But the services provided by the FMLC have never been more necessary.	但FMLC所提供的服务从未像现在那样必不可少。


The FMLC’s mission is to identify and propose solutions to issues of legal uncertainty in financial markets that might create risks in the future.	FMLC的任务是厘清金融市场中可能引起未来风险的法律不确定性问题，并提出解决方案。


As a recent FMLC paper showed, the wave of new regulations implemented since the global financial crisis – many of which were poorly planned or inconsistent across countries – has left a jumbled landscape of legal uncertainties.	最新的FMLC论文表明，全球金融危机爆发以来所实施的新监管潮——其中许多措施根本没有经过很好的计划，或者在国与国之间不具备一致性——带来了非常混乱的法律不确定局面。


Consider banks’ capital requirements.	以银行资本要求为例。


The Basel 3 Accord, adherence to which increased the liquidity of all banks and decreased their leverage, is viewed as a firm standard in some parts of the world.	巴塞尔3协议能让所有银行增加流动性、降低杠杆，它在一些地区被视为可靠的标准。


But, in others, it is regarded as a minimum to which additional rules may be added.	但是，在其他地区，它被认为只是最低要求，还需要添加其他规则。


Such “super-equivalence” or, more colloquially, “gold-plating” creates inconsistencies across jurisdictions, thereby facilitating regulatory arbitrage.	这些“超等价”（super-equivalence），或者通俗地说，这些“镀金”造成了不同司法辖区之间的不一致性，从而有利于监管套利。


Likewise, the European Union, in contrast to the United States, regards the leverage ratio as a supervisory optional extra, known as a “Pillar 2 measure” (which permits supervisors to add additional capital buffers to address a particular bank’s idiosyncratic risks).	类似地，与美国不同，欧盟把杠杆率作为可选监管项，称之为“支柱2手段”（Pillar 2 measure，它允许监管者增加资本缓冲以解决特定银行的特别风险）。


And, though both the US and the EU prohibit proprietary trading, they each define it differently.	此外，尽管美国和欧盟都禁止了自营交易，但对该业务的定义有所不同。


There are also inconsistencies between the US and the EU in derivatives-market reform, which the Financial Stability Board has warned could undermine the objectives, set out by the G-20, of greater standardization of contracts and enhanced transparency.	美国和欧盟的衍生品市场改革也不一致，金融稳定委员会（Financial Stability Board）警告这可能不利于G-20提出的加强衍生品合约标准程度和透明度的目标。


And, whereas the Basel standards continue to refer extensively to credit ratings as the basis for assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers, the Dodd-Frank Act in the US moves away from reliance on ratings.	此外，巴塞尔标准仍然广泛地将信用评级作为评估借款人信誉的基础，但美国的多德-弗兰克法（Dodd-Frank Act）已不再依赖评级。


Such differences – and the FMLC Council lists many more – reflect a dangerous shift in the world’s approach to regulation.	这些区别——FMLC理事会还举出了更多的区别——反映了世界监管方针的危险变化。


The early post-crisis enthusiasm for new, globally agreed regulatory standards has given way to a range of national initiatives, driven by domestic political agendas, with little regard for cross-border compatibility.	危机爆发之初对全球一致监管标准的热情已经变成了各自为政的国家监管政策，这些政策受国内政治日程推动，毫不顾及跨国兼容性。


More problematic, the peer-review procedures that have been introduced so far will do little, if anything, to resolve the problem.	问题更大的是，目前所引入的同行评议程序对于解决问题几乎没有作用。


Nor do the memoranda of understanding drawn up by national financial regulators offer hope of salvation.	国家金融监管机构之间所签订的谅解备忘录也没有带来多少希望。


According to the FMLC paper, “they are usually the subject of interpretative disagreement, are not legally binding, do not benefit from any binding dispute-resolution mechanisms, and do not prevent national authorities from acting unilaterally.”	根据FMLC论文，“它们往往沦为解释不同问题，不具有法律约束力，无法从有约束力的纠纷解决机制中获益，也无法防止国家当局实行单边行动。


So what can be done?	那么我们可以做些什么？


The FMLC makes four important recommendations.	FMLC提出了四点重要建议。


First, the Financial Stability Board should help to reduce avoidable inconsistencies across countries by propagating a set of high-level principles to which all member countries would be expected to conform when introducing new regulations.	首先，金融稳定委员会应该宣传一系列所有成员国在引入新监管措施时都会遵从的高级别原则，以此协助减少跨国不一致性。


Indeed, the need for such principles should have been recognized in 2009, when the wave of re-regulation began.	事实上，这类原则的必要性在2009年监管潮复起时就应该被认识到。


Second, to address existing regulatory conflicts, the FMLC recommends establishing a “conflict of regulation” framework to determine which legal regime – that of a global firm’s home country or that of its local subsidiary’s host country – has jurisdiction in a specific cross-border dispute.	其次，要解决当前的监管冲突，FMLC建议成立“监管冲突“框架以决定哪种法律机制——以跨国企业的母国为准还是以当地分支所在国为准——对具体的跨境纠纷拥有司法权。


The alternative of relying on a third-party multilateral organization to act as mediator in such disputes, the report explains, has little support from G-20 countries.	FMLC报告解释道，替代方案——依靠第三方多边组织作为这类纠纷的调停者——得不到G-20国家的支持。


Third, the FMLC proposes expanding the Financial Stability Board’s mandate.	第三，FMLC建议扩大金融稳定委员会的权限。


That body, which emerged from the old Financial Stability Forum in 2009 with few powers and no formal status, has only recently become a separate legal entity.	该机构2009年脱胎自昔日的金融稳定性论坛，基本上没有任何权力，也没有正式地位，直到最近才成为独立法律实体。


Strengthening its powers – to include, for example, the establishment of principles for addressing cross-border legal inconsistencies – could go a long way toward addressing the problems raised by regulatory disparities.	加强其权力——比如，包括制定解决跨国法律不一致性问题的原则——能大大有利于解决监管不一致所带来的问题。


Finally, the FMLC calls for the establishment of a permanent G-20 secretariat to improve continuity and coordination across G-20 presidencies.	最后，FMLC呼吁成立永久性的G-20秘书机构以改善G-20主席的延续性和协调性。


As it stands, political priorities are constantly in flux, with individual dossiers losing their centrality, and even vanishing, from year to year.	目前，政治重点一直飘忽不定，年复一年，个体正在失去乃至彻底丧失中心地位。


Regulatory uncertainty may not seem like the most exciting topic, which is probably why the FMLC report has attracted so little attention.	监管不确定性也许不是最令人激动的主题，这也许是FMLC报告无法引起多少关注的原因。


But, as the 2008 global financial crisis starkly demonstrated, it can render markets dysfunctional, with ambiguity about different regulators’ responsibilities making it difficult, even impossible, to address the problems caused by failing firms.	但是，2008年全球金融危机清楚地表明，它可以引起市场功能失调，不同监管者责任不清导致解决因企业倒闭带来的问题变得十分困难甚至不可能。


(Former US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s crisis memoir makes that point painfully clear.)	（前美国财政部长蒂姆·盖特纳（Tim Geithner）的危机回忆录十分清楚地指出了这一点。 ）


When I chaired the United Kingdom’s regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority, I believed in the idea that lawyers should be on tap, not on top.	我在主持英国监管机构——金融服务局（Financial Service Authority）时相信，律师只能做事而不能指挥做事。


But they should always be heard.	但我们永远应该聆听他们的声音。


The FMLC’s influential lawyers have spoken.	FMLC的著名律师们发声了。


The world should listen.	世界应该好好听听。


The Overselling of Financial Transaction Taxes	言过其实的金融交易税


CAMBRIDGE – However November’s presidential election in the United States turns out, one proposal that will likely live on is the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT).	坎布里奇—不管11月美国总统大选结果如何，金融交易税都将是有望实施的方案。


While by no means a crazy idea, an FTT is hardly the panacea that its hard-left advocates hold it out to be.	金融交易税绝非疯狂的主意，但也绝不像他的极左鼓吹者那样是万灵丹。


It is certainly a poor substitute for deeper tax reform aimed at making the system simpler, more transparent, and more progressive.	它显然是加深旨在将让税收制度变得更加简单、透明和累进的改革的拙劣替代品。


As American society ages and domestic inequality worsens, and assuming that interest rates on the national debt eventually rise, taxes will need to go up, urgently on the wealthy but some day on the middle class.	随着美国社会的老化和国内不平等性的恶化，并假定国民债务利率最终将上升，税收也需要增加，富裕阶层将立刻经历增税，中产阶级也有一天将会经历。


There is no magic wand, and the politically expedient idea of a “Robin Hood” tax on trading is being badly oversold.	没有魔法，作为政治权宜之计的“罗宾汉”交易税被严重地过度吹捧了。


True, a number of advanced countries already use FTTs of one sort or another.	诚然，诸多发达国家已经以某种方式实施了金融交易税。


The United Kingdom has had a “stamp tax” on stock sales for centuries, and the US had one from 1914 to 1964.	英国向证券卖出行为征收“印花税”，美国在1914—1964年间也有这一税种。


The European Union has a controversial plan on the drawing boards that would tax a much broader array of transactions.	欧盟正在酝酿一项有争议的计划，对范围甚广的一系列交易征税。


The presidential campaign of US Senator Bernie Sanders, which dominates the intellectual debate in the Democratic Party, has argued for a broad-based tax covering stocks, bonds, and derivatives (which include a vast array of more complex instruments such as options and swaps).	美国参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）总统竞选阵营主宰者民主党内部的知识辩论，他们支持一项宽税基税收，对象覆盖了股票、债券和衍生品（包括期权和互换等大量更加复杂的工具）等。


The claim is that such a tax will help repress the forces that led to the financial crisis, raise a surreal amount of revenue to pay for progressive causes, and barely impact middle-class taxpayers.	其理由是这种税收有助于遏制导致金融危机的力量，筹集巨额收入用于进步事业，并几乎不会影响中产阶级纳税人。


So far, Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic nominee, has embraced a narrower version that would target mainly high-speed traders, who account for a large percentage of all stock transactions, and whose contribution to social welfare is open to question.	目前，有望成为民主党提名人的希拉里·克林顿接受了这一方案的精简版，其主要对象是告诉交易者，他们贡献了所有股票交易的大头，并且对社会福利的贡献颇可质疑。


Clinton, however, may well shift closer to Sanders’s position over time, as she has on other issues.	但是，假以时日，克林顿可能会进一步向桑德斯的立场靠拢，就像在其他问题上一样。


Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, has not yet articulated a coherent position on the topic, but his views often come down remarkably close to those of Sanders.	推定的共和党提名人唐纳德·特朗普尚未就这一问题提出一致的立场，但他的观点常常和桑德斯惊人地相似。


The idea of taxing financial transactions dates back to John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s and was taken up by Yale professor and Nobel laureate James Tobin (who, incidentally, was my undergraduate professor) in the 1970s.	对金融交易课税的思想可以追溯到20世纪30年代的约翰·凯恩斯，并由耶鲁大学教授、诺贝尔经济学奖获得者詹姆斯·托宾（James Tobin，碰巧他正是我的本科生教授）发扬光大。


The idea, in Tobin’s words, was to “throw sand in the wheels” of financial markets to slow them down and make them hew more closely to economic fundamentals.	用托宾的话说，这一思想要想金融市场的“轮盘里掺沙子”，目的是让它们慢下来，更加符合经济基本面。


Unfortunately, this rationale has not held up particularly well either in theory or in practice.	不幸的是，这个道理不论在理论上还是在实践上表现得都不甚好。


Particularly misguided is the idea that FTTs would have significantly muted the buildup to the 2008 financial crisis.	特别具有误导性的观点是金融交易税可以有效防止2008年金融危机的酝酿。


Centuries of experience with financial crises, including in countries with FTTs, strongly suggests otherwise.	数百年来的金融危机经验——包括实施了金融交易税的国家的经验——都表明事实正好相反。


What is really needed is better regulation of financial markets.	真正需要的是更好地监管金融市场。


The unwieldy and deeply imperfect 2010 Dodd Frank legislation, with its thousands of pages of provisions, is a stopgap measure; few serious people view it as a long-term solution.	大而无当、缺陷百出的2010年多德-弗兰克立法只是一项权宜之计； 尽管这部立法厚达数千页，但几乎没有严肃认识将它视为长期解决方案。


A far better idea is to force financial firms to issue much more equity (stock), as Stanford University’s Anat Admati has proposed.	一个更好的主意是斯坦福大学的阿纳特·阿德马迪（Anat Admati）提出的强迫金融企业发行更多股本（股票）。


The more banks are forced to evaluate risks based on shareholder losses rather than government bailouts, the safer the system will be.	更多银行被迫基于股东损失而不是政府援助来评估风险，系统就越安全。


(On this score, Boston University professor Laurence Kotlikoff’s more radical ideas for taking leverage out of the financial system merit serious attention, even if his own quixotic presidential campaign otherwise goes unnoticed).	（就这一点而言，波士顿大学教授劳伦斯·科特利科夫（Laurence Kotlikoff）提出了更激进的观点，即消灭金融体系中的杠杆，值得严重关注，尽管他本人异想天开地参加了总统竞选，但没有引起多少关注）。


The fundamental problem with FTTs is that they are distortionary; for example, by driving down stock prices, they make raising capital more expensive for firms.	金融交易税的根本问题是它们具有扭曲性； 比如，它们压低股价，从而让企业筹资成本变高。


In the long run, this lowers labor productivity and wage levels.	在长期，这将拖累劳动生产率和工资水平。


True, all taxes are distorting, and the government has to raise money somehow.	诚然，所有税收都有扭曲性，而政府总得筹集资金。


Yet economists view FTTs as particularly troublesome because they distort intermediate activity, which amplifies their effects.	但经济学家认为金融交易税问题甚大，因为它们扭曲中介活动，这会放大它们的效应。


A modest tax that is narrowly targeted, like the UK’s, does not seem to cause much harm; but the revenue is modest.	目标较窄的温和税收（比如英国的做法）似乎不会引起多少伤害； 但收入也很“温和”。


To get more revenue requires casting the net much wider.	要获得更多收入，就得广撒网。


For this reason, the Sanders plan covers derivative instruments that would circumvent the FTT (for example, by allowing people to trade income streams on assets without trading ownership).	因此，桑德斯的计划覆盖了将绕过金融交易税（比如通过允许人们交易资产收益流而不交易所有权）的衍生工具。 。


But extending the tax to derivatives is a messy business, because their complexities make it difficult to define precisely what should be taxed.	但将税收扩大范围扩大到衍生品会造成混乱，因为衍生品的复杂性意味着难以精确定义那些应该课税。


And as the impact of the tax expands, it becomes hard to know what the ultimate effects on the real economy will be.	而随着税收影响的扩大，也很难知道对实体经济的最终影响将会怎样。


It is certainly difficult to determine whether the outsize revenue estimates of the Sanders campaign could be realized; many studies suggest otherwise.	确定桑德斯阵营所估算的巨大的收入是否能实现当然很难； 许多研究表明情况正好相反。


The claim is that the US can collect more than five times the amount the UK collects on its narrow tax – an amount equal to more than 10% of revenue from personal income tax.	桑德斯阵营主张美国所能筹集的数额将是英国在其较窄的交易税上所筹集数额的五倍多——相当于个人所得税收入的10%以上。


The problem is that trading will likely collapse in many areas, and many financial trades will be executed in other countries.	问题在于许多地区的交易可能崩盘，而许多金融交易将在其他国家执行。


If economic growth is affected, eventually other tax revenues will fall, and if government bonds are covered, borrowing costs will rise.	如果经济增长受到影响，最终其他税收收入将下降，而如果将政府债券也包括进来，借贷成本将会上升。


The US desperately needs comprehensive tax reform, ideally a progressive tax on consumption.	美国急切地需要全面的税收改革，最好是累进消费税。


In any case, a properly designed FTT can be no more than a small part of a much larger strategy, whether for reforming the tax system or for regulating financial markets.	无论如何，设计合理的金融交易税充其量只能是更大的战略中的一小部分，不管是税收制度改革还是金融市场监管。


Financing Education for All	为全民教育融资


NEW YORK – Of all of the investments needed to achieve sustainable development, none is more important than a quality education for every child.	纽约—在实现可持续发展所需要的所有投资中，没有一样比让所有孩子获得高质量教育更加重要。


In a knowledge-based world economy, a good education is vital for finding decent work; achieving good health; building functioning communities; developing the skills to be a dependable parent; and growing up to be an engaged and responsible citizen.	在基于知识的世界经济中，良好的教育对于找到体面工作、实现身体健康、构建运转良好的社区、发展成为可靠父母的技能以及成长为积极参与的负责任的公民来说是不可或缺的。


Indeed, it is no surprise that the most brutish and violent groups in the world, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram, attack education.	事实上，全世界最野蛮、最暴力的群体（如博科圣地等）攻击教育不足为奇。


And it was right on the mark to award the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize to Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani teenager shot by the Taliban for her brave advocacy of girls’ education.	而授予马拉拉·尤沙夫赛（Malala Yousafzai）2014年诺贝尔和平奖也堪称实至名归。 尤沙夫赛是一位巴基斯坦花季少女，因为勇敢地宣扬女孩受教育权而遭到塔利班的枪击。


When the world’s governments launch the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) this September, they will rightly put education for all children at the forefront, alongside ending extreme poverty, hunger, and death from preventable and treatable causes.	今年9月，当世界各国政府启动可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals，SDG）时，它们将正确地把全人类儿童的教育放在最优先的地位，与消灭极端贫困、饥饿和可防可治因素致死并驾齐驱。


Yet, while many poor countries have increased domestic financing for education, the international community has not yet done its part.	但是，尽管许多穷国增加了国内教育融资，但国际社会做得仍然不够。


Aid for education remains too low and too fragmented.	教育援助仍然太少，也太分散。


In advance of adopting the SDGs, at the Conference on Financing for Development in July, the world has the chance to put real resources behind the Education SDG.	在启动SDG之前，7月的发展融资会议（Conference on Financing for Development）将有机会为教育SDG找到真正的资源。


The three major types of partners convening in Addis Ababa – governments, philanthropists, and top companies – should pool resources to enable impoverished countries to scale up education, especially at the pre-K and secondary levels.	在这场亚的斯亚贝巴会议上，三种主要合作方——政府、慈善机构和大公司——应该将资源集中起来，让穷国扩大教育，特别是学前和中学教育。


The time has come to create a Global Fund for Education to ensure that even the world’s poorest children have the chance to receive a quality education at least through secondary school.	应该成立一个全球教育基金（Global Fund for Education ）以确保哪怕是世界上最贫穷的儿童也有机会获得至少延续到中学的高质量教育。


This is how malaria, AIDS, and vaccine-preventable diseases have been battled successfully in the past 15 years.	在过去15年中，我们用这一办法成功战胜了疟疾、艾滋病和疫苗可防疾病。


The United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and other governments teamed up with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, private companies like Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Ericsson, Sumitomo Chemical, and others to ensure that life-saving vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics could reach the poorest of the poor.	美国、英国、挪威、瑞典和其他政府与比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会（Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation）、诺华制药、葛兰素史克、爱立信、住友化学等私人公司以及其他合作者一起保证了救命疫苗、药品和诊断能够普及到最贫穷人口。


The results have been remarkable: millions of lives have been saved, and economic growth has been boosted.	结果令人瞩目：数百万生命得到了拯救，经济增长也得到了刺激。


We must now do the same for education.	如今，我们必须在教育方面依样画葫芦。


Though access to primary schooling has expanded dramatically over the past two decades, a transformative breakthrough in quality learning and secondary education has remained out of reach – until now.	尽管在过去二十年中小学入学率有了大幅提高，但迄今为止在高质量学习和中学教育方面仍没有实现变革性突破。


The spread of computers, mobile phones, and broadband coverage to the poorest regions of the world could – and should – ensure that every child in low-income countries has access to the same trove of online information and quality learning materials as children in high-income countries.	计算机、移动电话和宽带覆盖在世界最贫困地区的普及能够——也应该——确保所有低收入国家儿童能够与高收入国家儿童获得一样的在线信息和高质量学习素材。


Scaling up the use of information and communications technology (ICT), together with improved access to educational innovations, trained teachers and village education workers, and better measurement of learning outcomes, would enable low- and middle-income countries to create high-quality education systems within the next 15 years.	扩大信息和通讯技术（ICT）的使用，再加上增加教育创新普及度、培训教师和乡村教育工作者以及更好地衡量学习成果，将让中低收入国家能够在15年内建立高质量教育体系。


In the meantime, students in impoverished rural schools that currently lack books, electricity, and trained teachers would be connected online – via solar panels and wireless broadband – to quality educational materials, free online courses, and other schools, thereby closing a resource gap that, until recently, seemed insurmountable.	与此同时，目前缺少书籍、电力和受过培训的教师贫困农村学校的学生将通过网络接入——太阳能电板和无线宽带——获得高质量教育素材、免费在线课程和其他学校，从而缩小到目前为止仍显得不可逾越的差距。


The world even has the organizational leadership to make this possible.	世界甚至拥有使这一目标成为可能的有组织的领导。


The Global Partnership for Education is a worldwide coalition of governments and NGOs that has been working for more than a decade with the world’s poorest countries to help them scale up quality education.	全球教育合作组织（Global Partnership for Education，GPE）是由全世界政府和非政府组织组成的联盟，十多年来一直与世界最贫困地区合作，帮助它们扩大高质量教育。


Yet, despite the GPE’s tremendous success in encouraging poor countries to mobilize their own budget resources to expand the reach and quality of their educational programs, rich countries have not adequately supported this effort by closing the financing gap these countries face.	但是，尽管GPE在鼓励穷国动员本国预算资源扩大教育体系的覆盖面、提高教育体系的质量方面取得了巨大的成功，但富国并没有通过填补这些国家所面临的融资缺口给予足够支持。


The GPE should be supported to help build a true Global Fund for Education to ensure that every low-income country that puts in place an effective national strategy and domestic financing would have international support to accomplish its goals.	GPE应该获得支持以帮助成立真正的全球教育基金，确保所有采取了有效国家战略和国内融资的低收入国家都能获得国际支持以实现其目标。


The additional financing required is modest.	所需要的追加融资并不多。


UNESCO recently estimated the annual education “financing gap” of low- and lower-middle-income countries – to cover education up through lower secondary school – to be around $22 billion.	联合国教科文组织最新估计表明，中低收入国家的年度教育“融资缺口”——覆盖初中教育所需要的融资——大约为220亿美元。


Ensuring the scale-up of upper-secondary school and ICT access might raise the needed annual sum to around $40 billion, with detailed cost estimates still to be made.	确保扩大高中教育和获得ICT将让年度融资缺口总额上升到400亿美元左右，详细的成本估算还有待研究。


Such aid would be needed only until today’s poor countries achieve enough economic progress to cover the education bill on their own.	在今天的穷国实现足够大的经济进步、能够自力更生覆盖教育成本之前，都需要这类援助。


That $40 billion might seem like a lot of money, but consider this: The world’s richest 80 people have an estimated net worth of around $2 trillion dollars.	这400亿美元看起来似乎是一大笔钱，但请考虑以下事实：世界上最富有的80人净财富高达2万亿美元左右。


If they would devote just 1% of their net worth each year, they would cover half the global financial need.	如果他们愿意每年仅仅拿出1%的净财富，就可以覆盖全球教育融资需要的一半。


Facebook, Google, Ericsson, Huawei, Samsung, Microsoft, Cisco, and other ICT giants could cover at least another $10 billion per year, in cash and in kind.	Facebook、谷歌、爱立信、华为、三星、微软、思科和其他ICT巨头每年至少可以拿出100亿美元。


A few forward-looking governments could then close the remaining $10 billion gap.	一些前瞻性政府则可以填补剩下的100亿美元缺口。


As we have seen with immunization, this is the kind of partnership that is needed to take the SDGs from rhetoric to reality.	免疫方面的经验表明，这一类型的合作是让SDG从口头承诺变为现实的必要条件。


The beauty of a new Global Fund for Education is that, once it got underway, it would quickly attract supporters from around the world.	新全球教育基金的好处是，一旦成功建立将很快吸引全世界的支持者。


Arab governments would want to ensure that all Arabic-speaking children receive a decent ICT-backed education; Brazil and Portugal would surely contribute to ensure that Africa’s many Portuguese speakers benefit from scaled-up education systems.	阿拉伯政府将希望保证所有阿拉伯语儿童获得优良的基于ICT的教育； 巴西和葡萄牙必将出资确保非洲的许多葡萄牙语使用者从教育体系的扩张中获益。


Innovative high-tech companies would scramble to put their learning tools in front of the world’s children.	创新高科技公司将争相推出学习工具供全世界儿童选择。


Local universities would train teachers and villagers on how to maximize the potential of these new technologies.	地方大学将培训教师和村民如何实现这些新科技的潜力最大化。


The stars – the SDGs, the ICT giants, mobile broadband, online learning, and philanthropists – are aligning for such a scenario.	各路明星——SDG、ICT巨头、移动宽带、在线学习和慈善组织——正在为这一目标合作。


A Global Fund for Education, announced at the Conference on Financing for Development, would be the best news possible for today’s children everywhere and a dazzling inauguration for the SDGs.	在发展融资会议上宣布全球教育基金将是当今世界各地儿童的最好的消息，也是SDG最炫目的头炮。


Europe’s Dysfunctional Growth Compact	欧洲功能失调的增长契约


BRUSSELS – Recently, a €10 billion ($13 billion) shortfall in this year’s European Union budget came to light.	布鲁塞尔—最近，本年度欧盟预算的100亿欧元缺口被曝了光。


As a result, the EU cannot reimburse member states for recent unexpected expenditures, including emergency outlays, such as aid to Italian earthquake victims, and spending aimed at boosting economic growth and employment, such as the accelerated absorption of unused Structural and Cohesion Funds.	结果，欧盟无法偿还成员国近期计划外支出，包括紧急支出（如意大利地震灾区援助）以及旨在提振经济增长和就业的支出（如未使用结构和凝聚基金（Structural and Cohesion Funds）的加速吸收）。


Member states have refused the European Commission’s request for extra contributions to cover the shortfall, causing talks over next year’s budget to collapse.	成员国拒绝欧盟委员会增加出资弥补资金缺口的要求，导致明年预算谈判崩溃。


Meanwhile, negotiations over the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the central-planning instrument for the use of EU funds, have broken down, owing to disagreement over key issues, including the size of the budget and the composition of expenditure.	与此同时，2014—2020多年度财政框架（MFF，欧盟基金使用的中央规划工具）也由于在包括预算规模和支出组成等关键问题上的分歧而无法维持。


The decision has been postponed until early next year.	决定被推迟到明年初。


The situation has highlighted the ambiguity surrounding the EU budget’s role in European integration.	这一状况凸显出欧盟预算在欧洲一体化进程中作用不清。


While all EU leaders have advocated using the budget to stimulate economic growth, little action is being taken.	尽管所有欧盟领导人都支持用预算来刺激经济增长，但行动者寥寥。


This raises doubts about the so-called “growth compact” launched by the European Council in June, particularly about the political commitment to mobilize €120 billion quickly by reallocating unused Structural and Cohesion Funds and increasing the European Investment Bank’s lending capacity.	这引起了人们对欧洲委员会6月提出的所谓的“增长契约”的质疑，特别是其中通过重新配置未使用的结构和凝聚基金以及增加欧洲投资银行（European Investment Bank）的贷款能力迅速动员1200亿欧元的政治承诺。


Indeed, although European governments have agreed to encourage faster absorption of EU funds in crisis countries, they have refused to pay into the EU budget to enable the funds’ disbursement.	事实上，尽管欧洲各国政府同意鼓励快速回收危机国的欧盟基金，但它们拒绝向欧盟预算注资以满足这些基金的支出。


This contradiction signals that national interests continue to prevail in EU budget negotiations, which are often exploited for domestic political gain in member states.	这一矛盾表明，国家利益仍广泛存在于欧盟预算谈判中，成员国总是将谈判当作争取本国政治利益的工具。


Unless a mechanism is introduced that facilitates the rapid disbursement of EU funds, thus insulating the budget from destructive politicization, these funds cannot be used to stimulate growth in times of crisis.	除非引入能够促使欧盟基金快速支出的机制，从而让预算免于毁灭性的政治化，欧盟基金将无法被用于在危机时刺激增长。


Not all member states contribute equally to the EU budget; some are net contributors, while others are net beneficiaries.	各成员国对欧盟预算的出资并不是对等的； 一些国家是净贡献者，一些国家是净受益者。


At the end of EU-financed investment projects – payments for which are agreed and executed in the annual budget framework – the money is transferred to the beneficiary.	在欧盟出资的投资项目结束时——期支出在年度预算框架内同意并执行——资金便被转移给了净受益者。


Cash to net beneficiaries is paid in by net contributors.	而净受益者所得到的资金是由净贡献者出资的。


One country’s inflow of EU money is thus another country’s outflow – and these are grants, not loans.	于是，一国对欧盟资金的流入便是另一国的流出——是资助，不是贷款。


As a result, agreement every seven years on overall expenditures is inadequate to preclude conflict on annual budgets.	结果，每七年签一次总体支出协议并不足以排除年度预算冲突。


Nonetheless, steps can be taken to prevent political deadlock in budget negotiations, while increasing the budget’s flexibility so that it can be used to stimulate growth.	尽管如此，可以采取一些步骤防止在预算谈判中发生政治僵局，同时提高预算的灵活性，以使其能够用于刺激增长。


For example, some leveraging of the budget could be allowed, although this would spark controversy, given that EU treaties require that the budget remains balanced at all times.	比如，可以允许预算使用杠杆，尽管这会引起激烈的争论，因为欧盟条约要求预算随时保持平衡。


But the EU budget has already enabled an indirect form of leveraging: the European Commission’s use of implicit budget guarantees to raise capital on financial markets.	但欧盟预算已经包含着间接的杠杆形式：欧盟委员会利用隐含的预算担保在金融市场上筹集资本。


These funds are used to provide financial assistance to non-eurozone EU countries through the Medium-Term Financial Assistance Facility, to eurozone countries through the now-expired European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, and to partner third countries.	这些资金被用于通过中期金融援助便利（Medium-Term Financial Assistance Facility，MTFA）向非欧元区欧盟国家提供金融援助、通过现已过期的欧洲金融稳定机制（MFSM）向欧元区成员国提供援助以及与其他国家组成伙伴关系。


Between the MTFA, the EFSM, and payments to third countries, the total exposure this year is €70.5 billion.	在MTFA、EFSM和向第三方国家支付之间，今年的总敞口是705亿欧元。


Some borrowing over the seven-year MFF period may be possible, while upholding the medium-term objective of a balanced budget.	在七年的MFF期限中进行一定程度的借贷是可能的，与此同时，还能支持平衡预算的中期目标。


Such leveraging of the EU budget would complement the recently established European Stabilization Mechanism (the successor to the EFSM) and the MTFA.	此类欧盟预算杠杆可以补充最近出台的欧洲稳定机制（ESM，EFSM的后续机制）和MTFA。


Countries receiving assistance should be given the option of applying for an anticipated disbursement of EU funds.	获得���著的国家应被授予申请未来欧盟资金开支的选择权。


Following a request by a member state, the Commission would be entitled to borrow on capital markets under the implicit EU budget guarantee, with the maximum amount determined by the size of the country’s unused (pre-allocated) Structural and Cohesion Funds.	应成员国要求，欧盟委员会将得到授权，以欧盟预算为隐含担保在资本市场上借钱，最大金额由该国未使用（配置前）结构和凝聚基金规模决定。


The capital would be repaid in annual installments as the funds become available through the EU budget, while the national co-financing rate would apply to interest payments.	因为基金在欧盟预算期间都可获得，因此这笔资本将通过每年分期付款偿还，而利息支付将采用该国共同融资利率。


This framework would reduce incentives for using annual EU budget negotiations to advance political agendas.	该框架将削弱利用年度欧盟预算谈判行使政治图谋的激励。


Net contributors would be locked into a relationship with the markets – a convincing creditor.	净出资国将被锁定在市场关系中——可信的债权人。


At the same time, imposing conditionality on this kind of disbursement would enhance legitimacy, as opposed to the current framework, in which beneficiaries seek entitlements.	与此同时，为这类开支设定条件将增强合法性，而现有框架正好相反，受益国会寻求福利。


Indeed, all EU countries – not just eurozone members – would benefit from such a framework.	事实上，所有欧盟国家——不只是欧元区成员国——都能从这样的框架中受益。


Such an initiative could co-exist with European Council President Herman Van Rompuy’s proposal to create a risk-sharing mechanism only for eurozone countries.	这一方案可以和欧洲委员会主席范龙佩关于建立欧元区国家专属风险共担机制的方案共存。


The revamped growth compact would more effectively allocate European resources and increase the flexibility of permanent transfers from rich to poor countries – provided that the money is used for productive investment.	修改后的增长条约将更有效地配置欧洲的资源、增加从富国到穷国的转移支付的灵活性——只要这笔钱被用于生产性投资。


Van Rompuy’s budget would also help to stabilize the eurozone in the event that asymmetric shocks require temporary transfers from unaffected to crisis-stricken countries.	范龙佩的预算方案还有助于在不对称冲击要求未受影响国家向危机袭击国家进行转移支付时稳定欧元。


In fact, the two instruments may well be complementary in eurozone countries.	事实上，这两样工具可以在欧元区国家完美共存。


Crises are typically associated with a drop not only in actual growth, but also in a country’s growth potential, owing to deferred investment.	危机通常不仅伴随实际增长的下降，也伴随增长潜力的下降（因投资不振导致）。


A risk-sharing facility could limit the decline in actual growth after a crisis, while prompt EU-financed investment would prevent a country from shifting to a lower growth path.	风险共担便利能够限制危机后的世纪增长下跌幅度，与此同时，及时的欧盟融资投资项目能够防止防止一国向更低的增长路径迁移。


Financing the Green Economy	为绿色经济融资


ADDIS ABABA – At the climate-change summit in Copenhagen last December, political leaders expressed a strong will to urgently combat global warming.	发自亚的斯亚贝巴——在去年11月的哥本哈根气候变化峰会上，一众政治领袖都表现出要尽快为全球变暖效应制定对策的强烈意愿。


As we approach the next climate-change summit in Cancún, Mexico, this December, the international community must deliver concrete results and move forward to address the challenge.	而在墨西哥坎昆气候峰会将于本月召开之际，国际社会必须取得切实成果，并进一步向应对挑战迈进。


In this regard, at the Copenhagen summit developed countries committed themselves to the goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.  These funds would be transferred to developing countries in the context of meaningful – and transparently implemented – mitigation measures taken on their behalf.	“钱”是全球各国应对气候变化的其中一个关键因素，对此各发达国家已经在哥本哈根峰会上承诺每年筹集1000亿美元以填补发展中国家的资金缺口，并持续到2020年为止。 而这笔资金将被用于开展一系列合理可行且程序透明的移民措施之上。


United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Finance (AGF), which we chaired, was established to identify practical proposals for how developed countries can mobilize this level of climate financing by 2020.	为此联合国秘书长潘基文特别成立了全球气候变化金融问题高级咨询小组，并任命为笔者为召集人，专门就发达国家如何在2020年前筹集这笔巨资这个问题寻求实用方案。


The 21-member group included heads of state and ministers from both developed and developing countries, representatives from international organizations, experts on public finance and development, and leaders from the private sector.	该小组的21名成员既包括了发达国家和发展中国家的首脑和财政部长，还涵盖了国际组织代表，公共财政和发展领域的专家，以及来自私人部门的领袖人物。


Admittedly, the current global economic environment has placed public finances in many developed countries under extreme pressure.	诚然，当前的全球经济环境已经对许多发展中国家的公共财政造成了巨大压力。


Nevertheless, the AGF’s report concludes that reaching the goal of raising $100 billion a year by 2020, while challenging, is feasible.	但咨询小组的报告也显示：虽然在2020年前每年筹集如此巨款的任务非常艰巨，但还是切实可行的。


It will require a mix of new public sources, a scaling-up of existing public sources, and increased private flows.	而这则需要拓展一系列新的公共资源，加大现有公共资源所占比例，并增加来自私人部门的资金支持。


Among the AGF’s conclusions, which we have presented to the UN Secretary-General, there are some important messages:	我们呈交给潘基文秘书长的报告结论中包含了以下几条重要信息：


First, a carbon price in the range of $20-25 per ton of CO2 by 2020 is key to mobilizing climate finance at this level.	首先，要筹集这笔巨资，关键是要在2020年之前执行20~25美元/吨的碳排放收费。


Carbon prices expand the potential for both public and private financing by raising public revenue and creating private-sector demand for emission reductions.	该费用将有助于挖掘公共和私人部门的资金潜力，一方面增加了政府收入，另一方面也能激发私人部门的减排需求。


Second, new public mechanisms can mobilize tens of billions of dollars annually, an important step towards the $100-billion goal.	其二，新的公共机制将调动起数百亿美元的资金，并为实现每年1000亿美元的目标迈出重要一步。


Examples include the auctioning of emissions allowances, carbon taxes, and the pricing of emissions from international transport.	措施内容包括拍卖排放配额，征收碳税以及针对国际运输的碳排放费。


Policy instruments based on carbon pricing are particularly attractive, because they raise revenue for adaptation to climate change in developing countries while creating incentives for mitigation in developed countries.	基于碳排放收费的政策工具尤其引人注目，因为它不但为发展中国的气候变化应对措施筹集了资金，还能令各发达国家产生减排的动机。


Third, international private investment flows are essential. It is the private sector that will finance most low-carbon, sustainable growth.	第三，来自国际私人投资的资金是必不可少的。 事实上，大多数低碳和可持续发展措施都是由私人部门提供资助的。


Public funding should help leverage climate-friendly private investments. The multilateral development banks, in close collaboration with the UN system, can play a significant multiplier role in this regard.	而公共资金的作用则是抛砖引玉，最终带动一大批环保私人投资。 而与联合国紧密合作的各跨国开发银行将在这方面发挥重大的乘数效应。


Several sources of financing for adaptation and mitigation efforts in developing countries could be made operational relatively quickly.	众多有助于发展中国家适应和缓和气候变化影响的资金来源可以相对较快地投入运行。


We need to make progress on establishing the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, including, possibly, regional and thematic vehicles, such as an Africa Green Fund.	我们需要在成立哥本哈根绿色气候基金方面取得进一步进展，甚至包括一系列地区性专用架构，比如非洲绿色基金。


Ensuring economic growth and addressing climate change do not have to be opposing goals.	确保经济增长和应对气候变化这两个目标其实并不存在矛盾，也是可以并应当携手共进的；


They can and should go hand in hand; what we need is climate-resilient, low-carbon growth.	因为我们真正需要的是一个气候适应性强且低碳的经济增长。


It is now up to governments, international institutions, and the private sector to draw on our analysis in support of climate action.	请各国政府，国际组织和私人部门借助我们的分析，大家齐心协力扶持相关的气候应对措施吧！


Financing Health and Education for All	为全民卫生及教育筹资


NEW YORK – In 2015, around 5.9 million children under the age of five, almost all in developing countries, died from easily preventable or treatable causes.	纽约——2015年，几乎全部来自发展中国家的约590万5岁以下儿童死于可以轻松预防或治疗的原因。


And up to 200 million young children and adolescents do not attend primary or secondary school, owing to poverty, including 110 million through the lower-secondary level, according to a recent estimate.	同时近期估计数据显示，高达2亿儿童和青少年因贫困而未读过小学或中学，包括1. 1亿仅仅读过初中。


In both cases, massive suffering could be ended with a modest amount of global funding.	无论是哪种情况，如此大规模的苦难都可以因适度全球资助而终结。


Children in poor countries die from causes – such as unsafe childbirth, vaccine-preventable diseases, infections such as malaria for which low-cost treatments exist, and nutritional deficiencies – that have been almost totally eliminated in the rich countries.	贫困国家儿童常死于不安全分娩、疫苗可预防疾病、低成本治疗可以奏效的疟疾等感染性疾病、还有营养不良； 这些导致儿童死亡的原因在富裕国家几乎已经被彻底消灭掉。


In a moral world, we would devote our utmost effort to end such deaths.	在一个恪守道德标准的世界，我们会为结束这样的死亡贡献我们最大的力量。


In fact, the world has made a half-hearted effort.	事实上，世界各国付出了三心二意的努力。


Deaths of young children have fallen to slightly under half the 12.7 million recorded in 1990, thanks to additional global funding for disease control, channeled through new institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.	多亏通过全球抗击艾滋病、结核和疟疾基金等新成立机构划拨的额外全球疾病控制经费，幼儿的死亡人数已经比1990年记录的1270万下降了略微超过半数。


When I first recommended such a fund in 2000, skeptics said that more money would not save lives.	2000年我首次建议成立上述基金的时候，怀疑者表示追加投资也无法挽救生命。


Yet the Global Fund proved the doubters wrong: More money prevented millions of deaths from AIDS, TB, and malaria.	但全球基金用事实证明了怀疑论者的错误：追加投资防止了成百上千万人死于结核、疟疾和艾滋病。


It was well used.	这些钱花得非常值得。


The reason that child deaths fell to 5.9 million, rather to near zero, is that the world gave only about half the funding necessary.	儿童死亡人数降到590万、而不是接近零是因为世界只提供了必要资金的大约一半。


While most countries can cover their health needs with their own budgets, the poorest countries cannot.	虽然多数国家可以靠本国预算满足其健康需求，但最贫困国家却做不到。


They need about $50 billion per year of global help to close the financing gap.	他们每年需要约500亿美元的全球援助才能弥补资金缺口。


Current global aid for health runs at about $25 billion per year.	目前的全球医疗援助每年约250亿美元。


While these numbers are only approximate, we need roughly an additional $25 billion per year to help prevent up to six million deaths per year.	尽管以上数据仅仅是个大概，我们仍要每年追加250亿美元来协助防止每年高达600万人死亡。


It’s hard to imagine a better bargain.	很难想象资金还有比这更有意义的去处。


Similar calculations help us to estimate the global funding needed to enable all children to complete at least a high-school education.	类似的计算帮助我们估算出让所有儿童至少完成高中学业所需的全球投资额。


UNESCO recently calculated the global education “financing gap” to cover the incremental costs – of classrooms, teachers, and supplies – of universal completion of secondary school at roughly $39 billion.	联合国教科文组织最近计算出支付教室、老���及用品等普及中学教育所需增量经费的全球教育“资金缺口”约为390亿美元。


With current global funding for education at around $10-15 billion per year, the gap is again roughly $25 billion, similar to health care.	因为目前的全球教育经费只有约每年100到150亿美元，因此和医疗一样，这里再次出现了约250亿美元的资金缺口。


And, as with health care, such increased global funding could effectively flow through a new Global Fund for Education.	而且，和医疗一样，这些增量全球资金可以有效地通过新成立的全球教育基金划拨。


Thus, an extra $50 billion or so per year could help ensure that children everywhere have access to basic health care and schooling.	因此，每年额外追加500亿美元左右就可以协助确保世界各地的儿童享受到基本的医疗和教育。


The world’s governments have already adopted these two objectives – universal health care and universal quality education – in the new Sustainable Development Goals.	世界各国政府已经在全新可持续发展目标中设定了这两项目标——全民医疗和全民素质教育。


An extra $50 billion per year is not hard to find.	每年追加500亿美元的资金来源并不难找到。


One option targets my own country, the United States, which currently gives only around 0.17% of gross national income for development aid, or roughly one-quarter of the international target of 0.7% of GNI for development assistance.	一种方案是以我所在的国家美国为目标，美国目前只拿出国民总收入的约0. 17%用于发展援助，仅仅相当于国际通行的将国民总收入的0.


Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom each give at least 0.7% of GNI; the US can and should do so as well.	瑞典、丹麦、挪威、荷兰、卢森堡和英国都拿出了国民总收入的0. 7%以上；


If it did, that extra 0.53% of GNI would add roughly $90 billion per year of global funding.	如果美国履行义务，其国民总收入额外增加的0. 53%每年会增加约900亿美元的全球投入。


The US currently spends around 5% of GDP, or roughly $900 billion per year, on military-related spending (for the Pentagon, the CIA, veterans, and others).	美国目前将国民生产总值的5%，约合每年9000亿美元，用于军事相关开支（五角大楼、中情局、退伍军人及其他费用）。


It could and should transfer at least $90 billion of that to development aid.	美国可以而且应当将其中的至少900亿美元转用于发展援助。


Such a shift in focus from war to development would greatly bolster US and global security; the recent US wars in North Africa and the Middle East have cost trillions of dollars and yet have weakened, not strengthened, national security.	这样从战争到发展的重心转移将大大增强美国和全球的安全形势； 美国最近发动的北非和中东战争已经耗资数万亿美元，但却削弱而非增强了国家安全形势。


A second option would tax the global rich, who often hide their money in tax havens in the Caribbean and elsewhere.	第二种方案是向全球富豪征税，这些人往往将财产隐藏在加勒比海和其他地方的避税天堂。


Many of these tax havens are UK overseas territories.	很多避税天堂都是英国的海外领土。


Most are closely connected with Wall Street and the City of London.	其中多数与华尔街和伦敦关系密切。


The US and British governments have protected the tax havens mainly because the rich people who put their money there also put their money into campaign contributions or into hiring politicians’ family members.	美国和英国政府保护避税天堂主要因为将财产隐匿在那里的富人同时为竞选活动提供资金或雇用政客家属。


The tax havens should be called upon to impose a small tax on their deposits, which total at least $21 trillion.	应当呼吁避税天堂对其存款实施小额征税，那里的存款总额至少达21万亿美元以上。


The rich countries could enforce such a tax by threatening to cut off noncompliant havens’ access to global financial markets.	富国可以通过威胁切断不守规矩的避税天堂接入全球金融市场通道来落实上述税收。


Of course, the havens should also ensure transparency and crack down on tax evasion and corporate secrecy.	当然，避税天堂也应在确保透明度的同时打击偷税漏税及企业秘密。


Even a deposit tax as low as 0.25% per year on $21 trillion of deposits would raise around $50 billion per year.	即便对21万亿美元的存款每年征税0. 25%也可以每年筹资约500亿美元。


Both solutions would be feasible and relatively straightforward to implement.	这两种方案都具有可行性且执行相对简单。


They would underpin the new global commitments contained in the SDGs.	它们将支撑新的全球可持续发展目标。


At the recent Astana Economic Forum, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev wisely called for some way to tax offshore deposits to fund global health and education.	在日前举行的阿斯塔纳经济论坛上，哈萨克斯坦总统纳扎尔巴耶夫明智地呼吁通过某种方式对海外存款征税，从而为全球医疗和教育筹资。


Other world leaders should rally to his call to action.	其他国家领导人应当支持他的行动号召。


Our world is immensely wealthy and could easily finance a healthy start in life for every child on the planet through global funds for health and education.	我们的世界极其富裕，可以通过全球医疗和教育基金轻松实现让地球上的所有孩子健康地开始生活。


A small shift of funds from wasteful US military spending, or a very small levy on tax havens’ deposits – or similar measures to make the super-rich pay their way – could quickly and dramatically improve poor children’s life chances and make the world vastly fairer, safer, and more productive.	从巨额浪费的美国军事开支中划拨一小部分、或者对避税天堂存款小额征税——再或者采取类似的方法让超级富豪拿出钱来——都可以迅速并显著地改善贫困儿童的生存机会，并使世界更公平、更安全和更高效。


There is no excuse for delay.	继续拖延找不到任何借口。


Finding the Keys to National Prosperity	国家繁荣的关键


NEW YORK – In many of history’s most successful economic reforms, clever countries have learned from the policy successes of others, adapting them to local conditions.	发自纽约——在历史上许多最为成功的经济改革过程中，明智的国家都会借鉴其他国家的成功政策并使之适应本国国情。 在经济发展的历史长河中，18世纪的英国拜荷兰为师；


In the long history of economic development, eighteenth-century Britain learned from Holland; early nineteenth-century Prussia learned from Britain and France; mid-nineteenth-century Meiji Japan learned from Germany; post-World War II Europe learned from the United States; and Deng Xiaoping’s China learned from Japan.	19世纪初的普鲁士王国向英国和法国学习； 19世纪中明治维新时期的日本借鉴德国；


Through a process of institutional borrowing and creative adaptation, successful economic institutions and cutting-edge technologies spread around the world, and thereby boost global growth.	通过制度上的借鉴和创造性的适应过程，成功的经济制度以及前沿技术得以向全世界扩散，从而促进了全球经济增长。


Today, too, there are some great opportunities for this kind of “policy arbitrage,” if more countries would only take the time to learn from other countries’ successes.	只要更多的国家都能花点时间来学习别国的成功经验，对它们来说当前这种“政策套利”的巨大机会就依然存在。


For example, while many countries are facing a jobs crisis, one part of the capitalist world is doing just fine: northern Europe, including Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia.	例如，当许多国家正在面对就业危机的时候，资本主义世界的某些部分——北欧，包括德国，荷兰和斯堪的纳维亚半岛地区——表现尚可。


Germany’s unemployment rate this past summer was around 5.5%, and its youth unemployment rate was around 8% – remarkably low compared with many other high-income economies.	今年夏季德国的失业率约为5. 5%，其中年轻人的失业率约为8%——跟其他许多高收入国家相比，这算非常低的。


How do northern Europeans do it?	这些北欧国家是怎么做到这一点的？


All of them use active labor market policies, including flex time, school-to-work apprenticeships (especially Germany), and extensive job training and matching. 	它们都采用积极的劳动力市场政策——这些政策包括弹性工作时间，“从学校到职场”的职业教育（尤其是德国），以及大量的就业培训和人员/岗位配对。


Likewise, in an age of chronic budget crises, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland run near-balanced budgets.	同样，在这个长期预算危机的时代，德国，瑞典和瑞士都能基本实现预算平衡。


All three rely on budget rules that call for cyclically adjusted budget balance.	这三个国家依靠周期性调整财政收支平衡的预算规则。


And all three take a basic precaution to keep their entitlement spending under control: a retirement age of at least 65.	三国都采取了基本的预防措施以控制津贴开支——退休年龄至少为65岁。


This keeps costs much lower than in France, and Greece, for example, where the retirement age is 60 or below, and where pension outlays are soaring as a result.	这就使得这些国家的津贴支出比退休年龄为60岁或以下的国家——例如法国和希腊——要低得多，而后者的退休金支出正在不断膨胀。


In an age of rising health-care costs, most high-income countries – Canada, the European Union’s Western economies, and Japan – manage to keep their total health-care costs below 12% of GDP, with excellent health outcomes, while the US spends nearly 18% of GDP, yet with decidedly mediocre health outcomes.	在这个医疗保健费用不断上升的年代，大部分高收入国家——加拿大，欧盟内部的西欧国家以及日本——都设法将其总医疗成本控制在GDP的12%以下并保持着良好的国民健康状况，然而美国在这方面的支出了几乎占GDP的18%，但国民健康状况依然处于中下水平。


And, America’s is the only for-profit health system of the entire bunch.	美国是这些国家中惟一拥有营利性医疗系统的国家。


A new report by the US Institute of Medicine has found that America’s for-profit system squanders around $750 billion, or 5% of GDP, on waste, fraud, duplication, and bureaucracy.     	对此美国医学研究所发布的一份新报告指出：这些营利性系统已经在浪费、欺诈、无谓重复和官僚行为上挥霍了大概7500亿美元——相当于GDP的5%。


In an age of soaring oil costs, a few countries have made a real difference in energy efficiency.	在这个油价上涨的时代，一些国家在能源效率上取得了不俗的成就。


The OECD countries, on average, use 160 kilograms of oil-equivalent energy for every $1,000 of GDP (measured at purchasing power parity).	经济合作及发展组织成员国每创造1000美元的GDP（以购买力平价来衡量）平均消耗相当于160公斤石油的能源。


But, in energy-efficient Switzerland, energy use is just 100 kg per $1,000 of GDP, and in Demark it is just 110 kg, compared with 190 kg in the US.	但是，在高能效的瑞士，创造每一千美元的能源使用量仅为100公斤，丹麦为110公斤，相比之下美国的能源使用量高达190公斤。


In an age of climate change, several countries are demonstrating how to move to a low-carbon economy.	在这个气候变化的时代，一些国家正在演示如何向低碳经济转型。


On average, the rich countries emit 2.3 kg of CO2 for every kg of oil-equivalent unit of energy.	富裕国家每消耗1千克与汽油等价的单位能源平均排放2. 3千克的二氧化碳。


But France emits just 1.4 kg, owing to its enormous success in deploying safe, low-cost nuclear energy.	而法国仅排放1. 4千克，这得益于其在推广安全低成本核能上所取得的巨大成功。


Sweden, with its hydropower, is even lower, at 0.9 kg.	利用水力发电的瑞典的二氧化碳排放量更低，只有0.


And, while Germany is abandoning domestic production of nuclear energy for political reasons, we can bet that it will nonetheless continue to import electricity from France’s nuclear plants.	9千克。 由于德国出于政治原因放弃了国内核能生产，我们可以打赌它将继续从法国核电厂进口电。


In an age of intense technological competition, countries that combine public and private research and development (R&D) financing are outpacing the rest.	在这个技术竞争极为激烈的年代，公共和私人研发融资相结合的国家表现优于其他国家。


The US continues to excel, with huge recent breakthroughs in Mars exploration and genomics, though it is now imperiling that excellence through budget cuts.	近期美国在火星探索和基因学上的巨大突破使其继续傲视同侪，但预算削减已经威胁到了这一点。 与此同时，瑞典和韩国的研发支出约为GDP的3.


Meanwhile, Sweden and South Korea are now excelling economically on the basis of R&D spending of around 3.5% of GDP, while Israel’s R&D outlays stand at a remarkable 4.7% of GDP.	5%并以此取得了经济上的极佳表现，而以色列的研发支出占GDP比例则达到了令人瞩目的4. 7%。


In an age of rising inequality, at least some countries have narrowed their wealth and income gaps.	在这个贫富差距日益扩大的时代，至少有一些国家缩小了国内的财富和收入差距。


Brazil is the recent pacesetter, markedly expanding public education and systematically attacking remaining pockets of poverty through targeted transfer programs.	巴西是近期的榜样，它大幅扩大了公共教育并通过针对性的转移支付计划有系统地处理剩下的贫穷地区。


As a result, income inequality in Brazil is declining.	因此巴西的收入差距正在缩小。


And, in an age of pervasive anxiety, Bhutan is asking deep questions about the meaning and nature of happiness itself.	而且在这个人们普遍焦虑的时代，不丹正在探索幸福的本质及其深层意义。


In search of a more balanced society that combines economic prosperity, social cohesion, and environmental sustainability, Bhutan famously pursues Gross National Happiness rather than Gross National Product.	为了寻找一个经济繁荣、社会团结和环境可持续发展三者相结合的更加平衡的社会，不丹以追求国民幸福总值而非国民生产总值闻名天下。


Many other countries – including the United Kingdom – are now following Bhutan’s lead in surveying their citizenry about life satisfaction.	很多其它的国家——包括英国——都在以不丹为榜样，考察本国公民的生活满意度。


The countries highest on the ladder of life satisfaction are Denmark, Finland, and Norway.	在生活满意度上排名最高的国家是丹麦，芬兰和挪威。


Yet there is hope for those at lower latitudes as well.	然而那些处于低纬度的国家不乏希望。


Tropical Costa Rica also ranks near the top of the happiness league.	热带的哥斯达黎加在幸福度排名上也相当靠前。


What we can say is that all of the happiest countries emphasize equality, solidarity, democratic accountability, environmental sustainability, and strong public institutions.	我们可以推断出幸福感最高的这些国家都强调平等，团结，民主问责，环境可持续性和强大的公共机构。


So here is one model economy: German labor-market policies, Swedish pensions, French low-carbon energy, Canadian health care, Swiss energy efficiency, American scientific curiosity, Brazilian anti-poverty programs, and Costa Rican tropical happiness.	这里有一个标准的经济模型：德国劳动力市场政策，瑞典的退休金，法国的低碳能源，加拿大的医疗保健，瑞士的能源效率，美国的科学好奇心，巴西的扶贫项目以及哥斯达黎加的热带幸福感。


Of course, back in the real world, most countries will not achieve such bliss anytime soon.	当然，在真实的世界中，大部分国家都难以很快实现这样完美的状态。


But, by opening our eyes to policy successes abroad, we would surely speed the path to national improvement in countries around the world.	但是通过观察学习国外的成功政策，全世界各国无疑都能加快其国家发展速度。


The Globalization Disconnect	全球化断线


NEW HAVEN – While seemingly elegant in theory, globalization suffers in practice.	纽黑文—全球化在理论上看上去很美，实际却饱受折磨。


That is the lesson of Brexit and of the rise of Donald Trump in the United States.	这就是英国脱欧和美国特朗普崛起的教训。


And it also underpins the increasingly virulent anti-China backlash now sweeping the world.	这也是眼下席卷全世界的日益凶残的反华风潮的基础。


Those who worship at the altar of free trade – including me – must come to grips with this glaring disconnect.	崇拜自由贸易神坛的人——包括我在内——必须认识这一显而易见的“断线”（disconnect）。


Truth be known, there is no rigorous theory of globalization.	首先要澄清一个真相，关于全球化并没有严格的理论。


The best that economists can offer is David Ricardo’s early nineteenth-century framework: if a country simply produces in accordance with its comparative advantage (in terms of resource endowments and workers’ skills), presto, it will gain through increased cross-border trade.	经济学家拿得出手的最好的理论是十九世纪初大卫·李嘉图所提出的框架：如果一国只生产符合其比较优势（从资源禀赋和工人技能角度讲）的产品，那么，它就能从扩大的跨境贸易中获益。


Trade liberalization – the elixir of globalization – promises benefits for all.	贸易自由化——全球化的圣水——能让所有人获益。


That promise arguably holds in the long run, but a far tougher reality check invariably occurs in the short run.	这一许诺从长期看相当靠谱，但在短期，免不了会出现相当艰难的现实。


Brexit – the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union – is just the latest case in point.	英国退出——英国脱离欧盟——这是这方面最近的例子。


Voters in the UK objected to several of the key premises of regional integration: free labor mobility and seemingly open-ended immigration, regulation by supranational authorities in Brussels, and currency union (which has serious flaws, such as the lack of a fiscal transfer mechanism among member states).	英国选民拒绝了某些地区一体化的关键条件：劳动力自由流动和貌似无限制的移民； 布鲁塞尔超国家机构提供的监管；


Economic integration and globalization are not exactly the same thing, but they rest on the same Ricardian principles of trade liberalization – principles that are falling on deaf ears in the political arena.	货币联盟（存在严重漏洞，如缺少一个各成员国之间的财政转移机制）。 经济一体化和全球化并不严格相等，但它们都建立在李嘉图贸易自由化原理之上——这些原理在政治领域不受待见。


In the US, Trump’s ascendancy and the political traction gained by Senator Bernie Sanders’s primary campaign reflect many of the same sentiments that led to Brexit.	在美国，特朗普的影响力以及参议员桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）在初选中所赢得的选票也反映了导致英国脱欧的情绪。


From immigration to trade liberalization, economic pressures on a beleaguered middle class contradict the core promises of globalization.	从移民到贸易自由化，困境重重的中产阶级所受到的经济压力与全球化的核心许诺形成了矛盾。


As is often the case – and particularly in a presidential election year – America’s politicians resort to the blame game in confronting these tough issues.	和往常一样——特别是在总统选举年——美国政客在面对这些棘手问题时又开始了指责游戏。


Trump has singled out China and Mexico, and Sanders’s opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership – the proposed trade deal between the US and 11 Pacific Rim countries – has pushed Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party’s nominee, to adopt a similar stance.	特朗普拿出了中国和墨西哥，而桑德斯对跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP，美国与环太平洋11国的贸易协议）的反对促使民主党提名人希拉里·克林顿也采取了类似的立场。


In short, globalization has lost its political support – unsurprising in a world that bears little resemblance to the one inhabited by Ricardo two centuries ago.	简言之，全球化失去了政治支持——在这个两个世纪前的李嘉图时代截然不同的世界，这并不令人奇怪。


Ricardo’s arguments, couched in terms of England’s and Portugal’s comparative advantages in cloth and wine, respectively, hardly seem relevant for today’s hyper-connected, knowledge-based world.	李嘉图的观点用英格兰和葡萄牙分别在服装和葡萄酒方面的比较优势为例阐述，与当今高度互联、基于知识的世界大相径庭。


The Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson, who led the way in translating Ricardian foundations into modern economics, reached a similar conclusion late in his life, when he pointed out how a disruptive low-wage technology imitator like China could turn the theory of comparative advantage inside out.	诺贝尔奖获得者保罗·萨缪尔逊（Paul Samuelson）是将李嘉图的基础转化为现代经济学的先驱，他在晚年得到了一个类似的结论——他指出，中国等破坏性低工资技术模仿者可能完全颠覆比较优势理论。


Nor is it just a problem with an antiquated theory.	而问题不仅仅在于过时的理论。


Recent trends in global trade are also flashing warning signs.	全球贸易的最新趋势也是警报频响。


According to the International Monetary Fund, annual growth in the volume of world trade has averaged just 3% over the 2009-2016 period – half the 6% rate from 1980 to 2008.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF），2009—2016年世界贸易量年增长平均刚刚超过3%——只有1980—2008年期间6%的一半。


This reflects not only the Great Recession, but also an unusually anemic recovery.	这不仅是因为大衰退，也是因为此后复苏的反常萎靡。


With world trade shifting to a decidedly lower trajectory, political resistance to globalization has only intensified.	随着世界贸易已确凿无疑滑入了更低的趋势，对全球化的政治抵制只能与日俱增。


Of course, this isn’t the first time that globalization has run into trouble.	当然，这不是全球化第一次陷入麻烦。 全球化1.


Globalization 1.0 – the surge in global trade and international capital flows that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – met its demise between World War I and the Great Depression.	0——十九世纪末、二十世纪初全球贸易和国际资本流激增——“死于”第一次世界大战和大萧条期间。


Global trade fell by some 60% from 1929 to 1932, as major economies turned inward and embraced protectionist trade policies, such as America’s infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.	1929—1932年，全球贸易下跌了六成，主要经济体纷纷向内转向，采取了保护主义贸易政策，美国1930年史穆特-哈雷关税法便是著名的例子。


But the stakes may be greater if today’s more powerful globalization were to meet a similar fate.	但如果当今更加强大的全球化遭到同样的命运，代价将更加高昂。 全球化1.


In contrast to Globalization 1.0, which was largely confined to the cross-border exchange of tangible (manufactured) goods, the scope of Globalization 2.0 is far broader, including growing trade in many so-called intangibles – once nontradable services.	0主要局限于有形（制造）品的跨境交换，而全球化2. 0的范围要广泛得多，许多所谓的无形商品——曾经不可贸易的服务——贸易日增。


Similarly, the means of Globalization 2.0 are far more sophisticated than those of its antecedent.	类似地，全球化2. 0的手段比它的前辈成熟得多。


The connectivity of Globalization 1.0 occurred via ships and eventually railroads and motor vehicles.	全球化1. 0的连通性先通过轮船，在通过铁路和汽车实现。


Today, these transportation systems are far more advanced – augmented by the Internet and its enhancement of global supply chains.	如今，这些交通系统已��天翻地覆——因为互联网及其对全球供应链的强化而大大扩张。


The Internet has also enabled instantaneous cross-border dissemination of knowledge-based services such as software programming, engineering and design, medical screening, and accounting, legal, and consulting work.	互联网让基于知识的服务——如软件编程、工程与设计、医学筛查以及会计、法律和咨询工作——能够在一瞬间实现跨境流动。


The sharpest contrast between the two waves of globalization is in the speed of technology absorption and disruption.	两次全球化浪潮最尖锐的对比在于技术的吸收和破坏的速度。


New information technologies have been adopted at an unusually rapid rate.	新信息技术以罕见的高速被采用。


It took only five years for 50 million US households to begin surfing the Internet, whereas it took 38 years for a similar number to gain access to radios.	区区五年， 5,000万美国家庭就实现了网上冲浪，而无线电达到类似的普及程度用了38年。


Sadly, the economics profession has failed to grasp the inherent problems with globalization.	悲哀的是，经济学界没有抓住全球化的内在问题。


In fixating on an antiquated theory, they have all but ignored the here and now of a mounting worker backlash.	在修补过时理论的过程中，他们完全忽视了当下日益增长的工人抵制。


Yet the breadth and speed of Globalization 2.0 demand new approaches to cushion the blows of this disruption.	但全球化2. 0的广度和速度要求采取新的方法来缓冲这一破坏的冲击。


Unfortunately, safety-net programs to help trade-displaced or trade-pressured workers are just as obsolete as theories of comparative advantage.	不幸的是，帮助因贸易而失去饭碗或受到压力的工人的安全网计划和比较优势理论一样陈旧。


America’s Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, for example, was enacted in 1962 for the manufacturing-based economy of yesteryear.	比如，美国贸易调整救济（TAA）计划诞生于1962年，那还是基于制造的旧经济时代。


According to a report published by the Peterson Institute, only two million US workers have benefited from TAA since 1974.	据彼得森研究所（Peterson Institute）所发布的一份报告，自1974年以来只有两百万美国工人得益于TAA。


The design of more enlightened policies must account for the powerful pressures now bearing down on a much broader array of workers.	更加开明的政策在设计时必须考虑如今范围越来越广的工人所承受的巨大压力。


The hyper-speed of Globalization 2.0 suggests the need for quicker triggers and wider coverage for worker retraining, relocation allowances, job-search assistance, wage insurance for older workers, and longer-duration unemployment benefits.	全球化2. 0的超高速意味着需要更快速、覆盖面更广地开展工人再培训、安置津贴、求职补助、高龄工人工资保险和延长失业救济时限。


As history cautions, the alternative – whether it is Brexit or America’s new isolationism – is an accident waiting to happen.	历史告诉我们，替代方案——不管是英国脱欧还是美国的新孤立主义——在前面等着我们。


It is up to those of us who defend free trade and globalization to prevent that, by offering concrete solutions that address the very real problems that now afflict so many workers.	我们这些捍卫自由贸易和全球化的人必须阻止它们的发生，而我们的办法是巩固能够解决如今折磨着如此多工人的现实问题的方案。


Firebombing the Messenger in Armenia	对亚美尼亚新闻界的攻击


Late last month, while putting the finishing touches on the next edition of our newspaper, Haykakan Zhamanak (The Armenian Times), we heard an explosion outside our office.	上月末，正当我们的《Haykakan Zhamanak》（《亚美尼亚时代报》）进入新一期收尾工作时，办公室外传来爆炸声。


Staff members rushed to find my car on fire.	工作人员冲进来告诉我我的汽车已成一团火球。


That explosion was not unanticipated – nor was the announcement by Armenia’s police that the car had caught fire due to technical problems.	那场爆炸并非全无预兆——而亚美尼亚警方认为汽车着火是由于技术故障的解释也不出乎我意料。


But the real problem is censorship, for the explosion was but the latest offensive in Armenia’s hidden war against the press.	真正的原因在于新闻审查制度，这场爆炸其实正代表了亚美尼亚匿影藏形的反新闻界集团对新闻界发起的最新攻击。


For us the battle for press freedom began in 1999, soon after founding our newspaper, then named Oragir (Diary).	我们争取新闻出版自由的抗争始于1999年，那时我们刚刚创刊不久，报纸名字还叫《Oragir》（《日报》）。


It made an instant impact, but not in the way we hoped.	刚一成立它就立刻产生了巨大的影响，尽管那并非我们所希望看到的。


Throughout 1999 there were more court cases against Oragir than against all other Armenian media combined since independence in 1991.	1999年一整年，《Oragir》遭遇的法律诉讼比亚美尼亚自1991年独立后所有诉讼媒体案例总数都要多。


In one case, the prosecutor’s office brought criminal charges against me as editor-in-chief: I was accused of slandering an Armenian political figure and of insulting a state official. As a result, the court sentenced me to one year in prison.	在一起诉讼中，检察官办公室对本人——《Oragir》的主编，提出诽谤亚美尼亚政治领导人以及侮辱国家办公室的控告，并处以一年监禁。


By a lucky twist, however, on the day the court ruled, Lord Russell Johnston, Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, was in Armenia.	然而，就在法令生效的那天，幸运的转机出现了。


Lord Johnston expressed his opinion about my case in his talks with the authorities, which then decided not to send me to prison.	正在亚美尼亚访问的欧洲理事会会议大会主席罗素·约翰斯通勋爵在与当局的一次谈话中发表了他对我的案件的看法，使政府下令取消把我送进监狱的决定。


I remained free, only to be monitored by the police.	我保持了自由了，只是还须受到警察的监视。


A second trial against our newspaper had worse consequences: a $25,000 fine (a huge sum here) based on allegations that we had damaged the reputation of the Mika Armenia Company, controlled by the so-called Karabakh clan that helps rule Armenia.	针对我报发起的第二起讼诉案带来了更坏的结果：声称我们报纸破坏了亚美尼亚Mika公司的名誉并对我们处以高达25,000美元的罚金（在这里这可是笔巨款）。


The court’s verdict was based on falsified documents.	Mika公司的老板就是帮助亚美尼亚统治的Karabakh家族。


Following the verdict, bailiffs confiscated our equipment, prohibited the publishing house from printing our newspaper, and, most importantly, seized our business bank accounts, rendering us unable to pay the fine.	法院根据伪造的文件作出判决，司法官没收了我们的各种设备，禁止印刷厂排印我们的报纸，最致命的是，冻结了我们的银行账户使我们无法交付罚金。


These events were initiated by a court wrangle with Serzh Sargsyan, then the Minister of National Security and Internal Affairs.	这些事件的发生源于与当时国家安全和外交部部长Serzh Sargsyan的一次法庭斗争。


We demanded an apology for his impugning our paper’s reputation; he accused of us of libel.	我们要求他对破坏我报名誉作出道歉，而他则控告我们诽谤。


These manipulations worked: Oragir was closed down, which forced us to appear under the name Haykakan Zhamanak .	结果，《Oragir》被关闭，这迫使我们不得不以《Haykakan Zhamanak》的名字出现。


When my time under police supervision ended, the prosecutor’s office quickly brought a new criminal case of slander against me.	在我被警察监控的那段时间里，检察官办公室很快又对我提起一项新的诽谤罪名。


This time, Armenia’s chief of civil aviation had sued me.	这一次，起诉我的是亚美尼亚的国家航空局长。


Investigations lasted several months, before pressure from international organizations and public opinion forced the prosecutor to drop the charges.	调查持续了数月，直到来自国际组织和公众舆论的压力迫使检察官撤销控罪。


Later, after his dismissal from his post, that same civil aviation chief confessed that Armenian President Robert Kocharyan had advised him to file his lawsuit.	后来当那个局长被撤职后，他承认是亚美尼亚总统罗伯特·科恰良指示他提出此项诉讼的。


At a press conference just hours after my car exploded, I announced my suspicion that the explosion had been organized by Gagik Tsarukyan, an MP nicknamed “Dodi Gago” (“dod” means stupid in Armenian) and one of the country’s richest men and a close friend of the president’s family.	汽车爆炸几个小时后，在新闻发布会上，我怀疑这场爆炸是由议员Gagik Tsarukyan策划的。 Gagik Tsarukyan绰号为“Dodi Gago”（在亚美尼亚语中，dod是愚蠢的意思），他是亚美尼亚最富有的人，与总统家庭关系密切。


Many Armenians believe that Tsarukyan has carte blanche to do whatever he wants, when he wants.	许多亚美尼亚人相信，Tsarukyan已被赋予绝对权力足以使他为所欲为。


Indeed, he even gets to write his own history.	事实上，他甚至已经开始撰写自己的历史。


For although Gagik Tsarukyan was convicted of a sexual crime in the Soviet era, two years ago Armenia’s courts exonerated him by vacating the decision of the Soviet court.	尽管Gagik Tsarukyan被控在苏联时代有过性犯罪行为，但是两年前亚美尼亚法庭取消了苏联法庭的判决宣布他为无罪。


Indeed, there is something of a taboo on writing about Tsarukyan, and with good reason: not only is he rich, but also he controls an army of obedient skinheads.	当然，对Tsarukyan进行报道有犯禁忌，但我们有足够理由，不仅因为他很富有，也因为他一手控制了光头党，使其听命于他。


Armenia frequently sees skinheads attacking reporters covering opposition rallies and once severely beating a leading opposition politician.	在亚美尼亚，经常发生光头党对报道反对党集会记者的袭击事件，有一次他们还把反对党一名领导人打成重伤。


Five years ago, Tsarukyan himself led his thugs in a break-in at our office, taking my staff hostage for several hours.	五年前，Tsarukyan他还亲自带领着手下的一伙暴徒冲进我们的办公室，将我的工作人员挟持了几个小时做人质。


Recently, after reading some unflattering articles about him in our paper, Tsarukyan tried to invite me to a meeting.	最近，Tsarukyan读了几篇我报对他的不利报道后，试图邀请我与他会面，被我拒绝。


I refused. Armenia’s paramount oligarch fumed.	亚美尼亚权力最大的政治寡头被激怒了。


He promised to punish me, and that he would act the next time Haykakan Zhamanak criticized any well-known person.	他发誓如果下次《Haykakan Zhamanak》再发表攻击任何名人的言论就一定会惩罚我。


The car explosion occurred the day after we rebuked Armenia’s Police Chief.	这场汽车爆炸就发生在我们发文谴责亚美尼亚警察局局长的第二天。


None of us are surprised that the police are unwilling to investigate my car’s explosion.	没有人惊讶于警察对于调查我汽车爆炸案件的拖拉态度。


They began to do so only ten days later, when the fire brigade stated that the fire was likely the result of an explosion incited by “outside interference.”	直到爆炸案发生十天后当消防队宣布爆炸可能是由于某种“外来原因”引起的时候，警方才开始着手调查。


Such harassment is the everyday stuff of journalism in what Vladimir Putin calls the “post-Soviet space.”	在弗拉基米尔·普京所谓的“后苏联环境”下，这种骚扰已成为我们新闻界每天的家常便饭。


Armenia may have adopted in 1995 a new Constitution with fine phrases about freedom of speech, but both the petty harassments and the mortal threats of the Soviet era remain.	亚美尼亚1995年通过了新宪法，对言论自由游辞巧饰，但这种卑劣的骚扰和苏联时代惯用的死亡威胁却丝毫不减。


Of course, we never believed that press freedom would come easily. We understood from the start that we would have to fight for it everyday.	当然，我们一直相信新闻自由并非唾手可得，从一开始我们就知道必须每天都为此而抗争。


But we never imagined the terrifying lengths to which the state – working hand-in-hand with the new oligarchic rich – would go to defeat our cause.	但是我们从没有想到国家政府居然和新寡头政治富人联手打击挫败我们的事业——打击力度及其骇人。


We will not be defeated.	我们不会被打败。


An incinerated car is a small price to pay in the battle for freedom.	一辆烧毁的汽车远比不上自由之战的代价。


Firewalls to Freedom	自由防火墙


NEW YORK – Even the most cold-hearted realists would agree that the failure of Communist censorship played a role in the collapse of the Iron Curtain: Voice of America, the fax machine, rock ‘n’ roll, and the lure of Western capitalism helped to win over the people of the Soviet Bloc.	纽约--即使是最为冷血的现实主义者也会认同这样一个观点，那就是共产主义检查制度失效在铁幕崩溃中发挥了重要作用。 美国之音、传真机、摇滚乐以及西方资本主义的吸引促成赢得苏联集团国家的人心。


Today, similar hopes are often vested in the Internet, with high expectations that the wealth of online information might trigger the same kind of censorship failure in contemporary authoritarian states that we saw in Eastern Europe – and with the same results.	如今，有人对互联网也寄予同样的希望。 他们的期望很高，也就是丰富的在线信息或许会在当代极权制度国家中引发我们在所东欧见到的同样形式的检查制度失效，并且带来同样的结果。


Such expectations are not entirely unfounded, because most Internet censorship systems are not perfect.	这样的期望并非完全没有依据，因为大多数互联网检查制度并不完善。


But, while anybody with a little know-how can figure out how to circumvent, say, the “Great Firewall of China,” Internet filtering is only one layer of Chinese Internet censorship.	尽管只要有一点窍门的人都可以想办法绕过中国金关工程，但是互联网过滤只不过是中国互联网检查制度中的一层而已。


It is also supplemented by an increasingly sophisticated system of manipulation and spin.	它还得到越发精密的控制制度辅助。


While the blocking of foreign Web sites was eased during the Olympics, deletion of politically sensitive content from Chinese blogs and chat rooms continued unabated throughout 2008.	尽管在奥运会期间屏蔽外国网站有所减轻，但是在整个2008年期间，从中国博客以及聊天室中删除政治敏感内容一直在继续。


Now, a new crackdown against “vulgar” Internet content is being used to clean up politically sensitive writings – including discussion of Charter 08 , a pro-democracy treatise signed by thousands of Chinese who discovered it online.	现在，当局正在利用一场打击“淫秽”互联网内容的斗争来清除政治敏感内容，包括对零八宪章的讨论。 中国网民在网上发现了这一亲民主的文章后有几千人签名。


Contrary to Western expectations, most of this domestic Internet censorship is carried out not by the government's Internet police, but by Chinese Web hosting companies, which are being held legally responsible for what their users publish.	与西方估计不同的是，中国国内互联网检查制度大多数并不是由政府网络警察执行的，而是由中国网页托管公司落实的。 这些公司对其用户发表的言论负有法律上的责任。


Indeed, the Chinese Internet is evolving and adapting in ways that shore up the regime’s legitimacy.	确实，中国互联网正在朝巩固其政权合法性的方面演进和适应。


Hundreds of thousands of people are employed as freelance Web commentators, working to spin discussions in chat rooms and on blogs in a more patriotic, pro-government direction.	几十万人受雇成为自由网络评论员。 他们的工作就是引导聊天室和博客的讨论，让它们变得更为爱国和支持政府。


Nationalistic young people, proud of China’s newfound global economic and political power, gladly volunteer their time to show off their patriotism on the Internet.	那些民族主义情怀的年轻人对中国新近的全球经济和政治实力感到自豪，乐不得贡献时间来在互联网上展示其爱国主义。


Meanwhile, China is looking to Russia, which may have invented an entirely new model of controlling the Internet without recourse to censorship.	与此同时，中国也在向俄国看齐。 俄国或许已经发明了一种不需要检查制度的全新的互联网控制模式。


Having established full control of traditional media, the Kremlin is now moving full-speed into the virtual world.	克里姆林宫建立了对传统媒体的完全控制后，现在全速转向虚拟世界。


The authorities’ strategy is not new: establish tight control over the leading publishing platforms and fill them with propaganda and spin to shape online public opinion.	当局的策略并不新鲜，也就是对主要的平台建立严格控制，并且用宣传和控制来左右舆论。


The fate of LiveJournal – the most influential blogging platform in Russia, which is often used to express dissent and protest against the government – is one unfortunate example.	实况报是俄国最有影响力的博客平台，人们经常用它来表达异议和对政府的抗议，而它的命运就是一个不幸的例子。


In less than three years, this popular online resource has been transformed from a respectable American start-up to a shady Moscow-based enterprise, co-owned by the Kremlin’s favorite oligarchs.	在不到三年的时间里，这一颇受欢迎的在线资源已经从一个受人尊重、由美国人创办的新兴实体转化为一个可疑的、莫斯科控制的企业。 克里姆林宫宠爱的寡头们也共同拥有这一企业。


Government propaganda abounds, too, generated by new media operators like Konstantin Rykov, a 29-year-old Duma deputy and the founder of New Media Stars, the Kremlin’s favorite Internet firm.	年仅二十九岁的杜马代表、新的媒体老板李可夫经营着这些宣传。 他还是克里姆林宫宠爱的互联网公司新媒体之星的创办人。


Whenever manipulation efforts fail, cyber-attacks offer yet another powerful tool to crack down on dissent without triggering public accusations of formal censorship.	一旦操纵不灵就会采用网络攻击手段作为打击异议、同时又不被指责为正式检查的有力工具。


This is what happened to a Georgian (known by the screen name cyxymu) who used his blog on LiveJournal to criticize how both governments handled last summer’s war.	一个格鲁吉亚人(网名叫做CYXYMU) 用他在实况报上的博客批评两国政府处理去年夏天战争不当。


A series of cyber-attacks followed, and was so devastating that the entire service – with its millions of other blogs – crashed, forcing LiveJournal administrators to delete his account temporarily.	他随即就遭到了一系列网络攻击。 其规模极为严��，包括几百万其他博客在内的整个服务崩溃，迫使实况报管理员暂时删除了他的帐号。


As contemporary authoritarian regimes learn how to manage and engineer information flows, we must understand that promoting and protecting free speech in places like China and Russia is not a simple matter of “tearing down the wall.”	当代专制政权学会如何管理和控制信息流之际，我们必须知道，在中国和俄国等国家促进和保护言论自由并不是简单的“拆毁城墙”的事情。


Given these governments’ complex strategies for regulating what their citizens do online – ranging from establishing effective control of private media and telecoms businesses to allowing people to blow off steam without going too far – we should be more realistic about the true extent of the Internet’s transformational potential.	这些政府管理其民众网络活动策略复杂，从建立对私有媒体和电信企业的有效控制到允许人们发发牢骚而又不失控不等。 有鉴于此，我们对于互联网转变社会的潜力应当更为现实。


An Agenda for Global Fiscal Activism	全球财政积极主义日程


LONDON – Two important events loom on the calendar this month: the United States’ presidential election on November 8, and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond’s first Autumn Statement on November 23.	伦敦—本月日程中有两个重要事件：11月8日美国总统大选，以及11月23日英国财政大臣菲利普·哈蒙德（Philip Hammond）首次发布秋季报告（Autumn Statement）。


Obviously, the latter will not be as significant an event as the former, but it nonetheless will have important consequences beyond the United Kingdom.	显然，后者作为事件没有前者重大，但它的所产生的重要后果绝不止于英国。


So far this year, economics has had to compete with more emotional issues, such as personal attacks in the US election, and UK voters’ decision to leave the European Union.	今年截至目前，经济学一直在与情绪作斗争，如美国大选中的人身攻击、英国选民决定退出欧盟等。


But in both the US and the UK – and not only there – we can expect to hear more about active fiscal policies, especially with respect to infrastructure.	但不论是美国还是英国——以及其他国家——我们可以预期还能看见更多积极财政政策，特别是在基础设施方面。


In the communiqué released after September’s G20 summit, the group’s leaders repeatedly mentioned steps to boost world growth through infrastructure investment, and argued for more coordination among monetary, fiscal, and structural policies.	在9月G20峰会公报中，G20集团领导人一再提及通过基础设施投资刺激世界增长的措施，并提出要进行更多货币、财政和结构性政策协调。


Although recent data from the US and China – and surprisingly also from the eurozone and the UK – suggest that GDP growth in the fourth quarter could improve upon the sluggish performance earlier in the year, a strong case can still be made for fresh policies to strengthen the world economy.	尽管来自美国和中国的最新数据——令人惊讶地，也包括欧元区和英国的数据——表明四季度GDP增长可能较今年早前的萎靡表现有所改善，但采取新政策强化世界经济仍然很有必要。


After recently leading the UK’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR), and having thought long and hard about educational initiatives, I believe that it is time for a more adventurous response to both long-term and cyclical challenges, especially for developing countries.	我最近负责领导英国抗生素耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance，AMR评估），并且长期以来一直在深入思考教育措施，我认为现在应该采取更加冒险的措施应对长期和周期性挑战，特别是发展中国家。


And reading Jeffrey D. Sachs’s recent commentary, “The Case for Sustainable Investment,” only strengthens my conviction that policymakers and key development-finance institutions have a huge opportunity.	杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey D. Sachs）的最新评论《可持续投资论》（The Case for Sustainable Investment）让我更加确信决策者和重要发展融资机构面临着巨大的机会。


Fiscal activism need not stop at infrastructure.	财政积极主义不能只停留在基础设施。


In the Review on AMR, we showed that global GDP could suffer a $100 trillion loss over the next 34 years if we do not make certain public-health interventions between now and 2050.	在AMR评估中，我们发现，从现在到2050年间，如果我们不采取一定的公共卫生干预，未来34年全球GDP可能蒙受100万亿美元损失。


Those interventions would cost around $40 billion over a decade, which is to say that the investment needed to prevent $100 trillion in lost growth costs less than 0.1% of current global GDP.	这些干预需要在十年中投入400亿美元，也就是说，防止100万亿增长损失的投资只需要耗费当前全球GDP的不到0.


As an astute investor friend pointed out to me, this would be the equivalent of a 2,500% return.	1%。 一位精明的投资者朋友对我说，这相当于2,500%的回报率。


Investments in health and education are crucial for the developing world’s long-term prospects.	投资于卫生和教育对发展中世界的长期前景来说至关重要。


As someone closely associated with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), it seems obvious to me that the New Development Bank (NDB) – or the BRICS Development Bank, as it was formerly known – can and should help these and other emerging economies cooperate in both areas.	对与金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）关系密切的人士来说，新开发银行（NDB）——正式名称是金砖国家开发银行——显然能够也应该帮助金砖国家和其他新兴经济体在卫生和教育领域进行合作。


The Review on AMR concluded that ten million annual deaths will be attributable to drug-resistant infections by 2050, and that drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis could cause one-quarter of them.	AMR评估认为，到2050年，每年将有一千万人的死亡可以归因于抗药性传染病，其中抗药性结核菌株要占四分之一。


It seems only reasonable that the NDB should announce steps to support pharmaceutical research into new TB treatments and vaccines, particularly for drug-resistant strains, given that TB is especially prevalent in the BRICS.	NDB绝对应该采取措施支持新结核病治疗和免疫研究，特别是针对抗药性菌株的研究，因为结核病在金砖国家非常普遍。


And, beyond the BRICS, the other low-income countries that the NDB is trying to help will suffer even more without a proactive approach.	此外，除了金砖国家，其他NDB试图帮助的低收入国家也将因为没有采取积极措施而蒙受更多损失。


Similarly, many people in the BRICS and low-income countries do not have access to quality primary education, so the case for a major spending boost in this area should be clear.	类似地，许多金砖国家和低收入国家人民无法获得高质量初等教育，因此大幅增加该领域投入势在必行。


Sachs makes the same point, and former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who is now United Nations Special Envoy for Global Education, has called for more creative financing methods and social enterprise in this sector.	萨克斯也持有同样观点，而英国前首相、现任联合国全球教育特使戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）呼吁更有吸引力的融资方法和社会企业加入教育事业。


The NDB, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank should all be considering the activist fiscal-policy course developed countries are now charting for themselves.	NDB、世界银行、国际金融公司以及亚洲基础设施投资银行都应该考虑发达国家目前正在为自己制定的积极主义财政政策方针。


And they should take it further, because the policy imperatives they face are ultimately all interrelated.	并且它们应该更进一步，因为它们所面临的政策紧迫性是互相关联的。


In the West, the turn toward fiscal activism reflects widespread recognition that monetary activism has outlived its usefulness, at least at the margin.	在西方，转向财政积极主义反映出人们广泛认识到货币积极主义已成强弩之末，至少边际效应已经微乎其微。


To be sure, central banks technically should do whatever it takes to meet their inflation targets; but excessive quantitative easing has imposed high costs, and seems to have favored the few at the expense of the many.	平心而论，央行在技术上应该竭尽全力实现通胀目标； 但过度量化宽松已经带来了高昂的代价，并且似乎是康大多数人之慨便宜极少数人。


With monetary activism past its sell-by date, an active fiscal policy that includes stronger infrastructure spending is one of the only remaining options.	货币政策已是明日黄花，包括加强基础设施支出在内的积极的财政政策就成为唯一的选择。


But it is not a free lunch, as many of its promoters often suggest, because policymakers cannot ignore the high levels of government debt across much of the developed world.	但它并不是许多支持者所鼓吹的那样的免费午餐，因为决策者不可能忽视许多发达国家都存在的高企的政府债务水平。


It will be interesting to see how Hammond navigates the path toward higher infrastructure spending, while sticking to the Conservative Party’s platform of fiscal responsibility.	观察哈蒙德如何制定通往增加基础设施支出之路，同时坚持民主党财政责任承诺令人很感兴趣。


And in the US, if we look beyond the fog of election-season opprobrium, it appears that both sides are in favor of more infrastructure spending.	而在美国，如果我们能看穿选举季互相攻讦的迷雾，似乎双方都支持增加基础设施支出。


That being the case, the next US administration (regardless of who wins), together with a new UK leadership struggling to demonstrate its post-Brexit “openness,” should extend fiscal activism beyond domestic infrastructure to global development more generally.	考虑到这一点，下任美国政府（不管谁获胜）以及忙于证明英国退欧后“开放性”的新英国领导层应该将财政积极主义扩大到国内基础设施之外，进入更一般性的全球发展领域。


For example, with proper support, the World Bank could create new investment vehicles such as AMR or global-education bonds, which would support future development and salvage future global growth that may otherwise be lost.	比如，如有合适的支持，世界银行可以创造出AMR或全球教育债券等信投资载体，能够支持未来发展，挽回可能失去的未来全球增长。


The US and the UK both need to show that they can move beyond their highly sensitive – and, frankly, narrow-minded – domestic political issues.	美国和英国都需要证明它们能够超越高度敏感——并且实事求是地说，目光狭隘的国内政治问题。


And they should remember that without the export markets that the BRICS and other emerging countries represent, all attempts to rebalance their economies will be in vain.	它们应该记住，没有以金砖国家和其他新兴国家为代表的出口市场，所有经济再平衡尝试都将是徒劳。


Fiscal Apocalypse Now	现代财政启示录


As support for President George W. Bush in the United States has crumbled over the past year, perhaps the most surprising element is the revolt of economists and observers of economic policy.	去年，随着美国公众对乔治·W·布什总统的支持率几近崩溃，最出人意表的或许莫过于经济学家和观察家对布什经济政策的反感。


Last week, Peggy Noonan, a speechwriter for both President Reagan and the first President Bush declared in the Wall Street Journal that had she known what George W. Bush’s fiscal policy would be, she would have voted for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election.	上个星期，曾经担任里根和老布什两届总统讲稿写手的佩姬·努南（Peggy Noonan）在《华尔街日报》上撰文称：如果她早就知道乔治·W·布什的财政政策会是这样，那么在2000年总统选举中她就会把票投给戈尔。


“If I’d thought [that George W. Bush] was a big-spending Rockefeller Republican.... I wouldn’t have voted for him...,” Noonan wrote.	“如果我早知道[乔治·W·布什]是肆意挥霍的洛克菲勒式共和党…我绝不会为他投票…，”努南写道。


Bush “did present himself as a conservative...[and] conservatism is hostile, for reasons ranging from the abstract and philosophical to the concrete and practical, to high spending and high taxing....” And then she falls into near-complete despair: “Mr. Bush will never have to run again, and he is in a position to come forward and make the case, even if only rhetorically, to slow and cut spending.	布什当时“的确把自己打扮成保守派…[而]保守派无论从抽象、理论的层面还是具体、实际的层面都应该对高开支高税收的政策恨之入骨…”而后她几乎陷入了彻底的绝望：“布什先生再也不必参加选举了，现在需要他站出来把放缓和削减开支的问题讲清楚，即便他的要求是老生常谈。


He has not. And there’s no sign he will...”	可是他没有这么做，也没有任何迹象表明他会这么做…”


Noonan is not quite correct.	努南说的不全对。


George W. Bush presented himself not as a normal conservative, but as something he called a “compassionate conservative,” thus preserving a certain amount of ambiguity.	乔治·W·布什并没有把自己打扮成普通的保守主义者，而是他自己所谓的“富于同情心的保守派，”这样就留下了混淆的空间。


Some focused on the “conservative”: they expected the Bush administration’s fiscal policy to keep a tight rein on spending and to eliminate many programs in order to finance significant tax cuts.	有些人理解成“保守派”：他们认为布什政府的财政政策会严格控制开支、取消大量项目，进而实现大规模降低税赋。


Others focused on the “compassionate”: they expected Bush’s fiscal policy largely to eschew tax cuts and to adopt largely Democratic spending priorities, including expanded federal aid to education and a prescription drug benefit, thereby showing that Republicans could run a more cost-effective version of the social-welfare state.	其它人则把理解的重点放在了“富于同情心”：他们希望布什的财政政策远离削减赋税，从总体上保留民主党的开支重点，包括加大联邦教育援助的投入，批准实行医药补贴，从而证明共和党人可以更为有效地掌管福利国家。


Still others interpreted “compassionate conservatism,” as the commentator Andrew Sullivan put it, as a “smokescreen...necessary for any vaguely successful retrenchment of government power in an insatiable entitlement state.”	正像新闻评论家安德鲁·苏利文（Andrew Sullivan）所说的那样，还有些人把“富于同情心的保守主义者”理解成一层“烟幕…必须借助它才能在贪得无厌的福利国家里成功地控制政府的权力。


They expected tax cuts to be followed by a fangs-bared attack on social-welfare spending once deficits reemerged.	”他们期待着一旦赤字重新出现，政府会在降低税收的同时毫不留情地削减社会福利开支。


As a result, in 2000 and 2001 nobody was really sure of the Bush administration’s policy direction.	因此在2000和2001年，没有人能够确切地了解布什政府的政策走向。


Was it traditional fiscal conservativism?	是传统的财政保守主义？


Was it to do what Democrats do, but do it better?	是继承民主党的衣钵，在原有基础上发扬光大？


Was it to “starve the beast” by pumping up government debt to the point that social programs would have to be cut?	还是把政府负债扩大到极致，以致于不得不削减社会项目，让“贫困人口饿死”？


The first two priorities, if well designed and well implemented, are certainly honorable goals for a government to pursue.	如果策划实施得好，前两种政策无疑令人肃然起敬。


The third is less honorable, and likely to fail: it relies on the dangerously weak premise that the party in power’s political adversaries will be more public-spirited and less ruthless when they return to government.	而第三种非但不那么值得尊敬，还很可能会以失败告终：因为它有赖于一个非常脆弱的前提：那就是执政党的政治对手在重新执政后会比现在的执政党更加热心公益，也更能体恤民生。


Of course, conservatives and Republicans could hope that their own favorite policy priorities would emerge as the administration’s preferred strategy.	当然，保守派和共和党可以寄希望于各自的既定政策会被现任政府选中。


Or they could be content with whichever of the three strategies that they expected to see, agreeing that, in any case, fiscal policy was always going to be much better than it would have been under Democratic rule.	或者只要政府的选择范围不超乎他们的预料，无论选择3种政策中的哪一个他们都能够心安理得。 如果这个前提成立，那么无论最终出现哪种结果，财政政策都会比民主党执政时有很大优势。


But then a strange thing happened: the Bush administration did not order any of the three options that were thought to be on the menu. It chose something different entirely: big tax cuts, yes, but tax cuts that were badly designed from a genuine supply-side perspective aimed at boosting growth, as well as Democratic domestic spending priorities, but very badly implemented.	但接下来怪事却发生了：布什政府没有选择菜单上三款套餐中的任何一款，而是作出了截然不同的决定：没错，他们大规模削减了税赋，但其措施从真正有利于发展的供求角度看根本达不到预期的效果。


Moreover, the Bush administration combined its policies with an extraordinary reluctance to veto anything coming out of Congress, and, after the year or two that it took for this to become obvious, an inability to restrain Congress at all.	他们也在一定程度上继承了民主党国内开支的重点，但执行起来却像是一团乱麻。 不仅如此，布什政府在政策不力的同时还非常不愿意否决议会的任何提案，因此，一两年过后问题变得无法回避：那就是布什政府根本无法对国会起到任何抑制作用。


What emerged was neither traditional fiscal conservatism nor Democratic policies without Democrats nor starve-the–beast populism, but something that has no name.	布什政府实行的既不是传统的财政保守主义，也不是非民主党人的民主党政策，更不是“饿死穷鬼”的民粹主义，他们实行的政策根本叫不出名字。


An exchange between two characters in a scene from the movie “Apocalypse Now” captures an anti-ethic that characterizes the Bush administration’s policies as well:	电影《现代启示录》中两个角色有一段对白，能够准确地形容布什政府推行的反道德政策：


Willard: “They told me that you had gone totally insane, and that your methods were unsound.”	维拉德：“别人跟我说你彻底疯了，你的方法一点都不好。 ”


Kurtz: “Are my methods unsound?”	库尔特：“我的方法不好吗？ ”


Willard: “I don’t see any method at all, sir.”	维拉德：“实际上我根本看不出你用了任何方法。 ”


It is not that Republicans and conservatives think that the Bush administration has adopted the wrong method, but that they don’t see any method at all that has driven them into their (late) fiscal-policy revolt.	认为布什政府方法错误的不只限于共和党人和保守派，但人们却看不出到底是什么使他们反对这种政策。


And that is why so many of them now wish that they had had a different candidate to vote for back in 2000.	这就是为什么他们中的很多人现在希望自己在2000年选择了另一位候选人的原因所在。


Fiscal Fibs and Follies	财政愚蠢还是财政谎言？


BERKELEY – Across the globe, the debate over fiscal consolidation has the distinct sound of two sides talking past one another.	伯克利——眼下，全世界都在争论要不要巩固财政，其中有两种声音非常突出，但它们相互之间简直是鸡同鸭讲。


On one side are those who insist that governments must move now, at all cost, to rein in budget deficits.	一边认定政府必须马上采取行动，收紧预算缰绳，削减赤字。


Putting public finances on a sustainable footing, they argue, is essential to reassure financial markets.	他们说只有把公共财政置于牢固基础之上，才能确保金融市场的稳定。


If concerted efforts are taken to balance budgets, confidence will be bolstered.	如果各国协同一致平衡预算，就能提振信心；


And if confidence is bolstered, consumption and investment will rise.	如果信心恢复了，消费和投资都会相应复苏。


In this view, cutting deficits will be expansionary.	按照这种观点来看，削减赤字将会达到扩张经济的效果。


As evidence that this is not merely a hypothetical possibility, advocates of fiscal consolidation point to cases like Denmark in the early 1980’s, Ireland in the late 1980’s, and Finland in the 1990’s.	为了证明这不仅仅是一种理论假设，巩固财政的支持者举出20世纪80年代前期的丹麦、80年代后期的爱尔兰和20世纪90年代的芬兰作为例证。


On the other side are those who insist that additional public spending is still needed to support demand.	另一边则认定额外的公共支出仍是必需的，这样才能支撑需求。


Private spending remains weak, not least where continued high unemployment has led consumers, concerned about future prospects, to pocket their wallets.	他们指出私人部门的支出仍然疲软，而居高不下的失业率令消费者忧虑未来，捂紧口袋。


Moreover, the critics object, the evidence in support of expansionary fiscal consolidations is flawed.	此外，有人反驳巩固财政能起到扩张效果的论点，认为其论据存在瑕疵。


In each case where fiscal consolidation supposedly was expansionary, the economy grew because of some third factor.	他们说，上面用来佐证这一论点的几个历史上的事例，推动经济增长的其实是其他因素。


Denmark grew, despite fiscal cuts, because interest rates, initially in the double digits, came down.	在财政紧缩的情况下，丹麦经济仍能增长，靠的是降低利率（先前高达两位数）。


Ireland and Finland grew, despite fiscal cuts, because the exchange rate fell sharply, boosting exports.	爱尔兰和芬兰则是因为汇率大幅下跌，促进了出口增长。


The world economy today, desperate for demand, can’t count on either mechanism.	当今世界经济虽然深受需求不足之苦，但对上述的两个出路一个都指望不上。


Interest rates in many countries are already near zero.	许多国家的利率已经接近于零；


And all countries can’t depreciate their exchange rates at the same time.	各国也做不到同时令其货币贬值，总会有个先后输赢。


So who is right?	谁说得有理呢？


Consider the following image: consumers and investors as passengers in a car hurtling directly toward a brick wall. In this case, the driver stepping on the brake will give the passengers more confidence.	想象一下这个场景：一辆汽车正向一堵墙撞过去，车上的乘客就是消费者和投资者，这个时候，要让乘客安心，司机非得踩刹车不可。


Here, the plausible passengers are southern European firms. They understand that their countries’ fiscal positions are unsustainable.	如今，南欧的众多企业就好比车上的乘客，它们明白，它们所在国家的财政状况是不可持续的。


They know that debt default would be disruptive.	它们明白债务违约有可能突然爆发。


Seeing the economy hurtling toward a brick wall, they are holding their collective breath, while evidence that the government is serious about stepping on the brake can induce them to exhale.	眼看着车子在往墙上撞，它们都惊恐得屏住了呼吸，这个时候，如果政府真心踩刹车，可以让它们松一口气。


In this case, fiscal consolidation is likely to affect their investment spending positively.	有鉴于此，巩固财政有助于鼓励投资支出。


This does not mean that Greece, Portugal, and Spain will expand as robustly as Denmark, Ireland, and Finland did in the 1980’s and 1990’s.	这并不是说希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙会像当年丹麦、爱尔兰和芬兰那样迅速走上经济扩张之路。


They can’t lower the exchange rate to aid exports.	因为它们没法儿靠降汇率来促出口。


But they can reduce interest rates by eliminating the perceived risk of sovereign default.  Banks will be able to borrow from one another for less, and thus able to lend to firms for less.	但它们可以消除主权违约风险，从而使利率下降。 银行间拆借成本降低之后，才能以更低的利率放款给企业。


This suggests that investment may respond better than the pessimists fear.	那样一来，投资的表现将优于悲观者的预期。


But what might work in southern Europe has no chance of working elsewhere.	但是在南欧国家可能有效的办法，在其他地方肯定行不通。


In other G-20 economies, including the United States, Germany, China, and Japan, the car is still cruising down an open road.	其他G20国家，包括美国、德国、中国和日本，它们乘坐的汽车仍然走在一条下坡路上，前方一时也不会遇到什么障碍物。


Fiscal velocity may be considerable – that is, deficits may be large – but there is no sign of a brick wall ahead.	它们可以承受相当大的财政赤字——前方并没有主权违约的石墙挡路。


Interest rates on government debt are still low.	政府债券利率仍处于低水平。


If the passengers were growing restive, they would rise. At this point, they have not.	如果乘客情绪变得激动，利率就会升高，而现在并没有升高。


In these countries, there is therefore no reason to think that fiscal consolidation would have a strong positive effect on confidence.	因此，在那些国家，没有理由认为巩固财政会对提振信心起到显著效果。


That possibility could arise sometime in the future, when the proverbial brick wall comes into view.	未来某个时候，看到前方的石墙，那种可能性才会变大。


But it is not on the horizon yet, which means that there would be no positive private-spending response to buffer public-spending cuts.	但现在还看不到石墙，就意味着私人支出尚无法填补削减公共支出所留下的缺口。


As a result, budget cuts would be strongly contractionary.	也就是说，这些国家如果现在削减预算，将导致严重的经济紧缩效果。


Finally there are borderline cases, like Britain.	不过，毕竟还有一些介乎两者之间的情况，比如英国。


Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne insists that his country’s fiscal trajectory is dangerously unsustainable, and he has proposed draconian cuts.	英国财政大臣乔治·奥斯本坚持认为该国的财政状况不可持续，非常危险，因而主张严厉地削减赤字。


Others strongly disagree, noting the continued low level of interest rates, and that even under the previous government’s plan, net borrowing costs were already scheduled to fall by nearly two-thirds between 2010-11 and 2014-15.	其他人则强烈反对，因为他们注意到利率水平持续保持低位，市场预期净借贷成本在2010、2011年到2014、2015年间将会下降二分之三，比前届政府所希望的还要低。


It is almost as if governments like Britain’s are attempting to manipulate the private sector into believing that the dire conditions required for an expansionary fiscal consolidation have already been met.	看起来，有些国家的政府，比如英国政府，似乎试图蒙骗私人部门��想让它们相信采取扩张性财政巩固政策的可怕时刻已经到来。


It as if they are trying to terrorize the private sector, so that when the fiscal ax actually falls, consumers and investors will be sufficiently relieved that disaster has been averted that they will increase spending.	它们似乎想要先把私人部门吓怕，这样一来，在财政大斧头真正砍下来的时候，消费者和投资者才会相信大难已经避免，从而增加支出。


If so, leaders are playing a dangerous game that depends on encouraging more future spending by exciting consumers and investors now, while depressing actual spending just when it is most urgently needed.	如果真是这样，政客们是在玩一个危险的游戏——把消费者和投资者的兴奋点推迟，以鼓励未来的支出，却忘记了这样会抑制眼下的支出，而眼下的支出恰恰是当务之急。


Or maybe politicians don’t believe any of this and are simply intent on cutting spending for ideological reasons, irrespective of the economic consequences.	或者，政客们对上述理由全都不在意，只是出于意识形态的理由要削减支出，全然不够其经济后果。


But who would be so cynical as to believe that?	但除非是对人心悲观绝望到极点的人，谁也不会相信那是事情的真相。


Fiscal Follies in America and Beyond	美国和国外的金融罪恶


Those of us who know that long-run fiscal imbalances are likely to end in disaster – high inflation, deep recession, financial crisis, or all three – scratch our heads in bemusement at the priorities of George W. Bush and his administration.	我们这些知道长期未决的财政失衡可能会导致灾难¾高通货膨胀、严重经济衰退、金融危机，或是三者兼而有之¾的人看到乔治·W·布什及其政府的施政日程都会困惑地挠头。


The Social Security “crisis” that he wants to spend his political capital on “resolving” ranks no higher than third among America’s fiscal problems in urgency and seriousness – and at a time when these problems have grown into a profound threat to global economic stability.	他打算花些政治资本解决的社会保障“危机”在急迫性和严重性方面仅仅在美国财政问题中排名第三¾而目前这些问题已经成了全球经济稳定的严重威胁。


America’s gravest fiscal problem is the short- and medium-run deficit between tax revenues and spending.	美国最严重的财政问题是中短期税收及开支赤字。


This deficit is entirely of Bush’s own creation, having enacted – and now seeking to extend – tax cuts that are not cuts at all, because they merely shift the burden of fiscal consolidation onto future generations.	上述赤字完全是布什本人的杰作¾现在又想要继续推行¾根本不能减税的减税政策，它们只是将财政整合的负担留给了我们的后代。


The second most serious problem is the looming long-term explosion in the costs of America’s health care programs.	在重要性上紧随其后的是美国医疗保健计划即将到来的长期性开支飙升。


This is also partly Bush’s doing, or, rather, not doing, as his first-term policy on health spending was to do virtually nothing to encourage efficiency and cost containment.	布什对此也要负一定责任，或者说，正是因为他首任内在鼓励效率和控制成本的医疗开支政策上几乎无所作为才导致了今天这种局面。


Instead, he enacted a Medicare drug benefit that promises to spend enormous amounts of money for surprisingly little in the way of better health care.	相反，他颁布了医疗保险药物报销政策，这项政策花费巨额款项，但带来的医疗改善却微乎其微。


Surely a more competent administration would be worried about addressing these more severe and urgent fiscal problems.	一个能力更强的政府肯定会优先解决更严重、也更急迫的财政问题。


Let’s pretend that the United States had such a government. What would it do?	我们假设美国有这样一个政府，它要做什么呢？


Dealing with the short- and medium-run deficit would be fairly straightforward: decide how large a share of GDP the federal government should take up, set spending at that level, and set taxes so that the budget is balanced (or so that the debt-to-GDP ratio is not growing) over the business cycle.	处理中短期赤字比较简单：先确定联邦政府该分到国内生产总值的多大份额，再在此基础上决定开支，而后再确定税收，使得该商业周期的预算达到平衡（或者说确保债务占国内生产总值的份额不会扩大）。


Determine whether, overall, you would rather have in the medium term a federal government that spends, say, 16%, 20%, or 24% of GDP – and on what.	确定中期政府可以花费比如国内生产总值的16%、20%、或24%¾以及花在哪些方面。


What is not straightforward is how to address the imminent explosion of health-care costs.	但处理迫在眉睫的医疗保健开支飙升的问题就没那么简单了。


In fact, projections of rapidly rising Medicare and Medicaid spending in the US – and similarly rapidly-rising governmental health care expenditures elsewhere in the developed world – are not so such a problem to be solved as the side effects of an opportunity to be grasped.	实际上，预期中美国医疗保险和医疗补助开支的快速攀升¾以及其它发达国家政府医疗保健开支的急速攀升¾与其说是个急待解决的问题，还不如说是利用机会所产生的负作用。


The opportunity stems from the fact that our doctors and nurses, our pharmacists and drug researchers, our biologists and biochemists are learning to do wonderful things.	这个机会是：我们的医生和护士、药师和药品研究人员、生物学家和生化学家正在学习非常奇妙的事务。


Many of these things are, and will be, expensive.	很多东西都非常昂贵，而且也肯定会是这样。


Many of them will also be desirable: longer, healthier, and higher quality lives as we learn more about the details of human biology.	其中很多对人类大有益处：随着我们对人类生物细节了解的不断深入，能给我们带来更长寿、更健康、更高质量的生活。


Federal health-care spending will grow very rapidly over the next two generations because the things that health care money will be spent on will be increasingly wonderful, and increasingly valued.	今后两代人花在联邦医疗保健领域的开支肯定会迅速膨胀，因为联邦保健资金所资助的项目会越来越精彩，越来越有价值。


But it will be difficult to grasp fully this opportunity.	但完全抓住这个时机会很困难。


It is highly likely that desired health expenditures will be enormous for some things and trivial for others.	很可能有些领域需要巨额经费，而另外一些领域能得到的却少之又少。


This calls for insurance.	这就需要保险来进行调节。


The problem is that private insurance markets do not work well when the buyer knows much more about what is being insured than the seller.	但问题是当买家对投保对象的了解远远超过卖家的时候，私人保险市场就会运转不畅。


Obviously, one’s health is an area in which private information can be very private indeed.	显而易见，在个人健康领域，隐私信息可以是真正的个人秘密。


This is, of course, why state-run health-care systems came into being.	这当然也是国有医疗保健体系产生的原因。


But replacing private insurance with public insurance has its own problems: consider the parlous circumstances in which Britain’s National Health System finds itself, the result of generations of politically driven underinvestment in health care.	但以公共保险来替代私人保险也有它自己的问题：想想英国的国家保健体系所处的困境，就知道出于政治原因长期投入不足会带来什么后果。


Moreover, the overall level of spending is likely to be large.	此外，开支总额很可能十分巨大。


That means that without (and even with) state-run health-care systems, the rich will be able to afford more and better care than the poor.	也就是说如果没有（或即便有了）国家管理的医疗保健体系，富人能够享受的医疗条件穷人恐怕也难以企及。


To what extent do we accept a world where the non-rich die in situations in which the rich would live?	在多大程度上，我们可以容忍富人能够生存，而穷人在同等条件下却会死去？


To what extent do we hold on to our belief that when it comes to saving lives, medical care should be distributed on the basis of patients’ needs, not their wealth?	在多大程度上我们能够真正忠于自己的信仰：那就是涉及治病救人，医疗资源要按照病人的需要、而不是他们的财富来进行分配？


Where and how would we tax the resources to put real weight behind egalitarian principles?	我们要在哪些领域怎样利用资源，才能真正把平等原则落到实处。


Sharply rising health-care costs will probably confront governments throughout the developed world with the biggest economic policy issues they will face over the next two generations.	急剧攀升的医疗保健费用可能在今后两代和最大的经济政策问题一同摆在全世界发达国家政府的面前。


The Bush administration has yet to realize this, but other governments are not thinking hard enough, either.	布什政府还没能意识到，而其它政府也没有尽其所能地考虑这个问题。


At best, they are seeking ways to keep health-care spending from rising, as though the genie of medical progress can be forced back into the bottle.	往好里说，他们是在搜寻防止医疗开支上升的方法，好像这样就能把医学进步的精灵赶回到瓶子里面。


Instead, governments should embrace the promise of wonderful innovations in health care, and ask how fast spending should rise, and how that rise should be financed.	相反，政府应该充分利用医疗领域精彩创新的前景，弄清开支到底能增长多快，以及如何才能加以满足。


Fiscal Follies	愚蠢的财政政策


NEW YORK – The fiscal stimulus that most advanced economies and emerging markets implemented during the 2008-2009 global recession – together with monetary easing and the backstopping of the financial system – prevented the Great Recession from turning into another Great Depression in 2010.	纽约——绝大多数发达经济体和新兴市场国家在2008－2009年全球衰退期间实行的财政刺激政策——与宽松货币政策和支持金融体系政策的效果相叠加——成功防止了这场衰退在2010年再次陷入大萧条之中。


At a time when every component of private demand was collapsing, the boost from higher government spending and lower taxes stopped the global economy’s free-fall and created the basis for recovery.	在构成私人需求的所有元素都溃不成军的时刻，来自加大政府开支和降低税收的推动政策成功阻止了全球经济自由落体，并由此创造了复苏的基础。


Unfortunately, stimulus spending and the related bailout of the financial system, together with the recession’s effect on revenues, contributed to fiscal deficits on the order of 10% of GDP in most advanced economies.	不幸的是，刺激性消费和对金融系统的紧急援助，再加上衰退期间收入的下降效应，共同铸成了多数发达国家超过GDP10%的财政赤字。


According to the International Monetary Fund and others, these economies’ ratio of public debt to GDP will surpass 110% by 2015, compared to 70% before the crisis.	按照国际货币基金组织的统计，上述经济体政府公债占GDP的比例将于2015年超过110%，而危机爆发前这一数字只有70%。


Aging populations in most advanced economies imply additional public debt in the long term, owing to non-fully-funded pension schemes and rising health-care costs.	由于非全资退休金计划和医疗成本的升高，多数发达经济体的人口老化现象将会导致长期公共债务增加。


Thus, in most advanced economies, deficits need to be reduced to avoid a fiscal train wreck down the line.	因此，在多数发达国家中，需要降低赤字才能达到防止财政列车最终倾覆的效果。


But much research, including a recent study by the IMF, suggests that raising taxes and reducing government spending has a negative short-term effect on aggregate demand, thereby reinforcing deflationary and recessionary trends – and undermining fiscal consolidation.	但包括国际货币基金组织近期研究在内的多数研究成果表明，增加税收和削减政府开支会对总需求产生短期的负面影响，从而强化通货紧缩和经济衰退的趋势，并严重破坏财政领域的稳固。


In an ideal world, where policymakers could credibly commit to medium- to long-term fiscal adjustment, the optimal and desirable path would be to commit today to a schedule of spending reductions and tax increases, phased in gradually over the next decade as the economy recovers.	在决策者能够真正落实中长期财政调整的理想状况下，能达到最佳效果的理想方法是在经济渐趋复苏的今后十年间，从今天就开始落实削减开支和增加税收的计划。


That way, if the economy needed another targeted fiscal stimulus in the short run, financial markets would not respond by driving up borrowing costs.	这样，如果经济短期内还需要一次定向财政刺激计划来帮助复苏，金融市场也不会再以提高借款成本作为回答。


Unfortunately, the fiscal policy currently adopted by various advanced economies deviates sharply from this path of credible medium-term consolidation combined with short-term additional stimulus.	不幸的是，目前各发达经济体所采取的财政政策远远偏离了这种将中期稳定和短期额外刺激相结合的合理指向。


In the US, we have the worst of all possible worlds.	在美国，我们不得不面对所有的不利因素。


On one hand, stimulus had become a dirty word – even within the Obama administration – well before the Republicans’ mid-term election victory ruled out another round altogether.	一方面，早在共和党中期选举胜利彻底扼杀又一轮刺激之前，即便在奥巴马政府内部，刺激也已经成为一个令人厌憎的词。