Because they attract followers, governments must take them into account both as allies and adversaries.	因为它们吸引追随者，所以政府或必须与之结盟或与之为敌。


A few decades ago, large organizations like multinational corporations or the Roman Catholic Church were the most typical type of transnational organization.	数十年以前，如跨国公司和罗马天主教会一类的庞大组织是最典型的跨国组织。


Such organizations remain important, but the reduced cost of communication in the Internet era has opened the field to loosely structured network organizations with little headquarters staff and even to individuals.	这些组织现在仍然重要，但因特网时代通讯成本的降低为总部人手精干，结构松散的组织甚至为个人进入这一领域打开了方便之门。


These flexible groups are particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders.	这些灵活的集团在跨越边界渗透到不同国家方面特别有效。


Because they often involve citizens who are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries, they can focus the attention of media and governments onto their issues, creating new transnational political coalitions.	由于这些组织往往会有在好几个国家的政治生活中颇具影响力的公民参与，它们就能将传媒和政府的注意力集中到它们自己的议题上来，从而建立新的跨国政治联盟。


A rough way to gauge the increasing importance of transnational organizations is to count how many times these organizations are mentioned in mainstream media publications.	国际组织日益增长的重要性可以粗略地通过这些组织在主流媒体出版物上被提及的次数来衡量。


The use of the term "non-governmental organization" or "NGO" has increased 17-fold since 1992.	自1992年以来，"非政府组织"或"NGO"这一字眼的使用增加了17倍。


In addition to Human Rights Watch, other NGO's such as Transparency International, Oxfam, and Doctors without Borders have undergone exponential growth in terms of mainstream media mentions.	除了"人权观察"之外，其它NGO如"透明国际"、"Oxfam"和"无国界医生组织"等在主流媒体上被提及的次数都呈几何级增长。


By this measure, the biggest NGO's have become established players in the battle for the attention of influential editors.	就这一点来看，最大的一些NGO都已成为了争夺有影响力的编辑注意力的高手。


In these circumstances, governments can no longer maintain the barriers to information flows that historically protected officials from outside scrutiny.	在这样的情况下，政府再也不能为资讯流动设置障碍。 这种障碍曾保护官员不受来自外界的审查。


Even large countries with hard power, such as the United States, are affected.	就算是像美国那样拥有硬权力的大国也受到了影响。


NGO's played key roles in the disruption of the World Trade Organization summit in 1999, the passage of the Landmines Treaty, and the ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in May 2003.	NGO在干扰1999年世界贸易组织峰会，《地雷公约》的通过和2003年5月《烟草控制框架协议》的批准方面都扮演了关键角色。


The US, for example, initially had strong objections to the Convention on Tobacco Control, but dropped them in the face of international criticism.	例如，美国起初强烈反对《烟草控制框架协议》，但在国际舆论的谴责下也做出妥协。


The Landmines Treaty was created despite the opposition of the strongest bureaucracy (the Pentagon) in the world's largest military power.	《地雷公约》也突破世界第一军事大国最强大官僚机构（五角大楼）的反对而诞生了。


Similarly, transnational corporations are often targets of NGO campaigns to "name and shame" companies that pay low wages in poor countries.	同样，跨国公司也因为在穷国付低工资而经常成为被NGO"点名并羞辱"的对象。


Such campaigns sometimes succeed because they can credibly threaten to damage the value of global brand names.	这样的行动因为能有效地威胁到一些全球品牌的价值而时常获得成功。


Royal Dutch Shell, for example, announced in 2003 that it would not drill in any spots designated by UNESCO as World Heritage sites.	例如皇家荷兰壳牌石油公司在2003年宣布其不会在联合国教科文组织所认定的"世界遗产"保护地钻一口井。


This decision came two years after the company acceded to pressure from environmentalists and scrapped plans to drill in a World Heritage site in Bangladesh.	该公司在两年前因为面临环境保护主义者的压力而放弃了在孟加拉国一处"世界遗产"保护地开采石油的计划。


Transnational drug companies were shamed by NGO's into abandoning lawsuits in South Africa in 2002 over infringements of their patents on drugs to fight AIDS.	2003年的决定也是这一事件的结果。 跨国制药公司也在NGO的羞辱下放弃了在2002年对南非提起的关于该国侵犯艾滋病药物专利的诉讼。


Similar campaigns of naming and shaming have affected the investment and employment patterns of Mattel, Nike, and a host of other companies.	类似的"点名并羞辱"行动还影响了Mattel、Nike和其它几家公司的投资和雇用方式。


NGO's vary enormously in their organization, budgets, accountability, and sense of responsibility for the accuracy of their claims.	NGO在组织、预算、义务和对其主张准确性的责任感方面可谓差别巨大。


It is hyperbole when activists call such movements "the world's other superpower," yet governments ignore them at their peril.	活动家们将这些运动称为"世界的另一种超级强权"可能是在夸张，但政府对它们的忽视却是危险的。


Some have reputations and credibility that give them impressive domestic as well as international soft power.	有些组织的名誉和可信度赋予了它们在国内和国际上的相当的软权力。


Others lack credibility among moderate citizens but can mobilize demonstrations that demand the attention of governments.	有些虽然在民众中缺乏公信力但却能通过调动示威而要求政府的关注。


For better and for worse, NGO's and network organizations have resources and do not hesitate to use them.	不论好坏，NGO和网络组织都拥有相当的资源并会毫不犹豫的使用它们。


Do NGO's make world politics more democratic?	NGO使世界政治变得更民主吗？


Not in the traditional sense of the word.	我们不能从传统意义上去理解民主。


Most are elite organizations with narrow membership bases.	大多数的NGO是建立在严密的成员制度基础之上的精英组织。


Some act irresponsibly and with little accountability.	有些组织的行为不负责任且没有公信力。


Yet they tend to pluralize world politics by calling attention to issues that governments prefer to ignore, and by acting as pressure groups across borders.	但它们通过让人们关注政府不愿关注的问题和作为跨国界的压力集团而使世界政治多元化。


In that sense, they serve as antidotes to traditional government bureaucracies.	在这一点上，它们充当着传统政府官僚主义的解毒剂的角色。


Governments remain the major actors in world politics, but they now must share the stage with many more competitors for attention.	各国政府仍然是国际政治舞台上的主要演员，但它们现在必须与许多竞争对手一起分享这一舞台，争夺眼球。


Non-governmental actors are changing world politics.	非政府的演员们正改变着世界政治。


After Abu Ghraib, even US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld must take notice.	在阿布格勒布丑闻之后，就连美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德也必须对此留意了。


The Rising Sons of North Africa	北非政坛的领袖之子


LONDON – The role played by Libyan ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, in gaining the release of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s state visit to Washington accompanied by his son, Gamal, suggest that dynastic successions are underway in both countries.	伦敦 —— 利比亚统治者 穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲之子 赛义夫·伊斯兰在争取洛克比爆炸案犯 阿卜杜勒·阿里·迈加里获释中所起的作用，以及埃及总统 胡斯尼·穆巴拉克在其子贾迈勒的陪同下赴华盛顿访问，这两个事件都清楚地表明，相关国家在无声无息地推进着世袭进程。


They are not alone.	这并不是什么孤立事件。


Mubarak and Qaddafi, along with Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, are among the world’s oldest and longest-serving heads of state.	穆巴拉克和卡扎菲，还有突尼斯的 宰因·阿比丁·本阿里和阿尔及利亚的 阿卜杜拉齐兹·布特弗利卡，都是世界上年龄最大、执政时间最长的国家领导人。


All four face the ticklish problem of succession, and speculation has been mounting for some time of possible attempts to keep power in the family.	他们四位都面临着棘手的继承问题，一段时间以来，有关他们要将权力留在家族内部的猜测越来普遍。


That solution is becoming pretty commonplace, from the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan to the Kims of North Korea to the Assads in Syria.	这种做法已经司空见惯，从阿塞拜疆的阿利耶夫到北朝鲜的金氏再到叙利亚的阿萨德家族。


Dynastic succession safeguards the immediate and frequently extensive interests of the ruling family as well as those of the wider political and business elite.	世袭继承捍卫了执政家族直接而广泛的利益，更大范围的政治和商业精英们的利益也同样能够得到保护。


But the possibility of near simultaneous successions in North Africa is striking nonetheless.	尽管如此，北非诸国世袭继承几乎同时发生的情况还是非常引人瞩目。


All four North African rulers have, to greater or lesser degrees, made themselves the center of highly opaque power structures.	上述北非四国领袖都或多或少都处在高度不透明权力架构的核心位置。


Everything in their countries depends on the person and family rather than the office.	他们国家的一切都取决于个人和家族，而不是政府机构。


Yet, despite these authoritarian leaders’ apparently solid grip on power, ensuring that a relative takes over is not as simple as it seems.	但即使这些独裁领导人表面看来似乎牢牢控制着权力，但确保由亲属继承元首位置也不是一项简单的任务。


The problem boils down to overcoming possible resistance – from both the elite and the public – that could derail the handover or undermine the successor’s authority.	问题归结为克服从上层到公众的可能的阻力 —— 这些阻力可能破坏继承人的权威和权力的移交。


Dealing with elite interests requires ingenuity.	处理上层利益需要具备聪明才智。


Lucrative business opportunities can be allocated to soothe the successor’s political adversaries, while renegades can be targeted to discourage others – for example, by being stripped of property or dismissed from positions of influence.	可以借助利润丰厚的商业机会来安抚继承者的政治对手，也可以打击背叛者以儆效尤 —— 比方说没收财产，或者剥夺高官厚禄。


Where members of the ruling family hold direct commercial interests – as in Libya and Tunisia – the political transition is certain to cause collateral economic damage.	在执政家族掌握直接商业利益的国家 —— 比方说利比亚和突尼斯 —— 政治领域的过渡肯定会导致相应的经济损失。


For example, if Qaddafi’s fourth son, Muatasim, emerges as the successor, he could take away Saif al-Islam’s business holdings and ability to profit from foreign contracts.	比方说，如果卡扎菲的第四个儿子 莫塔西姆最终被选定为继任者，赛义夫·伊斯兰的控股公司以及从国外合同中牟利的特权就可能会被他夺走。


In Tunisia, a successor from the Trabelsi branch of the Ben Ali clan – linked to the president through his second wife, Leila Trabelsi – could target the extensive interests of families related to Ben Ali’s daughters from a previous marriage.	而在突尼斯，来自本阿里家族特拉贝尔西分支的继任者与总统通过他的第二任妻子莱拉·特拉贝尔西联系在一起 —— 这可能会损害与本阿里前妻的女儿有关的牵涉面极广的家族利益。


Securing popular legitimacy requires equal dexterity, which has played an important role in preventing North African leaders and family members from openly admitting their preparations for dynastic successions.	争取公众承认的合法地位同样需要依靠机敏的反应，对舆论的忌惮在防止北非领导人及其家族成员公开承认准备世袭继承时发挥了重要的作用。


In Egypt, where such preparations are the most obvious, Gamal and other senior figures have stubbornly denied his presidential ambitions.	在世袭继承意图最明显不过的埃及，贾迈勒和其他高层人士一直在顽固地否认他继任总统的抱负。


At the same time, room has been made for Gamal to build a public profile of his own through his senior role in the ruling party, and a constitutional framework has been put in place that will allow him to be elected in multi-candidate elections, thus establishing a façade of republican legitimacy.	但另一方面，当局又在为贾迈勒创造条件，通过在执政党内部任职打造他本人的公众形象，同时还建立了宪法框架，允许他在有多名候选人参与的选举中参选，并借此制造出符合共和规则的假象。


This strategy may find imitators.	这种操作手法可能会引起仿效。


Ben Ali’s son-in-law, Sakhr el-Materi, was last year elected to the central committee of the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique party.	本阿里的女婿 萨克赫尔·马泰（ Sakhr el-Materi ）去年通过选举进入了执政的宪政民主联盟党中央委员会。


In Algeria, Bouteflika’s brother, Said, has been linked to a “grassroots” movement that – it is rumored – could eventually serve as a basis for his succession bid.	在阿尔及利亚，布特弗利卡的兄弟赛义德已经与某“基层”运动组织建立了联系，谣言认为该运动可能最终成为他继位大业的基础。


But these two cases are at much earlier stages, and their prospects for success more uncertain.	但这两个例子还处在非常早期的阶段，而它们的成功前景也更加难以预料。


In Libya, Saif al-Islam has sought to distinguish himself as an agent of democratic change by setting up “non-governmental” organizations, establishing “independent” media outlets, and even sponsoring his own private drafting committee for a new constitution.	在利比亚，赛义夫·伊斯兰通过建立“非政府”组织、开辟“独立的”媒体渠道、甚至出资赞助属于他本人的新宪法起草委员会，试图将自己装扮成民主变革的代言人。


But he has encountered stubborn resistance from key elite groups, who regard his agenda as a threat to their vested interests.	但是他遭遇了来自重要精英团体的坚决抵制，后者认为他的议程安排威胁到了自己的既得利益。


The legitimacy question is particularly problematic if the ruler’s biography or charisma is closely tied to the legitimacy of the regime.	如果执政者的个人经历或魅力与政权合法性的关系太过密切，那么其地位合法与否就会成为更大的问题。


In Libya, the regime’s founding myth is inextricably linked to Qaddafi’s 1969 coup and his eclectic political theories.	利比亚政府建立的神话与卡扎菲 1969 年政变及其折衷的政治理论有着无法割裂的联系。


His departure would expose the anachronistic nature of the state’s ideological foundation; family ties will do nothing to protect his successor from the resulting shock to the system.	他的去职将使该国意识形态基础的时代性错误暴露无余，而家族关系丝毫无助于防止他的继任者给现有国家制度带来的冲击。


The Algerian situation is similar.	阿尔及利亚的情况也非常相似。


The regime’s legitimacy is based on the war of independence, with all presidents to date having played important roles in it.	独立战争奠定了阿政权合法地位的基础，迄今为止的历任总统都在其中扮演过重要角色。


But Bouteflika’s most likely successors, including his brother, almost certainly will not have this tie.	但布特弗利卡最有可能的继任者，包括他的兄弟在内，几乎肯定不会具备这样的联系。


As in Egypt, public opposition to a succession seen to threaten the republican order could sharpen the army’s understanding of itself as guardian of the state, prompting it to intervene.	而在埃及，公众对威胁共和秩序的继位企图的抵制可能会加深军队对捍卫国家使命的理解，导致军队出面干涉。


This is much more likely in Algeria than in Egypt.	阿尔及利亚发生这种情况的可能性比埃及大得多。


Another public-relations problem concerns business interests.	另外一个公关难题牵涉到商业利益。


In Egypt, Gamal Mubarak will have to counter the widespread perception that his interests are aligned with close allies among the business elite, notably steel tycoon Ahmed el-Ezz.	埃及的贾迈勒·穆巴拉克不得不对抗公众的观点，后者认为他的利益与其在商业精英阶层的亲密盟友，尤其是钢铁巨头 Ahmed el-Ezz 捆绑在一起。


Gamal could seek to dispel this perception by publicly making examples of regime cronies involved in excesses.	贾迈勒可以借公开指明参与越轨行为的政府亲信来对这种观点���以驳斥。


While business interests are not as openly discussed in Tunisia, they are no less unpopular.	虽然突尼斯对商业利益的讨论不像埃及这样公开，但这种事情同样被民众所厌恶。


Ben Ali’s successor could raise his profile by clamping down on cronyism.	本阿里可以通过打击任人唯亲来提升自己的公众形象。


The four rulers have deliberately played their succession cards close to their chests.	四位执政者都有意不揭开继任者的谜底。


Keeping everyone in suspense helps prevent the emergence of organized opposition to a dynastic succession.	让人们猜疑不定能防止出现对世袭继承行为的有组织的反抗活动。


Moreover, they may worry that heirs apparent will seek to force them out of office prematurely.	此外，他们也可能担心自己指定的继承人会企图迫使他们提前让位。


Thus, Ben Ali has demoted prominent politicians back when they attained sufficient influence to be considered potential successors.	因此，本阿里会将影响力足以成为潜在继任者的著名政治人士降职。


He is apparently concerned that one of them could imitate a coup like the one he led in 1987 that toppled Habib Bourguiba.	他显然担心他们中的某个人可能会模仿他在 1987 年推翻 哈比卜·布尔吉巴 的那次军事政变。


(He has since changed the constitution to prevent a repeat).	（他随后就修改了宪法以防止类似事件再次发生）。


In Libya, the fortunes of Saif al-Islam and Muatasim have waxed and waned as Qaddafi enforces his authority to prevent the emergence of a challenger.	在利比亚，赛义夫·伊斯兰和 莫塔西姆的影响力随着卡扎菲行使权威、防止挑战者出现的举措而起起落落。


While few obstacles remain in Gamal’s path to power in Egypt, in Algeria, meanwhile, a bid to install Said would likely collapse against resistance from powerful regime interests.	虽然贾迈勒在埃及掌权已经没有太多障碍，但在阿尔及利亚，将赛义德扶上宝座的努力可能会在强大政权利益的抵制下付诸东流。


The Rising Wealth of Nations	不断增长的国家财富


The new Penn World Table, Version 6.2, comparing standards of living across countries, has just been released.	将不同国家生活水平进行比较的最新6. 2版 宾夕法尼亚大学世界表（ Penn World Table）刚刚出版。


The latest figures are for 2004, and, because of data lags, not all countries are included.	最新的数据来自2004年，因为数据搜集的滞后，有些国家还没有统计进去。


Yet these numbers are valuable because they are of exceptional quality and they correct systematically for relative price differences across countries, which sometimes leads to surprising results.	尽管如此，这些数据仍然非常珍贵，因为它们不仅权威，而且系统地修正了不同国家间的相对价格差异，而修正后的结果有时会令所有人感到惊奇。


Among the 82 countries for which 2004 data are now available, there has been really good news: real per capita GDP has risen by an average of 18.9% between 2000 and 2004, or 4.4% per year.	在2004年数据统计已经完成的82个国家中，的确传出了令人振奋的消息：2000到2004年间，人均实际国内生产总值（GDP）平均增长了189%，或每年增长4.


People generally are a lot better off than they were just a few years ago.	4%。 从总体来看，人们都比若干年前富裕很多。


At this rate, real per capita GDP will double every 16 years.	如果保持这样的速度，人均实际国内生产总值将实现每16年翻一番。


Many people who could not afford a car in 2000 now have one, and people who could afford only one car in 2000 now have two.	很多在2000年买不起车的人买了车，而2000年只能买一辆车的人现在则有了两辆。


People who could not afford to send their children to a good school or college now can.	以前不能让孩子上好学校或好大学的人现在已经有这个能力。


And so it is with many different goods and services that people consume.	人们的消费分散在各种各样的商品和服务领域。


One surprise is that there has been relatively little change in the ranking of countries by real per capita GDP since 2000.	有一点出乎人们的意料，那就是从2000年到现在，各国人均实际国内生产总值排名并没有发生多大变化。


Despite all the talk about the Chinese economic miracle, China’s ranking has risen only slightly, from 61st out of 82 countries in 2000 to 60th in 2004 – even though per capita real GDP grew by 44% between 2000 and 2004, or 9.6% a year, the highest of the major countries.	尽管所有人都在谈论中国的经济奇迹，但中国的排名只是略有上升，从2000年在82个国家中排名第61位上升到2004年的第60位¾尽管从2000到2004年间中国的人均实际国内生产总值增长了44%，相当于每年增长9. 6%，在所有大国中独占鳌头。


The reason China has not risen higher is that other countries have been growing too, and because the gaps between countries are enormous.	中国排名没有多大进步的原因是其他国家也在发展，还因为国与国之间的差距非常之大。


The range between the poorest and the richest countries in the world is a factor of more than 100.	世界上最穷和最富的国家之间相差一百多位。


The average real per capita GDP of the top 25% of countries is 15 times that of the bottom 25%.	排名前25位国家的人均实际国内生产总值是排名后25位国家的15倍。


Watching these countries progress is like watching a marathon.	关注这些国家的发展就像在观赏一场马拉松赛。


At first, one is impressed by most of the runners, almost all of whom seem to be going fast.	开始时，多数选手都非常引入瞩目，似乎所有人都飞快地向前奔跑。


As they pass by, all spread out, one sees that some runners seem to be gaining rapidly.	当他们拉开距离从你身边跑过时，你就能看到有些选手似乎正在快速地缩短与领先者的距离。


And yet they do not often overtake one another, because the distances between them are so large.	但他们并不经常完成超越，因为他们之间相距实在太远。


Indeed, other runners are out of sight, perhaps miles ahead.	实际可能根本看不到其他选手，因为选手之间可能有着几英里的差距。


China isn’t the only success story.	中国并非唯一一个成功的范例。


Other big winners in terms of real per capita GDP between 2000 and 2004 are Lithuania (up 48%), Romania (up 41%), Estonia (up 40%), Chile (up 33%), Hungary (up 32%), Greece (up 31%), New Zealand (up 28%), Australia (up 25%), Korea (up 23%), Ireland (up 23%), South Africa (up 23%), and Nigeria (up 22%).	2000到2004年间在人均实际国内生产总值领域表现优异的还有 立陶苑（增长 48%）、罗马尼亚（增长41%）、 爱沙尼亚（增长 40%）、智利（增长33%）、匈牙利（增长32%）、希腊（增长31%）、新西兰（增长28%）、澳大利亚（增长25%）、韩国（增长23%）、爱尔兰（增长23%）、南非（增长23%）和尼日利亚（增长22%）。


Some of the worst performers among the major countries are Israel (a beleaguered country, with real per capita GDP up only 2% between 2000 and 2004) and Argentina (hit by a terrible financial crisis in 2001-2, up only 9% between 2000 and 2004).	大国之中表现最差的包括以色列（这个国家问题成堆，人均实际国内生产总值从2000年2004年只增长了2%）和阿根廷（遭到2001-2年严重金融危机的重创，人均实际国内生产总值从2000年2004年只增长了9%）。


Economic performance in several Latin American countries was relatively weak in this period, with Uruguay’s real GDP per capita actually recording a fall by a fraction of a percent.	这一期间几个拉美国家的经济表现也不尽如人意，其中乌拉圭的人均实际国内生产总值下降了不到百分之一。


But the overall picture is amazingly good.	尽管如此，总体情况还是相当令人满意的。


If such growth rates continue, we will see relatively poor countries like India, Indonesia, the Philippines, or Nicaragua reach the average levels currently enjoyed by advanced countries in 50 years.	如果保持这样的增长速度，印度、印尼、菲律宾或 尼加拉瓜等较穷的国家就可以在50年内赶上目前发达国家的水平。


But, of course, they will not have caught up with these countries, for those countries will have moved ahead too.	不过当然，它们还无法赶上发达国家，因为这些国家也在向前发展。


It is hard to imagine now what that world will be like with a doubling or quadrupling of just about every country’s GDP.	很难想象如果几乎所有国家的国内生产总值都翻一番或翻两番，这个世界将会变成什么样子。


What would all these countries do with all that money?	这些国家会用这些��来做什么呢？


In 1958, the economist John Kenneth Galbraith wrote the best-selling book The Affluent Society , in which he argued that the advanced world as typified by the United States had by that year finally emerged from “grim scarcity,” when dire necessity dictated our lives, to a “world of affluence.”	1958年，经济学家 约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷思(John Kenneth Galbraith)写成了畅销书《富裕社会》，提出以美国为首的发达国家民众已经从为生活必需品疲于奔命的“可怕的匮乏”中摆脱出来，进入了全新的“富足世界”。


He wrote: “So great has been the change [in standards of living] that many of the desires of the individual are no longer even evident to him.	他在书中写道：“生活水准的变化如此之大，以致于普通民众的很多愿望都再也不像过去那么明显。


They become so only as they are synthesized, elaborated and nurtured by advertising and salesmanship, and these, in turn, have become among our most important and talented professions.”	广告和推销培养、成就和放大了人们的愿望，而人们的愿望也使这些行业变成了强手如林的重要所在。 ”


But real per capita GDP in the US is now three times higher than it was in 1958.	但现在美国的人均实际国内生产总值已经是1958年的3倍。


What have people been spending all that extra money on?	人们把多出来的钱都花在了什么地方？


Is it all dictated by advertisers and salesmen who are inventing needs?	消费是否真的由创造需求的广告商和推销员们一手操纵？


According to my calculations comparing 1958 and 2005 data from the US Department of Commerce, Americans spent 27% of the huge increase in income between 1958 and 2005 on medical care, 23% on their homes, 12% on transportation, 10% on recreation, and 9% on personal business activities.	根据我对美国商务部1958和2005年统计数据所进行的比较，1958到2005年间，美国公民把收入增长的27%用于医疗保健、23%用于房屋、12%用于交通、10%用来娱乐，还有9%用于从事个人商务活动。


The kinds of things that advertisers and salesmen typically promote were relatively unimportant.	相形之下，广告商和推销员大肆推销的东西并不那么重要。


Food got only 8% of the extra money, clothing only 3%, and personal care 1%.	仅有8%的额外收入用于购买食品、3%购买衣物、用于个人保健的仅为1%。


Unfortunately, idealistic activities also received little of the extra money: 3% for welfare and religious activities, and a similar share for education.	令人遗憾的是，只有很少一部分投入了实现人类理想的活动：3%用于福利和宗教活动，教育所得到的份额也相差无几。


Thus, most of the extra money was spent on staying healthy, having a nice home, traveling and relaxing, and doing a little business.	归根结底，绝大部分的额外收入被用于医疗保健、购买和装饰家居、旅游、休闲，和做点小生意。


That sounds like what really happened in the US. Maybe that is the way it will be around the world.	这非常符合美国的实际情况，也许与其他国家的情况也相差无几。


As long as we can keep worldwide growth going at its current rate, billions of people can look forward to the same kind of improvement.	只要我们能保持目前的经济增长速度，成百上千亿人同样能够从中受益。


And that should be truly inspirational.	这真的让人激动不已。


The Risk of European Centralization	欧洲集中化的风险


FRANKFURT – For many European leaders, the eurozone crisis demonstrates the need for “more Europe,” the final aim being to create a full-fledged political union.	法兰克福—对许多欧洲领导人来说，欧元区危机说明了需要“更欧洲”，最终创造出完整的政治联盟。


Given the continent’s history of war and ideological division, and today’s challenges posed by globalization, a peaceful, prosperous, and united Europe that wields influence abroad is surely a desirable goal.	欧洲大陆的历史充满着战争和意识形态分歧，如今又经受着全球化的挑战，因此和平、繁荣、统一、对外影响力四射欧洲显然是值得追求的目标。


But major disagreements about how to achieve that goal remain.	但关于如何实现这一目标，仍存在大量分歧。


Historically, monetary union was regarded as the route to political union.	从历史上看，货币联盟是通往政治联盟的捷径。


In the 1950’s, the French economist Jacques Rueff, a close adviser to Charles de Gaulle, argued that “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie, ou ne se fera pas” (Europe will be made through the currency, or it will not be made).	20世纪50年代，戴高乐亲信顾问、法国经济学家吕埃夫（Jacques Rueff）提出“欧洲将通过货币构筑，除此之外别无他法。


Germany’s President Richard von Weizsäcker echoed this view almost a half-century later, declaring that only via a single currency would Europeans achieve a common foreign policy.	”近五十年后，德国总统魏茨泽克与这一观点遥相呼应，宣称只有通过单一货币，欧洲才能形成共同对外政策。


More recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel asserted that “if the euro fails, Europe will fail.”	更近一些，德国总理默克尔认为“如果欧元失败，欧洲也将失败。 ”


But the crisis confronting “Europe” is not so much about political union as it is about European Economic and Monetary Union.	但“欧洲”所面临的的危机与欧洲经济和货币联盟的关系远甚于与政治联盟的关系。


If anything, efforts to hold EMU together may have taken us further from the goal of a common foreign policy by re-igniting within member states (regardless of whether they give or receive financial aid) nationalist resentments that we hoped had died long ago.	要说坚持欧洲货币联盟有什么影响的话，那就是令我们距离共同外交政策的目标更加遥远了——成员国内部（不管该国是给予还是接受了金融援助）纷纷爆发我们希望早就已经死去的民族主义情绪。


Politicians launched monetary union in 1999, despite warnings that the constituent economies were too diverse.	政客们在1999年成立了货币联盟，尽管有人警告欧洲大陆的经济体之间多样性太大。


It wasn’t long before several states violated the Stability and Growth Pact.	没过多久，不少国家就违反了稳定和增长公约。


Later, the eurozone’s “no bail-out” principle was abandoned.	再后来，欧元区的“无援助”原则也被抛弃了。


The response to these failings, however, was a demand for greater economic integration, including such intermediate steps as the creation of a “European finance minister” or an EU commissioner with sweeping powers to facilitate closer integration.	但是，对这些失败的反应是要求更大的经济一体化，包括成立“欧洲财政部”或由一名欧盟委员总览促进一体化大权等中间步骤。


Such ideas, of course, ignored the central issues of national sovereignty and democracy, and specifically the privilege of nationally elected governments and parliaments to determine their own taxes and public spending.	当然，这些观点忽视了国家主权和民主等核心问题，特别是各国民选政府和议会决定本国税收和公共支出的特权。


The fact that sovereign member states did not deliver on their European commitments is hardly a convincing argument for giving up sovereignty now.	主权成员国没有兑现欧洲承诺，这一事实无法令人相信它们现在会放弃主权。


In short, all of the measures that would implicitly support political union have turned out to be inconsistent and dangerous.	简言之，所有间接支持政治联盟的措施都是前后矛盾且危险的。


They have involved huge financial risks for eurozone members.	它们包括了欧元区成员国的巨大金融风险。


They have fueled tensions among member states.	它们助长了成员国之间的紧张之势。


Perhaps most important, they have undermined the basis on which political union rests – namely, persuading European Union citizens to identify with the European idea.	也许最重要的是，它们破坏了政治联盟的基石——即说服欧盟人民认同欧洲思想。


Public support for “Europe” depends to a large degree on its economic success.	对“欧洲”的公众支持在很大程度上取决于其经济成功。


Indeed, it is Europe’s economic achievements that give it a political voice in the world.	事实上，欧洲在世界政治舞台上的分量正是来自其经济成就。


But, as the current crisis indicates, the best-performing EU economies are those with (relatively) flexible labor markets, reasonable tax rates, and open access to professions and business.	但是，最近的危机表明，表现最好的欧盟经济体具有“相对”灵活的劳动力市场、合理的税率以及职业和商业的开放态度。


Moreover, the impetus for economic reform has come not from the EU, but from national governments, one of the most successful examples being “Agenda 2010,” launched a decade ago by then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.	此外，经济改革的动力并不来自欧盟，而来自国家政府，其中最成功的例子之一是十年前由时任德国总理施罗德宣布的“2010日程”（Agenda 2010）。


Numerous academic studies, following the work of the American economic historian Douglass North, support the notion that it is competition among states and regions that lays the groundwork for technological progress and economic growth.	从美国经济史学家诺斯（Douglas North）开始，无数学术研究都支持技术进步和经济增长的额基础是国家和地区间的竞争这一观念。


The total failure of the Lisbon Agenda, launched in March 2000 to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-base economy in the world” demonstrated the weakness of a centralized approach.	发布于2000年3月的里斯本日程（Lisbon Agenda）——旨在让欧盟成为“世界上最有竞争力、最有活力的基于知识的经济”——的彻底失败证明了集中观点的弱点。


Arguably, in earlier centuries, it was competition within Europe that generated unparalleled dynamism and prosperity across much of the continent.	可以说，在过去几个世纪中，是欧洲内部的竞争造就了欧洲大陆大部无与伦比的活力和繁荣。


To be sure, this was also a time of wars.	诚然，这段时间战争频仍。


However, this does not mean that centralization is the best – much less the only – way to guarantee peace.	但是，这并不意味着集中化是确保和平的最佳方式，更不用说唯一方式了。


But, once again, EU leaders responded by concluding the opposite: the Lisbon Agenda’s failure was interpreted as justifying still more harmonization and centralization of national policies.	但是，在这方面，欧盟领导人的反应再次背道而驰：里斯本日程的失败被解释为国家政策需要进一步调和和集中的论据。


True to form, in his “State of the Union” address to the European Parliament in September 2012, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso called for a more powerful Commission.	一如既往地，在其2012年9月名为《联盟之国》（State of the Union）的演讲中，欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐呼吁加强欧盟委员会的权力。


This approach – harmonization, coordination, and centralized decision-making – continues to be regarded as a panacea for Europe’s problems.	这一观点——决策的调和、协调和集中化——仍然被视为解决欧洲问题的万灵丹。


It is the sort of pretense of knowledge that the economist Friedrich von Hayek denounced as a recipe for constraining freedom and ensuring economic mediocrity.	这正是经济学家哈耶克所谓的虚假的知识。 哈耶克认为此乃约束自由、注定带来经济平庸的办法。


Indeed, the European project should start from the premise that appropriate institutions, property rights, and competition, together with a growth-friendly tax system and solid fiscal policies, are the basis of economic success.	事实上，欧洲工程的起点乃是，合适的���度、产权和竞争加上增长友好型税收制度和稳健的财政政策构成了经济成功的基础。


The dangers of a centralizing approach can also be seen in the relationship between the 17 current eurozone members and the 11 non-eurozone EU states.	集中化观点的危险还可以见于目前17个欧元区成员国和11个非欧元区成员国欧盟国家之间的关系中。


As the former press on with greater integration, the adverse economic consequences of doing so are likely to deter the latter from EMU participation (which may be another sign that institutional competition cannot be suppressed forever).	前者要求进一步一体化，但这样做的经济副作用可能抑制后者加入欧洲货币联盟（这也是制度竞争不可能永远压制的又一信号）。


There are plenty of areas in which common action at the EU level is both appropriate and efficient.	在众多领域，欧盟层面的共同行动既合理又高效。


Environmental policy is clearly one.	环境政策显然是其中之一。


But centralization of economic decision-making, as an end in itself, cannot underpin a prosperous and powerful Europe.	但经济决策的集中化不可能带来繁荣而有力的欧洲。


Jean Monnet, one of the EU’s founding fathers, once said that, given the chance to start the European integration process again, he would have begun with culture – a dimension in which we neither need nor want centralization.	欧盟之父让·莫内（Jean Monnet）曾说，如果他有机会重新启动欧盟一体化过程，他会从文化开始——这是一个不需要也不想要集中化的领域。


Europe’s cultural richness consists precisely in its diversity, and the basis for its finest achievements has been competition between people, institutions, and places.	欧洲的丰富文化正是存在于它的多样性之中，而其最伟大的成就的基础正在于民族、制度和地方之间的竞争。


Its current economic malaise reflects European leaders’ prolonged efforts to deny the obvious.	欧洲目前的经济窘境是欧洲领导人长期试图否认这一显而易见的真相的结果。


Green Sovereign Wealth	绿色主权财富


PARIS – At the end of 2011, sovereign-wealth funds’ assets under management amounted to $3 trillion, following 237 direct investments worth $81 billion that year.	巴黎—2011年底，主权财富基金的资产管理总额达到了3万亿美元，在2011年当年直接投资了237个项目，投资总额810亿美元。


Some experts even estimate SWFs’ assets to be worth $6 trillion.	一些专家甚至估计主权财富基金的资产总量价值6万亿美元。


This means that SWFs, the avatars of state capitalism, are now twice as rich as the world’s hedge funds, the totems of liberal capitalism’s excesses.	这意味着主权财富基金——国家资本主义的象比对冲基金——自有资本主义的图腾有钱两倍。


The growing might of SWFs is causing concern – and, in some cases, inciting virulent criticism – particularly in host OECD countries, where many fear the redistribution of financial, economic, and political power to emerging countries that have very different political regimes from their own.	主权财富基金实力的增长引起了担忧——有时甚至是恶意攻击——特别是经合组织成员东道国的担忧，很多人担心金融、经济和政治实力的再分配，而新兴国家与它们自身的政治体制又大不相同。


In fact, of the seven SWFs that control more than two-thirds of all SWFs’ assets, three are from Asia (one from China and two from Singapore) and three are from the Middle East (Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Qatar).	事实上，七家主权财富基金掌握着主权财富基金资产总量的三分之二以上，其中三家来自亚洲（一家来自中国，两家来自新加坡），三家来自中东（阿布扎比、科威特和卡塔尔）。


European countries rank first among hosts for SWF investments, accounting for more than 40% of the total value of deals in 2011.	欧洲国家在主权财富基金投资东道国名单中名列榜首，2011年总交易额的四成落在了欧洲。


The United States, where opposition to such investments has been stronger, accounts for less than 10%.	对主权财富基金反对更激烈的美国只占主权财富基金投资的10%。


These countries’ concerns are not entirely unfounded.	这些国家的担心并非完全站不住脚。


SWFs pose concrete risks, some of which have already materialized, to the global economy and to financial markets both at home and in host countries.	主权财富基金给全球经济和金融市场（不管在母国还是在东道国）带来的风险是实实在在的，一些风险已经成为了现实。


For example, some SWFs faced temporary, but significant, losses after America’s subprime mortgage bubble burst in 2008, and after the European Union’s sovereign-debt crisis erupted a year later, owing to a high level of exposure to these economies’ property, financial, and sovereign-debt markets.	比如，一些主权财富基金在2008年美国次贷泡沫破裂和2009年欧盟主权债务危机爆发后面临暂时但巨大的损失，这是因为它们在这些经济体的房地产、金融和主权债务市场上有着巨额风险敞口。


Those that have not been hit have been protected by host-country opposition to projects in strategic sectors, and by the fact that SWFs, aware of the sensitivity of their investments, and afraid of potential retaliation, have mostly taken small stakes (1-2%) in their targets.	没有受到冲击的主权财富基金得益于东道国反对在战略部门的引资以及主权财富基金充分明白其投资的敏感性，担心潜在报复，因而对目标项目的所有权占比不大（通常只有1—2%）


There are some exceptions to this pattern.	这一模式也有例外。


The Chinese Investment Corporation’s biggest investment last year was a 30% ($3.2 billion) stake in the gas and oil exploration and production sector of the French energy giant GDF Suez.	去年，中投公司的最大投资项目是收购了法国能源巨头GDF Suez 30%（32亿美元）的股权。


CIC chose to take a significant share in one branch, rather than a small share in the whole group, because doing so offered both a strategic advantage (access to energy resources) and a monetary benefit (investment in dollar-denominated assets).	中投公司选择在一个子公司高持股，而不是整个集团的低持股，因为这样做既能提供战略优势（获得能源），又能提供货币好处（投资于美元计价资产）。


In general, however, opacity is a defining feature of most SWFs, exacerbating the risks that they pose.	但是，总的来说，不透明是大多数主权财富基金的一大特征，这加剧了它们所带来的风险。


While some SWFs, like Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, are transparent, little information is available on most SWFs’ size, portfolio holdings, investment strategy, performance, or mode of governance.	一些主权财富基金是透明的，如挪威政府养老基金Global，但对大部分主权财富基金来说，规模、资产组合、投资战略、表现和治理模式等信息都鲜为人知。


Enhancing transparency is one of the main aims of the Santiago Principles – a set of 24 voluntary guidelines that stipulate best practices for SWFs.	增强透明度是圣地亚哥原则（Santiago Principles，关于主权财富基金的24条示范性自愿实施指导准则）的主要目标。


Twenty-five countries have signed on to the Principles since 2008.	自2008年以来，已有25个国家在圣地亚哥原则上签字。


But, while they are an important first step toward managing SWFs’ legal framework, institutional and governance structure, and investment and risk-management policies, they are unevenly applied, and are widely considered inadequate.	但是，尽管这是迈向管理主权财富基金法律框架、制度和治理结构以及投资和风险管理政策的重要的第一步，但它们的应用并不是平等的，也被广泛认为是不充分的。


Given the geographical distribution of SWFs and their investments, truly global regulation is highly unlikely.	主权财富基金及其投资项目的地理分布决定了真正的全球监管是不可能的任务。


But, without closer monitoring, SWFs will inevitably face politically motivated restrictions by some host countries, so it is in their interest to intensify their efforts at self-regulation.	但是，没有密切的监督，主权财富基金免不了要面对东道国出于政治动机的限制，因此强化自我监督符合主权财富基金的利益。


The need to increase the transparency of SWF operations should not be allowed to eclipse their potential benefits.	增加主权财富基金经营透明度的需要不能压倒潜在好处。


As long-term investors, SWFs can help to reduce market volatility through financial intermediation, as well as contribute to financing projects with positive but long-term rates of return.	作为长期投资者，主权财富基金有助于通过金融中介消除市场波动性，并能为具有积极但产期回报率的项目融资。


Furthermore, SWFs have comparative advantages over other kinds of institutional investors.	此外，与其他类型的机构投资者相比，主权财富基金拥有比较优势。


Unlike insurance companies and pension funds, they have no long-term debt or future payment obligations.	与保险公司和养老基金不同，主权财富基金没有长期债务或未来支付义务。


And, as public investors, they are likely to have a better understanding of investment projects that depend on public policy.	而���为公共投资者，它们或许对以来公共政策的投资项目有更好的理解。


Given these advantages, SWFs play a large – and growing – role in infrastructure finance.	在这些优势的推动下，主权财富基金在基础设施融资中扮演着（越来越）重要的角色。


New financial regulations – Basel 3 for banks and Solvency 2 for insurers – are reinforcing these advantages.	新的金融监管——对银行的巴塞尔3协议（Basel 3）和对保险公司的偿付力2协议（Solvency 2）——在强化这些优势。


While the regulations are likely to reduce the likelihood and impact of financial crises, they will also make long-term loans more expensive and investments in illiquid assets riskier.	尽管监管有可能降低金融危机的可能性和影响程度，但也会导致长期贷款更贵，低流动性资产的投资风险更高。


As a result, banks and insurers might disengage from infrastructure finance, creating more opportunity at lower cost for SWFs.	结果，银行和保险公司可能远离基础设施融资，给主权财富基金创造更多、成本更低的机会。


Given that infrastructure is crucial to sustainable development, this could eventually lead SWFs to become key players in this area.	基础设施是可持续发展的关进，因此这将最终使主权财富基金成为该领域的关键玩家。


To achieve this, SWFs must alter their investment pattern.	为了达到这一点，主权财富基金必须改变其投资模式。


In 2011, SWFs invested $35.2 billion in financial services, $13.4 billion in property, $13.2 billion in fossil-fuel resources (mainly oil and gas), $6.5 billion in infrastructure and utilities, and $3.4 billion in aircraft, car, ship, and train manufacturers.	2011年，主权财富基金在金融服务领域投资352亿美元，在房地产领域投资134亿美元，在化石燃料资源领域（主要是石油和天然气）投资132亿美元，在基础设施和公用事业领域投资65亿美元，在飞机、汽车、轮船和火车制造领域投资34亿美元。


Given that SWFs’ primary objective is to transfer wealth to future generations, their high level of exposure to fossil-fuel markets is unsustainable.	主权财富基金的主要目的是将财富转移给子孙后代，因此它们在化石燃料市场上的高风险敞口是不可持续的。


Indeed, the remaining carbon-emissions “budget” until 2050, adherence to which is required to limit the global temperature increase to 2°C, is five times smaller than the carbon equivalent of proven fossil-fuel reserves.	事实上，在2050年前的剩余碳排“预算”——全球气温上升幅度不大于2℃——比探明化石燃料储量的碳当量小五倍。


This means that only 20% of these reserves, based on which SWF assets are valued, can be burned unabated.	这意味着这些储量中只有两成能够在不引起争议的情况下被使用，而它们乃是主权财富资产的基础。


Some SWFs in the Middle East and Asia seem to understand the risks associated with carbon-heavy investment portfolios, and are ready to work together to create a platform to finance resource-efficient, low-carbon, environmentally friendly infrastructure projects.	一些中东和亚洲的主权财富基金似乎已经明了蕴含于重碳投资组合中的风险，准备好了共同打造一个平台为资源效率高、碳排放量小、环境友好的基础设施项目融资。


Indeed, the idea was discussed in January at the World Future Energy Summit and the International Renewable Energy Conference in Abu Dhabi.	事实上，1月的世界未来能源峰会（World Future Energy Summit）和阿布扎比国际可再生能源会议（International Renewable Energy Conference）就讨论了这一问题。


This initiative should be supported unequivocally, serving as a springboard for a stronger focus on green investment among SWFs.	这一方案应该获得明确的支持，成为主权财富基金更专注于绿色投资项目的起点。


With the right approach, SWFs can offer significant long-term benefits to all.	只要方法得当，主权财富基金能够为我们所有人带来巨大的长期好处。


Ten QE Questions	十问QE


NEW YORK – Most observers regard unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing (QE) as necessary to jump-start growth in today’s anemic economies.	纽约——大多数观察者认为，非传统货币政策，如量化宽松（QE），是让当前乏力的经济重新启动的必要手段。


But questions about the effectiveness and risks of QE have begun to multiply as well.	但关于QE有效性和风险的质疑也日益增多。


In particular, ten potential costs associated with such policies merit attention.	此类政策的十种潜在成本尤其值得注意。


First, while a purely “Austrian” response (that is, austerity) to bursting asset and credit bubbles may lead to a depression, QE policies that postpone the necessary private- and public-sector deleveraging for too long may create an army of zombies: zombie financial institutions, zombie households and firms, and, in the end, zombie governments.	第一，尽管纯“奥地利学派”的（瘦身）方案主张强行戳破资产和信贷泡沫，容易导致萧条，显得过于严厉，但QE政策将私人和公共部门必要的去杠杆化阶段无止尽地拖延下去，也会造成一大批经济“僵尸”的恶果：僵尸金融机构、僵尸家庭部门和僵尸企业，最终，还有僵尸政府。


So, somewhere between the Austrian and Keynesian extremes, QE needs to be phased out over time.	所以，为了避免奥地利学派和凯恩斯主义的两个极端，QE需要逐步退出。


Second, repeated QE may become ineffective over time as the channels of transmission to real economic activity become clogged.	第二，反复QE可能会令效果逐渐减弱，因为向实体经济传导的渠道会被堵塞。


The bond channel doesn’t work when bond yields are already low; and the credit channel doesn’t work when banks hoard liquidity and velocity collapses.	债券收益率低迷，使得债券渠道不起作用； 银行囤积资金，周转停滞，使得信贷渠道形同虚设。


Indeed, those who can borrow (high-grade firms and prime households) don’t want or need to, while those who need to – highly leveraged firms and non-prime households – can’t, owing to the credit crunch.	说真的，那些有能力借款的人（信用级别高的企业和优质家庭客户）不想借款也无需借款，而那些需要借款的人——高杠杆的企业和非优质家庭客户——却因信贷紧缩无力借款。


Moreover, the stock-market channel leading to asset reflation following QE works only in the short run if growth fails to recover.	此外，股市渠道固然会在QE之后发生资产复膨胀，但如果经济不能真正恢复增长，这种效应也只会是短期的。


And the reduction in real interest rates via a rise in expected inflation when open-ended QE is implemented risks eventually stoking inflation expectations.	而无限期QE实施过程中，通过抬升通胀预期压低实际利率的做法也有风险，最终会把高通胀预期的火焰煽起来。


Third, the foreign-exchange channel of QE transmission – the currency weakening implied by monetary easing – is ineffective if several major central banks pursue QE at the same time.	第三，如果主要国家央行同时实施QE的话，QE传导的外汇渠道——货币宽松隐含的汇率走软——也会变得无效。


When that happens, QE becomes a zero-sum game, because not all currencies can fall, and not all trade balances can improve, simultaneously.	那将会导致一场零和博弈，因为所有的币种同时走软，各国的贸易收支表同时达到平衡，是不可能的。


The outcome, then, is “QE wars” as proxies for “currency wars.”	结果就是作为“汇率战争”代名词的“QE战争”。


Fourth, QE in advanced economies leads to excessive capital flows to emerging markets, which face a difficult policy challenge.	第四，发达经济体的QE会导致资本过度流入新兴市场，引发严峻的政策挑战。


Sterilized foreign-exchange intervention keeps domestic interest rates high and feeds the inflows.	冲销外汇干预会推高国内利率从而招引更多的热钱。


But unsterilized intervention and/or reducing domestic interest rates creates excessive liquidity that can feed domestic inflation and/or asset and credit bubbles.	但非冲销型干预或降低国内利率会创造过剩的流动性，容易引发国内通胀或资产和信贷泡沫。


At the same time, forgoing intervention and allowing the currency to appreciate erodes external competitiveness, leading to dangerous external deficits.	与此同时，放弃干预并允许汇率升值则会侵蚀对外竞争力，导致危险的对外赤字。


Yet imposing capital controls on inflows is difficult and sometimes leaky.	而对资本流入施加资本管制既很困难，也漏洞百出。


Macroprudential controls on credit growth are useful, but sometimes ineffective in stopping asset bubbles when low interest rates continue to underpin generous liquidity conditions.	对信贷增长的宏观审慎管控是有用的，但有时无法阻止信贷泡沫产生，因为低利率会持续创造过剩的流动性环境。


Fifth, persistent QE can lead to asset bubbles both where it is implemented and in countries where it spills over.	第五，长期QE可能不仅是在实施国，也在溢出国导致资产泡沫。


Such bubbles can occur in equity markets, housing markets (Hong Kong, Singapore), commodity markets, bond markets (with talk of a bubble increasing in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan), and credit markets (where spreads in some emerging markets, and on high-yield and high-grade corporate debt, are narrowing excessively).	此类泡沫可能产生于股市、楼市（香港、新加坡）、大宗商品市场、债市（人们在谈论美国、德国、英国和日本日益增加的泡沫）和信贷市场（在一些新兴市场，国债和高收益、高评级企业债的息差正急剧收窄）。


Although QE may be justified by weak economic and growth fundamentals, keeping rates too low for too long can eventually feed such bubbles.	尽管疲软的经济和增长基本面可能为QE提供支持，但将过低利率维持过久最终会引发泡沫。


That is what happened in 2000-2006, when the US Federal Reserve aggressively cut the federal funds rate to 1% during the 2001 recession and subsequent weak recovery and then kept rates down, thus fueling credit/housing/subprime bubbles.	2000~2006年已经发生过这一幕，当时美联储为了应对2001年衰退及其后的经济疲软，将联邦基金利率基金地降到1%并长期维持在低位，从而导致了次贷泡沫。


Sixth, QE can create moral-hazard problems by weakening governments’ incentive to pursue needed economic reforms.	第六，QE可能导致道德风险，因为它会削弱政府进行必要的经济改革的动力。


It may also delay needed fiscal austerity if large deficits are monetized, and, by keeping rates too low, prevent the market from imposing discipline.	大额赤字货币化也会拖延财政瘦身的步伐。 而利率过低则会妨碍市场树立纪律。


Seventh, exiting QE is tricky.	第七，退出QE是个棘手问题。


If exit occurs too slowly and too late, inflation and/or asset/credit bubbles could result.	如果退出太慢或太迟，会产生通胀或资产、信贷泡沫。


Also, if exit occurs by selling the long-term assets purchased during QE, a sharp increase in interest rates might choke off recovery, resulting in large financial losses for holders of long-term bonds.	而且，如果退出采用出售QE所购买的长期资产这种手段，会导致利率剧增，打击经济复苏，给长期债券持有者带来巨额金融亏损。


And, if the exit occurs via a rise in the interest rate on excess reserves (to sterilize the effect of a base-money overhang on credit growth), the ensuing losses for central banks’ balance sheets could be significant.	另外，如果退出是通过提高额外准备金的利率来实现（以冲销基础货币超发的信贷影响），则会给央行的资产负债表造成严重亏损。


Eighth, an extended period of negative real interest rates implies a redistribution of income and wealth from creditors and savers toward debtors and borrowers.	第八，实际利率长期保持负利率水平意味着，收入和财富由债权人和储蓄者向债务人和借款者再分配。


Of all the forms of adjustment that can lead to deleveraging (growth, savings, orderly debt restructuring, or taxation of wealth), debt monetization (and eventually higher inflation) is the least democratic, and it seriously damages savers and creditors, including pensioners and pension funds.	在去杠杆化的所有形式中（经济增长、储蓄增加、有序债务重组、征收财富税等等），债务货币化（最终是高通胀）是最不民主的一种，它会沉重打击储蓄者和债权人，包括退休人员和养老基金。


Ninth, QE and other unconventional monetary policies can have serious unintended consequences.	第九，QE和其他非传统货币政策可能引发一些严重的意外后果。


Eventually, excessive inflation may erupt, or credit growth may slow, rather than accelerate, if banks – faced with very low net interest-rate margins – decide that risk relative to reward is insufficient.	最终可能爆发恶性通胀，或者导致信贷增长放缓而非加速，因为银行可能认为，在边际净利率非常低的情况下，放贷的风险远远大于收益。


Finally, there is a risk of losing sight of any road back to conventional monetary policies.	最后，还有一种风险是，我们可能会找不到回归传统货币政策的道路。


Indeed, some countries are ditching their inflation-targeting regime and moving into uncharted territory, where there may be no anchor for price expectations.	说实话，一些国家的央行正在背弃传统的通胀目标体制，驶向未知水域，在这些水域可能不存在定价预期之锚。


The US has moved from QE1 to QE2 and now to QE3, which is potentially unlimited and linked to an unemployment target.	美国已经从QE1经QE2过渡到了QE3，而后者可能是无明确期限、同失业率挂钩的。


Officials are now actively discussing the merit of negative policy rates.	官员们正在热议负政策利率的好处。


And policymakers have moved to a risky credit-easing policy as QE’s effectiveness has waned.	当QE的效果逐渐弱化，政策制定者已经走向了风险很大的信贷宽松政策。


In short, policies are becoming more unconventional, not less, with little clarity about short-term effects, unintended consequences, and long-term impacts.	简言之，政策变得越来越非传统，更有甚者，对它们的短期效果、不良后果和长期影响则越来越没有清晰的认识。


To be sure, QE and other unconventional monetary policies do have important short-term benefits.	说实话，QE和其他非传统货币政策的确带来了重要的短期益处。


But if such policies remain in place for too long, their side effects could be severe – and the longer-term costs very high.	但如果此类政策维持太久，其副作用就会变得很严重，而长期成本则会变得相当高昂。


Asia’s Rebalancing Act	亚洲的再平衡举措


SEOUL – Rapid economic growth in China undoubtedly benefits the rest of Asia.	发自首尔——中国经济的快速增长无疑让其余亚洲国家受益良多。


Indeed, strong Chinese demand has supported its trading partners’ export-led growth for much of the past three decades.	事实上，在过去三十年中正是中国的强劲需求支撑其贸易伙伴实现了大幅的出口带动型增长。


But now, faced with a slowdown in China and significant downside risks there, the rest of Asia must abandon over-reliance on export-oriented development strategies and strive to ensure stable and sustainable growth domestically and regionally.	但如今面对中国经济增长放缓以及明显的下行风险，亚洲其他国家必须放弃过分依赖出口导向型的发展战略，并努力确保国内和区域内的稳定可持续增长。


China’s vulnerabilities and risks – stemming from property bubbles, shadow banking, and local-government debt – have triggered concerns about a crisis not only there, but also in neighboring Asian countries.	中国的漏洞和风险——源于房地产泡沫、影子银行，以及地方政府债务——不仅导致其国内对危机的担忧不已，还引起了各亚洲邻国的忧虑。


Some, indeed, now predict a Chinese banking or fiscal disaster; others predict long-term stagnation equivalent to Japan’s lost decades.	事实上，有些人预测中国会爆发银行或财政灾难； 其他人则预测中国经济会长期停滞，相当于日本迷失的十年。


These “hard landing” scenarios are extreme.	这些“硬着陆”的都属于极端情况。


But the road ahead is bumpy and uncertain.	但未来的道路将是坎坷且充满不确定性的。


No one can guarantee that Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s attempts to achieve deleveraging and structural reform will succeed.	没有人可以保证李克强总理的去杠杆化和结构改革会成功。


Moreover, external shocks, policy mistakes, and political instability could disrupt even the best-laid plans.	就算已经制订了最完美的计划，也可能被外部冲击，政策失误以及政治不稳定所打乱。


In any case, China’s stellar growth record cannot be sustained.	无论如何，中国的高增长记录都已经无法持续了。


Even if it manages a “soft landing,” annual output growth will slow to 5-6% in the coming decades.	即使其实现了“软着陆”，在未来几十年内的年产出增长都将放缓至5~6%。


Standard growth theory predicts “convergence” of per capita GDP: a fast-growing country will eventually encounter difficulty maintaining high rates of labor mobilization, capital accumulation, and technological progress.	标准经济增长理论预测会出现人均国内生产总值的“收敛”：一个快速增长的国家最终也难以保持较高的就业率，资本积累和科技进步。


In China, labor inputs have fallen as a result of declining fertility and an aging population.	在中国，新增劳动力由于出生率下降和人口老龄化而下降。


Reduced rates of return will lower investment rates.	资本回报率的减少会降低投资比率。


China may be able to rely on policy reforms to boost productivity growth; but, with relatively low innovative capacity, it will struggle to catch up with frontier technologies.	中国也许能够依靠政策改革来促进生产力增长； 但由于其创新能力相对较低，它将很难赶上前沿技术。


China’s inevitable growth slowdown, along with a large tail risk, threatens stable growth in Asian economies that have become increasingly interdependent.	中国不可避免的经济增长放缓，伴随着一个巨大的尾部风险，威胁着日益相互依存的亚洲经济体的稳定增长。


Trade within Asia now accounts for more than half of the continent’s total trade turnover.	如今亚洲内部贸易占了亚洲贸易总额的一半以上。


Moreover, direct investment and financial flows contribute further to economic interdependence.	此外，直接投资和资金流动也进一步推动了经济的相互依存。


The rise in intra-Asian trade reflects China’s central role in East Asia’s production networks.	亚洲内部贸易的兴起反映了中国在东亚生产网络中的核心作用。


From 2001 to 2011, China’s share of South Korean exports doubled, from 12% to 24%; its share of Japanese exports grew even faster, rising from 8% to 20%.	从2001到2011，中国占韩国出口份额从12%增加了一倍，至24%； 占日本出口份额的增长则更快，从8%上升到20%。


As a result, China has become South Korea’s single largest export market, and Japan’s second largest.	因此，中国已成为韩国最大，日本第二大的出口市场。


It is also the largest trading partner of all ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).	同时，它这也是东南亚国家联盟（东盟）所有十个成员国的最大贸易伙伴。


Asian economies’ deepening trade and financial integration has left them increasingly vulnerable to growth shocks from China, with exporters of commodities and capital goods especially vulnerable.	不断深入的亚洲各经济体贸易金融一体化让它们越来越容易受到中国的增长冲击，其中大宗商品出口商和资本货物尤其脆弱。


In fact, a study by the Asian Development Bank shows that Chinese shocks have larger and more persistent effects on individual Asian economies’ output than do global shocks, as a 1% increase in China’s GDP raised GDP in emerging East Asia by about 0.6%.	事实上，亚洲开发银行的一份研究表明，由于中国GDP每增长1%就会带动东亚新兴经济体GDP增长约0. 6%，因此中国对个别亚洲经济体所造成的冲击比全球化的冲击还要更大更持久。


In terms of investment, the International Monetary Fund predicts that a disruption in China’s investment boom will adversely affect its trading partners.	在投资方面，国际货币基金组织预测中国投资热潮的中断将对其贸易伙伴产生不利影响。


A drop of one percentage point in China’s investment rate is estimated to reduce Taiwan’s GDP growth rate by 0.9 percentage points and Korea’s by 0.6 percentage points.	预计中国的投资率每下降1个百分点将使台湾GDP增长率下降0. 9个百分点，韩国的GDP增长率下降0.


If China can successfully rebalance its economy and shift to consumption-based growth, its trading partners could benefit enormously from a huge retail market.	如果中国能成功重新平衡其经济，转变为以消费为基础的增长，它的贸易伙伴就可以从一个巨大的零售市场极大获益。


But as long as China’s import share of final consumption remains low, direct gains for exporters of consumer goods are likely to be small.	但只要中国的进口占最终消费仍然维持在低水平，那么消费品出口国的直接收益将很小。


As they prepare for the coming Chinese slowdown and seek to minimize the risk of regional destabilization, Asian economies must strengthen domestic demand and reduce excessive reliance on exports to China.	为了迎接即将到来的中国经济放缓和试图降低区域不稳定风险，亚洲经济体必须扩大内需，减少对中国出口的过度依赖。


In other words, sustainable growth requires all of Asia’s China-dependent economies to rebalance their two main growth engines.	换句话说，可持续增长需要亚洲所有的中国依赖型经济体重新平衡自身的两大经济增长引擎。


To enhance domestic demand, Asia, including China, must reallocate resources and structurally transform the economy.	为扩大内需，亚洲包括中国都必须重新分配资源和转变经济结构。


Reinforcing social safety nets, broadening and deepening financial markets, and supporting small and medium-size enterprises would also strengthen domestic demand.	强化社会安全网，扩大和深化金融市场，支持中小企业这些都可以扩大内需。


Likewise, service-sector liberalization will be essential to promoting productivity and creating jobs.	同样，服务业自由化对促进生产力和创造工作岗位至关重要。


In short, implementation of fiscal, financial, and structural reforms can mitigate the spillover effects from China’s slowdown.	总之，财政、金融和结构改革的实施，可以缓解中国经济放缓的溢出效应。


But a second reform front, aimed at enhancing regional coordination, must also be opened.	但同时还必须开辟一块旨在加强区域协调的二次改革战场。


With economic shocks able to spread more quickly than ever before, owing to broadened trade and financial channels, all Asian countries must maintain a sound macroeconomic environment.	由于贸易和金融渠道不断扩大，经济的冲击可能比以往蔓延的更为迅速，因此所有亚洲国家必须保持一个良好的宏观经济环境。


Perhaps most important, deeper regional integration calls for closer cooperation in macroeconomic and financial surveillance, as envisaged by the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.	也许最重要的是，深化区域经济一体化要求在宏观经济和金融监控方面实现更加紧密的合作，正如《清迈多边化倡议》（Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization）所设想的那样。


Asian countries must be able to conduct well-coordinated candid reviews of one another to reduce the likelihood of risks and detect emerging vulnerabilities.	亚洲国家必须对彼此进行协调和公正的检视以降低风险爆发的可能性并发现新出现的漏洞。


China’s long-term growth potential – and that of the rest of developing Asia – is not pre-defined.	中国——以及亚洲其他国家——的长期增长潜力可不是确定的。


Maximizing it requires not only that individual countries address their weaknesses and rebalance their sources of growth, but also that they build and strengthen the regional institutions needed to manage economic integration.	要实现这种潜力的最大化不仅需要个别国家解决自身弱点和重新平衡增长来源，还需要各国建立和加强区域机制去管理整体经济的一体化状况。


The Temptation of China’s Capital Account	中国资本帐户的诱惑


BEIJING – Despite fluctuations, China’s overall economic growth has been stable over the last three decades, owing not only to the economy’s strong fundamentals, but also to the government’s successful management of cross-border capital flows.	发自北京——尽管时有波动，但中国的总体经济增长在过去三十年里一直保持稳定，这不仅源自于其强大的经济基本面，还得益于中国政府对跨境资本流动的成功管理。


Capital controls enabled China to emerge from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 largely unscathed, even though its financial system was at least as fragile as those of the affected countries.	资本控制使中国能够在1997至1998年的亚洲金融危机中大体无碍——尽管其金融系统至少和那些受危机影响国家一样脆弱。


The Asian financial crisis persuaded China’s leaders to shelve plans, launched in 1994, to liberalize the capital account.	而这场危机也让中国领导人搁置了1994年启动的资本账户自由化进程。


In 2002, China reinitiated liberalization efforts, lifting restrictions on Chinese enterprises’ ability to open foreign-currency bank accounts, and allowing residents both to open foreign-currency accounts and to convert the renminbi equivalent of $50,000 annually into foreign currencies.	到了2002年，中国重启自由化进程，放宽中国企业开设外汇银行账户的限制，并允许其居民开设外汇账户、每年将等值于5万美元的人民币转换为外币。


The authorities also introduced the “qualified domestic institutional investors” (QDII) program to enable residents to invest in foreign assets – one of many initiatives aimed at easing upward pressure on the renminbi’s exchange rate by encouraging capital outflows.	当局还引入了“合格境内投资者”（QDII）项目使其居民能够投资海外资产——这是旨在通过鼓励资本外流来缓解人民币汇率上升压力的众多举措的其中一项。


At the same time, the “qualified foreign institutional investors” (QFII) scheme allowed licensed foreign entities to invest in domestic capital markets.	与此同时，“合格境内投资者”（QFII）项目则允许被授权的外国实体投资国内资本市场。


In early 2012, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) released a report calling for policymakers to take advantage of a “strategic opportunity” to accelerate capital-account liberalization.	2012年初，中国人民银行（PBOC）发布了一份报告呼吁决策者利用“战略机遇”来加速资本账户自由化。


Shortly after the release, QFII quotas were relaxed significantly.	报告发布后不久，“合格境内投资者”的额度就被大幅放宽了。


In fact, such an acceleration has been underway since the government initiated renminbi internationalization in 2009.	实际上，类似的加速动作自2009年中国政府开始人民币国际化进程以来就开始了。


Although currency internationalization is not tantamount to capital-account liberalization, progress on the former presupposes progress on the latter.	尽管货币国际化并不等于资本帐户自由化，但是在前者上取得的进展是后者得以推进的前提条件。


By allowing enterprises to choose currencies for trade settlement, and creating renminbi “recycling mechanisms,” the government effectively eased the restrictions on short-term cross-border capital flows.	通过允许企业自由选择货币进行贸易结算并创设“人民币回收机制”，中国政府有效放宽了针对短期跨境资本流动的限制。


Most economists in China seem to support the PBOC’s stance, citing the potential benefits of capital-account liberalization.	大部分中国经济学家似乎都支持中国人民银行的立场，并列举出资本账户自由化的各种潜在好处。


But Chinese policymakers should also recognize the significant risks inherent in relaxing capital controls.	但中国的决策者也应该意识到放松资本管制所隐含的重大风险。


First, China needs capital controls to retain monetary-policy independence until it is ready to adopt a floating exchange-rate regime.	首先，中国需要在开始采用浮动汇率制度前实施资本控制,从而保持货币政策的独立性。


As Barry Eichengreen has pointed out in the context of the post-WWII Bretton Woods system, capital controls weaken “the link between domestic and foreign economic policies, providing governments room to pursue other objectives.”	正如巴里·艾申格林(Barry Eichengreen)在二战后布雷顿森林体系的大背景下所指出的那样：资本控制会削弱“国内外经济政策之间的联系，为政府追求其他目标提供空间。


Because capital controls capped “the resources that the markets could bring to bear against an exchange-rate peg,” they “limited the steps that governments had to take in its defense.”	”因为资本控制限制了“市场可以用来应对汇率走向的资源”，也就“限制了政府为防御而不得不采取的步骤。


With current- and capital-account surpluses, the renminbi’s exchange rate is still under upward pressure.	”由于依然存在经常账户和资本账户盈余，人民币的汇率仍有升值压力。


Without adequate controls on short-term cross-border capital inflows, the PBOC will find it difficult to maintain monetary-policy independence and exchange-rate stability at the same time.	如果不对短期跨境资本流入进行适当的控制，中国人民银行将很难在保持货币政策独立性的同时保持汇率稳定。


Second, China’s financial system is fragile, and its economic structure rigid.	其二，中国的金融系统很脆弱，且其经济为刚性结构。


Hence, the Chinese economy is highly vulnerable to capital flight.	因此，中国经济很容易受到资本外流的冲击。


In recent years, China’s financial vulnerability has been rising, with enterprise debt estimated to exceed 120% of GDP, and broad money supply (M2) amounting to more than 180% of GDP.	近几年，中国的金融脆弱性一直在上升，其企业债务估计超过GDP的120%，广义货币供应量（M2）总计超过GDP的180%。


At the beginning of 2012, China’s concerns centered on local-government debt, underground credit networks, and real-estate bubbles.	2012初，中国的担忧主要集中在地方政府债务、地下信贷网络和房地产泡沫上。


Now, growth in shadow-banking activities has been added to the list.	现在影子银行活动的增长被列入其中。


Without capital controls, an unforeseen shock could trigger large-scale capital flight, leading to significant currency devaluation, skyrocketing interest rates, bursting asset bubbles, bankruptcy and default for financial and non-financial enterprises, and, ultimately, the collapse of China’s financial system.	没有资本控制，任何一个意料之外的冲击都会引发大规模的资本外逃，从而导致货币大幅贬值、利率��涨、资产泡沫破裂、破产及金融和非金融企业的违约、并最终导致中国金融系统的瓦解。


A third reason to go slow on easing capital controls is that China’s economic reforms remain incomplete, with property rights not yet clearly defined.	解除资本控制必须缓步推进的第三个原因是中国的经济改革一直都不彻底，其产权到现在还没有明确的定义。


Amid ambiguity over ownership and pervasive corruption, the free flow of capital across borders would encourage money laundering and asset-stripping, which would incite social tension.	由于所有权不明确并存在普遍的腐败，资本的跨境自由流动会鼓励洗钱和资产转移，并将影响社会稳定。


Finally, with more than $3.3 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, China is a particularly attractive target for international speculators.	最后，手握超过3. 3万亿美元的外汇储备，中国成为国际投机者眼里特别有吸引的目标。


Owing to its underdeveloped financial system and inefficient capital markets, China would be unable to withstand an attack akin to those that triggered the Asian financial crisis without the protection of capital controls.	由于其金融体系不发达且资本市场效率低下，若没有资本控制的保护，中国将无法承受那些与亚洲金融危机类似的攻击。


Already, even without a major speculative attack, the exchange-rate and interest-rate arbitrage facilitated by renminbi internationalization have imposed significant losses on China.	即使没有大规模的投机性攻击，人民币国际化所带来的汇率和利率套利已经让中国产生了重大损失。


To be sure, a cautious approach should not be allowed to impede incremental progress toward capital-account liberalization.	诚然，不应让谨慎的手段阻碍了资本账户自由化的进展。


But a broad framework for determining the timing of each policy step, based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis, is essential.	但基于严格的成本效益分析，用于决定每个策略步骤时机的大框架是很有必要的。


While some measures that the PBOC has taken under the banner of capital-account liberalization have turned out to be both necessary and appropriately moderate, others may need to be reassessed and rescinded.	事实证明在资本账户自由化的旗帜下，中国人民银行采取的有些措施很有必要且适当适度，而另外一些则需要重新评估或撤销。


Today, as all major developed economies resort to expansionary monetary policy, the global economy is being flooded with excess liquidity, and a “currency war” is looming large.	目前，由于所有重要发达经济体都采取了扩张性货币政策，全球经济都被注入了过剩的流动性，“货币战”正在日益凸显。


As a result, short-term capital inflows, whether seeking a safe haven or conducting carry trades, are bound to become larger and more volatile.	结果，短期资本流入——不管是寻求安全的港湾还是进行套利交易，都注定会变得更大规模且更不稳定。


In these circumstances, with China’s financial system too fragile to withstand external shocks, and the global economy mired in turmoil, the PBOC would be unwise to gamble on the ability of rapid capital-account liberalization to generate a healthier and more robust financial system.	在中国金融系统太脆弱以致无法抵御外部冲击，而全球经济陷入动荡的情况下，中国人民银行要是想冒险借助资本账户快速自由化的能力来催生一个更健康更健全的金融系统，将会是很不明智的选择。


On the contrary, policymakers should tread carefully in their pursuit of financial liberalization.	相反地决策者应该小心谨慎地追求金融自由化。


Given China’s extensive reform agenda, further opening of the capital account can wait; and, in view of liberalization’s ambiguous benefits and significant risks, it should.	考虑到中国宏大的改革议程，可以等一等再进一步开放资本账户； 鉴于自由化的利益模糊并风险巨大，更应当戒急戒躁。


Brave New Cells?	勇敢接纳新细胞？


LONDON – The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has launched a public consultation to gauge attitudes toward controversial new medical procedures aimed at preventing the transmission of incurable diseases that result from mutations of cell structures called mitochondria.	伦敦——英国人类受精和胚胎学管理局（HFEA）正在进行公共咨询，以了解人们对旨在防止因被称为线粒体的细胞结构发生突变而导致遗传不治之症的备受争议的新型医疗程序的看法。


Supporters of such research are framing criticism of it as opposition to saving children’s lives and an impediment to scientific development.	研究的支持者称反对这项研究就是反对挽救儿童生命和阻碍科学发展。


But this view neglects a crucial factor in the debate: the techniques being developed involve permanent genetic alterations passed on to future generations.	但这种观点忽略了辩论中的一个关键因素：这项技术将造成遗传改变并永久传递给子孙后代。


The mitochondria are the energy-producing “batteries” of the cell, containing the only DNA outside of the cell nucleus – 37 genes, or roughly 0.2% of a person’s genetic makeup.	线粒体是为细胞提供能量的“电池”，含有细胞核外全部的遗传物质——线粒体共包含37种基因，约占人类基因构成的0.


Given that these genes are contained in the egg, and thus are inherited only from the mother, the new techniques aim to replace the mother’s mutated mitochondria with that of a healthy female donor of eggs without the mutation.	2%。 由于从母亲处继承的卵子是上述基因的载体，新技术意在使用未发生线粒体突变的健康女性捐赠者的卵子来取代基因突变的母亲的线粒体。


This results in embryos that contain genetic material from three people – the child’s father and mother, plus the egg donor.	这将导致胚胎包含来自三方的遗传物质——孩子的父亲、母亲和卵子捐献者。


So the real question is how the public feels about crossing the line between medical treatments for existingpeople and irreversible genetic alterations that would be passed on to future generations through genetic modification of the human germline (the sequence of germ cells,such as sperm and eggs, containing genetic material that a child may inherit).	因此真正的问题在于公众对跨越原有医疗界限，并将通过改造人类生殖细胞（精子和卵子等生殖细胞序列，包含子女可以继承的遗传物质）传递给子孙后代的不可逆转的遗传改变作何感想。


Despite the good intentions behind mitochondrial research, international concern about the implications of breaching this barrier is mounting.	尽管线粒体研究用心良苦，但国际社会对跨越这条界线后果的担心却日渐增长。


Indeed, not only do most scientists and governments worldwide consider human germline genetic modification unacceptable; it is expressly prohibited in more than 40 countries, including the UK.	其实，不仅全球绝大多数政府和科学家无法接受对人类生殖细胞进行改造； 包括英国在内的40多个国家都明令禁止这种作法。


As a result, experts in the United States, Canada, Germany, Israel, and elsewhere have responded critically to the prospect of Britain unilaterally undermining the consensus that prohibits such techniques.	美国、加拿大、德国、以色列和其他地方的专家因此对英国单方面违反共识可能导致的结果持批评态度。


Mitochondrial mutations can have serious consequences, including epilepsy, liver failure, diabetes, and cardiomyopathy.	线粒体突变可能造成癫痫、肝功能衰竭、糖尿病和心肌病变等严重后果。


But, while the number of people affected by such mutations is estimated to be between one in 200 and one in 400, mutations do not translate to serious diseases in most cases.	但预计此类突变影响的人数比例为二百至四百分之一，基因突变在多数情况下不会造成严重的疾病。


Because the harmful changes are often only present in low levels, and because a single cell can contain both mutated and normal mitochondria, it is widely believed that only one person in 5,000 – or even one in 10,000 – will be affected by mitochondrial disease.	因为有害变化往往频率很低，还因为单个细胞也可以同时包含突变线粒体和正常线粒体，人们普遍认为只有五千至万分之一的人将受到线粒体疾病的影响。


Despite this relatively low frequency, the Wellcome Trust (an organization dedicated to improving human and animal health) recently donated £4 million ($6.5 million) to scientists at the University of Newcastle to establish a center for mitochondrial research.	尽管罹患此类疾病的概率较低，但威康信托基金（一家致力于改善人类和动物健康的机构）最近向纽卡斯尔大学科学家捐款400万英镑（合650万美元）用于线粒体研究中心的建设。


In a 2010 paper, the scientists reported some early success with a technique involving the use of human zygotes (single-cell embryos) that had been engineered to contain only healthy mitochondria.	在2010年论文中，科学家们报告在采用人类受精卵（单细胞胚胎）的一项技术（该技术经过改良仅包含健康线粒体）中取得了初步的成功。


But they managed to develop only 8% of the zygotes to a slightly later stage.	但受精卵成功进入下一阶段的比例仅有8%。


Nevertheless, in 2011, a coalition of scientists and funders submitted a letter to former UK Secretary of State for Health Andrew Lansley requesting regulation revision, in order to permit the new techniques’ use in clinical treatment “once sufficient pre-clinical evidence [was] established.”	尽管如此，2011年由科学家和出资人组成的联盟向前英国卫生大臣安德鲁•兰斯利呈递书信要求修改监管规则，以便“一旦取得充分的临床证据”即允许将新技术运用于临床治疗。


The influential groups backing the coalition – including the UK Academy of Medical Sciences, the Medical Research Council, and the Wellcome Trust – claimed that “translating research into treatment [looked] achievable in the near future.”	该联盟背后有影响力的团体——包括英国医学科学院、医学研究理事会和威康信托基金称“看似在不远的将来即可将研究成果运用于临床治疗”。


But “treatment” does not mean helping existing sufferers.	但“治疗”并不意味着帮助现有患者。


Rather, the techniques might allow a small subset of women with mitochondrial disease (in the UK, roughly 10-20 annually) to reduce the risk that their children will inherit the mutation – at the cost of setting a precedent with serious potential consequences.	相反，这项技术能使一小部分罹患线粒体疾病的妇女（英国每年仅有约10－20人）降低其子女继承相关基因突变的可能性——但同时还要付出可能造成严重潜在后果的代价。


In addition to national legislation, international treaties like the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (which the UK has not signed) specifically prohibit human germline genetic modification.	除国家法律外，欧洲理事会《人权和生物医学公约》（英国尚未签署此项公约）等国际条约明文规定禁止对人类生殖细胞进行基因改造。


The easy explanation for this prohibition would be moral aversion to eugenics, the pseudoscience of improving a population’s genetic composition, which was popular in the West in the first half of the twentieth century, before being discredited by the example of the Nazis.	对这项禁令最简单的解释是因优生学所引发的道德厌恶，优生学是一门改善人口基因构成的伪科学，该学科曾于二十世纪上半叶在西方红极一时，后因被纳粹用作理论基础而蒙羞。


Unlike eugenicists, proponents of altering mitochondrial DNA simply hope to free future generations from deadly diseases.	与优生学不同，线粒体基因改造的支持者仅仅希望让子孙后代免受致命疾病的困扰。


Nonetheless, critics fear the slippery slope.	但批评者们担心对线粒体进行基因改造可能造成的后果。


After all, breaching the ethical and legal barrier to permanent genetic modification could make it more difficult to block its application for treating non-lethal conditions, or even for enhancing qualities like cognitive ability or athletic prowess.	毕竟破除道德和法律障碍进行永久性的基因改造将加大阻止利用这项技术治疗非致命疾病、甚至提高认知或竞技能力等各项综合素质的难度。


But the more urgent threat is that any kind of germline genetic modification could do long-term, permanent damage.	但更迫切的威胁是任何形式的生殖细胞基因改造都有可能造成长期的永久性损害。


The HFEA’s own expert panel reported that the safety of mitochondrial techniques is far from being proven for current users.	英国人类受精和胚胎学管理局自身的专家组报告线粒体技术的安全性还远未在当前的使用者身上得到证实。


There is no telling what it could mean for their descendants.	根本没法预测这对他们的后代意味着什么。


According to Joanna Poulton, an expert in mitochondrial research at Oxford University, it is not yet appropriate to offer treatment with so little knowledge of the potential consequences when reasonable alternatives – such as egg donation from a woman unaffected by mitochondrial disease or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis – are available.	按照牛津大学线粒体研究专家乔安娜·波尔顿的说法，在对可能产生的后果知之甚少且存在合理替代方法（比方说由未受线粒体疾病影响的女性捐卵或在胚胎植入前开展基因诊断）的情况下进行相关治疗并不妥当。


She says, “There are very few families who don’t want to use donated oocytes (eggs), where PGD would not work, and where the risk of having severely affected babies is so high that it might be worth trying the new techniques.”	她说“在胚胎植入前诊断不起作用且严重影响婴儿的风险高到或许值得尝试新技术的情况下，不愿使用捐献卵母细胞（卵子）的家庭少之又少。 ”


In fact, mitochondrial studies have already begun to produce unexpected results.	其实线粒体研究已经开始产生意想不到的后果。


For example, scientists in Oregon recently observed abnormal fertilization in some of the human eggs that they had manipulated.	比方说美国俄勒冈州的科学家最近发现他们处理过的人类卵子出现异常受精现象。


Given that the defective eggs miscarry naturally, more eggs than expected would be needed for the technique – possibly posing a risk to the donors.	由于有缺陷的卵子会自然流产，这项技术需要的卵子数量比预期更多——这可能会威胁到卵子捐赠者。


Indeed, in their study, the team used 106 eggs from seven women, one of whom donated a total of 28 eggs, indicating possible ovarian hyperstimulation, which can be dangerous or even fatal.	事实上，研究小组在研究过程中使用由七名妇女捐赠的106枚卵子，其中有一名妇女捐卵28枚，这可能过度刺激卵巢，由此带来危险甚至致命的后果。


Like all human endeavors, science gets some things wrong.	像一切人类努力一样，科学也有可能铸成错误。


Germline genetic modification threatens to make such errors permanent.	生殖细胞基因改良可能造成错误永久化。


The UK scientific and charitable organizations advocating mitochondrial research are proud of the permissive legislative framework that has enabled them to establish an “international lead.”	主张进行线粒体研究的英国科学和慈善组织对使得他们“处于世界领先地位”的宽容的法律规则引以为傲。


But extending that leniency to human germline genetic modification may well cause future generations to view their actions very differently.	但子孙后代完全可能对人类生殖细胞基因改良产生完全不同的看法。


Taming the Arctic Oil Rush	控制北极的石油热


VIENNA – The rapid shrinkage of Arctic ice cover is one of the most dramatic changes in nature currently occurring anywhere on the planet, with profound environmental and economic implications.	维也纳——急剧萎缩的北极冰盖是地球自然界最显著的变化之一，并由此对环境和经济产生极为深远的影响。


On one hand, we stand to lose one of the Earth’s largest and most significant ecosystems.	一方面，我们将眼睁睁失去地球最大也最重要的生态系统。


On the other hand, the once fabled northeast and northwest passages will reduce shipping times and costs by as much as half, bringing China and Japan much closer to Europe and North America’s east coast.	另一方面，曾经传说中的东北和西北通道能减少一半的运输时间和成本，让中国和日本离欧洲和北美东海岸更近。


More immediately, the Arctic’s vast reserves of fossil fuels and minerals will become far more accessible than they are today.	北极地区巨大的石油矿产储量开发难度相比目前大大降低将是更直接的结果。


On land, oil fields in Alaska and gas fields in northern Russia have been producing hydrocarbons on a large scale for many years, but the estimated reserves under the Arctic Ocean are much larger.	阿拉斯加陆地油田和俄罗斯北部陆上天然气田大规模产出碳氢化合物已有多年，但相比北冰洋底的预测储量根本算不了什么。


At today’s prices, these reserves could be worth more than $7 trillion, according to international energy companies; factoring in the accompanying natural gas, $10 trillion would probably be a conservative figure.	据国际能源企业按现价测算，上述资源可能超过7万亿美元； 如果再算上伴生的天然气，那么10万亿美元或许只是比较保守的数字。


Because much of the Arctic Ocean is shallow and located on continental shelves, the bordering countries are scrambling to stake claims to exclusive economic zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.	由于北冰洋大部水域较浅且位于大陆架上，与之相邻的国家都在争先恐后地宣布按照联合国海洋法公约的规定设立专属经济区。


The political heat is also being turned up in the Arctic Council, a body set up to facilitate cooperation between states with Arctic territories.	北极理事会在政治上也骤然升温，设立该理事会的初衷是为推动北极各国之间的合作。


Besides the eight members – Canada, the five Nordic countries, Russia, and the United States – the Council has six permanent observers, including major countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.	除加拿大、北欧五国、俄罗斯和美国等八个成员国之外，理事会还吸收了由德、法、英等大国组成的六个常任观察员国。


Now China, India, and Japan are pressing to get in.	现在，中国、印度和日本也正积极谋求加入。


Not only states are playing for position in the Arctic.	不仅国家积极争取在北极占据一席之地。


The large oil and gas companies are very active, too.	大型石油和天然气公司也非常活跃。


In the wake of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent US drilling embargo, the approval of Shell’s drilling operations off the Alaskan coast received considerable media attention.	在2010年英国石油公司（BP）墨西哥湾漏油事故及美国钻探禁令发布后，壳牌在阿拉斯加海岸开展钻探作业的审批工作吸引了众多媒体的关注。


However, this year’s planned drilling of three wells in the Chukchi Sea and two in the Beaufort Sea was first reduced to one well and then postponed until next year after a containment dome – an emergency device for stopping a blowout – was damaged.	不过，今年在楚科奇海钻井三眼和波弗特海钻井两眼的计划先是被缩减到只钻一眼，之后又在安全穹顶（控制井喷的应急装置）受损后再次推迟到明年。


In other parts of the Arctic, though, exploratory drilling has continued.	但北极其他地方仍在继续钻井勘探。


Cairn Energy is drilling south and west of Greenland.	凯恩能源公司在格陵兰西南部实施钻探操作。


In Russia, Rosneft and BP are involved in a complicated arrangement to exploit Arctic offshore oil and gas resources – for example, in the Pechora Sea.	俄罗斯石油公司和英国石油公司在俄国合作推进开采北极近海（如伯朝拉海）石油天然气资源的复杂计划。


Rosneft has also signed exploration agreements with Statoil, ExxonMobil, and Eni.	俄罗斯石油公司已和挪威国家石油公司、埃克森美孚和埃尼集团签署勘探协议。


Of the large oil companies, only one – France’s Total – has argued against Arctic oil exploration and exploitation on the grounds of environmental risks and economic costs.	大型石油公司中只有法国道达尔一家以环境风险和经济成本为由反对在北极进行石油勘探开采。


There are several oil-related environmental risks specific to the Arctic Ocean.	北冰洋还面临着若干与石油相关的特殊环境风险。


For starters, there is the weather and climate.	天气和气候就是其中的首要因素。


Even if the Arctic Ocean becomes ice-free in the summer, most of the year it is not, and icebergs from melting glaciers will become more common and possibly larger.	尽管北冰洋在夏天冰雪消融，但在一年中多数时候却都是冰雪覆盖，冰川融化所形成的冰山不仅越来越大，也越来越常见。


This, together with frequent, powerful, and icy storms that appear on short notice, increases the likelihood of blowouts and other spills.	再加上随时发生的频繁强暴风雪，导致井喷和其他泄漏的危险性大大增加。


Then there are the problems associated with remoteness.	还有因地处偏远造成的问题。


The BP disaster in 2010 happened in the best possible place in terms of nearby resources for capping a blowout: the Gulf of Mexico contains the world’s largest concentration of oil companies, subcontractors, petroleum engineers, equipment, workshops, etc.	单就处理井喷的临近资源而言，2010年的英国石油公司事故发生在最幸运的地点：墨西哥湾云集了世界上为数最多的石油公司、分包商、石油工程师、设备和车间。


Yet it took three months to cap the Macondo well.	但封闭马康多油井仍然耗时三个月。


In the Arctic, all of those resources are thousands of kilometers away.	而所有这些资源距北极地区都远隔千里。


In the Gulf, the cleanup operations engaged tens of thousands of people in Mississippi and nearby US states.	清理行动因为美国密西西比及临近各州成千上万人的参与才得以顺利完成。


Where are such people to be found in the Arctic?	但北极地区到哪里去找那么多人？


Furthermore, in warm waters, most of the oil and its effects largely dissipate within five years.	此外，多数原油泄漏在温暖水域所造成的影响需要五年时间才能逐步消散。


In cold waters, however, recovery takes much longer, as the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989 demonstrated.	但寒冷水域的恢复速度要慢得多，1989年埃克森公司阿拉斯加湾漏油事件已经证明了这一点。


The rule of thumb that chemical and biochemical processes double in speed with each increase of ten degrees Celsius is a reasonable approximation here, too.	经验法则显示温度每升高十摄氏度化学生化反应速度提升一倍在污染消散问题上同样适用。


Thus, processes that take five years in the Gulf of Mexico would take more than 20 in the Arctic.	因此，在墨西哥湾需要五年的过程在北极就需要超过20年。


Meanwhile, in the low biodiversity ecosystems of the Arctic, with their simple food webs, so-called cascading effects are more pronounced than in temperate or warm regions.	此外，因为北极低生物多样性生态系统的食物网非常简单，导致所谓连锁效应比温带或温暖地区更为显著。


The demise of one species or trophic level (which contains organisms performing the same function in the food chain), leads to changes in others in a rapid sequence that is difficult to foresee.	单个物种或食性层级（包含在食物链中起到同样作用的有机体）的消亡对其他物种造成影响的速度难以预测。


The new US rules for offshore oil operations in the Arctic – which forced Shell to postpone drilling until next year – are certainly stricter than the old rules, and will reduce the risk of a blowout.	迫使壳牌将钻探推迟到来年的美国海上石油作业新规无疑比原有规则更为严格，并可以降低井喷的风险。


But, if one occurs, the only reliable way to stop it and cap the well is to drill a relief well.	但如果真发生井喷，钻减压井是阻止泄漏和封井独一无二的可靠方法。


That takes months in the best of circumstances; it could take a year or more in the Arctic.	钻减压井最快也要耗时数月，而北极地区可能需要一年或者更长。


There is, however, one way to shorten the time required to cap a well to a matter of days: drill two holes in parallel from the start.	但有一个办法可以将所需时间压缩到短短几天：即一开始就平行地钻两眼井。


In case of a blowout in one hole, the other could quickly become the relief well.	万一其中一眼发生井喷，另一眼就能迅速发挥减压井的作用。


Obviously, this would cause the cost of drilling to increase significantly.	这无疑将导致钻井成本大幅上升。


But, if we cannot wait to explore for oil in the Arctic until we have the technology to do it safely, the authorities should demand no less of the oil companies.	但如果来不及发明在北极安全开采石油的新技术，政府就应当对石油公司有此要求。


The Risky Rich	富国的主权风险


NEW YORK – Today’s swollen fiscal deficits and public debt are fueling concerns about sovereign risk in many advanced economies.	纽约 —— 如今，许多发达经济体财政赤字累累，政府债台高筑，已引发主权风险忧虑。


Traditionally, sovereign risk has been concentrated in emerging-market economies.	以前，说起主权风险，人们主要想到新兴市场经济体。


After all, in the last decade or so, Russia, Argentina, and Ecuador defaulted on their public debts, while Pakistan, Ukraine, and Uruguay coercively restructured their public debt under the threat of default.	毕竟，在过去 10 年里，俄罗斯、阿根廷、厄瓜多尔曾发生公债违约，而巴基斯坦、乌克兰和乌拉圭靠着强行推进公债重组，才免于违约。


But, in large part – and with a few exceptions in Central and Eastern Europe – emerging-market economies improved their fiscal performance by reducing overall deficits, running large primary surpluses, lowering their stock of public debt-to-GDP ratios, and reducing the currency and maturity mismatches in their public debt.	然而，除了中、东欧的几个例外，大多数新兴市场经济体的财政表现都有所改善 —— 总体赤字下降，收支保有很大的基本盈余（刨去债务利息支出后的盈余），公债的 GDP 占比降低，公债中的货币错配和期限错配现象也有所缓解。


As a result, sovereign risk today is a greater problem in advanced economies than in most emerging-market economies.	如今，主权风险与其说是新兴市场经济体的弱点，不如说是发达经济体的难题。


Indeed, rating-agency downgrades, a widening of sovereign spreads, and failed public-debt auctions in countries like the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, and Spain provided a stark reminder last year that unless advanced economies begin to put their fiscal houses in order, investors, bond-market vigilantes, and rating agencies may turn from friend to foe.	评级降级，国债息差扩大，英国、希腊、爱尔兰和西班牙等国公债流拍……说真的，去年的种种迹象严峻地提醒人们，除非发达经济体着手整顿财政结构，否则投资者、“债券市场义勇军”（ bond-market vigilantes ，指通过抛售国债来对抗扩张性政策的投资者群体）和评级机构就会由朋友转为敌人。


The severe recession, combined with the financial crisis during 2008-2009, worsened developed countries’ fiscal positions, owing to stimulus spending, lower tax revenues, and backstopping and ring-fencing of their financial sectors.	2008~2009 年，金融危机和严重衰退联翩而至，发达国家税收下滑，却不得不扩大开支刺激经济，还要为金融业输血、调养，这一切都使它们的财政体质急剧恶化。


The impact was greater in countries that had a history of structural fiscal problems, maintained loose fiscal policies, and ignored fiscal reforms during the boom years.	这种风险对不同国家影响不一。 长期以来存在结构性财政问题、财政政策松弛并且在繁荣时期忽视财政改革的那些国家，情况比较糟糕。


In the future, a weak economic recovery and an aging population are likely to increase the debt burden of many advanced economies, including the United States, the UK, Japan, and several euro-zone countries.	未来，由于经济复苏绵软无力、人口老龄化，不少发达经济体的债务负担有可能会进一步加重，包括美国、英国、日本和若干欧元区国家。


More ominously, monetization of these fiscal deficits is becoming a pattern in many advanced economies, as central banks have started to swell the monetary base via massive purchases of short- and long-term government paper.	更恐怖的是，许多发达经济体对财政赤字货币化开始习以为常了，其央行已大量购买短期、长期政府票据，使货币基数猛增。


Eventually, large monetized fiscal deficits will lead to a fiscal train wreck and/or a rise in inflation expectations that could sharply increase long-term government bond yields and crowd out a tentative and so far fragile economic recovery.	财政赤字大规模货币化终将导致财政列车脱轨，或引发高通胀预期，甚至双鬼拍门，从而大幅推高长期国债收益，把本就犹疑脆弱的经济复苏活活扼杀。


Fiscal stimulus is a tricky business.	财政刺激是个吃力不讨好的事儿。


Policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t.	政策制定者搞财政刺激也好，不搞也好，都会招人骂。


If they remove the stimulus too soon by raising taxes, cutting spending, and mopping up the excess liquidity, the economy may fall back into recession and deflation.	如果过早地实施加息、削减开支、挤出过剩流动性等刺激退出政策，容易把经济重新拖回衰退和通缩。


But if monetized fiscal deficits are allowed to run, the increase in long-term yields will put a chokehold on growth.	但如果允许财政赤字货币化继续搞下去，长期国债收益的上升势头简直就是在卡经济增长的脖子。


Countries with weaker initial fiscal positions – such as Greece, the UK, Ireland, Spain, and Iceland – have been forced by the market to implement early fiscal consolidation.	财政初始状���不佳的国家，例如希腊、英国、爱尔兰、西班牙和冰岛已经在市场压力下，被迫早早实施了财政巩固政策。


While that could be contractionary, the gain in fiscal-policy credibility might prevent a damaging spike in long-term government-bond yields.	尽管那种政策的效果也是两面的，但财政政策借此可以重塑公信力，从而有助于避免长期国债收益过分走高，对经济造成打击。


So early fiscal consolidation can be expansionary on balance.	所以，较早引入财政巩固政策这个选项的说服力可能更大一些。


For the Club Med members of the euro zone – Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal – public-debt problems come on top of a loss of international competitiveness.	对于欧元区里那些所谓“地中海俱乐部”的成员 —— 意大利、西班牙、希腊和葡萄牙而言，公债问题已经上升为事关国际竞争力的问题。


These countries had already lost export-market shares to China and other low value-added and labor-intensive Asian economies.	这些国家的部分出口市场份额已经输给了中国和其他低附加值、劳动密集型亚洲经济体。


Then a decade of nominal-wage growth that out-paced productivity gains led to a rise in unit labor costs, real exchange-rate appreciation, and large current-account deficits.	如果名义工资增长快于生产力增长的势头持续个十年，就会导致这些国家的单位劳动成本上升、实际汇率升值，进而导致经常项目大额赤字。


The euro’s recent sharp rise has made this competitiveness problem even more severe, reducing growth further and making fiscal imbalances even larger.	对这些国家的竞争力而言，欧元近期的剧烈升值不啻是雪上加霜，进一步削弱了它们的经济增长，扩大了它们的财政缺口。


So the question is whether these euro-zone members will be willing to undergo painful fiscal consolidation and internal real depreciation through deflation and structural reforms in order to increase productivity growth and prevent an Argentine-style outcome: exit from the monetary union, devaluation, and default.	所以问题在于，这些欧元区国家是否经得起一系列猛药：实施痛苦的财政巩固措施，以通缩形式让本币对内实际贬值，引入结构改革以提升生产力，并且还得抵御住阿根廷式自暴自弃的诱惑 —— 退出货币联盟，搞汇率贬值和债务违约。


Countries like Latvia and Hungary have shown a willingness to do so.	拉脱维亚和匈牙利等国家似乎已经忍不住想这么做了。


Whether Greece, Spain, and other euro-zone members will accept such wrenching adjustments remains to be seen.	希腊、西班牙和其他欧元区国家是否愿意接受这种痛苦的调整，还有待观察。


The US and Japan might be among the last to face the wrath of the bond-market vigilantes: the dollar is the main global reserve currency, and foreign-reserve accumulation – mostly US government bills and bonds – continues at a rapid pace.	即使美国和日本会受到“债券义勇军”惩罚，也是最后一批了：美元是主要的全球储备货币，而主要体现为美国国库券和长期国债的全球外汇储备仍在快速累积。


Japan is a net creditor and largely finances its debt domestically.	日本是净债权国，其国债的资金来源主要是国内。


But investors will become increasingly cautious even about these countries if the necessary fiscal consolidation is delayed.	但即便是这些国家，如果必要的财政巩固政策迟迟得不到出台，投资者对它们也会变得越来越警惕。


The US is a net debtor with an aging population, unfunded entitlement spending on social security and health care, an anemic economic recovery, and risks of continued monetization of the fiscal deficit.	美国是净债务国，它的人口趋于老龄化，社保和医保体系面临资金缺口，经济复苏乏力，财政赤字持续货币化的风险也在累积。


Japan is aging even faster, and economic stagnation is reducing domestic savings, while the public debt is approaching 200% of GDP.	日本的老龄化形势更严峻，经济停滞正在侵蚀国内储蓄，而公债更是高达 GDP 的 200% 。


The US also faces political constraints to fiscal consolidation: Americans are deluding themselves that they can enjoy European-style social spending while maintaining low tax rates, as under President Ronald Reagan.	要出台财政巩固政策，美国还面临一些政治障碍：美国人自欺欺人地以为，他们一方面可以享受欧洲式的社会福利，另一方面还能享受像里根执政时期那样的低税率。


At least European voters are willing to pay higher taxes for their public services.	至少，欧洲选民愿意为了公共服务缴纳更多的税款。


If America’s Democrats lose in the mid-term elections this November, there is a risk of persistent fiscal deficits as Republicans veto tax increases while Democrats veto spending cuts.	如果美国民主党在今年 11 月的中期选举中失利，财政赤字问题可能变成老大难：共和党会否决加税，而民主党会否决削减开支。


Monetizing the fiscal deficits would then become the path of least resistance: running the printing presses is much easier than politically painful deficit reduction.	这样一来，财政赤字货币化可能会成为受到抵制最少的折中方案，毕竟，开动印钞机比削减赤字在政治上容易多了。


But if the US does use the inflation tax as a way to reduce the real value of its public debt, the risk of a disorderly collapse of the US dollar would rise significantly.	但如果美国把“通胀税”当成解脱公债负担（令债务实际贬值）的捷径，美元在乱中崩盘的风险就会大增。


America’s foreign creditors would not accept a sharp reduction in their dollar assets’ real value that debasement of the dollar via inflation and devaluation would entail.	不论是通胀还是贬值，美元走软都意味着外国债权人手中美元资产的实际价值急剧缩水，他们不会坐视不理。


A disorderly rush to the exit could lead to a dollar collapse, a spike in long-term interest rates, and a severe double dip recession.	一旦大家开始争先恐后地逃离美元，美元就会大幅跳水，长期国债利率会飙升，随之而来的将是经济深深的二次探底。


The Road Map Includes Damascus	和平路线图包括大马士革


Powerful countries know that it is dangerous to be seen to flinch, because enemies take heart and allies’ knees begin to knock.	强国们知道表现出退缩是危险的，因为这会使敌人振奋而令盟友畏缩。


A great power also knows that if it sets out on a military adventure without setting achievable goals, it can get into bad trouble.	一个强国还知道如果它发动一场没有既定目标的军事冒险，就可能会陷入大麻烦之中。


What’s true for great powers is doubly true for beleaguered Israel, which failed to dismantle Hezbollah’s power over Lebanon.	这些大国们了然于胸的道理对于陷入重围的以色列更是适用。 它未能解除真主党在黎巴嫩的有生力量。


But the Lebanon war’s failure may yet provide an opening to peace if Israel is bold enough to seize it.	但黎巴嫩战争的失败却可能为和平提供了一个机会，就看以色列是否有勇气把握住它。


The world has two chief aims in the area between Cairo and Teheran: to maintain peace in the wider Middle East so that oil flows freely through the Persian Gulf; to steer the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians toward a settlement that guarantees the safety of Israel in its internationally recognised borders, while meeting the Palestinian people’s legitimate national aspirations for their own state.	国际社会在开罗和德黑兰之间的地区有两个首要的目标：维持更广泛的中东地区的和平以便让石油能够通过波斯湾畅流无阻； 朝和解的方向引导巴以冲突从而确保以色列在国际承认的边界内的安全，同时也满足巴勒斯坦人民建立自己国家的合法心愿。


The two issues have long been connected, but the main link is now President Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria.	这两个问题长期以来就是彼此关联的，而现在的关键环节则是巴萨尔·阿萨德总统领导下的叙利亚。


Isolated, desperate for allies, Syria has been helping Iran in its quest for regional hegemony.	在备受孤立而急需盟友的情况下，叙利亚一直在帮助伊朗寻求地区霸权。


Since Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution evicted Syria last year, the Syrians have sought to haul Lebanon back within their sphere of influence.	自从黎巴嫩在去年的“雪松革命”中将叙利亚驱逐以来，叙利亚人就一直企图将其重新纳入到自己的势力范围。


They back Hezbollah – and help Iran send it weapons – because Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah’s shock troops keep the government in Beirut weak.	他们支持真主党—并帮助伊朗运送武器—因为纳斯鲁拉的突击部队制约着贝鲁特的政府。


The Syrians also like to present themselves as the last real Arab defenders of the Palestinian cause.	叙利亚人还喜欢将自己标榜为巴勒斯坦事业在阿拉伯世界的最后一个真正捍卫者。


In short, Syria, with its geographical position, its Iranian links and weapons, and its brutal Ba’athist regime, has become the lynchpin of developments between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.	简言之，由于自身地理位置、与伊朗的联系机伊朗提供的武器和残暴的社会党政权，叙利亚已经成为地中海和波斯湾之间事态发展的关键。


To secure Lebanon, and to bring Hamas to the bargaining table with Israel, it is Syria that Israel and the United States must deal with, one way or another.	为了确保黎巴嫩的安全并使哈马斯能重新与以色列谈判，叙利亚才是以色列和美国迟早必须面对的难题。


Syria’s position and interests should make it amenable to a deal.	叙利亚的立场和利益因该使它能够接受某种协议。


Of course, Syria still believes in a “Greater Syria” and never fully accepted Lebanon’s sovereignty.	当然，叙利亚仍然坚持“大叙利亚”信念并从未真正接受黎巴嫩的主权地位。


Syrian intelligence and troops – present in Lebanon since 1976 – were forced out in 2005 only under enormous international pressure and $1billion were lost in smuggling revenue last year much of which previously flowed to the Syrian military.	叙利亚的情报机构和军队—自1976年以来就驻扎在黎巴嫩—完全是在国际社会的巨大压力下才于2005年被迫撤离。 因此，走私收入在去年损失了10亿美金，而这其中的相当一部分从前都被叙利亚军方收入囊中。


Many of the Hezbollah rockets that rained on Israel bore the markings of Syria’s Defence Ministry.	许多发射到以色列的真主党火箭上都印有叙利亚国防部的标记。


Yet Syria has one redeeming feature: it is a secular country that traditionally recoils from Islamic fundamentalism.	尽管如此，叙利亚却有一个足以救赎自身的特点：它是一个在传统上厌弃伊斯兰原教旨主义的世俗国家。


Indeed, President Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar’s father, massacred up to 38,000 mainly Sunni fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood insurgents in Hama in 1982.	的确，哈菲兹·阿萨德总统，巴萨尔·阿萨德的父亲于1982年在哈马屠杀了近38，000名以逊尼派原教旨主义者为主的穆斯林兄弟会起义军士兵。


Today, parts of the ruling Ba’ath elite worry about Syria’s deepening alliance with theocratic Iran and Islamist Hezbollah.	今天，社会党统治集团中的部分人也对叙利亚和神权政治的伊朗及伊斯兰主义的真主党日渐加深的联盟关系而忧心忡忡。


That alliance reflects fear, not commitment.	这个联盟反映出的是恐惧而不是承诺。


The moderate Sunni Gulf Arab emirates, suspicious of growing Shia ascendancy and of Iranian irredentism in the region, have stopped propping up Syria’s economy due to its alliance with the ayatollahs of Iran.	温和的逊尼派海湾阿拉伯众酋长国由于怀疑该地区日渐增长的什叶派势力和伊朗的领土收复主义，已经以叙利亚与伊朗的阿亚图拉们联盟为由停止支持其经济发展。


Labelled by the US as part of the “axis of evil,” Syria has also seen Saudi financial aid dry up and fears that the trade benefits that would come with ratification of its Association Agreement with the EU will never materialize.	在被美国贴上“邪恶轴心”的标签后，叙利亚发现沙特的财政援助也日渐干涸。 它还担心由于批准与欧盟的《联合协定》将会带来的贸易利益可能永远也无法实现。


Both Syria’s reluctant alliance with Iran, and its economic desperation, provide openings that Israel and the West should test.	叙利亚��伊朗的勉强联盟及其所处的经济困境，为以色列和西方提供了许多值得试探的机会。


But what might Syria want?	但叙利亚可能会需要什么呢？


Like most Arabs, Bashar Al-Assad views Israel from the perspective of pan-Arab anguish at Palestinian dispossession, but also sees a chance to use the Palestinians to strengthen his regime’s power by putting his own imprint on any settlement.	像大多数的阿拉伯人一样，巴萨尔·阿萨德从巴勒斯坦的遭遇所激起的泛阿拉伯的愤怒的层面上来看待以色列，但同时他也看到机会，能够通过在任何和解方案中留下自己的烙印的方式，利用巴勒斯坦人来强化其政权的力量。


Like his father, Assad is cautious.	和其父一样，阿萨德是谨慎的。


So long as Egypt remains neutral, he is unlikely to risk another war with Israel, let alone a war with America or with America and Israel combined.	只要埃及保持中立，他就不大可能会与以色列再进行一场战争，更别说与美国或美以联军的战争。


The big puzzle is what Assad wants with Lebanon.	最大的谜题是阿萨德想从黎巴嫩得到什么。


If his aim is a government in Beirut that takes into account Syria’s genuine security concerns, Israel can live with that.	如果他目的是一个将叙利亚的真正安全作为重要考量的贝鲁特政府，那么以色列是可能同意的。


Besides, widespread revulsion against Syria for its alleged role in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, particularly among Lebanon’s Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze, means that Lebanon is unlikely to ever become totally subservient again – that is, unless Hezbollah gets to call the shots.	另外，由于叙利亚在前黎巴嫩总理拉菲克·哈里里遇害事件中的参与，激起了黎巴嫩人，特别是马龙派、逊尼派和德鲁兹派的广泛厌恶。 这就意味着黎巴嫩不大可能会再变得百依百顺—除非真主党掌权。


Israel now faces three options.	以色列现在面临三种方案：退缩并佯装强硬；


It can flinch while pretending not to; it can carry on more or less as before, hoping for some positive new development; or it can try to decouple Syria from Iran and Hezbollah.	依旧我行我素，并寄望于事态向着积极的方向发展； 或试图将叙利亚同伊朗和真主党剥离开来。


The latter option is the only scenario that could stop the Islamist drift in the Middle East.	最后一种方案是唯一能够阻止伊斯兰主义在中东泛滥的方案。


But prying Syria from Iran’s embrace means, eventually, reopening the Golan Heights question.	但是把叙利亚拉出伊朗的怀抱意味着终究要重新提出戈兰高地的问题。


A deal with Syria is not impossible, given the ambiguities in Assad’s position.	就阿萨德立场的暧昧来看，与叙利亚达成协定并非不可能。


On the Israeli/American side, it would include recognition that Syria has security interests in Lebanon.	在以色列/美国一边，这协定将包括承认叙利亚在黎巴嫩有安全利益。


If Syria in turn accepts Lebanon’s sovereignty, and if it helps force Hezbollah into becoming a political force shorn of its military power, Israel and America ought to persuade Lebanon’s government to accept that Syria and Lebanon need to consult each other in security matters.	如果叙利亚接受黎巴嫩的主权地位，并且出力迫使真主党放弃武力成为一支政治党派，那么以色列和美国就应当劝服黎巴嫩政府在安全问题上和叙利亚互相商榷。


For Syria, a peace deal would also include an understanding that Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights is to be settled by serious negotiation, not war.	对于叙利亚而言，一份和平协定还会包括叙利亚对解决以色列占领戈兰高地的问题的谅解，即解决手段应该是谈判而不是战争。


Such a diplomatic opening may be hard for Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, to accept, let alone to sell to Israelis.	这样的外交机会可能使以色列总理奥尔默特难以接受，更别说让让他向以色列民众解释了。


So America and Europe must help him reach this conclusion.	因此，美国和欧盟必须帮助他做出正确的决定。


America and Israel must drop their refusal to talk to Syria.	美国和以色列必须放下拒绝与叙利亚谈判的姿态。


Indeed, the time is ripe to offer assurances to the isolated Syrian regime that blocking Hezbollah’s rearmament, stopping Islamist fighters’ passage into Iraq, and improving the country’s appalling human rights record would bring valuable diplomatic and economic benefits, including a strengthened association agreement with the EU.	的确，给备受孤立的叙利亚政权一些安慰的时机已经成熟。 要让其明白封锁真主党的军备，阻止伊斯兰好战分子进入伊拉克并改善自身触目惊心的人权记录会给它带来外交和经济上的实惠，其中包括强化与欧盟的联合协定。


Israel would gain much by talking to its enemy.	通过与敌人的沟通，以色列也能获益良多。


Conscious of its vulnerability to rocket attacks, Israel knows that needs a defensible state, safe from external aggression.	在意识到其在火箭袭击下的脆弱性后，以色列明白它需要成为一个不受外来侵扰、可以防卫的国家。


Removing Syria as a threat is a key element in achieving this strategic objective.	消除来自叙利亚的威胁是实现这一战略目标的关键因素。


The Road to Arab Democracy	阿拉伯民主之路


JERUSALEM – During the turmoil of the French Revolution, a popular saying arose: “How beautiful was the republic – under the monarchy.”	发自耶路撒冷——在法国大革命的动乱时期曾经流传着这么一句话：“共和国是多么美妙啊——我指的是君主制下的那个。


The Revolution aimed at achieving Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Instead, it wrought for France – and much of Europe – Jacobin terror, right-wing counter-terror, decades of war, and eventually Napoleonic tyranny.	”这场原本为了实现自由，民主和博爱的大革命最终为法国（以及欧洲大部分地区）带来了雅各宾专政，右翼势力反专政，持续数年的内战以及独裁者拿破仑的最终上台。


A similar challenge now faces North Africa and the Middle East, where most Arab countries are experiencing massive upheavals.	而如今随着一系列阿拉伯国家先后爆发大规模动荡，北非和中东地区也面临着同样的挑战。


Historically speaking, what is now happening is without precedent in the Arab world.	从历史上看，如今在阿拉伯世界发生的一切堪称史无前例。


For the first time, Arab authoritarian regimes have been toppled, and others are threatened, by mass demonstrations calling for freedom and democracy.	这是头一次有阿拉伯专制政权被推翻，还有一批政权在大规模民众自由民主示威中发生了动摇。


Previously, Arab regimes changed through military coups and other sorts of putsches, never through popular revolutions.	阿拉伯国家的政权一直以来都是通过军事政变以及其他形式的暴动实现更替，还从未出现过这种人民革命的形式。


During the great democratic wave of the 1990’s, which brought down dictatorships in Eastern Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia, nothing similar happened in Arab North Africa and the Middle East.	在1990年代的民主浪潮期间，东欧，拉美，撒哈拉以南非洲和东南亚地区都相继有独裁政权被推翻，但北非和中东却置身事外。


Now, however, the region’s political inertia has been disrupted. Cairo’s Tahrir Square has become a symbol for both hope and “people power.”	如今这两大区域的政治惰性已被打破，位于开罗的解放广场也成为了希望以及“人民力量”的象征。


Yet, while most Arab regimes now appear threatened, only two authoritarian rulers – Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt – have been actually deposed so far. Theirs were relatively “soft” autocracies.	虽然大多数阿拉伯政权似乎都受到了威胁，但目前为止只有两位独裁者——突尼斯的本·阿里和埃及的穆巴拉克最终被推翻，事实上他们的独裁统治也都属于相对较“软性”的类型。


Much more oppressive and ruthless rulers – Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, Bashar Assad in Syria, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen – though seriously threatened, have proven far more resilient (up to now) in suppressing popular opposition.	而那些更加残暴无情的统治者——利比亚的卡扎菲，叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德以及也门的萨利赫——虽然也受到了严重威胁，却也证明了自身更有能力去镇压反对派民众。


Even in tiny Bahrain, the Sunni minority has, for now, succeeded in maintaining its rule over the Shia majority, albeit with military help from neighboring Sunni-led countries.	即便是巴林这样的小国，执政的逊尼派也能在逊尼派邻国的军事协助下继续维持对人口占大多数的什叶派的统治。


As always, it is easier to bring down an autocracy than to construct and consolidate a democratic regime.	建立并巩固一个民主政体要比推翻一个独裁政权更加困难。


When communism in Eastern Europe collapsed, their old systems, despite some obvious differences, had the same characteristics: they were one-party dictatorships, with state control over the economy, education, and the media.	在共产主义体制崩溃之时，东欧各国旧有的政治系统都大同小异：都是一党专政，政府全面控制全国经济，教育和媒体。


Today, they are very different from each other. Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, for example, succeeded in navigating a successful transition to democracy and a functioning market economy.	到如今各国已经呈现出完全不同的状况：波兰，捷克和匈牙利成功实现了向民主和市场经济的转型。


Russia reverted to a neo-authoritarian system. The former Soviet republics in Central Asia have all developed various “sultanistic” forms of government.	俄罗斯又回归为一个准专制系统，而中亚各苏维埃共和国则全数演化出不同形式的“苏丹式”政府。


The reason for these differences is simple: democratic transition requires not only elections, but also several pre-conditions – a vibrant civil society; previous traditions, whether actual or remembered, of representation, pluralism, tolerance, and individualism; a limited role of religion; and an effective institutional framework for a multi-party system.	造成这些差异的原因很简单：民主的转变不仅需要选举，还必须具备一系列前提条件——充满活力的公民社会； 原有的代议制传统（无论依然存在还是早已消失）；


Where these conditions exist, a transition to democracy can succeed; where they are missing, the chances – as in Russia – for a successful transition to a consolidated democracy are slim.	影响力有限的宗教势力，以及可以一个运行多党系统的有效体制框架。 一旦具备这些条件，向民主制度的转型就很可能成功，反之则机会渺茫——俄罗斯就是一例。


Developments in Egypt will be crucial, not only because it is the largest Arab country, but also because some of the necessary pre-conditions appear to have a stronger presence there than elsewhere in the region.	因此埃及的民主发展状况非常关键，这可不仅因为它是国土面积最大的阿拉伯国家，而是它显然具备比邻国更为完备的条件去实现这一转型。


Yet, even in Egypt, the challenges are enormous.	但即便如此，埃及也要面对相当多的挑战。


With early elections called for September, there is serious doubt as to whether opposition groups will have the time, means, and experience to organize effective political parties.	在9月举行初选的日程安排下，我们很怀疑埃及各反对派别是否有足够的时间，手段和经验去组建真正的政治党派。


At the moment, only the army – which has effectively ruled the country since 1952 – and the Muslim Brotherhood, which has the widest social networks, appear to be serious players.	此时此刻，只有军方——这个国家自1952年至今的实际控制者——以及拥有最广泛社会网络的穆斯林兄弟会看上去像真正有实力的参与者。


Will the army, whose monopoly of power is paradoxically legitimized by the massive demonstrations that toppled Mubarak, be willing to give up the enormous political and economic clout that it has amassed over decades?	讽刺的是，推翻穆巴拉克的大规模示威认可了军方垄断权力的行为，如今这股势力又是否舍得放弃数十年积累下来的巨大政治和经济影响力？


One hears about a possible modus vivendi between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood.	笔者听说军队与穆斯林兄弟会之间已经私下达成了协议。


Indeed, some activists are already back in Tahrir Square demonstrating against such an incongruous yet possible alliance.	事实上，一些示威者已经重新回到解放广场，抗议这个看上去怪异却极有可能达成的联盟。


In Libya, if Qaddafi falls, can such a highly tribalized country possess the building blocks needed for a functioning democracy?	在利比亚，如果卡扎菲最终被推翻的话，那这么一个高度部族化的国家又能否为构建一个可运作的民主制度提供所需的基础呢？


The issue, one should emphasize, is not Islam as such: in Europe, the Catholic Church was for a long time the greatest enemy of democracy and liberalism.	笔者认为这项事务并非与伊斯兰教本身有关：在欧洲，天主教在一段长的历史时期内都是民主和自由的最大敌人。


Yet Christian Democratic parties today are one of the pillars of European democracy.	而如今天主教民主党派已经成为欧洲民主的支柱。


Like Christian churches, Islam can also change, and Indonesia and Turkey could well be examples for such a possibility.	因此伊斯兰教也可以发生像天主教那样的转变，而印尼和土耳其则很可能成为其中的成功例子。


But a context in which a fundamentalist Islamic group like the Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest organization in society, with very little effective countervailing powers, creates a serious challenge.	但问题是穆斯林兄弟会这样的极端伊斯兰组织的社会势力极端强大，也没有足够的力量足以制衡它，这就将带来一个严重的挑战。