Growth trends are even more pronounced in the Asia Pacific region, where readers in China and India are leading a return to traditional newspapers.	亚太地区的增长趋势更加喜人，中国和印度的读者成为传统报纸回归的领导力量。


Of course, newspapers’ post-election rebound was not entirely their own doing; it was also facilitated by social media’s failure to consolidate its gains.	当然，报纸在美国总统大选后出现反弹并不完全是它们自己的功劳； 社交媒体没能巩固优势也提供了助力。


Blinkered by the illusion of having snatched whatever influence newspapers commanded, social media’s mavens bungled their attempts to dethrone the older medium.	社交媒体自认为已经完全攫取了报纸所拥有的影响力，这一幻觉蒙蔽了它们的双眼，结果，社交媒体专家们颠覆就媒介的尝试以贻笑大方收场。


Instead of breaking stories, they took to drafting manifestos, like Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s 5,700-word jeremiad about nothing in particular.	它们不去报道突发新闻，而是炮制宣言，如Facebook创始人马克·扎克伯格（Mark Zuckerberg）所发表的5,700字的无病呻吟。


And, while there was a time when 140 characters may have been more appealing than 700-word opinion pieces, brevity is no longer enough.	此外，尽管这是一个140个字可能比700字的观点评述更有吸引力的时代，但简洁早已不是全部。


(Nor, for that matter, is lengthy incoherence).	（从这个意义上讲，无条理的冗长亦然。 ）


Having abducted the truth, social media were at a loss about what to do with it.	挟持了真相的社交媒体却弄巧成拙。


They did not innovate by, for example, following the lead of BuzzFeed, a once-notorious “clickbait” factory that soon expanded into serious reportage and long-form journalism.	它们不去通过（比如）效仿BuzzFeed进行创新。 BuzzFeed曾经是臭名昭著的“骗点击”工厂，后来它迅速演变成严肃的报道和长篇新闻网站。


After the US election, BuzzFeed shook up the media industry by publishing the Steele dossier, a collection of private intelligence on Trump gathered by a former British MI6 officer.	美国大选结束后，BuzzFeed发布了震惊媒体行业的斯蒂尔档案（Steele dossier），这是一份由英国军情六处官员搜集的关于特朗普的私人情报集合。


A few months later, it produced an 8,500-word expose on Milo Yiannopoulos, a former star commentator for Breitbart News.	几个月后，BuzzFeed写了一篇8,500字的报道曝光前布莱巴特新闻（Breitbart News）明星评论员米罗·杨诺波罗斯（Milo Yiannopoulos）。


The Columbia Journalism Review called the article “groundbreaking,” though recent squabbles with CNN indicate a certain reluctance to accept BuzzFeed as a legitimate news organization – and, potentially, even the emergence of a new media war.	《哥伦比亚新闻评论》（Columbia Journalism）称这是一篇“石破天惊”的报道，但最近与CNN的“嘴仗”表明人们还不太情愿接受BuzzFeed为正统的新闻组织——或许也不愿接受新媒体战争的出现。


Meanwhile, most major social media platforms continued to feature whatever presidential nonsense interested or amused their users, like analyzing “covfefe.”	与此同时，大部分主要社交媒体平台仍在用总统的胡言乱语来吸引和取悦用户，如分析“covfefe”。


This has led many to assume that Trump himself drives the social media agenda.	这让许多人认为是特朗普本人在左右社交媒体的计划。


Perhaps he does.	也许正是如此。


But Trump’s ad nauseam tweets about failing newspapers and fake news have also spurred more reasonable consumers to embrace newspapers as a bastion of anti-Trumpism.	但特朗普的令人作呕的关于失败的报纸和假新闻的tweet文也促使比较理性的消费者选择报纸作为反特朗普的堡垒。


In other words, newspapers’ revival is a visceral, if partisan, response to social media in the Trump era.	换句话说，报纸的复兴对特朗普时代的社交媒体的出于本能（也许带有党派性质）的反应。


Trump, the upstart, is leading the battle against the media Brahmins, buoyed by a fellow disruptor, social media.	暴发户特朗普正在引领一场达到媒体贵族的战斗，他有一个破坏者随从，就是社交媒体。


But Trump’s campaign is a losing one.	但特朗普正在输掉战斗。


Newspapers have gained allies even on Capitol Hill.	哪怕是在国会山，报纸也在赢得盟友。


When Congress grills executives from Facebook, Twitter, and Google, glee is evident in news headlines.	当国会拷问Facebook、Twitter和谷歌的高管们时，新闻标题一片欢腾。


To add insult to social media’s injury, it is newspaper articles that are being relentlessly quoted in congressional testimony.	令社交媒体雪上加霜的是，在国会听证中被大肆引用的，正是报纸文章。


For example, former FBI Director James Comey’s memo on his interactions with Trump, which led to the hiring of a special prosecutor to investigate the Trump campaign’s connections to Russia, was leaked to The New York Times.	比如，前联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科米（James Comey）关于其与特朗普之间的互动备忘录便是由《纽约时报》所曝光，该备忘录导致最高法院任命了应为特别检察官调查特朗普选举阵营与俄罗斯的联系。


As calls to rein in social media grow, it is the world’s newspapers – until very recently thought to be on the ropes – that have provided the reporting needed to convince policymakers to act.	随着约束社交媒体的声音日益高涨，促使决策者采取行动的报道，还需要世间的报纸——到目前为止，人们认为它们是社交媒体的鱼肉对象——来提供。


Because social media companies, for all their power and potential, never developed the journalistic capacities needed to displace traditional news media, the pendulum has changed direction.	由于社交媒体公司——尽管它们实力和潜力强大——从未发展出取代传统新闻媒体所需要的新闻能力，趋势已经转向。


The Next Fed Chair	下一任美联储主席


CAMBRIDGE – US President Donald Trump’s administration is expected, by November 2, to announce its choice, subject to Senate approval, to succeed Janet Yellen as Chair of the Federal Reserve Board in February 2018.	坎布里奇—预计美国总统特朗普将在11月2日宣布其所选择的替耶伦（Janet Yellen）的继任者，他将在经过参议院批准后，从2018年2月起上任。


The White House has indicated that it is weighing five potential candidates.	白宫已经表示正在权衡五位潜在候选人。


Not all of them would be a good choice.	这五人并不都是好选择。


The first candidate is Yellen herself.	第一个候选人是耶伦自己。


Though Yellen is a Democrat originally appointed by President Barack Obama, there is strong precedent for Trump to re-appoint her.	尽管耶伦是一位奥巴马总统任命的民主党，但有的是先例证明特朗普可以继续任命她。


Her three predecessors – Ben Bernanke, Alan Greenspan, and Paul Volcker – were each re-appointed to second terms by a president of the opposite party from the one who first appointed them, reflecting the value of continuity and predictability in central banking.	她的三位前任——伯南克（Ben Bernanke）、格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）和沃尔克（Paul Volcker）都在继任命了他们的总统之后，在对立党派总统上台后又获得了第二次任命，这表明央行业务保持连续性和可预测性至关重要。


Yellen, whom I have known since we worked together in 1977, has performed very well in her nearly four years as Fed Chair.	我从1977年就认识耶伦并与她共事。 在担任美联储主席的近四年里，她表现非常出色。


Though she hasn’t confronted a crisis, she did help to sustain the US economy’s steady recovery from the 2007-09 recession.	尽管她没有遭到危机，但确实帮助美国经济保持了从2007—2009年衰退后的稳定复苏。


Yellen, like Bernanke before her, used the Fed’s tools with a combination of clear communication and policy flexibility, shifting course as data revealed subtle changes in economic conditions.	和她之前的伯南克一样，耶伦通过清晰的沟通和政策灵活性使用美联储的工具，在数据表明经济状况已经发生微妙变化后，改变了政策方向。


The results speak for themselves.	结果说明了一切。


When Yellen was appointed to the Fed Board as Vice Chair in 2010, the US unemployment rate was at 9.9%.	2010年耶伦被任命为美联储理事会副主席时，美国失业率为9. 9%。


By the time she was promoted to Chair in 2014, it had fallen to 6.7%.	2014年她升任主席时，失业率下降到了6. 7%。


Today, it stands at just 4.2% – and yet inflation remains low.	如今，失业率为4. 2%——而通胀依然保持低水平。


Some complain that inflation remains below the 2% target; but the combination of low unemployment and low inflation used to be viewed as macroeconomic Nirvana.	一些人抱怨通胀仍低于2%的目标； 但低失业和低通胀的组合曾经被视为宏观经济的涅槃。


The second potential candidate for Fed Chair is Jerome Powell, who has been on the Fed Board for five years.	第二个美联储主席潜在候选人是杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome Powell），他已经在美联储理事会任职五年。


Powell might represent a good compromise for policymakers.	鲍威尔也许代表了决策者的最佳组合。


On one hand, he has supported Yellen’s strategy, from her dovish interest-rate policies to her recent moves toward normalization.	一方面，他支持耶伦的战略，不管是其鸽派利率政策还是最近的正常化方向。


On the other, he is a longtime Republican with a financial background.	另一方面，他是一位拥有金融背景的老牌共和党。


But Powell might face skepticism for his lack of academic training as an economist.	但鲍威尔可能因为他缺少经济学家学术训练而受到质疑。


PhD economists, like those who dominate the Fed’s staff and leadership, tend to favor their own kind and doubt others’ qualifications for top monetary-policy jobs.	拥有博士学位的经济学家，比如那些充斥着美联储工作和领导团队的人，总是偏向同类人，而质疑其他人担任货币政策最高职位的资质。


Certainly, a central banker without an economics PhD could struggle to hold his or her own against a large staff fluent in the models and jargon of academic economics.	显然，没有经济学博士学位的央行行长，可能难以面对一大批熟稔学院派经济学模型和术语的工作人员而毫不动摇。


Given this, many view a doctorate as a prerequisite for any Fed chair.	因此，许多人将博士学位视为担任美联储主席的先决条件。


But, in Powell’s case, I would argue that it should not be.	但对于鲍威尔，我得说不必如此。


Having known him since 1990, I can say that Powell has never been shy about asking questions.	我从1990年就认识他，可以说鲍威尔从来不耻于下问。


As a result, he has developed the analytical capabilities that a Fed governor needs.	因此，他已经具备了作为美联储官员所需要的分析能力。


Almost as important, he won’t have a chip on his shoulder when dealing with more credentialed staff.	同样重要的是，他在与学历更高的工作人员打交道时不会抱有成见。


From my perspective, Powell would stand out as one of the best appointments Trump has made.	从我的角度看，鲍威尔将是特朗普的最佳任命之一。


The third potential candidate, Kevin Warsh, is a former Fed governor, who also has a background in finance – in this case, at Morgan Stanley – rather than in academic economics.	第三位潜在候选人凯文·瓦尔什（Kevin Warsh）是前美联储官员，也拥有金融——这次是摩根士丹利——而不是学院派经济学背景。


But that is where the similarity between him and Powell ends.	但与鲍威尔的相似点也仅限于此。


Warsh, like many Republicans, has harshly criticized the Fed’s attempts to stimulate the US economy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, warning that the unprecedented expansion of the monetary base brought about by quantitative easing would trigger high inflation.	和许多共和党一样，瓦尔什强烈批评美联储在全球金融危机爆发后刺激美国经济的举措，警告说，量化宽松所带来的前所未有的货币基础扩张将引发高通胀。


Warsh started making such hawkish – and clearly incorrect – warnings in 2010, when unemployment was 9.5% and runaway inflation was the last thing most economists were worried about.	瓦尔什从2010年开始做出这类鹰派——也显然错误——的警告，当时的失业率高达9. 5%，而通胀则是大部分经济学家最不担心的事情。


One can’t help but wonder if Warsh understands how the economy works.	你绝对会怀疑瓦尔什是否理解经济如何运行。


The same cannot credibly be asked about the fourth candidate, John Taylor.	第四位候选人——约翰·泰勒（John Taylor）则有所不同。


Like Yellen, Taylor is an eminent economist with an impressive record both in academic research and as a practitioner of macroeconomic policy.	和耶伦一样，泰勒是一位著名经济学家，在学术研究和宏观经济政策实践方面都有耀眼的履历。


In fact, he is the sixth most widely cited monetary economist, owing his renown especially to the Taylor rule, a guideline for setting interest rates in response to observed inflation and growth.	事实上，他是被引用第六多的货币经济学家。 他的大名主要来自泰勒规则，即如何根据观察到的通胀和增长制定利率的指南。


Nonetheless, like Warsh, Taylor has long believed that monetary conditions are excessively generous.	尽管如此，和瓦尔什一样，泰勒一直认为货币条件过于慷慨了。


That criticism was probably warranted during the housing boom that resulted in the 2007-09 financial crisis.	这一批评在导致2007—2009年金融危机的房地产繁荣期间可能相当正确。


And Taylor was in an ideal position to deliver that message, because he served as Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs until 2005, which means that he met regularly with Greenspan, then the Fed’s chair, in private.	而泰勒也是做出这一批评的理想人选，因为他担任负责国际事务的美国财政部副部长直到2005年，这意味着他能够经常与时任美联储主席格林斯潘进行私下会面。


One wonders why, if he is so opposed to easy monetary policy, he didn’t convey that to Fed governors at a time when the message might have done some good.	你也许会奇怪，既然他如此反对货币政策宽松，为何不在这一警告能够带来一些好处的时候向美联储官员传达呢？


The White House’s final potential pick, Gary Cohn, is currently the director of Trump’s National Economic Council.	白宫的最后一位潜在人选加里·科恩（Gary Cohn）是现任特朗普国家经济委员会主任。


But Cohn, who has no background whatsoever in monetary economics and whose views are unknown, may already be out of the running.	但科恩没有任何货币经济学背景，所持立场也不为人知，因此他也许已经出局了。


The complaint of most Republican leaders since Obama took office in 2009 is that monetary policy has been too loose.	自2009年奥巴马上台以来，大部分共和党领导人抱怨货币政策过于宽松。


(Trump said the same when he was campaigning for the presidency, though, once in office, he suddenly proclaimed himself a “low rates guy.”)	（特朗普在竞选总统时也这么说，尽管在上台后，他突然表示自己是“低利率派”。


House Republicans wanted the Fed to adopt Taylor-style rules then; now, they want Trump to appoint Taylor himself.	）当时，众议院共和党希望美联储根据泰勒规则行事； 现在，他们希望特朗普任命泰勒本尊。


But, historically, Republicans have pushed easy monetary policy when they have had the presidency.	但从历史上看，共和党在赢得总统宝座后，总会推行宽松的货币政策。


If, as is likely, financial markets and the economy run into headwinds in the medium term – perhaps in the run-up to the next presidential election – Trump will almost certainly blame his troubles on the Fed.	如果，像可能的那样，金融市场和经济在中期遇到困难——也许发生在下一次总统竞选时——特朗普几乎肯定会把他的问题推卸给美联储。


The complaint, however, will not be that monetary policy is too easy, but that it is too tight.	但他的指责不会是货币政策太宽松，而将是货币政策太紧缩。


Good central bankers wouldn’t heed such politicized criticism either way.	好的央行行长不会理会这种政治化的批评。


They would make decisions based on what they believe is best for the economy, relying on evolving data, not on evolving political imperatives.	他们会基于他们所理解的对经济最好的政策作出决定，依靠数据而不是不断变化的政治要求作出决定。


The sitting governors have demonstrated the ability to do that.	现任官员们已经证明了他们有能力这样做。


Polio’s Last Stand	与脊髓灰质炎背水一战


GENEVA – It has been a tough year for Nigeria.	日内瓦——对尼日利亚来讲这是艰难的一年。


In the last 12 months, the country has suffered attacks by child suicide bombers and brutal massacres by Boko Haram.	过去12个月，该国遭受了儿童自杀式炸弹袭击和博科圣地的残酷屠杀。


The vast majority of the 276 schoolgirls abducted in Chibok last year are still missing.	去年在奇博克遭绑架的276名女生绝大多数至今依然下落不明。


And yet, during this time, despite such horrors, Nigeria has quietly managed to achieve something truly remarkable: an entire year without a single new case of wild polio.	但在此期间，尽管经历了如此的恐怖，尼日利亚却已在不知不觉间实现了真正令人赞叹的目标：整整一年没有发生一例脊髓灰质炎。


This is a great achievement for Nigeria and all of its partners in the effort to eradicate the disease.	这是尼日利亚及其合作伙伴根除脊髓灰质炎取得的重大成就。


Less than 30 years ago, polio plagued 125 countries, paralyzing 1,000 children a day.	不到30年前，脊髓灰质炎依然困扰125个国家，每天导致1，000名儿童瘫痪。


Until now, there were only three countries where the virus was still considered endemic: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria.	迄今为止，这种病毒被认为仅在阿富汗、巴基斯坦和尼日利亚等三国传染。


Health officials wait three years before declaring a country polio-free, but the one-year milestone in Nigeria raises hopes that we may have already seen the last case of wild polio in the country – and the whole of Africa.	卫生官员在宣布一个国家消灭脊髓灰质炎之前要等三年，但尼日利亚整整一年没有相关病例让人们燃起希望——尼日利亚乃至整个非洲都将根除脊髓灰质炎。


In addition to the logistical challenge of reaching every child in Africa’s most populated country, the Nigerian polio-eradication campaign has had to overcome security issues, opposition by religious fundamentalists, and rampant corruption.	除去在非洲人口最多的国家照顾到每一名儿童的后勤挑战，尼日利亚脊髓灰质炎根除运动还需要战胜安全问题、宗教原教旨主义者的反对和猖獗的腐败。


The fact that a country as troubled as Nigeria could pull off such an important feat is cause for celebration and provides grounds for optimism, not only in the fight against polio, but for global health efforts in general.	像尼日利亚这样的困难国家都能在预防脊髓灰质炎斗争和一般性全球卫生工作中完成这样一项壮举当然值得庆祝和乐观。


Nigeria’s success shows that it is possible to bring the miracles of modern medicine to the world’s most marginalized and hard-to-reach children.	尼日利亚的成功表明完全有可能将现代医学奇迹带到全世界最边缘化、最难以触及的儿童身边。


This has huge implications for the reduction of childhood mortality.	这对降低儿童死亡率意义重大。


The children that had previously not been reached with polio vaccines live in communities with little or no access to routine immunization, maternal healthcare, nutritional supplements, deworming, or malaria prevention.	过去脊髓灰质炎疫苗无法触及的儿童生活在无法获得常规免疫接种、孕产妇保健、营养补充剂、驱虫或疟疾预防的社区。


They are the children who are most at risk of dying before they reach their fifth birthday.	他们在五岁前面临最大的死亡危险。


Nigeria’s success in reaching these children is the result of the efforts of thousands of dedicated local volunteers, some of whom lost their lives in the process.	尼日利亚的成功是成千上万有献身精神的当地志愿者辛勤工作的结果，其中有些人甚至在此过程中献出了生命。


Since 2012, there has been nearly a fivefold increase in the number of volunteers involved in mobilizing communities during immunization campaigns.	从2012年起，参与免疫接种动员的社区志愿者人数几乎增加了5倍。


Meanwhile, government, global health organizations like the World Health Organization and UNICEF, civil-society organizations, and community leaders, all working together, managed to identify and bridge the gaps that have historically impaired access to polio vaccines.	此外，国家政府、世卫组织和联合国儿基会等全球卫生机构、民间社会组织和社区领袖各方通力合作，成功找到并弥合了过去一直阻碍脊髓灰质炎疫苗普及的鸿沟。


In early 2012, for example, Nigeria’s government established dedicated emergency operations centers to coordinate data flow, facilitate decision-making, and improve accountability within the program.	比方说在2012年初，尼日利亚政府设立了专门的紧急行动中心，协调数据、促进决策并改进该项目的问责制度。


With support from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Nigeria also installed more than 1,600 solar-powered refrigerators, which are critical to ensuring that vaccines remain safe and effective during their long journey through the distribution chain.	在全球疫苗免疫联盟（Gavi）的支持下，尼日利亚还安装了1，600多台太阳能冰箱，这是确保疫苗在经过分销链的漫长旅途中保持安全有效的关键。


These investments in physical and social infrastructure provide a means of protecting children from a range of diseases.	上述实体和社会基础设施投资为保护儿童远离多种疾病提供了手段。


Already, polio workers in Nigeria are spending more than half their time providing unrelated but vital health services.	目前，尼日利亚脊髓灰质炎工作人员已经把超过半数时间用在提供至关重要的无关医疗服务上。


The infrastructure has helped introduce new vaccines – such as pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, which protect against pneumonia, the biggest killer of children under the age of five – and increased coverage of routine immunization against measles and rubella.	上述基础设施在很大程度上协助了预防肺炎的肺炎球菌结合疫苗等新疫苗的引进工作。 肺炎是五岁以下儿童的最大杀手——同时实现了麻疹风疹等常规免疫覆盖率的增加。


Thanks to the emergency operations centers, this infrastructure even helped to stop the Ebola outbreak in Nigeria in 2014, by enabling contact tracing and surveillance.	多亏紧急行动中心的设立，这些基础设施甚至通过追踪和监控接触者，协助阻止了2014年尼日利亚埃博拉疫情的爆发。


These efforts have the additional benefit of ensuring that Nigeria cements its polio-free status.	一个额外的好处是这些工作还能确保尼日利亚巩固无脊髓灰质炎状态。


The health infrastructure put in place during the eradication campaign has enabled the deployment of injectable polio vaccines, which will complement the oral vaccines in ensuring that the virus does not return.	消灭脊髓灰质炎期间建立的卫生基础设施协助部署注射脊髓灰质炎疫苗，以便补充口服疫苗确保病毒不会卷土重来。


This was also the pattern in India, the most recent country to be declared officially free of polio, with no cases since 2010.	印度也采用同样的模式，该国最近被正式宣布消灭脊髓灰质炎，从2010年起就再没有相关病例出现。


The infrastructure put in place to deliver polio vaccines there is now being used to increase coverage of routine immunization, like the 5-in-1 pentavalent vaccine.	当时用来普及脊髓灰质炎疫苗的基础设施现在被用来提升五合一五价疫苗等常规免疫覆盖。


India can now wind down its polio-eradication campaigns, but still maintain its polio-free status.	印度现在终于可以暂缓脊髓灰质炎根除运动，而无需担心脊髓灰质炎卷土重来。


So far, in 2015, only 34 cases of polio have been documented worldwide – the majority of them in Pakistan.	2015年到目前为止，全世界仅录得 34例脊髓灰质炎病例——其中多数出现在巴基斯坦。


There is now a very real prospect that we could see the last ever case of wild polio – a disease that once threatened millions of people – before the end of 2016.	现在我们极有可能在2016年年底前消灭曾经威胁数百万人的脊髓灰质炎。


To eradicate the disease, however, we will have to build on successes like Nigeria’s and strengthen routine immunization efforts.	但要彻底根除这种疾病，我们就必须在尼日利亚成功的基础上加强日常免疫工作。


The end of polio should mark not just the defeat of a terrible disease, but also the beginning of a new phase in the effort to reduce childhood suffering and death, the benefits of which will be felt for generations to come.	脊髓灰质炎的终结标志着一种可怕疾病的失败和减少儿童痛苦死亡新阶段的开始，它所带来的好处将能被未来几代人感受到。


A New Trump?	一个新的特朗普？


WASHINGTON, DC – It’s generally agreed in Washington, DC, that President Donald Trump’s presidency is entering a new phase.	华盛顿—在华盛顿，人们普遍认为，特朗普总统的任期正在进入一个新阶段。


Defining just what that phase is, is proving to be problematic.	如何定义这个阶段，里面很有文章。


The widespread expectation was that the removal of Stephen Bannon – the former White House chief adviser and resident avatar of white American nationalism – would make the administration run more smoothly, mitigate (though not eliminate) infighting, and reduce the number of leaks.	广泛的预期是，史蒂芬·班农（Stephen Bannon，白宫前首席顾问、白人美国民族主义的守护神）的免职将让政府运转得更加平稳，减少（尽管不能消除）内讧，减少泄密数量。


The internal warfare may be quieter since John Kelly took over as White House Chief of Staff and imposed more order in the West Wing.	自约翰·凯利（John Kelly）接任白宫幕僚长、整顿白宫西翼后，内斗也许变得增加悄无声息了。


But so long as Trump is president, orderliness will not be the White House’s chief characteristic.	但只要特朗普还是总统，整齐划一就不可能成为白宫的主旋律。


In fact, Trump remains in frequent contact with Bannon, who is back in charge at Breitbart News.	事实上，特朗普仍与回到布莱巴特新闻（Breitbart News）主持大局的班农保持着频繁的联系。


Inevitably, by early September, after Kelly had been on the job for all of five weeks, Trump was chafing under his new chief of staff’s restrictions.	难免地，到了9月初，在凯利履新整整五周后，特朗普开始在他的新的幕僚长的限制下蠢蠢欲动了。


Kelly has imposed tight controls over who may enter the Oval Office, listens in on most of Trump’s phone calls during office hours, and controls what pieces of paper reach the president’s desk, thus eliminating the highly ideological screeds that some staff members used to slip him.	凯利严格限制着谁能够进入椭圆办公室，在上班时间旁听特朗普的大部分电话，还控制着哪些文件能直达上听，如此，他就将一些幕僚过去常常让特朗普过目的极具意识形态的长篇大论扼杀殆尽。


The problem is that Trump likes disorder; that’s how he had run his business, and he doesn’t take well to being managed.	问题在于特朗普喜欢无序； 这正是他经营企业的方式，而他很不习惯被管着。


He liked having favored people wandering into his office as they chose, and it’s been his managerial creed to play people off each other.	他喜欢亲信走进他的办公室，如同是他们选择的那样，他的管理信条是让人们彼此玩弄。


Nor does he bother to control his temper when dealing with aides.	他也不会在助手面前控制脾气。


Even Kelly, an ex-Marine Corps general, has come under the lash of Trump’s tongue.	即便是前海军陆战队将领凯利，也遭到过特朗普的嘴炮。


Observers now take bets on when Kelly will decide he’s had enough.	如今，观察者打赌凯利总有一天会忍无可忍。


I’ve never known a White House where so much depends on who has incurred the president’s ire.	我从来没想到白宫会如此取决于谁捋了总统的虎须。


Gary Cohn, the former Goldman Sachs president and chief operating officer who serves as Trump’s chief economic adviser, is the latest to be frozen out.	前高盛总裁兼首席运营官、现任特朗普首席经济顾问加里·科恩（Gary Cohn）是被打入冷宫的最新例子。


Cohn’s sin was to let it be known publicly that he almost resigned following the violence last month in Charlottesville, Va., when Trump equated white supremacist and neo-Nazi demonstrators, many of them armed, with those who opposed them.	科恩的罪名是让公众知道了他几乎因为上个月在弗吉尼亚州夏洛特维尔（Charlottesville）的暴力而辞职。 在该事件中，特朗普将白人至上主义者和新纳粹示威者（他们中不少持有武装），与反对他们的人相提并论。


Actually, one can have some sympathy for a president with an aide who wants to have it both ways, as Cohn did – letting his apparent anguish be known without acting on it.	事实上，你可能会对总统有一个左右逢源的助手而对他抱有一丝同情，科恩就是如此——他让他的痛苦众所周知，但并没有因为痛苦而做出什么行动。


But there can be problems when a president chooses to disregard his chief economic adviser.	但一个总统如果选择忽视他的首席经济顾问的话，就会产生问题。


Cohn has been seen as one of the administration’s more moderate voices, and he has wanted to succeed Janet Yellen as chair of the US Federal Reserve.	科恩被视为特朗普政府中比较温和的声音，他还想接替耶伦担任美联储主席。


Speculation about the possibility of a “new Trump” peaked in early September, when the president suddenly cut a deal with Democratic congressional leaders.	关于有可能出现一个“新特朗普”的猜测在9月初达到了顶峰，当时，总统突然与民主党国会领袖达成了一个协议。


Trump agreed with House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and her Senate counterpart, Chuck Schumer, on how to increase the federal debt limit, which Congress must raise each year as spending increases, and extend appropriations to keep the government running (because Congress routinely fails to write appropriations bills on time).	特朗普与众议院少数党领袖南希·佩洛西（Nancy Pelosi）和参议院少数党领袖查克·舒默（Chuck Schumer）就如何提高联邦债务上限的问题形成了一致，国会必须根据支出的增加，每年提高债务上限，并增加拨款以保持政府运转（因为国会总是无法及时通过拨款法案）。


Both items were tied to a special appropriation in the wake of Hurricane Harvey to pay for recovery efforts.	这两个事项都与飓风哈雷灾后重建拨款有关。


(The larger Hurricane Irma hadn’t yet hit.)	（当时，更大的飓风厄玛尚未登陆。 ）


In the midst of the discussion at the Oval Office meeting with Pelosi and Schumer, Trump interrupted Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin as he was defending the Republicans’ position that these issues should be put off for 18 months, until after the 2018 congressional elections.	在椭圆办公室与佩洛西和舒默的讨论过程中，财政部长史蒂夫·努钦（Steve Mnuchin）为共和党辩解说，这些问题应该推迟到18个月以后，等2018年国会选举完了再讨论，但特朗普打断了他。


The Democrats had argued that the increase in the debt ceiling and extension of appropriations should last for only three months, thus forcing the Republicans to take electorally risky votes before the 2018 elections.	此前，民主党认为提高债务上限以及拨款扩大只能维持三个月，这就迫使共和党要在2018年选举之前就冒着选举的危险举行投票。


Before the meeting, House Speaker Paul Ryan had adamantly rejected the Democrats’ proposal.	在这次会面之前，众议院议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）坚决拒绝了民主党的方案。


But suddenly, without notifying even his own aides, Trump went for it.	但突然间，特朗普就同意了它，甚至连自己的助手都没有通知。


The author of The Art of the Deal had accepted the Democrats’ opening position.	这位《交易的艺术》的作者（The Art of the Deal）接受了民主党的抛来的条件。


Commentators went into overdrive, imbuing the episode with broad significance: Trump was now not a Republican but an Independent.	评论者们解读过度，纷纷表示此举意义重大：特朗普现在不再是一个共和党，而成了一个独立人士。


He might start a third party.	他可能会创建第三党。


His move marked the beginning of a new way of governing.	他的举动标志着新治国方针的开端。


In fact, Trump merely saw an opportunity and took it.	事实上，特朗普只是看到了一个机会，并抓住了它。


With no real legislative achievements to claim, he did something.	在没有立法成就可以宣布等情况下，他做了一些事情。


The Republican congressional leaders, Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, had been in bad odor with Trump for a while, because they had been unable to deliver on his legislative agenda.	国会共和党领袖，瑞恩和参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔（Mitch McConell）与特朗普分道扬镳已有时日，因为他们无法实现他的立法日程。


He was embarrassed and angered at their failure to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare.	他感到很尴尬，对他们无法取消和取代平价医疗法即奥巴马医保愤怒不已。


(Trump didn’t recognize his own contributions to the debacle.)	（特朗普没有意识到他自己所造成的障碍。


On many issues, Trump lacks a governing majority in the Senate.	）在许多问题生，特朗普并不拥有参议院执政多数。


Overlooked in all the excitement over Trump’s lining up with Democratic leaders was that the issue at hand concerned legislative timing, not substance.	在人们为特朗普与民主党领袖结成一致欢呼雀跃的时候，都忽略了这一问题只关乎立法时机，无关乎立法内容。


And the subsequent fevered discussions about Trump’s core beliefs – maybe he was a crypto-Democrat, who had, after all, donated to Democratic candidates at one time and sympathized with Democratic positions (such as on abortion) – missed the point.	随后的关于特朗普的核心信念的热烈讨论——也许他是个地下民主党，毕竟，他曾经资助过民主党候选人，并且同情民主党立场（比如堕胎问题）——没有切中要害。


Trump harbors no particular political philosophy; he’s an opportunist who craves publicity and praise.	特朗普并不持有特定的政治哲学； 他是个机会主义者，渴望成为焦点、听到喝彩。


But his maverick behavior might turn out to be self-perpetuating.	但他的特立独行倒有可能收到自我持续之效。


For all his contempt for the “dishonest media,” Trump was ecstatic about the positive press coverage his bipartisan move received.	他蔑视“不诚实的媒体”，但其实他对于他的跨党派举措所获得的正面新闻评价暗自狂喜。


And that might lure him to try for more.	而这有可能会让他如法炮制。


Making Economic Sanctions on North Korea Work	让对朝经济制裁真正奏效


CAMBRIDGE – Last week, in a brazen rebuff to tough new United Nations sanctions, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s regime fired a ballistic missile over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido – its second launch over Japan in less than three weeks.	发自剑桥——上周，朝鲜金正恩政权向日本北海道北部海域发射了一枚弹道导弹——也是不到三周时间内飞越日本上空的第二次发射行动——并将其作为对联合国严厉制裁的粗暴回绝。


But, far from indicating that sanctions don’t work, Kim’s move shows that they still aren’t tough enough.	但这远远不能表明制裁无效，而是金正恩的举动显示这些制裁还不够强硬。


The latest sanctions cap oil imports, ban textile exports, and penalize designated North Korean government entities.	最新制裁内容包括限制石油进口，禁止纺织品出口，并惩罚指定的朝鲜政府实体。


Following Kim’s response, sanctions should be tightened even further, to stop all trade with North Korea, including halting all fuel imports.	鉴于金正恩对此作出的回应，应该进一步加强制裁，停止与朝鲜的所有贸易，包括停止所有燃料进口。


North Korea is one of the most insular countries in the world.	朝鲜是世界上最为孤立的国家之一。


That insularity is a curse for the long-suffering North Korean people, but an advantage for a sanction-based strategy, because only one country is needed to make it work: China.	这个孤岛状态虽然是对长期受苦受难的朝鲜人民的诅咒，而是制裁战略的一个优势，因为只需要一个国家出手就可以收到成果：中国。


From an economic perspective, China is the only country that really matters to North Korea, as it controls about 90% of the North’s foreign trade and supplies almost all of its fuel.	从经济的角度来看，中国是唯一对朝鲜至关重要的国家，因为它控制着朝方大约90%的对外贸易以及几乎所有燃料供应。


Yet China’s economy would barely register the effect of new sanctions: North Korea’s annual GDP, at a meager $28 billion, constitutes little more than a rounding error for its giant neighbor.	反过来中国经济几乎不会受到新制裁的影响：朝鲜的年度GDP仅为280亿美元，不过相当于其庞大邻国经济总量的一个零头。


The lack of viable commercial alternatives and the massive asymmetry of power between North Korea and those imposing sanctions mean that a stricter sanctions regime would push the country into a corner.	可替代通商选项的缺乏，以及朝鲜与实施制裁的大国之间实力的极大不对称意味着更严厉的制裁体系将推动该国进入四面楚歌的境况。


The question is whether economic hardship would induce North Korea to change its nuclear policy. Though it is impossible to say for sure, a look at the economics of North Korea’s nuclear program suggests that it might.	但问题在于经济困难是否会导致朝鲜改变其核政策，虽然无法下肯定的结论，但针对朝鲜核计划的经济学分析表明这是有可能实现的。


Contrary to popular perception, nuclear arms are weapons of the poor – extraordinarily cheap compared with conventional armaments.	与外界的普遍观点相反，核武器是穷人的武器——与常规武器相比极为廉价。


In fact, it was this rationale that drove the Soviet Union’s massive nuclear buildup: Soviet leaders, recognizing that they could not compete with the much wealthier United States’ conventional weapons, focused their country’s limited resources on creating a potentially devastating nuclear arsenal.	事实上，推动苏联大规模制造核武器的理由正是苏联领导人认识到自己无法与美国这个富裕国家的常规武器竞争，所以只能将有限的资源放在打造一个潜在的毁灭性核武库上。


Likewise, North Korea’s focus on nuclear, rather than conventional, weapons may be enabling it to minimize the tradeoff between guns and butter.	同样，朝鲜对核技术而非常规武器的关注可能使其能够最大限度地减少枪炮和食品之间的权衡。


Indeed, there are reports of some vitality in the North Korean economy, with markets full of goods and new buildings under construction.	事实上有报道指出朝鲜经济出现了一些活力，市场上商品变得丰富，还在营建一些新的建筑。


Tighter sanctions are therefore needed to increase the economic price that the regime must pay for its nuclear program.	因此必须采取更严格的制裁措施来增加该政权必须为其核计划支付的经济造价。


Even if North Korea does not change its policy, total economic isolation may bring about an end to its nuclear program, by sowing internal discord and, ultimately, triggering the regime’s collapse.	即使朝鲜不改变其政策，全面的经济孤立可能会导致其核计划的终结，引发内部动荡并最终触发政权的崩溃。


Yet China hopes to avoid precisely this outcome – which is a key reason why it has so far refused to escalate sanctions further.	然而中国恰恰希望避免出现这一结果——这也是该国迄今为止拒绝进一步升级制裁的一个关键原因。


China worries that the collapse of the Kim regime would fuel a major refugee crisis, with millions of Koreans pouring across its border in search of food, shelter, and security – and imposing heavy economic and social costs on China in the process.	中国担心金正恩政权的崩溃会引发一场严重难民危机，数以百万计的朝鲜人会穿越中朝边界寻求食物和栖身之所以及躲避战乱，而中国将为此承受沉重的经济和社会代价。


Moreover, Chinese leaders fear the loss of the North Korean buffer separating China from US troops stationed in South Korea.	此外中国领导人还担心会失去将本国与美军驻韩部队区隔开来的朝鲜缓冲区。


Given the widespread belief in Chinese policy circles that the US secretly hopes to re-fight the Korean war and establish a single US-allied Korea on China’s border, the potency of this concern should not be underestimated.	鉴于中国政策界普遍认为美国私底下希望再打一场朝鲜战争并在中国边界建立一个统一的作为美国盟国的朝鲜半岛国家，这一忧虑的影响力不应遭到低估。


US President Donald Trump’s administration understands the central importance of China to any strategy to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.	美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的政府明白中国在任何制止朝鲜核野心的战略方面所起到的核心重要性。


But, so far, the US has relied on threats, such as halting $650 billion in bilateral trade, to persuade China to cooperate.	但到目前为止，美国依旧依赖于威胁（比如停止6500亿美元双边贸易）来说服中国进行合作。


This is not a stick, but a boomerang – one that will hit China and immediately return to smack the US.	这可不是个大棒，而是一个回旋镖——它可以用来打击中国，但随即又会打到美国身上。


What is needed instead are carrots.	对此我们需要的是胡萝卜。


Persuading China to isolate the North economically will require the international community to establish some agreement regarding how regime collapse would be handled, with an eye to allaying China’s key concerns.	说服中国在经济上孤立朝鲜需要国际社会首先就如何处理政权崩溃问题达成一致意见，着眼于打消中国的核心忧虑。


For starters, the entire international community, but especially the US, must explicitly pledge not to attempt to change the nature of the North Korean regime.	首先，整个国际社会，尤其是美国，必须明确承诺不会试图改变朝鲜政权的性质。


That means that if the Kim regime collapses, the US will not pursue reunification.	那意味着，如果金正恩政权崩溃，美国不会寻求朝韩统一。


Instead, China should exercise primary political custodianship of North Korea in the event that a political vacuum emerges.	相反如果出现政治真空，中国应该对朝鲜进行基本政治监管。


Come what may, US and South Korean troops would not cross the 38th parallel.	无论出现何种情况，美韩军队不会跨越三八线。


Persuading China to impose potentially regime-destroying sanctions will also require economic pledges, with the entire international community – especially the US, Japan, and South Korea – committing to share the mammoth costs of sheltering refugees and rebuilding North Korea’s economy.	说服中国实施可能导致政权崩溃的制裁也将需要给予其一定得经济承诺，整个国际社会，特别是美日韩，应承诺分担一部分庇护难民和重建朝鲜经济的巨大代价。


While China would inevitably cover a substantial share of these costs, owing to its geographic proximity and historic ties to the North, it needs reassurance that it would not be left to shoulder the burden alone.	虽然中国因其与朝鲜的地理距离和历史关系而不可避免地需要承担这些费用的很大一部分，但它需要得到保证不会被留下来单独扛这个重担。


Admittedly, this approach is somewhat reminiscent of the one taken at the 1945 Yalta Conference, where leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the US carved out geopolitical spheres of influence in post-World War II Europe.	诚然，这种做法有点让人想起1945年雅尔塔会议上所采取的方式——苏联，英国和美国的领导人分割了第二次世界大战后欧洲的地缘政治影响力版图。


Moral and ideological objections, therefore, are to be expected.	因此出现道德和意识形态上的反对意见也不奇怪。


But it’s time to get real.	但现在是时候直面现实了。


The nuclear threat posed by North Korea is serious, immediate, and requires a bold response.	朝鲜造成的核威胁严峻而直接，需要大胆的反应。


This is not the time to be constrained by conventions and ideology; it is the time to do whatever is needed to defuse nuclear tensions and protect the lives of those in the Kim regime’s crosshairs.	这不是应该被公约和意识形态束手束脚的时候了。 现在是时候做任何必要的事情来缓解核紧张局势，以挽救被金正恩政权导弹瞄准的人们的生命。


China is the only country with the power to force North Korea to change its nuclear policy. Convincing the Chinese to wield that power must be world leaders’ top priority.	中国是唯一有权迫使朝鲜改变其核政策的国家，而说服中国人去动用这一权力则是世界领导人的首要任务。


North Korea and US Leadership	朝鲜与美国的领导力


DENVER – Earlier this month, North Korea went a couple of weeks without launching any missiles or testing nuclear weapons.	发自丹佛——在8月初那段时间，朝鲜已经连续几周没有发射任何导弹或测试核武器了。


That short interval, which has since ended, was enough to inspire US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to declare that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was showing “restraint.”	而这一短暂（并很快告终）的停歇启发了美国国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson），让他宣布朝鲜领导人金正恩已经表现出“克制”。


Perhaps, Tillerson concluded, Kim is ready to engage in dialogue.	蒂勒森总结说，或许金正恩准备好重开对话了。


To some extent, he may be right.	在某种程度上，他可能是对的。


To be sure, claims that the North was showing restraint were clearly premature: North Korea has since fired three short-range ballistic missiles from its east coast into the sea, and, more ominously, launched a ballistic missile over northern Japan.	不过这份朝鲜表现克制的声明显然站不住脚：自那以后朝鲜从东海岸向海面发射了三枚短程弹道导弹； 更令人忧心是，还发射了一枚飞越日本北部的弹道导弹。


Tillerson’s optimism about such a short pause reflects the pressure diplomats face in reassuring allies – and, in Tillerson’s case, his boss, President Donald Trump – and easing tensions with enemies.	蒂勒森对这段短暂停歇期所急于表现出的乐观态度反映了外交人员在安抚盟友——还有他老板特朗普——以及缓解与敌人的紧张关系方面压力不小。


Nonetheless, Tillerson is probably right that North Korea is ready to talk to the United States – but only as one nuclear-weapons state to another.	尽管如此，蒂尔森认为朝鲜准备和美国谈判的说法可能是对的——但只能一个核武国家与另一个核武国家之间的谈判。


What the country’s leaders are patently not ready for is to meet America’s own requirement: that negotiations are based on the international commitments made in 2005, at the end of the fourth round of the so-called six-party talks.	但朝鲜领导人显然没有准备好去遵守美国自己的要求：这场谈判应当基于2005年所谓六方会谈第四轮结束时所作出的国际承诺。


Chief among those commitments, enshrined in a joint statement released at the end of the talks, is North Korea’s abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”	在谈判结束时发表的联合声明中列明，首要承诺是朝鲜放弃“一切核武器及现有核计划”。


In exchange, the other five participants in the talks (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US) were supposed to provide North Korea with energy and economic assistance, respect its sovereignty, and pursue the normalization of diplomatic relations.	作为交换条件，另外五个谈判方（中国，日本，俄罗斯，韩国和美国）应该向朝鲜提供能源和经济援助，尊重其主权并实现外交正常化。


The five participants stood by their commitments, but North Korea repudiated its own in 2009.	五方都遵守了承诺，但朝鲜却在2009年反悔了。


According to critics, creating the “precondition” that the North stick to its original commitments amounts to a death blow to new talks.	批评家认为，将朝鲜坚持原有承诺作为“先决条件”是对新谈判的一大打击。 但事实上，金正恩对恢复旨在实现朝鲜半岛无核化六方进程毫无兴趣。


And, indeed, the Kim regime has shown no interest in resuming the six-party process, the stated purpose of which is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. In its 2013 constitution, North Korea for the first time even referred to itself as a “nuclear state.”	朝鲜甚至在其2013年首次修订的《确立党唯一领导体系的十大原则》中首度将自己称之为“核国家”（文件原文为：“具备了以核武器为核心的军事力量”）。


Tillerson rightly refers to a two-track policy toward North Korea.	蒂勒森也适当地提到了对朝执行的双轨政策。


One track is dialogue; the other is pressure, applied through sanctions and other measures aimed at isolating North Korea and convincing its leadership that it has no future with nuclear weapons.	一条轨道是对话； 另一条是施压，通过制裁和其他旨在孤立朝鲜并说服其领导层核武之路没有未来的措施来实施。


After North Korea’s tests of its new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month, Tillerson and the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, focused on the second track, working with other Security Council members to impose the toughest sanctions ever against the North.	在7月朝鲜试射其新型洲际弹道导弹后，蒂勒森和美国驻联合国大使妮基·哈雷（Nikki Haley）把重点放在了第二轨道上，与其他安理会成员国一道对朝鲜施加了最严厉的制裁。


Those sanctions could erode much of North Korea’s trade with China, the Kim regime’s economic lifeline.	这些制裁可以削弱朝鲜与中国的大部分贸易，而这是金正恩的经济命脉所在。


But the US cannot rely excessively on other countries to constrain the North Korean regime, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons is not a symbolic quest.	但美国不可过分依赖别国来约束朝鲜政权。


As its ICBM tests show, the goal is to threaten the US explicitly, in order to compel it to reduce its presence in Northeast Asia – and perhaps even reconsider its alliances with Japan and South Korea.	须知朝鲜发展核武器可不是什么象征性动作，正如本次洲际弹道导弹测试所体现的那样，其目标是明确威慑美国，迫使其减少在东北亚的存在——甚至可能重新考虑与日韩两国的联盟关系。


This ambitious goal is not without tacit support in the world: Russia and China have proposed that the US suspend its annual military exercises with the South, in exchange for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program.	而这一雄心勃勃的目标背后也不乏世界其他势力的默默支持：俄罗斯和中国就提出美国应该暂停与韩国的年度军事演习，以换取朝鲜核计划的冻结。


This supposedly fair-minded “freeze-for-freeze” proposal would do more to weaken the US-South Korea alliance than it would to impede North Korea’s development of a deliverable nuclear weapon.	相对于对朝鲜发展核武投送技术的阻碍，这个看似公平的“冻结对冻结”提议对美韩联盟的破坏性更大。


The proposal highlights how difficult it is to mount an international response to the North Korea nuclear issue.	这一提议也展现出对撮合一项对朝鲜核问题的国际回应有多困难。


Though China agreed to the recent sanctions in the Security Council, there is widespread skepticism about whether there is an internal consensus about the future it wants for the Korean Peninsula.	虽然中国同意了安全理事会最近的制裁决议，但外界普遍怀疑该国对朝鲜半岛的未来是否存在内部共识。


Russia, for its part, seems to be pursuing a foreign policy guided more by spite than national interest.	俄罗斯方面似乎正在追求一个对抗性的外交政策，而不是以国家利益为导向。


America’s allies in the region, meanwhile, are under serious pressure.	与此同时，美国的盟友们也面临着严峻的压力。


South Korea’s new government is stuck between the need to manage its relations with the US and the desire to open a dialogue with the North.	韩国的新政府在处理与美关系以及与朝鲜展开对话的愿望之间左右为难。


And, as the North’s latest missile launch shows, Japan’s hosting of US military assets puts it on the front lines of the crisis.	而正如朝鲜最近导弹试射所体现的那样，日本容留美国军事资产的行为也致其置身于危机的第一线。


This complex situation would require careful and precise diplomacy in the best of times, with the US using the various levers of its power.	这一复杂局势需要在最恰当的时间点以极为仔细和精确的外交手段才能应对，同时要求美国动用自身力量的各类杠杆。


But this is not the best of times.	但目前还不是最佳时点。


Trump has been mercurial, given to making unscripted pronouncements on the topic.	特朗普一直都反复无常，老是在这个问题上发表些信口胡说的声明。


This has called for assurances from Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and others eager to mitigate the impact of bellicose exclamations – incongruously issued off the cuff from the clubhouse of a golf course – about “fire and fury.”	这就只能靠国务卿蒂勒森，国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯（James Mattis）和其他希望减轻所谓“怒火与打击”的好战言论（总统在某高尔夫球场俱乐部会所里随性发出的）的人们去消除这一影响。


Trump’s statements about China’s role in addressing the problem don’t help, as they imply an interest in effectively outsourcing the job of reining in the Kim regime, in exchange for vague economic and trade assurances.	特朗普关于中国在解决该问题上作用的声明也没什么帮助，因为它们意味着他实际上想将遏制金正恩政权的工作外包以换取模糊的经济和贸易保证。


The result is a perception of American unseriousness about this most serious of challenges.	结果只是让人感觉到美国人对这个最严峻挑战的漠视。


The Trump administration has assembled before it all the components of an effective North Korea strategy: cooperation with China; pressure on North Korea through sanctions and isolation; reassurance of allies, including by providing the most up-to-date anti-ballistic missile defenses; and a willingness to talk.	特朗普当局已经集齐了实施有效朝鲜战略的所有组成部分：与中国的合作； 通过制裁和孤立对朝鲜施压；


But for any of these instruments to have an impact, they must be used in concert and with precision in tone and substance – a quality of statecraft that the Trump administration has been slow to master.	并表现出谈话的意愿。 但如果想让这些“乐器”都能发挥作用，就必须像主持一场音乐会样把它们协调起来，音准和乐曲内容都不能出偏差——无奈特朗普政府在这种治国之道上似乎缺乏天赋。


In this sense, the challenge in North Korea is not just a nuclear crisis. It is a crisis of the quality of US leadership.	在这个意义上，朝鲜的挑战不仅仅是一场核危机，更是美国领导质量的危机。


Many see the problem, but no one knows yet how to overcome it.	许多人看到了这个问题，只是没有人该知道如何克服这个问题。


Planning for Korean Reunification	准备朝鲜重新统一


SEOUL – The long-simmering North Korean nuclear crisis has reached a near boiling point.	首尔—有如文火慢炖般的朝鲜核危机终于接近了沸点。


Last month, the Hermit Kingdom launched two intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting major US cities.	上个月，这个隐秘王国发射了两枚能够袭击美国大城市的洲际弹道导弹。


The United Nations Security Council responded with a unanimous vote to impose new economic sanctions on the country – the most stringent yet – which would cut at least one third of its annual export revenue.	联合国安理会因此一致投票同意对朝鲜施加新的经济制裁——也是迄今为止最严厉的制裁，将至少让朝鲜出口收入减少三分之一。


Since then, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump have been hurling escalating threats at each other.	此后，朝鲜领导人金正恩和美国总统特朗普的口头威胁日益升级。


At this point, it is impossible to say what will happen on the Korean Peninsula.	到了这个地步，不可能预料朝鲜半岛会发生什么。


For now, all the international community can really do is continue to leverage a combination of economic sanctions, military pressures, and diplomacy to try to get the Kim regime to the negotiating table.	目前，整个国际社会确实能够做的，无非是继续利用经济制裁、军事压力和外交斡旋多管齐下，让金氏政权回到谈判桌前。


But, at the same time, we should consider and prepare for all eventualities, from a military conflict to the peaceful reunification of North and South Korea.	但与此同时，我们应该考虑所有可能性并做好准备，不管是军事冲突还是南北朝鲜的和平统一。


The most catastrophic scenario would undoubtedly be a military conflict.	最糟糕的灾难性情景当然是军事冲突。


And yet the likelihood of that outcome has now actually increased, owing to the Trump administration’s recent announcement that it is reviewing its military options, including “preventive war.”	但这一结果的可能性事实上大大增加了，因为特朗普政府最近宣布正在评估军事选项，包括“预防性的战争”。


The truth is that a preemptive strike is far from a practical solution.	真相是先发制人的打击远非务实选择。


It is not at all clear that such an approach would lead to North Korean denuclearization or topple the Kim regime.	这一方针是否能让朝鲜去核化或推翻金氏政权，我们完全不清楚。


What it could do is escalate into an armed confrontation between the US and China, with nuclear war being the worst possible outcome.	不过它演变为美国和中国之间的武装冲突，甚至爆发核战争这一最坏的结果，这倒是可能的。


South Koreans, well within the range of the North’s weapons, would suffer dearly from the Kim regime’s retaliation against a US strike.	位于朝鲜武器射程之内的韩国，将因为金氏政权报复美国的打击而遭受惨痛代价。


To put it into perspective, the Korean War of 1950-1953 killed more than two million Koreans, as well as 36,000 Americans and 600,000 Chinese soldiers – and it didn’t even involve nuclear weapons.	在考虑这一点时，想一想1950—1953年的朝鲜战争杀死了两百多万韩国人，以及36,000美国人和600,000中国士兵——而这场战争并没有动用核武器。


A safer and more practical approach would focus on tightening the economic and political screws on North Korea.	一个更安全、更务实的方针是着重于加紧对朝鲜的经济这政治制裁。


To be sure, some argue that economic sanctions, however harsh, would be inadequate to compel North Korea’s leaders to give up their nuclear weapons.	诚然，有人认为经济制裁不论多么严厉，都不足以迫使朝鲜领导人放弃核武器。


After all, both Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi halted their programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction, only to be driven out of power and then executed.	毕竟，伊拉克的萨达姆和利比亚的卡扎菲都停止了获得大规模杀伤性武器的计划，最后的结果是被推翻，然后被处决。


Given the risk implied by a military solution, more robust economic and political pressure remains the international community’s best bet for defusing the North Korean nuclear threat, whether by compelling the Kim regime to abandon its program or by triggering that regime’s collapse.	考虑到采取军事行动所隐含的风险，加强的经济和政治压力仍然是国际社会解决朝鲜核威胁的最好办法，不管是通过迫使金氏政权放弃核计划，还是通过引发政权更迭实现。


The UN Security Council sanctions are a step in the right direction, but they are not enough, as they do not ban supplies of oil to the North, apparently due to Chinese and Russian opposition.	联合国安理会的制裁是方向正确的一步，但还不够，因为它没有禁止向朝鲜供给原油，而这显然是因为中国和俄罗斯的反对。


In fact, though China agreed to the sanctions, it remains reluctant to aggravate its already tense relationship with its North Korean client.	事实上，尽管中国同意了制裁，但它并不愿意进一步恶化与其被保护人朝鲜已经十分紧张的关系。


This must change.	这一点必须改变。


Stronger and more focused US-China cooperation is essential if sanctions are to have a chance of working.	更强、更集中的中美合作是让制裁起作用的关键。


Avoiding such cooperation will only make a devastating outcome – be it a military conflict or an unruly collapse of the Kim regime – more likely.	避免这样的合作只能增加导致灾难性结果的可能性——不管是军事冲突还是金氏政权不可控地倒台。


China could still be persuaded to take a more active role in constraining the Kim regime.	仍然能够说服中国在约束金氏政权方面起到更加积极的作用。


Indeed, its uncooperativeness could damage its relationships with the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea – all of which are ultimately more valuable partners than the unruly, impoverished North Korea.	事实上，不合作可能危及其与美国、欧洲、日本和韩国的关系——而作为合作伙伴，它们都要比难以控制又一贫如洗的朝鲜更有价值。


But for China to do more, it needs assurances that it will not immediately lose its strategic buffer on the Korean Peninsula.	但要想中国做出更多贡献，就要保证它不会立即失去在朝鲜半岛的战略缓冲。


Hence the need for an agreement now on how to handle the potential collapse of the Kim regime and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.	因此，现在必须达成一个关于如何处理金氏政权可能的倒台、朝鲜半岛可能的统一的协议。


Like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kim regime’s collapse could come about quite suddenly.	和柏林墙的倒塌一样，金氏政权的倒台可能会在一夜之间发生。


So China needs to know now that a reunified Korea would not be its enemy, and that the US would withdraw its troops that are currently stationed in South Korea.	因此中国需要知道，统一的朝鲜不会是它的敌人，并且美国将撤出目前驻扎在韩国的军队。


Of course, the implications of a collapsed regime in North Korea extend far beyond China’s strategic interests.	当然，朝鲜政权的倒台的影响不仅仅限于中国的战略利益。


Indeed, it would have a major economic and political impact throughout the region.	事实上，这对于整个地区都将产生巨大的经济和政治影响。


That is all the more reason to put a comprehensive plan in place to ensure a peaceful transition.	因此，更加必须事先制定一套全面的计划以确保和平过渡。


I recently conducted a quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of unification on North and South Korea under several hypothetical scenarios, assuming North Korea’s sudden collapse.	我最近对南北朝鲜的统一的经济影响做了量化评估。 我做了几个假象情景，假设朝鲜突然崩溃。


As it turns out, a peacefully managed unification process, characterized by comprehensive economic reform and opening up, could enable North Korea to achieve sustained double-digit GDP growth, despite a sharp slowdown immediately following the collapse.	我的评估结果表明，和平管理的统一过程将伴随全面的经济改革和开放，能够让朝鲜实现持续的两位数GDP增长，但在崩溃之初，经济将急剧放缓。


The key to success would be to allow North Korea to take advantage of its relatively abundant human and natural resources, including rich mineral reserves, to achieve export-led industrialization.	成功的关键是让朝鲜利用其相对充足的人力和自然资源，包括丰富的矿藏，实现出口拉动型工业化。


As for South Korea, with sufficient preparation, effective policies, and more financial resources, it can manage a peaceful reunification and mitigate the adverse effects of the shock.	至于韩国，如能做好充分的准备，制定有效的政策，获得更多的金融资源，就能够管理好和平统一，减小冲击的消极影响。


By contrast, in a scenario where South Korea is unprepared for reunification and the North quickly dissolves in a state of disorder, the risk premium on the Korean Peninsula would jump sharply, and reforms would be delayed.	相反，如果韩国没有为统一做好准备，而朝鲜在无序状态下迅速解体，朝鲜半岛的风险升水将急剧上升，改革有可能被拖延。


This would lead to persistently weakened investment and GDP growth across the Korean Peninsula, causing South Korea’s GDP to decline by more than 3% in the initial years of the crisis.	这将导致整个朝鲜半岛投资和GDP增长持续萎靡，韩国GDP在危机的最初几年将收缩超过3%。


Inflows of migrants from the North would compound the risks, potentially disrupting South Korean labor markets and causing social unrest.	朝鲜移民的大量涌入将加剧风险，有可能干扰韩国劳动力市场、导致社会动荡。


For now, the international community, including China, should continue to push for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and pursue economic reforms, using ever-stronger economic sanctions.	目前，包括中国在内的国际社会应该利用不断加强的经济制裁，继续致力于推动朝鲜放弃核武器、采取经济改革。


Meanwhile, South Korea must continue its efforts to resume a dialogue with the North on humanitarian, health, and environmental issues.	与此同时，韩国韩国必须继续努力重启与朝鲜进行人道、卫生和环境问题的对话。


Civilian exchanges and information flows could nurture forces that would bring about fundamental change from the inside.	民间交流和信息流动有助于培养从内部发生根本性变化的力量。


Even after 70 years of division, South Koreans must not give up hope for peaceful reunification with our northern brethren. On the contrary, we must plan for it.	在分裂了70年后，韩国人仍然不可放弃与我们的北方同胞和平统一的希望，相反，我们必须充满希望。


The North Korean Cult	朝鲜崇拜


NEW YORK – The absurdity of the North Korean dictatorship is easy to caricature.	纽约——很容易用讽刺漫画来描绘朝鲜荒唐的专制制度。


Kim Jong-un, with his 1930s-style pudding-bowl haircut (cultivated, it is claimed, to make him resemble his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, the regime’s founder), his antiquated Mao suit, and his short, plump body, is almost like a cartoon character himself.	金正恩留着他30年代的老式布丁碗发型（据说他把发型修剪成这样是为了效仿他的祖父，朝鲜政权的创建者金日成）、身着过时的中山装、长着五短圆胖的身材，几乎本身就像极了一个卡通人物。


Officially regarded as an omnipotent genius, he is worshipped like a god and shown constantly surrounded by people, including his highest military officers festooned in medals, laughing or clapping, or shouting hysterically.	朝鲜官方将其视为无所不能的天才，他像神一样被人们所崇拜，只要一露面身边总是如众星捧月，身上挂满了奖章的朝鲜最高军事指挥官追随在他左右，金正恩总是大笑或者鼓掌，或者歇斯底里地大声叫喊。


As we know, of course, life in North Korea is anything but amusing.	当然，我们都知道，朝鲜的生活并不有趣。


Periodic famines devastate the population.	定期发生的饥荒摧毁了朝鲜民众。


Up to 200,000 political prisoners are kept as slaves in brutal labor camps, where they are lucky if they are not tortured to death.	残酷的劳改营像奴隶般关押着高达20万政治犯，如果没有被酷刑折磨致死他们其实就应当感到幸运。


And free speech does not exist.	言论自由根本不存在。


It is not only forbidden to express reservations about Kim’s divine status; staying alive requires regularly proclaiming one’s devotion.	人们不仅被严禁对金的神圣地位持保留态度； 而且要想生存就要经常宣誓自己的奉献精神。


It is possible, even likely, that many North Koreans behave like worshippers only because they must.	许多朝鲜人表现得像金的崇拜者很可能仅仅是因为这是生存的必须条件。


Others fall into line because they don’t know any better.	其他人欣然接受则是因为不了解实际是怎么回事。


Like people everywhere, they reflexively conform to the norms of the world around them, without thinking through their merits.	像世界各地的人们一样，他们条件反射式地遵守身边世界的规范，而不去思考其中所蕴含的优势及劣势。


But some North Koreans, perhaps many, might genuinely believe in the cult of the Kim Dynasty, which, like all cults (or indeed religious faiths), is made up of bits and pieces taken from other cultures, beliefs, and traditions.	但有些朝鲜人，这些人可能还为数不少，或许真心相信金氏王朝的个人崇拜，金氏王朝像所有邪教（或者任何宗教信仰）一样，来源于撷取自其他文化、信仰和传统的零零星星的碎片。


The Kim cult owes something to Stalinism, something to messianic Christianity, something to Confucian ancestor worship, something to indigenous shamanism, and something to the emperor worship of the Japanese, who ruled Korea in the first half of the twentieth century.	金式教派某些元素来自于斯大林主义、有些来自于救世主基督教、有些来自于儒家的祖先崇拜、有些来自于土生土长的萨满教、有些来自于日本的天皇崇拜，天皇曾在20世纪前半叶担任过朝鲜的领袖。


Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, was supposed to have been born on Mount Paektu, believed to be a sacred spot where the divine founder of the first Korean kingdom, a bear-man named Tangun, was born more than 4,000 years ago.	外界认为金的父亲金正日出生于白头山，那里被视为一块圣地，首届朝鲜王朝的神圣创建者，一个名叫檀君的熊人，就出生在4，000年前的某个时候。


The birth of Kim Jong-il, also known as the Dear Leader (his father, Kim Il-sung, was the Great Leader), turned winter into spring and was illuminated by a bright star in heaven.	被称为“亲爱的领袖”的金正日（也就是“伟大领袖”金日成的儿子）将冬天变成了春天，并被天堂里一颗明亮的星星所照耀。


All of this might sound zany, but the stories of miracles in any faith invariably do.	所有这一切可能听上去都非常滑稽，但任何信仰中的奇迹故事都无一例外具有这样的特色。


What matters is that people believe them.	重要的是人们是否相信这些故事。


In this respect, North Koreans are no weirder than believers anywhere else.	在这方面，朝鲜人并不比其他地方的信徒更加怪异。


There are often good reasons why certain beliefs have a strong appeal.	某些信仰完全有理由具有强大的吸引力。


Islam and Christianity found ready converts among outcasts and the oppressed because they offered equality in the eyes of God.	伊斯兰教和基督教因为宣扬在上帝眼中的平等而吸引被遗弃者和被压迫者选择皈依。


The North Korean faith is altogether less inclusive.	朝鲜人的信仰从根本上不具有包容的特质。


Indeed, at its core is a sense of ethnic purity, a feeling of sacred nationalism that must be defended at any cost against hostile forces.	事实上，这种信仰的核心是民族纯洁感，信仰者认为必须不惜一切代价捍卫这种神圣的民族主义不受敌对势力的侵蚀。


Like Poland, which has a strong Christian self-image of national martyrdom, Korea has a history of being dominated by greater powers, mainly China, but also Russia, and, most notably since the brutal invasions of the sixteenth century, Japan.	像波兰这样具有强烈民族牺牲意识的基督教国家一样，朝鲜曾在漫长的历史上被大国所主导，这些大国主要是中国，但也包括俄罗斯，其中最明显的是16世纪日本统治者野蛮的侵略历史。


The Americans are latecomers, but official hatred of American imperialism in North Korea stems not only from the savage Korean War, but also from the long memory of foreign oppression.	美国人是后来者，但朝鲜对美帝国主义的官方仇恨不仅来自于野蛮的朝鲜战争，同时也来自于外国压迫留下的漫长而痛苦的记忆。


Domination by outside powers created poles of collaboration and resistance in Korean history.	外国列强的占领在朝鲜历史上打造了合作和抵抗的两极。


Some of the ruling classes in various Korean kingdoms cooperated with the foreign powers, and some struggled against them.	历届朝鲜王国都有某些统治者与域外大国合作，也有人与他们斗争到底。


This resulted in deep hatreds among Koreans themselves.	这导致朝鲜民众之间刻骨的仇恨和分歧。


Kim Il-sung began his career as a collaborator.	金日成的政治生涯就从合作开始。


He was handpicked by Stalin to be a puppet Communist leader in the North.	他被斯大林亲手选中作为一个北方共产主义傀儡领导人。


This made the legend of Kim as a resistance hero against the Japanese during World War II, and later against the Americans and their South Korean “collaborators,” all the more important.	这成就了金日成在二战期间抗击日本帝国主义的英雄神话，更重要的是，后来金的对立面又变成了美国人及韩国的“合作者”。


North Korean nationalism, with its cult of self-reliance known as Juche, is as religious as it is political.	朝鲜民族主义崇尚在朝鲜语中被称为Juche的自治，这既是一种宗教也是一种政治信仰。


Defending the Kim dynasty, built up as a symbol of Korean resistance to foreign powers, is a sacred task.	捍卫象征朝鲜抵制外国列强事业的金氏王朝是一项神圣的任务。


And when the sacred takes over politics, compromise becomes almost impossible.	而当神圣在政治领域占据主导地位时，妥协几乎就成为不可能的。


People can negotiate over conflicting interests, but not over matters that are considered holy.	人们可以就利益冲突进行谈判，但被视为神圣的领域却是谈判的禁地。


Donald Trump, a real estate developer, believes that everything is negotiable.	房地产开发商出身的唐纳德·特朗相信任何事务都是可以谈判的。


Nothing is sacred in business.	商业领域不存在神圣二字。


His idea of making a deal is to overwhelm the other party with bluff and intimidation, hence his promise to “totally destroy North Korea” (a promise, by the way, that would mean more than 20 million dead).	他所谓的交易理念是借助虚张声势和威胁恐吓彻底压倒另一方，因此他号称要彻底摧毁朝鲜（顺便提一句，他的这个威胁意味着两千万人死亡的惨剧）。


It is hard to imagine how Kim Jong-un, as the divine defender of his people, could be persuaded by such bluster to negotiate.	很难想象作为本国民众神圣捍卫者的金正恩能够被这样的咆哮所说服参与到谈判当中。


It is possible that Kim, and perhaps even some subjects of his despotic rule, would rather be obliterated than give in.	金正恩，也许甚至还有其专制统治下的某些被统治者，做出了宁为玉碎而不为瓦全的选择。


It would not be the first time that a cult turned suicidal.	邪教演变为以自杀为目的也不是第一次了。


But there is another, more likely, risk.	但还有另一种，也是可能性更大的一种风险。


Because Trump’s hostile tweets and swaggering public utterances are usually followed by more cautious statements from senior members of his cabinet, Kim might not take them seriously.	因为特朗普充满敌意的推特和令人震惊的公开言论往往都会引来其内阁高级官员的更加谨慎的声明，金正恩可能根本没有认真对待。


He may well think that Trump is all bluff and will never carry out his threats.	他可能认为特朗普就是在虚张声势，他威胁的内容永远也不会兑现。


This might prod Kim into taking some reckless action – aiming a missile at Guam, for example – to which the US would feel it must respond in kind.	这可能导致金正恩采取一些鲁莽的行动——例如将导弹瞄准关岛——而美国面对这样的挑衅会感觉必须以同样方式作出回应。


The result would be a catastrophe, not only for the Koreans who believe in Kim’s sacred mission, but above all for millions of Koreans, just 35 miles from the North Korean border, who have no part in the Kim cult at all.	这样做会造成灾难性的后果，不仅那些相信金神圣使命的人会受到危害，同样深受其害的还会有成百上千万朝鲜人，这些人就生活在离朝鲜边境35英里处，他们与金正恩教派没有任何联系。


North Korea’s Real Strategy	朝鲜真正的战略


DENVER – North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons is often depicted as a “rational” response to its strategic imperatives of national security and regime survival.	丹佛—朝鲜追求核武器常常被描述为对其国家安全和政权生存的战略要务的“理性”反应。


After all, the country is surrounded by larger, supposedly hostile states, and it has no allies on which it can rely to come to its defense.	毕竟，朝鲜被比它更大、怀有敌意的国家所环绕，也没有能够依赖的盟友为其提供防务。


It is only logical, on this view, that Kim Jong-un wants to avoid the mistake made by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, both of whom would still be alive and in power had they acquired deliverable nuclear weapons.	这样看来，金正日想要避免伊拉克的萨达姆和利比亚的卡扎菲的覆辙相当合理，萨达姆和卡扎菲当初要是已经获得了可发射的核武器的话，现在肯定还活着掌权。


In fact, North Korea’s appetite for nuclear weapons is rooted more in aggression than pragmatism.	事实上，朝鲜对核武器的渴望更多地源自攻击性，而不是务实性。


North Korea seeks nothing less than to decouple the United States from its South Korean partner – a split that would enable the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on Kim’s terms.	朝鲜最大的目标就是要让美国与其韩国盟友“分手”——这样，朝鲜半岛就可以按照金正恩的想法实现统一。


In other words, North Korea does not want only to defend itself; it wants to set the stage for an invasion of its own.	换句话说，朝鲜想要的不仅仅是自卫，还想为自身的入侵创造条件。


Of course, such a scenario is, in many ways, the stuff of fancy.	当然，这一情景从诸多角度看都纯属幻想。


But to be a North Korean today is not necessarily to accept the world as it is.	但身为今天的朝鲜人，未必接受真实的世界状况。


And North Korean propaganda continues to reiterate the view that the Korean Peninsula consists of one people, sharing one language and one culture, indivisible – except by outsiders like the US.	朝鲜宣传机器一直在反复强调，朝鲜半岛只有一个民族，共用一种语言和一个文化，朝鲜半岛是不可分割的——除非美国这样的局外人插手。


By this logic, the North needs to find a way to discourage those outsiders from intervening in the peninsula’s affairs.	根据这一逻辑，朝鲜需要设法阻止局外人干预半岛事物。


As it stands, the US-South Korea relationship operates on the basis of something like the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective-defense clause, Article 5: any North Korean aggression against South Korea will, it is assured, be met by the combined forces of South Korea and the US.	目前，美韩关系的基础类似于北大西洋条约的集体防御条款，即第五条：只要朝鲜入侵韩国，韩国和美国就会组成联军予以回击。


Such a counterattack would be decisive, ensuring the total destruction of the North Korean regime.	这样的反击将是决定性的，不推翻朝鲜政权决不罢休。


If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, however, it might be able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula.	但是，如果朝鲜拥有了长程武器，它就有望改变这一战略算盘。 它可以威胁，如果美国干预朝鲜半岛，就向美国本土发动核打击。


The US might intervene anyway, launching its own devastating attack on North Korea.	美国仍然有可能干预，对朝鲜发动毁灭性打击。


But it might also choose not to risk casualties on its own soil.	但也有可能选择不冒本土受到牵连的险。


If the US did shirk its collective-defense responsibilities, South Korea would still have plenty of recourse against its northern neighbor.	如果美国真的推卸自己的集体防御责任，韩国仍有充足的资源对付朝鲜。


After all, South Korea’s conventional forces are far better trained, equipped, and motivated than their North Korean counterparts.	毕竟，韩国常规力量在训练、装备和动员方面都要远强于朝鲜。


But it is hard to say whether the North Koreans know that.	但很难说朝鲜人是否知道这一点。


Like many dictatorships before them, they may be the first to believe their own propaganda – in this case, that they can succeed against a South Korean foe that is not buttressed by American military might.	与此前的许多独裁政权一样，他们可能是最相信自己的宣传机器的人——即，只要韩国没有美国力量的扶持，他们就能成功战胜它。


In any case, North Korea – which has invested heavily in forward deployed special forces and other asymmetrical elements of contemporary warfare – seems to be gearing up for an offensive, if only it can get the US out of the way.	无论如何，朝鲜大力投资于前线特种部队和其他现代战争的非对称要素，它似乎是在准备进攻，只要能让美国出局，就万事俱备了。


Against this background, efforts to bring the Kim regime back to the negotiating table – spearheaded largely by China – are misguided.	在这样的背景下，试图让朝鲜政权回归谈判桌的策略——主要是中国在牵头——是错误的。


Such efforts aim to persuade North Koreans to freeze all missile and nuclear tests, in exchange for a scale-down and delay of annual joint exercises by US and South Korean forces.	这一策略旨在说服朝鲜冻结一切导弹和核试验，作为交换，一年一度的美韩联合军演将会缩减规模、推迟时间。


Advocates of this so-called “freeze for freeze” approach say that such a tradeoff is only fair: the North cannot be expected to suspend its efforts to strengthen its defensive capabilities if the US and South Korea are pursuing supposedly hostile military cooperation in its near-abroad.	这一所谓的“冻结换冻结”方针的支持者说，如此权衡非常公平：只要美国和韩国在朝鲜周边进行敌对的军事合作，就无法指望朝鲜停止加强其防御能力的努力。


But this argument has it backward.	但这一观点是有缺陷的。


In fact, it is the North whose activities are inherently hostile, and the South, along with the US, that is focused on defense.	其实怀有固有敌意的是朝鲜，而韩国和美国则一直注重防御。


Indeed, planning for the annual US-South Korea spring exercises is always based on the premise that North Korea has invaded the South, not vice versa.	事实上，一年一度的美韩春季军演的计划总是以朝鲜入侵韩国为假象情景，而非相反。


North Korea knows this well.	朝鲜对此心知肚明。


But North Korea also knows that, without joint exercises, a military alliance becomes weak and hollow.	但朝鲜同样明白，不进行联合军演，军事联盟就是徒有其表。


In 1939, for example, when Germany invaded Poland, the British and French, per their treaty with Poland, declared war on Germany.	比如，1939年德国入侵波兰，英国和法国根据它们与波兰签署的协定向德国宣战。


But, in reality, they did little to protect Poland, which Germany subjugated rather quickly.	但在现实中，它们几乎没有采取任何保护波兰的措施，波兰也很快被德国吞并。


If the US suspends joint military exercises with South Korea, its willingness or ability to respond to North Korean aggression in the South may become similarly weak.	如果美国停止与韩国的联合军演，其响应朝鲜入侵韩国的意愿和能力也将如同当年的英国和法国一样虚弱。


This scenario is all the more dangerous, given the possibility that the suspension of missile and nuclear tests may not actually lead to a concomitant weakening of North Korea’s nuclear program.	这一情景非常危险，因为中止导弹和核试验的可能性事实上并不会阻碍朝鲜的核计划。


Testing is only a small element of a weapons program – and not necessarily an essential one.	试验只是武器计划的一小部分，并且不是关键部分。


There is no sign that the North Koreans would actually end research and development of nuclear weapons.	没有任何迹象表明朝鲜会真的放弃研究和发展核武器。


In fact, the idea that North Korea will abandon its weapons programs in exchange for the promise of security and regime survival has been tested has failed whenever it has been tested.	事实上，朝鲜会放弃武器计划以换取安全承诺和政权生存的概念从来没有成功经受过考验。


In September 2005, five world powers, including the US, offered North Korea an unimpeded civilian nuclear program, energy assistance, economic aid, and diplomatic recognition, as well as a promise to establish a regional mechanism for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia.	2005年9月，包括美国在内的世界五大强国给朝鲜开出的条件是可以畅通推进民用核计划、给予能源援助、经济援助和外交承认，并承诺建立一个保持东北亚和平与安全的地区机制。


A US commitment not to attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons was also included in the deal.	美国还在协议中承诺不对朝鲜发动常规和核武器打击。


All North Korea had to do to secure these benefits was abandon its nuclear-weapons programs and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.	要获得这些好处，朝鲜唯一要做的就是放弃核武计划、加入核不扩散条约。


But the North was not willing to allow for a credible verification protocol.	但朝鲜不愿同意签署可信的核查协议。


Instead, it attempted to limit verification to that which was already known.	相反，它要求核查限定于已知的项目。


In the end, it walked away from the agreement, rather than work to find an acceptable way forward.	最终，朝鲜没有同意这一协定，而是寻求它可以接受的方案。


A stronger and more purposeful US-China dialogue on North Korea is essential to resolving what is emerging as the world’s most urgent security problem.	更强大、更有目的性的中美朝鲜问题对话对于解决这个全球最紧迫的安全问题至关重要。


But the discussion should focus on direct measures to impede and undermine the country’s inherently aggressive nuclear program – not to offer more concessions that will only strengthen a rogue regime’s hand.	但对话应该聚焦于采取直接措施遏制和阻挠朝鲜固有的侵略性核计划——而不是提供更多的让步，让步只能让流氓政权得寸进尺。


The Only Way Forward on North Korea	朝鲜问题的唯一前进路径


SEOUL – Could the world soon witness another devastating war on the Korean Peninsula?	发自首尔——朝鲜半岛是否即将爆发另一场毁灭性战争？


That question looms large in many conversations these days.	这些问题近来已经成为多场对话中的热门话题了。


Of course, concerns about the North Korean regime’s nuclear-weapons program are nothing new.	各界对朝鲜核武计划的担忧早就不是一天两天了。


The United States first tried to resolve the issue back in 1994, with the US-North Korean Agreed Framework; but that effort gradually collapsed, owing to actions taken – and not taken – on both sides.	美国先是在1994年试图用美朝框架协议来解决这个问题； 但在双方随后的作为（以及不作为）让这一努力逐渐失效。


Then, in 2006, Kim Jong-il’s regime detonated North Korea’s first nuclear device, and put the issue squarely back on the United Nations Security Council’s agenda.	到了2006年，金正日政权引爆了朝鲜的第一个核装置，也把这个问题一把推到了联合国安理会的议程上。


In the ensuing decade, North Korea has conducted five more nuclear tests – most recently in September – and demonstrated the technological mastery needed to develop advanced thermonuclear weapons.	在接下来的十年中朝鲜进行了五次核试验——最近那次在今年9月——并展示了开发先进热核武器所需的精湛技术。


And, under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, the situation escalated further when the regime began making significant progress toward developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the US mainland.	而政权在金正恩领导下开始大力发展射程到达美国大陆本土的洲际弹道导弹时，形势进一步升级。


And this development coincided with the arrival of US President Donald Trump, who has promised a new approach to global affairs.	而这一进展恰逢美国总统特朗普上台，而后者承诺将采用新手法来处理全球事务。


North Korea has made clear its commitment to developing a long-range nuclear-strike capacity. In the regime’s view, nuclear weapons are its only insurance against attack.	朝鲜明确表示致力于发展远程核打击能力，因为在该政权眼中核武器是保护自身不受进攻的唯一保险。


Without them, Kim believes, he would share the fate of others who abandoned their pursuit of nuclear arms, such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya.	金正恩认为一旦没有了核武器，他就会跟其他那些放弃追求核武器的领导人——比如伊拉克的萨达姆和利比亚的卡扎菲——是一个下场了。


In this context, the US objective of a denuclearized North Korea disarmed of ICBMs is unachievable by diplomatic means.	在这一大背景下，美国关于实现朝鲜无核无洲际弹道导弹化的目标是无法通过外交手段实现的。


And, at any rate, Trump has declared diplomacy a “waste of time,” and ominously warned that “only one thing will work,” though he hasn’t explained what that means.	而且无论如何特朗普已经宣布外交行动是“浪费时间”，并不怀好意地警告说“只有一种方法能奏效”（但他并未解释这是什么意思）。


Given that neither the US nor North Korea has shown any enthusiasm for talks, one could conclude that war is inevitable.	既然美国和朝鲜都没有表现出什么谈判欲望，我们可以判定战争是不可避免的。


Yet, for all its bellicosity, the North Korean regime is unlikely to start a full-scale military conflict, because that would surely spell its demise.	然而朝鲜政权纵使四处挑衅，却不大可能首先发动全面的军事冲突，因为简直就是自取灭亡。


At the same time, the US has no good first-strike options.	与此同时美国手里也没有好的首先攻击选项。


Surgical strikes may sound promising, but they are hardly foolproof.	外科手术式打击可能听起来很靠谱，但也绝非万无一失。


As US military commanders well know, strikes that failed to eliminate all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons at once could trigger a regional – or even a nuclear – war costing millions of lives.	所有美军指挥官都明白如果没法一次过消灭朝鲜的所有核武器，就可能引发一场夺去数百万人生命的区域（甚至是核）战争。


In the US, those who argue for military action often claim that deterrence will not work against an “irrational” regime.	在美国，那些鼓吹军事行动的人常常声称威慑对一个“非理性”政权是不起作用的。


But there is no reason to assume that Kim is bent on mass suicide.	但也没有理由假设金正日会选择把自己逼上绝路。


After all, when Mao’s China made a dash for nuclear weapons in the 1960s, its rationale was little different from that of North Korea today, but no one doubted that deterrence would work.	毕竟当毛泽东领导的中国在1960年代造出核武的时候其背后逻辑与今天的朝鲜大同小异，而当时也没人认为威慑会奏效。


Still, even assuming that deterrence – embodied in Trump’s threat that the US will “totally destroy” North Korea – does work, it will not prevent a nuclear- and ICBM-armed North Korea from fundamentally altering the strategic calculus in northeast Asia.	然而，即使假设威慑——体现在特朗普声称美国将“完全摧毁”朝鲜的威胁上——确实有用，这样做也无法阻止一个拥有核武和洲际弹道导弹的朝鲜从根本上改变东北亚的战略演算。


The US nuclear deterrent protects the US first and foremost. It remains to be seen if US “extended deterrence” will continue to protect American allies such as South Korea and Japan.	美国的核威慑力量首先是为了保护美国，而美国的“延伸威慑”会否继续保护美国的盟国（如韩国和日本）则不得而知。


If the US mainland becomes a potential target for a North Korean nuclear strike, then the credibility of deterrence could depend on whether the US is willing to sacrifice San Francisco to save Seoul or Tokyo.	如果美国大陆本土成为朝鲜核打击的潜在目标，那么这一威慑的可靠度就得取决于美国是否愿意牺牲旧金山来拯救首尔或东京。


Doubt about the US nuclear umbrella in the region could lead South Korea and Japan to decide to develop their own nuclear options.	对美国核保护伞能否覆盖本地区的质疑可能导致韩国和日本决定发展自身的核选项。


In fact, South Korea had a nuclear-weapons program long before North Korea.	事实上韩国早在朝鲜之前就有了一个核武计划，只是在1975年签署《核不扩撒条约》后放弃了。


That program was abandoned when South Korea signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, but restarting it has become a subject of debate in Seoul.	而如今是否重启该计划已经成为首尔内部的一个辩论议题。


Needless to say, further nuclear escalation on the Korean Peninsula would be very dangerous, not least because the Kim regime would feel even more threatened than it already does.	朝鲜半岛核态势的进一步升级无疑非常危险的，尤其是金正恩政权会感觉自己受到的威胁比当前更大。


So far, the US approach to North Korea has been to tighten sanctions and outsource the problem to China.	到目前为止，美国对朝鲜的做法是收紧制裁并将问题外包给中国。


But while China does have strong economic ties to North Korea, it is unclear whether China has the clout to change the Kim regime’s behavior, even if it wanted to.	但中国虽然确实与朝鲜有着极为紧密的经济联系，不管中国是否愿意接下这个担子，它是否拥有改变金正恩政权行为的影响力还尚不明确。


Success would probably require something close to regime change.	要取得成功可能需要实现一些近似于政权更替的变化。


It is thus unwise to rely wholly on China.	完全依赖中国是不明智的。


Clearly, a broader diplomatic approach is needed, and it should start by addressing a fundamental issue at the heart of the problem: namely, that no peace treaty has ever been signed to end the 1950-1953 Korean War.	我们显然需要采取更着眼点更宏大的外交手段并从位处这一问题核心的根本点入手：即各方还未签署一项和平条约来结束1950~53年的朝鲜战争。


A dialogue to replace the 64-year-old armistice with a formal peace agreement could pave the way for broader discussions about nuclear escalation and other threats to regional stability.	通过用正式的和平协议来取代64年前的停战协定，就可以为针对核武升级以及其他区域稳定威胁的更广泛讨论铺平道路。


And, at a minimum, it could break today’s diplomatic stalemate and give the parties involved more reason to refrain from further provocations.	至少也可以打破今天的外交僵局，给予有关各方更多的理由以避免进一步的挑衅行为。


More broadly, a new round of diplomacy would have to address North Korea’s security concerns, and provide space for the North to evolve politically and economically, as China has done over the past few decades.	放大来说，新一轮外交还必须解决朝鲜的安全问题，为朝鲜营造出类似中国过去几十年那样的政治和经济发展空间。


This may seem like a distant prospect; but if the security situation on the peninsula is resolved, it would not be out of the question.	这一前景看似遥远； 但如果半岛的安全形势得以缓解，那也是可以讨论的。


The alternative is to continue on the current path and risk a military conflict or a full-scale war.	另一种选择是冒着爆发军事冲突或全面战争的风险继续坚持当前的路径。


Even if those worst-case scenarios were averted, the region would have nothing to look forward to but instability for years to come.	可就算能避免那些最坏的情况，该地区在今后几年中也不会有任何奔头，只能陷入持续动荡了。


The Wrong Way to Prevent Nuclear War	阻止核战争的错误方式


STOCKHOLM – A vast majority of countries want to eliminate the existential threat of nuclear catastrophe, and rightly so.	斯德哥尔摩—绝大部分国家都希望消除核灾难所带来的生存威胁，理应如此。


But achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is easier said than done, and there is a risk that some attempts to do so could prove self-defeating.	但实现无核武器的世界说起来容易做起来难，还存在好心办坏事的风险。


Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear stockpiles around the world have been significantly reduced.	自冷战结束以来，全世界核库存大大减少了。


Russia and the United States have each shrunk their nuclear arsenals by 80%, and during Barack Obama’s presidency, the US urged Russia to pursue further reductions.	俄罗斯和美国各自将核武库削减了80%，在奥巴马担任总统期间，美国还敦促俄罗斯进一步去核。


In Western Europe, the United Kingdom and France have both made their already small arsenals even smaller.	在西欧，英国和法国也已经进一步减少了核武器数量。


These countries had various reasons for reducing their stockpiles.	这些国家减少核库存的理由各不相同。


But, as signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the foundation of global efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons – they also had an obligation to do so.	但作为减小核武器威胁的全球性措施的基础——1968年核不扩散条约（NPT）的签署国，它们也有义务这样做。


In recent years, progress toward nuclear disarmament has stalled.	近几年来，去核化的进展陷入了停顿。


Russia is currently modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, and has started to mention its nuclear capacity more often in public statements.	俄罗斯最近正在现代化其战略核力量，并开始增加公开谈论其核能力的频率。


That explains why efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals in Western Europe have come to a halt.	这也解释了为何西欧暂停了去核。


The US, for its part, is also reviewing its options for modernizing its nuclear arsenal.	至于美国，它也在评估现代化核武库的选项。


Meanwhile, Pakistan has continued to produce the fissile materials used in nuclear weapons.	与此同时，巴基斯坦仍在制造用于核武器的裂变材料。


Efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone have gone nowhere, largely because of Israel.	中东无核化的努力毫无成效，主要原因在于以色列。


The international community could not agree on a way forward at NPT review conferences in 2005 and 2015.	在2005年和2015年的NPT评估会议上，国际社会都无法就未来政策形成统一意见。


And, of course, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have created another nuclear crisis in East Asia.	当然，朝鲜的核野心更是在东亚制造了又一次核危机。


Against this backdrop, a large bloc of countries has proposed a far-reaching Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a draft of which was endorsed by 122 United Nations member states in early July.	在这样的背景下，许多国家提出了一个意义深远的禁止核武器条约，其草案在7月初获得了122个联合国成员国的支持。


Unfortunately, what started as a worthwhile humanitarian effort has culminated in a severely flawed proposal.	不幸的是，这个极其重要的人道主义计划，最终只形成了一个有严重缺陷的方案。


Three issues stand out.	三个问题非常突出。


First, since no nuclear states support a nuclear-ban treaty, the current proposal, by itself, would not rid the world of a single nuclear warhead.	首先，没有一个有核国家支持禁核条约，因此当前的方案本身无法让世界减少哪怕一枚核弹。


Worse, the new treaty could undermine the NPT, which, despite its own flaws, has far wider backing, including that of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US).	更糟糕的是，新条约可能削弱NPT，尽管NPT自身也有缺陷，但它拥有更加广泛的支持，包括联合国五大常任理事国（中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国和美国）的支持。


Finally, by treating the concept of extended nuclear deterrence as illegal, or at least immoral, the draft treaty could actually threaten security in Europe and East Asia.	最后，草案将扩大核威慑的概念视为非法，或至少为不道德，因此可能威胁到欧洲和东亚的安全。


The initial draft treaty, when it was unveiled earlier this year, did not include language explicitly banning the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent.	公布于今年早些时候的第一份条约草案并不包括明确禁止使用核武器作为威慑的条款。


But the version that countries voted on in July did.	但7月份供各国投票的草案中写入了这些条款。


This is a critical change.	这是一项关键性变化。


The threat of a nuclear counterstrike is what keeps countries from using nuclear weapons in the first place.	核反击威胁是一开始就阻止各国使用核武器的关键。


And so-called extended deterrence through alliances is what protects non-nuclear states from being blackmailed by nuclear states.	所谓的通过联盟扩大威慑可以保护无核国家受有核国家的裹挟。


Without extended deterrence, non-nuclear countries could see fit to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.	没有了扩大威慑，无核国家有可能认为应该拥有自己的核武器。


It is for this reason that the Netherlands, the only NATO country to participate in developing the nuclear-ban treaty, ultimately voted against it.	出于这个原因，唯一的参与制定禁核条约的北约国家荷兰最终投了否决票。


Japan, the only country that has ever been attacked with nuclear weapons, has also withheld support for the treaty, because it relies on extended nuclear deterrence from the US.	唯一曾经遭受核武器打击的国家日本也没有支持该条约，因为它依靠于美国提供的扩大的核威慑。


Without such protection, Japan would be completely vulnerable to Chinese nuclear blackmail and North Korean missile attacks.	没有了美国的保护，日本在中国的核裹挟和朝鲜的导弹打击面前根本不堪一击。


Indeed, since diplomacy and deep sanctions have not put an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, nuclear deterrence stands as the only practical way to protect East Asian countries from nuclear blackmail or attack.	事实上，由于外交和深度制裁都没有让朝鲜停止核计划，因此核威慑就成为保护东亚国家免受核裹挟或打击的唯一的可行办法。


Likewise, the vast majority of European countries – from Finland to Portugal – have no wish to reside in the shadow of Russian nuclear warheads with nothing to protect them.	类似地，绝大多数欧洲国家——从芬兰到葡萄牙——都不想毫无保护地暴露在俄罗斯核弹头的打击范围之下。


By effectively banning deterrence, the draft treaty could make the world even less safe than it already is.	条约草案在事实上禁止了核威慑，这可能导致世界变得更加不安全。


Of course, proponents of the treaty argue that it would build up public support for a nuclear-weapons ban over time, eventually forcing the governments of nuclear states to give up their arsenals.	当然，条约的支持者指出，随着时间的推移，这能够让公众支持禁核，最终迫使有核国家政府放弃核武器。


But this is pure naiveté.	但这样的想法着实天真。


No one with any connection to reality could seriously believe that the governments of China, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia will simply abandon their nuclear weapons because public opinion has turned against them.	任何了解一丝现实的人，都不可能真以为中国、以色列、巴基斯坦和俄罗斯政府会因为公众观点反对而放弃核武器。


Unfortunately, nuclear weapons are broadly popular in these countries, because they are seen as a security guarantor and a realization of national ambitions on the world stage.	不幸的是，核武器在这些国家很受欢迎，因为它们被视为安全的保证和在世界舞台上实现国家企图的手段。


Those of us who want a nuclear-free world do not have to agree with this outlook; but we had better not ignore it.	我们这些希望世界无核的人不必同意这一前景； 但我们最好也不要忽视它。


A more realistic approach would be to pursue further nuclear-weapons reductions in both the US and Russia, where serious risks still need to be addressed.	更现实的方针是追求美俄两国同时继续削减核武器。 美国和俄罗斯都有严重的威胁需要解决。


To that end, it is vital that neither country modernizes its nuclear arsenal in a way that is seen as expanding its nuclear capabilities.	在这方面，至关重要的是两国都不可通过被对方视为扩大核能力的方式来现代化核武器。


Instead, they must pave the way for further reductions.	相反，它们应该为进一步削核铺平道路。


In the Middle East, ending current conflicts and developing conflict-resolution mechanisms could help drive progress toward nuclear-free status over time.	在中东，结束当前的冲突、制定冲突解决机制有助于向日后的无核状况迈进。


In this regard, the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) is an important first step.	在这方面，伊朗和P5+1（联合国安理会五大常任理事国加德国）的核协议是重要的第一步。


As for South Asia, one hopes that a détente between India and Pakistan will facilitate better nuclear-arms control, even if the shadow of China – which sees its bomb as part of its place in the world – will still hang over India.	至于南亚，我们希望印度和巴基斯坦关系的缓和能够促进更好的核军备控制，即使中国——它将核弹视为世界地位的一部分——的阴影仍在困扰印度。


In the end, full-scale nuclear disarmament probably cannot be achieved with a single Big Bang.	最后，全方位核裁军决不能在出现核爆之后才实现。


The world would be better served by an incremental approach based on the NPT, strategic arms reductions by the major powers, and conflict resolution in key regions.	基于NPT的渐进方针、大国的战略性裁军，以及解决关键地区的冲突对世界更有利。


In the best-case scenario, the proposed nuclear-ban treaty will be just a sideshow.	在最好情景中，禁核条约草案只是次要因素。


But there is reason to fear that it will complicate ongoing efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals further, deepen the divide between nuclear- and non-nuclear states, and, in the worst-case scenario, even increase the risk of a nuclear conflict in key regions.	但我们有理由担心该条约让进一步去核计划复杂化，加深有核和无核国家间的分歧，并（在最糟糕情景中）增加关键地区核冲突的风险。


Odiousness Ratings for Public Debt	公共债务的可恶评级


CAMBRIDGE – On Friday August 25, the US government imposed financial sanctions on Venezuela, restricting the ability of President Nicolás Maduro’s government and its oil company, PDVSA, to issue new debt in American capital markets.	坎布里奇—8月25日星期五，美国政府对委内瑞拉实施了金融制裁，限制总统马杜罗政府及其石油公司PDVSA在美国资本市场发行新债的权利。


The sanctions were imposed in response to the regime’s unconstitutional and fraudulent election of a constituent assembly and the de facto closure of the constitutionally elected National Assembly, with its two-thirds opposition majority.	该制裁是针对马杜罗政权违宪和欺诈性的制宪会议选举以及实质关闭依宪选举的国民大会的行为。 在国民大会选举中，反对派赢得了三分之二多数。


Well-functioning markets should have shut down the Maduro regime’s access to finance long ago.	运转良好的市场早就应该切断马杜罗政权的融资源了。


The fact that they didn’t not only shocked the moral sentiments of many, but also revealed a fundamental defect in sovereign debt markets’ institutional architecture.	它们没有这样做，这一事实不但让许多人在道德上无法接受，更揭示出主权债务市场制度设计上的根本性缺陷。


Little good will come from Venezuela’s economic catastrophe, but one positive outcome would be a reform that puts such markets on a more solid financial – and moral – footing.	委内瑞拉经济崩溃不会带来什么好处，但一个积极的结果将是出现改革，为这些市场打下更可靠的金融以及道德基础。


All debts imply a commitment by the borrower to repay what was borrowed, with interest.	一切债务都隐含着借款人偿还所借款项并支付利息的承诺。


In the case of public debt, the pacta sunt servanda principle implies that future governments are obliged to respect the commitments assumed by their predecessors.	对于公共债务，“契约必须遵守”（pacta sunt servanda）原则意味着未来政府有义务尊重前任政府做出的承诺。


But, as Alexander Sack argued in 1927, successor governments should not always do so: “When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not for the needs or in the interests of the state, but rather to strengthen itself, to suppress a popular insurrection, etc., this debt is odious for the people of the entire state.”	但亚历山大·萨克（Alexander Sack）在1927年就指出，后续政府不应该永远尊重前任的承诺：“当一个专制政权签订债务契约，不是出于国家的需要或利益，而是为了让自己做大做强，从而镇压群众起义等，那么这笔债务，对于整个国家的人民而言，就是可恶的。 ”


According to this doctrine, debt incurred by “odious” regimes should not be enforceable, because the lender should have known that the debt was incurred without the consent of the people or for their benefit.	根据这一思想，“可恶”政权负下的债务，不应该具有强制性，因为贷款人应该知道，这笔债务的发生没有经过人民的首肯，或者是为了人民的利益。


As Sack put it: “This debt does not bind the nation; it is a debt of the regime, a personal debt contracted by the ruler, and consequently it falls with the demise of the regime.”	萨克指出，“这笔债务对国家不具有约束力； 它是政权的债务，是统治者签订的个人债务，因此随着政权的倒台而消灭。


The odious debt idea was revived in an influential 2006 article by Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer, and in a 2010 report by the Center for Global Development (CGD), which proposed that economic sanctions include a mechanism aimed at preventing the accumulation of odious obligations.	可恶债务的概念因为2006年西马·贾雅昌德兰（Seema Jayachandran）和迈克尔·克里莫（Michael Kremer）的一篇很有影响力的文章，以及2010年全球发展中心（CGD）的一份报告而复兴。 文章和报告认为，经济制裁应该包括一个旨在防止可恶债务累积的机制。


The mechanism would take the form of a declaration that debt issued by a particular government would be considered odious.	该机制的形式可以是宣布某个政府发行的债务将被视为可恶债务。


In effect, this is what the Trump administration has just done.	实际上特朗普政府正是这么做的。


Such a declaration reduces the flow of funds to odious regimes, owing to the risk that successor governments will renounce their predecessor’s debts without incurring legal and reputational costs (because participating countries’ courts will not enforce the debt contracts).	这样的宣布将降低流向可恶政权的资金流，因为继任政府有可能拒绝履行前任的债务，而不会导致法律和名誉损失（因为参与国的法院不会强制执行债务契约）。


The CGD report proposes that a regime should be considered odious if it abuses the human rights of the population, employs military coercion, perpetrates electoral fraud, and mismanages or misappropriates public funds.	CGD的报告提出，如果一个政权侵犯其人民的人权、采用军事胁迫、选举舞弊欺诈、管理不善或挪用公共资金，就应该将其视为可恶政权。


Clearly, the Venezuelan regime has ticked each of these boxes, making it a poster child for odiousness.	显然，委内瑞拉政权符合所有这些特征，堪称可恶政权的典范。


But it did not tick them all at once: the plundering of Venezuela’s wealth, the gross violation of human rights, and the unconstitutionality of its decisions did not begin with the election of the new Constituent Assembly on July 30.	但这些特征不是一夜之间具备的：对委内瑞拉财富的掠夺，对人权的大量侵犯，以及其决定对违宪，都不是7月30的新制宪大会选举才开始的。


It was a slow process that started many years earlier.	这是一个缓慢的过程，肇始于多年前。


For example, it is difficult to argue that the destruction of the Venezuelan oil industry, which lost almost half its global market share since President Hugo Chávez took power nearly 20 years ago, was carried out in the interest of the Venezuelan people.	比如，很难说委内瑞拉石油工业的破坏符合委内瑞拉人民的利益。 自查韦斯总统在近二十年前开始掌权以来，委内瑞拉石油工业失去了其全球市场份额的一半。


And it happened amid the biggest and longest oil-price boom in history, at a time when the country was sitting on the world’s largest reserves and PDVSA was borrowing on a massive scale.	其破坏过程发生在历史上规模最大、历时时间最长的石油价格繁荣期中，在这个过程中，委内瑞拉坐拥全世界最大石油储量，PDVSA大量举债。


It is even harder to argue that PDVSA’s dollar-denominated debt was legitimate when it was sold for local currency at below-market prices, to politically connected individuals, who often borrowed the needed bolivars overnight from public-sector banks, just to flip the bonds immediately to Wall Street.	也很难说PDVSA的美元计价债务出售的合法性——以低于市场价格按本币出售给政治关系户，他们常常从公共部门银行隔夜借入玻利瓦尔来购买这些债务，立即转手卖给华尔街。


As Barclay’s Alejandro Grisanti documented in 2008, beneficiaries pocketed an instant profit equal to 20-30% of the face value of the debt.	巴克莱银行的亚历杭德罗·格里桑迪（Alejandro Grisanti）测算，2008年受益人将相当于这些债务面值20—30%的转手立得利润收入囊中。


None of these considerations prevented the Venezuelan regime from borrowing, often at the ridiculous rate of 50%, as happened in May with Goldman Sachs’s purchase of “hunger bonds.”	所有这些考虑都没有阻止委内瑞拉政权借钱，利率常常高达骇人听闻的50%，如5月份高盛公司购买“饥饿债券”（hunger bonds）时发生的那样。


It also did not stop institutions such as JP Morgan from including Venezuelan bonds in their emerging-market bond indexes and purchasing more than $1 billion dollars of these bonds for the exchange-traded and mutual funds that it offers to the public as investment vehicles.	这也没有阻止JP摩根等机构将委内瑞拉债券纳入它们的新兴市场债券指数，并通过它们作为投资工具发售给公众的交易所交易基金和共同基金购买了10亿多美元的这些债券。


That is why we propose the adoption of an odiousness rating system, akin to credit ratings.	因此，我们建议采取一个类似于信用评级的可恶评级系统。


While the latter focus on the ability and willingness of the borrower to pay, the odiousness rating would provide an estimate of how likely it is that a court would decide that the debt falls with the regime.	前者侧重借款人偿付的能力和意愿，而后者将为法庭有多大可能裁决债务随政权的倒台而消灭提供估计。


The scale would be continuous, going from, say, O (odious repressive dictatorships) to W (well-managed and fully functioning democracies).	这一可能性大小是一个连续变量，从比如O（可恶的压迫性独裁统治）直到W（管理良好、功能完善的民主）。


There would be intermediate notches: dictatorships that promote economic development and thus benefit the population (think of South Korea in the 1970s) and corrupt democracies characterized by economic mismanagement and graft (think of Argentina during the Kirchner administration).	也会存在中间状态：促进经济发展，因此有利于人民的独裁（比如20世纪70年代的韩国）； 以及以经济管理不善、贪污横行为特征的腐败民主（如基什内尔执政期间的阿根廷）。


Odiousness ratings could become part of soft international law, used by courts when deciding how to enforce debt contracts, and they could help determine which bonds are included in the calculation of emerging-market indexes.	可恶评级可以成为软国际法的一部分，法庭可用它来裁定如何强制执行债务契约。 它也可以帮助确定哪些债券可以纳入新兴市场指数的计算。


The same country could have bonds which, being issued in different periods, have different odiousness ratings and enforcement probabilities.	同一个国家发行于不同时期的债券，可以有不同的可恶评级和强制执行概率。


Because a more odious rating would reduce investors’ appetite for bonds, downgrades could limit the irresponsible debt accumulation and economic disasters brought about by regimes such as Venezuela’s – and possibly accelerate their demise.	更加可恶的评级将抑制投资者对债券的偏好，因此降级可以限制像委内瑞拉这样的政权所导致的不负责任的债务积累和经济灾难，并有望加速它们的倒台。


There are many open questions.	有很多开放性问题有待解决。


Who should issue the rating?	应该由谁来发布评级？


What should the methodology be?	应该采用什么评级方法？


How can the rater be protected from political pressure?	如何保护评级者免受政治压力？


But all of these questions can be answered.	但所有这些问题都可以回答。


The best way to do that is to start the discussion.	最好的办法就是开始讨论。


The Pandora’s Box of the Digital Age	数字时代的潘多拉魔盒


STOCKHOLM – Is the world sliding dangerously toward cyber Armageddon?	斯德哥尔摩——世界是否正危险地滑向网络世界末日？


Let us hope not; but let us also apprehend the threat, and focus on what to do about it.	我们希望并非如此； 但我们也要理解现实的威胁，并重点思考处置的对策。


One country after another has begun exploring options for bolstering their offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and many other countries have already done so.	一个又一个国家已经开始探索加强网络攻击能力的方案，在这方面，其他许多国家已经成为先行者。


This is a dangerous escalation.	这是一种危险的升级。


In fact, few other trends pose a bigger threat to global stability.	事实上，几乎没有哪种趋势对全球稳定构成的威胁更大。


Almost all societies have become heavily dependent on the Internet, the world’s most important piece of infrastructure – and also the infrastructure upon which all other infrastructure relies.	几乎所有社会都严重依赖互联网，它既是世界最重要的基础设施——也是其他所有基础设施所依赖的基础设施。


The so-called Internet of Things is a misnomer; soon enough, it will be the “Internet of Everything.”	所谓的物联网是一种误导； 很快就会发展为“万物互联”的规模。


And our current era is not a Fourth Industrial Revolution; it is the beginning of the digital age, and the end of the industrial age altogether.	而我们所处的时代并非第四次工业革命，而是数字时代的开端，同时也是工业时代的彻底结束。


The digital age has introduced new vulnerabilities that hackers, cyber criminals, and other malign actors are already routinely exploiting.	数字时代已经出现了黑客、网络犯罪分子和其他恶意份子常常利用的新弱点。


But even more alarming is the eagerness of national governments to conduct cyber-warfare operations against one other.	但更令人震惊的是，各国政府热烈盼望着相互发动网络战争。


We have already reached the stage at which every conflict has a cyber dimension.	现在已经到了所有冲突无不具备网络维度的阶段。


The United States and Israel crossed the Rubicon in 2010 by launching the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.	2010年，美国和以色列对伊朗核设施发动的震网攻击突破了界限。


Now, there is no telling where ongoing but hidden cyber conflicts begin and end.	现在，已经无从得知隐蔽但正在进行的网络冲突在哪里开始和结束。


Things were different in the old world of nuclear weapons, which are complicated and expensive devices based on technology that only a few highly educated specialists have mastered.	在旧有的核武器世界一切都截然不同，核设施复杂而昂贵，仅有少数受过高等教育的专家才能掌握。


Cyber weapons, by contrast, are generally inexpensive to develop or acquire, and deceptively easy to use.	而网络武器却恰恰相反，开发或获取网络武器的成本一般较低，而且看起来非常容易使用。


As a result, even weak and fragile states can become significant cyber powers.	因此，即使是实力脆弱的小国也可以扮演重要网络强国的角色。


Worse still, cyber-war technologies have been proliferating at an alarming pace.	更糟糕的是，网络技术一直在以令人震惊的速度扩散。


While there are extensive safeguards in place to control access to sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, there is almost nothing preventing the dissemination of malicious software code.	尽管有全面的保障措施来控制对敏感核技术及材料的获取，但几乎没有任何措施可以阻止恶意软件代码的传播。


To understand the scale of the threat we face, look no further than the “WannaCry” virus that, among other things, almost shut down the British National Health Service this past May.	只需看看今年5月几乎导致英国国家卫生署瘫痪的“WannaCry”病毒，就可以知道我们所面临的威胁规模有多大。


The virus exploited a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system that the US National Security Agency had already discovered, but did not report to Microsoft.	该病毒利用了美国国家安全局已经发现但没有报告给微软的一个windows操作系统漏洞。


After this information was leaked or stolen from the NSA, North Korea quickly put the ransomware to use, which should come as no surprise.	在相关信息从美国国家安全局泄露或被盗取之后，朝鲜很快就将勒索软件付诸使用，这应当在我们的意料之中。


In recent years, North Korea has launched numerous cyber attacks around the world, most notably against Sony Pictures, but also against many financial institutions.	近年来，朝鲜在全球范围内发起了大量网络攻击，其中最著名的一次是针对索尼影业，此外还针对许多金融机构。


And, of course, North Korea is hardly an exception.	朝鲜当然并非个例。


Russia, China, and Israel have also developed cyber weapons, which they are busy trying to implant in systems around the world.	俄罗斯、中国和以色列也已经开发了网络武器，并忙于将它们植入世界各地的系统。


This growing threat is precisely why other countries have started talking about acquiring offensive cyber capabilities of their own: they want to have a deterrent to ward off attacks from other cyber powers.	日益增长的威胁恰恰解释了其他国家为什么开始探讨获取自己的攻击性网络能力：他们想要拥有某种震慑手段，以抵挡来自其他网络大国的进攻。


Cyber security is regarded as complicated and costly; but cyber offense is seen as inexpensive and sexy.	人们普遍认为网络安全复杂而昂贵； 但网络攻击却被认为既廉价又性感。


The problem is that, while deterrence works in the nuclear world, it isn’t particularly effective in the cyber world.	问题在于尽管威慑手段在核世界非常有效，但在网络世界效果却相当一般。


Rogue actors – and North Korea is hardly the only example – are far less vulnerable than developed countries to cyber counterstrikes.	流氓国家——朝鲜并不是唯一的例子——对网络反击的脆弱性比发达国家要小得多。


They can attack again and again without risking serious consequences.	它们可以一次又一次发动攻击，而不用承担严重的后果。


Cyber attacks’ often-ambiguous origins make it even harder to apply a rational theory of deterrence to the cyber world.	网络攻击往往模糊不清的起源也导致在网络世界应用理性震慑理论的难度更大。


Identifying the responsible party, if possible at all, takes time; and the risk of misattribution is always there.	确定责任方即使并非完全不可能，但也需要耗费大量时间； 而且错误认定的风险永远无法排除。


I doubt we will ever see unambiguous proof that Israel is conducting offensive cyber operations; but that certainly doesn’t mean that it isn’t.	我怀疑我们也许永远也看不到以色列正在开展网络攻击行动的明确证据； 但那绝不意味着它没有这样做。


In the darkness of cyberspace, sophisticated actors can hide behind oblivious third parties, who are then exposed to counterstrikes by the party under attack.	在网络世界的一片黑暗中，经验丰富的玩家可以隐藏在毫不知情的第三方身后，这毫不知情的第三方却会成为之后被攻击方发起反击的目标。


And in the ongoing conflict among Gulf countries, at least one government may have contracted hackers based in other countries to conduct operations against an adversary.	在海湾国家持续不断的冲突中，至少有一国政府可能已经雇佣了来自别国的黑客来对对手发起进攻行动。


This method of avoiding detection will almost certainly become the norm.	这种避免被发现的方法几乎肯定将成为准则。


In a world riven by geopolitical rivalries large and small, such ambiguity and saber-rattling in the cyber realm could have catastrophic results.	在这个由大大小小的地缘政治对手构成的世界里，这样的模糊暧昧和武力威胁可能带来灾难性的后果。


Nuclear weapons are generally subject to clear, strict, and elaborate systems of command and control.	核武器往往受控于明确、严格而精密的指挥和控制系统。


But who can control the legions of cyber warriors on the dark web?	但谁能控制暗网空间里大批的网络战士呢？


Given that we are still in the early stages of the digital age, it is anyone’s guess what will come next.	鉴于我们仍处在数字时代的初级阶段，任何人都可以猜测接下来将会发生什么。


Governments may start developing autonomous counterstrike systems that, even if they fall short of Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine, will usher in a world vulnerable to myriad unintended consequences.	政府可能会开始研发自动反击系统，即使这些系统还没有奇爱博士的末日机器那样威力巨大，但仍会将人类带入一个需要承受无数意外后果的世界当中。


Most obviously, cyber weapons will become a staple in outright wars.	最明显的是，网络武器将成为直接战争的主要武器。


The United Nations Charter affirms all member states’ right to self-defense – a right that is, admittedly, increasingly open to interpretation in a kinetic, digitized world.	《联合国宪章》确认，所有成员国有权自卫——无可否认，这项权利在一个动态的数字化世界越来越需要解释明确的规则。


The Charter also touches on questions of international law, particularly with respect to non-combatants and civilian infrastructure in conflict zones.	《宪章》还涉及国际法问题，尤其涉及冲突地区的非战斗人员和民用基础设施。


But what about the countless conflicts that do not reach the threshold of all-out war?	但人们将如何处理尚未达到全面战争门槛的无数冲突？


So far, efforts to establish universal rules and norms governing state behavior in cyberspace have failed.	迄今为止，在网络空间制定普遍规范和准则，制约国家行为的努力并没有取得成功。


It is clear that some countries want to preserve their complete freedom of action in this domain.	很显然，某些国家希望在这一领域保持完全的行动自由。


But that poses an obvious danger.	但这将构成明确的威胁。


As the NSA leaks have shown, there is no way to restrict access to destructive cyber weapons, and there is no reason to hope that the rules of restraint that governed the nuclear age will work in the cyber age.	正如美国国家安全局泄密事件已经表明的那样，没有办法限制破坏性网络武器的使用，也没有理由希望在网络时代，管制核时代的限制性规则能够发挥作用。


Unfortunately, a binding international agreement to restrict the development and use of offensive cyber weapons in non-war situations is probably a long way off.	令人遗憾的是，签订有约束力的国际条约限制非战争情况下攻击性网络武器的研发和使用可能还有很长的路要走。


In the meantime, we need to call greater attention to the dangers of cyber-weapon proliferation, and urge governments to develop defensive rather than offensive capabilities. An arms race in cyberspace has no winners.	与此同时，我们需要更加重视网络武器扩散的危险，并敦促政府发展防御而不是进攻技能，没有人能在网络空间的军备竞赛中获胜。


The Abnormality of Oil	反常态的油价


LONDON – Writing about oil prices is always risky.	发自伦敦——撰写关于油价的文章向来都是有风险的。


In a January 2015, I suggested that oil prices would not continue to fall, and even predicted that they would “finish the year higher than they were when it began.”	在2015年1月份，我提出油价不会继续下跌，甚至预测“年末收盘价将比年初更高。 ”最后证明是我错了；


I was wrong then; but I might not be wrong for much longer.	但我估计自己很快会迎来一次正确的预测。


I recently spoke at the massive Abu Dhabi Petroleum Exhibition and Conference (ADIPEC), which is a kind of Davos for oil-market participants.	我最近在声势浩大的阿布扎比石油展览会上发表了演讲，这可是一场石油市场达沃斯论坛式的盛会。


While there, I caught the tail end of a discussion among senior oil executives who all agreed that at this time next year, crude oil will still be around $60 per barrel, as it is today.	在那里我听到了一些石油行业高管们讨论的风声，他们一致同意在明年这个时候原油价格仍然会像今天这样维持在每桶60美元左右。


I was about to be interviewed by the CNBC reporter Steve Sedgwick, to whom I said, “That would be a first.	当时我正要接受CNBC财经有线电视台记者史蒂夫·塞齐维克（Steve Sedgwick）的采访，我对他说：“那将是第一次。


Oil prices hardly moving in a year?”	石油价格在一年之内几乎没有变化？


Needless to say, Sedgwick began the interview by telling the audience what I had said, and quizzed me on why I disagreed with the others.	”不出意料，塞齐维克在一开始采访时就把我的看法告知了观众，并询问我为什么不同意其他人的观点。


Before I get to my explanation, let me state the usual caveats.	在对此做出解释之前，请让我列明几个常规注意事项。


Forecasting oil prices is inevitably a fraught endeavor; in fact, it makes forecasting currency markets look easy.	预测油价很显然是个令人忐忑的壮举； 事实上预测货币市场可比这个要容易得多。


When I completed a doctorate on oil markets in the late 1970s and early 1980s, I had already concluded that trying to guess oil prices is a waste of time and energy.	当我在1970年代末80年代初读完石油市场博士学位时就已经得出结论：试图猜测油价就是在浪费时间。


Later, when I was at Goldman Sachs, I was often amused to see commodity analysts in my research group struggling to cope with the usual chaos of oil-price developments.	后来去了高盛，每当看到自己研究小组的商品分析师疲于应付对油价来说稀松平常的混乱走势时，我都很想发笑。


While interviewing me, Sedgwick raised an interesting point: Given that the volatility of many other asset prices has declined sharply in recent years, it might just be a matter of time before oil and other commodity prices do the same.	塞齐维克在采访我时提出了一个有趣的观点：由于近年来许多资产价格的波动性急剧下降，石油和其他商品价格的走势趋稳可能只是时间问题。


To be sure, that could very well happen.	当然这个情况很可能发生。


In principle, he is right.	原则上他是对的。


But I would argue that the decline in volatility in currency, bond, and equity markets largely reflects low inflation in many parts of the world, and the lack of significant monetary-policy adjustments by major central banks in recent years.	但我认为货币，债券和股票市场波动性的下降在很大程度上反映了世界许多地区的低通胀率以及近年来各大央行缺乏重大货币政策调整的事实。


I’m not sure that these factors apply to oil in the same way, especially at a time when energy markets are on the cusp of big changes in supply and demand.	但我不确定这些因素是否同样适用于石油，特别是在这个能源市场正处于供需关系剧变的时刻。