The reality of Greece’s two currencies is the most vivid demonstration yet of the fragmentation of Europe’s monetary “union.”	希腊两种货币的现实是欧洲货币“联盟”的碎片化的最生动演示。


In comparison, Arizona has never looked so good.	相比之下，亚利桑那州简直是人间天堂。


The Endgame in Greece	希腊的终局


PARIS – After months of wrangling, the showdown between Greece and its European creditors has come down to a standoff over pensions and taxes.	巴黎—在经历了几个月的争吵后，希腊及其欧洲债权人之间的摊牌最终可以归结为关于退休金和税收问题的僵局。


Greece is refusing to acquiesce to demands by its creditors that it cut payments to the elderly and raise the value-added tax on their medicine and electricity.	希腊拒绝顺从债权人的要求——削减退休金、增加医药和电力行业的增值税。


Europe’s demands – ostensibly aimed at ensuring that Greece can service its foreign debt – are petulant, naive, and fundamentally self-destructive.	欧洲的要求——似乎是为了确保希腊能够维持其外债——“任性”而天真，从根本上说是自我毁灭性的。


In rejecting them, the Greeks are not playing games; they are trying to stay alive.	希腊拒绝这些要求不是在博弈，而是在求生。


Whatever one might say about Greece’s past economic policies, its uncompetitive economy, its decision to join the eurozone, or the errors that European banks made when they provided its government with excessive credit, the country’s economic plight is stark.	不管你怎么看希腊过去的经济政策、其竞争力低下的经济、其加入欧元区的决定还是欧洲银行向其政府提供过多信用的错误，希腊的经济窘况十分尖锐。


Unemployment stands at 25%.	失业高达25%。


Youth unemployment is at 50%.	年轻人失业更是高达50%。


Greece’s GDP, moreover, has shrunk by 25% since the start of the crisis in 2009.	此外，自2009年危机开始以来，希腊GDP收缩了25%。


Its government is insolvent.	希腊政府已经资不抵债。


Many of its citizens are hungry.	许多希腊公民处于饥饿状态。


Conditions in Greece today are reminiscent of those in Germany in 1933.	希腊的情况让人想起了1933年的德国。


Of course, the European Union need not fear the rise of a Greek Hitler, not only because it could easily crush such a regime, but also – and more important – because Greece’s democracy has proved impressively mature throughout the crisis.	当然，欧盟不必害怕希腊希特勒的崛起，因为它可以轻而易举地粉碎他，也因为——这是更重要的原因——在整个危机过程中希腊民主表现得十分成熟。


But there is something that the EU should fear: destitution within its borders and the pernicious consequences for the continent’s politics and society.	但也有欧盟应该害怕的东西：欧盟边界内出现赤贫之国，以及这对欧洲大陆政治和社会所造成的恶劣影响。


Unfortunately, the continent remains split along tribal lines.	不幸的是，欧洲大陆正在分裂为几个阵营。


Germans, Finns, Slovaks, and Dutch – among others – have no time for the suffering of Greeks.	德国人、芬兰人、斯洛伐克人和荷兰人——以及其他人——对希腊人的苦难毫无兴趣。


Their political leaders tend to their own, not to Europe in any true sense.	他们的政治领袖永远只关心自己人，从来都没有真正对欧洲问题上过心。


Relief for Greece is an especially fraught issue in countries where far-right parties are on the rise or center-right governments face popular left-wing opposition.	在极右翼政党崛起或中右翼政府面临汹涌的左翼群众反对的国家，救希腊是一个特别不讨好的问题。


To be sure, European politicians are not blind to what is happening in Greece.	平心而论，欧洲政客绝非没有看到希腊正在发生什么。


Nor have they been completely passive.	他们也并不全然对此抱有消极态度。


At the beginning of the crisis, Greece’s European creditors eschewed debt relief and charged punitive interest rates on bailout funds.	危机伊始，希腊的欧洲债权人没有实施债务纾困，对援助资金要求极高的利率。


But, as Greeks’ suffering intensified, policymakers pressed private-sector banks and other bondholders to write off most of their claims.	但是，随着希腊灾难的加剧，决策者要求私有银行和其他债券持有人减记了大部分债权。


At each stage of the crisis, they have done only what they believed their national politics would bear – no more.	在危机的各阶段，他们都只做到了他们认为国内政治允许他们做的事——仅此而已。


In particular, Europe’s politicians are balking at steps that would implicate taxpayers directly.	特别是，欧洲政客在回避可能直接牵涉纳税人的措施。


The Greek government has asked Europe to swap existing debts with new debts to lock in low interest rates and long maturities.	希腊政府要求欧洲用新债替换旧债，以锁定低利率和长期限。


It has also requested that interest payments be linked to economic growth.	它还要求利息支付与经济增长挂钩。


(It has notably not asked for cuts in the face value of its debt).	（值得关注的是，它没有要求减少债务的面值）。


But debt relief of this sort vis-à-vis European governments or the European Central Bank has been kept off the table.	但这类债务纾困方案与欧洲政府或欧洲央行之争从未得到讨论。


Such measures would likely require parliamentary votes in countries across the eurozone, where many governments would face intense public opposition – no matter how obvious the need.	这些措施可能要求欧元区各国议会的表决，而许多国家政府将面对公众反对——无论需求是多么显著。


Rather than confront the political obstacles, Europe’s leaders are hiding behind a mountain of pious, nonsensical rhetoric.	欧洲领导���没有直面这些政治障碍，而是用毫无意义的坦诚之辞虚与委蛇。


Some insist that Greece finish its payment program, regardless of the humanitarian and economic consequences – not to mention the failure of all previous Greek governments to meet its terms.	一些人坚持希腊必须完成偿付，不管这样会造成怎样的伤害和经济后果——全然不顾此前诸任希腊政府都没有满足这一要求。


Others pretend to worry about the moral-hazard implications of debt relief, despite the fact that the country’s private-sector debt has already been written off at EU insistence, and that there are dozens, if not hundreds, of precedents for restructuring the debts of insolvent sovereigns.	其他人装作假装担心债务纾困的道德风险问题，尽管事实上希腊私人部门债务已经在欧盟的要求下被减记，而破产主权债务重组也有几十上百次先例。


Almost a century ago, at World War I’s end, John Maynard Keynes offered a warning that holds great relevance today.	近一个世纪前，一战结束时，凯恩斯曾经发出过直至今日仍有重大意义的警告。


Then, as now, creditor countries (mainly the US) were demanding that deeply indebted countries make good on their debts.	当时——现在也是如此——的债权国（主要是美国）要求负担沉重的债务国履行债务义务。


Keynes knew that a tragedy was in the making.	凯恩斯知道，这是在酝酿悲剧。


“Will the discontented peoples of Europe be willing for a generation to come so to order their lives that an appreciable part of their daily produce may be available to meet a foreign payment?” he asked in The Economic Consequences of the Peace.	“不满的欧洲民族会愿意牺牲一代人，让他们拿出日常收入的相当大一部分用于偿还外债吗？ ”他在《和平的经济后果》（The Economic Consequences of the Peace）中问道。


“In short, I do not believe that any of these tributes will continue to be paid, at the best, for more than a few years.”	“简言之，我认为这些债务最多只能维持几年，此后就不会得到偿付。 ”


Several European countries now seem content to force Greece into an outright default and provoke its exit from the euro.	如今，一些欧洲国家似乎十分愿意强迫希腊直接违约、驱使它退出欧元。


They believe that the fallout can be contained without panic or contagion.	它们认为这样所造成的后果可以得到遏制而不会引起恐慌或传染。


That is typical wishful thinking among politicians.	这是政客常有的一厢情愿。


Indeed, it is the type of heedlessness that led US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to let Lehman Brothers fail in September 2008, ostensibly to teach the market a “lesson.”	事实上，正是如此掉以轻心导致美国财政部长保尔森（Hank Paulson）放任雷曼兄弟公司在2008年9月倒闭——表面上是为了给市场一个“教训”。


Some lesson; we are still digging out from Paulson’s monumental mistake.	是有一些教训； 我们仍在保尔森所挖的大坑中苦苦挣扎。


Similarly, Keynes watched in horror as economic policymakers blundered repeatedly in the years following WWI, through the upheavals of the 1920s, and into the Great Depression of the 1930s.	类似地，凯恩斯惊恐地目睹一战后决策者的一错再错，先是20世纪20年代的剧烈动荡，然后是30年代的大萧条。


In 1925, Keynes criticized the insouciance of those “who sit in the top tier of the machine.”	1925年，凯恩斯批评“居庙堂之高者”的漫不经心。


He argued “that they are immensely rash in their regardlessness, in their vague optimism and comfortable belief that nothing really serious ever happens.	他指出，“他们普遍鲁莽，不顾一切，抱着模糊不清的乐观，心安理得地认为从未有真正严重的问题发生。


Nine times out of ten, nothing really serious does happen – merely a little distress to individuals or to groups.	十有八九，确实没有真正严重的问题发生——只是个人或群体的小不幸。


But we run a risk of the tenth time…”	但我们有可能遇到十之一二……”


Today, Greece’s European creditors seem ready to abandon their solemn pledges on the irrevocability of the euro in order to insist on collecting some crumbs from the country’s pensioners.	如今，希腊的欧洲债权人似乎准备放弃他们的庄严承诺——不容废除欧元，而这样做只是为了坚持要求从希腊退休者手中抢点小钱。


Should they press their demands, forcing Greece to exit, the world will never again trust the euro’s longevity.	如果他们坚决要求，迫使希腊退出欧元，那么世界再也不会信任欧元能够长期存在。


At a minimum, the eurozone’s weaker members will undergo increased market pressures.	至少欧元区弱势成员国将面临市场压力增加。


In the worst case, they will be hit by a new vicious circle of panic and bank runs, also derailing the incipient European recovery.	在最糟糕的情形中，它们将遭遇新的恐慌和银行挤兑恶性循环，扼杀刚刚露出萌芽的欧洲复苏。


With Russia testing Europe’s resolve to the east, the timing of Europe’s gamble could not be worse.	俄罗斯正在考验欧洲的东进决心，欧洲的这场豪赌不可不谓不逢时。


The Greek government is right to have drawn the line.	希腊政府划清界线的做法是正确的。


It has a responsibility to its citizens.	它需要为其公民负责。


The real choice, after all, lies not with Greece, but with Europe.	毕竟，真正的选择不在于希腊，而在于欧洲。


A Greek Morality Tale	希腊道德神话


NEW YORK – When the euro crisis began a half-decade ago, Keynesian economists predicted that the austerity that was being imposed on Greece and the other crisis countries would fail.	纽约—五年前，当欧元危机爆发时，凯恩斯主义经济学家预测强加给希腊和其他危机国的紧缩措施将以失败告终。


It would stifle growth and increase unemployment – and even fail to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio.	紧缩将扼杀增长、增加失业——甚至无法降低债务-GDP比率。


Others – in the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and a few universities – talked of expansionary contractions.	其他人——欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和一些大学中的人——大谈扩张性收缩（expansionary contractions）。


But even the International Monetary Fund argued that contractions, such as cutbacks in government spending, were just that – contractionary.	但即使是国际货币基金组织（IMF）也指出，收缩——比如政府支出的缩减——只能是收缩性的。


We hardly needed another test.	我们不需要其他验证了。


Austerity had failed repeatedly, from its early use under US President Herbert Hoover, which turned the stock-market crash into the Great Depression, to the IMF “programs” imposed on East Asia and Latin America in recent decades.	紧缩一再失败，从美国总统胡佛的早期尝试（将股市崩盘变成了大萧条），到近几十年来IMF给东亚和拉美制定的“计划”莫不如此。


And yet when Greece got into trouble, it was tried again.	而当希腊陷入麻烦时，我们又一次祭出了紧缩。


Greece largely succeeded in following the dictate set by the “troika” (the European Commission the ECB, and the IMF): it converted a primary budget deficit into a primary surplus.	希腊在遵循“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）所制定的政策方面相当成功：其初级预算已从赤字转为盈余。


But the contraction in government spending has been predictably devastating: 25% unemployment, a 22% fall in GDP since 2009, and a 35% increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.	但政府支出的收缩不出意料地产生了灾难性后果：失业率高达25%，GDP从2009年以来减少22%，债务-GDP比率增加35%。


And now, with the anti-austerity Syriza party’s overwhelming election victory, Greek voters have declared that they have had enough.	而如今，随着反紧缩的左翼联盟（Syriza）在大选中赢得压倒性胜利，希腊选民终于表示他们受够了。


So, what is to be done?	那么，应该做些什么呢？


First, let us be clear: Greece could be blamed for its troubles if it were the only country where the troika’s medicine failed miserably.	首先，我们需要搞清楚，如果它是唯一一个三级马车的药方遭遇惨败的国家，那么它的麻烦完全是咎由自取。


But Spain had a surplus and a low debt ratio before the crisis, and it, too, is in depression.	但西班牙在危机前存在盈余和低债务比率，而如今它也陷入了萧条。


What is needed is not structural reform within Greece and Spain so much as structural reform of the eurozone’s design and a fundamental rethinking of the policy frameworks that have resulted in the monetary union’s spectacularly bad performance.	现在，与其说需要在希腊和西班牙内部采取结构改革，不如说欧元区的设计需要结构改革，并且还需要反思导致这一货币联盟表现如此拙劣的政策框架。


Greece has also once again reminded us of how badly the world needs a debt-restructuring framework.	希腊也再次提醒我们有多么需要债务重组框架。


Excessive debt caused not only the 2008 crisis, but also the East Asia crisis in the 1990s and the Latin American crisis in the 1980s.	过度负债不但导致了2008年危机，20世纪90年代的东亚危机和80年代的拉美危机也是拜过度负债所赐。


It continues to cause untold suffering in the US, where millions of homeowners have lost their homes, and is now threatening millions more in Poland and elsewhere who took out loans in Swiss francs.	过度负债还在继续造成美国难以名状的痛苦，数百万屋主失去了房子，而数百万波兰和其他国家背负着瑞士法郎贷款的人目前也是危如累卵。


Given the amount of distress brought about by excessive debt, one might well ask why individuals and countries have repeatedly put themselves into this situation.	过度负债呆滞的痛苦是如此巨大，我们应该好好问问为何个人和国家一再放任自己陷入这一局面。


After all, such debts are contracts – that is, voluntary agreements – so creditors are just as responsible for them as debtors.	毕竟，这些债务都是契约——也就是说，是自愿签订的协议——因此债权人的责任并不小于与债务人。


In fact, creditors arguably are more responsible: typically, they are sophisticated financial institutions, whereas borrowers frequently are far less attuned to market vicissitudes and the risks associated with different contractual arrangements.	事实上，债权人理应承担更大的责任：通常它们是成熟的金融机构，而借款人常常不太适应市场的变幻莫测以及与不同契约安排有关的风险。


Indeed, we know that US banks actually preyed on their borrowers, taking advantage of their lack of financial sophistication.	事实上，我们知道，美国银行实际上在利用借款人缺乏金融知识而掠夺他们。


Every (advanced) country has realized that making capitalism work requires giving individuals a fresh start.	所有（发达）国家都认识到，让资本主义正常运转需要能够让个人重新开始。


The debtors’ prisons of the nineteenth century were a failure – inhumane and not exactly helping to ensure repayment.	十九世纪的债务人监狱是一场失败——既不人道，也没有帮助确保偿还。


What did help was to provide better incentives for good lending, by making creditors more responsible for the consequences of their decisions.	确实有帮助的是通过让债权人为它们的决定的后果承担更大责任来提供优质贷款的激励。


At the international level, we have not yet created an orderly process for giving countries a fresh start.	在国际层面，我们尚未建立让国家重新开始的有序过程。


Since even before the 2008 crisis, the United Nations, with the support of almost all of the developing and emerging countries, has been seeking to create such a framework.	2008年前，联合国在几乎所有发展中和新兴国家的支持下，已经开始寻求建立这一框架。


But the US has been adamantly opposed; perhaps it wants to reinstitute debtor prisons for over indebted countries’ officials (if so, space may be opening up at Guantánamo Bay).	但美国一直顽固反对； 也许它是想给债务国官员重建债务人监狱（果真如此的话，大概会建在关塔那摩吧）。


The idea of bringing back debtors’ prisons may seem far-fetched, but it resonates with current talk of moral hazard and accountability.	重建债务人监狱的思想也许有些牵强附会，但它与目前关于道德风险和问责的讨论异曲同工。


There is a fear that if Greece is allowed to restructure its debt, it will simply get itself into trouble again, as will others.	有人担心，如果允许希腊重组其债务，它将再一次陷入麻烦，其他国家亦然。


This is sheer nonsense.	这纯熟无稽之谈。


Does anyone in their right mind think that any country would willingly put itself through what Greece has gone through, just to get a free ride from its creditors?	如果你脑子正常过，你认为会有国家愿意让自己走希腊的老路，只是为了从债权人那里获得免费的午餐？


If there is a moral hazard, it is on the part of the lenders – especially in the private sector – who have been bailed out repeatedly.	如果存在道德风险，也是在反复得到援助的贷款人这一侧——特别是私人部门。


If Europe has allowed these debts to move from the private sector to the public sector – a well-established pattern over the past half-century – it is Europe, not Greece, that should bear the consequences.	如果欧洲允许这些债务从私人部门转移到公共部门——过去半个世纪都是这么做的——那么是欧洲而不是希腊应该承受后果。


Indeed, Greece’s current plight, including the massive run-up in the debt ratio, is largely the fault of the misguided troika programs foisted on it.	事实上，希腊目前的窘境，包括债务比率的大幅上升，主要是三驾马车对它试驾了错误的措施导致的。


So it is not debt restructuring, but its absence, that is “immoral.”	因此，不是债务重组，而是缺少债务重组，才是“不道德”的。


There is nothing particularly special about the dilemmas that Greece faces today; many countries have been in the same position.	目前希腊所面临的困境没有什么特别之处； 许多国家都面临过类似的情景。


What makes Greece’s problems more difficult to address is the structure of the eurozone: monetary union implies that member states cannot devalue their way out of trouble, yet the modicum of European solidarity that must accompany this loss of policy flexibility simply is not there.	让希腊问题更加难以解决的是欧元区的结构：货币联盟意味着成员国无法通过贬值摆脱困境，补偿这一政策灵活度损失只需要些许欧洲团结精神，但这一精神却不存在。


Seventy years ago, at the end of World War II, the Allies recognized that Germany must be given a fresh start.	七十年前，二战刚刚结束时，盟国认识到德国需要被允许重新开始。


They understood that Hitler’s rise had much to do with the unemployment (not the inflation) that resulted from imposing more debt on Germany at the end of World War I. The Allies did not take into account the foolishness with which the debts had been accumulated or talk about the costs that Germany had imposed on others.	它们明白，希特勒的崛起在很大程度上与一战结束时向德国施加更多债务所导致的失业（而不是通胀）有关。 盟国没有考虑导致债务累积的愚蠢政策，也没有讨论德国给其他国家造成了多大的代价。


Instead, they not only forgave the debts; they actually provided aid, and the Allied troops stationed in Germany provided a further fiscal stimulus.	相反，它们不但豁免了债务； 事实上还提供了援助，驻扎在德国的盟军提供了进一步的财政刺激。


When companies go bankrupt, a debt-equity swap is a fair and efficient solution.	当公司破产时，债务-股本交换是一个公平高效的解决方案。


The analogous approach for Greece is to convert its current bonds into GDP-linked bonds.	希腊也可以采取类似办法：将其现有债券转换为GDP挂钩债券。


If Greece does well, its creditors will receive more of their money; if it does not, they will get less.	如果希腊表现出色，其债权人可以获得更多的钱； 否则只能获得更少的钱。


Both sides would then have a powerful incentive to pursue pro-growth policies.	这样，双方都有追求亲增长政策的强大激励。


Seldom do democratic elections give as clear a message as that in Greece.	民主选举很少能像希腊的例子那样给出如此明确的信号。


If Europe says no to Greek voters’ demand for a change of course, it is saying that democracy is of no importance, at least when it comes to economics.	如果欧洲对希腊选民改变政策的要求说“不”，就无异于表示民主毫无重要性可言，至少在经济上毫无重要性。


Why not just shut down democracy, as Newfoundland effectively did when it entered into receivership before World War II?	为何不干脆取消民主，就像纽芬兰在二战前进入破产接管时所作的那样？


One hopes that those who understand the economics of debt and austerity, and who believe in democracy and humane values, will prevail.	我们希望理解债务和紧缩经济学，并且相信民主和人道价值的人能够胜出。


Whether they will remains to be seen.	是否会如此，仍需拭目以待。


The Economic Consequences of Greece	希腊退出的经济机会


TILTON – The first sentence of the 1957 Treaty of Rome – the founding document of what would eventually become the European Union – calls for “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe."	蒂尔顿—1957年罗马条约（Treaty of Rome，最终形成欧盟的基本文件）的第一句话呼吁建立“一个欧洲各民族间更加紧密的联盟”。


Recently, however, that ideal has come under threat, undermined by its own political elite, which adopted a common currency while entirely neglecting the underlying fault lines.	但是，最近，这一理想陷入了危险，而危险的制造者正是其自身的政治精英，他们采取了共同货币，却完全忽视了地下的断层线。


Today, those cracks have been exposed – and widened – by the seemingly never-ending Greek crisis.	如今，这些裂缝因为没完没了的希腊危机而暴露并且扩大。


And nowhere are they more evident than in Greece's relationship with the International Monetary Fund.	而最显而易见的莫过于希腊与国际货币基金组织（IMF）的关系了。


When the euro crisis erupted in 2010, European officials realized that they lacked the necessary expertise to manage the threat of sovereign defaults and the potential breakup of the monetary union.	2010年，当欧元危机爆发时，欧洲官员发现他们缺少必要的专业性管理主权违约风险和货币联盟的解体可能。


For EU officials, avoiding the eurozone's collapse became the top political imperative, so they turned to the IMF for help.	对欧盟官员来说，避免欧元区崩溃成为首要政治人物，因此他们向IMF寻求帮助。


The irregularities in the Fund's resulting intervention attest to how serious the eurozone's problems were – and continue to be.	IMF应求干预，期间的违规行为体现出欧元区危机有多严重，未来又会如何。


For starters, the IMF's Articles of Agreement require it to interact only with entities that are fully accountable for the help received: a member country's “treasury, central bank, stabilization fund, or other similar fiscal agency."	首先，IMF协定条款要求它只能在受助实体���受充分问责的情况下才能干预：成员国的“财政部、央行、稳定基金或其他类似财政机构”。


But the institutions with which the IMF is dealing in the eurozone are no longer responsible for their country's macroeconomic management; that power lies with the European Central Bank.	但IMF在欧元区所面对的机构并不对国家宏观经济管理负责； 该权力掌握在欧洲央行手中。


In lending to Greece, it is as if the Fund had lent to a sub-national unit, such as a provincial or city government, without insisting on repayment guarantees from the national authorities.	在对希腊的贷款中，IMF好像是在借钱给准国家单位（如省级或市级政府），而没有要求国家当局做出偿付担保。


Another problem is the sheer magnitude of the Fund's intervention.	另一个问题是IMF干预的成都。


The size of the Greek debt necessitated lending on a scale far exceeding what other countries could expect.	希腊债务的规模使得贷款数额远远超过了其他国家的预期。


The “exceptional access" to IMF resources granted to Greece in 2010 was set at a “cumulative limit of 600%" of the country's IMF quota, a measure of a country's financial commitment to the IMF.	2010年希腊所获得的IMF资源“特殊待遇”为“累计不超过”该国IMF份额（其对IMF的金融承担额）的600%。


Instead, in April 2013, cumulative financing was programmed to peak at 3,212% of Greece's quota.	而在2013年4月，累计融资已经达到希腊份额的3,212%。


The reason the IMF had to take on such huge exposure was Europe's initial refusal to contemplate debt reduction for Greece, owing to the authorities' fear that financial contagion would overwhelm the eurozone's firewall-free banking system.	IMF不得不在希腊身上投入如此之巨是因为欧洲一开始考虑减记希腊债务，因为欧洲当局担心由此造成的金融传染影响没有防火墙保护的欧元区银行系统。


That decision resulted in uncertainty about the currency union's capacity to resolve the crisis and aggravated the contraction in Greek output.	这一决定造成了货币联盟解决危机的不确定性，也加剧了希腊的产出下滑。


When a debt-restructuring agreement was finally reached in 2012, it provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposure by offloading their residual claims onto taxpayers.	2012年，当债务重组协议最终达成时，又给了私人债权人将剩余债权转嫁给纳税人以降低风险敞口的窗口。


Initially, the IMF took the official position that Greek debt was sustainable.	一开始，IMF的官方立场是希腊债务可持续。


But IMF staff knew otherwise.	但IMF员工知道并非如此。


In 2013, the Fund admitted that its analysts knew that Greece's debt was not sustainable, but decided to go ahead with the program “because of the fear that spillovers from Greece would threaten the euro area and the global economy."	2013年，IMF承认其分析师知道希腊债务不可持续，但仍决定按原计划行事，“因为害怕希腊的溢出效应威胁欧元区和全球经济”。


In addition, from November 2010 to April 2013, the IMF revised downward its forecast for 2014 Greek nominal GDP by 27%.	此外，从2010年11月至2013年4月，IMF将其2014年希腊名义GDP预测向下修正了27%。


This cast doubt on the transparency and accountability of the Fund's debt-sustainability projections.	这一系列动作让人质疑IMF债务持续性预测的透明性和可问责性。


The implication is shocking: the IMF was unable to provide a credible framework for the adjustment that Greece would have to make.	影响是震撼的：IMF无法提供可信的框架计算希腊必须做出的调整。


This background provides crucial context for the ongoing negotiations, for it reveals that the aim of the Greek bailout was not to restore prosperity to the country's people, but to save the eurozone.	这就是目前仍在进行的谈判的关键背景，因为它表明希腊援助的目的不是为了为希腊人民重塑繁荣，而是为了拯救欧元区。


Given this, the new Greek government is entirely justified in questioning the terms that the country was given.	基于此，希腊新政府质疑其所获条件是完全合理的。


The agreements previous administrations made will certainly reduce the range of policies available to the new government, especially with respect to debt reduction, which would require a unilateral default and withdrawal from the eurozone.	此前的诸任政府所达成的协议显然制约了新政府政策的可行范围，特别是债务减记问题。 减记债务需要单方面违约并退出欧元区。


But a democratically elected government need not be bound by its predecessors' commitments, and this is doubly true in the wake of an election that was a referendum on those very policies.	但民主选举的政府必须要受其前任的承诺的约束，考虑到此次选举无异于对这些政策的公投就更加如此了。


Ultimatums from unelected institutions that have compromised their own legitimacy have inflamed anti-EU sentiment across the continent.	来自非选举产生因此自身合法性有疑问的机构的最后通牒点燃了整个欧洲大陆的反欧盟情绪。


The single worst outcome of the current negotiations would be Greece's submission to its creditors' demands, with few concessions in return.	当前谈判的最糟糕结果将是希腊屈从于债券人的要求，而债权人对希腊的要求充耳不闻。


Such a result would fuel greater public support for anti-EU parties and movements elsewhere, and would amount to a missed opportunity for Greece and Europe.	这一结果将让更多的人支持其他地区的反欧盟政党和运动，并会让希腊和欧洲错失良机。


That opportunity is default and exit from the eurozone, which would allow Greece to begin correcting past mistakes and putting its economy on the path to recovery and sustainable growth.	这个良机就是违约并退出欧元区，这样能使希腊得以开始纠正过去的错误，让经济走上复苏和可持续增长之路。


At that point, the EU would be wise to follow suit, by unraveling the currency union and providing debt reduction for its most distressed economies.	到那时，欧盟的明智做法是跟进，解散货币联盟，为最困难的经济体提供债务减记。


Only then can the EU's founding ideals be realized.	惟其如此，欧盟的基本理想才能实现。


Why Greece is Different	为何希腊如此特殊?


BRUSSELS – The seemingly interminable negotiations between the new Greek government and its international creditors – the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission – on a new loan deal have entered a dangerous phase.	发自布鲁塞尔——希腊新政府和其国际债权人——世界货币基金组织，欧洲央行以及欧盟委员会——之间看似永无止境的新贷款协议谈判已经进入了一个危险的阶段。


At this point, a mistake on either side threatens to trigger the kind of accident that could precipitate a new crisis in Europe.	在这个结骨眼上，可能由任何一方犯下的错误都将欧洲拖入一场新的危机。


The IMF seems ready to throw in the towel – not least because of the recent revelation that Greece could post a small primary budget deficit (which excludes interest payments) this year, rather than the planned sizeable surplus.	国际货币基金组织似乎已经准备好退出谈判——不仅因为最近披露希腊将在今年出现小规模基本预算赤字（将利息支付款排除在外），而非原计划的大规模盈余。


But, with Greece’s economy tanking again, its government is convinced that the current repayment program is not working – and that, in the absence of significant adjustments, it never will.	更因为随着希腊经济再次下滑，该国政府认定现有的偿付计划是无用的——当然在缺乏大规模经济结构调整的情况下，该计划永远都不会起作用。


Fundamental to Greece’s case for new bailout terms is the narrative – reinforced by its current economic travails – that it has been a victim of excessive austerity.	而阻碍希腊新援助条款的最根本原因就是其自身认知——并由其当前的经济困局不断强化——认为该国是过度紧缩政策的牺牲品。


But this neglects a crucial fact: austerity worked in Europe’s other crisis-hit countries.	但这忽视了一个关键的事实：紧缩政策对其他受危机冲击的欧洲国家是起作用的。


Indeed, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and even Cyprus are showing clear signs of recovery, with unemployment finally falling (albeit slowly and from high levels) and access to capital markets restored.	事实上，爱尔兰，西班牙甚至塞浦路斯都呈现出明确的复苏迹象，失业率终于开始下降（虽然缓慢并从高位下行），从资本市场融资的渠道也得到了恢复。


Why is Greece different?	那为何希腊就如此特殊?


The short answer is exports.	简单回答就是出口的问题。


In all of the other crisis-hit countries (and, indeed, in most of the dozens of countries that have received IMF loans in recent decades), rising exports offset, at least partly, the hit that demand took when their governments slashed spending and raised taxes to balance their books.	在其他所有受到危机冲击的国家（事实上，是近几十年来接受受过国际货币基金组织援助贷款的那几十个国家中的大多数），出口的增幅——至少在某种程度上——都能抵消本国政府为实现收支平衡而削减支出以及加税所导致的需求下滑。


Of course, in a large economy where external financing is not a problem, as in the United States or the eurozone, attempting to reduce a budget deficit could conceivably lead to such a large decline in demand (and thus tax revenues) that austerity becomes self-defeating.	当然，对于那些外部融资不成问题的大型经济体（比如美国或者欧元区）来说，尝试减少预算赤字必将导致需求（以及税收收入）大规模下滑，让紧缩政策对自身不利。


But this argument does not apply to Greece.	但这一情节并不适用于希腊。


In fact, Greece was running very large current-account deficits – exceeding 10% of GDP – when external financing dried up suddenly in 2008-2009, forcing an adjustment in domestic spending.	事实上，在2008至2009年间外部融资突然断流的时候，希腊就已经存在着非常庞大的经常账户赤字——规模超过GDP的10%以上，迫使其对国内支出进行调整。


If the Greek government had not made such an adjustment, domestic demand and employment would certainly have remained higher – but so would imports and large external deficits.	如果希腊政府当时没有进行这一调整，国内需求和就业率当然也会维持高位——但进口和庞大的外部赤字也会不断上升。


So, while austerity did cause a deep recession, it enabled Greece to avoid large external deficits, thereby reducing the size of the bailout the country needed.	因此虽然紧缩政策确实造成了深层次的衰退，但它令希腊得以避免出现庞大的外部赤字，因此也减少了该国所需的援助规模。


Export performance is thus the key to escaping the austerity trap.	因此出口表现就是摆脱紧缩陷阱的关键。


The problem for Greece is that what little export growth it has experienced lately is largely illusory, as it has come mostly from petroleum products.	希腊的问题就是它随后所经历的小规模出口增长在很大程度上都是假象，因为主要来自于石油产品。


Since Greece does not produce oil, this can mean only that Greek refiners, which now have considerable excess capacity, are simply exporting imported crude oil in a slightly different form.	由于希腊并非产油国，所以这只能来自于希腊的炼油厂——这些厂如今已经严重产能过剩，而它们也只是将进口的原油稍微加工后再次出口而已。


With refinery margins typically less than 5%, the economy is gaining little added value from these exports.	由于这些炼油厂的毛利基本上低于5%，所以整个经济也只能从这些出口中获得极少的附加价值。


Other exports that have increased, such as metals, raise a similar problem.	其他有所增长的出口项目，比如金属，也存在着同样的问题。


Moreover, Greece’s largest services export, maritime shipping, has few real links with the rest of the economy, given that companies in the sector pay no taxes and employ few Greeks (the crews hail from low-wage countries).	此外，海运这个希腊最大的服务业出口项目与经济体的其他部分并没有多少实际关联，因为该部门的企业无需缴税并只雇佣了很少希腊人（船员大多从低工资国家招募）。


Undermining the sector’s economic contribution further is the fact that global commodity prices, on which shipping rates depend, have lately been declining.	而进一步减少该部门经济贡献的则是制定船运费用所依据的全球商品价格最近不断下滑。


Meanwhile, manufactured goods, which do add domestic value and employment, form only a small share of Greece’s overall exports.	与此同时，那些确实对国内附加值和就业有所贡献的制造业产品则只占希腊总体出口的一小部分。


In fact, Greece’s total foreign trade, if properly measured, amounts to only 12% of its GDP, much less than what one would expect from such a small economy.	事实上，在合理计算的情况下，希腊的对外贸易总额仅相当于其GDP的12%，远远小于这类小型经济体应有的规模。


More jarring is the fact that Greece’s total trade deficit (including both goods and services), was even higher in 2008, amounting to 13% of GDP, implying that, in order to avoid a subsequent decline in imports and thus in domestic demand, exports would have had to more than double.	更令人困扰的则是希腊的总体贸易赤字（包括产品和服务）甚至比2008年时还更高，相当于GDP的13%，意味着如果要避免因此导致的出口下滑以及随之而来国内需求��滑，出口规模必须增加超过一倍。


In Portugal, by contrast, the trade deficit amounted to only about one-third of exports in 2008, meaning that exports had to increase by one-third to close the external deficit, without reducing imports.	相比之下，葡萄牙的贸易赤字仅相当于其2008年出口额的1/3，意味着在不削减进口的情况下，出口只需要增加1/3就能填补其外部赤字。


Since then, Portugal has increased exports cumulatively by more than one-quarter, so that, despite a slight increase in imports since 2007, it runs a trade surplus.	自那以后，葡萄牙的出口额逐渐增加了超过1/4，因此虽然自2007年以来进口额稍微有所增加，但该国依然实现了贸易顺差。


To be sure, Greece’s trade deficit has declined, but only because imports collapsed.	毫无疑问，希腊的贸易赤字有所下降，但这只是因为进口崩溃了。


Meanwhile, exports stagnated, even as wages declined by more than 20%.	与此同时，出口却陷入了停滞，即便工资水平已经下跌了超过20%。


That, not austerity, is Greece’s real problem.	也正是这一情况，而非紧缩政策，给希腊带来了真正的麻烦。


If Greece had experienced the same growth in exports as Portugal (a country of similar size and per capita income), it would not have experienced such a deep recession, and tax revenues would have been higher, making it much easier for the government to achieve a primary budget surplus.	如果希腊能实现葡萄牙（一个与其体量和人均收入都相近的国家）那样的出口增长，它不会出现如此深层次的衰退，而税收收入也会更高，令其政府可以更容易地实现基本预算盈余。


This suggests that a combination of fiscal consolidation, lower wages, and export-oriented reforms could have enabled Greece to move toward a sustainable recovery.	这说明如果将财务巩固，低工资和出口导向型改革相结合，就能让希腊迈向一个更具可持续性的复苏。


This approach has been tried before, and it has failed only once, when Argentina had to default on its foreign debt in 2002 and break a decade-long 1:1 peg to the US dollar.	这一手段在过去已经进行了尝试，也只在2002年失败过一次，当时阿根廷被迫在其外债上实施违约并打破维持了10年的阿根廷比索对美元1:1汇率。


Unfortunately, Greece resembles Argentina in two key respects.	但不幸的，是希腊和阿根廷在两个关键方面非常相似。


Both countries have only a small export sector, which makes external adjustment much more difficult; and both have an export structure that is skewed toward commodities, the supply of which is unlikely to change much, even as structural reforms are pursued or wages decline.	两个国家的出口部门规模都相当小，使得外部调整更加艰难； 两国的出口结构及也更偏向商品，但即便实现了结构性的改革或是工资下调，商品的供应都不太可能出现大的变化。


Of course, this does not mean that Greece is doomed to follow in Argentina’s footsteps toward default.	当然这并不意味着希腊注定要步阿根廷违约的后尘。


But it does highlight the challenge that the country faces today – namely, to rebuild its export sector from the ground up.	但它确实点出了该国当前所面对的挑战——也就是要从零开始重建其出口部门。


It is time for Greece’s government to recognize this imperative and expand the scope of negotiations with its creditors to include not just the budget, but also strategies for stimulating exports.	希腊政府也是时候意识到这一要点并扩大与其债权人的谈判范围，不仅关于预算，还要包括刺激出口的策略。


But, first, Greece must finally recognize that austerity is not the enemy.	但首要的是，希腊必须最终认识到：紧缩政策不是自己的敌人。


Austerity Is Not Greece’s Problem	紧缩不是希腊的问题


CAMBRIDGE – When looking out a window, it is easy to be fooled by your own reflection and see more of yourself than the outside world.	美国剑桥—当你望向窗外时，很容易被你自己的影像所迷惑，比外部世界看到更多的你自己。


This seems to be the case when US observers, influenced by their own country's fiscal debate, look at Greece.	这似乎就是美国观察者在受到本国财政争论影响的情况下看希腊时的情景。


For example, Joseph Stiglitz regards austerity in Greece as a matter of ideological choice or bad economics, just like in the US.	比如，约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）认为希腊的紧缩是意识形态选择问题或坏经济学，与美国国内的情况一模一样。


According to this view, those who favor austerity must be obsessed with the theory, given the availability of a kinder, gentler alternative.	根据这一观点，支持紧缩者必然是沉迷于这一理论，因为有现成的更周到、更温和的替代方案可选。


Why would you ever vote for austerity when parties like Greece's Syriza or Spain's Podemos offer a pain-free path?	当希腊的左翼联盟（Syriza）和西班牙的社会民主党（Podemos）等政党提供了无痛苦路径时，你为何还要投票支持紧缩？


The question reflects a lamentable tendency to conflate two very different situations.	这一问题反映出一个可悲的趋势，即混淆两种截然不同的情况。


In the US, the issue was whether a government that could borrow at record-low interest rates, in the middle of a recession, should do so.	在美国，问题在于能够在危机期间以创纪录低的利率借贷的政府是否应该借贷。


By contrast, Greece piled up an enormous fiscal and external debt in boom times, until markets said “enough" in 2009.	相反，希腊在繁荣时期积累了巨大的财政和外部赤字，直到2009年市场对它说“够了”。


Greece was then given unprecedented amounts of highly subsidized finance to enable it to reduce gradually its excessive spending.	接着，希腊获得了前所未有数量的高补贴融资以使其能够逐渐削减过度支出。


But now, after so much European and global generosity, Stiglitz and other economists argue that some of Greece's debt must be forgiven to make room for more spending.	到目前为止，在获得了如此巨大的欧洲和全球的慷慨馈赠后，斯蒂格利茨和其他经济学家又说必须豁免一些希腊债务以使其拥有更多的支出空间。


But the truth is that the recession in Greece has little to do with an excessive debt burden.	但真相是希腊的衰退与过度债务负担没什么联系。


Until 2014, the country did not pay, in net terms, a single euro in interest: it borrowed enough from official sources at subsidized rates to pay 100% of its interest bill and then some.	2014年以前，从净值角度，该国从未偿还一个子儿的利息：它以补贴利率从官方资源借入了足够多的资金100%偿付利息还有余。


This situation supposedly changed a bit in 2014, the first year that the country made a small contribution to its interest bill, having run a primary surplus of barely 0.8% of GDP (or 0.5% of its debt of 170% of GDP).	这一情况据说在2014年略有改变，希腊第一次自讨腰包偿还了一点点利息，出现了大约相当于0. 8%的GDP的初级盈余（或相当于其占GDP的170%的债务的0.


Greece's experience highlights a truth about macroeconomic policy that is too often overlooked: The world is not dominated by austerians; on the contrary, most countries have trouble balancing their books.	希腊的经验彰显出一个常常被忽略的宏观经济政策真相：世界不是由紧缩派主宰的； 相反，大部分国家都存在平衡报表的麻烦。


Recent advances in behavioral economics show that we all have enormous problems with self-control.	行为经济学的最新进展表明我们都存在很大的自我控制问题。


And game theory explains why we act even more irresponsibly when making group decisions (owing to the so-called common pool problem).	博弈论则解释了为何我们在做集体决策时会变得更加不负责任（因为所谓的公共池塘问题）。


Fiscal deficits, like unwanted pregnancies, are the unintended consequence of actions taken by more than one person who had other objectives in mind.	财政赤字就像是计划外怀孕，是一种因为不止一个心怀其他目标的人的行为所造成的意料外后果。


And lack of fiscal control is what got Greece into trouble in the first place.	缺少财政控制是希腊陷入麻烦的原因。


So the problem is not that austerity was tried and failed in Greece.	因此问题不在于希腊尝试了紧缩但是失败了。


It is that, despite unprecedented international generosity, fiscal policy was completely out of control and needed major adjustments.	问题在于，尽管给予了前所未有的国际援助，但才政策仍然彻底失控，因此需要重大调整。


Insufficient spending was never an issue.	支出不足从来都不是问题。


From 1998 to 2007, Greece's annual per capita GDP growth averaged 3.8%, the second fastest in Western Europe, behind only Ireland.	从1998年到2007年，希腊年人均GDP增长平均为3. 8%，是西欧第二快的国家，仅次于爱尔兰。


But by 2007, Greece was spending more than 14% of GDP in excess of what it was producing, the largest such gap in Europe – more than twice that of Spain and 55% higher than Ireland's.	但到2007年，希腊支出超过产出部分是GDP的14%多，为欧洲之最——是西班牙的两倍，比爱尔兰也高出55%。


In Spain and Ireland, though, the gap reflected a construction boom; euro accession suddenly gave people access to much cheaper mortgages.	在西班牙和爱尔兰，这一差异体现的是建筑业繁荣； 使用欧元一夜之间让人们能够获得便宜得多的按揭。


In Greece, by contrast, the gap was mostly fiscal and used for consumption, not investment.	相反，在希腊，这一差异主要是财政赤字，大部分用在了消费而不是投资上。


Unsustainable growth paths often end in a sudden stop of capital inflows, forcing countries to bring their spending back in line with production.	不可持续的增长路径常常在资本流入的戛然而止中停止，迫使国家削减支出使之与生产相匹配。


In Greece, however, official lenders' unprecedented munificence made the adjustment more gradual than in, say, Latvia or Ireland.	但是，在希腊，官方贷款人的前所未有的慷慨让这一挑战来的比（比如）拉脱维亚和爱尔兰更加缓慢。


In fact, even after the so-called Greek Depression, its economy has grown more in per capita terms since 1998 than Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal.	事实上，即使在所谓的希腊大萧条后，1998年以来希腊经济人均GDP仍比塞浦路斯、丹麦、意大利和葡萄牙增长更多。


Sudden stops are always painful: economics has not discovered a hangover cure.	戛然而止永远是痛苦的：经济学从未找到宿醉灵药。


But the way to minimize the pain is to cut spending without cutting output, which requires selling to others what residents can no longer afford.	但让痛苦最小化的办法是削减支出但不削减产出，而这要求向其他国家出售居民不再负担得起的东西。


In other words, unless Greece boosts exports, spending cuts will amplify the output loss in the same way that Keynesian multipliers amplified the output gain from borrowing.	换句话说，除非希腊出口有所提振，否则支出削减只能加剧产出损失，一如凯恩斯乘数放大借贷所带来的产出增加。


The problem is that Greece produces very little of what the world wants to consume.	问题在于希腊生产的东西中很少有世界愿意买的。


Its exports of goods comprise mainly fruits, olive oil, raw cotton, tobacco, and some refined petroleum products.	其出口商品主要为水果、橄榄油、原棉、烟草和一些石化产品。


Germany, which many argue should spend more, imports just 0.2% of its goods from Greece.	许多人认为应该增加支出的德国只��0. 2%的商品自希腊进口。


Tourism is a mature industry with plenty of regional competitors.	旅游业是一个成熟的行业，地区竞争激烈。


The country produces no machines, electronics, or chemicals.	希腊不出产机械、电子和化工产品。


Of every $10 of world trade in information technology, Greece accounts for $0.01.	在信息技术全球贸易中，希腊所占比重更是只有0. 1%。


Greece never had the productive structure to be as rich as it was: its income was inflated by massive amounts of borrowed money that was not used to upgrade its productive capacity.	希腊从未拥有能让它曾经如此富裕的生产结构：其收入是用大量借款推起来的，而这笔借款本来可以用于升级其生产力。


According to the Atlas of Economic Complexity, which I co-authored, in 2008 the gap between Greece's income and the knowledge content of its exports was the largest among a sample of 128 countries.	我参与合著的《经济复杂性的阿特拉斯》（Atlas of Economic Complexity）一书指出，2008年希腊收入与其出口的只是成分之间的差距是128个样本国家中最大的。


Too much of the debate since then has focused on what Germany, the EU, or the International Monetary Fund must do.	此后的太多讨论聚焦于德国、欧盟或国际货币基金组织（IMF）必须做些什么。


But the bottom line is that Greece needs to develop its productive capabilities if it wants to grow.	但基本点是希腊如果想要增长，就必须发展自己的生产力。


The unfocused set of structural reforms prescribed by its current financing agreement will not do that.	当前融资协议中的无重点的结构改革计划做不到这一点。


Instead, Greece should concentrate on activist policies that attract globally competitive firms, an area where Ireland has much to teach – and where Stiglitz has sensible things to say.	相反，希腊应该集中于吸引拥有全球竞争力的企业的积极主义政策，在这方面爱尔兰可以提供很多指导 ，斯蒂格利茨也有很多明智的观点。


Unfortunately, this is not what many Greeks (or Spaniards) believe.	不幸的是，许多希腊人（或西班牙人）不这么认为。


A large plurality of them voted for Syriza, which wants to reallocate resources to wage increases and subsidies and does not even mention exports in its growth strategy.	他们中的绝大多数把票投给了左翼联盟。 左翼联盟想重新配置资源，将资源用于提高工资和补贴，在其增长战略中甚至没有提到出口。


They would be wise to remember that having Stiglitz as a cheerleader and Podemos as advisers did not save Venezuela from its current hyper-inflationary catastrophe.	他们最好想一想，以斯蒂格利茨为吹鼓手、社会民主党为顾问的委内瑞拉并没有逃脱目前的恶性通胀灾难。


Greece is Playing to Lose	希腊的败着


LONDON – The future of Europe now depends on something apparently impossible: Greece and Germany must strike a deal.	伦敦—如今，欧洲的未来取决于显然不现实的东西：希腊和德国必须达成协议。


What makes such a deal seem impossible is not the principled opposition of the two governments – Greece has demanded a debt reduction, while Germany has insisted that not a euro of debt can be written off – but something more fundamental: while Greece is obviously the weaker party in this conflict, it has far more at stake.	让希腊和德国不可能达成协议的不是两国政府坚守的立场——希腊要求债务削减，而德国坚持不会削减一个子儿的债务——而是更加基本的东西：希腊是这场冲突中显而易见的弱方，但它在其中的利害关系也要严重得多。


Game theory suggests that some of the most unpredictable conflicts are between a weak, but determined, combatant and a strong opponent with much less commitment.	博弈论表明，最不可预测的冲突是那种坚毅的弱方与坚定程度远远不如它的强方之间的冲突。


In these scenarios, the most stable outcome tends to be a draw in which both sides are partly satisfied.	在这一情境中，最稳定的结果总是双方都部分满意的平局。


In the Greek-German confrontation, it is easy, at least in theory, to design such a positive-sum game.	在希腊-德国冲突中，至少理论上很容易设计出这样一个正和博弈。


All we must do is ignore political rhetoric and focus on the economic outcomes that the protagonists really want.	我们所需要做的只是忽略政治说辞，专注于双方真正想要的经济结果。


Germany is determined to resist any debt write-offs.	德国决心抵制任何债务减记计划。


For German voters, this objective matters much more than the details of Greek structural reforms.	对德国选民来说，这一目标比希腊结构改革的细节重要得多。


Greece, for its part, is determined to gain relief from the punitive and counter-productive austerity imposed on it, at Germany’s insistence, by the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund).	至于希腊，它决心要获得对其惩罚性的、不利与生产的紧缩的减免。 紧缩是在德国的坚持下由“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织）实施的。


For Greek voters, this objective matters much more than detailed calculations about the net present value of national debt in 30 years.	对希腊选民来说，这一目标比详细计算30年后国民债务的净现值重要得多。


A deal should be easily negotiable if both sides concentrate on their top priorities, while compromising on their secondary aims.	如果双方都专注于最紧要问题，同时在第二目标上做出妥协，就很容易谈判协议。


Unfortunately, human fallibility seems to be working against such a rational solution.	不幸的是，人类的可错性（fallibility）似乎在与这一理性方案作对。


Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s new finance minister, is a professor of mathematical economics who specializes in game theory.	新任希腊财政部长雅尼斯·雅路法克斯（Yanis Varoufakis）是专长博弈论的数理经济学教授。


But his negotiating technique – unpredictable oscillations between aggressiveness and weakness – is the opposite of what game theory would dictate.	但他的谈判技巧——在强势和弱势之间以不可预测的方式波动——与博弈论的应有之义背道而驰。


Varoufakis’s idea of strategy is to hold a gun to his own head, then demand a ransom for not pulling the trigger.	雅路法克斯的策略思维是用枪指着自己的头，然后要求赎金否则就开枪。


German and European Union policymakers are calling his bluff.	德国和欧盟决策者认为他是虚张声势。


As a result, the two sides have become stuck in a passive-aggressive standoff that has made serious negotiation impossible.	结果，双方陷入了负和僵局，让严肃的谈判无从进行。


There was nothing inevitable about this outcome.	这一结果绝不是不可避免的。


Just last month, ECB President Mario Draghi provided a textbook example of how these negotiations could, and should, have progressed, when he outmaneuvered German opposition to the monetary stimulus that Europe clearly needed.	就在上个月，欧洲央行行长德拉吉如教科书案例般地证明了这类谈判可以也应该取得进展——他巧妙地绕过了德国对欧洲显然需要的货币刺激的反对。


Draghi spent months before the ECB’s January 22 announcement that it would launch quantitative easing (QE) in intense public debate with the Germans over which point of principle they chose as a “red line” – the point beyond which no deal would be possible.	1月22日，欧洲央行宣布启动量化宽松。 在此之间的好几个月中，德拉吉与德国人公开争论“红线”原则——即导致协议无法达成的点。


Germany’s red line was debt mutualization: there must be no sharing of losses if any eurozone country should default.	德国的红线是债务共同化：不管哪个欧元区国家违约，都不可能共担损失。


Draghi let Germany win on this issue, which he viewed as economically irrelevant.	德拉吉让德国在这个问题上获得了胜利，他认为这个问题在经济上无关紧要。


But, crucially, he was careful not to back down until the last possible moment.	但是，关键在于他小心翼翼地坚持到最后时刻才做出让步。


By focusing the QE debate on risk-sharing, Draghi managed to distract Germany from an infinitely more important issue: the enormous size of the QE program, which completely defied the German taboo against monetary financing of government debts.	德拉吉把量化宽松争论的焦点引向风险共担，因此将德国的注意力从重要性远远过之的问题上移开：量化宽松计划的庞大规模足以打破德国对于政府债务货币融资的禁忌。


By conceding at the right time on an issue of no importance, Draghi achieved an enormous breakthrough that really mattered to the ECB.	德拉吉在正确的时间在一个无关紧要的问题上做出了让步，而在对于欧洲央行真正重要的问题上取得了重大突破。


Had Varoufakis adopted an equivalent strategy for Greece, he would have stuck doggedly to his demand for debt cancellation until the last moment, then backed down on this “principle” in exchange for major concessions on austerity and structural reforms.	如果雅路法克斯为希腊制定类似的策略，他应该顽固坚持要求债务取消直到最后一刻，然后在这一“原则”上做出让步，以换取紧缩和结构改革问题上的重大利益。


Or he could have adopted a less aggressive strategy: Concede from the start the German principle that debts are sacrosanct and then show that austerity could be eased without any reduction in the face value of Greek debt.	或者他可以采取更温和的策略：从一开始就做出让步，承认债务神圣不可侵犯这一德国的原则，然后证明在不减少希腊债务任何面值的情况下可以减缓紧缩。


But, instead of consistently pursuing either strategy, Varoufakis veered between defiance and conciliation, losing credibility both ways.	雅路法克斯在无视与和解之间摇摆，结果在两个立场上都失去了信誉。


Greece started the negotiation by insisting on debt reduction as its red line.	在谈判中，希腊从一开始就坚持债务削减是其红线。


But, instead of sticking to this position and turning a debate over debt forgiveness into a Draghi-style diversionary tactic, Greece abandoned this demand within days.	但是，它没有坚持这一立场，将关于债务减免的争论引向德拉吉式的转移注意力战术，而是在几天之内就放弃了这一要求足。


Then came the pointless provocation of refusing talks with the troika, despite the fact that the three institutions are all much more sympathetic to Greek demands than the German government.	接着，希腊又做出了毫无意义的挑衅，拒绝与三驾马车谈判，尽管事实上这三家机构远比德国政府更加同情希腊的要求。


Finally, Varoufakis rejected any extension of the troika program.	最后，雅路法克斯拒绝延长三驾马车的计划。


This created an unnecessary new deadline of February 28 for the withdrawal of ECB funding and consequent collapse of the Greek banking system.	这就造成了一个毫无必要的截止期——2月28日欧洲央行将撤回资金，有可能导致希腊银行系统崩溃。


Greece’s idealistic new leaders seem to believe that they can overpower bureaucratic opposition without the usual compromises and obfuscations, simply by brandishing their democratic mandate.	希腊的理想主义新领导人似乎认为他们只要依靠民主权力就可以在不进行常规妥协和虚与委蛇的情况下战胜官僚主义反对。


But the primacy of bureaucracy over democracy is a core principle that EU institutions will never compromise.	但官僚而不是民主才最重要，这是欧盟机构永远不会妥协的核心原则。


The upshot is that Greece is back where it started in the poker contest with Germany and Europe.	结果是在与德国和欧洲的牌局中，希腊又回到了原点。


The new government has shown its best cards too early and has no credibility left if it wants to try bluffing.	新政府过早暴露了王牌，导致想要虚张声势时也没人相信。


So what will happen next?	那么接下来会发生什么？


The most likely outcome is that Syriza will soon admit defeat, like every other eurozone government supposedly elected on a reform mandate, and revert to a troika-style program, sweetened only by dropping the name “troika.”	最有可能的结果是左翼联盟（Syriza）很快认输——就像其他所有被选来承担改革使命的欧元区政府一样，然后回归三驾马车式的计划，只是把“三驾马车”的名头去掉。


Another possibility, while Greek banks are still open for business, might be for the government to unilaterally implement some of its radical plans on wages and public spending, defying protests from Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin.	另一个可能性——尽管希腊银行仍能开张营业——是政府单方面实施一些关于工资和公共支出的激进政策，无视来自布鲁塞尔、法兰克福和柏林的反对。


If Greece tries such unilateral defiance, the ECB will almost certainly vote to stop its emergency funding to the Greek banking system after the troika program expires on February 28.	如果希腊尝试这一单方面无视，欧洲央行将几乎肯定决定在2月28日三驾马车计划截止后中止其对希腊银行系统的紧急融资。


As this self-inflicted deadline approaches, the Greek government will probably back down, just as Ireland and Cyprus capitulated when faced with similar threats.	随着这一自作孽式的截止期的临近，希腊政府可能会认输，正如爱尔兰和塞浦路斯面临类似威胁时妥协一样。


Such last-minute capitulation could mean resignation for the new Greek government and its replacement by EU-approved technocrats, as in the constitutional putsch against Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi in 2012.	这一最后一分钟的妥协可能意味着新希腊政府的辞职并由欧盟批准的技术官僚取而代之，就像2012年意大利所爆发的反对贝卢斯科尼的宪法政变。


In a less extreme scenario, Varoufakis might be replaced as finance minister, while the rest of the government survives.	在不那么极端的情形中，雅路法克斯可能丢掉财政部长的职位，而政府其他部分照旧。


The only other possibility, if and when Greek banks start collapsing, would be an exit from the euro.	唯一的其他可能性——当希腊银行开始崩溃时发生——时退出欧元区。


Whatever form the surrender takes, Greece will not be the only loser.	不管以什么形式屈服，希腊都将是唯一的输家。


Proponents of democracy and economic expansion have missed their best chance to outmaneuver Germany and end the self-destructive austerity that Germany has imposed on Europe.	民主和经济扩张的支持者错失了智胜德国、结束德国给欧洲所施加的自我毁灭式紧缩的最佳良机。


Greece’s Other Deficit	希腊的其他赤字


OAKLAND – For the past decade, much attention has been paid to Greece’s public finances.	奥克兰——过去十年来，外界十分关注希腊的公共财政状况。


And when, in November, the country faced the first review of its reform progress under its latest agreement with its creditors – an exercise required to obtain a new infusion of bailout funds – its budget deficit was put under the microscope once again.	当该国11月按照与债权人的最新协定首次面对改革进展状况审核时（这是获得新注入救助资金的必要条件）——其预算赤字问题再次被放到显微镜下。


But Greeks would do well to consider another type of deficit – one that has received far less public scrutiny, but could have economic consequences that are just as serious.	但关注另一类赤字对希腊民众有利——虽然其公众监督远不及财政，但却完全可能造成同样严重的经济后果。


Like the rest of the Mediterranean region (and indeed the entire world), Greece is not just running a fiscal deficit; it is also running an ecological one.	像其他地中海国家（其实还有整个世界一样），希腊不仅背负着财政赤字； 生态赤字的情况也同样堪忧。


According to our analysis, Mediterranean countries currently use 2.5 times more ecological resources and services than their ecosystems can renew.	我们的分析显示，地中海国家目前所用的生态资源和服务比生态系统能够再生的高2. 5倍以上。


Greece, for example, would need the total ecological resources and services of three Greeces in order to meet its citizens’ demand on nature for food, fiber, timber, housing, urban infrastructure, and carbon sequestration.	以希腊为例，总共需要三个希腊的生态资源和服务才能满足国内民众对粮食、纤维、木材、住房、城市基础设施和碳回收的需求。


Athens alone demands 22% more from nature than the entire country’s ecosystems can provide.	仅雅典一地对自然资源的需求量就超过全国生态系统供应能力的22%。


And, after years of recession during which pressure on Greece’s natural resources declined, demand has begun to rise again, as GDP growth has shown some improvement.	而且在多年衰退导致对希腊自然资源压力减轻后，随着GDP的逐渐改善需求开始显露出回升的势头。


To enable lasting economic progress, we need to break this link between GDP growth and overuse of the environment.	为实现持久经济发展，GDP增长和对环境过度使用之间的联系必须打破。


Ecological deficits can jeopardize energy sources and threaten food security, with direct social and economic consequences.	生态赤字可以危害能源资源并威胁粮食安全，造成直接的社会和经济后果。


If Greece and other countries are to ensure the health and prosperity of their citizens in the decades to come, they will have to find a way to prevent current economic activity from increasing an already unsustainable burden of environmental debt.	如果希腊等国想���保未来几十年国内民众的健康和繁荣，他们就必须想法设法防止当前经济活动进一步加剧本已不可持续的环境债务。


For that to happen, ecological resources must come to be viewed as valuable endowments to be managed wisely.	要想实现这一目标，必须明智地管理价值连城的生态系统。


The Mediterranean region’s unique, breathtaking natural capital is one of its greatest assets – the reason why more than 200 million tourists flock to the region each year, feeding the region’s economy.	地中海地区特有的、令人叹为观止的自然资源本是其最大的财富——每年都会吸引超过2亿游客涌向上述地区，为地区经济输送营养。


Overusing resources, or even failing to manage them carefully, inevitably saps the region’s economic strength.	过度使用资源、甚至未能认真对其进行管理都不可避免地会对地区经济实力造成损伤。


Of course, countries with ecological deficits can often fill part of the gap through global trade – if they can pay for the necessary imports.	当然，如果能支付必要的进口费用，生态赤字国往往可以通过全球贸易弥补部分差额。


But, as Greece has recently learned, countries dependent on external natural resources can experience economic shocks when commodity prices increase or their ability to pay otherwise declines.	但正如希腊近来已经了解的那样，外部自然资源依赖国可能在商品价格上涨或自身支付能力下降时出现经济震荡。


According to our calculations, a mere 10% increase in commodity prices would result in a $7.6 billion hit to Greece’s trade balance – equivalent to 0.3% of its GDP.	根据我们的计算，商品价格只上涨10%就会对希腊贸易平衡造成76亿美元的冲击——相当于其国内生产总值的0. 3%左右。


In any case, reliance on global trade is not an adequate solution to the problem.	无论如何，依赖全球贸易都不是彻底的解决之道。


Some ecosystem services – including clean air and water, mitigation of extreme climate events such as floods or droughts, and recreational uses of nature – simply cannot be imported.	有些生态系统服务——包括清洁的空气和水、缓解洪水或干旱等极端气候事件和自然的消遣性用途——根本就无法进口。


More important, if a country is importing natural resources, another country must be exporting them.	更重要的是，如果一个国家进口自然资源，那么必须有其他国家出口。


And just as governments cannot run huge financial deficits indefinitely, countries cannot continue to run large annual ecological imbalances without depleting their natural capital – and thus weakening their economic health.	而且就像政府不能无限制地背负财政赤字一样，国家也不能在不耗尽自然资本——进而削弱其经济实力的情况下每年持续积累生态不平衡。


Fortunately, countries like Greece are not powerless to act.	幸运的是，希腊等国有能力采取行动。


Cities offer particularly promising opportunities for improvement, especially in areas like transportation and housing.	城市的改造机会尤其诱人，特别是在交通及住房等领域。


Athens, for example, is an obvious target for policy changes.	例如雅典是政策改革的显著目标。


The average ecological footprint of an Athenian is higher than the national average (and higher than the average footprint of residents in other Mediterranean cities such as Barcelona, Izmir, Palermo, and Valencia).	雅典居民的人均生态足迹高于全国（也高于巴塞罗那、伊兹密尔、巴勒莫和瓦伦西亚等其他地中海城市居民）。


Transportation is the biggest source of this disparity, which means that policy interventions favoring public transport or walkability can reduce Athens’ ecological deficit.	交通是造成上述差距的主要因素，这意味着倾向公共交通或步行的政策干预可以降低雅典的生态赤字。


Another area in which Greece should consider taking action is food.	希腊应考虑采取行动的还有粮食领域。


The world-famous Mediterranean diet – heavy in vegetables, fruits, and olive oil – is not only healthy; it is less taxing on the environment.	世界著名的地中海饮食——大量食用蔬菜、水果和橄榄油——不仅有利健康；


As consumption of meat and processed foods rises around the Mediterranean, a renewed focus on the region’s culinary heritage could help lighten the load on the world’s natural resources – and boost people’s health.	而且能对环境起到保护作用。 随着地中海地区肉类和加工食品消费量上升，重新关注地区饮食传统有助于减轻自然资源负担——并促进民众健康。


As Greece’s government works to revive an economy flattened by fiscal disaster and improve the wellbeing of all, the path it forges toward long-term prosperity must not lead to further environmental degradation.	在希腊政府致力于恢复因财政灾难而陷于停滞的经济和改善民众福祉的同时，它所选定的通往长期繁荣之路绝不能导致环境进一步恶化。


Greece cannot afford to address one of its deficits at the expense of the other.	希腊不能解决一种赤字危机，而以另一种赤字危机为代价。


Austerity Is the Only Deal-Breaker	紧缩是协议的唯一障碍


ATHENS – A common fallacy pervades coverage by the world’s media of the negotiations between the Greek government and its creditors.	雅典—全世界媒体在报道希腊政府及其债权人的谈判时有一个普遍存在的共同谬误。


The fallacy, exemplified in a recent commentary by Philip Stephens of the Financial Times, is that, “Athens is unable or unwilling – or both – to implement an economic reform program.”	菲利普·史蒂芬斯（Philip Stephens）的最新《金融时报》评论很好地说明了这一谬误：“希腊不能，或不愿，或既不能也不愿实施经济改革计划。


Once this fallacy is presented as fact, it is only natural that coverage highlights how our government is, in Stephens’s words, “squandering the trust and goodwill of its eurozone partners.”	”当这一谬误以事实的面貌出现时，媒体强调我国政府如史蒂芬斯所言“滥用欧洲伙伴的信任和好意”也就不足为奇了。


But the reality of the talks is very different.	但谈判的现实绝非如此。


Our government is keen to implement an agenda that includes all of the economic reforms emphasized by European economic think tanks.	我国政府十分渴望实施包括所有欧洲经济智库所强调的经济改革的日程。


Moreover, we are uniquely able to maintain the Greek public’s support for a sound economic program.	此外，我们也是唯一能够保持希腊公众支持可靠经济计划的。


Consider what that means: an independent tax agency; reasonable primary fiscal surpluses forever; a sensible and ambitious privatization program, combined with a development agency that harnesses public assets to create investment flows; genuine pension reform that ensures the social-security system’s long-term sustainability; liberalization of markets for goods and services, etc.	明智又宏大的私有化计划并辅之以运营公共资产以产生投资流的发展机构； 真正的退休金改革以确保社会安全制度的长期可持续性；


So, if our government is willing to embrace the reforms that our partners expect, why have the negotiations not produced an agreement?	那么，既然我国政府愿意采取我们的伙伴所期待的改革，为何谈判还是没有形成协议呢？


Where is the sticking point?	症结究竟何在？


The problem is simple: Greece’s creditors insist on even greater austerity for this year and beyond – an approach that would impede recovery, obstruct growth, worsen the debt-deflationary cycle, and, in the end, erode Greeks’ willingness and ability to see through the reform agenda that the country so desperately needs.	问题很简单：希腊债权人坚持今年及以后实施更大的紧缩，而这一方针将破坏复苏、阻碍增长、恶化债务-通缩循环，最终腐蚀希腊人领会希腊所急需的改革日程的意愿和能力。


Our government cannot – and will not – accept a cure that has proven itself over five long years to be worse than the disease.	我国政府无法——也不会——接受一个在长达五年的时间里已经证明比病症还要糟糕的疗方。


Our creditors’ insistence on greater austerity is subtle yet steadfast.	我国债权人坚持更大规模的紧缩的立场微妙而顽固。


It can be found in their demand that Greece maintain unsustainably high primary surpluses (more than 2% of GDP in 2016 and exceeding 2.5%, or even 3%, for every year thereafter).	这一立场的一个写照是它们要求希腊保持不可持续的高初级盈余（2016年超过GDP的2%，此后各年超过2. 5%甚至3%）。


To achieve this, we are supposed to increase the overall burden of value-added tax on the private sector, cut already diminished pensions across the board; and compensate for low privatization proceeds (owing to depressed asset prices) with “equivalent” fiscal consolidation measures.	要达到这一目标，我们被认为应该增加私人部门的总体增值税负担，全面减少已经有所缩水的退休金，并以“等价”财政整合措施补偿低私有化收入（拜资产价格萎靡所赐）。


The view that Greece has not achieved sufficient fiscal consolidation is not just false; it is patently absurd.	希腊没有充分实现财政整合的观点不但是错误的，简直荒谬可笑。


The accompanying graph not only illustrates this; it also succinctly addresses the question of why Greece has not done as well as, say, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, or Cyprus in the years since the 2008 financial crisis.	相关数据不但说明了这一点； 还扼要地回答了为何2008年金融危机以来希腊的表现不如西班牙、葡萄牙、爱尔兰和塞浦路斯等国家。


Relative to the rest of the countries on the eurozone periphery, Greece was subjected to at least twice the austerity.	相对于欧元区外围的其他国家，希腊的紧缩力度至少要大出一倍。


There is nothing more to it than that.	就是这么简单。


Following Prime Minister David Cameron’s recent election victory in the United Kingdom, my good friend Lord Norman Lamont, a former chancellor of the exchequer, remarked that the UK economy’s recovery supports our government’s position.	首相卡梅伦赢得最新的英国大选后，我的好友、前英国财政大臣诺曼·拉蒙特勋爵（Lord Norman Lamont）评论道，英国经济的复苏支持我国政府的立场。


Back in 2010, he recalled, Greece and the UK faced fiscal deficits of more or less similar size (relative to GDP).	他回忆道，在2010年，希腊和英国面临大致相当的财政赤字（相对GDP而言）。


Greece returned to primary surpluses (which exclude interest payments) in 2014, whereas the UK government consolidated much more gradually and has yet to return to surplus.	希腊在2014年恢复初级盈余（不含利息支付），而英国政府的财政整合更加缓慢，至今仍没有恢复盈余。


At the same time, Greece has faced monetary contraction (which has recently become monetary asphyxiation), in contrast to the UK, where the Bank of England has supported the government every step of the way.	与此同时，希腊面临着货币紧缩（最近已经演变为货币窒息），这与英国形成了鲜明对比。 在英国，英格兰银行在整个过过程中支持了政府的每一步措施。


The result is that Greece is continuing to stagnate, whereas the UK has been growing strongly.	结果是希腊仍陷在停滞中，而英国一直在强劲增长。


Fair-minded observers of the four-month-long negotiations between Greece and its creditors cannot avoid a simple conclusion: The major sticking point, the only deal-breaker, is the creditors’ insistence on even more austerity, even at the expense of the reform agenda that our government is eager to pursue.	在希腊及其债权人为期四个月的谈判中，公正的观察者必然会得出一个简单的结论：主要症结、达成协议的唯一障碍在于债权人坚持更大规模的紧缩，即使这将导致我国政府急切地意欲实施的改革日程无从实现。


Clearly, our creditors’ demand for more austerity has nothing to do with concerns about genuine reform or moving Greece onto a sustainable fiscal path.	显然，希腊债权人扩大紧缩的要求绝非为真正的改革或让希腊走上可持续财政之路考虑。


Their true motivation is a question best left to future historians – who, I have no doubt, will take much of the contemporary media coverage with a grain of salt.	它们的真正动机最好由未来历史学家来评判——我毫不怀疑，未来史家一定会对现在的许多媒体报道持保留态度。


Greece Must Exit	希腊必须退出


NEW YORK – The Greek euro tragedy is reaching its final act: it is clear that either this year or next, Greece is highly likely to default on its debt and exit the eurozone.	纽约—希腊欧元悲剧正在上演最后一出：显然，今年或明年，希腊很有可能对其债务违约并退出欧元区。


Postponing the exit after the June election with a new government committed to a variant of the same failed policies (recessionary austerity and structural reforms) will not restore growth and competitiveness.	即使6月选举后上台的新政府让退出暂时中止，老方一帖的无用政策（必须的紧缩和结构性改革）也不能重塑增长和竞争力。


Greece is stuck in a vicious cycle of insolvency, lost competitiveness, external deficits, and ever-deepening depression.	希腊已经陷入了无力偿债、丢失竞争力、外部赤字和萧条越滑越深的恶性循环。


The only way to stop it is to begin an orderly default and exit, coordinated and financed by the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (the “Troika”), that minimizes collateral damage to Greece and the rest of the eurozone.	唯一的解脱办法就是在欧洲央行、欧盟和IMF的融资和协助下有序违约和退出，以最小化对希腊和欧元区其他国家的附带伤害。


Greece’s recent financing package, overseen by the Troika, gave the country much less debt relief than it needed.	目前，由三驾马车监视的希腊再融资计划所给予的债务纾困远小于希腊之所需。


But, even with significantly more public-debt relief, Greece could not return to growth without rapidly restoring competitiveness.	但是，即使大幅增加公债纾困额度，希腊也无法在不能迅速重塑竞争力的情况下重回增长之路。


And, without a return to growth, its debt burden will remain unsustainable.	而不能重回增长之路，希腊的债务负担就不可持续。


But all of the options that might restore competitiveness require real currency depreciation.	但可能重塑竞争力的选择无不要求实际货币贬值。


The first option, a sharp weakening of the euro, is unlikely, as Germany is strong and the ECB is not aggressively easing monetary policy.	第一个选择是欧元大幅贬值，这是不可能实现的，因为德国非常坚挺，欧洲央行也没有大幅放松货币政策。


A rapid reduction in unit labor costs, through structural reforms that increased productivity growth in excess of wages, is just as unlikely.	通过促使生产率增长快于工资实现单位劳动力成本的快速下降同样不可能实现。


It took Germany ten years to restore its competitiveness this way; Greece cannot remain in a depression for a decade.	德国用了十年时间才靠此法重塑了竞争力； 而希腊不可能在萧条中度过十年。


Likewise, a rapid deflation in prices and wages, known as an “internal devaluation,” would lead to five years of ever-deepening depression.	类似地，价格和工资的快速通缩，即所谓的“内部贬值”将导致持续五年的极度萧条。


If none of those three options is feasible, the only path left is to leave the eurozone.	如果这三种选择都不可能实现，那么唯一剩下的办法便是离开欧元区。


A return to a national currency and a sharp depreciation would quickly restore competitiveness and growth.	回归本国货币并大幅贬值能够迅速重塑竞争力和增长。


Of course, the process would be traumatic – and not just for Greece.	当然，整个过程将是痛苦的——不仅是对希腊而言。


The most significant problem would be capital losses for core eurozone financial institutions.	最大的问题将是欧元区核心金融机构的资本损失。


Overnight, the foreign euro liabilities of Greece’s government, banks, and companies would surge.	希腊政府、银行和公司的外国欧元债务将在一夜之间风起云涌。


Yet these problems can be overcome.	但这些问题都是可以克服的。


Argentina did so in 2001, when it “pesofied” its dollar debts.	2001年，阿根廷就这样做过，将其美元债务“比索化”。


The United States did something similar in 1933, when it depreciated the dollar by 69% and abandoned the gold standard.	1933年，美国也这样做过，将美元贬值69%并抛弃金本位。


A similar “drachmatization” of euro debts would be necessary and unavoidable.	将欧元债务“德拉克马化”是必须进行且不可避免的。


Losses that eurozone banks would suffer would be manageable if the banks were properly and aggressively recapitalized.	欧元区银行的损失是可控的，只要它们适当激进地进行资本重组。


Avoiding a post-exit implosion of the Greek banking system, however, might require temporary measures, such as bank holidays and capital controls, to prevent a disorderly run on deposits.	但是，为了避免退出欧元后希腊银行系统出现崩溃，可能需要实施暂时性措施，比如休业和资本管制，以防止发生无序的存款挤兑。


The European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) should carry out the necessary recapitalization of the Greek banks via direct capital injections.	欧洲金融稳定激进/欧洲稳定机制（EFSF/ESM）应该通过直接注资对希腊银行进行必要的资本重组。


European taxpayers would effectively take over the Greek banking system, but this would be partial compensation for the losses imposed on creditors by drachmatization.	欧洲纳税人将在事实上拥有希腊银行系统，但这是对债权人所承受的德拉克马化损失的部分补偿。


Greece would also have to restructure and reduce its public debt again.	希腊还必须再次重组并削减公债。


The Troika’s claims on Greece need not be reduced in face value, but their maturity would have to be lengthened by another decade, and the interest on it reduced.	三驾马车的希腊债权不必在面值上有所让步，但期限必须延长十年，利息也必须减少。


Further haircuts on private claims would also be needed, starting with a moratorium on interest payments.	此外，还需要私人债权的进一步“剃头”，可以从暂停利息支付开始入手。


Some argue that Greece’s real GDP would be much lower in an exit scenario than it would be during the hard slog of deflation.	有观点认为，若退出欧元区，希腊实际GDP将远低于承受通缩痛苦的情形。


But that is logically flawed: even with deflation, real purchasing power would fall, and the real value of debts would rise (debt deflation), as the real depreciation occurs.	但这在逻辑上是不成立的：随着实际贬值的发生，即使通缩了，实际购买力也会想将，而债务的实际价值会升高（债务通缩）。


More importantly, the exit path would restore growth right away, via nominal and real depreciation, avoiding a decade-long depression.	更重要的是，退出能通过名义和实际贬值马上重塑增长，避免长达十年的萧条。


And trade losses imposed on the eurozone by the drachma depreciation would be modest, given that Greece accounts for only 2% of eurozone GDP.	而德拉克马给欧元区带来的贸易损失也不会很大，因为希腊GDP只占欧元区总量的2%。


Reintroducing the drachma risks exchange-rate depreciation in excess of what is necessary to restore competitiveness, which would be inflationary and impose greater losses on drachmatized external debts.	重新使用德拉克马存在汇率贬值幅度大于重塑竞争力之所需的危险，这将造成通胀压力并加重德拉克马化外债的损失。


To minimize that risk, the Troika reserves currently devoted to the Greek bailout should be used to limit exchange-rate overshooting; capital controls would help, too.	为了将这一风险最小化，三驾马车当前为希腊援助计划所留存的储备应该用于防止汇率超调，资本管制也会有所助益。


Those who claim that contagion from a Greek exit would drag others into the crisis are also in denial.	也有人认为希腊的退出将形成传染效应，将其他国家拖入危机，这种观点也是站不住脚的。


Other peripheral countries already have Greek-style problems of debt sustainability and eroded competitiveness.	其他外围国家早已存在希腊式的债务可持续性和竞争力受损的问题了。


Portugal, for example, may eventually have to restructure its debt and exit the euro.	比如，葡萄牙最终可能不得不重组债务并退出欧元区。


Illiquid but potentially solvent economies, such as Italy and Spain, will need support from Europe regardless of whether Greece exits; indeed, without such liquidity support, a self-fulfilling run on Italian and Spanish public debt is likely.	缺少流动性但偿债能力并不缺乏的国家（如意大利和西班牙）不管希腊是否退出欧元区都需要欧洲的支持，没有欧洲流动性支持，意大利和西班牙将可能爆发自我实现的公债挤兑。


The substantial new official resources of the IMF and ESM – and ECB liquidity – could then be used to ring-fence these countries, and banks elsewhere in the eurozone’s troubled periphery.	因此，充足的新官方资金源——IMF、ESM和欧洲央行流动性——可以被用来隔离这些国家以及欧元区其他受困外围国家的银行。


Regardless of what Greece does, eurozone banks now need to be rapidly recapitalized, which requires a new EU-wide program of direct capital injections.	不论希腊如何选择，欧元区银行现在都需要进行快速资本重组，而这需要新的泛欧洲直接注资计划。


The experience of Iceland and many emerging markets over the past 20 years shows that nominal depreciation and orderly restructuring and reduction of foreign debts can restore debt sustainability, competitiveness, and growth.	过去20年来，冰岛和许多新兴市场的经验表明，名义贬值和有序重组及削减外债可以重塑债务可持续性、竞争力和增长。


As in these cases, the collateral damage to Greece of a euro exit will be significant, but it can be contained.	和这些案例一样，希腊退出欧元区的附带伤害将会很大，但不是不可承受。


Like a doomed marriage, it is better to have rules for the inevitable divorce that make separation less costly to both sides.	就像感情破裂的婚姻，为不可避免的离婚分居制定规则对夫妻双方都有好处。


Make no mistake: an orderly euro exit by Greece implies significant economic pain. But watching the slow, disorderly implosion of the Greek economy and society would be much worse.	诚然，希腊的有序退出欧元意味着剧烈的经济阵痛，但要比看着希腊经济和社会缓慢、无序地陷入崩溃好得多。


Europe’s Vindictive Privatization Plan for Greece	别有用心的欧洲希腊私有化计划


ATHENS – On July 12, the summit of eurozone leaders dictated its terms of surrender to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who, terrified by the alternatives, accepted all of them.	雅典—7月22日，欧元区领导人峰会向希腊总理齐普拉斯宣布了投降条件。 因走投无路而惊慌失措的齐普拉斯全盘接受。


One of those terms concerned the disposition of Greece’s remaining public assets.	其中一个条件是处置希腊现有公共资产。


Eurozone leaders demanded that Greek public assets be transferred to a Treuhand-like fund – a fire-sale vehicle similar to the one used after the fall of the Berlin Wall to privatize quickly, at great financial loss, and with devastating effects on employment all of the vanishing East German state’s public property.	欧元区领导人要求希腊公共资产转移到一个类似于德国资产托管局（Treuhand）的基金中，即类似于柏林墙倒塌后不惜巨大金融代价迅速私有化、给东德国家公共财产造成巨大损失和灾难性失业的甩卖机构。


This Greek Treuhand would be based in – wait for it – Luxembourg, and would be run by an outfit overseen by Germany���s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, the author of the scheme.	希腊资产托管局将位于——等着瞧吧——卢森堡，并将由德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble，该方案的起草者）监督下的委员会负责。


It would complete the fire sales within three years.	该基金将在三年内完成资产甩卖。


But, whereas the work of the original Treuhand was accompanied by massive West German investment in infrastructure and large-scale social transfers to the East German population, the people of Greece would receive no corresponding benefit of any sort.	但是，原版的德国资产托管局带来了西德的巨额基础设施投资和大规模西德向东德的社会转移支付，而希腊不会获得任何相应的好处。


Euclid Tsakalotos, who succeeded me as Greece’s finance minister two weeks ago, did his best to ameliorate the worst aspects of the Greek Treuhand plan.	在我之后担任希腊财政部长的萨卡洛托斯（Euclid Tsakalotos）竭尽全力降低希腊资产托管局计划的弊端。


He managed to have the fund domiciled in Athens, and he extracted from Greece’s creditors (the so-called troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) the important concession that the sales could extend to 30 years, rather than a mere three.	他设法让该基金设在雅典，并让希腊债权人（所谓的三驾马车，即欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）做出重要让步——将甩卖过程延长到30年而不是三年。


This was crucial, for it will permit the Greek state to hold undervalued assets until their price recovers from the current recession-induced lows.	这一点至关重要，因为它让希腊能够持有低估资产以待价格从衰退导致的当前低位有所恢复。


Alas, the Greek Treuhand remains an abomination, and it should be a stigma on Europe’s conscience.	唉，尽管如此，希腊资产托管局计划仍然令人憎恶，应该被视为欧洲良心的污点。


Worse, it is a wasted opportunity.	更糟糕的是，这是一个被浪费的机会。


The plan is politically toxic, because the fund, though domiciled in Greece, will effectively be managed by the troika.	该计划简直是政治毒药，因为该基金尽管设在希腊，实际上将由三驾马车管理。


It is also financially noxious, because the proceeds will go toward servicing what even the IMF now admits is an unpayable debt.	该计划在金融上也贻害无穷，因为所获款项将用于偿还如今IMF也承认无法偿还的债务。


And it fails economically, because it wastes a wonderful opportunity to create homegrown investments to help counter the recessionary impact of the punitive fiscal consolidation that is also part of the July 12 summit’s “terms.”	它在经济上也将失败，因为它浪费了形成内生投资的良机。 国内投资有助于抵消惩罚性财政整合（也是7月15日峰会“条件”的一部分）所带来的衰退效应。


It did not have to be this way.	事情本非必须如此。


On June 19, I communicated to the German government and to the troika an alternative proposal, as part of a document entitled “Ending the Greek Crisis”:	6月19日，我向德国政府和三驾马车提交了一份替代方案，记录在题为《结束希腊危机》（Ending the Greek Crisis）的文件中：


“The Greek government proposes to bundle public assets (excluding those pertinent to the country’s security, public amenities, and cultural heritage) into a central holding company to be separated from the government administration and to be managed as a private entity, under the aegis of the Greek Parliament, with the goal of maximizing the value of its underlying assets and creating a homegrown investment stream.	“希腊政府建议将公共资产（不包括国家安全相关资产、公共设施和文化遗产）捆绑注入一家中央控股公司中，该公司将与政府部门分离，作为一家私募股权资金管理并受希腊议会监督，其目标是基础是产价值最大化和产生内生投资流。


The Greek state will be the sole shareholder, but will not guarantee its liabilities or debt.”	希腊将是唯一股东，但不担保其负债或债务。 ”


The holding company would play an active role readying the assets for sale.	该控股公司将就资产出售事宜进行积极准备。


It would “issue a fully collateralized bond on the international capital markets” to raise €30-40 billion ($32-43 billion), which, “taking into account the present value of assets,” would “be invested in modernizing and restructuring the assets under its management.”	它将“向国际资本市场发行有充分抵押的债券”以筹集300—400亿欧元，这笔钱在“考虑资产现值”的情况下“投入到旗下管理资产的现代化和重组中。 ”


The plan envisaged an investment program of 3-4 years, resulting in “additional spending of 5% of GDP per annum,” with current macroeconomic conditions implying “a positive growth multiplier above 1.5,” which “should boost nominal GDP growth to a level above 5% for several years.”	该计划着眼于3—4年的投资项目，带来“每年提高5%的GDP的支出，”在现有宏观经济条件下这意味着“1. 5以上的正投资乘数”，应能“在多年中将名义GDP增长水平提高到5%以上。


This, in turn, would induce “proportional increases in tax revenues,” thereby “contributing to fiscal sustainability, while enabling the Greek government to exercise spending discipline without further shrinking the social economy.”	”这反过来将带来“税收收入的相应增加”，从而“有助于财政可持续性，同时让希腊政府能够遵守支出纪律而不进一步拖累社会经济”。


In this scenario, the primary surplus (which excludes interest payments) would “achieve ‘escape velocity’ magnitudes in absolute as well as percentage terms over time.”	在这一情景中，初级盈余（不含利息支付）将“达到‘逃逸速度’，不管是从绝对值衡量还是从一段时间的百分比衡量。


As a result, the holding company would “be granted a banking license” within a year or two, “thus turning itself into a full-fledged Development Bank capable of crowding in private investment to Greece and of entering into collaborative projects with the European Investment Bank.”	”因此，控股公司将在两年内“获得银行执照”，“从而转变为成熟的开发银行，能够引导私人天投资流向希腊并与欧洲投资银行进行项目合作。 ”


The Development Bank that we proposed would “allow the government to choose which assets are to be privatized and which not, while guaranteeing a greater impact on debt reduction from the selected privatizations.”	我们计划的这一开发银行将“让政府选择哪些资产进行私有化，哪些不进行私有化，同时确保从选出的私有化操作中获得更大的降低债务效果。


After all, “asset values should increase by more than the actual amount spent on modernization and restructuring, aided by a program of public-private partnerships whose value is boosted according to the probability of future privatization.”	”毕竟，“随着现代化和重组的实际支出数字的增加，并有公私合作计划（其价值将根据未来私有化的可能性而得到提升）的助推，资产价值应该有更大的增加。 ”


Our proposal was greeted with deafening silence.	我们的方案根本没有受到关住。


More precisely, the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers and the troika continued to leak to the global media that the Greek authorities had no credible, innovative proposals on offer – their standard refrain.	更准确地说，由欧元区财政部长和三驾马车组成的欧元集团继续想全球媒体放风说希腊当局拿不出可信的创新性方案——它们的标准说辞。


A few days later, once the powers-that-be realized that the Greek government was about to capitulate fully to the troika’s demands, they saw fit to impose upon Greece their demeaning, unimaginative, and pernicious Treuhand model.	几天后，当权者意识到希腊政府将完全屈服于三驾马车的要求时，他们觉得是时候向希腊施加他们的侮辱性的、毫无想象力的、贻害无穷的资产托管局模式了。


At a turning point in European history, our innovative alternative was thrown into the dustbin.	在欧洲历史的转折点上，我们的创新方案被扔进了垃圾桶。


It remains there for others to retrieve.	现在它仍然在哪儿等待有人去发现。


Greece-Proofing China	中国怎样抵抗希腊风险


BEIJING – Despite repeated assurances by European Union leaders, after more than two years, there is still no light at the end of Europe’s debt-crisis tunnel.	北京—尽管欧盟领导人一再保证，但两年多之后，我们仍看不到欧洲债务危机缓和的迹象。


Recently, the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, referring to a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, told the European Parliament that there is no “Plan B.”	最近，欧洲委员会主席巴罗佐在提及希腊退出欧元区的可能性时对欧洲议会说，没有“B计划”。


Barroso’s statement was meant to be reassuring.	巴罗佐的话是为了安抚人心。


But, after so many disappointments, China cannot accept at face value the assurances of European politicians, which even they themselves do not know whether they can redeem.	但是，在经历了多次的失望后，中国已无法按字面意思理解欧洲政客的保证了，就连他们自己都不知道承诺能够兑现几分。


China should have its own Plan B in case Greece has to leave the eurozone.	中国应该准备好自己的B计划，以应对希腊脱离欧元区。


Indeed, it is increasingly likely that Greece will renege on its bailout obligations.	事实上，希腊无法履行援助义务的可能性正在与日俱增。


If that happens and the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) cuts off financial support, Greece’s exit from the euro will become all but inevitable.	如果果真如此，而“三驾马车”（欧洲委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）因此削减金融支持，那么希腊之退出欧元区将成不可避免之势。


In that event, China must be prepared for any ensuing global financial turmoil and longer-term consequences.	如此，则中国必须为随之发生的全球金融动荡和长期后果做好准备。


For starters, Chinese officials should be under no illusion that the country will be immune to financial contagion.	首先，中国官员必须破除幻想，中国并不能免疫于金融传染病。


A “Grexit” would hit European banks that hold peripheral eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds.	希腊退出将冲击持有外围欧元区成员国主权债务的欧洲银行。


Shock waves from the deleveraging would, in turn, spread to emerging markets like China.	去杠杆化的震波又会传播到中国这样的新兴市场。


Although the exposure of Chinese banks and financial institutions to eurozone sovereign and banking-sector assets is negligible, post-Grexit capital flight from risky markets could rival, or even surpass, that in the weeks following Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008.	尽管中资银行和金融机构在欧元区主权和银行部门资产上的风险敞口可以忽略不计，但希腊退出后所造成的资本逃离风险市场风潮将不亚于甚至超过2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒台后几周的程度。


Compared to 2007 and 2008, foreign investors’ holdings in emerging markets are much higher, owing to these countries’ relative economic strength in recent years and rock-bottom returns on developed-market financial assets.	与2007年和2008年相比，外国投资者所持有的新兴市场资产大大增加了，因为这些国家在近几年经济相对较为坚挺，而发达市场金融资产回报率又实在太低。


In fact, China already experienced the impact of deleveraging late last year, when the European financial system seemed on the brink of collapse.	事实上，去年年底欧洲金融市场在崩溃边缘摇摇欲坠时，中国便已经历了去杠杆化的冲击。


With European banks hunkering down, the renminbi’s exchange rate fell for 11 consecutive days, even though China was running a current-account surplus.	随着欧洲银行遭遇重创，人民币汇率连跌11天，即使中国的经常项目一直是盈余。


The performance of emerging-market currencies and other assets so far in the second quarter suggests that deleveraging has begun once again.	新兴市场货币和其他资产在二季度的表现表明，去杠杆化再次开始了。


Disappointing first-quarter growth data have already led foreign investors to have second thoughts about keeping money in China.	第一季度令人失望的增长数据让外国投资者考虑投资中国时更加谨慎了。


A Grexit could prove to be the last straw, and would surely lead to a tightening in domestic monetary conditions at a very precarious point in the economic cycle.	希腊的退出将是一根导火索，必然导致在经济周期的疲软期收紧国内货币条件。


As such, the timing could not be worse to float the idea of speeding up capital-account liberalization.	因此，现在提出加速资本项目自由化的观点不可不谓不合时宜。


On the contrary, the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) and other relevant authorities should consider capital controls, market suspensions, and emergency liquidity provision.	相反，中国人民银行和其他相关部门应该考虑资本管制、暂时休市和紧急流动性注入。


These measures are not dissimilar to those that the eurozone will pursue if Greece exits.	这些措施与欧元区在希腊退出时所将实施的措施并没有什么不同。


Ideally, the response would be coordinated with China’s international partners in the G-20.	在理想的情况下，如此反应将能得到中国的G20国际合作伙伴的配合。


The infrastructure for such cooperation has developed strongly since 2008, and China must not shy away from advocating its deployment.	自2008年以来，此类配合的基本条件已经有了长足的发展，中国不必耻于号召如此行动。


Moreover, China must have a medium-term plan to deal with the economic aftermath of a Grexit.	此外，中国必须有一个中期计划对付希腊退出的经济后果。


Should contagion prove to be limited, with Greece the only casualty, the drop in eurozone output may be severe, but not catastrophic.	如果金融传染病程度有限，希腊是唯一的受害者，那么欧元区产出尽管将受严重打击，但不至于出现灾难性后果。


Nonetheless, the EU is China’s most important trading partner, and China must be braced for serious job losses in the export sector.	尽管如此，欧盟是中国最重要的贸易伙伴，中国必须做好应对出口部门大量失业的准备。


Japan’s experience shows that a recession that results from a financial crisis can be extremely prolonged, because deleveraging is a long process.	日本的经验表明，由金融危机引发的衰退可以维持极长的时期，因为去杠杆化是一个长期过程。


It is highly likely that today’s recession will drag on for many more years in both America and the EU.	很有可能，如今的衰退将在美国和欧盟肆虐多年。


So China’s government must have a medium- and long-term plan to address problems caused by a drawn-out global slump.	因此中国政府必须有一个中长期计划以修正因��球长期衰退带来的问题。


The problems include a surge in unemployment, and the need to reallocate fiscal resources to these individuals, whose welfare is critical to the preservation of social stability.	这些问题包括失业率飙升以及需要将财政资源配置给那些出于维持社会稳定目的必须保证其福利水平的个人。


More importantly, the Chinese government should not retreat from efforts to implement structural reforms aimed at shifting China’s growth model to one that places much greater emphasis on domestic demand.	更重要的是，中国政府不能因此让旨在转变中国增长模式、使其更偏重于内需的结构性改革缩水。


In addition, net foreign capital inflows are likely to dwindle for several quarters at least, affecting domestic monetary conditions while aggregate demand is weak.	此外，净外国资本流入至少将在未来几个季度内有所减少，在总需求不足之时，这将影响国内货币条件。


As such, the PBoC will need to maintain counter-cyclical policies in order to avoid a deflationary spiral.	因此中国人民银行将必须维持反周期政策，以避免通缩螺旋。


Although bound to be controversial, especially in an election year in the United States, enough flexibility should be given to the renminbi in both directions when it is needed.	争议是不可避免的，特别是在美国大选年。 尽管如此，人民币应该获得充分的双向调整灵活度。


One of the biggest failures of the eurozone periphery is a loss in competitiveness, hidden by a wall of credit that has been leveraged from Germany’s balance sheet.	欧元区外围国最大的失败之处是失去了竞争力，这一点因为受德国资产负债表支撑的信贷泛滥而被掩盖了。


This is always unsustainable.	这从来都是不可持续的。


Any loosening by the PBoC should not be used to avoid painful structural reforms.	中国人民银行的宽松政策决不能用于避免痛苦的结构性改革。


Finally, China should be ready to extend a helping hand.	最后，中国应该做好施以援手的准备。


To ensure that the post-Grexit eurozone’s integrity faces no further immediate threats, China must join international partners in establishing a fully credible firewall, via the IMF.	为确保希腊退出后欧元区一体化不会受到后续威胁的冲击，中国必须加入国际合作，通过IMF建立一个拥有充分信誉的防火墙。


However, the eurozone, and Germany in particular, must fully acknowledge the fundamental causes of Greece’s exit and pledge to move towards fiscal union, while acknowledging that an austerity-only approach towards other at-risk members is a dead end.	但是，欧元区，特别是德国，必须深刻认识希腊退出的基本原因，并承诺朝财政联盟的方向前进，并认识到对其他高风险成员国采取只顾紧缩不论其他的政策是死路一条。


An adequate firewall and a European commitment to structural reform would go far toward calming markets and reducing the risks to any Chinese contribution.	建立胜任的防火墙和欧洲做出结构性改革承诺将能极大地安抚市场，降低对中国的风险。


In other words, any assistance that China provides must be “throwing good money after good potential results.”	换句话说，中国的援助必须“将钱用于潜在好结果”。


Of course, IMF governance reform will also need to be part of the discussion.	当然，IMF治理改革也应该被纳入讨论议题。


Meanwhile, the eurozone will likely be more open to foreign investment out of necessity, and cash-rich Chinese companies should continue to pursue opportunities via FDI or corporate acquisitions.	与此同时，欧元区也必须对外国投资更加开放，富于现金的中国公司应该继续通过FDI和公司收购寻找在欧洲的机会。


A potential Grexit will present entirely new challenges to China in the coming months, and the country must avoid complacency over its own exposure. A battle plan for both the present and the future is needed now.	潜在的希腊退出将在未来几个月内给中国带来完全不同的新挑战，中国不能因为对此风险敞口小而高枕无忧，需要马上制定出立足现在、着眼未来的作战计划。


Greece’s Vote for Sovereignty	希腊的主权公投


CAMBRIDGE – Creditors and debtors have found themselves at odds for as long as money has changed hands.	美国剑桥—金钱关系一发生，债权人和债务人就陷入了对立。


But rarely have the issues been framed as starkly – and in such a public manner – as in the just completed Greek referendum.	但问题你从未像刚刚结束的希腊全民公投那么尖锐——也没有那么大的公共影响。


In a vote on July 5, the Greek electorate resoundingly rejected demands for further austerity by the country’s foreign creditors: the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the other eurozone governments, led by Germany.	在7月5日的公投中，希腊选民断然拒绝了外国债权人——欧洲央行、国际货币基金组织（IMF）和以德国为首的其他欧元区政府——关于希腊采取进一步紧缩措施的要求。


Whatever the economic merits of the decision, the Greek people’s voice rang loud and clear: We are not going to take it anymore.	不管这一决定是否具有经济合理性，希腊人民的声音响亮而明确：我们受够了。


It would be a mistake, however, to view the vote in Greece as a straightforward victory for democracy – despite what the country’s prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, and his supporters like to claim.	但是，将希腊公投视为直观的民主胜利是一个错误——尽管希腊总理齐普拉斯及其支持者这样宣称。


What the Greeks call democracy comes across in many other – equally democratic – countries as irresponsible unilateralism.	希腊人称之为民主的东西，在其他许多国家——它们与希腊一样民主——称之为不负责任的单边主义。


There is, in fact, little sympathy for the Greek position in other eurozone countries, where similar referendums would undoubtedly show overwhelming public support for the continuation of the austerity policies imposed on Greece.	事实上，其他欧元区国家对希腊的状况一点都不同情，如果在其他国家举行公投，结果毫无疑问将是一边倒地支持继续施加给希腊的紧缩措施。


And it isn’t just citizens of the large creditor countries, such as Germany, who have little patience for Greece.	而对希腊不耐烦的并不只限于德国等大债权国的公民。


Exasperation is especially widespread among the eurozone’s poorer members.	相对较穷的欧元区成员国尤其愤慨。


Ask the average person on the street in Slovakia, Estonia, or Lithuania, and you are likely to get a response not too different from this one from a Latvian pensioner: “We learned our lesson – why can’t the Greeks learn the same lesson?”	随便问一个斯洛伐克、爱沙尼亚或立陶宛的街头民众，你听到的反应不会和拉脱维亚退休者有多大区别：“我们接受了教训，为何希腊人不能接受同样的教训？ ”


One might argue that Europeans are not well informed about the plight of the Greeks and the damage that austerity has done to the country.	你也许会说，欧洲人并不充分了解希腊人的窘况以及紧缩已经给希腊造成的伤害。


And, indeed, it is possible that with better information, many among them would change their position.	诚然，如果对情况有更好的了解，许多人也许会改变立场。


But the forces of public opinion on which democracies rest rarely take shape in ideal conditions.	但作为民主基础的民意的力量很少形成于理想环境。


Indeed, one need look no further than the Greek vote itself to find an example of raw emotions and outrage winning out over a rational calculation of economic costs and benefits.	事实上，只要看一看希腊公投本身就可以发现，原始冲动和愤怒压倒了理性的经济成本收益分析。


It is important to remember that the creditors in this instance are not a bunch of oligarchs or wealthy private bankers, but the governments of the other eurozone countries, democratically accountable to their own electorates.	在这个例子中，债权人不是一小撮寡头和富有的私人银行家，而是需要被自身选民民主问责的其他欧元区国家政府，记住这一点很重要。


(Whether they did the right thing in 2012 by lending to Greece so that their own bankers could be repaid is a legitimate, but separate question.)	（它们在2012年贷款给希腊以使本国银行家能获得偿付是否正确是一个合理质疑，但这是另一个问题。


This is not a conflict between the Greek demos – its people – and the bankers, as much as it is a conflict between European democracies.	）这不是希腊“德莫斯”（demos，即人民）与银行家之间的冲突，而是欧洲民主国家之间的冲突。


When the Greeks voted “no,” they reaffirmed their democracy; but, more than that, they asserted the priority of their democracy over those in other eurozone countries.	当希腊人说“不”时，他们重申了他们的民主； 但是，在更大的意义上，他们主张他们的民主高于其他欧元区国家的民主。


In other words, they asserted their national sovereignty – their right as a nation to determine their own economic, social, and political path.	换句话说，他们主张他们的国家主权——他们作为一个国家决定自身经济、社会和政治道路的权利。


If the Greek referendum is a victory for anything, it is a victory for national sovereignty.	如果希腊公投是一场胜利的话，那就是一场国家主权的胜利。


That is what makes it so ominous for Europe.	而这也是欧洲的不幸。


The European Union, and even more so the eurozone, was constructed on the expectation that the exercise of national sovereignty would fade away over time.	欧盟建立的基础是期望国家主权的行使会随着时间的推移而逐渐消失——欧元区更是如此。


This was rarely made explicit; sovereignty, after all, is popular.	这一点从未被直观表述； 毕竟，主权受到民众的支持。


But as economic unification narrowed each country’s room for maneuver, it was hoped, national action would be exercised less frequently.	但经济统一化缩窄了各国的动作空间，人们希望，国家行动因此将更加罕有。


The Greek referendum has put perhaps the final nail in the coffin of that idea.	希腊公投也许正式宣判了这一希望死刑。


It need not have been this way.	本不必如此。


Europe’s political elite could have framed the Greek financial crisis as a tale of economic interdependence – you cannot have bad borrowers, after all, without careless lenders – instead of a morality tale pitting frugal, hard-working Germans against profligate, carefree Greeks.	欧洲政治精英本可以将希腊金融危机写成经济互相依存的故事——毕竟，如果贷款人足够谨慎，就不会存在坏借款人——而不是勤俭节约的德国人与铺张恣睢的希腊人相对立的道德故事。


Doing so might have facilitated the sharing of the burden between debtors and creditors and prevented the emergence of the us-versus-them attitude that poisoned the relationship between Greece and the institutions of the eurozone.	这样做也许可以促使债务人和债权人共担负担，阻止“我们与他们”的对立情绪的出现——后者正是恶化希腊与欧元区机构关系的罪魁。


More fundamentally, economic integration could have been accompanied by the expansion of a European political space.	更基本的是，经济一体化本可以伴随欧洲政治空间的扩大。


Compensating for reduced national autonomy by creating room for democratic action at the European level really would have been a victory for democracy.	创造欧洲层面的民主行动空间，���此补偿国家自治权的降低，这才是民主的真正胜利。


It is too late to debate whether the culprit was the unwillingness of the European public to embark on the path toward political union or the timidity of its national politicians to exercise leadership.	争论罪魁祸首是欧洲公众不愿走上通往政治联盟的道路还是各国政客不敢承担领导责任已经太迟了。


The consequence is that in today’s Europe, democracy can be reaffirmed only by asserting national sovereignty.	结果是，在今天的欧洲，民主只能通过主张国家主权重申。


And that is what the Greek electorate has done.	而这正是希腊选民所做的事情。


The referendum is deeply important, but mostly as an act of political symbolism.	希腊公投具有深刻重要性，但基本上只是作为政治象征主义行动。


What remains to be seen is whether the Greek public also has the stomach for the economic actions – in particular, an exit from the eurozone and the introduction of a national currency – that real sovereignty would entail.	仍需要观察希腊公众是否也有采取真正的主权经济行动的意愿——特别是退出欧元区、引入国家货币。


After all, the terms on offer from the country’s creditors are unlikely to change much.	毕竟，债权人的条件不可能有大变化。


If the Greeks voted “no” based on unrealistic expectations that other eurozone democracies would be forced to bend to their wishes, they may be in for another deep disappointment – and their own lesson in democracy.	如果希腊人说“不”是基于不切实际的期望——其他欧元区民主国家将被迫满足他们的愿望，那么等待他们的也许将是又一次深深的失望——以及他们自己的民主教训。


Europe’s Attack on Greek Democracy	对希腊民主的欧洲打击


NEW YORK – The rising crescendo of bickering and acrimony within Europe might seem to outsiders to be the inevitable result of the bitter endgame playing out between Greece and its creditors.	纽约—欧洲内部的争吵和讽刺日益升级，对于外部人士来说，这似乎是希腊及其债权人博弈的苦涩终局的必然结果。


In fact, European leaders are finally beginning to reveal the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute, and the answer is not pleasant: it is about power and democracy much more than money and economics.	事实上，欧洲领导人终于开始揭露这场债务纠纷的真正本质，答案并不邻人愉快：这场纠纷的权力和民主性质远大于资金和经济。


Of course, the economics behind the program that the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) foisted on Greece five years ago has been abysmal, resulting in a 25% decline in the country’s GDP.	当然，“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）五年前强加给希腊的计划背后的经济学不可不谓糟糕透顶，它导致希腊GDP缩水25%。


I can think of no depression, ever, that has been so deliberate and had such catastrophic consequences: Greece’s rate of youth unemployment, for example, now exceeds 60%.	我再也想象不出会有哪次萧条能够比希腊更加“故意”，后果更加灾难性：比如，希腊年轻失业率现已超过60%。


It is startling that the troika has refused to accept responsibility for any of this or admit how bad its forecasts and models have been.	令人震惊的是，三驾马车拒绝为所有这些后果负责，也拒绝承认它们的预测和模型有多糟糕。


But what is even more surprising is that Europe’s leaders have not even learned.	但更令人吃惊的是，欧洲领导人根本没有意识到这一点。


The troika is still demanding that Greece achieve a primary budget surplus (excluding interest payments) of 3.5% of GDP by 2018.	三驾马车依然要求希腊在2018年实现相当于GDP的3. 5%的初级预算盈余（不包括利息支付）。


Economists around the world have condemned that target as punitive, because aiming for it will inevitably result in a deeper downturn.	全世界经济学家都认为这一目标严苛得离谱，因为这必然会导致更深度得衰退。


Indeed, even if Greece’s debt is restructured beyond anything imaginable, the country will remain in depression if voters there commit to the troika’s target in the snap referendum to be held this weekend.	事实上，即使希腊债务能够以超乎任何人想象的程度得到重组，如果希腊选民在本周末进行的提前公投上接受三驾马车的目标，希腊仍将陷入萧条。


In terms of transforming a large primary deficit into a surplus, few countries have accomplished anything like what the Greeks have achieved in the last five years.	在让巨额初级赤字转变为盈余这个问题上，极少有国家曾经取得过过去五年来希腊所取得的成就。


And, though the cost in terms of human suffering has been extremely high, the Greek government’s recent proposals went a long way toward meeting its creditors’ demands.	此外，尽管人力损失成本极其高昂，但希腊政府的最新方案仍朝着满足债权人要求的方向迈进了一大步。


We should be clear: almost none of the huge amount of money loaned to Greece has actually gone there.	我们应该清楚：在贷给希腊的巨额资金中，真正来到希腊的几乎为零。


It has gone to pay out private-sector creditors – including German and French banks.	这些资金都被用来偿还私人债权人了——包括德国和法国银行。


Greece has gotten but a pittance, but it has paid a high price to preserve these countries’ banking systems.	希腊只得到了少得可怜的资金，但却为保护这些国家的银行系统付出了高昂代价。


The IMF and the other “official” creditors do not need the money that is being demanded.	IMF和其他“官方”债权人并不需要它们所要求的资金。


Under a business-as-usual scenario, the money received would most likely just be lent out again to Greece.	在正常情形中，��们所获得的资金最有可能的去向是重新贷给希腊。


But, again, it’s not about the money.	但是，这也并非事关资金。


It’s about using “deadlines” to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable – not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies.	这事关用“截止期”迫使希腊屈服，接受不可接受的条件——不仅仅包括紧缩措施，也包括其他倒行逆施的惩罚性政策。


But why would Europe do this?	但欧洲为什么要这样做？


Why are European Union leaders resisting the referendum and refusing even to extend by a few days the June 30 deadline for Greece’s next payment to the IMF?	欧盟领导人为什么要抵制公投，甚至拒绝将希腊下一次偿付IMF的截止期——6月30日延长几天？


Isn’t Europe all about democracy?	欧洲不是最讲民主吗？


In January, Greece’s citizens voted for a government committed to ending austerity.	1月，希腊选民选出了一个承诺结束紧缩的政府。


If the government were simply fulfilling its campaign promises, it would already have rejected the proposal.	如果希腊政府一心要兑现竞选承诺，那么它已经拒绝这个方案了。


But it wanted to give Greeks a chance to weigh in on this issue, so critical for their country’s future wellbeing.	但希腊政府希望给予希腊人民一个权衡这一问题的机会，这个问题对希腊的未来福祉至关重要。


That concern for popular legitimacy is incompatible with the politics of the eurozone, which was never a very democratic project.	这一公众合法性顾虑与欧元区政治格格不入。 欧元区从来不是一项民主工程。


Most of its members’ governments did not seek their people’s approval to turn over their monetary sovereignty to the ECB.	大部分成员国政府从未征求人民的批准将货币主权交给欧洲央行。


When Sweden’s did, Swedes said no.	瑞典曾经这样做了，结果瑞典人民说了“不”。


They understood that unemployment would rise if the country’s monetary policy were set by a central bank that focused single-mindedly on inflation (and also that there would be insufficient attention to financial stability).	他们明白，如果瑞典货币政策由只关注通货膨胀（而对金融稳定性的关注不足）的央行来制定，失业率就会上升。


The economy would suffer, because the economic model underlying the eurozone was predicated on power relationships that disadvantaged workers.	经济将遭受打击，因为欧元区背后的经济学模型根据不利于工人的权力关系确定的。


And, sure enough, what we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy: Many European leaders want to see the end of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s leftist government.	此外，毫无疑问，如今，在欧元区将这些关系制度化16年后，我们看到的情景与民主完全背道而驰：许多欧洲领导人希望看到总理齐普拉斯的左翼政府的下台。


After all, it is extremely inconvenient to have in Greece a government that is so opposed to the types of policies that have done so much to increase inequality in so many advanced countries, and that is so committed to curbing the unbridled power of wealth.	毕竟，有一个如此反对在如此多发达国家制造了如此大幅不平等性加剧的政策、并且如此致力于遏制有钱人权力放纵的希腊政府是一件令人极度不愉快的事情。


They seem to believe that they can eventually bring down the Greek government by bullying it into accepting an agreement that contravenes its mandate.	他们似乎认为他们可以通过迫使它接受违背其使命最终让希腊政府下台。


It is hard to advise Greeks how to vote on July 5.	很难建议希腊人民在7月5日怎样投票。


Neither alternative – approval or rejection of the troika’s terms – will be easy, and both carry huge risks.	没有一个方案——批准或拒绝三驾马车的条件——是容易的，并且两个方案都含有巨大的风险。


A yes vote would mean depression almost without end.	投赞成票意味着几乎看不到头的萧条。


Perhaps a depleted country – one that has sold off all of its assets, and whose bright young people have emigrated – might finally get debt forgiveness; perhaps, having shriveled into a middle-income economy, Greece might finally be able to get assistance from the World Bank.	也许等到国家被榨干——卖掉它的所有资产，有才华的年轻人都移民国外——才能得到最终的债务豁免； 也许倒退回中等收入经济的希腊才能够最终得到世界银行的援助。


All of this might happen in the next decade, or perhaps in the decade after that.	所有这些都有可能在未来十年发生，也有可能在十年后的十年发生。


By contrast, a no vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands.	相反，投反对票至少能带来一种可能性，希腊极其强大的民主传统能够掌握自己的命运。


Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present.	希腊人也许能够获得决定未来的机会——尽管不如过去繁荣，但要比当下昧着良心的折磨有希望得多。


I know how I would vote.	我知道我会怎么投票。


Greece’s “No” is No Victory for Democracy	希腊说“不”不是民主的胜利


PARIS – Despite what many are saying – especially those who do not have to bear the consequences of their words – Greek voters’ rejection on Sunday of the latest bailout offer from their country’s creditors did not represent a “victory for democracy.”	巴黎—不管很多人怎么说——特别是那些不需要为言论承担后果的人——希腊选民星期日拒绝希腊债权人最新的援助方案并不代表“民主的胜利”。


For democracy, as the Greeks know better than anyone, is a matter of mediation, representation, and orderly delegation of power. It is not ordinarily a matter of referendum.	民主——希腊人应该比其他任何人都更懂得民主——是关于调停、代表和有序权力委托的事情。


Democracy becomes a matter of referendum only in exceptional circumstances: when elected leaders run out of ideas, when they have lost the confidence of their electorate, or when the usual approaches have ceased to work.	只有在极其特殊的环境下，民主才会变成全民公投：当当选领导人束手无策时，当他们失去了选民对他们的信心时，或者当常规手段不再起作用时。


Was that the case in Greece?	希腊是如此吗？


Was the position of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras so weak that he had no better choice than to pass the buck to his people by resorting to the extraordinary form of democracy that is democracy by referendum?	总理齐普拉斯的地位如此弱势，以至于他没有其他更好的选择，只能求诸民主的反常方式——公投民主间该责任推给希腊人民了吗？


What would happen if Greece’s partners, each time they confronted a decision that they lacked the courage to make, broke off discussions and demanded a week to allow the people to decide?	如果希腊的伙伴国一遇到没有勇气作出决定的情况就中断讨论、要求用一周时间让人民来做决定，情况会怎么样？


It is often said – and rightly so – that Europe is too bureaucratic, too unwieldy, too slow to make decisions.	人们常说——说得正确——欧洲太官僚，太笨拙，做决定太慢。


The least that can be said is that Tsipras’s approach does not make up for these defects.	至少可以说，齐普拉斯的方针无法弥补这些缺陷。


(Much more could be said, if it inspires Spanish citizens to take the risky decision of electing a government led by their own anti-austerity party, Podemos.)	（如果这促使西班牙公民铤而走险，将西班牙反紧缩政党社会民主党（Podemos）选上台，那么就更加可以这样说了。 ）


Putting this aside, let us suppose that the decision before Tsipras was so crucial and complex that it merited the exceptional step of referendum.	姑且将这一点放在一边，假设齐普拉斯面前的决定极其关键和复杂，需要采取反常的公投措施。


In that case, the event should have reflected that complexity.	果真如此的话，事件应该反映了这一复杂性。


It should have been a careful and deliberate sounding out of the will of the people.	它应该是人民经过深思熟虑后发出的意愿。


It should have been organized and carried out with due respect for the stakes involved, with the government ensuring that adequate information was relayed to the Greek people.	它应该因为兹事体大而得到充满敬意的组织和实施，政府应该确保希腊人民了解充分的信息。


Instead, Greece got a hastily arranged referendum.	相反，希腊举行的是一场匆忙组织的公投。


It got an opaque – indeed, a downright incomprehensible – referendum question.	公投所涉及的问题是一个不透明的——事实上，是一个完全无法理解的问题。


It got no public-information campaign worthy of the name.	它缺少对得起“公投”名号的公共信息披露运动。


It got an appeal for a “No” vote that no one understood; the details of the proposals that Greek voters were supposed to reject were not even disclosed to them.	它号召一个没人理解的“不”选项； 希腊选民准备拒绝的方案的细节并未向他们披露。