Argentina abandoned its fixed exchange rate against the US dollar in 2001, and experienced rapid recovery after two bad quarters.	2001年，阿根廷放弃了兑美元固定汇率，在经历了两个糟糕的季度后实现了快速复苏。


In both cases, regaining monetary sovereignty allowed a more competitive currency, which in turn increased export demand and assisted economic recovery.	在这两个例子中，重获货币主权让两国得以拥有更具竞争力的货币，这反过来增加了出口需求、刺激了经济复苏。


Under Grexit, Greece's best hope would be something similar – a sharp boost in external competitiveness.	在希腊退出情形下，希腊的最佳结果也与此类似——猛然增加其外部竞争力。


The Greek government has limited room for fiscal stimulus, and it would be shut out of financial markets.	希腊政府的财政刺激空间有限，也将无法进入金融市场。


A cheaper currency could, in principle, reverse the effects of austerity.	理论上，货币贬值能够扭转紧缩的影响。


Currency depreciation works by lowering domestic costs in foreign-currency terms.	货币贬值通过降低以外币计价的国内成本起作用。


One such cost has already come down significantly in Greece.	对希腊来说，其中一个成本已经显��降低了。


Since the onset of the crisis, Greek wages have dropped by more than 15% – a process called, appropriately enough, internal devaluation.	自危机爆发以来，希腊工资下降了15%以上——名副其实的内部贬值。


Yet the response in terms of exports has been disappointing.	但出口对此的反应令人失望。


Though the country's whopping current-account deficit is gone, this reflects a collapse of imports – a result of austerity – rather than an export boom.	尽管希腊巨大的经常项目赤字已经一去不返，但这主要是因为进口崩溃——紧缩所致——而不是出口繁荣。


This fact on its own suggests that bringing back the drachma might not help Greece much.	这一事实本身表明回归德拉克马也许并不能给希腊带来多少裨益。


Greek exports appear to have been hampered by other factors.	希腊出口也许是因为其他因素才萎靡不振的。


Higher energy costs (owing to increases in both excise taxes and electricity rates), credit bottlenecks, specialization in stagnant export markets, and generalized policy uncertainty all seem to have played a role.	高企的能源价格（因为消费税和电费的增加）、信用瓶颈、细分专长恰好位于停滞出口市场，以及总体政策不确定都在起作用。


As a result, Greek export prices have not come down nearly as much as wages.	结果，希腊出口价格的降幅不如工资。


Grexit might conceivably help with some of these costs, but it will aggravate others (such as policy uncertainty).	希腊退出也许有助于改善其中一些成本，但也会增加另一些成本（如政策不确定性）。


In the short to medium run, increasing Greek competitiveness requires remedies targeted at specific binding constraints faced by exporters.	在短期和中期，希腊竞争力的提升需要对出口商所面临的具体制约因素进行定向纠正。


A Greek program that identifies these constraints and proposes remedies would be much better economics than blind adherence to the troika's laundry list of structural reforms.	确定这些制约因素并提出纠正方案的希腊政策在经济上远比盲目遵从三驾马车的结构改革详细清单划算。


It would also offer a credible alternative to remaining in the eurozone under current terms, thereby strengthening Greece's hand in bargaining for a deal that ensures that Grexit does not in fact occur.	这还能提供一个可替代现有条件留在欧元区的方案，以此增强希腊在讨价还价中的筹码，谈判确保希腊不退出的协议。


Greek Lessons for Europe	希腊危机本质上是欧元危机


BERLIN - “It’s when the tide goes out that you find out who has been swimming naked,” the legendary investor Warren Buffett aptly remarked when the global economic crisis hit.	“只有退潮时，才知道谁在裸泳。 ”传奇投资家沃伦·巴菲特的这句名言是全球经济危机的生动写照。


And, as we have found out in the meantime, this is as true for countries as it is for companies.	而且，近来我们发现，这话不仅适用于公司，而且也适用于国家。


Following Ireland, Greece is now the second euro-zone member to have gotten into massive payment difficulties due to the crisis, almost to the point of national bankruptcy.	继爱尔兰之后，如今希腊成了第二个陷入严重偿债困境的欧元区国家，危机几乎把它拖到了国家破产的边缘。


Ireland was able to resolve its problems by itself, through a restructuring policy that was painful yet unflinching.	爱尔兰下决心执行了一套财政重组政策，熬过阵痛之后，自力更生走出了困境。


It could do so because its economy, apart from its excessive debt burden following the collapse of an asset bubble, was basically sound.	它之所以能做得到，是因为除了资产泡沫破灭后暴露出来的过高债务负担之外，爱尔兰的经济总体上是健康的。


The situation in Greece is different.	希腊的情况则不同。


A restructuring of the economy will be much more difficult, because it will have to be more far-reaching.	希腊需要重组的不仅仅是财政，而且是整个经济，范围广得多，也困难得多。


The fiscal deficit must now be redressed resulted not just from internal financial imbalances, but also from a political system that for too long time has been in denial of reality, allowing the country to live beyond its means.	眼下急需削减的财政赤字，不仅仅源自国内的收支失衡，其病根在于希腊的整个政治体制：它长期以来无视现实，让整个国家入不敷出。


Nevertheless, the European Union can neither allow Greece to slide into national bankruptcy nor hand it over to the International Monetary Fund, since other euro-zone members – namely, Portugal, Spain, and Italy – would probably be next in line to be attacked by the financial markets.	不过，欧盟既不会坐视希腊划向国家破产的境地，也不会把它托付给国际货币基金组织，因为其他一些欧元区国家 —— 葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利可能成为受金融市场冲击的下一批对象。


In that case, the euro would be in danger of failing, for the first time seriously imperiling the entire project of European integration.	一旦出现那样的局面，欧元就会面临解体的危险，并有史以来第一次严重威胁到整个欧洲一体化方案。


The real problem at the heart of the Greek crisis is so grave because it involves the fundamental weakness of the euro: its lack of support by a government policy.	希腊危机所蕴含着的深层次问题十分严峻，因为它直指欧元的内在弱点：缺乏统一的政府政策的支持。


The caps on member states’ budget deficits and public debt imposed by the Maastricht criteria have proven relatively early on to be of limited use in the real world, and the same is true for the monitoring tools linked to these limits.	尽管《马斯特里赫特条约》给各成员国的预算赤字和公共债务规定了上限，但危机爆发后，这一套规定和相关的监管机制在严酷的现实面前显得作用有限。


In any case, the Maastricht rules were never designed for a perfect storm like the one triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.	2008 年 9 月雷曼兄弟崩溃所引发的是一场“完美风暴”，马斯特里赫特规则压根儿不是为应付这样的风暴而设计的。


The euro, which turned out to be the critical tool for defending European interests in this crisis, will now be subjected to an endurance test directed at the soft political heart of its construction.	在本轮危机中，欧元成为了捍卫欧洲利益的关键工具，现在，它脆弱的政治心脏不得不经受一次耐力测试。


Europe’s leaders – first and foremost Germany and France, which will play the deciding role – must act quickly and put through new, imaginative solutions.	欧洲国家的领导人，首先是德国和法国的领导人，必须迅速行动起来，推出新的、富有想象力的解决方案。


This will not come cheap, and therefore will entail substantial political risks.	这样的方案肯定不便宜，因此也包含着相当大的政治风险。


But, given a global economic environment that promises scant sustainable growth in the coming years, things could otherwise get very tough very soon.	但是，根据全球经济环境预测，未来几年都将是增长乏力，有鉴于此，如果现在不赶紧行动，局面很快会变得更糟糕。


The solutions that Europe’s leaders provide must go beyond Maastricht, but without triggering new institutional debates, which would lead us nowhere.	欧洲各国领导人这次推出的方案，必须超越马斯特里赫特的水平，但同时不能引发新一轮制度上的辩论，否则我们将一事无成。


Moreover, new instruments like Eurobonds will have to be made available in order to reduce the affected euro-zone countries’ interest burden, provided that they have taken serious steps – subject to effective control mechanisms – toward credible restructuring.	此外必须扩大欧元债券等新工具的使用面，以减轻欧元区国家的利息负担。 当然前提是它们自己也迈出实质性步伐，接受有效的监督，实施具有公信力的经济重组方案。


The current crisis has, however, also shown that the Council of Finance Ministers (Ecofin) is unable to assert such control over EU member states’ fiscal policies.	然而，当前的危机也表明，欧洲财政理事会（ Ecofin ）对欧盟各成员国财政政策的约束力不够。


The direct leadership of heads of state and government is needed, at least in these times of extreme crisis.	因此需要各国元首和政府首脑来直接领导有关行动 —— 至少在目前的紧急状态下。


One sign of hope is that, following the recent Franco-German summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel for the first time did not publicly oppose the idea of a European economic government.	希望的曙光也已经闪现。 在刚刚结束的法 — 德领导人会议之后，德国总理默克尔没有公开反对建立欧盟经济政府的理念，这可是破天荒头一遭。


Spelling out such a body’s structure, costs, decision-making procedures, and control mechanisms as quickly as possible is now the order of the day.	目前的当务之急就是尽早设计好这个实体的结构、费用、决策程序和监督机制。


Indeed, there is no time to lose.	我们再也浪费不起时间了。


But even with one, two, or three steps forward, the German and French governments will be taking great political risks domestically if the euro crisis in the Mediterranean worsens and a financial bailout there becomes necessary to save the common currency.	但是，就算有了第一步、第二步甚至第三步的进展，如果地中海地区的欧元危机进一步恶化，以至于欧盟不得不出手救助以挽救共同货币，那么德国和法国政府在国内也会面临巨大的政治风险。


The populations in the countries that will have to foot the bill are unprepared for the reality check ahead of them, adding fuel to a years-long growth in Euro-skepticism, which now pervades all political camps.	那些需要为救助出钱的国家，它们的民众尚未准备好为现实埋单，对欧元的怀疑态度如今已渗透到各个政治阵营。


This applies increasingly to Germany as well, making it very likely that we will see an extremely large political problem emerge there in the near future.	德国也出现了类似苗头，在不远的未来，我们可能会看到，要不要捍卫欧元成为德国政治极端重要的议题。


Pay for the southern European countries or resign oneself to the end of the euro?	为南欧国家擦屁股还是放弃欧元？


The question alone makes clear what this crisis is about: the future of the European project.	单单这个问题就表明了本轮危机的深刻意义：它关系着欧洲一体化方案的未来。


At the same time, muddling through – a typically European answer that limits political risk while not really changing anything – will be difficult, because the consequences of the global economic crisis have not yet been fully addressed.	当遇到政治风险时，欧盟各国往往喜欢“捣浆糊”，尽量避免政治风险，但什么也改变不了。 可如今，浆糊恐怕也没那么容易捣了，全球经济危机所引起的连锁反应还没有完全应付过去呢。


What is necessary now is statesman-like leadership – and even more so states woman -like leadership.	现在，欧洲各国领导人必须拿出点治国者的真正样子来。


Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy are facing the defining challenge of their respective terms in office.	默克尔和法国总统萨科齐正面临其各自任期中最重大的挑战。


They must navigate the European ship safely through this storm.	要么他们引领欧洲这条大船平安穿越风暴，要么船就翻了。


Only courageous thinking and action will enable them to steer clear of the rocks.	只有勇敢的想法和行动才能让他们避开重重暗礁，找到正确的航路。


The Greece of the Caribbean	加勒比海的希腊


NEW YORK – There was a time when it might have been said that Puerto Rico, in the midst of a wrenching debt crisis, was returning to its Latin roots.	纽约——曾几何时，我们可以说波多黎各在痛苦的债务危机中回归到拉美源头。


After all, Latin American governments were once world leaders in over-indebtedness.	毕竟，拉美各国政府曾经是过度负债的世界领袖。


But the United States’ public debt now stands at over 100% of its GDP, and Detroit has just gone through bankruptcy.	但美国的公共债务目前达到GDP的100%，底特律也宣布破产了。


Perhaps Puerto Rico is, at last, becoming more American.	或许到最后，波多黎各变得更像美国。


Or perhaps it is becoming more European, given the resemblance of its debt problems to those of Greece.	或者说波多黎各变得更像欧洲，因为其债务问题与希腊非常相似。


After the adoption of the euro, Greece was able to borrow at interest rates not much higher than those paid by northern European countries, even though its fiscal policy was worlds apart from that of Germany or Finland.	采用欧元后，希腊可以以比北欧国家高不了多少的利率借贷，尽管其财政政策与德国和芬兰有着天壤之别。


The result was massive debt accumulation to fund current expenditure, not investment.	结果是大量债务积累没有用于投资而是用于当前支出。


Puerto Rico – a US territory – was also allowed to borrow too much for too long.	美国领土波多黎各同样也被允许借贷太久、借债太多。


Its government bonds are tax-exempt everywhere in the US, and hence particularly attractive to US investors, who, despite the increasingly perilous state of the island’s finances, have gorged on them.	其政府债在美国各地免税，因此特别吸引美国投资者。 投资者不顾岛上越来越危险的财政状况，贪婪地大笔买入。


So, Bloomberg reports, Puerto Rico has more debt – over $70 billion – than any US state government except California and New York, while its economy is smaller than that of Kansas.	因此据彭博社报道，尽管其经济规模不及堪萨斯，波多黎各债务总额却高达700多亿美元，超过除加利福尼亚和纽约以外的所有美国州政府。


Another similarity has to do with relative prices.	相对价格是另一个相似之处。


Once it gave up the drachma, Greece was no longer able to devalue in order to cut the value of domestic wages in terms of foreign currency, and thus spur exports.	一旦放弃德拉克马，希腊就无法再以贬值的方式降低国内工资的外汇价值，进而刺激出口。


With competitiveness lagging, the trade deficit soared, and so did unemployment.	随着竞争力一蹶不振，贸易赤字飙升，同样快速攀升的还有失业人数。


Puerto Rico’s predicament is similar, but again with a twist that makes it more serious.	波多黎各的困境相似，但有些问题进一步增加其严重程度。


The island uses the US dollar, and the US Congress imposed on Puerto Rico the federal minimum wage, even though its per capita income is – as Anne Krueger has pointed out – about half that of the poorest US state.	岛上使用美元货币，且美国国会在波多黎各强制推行联邦最低工资标准，尽管像安妮·克鲁格所指出的那样 ，岛上的人均收入仅为美国最贫困州的一半。


Puerto Ricans’ freedom to move to the mainland was not enough to keep unemployment from becoming a secular problem: around 11% before the 2008 financial crisis, a 17% peak in 2010, and above 12% recently.	波多黎各人有权自由向大陆移民并不足以阻止失业成为普遍问题：2008年金融危机前失业率约为11%、2010年达到峰值17%、最近维持在12%以上。


As in Greece, there is plenty of blame to go around.	人们都在互相指责，这一点也像希腊一样。


Critics point to weak budget institutions, muddled accounting, and rampant fiscal populism among island politicians.	批评人士将问题归咎于疲弱的预算制度、混乱的会计核算和岛上政治家狂热的财政民粹主义思想。


Proud Puerto Ricans retort that US banks and hedge funds were complicit by happily loading up on island debt.	骄傲的波多黎各人反驳说美国银行和对冲基金串通一气开心地买入岛上的债务。


Both sides are right.	双方都没有说错。


Puerto Rico and its leaders can learn three important lessons from Greece.	波多黎各及其领导人可以从希腊汲取三点重要教训。


First, it is no use pretending that debt reduction can be avoided.	首先，假装可以避开债务减免是没有用的。


And when the time comes, action must be sufficiently bold to do away with the debt overhang and encourage private investment.	而且一旦时机成熟，必须以足够的胆量坚决执行免除债务负担和鼓励私人投资的动作。


The European Union dithered for years before acknowledging that private loans to Greece should be written down.	欧盟犹豫多年才承认希腊民间借贷需要减记。


Then it negotiated an insufficient haircut and ended up dithering again – resorting to accounting tricks to avoid writing down European public-sector loans.	而后又谈判减记额不足，并再度陷入犹豫——利用会计技巧避免减记欧洲公共部门债务。


The story would have been very different if the need for substantial debt reduction had been accepted upfront.	如果从一开始就承认大幅削减债务的必要性，情况会有很大的不同。


The same holds for Puerto Rico, except that – yet again – the situation is more complicated, owing to the vagaries of US law.	同样的情况也发生在波多黎各，不同之处在于美国法律的变幻莫测导致局面更加复杂。


Puerto Rico cannot declare bankruptcy under Chapter 9 (neither can any of the 50 states).	波多黎各不能按照第九章规定宣布破产（其他50个州也无权这样做）。


In 1984, Congress adopted an amendment that also denied Puerto Rico’s municipalities and public corporations access to Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection.	1984年，国会通过修正案不允许波多黎各市政机构和上市公司根据第九章规定申请破产保护。


Puerto Rico recently tried to enact legislation modeled on Chapter 9 that would allow for an orderly restructuring of the debt of public corporations and municipalities.	波多黎各最近尝试颁布仿效第九章制定的法律，允许对上市公司和市政当局债务进行有序重组。


But creditors have challenged the move in court, with the US Supreme Court set to issue a ruling by the end of June.	但债权人在法庭上对此提出疑议，美国最高法院将于6月底对此进行裁决。


So exactly how debt reduction will happen in Puerto Rico remains unclear.	因此波多黎各债务减免将采取何种方式仍然有待明确。


But whether it will happen is in little doubt; when it does, it better be large.	但毫无疑问减记将会发生； 而且真正发生时最好数额足够。


The second lesson is that policymakers must put fiscal policy on a sustainable path, while recognizing that austerity alone is not the answer.	第二个教训是决策者必须实现财政政策可持续发展，同时认识到一味强调紧缩政策是不能解决问题的。


Puerto Rico’s economy had been shrinking before the fiscal crisis, and the spending cuts and tax increases since it erupted have only made matters worse.	波多黎各经济在财政危机前就一直处于萎缩状态，危机爆发后的开支缩减和税收增加只是进一步恶化了局势。


The island risks sharing Greece’s fate, with the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing to rise as austerity deepens the recession.	这个小岛有可能遭受与希腊同样的命运，因紧缩政策加剧经济衰退而导致债务占GDP之比持续上升。


In exchange for help, congressional Republicans are threatening to impose on Puerto Rico a fiscal control board similar to the one established in 1995 in response to the fiscal crisis in Washington, DC.	作为援助条件，国会共和党人威胁要对波多黎各实行类似华盛顿1995年财政危机时那样的财政管制政策。


Bad idea.	这个主意真的很馊。


Not only would such a board smack of colonialism and be politically untenable; the scheme would also lack the flexibility needed to avoid a depression in Puerto Rico, while reassuring everyone, including investors, that fiscal policy will remain prudent in the future.	此等管制不仅涉嫌殖民主义而且在政治上站不住脚； 该方案也不具备避免波多黎各陷入衰退所必不可少的灵活，同时也不能让人们、包括投资者相信未来将会实行稳健的财政政策。


A much better solution is a rule of fiscal responsibility like those adopted in countries as different as New Zealand, Sweden, Colombia, and Chile.	更好的解决方案是仿效新西兰、瑞典、哥伦比亚和智利等国实行负责任的财政政策。


The idea is to keep expenditure below what the government can raise in taxes in the long run (thereby ensuring sustainability), while allowing deficits whenever the economy is operating below potential and tax revenue is abnormally low (thereby guaranteeing flexibility and contributing to macroeconomic stabilization).	原则是确保开销低于政府所能收取的长期税收（从而确保可持续发展），并在经济低于潜在水平且税收异常低迷时容忍出现赤字（从而在确保灵活的同时促进宏观经济稳定） 。


In Chile, the rule allowed the government to pay back debt gradually and eventually turn itself into a net creditor, while at the same time reducing the volatility of public investment and output.	在智利，这项原则容许政府逐步偿还债务，并最终在将自身改造为净债权国的同时降低公共投资和产出的波动幅度。


There is no reason why a similar arrangement could not work in Puerto Rico.	没有理由相信类似的安排在波多黎各无法发挥效果。


The third lesson from Greece is that macro tinkering is not enough; highly indebted countries also need a credible growth strategy.	来自希腊的第三点教训是仅靠宏观修补还远远不够； 高负债国也需要可靠的增长战略。


Puerto Rico is no exception.	波多黎各也不例外。


For a long time, the island’s economy grew on the basis of corporate tax incentives.	长久以来，岛上的经济增长全靠企业税收优惠政策。


But, beginning in 1996, the US Congress did away with those tax breaks, without producing any blueprint for development.	但1996年后，美国国会废除了这些税收减免，却没有绘制任何发展蓝图。


On the contrary, Puerto Rico is stuck with an early-twentieth-century law that forces all trade with the mainland to be conducted with expensive US ships, increasing transport costs and undermining economic competitiveness.	相反，波多黎各背负着二十世纪早期法律的沉重负担，这些法律强制规定与大陆的所有贸易必须使用昂贵的美国船只，从而增加运输成本并削弱经济竞争力。


All that must change.	所有这一切都必须改变。


Puerto Rico will not pay its debts – not even what is left after debt reduction – unless its economy grows.	除非经济恢复增长，否则波多黎各将拒绝还债——即便实行债务减免后也不例外。


US creditors and lawmakers must accept that reality, and act accordingly.	美国债权人和立法人士必须接受这一现实，并采取相应的行动。


Greek Lessons for the World Economy	希腊危机带给世界经济的教训


CAMBRIDGE – The $140 billion support package that the Greek government has finally received from its European Union partners and the International Monetary Fund gives it the breathing space needed to undertake the difficult job of putting its finances in order.	坎布里奇——希腊政府最终从欧盟伙伴和国际货币基金组织得到的1400亿美元的一揽子援助款让他们赢得了完成恢复金融秩序这项艰巨任务所必不可少的喘息空间。


The package may or may not prevent Spain and Portugal from becoming undone in a similar fashion, or indeed even head off an eventual Greek default.	这项援助计划或许能、或许不能防止西班牙和葡萄牙同样变得一蹶不振，甚至可能都无法防止希腊债务违约的最终发生。


Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the Greek debacle has given the EU a black eye.	无论结果怎样，希腊经济的崩溃显然都已经令欧盟鼻青脸肿。


Deep down, the crisis is yet another manifestation of what I call “the political trilemma of the world economy”: economic globalization, political democracy, and the nation-state are mutually irreconcilable.	从本质上看，这次危机不过又一次生动诠释了我所提出的“世界经济在政治问题上面临三难选择”： 经济全球化、政治民主化和民族国家间存在不可调和的冲突。


We can have at most two at one time.	我们最多能同时实行两种制度。


Democracy is compatible with national sovereignty only if we restrict globalization.	只有在限制全球化的情况下，民主才能与国家主权实现和平共处。


If we push for globalization while retaining the nation-state, we must jettison democracy.	如果在推动全球化的同时保留民族国家，我们就必需舍弃民主制度。


And if we want democracy along with globalization, we must shove the nation-state aside and strive for greater international governance.	如果我们希望实行民主和全球化，那么就必需将民族国家抛到一边，努力提高国际治理程度。


The history of the world economy shows the trilemma at work.	世界经济的过往历史表明确实存在这样的三难选择。


The first era of globalization, which lasted until 1914, was a success as long as economic and monetary policies remained insulated from domestic political pressures.	持续到1914年结束的首次全球化浪潮在经济和货币政策与国内政治压力分离的情况下都取得了成功。


These policies could then be entirely subjugated to the demands of the gold standard and free capital mobility.	当时这些政策完全服从于金本位制和资本自由流动的需要。


But once the political franchise was enlarged, the working class got organized, and mass politics became the norm, domestic economic objectives began to compete with (and overwhelm) external rules and constraints.	可政治投票权一旦扩大，工人阶级立刻组织起来，大众政治也成为常态，国内经济目标开始和外部规则和限制展开竞争，并逐渐将后者压倒。


The classic case is Britain’s short-lived return to gold in the interwar period.	两次世界大战期间英国曾短暂恢复金本位制是这方面的经典案例。


The attempt to reconstitute the pre-World War I model of globalization collapsed in 1931, when domestic politics forced the British government to choose domestic reflation over the gold standard.	重建一次大战前全球化模式的企图在1931年宣告彻底失败，因为当时的国内政局迫使英国政府放弃金本位制，而选择国内通货再膨胀。


The architects of the Bretton Woods regime kept this lesson in mind when they redesigned the world’s monetary system in 1944.	布雷顿森林体系的设计者在1944年重新设计世界货币体系时记取了这次教训。


They understood that democratic countries would need the space to conduct independent monetary and fiscal policies.	他们明白民主国家需要空间来推行独立的货币和财政政策。


So they contemplated only a “thin” globalization, with capital flows restricted largely to long-term lending and borrowing.	因此他们仅仅构想了“有限度”的全球化，即在很大程度上将资本流动限制在长期借贷领域。


John Maynard Keynes, who wrote the rules along with Harry Dexter White, viewed capital controls not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent feature of the global economy.	与亨利·迪克特·怀特共同起草相关规则的约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯并没有将资本控制仅仅视为一种权宜之计，而是将其看作全球经济的一项��久性特色。


The Bretton Woods regime collapsed in the 1970’s as a result of the inability or unwillingness – it is not entirely clear which – of leading governments to manage the growing tide of capital flows.	由于起领导作用的国家不能或者不愿——究竟属于哪种情况已经很难搞清——继续管理日益增加的资金流，导致布雷顿森林体系于20世纪70年代陷入崩溃。


The third path identified by the trilemma is to do away with national sovereignty altogether.	三难选择所指明的第三条道路是彻底舍弃国家主权。


In this case, economic integration can be married with democracy through political union among states.	在这种情况下，经济一体化可以通过国家间的政治联盟实现与民主的结合。


The loss in national sovereignty is then compensated by the “internationalization” of democratic politics.	这样国家主权的损失可以通过民主政治的“国际化”来加以弥补。


Think of this as a global version of federalism.	可以将这看作全球联邦制的一种形式。


The United States, for example, created a unified national market once its federal government wrested sufficient political control from individual states.	比方说美国，在联邦政府从各州政府手中获得足够的政治控制权后，就创立了一个统一的国家市场。


This was far from a smooth process, as the American Civil War amply demonstrates.	曾经发生的美国内战充分表明，这一过程远不是一帆风顺的。


The EU’s difficulties stem from the fact that the global financial crisis caught Europe midway through a similar process.	而欧盟所面临的困难在于，在类似过程尚未完成之前，全球金融危机就袭击了欧洲。


European leaders always understood that economic union needs to have a political leg to stand on.	欧洲领导人一直非常清楚，经济联盟需要相应的政治制度才能加以支撑。


Even though some, such as the British, wished to give the Union as little power as possible, the force of the argument was with those who pressed for political integration alongside economic integration.	尽管以英国为代表的某些国家希望尽可能限制欧盟的权力，但在经济一体化的同时推进政治一体化才是欧盟国家的主流。


Still, the European political project fell far short of the economic one.	即使如此，欧洲的政治一体化较之经济一体化进程仍然远远落后。


Greece benefited from a common currency, unified capital markets, and free trade with other EU member states.	希腊受益于共同货币、统一资本市场和与其他欧盟成员国的自由贸易。


But it does not have automatic access to a European lender of last resort.	但却无权自动获得欧洲紧急贷款人的援助。


Its citizens do not receive unemployment checks from Brussels the way that, say, Californians do from Washington, DC, when California experiences a recession.	希腊居民不能像加利福尼亚居民那样，在陷入经济衰退时从布鲁塞尔获得像华盛顿那样的援助。


Nor, given linguistic and cultural barriers, can unemployed Greeks move just as easily across the border to a more prosperous European state.	而且由于存在语言和文化上的障碍，失业的希腊人也不能轻松越境，进入更繁荣的欧洲国家寻找工作。


And Greek banks and firms lose their creditworthiness alongside their government if markets perceive the latter to be insolvent.	而一旦市场认定希腊政府破产，那么希腊的银行和公司也会像政府一样丧失信誉。


The German and French governments, for their part, have had little say over Greece’s budget policies.	而从德法两国政府的角度看，他们对希腊的预算政策并没有多少发言权。


They could not stop the Greek government from borrowing (indirectly) from the European Central Bank (ECB) as long as credit rating agencies deemed Greek debt creditworthy.	只要信用评级企业认为希腊具备偿付能力，他们就不能阻止希腊政府从欧洲央行间接贷款。


If Greece chooses default, they cannot enforce their banks’ claims on Greek borrowers or seize Greek assets.	如果希腊选择违约，他们也不能执行本国银行对希腊借款人的索赔，或者扣押希腊所属财产。


Nor can they prevent Greece from leaving the eurozone.	如果希腊选择退出欧元区，他们也同样束手无策。


What all this means is that the financial crisis has turned out to be a lot deeper and its resolution considerably messier than necessary.	所有这些导致金融危机的程度更深，解决起来头绪也更加混乱。


The French and German governments have grudgingly come up with a major loan package, but only after considerable delay and with the IMF standing at their side.	法德两国政府勉强出台了大额信贷方案，但在时间上多有延误，而且一直等到国际货币基金组织承诺加入该方案才得以出台。


The ECB has lowered the threshold of creditworthiness that Greek government securities must meet in order to allow continued Greek borrowing.	欧洲央行已经调低了希腊政府债券需要满足的信用标准，以方便希腊继续借贷。


The success of the rescue is far from assured, in view of the magnitude of belt-tightening that it calls for and the hostility that it has aroused on the part of Greek workers.	考虑到避免出现债务危机需要很多人勒紧裤带以及由此在希腊工人中引发的敌意，我们无法保证这次援助计划取得成功。


When push comes to shove, domestic politics trumps foreign creditors.	当需要我们当机立断作出决策时，国外债权人却被国内政治所打败。


The crisis has revealed how demanding globalization’s political prerequisites are.	这次危机揭示了全球化的政治条件究竟有多苛刻。


It shows how much European institutions must still evolve to underpin a healthy single market.	危机表明欧洲机构需要进行多少改革，才能支撑起一片健康发展的统一市场。


The choice that the EU faces is the same in other parts of the world: either integrate politically, or ease up on economic unification.	欧盟面临着与其他国家同样的选择： 实现政治一体化，或者放慢经济一体化的脚步。


Before the crisis, Europe looked like the most likely candidate to make a successful transition to the first equilibrium – greater political unification.	危机爆发前，欧洲似乎是首度成功实现政治一体化平衡状态可能性最大的候选人。


Now its economic project lies in tatters while the leadership needed to rekindle political integration is nowhere to be seen.	现在它的经济计划被撕成了碎片，而重新开始政治一体化所需的有力领导却迟迟未能出现。


The best that can be said is that Europe will no longer be able to delay making the choice that the Greek affair has laid bare.  If you are an optimist, you might even conclude that Europe will therefore ultimately emerge stronger.	能够预料的最好情况是，欧洲将无法继续推迟希腊债务问题凸显出来的抉择。   如果你是个乐观主义者，你甚至可能得出结论：欧洲终将因此变得更加强大。


A Blueprint for Greece’s Recovery	希腊复苏蓝图


ATHENS – Months of negotiations between our government and the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank have produced little progress.	雅典—我国政府与国际货币基金组织（IMF）、欧盟和欧洲央行的谈判几乎毫无进展。


One reason is that all sides are focusing too much on the strings to be attached to the next liquidity injection and not enough on a vision of how Greece can recover and develop sustainably.	一个原因是所有各方都太关注下一次流动性注入的附加条件，而对希腊如何可持续地复苏和发展着眼不够。


If we are to break the current impasse, we must envisage a healthy Greek economy.	要想打破当前的僵局，就必须盯住希腊经济的健康。


Sustainable recovery requires synergistic reforms that unleash the country’s considerable potential by removing bottlenecks in several areas: productive investment, credit provision, innovation, competition, social security, public administration, the judiciary, the labor market, cultural production, and, last but not least, democratic governance.	可持续复苏需要综合改革，通过破除几大领域的瓶颈——生产性投资、信用供给、创新、竞争、社会安全、公共管理、司法、劳动力市场、文化产品、民主监督等——释放希腊巨大的潜力。


Seven years of debt deflation, reinforced by the expectation of everlasting austerity, have decimated private and public investment and forced anxious, fragile banks to stop lending.	持久紧缩预期所推动的七年债务通缩扼杀了私人和公共投资，迫使焦急又脆弱的银行不再贷款。


With the government lacking fiscal room, and Greek banks burdened by non-performing loans, it is important to mobilize the state’s remaining assets and unclog the flow of bank credit to healthy parts of the private sector.	政府缺少财政空间，希腊银行背上了沉重的不良贷款负担，因此，动员希腊剩余资产、打通银行信用流向私人部门的健康部分的渠道十分重要。


To restore investment and credit to levels consistent with economic escape velocity, a recovering Greece will require two new public institutions that work side by side with the private sector and with European institutions: A development bank that harnesses public assets and a “bad bank” that enables the banking system to get out from under their non-performing assets and restore the flow of credit to profitable, export-oriented firms.	要想恢复投资和信用水平，使之与经济逃逸速度相匹配，希腊复苏需要两个新的公共机构，齐心协力与私人部门和欧洲机构合作：一是处理公共资产的开发银行，二是让银行系统摆脱不良贷款、让信用流重新流向盈利的出口企业的“坏银行”（bad bank）。


Imagine a development bank levering up collateral that comprises post-privatization equity retained by the state and other assets (for example, real estate) that could easily be made more valuable (and collateralized) by reforming their property rights.	开发银行接受由私有化后仍由国家持有的股权以及其他可以通过产权改革轻易地提升价值（和抵押品化）的资产（如不动产）组成的抵押品。


Imagine that it links the European Investment Bank and the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s €315 billion ($350 billion) investment plan with Greece’s private sector.	它将欧洲投资银行和欧盟委员会主席容克的3,150亿欧元的投资计划与希腊的私人部门联系起来。


Instead of being viewed as a fire sale to fill fiscal holes, privatization would be part of a grand public-private partnership for development.	私有化不会被视为为了填补财政窟窿而进行的大甩卖，而将是宏大的公私合作开发计划的一部分。


Imagine further that the “bad bank” helps the financial sector, which was recapitalized generously by strained Greek taxpayers in the midst of the crisis, to shed their legacy of non-performing loans and unclog their financial plumbing.	“坏银行”有助于金融部门摆脱不良贷款历史负担、疏通金融渠道。 在危机期间，勒紧裤腰带的希腊纳税人慷慨出资让银行进行资本重组。


In concert with the development bank’s virtuous impact, credit and investment flows would flood the Greek economy’s hitherto arid realms, eventually helping the bad bank turn a profit and become “good.”	信用和投资流将与开发银行的积极效应形成一股合力，让久旱的希腊经济迎来甘霖，最终帮助坏银行实现盈利，成为“好”银行。


Finally, imagine the effect of all of this on Greece’s financial, fiscal, and social-security ecosystem: With bank shares skyrocketing, our state’s losses from their recapitalization would be extinguished as its equity in them appreciates.	最后，想象一下所有这些对希腊金融、财政和社会安全生态系统的作用：银行股票大涨，我国因为银行资本重组而遭受的损失将随着股票升值而得到弥补。


Meanwhile, the development bank’s dividends would be channeled into the long-suffering pension funds, which were abruptly de-capitalized in 2012 (owing to the “haircut” on their holdings of Greek government bonds).	与此同时，开发银行的分红将被注入长期蒙受损失的退休基金。 退休基金在2012年因为它们所持有的希腊政府债券惨遭“剃头”（haircut）而一夜之间变得资不抵债。


In this scenario, the task of bolstering social security would be completed with the unification of pension funds; the surge of contributions following the pickup in employment; and the return to formal employment of workers banished into informality by the brutal deregulation of the labor market during the dark years of the recent past.	在这一情形中，增进社会安全的任务将由退休基金的统一、就业增加带来的退休金缴纳量的提高，以及因为最近的萧条时期的劳动力市场急剧去监管化而沦落到非正式部门的工人回归正式部门来完成。


One can easily imagine Greece recovering strongly as a result of this strategy.	不难想象，这一战略将让希腊实现强劲复苏。


In a world of ultra-low returns, Greece would be seen as a splendid opportunity, sustaining a steady stream of inward foreign direct investment.	在回报极低的环境中，希腊将被视为巨大的机会，保持稳定的外国直接投资流入。


But why would this be different from the pre-2008 capital inflows that fueled debt-financed growth?	但这与2008年前助推债务融资增长的资本流入的区别在哪里？


Could another macroeconomic Ponzi scheme really be avoided?	真的能够避免又一场宏观经济庞氏骗局吗？


During the era of Ponzi-style growth, capital flows were channeled by commercial banks into a frenzy of consumption and by the state into an orgy of suspect procurement and outright profligacy.	在旁氏增长时期，资本流通过商业银行进入消费狂热，通过国家被用于十分可疑的采购和肆意挥霍。


To ensure that this time is different, Greece will need to reform its social economy and political system.	要确保这次不一样，希腊需要改革其社会经济和政治制度。


Creating new bubbles is not our government’s idea of development.	制造新泡沫不是我国政府的发展理想。


This time, by contrast, the new development bank would take the lead in channeling scarce homegrown resources into selected productive investment.	相反，这一回，将由新开发银行引导稀缺的本土培养资源进入优选的生产性投资。


These include startups, IT companies that use local talent, organic-agro small and medium-size enterprises, export-oriented pharmaceutical companies, efforts to attract the international film industry to Greek locations, and educational programs that take advantage of Greek intellectual output and unrivaled historic sites.	这些投资包括创业企业、使用本地人才的IT公司、中小型有机农业企业、出口导向制药公司、吸引国际电影业来希腊落户的政策，以及利用希腊知识产出和无与伦比的历史沉淀的教育计划。


In the meantime, Greece’s regulatory authorities would be keeping a watchful eye over commercial lending practices, while a debt brake would prevent our government from indulging in old, bad habits, ensuring that our state never again slips into primary deficits.	与此同时，希腊监管当局将小心监督商业借贷行为，而债务刹车（debt brake）将防止我国政府重新陷入昔日的坏习惯，确保我国永不再次出现初级赤字。


Cartels, anti-competitive invoicing practices, senselessly closed professions, and a bureaucracy that has traditionally turned the state into a public menace would soon discover that our government is their worst foe.	卡特尔、反竞争的开发票行为（invoicing practices）、无意义的职业壁垒和从前将国家成为公共威胁的官僚很快就会发现，我们的政府将是他们的噩梦。


The barriers to growth in the past were an unholy alliance among oligarchic interests and political parties, scandalous procurement, clientelism, the permanently broken media, overly accommodating banks, weak tax authorities, and a weighed-down, fearful judiciary.	过去的增长壁垒是由寡头利益和政党、可耻的采购、裙带主义、永远不作为的媒体、过于随和的银行、疲软的税收当局和堕落怕事的司法系统组成的邪恶同盟。


Only the bright light of democratic transparency can remove such impediments; our government is determined to help it shine through.	唯有民主透明之光能消灭这些障碍，我国政府决心帮助亮光照进希腊。


Asia’s View of the Greek Crisis	希腊危机的亚洲观点


SEOUL – Asian countries have been watching the Greek crisis unfold with a mixture of envy and schadenfreude.	首尔—亚洲国家以一种混杂着嫉妒和幸灾乐祸的心情看待希腊危机。


When they experienced their own financial crisis in 1997, they received far less aid, with far harsher conditions.	1997年，当它们面临金融危机时，它们得到的援助比希腊小得多，条件苛刻得多。


But they also recovered much more strongly, suggesting that ever-growing bailouts may not be the best prescription for recovery.	但它们的复苏也远比希腊强劲，这表明不断加码的援助也许并不是复苏的良方。


Since the onset of the crisis, Greece has received massive financing from the so-called “troika”: the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.	自危机爆发以来，希腊得到了来自所谓的“三驾马车”——欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的巨额融资。


It received bailout packages in 2010 and 2012 totaling €240 billion ($266 billion), including €30 billion from the IMF, more than triple Greece’s cumulative limit for IMF borrowing.	2010—2012年的援助方案总规模高达2,400亿欧元（2,600亿美元），包括来自IMF的300亿欧元，这一数字是希腊的IMF贷款累计上限的三倍有余。


The latest deal promises up to another €86 billion.	最新协议又将给希腊带来860亿欧元。


By contrast, South Korea’s 1997 bailout package – which was larger than those received by Indonesia, Thailand, or the Philippines – totaled $57 billion, with $21 billion coming from the IMF.	相反，1997年韩国所获得的援助方案——比印尼、泰国和菲律宾规模更大——总值只有570亿美元，其中210美元来自IMF。


At the time, South Korea’s annual GDP was $560 billion; in 2014, Greek GDP amounted to less than $240 billion.	。 与此同时，韩国年GDP为5,600亿美元，而2014年希腊GDP还不到2,400亿美元。


The IMF seems to have lent Greece such a large amount for political reasons.	IMF给希腊贷款在很大程度上是出于政治原因。


For starters, at the onset of the crisis, then-IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was a leading candidate to become President of France.	首先，危机爆发时，时任IMF总裁斯特劳斯-卡恩（Dominique Strauss-Kahn）在法国总统选举中领先。


More generally, major IMF shareholders, the European Union, and the United States have a vital interest in stabilizing Greece to safeguard French and German banks and preserve NATO unity.	更一般地说，IMF主要股东——欧盟和美国在稳定希腊以捍卫法国和德国银行和保持北约团结方面存在重要利益。


Desmon Lachman, a former deputy director of the IMF’s policy department, has called the institution a slush fund, abused by its political masters during the Greek crisis.	IMF政策部门前副主管拉赫曼（Desmon Lachman）说IMF是一个行贿基金，在希腊危机中被其政治“主人”所滥用。


To be sure, the economic mess created in Greece – the result of government profligacy, official corruption, and widespread tax evasion – merited some international assistance.	平心而论，在希腊造成的经济混乱——拜政府挥霍、官员腐败和普遍逃税所赐——缺失应该给予一些国际援助。


And the IMF did impose conditions on its loans to Greece – including fiscal austerity, privatization, and structural reform of its pension and tax systems – most of which were necessary to address the country’s insolvency.	而IMF也确实给其希腊贷款加上了条件——包括财政紧缩、私有化和退休金和税收制度的结构改革——其中大部分条件都是解决希腊资不抵债问题不可或缺的措施。


The requirements of the latest rescue deal are the toughest yet – even tougher than those that Greek voters overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum earlier this month.	但最新的援助协议的条件是最严苛的——比本月早些时候希腊公投所一边倒地拒绝的条件还要严苛。


But the scale of the aid remains massive, especially when one considers how little progress Greece has made in implementing the reforms it promised in the past.	但援助规模仍然十分巨大，特别是考虑到希腊在实施过去所承诺的改革方面几乎还无进展的情况下。


This contrasts sharply with Asia’s experience in 1997.	这与1997年的亚洲的情况形成了鲜明对比。


Unlike Greece, Asia’s problem was not an insolvency crisis, but a liquidity crisis, caused by a sudden reversal of capital flows.	与希腊不同，亚洲的问题不是偿债能力危机，而是流动性危机，其原因是资本流的突然逆转。


In South Korea, net private-capital inflows of 4.8% of GDP in 1996 swung to net outflows of 3.4% of GDP in 1997.	在韩国，1996年私人资本流入占GDP的4. 8%，而到了1997年，出现了相当于GDP的3.


Though the accumulation of substantial short-term debts in the financial system and corporate sector did amplify the shocks, the primary factors fueling the crisis were the lack of international liquidity, panicked behavior by investors, and financial contagion.	4%的净流出。 尽管金融系统和公司部门所累积的大量短期债务确实放大了冲击，但助长危机的主要因素是缺少国际流动性、投资者的恐慌性行为和金融传染。


Yet the IMF imposed even tougher conditions on Asia than it has on Greece, including fiscal austerity, monetary tightening, and financial restructuring.	但IMF给亚洲施加的条件比希腊还要严格，包括财政紧缩、货币紧缩和金融重组。


Some of these requirements were clearly unnecessary, as evidenced by Malaysia, which recovered quickly from the crisis without IMF assistance.	其中一些要求显然不是必须的，马来西亚就是明证，它在没有IMF援助的请款下讯速地从危机中复苏。


In any case, the actions were temporary.	无论在哪个国家，行动都是暂时性的。


Once confidence began to recover and market conditions stabilized, the East Asian economies shifted their monetary and fiscal policies toward expansion and embraced large-scale exchange-rate depreciation – efforts that enhanced their export competitiveness.	一旦信心开始恢复、市场环境企稳，东亚经济体便开始了货币和财政政策扩张和大规模汇率贬值——这些措施e增强了它们的出口竞争力。


Structural reforms, including the immediate closing of financial institutions and the elimination of non-performing loans, also helped to bolster recovery.	结构改革，包括立刻关闭金融机构和勾销不良贷款也有助于提振复苏。


In South Korea, for example, real GDP growth quickly rebounded from -6.7% in 1998 to 9.5% in 1999.	比如，在韩国，真实GDP增长迅速从1998年的-6. 7%增加到1999年的9.


By mid-2003, some 776 of the country’s financial institutions were closed.	5%。 到2003年年中，776家韩国金融机构关门大吉。


And the authorities’ strong commitment to reform restored investor confidence, reviving inflows of private capital and reactivating foreign trade.	而当局对改革的强力承诺重塑了投资者信心，私人资本重新流入，外贸重新活跃。


Greece, by contrast, has utterly failed to engineer a recovery.	相反，希腊在刺激复苏方面做得一团糟。


Instead of dropping to 110% as planned, the public debt-to-GDP ratio has increased to 170%.	公债-GDP比例没有如计划那样下降到110%，反而增加到170%。


Annual per capita real income contracted 4.8%, on average, over the last six years.	过去六年人均真实收入平均每年下降4. 8%。


Unemployment stands at 26%, and hovers around 50% among young people.	失业率高达26%，年轻人失业率更是高达50%左右。


Against this background, it was not shocking that Greece, unable to come up with €1.5 billion at the end of June, became the first developed country to miss a payment to the IMF.	在这一背景下，毫不奇怪希腊在6月底连15亿欧元都拿不出来，成为第一个无力偿还IMF的发达国家。


Belatedly, the Fund acknowledged that its lending and policy advice had failed in Greece.	IMF也终于承认其贷款和政策建议在希腊失败了。


Greece’s government then demanded more financial support with less stringent conditions.	接着，希腊政府要求在减轻条件的情况下给予更多的支持。


But, as its creditors have now recognized, providing more money will not address Greece’s insolvency.	但是，债权人现在发现，提供更多的资金无法解决希腊的偿债能力问题。


That is why the new deal requires that the government immediately cut pensions, hike taxes (beginning with the value-added tax), liberalize the labor market, and adhere to severe spending constraints.	因此，新协议要求希腊政府立即削减退休金、提高税收（从增值税开始）、实现劳动力市场自由化、遵守严格的支出约束。


At the same time, a write-down of official debt, like the “haircut” given to private creditors in 2012, will be necessary.	与此同时，债务减记也是不必可少的，一如2012年对私人债权人的“剃头”（haircut）。


Many have questioned whether agonizing reforms are entirely necessary; if the country returned to the drachma, they suggest, it could implement interest-rate cuts and devalue its exchange rate, thereby engineering an export-led recovery.	许多人质疑痛苦的改革是否完全必要； 他们认为，如果希腊重新启用德拉克马，就能实施降息和汇率贬值，从而提振出口拉动型复苏。


But, given Greece’s small export sector, not to mention the weakness of the global economy, such a recovery may be impossible.	但是，希腊出口部门规模很小，全球经济也处于疲软状态，强劲复苏是不可能的任务。


Greece’s best bet is reform.	希腊的最佳选择还是改革。


So far, Greece has shown itself to be unwilling to implement a painful internal-wage adjustment and reform measures forced by outsiders.	目前，希腊已经表明它不愿实施痛苦的内部工资调整和外部强加的改革措施。


Perhaps the latest deal, which was reached with Greece on the brink, will prove to be a turning point, with Greece finally committing actively to economic and fiscal reform.	也许在希腊最危险关头达成的最新协议能够成为一个转折点，希腊最终开始积极致力于经济和财政改革。


Otherwise, Greece’s exit from the eurozone – with all the concomitant social and economic strife – seems all but inevitable.	否则，希腊退出欧元区——以及由此造成的社会和经济冲突——将无可避免。


Asians watch with sympathy the fall from grace of the birthplace of Western civilization.	亚洲人民带着同情目睹着西方文明诞生地的坠落。


But perhaps Greece should look to Asia for proof that, by taking responsibility for its own destiny, a country can emerge stronger from even the most difficult trials.	但也许希腊应该从亚洲身上看到，为自己的命运负责的国家才能从最困难的考验中变强。


The Greek Time Bomb	希腊这颗定时炸弹


ATHENS – Much is at stake in Greece’s upcoming election.	发自雅典——即将举行的希腊大选事关重大。


Indeed, the outcome could determine whether the country remains in the eurozone, with far-reaching implications for the rest of the monetary union.	事实上，其结果将可能决定该国是否继续留在欧元区，并对其他货币联盟成员国产生深远的影响。


Syriza, a radical left-wing party whose popularity has skyrocketed amid the country’s economic crisis, is the favorite to win, though it is unlikely to gain enough parliamentary seats to govern alone.	希腊激进左翼联盟（Syriza）这个激进左翼政党在国家经济危机中支持率飙升，并最有可能在大选中胜出，但它不太可能获得足够的议会席位而实现单独执政。


Instead, it will probably lead a coalition government, though with which other parties remains unclear.	相反，它更可能会领导一个联合政府，虽然尚未明确将和哪些政党携手。


Fundamental to Syriza’s platform is its economic program, designed to counteract the impact of the excessively strict austerity that Greeks have endured for the last four and a half years, in exchange for bailouts from the “troika” of the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Commission.	激进左翼联盟的基本政纲是其经济计划，旨在抵消希腊人为换取欧洲央行、国际货币基金组织和欧盟委员会“三驾马车”的救助而承受了四年半的过度严苛紧缩政策所带来的影响。


Pensions have been reduced by 40%, on average, while the middle class is suffering under the weight of crippling new property taxes.	养老金平均减少了40%，而与此同时中产阶级则承受着新房产税的过度重压。


As a result, Greece has fallen into a deep and prolonged recession, with output down 25% from pre-crisis levels.	希腊因此陷入了长期及深层次的经济衰退，与危机前相比，其出口水平下降了25%。


Worse, unemployment stands at nearly 26% – and more than 50% among young people.	更糟糕的是，失业率接近26%，在年轻人中这个比例超过50%。


Yet most unemployment benefits are now being eliminated after 12 months, with the long-term unemployed often losing access to the state health-care system.	而大多数失业救济会在持续失业12个月后被取消，长期失业者常常无法加入国家医疗保健体系。


Add to this a 30% increase in prices for prescription drugs, and it is easy to see why Greek society is unraveling.	再加上处方药价格上升了30%，使得希腊社会解体的原因变得显而易见。


Of course, these sacrifices might be worthwhile were they helping Greece reduce its public debt to manageable levels.	当然，如果能够把希腊公共债务减少到可管理的水平，这些牺牲就是值得的。


But, at the end of 2014, public debt amounted to 175% of GDP, having increased from its 2009 level of 127%.	但是到2014年底，公共债务从2009年的相当于GDP的127%上升到175%。


Servicing that debt would require primary budget surpluses equal to at least 4% of GDP until 2022 – an outcome that would require a surge in growth.	偿还债务需要基本预算盈余至少在2022年之前达到GDP的4%——这 要求经济的极速增长。


Under the weight of relentless fiscal austerity, however, such growth is out of the question.	然而在无情的财政紧缩政策重压下，这样的增长是不可能的。


That is why Syriza has promised to launch a massive new spending program – including free electricity and food coupons for the poor and an increase in state pensions to pre-crisis levels – that would cost about 6.5% of GDP.	这就是为何激进左翼联盟承诺推出大规模的新支出计划——包括为穷人免费提供电力和食品券，以及提高国家养老金至危机前的水平，这将耗资约GDP的6.


Tax hikes for high-income earners and large property owners would help to finance these expenditures, while increases in the minimum wage would round out income redistribution efforts.	5%。 增加高收入人群和大资本家的税收将有助于支撑这些支出，而增加最低工资则将完善收入再分配工作。


Syriza has also promised to repeal labor-market liberalization and suspend privatization.	激进左翼联盟还承诺废除劳动力市场自由化并暂停私有化。


Finally, it plans to renegotiate Greece’s debt with lenders, in the hope of writing off the bulk of its liabilities.	最后，它还计划与贷款国协商，希望减免希腊的大部分债务。


Syriza’s economic program neglects the important fact that fiscal consolidation and structural measures not only form part of Greece’s commitments; they also serve the country’s long-term interest.	但激进左翼联盟的经济方案忽略了一个重要的事实，就是财政整顿和结构性改革措施不仅是希腊承诺的一部分； 同时也服务于国家的长远利益。


Given this, they cannot – and should not – be abolished.	基于这一点，它们不能，也不应该被废除。


Instead, the problems in their design and implementation should be addressed, in order to improve their effectiveness within current economic circumstances.	相反，为了在当前的经济情况下提高其有效性，应该对其设计和执行中存在的问题应该进行调整。


Such an approach would strengthen Syriza’s position in debt-relief negotiations.	这些手段将强化激进左翼联盟在债务减免谈判方面的立场。


Nonetheless, official statements suggest that the troika would not be inclined to accept Syriza’s negotiating framework, intending instead to complete the talks that it had launched with the outgoing center-right government, the goal being to securing further budget cuts and initiate new labor-market and pension reforms.	但尽管如此，官方声明表明，三驾马车无意接受该联盟的谈判框架，并希望继续完成与即将离任的中间偏右政府的谈判，目的是实现进一步削减预算，并启动新的劳动力市场和养老金改革。


In short, the troika will insist that Greece honors its prior commitments.	简而言之，三驾马车将坚持要希腊信守之前的承诺。


If negotiations stall, financial and liquidity stress, resulting from Greece’ inability to borrow at current interest rates – ten-year bond yields have reached 9.5 % – will weaken the fiscal position and banking system further.	如果谈判停滞，因为希腊无法按照当前利率贷款——10年期债券收益率达到了9. 5%——而造成的金融和流动性压力，将进一步削弱其财政状况和银行系统。


This could lead to a collapse in confidence, triggering financial upheaval and, in turn, forcing the country to seek a third bailout – one that would require Greece to leave the eurozone and introduce a new, devalued currency.	这可能导致信心崩溃，引发金融动荡，反过来，迫使这个国家寻求第三种救助方案——让希腊离开欧元区，引入一个新的贬值货币。


In that case, Greece’s geopolitical position would be weakened, its economy would sink further into recession, and social tensions would rise.	在这种情况下，希腊的地缘政治地位将被削弱，其经济将进一步陷入衰退，社会矛盾将会上升。


Moreover, instability would become chronic, because the eurozone would no longer offer a backstop for fiscal and financial laxity.	不仅如此，不稳定将成为常态，因为欧元区将不再为财政和金融的废弛提供支撑。


Eurozone authorities may claim that a Greek exit no longer poses a systemic risk, given the introduction in recent years of various instruments for fighting financial crises, including government-backed rescue funds, a partial banking union, tougher fiscal controls, and the European Central Bank’s new role as lender of last resort.	欧元区当局声称有鉴于近年来引进各种工具来对抗金融危机，包括政府支持的救助基金，局部性银行联盟，强硬的财政控制，以及欧洲央行作为最后贷款人的新角色，因此希腊退出欧元区不再会构成系统性风险，。


But a member’s exit would still indicate that the eurozone’s integrity is not guaranteed – a message that the markets are unlikely to miss.	但某一成员国的退出仍会表明欧元区的完整性是无法保证的——市场自然也不会错过这一信息。


A Greek exit may serve as a warning to countries like Spain, Italy, and France, where strong anti-Europe or anti-establishment parties are on the rise.	希腊的退出之举可能会对西班牙、意大利和法国这样的国家起到警示作用，在这些国家，强烈反欧洲反建制的呼声正在上升。


But it would do nothing to address the real problem: the increasing economic divergence among eurozone countries.	但它并不会解决真正的问题：欧元区国家之间的经济差异正在增大。


So long as performance gaps continue to widen, voters will continue to challenge European integration.	只要经济表现的差距继续扩大，选民们将继续挑战欧洲一体化。


Only further unification, underpinned by growth-oriented policies in the struggling countries, can reverse this trend.	只有进一步统一，在陷入困境的国家实行支撑增长导向型政策，才能扭转这一趋势。


Such an outcome is still possible – but only if the relevant actors recognize the risks associated with a Greek exit from the eurozone.	只有当相关参与者意识到希腊退出欧元区的风险时，这样的结果才是可能的。


A Syriza-led government must moderate its approach and promise that it will continue to pursue reform and limit spending in exchange for a substantial reduction to its debt burden – a reduction that the troika must be willing to grant.	一个由激进左翼联盟带领的政府必须适当柔化缓和其方法和承诺，它将继续坚持改革和限制支出以换取大量减少其债务负担——这也是三驾马车所愿意接受的。


It is critical to note here that it is not the state as administrator fulfilling this role; rather, it is the entrepreneurial state in action, creating markets, instead of just fixing them.	一���关键点是认识到不是作为政府的国家扮演着这一角色； 而是创业国家在行动，建立市场，而不只是调整它们。


Green Money	绿色金钱


NEW YORK – There is little doubt that green will be the metaphorical color of choice for world leaders when they gather at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh.	纽约——世界领袖参加在匹兹堡举行的二十国峰会时，绿色毫无疑问将成为他们隐喻的色彩选择。


Attention will focus on turning the “green shoots” of recovery into sustainable “green growth,” leading to “green economies” consistent with the goal of protecting the world’s climate.	人们关注的焦点在于将经济复苏的“绿色嫩芽”培育成可以持续的“绿色发展”，从而让与保护全球气候目标相一致的“绿色经济”成为现实。


Governments in rich countries are beginning to spell out just what that will mean in terms of policy and lifestyle changes and the investments required to develop clean energy sources.	富裕国家的政府开始诠释这在政策和生活方式的改变和洁净能源研发投资方面意味着什么。


But, to be successful, a “green new deal” will have to address some enormous challenges in the developing world, where the impact of global warming will be felt first and hardest, and where rapid growth requires massive expansion of cheap energy.	但要想取得成功，“新绿色协议”必须解决发展中国家的某些重大挑战，全球变暖的后果在发展中国家最先被感知到，而且也最显著，因为经济的快速发展需要大规模扩张廉价能源。


Globally, more than 30 million tons of oil equivalent are consumed in the form of primary energy every day, equivalent to 55 kilowatt hours per person per day, with rich countries, on average, consuming more than twice that figure.	全球范围内，作为主要能源每天都要消耗相当于3000多万吨石油，这相当于每人每天55千瓦小时的消耗量，而富裕国家人均消耗量超过这一数字的两倍。


For many developing countries, the figure is well under 20 kwh; China is still well below the global average, and even most emerging markets consume less than one-third of the average in many advanced economies.	对许多发展中国家来讲，这一数字远低于20千瓦小时，而中国仍然远低于全球平均水平，甚至就连多数新兴市场的能源消耗也低于许多先进经济体的三分之一。


The economics behind efforts to close these energy gaps are relatively straightforward.	填补能源缺口努力背后的经济因素相对容易理解。


Up to a threshold of around 100 kwh per capita per day, energy consumption and human development indicators go hand in hand.	在达到约每人每天100千瓦小时的门槛之前，能源消耗和人类发展指标基本保持同步。


At current prices, between $10 and $20 per person per day would be needed to reach that threshold.	在目前的价格状况下，需要每人每天10到20美元才能达到这道门槛。


This puts energy security well beyond the means of not just the poorest, but also of most people in emerging economies.	这导致能源安全不仅超出了最贫困人口的承受能力，就连新兴经济体的大多数人也都无法承受。


Spending $10 per day on energy services would, for example, exhaust the per capita incomes of countries such as Angola, Ecuador, and Macedonia.	例如，每天10美元的能源消费将耗光安格拉、厄瓜多尔和马其顿等国的人均收入。


Hence, big investments in energy services are the order of the day throughout the developing world.	因此，大规模投资于能源服务登上了整个发展中世界的议事日程。


In order to provide more energy to meet development goals without accelerating global warming, there must be a shift to a new energy infrastructure built around renewables (of which the most significant are probably solar power, wind, and biofuels), cleaner coal, and carbon capture and storage.	要想实现在不加速全球变暖的前提下提供更多能源以满足发展需要的目标，就必须实现向以可再生能源（其中最重要的可能是太阳能、风能和生物燃料）、洁净煤炭和碳捕获及碳储存为核心的新能源基础设施的过渡。


The problem is that these are currently much more costly options than their carbon-heavy alternatives.	问题在于目前比高碳含量替代方案成本更昂贵的备选方案还有很多。


Policy makers in developing countries are concerned that being forced to go down this path could put modern energy services beyond the reach of poor countries, families, and communities.	发展中国家的决策者担心被迫走上这条道路可能导致贫困国家、家庭和人群享受不到现代能源服务。


Market-based solutions to the climate challenge run the very serious risk of undermining development objectives, precisely because they aim to raise the price of energy services in order to make renewable energy sources attractive to private investors.	采用以市场为基础的解决方案来应对气候挑战很有可能会破坏发展目标，而这恰恰是因为它们的目标是提高能源服务价格，从而使可再生能源能够吸引私人投资者。


Indeed, the protectionist elements tacked on to these proposals make them decidedly anti-development.	事实上，上述方案所附带的保护主义成份肯定起了妨碍发展的作用。


So what is needed is massive public investment in cleaner energy provision, coupled in the short term with appropriate subsidies to offset high initial prices.	因此我们真正需要的是在洁净能源供应领域的大规模公共投资，以及在短期内提供抵消初始阶段高价格的恰当的补助。


If targeted at the most promising technology options (say, solar and wind), such a strategy would yield early unit cost write-downs through innovation, learning, and economies of scale; give the private sector clear, credible, and attractive signals; and encourage energy efficiency.	如果以发展最有前途的技术备选方案（例如太阳和风能）为目标，上述策略可以通过创新、学习和规模经济带来早期单位成本减记，向私有部门发出明确、可信和颇具吸引力的信号，并鼓励提高能效。


The big obstacle is access to predictable and affordable finance.	比较大的障碍在于难以获得可靠而廉价的融资。


The onus is on rich-country governments to support this big push into clean energy in the developing world, as it was their carbon-fueled economic prosperity that has brought us to the brink of a climate catastrophe.	富裕国家有责任支持发展中世界对于洁净能源的大规模推动，因为正是它们以碳为燃料的经济繁荣将我们带到了气候灾难的边缘。


So far, rich countries have not risen to the challenge; despite commitments made at Kyoto, Bali, and elsewhere, the resources committed for climate-change mitigation – let alone adaptation – in developing countries have been paltry and poorly targeted.	到目前为止，虽然在京都、巴厘和其他地方都做出了承诺，但富裕国家并没有主动迎接挑战，而发展中国家用于缓解、更不用说顺应气候变化的资源一直严重不足，而且在集中使用方面也做得不够。


The scale of the needed support is comparable to the Marshall Plan, which committed 1% of the United States’ GDP per year to help European reconstruction after World War II.	这项努力所需的支持规模可以和马歇尔计划媲美，该计划承诺投入美国每年国内生产总值的1%帮助欧洲战后重建。


But, as with the original plan, the long-term returns from such a commitment will be enormous.	但就像这个独创性的计划一样，这样一个计划将带来巨大的长期回报。


This time, moreover, the burden will not fall on one country alone, and a broader mix of traditional and innovative sources of financing are already available to help fund the required investment programs in energy efficiency and renewables.	此外，应对气候变化的成本不会由哪一个国家来承担，而且已经有一系列传统和创新的融资渠道，能够支持能效和可再生能源计划所需的投资。


Even so, scaling-up multilateral support will require a massive overhaul of international finance.	即便如此，相应地增加多边支持需要在国际融资领域开展重大的改革。


Back in April, G-20 leaders accepted that investing in a low-carbon infrastructure, particularly energy services, is key to a truly sustainable economic and environmental future.	回到今年四月，二十国集团领袖已经承认投资于低碳的基础设施、特别是能源服务是确保真正可持续经济和环境未来的关键所在。


In Pittsburgh, with the clock ticking on talks to adopt a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol this December in Copenhagen, the G-20 will have a real opportunity to show that the color of serious money to meet both climate and development goals really is green.	在匹兹堡，随着今年12月在哥本哈根达成《京都议定书》后续协议的时间一分一秒地临近，二十国集团将面临真正的机会，证明满足气候和发展目标的严肃金钱实际是绿色的。


Green Shoots or Yellow Weeds?	嫩芽还是枯草？


New York – Recent data suggest that the rate of contraction in the world economy may be slowing.	纽约－最近的数据显示，世界经济的收缩率可能正在放缓。 但是，经济复苏的“嫩芽”会破土而出的希望，已经被许多枯草的出现击碎了。


But hopes that “green shoots” of recovery may be springing up have been dashed by plenty of yellow weeds.	美国最近的就业、零售、工业生产和房屋销售数据仍然很疲弱； 欧洲第一季度GDP的增长数据也令人失望；


Recent data on employment, retail sales, industrial production, and housing in the United States remain very weak; Europe’s first quarter GDP growth data is dismal; Japan’s economy is still comatose; and even China – which is recovering – has very weak exports.	日本的经济仍然了无生气； 就连中国——经济正在复苏的中国——出口也很疲软。


Thus, the consensus view that the global economy will soon bottom out has proven – once again – to be overly optimistic.	因此，经济学家曾一致认为全球经济很快就会见底回升的观点，再次被证实是过于乐观了。


After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the global financial system nearly melted down and the world economy went into free fall.	在2008年9月份雷曼兄弟破产之后，全球金融体系几乎崩溃了，世界经济坠入了深渊。


Indeed, the rate of economic contraction in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 reached near-depression levels.	事实上，2008年第四季度和2009年第一季度的经济收缩率，几乎达到了经济萧条的水平。


At that point, global policymakers got religion and started to use most of the weapons in their arsenal: vast fiscal-policy easing; conventional and unconventional monetary expansion; trillions of dollars in liquidity support, recapitalization, guarantees, and insurance to stem the liquidity and credit crunch; and, finally, massive support to emerging-market economies.	当时，世界各国的政策制定者们开始变得虔诚起来，为了挽救经济几乎使出了浑身解数：大幅放宽财政政策； 常规和非常规的货币扩张；


In the last two months alone, one can count more than 150 different policy interventions around the world.	在流动性支持、资本调整、保证和保险上投入数万亿的资金来阻止流动性枯竭和信贷紧缩； 给予新兴市场经济体大量的支持。


This policy equivalent of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine of “overwhelming force,” together with the sharp contraction of output below final demand for goods and services (which drew down inventories of unsold goods), sets the stage for most economies to bottom out early next year.	这种与美国前国务卿科林·鲍威尔（Colin Powell）的“压倒性力量”理论相同的政策，与低于货物和服务最终需求的产量的急剧收缩（这减少了存货的库存）一起，为大多数经济体在明年年初见底回升打下了基础。


Even so, the optimists who spoke last year of a soft landing or a mild “V-shaped” eight-month recession were proven wrong, while those who argued that this would be a longer and more severe “U-shaped” 24-month recession – the US downturn is already in its 18th month – were correct.	然而，即使是这样，那些在去年提到经济会软着陆或者经济经过八个月的温和衰退就会“V型”反转的乐观主义者，也被证实是错误的，而那些认为经济危机会持续更长时间，而且是更严重的二十四个月的“U型”衰退的人——美国的衰退已经持续了18个月了——是正确的。


And the recent optimism that economies will bottom out by mid-year have been dashed by the most recent economic data.	而且，最近对经济会在今年年中见底回升的乐观预期，已经被最新的经济数据击碎了。


The crucial issue, however, is not when the global economy will bottom out, but whether the global recovery – whenever it comes – will be robust or weak over the medium term.	但是，现在问题的关键不是世界经济会在什么时候见底，而是全球经济复苏——不管复苏从什么时候开始——从中期看来，是强劲的复苏还是是疲弱的复苏。


One cannot rule out a couple of quarters of sharp GDP growth as the inventory cycle and the massive policy boost lead to a short-term revival.	因为库存周期和大量的政策支持会导致经济短期的复苏，所以我们不能排除有几个季度GDP会强劲增长。


But those tentative green shoots that we hear so much about these days may well be overrun by yellow weeds even in the medium term, heralding a weak global recovery over the next two years.	但是，我们在最近经常听到的短暂的经济复苏的嫩芽，即使从中期看来，也有可能会被经济中存在的下列枯草所吞没，从而预示着接下来的两年里全球经济复苏的疲弱。


First, employment is still falling sharply in the US and other economies.	第一，美国和其他经济体的就业机会仍然在急剧减少。


Indeed, in advanced economies, the unemployment rate will be above 10% by 2010.	事实上，发达经济体到2010年的失业率会高于10％。


This will be bad news for consumption and the size of bank losses.	这对消费和银行亏损的规模来说，是个不好的消息。


Second, this is a crisis of solvency, not just liquidity, but true deleveraging has not really started, because private losses and debts of households, financial institutions, and even corporations are not being reduced, but rather socialized and put on government balance sheets.	第二，经济危机是一场偿付能力危机，而不仅仅是流动性危机，但是，因为私营部门的损失和家庭、金融机构甚至是公司的负债，并没有减少，而是社会化了并表现在政府的资产负债表上，所以真正的去杠杆化还没有开始。


Lack of deleveraging will limit the ability of banks to lend, households to spend, and firms to invest.	缺乏去杠杆化会限制银行贷款的能力，家庭消费的能力以及公司投资的能力。


Third, in countries running current-account deficits, consumers need to cut spending and save much more for many years.	第三，在经常项目逆差的国家，消费者要减少支出并为将来进行储蓄。


Shopped out, savings-less, and debt-burdened consumers have been hit by a wealth shock (falling home prices and stock markets), rising debt-service ratios, and falling incomes and employment.	购物多、储蓄少而且债务负担沉重的消费者已经遭受了财富缩水（住房价格和股市下跌）、偿债率上升以及收入和就业机会减少的打击。


Fourth, the financial system – despite the policy backstop – is severely damaged.	第四，金融系统——尽管有政策的支持——也遭到了严重的破坏。


Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and traditional commercial banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalized.	大部分影子银行系统消失了，传统商业银行在资本仍然严重不足的情况下，却背负了预期会达到几万亿美元的贷款和证券方面的损失。


So the credit crunch will not ease quickly.	因此，信贷紧缩不会很快就会得到缓解。


Fifth, weak profitability, owing to high debts and default risk, low economic – and thus revenue – growth, and persistent deflationary pressure on companies’ margins, will continue to constrain firms’ willingness to produce, hire workers, and invest.	第五，公司盈利能力薄弱，高负债和违约风险，经济增长缓慢——并因此引起收入增长缓慢，以及公司盈利所面临的持续的通货紧缩压力，会继续抑制企业生产、雇工和投资的意愿。


Sixth, rising government debt ratios will eventually lead to increases in real interest rates that may crowd out private spending and even lead to sovereign refinancing risk.	第六，政府负债率的上升会最终导致实际利率的上升，而实际利率的上升会压缩私人开支，甚至会导致国家再融资的风险。


Seventh, monetization of fiscal deficits is not inflationary in the short run, whereas slack product and labor markets imply massive deflationary forces.	第七，将财政赤字货币化在短期内不会导致通货膨胀，同时，生产和劳动力市场的疲软意味着巨大的通货紧缩压力。


But if central banks don’t find a clear exit strategy from policies that double or triple the monetary base, eventually either goods-price inflation or another dangerous asset and credit bubble (or both) will ensue.	但是，如果各国中央银行不能找到对使基础货币数量翻两倍或者三倍的政策的退出策略，最终，货物价格暴涨或者另一个危险的资产和信贷泡沫（或者二者兼而有之）就会出现。


Some recent rises in the prices of equities, commodities, and other risky assets is clearly liquidity-driven.	最近有些资产、商品和其他风险资产价格的上涨，显然是由流动性驱动的。


Eighth, some emerging-market economies with weaker economic fundamentals may not be able to avoid a severe financial crisis, despite massive IMF support.	第八，有些经济基本面薄弱的新兴经济体，尽管有国际货币基金组织的大力支持，可能仍然无法避免一场严重的金融危机。


Finally, the reduction of global imbalances implies that the current-account deficits of profligate economies (the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries) will narrow the current-account surpluses of over-saving countries (China and other emerging markets, Germany, and Japan).	最后，全球经济失衡的减少意味着，挥霍经济体（美国和其他盎格鲁撒克逊国家）的经常项目逆差会减少过度储蓄国家（中国和其他新兴市场国家、德国以及日本）的经常项目顺差。


But if domestic demand does not grow fast enough in surplus countries, the resulting lack of global demand relative to supply – or, equivalently, the excess of global savings relative to investment spending – will lead to a weaker recovery in global growth, with most economies growing far more slowly than their potential.	但是，如果经常项目顺差国家的国内需求没有足够快的增长，并由此导致全球需求相对于供应显得不足——或者，换句话说，全球储蓄相对于投资开支显得过度——就会使全球经济复苏疲软，使许多经济体的增长速度远远落后于它们的增长潜力。


So, green shoots of stabilization may be replaced by yellow weeds of stagnation if several medium-term factors constrain the global economy’s ability to return to sustained growth.	所以，如果有几个中期因素在抑制全球经济恢复持续增长的能力，经济稳定的嫩芽就可能会被滞胀的枯草所代替。


Unless these structural weaknesses are resolved, the global economy may grow in 2010-2011, but at an anemic rate.	除非这些结构性弱点得到了解决，否则，全球经济即使在2010-2011会有所增长，增长速度也会是非常缓慢的。


Greenspan Hypnotizes Himself	格林斯潘的自欺欺人


On the eve of the last G-7 meeting in London, US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan did a startling about-face by soft-pedaling America’s trade deficit.	伦敦举行的7国集团财长会议当晚，美国美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘出乎意料地来了个大变脸，对美国贸易赤字持起缓和态度。


“Market pressures …appear poised to stabilize and over the longer run possibly to decrease the US current-account deficit and its attendant financing requirements,” he said.	“市场压力……表现出准备稳定并在长期内尽可能地降低美国经常项目赤字以及伴随而来的融资要求的态势，”他说。


But just two months earlier, in Frankfurt, Mr. Greenspan had cautioned that the US deficit could not go on forever without the dollar depreciating. What is going on here?	但是就在两个月前，在法兰克福，格林斯潘先生曾经发出警告说，如果美元不贬值的话，美国的赤字将难以为继。


To be sure, the US trade figures have improved somewhat.	诚然，美国的贸易数字已经略有上升。


The expected December trade deficit is $57 billion—an improvement on the record $60.3 billion gap in November.	去年12月的预期贸易赤字为570亿美元——与11月的603亿美元贸易缺口相比已有改善。


And the November figure will be adjusted downward because of a recently discovered statistical error by Canadian authorities.	并且，由于加拿大政府最近发现的统计错误，11月的数字还将有所下调。


But politics, not economics, explains why the Fed chairman changed his tune about America’s weak external position.	但是，是政治，而非经济，导致了美联储主席对美国不利的外部形势改变论调。


Mr. Greenspan’s statement in Frankfurt in November alarmed senior European Central Bank (ECB) officials, who considered it a “provocation” – one that promptly sent the dollar into an unwanted tailspin.	格林斯潘于去年11月在法兰克曾发表了被欧洲央行(ECB)高层官员视为“挑衅”的言论，并立刻将美元推入了一个不应有的衰退境地。


The last thing the Fed Maestro needed was a repeat performance on the eve of the G-7 – a meeting that is supposed to exemplify international co-operation.	这位美联储当家人最不能做的就是在象征着国际合作的7国集团会议当晚重蹈覆辙。


So Mr. Greenspan decided to extend a peace offering to the Europeans.	因此，格林斯潘先生决定向欧洲抛出和平橄榄枝。


Politics also explains Mr. Greenspan’s pre-G-7 comment that “the voice of fiscal restraint, barely audible a year ago, has at least partially regained volume.”	格林斯潘先生在7国集团会议前发表评论，“一年前，财政紧缩的声音还微弱得几乎听不到，现在已多少有些声音了”，这也是出于政治原因。


The Fed chairman is “hearing voices” because he is a team player who wants to encourage US budget cutting.	美联储主席正在“倾听这个声音”因为他是鼓励美国削减财政预算的参与者。


How would it look if he had openly expressed misgivings about Bush’s plan to cut the budget deficit in half by 2009 just days before it was made public?	若他就在布什公布2009年前削减一半预算赤字计划的前几天公开对此计划表示疑虑，那会是怎么样呢？


What Mr. Greenspan chose to overlook, however, is that most experts are extremely – and rightly – skeptical of the Bush plan, which leaves out big-ticket items such as the cost of the Iraq War, and uses an unrealistic benchmark from which to measure the alleged 50% cutback.	大部分专家对布什计划持极度质疑的态度，他们是正确的，因为该计划遗漏了开销巨大的项目，诸如伊拉克战争费用，以及据称将费用减少了50%的不切实际的计算基准，然而，格林斯潘先生选择要忽略的正是这些质疑。


Timing the budget’s release for just after the G-7 made for a harmonious London meeting in which both Americans and Europeans could claim that the US was taking care of business—that is, its twin fiscal and current-account deficits.	把预算削减计划公布的时间就定在7国集团会议之后有助于伦敦会议能和谐一致地举行。 通过此会议，美国和欧洲可以一致宣称美国正在着手解决它的“双赤字”——财政赤字和经常项目赤字。


The Europeans gladly went along with this charade because they now fear dollar depreciation more than global imbalance.	欧洲对这种荒唐可笑又显而易见的伪装乐得其所，因为现在比起全球性的不平衡，他们更惧怕美元贬值。


So far, Europe’s fragile economic recovery has been based largely on exports.	到目前为止，欧洲微弱的经济复苏很大程度上依赖于出口。


The euro’s rapid appreciation against the dollar threatens to undermine this foundation.	欧元兑美元的急速升值将有可能破坏此基础。


But internal European Union studies indicate that European exports are more closely linked to changes in external demand than the euro-dollar exchange rate.	但是欧盟内部研究表明，欧洲出口与外部需求的关系比与欧元兑率的关系更为紧密。


So long as external demand holds up – and recent growth numbers from China and the US are positive in this regard – Europe’s exports should continue to perform well.	只要外部需求持续上涨——近期中国和美国在此方面的数字增长就是一个积极信号——欧洲出口就应该能继续表现良好。


In any case, protecting exports by resisting euro appreciation – or, more precisely, dollar depreciation – is a poor way to promote economic growth.	无论怎么说，抵制欧元升值，或者，更精确地来说是美元贬值，不是刺激经济增长的良策。


A strong currency keeps both inflation and ECB interest hikes at bay. This helps boost private consumption and investment.	一个走势强劲的货币应该既能阻止通货膨胀，也能抑制欧洲央行利息上调，且将助于促进个人消费和投资。


Moreover, because crude oil is priced in US dollars, a rise in the euro means a fall in energy costs.	此外，由于原油价格以美元计算，欧元上涨意味着能源成本的下降。


This, too, helps European growth.	这也能帮助欧洲经济增长。


Over the longer term, a strong currency promotes efficiency in export industries, further insulating competitiveness from exchange-rate effects. Dollar depreciation improves Europe’s terms of trade and real income.	从长远来看，一个强势货币能提高出口行业的效率，还能更进一步地避免由兑换率影响导致的竞争。


America’s fiscal and external deficits will not disappear just because the chief magician at the Federal Reserve waves his wand and says abracadabra.	美国的财政赤字和外部赤字不会仅仅因为美联储的首席魔术师挥舞着他手上的魔杖、念上几句咒语就消失了。


On the contrary, the longer Greenspan plays down America’s dangerous macroeconomic imbalances with happy talk, the more damage they will ultimately inflict on the global economy.	相反，格里斯潘越是长期使用乐观谈话来淡化美国岌岌可危的宏观经济不平衡，就会最终给全球经济带来越多的危机。


What the world needs now is the realist Greenspan of Frankfurt, not the cheerleader Greenspan of London.	世界现在需要的是在法兰克福的那个实事求是的格林斯潘��而不是伦敦那个附和夸奖的拉拉队队长。


Simply put, there must be dollar depreciation to keep global imbalances in check.	简而言之，必须要通过美元贬值来防止全球性的不平衡。


Instead of catering to European fears and prejudices about exchange rates, the Fed chairman should put politics aside and stick to sound economics.	美联储主席应该做的不是迎合欧洲对兑换率的恐惧和偏见，而是把政治放到一边，坚持维护一个稳健的经济形势。


The Costs of Grexit	希腊退出的成本


PARIS – Earlier this week, following days of tense discussions, the new government in Athens reached an agreement with its eurozone creditors that includes a package of immediate reforms and a four-month extension of the financial assistance program.	巴黎—本周早些时候，在经历了几天的激烈讨论后，雅典新政府与其欧元区债权人达成了一份协议，协议包括立刻采取一揽子改革和将金融援助延长四个月。


But, despite Europe's collective sigh of relief, the compromise does not preclude the need for further tough negotiations on a new financial-assistance program that should be introduced by the end of June.	但是，尽管欧洲集体大舒一口气，但这一妥协并不意味着到6月底不再需要艰难谈判以达成新的金融援助计划。


In any negotiation, a key variable influencing the protagonists' behavior, hence the outcome, is what failure to reach an agreement would cost each of them.	在任何谈判中，一个影响参与者行为进而决定最终结果的关键变量是不能形成一致会给双方带来多大成本。


In this case, the issue is the cost of Greece's exit (“Grexit") from the eurozone – a prospect that was widely discussed in the media throughout the recent negotiation, with considerable speculation about the stance of the various players, especially the Greek and German governments.	在希腊的例子中，这一成本便是希腊退出欧元区（希腊退出）的成本。 在最近的讨论过程期间，媒体广泛讨论了希腊退出的情景，并且就各参与方的立场（特别是希腊和德国政府）做出了各种猜测。


From Greece's perspective, leaving the euro would be highly disruptive, which explains why there is very little support for it in the country.	从希腊角度看，离开欧元区将具有极大的破坏性，因此对这一选择国内几乎无人支持。


But what about Grexit costs for the rest of the eurozone?	但希腊退出对欧元区其他部分会造成怎样的成本？


Ever since the question was first raised in 2011-2012, there have been two opposing views.	自2011—2012这一问题首次浮现以来，有过两种相反的观点。


One view – dubbed the domino theory – claims that if Greece exited, markets would immediately start wondering who is next.	一种观点可称之为多米诺理论，它认为如果希腊退出，市场将立刻开始猜测谁是下一个。


Other countries' fate would be called into question, as occurred during the Asian currency crises of 1997-98 or the European sovereign-debt crisis of 2010-2012.	其他国家的命运将受到质疑，就像1997—98年的亚洲货币危机和2011—12年的欧洲主权债务危机那样。


Disintegration of the eurozone could follow.	欧元区解体可能跟风而至。


The other view – often dubbed the ballast theory – claims that the eurozone would actually be strengthened by Greece's withdrawal.	另一个观点可称之为压舱石理论，它认为欧元区实际上将因为希腊退出而强化。


The monetary union would be rid of a recurring problem, and a eurozone decision to allow or invite Greece to leave would bolster the credibility of its rules.	这一货币联盟将摆脱反复发作的问题，而欧元区决定允许甚至要求希腊退出将增加其规则的信誉。


No country, it is claimed, could dare to blackmail its partners anymore.	这种观点认为，再也没有一个国家敢于敲诈伙伴国了。


Back in 2012, the domino theory looked realistic enough that the creditor countries ditched the Grexit option.	2012年，多米诺理论看起来相当现实，因此债权国抛弃了希腊退出选项。


Having reflected and pondered over the summer, German Chancellor Angela Merkel went to Athens and expressed her “hopes and wishes" that Greece remains in.	在经过一个夏天的深思熟虑后，德国总理默克尔来到雅典，表示她“希望和祝愿”希腊留在欧元区内。


But the situation today is different.	但今天的情况有所不同。 紧绷的市场已经大为缓和；


Market tension has eased considerably; Ireland and Portugal are not under assistance programs anymore; the eurozone financial system has been strengthened by the decision to move to a banking union; and crisis-management instruments are in place.	爱尔兰和葡萄牙不再需要援助计划； 欧元区金融系统因为迈向银行联盟的决定而有所强化；


A Grexit-induced chain reaction would be significantly less likely.	危机管理工具也已经就位。 希腊退出造成连锁效应的可能性大大降低了。


But it does not follow that the loss would be harmless.	但这并不意味着损失将毫发无伤。


There are three reasons why Grexit could still seriously weaken Europe's monetary union.	有三个理由认为希腊退出仍将严重削弱欧洲货币联盟。


First and foremost, a Greek exit would disprove the tacit assumption that participation in the euro is irrevocable.	首先也是最重要的，希腊退出将证明不言而喻的假设是错误的，参与欧元区并不是不可逆的选择。


True, history teaches that no commitment is irrevocable: according to Jens Nordvig of Nomura Securities, there have been 67 currency-union breakups since the beginning of the nineteenth century.	诚然，历史告诉我们没有什么承诺是不可逆的：a野村证券的延斯·诺德维格（Jens Nordvig）指出，自十九世纪以来，已经发生过67次货币联盟解体事件。


Any exit from the eurozone would increase the perceived probability that other countries may, sooner or later, follow suit.	任何国家退出欧元区都将让人们增加其他国家迟早也有可能步后尘的感觉。


Second, an exit would vindicate those who do consider the euro merely a beefed-up fixed-exchange-rate arrangement, not a true currency.	其次，发生退出事件将证实一些人的观点——欧元只不过是加强版的固定汇率制度，而不是真正的货币。


Confidence in the US dollar relies on the fact that there is no difference between a dollar held in a bank in Boston and one held in San Francisco.	对美元的信心建立在一个事实的基础上，即在波士顿银行和在旧金山银行持有的一美元之间没有区别。


But since the 2010-2012 crisis, this is not entirely true of the euro anymore.	但自2010—2012危机以来，这一点对于欧元已不再成立。


Financial fragmentation has receded but not disappeared, meaning that a loan to a company in Austria does not carry exactly the same interest rate as a loan to the same company on the other side of the Italian border.	金融分裂有所减少，但并未消失，这意味着给奥地利公司的贷款与对奥地利-意大利边境另一边的同一家公司的贷款，它们的利率并不完全相同。


Critics like the German economist Hans-Werner Sinn have made a specialty of tracking exposure to the break-up risk.	德国经济学家汉斯-沃纳·辛恩（Hans-Werner Sinn）等批评者专门就解体风险敞口做了跟踪调查。


None of this is currently lethal, owing to the initiatives taken in recent years; but it would be a mistake to assume that full confidence has been restored.	因为近几年采取了一些措施，这些因素目前尚不致命； 但认为已经建立了十足的信心是错误的。


European citizens would certainly respond to a country's withdrawal (or expulsion) from the eurozone by starting to look at the currency in a different way.	如果由国家退出（或被逐出）欧元区，欧洲公民对欧元的态度必然会发生改变。


Where a euro is held would become a relevant question.	在哪里持有欧元将成为一个重大问题。


Domestic and foreign investors would scrutinize more closely whether an asset's value would be affected by a breakup of the monetary union.	本国和外国投资者将更仔细地检查某资产的价值是否会因为货币联盟的解体而受到影响。


Governments would become more suspicious of the risks to which their partners potentially expose them.	政府将更加小心伙伴国可能给它们带来的风险。


Indeed, suspicion would become irreversible, and it would replace the belief in the irreversibility of the eurozone.	事实上，怀疑将是不可撤销的，并将取代欧元区不可撤销的信念。


Finally, an exit would force European policymakers to formalize their so-far unwritten and even unspecified rules for divorce.	最后，退出将迫使欧洲决策者将目前尚未成文甚至尚未具体化的“离婚规则”正式化。


Beyond broad principles of international law – for example, that what matters for deciding an asset's post-divorce currency denomination are the law governing the underlying contract and the corresponding jurisdiction – there are no agreed rules for deciding how conversion into a new currency would be carried out.	除了国际法的宽泛原则——比如，对决定一项资产的分离后货币计价来说，重要的是基本合约的约束法律和相应的司法辖区——没有一致同意的规则约束如何实现新货币的转换。


A Grexit would force these rules to be defined, therefore making it clear what a euro is worth, depending on where it is held, by whom, and in what form.	希腊退出将迫使制定这些规则，从而明确地表明，某欧元价值几何取决于在哪里持有、被谁持有、以何种形式持有。


Indeed this would not only make the break-up risk more imaginable; it would also make it much more concrete.	事实上，这不但将让解体风险变得容易想象； 还会让它更加具体化。


None of this means that eurozone members should be ready to pay whatever cost is needed to keep Greece inside the eurozone.	所有这些都不意味着欧元区成员国应该准备不惜一切必要的代价让希腊留在欧元区内。


This would obviously amount to a surrender.	这显然会导致放弃。


But they should not harbor any illusions, either: there can be no such thing as a happy Grexit.	但也不能造成任何幻觉：绝不会存在令人愉快的希腊退出。


Grit is Good	放慢脚步是好事


PARIS – The United States is widely recognized as possessing the deepest, most liquid, and most efficient capital markets in the world. America’s financial system supports efficient capital allocation, economic development, and job creation.	巴黎——


These and similar phrases have been common currency among American legislators, regulators, and financial firms for decades.	人们普遍认为美国拥有世界上最深、最具流动性和最有效的资本市场。


Even in the wake of the financial crisis that erupted in 2008, they trip off the word processors of a hundred submissions challenging the so-called Volcker rule (which would bar banks from making proprietary investments). The casual reader nods and moves along.	美国的金融系统支持有效的资金分配、经济发展和创造就业。


But there are signs that these assumptions are now being challenged.	几十年来，这些词组以及类似的词组表达了美国立法者、监管者以及金融公司的共同心声。


Prior to the crisis, regulatory authorities focused mainly on removing barriers to trading, and generally favored measures that made markets more complete by fostering faster, cheaper trading of a wider variety of financial claims. That is no longer the case.	甚至在2008年爆发的金融危机之后，他们还是跳过了单词加工者提供的一百条建议，质疑所谓的沃克尔法则（该法则禁止银行投资房地产）。


On the contrary, nowadays many are questioning the assumption that greater market efficiency is always and everywhere a public good.	随意的读者一扫而过了。


Might such ease and efficiency not also fuel market instability, and serve the interests of intermediaries rather than their clients?	但是有迹象表明，这些观点现在受到了挑战。 危机之前，监管机构主要致力于消除贸易障碍，总体上支持如下措施：通过促进更加快速、更加节省、种类更加广泛的金融债权交易使市场更加完整。


Phrases like “sand in the machine” and “grit in the oyster,” which were pejorative in the prelapsarian days of 2006, are now used to support regulatory or fiscal changes that may slow down trading and reduce its volume.	现在情况已经不是这样了。 相反，许多人开始质疑如下观点：更高的市场效率总是有利无弊的。


For example, the proposed Financial Transactions Tax in the European Union implies a wide-ranging impost generating more than €50 billion a year to shore up the EU’s own finances and save the euro. The fact that 60-70% of the receipts would come from London is an added attraction for its continental advocates.	这样的安逸和效率不会使市场更加不稳定，符合中介人而不是其客户的利益吗？


Opponents argue, in pre-crisis language, that the FTT would reduce market efficiency and displace trading to other locations. “So what?” supporters reply: maybe much of the trading is “socially useless,” and we would be better off without it.	“机器中的沙子”和“牡蛎中的沙粒”等短语在2006年爆发危机之前是受到鄙视的，现在却用于支持可能放缓交易和减少交易量的监管或财政变革。


The Volcker rule (named for former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker) provoked similar arguments.	比如，欧盟提议的金融交易税意味着广泛征税，一年能获得500多亿欧元，用于支持欧盟的财政，拯救欧元。


Critics have complained that it would reduce liquidity in important markets, such as those for non-US sovereign debt.	60%-70%的收入将来自伦敦，这一事实使该税收对其欧洲倡导者更有吸引力了。


Defending his creation, Volcker harks back to a simpler time for the financial system, and refers to “overly liquid, speculation-prone securities markets.”	反对者用危机之前的措辞称，金融交易税会降低市场的效率，导致交易到其他地方进行。 “这又怎么样呢？


His message is clear: he is not concerned about lower trading volumes.	”，支持者回应说：或许许多交易“对社会来说都是无用的，”没有这些交易我们能过得更好。


There is more grit on the horizon.	沃克尔法则（是以前美联储主席保罗•沃克尔命名的）持类似的观点。


In a penetrating analysis of the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, when the Dow lost $1 trillion of market value in 30 minutes, Andy Haldane of the Bank of England argues that while rising equity-market capitalization might well be associated with financial development and economic growth, there is no such relationship between market turnover and growth.	批评人士抱怨道，这将减少重要市场的流动性，比如说非美国主权债务的市场。 为辩护其法则，沃克尔追溯了金融系统较简单的时期，提到了“流动性过大、投机盛行的证券市场”。


Turnover in US financial markets rose four-fold in the decade before the crisis.	将来会遇到更多的障碍。


Did the real economy benefit?	2010年5月6日出现了“闪电崩盘”，道琼斯公司市值在30分钟内减少了1万亿美元。


Haldane cites a striking statistic: in 1945, the average investor held the average US share for four years. By 2000, the average holding period had fallen to eight months; by 2008, it was two months.	在对这次“闪电崩盘”深入的分析过程中，英格兰银行的安迪•霍尔丹称，尽管股票市场日益资本化可能与金融发展和经济增长有关，但是市场成交量和增长之间没有这种关系。


There appears to be a link between this precipitous drop in the average duration of stock holdings and the phenomenon of the so-called “ownerless corporation,” whereby shareholders have little incentive to impose discipline on management.	在危机爆发前的十年里，美国金融市场的成交量增长了3倍。 实体经济受益了吗？


That absence of accountability, in turn, has contributed to the vertiginous rise in senior executives’ compensation and, in financial firms, to a shift away from shareholder returns and towards large payouts to insiders.	霍尔丹援引了一组显著的统计数据：1945年，一般投资者持美国股票的平均时间为4年。 到2000年，平均持股的时间已降到8个月；


But Haldane’s main concern is with the stability of markets, particularly the threats posed by high-frequency trading (HFT).	平均持股的时间日益下降与所谓的“无控股企业”现象似乎有联系，因而股东没有什么动力迫使管理层遵守纪律。


He points out that HFT already accounts for half of total turnover in some debt and foreign-exchange markets, and that it is dominant in US equity markets, accounting for more than one-third of daily trading, up from less than one-fifth in 2005.	问责制的缺失反过来导致高管的补偿迅速上升，导致在金融公司，从股东的回报向内部人士获得大量回报转移。


The rapid, dramatic shifts brought about by HFT are likely to continue.	但是霍尔丹主要担心市场的稳定性，尤其是高频交易所带来的威胁。


It is only a decade since trading speeds fell below one second; they are now as fast as the blink of an eye. Technological change promises even faster trading speeds in the near future.	他指出，高频交易已经占到了一些债券和外汇市场总成交量的一半，在美国的股票市场中占到了主导地位，占到了日成交量的三分之一以上，2005年时，还不到五分之一。


Indeed, HFT firms talk of a “race to zero,” the point at which trading takes place at close to the speed of light.	高频交易带来的快速又巨大的转变很可能继续。 交易速度低于一秒一次才过了十年，现在其速度已经与眨眼一样快了。


Should we welcome this trend? Will light-speed trading deliver us to free-market Nirvana?	技术变革意味着不久的将来交易速度将更快。


The evidence is mixed. It would seem that bid-offer spreads are falling, which we might regard as positive.	实际上，高频交易公司所说的“向零逼近”，就是指交易速度接近于光速��我们应该欢迎这种趋势吗？


But volatility has risen, as has cross-market contagion. Instability in one market carries over into others.	光速的交易会带给我们自由市场的天堂吗？


As for liquidity, while on the surface it looks deeper, the joint report on the Flash Crash prepared by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission shows that HFT traders scaled back liquidity sharply, thereby exacerbating the problem.	各类证据错综复杂。 供求之间差距似乎在缩小，我们或许会认为这是积极的。


The liquidity that they apparently offer proved unreliable under stress – that is, when it is most needed.	但是市场动荡在加剧，问题也在不同市场不断蔓延。 一个市场的不稳定会导致另一个市场不稳定。


There are lessons here for regulators. First, their monitoring of markets requires a quantum leap in sophistication and speed.	至于流动性，从表面上来看似乎更强了，但是美国证券交易委员会和美国商品期货交易委员关于“闪电崩盘”所做的联合报告表明高频交易的交易员大幅减少了流动性，导致问题更加严重。


There is a case, too, for looking again at the operation of circuit-breakers (which helped the Chicago markets in the crash), and for increasing the obligations on market makers.	显然，他们提供的流动性在压力之下——即在最需要的时候——是不可靠的。


Such steps must be carefully calibrated, as greater obligations, for example, could push market makers out of the market.	首先，要大幅提高监管市场的熟练度和速度。 这也是再次关注自动切断系统运行（这导致芝加哥的市场崩溃），增加股票经纪人责任的原因。


But Haldane’s conclusion is that, overall, markets are less stable as a result of the sharp rise in turnover, and that “grit in the wheels, like grit on the roads, could help forestall the next crash.”	但是霍尔丹的结论是，总体而言，由于成交量显著增加，市场的稳定性下降了； “轮子中的沙子，像道路上的沙子一样，有助于预防下一次崩盘。


So the traditional defense of US and, indeed, European capital markets is not as axiomatic as it once seemed.	因此，美国以及欧洲资本市场的传统防御性已经不像以前那样不言自明了。


Market participants need to engage more effectively with the new agenda, and not assume that claims of greater “market efficiency” will win the day.	市场的参与者要更有效地参与新议程，不要认为“市场效率”更高就能胜出。


Without more sophisticated arguments, they might well find themselves submerged under a pile of regulatory sandbags.	由于没有更有力的论据，他们发现自身被埋在了一堆监管的沙袋之下。


Grounding Syria’s Killers	阻止叙利亚杀手上天


NEW YORK – As Syria has descended into all-out civil war, much of the worsening slaughter has been attributable to aerial bombardments of urban neighborhoods that President Bashar al-Assad’s opponents control, with such attacks causing especially high casualties in recent weeks in the ancient city of Aleppo.	纽约—随着叙利亚滑向全面内战，许多情况越来越恶化的大屠杀是因为对总统巴沙尔的反对者控制的城市社区发动空袭造成的，其中古城阿勒颇的伤亡尤为严重。


Can anything be done to stop the killing?	为了阻止杀戮，我们可以做些什么？


There are many good reasons not to intervene militarily.	有很多理由不进行军事干预。


For one thing, it would be impossible to do so under the auspices of the United Nations, owing to Russian and Chinese obstructionism in the Security Council.	一方面，由于俄罗斯和中国在安理会中作梗，不可能在联合国的批准下采取军事干预。


There is also America’s understandable reluctance to become involved in yet another war in an Islamic country, as well as the impossibility of knowing what kind of regime might emerge if and when Assad is overthrown.	此外，美国也有可以理解的难处不愿卷入另一场对伊斯兰国家的战争 。 第三，没人知道巴沙尔被推翻后叙利亚会冒出怎样一个新政权。


Yet it also seems impossible to stand by while the daily bloodbath continues.	但你也不可能对这个每天都在流血的国家束手旁观。


The situation in Syria feels more and more like what we witnessed in Bosnia 20 years ago.	叙利亚的情况与20年前的波斯尼亚越来越像。


Then, as now, the international community’s main response for an extended period was to provide humanitarian assistance to the conflict’s growing number of victims.	当时，在很长一段时间里，国际社会的主流反应向冲突所造成的越来越多的受害者提供人道主义援助。


Thanks to satellite television, the world had a front-row seat to watch the citizens of Sarajevo, who were kept alive by UN food deliveries, being killed by shelling and sniping from the surrounding hills.	感谢卫星电视，全世界都可以在电视机前看到萨拉热窝的居民以联合国提供的食品为生、因周围群山中发来的炮击和冷枪而丧命。


Today, the UN is delivering an increasing amount of assistance to Syrian refugees who have managed to escape to neighboring countries, while those who have not are being slaughtered.	如今，联合国正在对设法逃到了邻国的叙利亚难民发放越来越多的援助，而没有逃出叙利亚的，则继续引颈受戮。


As with Syria now, Russian support for the Serbian side two decades ago was one of the factors that prevented military intervention.	和现在的叙利亚一样，20年前，俄罗斯对塞尔维亚的支持是阻挡了军事干预的一大因素。


But it was by no means the only obstacle.	但这并不是唯一的障碍。


The US presidential election in 1992 made George H. W. Bush’s administration reluctant to use military force.	1992年美国大选让老布什总统不愿意使用武力。


Other political factors deterred Britain and France – and Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton – from intervening until another three years of killing had taken place.	其他政治因素阻止了英国和法国以及布什的继任者克林顿，让杀戮又进行了三年之久。


While military intervention in Syria may be impossible, imposing a no-fly zone is not.	尽管军事干预叙利亚不可能实现，但设置禁飞区还是可行的。


To be sure, a no-fly zone over Syria would not be a simple undertaking: substantial resources would be required, and, given the regime’s military capabilities, it would not be a risk-free operation.	平心而论，在叙利亚上空设置禁飞区不是个简单的任务：要求投入很大的资源，而且由于巴沙尔政权军力雄厚，因此设置禁飞区绝不是没有风险的。


Yet it was accomplished for more than a decade in neighboring Iraq to keep Saddam Hussein from attacking segments of his own population, so we know that it can be done in Syria as well.	但在叙利亚的邻国伊拉克，禁飞区就被成功设置过，保护了萨达姆·侯赛因统治下的伊拉克人民在十年时间里免受空袭。 由此可知，叙利亚也可以有禁飞区。


Of course, someone – presumably Gulf States such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia – is supplying the Syrian opposition with weapons.	当然，有人在向叙利亚反对派提供武器，特别是卡塔尔和沙特等海湾国家。


Yet, as long as Assad’s forces can attack opposition-controlled neighborhoods with helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes, the opposition’s ability to overthrow the regime with the arms that are now available to it seems questionable.	但是，只要巴沙尔的军队能够调用直升机和固定翼飞机袭击反对派控制的社区，反对派就很难通过现在能够搞到的武器推翻巴沙尔政权。


What is more certain is that the presence of armed fighters in a neighborhood provokes aerial attacks that destroy civilian infrastructure and maim and kill those residents who have not fled.	更加可以肯定的是，只要社区里出现武装反对派，就会招来空袭，摧毁民用基础设施，让没能逃脱的居民丧命或致残。


Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a valiant effort to negotiate a peace settlement when there still seemed to be a remote chance of success.	前联合国秘书长科菲·安南在看似机会渺茫的情况下仍尽了最大的努力安排和平谈判。


Since then, the sharp rise in bloodshed has made it increasingly unlikely, or even impossible, that Assad’s opponents would consent to any arrangement that kept him in power.	自此以后，流血事件的陡然增加让和平谈判的希望更加渺茫了，甚至说已经完全扼杀了谈判希望，巴沙尔的反对者不会接受任何让巴沙尔不下台的安排。


At the same time, Assad’s loyalists, especially members of the minority Alawite sect, must fear that they would be massacred if his regime fell.	与此同时，巴沙尔的支持者，特别是少数教派阿拉维（Alawite），必然会担心一旦他倒台就会遭到大屠杀。


At some point, the international community may have to intervene to prevent or mitigate such a massacre.	到了一定程度，国际社会可能不得不出手干预，以阻止或减轻大屠杀。


Its credibility in doing so, and therefore its likelihood of success, would be far greater if it were to intervene now to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians in the opposition neighborhoods of Syria’s cities.	如果现在就出手干预建立禁飞区保护叙利亚各大城市反对派社区的平民，国际社会这样做的可信度以及行动成功的可能性就会大大增加。


Because Russian and Chinese intransigence precludes the UN from establishing a no-fly zone, the Arab League and NATO should jointly take the lead.	由于俄罗斯和中国的不让步，无法由联合国来设置禁飞区，阿盟和北约应该联合承担领导责任。


And, while the participation of the US, which has by far the greatest logistical capacity, is essential, it should not be in the forefront.	此外，尽管拥有目前最强物流能力的美国的加入十分关键，但美国不必站在最前列。


As in the case of Libya, this would be an excellent opportunity to “lead from behind.”	就像利比亚的先例一样，这是一次“幕后领导”的良机。


A no-fly zone is by no means a solution to the conflict in Syria.	禁飞区绝不是解决叙利亚冲突的办法。


But it would be a modest step in the direction of reducing the great harm currently being done.	但它可以作为减少当前巨大伤害的一小步。


A more comprehensive approach, if one could be found, would be far preferable.	更完整的计划——如果可以找的话——当然更值得选择。


Until then, it seems well worth pursuing efforts that would help to abate the carnage.	在找到更好的办法以前，设置禁飞区是值得做出的有助于阻止大屠杀的努力。


Growing Up in the Eurozone	在欧元区成长壮大


MILAN – A rapid and large increase of government debt has been a general phenomenon in the advanced countries since the 2007-09 crisis: for the first time, the average debt/GDP ratio for OECD countries has surpassed 100%.	米兰——2007-09年危机爆发后，政府债务的迅速大量增加已经成为发达国家的一种普遍现象：经合组织国家平均债务在GDP中的占比首次超过了100%。


Fiscal consolidation will weigh on growth prospects for two generations to come, and the welfare state as we have known it in Europe since World War II will have to be transformed, especially given a rapidly aging population.	今后两代人在经济发展当中均需要面对财政整顿的难题，尤其是在人口老龄化迅速推进的前提下，二战以来我们所熟悉的欧洲福利国家将被迫面临转型。


But the eurozone debt crisis has distinctive features.	但欧元区债务危机具有鲜明的特征。


Most importantly, while the average debt/GDP ratio is no higher than it is in other advanced countries, and consolidation efforts started earlier, the eurozone has been mired in a severe crisis of confidence for the past two years.	最重要的是，在平均债务/ GDP占比位居发达国家之首、而且整顿工作已全面开始的情况下，欧元区在过去两年中已经陷入严重的信心危机。


This points to a systemic dimension of the crisis that cannot be reduced to profligate behavior by fiscal sinners.	这直接指向了危机的制度层面，仅仅归咎于财政过错者的挥霍行为恐怕无法解释。


Indeed, the Greek crisis exposed three main flaws in the monetary union itself.	其实，希腊危机暴露了货币联盟本身的三项重要缺陷。


First, the system lacked effective arrangements to align fiscal and other economic policies.	首先，相关制度缺乏整合财政和其他经济政策的有效机制。


As long as enforcement of fiscal discipline is entrusted to an intergovernmental body, the problem is bound to reappear, limiting the credibility of common budgetary rules.	只要仍然由政府间机构负责执行财政纪律，相关问题势必会再次出现，而且会损害共同预算规则的可信性。


Moreover, financial markets underpriced private and sovereign credit risks, in the implicit belief that no one would fail, and that all debts would somehow be made whole, implying weak market discipline on borrowers.	此外，金融市场低估了私人以及主权信用风险，其中隐含的理念是所有人都不会违约，而且所有债务将以某种形式全部偿还，也就是说对借方的市场约束非常薄弱。


Finally, once the crisis hit, leading to a re-pricing of risks in financial markets, the need to avoid an economic and financial meltdown compelled governments to support aggregate demand and make private liabilities whole.	最后，一旦危机爆发，引致金融市场对风险进行重估，避免经济和金融危机的紧迫性会迫使政府支撑总体需求并挽救私人债务。


But the disconnection between centralized monetary and decentralized fiscal powers de facto impeded the full use of monetary instruments to meet monetary and financial shocks.	但集中货币与实际分散的财政权力之间的脱节阻碍了货币政策工具充分发挥抵御货币和金融领域冲击的作用。


That left individual eurozone members exposed to brutal pressure by financial markets at a time when excessive private debt was turned into unsustainable public debt.	这导致欧元区成员国在过度私人债务转化为不可持续的公共债务期间承受着残酷的压力。


Suddenly, the eurozone had become a straightjacket.	突然，欧元区已经成为一件令人难受的紧身衣。


And so it has remained: budgets are cut, growth falters, and periphery countries must engineer substantial real exchange-rate devaluations to regain competitiveness and close their external deficits.	这件紧身衣还在发挥作用：削减预算、经济增长减慢，周边国家被迫策划大规模实际汇率贬值，以重拾竞争力并弥合外部赤字。


Core countries, meanwhile, argue that they can do little to strengthen aggregate demand and relieve pressure on their partners, even as the periphery’s agony is dragging the core into recession, owing to its dependence on peripheral export markets.	而核心国家则提出自己很难在加强总体需求和纾缓合作伙伴压力方面有所作为。 即使因为核心国家对周边出口市场的依赖，周边国家的痛苦正在将核心国家拖入衰退。


And, indeed, recent data point to a rapidly worsening economic environment in Germany, where the trade surplus has shrunk dramatically in recent months.	实际上，最新数据显示德国的经济环境正在迅速恶化，贸易顺差开始在最近几个月急剧缩水。


Over the past two years, fundamental changes in the eurozone’s economic governance have aimed at rectifying the monetary union’s founding flaws.	过去两年来，欧元区经济治理结构的根本性转变正是想要纠正货币联盟与生俱来的种种缺陷。


And, along the way, an intergovernmental process has become communitarian.	而且在这一过程中，政府间进程已逐步发展为群体主义。


Key powers over the implementation of common policy guidelines have been entrusted to the European Commission, and the European Council has limited its own ability to reject Commission recommendations by requiring a qualified majority to change them.	在执行共同政策方针方面的重点权力已经委托给欧盟委员会，而欧盟理事会则将自身权力限定为在获得符合条件的多数成员支持的情况下否决委员会的提议。


Strong economic-governance rules, however, will not suffice.	但仅有强劲的经济治理规则还远远不够。


A fully functioning monetary union also requires a central bank that is free to act as required to confront liquidity and confidence shocks, some mutualization of government debts, and centralized control over fiscal policy.	全面发挥职能的货币联盟还需要一家能自由应对流动性和信心冲击问题的央行，以便对某些政府债务实现共有，并对财政政策实现集中控制。


Moreover, it must have centralized banking supervisory policies, with strong powers to manage bank crises and to liquidate banks that cannot be rescued.	此外，必不可少的还有权力集中的银行业监管政策，掌握处理银行危机的生杀大权，并对无法挽救的银行展开清算工作。


All of this can be achieved only gradually, as Europe moves to a fully-fledged federal union.	所有这些都不可能一蹴而就，而只能在欧洲逐步成为不折不扣的联邦的过程中逐步实现。


Whether the eurozone will survive in the meantime will be determined by the European Council’s capacity to establish intermediate arrangements that can halt the crisis and restore trust among its members.	在此过程中欧元区是否能继续存在将取决于欧盟理事会能否建立中间制度，制止危机进一步发展并恢复各成员国的信任能力。


At their meeting at the end of June, European leaders acknowledged for the first time the multiple dimensions of the crisis, accepting that austerity – putting everyone’s house in order – will not suffice.	在六月底举行的会议上，欧洲领导人首次承认了此次危机具有多面性，他们承认实行内部整顿的紧缩政策并不能解决��题。


Accordingly, new joint policy initiatives will address economic growth, banking union, and liquidity.	因此，新的联合政策行动将要解决的问题涉及经济增长、银行业工会以及流动性。


Moreover, European leaders have placed these new policies within a coherent longer-term framework that may also include “the issuance of common debt.”	此外，欧洲各国领袖为上述新政制定了前后一致的长期框架机制，其中可能包括实施“统一的债务发行措施”。


Likewise, the European Council has agreed on a new “Compact for growth and jobs” that identifies a specific European dimension of growth policies, mainly integration of energy, transport, communications, and services, together with higher infrastructure investment.	欧盟理事会同样达成了新的“增长及就业协定”，明确了欧洲特定的增长政策领域，主要包括能源、交通、通讯及服务一体化，以及较高水平的基础设施投资。


What is notably missing is recognition of the need for greater flexibility on fiscal-consolidation efforts.	上述机制显然缺少了对需要扩大财政整顿灵活性的认知。


As the Commission has requested, countries with stronger fiscal positions should consider slowing their consolidation efforts in order to avoid aggravating the recession.	委员会已经要求财政状况相对强劲的国家考虑减缓国内的整顿工作，以避免经济衰退加剧。


But, in order to preserve investors’ confidence, some eurozone countries must strike a difficult balance between austerity and overkill, which would have been facilitated had the European Council issued a clear statement that letting automatic stabilizers work, while remaining on track with structural budget targets, fully complies with European Union obligations.	但为维护投资者信心，某些欧元区国家必须在紧缩和矫枉过正之间艰难地寻求平衡，欧盟理事会发表明确声明让自动稳定机制发挥效应可以促进这种状况，同时要遵守结构性预算目标并全面履行欧盟各项义务。


Moreover, a greater share of the adjustment burden must fall on Germany.	此外，德国必须承担起更多的调整任务。


Recent fairly generous wage agreements in Germany will help, but are not enough; there is also a need to boost domestic demand.	最近相当慷慨的德国工资协议将会有所助益，但还远远不够； 还有必要扩大内需。


More aggressive liberalization of the bloated banking system, network services (especially in energy and transport), and public procurement may contribute significantly over time to raising domestic investment and incomes.	积极推进臃肿的银行系统、网络服务（特别是在能源和运输领域）和公共采购自由化长远来看可能对增加国内投资和收入很有帮助。


The sizeable investments required to make up for the loss of nuclear energy may contribute more immediate stimulus.	旨在弥补核能损失的大规模投资或许可以提供更直接的刺激。


All of this should not be seen as a concession, but as part of the obligations undertaken by eurozone governments to address excessive imbalances.	我们不应将这一切措施视为一种让步，而是欧元区各国政府承诺解决过度失衡问题。


Now more than ever, Germany must be persuaded that without its contribution in reviving growth and correcting external imbalances, the eurozone faces prolonged depression and certain collapse.	当前形式下，比以往任何时候更需要说服德国，没有它在恢复增长和纠正外部失衡方面所做出的贡献，欧元区将会面临长期衰退和注定崩溃的厄运。


Long Live China’s Boom	中国腾飞仍将持续


BEIJING – After three decades of 9.8% average annual GDP growth, China’s economic expansion has been slowing for 13 consecutive quarters – the first such extended period of deceleration since the “reform and opening up” policy was launched in 1979.	发自北京——在经历了过去30年年均9. 8%的GDP增长后，中国的经济增长已连续13个季度放缓了——这是自1979年改革开放政策出台以来的首次长时间减速。


Real GDP grew at an annual rate of only 7.5% in the second quarter of this year (equal to the target actually set by the Chinese government at the beginning of this year).	今年第二季度的GDP增长年率仅为7. 5%（刚好等于中国政府今年年初制定的目标）。


Many indicators point to further economic deceleration, and there is a growing bearishness among investors about the outlook for China.	许多指标显示经济正在进一步减速，越来越多的投资者对中国的前景感到悲观。


Will China crash?	那么中国会因此走向崩溃吗？


In fact, many other rapidly growing emerging economies have suffered – and worse than China – from the drop in global demand resulting from ongoing retrenchment in high-income economies since the 2008 financial crisis.	事实上，自2008年的金融危机以来，由于高收入经济体持续紧缩导致全球需求减少，许多其他快速增长的新兴经济体都遭受了比中国更为严重的影响。 例如巴西的GDP增长已大幅放缓，从2010年的7.


For example, GDP growth in Brazil has slowed sharply, from 7.5% in 2010 to 2.7% in 2011 and to just 0.9% in 2012, while India’s growth rate slowed from 10.5% to 3.2% over the same period.	7%，甚至是2012年的0. 9%，同期印度的经济增长率也从10.


Moreover, many high-income newly industrialized economies (NIEs) with few structural problems were not spared the effects of the 2008 crisis.	此外，受2008金融危机的影响，许多存在结构性问题的高收入新工业化经济体（NIEs）也不能幸免。 韩国的GDP增长率从2010年的6.


South Korea’s GDP growth slowed from 6.3% in 2010 to 3.7% in 2011 and to 2% in 2012; Taiwan’s fell from 10.7% to 1.3% over this period; and Singapore’s plummeted from 14.8% to 1.3%.	7%及2012年的2%； 与此同时，台湾从10.


Given this, China’s economic slowdown since the first quarter of 2010 has apparently been caused mainly by external and cyclical factors.	有鉴于此，2010第一季度以来中国经济的放缓显然主要是由外部因素及周期性因素引起的。