The usual thinking is that lower prices stimulate global demand, because consumers are likely to spend most of the windfall, whereas producers typically adjust by cutting back savings.	常规思维是，更低的价格刺激全球需求，因为消费者可能会把这笔意外之财的大部分花掉，而生产者通常以减少储蓄作为调整手段。


In 2015, though, this behavioral difference has been less pronounced than usual.	但是，2015年这一行为差异不像正常时期那样明显。


One reason is that emerging-market energy importers have a much larger global economic footprint than they did in the 1980s, and their approach to oil markets is much more interventionist than in the advanced countries.	一个原因是新兴市场能源进口国对于全球经济的作用远远大于20世纪80年代时，它们对石油市场的方针也远比发达国家更有干涉性。


Countries such as India and China stabilize retail energy markets through government-financed subsidies to keep price down for consumers.	印度和中国等国家通过政府出资的补贴稳定零售能源市场以维持消费者价格低水平。


The costs of these subsidies had become quite massive as oil prices peaked, and many countries were already looking hard for ways to cut back.	这些补贴的成本在油价位于峰值时十分巨大，许多国家已经开始努力寻找削减补贴之道。


Thus, as oil prices have fallen, emerging-market governments have taken advantage of the opportunity to reduce the fiscal subsidies.	因此，随着油价的下降，新兴市场政府利用这一机会削减财政补贴。


At the same time, many oil exporters are being forced to scale back expenditure plans in the face of sharply falling revenues.	与此同时，面临收入急剧下滑的情况，许多石油出口国被迫削减支出计划。


Even Saudi Arabia, despite its vast oil and financial reserves, has come under strain, owing to a rapidly rising population and higher military spending associated with conflicts in the Middle East.	就连拥有巨量石油和金融储备的沙特阿拉伯也承受了巨大的压力——其人口迅速增加，中东冲突相关的军事支出也水涨船高。


The muted effect of oil prices on global growth should not have come as a complete surprise.	石油价格对全球增长几无影响，这其实并不令人非常奇怪。


Academic research has been pointing in this direction for a long time.	学术研究早就指向这一方向。


Oil is now thought to be less of an independent driver of business cycles than was previously believed. Also restraining growth is a sharp decline in energy-related investment.	如今，石油已不像过去那样被认为是商业周期的独立驱动因素。


After years of rapid growth, global investment in oil production and exploration has fallen by $150 billion dollars in 2015.	能源相关投资的急剧下降也在制约增长。


Eventually, this will feed back into prices, but only slowly and gradually: Futures markets have oil prices rising to $60 per barrel only by 2020.	在经历了多年的快速增长后，2015年全球石油生产和勘探投资减少了1，500亿美元。


The good news for 2016 is that most macroeconomic models suggest that the impact of lower oil prices on growth tends to stretch out for a couple years.	在2016年，好消息是大部分宏观经济模型表明低油价对增长的影响一般需要多年时间慢慢显现。


Thus, low prices should continue to support growth, even if emerging-market importers continue to use the savings to cut subsidies.	因此，低油价应该会继续支持增长，即使新兴市场进口国继续利用节省下来的支出削减补贴。


For oil producers, though, the risks are rising.	但对石油生产国来说，风险在上升。


Only a couple – notably governance-challenged Venezuela – are in outright collapse; but many are teetering on the brink of recession.	只有少数国家——最引人关注的是饱受治理问题挑战的委内瑞拉——完全崩盘； 但许多国家位于衰退悬崖的边缘。


Countries with floating exchange rates, including Colombia, Mexico, and Russia, have managed to adjust so far, despite facing significantly tighter fiscal constraints (though Russia’s situation remains especially vulnerable if low oil prices endure).	浮动汇率国家，包括哥伦比亚、墨西哥和俄罗斯，到目前为止都成功做出了调整，但面临着严峻得多的财政约束（如果低油价持续下去，俄罗斯的状况将继续孱弱不堪）。


By contrast, countries with rigid exchange-rate regimes are being tested more severely.	相反，利率机制僵化的国家遭到的考验更大。


Saudi Arabia’s long-standing peg to the dollar, once apparently invulnerable, has come under enormous pressure in recent weeks.	沙特阿拉伯长期盯住美元的政策曾经看上去刀枪不入，但最近几周也遭到了巨大的压力。


In short, oil prices were not quite as consequential for global growth in 2015 as seemed likely at the beginning of the year.	简言之，2015年石油价格对全球增长的影响不如年初时看上去那么大。


And strong reserve positions and relatively conservative macroeconomic policies have enabled most major producers to weather enormous fiscal stress so far, without falling into crisis.	到目前为止，强大的储备头寸和相对保守的宏观经济政策让大部分主要生产国抵御住了巨大的财政压力，没有发生危机。


But next year could be different, and not in a good way – especially for producers.	但明年可能会不一样，并且不是“好”的不一样——特别是对生产国来说。


Oil’s Upward March	油价的上涨之路


IRVING, TEXAS – When OPEC members met in Vienna recently, the Saudis failed to control the meeting, OPEC’s production ceiling remained unchanged, and member countries are setting their own output levels.	发自美国德克萨斯州欧文市——在最近召开的石油输出国组织（OPEC）越南会议上，沙特阿拉伯失去了对整个会议的主导权，OPEC的生产限额没变，而各成员国都在制定本国的产量水平。


But talk of an OPEC breakup is premature.	但现在讨论OPEC组织的分裂还为时过早。


After all, it has survived major wars, numerous diplomatic disputes, and two major market collapses.	毕竟这个组织在经历了数次大规模战争，无数外交争端以及两次重大市场崩溃后依然能维持下来。


In fact, the secret to OPEC’s survival is its weakness, not its strength.	事实上，OPEC能生存下来的秘诀就是它的弱势，而不是强势。


Friction or no friction, OPEC has been, and will always be, irrelevant to market forces on the ground.	不管内部如何斗争，OPEC已经，也常常，与市场力量相脱节。


OPEC has never had market power, but Saudi Arabia has, and Saudi market power has always been assigned, mistakenly, to OPEC.	OPEC从未拥有过市场力量，但沙特阿拉伯有，而该国的市场力量却常常被错误地归到OPEC身上。


The Saudis did not like the recent meeting.	沙特人对最近这次会议并不满意。


They decided to go it alone.	他们决定单干。


Can they deliver?	那么这能否成功？


The answer is no.	答案是否定的。


The recent move by the 28-member International Energy Agency to release oil from strategic reserves proves this point.	拥有28个成员国的国际原子能机构最近投放其原油战略储备的事件就证明了这一点。


The global oil market has become a large sea that generates its own storms, which guarantee that the sea will continue to grow.	全球原油市场已经变成了一个拥有自身运作规则的大海，并以此保证大海的水量能不断增长。


Looking at recent history, one can identify four factors that will continue to drive oil prices higher unless a major earthquake brings the market to its knees.	回顾过去的历史，我们可以找到四个推动油价上涨的因素，除非发生重大事件直接导致市场崩溃，否则这四大因素都会适用。


The first factor is the relationship between oil prices and economic growth in the oil-producing countries.	第一个因素就是各产油国经济发展与油价的关系。


Higher prices fuel higher growth in these countries, which, accompanied by a population boom, leads to higher domestic energy consumption.	高油价推动这些国家的高增长，并伴随着人口的大幅增加，推高国内的能源消耗水平，反过来又减少了原油出口，导致油价进一步上升。


That, in turn, reduces oil exports, driving up prices further.	只有爆发一次大规模衰退才能打破这个怪圈；


Only a major recession could break this cycle; otherwise, we are headed for an energy crisis.	否则我们就将面对越来越高的油价。


Of course, prices cannot continue to rise indefinitely – the price increase will ration demand.	当然，油价不可能无限上升——因为价格的增加将遏制需求。


The increase in energy demand has already led to power shortages in the oil-producing countries, which are expected to reduce exports this summer.	不断增加的能源需求已经在某些产油国造成了能源短缺，并可能在今年夏天导致出口量减少。


More crude oil will be burned in power plants, more diesel will be burned in private generators, and more gasoline will be burned in SUVs from Riyadh to Kuwait City during blackouts in which the only place to keep cool will be in a moving car.	更多原油将被送往发电厂发电，更多地柴油将在私人发电机中燃烧，而更多地汽油将被用于从利雅得到科威特城的SUV车辆中，因为停电时唯一能保持凉爽的方式就是呆在汽车里。


Second, there is the relationship between oil prices and the need for income diversification in the oil-producing countries.	其二，油价和产油国对收入多样化的需求中也存在着联系。


As oil prices rise, these countries’ dependence on the oil sector increases, despite all efforts to diversify their economies.	随着油价上升，这些国家虽然想方设法实现收入来源多样化，但对石油部门的依赖度依旧不断增加。


To combat the impact of such dependence, they spend oil revenues on other sectors, leaving the oil sector with little investment.	为了对抗这种依赖，它们将原油收入投入其他部门，而石油部门只能获得少量投资。


As global oil demand increases, there is not enough capacity to meet it – a cycle that will continue until demand collapses.	一方面是全球石油需求上涨，另一方面却没有足够的产能去满足——这个循环将一直持续下去，直到需求崩溃为止。


The rhetoric of energy independence in the oil-consuming countries makes the situation even worse: the oil-producing countries are building energy-intensive industries to guarantee a market for their oil once consuming nations wean themselves of imported oil.	石油进口国的能源自主呼声使得这一情况更加恶化：产油国正在建设一整套能源密集型工业体系，以便在进口国摆脱进口石油依赖后消化自身产能。


They intend to export oil embedded in other products, such as petrochemicals, plastic, aluminum, etc.	他们试图通过转化为其它产品——石油化工产品，塑料，铝等等——的方式来出口石油。


And they can build such plants in faster than the oil-consuming countries can establish alternatives to oil imports, exacerbating future shortages.	他们正在用比进口国寻找石油替代产品更快的速度来兴建这些工业，使得未来的短缺状况进一步恶化。


Again, higher prices will ration global oil demand, but only after a period of economic pain in some regions around the world.	更高的价格再次将遏制全球石油需求，但这只会发生在世界某些地方经历一段经济阵痛期之后。


The third factor is the vicious circle of oil prices and the value of the US dollar.	第三个因素则是油价与美元价值之间的怪圈。


Higher oil prices increase America’s trade deficits, which in turn lower the value of the dollar. Owing to the inverse relationship between oil prices and the dollar, the weaker dollar increases oil prices, which increases the trade deficit further, putting more downward pressure on the dollar.	更高的油价使美国的贸易赤字进一步增加，反过来压低了美元价值。 由于油价与美元之间的负相关作用，更弱势的美元导致油价上升，进一步推高贸易赤字，从而向美元施加更加大的贬值压力。


Oil prices will continue to rise until demand collapses.	油价将不断上升直到需求崩溃。


Statistical evidence suggests that this relationship will weaken once the real-estate market recovers, but this remains a long-run prospect.	虽然统计数据显示这个关联将会房地产市场复苏后被弱化，但后者的复苏还需要很长的一段时间才能实现。


Finally, there is the relationship between oil prices and fiscal and monetary policies in the oil-consuming countries.	最后，油价与石油进口国的货币和财政政策也存在联系。


To combat the effect of high oil prices, consuming countries adopt expansionary economic policies, lowering interest rates and increasing government spending.	为了抵消高油价的负面作用，石油进口国采取了扩张性的经济政策，降低利率并增加政府支出，使得经济能在高油价下继续增长。


This enables continued economic growth with high oil prices.	但持续增长导致对石油的需求不断上升，使得油价更加高涨。


But continued growth increases demand for oil, sending prices even higher. The alternative to monetary and fiscal expansion is recession, at which point oil prices would stop rising.	而货币和财政政策之外的反面则是经济衰退，到了那时油价才会停止上升。


Given the current turmoil in the Middle East, the loss of Libyan and Yemeni oil, and increasing energy demand in the oil-producing countries, any increase in Saudi oil exports, if any, would have a limited impact on the market.	考虑到最近在中东地区发生的一连串事件，利比亚和也门石油的停产，以及产油国内部不断增加的能源需求，沙特阿拉伯石油产量的增加都只能对市场产生极为有限的影响。


Oil production does not matter; exports do, which means that announcements of increases in oil output are irrelevant for prices.	石油产量多少其实无关大局； 但出口量却至关重要，这意味着关于增加产量的声明其实根本无法影响油价。


Indeed, regardless of what OPEC or its members decide, the vicious cycles described here will support oil prices around the world probably in the range of $70-$90 per barrel.	事实上，不管OPEC成员国做出何种决定，上面所述的怪圈都将继续支持全球油价维持在70%~90%美元一桶的水平上。


That said, OPEC members and oil-consuming countries policymakers alike should not forget that nothing cures high prices like high prices.	这表明OPEC成员国国和石油进口国的政策制定者们都不应该忘记：应对高油价的唯一方法就是维持高油价。


Old Europe, Young World	老欧洲和年轻世界


As the EU reaches its 50th birthday, many Europeans are entering middle age with it.	正值欧盟成立50周年之际，许多欧洲人也与欧盟一道步入中年。


They are also becoming aware of the potential of demographic change to make Europe’s next half-century very different from the previous one.	他们也开始知道，潜在的人口变化将会让欧洲下一个五十年与上一个五十年大为不同。


The EU’s first 50 years were characterized by a growing population and a high proportion of working-age people relative to children and the elderly.	欧盟第一个五十年的特征是人口增长以及工作年龄的人相对儿童和老人比例较高。


The post-war “baby boom” generation drove a period of sustained economic growth that strengthened Europe’s standing in the world and led to dramatic improvements in its citizens’ quality of life.	战后“婴儿潮”一代人推动了持续经济增长的时期，这一时期加强了欧洲在世界上的地位并且带来了欧洲公民生活质量的显著提高。


The EU’s next five decades, on the other hand, will see the baby boomers moving into retirement, leaving a shrunken labor force with the heavy burden of supporting their elders’ health care and pension needs.	而在另一方面，欧盟的下一个五十年中，婴儿潮一代人步入退休，缩减了劳动力数量，这些人还要担负老年人医疗和养老金需求的沉重负担。


Thirty-six per cent of Europeans will be aged 60 or over by 2050, and, despite increasing life expectancy, continued low fertility will mean the continent’s population will begin to dwindle by 2020.	到2050年，百分之三十六的欧洲人将会年满60岁，而且，尽管预计寿命增加，持续的低出生率意味着欧洲大陆人口将在2020年开始萎缩。


Although Europe is unlikely to become poorer as a consequence of this demographic shift, it may experience a prolonged period of slower growth.	尽管欧洲不大可能由于这一人口变迁而变得相对贫困，但是，它却可能会经历长时间放缓的增长时期。


All else being equal, per capita incomes and productivity in countries with high proportions of elderly people tend to grow more slowly than in younger countries.	在其他因素不变的情况下，老年人口占较高比例国家的人均收入和生产效率增长相对于年轻国家而言趋向于更为缓慢。


Europe’s economic strength relative to the rest of the world may therefore diminish, perhaps sharply.	欧洲的经济实力相对于世界其他地方而言因此会下降，可能还是剧烈下降。


Just as Europe’s population is aging and will be shrinking, that of much of the developing world is young and growing.	正当欧洲人口正在老龄化同时将会下降之际，大部分发展中国家却是生气勃勃而又在增长。


By 2050 the population of the 50 least developed countries is projected to double, and while the ratio of working-age to non-working-age people in Europe will fall to around 1.4, in the developing world it will be considerably higher.	到2050年，50个最不发达国家的人口预计将会翻番，欧洲工作年龄和非工作年龄人的比例将会下降到1. 4左右，而在发展中国家这一比例将会高出许多。


Countries in most developing regions, such as Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia, may be able to absorb their armies of potential workers into productive employment and benefit appreciably from the ensuing economic boost.	大多数发展中地区的国家，像拉丁美洲、北非、中东以及大部分亚洲地区将会有能力把它们的潜在工人大军吸收到生产性就业上来，并且从随之而来的经济激增中大为获益。


(Indeed, this “miracle” has already occurred in East Asia.)	（实际上，这一“奇迹”已经在东亚发生了。


As a result, these regions’ share of the global economy would increase.	）结果，这些地区在全球经济中所占的份额将会提高。


Other regions, however, are likely to be unable to provide productive employment.	但是，其他地区却会可能无法提供生产性就业。


Swollen cohorts of young, underemployed people may cause an increase in crime and civil unrest.	膨胀的年轻而又没有工作的人口大军可能会造成犯罪和社会动乱的增加。


Political instability, war, and terrorism could result, with dire effects both at home and abroad, including in Europe.	政治不稳定、战争和恐怖主义可能随之而来，在国内外造成严重的后果，包括欧洲在内。


Sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic prospects look particularly bleak, as mushrooming populations of young people move into labor markets that cannot accommodate them.	撒哈拉沙漠以南国家的人口前景尤为不妙，滚滚的年轻人口进入无法安置他们的劳动力市场。


Migration from Africa and other developing regions to Europe is already increasing; as populations in poor countries grow, the number of would-be migrants will multiply.	来自非洲以及其他发展中地区的移民已经在增加； 穷国人口增加的时候，可能的移民数量就会翻番。


These migration pressures present a potential solution to Europe’s labor-market problem.	这些移民压力给欧洲的劳动力市场问题带来了潜在的解决之道。


Europe needs working-age people to reduce the burden of a burgeoning elderly population, so relaxing immigration restrictions could help.	欧洲需要工作年龄的人口来减少不断增长的老年人口负担，所以，放松移民管制将会有所帮助。


But this might bring with it social problems, as Europeans resist an influx of foreigners, owing to fears about jobs, security, or cultural differences.	但是这也会随之带来社会问题，这是由于欧洲人担心工作、安全或者文化差别而抵制外国人的涌入。


Opening the door to migrants would have to be a gradual and controlled process, with determined efforts made to convince Europeans of its benefits.	向移民敞开大门将应该是一个循序渐进而又控制得当的过程，并且要做出坚定的努力来让欧洲人确信移民的益处。


Moreover, given the massive increase in migration that would be needed to offset the impact of population aging in Europe, this would be only a partial solution at best.	而且，鉴于需要大量移民来抵消欧洲人口老龄化的影响，因此这最多只是一个不全面的方案。


But Europe can take other steps to redress or adapt to the looming demographic imbalance.	但是，欧洲可以采取其他步骤来解决或者适应迫在眉睫的人口不平衡问题。


Many countries in the region already have policies aimed at increasing the birth rate.	欧洲地区的许多国家已经有了意在提高出生率的政策。


Tax benefits and monthly allowances for couples with children and reduced support for contraception are among the most common means of encouraging increased fertility.	给予有孩子的夫妇税收优惠和每月津贴，以及减少对避孕的支持是鼓励提高生育率最为常见的手段。


In many EU countries, a much higher percentage of men than women are in the labor force.	在许多欧盟国家，男子就业的比率要远远高于女子。


Measures aimed at enabling mothers to work, such as state-funded childcare and more flexible working hours, create incentives for childrearing while expanding the labor force.	让妇女就业的措施，例如国家资助的托儿所和更为灵活的工作时间为生育创造了激励机制，同时又扩大了劳力。


However, the effects of such measures are unlikely to be felt soon, so policies will also need to be directed at those already in the labor force, to encourage them to save more for retirement, and at those on the point of leaving it.	但是，这些措施的效力不大可能立竿见影，所以需要实施针对已经就业以及即将退休的人的政策，鼓励他们多为退休作储蓄。


Existing pension systems often penalize people who wish to work beyond the official retirement age, and age discrimination impedes many who are capable of working into their sixties and seventies.	现有的养老金体系经常惩罚那些希望在正式退休年龄以后工作的人，而年龄歧视阻碍了许多有能力工作到六七十岁的人。


More flexible pension arrangements, legal reforms, and media and education campaigns aimed at shifting employers’ perceptions of older workers will allow individuals to keep working for longer.	更为灵活的养老金安排、法制改革以及目的在于转变雇主对于年长的工人的观念的媒体和教育行动将会让人们工作更长的时间。


Encouraging lifelong learning will help people adapt their skills and knowledge to the demands of a changing economy.	鼓励终生学习将会帮助人们将他们的技能和知识适应于不断变化的经济要求。


And with higher life expectancy, raising the retirement age is a further sensible way to address the negative effects of an aging population.	而且，鉴于预计生命更高，提高退休年龄是解决老龄化人口负面影响的又一个合理办法。


A combination of these and other measures would help Europe to sustain its high living standards in the coming decades.	综合运用这些手段和其他措施将会帮助欧洲在未来几十年中维持其较高的生活水准。


Recognition of the growing power of regions with more favorable demographic structures, for example, will encourage political and economic alliances that help the EU preserve its own global status.	例如，承认那些具有更为有利的人口结构地区的不断增长的实力将会鼓励形成帮助欧盟维持其自身全球地位的政治和经济同盟。


Likewise, efforts to help developing countries create jobs and improve quality of life will reduce irregular migration and help avert its social costs.	同样，帮助发展中国家创造就业、改善生活质量的措施将会减少不正规的移民以及帮助避免其社会成本。


Population change happens slowly, but its effects can be forecast early.	人口变化缓慢发生，但是其效果却可以提早预测。


If EU countries are to overcome the demographic challenges of the next half-century, they should not delay in preparing for them.	如果欧盟国家要想克服下一个五十年的人口挑战，它们就不应该延误做好准备。


Old Left Versus New Left in Latin America	拉丁美洲新旧左翼对峙


There are two ways to interpret Latin America’s recent election results.	有两种方式可以诠释最近拉美国家的选举结果。


First, and most obviously, the supposed turn to the left is running out of steam, fast.	第一而且是最为明显的是，所谓的左倾江河日下。


In recent weeks, the hyper-nationalist Ollanta Humala, a clone of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, was defeated in Peru, the conservative Alvaro Uribe won a landslide victory in Colombia, with 62% of the vote, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador has fallen behind in Mexico’s July 2 presidential election.	在最近数周里，与委内瑞拉总统查韦斯同出一辙的极端民族主义的乌马拉在秘鲁大选中落选，保守派的乌里韦在哥伦比亚大选中大获全胜，赢得62％的选票，而洛佩斯则已经在7月2日的墨西哥总统选举中落后。


All of these isolated developments seemingly contradict the leftward trend in Latin America.	所有这些个别的事件似乎与拉丁美洲的左倾潮流格格不入。


But there is another way of looking at these events.	但是，还可以用另一种方式来看待这些事件。


Yes, President Uribe won re-election, but the big surprise in Colombia was the end of the two-party system that had dominated the country for decades, and the emergence of the left-wing Polo Democrático as the second largest political force in the nation.	是的，乌里韦总统再次当选，但是，哥伦比亚令人惊讶的事件是统治该国长达几十年的两党政治宣告结束，左翼的民主中心党作为该国第二大的政治力量登上舞台。


Similarly, while Alan García won in Peru, he does not come from a hard-left party that has finally seen the light (like Lula da Silva in Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay).	同样，尽管加西亚在秘鲁获胜，但是他并非像巴西的卢拉德席尔瓦、智利的巴切莱特以及乌拉圭的巴斯克斯那样来自最终归顺正途的极端左翼政党。


His APRA party, founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in the 1920’s, is one of the region’s oldest and most anachronistic populist organizations.	其秘鲁人民革命同盟由德拉托尔在二十世纪二十年代创立，是该地区历史最长、最为与时代格格不入的民粹主义组织。


Like Chávez in Venezuela, Kirchner in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and López Obrador in Mexico, President García belongs to the unreconstructed left that springs from the great Latin American populist tradition.	像委内瑞拉的查韦斯、阿根廷的基什内尔、玻利维亚的莫拉莱斯以及墨西哥的洛佩斯一样，加西亚总体属于未经改造的、发端于强大的拉丁美洲民粹主义传统的左翼。


He may have learned many lessons from his disastrous presidency in the 1980’s, but he is much closer to the wrong left than to the right one.	八十年代担任总统期间一片乱局，他有可能从中汲取了教训，但是，比较正确的方向而言，他更为接近错误的左翼。


In Mexico, López Obrador has both begun picking up in the polls in recent days, and showing his true colors, promising the stars and the moon to the Mexican electorate.	在墨西哥，洛佩斯不仅开始在最近几天的民意调查中上升，而且显示出了他的真实一面，向墨西哥的选民们作出不切实际的承诺。


In fact, the more important recent developments within the Latin American left may lie not so much in the horserace results of elections, but in the growing differences between modernists and revanchists, between national interests and ideology.	实际上，最近拉美左翼内部更为重要的事件并非是赛马般的选举结果，而是现代主义者和复仇主义者、国家利益和意识形态之间不断增加的分歧。


As Morales cozies up to Chávez and Fidel Castro more quickly than most people expected – nationalizing Bolivia’s natural gas, inviting large numbers of Cuban doctors and advisers to his country, and signing myriad cooperation agreements with Venezuela – he is also fueling increasing tensions with Brazil and Chile.	莫拉莱斯将玻利维亚的天然气收归国有，邀请大量的古巴医生和顾问前往该国，并且与委内瑞拉签署了包罗万象的合作协议。 他与查维斯和卡斯特罗交好要比大多数人预料的要更为迅速。


Both countries are his neighbors, and in theory at least, their leaders are his ideological soul mates.	这两个国家都是它的邻国，而且至少在理论上，两国的领导人都是他在意识形态方面的同路人。


But the differences between the modern and archaic left, and the three countries’ contradictory national interests, seem to be trumping more superficial political affinities.	但是，现代左翼和陈旧过时的左翼之间以及三国充满矛盾的国家利益的分歧看起来战胜了更为肤浅的政治亲和。


For example, Saõ Paulo, Brazil’s industrial powerhouse, now depends for most of its energy on Bolivian natural gas.	例如，巴西的产业基地圣保罗的大部分能源供应现在都依赖于玻利维亚的天然气。


As a result, Petrobras, the Brazilian energy company, has invested huge sums in Bolivia in everything from exploration to pipelines.	结果，巴西国有能源公司在玻利维亚的开采和管道上投入巨资。


Now, with the election of Evo Morales, the main source of Petrobras’s natural gas has suddenly been nationalized.	现在，随着莫拉莱斯的当选，该公司天然气的主要来源顷刻间被收归国有。


Indeed, domestic royalties on Bolivian gas production are being increased by more than 50%, and the price charged to Bolivia’s foreign clients may well be doubled.	确实，玻利维亚天然气生产的国内开采权使用费提高了一半以上，向该国的国外客户收取的费用可能翻番。


Contracts are being respected only in the breach, and technicians and lawyers from PDVESA, the Venezuelan oil giant, are auditing Petrobras installations in Bolivia.	只有在违约的情况下才尊重合同，而且，委内瑞拉石油巨人PDVESA的技术员和律师们则在审计巴西国有能源公司在玻利维亚的设施。


Lula wants to be nice to Morales, but he can’t be nice to his expropriating neighbor and at the same time keep the industrialists and consumers of Saõ Paulo happy.	卢拉想要同莫拉莱斯交好，但是，他却无法在与其收归国有的邻居交好的同时又让圣保罗的产业巨头和消费者们满意。


Similar frictions are arising with Chile.	同样的摩擦也发生在与智利的关系上。


President Bachelet would like to solve the century-old problem of landlocked Bolivia’s access to the Pacific, but she is finding this task to be trickier than expected, as Morales increases gas prices and reduces gas exports to Argentina, Chile’s largest foreign supplier of energy.	巴切莱特总统想要解决内陆国家玻利维亚进入太平洋这个世纪难题。 但是，当莫拉莱斯提高天然气价格并减少向智利最大的外国能源供给国阿根廷的天然气出口时，他发现这一任务要比预想的要更为复杂。


Nor does Morales’s rhetoric help: accusing the United States of attempting to assassinate him, as he did last week, does not endear him to the elites of a country that has signed a free-trade agreement with the US and whose president will be visiting Washington soon.	他上周指责美国企图暗杀他。 玻利维亚与美国签署了一份自由贸易协议，该国总统即将造访华盛顿，因此这一指责并不让他在该国的精英者们面前更为可爱。


At the end of the day, Bolivia’s immediate national interests may be served by Morales’s strategic alliance with Cuba and Venezuela.	最终，莫拉莱斯与古巴和委内瑞拉结成战略联盟，可能有利于玻利维亚的直接国家利益。


On the other hand, Chávez’s unabashed meddling in the Peruvian elections may have so alienated Alan García that he actually becomes a European-style social democrat, and López Obrador may deliver on his promises to respect NAFTA, adhere to macro-economic orthodoxy, and pursue good relations with the US.	另一方面，查韦斯明目张胆地干涉秘鲁选举也有可能与加西亚结盟而实际上成为欧洲风格的社会民主派，而且洛佩斯有可能履行遵守北美自由贸易协议的承诺，遵守正统的宏观经济政策，并且与美国发展良好的关系。


But the cleavage between the two lefts in Latin America is steadily deepening.	但是，拉美两派左翼之间的分歧正在逐步加深。


This is inevitable, because that rupture is being fueled by the simple acknowledgement that responsible governments must place national interests ahead of nostalgia, grandstanding rhetoric, and strident ideology.	这是无法避免的。 人们只要认识到负责任的政府必须将国家利益置于怀旧、豪言壮语以及鼓噪的意识形态之上，就会加剧这一分歧。


Trading Away Human Rights	出卖人权


NEW YORK – Trade negotiators in Singapore recently failed to finalize a deal on the long-awaited Trans-Pacific Partnership; they will soon have another chance to complete what would be the world’s largest regional free-trade agreement.	纽约——新加坡贸易谈判代表近日未能成功签署期待已久的跨太平洋伙伴关系协议； 但很快他们就会有另一次机会签署全世界规模最大的区域自由贸易协议。


But, given serious concerns that the TPP will fail to consider important human-rights implications, that is no cause for celebration.	不过鉴于跨太平洋伙伴关系不考虑对人权的重要影响，签署这项协议并不值得庆祝。


The TPP talks involve the United States, Canada, and ten other Pacific Rim countries with a combined annual output of around $26 trillion, or about 40% of global GDP.	跨太平洋伙伴关系谈判涉及美国、加拿大等10个环太平洋国家，成员国年生产总值约为26万亿美元，约占全球GDP的40%。


Their economic clout is matched by their ambitions; the talks go beyond traditional trade issues, which account for only five of the 29 proposed chapters, and consider a wide range of investment and regulatory issues that will affect many millions of people – and not always positively.	经济实力铸就了他们的雄心壮志； 谈判超越了传统的贸易问题，贸易问题在29章内容中仅占5章，此外还讨论了影响成百上千万人的多元化投资和监管问题——但这种影响并不总是积极的。


Whether trade liberalization generally helps or harms the most vulnerable is a complex question.	贸易自由化总体而言对弱势群体有益还是有害是个复杂的问题。


But that theoretical debate should not prevent us from carrying out a thorough human-rights impact assessment on the terms of the deal currently on the table.	但理论上的争议不应妨碍我们针对目前提出的条款展开全面的人权影响评估。


Such an assessment should be conducted before the TPP negotiations reach any final agreement on the relevant issues, and it should not overlook how the terms are implemented in practice.	这样的评估应赶在跨太平洋伙伴关系谈判就相关问题达成最终协议前进行，而且也不能忽略上述条款的实际落实。


Unfortunately, TPP member states have not only failed to do this; they have also excluded independent organizations from the assessment process by refusing to provide access to draft texts.	遗憾的是，跨太平洋伙伴关系成员国不仅没有这样做，而且还拒绝提供文本草案，从而不允许独立机构参与评估过程。


An outside view is especially important when a free-trade and investment agreement is, as the Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has noted, more of a “managed trade regime that puts corporate interests first.”	当自由贸易和投资协议如贝尔经济学奖得主约瑟夫•斯蒂格利茨所言更像“企业利益至上的管理贸易制度”时，听取外界看法是尤其重要的。


Indeed, the TPP’s emphasis on regulatory policies suggests that business interests will trump human rights.	事实上，跨太平洋伙伴关系注重调控政策显示各成员国会牺牲人权来换取商业利益。


While some proposals (against shark-finning, for example) would benefit certain advocacy groups, many more items are likely to cause widespread hardship.	虽然某些提案（比方说反对割取鱼翅）有利于某些利益团体，但还有更多条款有可能造成更广泛的问题。


Leaked drafts of intellectual-property proposals show an obstinate US effort to require patent protections for plants and animals, thus going beyond the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.	目前透露的知识产权建议草案显示美国固执地要求为动植物提供专利保护，这种做法超越了世贸组织与贸易相关知识产权协议的���关规定。


The US stance could further restrict farmers’ access to productive resources, thus affecting the right to food.	美国的立场有可能进一步限制农民获得高产资源，进而影响到粮食权利。


And such proposals would limit governments’ options when addressing wider food-related human-rights issues.	这样的提案还将限制在解决大范围粮食相关人权问题时政府的选择方案。


This clash of interests contravenes basic principles of international law, namely that countries’ trade deals must not conflict with their obligations under human-rights treaties.	上述利益冲突违反国际法的基本原则，即国家的贸易协议不得与他们的人权条约义务相矛盾。


That is why a human-rights impact assessment must be conducted – and necessary additional safeguards added – before any TPP deal is signed.	这就是为什么要在跨太平洋伙伴关系协议签署前进行人权影响评估——并补充必要的额外保障条款。


An assessment would also galvanize public debate on the issues being discussed.	评估还将引发对正在探讨问题的公开辩论。


Although trade negotiations require discretion to avoid political grandstanding by participants, the secrecy that currently surrounds the TPP talks is preventing important human-rights arguments from being aired.	虽然贸易谈判需要谨慎从事以避免参与者在政治上哗众取宠，但跨太平洋伙伴关系谈判目前的遮遮掩掩妨碍了人们了解重要的人权观点。


That entitlement to be heard – especially on a subject with such far-reaching significance – is also fundamental.	公众对上述问题的知情权——特别当涉及如此深远意义的决策时——也是一项基本原则。


Transparency and inclusiveness should be prerequisites of any deal.	透明度和包容性理应是任何协议的先决条件。


In fact, a human-rights impact assessment would not be difficult to conduct: guiding principles presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011 explain how to do it.	其实，人权影响评估应当不难进行：2011年提交给联合国人权理事会的指导原则详细说明了评估的具体方法。


The matter is urgent.	这个问题已经非常紧迫。


As the current round of TPP negotiations winds down, the opportunity for an open and rigorous impact assessment is diminishing.	随着这轮跨太平洋伙伴关系谈判接近尾声，进行公开严谨影响评估的机会正在消失。


Yet, even at this late stage, the negotiating countries could still commission a follow-up assessment that could be linked to reporting requirements.	但即使着手偏晚，谈判国家仍可以委托进行与报告要求挂钩的后续评估。


The delay in reaching a final agreement should be viewed as a last chance to correct potentially profound injustices.	延迟达成最终协议理应被视为纠正潜在深刻不公平现象的最后一次机会。


It is the bare minimum that must be expected of negotiators.	这是谈判代表必须达到的最低预期。


If they truly want the TPP to be a model for the twenty-first-century global economy, as they claim, then they should show real leadership.	如果他们真像自己所说的那样希望跨太平洋伙伴关系成为二十一世纪全球经济的榜样，那么他们必须表现出真正的领导力。


The TPP negotiators should consider the rights of everyone affected by the deal and act in the public interest, not just the special interests of the economic players that stand to benefit the most.	跨太平洋伙伴关系的谈判代表不仅要考虑到受益最多的经济团体的特殊利益，还必须照顾受协议影响的所有人的权利并保护公众利益。


The Right to Eat	吃的权利


NEW YORK – Food systems have gone global.	纽约—粮食体系已经全球化了。


The average North American meal now travels 2,400 kilometers (1,491 miles) from field to plate.	如今，北美肉食从地头到盘中平均要走2400公里。


As the food-supply chain has been transformed, efforts to ensure that it is accessible to all have intensified, with the “right to food” serving as an important driver of bottom-up change.	随着粮食供应链的演变，保证所有人都能获得粮食的措施越来越重要，而“粮食权”已成为自下而上变革的重要推动力。


In September, India adopted a landmark law on food security, guaranteeing five kilograms of subsidized wheat, rice, and other foodstuffs monthly for two-thirds of the population, and enhancing support for pregnant women, schoolchildren, and the elderly.	9月印度出台了具有里程碑意义的粮食安全法，保证三分之二的人口每个月可以获得五公斤小麦、稻米和其他视频补贴，并加强了对孕妇、学校儿童和老人的支持。


Though there are undoubtedly numerous holes in the system, treating access to food as a legal entitlement is an important step in the right direction.	尽管这套系统毫无疑问存在大量漏洞，但把获得粮食作为法定权利是朝向正确方向的重要一步。


Such progress, which extends far beyond India, follows a decade of global activism that has challenged the logic of existing food systems like never before.	这些进步（远远不局限于印度一地）是十年来全球积极主义的结果。 这一积极主义对现有粮食体系造成了前所未有的挑战。


Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, political rights like freedom of speech have been widely claimed, while the right to food has been largely neglected.	自1948年发布《世界人权宣言》以来，言论自由等政治权利已经得到了广泛推行，而粮食权却被大大忽略了。


To be sure, since the declaration was signed, a plethora of tools has been introduced in the effort to combat hunger.	平心而论，自世界人权宣言签署以来，人们已经动用了各种工具治理饥饿。


Some countries have opened their markets to imports; others have closed them.	一些国家向进口开放市场； 一些国家反其道而行之。


Many became dependent on food aid, while some acted on the conviction that eradicating hunger is merely a matter of fostering GDP growth.	许多国家依赖于粮食援助，也由国家信封消除饥饿无非是刺激GDP增长的问题并据此行动。


But such efforts have had limited success.	但这些努力效果有限。


Meanwhile, the most powerful institutional tool has been neglected.	与此同时，最有力的制度性工具被忽略了。


Unlike the top-down, technical solutions that policymakers have usually favored, a solution based on the concept of food as an entitlement, not a privilege, would involve – and empower – multiple actors.	与决策者通常更偏爱的自上而下的技术性解决方案不同，基于粮食是一种权利而不是特权的概念的解决方案将包括——以及提振——多个行动方。


Such an approach would be centered on upholding the right of all people to produce or gain access to food.	这套方针将致力于保护人们生产或获得粮食的权利。


This approach has clearly found an audience in India, where millions of people live in hunger and poverty, even as the country’s net wealth grows.	显然，这一方针已经有了一个身体力行者——印度，尽管该国净财富在增长中，但仍有几百万人生活在饥饿和贫困中。


Over the last decade, a right-to-food movement has taken root in the country, putting pressure on policymakers and approaching the problem from legal and political angles.	在过去十年中，粮食权运动已经在印度生根发芽，给决策者带来了压力，也在从法律和政治角度接近这一问题。


In 2001, a lawsuit brought by public-interest NGOs resulted in the Indian Supreme Court recognizing the right to food as an aspect of the constitutionally protected “right to life.”	2001年，公共利益NGO所提起的诉讼让印度最高法院承认粮食权是受宪法保护的“生命权”的一个维度。


The court ruled that a series of social programs should be expanded, in order to provide a basic nutritional floor for all.	印度最高法院判决一系列社会计划应该进行扩张，从而为所有人提供基本营养基础。


This activated a virtuous circle; by strengthening the social movements rallying around the right to food, the Supreme Court’s decision enabled them to ratchet up pressure on state governments to build an effective food-security apparatus.	这激活了一个良性循环； 通过加强围绕粮食权的社会运动，最高法院的裁决使它们能够增加对邦政府的压力以成立有效的粮食安全机关。


The recent law is a milestone in this process, but by no means the end point.	最近的法律是这一过程中的一座里程碑，但绝不是终点。


In a country characterized by massive regional wealth disparities and deep-rooted poverty, the road to eradicating hunger is sure to be long and difficult.	在印度，地区间财富差距巨大，贫困根深蒂固，消除饥饿的道路必然十分漫长而艰难。


The key to ensuring continued progress is to establish accountability.	确保后续进步的关键是建立问责制。


In this sense, the social audits used by India’s Right to Food Campaign to assess compliance with court-mandated policies, such as the delivery of school meals, will be essential in the coming years.	在这方面，印度粮食权运动（Right to Food Campaign）用社会审计来评估是否遵守法院指定政策（比如提供校园餐）的做法将在未来多年中起到关键作用。


Peasant farmers, parliamentarians, civil-society groups, and institutional actors have come together in similar ways elsewhere – including in Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico – to demand legal protections against hunger.	在其他地区（包括巴西、南非和墨西哥），农民、议会、公民社会团体和机构行动方也在以类似的方式合作，要求立法保护公民免受饥饿。


Right-to-food framework legislation has been adopted in Argentina, Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras.	阿根廷、危地马拉、厄瓜多尔、巴西、委内瑞拉、哥伦比亚、尼加拉瓜和洪都拉斯已经实施了粮食权框架立法。


This has often led to the kind of participatory approach to policymaking that empowers the poor and enables lasting inroads against hunger to be made.	这通常能够带来务实的决策��给穷人带来权利，有助于战胜饥饿。


In Brazil, for example, civil-society representatives comprise two-thirds of the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security, and thus have the opportunity to influence policymaking at the highest level.	比如，在巴西，公民社会代表占据了国家粮食和营养安全委员会（National Council on Food and Nutrition Security）的三分之二席位，因此有机会影响最高层的决策。


In Mexico – where the right to food was constitutionally recognized in 2011 – an inter-ministerial commission includes 19 government departments and institutions.	墨西哥——粮食权已在2011年获得了宪法承认——成立了包括19个政府部门和机构在内的夸部门委员会。


It is no coincidence that these countries now boast bold social programs that are dramatically reducing hunger among the poorest groups.	这些国家如今以能显著消除最贫困人群饥饿状况的大胆社会计划为傲绝不是巧合。


Clearly, courts have made a signal contribution to the fight against hunger, by upholding and making fully operational the right to food.	显然，法庭通过支持粮食权并将之完全落实到操作，在与饥饿的斗争中起到了标志性贡献。


In 2012, South Africa’s High Court ordered a revision of fisheries legislation to protect the livelihoods of small-scale fishers.	2012年，南非高等法院下令修订渔业法以保护小渔民的生活。


In Nigeria, Argentina, and Nepal, the right to food has recently been invoked on behalf of regions and population groups – including indigenous peoples – whose access to food was threatened.	尼日利亚、阿根廷和尼泊尔最近纷纷以地区和群体（包括获得粮食途径受到威胁的土著民族）的名义落实粮食权。


Breakthrough crops, fertilizer subsidies, and aid campaigns may grab the headlines, but it is the right-to-food movement that holds the greatest promise for ending hunger.	突破性农作物、肥料补贴和援助行动可以占据头条，但对结束饥饿来说，最大的希望还在于粮食权运动。


The good news is that its power is only just being realized.	好消息是其力量方兴未艾。


With a truly global right-to-food movement now emerging, the best is yet to come.	随着真正的全球粮食权运动开始浮现，更大的成果还在后头。


Ollanta Humala’s Limited Options	奥兰塔·乌马拉的有限选择


BUENOS AIRES – The big question in Latin America today is this: Will Peru’s newly elected president, Ollanta Humala, orient his country toward Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and his radical allies?	布宜诺斯艾利斯——当今摆在拉美面前的重大问题是：秘鲁新当选总统奥兰塔·乌马拉是会仿效委内瑞拉总统乌戈·查韦斯及其激进盟友？


Or will he choose the path taken by Brazil’s former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the region’s other moderate politicians?	还是会仿效巴西前总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦和地区内其他的温和政治家？


Humala’s own ambiguous words offer little guidance.	我们从乌马拉自身模棱两可的言辞中找不到线索。


So the direction in which he intends to lead must be read from his actions, and these are unlikely to be definitive in the short term.	因此必须从他的所作所为中体会其领导方向，而在短期内形成的感觉往往并不可靠。


Peru’s domestic and international situation, however, will frame his main decisions.	但秘鲁的国内国际局势将会主宰他的重要决策。


Humala is no novice politician rising to victory on charm and luck.	乌马拉并不属于依靠魅力和运气取胜的新秀政客。


In the presidential election of June 2006, he received 45.5 % of the vote – not enough to defeat Alan García, but sufficient to show how deeply he had tapped into the hopes and trust of many Peruvians.	2006年6月的总统选举中他得到了45. 5 %的选票——虽然不足以击败阿兰·加西亚，但却足以证明他承载了众多秘鲁人的信任和希望。


At that time, populism seemed an unstoppable force in Latin America.	当时的民粹主义似乎在拉美形成了一股不可阻挡的力量。


Fueled by an oil boom and vast social spending, Chávez was flying high, blessed and supported by the aging but still active Fidel Castro.	在石油繁荣及庞大社会开支的推动下，查韦斯在年纪渐长但却依然活跃的菲德尔·卡斯特罗的祝福和支持下展翅飞翔。


Across the región, Chávez’s influence was strong.	查韦斯在拉美地区的影响力极强。


His backing was a decisive influence in the election of Bolivia’s President Evo Morales in 2006, and the following year he supported Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, though his impact on their victories is hotly debated.	他的支持是2006年玻利维亚总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯当选的决定因素，虽然引发了激烈的争论，但在其后的一年里他又支持了尼加拉瓜的丹尼尔·奥尔特加和厄瓜多尔的拉斐尔·科雷亚。


In 2006, Humala praised Chavez’s policies as a sign of a new era in Latin America.	2006年，乌马拉称赞查韦斯的政策标志拉美进入新的时代。


But, in the recent presidential campaign, he suggested that his policies would resemble those of Lula, not Chávez.	但在不久前的总统竞选中，他提出他的政策会更近似于卢拉，而不是查韦斯。


In particular, he would seek to emulate Lula’s efforts to include vast sectors of the population in the benefits of a strong economy.	具体地讲，他会竭力仿效卢拉让强势经济惠及普罗大众的做法。


Today, with Venezuela’s economy mired in high inflation and overly dependent on oil, Chávez is fading as a regional model and guide.	如今，随着委内瑞拉经济陷入高通胀和对石油的过度依赖而不能自拔，查韦斯地区榜样和领袖的光环正在逐渐褪去。


He has also been startled by the rise of domestic opposition.	国内反对派的崛起也让他倍感惊讶。


So Brazil’s mix of diversified economic growth and redistribution is a far more appealing example.	因此巴西多元化经济增长及再分配的模式显得更有吸引力。


Indeed, a major reason for Humala’s victory was García’s inability to secure the benefits of growth for Peru’s poorest people.	事实上，乌马拉获胜的重要原因是加西亚未能使经济发展惠及秘鲁最贫困的群体。


Humala’s main campaign argument was that he would not risk the “success” of Peru’s economy, but would, on the contrary, strengthen it.	乌马拉主要的竞选观点是他不会去拿秘鲁的经济“成功”冒险，而恰恰会进一步强化秘鲁的经济。


His fight against poverty and social exclusion would be undertaken as part of that effort.	他将在推动经济增长的同时战胜贫困和社会排斥问题。


Humala comes to power in a regional environment of moderation and growing economic integration, which he would disturb at his peril.	乌马拉在地区环境日渐温和及经济一体化持续发展的背景下开始执政，如果不顺应这样的趋势，他的执政肯定不会长久。


García recently signed an economic agreement with Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, called Pacto del Pacífico, which is destined to reorient Latin America’s economies.	加西亚不久前与智利、哥伦比亚和墨西哥签署了一份名为Pacto del Pacífico的经济协定，旨在重新调整拉美经济。


These countries will jointly seek to develop a bigger presence in Asian markets, and to offer developed countries a safe option for capital investments in emerging markets.	上述国家会共同拓展在亚洲的市场份额，并为发达国家投资新兴市场提供安全的保障。


Moreover, each of the countries has bilateral free-trade agreements with the others and with the United States (though the US Congress has yet to approve the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, as it is officially known).	此外，上述各国之间及其与美国间均签署了双边自由贸易协定（尽管官方名称为《美国哥伦比亚贸易促进协定》的议案尚待美国国会批准）。


Breaking with these strategic policies would harm Peru’s economy.	破坏这样的战略政策可能会损害秘鲁的经济。


It would also harm Humala’s domestic political base and isolate him in the region.	这样做还会伤及乌马拉在国内的政治基础 ，使他在区域内陷于孤立。


He would not be able to lean on Brazil, the moderating regional power, but would inevitably fall under the sway of Chávez and Morales, deterring foreign investors and harming the country’s foreign relations.	他不能依赖巴西这一温和的地区力量，但却无法逃避查韦斯和莫拉莱斯的影响，阻碍外国投资者，损害国家外交关系。


Cuba is out of the question as a patron, due to its preoccupation with Raúl Castro’s efforts to reshape its depleted economy in an improbable bid for Chinese-style capitalism in a one-party state.	以古巴为靠山根本没有可能，因为劳尔·卡斯特罗正一心一意地幻想按中国式的一党资本主义模式重塑古巴已经垮掉的经济。


So Humala’s Latin American options are limited: Venezuela, Brazil, or the countries of the Pacto del Pacífico.	因此乌马拉的拉美备选方案十分有限：委内瑞拉、巴西、或Pacto del Pacífico联合体。


Although the last two options might be difficult to merge –Mexico might not want the competition of such a large player as Brazil – they are not mutually exclusive.	尽管后两种方案结合起来有些困难——墨西哥可能并不喜欢与巴西这种大国竞争——但它们也并不相互排斥。


In fact, Brazil’s leaders have good reason to be flexible: their country needs the access to the Pacific that Peru and Chile offer.	事实上，巴西领导人有理由采取更为灵活的态度：他们的国家需要秘鲁和智利所提供的太平洋通路。


The local stock market’s fall immediately after Humala’s victory is a clear sign that the most influential forces in the Peruvian economy will continue to press for deeds, not promises – deeds that benefit their interests, of course.	乌马拉当选后当地股市应声下跌表明秘鲁经济中最具影响力的群体将继续要求他用实际行动兑现承诺——当然这种实际行动要符合他们的利益。


Humala most likely will not follow market dictates robotically.	乌马拉很有可能不会机械仿效市场独裁者。


But he will not be able wholly to avoid them.	但他也不太可能完全不受他们影响。


Finally, there is the question of political effectiveness.	最后政治效力问题也不容忽视。


Humala’s coalition, Gana Perú, will have a plurality of representatives in Peru’s congress, but will need the votes of ex-president Alejandro Toledo’s party to have a controlling majority.	虽然乌马拉领导的加纳秘鲁联盟将在秘鲁国会中占据多数席位，但仍然需要前总统亚历杭德罗·托莱多所领导的政党选票才能取得控制地位。


Toledo, a Stanford graduate and a moderate politician, supported Humala during the campaign and provided him with economic advisers, which proved to be decisive in establishing the credibility of Humala’s retreat from radical policies.	毕业于斯坦福的温和政治家托莱多在竞选中支持乌马拉并为其指派经济顾问，事实证明这在验证乌马拉退出激进政策的可信度方面起到了决定性的作用。


Both the internal and external environments in which Humala finds himself – and the fact that he won by a margin of only three percentage points – seem to call for moderation and consensus.	乌马拉所处的内部和外部环境以及他仅凭三个百分点取胜的事实似乎都在呼唤着温和与共识的主流。


Half of Peru’s citizens did not side with him.	半数秘鲁民众没有和他站在一起。


Polarization may have proved functional to winning an election, but Humala will have to broaden his support in order to forge the consensus he needs in order to govern.	两极化可能是在选举中获胜的有效方法，但乌马拉必须扩大自己的支持范围，才能达成执政所需要的共识。


Olympian Economics	奥运经济学


LONDON – As Olympic mania swept the world in recent weeks, it transported the host country, Great Britain, to a rare display of public exultation.	伦敦—最近几周，随着奥运狂热席卷全世界，东道国英国被罕见地推向了公众狂欢的风口浪尖。


Indeed, the successes of “Team GB” produced an upsurge of patriotic rejoicing akin to victory in war.	事实上，“英国队”的成功所掀起的爱国热情一点都不亚于打赢一场战争。


Britain finished third in the gold medal count, behind the United States and China, much larger countries, but ahead of Russia, which traditionally competes with America for first place.	最终，英国在金牌榜上位列第三，仅次于国家规模大得多的美国和中国，压倒了通常总是与美国竞争头把交椅的俄罗斯。


So, what is the secret of Olympic success?	那么，奥运成功的秘诀在哪里呢？


The acquisition of medals, precisely because it gives so much satisfaction, has become the object of scientific inquiry and national endeavor.	正是由于夺牌所带来的巨大满足感，使得它成了科学研究和国家努力的对象。


Before the 2012 Games, the Financial Times combined four economic models to produce the following “consensus” prediction of gold medals (the actual results are in brackets): 1.	在2012年奥运会之前，《金融时报》综合了四个经济模型，给出了金牌数量的“一致”预测（括号内位实际金牌数）：1.


United States, 39 (46); 2.	美国，39（44）； 2.


China, 37 (38); 3.	中国37（38）； 3.


Great Britain, 24 (29); 4.	英国，24（28）； 4.


Russia, 12 (24); 5.	俄罗斯，12（21）； 5.


South Korea, 12 (13); and 6.	韩国，12（13）； 6.


Germany, 9 (11).	德国，9（11）。


The gold medal rankings and overall medal placement (gold, silver, and bronze) were correctly predicted in all cases.	金牌榜和奖牌（金铜牌）总数榜的预测次序完全正确。


The most striking finding is that the medal count can be predicted with great accuracy from four key variables: population, GDP per capita, past performance, and host status.	最令人惊奇的发现是，奖牌数量可以通过四个关键变量极其精确地被预测出来：人口、人均GDP、过去的表现以及东道主地位。


Everything else – different training structures, better equipment, and so forth – is pretty much noise.	所有其他因素——不同的训练结构、更好的训练设备等等，都可以归于噪音。


The impact of population and GDP is obvious: A large population increases the chance that a country will have athletes with the natural talent to win medals, and a high GDP means that it will have the money to invest in the infrastructure and training needed to develop medal-winning athletes.	人口和GDP的影响是显而易见的：一国人口数量越大，拥有夺牌天赋运动员出生的概率就越高，而高GDP意味着一国有钱投入到开发夺牌运动员的基础设施和训练中去。


Past performance is also important: the visibility and prestige of a sport increases after Olympic success, as does funding.	过去的表现也很重要：一种运动会因在奥运会中大放异彩而在会后获得更高的关注度和地位。


Medals attract money; failure results in cuts.	奖牌吸引着金钱； 失败意味着金钱流失。


Finally, the “home advantage” includes not just the benefit of morale and the opportunity to train in the actual Olympic venues, but also the funding boost that host status brings.	最后，“东道主优势”不仅包括士气和在正宗奥运场馆训练的机会，也包括东道主地位所带来的资金充沛。


In 2004, British athletes received £70 million ($110 million).	2004年，英国运动员得到了7000万英镑的资助。


By 2008, after London was awarded the 2012 Games, the total was £245 million, and stood at £264 million this year.	到2008年，在伦敦获得2012年奥运会主办权后，这一数字变成了2. 45亿英镑，今年更是达到了2.


Over the past ten Olympics, the host country has won 54% more medals on average than when it was not the host.	64亿英镑。 在过去十届奥运会中，东道国获得了比不当东道国的平均水平多54%的奖牌。


Hosting the Olympics boosts performance before the hosted Games, and has effects that outlast them.	主办奥运会在奥运会开始前就能提振运动表现，而且这一效果是持久的。


Some sports are more sensitive to income and host-nation effects than others.	一些运动比其他运动对收入和东道国效应更加敏感。


Equestrianism, sailing, cycling, and swimming, for example, are far more expensive than running, and this reduces the participation of low-income countries.	比如，马术、帆船、自行车等运动比田径运动花费大多了，这削弱了低收入国家的参与度。


It is almost impossible for some countries to produce medal-winning athletes in some sports – Ethiopia has only one swimming pool per six million people.	对一些国家来说，在某些项目上培养夺牌运动员不啻天方夜谭——比如600万埃塞俄比亚人总共只拥有一个游泳池。


Sometimes, poor countries are priced out of a sport.	有时，穷国因没钱而被排斥在某项运动之外。


India was historically strong at field hockey, winning almost all of the gold medals between 1928 and 1968, but, since the Games switched from grass to expensive synthetic turf, the Indians have won just one field hockey medal.	历史上，印度是曲棍球强国，在1928—1968年间几乎垄断了奥运曲棍球金牌，但是，随着奥运会曲棍球比赛不再采用天然草坪，而是转用昂贵的人工草坪，印度人从此以后只获得过一块曲棍球奖牌。


Some of the sports at which Britain has done particularly well, like cycling and rowing, are most highly influenced by income and host effects.	一些英国人玩得最溜的运动，如自行车和赛艇，正是收入和东道主效应最明显的运动。


Brazil can therefore expect to improve considerably on its modest haul (15 medals) and 21st-place finish when it hosts the 2016 Games.	因此，在2016年奥运会上，巴西大有希望显著提高自己的奖牌数（15枚）和奖牌榜排名（第21位）。


As for the others, the formula for success is fairly simple: select your potentially winning sports, pick the potential medalists in those sports, pour money into them, and stick with both the sports and the players until the medals roll in.	对其他国家来说，成功公式也相当简单：挑选潜在优势项目，挑选这些项目上的潜在夺牌选手，在他们身上可了劲花钱，如此坚持，直到奖牌滚滚而来。


The funding can be corporate sponsorship (as in the United States), state money (as in China), or a mixture of National Lottery and state money (as in the United Kingdom).	资金来源可以是公司赞助（如美国），也可以是国家出资（如中国），也可以是体育彩票和国家出资双管齐下（如英国）。


Two questions arise.	这里又会产生两个问题。


First, why should a country concentrate on accumulating trophies at the expense of other desirable goods?	首先，为什么一国要牺牲其他值得追求的目标，把精力集中在堆砌奖牌？


And, second, can the formula for “picking winners” in sports be replicated for competitive success in international trade?	其次，在体育中“挑选赢家”的公式能否复制到国际贸易竞争中去？


The answer to the first is not obvious.	第一个问题的答案并不是显然的。


An economist would probably argue that money spent on education, housing, and health care brings more “welfare” than money spent in the quest for medals.	经济学家可能会指出，与追求奖牌相比，把钱花在教育、住房和医疗上能带来更多的“福利”。


When all is said and done, sports is entertainment; the others are necessities.	说到底，体育只是娱乐； 而上述这些东西可是必需品。


But that argument ignores the effect of sporting success on national morale, an intangible factor in a country’s success in other, more “serious,” spheres of endeavor.	但这一观点忽视了体育成功对国民士气带来的效应，而这是一国在其他更“严肃”的领域取得成功��无形因素。


A country that can succeed in one sphere of peaceful competition is encouraged to feel that it can do well in others.	在一项和平竞争中胜出能够鼓舞一国在其他领域也取得成就。


One can treat this claim with a certain degree of skepticism – after all, the 2004 Athens Olympics failed to produce a Greek economic miracle.	对于这一结论，你大可以保持怀疑态度——毕竟2004年雅典奥运会并没有给希腊带来经济奇迹。


But it does lead to the second question: Can the methods that produce Olympic winners be applied elsewhere?	但它的确引出了第二个问题：打造奥运赢家的方法是否可以应用到别处？


Nothing is more discredited in Anglo-American economics than the policy of “picking winners.”	在盎格鲁-美国经济学中，“挑选赢家”是最被看不起的政策。


The consensus has been that it inevitably leads to the state “backing losers.”	经济学家的一致意见是，这不可避免地会导致国家“支持输家”。


Economic success, on this view, is best left to the unfettered play of market forces.	根据这一观点，经济成功的最佳方式是让市场力量自由发挥。


This philosophy has been heavily jolted by two inconvenient facts: the financial collapse of 2007-2008 and the experience of countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, and even the US, where economic success depended heavily on sustained government investment of the kind that has produced Olympic medals.	这一哲理受到两条令人不安的事实的严重挑战：2007—2008年的金融崩盘以及日本、韩国、中国台湾、德国甚至美国等地区的经验——经济成功很大程度上取决于政府投资，而这种政府投资与奥运奖牌投资别无二致。


As in sports, so in economic life: government commitment can start a virtuous circle of success, while government neglect can trigger a vicious circle of decline.	体育如此，经济亦然：政府承诺可以开启良性循环，而政府的忽视可能触发衰落的恶性循环。


Nevertheless, the popular hunger for sporting success, and the celebratory outpouring that it evokes, is bound to provoke some disquiet.	尽管如此，大众对体育成功的渴望以及体育成功所带来万人空巷的庆祝场面注定会引起一些不安。


It seems to mark humanity’s retreat into infantilism.	这似乎意味着人类向幼稚的退步。


But if the douceur of sports can channel aggressive passions into benign, if trivial pursuits, why should we deny our star performers their heroic stature?	但如果体育的优雅能够将过剩的激情引导到温和（如果说是无关紧要的话）的目标上，为什么我们要否认明星运动员的英雄形象呢？


An Economic Myth of Olympic Proportions	奥运会级别的经济神话


NORTHAMPTON – According to Olympic legend, hosting the Games is an economic boon for the chosen city and country.	北安普顿—奥林匹克传说说，举办奥运会是对被选中的城市和国家的经济大礼。


In reality, the Games are more often a boondoggle, as Rio de Janeiro is finding out.	在现实中，举办奥运会更多地是一件吃力不讨好的事，里约热内卢正在领教这一点。


First, consider how the games are awarded to a host city.	首先我们来看看奥运会主办权是如何授予东道主的。


The International Olympic Committee (IOC), an unregulated global monopoly, conducts a biannual auction whereby the world’s cities compete against one another to prove their suitability.	国际奥林匹克委员会是一家不受监管的全球垄断机构，它组织双年拍卖会，让全世界城市彼此竞争，证明自己才是合适的主办者。


Business executives – often from the construction industry – who stand to gain from the Games’ preparation usually lead a prospective city’s bidding process.	领衔候选城市竞价过程的往往是有望从奥运会筹办中获益的企业高管——通常来自建筑业。


Among other things, cities will offer lavish sporting venues, ostentatious ceremonial spaces, newly built transportation networks, luxurious accommodations for athletes, and media and broadcasting centers.	各城市将提供铺张的体育场馆、浪费的仪式空间、新建交通网络、奢华的运动员接待设施以及媒体和转播中心。


The outcome of this process is predictable: winning cities usually overbid.	这个过程的结果不难预料：获胜的城市总是出价过高。


The cost of hosting the Summer Olympics these days runs from $15 billion to $20 billion, including venue construction and renovation, operations and security, and additional infrastructure.	如今，主办夏季奥运会的成本为150—200亿美元，包括场馆建设和翻新、运营和安全以及其他基础设施。


The total revenue for the host city from its share of international television contracts (roughly 25%, with the other 75% going to the IOC), international and domestic sponsorships, ticket sales, and memorabilia is $3.5-4.5 billion.	主办城市从其国际电视转播合同分成（大约为25%，其余75%归国际奥委会）、国际和国内赞助、门票销售以及纪念品销售中获得的总收入为35—45亿美元。


In other words, costs comfortably exceed revenues by $10 billion or more.	换句话说，成本轻轻松松就超出收入100亿美元或更多。


Those vying for their city to host the Games often argue that any short-term deficit will turn into long-term gain, because tourism, foreign investment, and trade will grow, to say nothing of improved national morale.	争夺奥运会主办权的城市常常辩称短期赤字能转化为长期收益，因为旅游、外国投资和贸易将会增长，更不用说国民士气的提高了。


Again, the empirical evidence does not support this extravagant claim.	但是，实证证据并不支持这一不惭大言。


Consider tourism.	以旅游业为例。


During July and August 2012, the number of tourists visiting London, the host city for the Summer Games that year, actually fell by 5%.	2012年7月—8月间，到访当年夏奥会主办城市伦敦的旅客实际上下降了5%。


The shops, restaurants, theaters, and museums around the event space in Piccadilly Circus all reported next to no business during the 17 days of the Games.	皮卡迪利转盘（Piccadilly Circus）周边商店、餐厅、剧院和博物馆在奥运会举行的17天中门可罗雀。


As it happens, everyday tourists avoid Olympic host cities during the Games, owing to crowds, transportation delays, inflated prices, and possible security threats.	说起来，寻常游客会因为拥挤、交通延时、物价膨胀和可能的安全隐患而避免在奥运会期间去主办城市。


As a result, hosting the Games does more harm than good for tourism, which thrives on word of mouth.	因此，主办奥运会对依靠口碑繁荣的旅游业弊大于利。


If tourists are avoiding a city – or having a negative experience because of the Games – they will have nothing good to report back to their family and friends.	如果游客对一座城市避之不及——或者因为奥运会而印象不佳——就无法给予亲朋好友正面的反馈。


Beyond tourism, no smart business makes investment or trade decisions simply because a city has hosted the Olympics.	除了旅游业，聪明的企业都不会仅仅因为一座城市主办奥运会而做出投资或贸易决定。


If anything, the expense to the city creates fiscal distress, implying a less favorable business environment in the future.	如果说要考虑什么的话，那就是在这座城市的投入会造成财政负担，这意味着未来商业环境不利。


Another drawback to hosting the games is the public scrutiny a city receives.	主办奥运会的另一个弊端是这座城市将受到公众的密切关注。


Rio de Janeiro’s preparations to host this year’s Summer Games did its international image no favors.	里约热内卢举办今年夏奥会的筹备工作非常不利于其国际形象。


A city once known for its natural beauty and fun-loving lifestyle is now known for corruption, violence, bad traffic, pollution, political instability, and the Zika virus.	以往以自然美景和玩乐生活著称的城市现在因为腐败、暴力、交通拥堵、污染、政治动荡和寨卡病毒而闻名。


One area where some host cities – but not all – can actually realize long-term gains is in infrastructure spending.	一些主办城市——但非所有——真正能够实现长期收益的一个领域是基础设施支出。


In Rio’s case, one could argue that the city will benefit from improvements to its international airport and downtown port.	在里约的例子中，有人会指出它将得益于国际机场和市中心港口的改善。


But this is not a valid reason to become a host city; it is merely a consolation prize.	但这并不是主办奥运会的合理理由； 而只是一个安慰性的奖励。


A billion dollars of productive infrastructure development does little to make up for the other $19 billion spent on the Games, which will not improve the city for most of its residents or regular visitors.	十亿美元生产性基础设施开发对于弥补其他190亿美元奥运会支出来说只是杯水车薪——这些支出对于改善居民和常规游客来说几乎毫无好处。


Consider the $2.9 billion subway line (originally budgeted at $1.6 billion) connecting the Games’ beachside event space to Barra da Tijuca, a wealthy suburb ten miles away.	以连接奥运会海滩赛事场地和十英里外的市郊富人区Barra da Tijuca的地铁为例。 这条线路耗资29亿美元。


This new infrastructure will boost property values in Barra da Tijuca, while doing nothing to improve Rio’s horrendous street traffic.	它将提振Barra da Tijuca的房价，但对改善里约可怕的道路交通状况无济于事。


The bulk of Rio’s workers living north and west of downtown will have just as difficult a commute as ever.	里约大部分工人生活在市中心北部和西部，他们的通勤和以往一样困难。


Examples like this abound.	类似的例子不胜枚举。


The city built a new golf course on the protected wetlands of the Marapendi Natural Reserve, which will degrade the ecosystem and consume vast amounts of water – a preciously scarce resource in Rio.	里约在Marapendi自然保护区内的受保护��地建造了一座高尔夫球场，该球场会破坏当地生态系统并消耗巨量在里约十分宝贵的稀缺水资源。


It also built bus lanes that run between Olympic venues, which will ease travel for IOC executives but only further congest the city’s now-narrower roadways for everyone else.	里约还建造了多条在奥运会场馆间运行的公交线路，国际奥委会官员的出行是因此方便了不少，但也将进一步挤占对其他所有人来说越来越窄的道路。


Along with pointless and disruptive infrastructure, the Rio Games have exacted a human cost.	除了无用和破坏性的基础设施，里约奥运会还有人力成本。


To make room for the 32 sport venues, the athletes’ Olympic Village, the broadcasting and media center, the ceremonial green space, and to beautify the surrounding landscape, the Rio government has evicted more than 77,000 residents from shantytowns or favelas since 2009, the year the city was awarded the Games.	为了给32座比赛场馆、奥运村、转播和媒体中心、仪式性绿色空间腾出空间和美化周边景观，里约政府从2009年（里约赢得主办权当年）开始将77,000居民赶出了贫民窟和棚户区。


Ultimately, hosting the Olympic Games is a big economic gamble for any city.	说到底，主办奥运会对任何城市来说都是一场经济豪赌。


Less developed cities with inadequate infrastructure must spend more to meet the IOC’s transportation, communications, and hospitality requirements; more developed cities have the infrastructure, but not necessarily the land, and risk disrupting thriving industries to bring the Games to fruition.	基础设施不足的欠发达城市必须花费更多才能满足国际奥委会的交通、通讯和接待要求； 较发达城市具备了基础设施，但未必有足够的土地，并且还要冒着为落实奥运会破坏繁荣产业的风险。


Olympic Gamesmanship	奥运花招


NEW YORK – China lobbied long and hard to host this summer’s Olympics, and thousands of Chinese literally danced in the streets when the decision was made to award Beijing the games.	纽约－中国为举办今夏的奥运会进行了长期而艰苦的游说，当国际奥委会决定由中国举办这届奥运会的时候，成千上万的中国人到街头舞蹈欢庆。


This was to be a chance for the Chinese to show the world just how far they and their country had come.	这是中国人向世界展示他们和他们的祖国取得的成就的机会。


I do not know if there is a Mandarin equivalent for “Be careful what you wish for,” but if there is, it surely applies.	我不知道中文是否有和“小心你希望的东西”相应的说法，但是，如果有，这个说法在这里当然适用。


China is getting a great deal of international attention, but not the sort it bargained for.	虽然中国受到了大量的国际关注，但是这样的关注不是它希望的那种。


On the contrary, China is finding itself under intense international scrutiny for everything from its policy toward Tibet, human rights, and product safety to the level of its currency, its policy in Sudan, and global climate change.  What was meant to be a moment of celebration has turned into one of criticism.	相反，中国发现从其西藏政策、人权、产品安全到货币水平、对苏丹以及全球气候变化的政策的所有事情都遭到严格的国际审视。 本应该是一个庆祝的时刻却变成了一个受批评的时刻。


Indeed, it is likely that several prominent world leaders, including British Prime Minster Gordon Brown, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, will not attend the opening ceremonies.	事实上，可能世界上一些著名的领导人，包括英国首相戈登·布朗，德国总理安格拉·默克尔以及联合国秘书长潘基文，将不会出席奥运会开幕式。


Several prominent American politicians have voiced support for a boycott.	一些知名的美国政治家对抵制奥运表示支持。


Still other heads of state, including French President Sarkozy, are weighing staying away.	还有一些国家的元首，包括法国总统萨尔科其，正在考虑不参加。


Of course, China merits criticism in many areas of its domestic and foreign policy.	当然，中国在其国内和国外政策的许多方面都应该受到批评。


But snubbing China is misguided. It ignores what the country has accomplished, and it risks consequences that are inconsistent with what the critics themselves want to see.	但是冷落中国具有误导性，它忽略了中国已经取得的东西，并且冒着产生与批评者想看到的东西不一致的后果的风险。


Some perspective is called for.	在此要提倡一些观点。


Modern China is only some six decades old.	现代中国只有六十年的历史。


Its economic growth has been and is truly astounding.	它的经济增长已经并且现在仍然很惊人。


Hundreds of millions of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty.	几亿中国人已经脱离贫困。


Indeed, Chinese economic growth must be acknowledged as one of history’s great achievements in poverty reduction.	事实上，中国的经济增长应被公认为历史上最伟大的减少贫困的成果之一。


China is not simply wealthier; it is also a far more open place politically than it was during the Mao era.	中国不仅仅是更富有了； 它也是一个比在毛泽东时代时的中国在政治上更开放的中国。


Civil society is growing; there are now more than 300,000 NGOs.  Official statistics show that more than 85,000 public protests occurred in 2005 (and probably more each year since) over issues such as corruption, public health, the environment, and land use.	官方统计显示在2005年有8. 5万起对诸如腐败、公共卫生、环境和土地使用这样的问题进行的公开抗议（可能此后每年更多）。


Even the recent earthquake in Sichuan revealed how Chinese politics are changing.	即使最近的四川地震也显示出中国的政治观念正在发生变化。 中国允许记者到灾区进行拍摄报道；


Cameras were allowed in; senior officials were seen and heard.	能够看见中国高级官员出现在灾区并能听到他们的讲话。


There are also indications that China’s foreign policy is evolving.	也有迹象表明中国的外交政策正在发生变化。


China has played a helpful role of late in encouraging North Korean cooperation with demands to limit its nuclear capabilities.	中国最近在鼓励北朝鲜合作并要求其限制其核能力上起到了有益的作用。


In Sudan, China supported a UN Security Council resolution establishing an international operation and committed 315 engineers to the UN-African Union force.	在苏丹，中国支持联合国安理会进行国际行动的决议并向联合国－非盟军队派出了315名工程师。


None of this excuses or justifies the shortcomings in Chinese behavior at home or abroad, which are many and real.	这些都不能成为中国在国内或国外的行为缺点的托词或正当理由，这些行为非常多并且都是真实的。


But reality is not one-dimensional.	但是，事实不只有一个方面。


China is changing, in many ways for the better, and further change in the right direction is not likely to result from a policy of isolating or sanctioning China.	中国正在在许多方面向好的方向发展 ，而且，向正确的方向发生进一步的变化不太可能从孤立或制裁中国的政策中产生。


If we want China to become a full participant, a stakeholder, in the international system, we are more likely to achieve this outcome by integrating China into the world’s institutions.	如果我们想中国在国际系统中成为一个全面的参与者、一个利益相关方，我们更有可能通过将中国融入世界的制度中的方式来取得这样的结果。


The Chinese need to see how they benefit from inclusion – and how they would suffer from not being one of the countries shaping and buttressing today’s international institutions.	中国人需要看到从参与中得到的好处——以及不是改变和支撑现在的国际制度的国家之一他们可能遭受的损失。


We should seek China’s integration as a matter of self-interest.	我们应该将中国的融入作为与自己利益相关的事情。


In a globalized world, global challenges largely require global responses, which are impossible if a country of China’s size and population and wealth does not participate.	在一个全球化的世界，全球挑战绝大多数需要全球应对，如果一个拥有中国这样的面积和人口以及财富的国家不参与，不可能取得这样的成果。


Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting more efficient energy use, taking action on climate change, and maintaining an open global economy – these and other tasks require Chinese participation, even cooperation, if globalization is not to overwhelm us all.	阻止核武器扩散，促进能源更有效地利用，对气候变化采取措施以及维护开放的全球经济——这些以及其它的工作都需要中国的参与，甚至是合作，如果我们不想全球化压倒我们的话。


One useful step on our part would be to end the anachronism of bringing together many of the world’s principal leaders in the annual G-8 meeting of industrialized countries and not including China (or India or Brazil, for that matter) as a matter of course.	我们可以采取的一个有益的措施是，结束每年由世界上主要的领导人参加的工业化国家举行的G-8会议按照惯例不包括中国（或者不包括印度或巴西）的时代错误。


But integration will succeed only if China and its leaders are open to it.	但是，一体化只有在中国及其领导人对此持开放的态度时才能成功。


Communism and socialism do not command public support as they once did.	共产主义和社会主义不像它们过去那样得到公众的支���。


Materialism and consumerism cannot be a substitute for political and religious freedoms, which remain severely constrained.	唯物主义和拜金主义不能成为政治和宗教自由的替代品，而政治和宗教自由在中国受到了严格的抑制。


Nationalism can all too easily fill a void.	民族主义能轻易地填补空虚。


This is dangerous, as history demonstrates that leaders who allow or stimulate excessive nationalism can all too easily become trapped by it.	但是这是非常危险的，因为历史证明，允许或激励过度的民族主义的领导人会很容易地陷入其中。


This argues not simply for keeping nationalism in check, but for allowing greater political and religious freedom so that there are alternative sources of legitimacy and allegiance in Chinese society beyond that of economic advancement.	这不仅是为了说明应控制民族主义，而且是为了说明允许更多的政治和宗教自由以使中国社会拥有除经济进步之外的正当性及忠诚的来源。


This is something that the Chinese will largely have to do by and for themselves.	这大部分是需要由中国人自己为自己做的事情。


Outsiders can and should make their views known, but mostly in private and without saying and doing things likely to stimulate the very nationalism we want to discourage.	外人可以并应该使他们的观点为中国所知，但是，这应该是私下里进行并且不应该说和做可能激起我们不提倡的民族主义的事情。


All of which brings us back to this summer’s events in Beijing.	所有这些使我们想起今夏在北京举办的奥运盛事。


China needs to show respect for human rights and allow journalists to report.	中国需要显示对人权的尊重并允许记者报道。


Rather than boycott Beijing, the world’s leaders should embrace the Olympics and what they represent.	世界各国的领导人应该欢迎奥运会以及它们代表的精神，而不是抵制北京。


The Olympics are a venue in which individuals and countries compete, but in conformity with a set of rules.  This is exactly what we want from China in the twenty-first century.	虽然奥运会是个人和国家竞争的场所，但是却遵循着一套规则。 这正是我们在21世纪对中国的期望。


Olympolitik	奥林匹克政治


PARIS – Is there a link between economic power and Olympic medals?	巴黎—经济实力和奥运会奖牌数之间有关系吗？


Is a form of multipolarity in sports emerging as political multipolarity sets in?	随着政治多极化的建立，某种形式的体育多极化也会随之出现吗？


In 1992, immediately after the Cold War’s end, the United States and the former Soviet Union’s “Unified Team” won a quarter of the medals in Barcelona.	1992年，冷战刚刚结束，美国和前苏联国家组成的“独联体”在巴塞罗那奥运会上夺走了四分之一的奖牌。


Global bipolarity had not yet vanished.	全球两极化还没有彻底消失。


By the 2008 Beijing games, the world had changed significantly. The Soviet-American duopoly had given way to a Sino-American duopoly, which won a combined 20% of the medals.	到了2008年北京奥运会，世界已经发生了重大变化，中美两极取代了苏美两极，两国相加夺走了20%的奖牌。


The London games confirmed this trend.	伦敦奥运会确认了这一趋势。


The Sino-American duopoly has loomed large in the medal count (22% of the total), but not outrageously so.	中美两极在奖牌榜上的比重更大了（总数的22%），但没有显著增长。


Europe remains strong, while Asia and the Caribbean have made significant headway.	欧洲依然强势，亚洲和加勒比地区进步明显。


There are, in fact, four factors behind Olympic power: population size, sports traditions, sports policy, and level of development.	事实上，奥运实力背后存在四大因素：人口规模、体育传统、体育政策和发展水平。


Taken separately, none of these factors can explain a country’s Olympic record.	单独看，这四个因素均不能解释一国在奥运会上的记录。


Collectively, however, their explanatory power is relatively large.	但是，合在一起，它们的解释力就会相对增加。


For starters, population size is a source of power simply because large countries can take advantage of their greater human potential to shine in a broad array of disciplines.	首先，人口因素之所以成为实力来源，只是因为大国可以利用更大的人口潜力从事范围极广的项目。


Countries with great demographic potential therefore inherently have great Olympic potential.	具有巨大人口统计潜力的国家因此天生拥有巨大的奥运会潜在实力。


Conversely, Australia appears to be the only country with less than 50 million inhabitants gaining more than 3% of the medals at a Summer Olympic Games.	相反，澳大利亚是唯一一个居民不到5000万人但能获得3%以上夏季奥运会奖牌的国家。


But, of course, a large population is not always a recipe for success.	但是，人口众多并不是万能的成功秘诀。


The most striking example is India, one of the least sports-oriented countries in the world, given its demographics: six medals for more than 1.2 billion inhabitants – the same number as Croatia, which has a population of just 4.3 million!	最令人吃惊的例子是印度，从人口统计角度看，它算得上是全世界最不爱体育的国家：12亿人口只获得了6块奖牌，和只有430万人的克罗地亚等量齐观！


Clearly, Indian society has a complex relationship with sports.	显然，印度社会与体育之间的关系非常复杂。


But the disparity between its demographic size and its Olympic success also shows that political multipolarity and sports multipolarity are not cast from the same mold.	但其人口规模和其奥运会表现之间的对比也表明，政治多极化和体育多极化具有不同的原因。


India is probably the most spectacular counter-example, but it is not the only one.  Countries like Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, and Mexico are dwarfed by countries like South Korea.	印度大概是最引人注目的反例，但不是唯一一个。 巴西、阿根廷、土耳其和墨西哥等国家均被韩国压得抬不起头。


Overall, it is fair to say that South America and the Middle East remain fringe players at the Olympics.	总的来说，平心而论，南美和中东仍是奥运竞技场上的边缘国家。


The Caribbean, for example, far outranks Brazil.	比如，加勒比国家就远胜过巴西。


National traditions are the second important factor in Olympic success.	国家传统是决定奥运表现的第二大因素。


First, there are physical and natural realities.	首先，各国人民的身体和自然条件不同。


Ethiopians begin running in childhood as a means to reach, say, a distant school in the highlands.	埃塞俄比亚人孩提时代就需要考跑步前往（比如）位于离家很远的高地上的学学。


And the Caribbean does not necessarily offer many sports activities besides track and field, for which relatively few material resources are needed to create champions.	加勒比人不需要从事田径之外的运动，因为田径比赛不需要多少物质资源就能取得成绩。


This is one of the reasons why East Africa, the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent the Maghreb are prominently represented in Olympic running disciplines.	这就是为什么东非、加勒比、一定程度上还有马格勒布地区，在奥运会上主要靠跑步项目出成绩。


But traditions can also be created.	但传统也是可以创造的。


The French are not culturally or physically predisposed to dominate sports such as judo, canoeing, and swimming, in which they have achieved distinction for more than 50 years.	法国对于柔道、皮划艇和游泳项目就没有文化或身体优势，但它们在这些项目上的优异表现已经持续了50多年。


A national sports policy can be conducive to good results.	国家体育政策可以催生好效果。


Such policies embody a country’s choice in developing one or several sports.	这类政策体现在一国选择发展一项或几项体育运动中。 其形式包括给予众多体育���会很大的自治权（如美国和英国）；


They can grant a great deal of autonomy to various federations (as in the US and Great Britain); devote significant public resources to sports for political purposes (as in Russia and other dictatorships); or insulate publicly financed sports institutions from partisan politics in order to ensure continuity (as in Italy and France).	动用公共资源根据政治目的培养强项（如俄罗斯和其他独裁国家）； 或将公共资金支持的体育机构与党派政治相隔离以确保连续性（如意大利和法国）。


On the other hand, the absence of a real sports policy (or its unraveling) can become a decisive handicap.	另一方面，真正体育政策（及其解释）的缺位可能成为决定性的障碍。


Indeed, how else to explain the poor performance of a country as well-endowed as Switzerland, or as highly populated as Nigeria?	事实上，还有什么能够解释向瑞士这样禀赋优渥国家，或像尼日利亚这样人口众多的国家会在奥运会上表现如此糟糕呢？


And what accounts for South Korea’s exceptional performance if not a coherent sports policy?	如果不是具有连贯性的体育政策，韩国为什么能够有如此卓越的表现呢？


Finally, a country’s level of development, as we have seen, is far from being decisive to Olympic success, especially in the running disciplines.	最后，我们已经看到，一国的发展水平在奥运会表现上并不具有决定性，特别是在跑步项目中。


Runners can travel and train individually on the best tracks.	跑步选手可以单枪匹马地在最好的赛道上跑步和训练。


Obviously, however, development does play a significant role.	但是，显然，发展确实起到了重要作用。


While sports like running are relatively inexpensive, others – including gymnastics, swimming, and even more so team games and equestrian events – require significant resources.	跑步等运动相对来说成本较低，但其他运动——包括体操、游泳，以及比它们更甚的团队运动和马术——要求巨大的资源投入。


It is no coincidence that the Caribbean and Africa do not have a presence in these disciplines at the highest levels of competition.	加勒比地区和非中在这些运动的高水平赛事中难觅踪影并不是巧合。


Indeed, of the ten countries that received the most medals at the London games, all except China and Russia are OECD members.	事实上，在伦敦奥运会上位居奖牌榜前十名的国家中，除俄罗斯和中国外都是经合组织成员国。


There are no less-developed countries, with the possible exception of Ukraine, in the top 15.	除了乌克兰之外，没有欠发达国家进入奖牌榜前15名。


Thus, while economic power is not a prerequisite to Olympic power, multipolarity in sports remains positively correlated with it.	因此，尽管经济实力并非奥运实力的先决条件，但体育多极化仍与之具有正相关性。


Africa received only 3% of all medals in London.	非洲只获得了伦敦奥运会3%的奖牌。


But, if the continent can sustain its recent economic growth, that number will almost surely rise.	但是，如果非洲能够保持当前的经济增长速度，可以肯定他们的奖牌数量会上升。


The Draghi Put on Trial	经受考验的德拉吉对策


CAMBRIDGE – In the summer of 2012, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi pledged to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro, including purchasing “unlimited” amounts of struggling governments’ bonds.	发自剑桥——在2012年夏季，欧洲中央银行行长马里奥·德拉吉发誓要“使用一切手段”去拯救欧元，包括购买“无上限”数量的受灾国政府债券。


The move, which has come to be known as the “Draghi put,” almost immediately reduced borrowing costs for Spain and Italy, and is widely touted as having pulled the eurozone back from the brink of disaster – without ever using the so-called “outright monetary transactions.”	这个人们称之为“德拉吉对策”的举动几乎立刻降低了西班牙和意大利的融资成本，也得到了广泛宣扬，被认为是将欧元区从灾难的边缘拉了回来——而无需动用所谓的“直接货币交易”(Outright Monetary Transactions）手段。


That may sound like a resounding success: the mere announcement of the OMT scheme was enough to end the monetary union’s existential crisis.	这听上去像是取得了一场彻底的胜利：仅仅宣布“直接货币交易”方略就足以令货币联盟的存在性危机得到终结。


But, according to the German Constitutional Court, the policy violates European Union treaties – a ruling that the European Court of Justice is now reviewing.	但是德国宪法法庭判决该政策违反了欧洲联盟条约——虽然欧盟法院正在对此判决进行复核。


The ECJ’s decision will have important implications for the eurozone’s future, for it will define what authority, if any, the ECB has to intervene in a debt crisis.	而欧盟法院的判决将对欧元区的未来产生重大的影响，因为这将明确定义欧洲央行拥有哪种授权（如果有的话）去介入一场债务危机。


And yet, in a fundamental way, the current debate about OMT misses the point.	但从根本上说，目前对于直接货币交易手段的讨论其实不得要领。


Rather than asking whether the ECB’s mandate allows it to intervene in a debt crisis, EU leaders should be asking whether it should.	与其质询欧洲央行所获得的授权是否允许其介入债务危机，欧洲领导人们更应该质询央行是否应该介入。


The Bundesbank’s position on this question is well known; a leaked submission to the Constitutional Court last year declared unequivocally that, “It is not the duty of the ECB to rescue states in crisis.”	德意志银行在这个问题上的立场广为人知； 去年该行一份遭到泄密的宪法法院呈报文件明确无误地指出：“拯救那些危机国家并不是欧洲央行的责任。


But there is a strong case for allowing the ECB to act as lender of last resort.	”但也有极为现实而紧迫的情况要求欧洲央行去担任一个最终贷款者的角色。


One key argument for forcing central banks to adhere to strict inflation targets is that it eliminates the temptation to use “monetary financing” (purchases of government bonds) unexpectedly, either to stimulate the economy or to inflate away its debt.	一个迫使各国央行去遵循严格通胀目标的核心观点是它可以消灭那种非常规使用“货币融资”（买入政府债券）手段的冲动，以及以及刺激经济通货膨胀以摆脱债务的做法。


After all, such action rarely works: markets anticipate it and raise interest rates to compensate lenders for expected inflation.	归根结底，这些手段很少能起到作用：市场会对此有所预期，并相应提升利率去补偿借款者因预期通胀所导致的损失。


The result is typically both high inflation and high borrowing costs.	最后的结果往往高通胀和高贷款成本并存。


What is worse, the argument goes, the expectation of monetary financing would drive governments to borrow excessively.	该观点认为，更糟糕的是，这种货币融资的预期将推动政府过度借贷。


This could trigger a vicious circle of mounting debt and uncontrollable inflation, with devastating consequences.	这将引发一个债务不断堆积且通胀失控的恶性循环，并带来极其恶劣的后果。


These are convincing arguments.	这些说法都非常令人信服。


But they fail to account for one critical factor: historical context.	但它们都无法解释一个关键因素：历史背景。


If a debt crisis results from government profligacy and mismanagement, rather than from a market failure, it is true that the central bank should not intervene.	如果一场债务危机源自于政府的滥用支出和管理不善，而不是由市场失灵所引发，那么中央银行显然是不应介入的。


If, however, the crisis results from a coordination failure among investors – when each investor refuses to roll over the government’s debt for fear that others will do the same, leading to a default – monetary policy can play an important role.	但如果这场危机来源于投资者之间的协调失误——每一个投资者都因为害怕其他人会作出同样的举动而拒绝延迟兑现政府债券，最终导致违约——货币政策就能在其中扮演一个重要的角色。


Indeed, by putting a floor on the price of sovereign debt and any accompanying inflation, central-bank intervention would reduce the real value of the debt and facilitate repayment.	事实上，通过对主权债券的价格以及任何相伴随通胀设定一个底线，中央银行的介入可以减低债务和基础设施偿还款的实际价值。


Moreover, as the OMT announcement demonstrated, a credible promise to use monetary financing in the event of such a crisis can prevent it from arising in the first place – with no inflationary action required.	此外，正如“直接货币交易”声明所体现的那样，一个在发生这类危机的时候使用货币融资手段的可靠承诺可以在第一时间遏制危机升级——而无需任何通胀行为。


Without central-bank involvement, investors’ panicky prophecy would be self-fulfilling, with the resulting spike in borrowing costs making it impossible for the government to repay its creditors.	没有中央银行的介入，投资者的恐慌性预言就得以自证，并引发借款成本高涨，导致政府无力还款给借款者。


In other words, prohibiting the central bank from acting as lender of last resort can push solvent economies into a needless debt crisis, undermining output and employment.	一句话说，阻止中央银行扮演最后借款者的角色将导致原本有能力偿付债务的经济体陷入一场不必要的债务危机，破坏生产及就业。


By most accounts, this is precisely what happened to Spain and Italy in 2012.	在大多数的描述中，这正是2012年在西班牙和意大利所发生的事情。


In this context, the Draghi put was a highly defensible action.	在这种背景下，德拉吉对策就是一个拥有高度防御性的举动。


Refusing to consider any amount of monetary financing, and continuing to adhere to a strict inflation target, would have been much more difficult to justify.	因此拒绝考虑任何数额的货币融资，并继续坚定维护一个严格通胀目标的做法则更加难以被认为是正当的。


To be sure, central-bank intervention is not the only way to quell self-fulfilling crises in the eurozone.	无可否认，央行介入并不是压制欧元区内自证性危机的唯一手段。


Fiscal transfers, whereby eurozone countries commit to provide funds to their distressed counterparts, could also work.	财政转移支付，借助欧元区国家承诺为其他受灾国提供资金的方式也能生效。


But this approach is far less practicable, and thus less credible.	但这种方式的可行性远低于前者,因此可信度也更低。


Opponents of central-bank intervention are right about one thing: monetary financing carries serious risks.	中央银行介入的反对者们在一件事情上是正确的：货币融资也附带有严重的风险。


In order to ensure that it is as safe and effective as possible, it must be used primarily in the event of self-fulfilling debt crises.	为确保其尽可能地安全和有效，就必须主要被用在这类自证性危机中。


In terms of institutional design, it is thus optimal for the central bank to maintain a strong commitment to keeping inflation low in normal times and to be willing to intervene in a crisis.	在制度设计方面，中央银行也应该去维护一个在平常时期维持低通胀并愿意在危机时出手介入的坚定承诺。


The ECB’s use of OMT satisfies both criteria.	而欧洲央行对直接货币交易手段的使用也符合这两项条件。


One Big Union	一个大联盟


PARIS – In the last few weeks, the idea of establishing a European banking union has become the latest remedy advanced as a solution to the long-running euro crisis.	巴黎—在过去几周中，成立银行联盟成了解决爆发已久的欧元危机的最新药方。


But, whatever the merits of a banking union – and there are many – proposals to establish one raise more questions than can currently be answered.	但是，不管银行联盟能带来多少好处——的确能带来不少好处——成立这样一个联盟会引起目前无法回答的问题。


The motivations of those who advocate a banking union differ markedly.	支持银行联盟者的动机显然是不同的。


For some, particularly in southern Europe, it is seen as a means of shifting the burden of supporting their indigent banks to those with deeper pockets.	一些人（特别是南欧人）将此视为让资金充裕国承担支持其资金短缺银行负担的办法。


For others, especially in the European Union’s Brussels Eurocracy, it is seen as another leap forward in the construction of a European super-state.	其他人（特别是欧盟的布鲁塞尔共同市场体系）将此视为迈向欧罗巴超级国家的一大步。


Taking their cue from the sacred Rome Treaty’s reference to “ever closer union,” the European Commission’s theologians view every crisis as an opportunity to advance their federalist agenda.	欧盟委员会的神学家们根据神圣的罗马条约中所提及的“最紧密的联盟”的说法，将每一次危机都视为推进其联邦日程的机会。


The European Central Bank has been more thoughtful, though no less enthusiastic, arguing that a banking union should have three objectives.	欧洲央行尽管热情程度要低一些，但想得更深，它认为银行联盟必须具备三大目标。


First, stronger eurozone-wide supervision should reinforce financial integration, “mitigate macroeconomic imbalances,” and improve the conduct of monetary policy.	首先，更强的泛欧元区监管应能促进金融一体化，“缓解宏观经济失衡”，并改善货币政策管理。


How a single EU supervisor would address the problem of imbalances is not explained, but it is surely a worthy aim.	单一欧盟监管者如何解决失衡问题，欧洲央行并未给出解释，但毫无疑问，这是一个值得追求的目标。


The second objective should be to “break the link between banks and sovereigns,” which has been a particularly dangerous feature of the last year, while the third is to “minimize the risks for taxpayers through adequate contributions by the financial industry.”	第二大目标应该是“打破银行和主权的联系”，这种联系在过去的一年中已成为一大为害甚深的特征。


The third aim could be achieved country by country, but it is certainly arguable that an across-the-board banking levy, or a Europe-wide financial-transaction tax, would eliminate competitive distortions.	第三大目标则是“通过金融业的充分出资让纳税人的风险最小化”，该目标将在欧洲各国逐一实现，但这必将引起一番争论：跨境银行税，或者泛欧洲金融交易税是否会消除竞争扭曲？


How might these laudable objectives be achieved?	这些值得赞赏的目标如何实现？


The European Commission has argued that a fully-fledged banking union would need to rest on four pillars: a single deposit protection scheme covering all EU (or eurozone) banks; a common resolution authority and common resolution fund, at least for systemically important and cross-border banks; a single European supervisor for the same banks; and a uniform rule book for prudential supervision of all banks in Europe.	欧洲委员会指出，成熟的银行联盟应有建立在四大基础上：覆盖所有欧盟（或欧元区）银行的单一存款保护机制； 共同清算机构和共同清算基金，至少要覆盖具系统重要性的银行和跨国银行；


Anyone who has been involved in banking supervision can see at once that these four pillars will require careful construction.	任何参与过银行监管的人一眼就能看出，这四大基石需要细心建设。


Many individual countries have taken a generation to develop their own domestic schemes.	众多国家花了一代人的时间才建立起本国的机制。


And, in this case, three big political issues have yet to be resolved.	而在欧洲银行联盟的建设中，有三大政治问题需要解决。


First, the identity of the single European banking supervisor remains undecided, and the ECB has seen an opportunity for a power grab.	首先，单一欧洲银行监管者的身份还没有确定，欧洲央行将其视为争权良机。


Central bankers in Europe have always resented the narrow monetary-policy mandate given to the ECB under the Maastricht Treaty.	欧洲的中央银行家们总是对马斯特里赫特条约只授予欧洲央行狭窄的货币政策管理权耿耿于怀。


Banking supervision was not included among the ECB’s objectives, though one article of the treaty gives the system of European central banks as a whole the task of contributing to effective supervision.	银行监管并不在欧洲央行的目标中，尽管马约中的一项条款给予了整个欧洲央行系统提供有效监管的责任。


They now argue that the simplest solution would be to expand that remit and make the ECB the de facto pan-European supervisor.	眼下，他们认为最简单的解决办法是扩大这一责任，让欧洲央行成为实质上的泛欧洲监管者。


That is not the outcome favored by the European Commission, which has only just set up the European Banking Authority.	刚刚成立欧洲银行管理局（European Banking Authority，EBA）的欧洲委员会并不喜欢这个结果。


The EBA is closely linked to the Commission itself, and is seen as the natural candidate for a broader role.	EBA与欧洲委员会本身关系甚密，被视为扮演更大角色的天然候选者。


The Commission has a case, but it also has a problem.	欧洲委员会有优势，但也有问题。


During the political horse-trading that preceded the creation of the EBA (together with two equivalent bodies for securities and insurance), it was agreed that the new authority would be based in London.	在为了创建EBA（以及其他两家证券和保险业的对等机构）而进行的政治讨价还价中，各方同意将新机构设于伦敦。


That seemed logical at the time, but not if the EBA’s role is to be broadened.	在当时，这似乎是理所当然之事，但如果EBA的权限得到扩张就不是这样了。


How could a eurozone supervisor be based outside the eurozone?	欧元区监管机构怎么能设在欧元区之外呢？


The second unresolved question is how to achieve a banking union in legal terms.	第二个悬而未决的问题是如何在法律上给银行联盟定性。


Constitutional change on this scale would normally require a new European treaty.	如此规模的宪政性变化需要通过新的欧洲条约来完成。


But that would take time, and Europe’s leaders have run out of it.	但这需要时间，而欧洲领导人最耗不起的就是时间。


Furthermore, there is no guarantee that voters in countries that require a referendum on treaty changes would support a further transfer of sovereignty.	此外，要求就条约变化问题进行全民公投的国家的选民是否支持进一步交出主权还远未可知。


So the likely outcome is that, in the EU’s time-honored fashion, the banking union will be constructed using existing powers, finessing the sovereignty question, and avoiding any reference to public opinion.	因此，可能的结果是，银行联盟将根据欧盟历史悠久的传统使用现有权力来建设，主权问题将被小心处理，避免任何涉及公众观点之处。


That points towards reliance on the ECB.	这意味着需要依赖欧洲央行。


The final question is what such a eurozone banking union would mean for the single financial market, and especially for EU countries that are outside the single currency.	最后一个问题是，这样一个欧元区银行联盟对单一金融市场，特别是位于单一货币区之外的欧盟国家意味着什么。


Many of them would sign up willingly, as they intend to join as soon as possible, in spite of the euro’s difficulties.	这些国家中不少会欣然点头，因为它们巴不得早点加入其中，即使欧元遇到了重大困难。


But that is not the case for the United Kingdom, and London remains the continent’s biggest financial center, by far.	但这些国家不包括英国，而伦敦目前依然是欧洲最大的金融中心。


I fear that the French and Germans have now lost patience with the troublesome British, and are reluctant to cut a deal.	我担心法国人和德国人现在已经对麻烦制造者英国人失去了耐心，不准备与它们周旋了。


And Euroskeptic British politicians see this as an opportunity to recast the UK’s relationship with the EU; indeed, for some, it means a chance to negotiate an exit.	而对欧元充满狐疑的英国政客将此视为重塑英国与欧盟关系的机会； 事实上，在某些人看来，这是一次谈判退出事宜的机会。


Opinion in the City of London tends to favor a middle way, which would allow the UK to cling to the benefits of the single market, without conceding unified regulation.	伦敦金融城的态度趋于中间道路，这能够让英国继续获得单一市场的好处，又不需要让步于统一监管。


That will be hard to pull off.	这将是难以完成的任务。


I suspect that a banking union of some kind will be implemented, and soon.	我认为很快就会实施某种类型的银行联盟。


Otherwise, the eurozone banking system will collapse.	否则的话，欧元区银行系统将会崩溃。


But the consequences of such a step for Europe’s great free-trade experiment could be serious, and, if not managed carefully, could lead to Britain’s withdrawal.	但欧洲的伟大自由贸易实验迈出这一步所带来的后果可能十分严重，如果不能小心治理，可能导致英国的退出。


The political stakes are high, and the outcome is likely to reflect that.	这是一场政治豪赌，或许结果会证明这一点。


One Crisis, One World	同一场危机，同一个世界


GENEVA – As recession spreads around the world, the global production networks that arose with the globalization of the world economy have become sources of cutbacks and job losses.	日内瓦--在衰退波及全球之际，在世界经济全球化时代崛起的全球生产网络也遭受削减和失业。


Postponing purchases of new winter coats in the United States means job losses in Poland or China.	美国人推迟购买冬天大衣就意味着波兰或中国工人的失业。


These losses then translate into reduced demand for American or German machine tools.	这些失业就会导致对美国或者德国机械工具需求的减少。


Unemployment and reduced sales then feed back into new losses in banks’ loan portfolios, further weakening the battered financial sector.	失业和销售下降最后转回到银行贷款组合的损失，进一步削弱受到打击的金融行业。


As a result, anxiety, hopelessness, and anger are spreading, as what was a financial crisis becomes an economic and human crisis.	结果，人们的担忧、无望以及愤怒波及开来，原本一场金融危机变成了经济和人力危机。


Unchecked, it could become a security crisis.	如果不加以限制，就会成为一场安全危机。


Trying to rescue the financial sector without supporting a recovery in terms of businesses, jobs, and family purchasing power will not work.	试图不通过支持企业、就业以及家庭购买力的复苏来拯救金融行业是行不通的。


What is needed is a large worldwide fiscal stimulus to counteract falling private demand.	现在所需要的是世界范围内大规模的财政刺激来抵消不断下降的私营企业需求。


Different countries’ capacity to act depends on their indebtedness, foreign exchange reserves, and current-account deficits.	不同国家采取行动的能力取决于各自的负债情况、外汇储备以及经常项目赤字。


Germany and China can do more than others.	德国和中国可以做的比别人多。


The US can do a lot, in part because of the dollar’s status as the main international reserve currency.	美国可以大有作为，部分是由于美元作为国际主要储备货币的地位。


Low interest rates mean that the additional debt burdens that public borrowing will create can remain manageable.	低利率意味着公共借贷产生的额外债务负担可以保持在可以管理的水平上。


Moreover, if the stimulus succeeds and leads to an early recovery, the additional income gained may more than offset the increase in debt.	而且，如果经济刺激成功并且促成早期复苏，由于得到的额外收入或许会抵消债务增加。


Given the collapse of commodity prices and excess production capacities, there is no short-term inflation danger, even if part of the stimulus is financed directly by central banks.	由于基本商品价格暴跌和过剩的产能，即使中央银行直接为部分经济刺激计划提供资金，因此近期通货膨胀危险并不存在。


The argument for a strong fiscal stimulus is overwhelming.	大规模财政刺激计划的理由是不容置疑的。


Several countries have already announced measures, but there is a need to evaluate what they all amount to in reality.	几个国家已经宣布了措施，但是需要评估这些措施的成效。


For example, some constitute “new” money, while others represent existing commitments brought forward.	例如，有些措施提供“新的”货币，而其他措施则提前实现现有的承诺。


We also need to assess the quality of these packages.	我们还需要评估这些措施的质量。


The argument is strong for providing stimulus through increased government expenditures rather than relying on, say, tax cuts, because panicked consumers might save the money instead of spending it.	由于惊慌的消费者们可能储蓄而非消费，因此，通过增加政府开支而非依靠减税来提供经济刺激更为有理。


Debt and inflation will reappear as medium-term problems, so it is critical that the fiscal ammunition used helps long-term productivity, growth, and sustainability.	债务和通货膨胀会成为中期问题，因此，使用财政措施帮助实现长期生产效率、增长以及可持续就十分重要。


Of course, fiscal stimulus does not mean just throwing money at the problem. There needs to be a strategy, priorities must be weighed, and empirical evidence analyzed.	当然，财政刺激并不意味着仅仅是用钱来解决问题。


We should also remember that what growth there is in the world economy in 2009-2010 will come mostly from developing economies. Policies supporting their growth are critical to prospects in the advanced economies, too.	我们需要一种战略，必须衡量轻重缓急并且分析实际经验证据。


Each country may hope that others will stimulate their demand while it preserves its fiscal headroom, thereby relying on exports as the engine of recovery.	各国可能希望在其保持财政平衡的情况下其他国家将会刺激需求，从而以来出口作为复苏的发动机。


Each country may also be tempted by protectionist measures, trying to preserve domestic jobs at the expense of imports.	各国也或许会受到保护主义措施的诱惑，试图以进口的代价来保证国内工作机会。


Such “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies in the 1930’s aggravated and deepened the Great Depression.	二十世纪三十年代的这种以邻为壑的政策使得大萧条雪上加霜。


The automobile industry is a good example.	汽车产业就是一个好例子。


Measures to keep the industry afloat in one country look like unfair competition to others.	某一国家采取措施让这一产业存活下来对其他国家而言好像是不公平竞争。


But the answer is not to let a collapse in the world’s car industry fuel a deeper recession.	但是，这实际上是不让世界汽车产业崩溃造成更深度的衰退。


The answer is to coordinate a global recovery package, which creates the opportunity to point recovery in the direction of a new generation of fuel-efficient and low-carbon-emission vehicles and green jobs.	解决办法是协调全球复苏措施，这样创造机会把复苏引向新一代节能和低二氧化碳排放汽车和绿色职业的方向。


Sovereign countries will have the final say on their recovery packages, but global coordination will increase the effectiveness of everyone’s actions.	主权国家最终决定自己的经济复苏计划，但是全球协调将会增加各国行动的有效性。


Moreover, fairness and security considerations demand that the most vulnerable, who had no role in the making of this crisis, receive support.	而且，公平和安全考虑要求与引发这一危机无关的社���弱势群体得到扶持。


Extending social safety nets helps the most vulnerable and is likely to have high multiplier effects, as the need to spend is most urgent for the poorest people.	扩大社会保险将会帮助弱势群体并且有可能产生较高的多重效应，因为最为贫困人口的花费需求最为迫切。


Training programs, including for green jobs, should be significantly increased.	包括绿色职业在内的培训计划应该大力增加。


Public expenditures must be focused on programs with strong employment content, such as in small- and medium-scale infrastructure projects and support to local governments.	公共开支必须集中在强有力的就业项目上，例如中小规模的基础设施项目并且为地方政府提供支持。


Credit lines should be kept open to smaller businesses, which employ the bulk of the world’s workers but have the least access to credit.	小企业雇用了全世界大部分工人但是获得贷款最为困难，因此信贷应当向它们开放。


The use of social dialogue for crisis management should be increased, because trust must be rebuilt.	增加使用社会对话用于危机管理，因为信任必须重建。


Donors must maintain the promised (and very modest) levels of development aid for the poorer countries, and the drive to achieve the Millennium Development Goals must be renewed.	捐助国家必须维持对贫困国家许诺的(很少的) 发展援助，而且必须恢复实现联合国千年发展目标。


The availability and affordability of trade finance should be improved.	贸易融资的供应和可支付性应当得以改进。


The Bretton Woods institutions have a key role to play.	布雷顿森林体系机构应当发挥关键作用。


The International Monetary Fund and central banks should increase liquidity in a coordinated fashion in the form of short-term credit to emerging-market economies suffering from cuts in capital inflows and export earnings.	国际货币基金组织和各国中央银行应当相互协调，以短期信贷的形式向受到资本流入和出口收入减少影响的新兴市场国家提供流动资金。


The World Bank should increase lending to help finance growth-supporting expenditures in developing countries.	世界银行应当增加借贷来帮助为发展中国家支持经济增长的开支提供资金。


Tangible progress is needed in global trade negotiations in order to signal that the world economy will remain open.	在全球贸易谈判中需要做出切实进展来表明世界经济将会保持开放。


While these recovery measures are put in place, the world must also build the institutions for the twenty-first-century economy.	在落实这些复苏措施的时候，世界还必须为二十一世纪的经济建立各种机构。


The International Labor Organization’s Decent Work Agenda of employment and enterprise, social protection, sound labor relations, and fundamental rights at work creates a solid platform for fair globalization.	国际劳工组织有关就业、企业、社会保险、良好的劳资关系以及工作基本权利的体面工作议程为公平全球化提供了坚实的基础。


Any crisis is also an opportunity.	危机带来机遇。


This crisis has demonstrated that the destinies of countries around the world are linked.	这一危机表明全球各国的命运是联系在一起的。


Policy coordination and a global strategy that instills confidence and creates hope will bring a quicker and stronger recovery to us all.	政策协调和建立信心和希望的全球战略将会给我们所有人带来更快和更强劲的复苏。


One Forest, Two Tigers	一山二虎


When Japan’s government recently decided to ignore Chinese protests and allow Taiwan’s former president, Lee Teng-hui, to visit Japan, China lashed out at its Asian neighbor, even threatening retaliation. But this latest dispute is characteristic of a remarkable flurry of anti-Japanese activity in China since 2003.	当日本政府无视中国政府的抗议，作出允许台湾前总统李登辉访日之决定时，中国对它的亚洲同邻“不顾中方再三严正交涉和坚决反对，执意做出错误决定”允许李登辉访问表示强烈谴责，甚至威胁进行报复。


That August, construction workers in Qiqihar mistakenly ruptured mustard gas canisters left from the wartime Japanese occupation, injuring dozens and killing at least one.	这场最近的争执可谓是自2003年以来颇受关注的中国反日活动的典型。 2003年8月，齐齐哈尔建筑工人在施工时不慎挖破侵华日军遗留的化学毒气罐，造成数十人受伤、至少一人死亡的悲剧。


The reaction by China’s public to the gory photos of the injured was furious.	面对血淋淋的受伤者照片，中国人群情激愤。


One million signatures were rapidly gathered on an Internet petition demanding that the Japanese government thoroughly resolve the chemical weapons issue, while Internet chat rooms filled with anti-Japanese invective.	一百多万个签名迅速汇至一个互联网上的申诉书，要求日本政府彻底解决遗留化学武器问题，互联网聊天室里这种对日本大张挞伐的言论可谓司空见惯。


Two weeks later, 400 Japanese businessmen hired as many as 500 local Chinese prostitutes for a weekend sex party in a Zhu Hai hotel.	两周以后，400名日本商人在中国珠海一家宾馆召了500多名中国当地妓女举行周末性派对。


Racy reports in China’s press sparked another round of righteous fury, drawing on the trope of China as a raped woman, an image long suppressed under Mao.	中国媒体在其渲染式的报道中，借用毛泽东统治时曾长期禁止使用的修辞，将中国比喻成一名遭蹂躏的妇女，从而激起新一轮义愤。


Occurring on the 72nd anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident that led to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, 90% of Chinese respondents to an Internet poll said they believed that the Japanese businessmen intended to humiliate China.	1931年的“满洲里事件”最终导致日本占领东北三省，日本商人召妓正发生在该事件72周年纪念日。 在一个互联网民意测验中90%的投票者表示他们坚信日本商人是故意要籍此羞辱中国。


The following month, at a party thrown by Northwestern University in Xian, three Japanese students and one of their Japanese teachers performed a skit, during which they pranced around the stage with red bras over their t-shirts.	就在一个月后，在西安西北大学的一个派对上，三名日本学生和一名日本老师表演了一个幽默短剧，他们将红色的女式文胸穿在T恤衫外面，绕着舞台又蹦又跳。


In Japan, such skits are apparently regarded as humorous; in China, the skit was seen as lewd and insulting.	在日本，这样的短剧被认为是幽默搞笑的。 但在中国，它却被看作猥亵淫秽且带有侮辱意味。


The Japanese students received death threats.	三名日本学生因此受到死亡威胁。


Thousands of Chinese demonstrated on campus and through the city, shouting “Boycott Japanese goods!” and “Japanese dogs, get out!”	成千上万名中国人在校园和全城进行游行，高喊着“抵抗日货！ 日本狗，滚出去！


A Japanese flag was burned outside the foreign students’ dorm.	”的口号，并在留学生宿舍门口焚烧日本国旗。


Even though the Japanese students apologized, they were expelled.	尽管日本学生为此作出道歉，他们还是被开除学籍驱逐出境。


Then, last August, during the Asian Cup soccer tournament, Chinese fans in Chongqing, Jinan, and Beijing hurled insults at the Japanese team – and bottles at their team bus.	接着，去年八月，在中国亚洲杯足球比赛中，来自中国重庆、济南和北京的球迷对日本队大加谩骂，并向日本球队队车投掷水瓶。


During the Cup final between China and Japan in Beijing, which Japan won, Chinese fans reportedly chanted “Kill!	在北京举行的亚洲杯中国与日本的决赛中，日本以3比1战胜中国队，据报道称中国球迷齐呼“杀！


Kill!	杀！


Kill!” and “May a big sword decapitate the Japanese!”	杀！ ”以及“斩首日本人”的口号。


Sino-Japanese amity was hardly enhanced in mid-November, when a Chinese nuclear sub encroached into Japanese waters.	十一月中旬，中国核潜艇侵入日本海域，中日友好关系停滞不前。


Nor did it help when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao snubbed Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s invitation to visit his country.	中国总理温家宝婉拒日本首相小泉纯一郎的访日邀请也为中日关系雪上加霜。


Why has this popular nationalism emerged?	为何一度盛行的民族主义又死灰复燃？


And why is it directed at Japan?	又为何矛头直指日本？


The short answer is that after a quarter-century of economic reform, Chinese today are much freer to express themselves.	简而言之，经过二十五年的经济改革，今天的中国人能够更自由地表达自我。


Under Mao, when the Chinese Communist Party sought accommodation, diplomatic recognition, and overseas development aid from Japan, Chinese were not allowed to confront their past victimization at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism.	在毛泽东统治时代，当时的中国共产党正处于向东京寻求调节、外交承认和海外发展援助之时，中国人在西方和日本帝国主义挟制下，无法正视过去所遭受的迫害。


Today, however, Chinese are facing past atrocities from the “Century of Humiliation” that ended with the Communist takeover in 1948, and a long suppressed anger has resurfaced.	然而今天，中国人终于能够直面这段长达一个世纪（19世纪中期至20世纪中期）的暴行所带来的羞辱，一股被压抑了太久的怒火又重抬头。


To most Chinese, the Japanese are paradigmatic “devils,” not only because of the brutality of Japanese imperialism and the sheer number of Chinese killed by Japanese troops.	对多数中国人而言，日本人是魔鬼的象征，不仅因为日本侵略中国的残忍暴行以及被日本军队杀害的中国人人数之多，还有更早渊源的民族仇恨。


Anti-Japanese anger has an ethical justification rooted in the perceived injustice of “little brother” Japan’s impertinent behavior towards “big brother” China, from China’s loss in the Sino-Japanese Jiawu War and the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 to the insulting “21 Demands” of 1915 and on to WWII atrocities like the Rape of Nanking.	自中国在甲午战争中惨败并签订令中国蒙羞的1985年《马关条约》后，认为日本小弟是对中国老大哥实施了非正义暴行的想法就油然而生，伴随着1915年奇耻大辱的“二十一条”和日本在二战中的蹂躏暴行，诸如南京大屠杀，为反日愤情提供了一个正当的民族理由。


The complexity and depth of these anti-Japanese sentiments helps sustain them and sets them apart from other, more fleeting and contradictory anti-foreign sentiments, such as those Chinese sometimes harbor towards Americans.	这种反日情绪的复杂性和根深蒂固性使得它延续至今，与中国人对其他一些国家更为短暂矛盾的敌对情绪有所不同，比如有时中国人还庇护美国人。


The emergence of a deep-rooted and popular anti-Japanese enmity in China does not bode well.	中国普遍出现的这种根深蒂固的反日情绪并不是好的预兆。


As the Party uses nationalist sentiment to keep China unified, these sentiments have become fiercer, and the political leadership is increasingly held hostage to nationalist opinion in formulating China’s foreign policy towards Japan.	由于中国共产党允许使用这种民族主义情绪以保持中国统一，使得这种情绪更为激烈，而中国政治领导层在本国的日本政策制定中，也越来越多地带上敌对的民族主义色彩。


As a result, Japanese increasingly fear China’s rise and possible future retribution for their country’s wartime aggressions.	结果，日本对中国的崛起就越发恐惧，害怕将来中国有可能将对战争时代日本的入侵进行报复。


Indeed, Japanese public-opinion surveys also reveal a marked decline in favorable views of China.	事实上，一项日本民意调查显示，持亲华观点的日本人比例呈现明显下降趋势。


Meanwhile, an emergent Japanese nationalism argues that Japan should revise its pacifist constitution and develop its military capability – possibly including nuclear weapons to balance threats like that from North Korea.	与此同时，日本国内出现的民族主义思潮主张，日本应该重新制定它的和平宪法，发展有可能包括核武器的武装力量，以抗衡来自北朝鲜的威胁。


The possibility of a Sino-Japanese arms race is becoming increasingly real.	中日的军备竞赛越来越有可能成为现实。