The world’s changing before them and they’re clinging to something in the past that’s not sustainable.”	世界日新月异，而他们却仍然固守着不可持续的过去。


So long as the façade holds, Russians will continue to cling to Putin’s illusion of power.	”只要表面繁荣仍在，俄罗斯人就会继续紧拥着普京的权力幻影。


The Goebbels of the Kremlin	克里姆林宫的戈培尔


MOSCOW – In Soviet Russia, everybody knew that they were being watched.	莫斯科——苏俄时代，人人都知道自己受到监视。


Any deviation from officially sanctioned behavior would be treated with suspicion and most likely punished.	任何偏离官方认可标准的行为都将引起怀疑，并且极有可能遭到惩罚。


The Soviet state saw itself as being at war with almost everything – foreign spies, class enemies, people wearing jeans or playing jazz.	苏维埃国家几乎与一切事物作战——外国间谍、阶级敌人、穿着牛仔裤或演奏爵士乐的普通人。


The regime’s dominant ideology was not Marxism-Leninism, but suspicion and animosity.	怀疑与敌意、而非马列主义思想，主导着苏俄政权。


Not since the early 1980s, before the first rays of glasnost in Russia, have those dark times felt as close as they do now.	自从20世纪80年代初公开化的第一缕曙光照进俄罗斯后，人们从未像现在这样如此近距离接触那样的黑暗时代。


Protecting society from enemies, foreign and domestic, is once again the order of the day.	当务之急再次变成保护社会免遭国内外敌人的威胁。


Indeed, an ethos of perpetual vigilance is central to sustaining President Vladimir Putin’s high popular-approval ratings.	事实上，永远保持警惕的民族精神是维持弗拉基米尔·普京总统超高民众支持率的核心所在。


And no one plays a more important role in creating the necessary public atmosphere than Vladislav Surkov.	而在创造必要的公众氛围方面没有人的作用比弗拉季斯拉夫·苏尔科夫更重要。


Once Putin’s chief of staff, Surkov served as Deputy Prime Minister from 2011 to 2013.	曾在2011到2013年间任职副总理的苏尔科夫曾经当过普京办公厅的主任。


He now formally advises Putin on foreign affairs, but is really the regime’s chief propagandist.	他目前的正式身份是普京的外交事务顾问，但实际是普京政权的首席宣传员。


He has been credited with the introduction of the concept of “managed democracy” in Russia, and he played a leading role in nurturing the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.	是他首先在俄罗斯引入了“管理民主”的概念，并主导了格鲁吉亚阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的分裂。


More recently, he was a guiding hand behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, inspiring the feverish media campaigns that have delivered near-universal public support for these moves.	不久前，他再次主导俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和吞并克里米亚，掀起了为上述行动赢得几乎普遍公众支持的狂热的媒体宣传。


Surkov is the man most responsible for nurturing pro-Putin sentiment, which increasingly resembles a Stalin-like cult of personality.	苏尔科夫是亲普京情绪的主要缔造者，这种情绪越来越接近斯大林式的个人崇拜。


Surkov is Chechen by descent, infused – like Stalin – with the saber-rattling mindset of the Caucasus.	苏尔科夫和斯大林一样是车臣血统，拥有高加索人典型的武力叫嚣心态。


Under his watch, the central focus of the Kremlin’s communication strategy has been to sustain the perception that the West wants to destroy Russia.	在他的监督下，西方想摧毁俄罗斯一直是克里姆林宫宣传策略的核心焦点。


Thus, the conflict in Ukraine has been framed as a renewed struggle against fascism – and in defense of Russia’s true, anti-Western identity.	因此，乌克兰冲突已经被定义为又一次反法西斯斗争——捍卫俄罗斯真正的反西方身份。


The supposed threat to Russia today was underscored for the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, with billboards springing up across Moscow to remind Russians of the sacrifices that victory required.	二战结束70周年庆凸显了当今俄罗斯面临的所谓威胁，如雨后春笋般在莫斯科竖起的广告牌提醒俄罗斯人胜利需要做出牺牲。


Like the Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, Surkov is not overly concerned about facts.	像纳粹宣传家约瑟夫·戈培尔一样，苏尔科夫并不过分关注事实。


Emotions are at the core of the Kremlin’s message; indeed, they are the tie that binds Putin to his subjects.	克里姆林宫信息的核心内容是情绪； 事实上，情绪才是联系普京及其臣民的纽带。


This is why Surkov portrays Putin, who recently divorced his wife of 30 years and is rumored to have fathered several children with a former Olympic gymnast, as an avatar of conservative values, with the Orthodox Patriarch constantly at his side.	这就是为什么苏尔科夫将不久前刚与结婚30年的妻子离婚、并与前奥运体操运动员育有几名私生子的普京描绘成保守价值观的化身，拥有东正教主教的支持。


The Kremlin’s campaign against gay rights has secured the support of the church, while reminding ordinary Russians that the state takes a watchful interest in their lives.	克里姆林宫掀起的反同性恋权益运动已经得到了教会的支持，同时时刻提醒普通俄罗斯人，国家时刻对他们的生活保持着兴趣。


Today’s Russian propaganda combines quintessentially Soviet-style heavy-handedness and state-of-the-art technique.	今天俄罗斯的宣传攻势结合了先进技术和标准的苏式高压手段。


There have been no mass purges and few large rallies.	目前还从未发生过大规模清洗、大型集会也并不多见。


Western values may be under assault, but Western goods are welcome.	西方价值观可能受到攻击，但对西方的商品却抱着欢迎的态度。


A common sight in Russia is a shiny German-made car with a bumper sticker recalling the glories of World War II: “On to Berlin” or “Thank you, grandfather, for the victory, and grandmother for the tough bullets.”	俄罗斯的常见景象是一辆闪闪发亮的德制轿车，在保险杠上贴着回顾二战辉煌的贴纸：“打到柏林去”或“感谢爷爷们的胜利和奶奶们的子弹。 ”


For the last two decades, Russians have been able to travel internationally without restrictions.	过去二十年来，俄罗斯人出国旅行一直不受任何限制。


Now, however, many seem ready to give up this right.	但现在很多人似乎准备放弃这一权利。


Last month, the Kremlin warned the country’s citizens that the United States was “hunting” Russians abroad.	上个月，克里姆林宫警告该国民众美国正在对国外的俄罗斯人进行“追捕”。


A few Russians have indeed been arrested and extradited to the US: the arms dealer Viktor Bout, for example, who is charged with providing aid to terrorists, or the hacker Vladimir Drinkman, who is accused of stealing millions of credit card numbers.	确实有几个俄罗斯人被捕并被引渡到美国：比方说被控为恐怖分子提供援助的军火商维克多·布特，以及被控盗窃成百上千万张信用卡号的黑客弗拉基米尔·德林克曼。


There is no credible threat to ordinary Russians, yet Surkov’s campaign is having a profound impact.	普通俄罗斯人并未受到切实的威胁，但苏尔科夫宣传攻势影响却十分深远。


Rather than risking mockery with outlandish claims – a staple of Soviet propagandists – that Russia will one day surpass the West economically, Surkov taps a deeper and safer emotion: fear.	与其因为俄罗斯总有一天会在经济上超过西方的怪诞说法而冒着被耻笑的危险——这几乎是苏联时期宣传的主基调——恐惧成了苏尔科夫所能利用的更隐秘、更安全的情感。


Whatever Russians think of the country’s economic malaise – GDP is expected to contract by 3.8% this year, while inflation could top 15% – they are assured that they would be much worse off without Putin.	无论俄罗斯人认为国家经济多么萎靡不振——今年国内生产总值预计萎缩3. 8%，而通胀则可能突破15%——都有人向他们保证没有普京更加不堪设想。


And Russians have fallen into line.	俄罗斯民众已经接受了这种说法。


A few years ago, it seemed that every tenth person wore a white ribbon, a symbol of protest against Putin.	几年前，似乎有十分之一的人佩戴象征反对普京的白丝带。


Today, one gets the impression that every third Russian is wearing the Ribbon of Saint George, an orange and black symbol of patriotism and loyalty to the Kremlin.	而今天，似乎有三分之一的俄国人佩戴圣乔治丝带，这种橙黑色丝带象征着爱国和效忠克里姆林宫。


Those who do not wear the ribbon can expect to be asked – and not very politely – why they choose not to.	不戴丝带的人会受到不礼貌的质问，问他们为什么会如此选择。


It is an insidious and effective strategy, one that marginalizes dissenters and generates the impression of near-universal support for the regime.	这是一种阴险但却有效的策略，持不同政见者被边缘化，给人留下的印象是对政府近乎普遍的支持。


On my last visit to Moscow, I noticed that a friend, a singer in the Bolshoi opera, had tied a small Ribbon of Saint George to her white Mercedes.	上次访问莫斯科时，我注意到莫斯科大剧院的一位歌手朋友把一条圣乔治丝带绑在她的白色奔驰车上。


Though she is no fan of Putin, she did not want to stand out unnecessarily.	虽然她并非普京的崇拜者，但她不想不必要地引人注目。


It is through small surrenders like hers that men like Surkov ultimately succeed.	苏尔科夫的成功正是通过像她这样小小的让步。


Citizens pretending to be loyal build a culture of conformity.	假作忠诚的民众一手营造了服从文化。


With dissent suppressed, the authenticity of citizens’ loyalty becomes irrelevant.	由于不同意见受到压制，民众是否真的忠诚变得无关紧要。


Indeed, like Goebbels, Surkov understands that when public life and private expression can be turned into theater, there is no difference between performance and reality.	事实上，像戈培尔一样，苏尔科夫明白当公共生活和私人表达可以用来作秀，那么表演和现实之间就已经没有任何区别。


The Middle East’s Three Timelines	中东的三大时间线


BERLIN – Three distinct timelines are shaping developments in the Middle East: the short-term timeline of daily struggles and politics; the medium-term timeline of geopolitical shifts, which is measured in decades; and the long-term timeline of sociocultural transformation, or what the historian Fernand Braudel called the longue durée.	柏林—三条不同的时间线正在决定中东发展局势：日常斗争和政治的短期时间线； 以十年为单位的地缘政治变化的中期时间线；


Understanding each is essential to craft an effective strategy in the region.	以及社会文化转型或历史学家布罗代尔所谓的“长时程”（longue durée）的长期时间线。 理解这三条时间线是制定有效中东战略的关键。


The first timeline certainly receives the most attention.	毫无疑问，第一条时间线吸引着最多的注意力。


The media report relentlessly on the latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas; recent negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program; ongoing opposition activity and political repression in Egypt and Bahrain; and the slaughter and humanitarian tragedies unfolding in Syria and Iraq.	媒体不断地报道着以色列和哈马斯的最新战况、关于伊朗核计划的最新谈判、埃及和巴林没完没了的反对活动和政治压迫，以及叙利亚和伊拉克上演的杀戮和人道主义悲剧。


But political thinking in the Middle East is often linked to the second timeline.	但中东政治思维常常与第二条时间线有关。


Indeed, it is impossible to grasp the region’s contemporary history and politics without understanding the emergence of the regional state system after World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire.	事实上，如果不理解一战和奥斯曼帝国崩溃以来该地区国家体系的形成，就无法抓住中东地区的当代历史和政治。


For example, there are the constant reminders that external powers – most notably, the United Kingdom and France – established the existing borders.	比如，外部势力——主要是英国和法国——一直在决定现有边界的构成。


Resistance against the so-called Sykes-Picot order nurtured the founding myths of many states and political movements in the region.	对所谓的赛克斯-皮科特秩序（Sykes-Picot order）的反对孕育了该地区众多国家和政治运动的先声。


That order has remained largely intact for almost a century, enabling the emergence of separate, though not necessarily exclusive, political identities in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and, to varying degrees, in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries.	赛克斯-皮科特秩序稳定维系了将近一个世纪，形成了叙利亚、伊拉克、约旦、黎巴嫩等分裂（尽管未必互相排斥）的政治身份，沙特阿拉伯和海湾国家也或多或少地受该秩序的影响。


It has dictated the political parameters for 4-5 generations in the Arab world, including today’s main protagonists, who have battled over it, adapted to it, and attempted to manipulate it.	该秩序决定了4—5代阿拉伯世界的政治特征，也包括今天或与之展开斗争，或接受适应之，或试图操纵之的风云人物。


But the system may finally be unraveling.	但这一体系正在发生最终崩溃。


The border between Iraq and Syria is evaporating, as the Sunni militants of the Islamic State capture a widening swath of territory.	伊拉克和叙利亚之间的边界正在日益模糊，伊斯兰国的逊尼派武装侵占了大片领土。


And the rise of Kurdish military forces against them raises the possibility that a full-fledged Kurdish state will eventually emerge.	与之针锋相对的库尔德军事力量的崛起也增加了成熟的库尔德国家最终形成的可能。


Meanwhile, the tenuous status quo in Israel and Palestine is crumbling.	与此同时，以色列和巴勒斯坦的微妙现状极其脆弱。


With a two-state solution less likely than ever, the area is likely to experience the creeping consolidation of a one-state reality.	两国方案希望前所未有地渺茫，该地区可能经历缓慢的一国现实的形成。


In the Persian Gulf, ongoing international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program are but the latest chapter in a struggle over strategic hegemony, security, and economic interests.	在波斯湾，进行中的伊朗核计划国际谈判只不过是战略霸权、安全和经济利益斗争的最新篇章。


And, though the world’s appetite for energy resources from the Gulf will not diminish anytime soon, the structure of influence may be set to change again.	而尽管世界对波斯湾能源资源的渴求在短期内不会有所减小，影响力结构却有可能再次发生变化。


When it comes to external power brokers, the United States plays the largest role, having replaced Great Britain by the 1970s.	在外部斡旋势力方面，自20世纪70年代起美国取代英国成为最重要的角色。


It now must learn to cope with the growing influence of India and China, as well.	如今美国也必须学习处理印度和中国影响力的日益增强。


But it is the leading regional powers – Iran and Saudi Arabia – that have the greatest potential to transform the Middle East.	但最能改变中东的还是主要地区势力——伊朗和沙特阿拉伯。


The question is whether they will continue their competition for regional dominance, regardless of its destabilizing impact, or become pillars of a new regional security structure.	问题在于它们是将继续不顾破坏性影响竞争地区主导地位，还是蜕变为新地区安全结构的基石。


Such a structure has become all the more important as the major external powers’ appetite for sustained involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts wanes.	随着主要外部势力继续干预中东冲突的意愿日一消退，新地区安全结构也将日益重要。


Having learned the hard way that they cannot dictate regional political outcomes, Western powers – as well as Russia, China, and India – will likely limit their involvement to protecting their direct interests and, if necessary, containing regional threats.	惨痛的教训让西方认识到它们无法主宰地区政治的结果（俄罗斯、中国、印度亦然），它们可能将干预局限于保护直接利益以及必要时遏��地区威胁。


Wherever the political and socioeconomic conditions of the short- and medium-term timelines fail to provide order and stability, the confessional, ethnic, or tribal identities that emerged over the longue durée gain prominence.	一旦短期和中期时间线的政治和社会经济条件无法提供秩序和稳定，产生于“长时程”的宗教、种族或部落身份就有可能占据主导地位。


The extent to which identities are invented matters little, as long as their invocation helps to appropriate elements of history and harness them to current political goals.	只要有利于利用历史元素，并让他们接近当前政治目标，身份如何产生不重要。


Episodes from this timeline thus become as relevant as recent events.	因此，这条时间线的重要性在最近的事件中显露无疑。


The conflict over the succession of religious leadership following the death of the Prophet Muhammad nearly 1,400 years ago is the origin of the split between Sunni and Shia Islam.	近1,400年前先知穆罕默德死后的宗教领袖继承权冲突是逊尼派和什叶派伊斯兰教分裂的根源。


The battles between the Fatimids and the Abbasids, the Crusades, the Mongol invasion, the Ottoman conquest, and, of course, Western imperialism all serve as points of reference for today’s struggles.	法蒂玛和阿巴斯王朝之战、十字军东征、蒙古人入侵、奥斯曼帝国的政府，当然还有西方帝国主义，都是今天的斗争的参照点。


But these events provide more than explanation; they often provoke powerful responses.	但这些事件不仅仅是解释； 它们往往还会挑起激烈的反弹。


Consider the Islamic State’s recent declaration of a caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria.	比如，伊斯兰国最近宣布在伊拉克和叙利亚的部分领土上建立哈里发帝国。


Most Sunnis are outraged by the brutal behavior of the Islamic State’s self-appointed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and consider his claim that he will eventually “conquer Rome” ridiculous.	大部分逊尼派都因为伊斯兰国悍然自封的哈里发——巴格达迪的残暴行径而愤怒不已，也认为他所宣称的终将“征服罗马”的说法荒谬可笑。


Nonetheless, the symbols and “memories” from the longue durée that Baghdadi uses – such as the black flag of the Abbasids and the glorious stories of a time when the caliphate constituted a great power and a lodestar for all Sunnis – have an enduring impact.	尽管如此，巴格达迪利用源自长时程的符号和“记忆”——如阿巴斯王朝的黑旗和关于哈里发帝国曾经无比强盛、是所有逊尼派的明灯的光荣故事——这些符号和“记忆”能产生持久影响。


Of course, these ideas would amount to little were they not backed by modern weaponry, and had the countries whose territory the Islamic State is seizing not failed to create inclusive social contracts.	当然，如果没有现代武器作支撑，如果被伊斯兰国蚕食国土的国家当初成功地形成了包容性社会契约，这些观念也将一无是处。


But they imbue the Islamic State’s project with a powerful historical narrative that cannot be dismissed.	但它们用不可磨灭的强大的历史叙事灌输伊斯兰国观念。


Navigating this narrative can be tricky for external actors.	引导这样的叙事对外部行动方来说可能不胜其烦。


They must neither ignore the longue durée nor believe misleading claims that the struggle is really over the legitimacy of opposing interpretations of the faith.	它们既不能忽视长日程，也不能相信所谓“这场斗争真的关乎反对信仰解释的合法性”这样的误导性言论。


More generally, these actors’ actions in the region must never be shaped by the delusion that the Sunnis, Shia, or any other ethnic or religious minority is on their side.	更一般地说，这些行动方在该地区的行为决不能被“与逊尼派、什叶派或其他种族和宗教少数派站在一起”之类的幻觉左右。


One lesson common to all of the Middle Eastern timelines is that all local actors are on their own side – and more than willing to draw foreigners into their wars if doing so fortifies them against their enemies.	一个三大中东时间线的共同教训是，所有本地行动方都站在自己的立场上——如果吸引外国人加入战争有利于它们与敌人作战，它们会毫不犹豫地这样做。


Syria’s No-Solution Solution	叙利亚不是方案的方案


BERLIN – The Russian-American plan to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons – now embodied in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 – may open a more constructive approach to ending the country’s civil war, because the Security Council is also demanding that the long-planned Geneva II conference on Syria convene as soon as possible.	柏林—俄罗斯-美国消灭叙利亚化学武器的计划——如今已写入了联合国安理会2118号决议——或许能开启结束叙利亚内战更具建设性的方向，因为安理会还要求计划已久的叙利亚问题日内瓦II会议尽快召开。


Rightly so: elimination of Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpiles and a political process to end the war must occur simultaneously.	这样做十分正确：销毁叙利亚化学武器存量、开启结束内战的政治进程必须双管齐下。


As a practical matter, efforts to verify, secure, and eventually destroy Syria’s huge supply of chemical weapons cannot be implemented without at least a lasting ceasefire.	作为政治事件，证实、保护并最终销毁叙利亚的巨量化学武器供应在没有持续停火的条件下是不可能得以实施的。


But synchronizing the two processes is necessary for other reasons, too.	但让两个过程实现同步的必要性并不仅限于此。


Aside from the human suffering caused by Syria’s ongoing war, we should be aware of the potentially dire regional consequences.	除了叙利亚持续战事所造成的人道灾难，我们应该了解可能发生的地区性可怕后果。


Some people now warn of a “Lebanonization” of Syria – partition of the country into rival fiefdoms and quasi-independent regions.	如今，一些人警告叙利亚的“黎巴嫩化”——国家分裂为敌对的地盘和半独立地区。


But Syria’s fragmentation is not the only plausible scenario.	但叙利亚的分裂并不是唯一可能的结局。


Indeed, the Lebanon metaphor is too benign.	事实上，黎巴嫩隐喻可以说太温和了。


Unlike Lebanon during its 15-year civil war, no regional power today would be able to contain Syria’s war within its borders.	与黎巴嫩及其15年内战不同，如今没有地区大国能让叙利亚战争仅仅局限于叙利亚境内。


As a result, it is much more likely that Syria’s disintegration would call the entire post-World War I (or post-Ottoman) Middle Eastern state system – also called the “Sykes-Picot” system – into question.	因此，更有可能的是叙利亚的分崩离析导致一战后（或奥斯曼帝国后）的中东国家体系——亦称“赛克斯-皮科”（Sykes-Picot）体系——陷入危机。


Such region-wide instability is not just a theoretical scenario; it follows from developments on the ground.	这一地区级动荡绝不仅仅是理论上的可能； 而是实实在在的发展态势的产物。


Lebanon’s established political contours already are beginning to blur under the relentless pressure of the Syrian conflict.	黎巴嫩既成事实的政治格局已经开始因为来自叙利亚冲突的无情压力而变得模糊。


A zone of de facto control by Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces has emerged between Baalbek and Homs, straddling the Lebanese-Syrian border.	黎巴嫩真主党和叙利亚政府势力实际控制的地区已经在横跨黎叙边境的巴勒贝克（Baalbek）和霍姆斯（Homs）之间的地带产生。


Likewise, the fighting has created highly fluid conditions in the Kurdish-majority areas of Iraq and Syria.	类似地，战斗也让伊拉克和叙利亚库尔德人占多数的地区开始躁动不安。


Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq has effectively established de facto autonomy vis-à-vis the central government in Baghdad.	自萨达姆·侯赛因倒台以来，伊拉克北部的库尔德斯坦地区政府（KRG）实际上已经建立了与巴格达中央政府针锋相对的自治区。


Regional and domestic developments could push the Kurdish authorities in Erbil, their capital, toward declaring formal independence.	地区和国内发展态势可能让埃尔比勒（Erbil，库尔德斯坦地区首府）的库尔德当局宣布正式独立。


With its oil income and good neighborly relations with Turkey, such a state would be viable.	考虑到石油收入以及与土耳其的睦邻友好关系，这样一个国家是可以立足的。


Indeed, the KRG government has long made clear that it respects Turkish sovereignty and will not interfere with relations between Turkey’s government and its own Kurdish population.	事实上，KRG政府早就明确表示它尊重土耳其主权，也不会干涉土耳其政府与其自身库尔德人民之间的关系。


And, if only for its own security, the KRG is attempting to extend its power, formally or informally, into northern Syria.	此外，仅仅为了自身安全考虑，KRG正式或非正式地将其势力扩张进入叙利亚北部。


Regional acceptance of a Kurdish state-building project that transcends today’s KRG-controlled borders would depend, among other things, on the scale of the Kurds’ national ambitions.	超越现今KRG控制边界的库尔德国家建国工程能否获得地区接受的取决因素之一是库尔德建国雄心的大小。


From Turkey’s perspective, a confederation of Syria’s northeastern region with the KRG might be favorable to continuing domestic Kurdish unrest, much less rule by the anti-Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) along its border with Syria.	从土耳其的角度看，由叙利亚东北部地区���KRG组成的邦联可能有利于持续其国内库尔德人骚乱，大大减少反土耳其的库尔德工人党（PKK）在土叙边境的统治。


In contrast, any attempt by the KRG to establish a Kurdish corridor to the Mediterranean would certainly meet resistance, not only from Turkey, but also from other warring factions in Syria.	相反，KRG试图打造库尔德走廊直通地中海必然会遇到阻力，不但来自土耳其，也将来自其他叙利亚战斗派系。


What, however, would Kurdish independence mean for the rest of Iraq?	但是，库尔德独立对伊拉克其他地区意味着什么？


This is not only a question of territory, borders, and oil, but also one that concerns the domestic balance of power.	这不是关于领土、边境和石油的问题，而是关于国内实力平衡的问题。


With a Kurdish exit removing the third constituent element – besides Shia and Sunni Arabs – of Iraqi politics, the country’s sectarian polarization would most likely deepen.	库尔德人的离开意味着伊拉克政坛仅次于什叶派和逊尼派阿拉伯人的第三大组成部分不复存在，该国的宗派极化问题几乎肯定将有所加深。


Moreover, Kurdish independence could encourage demands for autonomy in the Sunni-majority provinces bordering Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – a third region where Syria’s civil war is blurring international borders.	此外，库尔德独立可能鼓励与叙利亚、约旦和沙特接壤的逊尼派占多数地区的自治要求——这也是叙利亚内战让国际边境变得模糊的第三个地区。


Social, tribal, and economic ties between the provinces of Deir al-Zour in Syria and Anbar in Iraq are strong and have strengthened further as control by the Syrian and Iraqi governments has loosened.	叙利亚代尔祖尔省（Deir al-Zour）和伊拉克安巴尔省（Anbar）的社会、部落和经济联系很强，随着叙利亚和伊拉克政府控制的松动，这种联系进一步强化了。


It is astonishing how many regional observers seem to expect, hope, or fear that such developments will somehow lead, almost automatically, to a “new Sykes-Picot” – that is, to the establishment of a new regional order in the Middle East created by today’s great powers.	奇怪的是，许多地区观察者似乎期待、希望或害怕这样的发展态势会在某种程度上（几乎自动地）导致“新赛克斯-皮科”——即今日大国一手早就的新的中东地区秩序。


(A Google search for “new Sykes Picot” in Arabic brings 52,600 hits.)	（在谷歌上用阿拉伯语搜索“新赛克斯-皮科”，能得到52 600个结果。


Such expectations are patently unrealistic.	）这些期望显然是不现实的。


Europeans and Americans have learned – and China, Russia, and others have learned from Western experience – that external powers cannot successfully engineer political arrangements or regional order in the Middle East.	欧洲人和美国人知道——中国、俄罗斯和其他国家的人则从西方经验中知道——外部势力无法成功地在中东树立政治安排和地区秩序。


Rather than pondering or devising new borders, regional and external powers need to focus their efforts on holding Syria together.	地区和外部势力不应该去思索和规划新边境，而需要将注意力集中在保持叙利亚完整上。


The planned Geneva II conference is a necessary first step.	计划中的日内瓦II会议是不可或缺的第一步。


To be sure, there are many reasons to be pessimistic about the willingness of Syria’s warring parties to engage in serious negotiations.	平心而论，有许多理由让人们对叙利亚敌对各方加入严肃谈判的意愿感到悲观。


Indeed, no one – not Russia, the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or other external patrons of either the regime or the opposition – can guarantee that Geneva II will succeed.	事实上，没有人——不论是俄罗斯、美国、伊朗、沙特还是其他任何支持政权或叛军的赞助者——能保证日内瓦II可以成功。


But all of them could improve conditions for negotiations by sending the same message to their respective Syrian clients, namely that they henceforth exclude a military victory by one side over the other.	但他们都能通过向各自的叙利亚客户释放相同的信号——即排除一方对另一方的军事胜利——来改善局面。


Thus, Russia and Iran will have to tell Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that they will not support his effort to seek a military victory.	因此，俄罗斯和伊朗必须告诉叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德，他们不会支持他寻求军事胜利。


Saudi Arabia, the US, Turkey, and others will have to tell the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that it will not win on the battlefield; the Salafists must hear this message from Saudi Arabia, too.	沙特、美国、土耳其和其他国家必须告诉叙利亚革命和反对派武装全国联盟（National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces）他们不可能在战场上取得胜利；


And Turkey and Qatar, for their part, will have to pass the same message to the Muslim Brotherhood.	沙拉菲派也必须从沙特那里得到这一信息。 土耳其和卡塔尔则必须向穆斯林兄弟会传递相同的信息。


The message to all of these groups should be consistent: We will continue to support you politically, financially, and in negotiations with the Syrian regime, but we will no longer support a military solution.	所有这些群体所获得信息必须是一致的：我们将在政治上、金融上以及在与叙利亚政权的谈判中继续支持你，但我们不会再支持军事解决方案。


This would be a strong incentive to go to Geneva.	这将是走向日内瓦的强大激励。


Warring parties start to negotiate seriously only if and when they know that other alternatives are out of reach.	敌对各方只有在明白别无选择时才会严肃对待谈判。


Europe in a Multipolar World	多极世界中的欧洲


BERLIN – One aspect of the Ukraine crisis that both Russia and the West need to understand is that the rest of the world appears to be relatively unconcerned about it.	柏林—关于乌克兰危机，俄罗斯和西方都需要理解的一个问题是世界其他国家相对来说并不太关注这一事件。


Though the West, along with Japan, may view the crisis as a challenge to the global order, most other states do not feel threatened by Russia’s annexation of Crimea or designs it may have elsewhere in Ukraine. Instead, many view this crisis as being largely about Europe’s inability to resolve its own regional disputes – though a successful outcome could bolster Europe’s global influence as a peacemaker.	尽管西方与日本可能将此次危机视为对全球秩序的挑战，但其他大部分国家并不会对俄罗斯吞并克里米亚或者觊觎乌克兰其余部分感到危险。


As the Ukraine crisis unfolded, Russian policymakers and commentators talked about “the end of the Post-Cold War era,” while Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Rogozin even appeared to welcome the start of a New Cold War.	随着乌克兰危机的展开，俄罗斯决策者和评论家大谈“后冷战时代的结束”，而俄罗斯副总理罗戈津（Dimitri Rogozin）甚至表示了欢迎新冷战的开始。


Such wishful thinking is predicated on the notion that conflict between Russia and the West would once again come to define the entire international system, thereby returning Russia to its former superpower status.	如果认为俄罗斯语西方之间的冲突将再次决定整个国际体系、进而让俄罗斯重获从前的超级大国地位，那么这些一厢情愿的预言并不难理解。


That is not going to happen.	但这并不会发生。


As emerging powers’ reactions to the Ukraine crisis demonstrate, world politics is no longer defined by what happens in Europe, even when a major conflict is brewing there.	正如新兴大国对乌克兰危机的反应所显示的，世界政治已不再决定于欧洲发生了什么，即便欧洲正在酝酿一场大冲突。


The international system has become so multi-polar that non-European states can now choose to follow their own interests rather than feel obliged to side with the East or the West.	国际体系已变得多极化，非欧洲国家大可选择追求自身利益而没有义务在东方和西方之间站队。


Few world leaders doubt that Russia’s use of force to compromise Ukraine’s territorial integrity, change its borders, and annex Crimea violated international law.	极少有世界领导人怀疑俄罗斯使用武力损害乌克兰领土完整、改变其边境并吞并克里米亚的行为违反了国际法。


China’s abstention in the subsequent United Nations Security Council vote clearly signaled its leaders’ displeasure with Kremlin policy.	中国在随后的联合国安理会投票中弃权，这明确显示了中国领导人对克里姆林宫政策的不满。


But nearly one-third of the UN’s members sent an equally emphatic message by abstaining or not participating in a General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s actions.	但近三分之一的联合国成员国用弃权或不参加联合国大会关于谴责俄罗斯行为的投票来传递同样强烈的信息。


Even Western-friendly governments – including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Israel – were not prepared to take sides.	即使亲西方的政府——包括巴西。 印度、南非和以色列——也不准备站队。


The Indian journalist Indrani Bagchi referred to the abstentions as a new form of non-alignment.	印度记者巴格奇（Indrani Bagchi）将弃权称为新形式的不结盟。


Cynicism and schadenfreude may also be playing a role.	怀疑派和幸灾乐祸派可能也在起作用。


Raja Mohan, a prominent Indian strategist, notes that Europe “has never ceased to lecture Asia on the virtues of regionalism,” but now seems unable to cope with its own regional security challenges.	印度著名战略家莫汉（Raja Mohan）指出，欧洲“从未向亚洲灌输地区主义的好处，”但如今它似乎根本无力处理自身的地区安全挑战。


The implicit message from the new non-aligned is straightforward: Why should we care about a territorial conflict in Europe when you Europeans fail to act decisively on Palestine, Kashmir, or territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas?	新不结盟运动的潜台词是显而易见的：你们欧洲人在巴勒斯坦、克什米尔和中国东海和南海的领土纠纷中都没有采取决定性行动，我们为什么要关心欧洲的领土冲突？


Instead, many of these countries are calling on the West to de-escalate the crisis and, as an official Chinese foreign-ministry statement advocated, to “exercise restraint and refrain from raising tensions.”	反之，这些国家中许多人要求西方遏制危机升级并且，正如中国外交部的一份正式声明所言，“保持克制，避免紧张局面加剧。 ”


That is good advice – and no different from what Europeans tell others in similar situations.	这些都是很好的建议——也与欧洲人在其他人陷入类似局面时给出的建议没有区别。


Unlike other regions of the world, however, Europe, including Russia, can be proud of its regional security organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Europe needs to make them work.	但是，与世界其他地区不同，欧洲（包括俄罗斯）有引以为傲的地区安全组织，如欧洲安全与合作组织（Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe，简称“欧安组织”）； 欧洲需要让这些组织起作用。


The OSCE, for example, would be greatly strengthened if, using its wide range of diplomatic mechanisms (such as roundtable discussions and support for constitutional reforms), it succeeded in defusing the Ukraine crisis and thereby bolstered European security.	比如，欧安组织可以利用其广泛的外交手段（如圆桌会议和支持宪政改革）淡化乌克兰危机，从而增进欧洲安全。


Doing so would also provide a powerful example of institutionalized regionalism that might serve as a conflict-resolution model for other countries.	如若成功，欧安组织也将得到极大的强化，还能提供一个有力的例子证明机构化地区主义能够作为冲突解决模式，其他国家也可以仿效。


Alternatively, if Europe is unable to resolve the Ukraine crisis with diplomacy, its global influence, and that of Russia, will surely fade.	或者，如果欧洲无力用外交手段解决乌克兰危机，其（以及俄罗斯的）全球影响力将必然有所损失。


Russia has reminded the world that it is possible to bully one’s neighbors and steal their territory using brute force; but, in a globalized, multi-polar system, this alone will not be enough to rally other countries to its cause.	俄罗斯已经向世界表明，它有可能恃强凌弱，用残暴的武力从邻邦窃取领土； 但是，在一个全球化的多极体系中，光凭这一点是无法让其他国家臣服的。


And the EU, as a highly sophisticated paper tiger, would be no more attractive.	而身为高度发达的纸老虎的欧盟也不会比俄罗斯更有吸引力。


EU member states have no interest in letting their continent slip back into ethnic nationalism and power politics.	让欧洲大陆重新分裂、陷入种族民族主义和权力政治不符合欧盟成员国的利益。


The Ukraine crisis is therefore both a challenge and an opportunity.	因此，乌克兰危机既是挑战，也是机遇。


If Europe wants to remain a pole in a multi-polar international system, it must prove that it can pursue a common foreign and security policy, particularly in times of crisis and conflict.	如果欧洲想保持其在多极国际体系中一极的地位，就必须证明它能够追求共同外交和安全政策，特别是在危机与冲突时期。


That means that the EU must emerge from the Ukraine crisis with a stronger commitment to common defense and joint contingency planning, and a unified energy policy that can secure independence from Russian oil and gas.	这意味着欧盟必须拿出更有力的共同防务和联合应急计划承诺以及能确保摆脱俄罗斯石油和天然气依赖的统一的能源政策来应对乌克兰危机。


But Europe must also show that it can, and will, defend the principles of rules-based international relations.	但欧洲还必须证明它可以也愿意捍卫基于规则的国际关系原则。


Maintaining and strengthening the pillars of Europe’s common defense is not a simple task; but multilateral security organizations like the OSCE are not made for easy times.	维持和强化欧洲共同防务基石不是一个简单的任务； 但成立欧安组织等多边安全组织也不是为了享受。


They are intended to protect members from manipulation and aggression, and in a way that can garner global support.	它们是为了保护成员国免受操纵和侵略、保证它们能获得全球支持而成立的。


In this sense, Europe’s main task now is to leverage its already considerable strategic assets.	从这个角度讲，目前欧洲的主要任务是利用其已经拥有的巨大的战略资产。


A Syrian Farewell to Arms	叙利亚版永别了，武器


BERLIN – The Geneva II conference on Syria, set to begin in Montreux, Switzerland, on January 22, is unlikely to achieve its goal of forming a transitional governing authority with full executive powers.	柏林——1月22日即将在瑞士蒙特勒召开的叙利亚问题第二次日内瓦会议不太可能成功组建具有完全行政能力的过渡性管理机构。


But what it can do is launch a much-needed political process and, more important, produce a ceasefire agreement between government and opposition forces.	但此次会议可以启动迫切需要的政治进程，更重要的是，制定政府和反对派之间的停火协议。


Only when the fighting has stopped can Syria make genuine progress toward a political transition.	只有战斗停止，叙利亚才能走向真正的政治过渡。


Of course, Al Qaeda-linked jihadist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has become a potent force on the ground, and the Nusra Front will not and should not be represented in Montreux – not least because they will not feel bound by any agreement.	当然，像伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰教国（ISIS）和努斯拉阵线这样与基地组织挂���的圣战团体已经形成了一股强大的力量，他们既不能也不该出现在蒙特勒会议——尤其考虑到他们任何协议也不会遵守。


But this should not serve as an excuse not to pursue a ceasefire.	但这不该成为不努力实现停火的借口。


After all, even stopping the fighting between regime forces and some armed groups – that is, those that associate themselves with the Syrian National Coalition, or are at least willing to coordinate with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the partly Saudi-sponsored Islamic Front – would be a major achievement.	毕竟，即使在政府军和某些武装团体（与叙利亚全国联盟有联系或至少愿意和叙利亚自由军及部分由沙特资助的伊斯兰阵线合作）之间实现停战也将是一项重大的成就。


A ceasefire is critical, because the fighting serves the interests of the most brutal elements on both sides of the conflict.	停火至关重要，因为战争只与冲突双方最残酷份子的利益相符。


This includes the core leadership of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which is now supported by Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, as much as the ISIS, which is composed largely of non-Syrian fighters who are unconcerned about rebuilding the country or safeguarding its people’s future.	这其中包括总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的核心领导，阿萨德政权目前拥有黎巴嫩真主党、伊拉克民兵和伊拉克与叙利亚伊斯兰教国（ISIS）等团体的支持。 ISIS成员大多由非叙利亚籍战士组成，他们不关心国家重建，也不关心保护叙利亚民众的未来。


As in any civil war, such entrepreneurs of violence become increasingly likely to carry the day the longer the conflict endures.	像在任何内战中一样，冲突持续的时间越长暴力煽动者就胜算越大。


They feed on their own atrocities or on those of their opponents to win support through fear rather than conviction – using videos to raise funds and recruit new members.	他们从自己和对手的暴行中得到滋养，利用恐惧而不是信念来获得支持——还利用视频筹资和招募新成员。


With skilled fighters and plenty of money and arms, the ISIS and the Nusra Front thrive amid persistent war and anarchy.	凭借有经验的战士和充足的资金武器，叙利亚伊斯兰教国和努斯拉阵线在长期的战争和无政府状态下不断扩充势力。


Meanwhile, the Assad regime benefits from the fact that parts of the country that it no longer controls cannot be called “liberated zones,” given the prevailing chaos and extremism in these areas.	同时，鉴于非阿萨德政权控制区混乱和极端主义势力迅速蔓延，实际情况离“解放区”相去甚远，这种状况导致阿萨德政权从中受益。


A ceasefire would initiate a shift in this dynamic, allowing humanitarian supplies to reach the areas where they are needed most urgently, while halting the country’s gradual “Somalization.”	停火将逐渐改变现状，允许人道主义物资抵达需求最迫切的地区并遏止叙利亚日趋“索马里化”。


This would help to stem the flow of refugees – and the spillover of violence – to neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and Iraq.	停火将有助于阻止难民潮流往邻国（特别是黎巴嫩和伊拉克），也有利于阻止暴力范围不断扩大。


Furthermore, if the ceasefire held, it would facilitate economic reconstruction, while enabling moderate political actors and civil society to win back some power from the extremists – a shift that ordinary Syrians would welcome.	此外，停火有利于重建经济，有利于温和政治势力和民间团体从极端分子手中夺回部分权力——而这样的转变符合普通叙利亚民众的利益。


Indeed, people in jihadist-controlled areas are deeply unhappy with Al Qaeda thugs terrorizing them and trying to enforce their version of Islamic mores – so much so that the Assad regime increasingly appears to be a better alternative to continued warfare or an Al Qaeda takeover.	事实上，圣战势力控制区的普通百姓对基地组织打手的恐吓及执行所谓伊斯兰教习俗深感不满——乃至于阿萨德政权与长期战乱或基地组织接管相比越来越成为一种不错的选择。


The problem is that, as long as violence prevents moderate forces from restoring local services and administrative structures, people’s capacity for resistance will remain weak.	问题在于只要暴力阻止温和派恢复当地服务及行政机制的行为依然存在，人们仍然并不具备多强的反抗能力。


International organizations could treat such structures as de facto authorities, supplying them directly with aid and also giving NGOs or United Nations investigators an opportunity to collect evidence of war crimes for future judicial or truth-commission proceedings.	国际组织可以把上述机制作为事实政府，在直接为其提供援助的同时也为非政府组织或联合国调查机构提供搜集战争罪证据，并用于未来司法或真相委员会诉讼的机遇。


To be sure, fears that a ceasefire could lead to a stabilization of the conflict’s frontlines, turning them into semi-permanent lines of division, are not without merit.	可以肯定，担心停火导致冲突前线稳定并形成半永久性分割并非没有道理。


After all, a ceasefire is not a peace agreement; it would, for the time being, leave regime and opposition forces in their respective positions.	毕竟，停火不是和平协议； 它只能暂时使政府和反对派武装停留在各自的位置。


But having different authorities administer different parts of Syria is preferable to the absence of any responsible governance across large swaths of the country.	但让不同政府分治叙利亚好过没有任何政府能管理大片领土。


Moreover, a ceasefire would enable the FSA and its allies to coordinate action with units of the regular army against Al Qaeda bands, which would undoubtedly try to sustain the violence.	此外，停火能让叙利亚自由军及其盟友与正规部队协调行动打击持续进行暴力活动的基地组织。


Even such limited cooperation would advance the “Geneva process” – especially negotiations aimed at establishing a transitional authority that would command the armed forces.	即便如此有限的合作也能推进“日内瓦进程”——特别是旨在建立过渡性政府指挥军队的谈判努力。


Given that the Assad regime has overwhelming firepower, its consent is vital to achieving a ceasefire agreement.	鉴于阿萨德政府拥有压倒性优势火力，其赞成与否对签订停火协议至关重要。


Responsibility for convincing Assad to stop bombing and shelling opposition-held areas would fall primarily on his international allies, Russia and Iran.	阿萨德的国际盟友俄罗斯和伊朗需要承担起说服他停止轰炸和炮击反对派控制区的主要责任。


In doing so, they should bear in mind that it was Assad who led the country into civil war by choosing a military solution when high-level members of his own government and political party argued for a negotiated settlement.	在此过程中，他们应该牢记阿萨德是叙利亚战争的始作俑者，是他在政府高层和政党主张谈判时选择用军事手段来解决问题。


Neither Russia nor Iran has an interest in prolonging a war that is destabilizing the Middle East and fostering the spread of Al Qaeda-style extremism.	将导致中东动荡和基地极端主义蔓延的战争继续下去既不利于俄国也不利于伊朗。


Indeed, both have already helped to bring the Syrian regime to Geneva.	事实上，上述两国都在促成叙利亚政权来到日内瓦。


Now, they must make their support for Assad’s delegation conditional upon his acceptance of a ceasefire.	现在，他们必须把接受停火作为支持阿萨德代表团的先决条件。


Otherwise, prospects for an outcome that leaves Syria intact and viable will only become bleaker.	否则，保持叙利亚完整的前景只会变得更加暗淡。


Pensioners and Populism	退休者和民粹主义


NEW YORK – If Donald Trump loses the US election, will the tide of populism that threatened to overwhelm the world after the Brexit vote in June begin to wane?	纽约—如果唐纳德·特朗普输掉美国大选，在6月英国退欧公投后眼看就要席卷全世界的民粹主义浪潮会不会开始消退？


Or will the revolt against globalization and immigration simply take another form?	还是反对全球化和移民的叛逆潮将以另外一种形式出现？


The rise of protectionism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Britain, America, and Europe is widely believed to reflect stagnant incomes, widening inequality, structural unemployment, and even excessive monetary easing.	人们广泛认为，英国、美国和欧洲保护主义和反移民情绪的崛起反映了收入停滞、不平等性加剧、结构性就业和过度的货币宽松。


But there are several reasons to question the link between populist politics and economic distress.	但出于一些原因，应该质疑民粹主义政治和经济不景气之间的联系。


For starters, most populist voters are neither poor nor unemployed; they are not victims of globalization, immigration, and free trade.	首先，大部分民粹主义选民不穷，也有工作； 他们不是全球化、移民和自由贸易的受害者。


The main demographic groups behind the anti-establishment upsurge have been people outside the workforce: pensioners, middle-aged homemakers, and men with low educational qualifications receiving disability payments.	反建制情绪高涨的主力军是劳动力之外的人群：退休者、中年家庭主妇和主夫以及享受残疾救济的教育程度较低的男性。


In Britain, where detailed analyses of the votes actually cast in the Brexit referendum are now available, the group most directly affected by low-wage competition from immigrants and Chinese imports – young people under 35 – voted against Brexit by a wide margin, 65% to 35%.	在英国，英国退欧公投实际投票详细情况分析已经出炉，受到来自移民和中国进口品的低工资竞争的直接影响最大的人群——35岁以下年轻人以很大比例（65%对35%）反对英国退欧。


Meanwhile, 60% of pensioners who voted backed the “Leave” campaign, as did 59% of voters with disabilities.	与此同时，60%的退休者以及59%的残疾选民投票支持“脱欧”阵营。


By contrast, 53% of full-time workers who participated wanted Britain to remain in Europe, as did 51% of part-time workers.	相反，53%参与投票的全职工人希望英国留在欧洲，兼职工人则为51%。


The British data suggest that cultural and ethnic attitudes, not direct economic motivations, are the real distinguishing features of anti-globalization voting.	英国的数据表明，文化和种族态度，而不是直接的经济动机，才是反全球化投票真正的区别因素。


Asked whether “social liberalism” is a “force for good” or a “force for ill,” 87% of “Remain” voters said it was a force for good, while 53% of Leave voters called liberalism a “force for ill.”	在被问及“社会自由主义”是“好力量”还是“坏力量”时，87%的“留欧”选民说它是好力量，53%的脱欧选民说自由主义是坏力量。


On “multiculturalism,” the difference was even starker – 65% of Leave voters were against it, while 86% of Remainers approved.	在“多元文化主义”问题上，差距更大——65%的脱欧选民反对它，86%的留欧派支持它。


Another analysis published by the BBC after the referendum found one of the strongest predictors of a Leave vote to be support for capital punishment.	另一项公投后BBC发表的分析发现，脱欧投票的最强指标是对死刑的支持。


In America, polls suggest that gender is an even more important indicator of support for Trump than age or education.	在美国，民调显示性别是比年龄和教育程度更重要的支持特朗普指标。


Early this month, when Trump was only a few points behind Clinton in overall support, a Washington Post/ABC poll compared voting intentions with the 2012 election.	本月初，特朗普在总支持率上只落后克林顿几个点，一份《华盛顿邮报》/美国广播公司民调比较了2012年的选举倾向。


It found not only that white men backed Trump by a margin of 40 percentage points, but also that their support for Trump was 13 points higher that it was for Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican nominee.	调查发现，白人支持特朗普的比例比不支持高40个百分点，并且在2012年的大选中，支持共和党提名人米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）的白人男性比例也要比不支持高出13个百分点。


White women, by contrast, marginally supported Clinton and had swung by 15 percentage points against the Republicans.	相反，白人女性支持克林顿的比例略高，反对共和党的比例在15个百分点上下。


Among voters without a college education, the gender difference was even starker: less-educated white men favored Trump by a 60% margin and had swung in favor of the Republicans by 28 percentage points, while women had swung by ten percentage points in the opposite direction and only marginally supported Trump.	在没有大学文凭的选民中，性别差异更加明显：教育程度较低的白人男性支持特朗普的优势高达60%，支持共和党的优势为28个百分点，而女性支持民主党的优势为十个百分点，支持特朗普的比例只是略高。


It seems, therefore, that the conflicts generally ascribed to economic grievances and globalization are actually the latest battles in the culture wars that have split Western societies since the late 1960s.	因此，这一通常归因为经济仇恨和全球化的冲突实际上只是自20世纪60年代末以来撕裂西方社会的文化战争的最新战役。


The main relevance of economics is that the 2008 financial crisis created conditions for a political backlash by older, more conservative voters, who have been losing the cultural battles over race, gender, and social identity.	最重要的经济意义是2008年金融危机形成了有利于年纪较长、思想较保守的选民政治逆袭的条件，而他们一直是种族、性别和社会身份的文化战斗中的输家。


The dominance of free-market ideology before the crisis allowed many controversial social changes, ranging from income inequality and intensified wage competition to greater gender equality and affirmative action, to go almost unchallenged.	危机前占主导地位的自由市场思想让许多争议性社会变化——从收入不平等和激烈的工资竞争到更大的性别平等和平权法案——几乎无人挑战。


“Progressive” social liberalism and “conservative” free-market economics seemed to be two sides of the same coin.	“进步的”社会自由主义和“保守的”自由市场经济学似乎是同一枚硬币的两面。


But when free-market economic liberalism failed in the 2008 crisis, political challenges to social liberalism could no longer be deflected by invoking impersonal economic laws.	但当自由市场经济自由主义在2008年危机中破产时，对社会自由主义的政治挑战便不再能够引用非人化的经济学定律来解决。


But if social change can no longer be legitimized as the necessary condition for economic progress, it seems unlikely that democracies will now vote to reinstate the social conditions before the ascendancy of economic liberalism and globalization.	但既然社会变化不再能够合法化为经济进步的必要条件，民主国家也就不可能投票恢复经济自由主义和全球化成为主流之前的社会条件。


Racial and gender equality are now backed by clear majorities in the US, Britain, and most European countries, and even apparently popular policies such as trade protectionism and strict immigration controls rarely muster more than 30-40% support in opinion surveys.	现在，美国、英国和大部分欧洲国家均已明确多数支持种族和性别平等，而即使是显然受到欢迎的政策，如贸易保护主义和严格的移民管制，也很少在民意调查中赢得30—40%以上的支持。


Why, then, did Brexit win, and why is it still possible that Donald Trump will be the next US President?	那么，为何英国退欧能胜出，又为何唐纳德·特朗普仍有可能当选下任美国总统？


Both Brexit and Trump were powered by an unstable alliance between two very different, even contradictory, movements.	英国退欧和特朗普背后均有一个不稳定的联盟，它由两股截然不同甚至互相矛盾的运动组成。


The bulk of their supporters were indeed social conservatives and protectionists who wanted to undo the social changes that began in the late 1960s.	两者的大部分支持者事实上都是希望扼杀始于20世纪60年代末的社会变化的社会保守派和保护主义者。


Two of the most effective slogans of the Brexit and Trump campaigns have been “Take back control” and “I want my country back.”	英国退欧和特朗普选战的两个最有效的口号是“夺回控制”和“我要祖国回来”。


But the social conservatives inspired by such atavistic and authoritarian sentiments do not make up majorities in any Western country.	但受这一“返祖”的极权情绪驱动的社会保守派在任何西方国家都没有达到多数。


On its own, social conservatism could never mobilize more than 30-40% of voters.	仅凭一己之力，社会保守主义绝无可能动员超过30—40%的选民。


To achieve majorities, the socially conservative protectionists had to unite with the remnants of the Thatcher-Reagan laissez faire movement, who resent the interventionist economic management of the post-2008 period and want to intensify the competition, deregulation, and globalization that social conservatives resent.	要获得多数，社会保守型保护主义者必须联合撒切尔夫人-里根自由放任运动的残余势力，后者憎恨2008年后的干预主义经济管理，希望加强社会保守派所憎恨的竞争、去监管和全球化。


This unstable political compound is now dissolving in the US, and also in Britain, where Prime Minister Theresa May’s government is divided between ideological nationalists and economic liberals.	这一不稳定的政治结合现在正在美国分崩离析，英国也是如此，首相梅的政府分裂为意识形态上的民族主义者和经济自由派两个阵营。


If the US election on November 8 confirms Trump’s failure to bind social conservatives and economic liberals into a winning coalition, similar disintegration is likely among European populists, too.	如果11月8日的美国大选确认特朗普无法结合社会保守派和经济自由派，使之成为一个无往而不利的联盟，则欧洲民粹主义者也可能陷入类似的分崩离析。


In that case, the Brexit vote will begin to look like an aberration – not the start of a powerful new trend toward nationalism, protectionism, and de-globalization, but the end of a backlash against modernity by an unstable alliance of social authoritarians and laissez faire market liberals.	果真如此的话，英国退欧投票将只是一个偏差——不是通往民族主义、保护主义和去全球化的强大新趋势的起点，而是由社会极权主义者和自由放任市场自由派组成的不稳定联盟对现代性的反动的终结。


It will be the last gasp of an aging generation that tried to impose its nostalgic parochialism on an increasingly cosmopolitan younger generation, but succeeded in only one unfortunate country.	它将是日渐老去的一代试图将他们的老旧本位主义凌驾于日益信奉世界大同的年轻一代之上的最后一搏，但这一尝试只在一个不幸的国家取得了一次成功。


Waiting for Obama	期待奥巴马的到来


This is the season for Asian gatherings. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Thailand in late October brought all the key players of Asia together.	最近正是亚洲各国举行会谈的时节，10月末在泰国召开的东南亚国家联盟峰会把亚洲各国的所有重要领导人都聚集到了一起。


Come mid-November, almost all of them will meet again in Singapore at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which will include other Pacific leaders, plus US President Barack Obama.	而在不久后的11月中旬，上述领导人都将在新加坡举行的亚太经合组织峰会上再度汇聚一堂，此外参加亚太经合峰会的包括其他太平洋国家领导人，特别是美国总统奥巴马。


Summits are a circus with many rings and acronyms.	峰会这东西堪称一个充斥着帮派和暗语的大聚会。


At the ASEAN summit, the 10 Southeast Asian leaders met counterparts from China, Japan, and South Korea.  These 13 countries then met again with India, Australia, and New Zealand.	在东盟峰会上来自10个东南亚国家的首脑将与中日韩三国领导人会面。 随后这13个国家的首脑将共同会见来自印度，澳大利亚和新西兰的到访者。


Some 42 agreements were reportedly penned at the meeting, on issues ranging from outstanding trade and economic matters to the launch of a human rights commission.	据报道，本次东盟峰会共签署了大约42项协议，内容涵盖尚未解决的贸易经济问题以及人权委员会的成立事宜。


Not bad for a summit that some feared would not happen at all: an earlier meeting planned for April in Bangkok had been disrupted by protesters – “red shirts” who support ousted Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra.	而这样的结果对于一场曾经连是否能举办都成问题的峰会来说已经不错了：须知早先计划4月在曼谷举行的会议就被支持前首相他信·西那瓦的“红衫军”给搅黄了。


As for Obama, he will first visit Japan, and, while at APEC, will also attend the first US-ASEAN Summit.	而对奥巴马来说，这位新任美国总统将首度访问日本，然后在亚太经合组织会议上出席首届美国-东盟峰会。


Afterwards, he will go to China and South Korea. What additional dimension might America’s president bring on his first visit to the region?	随后他将前往中国和韩国进行访问，那么在他对该地区的首访之中，奥巴马又将带来什么额外的亮点呢？


Obama is still fighting back home for his healthcare initiative, and is hamstrung from acting on climate change in time for the Copenhagen summit, which is to agree on a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol.	就目前而言，奥巴马依然深陷在美国国内卫生法案的政治斗争当中难以自拔，而且也难以及时地为即将给京都议定书制定后续协议的哥本哈根峰会做点什么。


So there is a risk that he will come to Asia for just a star turn and photo opportunities while reserving his strength for other battles.	因此奥巴马此次亚洲之行很可能只不过是为了亮个相合个影，因为他还要把自己的精力留到其他的政治斗兽场上使用。


But more is needed and should be expected of him.	但是，人们对他的需要和期望可远远不止于此。


Starting with Japan, Obama needs to ensure a good working relationship with Yukio Hatoyama, the new premier.	先从日本开始，奥巴马必须确保和新首相鸠山由纪夫建立一个良好的工作关系。


Japan has voiced support for an East Asian community that includes India, Australia, and New Zealand, while the Chinese and others question widening the circle.	因为日本已经表态支持成立一个包含印度，澳大利亚和新西兰在内的东亚国家集团，而中国和其他国家则对此表示质疑。


The US should welcome the Japanese initiative and engage with Asia as a whole.	美国应该对日本的这一提案表示欢迎，并尝试与作为一个整体的亚洲展开合作。


Keeping Japan close is a starting point.	因此和日本保持密切的关系将是一个好的开始。


Moving onto ASEAN, much attention will be on how Obama interacts with Myanmar’s leader, who will also be present.	而对于东盟来说，大部分注意力将集中在奥巴马如何与即将出席峰会的缅甸军政府领导人互动的问题上。


Obama should stand for democracy and help push for a clean vote in the elections that the junta has promised for 2010.	在此奥巴马必须坚持民主的立场，并推动缅甸军阀承诺的2010年大选，使之成为一场廉洁透明的选举。


But there are other, broader opportunities.	但其实还有其他更广泛的机会。


ASEAN has been the hub for Asian regionalism, but some in Australia have proposed focusing only on the larger countries.	东盟是亚洲地方主义的轴心，但有些来自澳大利亚的声音则提议只关注那些比较大的国家。


Southeast Asians have a renewed openness towards American leadership, and meaningful initiatives can be started that would resonate with regional aspirations.	东南亚各国如今都对美国的新领导层敞开了胸怀，只要美方能够拿出一些有意义的提议，就必然能与该地区各国的意愿产生共鸣。


One such initiative is for freer trade.	而这类提议的其中之一就是自由贸易协定。


While the US has stood on the sidelines, intra-Asian agreements have run ahead.	当美国人还在袖手旁观之时，亚洲内部的自由贸易协定已经走在了前面。


US Senator Richard Lugar has floated the idea of a free-trade agreement between the US and ASEAN.	美国国会参议员理查德·卢加尔已经提出了建立美国-东盟自由贸易协定的想法。


But, with Myanmar included, this may be too difficult politically, and an ASEAN sub-grouping may be more realistic.	但是由于缅甸的问题，这在政治上显然十分困难，因此与东盟内部某些更小范围的国家集团签订协议将是更现实的做法。


Another option is for the US to press for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.	美国的另外一个选项则是推动成立一个泛太平洋伙伴关系。


This was proposed late in the Bush administration in order to forge links with some ASEAN members – Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei – as well as others across the Pacific.	这个理念在小布什执政后期已经提出，目的是为了和某些东盟成员国构建联系——比如新加坡，越南和文莱——同时也涵盖其他太平洋国家。


This could be built up to include other open Southeast Asian economies – Malaysia and Thailand – with the eventual aim being an APEC-wide agreement, which would be an impressive achievement if realized by the end of 2011, when it will be Obama’s turn to play host to all the leaders.	这还将囊括其他的东南亚开放经济体——比如马来西亚和泰国——而最终目标则是实现一个与亚太经合组织作用范围相类似的协定，如果该协定能在2011年奥巴马在美国举行会议招待各国元首之时实现的话，那将是一个伟大的成果。


In this time of crisis and unemployment, the American public may question freer trade.	在目前经济危机和高失业率的困扰下，美国公众可能会对自由贸易协定有所质疑。


But more and more American businesses realize that still-growing Asian markets are vital for their future profits and overall economic recovery.	但越来越多的美国企业也都意识到，保持着持续增长的亚洲市场对于企业未来的盈利和经济的整体复原都是至关重要的。


Most economic frameworks are among Asians only, but an American initiative could trump them and ensure that the region remains open and engaged with the US.	目前来说��绝大多数经济框架的实施都只局限在亚洲内部，但美国的提议将对这些国家有所鼓舞，并确保该地区在继续保持开放的同时和美国保持联系。


It could also help lessen the tendency of some governments to gravitate ever closer towards the booming Chinese economy.	而这也将缓解某些国家政府向中国经济逐渐靠拢的趋势。


Of course, when Obama arrives in Beijing, he must continue to strengthen cooperation with China.	当然，当奥巴马到达北京的时候，他必须继续巩固和中国的关系。


On the economic crisis, climate change, and many other global issues, China and the US are potentially the decisive actors.	在经济危机，气候变化和其它全球议题上，中美两国都是潜在的具有决定意义的参与者。


But the US must also engage in a more multilateral way to include Southeast Asia’s smaller countries.	但美国也必须采用某种更加多边主义的手段去拉拢东南亚小国。


China has been charming them over the past decade, and the US must offer an attractive alternative.	须知在过去十年中，中国对这些小国释放了极大的吸引力，而今美国也必须提供另一个有吸引力的选择。


To cynics, APEC is a talking shop, while ASEAN is an arena for an ongoing contest between China and Japan, with India on the side.	对于那些批评者来说，亚太经合组织只是一个空谈茶馆，而东盟则是中日两国正面交锋，印度则从旁暗中使劲的竞技场。


But, despite the rivalries and all the chatter, it is clear that Asians are coming closer together.	但尽管充满着敌意和抱怨，亚洲各国正走得越来越近的趋势是再明显不过的。


And, while Asian regionalism is messy and rife with tensions and flash points, the US has been the stabilizing power in the region.	而虽然亚洲的地方主义极端混乱，而且充满紧张和摩擦，美国依然是该地区的稳定性力量。


Obama has the opportunity to ensure that the region continues to see the US as the essential actor – now more open and helpful than before.	如今奥巴马有机会去确保该地区继续将美国视为必不可少的参与者——而且是比以前更开放更有裨益的参与者。


If he achieves this, Obama’s long trip will be valuable for Americans, and Asians will realize that it was worth waiting for him.	如果他能促成这一点，奥巴马这趟漫长的旅行将对美国人大有益处，而亚洲的人们也将意识到，等待他的到来是值得的。


Europe’s Wake-Up Call	唤醒欧洲的呼声


BRUSSELS – There’s a silver lining to the dark clouds of populist Euroskepticism crowding in on the European Union.	布鲁塞尔——欧盟上空弥漫着民粹主义欧洲怀疑论的阴云，但也不乏一线生机。


In Brussels and a number of Europe’s capitals, leaders know that the EU must respond to mounting discontent, and that – at long last – there is political capital to be gained in doing so.	布鲁塞尔和欧洲其他首都的领袖知道欧盟必须对民众日益增长的不满情绪作出反应，并且——这样做可以获得政治资本的一天终于到来了。


The catalyst has been the United Kingdom’s often-nonsensical “Brexit” debate.	催化剂是常常无厘头的“英国退欧”辩论。


The arguments of “Leave” campaigners are frequently inaccurate, when they are not outright lies; but the furious debate in Britain over whether to remain in Europe has laid bare the EU’s deep-seated weaknesses – and has forced European leaders to stop ignoring them.	“退欧”宣传者的论据往往并不准确，甚至可以说是十足的谎言； 但英国就留欧与否展开的激烈辩论暴露了欧盟根深蒂固的弱点——并迫使欧洲领导人正视它的存在。


The rise of Europe’s populist parties is exerting similar pressure across the continent.	欧洲民粹主义党派的崛起正在影响整个欧洲。


And yet, though feared, they have scant political credibility; the UK’s Brexiteers, by contrast, include government ministers who count the EU’s supposedly undemocratic decision-making among its main shortcomings.	民粹主义虽然令人害怕，但却缺乏政治可信度； 相反，英国的退欧支持者却包括政府部长，他们认为欧盟的主要缺点包括所谓的非民主决策。


In fact, the EU’s chief failures have little to do with democracy.	事实上，欧盟的主要问题与民主没有多大关系。


The chaos of the refugee and migrant crisis, Europe’s inadequate response to the Arab Spring of 2011, the Ukraine crisis three years later, and Russia’s assertiveness cannot be blamed on how the EU reaches decisions.	难民和移民危机所造成的混乱、欧洲对2011年阿拉伯之春革命的应对失据、之后3年爆发的乌克兰危机和俄罗斯的强硬态度都不能归咎于欧盟的决策方式。


But they do underscore its inability to react quickly and decisively.	但上述事实却切实凸显出欧盟缺乏迅速果断采取措施的能力。


Worse still, they highlight its failure to head off trouble by agreeing on clear economic and security strategies.	更糟糕的是，它们彰显了欧盟缺乏通过达成明确的经济和安全战略来防止麻烦发生的能力。


Nonetheless, democracy is key to the EU’s future.	尽管如此，民主仍是欧盟未来的关键问题。


For years, critics have pointed to Europe’s “democratic deficit.”	多年以来，批评人士一直指责欧洲的“民主赤字”。


The Council of Ministers – which, together with the European Parliament, makes up the EU’s legislature – is as impenetrably secretive as that of North Korea; indeed, it operates behind closed doors, without any public record of who said what.	与欧洲议会共同构成欧盟立法机构的欧洲部长理事会就像朝鲜一样充满秘密； 事实上，上述委员会一贯闭门造车，从未留下任何的公共发言记录。


There have been modest moves to increase the European Parliament’s powers, but they have not been recognized sufficiently by the European public to quiet complaints.	的确爆发过加大欧洲议会权力的温和运动，但尚未得到欧洲民众的充分认可以平息他们的不满情绪。


Mollifying voters’ antipathy to the EU will require substantial change, and that uncomfortable truth is beginning to dawn on Europe’s mainstream politicians.	缓和选民对欧盟的愤怒需要大力改变现状，欧洲主流政治家已经开始意识到这一令人不安的现实。


EU governments’ main fear has been that a vote for Brexit on June 23 will unleash a stream of copycat referendums elsewhere.	欧盟各国政府主要担心6月23日的英国退欧公投会导致其他地方纷纷跟进。


It certainly would deal a devastating blow to the EU’s credibility, both in its member states and abroad.	这无疑会在欧盟成员国及海外对欧盟的信誉造成毁灭性的打击。


But a British decision to remain would be almost as bad, if the EU institutions in Brussels simply heaved a sigh of relief and returned to business-as-usual, leaving dysfunctional structures untouched.	但如果布鲁塞尔的欧盟机构仅仅在长出一口气的同时一切照旧，不改革阻碍正常发挥职能的结构性问题，那么即使英国决定留下，最终结果也好不到哪去。


In that case, the populists would use the bogeyman of the EU “superstate” to gnaw away at mainstream parties’ grassroots support.	在那种情况下，民粹主义者将利用欧盟“凌驾于国家之上的”可怕之处一步步蚕食民众对于主流政党的支持。


What sort of democratic reform, then, might be envisaged?	那么，究竟什么样的民主改革应当尽快落实？


The last time this question was asked was in 2005, when French and Dutch referendums torpedoed the EU’s proposed Constitutional Treaty.	最后一次提出这个问题是在2005年，当时法国及荷兰公投大肆攻击欧盟拟议中的《宪法条约》。


The EU was at its apogee at the time, lifted by the new euro and the ambitious “Big Bang” eastward enlargement of 2004; so the chances of securing change today, when the EU is at its nadir of popularity, would at first sight seem even more unlikely.	在新欧元和2004年雄心勃勃的“大爆炸式”东扩运动的提振下，欧盟当时正处在全盛时期。 因此今天在欧盟的历史低点落实改革乍看上去似乎很不乐观。


In fact, the opposite could be true.	其实情况可能恰恰相反。


When the “European project” was thriving, only a few visionaries saw the need for centralizing more powers.	“欧洲计划”一枝独秀的时候，只有少数远见卓识者认为有必要集中更多的权力。


It may look counter-intuitive, but Europe's falling productivity and shrinking workforce signal even tougher times ahead and strengthen the case for an EU that is more efficient, as well as more democratically responsive.	现在或许看上去有悖常理，但欧洲的生产率下降和劳动人口缩减预示着今后经济难度将进一步加大，因此有必要改革欧盟的效率和民主响应能力。


And that's the trickiest question of all.	而这是最棘手的问题。


How can the EU transform ramshackle decision-making mechanisms that have been re-jigged and subject to makeshift additions for almost 40 years into an efficient, working democracy?	欧盟该如何将40年来一直可以临时改变的摇摇欲坠的决策机制改造为高效、实际的民主制度？


Standing in the way is the prized sovereignty of 28 countries with very different political cultures and a host of conflicting national and regional interests.	起阻碍作用的是政治文化迥异的28个国家所珍视的主权和一系列相互冲突的国家和地区利益。


There are no obvious models to draw on.	在这个问题上找不到可以借鉴的明确模式。


Political scientists have suggested scores of ideas, ranging from the re-introduction of double mandates (giving national MPs a seat in the European Parliament) to the creation of an EU Senate in a bicameral system.	政治学家提出了不少观点，从重新引入双重任务（赋予国家议员欧洲议会席位）到成立欧盟参议院推行两院制。


But the details of a more democratic EU, in which the Commission would be made truly accountable to the public, are less important than the political will to move forward.	但欧盟委员会真正对公众负责并实现欧盟进一步民主化的具体规定相比取得进展的政治意愿重要性反而较低。


Most of Europe’s national governments, whatever their political color, have long opposed a more streamlined and democratic EU.	无论具有何种政治色彩，欧洲多数国家政府一直反对更加精简和民主化的欧盟体系。


Now, though, they must choose between being outflanked by Euroskeptic parties on both the far left and far right, or responding to that threat by creating a supra-national democracy that can satisfy voters’ legitimate concerns.	但现在，他们必须选择是要在极左和极右翼遭到欧洲怀疑论政党的包抄，亦或是成立超国家民主制度来应对上述威胁，并解除选民的合理忧虑。


The 2003 European Convention that produced the ill-fated EU Constitution offers no blueprint for the future.	制定出命运多舛的欧盟宪法的2003年欧洲公约并没有勾画出未来的蓝图。


Its convoluted business was conducted largely out of sight.	其复杂业务的展开过程大体上并不接受公众的监督。


To stem mounting criticism of “Europe,” the EU needs the coup de théâtre of an open debate involving civil society, not just a handful of political representatives.	为遏制愈演愈烈的针对“欧洲”的批评，欧盟不仅需要少数政治代表的参与，还需要民间社团参与开放辩论的突变情节。


Its premise must be that the EU is heading toward dissolution, and that only by becoming more responsive to Europe’s citizens can it reverse the trend.	改革的前提是欧盟正在走向解体，只有更多响应欧洲民众的关切才能逆转欧盟解体的趋势。


Wall-to-Wall Wal-Mart?	沃尔玛是否横扫千军？


Do you want to know which video clip will soon be scaring the daylights out of policymakers throughout the world?	你是否知道哪一个录像片马上会令世界各地的决策者大惊失色？


In a scenario that looks uncannily like the spread of a global pandemic, the economist Thomas Holmes has prepared a dynamic map simulation showing the spread of Wal-Mart stores throughout the United States.	经济学家托马斯·赫尔姆斯准备了一个展示沃尔玛商店席卷美国的动画地图模拟片，这一景象令人惊讶，看似就像是一场全球性的传染病。


Starting at the epicenter in Bentonville, Arkansas, where Sam Walton opened his first store in 1962, giant boxy Wal-Mart stores have now multiplied to the point where the average American lives less than seven kilometers from an outlet.	1962年创始之初，山姆·沃顿在美国阿肯色州的本顿维尔老家开设了他的第一家店铺，现在，外表四四方方、巨大无比的沃尔玛商店已经翻倍增长，普通美国人的住家距离其中一家商店不到七公里。


Interestingly, the video shows how the stores spread out like petals of a flower, ever thickening and expanding.	有趣的是，录像片展示的是沃尔玛如何像花束一样扩张，不断变厚和扩大。


Rather than jumping out to the coasts – 80% of all Americans live within 80 kilometers of the Pacific or Atlantic oceans – Wal-Marts have spread organically through an ever-expanding supply chain.	80％的美国人口居住在太平洋或大西洋沿岸，沃尔玛并没有扑向美国的海岸线，而是通过不断扩张的供应链条有机地扩散。


Even though each new store takes away business from Wal-Mart stores established nearby, ever-improving supply efficiencies help maintain the chain’s overall growth.	尽管每一家新店会抢走附近的沃尔玛店的生意，但是不断提高完善的供应效率帮助维持了连锁店的总体增长。


Love them or hate them, what is undeniable is that Wal-Mart is the quintessential example of the costs and benefits of modern globalization.	无论你喜欢还是仇视沃尔玛，无可否认的事实是，沃尔玛本质上是现代全球化成本和效益的范例。


Consumers pay significantly less than at traditional outlets.	与传统商店相比，消费者节省大笔开支。


For example, economists estimate that the food section of Wal-Mart charges 25% less than a typical large supermarket chain.	例如，经济学家们估计，沃尔玛的食品部与典型的大型超市连锁店相比便宜25％。


The differences in price for many other consumer goods is even larger.	其他许多消费品的价格差异甚至更大。


Consider the following stunning fact: together with a few sister “big box” stores (Target, Best Buy, and Home Depot), Wal-Mart accounts for roughly 50% of America’s much vaunted productivity growth edge over Europe during the last decade.	看一看下面令人惊异的现实：美国大为炫耀过去十年来生产效率增长领先于欧洲，沃尔玛连同几家姊妹“大方盒子”商店，例如Target, Best Buy以及Home Depot一起所占的比重大约为50％。


Fifty percent!	真是一半！


Similar advances in wholesaling supply chains account for another 25%!	类似的批发供应链增长占据另外的25％！


The notion that Americans have gotten better at everything while other rich countries have stood still is thus wildly misleading.	因此，其他富国停滞不前之时美国人一枝独秀的观点是大为误导的。


The US productivity miracle and the emergence of Wal-Mart-style retailing are virtually synonymous.	美国生产效率的神话几乎就是沃尔玛式的零售业崛起。


I have nothing against big box stores.	我对巨型零售商店并不抱有成见。


They are an enormous boon to low-income consumers, partly compensating for the tepid wage growth that many of them have suffered during the past two decades.	他们对低收入消费者而言是一个佳音，在某种程度上弥补了过去二十年中他们中的许多人所忍受的缓慢工资增长。


And I don’t agree with friends of mine who turn their noses down at Wal-Mart stores, and claim never to have visited one.	我有些朋友对沃尔玛店不屑一顾，宣称从来没有在那里购物，我也不赞同他们。


As a consumer, I think big-box stores are great.	作为一个消费者，我认为巨型零售店是一件好事。


They have certainly been great for America’s trading partners; Wal-Mart alone accounts for over 10% of all US imports from China.	对于美国的贸易伙伴来说它们无疑也是好事，仅仅沃尔玛一家就占美国进口中国商品的10％以上。


But I do have some reservations about the Wal-Mart model as a blueprint for global growth.	但是，我对沃尔玛模式作为全球性增长的蓝图却持有保留。


First, there is the matter of its effect on low-wage workers and smaller-scale retailers.	首先，这一模式对低工资工人以及小型零售者产生影响。


While completely legal, studies suggest that Wal-Mart’s labor policies exploit regulatory loopholes that, for example, allow it to sidestep the burden of healthcare costs for many workers (Wal-Mart provides healthcare coverage to less than half its workers).	研究报告表明，沃尔玛的劳工政策尽管完全合法，但是却钻法规的空子。 例如，这些空子让沃尔玛规避给许多雇员承担医疗费用（沃尔玛只给一半的雇员提供医疗保险）。


And the entry of big-box stores into a community crushes long-established retailers, often traumatically transforming their character.	而且，巨型零售店进军某个社区，就会冲垮经营已久的零售者，经常痛楚地改变它们的性质。


Yes, to some extent, such is the price of progress.	是的，在某种程度上而言这的确是进步的代价。


But the loss of aesthetics and community is not easily captured in simple income and price statistics.	但是审美和社区的丧失并非可以轻而易举地用简单的收入和价格统计来加以俘获。


Big-box stores are not exactly attractive – hence their name.	巨型商店并非引人入胜，因此口碑也是如此。


If they continue their explosive growth over the next 20 years, will Americans someday come to regard their proliferation as a spectacular example of the failure to adopt region-wide blueprints for balanced growth?	如果在未来20年中继续爆炸式的增长，美国人是否会在某一天把它们的扩散视为未能采纳地区性平衡增长的巨大失败的例子呢？


Indeed, many Europeans, and others, will view Holmes’s video simulation of Wal-Mart’s spread as a horror film.	的确，许多欧洲人和其他人将会把赫尔姆斯有关沃尔玛扩散的录相模拟片视为恐怖电影。


The French may have invented the hyper mart – the forerunner of the big-box store – but they never intended to let their growth go unchecked.	也许是法国人发明了超市，也就是巨型超市的前身，但是他们从来就没有打算对其放任自流。


The big question for Europeans is whether they can find ways to exploit some of the efficiency gains embodied by the Wal-Mart model without being overrun by it.	欧洲人的大问题是，他们是否可以找到在不被吞没的情况下利用沃尔玛模式所体现的某些效率提高。


For Americans, there is the additional question of what to do when the big-box store phenomenon has run its course.	对于美国人而言还有一个问题，那就是当巨型商店现象长驱直入之时如何应对。


If so much of the US productivity edge really amounts to letting Wal-Mart and its big-box cousins run amok, what will happen after this source of growth tapers off?	如果美国生产效率领先的确意味着让沃尔玛以及其他巨型零售企业为所欲为，那么这一增长源泉枯竭后又当如何呢？


The US economy has many other strengths, including its superior financial system and leading position in high-tech capital goods, but the fact remains that America’s advantage in these areas has so far not been nearly as striking as the Wal-Mart phenomenon.	美国经济具有其他许多优势，包括其超人一等的金融体系以及在高科技资本商品上的领先地位，但是，美国在这些领域上的优势目前为止还没有像沃尔玛现象那样独树一帜也还是事实。


It is curious how many people seem to think that the US will grow faster than Europe and Japan over the next ten years simply because it has done so for the past ten years.	许多人似乎认为，仅仅由于在过去十年中美国经济增长快于欧洲和日本，因而在以后的二十年里也是如此。 这一观点不可思议。


Wal-Mart and its ilk are a central feature of the modern era of globalization.	沃尔玛及其同类就是现代全球化时代的中心特征。


They are not quite the pandemic that their explosive growth pattern resembles, but nor is their emergence completely benign.	它们并不是类似其爆炸式增长模式的传染病，但是其崛起也并非完全良性。


Those who would aim to emulate US productivity trends must come to grips with how they feel about big-box stores sprouting across their countryside’s, driving down wages and plowing under smaller-scale retailers.	那些想要模仿美国生产效率趋势的人们必须了解他们对巨型零售点遍布乡间、压低工资以及摧垮小规模零售商的感觉。


Americans, in turn, must think about where the proper balance lies between aesthetics, community, and low prices.	美国人反过来也必须考虑在审美、社区以及低工资之间取得适当的平衡。


Shaking Up “Shaken Baby Syndrome”	撼动“抖动婴儿综合征”


OXFORD – The most tragic event that can befall new parents is the sudden, unexpected death of their baby.	牛津—对新晋父母来说，最悲剧的事情莫过于孩子突然间意外死亡。


Perhaps the only thing worse is the parents being wrongly accused of causing the death, and indeed prosecuted, owing to the medical community’s misinterpretation of the findings.	也许唯一比这还要糟糕的是父母亲被错误地指责导致了孩子的死亡，并且因此被起诉，而造成这一幕的原因乃是医学界对发现的误解。


A small number of babies who collapse and die unexpectedly in their first year are found to have one or more of the following three symptoms in common: bleeding just outside the brain (subdural hemorrhage); bleeding at the back of the eye (retinal hemorrhage); and brain swelling.	少数在不满一周岁意外夭折的婴儿被发现有以下三种症候中的一种或多种：大脑外延出血（膜下出血）、眼底出血（视网膜出血）和脑水肿。


These same features are also seen in some babies who have suffered trauma, such as falls or motor-vehicle accidents.	同样的特征也见于一些受伤的婴儿，如坠落或车祸。


Yet many babies with these symptoms have no history or medical evidence of trauma (such as fractures, abrasions, or bruises), physical abuse, or neglect.	但许多存在这西症候的婴儿并无外伤（如骨折、擦伤或撞击）、身体虐待或被忽视的历史或医学证据。


Pediatricians wrestled with this conundrum until the 1970’s, when it was proposed that shaking might induce rotational forces and cause the “triad” of symptoms without bruises or fractures.	儿科医师一直在试图破解这一谜题，直到20世纪70年代才有人提出，震动可能造成旋转力，在没有擦伤和撞击的情况下导致“三重”症候。


Over the years, these findings evolved into “shaken baby syndrome” (SBS), a medico-legal hypothesis that remains contentious, and scientifically unproven, to this day.	多年来，这些发现进一步演化为“抖动婴儿综合症”（shaken baby syndrome，SBS）。 SBS是目前仍是有争议的、没有获得科学证明的法医学假说。


The SBS hypothesis attributed the triad of symptoms to the physical rupture of blood vessels on the brain’s surface and in the retina, and the tearing of nerve fibers within the brain.	SBS假说将三重症候归因于大脑表面和视网膜内血管的病理性破裂以及大脑内神经纤维的撕裂。


It was suggested that these outcomes required a force equivalent to a multi-story fall or major motor-vehicle accident, causing immediate symptoms or collapse.	人们指出，这些结果需要相当于从多层楼高处掉落或严重车祸这么大的力才能造成，导致即刻生成的症候或死亡。


Because violent shaking cannot be accidental, the hypothesis simultaneously established a criminal act and identified the perpetrator, typically the person with the baby at the time of collapse.	由于暴力震动不可能是事故性的，因此该假说同时坐实了犯罪行为并能够认定施暴者，通常是婴儿致死现场所在人物。


Though the SBS hypothesis was incorporated into medical training and judicial decisions worldwide, it remained untested for almost two decades.	尽管SBS假说已在全世界范围被纳入医学训练和司法判决，但在近20年的时间里，它并没有经受过测试。


In 1987, the first biomechanical experiments found that the force of shaking is much less than that of impact and concluded that shaking alone was unlikely to cause the triad of symptoms.	1987年，第一次生物力学实验发现，震动力远远小于撞击力，因此仅凭震动不可能造成三重症候。


Subsequent research in my specialty, pediatric neuropathology, established that the medical basis for the SBS hypothesis was also flawed.	我所在专业——儿科神经学的后续研究发现，SBS假说的医学基础也是有漏洞的。


We learned that the brain damage in these children did not reflect trauma to nerve fibers, but rather a failure of blood supply.	我们了解到，这些孩子的大脑损伤并不反映神经纤维外伤，而是反映了供血失灵。


We also learned that the typical subdural hemorrhages in these cases are too thin to result from the rupture of the large bridging veins on the brain’s surface.	我们还了解到，这些案例中的典型的膜下出血很薄，不可能来自大脑表层大型桥静脉的断裂。


And we learned that the same findings are seen in natural deaths.	我们还了解到，同样的发现也见于自然死亡。


In the last decade, the list of other causes – including accidental trauma, congenital causes, and natural illness – has continued to grow.	在过去十年中，其他原因——包括事故外伤、先天性因素和自然疾病等——一直在不断涌现。


Perhaps the most compelling observation in recent years is that subdural hemorrhages are present in nearly half of normal, healthy newborns with no evidence of birth trauma.	也许最近几年来最有说服力的发现是，膜下出血现象在近一半的没有分娩外伤痕迹的健康新生儿身上出现。


These findings, combined with the immature anatomy of the infant dura, suggest that dural bleeding in young babies may be a natural protective device – a reservoir to prevent backflow into the brain’s blood vessels during the pressure fluctuations of normal labor and delivery.	这些发现，加上婴儿硬脑膜发育不成熟，表明新生儿脑膜出血可能是天然保护机制——为了防止正常劳作和分娩时压力波动造成血液回流大脑血管。


Because these anatomical features persist into early childhood, the dura may remain similarly vulnerable to bleeding beyond the newborn period.	由于这些解剖学特征一直持续到早期童年，因此脑膜可能一直保持类似的易出血状态直到新生儿阶段后。


Indeed, both birth-related bleeds and those attributed to shaking are most often located in the folds of membranes covering the brain that have more and larger blood vessels at this age than later in life.	事实上，不管是与出生有关的出血，还是被归因于震动的出血，通常都位于包裹大脑的膜的褶皱处，这些部位的血管在初生时比日后更大。


While scientific evidence over the last three decades has undermined the shaken baby hypothesis, no new evidence has emerged to support it.	过去三十年来的科学证据不支持抖动婴儿假说，也没有新证据出现支持它。


Instead, several researchers have relied upon the data in older studies to calculate the statistical probability of inflicted brain injury when certain features (such as intracranial hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, brain swelling, and seizures) are present.	相反，一些研究者根据旧研究中的数据计算出现某些特征（如颅内出血、视网膜出血、脑水肿和癫痫）情况下的大脑损伤的统计概率。


These probabilities are then offered as the basis for diagnosis and as evidence in court.	这些概率常常被用于诊断依据和法庭证据。


However, the reasoning behind the studies on which these researchers rely is circular, and based on assumptions now known to be unreliable.	但是，这些研究者的研究所基于的逻辑是��套逻辑，其基础假设现已知道是不可靠的。


For example, in some studies, the researchers decided arbitrarily that falls of less than one meter could not harm a baby, so that parents who described such a fall must be lying.	比如，在一些研究中，研究者武断地认定不足一米高度跌落不会伤害婴儿，因此描述此类跌落情形的父母一定在撒谎。


Other studies viewed the parents’ inability to explain the findings as evidence of abuse.	其他研究认为，父母对发现无力辩解便是虐待的证据。


Given these flaws, reviews of old studies do not provide a reliable evidence base for diagnosing abuse.	由于存在这些缺陷，对旧研究的再检视无法为确认虐待提供可靠证据。


They simply predict the likelihood that specific findings will be categorized as abusive, and that, consequently, the child’s caregiver at the time will be accused or convicted of abuse, regardless of the accuracy of the diagnosis.	它们只不过预测了具体发现可被归于虐待的概率，以及可以指控或确认当时在场的儿童看护者虐待的概率，确认的准确性并无保障。


Leading proponents of the SBS hypothesis now acknowledge that the triad is a “myth,” that SBS diagnoses consist of “informed speculation,” and that the hypothesis is supported solely by confessions.	SBS假说的主要支持者现在也承认，三重症候是一个“传说”，SBS确认是“有根据的猜测”，SBS假说的支持证据完全来自坦白。


Some courts are following suit, with one US federal judge describing the types of confessions obtained as “worthless as evidence,” and another noting that, given recent developments, claims of SBS may be “more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”	一些法庭已有所跟进，一位美国联邦法官宣布以此获得的坦白“作为证据毫无价值”，另一位美国联邦法官指出，根据最新发展，SBS或许“更多地是一种信念，而不是一项科学”。


No one questions whether infants can be damaged or killed by violent shaking or abuse; of course they can.	没有人会质疑婴儿是否可能因为暴力震动或虐待而受伤甚至致死；


The real issue is whether shaking or abuse can be inferred on the basis of a hypothesis that lacks scientific support.	当然是可能的。 真正的问题在于是否可以根据缺少科学依据的假说推断震动或虐待。


In no other area of medicine and law would an unproved hypothesis provide a basis for diagnosis, let alone criminal prosecution.	其他医学和法律领域都没有让未经证明的假说作为确认依据的做法，更不用说刑事指控了。


Given the developments of the past decade, we now face the possibility that for the past 30 years we have been wrongly imprisoning parents on the basis of a flawed hypothesis.	从过去十年的发展来看，我们面临着一种可能性——过去30年来，我们根据一项有缺陷的假说错误地将许多父母亲送入了监狱。


China’s North Korean Pivot	中国的朝鲜重点


BEIJING – After a spring of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, a flurry of diplomatic activity in recent weeks has brought some hope of a meeting of the minds, at least between China, South Korea, and the United States.	北京—在经历了一个朝鲜半岛局势紧张的春天后，最近几周的一系列外交活动带来了形成一致的希望，至少在中国、韩国和美国之间是如此。


But the emergence of a viable consensus on how to minimize the security risks emanating from North Korea’s mercurial leadership remains to be found.	但关于如何将来自朝鲜领导层的变化无常的风险降到最低，目前还有待形成可行的一致意见


After a reportedly tough meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Vice Marshall Choe Ryong-hae, one of the four members of North Korea’s ruling presidium, the US-China summit in California took place with North Korea as one of the central points of discussion.	据称中国主席习近平和朝鲜副元帅、四人最高统治集团成员之一崔龙海进行了艰难的会谈，随后，加利福尼亚州中美峰会将朝鲜问题作为讨论的核心议题之一。


This was quickly followed by a Beijing summit between Xi and South Korean President Park Geun-hye.	中美峰会后，习近平与韩国总统朴槿惠马上在北京举行了峰会。


The fact that Xi participated in all three meetings underscores two truths: China’s policy toward North Korea is the key to a solution to the problems posed by North Korea, and China may be actively searching for a new approach to its wayward ally.	习近平参与了三次会面这一事实暗示了两大真相：中国对朝政策是形成针对朝鲜造成的问题的解决方案的关键； 以及中国或许正在积极寻找对付其不安分的盟友的新方法。


China’s interest in a new North Korea policy is not entirely new.	中国对新朝鲜政策的兴趣算不上全新。


After all, China’s policy toward the country has been gradually moving in a more constructive direction for the past two decades, reflecting China’s growing international prominence, as well as its leaders’ cautious embrace of the global role that their country’s new economic might has provided.	毕竟，过去二十年来，中国对朝政策一直在逐渐朝更具建设性的方向改变，这反映出中国日渐提高的国际突出地位以及其领导人谨慎行使中国经济实力带来的全球影响力的态度。


In the immediate post-Cold War period, China cooperated with other concerned parties in the process of resolving the first North Korea nuclear crisis of 1993-1994; but it tended to regard the North’s nuclear ambitions mainly as a bilateral issue between North Korea and the US.	冷张时代结束伊始，1993—1994年中国就与其他相关方面合作解决了第一次朝鲜核危机； 但它倾向于将朝鲜和野心视为主要是朝鲜和美国的之间的双边问题。


President Bill Clinton seemed to agree, and adopted a bilateral approach to the nuclear crisis, which resulted in the two countries’ Agreed Framework of 1994.	美国总统克林顿似乎也这样认为，并对朝鲜核危机采取双边主义方法，并于1994年与朝鲜达成框架协议。


But China upgraded its role in the 2000’s.	但进入21世纪后，中国的作用开始升级。


After North Korea’s enriched uranium program triggered another crisis in late 2002, President George W. Bush wanted to mobilize China’s influence in a more systematic way.	2002年底，朝鲜铀浓缩计划触发了又一场危机，小布什总统希望动员中国的影响力以形成更加系统性的方法。


But China’s leaders balked, circumscribing their role severely.	但中国领导人踯躅不前，小心翼翼地控制着自己的角色。


Though Chinese leaders became more active by hosting the six-party talks, they still regarded their role as that of mediator between the US and the North, rather than that of a party whose security interests were seriously affected by events on the Korean Peninsula.	尽管中国领导人通过主办六方会谈表现出更积极的态度，但仍把自己视为美国和朝鲜之间的调停人，而不是安全利益受朝鲜半岛局势严重影响的当事方。


Immediately after the North’s second nuclear test in 2009, Chinese officials undertook a review of their country’s North Korea policy and decided to separate the nuclear issue from the overall bilateral relationship.	在2009年朝鲜进行第二次核试验后，中国官员马上反思了中国的对朝政策，决定将朝鲜核问题与全面双边关系分离。


Thus, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang in October 2009 and promised generous economic aid.	于是，前总理温家宝于2009年10月访问平壤，承诺给予朝鲜丰厚的经济援助。


Chinese leaders may have believed that inducing the North to adopt the Chinese model of economic opening would create a better political environment for denuclearization.	中国领导人或许认为让朝鲜采取中国的经济开放模式能为去核化创造更好的政治环境。


One result was a deepening of North Korea’s economic dependence on China.	这一政策的一个结果是朝鲜经济更加依赖中国了。


But the big problem was that the North’s leadership apparently interpreted China’s policy as a sign of unwillingness to pressure the North on nuclear matters.	但大问题是朝鲜领导人显然将中国的这一政策解读为不愿意就核问题向朝鲜施压的信号。


Indeed, North Korean behavior became much more provocative, including an attack in 2010 that sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan and another in which the South’s Yeonpyeong Island was shelled.	事实上，朝鲜的行为变得更具挑衅性，包括在2010年炮击延坪岛，击沉韩国巡洋舰天安号和另一艘军舰。


Following this spring’s round of North Korean provocations, Xi appears to have concluded that enough is enough.	在今年春天朝鲜又一次挑衅后，习近平似乎感到忍无可忍。


As a result, China’s North Korea policy has entered a new stage.	于是，中国的朝鲜政策迈入了新阶段。


Xi’s criticism of the North’s nuclear ambitions has become both unusually public and blunt.	习近平对朝鲜和野心的批评反常地公开且尖锐。


Chinese leaders may still view North Korea as a strategic buffer state, but China’s status as a global power is pushing them to view the North in a new way.	中国领导人或许仍把朝鲜视为战略缓冲国，但中国作为国际大国的地位使其以新视角看待朝鲜。


Former State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan was even reported to have said recently that denuclearization is now a higher priority for China than stabilization of the Korean Peninsula.	据报道，前国务委员唐家璇最近甚至表示如今对中国来说朝鲜半岛的去核化比朝鲜半岛的稳定更加重要。


This approach should favor China’s global strategy, which is premised upon Xi’s desire to build a new type of “major power” relationship between China and the US (the Chinese government prefers “major power” to “great power,” probably in order to highlight its stated renunciation of hegemonic ambition).	这一立场有利于中国的全球战略——该战略的前提是习近平建立中美新型“大国”关系的渴望（中国政府喜欢用“大国”而不是“强国”，可能是为了突出其不称霸的原则）。


Indeed, among the myriad unresolved issues dividing the US and China, North Korea’s nuclear program is the one most likely to impede mutual trust.	事实上，在中美存在分歧的诸多未解决问题中，朝鲜核计划是最有可能妨碍双方互信的问题之一。


If the US and China are to avoid being steered by North Korea onto a collision course, they probably have four or five years to pursue a joint strategy – a timetable established by the point at which North Korea could have the technology to load miniaturized nuclear warheads atop long-range missiles.	如果美国和中国欲避免被朝鲜引诱而发生碰撞，它们或许有四到五年时间追求联合战略——即朝鲜获得制造小型远程导弹核弹头技术所需要的时间。


As the North approaches this point, the US will have to strengthen its missile defenses in the western Pacific – areas close to China – in order to deter the North Korean threat.	如果朝鲜掌握了这一技术，美国将不得不强化其西太平洋（接近中国的地区）的导弹防御，以消除朝鲜的威胁。


The result, invariably, will be heightened Sino-US tension.	其结果免不了将加剧中美紧张。


China has no interest in such an outcome.	如此结局不符合中国的利益。


The long-term costs of a worsening security confrontation with the US would exceed the short-term tactical benefits to be derived from continuing to support the North as a buffer state, especially given China’s deepening relationship with South Korea.	对美安全冲突恶化的长期成本将压倒继续支持朝鲜作为缓冲国所获得的战术好处，特别是在中国欲韩国关系深化的条件下。


Though Park’s visit to Beijing has not closed the gap between the Chinese and South Korean approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue, it does seem to have prepared the ground for closer coordination between the two governments.	尽管朴槿惠的北京之行并没有完全弥合中国和韩国关于朝鲜核问题的分歧，但的确为两国政府跟紧密的合作做了铺垫。


Those improved ties matter, because the time has come for China to rebalance its traditional geostrategic interests with its role as a global leader.	这些关系的改善十分重要，因为中国需要重新平衡其传统地缘政治利益和全球领袖的角色。


That calls for a Chinese policy of disciplined engagement toward North Korea, without which an internationally coordinated solution to the nuclear problem – and, with it, the promise of more productive relations with the US and South Korea – will be impossible.	这需要中国为朝鲜制定纪律，否则朝鲜核问题的国际合作解决方案就无法实现，与美国和韩国建立更加建设性的关系的承诺也无法兑现。


Wanted: An Arab Jean Monnet	寻找阿拉伯的让·莫内


The Middle East is beyond doubt one of the most dangerous crisis regions worldwide.	毫无疑问中东是全世界最危险的危机高发区。


The next war, terrorist attack, or failed peace initiative may lurk just around the corner.	下一场战争、恐怖袭击或和平倡议的失败都使其四伏的危机随时可能爆发。


Compared to the politics of this region, a rollercoaster ride is downright calming.	相对于这一地区的政治局势来说，坐过山车的感觉应该算是让人十分心平气和的了。


And yet the Middle East is also a region that, throughout its innumerable conflicts, has hardly changed, languishing in a strange kind of standstill.	然而，也正是中东这样一个地区，经过了无数的冲突后，几乎没有发生任何变化，至今仍在一种怪异的停滞不前的状态中煎熬。


There must be an intrinsic correlation between the lack of developmental dynamism of most Middle Eastern societies and the fact that the region is so crisis-prone.	大部分的中东地区的社会缺乏发展的活力，而且该地区是如此容易发生危机，这两者之间一定存在着内在的联系。


The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians stands out as an example of the static nature of this key geopolitical region, because it seems to be completely unaffected by any international upheaval.	以色列和巴勒斯坦之间的冲突，是这一重要地缘政治区域的停滞不前的一个突出例子，因为这种冲突似乎完全不受任何国际形势动荡的影响。


The Ottomans, the British, decolonization, the Cold War, numerous American Presidents, and even more international mediators have come and gone, but the parameters of this conflict and the inability to find a solution never seem to change.	土耳其人、英国人、非殖民化、冷战、多任美国总统，甚至更多的国际调停人士来了又去，可是这一冲突的各种特征，以及找不到解决办法的困窘，似乎从未改变过。


However, this impression – correct where the past is concerned – might prove deceptive in the future, because two global megatrends will subject the region to more profound change than all the many previous political crises and wars were able to bring about.	然而，这一印象，尽管从过去的历史来看是正确的，但可能在未来会被证明具有迷惑性，因为有两个全球大趋势，将给该地区带来前无所有变化，这些变化比过去多场政治危机和战争所带来的所有变化的总和还要更为深刻。


The first is globalization, by which ever-larger parts of the Arab world, beginning with the Persian Gulf and its oil countries, will be influenced, albeit slowly, both economically and culturally.	第一是全球化，从波斯湾和该地区的产油国开始，阿拉伯世界越来越大的部分将受此大趋势的影响。 尽管全球化对其影响，无论在经济上还是文化上，其速度都是缓慢的。


With the shift of wealth and power from the West to the East, the pressures of globalization will increasingly come from the East.	随着财富和权力从西方向东方转移，全球化的压力将越来越多地来自东方。


In Morocco, for instance, investment from the Arab oil countries has already significantly reduced Europe’s importance.	例如，在摩洛哥，来自阿拉伯产油国的投资已经大大削弱了欧洲的重要性。


The inherent contradiction between a governance structure incapable of change and economic modernization, between cultural and religious conservatism and social and normative transformation, will therefore increase and bring about new, additional frictions if positive answers to these fundamental changes cannot be found.	无法进行变革的治理结构和经济现代化之间的矛盾，文化和宗教保守主义和社会规范变革之间的矛盾，如果无法找到解决这些根本性变化的正面答案，这些固有的矛盾将加剧和带来新的、更多的摩擦。


The second megatrend is the global climate crisis.	第二个大趋势是全球的气候危机。


Apart from those countries that are threatened – partly or completely –by rising sea levels, global warming will primarily affect the desert belts and their already precarious water supplies.	除了那些部分或完全受到海平面上升的威胁国家，全球气候变暖还将主要影响沙漠带和那些地区已经岌岌可危的水供应。


And, while the conflicts in the Middle East are primarily about territory, this includes the scarce water resources so essential for survival.	虽然中东的冲突主要是领土方面的，但也包括生存所必需的稀缺的水资源问题。


Rapid population growth, a dramatic increase in water consumption due to industrial, agricultural, and tourism growth, and rising standards of living will make the water issue even more important to the region’s political stability than it is already.	人口的迅速增长、工农业和旅游业增长所引起的水消耗量大幅增长以及不断提高的生活水准，使现在已经对该地区的政治稳定起重要作用的水问题变得愈加重要。


A sustainable answer to questions of such vital importance to the Middle East only makes sense if it is regional in character.	要回答这类对中东至关重要的问题并使答案有说服力，答案必须是针对整个区域的才会有意义。


And the same applies to the increasing demand for energy: although the region as a whole is rich in energy resources, their uneven geographical distribution suggests that any viable solution must be built on cooperation.	这个标准也同样适用于能源需求增加的问题上：尽管整个地区有丰富的能源资源，但地域分布不平衡； 这说明，任何可行的解决方案必须建立在合作的基础上。


Of course, resolving the political crises and conflicts remains the top priority.	当然，解决政治危机和冲突仍是首要任务。


To make regional peace and stability possible, however, the region’s very young and rapidly increasing populations require an economic perspective that makes their participation in globalization possible – in a dignified manner and grounded in their own culture and history.	然而，为了使区域的和平与稳定成为可能，该地区的非常年轻的、并迅速膨胀的人口，需要一个经济的视角使他们能够有尊严地、并基于自身的文化和历史上参与全球化进程。


The Middle East’s individual states won’t be able to manage this without regional cooperation.	没有区域合作，中东的各分散的国家将无法做到上述这一点。


The European Union’s successful track record could therefore provide an almost perfect model.	因此，欧盟的成功可以提供一个近乎完美的榜样。


In fact, the preconditions for intra-regional cooperation – up to partial integration of the interests of the countries involved – look more auspicious than they did in Western Europe in the early 1950’s.	事实上，区域内合作的先决条件-参与的国家的利益部分一体化-看起来更比五十年代初的西欧更加成熟和有希望。


Europe had neither a common language, nor was it as religiously and culturally as homogeneous as the Middle East.	那时的欧洲既没有共同语言也不如中东在宗教和文化上那样具有同质性。


For Europe, the starting point was visionary leaders like Jean Monnet and the creation of new institutions like the Coal and Steel Community.	欧洲的出发点是出现了让·莫内那样富有远见的领导人和新机构如煤钢共同体的创立。


In the Middle East, the process of regional integration could begin with water and energy.	在中东，区域一体化进程可以从与水和能源着手。


A common market for goods and services could follow, along with a regional security system.	加上区域安全体系，一个商品和服务的共同市场便可以跟进。


This would, finally, give the Middle East – a region poor in growth and rich in conflicts – a distinct identity, making it a player in global economic terms as well, and thus enabling it to become the architect of its own future.	这最终会给中东-这个缺乏增长但不乏冲突的地区-一个独特的身份，使其也成为在全球经济领域种的一个角色，进而使它能设计自己的未来。


Europe, once the continent of war, has shown that this is possible.	曾经战事频繁的欧洲大陆已经证明了这是可能的。


And Europe can help the Middle East – its neighboring region – achieve this strategic objective.	欧洲可以帮助中东，也是它的区域邻居，实现这一战略目标。


An instrument for it already exists: the new Union for the Mediterranean.	一个实现目标的工具已经存在：新成立的地中海联盟。


In any case, the time of standstill in the Middle East is coming to an end.	总之，中东停滞不前的时代即将结束。


Whether the consequences of this development will be good or bad depends on whether the region can muster the foresight and strength actively to shape this process.	这种发展的后果是好是坏，取决于该地区是否能拿出远见和力量积极创造这一进程。


Imagination, vision, and pragmatic perseverance will be necessary.	想象力、远见和务实的毅力是必需的。


What is needed now is an Arabian Jean Monnet.	现在需要一个阿拉伯的让·莫内。


Washington and the Art of the Possible	华盛顿和可能的艺术


CHICAGO – These days, the United States media are full of ordinary Americans venting their rage at the incompetence and immaturity of their politicians.	芝加哥——近日来，美国各大媒体充斥着普通美国人对美国政客无能和不成熟的愤怒。


Even though the US government’s debt limit was raised in the nick of time, the process was – and remains – fraught with risk.	美国政府在关键时刻终于成功地提高了债务上限，但整个过程险象环生，而且尚未脱离危险。


Why, the public asks, can’t politicians sit down together like sensible adults and come up with a timely agreement that commands broad consensus?	公众怒问，为什么政客们不能像理智的成年人那样坐下来好好谈，及时达成广泛一致？


If we can balance our household budgets, they ask irately, why can’t our political leaders?	公众怒问，既然我们可以实现家庭预算平衡，为什么政客们就不行呢？


The reality, though, is that US politicians reflect the views of the American electorate – views that are fundamentally inconsistent. The absence of broad consensus is no wonder.	然而，现实是美国政客所代表的正是美国全体选民的意见，而全体选民的意见注定不会一致，这丝毫都不令人奇怪。


Indeed, the last-minute agreement to raise the debt ceiling is proof that the politicians did what they were sent to Washington to do: represent their constituencies and only compromise in the interests of the country as a whole.	事实上，在最后一刻就提升债务上限达成一致倒是证明，政客们完成了自己的使命：代表自己的选区，只对全美国整体利益让步。


The key question is whether the political gridlock exposed by the debt-ceiling debate will worsen in the run-up to the 2012 presidential and congressional elections – if not beyond.	关键的问题是，由债务上限争论导致的政治僵局是否会对2012年（甚至此后各届）总统和国会选举造成不良影响。


That is possible, but we should not overlook cause for hope in what America’s politicians just accomplished.	这并非不可能，但我们也不应该忽视美国政客刚刚所取得的成果。


Let’s start with why the electorate is so polarized.	让我们从选民为何会如此两极分化开始。


There are two key divisive factors: income and age.	其中的决定性因素有二：收入和年龄。


Income inequality has been growing in the US over the last three decades, largely because the labor market has increasingly demanded skills that the education system has been unable to supply.	过去三十年来，美国的收入不平等情况一直在恶化，这大部分是因为教育体系越来越难以满足劳动力市场所要求的技能。


The everyday consequence for the middle class is a stagnant paycheck and growing employment insecurity, as the old economy of well-paying low-skilled jobs with good benefits withers away.	这给中产阶级带来了怎样的后果呢？ 薪金增长停滞，失业风险增加，因为低技能要求的高薪高福利旧经济一去不复返了。


Until the financial crisis, the easy availability of credit, especially against home equity, enabled the middle class to sustain higher consumption despite stagnant incomes.	在金融危机爆发前，信贷泛滥（特别是住房信贷）让中产阶级得以维系高消费水平，尽管他们的收入并未增加。


With the collapse of the housing bubble, many people lost their jobs and health insurance, risked losing their homes, and suddenly had little reason for economic optimism.	随着房地产泡沫的破裂，许多人丢到了自己的工作和医疗保险，还面临着丢掉房子的风险，一夜之间，他们就失去了所有对经济保持乐观的理由。


The response from America’s Democratic Party, which has traditionally represented this constituency, was to promise affordable universal health care and more education spending, while also protecting government jobs and entitlement programs.	传统上代表这类选民的民主党提出的应对措施是承诺推行人人负担得起的普适医保以及增加教育支出，同时保证政府工作岗位和权利计划。


When added up, such spending is unaffordable, especially with current federal revenues at just 15% of GDP.	但我们把所需支出一加总就会发现这根本是无法负担的，特别是在联邦岁入只有GDP的15%的情况下。


The solution for many Democrats is to raise revenues by taxing the rich.	在很多民主党看来，这可以通过向富人征税以增加岁入来解决。


But the rich are not the idle rich of the past; they are the working rich.	但富人已经不再是过去的有闲阶级了；


To balance the budget only by taxing the rich will require a significant increase in income taxes, to the point that it would lower incentives for work and entrepreneurial activity considerably.	现在的富人是劳动致富的。 仅仅依靠向富人征税来平衡预算将使所得税大幅提高，就目前的情况而言，这会大大降低努力工作的激励和企业家行为。


This is not to say that taxes on the rich cannot be increased at all; but such increases cannot be the primary way of balancing the budget.	这并不是说完全不能对富人增税； 但增税不应该作为平衡预算的首选方案。


Republicans, trying to give voice to many working Americans’ ambient uneasiness with rising government expenditures, as well as to the growing anger of the working rich, find it easier to defend a principle than a particular constituency.	共和党试图吐出美国劳动阶级的心声——境况越来越差，而政府支出越来越大，同时也试图代表劳动致富的富人表达心中的愤怒。 他们知道，维系选民支持比捍卫原则容易多了。


Hence their mantra: no additional taxes.	因此，共和党的口号是：不加税。


The neat divide based on income is muddled by the elderly.	收入带来的分歧是明确的，但年龄则否。


It is understandable that older Americans who have few savings want to protect their Social Security and Medicare benefits.	不难理解，没有多少积蓄的老年人希望保护他们的社会保险和医疗保险福利。


However, even elderly Tea Party Republicans, who are typically against big government, defend these programs because they view them as a form of property right, paid for when they worked.	但是，即使是通常反对大政府的高龄茶党共和党人现在也在捍卫这些计划，因为他们将它们视为产权，是他们通过自己过去的劳动所应获得的报酬。


In truth, rising life expectancy and growing health-care costs mean that today’s elderly have contributed only a fraction of what they expect to receive from Social Security and Medicare.	事实上，预期寿命的提高与医疗成本的膨胀意味着与当前老年人所期待获得的社会保险和医疗保险福利比起来，他们对社会所做的贡献实在不值一提。


The government made a mistake in the past by not raising taxes to finance these programs or reducing the benefits that they promised.	政府过去犯了一个错误，没有增税来为这些计划融资，也没有削减福利承诺。


Unless the growth of these entitlement programs is curbed now, today’s young will pay dearly for that mistake, in the form of higher taxes now and lower benefits when they are old.	除非这些权利计划现在可以被削减，否则这个错误将极大增加现今年青一代的负担——他们将在现在承担高税收，而在年老时享受低福利。


But the elderly are politically active and powerful.	但老年人在政治上更活跃，也更有影响力。


Not only do many defend their entitlements strongly; some oppose growth in other types of public spending for fear that it will weaken the government’s ability to pay for the benefits that they believe they are owed.	许多人不仅强烈捍卫他们的权利，而且还反对其他方面公共支出的增加，因为他们担心这会削弱政府支付他们认为自己应得福利的能力。


These then are the roots of America fiscal impasse, which has produced passionate constituencies viscerally opposed to compromise.	这些就是美国财政僵局的根源，而财政僵局造成了选民发自内心的对妥协的强烈的反对。


Any political deal significantly before the debt-ceiling deadline would have exposed politicians to charges of betrayal from their constituents.	任何在债务上限最后期限前所达成的政治妥协都会让政客背上背叛选民的恶名。


And, given that President Barack Obama would ultimately be held responsible for a default, he needed the deal more than the Republicans did.	而一旦违约，最终负责的将是奥巴马政府，因此奥巴马比共和党更需要妥协。


So he had to coerce his party into accepting a deal full of spending cuts and devoid of tax increases.	于是，他必须强迫他所在的民主党接受只有支出削减、丝毫不见增税字样的方案。


Will the deal deliver what it promises?	最后的方案能够兑现承诺吗？


A bipartisan committee has to propose $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction by the end of this year, and Congress must either accept that proposal, or see immediate, politically painful expenditure cuts, which would include defense spending – an area that America’s Republicans care about strongly.	一个跨党派委员会必须拿出在今年年底前削减1. 5万亿美元赤字的方案，国会要么接受这一方案，要么接受马上开始但在政治上极为痛苦的方案（其中包括防务支出削减，而这是美国共和党所强力捍卫的领域），没有第三个选择。


If this structure works as advertised, Congress will be forced to reach a compromise, which can be sold once again by politicians to their polarized constituencies as being necessary to avoid a worse outcome.	如果这一结构如宣传的那样起效，那么国会必须达成妥协，而要达到妥协，政客就必须再一次说服两极分化的选民以避免更糟糕的结果。


This time, Obama’s Democrats will be on a level playing field, because both parties will be held equally responsible for a failure to reach a deal.	这一次，奥巴马的民主党将和共和党站在同一条起跑线上，因为如果不能达成一致，两大党派所要负的责任是一样的。


Ultimately, the big necessary decisions on curbing entitlement growth and reforming the tax code will probably have to wait until after the next election, giving the divided electorate an opportunity to reflect on its own inconsistency and send a clearer message.	最终，削减权利增长和改革税法所必须的重大决策可能不得不等到下一次选举之后才会做出，这给了意见相左的两派选民一次机会，反思自身阵营内部的不一致并给出清晰的信号。


In the meantime, US politicians might have done just about enough to convince debt markets that America’s credit is still good.	与此同时，美国政客或许能够勉强使债券市场相信美国信用亦然坚挺。


For that, Americans – and others around the world – should stop pillorying them and give them their due credit.	为此，美国和世界其他国家的人们应该停止攻击美国政府，给予他们应该给予的信用。


Was Killing Bin Laden a Mistake?	杀死本·拉登错了吗？


LONDON – “He lived a hero, he died a martyr...if they killed one Osama, a thousand others will be born,” says a comment on a Facebook group called “We are all Osama bin Laden.”	伦敦——Facebook网站上一个名叫“我们都是奥萨马·本·拉登”的组织称“他生为英雄，死为烈士…他们杀死一个奥萨马，一千个奥萨马会就此诞生。


The group was formed one hour after US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the Al Qaeda leader’s death.	”该组织成立于美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马宣布基地组织领袖死讯后的短短一小时。


That Facebook group already has around 30,000 “likes.”	这家Facebook组织已经拥有约30，000名“追随者”。


Moreover, there are more than 50 similar groups on Facebook.	此外，Facebook网站上类似的组织还有50多家。


Reaction to Bin Laden’s death on Al Jazeera and other Arabic news outlets has been mixed.	半岛电视台和其他阿拉伯新闻媒体对本·拉登之死反应复杂。


Some view the man considered a mass murderer in the West as an icon, and his death and burial at sea at the hands of American forces will not undermine that perception in the eyes of his sympathizers.	有人把这个西方人眼中的刽子手视为偶像，他死于美军之手并被海葬丝毫不会影响支持者对他的看法。


Indeed, Egypt’s former Mufti, Sheikh Nasr Farid Wasil, has already declared Bin Laden a martyr, “because he was killed by the hands of the enemy.”	实际上，埃及的前任穆夫提谢赫·纳斯尔·法里德·瓦西勒“因本·拉登死于敌手”已将他奉为烈士。


(Sheikh Wasil, it should be made known, has no links or known sympathies for Al Qaeda and he represents a very different Islamic school of thought.)	（值得一提的是，谢赫·瓦西勒此前与基地组织既无关系也不抱同情态度，他所代表的是一个完全不同的伊斯兰学派）。


Aside from the mixed signals online, in the virtual world, the critical question is whether eliminating Bin Laden marks the beginning of Al Qaeda’s demise in reality.	抛开错综复杂的网络反应，虚拟世界的关键问题在于消灭本·拉登是否标志着基地组织开始毁灭。


Some terrorist organizations have, of course, collapsed following the death of their charismatic leader.	当然，有些恐怖组织在其超凡领袖死后逐渐土崩瓦解。


The case of Shoko Asahara, the founder of Aum Shinrikyo (the Japanese group that organized the Sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway in 1995), comes to mind here.	这不禁让人想起（组织1995年东京地铁沙林毒气袭击事件的日本组织）奥姆真理教创始人麻原彰晃。


But capturing and trying violent leaders is probably a better marker of the end of such organizations – the chances of such an outcome being higher when such leaders recant their views and call on their followers to lay down their arms.	但逮捕并审判暴力领袖也许是宣告组织终结的更好的方式——如果该领导人宣布放弃自己的信仰并号召追随者放下武器，恐怖组织瓦解的可能性就会增大。


Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the Maoist Shining Path in Peru, and Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, are notable examples of this.	这方面的著名事例有秘鲁的毛派光辉道路领袖阿维马埃尔·古斯曼和土耳其库尔德工人党领袖阿卜杜拉•奥贾兰。


By contrast, far from causing the demise of an armed movement, the killing of a charismatic leader at the hands of his enemies can transform such a figure into a martyr.	相反，被神化的领袖死于敌手不但不能导致武装运动的解体，反而会使其上升到烈士的高度。


Che Guevera was far more valuable to leftist militancy after his death than he was while alive.	切·格瓦拉死后远比他在世时对左翼好战份子的价值更高。


Armed Islamism has its particularities, of course, but it also shares important characteristics with some of these groups, including the relationship between the physical elimination of a leader and organizational survival.	当然，伊斯兰教武装有其自身的独特性，但领袖肉体消灭和组织生存之间的关系等等重要特点与其他某些武装组织相通。


Decentralized organizations with relevant ideologies, operating in contexts full of conditions conducive to armed action, usually survive leadership losses, whereas hierarchical, cult-like organizations often do not.	在充满暴力诱因的环境中行动的具有相关意识形态的分散化组织通常能经受住失去领袖的打击，而等级森严的邪教组织则往往不能。


Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has been far from a hierarchical, cult-like organization.	自9/11事件后，基地组织已经与等级森严的邪教组织大相径庭。


Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi’s Al Qaeda offshoot in Iraq demonstrates this well: the group was called Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia for recruitment and propaganda purposes, but it was quite autonomous organizationally and operationally.	这一点在阿布·穆萨布·扎卡维的基地组织伊拉克海外分部问题上得到了充分的证明：该组织为方便招募和宣传起见在美索不达米亚对外自称为基地组织，但无论在机构还是运作方面都具有相当的自主性。


When Bin Laden’s close collaborator Ayman al-Zawahiri asked al-Zaraqawi to avoid targeting Shiites, al-Zaraqawi instead escalated the violence against them.	本·拉登的亲密合作者艾曼·扎瓦希里要求扎卡维不要袭击什叶派的时候，扎卡维反而加强了对什叶派的进攻。


Al Qaeda’s franchise model applies to Algeria, Yemen, North Mali, and Somalia as well.	基地组织的授权招募模式同样也适用于阿尔及利亚、也门、北马里和索马里等国。


And, like guerrilla movements of yore, Al Qaeda partakes of “ideological front” tactics: small urban cells and/or vulnerable individuals subscribe to the ideology and self-recruit or self-start an affiliated cell.	基地组织像很久以前的游击运动一样采用所谓的“思想战线”模式：由接受相关意识形态的城市小团体和/或脆弱个体自主招募或者成立附属机构。