The DR-CAFTA pays lip service to international labor standards as enshrined in the International Labor Organization’s core labor rights, but promptly throws them overboard.	对国际劳工组织核心劳工权中规定的国际劳工标准，DR-CAFTA也是口惠而实不至，说抛弃就抛弃。


Instead, countries are committed only to enforcing their own labor laws, which often seem designed to prevent workers from joining a union.	相反，各国孜孜以求的不过是对本国劳工法的加强，而多数情况下，这些劳工法好像是专门设计来阻止工人加入工会的。


Moreover, enforcement of the rights that do exist is trapped somewhere between ineptitude and corruption.	此外，对既有权益的维护也受困于无能和腐败。


As if this were not bad enough, the agreement jettisons everything we’ve learned over the last 30 years or so about international pressure and labor law reform.	更糟的是，我们在过去约三十年里，了解到的所有与国际压力和劳工法改革有关的一切，协议都弃之不顾。


The stronger provisions of previous trade agreements, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), have been dumped.	以前贸易协议中更重要的一些条款，如普遍优惠待遇和加勒比海盆地优惠方案，也都被抛在了一边。


Although trade with Central America represents only about 1.5% of total US trade, the outcome of the debate on DR-CAFTA will shape US trade policy – which sets the tone for other rich countries’ stance in trade talks – for years to come.	尽管与中美洲的贸易仅占了美国贸易总额的1. 5%， 但DR-CAFTA 的辩论结果却会决定美国未来贸易政策的方向。


A trade agreement such as this puts US and Central American workers in the same labor market.	而美国的贸易政策往往会为其他富裕国家在贸易谈判中的态度奠定基调。


If the whip is cracked in Tegucigalpa today, workers in Charlotte will feel it tomorrow.	这样的贸易协议将美国和中美洲的工人放到了同一个劳动力市场上。


If Salvadorans’ wages are squeezed, they won’t be buying many products made in Los Angeles — unless, of course, they wind up moving there.	如果今天鞭子在特古西加尔巴抽响，明天夏洛特的工人就会感觉到。 如果萨尔瓦多工人的工资被压榨了，他们就不会购买洛杉矶制造的很多产品---当然，除非他们最后搬到洛杉矶去。


The anemic labor standards enshrined in this agreement encourage firms to compete by taking the low road, a route that puts them on a collision course with China’s rock-bottom wages.	本协议中的劳工标准并不得力，这些标准鼓励公司走低端道路来竞争，但低端道路会导致公司与中国极为低下的工资水平撞车。


They could just as easily take the high road: much evidence indicates that workers who are rewarded rather than victimized can contribute to greater competitiveness for firms in the long run.	其实他们完全可以走高端道路，非常容易：很多证据表明，从长远来看，给劳工以相应回报，而非侵害他们的利益，更有助于增强公司的竞争力。


It is hypocritical to promote democracy and then sign a trade agreement that denies workers the basic democratic right to organize and join unions.	高谈促进民主，却又签署协议，否认工人组建与参与工会的基本民主权，无疑是虚伪行径。


Without this right, elections may not add up to democracy.	没有这一基本民主权，选举不会累加成民主。


The checks and balances that unions provide are essential in the workplace, but they are even more important in sustaining fledgling democratic regimes.	在工作场所，工会带来的制衡至关重要，但在维系刚成立的民主政权方面，这种制衡甚至更��重要。


The issue is not free trade versus protectionism, but “smart trade” versus “polarizing trade.”	这不是自由贸易对保护主义的问题，而是“智能贸易”对“极化贸易”的问题。


Smart trade creates balanced development, while polarizing trade rewards a small circle of winners at the expense of the many.	智能贸易创建的是均衡发展，而极化贸易则是以多数人为代价来回报小范围的胜利者。


Smart trade requires two key provisions: core labor rights, backed up by tough enforcement, and a development fund targeting infrastructure and education to boost competitiveness.	智能贸易要求具备两大关键条款：有严格的执法保障的核心劳工权益，以及针对基础设施与教育以增强竞争力的发展基金。


DR-CAFTA does neither.	DR-CAFTA却一条也不具备。


Instead, it condemns Central America to carry its dismal past far into the future.	相反，该协议迫使中美洲带着黯淡的过去走入未来。


Rejecting it opens the possibility for freer markets and faster income growth in Central America, as well as healthier democracies.	拒绝接受这一协议，才有可能在中美洲建立起自由市场，促使其经济更快增长，同时也为民主的健康发展提供了可能性。


Free Trade with a Human Face	人性化的自由贸易


MEXICO CITY – Although many Americans believe immigration is a domestic issue that should be excluded from talks with other governments, this is not a view held by other nations – or by the United States.	墨西哥城－虽然许多美国人认为，移民是一个不应该包含在与其他政府会谈中的国内问题，但是，这并不是其他国家持有的观点——也不是美国持有的观点。


Indeed, the US negotiated its first immigration deal in 1907, maintained for more than two decades a controversial treaty with Mexico covering immigration, and has kept up immigration talks and deals even with Fidel Castro since the early 1960’s.	事实上，美国在1907年谈判了其第一个移民安排，并使一个与墨西哥达成的充满争议的移民条约在20多年里得以保留，并且从20世纪60年代早期起，即使是同菲德尔·卡斯特罗，美国也保持着移民会谈和安排。


For many Latin American nations, not just Mexico, immigration is the single most important issue in their relations with the US.	不仅仅是墨西哥，对许多拉丁美洲国家来说，移民问题在它们和美国的关系中，也是最重要的问题。


The Caribbean islands all have a similarly high proportion of their citizens residing in the US and depend as much as Mexico on remittances.	加勒比海岛国的公民中，都有差不多同样高比例的人口居住在美国，并且像墨西哥那样非常依赖来自美国的汇款。


The same is true for much of Central America.	对许多中美洲国家来说也是如此。


And no part of South America is exempt from this pattern.	在南美地区，也没有国家逃脱这种模式。


So almost all of Latin America is deeply affected by the current immigration climate in the US, and would benefit greatly from the type of comprehensive immigration reform that both John McCain and Barack Obama have supported.	所以，几乎所有的拉丁美洲都深受美国当前的移民环境的影响，并且，都会从约翰·麦凯恩和巴拉克·奥巴马都支持的那种全面移民政策改革中，受益巨大。


The Bush administration’s regrettable decision to build fences along the US-Mexico border, raid workplaces and housing sites, detain and deport foreigners without papers, is viewed in Latin America as being hypocritical and offensive.	布什政府的在美国和墨西哥边境建立围墙，搜查车间和建筑工地，拘留并驱逐没有证件的外国人的决定，是令人遗憾的，这些决定在拉丁美洲也被认为是伪善而且具有攻击性的。


The issue is all the more painful and disappointing since most Latin American foreign ministries know full well that these attitudes are pure politics, nothing more.	问题是，因为大多数拉丁美洲国家的外交部都非常清楚这些姿态完全是政治性的，而不是其他，所以造成了更多的痛苦和失望。


Everyone knows what viable immigration reform in the US will entail: tightening security at the border, but also including gates in the walls currently being built; legalizing, with expeditious and sensible fines and conditions, the 15 million or so foreigners present in the US illegally; and establishing a migrant or temporary worker program that allows a sufficient number of foreigners to satisfy the growing needs of the US economy, with paths both to regular visits home and to US permanent residence.	在设定迅速并合理的罚金以及条件要求的同时，使当前非法居留在美国的大约1500万外国人合法化； 以及建立能使足够数量的外国人，进入美国来满足不断增长的美国经济需求的外来人员或临时工人项目，并为这些工人提供定期回国以及永久居留美国的途径。


A second component is political will and timing.	另一个因素是政治意愿和时机。


Bush had it right at the beginning: his willingness to negotiate an immigration agreement with Mexico at the start of his term was probably the only way to get it done.	布什开始的做法是正确的：他愿意在其任期开始时和墨西哥谈判一个移民协议，这可能是使问题得到解决的唯一途径。


Moving quickly is probably the only way the next president can succeed on this front as well.	同样，在这个问题上采取快速行动，可能是下任美国总统可以在这方面取得成功的唯一方法。


If immigration is to become a less heated issue, the US must address the needs of Latin America’s economies.	如果移民要变成一个讨论不是那么激烈的问题，美国必须关注拉丁美洲的经济需求。


Here, one of the key challenges facing the next US administration lies in the existing and pending free-trade agreements between the US and Latin America.	在此，下届美国政府面临的关键挑战之一是，现存的和将来的美国和拉丁美洲国家间的自由贸易协议。


If John McCain is elected, tinkering with or overhauling NAFTA, CAFTA, and free-trade deals with Chile and Peru, as Barack Obama has proposed, will be unlikely.	如果约翰·麦凯恩当选，要像巴拉克·奥巴马提议的那样，修补或者革新北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA），中美洲自由贸易协定（CAFTA）以及与智利和秘鲁达成的自由贸易安排，是不大可能的。


But, given the likelihood that Democrats will retain their majorities in the US Congress, even McCain would need to modify the agreement with Colombia in order to get it passed.	但是，鉴于民主党保持其在美国国会中多数席位的可能性，即使是麦凯恩当选，也需要修改美国与哥伦比亚的协议以使其通过。


The pressure to include similar provisions in the other deals would then grow.	这样，在其他贸易安排中包含类似规定的压力就会增加。


If recession drags on and Americans continue to blame trade agreements – erroneously – for growing unemployment, falling wages, and yawning inequality, opposition to these deals will grow.	如果经济衰退延长，并且美国人继续错误地将不断上升的失业率，工资下降以及不平等加剧归咎于贸易协议，那么，反对这些协议的力量就会增强。


Instead of waiting for the pressure to mount, the next president would do well to preempt it with an ambitious agenda on free-trade reform that would benefit everyone.	下任美国总统用一个能惠及每个人的宏伟自由贸易改革计划，来预防压力的增加，而不是等待压力的增加，会��得很好的效果。


In this respect, the US could learn from the European Union.	在这方面，美国可以向欧盟学习。


American trade agreements have been faulted for limiting themselves to trade.	美洲贸易协议将美洲国家局限于贸易上，是有缺陷的。


The response has always been: the US is not Europe, nor is it in the business of nation-building or reconstruction.	许多人对此的反应总是是这样的：美国不是欧洲，它也不从事建立国家或改造国家的事业。


But this is exactly what it did, successfully, with the post-1945 Marshall Plan and, unsuccessfully, with Iraq and Afghanistan today.	但是，这正是美国在1945年马歇尔计划之后成功做到的东西，也是现在在伊拉克和阿富汗失败了的东西。


First, clear and explicit human rights and democracy clauses should be included, along the lines of similar clauses in the Mexican and Chilean Economic Association treaties with the EU.	首先，美洲贸易协议应该包括明确而直接的人权和民主条款，像在墨西哥和智利与欧盟的经济联合协议中规定的那样。


Second, more specific provisions on labor, the environment, gender equality, and indigenous rights are needed, as well as anti-trust, regulatory, and judicial reform provisions, for reasons both of principle and political expediency.	其次，因为原则以及政治权宜之计的原因，美洲贸易协议需要更具体的关于劳动力，环境，性别平等，土著权利，以及反垄断，监管和司法改革方面的规定。


Although there have been enormous improvements in most of these areas, there remains a huge agenda, particularly with regard to breaking up or regulating monopolies – public, private, commercial, trade union-based – that plague nearly every country in the region.	虽然这些领域中的绝大多数领域，都有巨大的进步，但是，任务仍然很艰巨，特别是在打破或监管几乎危害该地区所有国家的垄断问题上——公共的，私人的，商业的，建立在工会基础上的垄断等等。


These revised agreements should include bold, enlightened provisions for infrastructure and “social-cohesion” funds, since these can make the difference between muddling through and true success.	这些修改后的协议应该包括大胆的、开明的对基础设施以及“社会凝聚力”基金的规定，因为这些东西区分了蒙混过关和真正的成功。


Free-trade advocates should not view Obama’s demand that these deals be revisited as a mistake, but rather as an opportunity to improve and deepen them; McCain’s supporters should not see the incorporation of all of the aforementioned inclusions as “European nonsense,” but rather as a way to narrow the gap between the agreements’ promise and their actual results.	自由贸易的支持者不应该认为奥巴马重新审视这些协议的要求是一个错误，而应该认为这是一个改进并深化它们的机会； 麦凯恩的支持者不应该将前述内容的纳入看作是“欧洲废话”，而应该将其作为缩小协议的承诺与其实际结果之间差距的途径。


Improving Mexican and Central American infrastructure, education, and rule of law, or improving Colombian and Peruvian drug-enforcement efforts and respect for labor laws and human rights, are all in America’s interest, and-free trade agreements can help rather than harm such efforts.	改善墨西哥和中美洲国家的基础设施、教育和法治，或者增强哥伦比亚和秘鲁打击毒品的执行措施的力度，并提高它们尊重劳动法律和人权的程度，都是符合美国利益的； 而且，自由贸易协议会促进而不是危害这些努力。


If the US and Latin America can face up to the challenges of trade and immigration together, the next US president may leave a weightier mark on the hemispheric relationship than any American leader in three generations.	如果美国和拉丁美洲能够勇敢的一起面对贸易和移民带来的挑战，下任美国总统与这三代人中的任何一位美国总统相比，将会在西半球关系中留下更深刻的印记。


Freeze the Settlement Freeze	冻结定居点的死胡同


RAMALLAH – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to approve new Jewish settlements on the eve of a possible settlement freeze is the latest round in a cycle that has been repeated so many times over the past 40 years that it would seem mundane if it were not so dangerous.	发自拉马拉——在即将达成停建犹太人定居点决策的前夕，以色列总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡却又批准兴建一批新犹太定居点，而他的行为只不过是过去40年内无数次循环往复的怪圈中的最新一环，如果不是这个怪圈充满危险的话，人们可能早就对其见怪不怪了。


The cycle goes something like this: American or international pressure mounts on Israel to stop settlement activities in the occupied territories.	“怪圈”一般都是这样的：美国或者国际社会向以色列施压，要求其终止在占领区内的定居活动。


Israeli settlers and their supporters then gather even more energy to expand onto more Palestinian land, build more exclusively Jewish settlements, and destroy more Arab homes before the so-called “freeze” comes into effect.	而犹太定居者和众多支持者们则集结更大的力量来“开拓“巴勒斯坦的土地，建造更多的犹太人专属定居点，并破坏更多阿拉伯人的家园——抢在所谓“冻结”政策生效之前。


The peace process, not surprisingly, becomes a joke while this happens.	一旦此类事件发生，和平进程便毫无意外地成了一场笑话。


Eventually, world pressure subsides and the freeze fails to materialize. In the end, more Jewish settlements appear.	最终国际压力偃旗息鼓，而定居点冻结政策却毫无实质性进展，于是越来越多的定居点拔地而起。


Indeed, the great paradox of this cycle is that more settlements are built during times of negotiations than during times of conflict.	而实际上这个怪圈当中最为自相矛盾的一点，则是在谈判期间所建立起的犹太人定居点可比冲突时建造的要多得多。


This pattern can be traced to 1967.	这种畸形模式可以追溯至1967年。


Israelis understand that the only reality in politics is the reality on the ground.	当时以色列人意识到本国政治的唯一问题就是土地问题。


So long as Israeli soldiers control the occupied territories, the idea of a settlement freeze will not take root.	因此只要占领区还在以色列军人手里，任何有关冻结犹太人定居点的想法都沦为无稽之谈。


In fact, the demand for a settlement freeze is nothing more than a call to arms to a wide group of Israelis and their supporters to go and build on stolen Palestinian land.	而事实上，对冻结政策的呼吁更像是战斗的号角，召唤着一大群以色列人连同其支持者一道，奔赴他们偷来的巴勒斯坦土地上大肆建设。


When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was preparing for his historic visit to Jerusalem, a group of settlers created the settlement of Elon Moreh near Nablus, the most populated West Bank city.	当埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特正准备他对耶路撒冷的历史性访问之时，一群犹太定居者在约旦河西岸人口最多的城市纳布卢斯附近建立起一个名为埃隆·莫热赫的犹太定居点。


When former United States Secretary of State James Baker began his shuttle diplomacy for peace, his ultimately unsuccessful efforts actually resulted in more settlements, with a new one started just hours before he was due to arrive for talks.	而当美国前国务卿詹姆斯·贝克尔展开和平外交斡旋之旅时，他所遭遇的根本性失败则在实际上催生了更多的犹太定居点，甚至有个定居点就选在他下飞机准备会谈之前几个小时正式动工。


Baker postponed his visit and later vented his frustrations to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations.	当时贝克尔推迟了访问行程，并向美国参议院拨款委员会狠狠地发泄了一通不满。


He resented “being greeted” every time he came to the Middle East with yet “another settlement.”	他十分愤慨每次“欢迎”他到访中东的都仍是“另一个定居点”。


Baker’s efforts eventually led to the Madrid peace conference in 1991, but that, too, failed to resolve the conflict.	贝克尔的努力最终使得马德里和平会议于1991年召开，但这次会议也没能解决以巴冲突问题。


And, while Palestinians and Israelis did reach a secret agreement a few years later that was publicly declared at a White House ceremony, construction of Jewish settlements didn’t stop.	此外，即使巴勒斯坦和以色列在数年后真正达成了一个秘密的和平协议并在白宫某个仪式上共之于众，犹太定居点的建设却依然没有停止。


In fact, since the 1993 Oslo Accords the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories has doubled.	事实上，自1993年奥斯陆协议签订以来，犹太定居者在被占领区的数目已经增加了一倍。


The creation of new settlements has often been accompanied by hostile media reporting – even within Israel – as well as international condemnation, yet the settlement train has not stopped. It continued to race ahead even during the days when Israel’s government rotated between Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir and Labor’s Shimon Peres between 1984 and 1990.	新的犹太定居点往往伴随着充满敌意的媒体报道而产生——有些报道甚至在以色列内部——而同样刺激其建立的另一原因则是国际社会的谴责，然而建立犹太定居点的进程并无中止迹象，反而呈持续加速之势，即便在1984至1990年以色列由伊沙克·沙米尔领导的利库德集团和西蒙·佩雷斯领导的工党轮流执政的时期内也未曾改变。


The Shamir government would be defeated at the polls, and the incoming Labor government would declare a freeze on all settlement construction, even on buildings that had already been started.	在那段时间，如果沙米尔政府在大选中败下阵来，那么接替组阁的工党政府就会宣布冻结一切定居点的建设，甚至包括那些已经启动的工程。


But, despite the decrees, ways were found to continue building, to absorb new residents, and to increase the settler population.	但不管法律如何规定，人们总有办法继续建造定居点，来容纳新居民，增加定居者的人数。


For the US, the settlements have proven to be an equal-opportunity obstacle, obstructing both Republican and Democratic diplomacy.	而对于美国来说，犹太定居点问题对于民主共和两党的外交政策来说都是同样棘手的绊脚石。


The Clinton administration attempted to put brakes on then-Prime Minister Netanyahu’s efforts to construct a new settlement near Bethlehem. After a short hiatus, construction resumed.	克林顿政府曾经试图遏制时任以色列总理的内塔尼亚胡在伯利恒附近建立新定居点，但在暂缓了一阵时候，建设一切照旧。


The Bush-Cheney Administration, the most pro-Israeli in memory, fared no better.	而有史以来最为亲以的小布什-切尼政府运气也没好到哪去。


Today, Har Homa, built on Jabal Abu Ghnaim with the aim of cutting off Bethlehem from Jerusalem, is home to 19,000 settlers.	当今建造于阿布古奈姆山上，用来切断伯利恒至耶路撒冷之间路径的霍马山犹太人定居点，就生活着1. 9万犹太定居者。


This cycle has become so bizarre and confusing that Palestinians are not sure whether they should hope for continued tensions with Israel (which usually means no new settlements) or for continued negotiations (which usually provide cover for building settlements).	这个怪异的循环模式如此令人迷惑，使得巴勒斯坦人都已经不敢确���，他们究竟是应该祈祷同以色列的持续紧张态势呢（这经常意味着没有新的定居点形成），还是应该期待新一轮的协商（而这却经常为建立新犹太人定居点提供了掩护）。


On January 5, 2007, the day Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss a new round of talks, the Israeli Construction and Housing Ministry issued a tender for the construction of more units in Ma’ale Adumim, an exclusively Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank.	2007年1月5日，就在以色列总理奥尔默特同美国时任国务卿赖斯会面，商讨新一轮和平谈判的同一天，以色列住房和建设部发出了一个决定，要在Ma'ale Adumim，这个分布在约旦河西岸占领区内的犹太人专属定居点上兴建更多的居住单元，


Of course, whenever the Israelis defy the world over the settlements, as is now once again happening, US and other officials “denounce” and “regret” the decision.	当然，每当以色列人利用犹太人定居点来表达对国际社会的蔑视，就像现在再次发生的这样的时候，美国和其他国家的官员们都持“谴责”和“遗憾”的态度。


But, at the end of the day, despite these few statements and perhaps even a UN resolution of opposition, the pattern established over the past 40 years is clear: the decision stands.	但是，当一天过去，无论是新的声明、甚至是联合国的反对决议，建立在40年循环往复之上的模式都是清楚无误地显示：犹太人的决定依然不变。


Jeff Aronson, a senior researcher at the Washington-based Foundation for Middle East Peace, concludes that Israeli leaders will continue to be able to fool their American counterparts on this issue.	杰夫·阿隆森是一名华盛顿智库中东和平基金会的高级研究员，他得出的结论是，以色列领导人将有能力继续在这个问题上愚弄他们的美国同行。


Some Israeli right-wing leaders like Menachem Begin, Shamir, and Netanyahu trumpet their settlement achievements.	一些以色列右翼领导人，例如穆纳赫姆·贝京，沙米尔以及内塔尼亚胡大肆宣扬他们建立犹太定居点的成就。


Others, including Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and Ehud Olmert “talked left and built right.”	其他领导人，包括前总理拉宾，埃胡德·巴拉克和奥尔默特则持有左翼的观点，但仍然按照右翼那样执行建立定居点的路线。


Palestinians are caught in a Catch-22: if they insist on a settlement freeze, Israel preemptively begins to build new settlements.	至此巴勒斯坦人已经陷入了一条自相矛盾的“第22条军规”当中：假使他们坚持要求冻结犹太人定居点建设，以色列方面必会抢先建造更多的新定居点。


Unless and until Israel pays a heavy price for its illegal activities in the occupied territories, it is hard to imagine a successful peace process taking shape.	除非要以色列为其在占领区内的非法行为付出极大代价，否则很难想象一个真正的和平进程能够成为现实。


The French Exception?	法国例外论？


PARIS – More than ever, the French economy is at the center of the global debate about how far one can push the limits of state size and control in a capitalist democracy.	发自巴黎——为了解答在资本主义民主体制下究竟能把国家规模和控制力推到何种限度的问题，当前的法国经济比以往任何时候都更处于全球辩论的核心。


To those on the left, France’s generous benefits and strong trade unions provide a formula for a more inclusive welfare state.	对左派来说，慷慨福利和强势工会为建构一个更具包容性的福利国家提供了范本。


To those on the right, France’s oversized and intrusive government offers only a blueprint for secular decline.	而在右派看来，法国过于臃肿且处处伸手的政府只描绘了一张江河日下的蓝图。


For the moment, the right looks right.	且在目前看来，右派是对的。


Once nearly the economic equal of Germany, France has fallen well behind over the past decade, with per capita GDP now about 10% lower.	法国曾在经济水平上与德国并驾齐驱，但在过去十年间已被远远抛离，人均GDP现在比后者低大约10%。


France may punch above its weight politically, but it punches far below its weight economically.	这个国家可能在政治权重上还具备优势，但经济权重上则早就偃旗息鼓了。


Whenever someone proposes turning the eurozone into a transfer union, as France’s economy minister, Emmanuel Macron, recently did, the presumption is that Germany will carry everyone else on its shoulders.	每当有人提出把欧元区变成一个转移支付联盟，正如法国经济部长埃曼纽尔·马克朗（Emmanuel Macron）最近提出的那样，都是假设德国将肩负其他国家的重担。


But why should only Germany have that responsibility?	但为什么只能让德国来背？


France’s economy is roughly three-quarters the size of Germany’s.	法国的经济规模大约相当于德国的四分之三。


Persuading the Germans that the French are willing and able to pay their fair share could make room for a lot of necessary compromises that until now have seemed impossible.	如果法国能以自身愿意且有能力承担应有的份额来说服德国人，就足以为许多至今看来似乎不可能的必要妥协争取到空间。


For now, few people feel confident about France’s economic future.	目前，很少有人对法国的经济前景感到自信。


The good news is that France is not quite as French as it pretends to be.	但好消息是法国并不是它表面上那么法国。


Yes, there is a 35-hour workweek, but companies can negotiate around the limit by offering to pay more for overtime.	虽然一周工作规定为35小时，但公司可以协商支付更多加班费来绕过限制。


The effective workweek for most workers is perhaps closer to 39 hours.	大多数工人的有效工作时间大概有接近39小时。


Yes, France has sought to limit the car service Uber, whose business model has arguably been one of the most transformative and important advances of the decade.	没错，法国已经全面禁止了优步的汽车服务，虽然后者无疑是近十年来最具革命性且最有重大进步意义的商业模式。


But, while this is a triumph for taxi unions and a tragedy for passengers and Uber drivers, France has also started focusing on nurturing small, high-potential technology companies.	但纵使造就了这一幕出租车工会，乘客与优步司机的悲喜剧，法国也逐渐开始注重培育小型高成长性的科技公司。


The French government is no longer placing all its bets on big, state-led projects, as it did in the 1970s heyday of massive investment in high-speed trains and Airbus.	法国政府不再像在1970年代在高速列车和空客上那样将全部赌注都压在由政府主导的大型项目。


President François Hollande has given Macron wide berth to try to implement desperately needed structural reforms of labor and product markets.	总统弗朗索瓦•奥朗德（François Hollande）给埃曼纽尔·马克朗提供了极大的空间去尝试实施国家急需的劳动力和产品市场结构改革。


Of course, it remains to be seen just how much political support such market-oriented policies can sustain.	当然，这类以市场为导向的政策究竟能得到多少政治支持还有待观察。


Progressive economists love the French government for spending a staggering 57% of GDP, compared to government expenditures of 44% of GDP for Germany.	进步主义经济学家（Progressive economists）偏爱法国政府，因其支出高达GDP的57%，相比之下德国政府支出只占GDP的44%。


And it must be acknowledged that the French government provides excellent value in some key areas.	同时也必须承认法国政府在一些关���领域提供了极为优异的服务。


France’s health service justly receives much better reviews than the United Kingdom’s.	法国的医疗服务收到的评论比英国要好得多。


French citizens might pay a lot of taxes and suffer a high degree of regulation, but at least they get something in return.	虽然法国民众可能会支付更高额税项及受到高度监管，但至少他们还能得到一些回报。


Still, France’s supersize government is hardly a source of unalloyed dynamism.	同时，法国过度庞大的政府并非纯粹的动力来源。


And indeed, one suspects that France’s GDP and productivity measures are flattered by the fact that, for lack of market prices, statisticians blindly assume that citizens get one dollar of value for each dollar spent on government, which might be an overstatement.	事实上，那些质疑法国GDP和生产力测量方法的人都受到了蒙蔽，这是因为市场定价的缺失导致统计学家们盲目假设公民每花一美元在政府身上就能得到一美元价值的回报，但这个数字可能是夸大了。


Worryingly, it is not clear how well France’s culture of inclusiveness can ever extend to immigrants.	令人担忧的是，目前尚不清楚法国的包容性文化如何能延伸到移民身上。


The same strict firing laws and high levels of minimum wages that are intended to protect native French workers from globalization make it much more difficult for newcomers to land jobs.	同样严格的解雇法律和高水平的最低工资是为了保护本地法国工人免遭全球化冲击，也使新来者更难找到工作。


Yet virtually every study of global inequality suggests that gains from allowing greater labor mobility dwarf gains from redistributing income among natives.	然而几乎所有对全球不平等现象的研究表明，允许更高劳动力流动性所带来的收益要远高于原住民之间收入再分配的收益。


By contrast, the more liberal labor laws in the United States and the United Kingdom ensure more opportunities for outsiders.	相比之下，美国和英国拥有更加自由的劳动法，确保外来人士有更多的机会。


The center of Paris and other French cities may be grand, but many immigrants from North Africa and elsewhere live in squalid ghettos on the outskirts.	法国巴黎和其他大城市的市中心区堪称富丽堂皇，但来自北非和其它地方的许多移民都蜗居在肮脏的郊区贫民窟里。


Although the precise rate of unemployment for particular ethnic groups is not known (French law precludes collecting data by ethnic classification), anecdotal evidence suggests much higher levels of joblessness for immigrants and their descendants.	尽管特定族群的准确失业率没有定数（法国法律禁止以种族分类来收集数据），但非正式证据显示移民及其后代的失业率要更高。


True, the government provides generous welfare benefits; but this alone does not produce inclusiveness.	没错，政府提供了慷慨的福利，但这还不足以产生包容。


Strong popular support for Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigration National Front party, together with French recalcitrance about accepting migrants escaping the war in Syria, indicates the problems with applying the French model in diverse societies.	玛丽娜·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的反移民国民阵线党与反对接收叙利亚战争难民的法国顽固派得到了强烈而广泛的主持，这表明在多元社群中推行法国模式是会出问题的。


Another obstacle to applying the French model elsewhere is that France enjoys certain unique advantages that are arguably critical to its success.	另一个在其他地方法国模式的障碍是法国享有某些导致其成功的独特优势。


Elite French managers are widely considered among the best in the world, and are frequently selected to head major international corporations.	法国高级经理人被公认为世界顶尖的，经常是大型国际企业的高层人选。


Corruption is certainly a problem, but significantly less so than in most of the eurozone’s south. (The Italian state is also large and intrusive, but it does not produce the high-quality public services that the French government does.)	腐败问题当然也存在，但相对于欧元区南部大部分地区已经较低了(意大利也有着强权型的大政府，但它不能像法国政府那样提供高质量的公共服务)。


Lastly, France arguably has one of the world’s most favorable natural environments, with fertile soil and an exceptionally temperate climate.	最后，法国可以说有着世界上最有利的自然环境，土壤肥沃，气候极为温和。


A healthy French economy would do wonders to help lift the eurozone out of its malaise.	健康的法国经济将创造奇迹，帮助欧元区走出困境。


It could also provide an example to countries everywhere of how inclusive capitalism can work.	它还可以为其他地区提供一个包容性资本主义如何运行的范例。


But that assumes that the government will embrace the structural reforms that France’s economy so desperately needs.	但前提是政府能接受法国经济迫切需要的结构性改革。


The Monetarist Mistake	货币主义错误


BERKELEY – Ideas matter.	伯克利—思想很重要。


That is the lesson of Hall of Mirrors, the American economist Barry Eichengreen’s chronicle of the two biggest economic crises of the past 100 years: the twentieth century’s Great Depression and the ongoing Great Recession, from which we are still struggling ineffectually to recover.	这是美国经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）对过去100年的两次最大经济危机所做的历史记录《镜厅》（Hall of Mirrors）给我们的教训。 这两次危机一次是二十世纪的大萧条，另一次是现在仍没有结束、我们仍在近乎徒劳地竭力从中复苏的大衰退。


Eichengreen is my friend, teacher, and patron, and his book is to my mind the best explanation to date of why policymakers in Europe and the United States have reacted to the most dramatic economic collapse in almost four generations with half-hearted measures and half-finished interventions.	艾肯格林是我的朋友、老师和导师，在我看来，他的著作是迄今为止对欧洲和美国决策者在应对近四代人以来最严重的经济崩溃的过程中措施心不在焉、干预半途而废的原因的最佳解释。


According to Eichengreen, the Great Depression and the Great Recession are related.	艾肯格林认为，大萧条和大衰退是有关联的。


The inadequate response to our current troubles can be traced to the triumph of the monetarist disciples of Milton Friedman over their Keynesian and Minskyite peers in describing the history of the Great Depression.	对当前困境反应不力的原因可以追溯到米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）在解释大萧条历史的竞争中胜过了凯恩斯主义和明斯基主义同道。


In A Monetary History of the United States, published in 1963, Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz famously argued that the Great Depression was due solely and completely to the failure of the US Federal Reserve to expand the country’s monetary base and thereby keep the economy on a path of stable growth.	在1963年出版的《美国货币史》（A Monetary History of the United States）中，弗里德曼和安娜·雅各布森·施瓦茨（Anna Jacobson Schwartz）指出，大萧条完全仅仅是因为美联储没有扩大货币基础、保持经济的稳定增长路径导致的。


Had there been no decline in the money stock, their argument goes, there would have been no Great Depression.	如果货币存量没有下降，他们的观点认为，就不会有大萧条。


This interpretation makes a certain kind of sense, but it relies on a critical assumption.	这一解读不无道理，但它依赖一个关键假设。


Friedman and Schwartz’s prescription would have worked only if interest rates and what economists call the “velocity of money” – the rate at which money changes hands – were largely independent of one another.	弗里德曼和施瓦茨的药方只有在利率和经济学家所谓的“货币周转速度”——即货币转手的速度——基本互相独立的情况下才有效。


What is more likely, however, is that the drop in interest rates resulting from the interventions needed to expand the country’s supply of money would have put a brake on the velocity of money, undermining the proposed cure.	但是，更有可能的情况是，因扩大一国货币供给的需要而进行干预、从而导致货币下降会降低货币周转速度，破坏预想的疗效。


In that case, ending the Great Depression would have also required the fiscal expansion called for by John Maynard Keynes and the supportive credit-market policies prescribed by Hyman Minsky.	在这种情况下，结束大萧条还需要凯恩斯所呼吁的财政扩张和明斯基所提出的支持性信用市场政策。


The debate over which interventions would be needed to put a halt to something like the Great Depression should have been a simple matter of analyzing the evidence.	需要什么干预才能停止类似于大萧条的东西，原本应该只是一个简单的证据分析问题。


In economic hard times, did interest rates have little impact on the velocity of money, as Friedman suggested?	在经济艰难时期，利率真的像弗里德曼所认为的那样对货币周转速度几乎没有影响吗？


Was Keynes correct when he described the concept of a liquidity trap, a situation in which easing monetary policy further proves ineffective?	凯恩斯描述的流动性陷阱——放松货币政策不再继续有效的情况——的概念是正确的吗？


Is the stock of money in an economy an adequate predictor of total spending, as Friedman claimed, or is the smooth functioning of credit channels a more important factor, as Minsky argued?	经济的货币存量足以如弗里德曼所说的那样充当总支出的预测指标吗？ 还是应该像明斯克所认为的那样，信用渠道平稳地起作用才是更重要的因素？


These questions can be debated.	这些问题都是可争论的。


But it is fairly clear that even in the 1970s there was not enough empirical evidence in support of Friedman’s ideas to justify their growing dominance.	但很显然，即使在20世纪70年代，也没有足够的实证证据支持弗里德曼的思想、证明它们的日占上风实至名归。


And, indeed, there can be no denying the fact that Friedman’s cure proved to be an inadequate response to the Great Recession – strongly suggesting that it would have fallen similarly short had it been tried during the Great Depression.	此外，事实上，一个不容否认的事实是弗里德曼的药方被证明并不足以应对大衰退——这强烈地表明如果在大衰退期间使用，其效果也可能远远不够。


The dominance of Friedman’s ideas at the beginning of the Great Recession has less to do with the evidence supporting them than with the fact that the science of economics is all too often tainted by politics.	弗里德曼的思想在大衰退开始时占据上风，这与其说是靠证据支持，不如说是因为经济科学常常被政治左右这一事实。


In this case, the contamination was so bad that policymakers were unwilling to go beyond Friedman and apply Keynesian and Minskyite policies on a large enough scale to address the problems that the Great Recession presented.	在这一例子中，政治的染指非常严重，以至于决策者不愿超越弗里德曼的范围、大规模地应用凯恩斯主义和明斯基主义政策解决大衰退所暴露的问题。


Admitting that the monetarist cure was inadequate would have required mainstream economists to swim against the neoliberal currents of our age.	承认货币主义药方不足以解决问题需要主流经济学家抵抗当代新自由主义潮流。


It would have required acknowledging that the causes of the Great Depression ran much deeper than a technocratic failure to manage the money supply properly.	这需要承认大萧条的原因远比在恰当的货币供应管理问题上官僚主义失败更加深刻。


And doing that would have been tantamount to admitting the merits of social democracy and recognizing that the failure of markets can sometimes be a greater danger than the inefficiency of governments.	而这样做意味着承认社会民主的优点，并认识到市场失灵有时可能比政府效率低下更加危险。


The result was a host of policies based not on evidence, but on inadequately examined ideas.	其结果是基于证据而不是未得到充分考察的思想的政策。


And we are still paying the price for that intellectual failure today.	并且我们至今仍在为了这一思维失败付出代价。


From Central Bank to Central Planning?	从中央银行到中央计划?


BERKELEY – For more than 170 years, it has been accepted doctrine that markets are not to be trusted when there is a liquidity squeeze.	伯克利——170多年来，一个公认的理论是当市场出现流动性紧张时，就不能再信任市场。


When the prices of even safe assets fall and interest rates climb to sky-high levels because traders and financiers collectively want more liquid assets than currently exist, it is simply not safe to let the market sort things out.	由于交易员和金融业者集体希望得到比存量更多的流动资产，导致安全资产跌价而利率暴涨时，还想靠市场来解决问题就太不安全了。


At such a time, central banks must step in and set the price of liquidity at a reasonable level – make it a centrally-planned and administered price – rather than let it swing free in response to private-sector supply and demand.	此时，央行必须出手干预，将流动性设定在合理的价格水平上——使之成为中央计划和管理的价格——而不是任由它根据私有部门的供求而自由涨落。


This is the doctrine of “lender-of-last-resort.”	这就是“最后贷款人”学说。


For more than half that time – say, 85 years – it has been accepted doctrine that markets are also not to be trusted even in normal times, lest doing so lead to a liquidity squeeze or to an inflationary bubble.	这段时间中超过一半——就算85年吧——还有一个公认的理论，那就是为了防范流动性紧张或通胀泡沫出现，即便在正常情况下也不要信任市场。


So, central banks must set the price of liquidity in the market day in and day out.	因此，央行就必须每天制定流动性市场价格。


According to the followers of Knut Wicksell, the central bank must keep the market rate of interest near the natural rate of interest.	克努特·维克塞尔的追随者认为，央行必须将市场利率控制在自然利率附近。


No, said the followers of John Maynard Keynes, it must offset swings in business animal spirits in order to stabilize aggregate demand.	而约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯的追随者却说，不对，央行必须抵消商业中动物情绪消涨的影响来稳定需求总量。


On the contrary, said the followers of Milton Friedman, it must keep the velocity-adjusted rate of growth of the money stock stable.	相反，米尔顿·弗里德曼的追随者会说，央行必须让速率调整后的货币储备增长率保持稳定。


In fact, if you do any one of these things, you have done them all, for they are three ways of describing what is at bottom the same task and the same reality.	实际上，这三件事只要做了其中一件，就完成了所有任务，因为他们实际上是对同一任务和现实的三种不同的描述。


Thus, as social democracy, government guideposts, and centralized planning waxed and waned elsewhere in the economy, social democracy in short-term finance went from strength to strength.	这样，当社会民主、政府指导和中央计划在经济生活的其他方面此消彼长时，短期融资却在不断壮大社会民主的力量。


First, central banks suspended the rules of the free market in liquidity squeezes.	首先，央行在流动性紧张时暂时中止了自由市场原则。


Then they set the price of liquidity as an administered price in normal times.	然后，它们将流动性价格设定为正常时期的管制价。


Then they freed themselves of all but the lightest contact with their political masters: they became independent technocrats, a monetary priesthood that spoke in Delphic terms obscure to mere mortals.	接下来，他们尽量避免与政治领袖接触：变成了独立的专家统治论者，所起的作用类似于金融货币领域的传教士，用神谕一样模棱两可的语言让普通百姓听不懂他们在说些什么。


The justification for this system was that it seemed to work well – or at least less badly than central banking that blindly adhered to the gold standard or no central banking at all.	这种体系存在的理由是它表面看来效果不错——至少比盲目奉行金本位央行制或根本没有央行要强。


This island of central planning in the midst of the market economy was a strange and puzzling feature – all the more so because so few remarked how strange it was.	市场经济中的中央计划孤岛古怪而令人迷惑——很少有人评论它有多么古怪就显得更不正常。


There were no calls for a five-percent-growth-of-kilowatt-hours rule as there were calls for a five-percent-growth-of-M2 rule.	有人呼吁制定M2百分之五的增长规则，但却没有人提出规定千瓦小时必须有百分之五的增长。


There was no Federal Automobile Board to set the price of vehicles the way the Federal Reserve Board set the price of federal funds.	没有联邦汽车委员会像美联储设定联邦基金价格那样来规定车价。


But now it appears that, despite all this, we still have not had enough central planning in finance.	尽管如此，但现在看来，我们在金融领域的中央计划似乎还远远不够。


For, even as the central banking authority administered the price of liquidity, the price of risk was left to the tender mercies of the market.	因为虽然央行当局管理了流动性定价，但风险的定价仍然完全取决于市场。


And it is the price of risk that is the source of our current distress.	而我们现在的困境归根结底是拜风险价格所赐。


It is not that the world economy faces a liquidity squeeze.	不是世界经济面临着流动性紧张。


Far from it: two-year United States Treasury notes with a face value of $1,000 will get you $998 in cash – the lowest liquidity price since the Great Depression and Japan in the 1990’s.	实际情况远不是这样：面值一千美元的两年期美国国债现在只能变现998美元——这是自大萧条和20世纪90年代日本危机以来最低的流动性定价。


Yet the risk premia on non-Treasury assets have soared to barely believable heights: the annual interest-rate premium for holding a CD issued by a private bank now stands at five percentage points.	但国债以外资产的风险回报却涨到了令人难以置信的高度：持有私有银行存款凭证的年回报率现在涨到了五个百分点。


And it is this rise in risk premia that threatens to send the global economy into a deep recession, and turn the financial markets from a spectacle of schadenfreude into a malign source of unemployment and idle factories worldwide.	正是这样的风险回报增长导致全球经济可能陷入深度衰退，并使金融市场由幸灾乐祸旁观者变成了造成全球失业和工厂停产的罪魁。


The US Federal Reserve, the US Treasury, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and other public financial regulatory entities are being pushed toward a further expansion of their roles.	美联储、美国财政部、欧洲央行、英国银行和其他公共金融监管机构正被迫扩大其监管范围。


The Treasury and Federal Reserve are adding preferred stock to the balance sheets of the US mortgage giants Fannie Mae and FHLBC and the insurance giant AIG in the hope of shoring up their capital cushions and lowering their borrowing costs so that they can buy more mortgages.	财政部和美联储正在向抵押贷款巨头房利美和芝加哥联邦住房贷款银行（FHLBC）以及保险业巨头AIG的资产负债表上追加优先股，希望能为它们设立资本缓冲带、降低他们的借款成本、让他们增加抵押贷款的购买数量。


The Treasury has asked for authority to purchase $700 billion of mortgages to get them off of the private sector's books.	财政部已经要求政府购买七千亿美元的抵押贷款，让这些贷款不再计入私有部门的帐上。


Expanding the demand and reducing the supply of these risky assets is a way of manipulating their price.	扩大这些风险资产的需求、减少它们的供给是操纵价格的一种方法。


The Fed and the Treasury are walking down a road that ends with making the price of risk in financial markets, along with the price of liquidity, an administered price.	美联储和财政部的最终目的是使金融市场的风险及流动性定价能够被政府所控制。


This was how central banking got started in the first place: letting the market and the market alone determine the price of liquidity was judged too costly for the businessmen who voted and the workers who could overthrow governments.	中央银行计划最早即始于此：让市场且只让市场确定流动性价格对投票选举政府的商人和可以推翻政府的工人来说代价过于高昂。


Now it looks as though letting the market alone determine the price of risk is similarly being judged too costly for today’s voters and campaign contributors to bear.	现在似乎让市场独立确定风险定价也被认为代价太大，让今天的选民和选举赞助商难以承受。


America’s Trouble with China	美国所面临的中国麻烦


WASHINGTON, DC – Xi Jinping, China’s newly anointed president, made his first visit to the United States in May 1980.	华盛顿——1980年5月，中国新任主席习近平首次访美。


He was a 27-year-old junior officer accompanying Geng Biao, then a vice premier and China’s leading military official.	他当时是陪同耿飚访美的一名27岁的下级军官，之后曾历任副总理和军方高级职务。


Geng had been my host the previous January, when I was the first US defense secretary to visit China, acting as an interlocutor for President Jimmy Carter’s administration.	我曾是美国访华的首位国防部长，在以吉米·卡特政府特使身份访问中国时，耿飚恰好负责我的接待工作。


Americans had little reason to notice Xi back then, but his superiors clearly saw his potential.	美国人当时几乎没有理由关注习近平，但他的上司显然看到了他的潜力。


In the ensuing 32 years, Xi’s stature rose, along with China’s economic and military strength.	之后的32年随着中国经济和军事实力的增强，习的地位也不断提升。


His cohort’s ascent to the summit of power marks the retirement of the last generation of leaders designated by Deng Xiaoping (though they retain influence).	他和团队登上权力巅峰标志着由邓小平指定的上一代领导正式退休（尽管他们在退休后仍有影响力）。


Despite China’s greater weight in world affairs, Xi faces internal strains that make China more fragile than is generally understood.	尽管中国在世界事务中拥有更多话语权，但习不得不面对致使中国比一般人认识中更加脆弱的内部压力。


China’s export-led economic model has reached its limits, and the transition to domestic-led growth is intensifying internal frictions.	中国出口导向的经济模式已经达到极限，而向内需拉动型增长的过渡正在激化内部摩擦。


Managing unrest through repression is more difficult than in the past, as rapid urbanization, economic reform, and social change roils a country of 1.3 billion people.	随着城市化快速发展、经济改革和社会变化在这个13亿人口的国家掀起轩然大波，依靠镇压手段管理骚乱比之前难度更大。


Ethnic conflicts in outlying regions will also test Xi’s political control.	边远地区的民族冲突也将考验习近平的政治控制力。


China’s foreign policy is another cause for concern – especially for the US.	中国的外交政策同样要引起关注——对美国而言更是这样。


History teaches us that rising powers inevitably compete with status quo leading powers, and that this conflict often leads to war.	历史告诉我们崛起中的大国不可避免地会与目前处于统治的地位的大国出现竞争，而这种冲突往往会导致战争的爆发。


For now, the large bilateral trade imbalance has exacerbated US-China tensions, and can be safely reduced only by changes in behavior on both sides – or, unsafely, though a dangerous crisis-driven correction.	当前的双边贸易不平衡进一步恶化了美中两国的紧张关系，只有双方改变行为模式才能缓解目前的紧张状况——否则就要通过危机驱动变革的危险方式。


More immediately, China’s territorial claims – particularly in the South China Sea, but also regarding its border with India – and its efforts to expand its influence over neighboring countries will force the US to navigate two overarching risks.	现在，中国在南海和中印边境的领土要求需要引起关注。 还有中国在邻国扩大影响力的举措将迫使美国平衡两种最主要的风险。


The first is confrontation, which could occur directly or as a result of the US being drawn into conflicts between China and its neighbors.	其中之一是对抗，这可能导致美国被直接卷入到中国与邻国间的冲突。


The other risk is that Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, or Myanmar could fall into China’s strategic orbit.	此外日本、韩国、越南、菲律宾、泰国或缅甸都有可能落入中国的战略轨道。


Many of these countries will look to the US as a strategic counterweight should China seek to assert local dominance.	许多国家都会用美国作为战略筹码来防止中国的地区称霸。


But some may conclude that it is safer to steer closer to China than away from it, because their economies depend so strongly on Chinese trade.	但也有国家可能认为靠近中国比远离中国更安全，因为它们的经济对中国贸易的依赖性极强。


As recent events in the East and South China Seas show, China sometimes attempts to strong-arm its neighbors.	最近发生在东海和南海的事件表明，中国在某些情况下可能会对自己的邻国诉诸武力。


The US will need to defend its allies and interests by pushing back, but with actions modulated to limit Chinese concerns.	美国需要采取反制措施来保护盟国和自身的利益，但又不能罔顾中国的担忧。


One way to do this is to understand China’s motives.	成功做到这点需要了解中国的动机。


China’s drive for economic and political leadership in East Asia, and its increased military capability there, is inevitable.	中国在东亚地区增强军力及寻求经济政治领导地位是不可避免的。


But the world can be confident that the US will remain stronger, wealthier, and more influential in global affairs than China even in 2030.	但世界各国可以相信即使在2030年美国仍将在全球事务中比中国更强大、更富足、更有影响力。


That argues against American overreaction, which could fuel the kind of self-reinforcing downward spiral in bilateral relations that occurred between Great Britain and Germany prior to the conflagrations of the first half of the twentieth century.	认清这点可以防���美国过度反应，而过度反应可能造成双边关系像20世纪早期冲突之前英德的关系那样落入自我强化的螺旋式下降通道。


Perhaps the best way to avoid confrontation is to cooperate on shared external threats, most notably nuclear proliferation, global climate change, and Islamic extremism.	就共同的外部威胁，尤其是核扩散、全球气候变化和伊斯兰极端主义进行合作或许是避免对抗的最好方法。


But getting to 2030 without a major confrontation will be a major achievement.	但在不出现大规模对抗的前提下安然进入2030将是一种莫大的成就。


While the US is likely to maintain the upper hand in terms of military power for at least another 15-20 years, asymmetric warfare could undercut America’s advantage should China engage in cyber-attacks on US electronic and satellite systems, along with attacks on infrastructure.	尽管美国可能在今后至少15－20年内仍将在军事实力上占据上风，但如果中国在对美电子及卫星系统发动网络攻击的同时对美基础设施发起攻击，美国的优势可能会在非对称战争中遭到削弱。


In response to China’s capability to project power many hundreds of miles from its borders, the US (as I have suggested for the last 25 years) should develop a long-range bomber capable of penetrating sophisticated defenses and delivering great force.	要想防止中国在距边境数百英里外投射军力，美国应研发一种能穿透复杂防御系统的强火力远程轰炸机（就像我过去25年一直建议的那样）。


As US security interests shift to the Pacific, Americans now rely on increasingly vulnerable forward land bases and carrier fleets with tactical aircraft that have a combat radius of 300-500 miles (482-805 kilometers).	由于安全利益日益向太平洋转移，美国现在只能依赖于越来越脆弱的陆上基地和作战半径300-500英里（482-805公里）的搭载战术飞机的航母舰队。


But a long-range bomber would be more cost-effective than standoff bombers with cruise missiles, and, unlike shorter-range tactical bombers, its bases would be invulnerable to attack.	但携带巡航导弹的远程轰炸机比短程战术轰炸机更具成本效益，因为袭击远程轰炸机基地是不可能的。


That said, America’s most serious challenge right now is to get the US economy and its governance in order.	总而言之，美国目前最严峻的挑战是恢复美国的经济和治理结构。


I believe that it can do that.	我认为美国有能力做到。


But, unless and until it does, thereby giving President Barack Obama a firm basis from which to engage Xi on issues requiring international statesmanship, the prospect of trouble between the US and China will continue to grow.	但直到美国实现这一目标，从而为奥巴马总统奠定就需要治世之才的问题与习近平接触的坚实基础，美中两国间出现麻烦的可能性仍然会继续增大。


From Constitutional Crisis to European Crisis	从宪法危及到欧洲危机


Since the shock of the French and Dutch “no” votes against the European Union’s proposed Constitutional Treaty, events have followed their inevitable course, but more rapidly than expected.	自从法国和荷兰对提议中的欧盟《宪法条约》说“不”以来，形势按着不可避免的轨迹发展，而其速度比我们预想的还要块。


The French “no” was a massive blow to the political credibility of French President Jacques Chirac.	法国人的拒绝是对希拉克总统政治公信力的一次重大打击。


So he did what French Presidents usually do in such circumstances: rather than admit that French voters might be right, he sacked Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin as a scapegoat, replacing him with his protégé Dominique de Villepin, who has never held an elective office.	因此他的反应和众多的法国总统们如出一辙：他宁愿罢免总理让—皮埃尔·拉法兰，并代之以门徒，从未通过选举获得过任何职位的多米尼克·德维尔潘，而不愿承认法国公众的决定可能是正确的。


Opinions differ as to the reasons for France’s rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.	对于法国拒绝《宪法条约》的原因也是众说纷纭。


But most analyses suggest that it was directed against high unemployment, magnified by the perceived threat to jobs from the new Central and Eastern European EU members.	但大多数的分析都认为这是针对在来自于中欧及东欧的欧盟新成员国的威胁下更为严峻的高失业率的回应。


Naturally, Chirac immediately reaffirmed his faith in the French economic model.	自然，希拉克立即再次肯定了他对法国经济模式的信心。


The most undeniable implication of the French vote has been to raise a large question mark over the future of the EU’s traditional integration project.	法国公决的最不容忽视的影响在于它给欧盟传统的一体化进程的未来划上了一个巨大的问号。


Rather than admit any such thing, Chirac hurried to meet German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, so that they could jointly reaffirm their traditional alliance as the spiritual leaders of this European project, in the hope that the Constitutional Treaty might yet be rescued.	希拉克不愿承认这一点，而是立刻和法国总理施罗德会晤，借此向世人重新昭示他们作为这项欧洲进程的精神领袖的传统盟友形象，并企望《宪法条约》还有被挽救的余地。


Neither of them have been able to say how this should be done.	但他们谁也不能阐明应该如何力挽狂澜。


The British government tried to wriggle out of taking sides on the implications of the French and Dutch votes by saying that it would suspend its own plans for a referendum, but not cancel it outright.	英国政府则是尽力避免在法、荷两国表决的基础上表态，而只是说要搁置而不会取消全民公决的计划。


But if the government thought that this mid-way position would finesse its European predicament by appeasing the large anti-European majority in the UK without gratuitously offending the EU’s other members, it was quickly disabused.	但如果英国政府认为这一中庸立场能够安抚国内为数众多的反欧洲势力而又不用无谓地得罪欧盟的其他成员国，那么它很快就会发现这个如意算盘打错了。


One consequence of last year’s enlargement is that it is forcing a far-reaching re-negotiation of all aspects of the EU budget.	去年欧盟扩大的一个结果就是迫使欧盟对其预算进行更为广泛的全方位再谈判。


Most of the ten new members are much poorer than the old members, and are thus much less able or willing to pay large financial contributions.	新成员国的大多数都是比老成员国穷得多的国家，因此他们也更无力或不愿支付巨额的财政派款。


They expect to be net financial beneficiaries, which would help them modernize.	他们希望成为纯粹的财政受惠者，这将有助于他们的现代化。


But the old member states that have hitherto benefited most from the budget – poorer countries like Spain, Greece, and Portugal – want the budget to be expanded, so that they can continue to receive money.	但迄今从预算中获益最多的老成员国—如西班牙、希腊和葡萄牙等较穷的国家—则希望预算能够增加以便他们继续接受资金支持。


Old member states that have traditionally contributed most, like Germany and the Netherlands, want to keep the budget as small as possible.	而德国和荷兰等传统上贡献最大的老成员国则希望将预算控制得越小越好。


Given this looming negotiation between old and new – and between rich and poor – and because Chirac has no cunning proposal for resurrecting the EU Constitution, he has sought and found a second scapegoat: Britain has, for over 20 years, benefited from a large rebate in its outsized contribution to the EU budget.	由于新老成员国—穷国与富国之间—仍不明朗的谈判，也因为希拉克没有一个聪明的计划来挽救《欧盟宪法》，他就千方百计地找到了第二只替罪羊：过去20年以来，英国由于对欧盟预算的超额贡献而获得了巨额减免。


By design the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) gives large financial benefits to countries with large farming sectors, like France, but imposes financial penalties on countries with small farming sectors, like Britain.	欧盟《共同农业政策》(CAP)的制定给法国这样农业规模大的国家带来财政收益，而对英国这样的农业规模小的国家施以财政处罚。


This inequity long rankled in Britain.	这种不平等长久以来就遭到英国人的怨恨。


In 1984, Margaret Thatcher demanded and got a large rebate in the British net contribution, which this year is worth roughly €5bn.	1984年， 在马格丽特·撒切尔的力争下，英国得到了对其净财政派款的巨额减免。 这一额度今年达到了50亿欧元。


Ever since, this concession has been resented by other member states.	从那时起，这一让步就令其他所有的成员国愤愤不平。


Last week, Chirac decided to raise the stakes in the European crisis by going on the offensive against Britain.	上周，希拉克决定对英国发难，以增加在欧洲危机中的筹码。


The time has come, he said, for “our English friends” to understand that they have to make a gesture of solidarity, and renounce the rebate negotiated by Thatcher.	他说是到了让我们的“英国朋友”明白他们必须做出团结的姿态，并放弃撒切尔争来的减免额度的时候了。


The British government’s first reflex was to reject any suggestion that the British rebate is open to discussion: it was justified in 1984, and it is justified today.	英国政府的第一反应是英国的减免额度不容商榷：这在1984年和现在都是合理的。


But Tony Blair has now gone on the counter-offensive, raising the stakes himself.	而布莱尔现在也提了高筹码，对法国还以颜色。


Britain, he says, might be prepared to put the British rebate on the table, but only if the French are prepared to remove the reasons for it by means of a radical renegotiation of EU farm policy.	他表示，只有当法国准备就欧盟的农业政策进行彻底的再谈判，从而消除减免额度存在的理由时，英国才可能会将这一问题放到谈判桌上。


From a narrowly British perspective, this might seem a shrewd and reasonable posture for defending British interests.	从狭隘的英国视角来看，这不失为一种捍卫英国利益的，精明而合理的姿态。


But, by picking up Chirac’s challenge, Blair has allowed himself to be drawn away from the general European dilemma (what to do about the Constitutional Treaty) – for which Britain is not to blame – to a specific policy problem (the CAP’s finances) on which Britain is isolated.	然而，布莱尔接受了希拉克的挑战，就使自己的注意力从总体的欧洲困局（如何应对《宪法条约》）--一个并非由英国造成的局面—转移到了一个让英国备受孤立的具体政策问题（CAP的财政问题）上。


Coming from anyone else, Blair’s proposal to re-think the CAP might seem reasonable; indeed, over the years, the EU has tried (slowly) to reform its defects.	重新审视CAP的提议如果由布莱尔以外的任何人提出似乎都是合理的； 的确，多年以来欧盟都试图（缓慢地）改善它的先天不足。


Unfortunately, in eight years of power, Tony Blair reinforced the widespread impression in the rest of the EU, that the UK is irremediably skeptical about European integration.	不幸的事，在8年的执政期间，布莱尔又强化了欧盟其他成员国中广泛存在的印象，即英国是欧��一体化不可救药的怀疑者。


His proposal will thus be seen for what it is, a counter-attack on a founding policy of the European project.	因此，他的提议自然会被认为是对欧洲计划的根本政策的责难。


The danger is that this week’s EU summit will not be devoted to finding a solution to the dilemma of the French and Dutch “no” votes, but instead will be turned into a confrontation between Britain and the rest about the budget.	危险在于这周的欧盟首脑会晤不会以解决由于法、荷的拒绝而造成的欧洲立宪困境为中心议题，而是成为英国和欧盟其他国家关于预算的对抗。


This would be a pity for Europe and for Britain.	果真如此，这对于欧洲和英国都将是个遗憾。


It would underscore the depth of the chasm between leaders who are seeking to advance the cause of European political integration but are out of touch with their electorates, and the British, who do not like European political integration at all.	这会加深正力图寻求欧洲政治一体化但却脱离选民的领导人和全然无意于欧洲政治一体化的英国人之间的裂痕。


The Biodiversity Bargain	廉价的生物多样性


NAIROBI – What will it cost to save the world’s forests and boost the life prospects of its seven billion people?	内罗毕—拯救世界森林、改善70亿人口生活前进的成本几何？


In a few days, India will host a meeting in Hyderabad of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.	几天后，印度海德拉巴将举办联合国生物多样性会议。


The assembled countries will consider how to raise the resources necessary to achieve the ambitious Aichi Biodiversity Targets, adopted two years ago at the last such meeting in Japan.	与会各国将考虑提高为达成雄心勃勃的爱知生物多样性目标（Aichi Biodiversity Targets）而投入的必要资源。 爱知目标是两年前日本联合国生物多样性会议上提出的。


The Aichi targets call for cutting by half the rate of loss of the planet’s natural habitats, including forests, by 2020.	爱知目标要求在2020年将地球原始森林流失率减少一半。


In Hyderabad, governments will be presented with the likely costs of scaling up efforts to achieve that goal.	在海德拉巴，各国政府将讨论增加达成该目标投入的可能成本。


One assessment estimates that about $40 billion a year will be needed to halve rates of deforestation and ensure sustainable management of forests in developing countries by the target date.	一项估计表明，若想在爱知目标期限之前实现森林毁坏率下降一半并保证发展中国家的森林可持续管理，每年就必须投入400亿美元。


The cost may seem significant in a world of rising unemployment rates, with many countries still struggling with ongoing financial and economic crises, and others staring bankruptcy in the face.	在全球失业率高企、众多国家仍在持续发酵的金融和经济危机中挣扎、更有不少国家已经陷入破产状态的时期，这看起来是笔巨大的数字。


But the cost of preserving the world’s biodiversity needs to be contrasted with the enormous economic and social value of forests in terms of the benefits that they provide locally and globally.	但保护世界生物多样性的成本必须与森林的巨大经济和社会价值——以其给当地和全球带来的好处衡量——作比较。


Forests ensure water supplies, counter soil erosion, and safeguard an abundance of genetic resources that will become increasingly important in developing the new products, pharmaceuticals, and crop strains needed to support the lives and livelihoods of more than nine billion people by 2050.	森林能够保证水供给、抵抗水土流失、保护基因资源充足性，后者对于开发新产品、药品和农作物以支持2050年的90亿人口的生存和生活具有重大意义。


Moreover, investing in forest conservation and sustainable land use is one of the most cost-effective means of mitigating climate change.	此外，投资森林保护和可持续土地利用也是减轻气候变化成本最低的方式。


The potential returns from targeted investments in forests are immense.	定向森林投资的潜在回报是巨大的。


Restoring just 15% of degraded forest landscapes worldwide could generate up to $85 billion worth of ecosystem services every year, mostly benefiting rural and underprivileged communities.	恢复15%的世界范围流失林地每年可以产生多达850亿美元的生态系统价值，受益者大多是农村和不发达地区。


Estimates of the value of the Mau forest complex to the Kenyan economy, for example, are $1.5 billion a year.	比如，据估计，Mau森林复杂性每年能够给肯尼亚经济带来15亿美元。


Similar estimates are underway in Brazil, Colombia, India, and elsewhere.	巴西、哥伦比亚、印度和其他国家的评估也在计算中。


The cost of inaction would be considerably higher than the required investment.	不作为的成本比作为所需要的投资高得多。


The annual cost of adapting to climate change has now passed the $40 billion mark, and is expected to rise every year unless we can significantly reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	如今，每年为适应气候变化而投入的资金已经超过了400亿美元大关，除非我们可以减少温室气体排放，否则这一成本每年都会继续增长。


Some countries are already stepping up to the challenge.	一些国家已经开始行动起来应对这一挑战。


Norway is investing $3 billion to support national and international initiatives, including the UN-REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) Program, a joint effort of three UN agencies to support developing countries’ efforts to save, sustainably manage, and restore tropical forests (a range of activities known as REDD+).	挪威正在投入30亿美元用于支持国家和国际计划，其中就包括UN-REDD（减少森林砍伐和退化所产生的排放）计划，这是由三个联合国机构联合发起的计划，旨在支持发展中国家保护、可持续管理和恢复热带雨林（这一系列活动被称为REDD+）。


Brazil has reduced deforestation rates in the Amazon by roughly 80% since 2005, and Norway’s pledge of $1 billion is helping to achieve further reductions.	自2005年以来，巴西已经将亚马孙森林破坏速度减少了80%，挪威承诺出资10亿美元用于达到进一步减少破坏速度的目标。


Brazil’s efforts have led to perhaps the biggest emission reduction of any country in the world – at a time when deforestation accounts for around 15% of global greenhouse-gas emissions.	巴西的努力换来的是也许是全世界最大规模的减排——如今，毁林造成的温室气体排放约占总排放的15%。


The UN-REDD Program, launched in 2008, currently supports 44 developing countries, with 16 countries receiving direct financial and technical support.	2008年实行的UN-REDD计划目前支持着44个发展中国家，其中16国受到了直接金融和技术支持。


The funding is preparing them, for example, to develop monitoring systems and build support and awareness among local communities and indigenous peoples for a fresh start to forest management.	比如，该几乎所提供的自己让它们得以开发监测系统、培养地方社区和本国居民对该计划的支持和理解，从而开启崭新的森林管理方式。


Some are already seizing the funding opportunities under what is essentially a climate-change initiative to pursue broader sustainability goals.	一些国家已在利用这一融资机会，进行着可视为最求广义可持续目标的气候变化方案。


For example, Indonesia is seeking to establish a Green Corridor in Kalimantan (the Indonesian portion of the island of Borneo), where deforestation is not only fueling greenhouse-gas emissions, but also diminishing river flows, making it difficult in some months to transport goods by barge.	比如，印度尼西亚正在寻求在婆罗洲岛印尼端打造加里曼丹绿色走廊。 在婆罗洲，森林的毁灭不但加剧了温室气体排放，也在毁坏河流，这使得一年中有好几个月无法通过驳船运送货物。


Given that transportation by barge costs about $10 a ton, compared to close to $60 a ton by road, REDD+ offers a chance to hold down greenhouse-gas emissions while preserving an economically important sector.	驳船运输成本大约在10美元/吨，而陆运成本高达近60美元/吨，因此REDD+不但可以降低温室气体排放，还可以保护拥有成本优势的重要部门 。


While Norway has made the biggest commitment to UN-REDD and other initiatives to date, other donors – including the European Commission, Denmark, Japan, and Spain – are also contributing.	到目前为止，对UN-REDD和其他计划出力最甚的是挪威，但其他出资者——包括欧盟、丹麦、日本和西班牙——也已经行动起来。


Enlightened businesses, which will be key to meeting the 2020 funding goals, are also investing in sustainable forest management.	开明的企业——它们将是2020融资目标的关键——也在投资可持续森林管理。


Countering deforestation is not without its challenges.	反毁林斗争绝非坦途。


Governance and land-tenure systems must be improved in many countries, and the risk of corruption must be addressed rigorously.	许多国家的治理和土地所有制必须改善，腐败风险必须花大力气纠正。


In Hyderabad, countries and experts will consider how safeguards can ensure that both people and nature benefit from REDD+ activities.	在海德拉巴，各国和专家将考虑如何让人民和大自然同时获得REDD+带来的好处。


Nevertheless the challenges should not mask or deflect attention from the opportunities.	但我们不能因为挑战而无视机会。


The UN-REDD Program is just four years old, and the best is yet to come.	UN-REDD计划才进行了四年，其最佳效果还远没有体现出来。


Whether to combat climate change or to realize wider environmental benefits, the need for enhanced financing of forests can no longer be ignored.	不管是与气候变化作斗争，还是认识更广义的环境益处，都需要加强森林融资。


And there is a final imperative: 1.4 billion people currently depend for their livelihoods on forests.	还有最重要的理由：14亿人口目前要靠森林过活。


Annual investments of $40 billion per year could generate five million new jobs globally.	每年投入400亿美元可以在全球创造500万个新工作岗位。


The world is struggling to fight climate change, sustain a growing global population, and find decent jobs for millions of young people.	气候变化斗争、维持不断增长的全球人口、为千百万年轻人找到体面工作，这些都是当今世界所面临的挑战。


Investing in forests and biodiversity represents a root-and-branch response to these challenges.	投资森林和生物多样性是应对这些挑战治标兼治本的方法。


But it requires more ambitious and wider public- and private-sector support.	但我们需要更大的雄心和更多的公私部门支持。


With a price tag of around $40 billion per year, the cost of that support is, to be frank, a bargain.	每年400亿美元，平心而论，这样的支持成本可谓价廉。


From Depression to Freedom	从抑郁到自由


Clinical depression affects roughly one in four people at some point in their lives.	一生中曾受过临床抑郁症影响的人口大约占人口总数的四分之一左右。


It is a severe and prolonged state of mind in which normal sadness grows into a painful state of hopelessness, listlessness, lack of motivation, and fatigue.	这是一种长期而严重的精神疾病，得这种病的患者从正常的悲伤转化成一种失望、冷漠、委靡和疲惫的精神状态。


But, however well defined, clinical depression is many things to many people, varying from mild to severe.	但无论界定何等精确，临床抑郁症对不同的人都有着不同的含义，对患者的影响也从轻微到严重各不相同。


Mild depression can result in brooding on negative aspects of self or others, feeling resentful, irritable or angry much of the time, feeling sorry for oneself, and needing constant reassurance from someone.	轻微的抑郁会使患者只考虑自己和别人的短处，大多数时间都感到愤懑、急躁和生气，为自己感到悲伤，需要别人不停地安慰。


It can also result in various physical complaints that do not seem to be caused by any physical illness.	轻微抑郁症还能导致多种生理症状，但这些症状却并非由于任何疾病的结果。


As depression worsens, feelings of extreme sadness and hopelessness combine with low self-esteem, guilt, memory loss, and concentration difficulties to bring about a severely painful state of mind.	随着抑郁状态的加重，病人除了感到极度的悲伤和无助，还会伴有丧失自信、内疚、失忆和精力难以集中等症状，导致他们陷入极度的痛苦之中。


To make things worse, there may be a change in basic bodily functions.	更糟的是还可能伴有日常肌体功能的改变。


The usual daily rhythms seem to go wrong: can’t sleep, or sleep too much, can’t eat, or eat too much. Enthusiasm for what are usually enjoyable activities fades.	往日的生活节奏似乎被彻底打乱：病人或者无法入睡、或者昏睡不醒、或者无法进食、或者暴饮暴食。


Sometimes, there is even a feeling that life is not worth living and that one would be better off dead.	他们对通常令人愉快的行为热情逐渐消退，有时甚至感到活着没有意义，死了反倒是一种解脱。


The most commonly used treatment for major depression is antidepressant medication.	抑郁症的常用疗法是服用抗抑郁药物。


It is relatively cheap, and it is easy for family practitioners, who treat the majority of depressed people, to prescribe.	这类药物价格相对便宜，很多家庭执业者采用它来治疗多数抑郁症病人。


However, when the episode has passed, and medication ceases, depression tends to return, and at least 50% of those who experienced an initial episode of depression find that depression comes back, despite appearing to have made a full recovery.	但症状缓解后，药物治疗停止，抑郁又会重新发作，而且至少50%有过首次发作史的病人会再次患上抑郁症，尽管他们看上去已经完全康复了。


After a second or third episode, the risk of recurrence rises to 80-90%.	发作两三次后，重犯的可能性提高了80-90%。


Early onset depression (before 20 years of age) is particularly associated with a significantly higher risk of relapse and recurrence.	如果患上抑郁症时年龄很小（还不到20岁），那么复发和重犯的危险性会大大提高。


For those who have been suicidal in the past, any depressed mood is likely to be accompanied by a return of suicidal thinking.	对产生过自杀念头的病人来讲，任何情绪抑郁都可能导致再次产生轻生之念。


The problem with viewing antidepressants as the main method for preventing recurrence is that many people do not want to stay on medication for indefinite periods, and when the medication stops, the risk of becoming depressed again returns.	把抗抑郁药作为防止重犯主要方法的困难在于：很多人不愿意无限期地服用抗抑郁药，而一旦停止服药，又将再次面临着抑郁的危险。


Finding new ways of helping people stay well after depression demands an understanding of why depression keeps returning.	要想找到帮助患者巩固抑郁症疗效的新方法，就需要了解抑郁为什么会反复发作。


During a period of crisis in which someone becomes depressed and suicidal, an association is learned between the various symptoms (low mood, physical pain, suicidal tendencies, and so on).	在患者陷入抑郁、试图轻生的危机时刻，各种症状在患者的体内建立了联系（情绪低落、生理痛楚、自杀倾向等诸如此类）。


This means that when the negative mood returns, for any reason, it will tend to trigger all the other symptoms – a process called “cognitive reactivity”).	这意味着一旦负面情绪由于某种原因再度出现，就可能引发其它的所有症状¾这个过程被称为“认知反应”）。


The discovery that the link between negative moods and negative thoughts remains ready to be reactivated even when people feel well is hugely important: it means that preventing future crises depends on learning how to keep mild upsets from spiraling out of control.	负面情绪和负面想法之间的联系随时可能再度激发，即便人感觉良好时也不会例外，这一发现的确至关重要：它告诉我们，防止未来危机的关键在于学会如何阻止轻微的不快最终变得无法控制。


Research has shown that combining the ancient practice of meditation with modern psychotherapies can accomplish this.	研究表明冥想的古老方法和现代心理治疗相结合就能够实现这一目标。


Based on Jon Kabat Zinn’s Stress Reduction program at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) combines modern cognitive behavioral therapy with meditation practices to help people become more aware of the present moment, including getting in touch with moment-to-moment changes in the mind and body (see www.mbct.co.uk).	以马萨诸塞大学医疗中心兹恩博士的减压计划为基础，正念认知疗法（MBCT）将现代认知行为疗法和冥想结合在一起，帮助人们集中精力关注现在，包括了解每时每刻的身体和精神变化（请参见www. mbct.


In weekly classes (the atmosphere is that of a class, rather than a therapy group), and by listening to CD’s or tapes at home during the week, participants learn the practice of mindfulness meditation.	通过每周上课（这里的氛围是课堂，而不是治疗小组），以及在家听CD和磁带，参与者们学会了正念认知的方法。


The classes also include basic education about our moods, and several exercises from cognitive therapy that show the links between thinking and feeling and how participants can best look after themselves when a crisis threatens to overwhelm them.	教学内容还包括有关情绪的基础知识，以及几项展示思考和感觉之间联系的认知治疗练习，讲授的内容还包括当无法化解的危机降临时，参与者怎样才能给予自己最好的照顾。


The MBCT approach helps participants in the classes to see more clearly the patterns of the mind and to learn how to recognize when their mood is starting to sink.	正念认知疗法帮助听课者更清晰地洞察自己的思维模式，学会正确判断情绪的沉沦。


It helps break the normal link between negative mood and negative thinking.	它帮助人们打破负面情绪和负面思想之间的惯常联系。


Participants develop the capacity to allow distressing moods, thoughts, and sensations to come and go, without having to battle with them.	参与者学会了顺利化解痛苦的情绪、思想和感受，而不必与它们苦苦纠缠。


They find that they can stay in touch with the present moment without having to ruminate about the past or worry about the future.	他们发现自己可以关注现在，而不必思考过去或忧心未来。


Thus, they come to see with greater clarity and conviction how to approach moment-by-moment experience skillfully, taking more pleasure in the good things that often go unnoticed or unappreciated while dealing more effectively with the difficulties encountered, whether real or imagined.	这样，他们就能更加清楚明确地了解如何正确地处理每时每刻的情绪，从常常不被留意的美好事物中获得更多乐趣，同时更有效地处理碰到的困难，无论这种困难存在于实际还是想象之中。


Two controlled clinical trials have demonstrated that MBCT can reduce the likelihood of relapse by about 40-50% in people who have suffered three or more previous episodes of depression.	两次控制临床试验表明：正念认知疗法可以使抑郁发作过三次或者以上患者的再次复发率降低约40-50%。


As a result of such findings, MBCT has now been included in the British government’s national guidelines for treating recurrent major depression.	这项研究的结果使正念认知疗法被纳入了英国政府治疗抑郁复发的国家指导纲要之中。


But this implies a redefinition of treatment itself.	但这也意味着对治疗的重新界定。


As our understanding of depression grows and we see that it is a recurring problem, the emphasis is shifting from cure to prevention.	随着我们对抑郁的认识不断深入，了解到这种疾病很容易反复发作，我们就应该把重点从治疗向预防转移。


Mindfulness-based approaches have already proven that they will play an enormously important role in this.	现有的证据表明：正念认知疗法将在其中起到非常重要的作用。


From Football to Fascism in Russia	从足球到法西斯主义


MOSCOW – In Russia, 2010 ended with an unprecedented upsurge of ultra-nationalist violence.	发自莫斯科——俄罗斯的2010年最终在一场前所未有的极端民族主义暴乱中落下帷幕。


Images of rioting, fascist-minded thugs have dominated TV broadcasts.	打开电视，满目都是骚乱和法西斯分子的画面。


The violence began following an ordinary conflict between two small groups of young people over a taxi.	这场暴力冲突的导火索其实是两伙年轻人争夺一辆出租车。


One group consisted of young people from the Northern Caucasus, the other of fans of a Moscow football (soccer) club.	其中一伙人来自北高加索地区，而另一伙人是莫斯科某足球俱乐部的球迷。


One of the leaders of the Moscow fans, Yegor Sviridov, was murdered.	冲突导致一名叫伊戈尔·施维利多夫的球迷领袖丧生。


Rumors raced around the city the next day that the police had released all those accused of Sviridov’s murder (as it happens, the rumors were true).	事发第二天城中谣言四起，说警方把所有涉嫌杀害施维利多夫的人都放了（跟往常一样，这是真的）。


Spontaneous protests erupted in front of police headquarters, but the police did not intervene.	于是人们自发聚集到警察总部门口抗议，但警方却按兵不动，未做任何阻拦。


On December 11, another rally was held at site of the murder, and moved into the very center of Moscow, Manezhnaya Square, just outside the Kremlin’s walls.	到了12月11日，人们在施维利多夫遇害地点又发动了另一场示威，并游行到莫斯科市核心区域，与克里姆林宫仅一墙之隔的涅什纳亚广场。


The crowd began to chant nationalist slogans, and then proceeded to beat up passersby who did not look Slavic.	游行群众开始高喊民主主义口号，随后又开始追打那些不像斯拉夫面孔的路人。


The police were slow to arrive.	警方此时才姗姗来迟。


The beatings continued and spread to the subway, where the police were essentially powerless.	而殴打行为一直持续并蔓延到警方力量薄弱的地铁站内。


The night finished with many wounded and one more killed.	持续一天的事件造成多人受伤一人死亡。


The next day, back on Manezhnaya Square, beside the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a huge swastika appeared.	翌日，就在马涅什纳亚广场附近的无名烈士墓旁，有人打出了一幅大大的纳粹十字符号。


These events are not without precedent.	这些事件并不是没有先兆的。


In 2002, Moscow authorities mounted huge TV-screens on Manezhnaya Square to broadcast a World Cup match between Russia and Japan.	在2002年，莫斯科政府在马涅什纳亚广场安放了一个巨大的电视屏幕，转播俄罗斯与日本之间的世界杯足球赛。


By the start of the game, tens of thousands of young fans were on the square, many of them drunk and agitated.	从赛事一开始就有数千万名年轻球迷聚集到广场上，很多人都灌了许多酒，极端躁动不安。


When the final whistle sounded on a 1-0 victory for Japan, the crowd, infuriated, burst into spontaneous pogroms and beatings.	当终场哨声响起宣布日本以1-0获胜之时，群众当即被激怒了，现场立刻沦为人们拳脚相加的角斗场。


Those events were preceded by a propaganda campaign in which government-controlled newspapers, television stations, and radio broadcasters took part.	其实在那场赛事之前，由政府控制的电视台，报纸和广播电台就发动了一场宣传攻势。


It was decided to exploit the forthcoming world championship for “patriotic” purposes.	旨在借俄罗斯队这个“未来的世界冠军”来达到宣扬“爱国”的目的。


In pumping up football-induced hysteria, Russian politicians – headed by then-President Vladimir Putin – took the lead.	在这场鼓动足球狂热的运动中，以普京为首的俄罗斯政客们扮演了领导作用。


The government had erected the TV screens outside the Kremlin in order to ensure patriotic exultation of the victory that they assumed was coming.	政府之所以在克里姆林宫外安装了大荧幕转播比赛，就是想借即将到来的胜利激发爱国热情。


No one was prepared for defeat.	只不过没人想到最后竟然输了。


Clearly, careless manipulation by the authorities of patriotic sentiments has proven to be a risky business in Russia.	很显然，当局对爱国主义情绪的无力操控证明这在俄罗斯是行不通的。


But the Kremlin still seems addicted to this means of buttressing its legitimacy among ordinary Russians.	但克里姆林宫却依然对此着迷不已，希望以此提高它在普通俄罗斯民众中的统治合法性。


Indeed, the vast popular protests that took place during the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine five years ago convinced the Kremlin that they could not allow any spontaneous outburst of public emotions.	事实上，5年前在乌克兰“橙色革命”期间爆发的大规模群众抗议活动已使莫斯科当局确信：不能容许任何公众情绪的自发释放。


Officials evidently decided that it is better to flirt with and control public passion than allow it to erupt on its own.	官员们显然决定应该适当挑起和控制公众的热情，而不是任由其自由喷发。


Back then, the Kremlin was frightened by the possibility of a so-called “color revolution” breaking out in Russia.	在那时候，克里姆林宫极端惧怕一场所谓“颜色革命”会在俄罗斯爆发。


As a result, enormous resources – both funds and officials’ time – were invested in youth movements created by Kremlin puppeteers, with two aims: control street political activity and prepare brigades for a future struggle – which might include ballot rigging – against political opponents.	于是他们投入了大量资源——包括资金和官员的精力——在克里姆林宫操纵下的青年运动上。 此举的目的有二：一是控制街头政治活动；


For this purpose, contingents of football fans were also used.	二是为未来与政治反对派之间的斗争做准备——包括操纵选举。 在此目的之下，球迷也成为了利用的目标。


This sort of manipulation is now a Kremlin staple.	这类操纵行为已经成为克里姆林宫最拿手的手段。


Indeed, by coincidence, on the Sunday the young football fan was murdered in Moscow, Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy in President Dmitri Medvedev’s administration, was meeting Michael McFaul of President Barack Obama’s National Security Council. That meeting was taking place as part of a gathering, led by Surkov, of Russian youth-movement activists.	巧合的是，在莫斯科青年球迷被杀害的那个星期天，俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫总统办公室第一副主任弗拉基·苏尔科夫正在与奥巴马国家安全委员会代表迈克尔·麦克福尔会晤，而这场会面其实是苏尔科夫发起的俄罗斯青年运动分子聚会的一部分。


One quote from Surkov that day is particularly telling: “Make ready for the elections, train your brains and muscles. You can always rely on our support.”	苏尔科夫当天说过的一句特别的话就是：“准备好迎接选举，锻炼好你们的大脑和肌肉，我们永远支持你们。


Those muscles were put to use outside the Kremlin walls that very day.	”谁知这些肌肉当天则在克里姆林宫的宫墙外发挥了作用。


To understand what is at stake, it is sufficient to consider the name of the main youth movement fathered by the Kremlin: Nashi, or “Ours.”	为了说明事情的严重性，我们可以看看克里姆林宫为其一手扶持的主要青年运动组织所取的名字——“我们（俄文为Nashi）”。


It is difficult to invent a more potentially explosive moniker, for the name proudly proclaims a division between “us” and “them” – the most ancient and most destructive of human instincts. And it is hard to rationalize so atavistic an effort being initiated by a government and supported with taxpayers’ money.	再没有比这个字眼更具有潜在爆发性的名号了，它傲慢地将“我们”和“他们”区分开来——而这是人们最古老也最具危险性的意识，同时也很难为这么一个由政府发起并由纳税人的钱支撑起来的返祖行为找到合适的理由。


As a result, special youth brigades fostered by the Kremlin nowadays beat up activists of “not ours.” If the policedetain Nashi members, a telephone call from the President’s administration follows, and the detainees are released.	结果，这些由克里姆林宫培养出来的特殊青年团体如今开始痛打那些“非我们”分子��如果警方拘捕了“我们”的成员，他们随后就会接到克里姆林宫打来的电话，要求立刻放人。


That is why the police fail to take tough action against rioting young thugs.	这也是警方无法重拳打击骚乱青年暴徒的原因。


Only when the Kremlin was seized by panic at the level of the disturbances that Nashi had initiated, did it demand that the police take control of events.	只有当克里姆林宫也开始对“我们”做造成的骚乱感到恐慌之时，他们才会要求警方彻底控制局势。


It is not clear yet whether the nationalist youth rebellion has been suppressed, and whether Muscovites will be able to use the subway without fear during Russia’s New Year and Orthodox Christmas holidays.	我们不知道这伙青年民族主义暴徒是否遭到了镇压，也不知道莫斯科市民是否敢在俄罗斯新年和东正教圣诞假日期间使用地铁。


But it is absolutely certain that the Kremlin’s unconstitutional activities – its division of citizens into “ours” and aliens, and its flirtation with hard-core xenophobes – has led to serious social and political destabilization.	但很明显克里姆林宫的这种违反宪法的行为——将本国公民割裂为“我们”和外人，以及政府与极端仇外主义者之间的那种暧昧关系——将严重影响到社会和政治稳定。


In a society with weakened immunity to extremism – and with an utterly dysfunctional government – the authorities are, perhaps literally, playing with fire.	一个对极端主义日渐缺乏免疫力的社会中——再加上一个完全失效的政府——当局实际上是在引火烧身。


From Global Imbalances to Effective Global Governance	从全球经济失衡到有效的全球治理


STANFORD, CALIFORNIA – The current credit crisis has led to scaled-back projections for growth around the world.	加利福尼亚州斯坦福-目前的信贷危机已导致对全球增长大幅回落的预测。


Governments and central banks are responding to damaged balance sheets and credit lockups in an attempt to limit extreme harm to their economies outside the financial sector.	各国政府和中央银行纷纷对糟糕的资产负债表和信贷保护进行了回应，企图以此限制对各自的经济体在金融业之外造成极端的伤害。


In the United States, the financial sector is undergoing a high-speed but permanent structural transformation, the effects of which could be severe for developing countries’ economic growth.	在美国，金融业正经历着一场高速但永久性的结构性变化，其结果可能会严重影响发展中国家的经济增长。


Indeed, these countries are already experiencing large relative price increases for food and oil, a food emergency for the poor, and higher rates of inflation induced by commodity price shifts.	事实上，这些国家已经出现粮食和石油的相对价格的巨幅上扬、穷人的粮食危机和由商品价格上涨所引起的更高的通货膨胀。


While rapid growth in developing countries has been an important factor in the rising commodity prices, much of this is beyond their control.	虽然发展中国家的快速发展一直是商品价格上涨的一个重要因素，但这种局势的绝大部分是他们自己也无法控制的。


For the past two years, my colleagues and I on the Growth Commission have sought to learn how 13 developing countries managed to record growth rates averaging 7% or more for 25 years or longer.	在过去的两年里，我和我的发展委员会的同事们试图去了解13个发展中国家是如何在25年甚至更长的时间内取得7 ％甚至更高的平均增长率的。


In The Growth Report , published in May, we tried to understand why most developing countries fell far short of this achievement, and explored how they might emulate the fast growers.	在5月发表的“发展报告”里，我们试图去理解为什么大多数发展中国家远未达到这一成就，并探讨了这些国家如何向高速发展的国家学习。


Sustained high growth is enabled by and requires engagement with the global economy that goes beyond simply being able to produce for a potentially massive export market.	参与全球化经济造就了持续的高增长，而高增长必须参与全球化经济。 这不仅仅意味着能够为潜在的巨大的出口市场生产产品；


It also involves, crucially, importing an essential intangible asset: knowledge.	重要的是，它还涉及到引进一种重要的无形资产：即知识。


Economies can learn faster than they can invent, so less developed countries can achieve much faster growth than was experienced by today’s industrialized countries when they were becoming wealthy.	经济体学习的速度可以超过其创造的速度，所以欠发达国家相比今天的工业化国家，在向富裕的道路迈进时，前者比后者的成长速度更快。


Because of the importance of the global economy, the destiny of developing countries is not entirely in the hands of their leaders, workforces, and entrepreneurs.	由于全球化经济的重要性，发展中国家的命运并不完全掌握在他们的领导人、劳动大军和企业家手中。


Today, there are potential adverse global trends and challenges, many of which are relatively new developments that the 13 high-growth cases did not face.	今天，存在着潜在的不利的全球性趋势和挑战，其中许多是13个高增长的国家从未经历过的相对较新的局势。


The most immediate is financial distress emanating mainly, but not exclusively, from the US and spilling out to hit all sectors of the global economy.	最直接的是，主要从美国、但又不完全是从美国产生的金融危机，其向美国之外蔓延，打击了全球经济的所有领域。


This was and is the result of an asset bubble fueled by excessive leverage and by the massive transparency issues associated with complex securities and derivatives that were supposed to spread risk, but instead mainly increased the systemic risk already present with excess debt.	这过去是、现在仍是资产泡沫带来的结果。 对杠杆效应的过度运用，以及与复杂的证券及衍生产品相关的透明度方面的严重问题（这些证券和衍生产品本来是应该分散风险的，而最后却增加了已经因为过多的债务而存在的系统性风险），都对资产泡沫起了火上浇油的作用。


Much has become clear.	许多事情已看得很清楚了。


First, extreme financial distress can bring down the real economy, with a shortage of credit being the most potent channel.	首先，极其严重的金融危机可以拖垮实体经济，信贷的缺乏是其最有杀伤力的渠道。


Second, the current regulatory structure is not adequate to ensure stability in the US economy.	其次，目前的监管架构不足以确保美国经济的稳定。


America’s light, incomplete, and fragmented pattern of regulation will not survive, and it will not be used as a model in other parts of the world.	美国的轻率的、不完整的并且零散的监管模式将无法再生存下去，它也不能用来作为世界其他地区的楷模。


Third, contributing factors included low interest rates, compressed risk spreads, and global imbalances that accommodated low savings in the US, consumption in excess of output, and a mounting trade deficit.	第三，促成此次危机的因素还包括：低利率、压缩风险利差、美国人的低储蓄的全球经济失衡的、消费量超过��量以及不断攀升的贸易赤字。


Absent the willingness of large developing countries to run trade surpluses and high savings rates relative to investment, the asset bubble in the US – leading to a rise in domestic consumption and a fall in the savings rate – would have triggered inflation and higher interest rates.	大的发展中国家不愿意把贸易顺差和高储蓄率相对于投资来运用，这样，美国的资产泡沫导致了国内消费的增加和储蓄率的降低，这早该会引发通货膨胀和高利率。


That would have put a partial brake on growth in asset prices, raised savings, reduced investment, and probably lowered the trade deficit. But the automatic stabilizers that normally kick in did not.	那种情况照理应该对遏制资产价格增长起一些作用，并且会提高储蓄率，减少投资，也许还可以降低贸易赤字。


In general, automatic stabilizers may not kick in across the global economy, which means that policies need to be coordinated.	但一般来说，自动稳定效应不会在全球经济范围内生效，这意味着，各国政策必须互相协调。


Fourth, regulatory structures will need to be rebuilt, and this will require a global effort.	第四，监管架构将需要重建，而这将需要全球共同的努力。


Absent international coordination, the opportunities for destructive regulatory competition will defeat regulatory reform.	如果没有国家间的协调，破坏性的监管竞争将使监管改革失败。


Finally, both the interdependence and global risk that are evident in this crisis will and probably should cause countries to adopt policies with respect to financial structures that provide for some insulation from external shocks, even if such policies impose a cost.	最后，在这场危机中显而易见的互相依存性和全球性风险，将可能、也应该导致各国采取这样的金融结构政策，即能在某些方面使其免受外部冲击的政策，即使这样的政策会增加成本。


The interdependencies in the global economy (in areas as diverse as financial markets, product safety, infectious diseases, natural resource dependency, and global warming) have outrun our collective capacity to manage them and coordinate policy responses.	全球经济的相互依存性（在如此众多的领域中，诸如金融市场、产品安全，传染病，自然资源的依赖和全球变暖）已非我们的集体能力和政策反应协调能力所能应付。


Restoring that balance will take time, leadership, a shift in attitudes, and creativity.	恢复这种平衡需要时间、领导力、观念的转变以及创造力。


In the interim, the mismatch creates risks for everyone, including developing countries.	在过渡期间，此种不匹配给每一个人带来了风险，这包括发展中国家。


It creates skepticism about whether the net benefits of openness are positive, and uncertainty about what adaptations are needed in the regulation of free markets to achieve a reasonable balance between their benefits and risks.	它让人们怀疑开放的净效益是否为正面积极，它还使人们对自由市场需要何种调整以达到利益和风险之间的合理平衡感到迷茫。


Influential developing countries share a joint responsibility with the G-8 for the stability of the global financial and economic systems.	有影响力的发展中国家与八国集团，对全球金融和经济体系的稳定，有着共同的责任。


But they currently have limited channels for discharging that responsibility and influencing global policies.	但是目前，他们履行这一职责和影响全球政策的渠道有限。


In addition, collectively we must do a better job of anticipating problems rather than being in reactive mode in the face of crises.	此外，我们一起必须更好地预期问题，而不是总以被动的模式面对危机。


The global economy and its increasing openness made it possible for three billion people to enjoy the fruits of growth in the postwar period.	全球性经济和其不断的开放程度曾让30亿人在战后享受增长的成果。


It may also provide an economic springboard for another two billion people to fulfill their aspirations in the coming decades.	它也可以向另20亿人提供一块经济跳板，在未来的几十年中实现他们的抱负。


But openness brings risks, many unanticipated and most under-managed.	但是，开放会带来风险，而其中许多风险出乎我们意料且大部分管理不善。


People are skeptical for understandable reasons, and in the case of the credit crisis, angry.	可以理解人们为什么持怀疑态度并在信用危机发生时感到愤怒。


Openness needs protecting and the best way to protect it is to manage the areas of growing interdependence effectively, pragmatically and inclusively.	开放需要保护，而保护的最佳途径是有效、务实和包容地管理日益加强的相互依存的领域。


From Great Game to Grand Bargain	从大博弈到大协定


LAHORE – The “Great Game” is no fun anymore.	拉合尔-“伟大的博弈”不再好玩了。


Nineteenth-century British imperialists used that term to describe the British-Russian struggle for mastery in Afghanistan and Central Asia.	十九世纪的英帝国主义用这个词来形容英国与俄罗斯为掌控阿富汗和中亚地区而进行的争斗。


More than a century later, the game continues.	一个多世纪后，博弈继续进行着。


But now, the number of players has exploded, those living on the chessboard have become players, and the intensity of the violence and the threats that it produces affect the entire globe.	但现在，博弈的人数大大增加了，棋子成了棋手，其产生的暴力和威胁的强度影响到整个地球。


Afghanistan has been at war for three decades, and that war is spreading to Pakistan and beyond.	阿富汗处于战争状态已有三十年了，而且战争正在向巴基斯坦和更远处蔓延。


A time-out needs to be called so that the players, including President-elect Barack Obama, can negotiate a new bargain for the region.	战争需要被喊停； 这样，包括当选总统奥巴马在内的参与方，可以为此地区进行谈判以达成一项新的协定。


Securing Afghanistan and its region will require an international presence for many years.	确保阿富汗和该地区的安全将需要多年的国际力量的存在。


Building up Afghanistan’s security forces is at most a stopgap measure, as the country cannot sustain forces of the size that it now needs.	建立阿富汗的安全部队至多只是一种应急措施，因为该国将没法维持它目前需要的军队的规模。


Only a regional and global agreement to place Afghanistan’s stability above other objectives can make long-term stability possible by enabling Afghanistan to survive with security forces that it can afford.	只有一个区域性和全球性的将阿富汗的稳定置于高于其他目标之上的协议，才能使长期稳定成为可能，使阿富汗以它能负担得起的安全军队而生存下去。


Such agreement, however, will require political and diplomatic initiatives both inside and outside of the country.	但这需要阿富汗国内和国外的政治和外交举措。


In Afghanistan, the United States and NATO must make clear that they are at war with al-Qaeda and those who support its global objectives, but have no objection if either the Afghan or Pakistani government negotiates with insurgents who renounce ties to Osama bin Laden.	在阿富汗，美国和北约必须清楚地表明，他们是在与基地组织和那些支持基地组织的全球目标的人作战，但他们不反对阿富汗或巴基斯坦政府同不再与本拉登联系的武装分子进行谈判。


In exchange for such guarantees, international forces could largely withdraw, leaving a force to secure a political agreement and to train Afghan security forces.	这种承诺所换取的是，国际部队可以在很大程度上撤走，留下一支部队，以确保达成政治协议，并训练阿富汗的维和部队。


But a political settlement within Afghanistan cannot succeed without a regional grand bargain.	但是，阿富汗境内的政治解决方案，如果没有区域性的大协定，就不能取得成功。


The first Great Game was resolved a century ago by making Afghanistan a buffer state in which outsiders did not interfere.	一个世纪前的第一个大博弈得到了解决，其途径是让阿富汗成为没有外人干涉的缓冲国。


Today, however, Afghanistan is the scene not only of the War on Terror, but also of longstanding Afghan-Pakistani disputes, the India-Pakistan conflict, domestic struggles in Pakistan, US-Iranian antagonism, Russian concerns about NATO, Sunni-Shia rivalry, and struggles over regional energy infrastructure.	然而今天，阿富汗不仅是反恐战争的战场，而且还是阿富汗和巴基斯坦长期争端的战场，也是印巴冲突、巴基斯坦国内斗争、美国和伊朗的对抗、俄罗斯对北约的担心、逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林之间的竞争以及对能源基础设施的区域性争夺的战场。


These conflicts will continue as long as the US treats stabilizing Afghanistan as subordinate to other goals, accompanied by all the risks entailed by terrorist resurgence and a regional security crisis.	只要美国将阿富汗的稳定的重要性放在其它目标之下，且伴随着恐怖主义的卷土重来和区域性的安全危机所带来的各种危险，这些冲突将继续下去。


This is why Obama must adopt a bold diplomatic initiative that encompasses the entire region and help resolve longstanding disputes between Afghanistan’s neighbors.	这就是为什么奥巴马必须采取一种大胆的外交方案，以囊括整个地区并能帮助解决阿富汗和邻国之间长期存在的争端。


Such an initiative must include a comprehensive regional aid and development package.	这一方案必须包括一个全面的区域援助和发展计划。


In addition, the US must rebalance its regional posture by reducing its dependence on Pakistan’s military.	此外，美国必须通过降低对巴基斯坦军方的依赖，来调整其在该区域的姿态。


Obama will need firmly to support Pakistan’s fragile elected government as it tries to gain control over the army and intelligence apparatus and thus reverse decades of support for militants.	当巴基斯坦脆弱的民选政府试图控制其军队和情报机构的时候，奥巴马将需要坚定地支持它，从而扭转对武装分子几十年来的支持。


Dialogue with Iran and Russia over common interests in Afghanistan – both helped the US in 2001 – would place more pressure on Pakistan.	与曾在2001年帮助过美国的伊朗和俄罗斯就其在阿富汗的共同利益进行对话，将对巴基斯坦产生更大的压力。


At the same time, the US and other powers with a stake in Afghanistan must seek to reduce Indian activities in Afghanistan that Pakistan sees as threatening, or, if those policies are not threatening, assure greater transparency for them.	与此同时，美国和其它在阿富汗有利益关系的大国，必须设法减少印度在阿富汗的活动，这些活动被巴基斯坦视为对他们的威胁。 若这些政策没有威胁作用，也要确保其有更大的透明度。


This objective requires more than “pressuring” Pakistan.	这一目标不仅仅需要对巴基斯坦进行“施压”。


The Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces a US-Indian-Afghan alliance aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Civilian leaders evaluate Pakistan’s national interests differently, but they, too, cannot be indifferent to Pakistan’s chronic sense of insecurity.	巴基斯坦的安全部门认为，该国面临着美印阿富汗联盟，其目的是要削弱巴基斯坦在阿富汗的影响，甚至要分裂巴基斯坦国家。 民选文职领袖虽然在评价巴基斯坦的国家利益的时候有所不同，但他们也不能漠视巴基斯坦长期的不安全感。


Pakistan does not have border agreements with either India, with whom it disputes the incorporation of Kashmir, or Afghanistan, which has never explicitly recognized the Durand Line, the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.	巴基斯坦与印度没有边界协定，两国在克什米尔归属问题上有争议。 巴基斯坦也没有与阿富汗有边界协定，后者从未明确承认作为巴基斯坦和阿富汗边界线的杜兰德线。


Pakistan also claims that the Northern Alliance, part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan, is working with India from within Afghanistan’s security services.	巴基斯坦还声称，北方联盟正与印度在阿富汗情报机构内部进行合作，北方联盟是在阿富汗的反塔利班抵抗力量的一部分。


And the US-India nuclear deal effectively recognizes India’s legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Pakistan, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah.	美印核协议有效地承认了印度作为一个拥有核武器的大国的合法地位，同时继续把有核扩散纪录的巴基斯坦视为作为一个地位低下的国家。


Pressure will not work if Pakistan’s leaders believe that their country’s survival is at stake.	如果巴基斯坦的领导人认为他们国家的生存受到威胁，那么，压力将起不到作用。


Instead, the new US administration should help to create a broad multilateral framework for the region, one aimed at building a genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan’s insecurity while strengthening opposition to disruptive Pakistani behavior.	相反，美国新一届政府应帮助该地区建立一个广泛的多边框架，旨在建立实现阿富汗稳定的真正的共识，其途径是正视巴基斯坦的不安全感的合理原因，同时加强阻拦巴基斯坦的破坏性行��。


A first step could be establishing a contact group for the region, authorized by the United Nations Security Council.	第一步可以为该地区建立一个经联合国安全理事会授权的联络小组。


This contact group could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political strategy from the Pakistani government for the future of the tribal agencies; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on frontier issues, and promote a regional plan for economic development and integration.	这个联络小组可以促进印度和巴基斯坦之间各自在阿富汗的利益问题上以及寻求解决克什米尔争端的对话;还可以寻求巴基斯坦政府对未来的部落机构的一个长期的政治战略;推动阿富汗和巴基斯坦讨论边界问题，并促进经济发展和一体化的区域性计划。


China, the largest investor in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, could help finance projects of common interest.	中国，这个在巴基斯坦和阿富汗最大的投资者，可以帮助资助有共同利益的项目。


A successful initiative will require exploratory talks and an evolving road map.	一个成功的举措将需要试探性的会谈和不断完善的路线图。


Today, such suggestions may seem audacious, naive, or impossible; but, without such audacity, there is little hope for Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the region as a whole.	今天，这样的建议似乎显得大胆和天真甚至是不可能。 但是，如果没有这样的勇气，阿富汗、巴基斯坦或整个地区就不会有什么希望。


From Hubris to Nemesis in the EU	欧盟：从傲慢到报应


Paris – The European Union’s Lisbon treaty was initially greeted with enthusiasm, pride, and even hubris.	巴黎—起初人们用热忱、自豪甚至是骄傲来欢迎欧盟的 《里斯本条约》 。


It promised a more realistic and reasonable way forward than the ill-fated constitutional treaty that it replaced, and many of its supporters also hoped that a central feature of its predecessor – the notion of “constitutional patriotism” – was still alive.	它承诺了一条比它所取代的、命运多舛的《宪法条约》更为现实合理的前进道路。 许多它的支持者也希望其前身的核心特点—“ 宪政 爱国主义”的理念—仍然鲜活。


But the Lisbon treaty has instead brought chaos to the Union.	但《里斯本条约》却给欧盟带来了混乱。


What went wrong?	问题出在哪里？


Constitutional patriotism, a concept developed by two German philosophers, Dolf Sternberger and Karl Jaspers, was intended to replace the nationalism that had been discredited in Germany by the country’s Nazi past.	宪政爱国主义是由两位德国哲学家斯滕贝尔格和雅士培提出的理念。 其目的是在德国代替由于纳粹历史而彻底失信的民族主义。


Similarly, as the EU evolved into a federal state, its loyal citizens would reject nationalism based on ethnic affinities and instead identify with the democratic principles of the federation’s constitution.	同样，随着欧盟演进为一个联邦国家，其忠诚的公民会拒绝基于种族亲缘性的民族主义并转而认同联邦宪法的民主原则。


This fantasy was unambiguously rejected by Irish voters, so it seems fitting to remind ourselves that the ancient Greeks, who gave the word “hubris” to the western world, saw it as a portent of tragedy leading to downfall, or “nemesis.”	这份幻想被爱尔兰的选民们毫不含糊地拒绝了。 所以我们似乎有必要提醒自己，将“傲慢（hubris）”这个词传到西方世界的古希腊人将其视为一种悲剧的凶兆。


Did the ambitions of the Lisbon treaty’s designers condemn it to failure?	是《里斯本条约》缔造者们的雄心让它注定失败么？


And, indeed, has it really failed?	确切地说，它真的失败了么？


After all, European integration may meet obstacles, but it is still moving forward.	毕竟，虽然欧洲一体化可能会遇到阻碍，但仍然在前进。


As France’s Robert Schuman, one of the EU’s founding fathers, said in 1950, “Europe will neither happen in one go, nor as a whole construct: it will happen through concrete achievements, first by creating a de facto solidarity.”	正如欧盟的奠基人之一，法国的罗伯特•舒曼在1950年所言：“（一体化的）欧洲不会一蹴而就，也不会一开始就是一个整体架构：它会通过具体的成就逐渐实现，而第一步就是创建事实上的团结。 ”


Many thought that this solidarity had been achieved in October 2004, with the signing of the Nice treaty, which outlined an EU constitution.	许多人认为这种团结随着勾画欧盟宪法的《尼斯条约》的签署，已经在2004年10月实现。


But only 18 member states then approved it, before France and the Netherlands rejected it in referenda and the seven other member states then halted the ratification process.	但当时只有18个成员国批准了该条约，接着法国和荷兰在全民公决中否决了该条约，而其他7个成员国也因此中止了批准程序。


Faced with this situation, the European Council had only two choices.	面对这种情况，欧洲理事会只有两种选择。


First, it could stick with the Nice treaty as the basis of the Union’s operation.	首先，它可以坚持将《尼斯条约》作为欧盟运行的基础。


But that admission of failure would have weakened the political dynamic of the European project and severely constrained its scope for the future.	但承认失败可能会削弱欧洲计划的政治活力并严重制约其未来的发展。


The second option was to search for a compromise – the Lisbon treaty.	第二种方案就是寻求妥协--《里斯本条约》。


It bears repeating that the Lisbon treaty constitutes real, if modest, progress for the European project.	我们一再重申《里斯本条约》（即便保守地说）是欧洲计划的真正进展。


Under its terms, the European Council’s presidency would have far greater stability; in place of the current six-month rotating presidency, a European political leader who could command the necessary support would be elected to serve as President for two and a half years.	在其条款下，欧洲理事会的主席职位将会拥有更大的稳定性； 在取代了目前为期6个月的轮值主席制度后，一位有能力争取到足够支持的欧洲政治领导人可以获选担任主席两年半的时间。


Council decisions that now require unanimity would be taken by majority vote.	许多目前需要全票通过的理事会决议可以用多数票的方式通过。


The EU’s “high representative” would straddle the European Commission and the European Council to look after foreign affairs and security, and the European Parliament would have more power.	欧盟的“最高代表”可以同时敦促欧盟委员会和欧洲理事会去应对外交及安全事务，而欧洲议会也会拥有更大的权力。


Over and above these considerable advances, the treaty aims to make the EU more democratic.	置于这些巨大的进步之上的更高目标是该条约要使欧盟变得更为民主。


A group of citizens would be able to “invite” the European Commission to propose new legislation.	公民群体可以“要约”欧盟委员会提出新的法案。


National parliaments would be given a say in EU lawmaking, as the treaty recognizes the roles of parliaments in the “adequate workings of the Union.”	由于该条约承认议会在“欧盟充分运作”中的作用，各国议会将被赋予在欧盟立法过程中的发言权。


Yet, despite its undeniable importance and its contribution to the EU’s development, the Lisbon treaty is far from being the key to everything.	然而，尽管具有无可否认的重要性以及对欧盟的发展做出贡献，《里斯本条约》还远非一切事务的重心。


Instead, it is a simplified treaty replete with protocols, dispensations, and opt-out causes.	相反，它却是一个充斥着各种协议、特许和退出条款的简单化条约。


Former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was right when he spoke of the treaty as a set of “footnotes.”	比利时前首相伏思达将该条约称为一套“注脚”是言之有理的。


Meanwhile, with the Lisbon treaty blocked and no institutional step forward in sight, the underlying question remains: What type of Europe do we want?	而今，随着 《里斯本条约》 受阻而又没有其他可预见的立宪步骤，一个根本性的问题仍然是：我们需要怎样的欧洲？


The Lisbon treaty is content with clearing pathways rather than creating new horizons.	《里斯本条约》的最大作用是扫清障碍而不是开天辟地。


It mainly gives member states’ leaders the responsibility of implementing various EU advances, and sketches only tantalizing glimpses of Europe’s full potential.	它主要给予了个成员国领导人们在实施推进欧盟发展中的责任，并只是粗略而充满诱惑地让我们对欧盟的完整潜力管中窥豹。


It doesn’t condemn the EU, but as French President Nicolas Sarkozy likes to say, it doesn’t save it, either.	它没有拖累欧盟，但正如法国总统萨科奇所说的那样，它也不会拯救欧盟。


The member states’ political authority remains the motor of European policymaking, with all that this implies in terms of coordination, compromise, and negotiation.	成员国的政治权力仍然是欧洲政策制定的动力，这种动力隐含在协调、妥协和谈判之中。


It is now up to the EU’s political leadership to move quickly and take firm grasp of the achievements that initially gave birth to the Lisbon treaty.  A charter of fundamental rights has, for example, been integrated into the treaty; but, unless the member states bring it to life, it will certainly fail to yield concrete results.	现在就要看欧盟的政治领导层如何迅速行动，牢牢掌握已有的成果了。 正是这些成果催生了《里斯本条约》。


Fair rather than free competition in trade is proposed, but what does this mean if member states are not able to reach consensus on how to make it happen?	条约提出了公平竞争，而非自由竞争。 但如果各成员国不能就如何贯���达成共识，那这些说辞又有什么意义呢？


A final point worth emphasizing is that the Lisbon treaty moves away from many of the ideas that could serve as the foundations of a European federal super-state.	值得强调的最后一点是，《里斯本条约》抛弃了许多本可用作一个欧洲联邦超级国家的立国之本的理念。


The disappearance from the treaty of such terms as “constitution” and “minister of foreign affairs” clearly show that the constitutional treaty’s ambitions have been scaled back.	诸如“宪法”和“外交部长”等字眼的消失，清楚地表明了这部宪法条约已收敛了雄心壮志。


To move forward without Ireland by establishing a new Union with only 26 countries is legally impossible.	建立一个仅有26个成员国的新联盟，不顾爱尔兰而向前迈进，在法律上是不可行的。


But starting a new cycle of institutional negotiations also seems improbable.	但启动新一轮立宪谈判也似乎不太可能。


Europe’s citizens are tired of these recurrent discussions – since 1995, there have been treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, Rome, and Lisbon, none of which has entirely succeeded.	欧洲的公民们厌倦了这些老生常谈—自1995年开始，就有了阿姆斯特丹、尼斯、罗马和里斯本等条约，而没有一个取得了完全的成功。


Some believe that we will ultimately find a compromise, some ruse to make the Irish succumb, that gives the EU a treaty.	有人相信我们最终会找到一种妥协、某种策略让爱尔兰人屈服，从而给欧盟一个皆大欢喜的条约。


But it will all take time, and if the new arrangement lacks a qualified majority vote, fails to reform the Commission, and includes an opt-out on the charter of fundamental rights, it will not resolve the EU’s essential problems or its estrangement from European public opinion.	但这需要时间。 如果这种新的安排缺乏有效的多数票支持，未能改革欧盟委员会并在根本权利宪章中包含了一种退出机制，那么它将不会解决欧盟的本质性问题，也不会解决欧盟与欧洲民意的疏远。


Perhaps hubris has finally delivered nemesis in the form of a Union without people, where treaties have replaced the spirit of Europe.	可能傲慢最终导致了报应，令欧盟成为一个民心尽失的联盟，一个用条约替代了欧洲精神的联盟。


From Karl Popper to Karl Rove – and Back	卡尔·波普和卡尔·罗夫之间


NEW YORK -- In his novel 1984 , George Orwell chillingly described a totalitarian regime in which all communication is controlled by a Ministry of Truth and dissidents are persecuted by political police.	纽约--奥威尔在其小说《1984年》中冷竣地描写了一个独裁主权中，所有的通信都受到真相部的控制，而异议人士则受到政治警察的迫害。


The United States remains a democracy governed by a constitution and the rule of law, with pluralistic media, yet there are disturbing signs that the propaganda methods Orwell described have taken root here.	美国依旧是由宪法和法治管辖的民主国家，拥有多样性的媒体，但是还是有令人不安的迹象表明奥威尔所描绘的宣传手段已经在这里生根。


Indeed, techniques of deception have undergone enormous improvements since Orwell’s time.	确实，自从奥威尔的时代以来，欺骗伎俩经历了巨大的改进。


Many of these techniques were developed in connection with the advertising and marketing of commercial products and services, and then adapted to politics.	许多这些伎俩都是与商业产品和服务的广告和市场营销有关而得到开发并适用于政治。


Their distinguishing feature is that they can be bought for money.	它们有所区分的特点是它们可以用钱来买到。


More recently, cognitive science has helped to make the techniques of deception even more effective, giving rise to political professionals who concentrate only on “getting results.”	近来，认知科学使得欺骗伎俩更为有效，产生了一些专门“取得成效”的政治专业人士。


These professionals take pride in their accomplishments, and may even enjoy the respect of an American public that admires success no matter how it is achieved.	这些专业人士以其取得的成就而自豪，而且甚至可能得到崇拜成功而不问成功之道的美国公众的尊敬。 这一事实让人们对卡尔波普的开放社会的概念产生怀疑。


That fact casts doubt on Karl Popper’s concept of open society, which is based on the recognition that, while perfect knowledge is unattainable, we can gain a better understanding of reality by engaging in critical thinking.	尽管完善的知识是无法得到的，但是我们可以通过思辩而获得对现实更好的理解。 开放社会就是建立在这一认识基础之上。


Popper failed to recognize that in democratic politics, gathering public support takes precedence over the pursuit of truth.	波普没有认识到，在民主政治中，获得公众支持要优先于追求真相。


In other areas, such as science and industry, the impulse to impose one’s views on the world encounters the resistance of external reality.	在其他领域，例如科学和工业，向世界强加某人的观点的冲动会遇到外部现实的阻力。


But in politics the electorate’s perception of reality can be easily manipulated.	但是在政治中，选民对于现实的感觉却可以得到轻易操纵。


As a result, political discourse, even in democratic societies, does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of reality.	结果，政治对话即使在民主社会中也并不一定会引向对现实更好的理解。


The reason democratic politics leads to manipulation is that politicians do not aspire to tell the truth.	民主政治引向操纵的原因在于政坛人物们并不渴望说明真相。


They want to win elections, and the best way to do that is to skew reality to their own benefit.	他们想要赢得选举，而赢得选举的最佳方式就是歪曲事实，为其所用。


This insight should lead us not to abandon the concept of open society, but to revise and reaffirm the case for it.	了解这一点并不应该让我们放弃开放社会的概念，而是修改和重新确定其理由。


We must abandon Popper’s tacit assumption that political discourse aims at a better understanding of reality and reintroduce it as an explicit requirement.	我们必须放弃波普默认的假定，那就是，政治对话的目标在于更好地理解现实并且作为明确的要求再次申明现实。


The separation of powers, free speech, and free elections alone cannot ensure open society; a strong commitment to the pursuit of truth is also required.	单单是分权、言论自由以及自由选举并不确保开放社会； 为此还需要致力于追求真相。


We need to introduce new ground rules for political discourse.	我们需要为政治对话引入新的规则。


These cannot be identical to scientific method, but they should be similar in character, enshrining the pursuit of truth as the criteria on which political views are to be judged.	这些规则无法与科学方法相同，但是它们在性质上应该近似，即把追求真相作为判断政治观点的标准。


Politicians will respect, rather than manipulate, reality only if the public cares about the truth and punishes politicians when it catches them in deliberate deception.	只有在公众关心真相并且在发现政坛人物故意欺骗的时候惩罚他们，政坛人物们才会尊重、而不是操纵真相。


And the public should care about the truth because deception misleads people in choosing their representatives, distorts policy choices, undermines accountability, and destroys trust in democracy.	而公众应当关心真相，因为欺骗在人们选择代表的时候误导人民，歪曲政策选择，破坏责任制度并且摧毁民主国家中的信任，所以，公众应当关心真相。


Recent history provides convincing evidence that policies based on a misrepresenting reality backfire.	近来的历史提供了令人信服的证据表明，建立在错误事实基础上的政策将会适得其反。


The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – declaring a War on Terror and treating criticism as unpatriotic – succeeded in gathering public support, yet the results were the exact opposite to what the Bush administration intended, both for itself and the United States.	布什政府对于2001年9月11日恐怖袭击的反应是宣布反恐战争并且把批评当作不爱国。 这些获得了公众的支持，但是其结果却与布什政府的意愿背道而驰，对于该政府和美国而言都是如此。