Perhaps most strikingly, while some governments have closed their embassies in Damascus (citing safety considerations), there has been no systematic severing of diplomatic relations with Syria.	也许最引人注目的是，虽然某些政府以安全为由关闭了驻大马士革使馆，但一直未能有计划有步骤地与叙利亚断绝外交关系。


Indeed, there has been no stoppage of flights to and from the country, or any other measures that could tilt the population of Damascus and Aleppo against the regime and bring the crisis to an end.	事实上，往返叙利亚的航班都没有中断，也没有其他任何措施争取让大马士革和阿勒颇的民众反对阿萨德政府和结束这��危机。


This ambivalence can largely be explained by Western and Arab concern with the weakness and opacity of the Syrian opposition’s political leadership.	这种举棋不定的状况在很大程度上可以从西方和阿拉伯国家担心叙利亚反对派政治领导层的软弱无能和暗箱操作中得到解释。


There is a dramatic discrepancy between the courage and tenacity of the demonstrators and fighters in Homs, Idlib, and Deraa, and the Syrian National Front, whose people and factions have failed to formulate a coherent political program, build an identity, and obtain name and face recognition.	霍姆斯、伊德利卜和德拉等地战士和示威群众的勇猛和顽强与叙利亚国民阵线的态度有着很大的差别，国民阵线的民众和派别无法成功制定连贯的政治计划，在确立自己身份的同时逐渐为人所知。


Western policymakers and those in the Gulf ask themselves what Syria would look like the day after Assad is toppled.	西方和海湾国家的决策者无法确定阿萨德倒台后叙利亚将会是什么样子。


This was starkly illustrated in the second week of March, when US defense officials vented their frustration with the Syrian opposition in several press briefings.	这在三月第二周所发生的状况中已经得到了证实，当时美国国防官员在几次新闻发布会上发泄了对叙利亚反对派的不满情绪。


The regime has been effective in exploiting that uncertainty by spreading the fear of an Egyptian scenario, in which the weakness of secular activists leads to a takeover by the Muslim Brothers and jihadis.	叙利亚政权一直积极利用上述不确定情绪传播对埃及局势的恐惧，即世俗活动人士的缺乏导致国家被穆斯林兄弟会和圣战组织所占据。


In fact, it is difficult to separate cause from effect.	事实上很难区分这种因果关系。


Recognizing the opposition as the legitimate government of Syria, as was done in Libya, would give Assad’s foes a boost, but, so far, they lack the gravitas that such a bold measure would require.	像在利比亚那样承认反对派为叙利亚的合法政府会激励阿萨德的敌人，但到目前为止他们还没有表现出这种大胆举措所需要的庄重态势。


The opposition must build itself as a credible and attractive alternative to the Assad regime, and the regime’s international and regional critics must assist in that process.	反对派必须努力成为阿萨德政权可靠而有吸引力的替代者，而叙政权的国际和地区批评家必须协助实现这一目的。


Assad’s regime is doomed.	阿萨德的政权注定要失败。


It has no legitimacy, and it is bound to fall.	阿萨德政权不具有合法性，垮台是早晚的事。


But that could take a long time – and come at an alarming cost.	但这个过程可能需要很长时间——而且要付出惊人的代价。


The alternative is an effective opposition that enjoys unambiguous support by the key regional and international actors.	此外我们可以逐步建设有效的反对势力，并让反对势力享有重要地区和国际力量毫不犹豫的支持。


For Turkey, For Europe	欧盟与土耳其双赢


Turkey is now, finally, negotiating with the European Commission the terms of its possible membership in the European Union.	土耳其现在终于同欧盟委员会谈判其可能加入欧盟的条件了。


But whether “possible” becomes “eventual” remains very much an open question.	但是，“可能”是否成为“最终”仍然悬而未决。


Indeed, completing the negotiations is likely to prove as difficult as the decision to start them.	实际上，完成入盟谈判有可能与开启谈判的决定一样困难。


Recall that Turkey made its first application to join in 1959, and that since 1963, the European Economic Community, the forerunner to today’s EU, responded with a delaying tactic: a request for a customs agreement.	还记得土耳其最初于1959年提出申请，而且从1963年以来，今日欧盟的前身欧洲经济共同体使用拖延战术予以应付，那就是要求达成海关协议。


At the same time, having never had to take “no” for an answer – and after receiving a series of nods and winks that hinted that membership might one day come – Turkey’s expectation of eventual EU integration became increasingly palpable.	与此同时，土耳其从未把欧盟的答复视为拒绝，而且在收到一系列将来总有一天会入盟的暗示之后，其最终融入欧盟的期望变得愈发明显。


But ordinary Europeans have begun looking at maps, and the geography that they see cannot be denied: 95% of Turkey’s territory and 80% of its population is in Asia.	但是，普通欧洲人开始观查看地图，而他们所看到的地理情况无法否认：土耳其95％的领土和80％的人口分布在亚洲。


As a result, the fierce and lively debate – in Turkey and much more emphatically in the EU – about whether Turkey really belongs to Europe has continued, despite the start of negotiations.	因此，尽管谈判已经开始，但是，有关土耳其是否真正属于欧洲的强烈而生动的辩论在土耳其和欧盟继续展开，欧盟内部的辩论更为激烈。


Of course, the question of Turkey’s European identity cannot be answered with geography lessons.	当然，土耳其的欧洲特征问题不能用地理课程来解答。


At least half of the body of Greek theater and philosophy was produced in Asia Minor.	希腊戏剧和哲学中的至少一半产生于小亚细亚。


The first Christian evangelization trips of Saint Peter and Saint Paul were to Turkey.	圣彼得和圣保罗的首次基督教福音之旅是前往土耳其。


Later, Ottoman Turkey was for centuries considered a part of the “concert of Europe,” proving indispensable in defining and securing the strategic balance among the European continent’s Great Powers.	后来，奥托曼土耳其数百年来被视为“欧洲音乐会”的一部分，并且在确定和确保欧洲大陆列强战略平衡中不可或缺。


Yet this historical evidence is not enough to unite European sentiment in favor of Turkey’s EU membership.	但是，这一历史证据并不足以将欧洲的情感统一到赞成土耳其的欧盟成员资格上来。


On the contrary, “the Turkish Question” will be resolved on the basis of the current political preoccupations and concerns for the future.	相反，“土耳其问题”将会在当前政治优先考量以及对未来的担忧的基础上得到解决。


Fortunately, that choice was not settled prematurely and peremptorily: the process that will lead to a final decision was merely allowed to start with the opening of negotiations.	所幸的是，这一选择并未过早地作出，而且不容更改，只不过是开启谈判，从而开始形成最终决定的进程。


Membership talks can’t help but be long and arduous, if only because adopting the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law) requires that Turkey integrate around 10,000 pages of texts into its legislation.	如果仅仅是因为采纳欧盟既成法律而要求土耳其将大约10,000页的法律文本吸纳到其国内立法之中，入盟谈判无可避免地艰苦漫长。


However, all this now seems to have a serious chance of succeeding.	但是，所有这些都看似确有成功的机会。


And yet Turkey scares countless Europeans.	然而，土耳其却另无数欧洲人害怕。


With 67 million people today, and a population that will reach 80 million in 20 years and 100 million in 2050, Turkey is bound to become the most populous of all European nations.	土耳其现有人口6,700万，20年内达到8,000万，2050年则为1亿。 土耳其必定成为所有欧洲国家中人口最多的国家。


It is also a very poor Muslim country.	它而且还是一个贫穷的穆斯林国家。


To be sure, a few countries in Europe, mainly Germany and Austria, have welcomed strong inflows of Turkish immigration.	的确，一些欧洲国家，主要是德国和奥地利，欢迎土耳其移民的大量涌入。


But the immigrants have been mostly poor peasants from Anatolia, whose integration has proven to be difficult.	但是，移民中的大多数是安纳托利亚的贫穷农民。 他们很难融入欧洲社会。


By contrast, Turkey’s large, secular intellectual community, whose cultural background is European, and from which the Turkish state recruits most of its executives, has remained in Istanbul and Ankara.	相反，土耳其庞大的、世俗化的知识阶层的文化背景是欧洲化的，土耳其国家从中招募其大部分行政管理人员。 这些人则留在了伊斯坦布尔和安卡拉。


Europe, then, is frightened by the prospect of more immigration by Turks who find it almost impossible to assimilate.	更多的土耳其移民发觉几乎无法归化，欧洲因此而感到恐惧。


For the moment, such immigration has almost stopped, owing to rapid economic growth – indeed, the fastest in Europe – in recent years, which is absorbing the country’s available labor and has thus stemmed the flow of emigrants.	目前，由于近年来土耳其经济增长迅猛（实际上在欧洲首屈一指），吸收了该国拥有的劳力并且阻止了移民外流，这样的移民几乎已经停止。


Yet the fear remains that membership in the Union will unleash a new human tide.	但是，由于土耳其入盟将会引发新一轮人潮的担心依然存在。


Economic fears are not the only concern for EU citizens.	对于欧洲人而言，担忧并非仅仅是经济上的。


Turkey was the theater of exceptional violence in the twentieth century: its participation in WWI fueled hatred and gigantic massacres, with the genocide of the Armenians the last vicious spasm of the Ottoman Empire’s brutal demise.	土耳其在二十世纪中发生了浩大的暴力。 它参加第一次世界大战加剧了仇恨和骇人听闻的屠杀，在奥托曼帝国血腥瓦解的最后的邪恶痉挛中，它对亚美尼亚人实行了种族屠杀。


Moreover, while Kemal Ataturk restored Turkish national pride by creating the secular Turkish republic, his legacy is mixed, for it includes both Turkey’s strong attraction to the West and a militarization of public life.	而且，尽管凯末尔通过建立世俗的土耳其共和国而恢复了土耳其的民族自豪，但是，他所留下的遗产却是毁誉参半，因为这一遗产既包括土耳其对西方强烈的吸引力，也包括将公共生活军事化。


The latter explains much of the repressive attitude towards free speech and independent opinion that has characterized much of Turkish public life – a straitjacket that has left little room for real negotiations with Turkey’s restless Kurds or for resolving the division of Cyprus.	后者可以大部分解释为何对言论自由和独立意见的压制态度。 这一态度是土耳其公共生活中的一大特征，也束缚了同土耳其躁动不安的库尔德人或者解决塞浦路斯分裂问题的真正的谈判的空间。


But Turkey’s EU aspirations mean that it is now being forced to demilitarize its democracy and to find negotiated and peaceful agreements with all its neighbors and future partners – Armenians, Kurds, and Cypriots.	但是土耳其的入盟企望意味着它正在被迫将其民主非军事化，并且同其所有邻国和未来的伙伴寻求谈判协商的和平协议。 他们包括亚美尼亚人、库尔德人以及塞浦路斯人。


Thus, if Europe manages to overcome its fears and hesitations and open itself to a powerful Muslim state, it will consolidate peace in one of the world’s most dangerous regions.	这样，如果欧洲得以克服其恐惧和迟疑，向一个强大的穆斯林国家开放，那么，欧洲将在世界上最为危险的地区之一巩固和平。


Indeed, by integrating Turkey, Europe would show that it is not a Christian club, that the supposed “clash of civilizations” need not be fatal, and that the European project, born out of a desire for reconciliation and the need to promote development, can spread its benefits far beyond the Western half of Europe.	确实，通过融合土耳其，欧洲将会向世人展示，它并非是一个基督教俱乐部，所谓的“文明的冲突”并非必然是致命的，而且，来源于企求和解以及促进发展需要的欧洲联合事业可以将其益处远远撒播到欧洲西部以外的地方。


In opening itself to Turkey, the EU would finally begin to play its proper role in confronting today’s most daunting political challenges.	通过向土耳其开放自身，欧盟将最终开始在应付当今最为艰巨的政治挑战中扮演适当的角色。


For Whom America’s Bell Tolls	美国的警钟为谁而鸣


These days the Chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, Ben Bernanke, likes to talk about a “global savings glut” that has produced astonishingly low real interest rates around the world.	近一段时间，布什总统经济顾问委员会主席Ben Bernanke总是把“全球储蓄过剩”挂在嘴边，说这一现象造成了全球范围出奇之低的实际利率。


But that is the wrong way to look at it.	但这种看法并不正确。


America certainly does not have a savings glut.	美国当然不存在储蓄过剩。


Its savings rate has been distressingly low for decades.	它的储蓄率数十年来都低得令人沮丧。


Then the Bush administration’s reckless fiscal policy pushed it lower.	而布什政府不计后果的财政政策又将其压得更低。


Falling interest rates in recent years pushed up real estate prices and allowed America’s upper middle class to treat their houses as enormous ATM’s, lowering savings still more.	近几年不断下滑的利率推高了不动产价格，从而让美国的中上阶层能够将自己的房产当作巨型的“自动提款机”，并使储蓄率进一步降低。


America has a savings deficiency, not a glut.	美国存在着储蓄不足的情况，而不是储蓄过剩。


And the rest of the world?	那么世界其他地方的情况又如何呢？


A global savings glut would suggest that rebalancing the world economy requires policies to boost America’s savings rate and to increase non-US households’ consumption.	一种全球性的储蓄过剩意味着要重新平衡世界经济就必须制定政策提高美国的储蓄率并增加非美国家庭的消费。


But what the world economy is facing is not a savings glut, but an investment deficiency.	但世界经济所面临的并不是储蓄过剩，而是投资不足。


Divide the world into three zones: the United States, China, and all the rest.	权且把世界分为三个区域：美国、中国和其他地区。


Since the mid-1990’s, the net current-account surplus of “all the rest” has risen by an amount that one Federal Reserve Bank economist has put at $450 billion a year, not because savings rates have increased, but because investment rates have fallen.	自1990年代中期以来，“其他地区”经常账目下的净存款余额有了巨额攀升。 按联邦储备银行的一位经济学家估算，为每年4500亿美金。


Declining investment rates in Japan, the newly-industrializing Asian economies, and Latin America, in that order of importance, have fueled the flood of savings into US government bonds, US mortgage-backed securities, and US equity-backed loans – the capital-account equivalent of America’s enormous trade deficit.	这并不是因为储蓄率的提高，而是因为投资率的降低。 以重要性顺序而言，日本、亚洲新兴工业国家和拉丁美洲不断降低的投资率，极大地驱动了以美国政府债券、以美国抵押为支撑的证券和以美国股票为支撑的贷款等形式的储蓄—这一庞大的资本账户与美国巨大的贸易逆差相当。


The investment deficiency in Asia relative to rates of a decade ago amounts to an annual shortfall of $400 billion a year, with the decline in investment in Japan – a consequence of more than a decade of economic stagnation – accounting for more than half of the total.	在亚洲，与十年前的投资率相比较的投资缺口，每年为4000亿美金，而日本的投资下降—作为十多年以来经济滞胀的结果—则占其中的一半强。


Moreover, investment rates in the newly industrialized economies of Asia have never recovered to their pre-1997-8 crisis levels, and investment rates in the rest of Asia outside China have fallen off as well.	另外，亚洲新兴工业国家的投资率也从来没有恢复到1997-1998年金融危机以前的水平。 而除中国以外的其他亚洲地区的投资率也下降了。


This would seem to call for a very different set of policies to rebalance the world economy.	这一现象似乎在呼吁出台一套全然不同的政策来重新平衡世界经济。


Yes, the US needs tax increases to move the federal budget into surplus and policies to boost private savings.	是的，美国需要增加税收来扭转其财政赤字状况并推动私人储蓄。


But the world also needs policies to boost investment in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.	但世界也需要推动投资亚洲、拉美、中东和非洲的政策。


And here we face a difficulty.	而这就是我们面临的困难。


People like me who have been cheerleaders for international integration in trade and finance, as well as for reductions in tariffs and other barriers, have cited three benefits:	和我一样为贸易和金融的国际一体化以及削减关税和其他壁垒摇旗呐喊的人提出了（这样做的）三大好处：


· Maximizing economic – and also social and cultural – contact between rich and poor nations is the best way we can think of to aid the flow of knowledge about technology and organization, which is the last best hope for rapid world development.	u 使富国和穷国之间的经济—以及社会和文化—联系最大化是我们可以想到的，促使有关技术和组织的知识流动的最佳方式。


· Lower trade barriers will make locating production in the poor low-wage parts of the world irresistible to those who have access to finance.	u 更低的贸易壁垒会使将生产转移到世界低工资贫穷地区的做法对拥有金融资源的人产生不可抗拒的诱惑力。


· Freer capital flows will give poor countries precisely this access, as the greed of investors in rich country leads them to venture into poor regions where capital is scarce.	u 由于富国投资者的贪婪引导资本进入资本稀缺的贫穷地区，更自由的资本流动会让穷国也享有这样的资源。


The first reason still holds true.	第一条理由仍然是成立的。


Maximizing economic, social, and cultural contact between rich and poor remains both the best way to aid the flow of knowledge and the last best hope for rapid world development.	使富国和穷国之间的经济、社会和文化联系最大化不仅是促进知识流动的最佳方式，也是促使全世界快速发展的最后希望。


But the second and third reasons look shaky.	但第二和第三个理由却有些站不住脚。


Those with access to finance appear to be capable of resisting the urge to locate production in poor low-wage parts of the world (China aside).	那些拥有金融资源的人似乎能够抵制将��产转移到贫穷的世界低收入地区（中国除外）的冲动。


Rather than leading rich-country savers to invest their money in poor countries out of greed, liberalization of capital flows has led poor-country savers to park their money in rich countries out of fear – fear of political instability, macreconomic disturbances, and deficient institutions (especially those that protect the rights of bondholders and minority shareholders).	资本流动的自由化非但没有令富国的储蓄人出于贪婪将金钱投资到穷国，反而使穷国的储蓄人出于担心—担心政治不稳定、宏观经济干扰和制度不完善（特别是那些保护债券持有人和小股东权益的制度）—而将金钱存到了富国。


Something may well happen in the next several years to radically boost America’s savings rate by making US households feel suddenly poor: tax increases, a real estate crash, rapidly-rising import prices caused by a plummeting dollar, a deep recession, or more than one of the above.	在未来几年很有可能发生一些情况，使美国家庭突然感到窘迫，进而使美国的储蓄率急剧攀升：税收提高、房地产市场崩溃、美元贬值造成的进口商品价格飙升、严重的经济衰退或几种上述情况同时发生。


It would be nice to believe that when the tide of dollar-denominated securities ebbs, the flows of finance currently directed at America will smoothly shift course and boost investment in Asia.	我们可以憧憬在以美元计价的证券热潮消退以后，目前以美国为目的地的金融流就会平缓地改道，从而推动亚洲的投资。


But don’t count on it, especially considering the share of marginal investment in Asia that is aimed, one way or another, at exporting to the American market.	但也别指望太多，特别是考虑到在亚洲的投资的边际部分，或多或少是以向美国市场出口为目的的。


Those outside America, especially in Asia, should regard the unstable state of the US macro-economy with grave concern.	美国之外，特别是亚洲的人们应该对美国不稳定的宏观经济状况保持严重关注。


As the seventeenth-century poet John Donne put it, “Ask not for whom the bell tolls – it tolls for thee.”	正如17世纪的诗人约翰•多恩所说：“不要问钟声为谁而鸣—它为你而鸣。 ”


For Whom Syria Tolls	叙利亚警钟为谁而鸣？


PARIS – With every passing week, the Syrian conflict increasingly resembles the Spanish Civil War.	发自巴黎——随着时间一周周过去，叙利亚冲突越来越变得像西班牙内战。


The images of warplanes bombing civilians and destroying cities have turned Aleppo into a latter-day version of Guernica, immortalized in Picasso’s masterpiece.	战机轰炸平民摧毁城市的景象已经把阿勒颇变成了现代版的格尔尼卡——那座在毕加索大作中的名垂千古的西班牙城市。


But the real similarities between the two conflicts are to be found in the behavior of the international community’s main actors, which have again taken opposite sides.	但这两个冲突真正的相似之处在于国际社会主要成员的行为：它们再度分裂成了两大阵营。


On one side stand Russia and Iran, cynically determined to buttress President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	一边是俄罗斯和伊朗为了一己私利坚决支持总统巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar al-Assad）的政权。


On the other side stand the established democracies, hesitant and ambivalent in their support of the rebels.	另一边则是犹豫而矛盾地支持反对派的民主国家。


In 1930’s Spain, of course, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy fully supported General Francisco Franco’s rebellion, while the democracies reluctantly offered scant help to the Spanish Republic.	在1930年西班牙内战中，纳粹德国和意大利法西斯全力支持弗朗西斯科·弗朗哥（Francisco Franco）将军的叛乱，而民主国家则很不情愿给了西班牙共和国一点勉强的帮助。


There are even deeper similarities.	两者之间还有更深层次的相似之处。


Many argued at the time that support for republican Spain meant helping the far more dangerous anarchists and Communists at a time when the Soviet threat in Europe was growing.	许多人称在当年苏联对欧洲威胁日益严重的时候支持西班牙共和国意味着帮助更加危险的无政府主义者和社会主义者。


In that sense, yesterday’s Reds have become today’s “fundamentalist Muslims.”	从这个意义上看，过去的赤化分子已经化身成为了今天的“原教旨主义穆斯林”。


Indeed, for many nowadays, helping the Syrian rebels is too risky, and might even jeopardize the Middle East’s Christian minorities.	的确，在当今许多人眼中帮助叙利亚反对派的风险太大了，甚至可能令中东地区的基督教少数派遭殃。


While the Syrian regime is odious, they argue, the choice is between a hypothetical hope of democracy in the Muslim world and the real risk of endangering Christians’ lives.	他们认为尽管叙利亚政权令人厌恶，但如今却要在穆斯林世界实现民主的假想前景与危及基督徒生命的真实风险之间作出选择。


Unfortunately, therefore, one must choose the status quo.	于是很不幸地必须选择维持现状。


Of course, Western vacillation reflects deeper strategic and diplomatic factors as well.	当然，西方世界的踌躇同时也反映了更深的战略和外交因素。


Indeed, by shooting down a Turkish warplane that wandered into Syrian airspace, Assad’s regime intended to deliver a clear message to the international community: “Stay out of Syria’s domestic affairs.”	的确，通过击落一架徘徊在叙利亚领空的土耳其战机，阿萨德政权想要给国际社会传达一个明确信息——“别来干涉叙利亚的内政。 ”


Syria is not Libya, and the political context has changed significantly, with America’s presidential election approaching and a deepening economic crisis in Europe.	叙利亚不是利比亚，而且现在的政治环境也有了显著的变化——美国总统大选近在眼前，欧洲又面临着日益恶化的经济危机。


Rightly or wrongly, Russia and China believe that the time has come to take their revenge over an arrogant West that deceived them about the true purpose of “humanitarian intervention” in Libya.	且不论是对是错，俄罗斯和中国认为报复傲慢自大的西方世界的时机到了，因为它们认为自己在对利比亚进行“人道主义干涉”的真正意图上遭到了欺骗——。


This time, they hold the better cards.	这次它们手里握着更好的牌。


At a time when US President Barack Obama is basing his campaign partly on his withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and his plan to do the same in Afghanistan, he cannot take the risk of intervening in Syria.	在美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）将其大选的一部分胜算押在从伊拉克撤军的举措以及在阿富汗的类似计划上的时候，他不会冒险干涉叙利亚。


Meanwhile, the European Union is fighting for its survival, and cannot devote its energies to an uncertain battle.	与此同时，欧盟正为自身的生存而战，无法为一场不确定的战争分神。


For the West, the timing of the Syrian rebels’ uprising could not have been worse.	对西方世界来说，叙利亚反对派起义的时机再糟糕不过了。


But, despite deep divisions among the rebels, the cost of Western indifference is probably higher than the risk of intervention.	然而尽管反对派之间分歧很深，西方世界隔岸观火的代价恐怕要比出手干涉的代价要大。


The international community can no longer hide behind the pretense of ignorance.	国际社会再也不能以不知情为借口逃避事实。


It lost its innocence decades ago.	因为早在几十年前它就已经失落那副不谙世事的面孔了。


When faced with the slaughter of civilians, it can no longer pretend that it does not know.	面对平民被屠杀的事实，它再也不能假装什么也不知道了。


But, beyond ethics, there are geopolitical considerations.	然而除道德之外，还要考虑到地缘政治。


With the Arab world in the midst of upheaval, what message does the West want to send?	面对陷入动乱的阿拉伯世界，西方想要传达什么信息呢？


And, with global power in flux, what message is the West sending to the authoritarian regimes that are backing Assad?	而随着全球势力不断变动，而西方又要给支持着阿萨德的专制政权发出什么样的信息？


These regimes can only read the West’s dithering as a green light for their cynical agendas.	这些政权只会把西方的踌躇解读为对其自私议程的默许。


This is particularly problematic in the case of Iran.	这个问题在伊朗的情况中尤其突出。


The less determination the West demonstrates in Syria, the more the Iranians become convinced that they can play with the international community’s nerves and patience indefinitely.	西方在叙利亚问题上表现得越缺乏果断，伊朗人就越确信他们可以无限期地挑逗国际社会的神经和耐性。


As Russia and Iran continue to send money and weapons, if not military advisers, to Syria, it is impossible to persist with hypocritical language that can be interpreted only as a formula for inaction.	随着俄罗斯和伊朗不断地给叙利亚运送资金和武器（如果没有提供军事顾问的话），西方国家已经无法坚持那套虚伪的说辞——这些话只能被解释成为不作为开脱的借口。


Threatening the Syrian regime with “terrible consequences” if it were to use chemical weapons means only one thing: “Bomb your civilians at will, but use only conventional munitions.”	用“可怕的后果”来警告叙利亚政权不要使用化学武器其实只意味着一点:“随便轰炸你自己的平民，不过只可以用传统的武器。 ”


The time has come to supply the rebels with what they desperately need: anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles.	是时候给反对派提供他们急需的反坦克和地空导弹了。


Of course, such a choice carries risks.	当然，选择这么做有一定的风险。


Do we know the people we would be helping?	我们了解我们将要帮助的人吗？


After all, such weapons could be turned against the West one day, as they have been in Afghanistan.	毕竟这些武器或许有一天会被用来对付西方，就像在阿富汗发生过的一样。


And, by involving ourselves militarily in the conflict, even if only by supplying the rebels, we might give a propaganda boost to terrorist groups that are already willing to strike in the West.	此外，如果我们在军事上介入到这场冲突，尽管可能只是给反抗者提供物资，可能就会给那些早就想袭击西方的恐怖组织宣传造势。


Nevertheless, the risks of passivity, indecision, and incoherence are even greater.	然而消极被动，优柔寡断和前后立场不一致所导致的风险更大。


The more the West waits, the more radicalized the rebels will become, weakening the standing and influence of moderate forces.	西方观望得越久，反对派就会变得更激进，这将削弱温和派的立场和影响力。


The logic of intervention goes through cycles.	干预的逻辑是周期性循环的。


In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent refugee crisis and war in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa in the 1990’s, a combination of guilt, economic prosperity, and America’s unique international status led to interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and, unfortunately, Iraq. Today, we are in a completely different cycle, dominated by the ghosts of Iraq, the global economic crisis, and the (relative) decline of the West.	在对卢旺达的种族大屠杀和随之而来的难民危机以及1990年的中非大湖区战争的反思之下，一个愧疚、经济繁荣和美国独特国际地位的结合体引发了对科索沃，阿富汗和伊拉克的干涉，而不幸的是，如今我们正处于一个完全不同的循环周期中，其中占主导地位的是伊拉克事件的阴影，全球经济危机和西方世界地位的（相对）衰落。


When it comes to intervention nowadays, respect for legality has overcome the concern for legitimacy that prevailed a decade ago.	如今每当涉及干预时，对法律合法性的尊重已经超过了十年前通行的对政权合法性的考虑。


We have gone from one extreme to the other, whereas a middle road would be wiser.	我们从一个极端走到了另一个极端，而中间道路可能会是更明智的选择。


But, above all, let us not forget the lessons of the Spanish Civil War.	但最重要的是我们不要忘了西班牙内战的教训。


It is always dangerous to give the impression of being the first to blink when facing authoritarian regimes.	面对独裁政权时，给对方留下带头妥协者的印象通常都是危险的。


Fossil Fuel Follies	化石燃料讽刺剧


BERLIN – If the world is to avoid climate catastrophe, it will have to forego burning almost 90% of proven coal reserves, plus one-third of oil and half of natural-gas reserves.	柏林——如果世界要避免气候灾难，需要被迫放弃燃烧近90%的煤炭探明储量，再加上三分之一的石油和一半的天然气。


But instead of implementing policies aimed at realizing that objective, governments continue not only to subsidize the fossil-fuel industry, but also to use scarce public resources to find new reserves.	但各国不但没有落实旨在实现上述目标的政策，反而继续在补贴化石燃料工业的同时，利用稀缺的公共资源探寻新的储量。


That has to change – and fast.	这种情况必须改变——而且改变必须迅速。


In an effort to help spur that change, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Friends of the Earth International have aggregated key data about the coal industry in the just-released Coal Atlas.	为了推进上述变化，海因里希·伯尔基金会和地球之友国际在刚刚发行的煤炭图册中汇总了有关煤炭行业的关键数据。


The figures are striking.	这些数字令人触目惊心。


According to the International Monetary Fund, post-tax subsidies for coal (including environmental damage) reached 3.9 % of global GDP this year.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF）统计，税后煤炭补贴（包括环境破坏）今年达到全球GDP的3.


G-20 governments are estimated to spend $88 billion per year on exploration subsidies for new fossil fuels.	9%。 G-20国家政府估计每年耗费880亿美元补贴勘探新增化石燃料。


And a recent report by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Oil Change International, and the World Wide Fund for Nature revealed that from 2007 to 2014, governments channeled more than $73 billion – or over $9 billion per year – of public money toward coal projects.	自然资源保护委员会、换油国际和世界自然基金会最新报告显示，2007年到2014年，政府引导730多亿美元——约合每年90多亿美元的公共资金投资煤炭项目。


Leading the way were Japan ($20 billion), China (around $15 billion), South Korea ($7 billion), and Germany ($6.8 billion).	其中名列前茅的有日本（200亿美元）、中国（约150亿美元）、韩国（70亿美元）和德国（68亿美元）。


This public investment augments already-substantial commercial funding for the coal sector.	上述公共投资进一步增加了本已巨大的煤炭板块商业投入。


In 2013, 92 leading banks provided at least €66 billion ($71 billion) – over four times more than in 2005.	2013年，全球排名靠前的92家银行至少提供了660亿欧元（合710亿美元）的资金——该投资额达到2005年的4倍。


All of this has gone to buttress an industry that produces a massive share of global emissions – and seems dead set on continuing to do so.	所有资金都被用来支持一个制造大部分全球排放的产业——而且这一产业似乎死心塌地要继续做下去。


Since 1988, just 35 coal producers, both private and state-owned, have contributed one-third of total CO2 emissions.	自1988年来，仅35家煤炭生产企业，包括私营及国有企业，贡献了总二氧化碳排放量的三分之一。


The damage their products are causing is no secret.	其产品造成的损害早已不是什么秘密。


And yet coal and other fossil-fuel companies have refused to adjust their business models.	但煤炭和其他化石燃料公司拒绝调整自身的商业模式。


Instead, they have actively worked to block efforts to mitigate climate change at the national and international levels, including by funding climate-change deniers and lobbying against renewable-energy targets and successful instruments like feed-in tariffs.	相反，他们积极努力阻止在国内和国际层面缓和气候变化，包括资助气候变化否认者、游说反对可再生能源目标和上网电价等有效工具。


Meanwhile, the coal industry argues that it plays an indispensable role in tackling “energy poverty” – that is, the lack of access to modern non-polluting forms of power, primarily electricity.	此外，煤炭行业认为其在解决“能源贫困”中的作用不可或缺——能源贫困是指无法获得无污染的现代能源，主要是电力。


It is true that energy poverty is a huge problem, affecting some 1.2 billion people worldwide.	的确，能源贫困问题非常严重，影响着全球约12亿人。


For farmers, who must rely on pumped water to irrigate their crops, this means lower efficiency and productivity.	对于必须依靠抽水灌溉作物的农民来说，这意味着低效低生产率。


For households, which must burn firewood, cow dung, and kerosene to cook, it means indoor air pollution that can cause respiratory disease.	对必须燃烧木柴、牛粪和煤油做饭的家庭，这意味着室内空气污染可能导致呼吸系统疾病。


For schoolchildren, poor lighting after dark means lost learning opportunities.	而对在校学生而言，天黑以后照明不好意味着失去了学习的机会。


But coal is not the solution.	但煤炭解决不了问题。


Just the health consequences of coal production and combustion are staggering.	仅煤炭生产和燃烧对健康的影响就足以令人触目惊心。


In 2013, Coal workers pneumoconiosis (“black lung disease”) resulted in more than 25,000 deaths globally.	2013年，全球25，000多人死于煤炭工人尘肺病（“黑肺病”）。


In the European Union, coal combustion is responsible for 18,200 premature deaths and 8,500 new cases of chronic bronchitis per year.	在欧盟范围内，煤炭燃烧每年造成18,200人死亡，新增慢性支气管炎8，500例。


In China, an estimated 250,000 people die prematurely because of coal combustion.	中国估计有250,000人因燃煤污染而早逝。


The physical toll carries large economic costs as well, from lost working days to pressure on health-care systems.	人身伤害带来了巨大的经济成本，从因病无法工作到对医疗保健系统造成压力。


Climate change, too, will impose enormous costs, even if strong mitigation and adaptation measures are taken.	而且即使采取强有力的缓和及改造措施，气候变化也将带来巨大的成本。


For the 48 least-developed countries, the costs of coal will soon amount to an estimated $50 billion per year.	对最不发达的48个国家而言，预计燃煤成本将很快达到每年500亿美元。


Far from receiving subsidies, the fossil-fuel industry should be paying for climate change.	化石燃料行业不但不应拿到补贴，还应该承担气候变化造成的损失。


After all, just last year, the top two fossil-fuel companies – Chevron and ExxonMobil – together pulled in more than $50 billion in profits.	毕竟，就在去年，最大的两家化石燃料公司——雪佛龙和埃克森美孚——合计赚取了超过500亿美元的利润。


If the world is to have any chance of capping the increase in global surface temperature at 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels, without being forced to employ dangerous and risky technologies like Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage or geo-engineering, its energy system must be transformed.	如果世界想有机会在不采用二氧化碳捕获及存储或地球工程等危险技术的情况下将全球表面温度控制在比前工业化时期升高2摄氏度以内，就必须改造全球能源体系。


First and foremost, world leaders must commit to phasing out fossil fuels, with the explicit goal of leaving 90% of proven coal reserves, one-third of oil reserves, and half of gas reserves in the ground.	首先，世界领导人必须承诺淘汰化石燃料，并明确承诺放弃开采地下90%的探明煤炭储量、三分之一的探明石油和半数的天然气。


They must also end public subsidies for coal as soon as possible, within the next few years, while ensuring that poor and vulnerable communities do not suffer from an increase in energy prices.	他们还必须在未来几年尽快结束煤炭公共补贴，并在同时确保贫困人口和弱势群体免受能源价格上升的打击。


Moreover, governments worldwide must hold coal and other fossil-fuel producers accountable for the damage their products have caused, including through a levy on fossil-fuel extraction to fund the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.	此外，各国政府必须对煤炭和其他化石燃料生产企业问责，要求他们承担自身产品所造成的损失，包括通过征收化石燃料开采税为联合国气候变化框架公约下的华沙损失与损害机制出资。


Existing international law – in particular, the “polluter pays” principle, the “no-harm” rule, and the right to compensation – supports such a system.	现有的国际法——特别是“污染者付费”原则、“无伤害”规则和获取赔偿的权利——都支持这样一种体制。


Finally, to address energy poverty, world leaders must scale up funding for decentralized renewable-energy projects, including through a globally funded feed-in tariff for renewable energy mini-grids in developing countries.	最后，为解决能源匮乏问题，世界领导人必须加大投资分散的可再生能源项目，包括通过资助全球上网电价为发展中国家的可再生能源小型电网出资。


The fossil-fuel industry’s success in safeguarding its own interests has come at the expense of the health of our planet and its people.	化石燃料业成功维护自身利益损害了地球及其民众的健康。


It is time to reform our perverse global energy system – beginning by resolving to leave coal and other fossil fuels where they are.	是时候改革我们不正常的全球能源体系——从停止开采煤炭和其他化石燃料资源开始。


Financing Climate Safety	为气候安全融资


NEW YORK – The purpose of the global financial system is to allocate the world’s savings to their most productive uses.	纽约—全球金融体系的目标是将全世界的储蓄配置给生产率最高的用途。


When the system works properly, these savings are channeled into investments that raise living standards; when it malfunctions, as in recent years, savings are channeled into real-estate bubbles and environmentally harmful projects, including those that exacerbate human-induced climate change.	当金融体系运转良好时，这些储蓄被引导进入提高生活水平的投资； 当金融体系功能失调时（比如近几年的情况），储蓄就流入房地产泡沫和引起环境破坏的项目，包括那些加剧人为气候变化的行为。


The year 2015 will be a turning point in the effort to create a global financial system that contributes to climate safety rather than climate ruin.	2015年将是一个转折点——努力建立一个有利于气候安全而不是气候变化的全球金融体系。


In July, the world’s governments will meet in Addis Ababa to hammer out a new framework for global finance.	7月，全世界政府将在亚的斯亚贝巴会晤构建全球金融新框架。


The meeting’s goal will be to facilitate a financial system that supports sustainable development, meaning economic growth that is socially inclusive and environmentally sound.	该会议的目标是促进支持可持续发展的金融体系。 可持续发展意味着经济增长具有社会包容性和环境可靠性。


Five months later, in Paris, the world’s governments will sign a new global agreement to control human-induced climate change and channel funds toward climate-safe energy, building on the progress achieved earlier this month in negotiations in Lima, Peru.	5个月后，全世界政府将在巴黎签署新的关于控制人为气候变化和引导资金流向气候安全能源的新全球协定。 这一协定建立在本月秘鲁利马谈判所达成的早期进展的基础上。


There, too, finance will loom large.	在巴黎，金融也将是重中之重。


The basics are clear.	基本要点是清晰无疑的。


Climate safety requires that all countries shift their energy systems away from coal, oil, and gas, toward wind, solar, geothermal, and other low-carbon sources.	气候安全要求所有国家将能源体系从煤炭、石油和天然气转变为风能、太阳能、地热能和其他低碳资源。


We should also test the feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which might enable the safe, long-term use of at least some fossil fuels.	我们还应该检验大规模碳捕捉和储存（CCS）的可行性，该技术有可能实现至少部分化石燃料的长期安全使用。


Instead, the global financial system has continued to pump hundreds of billions of dollars per year into exploring and developing new fossil-fuel reserves, while directing very little toward CCS.	相反，全球金融体系每年仍在化肥数千亿美元用于勘探和开发新的化石燃料储量，并且鲜有人使用CCS。


Many investments in new fossil-fuel reserves will lose money – lots of it – owing to the recent fall in world oil prices.	许多新化石燃料储量方面的投资将是亏本买卖——非常亏本的买卖，因为当前世界油价呈现大跌之势。


And many of the fossil-fuel reserves that companies are currently developing will eventually be “stranded” (left in the ground) as part of new global climate policies.	许多各大公司目前正在开发的化石燃料储量最终将作为新气候政策的一部分被“搁置”（留在地下）。


The simple fact is that the world has far more fossil-fuel resources than can be safely burned, given the realities of human-induced climate change.	一个简单的事实是，从人为气候变化现实看，世界所拥有的化石燃料资源远远大于可安全燃烧的量。


Though market signals are not yet very clear, this year’s more successful investors were those who sold their fossil-fuel holdings, thereby avoiding the oil-price crash.	尽管市场信号尚不十分清晰，但今年的成功投资者将是出售化石燃料持仓的投资者，他们因此躲避了油价崩盘。


Perhaps they were just lucky this year, but their divestment decision makes long-term sense, because it correctly anticipates the future policy shift away from fossil fuels and toward low-carbon energy.	也许他们只是今年鸿运当头，但他们远离化石燃料的决定具有长期意义，因为这一行为正确地预见到未来政策将不利于化石燃料而有利于低碳能源。


Several major pension funds and foundations in the United States and Europe have recently made the move.	美国和欧洲的一些主要退休基金和基金会目前已经采取行动。


They have wisely heeded the words of the former CEO of oil giant BP, Lord Browne, who recently noted that climate change poses an “existential threat” to the oil industry.	它们明智地注意到石油巨头英国石油公司（BP）前CEO布朗勋爵（Lord Browne）的话。 布朗在最近指出，气候变��给石油行业带来了“生存威胁”。


More governments around the world are now introducing carbon pricing to reflect the high social costs inherent in the continued use of fossil fuels.	放眼全球，更多政府正在引入碳定价反映继续使用化石燃料的高昂的内在成本。


Every ton of carbon dioxide that is emitted into the atmosphere by burning coal, oil, or gas adds to long-term global warming, and therefore to the long-term costs that society will incur through droughts, floods, heat waves, extreme storms, and rising sea levels.	因燃烧煤炭、石油或天然气而排入大气的每一吨二氧化碳都加剧着长期气候变暖，因此给社会带来通过干旱、洪水、热浪、极端风暴和海平面升高等现象体现的长期成本。


While these future costs cannot be predicted with precision, recent estimates put the current social cost of each added ton of atmospheric CO2 at $10-100, with the US government using a middle-range estimate of about $40 per ton to guide energy regulation.	这些未来成本无法精确预测，但最新估算表明，当前每向大气排放一吨二氧化碳都会带来10—100美元的社会成本，美国政府的能源监管指导使用了每吨40美元左右的中间值。


Some countries, like Norway and Sweden, long ago introduced a tax on CO2 emissions to reflect a social cost of $100 per ton, or even higher.	挪威和瑞典等一些国家早已引入了二氧化碳排放税，其税率所反映的社会成本为每吨100美元甚至更多。


Many private companies, including major oil firms, have also recently introduced an internal accounting cost of carbon emissions to guide their decisions regarding fossil-fuel investments.	包括主要石油企业在内的许多私人公司最近也引入了内部碳排会计成本指导有关化石燃料投资的决策。


Doing so enables companies to anticipate the financial consequences of future government regulations and taxation.	这样做可以让公司预测未来政府监管的财务后果。


As more countries and companies introduce carbon pricing, the internal accounting cost of carbon emissions will rise, investments in fossil fuels will become less attractive, and investments in low-carbon energy systems will become more appealing.	随着更多国家和公司引入碳定价，碳排的内部会计成本将继续增加，化石燃料投资将更加没有吸引力，低碳能源系统投资则会变得更加诱人。


The market signals of CO2 taxation (or the cost of CO2 emission permits) will help investors and money managers steer clear of new fossil-fuel investments.	二氧化碳税（或二氧化碳排放许可成本）的市场信号有助于投资者和资金管理人避开化石燃料投资。


Carbon taxes also offer governments a crucial source of revenue for future investment in low-carbon energy.	碳税还能给政府带来未来低碳能源投资的关键收入源。


With international oil prices dropping – by a whopping $40 per barrel since the summer – this is an ideal moment for governments to introduce carbon pricing.	随着国际油价的下跌——自今年夏天以来已暴跌40美元/桶——政府引入碳定价的理想时机已经到来。


Rather than let the consumer price of oil fall by that amount, governments should put a carbon tax in place.	政府不应该让石油消费价格也下跌如此幅度，而应该引入碳税。


Consumers would still come out ahead.	消费者仍然有利可图。


Because each barrel of oil emits roughly 0.3 tons of CO2, a carbon tax of, say, $40 per ton of CO2 implies an oil tax of just $12 per barrel.	由于每桶石油大约会产生0. 3吨的二氧化碳，因此要让二氧化碳成本达到（比如）40美元/吨，只需要课以每桶12美元的石油税。


And, because oil prices have declined by more than triple the tax, consumers would continue to pay much less than they did just a few months ago.	此外，由于石油价格下跌幅度是这一征税额的三倍多，消费者所面临的油价仍将比几个月前低得多。


Moreover, new revenues from carbon taxes would be a boon for governments.	此外，来自碳税的新收入将是政府的福音。


High-income countries have promised to help low-income countries invest in climate safety, both in terms of low-carbon energy and resilience against climate shocks.	高收入国家已承诺帮助低收入国家进行气候安全投资——包括低碳能源和应对气候冲击的恢复力方面。


Specifically, they have promised $100 billion in climate-related financing per year, starting in 2020, up from around $25-30 billion this year.	具体而言，它们承诺从2020年开始每年给予1,000亿美元的气候相关融资，而今年这一数字为250—300亿美元左右。


New revenues from a CO2 tax would provide an ideal way to honor that pledge.	来自二氧化碳税的新收入将是兑现这一承诺的理想途径。


The math is simple.	账很好算。


High-income countries emitted around 18 billion tons of CO2 this year – roughly half of all global emissions.	高收入国家今年的二氧化碳排放量大约在180亿吨，相当于全球总排放量的一半。


If these countries earmarked just $2 per ton of CO2 for global financing organizations like the new Green Climate Fund and the regional development banks, they would transfer around $36 billion per year.	如果这些国家只为新绿色气候基金（Green Climate Fund）和地区开发银行提供每吨二氧化碳2美元的资金，每年就能实现约360亿美元的转移支付。


By using part of that money to mobilize private-sector financing, the full $100 billion of climate financing could be reached.	将这笔钱的一部分用于动员私人部门融资就可以实现全部1,000亿美元的气候融资。


Both Big Oil and Big Finance have made major mistakes in recent years, channeling funds into socially destructive investments.	大石油和大金融在近几年中都犯下了大错误，将资金用在了破坏社会的投资上。


In 2015, these two powerful industries, and the world as a whole, can start to put things right.	2015年，这两个强大的行业以及全世界整体可以开始纠错了。


We have within our reach the makings of a new global financial system that directs savings where they are urgently needed: sustainable development and climate safety, for ourselves and for future generations.	我们完全可以建立一个新的全球融资体系，将储蓄引向需要最紧迫的领域：可持续发展和气候安全——为了我们自己和我们的子孙后代。


The Responsible Investor’s Guide to Climate Change	负责投资者的气候变化指南


NEW YORK – Around the world, institutional investors – including pension funds, insurance companies, philanthropic endowments, and universities – are grappling with the question of whether to divest from oil, gas, and coal companies.	纽约—放眼全球，机构投资者——包括养老基金、保险公司、慈善捐赠基金和大学——正在纠结一个问题：是否将投资从石油、天然气和煤炭公司转移。


The reason, of course, is climate change: unless fossil-fuel consumption is cut sharply – and phased out entirely by around 2070, in favor of zero-carbon energy such as solar power – the world will suffer unacceptable risks from human-induced global warming.	当然，原因就在气候变化：除非化石燃料消费大幅削减——并在2070年前后彻底杜绝，转而利用太阳能等零碳能源——否则认为导致的全球变暖给地球造成的风险将是难以接受的。


How should responsible investors behave in the face of these unprecedented risks?	负责任的投资者应该如何面对这些前所未有的风险采取行动？


Divestment is indeed one answer, for several reasons.	取消投资确实是一个答案，原因是多样的。


One is simple self-interest: the fossil-fuel industry will be a bad investment in a world that is shifting decisively to renewables.	一是单纯出于自利：在一个决然向可再生能源转移的世界中，化石燃料行业是一项坏投资。 （尽管也有例外；


(Though there will be exceptions; for example, fossil-fuel development in the poorest countries will continue even after cutbacks are demanded in the rich countries, in order to advance poverty reduction.)	比如，最贫穷国家的化石燃料开发将继续存在，即使富国被要求削减开发，这是为了推进减贫。 ）


Moreover, divestment would help accelerate that shift, by starving the industry of investment capital – or at least raising the cost of capital to firms that are carrying out irresponsible oil, gas, and coal exploration and development, despite the urgent need to cut back.	此外，取消投资还可以通过让该行业得不到投资资本而有助于加速��一转变——或至少提高在削减生产的迫切要求下仍然进行不负责任的石油、天然气和煤炭勘探开发的企业的资本成本。


Though no single institutional investor can make a significant difference, hundreds of large investors holding trillions of dollars of assets certainly can.	尽管单独看，每一家机构投资者都无法带来重大变化，但几百家大型投资者手中的数万亿美元资产一定可以。


Indeed, divestment by leading investors sends a powerful message to the world that climate change is far too dangerous to accept further delays in the transition to a low-carbon future.	事实上，领导投资者的取消投资决定向全世界释放出强烈信号：气候变化危险之极，朝低碳未来的转型绝不容拖延。


Divestment is not the only way to send such a message, but it is a potentially powerful one.	取消投资不是传递这一信号的唯一方式，但是一个具有强大潜在效果的方式。


Finally, investors may divest for moral reasons.	最后，投资者也可能因为道德原因取消投资。


Many investors do not want to be associated with an industry responsible for potential global calamity, and especially with companies that throw their money and influence against meaningful action to combat climate change.	许多投资者不愿与需要为潜在全球灾难负责的行业染上关系，特别是那些将资金和影响力用于反对有意义的遏制气候变化行动的公司。


For similar reasons, many investors do not want handgun manufacturers or tobacco companies in their portfolios.	同理，许多投资者不希望将军火制造商和烟草公司纳入投资组合。


Yet there is also an ethically responsible and practical alternative to divestment that can help steer fossil-fuel companies toward the low-carbon future.	但还有另一个在道德上负责、又相当务实的方案可以代替取消投资，并有助于促使化石燃料公司走向低碳未来。


As active, engaged shareholders, institutional investors can use their ownership (and, in the case of large investors, their public voice) to help persuade companies to adopt climate-safe policies.	作为积极参与的股东，机构投资者可以利用其所有权（对于大型投资者，还可以利用其公共话语权）帮助说服公司采取气候安全政策。


American universities are on the front line of this debate, pushed by their students, who are young enough to face the brunt of climate change in the coming decades.	美国的大学站在这一争论的前沿，其背后的推动力是大学生，年纪轻轻的他们将在未来数十年中面对气候变化的冲击。


The students are right to be frustrated that most university endowments have so far been passive on the issue, neither divesting nor engaging as active investors.	大学生对大部分大学捐赠基金在这一问题上的消极态度非常不满，既没有取消投资，也没有作为积极股东参与。 他们这样做是正确的。


For example, Harvard University President Drew Gilpin Faust sharply rejected divestment in 2013; the purpose of Harvard’s endowment, she argued, is to finance the university’s academic activities.	比如，2013年哈佛大学校长德鲁·吉尔平·福斯特（Drew Gilpin Faust）断然拒绝取消投资； 她说，哈佛捐赠基金的目的是为哈佛的学术活动筹集资金。


Though she did say that Harvard would be an active and responsible shareholder, she offered no details about what such engagement might look like.	尽管她确实也表示哈佛将扮演负责任的积极股东角色，但并未就如何参与做出详细说明。


Harvard and many other universities (including our own, Columbia University) have long been committed to acting as responsible investors.	哈佛和其他许多大学（包括我所在的哥伦比亚大学）早已承诺要像负责任的投资者那样行动。


Several have committees that advise university trustees on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues in their portfolio, most commonly when proxy votes in support of ESG proposals are to be held.	一些大学成立了委员会，就大学受托人投资组合中的环境、社会和治理（ESG）相关内容提供建议，最常见的情形是要举行支持ESG方案的代理投票时。


Yet few so far have applied the ESG principles to their endowment’s fossil-fuel holdings.	但到目前为止，很少有大学将ESG原则用于捐赠基金的化石燃料持股上。


Despite Faust’s rejection of divestment, Harvard and other universities have long accepted the principle that divestment is the correct choice in certain circumstances.	尽管福斯特拒绝取消投资，但哈佛和其他大学早已接受了取消投资在特定条件下是正确的选择这一原则。


In 1990, Harvard divested completely from tobacco companies.	1990年，哈佛完全取消了对烟草公司的投资。


Harvard’s president at the time, Derek Bok, said that the university’s decision “was motivated by a desire not to be associated as a shareholder with companies engaged in significant sales of products that create a substantial and unjustified risk of harm to other human beings.”	时任哈佛校长德雷克·伯克（Derek Bok）表示，哈佛的决定“的动机是不愿作为某些公司的股东，这些公司大量销售会给其他人带来巨大的未被证实的伤害风险的产品。


Many other universities, including Columbia, have done the same.	”许多其他大学，包括哥伦比亚大学，也是这么做的。


Today’s students make cogent arguments that the case for fossil-fuel divestment looks similar to the case for tobacco divestment.	今天的大学生令人信服地指出，取消化石燃料投资就像是取消烟草投资。


Both represent massive risks to human wellbeing.	两者都给人类福祉造成巨大风险。


Before divesting from tobacco companies, Harvard wrote to them, requesting that they address the ethical issues involved in selling tobacco and their adherence to World Health Organization guidelines.	在取消烟草公司投资之前，哈佛致信它们，要求它们解决与出售烟草有关的道德问题并严守世界卫生组织的指引。


The companies either were unresponsive or challenged the evidence that smoking was linked to disease.	烟草公司要么没有回应，要么质疑吸烟与疾病有关的证据。


Similarly, in deciding whether to divest, responsible investors like universities should ask four key questions of the oil, gas, and coal companies in their portfolio:	类似地，在决定是否取消投资时，大学等负责任的投资者应该询问投资组合中的石油、天然气和煤炭公司四个关键问题：


•           Has the company publicly and clearly subscribed to the internationally agreed goal of limiting global warming to 2º Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to the limits on global carbon-dioxide emissions needed to meet that goal?	·  公司是否公开明确地遵循国际上所接受的目标——将全球变暖幅度限制在前工业化水平以上2℃以内，并遵守达到这一目标所必须采取的全球二氧化碳排放上限？


•           Will the company pledge to leave business groups that lobby against effective climate policies to achieve the 2º limit?	·  公司会不会承诺离开游说反对实现2℃限制的有效气候政策的商业集团？


•           Will the company agree to end any exploration and development of unconventional reserves (for example, in the Arctic and much of the Canadian oil sands) that science has shown to be inconsistent with the 2º limit?	·  公司会不会同意停止一切非常规储备（如北冰洋和大部分加拿大油砂）的勘探和开发？ 科学以证明这些非常规储备与2℃限制不相容。


•           Can the company demonstrate that it remains a good investment, despite the transition to low-carbon energy sources and technologies (for example, by demonstrating its own plans to make such a transition or highlighting its contributions to poverty reduction)?	·  公司能否证明，在向低碳能源资源和技术转型的背景下，它仍是个好投资？ （比如，通过展示其自身的该转型的计划，或突出其对减贫的贡献。


If companies can give convincing answers to these four questions, they may indeed remain part of the portfolio, and responsible investors can work with them as part of the climate solution, rather than concluding that they are part of the problem and parting ways.	如果公司可以就这四个问题提供令人信服的答案，它们也许确实应该留在投资组合中，负责任的投资者可以与它们合作，成为气候解决办法的一部分，而不是认定它们是问题的一部分并敬而远之。


For those companies that duck the questions, including by claiming that the world will not in fact enforce the 2º limit, divestment would make sense on both financial and ethical grounds, as such companies are clearly not prepared to contribute to creating a low-carbon economy.	对于回避这些问题的公司——包括宣称世界不会真的执行2℃限制的公司——取消投资既符合金融原则，也符合道德原则，因为这些公司显然不准备为打造低碳经济贡献力量。


Of course, the need for climate action does not stop with investors; sustainable consumption and production practices by businesses and individuals must be part of the solution as well.	当然，气候行动的需要并不随投资者而停止； 企业和个人的可持续的消费和生产行为也必须成为解决方案的一部分。


The transition to a safe, low-carbon future requires all parts of society to act responsibly and with foresight.	向安全、低碳未来的转型需要社会各部分都采取负责任、有远见的行动。


As leaders in education, research, and problem solving, universities have a unique responsibility and opportunity to lead, including as responsible and ethical investors.	作为教育、研究和解决问题等领域的领导者，大学背负着独特的责任，也面临着独特的机会，成为负责任、有道德的投资者就是其中之一。


The Foundations of Greece’s Failed Economy	希腊经济失败的根本


NEW YORK – Too many politicians and economists blame austerity – urged by Greece’s creditors – for the collapse of the Greek economy.	纽约—太多政客和经济学家认为紧缩——希腊债权人所强加的紧缩——是希腊经济崩溃的罪魁。


But the data show neither marked austerity by historical standards nor government cutbacks severe enough to explain the huge job losses.	但数据表明，以历史标准衡量，希腊的紧缩并不突出，政府削减支出也没有严重到可以解释巨大的就业岗位损失的程度。


What the data do show are economic ills rooted in the values and beliefs of Greek society.	数据表明的是希腊社会的价值和信仰才是经济问题的根本。


Greece’s public sector is rife with clientelism (to gain votes) and cronyism (to gain favors) – far more so than in other parts of Europe.	希腊公共部门充斥着侍从主义（clientelism，以获得选票）和裙带主义（cronyism，以获得帮助）——远甚于欧洲其他国家。


Maximum pensions for public employees relative to wages are nearly twice as high as in Spain; the government favors business elites with tax-free status; and some state employees draw their salaries without actually turning up for work.	公职人员退休金与工资的最大比例是西班牙的近两倍； 政府用免税地位宽待商业经营；


There are serious ills in the private sector, too – notably, the pervasive influence of vested interests and the country’s business and political elites.	私人部门也是问题严重——最令人瞩目的便是利益集团和商业和政治精英影响力无处不在。


Profits as a share of business income in Greece are a whopping 46%, according to the latest available data.	据最新数据，希腊的利润占企业所得比例高达46%。


Italy came in second at 42%, with France third, at 41%.	意大利的这个数字位居第二，为42%，法国是第三名，为41%。


(Germany’s share is 39%; the United States’, 35%; and the United Kingdom’s, 32%.)	（德国的这一比例为39%，美国为35%，英国为32%。


Insiders receive subsidies and contracts, and outsiders find it hard to break in.	）内部人士获得补贴和合同，而外部人士根本难以分一杯羹。


Astoundingly, young Greek entrepreneurs reportedly fear to incorporate their firms in Greece, lest others use false documents to take away their companies.	令人惊讶的是，据说希腊年轻企业家很怕在国内开办企业，担心其他人用假文件私吞他们的公司。


According to the World Bank, Greece is one of the hardest places in Europe to start a business.	据世界银行的数据，希腊是欧洲最难开公司的地方之一。


The result is that competition for market share is weak and there are few firms with new ideas.	结果是市场份额的竞争很弱，很少出现带着新思维的新企业。


This stunted system springs from Greece’s corporatist values, which emphasize social protection, solidarity instead of competition, and discomfort with uncontrolled change.	这一拙劣的体系诞生于希腊的社团主义价值。 社团主义价值强调社会保护、用团结代替竞争，不愿面对不受控制的变化。


These values may well be beneficial for family life; but, even with the best of intentions, they are a recipe for a static economy and stultified careers.	这些价值或许对家庭生活很有裨益； 但是，即使初衷良好，也产生不出有活力的经济和蒸蒸日上的事业。


Indeed, Greece’s labor productivity (GDP per worker) is only 72% of the level in the UK and Italy, and a mere 57.7% of that in Germany.	事实上，希腊的劳动生产率（每工人GDP）只有英国和意大利的72%和德国的55%。


And surveys indicate that mean life satisfaction in Greece is far below that found in the wealthiest EU countries (the EU15).	调查表明，希腊平均生活满意度远低于最富有的欧盟国家（欧盟15）。


Contrary to claims by the Greek government, corporatism impoverishes the less advantaged.	与希腊政府的说法相反，社团主义拖累了落后人群。


EU data on poverty rates in 2010 put Greece at 21.4% – far higher than the mean EU15 rate of 16.7%.	在2010年的欧盟贫困率数据中，希腊为21. 4%——大大高于欧盟15的16.


To be sure, Greece saw productivity gains after World War II – but mostly from increases in education and capital per worker, which can go only so far.	诚然，希腊在二战后生产率有所增加——大部分来自教育和每工人资本量的增加，这方面已经无法继续进步。


Two important sources of broad prosperity are blocked by Greece’s system.	全面繁荣的两个重要源泉被希腊的制度所阻碍。


One is an abundance of entrepreneurs engaged in detecting and exploiting new economic opportunities.	一是有大量企业家参与寻找和探索新的经济机会。


Without them, Greece does a poor job of adjusting to changing circumstances (an imperative emphasized by Friedrich Hayek).	没有这些企业家，希腊就难以出色地做出调整以适应新环境（哈耶克十分注重这一点）。


Greece’s much-lauded shipowners, for example, were too slow to adapt to containerization, and thus lost their market share.	希腊引以为豪的船业就因为集装箱化调整太慢而丧失了市场份额。


The other source of broad prosperity is an abundance of business people engaged in conceiving and creating new products and processes – often termed “indigenous innovation.”	全面繁荣的另一个源泉是有大量商人参与构思和制造新产品和工艺——我们常称之为“内生创新”。


Here, Greece lacks the necessary dynamism: venture capital investment flows are smaller, relative to GDP, in Greece than in any other EU country.	在这方面，希腊缺少必要的活力：希腊风险资本投资流占GDP之比低于其他任何一个欧盟国家。


So Greece’s economy has scant ability to create sustained productivity growth and high human satisfaction.	因此，希腊经济几乎没有能力形成持续的生产率上升和高人居满意度。


Some economists believe that these structural considerations have nothing to do with Greece’s current crisis.	一些经济学家认为，这些结构问题与希腊当前的危机无关。


In fact, a structuralist perspective illuminates what went wrong – and why.	事实上，结构主义观点点明了哪里出了问题——以及为什么会出问题。


For several years, Greece drew on the EU’s aptly named “structural funds” and on loans from German and French banks to finance a wide array of highly labor-intensive projects.	多年来，希腊依靠欧盟名副其实的“结构基金”和来自德国和法国的贷款为各种劳动力高度密集的项目融资。


Employment and incomes soared, and savings piled up.	就业和收入飙升，储蓄也水涨船高。


When that capital inflow stopped, asset prices in Greece fell, and so did demand for labor in the capital-goods sector.	当这一资本流入停止时，希腊资产价格开始下跌，资本品部门的劳动力需求亦然。


Moreover, with household wealth having far outstripped wage rates, the supply of labor diminished.	此外，家庭财富远远超过了工资率，导致劳动力供给下降。


Thus, Greece went from boom to outright slump.	因此，希腊从繁荣陷入了大衰退。


The structuralist perspective also explains why recovery has been slow.	结构主义观点还解释了为何复苏一直如此缓慢。


With competition weak, entrepreneurs did not rush to hire the unemployed.	竞争不足导致企业家不急于雇用失业者。


When recovery began, political unrest last fall nipped confidence in the bud.	当复苏开始时，去年秋天的政治动荡又将信心扼杀在萌芽状态。


The truth is that Greece needs more than just debt restructuring or even debt relief.	事实是希腊需要的不止是债务重组甚至债务纾困。


If young Greeks are to have a future in their own country, they and their elders need to develop the attitudes and institutions that constitute an inclusive modern economy – which means shedding their corporatist values.	如果希腊年轻人想要在国内拥有未来，他们和他们的老一辈就需要形成新的态度和机构以构建包容性现代经济——这意味着与他们的社团主义价值决裂。


Europe, for its part, must think beyond the necessary reforms of Greece’s pension system, tax regime, and collective-bargaining arrangements.	至于欧洲，它决不能止步于希腊退休金体系、税收制度和集体讨价还价安排改革，必须有更长远的目光。


While Greece has reached the heights of corporatism, Italy and France are not far behind – and not far behind them is Germany.	希腊已经达到了社团主义的最高峰，意大利和法国也没有落后多少——而德国就在他们身后不远处。


All of Europe, not just Greece, must rethink its economic philosophy.	全欧洲，而不仅是希腊，都必须反思经济哲学。


The Winning International NGO	国际非政府组织的卓越之道


MELBOURNE – It has long been clear that many non-state actors have more influence on international policymaking than a great many sovereign states.	墨尔本—很久以前我们就已经明白，许多非国家行动方在国际政策决定方面比许多主权国家更有影响力。


No one doubts the impact that major multinational corporations and terrorist organizations can have, for better or worse.	没人会怀疑跨国大公司和恐怖组织所能掀起的冲击，不管是好是坏。


But the role of a number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) has been more significant than is generally recognized, and what makes the best of them tick is worth exploring.	但一些国际非政府组织（INGO）的作用比通常认为的还要打，为什么会如此？ 值得探索。


According to current estimates, there are some 40,000 NGOs operating internationally, with the overwhelming majority focusing primarily on health, education, welfare, economics, industry, energy, the environment, human rights, social policy, and governance- and development-related issues.	根据最新统计，大约有40 000个非政府组织（NGO）为国际性组织，绝大多数主要专注于卫生、教育、福利、经济、产业、能源、环境、人权、社会政策以及治理和发展相关问题。


A much smaller number – a few hundred at best – work primarily on peace and security issues, though some primarily human rights-focused organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are influential here.	主要专注于和平和安全问题的NGO要少得多（大概只有几百家），不过一些主要专注于人权的组织，比如人权观察组织（Human Rights Watch）和国际特赦组织（Amnesty International）在这方面也很活跃。


Those that seek to influence foreign-policy outcomes can be typecast, perhaps unkindly, as “thinkers,” “talkers,” or “doers.”	寻求影响对外政策的NGO总是被不太友好地称为“思想者”（thinker）、“谈话者”（talker）和“实干者”（doer）。 换句话说，他们总是纯粹的智库、研究机构和政策论坛（比如伦敦的漆咸楼（Chatham House）、纽约的对外关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）和华盛顿的布鲁金斯研究所）；


In other words, they tend to be pure think tanks, research institutions, or policy forums (like London’s Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, or the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC); overwhelmingly campaign-focused advocacy organizations (like Human Rights Watch, Enough, Kony 2012, or Global Zero); or field-based, on-the-ground operational organizations engaged in activities like mediation, capacity-building, and confidence-building (like Search for Common Ground, the Community of Sant’Egidio, or Independent Diplomat).	几乎完全专注于倡议活动的组织（比如人权观察组织、“够了”（Enough）组织、科尼2012（Kony 2012）组织、全球无核（Global Zero）组织）； 以及基于实地的有理有据有节地运作的组织，它们向调停人那样活动，参与能力和信心建设（比如圣艾志德（Sant’Egidio）的寻找共同基础（Search for Common Ground）组织和独立外交（Independent Diplomat）组织）。


The organization with which I was longest and most closely associated, the International Crisis Group (ICG), is an unusual combination of all three categories.	与我关系最紧密、时间也最长的组织是国际危机集团（International Crisis Group，ICG），它是罕见的集三类于一身的组织。


It is field-based in a way that most operational organizations are, but that think tanks and advocacy organizations are not.	它和大部分运作组织一样基于实地，这一点与智库和倡议组织不同。


It focuses, as policy-oriented think tanks do, on analyzing complex conflicts and potential conflicts around the world and identifying workable solutions.	它又如政策导向的智库那样专注于分析环球复杂冲突和潜在冲突，指出可行解决方案。


It campaigns for the adoption of these solutions, but less at the grassroots and more by direct access to high-level policymakers.	它宣传采取这些方案，但较少通过草根，而是直接与高层决策者联系。


Measuring INGOs’ impact on policy outcomes is more an art than a science.	衡量INGO对政策结果的影响与其说是科学，不如说是艺术。


The most successful, like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the ICG, have high visibility among policymakers, and produce analysis and argument that – whether publicly acknowledged or not – regularly becomes part of the currency of debate.	最成功的INGO，比如人权观察组织、国际特赦组织和ICG在决策者中间出镜率极高，并且炮制不时成为争论论据的分析和观点——不管是否获得公开承认。


Their perceived ability to make a difference is usually reflected in their capacity to raise funds, whether from governments or the private sector.	人们感到他们改变结果，这通常体现在它们的筹资能力中，不管资金来自政府还是私人部门。


What does it take for organizations like these to become and remain successful?	这样的组织怎样才能成功并保持成功？


My own experience, as both a government insider and INGO outsider, has been mostly in the area of peace and security, but I think the lessons are generalizable.	作为政府内部人士和INGO外部人士，我个人的经验多在于和平和安全领域，但我认为我的经验是一般化的。


Four criteria seem to be essential:	有四个关键标准：


First, INGOs must add value, meeting a need that is not currently being met well or at all.	首先，INGO必须带来价值，满足目前未完全满足或完全未满足的需要。


The primary unmet need seen by the founders of the ICG, for example, was to compensate for governments’ growing incapacity, for both security and budgetary reasons, to develop an accurate picture of what was happening on the ground in conflict zones.	比如，ICG创始人所看到的主要的未满足需要是为了安全和预算原因补充政府的日益无能，开发关于冲突区到底在发生什么的准确图景。


Open-source reporting and commentary by the media were not doing much to fill the gaps, because resource shortages, particularly in the quality print media, have long been dumbing down international coverage of sensitive and difficult situations.	媒体开源报告和评论对于填补这方面空白贡献甚微，以为内资源短缺，特别是高质量印刷媒体的短缺，长期以来都在制约对敏感和困难局面的国际报道。


Second, successful INGOs are marked by the clarity of their mission.	其次，成功的INGO的一个显著特征是使命明确。


The most successful tend to be those that find a clear niche and stick to it.	最成功的INGO总是那些找到明确利基并坚持不懈者。


When Amnesty International broadened its focus from traditional political and civil rights to the whole range of economic, social, and cultural rights, it seemed for quite some time to lose direction and impact.	当国际特赦组织将其注意力扩展从国际政治和公民权利扩展到全方位的经济、社会和文化权利时，在方向上和影响上迷失了很长一段时间。


The most insidious temptation to muddy an INGO’s mission occurs when money is potentially available for some project that is not part of its core business, and for which it does not have readily available internal expertise.	弄混INGO使命的最危险的诱惑情形是给钱让你从事并非核心业务的项目或你没有现成内行专业知识的项目。


In such cases, diversion and dilution of resources and loss of focus is the inevitable result.	在这样的情形中，资源的流失和稀释以及专注力的丧失就成了不可避免的结果。


Third, INGOs require real independence.	第三，INGO需要有真正的独立性。


Any INGO in the business of giving advice must be scrupulous about being – and being perceived as – immune from influence by vested interests.	任何从事顾问业务的INGO如履薄冰地免受既得利益影响，并要树立这样的形象。


Some organizations, like Human Rights Watch, solve the problem by refusing to accept any government funding.	一些组织，比如人权观擦组织，通过拒绝任何政府资金解决这一问题。


The ICG doesn’t do that, but it has always been absolutely insistent on saying whatever has needed to be said, and in practice governments have been remarkably tolerant of specific criticism, provided it is well-supported and well-argued.	ICG并不如此，但它毫无例外地坚持说必须说的话，而在实践中，政府有惊人的具体批评忍受力，只要批评有理有据。


The final criterion that a successful INGO must meet in order to be taken seriously, at least by government policymakers, is total professionalism.	为了得到认真对待，至少是得到政府决策者的认真对待，成功的INGO必须满足的最后一项标准是完全的专业化。


If you want to meet governments on their home ground, you have to provide a product that, in terms of the depth and accuracy of its research and the style of its presentation, the best of them are accustomed to and demand.	如果你想在政府的地盘和它们会面，你所提供的产品在研究的深度和精度以及展示方式上必须是政府要人所习惯和要求的。


And your management – of finance, personnel, and governance – has to be sustained at the level of global best practices.	而你的管理——财务、人事和治理方面——必须保持全球最佳水平。


The best INGOs develop strong reputations quickly, sustain them indefinitely, and exercise real influence on policymaking.	最好的INGO能快速建立强大的名誉，坚决地维护名誉，并在决策中产生真正的影响力。


But they operate in a highly competitive environment, and will be on a fast track to losing their way if they come to be seen as no longer meeting real needs, remaining sharply focused, or being uncompromising in maintaining their independence and professionalism.	但它们运作于一个高度竞争的环境，如果被认为不再满足真正的需要、不再保持犀利的专注力，或不再毫不妥协地坚持独立性和专业化，它们就会很快成为明日黄花。


Mastering the Fourth Industrial Revolution	把握第四次工业革命


LONDON – Technological innovation has long triggered diametrically opposed reactions: awe of new possibilities for some; for others, fear of disruptive change.	发自伦敦 — — 技术创新一直以来都会引发截然不同的反应: 有些人惊叹于新的可能性：其他人则为破坏性变化而忧心。


But most of us don’t even realize what is happening.	但是我们大多数人甚至尚未意识到正在发生些什么。


We take change for granted.	我们认为变化是理所当然的事情。


Human ingenuity is far too little recognized or appreciated, particularly in financial markets.	我们对于人类聪明才智的承认或赞赏是远远不够的，尤其是在金融市场里。


Investors obsess about more pedestrian concerns: fears about a hard landing in China, the repercussions of falling oil prices, and the risk that some shock could tip a fragile world economy into renewed recession or deflation.	投资者更多地纠结于一些平庸乏味的热点: 对中国经济硬着陆的恐惧，油价下跌的后果，一些冲击可能令脆弱的世界经济陷入新一轮衰退或通缩的风险。


Obviously, worries about global demand conditions are not unfounded – surely the last thing the world economy needs now is renewed stress.	显然，对全球需求状况的担忧并非杞人忧天 — — 世界经济现在最要不得的东西就再来一次紧缩了。


Yet, for all our angst about excessive debt and policy inadequacy, nothing is as important as human ingenuity for delivering improved living standards and investment opportunities.	然而在我们为过度债务和政策不得力之处忧心之时，没有什么比人类在提供更高生活水平和投资机会方面的智慧更重要了。


Indeed, the advent of new technologies holds out the promise of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, the theme of this year’s World Economic Forum meeting in Davos.	事实上，新技术的出现带来了第四次工业革命的曙光，这也是今年达沃斯世界经济论坛的主题。


The First Industrial Revolution was based on the steam engine. James Watt’s invention, introduced around 1775, powered the nineteenth-century expansion of industry from its origins in England to Europe and the United States.	第一次工业革命奠基于詹姆斯·瓦特（James Watt）发明并于 1775 年推广开来的蒸汽机，令工业在十九世纪从它在英格兰的发源地扩展到欧洲和美国。


The Second Industrial Revolution, from the last third of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War I, was powered by developments in electricity, transportation, chemicals, steel, and (especially) mass production and consumption.	从十九世纪后30年到第一次世界大战爆发前的第二次工业革命是由电力、 交通、 化学品、 钢、 以及(尤其是) 大规模生产和消费的发展所推动的。


Industrialization spread even further – to Japan after the Meiji Restoration and deep into Russia, which was booming at the outset of World War I. The Third Industrial Revolution arrived at the end of the last century with the manufacture and diffusion of information technology.	工业化更进一步扩展 — — 在明治维新后传入日本并深入俄罗斯，在一次世界大战爆发时蓬勃发展。 上世纪末的第三次工业革命则是以通讯技术的制造和传播为特征。


The promise of a Fourth Industrial Revolution consists in advances in robotics, the Internet of Things, big data, mobile telephony, and 3D printing.	第四次工业革命的迹象包括在机器人技术、 物联网、 大数据、 移动电话和 3D 打印技术方面的研究进展。


According to one estimate, the successful adoption of these new technologies could boost global productivity by as much as the personal computer and the Internet did during the late 1990s.	根据一项估计，成功采用这些新技术可以像1990 年代后期的个人电脑和互联网一样大幅提升全球生产力。


For investors, the fourth revolution offers opportunities for vast profits, akin to those delivered by its predecessors.	对投资者而言，第四次革命可能再次带来类似于上次科技革命的巨额利润。


Already, early movers in fourth-generation technologies command eye-popping valuations.	而那些第四代技术的先行企业也拥有了令人瞠目的估值。


New eras of rising investment, productivity, and living standards are not just possible; they are probable, recurring with increasing frequency.	令投资、 生产率和生活水平得到进一步提升的新时期并不仅仅是某种可能性； 他们是有可实现的，而且正以越来越高的频率反复呈现。


And they are the result of human ingenuity.	他们是人类智慧的结晶。


But new eras require more than basic science or garage-based entrepreneurial wizardry.	但新的时代需要比基础科学或车库创业奇迹更多的东西。


To be transformative, technology must be adopted and diffused into everyday life.	要实现变革就必须在日常生活中采用并融入各类技术。


This is easier said than done.	当然这点是说易行难。


At the very outset of industrialization, Watt struggled financially and did not successfully commercialize his steam engine until he formed a partnership with the English manufacturer Matthew Boulton.	在工业化最初的一段时间，瓦特陷入了财务困境，直到与英国制造商马修·布尔顿（ Matthew Boulton）合伙之前，他的蒸汽机一直都无法成功实现商业化。


More important, history suggests that enthusiasm – in macro and market terms – can run ahead of reality.	更重要的是，历史经验表明，热情 — — 无论是关于总体大势还是市场运行 — — 是要比现实快一步的。


One does not have to be a “productivity pessimist” (arguing, for example, that the indoor toilet was the last great human invention) to acknowledge that many new technologies deliver less than promised or reward investors only with long lags.	一个人不一定非要是“生产力悲观主义者”(比如认定室内坐便器是人类最后一个伟大发明) 才能承认许多新技术并未带来原本所承诺的效果，或者把投资者拖死了。


It is worth remembering that early steam power predated Boulton and Watt by nearly a century, and that it took more than a half-century for their invention to overtake conventional water-mill power as the mainstay of nineteenth-century industrial production.	要记住，早期蒸汽动力技术在博尔顿和瓦特之前近一个世纪已经出现了，而两人花了半个多世纪才让他们的发明超越常规的磨坊水车作为19世纪工业生产的主力军。


Volta first discovered electricity cells in 1800, but it took another eight decades to introduce direct current as a means of power transmission.	意大利物理学家亚历山德罗·伏特（Alessandro Volta）在 1800 年首次发明了电池，但又过了80多年人们才引入直流电作为电力传输的手段。


Likewise, ENIAC, the first electronic computer, was developed in secret during World War II.	同样，在二次世界大战期间秘密研制了第一台电子计算机ENIAC。


Computing power and usage grew exponentially over the ensuing decades of the twentieth century; but even as late as the 1980s, the Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow could quip that the computer age was “everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”	随后在20世��的几十年间计算机的运算能力和使用都实现了成倍增长，但直到1980 年代，诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特 · 索洛（Robert Solow）还在讥笑说电脑时代的说法“无处不在，唯独不在生产力统计数字中”。


For investors, this consideration holds important implications – among them, the need to be patient and to resist the temptation to overpay early.	对投资者来说，这一思考具有重要的意义 — — 其中就包含耐心，以及提前过度支付的冲动。


Initially, identifying losers (who remembers Wang Computers?) may be as important as picking winners.	首先，确定谁是输家（试问谁还记得王安计算机公司？ ）可能和挑选优胜者一样重要。


It is also important to understand how technology can transform seemingly unrelated industries.	它也是重要的是了解技术如何可以变革那些看似不相关的行业。


The advent of computing power enabled “big box” retailers in the US – Walmart, Staples, Home Depot, and others – to supplant both mom-and-pop stores and the established retail chains of the 1950s and 1960s.	电脑计算能力的跃进使美国那些“大个子”零售商 — — 沃尔玛、 斯台普斯、 家得宝等等 — — 取代了夫妻店和 1950 ~1960 年代建立的零售链条。


Computational power, together with advances in the logistics of transportation, storage, and delivery, enabled retailing on hitherto unimaginable economies of scale.	电脑计算能力，加上运输、 存储和快递物流的发展使零售业实现了迄今为止都超越人们想象的规模经济。


Yet today, these same big-box giants are under siege from online retailing, which promises even greater economies of scale and logistical efficiencies, undercutting even the most efficient brick-and-mortar operations.	然而如今，同样的这些大个子巨人却被在线零售所包围，后者展现出更庞大的规模经济和后勤效率，连最有效率的实体运作都难以招架。


Ingenuity it is.	这是智慧的结晶。


But, to paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter, it is also destructive.	但套用约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）的话，这也是具有破坏性。


In today’s parlance, we speak of “disruptive technologies.”	按当今的说法，我们把这称之为“颠覆性技术”。


But no-one should be gulled by jargon: New ways of producing things often kill off old industries and jobs before the full benefits of the successor mode of production are realized.	但没人应该被这种时髦的行话说蒙蔽：新的生产技术通常会在该模式的好处彻底实现之前杀死老的产业和就业机会。


A certain degree of violence inevitably accompanies human progress.	人类的进步也不可避免地伴随着一定程度的暴力。


That is why the executives gathering in Davos this month are discussing how to “master” the Fourth Industrial Revolution.	这就为何本月聚集在达沃斯的高管们都在讨论如何“掌控”第四次工业革命。


For all the awe-inspiring promises of technological advance, theirs is an apt concern.	这些技术进步的所有令人惊叹的前景，恰当的思考是有必要的。


Leading the Middle East Into the Future	领导未来


SAN FRANCISCO – New technologies are emerging so rapidly that societies in the Middle East are now having trouble coping with their impact.	旧金山——新技术涌现速度如此之快，以至于我们无法面对它们对社会造成的影响。


By affecting everything from the nature of work to what it means to be human, technological changes could prove overwhelming if we do not collaborate to understand and manage them.	技术变革影响工作性质及生而为人的意义，如果我们无法合作来对其进行理解和管理，就有可能淹没在技术变革的大潮中。


Around the globe, entire industries are being redefined and created from scratch, owing to groundbreaking developments in artificial intelligence, robotics, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage, and quantum computing.	由于人工智能、机器人、物联网、自动驾驶车辆、3D打印、纳米技术、生物技术、材料科学、能源存储和量子计算等领域的突破性进展，整个行业正在被重新定义和创造。


We at the World Economic Forum have dubbed this wave of innovation the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” because it is fundamentally changing the way we live, work, and relate to one another. And these changes will be felt as much in Cairo, Dubai, and Riyadh as in New York, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong.	我们世界经济论坛将这股创新浪潮称之为“第四次工业革命”，因为它从根本上改变了我们的生活、工作和联系方式。


New technologies such as the steam engine and the cotton mill launched the First Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied by historic sociopolitical developments such as urbanization, mass education, and mechanized agriculture.	蒸汽机和棉纺厂等新技术开启了首次工业革命，城市化、大众教育和机械化农业等历史性的社会政治发展随之应运而生。


Thanks to electrification and mass production, the Second Industrial Revolution introduced entirely new social models and forms of work.	由于电气化和大规模生产，第二次工业革命催生了全新的社会模式和工作形式。


And with the advent of digital technology and instant telecommunications, the Third Industrial Revolution, playing out over the past five decades, has connected the planet and shrunk time and space.	而随着数字技术和即时通信技术的出现，过去五十年发生的第三次工业革命已经压缩了时间和空间，并且联通了地球。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution will be no less transformative: individual technologies will be influential, but changes in our social and economic systems will do far more to shape our future lives.	第四次工业革命将同样充满变革意味：单一技术无疑将极具影响力，但我们的社会和经济制度变化却更能塑造未来的生活。


At this stage, there is no consensus on such basic issues as personal-data ownership, infrastructure security, and new disruptive businesses’ rights and responsibilities.	在这一阶段，对个人数据所有权、基础设施安全和全新破坏性企业权利和责任的基本共识仍然尚未达成。


What is needed is a conceptual framework to help businesses, governments, and individuals anticipate the radical technology-driven shifts – in business models, ethics, and social issues – on the horizon.	人们迫切需要在商业模式、伦理和社会问题上建立一整套能协助企业、政府和个人预测极端技术变化的概念性架构。


To ensure the future prosperity of the Middle East, its governments and citizens must ask themselves if new technologies are being designed and adapted to meet real social needs, or if they are simply ushering in change for its own sake.	为保障我们未来的繁荣，我们必须问自己，新技术设计究竟是为满足社会需要，抑或仅仅是为变而变的无意之举。


More generally, we must focus not just on technological progress and economic productivity, but also on how these forces are affecting people, communities, and the environment.	推而广之，我们不能只注重技术进步和经济效率，还必须注重技术力量影响人、团体和环境的方式。


As the Fourth Industrial Revolution continues, four principles should guide the region’s policies and their implementation.	随着第四次工业革命的不断深化，指导我们政策及其执行的理应有四项原则。


For starters, focus should be placed on systems rather than on any individual technology; only by observing how divergent technological, social, and economic forces interact with one another can any country’s leaders and citizens determine and predict how business, society, and economics may change.	首先，我们应当注重制度而不是任何单一技术； 只有通过观察各种技术、社会和经济力量如何相互作用，我们才能确定和预测企业、社会和经济可能如何变革。


Second, there must be push back against the common fatalistic view that progress is predetermined.	其次，我们应当反对进步是预先设定的这一常见的宿命论。


Communities and individuals should be educated and empowered to master technologies for truly productive purposes, rather than being mastered by them for someone else’s ends.	群体和个人应当有效掌握技术，而不是像某些人所希望的那样反而被技术所掌控。


If we fail to harness new technologies for ourselves, we will have surrendered our personal and collective agency, leaving little reason for optimism.	如果我们无法让新技术为自己所用，就等于放弃了个人和集体影响，因此再也没有什么乐观的理由。


Third, we should design new technologies and systems with the future in mind, rather than blindly accepting change as it comes.	第三，我们应当为未来设计新的技术和体制，而不是盲目地接受变革。


Integrating transformative technologies into our social and economic systems will require close collaboration between stakeholders in government, industry, and civil society.	在社会和经济体系中融入变革性技术需要政府、行业和民间社会各利益相关方能够密切合作。


Otherwise, our future will be decided by default circumstances instead of our own collective judgment.	否��，我们的未来将取决于默认设定，而不是我们的集体选择。


Finally, social and ethical considerations are not a bug to overcome or override; the region’s shared values should be a central feature of all new technologies.	最后，社会和伦理因素并非只是需要克服或压制的障碍； 我们的共同价值观应当成为一切新技术的核心原则。


If technologies are being used in ways that exacerbate poverty, discrimination, or environmental degradation, they have not been optimized for the future that the people of the Middle East want to build.	如果新技术的运用形式加剧了贫困、歧视或环境退化，那么这项技术尚未经过适应我们预想中未来的优化进程。


Investments in new technologies are justifiable only if they contribute to a safer, more integrated world.	只有能建设更安全、更一体化的世界，新技术投资才具有合理性。


No single stakeholder can address all of the Fourth Industrial Revolution’s social and economic challenges, not even government.	靠单一利益相关方来解决第四次工业革命所面临的社会和经济难题是不可能的。


The business community, for its part, must create an environment in which technologies are developed and deployed safely, and with social considerations in mind.	企业界的任务是创造一个能安全研发和运用技术的环境，并同时要考虑到社会因素。


Governments, too, must be actively engaged in how innovations are introduced to society.	政府也必须积极参与将创新引入社会的活动。


Policymakers should maintain close collaboration with the technologists and entrepreneurs leading the revolution, lest they fall behind.	决策者必须与领导革命的技术人员和企业家保持密切合作，以免陷入落后。


And all of us, as individuals, must stay informed so that we can understand and take action on new issues that emerge from the complex interplay between technology and society.	我们所有人身为社会一份子都应当了解事态发展，以便对因技术和社会相互作用而产生的复杂新问题采取行动。


The Fourth Industrial Revolution will usher in systemic changes that demand collaborative engagement. As the countries of the Middle East adapt their economies to the impact of new technology, they will need to consider new ways of working together across public and private spheres.	第四次工业革命将引发需要合作参与的系统性变革，同时我们必须对公共和私人领域开展合作的新方式展开思考。


Because the pace of change will only continue to accelerate, transparency must become greater for all stakeholders, so that every part of society can weigh the risks and rewards of each new development.	因为变革速度只会越来越快，我们必须对所有利益相关方保持透明，以便他们能够权衡每项新成果的风险和回报。


We live in an age of complexity, and sound leadership in the Middle East, as everywhere around the world, calls for a wholesale shift in how we think about collaborative engagement for the future.	我们生活在一个复杂的时代，卓越的领导需要对合作建设未来的思维方式进行彻底的变革。


If we are to avoid the dystopian outcomes that technology can easily produce, we must collectively envision the future that we want to create.	如果想要避免技术轻而易举就能带来的反乌托邦效果，我们必须共同设想我们希望创造什么样的未来。


Four Ways Out	四条脱身之策


BERKELEY – When an economy falls into a depression, governments can try four things to return employment to its normal level and production to its “potential” level.	伯克利--当经济陷入萧条之际，政府可以采用四种方式把就业恢复到正常水平并且把生产恢复到其潜在水平。


Call them fiscal policy, credit policy, monetary policy, and inflation.	我们可以把它们称为财政政策、信贷政策、货币政策以及通货膨胀。


Inflation is the most straightforward to explain: the government prints up lots of banknotes, and spends them.	通货膨胀最为容易解释，也就是说，政府印制大量钞票并且把它们花出去。


The extra cash in the economy raises prices.	经济体内的额外现金提高了价格。


As prices rise, people don’t want to hold cash in their pockets or their bank accounts – its value is melting away every day – so they step up the pace at which they spend, trying to get their wealth out of depreciating cash and into real assets that are worth something.	当价格上升的时候，人们并不想把现金藏在口袋里或者放在银行帐户上，因为它们的价值每天都在消失。 因此，他们加快花钱的速度，试图把他们的财富从日益贬值的现金中取出来，放到值钱的实务资产当中。


This spending pulls people out of unemployment and into jobs, and pushes capacity utilization up to normal and production up to “potential” levels.	这一花钱运动把人们从失业中解救出来并且找到工作，把产能利用推高到正常水准并且把生产提高到“潜在”水平。


But sane people would rather avoid inflation.	但是有理智的人更愿意避免通货膨胀。


It is a very dangerous expedient, one that undermines standards of value, renders economic calculation virtually impossible, and redistributes wealth at random.	通货膨胀是一个非常危险的权宜之计，它会破坏价值标准，几乎无法进行经济测算并且随意重新分配财富。


As John Maynard Keynes put it, “there is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency.	正如凯恩斯所言，“没有比破坏货币更为微妙和确切的手段来颠覆社会的现有基础的了。 这一过程把所有经济规律的隐藏力量都放在了破坏的一边，其破坏的方式无人可以分析。


The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose…” But governments will resort to inflation before they will allow another Great Depression – we just would very much rather not go there, if there is any alternative way to restore employment and production.	”但是政府在允许另一场经济大萧条发生之前将求助于通货膨胀。 如果我们还有其他方式来恢复就业和生产，那么我们还是情愿不要走这一条路。


The standard way to fight incipient depressions is through monetary policy.	对付山雨欲来萧条的标准方法是通过货币政策。


When employment and output threaten to decline, the central bank buys up government bonds for immediate cash, thus shortening the duration of the safe assets that investors hold.	当就业和产量威胁下降的时候，中央银行购买政府债券用于即刻现金，这样缩短了投资者持有安全资产的期限。


With fewer safe, money-yielding assets in the financial market, the price of safe wealth rises.	当金融市场上安全、有所收益的资产减少时候，安全财富的价格就会上升。


This makes it more worthwhile for businesses to invest in expanding their capacity, thus trading away cash they could distribute to their shareholders today for a better market position that will allow them to reward their shareholders in the future.	这样，各企业投资于扩大产能就越发具有价值。 它们把能够在今天分配给股东的现金交换用来获得更佳的市场地位从而可以在今后回报他们的股东。


This boost in future-oriented spending today pulls people out of unemployment and pushes up capacity utilization.	这一当今面向未来的开支把人们从失业中摆脱出来并且提高了产能利用。


The problem with monetary policy is that, in responding to today’s crisis, the world’s central banks have bought so many safe government bonds for so much cash that the price of safe wealth in the near future is absolutely flat – the nominal interest rate on government securities is zero.	货币政策的问题是，在应对当今危机的时候，世界各国中央银行已经购买了如此大量的安全稳妥的政府债券换取如此大量的现金，导致近期内的安全财富价格变得绝对平直。 政府证券的名义利率变成了零。


Monetary policy cannot make safe wealth in the future any more valuable.	货币政策无法让未来的安全财富变得更为有价值。


And this is too bad, for if we could prevent a depression with monetary policy alone, we would do so, as it is the policy tool for macroeconomic stabilization that we know best and that carries the least risk of disruptive side effects.	这一情形很不妙，因为如果我们仅仅采用货币政策就可以防止萧条，那么我们就会这样做，因为这是我们了解最多的用于宏观经济稳定的政策工具，而且它带来的破坏性副作用风险也最小。


The third tool is credit policy.	第三个工具是信贷政策。


We would like to boost spending immediately by getting businesses to invest not only in projects that trade safe cash now for safe profits in the future, but also in those that are risky or uncertain.	有些项目是用现在安全的现金换取将来安全的利润。


But few businesses are currently able to raise money to do so.	我们想要通过让企业不仅投资于这些项目，而且还投资于那些具有风险或者前途未卜的项目来迅速提高开支。


Risky projects are at a steep discount today, because the private-sector financial market’s risk tolerance has collapsed.	有风险的项目如今大为贬值，因为私营部门金融市场的风险容忍程度已经崩溃。


No one is willing to buy assets and take on additional uncertainty, because everyone fears that somebody else knows more than they do – namely, that anyone would be a fool to buy.	没人愿意购买资产并且承担额外的不确定因素，因为所有人都担心有些人了解的情况比他们多。 那也就是说，谁购买谁就是傻瓜。


Although the world’s central banks and finance ministries have been devising many ingenious and innovative policies to stimulate credit, so far they have not had much success.	尽管各国中央银行以及财政部设计了许多新颖和创意的政策来刺激信贷，但是目前为止成效甚微。


This brings us to the fourth tool: fiscal policy.	这也就把我们带到了第四个工具上来，也就是财政政策。


Have the government borrow and spend, thereby pulling people out of unemployment and pushing up capacity utilization to normal levels.	让政府借款以及开支，从而把人们从失业中摆脱出来并且把产能利用提高到正常水准。


There are drawbacks: the subsequent deadweight loss of financing all the extra government debt that has been incurred, and the fear that too rapid a run-up in debt may discourage private investors from building physical assets, which form the tax base for the future governments that will have to amortize the extra debt.	但是这也有缺点。 那也就是，给所有已经产生的额外政府债务提供资金随后流失殆尽，而且人们担心债务增加过快将会把私人投资者避让建造实体资产，而这些实体资产构成了未来政府的税收基础，政府又要分期偿还额外的债务。


But when you have only two tools left, neither of which is perfect for the job, the rational thing is to try both – credit policy and fiscal policy – at the same time.	但是当人们只剩下两个工具的时候，没有一个是可以胜任这一任务的。 合情合理的措施就是把两个工具、也就是信贷政策和财政政策同时都试一下。


That is what the Obama administration is attempting to do right now.	这也就是奥巴马政府目前正在试图做的事情。


Françafrique at 50	写在法非关系五十周年纪念日


DAKAR – This month, Africa’s Francophone countries will mark the 50th anniversary of their independence, and of the ties they maintain with France.	达卡尔——本月，非洲法语国家将纪念独立五十周年，纪念它们与法国保持的关系。


But is there much to celebrate?	但真有什么值得庆祝吗？


Even before French President Charles de Gaulle took office in 1958, he foresaw the wave of revolutionary nationalism that would soon sweep across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.	即使在法国总统查尔斯·戴高乐1958年就职前，他就已经预见到革命民族主义浪潮将很快席卷亚非拉和中东。


As French president, he sought to circumvent that tide by proposing to the leaders of France’s African colonies a negotiated settlement for independence.	身为法国总统的他试图回避这股浪潮，向法国非洲殖民地的领袖们提议通过谈判的方式实现他们的独立之梦。


To accept de Gaulle’s offer, these leaders had to agree, among other things, to allow the stationing of French troops on their territory, provide France with a steady supply of raw materials at pre-determined prices, assume all colonial-era debts incurred by France, maintain the CFA Franc as their common currency, and grant the French Treasury veto authority over their sub-regional central banks.	要想接受法国的建议，这些领导人必须同意允许法国在本国领土上驻军、按照事先约定的价格稳定地向法国供应原材料、承担法国在殖民时期的所有债务、使用西非法郎作为其共同货币、并赋予法国财政部对其地区央行决策的否决权等。


De Gaulle got most of what he wanted, and granted independence.	戴高乐的目的基本达到，于是非洲殖民地获准成为独立的国家。


Francophone Africa has been paying for independence ever since.	非洲法语国家自此之后一直在为独立付出代价。


French troops have repeatedly intervened in Chad, Gabon, Zaire, Central Africa, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire to prop up and protect complacent, corrupt, undemocratic, and incompetent leaders, remove recalcitrant ones, or curb civil unrest.	法国军队一再干预乍得、加蓬、扎伊尔、中非共和国、多哥和科特迪瓦的内部事务，支持并保护自大、腐败、专制、无能的领导人，推翻不听指挥的领袖，或者平息内乱。


In Rwanda, France has yet to live down its perceived role in enabling the 1994 genocide.	在卢旺达，人们并没有忘记法国在默许1994年种族灭绝中所起的作用。


On the monetary front, the CFA Franc Zone’s member countries dismantled the federal structure that united them during French occupation and erected trade barriers instead.	货币市场领域，非洲金融共同体法郎区各成员国废除了在法统期将他们合为一体的联邦制，转而设立了贸易壁垒。


The CFA franc issued by two sub-regional central banks (BCEAO and BEAC) are not interchangeable.	由西非国家央行和中非国家银行等两大区域性央行发行的西非法郎不能相互兑换。


As a result, regional trade and economic integration have been stifled.	结果是区域贸易和经济一体化受到了抑制。


The ensuing economic difficulties were exacerbated under President François Mitterrand, whose prime minister, Pierre Bérégovoy, pursued a strong French franc – a policy that ultimately led to a massive 100% devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994.	法国总统弗朗索瓦·密特朗的统治加剧了之后的经济困难，密特朗的总理皮埃尔·戈瓦奉行强势法郎政策——这一政策最终导致西非法郎于1994年贬值100%。


And the euro’s appreciation against the dollar from 2002 until very recently meant that the shift in the CFA franc’s exchange-rate peg from the French franc to the euro caused a repeat of that scenario.	而始于2002年并于不久前刚刚结束的欧元对美元升值则意味着西非法郎在从法国法郎转而钉住欧元时重演了1994年的悲剧。


With the bulk of their exports denominated in US dollars and their imports priced mainly in euros, chronic structural deficits have wrecked the Franc Zone economies, and the prospect of a second devaluation looms larger by the day.	由于主要出口以美元计价而主要进口则以欧元计价，这种长期的结构性赤字几乎为西非法郎区经济带来毁灭性打击，不久可能又要发生第二次货币贬值。


More appalling is the fact that France guarantees the CFA franc’s free convertibility into hard currency, originally on the condition that all 15 Franc Zone countries surrender 100% of their foreign reserves to the French Treasury.	更令人震惊的是法国保证西非法郎与硬通货自由兑换，但最初的条件是所有15个法郎区国家向法国财政部100%上缴本国的外汇储备。


The amount was reduced to 65%, and then 50%, in 2005, but France still deducts its share directly from these countries’ export earnings.	这一比例后来降低到65%和2005年的50%，但法国仍然从这些国家的出口收入中直接扣除一定的比例。


Moreover, the mandatory 20% foreign exchange cover stipulated in the convention signed with France in 1962 now stands at 110%.	此外，1962年非法合约中规定20%的强制外汇支付现在已经飙升至110%。


And a foreign-exchange control enacted in 1993 ensures that only France benefits from this capital drain by limiting the free flow of capital to France alone.	而1993年开始实行的外汇管制通过限制资本只能流向法国，从而确保只有法国才能从上述资本外流中获益。


The ensuing massive capital flight has bled the region’s economies and eroded their competitiveness.	随之而来的巨额资本外逃致使西非地区经济严重失血，损害了非洲法语国家的竞争力。


This is a shame, because the economic situation elsewhere in Africa has been improving in recent years – mostly in Eastern and Southern Africa, where economic integration is proceeding within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).	这真的是一种耻辱，因为非洲其他地区的经济状况近年来一直持续改善——这种改善多数集中在东南非洲，那里的东南非共同市场（COMESA）和南部非洲发展共同体（SADC）大大提高了经济一体化程度。


Unfortunately, West Africa’s regional grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is not as effective.	但遗憾的是，西非地区的区域集团西非国家经济共同体（ECOWAS）却没有这么高的效率。


With the establishment of ECOWAS, the Franc Zone countries created two sub-regional groupings, WAEMU and CEMAC, in a bid to curb British, American, and Nigerian influence.	在建立西非国家经济共同体的同时，法郎区国家还为遏制英、美以及尼日利亚的影响，成立了西非经货联盟和西非经货共同体等两大区域性组织。


As a result, West African countries are mostly missing out on Africa’s current revival – and the prospect of a prolonged period of stagnation in the eurozone certainly won’t help.	绝大多数西非国家因此错过了非洲目前的经济复苏，而欧元区长期经济停滞的前景肯定对西非的发展非常不利。


The imbalanced relationship between France and its former African colonies would beggar belief if the psychology of Africa’s “liberators” 50 years ago were overlooked.	如果忽视非洲“解放者”50年前的心理状态，那么人们或许很难相信法国和前非洲殖民地国家之间的不平衡关系。


Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was a strong believer in white supremacy who once wrote that “reason is Helennic; emotion is Negro.”	塞内加尔的首位总统列奥波尔多·赛达尔·桑戈尔坚定地信奉白人至上，他曾经写道“白人的代名词是理智，而黑人的代名词是感情。


Leon Mba, the first Gabonese president, was such a Francophile that he bequeathed his personal fortune to France in order to finance the construction of a hospital in Paris.	” 第一位加蓬总统莱昂·姆巴对法国的感情如此深厚，以致于他把个人财产遗赠给法国，用于在巴黎修建医院。


Similarly, the founder of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, coined the word “Françafrique” to underline the total osmosis between France and its former colonies.	同样，科特迪瓦创始人费利克斯·乌弗埃·博瓦尼发明了“法非关系”这一术语，强调法国对其前殖民地国家这种耳濡目染、潜移默化的影响力。


Houphouët-Boigny’s support for France’s African policy led him to establish diplomatic ties with South Africa’s apartheid regime and make his country a supply-transit route for the Biafra secessionists.	乌弗埃·博瓦尼对法国非洲政策的支持促使他与南非种族隔离政府建立外交关系，并默许自己的国家成为比拉夫分裂主义者的过境运输线路。


These leaders were unlikely ever to dispute France’s Diktat, and the same applies to their heirs.	上述领导人永远不可能质疑法国的强制命令，他们的继承人也同样如此。


Indicted French child abductors were freed by Chad at France’s request.	在法国的要求下乍得释放了遭到指控的法国儿童绑架犯。


In Mali, several suspected terrorists – members of a local branch of Al Qaeda – were set free in exchange for a lone French hostage.	在马里，几名恐怖分子嫌疑人——当地基地组织成员——为交换一名法国人质而最终获释。


Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade once labeled the CFA franc a colonial relic – but that was when he was an opposition leader.	塞内加尔总统阿卜杜拉耶·瓦德曾经指责西非法郎为殖民遗迹——但当时他还是一名反对派领袖。


Now he considers it the best currency in the world.	现在他认为西非法郎是全世界最好的货币。


This economic and psychological status quo ensures that, after 50 years of independence, true emancipation for Françafrique will remain a distant prospect.	这样的经济和心理状态造成在独立50年后，法非关系的真正解放仍然像梦想一般遥不可及。


If there is something to celebrate, it is that the balance of global economic power is shifting to emerging countries, and that new role models and a new generation raised in a globalized world are becoming ready to assume the mantle of leadership. 	如果说有什么值得庆祝，那恐怕是全球经济发展的重心正在向新兴国家转移，而在全球化环境中成长起来的新的榜样和青年正准备着担负起领导责任。


France and Germany Must Act in Iraq	法德须在伊采取行动


Next week, President Bush, President Chirac, and Chancellor Schroeder will meet on the cliffs of Normandy to mark the 60th anniversary of the D-Day invasions that led to the liberation of Europe.	下星期，布什总统、希拉克总统和施罗德总理将在诺曼底的悬崖峭壁上会面，纪念最终解放欧洲的 D 日登陆。


They should also seize the moment to liberate themselves from the bitterness that has divided the Atlantic Alliance over the Iraq War, argue Pierre Lellouche and Christoph Bertram.	Pierre Lellouche 和 Christoph Bertram 主张：他们还应当抓住机会，消除伊拉克问题给大西洋盟国带来的分歧之苦。


When the United States launched the war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, France and Germany rightly warned that the invasion could well end up worsening instability in the Middle East and increase the threat of radical Islamic terror.	美国发起针对萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克战争时，法德两国恰如其分地警告说：这次入侵也许只会加剧中东地区的不稳定局势，扩大伊斯兰激进组织的恐怖威胁。


But now that America and its coalition have proven themselves to be incapable of bringing stability to Iraq on their own, the French and German governments can no longer rest and smugly say, "I told you so," as the situation deteriorates even further.	但现在事实已经证明：美国及其盟友依靠自身的力量不能给伊拉克带来和平，随着局势的进一步恶化，法德两国政府再也不能袖手旁观，洋洋得意："看，我早就告诉过你们。


Both governments must now become seriously and fully engaged in what must now be a united Western effort.	"法德政府必须立刻全面正式地参与到西方国家的联合行动中来。


Of course, it would be best for everyone - France and Germany included - if the current US-led coalition were to succeed and Iraq could turn into a pillar of Middle East stability and modernization.	当然，如果当前美国领导的联盟能旗开得胜，伊拉克能够成为中东稳定和现代化的支柱，这对各方来讲都是最好的结果，法德两国也不例外。


Yet, however desirable this outcome, it is no longer likely (if it ever was).	但无论这个结果多么诱人，实现的可能如今已是微乎其微（即便这种可能性曾经存在的话）。


Internal stability and economic recovery continue to be elusive, with the specter of civil war hovering ever closer.	国内稳定和经济复苏继续遥不可及，而内战的阴云却日益逼近。


A divided Iraq at war with itself would be a disaster for the region, for America's international credibility and authority, and for transatlantic relations.	分裂的伊拉克内战纷起，不仅会给中东地区、也会给美国的国际信用和权威、甚至泛大西洋关系带来灾难性的后果。


In an already fragile region, a major Arab country like Iraq would most likely prompt interventions by its nervous neighbors - of which there is no shortage - if it turns into a failed state.	在已经非常脆弱的阿拉伯地区，像伊拉克这样的主要国家如果陷入内乱，就很可能招来邻国的不安和干预，这样的邻居可谓比比皆是。


Instead of the rule of law, there would be the law of the mafia, of terrorist groups, and of tribal militias.	统治伊拉克的将不是法律，而是黑社会、是恐怖组织和部族武装。


Many of them are already in place.	不少势力已经蠢蠢欲动。


Instead of moving toward modernization and development, the region would be confirmed as a cockpit for conflict, a threat to itself and to the world beyond.	该地区不仅不能走向发展和现代化，还将再次成为冲突之地，给本地区和全世界都带来威胁。


Were the US forced to withdraw in failure, Islamic terrorist groups would claim a historic victory, promising more bloodshed for the West.	如果美国战败撤退，伊斯兰恐怖组织将获得历史性的胜利，在西方各国制造更多的流血事件。


Moreover, America might also once again retreat bitterly into isolationism, blaming her failure on the UN and on disloyal European allies.	不仅如此，美国可能再次陷入痛苦的孤立主义，将失败的责任归咎于联合国、归咎于不讲信用的欧洲盟友。


So the stakes are high in Iraq, for Europeans no less than for Americans.	因此如果问题得不到解决，欧洲付出的代价与美国同样惨重。


That is why it is time that even those who have been most skeptical about US policy in Iraq start to do something about it.	这解释了为什么最不信任美国对伊政策的人也开始采取行动。


Both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder have repeatedly pronounced that what happens in Iraq is a strategic challenge to their countries. Yet their actions in response to this insight have been modest.	雅克·希拉克和格哈德·施罗德都一再宣称，伊拉克局势是法德两国面临的战略性挑战，但他们对此理解做出的反应却谨小慎微。


The recent turmoil in Iraq has, on the contrary, strengthened those in both capitals who argue that there is now even less reason to get involved on the ground.	恰恰相反，近来伊拉克的混乱局势给了政府内不主张对伊派兵者更充足的理由。


At the very least, France and Germany are demanding that the Bush administration openly admit to its failure and the need for help.	最低限度，法德政府也要求布什政府公开承认失误和寻求帮助。


Yet not only is such a demand naïve, with the Bush team battling for re-election, it is not at all certain that most of America's European allies would heed a US call for solidarity if one were issued.	但在布什政府寻求连任的情况下，这样的要求不仅天真，而且即便美国真的发出团结信号，欧洲盟友们是否能够响应也尚未可知。


Confronting the threat that an unsettled Iraq poses to Europe and to the transatlantic relationship implies stopping these tactical games.	勇敢地直面尚未解决的伊拉克问题对欧洲和泛大西洋关系的威胁意味着停止这种战术游戏。


The passing of authority in Iraq from the US-led coalition to an Iraqi government and the need for a much stronger UN role now offers the chance and imposes the need for everyone to stop posturing and get serious.	政权从以美国为首的联军向伊拉克政府过渡和呼吁联合国更多参与给其余各国停止作态，严肃对待提供了机遇。


For their part, EU governments should provide the UN - on whose involvement in Iraq they have long insisted - with the protective force it needs to prepare nation-wide elections in Iraq later in the year, and ask others to join.	欧盟政府的责任是改变反对联合国参与伊拉克问题的一贯立场，向联合国派出所需的防卫部队，为后半年进行的伊全国选举做好准备，同时争取其它国家的参与。


A UN staff protected by US marines simply cannot do that job.	仅仅由美国海军保护的联合国人员完成不了这项任务。


With the consent of both the US and Iraq's new leadership, EU governments should also offer to organize an international conference uniting all those with a stake in Iraqi stability, including Iraq's neighbors, to work out a strategy and commit resources in order to save Iraq from slipping into protracted turmoil.	有了美国和伊拉克新政府的许可，欧盟政府还应承担起组织国际会议的责任，号召所有希望伊拉克稳定的国家，包括伊拉克的邻居们参与进来，共同确定对伊策略，齐心协力防止伊拉克陷入长期的混乱之中。


If Europe is to act, France and Germany must lead.	如果欧洲要采取行动，法德两国必须起到带头作用。


Precisely because they opposed the war, they are now the only countries that can restore Europe's unity of action in promoting stability.	正是因为它们反对战争，因此成为能让欧洲采取统一行动，促进稳定的唯一人选。


France professes to bearing a special responsibility for international order, but so does Germany; only a few weeks ago, Chancellor Schroeder based his claim to a permanent German seat in the UN Security Council on Germany's readiness to shoulder such responsibilities.	法国明确表示对国际秩序负有特别的责任，而德国在几星期前也刚表过态。 施罗德总理���提出联合国安理会常任理事国申请中提及此事，表明德国愿意承担这样的责任。


Of all the crisis regions in the world today, instability in Iraq constitutes the greatest challenge to international order.	当今世界的所有危机中，伊拉克局势不稳对国际秩序的危害最深。


But France and Germany can also block European responsibility for international order and for solidarity with a US facing possible defeat in Iraq.	但法德两国也可以拒绝担负欧洲维护国际秩序的责任，拒绝与可能在伊遭遇失败的美国联盟。


The decision is theirs.	决定权在他们手中。


It is time for both to realize that the consequences of inaction will be no less severe for the region than for the Atlantic relationship.	但他们是时候认识到：按兵不动对该地区和大西洋关系会带来同样严重的后果。


The Battle of the Burkini	布基尼之战


LONDON – There has been a lot of fuss lately about the handful of Muslim women who choose to bathe on French beaches wearing a special garment that covers the head (not the face), and much of the body.	伦敦——近来几位穆斯林妇女选择身穿遮住头部（脸部裸露在外）和身体绝大部分的特殊服装在法国海滩上沐浴引发了不少人的大惊小怪。


That garment – the so-called burkini – was invented in 2004 by an Australian-Lebanese woman named Aheda Zanetti, with the goal of enabling even the strictest Muslim women to swim or play sports in public.	那种服装——也就是所谓的布基尼——是由一位名叫阿赫达·赞尼蒂的黎巴嫩裔澳大利亚女性于2004年发明的，她发明这种服装的目的是让那些哪怕最严守教规的穆斯林女性也能游泳或在公众场合运动。


Little did Zanetti know that her creation would generate a national controversy.	赞尼蒂恐怕没想到她的发明会引发一场全国性的争论。


The imbroglio started when mayors in several southern French seaside towns banned burkinis on their beaches.	法国南部几个海滨城镇的市长禁止在当地海滩上穿戴布基尼引发了这场纠葛。


A grotesque photograph soon appeared in newspapers around the world of three armed French policemen forcing a woman to undress on a beach in Nice.	一张怪诞的照片很快就出现在世界各地的新闻媒体，照片上有三位全副武装的法国警察，在尼斯的海滩上强迫一位女性脱衣服。


Though the ban has now been invalidated by France’s highest court, it is still enforced in several seaside resorts.	虽然现在法国最高法院否决了这项禁令，但它在几个海边城镇仍在执行当中。


And, indeed, the controversy is far from over.	而且事实上，这场争论还远未结束。


Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is now running for a new term, recently called the burkini a “provocation,” while Lionnel Luca, the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet, spoke of “rampant Islamization.”	法国前总统萨科奇现在正在竞选新的任期，他不久前曾称布基尼为一种“挑衅”，而卢贝新城市长昂奈勒·吕卡则谈论“猖獗的伊斯兰化”。


The equally outraged Prime Minister Manuel Valls has called bare breasts a symbol of French republican liberty.	同样愤怒的法国总理曼努埃尔·瓦尔斯称裸露乳房是法国共和自由的象征。


After all, he concluded, wasn’t Marianne, the female symbol of the French Republic, usually depicted with her breasts exposed?	毕竟，他总结道，法兰西共和国最具象征意义的女性玛丽安难道在绘画作品中不是永远袒露着胸部？


There is little doubt that Sarkozy’s opposition to the burkini is entirely opportunistic.	毫无疑问，萨科齐反对布基尼完全是投机取巧。


The controversy represents yet another opportunity to stoke prejudice against an unpopular minority, in the hope of siphoning votes from the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen in the 2017 election.	这场争论代表了又一次挑起针对不受欢迎的少数族裔的偏见，并且借机在2017年大选中从极右翼国民阵线候选人马琳·勒庞手中争夺选票的机会。


But, in a tradition that spans centuries of European missionary zeal, his opportunism has been cloaked in moral terms: “We don’t imprison women behind fabric.”	但在持续几个世纪的欧洲传教热情的感召下，萨科奇的机会主义却被披上了道德的外衣：“我们不允许用布料来禁锢妇女。 ”


Sarkozy would have us believe that the ban on burkinis is really meant to liberate Muslim women from primitive restrictions imposed by authoritarian Muslim men, just as British colonial rulers once liberated Indian Hindu widows from being burned alive to accompany their spouses in death.	萨科齐想让我们相信就像英国殖民统治者曾挽救印度教寡妇，避免她们在配偶死后被活活烧死的厄运一样，布基尼禁令其实旨在从专制的穆斯林男性强加的原始规定中解放穆斯林妇女。


This reflects a broader tendency, which has been gaining traction since the end of the last century, to couch anti-Muslim rhetoric in the language of human rights, as though equal rights for women or gays were ancient Western customs that must be defended against alien religious bigotry.	这反映了某种从上世纪末就逐步壮大的更广泛的趋势，将反穆斯林言论隐藏在人权的外衣下，就好像妇女或同性恋权利平等是西方古老的法则，必须要在外来宗教所谓的偏执面前得到维护。


In Valls’s version of history, public nudity is a cherished French tradition and a sign of freedom.	在瓦尔斯版的历史中，在公共场合赤身裸体是一种珍贵的法国传统和自由的标志。