Wall Street employees received more in annual bonuses ($33.2 billion) in 2007, the year before the global financial meltdown.	2007年（全球金融崩溃的前一年）华尔街雇员的奖金数量（332亿美元）就比这个数字大。


The whole family of the UN Secretariat and related entities, together with current peacekeepers, adds up to around 215,000 people worldwide – not a small number, but less than one-eighth of the roughly 1.8 million staff employed by McDonald’s and its franchisees worldwide!	联合国秘书处和相关机构全体加上现有维和力量大约总共有215 000人——人数不少，但还不到麦当劳及其连锁店全世界员工总数180万人的八分之一！


The bottom line, as the youngsters gathered in Melbourne fully understood, is that the UN provides fabulous value for what the world spends on it, and that if it ever ceased to exist, we would have to reinvent it.	聚首于墨尔本的年轻人都十分明白，根本出发点在于世界花在联合国上的钱产生了极高的价值，如果联合国寿终正寝，我们还得重新创造一个。


The downsides are real, but we need to remember the immortal words of Dag Hammarskjold, the UN’s second secretary-general: “The UN was created not to bring us to heaven, but to save us from hell.”	联合国的衰落是实实在在的，但我们必须铭记联合国第二任秘书长哈马舍尔德的不朽名言：“联合国不是用来把我们带上天堂的，它是用来把我们带离地狱的。 ”


In Defense of Varoufakis	为瓦鲁法基斯辩护


LONDON – From blaming him for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy to accusing him of illegally plotting Greece’s exit from the eurozone, it has become fashionable to disparage Yanis Varoufakis, the country’s former finance minister.	伦敦—从指责他导致希腊经济新一轮崩溃，到指控它非法密谋希腊退出欧元区，诋毁希腊前财政部长雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）已经成为一种时尚。


While I have never met or spoken to him, I believe that he is getting a bad rap (and increasingly so).	我从未见过他，也没有和他对过话，但我认为他受到了无理指责（越来越多）。


In the process, attention is being diverted away from the issues that are central to Greece’s ability to recover and prosper – whether it stays in the eurozone or decides to leave.	在此过程中，人们的注意力不再集中在希腊复苏和繁荣能力的核心问题——留在欧元区还是离开欧元区。


That is why it is important to take note of the ideas that Varoufakis continues to espouse.	因此，注意瓦鲁法基斯仍在宣扬的观点十分重要。


Greeks and others may fault him for pursuing his agenda with too little politesse while in office.	希腊和其他国家也许会指责他在担任财政部长期间只知道追求自己的日程，不讲道理。


But the essence of that agenda was – and remains – largely correct.	但他的日程的实质基本上是正确的，并且现在仍然正确。


Following an impressive election victory by his Syriza party in January, Greece’s prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, appointed Varoufakis to lead the delicate negotiations with the country’s creditors.	他的左翼联盟党（Syriza）在1月的大选中大获全胜，随后希腊总理齐普拉斯任命瓦鲁法基斯领衔与希腊债权人进行如履薄冰的谈判。


His mandate was to recast the relationship in two important ways: render its terms more amenable to economic growth and job creation; and restore balance and dignity to the treatment of Greece by its European partners and the International Monetary Fund.	他的使命是以两种重要方式重塑希腊与债权人的关系：让条件更有利于经济增长和就业创造； 以及让欧洲伙伴国和IMF在对待希腊时重塑平衡与尊严。


These objectives reflected Greece’s frustrating and disappointing experience under two previous bailout packages administered by “the institutions” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF).	这些目标表明希腊在前两次“机构”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）援助方案中所经历的沮丧和失望。


In pursuing them, Varoufakis felt empowered by the scale of Syriza’s electoral win and compelled by economic logic to press three issues that many economists believe must be addressed if sustained growth is to be restored: less and more intelligent austerity; structural reforms that better meet social objectives; and debt reduction.	在追求这些目标的过程中，瓦鲁法基斯因为左翼联盟的选举获胜优势而有了底气，也因为需要强调许多经济学家认为是重塑持续增长的必须条件的三个问题而倍感压力。 这三个问题是更少和更多明智紧缩、更符合社会目标的结构改革，以及减债。


These issues remain as relevant today, with Varoufakis out of government, as they were when he was tirelessly advocating for them during visits to European capitals and in tense late-night negotiations in Brussels.	如今，瓦鲁法基斯已退出希腊政府，而这三个问题依然十分重要，一点都不亚于他在拜访欧洲各国和紧张的布鲁塞尔谈判最后关头的时候。


Indeed, many observers view the agreement on a third bailout program that Greece reached with its creditors – barely a week after Varoufakis resigned – as simply more of the same.	事实上，许多观察家认为，希腊与其债权人所达成的第三次援助方案协议——在瓦鲁法基斯辞职不到一周时签署——只不过是前两次的重复。


At best, the deal will bring a respite – one that is likely to prove both short and shallow.	该协议充其量只是安慰剂——也许效果既短且微。


In part, the criticism of Varoufakis reflects less the substance of his proposals than the manner in which he approached his interlocutors.	从某种程度，瓦鲁法基斯的批评反映的与其说是他的方案的实质，不如说是他对待谈判对手的方式。


Eschewing the traditional duality of frank private discussions and restrained public commentary, he aggressively advocated his case openly and bluntly, and did so in an increasingly personal manner.	他回避坦率的私下讨论和克制的公开评论的传统两面性，而是公开粗暴地推进己方观点，并且日益采用个人方式这样做。


Whether deemed naive or belligerent, this approach undeniably upset and angered European politicians.	天真也好，好斗也罢，不可否认这一方法让欧洲政客感到不安和震怒。


Rather than modifying a policy framework that had failed for five years to deliver on its stated objectives, they dug in their heels, eventually resorting to the economic equivalent of gunboat diplomacy.	他们没有去修补五年来从未实现预定目标的政策框架，而是挖他的墙角，最终形成了经济版炮舰外交的局面。


And they evidently also made it clear to Varoufakis’s boss, Tsipras, that the future of negotiations depended on him casting aside his unconventional minister – which he did, first by assigning someone else to lead the negotiations and then by appointing a new finance minister altogether.	他们显然也向瓦鲁法基斯的上司齐普拉斯表明，谈判的未来取决于他是否让他的非主流部长靠边站——他照办了，先是任命另一个人领导谈判，然后又认命了新的财政部长。


Now that he is out of office, Varoufakis is being blamed for much more than failing to adapt his approach to political reality.	如今，瓦鲁法基斯已经退出了政府，而他受到的指责远不止于没能根据政治现实调整方法。


Some hold him responsible for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy, the unprecedented shuttering of the banking system, and the imposition of stifling capital controls.	一些人认为他应该为希腊经济再度崩溃负责，为前所未有的银行体系关门负责，为令人窒息的资本管制负责。


Others are calling for criminal investigations, characterizing the work he led on a Plan B (whereby Greece would introduce a new payments system either in parallel or instead of the euro) as tantamount to treason.	也有人要求对他展开刑事调查，说他领导的B计划（希腊将引入新的支付体系，采用与欧元平行或取代欧元的货币）相当于叛国。


But, love him or hate him (and, it seems, very few people who have encountered him feel indifferent), Varoufakis was never the arbiter of Greece’s fate.	但是，不管你讨厌他还是喜欢他（似乎在与他打交道的人中很少有对此无所谓的），瓦鲁法基斯从来不是希腊命运的裁判官。


Yes, he should have adopted a more conciliatory style and shown greater appreciation for the norms of European negotiations; and, yes, he overestimated Greece’s bargaining power, wrongly assuming that pressing the threat of Grexit would compel his European partners to reconsider their long-entrenched positions.	是的，他应该采取更温和的态度，表现出对欧洲谈判规范的更大的顺从； 是的，他高估了希腊的讨价还价能力，���误地假设抛出希腊退出（Grexit）威胁就能迫使欧洲伙伴国重新考虑根深蒂固的立场。


But, relative to the macro situation, these are minor issues.	但是，相对宏观局面来说，这些都是次要问题。


Varoufakis had no control over the economic mess that Syriza inherited when it came to power, including an unemployment rate hovering around 25% and youth joblessness that had been running at more than 50% for a considerable period.	瓦鲁法基斯对于左翼联盟上台执政时所面临的经济乱局无能为力，包括长期徘徊在25%的失业率和高达50%以上的年轻人失业率。


He could not influence in any meaningful manner the national narratives that had sunk deep roots in other European countries and thus undermined those countries’ ability to adapt.	他无法以任何有意义的方式影响在其他欧洲国家已经根深蒂固、因而妨碍了这些国家的调整能力的国家叙事（national narrative）。


He could not counter the view among some of the region’s politicians that success for Syriza would embolden and strengthen other non-traditional parties around Europe.	他无法反驳该地区某些政客的观点——左翼联盟的成功将让其他欧洲非传统政党更大胆、更强大。


It also would have been irresponsible for Varoufakis not to work behind closed doors on a Plan B. After all, Greece’s eurozone destiny largely was – and remains – in the hands of others (particularly Germany, the ECB, and the IMF).	指责瓦鲁法基斯没有关起门来实施B计划也是不负责任的。 毕竟，希腊是否留在欧元区，决定权很大程度上掌握在其他人（特别是德国、欧洲央行和IMF）手中，现在仍是如此。


And it is yet to be established whether Varoufakis broke any laws in the way he and his colleagues worked on their contingency plan.	而瓦鲁法基斯及其同事的应急计划到底有没有触犯法律也没有定论。


When push came to shove, Varoufakis faced the difficult choice of going along with more of the same, despite knowing that it would fail, or trying to pivot to a new approach.	当情况紧急时，瓦鲁法基斯面临艰难的抉择：要么继续老路，尽管知道它必然会失败； 要么试图转向新方法。


He bravely opted for the latter.	他勇敢地选择了后者。


While his brash style undermined outcomes, it would be a real tragedy to lose sight of his arguments (which have been made by many others as well).	尽管他傲慢无礼的风格破坏了结果，但对他的观点（其他很多人也持有相同的观点）视而不见将是不折不扣的悲剧。


If Greece is to have any realistic chance of long-term economic recovery and meeting its citizens’ legitimate aspirations, policymakers must recast the country’s austerity program, couple pro-growth reforms with greater social justice, and secure additional debt relief.	如果希腊真的想实现长期经济复苏、满足公民的合理愿望，决策者就必须推翻紧缩方案，将促增长改革与加强社会正义相结合，并确保更大规模的债务纾困。


And if Greece is to remain in the eurozone (still a big if, even after the latest agreement), it must not only earn its peers’ respect; it must be treated with greater respect by them as well.	如果希腊想留在欧元区（这仍然是一个未知数，尽管最新协议已经达成），它不但必须赢得其他国家的尊重； 还必须赢得它们的尊重对待。


Varoufakis’s Great Game	瓦鲁法基斯的大博弈


MUNICH – Game theorists know that a Plan A is never enough.	慕尼黑—博弈论专家知道，只有A计划永远是不行的。


One must also develop and put forward a credible Plan B – the implied threat that drives forward negotiations on Plan A. Greece’s finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, knows this very well.	你必须制定和事先布局可信的B计划——推动A计划谈判的隐含威胁。 希腊财政部长雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）对于这一点心知肚明。


As the Greek government’s anointed “heavy,” he is working Plan B (a potential exit from the eurozone), while Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras makes himself available for Plan A (an extension on Greece’s loan agreement, and a renegotiation of the terms of its bailout).	作为希腊政府推出的“重磅”，在总理齐普拉斯出面谈判A计划时（延长希腊的贷款协议并重新谈判援助计划条件），瓦鲁法基斯正致力于B计划（可能退出欧元区）。


In a sense, they are playing the classic game of “good cop/bad cop” – and, so far, to great effect.	从某种角度讲，他们在玩“好警察/坏警察”的经典博弈——并且到目前为止收效甚好。


Plan B comprises two key elements.	B计划有两个关键要素。


First, there is simple provocation, aimed at riling up Greek citizens and thus escalating tensions between the country and its creditors.	首先是简单的挑衅，旨在煽动希腊公民，从而加剧希腊与其债权人的紧张。


Greece’s citizens must believe that they are escaping grave injustice if they are to continue to trust their government during the difficult period that would follow an exit from the eurozone.	希腊公民必然认为，如果他们在因为退出欧元区而导致的困难时期继续信任他们的政府，就可以摆脱严重的不公。


Second, the Greek government is driving up the costs of Plan B for the other side, by allowing capital flight by its citizens.	其次，希腊政府正在推高B计划对另一端的成本，办法是允许资本随希腊公民外逃。


If it so chose, the government could contain this trend with a more conciliatory approach, or stop it outright with the introduction of capital controls.	如果选择如此，希腊政府可以用更加安抚性的方针遏制这一趋势，或通过引入资本管制一刀切解决这一问题。


But doing so would weaken its negotiating position, and that is not an option.	但这样做会削弱其谈判立场，而这不是选项之一。


Capital flight does not mean that capital is moving abroad in net terms, but rather that private capital is being turned into public capital.	资本外逃并不意味着从净值角度资本移向海外，而是意味着私人资本正在变为公共资本。


Basically, Greek citizens take out loans from local banks, funded largely by the Greek central bank, which acquires funds through the European Central Bank’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme.	基本上，希腊公民从地方银行贷款，资金主要来源于希腊央行，而希腊央行又通过欧洲央行的紧急流动性援助（ELA）机制获得资金。


They then transfer the money to other countries to purchase foreign assets (or redeem their debts), draining liquidity from their country’s banks.	然后，希腊公民将钱输入其他国家购买外国资产（或偿还债务），耗尽希腊银行的流动性。


Other eurozone central banks are thus forced to create new money to fulfill the payment orders for the Greek citizens, effectively giving the Greek central bank an overdraft credit, as measured by the so-called TARGET liabilities.	其他欧元区央行因此被迫创造新货币满足希腊公民的支付单，这实际造成了希腊央行透支信用（以所谓的TARGET负债衡量）。


In January and February, Greece’s TARGET debts increased by almost €1 billion ($1.1 billion) per day, owing to capital flight by Greek citizens and foreign investors.	1月和2月，希腊TARGET债务每天增加近10亿欧元，原因就在于希腊公民和外国投资者的资本外逃。


At the end of April, those debts amounted to €99 billion.	到4月底，TARGET债务已高达990亿欧元。


A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries – let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts.	希腊退出欧元区不会伤及希腊公民在其他欧元区国家开立的账户——更不用说导致希腊损失其用这些账户所购买的资产了。


But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-à-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma.	但这会让这些国家的央行不得不接受希腊公民对希腊央行的欧元计价的TARGET债权，而希腊央行的资产将全部由重新启用的德拉克马计价。


Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.	由于希腊新货币难免将出现贬值，再考虑希腊政府不必为其央行债务兜底的事实，一场剥夺其他央行索偿权的违约在所难免。


A similar situation arises when Greek citizens withdraw cash from their accounts and hoard it in suitcases or take it abroad.	当希腊公民从账户中套现，将钱藏起来或带往国外时，也会发生类似的情况。


If Greece abandoned the euro, a substantial share of these funds – which totaled €43 billion at the end of April – would flow into the rest of the eurozone, both to purchase goods and assets and to pay off debts, resulting in a net loss for the monetary union’s remaining members.	如果希腊放弃欧元，则这些资金（到4月底高达430亿欧元）的大部分将流入欧元区其他国家，用于购买商品和资产以及偿还债务，导致货币联盟剩余成员国的净损失。


All of this strengthens the Greek government’s negotiating position considerably.	所有这些都大大加强了希腊政府的谈判立场。


Small wonder, then, that Varoufakis and Tsipras are playing for time, refusing to submit a list of meaningful reform proposals.	因此，毫不奇怪瓦鲁法基斯和齐普拉斯在争取时间，拒绝给出有意义的改革方案清单。


The ECB bears considerable responsibility for this situation.	欧洲央行对这一局面负有很大的责任。


By failing to produce the two-thirds majority in the ECB Council needed to limit the Greek central bank’s self-serving strategy, it has allowed the creation of more than €80 billion in emergency liquidity, which exceeds the Greek central bank’s €41 billion in recoverable assets.	���没有达成所需要的欧洲央行理事会三分之二多数以限制希腊央行的自利战略，从而使800亿欧元以上的紧急流动性——比希腊央行410亿欧元的可回收资产还要多——得以建立。


With Greece’s banks guaranteed the needed funds, the government has been spared from having to introduce capital controls.	希腊银行获得了所需资金的保障，希腊政府因此不再需要引入资本管制。


Rumor has it that the ECB is poised to adjust its approach – and soon.	有流言称欧洲央行将调整其方针——并且很快就会实施。


It knows that its argument that the ELA loans are collateralized is wearing thin, given that, in many cases, the collateral has a rating below BBB-, thus falling short of investment grade.	欧洲央行知道，其声称的ELA贷款是有抵押贷款的说法并不可靠，因为其中大量抵押品评级低于BBB-，因此不属于投资级。


If the ECB finally acknowledges that this will not do, and removes Greece’s liquidity safety net, the Greek government would be forced to start negotiating seriously, because waiting would no longer do it any good.	如果欧洲央行最终承认这不可靠，并移除希腊的流动性安全网，则希腊政府将被迫开始认证的谈判，因为等待不再有利可图。


But, with the stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP, its position would remain very strong.	但是，汇往国外和以现金持有的货币存量已增至GDP的79%，其谈判立场仍将十分强硬。


In other words, thanks largely to the ECB, the Greek government would be able to secure a far more favorable outcome – including increased financial assistance and reduced reform requirements – than it could have gained at any point in the past.	换句话说，很大程度上拜欧洲央行所赐，希腊政府将能够确保远比过去更加有利的结果——包括增加金融援助和降低改革要求。


And if Greece exits, a large share of the acquired resources measured by the TARGET balances and the cash that has been printed would turn into an endowment gift for an independent future.	很大一部分已获得的资源（用TARGET余额衡量）和已印出的现金将成为希腊的独立的未来的禀赋。


Many people in Europe seem to believe that Varoufakis, an experienced game theorist but a political neophyte, does not know how to play the cards that Greece has been dealt.	许多欧洲人似乎认为，瓦鲁法基斯是经验丰富的博弈论专家，但在政治上还是菜鸟，他不知道如何去玩希腊已经开始的牌局。


They should think again – before Greece walks away with the pot.	他们应该三思——在希腊带着战利品离开之前。


European Universities’ Identity Crisis	欧洲大学的身份危机


MADRID – Higher education in Europe today finds itself in a state of profound uncertainty.	马德里—如今，欧洲高等教育陷入了极为不确定的状态。


What should universities’ primary focus be – research, professional training, or social inclusion?	大学的首要重点是什么？ 研究、职业训练还是社会包容？


Should governments invest more in higher education to underpin long-term economic growth?	政府应该更多地投资于高等教育从而为长期经济增长打好基础吗？


Should universities be left alone to compete and survive (or not) in a global education marketplace?	大学应该自力更生在全球教育市场中竞争和生存（或死亡）吗？


Amid the debates about their future role, Europe’s universities must not lose sight of their individual identity, their traditions, and their sense of social purpose.	在关于其未来角色的争论中，欧洲大学决不能对个体身份、传统以及社会目的使命视而不见。


This will not be easy.	者并不容易。


University administrators face pressures from above – European institutions and national governments – and from their own researchers, teachers, and students.	大学管理者面临着来自上层——欧洲机构和国家政府——和自身研究人员和师生的压力。


Moreover, the parameters of the debate are becoming hazy.	此外，争论的角度正变得日益模糊。 一方面，大学遵守着长期存在的与政府的协议；


On one hand, universities are abiding by long-standing agreements with government; on the other, they face zealous reformers who seek market-based solutions that stress competition among institutions, encourage staff and student mobility, and emphasize student-centered learning.	另一方面，它们又面临着寻求市场解决方案的急切的改革者。 市场方案将增加机构之间的竞争、鼓励教员和学生流动，并且强调以学生为中心的学习。


Obviously, these outlooks generate very different implications for universities’ future.	显然，这些前景给大学的未来带来的影响是极为不同的。


Traditionally, universities undertook research, provided a professional education, and offered a country’s young people a cultural foundation as they entered society.	传统上，大学承担着研究任务，提供专业教育，为一国年轻人进入社会打好文化基础。


Today, none of these aims appears secure.	如今，这些目标都不再是铁板一块。


Indeed, the gravest danger to Europe’s universities is a prolonged period of confusion about their ultimate aims.	事实上，欧洲大学所面临的的最严重威胁是对其终极目标的长期迷茫。


Seeking truth through observation, experimentation, rational argument, and mutual criticism has always been a raison d’être of universities.	通过观察、实验、理性争论和互相批评寻找真理一直是大学的存在理由。


Reflecting this, some European institutions are encouraged by government to try to match the research excellence attained by top universities in the United States.	考虑到这一点，一些欧洲机构受政府鼓励试图赶上美国顶尖大学在研究方面的出色表现。


But not all of Europe’s universities regard themselves primarily as research institutions.	但并非所有欧洲大学都认为自己首先是研究机构。


Many prefer to focus on preparing their students for the world of work.	许多大学宁可专注于帮助学生做好进入职场的准备。


However, the skills that are now required outside academia are changing so rapidly that universities may struggle to marry the generic cognitive skills taught in the classroom – such as critical thinking, analytical reasoning, problem solving, and writing – with the professional expertise that is increasingly acquired in the workplace.	但是，如今学术圈外所需要的技能瞬息万变，以至于大学要花大力气将课堂所教授的通用认知技能（如批判性思考、分析推理、解决问题和写作）与工作场所日益需要的专业经验相协调。


And if years of schooling do not translate into greater cognitive skills, then much of the economic justification for investing in higher education falls apart.	而如果多年的学校教育不能转化为更好的认知技能，那么投资高等教育的经济理由就站不住脚了。


Universities have also had a public-service mission: to provide students with a cultural foundation for life.	大学还有社会服务使命：为学生提供生活的文化基础。


This purpose may seem increasingly controversial in pluralistic Western societies, but universities should at least provide their students with an understanding of the models, history, and philosophical fundamentals with which to debate these issues.	这一目标似乎与多元的西方社会日益冲突，但大学至少应该为学生提供模式、历史和哲学基础的理解以参与这些问题的争论。


Without a reasonable awareness of their socio-cultural environment, students may view universities merely as a place to pursue private goals, make useful connections, enjoy student life, and perhaps pick up a superficial sense of diversity.	学生如果不能合理地理解社会文化环境，就可能把大学仅仅当作追求个人目标、打造有用人际关系网、享受学生生活和（也许）肤浅地体验多样性的场所。


Whichever path Europe’s universities take, maintaining a distinct identity in the face of global change and education reform will become increasingly difficult.	不管欧洲大学采取哪种方法，在全球变化和教育改革面前保持独立身份将变得越来越困难。


Researchers are no longer confined within their ivory towers, but work as part of complex global networks alongside private-sector participants.	研究者不再能安于象牙塔，而是作为复杂的全球网络的一部分与私人部门参与者共事。


Tenured professors, once central to the life and image of a college, are being replaced by part-time teachers who lack a strong connection to their institution.	昔日大学生活和形象的核心——终身教授正在被与所在机构没有强烈关系的兼职教师取代。


Likewise, in the emerging conception of universities – one that draws heavily from the corporate world – educational “managers,” applying “best practices” (and always ready to move on to the next posting) – retain the most cursory regard for the institution’s life and traditions.	类似地，在新的大学概念中——这一概念深受商界影响——教育“经理”采用“最佳实践”（并时刻准备着升迁），并对机构的命运和传统关心甚少。


And students, seen as mere consumers of a service, are invited to exercise choice regarding teachers, curricula, and location.	而学生将被当作服务的消费者，请来做出关于教师、课程和地点的选择。


Some may find these changes exciting.	一些人可能认为这些变化令人激动。


But their purpose will be lost if pursuing them weakens the very identity of Europe’s universities, many of which are used to functioning in a world of state patronage and strict regulation.	但它们的目的可能会丧失，如果追求它们虚弱了欧洲大学的身份的话。 许多欧洲大学习惯于在国家庇护和严格监管的环境下运行。


Policymakers must be aware of the educational and cultural damage that continuous reforms – all justified in the future-oriented jargon of the day – can wreak.	决策者必须认识到持续改革——在当今的未来导向术语中，改革是硬道理——所可能带来的教育和文化上的伤害


Universities must protect their institutional memories, local traditions, and commitment to each new generation of students.	大学必须捍卫自己的机构记忆、地方传统以及对每一代新学生的承诺。


A loyal and grateful alumni network can help to ensure this.	忠诚而感恩的校友网络有助于确保这一点。


The alternative is a formulaic educational experience that not only lacks individual character, but that is also devoid of moral purpose.	否则我们将面临公式化的教育体验，不但缺少个性，也毫无道德目标可言。


Veiled Sexuality	被遮掩的性欲


NEW YORK –A woman swathed in black to her ankles, wearing a headscarf or a full chador , walks down a European or North American street, surrounded by other women in halter tops, miniskirts and short shorts.	纽约 – 一位披戴着头巾并身着查多尔黑罩袍从头遮到脚跟的女子，在欧洲或是北美的大街上行走，周围全是穿着露背背心和迷你裙或超短短裤的女子。


She passes under immense billboards on which other women swoon in sexual ecstasy, cavort in lingerie or simply stretch out languorously, almost fully naked.	她在巨大的广告牌下穿过，上面的女郎因性欲亢奋而显得欲仙欲死，穿着内衣裤跳舞，或干脆几乎全裸着慵懒地张开四肢。


Could this image be any more iconic of the discomfort the West has with the social mores of Islam, and vice versa?	还有比这种景象更典型地反应出西方世界对伊斯兰世界的社会习俗的不自在吗？ 或是，从相反角度来看，是伊斯兰世界对西方世界习俗的不自在？


Ideological battles are often waged with women’s bodies as their emblems, and Western Islamophobia is no exception.	意识形态的战争常常用女子的身体为象征来进行，西方的伊斯兰恐惧症也不例外。


When France banned headscarves in schools, it used the hijab as a proxy for Western values in general, including the appropriate status of women.	当法国禁止在该国的学校里披戴HIJAB头巾时，它用这方头巾来代表西方的普世价值，其中包括妇女的恰当的地位。


When Americans were being prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban were demonized for denying cosmetics and hair color to women; when the Taliban were overthrown, Western writers often noted that women had taken off their scarves.	当美国人在为入侵阿富汗作准备时，塔利班也被妖魔化为不许妇女使用化妆品或染发。 而当塔利班被推翻时，西方的作家常常会注意到妇女们已经摘去了头巾。


But are we in the West radically misinterpreting Muslim sexual mores, particularly the meaning to many Muslim women of being veiled or wearing the chador ?	但是我们西方人是否完全误解了穆斯林世界的性习俗，尤其是用头巾遮住脸或穿戴查多尔黑罩袍对许多穆斯林妇女所代表的意义呢？


And are we blind to our own markers of the oppression and control of women?	我们是否对自己的妇女受压迫和控制的现象视而不见呢？


The West interprets veiling as repression of women and suppression of their sexuality.	西方把头巾遮脸解释为对妇女的性压抑。


But when I traveled in Muslim countries and was invited to join a discussion in women-only settings within Muslim homes, I learned that Muslim attitudes toward women’s appearance and sexuality are not rooted in repression, but in a strong sense of public versus private, of what is due to God and what is due to one’s husband.	但是当我去穆斯林国家并被邀请到穆斯林家里做客时，在只有女性参加的讨论会上，我才明白了穆斯林对女性外表和性的态度并非源于压抑，而是源于对公众场合和私密场合、对上帝和对丈夫应尽义务之间的强烈的泾渭分明的态度。


It is not that Islam suppresses sexuality, but that it embodies a strongly developed sense of its appropriate channeling – toward marriage, the bonds that sustain family life, and the attachment that secures a home.	穆斯林并不压抑性，而是它体现了对性行为进行合理引导的高度智慧。 穆斯林把性行为向婚姻内引导，而婚姻则是维持家庭生活的纽带和稳固家庭的感情寄托。


Outside the walls of the typical Muslim households that I visited in Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, all was demureness and propriety.	我访问过摩洛哥、约旦和埃及的一些典型的穆斯林家庭。 人们一走出家门，一切行为皆是中规中矩；


But inside, women were as interested in allure, seduction, and pleasure as women anywhere in the world.	但一走进家门，女性就和其它世界各地的女性一样，对性的吸引力、挑逗和愉悦饶有兴趣。


At home, in the context of marital intimacy, Victoria’s Secret, elegant fashion, and skin care lotions abounded.	在家里，有了婚姻允许的亲密关系的前提条件，也就不乏“维多利亚的秘密”品牌的性感衣服、优雅的时装和护肤品。


The bridal videos that I was shown, with the sensuous dancing that the bride learns as part of what makes her a wonderful wife, and which she proudly displays for her bridegroom, suggested that sensuality was not alien to Muslim women. Rather, pleasure and sexuality, both male and female, should not be displayed promiscuously – and possibly destructively – for all to see.	人们给我看的婚礼录像中，新娘自豪地为新郎表演美轮美奂的舞蹈，这是成为一个优秀妻子必学的一部分，这都说明了穆斯林妇女并非不懂感官愉悦，而是穆斯林认为，愉悦和性，无论男女，都不应该不分场合和对象地展现给所有人看，不然，这可能造成破坏性的后果。


Indeed, many Muslim women I spoke with did not feel at all subjugated by the chador or the headscarf.	说实在，和我交谈过的许多穆斯林妇女们一点也不觉得她们被黑罩袍和头巾所束缚。


On the contrary, they felt liberated from what they experienced as the intrusive, commodifying, basely sexualizing Western gaze.	恰恰相反，西方对她们投去的侵犯性的、把人商品化的以及低俗性感化的审视目光，使她们有一种被解放的感觉。


Many women said something like this: “When I wear Western clothes, men stare at me, objectify me, or I am always measuring myself against the standards of models in magazines, which are hard to live up to – and even harder as you get older, not to mention how tiring it can be to be on display all the time.	许多妇女说了诸如以下的话：“当我穿西式服装时，男人们瞪眼看我，把我当成一件物品，或我自己总是以杂志上模特的标准要求自己，但那些标准是难以达到的，而且年纪越大就越不可能达到，更不用说一直处以一种被展示的状态中是多么令人疲惫。


When I wear my headscarf or chador , people relate to me as an individual, not an object; I feel respected.”	当我披上头巾或穿上黑罩袍时，人们就把我当成一个具体的人，而不是一件物品，我感觉到被尊重。


This may not be expressed in a traditional Western feminist set of images, but it is a recognizably Western feminist set of feelings.	” 这些话或许不是以传统的西方女权主义的语汇来表达的，但却带有西方女权主义感情色彩。


I experienced it myself.	这种经历我自己也有过。


I put on a shalwar kameez and a headscarf in Morocco for a trip to the bazaar.	我在摩洛哥穿上纱丽克米兹女装和头巾去巴扎市场时，人们给予我的热情，部分是源于看到一个西方人如此穿着的新鲜感；


Yes, some of the warmth I encountered was probably from the novelty of seeing a Westerner so clothed; but, as I moved about the market – the curve of my breasts covered, the shape of my legs obscured, my long hair not flying about me – I felt a novel sense of calm and serenity.	但是，当我在市场里四处走动，我的穿着掩盖了我乳房的曲线和我腿部的轮廓，我的长发不再飘散，我感到了一种平和安宁的全新的感觉。


I felt, yes, in certain ways, free.	是的，从某些方面来说，我有了自由感。


Nor are Muslim women alone.	不仅仅穆斯林妇女是这样的。


The Western Christian tradition portrays all sexuality, even married sexuality, as sinful.	西方的基督教传统把所有的性，甚至是婚姻内的性，都视为罪恶。


Islam and Judaism never had that same kind of mind-body split.	伊斯兰教和犹太教就从未有过这样的脑袋-身体间的分裂。


So, in both cultures, sexuality channeled into marriage and family life is seen as a source of great blessing, sanctioned by God.	所以，在后两种文化里，被引导进入婚姻和家庭生活的性行为被视为是上帝授权的和重大福祉的源泉。


This may explain why both Muslim and orthodox Jewish women not only describe a sense of being liberated by their modest clothing and covered hair, but also express much higher levels of sensual joy in their married lives than is common in the West.	这或许能解释为什么穆斯林和犹太正教妇女们自称她们的保守穿着和遮盖头发让她们感到一种被解放的自由感，而且她们也表示她们在婚姻中得到的肉体快感比西方人强烈得多。


When sexuality is kept private and directed in ways seen as sacred – and when one’s husband isn’t seeing his wife (or other women) half-naked all day long – one can feel great power and intensity when the headscarf or the chador comes off in the sanctity of the home.	当性行为被限制在私人空间而且被引导为以被视为神圣的方式进行时，当丈夫并非整日看到他的妻子（或别的妇女）以半裸状态出现时，那么，当头巾和黑罩袍在家庭的神圣感中脱下时，人就能感到性的威力和强度。


Among healthy young men in the West, who grow up on pornography and sexual imagery on every street corner, reduced libido is a growing epidemic, so it is easy to imagine the power that sexuality can still carry in a more modest culture.	西方健康的年轻男性，在他们的成长过程中，在每个街角都能接触到色情和性有关的内容，他们中的性欲减退的状况正愈显普遍。 所以，不难想象，在较保守文化中，仍存在那种性依然所能传承的力量。


And it is worth understanding the positive experiences that women – and men – can have in cultures where sexuality is more conservatively directed.	在性较为保守的社会中，女人，也包括男人，他们也能获得的正面的体验，理解这些体验对我们是有益的。


I do not mean to dismiss the many women leaders in the Muslim world who regard veiling as a means of controlling women.	穆斯林世界中有不少妇女领袖将披戴头巾视为控制妇女的一种方式，在此我并不是要否定她们。


Choice is everything.	选择才是硬道理。


But Westerners should recognize that when a woman in France or Britain chooses a veil, it is not necessarily a sign of her repression.	但西方人应该承认，在法国或英国，当一个女人选择披戴头巾时，这并不一定就代表着她受到压抑。


And, more importantly, when you choose your own miniskirt and halter top – in a Western culture in which women are not so free to age, to be respected as mothers, workers or spiritual beings, and to disregard Madison Avenue – it’s worth thinking in a more nuanced way about what female freedom really means.	而且更重要的是，在西方文化中，妇女并不能那么自由地老去，也不能那么自由地以母亲、职业妇女或精神存在体的身份获得尊重，也不能漠视广告的影响； 而当你自己选择穿迷你裙和露背背心时，若能更细致地思考一下女性自由到底意味着什么，对你是有好处的。


Through the Venezuelan Looking Glass	以委内瑞拉为鉴


CAMBRIDGE – When we hear of a catastrophe that has befallen a friend, we feel both empathy and a sense of vertigo.	坎布里奇—当我们听说一位朋友横遭不测时，我们会感到同情和一种眩晕感。


We wonder whether it could happen to us: Is this catastrophe the result of some peculiar characteristic that we fortunately do not share?	我们不知道它是否会降临到我们头上：这一不测是因为我们碰巧不曾具有的某种特殊性格造成的吗？


Or are we also vulnerable?	还是我们也像他一样脆弱？


If so, can we avoid a similar fate?	果真如此的话，我们如何避免相似的命运？


The same logic applies to countries.	同样的逻辑也适用于国家。


On the weekend of July 16-17, Venezuelans were given the opportunity to cross the border into Colombia for up to 12 hours.	7月16—17日的这个周末，委内瑞拉人民有机会在最多12个小时内穿越边境进入哥伦比亚。


It was an event reminiscent of the fall of the Berlin Wall.	这个事件让人想起了柏林墙的倒塌。


More than 135,000 people used this respite to go to Colombia to buy basic necessities.	超过135,000人抓住这个机会前往哥伦比亚购买基本必需品。


They traveled hundreds of miles and converted their cash for just 1% of the foreign exchange they would have received had they been allowed to exchange it at the official rate applicable for food and medicines.	他们跋涉数百英里，用手中的现金换取外汇——所换来的钱还不到官方食品和药品价格汇率的百分之一。


And yet they found it worthwhile, given the hunger, shortages, and desperation at home.	但他们仍然认为这是值得的，因为国内饥饿、短缺和绝望遍地。


The international press has reported the collapse of Venezuela’s economy, of its health system, of personal security, and of constitutional rule and human rights.	国际媒体报道了委内瑞拉经济、卫生体系、个人安全以及宪政规则和人权的崩溃。


All of this is happening in the country with the world’s largest oil reserves, just two years after the end of the longest oil-price boom in history.	所有这些都发生在全世界石油储量最大的国家，而时间距离历史上历时最久的石油价格繁荣结束仅仅两年。


Could it happen elsewhere?	其他地方也会如此吗？


The particulars of any situation are always, well, particular, and hence do not travel well.	好吧，特殊的情况各有各的特殊，因此不能一概而论。


But that can provide us with a false sense of security; properly viewed, Venezuela’s experience holds important lessons for other countries.	但这会让我们感到一种错误的安全感； 合理地分析委内瑞拉的经验可以给其他国家带来重要教训。


Venezuela’s crisis is not the result of bad luck.	委内瑞拉危机不是拜坏运气所赐。


On the contrary, good luck provided the rope with which the country ended up hanging itself.	相反，是好运气给了这个国家吊死自己的绳子。


Instead, the crisis is the inevitable consequence of government policies.	这场危机是政府政策的必然结果。


In Venezuela’s case, these policies included expropriations, price and exchange controls, over-borrowing in good times, anti-business regulations, border closures, and more.	在委内瑞拉的例子中，这些政策包括征用、价格和汇率管制、在繁荣期过度借贷、反商业监管、边境封闭，等等。


Just consider this small absurdity: President Nicolás Maduro has refused, on several occasions, to authorize printing larger-denomination banknotes.	不妨看看这个小小的荒谬情况：总统马杜罗数次拒绝批准印制大额钞票。


The largest bill currently is worth less than $0.10.	目前，最大面额钞票价值不足10美元。


This has caused havoc in the payment system and in the functioning of banks and ATMs – a source of untold nuisances to the public.	这给支付系统和银行和ATM机的运行带来了一场浩劫——也是一场难以形容的公害。


So the relevant question is: why would a government adopt harmful policies, and why would society go along?	因此，要害问题是：为何政府采取有害政策，以及为何社会还能容忍？


The chaos into which Venezuela has fallen may seem to be beyond belief.	委内瑞拉所陷入的混乱简直令人难以置信。


In fact, it is a product of belief.	事实上，它是信念的产物。


Whether policies sound crazy or sensible depends on the conceptual paradigm, or belief system, that we use to interpret the nature of the world we inhabit.	政策是疯狂还是正常取决于我们用来解释我们所居住其中的世界的性质的概念范式或信念体系。


What looks crazy under one paradigm may seem like plain common sense under another.	一种范式下疯狂的政策在领一种范式下可能是很正常的常识。


From February 1692 to May 1693, for example, the normally sensible people of Massachusetts accused women of practicing witchcraft and hanged them.	比如，1692年2月到1693年3月间，神志正常的马萨诸塞人民将矛头对准了巫女，把她们吊死。


If you don’t believe in witchcraft, this behavior seems incomprehensible.	如果你不相信巫术，就很难理解这种行为。


But if you believe that the Devil exists and takes over women’s souls, then hanging, burning, or stoning their bodies looks like sensible public policy.	但如果你相信有魔鬼存在并接管了巫女的灵魂，那么上吊、火烧或用石头砸她们的身体就是相当正常的公共政策。


The paradigm of Venezuela’s chavismo blamed inflation and recession on devious business behavior that had to be controlled through more regulation, more expropriations, and more managers in jail.	委内瑞拉查韦斯主义的范式将通货膨胀和衰退归咎于不诚实的商业行为，必须通过更多的监管、征用和抓捕管理人员来进行控制。


The destruction of people and organizations was perceived as a step in the right direction.	摧毁人事和组织被认为是正确的步骤。


By getting rid of those witches, the country would be healed.	通过处置这些巫师，国家就能恢复正常了。


Societies’ conceptual paradigms for understanding the nature of the world they inhabit cannot be anchored only in scientific fact, because science can at best establish the truth of individual beliefs; it cannot devise an overarching belief system or assign moral value to outcomes.	社会用于理解他们身处其中的世界的性质的概念范式不可能只锚定于科学事实，因为科学充其量只能构建个体信念的真理； 它无法形成一个支配性的新年体系或让结果具有道德价值。


Politics is about the representation and evolution of alternative belief systems.	政治是关于代表和替代信念体系的演化的学问。


Harvard’s Rafael Di Tella has shown that the fundamental determinant of public policy choices is the public’s beliefs.	哈佛大学的拉斐尔·迪特拉（Rafael Di Tella）说明了决定公共政策选择的基本因素是公众的信念。


In countries where people regard the poor as unlucky, they want redistribution; where they regard them as lazy, they don’t.	在人们认为贫穷是不幸的国家，他们希望再分配； 在人们认为贫穷是懒惰的国家，他们不希望再分配。


Where people believe that businesses are corrupt, they want more regulation; and, with enough regulation, the only successful businesses are corrupt.	如果人们认为企业是腐败的，他们希望更多的监管； 而当监管足够多时，只有腐败的企业才能成功。


So beliefs may even be self-perpetuating.	因此，信念甚至可以是自我延续的。


Consider Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee in the United States.	以美国共和党总统提名人唐纳德·特朗普为例。


According to him and his many supporters, the US is led by weaklings who are being exploited by savvy foreign powers, masquerading as allies.	按照他和他的许多支持者的说法，领导美国的是一群被伪装成盟友的精明���外国势力摆布的低能。


Free trade is a Mexican invention to take away American jobs.	自由贸易是抢夺美国就业岗位的墨西哥图谋。


Global warming is a hoax invented by China to destroy American industry.	全球变暖是中国人炮制出来摧毁美国工业的。


It follows from this that the US should stop playing a leading role in creating a functioning global order based on universal values and rules, and instead use its power to coerce others into submission.	按照这一逻辑，美国应该停止充当创造基于普世价值和规则的运转良好的全球秩序的领袖，而要用力量让其他国家屈服。


Under the current paradigm, as argued by Harvard’s Joseph Nye, this would imply the unilateral destruction of America’s most important source of “smart” power.	在当前范式下，如哈佛大学的约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye）所言，这意味着单方面毁掉美国最重要的“巧”实力源泉。


But according to Trump’s worldview, it would be a step forward.	但根据特朗普的世界观，这是前进的步骤。


Much the same may be true of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union.	英国投票脱离欧盟的情况在很大程度上可能也是如此。


Were immigrants and EU rules really blocking the country’s progress, implying that Brexit will open a path to greater prosperity?	移民和欧盟规则真的阻碍了英国的进步，因为这脱欧将开启更大的繁荣之路？


Or is the economic downturn since the vote an indication of how valuable integration and the free movement of Europeans was to the UK’s own vitality?	还是自投票以来的经济颓势表明了一体化和欧洲人的自由迁徙对于英国自身的活力至关重要？


The danger that Venezuela highlights – and that Britain may soon highlight as well – is the damage that dysfunctional belief systems can have on national wellbeing.	委内瑞拉所突显的危险——英国可能很快也将突显这一点——是不健全的新年体系可能对国家福利造成怎样的伤害。


While the particular chavista creed that destroyed Venezuela will most likely end up collapsing under the weight of its own cataclysmic failure, the lesson for others is how costly it is to adopt a potentially dysfunctional belief system.	毁掉了委内瑞拉的特殊的查韦斯主义教条极有可能最终不堪其自身的巨大失败而崩溃，而其他人应该从中汲取的教训是采取可能不健全的信念体系会造成怎样的代价。


When it comes to wholesale shifts in paradigms of belief, Venezuela shows how unaffordable such experiments may turn out to be.	在信念范式整体变迁的问题上，委内瑞拉说明了这样的经验真是不可承受之重。


Victors’ Justice, Iraqi-Style	伊拉克式的胜利者正义


Saddam Hussein is dead, but not all Iraqis are celebrating.	萨达姆已经死了，但是并非所有的伊拉克人都在庆贺。


On the contrary, the way in which the various religious and ethnic groups in Iraq responded to his execution is emblematic of the difficulty of holding Iraq together as a coherent entity.	相反，伊拉克境内不同的宗教和种族团体对处死萨达姆的反应体现了将伊拉克作为一个统一的实体团结起来是何等困难。


To the Shiite majority, long brutally oppressed by Saddam and all previous Sunni-dominated Iraqi regimes, Saddam’s death symbolizes their attainment of political hegemony.	多数派的什叶派长期以来受到萨达姆和所有先前的由逊尼派执政的伊拉克政权的残酷压迫。 对于他们而言，萨达姆的死标志着其实现了政治霸权。


Moreover, their triumphalist rejoicing is a cruel reminder that when the oppressed become liberated, they can very easily turn into oppressors themselves.	而且，他们胜利者的庆贺残酷地提醒人们，一旦受迫害的人得到解放，他们自己就会非常容易地由受压迫者变成压迫者。


To the Sunni minority, pushed from power by the American invasion and giving vent to their frustration with daily attacks on the Shi’a population and their holy sites, Saddam will remain a hero for a long time to come.	少数派的逊尼派被美国的入侵赶下了权力宝座，用每天都攻击什叶派居民及其圣地的方式发泄其不满。 对于他们而言，萨达姆将在很长一段时间内都是一位英雄。


The Kurds – who, like the Shi’a, were victimized by Saddam for decades – quietly cling to their de facto independence in the north, making sure that they will never again come under Arab rule.	库尔德人像什叶派一样几十年来也受到萨达姆的迫害，他们则静悄悄地在伊拉克北部维持着事实上的独立地位，确保他们永远不再受到阿拉伯人的统治。


Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri el-Maliki, representing the ruling Shi’a-Kurdish coalition, expressed the hope that the dictator’s end would help to heal the sectarian divides.	伊拉克总理马利基代表了占据统治地位的什叶派和库尔德人联盟，他表示说希望独裁者的死将会帮助平息国内不同部落之间的隔阂。


But, however sincere his words may sound, reality is moving in the opposite direction, and the ugly verbal exchanges surrounding the act of execution itself will certainly do little to dispel the notion that this was “victors’ justice” – the victors being not the United States, but the Shi’a.	但是，无论他的言辞听起来如何真诚，现实却在朝相反的方向发展，而且，执行死刑的时候出现的丑陋的言语对骂肯定不会消除人们的观点，那就是，这是一个“胜利者”的正义，胜利者不是美国，而是什叶派。


None of this augurs well for the future of what we should get used to calling “the former Iraq.”	所有这些对于我们应当习惯称作的“前伊拉克”而言都不是好兆头。


Indeed, the Washington debate surrounding how to “fix Iraq” is irrelevant, because something that does not exist any longer – namely, Iraq as a functioning state – cannot be fixed.	实际上，美国围绕有关如何“解决伊拉克”的辩论无的放矢，因为有些东西根本就不复存在了，那就是作为一个得以运转的国家的伊拉克不复存在，也就无法治理。


Under the guise of US-inspired constitutional arrangements, the Shia majority has succeeded in arrogating near-absolute power to itself.	在美国主导的宪法条款安排的幌子下，多数派的什叶派成功地僭取近乎绝对的权力。


Thus, what only a few months ago had looked from Washington like a successful transition to some sort of representative government is obviously a travesty: just as under Saddam, power today grows out of the barrel of the gun – only now the state does not hold a monopoly on the means of violence.	这样，几个月前在美国看来还是一个成功的向某种形式的代表性政府的过渡现在看起来就是一场滑稽戏。 和萨达姆统治一样，如今也是枪杆子里面出政权，唯一不同的就是国家现在不再垄断暴力手段了。


Every militia, every ministry, every Shia political faction, has its own guns, goons, and death squads – while the Sunnis continue to use the stockpiles of weapons they accumulated under Saddam to fight a rear-guard action against the new order, apparently legitimized by elections.	每一个民兵组织，每一个牧师，每一个什叶派政治派别都有自己的枪炮、受雇暴徒以及杀人小队，而逊尼派则继续使用他们在萨达姆统治时期囤积的武器同一个新的、明显地是由选举所合法化的秩序作战，以维持旧有状态。


There is no power – save a new violent dictatorship – that can bring Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds to live once again in one body politic.	除了一个新的暴力独裁者外，没有力量能够将什叶派、逊尼派以及库尔德人在一个国家中共存。


America’s chimerical dream of democratizing overnight a deeply divided society accustomed only to violence and coercion has unleashed a terrifying array of political demons.	伊拉克社会分歧严重，只习惯于暴力和高压政治。 美国想在一夜之间将其民主化不过是白日做梦，并且释放了一长串可怕的政治恶魔。


In these circumstances, the post-Baker-Hamilton debate in Washington is largely irrelevant to the future of Iraq – though it continues to be crucial to the future of US power, prestige, and standing in the world.	在这些情形下，华盛顿的贝克-汉米尔顿报告发表后的辩论对于美国的势力、声望以及在全世界的地位而言仍然十分关键，但是对于伊拉克的未来而言也就不得要领了。


The future of Iraq will be decided by the people of Iraq, but with bullets, not ballots.	伊拉克的未来将会被伊拉克人们来决定，但却是通过子弹，而非选票决定。


The US and the entire international community are utterly unequipped to deal with this Middle Eastern version of Yugoslavia and its regional consequences.	美国和整个 国际社会都完全无力应付这一中东版本的南斯拉夫及其地区性后果。


And, unlike Yugoslavia’s successor states, which could look to Europe, the lack of a legitimate Arab democratic role model makes crafting a democratic order even more difficult.	而且，南斯拉夫的继任国家可以向往欧洲，伊拉克与其不同的是没有一个合法的阿拉伯民主模范，也就让制定一个民主秩序更为困难。


Some Europeans and others may gloat over America’s failure in Iraq, and the ineptness – or worse – of US post-occupation policy cries to heaven.	某些欧洲人士和其他人士可能会美国在伊拉克的失败文过饰非，而美国占领后的政策的无能甚至更糟则无出其右。


Yet the root causes of that failure go deeper, to Iraq’s creation as an artificial entity in the 1920’s by British imperialist planners, who stitched together three disparate provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire into a state that never had a coherent identity.	但是，这一失败的根本原因还要深刻，一直可以追溯到二十世纪二十年代英国帝国主义份子规划者人为地建立了伊拉克这样一个实体。 这些人把战败的奥托曼帝国完全不同的三个省份合并成为一个国家，而这个国家从来就没有一个统一的身份认同。


Indeed, the very foundation of Iraq was based on victors’ justice: the British Empire, having vanquished the Ottomans, made the Sunni Arabs overlords in a country in which they were a minority.	实际上，伊拉克整个就是建立在胜利者正义基础之上。 大英帝国征服了奥托曼帝国后，让逊尼派阿拉伯人在一个居于少数派的国家超负荷。


That arrangement has now come unglued following another cycle of victors’ justice.	这一安排在另外一场胜利者正义循环之后现在已经分崩离析。


The consequences of this re-ordering of power are not yet clear.	这一场势力重组的后果还不明朗��伊拉克社会中一部分人正确地把萨达姆视为一个令人毛骨悚然的压迫者，而另一部分人则敬仰其为英雄和烈士。


But a coherent Iraqi state – whether unitary, federal, or confederal – will not grow out of a society in which one part of the population views Saddam, rightly, as a gruesome oppressor, while another part reveres him as a hero and martyr.	一个统一的伊拉克国家是无法从这样的一个社会中建立起来的，无论其制度是单一集权，还是联邦制抑或是邦联制。


Wars always have unintended consequences and cruel ironies.	战争总是产生意想不到的后果和残忍的讽刺。


In Iraq, only now is it becoming evident that some states cannot be saved without being destroyed.	在伊拉克，一个道理只有现在才变得明显，那就是，对于某些国家而言，不摧毁就无以挽救。


The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons	核武器的人道主义影响


VIENNA – In 1983, three years before I was born, a chilling television docudrama about the consequences of a nuclear war was broadcast around the world.	维也纳——1983年，也就是我出生前3年，一部关于核战争后果的令人不寒而栗的电视文献片在世界各地上映。


The Day After, now cited as the highest-rated film in TV history, left then-US President Ronald Reagan “greatly depressed” and caused him to rethink his nuclear strategy.	这部现在被引为电视史上收视率最高的纪录片《浩劫后》使得美国总统罗纳德·里根感到“万分沮丧”，并重新思考自己的核战略。


At their summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, he and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came tantalizingly close to eliminating all nuclear weapons.	1986年10月的雷克雅未克峰会上，里根和苏联总统 戈尔巴乔夫仅差一点点就销毁了所有的核武器。


My generation has conveniently consigned such fears to history.	我们这代人轻松地认为这样的恐惧已经成为历史。


Indeed, with the Cold War tensions of 1983 far in the past and the international order dramatically changed, many people nowadays ask why these memories should concern us at all.	事实上，因为1983年冷战局势已经过去而且国际秩序发生了很大变化，现在有许多人在问这些记忆还与我们有什么关系。


But the premise of that question is both wrong and dangerous.	但这个问题的假设条件既危险又错误。


This week, Austria is providing the world an opportunity to rethink its complacency.	本周，奥地利为世界提供了一个重新审视自满情绪的机会。


On December 8-9, representatives from the governments of more than 150 countries, international organizations, and civil-society groups will meet in Vienna, to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.	12月8日到9日，超过150个国家政府、国际组织和民间社会团体的代表 将在维也纳举行会议探讨核武器的人道主义影响。


These weapons, which terrified people 30 years ago, still remain in countries’ arsenals and continue to pose a grave risk to human security and safety.	30年前曾令人们胆战心惊的这些武器仍然保存在各国的核武库，并继续对人类安全构成严重的威胁。


Austria’s concern is that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their use exists, either by accident or design.	奥地利认为只要核武器依然存在，因巧合或故意而使用核武器的危险就没有消除。


An overwhelming majority of states share this view.	这种观点得到了绝大多数国家的赞同。


Consider how many nuclear weapons there are: an estimated 16,300 around the world, with 1,800 on high alert and ready for use on short notice.	让我们想想这个世界有多少核武器：全世界共有约16,300件，其中1,800件处于高度戒备状态，一声令下就可以发射。


Nearly 25 years after the Cold War’s end, we remain stuck with its strategic legacy: Nuclear weapons continue to underpin the international security policy of the world’s most powerful states.	冷战结束迄今已将近25年，我们依旧摆脱不了冷战时期的遗留战略：核武器继续支撑着世界最强国的国际安全政策。


There are too many risks – human error, technical flaws, negligence, cyber attacks, and more – to believe that these weapons will never be used.	人为错误、技术缺陷、粗心大意、网络攻击等等等等，核武器有太多的风险无法排除。 相信这些武器永远不会被使用是一种错误。


Nor is there good reason to believe that adequate fail-safe mechanisms are in place.	而且也没有理由认为建立了充分的故障安全机制。


The history of nuclear weapons since 1945 is studded with near misses – both before and after the Cuban missile crisis.	1945年后的核武器史——无论在古巴导弹危机之前还是之后—— 随处可见侥幸逃脱的例子。


On more than one occasion, the actions of plucky individuals, applying their intelligence against orders, saved us from catastrophe.	凭借个人智慧对抗命令的勇敢的个人行为不止一次地使我们免于大难临头。


For example, in 1983, the Soviet Union’s nuclear early-warning system reported, not once but twice, the launch of US missiles.	举例来讲，1983年，苏联核预警系统两次报告美国导弹发射。


Fortunately, Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov of the Soviet Air Defense Forces recognized these as false alarms, preventing a mistaken nuclear retaliation.	幸运的是，苏联防空部队的斯坦尼斯拉夫·彼得罗夫意识到这些属于误报，从而避免了错误的核报复。


It is remarkable that the world has avoided disaster thus far.	世界能到今天仍幸免于难已经很有些运气。


Why continue to push our luck?	为什么还要继续得寸进尺？


Since 2012, when the humanitarian impact initiative was conceived, most countries have stepped up to support it, owing to their anxiety and frustration at the snail-like pace of disarmament.	2012年人道主义影响计划的构想提出后，因为对核裁军蜗牛般缓慢步伐感到焦虑和沮丧，多数国家都挺身而出表示支持。


Still, one might legitimately ask whether world leaders shouldn’t first focus their attention on other problems, such as climate change and sustainable development.	尽管如此，有人提出世界领袖为什么不以气候变化及可持续发展等其他事务为重的问题仍然是合情合理的。


In fact, like past generations’ loading of the earth’s atmosphere with carbon, nuclear weapons represent a legacy to overcome.	事实上，就像过去几代人将碳排入地球大气，核武器也代表了一种必须摒弃的传统。


But nuclear weapons, unusable and extremely expensive to maintain, are low-hanging fruit – a risk that we can easily grasp and eliminate.	但消灭无法使用且维护价格昂贵的核武器是很容易实现的目标——是我们能够轻松把握和消除的风险因素。


Enticing the nuclear-weapon states to give up their arsenals will not be easy.	说服有核国家放弃核武器并不是轻而易举的任务。


As long as some states possess them, other states will be led by envy or fear to desire their own.	只要某些国家拥有核武器，其他国家就会出于羡慕或恐惧建设属于自己的核武库。


But the status quo reflects yesterday’s thinking.	但现状所反映的是过时的思维方式。


Acknowledgement that these Cold War relics are outmoded security tools – indeed, that they cause insecurity – is coming from a diverse range of voices.	不同背景的人正在意识到上述冷战遗存物属于过时的安全工具——事实上只会强化不安全因素。


Thirty years ago, The Day After galvanized a president.	30年前，《浩劫后》打动了一位总统。


The goal of next week’s Vienna conference is to provide the public with new and updated evidence of the impact of using nuclear weapons.	而下周维也纳会议的目标是让公众了解核武器使用影响的最新证据。


The picture is even grimmer and the consequences more dire than we believed in 1983.	使用核武器的后果比我们在1983年认识到的更加严峻和可怕。


As long as nuclear weapons exist, it is irresponsible not to confront the implications of their use – implications for which there is no antidote or insurance policy.	只要核武器依然存在，不正视使用核武器的后果就是不负责任的。 世界上没有任何解药或保险能够化解这种后果。


They are not some deadly virus or long-term environmental threat.	它们并不是某种致命病毒或者长期的环境威胁。


They are the poisonous fruit of a technology that we created – and that we can and must control.	它们是人类技术结出的有毒成果——我们能够而且必须将其控制住。


Vietnam’s Chinese Lessons	中国留给越南的教训


TOKYO – For 30 years after World War II’s end, Vietnam claimed the global spotlight.	发自东京——在二战结束30年后的1975年，全球的目光都聚焦在了越南身上。


Its victories over France and the United States were the defining wars of independence of the post-colonial era.	当时越南对美法两国的军事胜利堪称后殖民时代国家独立战争的经典注脚。


But ever since those immortal scenes of US army helicopters hovering above the abandoned US embassy in Saigon in 1975, Vietnam has mostly slipped from the world’s consciousness.	而自从那一幕幕最终定格在美军直升机于废弃的西贡美国大使馆上空盘旋的经典画面之后，越南也淡出了人们的视线之外，被遗忘了。


No longer. Vietnam’s strategic position – as a neighbor of China, situated parallel to the great sea trade routes of Asia – always made the country tremendously important, which may be one reason why its anti-colonial wars lasted so long.	毗邻中国，扼守亚洲海上贸易咽喉，越南凭借着优越的地理位置一直是全球战略的重要据点，而这或许也是该国反殖民斗争何以持续如此长时间的理由。


In recent years, however, Vietnam’s strategic significance has increased dramatically, owing to huge – and not always widely recognized – transformations in its economic performance and foreign-policy orientation.	近年来，由于国内经济状况的改善和外交立场的转变（世人对此依然所知甚少），越南在战略重要性也再度凸显出来。


Reinvigorated by two decades of rapid economic growth and a broad-based opening to the outside world, Vietnam is now an emerging player in regional economic and security affairs.	得益于近20年来的快速经济增长以及全面对外开放，越南现已在区域经济和防务上崭露头角。


Indeed, in recent months the country has played a pivotal role in helping to establish Asia’s emerging security order.	的确，近几个月来该国就在协助建立亚洲新兴安全秩序中就扮演了核心角色。


In late October, Hanoi hosted the East Asian Summit, a meeting at which the US and Russia were recognized as Asian powers with vital national interests in the region.	去年10月，河内举办了东亚峰会，会议将美国和俄罗斯视为在区域内拥有重要利益的“亚洲势力”。


Earlier in October, at the inaugural summit of ASEAN defense ministers in Hanoi, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared the US a “resident power” in Asia.	在今年10月于河内召开的首届东盟国防部长峰会上，美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨声称美国是亚洲的“常驻力量”。


And earlier this summer, while hosting US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vietnam encouraged her to intervene in the growing maritime disputes between China and Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam itself.	今年夏天早些时候，在热情接待美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿的同时，越南还鼓动她干预中国与马来西亚，菲律宾，日本以及越南之间逐渐升级的海事纠纷。


Vietnam’s emergence as a central player in Asian affairs should not be surprising, for the country was the catalyst of perhaps the key turning point in modern Asian history.	对于越南兴起成为亚洲国际事务的核心成员之一，我们无需大惊小怪。 它的兴起或许会成为亚洲现代史步入关键转折点的催化剂。


In February 1979, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, ordered the People’s Liberation Army to invade Vietnam. Deng wanted to punish the Vietnamese for their own invasion of Cambodia, which ended the genocidal rule of China’s allies, the Khmer Rouge.	1979年2月，当时的中国领导人邓小平下令解放军入侵越南，以示对越南入侵柬埔寨的惩罚，而后者的行为实际上结束了红色高棉（时为中国盟友）在柬埔寨的种族屠杀统治。


So vital was this decision to Deng that he assigned overall command of the invasion to his fellow Long March veteran, General Hsu Shih Yun (who had given Deng shelter when, in 1976, he was purged for the second time by the dying Mao Zedong).	邓小平对此次作战极为重视，并专门委任他的长征老战友许世友担任总指挥（在1976年邓小平被垂死的毛泽东再次打倒时，许世友曾庇护过他）。


The British military analyst Major General Shelford Bidwell has dubbed this form of Chinese military strategy “teach a lesson” warfare.	英军少将谢尔福德·比德韦尔称中国的这种军事策略为“教训战略”。


The first example of it was the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962.	该战略的首次使用是1962年那场短暂的中印战争。


That Chinese invasion was intended to teach India a lesson for its support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan resistance. An existing border dispute was used as a pretext to launch a swift invasion (one that caught Nehru’s India by surprise), inflict a humiliating defeat, and then stage a seemingly magnanimous unilateral withdrawal designed to highlight India’s impotence.	当时中国想教训一下支持达赖喇嘛和西藏分裂运动的印度，于是以现有的边界争议为借口发动快速入侵（打了尼赫鲁政府治下的印度一个措手不及），印度惨败，然后中方突然单方面撤军，以展示自己宽宏大量，并突显印度的无能。


Deng’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was supposed to be another “teach a lesson” war.	邓小平在1979年入侵越南的决定原本也是想“教训”后者一下。


But, when the fighting ended, it was Deng who had to absorb most of the lessons.	谁知战争的最终结果却似乎狠狠地教训了邓小平。


In a war that lasted barely a month, 250,000 Chinese front-line soldiers were thrashed by 100,000 Vietnamese border-militia troops.	在短短一个月的战争里，25万中国正规军被10万越南边防民兵打得落花流水。


The Chinese lost more soldiers (perhaps 20,000) in those four weeks than the US lost in any single year of the Vietnam War.	在那四个星期里，中国军队的阵亡数量（可能有2万人）要比越战中美军任何一年的战亡人数都要多。


The scale of China’s defeat stunned Deng, and historians often credit the PLA’s miserable performance with forcing him to take a hard look at China’s moribund Maoist system.	那场溃败震惊了邓小平，历史学家痛批人民解放军在战场上的软弱无能，强烈要求邓深刻反思中国奄奄一息的毛泽东主义体制。


Within months of the war’s end, indeed, Deng initiated the reforms that have since transformed his country.	而在战争结束几个月后，邓小平也的确启动了改革，中国自始发生了天翻地覆的变化。


Ten years later, Vietnam’s Communist rulers also concluded that Marxism-Leninism was an economic dead end, and decided to start down the same path of market reform that Deng had taken.	10年后，越南共产党的领导人也同样得出了马克思列宁主义将令经济走入死胡同的结论，并决心踏上邓小平当年走过的市场化改革之路。


As in China, it took time for the benefits to appear, but over the past few years Vietnam has seen the same rapid, poverty-reducing growth that China has experienced.	正如在中国一样，市场化改革的优势需要时间来展现，然而在过去的几年间，越南已经体验到了中国曾经体验过的快速经济发展和贫困下降。


An agricultural miracle has transformed a country of nearly 90 million people who were once barely able to feed themselves into a global food-exporting powerhouse.	一场农业奇迹深刻地改变了一个拥有约9000万人口的国家，这是一个曾经只能依靠粮食出口才能生存的国度。


Vietnam has also become a major exporter of clothes, shoes, and furniture.	如今越南已经成为了服装，鞋类和皮具的主要出口国。


These are soon to be joined by microchips, given the $1 billion factory that chipmaker Intel built outside Ho Chi Minh City.	而芯片制造商因特尔投资10亿美元在胡志明市郊区建立的工厂将使越南很快成为微型芯片的主要出口国。


Vietnam’s total trade turnover now equals 160% of GDP, making it one of the world’s most open economies.	越南当前的国际贸易总额是GDP的1. 6倍，这使它成为世界上最开放的经济体之一。


With Vietnam’s emergence as a pivotal player in Asia, we are able to view the Vietnam War in the context of the US strategy of global containment, which led it to defend not only South Vietnam, but also South Korea and Taiwan – “the three fronts,” as Mao Zedong put it.	随着越南兴起成为亚洲事务的其中一位核心参与者，我们要在美国全球遏制战略的背景下来重新解读越南战争，这场战争不仅保卫了越南南部，同时也保住了韩国和台湾——类似于毛泽东所谓的“三条战线”。


Then and now, Vietnam was the locus of a struggle between the vision of a monolithic Asia and that of an Asia that is open internally and to the world.	不论过去还是现在，在亚洲秩序是走向单一霸权还是对内外开放的斗争中，越南都占据了核心地位。


Today, that choice must be made anew.	今天，历史的选择必须被重新修正。


By acting to invigorate an Asian order that rejects hegemonic dominance, even to the extent of improving its military ties with the US, Vietnam has shown that it has learned its own lessons from the blood and treasure that it lost in its long wars of independence.	通过积极参与重建亚洲秩序以抵制霸权统治，甚至增加与美国的军事联系，越南正在向世界表明：它已经吸取了在漫长的独立战争中用鲜血和财富换来的教训。


The Global Classroom	全球教室


MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA – When I taught at Stanford University in the 1970’s, I was always on the lookout for ways that technology could help to improve learning.	山景城，加州—20世纪70年代，我在斯坦福大学教书的时候，我总是在寻找利用技术改善学习的方法。


The big innovation of that time was that my classes were broadcast around the San Francisco Bay Area.	当时的重大创新是我的课通过广电信号送到旧金山湾区周边。


We even sent videotapes of lectures farther afield.	我们还把授课录像带寄给更远的地区。


Today, teachers record and upload their lectures, and, thanks to the Internet, students anywhere in the world can watch them as many times as they want.	如今，教师们可以录制并上传授课录像，感谢互联网，世界上任何地方的学生都可以一遍又一遍地观看这些教学录像。


Education – one of the last big economic sectors yet to be transformed by the digital age – is on the cusp of a revolution.	教育——尚未因数字时代而改变的最后一批大经济部门之一——正处在革命前夜。


And why shouldn’t it be digitized?	为什么教育不进行数字化？


The Web is the fuel of the twenty-first century, and it will propel students of all ages, from all corners of the globe, into a successful future.	网络是二十一世纪的燃料，能助力所有年龄段、地球上任何角落的学生，促进他们走向未来的成功。


For example, MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) offer free or low-cost, high-quality higher-education classes to hundreds of thousands of people on the Internet, making it easier to learn whatever – and wherever – they want.	比如，MOOC（Massive Open Online Course，大众在线公开课）面向互联网上的几十万人提供免费或低成本的高质量高等教育课程，只要你愿意，你可以很轻松地学到任何东西。


I see similar opportunities coming to primary and secondary education in the future.	我认为未来小学和中学教育也将迎来类似机会。


MOOCs enable an unlimited number of students to take courses on almost any subject, from computer science to music, taught by some of the world’s leading specialists.	MOOC让无数学生能够听上由世界顶尖专家讲授的几乎所有方面的课程，从计算机科学到音乐无所不包。


Some MOOCs have mass appeal, like those from the University of Alicante in Spain and the Humboldt Institute in Germany, both of which offer courses on the practical aspects of starting up a business.	一些MOOC具有广泛的吸引力，如西班牙阿利坎特大学（University of Alicante）和德国洪堡研究所（Hunboldt Institute）的课程，这两家机构都提供关于创业的实践层面的课程。


The University of Alicante is now on its second version and has already welcomed more than 30,000 + attendees.	阿尔坎特大学在线课程已经发布第二版，访问人数已经超过30 000人。


Other MOOCs, like an upcoming one on cellular metrics offered by France’s Institut Mines-Télécom, are more tailored to niche audiences.	其他MOOC，如即将开课的法国矿业-电信学院（Institut Mines-Télécom）的细胞测量学（cellular metrics）课程，则是面向利基受众的定制课程。


MOOCs can also be creative or unique.	MOOC还可以是创造性的和独一无二的。


Anyone who has ever wanted to figure out just how and why footballers get paid as much as they do can sign up for the Valoración de Futbolistas MOOC offered by the University of Valencia.	任何人想要弄明白足球选手为何收入如此之高都可以的登陆巴伦西亚大学（University of Valencia）提供的Valoración de Futbolistas MOOC。


In this program, one can learn all one ever wanted about how to assess a footballer’s value.	在该课程中，你可以了解到你所想知道的所有关于如何评估足球选手价值的内容。


Watching a football match might never be the same again!	观看足球比赛的意义从此不同！


Wherever youth unemployment remains high, MOOCs offer a new way to boost skills and employability.	在年轻人失业高企的地区，MOOC提供了一条新的提振技能和工作能力的方法。


A key area should be support for teachers, particularly in computer science, especially in middle and high school curricula.	一个关键领域是支持教师，特别是初高中课程中计算机科学方面的教师。


Fortunately, many governments are taking steps to promote the online education revolution.	幸运的是，许多政府正在采取措施促进在线教育革命。


Malaysia’s government has announced a plan to provide lightweight laptops to primary and secondary schools nationwide, and has adopted free Web-based email, calendar, and document processing for ten million students, teachers, and parents.	马来西亚政府出台了一项计划，为全国小学和初中教师提供轻便型笔记本电脑并推出免费的电子邮件、在线日程和文档处理系统供数百万学生、教师和家长使用。


Providing Web-based services to students and educators enables access to information and makes it possible for everyone – regardless of financial resources, location, or influence – to become educated.	向学生和教育者提供基于网络的服务有利于获得信息，也让有教无类成为可能——不管你经济状况如何、位于何地、影响力怎样。


But much more needs to be done.	但还有很多事情有待完成。


Governments must expand national infrastructure so that students in densely packed urban areas and remote rural villages alike can get online.	政府必须扩大国民基础设施以便人口密集的城市地区和偏远农村地区的学生都能上网。


Public-private partnerships are often a good way to do this.	公私合作通常是实现这一目标的好办法。


For example, 10,000 Malaysian public schools should get 4G access this year through a collaboration with a local telecom provider.	比如，10 000所马来西亚公立学校今年将可以通过与本地通信服务商合作获得4G接入。


Once students are online, there is no limit to what they can do with the vast amount of information available to them or how they will collaborate with and learn from one another.	连上网后，学生将获得海量信息，结成对子、互相学习，没有任��限制。


Imagine students in Malaysia working with students around the world on a weather project.	比如，马来西亚学生可以和世界各地学生合作开展天气项目。


They could conduct virtual experiments, work simultaneously to update data in a spreadsheet or document, and create a shared final presentation.	他们可以进行虚拟实验，同步工作更新工作表或文档中的数据，并建立共享的最终报告。


Where desktop or laptop computers are not widely available, students might use smartphones or tablets to augment their learning.	在无法获得桌面电脑或笔记本电脑时，学生可以使用智能手机或平板电脑开展学习。


For example, they could turn to sophisticated mobile biology apps that let them interact with a 3D version of a cell, or polling apps that they could use to conduct a psychology experiment.	比如，他们可以使用成熟的移动生物应用，与3D细胞影像互动； 或者使用投票应用来开展心理学实验。


Study groups can be far more accessible and flexible with the Web.	在网上，学习小组的可能性和灵活性都将大大增加。


It might be difficult for a child to go to a classmate’s house to study after school, because of bad roads, unsafe neighborhoods, or parents who are working and cannot provide a lift (or do not own a car).	受糟糕的路况、不安全的社区或父母无法接送（或没车）等因素的制约，学生在放学后去同学家继续学习可能并不容易。


With sufficient bandwidth, students can now meet virtually via Google+ Hangouts or other social-media platforms and study together – or with the leading experts on the planet.	但有了足够的带宽，如今学生可以通过Google+ 环聊或其他社交媒体平台一起学习——还能和世界顶尖专家结成对子。


Thanks to the Internet, distances no longer matter: the world really can be our classroom.	感谢互联网，距离已不再是问题：世界真的可以变成我们的教室！


More War than Peace	战争更比和平多


WINCHESTER – “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”	温切斯特—“只有死人才看见过战争结束。


George Santayana’s dictum seems particularly appropriate nowadays, with the Arab world, from Syria and Iraq to Yemen and Libya, a cauldron of violence; Afghanistan locked in combat with the Taliban; swaths of central Africa cursed by bloody competition – often along ethnic/religious lines – for mineral resources.	”乔治·桑塔亚纳（George Santayana）的名言似乎特别契合今天，阿拉伯世界——从叙利亚和伊拉克到也门和利比亚——已经成为一口暴力坩埚； 阿富汗深陷与塔利班的战斗中；


Even Europe’s tranquility is at risk – witness the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, which before the current ceasefire had claimed more than 6,000 lives.	多个中非国家饱受争夺矿产资源的血性竞争（常常与种族/宗教有关）的诅咒。 甚至欧洲的宁静也饱受威胁——东乌克兰分裂冲突就是明证，在最近的停火协议达成时已让6,000多人丧生。


What explains this resort to armed conflict to solve the world’s problems?	如何解释这一用武装冲突解决世界问题的做法？


Not so long ago, the trend was toward peace, not war.	不久前，世界趋势还是和平而非战争。


In 1989, with the collapse of communism, Francis Fukuyama announced “the end of history,” and two years later President George H. W. Bush celebrated a “new world order” of cooperation between the world’s powers.	1989年，共产主义的崩溃让弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）宣布“历史的终结”，两年后，老布什总统庆祝世界大国间互相合作的“新世界秩序”。


At the time, they were right.	当时他们都是对的。


World War II, with a death toll of at least 55 million, had been the high point of mankind’s collective savagery.	第二次世界大战卷走了至少5,500万条人命，是人类历史上集体暴行的最高峰。


But from 1950 to 1989 – the Korean War through the Vietnam War and on to the end of the Cold War – deaths from violent conflict averaged 180,000 a year.	但从1950年到1989年——从朝鲜战争到越南战争再到冷战结束——平均每年暴力冲突死亡人数为180,000人。


In the 1990s, the toll fell to 100,000 a year.	20世纪90年代，这一数字下降到每年100,000人。


And in the first decade of this century, it fell still more, to around 55,000 a year – the lowest rate in any decade in the previous 100 years and equivalent to just over 1,000 a year for the “average armed conflict.”	而在21世纪第一个十年，这一数字继续下降至每年大约55,000人——比此前100年中的任何一个十年都要低，相当于“平均武装冲突”每年只有略多于1,000。


Sadly, as I note in my new book The World in Conflict, the trend is now turning upward.	悲哀的是，如我在我的新书《冲突中的世界》（The World in Conflict）中所指出的，这一趋势现在正在由降转升。


Given that so many of Africa’s wars, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the conflict in Somalia, began decades ago, the explanation lies elsewhere: in the Muslim world from northern Nigeria to Afghanistan and beyond.	如此多的非洲战争——从民主刚果到索马里冲突——几十年前就开始了，因此必须从别处寻找解释：从尼日利亚北部到阿富汗和更大范围的穆斯林世界。


Since Syria’s civil war erupted in 2011, the death toll has reached more than 250,000, and half of the population has been displaced, causing a flood of refugees into surrounding countries and into the European Union.	2011年叙利亚内战爆发以来，死亡人数已经超过250,000人，一半叙利亚人流离失所，造成大量难民涌入周边国家和欧盟。


Indeed, the Syrian conflict alone has been enough to change the graph of conflict — and the upward trajectory becomes even steeper when the deaths in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya are included.	事实上，仅仅是叙利亚冲突就足以改变冲突图表——如果将伊拉克、也门和利比亚的死亡人数包括进来，上升趋势将更加陡峭。


Those who hailed the Arab Spring five years ago must now recognize that its blooms died fast.	五年前为阿拉伯之春欢呼的人现在必须承认，它的光荣很快就已经褪色。


Only Tunisia has reasonable democratic credentials, whereas Libya, Yemen, and Syria have joined Somalia as failed states, and Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, has reverted to an autocracy verging on dictatorship.	只有突尼斯相当民主，而利比亚、也门和叙利亚都加入了索马里的行列，沦为失败之国，而埃及，阿拉伯世界人口最多的国家，已经倒退回专制，即将进入独裁。


The question is when – or if – the trend will turn down again.	问题在于趋势何时——或能否——重新由升转降。


Thanks largely to multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, states very rarely go to war with other states (Russia’s brief war with Georgia in 2008 is an exception proving the rule).	很大程度上由于联合国等多边机构的存在，各国极少向另外的国家开战（2008年俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚的短暂战争是个例外，正好证明了这一规律）。


Likewise, thanks to the EU – awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 because it had “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe” – another Franco-German war is inconceivable.	类似地，由于欧盟的存在，再次爆发法德战争的可能性也微乎其微。 2012年，欧盟因“六十年来为推进和欧洲的平和妥协、民主以及人权方面的贡献”而获得诺贝尔和平奖。


Instead, wars are between states and non-state actors – between, say, Nigeria and Boko Haram, or between India and its Naxalite insurgents.	相反，战争在国家和非国家行动方之间展开，比如尼日利亚和博科圣地组织（Boko Haram）之间，或印度和纳萨尔（Naxalite）叛军之间。


Or they are civil wars – for example, in South Sudan or Libya.	或者是内战——如南苏丹或利比亚。


Or they are proxy battles of the type that characterized the Cold War – witness Iran’s deployment in Syria of Lebanon’s Hezbollah fighters to defend Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	或者是类似于冷战的代理战争——比如伊朗在叙利亚部署黎巴嫩真主党力量捍卫巴沙尔·阿萨德。


Whatever the various, often overlapping, causes of conflict – ideology, religion, ethnicity, competition for resources – the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz two centuries ago gave the pithiest answer to the question of why we resort to violence: “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”	不管冲突的各种（常常相互重叠）原因为何——比如意识形态、宗教、种族、争夺资源——但关于我们为何会诉诸暴力这一问题，最简洁的答案仍要数两个世纪前的普鲁士将军克劳塞维茨：“战争是迫使我们的敌人遵从我们的意愿的武力行为。 ”


But can force alone compel the submission of the Islamic State and the demise of jihadist extremism in the Muslim world?	但光凭武力就能迫使伊斯兰国屈服，消灭伊斯兰世界的圣战极端主义吗？


There are two reasons to doubt that it can.	有两个理由认为应该对此表示怀疑。


One is the reluctance of militarily strong outside powers, whether America and its NATO allies or Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to “put boots on the ground” after their painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (a disaster for the Soviet Union in the 1980s and in this century for the US and NATO).	一是军事力量强大的外部势力——不管是美国及其北约盟友（本世���）还是普京的俄罗斯（上世纪80年代的苏联）——不愿“派遣地面部队”。


The second reason is the underlying appeal of the Islamist message to many of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims.	第二个理由是伊斯兰教对世界13亿穆斯林的基本号召力。


The nation-states of the Arab world are colonial inventions, superseding the caliphates – Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, and finally Ottoman – that once spread civilization from Mesopotamia to the Atlantic.	阿拉伯世界的民族国家是殖民的产物，是哈里发帝国的继承者——倭马亚、阿拔斯、法蒂玛、奥斯曼等——这些哈里发帝国曾经将文明从美索不达米亚传播到大西洋。


When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014 announced a new caliphate, with himself as “commander of the faithful,” it struck a chord.	2014年，当巴格达迪宣布成立新的哈里发帝国并有他本人担任“信仰指挥官”时，击中了全体穆斯林的心弦。


Moreover, the brutality of his fundamentalist Islamic State seems to many not so very different from the behavior of Saudi Arabia, which has spent decades spreading its Wahhabi fundamentalism through mosques and madrassas around the world.	此外，巴格达迪的原教旨伊斯兰国的残忍性对很多人来说与沙特阿拉伯的行为并没有很大不同，后者花了几十年通过全世界的清真寺和伊斯兰教学校传播其瓦哈比派原教旨主义。


In other words, the message must change if peace is to return to the Muslim world.	换句话说，要想让和平回到穆斯林世界，就必须变换信号。


That will not happen soon.	这需要很长时间。


Sunni Saudi Arabia will first have to moderate its antipathy to Shia Muslims in general and Shia-majority Iran in particular.	逊尼派沙特阿拉伯首先必须温和化其哈里发帝国，接受什叶派穆斯林特别是什叶派占多数的伊朗。


Meanwhile, the Islamic State has manpower, money, territory, and military expertise (much of it from former officers in the Iraqi army).	与此同时，伊斯兰国用有人力、财力、领土和军事专家（其中很多为前伊拉克军官）。


Saudi Arabia will eventually recognize that it needs Iran’s help to defeat the Islamic State.	沙特阿拉伯最终将认识到它需要伊朗的帮助打击伊斯兰国。


And eventually the Islamic State will implode as its subjects demand the right to listen to music and behave as they want.	而最终伊斯兰国最终将因为其民众要求听音乐和做想做的事的权利而内部崩溃。


Sadly, “eventually” is the key word.	悲哀的是，其中的关键词是“最终”。


Saudi Arabia’s instinct, born of the centuries-old antipathy between Arabs and Persians, is to see Iran as a threat to be confronted, rather than accommodated.	沙特阿拉伯的本能是将伊朗视为与其对峙的威胁而不是与它和解。 这来自阿拉伯人和波斯人之间几个世纪以来的敌对。


As for the Islamic State, North Korea is proof that brutal regimes can be very durable.	至于伊斯兰国，朝鲜证明了残酷政权也可以长期存在。


In the meantime, the graph of deaths from conflict will keep trending upwards, mocking the world’s diplomats, peacemakers, and pretensions to humanity and civilization.	与此同时，冲突死亡人数将保持上升趋势，令全世界外交家、和平活动家以及人道和文明的伪善蒙羞。


Virtual Vices	虚拟的罪恶


In a popular Internet role-playing game called Second Life, people can create a virtual identity for themselves, choosing such things as their age, sex, and appearance. These virtual characters then do things that people in the real world do, such as having sex.	在一款名为“第二生命”的热门角色扮演类网络游戏中，玩家可以为自己创建虚拟的身份，选择年龄、性别和外貌等，然后用这些虚拟人物做真实世界里的人所做的事情，例如做爱。


Depending on your preferences, you can have sex with someone who is older or younger than you – perhaps much older or younger.	你可以根据自己的喜好，与比你年长或年轻——或者比你年长或年轻许多——的人发生性关系。


In fact, if your virtual character is an adult, you can have sex with a virtual character who is a child.	事实上，如果你的虚拟人物是成年人，你还可以和虚拟身份是儿童的人发生性关系。


If you did that in the real world, most of us would agree that you did something seriously wrong.	如果你在真实世界里这样做，大多数人会认为你的行为属于严重犯罪。


But is it seriously wrong to have virtual sex with a virtual child?	那么与虚拟儿童发生虚拟性关系也是严重犯罪吗？


Some Second Life players say that it is, and have vowed to expose those who do it.	“第二生命”的部分玩家认为是，并且发誓要把这样做的人曝光。


Meanwhile, the manufacturers, Linden Labs, have said they will modify the game to prevent virtual children from having sex.	同时，游戏制造商林登实验室也声称要修改游戏，防止虚拟儿童与人发生性关系。


German prosecutors have also become involved, although their concern appears to be the use of the game to spread child pornography, rather than whether people have virtual sex with virtual children.	德国的检察官们也没有置身事外，不过他们关注的焦点是有人利用这个游戏传播儿童色情产品，而不是人们是否与虚拟儿童发生虚拟性关系。


Laws against child pornography in other countries may also have the effect of prohibiting games that permit virtual sex with virtual children.	其他国家有关禁止儿童色情产品的法律可能也会禁止允许和虚拟儿童发生虚拟性关系的游戏。


In Australia, Connor O’Brien, chair of the criminal law section of the Law Institute of Victoria, recently told the Melbourne newspaper The Age that he thought the manufacturer of Second Life could be prosecuted for publishing images of children in a sexual context.	在澳大利亚，维多利亚律师协会刑事部门的主席康纳·欧布莱恩最近在接受墨尔本《时代报》的采访时说，他认为“第二生命”的制造商应该为公布色情环境中的儿童图像而受到起诉。


The law is on solid ground when it protects children from being exploited for sexual purposes.	法律保护儿童免遭性侵害是无可厚非的。


It becomes much more dubious when it interferes with sexual acts between consenting adults.	但是法律如果干预成人之间自愿的性行为，则不再理直气壮。


What adults choose to do in the bedroom, many thoughtful people believe, is their own business, and the state ought not to pry into it.	许多有思想的人认为，成年人选择在寝室里做什么是他们自己的事，国家不应干预。


If you get aroused by having your adult partner dress up as a schoolchild before you have sex, and he or she is happy to enter into that fantasy, your behavior may be abhorrent to most people, but as long as it is done in private, few would think that it makes you a criminal.	如果你让你的成年伴侣打扮成中小学生的样子和你做爱，而他或她也愿意满足你的幻。 ，这样的行为可能会让大多数人感到厌恶，但只要你们是在私下里，没人会认为你在犯罪。


Nor should it make any difference if you invite a few adult friends over, and in the privacy of your own home they all choose to take part in a larger-scale sexual fantasy of the same kind.	如果你邀请几位成年朋友到自己家里，而他们都自愿加入性质相同但规模更大的性幻想，这也不算犯罪。


Are computers linked via the Internet – again, assuming that only consenting adults are involved – so different from a group fantasy of this kind?	那么，通过因特网连接起来的电脑——同样假设只有成年人自愿参与——与此类的群体幻想真有那么大的区别吗？


When someone proposes making something a criminal offense, we should always ask: who is harmed?	每次有人提议将某事作为刑事犯罪的时候，我们都应该思考：什么人受到了伤害？


If it can be shown that the opportunity to act out a fantasy by having virtual sex with a virtual child makes people more likely to engage in real pedophilia, then real children will be harmed, and the case for prohibiting virtual pedophilia becomes stronger.	如果可以证明，人们一旦有机会通过与虚拟儿童发生虚拟性关系来满足性幻想，在现实生活中发生恋童癖行为的可能性就会提高，并且真正的儿童就会受到伤害，那么禁止虚拟恋童癖的理由会更加充分一些。


But looking at the question in this way raises another, and perhaps more significant, issue about virtual activities: video game violence.	但是从这个角度看问题会引出另一个——也许更加重要——有关虚拟活动的问题：电子游戏暴力。


Those who play violent video games are often at an impressionable age.	暴力电子游戏的玩家大多处于一个容易受影响的年龄。


Doom, a popular violent videogame, was a favorite of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the teenage Columbine High School murderers.	“毁灭战士”，一款热门的暴力游戏，曾是哥伦拜高中屠杀案中的青少年杀手埃里克·哈里斯和迪伦·克莱波尔德的最爱。


In a chilling videotape they made before the massacre, Harris says “It's going to be like fucking Doom….That fucking shotgun [he kisses his gun] is straight out of Doom!”	他们在惨案发生前制作了一卷令人不寒而栗的录像带，其中，哈里斯说：“就跟‘毁灭战士’里一样……这把散弹枪（他亲了手中的枪一下）跟‘毁灭战士’里的一模一样！ ”


There are other cases in which aficionados of violent videogames have become killers, but they do not prove cause and effect.	另外还有一些暴力电子游戏的狂热爱好者变成杀人犯的例子，不过这些还不能说明其中存在因果关系。


More weight, however, should be given to the growing number of scientific studies, both in the laboratory and in the field, of the effect of such games.	但是，我们应该更多地考虑在实验室和现场进行的越来越多的关于此类游戏影响的科学研究。


In Violent Video Game Effects on Children and Adults, Craig Anderson, Douglas Gentile, and Katherine Buckley, of the Department of Psychology at Iowa State University, draw these studies together to argue that violent video games increase aggressive behavior.	在《暴力电子游戏对儿童和成人的影响》一书中，爱荷华州立大学心理学系的克雷格·安德逊、道格拉斯·金泰尔和凯瑟琳·巴克雷总结了这些研究结果，认为暴力电子游戏会增加攻击性行为。


If criminal prosecution is too blunt an instrument to use against violent video games, there is a case for awarding damages to the victims, or families of the victims, of violent crimes committed by people who play violent video games.	如果对于暴力电子游戏来说，刑事起诉的手段过于粗暴，那么可以向暴力电子游戏玩家所犯暴力罪行的受害人或其家属做出赔偿。


To date, such lawsuits have been dismissed, at least in part on the grounds that the manufacturers could not foresee that their products would cause people to commit crimes.	迄今为止，这样的诉讼都被驳回了，其理由至少有一部分在于制造商不能预见到其产品会诱人犯罪。


But the evidence that Anderson, Gentile, and Buckley provide has weakened that defense.	不过安德逊、金泰尔和巴克雷提供的证据削弱了这样的辩词。


André Peschke, editor-in-chief of Krawall.de , one of Germany’s leading online computer and video game magazines, informs me that in ten years in the video game industry, he has never seen any serious debate within the industry on the ethics of producing violent games.	德国最大的网上电脑与电子游戏杂志之一 Krawall. de 的主编安德鲁·普施克告诉我，他在电子游戏行业工作了十年，从未见到这个行业内有人就制作暴力游戏的道德问题进行严肃的讨论。


The manufacturers fall back on the simplistic assertion that there is no scientific proof that violent video games lead to violent acts.	制造商们武断地认为没有科学证据证明暴力电子游戏会引发暴力行为。


But sometimes we cannot wait for proof.	不过有时候我们不能等待证据。


This seems to be one of those cases: the risks are great, and outweigh whatever benefits violent video games may have.	这似乎属于这样一种情况：风险过于巨大，超过了暴力电子游戏可能带来的任何好处。


The evidence may not be conclusive, but it is too strong to be ignored any longer.	现在或许还没有真凭实据，但结果太严重，再也不能视而不见。


The burst of publicity about virtual pedophilia in Second Life may have focused on the wrong target.	针对“第二生命”中的虚拟恋童癖盛行的舆论可能搞错了目标。


Video games are properly subject to legal controls, not when they enable people to do things that, if real, would be crimes, but when there is evidence on the basis of which we can reasonably conclude that they are likely to increase serious crime in the real world.	电子游戏成为法律管制的对象，其理由不在于人们可以通过它们做一些现实生活中属于犯罪的事情，而在于是否有证据证明它们有可能增加现实生活中的严重犯罪行为。


At present, the evidence for that is stronger for games involving violence than it is for virtual realities that permit pedophilia.	目前，涉及暴力的游戏在这方面的证据比允许恋童癖的虚拟现实要更充分。


Vladimir de Gaulle?	弗拉基米尔·戴高乐


MOSCOW -- The greatest disappointment of the postcommunist era has been the failure of the West – particularly Europe – to build a successful relationship with Russia.	莫斯科--后冷战时代最令人失望的事情就是西方、特别是欧洲没有建立一个成功的对俄关系。


Most policymakers and experts expected that, after an inevitably troublesome period of transition, Russia would join the United States and Europe in a strategic and economic partnership, based on shared interests and values.	大多数决策者和专家都期望，在经过一段不可避免的艰苦转型期后，俄国将会在共同利益和价值的基础上与美国和欧洲一道构成战略和经济夥伴关系。


The pace of change might be doubtful, but not its direction.	尽管改变的步伐可能值得怀疑，但是方向是确定无疑的。


Vladimir Putin’s massive electoral triumph in this week’s Duma elections has put the lie to that notion.	普京在本周的杜马选举中大获全胜打破了这一观点。


Today, shared interests have shrunk and values have diverged.	如今，共同利益消退，价值观分道扬镳。


A resurgent Russia is the world’s foremost revisionist power, rejecting a status quo predicated on the notion of a Western victory in the Cold War.	复兴的俄罗斯是世界上最大的修正主义大国，它拒绝接受根据西方获得冷战胜利这一观点而制定的现状。


Its two super-power assets – nuclear weapons and energy – make it a potential leader of all those lesser powers dissatisfied with their position in the world.	俄国的两大超级大国资产，也就是核武器和能源，使得其成为所有不满于在世界上的地位的较为弱小的国家的潜在的领头国家。


A potential Russia-China axis based on shared resistance to US hegemony carries the seeds of a new bipolarity.	建立在共同的抵制美国霸权基础上的潜在的中俄轴心有可能成为新的双极世界的开端。


Western expectations of postcommunist Russia’s trajectory rested on three assumptions that proved to be mistaken.	西方对后共产时代俄国的走向的预期建立在三个假设基础之上，它们都被证明是错误的。


First, most of Russia’s elite rejected the view that the loss of empire was irreversible.	首先，俄国精英大多数都拒绝接受这一观点，即帝国的丧失是不可逆转的。


Second, the Bush administration’s unilateralism shattered the belief that the US would continue to provide the world with “multilateral” leadership; indeed, US unilateralism was a cue for Russia to pursue its own unilateral policy.	第二，布什政府的单边主义打破了美国将会继续以“多边主义”领导世界的信念； 的确，美国的单边主义引发俄国实行其自身的单边主义政策。


Third, Russia has not yet become economically integrated with the West, especially Europe, as was expected.	第三，俄国并未像人们预期的那样在经济上与西方、特别是欧洲融合。


What happens when the pull of a country’s imperial history meets the constraints of its current international position?	当国家的帝国历史牵引受到其当前的国际地位局限时会发生什么呢？


Will it try to weaken the constraints? Or will it adjust to them?	它是否会削弱其局限还是适应局限？


The first option may involve international conflict, the second domestic conflict.	第一个选择可能会产生国际冲突，而第二个则会产生国内冲突。


I believe that the attempt by President Putin’s Kremlin to impose “liberal empire” or “sovereign democracy” on the post-Soviet states will fail.	我相信，普京总统把“自由化帝国”或者“主权民主”强加给后苏联国家的企图将会失败。


Of course, Russia is bound to exercise strong influence in the former Soviet territories, but it will have to share that influence with others.	当然，俄国肯定会在前苏联领地上实行强大的影响力，但是它不得不与其他国家分享这一影响力。


Russia has too little to offer for exclusive dominance.	俄国没有什么东西可以用来排他独自控制。


The European Union, the US, and China offer the former Soviet republics opportunities for “balancing” against Russia.	欧盟、美国以及中国给前苏联共和国机会来“平衡”俄国的影响力。


Of course, it is not very difficult to envisage the voluntary reincorporation of the ethnic Russian populations of Belarus, eastern Ukraine, and northern Kazakhstan into the Russian Federation – but only in a context in which Russia emerges as a true regional leader on a par with the EU.	当然，人们并不难以设想在白俄罗斯、东乌克兰以及北哈萨克斯坦的俄罗斯裔人口自愿重新返回俄罗斯联邦，但是这只会在俄国崛起成为与欧盟并驾齐驱的真正的地区领导国家的情况下才可以。


Alternatively (or coincidentally), Russia might discover a new business center of gravity in Central Asia and East Asia, though this would hardly be the “liberal empire” that Anatoli Chubais once envisaged, for it would be based on the mutual attraction of autocrats.	或者(或者意外地)，俄国或许会在中亚和东亚发现一个新的商业重心，尽管这难以成为丘拜斯曾经设想的那种“自由化帝国”，因为是建立在独裁者之间的互相吸引之上。


Russia also will not transform its economic system along Anglo-American lines.	俄国也不会根据盎格鲁美国模式转变其经济制度。


Apart from their incapacity to do so, Russians are well aware of the Anglo-American model’s faults.	俄国人除了无力这样做，也十分清楚这一模式的缺陷。


We may see some compromise between European (Sarkozy-style) capitalism and an authoritarian, protectionist model with a lot of industrial policy.	人们可能会见到萨尔科奇式的欧洲资本主义与具有大量产业政策的独裁和保护主义模式的某些妥协。


This is the kind of civilizational choice that sovereign countries are entitled to make for themselves.	这是主权国家有权为自己做出的文明化的选择。


The territorial and economic imperatives of empire will continue to make it difficult for Russia to develop a political system that conforms to Western norms.	帝国的领土和经济需要将会继续让俄国难以建立符合西方标准的政治制度。


The middle class will expand, but there is no assurance that it will become “liberal” in the Western sense.	中产阶级将会扩大，但是没人保证它会变成西方意义上的“自由化”。


So Russia’s political system will probably remain autocratic for the foreseeable future, with a facade of democracy.	所以，俄国的政治制度将可能会在可以预见的将来在民主的外表下保持专制独裁。


While this is disappointing, it is an improvement on anything Russia has ever experienced, except briefly.	尽管这令人失望，但是除了俄国曾经短期经历过的外，还是有进步。


It is hard to see Russia offering the world a new type of universalism, as it once did with communism.	人们很难看到俄国提供给世人一种新型的普世主义，正如它曾经以共产主义所提供的那样。


The Russian strain of political messianism is pretty much exhausted.	俄国的政治救世主主义已经大体耗尽。


Nevertheless, Russia may be able to develop, out of its own spiritual and cultural resources, an attractive alternative to both the American and European models, provided it achieves long run economic success.	但是，俄国或许会用自身的精神和文化资源发展吸引人的替代美国和欧洲的模式，前提是它取得长久的经济成功。


If Russia fails in its attempt to become an independent center of power to rival the US (and eventually China), what role will it play?	如果俄国不能成为与美国(���及最终中国)分庭抗礼的独立的权力中心，那么它将会发挥什么作用呢？


A suggestive analogy may be to France during the long period of Anglo-American hegemony.	可以用在长久的英美霸权时期的法国做比方。


Broadly speaking, France has been the “awkward partner” in the Anglo-American club – a role it played right up to its orchestration of opposition to the Iraq war in 2003.	大体上而言，法国是英美俱乐部中一个“尴尬的夥伴”，直到2003年的伊拉克战争，法国一直统领反对派。


Twice in the twentieth century – in 1931 and again in 1969-70 – France helped to bring down the world monetary system.	二十世纪中有两次，也就是1931年和1969至1970年期间，法国在破坏世界货币体系上发挥了作用。


Charles de Gaulle took France out of the NATO military alliance in 1966.	戴高乐在1966年将法国退出了北约军事联盟。


France, uniquely in Western Europe, built its own independent nuclear deterrent, and has been a champion of creating a European military capacity outside NATO.	法国在欧洲独一无二地建立了自己独立的核子威摄力量，并且一直倡导在北约之外建立欧洲军事能力。


Without explicitly challenging US leadership, France tried to build its own “Ostpolitik” with Russia, and to use its axis with Germany to create a European position on foreign policy.	在不明确挑战美国领导权的情况下，法国试图与俄国建立自己的“友好关系”，并且利用与德国的轴心来构建欧洲外交政策的立场。


The French have been the most insistent that Europe has interests that are not identical to America’s – particularly in the Middle East, where France has been pro-Arab.	法国一直坚持欧洲具有与美国不同的利益，特别是在中东地区。 法国在中东一直倾向于阿拉伯人。


And, like de Gaulle, Putin has sought to rescue his country from humiliation and defeat by carving out a role consonant with popular feelings of national mission and pride, with national interest interpreted as “sovereignty.”	而且，像戴高乐一样，普京通过确立符合国家使命和尊严的大众感觉，以及被解释为“主权”的国家利益的作用寻求把他的国家从屈辱和失败中解救出来。


The Gaullist dream of creating an independent power center never succeeded, but the role of “awkward partner” has given a distinctive flavor to French diplomacy, and it may be equally viable for a shrunken, proud, but no longer hegemonic Russia.	戴高乐建立独立的权力中心的梦想从来没有实现，但是“尴尬的夥伴”的作用给了法国外交以独特的味道，而且，这对于受到挫败、趾高气扬但是不再霸权的俄国可能同样适用。


Being an “awkward partner” may offer Russia its best hope of reconciling its yearning for independence with the realities of the modern world.	作为一个“尴尬的夥伴”给予俄国在渴望独立与现代世界现实之间调和的最佳希望。


Vladimir Putin, Part Two	普京第二章


LONDON -- Opinions about Vladimir Putin run the gamut.	对于普京各方看法迥然不同。


In the West, he is regarded as an “authoritarian,” an “autocrat,” even as a “dictator” while in Russia a huge majority regard him as the most “democratic” of leaders, on the grounds that he has done more than his predecessors to improve the lot of ordinary people.	在西方国家，他被认为是一个“独裁主义者”，一个“独断专行的人”，甚至一个“独裁者”，而大部分俄罗斯人把他看成是最最“民主”的领导人，因为他比他的所有前任都更大地提高了普通老百姓的生活水平。


But there is one point on which both camps agree: Putin intends to remain in power indefinitely.	但是有一点是两大阵营都同意的：那就是普京想要无限期地留在权力的舞台。


That conclusion stems from Putin’s recent statement that he might become prime minister after relinquishing the presidency next May.	这一结论来自普京最近表态说他在明年五月卸任总统后可能会去当总理。


But, regardless of what Putin does, his personal influence and the strategic direction in which he has taken Russia will remain dominant for years to come.	但是，不管普京到底会怎么做，他的个人影响力以及他带领俄罗斯所走的战略方向在以后多年都将占据主导地位。


Given this reality, what matters now is how this “Putin system” will work, which will depend on institutional frameworks and practices.	鉴于这一现实，现在人们需要关心的是“普京体系”将会怎样运作，这将依赖于制度框架和实践。


At stake, both for Russia and the wider world, are stability and legitimacy, hence the prospects for steady political and economic modernization.	对于俄罗斯和世界来说，稳定和合法性都面临巨大的危机，因此也使稳定推进政治和经济现代化的前景变得令人堪忧。


Legitimacy and stability are inseparable in practice, because maintaining stability in the absence of legitimacy would ultimately require Tiananmen-style repression.	合法性和稳定实际上是密不可分的，缺乏合法性地维护稳定最终需要天安门事件式的镇压来实现。


But this can be ruled out in today’s Russia, because the instruments to implement it – notably an army that would obey orders to mow people down in the streets – are lacking.	但是这种结果在今天的俄罗斯是不可能出现的，因为缺乏实施它的工具，就是说一支会遵从命令走上街头用机枪扫杀群众的军队。


Much opinion poll evidence shows that the presidency is the only institution that Russians accept as legitimate (in contrast to the legislature and judiciary, which are perceived as corrupt and ineffective).	大多数的民意调查结果显示总统职位是俄罗斯人认为唯一合法的机构（这与立法机关和司法系统形成鲜明对比，它们被看成是腐败和低效率的）。


This is not surprising, given the country’s history and culture.	考虑到这个国家的历史和文化，这并不令人感到惊讶。


More important is that an almost equally large majority values the power to hire and fire their czar – in free elections held at regular intervals in line with the constitution.	更为重要的是几乎同样多数的人重视雇佣和解雇他们的沙皇的权力，也就是根据宪法在相隔一定的时间进行的自由选举中行使这样的权力。


In Russia’s current political cycle, which will culminate in the presidential election of March 2008, there will be no difficulty in meeting the main conditions of legitimacy: respecting the constitution’s rules about regular free elections to the presidency.	在俄罗斯目前这个以2008年3月的总统大选为目标的政治进程中，要达成合法的主要条件并不存在什么困难，即尊重宪法关于定期进行自由的总统选举的规定。


Given Putin’s popularity, these rules present no threat to the ruling group’s power.	鉴于普京的声望，这种规定对统治集团的权力不会构成任何威胁。


The voters will enthusiastically elect anyone who has Putin’s blessing.	投票人只须热情地选举任何受到普京恩赐的人选。


But looking forward to the next political cycle in 2012, or the one after that in 2016, there is no guarantee that today’s conditions will still apply.	但是展望到2012年，甚至是到2016年的下一个政治进程，没有人能保证今天的条件还会适用。


Invincible popularity can evaporate.	不可战胜的声望会蒸发掉。


Even in the rosiest economic scenario, expectations about rising living standards will outstrip reality, causing disenchantment.	即便经济处于最最繁荣的阶段，人们也会有对于提高生活水平超越现实的期望，从而催生不满情绪。


If, in the meantime, the political system has not acquired more institutional cushioning, and the presidency’s unique legitimacy remains – like today – based merely on the public’s approval of an incumbent surrounded by shady and bickering Kremlin factions, there would be a high risk of chronic destabilisation.	如果与此同时政治体系未能获得更多的体制保护，而总统职位独特的合法性依然像今天一样仅仅依赖于公众对一个被在幕后争执不休的克里姆林宫各派系所围绕的现任者的认同，那就极有可能产生急性不稳定。


In these circumstances, an isolated and increasingly unpopular regime might decide to cancel or rig the presidential election when it fell due.	在这种情况下，一个被独立和越来越不受欢迎的政权在面临即将到来的总统选举时也许会决定取消或者操纵大选。


This is what happened in Ukraine in November 2004, with revolutionary consequences.	那正是乌克兰在2004年11月所发生的事情，由此引发了一场革命。


It would be rash to assume that the outcome in Russia would be as benign as Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution.”	现在就预期俄罗斯最后的结果会像乌克兰的“橙色革命”一样产生良性的结果尚为时过早。


Integrating the presidency into broader political structures and procedures – especially into party politics – would reduce this risk.	把总统职位融入更广泛的政治结构和程序尤其是党派政治可以减少风险。


A political party infused with a normal instinct for self-preservation would produce a fresh face to run in a proper presidential election, replacing an unpopular incumbent and his cronies.	一个有着自我保护的通常本能的政党会推出一张新面孔取代其不受欢迎的现任及其密友来参加一场真正的总统大选。


As it happens, Putin is now entrenching the already dominant United Russia party by his decision to head the party’s candidate list in December’s parliamentary election.	现在的情况是，普京已经牢牢掌握了在这个国家占压倒地位的统一俄罗斯党，决定作为这个党名列首位的候选人参加11月份的议会选举。


Could Russia emulate Japan’s post-war model, in which a single dominant party revives and modernizes the country?	俄罗斯会效仿日本战后的模式，即以单个占统治地位的政党来使国家走向复兴和现代化吗？


Like all historical analogies, this one may prove flawed, but it is not absurd.	像所有历史的类比一样，这个类比也许也会被证明是有漏洞的，但是并不荒唐。 日本事实上的一党制国家由于其以法律为基础的框架以及负责任的文化更多体现的是民主而不是独裁。


Japan’s	自民党的精英对民众的情绪和关切总是会作出反应，常常是窃取其反对派的观点。


While inferior to the open alternation of power between two or more political parties, the evolution of United Russia into something resembling the LDP would still leave Russia in a much better shape than a personal regime confined to the Kremlin.	尽管没有两党或多党轮流执政的体制那么好，但是让统一俄罗斯党演变成类似于自民党这样的党派对于俄罗斯的局面总见得要比局限于克里姆林宫的个人统治好得多。


Despite Russia’s history after 1917, one dominant political party is preferable to none at all.	不管俄罗斯自1917年以来的历史是怎样的，一党独大是任何人所不愿意看到的。


Putin’s recent public statements point to such a vision: a dominant center-right ruling party, with a (non-communist) social democratic alternative waiting in the wings to maintain stable government should the main party falter.	普京最近的公开表态造成了这样一种印象：一个占统治地位的中右执政党，还有一个作为替代的（非马克思主义的）社会民主党时刻准备着在这个主要党派出现动摇时出面维持政府的稳定。


As so often in politics, much will depend on how far Putin matches deeds to words after leaving the presidency.	正如经常出现的政治局面那样，这一切在很大程度取决于普京在卸任总统后能在多大程度上做到言行一致。


Should he choose to exercise his vast residual influence through United Russia (with its inevitable majority in the newly elected parliament), we will know that he means what he says.	如果他选择通过统一俄罗斯党发挥他巨大的剩余影响力（依靠其在新选举出的议会中肯定会占据的多数席位），那么我们将知道他确实是说到做到的。


If, by contrast, he leaves the presidency, gets himself appointed prime minister, and overhauls the constitution to shift powers from the former to the latter, we will know that he is going for a personal regime after all.	如果相反，他离开总统职位后，又把自己推选为总理，并且全面修订宪法把前者的权力转移给后者，那么我们将知道他终于走向了个人统治。


Emasculating the elected presidency, which is Russia’s sole source of political legitimacy, would pave the way to chaos.	架空选举产生的总统这个俄罗斯政治合法性的主要来源，将无可避免地导向混乱。


The habit of changing the rules to keep power would persist after the strongman eventually leaves the scene, but the superficial stability of his rule would not.	改变规则以保持权力的习惯在强人最终离开舞台后将会依然保留下去，但是在他统治下的外表的稳定性却不再会得到保留。


Vladimir Putin’s Potemkin Nation	弗拉季米尔·普京德波将金国度


MOSCOW – “Image is everything” might be a viable credo if you are the house of Gucci or a catwalk model, but it is definitely not appropriate as a national strategy.	莫斯科--“形象即一切”可能对于Gucci这样的时尚大牌或T型台上的模特而言是个不错的信条，但作为一种国家战略它肯定是不合适的。


Yet “Putinism,” the ruling ideology of the Russia that Vladimir Putin has forged during his ten years in power, is all about image – the image of a reconstituted great power restored to the world stage.	然而，普京在位十年所一手缔造的俄罗斯统治思想“普京主义”却是一切以形象为中心--一个重返世界舞台的再造大国的形象。


The problem is that, unlike the rail thin catwalk model who starves herself half to death to stay slim, the image of Russia that Putin seeks to project is completely imaginary.	问题是，和一个把自己饿得半死来保持薄如纸片般削瘦身材的时装模特不同，普京试图塑造的形象完全是虚构的。


The Russian economy is a shambles, and Russia’s mighty military had to exert itself to its fullest to vanquish tiny Georgia in 2008.	俄罗斯的经济一团糟，而其强大的军事机器在2008年必须竭尽全力来击败弹丸之地格鲁吉亚。


Of course, Russia’s rulers have usually preferred myth to reality.	当然，俄罗斯的统治者们历来喜欢神话多于现实。


After all, it was during the reign of Catherine the Great that the “Potemkin village” was invented, whereby the squalor of the lives of Catherine’s serfs was hidden behind cheerfully painted housing façades as the Empress toured her country.	毕竟，“波将金村”是在叶卡捷琳娜大帝统治时期发明的。 在女皇巡游全国之时，这些村落以色彩明快的外立面掩盖了叶卡捷琳娜的农奴们污秽的生活。


In today’s Russia, the overriding myth is that Putin has presided over a rapidly modernizing country.	在当今的俄罗斯，最大的神话就是普京已经主宰了这个正快速现代化的国家。


Here the cheerful façade is composed of Russia’s miniature president, Dmitri Medvedev, whose job – like that of the American First Lady – is to keep up appearances.	在这里，俄罗斯的微型总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫构成了光鲜的外立面。 他的工作--如同美国的第一夫人一样--就是保持曝光率。


And the appearance that needs the most maintenance is that of a modern and civilized Russia.	而最需要保持曝光率的却是一个现代而文明的俄罗斯。


Upon assuming the presidency in 2008, Medvedev proclaimed: “We must achieve a true respect for law, and overcome the legal nihilism that is hampering modern development.”  And, in a much discussed newspaper article entitled “Russia Forward,” he declared, “Should we continue to drag into the future our primitive raw-materials economy, endemic corruption, and inveterate habit of relying on the state to solve our problems?	在2008年就任总统之际，梅德韦杰夫宣称：“我们必须实现对法律的真正尊重，并克服那种正妨碍现代化进程的法律虚无主义。 ”在另一篇引发热烈讨论的报纸文章中，他宣布：“难道我们要继续把初级的原材料经济、贪污成风和依赖国家解决问题的根深蒂固的习惯托拽到未来吗？


Today, for the first time in our history, we have a chance to prove to ourselves and the world that Russia can develop democratically.	今天，我们在历史上第一次有机会能够向世界和我们自己证明俄罗斯能够民主地发展。


Our political system will be extremely open, flexible.”	我们的政治制度将会是极为开放和灵活的。 ”


And, just this October, remembering the victims of Stalin, Medvedev wrote in his blog (itself a sign meant to convey how up-to-date he is), “We can hear voices saying that those numerous deaths were justified by some supreme goals of the state.	而就在今年十月，在缅怀斯大林的受害者们之际，梅德韦杰夫于他的博客中写道（这本身就意在显示他的与时俱进）：“我们能够听到有声音在说这些无数死去的人们是为某些崇高的国家目标而牺牲的。


I am convinced that no development of a country, no success or ambitions, can be achieved through human grief and losses.	我坚信没有任何一个国家的发展，没有任何的成功或雄心能够通过人类的痛苦和损失而实现。


Nothing can be valued above human life, and there is no excuse for repressions.”	什么也没有人的生命更宝贵，镇压没有任何借口。 ”


Of course, if Medvedev actually meant what he says, he would be leading the opposition to the Russian state that Putin has built.	当然，如果这真是梅德韦杰夫的肺腑之言，他本来会领导起普京一手打造的这个俄罗斯国家的反对派。


But, since Putin put Medvedev in his job and can remove him anytime he pleases, Russia’s president is not opposed to the ways of the Putin regime.	但是，由于普京让他坐上这个位置并且能在任何时候拖他下台，俄罗斯总统是不会与普京政权唱反调的。


So what is going on here?	那这究竟是怎么一回事？


Putin’s political genius is that he understands that, for Russians, being perceived as powerful is even more important than actually being powerful.	普京的政治天才在于他明白对越罗斯人而言，被人看作强大甚至比真正的强大还重要。


He does not need to modernize Russia so that it can actually compete with the world’s mightiest powers; he just needs to bluster enough that people – particularly his own – believe that Russia is once again among the first rank of nations.	他不需要使俄罗斯现代化到能与世界上最强大的国家不相伯仲； 他只需要雷声大，雨点小，让人们--特别是他的自己人--相信俄罗斯再次跻身于世界一线强国之林。


Putin’s promise to restore national self-respect, shattered by Russia’s bitter loss of superpower status in 1991, is centered around cowing Europe into submissively accepting Russia’s sphere of “privileged interest” in the post-Soviet nations.	普京承诺恢复民族自尊心（随着俄罗斯在1991年怅然失去超级大国地位而破碎）。 其核心是胁迫欧洲接受俄罗斯在苏联解体后的国家里的“特权利益”范畴。


By increasing oil and gas prices, or limiting supplies, flexing its military muscles in Georgia, or sending ships to Cuba and Venezuela to parade Russia’s power on the world stage, Putin has convinced many people that Russia is back.	通过提高石油和天然气的价格，或限制供应，在格鲁吉亚炫耀武力，或派遣军舰出访古巴和委内瑞拉从而在世界舞台上显示实力，普京已经让许多人相信俄罗斯东山再起。


Moreover, Putin’s project to safeguard “great Russian statehood” from the disarray of the post-Soviet era has seen the imprisoning of “dishonest” oligarchs; the prosecution of an “irresponsible” press; and the establishment of his personal dictatorship over the rule of law.	另外，普京在后苏联时代的混乱中保卫“伟大的俄罗斯国家”的计划见证了对“不诚实的”政治寡头的监禁； 对一家“不负责任的”媒体的起诉；


Because the world associates these traits with the Soviet era, many people mistake their reappearance as a sign that Russian power is now approaching that of the USSR.	因为外部世界将这些特点与苏联时代联系起来，许多人都错误地认为它们的重新出现是俄罗斯的实力正在接近苏联的征兆。


Nothing could be farther from the truth.	而这与事实相去甚远。


As in the Soviet era, the dictatorial mask disguises the system’s economic and political fragility.	正如苏联时代一样，独裁面具所掩饰的是这个体系在经济与政治上的脆弱。


Thus, instead of investing in the energy industry – the lifeblood of the economy – in order to reverse declining output, the Kremlin is devoting its energy to a presidential commission to “counteract attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests.”	因此，克里姆林宫没有加大对能源工业--这一经济命脉--的投入���扭转产量下降的趋势，而是将精力花在一个旨在“对抗通过篡改历史来损害俄罗斯利益的企图”的总统委员会。


This means that the state will decide which interpretations of history should be considered “true,” creating endless opportunities for manipulation to serve the agenda of those in power.	这就意味着国家将会决定对历史的何种阐释才是“真实的”，从而为服务当权者意图的肆意操纵创造无尽的机会。


Likewise, instead of welcoming the sort of foreign investors who can modernize the economy, the regime continues to wage its judicial war against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev of Yukos Oil.	无独有偶，普京政权并没有欢迎能使经济现代化的外国投资者，而是继续对Mikhail Khodorkovsky和尤科斯石油公司的Platon Lebedev穷追猛打。


They were convicted for financial crimes in a 2004 trial, but in August faced a fresh round of charges, including tax evasion and embezzlement.	在2004年的审判中，他们都被判犯有金融罪行，但在今年八月，他们又面临了包括逃税和挪用公款在内的新一轮的指控。


Journalists and human rights activists and lawyers – Anna Politkovskaya, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova, Natalia Estemirova, and dozens of others – are murdered, and no one in the Kremlin seems to mind, because they are not really a part of the New Russia that Putin is building.	新闻工作者和人权活动家--Anna Politkovskaya, Stanislav Markelov, Anastasia Baburova, Natalia Estemirova及其他十几位人士被谋杀，而克里姆林宫里的官员们却似乎不以为意。 因为这些人并不真是普京打造中的俄罗斯的一部分。


Indeed, just this November, Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer for Hermitage Capital Management, died in prison because of his captors’ negligence.	的确如此，就在今年十一月，Hermitage资本管理公司的律师Sergei Magnitsky因为其逮捕者的疏忽而死在狱中。


Perhaps US Vice President Joe Biden summed up Russia’s predicament best: “The reality is, the Russians are where they are, having a shrinking population base, a withering economy, and a banking structure that is unlikely to withstand the next 15 years.	或许美国副总统拜登对俄罗斯的困境进行了最佳的总结：“现实是，俄罗斯人还在原地踏步。 人口基数日渐缩小，经济不断萎缩，银行体系也很可能撑不过未来的十五年。