The problem, quite simply, is that many of the underlying conditions that produced the eurozone crisis remain unaddressed.	简而言之，根本原因就是许多导致欧洲危机的潜在因素都尚未得到解决。


If Europe now grows without making the hard decisions needed to address them, those decisions become correspondingly less likely to be made.	如果欧洲在没下狠心解决这些问题之前实现了增长，那么就因此更难以作出这些艰难的决定。


In developing countries, it is said that good times are bad times for economic reform.	在发展中国家，有种说法叫经济改革往往在年景好的时候最为艰难。


Welcome to developing Europe.	好吧，欢迎大家来到发展中的欧洲。


Muzzled in the Name of Freedom	以自由的名义噤声


NEW YORK – Acts of terror can inflict terrible damage.	纽约—恐怖行动可以造成可怕的伤害。


But they cannot destroy an open society.	但它们无法摧毁开放社会。


Only those who govern our democracies can do that, by shrinking our freedoms in freedom's name.	只有治理我们的民主国家的人可以，那就是以自由的名义打击我们的自由。


Shinzo Abe, Japan's right-wing nationalist prime minister, does not need much encouragement to tighten up secrecy laws, give more powers to the police, or make it easier to use military force.	日本右翼民族主义者首相安倍晋三不需要有人鼓舞就收紧了隐私法，授予警察更大的权力，或让使用武力更加容易。


The grisly executions of two Japanese citizens caught by Islamic State terrorists in Syria have provided precisely the encouragement that Abe needs to pursue such measures.	两名被伊斯兰国恐怖分子绑架的日本公民在叙利亚被残忍处决，这给了安倍正需要的采取这些措施的鼓励。


But Japan has never been seen as a bastion of free speech, nor did it ever make great claims to be.	但日本从未成为言论自由的堡垒，也没有如此自称过。


France does.	法国有过。


That is what the demonstration of solidarity in the face of last month's terrorist attacks in Paris was surely all about.	这显然是上个月恐怖分子袭击巴黎后所举行的彰显团结的示威的意义。


France, of all countries, would avoid the trap that snared the other great Western republic claiming to be a beacon of freedom in the world.	在世界各国中，法国可以避免其他自称世界自由灯塔的西方伟大共和国深陷其中的陷阱。


Fear of terrorist violence after the 9/11 attacks did more damage to freedom in the United States than the suicidal murder of thousands of its citizens.	9/11袭击后所产生的对恐怖主义暴力的恐惧对美国的自由所造成的伤害比9/11自杀式袭击所导致的几千条美国人民的生命更大。


Because of that fear, Americans allow themselves to be spied on indiscriminately by their own government, and permit terrorism suspects to be tortured and locked up indefinitely without trial.	因为这一恐惧，美国人让自己遭到本国政府的一律监视，也让恐怖主义嫌犯不经审判就被无限期关押和虐待。


France, like most other countries in the European Union, already has laws that ban hate speech.	与其他大部分欧盟国家一样，法国也有禁止仇恨言论的法律。


You cannot legally insult people on the grounds of their race, beliefs, or sexual orientation.	基于种族、信仰和性取向攻击他人是违法的。


And in France, as well as in some other countries, one can be prosecuted for denying the Holocaust and other historical genocides.	在法国——以及其他一些国家——你可能因为否认犹太人大屠杀和其他历史种族灭绝事件而被起诉。


President François Hollande, who is not a right-wing nationalist like Abe, now wants to strengthen those bans.	法国总统奥朗德——与安倍不同，他不是右翼民族主义者——现在希望收紧这些禁令。


He has proposed new laws that would make online entities like Google and Facebook responsible for any "hate speech" posted online by their users.	他提出了新的法律，要求Google和Facebook等在线实体为其用户在线发布的任何“仇恨言论”负责。


Former EU heads of state have also backed a proposal from European Jewish leaders to criminalize in every EU country not just anti-Semitism and genocide-denial, but also "xenophobia" in general.	前欧盟国家首脑也支持来自欧洲犹太人领袖的建议——所有欧盟国家不仅反犹太主义和否认种族灭绝将被定罪，总体的“仇外”也是犯罪行为。


Few people would wish to defend expressions of xenophobia or anti-Semitism.	几乎没有人会为仇外或反犹太言论辩护。


But is it really wise to use the law to ban opinions?	但用法律来禁止观点真的明智吗？


First of all, such laws, if enacted, are unlikely to reduce the risk of terrorist acts.	首先，这些法律即便实施，也不可能降低恐怖行动的风险。


Banning the expression of opinions will not make them go away.	禁止观点表达并不能扼杀观点。


They will continue to be expressed, more secretively perhaps, and as a result become even more toxic.	它们还是会被表达，也许以更秘密的方式，因此也有可能变得更加恶毒。


And the social and political basis for terrorism, in the Middle East and elsewhere, will not vanish just because of a public ban on xenophobic speech.	中东和其他地区的恐怖主义的社会和政治基础不会仅仅因为公开禁止仇外言论而消失。


But there is a larger danger in using the law to police what people think.	但监督人们想什么的法律还有一个更大的危险。


It can stifle public debate.	它可能扼杀公共争论。


That danger underlies the view, still operative in the US, that opinions, however obnoxious, should be freely expressible, so that they can be opposed by counter-arguments.	这一危险导致了至今在美国仍有市场的看法，即观点不管多么令人讨厌，都应该可以自由表达，因此可以被反对观点驳斥。


It would be naive, of course, to believe that religious or political extremists are interested in an exchange of views.	当然，认为宗教或政治极端主义者有兴趣交换观点实属天真。


But inciting violence is banned in the US as well.	但煽动暴力在美国也是被禁止的。


The First Amendment of the Constitution does not protect freedom of expression when it can be shown to create a risk of imminent violence.	美国宪法第一修正案不保护可证明马上会带来暴力风险的言论的表达。


Xenophobic views, or the denial of genocide, are repellent, but do not necessarily result in such a threat.	仇外观点，或否认种族灭绝，是令人厌恶的，但未必会引起这种威胁。


In most societies, including the US, the public expression of such opinions is limited by a rough consensus on what is socially respectable.	在大部分社会——包括美国社会——公开表达这类观点受到什么可以被社会尊重这一粗略共识的限制。


This consensus changes with time.	这一共识随时间变化而变化。


It is up to editors, writers, politicians, and others who speak in public to shape it.	它受到编辑、作家、政客和其他公开发表言论的人的左右。


Cartoonists, artists, bloggers, activists, and comedians sometimes like to challenge the consensus of respectability.	漫画家、艺术家、博客写手、活动家和喜剧演员有时喜欢挑战关于可尊重性的共识。


Some of these challenges might cause outrage (that, after all, often is the point).	一些挑战可能引起愤慨（毕竟，这才是重点）。


But as long as they do not promote or threaten violence, it would do more harm than good to ban them by law.	但只要它们不宣扬或威胁使用暴力，用法律禁止它们就弊大于利。


Allowing the government to decide which opinions are permissible is dangerous not just because it smothers debate, but also because governments can be arbitrary or self-serving.	允许政府决定什么观点可以发表是危险的，这不仅扼杀争论，还导致政府独断专行和自私自利。


It would be useful in the current climate of fear to recall a famous hate-speech case in the US.	在当前的恐慌环境中，回忆一下美国的��个著名仇恨言论案件大有裨益。


In 1977, the American Nazi Party planned to stage a demonstration in Skokie, a suburb of Chicago with a large Jewish population.	1977年，美国纳粹党计划犹太人口数量庞大的芝加哥卫星城斯科基（Skokie）举行示威。


A local court, prompted by shocked and fearful public opinion, decided that the display of swastikas, distribution of leaflets, and the wearing of Nazi uniforms should be banned.	受震惊而恐慌的公共观点的驱使，地方法院裁定，展示纳粹十字、发布传单和身穿纳粹制服应该禁止。


Such a demonstration, it was quite plausibly argued, would be an insult to a community that included Holocaust survivors.	这样的示威将是对包括大屠杀幸存者在内的社区的侮辱——很有道理。


But the ban was contested by the American Civil Liberties Union as an infringement of the First Amendment.	但这一禁令受到美国民权同盟（American Civil Liberties Union，ACLU）的挑战，认为这违反了宪法第一修正案。


The argument of the ACLU lawyers, most of whom were liberal Jews, was not based on any sympathy for Nazi symbols or views.	ACLU律师（大部分是自由派犹太人）的论据不是以同情纳粹符号或观点为基础。


Their argument was that if you allow the government to ban opinions you hate or despise, you weaken your right to contest a similar ban on views with which you might agree.	他们的论据是，如果你允许政府禁止你所讨厌或鄙视的观点，你就削弱了你自己挑战针对你所同意的观点的类似禁令的权利。


Freedom of speech, in other words, should mean freedom of hateful speech, too, as long as it does not threaten or promote violence.	换句话说，言论自由理应也意味着仇恨言论的自由，只要它不威胁或宣扬使用暴力。


Most European governments already take a stricter view of public insults than the US Constitution does.	大部分欧洲政府对公开侮辱的砍伐比美国宪法更严格。


It would be a great mistake to add even more restrictions.	进一步增加限制将是一个大错。


Terrorist attacks are doing enough damage, in lives and property.	恐怖袭击已经造成了足够多的生命和财产伤害。


There is no reason for governments to make things worse by tampering with their citizens' liberties.	政府没有理由通过干预公民自由来雪上加霜。


Inequality, Immigration, and Hypocrisy	不平等、移民和伪善


CAMBRIDGE – Europe’s migration crisis exposes a fundamental flaw, if not towering hypocrisy, in the ongoing debate about economic inequality.	美国剑桥—欧洲移民危机暴露出正在进行的关于经济不平等性的争论的一个根本性缺陷——或者令人瞩目的伪善。


Wouldn’t a true progressive support equal opportunity for all people on the planet, rather than just for those of us lucky enough to have been born and raised in rich countries?	真正的进步分子难道不应该支持全世界所有人机会平等，而不是幸运地生长于富裕国家的人才有机会平等？


Many thought leaders in advanced economies advocate an entitlement mentality.	许多发达国家的思想领袖鼓吹一种应得权利（entitlement）思想。


But the entitlement stops at the border: though they regard greater redistribution within individual countries as an absolute imperative, people who live in emerging markets or developing countries are left out.	但应得权利止于国界：他们认为在个体国家内进行更大规模再分配是绝对必要的，但新兴市场或发展中国家的人不在此列。


If current concerns about inequality were cast entirely in political terms, this inward-looking focus would be understandable; after all, citizens of poor countries cannot vote in rich ones.	如果说当下关于不平等性的担忧完全属于政治范畴，那么这一内向视角是可以理解的； 毕竟，穷国公民无法在富国投票。


But the rhetoric of the inequality debate in rich countries betrays a moral certitude that conveniently ignores the billions of people elsewhere who are far worse off.	但富国不平等争论的论调有悖于一个道德标准，它心安理得地忽视境况差得多的数十亿其他地区的人。


One must not forget that even after a period of stagnation, the middle class in rich countries remains an upper class from a global perspective.	我们决不能忘记，哪怕经历了一段时间的停滞，富裕国家的中产阶级在全球范围内仍属于上层阶级。


Only about 15% of the world’s population lives in developed economies.	全球只有15%的人口生活在发达国家。


Yet advanced countries still account for more than 40% of global consumption and resource depletion.	但发达国家占据了全球消费和资源消耗的40%强。


Yes, higher taxes on the wealthy make sense as a way to alleviate inequality within a country. But that will not solve the problem of deep poverty in the developing world.	诚然，增加富人税收有助于减轻一国内部的不平等性，但这无法解决发展中国家深度贫困的问题。


Nor will it do to appeal to moral superiority to justify why someone born in the West enjoys so many advantages.	道德优越感吁求——以证明出生在西方就能享受如此多优势是合理的——也无助于解决问题。


Yes, sound political and social institutions are the bedrock of sustained economic growth; indeed, they are the sine qua non of all cases of successful development.	诚然，可靠的政治和社会制度和机构是持续经济增长的基石； 事实上，它们是一切成功发展的必要条件。


But Europe’s long history of exploitative colonialism makes it hard to guess how Asian and African institutions would have evolved in a parallel universe where Europeans came only to trade, not to conquer.	但欧洲的长期掠夺性殖民主义史让人们很难猜测，如果欧洲人带来的只是贸易而没有征服，亚洲和非洲的制度和机构会发展成怎样。


Many broad policy issues are distorted when viewed through a lens that focuses only on domestic inequality and ignores global inequality.	当我们仅仅从只关注国内不平等而忽视全球不平等的视角看待问题时，许多广义政策问题就会扭曲。


Thomas Piketty’s Marxian claim that capitalism is failing because domestic inequality is rising has it exactly backwards.	托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）的马克思主义论断——资本主义正在失败，因为不平等性正在增加——背景正在于此。


When one weights all of the world’s citizens equally, things look very different.	当你赋予全球公民完全一致的权重时，将看到一个完全不同的情景。


In particular, the same forces of globalization that have contributed to stagnant middle-class wages in rich countries have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty elsewhere.	特别是，同样是让富裕国家中产阶级工资陷入停顿的全球化力量，让其他国家的数亿人走出了贫困。


By many measures, global inequality has been reduced significantly over the past three decades, implying that capitalism has succeeded spectacularly.	从很多角度讲，全球不平等性在过去三十年得到了巨大的降低，这是资本主义的伟���胜利。


Capitalism has perhaps eroded rents that workers in advanced countries enjoy by virtue of where they were born.	资本主义也许减少了发达国家工人因为出生而享受到的租（rent）。


But it has done even more to help the world’s true middle-income workers in Asia and emerging markets.	但它对亚洲和新兴市场的全球真正的中等收入工人的帮助更大。


Allowing freer flows of people across borders would equalize opportunities even faster than trade, but resistance is fierce.	实现更加自由的人口跨境流动将比贸易更加迅速地实现机会平等，但对此的抵制是强烈的。


Anti-immigration political parties have made large inroads in countries like France and the United Kingdom, and are a major force in many other countries as well.	反移民政党在法国和英国等国家正在取得节节胜利，在其他国家也成为重要力量。


Of course, millions of desperate people who live in war zones and failed states have little choice but to seek asylum in rich countries, whatever the risk.	当然，生活在战区和失败国家的数百万绝望的人民别无选择，只能寻求富裕国家的庇护，不管这意味着多大的风险。


Wars in Syria, Eritrea, Libya, and Mali have been a huge factor in driving the current surge of refugees seeking to reach Europe.	叙利亚、厄立特里亚、利比亚和马里的战争是最近试图进入欧洲的难民潮的重要原因。


Even if these countries were to stabilize, instability in other regions would most likely take their place.	即使这些国家稳定下来，其他地区的动荡也极有可能会取而代之。


Economic pressures are another potent force for migration.	经济压力是另一个强大的移民原因。


Workers from poor countries welcome the opportunity to work in advanced countries, even at what seem like rock-bottom wages.	来自穷国的工人欢迎发达国家的工作机会，哪怕他们的工资处于社会底层。


Unfortunately, most of the debate in rich countries today, on both the left and the right, centers on how to keep other people out.	不幸的是，如今，富裕国家的大部分争论——不论是左翼还是右翼——核心都是如何将其他人拒之门外。


That may be practical, but it certainly is not morally defensible.	这也许是务实的，但显然在道德上站不住脚。


And migration pressure will increase markedly if global warming unfolds according to climatologists’ baseline predictions.	而如果全球变暖根据气候学家的基线预测那样展开，移民压力还将进一步增加。


As equatorial regions become too hot and arid to sustain agriculture, rising temperatures in the north will make agriculture more productive.	随着赤道地区变得过于炎热和干旱以至于无法开展农业，北方气温的升高将增加农业生产率。


Shifting weather patterns could then fuel migration to richer countries at levels that make today’s immigration crisis seem trivial, particularly given that poor countries and emerging markets typically are closer to the equator and in more vulnerable climates.	因此，气候模式的变化将助长流向富裕国家的移民潮，让眼下的移民危机相形见绌，特别是考虑到穷国和新兴市场通常较接近赤道、气候条件更脆弱的情况下。


With most rich countries’ capacity and tolerance for immigration already limited, it is hard to see how a new equilibrium for global population distribution will be reached peacefully.	大部分国家的能力和对移民的忍受力已经达到了极限，很难说全球人口分布的新均衡将以和平方式达到。


Resentment against the advanced economies, which account for a vastly disproportionate share of global pollution and commodity consumption, could boil over.	对发达经济体的怨恨——发达经济体对于全球污染和商品消费负有最主要的责任——随时可能爆发。


As the world becomes richer, inequality inevitably will loom as a much larger issue relative to poverty, a point I first argued more than a decade ago.	随着世界越来越富有，不平等性难免将成为比贫困更加严重的问题，我在十多年前就首次提出了这一问题。


Regrettably, however, the inequality debate has focused so intensely on domestic inequality that the far larger issue of global inequality has been overshadowed.	但是，遗憾的是，不平等性争论一直聚焦于国内不平等，而严重性远远过之的全球不平等性问题一直没有得到关注。


That is a pity, because there are many ways rich countries can make a difference.	这是一个糟糕的局面，因为富裕国家有很多办法可以让情况有所不同。


They can provide free online medical and education support, more development aid, debt write-downs, market access, and greater contributions to global security.	它们可以提供免费的在线医疗和教育支持、增加发展援助、债务减记、市场准入、更多地位全球安全做出贡献。


The arrival of desperate boat people on Europe’s shores is a symptom of their failure to do so.	绝望地乘船向欧洲海岸靠近的移民乃是发达国家失败的写照。


Europe in Reverse	欧洲的倒退


BERLIN – The legendary American investor Warren Buffet once said, “It’s when the tide goes out that you find out who has been swimming naked.”	柏林-美国富有传奇色彩的投资家沃伦·巴菲特曾经说过， “只有当潮水退去的时候，你才知道谁一直在裸泳。


That particular piece of wisdom referred to the situation of companies in an economic crisis. But it can also be applied to countries and economies.	”这一睿智的说法指的是公司在发生经济危机时的情况,但它同样也适用于指国家和经济体。


In Europe, the situation is cause for growing concern, because the global economic crisis is relentlessly laying bare the European Union’s flaws and limitations.	在欧洲，情况越来越令人担心，因为全球经济危机正在把欧盟的缺点和局限性无情地暴露出来。


Indeed, what Europe lost, first and foremost, with the rejection of the constitutional treaty is now obvious: its faith in itself and its common future.	事实上，随着对宪法规定的条约的蔑视，欧洲丧失的最重要的东西现在是显而易见的：它丧失了它对自身和对自己的共同的前途的信念。


Amid this worst crisis since 1929, America has opted for a truly new beginning with the election of Barack Obama, and is now in the process of reinventing itself.	在这个自1929年以来发生的最严重的危机的时刻，通过巴拉克·奥巴马的当选，美国现在选择了一个真正的重新起步，已进入了重塑自身的进程。


By contrast, each passing day seems to drive EU members further apart.	而相反，欧盟成员国之间的分裂却日益加深。


Rather than reinventing itself, Europe, under the pressure of the crisis and its own internal contradictions, threatens to revert to the national egoism and protectionism of the past.	欧盟不但不进行自我重塑，反而在危机和其自身内部矛盾的压力下，有回到国家利己主义和保护主义的老路上去的危险。


Europe today has a common currency and the European Central Bank (ECB), which have proven to be bulwarks in defending monetary stability during the financial crisis.	当今的欧洲有着统一的货币和欧洲央行（ ECB ） ，这已被证明是金融危机期间维护货币稳定的利器。


Any weakening of these two institutions would cause severe damage to common European interests.	任何对这两个机构的作用的削弱，都会对欧洲的共同利益造成严重损害。


But EU member governments’ behavior during the past few months raises grave doubts about whether they see things this way.	但是，过去几个月里欧盟各成员国政府的行为令人非常怀疑他们是否也这么认为。


The longer the crisis continues, the more obvious it becomes that the common currency and the ECB alone are not enough to defend the Common Market and European integration.	这场危机持续的时间越长，越变得明显的是，仅靠统一的货币和欧洲央行是不足以维护共同市场和欧洲一体化的。


Without common economic and financial policies, coordinated at least between the members of the euro zone, the cohesion of the common currency and the EU – indeed, their very existence – are in unprecedented danger.	没有至少在欧元区成员国之间协调的共同的经济和金融政策，那么共同货币和欧盟的凝聚力-事实上，这两者本身的存在-也会陷入前所未有的危险境地。


To be sure, the crisis has placed a stranglehold on countries worldwide.	可以肯定的是，这场危机已捆住了世界各国的手脚。


But there are significant differences and economic imbalances within the EU and the euro zone, reflected, for example, by increasingly divergent interest rates.	但在欧盟和欧元区内有明显的差异和经济上的不平衡，例如，这反映在越来越多的利率冲突上。


Confidence in Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece is rapidly evaporating, while the stronger economies in northern Europe are doing better, although they are struggling, too.	人们对意大利、西班牙、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和希腊的信心正在迅速蒸发，而北欧比较强大的经济体尽管日子也不好过，但情况相对要好一些。


Should this continue, perhaps bringing a de facto end to the Maastricht criteria and rising national protectionism in the form of industrial subsidies, the euro will be seriously jeopardized.	如果这种情况继续下去，也许马城条约标准将走到事实上的尽头，并且以国家保护主义的形式出现的工业补贴将不断抬头，欧元也将受到严重损害。


It is easy to imagine what the euro’s failure would mean for the EU as a whole: a disaster of historic proportions.	不难想象欧元的失败将对欧盟作为一个整体意味着什么：那将是一场历史性的灾难。


Moreover, the new EU member states in Eastern Europe, which have neither the economic strength nor the political stability of long-term members, are now beginning to take a nosedive.	此外，欧盟的东欧新成员国既没有经济实力也没有长期成员国那样的政治上的稳定，它们现在的情况开始急剧恶化。


Given the exposure of some euro-zone states such as Austria, this crisis will also affect the euro area directly.	鉴于一些欧元区国家如奥地利也不能幸免，这场危机也将直接影响到欧元区。


To wait and see is, therefore, the wrong strategy.	因此，等待和观望是个错误的战略。


There is no reason to believe that the current global economic crisis has bottomed out.	我们没有理由认为目前的全球经济危机已经走出谷底。


So, assuming that it intensifies further, Europe will rapidly face a grim alternative: either the richer and more stable economies in the North – first and foremost Europe’s largest economy, Germany – will use their greater financial resources to help the weaker euro-zone economies, or the euro will be endangered, and with it the whole project of European integration.	因此，假设它进一步恶化，那么欧洲将很快面临严峻选择：要么是较富裕和稳定的经济体-首先是欧洲最大的经济体德国-利用其更丰富的财政资源来帮助较弱的欧元区中的其它经济体;要么是欧元将受到威胁，从而威胁到整个欧洲一体化。


Why not, then, quickly introduce new instruments such as Eurobonds, or create an EU mechanism comparable to the IMF?	那么为什么不迅速推出新的证券形式，如欧元债券，或建立一个类似于国际货币基金组织的欧盟机制呢？


Each would certainly be costly – particularly for Germany – and therefore would be anything but popular, but the alternatives are much costlier; indeed, they are not serious political options.	它们肯定都要花昂贵的代价的-尤其是对德国-也因此根本不会受选民的支持，但其它的选项会更昂贵，实际上，这些不会成为被认真加以考虑的政治选项。


Institutionally, there is no way around a “European economic government” or “enhanced economic coordination” (or whatever you want to call it), which in fact would be possible informally and thus without any treaty change.	在体制上，没有办法绕过“欧洲经济政府”或“强化了的经济协调” （或随你怎么称呼都可以）之路 ，非正式地这会成为可能，也因此不会带来任何条约上的变化。


Unfortunately, it has become clear that the Franco-German engine, which is crucial to the EU acting in unison, is momentarily blocked.	不幸的是，现在已经很清楚，法德这个对欧盟行动一致起至关重要作用的引擎，暂时熄火了。


Their rhetoric suggests that France and Germany have a great deal in common, but the facts speak a completely different language.	他们在公开言论中认为法国和德国有许多共通之处，但事实上却完全不是这样。


In nearly all strategic aspects of EU crisis management, Germany and France are blocking each other – although ironically, both are doing virtually the same thing.	在几乎所有的管理欧盟危机的战略层面，德国和法国��在互相阻碍对方-虽然具有讽刺意味的是它们几乎都在做同样的事情。


They are thinking first and foremost of themselves, not of Europe, which is thus effectively without leadership.	他们首先想到的是自己而不是欧洲，因此，这里毫无领袖作风可言。


The EU was and is institutionalized compromise, and must remain so now, in the midst of a global economic crisis.	欧盟是和制度化的妥协，过去是，现在也是，而且处在全球经济危机的时刻，将来也必须继续这样。


If Germany and France don’t quickly resolve their differences and find a joint strategic answer to the crisis, they will damage themselves and Europe as a whole.	如果德国和法国不迅速地解决他们的分歧并找到针对危机的共同战略，他们将损害到自身和整个欧洲。


It must never be forgotten that the EU is a project designed for mutual economic progress.	绝不能忘记的是，欧盟是一个旨在为促进相互间的经济进步而设计的。


If this economic bond disappears, national interests will reassert themselves and rip the project apart.	如果这个经济上的纽带消失了，国家利益将重新迅猛抬头并撕裂整个欧盟。


Europe today does not lack economic strength, but rather the political will to act in unison.	今天的欧洲并不缺乏经济实力，缺乏的是采取一致行动的政治意愿。


Here is where Germany and France must lead the way.	这是德国和法国必须带头的方面。


Europe Has Lost its Way	欧洲迷途


WASHINGTON, DC – Europe’s response to the strategic challenges it is facing – Russian aggression in Ukraine, refugees fleeing violence in the Middle East, disorder in North Africa – leaves the impression that its leaders have no idea what to do.	发自华盛顿特区——欧洲针对其战略挑战的应对——俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略，逃离暴力冲突的中东难民，失控的北非局势——都让人觉得它的领导人像个无头苍蝇。


And indeed, they may not – a reality that needs to be acknowledged, not papered over.	实际上这些人可能并非如此——这是一个需要开诚布公而非刻意掩盖的事实。


Simply put, the European Union’s stagnant economy is conditioning its response to the external pressures it confronts; internal crisis has left EU leaders little room for maneuver.	简单地说，欧盟的经济停滞限制了其对外部压力的回应，内部危机又使欧盟领导人缺乏腾挪的空间。


Fortunately, Europe has the means to address this crisis, if it can summon the wisdom and the political will.	幸运的是，如果能唤起足够的智慧和政治意愿，欧洲其实有办法去解决这一危机。


The origins of the EU’s problems lie in its response to the 2008 global financial crisis: two years of large-scale fiscal stimulus.	欧盟问题的根源在于其对2008年全球金融危机的应对：两年的大规模财政刺激计划。


While this did little for growth, it resulted in crippling public debt.	这不仅没有带来多大的增长，还导致了严重的公共债务。


Seven years later, EU output per person is no higher than it was at the start of the crisis.	七年后，欧盟的人均产出甚至还低于危机爆发时的水平。


Meanwhile, average public debt has soared to 87% of GDP, leaving little space for policy flexibility or innovation.	同时公共债务规模飙升，相当于GDP总量的87%，导致留给政策调整和创新的空间极为有限。


In hindsight, it is all too obvious what should have been done.	事后看来，很显然应该采取另一种正确的策略的。


Greece, which carried out the biggest fiscal stimulus, is the country whose economy has suffered the most damage.	希腊，作为财政刺激方案力度最大的国家，受到经济伤害也最大。


Its depression continues, whereas countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which carried out early, radical fiscal adjustments and liberalized their economies, are enjoying strong growth.	希腊继续萧条，而像拉脱维亚、立陶宛、爱沙尼亚等几个早期大张旗鼓地推动财政调整为经济松绑的国家，则正在享受强劲增长。


Furthermore, the slow pace of European decision-making has compounded Greece’s troubles.	此外，欧洲缓慢的决策过程也加深了希腊的麻烦。


When it comes to economic policy, a fast, faulty decision is often better than inaction.	当谈到经济政策时，一个快速的、错误的决定通常是比无所作为要好。


Instead of resolving the Greek financial crisis quickly, EU leaders allowed it to crowd out discussion of other issues for five long years.	与其迅速地解决希腊金融危机，欧盟领导人却坐视它在其他议题之间拖拉了五年之久。


Meanwhile, Greece limped along, never taking the decisive measures that might have restored confidence.	期间希腊只得蹒跚前行，从未采取过任何有助于恢复信心的决定性措施。


With its attention focused on macroeconomics, the EU neglected to take the measures that would have put economic growth back on track: freeing up markets, cutting spending (rather than raising taxes), and, above all, further developing its greatest asset, the single European market.	由于聚焦于宏观经济，欧盟无暇采取那些让经济回到正轨的措施：开放市场，削减开支(而非增税)，而且最重要的是，进一步发展最大的资产：欧洲单一市场。


Little has changed since Italian economists Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi noted, nearly a decade ago, that, “Without serious, deep, and comprehensive reforms, Europe will inexorably decline, both economically and politically.”	意大利经济学家阿尔伯托·阿里斯纳（Alberto Alesina）和弗兰塞斯科·吉雅瓦兹（Francesco Giavazz）在差不多十年前就指出，“没有严肃、深入、全面的改革，欧洲将不可避免地衰退，无论在经济上还是政治上都一样。 ”，但一切至今都没什么改变。


They warned that, “Absent profound change, in 20 or 30 years the share of Europe [in world output] will be significantly lower than it is today, and, perhaps more important, its political influence will be much trimmed.”	他们警告说“如果缺乏深刻的变革，欧洲在20到30年后占全球产出的比例将明显低于现今，而或许更重要的，是其政治影响力将大大削弱。 ”


Indeed, a World Bank report on European growth in 2012 summed up the situation as follows: “Aging Europeans are being squeezed between innovative Americans and efficient Asians.”	事实上，世界银行的一份报告对欧洲2012年的增长情况总结如下：“日益老迈的欧洲人正受到创新美国人和高效亚洲人的挤压。 ”


The chief culprits for Europe’s underperformance are well known: high taxes, too many and bad regulations, the absence of key markets, and high public expenditures.	欧洲表现不佳的罪魁祸首路人皆知：高税收，过多且负面的监管，缺乏关键市场以及高昂的公共支出。


And there is only one reason why European governments spend so much: excessive social protection.	欧洲政府花那么多钱的原因只有一个：过度的社会保障。


As the World Bank observed, “Western European governments spend about 10% of GDP more than the United States, Canada, and Japan. The difference in social protection spending is 9% of GDP.”	世界银行指出，“西欧政府支出与GDP的比率要比美国、加拿大和日本都高出10%，在社会保障支出上的差距相当于GDP的9%。


In order to fund this spending, revenues must be raised.	为了支撑这笔费用，就必须增加政府收入。


And, because it is difficult to tax capital efficiently, Europe has imposed exorbitant levies on labor.	同时，因为难以有效计算资本所得税，欧洲转而对劳动征收极高税率。


Across the continent, but especially in southern Europe, taxes and strict labor-market regulations keep unemployment high, at 11% of the labor force, and dissuade Europeans from investing in their education.	整个欧洲大陆，尤其南欧，税收和严苛的劳动力市场使得失业率居高不下，占劳动力总量的11%，也因此阻碍了欧洲人对教育的投资。


The natural consequences are too little employment, too little investment in sophisticated education, too little innovation, and minimal increases in productivity.	自然后果是就业过低，高等教育投资过低，创新过少，伴随着生产力的极低增长。


Most striking is European backwardness in high-tech development and innovation.	最引人注目的是欧洲在高科技发展和创新背景下的衰落。


By almost any measure, most of Europe looks pitiable.	从各个方面来讲，欧洲大部分地区看起来可怜的。


Of the 50 best universities in the world, according to the Shanghai list and the Times Higher Education Supplement list, some 30 are American, six or seven are British, and only a handful are to be found in continental Europe.	根据上海名单和《泰晤士报高等教育增刊》的排名, 全球最好的50所大学中，约有30所在美国，6~7所在英国，只有少数是位于欧洲大陆。


A half-dozen northern European countries can compete with the US when it comes to research and development spending and patents granted, but the south and east of Europe lag far behind.	北欧六个国家可在研发支出和专利授予方面与美国比肩，而欧洲南部和东部则远远落后。


Meanwhile, the EU has yet to open its markets for business services and digital trade, on which the American economy thrives, even though services account for about 70% of GDP in most EU countries.	与此同时，尽管服务业约占在大多数欧盟国家GDP的70%，但欧盟尚未开放商务服务和数字贸易市场——这两者正是美国经济繁荣的动力。


In 2006, the European Commission issued a directive on the liberalization of trade in services, but major countries – particularly Germany – have refused to implement it.	2006年，欧盟委员会发布一项关于服务贸易自由化的指令，但主要国家——尤其是德国——拒绝执行。


The absence of services and digital markets harms the development of a modern economy in Europe. It is not by chance that American giants like Apple, Amazon, and Google rule the world of high-tech.	缺乏服务和数字市场在损害了欧洲现代经济的发展，可见美国巨头苹果、亚马逊和谷歌在高科技行业的统治地位并非偶然。


There is nothing inevitable about Europe’s malaise, just as there is nothing quintessentially European about having excessive social transfers.	欧洲的问题是完全可以避免的，正如过度的社会转移支付并不应该是欧洲特色那样。


Serious European governments – from Ireland to Poland – have successfully addressed the problem.	一些认真执政的欧洲国家政府——从爱尔兰到波兰——都已成功地解决了这个问题。


The rest of the EU should not only follow suit; they should also cut income and payroll taxes and liberalize their labor markets.	欧盟其它地区不仅应该效仿； 也应该减少收入和工资税并开放劳动力市场。


Fundamental economic reforms are usually implemented only after a severe crisis, as was the case in Britain in the late 1970s, in Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s, and in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism in 1989.	根本性地经济改革通常只在严重的危机后施行，就像在1970年代末的英国，1990年代早期的瑞典和芬兰，1989年共产主义崩溃后的东欧。


The EU has wasted the opportunities afforded by the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis.	欧盟已经浪费了2008年全球金融危机和随后的欧元危机所带来的机会。


Rather than making the difficult changes that would enable strong recovery, Europe’s policymakers have weighed down the economy with more spending and debt.	相比通过艰难的改变来实现强劲复苏，欧洲的政策制定者却因为增加支出和债务而拖累了经济。


The EU will continue to flounder until it recognizes its mistakes and begins to carry out the reforms its economy needs.	除非意识到自身的错误，开始实施经济所需的改革，否则欧洲只能继续徘徊不进。


Only by putting the continent firmly back on the path of growth will Europe’s leaders be able to address the external challenges they now confront.	也只有让欧洲大陆回归增长之路，才能让欧洲领导人腾出手来，应对当前所面对的外部挑战。


Europe is Not the United States	切勿把欧洲当成美国


CAMBRIDGE – Europe is now struggling with the inevitable adverse consequences of imposing a single currency on a very heterogeneous collection of countries.	发自剑桥——在一个国情千差万别的国家集团中推行单一货币必将引发某些负面后果，而欧洲目前正为此焦头烂额。


But the budget crisis in Greece and the risk of insolvency in Italy and Spain are just part of the problem caused by the single currency.	但希腊的预算危机以及意大利、西班牙两国的破产风险只不过是单一货币所导致的其中一部分问题而已。


The fragility of the major European banks, high unemployment rates, and the large intra-European trade imbalance (Germany’s $200 billion current-account surplus versus the combined $300 billion current-account deficit in the rest of the eurozone) also reflect the use of the euro.	欧洲各大银行的脆弱性，高失业率以及欧洲各国之间的巨额贸易不平衡（德国拥有2000亿欧元经常账户盈余，相反其他欧元区国家合共存在3000亿欧元的经常账户亏损）也是因为欧元的推行而导致的。


European politicians who insisted on introducing the euro in 1999 ignored the warnings of economists who predicted that a single currency for all of Europe would create serious problems.	经济学家曾经警告一个全欧洲通用的单一货币将造成严重问题，但那些坚持在1999年启动欧元的欧洲政治家却忽略了这一点。


The euro’s advocates were focused on the goal of European political integration, and saw the single currency as part of the process of creating a sense of political community in Europe.	欧元的鼓吹者们把注意力放在了欧洲政治整合的目标之上，并将单一货币视为培养政治认同感的其中一环。


They rallied popular support with the slogan “One Market, One Money,” arguing that the free-trade area created by the European Union would succeed only with a single currency.	他们用“一个市场，一种货币”这样的口号来发动群众，声称只有依靠一个单一货币才能最终建成欧盟自由贸易区。


Neither history nor economic logic supported that view.	然而历史和经济学逻辑都无法支撑上述观点。


Indeed, EU trade functions well, despite the fact that only 17 of the Union’s 27 members use the euro.	事实上，尽管27个欧盟成员国中只有17个使用欧元，但欧盟贸易依旧运作良好。


But the key argument made by European officials and other defenders of the euro has been that, because a single currency works well in the United States, it should also work well in Europe.	但对欧洲官员和其他为欧元辩护者来说，他们的核心论据是既然一个单一货币能在美国通行无阻，那么在欧洲也应该行的通。


After all, both are large, continental, and diverse economies.	毕竟欧美双方都是大型洲际经济体，内部也参次不齐。


But that argument overlooks three important differences between the US and Europe.	但这个论据却忽视了美欧之间的三个重要差别。


First, the US is effectively a single labor market, with workers moving from areas of high and rising unemployment to places where jobs are more plentiful.	首先，美国基本上是一个单一劳动力市场，劳动者可以从失业率不断上升的区域向职位想对充裕的地区流动。


In Europe, national labor markets are effectively separated by barriers of language, culture, religion, union membership, and social-insurance systems.	而在欧洲，各国劳动力市场实际上被语言，文化，宗教，欧盟成员国资格和社保系统等各类障碍割裂开来。


To be sure, some workers in Europe do migrate. In the absence of the high degree of mobility seen in the US, however, overall unemployment can be lowered only if high-unemployment countries can ease monetary policy, an option precluded by the single currency.	虽然某些欧洲劳动者确实能在各国间迁徙，但由于缺乏美国劳动者所拥有的高度流动性，欧洲的总体失业率只有在高失业率国家实行宽松货币政策之后才能有所下降，但这条路已经被单一货币堵死了。


A second important difference is that the US has a centralized fiscal system.	第二个重要差别则是美国拥有一个中央财政系统。


Individuals and businesses pay the majority of their taxes to the federal government in Washington, rather than to their state (or local) authorities.	个人和组织把大部分税款交给了位于华盛顿的联邦政府，而非所在地（州）当局。


When a US state’s economic activity slows relative to the rest of the country, the taxes that its individuals and businesses pay to the federal government decline, and the funds that it receives from the federal government (for unemployment benefits and other transfer programs) increase.	因此当一个州的经济活动落后于其他州的时候，该州的个人和组织向联邦政府缴交的税款也会相应减少，同时来自联邦政府的资助额（失业津贴以及其他转移支付项目）也会相应增加。


Roughly speaking, each dollar of GDP decline in a state like Massachusetts or Ohio triggers changes in taxes and transfers that offset about 40 cents of that drop, providing a substantial fiscal stimulus.	大体上看，马萨诸塞州或者俄亥俄州每出现1美元的GDP下降，所引发的税率变更和转移支付就将冲抵其中40美分，也因此起到有效的财政刺激作用。


There is no comparable offset in Europe, where taxes are almost exclusively paid to, and transfers received from, national governments.	而欧洲则不存在类似的抵消行为，因为纳税人上缴的税款（以及接受的转移支付）基本上全部针对各国政府。


The EU’s Maastricht Treaty specifically reserves this tax-and-transfer authority to the member states, a reflection of Europeans’ unwillingness to transfer funds to other countries’ people in the way that Americans are willing to do among people in different states.	欧盟《马斯特里赫特条约》特别保留了成员国收税以及进行转移支付的权力，而这也反映出欧洲各国并不愿像美国各州那样互相进行转移支付。


The third important difference is that all US states are required by their constitutions to balance their annual operating budgets.	第三个重要区别是美国各州的宪法都规定要平衡每年的预算。


While “rainy day” funds that accumulate in boom years are used to deal with temporary revenue shortfalls, the states’ “general obligation” borrowing is limited to capital projects like roads and schools.	在年景好的时候设立“纾困基金”以备衰退的同时，各州的“一般责任（general obligation）”借贷仅限于修建公路或者学校项目。


Even a state like California, seen by many as a poster child for fiscal profligacy, now has an annual budget deficit of just 1% of its GDP and a general obligation debt of just 4% of GDP.	即便是加利福尼亚这样看似挥霍无度的州，其当前年度预算赤字只是GDP的1%，一般责任债务也仅相当于GDP的4%。


These limits on state-level budget deficits are a logical implication of the fact that US states cannot create money to fill fiscal gaps.	这些在州层面的预算赤字限制政策正是美国各州无法印钱来填补赤字空缺的逻辑结果。


These constitutional rules prevent the kind of deficit and debt problems that have beset the eurozone, where capital markets ignored individual countries’ lack of monetary independence.	这些宪法规定防止了各州出现欧元区那样的赤字和借贷问题，而资本市场也忽略了各单一欧洲国家缺乏货币独立性的事实。


None of these features of the US economy would develop in Europe even if the eurozone evolved into a more explicitly political union.	即使欧元区能进化成为一个更加明确的政治联盟，也无法发展出美国经济的上述特质。


Although the form of political union advocated by Germany and others remains vague, it would not involve centralized revenue collection, as in the US, because that would place a greater burden on German taxpayers to finance government programs in other countries.	尽管德国以及其他各方依然大力鼓吹政治联盟的形式，它也无法实现一个美国式的中央税收系统，因为这会令德国纳税人承担更多资助其他国家政府项目的压力。


Nor would political union enhance labor mobility within the eurozone, overcome the problems caused by imposing a common monetary policy on countries with different cyclical conditions, or improve the trade performance of countries that cannot devalue their exchange rates to regain competitiveness.	而这种政治联盟也无法提高欧元区内的劳动者流动性，更无法解决共同货币政策对经济循环状况各不相同的国家所带来的问题，同时也不能改善竞争力的国家的贸易状况，因为它们无法降低自身的货币汇率。


The most likely effect of strengthening political union in the eurozone would be to give Germany the power to control the other members’ budgets and prescribe changes in their taxes and spending.	或许加强欧元区政治联盟的最有效方法就是授予德国控制其他国家预算并修订相关征税和支出政策的权力。


This formal transfer of sovereignty would only increase the tensions and conflicts that already exist between Germany and other EU countries.	但这种主权的正式让渡只能增加德国和其他欧盟国家之间业已存在的紧张和冲突。


A European Role in Palestine?	巴勒斯坦的欧洲角色？


LONDON – The international community’s attention in the Middle East nowadays is inevitably focused on the Islamic State’s military advances in Syria and Iraq, the failed states of Yemen and Libya, the activities of Islamic extremists everywhere, and the continuing efforts to complete a deal to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.	伦敦—如今，国际社会对中东的关注难免集中于伊斯兰国在叙利亚和伊拉克的军事扩张、也门和利比亚的国家失败、伊斯兰极端分子在各地的活动，以及完成遏制伊朗核野心的协议的努力。


Meanwhile, the oldest dispute in the region – the subject of a decades-long peace process that moves nowhere – continues to fester and worsen in Palestine and Israel.	与此同时，该地区最古老的纠纷——一个进行了几十年仍不知所踪的和平进程——依旧在巴勒斯坦和以色列不断恶化。


A report submitted earlier this month by the NGO Defense for Children International – Palestine (DCIP) to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the Palestine-Israel conflict’s toll on children in 2014 underscores some of the most damaging consequences of this state of affairs.	本月早些时候，非政府组织巴勒斯坦国际儿童保护组织（Defense for Children International – Palestine，DCIP）向联合国秘书长潘基文递交了一份报告，总结了2014年巴以冲突所造成的儿童伤亡情况。 该报告凸显出这场冲突伤害最大的后果。


Its reception also serves as a reminder of why we have made no progress toward peace.	它的发布也提醒我们为何没能在这一和平进程上取得进展。


Last year, according to the DCIP report, 561 children were killed – 557 of them Palestinian, most as a result of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza during the summer.	根据DCIP报告，去年有561名儿童被杀——其中557人是巴勒斯坦人，大部分死于去年夏天以色列在加沙进行的护刃行动（Operation Protective Edge）。


In addition, almost 3,000 Palestinian children were injured during that 50-day conflict, with about 1,000 permanently disabled.	此外还有近3,000名巴勒斯坦儿童在这场为期50天的冲突中受伤，大约1,000名儿童永久致残。


The report also details the destruction of schools, the post-conflict mental health problems faced by the young, and the imprisonment of children.	报告还相信列出了学校的毁坏情况、冲突后年轻人所面临的精神健康问题，以及儿童被囚禁的情况。


According to Ban, the number of Palestinian children killed in 2014 was higher than the numbers of child deaths in Syria and Darfur, and was exceeded only in Afghanistan and Iraq.	潘基文指出，2014年被杀的巴勒斯坦儿童数量比叙利亚和达尔富尔儿童死亡人数还要多，仅次于阿富汗和伊拉克儿童死亡人数。


The number of schools destroyed in Palestinian areas was the highest recorded anywhere.	巴勒斯坦地区被摧毁学校数量则比其他任何地方都要多。


Not surprisingly, the UN’s special representative for children and armed conflict, Leila Zerrougui, recommended that Israel and its adversary in Gaza, Hamas (which has a grim record, too), should be placed on the UN’s annual list of states and groups that gravely violate children’s rights.	毫不奇怪，联合国儿童和武装冲突特别代表莱拉·泽罗圭（Leila Zerrougui）建议以色列及其加沙的对手哈马斯（也是双手沾满了鲜血）应该被记上联合国严重损害儿童权利年度名单。


But the United States put pressure on the Secretary-General to leave Israel off the list; Ban acceded, and decided to leave Hamas off the list as well.	但美国向秘书长施压，要求将以色列剔除出该名单； 潘基文同意了，并决定把哈马斯也剔除出该名单。


Israel, frequently lauded in the US Congress as America’s most dependable ally in the region, is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.	以色列常常在美国国会叫嚣自己是美国在中东地区最可靠的盟友，它也是联合国儿童权利公约签署国。


It is difficult to imagine that US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, who has a fine record on human-rights protection, had her heart in lobbying to whitewash Israel.	很难想象美国驻联合国大使萨曼莎·鲍尔（Samantha Power，她在人权保护方面记录优异）一心游说为以色列洗白。


Many Europeans will conclude that this is further evidence (if any was needed) that the US will always – and disastrously – protect Israel from the international and reputational consequences of its actions.	许多欧洲人会认为，这进一步表明（如果有任何需要的话）美国将永远——也是灾难性地——保护以色列免于面对其行为的国际和名誉后果。


But this is not enough.	但这还不够。


Israel and Palestine are trapped in a bloody cul-de-sac, which is catastrophic for Palestinians and increasingly dangerous for Israel’s prospects.	以色列和巴勒斯坦走进了血腥的死胡同，这对巴勒斯坦人来说是一场灾难，对以色列的前景来说也日益危险。


As a group of eminent European politicians recently noted, a two-state peace deal could be lost, leaving Israel to face a stark choice: become a non-Jewish democracy or a Jewish non-democracy.	一个由欧洲政治要人组成的小组最近指出，两国和平协议可能丧失，以色列将因此面临二选一：成为非犹太民主国家，或者成为犹太非民主国家。


This group, which included former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, European Union commissioners and senior diplomats, sent a set of proposals to EU leaders in May.	5月，这个包括了多位前总统、首相、外交部长、欧盟委员和高级外交官的小组向欧盟领导人提出了一系列建议。


Europe, according to the group, should offset America’s evident withdrawal from the diplomatic process and play a serious role in reviving prospects for peace.	该小组指出，欧洲应该弥补美国从外交进程中的撤退（这一点已经显而易见），承担起重振和平前景的主要作用。


At the heart of the proposals is EU support in the UN Security Council for a resolution that “either (1) calls for new negotiations and sets a mandatory deadline for the completion of an agreement to establish a two-state solution, or (2) creates a greater equivalence between the Israeli and Palestinian parties, including through recognition of a Palestinian state and strong support for Palestine accession to international treaties and organizations.”	这些建议的核心是欧盟支持这样的联合国安理会协议：“要么（1）呼吁进行新磋商并为两国方案协议设定强制性的完成期限，要么（2）在以色列和巴勒斯坦各方之间建立更大的平等关系，包括通过承认巴勒斯坦国和大力支持巴勒斯坦加入国际条约和组织。 ”


The call for such a resolution reflects the impact of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s obnoxious behavior and the extremist views of several of his ministers, which have increased European countries’ sympathy for Palestinian statehood.	呼吁这样一个决议反映出以色列总理内塔尼亚胡行为可憎，而他的几位部长观点极端，以至于欧洲国家开始同情巴勒斯坦的国家地位。


There is also a growing clamor in the EU to enforce the correct labeling of products made in Israel’s West Bank settlements.	此外，欧盟中有越来越多的人要求强制性纠正产自以色列约旦河西岸定居点的产品的标签。


These products are exported to Europe under bilateral trade agreements between the EU and Israel.	这些产品根据欧盟和以色列的双边贸易协定出口到欧洲。


But the settlements are not part of Israel under international law.	但根据国际法，约旦河西岸定居点并不是以色列的一部分。


Sooner or later, someone will take EU countries to court over this.	迟早会有人就此将欧盟国家告上法庭。


The response to these sorts of proposals from Israel’s government has been depressingly predictable.	以色列政府对这些提议的反应不难预测，令人压抑。


First, Israeli spokesmen accuse Europeans of anti-Semitism – that hateful blot on Europe’s history.	首先，以色列发言人指责欧洲人反犹——这是欧洲历史上的一个可恨污点。


But there is a real danger in conflating criticism of Israeli intransigence and extremism with anti-Semitism.	但将对以色列的“任性”行为和极端主义的批评与反犹相提并论真的很危险。


To say that it is anti-Semitic to condemn the killing and maiming of children in Gaza is to make a mockery of acts that really are anti-Semitic and that deserve to be condemned by every civilized person.	说谴责杀害和致残加沙儿童的行为是反犹，这是对每个文明人都应该谴责的真正的反犹行为的嘲弄。


Second, Israel repeats its claim that it has no potential partner for peace.	其次，以色列反复声明，它没有潜在的和平伙伴。


In fact, Israel is in deep denial, which was reflected in Netanyahu’s contemptuous rejection of a two-state solution in his successful re-election campaign.	事实上，以色列已陷入了深刻的否认，内塔尼亚胡在其获得成功的竞选中轻蔑地拒绝两国方案就是明证。


The fact is that every situation in which a dominant power confronts those it condemns as terrorists sooner or later ends in negotiations.	事实是，凡是主宰力量与被它谴责为恐怖分子存在冲突局面，迟早都要以磋商解决问题。


In Algeria, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, those in power invariably claimed that they had no partner for peace – until they made peace with the very “terrorists” they had spent decades vilifying.	在阿尔及利亚、南非和北爱尔兰，掌权者无一例外地宣布它们没有和平伙伴——直到它们与它们中伤了���十年的“恐怖分子”缔结和平。


To put off talking makes violence increasingly difficult to end, which means that the sentiments that violence breeds become increasingly difficult to change.	阻挠谈判让暴力越来越难以结束，这意味着暴力所引起的情绪越来越难以改变。


To secure peace, Israel will one day have to talk seriously to Hamas as well as Fatah and the PLO.	为了确保和平，以色列总有一天不得不与哈马斯以及法塔赫和PLO进行严肃对话。


There is no alternative.	没有第二条路可走。


Until that happens, the children – the overwhelming majority of them Palestinian –will continue to suffer.	在这一幕发生前，儿童——其中绝大部分是巴勒斯坦儿童——将继续遭受苦难。


How long will the rest of the world look the other way?	世界其他国家还要袖手旁观多久？


Europe is Working Longer	欧洲：工作得更长点


France’s decision effectively abolishing its 35-hour workweek by allowing employers to increase working hours – and pay – marks a reversal of a decades-old trend.	法国允许雇主增加工作时间及薪酬、废除它每周35小时工作制的决定标志着数十年的趋势出现了逆转。


In the 1980’s and 1990’s, most European countries reduced working hours: Germany went from more than 40 to 38 per week, the UK from 40 to 37, Denmark from 39 to 37, and France from 40 to 35.	在上世纪80及90年代，大部分欧洲国家削减了工作时间：德国将每周工作时间从40降为38小时，英国从40降为37小时，丹麦从39减少到37小时，法国从40减少到35小时。


Today, however, as Europeans struggle with high unemployment and stagnating living standards, they may have to work longer to cope with globalization.	然而今天，当欧洲人在高失业率和停滞不前的生活水平中苦苦挣扎时，他们不得不工作得更长一点以适应全球化。


The French actions follow changes in Germany, where some recent wage settlements resulted in longer working times.	德国最新的工资协议导致更长的工作时间，法国的行动就在德国政策变化之后。


The difference between the two countries is that, in Germany, working times were increased without compensating pay increases.	两国的不同之处在于，德国的工作时间虽然增长了，但是补贴报酬却毫无增长迹象。


Siemens was the forerunner, going from 35 to 40 hours per week.	西门子首当其冲，将每周工作时间从35小时提高至40小时。


Bavaria’s government increased the workweek from 38.5 to 40 hours for older employees and to 42 hours for younger employees.	巴伐利亚市政府将老年雇员的工作时间从38. 5小时提高至40小时，年轻雇员的工作时间则增至42小时。


When Daimler-Chrysler increased work hours from 35 to 40 hours in its research and development center, the dam broke and other bargaining agreements fell into line.	戴姆勒-克莱斯勒将其研究和发展中心的工作时间从35小时提高至40小时，此先河一开，其他的谈判协议纷至沓来。


Germany primarily reacted to low-wage competition from ex-communist countries.	德国原本是出于对来自前社会主义国家的低工资竞争做出回应。


Currently, the average wage of the ten countries that joined the EU in May 2004 is about one-seventh of the West German wage level, and the Chinese wage is one twenty-fifth.	目前，2004年五月加入欧盟的十国平均工资大约是西德工资水平的七分之一，中国工资是其二十五分之一。


Those differences are so huge that some people consider efforts to compete futile.	这些差距如此之大以至于某些人认为参与竞争的努力无济于事。


But, as productivity is much higher in Germany, an effective reduction of hourly labor costs by uncompensated increases in working hours seems worth trying.	但是，由于德国生产效率要高得多，增加工作时间以有效削减人力成本的做法看起来值得一试。


This could be an example for other European countries.	这对欧洲其他国家而言树立了一个榜样。


The next step for France could be unpaid increases in working times.	法国的下一步可能是无薪延长工作时间。


Trade union opposition to extending working hours is based on the “lump-of-labor” theory.	工会反对延长工作时间的抗议建立在“劳动合成谬误”的理论之上。


According to this view, there are no economic advantages of such a policy, because the total amount of labor in the economy is fixed.	根据这一观点，这样的政策毫无经济利益，因为经济学中的劳力总和是固定的。


As a result, a 10% increase in working time will merely reduce employment by 10% percent.	因此，工作时间延长10%只会导致就业率降低10%。


Despite its seeming plausibility, this view is wrong.	这个观点尽管看上去颇有道理，但它是错误的。


Working longer for the same pay is a useful way of making Europe more competitive, and, when compared to reducing wages, it imposes a much lighter burden on workers and employees.	同酬条件下的延长工时是使欧洲更具竞争力的有效方法，与削减工资相比，它对工人和雇主的负担都较轻。


Working longer will boost economic growth, for if people work longer, then so does capital.	更长的工作时间将促进经济增长，因为如果人们工作时间更长，资本也就积累越多。


Except for where all 24 hours of the day are filled with shift work, increasing the daily working time of people extends daily capital utilization.	除了全天24小时轮班的地方，延长人们白天的工作时间能提高资本利用率。


Thus, a 10% increase in working time is the same as if the economy’s stock of productive capital were increased by 10%.	因而，工作时间加长10%就像经济生产资本储备增加了10%一样。


There is a jump in wealth and an immediate production boom.	社会财富将有跳跃式增长，生产力将会即刻提高。


The lump-of-labor theory assumes that working longer and employing more people is the same thing.	“劳动合成谬误”理论假定加长工作时间与雇佣更多的人是一回事情。


But they are very different.	但事实上，它们是不同的。


Longer working time can be achieved nearly instantaneously, whereas employing more people is time consuming and expensive, as it typically requires new physical investment. Working longer is thus the ideal way to achieve growth and competitiveness.	延长工作时间可以立马做到，然而因为雇佣更多员工尤其要求新的实物投资，时间长、花费大，所以，延长工时是达到增长并获得竞争力的最理想方法。


In fact, extending daily working times will, in the medium term, also result in higher employment, because it will increase productivity while labor costs remain constant.	事实上，用媒体的术语来说，延长白天的工时将造就更高的就业率，因为它能在保持劳动力成本不变的情况下提高生产效率。


Some workers whose productivity was too low to cover their cost will now be hired, as firms will find it worthwhile to expand output above the level resulting from the increased working time itself by investing more capital and hiring more workers.	那些生产效率过于低下以至于与劳力成本不相称的工人现在将被解雇，因为公司将会发现，将产量水平提高到通过投入更多资本、雇佣更多工人这种方式增加工时所达到的产量水平之上，那是值得的。


Some fear that extending the workday will not produce more jobs because the resulting expansion of hours worked will reduce the capital-labor ratio.	一些人担心工作日增加所导致的资本对劳动比例降低将无法提供更多的工作岗位。


This would lower the marginal productivity of hours worked sufficiently to offset the positive effects of increasing the number of hours per worker.	它将会降低高效工作的每小时边际生产力，抵消掉增加每小时工人人数所带来的积极影响。


But, again, capital would also work longer.	但是，再说一次，资本将会运营地更久一点。


Because of the “capital utilization effect,” the capital-labor ratio would not, in fact, decline, and hence there would be no significant effect on the marginal productivity of hours worked.	事实上，根据“资本利用率效益”资本对劳力比例不会降低，因此也不会对工作时间的边际生产力产生重要影响。


The theoretical effect on employment is unambiguously positive, because marginal workers will be more productive as they work longer.	从理论上来说，如果边缘劳工工作得更长的话，他们的生产效率更高，这无疑还会对就业率产生积极作用。


Would there be enough demand to absorb the additional output resulting from increasing the workday?	会有足够的需求来吸收工作日延长所带来的附加产量吗？


Advocates of the lump-of-labor view say no.	“劳动合成谬误”观点的支持者们说，不会。


But as more goods are produced while the wage per worker is fixed, profits increase by exactly the same amount as the value of output does.	但是当每个工资固���的工人生产出更多货物，利润与产量的价值增长量是相同的。


Thus, in principle, the purchasing power for the extra output would be available.	所以，原则上说，会出现针对附加产量的购买力量。


The entrepreneur might buy his wife a new fur coat or his workers a new production plant.	企业主也许要为他的妻子买一件皮毛大衣或为他的工人建造一座新生产车间。


If all firms work longer, most will experience more demand, and the average firm will face as much extra demand as it provides extra supply.	如果所有的公司都工作长一点，大部分将会面临更多的需求，并且一般公司会遇到与其额外供给相同的额外需求。


True, some extra demand will go abroad, but so will some of the extra supply.	的确，一部分额外需求将会流入国外，但是这种情况也会发生在额外供给上。


A slight devaluation would solve any remaining problem with export demand.	轻微的货币贬值将能解决出口需求的任何遗留问题。


This could be an explicit devaluation or an implicit one due to a price reduction, made possible by the reduction in unit production costs resulting from the extra working time at constant pay.	这可能是直接贬值也可能是由于价格下降而引起的隐性贬值，这两种情况都有可能是因为工资不变条件下额外的工作时间所引发的单元生产成本降低所造成的。


The argument that working longer destroys jobs and that we need technological progress in order to become more competitive and maintain employment is inherently inconsistent, because working longer is nearly the same as technological progress that makes capital and labor more productive.	“工作更长久将会损害就业”和“我们需要技术进步以使我们变得更具竞争力并保持就业率”的观点本身就是矛盾的，因为工作时间加长与能使资本和劳力都更具价值的技术进步几乎是一样的。


Either one or the other view is correct, but both cannot be true simultaneously.	尽管两者都有可能正确，但是它们不可能同时正确。


In any case, only the second interpretation is correct.	担心加长工作时间将会对就业率造成损害是毫无道理的。


The fear that extending the workday will damage employment is unfounded. It is a tried and true path towards growth, competitiveness and employment.	这是一条费力但却是真正的通往经济增长、竞争力加强、就业率提高的道路。


Resolving Europe’s Banking Crisis in Italy	在意大利解决欧洲银行危机


LONDON – The European banking sector is crippled and highly fragmented.	伦敦—欧洲银行业步路蹒跚并且高度分散。


Though its problems are more acute for some countries and financial institutions, the sector runs on a level of profitability that is, on average, lower than its cost of equity and maintains a stock of non-performing loans and hard-to-value assets large enough to undermine its capitalization for years to come.	它的问题在某些国家和金融机构中尤其尖锐，但这一行业的盈利水平平均而言要低于其股权成本，并且其手中的不良贷款和难以估值的资产的存量之大足以威胁到未来多年的市值。


Italy is a case in point.	意大利正是如此。


Not only is its dysfunctional banking sector undermining economic recovery and inhibiting investment; the sector’s troubles are the sharp end of a problem that affects the entire eurozone.	其银行业萎靡不振不但威胁到经济复苏、阻碍了投资，并且其银行业的麻烦尖锐地反映了一个影响到整个欧元区的问题。


By the spring of 2012, it had become clear that the European banking system was a critical weak point in the euro’s architecture.	到2012年春，显然欧洲银行系统已成为欧元大厦的一个关键弱点。


Common banking supervision, a centralized resolution framework, and a mutualized deposit-guarantee scheme were understood to be necessary pillars of the eurozone.	人们已经认识到，共同银行监督、中央化清算框架以及共同化存款担保机制是欧元区必不可少的支柱。


It was thought that these measures would help in the short term to accelerate bank repair, and that they would end financial fragmentation, establish a level playing field, reduce the risk of future banking crises, and ultimately contain and share the costs of banking failures.	人们认为，这些措施短期有助于加快银行恢复，并最终结束金融分散问题，形成一个公平的经营环境，降低未来银行危机风险，最终遏制并共担银行倒闭的成本。


But the road to hell is paved with good intentions.	但好心办了坏事。


The European banking union, in its current state, is not only incomplete; its design flaws have made it a source of inaction and instability potentially worse than the ills it was intended to cure.	欧洲银行联盟的现状不但远远算不上完善，其设计缺陷更是令它成为不作为和不稳定的根源，这可能比它原本想要解决的问题还要糟糕。


The deposit-guarantee scheme, for example, shows no sign of progress, and the debates on the single resolution fund and its lack of a public backstop to deal with large-scale banking distress are going nowhere.	比如，存款担保机制完全看不到进展迹象，而关于单一清算基金，以及因为它无法获得公共支持，故而不能解决大规模银行灾难的争论也是众说纷纭。


Finally, the bail-in rules were introduced before banks could issue enough bail-in-able debt.	最后，自救（bail-in）规则引入过早，银行还无法发行足够的足以自救（bail-in-able）的债务。


These sequencing issues can and should be addressed over time.	这些顺次发生的问题可以也应该用时间来解决。


But there are far more troubling problems with the conceptual foundation of the banking union itself, in particular with its resolution framework.	但银行联盟本身的概念基础存在更加麻烦的问题，特别是其清算框架。


Since 2007, EU countries have provided in excess of €675 billion ($757 billion) in capital and repayable loans, along with €1.3 trillion in guarantees, to financial institutions in distress, so the desire to limit bailouts is understandable.	2007年以来，欧盟国家向陷入困境的金融机构提供了超过6,750亿欧元资本金和应偿还贷款以及1. 3万亿欧元担保，因此不难理解它们希望限制援助（bail-out）。


This concern is all the more legitimate, given that bailouts have often hampered restructuring, resolution, and consolidation to preserve existing banking interests and practices, thereby delaying the necessary repair of balance sheets and zombifying the European banking system.	再考虑到援助常常会为了保护现有银行利益和行为而妨碍重组、清算和整合，从而延迟必要的资产负债表修复、导致欧洲银行系统僵尸化，这一顾虑就更加合情合理了。


To be sure, international experience shows that public resources are sometimes necessary to minimize costs and hasten consolidation.	诚然，国际经验表明必须使用公共资源才能实现成本最小化和加快整合。


But the logic of isolated intervention ignores the interconnectedness of the system, whereby distress in one large institution often creates spillover effects that feed destabilizing system-wide runs.	但孤立干预的逻辑忽视了系统的互通性，一家大机构陷入困难常常形成溢出效应，带来破坏性的全系统挤兑。


That is why successful interventions in Spain and Ireland were comprehensive and required large amounts of national and European resources to establish a “bad bank” and ensure a system-wide subsequent triage of assets, recapitalization, and consolidation.	正因如此，西班牙和爱尔兰的成功干预都是全面干预，需要大量国家和欧洲资源成立“坏银行”，保证随后进行一次全系统的资产大检查、资本重组和整合。


Although these programs’ comprehensive nature explains their success, neither the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive nor the Single Resolution Board (SRB) are designed to put in place such systemic responses.	尽管这些计划的全面性特点是其成功的因素，但不论是银行复苏和清算指令（Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive）还是单一清算委员会（SRB），都不是为了落实这些系统性因对措施而设。


In fact, the SRB even lacks the executive authority to implement its decisions, which are carried out by national authorities.	事实上，SRB甚至没有行政权限实施它的决定，而由国家当局实施。


It also lacks the ability to ensure that bank resolutions are accompanied by the necessary preventive steps in the rest of the banking system.	它也没有能力确保银行清算时银行系统的其余部分采取必要的预防性措施。


In short, the European banking resolution framework has confiscated the tools for intervention from national authorities (which was the right thing to do), without recreating them at the European level.	简言之，欧洲银行清算框架将干预工具从国家当局（它们知道应该怎样做）手中收走，但并没有在欧洲层面恢复这些工具。


As a result, neither national governments nor European authorities are empowered to act.	结果，不论是国家政府还是欧洲当局，都没有行动的权力。


This leaves the Italian authorities with a limited set of options.	这就导致意大利当局面临的选项十分有限。


A unilateral blanket bailout would stress the banking union, stretch public finances, and leave the Italian banking system with its structural weakness.	单方面一刀切援助将导致银行联盟承压，公共财政吃紧，而意大利银行系统结构性弱点依旧。


Alternatively, they could also maintain the current piecemeal approach, which has essentially committed small amounts of public resources and forced the stronger banks to support the weaker ones.	或者，他们也可以保持当前的渐进方针，该方针本质上即投入少量公共资源，强迫情况较好的银行支持情况较差的银行。


But this strategy cannot work for large institutions.	但这一策略对大机构束手无策。


A third option would be to confront the European banking union’s shortcomings by setting out a comprehensive plan to restructure, recapitalize, and consolidate the Italian banking system, thereby ending decades of poor governance and bad supervisory practices.	第三个选项是通过制定全面的债务重组、资本重组和整合意大利银行系统的计划来应对欧洲银行联盟的缺陷，从而结束几十年来的治理和监管不力。


This new approach would require, first, a substantial increase in the size of Atlante, the fund set up to recapitalize some of the weaker Italian banks, to enable it to play the standard role of asset triage of a “bad bank” for the entire banking sector.	这一新方针首先要求大幅扩大阿迪兰特基金（Atlante，其成立的目的是对情况较差的意大利银行进行资本重组）的规模，让它对银行业的“坏银行”资产进行梳理鉴别。


The need for further Italian public resources could be acceptable if the European Commission’s competition authority were to play a role in the governance of Atlante.	如果欧盟委员会竞争管理当局能承担治理阿迪兰特基金的责任，那么增加投入意大利公共资源的要求也可以接受。


Second, once freed of their non-performing loans, banks would need to undertake precautionary recapitalizations, including the bail-in of subordinated bondholders and the immediate compensation of retail investors.	其次，一旦从不良贷款中解放出来，银行需要进行预防性资本重组，包括次级债券持有人的自救以及立刻补偿散户投资者。


Then, all banks should be given a tight schedule to raise capital privately, in accordance with the single supervisor’s instructions, to levels that create a sufficient buffer to ensure their viability; banks that fail to meet this schedule should be resolved.	接着，所有银行都应该被要求在短期内根据单一监督者的指示筹集私有资本，直到能够建立足够确保生存的缓冲； 不能按时完成这一任务的银行应该被清算。


Finally, and most important, deep reforms should be undertaken to facilitate a real shift in banks’ business models in order to restore their profitability.	最后也是最重要的，应该采取深度改革促使银行业务模式的真正变化，重塑银行盈利能力。


Such reforms should include dedicated redundancy schemes for bank employees (to facilitate consolidation), an overhaul of solvency law and court procedures (to redress repossession delays), and profound changes in corporate governance, particularly in the cooperative banking system.	这些改革应该包括专门针对银行员工的冗余机制（以便利整合），修订偿债能力法和法庭程序（以纠正拖延补偿），大幅变革公司治理、特别是合作性银行系统的公司治理等。


European authorities are unable to design such a plan, owing to the banking union’s fragmented and incomplete competencies.	由于银行联盟的分散和能力不足，欧洲当局无法指定这样的计划。


It is up to Italy to break the vicious cycle of inaction and take the bold steps needed to repair Italian banks (and avert a real crisis), which would also provide a blueprint for redressing the inadequacies of the European resolution framework.	必须由意大利来打破不作为的恶性循环，采取必要的果断措施修复意大利银行（并避免真正的危机），这也将为解决欧洲清算机制缺位的问题提供一个蓝图。


Italy needs to show that one can be both a firefighter and a builder.	意大利需要表明它既能当消防员，也能当建筑工人。


The ECB’s Illusory Independence	欧洲央行的独立假象


ATHENS – A commitment to the independence of central banks is a vital part of the creed that “serious” policymakers are expected to uphold (privatization, labor-market “flexibility,” and so on).	发自雅典——对中央银行独立性的坚守是人们希望“靠谱”政策制定者所能秉承信条的重要组成部分（还有私有化，劳动力市场的“灵活性”等等）。


But what are central banks meant to be independent of?	但央行应该独立于什么而存在？


The answer seems obvious: governments.	答案似乎显而易见：政府。


In this sense, the European Central Bank is the quintessentially independent central bank: No single government stands behind it, and it is expressly prohibited from standing behind any of the national governments whose central bank it is.	在这个意义上说，欧洲央行就是个典型的独立中央银行：没有任何一个单一政府为它作后盾，同时也被明确禁止为以它作为央行的任何国家政府作后盾。


And yet the ECB is the least independent central bank in the developed world.	然而欧洲央行却是发达经济体中独立性最低的中央银行。


The key difficulty is the ECB’s “no bailout” clause – the ban on aiding an insolvent member-state government.	核心的难题来自于欧洲央行的“不救助”条款——禁止其援助任何破产的成员国政府。


Because commercial banks are an essential source of funding for member governments, the ECB is forced to refuse liquidity to banks domiciled in insolvent members.	由于商业银行是各成员国政府筹集资金的一个重要来源，而欧洲央行被迫拒绝为那些位于破产国的银行提供流动性。


Thus, the ECB is founded on rules that prevent it from serving as lender of last resort.	因此欧洲央行是建立在阻止其作为最后贷款人的规则之上的。


The Achilles heel of this arrangement is the lack of insolvency procedures for euro members.	这一安排的致命弱点是缺乏针对欧元区成员国的破产程序。


When, for example, Greece became insolvent in 2010, the German and French governments denied its government the right to default on debt held by German and French banks. Greece’s first “bailout” was used to make French and German banks whole.	于是当希腊在2010年宣布破产后，德法两国政府拒绝承认希腊政府拥有抹去两国银行所持债务的权利，结果希腊的第一个“救市”就是用来让德法两国银行全身而退的，但这样做只是进一步加深了希腊的债务困境。


It was at this point that the ECB’s lack of independence was fully exposed.	也正是这一点充分暴露了欧洲央行独立性的缺失。


Since 2010, the Greek government has been relying on a sequence of loans that it can never repay to maintain a façade of solvency.	2010年以来，希腊政府一直依赖一系列永远无法偿还的贷款来维持自身拥有偿付能力的表象。


A truly independent ECB, adhering to its own rules, should have refused to accept as collateral all debt liabilities guaranteed by the Greek state – government bonds, treasury bills, and the more than €50 billion ($56 billion) of IOUs that Greece’s banks have issued to remain afloat.	一个真正独立的欧洲央行，根据自身的规则，应拒绝接受所有由希腊政府担保的债务负债抵押品——政府债券，国库券以及希腊银行为维持周转而发行的500亿欧元（折合560亿美元）白条。


Of course, such a refusal would close down Greek banks and lead immediately to Greece’s exit from the eurozone, because the government would be forced to issue its own liquidity.	当然，这种拒绝将导致希腊各银行纷纷倒闭，并立即引发希腊退出欧元区，因为政府被迫得去发行属于自己的流动性。


The only alternative would be a meaningful debt restructuring to end Greece’s insolvency.	唯一的选择将是借助一个有意义的债务重组来结束希腊的破产。


Alas, Europe’s political establishment, unwilling to adopt either option, has chosen to extend Greece’s insolvency – which it pretends has been resolved through new loan tranches.	无奈欧洲的政治机构不愿采用上述任何一个选项，而是选择去敷衍拖延希腊的破产状况——并假装已经通过新一批的贷款解决了这一问题。


The ECB’s ongoing acquiescence in the extend-and-pretend charade demanded by Greece’s creditors has demolished its claim to be independent.	欧洲央行一直都对希腊债权人要求下的拖延掩饰行为持默许态度，也因此撕下了其自称独立的伪装。


To keep Greece’s banks open, and accept their government-guaranteed collateral, the ECB is obliged to grant Greek debt an exemption from its no-insolvency rule.	如果要保证希腊各银行继续营业，并接受它们提供的政府担保抵押品，欧洲央行有义务给予希腊债务一个不救助规则之外的豁免。


And, to keep the noose firmly around Greece’s neck, Germany insists that this exemption is conditional on its approval – or, in euro-speak, that the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers confirms that “Greece’s fiscal consolidation and reform program are on track.”	但为了继续钳制住希腊，德国坚持这项豁免条件必须得到它的批准——或者在欧洲的语境中，就是要让欧元区各国财政部长一致认定“希腊的财政整顿和改革计划正处于合理的轨道上。 ”


So, in effect, it is politicians that tell the ECB when to cut off liquidity to an entire banking system.	因此实际上是政治家在指挥欧洲央行何时该切断整个银行系统的流动性。


While the ECB can claim independence vis-à-vis insolvent, peripheral governments, it is entirely at the mercy of the governments of Europe’s creditor countries.	可见欧洲央行一方面在面对破产的欧盟外围国家政府时号称独立，一方面又听任欧洲债权国政府的摆布。


To illustrate the ECB’s conundrum, it is worthwhile revisiting the creditors’ treatment of the Greek government elected in January 2015.	我们可以重新审视债权国是如何对待2015年一月选举产生的希腊政府，并借此说明欧洲央行的困局。


By December 2014, it had become clear that the previous government was on its last legs and that the leftist Syriza party was on its way to power.	2014年12月时形势已经相当明朗，前任政府濒临倒台，左翼激进左翼联盟即将上台。


The governor of Greece’s central bank, an arm of the ECB, “predicted” that markets were facing a liquidity squeeze, implying that a Syriza victory would render the banking system unsafe – a statement that would be inane were it not calculated to start a bank run.	希腊央行行长这个欧洲央行的爪牙竟���“预测”市场面临流动性紧张，暗示激进左翼联盟的胜选将会导致银行系统不稳定——但凡认真考量过的人都会意识到这份声明很可能会导致挤兑。


By the time I became Finance Minister that February, after Syriza’s electoral victory, the bank run was in full swing and stocks were in free fall.	激进左翼联盟在选举中获胜后，我也随即在二月就任财政部长，那时银行挤兑得一塌糊涂，股票一落千丈。


The reason, of course, was the common knowledge that Germany, vehemently opposed to our government, was about to switch off the green light required by the ECB to maintain the exemptions allowing it to accept Greek collateral.	究其原因，显然是因为大家都知道德国强烈反对我们这届政府，即将禁止欧洲央行继续维持接受希腊抵押品的豁免要求。


To stabilize the situation, I flew to London to address financiers with a message of moderation and sensible policies regarding both reforms and debt restructuring.	为了稳定局势，我飞赴伦敦去游说一众金融家，阐述关于改革和债务重组的一系列温和合理政策。


The following morning, the stock exchange rebounded 13%, bank shares rose by more than 20%, and the bank run ceased.	第二天早上，股市反弹了13％，银行股上涨幅度超过20％，挤兑停止了。


On that day, the ECB, pressured by Germany, rescinded an important part of its exemption, thereby cutting off Greek banks’ direct access to the ECB and diverting them to pricier financing from Greece’s central bank (so-called emergency liquidity assistance).	当天，欧洲央行在德国压力下撤销了其豁免的一个重要组成部分，从而切断了希腊银行向欧洲央行的直接融资渠道，并将它们导向希腊央行的高价融资渠道（所谓的紧急流动性援助）。


Unsurprisingly, stock prices plummeted and the bank run returned with a vengeance, bleeding €45 billion of deposits out of the system over the next few months.	不出所料，股价暴跌和银行挤兑卷土重来，希腊银行系统在接下来的几个月内流失450亿欧元存款。


Meanwhile, Germany and other creditors began to push Greece to accept new austerity measures as the price of reversing the “ECB’s” decision.	与此同时，德国和其他债权国开始逼迫希腊接受新的财政紧缩措施，作为反抗“欧洲央行的”决定的代价。


This was not the ECB’s only politically driven intervention.	这并不是欧洲央行的唯一一次基于政治动机的出手。


Equally aggressive was its decision to curtail Greek banks’ spending on government treasuries, by instructing them to refuse debt rollovers.	同样积极的还有其限制希腊银行政府国债购买的决定，指示它们拒绝债务展期。


This diminished my ministry’s capacity to repay the International Monetary Fund, which was insisting on drastic pension cuts and on the removal of the last protections for Greek workers.	这削弱了我治下的希腊财政部偿还国际货币基金组织贷款的能力，而正是该组织坚持要求大幅削减养老金和取消对希腊工人最后的保护屏障。


For five months, as the ECB’s noose tightened, we resisted German and IMF demands for further austerity.	在欧洲央行的步步紧逼之下，我们抵制德国和国际货币基金组织执行进一步紧缩政策的要求并坚持了五个月。


Finally, the complete cessation of all liquidity to Greece’s banks in June 2015 forced their closure.	最后在2015年6月，所有希腊银行的流动性供应都被关闭，只能关门大吉。


This was followed by the final push to divide our government and force the prime minister to capitulate – as he did, accepting the latest extend-and-pretend loan of €85 billion.	随后各方再次尝试分裂我们的政府并迫使我们的总理屈服——他也弹尽粮绝，只得接受850亿欧元的最新一笔的拖延掩饰贷款。


Almost a year later, Greece’s creditors were pushing for even greater austerity in exchange for more loan tranches.	差不多一年后，这帮债权国又来推动更严厉的紧缩政策以换取更多的贷款。


At this point, Greece’s central-bank governor (who had triggered the original bank run in December 2014) publicly alleged that our government’s stance until June 2015 caused the loss of €45 billion worth of deposits, the ensuing bank closures, and the new extend-and-pretend loans.	这时候希腊央行行长（那位曾引发了2014年12月第一轮挤兑的人）又跳出来公开声称是我们这届政府在2015年6月之前所持的立场导致了450亿欧元的存款流失，随之而来的银行倒闭以及新一轮的拖延掩饰贷款。


The bully was blaming the victim, and the ECB was openly embracing its role as enforcer for its political masters: the creditors.	施暴者竟然指责受害者，欧洲央行也公开自身作为其幕后政治大佬——债权国——鹰犬的角色：。


The eurozone’s current design makes ECB independence impossible.	欧元区目前的设计使得欧洲央行不可能维持其独立性。


Worse, the pretense of independence serves as a fig leaf for interventions that are not only politically driven, but that are also utterly inconsistent with the principles of liberal democracy.	更糟的是，独立性的幌子已经成为了一块遮羞布，不仅粉饰了那些政治动机，更与自由民主的原则背道而驰。


Europe’s Roadblocks to Long-Term Investment	欧洲长期投资障碍


AMSTERDAM – One of the major challenges facing the European economy is the lack of liquidity in its capital markets.	阿姆斯特丹—欧洲经济所面临的重大挑战之一是其资本市场缺乏流动性。


Since the 2008 global financial crisis, an enormous number of new rules have been put in place.	自2008年全球金融危机以来，欧洲已经实施了大量新规则。


In order to facilitate the long-term investment that Europe desperately needs, it would be wise to reassess the broader regulatory environment that has emerged over the past six years.	为了促进欧洲所急需的长期投资，明智的做法是重新评估过去六年中所浮现的监管大环境。


With banks reluctant to make new loans, institutions such as pension funds are well placed to meet the desperate demand for capital.	由于银行不愿发放新贷款，退休基金等机构就成了解资本之渴的近水。


Indeed, the savings of workers who may not be retiring for several decades are particularly well suited for long-term investments.	事实上，几十年后才会退休的工人的储蓄特别适合长期投资。


The trouble is that in many cases, rules and regulations intended to ensure financial markets’ stability impede the ability of pension funds and others to allocate savings smoothly and efficiently.	麻烦之处在于，在许多情形中，规则和监管总是倾向于确保金融市场的稳定性，而牺牲了退休基金和其他资金平滑有效地配置储蓄的能力。


The importance of proper regulations cannot be understated.	合理监管的重要性怎么强调都不过分。


When properly drafted and applied, they ensure financial stability, maintain (and, if necessary, restore) confidence in the markets, and facilitate long-term investment, helping citizens meet their future financial needs.	内容和应用合理的监管能确保金融稳定，维持（并且在必要时重塑）市场信心，也有利于长期投资，有助于公民满足未来金融需要。


But if regulations are not well tailored to the various types of market participants and to how markets actually work, they can choke off opportunities that would otherwise benefit investors and the economy.	但如果监管措施与各种类型的市场参与者不匹配，与市场实际运转情况不匹配，那么它们可能扼杀本可以有利于投资者和经济的机会。


The new margin requirements for derivatives, introduced in order to reduce systemic risk, are one example of such a chokepoint.	新衍生品保证金要求便是扼杀机会的例子。 它的初衷是降低系统风险。


It might make sense to apply them to banks or hedge funds, but pension funds are highly creditworthy institutions that pose little or no systemic risk to financial markets.	对于银行和对冲基金来说，实施这一要求是合适的，但退休基金是信誉卓著的机构，不会或极少给金融市场带来系统风险。


Forcing them to set aside assets for collateral purposes only drains capital that could be used for long-term-investment.	强迫它们将部分资产用于抵押目的只能减少可用于长期投资的资本。


Such investment involves a variety of products, market players, and jurisdictions, and, as a result, the effect of regulations can be difficult to see, much less quantify.	这类投资包括各种产品、市场参与者和司法辖区，结果是监管的效果难觅踪影，更无法定量评估。


For starters, the impact of rules and regulations can be direct or indirect.	首先，规则和监管的影响可以是直接的，也可以是间接的。


Rules that apply specifically to long-term-investment products or strategies can be classified as having a direct impact.	专门适用于长期投资产品或策略的规则可以归为直接影响型。


Rules that apply to investors or their counterparts, competitive products, or complementary parts of the market can be described as having an indirect effect.	适用于投资者及其对手方、竞争性产品或市场的补充方的规则可以归为间接影响型。


A well-crafted regulatory framework minimizes the adverse consequences for long-term investment, while maximizing the positive effects.	设计合理的规则框架能最小化长期投资的不利后果，同时最大化积极效应。


New regulations are constantly being introduced.	欧洲一直在引入新监管措施。


It is important to analyze carefully whether the new regulations are actually needed and, if yes, to foresee and fill regulatory gaps with rules that ensure the smooth flow of savings to new and existing projects.	仔细分析新监管措施是否真的需要，以及在需要的情况下预估并用规则填补监管空白以确保储蓄平稳流向新建和已有项目很重要。


For example, standardizing regulations relating to covered bonds, green bonds, and cross-border investment through real-estate trusts could encourage more long-term investment.	比如，与备兑债券（covered bond）、绿色债券和通过不动产信托进行的跨境投资有关的标准化监管措施能鼓励更多的长期投资。


In a more indirect way, a general regulatory push that increased the availability of projects suitable for long-term-investment and harmonized local insolvency regimes could also have a positive effect.	增加适合长期投资、调和地方破产机制的总体监管推进手段可以以更加间接的方式产生积极效应。


Prominent examples of regulations with a direct negative impact include existing rules on securitization and proposed rules on asset-based capital charges.	存在直接消极影响的监管显例包括现有证券化规则和关于基于资产的资本费用的建议规则。


The indirect negative effects of such regulations on long-term investment are, by nature, more difficult to discern, but they can be just as harmful as the direct effects – especially if they leave investors with fewer funds available for long-term investment.	这些监管措施对长期投资的间接消极影响自然更加难以识别，但其伤害性不亚于直接影响——特别是当它们导致投资者可用于长期投资的资金减少的情况下。


Margin requirements for derivatives transactions have this effect, as do regulations that increase banking costs.	衍生品交易保证金要求就有这类影响，提高银行成本的监管措施亦然。


These types of indirect negative effects have not been central to policy discussions concerning how to boost long-term investment.	这些类型的间接消极影响从未成为关注如何提振长期投资的政策讨论的核心。


But they deserve careful consideration.	但我们应该仔细考虑这个问题。


It is crucial that we identify the full scope and scale of their impact on the allocation of capital.	关键点是我们需要厘清它们对资本配置的影响的全部范围和规模。


Otherwise, they risk offsetting the positive impact of investment-enhancing reforms.	否则，它们就有可能抵消投资刺激改革的积极影响。


As legislators and regulators continue to shape the investment environment, it is important not only to monitor and evaluate the impact of each piece of additional regulation; the way rules interact with one another – and with new rules as they are introduced – must also be understood.	在立法者和监管者继续调整投资环境时，他们不仅要监督和评估每一项新增监管政策的影响，也必须明白规则彼此之间——以及与所引入的新规则之间——的互动方式，这一点很重要。


Unnecessarily broad regulations should be avoided in favor of rules that are specifically tailored to the various participants in the market.	不必要的宽监管应该避免，以利于为不同的市场参与者量身定制的规则。


Allowing long-term investors such as pension funds to provide the European economy with much-needed capital has the potential to provide huge benefits to future retirees, as well as to the broader economy.	让退休基金等长期投资者为欧洲经济提供急需的资本有望给未来退休者和整体经济带来巨大好处。


But that will not be possible unless, and until, the right regulatory environment is created.	但这只有在建立了正确的监管环境的基础上才有可能。


Europe Means Fair Play	欧洲想要公平竞争


As Ukraine’s agonizing struggle for democracy continues, Europeans wonder if the politics of principle can ever eclipse the politics of power.	随着乌克兰的民主进程继续痛苦地进行，欧洲人不知道原则政治能否有一天超越权力政治。


Is it naive to believe that the world amounts to more than zero-sum thinking?	相信世界不仅仅是零和思维是否太天真？


Can Europe promote fair play in international affairs, or must it accept a new game of great power rivalry as inevitable and throw itself into the fray?	欧洲能否在国际事务中促进公平竞争？ 还是不得不承认新的大国竞争游戏不可避免，然后也投身到这场喧嚣之中？


Many Europeans see themselves as champions of global fair play. But Europe’s opinion of its integrity is not always shared.	许多欧洲人都把自己看作是全球公平竞争的典范，但是欧洲自以为正直的想法并不总是得到别人的同意。


One example is Russia, which is skeptical about the EU’s intentions, most recently over Ukraine.	俄罗斯就是一个例子。 俄罗斯对欧盟的意图感到怀疑，特别是最近对乌克兰的意图。


That should not surprise us.	我们并不感到惊讶。


The EU has expanded from six members to 25, with Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey waiting in the wings.	欧盟的成员已经从六国增加到25国，而且保加利亚、罗马尼亚、克罗地亚和土耳其还在等候加入。


Russia wants to know where the Union will stop.	俄罗斯想知道欧盟的边界会扩展到哪里。


Does it plan to swallow Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus?	它是否还计划吞并乌克兰、白俄罗斯和高加索地区？


Most EU members view these as open questions, unlikely to be resolved soon.	大多数欧盟成员国认为这是悬而未决的问题，近期内不大可能解决。


The Kremlin, however, seems to see in such vagueness a smokescreen hiding the Union’s true intentions, though the recent EU-Russia summit provided an opportunity to clear the air.	然而克里姆林宫似乎隐隐约约地看到了一道烟幕，掩盖了欧盟的真实意图，尽管欧盟和俄罗斯最近的高峰会议提供了澄清事实的机会。


In a sense, critics of the EU are right: the Union may be on a quest to reshape the world in its image.	从某种意义上讲，对欧盟持批评态度的人是对的：欧盟可能正在寻求按自己的形象改造世界。


Nowadays, when the EU concludes agreements with non-EU countries, it includes all sorts of stiff requirements in areas like human rights, non-proliferation, readmission of migrants, and terrorism.	如今，如果欧盟与非欧盟国家签署协议，它必定要包括人权、核不扩散、重新接纳移民、以及恐怖主义等领域的各种硬性要求。


To countries on the receiving end, these conditions can seem like a subtle form of power politics, with Europe trying to impose its values on the world.	对于处在接受方的国家而言，这些条件可以被看作一种微妙的权力政治，是欧洲把自己的价值观强加给世界。


Indeed, for the EU some issues are non-negotiable, because they are pillars of the European model that we seek to share with the world.	的确，对欧盟来说，某些问题是没有商量的，因为它们是我们寻求与世界分享的欧洲模式的支柱。


These issues include democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the environment, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the campaign against terrorism.	这些问题包括民主和法制、尊重人权和环境、不扩散大规模杀伤性武器、以及反对恐怖主义的运动。


Countries cannot expect economic and other benefits from the Union unless they meet its political standards.	其他国家如果不达到欧盟的政治标准，就不要想从欧盟得到经济的以及其他的利益。


But are those standards really an imposition?	但这些标准真的是强加的吗？


It looks as if the principles of fair play are increasingly embraced outside of Europe.	在欧洲以外，公平竞争的原则似乎正在被越来越多的人所拥护。


Consider Africa, where the African Union is taking a leading role in resolving conflicts on the continent and is increasingly determined to intervene to halt aggression and assure fair play for African minorities.	想想非洲，非洲联盟在解决大陆上的争端中正发挥着领导作用，并且越来越坚定地介入和制止侵略，确保对非洲少数民族公平。


Even if the results on the ground in Africa don’t yet look spectacular to outsiders, the change in attitude is real.	尽管在外人看来，非洲大地上的现实还谈不上引人注目，但态度上的变化是真实的。


Instead of playing the “Great Power Game” in Africa, the EU can support Africans’ own efforts and allow them to benefit from the Union’s experience.	欧盟可以支持非洲人自己的努力，让他们从欧盟的经验中获益，而不是在非洲玩“大国游戏”。


Europe’s belief in fair play for all reflects its self-interest, at least in some ways, because the world’s balance of power is changing.	欧洲对所有人公平竞争的信仰反映了它自身的利益，至少在某些方面如此，因为世界上的势力平衡正在发生变化。


Consider the rise of China and India.	想想中国和印度的崛起。


The investment bank Goldman Sachs predicts that the dollar size of the Chinese economy will overtake that of Britain and Germany by 2007.	投资银行高盛公司预测，到2007年，中国经济的美元价值将超过英国和德国。


India will pull ahead of France by 2020 and surpass Germany by 2023.	到2020年，印度将超过法国，到2023年超过德国。


As Asia’s economies race forward, so do its political ambitions.	随着亚洲经济体向前飞速发展，它们的政治抱负也同样高涨。


Asians want to assume greater responsibility in the world, and it is in Europe’s interest that they do, as long as they, too, respect the rules of fair play.	亚洲人想在世界上承担更多的责任，而只要他们也尊重公平竞争的规则，那么他们的如愿就符合欧洲的利益。


A sense of fair play also matters within the Union.	在欧盟内部，公平竞争的意识也是非常重要的。


The larger the EU gets, the greater its need for coordinated and coherent policies, and the harder it becomes to rally all members around a common position.	欧盟变得越大，对协调一致的政策的需要就越强烈，而要让所有成员国都站在统一的立场上就越困难。


Call this the “paradox of enlargement.”	这可以被称作“扩张的矛盾”。


The three largest member states – Britain, France, and Germany – have tended to respond to this paradox by pursuing closer trilateral cooperation.	最大的三个成员国——英国、法国和德国——面对这个矛盾，倾向于追求更紧密地三边合作。


Of course, there’s nothing wrong with vanguard groups of members forging ahead – the recent diplomatic initiative concerning Iran’s nuclear program is a case in point.	当然，先锋成员国先行一步没有什么不对——最近在伊拉克核计划问题上的外交倡议就刚好说明了这一点。


Indeed, every member state can be expected to cling to its right to pursue an independent foreign policy for the foreseeable future.	的确，在可预见的未来，每个成员国都可能坚持自己追求独立外交政策的权利。


However, to ensure that the European whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and to guarantee fairness to all Union members, all EU states must work within the parameters of EU policy, as they have in the case of Ukraine.	但是，要保证欧洲的整体要大于各个部分之和，保证所有欧盟成员国之间的公平，所有欧盟国家都必须在欧盟政策的范围内活动，正如它们在乌克兰的问题上所做的一样。


When they do, their efforts strengthen the legitimacy and authority of both the member states and the Union.	当它们这样做了，它们的努力就会巩固各成员国和欧盟的合法性和权威性。


In a world of fair play, the flip side of rule making is compliance, and compliance may require enforcement, through economic sanctions and other non-military measures.	在一个公平竞争的世界里，制定规则的另一面就是遵守规则，而遵守规则可能会需要通过经济制裁和其他非军事化的措施强制执行。


As a last resort, the EU must even be prepared to rise to the military defense of the values and principles it believes are worth protecting.	���为最后的手段，欧盟甚至必须准备好通过军事措施捍卫它认为值得保护的价值和原则。


If Europe is not prepared to take up arms when it must, then its appeals for fair play will sound to the rest of the world like mere posturing.	如果欧洲不准备在必要的时候拿起武器，那么在世界其他国家看来，它对公平竞争的呼吁就仅仅是故作姿态。


But if fair play is to be made global, European initiatives should be part of broader international efforts, involving both like-minded partners such as the United States and multilateral institutions.	但是如果要在全球范围内推广公平竞争，欧洲人的倡议就应该是更大范围的国际努力的一部分，其中还有美国等意趣相投的伙伴和多边机构的参与。


A divisive transatlantic rivalry offers no ethical or political basis for an enlightened European approach.	分裂性的跨大西洋竞争不会给开明的欧洲模式带来民族的或政治的基础。


On the contrary, fair play requires American power to back it up.	相反，公平竞争需要美国的力量作为支持。


The Migration Opportunity	欧洲的移民机会


LONDON – In the last year, more than 4,000 men, women, and children have lost their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Europe.	伦敦—去年，有4,000多男性、女性和儿童在试图经地中海从非洲前往欧洲的过程中丧命。


Their tragic deaths have done nothing to slow the human tide, which is swelling by the week, as smugglers on the coast become increasingly brazen and cruel.	他们的悲剧并没有延缓迁徙人潮——蛇头变得越来越无耻而残忍，偷渡人数每周都在增长。


Thousands of migrants have been rescued from the frigid waters since the beginning of this year alone.	光是今年以来，就有数钱移民在冰冷的海水中获救。


Against this backdrop – and that of the fear sown by the terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen – the European Union is set to develop a new – and critically important – agenda on migration.	在这一背景下——以及在巴黎和哥本哈根恐怖袭击造成的恐慌的影响下——欧盟即将制定新的关键性移民议程。


When EU commissioners gather to debate how to proceed, they must overcome the temptation to grasp at short-term, knee-jerk solutions, and instead develop a truly creative, comprehensive plan of action both at home and abroad.	欧盟委员们在开会讨论如何处理移民问题时，他们必须克服短期下意识解决方案的诱惑，而要制定出真正的创新、全面的国内和国外行动计划。


The last time Europe faced such a turning point on migration was in 2011, when the Arab Spring triggered a flood of new arrivals fleeing violence and chaos in North Africa.	欧洲上一次面临类似的移民政策转折点是在2011年。 当时，阿拉伯之春导致大量逃脱北非暴力和混乱的移民来到欧洲。


But the moment for bold actions – the creation of a Mediterranean Marshall Plan, for instance, or massive investments into immigrant integration – passed without being seized.	但采取果断行动——建立地中海马歇尔计划，把投资引向移民融合项目——的时机被白白浪费了。


Instead, the EU made a few bureaucratic tweaks to its asylum system and consumed itself with debates about non-issues, such as migrant “welfare cheats."	相反，欧盟对其庇护制度做了一些官僚主义修改，讨论一些不痛不痒的问题，比如移民的“福利欺诈”问题。


In 2014, the EU's emergency funding for migration and asylum totaled a mere €25 million ($28 million) – a pathetic exercise in collective action, albeit one supplemented by funds from member states.	2014年，欧盟移民和庇护紧急资金总额只有250亿欧元——对于一项集体行动来说，这个数字低得可怜，尽管有来自成员国的资金补充。


Last fall, Italy's bold Mare Nostrum sea-rescue operation, which had saved thousands of lives, was replaced by a far feebler EU initiative that has struggled to carry out its mission.	去年秋天，拯救了数百人生命的意大利地中海海事救援行动被欧盟集体行动所代替。 但欧盟的行动力度弱得多，并且执行相当不力。


Adding to the problem is an imbalance of commitment and compassion within the EU itself.	让问题更加严重的是欧盟本身内部承诺与同情的不平衡。


Sweden and Germany have taken in the majority of asylum seekers from Syria and elsewhere, while most other EU member states have admitted few or none.	瑞典和德国接纳了大部分来自叙利亚和其他地方的寻求庇护者，而其他大部分欧盟成员国只接纳了极少数或一个人都没有接纳。


The UK, for example, offered just 90 resettlement spots for Syrian refugees last year.	比如，英国去年只为叙利亚难民提供了90个安置点。


(By contrast, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are spending billions of dollars to host nearly four million refugees.)	（相反，土耳其、黎巴嫩和约旦花了数十亿美元，安置了近四百万难民。 ）


Greece, Italy, and Malta have borne the brunt of the impact of accommodating new arrivals, with all of the financial, social, and political costs this entails.	希腊、意大利和马耳他是新移民涌入的首当其冲者，并承担了所有的相关金融、社会和政治成本。


As a result, the ongoing tragedy in the Mediterranean is placing EU solidarity under serious strain.	因此，仍在上演的地中海悲剧正在严重影响欧盟的凝聚力。


Continued inaction will not make the problem go away, nor will it benefit European leaders in their next domestic elections.	持续不作为不会让问题自动消失，也不会让欧洲领导人在下一轮国内选举中获益。


“Cracking down on smugglers," the go-to solution for many in the EU, will take many years to have an impact, given the instability of many North African governments.	考虑到许多北非政府的动荡，“打击蛇头”——对许多欧盟人来说，这是首选方案——需要许多年才会收到效果。


Meanwhile, further destabilization of the Middle East – a very real prospect – could compromise the security of tens of millions of people who, under international law, would have a legitimate right to claim asylum.	与此同时，中东动荡的加剧——十分现实的前景——可能让数千万根据国际法拥有请求庇护的合法权利的人无法获得安全。


A better, more active approach is needed.	我们需要更佳、更积极的方针。


The immediate necessary response is resource-intensive but operationally viable: a robust joint EU sea operation with an explicit rescue mandate.	紧迫的必要措施需要大量资源，但在操作上可行：拥有明确救助权力的强大的欧盟联合海上行动。


When asylum seekers reach European shores, the EU should take collective financial and administrative responsibility for processing and accommodating them, regardless of where they disembark.	当寻求庇护者抵达欧洲海岸时，欧盟应该集体承担处置和收容的金融和管理责任，不管他们在何处上岸。


And it should take solidarity a step further when it comes to Syrians, equitably distributing the responsibility to host them across all member states.	欧盟还应该更加团结地应对叙利亚难民，在所有成员国之间平等地分担接纳他们的责任。


Meanwhile, in order to lighten smugglers' boats, the EU should commit to resettling many more than the 30,000 Syrian refugees it has pledged to accept thus far.	与此同时，要减少蛇头船只上的人数，欧盟所承诺的安置人数应该远远多于目前所承诺的30,000叙利亚难民。


A number closer to 250,000, at least, would seem fair – given the millions being sheltered by Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan.	至少要达到近250,000才是公平的数字——考虑到黎巴嫩、土耳其和约旦已经安置了数百万人。


Meanwhile, EU foreign ministers should intensify talks with African countries in order to establish new, legal, and safe means for those at risk who want to cross the Mediterranean.	与此同时，欧盟外交部长们应该加紧与非洲国家的谈判，为那些遭受危险、想穿越地中海的人建立新的合法安全的途径。


This could entail extending humanitarian, labor, and family-reunification visas, with applications processed overseas.	这可以包括扩大人道主义、务工和家庭团聚签证并在海外办理申请。


The EU should consider longer-term goals, like creating a common Mediterranean market to allow North African economies to grow, eventually transforming the region into a destination for migrants rather than a transit zone.	欧盟应该考虑从长期目标，如建立地中海共同市场促进北非经济体增长，最终将该地区转变为移民目的地而不是转运区。


Most important, Europe needs to strengthen itself from the inside out.	最重要的是，欧洲需要从内而外强化自己。


The continent is in desperate need of a dramatically different approach to diversity.	欧洲大陆迫切需要焕然一新的多元化方针。


The countries of the EU have two options: They can either make a vain attempt to revert to outdated, mono-ethnic models of statehood, or they can accept diversity with the realization that their national cultures will not only survive, but flourish.	欧盟国家有两个选择：它们可以徒劳地试图恢复过时的单一民族国家； 也可以带着民族文化不但能存活下来、还能繁荣昌盛的认识接受多元化。


Doing so would in no way entail compromising any core European values.	这样做并不会牺牲任何欧洲核心价值。


But it would require a commitment to respect all who adopt those values, regardless of their race or religion.	但这需要承诺尊重所有接受这些价值的人，不管他们来自什么种族，信仰什么宗教。


Some see the Mediterranean as Europe's soft underbelly.	一些人认为地中海是欧洲的软肋。


But it is the failure to build stable, diverse societies that is the continent's true Achilles heel.	但欧洲大陆真正的阿克琉斯之踵乃是其无法建立稳定多元的社会。


The Judgment of Aleppo	阿勒颇审判


PARIS – We must halt the massacre in Aleppo.	巴黎—我们必须阻止阿勒颇大屠杀。


Whatever the cost, we must stop the massive, random, indiscriminate bombings – and, worst of all, the discriminate ones aimed chiefly at civilians, humanitarian convoys, and hospitals – that the forces of Bashar al-Assad and Russia have resumed with a vengeance in and around what was once Syria’s most populous city.	不惜一切代价，我们必须停止大规模随机无差别轰炸——以及最糟糕的，主要以平民、人道主义车队和医院为目标的有差别轰炸——巴沙尔·阿萨德的部队和俄军在这座叙利亚昔日人口最多的城市进行着这样的报复。


We must call a halt in the days (if not hours) ahead to the rain of steel, the cluster and phosphorus bombs, and the barrels of chlorine dropped from low-flying government helicopters on the last parts of Aleppo held by moderate rebels.	我们必须阻止它们，否则要不了几天（甚至几小时），丛集炸弹、磷弹和氯气弹就将从低空盘旋在温和叛军控制的阿勒颇残部的政府军直升飞机上倾泻而下。


The world, with the democracies out front, cannot fail to respond to the horrifying images, relayed by the few witnesses still there.	以民主国家为首的全世界不可以对这些由仍留在阿勒颇的极少数目击者所提供的骇人听闻的影像无动于衷。


Those images are of children’s shriveled, vitrified bodies; of the wounded whose limbs, for lack of drugs, have been amputated by desperate doctors who are soon massacred themselves; of women mown down by rocket fire, as in Sarajevo 24 years ago, while waiting in line to buy yogurt or bread; of volunteers struck down while digging through the rubble in search of survivors; of human beings drained of strength, surviving in filth and waste, saying goodbye to life.	肢体因为缺医少药而被绝望的医生从身体上切除的伤员——医生自己也很快遭到屠杀； 在排队购买酸奶或面包时被火箭弹杀死的女人——一如24年前的萨拉热窝；


We must smother the columns of fire and smoke.	我们必须制止硝烟和战火。


We must dispel the clouds of flaming gas streaming from the murderers’ unprecedentedly sophisticated weapons.	我们必须驱散从杀人犯的前所未有的先进武器中吐出的火舌。


We must act because we can act.	我们必须行动，因为我们可以行动。


And we can act because those who are responsible for this carnage, for these war crimes, for an urbicide in which probable crimes against humanity are compounded by the destruction of sites of memory and culture that counted among the world’s vital heritage, are not hiding.	而我们可以行动，是因为需要对这场大屠杀，对这些战争罪行，对这个城市的毁灭的人并没有藏匿起来。 他们不但犯有反人类罪，更摧毁了这座世界最重要遗产之一的城市的记忆和文化。


They are standing in plain sight as they destroy Syria’s most cosmopolitan, wondrously alive city, doing nothing to hide their acts.	他们公然摧毁叙利亚最国际化的生机勃勃的城市，从不掩饰自己的行为。


We know who they are.	我们知道他们是谁。


I mean, of course, the regime in Damascus, which years ago we should have begun to deal with as we dealt with Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime.	当然，我指的是大马士革政权，多年前我们就应该像对待卡扎菲政权那样处理它。


I mean, too, the regime’s Iranian and, above all, Russian sponsors.	我也指该政权的伊朗以及——最重要的——俄罗斯支持者。


For five years, they have systematically blocked every attempt at a resolution emanating from the United Nations.	五年来，他们系统性地阻挠联合国所提出的每一项解决方案。


Russian planes have, in several well-documented instances, openly participated in Assad’s massive campaign against civilians.	在多起记录详尽的例子中，俄罗斯飞机公开参与阿萨德针对平民的大规模行动。


Indeed, the Kremlin appears increasingly determined to apply to Syria the policy practiced in Chechnya, namely to “kick into the crapper” those whom Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is again mendaciously labeling “terrorists.”	事实上，克里姆林宫日益铁心要在叙利亚实施在车臣实施过的政策，即将那些俄外交部长拉夫罗夫故技重施贴上“恐怖分子”标签的人“踢进马桶”。


Given these facts, there is no dilemma about whether it is necessary to act.	基于这些事实，是否必须采取行动是显而易见的。


But, because the United States adopted the position it did three years ago, after President Barack Obama chose not to punish Assad for using chemical weapons (a red line that Obama himself had drawn), I fear that the responsibility falls chiefly, if not exclusively, on Europe.	但是，因为美国采取了与三年前一样的立场——总统奥巴马选择不因为使用化学武器（这是奥巴马本人划定的红线）而惩罚阿萨德——我恐怕这一责任将主要甚至全部落在欧洲头上。


It’s our choice.	这是我们的选择。


We in Europe can draw our own red line, warning Russia that, if the line is crossed, we will increase sanctions against it as a state henceforth held to be responsible for the crimes of its Syrian vassal.	我们欧洲人可以划定我们自己的红线，警告俄罗斯，如果越线，我们将收紧对俄制裁，因为从此以后它将为其叙利亚附庸的罪行负责。


We can also immediately take the initiative to establish a forum for negotiation and pressure akin to the “Normandy format” that President François Hollande and Chancellor Angela Merkel successfully conceived two years ago to contain the war in Ukraine.	我们也可以立即采取行动成立一个磋商论坛施压，类似于两年前法国总统奥朗德和德国总理默克尔所成立的、成功遏制了乌克兰战争的“诺班底计划”（Normandy format）。


In so acting, we can force the aggressor to come to terms.	这样做，我们可以迫使侵略者妥协。


Or we can do nothing and acquiesce in another Sarajevo, as François Delattre, France’s ambassador to the United Nations, put it; we can run the risk of an Arab Guernica, with Russian aircraft in the role of the German Condor Legion over the skies of Republican Spain in 1936.	我们也可以什么都不做，如法国驻联合国大使德拉特（François Delattre）所言那样默默接受又一个萨拉热窝； 我们可以去冒出现阿拉伯格尔尼卡（Guernica）的风险，让俄罗斯战机扮演德国秃鹰军团（Condor Legion）在1936年西班牙共和国领空中的角色。


In that case, we would not only reap dishonor, but also, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, raise to extreme levels all of our present dangers, starting with a dramatic increase in the tide of refugees, most of whom have fled Syria as a direct consequence of the world’s nonintervention.	在这一情形中，我们不但将颜面扫地，借用丘吉尔的话说，我们还将让所有我们所面临的危险上升到极端水平，首先就是移民数量激增，其中大部分人是直接因为国际不干预而被迫逃离叙利亚。


This is where we stand: Aleppo, besieged and in ruins, exhausted and abandoned by the world, yet defiant – dying with its boots on – is our shame, our crime of omission, our self-abasement, our capitulation in the face of brute force, our acceptance of the worst in humanity.	我们就站在这里：已经成为废墟的深陷重围的阿勒颇，它已经精疲力竭并被全世界抛弃，但它的反抗——它的死于抗争——是我们的耻辱，我们的玩忽职守罪，我们的自取其辱，我们的面对野蛮暴力的投降主义，我们对惨无人道的接受。


Aleppo, which no longer cries out, is dying and cursing the West.	阿勒颇已经不再哭喊，它已濒临死亡并在诅咒西方。


And Europe, on the front line, risks its future and a part of its identity as the people it could not protect press at its borders, asking to be let in.	而站在最前沿的欧洲的未来和一部分身份也将受到威胁——它所无力保护的人们正站在欧洲边境，要求进入。


Will Europe surrender, in Aleppo, what remains of its soul, or will it pull itself together, hold up its head, and do what it must?	欧洲会在阿勒颇放弃我们仅存的灵魂吗？ 还是会团结一心，昂首挺胸，完成必须完成的任务？


If Europe can’t or won’t answer that question, all of the other questions and crises it is facing may well become irrelevant.	如果欧洲不能或不愿回答这个问题，它所面临的所有其他问题和危机都将变得不重要。


New Europe’s Old Ghosts	新欧洲的老幽灵


NEW YORK – The past stalked Europe in 2014.	纽约—2014年，历史纠缠着欧洲。


When the year started, the centennial of the Great War’s outbreak attracted much commemorative energy.	年初，一战爆发百年吸引了无数纪念热情。


But, as it progressed, disturbing parallels appeared – not to 1914, but to some of the nastier features of the interwar years.	但是，随着2014年的深入，出现了令人担忧的比较——不是和1914年，而是一些两次大战之间的更凶险的特点。


From Scotland and Catalonia to the borders of Ukraine, the politics of nationality flared, while Europe’s economy stagnated – hostage to a German inflation phobia that dates back to 1923.	从苏格兰和加泰罗尼亚到乌克兰边境，国籍政治（politics of nationality）闹得不可开交，与此同时，欧洲经济陷入了停滞——这是可追溯到1923年的德国通胀恐惧症的副作用。


And, as the year unfolded, a new geopolitical tug of war between the continent’s two early-twentieth-century giants, Germany and Russia, became apparent, while Europe’s amnesiac political elite seemed to be fumbling on one front after another.	此外，随着2014年的展开，欧洲大陆两大20世纪初的巨人——德国和俄罗斯之间的新的地缘政治战争角力变得日益明显，而欧洲健忘的政治精英们在各个阵线上手忙脚乱。


To anyone who recalls Danzig and the Sudetenland – the endless nationality claims and counter-claims that triggered World War II in the borderlands of Eastern Europe – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revanchism in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014 has a disturbingly familiar ring to it.	任何还记得但泽和苏台德的人都会觉得2014年俄罗斯总统普京在东乌克兰顿巴斯地区的复仇主义令人不安地似成相识——没完没了的国籍归属主张和反主张在东欧边境引发了第二次世界大战。


His rhetoric of humiliation and encirclement, the instrumental talk of minority rights, and the Kremlin’s use of local proxies, with all of the uncertainties that accompany reliance on such actors – all of this was reminiscent of nothing so much as interwar Germany’s own irredentist policies.	普京的羞辱和包围论、关于少数群体权利的策略性谈话、克里姆林宫对当地代理人的利用，以及伴随依靠这些行动者而产生的诸多不确定性——所有这些都让人想起两次大战期间德国自身的恢复国土政策。


The politics of nationality is not confined to Eastern Europe.	国籍政治并不局限于东欧。


Scotland’s independence referendum in September threatened to split the United Kingdom.	9月的苏格兰独立公投大有分裂英国之势。


The same month, up to two million pro-independence Catalans marched through Barcelona, in what may have been the largest demonstration ever seen in Europe.	同一个月，多达两百万支持独立的加泰罗尼亚人在巴塞罗那举行了游行，也许是欧洲有史以来规模最大的游行示威。


Ask most Catalans what independence will bring, aside from freedom from Spain, and you won’t get much of an answer: resentment at past wrongs overshadows any serious calculations about the future.	如果你问大部分加泰罗尼亚人，除了摆脱西班牙独立还能带来什么，你不会听到多少答案：对历史错误的仇恨压倒了任何对未来的认真算计。


But perhaps the purest reversion to interwar nationalist ideology is occurring just beyond Europe’s borders – in Israel, of all places.	但也许最纯粹的大战之间民族主义意识形态回归发生在欧洲边界之外——以色列各地。


There, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government has proposed a law enshrining the collective primacy of the country’s Jews – legislation that destroys in spirit and form what little is left of Israel’s founding commitment to equality under the law.	在以色列，总理内塔尼亚胡政府提出了一项法律，要将以色列犹太人的集体主体地位写入其中——这一立法从精神和形式上摧毁了目前已经所剩无几的以色列建国承诺——法律面前人人平等。


Could there be any sadder demonstration of the cunning of history?	关于历史狡猾的最悲哀写照莫过于此。


Europe’s past was equally present in the realm of economics in 2014.	欧洲的历史同样体现在2014年的经济中。


Thanks to the European Union’s austerity policies, the eurozone faces the prospect of a Japan-style era of stagnation, and chronic high unemployment on its southern fringe.	拜欧盟的紧缩政策所赐，欧元区面临着日本式的停滞时代，南欧更是出现了持久居高不下的失业。


The irony is that Germany’s anxieties about price stability, which underlie the EU’s embrace of austerity, are entirely misplaced: German inflation could scarcely be lower.	讽刺的是，德国对价格稳定的焦虑——这也是欧盟采取紧缩的原因——完全是无的放矢：德国通胀低得不能再低了。


With German unemployment, too, hitting record lows, while joblessness hits record highs in Italy and remains at obscene levels in Greece and Spain, what has emerged is a two-tier Europe, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government calling the shots.	德国的失业率也处于历史最低水平，而意大利失业率处于历史最高水平，希腊和西班牙的失业率也高得可怕，这造就了一个两级欧洲，德国总理默克尔的政府掌握生杀大权。


For now, the periphery countries calculate that the eventual benefits to be gained from remaining within the eurozone will outweigh the current pain of austerity.	如今，外围国还认为留在欧元区内的最终好处高于紧缩带来的当下的痛苦。


For its part, Germany exacts austerity as the price of its participation in the single currency.	至于德国，它把紧缩当作它参与单一货币的交换。


It is on this uneasy basis that its hegemony in Europe rests.	在这一并不容易的基础上，德国建立了欧洲霸权。


Though depoliticization and apathy have held back serious challenges to German dominance, such challenges are emerging.	尽管去政治化和漠不关心阻止了对德国主宰地位的严重的挑战，但这类挑战正在浮现。


German policymakers have discounted the rise of extremism in relatively small countries such as Hungary and Greece.	德国决策者认为匈牙利和希腊等相对小国中的极端主义崛起并不重要。


But one wonders how they might respond to spectacular results for Marine Le Pen’s National Front in next year’s French regional elections or in the presidential election in 2017.	但你也许好奇他们会如何应对马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的国民阵线（National Front）在明年法国地区选举或2017年总统选举中大获全胜的情景。


And of course the big mystery is Germany itself, seemingly lifted from history by its own economic buoyancy.	当然，德国本身也是一个大谜，它似乎因为经济繁荣而迷失了历史。


Can German politicians abandon Weimar-style economics before they are hit by Weimar-style political disintegration?	德国政客能够在被魏玛式政治崩溃反噬之前抛弃魏玛式经济学吗？


And even if they manage this eventually, will Germany have lost much of Europe in the meantime?	即使他们最终治理好了经济，德国会与此同时丧失大部分欧洲吗？


This brings us to the nascent but unmistakable signs of a Russo-German rift.	这就引出了俄罗斯-德国对峙的一个仍在萌芽状态但已清晰可辨的信号。