Some of it is a destructive transfer from consumers to shareholders as corporations gain more monopoly power, some of it is an improvement in efficiency from better management and more appropriately scaled operations, and some of it is overpayment by those who become irrationally exuberant when companies get their names in the news.	有一部分是来自于更佳的管理和更合理的规模经营所带来的效益提升； 还有一部分是来自于那些借公司出名的好大喜功者的超额支付。


If each of these factors accounts for one-third of the net gain, several conclusions follow.	如果以上三个因素每个都代表了净收益的三分之一，那么我们就能有以下的几个结论。


First, once we look outside transfers within the financial sector, the total global effects of this chunk of finance is a gain of perhaps $340 billion in increased real shareholder value from higher expected future profits.	首先，一旦我们不只把目光局限在金融部门的交易中，那么就会发现这一块交易对全球的影响是以增加的真实股东价值的形式出现的约3400亿美元的收益。 而这种增长来自于更高的预期未来收益。


A loss of $170 billion can be attributed to future real wages, for households will find themselves paying higher margins to companies with more market power.	1700亿美元的损失是由未来的真实薪资造成的，因为普通消费者会发现他们将为拥有更大市场实力的公司支付更高的利润边际。


The net gain is thus $170 billion of added social value in 2007, which is 0.3% of world GDP, equal to the average product of seven million workers.	因此2007年的净收益就是1700亿美元的增加社会价值，占全球GDP的0. 3%，相当于700万个工人的平均总产值。


In one sense, we should be grateful for our hard-working M&A technicians, well-paid as they are: it is important that businesses with lousy managements or that operate inefficiently be under pressure from those who may do better, and can raise the money to attempt to do so.	从某种意义上讲，我们应该对这些努力工作的并购技师们心存感激，虽然他们收入不菲：管理不善或经营低效的公司从更有实力并有能力获得融资的公司那里受到压力是非常重要的。


We cannot rely on shareholder democracy as our only system of corporate control.	我们不能将股东民主作为唯一的公司控制系统。


The second conclusion is that the gross gains – fees, trading profits, and capital gains to the winners (perhaps $800 billion from this year’s M&A’s) – greatly exceed the perhaps $170 billion in net gains.	第二个结论是毛收益—付给赢家的费用、交易盈利和资本收益（可能是今年并购总值中的8000亿美元）--大大超过1700美元的可能净收益。


Governments have a very important educational, admonitory, and regulatory role to play: people should know the risks and probabilities, for they may wind up among losers of the other $630 billion.	各国政府要发挥非常重要的教育、劝告和监管的作用：人们应该了解风险和概率，因为他们可能成为为那6300亿美元买单的失败者。


So far there is little sign that they do.	但到目前为止似乎还很少有人明白这个道理。


Finally, finance has long had an interest in stable monopolies and oligopolies with high profit margins, while the public has an interest in competitive markets with low margins.	最后，金融素来就对稳定的、高利润边际的垄断和寡头垄断感兴趣，而公众则青睐低利润边际的竞争性市场。


The more skeptical you are of the ability of government-run antitrust policy to offset the monopoly power-increasing effects of M&A’s, the more you should seek other sources of countervailing power – which means progressive income taxation – to offset any upward leap in income inequality.	你对政府反垄断政策在抵销并购带来的垄断实力增加方面的作用越怀疑，就越应该寻求其它渠道的抵销力量—也就是累进所得税制—来���销收入不平等的急剧拉大。


Eighteenth-century physiocrats believed that only the farmer was productive, and that everyone else was somehow cheating the farmers out of their fair share.	十八世纪的重农主义者认为只有农民是具有生产力的，而其它所有人都在不同程度地骗取农民应得的份额。


Twentieth-century Marxists thought the same thing about factory workers.	二十世纪的马克思主义者对于工厂工人也持同样的观点。


Both were wrong.	这两种观点都是错误的。


Let us regulate our financial markets so that outsiders who invest are not sheared.	让我们对金融市场进行监管以使其不会损害外部投资人的利益。


But let us not make the mistake of fearing finance too much.	但我们也不应该错误地对金融怀有过度的恐惧。


Eurozone Budgets Under the Spotlight	聚光灯下的欧元区预算


DUBLIN – Bond markets are notoriously fickle, often driven by sentiment rather than rigorous macroeconomic analysis, and, as the 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated, they are far from infallible.	都柏林—债券市场向来变化无常，常常被情绪而不是靠谱的宏观经济分析推动，而正如2008年全球金融危机所表明的，债券市场也绝不是永远正确的。


They can also be particularly unreliable when assessing an economy’s long-term prospects.	在评估经济的长期前景时，债券市场可能极不靠谱。


Though interest rates across the European Union are at historic lows, government debt in the eurozone could come under severe pressure should bond markets re-evaluate the riskiness of sovereign borrowers.	尽管欧元区上下利率位于历史低点，但如果债券市场重新评估主权借款人的风险，欧元区政府债务可能面临严重压力。


That is a consideration that should weigh heavily on indebted governments as they submit their budgets for scrutiny to the European Commission.	在负债国政府向欧盟委员会递交预算以供检查时，它们应该考虑这一点。


It is not just bond traders who can be swayed by irrational exuberance (or its opposite).	受非理性繁荣（或相反）左右的并不只是债券交易员。


The verdicts of rating agencies on asset quality can also be flawed.	评级机构对资产质量的判断同样可能存在缺陷。


Too often, the raters seem content to follow rather than lead sentiment.	评级者更喜欢追随而不是引导情绪，这种事情已经见怪不改了。


Like the proverbial bus driver fixated on what is happening in his rear view mirror rather than watching what is in front of him, too many bond analysts focus on historical economic data as the key determinant of future performance.	就像寓言中看后视镜而不是眼前的巴士司机一样，太多债券分析员关注历史经济数据，以此作为未来表现的关键决定因素。


It is against this background that the budget plans submitted by eurozone governments on October 15 will have to be assessed.	在这样的背景下，10月15日递交的欧元区政府预算必须进行评估。


This requirement of the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact, specified by Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, applies to member states that fail to meet their commitments to bring their budget deficits below 3% of GDP.	欧元区稳定和增长契约（Stability and Growth Pact）的这一要求——具体内容见欧盟运作条约（Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union）第126条——适用于不能履行将预算赤字压在GDP的3%以下的承诺的成员国政府。


The main source of concern is that the low interest rates at which most European governments can currently borrow are not likely to last.	主要的担心是大部分欧元区政府目前所能得到的低借贷利率不太可能持续下去。


There are two reasons for this.	原因有二。


First, sovereign bonds held by banks are treated as risk-free assets under EU rules for calculating banks’ solvency and capital-adequacy levels.	首先，根据欧盟银行偿债能力和资本充足度计算规则，银行所持有的主权债券被视为无风险资产。


This is a risky assumption, because it implies that no European government will ever fail to repay the bond in full, with all interest due, and on time.	这是一个危险的结社，因为这意味着没有一个欧洲政府会出现无法按时足额连本付息偿还债券的情况。


But the debt levels of some European countries relative to their income raise serious questions about whether their bonds really are risk-free.	但一些欧洲国家债务相对收入的水平之高让人颇为怀疑它们的债券是否真的无风险。


And, assuming that there is no surge in inflation or economic growth, the danger of default cannot be so easily dismissed.	而假设不会发生通胀剧增或经济增长，那么违约的危险就无法轻易排除。


Second, with low interest rates causing vast sums of money to chase so few opportunities for decent yields, it is understandable that investors have turned to government bonds, thereby driving down yields still further.	其次，低利率导致大量资金追逐极少数高收益机会，因此不难理解投资者转向了政府债券，从而进一步压低收益率。


But this situation cannot last forever; if the flow of funds slows, or alternative, higher-yielding assets become available, demand for government bonds could drop markedly.	但这一局面不可能永远维持； 如果资金流放缓，或者可以获得更高收益的资产，政府债券需求就有可能大幅下降。


At that point, interest rates on sovereign debt would have to rise to sustain governments’ borrowing levels.	此时，主权债务利率就不得不上升以维持政府的借贷规模。


This is not a far-fetched scenario, and its realization would play havoc with the budgets of many indebted eurozone member states.	这一情况离我们并不遥远，如果发生，将会给许多负债欧元区成员国预算带来灾难。


Therefore, in assessing member states’ draft budgets, governments and the Commission would be foolish to assume that low interest rates on government bonds will be around for the foreseeable future.	因此，在评估成员国预算草案时，政府和欧盟委员会假设政府债券将在可预见的未来维持低利率是愚蠢的。


If investors do decide that government bond yields are no longer worth the investment, sovereign borrowers’ options may be limited.	如果投资者确实认定政府债券收益率已不再值得投资，主权借款人的选择将十分有限。


They might be able to defy the European Commission, but they would be hard-pressed to resist the views of the bond markets.	它们可能可以挑战欧盟委员会，但顽抗债券市场观点将让它们付出沉重代价。


After all, the world’s financial centers are not only susceptible to bouts of irrationality; they are also less likely to be swayed by the sort of political rhetoric that might find some sympathy within the Commission or among ministerial colleagues in the EU Council.	毕竟，世界金融中心不但容易爆发非理性行为； 而且还不太会受可能在欧盟委员会和欧洲议会部长同僚那里获得些许同情的政治说辞的影响。


Moreover, the market’s change of heart can occur very quickly and without warning, giving governments little if any time to make the necessary fiscal adjustments.	此外，市场心理的转换可能发生得极为迅速，根本没有警示信号，政府根本没时间采取必要的财政调整。


But that is less likely to happen if the EU system for coordinating the 18 eurozone members’ budget policies (the so-called Two Pack and Six Pack) is seen to be respected – especially by the larger countries, such as France and Italy.	但如果欧盟协调18个欧元区成员国预算政策的制度（所谓的“两部法规”和“六部法规”（Two Pack and Six Pack））可以获得尊重（特别是法国和意大利等大国的尊重），则发生这一情况的可能性会小一点。


On the other hand, if the system is defied, or reinterpreted in a way that alters its intended meaning, bond markets could once again become nervous.	另一方面，如果该制度受到违抗，或者以有违其初衷的方式解释，那么债券市场将再次紧张起来。


Ireland knows better than most countries the difficulties that can arise from having to borrow to fund services or repay maturing debts.	爱尔兰比大部分国家都更了解不得不借钱为维持和偿还到期债务所引起的困难。


Federalism and Progressive Resistance in America	美国的联邦主义和进步抵制


BERKELEY – The year 2016 was one of ascendant populism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other developed countries.	伯克利—2016年是民粹主义在美国、英国和其他许多发达国家崛起的一年。


With income stagnation, faltering economic opportunities, and a loss of faith in progress fueling widespread discontent, voters backed candidates who promised to return power to the “people” and to shake up systems that mainstream political leaders had “rigged” in favor of a corrupt “elite.”	在收入停滞、经济机会损失和丧失进步信念导致不满大幅扩散的情况下，选民选择支持承诺让权力回归“人民”、动摇主流政治领导人为了腐败“精英”的利益而“操纵”的制度的候选人。


In the US, growing ethnic diversity, smoldering racial tensions, and changing social mores added fuel to the electoral fire.	在美国，日益增加的种族多样性、慢火焖炖般的种族紧张以及社会风俗的改变让选举之火火上浇油。


In the US, long-term erosion of trust in the federal government culminated in Donald Trump’s victory in November’s presidential election: even though President Barack Obama enjoyed high public approval, only 19% of Americans trusted the federal government to do what is right.	在美国，对联邦政府的信任感的长期流失在11月唐纳德·特朗普赢得总统竞选中达到顶峰：尽管奥巴马总统得到了众多民众的认可，但只有19%的美国人相信联邦政府能做出正确的事。


Given traditional Republican priorities, reflected in President-elect Trump’s cabinet choices, federal government programs (with the notable exception of the military) are likely to be slashed.	考虑到共和党的政策重点传统——从当选总统特朗普的内阁人选中可见一斑——联邦政府项目可能遭到大量削减（军事是一个显著的例外）。


Ironically, spending cuts for health, education and training, and the environment, along with large regressive personal and business tax reductions, will further enrich the “elite” while undermining programs that benefit the majority of households.	讽刺的是，削减医疗、教育和培训以及环境支出，加上大规模累退性个人和企业减税，将进一步有利于“精英”而有损于惠及大部分家庭的项目。


But the major social and economic challenges addressed by federal programs will not disappear.	但联邦���目所解决的重大社会和经济挑战不会消失。


The responsibility to deal with them will merely fall more heavily on state and local governments, which will have to tackle them in innovative ways.	处理它们的责任只是更多地落到了州和地方政府肩上，后者必须找到创新解决办法。


Indeed, the answer to Trumpism is “progressive federalism”: the pursuit of progressive policy goals using the substantial authority delegated to subnational governments in the US federal system.	事实上，特朗普主义的答案是“进步联邦主义”：用授予美国联邦体系中的次国家级政府的重大权力追求进步政策。


Annual Gallup polls continue to show that a majority of Americans trust their state governments (62%) and their local governments (71%) to handle problems.	盖洛普年度调查仍然显示，大部分美国人信任州政府（62%）和地方政府（71%）能够解决问题。


A 2014 Pew study found that while only 25% of respondents were satisfied with the direction of national policy, 60% were satisfied with governance in their own communities.	2014年的皮尤（Pew）研究发现，只有25%的受访者满意国家政策方向，但有60%满意本人所在社区的治理。


And the US Constitution allows individual states to function as what Judge Brandeis called laboratories of democracy by experimenting with innovative policies without putting the rest of the country at risk.	美国宪法允许各州充当布兰代斯（Brandeis）法官所谓的民主实验室，在不危及其他州的情况下实施创新政策。


There is a long and rich history of successful experiments.	成功实验历史既长，案例亦丰。


State and local governments were leaders in establishing public primary and secondary education systems, as well as state colleges and universities.	州和地方政府是建立公立中小学教育体系以及州立学院和大学的领导者。


California, Wyoming, and other states allowed women to vote – an example that encouraged passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (enfranchising all adult women).	加利福尼亚、怀俄明和其他州允许女性投票——这一先例促使第十九修正案（授予全体成年女性选举权）获得通过。


Welfare-to-work programs in Michigan and Wisconsin served as the model for federal welfare reform under President Bill Clinton, and Obamacare is based on Massachusetts’ health-care system, introduced under Republican Governor Mitt Romney.	密歇根和威斯康辛州的以工代赈项目成为比尔·克林顿总统的联邦福利改革的样板，而奥巴马医保则是基于马萨诸塞州共和党州长米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）所引入的医疗制度。


Likewise, from 2000 to 2014, by enacting a variety of energy policies – from broad climate action plans to mandated renewable-energy standards – 33 states cut carbon dioxide emissions while expanding their economies.	类似地，从2000年到2014年，33个州实行了各自的能源政策——有的制定了广泛的气候行动计划，有的建立了可再生能源标准——既减少了二氧化碳排放，也扩张了经济。


More recently, some states have introduced cap-and-trade systems to put a price on carbon, and many are already on track to meet Obama’s Clean Power Plan targets.	最近，一些州引入了限额和交易制度为碳定价，许多周已经开始实现奥巴马的清洁电力计划目标。


Half of all US states have now legalized marijuana in some form, with eight embracing full legalization.	一半的美国州已经实现某种形式的大麻合法化，其中八个州完全合法。


Three states have implemented laws offering paid family leave, with a fourth on the way.	三个州实施了带薪产假立法，四分之一的州正在跟进。


Nineteen states rang in 2017 with increases in their minimum wage.	2017年将有十九个州提高最低工资。


The list goes on.	这个清单还可以继续列举。


Successful examples of progressive federalism can be seen in a wide variety of areas, including health care, prison reform, higher education and job training, entrepreneurship, worker protection and benefits in the “gig economy”, and pay-for-success government contracts.	成功的进步联邦主义例子在各个领域都随处可见，包括医疗、监狱改革、高等教育和就业培训、企业家精神、工人保护和福利，以及成功后支付的政府合同。


Cooperation, collaboration, and compromise – between private and public actors, for-profit and non-profit organizations, and Republicans and Democrats – are essential features in all of them.	合作、协同和妥协——私人与公共部门之间、营利性和非营利性组织之间、共和党和民主党之间——是所有这些例子的重要特征。


They also underpin the myriad examples of policy innovation and civic engagement at the local level described by James Fallows in a recent article and upcoming book.	它们也是詹姆斯·法洛斯（James Fallows）在最近的文章和即将出版的新书中所描述的大量地方层面政策创新和公民参与的例子的基础。


To promote state and local policy innovation, the federal government often assumes the role of venture capitalist, providing measurable goals and incentives, rather than dictating solutions.	为了促进州和地方政策创新，联邦政府常常扮演风险资本家的角色，提供可测的目标和激励，而不是规定解决方案。


Obama championed this approach through statewide competitions like the Department of Education’s Race to the Top program, through federal “social innovation grants” to support state and local governments, and through the Medicaid expansion program.	奥巴马是这一方针的坚定践行者，他用教育部的力争上游（Race to the Top）项目促进州内竞争，用联邦“社会创新拨款”支持州和地方政府，并扩大医疗补助（Medicaid）项目。


Vice President-elect Mike Pence is proud of the Medicaid expansion he led as Governor of Indiana – though, as of October 2016, 19 states, mainly in the South and Midwest, had opted not to participate, thereby denying health insurance to more than 2.5 million low-income people.	当选副总统麦克·彭斯（Mike Pence）自豪于他在印第安纳州州长任上对医疗补助的推广——尽管截至2016年10月，19个州（主要是南部和中西部州）选择不参与，从而让250万多低收入人群无法获得医保。


With the world’s sixth-largest economy, a population of nearly 40 million that looks like the future of America, and a united and responsible Democratic government, California is a model of what progressive federalism can accomplish.	作为世界第六大经济体、拥有4,000万人口、堪称美国未来的化身、由团结负责的民主党政府执政的加利福尼亚州是进步联邦主义能够取得什么成就的榜样。


It has led the way in expanding rights for women, farmworkers, immigrants, and sexual minorities, among others.	加州是扩大女性、农民、移民、性少数群体和其他群体权利的先锋。


Similarly, it has been at the vanguard of environmental protection and efforts to combat climate change – from setting tough standards for energy consumption and auto emissions (adopted as federal law in 2016), to pioneering a carbon-pricing system.	类似地，加州也是环境保护和遏制气候变化的先行者——从指定严格的能源消费和汽车排放标准（2016年被通过为联邦法律）到率先建立碳定价体系。


Governor Jerry Brown recently promised that if the Trump administration cuts federal funding for satellites needed to collect climate data, California would “launch its own damn satellite.”	州长杰瑞·布朗（Jerry Brown）最近承诺，如果特朗普政府削减收集其后数据所需要的卫星的联邦拨款，加州将“发射自己的该死的卫星”。


California can also be a leader of progressive resistance or “uncooperative federalism,” by refusing to carry out federal policies that it opposes.	加州也可能成为进步抵制或“不合作联邦主义”的领导者，比如拒绝实施它所反对的联邦政策。


Many cities in California and the state itself already act as “sanctuary jurisdictions,” which protect undocumented immigrants from deportation by limiting cooperation with federal authorities.	许多加州城市和该州本身已经开始按照“庇护所司法辖区”采取行动，限制与联邦当局的合作以保护无证移民免遭遣返。


By law, immigration enforcement is the federal government’s responsibility; in practice, it lacks adequate resources.	根据法律，执行移民法是联邦政府的责任； 在实践中，联邦政府没有足够的资源。


The massive spending and personnel cuts promised by Trump will exacerbate the shortfall, forcing the federal government to rely even more on state and local authorities to do much of the work.	特朗普所承诺的大规模支出和人手削减将加剧执法资源短缺的状况，迫使联邦政府更多地依靠州和地方当局完成这一工作。


Signaling its opposition, the California legislature recently introduced for consideration new bills to finance legal services for immigrants fighting deportation and to ban the use of state and local resources for immigration enforcement on constitutional grounds.	加州立法机关最近开始考虑新法案资助对抗遣返的移民的法律服务和禁止州和地方资源用于依据宪法立场的移民法执行。


Trump has already threatened to cut federal funding to sanctuary jurisdictions.	特朗普威胁要削减庇护所司法辖区的联邦拨款。


But such pressure tactics have been rendered more difficult by a recent Supreme Court decision limiting the use of conditional spending by the federal government to “coerce” state officials into implementing federal policies.	但这样的压力策略因为最高法院的最新裁决而变得更加困难：最高法院限制联邦政府用有条件支出来“强迫”州官员实施联邦政策。


We may remember 2016 as the year populism returned to power in the US.	2016年也许将以民粹主义在美国重新夺权之年而被铭记。


But it may also be remembered as the start of a new era of progressive federalism and resistance, championed by state and local governments trusted by their citizens to help improve their lives and communities.	但它也有可能以进步联邦主义和抵制新时代元年而被铭记，进步联邦主义和抵制的排头兵是受到公民信任、相信它们能改善自己的生活和社区的州和地方政府。


Uncertainty at the Fed	美联储的不确定性


BERKELEY – The US Federal Reserve is increasingly at risk of losing credibility – and for good reason.	伯克利—美联储正面临越来越大的失去信誉的风险——并且不无道理。


As Narayana Kocherlakota, former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, recently argued, Fed officials seem be balancing their stated aim of keeping inflation near 2% over the long term with a host of other, inexplicit, considerations.	明尼阿波利斯联储银行前行长纳拉亚纳·科薛拉科塔（Narayana Kocherlakota）最近指出，美联储官员似乎正在他们的规定使命——将长期通胀保持在2%附近和其他一些隐含的考虑因素之间寻找平衡。


In public statements, officials have given some hints as to what these other considerations may be.	美联储官员在公开资料中给出了一些关于这些其他考虑因素是什么的线索。


They seem to include the risk of distortion in the financial system, worries that unemployment may fall to unsustainable lows, and concerns that raising interest rates too quickly will disrupt economic recovery.	它们似乎包括金融系统扭曲风险、对失业可能下降至不可持续的低位的担心，以及对过快提高利率破坏经济复苏的担心。


But the fact remains that the Fed’s criteria for changing interest rates are for the most part unstated and unclear, making it difficult to predict how it will act.	但事实仍然是美联储改变利率的标准在很大程度上从未公布也不清不楚，这让人难以预测它会如何行动。


“This kind of uncertainty – about which goals will define the Fed’s policies – is not healthy,” says Kocherlakota. “Consumers and businesses can’t make good decisions if they don’t have a strong enough sense of how the central bank will act in any situation.”	“这种不确定性——关于哪些目标决定美联储的政策的不确定性——是不健康的，”科薛拉科塔说，“如果消费者和企业无法获得关于央行在任何情况下如何行动的足够强的感觉，他们就无法做出好决策。


Kocherlakota is right to be concerned.	科薛拉科塔的担心是正确的。


If anything, he understates the problem.	如果说有什么问题的话，那就是他低估了问题。


A lack of clarity about the Fed’s economic objectives is just one factor obscuring understanding of its decision-making.	美联储的经济目标缺乏明确性只是妨碍对美联储决策的理解的一个因素。


The heart of the trouble consists in the fact that neither financial-market participants nor, it seems, the Fed itself know the true state of the economy or how best to model it – especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.	麻烦的核心在于一个事实：似乎不管是金融市场参与者还是美联储本身，都不知道经济的真正状态或如何最好地为此建模——特别是在2008年金融危机爆发后。


And it remains unclear how the Fed is using new data to update its analysis.	而美联储如何使用新数据来更新它的分析仍不清楚。


The confusion about which factors – besides price stability and maximum feasible employment – the Fed takes into consideration in setting monetary policy aggravates the problem.	不清楚哪些因素——除物价稳定和可行就业最大化外——是美联储在制定货币政策时所考虑的因素加剧了这一问题。


It has become nearly impossible to predict how the Fed will respond to events.	预测美联储如何响应事件变得几乎不可能。


In an environment of economic volatility like the one in which we find ourselves today, a prudent central bank should do everything it can to raise expected and actual inflation, in order to gain the ability to stabilize the economy in any direction.	在当今经济波动的环境中，审慎的央行应该竭尽全力提高预期和实际通胀，从而获得在任意方向上稳定经济的能力。


If interest rates were well above zero, the Fed would have scope to raise them further in case of overheating or to lower them in response to adverse demand shocks.	如果利率远高于零，美联储可以在过热的时候进一步提高利率，而在面临不利需求冲击时降低利率。


But the Fed is not pushing for inflation at or above its target.	但美联储并没有将通胀推向或推高到目标之上。


Instead, by tightening policy, it is narrowing its room for maneuver – and is champing at the bit to narrow it even more.	相反，其收紧政策的举动压缩了施展空间——并且还在迫不及待地进一步压缩这一空间。


Nor does the Fed seem to be updating its view of the economy in an understandable way.	美联储似乎也没有以可理解的方式更新对经济的看法。


In June 2013, the Fed was predicting that annual GDP growth during the 2013-2015 period would average 2.9%, with longer-run growth of real potential GDP averaging 2.4%.	2013年6月，美联储预测2013—2015年年GDP增长率平均为2. 9%，更长期实际潜在GDP增长率平均为2.


Instead, annual growth has averaged 2.3% (or 2.2%, if estimates for the first half of 2016 are correct).	3%（或2. 2%，如果2016年上半年的估算值被修正的话）。


Nor did it perform better on other measures.	以其他标准衡量，美联储的表现也不出色。


The Fed predicted an annual inflation rate, based on the personal consumption expenditures index, of 1.9% for 2015.	美联储预测基于个人消费支出指数的2015年年通货膨胀率为1. 9%。


The true number was 1.5%.	真正的数字是1. 5%。


Similarly, its average projection of the federal funds rate for 2015 was 1.5%.	类似地，2015年联邦基金利率平均预测值为1. 5%。


The figure is currently 0.25%.	目前这一数字为0. 25%。


This three-year period, starting in 2013, in which the economy undershot the Fed’s expectations, follows a three-year period in which the economy likewise fell short of the Fed’s forecast.	在始于2013年的这三年（经济表现不如美联储预期）之前，是一个经济同样落后于美联储预测的三年。


And that period followed a three-year period, starting in 2007, in which the Fed massively understated downside deflationary risks.	而在这三年之前，是一个美联储大规模低估下行通缩风险的三年（从2007年开始）。


One would think that such a track record would have prompted officials to revise their model of the economy.	你也许会想，如此表现记录理应促使官员修正他们的经济模型。


But the Fed continues to neglect asymmetry, considering it only a second- or third-order phenomenon.	但美联储仍然无视不对称性，将它视为第二阶甚至第三阶现象。


It continues to gear inflation expectations at unrealistically high levels based on past inflation.	它仍然将通胀预期定在基于过去通胀数字的不切实际的高水平上。


And it continues to rely on the unemployment rate as a stand-in for the state of the labor market, at the expense of other indicators.	它仍然依靠失业率作为劳动力市场状态的替身，而忽略其他指标。


The Fed has also been consistently more optimistic than market expectations about the available headroom for raising interest rates.	美联储对于升息余量的看法也一直比市场预期更乐观。


This had led observers to conclude that Fed officials have not just been unlucky; they have an incorrect understanding of the economy.	这导致观察者认定美联储官员并非仅仅是不幸运； 他们对经济的理解是错误的。


Indeed, the failure of officials to convey how their inability to make accurate predictions has prompted them to update their model is leading many to lose confidence in the Fed’s capacity for sound decision-making.	事实上，美联储官员没有证明在做出正确预测方面的无能已经促使他们更新了模型，这正在让很多人失去对美联储做出可靠决策的能力的信心。


If the Fed is to maintain the confidence of markets, it will need not only to communicate its key objectives; it will also have to make clear which considerations have priority and how officials will respond if policy prescriptions required to meet various objectives conflict with one another.	如果美联储要维持市场信心，不但需要沟通其关键目标； 还必须明确它优先考虑哪些因素以及如果满足不同目标所需要的政策药方彼此冲突官员将如何响应。


Finally – and most important – the Fed will have to provide reassurance that it is keeping its internal model of the economy up to date.	最后——也是最重要的——美联储必须能够保证其内部经济模型与时俱进。


Would Higher Interest Rates Boost US Growth?	提高利率能提振美国增长吗？


BERKELEY – Blackstone CEO Tony James recently published a column in the Financial Times titled “To revive America’s economy, raise interest rates.”	伯克利—百仕通公司（Blackstone）首席执行官托尼·詹姆斯（Tony James）最近在《金融时报》发表了一篇专栏，名为《为复兴美国经济，提高利率》（To revive America’s economy, raise interest rates）。


This is a very bad idea.	这真是一个坏主意。


Let us imagine that we have been transported to a parallel universe, one where the US Federal Reserve has not held interest rates at or near zero.	想象我们被输送到平行世界，在那里，美联储并没有将利率保持在零或近零水平。


Instead, this Fed has gradually raised interest rates for the past six years, and the federal funds rate is now 400 basis points higher than it currently is.	相反，这个美联储在过去六年中逐步提高利率，联邦基金利率要比现在高400个基点。


Before looking at what this alternate-universe economy would look like, let us review what has happened in the real world.	在探讨这个平行世界的经济将如何之前，我们先回顾一下真实世界发生了什么。


In the fourth quarter of 2015, households, businesses, and foreign investors saved $940 billion in the United States.	2015年四季度，家庭、企业和外国投资者在美国存了9,400亿美元。


Of that amount, $185 billion was invested in newly issued government bonds, and the other $755 billion flowed into interest- and dividend-paying savings vehicles such as loans, corporate bonds, and new equity issues, which in turn added to the US private sector’s productive-capital stock.	当是时，1,850亿美元投资于新发行政府债券，7,550亿美元流入产生利息和红利的储蓄工具，如贷款、公司债券和新股发行，这反过来增加了美国私人部门生产性资本存量。


In our hypothetical scenario, $755 billion in new savings vehicles would not have been created in the fourth quarter of 2015 to fund investment.	在我们的假设情景中，流入新储蓄工具的7,550亿美元无法在2015年四季度创造出来用于投资的。


With higher interest rates, that $755 billion could still have been as high as $735 billion, or it could have dropped to as low as $700 billion.	尽管利率更高，但这7,550亿美元可能仍会有7,350亿美元，也有可能低至7,000亿美元。


In any case, we know that it would have been lower, and that the liquidity balances that support spending would have been deprived of $20-55 billion.	无论如何，我们知道它一定会降低一些，支出的流动性余额会减少200—550亿美元。


Perhaps James only talks to firms that do not rationalize their investment plans when interest rates rise; but many firms certainly do.	也许詹姆斯只是在通知企业不要在利率提高时为投资计划找理由； 但许多企业显然是这么做了。


For example, interest rates play a major role in the construction business, especially on the coasts, where real-estate values are especially sensitive to financing costs and available cash flows.	比如，利率在建筑业中起着重要作用，特别是在房地产价值对融资成本和可用现金流特别敏感的沿海地区。


Increased financing costs and reduced liquidity can also dampen consumer-goods purchases and prevent small businesses from expanding.	融资成本增加和流动性的减少还可能抑制消费品购买，阻止小企业扩张。


The Fed could respond by adding to the economy’s cash stock, but then interest rates would fall, and we would be exactly where we are now.	美联储的反应可能是增加经济的现金存量，但那样的话利率将下降，回到我们现在的状况。


On the other hand, if the Fed maintained the higher federal funds rate, financial flows would be diverted away from productive investment and into idle cash balances, spending would decrease, and the economy would enter a new recession.	另一方面，如果美联储维持较高的联邦基金利率，金融流将从生产性投资流出，成为闲置现金余额，支出将下降，经济将进入新衰退。


At this point, James would object that this is not what he wanted at all.	这时，詹姆斯会抗议说这完全不是他想要的。


He would have expected the confidence fairy to show up and spur production and demand across all economic sectors, so that businesses still would have created $755 billion in new savings vehicles, aside from government bonds, in the fourth quarter of 2015.	他原本预期信心仙女现身刺激经济中各部门的产量和需求，从而2015年四季度企业仍能在政府债券之外创造7,550亿美元用于投资新储蓄工具。


With the confidence fairy’s arrival, everything would indeed be fine: the economy would be stable and close to full employment, interest rates would be higher, and the negative effects of abnormally low interest rates that James lists would all disappear.	随着信心仙女的到来，一切都真的会变好：经济将稳定下来，接近充分就业； 利率将会更高；


According to James, these effects include “companies substituting capital for labor to an unnatural degree”; economic hardship for “the elderly and others who depend on income-producing investments”; higher retirement-savings requirements; “systemic risks” in the financial system as investors buy “esoteric assets” to “grasp for higher returns”; and lower bank profitability from lending.	詹姆斯所列出的反常地利率的消极效应将全部消失。 据詹姆斯的说法，这些效应包括“公司以不正常的程度用资本代替劳动力”、“年长者和其他依赖产生收益的投资的人”的经济困难、更高的退休储蓄要求、金融系统因为投资者购买“深奥资产”以“抓住更高回报”而产生的“系统性风险”，以及银行贷款利润的降低。


But these problems would not be averted by the Fed independently raising interest rates.	但这些问题无法通过美联储独立地提高利率解决。


Rather, businesses must create savings vehicles and make investments, to which the Fed can then respond by allowing interest rates to rise, in order to head off excess demand and high inflation.	相反，企业必须创造储蓄工具和做投资，接着美联储才能做出反应让利率提高，从而遏制过度需求和高通胀。


The Federal Open Market Committee cannot dictate this process from the Eccles Building in Washington, DC.	美联储公开市场委员会（FOMC）无法在华盛顿埃克尔斯大厦（Eccles Building）控制这一过程。


But the Fed has now tried to induce the creation of more savings vehicles, in part through $3 trillion in purchases of long-term securities.	但美联储现在试图引导创造更多储蓄工具，部分是通过购买3万亿美元长期证券实现。


The Fed has removed an annual $30 billion in duration risk from private-sector balance sheets – which bond issuers previously had to pay savers to bear – and that freed-up risk-bearing capacity has presumably been used to fund risky investment projects.	美联储��年将300亿美元的久期风险从私人部门资产负债表上剔除——此前债券发行人必须向储蓄者支付这笔钱以补偿他们承担这一风险——而因此释放的风险承受力想必被用于支持高风险投资项目。


But surely James would agree that financial organizations that assess and bear duration risk are not necessarily competent to judge other risky ventures.	但显然詹姆斯也将同意，评估和承担久期风险的金融组织未必能够很好地判断其他高风险投资。


If we want more savings vehicles to push up interest rates in loanable-funds markets, so that the Fed can then increase the federal funds rate, there is an obvious solution: the government itself should create savings vehicles.	如果我们想要更多储蓄工具推高可贷资金市场的利率，从而美联储可以提高联邦基金利率，那么有一个显而易见的解决方法：政府本身应该创造储蓄工具。


For example, a government-sponsored infrastructure bank could start borrowing $100 billion every quarter to finance infrastructure projects.	比如，政府出资的基础设施银行可以开始每季度借入1,000亿美元用于基础设施项目融资。


With that, concerns about abnormally low interest rates would be a thing of the past.	这样，关于反常低利率的担忧就将是明日黄花。


In the meantime, the Fed should certainly not take the lead in raising interest rates when there is no evidence of excess supply in savings vehicles.	与此同时，美联储显然不应该在尚无证据证明储蓄工具供给过剩的情况下领衔提高利率。


To do so would be akin to building a half-mile landing strip in the Pacific Ocean in 1944, and thinking that cargo-bearing B-17s would suddenly start to land.	这样做好比是1944年在太平洋上铺设半英里长的跑道，然后指望载重巨大的B-17轰炸机可以猛然着陆。


The Fed Under Fire	饱受抨击的美联储


CAMBRIDGE – The Federal Reserve is under attack.	剑桥—美联储正在遭到攻击。


Bills subjecting the United States' central bank to “auditing" by the Government Accountability Office are likely to be passed by both houses of Congress.	让其接受“政府问责局（Government Accountability Office）“审计”的法案有望在国会两院获得通过。


Legislation that would tie how the Fed sets interest rates to a predetermined formula is also being considered.	要求美联储以事先预定的公式制定利率的立法也在考虑当中。


Anyone unaware of the incoming fire only had to listen to the grilling Fed Chair Janet Yellen received recently on Capitol Hill.	任何没有意识到即将到来的“大火”的人，只要听一听美联储主席耶伦最近在国会山所受到的诘难便可略知一二。


Members of Congress criticized Yellen for meeting privately with the president and treasury secretary, and denounced her for weighing in on issues tangential to monetary policy.	国会议员批评耶伦私下会晤总统和财政部长，谴责她考虑与货币政策风马牛不相及的问题。


Still others, like Richard Fisher, the outgoing president of the Dallas Fed, have inveighed against the special role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.	还有一些人，如即将卸任的达拉斯联邦储备银行行长理查德·费舍尔（Richard Fisher）猛烈抨击了纽约联邦储备银行的特殊角色。


Reflecting the New York Fed's heavy regulatory responsibilities, owing to its proximity to the seat of finance, its president has a permanent seat on the Federal Open Market Committee, the body that sets the Fed's benchmark interest rate.	纽约联储银行承担着沉重的监管责任——因为它与金融中心近在咫尺——因此其行长拥有美联储基准利率决定机构——美联储公开市场委员会的永久委员席位。


This, its detractors warn, privileges Wall Street in the operation of the Federal Reserve System.	它的批评者指出，这给了华尔街影响美联储操作的特权。


Finally, some object that bankers dominate the boards of directors of the regional Reserve Banks, making it seem that the foxes are guarding the henhouse.	最后，一些人反对银行家把持了地区联储银行董事会，这就好像是让狐狸看守鸡窝。


This criticism reflects the fact that the United States has just been through a major financial crisis, in the course of which the Fed took a series of extraordinary steps.	这类批评反映了美联储刚刚经历了重大金融危机的事实，在此期间，美联储采取了一系列非常规措施。


It helped bail out Bear Stearns, the government-backed mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the insurance giant AIG.	它出手救助了贝尔斯登公司（Bear Stearns）、政府支持的按揭贷款商房利美和房地美以及保险巨头AIG。


It extended dollar swap lines not just to the Bank of England and the European Central Bank but also to the central banks of Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore.	它扩大了美元互换规模，其对象不仅包括英格兰银行和欧洲央行，也包括墨西哥、巴西、韩国和新加坡央行。


And it embarked on an unprecedented expansion of its balance sheet under the guise of quantitative easing.	它还以量化宽松的名义前所未有地扩大了其资产负债表。


These decisions were controversial, and their advisability has been questioned – as it should be in a democracy.	这些决定都带来了争议，其正当性饱受质疑——在民主国家理应如此。


In turn, Fed officials have sought to justify their actions, which is also the way a democracy should function.	反过来，美联储官员也在为他们的行动辩护，这也是民主的应有之义。


There is ample precedent for a Congressional response.	国会的反应有大量先例可循。


When the US last experienced a crisis of this magnitude, in the 1930s, the Federal Reserve System similarly came under Congressional scrutiny.	上一次经历如此规模危机时，即20世纪30年代，美联储也接受了类似的国会调查。


The result was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 and 1933, which gave the Fed more leeway in lending, and the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, which allowed it to disregard earlier gold-standard rules.	其结果是给予美联储更大贷款自由的1932和1933年格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案以及让美联储可以无视此前金本位规则的1934年黄金储备法案。


The Banking Act of 1935, as amended in 1942, then shifted power from the Reserve Banks to the Board in Washington, DC, and confirmed the special role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.	接着，1935年银行法（根据1942年修订内容）将权力从地方联储银行转移到华盛顿美联储理事会手中，并确定了纽约联储银行的特殊地位。


These reforms reflected an overwhelming consensus that the Fed had been derelict in fulfilling its duties.	这些改革反映了一个压倒性共识，即美联储在履行职责方面令人十分不满。


It had failed to prevent the money supply from contracting in the early stages of the Great Depression.	它没有在大萧条初期阻止货币供给减少。


Heedless of its responsibilities as an emergency lender, it had allowed the banking system to collapse.	它没有注重其紧急贷款人的责任，放任银行体系崩溃。


When financial stability hung in the balance in 1933, the Reserve Banks' failure to cooperate prevented effective action.	当1933年金融稳定摇摇欲坠时，各联储银行又没有进行合作，导致无法采取有效行动。


Given such incompetence, it is not surprising that subsequent reforms were far-reaching.	美联储如此失职，无怪乎此后的改革如此深远。


But these reforms went in precisely the opposite direction from today's proposed changes: fewer limits on policy makers' discretion, more power to the Board, and a larger role for the New York Fed, all to enable the Federal Reserve System to react more quickly and robustly in a crisis.	但这些改革与今天的计划变革恰好相反：减少对政策制定者自由裁量权的限制、增加美联储理事会的权力、给予纽约联储银行更大的角色，所有这些都是为了让美联储能在危机中更快更强地采取行动。


It is far from clear, in other words, that the right response to the latest crisis is an abrupt about-face.	换句话说，对于最新危机的正确反应是否是猛然向后转还远未可知。


Ultimately, whether significant changes are warranted should depend on whether the central bank's interventions in fact aggravated the recent crisis, as they aggravated the crisis of the 1930s.	说到底，重大变革能否成为现实应该取决于央行干预是否实际加剧了当前危机，就像它在20世纪30年代所做的那样。


But the Fed's critics have been curiously nonspecific about what they regard as the Fed's mistakes.	但美联储批评者很有意思地从未具���描述他们认为美联储错在何处。


And where they have been specific, as with the accusation that the Fed was fomenting inflation, they have been entirely wrong.	而他们做了具体论述的东西——比如美联储在助长通胀——完全错误的。


Fed officials, for their part, must better justify their actions.	至于美联储官员，他们应该更好地论证他们的行动。


While they would prefer not to re-litigate endlessly the events of 2008, continued criticism suggests that their decisions are still not well understood and that officials must do more to explain them.	他们当然不想没完没了地辩解2008年的事件，但不断的批评表明他们的决定并未得到充分理解，美联储官员应该更详细地予以解释。


In addition, Fed officials should avoid weighing in on issues that are only obliquely related to monetary policy.	此外，美联储官员应该避免介入与货币政策没什么关系的问题。


Their mandate is to maintain price and financial stability, as well as maximum employment.	美联储的职责是保持物价和金融稳定以及就业最大化。


The more intently Fed governors focus on their core responsibilities, the more inclined politicians will be to respect their independence.	美联储高层越是专注于核心责任，公平的政客就越支持其独立性。


Finally, Fed officials should acknowledge that at least some of the critics' suggestions have merit.	最后，美联储官员应该承认至少部分批评建议是有道理的。


For example, eliminating commercial banks' right to select a majority of each Reserve Bank's board would be a useful step in the direction of greater openness and diversity.	比如，取消商业银行选择每家联储银行理事会多数的权利将是迈向更开放、更多元的正确方向的有益的一步。


The Federal Reserve System has always been a work in progress.	美联储永远在改进。


What the US needs now is progress in the right direction.	如今美国需要的是朝正确方向的改进。


The Great Policy Divergence	政策大分歧


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the next few weeks, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are likely to put in place notably different policies.	华盛顿—未来几周，美联储和欧洲央行可能会采取极其不同的政策。


The Fed is set to raise interest rates for the first time in almost ten years.	美联储即将提高利率，这是近十年来的第一次。


Meanwhile, the ECB is expected to introduce additional unconventional measures to drive rates in the opposite direction, even if that means putting further downward pressure on some government bonds that are already trading at negative nominal yields.	与此同时，欧洲央行预计将采取更多非常规手段让利率朝反方向运动，即使这意味着给某些已经处于负名义收益率的政府债券造成进一步下跌压力。


In implementing these policies, both central banks are pursuing domestic objectives mandated by their governing legislation.	实施这些政策的两家央行都是在执政立法机关的授权下追求国内目标。


The problem is that there may be few, if any, orderly mechanisms to manage the international repercussions of this growing divergence.	问题在于几乎没有可以用来管理这一日益严重的分歧所造成的国际影响的有序机制。


The Fed is responding to continued indications of robust job creation in the United States and other signs that the country’s economy is recovering, albeit moderately so.	美联储是在响应美国坚挺的就业创造指标和其他经济正在复苏的信号（尽管复苏势头不强）。


Also conscious of the risk to financial stability if interest rates remain at artificially low levels, the Fed is expected to increase them when its policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee meets on December 15-16. The move marks a turning point in the Fed’s approach to the economy.	美联储也认识到，如果利率保持在人为的低水平，将给金融稳定造成风险，因此预计它将在12月15—16日的美联储公开市场委员会政策制定会议上提高利率。


In deciding to raise interest rates, it will be doing more than simply lifting its foot from the financial-stimulus accelerator; it will also be taking a notable step toward the multiyear normalization of its overall policy stance.	决定提高利率不仅意味着美联储不再踩下金融刺激油门，也意味着它向着为期多年的总体政策立场正常化过程迈出了第一步。


In the meantime, the ECB is facing a very different set of economic conditions, including generally sluggish growth, the risk of deflation, and worries about the impact of the terrorist attacks in Paris on business and consumer confidence.	与此同时，欧洲央行面临着完全不同的经济环境，包括停滞的总体增长形势、通缩风险以及对巴黎恐怖袭击给企业和消费信心造成的影响的担忧。


As a result, the bank’s decision-makers are giving serious consideration to pushing the discount rate further into negative territory and extending its large-scale asset-purchase program (otherwise known as quantitative easing).	因此，欧洲央行决策者正在认真考虑让贴现率朝负区间更进一步，并延长其大规模资产购买计划（即量化宽松）。


In other words, the ECB is likely to expand and extend experimental measures that will press even harder on the financial-stimulus accelerator.	换句话说，欧洲央行可能扩大和延长进一步加大金融刺激油门的实验性措施。


In a perfect world, policymakers would have assessed the potential for international spillovers from these divergent policies (including possible spillbacks on both sides of the Atlantic) and put in place a range of instruments to ensure a better alignment of domestic and global objectives.	在完美的世界中，决策者会评估不同方向的政策的潜在国际溢出效应（包括大西洋两岸可能发生的互相影响），用各种工具确保国内和全球目标的协调性。


Unfortunately, political polarization and general policy dysfunction in both the US and the European Union continue to inhibit such an effort.	不幸的是，美国和欧盟的政治两极分化和总体政策无能仍制约着这样的评估。


As a result, lacking a more comprehensive policy response, the harmonization of their central banks’ divergent policies will be left to the markets – in particular, those for fixed-income assets and currencies.	结果，由于缺乏更全面的政策响应，两家央行的分歧政策的协调需要由市场来完成——特别是固定收益资产和货币市场。


Already, the interest-rate differential between “risk-free” bonds on both sides of the Atlantic – say, US Treasuries and German Bunds – has widened notably.	目前，大西洋两岸的“无风险”债券——如美国国债和德国国债——的利差相当可观。


And, at the same time, the dollar has strengthened not only against the euro, but also against most other currencies.	与此同时，美元不仅对欧元升值，也多其他大部分货币升值。


Left unchecked, these trends are likely to persist.	若放任不管，这些趋势可能会持续。


If history is any guide, there are three major issues that warrant careful monitoring in the coming months.	从历史上看，在未来几个月中必须严密监控三个问题。


First, the US is unlikely to stand by for long if its currency appreciates significantly and its international competitiveness deteriorates substantially.	首先，如果美元大幅升值、美国国际竞争力大幅下降，美国不可能长时间袖手旁观。


Companies are already reporting earning pressures due to the rising dollar, and some are even asking their governments to play a more forceful role in countering a stealth “currency war.”	公司已在纷纷抱怨美元升值所造成的利润压力，一些公司甚至要求政府更加强硬地遏制“货币暗战”。


Second, because the dollar is used as a reserve currency, a rapid rise in its value could put pressure on those who have used it imprudently.	其次，美国被用作储备货币，因此其价值的迅速上升将给不审慎地使用美元的国家造成压力。


At particular risk are emerging-country companies that, having borrowed overwhelmingly in dollars but generating only limited dollar earnings, might have large currency mismatches in their assets and liabilities or their incomes and expenditures.	风险尤其大的是那些几乎完全用美元借贷但美元收入有限的新兴国家公司，它们的资产和负债或者收入和支出之间存在严重的货币错配。


And, finally, sharp movements in interest rates and exchange rates can cause volatility in other markets, most notably for equities.	最后，利率和汇率的大幅波动可能导致其他市场的动荡，最主要是股市。


Because regulatory controls and market constraints have made brokers less able to play a countercyclical role by accumulating inventory on their balance sheets, the resulting price instability is likely to be large.	监管管制和市场约束让经纪商比较难以通过自身资产负债表上的累积存货起到反周期作用，由此导致的价格波动可能非常巨大。


There is a risk that some portfolios will be forced into disordered unwinding.	有可能一些投资组合将被迫��序甩卖。


Furthermore, the central banks’ policy of curtailing so-called “volatile volatility” is likely to be challenged.	此外，央行遏制所谓的“波动性波动”（volatile volatility）的政策也可能受到挑战。


Of course, none of these outcomes is preordained.	当然，所有这些结果都不是必然的。


Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have the ability to lower the risk of instability by implementing structural reforms, ensuring more balanced aggregate demand, removing pockets of excessive indebtedness, and smoothing out the mechanisms of multilateral and regional governance.	大西洋两岸的政客有能力通过实施结构改革、确保更平衡的总需求、解决过度负债问题以及理顺多边和地区监管机制来降低动荡风险。


The three possible outcomes of all this include a relatively stable multi-speed world, notable disruptions that undermine the US’s economic recovery, and a European revival that benefits from US growth.	所有这些因素的三个可能结果包括相对稳定的多速世界、破坏美国经济复苏的大扰动，以及得益于美国增长的欧洲复兴。


The good news is that the impact of the divergence will depend on how policymakers manage its pressures.	好消息是政策分歧的影响将取决于决策者如何管理压力。


The bad news is that they have yet to find the political will to act decisively to minimize the risks.	坏消息是决策者并没有政治意愿果断行动尽量降低这些风险。


As the Fed normalizes its monetary policy and the ECB doubles down on extraordinary measures, we certainly should hope for the best.	在美联储货币政策正常化和欧洲央行加码非常规措施之际，我们当然应该报以最大的希望。


But we should also be planning for a substantial rise in financial and economic uncertainty.	但我们也应该为金融和经济不确定性的激增做好准备。


Why the Fed Buried Monetarism	美联储为何抛弃货币主义


LONDON – The US Federal Reserve’s decision to delay an increase in interest rates should have come as no surprise to anyone who has been paying attention to Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s comments.	发自伦敦——美联储推迟提高利率的决定对于一直关注该机构主席珍娜·耶伦（Janet Yellen）言论的人来说不足为奇。


The Fed’s decision merely confirmed that it is not indifferent to international financial stress, and that its risk-management approach remains strongly biased in favor of “lower for longer.”	这一决定只不过是确认了美联储并非对国际金融压力无动于衷，而且其风险管理手段仍然坚定倾向于“更低、更长期”的方针。


So why did the markets and media behave as if the Fed’s action (or, more precisely, inaction) was unexpected?	那么，为什么市场和媒体表现的就像美联储的动作（或者更精确地说，不作为）是意料之外呢？


What really shocked the markets was not the Fed’s decision to maintain zero interest rates for a few more months, but the statement that accompanied it.	真正震惊市场的并不是美联储决定维持零利率数月，而是伴随这个决定的声明。


The Fed revealed that it was entirely unconcerned about the risks of higher inflation and was eager to push unemployment below what most economists regard as its “natural” rate of around 5%.	美联储透露这一决策完全没有考虑高通胀的风险，并急于将失业率推低至大多数经济学家认为的“自然”失业率（约5%）以下。


It is this relationship – between inflation and unemployment – that lies at the heart of all controversies about monetary policy and central banking.	而关于货币政策和央行行为的所有争论核心正是通货膨胀和失业率之间的关系。


And almost all modern economic models, including those used by the Fed, are based on the monetarist theory of interest rates pioneered by Milton Friedman in his 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association.	而几乎所有的现代经济模式，包括美联储所使用的都基于由米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）在其1967年的美国经济学会主席发言中首先提出的利率货币主义理论。


Friedman’s theory asserted that inflation would automatically accelerate without limit once unemployment fell below a minimum safe level, which he described as the “natural” unemployment rate.	弗里德曼的理论断言，一旦失业率低于最低安全水平（即他形容的“自然”失业率），通胀便会自动无上限加速攀升。


In Friedman’s original work, the natural unemployment rate was a purely theoretical conjecture, founded on an assumption described as “rational expectations,” even though it ran counter to any normal definition of rational behavior.	在弗里德曼的原文中，自然失业率是一个纯理论推测，建基于称之为“理性预期”的假设，尽管它违背了任何理性行为的标准定义。


The theory’s publication at a time of worldwide alarm about double-digit inflation offered central bankers exactly the pretext they needed for desperately unpopular actions.	当时全球正面对两位数的通胀忧心不已，而该理论的出世恰恰为央行行长采用那些极为不受欢迎的行动提供了借口。


By dramatically increasing interest rates to fight inflation, policymakers broke the power of organized labor, while avoiding blame for the mass unemployment that monetary austerity was bound to produce.	通过大幅提高利率以对抗通胀，政策制定者击破了工会组织的力量，同时避免了因货币紧缩必然导致的大规模失业而受指责。


A few years later, Friedman’s “natural” rate was replaced with the less value-laden and more erudite-sounding “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU).	几年后，弗里德曼的“自然”率被换成了更少价值判断，但更冠冕堂皇的“非加速通胀型失业率”（NAIRU）。


But the basic idea was always the same. If monetary policy is used to try to push unemployment below some pre-determined level, inflation will accelerate without limit and destroy jobs.	但其基本思维是始终不变的，如果试图用货币政策将失业率降低至某个预定水平，通胀将无限加速并消灭就业职位。


A monetary policy aiming for sub-NAIRU unemployment must therefore be avoided at all costs.	因此，必须不惜一切代价避免实施将低于非加速通胀型失业率作为目标的货币政策。


A more extreme version of the theory asserts that there is no lasting tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. All efforts to stimulate job creation or economic growth with easy money will merely boost price growth, offsetting any effect on unemployment.	该理论还有一个更极端的版本推断说通货膨胀和失业率之间不存在持久的权衡，所有以“快钱（easy money）”刺激就业和经济增长的努力只会助推物价上涨，抵消在降低失业率上所做的努力。


Monetary policy must therefore focus solely on hitting inflation targets, and central bankers should be exonerated of any blame for unemployment.	因此货币政策必须只关注如何达到通胀目标，而央行应免遭任何关于失业率的指责。


The monetarist theory that justified narrowing central banks’ responsibilities to inflation targeting had very little empirical backing when Friedman proposed it.	当费里德曼为将央行职责缩窄为实现通胀目标寻找理论依据时，这一货币主义理论还没有什么实践经验来支撑。


Since then, it has been refuted both by political experience and statistical testing.	自那以后，它同时遭到政治经验和统计检验的驳斥。


Monetary policy, far from being dissipated in rising prices, as the theory predicted, turned out to have a much greater impact on unemployment than on inflation, especially in the past 20 years.	在货币政策方面也远未如理论预期的那样作用在物价提升之上，反而对失业造成了比通胀更大的影响，特别是在过去的20年内。


But, despite empirical refutation, the ideological attractiveness of monetarism, supported by the supposed authority of “rational” expectations, proved overwhelming.	但就算有实践经验的批驳，在“理性”预期的所谓权威撑腰下，货币主义的意识形态吸引力如日中天。


As a result, the purely inflation-oriented approach to monetary policy gained total dominance in both central banking and academic economics.	于是这一单纯通胀导向的货币政策便统治了央行界和经济学学术圈。


That brings us back to recent financial events.	让我们回顾一下到最近的金融事件。


The inflation-targeting models used by the Fed (and other central banks and official institutions like the International Monetary Fund) all assume the existence of some pre-determined limit to non-inflationary unemployment.	美联储（以及其他国家央行和官方机构，如国际货币基金组织）所使用的通胀目标模型都假设存在着某个对非通胀型失业率的预设限值。


The Fed’s latest model estimates this NAIRU to be 4.9-5.2%.	美联储的最新模型估计该比率为4. 9-5.


And that is why so many economists and market participants were shocked by Yellen’s apparent complacency.	这就是为何众多经济学家和市场参与者被耶伦的过度自信所震惊。


With US unemployment now at 5.1%, standard monetary theory dictates that interest rates must be raised urgently.	由于美国目前5. 1％的失业率，标准的货币理论规定利率必须紧急提高。


Otherwise, either a disastrous inflationary blowout will inevitably follow, or the body of economic theory that has dominated a generation of policy and academic thinking since Friedman’s paper on “rational” expectations and “natural” unemployment will turn out to be completely wrong.	否则要么出现灾难性的通胀井喷，要么自弗里德曼对“理性”预期和“自然”失业率论文的论文发表后主宰了一代政策和学术思想的经济理论主体被证明为完全错误。


What, then, should we conclude from the Fed’s decision not to raise interest rates?	那么，我们应该从美联储决定不加息的行为中得出什么结论？


One possible conclusion is banal.	一个可能的结论就是什么也不会发生。


Because the NAIRU is a purely theoretical construct, the Fed’s economists can simply change their estimates of this magic number.	由于自然失业率是一个纯粹的理论建构，美联储的经济学家们可以直接更改对这个神奇的数字的估算。


In fact, the Fed has already cut its NAIRU estimate three times in the past two years.	事实上在过去两年内美联储已经三次下调了对自然失业率的估算。


But there may be a deeper reason for the Fed’s forbearance.	但美联储的克制也有可能出于一个更深层次的原因。


To judge by Yellen’s recent speeches, the Fed may no longer believe in any version of the “natural” unemployment rate.	由耶伦近期的讲话判断，美联储可能不再相信任何版本的“自然”失业率了。


Friedman’s assumptions of ever-accelerating inflation and irrationally “rational” expectations that lead to single-minded targeting of price stability remain embedded in official economic models like some Biblical creation myth.	导致一心关注物价稳定的弗里德曼长期加速通胀假设和非理性的“理性”预期依然如圣经创世神话那样深植在官方的经济模型中。


But the Fed, along with almost all other central banks, appears to have lost faith in that story.	但美联储，与几乎所有他家央行一道，显得已经对这个神话失去了信仰。


Instead, central bankers now seem to be implicitly (and perhaps even unconsciously) returning to pre-monetarist views: tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment are real and can last for many years.	相反，央行如今似乎暗中（甚至不自觉地）返回到前货币主义者的观点：通货膨胀与失业之间的权衡是真实的，而且可以持续多年。


Monetary policy should gradually recalibrate the balance between these two economic indicators as the business cycle proceeds.	货币政策应逐步随着商业周期调整这两个经济指标之间的平衡。


When inflation is low, the top priority should be to reduce unemployment to the lowest possible level; and there is no compelling reason for monetary policy to restrain job creation or GDP growth until excessive inflation becomes an imminent danger.	当通货膨胀率较低，当务之急应该是降低失业率到尽可能低的水平； 同时也并没有令人信服的理由让货币政策去抑制创造就业或GDP的增长，除非过度通胀变得迫在眉睫。


This does not imply permanent near-zero US interest rates.	这并不意味着永远实施接近零的美元利率。


The Fed will almost certainly start raising rates in December, but monetary tightening will be much slower than in previous economic cycles, and it will be motivated by concerns about financial stability, not inflation.	美联储几乎肯定会在12月开始加息，但货币紧缩会比以往的经济周期要慢得多，主要动机也将是金融稳定而非通胀。


As a result, fears – bordering on panic in some emerging markets – about the impact of Fed tightening on global economic conditions will probably prove unjustified.	这样一来，围绕在一些新兴市场对美联储政策收紧对全球经济形势影响的恐慌状况的担忧，可能会证明是站不住脚的。


The bad news is that the vast majority of market analysts, still clinging to the old monetarist framework, will accuse the Fed of “falling behind the curve” by letting US unemployment decline too far and failing to anticipate the threat of rising inflation.	坏消息是，绝大多数仍沿袭着旧有货币主义框架的分析师将指责美联储通过坐视美国失业率过度下降而“下跌到曲线之下”并未能预见到通货膨胀上升的威胁。


The Fed should simply ignore such atavistic protests, as it rightly did last week.	而美联储应该直接忽略这样的老古董的抗议，正如它上周的正确作为。


The Fed’s Risky New Mandate	美联储危险的新使命


LONDON – “In this world, there are only two tragedies,” Oscar Wilde once wrote. “One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.”	伦敦—“这个世界只有两出悲剧，”奥斯卡·王尔德（Oscar Wilde）曾经写道，“一是得不到想要的，而是得到。


As the US Federal Reserve inches closer to achieving its targets for the domestic economy, it faces growing pressure to normalize monetary policy.	”随着美联储逐渐接近实现国内经济目标，它面临着日益增加的货币政策正常化的压力。


But the domestic economy is no longer the Fed’s sole consideration in policymaking.	但国内经济已不再是美联储决策的唯一考虑因素。


On the contrary, America’s monetary authority has all but explicitly recognized a new mandate: promoting global financial stability.	相反，美国的货币政策已经明白无误地有了新的使命：促进全球金融稳定。


The US Congress created the Fed in 1913 as an independent agency removed from partisan politics, tasked with ensuring domestic price stability and maximizing domestic employment.	1913年，美国国会建立了美联储，它是一个从党派政治中分离出来的独立机构，其任务是保证国内物价稳定和国内就业最大化。


Its role has expanded over time, and the Fed, along with many of its developed-country counterparts, has engaged in increasingly unconventional monetary policy – quantitative easing, credit easing, forward guidance, and so on – since the 2008 global financial crisis.	其角色随时间而扩大，和许多发达国家的同道机构一样，自2008年全球金融危机以来，美联储也采取了日益非常规的货币政策——量化宽松、信用宽松、前瞻指引，等等。


Now, the unconventional has become conventional.	如今，非常规已经成为常规。


A generation of global market participants knows only a world of low (or even negative) interest rates and artificially inflated asset prices.	这一代全球市场参与者只识低（甚至负）利率和人为抬高的资产价格。


But the Fed’s dual mandate remains in force.	但美联储的双重使命仍然有效。


And while the Fed’s recent rhetoric has been dovish, the fundamentals of the US economy – particularly those that supposedly matter most for the Fed – indicate a clear case for further rate hikes.	而尽管美联储最近的语调相当“鸽派”，但美国经济的基本面——特别是应该对美联储最为重要的基本面——显然表明未来将会升息。


Consider, first, the Fed’s employment mandate.	首先考虑美联储的就业使命。


The unemployment rate is down to just 5%, job growth is strong and consistent, and jobless claims have been on a clear downward trajectory for several years.	失业率已下降至略高于5%，就业增长强劲而持续，失业登记多年来呈现出显而易见的下降趋势。


As for the price-stability mandate, the oil-price collapse has naturally affected headline figures over the past year, but the trend in core inflation (excluding the energy component) suggests that the Fed is falling behind the curve.	至于物价稳定使命，石油价格崩盘必然地影响了去年的标题数字，但核心通胀（剔除能源）趋势表明美联储已经落后于形势。


Core CPI is at a post-crisis high, having risen 2.3% year on year in February, and 2.2% in March.	核心CPI已处于危机后的高点，2月同比上涨2. 3%，3月同比上涨2.


Moreover, inflationary pressures will likely mount as the year progresses.	此外，通胀压力可能随着今年的深入而增加。


With the household debt-to-asset ratio now approaching levels last seen in the 1990s, consumers have plenty of capacity to ramp up their borrowing.	目前家庭债务-资产比正在接近20世纪90年代的低水平，消费者有充足的空间增加借贷。


At the same time, the cost drag on inflation is set to diminish as the oil price stabilizes, and the dollar’s recent softness implies further inflationary pressure.	与此同时，通胀低迷的成本因素必然会随着石油价格的稳定而减弱，而最近美元的弱势意味着进一步的通胀压力。


But this domestic progress puts the Fed in a difficult position.	但这一国内进展让美联储处于困难的境地。


As a result, the Fed is effectively trapped between a US economy that increasingly justifies normalization of monetary policy and the interest of fragile global markets – in which about 60% of the world’s transactions are dollar-denominated – in further dovishness.	结果，美联储实际上陷在了日益要求货币政策正常化的美国经济和脆弱的要求进一步采取鸽派立场的全球市场（其中大约60%的交易用美元计价）利益之间。


Messaging from financial markets increasingly influences the Fed’s decision-making.	来自金融市场的信号日益影响着美联储的决策。


Any suggestion that the Fed will hike faster or sooner than anticipated leads to fears of tighter financial conditions, and violent risk-off moves.	任何美联储将比预期更快更早升息的暗示都将导致金融条件收紧的恐慌和暴力规避风险动作。


After a multi-year bull market in equities and fixed-income securities, stimulated by the very monetary policies the Fed is trying to leave behind, there is no valuation support to dampen the reaction.	受美联储货币政策影响，股票和固定收益证券市场经历了多年的牛市，如今美联储试图退出这些货币政策，而市场估值无力提供反弹支持。


In the absence of genuinely robust global growth, which is unlikely in the near term, financial markets are relying on extremely loose monetary policy to prop up prices.	在全球增长无力、并且近期难见起色的情况下，金融市场需要依赖极端宽松的货币政策来支持价格。


The Fed’s rate decision in March, and Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s commentary, was a case in point.	美联储的3月利率决定，以及美联储主席耶伦的评论是一个很好的例证。


The Fed apparently could not stomach the sell-off in global financial markets in January and February, which was driven largely by concerns about further tightening.	美联储显然无法消化1月和2月的全球金融市场抛售，而这一抛售潮主要是因为对美联储进一步紧缩的担忧导致的。


This is odd, because effects on consumption from changes in financial wealth (stocks and bonds) are small.	这有些奇怪，因为金融财富（股票和债券）的变化对消费的影响很小。


What matters far more are changes in house prices, which have not deteriorated.	更为重要的是房价变化，而房价形势并未恶化。


Similarly, changes in the cost of capital, including the equity cost of capital, have a minor impact on business investment.	类似地，资本成本，包括资本的权益成本的变化对商业投资的影响也很小。


In other words, from the standpoint of its dual mandate, the Fed should not be terribly concerned about market volatility, even of the magnitude seen in January and February.	换句话说，从双重使命的角度看，美联储不应该严重关注市场波动性，即使出现了1月和2月这样的大波动。


But every signal sent from Yellen and the Fed was that policymakers were very concerned about exactly this.	但耶伦和美联储所释放的没一个信号都表明决策者非常关注市场波动。


And the rally in markets that came after the Fed backpedaled on the pace of rate increases has only served to strengthen the feedback loop between the probability of US interest-rate hikes and global market volatility.	而美联储延缓升息节奏后所出现的市场反弹更是强化了美国升息概率和全球市场波动之间的反馈环。


The loop has become calcified into a new mandate for the Fed, with other global policymakers becoming increasingly overt in referring to it.	这一反馈环已经演变为美联储的一项新使命，其他全球决策者提及这一点时已经日益不加掩饰。


China’s deputy finance minister recently praised Yellen for her communication and cautious approach, which “takes us into consideration.”	中国财政部副部长最近赞扬了耶伦的沟通和谨慎方针“考虑了我们的情况。 ”


The implications of this are worrying.	其中的影响值得担忧。


If Yellen and the Fed feel beholden to financial markets, the risk of sharper rate hikes further down the road, as the Fed increasingly falls behind the inflation curve, will rise.	如果耶伦和美联储感到受制于金融市场，那么未来更加急剧地提升利率的风险也将随着美联储落后于通胀曲线而增加。


Beyond this, there are important longer-term considerations.	除此之外，还有重要的长期考量。


Given the low base, and the Fed’s obvious caution, nominal interest rates are unlikely to climb too far by the next US recession.	考虑到较低的基数，以及美联储显而易见的谨慎态度，到美国下一次衰退前，名义利率不太可能有很大的提升。


With a lack of traditional rate-cutting firepower, the next downturn could be longer than usual, compelling further reliance on unconventional monetary policy – even beyond the negative nominal interest rates now being pursued in Europe and Japan.	在缺少传统降息手段的情况下，下一次衰退可能比往常更长，迫使美联储更加依靠非常规货币政策——甚至不止于欧洲和日本目前正在实施的负名义利率。


Indeed, Yellen’s predecessor, Ben Bernanke, recently addressed such possibilities, notably the potential for a permanent increase in the money supply (so-called helicopter money).	事实上，耶伦的前任本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）最近提出了这样的可能，特别是可以持久提高货币供给（所谓的直升机撒钱）。


This could take a number of forms: quantitative easing combined with fiscal expansion (for example, higher infrastructure spending), direct cash transfers to the government, or, most radically, direct cash transfers to households.	这可以通过多种形式实现：量化宽松加财政扩张（如提高基础设施支出）、直接向政府转移支付现金，或最极端的，直接向家庭转移支付现金。


Such extreme policies are still only theoretical, and implementing them would most likely spur heightened congressional scrutiny.	这些极端政策仍只有理论可能，实施它们很有可能引发国会调查。


Nonetheless, the pressure to support global financial markets and other external economies suggests why the issue is being debated.	尽管如此，支持全球金融市场和其他外部经济体的压力解释了这一问题为何会受到争论。


With the Fed deciding in their just-concluded April meeting, yet again, to hold rates, their dilemma is set only to intensify this year: normalize monetary policy in line with domestic fundamentals, or cede to the pressures of global financial markets.	美联储在刚刚结束的4月会议上再次决定保持利率不变，其所面临的困境在今年将更加严峻：根据国内基本面正常化货币政策，还是屈从于全球金融市场的压力？


The former is sure to usher in a highly volatile future; the latter would further entrench the Fed’s new mandate – one that undermines any semblance of central-bank independence.	前者必然会导致高波动的未来； 后者将让美联储的新使命固化——而这一使命将破坏央行独立性的表象。


The World’s Reluctant Central Banker	不情不愿的世界央行


NEW YORK – This is supposed to be the era of powerful central banks, ready to wield their firepower worldwide.	纽约—这应该是强势央行时刻准备着向全世界提供弹药的时代。


Yet the most powerful of all central banks – the United States Federal Reserve – is also the most reluctant to acknowledge its global reach.	但最强势的央行——美联储也是最不愿意承认其全球地位的央行。


Like all central banks, the Fed has a local mandate, focused on domestic price stability and employment.	和所有央行一样，美联储也有本国使命，关注国内物价稳定和就业。


But, unlike most central banks, the Fed has global responsibilities.	但是，和大部分央行不同，美联储还有全球责任。


This tension is at the root of some of the most threatening problems facing the world economy today.	这一矛盾是当今世界经济所面临的一些最大的威胁的根源。


The Fed has global responsibilities for two closely related reasons, neither of which has much to do with the need to avoid the “currency wars” that so concerned former Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega.	美联储有全球责任，是因为两个关系紧密的原因，这两个原因都和避免巴西前财政部长曼特加（Guido Mantega）深深忧虑的“货币战争”的需要没什么关系。


First, despite the birth of the euro and talk of the Chinese renminbi’s ascendancy, the dollar remains the currency of choice for borrowing and lending around the world.	首先，尽管诞生了欧元并且人民币地位也在提升，但美元仍然是全世界借贷行为的货币选择。


When a bank or corporation in Kuala Lumpur, São Paulo, or Johannesburg borrows abroad, the loan is more likely to be denominated in dollars than in any other currency.	当吉隆坡、圣保罗或约翰内斯堡的银行或公司需要进行海外借贷时，计价货币更有可能是美元而不是其他货币。


If local banks suffer a run, or if corporations have trouble rolling over their debt, they need to be able to borrow dollars from the local central bank, which in turn may have no choice but to get those dollars from the Fed.	如果本地银行遭遇挤兑，或者公司难以延展债务，它们就必须能够从本地央行借到美元，而本地央行又只能从美联储获得美元。


When the Fed in 2007-2008 entered into swap agreements with 14 central banks, including those of four emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and South Korea), it de facto acknowledged that it is the world’s lender of last resort in dollars.	2007—2008年，美联储与14家央行签订互换协议，包括四个新兴经济体（巴西、墨西哥、新加坡和韩国），它实际上是承认了它是全世界美元最后贷款人。


Yet the Fed, its governors argue, cannot be expected to do that on a regular basis.	但是，美联储官员称，不能指望这称为美联储的常规业务。


In a 2015 speech, Stanley Fischer, one of the most internationally-minded of the Fed’s governors, acknowledged that world financial stability could be supported by a global central bank, yet concluded: “I should be clear that the US Federal Reserve is not that bank.”	在2015年的讲话中，美联储最具国际思维的关于之一的斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）承认，世界金融稳定可以由一家全球央行支持，但又总结说：“我应该澄清，这家央行不是美联储。 ”


The second reason why the Fed has global responsibilities is that its policies affect monetary conditions worldwide.	美联储有全球责任的第二个原因是其政策影响着全世界货币条件。


There is mounting evidence that monetary-policy shocks affect risk premia, and that this channel operates internationally as well as domestically, with sizeable effects.	大量证据表明，货币政策冲击影响风险溢价，这一渠道通过国际和国内两方面起作用，影响甚大。


In the 2013 episode known as the “taper tantrum,” the mere hint that the Fed might slow the pace of its bond-buying program triggered large capital outflows and asset-price drops in most emerging economies.	在2013年的所谓的“退出恐慌”（taper tantrum）中，美联储仅仅是暗示可能减慢其债权购买计划的节奏，就引发了大部分新兴经济体大量资本外逃和资产价格暴跌。


The traditional Fed response, expressed eloquently by former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke at the 2015 IMF Research Conference, is simple: Float your currency.	传统的美联储反应，美联储前主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在2015年IMF研究会议上明确指出，十分简单：让你的货币浮动起来。


The standard trilemma of international monetary policy holds that countries cannot have fixed exchange rates, monetary independence, and free capital movement simultaneously, but they can have two of the three.	国际货币政策的标准三元悖论认为，一国不可能同时满足固定汇率、货币独力和自由资本流动，但它们可以实现其中两者。


Countries that float their currencies can be free to set interest rates and determine financial conditions at home, even with substantial international capital mobility.	浮动货币的国家可以自由制定利率、决定国内金融条件，甚至赢得极大的国际资本流动性（mobility）。


If they don’t float – because they have targets for exports or the real exchange rate �� that is their problem.	如果货币不浮动——由于存在出口目标或实际利率目标等原因——那是各国自己的问题。


The Fed, Bernanke argued, cannot be expected to help them.	伯南克认为，不能指望美联储去帮助它们。


But Bernanke’s argument is not entirely convincing.	但伯南克的观点并不十分令人信服。


As London Business School’s Hélène Rey has argued, the “risk-taking” channel of monetary policy is so powerful internationally that Fed policy helps determine credit conditions in many countries quite independently of their exchange-rate regimes.	伦敦商学院的海伦·雷（Hélène Rey）指出，货币政策的“风险承担”渠道的国际影响力太大，美联储政策让许多国家的信用条件几乎与汇率机制独立。


When the Fed loosens policy, credit grows all over the world, and vice versa.	当美联储政策放松时，全世界信用都会增长，反之则反是。


So it is not a policy trilemma but a dilemma: capital-account restrictions –not just flexible exchange rates – may be necessary for central banks to exercise effective control over domestic credit conditions.	因此，这不是三元悖论，而是二元悖论：资本账户管制——而不只是弹性汇率——可能是各国央行有效控制国内信用情况的必要条件。


The Fed’s reluctance to serve as the world’s lender of last resort, or to acknowledge that exchange-rate movements cannot undo its actions abroad, would seem to condemn it to being a parochial and inward-looking institution.	美联储不愿充当世界最后贷款人，或不愿承认汇率运动无法抵消其行动的海外效应，这似乎表明它是只顾自己的分内事的内省机构。


But Donald Trump should not start applauding yet.	但唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）是不会因此拍手称快的。


The Fed’s domestic mandate requires it to recognize, in Fischer’s words, that “the US economy and the economies of the rest of the world have important feedback effects on each other.”	美联储的国内责任要求它承认——用费舍尔的话说——“美国经济，以及世界其他国家的经济，彼此之间存在重要的反馈效应。


And those effects are getting larger.	”并且这些效应正在日益变大。


When justifying its interest-rate decisions, the Fed has historically paid little attention to the effect of international conditions on the US economy.	在论证其利率决策时，传统上美联储不怎么关注美国经济的国际环境的影响。


But it broke with tradition in September 2015.	但在2015年9月，它打破了这一传统。


Both the official minutes of the rate-setting meeting and Chairman Janet Yellen in her press conference mentioned heightened uncertainties abroad, including weakness in the Chinese economy, as key reasons to delay the Fed’s increase in interest rates.	利率制定委员会官方备忘录和主席耶���在新闻发布会上都强调了外部不确定性（包括中国经济疲软）是美联储推迟提高利率的关键原因。


Other international linkages are also receiving greater attention.	其他国际联系也在日益受到关注。


As the US economy becomes more open to international trade and capital movements, the dollar’s value matters more because of its effect on inflation and on domestic financial conditions.	在国际贸易和资本流动方面，美国经济变得更加开放了，美元价值随之变得更加重要，因为它影响着通货膨胀和国内金融环境。


In the current debate about what the Fed should do next, Governor Lael Brainard has been arguing that real dollar appreciation of 20% in 2014 and 2015 reduces the need for further monetary-policy tightening.	在关于美联储下一步应该怎么做的最新争论中，美联储官员布莱恩纳德（Lael Brainard）一直认为美元在2014年和2015年实际升值20%，这降低了进一步收紧货币政策的必要性。


Of course, caring about how the world affects the US is not the same as concern about the economic health of the rest of the world.	当然，关心世界如何影响美国和担心世界其他国家的经济健康是不同的。


And yet these small steps are significant.	但这些小措施意义重大。


Berkeley’s Barry Eichengreen has shown that international considerations have long played a key role in the conduct of Fed policy, and that the last three decades, in which the Fed turned mostly inward, were something of an aberration.	加州大学伯克利分校的巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）指出，国际考虑因素长期以来一直是美联储货币政策的重要考虑因素，而在过去三十年中，美联储主要关注美国国内，这是反常。


So perhaps the 102-year-old Fed is returning to its original tradition.	因此，102岁的美联储也许正在回归其最初的传统。


Or perhaps its outlook already is quite internationalist – as its actions during the financial crisis suggest – and it is only domestic political constraints that prevent this from being acknowledged openly.	或者其展望已经相当国际主义——其在金融危机中的行动就是明证——只不过国内正是约束阻止了它公开承认这一点。


Either way, even incremental movement in this direction is welcome, for the last thing the world needs is a parochial Fed.	无论如何，这一方向的举动即使只是渐进的，也是值得欢迎的，因为全世界最不需要的是只顾国内的美联储。


Recent financial history suggests that the next liquidity crisis is just around the corner, and that such crises can impose enormous economic and social costs.	最近的金融史表明，下一次流动性危机近在眼前，这类危机可能造成极大的经济和社会成本。


And in a largely dollarized world economy, the only certain tool for avoiding such crises is a lender of last resort in dollars.	在一个极为美元化的世界经济中，避免这些危机的唯一的确定的工具是美元最后贷款人。


The IMF could have been that lender, but it is not.	IMF应该成为这个贷款人，但它没有。


The Fed is.	美联储才是。


The sooner the US and the rest of the world fully recognize this, the safer the world economy will be.	美国和世界其他国家越早充分认识到这一点，世界经济就越安全。


The Fed’s Communication Breakdown	美联储的沟通危机


CAMBRIDGE – Nothing describes the United States Federal Reserve’s current communication policy better than the old saying that a camel is a horse designed by committee.	发自剑桥——如果要形容美国联储现行沟通政策的话，最适合的说法莫过于“骆驼是一匹由委员会设计的马”这一老话了（形容决策过程导致结果走样）。


Various members of the Fed’s policy-setting Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) have called the decision to keep the base rate unchanged “data-dependent.”	负责政策制定的联邦公开市场委员会中的多名成员都认为保持基准利率不变的决定“过于依赖数据”。


That sounds helpful until you realize that each of them seems to have a different interpretation of “data-dependent,” to the point that its meaning seems to be “gut personal instinct.”	这听起来有点道理，直到你意识到他们每个人对“数据依赖”似乎都有着不同的解读，以至于这一词汇的含义似乎有点“凭直觉”。


In other words, the Fed’s communication strategy is a mess, and cleaning it up is far more important than the exact timing of the FOMC’s decision to exit near-zero interest rates.	换句话说，美联储的沟通策略是个烂摊子，而理顺它远比搞清楚联邦公开市场委员会决定退出近零利率的确切时间更重要。


After all, even after the Fed does finally make the “gigantic” leap from an effective federal funds rate of 0.13% (where it is now) to 0.25% (where is likely headed soon), the market will still want to know what the strategy is after that.	毕竟，即使在美联储最终做出了将有效联邦基金利率从（目前的）0. 13％调到（未来）0.


And I fear that we will continue to have no idea.	25％的“重大“飞跃，市场仍想知道在此之后将是如何走向，而我担心的是大家还将继续蒙在鼓里。


To be fair, deciding what to do is a very tough call, and economists are deeply divided on the matter.	平心而论，决定如何行动是一个非常艰难的选择，对此经济学家们也存在严重分歧。


The International Monetary Fund has weighed in forcefully, calling on the Fed to wait longer before raising rates.	国际货币基金组织也强势介入，要求美联储在提升利率前等待更长的时间。


And yet central bankers in the very emerging markets that the IMF is supposedly protecting have been sending an equally forceful message: Get on with it; the uncertainty is killing us.	而国际货币基金组织正在保护的新兴市场国家央行行长们也在传达一个同样强烈的信息：赶紧决定吧； 不确定性快要害死我们啦！


Personally, I would probably err on the side of waiting longer and accept the very high risk that, when inflation does rise, it will do so briskly, requiring a steeper path of interest-rate hikes later.	就个人而言，我可能会倾向于等待时间较长的一方，并接受如果通胀最终上升，它会迅速行动，以一个陡峭曲线大幅加息的极高风险。


But if the Fed goes that route, it needs to say clearly that it is deliberately risking an inflation overshoot.	但如果美联储最终走上了这条路线，就需要向外界表明这是有意识地冒着通胀飙升的风险来运作。


The case for waiting is that we really have no idea of what the equilibrium real (inflation-adjusted) policy interest rate is right now, and as such, need a clear signal on price growth before moving.	而等待所产生的问题是我们真的不知道均衡实际（去除通胀因素）政策利率现在究竟是多少，正因如此，在行动之前需要一个价格增长的明确信号。


But only a foaming polemicist would deny that there is also a case for hiking rates sooner, as long as the Fed doesn’t throw random noise into the market by continuing to send spectacularly mixed signals about its beliefs and objectives.	但只要美联储不继续发送引人耳目的有关其理念和目标的混合信号，导致随机噪声涌入市场，就只有泡沫论者才会否认存在提早升息的问题。


After all, the US economy is at or near full employment, and domestic demand is growing solidly.	毕竟，美国经济正处于或接近充分就业，而国内需求也不断稳步增长。


While the Fed tries to look past transitory fluctuations in commodity prices, it will be hard to ignore rising consumer inflation as the huge drop of the past year – particularly in energy prices – stabilizes or even reverses.	尽管美联储试图忽略过去商品价格的短暂波动，也将难以忽视一旦过去一年价格大幅下降态势——尤其是能源价格——出现停止甚至逆转所导致的消费通胀。


Indeed, any standard decision rule used by central banks by now dictates that a hike is long overdue.	事实上，所有央行使用的现行标准决策规则都决定了加息将会姗姗来迟。


But let’s not make the basic mistake of equating “higher interest rate” with “high interest.”	但我们也不要犯下将“更高利率”视��于“高利率”的低级错误。


To say that 0.25%, or even 1%, is high in this environment is pure hyperbole.	在这种情况下认定0. 25％——甚至1％——属于高利率完全是夸大。


And while one shouldn’t overstate the risks of sustained ultra-low rates to financial stability, it is also wrong to dismiss them entirely.	虽然我们不应该过分强调持续超低利率对金融稳定的风险，也不应完全否定这些风险的存在。


With the decision about raising rates such a close call, one would think that the Fed would be inclined to do it this year, given that the chair and vice chair have pretty much told the market for months that this will happen. The real reason for not hiking by the end of the year is public relations.	随着加息的决定变得如此迫切，人们可能会认为美联储倾向于在今年实现这一点，因为主席和副主席都已经一连几个月对市场如此表态，然而不在年末加息的真正原因则是公共关系。


Let’s suppose the Fed raises interest rates to 0.25 basis points at its December meeting, trying its best to send a soothing message to markets.	让我们假设美联储会在12月的会议上提高利率0. 25个基点，并尽可能弱化对市场的影响。


The most likely outcome is that all will be fine, and the Fed doesn’t really care if a modest equity-price correction ensues.	最可能出现的结果是一切都相安无事，同时美联储不会为随之出现的适度股票价格调整而担忧。


No, the real risk is that, if the Fed starts hiking, it will be blamed for absolutely every bad thing that happens in the economy for the next six months to a year, which will happen to coincide with the heart of a US presidential election campaign.	但其实真正的风险在于，如果美联储开始加息，就要为经济在未来半年到一年内出现的所有坏情况承担罪责，并与即将举行的美国总统大选产生联动。


One small hike and the Fed owns every bad outcome, no matter what the real cause.	就因为一个小加息，无论造成坏结果的真实原因是什么，都要由美联储来背黑锅。


The Fed of course understands that pretty much everyone dislikes interest-rate hikes and almost always likes rate cuts.	当然，美联储了解到，几乎每个人都讨厌加息，而且基本上都喜欢降息。


Any central banker will tell you that he or she gets 99 requests for interest-rate cuts for every request for a hike, almost regardless of the situation.	所有央行行长会告诉你，无论在何种情况下，他/她每收到一个加息请求就会同时收到99个降息请求。


The best defense against these pressures is to operate according to utterly unambiguous criteria.	应对这些压力的最好办法是按照完全明确的标准来操作。


Instead, however good its intentions, the net effect of too much Fed speak has been vagueness and uncertainty.	相反，无论怀着多少善意，美联储过度发言的的最终影响都是含糊和不确定性。


So what should the Fed do?	那么美联储应该怎么办？


My choice would be to have it explain the case for waiting more forthrightly: “Getting off the zero bound is hard, we want to see inflation over 3% to be absolutely sure, and then we will move with reasonable speed to normalize.”	我的选择是让它更加直言不讳地解释为何要继续等待：“摆脱零利率底限是很难的，我们希望等到通胀率超过3％以最终确认，然后我们会采取合理的行动速度来恢复正常化。


But I also could live with, “We are worried that if we wait too long, we will have to tighten too hard and too fast.”	”但我同时也可以忍受他们说“我们担心如果我们等待太久，我们将不得不过快过剧烈地收紧（货币政策）。 ”


Throwing out the rulebook made sense in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It doesn’t anymore.	在检讨2008年金融危机的教训时按照规则操作是有道理的，但如今已经不一样了。


And today’s lack of clarity has become a major contributor to market volatility – the last place the Fed should want to be.	而今时今日的含糊其辞已经成为了导致市场波动的主要动因——也是美联储最不想看到的。


It’s wrong to vilify the Fed for hiking, and it’s wrong to vilify it for not hiking; if it is such a close call, it probably doesn’t matter so much.	因为美联储升息而丑化它是不对的，因为不升息而丑化它也是不对的； 如果情况真的如此紧急，它可能就不那么重要了。


But, at this critical point, it is fair to ask the Fed for a much clearer message about what its strategy is, and what this implies for the future.	但在这个临界点，就应该去要求美联储提供关于其战略，以及这对未来意味着什么的更清晰信息。


If Fed Chair Janet Yellen has to assert her will over the FOMC for a while, so be it.	如果美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）想在一段时间内凌驾于联邦公开市场委员会的话，那就只管干吧。


Somebody on the committee has to lead the camel to water.	总要有某个委员挺身而出把骆驼领到水边的是不？


Macro Malpractice	宏观庸医


NEW HAVEN – The wrong medicine is being applied to America’s economy.	纽黑文—美国经济的药方开错了。


Having misdiagnosed the ailment, policymakers have prescribed untested experimental medicine with potentially grave side effects.	决策者诊错了病，开出了未受过检验的实验性药方，这一药方的潜在副作用巨大。


The patient is the American consumer – the world’s biggest by far, but now in the throes of the worst funk since the Great Depression.	病人是美国消费者——世界有史以来最大规模的消费者，但现在正陷入大萧条以来最大的不适中。


Recent data on consumer spending in the United States have been terrible.	最新的美国消费数据令人极其沮丧。


Growth in inflation-adjusted US personal consumption expenditures has just been revised down to 1.5% in the second quarter of 2012, and appears to be on track for a similarly anemic increase in the third quarter.	2012年二季度经通胀调整的个人消费支出刚刚被向下修正了1. 5%，看起来三季度的数字也是半斤八两。


Worse, these numbers are just the latest in what has now been a four-and-a-half-year-old trend.	更糟糕的是，这些数字只是已经存在了四年半的趋势的最新延续。


From the first quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2012, annualized growth in real consumption spending has averaged a mere 0.7% – all the more extraordinary when compared with the pre-crisis trend of 3.6% in the decade ending in 2007.	从2008年一季度开始直到2012年二季度，年化真实消费支出增长率只有0. 7%——与2007年危机前十年的平均数字3.


The disease is a protracted balance-sheet recession that has turned a generation of America’s consumers into zombies – the economic walking dead.	病灶在于被推迟的资产负债表衰退将一代美国消费者变成了经济僵尸。


Think Japan, and its corporate zombies of the 1990’s.	想想日本和日本企业僵尸吧。


Just as they wrote the script for the first of Japan’s lost decades, their counterparts are now doing the same for the US economy.	正如他们造成了日本失去的十年，现在，他们的美国同道在对美国经济做同样的事情。


Two bubbles – property and credit – enabled a decade of excessive consumption.	两场泡沫——地产泡沫和信用泡沫——带来了十年的过度消费。


Since their collapse in 2007, US households have understandably become fixated on repairing the damage.	2007年泡沫破裂以来，美国家庭可以理解地开始不懈地修正由此造成的伤害。


That means paying down debt and rebuilding savings, leaving consumer demand mired in protracted weakness.	这意味着偿还债务、重建储蓄，让消费需求陷入持续萎靡一蹶不振。


Yet the treatment prescribed for this malady has compounded the problem.	但针对这一病灶的疗法却让问题更加严重了。


Steeped in denial, the Federal Reserve is treating the disease as a cyclical problem – deploying the full force of monetary accommodation to compensate for what it believes to be a temporary shortfall in aggregate demand.	尽管美联储一再否认，但它在把这病当周期性问题在治——发动全部货币调整能力填补它所认为的总需求暂时性不足。


The convoluted logic behind this strategy is quite disturbing – not only for the US, but also for the global economy.	这一战略背后的复杂逻辑相当令人不安——不但对美国如此，对全球经济亦然。


There is nothing cyclical about the lasting aftershocks of a balance-sheet recession that have now been evident for nearly five years.	没有哪个周期性问题可以造成五年的资产负债表衰退余震，就像美国所经历的那样。 事实上，修复资产负债表对于美国家庭来说才刚刚开始。


Indeed, balance-sheet repair has barely begun for US households.	2012年个人储蓄率只有3. 7%，较2005年的1.


The personal-saving rate stood at just 3.7% in August 2012 – up from the 1.5% low of 2005, but half the 7.5% average recorded in the last three decades of the twentieth century.	5%的历史低点有所上升，但与20世纪最后三十年7. 5%的平均水平相去甚远。


Moreover, the debt overhang remains massive.	此外，债务积压状况依然十分严重。


The overall level of household indebtedness stood at 113% of disposable personal income in mid-2012 – down 21 percentage points from its pre-crisis peak of 134% in 2007, but still well above the 1970-1999 norm of around 75%.	2012年年中，家庭负债总水平是可支配收入的113%，较2007年危机前的峰值水平134%下降了21个百分点，但仍远高于1970—1999年间的正常水平75%。


In other words, Americans have much farther to go on the road to balance-sheet repair – which hardly suggests a temporary, or cyclical, shortfall in consumer demand.	换句话说，美国人在修复资产负债表的道路上还有极长的距离要走，这表明当前问题绝不是暂时性或周期性的消费需求短缺问题。


Moreover, the Fed’s approach is severely compromised by the so-called zero bound on interest rates.	此外，美联储的办法严重受制于所谓的零利率极限。


Having run out of basis points to cut from interest rates, the Fed has turned to the quantity dimension of the credit cycle – injecting massive doses of liquidity into the collapsed veins of zombie consumers.	降息空间用完后，美联储不得不转向信用周期的量化手段——给僵尸消费者已经崩溃的经脉注入大规模流动性。


To rationalize the efficacy of this approach, the Fed has rewritten the script on the transmission mechanism of discretionary monetary policy.	为了论证这一办法的功效，美联储还写了自由裁量货币政策转换机制的脚本。


Unlike the days of yore, when cutting the price of credit could boost borrowing, “quantitative easing” purportedly works by stimulating asset and credit markets.	从前，降低信用价格就可以刺激借贷，但今时不同往日，刺激资产和信用市场的重任得由“量化宽松”来完成。


The wealth effects generated by frothy financial markets are then presumed to rejuvenate long-dormant “animal spirits” and get consumers spending again, irrespective of lingering balance-sheet strains.	接着，金融市场牛市所产生的财富效应应该能够��醒长期沉睡的“动物精神”，让消费者不顾依然困扰自己的资产负债表约束重新开始花钱。


There is more: Once the demand problem is cured, according to this argument, companies will start hiring again.	这还没完：根据美联储的观点，只要需求问题解决了，公司就会重新开始招聘。


And then, presto – an unconventional fix magically satisfies the Fed’s long-neglected mandate to fight unemployment.	到那时，大功就告成了——非常规疗法魔法般地满足了美联储长期以来忽略的指导抗击失业的重任。


But the Fed’s policy gambit has taken the US down the wrong road.	但美联储的政策算盘把美国引上了错误的道路。


Indeed, the Fed has doubled down on an approach aimed at recreating the madness of an asset- and credit-dependent consumption model – precisely the mistake that pushed the US economy toward the abyss in 2003-2006.	事实上，美联储的做法无异于制造更大的依赖于资产和信用的疯狂消费模式——这正是2003—2006年将美国经济推向深渊的错误。


Just as two previous rounds of quantitative easing failed to accelerate US households’ balance-sheet repair, there is little reason to believe that “QE3” will do the trick.	前两轮量化宽松都没有加速美国家庭资产负债表的修复速度，因此，没有理由相信“QE3”会奏效。


Quantitative easing is a blunt instrument, at best, and operates through highly circuitous – and thus dubious – channels.	说得再好，量化宽松充其量也只是个钝器，其传递渠道迂回曲折，而且颇可质疑。


Significantly, it does next to nothing to alleviate the twin problems of excess leverage and inadequate saving.	特别是，对于负债过度和储蓄不足这一孪生问题，它根本没有疗效。


Policies aimed directly at debt forgiveness and enhanced saving incentives – contentious, to be sure – would at least address zombie consumers’ balance-sheet problems.	直接以债务豁免和强化储蓄激励为目标的政策——平心而论，这样说可能会引起争议——至少能够修正僵尸消费者的一部分资产负债表问题。


Moreover, the side effects of quantitative easing are significant.	此外，量化宽松的副作用很大。


Many worry about an upsurge in inflation, though, given the outsize slack in the global economy – and the likelihood that it will persist for years to come – that is not high on my watch list.	不过，在全球经济萎靡不振的情况下，许多人所担心的通胀大爆发并延续多年的情景并不在我的预料名单中。


Far more disconcerting is the willingness of major central banks – not just the Fed, but also the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan – to inject massive amounts of excess liquidity into asset markets – excesses that cannot be absorbed by sluggish real economies.	比通胀问题危险得多的是主要央行——不只包括美联储，也包括欧洲央行、英格兰银行和日本银行——准备向资产市场注入巨量过剩流动性，远超停滞不前的实体经济所能吸收的程度。


That puts central banks in the destabilizing position of abdicating control over financial markets.	这样做会让央行地位不稳，丢掉对未来金融市场的控制权。


For a world beset by seemingly endemic financial instability, this could prove to be the most destructive development of all.	在世界正被地方性金融不稳定困扰的时候，这将是最危险的情景。


The developing world is up in arms over the major central banks’ reckless tactics.	发展中世界正在竭力反对主要央行的鲁莽策略。


Emerging economies’ leaders fear spillover effects in commodity markets and distortions of exchange rates and capital flows that may compromise their own focus on financial stability.	新兴国家领导人担心商品市场的溢出效应、汇率的扭曲，以及干扰他们对金融稳定性专注度的资本流动。


While it is difficult to track the cross-border flows fueled by quantitative easing in the so-called advanced world, these fears are far from groundless. Liquidity injections into a zero-interest-rate developed world send return-starved investors scrambling for growth opportunities elsewhere.	尽管追踪所谓发达国家的量化宽松所引起的跨境资本流十分困难，但这些担忧绝不是杞人忧天。


As the global economy has gone from crisis to crisis in recent years, the cure has become part of the disease.	近几年来，全球经济在一个又一个危机中挣扎，药方本身也成了病源的一部分。


In an era of zero interest rates and quantitative easing, macroeconomic policy has become unhinged from a tough post-crisis reality.	在零利率和量化宽松的时代，危机后的现实令宏观经济政策精神错乱。


Untested medicine is being used to treat the wrong ailment – and the chronically ill patient continues to be neglected.	未受检验的药方被用于在了错误的小病上，而病人的心腹大患却一直被忽视了。


The Federal Reserve’s Escape from New York	美联储逃离纽约


WASHINGTON, DC – The US Federal Reserve System is the world’s most important central bank.	华盛顿—美国联邦储备体系是世界上最重要的中央银行。


Its decisions about interest rates and financial regulation reverberate through global markets and affect millions of lives.	它的利率和金融监管决定会影响全球市场和数百万人的生活。


Yet its governance structure is of another age – antiquated, increasingly problematic, and urgently in need of sensible reform.	但它的治理结构早已不合时宜——陈腐不堪、问题日益严重、急需明智改革。


The Fed made major mistakes in the run-up to the global economic crisis of 2007-08, most notably by adopting a lax approach to the supervision of key financial institutions, and by allowing some very large banks to become extremely fragile.	美联储在2007—2008年全球经济危机酝酿阶段犯下了严重错误，其中最显著的便是对重要金融机构的监督采取了“松”政策以及坐视一些巨型银行变得极为脆弱。


In one of the great ironies of modern American politics, the post-crisis Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010 actually gave more power to the Fed, mostly because other US regulatory agencies were regarded as having done a worse job.	现代美国政治的一个巨大讽刺便是危机后的2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革实际上给了美联储更大的权力，这主要是因为其他美国监管机构被认为做得比美联储还要糟糕。


In view of the Fed’s decidedly mixed track record since the Dodd-Frank reforms, some officials evidently regarded that default by Congress as a mandate to conduct business as usual.	自多德-弗兰克改革以来，美联储的历史记录表现出明显的分化，一些官员显然认为这一国会的违约是让一切回归常态的指令。


Recent press reports have highlighted lapses in supervision, particularly in and around the Federal Reserve Bank of New York – one of 12 regional banks in the Fed System, which also has a Board of Governors in Washington, DC.	最新新闻报道着重于监督方面的不足，特别是纽约联邦储备银行内部和周边的不足。 纽约联储银行是美联储体系12家地区银行之一，它在华盛顿也有一个理事会。


This regional structure is the result of legislative compromise in 1913, when the Fed was created, and again in the mid-1930s, when its governance was last overhauled.	这一地区结构是1913年美联储成立以及20世纪30年代起治理结构最后一次修订时立法妥协的结果。


Whereas members of the Fed’s Washington-based Board of Governors are nominated by the US president, subject to Senate confirmation, the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks are appointed by local boards.	美联储的华盛顿理事会由美国总统提名并需经过参议院确认，但地区联储银行行长是由当地委员会任命的。


In reality, the New York Fed has always had disproportionate sway; not all regional Fed presidents are created equal.	在现实中，纽约联储可谓炙手可热； 并非所有地区美联储行长都是平等的。


The president of the New York Fed is a permanent voting member and vice chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets interest rates, whereas other regional Fed presidents are voting members only on a rotating basis.	纽约联储行长拥有联邦公开市场委员会永久投票资格并自动成为副主席； 而其他地区联储行长只能轮流拥有投票权。


The New York Fed also has a particularly important role in bank supervision – most of America’s “too big to fail” banks are located in its jurisdiction (and most global banks have a presence there).	纽约联储在银行监督方面也扮演着特别重要的角色——大部分“太大而不能倒”的银行位于其管辖区中（大部分全球银行也在这片地区设有分支）。


And the New York Fed has long been the Fed System’s eyes and ears on Wall Street.	纽约联储也一直是美联储体系在华尔街的耳目。


Or perhaps it has become the other way around.	或许反着说才对。


At least over the past decade, senior New York Fed officials have consistently sided with the interests of very large banks.	至少在过去十年中，纽约联储官员一直站在巨型银行利益一边。


(To be clear, I also know many Fed officials who are outstanding public servants).	（声明，我也知道许多美联储官员是杰出的公务员）。


Though Wall Street interests have long been well represented on the board of the New York Fed, under Timothy Geithner, its president from 2003 to 2009, the big players became even more powerful – with some rather unfortunate consequences for the rest of us.	尽管华尔街利益已占据纽约联储理事会相当大的部分，但在其2003—2009年主席蒂莫西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）的领导下，大银行权力变得更大了——也给我们其他人带来了不幸的后果。


In his recent memoir, Stress Test, Geithner says, “I basically restored the New York Fed board to its historic roots as an elite roster of the local financial establishment.”	在其最新的回忆录《压力测试》（Stress Test）中，盖特纳说：“我基本上重建了纽约联储理事会，让其回归了地方金融系统精英俱乐部的历史根源。


His choices included Dick Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, which failed spectacularly in September 2008, and Stephen Friedman, a Goldman Sachs board member, who resigned as chair of the New York Fed’s board after being accused of inappropriately trading Goldman stock during the financial crisis.	”他的选择包括迪克·福尔德（Dick Fuld，在2008年9月轰然倒闭的雷曼兄弟公司CEO）和史蒂芬·弗里德曼（Stephen Friedman，高盛董事会成员，在金融危机期间被控不当交易高盛股票，因此辞去了纽约联储理事会主席之职）。


Geithner also established a tangled web of connections between the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase, some of which linger to this day.	盖特纳还建立了一个纽约联储和摩根大通之间的复杂网络，其中一部分至今仍然存在。


Some senior Fed officials become angry when pressed about this reality.	一些美联储高级官员在阐述这一现实时十分愤怒。


But the Fed’s legitimacy – and its ability to make sensible policy – is not boosted by having major banks represented, directly or indirectly, on a board that chooses and oversees a key policymaker.	但美联储的合法性——以及其做出明智决策的能力——并没有因为让大银行获得遴选和监督重要决策者的理事会席位而直接或间接地得到增强。


Now, finally, US politicians on both the left and the right are focusing their attention on a long-overdue reform of the Fed’s governance.	如今，美国左翼和右翼政客终于开始将注意力集中到长期缺失的美联储治��改革上了。


One important proposal comes from Senator Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, who proposes, quite reasonably, that the president of the New York Fed should be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, just like members of the Board of Governors – or any other important economic policymaker.	一个重要提案来自罗德岛民主党参议员杰克·里德（Jack Reed），他十分合理地提出，纽约联储行长应该由总统提名并由参议院确认，与其他理事会成员（或任何其他重要的经济决策者）一样。


The president of the New York Fed would also be required to testify before Congress on a regular basis.	纽约联储行长也应该需要定期在国会面前听证。


The Fed’s defenders will respond that it would be dangerous to alter the status quo.	美联储的捍卫者会如此回应：改变现状是危险的。


But it is the Fed’s current governance that has become dangerous.	但如今变得危险的是美联储的现有治理结构。


Senators Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Joe Manchin of West Virginia argue, entirely convincingly, that the composition of the Fed’s Board of Governors should be tilted away from people who are connected with big Wall Street firms.	马萨诸塞州参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）和西弗吉尼亚州参议员乔·曼勤（Joe Manchin）令人十分信服地指出，美联储理事会的构成应该将与华尔街大公司有关联的人剔除。


Meanwhile, House Republicans are preparing their own Fed governance reforms, which would be even more radical – and would likely constrain monetary policy unwisely.	与此同时，众议院正在准备其自身的美联储治理改革方案——这一方案将更加激进，有可能不明智地约束货币政策。


In any case, it is time for change at the Fed.	无论如何，美联储应该发生改变。


And, as is often the case with finance, the place to start is New York.	正如金融界通常的情况，起点就在华尔街。


The Fed’s Gamble on Surplus Labor	美联储下注剩余劳动力


LONDON – In recent weeks, the US Federal Reserve has buoyed markets by adopting a more gradual approach to policy normalization.	伦敦—最近几周，美联储采取了更加渐进的政策正常化方针，这提振了市场。


Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s most recent public remarks, in late March, were more dovish than anticipated.	美联储主席耶伦3月底的最新公开讲话比预期更加“鸽派”。


And, at its last meeting, the Fed suggested that it would pursue two, rather than four, quarter-point interest-rate hikes in 2016.	此外，在上一次会议上，美联储表示将在2016年实施两次而不是四次四分之一个百分点的升息。


In response, investors have sold the US dollar and bid up equity prices and US Treasuries, and commodities and emerging-market assets have surged.	结果是投资者出售美元，买入提振股价和美国国债，大宗商品和新兴市场资产也大幅上扬。


At first glance, these developments are curious.	乍一看，这些情况相当有趣。


For one thing, the Fed’s decision appears to be at odds with signs that US inflation is accelerating.	一方面，美联储的决定似乎与美国通胀正在加速的信号相悖。


If, as some have suggested, the Fed is responding to fears about global growth, it would not make sense that risk assets – above all commodities and emerging markets – are rallying.	如果如一些人所认为的那样，美联储是在应对全球增长担忧，那么风险资产——首先是大宗商品和新兴市场——反弹就没有依据。


But there is a logical thread that explains these apparent inconsistencies, one that centers on a potentially high-stakes Fed gamble.	但有一个逻辑线条可以解释这些显而易见的不一致，其核心是一个潜在后果巨大的美联储赌注。


Before we get to that wager, it is worth considering other proposed explanations for the market rally.	在审视这一赌注之前，不妨考虑以下对市场反弹的其他解释。


The first centers on monetary easing by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan.	第一种解释的核心是欧洲央行和日本银行的货币宽松。 但负利率和平坦收益率曲线伤害了银行利润；


But negative interest rates and flat yield curves harm banks’ earnings; links between extraordinary monetary policies and growth or inflation remain tenuous; and surely monetary policy is subject to diminishing returns by now.	反常货币政策与增长或通胀之间的联系仍然模糊； 并且显然如今货币政策的回报已在逐渐下降。


Another view focuses on OPEC countries’ oil-supply restraint, claiming that it is helping to support oil prices and thus high-cost producers in North America.	另一个观点聚焦于欧佩克国家的石油供给减少，认为这有助于支持石油价格，从而支持北美高成本生产商。


But this logic rests more on correlation than causation.	但这一逻辑与其说是因果关系，不如说是相关关系。


OPEC has not decided to cut production, and only a handful of its members have agreed to freeze output.	欧佩克尚未决定减产，并且只有少数成员国同意冻结产出。


A genuine reduction in global excess supply awaits a decline in output, as existing wells, deprived of capital investment, run dry.	全球过剩供给的真正下降要等到产出下降，而产出下降要等到现有油井因为资本投资不足而干涸。


A more plausible explanation for improved market performance is waning pessimism.	对市场表现改善的更有道理的解释是悲观心理的消失。


Fears of recession in the United States, the United Kingdom, or Germany – countries with full employment and rising real household incomes – were always a bit odd.	对美国、英国或德国衰退的恐慌——这些国家就业充分，真实家庭收入也在增加——总是有些不合常理。


So was the notion that financial-market gyrations would have the atypical impact of significantly denting household or corporate spending.	金融市场轮转将产生大幅遏制家庭或公司支出的非典型影响的概念也不合常理。


And in China – a country that may be experiencing slowing GDP growth, but is nowhere near recession – rising household income and consumption are helping to offset the decline in fixed-asset investment.	而在中国——它可能正在经历GDP增长放缓，但距离衰退还十分遥远——家庭收入和消费的增加正在帮助抵消固定资产下降的影响。


This brings us back to the Fed and its gamble.	这就让我们回到美联储和它的赌注上。


Policymakers’ change of heart likely arose from a re-think about slack in the US economy, especially in the labor market.	决策者看法的改变可能来自对美国经济弱势的反思，也别是美国劳动力市场。


Indeed, in her recent remarks, Yellen noted that the labor-force participation rate had “turned up” and that “room for improvement” remained.	事实上，在其最近的讲话中，耶伦指出劳动力参与率“上升”，“改进空间”仍然存在。


If the Fed now believes that the economy has greater capacity for above-trend expansion without generating much inflation, it can, to paraphrase John Lennon, “give growth a chance.”	如果现在美联储认为经济具备了更大的不引起剧烈通胀的超趋势扩张容量，那么，用约翰·列侬（John Lennon）的话说，可以“给增长一个机会”。


Faster growth and slower policy tightening are great news for asset prices.	加速增长和放缓政策收紧对资产价格来说是好消息。


A gentler Fed also means less risk of dollar appreciation – an unambiguous benefit for commodity markets and dollar-indebted emerging economies.	更加温和的美联储也意味着美元升值风险降低——毫无疑问，这对于大宗商品市场和负有美元债务的新兴经济体来说是好消息。


Finally, a stable dollar takes pressure off the renminbi, which should slow outflows of “hot” capital from China, removing another source of risk from the global financial system.	最后，稳定的美元减轻人民币压力，从而放缓“热”资本流出中国的势头，消除全球金融体系的另一个风险源。


Given these implication, it is little wonder that markets turned up.	考虑到这些影响，毫不奇怪市场会上扬。


But with US core inflation on the rise, the Fed is taking a big risk.	但随着美国核心通胀率的上升，美联储正在冒一个很大的险。 毕竟，核心消费物价指数已经达到了2.


After all, the core consumer-price index is already at 2.3%, led by 3.1% inflation in services (both figures are up by more than half of a percentage point year on year).	3%，原因是服务价格上升了3. 1%（两个数字同比均增加1.


Housing inflation, which comprises about a quarter of the CPI index, has also accelerated, to 3.2%.	5个百分点以上）。 占消费物价指数四分之一权重的住房通胀也加速至3.


And price growth in health-care services, which had slowed in recent years, has jumped to 3.9%, double the rate recorded a year ago.	而最近几年有所放缓的医疗服务价格涨幅升高到3. 9%，比一年前扩大了一倍。


The Fed prefers to watch core “private consumption expenditure” inflation, which stands at a more subdued 1.7%.	美联储喜欢关注核心“私人消费支出”通胀，该数字较低，为1. 7%。


PCE goods prices are still falling, and services prices are rising just 2.1%, roughly unchanged over the past year.	私人消费支出商品价格仍在下跌，而服务价��涨幅只有2. 1%，与过去一年基本持平。


But the focal point for the Fed is the labor market.	但美联储的焦点是劳动力市场。


According to a March report, the civilian participation rate has increased by half a percentage point from its September 2015 lows, and now stands at 63%.	据3月份的报告，公民参与率较2015年9月的低位增加了1. 5个百分点，目前为63%。


The same survey indicates that nearly six million Americans, who are not currently in the labor force, want to work.	同一份报告显示，近六百万目前身处劳动力大军之外的美国人想要工作。


Another six million are working part-time for economic reasons.	还有六百万因为经济原因而从事兼职工作。


In part, low levels of US labor-force participation reflect structural factors.	从某种意义上说，美国劳动力参与水平低下反映了结构因素。


Nearly every sub-category – by gender, education level, age cohort, or race – has been declining in the US since 2000.	2000年以来，美国的几乎所有子分类——如性别、教育水平、年龄段或种族——都在下降。


Yet labor supply is typically also cyclical, picking up as the economy improves and job opportunities arise.	但劳动力供给通常也呈现周期性，随着经济改善、就业机会的增加而增加。


Until now, that cyclical pattern has been absent in the post-crisis “new normal.”	到目前为止，这一周期模式尚未体现在危机后“新常态”中。


What might an increasingly elastic labor supply mean for Fed policy?	弹性日益增加的劳动力供给对美联储政策意味着什么？


The answer depends on how much surplus labor is available.	答案取决于有多少剩余劳动力可用。


Suppose it is 1.5 million workers – a conservative figure that would still leave the civilian employment-to-population ratio well below its post-war peak.	假设剩余劳动力为150万——这个数字较为保守，民用就业-人口比例仍远低于战后峰值—。


At plausible rates of US job creation, it would take 12-18 months to absorb those new entrants.	按照可信的美国就业创造速度，将需要12—18个月时间吸收这些新来者。


That labor influx would dampen wage and price pressures, allowing the Fed to proceed gradually with interest-rate normalization.	这一劳动力的大量涌入将压低工资和物价压力，让美联储逐步实现利率正常化。


The bigger the pool of available labor, the longer the Fed can go slow.	可用劳动力储备越大，美联储可以放缓利率正常化的时间越长。