The Arab Spring, however, reveals the fragility of repressive political regimes that try to maintain their legitimacy by limiting information flows.	但是，阿拉伯之春显示了高压政治体制的脆弱，通过限制信息流动维持统治的合法性是行不通的。


The main lesson for dynamic emerging-market countries is that an exclusive focus on GDP growth may ultimately not be good for economic and political stability.	充满活力的新兴市场国家给我们的主要教训是，只关注GDP增长最终可能不利于经济和政治稳定。


Even with rapid increases in national income, if these countries’ leaders do not distribute the benefits fairly, they will become vulnerable to popular discontent.	尽管国民收入有了快速增加，但如果领导人不能公平地分配经济增长到来的好处，他们就很容易受到群众的反对。


Tackling corruption is critical to improving long-term growth and maintaining social stability.	处理腐败是改善长期增长、维持社会稳定的关键。


These economies need measures that help to keep the poor out of poverty traps, and that give them realistic opportunities to improve their economic well-being.	这些国家需要采取措施助贫民摆脱贫困陷阱，给他们现实的机会改善其经济福利。 这些措施包括扩大金融市场，让更多的人能够获得信用和投资；


Such steps include broadening financial markets to give more people access to credit and investment, strengthening social safety nets to protect the economically vulnerable, and improving educational access and quality.	增强社会安全网以保护经济弱势群体； 以及增加教育的可获得性和平等性。


These lessons apply equally to advanced economies, which also suffer from rising inequality and subtle forms of corruption.	这些教训对发达经济体同样有效，因为发达经济体也在遭受不平等性恶化和腐败潜规则的问题。


But, for those wealthy economies, restoring decent growth is now the major priority.	但是，对富国来说，重建漂亮的经济增长才是当务之急。


Emerging markets have a golden opportunity to build on their economic gains and lock in growth and stability by tackling deep-seated problems like corruption.	新兴市场正面临着黄金机会，可以通过解决腐败等深层次问题来最大程度地汲取经济利益、锁定增长和稳定。


As the past year’s events have shown, the costs of inaction could be calamitous.	去年发生的一系列事件表明，不作为的代价是沉重的。


A Climate Deal is Not Enough	仅一个气候协议还不足够


AMSTERDAM – During the COP15 climate summit in Copenhagen, world leaders have been negotiating the future of our planet. All the signs suggest that they are unlikely to sign a global climate treaty.	阿姆斯特丹 ——


The politicians, civil servants, and other participants at the Copenhagen summit have mainly been bombarding each other with numbers.	在本次哥本哈根气候大会上，世界各国的领导人们正在讨论我们未来的命运。


Figures on how much various countries should reduce CO2 emissions, the amount of money they should put up in coming years, the exact nature of their responsibilities, how much temperature increase Earth will be able to endure, and how long we can continue to wait.	所有迹象都显示，他们不可能签署一个全球性的气候条约。 不同的观点，不同的工业化进程，不同的政治联盟，各国之间彼此有太多的分歧。


These are all very important issues.	会议期间，政客，公务员和其他参会者各自引用不同的数字相互攻击。


But the mere figures are simply not enough. A different approach to the problem of climate change is needed.	这些数字包括：不同减排的标准，应该投入的资金，目前各国准确的排放量，地球所能承受的温度升幅，以及我们还能等待多久。


The climate issue can only be solved on the basis of shared, deeply felt ethical principles.	这些都是重要的话题，但光有数字还不足够。


Humanity has reached a critical moment in Earth’s history, at which peoples and nations will have to recognize their solidarity – with each other and with the Earth – and start acting upon it.	我们应该另辟蹊径，找到解决气候问题的新方法。


Similar to the way world leaders adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration in September 2000, and embraced the resulting Millennium Development Goals, today’s climate negotiators will have to commit themselves to creating a basis of shared fundamental ethical principles.	只有大家深深感到，对社会责任拥有共同承担的义务，气候问题才能解决。 人类已经走到了一个历史关键时刻，所有的国家和民众必须团结起来


Such a basis is not hard to find.	首先，我们应该接受 2000 年 9 月的联合国千年宣言，实现当时制定的共同发展目标。 这些的共同点并不难找。


Its inspiration can be the Earth Charter, which, launched in 2000, was initiated by, among others, former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and Wangari Mathaai, who received the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts in the Green Belt Movement, a pan-African tree-planting initiative.	由前苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫和旺加里 ‧ 马塔伊教授等发起的地球宪章就是很好的例子。 旺加里 ‧ 马塔伊积极发起了名为“绿带运动”的非洲植树活动， 2004 年因此获得诺贝尔和平奖。


The climate problem does not stop at borders.	气候问题不分国界。


In the next few decades, a low-lying country like the Netherlands will need to invest billions of euros to intensify its age-old struggle against rising water.	在今后的几十年里，一些低海拔的国家，例如荷兰，将投资数十亿美元，用于应对多年以来不断上涨的海平面。


But in many other countries, the water is already flooding over the dikes, both literally and figuratively.	而对其他一些国家而言，洪水实际行已经淹没了堤坝。 对于那些缺乏资金自救的国家尤其甚之。


Climate change affects particularly those countries that lack the money needed to take adequate measures against rising sea levels, persistent droughts, or devastating storms, even though they had nothing to do with the primary cause of these problems – industrialization in the developed countries.	它们无法应对不断上涨的海平面，持续的干旱和灾难性的风暴。 而这些国家往往不是工业化国家，无端成了气候问题的无辜受害者。


Apart from the necessary, often infrastructural adaptations to survive the effects of climate change, enormous efforts to prevent even worse things from happening are required.	除此之外，基础设施的改进等其他重大的举措也都十分必要。


Large investments in forestation, agriculture, and energy supply are called for.	我们必须在农林业和能源开发上投入巨额资金。


In devising solutions, the role of women should be the main focus.	妇女应该在其中担当重要角色。


Women are often the first people who have to address the problem of gaining access to natural resources, and they are capable of playing a major role as pioneers in finding solutions to climate change and the way humankind should adapt to it.	女性通常首先发现这些自然界问题，她们有能力承担起领导角色，找到解决人类生存问题的良方。


In the short term, the world should become a sustainable global society of low CO2 emitters.	简而言之，未来的世界应该是低碳可持续发展的社会。


This is a mission for all humankind, in which patriotic feelings and thinking in terms of power blocs have no place.	这是我们全人类的任务，狭隘的爱国主义和国家联盟的思维在这里没有市场。


The pursuit of a sustainable global society of low CO2 emitters requires a tremendous effort.	要想达到低碳可持续发展的社会，我们还需��做出巨大的努力。


Precisely for this reason, it also requires a broadly shared ethical basis.	这就要求我们有着共同的道德基础。


This would guide the negotiating parties in such a way that they look not only for solutions to a part of the problem, but first and foremost at a comprehensive solution to the entire problem.	这样才能避免片面的理解，找到一个对所有问题的全面性的解决方法。


The climate change issue is too important to be left in the care of politicians.	气候问题已不仅仅是政治领袖的事情。


In Copenhagen, it is therefore imperative that not only nation states, but the business community and citizens combine their efforts to save our planet’s climate. That is not only a scientific necessity; it is an ethical imperative.	在哥本哈根，不仅在国家层面，商界和市民社会也应该一起都行动起来，共同拯救我们的地球，这不仅仅是学术讨论，而是关乎道德层面的问题。


A Communist Party without Communism	没有共产主义的共产党


PRINCETON – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s anointment of Alexander Medvedev to succeed him in what is supposed to be a democratic presidential election next March shows that Russia’s leaders have not changed a whit.	普林斯顿--俄国总统普京钦点梅德韦捷夫在明年三月本应民主的总统选举后继承总统职位，这标明俄国领导人并未做出任何改变。


It looks increasingly likely that, as under Leonid Brezhnev, we will see the same names in the news for decades to come.	现在看来越发可能我们将会在今后几十年中见到同样的名字，正如在伯列日涅夫统治时期一样。


According to Gleb Pavlovsky, the Putin regime’s leading ideologist, the current Russian system is perfect in all respects but one: it doesn’t know its enemies.	普京政权的首席意识形态官员巴普洛夫斯基说，俄国目前的体制除了不知道其敌人是谁意外在各方面都完美无缺。


Indeed, it seems as if everyone in the Kremlin is reading Carl Schmitt, the Nazi legal theorist who taught that naming your enemy is the central mission of politics.	确实，看起来克里姆林宫的每个人都在阅读纳粹法学家施密特的著作。 施密特教诲说，指出你的敌人是政治的中心使命。


In the spirit of Schmitt, Putin’s men designated a liberal party, the Union of Right Forces, as their ur-enemy.	根据施密特的精神，普京的人马设计了一个自由派政党即右翼力量联盟作为他们的敌人。 该党的公开集会被武装警察驱散；


Its public meetings were broken up by armed police; its leaders arrested and beaten; Putin called its supporters “coyotes.”	其领导人被捕和遭到殴打； 普京把它的支持者们称为“小狼”。


What is surprising is that this aggressive behavior occurred in response to no visible danger.	令人惊讶的是，这一咄咄逼人的举动是在没有可以见到的危险的情况下发生的。


Oil prices are soaring, as are Putin’s approval ratings.	普京的支持率就像石油价格一样在上涨。


His appointees control everything that matters, from Gazprom to the Central Electoral Committee.	他所任命的官员控制所有重要部门，从俄国天然气石油公司到中央选举委员会。


Since the pacification of Chechnya with violence and subsidies, the incarceration or emigration of a few financially viable opponents, and the massive “social investments” of recent years, which, under Medvedev’s personal supervision, have bribed the population, no credible force can seriously challenge Putin’s men.	近年来用暴力和补贴平息车臣叛乱，拘捕和驱逐几个资金不菲的反对者并且最近几年在巴普洛夫斯基亲自监督下进行大幅度“社会投资”。 这一投资收买了俄国人民，没有令人信服的力量可以严重挑战普京的人马。


Yet their regime is in crisis, and they know it.	但是他们的政权处于危机之中，而且他们也知道这一点。


Russia’s economy is more dependent on gas and oil than ever before.	俄国经济现在比以往更为依赖于天然气和石油。


Military reform has been reversed.	军事改革已经逆转。


Despite increasing incomes, Russians are less educated and less healthy than they were when Putin came to power; they still die at a shockingly young age.	尽管收入增加，俄国人的教育和健康都不如普京刚刚掌权之时； 他们依旧过早去世。


Russian involvement in world affairs is tainted by poison and corruption.	俄国参与世界事务也是充斥着敌视和腐败。


State monopolies undo what private businesses created.	国家垄断把私有经济创造的东西化为乌有。


With more money, ill-educated bureaucrats hire more ill-educated bureaucrats; as a result, the regime fails to rule the country.	教育水平低下的官僚们有了更多的钱就任用更多的没文化的官僚。 结果，这一政权无法治理国家。


The country is unruly, and its rulers know it.	俄国混乱不堪，而其统治者们知道这一点。


So they panic.	所以他们就紧张不安。


Putin’s aim was to subject all power to the control of Russia’s security forces.	普京的目标是把所有的权力都归于俄国安全力量的控制之下。


His generation of KGB officers watched the collapse of the Communist Party and all the governmental bodies that it “directed and controlled,” including the KGB.	他的时代的克格勃官员目睹了共产党和及其“指导和控制”的所有政府机关的崩溃，包括克格勃在内。


Under Putin, the security service has had its revenge.	在普京统治下，安全力量进行报复。


Its people have become powerful, arrogant, and enormously rich.	它们的人马变得权力庞大、自负以及巨富。


They have also become disobedient.	他们也变得不停从调遣。


In 2004, General Viktor Cherkesov, then Putin’s representative in northwest Russia, published an essay that glorified the KGB as the only unspoiled authority in a corrupted country.	在2004年，当时担任普京驻俄国西北方代表的切尔克索夫将军发表文章，把克格勃美化成为腐败国家中唯一清廉的权力部门。


This essay, more than anything else, defined Putin’s second term.	这一文章要比任何东西都要确定普京的第二任期的性质。


In October 2007, Cherkesov (now chief of one of the most obscure and powerful services, the Federal Anti-Drug Administration) published another essay in which he lamented his colleagues’ degradation: warriors had turned into traders, he complained.	2007年10月，切尔克索夫(现在是最为不为人所知以及权力强大的部门联邦反毒品局局长)发表了另一篇文章，痛斥其同僚的堕落。 他抱怨说，武士变成了商人。


Earlier, generals from a competing service, the FSB, had arrested Cherkesov’s deputy for “illegal bugging.”	早先，与其争斗的联邦安全局的将军们因“非法窃听”逮捕了切尔克索夫的副手。


In a public gesture of despair, Cherkesov admitted the failure of Putin’s project to reanimate Russian governance by subordinating it to the security services.	切尔克索夫公开表示绝望，承认普京通过把俄国政府置于安全部门控制之下来创新振作政府是失败的。


Cherkesov’s deputy remains in prison.	切尔克索夫的副手还呆在牢里。


Most believe that Putin is unable to intervene in his defense.	大多数人相信普京无力干预为其辩护。


In the absence of Communist Party control, these security officers betrayed their corporate ethic and engaged in horse-trading, applying force when a trade did not go well.	在没有共产党控制的情况下，这些安全官员背叛了他们的企业伦理，参与交易，并且在交易不顺利的时候施加力量。


That this happens to ordinary Russians is clear; what Cherkesov revealed was that Putin’s circle also confronts this situation.	这发生在普通俄国人身上是明显的； 切尔克索夫揭露的是普京圈子里的人也对抗这一局面。


What is to be done when ex-KGB warriors turn their swords and bugs against one another?	当以前的克格勃人马自相残杀的时候该怎么办呢？


Cherkesov’s case exemplifies Putin’s nightmare.	切尔克索夫的情况就是普京恶梦的例子。


But if your instincts betray you, you go back to even deeper ones.	但是如果你的本能背叛你，你就会进入更深的本能。


Now that Putin’s people have left their predecessors’ neo-liberal ideas behind and feel disenchanted with the ex-KGB clique, the task is to recreate an omnipresent political party that controls the security services, the administration, business, and much else.	现在，普京的人马已经抛弃了其前任新自由派观点，并且对前克格勃的结党营私感到不满。 现在的任务就是创新组织一个控制安全部门、政府、商界以及更多其他东西的无处不在的政党。


This party will be centralized under personal leadership and will reduce the state to a legal fiction.	这一政党将是个人领导下的集权体系，并且把国家削弱为一个法律虚构而已。


Preaching nationalism, its managers will believe in their universal competence, as opposed to KGB-style professionalism and corporatism.	其主管们灌输民族主义，相信其无所不能，而不是克格勃风格的专业精神和社团主义。


Boris Yeltsin forbade party cells in state-controlled institutions by decree.	叶利钦通过命令禁止政党存在于国家控制机构之中。


Putin’s lawyers will reverse that decision; the party will have cells or committees in every factory, corporation, military unit, university department, etc.	普京的律师们将会推翻这一决定。 政党可以在任何工厂、公司、军事单位、大学院系等等拥有组织或者委员会。


Integrated by the leader’s charisma and party discipline, party members will direct and unify the desolated country.	党员将在领导人魅力和党纪的融合下指导和团结这一荒凉的国家。


This is Putin’s plan.	这就是普京的计划。


Like former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, the only other KGB man to rule Russia, Putin will become the party’s general secretary.	唯一的另一个统治俄国的克格勃是安德罗波夫。 普京像���一样将成为该党的总书记。


As in the Soviet era, state and governmental officials will be reduced to party ciphers – the role that President Medvedev will play under General Secretary Putin.	就像在苏联时期一样，国家和政府官员将会被变成党的暗号，这就是梅德韦捷夫总统在普京总书记领导下所扮演的角色。


And, of course, being General Secretary carries no constitutional term limit.	而且当然，总书记没有任期限制。


In the end, Putin has what history left him: not ideas, just a faction yearning to consolidate its grip on power.	最后，普京有的只是历史留给他的东西。 没有观念，只有渴望巩固权势的派系。


Lenin and Trotsky needed a party to make their ideology a reality; Putin and Medvedev are devising an ideology to solidify their party.	列宁和托洛斯基需要一个政党来把他们的意识形态变成现实； 普京和梅德韦捷夫则正在设计一个意识形态来巩固其政党。


It is a bizarre ideology.	这是一个奇怪的意识形态。


Accusing warriors of being traders and traders of being thieves, it shuns its Marxist origins.	把武士指责为商人，把商人指责为贼，它抛弃了共产主义本源。


It will subordinate all who really do work – traders, warriors, journalists, and others – to party ideologues whose sole job is to search for enemies.	它将把所有作实际工作的人，也就是商人、武士、记者以及其他人统统置于政党理论家之下，而这些理论家唯一的工作就是寻找敌人。


A Confederal Solution for Palestine	巴勒斯坦问题的联邦制解决方案


LONDON – Last month, while in New York City, I happened to be staying in the same hotel as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.	伦敦——上个月在纽约时，我碰巧与以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡同住在一家酒店。


To accommodate his security needs, the hotel had been converted into a fortress, much like Israel itself.	为照顾内塔尼亚胡的安全需要，这家酒店几乎被武装成一座堡垒，这与以色列本身颇有几份相似之处。


Netanyahu was in the United States for yet another round of Middle East peace talks.	内塔尼亚胡要在美国参加另一轮中东和平谈判。


The US offered various sweeteners to induce Israel to freeze its West Bank settlement construction for another 90 days.	美国开出种种优惠条件，目的是诱使以色列再冻结西岸定居点的建设九十天。


The Israelis refused; another impasse was reached.	以色列拒绝合作，谈判再度陷入僵持局面。


What, then, might be the prospects of a negotiated peace between two peoples with claims to the same land?	那么，对同一块土地提出领土要求的两群人究竟有着怎样的谈判前景？


The answer is: very poor.	答案只有一个： 谈判前景极其黯淡。


All peace efforts since the Oslo accords of 1993 have been based on the “two-state solution,” according to which Israel is supposed to turn over the occupied territories to a Palestinian state, the Palestinians are supposed to renounce any claims on the Jewish state, and everyone is supposed to live happily ever after.	1993年《奥斯陆协议》后所有的和平努力都以“两国制”为前提，在这样的前提下，以色列应该向巴勒斯坦国归还被占领土，而巴勒斯坦国则应承认犹太国家的主权，而后双方应该从此过上幸福的生活。


A negotiated “land for peace” solution still remains official Western doctrine.	通过谈判达成“以土地换和平”协议迄今仍是西方的主流理论。


As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in a recent speech, “a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace” has to be based on “two states for two peoples.”	正如美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿在最近一次讲话中提到的那样，“为两国人民分别建国”是实现“公正、持久、全面和平”的基础。


Meanwhile, the two main parties to the dispute, Palestine and Israel, are searching for unilateral alternatives to the stymied “peace process.”	与此同时，中东冲突的两大主体巴勒斯坦和以色列都在不停寻找阻碍“和平进程”的单方解决方案。


The Palestinians are pushing for international recognition of their statehood, while the Israelis are using their settlement policy to preempt a Palestinian state.	巴勒斯坦人不断要求国际社会承认其独立国家地位，而以色列则意图借助定居点政策抢先占领巴勒斯坦。


Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has said that, if the latest peace talks collapse, he will press for UN recognition of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.	巴勒斯坦总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯已经表示，如果最近一次和谈失败，他将敦促联合国以1967年边界为基础承认巴勒斯坦国。


This month, Brazil and Argentina recognized “Palestine,” and a cascade of Latin American countries is expected to follow.	巴西和阿根廷这个月承认了“巴勒斯坦”，预计将引发一连串拉美国家的纷纷仿效。


Abbas is now setting his sights on Europe, and would ask Turkey to serve as a go-between.	阿巴斯现在将目光钉住欧洲，并将要求土耳其扮演中间人的角色。


The game is to use international recognition of an independent Palestinian state to pressure the US to retreat from its almost unconditional support for Israeli policy.	其目的是利用国际舆论对独立巴勒斯坦国的承认向美国施压，迫使其改变几乎无条件支持以色列的政策。


Israel’s main concern continues to be security.	安全问题仍是以色列主要的关注目标。


The official Western doctrine is that Israel’s long-term security depends on the success of the “peace process.”	主流的西方理论仍然是以色列的长期安全取决于“和平进程”能否成功。


In practice, Israel has been taking other measures to secure its future.	事实上，以色列已经为保证未来安全采取了很多其他举措。


Media attention has been focused on the “security wall,” which has certainly succeeded in reducing the level of violence.	其中最受媒体关注的非“安全墙”莫属，这种方法确实有效减轻了暴力活动。


But, to the hawks who now control Israeli politics, the key to Israel’s security depends on depth of defense, for which expansion of the settlements is indispensable.	但在目前把持以色列政局的鹰派人物看来，以色列安全与否直接取决于防御深度，因此扩建定居点成为必不可少的一步。


The hawks’ recipe for survival is threefold: continued military and economic support from the US, defensible frontiers through a strategic settlement program, and the carve-up of the Palestinian West Bank into disconnected bantustans, or subordinate authorities, incapable of concerted opposition to Israeli policy.	鹰派提出了层层推进的三重生存计划： 继续争取美国的军事和经济支持、借助战略定居点计划修建可防御边界、以及将巴勒斯坦西岸地区割裂成互不相连的班图斯坦，或者是无力联合反对以色列政策的孤立政权。


Thus, while Abbas seeks to create a new “fact on the ground” by drumming up international support for a Palestinian state, Israel aims to trump him by making such a state unviable.	于是，在阿巴斯争取对巴勒斯坦国的国际支持，力求制造“既成事实”的同时，以色列的克敌之道则是釜底抽薪，让建立巴勒斯坦国的愿望不可能实现。


The ideal alternative to both strategies is a peace process that aims not to create two states, but rather to establish the political and economic basis for a single confederal state.	不追求两个国家、而建立拥有统一政治经济制度的联邦制国家才是上述两种战略的理想替代方案。


Indeed, the two-state solution was always an illusion.	事实上，分别建国的解决办法从来都无法实现。


There was never enough land to satisfy the passionate possessiveness of all those with claims to it.	有限的土地资源从来无法满足各方强烈的占有��愿。


And, over time, Israeli settler disengagement from the West Bank and East Jerusalem has become just as impossible as any attempt by Israel to expel its remaining Arabs.	而且，随着时间一点一滴的流逝，让以色列定居者从西岸和东耶路撒冷地区撤离和从该地区驱逐剩余阿拉伯人的企图都已经无法实现。


Israeli Jews are bound to stay in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Israeli Arabs are bound to stay in Israel proper.	以色列犹太人注定要待在西岸和东耶路撒冷，而以色列阿拉伯人也注定要在以色列的本土上繁衍。


These are the “facts on the ground” that doom Palestinian hopes for a sovereign Palestinian state no less than Israeli hopes for a wholly Jewish state.	这就是“不得不面对的现实”，它打破了巴勒斯坦人独立建国的希望，而以色列人建立纯粹犹太国家的梦想也同样因此而破灭。


Moreover, land for peace never made sense from an economic point of view.	此外，从经济的角度讲，以土地换和平从来就是行不通的解决方案。


If compensation for wrongs to the Palestinians was to be the guiding principle, there were always better ways of going about it than to found a rickety, poverty-ridden new country dependent on foreign aid.	如果真的以补偿巴勒斯坦人所受的损失为解决问题的基本原则，那么总有比成立仰仗外国援助的贫困国家更好的办法来解决这场巴以冲突。


Most people have forgotten that the Paris Protocols of April 1994 established a customs union between Israel and the occupied territories, with a joint Economic Council to adjudicate trade disputes.	绝大多数人已经忘记1994年4月签订的《巴黎协议》建立了以色列和被占领土关税同盟，并规定由联合经济委员会负责对贸易纠纷做出裁决。


The free movement of goods, labor, and capital between the two parts could have given a tremendous economic boost to Palestinian GDP.	货物、劳工和资金的自由流动可以在很大程度上推动巴勒斯坦国内生产总值的发展。


It could also have been the basis of a confederal state, whose Palestinian part would have benefited from the West Bank settlers’ productivity and taxes.	这也可以成为建立联邦制国家的基础，西岸定居者的生产和纳税会帮助联邦制度下的巴勒斯坦方面。


But this benign prospect was undermined by the violence needed to maintain the Jewish state and enable the emergence of a Palestinian one.	但如此美好的前景却遭到以保护犹太国、成立巴勒斯坦国为目的的暴力的无情破坏。


The official view remains that only an internationally guaranteed two-state settlement will bring about the security needed for the economic revival of the Palestinian territories.	主流观点仍然坚持只有国际社会担保的两国解决方案才能确保巴勒斯坦地区经济复苏所必不可少的安全。


But it is just possible that unilateral Israeli policy, implicitly backed by the US, will create interim conditions of peace that are sufficient for economic growth to cool Palestinian nationalism.	但我们必须承认这种可能性，即受到美国暗中支持的以色列单边政策可以创造和平发展经济的临时条件，而经济的发展则能够熄灭巴勒斯坦民族主义的火焰。


The Palestinian cause is not the overriding preoccupation of even the Arab states, so Netanyahu’s strategy of defense in depth stands a better chance of success than Abbas’s pursuit of statehood through international recognition.	巴勒斯坦解放事业甚至谈不上阿拉伯国家压倒一切的当务之急，因此内塔尼亚胡的深度防御策略比阿巴斯博取国际承认的建国策略取得成功的机会更大。


Netanyahu’s project is not moral.	内塔尼亚胡的计划不合乎道德原则。


But that doesn’t mean that it won’t work, at least for a time.	但这并不意味着这项计划不会取得至少某种短期效果。


A Confederation for Kosovo	为科索沃建立邦联


Time is running out in Kosovo.	留给科索沃的时间已经越来越少了。


If a United Nations-backed settlement is not reached by early December, the province’s majority Albanian population is likely to declare independence unilaterally – a move that the United States has announced it may support.	如果一项由联合国支持的解决方案在十二月初不能出台，那么在这个省占多数的阿尔巴尼亚族很可能会单方面宣布独立。 美国曾表示会支持这一举动。


That would be a disastrous step.	那将是一个灾难性的举动。


Russia would be furious, because it fears that Kosovo’s secession – whether or not it is internationally recognized – might fuel separatist movements in the former Soviet empire.	俄罗斯会震怒，因为它担心科索沃一旦分离，不管是否为国际所承认，都会进一步引发前苏联帝国内部主张独立的运动。


Serbia is even more strongly opposed.	塞尔维亚甚至会更激烈地表示反对。


Dusan Prorokovic, Serbia’s state secretary for Kosovo, has said that his country might use force to maintain its sovereignty.	塞尔维亚负责科索沃问题的国务秘书普罗洛科维奇曾表示他的国家可能会动用武力来维护他的主权。


Even if the government hesitates, ultranationalist groups might push Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica to send in troops: the current UN presence in Kosovo is very thin (only 40 “military observers” and 2,116 policemen) but the stationing of 15,000 NATO troops could make any armed clash very dangerous.	即便政府会在这个问题上犹豫不决，极端民族主义团体也可能会迫使总理科什图尼察派出军队。 联合国目前在科索沃的军事力量非常薄弱（只有40个“军事观察员”和2116名警察），但是在那里驻扎15000名北约军队也许会使任何的武装冲突变得非常危险。


After eight years of international administration, Kosovo’s Albanian majority has tasted freedom and is eager for full independence.	在经过八年的国际管制后，科索沃占据多数的阿尔巴尼亚族已经尝到了自由的味道，并且渴望完全独立。


But Serbia claims that the province remains an essential part of its historical and cultural tradition.	但是塞尔维亚宣称，这个省从历史和文化传统上都是它的一个重要部分。


Moreover, independence would not be accepted by the Serbian public, which has already watched in dismay as “Great Serbia” has been gradually whittled away, most recently with the secession of Montenegro.	此外，独立也不能为塞尔维亚的公众所接受，他们已经眼睁睁地看着“大塞尔维亚”一点点地在缩小，而最近是黑山共和国分离。


Serbia is prepared to concede only “enhanced autonomy” to Kosovo, and some capacity to enter into international agreements.	塞尔维亚已经准备给予科索沃只会“得到增强的自治权”，以及部分签定国际协约的地位。


Yet, while the two parties now seem irreconcilable, it is not too late for compromise.	然而，尽管这两方看上去似乎无法调和，要取得妥协现在还为时不晚。


But this is possible only by resuscitating – and updating – an old institution of the international community: a confederation of states.	但是这只有通过复苏以及更新一个国际社会的旧的机制，也就是多国邦联才有可能实现。


By means of a binding UN Security Council resolution, Kosovo could be granted full and exclusive authority over its citizens and territory, as well as limited capacity for action on the international scene.	通过有约束力的联合国安理会决议，科索沃可以被授予对其公民和领土全面和唯一的管辖权，以及在国际层面采取行动的有限权力。


It could be authorized to enter into trade agreements as well as agreements concerning individuals (for example, admission and circulation of foreigners, or extradition), plus the right to seek admission to the UN (which does not require full sovereignty and independence).	可以允许其签署贸易协议以及与个人相关的协议（比如，允许外国人入境及在其境内活动，或者引渡），以及寻求加入联合国的权利（联合国并不要求完全的主权和独立）。


Kosovo would thus gain some essential trappings of statehood.	科索沃将因此获得某些表明国家地位的重要外部标志。


However, a decision-making body consisting of delegates from Kosovo, Serbia, and the European Union would be given full authority over major foreign policy issues (for example, alliances and relations with international economic institutions), defence, borders (in case Kosovo wished to join with Albania), and the treatment of Kosovo’s Serbian minority.	然而，一个由科索沃、塞尔维亚和欧盟代表组成的决策机构将全权处理重大的外交政策事宜（比如，与国际经济组织的结盟及关系）、防务、边界（如果科索沃想加入阿尔巴尼亚的话）以及处理科索沃境内塞尔维亚少数民族的问题。


As a result, Kosovo and Serbia would constitute two distinct international subjects, bound by a confederation hinging on a common decision-making body.	其结果是，科索沃和塞尔维亚将组成两个不同的国际主体，捆绑在由一个共同决策机构将其连接起来的邦联体下。


Of course, this confederation would be asymmetrical, because the Serbian government’s sovereignty over the rest of Serbia would remain intact and unlimited, whereas the Kosovar government’s “sovereignty” over Kosovo would be restrained.	当然，这个同盟体是不对称的，因为塞尔维亚政府对塞尔维亚其他部分的主权不会受到影响和限制，而科索沃政府对科索沃的“主权”会受到约束。


To avoid one of the two parties getting the upper hand and imposing arbitrary decisions, the common decision-making body should consist of four Serbian delegates, two Kosovar delegates, and three representatives of the EU, thus requiring both sides to gain the support of the European delegates.	为避免两方的任何一方占据上风而强行通过专横的决定，这个共同决策机构将由四名来自塞尔维亚的代表、两名来自科索沃的代表和三名来自欧盟的代表组成，这样就需要两方都要获得欧盟代表的支持。


In addition, the EU should create a small but effective military force (say, 5,000 troops) to back up the common body’s decisions.	此外，欧盟应该建立一支小但却有效的军事力量（比如说，5000人的部队）来支持共同决策机构所做出的决定。


As with any compromise, the contending parties would both gain and lose from this arrangement.	像任何妥协一样，参与的各方在这一安排中都会有所得也有所失。


Serbia would save face, and would continue to have a say on crucial matters concerning Kosovo, including the treatment of the Serbian minority.	塞尔维亚会保全脸面，并且将继续对有关科索沃的重大问题、包括科索沃的塞尔维亚少数民族的问题拥有话语权。


Kosovo would acquire limited independence, with its status rising from a province of a sovereign state to an international subject capable of entering into certain agreements with other states and even joining the UN.	科索沃会获得有限的独立，它的地位将从一个主权国家的省上升到一个能够与其他国家签署某种协定、甚至加入联合国的国际主体。


The EU would benefit as well, by contributing to the stabilization of a highly volatile area.	通过给一个高度动荡的地区注入稳定，欧盟也会同样从中受益。


Subsequently, the EU would monitor Kosovo and prevent any dispute that might turn violent.	其结果是，欧盟将会监管科索沃，并且防止任何可能会引发暴乱的争端发生。


A final advantage of this solution is that it would be temporary.	这一解决方案的最后一点好处是它会是临时性的。


Historically, confederations sooner or later either become federations (as occurred in the US, Germany, and Switzerland) or, pushed by centrifugal forces, split up (as with the United Arab Republic, established in 1958, which split three years later into Egypt and Syria).	在历史上，邦联早晚都会变成联邦（就像在美国、德国和瑞士发生的那样），或者在离心力的推动下，分裂开（就像1958年建立的阿拉伯联合共和国，它在三年后分裂成了埃及和叙利亚）。


The confederation I advocate would thus constitute an intermediate stage (lasting five or ten years), at the end of which Kosovo is likely to become fully independent.	我所提倡的这个邦联因此将是一个中间步骤（延续5到10年时间），在这一阶段最后科索沃可能会完全独立。


Delaying a final solution in this way would provide time to verify Kosovo’s prospects of joining the EU and thus eventually sharing “sovereign authority” with other independent states, which could deflate Kosovars’ dangerously robust nationalistic demands.	以这种方式延后一个最终的解决方案可以为验证科索沃加入欧盟的前景从而最终享有与其他独立国家同等的“主权权力”提供时间，也可以给科索沃危险的高涨的建立国家的要求降降温。


A Cool Calculus of Global Warming	全球变暖的成本计算


The British government recently issued the most comprehensive study to date of the economic costs and risks of global warming, and of measures that might reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in the hope of averting some of the direst consequences.	英国政府最近发布了迄今为止关于全球变暖的经济成本和风险最为全面的研究报告，并提出了可能减少温室气体排放的措施，希望藉此避免一些最可怕的后果。


Written under the leadership of Sir Nicholas Stern of the London School of Economics, who succeeded me as Chief Economist of the World Bank, the report makes clear that the question is no longer whether we can afford to do anything about global warming, but whether we can afford not to.	这份报告在继任世界银行首席经济学家的，伦敦经济学院尼古拉斯▪斯特恩爵士的主持下完成。 它明确指出问题的关键不在于我们是否能够负担得起应对全球变暖的措施，而在于我们是否能够承受无所作为的后果。


The report proposes an agenda whose cost would be equivalent to just 1% of annual consumption, but would save the world risk equivalent costs that are five times greater.	该报告提出的计划其成本只等于年消费的1%，但却能为世界节省5倍的风险等价成本。


The reported costs of global warming are higher than in earlier studies because it takes into account the mounting evidence that the process of global warming is highly complex and non-linear, with a non-negligible chance that it may proceed much faster than had previously been thought and that the extent of warming may be much greater than had previously been thought.	所报告的全球变暖成本比早先的研究中提出的要高，那是因为它将越来越多的新证据考虑在内，比如全球变暖是一个高度复杂且非线性的过程。 一种不可忽视的可能性是它发生的速度比我们先前想象的要快，而且变暖的程度也比我们先前想象的要高。


Indeed, the study may actually significantly underestimate the costs: for instance, climate change may lead to more weather variability, a possible disappearance or major shift of the Gulf Stream – of particular concern to Europe – and a flourishing of disease.	的确，这项研究实际上很可能还大大低估了相关成本：例如，气候变化会引起天气的更大可变性，可能造成墨西哥湾暖流的变化消失—欧洲特别担心的问题—并引发大量的疾病。


When I served in 1995 on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the scientific group that periodically assesses the science of global warming, there was overwhelming evidence that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere had increased markedly since the beginning of the industrial revolution, that human activity had contributed significantly to those increases, and that they would have profound effects on climate and sea levels.	当我在1995年任职于“政府间气候变化专门委员会”（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change），这个定期对全球变暖的科学研究进行评估的科学机构时，有令人震惊的证据表明温室气体在大气中的集中程度自工业革命开始已经显著增加。 还有证据表明人类活动在很大程度上造成了这种集中。


But few saw, for instance, the Artic ice cap melting as rapidly as now seems to be the case.	温室气体集中度的增加会对气候和海平面产生强烈的影响。 但几乎没有人认识到北极冰盖以现在的速度融化也与此有关。


Still, some suggest that because we are not certain about how bad global warming will be, we should do little or nothing.	可仍然有人建议说由于还不清楚全球变暖的情况究竟有多严重，我们应该静观其变甚至无所作为。


To me, uncertainty should make us act more resolutely today, not less.	在我看来，不确定性应该使我们今天更坚定地采取行动。


As one scientist friend puts it: if you are driving on a mountain road, approaching a cliff, in a car whose brakes may fail, and a fog bank rolls in, should you drive more or less cautiously?	正如我的一个科学家朋友所说：如果你在一条山路上开车，驶向一处悬崖，而汽车的制动系统可能有问题，又正逢山雾弥漫，你应该开得更谨慎还是更随意呢？


Global warming is one of those rare instances where the scientific community is more fearful of what may be happening than the population at large.	全球变暖是少数几个令科学界比令大众更担心的问题。


Scientists have glimpsed what the future may portend.	科学家们已经窥见了未来。


As the Stern report points out, as usual, the poor are the most vulnerable.	正如斯特恩的报告中所指出，和很多情况下一样穷国是最脆弱的。


A third of Bangladesh will be underwater by the end of this century.	到本世纪末孟加拉国三分之一的国土会被海水淹没。


The Maldives and a host of Pacific Island states will disappear: our twenty-first-century Atlantis.	马尔代夫和一些太平洋岛国会消失：成为我们二十一世纪的亚特兰蒂斯。


To an economist, the problem is obvious: polluters are not paying the full costs of the damage they cause.	对于一位经济学家而言，问题是明显的：污染的制造者们没有为自己造成的破坏完全买单。


Pollution is a global externality of enormous proportions.	污染是一项比例巨大的全球性外部因素。


The advanced countries might mean Bangladesh and the disappearing island states no harm, but no war could be more devastating.	发达国家可能并非有意危害孟加拉国和那些正在消失的岛国，但即便是战争也没有这样的破坏力。


A global externality can best be dealt with by a globally agreed tax rate.	应对一项全球性外部因素的最佳方式是通过一个全球认同的税率。


This does not mean an increase in overall taxation, but simply a substitution in each country of a pollution (carbon) tax for some current taxes.	这并不是意味着总体税收的增加，而仅仅是在每一个国家以一项污染（碳）税取代现有的某些税种。


It makes much more sense to tax things that are bad, like pollution, than things that are good, like savings and work.	对污染这样的不良现象征税比对储蓄和工作等良好的事物征税更有道理。


Although President George W. Bush says he believes in markets, in this case he has called for voluntary action.	虽然布什总统声称他相信市场的作用，但在这一问题上他还是呼吁自发的行动。


But it makes far more sense to use the force of markets – the power of incentives – than to rely on goodwill, especially when it comes to oil companies that regard their sole objective as maximizing profits, regardless of the cost to others.	但更为明智的做法的利用市场的力量—激励机制的力量—而不是依靠善意，特别是当情况涉及那些将利益最大化作为唯一目标而不顾其行为对他人的影响的石油公司。


Exxon has reportedly been funding so-called think tanks to undermine confidence in the science of global warming, just as the tobacco industry funded “research” to question the validity of statistical findings showing the link between smoking and cancer.	据报道埃克森公司对一些所谓的“智库”提供支持以削弱公众对全球变暖的科学的信心，正如烟草工业资助质疑吸烟与癌症之间的联系的“研究”一样。


Some companies even seem to celebrate the melting of the polar ice cap, because it will reduce the cost of extracting the oil that lies beneath the Arctic Ocean.	有些公司甚至似乎在庆祝极地冰盖的融化，因为这会降低它们在北冰洋开采石油的成本��


The good news is that there are many ways by which improved incentives could reduce emissions – partly by eliminating the myriad of subsidies for inefficient usages.	好消息是我们有很多办法可以通过改善后的激励机制减少（温室气体的）排放—其中一个办法是取消对低效使用能源的种种补贴。


The US subsidizes corn-based ethanol, and imposes tariffs on sugar-based ethanol; hidden in the tax code are billions of dollars of subsidies to the oil and gas industries.	美国对用玉米为原料制备的乙醇提供补贴，而却对以糖为原料的乙醇征收关税，被这一税则掩盖的是对石油和天然气工业的巨额补贴。


Most importantly, price signals that show the true social costs of energy derived from fossil fuels will encourage innovation and conservation.	最为重要的是，显示来自化石燃料的能源所造成的真实成本的价格信号会鼓励创新和节能。


Small changes in practices, when replicated by hundreds of millions of people, can make an enormous difference.	日常行为的小小改变如果被成千上万的人实践就能扭转局面。


For example, simply changing the color of roofs in warm climates to reflect sunlight or planting trees around houses can lead to great savings on energy used for air conditioning.	例如，仅仅改变气候温暖的地区的房屋顶部颜色以反射阳光，或在房屋周围植树就能实现空调耗能的大量节省。


We have but one planet, and should treasure it.	我们只有一个地球，我们应该珍爱它。


Global warming is a risk that we simply cannot afford to ignore anymore.	全球变暖是一个我们无论如何都不能再忽视的风险。


A Cool Head for the Hottest Issues	每临大事有静气


LONDON – Reading Barack Obama’s Dreams from My Father , the US president’s beautifully written reflections on his early life and identity, most people are struck by his cool and intellectual approach.	发自伦敦 —— 当读到《我父亲的梦想》这本美国总统奥巴马用优美的文笔叙述自己早年生活以及个人身份定位的自传时，许多人都会惊讶于他那种冷静而理智的做事方式。


This is not to say that he is unemotional.	但这并不是说奥巴马就是个毫无感情的人。


Obama can rage and weep.	他这个人可以表现得狂野暴躁，有时也会软弱无力。


But he rarely seems to act on the basis of raw sentiment or instinctive prejudice.	但奥巴马似乎很少由着自己不加掩饰的情感或者本能的偏见行事。


Pragmatic and highly intelligent, sooner or later every issue receives the full attention of his forensic curiosity.	得益于他的务实和睿智，所有事物迟早都会被奥巴马仔细研究和审视。


Recalling Hillary Clinton’s famous Democratic primary television advertisement, Obama, it turns out, is exactly the sort of president that most of us would want to have in the post for that 3 a.m. phone call about an international crisis.	再回想到希拉里 · 克林顿在民主党总统初选时发布的著名电视广告，每个人都会毫不犹豫地认为奥巴马就是他们所期望的那个能在凌晨 3 点钟拿起电话处理国际危机的总统。


He would not be afraid to act, but he would be prepared to think first.	在行动面前他从不缩手缩脚，但在此之前，他必会三思。


I do not think, therefore, that Obama will be too vexed by some of the criticism he faces at the end of his first year in office, though he will undoubtedly grimace at the defeat of the Democratic candidate in the special election in Massachusetts to fill Ted Kennedy’s old seat.	因此我觉得奥巴马大概也不会被自己第一任任期即将结束时所面临的种种批评所困扰，虽然他肯定会对马萨诸塞州因泰德 · 肯尼迪参议员过世而举行的特别选举中民主党候选人的落马而感到有点恼火。 一年之前，这位总统承受了过度的赞誉；


Obama was praised extravagantly a year ago; 12 months on, the criticism is over the top, too.	如今 12 个月过去了，他所背负的批评自然也会登峰造极。


Obama inherited a terrible legacy – recession, financial meltdown, Iraq, Afghanistan. He has not solved all of these problems.	奥巴马继承的是一笔非常糟糕的遗产 —— 经济衰退，财政崩溃，伊拉克，还有阿富汗。


But it is difficult to see any really bad mistakes, except perhaps allowing himself to be pushed around by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and giving China the impression that he was prepared for a bilateral relationship entirely on China’s terms.	他还未能解决上述所有问题，然而除了允许自己任由以色列总理内塔尼亚胡摆布，以及令中国人相信他正在照中国的意思构建一个新的中美双边关系之外，似乎也没有出什么大的纰漏。


That seems to be changing now.	但事情如今也有了转机。


Obama may have come to understand that when you are the leader of the world’s only superpower, you need to be feared just a little if you are to be respected.	奥巴马可能会意识到，当自己是世界唯一超级大国的领袖时，如果想得到人们的尊敬，就得至少要让别人有点害怕你。


The left in America criticizes Obama for not turning the economy around already.	美国左派批评奥巴马至今没有令经济完全复苏。


The right angrily denounces him as a crypto-communist because he wants every American to have health care.	右派则愤怒地宣称他是个共党地下党员，因为他试图令每个美国人都享受医疗保险。


With a dispassionate eye on the long game, what will the president himself be thinking?	但不知道这位用平和的心态去看待这个漫长过程的总统，自己又在琢磨些什么呢？


One issue that Obama is certain to have in his sights is a problem that shadowed the world for years.	对此，奥巴马肯定会考虑的一个问题就是那个笼罩了世界多年的阴影。


When I was growing up in the 1950’s and 1960’s, world peace was based on the nuclear standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main strategic assessment on both sides of the Berlin Wall was that if either side made a wrong move, all of us might end up consumed in the flames of a nuclear holocaust.	在我成长的那个


We have forgotten those days.	如今人们已经淡忘了那些年月。


Yet there are still 23,000 nuclear warheads on our planet, with the explosive power of 150,000 Hiroshima bombs.	但这个星球上依然有 2 万 3 千枚核弹头，破坏力相当于 15 万枚广岛原子弹。


Terrorist groups would undoubtedly like to get their hands on one.	而那些恐怖组织也肯定很想搞到其中的一两枚。


In all, there are eight nuclear-weapon states – the US, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan.	世界上总共有 8 个核武国家 —— 美、俄、英、法、中，还有印巴两国以及以色列。


North Korea may also have a few bombs. Iran is believed by many to be trying to develop one.	朝鲜可能也有几枚原子弹，很多人也相信伊朗正在努力发展核武器。


Other states, which have their own civil nuclear capacity, have the potential to develop a weapon. The number of countries in this category is bound to increase as the number of nuclear power reactors doubles over the next 20 years.	其它拥有民用核技术的国家也有制造原子弹的潜力，而这些国家正计划在未来 20 年内将核反应堆的数量增加一倍。


The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has contained the number of nuclear states.	《核不扩散条约》文本中列明的核国家数目已经过时。


A conference is to be held in May to renew and review it.	因此将在今年五月召开一个会议对条约重新进行审议和修订。


Obama clearly recognizes that the NPT needs to be strengthened in order to prevent countries from turning their civil nuclear-power capacity into weapons.	奥巴马清楚地明白到必须加强这一条约，否则就难以阻止那些拥有民用核技术的国家将自己的科技转化为杀人武器。


But Obama also knows that if the existing nuclear states want others to accept tougher restrictions, they will have to cut back their nuclear arsenals. This is principally an issue for the US and Russia, which possess 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons.	但奥巴马也同时意识到，如果现有的核武国家希望其他国家接受更严格的管制，他们就必须削减自己的核武器数量。


In addition, it would help if the US could take a strong lead by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	而这主要是美俄两家的事情，因为两国手中握有占全世界总量


The nuclear issue is one of the biggest items on the Obama agenda. How it is handled will help to define his presidency.	核问题是奥巴马众多议程中的其中一个重中之重。


Even before the talking gets serious in May, there will be the question of Iran to sort out.	而如何处理这个问题甚至将决定人们对他总统任期的评价。


Iran says that it seeks no more than its own ability to produce nuclear power.	即便在五月进行正式谈判之前，伊朗的问题也亟待解决。


Disbelief grows with every revelation of secret Iranian facilities and plans, and with every refusal by Iran to negotiate safeguards that would allow for civil use while preventing weaponization.	随着伊朗秘密核设施和反应堆的不断曝光，以及德黑兰当局不断拒绝旨在保证核设施民用而非武器化的国际监察，不信任的情绪正与日俱增 .


The US, the European Union, and Russia have tried to engage Iran on this issue, so far without success.	在这个问题上，美国，欧盟和俄罗斯都在努力和伊朗接触，但至今都无功而返。


China seems likely to block effective sanctions on Iran because of its close energy relationship with the country.	中国似乎出于两国之间紧密的能源关系考虑，希望阻止对伊朗进行有效制裁。


How China eventually handles this will profoundly affect its standing in the US and Europe.	而中国最终如何处理这个问题将深远地影响其在美国和欧洲心目中的形象。


These are going to be some of the major questions for Obama over the next year and more.	而上述就几个是奥巴马在今后几年中所需要面对的主要问题。


If he gets them right, he can forget about his short-term critics.	如果处理得漂亮，他就能把这些短期内的批评置诸脑后。


Fortunately, he is smart enough to know this.	幸运的是，他足够聪明，肯定会意识到这一点。


A Crisis in Full Flight	大逃亡危机


MUNICH – For a while, it looked as if the European Central Bank’s €1 trillion credit program to pump liquidity into Europe’s banking system had calmed global financial markets.	慕尼黑—曾经有那么一段时间，看上去欧洲央行向欧洲银行系统注资1万亿欧元信用以提振流动性的计划已让金融市场平静下来。


But now interest rates for Italian and Spanish government bonds are on the rise again, closing in on about 6%.	但眼下，意大利和西班牙国债利率再次开始上升，正在向6%靠近。


Of course, this may not be the breaking point beyond which the debt burden becomes unsustainable.	当然，这或许并不是债务负担变得不可持续的临界点。


After all, interest rates in Southern Europe were well above 10% in the decade before the euro was introduced.	毕竟，南欧国家的利率在欧元引入前要大大高于10%。


Even Germany at that time had to pay bondholders more than 6%.	即使是德国，当时也必须向债权人支付6%的利息。


Nevertheless, the markets are clearly signaling growing doubt about whether Spain and Italy will be willing to bear their debt burden.	尽管如此，市场清楚地标明，对西班牙和意大利是否愿意承担债务负担的疑虑正在与日俱增。


The main problem is Spain, where private and public-sector foreign debt is larger than that of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy combined, and, as in Greece, is in the neighborhood of 100% of GDP (93% to be precise).	主要的问题是西班牙，它的公私债务比希腊、葡萄牙、爱尔兰和意大利加起来还要多，已经达到了GDP的近100%（确切地说，是93%），与希腊相仿佛。


A quarter of the labor force and half of Spain’s youth are unemployed, reflecting the country’s loss of competitiveness in the wake of the real-estate bubble inflated by cheap euro credit in the pre-crisis period.	四分之一的西班牙人口和一半年轻人没有工作，这表明危机之前由便宜的欧元信用引起的地产泡沫导致该国竞争力的流失。


The current-account deficit remains at 3.5% of GDP, despite the recession-induced decline in imports, while economic contraction will cause Spain to miss its budget-deficit target again.	经常项目赤字相当于GDP的3%，这还是衰退导致进口大幅下降情况下的数字； 而经济收缩将使西班牙再次脱离预算赤字目标。


Moreover, Spain’s debt with the ECB’s TARGET settlement system rose by €55 billion ($72 billion) between February and March, because capital outflows of that amount had to be compensated.	此外，今年2月—3月，西班牙在欧洲央行“目标”（TARGET）清算系统中的债务增加了550亿欧元（相对于720亿美元），这是因为大规模资本外流需要获得补偿。


Since July 2011, Spain’s TARGET debt has grown by €199 billion.	2011年7月以来，西班牙的“目标”系统债务增加了1990亿欧元。


Capital is in full flight, more than offsetting the inflows from 2008-2010.	资本蜂拥而出，比2008—2010年的流入量还要多。


The cumulative total since the beginning of the first crisis year (2008) means that Spain has financed its entire current-account deficit via the printing press.	从危机爆发首年（2008）以来的累计总量看，西班牙的全部经常项目赤字都是通过印钞来融资的。


The picture is little better in Italy, where the current-account balance has swung from a surplus of around 2% of GDP to a 3%-of-GDP deficit over the last ten years.	意大利的情况要好一些，过去十年来经常项目收支在2%GDP盈余和3%GDP赤字之间波动。


The country’s TARGET debt grew by €76 billion from February to March, with the total since July 2011 reaching €276 billion.	今年2月—3月，意大利“目标”系统债务增加了760亿欧元，2011年7月以来的总额为2760亿欧元。


Italy, too, is being drained of capital; in fact, the flight of investors accelerated after the ECB’s liquidity injection.	意大利也面临着资本枯竭的问题； 事实上，投资者的外逃加速了欧洲央行的流动性注入。


It is now clear that the ECB itself has caused a large part of the capital flight from countries like Spain and Italy, because the cheap credit that it offered drove away private capital.	现在看来，显然欧洲央行自身压实资本从西班牙和意大利等国大量外逃的一大原因，因为它所提供的廉价信用驱走了私人资本。


The purpose of the ECB’s measures was to re-establish confidence and bring about a recovery of the inter-bank market.	欧洲央行行动的初衷是重塑信心并让银行间市场复苏。


In this, too, it has not really been successful, despite the huge amount of money that it put on the table.	但这个目的同样没有达到，尽管它抛出了巨额资金。


Indeed, now the French are looking wobbly.	事实上，现在法国看上去也开始动摇了。


As capital fled the country between July 2011 and January 2012, France’s TARGET debt increased by €95 billion.	2011年7月至2012年1月，资本从法国逃出，该国“目标”系统债务增加了950亿欧元。


France, too, has become uncompetitive, owing to the cheap credit brought by the euro in its initial years.	使用欧元最初几年的便宜信用同样拖累了法国的竞争力。


According to a recent study by Goldman Sachs, the country’s price level must drop by an estimated 20% vis-à-vis the euro average – that is, depreciate in real terms – if the economy is to regain competitiveness within the eurozone.	高盛公司最新研究称，据估算，法国价格水平必须较欧元平均水平下跌20%——即实际贬值——才能让法国重新获得欧元区内的竞争力。


Italy will have to depreciate by 10-15%, and Spain by roughly 20%.	意大利必须贬值10%—15%，西班牙必须贬值约20%。


While Greece and Portugal face the need for deflation totaling 30% and 35%, respectively, the figures for Spain and Italy are high enough to justify fears about the future development of the eurozone.	希腊和葡萄牙所需贬值幅度分别为30%和35%，但西班牙和意大利的数字之高已足以引起人们对欧元区未来的担忧。


These imbalances can be redressed only with great effort, if at all, and only if one accepts a decade of stagnation.	这些失衡唯有通过付出巨大努力才能消除，而且必须接受长达十年的停滞。


For Greece and Portugal, staying in the eurozone will be a tight squeeze.	对希腊和葡萄牙来说，留在欧元区内将是活受罪。


There are many who would solve the problem by routing more and more cheap credit through public channels – bailout funds, eurobonds, or the ECB – from the eurozone’s healthy core to the troubled South.	对许多人来说，解决问题之道就是通过公共渠道（援助基金、欧元债券或欧洲央行）由欧元区坚挺核心国向疲软南欧国提供更多更便宜的信用。


But this would unfairly force savers and taxpayers in the core countries to provide capital to the South on terms to which they would never voluntarily agree.	但这对核��国的储蓄者和纳税人是不公平的，他们向南欧提供资本，所能获得的回报太低，他们不会自愿接受。


Already German, Dutch, and Finish savings amounting to €15,000, €17,000, and €21,000, respectively, per working person have been converted from marketable investments into mere equalization claims against the ECB.	德国、荷兰和芬兰的工作者人均分别有15000、17000和21000欧元储蓄由可交易投资变成了一视同仁的欧洲央行债权。


No one knows what these claims will be worth in the event of a eurozone breakup.	如果欧元区崩溃，没人知道这笔债权能有多大价值。


Above all, however, the permanent public provision of cheap credit would ultimately lead to a lingering infirmity, if not to Europe’s economic collapse, because the eurozone would become a central management system with state control over investment.	不过，最大的问题是，廉价信用的持续注入最终会导致旷日持久的虚弱（如果欧洲经济部崩盘的话），因为欧元区将沦为一个中央管理系统，而投资掌控权则在国家手里。


Such systems cannot work, because they eliminate the capital market as the economic system’s main steering mechanism.	这样一个系统是无法运作的，因为它剥夺了资本市场作为经济系统主要导航机制的地位。


One cannot help but wonder how thoughtlessly Europe’s politicians have started down this slippery slope.	留给人们的只能是无尽的迷惑：无脑的欧洲政客为什么会选择走这样一条黑路。


A Crisis in Two Narratives	一个危机，两种解读


CHICAGO – With the world’s industrial democracies in crisis, two competing narratives of its sources – and appropriate remedies – are emerging.	芝加哥—世界发达民主国家陷入了危机，关于什么是危机的源头以及如何补救，出现了两种相互对立的声音。


The first, better-known diagnosis is that demand has collapsed because of high debt accumulated prior to the crisis.	第一种为人所熟知的诊断是需求因为危机前积累的高债务而崩溃。


Households (and countries) that were most prone to spend cannot borrow any more.	最具支出倾向的家庭（以及国家）再也无法借到钱了。


To revive growth, others must be encouraged to spend – governments that can still borrow should run larger deficits, and rock-bottom interest rates should discourage thrifty households from saving.	为了重振增长，必须鼓励其他家庭和国家来支出——仍然能够借钱的政府应该扩大赤字，同时极低的利率应该阻止节约的家庭继续储蓄。


Under these circumstances, budgetary recklessness is a virtue, at least in the short term.	这种观点认为，粗犷的预算是一种美德，至少在短期看是如此。


In the medium term, once growth revives, debt can be paid down and the financial sector curbed so that it does not inflict another crisis on the world.	从中期看，只要增长能够得到提振，债务就能活得偿付，而金融部门得到了抑制，因此不会在世界上掀起另一场危机。


This narrative – the standard Keynesian line, modified for a debt crisis – is the one to which most government officials, central bankers, and Wall Street economists have subscribed, and needs little elaboration.	这种观点是标准的凯恩斯主义，只是根据债务危机做了些许修正。 该观点受到了大部分政府官员、中央银行和华尔街经济学家的支持，已无需再赘述了。


Its virtue is that it gives policymakers something clear to do, with promised returns that match the political cycle.	其优点在于向决策者明确指出了行动方向，还给出了符合政治周期的预期回报。


Unfortunately, despite past stimulus, growth is still tepid, and it is increasingly difficult to find sensible new spending that can pay off in the short run.	不幸的是，尽管已经实施了刺激措施，但增长仍然疲软，而且，从短期看，要找到给力的新支出之源越来越困难了。


Attention is therefore shifting to the second narrative, which suggests that the advanced economies’ fundamental capacity to grow by making useful things has been declining for decades, a trend that was masked by debt-fueled spending.	于是，人们的目光开始转移到第二种观点。 这种观点认为，发达经济体通过生产有用的东西获得增长的基本能力下滑已经持续了数十年之久了，其特征便是用债务来支撑支出。


More such spending will not return these countries to a sustainable growth path.	更多的同类支出无法给这些国家带来可持续的增长。


Instead, they must improve the environment for growth.	相反，它们必须改善增长环境。


The second narrative starts with the 1950’s and 1960’s, an era of rapid growth in the West and Japan.	第二种观点的着眼点始于20世纪五六十年代，当时正是西方和日本的高速增长期。


Several factors, including post-war reconstruction, the resurgence of trade after the protectionist 1930’s, the introduction of new technologies in power, transport, and communications across countries, and expansion of educational attainment, underpinned the long boom.	几大因素——包括战后重建、20世纪30年代保护主义风潮过去之后的贸易复兴、电力、运输和跨国通信方面的新技术，以及教育程度的改善——推动了长期繁荣。


But, as Tyler Cowen has argued in his book The Great Stagnation, once these “low-hanging fruit” were plucked, it became much harder to propel growth from the 1970’s onward.	但是，泰勒·柯万（Tyler Cowen）在其《大停滞》（The Great Stagnation）一书中指出，这些“低处的果实”被摘取殆尽后，进入20世纪70年代以来，提振增长就变得日益困难了。


Meanwhile, as Wolfgang Streeck writes persuasively in New Left Review, democratic governments, facing what seemed, in the 1960’s, like an endless vista of innovation and growth, were quick to expand the welfare state.	与此同时，沃尔夫冈·斯特里克（Wolfgang Streeck）在《新左翼评论》（New Left Review）中雄辩地写道，民主政府在20世纪60年代面临着看似永远光明的创新和增长前景，因此大踏步地进入了福利国家的行列。


But, when growth faltered, this meant that government spending expanded, even as its resources shrank.	但是，当增长开始放缓时，这意味着政府支出的膨胀（尽管此时其创收资源出现了萎缩）。


For a while, central banks accommodated that spending.	在一定的时间里，央行承担起了支出的重任。


The resulting high inflation created widespread discontent, especially because little growth resulted.	由此产生的高通胀引起了广泛的不满，特别是在增长不见提振的情况下。


Faith in Keynesian stimulus diminished, though high inflation did reduce public-debt levels.	人们对凯恩斯主义刺激的信任度下降了，尽管高通胀确实降低了公债水平。


Central banks then began to focus on low and stable inflation as their primary objective, and became more independent from their political masters.	此后，央行开始将稳定的低通胀作为其首要目标，并越来越独立于行政。


But deficit spending by governments continued apace, and public debt as a share of GDP in industrial countries climbed steadily from the late 1970’s, this time without inflation to reduce its real value.	但政府的赤字支出并没有放慢脚步，发达国家公债水平占GDP的比例从20世纪70年代末开始稳步攀升，这一次不再有通胀来帮它们拉低债务的真实价值了。


Recognizing the need to find new sources of growth, towards the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, and then under Ronald Reagan, the United States deregulated industry and the financial sector, as did Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom.	美国从吉米·卡特任期后半段和罗纳德·里根任期内开始认识到需要寻找新的增长源，并对产业和金融部门实施了去监管化，与此同时，撒切尔夫人在英国也采取了相似的动作。


Productivity growth increased substantially in these countries over time, which persuaded Continental Europe to adopt reforms of its own, often pushed by the European Commission.	多年来，这些国家的生产率有了显著提高，受此影响，欧洲大陆国家也采取了改革（大多由欧洲委员会推动）。


Yet even this growth was not enough, given previous governments’ generous promises of health care and pensions – promises made even less tenable by rising life expectancy and falling birth rates.	但由于此前政府承诺了过于慷慨的医疗和养老承诺，如此增长仍旧显得力不从心，而预期寿命的增加和出生率的下降使得政府愈加不堪重负了。


Public debt continued to grow.	公债水平继续增加。


And the incomes of the moderately educated middle class failed to benefit from deregulation-led growth (though it improved their lot as consumers).	而教育程度适中的中产阶级在去监管化带来的增长中并没有获得好处（尽管作为消费者，他们获益良多）。


The most recent phase of the advanced economies’ frenzied search for growth took different forms.	发达经济体疯狂寻找增长的最新阶段，各国可谓八仙过海各显神通。


In some countries, most notably the US, a private-sector credit boom created jobs in low-skilled industries like construction, and precipitated a consumption boom as people borrowed against overvalued houses.	在有的国家（以美国为甚），私人部门的信贷繁荣为低技能行业（如建筑业）带来了大量工作岗位，而居民则通过以价值高估的房地产作抵押，借钱来维持消费繁荣。


In other countries, like Greece, as well as under regional administrations in Italy and Spain, a government-led hiring spree created secure jobs for the moderately educated.	在其他国家（如希腊以及西班牙和意大利的部分地区），政府领导的招工潮为教育程度不高者提供了就业保障。


In this “fundamental” narrative, the advanced countries’ pre-crisis GDP was unsustainable, bolstered by borrowing and unproductive make-work jobs.	在这一“基本面”观点看来，发达国家的危机前GDP增长是不可持续的，是用借贷和非生产性冗余工作岗位堆出来的。


More borrowed growth – the Keynesian formula – may create the illusion of normalcy, and may be useful in the immediate aftermath of a deep crisis to calm a panic, but it is no solution to a fundamental growth problem.	“借”来的繁荣——即凯恩斯模式——可以造成一种常态幻觉，在深度危机袭来后可以起到平息恐慌的作用，但绝非基本增长问题的解决办法。


If this diagnosis is correct, advanced countries need to focus on reviving innovation and productivity growth over the medium term, and on realigning welfare promises with revenue capacity, while alleviating the pain of the truly destitute in the short run.	如果这一诊断正确，那么发达国家就需要将注意力集中于重塑中期创新和生产率增长，同时根据收入能力重新定义福利承诺，在短期则致力于减轻真正赤贫者的痛苦。


For example, Southern Europe’s growth potential may consist in deregulating service sectors and reducing employment protection to spur creation of more private-sector jobs for retrenched government workers and unemployed youth.	比如，南欧国家的增长潜力或许在于放松服务部门的监管、减少就业保护以为丢掉工作的政府员工和失业青年创造更多的私人部门工作岗位。


In the US, the imperative is to improve the match between potential jobs and worker skills.	在美国，当务之急是改善潜在工作岗位和工人技能之间的匹配度。


People understand better than the government what they need and are acting accordingly.	个人要比政府更清楚知道他们需要什么，并据此行动。


Many women, for example, are leaving low-paying jobs to acquire skills that will open doors to higher-paying positions.	比如，大量妇女正在脱离低收入岗位，以便获得更好的技能叩开高收入职位之门。


Too little government attention has been focused on such issues, partly because payoffs occur beyond electoral horizons, and partly because the effectiveness of government programs has been mixed.	政府在这些方面的关注度远远不够，部分是因为其好处要在在任者任期结束后才会显现，也有部分是因为政府计划的效率不够高。


Tax reform, however, can provide spur retraining and maintain incentives to work, even while fixing gaping fiscal holes.	税收改革可以刺激人们参与再培训，也可以激励人们继续工作，且不耽误填补财政窟窿。


Three powerful forces, one hopes, will help to create more productive jobs in the future: better use of information and communications technology (and new ways to make it pay), lower-cost energy as alternative sources are harnessed, and sharply rising demand in emerging markets for higher-value-added goods.	有三大力量有助于在未来创造更多的生产性岗位：对信息和通讯技术的更好的使用（以及新的收费方式）、随着替代资源的开发而实现的低成本能源，以及新兴市场快速增长的对高附加值产品的需求。


The advanced countries have a choice.	发达国家有的选择。


They can act as if all is well, except that their consumers are in a funk, and that “animal spirits” must be revived through stimulus.	它们可以若无其事（尽管消费者如同惊弓之鸟，“动物精神”也需要刺激来予以提振）。


Or they can treat the crisis as a wake-up call to fix what debt has papered over in the last few decades.	它们也可以将此次危机视为修正过去数十年来产生债务的问题的契机。


For better or worse, the narrative that persuades these countries’ governments and publics will determine their future – and that of the global economy.	无论如何，政府和公众选择相信哪种观点将决定它们的未来——以及全球经济的未来。


Financing the Next Development Agenda	为下一个发展日程融资


WASHINGTON, DC – As the 2015 target date for the Millennium Development Goals approaches, the United Nations is intensifying its efforts to foster debate about what comes next for promotion of development worldwide.	华盛顿—随着千年发展目标2015年到期日的临近，联合国抓紧了关于下一轮促进全球发展措施的争论。


The outcome of these discussions will shape policies and investment aimed at spurring GDP growth, strengthening human capital, and promoting more inclusive prosperity.	这些讨论的结果将决定旨在刺激GDP增长、强化人力资本和促进更具包容性的繁荣的政策和投资。


With the global population expected to reach nine billion people by 2050 – a significant proportion of whom will reside in developing or underdeveloped countries – the international community must improve access to education, health care, and employment opportunities worldwide.	2050年，世界人口预计将达到90亿——其中很大一部分将居住在发展中或欠发达国家——国际社会必须改善全球教育、卫生和就业机会的普及。


Meanwhile, the prospect of a rise in global temperature of more than 2°C (3.6°F) over pre-industrial levels by the end of this century (which would trigger global warming’s most damaging effects) calls for higher investment in sustainable urbanization, climate-smart agriculture, and social safety nets.	与此同时，全球气温预计将在本世纪末较工业化前水平升高2℃以上（这将触发全球变暖最危险的效应）意味着需要增加可持续城市化、气候智能型农业和社会安全网的投资。


Both factors challenge us to define, in the longer term, more sustainable patterns of production and consumption.	两大因素对我们构成了挑战，从长期看，我们需要更加可持续的生产和消费模式。


Governments, civil society, and the private sector must rise to the challenge, cooperating to find and implement creative solutions.	政府、公民社会和私人部门必须应对这一挑战，合作寻找并实施创造性解决方案。


But, first, they must anticipate the associated financing requirements, which will soon surpass the current capacities of governments and international donors, and take action now to activate new, reliable sources of financing.	但是，首先，我们必须预计相关融资要求——融资要求很快就会超过政府和国际赞助者当前的能力； 同时，我们还必须现在就采取行动激活可靠地新融资源。


To start, governments should design targeted, evidence-based policies and support the development of sound institutions.	首先，政府应该设计基于证据的定向政策并支持可靠机构的发展。


This would make government services more effective, while helping to catalyze additional development aid from traditional donors and mobilize private-sector resources.	这将让政府服务更加有效，同时有助于刺激传统赞助者提高发展援助以及动员私人部门资金源。


In many countries, there is considerable scope for domestic resource mobilization.	在许多国家，国内资源动员空间相当大。


Broadening the tax base, improving tax administration, and closing gaps in the value-added tax could make a significant difference in lower-income countries, where tax revenues account for only about 10-14% of GDP, compared to 20-30% of GDP in high-income countries.	扩大税基、改善税制以及缩小增值税差异能让低收入国家发生翻天覆地的变化，在这类国家，税收收入只占GDP的10—14%，而高收入国家占GDP的20—30%。


More equitable taxation would have a positive impact on governance, another important tool for mobilizing domestic resources.	更平等的税收能对治理产生积极效应，而治理是动员国内资源的又一重要工具。


With improved corporate and public governance and clear transfer-pricing policies, resource-rich countries could shore up their capacity to negotiate fair contracts with extractive industries, balance revenues and expenditures over time, and manage their natural endowments more transparently.	改善公司和公共治理、明确移定价政策能让资源富裕国获得与开采业谈判公平合同的能力，逐渐平衡收入和支出，并更透明地管理其自然资源禀赋。


Progress in these areas would help governments to channel their spending more effectively toward those who would benefit the most.	这些方面的进步有助于政府有效地将钱花在受益最大的人群上。


For example, only 8% of the $409 billion spent on fossil-fuel subsidies in 2010 reached the poorest 20% of the population.	比如，2010年所发放的4090亿美元化石燃料补助中只有8%送到了最贫困的20%人群手中。


A targeted support program could increase substantially the efficiency of spending, freeing up resources for education, health, and poverty eradication.	定向支持项目能极大地增加支出的效率，解放资源用于教育、卫生和减贫。


Furthermore, promoting financial deepening and inclusiveness could accelerate private-sector growth, creating more opportunities.	此外，促进金融深化和包容能加速私人部门增长，创造更多机会。


Indeed, broader access to financial services would help the estimated 400 million micro, small, and medium-size enterprises in developing countries to prosper, while enabling the 2.5 billion people worldwide who currently lack access to such services to build their assets.	事实上，金融服务的普及有助于发展中国家约4亿家（估计值）微型、小型和中型企业繁荣，同时让全世界25亿目前无法获得金融服务的人建立自己的资产。


A deeper and more efficient financial sector would also reduce transaction costs and facilitate risk management.	更深化、更高效的金融部门还能降低交易成本、有利于风险管理。


Local-currency bond markets could help to develop domestic investor bases and mobilize domestic savings to support long-term investments.	本币债券市场有助于发展国内投资者基础病动员国内储蓄支持长期投资。


At the same time, the international community should work to improve the availability and effectiveness of official development assistance.	与此同时，国际社会应该致力于改善官方发展援助（ODA）的普及型和效率。


The ODA target of 0.7% of GDP – agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico – should motivate countries to increase their contributions.	2002年墨西哥蒙特雷国际发展融资会议（International Conference on Financing for Development）为ODA设定了GDP的0. 7%的目标值，这应该能够刺激各国增加各自的贡献力度。


They can also take steps to make ODA more predictable from year to year.	它们还可以采取措施逐年增加ODA的可预测性。


Donors should structure aid to ensure that it supports sound national development policies and programs, rather than their own narrow interests.	赞助者应该设计好援助结构，以保证支持优质国民发展政策和计划，而不是满足它们自身的狭隘利益。


This is particularly relevant as emerging development partners, especially the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), offer new kinds of aid packages that incorporate investment and non-financial assistance.	这一点随着新兴发展伙伴——特别是金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）——提供结合了投资和非金融援助的新形式的援助方案而显得特别重要。


Private charities, which have been instrumental in promoting innovation in fields such as health care, the environment, and education, could provide valuable insight into channeling aid more effectively.	私人慈善机构——它们一直是刺激卫生、环境和教育等领域创新的有力工具——能提供关于如何更高效地使用援助的宝贵洞见。


More generally, improving coordination among donors would help to maximize the impact of aid on the ground.	更一般地，改善赞助者间的协调有助于援助项目影响的最大化。


While ODA remains an important source of financing for fragile and very-low-income countries, it represents only 7% of net financial flows to developing countries, where foreign direct investment, remittances, long-term debt, and portfolio investment have a larger impact.	ODA仍是脆弱的极低收入国家重要的融资源，但它仅占流向发展中国家的净金融流的7%，外国直接投资、侨汇、长期债务和资产组合投资占比均高于ODA。


Donors should leverage aid to “grow the pie” and to diversify financing sources for the world’s poorest countries by providing risk guarantees, innovative investment vehicles, debt syndication, and co-financing arrangements.	赞助者应该利用援助“做大馅饼”并通过提供风险担保、创新性投资载体、债务承销团和共同融资安排实现世界最贫困国家融资源的多样化。


Attracting even a fraction of the assets held by institutional investors, sovereign-wealth funds, and public pension funds could boost development finance substantially.	吸引哪怕一小部分机构投资者、主权财富基金和公共养老基金所持资产也能够极大地提振发展融资。


Diaspora populations are another major potential source of development financing.	侨民是另一个发展融资的潜在主要来源。


Reducing transfer costs, which average an estimated 9% of the value of transactions, would put more money into the hands of those who need it most.	降低汇款成本——据估计平均而言占交易价值的9%——将使更多的钱流向最需要它们的人的手中。


Tailoring financial products for diaspora communities could attract resources for investment, while reinforcing migrants’ ties – economic and otherwise – to their home countries.	为侨民社区量身定做金融产品能吸引投资源，同时加强移民与其祖国的经济和其他联系。


Finally, the international community bears a special responsibility for delivering global public goods.	最后，国际社会有实现全球公共品多样化的特殊责任。


The responsibility to preserve the environment, stem the spread of communicable diseases, strengthen the international financial architecture, enhance developing-country participation in the global trading system, and facilitate the exchange of knowledge lies at the intersection of national development priorities and global interests.	保护环境、阻止传染病传播、强化国际金融结构、促进发展中国家参与全球贸易体系以及增进知识交换的责任是国民发展优先项和全球利益的交汇点。


Duty-free, quota-free access to OECD markets, complemented by simpler, more transparent rules of origin, would raise GDP by 1% in the least-developed countries, lifting millions out of poverty.	免责、无限额地进入经合组织市场，并辅之以更简单、更透明的原产地规则能使最不发达国家GDP提高1%，让千百万人摆脱平困。


Investment in statistical capacity would help governments and businesses worldwide to make better policy decisions, based on a more accurate accounting of the associated costs and benefits.	投资于统计能力有助于全球政府和企业更好地做出政策决策，让计量相关成本和收益更加正确。


The challenge of the post-2015 development agenda lies in finding creative solutions to support prosperity, equality, and sustainability.	2015年后的发展日程的挑战在于找出创造性解决方案支持繁荣、平等和可持续性。


Together, governments, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector can improve the availability and quality of finance for development, and shape a better future for all.	政府、公民社会、国际组织和私人部门齐心协力就能改善发展融资的普及和质量，为所有人带来更美好的未来。


A Czech Moment	捷克风光时刻


PRAGUE – As I listened to what some Europeans were saying as my country prepared to take over the presidency of the European Union, I heard dim echoes of Neville Chamberlain’s infamous description of Czechoslovakia as “a faraway country of which we know little.”	布拉格--当捷克准备接手成为欧盟轮值主席国的时候，有些欧洲人议论我国。 我听到他们言论好像是张伯伦对捷克斯洛伐克声名狼藉评论的回音，那也就是，我们是“一个很少听说的穷乡僻壤国家”。


I suppose that Donald Rumsfeld’s misguided bid a few years ago to incite a divide between “new and old” Europe contributed to the re-emergence of that disdainful attitude.	几年前，拉姆斯菲尔德想要把欧洲分出“新欧洲”和“老欧洲”实为不智，但是他的这一言论确重新体现了这一令人厌恶态度。


The reality is that there is no such thing as “old and new” Europe, and there never was.	实际上，世上根本就没有什么“新欧洲”和“老欧洲”，历史上从来就没有这回事。


The break with communism and reunification of Europe is now almost two decades old.	欧洲重新统一并且与共产主义决裂目前已经将近二十年时间。


We Czechs are 100% European, and were even when the Iron Curtain cut us off from democratic Europe.	我们捷克人是100%的欧洲人，而且在铁幕把我们从民主欧洲分裂的时代更为如此。


Indeed, our pro-EU sentiments may be all the stronger because our membership in the Union, like our freedom, is so comparatively new.	确实，随着加入欧盟以及刚刚获得自由，我们的亲欧盟情感更为强烈。


So no one in Europe needs to fear that the Czech Republic has some nostalgic or idiosyncratic agenda that it wants to impose on the Union.	所以，欧洲没有必要担心捷克共和国有什么怀旧或者怪异的议程来施加在欧盟头上。


On the contrary, events have imposed an agenda on Europe that we cannot escape and for which solidarity – true union – will be needed.	相反，国际大事确给欧洲施加了我们所无法逃避的议程。 对此，我们需要真正的欧洲团结。


The primary, and most pressing, of the problems we face is the financial and economic crisis that is enveloping the EU.	我们面临的主要、也是最为迫切的问题是正在席卷欧盟的金融和经济危机。


Unfortunately, conditions across the Union will likely worsen before they begin to improve.	不幸的是，整个欧盟的形势在转好之前还要继续变坏。


The type of social unrest recently witnessed in Greece may spread, because the downturn is likely to take a disproportionate toll on Europe’s young people, who are seeking jobs at a time when hard-pressed European businesses will be able to offer them very few.	最近在希腊发生的社会动乱可能蔓延，这是因为经济衰退对欧洲年轻人的影响可能更加严重。 这些找工作的年轻人正好赶上不景气的欧洲企业无法提供多少就业机会。


It will fall to the Union, once again, to help transform despair into hope.	这样，欧盟就要再次帮助把绝望转化为希望。


We Czechs know something about this, as the wrenching economic transition that we underwent in the 1990’s taught us much about how the right policies can break the grip of hopelessness.	我们捷克人对此有所了解，因为我们在九十年代经历了艰苦的经济转型，告诉了我们许多道理，也就是正确的政策可以打破绝望钳制。


To contain today’s financial and economic crisis, Europe will also need to continue the cooperation that it has shown up to this point.	欧洲为了遏制当今的金融和经济危机就必须继续进行迄今为止的合作。


The very existence of our Union, and particularly of the euro, has already helped to prevent the competitive devaluations and beggar-thy-neighbor policies that ravaged Europe during the 1930’s – the last time the continent faced so brutal an economic downturn.	二十世纪三十年代，欧洲大陆面临同样残酷的经济衰退。 如今，欧盟、特别是欧元的存在本身就已经防止了当时破坏欧洲的各国货币竞相贬值以及让邻国贫困的政策。


But we cannot be complacent that the forces of national egoism will remain in check.	但是我们并不能自满，认为各国民族自我观念会受到限制。


For now, EU governments’ coordinated fiscal stimulus has deprived populists of their usual charge that the EU is indifferent to the fate of individuals.	目前，欧盟各国政府协调财政刺激政策，民粹主义者通常指责欧盟对单个个人的命运无动于衷也就不攻自破。


Even more policy coordination will be needed both to confront the crisis and to re-establish EU norms once the storm clouds begin to dissipate.	为了应对危机以及在暴风开始消失的时候重新建立欧盟规则，人们就需要更多的政策协调。


Although it is right that the Stability and Growth Pact has become more flexible in these extraordinary times, its rules did secure a successful first decade for the euro.	欧洲稳定和增长公约在这一特殊时期变得更为灵活，这是不假。 但是这一公约规则确保了欧元取得第一个十年的成功。


These rules must eventually be restored intact if Europe is to return to the path of sustainable growth, and a consensus will need to be forged now to make that happen.	欧洲要想回到可持续增长的道路上来，这些规则就必须最终得以恢复，而且人们必须就如何促成这一局面达成一致意见。


The second key challenge that we will face during our European presidency is that of Russia.	我们担任欧盟轮值主席国期间将要面临的第二个关键挑战就是俄国。


A new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and the Russian Federation must be negotiated.	我们必须谈判制定一项欧盟与俄罗斯联邦之间新的伙伴关系和合作协议。


Those negotiations should have begun seriously last year, but the war in Georgia intervened to put them on hold.	谈判原本应该在去年就认真开始，但是格鲁吉亚战事却把这一工作陷于停顿。


Now those talks have resumed, but the background to the negotiations has changed dramatically.	现在这些谈判已经恢复，但是谈判的背景发生了剧烈的变化。


Russia’s economy is now in far worse shape than that of EU members.	俄国经济现在比欧盟国家的要糟糕许多。


The collapse of world oil and gas prices has wounded Russia’s budget, and lack of investment in the country’s energy sector over the years is now causing the declining production that economists have long predicted.	国际石油和天然气价格大跌损害了俄国的预算，而且俄国能源部门多年来投资不足正在造成经济学家们长久以来就预言的产量下降。


Until now, Russia has cared less about a new PCA than the EU, because two-thirds of Russia’s exports to the Union comprise natural resources, which bring in cash even without the strong rules that a PCA provides.	目前为止，俄国对协议的关心并不像欧盟那样强烈，因为俄国向欧盟出口的三分之二是自然资源。 因此，即使没有协议规定的硬性条款也能够带来现金收入。


Given the stark changes in economic conditions, however, it is now in Russia’s national interest to reassure international markets that it is a reliable place to do business, for which a new PCA would serve as an ideal signal.	但是，由于经济形势发生了剧烈变化，现在俄国向国际市场重新保证其是个经商的可靠地方符合自身的利益，而新的协议就是一个理想的信号。


Moreover, without a new PCA, individual European countries may feel it necessary to seek even more bilateral agreements with Russia.	而且，没有新的协议，欧洲各国就会感到有必要与俄国签订更多的双边协议。


Indeed, many EU members have been in a race with each other to see who will be Russia’s closest friend in the Union.	确实，许多欧盟成员国已经开展竞赛，看看谁成为欧盟中与俄国最为亲近的朋友。


But the bilateral deals that have emerged from this race sometimes come at the expense of other Union members, and may unbalance relations within the Union as a whole.  Only a rules-based EU framework can provide a firm foundation for both bilateral and Union-wide relations with Russia.	但是这一竞赛带来的双边协议有时候会损害其他欧盟成员国，而且可能破坏整个欧盟的内部平衡。 只有建立在规则基础上的欧盟框架才能够为对各国和整个欧盟对俄关系提供坚实的基础。


Europe’s main strength in foreign policy is not its commitment to a rules-based multilateralism, important as that undoubtedly is, but its unity.	尽管多边主义毫无疑问非常重要，但是欧洲外交的主要力量并不是其专心致志建立规则基础之上的多边主义，而是团结。


When the Georgia crisis erupted, Europe united around a single position on Russia’s withdrawal.	格鲁吉亚危机爆发之时，欧洲团结一致，要求俄国撤军。


It is the Czech Republic’s task, and that of the Swedish EU presidency that will follow our own, to maintain this unity as the PCA negotiations move forward.	捷克共和国的任务，以及随后担任主席国的瑞典的任务就是在协议谈判的时候维持团结。


During the 1990’s, the US and Europe erred in treating Russia with benign neglect.  It would be a mistake for Russia to respond in kind today by seeking to prolong the PCA negotiations in the hope that a possibly more amenable EU president may one day offer softer terms.	在九十年代，美国和欧洲善意忽略俄国犯下错误。 如今，如果俄国寻求拖延协议谈判，从而希望更为屈从的欧盟主席国会有一天提出更为软弱的条款，那就是错误。


We, like all EU presidencies, will be representing the wider Union interests when we negotiate.	我们和其他欧盟轮值主席一样，将会在谈判的时候推动广泛的欧盟利益。


The Trade Delusion	贸易的迷思


LONDON – Since 2008, global trade has grown slightly more slowly than global GDP.	发自伦敦——自2008年以来，全球贸易的增长幅度稍微落后于全球GDP的增长。


The Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations ended in failure.	世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判以失败告终。


Transatlantic and transpacific trade negotiations are progressing slowly, held back by the resistance of special interests.	在各特殊利益集团的阻挠之下，跨大西洋和跨太平洋的贸易谈判也步履维艰。


But, though many experts fear that protectionism is undermining globalization, threatening to impede global economic growth, slower growth in global trade may be inevitable, and trade liberalization is decreasingly important.	尽管许多专家担心保护主义会破坏全球化并威胁到全球经济增长，但全球贸易增长放缓很可能是无法避免的，而贸易自由化的重要性也在不断降低。


To be sure, for 65 years, rapid trade growth has played a vital role in economic development, with average advanced-economy industrial tariffs plummeting from more than 30% to below 5%.	可以肯定的是，过去65年以来，贸易的快速增长在经济发展中扮演了至关重要的作用，使得发达经济体的各行业平均关税从超过30%暴跌到5%以下。


The creation of Europe’s single market facilitated increased intra-European trade.	欧洲单一市场的建立促进了欧盟内部贸易的增长。


Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan achieved rapid economic catch-up on the basis of export-led growth.	日本、韩国以及台湾以出口主导型增长实现了经济的快速赶超。


China has followed the same path over the last 30 years.	中国在过去30年中遵循了同样的路径。


Trade grew about twice as fast as global output from 1990 to 2008.	从1990年到2008年，贸易增速相当于全球产出增速的两倍。


But there is no reason why trade should grow faster than GDP forever.	但是贸易不可能永远比GDP增长得更快。


Indeed, even if there were no trade barriers at all, trade might grow significantly more slowly than GDP in some periods.	事实上，即使没有贸易壁垒，贸易增长也可能会在某些时期明显慢于GDP增长。


Several factors make it possible that we are entering such a period.	有几方面因素使得我们正在进入这样一个时期。


For starters, there is the changing pattern of consumption in the advanced economies.	首先，发达经济体的消费模式发生了变化。


Richer people spend an increasing share of their income on services that are either impossible to trade (for example, restaurant meals) or difficult to trade (such as health services).	富人越来越多的把收入份额花费在服务上，这些服务要么是不可能进行贸易（例如，外出用餐），要么是难以贸易（如卫生服务）。


Non-tradable sectors tend to account for a growing share of employment and economic activity.	非贸易部门在就业和经济活动中占据的份额越来越大。


For several decades, that tendency has been offset by ever more intensive trading of tradable goods, often passing through many countries in complex supply chains.	几十年来，这一趋势一直被越发频密的可贸易商品交易所抵消，这些交易往往通过复杂的供应链在许多国家之间流通。


In the future, however, the shift to non-tradable consumption may dominate.	然而在未来，非贸易消费可能转而占据主导地位。


Indeed, trade intensity may decline even for manufactured goods.	事实上，甚至制造业商品的贸易频密度也可能会下降。


Trade is partly driven by differences in labor costs.	贸易在一定程度上是由劳动力成本差异所驱动的。


China’s dramatic manufacturing growth reflected low wages up to now.	目前为止，中国制造业的急剧增长反映了其低工资水平。


But as real wages in China and other emerging economies grow, incentives for trade will decline.	但随着中国和其它新兴经济体实际工资的提高，贸易的激励因素将下降。


The more that global incomes converge, the less trade there may be.	全球收入越是趋同，贸易的次数就越少。


In addition, as the economists Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee of MIT have argued in their book The Second Machine Age, rapid advances in information technology may enable increasingly extensive automation.	另外，正如麻省理工学院经济学家埃里克·布伦乔尔森（Erik Brynjolfsson）和安德鲁·麦卡菲（Andrew McAfee）在《第二次机器时代》（The Second Machine Age）一书中所说，飞速发展的信息技术可以使自动化技术的应用日益广泛。


Some manufacturing activities, though few jobs, may well return to developed countries, as the advantages of proximity to customers and lower transport costs outweigh decreasingly important differences in labor costs.	一些生产活动，尽管只能很少的就业，很可能会回到发达国家开展，因为接近客户的优势和更低的运输成本更胜于重要性逐渐降低的劳动力成本差异。


Global trade as a share of GDP may therefore decline, but without adverse consequences for global economic growth.	全球贸易作为全球GDP的组成部分，其比例可能因此下降，但不会对全球经济增长产生不利影响。


Rising productivity does not require relentlessly increasing trade intensity.	生产率的提高无需不断增加贸易频密度。


Earth, after all, does not trade with other planets, yet its economy still grows.	毕竟，虽然地球没有跟其他星球进行贸易，其经济却仍然保持增长。


Optimal trade intensity depends on many factors – such as relative labor costs, transport costs, productivity levels, and economy-of-scale effects.	最优贸易频密度取决于许多因素——如相对劳动力成本，运输成本，生产力水平，经济规模效应。


Trends in these factors might make reduced trade intensity not only inevitable but desirable.	这些因素的变化趋势会令贸易频密度的降低变得不可避免，但却是有利的。


Even if that is true, international trade will still play a vital role, and preventing any reversal of past trade liberalization is essential.	即使这是真的,国际贸易仍将发挥至关重要的作用，防止对过去贸易自由化进程的逆转是至关重要的。


But further trade liberalization is bound to be of declining importance to economic growth.	但进一步的贸易自由化对经济增长的重要性必然会下降。


With industrial tariffs already dramatically reduced most potential benefits of trade liberalization have already been grasped.	由于各行业关税都已大大减少，大多数贸易自由化的潜在好处已经被开发。


Estimates of the benefits of further trade liberalization are often surprisingly low – no more than a few percentage points of global GDP.	估计进一步的贸易自由化的好处往往出奇地低——不超过全球GDP的几个百分点。


That is small compared to the cost of the 2008 financial crisis, which has left output in several advanced economies 10-15% below pre-crisis trend levels.	这相比2008年金融危机的影响来说极为微小，后者导致多个发达经济体的经济产出比危机前下跌了10~15%。


It is small, too, compared to the difference in economic performance between successful catch-up countries – such as China – and other countries that have enjoyed the same access to global markets but have performed less well for other reasons.	而这相对于那些成功实现经济追赶的国家——比如中国——与那些同样拥有通往全球市场渠道但因为其他原因未能充分发力的国家之间的经济表现差异来说也相对较少。


The main reason for slow progress in trade negotiations is not increasing protectionism; it is the fact that further liberalization entails complex trade-offs no longer offset by very large potential benefits.	贸易谈判进展缓慢的主要原因并不是贸易保护主义的日渐增加； 而是因为进一步自由化导致的复杂权衡取舍无法再被非常庞大的潜在利益所抵消。


The Doha Round’s failure has been decried as a setback for developing countries. And some liberalization – say, of advanced economies’ cotton imports – would undoubtedly benefit some low-income economies.	多哈回合的失败被认为是发展中国家所遭遇的挫折���同时一些自由化行动——比如发达国家的棉花进口——无疑会令一些低收入国家受益。


But full trade liberalization would have a complex impact on the least developed economies, some of which would benefit only if compensated for the loss of the preferential access to advanced-economy markets that they currently enjoy.	但全面的贸易自由化会对那些最不发达的国家产生复杂的影响，其中一些国家可能会失去现在享有的通往发达经济体市场的优惠渠道，只有对此进行补偿才能让它们受益。


This implies that further progress in trade liberalization will be slow.	这意味着贸易自由化的进一步进展将会放缓。


But slow progress is a far less important challenge to growth prospects than the debt overhang in developed economies, or infrastructure and educational deficiencies in many developing economies.	但相对于发达国家所面对的债务，或者许多发展中经济体的基础设施和教育缺口来说，这一缓慢进展只能算是一个次要的发展障碍。


That reality often goes unacknowledged.	事实的真相往往会被忽视。


The importance of past trade liberalization has left the global policy establishment with a bias toward assuming that further liberalization would bring similar benefits.	过去的贸易自由化导致全球政策体制出现了一种偏见，以为进一步的自由化就能产生同样的结果。


But while the potential global benefits of trade liberalization have declined, reduced trade intensity might still impede economic development in some countries.	但虽然贸易自由化所带来的潜在全球利益在缩小，但贸易频密度的降低将依然阻碍某些国家的经济发展。


Only a handful of economies over the last 60 years have fully caught up to advanced-economy living standards, and all relied on export-led growth to drive productivity and job creation in manufacturing.	在过去60年中只有少数几个国家完全赶上的发达国家的生活水平，而这些国家都是依靠出口导向型增长并通过制造业提高生产力和创造就业。


Relying solely on that model will be more difficult in the future.	在未来，单纯依靠这一模式将变得更为艰难。


China is so big that it must develop domestic drivers of growth at an earlier stage of development than did Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea; as a result, its exports will inevitably decline (relative to GDP).	中国幅员辽阔，所以它必须比日本，台湾和韩国提早一个阶段去开发发展的国内驱动力； 因此其出口将无可避免地（相对于GDP）下跌。


Meanwhile, for some low-income countries, increased manufacturing and service-sector automation of the sort described by Brynjolfsson and McAfee, whether within advanced economies or within China’s established industrial clusters, will make the path to middle- and high-income status more difficult to achieve.	与此同时，对某些低收入国家来说，布伦乔尔森和麦卡菲所提出的那种制造业和服务业自动化，无论是在发达经济体还是中国已经成型的产业集群之中，都将令它们迈向中等/高收入国家的路径更加坎坷。


That poses important challenges for development policy, which further trade liberalization can alleviate only marginally.	这对发展政策的制定提出了严峻的挑战，而进一步的贸易自由化只是杯水车薪而已。


Rethinking the Monetization Taboo	反思货币化戒条


LONDON – Now that the pace of the US Federal Reserve’s “tapering” of its asset-purchase program has been debated to death, attention will increasingly turn to prospects for interest-rate increases.	发自伦敦——如今人们已经对美联储“缩减”资产收购计划的步骤进行了充分的讨论，而注意力也将逐渐转向对利率上升的预期方面。


But another question looms: How will central banks achieve a final “exit” from unconventional monetary policy and return balance sheets swollen by unconventional monetary policy to “normal” levels?	但同时又出现了另一个问题：央行们将如何达到一个退出非常规货币政策的最终“出口”，并把在非常规货币政策下过度膨胀的资产负债表恢复到“正常”的水平？


To many, a larger issue needs to be addressed.	对许多人来说，一个更大的问题必须得到处理。


The Fed’s tapering merely slows the growth of its balance sheet.	美联储的缩减仅仅是减缓了其资产负债表的增速。


The authorities would still have to sell $3 trillion of bonds to return to the pre-crisis status quo.	如果想回到危机前水平的话，当局还要发行价值3万亿美元的债券。


The rarely admitted truth, however, is that there is no need for central banks’ balance sheets to shrink.	但一个很少被承认的真相就是各大央行其实无需去缩减自己的资产负债表规模。


They could stay permanently larger; and, for some countries, permanently bigger central-bank balance sheets will help reduce public-debt burdens.	它们可以长期保持更大的规模； 而对一些国家来说，这种长期大规模状况将有助于减轻公共债务负担。


As a recent IMF paper by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff illustrates, advanced economies face debt burdens that cannot be reduced simply through a mix of austerity, forbearance, and growth.	正如卡门·莱因哈特与肯尼思·罗格夫最近发表的一篇国际货币基金组织论文所指出的那样，那些发达经济都面临着一些无法仅仅借助一系列紧缩，拖延和增长就能消除的债务负担。


But if a central bank owns the debt of its own government, no net public liability exists.	但如果一家央行也持有本国债券的话，那就再也不存在什么纯粹的公共债务责任了。


The government owns the central bank, so the debt is to itself, and the interest expense comes back to the government as the central bank’s profit.	央行为政府所有，因此等于政府自己向自己借债， 而利息支出又以央行利息收入的形式返还给了政府。


If central bank holdings of government debt were converted into non-interest-bearing perpetual obligations, nothing substantive would change, but it would become obvious that some previously issued public debt did not need to be repaid.	即便央行持有的政府债券被转化成无息长期债券，也不会有任何实质性的改变，但很显然一些从前发行的公共债权都不再需要偿还了。


This amounts to “helicopter money” after the fact.	这等同于债务出现之后投放的“直升飞机货币”。


In 2003, then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke argued that Japan, facing deflation, should increase public expenditure or cut taxes, funding the operation by printing money rather than issuing bonds.	在2003年，时任美联储主席的本·伯南克认为面临通缩的日本应当增加公共支出或者减税，并通过印钞而非发行债券的方式来为这些措施注入资金。


This, he argued, was bound to increase national income, because the direct stimulative effect would not be offset by concern about future debt burdens.	他认为这最终会增加国家收入，因为这种直接刺激的效应不会被对未来债务负担的担忧所抵消。


His advice was not followed; large Japanese deficits were in fact bond-financed.	但他的建议却没有被采纳； 大量的日本财政赤字其实是通过发债支撑的。


But the debts held by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) could still be written off.	但日本银行所持有的债务却依然是可以被注销的。


In Japan’s case, this would reduce government debt by an amount equal to more than 40% of GDP today, and around 60% if implemented after the bond purchases planned for 2014.	对日本来说，这将可以削减相当于当前GDP总额40%的政府债务，如果在2014年计划的债权购买计划后实施的话甚至可以达到60%。


Objections focus on two risks: central-bank losses and excessive inflation.	反对的焦点集中在两大风险之上：央行的损失以及过度通胀。


But both of these outcomes can be avoided.	但这两点后果其实都是可以避免的。


Central banks have bought government bonds with money on which they currently pay zero or very low interest rates.	央行们用自身以零利率或者超低利率融来的钱去购买政府债券。


So, as interest rates rise, central banks might face costs exceeding their income.	因此随着利率上升，央行可能会面临支出超过收入的状况。


But central banks can choose to pay zero interest on a portion of the reserves that commercial banks hold with them, even when they increase the policy interest rate.	但即便央行提升了政策利率，它们依然可以选择去向那一部分由商业银行持有的储蓄支付零利息。


And they can require commercial banks to hold zero-interest reserves at the central bank equal to a defined proportion of their loans, thus preventing inflationary growth of private credit and money.	它们也可以要求商业银行在央行持有相当于其贷款特定比例的零利率储蓄，并因此防止私人信贷和货币的通胀性增长。


Permanent monetization of government debts is undoubtedly technically possible.	长期的政府债务货币化无疑是技术上可行的。


Whether it is desirable depends on the outlook for inflation.	而这是否可取则取决于对通胀的预期。


Where inflation is returning to target levels, debt monetization could be unnecessarily and dangerously stimulative.	当通胀恢复到目标水平时，债务货币化就可能变成一种不必要且危险的刺激手段。


Central-bank bond sales, while certainly not inevitable, may be appropriate.	央行债务出售，虽然注定无法避免，但也可以是恰当的。


But if deflation is the danger, permanent monetization may be the best policy.	但如果通缩是真正威胁的话，长期的货币化可能是最佳的政策。


I predict that Japan will, in effect, permanently monetize some government debt.	我预测日本会在事实上将一些政府债务实施长期货币化。


After two decades of low growth and deflation, Japanese gross public debt is now above 240% of GDP (and above 140% of GDP on a net basis); and, with the fiscal deficit at 9.5% of GDP, the debt burden continues to increase.	在经历了20年的低增长和通缩之后，日本的总公共债务已经超过了GDP的240%（如果以净债务计算的话则超过GDP的140%）； 同时在相当于GDP9.


According to the IMF, to reduce its net public debt to 80% of GDP by 2030, Japan would have to turn today’s 8.6% primary budget deficit (the balance excluding interest payments) into a 6.7% primary surplus by 2020 and maintain such surpluses continuously until 2030.	5%的财政赤字之下，债务负担依然在不断增长。 据国际货币基金组织统计，如果要在2030年将净公共债务总额降低到相当于GDP80%的话，日本必须在2020年将当前8.


That will not happen, and any attempt to reach that target would drive Japan into a severe depression.	这种情况不会发生，而且任何试图实现这一目标的举措都将把日本带入一场严重衰退之中。


But the government does not need to repay the ¥140 trillion ($1.4 trillion) of its debt that the BoJ already owns.	但日本政府不需要偿还日本银行已经持有的140万亿日元（折合1. 4万亿美元）债务。


The BoJ will continue to increase its balance sheet until it achieves its 2% inflation target.	日本银行将继续扩大其资产负债表直到达到2%的通胀目标。


Thereafter, its balance sheet may stabilize in absolute yen terms and fall slowly as a percentage of GDP, but its absolute size will probably never decrease – a likelihood that should cause no concern.	此后其资产负债表的日元净值将趋向稳定并以GDP的一定比例稳步下降，但其绝对规模或许永远不会减少——这是一种不会引发任何忧虑的可能性。


It is precisely what happened to the Fed’s balance sheet after its wartime and postwar buying of US government bonds came to an end in 1951.	而这也正是美联储的资产负债表在1951年结束购买美国政府战时和战后债券后所发生的情况。


Even as permanent monetization occurs, however, the truth may be obfuscated.	即便长期货币化的情况出现，但真相或许会被掩饰掉。


If government bond repayments to the BoJ continued, but were always offset by new BoJ bond purchases, and if the BoJ kept the interest rate on reserves at zero, the net effect would be the same as a debt write-off, but the fiction of “normal” central-bank operations could be maintained.	如果日本政府债券对日本银行的偿付持续存在，但却往往会被新的央行债券购买所抵消，同时倘若日本银行将储蓄利率保持为零，那产生的净效应就等于注销了这些债务，但一个“正常”央行运作的虚构表象将得到维持。


Central banks can monetize debt while pretending not to.	央行可以在假装没有的情况下把债务货币化。


That pretense may reflect a useful taboo: if we overtly recognize that debt write-off/monetization is possible, politicians might want to do it all the time and in excess, not just in circumstances that make it appropriate.	这种假装可能反映出一个有用的戒条：如果我们公开承认债务注销/货币化是可能的，政治家们就可能时刻想着怎样去滥用它，而不是选择适当的时机去实施。


The historical experience of Weimar Germany, or that of Zimbabwe today, illustrates the danger.	过去德国魏玛政府，当今津巴布韦的遭遇都反映了这种风险。


As a result, even when permanent monetization occurs – as it almost certainly will in Japan and possibly elsewhere – it may remain forever the policy that dare not speak its name.	因此，即便发生了长期货币化——几乎可以确定日本会实施而其他国家也有可能——但可能政策永远不会提到这一词汇。


Such reticence may serve a useful purpose.	这种沉默或许将有利于实现一个有益的目的。


But it must not blind central banks and governments to the full range of policy tools available to address today’s severe debt overhangs.	但这也不应令央行和政府们忘记还有这类政策工具是可以用来应对当前的债务暴增问题的。


The Great Credit Mistake	信用之谬大矣


LONDON – Before the financial crisis erupted in 2008, private credit in most developed economies grew faster than GDP.	伦敦—2008年前，大部分发达经济体的私人信用增长都快于GDP。


Then credit growth collapsed.	接着，私人信用增长崩了盘。


Whether that fall reflected low demand for credit or constrained supply may seem like a technical issue.	私人信用增长的崩盘反映了需求低迷还是供给受限或许是个技术性问题。


But the answer holds important implications for policymaking and prospects for economic growth.	但答案对决策和经济增长前景具有重要影响。


And the official answer is probably wrong.	而官方答案可能是错的。


The prevailing view has usually stressed supply constraints and the policies needed to fix them.	流行的观点通常强调供给受限以及纠正这一问题的政策。


An impaired banking system, it is argued, starves businesses, particularly small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), of the funds they need to expand.	该观点认为，受损的银行系统让企业困于缺乏扩张所需要的资金，特别是中小企业。


In September 2008, US President George W. Bush wanted to “free up banks to resume the flow of credit to American families and businesses.”	2008年9月，美国总统小布什希望“解放银行以使信用重新流向美国家庭和企业。 ”


The stress tests and recapitalizations of US banks in 2009 were subsequently hailed as crucial to the recovery of both the banking system and the economy.	2009年美国银行的压力测试和资本重组随后被称为是银行系统和经济复苏的关键。


By contrast, the European Central Bank’s inadequately tough stress tests in 2010 were widely panned for leaving eurozone banks too weak to provide adequate credit.	相反，2010年欧洲央行压力测试不够严厉被广泛指为导致欧元区银行太疲软而无法提供重组信用的原因。


In the United Kingdom, banks have been criticized for not lending the reserves created by quantitative easing to the real economy, leading the Bank of England to introduce its “funding for lending” scheme in 2012.	在英国，人们批评银行没有将量化宽松所创造出来的准备金贷给实体经济，导致英格兰银行在2012年引入“贷款专用资金”（funding for lending）机制。


In the eurozone, it is hoped that this year’s asset quality review (AQR) and stress tests will finally dispel concerns about bank solvency and free up credit supply.	在欧元区，人们希望今年的资产质量检查（asset quality review）和压力测试最终能够打消关于银行偿债能力的疑虑，解放信用供给。


A “credit crunch” – particularly in trade finance – was certainly a key reason why the financial crisis generated a real economy recession.	“信用动荡”——特别是贸易融资信用——毫无疑问是金融危机导致实体经济衰退的一个关键因素。


Taxpayer-funded bank rescues, higher bank capital requirements, and ultra-easy monetary policy have all been vital to overcome credit supply constraints.	纳税人出资的银行援助政策、更高的银行资本要求以及极端宽松的货币政策都是克服信用供给受限的关键。


But there is strong evidence that once the immediate crisis was over, lack of demand for credit played a far larger role than restricted supply in impeding economic growth.	但充分的证据表明，一旦迫在眉睫的危机过去，信用需求不足对阻碍经济增长的作用就会远远超过供给受限。


That argument is persuasively made by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi in House of Debt, an important new book that analyzes US data on a county-by-county basis.	这一令人信服的观点由阿提夫·米安（Atif Mian）和埃米尔·苏菲（Amir Sufi）在《债务屋》（House of Debt）中提出。


Mian and Sufi show that the recession was caused by a collapse of household consumption, and that consumption fell most in those counties where pre-crisis borrowing and post-crisis real-estate prices left households facing the largest relative losses in net wealth.	这部重要的新书逐县地分析了美国的数据。 米安和苏菲向我们表明，衰退由家庭消费崩溃引起，而家庭消费下降大部分发生在危机前的借债和危机后的房地产价格导致家庭面临的净财富相对损失最大的县。


It was in those US counties, too, that local businesses cut employment most aggressively.	地方企业削减人工最猛的也是这些县。


For SMEs, a shortage of customers, not a shortage of credit, constrained borrowing, employment, and output.	对中小企业来说，缺少客户，而不是缺少信用，制约了它的借贷、雇用和产出状况。


And the customers were absent because the pre-crisis credit boom had left them over-leveraged.	而之所以缺少客户，是因为危机前信用繁荣导致他们过度借贷。


In the UK, many business surveys from 2009-2012 told the same story.	在英国，2009—2012年的多项商业调查也给出了同样的结论。


Poor customer demand was ranked well ahead of credit availability as a constraint on growth.	客户需求萎靡在制约增长方面的作用远甚于信用易得性。


Economic growth can indeed continue to be severely depressed by a debt overhang even when credit supply is unrestricted and cheap.	即使在信用供给不再受限并且十分低廉的情况下，经济增长也确实有可能继续陷于深度萧条。


Many Japanese companies were left overleveraged by the boom and bust in credit and real estate in the 1980s and early 1990s.	20世纪80年代和90年代初，许多日本公司因为信用和房地产业的繁荣和萧条而陷于举债过度的境况。


By the late 1990s, the Japanese banking system was offering companies loans at near-zero interest rates.	到20世纪90年代末，日本银行系统以几乎为零的利率向公司提供贷款。


But, rather than borrow to invest, firms cut investment to pay down debt, driving two decades of stagnation and deflation.	但是，企业并未借钱投资，反而削减投资来偿债，因而助长了二十年的停滞和通缩。


Since 2011, the ECB’s analysis of weak eurozone growth has stressed the negative impact of an impaired and fragmented financial system, with high sovereign-bond yields and funding costs for banks resulting in prohibitive lending terms in the peripheral countries.	2011年以来，欧洲央行对欧元区增长萎靡的分析强调受损且分散的金融系统的消极影响，以及主权债务收益率高企和银行资金成本导致外围国贷款条件过于苛刻。


Major progress in fixing these problems has already been achieved.	纠正这些问题的主要进展已经实现了。


The ECB’s latest Monthly Bulletin documents this, citing multiple indicators of improved credit availability and pricing.	欧洲央行的最新《月报》（Monthly Bulletin）肯定了这一点，指���多重指标表明信用易得性和价格都在改善。


Nonetheless, the rate of decline in private-sector loans has accelerated over the last year – from -0.6% to -2% – and low demand is acknowledged to be the main driver of depressed credit growth.	尽管如此，私人部门贷款收缩速度在去年仍出现了加快——从-0. 6%变为-2%——并且寻求低迷已被认定为信用增长受阻的主要原因。


Simultaneous private deleveraging and fiscal consolidation are restricting eurozone growth far more than remaining restrictions on credit supply.	私人去杠杆化和财政整合的同时进行对欧元区增长的限制远过于信用供给持续受限。


Despite the ECB’s own evidence, however, the policy focus remains on fixing the credit-supply problem, through the AQR and stress tests, and through the ECB’s own version of a funding for lending scheme, announced on June 5.	但是，尽管欧洲央行提出了证据，但政策焦点仍集中在通过资产质量检查和压力测试以及通过欧洲央行自身的贷款专用资金机制（6月5日宣布）来纠正信用供给问题上。


That reflects a recurring tendency in official policy debates, particularly in the eurozone, to concentrate on fixable problems to the exclusion of more difficult issues.	这表明官方政策争论（特别是欧元区内）再度集中于可解决的问题而不去顾及更加困难的问题。


Fixing impaired banking systems after a crisis is both essential and achievable.	在危机后修补受损银行系统至关重要并且可以实现。


Moreover, even when public rescue costs are inevitable, they are typically small change compared to the economic harm wrought by the financial crisis and post-crisis recession.	此外，虽然公共援助成本难以避免，但与金融危机和危机后衰退所带来的经济伤害相比，它们往往只是次要变化。


By contrast, a large debt overhang may be intractable unless policy orthodoxies are challenged.	相反，大量债务积压非常棘手，除非挑战政策正统。


Japan offset private deleveraging in the 1990s by running massive public deficits.	20世纪90年代，日本用大规模公共赤字抵消私人去杠杆化。


The US has pulled out of recession faster than the eurozone, not only – or even primarily – because it fixed its banking system faster, but because it pursued more stimulative fiscal policies.	美国之所以比欧元区更快地摆脱衰退，不仅是因为——甚至并非主要因为——它更快地修补了银行系统，也是因为它采取了更具刺激性的财政政策。


But fiscal stimulus is constrained within the eurozone, where member countries no longer issue their own currency and “sovereign” debt therefore carries a default risk.	但财政刺激却在欧元区受到了限制，欧元区成员国不再发行本国货币，因此“主权”债务有了违约风险。


Aggressive monetary expansion through quantitative easing is also far more complicated and politically contentious in a currency area with no federal debt for the central bank to buy.	通过量化宽松实现的激进的货币扩张在欧元区也更加复杂、更具政治正义性，因为作为货币区的欧元区不存在可供中央银行购买的联邦债务。


To survive and thrive, the eurozone will need to become more centralized, with some common fiscal revenues, expenditures, and debts.	要摆脱困境，实现复苏，欧元区就需要更加集中化，拥有一些共同财政收入、支出和债务。


Of course, this scenario implies immensely difficult political choices.	当然，这一情景意味着非常艰难的政治抉择。


But the starting point for debate must be realism about the nature and severity of the problems facing the eurozone.	但争论起点必须是现实地认清欧元区所面临的问题的性质和严重程度。


If eurozone policy assumes that fixing the banks will fix the economy, the next ten years in Europe could look like the 1990s in Japan.	如果欧元区政策认为解决了银行问题就能解决经济问题，那么欧洲的未来十年将和日本的20世纪90年代一样。


A Daughter of Dictatorship and Democracy	独裁与民主的女儿


SEOUL – It is something of a cliché question in South Korea nowadays: Who would be the country’s next president if the election were held tomorrow, rather than in December 2012?	首尔——如果选举提前到明天，而不是2012年12月进行，谁将成为下一任国家总统已经成为韩国老生常谈的话题。


Numerous opinion polls show Park Geun-hye of the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) to be the leading candidate.	不止一项民调显示执政大国家党候选人朴槿惠最有希望胜出。


If elected, she would be South Korea’s first woman president, and, for her rivals, her dominant position in the race is an uncomfortable but unassailable fact.	如果成功当选，她将成为韩国首任女性总统，而且在她的对手看来，她在竞选中的优势地位虽然令人不快，但又不容置疑。


South Korean voters of all ages and regions have welcomed Park as a candidate for their country’s leadership.	韩国各地各年龄段的选民都欢迎朴槿惠参选总统。


Her political style is both refreshing and relevant, because she comes across as sincere and forthright at a time when the public is hungry for moral leadership.	她的政治风格既有价值又令人耳目一新，因为在公众渴望道德领袖的今天她给人留下了真诚坦荡的印象。


And she has an astonishing talent for simplifying complicated issues accurately, which she likely learned – along with how to interpret and manipulate the political connotations of every issue – from her father, former President Park Chung-hee.	而且她在准确简化复杂问题方面拥有惊人的天赋，她的这种天赋和解读控制所有问题政治内涵的能力极有可能来自前总统朴正熙，也就是她的父亲。


Acclaimed as a national hero among radical right-wingers, the iron-fisted Park Chung-hee ruled South Korea from 1963 to 1979, in the wake of the 1961 military coup, only to be assassinated by his intelligence chief.	1961年军事政变后，当时在右翼激进份子中被奉为民族英雄的铁腕总统朴正熙从1963到1979年被情报机构负责人暗杀前一直统治韩国。


His daughter is proud of his legacy, which marked the beginning of South Korea’s economic boom.	他的女儿为父亲取得的成就感到骄傲，在他执政期间恰好是韩国经济繁荣的开始。


Indeed, as a pillar of export-oriented modernity, Park Chung-hee was once lionized as the archetype of a modernizing political leadership in military-authoritarian states.	事实上，作为出口导向型现代化的中流砥柱，朴正熙一度被奉为军事独裁国家现代化政治领袖的典型。


At home, he still ranks first in popularity among the country’s heads of state, kindling nostalgia like a popular old record – a corollary to people’s frustration and anger at the current government of President Lee Myung-bak.	他在韩国国内的受欢迎的程度依然在国家首脑中名列前茅，就像流行老唱片那样点燃怀旧的火种——这也是人们对总统李明博领导的现任政府感到无奈和愤怒的必然结果。


Park, who lost her first bid for the GNP’s nomination to Lee in 2007, needs to ensure that no rupture with her erstwhile rival knocks her off the path to victory in 2012.	朴槿惠2007年在大国家党内部首轮候选人竞争中负于李明博，而她今天的当务之急是确保与昔日对手的决裂不会影响她在2012年的竞选中胜出。


An astute politician, Park did not hesitate to campaign wholeheartedly for Lee the last time around – a move that, as part of long-term political strategy, made perfect sense.	作为精明的政治家，朴槿惠上次失利后毫不犹豫地全力为李明博助选——这样的举动作为长期政治策略的组成部分是很有意义的。


To many South Koreans, the election is now Park’s to lose.	在许多韩国人看来，总统竞选已经是朴的囊中之物。


No candidate on the horizon seems able to stop her.	似乎没有哪位候选人能够阻挡她成功的步伐。


If she wins, it will be the result of her seriousness and tenacity, not her political heritage.	如果当选，她制胜的法宝将会是严肃和韧性，而不是政治承袭。


No one in South Korea’s conservative movement doubts that Park is one of them.	韩国保守运动的任何人都不怀疑朴是他们当中的一份子。


And, as an icon of the right, she is well aware that she cannot afford to betray her status.	作为右翼势力的标志性人物，她比谁都清楚她不能背叛自己的位置。


Despite her charisma, Park is neither a Sarah Palin nor an Eva Peron.	尽管拥有超凡的个人魅力，但朴既不同于萨拉·佩林也不同于伊娃·裴隆。


Indeed, she looks more like a Korean Margaret Thatcher – a lady not for turning, in Thatcher’s famous phrase, and with clearly thought-through political principles animating her actions.	事实上，她更像是韩国的玛格丽特·撒切尔——按照撒切尔的那句名言，一位不会转弯的女士。 深思熟虑的政治准则为她的一举一动注入活力。