No one knows precisely the Mexican drug cartels’ annual profits, but they certainly amount to billions of dollars.	没人知道墨西哥毒枭的准确年利润数字，但肯定以十亿美元计。


Second, the US, with its incredibly lax restrictions on gun purchases, serves as a veritable arms depot for rich Mexican drug lords.	其次，美国对枪支交易的限制松得令人难以置信，于是腰缠万贯的墨西哥毒枭有了名副其实的军火库。


True, they could arguably acquire similar weapons elsewhere, but not necessarily as cheaply and conveniently.	诚然，他们也可以从别处获得同样的军火，但想必不会那么便宜和轻松。


Finally, the US could do more to curtail money laundering.	最后，美国可以在打击洗钱方面做得更多。


One simple step would be to restrict the circulation of $100 bills, which are mostly used in the underground economy.	一个简单的措施是限制100美元钞票的流通，这是地下经济中最常用的面值。


Many of the problems that characterize the complex US-Mexican relationship will be ameliorated if Mexico can sustain rapid economic growth.	只要墨西哥能够维持快速经济增长，许多美国-墨西哥关系中的复杂的标志性问题就会得到改善。


Net immigration to the US, which has already tapered off, might reverse.	向美国的净移民状况可能会逆转（已经有所减少）。


The US stands to benefit as much as Mexico if conditions south of the border begin breaking good.	如果国境南面的情况有所改善，美国所获得的好处不比墨西哥少。


Mexico’s Paradox of Reform	墨西哥的改革悖论


Sometimes no reform is better than the wrong type of reform.	有时候不改革都比错误的改革要好。


That seems to be the case in Mexico, which recently passed new tax and electoral laws – but not the ones the country needs.	墨西哥似乎就是这样的情况。 该国最近通过了新的税法和选举法—但并不是它所需要的。


While tax reform was high on President Felipe Calderón’s agenda during last year’s presidential campaign, electoral reform was not.	虽然在去年的大选中税制改革在总统Felipe Calderón的议事日程上处于重要地位，但选举改革却不是。


Instead, it has been imposed upon him by a strange and extreme version of political horse-trading.	后者是被一种古怪而极端的政治议价强加给他的。


Opposition legislators wanted electoral reform, but no new taxes; the administration wanted more revenues, but no new election laws.	反对党的立法者们想要选举改革而不是新税制； 现政府需要更多的收入而不是新的选举法。


Both sides got part of what they wanted, and Mexico got the short end of the stick.	双方都部分达成所愿而墨西哥则成了输家。


An alternative minimum tax was established, along with a slight increase in gasoline taxes, but both were so watered down that they barely add up to anything.	另一种可选择的最低税务标准被建立起来，同时汽油税也略有上调。 但这两项税制改革都被冲淡得几乎起不到什么实质性的作用。


According to the government’s own figures, they equal just 1% of GDP – a pathetic increase in an economy with one of Latin America’s lowest tax takes.	据政府自己的数据统计，它们只相当于GDP的1%--作为拉美税收最低的经济体之一，这点提高是微不足道的。


Meanwhile, the three main parties – the National Action Party (PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) – united in order to keep newcomers out of the electoral arena.	与此同时，三个主要政党—国家行动党(PAN)、制度革命党(PRI)和民主革命党(PRD)—也为了防止新人踏上选举舞台而联起手来。 他们驱逐了组织去年总统选举的联邦全选举委员会(IFE)的委员；


They evicted the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) directors, who organized last year’s presidential vote; strengthened the ban on independent candidates; made it practically impossible to create new parties; and established a series of arbitrary, quasi-Stalinist restrictions on the content of campaign advertising, speeches, and exchanges among candidates.	消除了创立新党派的实际可能性； 并对竞选广告、演说和候选人之间交流的内容实施了一系列武断地、准斯大林式的限制。


All of these changes were rammed through the Congress as constitutional amendments, exempting them from appeals to the courts.	所有这些改变都以宪法修正案的形式在国会强行推动，从而避免了可能引发的法庭诉讼。


The one positive feature of the reforms – a scheme aimed at ensuring equal radio and television airtime for parties during electoral campaigns – was tainted by serious legislative omissions.	这些改革中的一个积极的特点—一个旨在确保各政党在选举过程中获得同等的电台和电视广播时间的计划—由于严重的立法疏忽而变质。


Given the absence of any regulation regarding fairness in news coverage of campaigns, the blatant corruption of many news organizations, and the absence of a current affairs program on national, prime-time television, banning the purchase of airtime merely erects an insurmountable barrier to potential new political entrants.	在没有对选举新闻公正性的任何监管，许多新闻机构的腐败盛行和国家级电视台在黄金时间不播放时事类节目的情况下，禁止购买广播时间等于是针对潜在的新政治竞争者竖起了一道无法攀越的障碍。


Against this backdrop, the ejection of the IFE directors stands out all the more glaringly.	在这样的背景下，驱逐IFE委员的事件就显得更为突出了。


While the IFE undoubtedly committed several serious public-relations mistakes during last year’s election, it remains one of Mexico’s most respected institutions, with credibility ratings that are regularly double or triple those of Congress and the three political parties.	尽管IFE的确在去年的选举过程中犯了几个严重的公共关系错误，但它仍然是墨西哥最受尊敬的机构。 其公信度评级常常是国会或三个政治党派的两倍或三倍。


The IFE shepherded Mexico through several crisis in 2006, when the PRD’s presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, refused to accept his razor-thin margin of defeat and took his battle to the streets.	2006年，当PRD 的总统候选人Andrés Manuel López Obrador 拒绝接受其惜败而走上街头造势时，IFE陪护墨西哥度过了数次危机。


Now, the same people who certified that last year’s vote was free and fair, and that Calderón had indeed won, are being fired for exactly that reason.	现今，同样是证明去年的选举是自由和公正的、且Calderón的确胜出的那些人却正是因为同样的原因被罢免。


Their removal, as everyone in Mexico acknowledges, is a sop to the PRI and the PRD in exchange for Calderón’s miserly tax reform.	在墨西哥人尽皆知的是，他们的免职是对PRI和PRD的安抚，以换取Calderón隔靴搔痒的税务改革。


Bismarck was right when he said one should never look too closely at how laws and sausages are made.	当俾斯麦说人们不应该对法律和香肠的炮制过程过于关注时，他是对的。


Unfortunately, the attack on the IFE’s autonomy is not an isolated event in Latin America.	不幸的是，对IFE独立性的攻击在拉美并不是一个孤立的事件。


Although independent central banks have been crucial in helping the region achieve macroeconomic stability over the past two decades, they, like electoral authorities, are being subjected to increasing pressure.	虽然独立的央行在帮助该地区在过去20年里实现宏观经济稳定中发挥了至关重要的作用，但和选举机构一样，它们也正受到日益强大的压力。


Venezuelan Preseident Hugo Chávez has openly proposed abolishing the central bank’s independence, submitting a constitutional reform that would allow him to use the country’s international reserves as he sees fit.	委内瑞拉总统查韦斯已经公开提议废除央行的独立地位。 他呈交了一份允许他自由支配该国外汇储备的宪法改革方案。


Likewise, electoral commissions there and in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, according to some accounts, in Argentina are being packed with political loyalists.	同样，在该国及玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔、尼加拉瓜和（据有人称）阿根廷的选举委员会中也充斥着拥护现政权者。


Mexico now seems poised to join this dubious club.	墨西哥现在似乎也正准备加入这个令人怀疑的俱乐部。


It shouldn’t, and if anyone should know that, it is Calderón.	它不应该这么做。 没有人比Calderón更清楚这一点。


It is understandable that he wishes to distinguish himself from his predecessor, Vicente Fox, who was unable to get meaningful reforms through Congress.	可以理解的是，他希望将自己和前任文森特•福克斯区别开来。 后者就缺乏在国会推动有意义的改革的能力。


But it is not reasonable to do so by proposing a cure that is worse than the disease.	但如果为了达到此目的所提议的解决方案比问题本身更糟糕那就没道理了。


Mexico’s War of Choice	墨西哥的选择之战


MEXICO CITY – Three years ago this month, Mexican President Felipe Calderón donned military fatigues and declared a full-scale war on drugs, ordering the Army into Mexico’s streets, highways, and villages.	发自墨西哥城 —— 就在三年前的 12 月，墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙一身戎装，正式向毒品全面宣战，并命令军队进驻街道，高速公路和村庄。


Back then, Calderón received broad support, both domestically and from abroad, for what was viewed as a brave, overdue, and necessary decision. Tangible results were predicted to come soon.	当时他的行动在国内外都得到了广泛支持，人们都认为这是个勇敢无畏，早该拍板而且必须下达的决定，并预计行动的成果必将立竿见影。


Moreover, George W. Bush’s administration quickly promised American support – the so-called Mérida Initiative, signed in February, 2007 – and public-opinion polls showed that Calderón had, in one fell swoop, left behind the travails of his close and questioned electoral victory, gaining the trust of the Mexican people.	此外，美国小布什政府也爽快地许下诺言，承诺要提供支援 —— 即 2007 年 2 月签署的所谓《梅里达倡议》 —— 当时的民调显示，卡尔德隆一举摆脱了墨西哥人对其刚刚到手且堪称险胜的总统大选胜利的质疑，赢得了民众的信任。


But today, things look very different.	但事到如今，情况已经大不相同了。


At a recent debate with, among others, Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek and CNN, Asa Hutchison, the former head of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, the main question was whether the US was to blame for Mexico’s drug war.	就在最近，我与美国缉毒署前主管阿沙·休切逊以及来自《新闻周刊》和 CNN 的法里德·扎卡利亚进行了一场辩论，主题是美国是否应该为墨西哥反毒战争受责难。


I pointed out that neither the US nor Mexico was to blame; only Calderón was.	我认为美国和墨西哥两国都没什么好指摘的，但卡尔德隆要负全责。


Just like Bush’s invasion of Iraq, Mexico’s drug war was a war of choice.	因为正如小布什入侵伊拉克一样，墨西哥的反毒战争也是一场选择之战。


It was a war that Calderón should not have declared, that cannot be won, and that is doing enormous damage to Mexico.	这是一场卡尔德隆不该发起，也没法获胜的战争，而这场战争现在却正给墨西哥带来巨大的伤害。


Today, a growing number of Mexicans shares this view.	时至今日，越来越多的墨西哥人开始认同这个观点。


As the war drags on, positive results are nowhere to be seen, while violence in the country is escalating.	随着战争进程的不断推进，国内的暴力行动不断升级，而战争的积极效果却连影子都没有。


On December 9, for example, according to the daily newspaper Reforma , 40 people died in firefights between police and army forces and the drug cartels.	根据《改革报》报道，光 12 月 9 日一天就有 40 人在军警与贩毒集团的火拼中死亡。


More than 6,500 fatalities will have occurred this year alone, topping last year’s total, which was double that in 2007.	而今年一年估计会有 6500 多人在冲突中死于非命，不但超过了去年的总和，更是 2007 年的两倍。


I believe that Calderón declared this war because he felt the need to legitimize himself before Mexico’s people, given the doubts surrounding his victory in the 2006 presidential election – doubts that his supporters, like me, never shared.	我相信卡尔德隆发起这场战争的目的其实是为了提高他自己在墨西哥人民心目中的统治合法性，因为他 2006 年总统大选险胜后遭到了诸多质疑（当然他的支持者们，比如我就永远不会有这样的质疑）。


And I believe that it is unwinnable because it fails to comply with the tenets of the Powell Doctrine, elaborated 18 years ago by Colin Powell, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in relation to the first Gulf War.	而我之所以认为这场战争不可能获胜的原因，是因为它违反了“鲍威尔法则”，而这条法则是 18 年前时任美国参谋长联席会议主席的柯林斯·鲍威尔根据第一次海湾战争的经验总结出来的。


Powell enumerated four conditions that must be satisfied in order to succeed in a military operation. One was deployment of overwhelming force, which the Mexican military lacks.	要获取一次军事行动的胜利，鲍威尔列出了四个必须满足的条件：一是压倒性的兵力部署，这是墨西哥军队所没有的。


Another was definable victory, which one never has in a war on drugs (a term first used by Richard Nixon in the late 1960’s).	第二个是清晰界定的胜利，这在历次反毒战争（这个词由理查德·尼克松在 1960 年代末首次提出）中也都没有明确定义过。


The third condition was an exit strategy at the outset, which Calderón lacks, because he can neither withdraw in defeat in his own country, nor withdraw and declare victory.	第三是从一开始就制定好的退出战略，这也是卡尔德隆所欠缺的，因为他是在自己本国的领土上，如果战败了当然无路可走，即使是打赢了也当然只能留在国内。


Calderón still does enjoy the support of the public – Powell’s fourth condition – but he is beginning to lose it.	虽然卡尔德隆目前仍然拥有公众的支持 —— 这是鲍威尔的第四条原则 —— 但他本人也正逐渐丢掉这点老本。


Over the past three years, more than 15,000 Mexicans have died in the drug war.	在过去三年里有超过 1. 5 万名墨西哥人死于这场反毒战争。


Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Peer Review have all documented, with more or less evidence and precision, a proliferation of abuses and an absence of accountability for them.	对于战争中不断增多的权力滥用以及政府责任缺失行为，人权观察，大赦国际以及联合国人权理事会等组织国际定期监察等组织都有或多或少的证据和精确数字记录。


Of the more than 220,000 people arrested on drug charges since Calderón took office, three-quarters have been released.	在卡尔德隆上台后所逮捕的 22 多万人中，有 3/4 已经被释放。


Only 5% of the remaining 60,000 or so have been tried and sentenced.	余下大约 6 万人中只有 2% 送法庭审讯并被判刑。


Meanwhile, acreage used for poppy and marijuana production has risen, according to the US government, to 6,900 and 8,900 hectares, respectively.	而与此同时，据美国政府统计，墨西哥境内的罂粟和大麻的种植面积分别扩大到了 6900 公顷和 8900 公顷。


Restrictions on the transshipment of cocaine from South America to the US have made only a dent in street prices, which spiked in 2008 but have stabilized in 2009 at levels well below their historical highs in the 1990’s.	对从南美向美国运输可卡因的限制仅仅稍微影响了一下这种毒品的路边交易价，而这一价格在 2008 年暴涨之后在 2009 年稳定了下来，也远低于其 1990 年代的历史高位。


According to the US government’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), opium, heroin, and marijuana seizures have decreased since Calderón began his drug war, and drug production in Mexico is on the rise. In 2008, according to the US State Department, potential heroin production reached 18 metric tons, up from 13 metric tons in 2006, as production of opium gum rose to 149 metric tons, from 110 metric tons.	根据 美国政府的国际毒品管制策略报告 (INCSR) ，在卡尔德隆发动的反毒战争之后，美国缉获的鸦片，海洛因和大麻的数量有所下降，而墨西哥的毒品产量却有所上升。 根据美国国务院 2008 年的统计，海洛因的潜在生产量从 2006 年的 13 公吨上升到 2008 年的 18 公吨，而鸦片的产量也从 110 公吨上升到 149 公吨。


Cannabis production grew by 300 metric tons over this period, to 15,800 metric tons.	大麻的产量在这一时期增长了 300 公吨，达到 15800 公吨。


In other words, since Calderón began his war on drugs, more Mexican drugs are on the market, not less.	换句话说，自卡尔德隆发起了反毒战争，流到市面的墨西哥毒品不但没有减少，反而更多了。


There is no easy way out of this quagmire.	没有任何方法能轻而易举地摆脱这个困境。


The National Police Force that Mexico’s last three presidents – Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox and Calderón – have tried to build is still far from ready to replace the Army in drug-enforcement tasks.	墨西哥的最近三任总统 —— 欧内斯托 · 塞迪略 ， 比森特 · 福克斯 和卡尔德隆 —— 所尝试建立的国家警察部队至今也还远远无法取代军队在缉毒行动中的作用。


American assistance, as a US General Accounting Office report made clear in early December, is barely trickling in.	而正如美国审计总署在 12 月初的报告所显示，美国的援助也只是些空头支票。


Indeed, by some accounts, only 2% of the projected $1.3 billion in aid has been disbursed.	的确，在计划支付的 13 亿美元援助资金中，只有其中 2% 通过某些账户进行了划拨。


Perhaps the least bad solution would be to proceed by default: gradually allow the drug war to vanish from television screens and newspapers, and have its place taken by other wars: on poverty, on petty crime, and for economic growth.	也许最不坏的解决方案就是任其发展：任由这场战争慢慢地从电视屏幕和报纸上消失，然后以其他战争取而代之：如反贫穷的战争，反轻微罪行的战争以及为经济发展而战。


This may not be ideal, but it is better than prolonging a fight that cannot be won.	虽然这不算是个理想的方法，但总比继续一场不可能获胜的战争要强得多。


Policy “Crimes”	政策“犯罪”


STANFORD – When the Berlin Wall fell a quarter-century ago this November, pundits led by Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history – the triumph of democratic capitalism over all rival systems.	斯坦福—四分之一个世纪前的11月，当柏林墙倒塌时，以弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）为首的专家宣布历史的终结——民主资本主义战胜了一切对手制度。


America’s economic success and the collapse of communism fed the narrative.	美国的经济成功和共产主义的崩溃催生了这一论断。


The long political, intellectual, and, at times, military confrontation that we knew as the Cold War was over.	被称为冷战的长期政治、情报、往往还有军事的冲突结束了。


Indeed, at a meeting in Warsaw in the winter of 1990, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland’s President and communist party boss, declared to me and my cabinet colleagues that “The forces of history have inevitably led us to capitalism.”	事实上，在1990年华沙的一次会议是上，波兰总统、共产党总书记雅鲁泽尔斯基将军（General Wojciech Jaruzelski）对我和我的内阁同僚宣布“历史的力量不可避免地将我们引向资本主义。


He could not free himself of the Hegelian dialectic, but he admitted that communism had gotten history’s end point entirely wrong.	”他无法让自己摆脱黑格尔辩证法，现在他承认，共产主义让历史抵达终点的观点是完全错误的。


A couple of decades later, various forms of capitalism have worked wonders for some former communist and socialist countries.	几十年后，各种形式的资本主义让一些前共产主义和社会主义国家出现了奇迹。


Poland is an excellent example of a successful economic and political transition.	波兰是经济和政治转型成功的显著例子。


But capitalism is far from flourishing everywhere.	但资本主义远没有红遍全球。


North Korea, which never had a transition and maintains heavy-handed central planning, is an economic basket case.	韩国从未发生转型，至今仍保持强力中央计划，经济一团糟。


And soft socialism combined with subsidized “national champions” is decaying in France.	而软社会主义和接受补贴的“国家冠军企业”（national champions）正在腐蚀法国。


Moreover, in many countries, capitalism arrived without democracy.	此外，在许多国家，资本主义并未与民主携手降临。


China is an obvious example of capitalist success and lagging political reform.	中国是一个资本主义成功和政治改革落后并存的显著例子。


For these countries, honest competition at the ballot box, free and open debate, and respect for minority rights – the foundation of liberal democracy – are not currently on the agenda.	在这些国家，选票箱的诚实竞争、自由的公开辩论以及尊重少数派权利——自由民主的基础——并不在当前日程之中。


The champagne corks were popped prematurely in 1989. 	1989年的庆祝操之过急了。


Indeed, precisely because liberal democracy did not triumph worldwide, many pressing crises now require attention and action.	事实上，正是因为自由民主不曾在全世界大获全胜，许多今天的紧迫危机需要引起关注和行动。


But we must also focus – in the media and in the classroom – on the less dramatic but nonetheless dangerous attacks on democracy and democratic values, including in the Americas, where statist regimes and others have been attacking freedom of speech and of the press.	但我们还必须专注于不那么具有戏剧性但仍然相当危险的针对民主和民主价值的攻击，它们存在于媒体和课堂之中，包括美国——中央集权政权和其他人一直在攻击言论和出版自由。


As a result, policy disputes can become criminal.	结果，政策争议就成了犯罪。


In a pernicious recent example, Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, in a nationally televised speech, ordered the country’s attorney-general and public prosecutor to take “action” against the Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann for daring to ask, “Should Venezuela Default?”	一个最近的反面例子是委内瑞拉总统马杜罗，他在全国电视转播的演讲中下令司法部长和公共检察官采取“行动”对付哈佛大学经济学家里卡多·豪斯曼（Ricardo Housmann），因为他胆敢质问《委内瑞拉应该违约吗？ 》（Should Venezuela Default?


Hausmann was right to ask that question.	豪斯曼提出这一问题是正确的。


Research overwhelmingly shows that successful economic development requires inclusive property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and even-handed rule of law.	研究以压倒性的结论表明，成功的经济发展需要包容性产权、对合同的强制执行以及公正的法治精神。


Venezuela currently has none of these ingredients.	目前的委内瑞拉一个都不具备。


So it is not surprising that massive government deficits financed by explosive monetary growth have caused the currency to collapse, with multinationals writing down the value of their Venezuelan subsidiaries each time the official exchange rate is lowered.	因此，毫不奇怪，用货币爆发式增长融资的巨量政府债务导致委内瑞拉货币贬值，而每逢官方汇率下调时，跨国公司就纷纷减记它们在委内瑞拉分支的价值。


Nor is it surprising that, with inadequate foreign exchange, the country is having difficulty paying its bills, or that price controls and police-state regulation have severely worsened food shortages.	同样毫不奇怪的是，由于外汇不足，委内瑞拉已很难偿还账单，而价格管制和警察国家监管严重��化了食品短缺。


Finally, amid widespread speculation that Venezuela may indeed default on up to $80 billion of foreign debt, it is not surprising that yields on its sovereign debt have hit 15%.	最后，关于委内瑞拉将对最多800亿美元的对外债务违约的猜测甚嚣尘上，其主权债务收益率飙升至15%也就不足为奇了。


Venezuela, with some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves, should be enjoying an era of prosperity amid high oil prices.	委内瑞拉拥有全球最大碳氢化合物储量之一，在高油价时代本应进入繁荣。


But corruption, political control of the national oil company, and nationalization of foreign-owned oil assets have caused exactly the opposite.	但腐败、对国有石油公司的政治控制以及对外国所有石油资产的国有化导致了相反的结果。


(Disclosure: I serve on the board of one such company, ExxonMobil, which is awaiting the results of arbitration in international court.)	（披露：我在这些公司之一的埃克森美孚董事会任职，该公司正在等待国际法庭的仲裁结果。 ）


The combination of authoritarian rule, extreme populism, socialist ideology, and incompetence under former President Hugo Chávez and Maduro has wreaked havoc on Venezuela.	极权统治、极端民粹主义、社会主义意识形态以及前总统查韦斯和马杜罗的能力欠缺，所有这些一起造成委内瑞拉的一蹶不振。


But when Hausmann, a Venezuelan citizen and former government minister, discusses an important question that is being asked by investors around the world, he is not merely chastised, but threatened.	但当委内瑞拉公民兼前政府部长豪斯曼开始讨论一个呗全世界投资者所质疑的问题时，他不但备受指责，还受到了威胁。


The implication is clear: Speak out and you may be jailed.	言下之意很明显：乱说话就把你抓起来。


This is not the first such treatment of a prominent economist in Latin America.	这不是拉丁美洲著名经济学家第一次遭到这种待遇。


A decade ago, it was Domingo Cavallo, who, as Argentina’s finance minister, had pegged the peso to the dollar to bring down the 1,000% inflation that was destroying the economy – and the fabric of society.	十年前，多明戈·卡巴罗（Domingo Cavallo）就有此遭遇。 作为阿根廷财政部长，他让比索盯住美元，以使摧毁阿根廷经济（以及社会）的高达1,000%的通货膨胀降了下来。


When he abruptly ended the peg in 2001, a severe recession followed, and he was arrested and jailed.	2001年，当他突然结束盯住时，严重的衰退接踵而至，他也被逮捕并关了起来。


Fortunately, international outrage, including a campaign organized by North American economists, helped to free Cavallo.	幸运的是，国际社会的愤慨，包括北美经济学家们所组织的行动，帮助卡巴罗获得了自由。


I do not agree with all of the policies advocated by Cavallo or Hausmann, or any other policymaker for that matter.	我并不完全赞同卡巴罗、豪斯曼或其他类似问题上的任何决策者所提出的全部政策。


But should we really criminalize not corruption or self-dealing, but policy disagreements?	但我们不让腐败和假公济私致罪，而让政策异见致罪，果真应该如此吗？


Do we want every new government to jail its political opponents – as Ukraine’s deposed President Viktor Yanukovych did to former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko – because it rejects the policies they enacted or condemns the perceived outcomes?	我们想让所有新政府都把政治反对者抓起来——如被推翻的乌克兰总统尤先科对前总理季莫申科所做的那样——只因为政府拒绝他们所采取的政策，或不满于它所感到的政策结果吗？


We have not fallen so far yet in the United States.	在美国，我们还不至于如此。


But even here, it has become far too common to impugn the motives and values, not just the ideas, of those with whom we disagree.	但即使是美国，抨击与我们意见相左者的动机和价值而不仅仅是观点也变得稀松平常。


Journalists, politicians, and public intellectuals who should know better routinely argue not just that policies and proposals are wrong-headed, but that the proponents themselves must be evil to have enacted or suggested them.	理应更加了解的记者、政客和公共知识分子往往不但认为政策和建议方向错误，还指出支持者本身如果实施或建议这些政策，也是罪恶的。


Criticism and disagreement should not be allowed to curdle into the hateful vitriol that demeans so much public discourse today.	不应该让批评和分歧演变成弥漫于当今公共辩论中的令人厌恶的中伤和贬低。


Words have consequences and can inflame thuggery or worse.	言辞会造成后果，可以谋财害命甚至更加糟糕。


Even attempted suppression of free and open debate, or official delegitimization of those with alternative policy proposals, is dangerous.	对自由公开辩论的镇压（即使只是试图这样做），或者通过官方将不同政策的支持者打为非法，都是危险的。


Such outrages must be resisted, before more people like Cavallo and Hausmann are threatened – and before the disease spreads to North America and Europe.	必须在更多像卡巴罗和豪斯曼这样的人受到威胁、这一可怕顽疾蔓延到北美和欧洲之前阻止这样的暴行。


An Economist for the Ages	划时代的经济学家


STANFORD – Like many others, I first met the Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker, who died earlier this month, by reading his seminal works Human Capital and The Economics of Discrimination.	斯坦福—和许多人一样，我第一次接触本月早些时候去世的诺贝尔经济学奖得主加里·贝克尔（Gary Becker）是阅读他的开创性著作《人力资本》（Human Capital）和《歧视经济学》（The Economics of Discrimination）。


Several dozen outstanding economists have won the Nobel Prize in Economics since Sweden’s central bank began awarding it in 1969, but Becker is among the handful who have fundamentally transformed how economists (and social scientists more generally) think about a wide array of important economic issues.	自瑞典中央银行于1969年设立诺贝尔经济学奖以来，已有好几十位出色的经济学家获得过这一奖项，但贝克尔是其中少数从根本上改变了经济学家（更一般地说，是社会科学家）看待众多经济学重要话题的经济学家之一。


Becker was remarkable for applying his penetrating insights, especially concerning economic incentives, to issues that had been mostly underexplored by economic analysis. This included viewing education as an investment, asking who gained and lost from discrimination, examining how families allocated their time, and explaining women’s fertility decisions.	贝克尔的引人注目之处是将他的敏锐洞见（特别是关于经济激励的洞见）应用于经济分析不常探索的问题，包括将教育视为一种投资、提出歧视的受益者和受害者是谁的问题、考察家庭如何配置他们的时间、解释女性的生育决策等。


His research on any one or two of these issues might well have won him a Nobel Prize on its own; to develop important insights into such a wide range of questions is truly remarkable.	他在这些问题中的任何一两个上的研究便已足以让他获得诺贝尔奖； 在范围如此广泛的问题上做出重要洞见，这着实令人瞩目。


He amply deserved the rare accolade accorded to him by his long-time mentor and friend, the late Milton Friedman (himself a Nobel laureate who, like Becker, transformed economists’ thinking in many areas).	他绝对对得起他的长期导师兼朋友、已故的米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman，与贝克尔一样，他也是改变了经济学家在许多问题上的思维方式的诺贝尔奖获得者）的罕见的溢美之辞。


Becker, declared Friedman, was “the greatest social scientist who has lived and worked in the last half-century.”	弗里德曼说，贝克尔是“过去五十年在世和活跃的最伟大的社会科学家。 ”


Becker’s constant focus was on the main forces driving human behavior and people’s interaction both in markets and in non-market activities.	贝克尔的研究精力一直集中在驱动人类行为的主要动力和人在市场及非市场活动中的互动。


Early in his career, his work was often criticized for being overly dependent on economic analysis in dealing with big social problems, sometimes touching raw nerves on very sensitive issues.	在职业生涯早期，他的工作常常被批在处理重大社会问题时过于倚重经济血分析，有时会触及敏感问题的敏感处。


For example, the notion of modeling children as a durable good seemed crass to some but led Becker to analyze the allocation of parental time and financial resources.	比如，将孩子建模为耐用商品的概念可能让一些人感到愚不可及，但贝克尔却因此得以分析父母亲的时间和财务资源配置。


He showed how this insight could predict trends in female labor-force participation and birth rates, and led to the policy conclusion that the best way to lower high birth rates in poor countries was to educate women.	他展示了如何用这一洞见预测女性劳动力参与率和生育率，并因此得出了降低穷国高生育率的最佳方式是教育女性的政策结论。


Better education would raise women’s wages, making staying at home more costly, and would lead to higher female labor-force participation and a voluntary decline in birth rates.	改善教育能提高女性工资，让不上班的代价更加高昂，从而产生更高的女性劳动力参与率和自愿的出生率下降。


This analysis reflected Becker’s deep belief in the power of incentives to lead people, in pursuit of their own interest and interacting within and outside markets, to achieve great things with minimal government input.	这一分析反映出贝克尔对激励的深刻信念，他相信激励的力量能让人们在追求自身利益和市场内外的互动中产生重大成果，并且只需要最低限度的政府投入。


In this sense, he was very much in the tradition of the great eighteenth-century Scottish economist Adam Smith, whose writings Becker regarded as one of the greatest influences on his career.	在这方面，他与伟大的十七世纪苏格兰经济学家亚当·斯密英雄所见略同，斯密的著作也被贝克尔认为是对自己职业生涯影响最大的。


Equally off-putting to some was the notion that education was an investment – that an important reason to pursue post-secondary schooling, for example, was to raise one’s future earnings.	同样令一些人难以接受的是将教育视为投资的概念——比如，追求高等教育的一个重要原因是提高未来收入。


The education establishment recoiled at what it considered a less-than-noble reason to seek higher education.	教育机构对于这一不那么高尚的追求高等教育的动机颇有微词。


And the idea that one could model the economics of racial discrimination as rational, if deplorable, behavior and trace out the implications was sometimes misconstrued as paying insufficient attention to the character and behavior flaws of those who discriminate.	而将种族歧视经济学建模为理性（尽管糟糕透顶）行为并探索其隐含影响思想有时也被误解为对歧视者的个性和行为缺陷重视不足。


Truth will out, as Shakespeare reminds us, and eventually even Becker’s harshest early critics came around to appreciating his deep insights and conclusions.	所谓真金不怕火炼，最终，就连贝克尔早期最猛烈的抨击者也开始欣赏他的深刻洞见和结论。


For example, the education industry now touts the economic value of a college degree.	比如，如今教育界以大学文凭的经济价值作为招生招牌。


And governments around the world conduct vast surveys of households’ time use.	全球政府纷纷进行了大规模家庭时间使用调查。


Few economists today work on these and related problems without building on Becker’s foundations or laboring under his strong influence.	如今，极少有经济学家能够在研究这些和相关问题时绕过贝克尔的成果或不受他的强烈影响。


On a personal note, some of my early research on the best way to tax families and on the effects of taxes on human-capital investment built on Becker’s insights.	以个人经验为例，我的一些关于家庭课税的最佳方式以及税收对人力资本投资的效应的早期研究便是建立在贝克尔的洞见的基础上。


Becker was a rarity among economists in recent decades.	贝克尔在最近几十年的经济学界独树一帜。


He often looked at broad, long-range trends and data, comparing things like family structure, number of children, and women’s roles in the home and the market across many decades and even from one century to the next, or across very different societies.	他往往着眼于大范围、长时间的趋势和数据，比较几十年间甚至百年间、或者非常不同的社会间的家庭结构、孩子数量、女性在家中和市场中的决策等数据。


Cumulatively, his work yielded powerful conclusions, not only explaining trends in birth rates, but also showing that preferences for discrimination led to a tradeoff with profits.	逐渐地，他的工作产生了非常有力的结论，不仅解释了生育率的趋势，还证明了歧视偏好产生了利润权衡。


Workers who did not face discrimination in sectors where animus was rife would win, while the losers would include not just those directly being discriminated against, but also workers forced to compete when those workers sought employment elsewhere.	在充满敌意的部门中并且不必面临歧视的工人将是赢家，而输家不仅包括直接遭受歧视者，也包括在别处找工作时被迫竞争的工人。


Becker relied on rigorous standards in evaluating government policy.	贝克尔用非常严格的标准评估政府政策。


He knew, and documented, that government solutions to market failures could themselves fail, with the cure turning out to be worse than the disease.	他知道并且在文章中指出，政府对市场失灵的解决方案本身也可能失灵，药方最终可能让病情更重。


He sought to compare what was likely to be the actual government program, tax, or regulation to the problem it purported to solve, not to the idealized textbook solution academics favor but that is rarely adopted.	他试将可能的实际政府项目、税收或监管与其所欲解决的问题相比较，而不是与学界支持但很少被采取的理想化的教科书解决方案相比较。


The basic economic analysis that Becker developed was applicable everywhere, for everyone, and for all time.	贝克尔所开发的基本经济分析可以由任何人用在任何地区、任何时间。


Conditions in the US in the nineteenth and late twentieth centuries – or in North America and Europe and developing Asia, Africa, or Latin America – might differ; but the same economic models could be used to understand changing events and circumstances.	十九世纪和二十世纪末的美国环境或许有所不同，北美和欧洲与发展中的亚洲、非洲或拉丁美洲的环境或许有所不同，但可以用同样的经济模型理解变化的事件和环境。


In this sense, Becker was a great economist and a truly remarkable social scientist.	从这个角度讲，贝克尔是一个伟大的经济学家、真正引人注目的社会科学家。


His work stands as a testament to the power of deep thinking and the courage to follow it to its logical conclusions.	他的工作就像是圣约，教会我们深邃思考的力量和追寻探索逻辑结论的勇气。


That seems especially relevant in today’s world, in which technology tempts us merely to scratch the surface of so many issues.	这对当今世界意义尤重。 如今，科技导致我们对太多问题的理解流于表面。


He was a tremendous colleague at the Hoover Institution, a true and supportive friend, and admirably humble despite his incredible intellectual influence.	他是胡佛研究所伟大同事、给人力量的诤友、著作等身又谦逊有礼。


He will be sorely missed.	他的逝世是巨大的损失。


Coming Together and Falling Apart	团结起来或分崩离析


STANFORD – Millions of people worldwide watched the athletic achievements at the Sochi Olympics and the opening and closing ceremonies’ majestic portrayals of Russian history and culture.	斯坦福——数以百万计来自世界各地的民众亲眼见证了索契冬奥会的运动成绩和开闭幕式所描绘的雄伟壮观的俄罗斯历史文化成就。


But the cost was immense, the alleged corruption dispiriting, and the contrast with the political situation in nearby Ukraine alarming.	但这种展示代价巨大，本届冬奥会因涉嫌贪污令人垂头丧气，而邻国乌克兰的政局相比之下也反差强烈。


After lining up for an Association Agreement with the European Union, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych instead opted for closer ties with Russia, following immense pressure from the Kremlin, as well as a promise of $15 billion in financing.	在排队等待与欧盟签订联合协议后，在克里姆林的巨大压力和150亿美元的巨资诱惑下，乌克兰前总统维克托·亚努科维奇反而选择了与俄罗斯拉近关系。


Three months of protests and riots ensued.	长达三个月的抗议和骚乱接踵而至。


A parliamentary vote stripped the high-living Yanukovych of power, and he fled to Russia.	议会投票表决定不再让生活奢侈的亚努科维奇继续掌权，亚努科维奇随之逃往俄罗斯。


The situation remains tense and fluid.	目前的局势依旧紧张多变。


Russian troops have occupied Crimea, and European and American leaders are threatening to impose stiff sanctions on Russia if it does not respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.	俄罗斯军队占领了克里米亚，而欧美领导人则威胁如果俄罗斯不尊重乌克兰主权，就要对俄罗斯实行严厉的制裁。


But Ukraine’s disunity is obvious.	但乌克兰的不团结是显而易见的。


Eastern Ukraine has close linguistic, cultural, and economic ties to Russia, while western Ukraine leans more toward continental Europe.	东乌克兰与俄罗斯的语言、文化和经济联系十分紧密，而西乌克兰则更倾向于欧洲大陆。


Some of Ukraine’s regions have historically been a part of Russia, Poland, or the Ottoman Empire.	乌克兰的某些地区从历史上看就是俄罗斯、波兰或奥斯曼帝国的领土。


Peter the Great, whose eighteenth-century Westernization of Russia was portrayed in Sochi, fought the Crimean Tatars, many of whose descendants were dispersed by Stalin to other parts of the former Soviet Union.	索契冬奥会上所描述的十八世纪引领俄国西化进程的彼得大帝曾与克里米亚的鞑靼人作战，而鞑靼人的很多后裔被斯大林分散到前苏联的其他地区。


Some fear that Ukraine could break apart.	有人担心乌克兰可能陷入分裂。


An EU Association Agreement could be a huge boon to the Ukrainian economy.	欧盟联合协议或许能为乌克兰经济带来巨大的福利。


When smaller economies gain access to a much larger market, trade volumes expand and wages rise, with a small part of the trade expansion diverted from other countries (one of Russia’s concerns).	规模较小的经济体进入大得多的市场肯定能扩大贸易量并提高工资，同时可能会有很少部分的贸易增量被从其他国家转移开去（这也是俄国担忧的主要问题之一）。


But, beyond the direct gains from trade, such a pact holds the promise of opening up and accelerating the transformation of Ukraine’s economy and polity.	但即使不考虑直接的贸易收益，欧盟联合协议还有可能开放和加速乌克兰经济政治的转型程序。


Competing for the EU’s more discriminating consumers would force Ukrainian producers to improve their competitiveness by raising productivity, quality control, and marketing and logistical capabilities.	争夺欧盟更挑剔的消费者将迫使乌克兰企业通过改善生产率、质量控制、市场营销和后勤保障来提升竞争能力。


Over time, Ukrainian producers would become part of an integrated supply chain alongside EU producers.	随着时间的推移，乌克兰企业将成为欧盟综合供应链上不可或缺的一份子。


Canada and Mexico were transformed in this way by the 1987 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.	加拿大和墨西哥就以这种方式通过1987年美加自由贸易协定和1994年北美自由贸易协定实现了转型。


On average, 40% of Mexican exports to the United States now have US content.	墨西哥对美出口的40%现在都包含美国元素。


But free-trade agreements presuppose the existence of established political borders, and Ukraine is not the only country that might come apart.	但签署自由贸易协定的前提是存在确定的政治边界，而乌克兰并不是唯一一个可能分裂的国家。


The United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, Iraq – and even the US state of California – among others, face a similar possibility, albeit more or less remote.	英国、加拿大、西班牙、伊拉克——甚至是美国的加利福尼亚——虽然���能性有大有小，但都有可能陷入分裂。


What all of these situations have in common is a wide diversity of cultural, ethnic, and economic interests.	这些国家的共同点就是有着多样而又复杂的文化、种族和经济利益。


Scotland, for example, has much local authority, yet will vote on independence in September.	比方说苏格兰本来拥有地方自治权，但仍将在9月投票决定是否独立。


The secessionists hark back to eighteenth-century English brutality and claim that Scotland will be able to keep all of its North Sea oil and shed its share of the UK’s debt.	分离主义分子重提18世纪英国的暴行，并称苏格兰可以借此保有全部的北海石油储量，并且不再分担英国的债务。


In fact, both are likely to be shared.	事实上，双方极有可能要共同承担石油和债务。


Those who prefer to remain in the UK cite a loss of markets, possible loss of the pound sterling, and reduced significance on the European and world stage.	愿意留在英国的民众称独立将失去英国市场，此外还可能殃及英镑，并有损苏格兰在欧洲和世界舞台上的影响力。


The betting is that the Scots will vote to remain.	从目前情况看苏格兰人可能投票留在英国体制内。


In Spain, some Catalonians have episodically demanded independence, as have some Flemish in Belgium and some Québécois in Canada.	一部分西班牙加泰罗尼亚人、比利时佛兰芒人和加拿大魁北克人往往间歇性地要求独立。


Iraq periodically verges on splitting into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish states (the Kurds already have considerable autonomy).	伊拉克的逊尼派、什叶派和库尔德人也一再近乎分裂（库尔德人已经在很大程度上实现了自治）。


In California, every decade or two, proposals surface to split the state into a North and South California.	每隔10年20年，加利福尼亚州就有提案分成南北两个加利福利亚。


The more arid and populous south has traditionally been more politically conservative than the north (Los Angeles is an exception).	干旱但人口众多的南部地区一直秉承比北部更保守的政治见解（只有洛杉矶例外）。


Water diversion in a difficult drought year, along with Governor Jerry Brown’s proposal for massive new infrastructure to send water south, has heightened tensions.	在大旱之年调水加之州长杰里·布朗提议修建大规模基础设施向南加州调水都进一步恶化了本已紧张的局势。


A prominent venture capitalist, Tim Draper, wants to put a proposition on the ballot to split California into six separate states.	著名风险投资家蒂姆·德雷珀提议就是否将加州分为六个独立的州展开投票。


(California often makes big decisions – from limiting property taxes to formulaic restrictions on state spending – by ballot initiative.)	（加州往往靠公民投票做出从限制征收房产税到统一限制政府开支的重大决策。


Even if Draper’s proposed initiative qualifies and passes, it would require approval by the US Congress, which is unlikely.	）就算德雷珀提出的议案获准通过，还要得到美国国会的批准，而这几乎是不可能的。


Which responsibilities should be left primarily to individuals acting within markets, families, and communities, and which fall to government?	哪些责任应当主要由组成市场、家庭和团体的个人承担，又有哪些需要留给政府？


And at what level of government – federal, regional, municipal, or supranational – are the latter responsibilities best exercised?	政府行使的职能又最好分配给联邦、地区、市或者超国家的哪一级政府？


These are timeless questions; but, in an era of increased and instantaneous communication, centralized, big-government bureaucracies are creaking or worse.	这些都是亘古不变的话题，但在这个即时通讯激增的年代，中央集权的大政府官僚机构哪怕最幸运的也都在摇摇欲坠。


People want more effective and more affordable government that responds to their concerns, and are demanding that decisions be decentralized.	人们希望政府更有效、更经济地响应他们的关注，因此要求下放决策权利。


We may be in the early stages of reversing the trend toward increases in the size, scope, and centralization of government, with authority devolving on more localized environments, closer to where people live and work.	我们或许正处在政府规模、范围和集权程度不断下降的早期，权力被移交给距离民众的生活和工作更近、更本地化的政府。


More and more people seem to be increasingly unwilling to live by current government decision-making processes.	越来越多的人似乎越来越不愿接受目前政府的决策程序。


Even with democratic majority rule, minorities believe that their interests and rights – economic, cultural, or religious – are not being protected.	即使在民主多数执政的前提下，少数人也认为并没有保护他们的经济、文化或宗教权利和利益。


The proliferation of calls for devolution, secession, and independence is but one manifestation of this tectonic shift.	民众分离、下放和独立的呼声越来越普遍就是这种结构性变化的表现之一。


Europe’s Options	欧洲的选择


STANFORD – Many Europeans have come to believe that they have weathered the economic and financial storm.	斯坦福—许多欧洲人现在相信，他们已经成功抵挡住了经济和金融风暴。


In the last two years, deficits and debt have stabilized.	在过去两年中，赤字和债务稳定了下来。


Yields on the sovereign debt of the eurozone periphery’s weak economies have fallen sharply.	欧元区外围疲软经济体主权债务收益率显著下降。


Portugal and Ireland have exited their bailout programs.	葡萄牙和爱尔兰退出了援助计划。


Talk of Greece leaving the euro has subsided.	希腊退出欧元区的风声也日渐平息。


All of that is true, but there is a big catch: economic growth in the European Union remains anemic.	确实如此，但有一个大问题：欧盟经济增长仍然萎靡不振。


GDP in Holland and Italy shrank in the last quarter, and France’s barely budged.	上个季度荷兰和意大利GDP呈现收缩之势，法国则勉强持平。


Forecasters are revising down their estimates for 2014 eurozone growth to just 1% year on year.	预测者将欧元区2014年同比增长率预测值向下修正至1%。


Unemployment remains at a staggering 11.6% in the eurozone as a whole, compared to 10% in the United States at the worst of America’s Great Recession.	欧元区总体失业率仍高达 11. 6%，而美国在大衰退期间的最差成绩为10%。


It is above 25% in Greece and Spain – and even higher among the young.	希腊和西班牙失业率更是高达25%以上——年轻人失业率甚至更高。


Europe’s economy remains shackled by three problems – sovereign debt, the euro, and wobbly banks – despite several new policy backstops: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); the European Central Bank’s easy-money policies and holdings of sovereign debt; and the ECB’s takeover in November of supervision of the 130 or so largest pan-eurozone banks.	欧洲经济仍饱受三个问题困扰：主权债务、欧元和飘摇不定的银行——尽管欧盟已经有了不少新的政策支撑网：欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism，ESM）、欧洲央行的宽松货币政策和持有主权债务； 以及11月欧洲央行接管了130家左右泛欧洲银行的监督权。


None of these reforms has been sufficient to restore the stronger growth that Europe desperately needs.	所有这些改革都不足以重塑欧洲所急需的更强劲的增长。


Widespread economic discontent is reflected in recent political instability.	普遍存在的经济不满反映在最近的政治不稳定局面中。


The European Parliament election in May shocked Europe’s elites, as parties of the far right, assorted euroskeptics, and even leftists made strong gains in many countries, fueled in part by popular frustration with the European Commission’s concentration of power.	5月的欧洲议会选举震惊了欧洲精英，极右翼政党、各色欧洲怀疑派甚至极左翼在许多国家颇有斩获，这部分是拜群众普遍对欧盟委员会的权力集中感到不满所赐。


Great Britain may be headed for a referendum on EU membership in 2017 unless certain terms of its membership are revised.	英国可能在2017年举行关于是否保留欧盟成员的公投，除非其欧盟成员条件作出修订。


Elected leaders face a daunting task: enacting difficult structural reforms of labor markets, pension systems, and taxes.	当选领导人面临严峻的任务：启动艰难的劳动力市场、退休金体系以及税收的结构性改革。


All were long overdue prior to the crisis, and they remain in the very early stages, at best, in most countries, while the high-debt countries’ fiscal condition has improved only modestly.	这些改革在危机之前就早应该实施，但直到目前仍在初级阶段（大部分国家都是如此），而高负债国财政状况改善也差强人意。


And Italy and France demand relief from the eurozone’s budget deficit and debt rules.	意大利和法国要求豁免于欧元区预算赤字和债务规则约束。


Economists are not certain whether there are short-run costs or benefits to rapid fiscal consolidation.	经济学家不能���定快速财政整合会带来何种短期成本或收益。 我的观点是这取决于事实和时机，如整合的规模、信誉和时机；


My view is that it depends on facts and circumstances, such as the size, credibility, and timing of the consolidation; the mix of spending and tax cuts; whether consolidation is mostly permanent and structural (for example, a change in pension formulas); and, of course, the stance of monetary policy.	取决于支出和税收削减的组合； 取决于整合是否是持久且结构性的（如改变养老金机制）；


Given most European countries’ increasingly daunting demographic outlook, the current pace of structural reform is woefully insufficient.	由于大部分欧洲国家人口前景日益不利，目前的结构性改革速度是远远不够的。


Italy and Germany are headed toward a ratio of one retiree per worker; without more rapid GDP growth, new immigration policies, higher retirement ages, and efforts to stem the increase in welfare spending, taxes will inexorably rise from already damaging levels.	意大利和德国的退休人口/工作人口之比正在向1比1靠拢； 若无更快的GDP增长、新的移民政策、提高退休年龄以及阻止福利支出扩张，税收就必然会在已然十分危险的高水平进一步大幅提高。


Europe has three broad options.	欧洲有三个广义选择。


The first is the status quo – which would entail cobbling together responses to future mini-crises as they arise, following the pattern of the past few years.	其一是维持现状——包括胡乱拼凑应对未来迷你危机的应对措施，一如过去几年的模式。


Given the divergent interests and problems facing different countries within the eurozone and the EU, together with cumbersome governance structures and the difficulty of treaty changes, this is the path of least resistance for elected leaders – and thus the one most likely to be followed.	考虑到欧元区内不同国家和欧盟的利益和所面临问题的不同，再加上笨重的治理结构和更改条约的困难性，这条路径堪称当选领导人的阻力最小路径——也是他们最有可能遵循的路径。


The second option is serious, concerted structural reform.	其二是认真的、齐头并进的结构性改革。


This would include, at a minimum, reforms of labor rules, pension systems, and anti-growth provisions of tax codes.	这至少需要包括劳动力市场、退休金体系和反增长税法条文改革。


It would also include an aggressive attempt to reduce the sovereign-debt overhang that remains a major impediment to growth and continues to threaten some European banks.	另外还应该包括减少主权债务积压的积极尝试。 目前，主权债务积压仍是增长的主要障碍，并在继续威胁某些欧洲银行。


Existing debt agreements are not sufficient without a decade of strong growth, which appears unlikely, to say the least.	若无十年的强劲增长（最低条件，但可能性很低），现有债务协定是不足够的。


European governments and banks ultimately will need a solution similar to Brady bonds, which worked quite well in overcoming the 1990s Latin American debt crisis and the threat that it posed to highly exposed US money-center banks.	欧洲政府和银行最终将需要类似于布雷迪债券（Brady bond）的解决方案。 20世纪90年代，布雷迪债券在克服拉丁美洲危机及其对风险敞口高企的美国资金中心银行的威胁中居功至伟。


As was true then, a menu of exit options and credit extensions will have to be negotiated.	与那时一样，必须商谈退出选择和信用延期等内容。


The politics of this approach will be difficult, particularly in the rich countries; but, structured properly, concerted structural reform could help to restore growth, which would feed back into healthier budgets, more jobs, better balance sheets, and less financial risk.	这一方针具有很大的政治困难，特别是在富国； 但是，若组织得当，齐头并进的结构性改革将有助于重塑增长，而增长的恢复将反过来带来更健康的预算、更多的工作岗位、更良好的资产负债表和更少的金融风险。


The third option is rethinking and reworking the EU itself, from the euro to its basic institutions.	第三个选择是反思和重构欧盟本身，从欧元一直到基本机构。


As a free-trade arrangement, the EU has been a major success.	作为自由贸易安排的欧盟取得了巨大的成功。


But the euro makes economic sense only for a subset of its current members, not for countries such as Greece in its current situation.	但欧元只对少数现有成员有利，对于目前的希腊等国家来说则是弊大于利。


Some economists have proposed a two-track euro, with “problem” countries using a “euro-B” that floats against the “euro-A” until they abide by the economic and financial rules and earn re-entry.	一些经济学家建议采取双轨制欧元，“问题”国家使用围绕“甲等欧元”浮动的“乙等欧元”，直到它们遵守经济和金融规则并获得重入资格。


Enhanced labor mobility has been another great benefit brought about by the EU.	劳动力流动性的增强是成立欧盟所带来的另一个巨大的好处。


But the European Commission’s rigid bureaucratic diktats have taken some regulation too far, and efforts to force lower-tax countries to “harmonize” their rates would be devastating to their citizens and firms.	但欧盟委员会僵化的官僚勒令（diktats）让某些监管规则走得太远，强制低税收国家“调和”其税率的做法对这些国家的人民和企业来说是一场灾难。


While it is unlikely that much progress will be made along the lines of the second or third options in the near future, Europe’s elected leaders should constantly test what makes sense and what needs to be reformed.	短期内在第二种或第三种选择方面取得大进展不太可能，尽管如此，欧洲当选领导人仍应该不断测试那些政策有效，哪些地方需要改革。


The recent election was a wake-up call; Europe’s leaders need to open their eyes.	最近的选举好比起床号； 欧洲领导人需要睁开眼睛了。


The Irrelevant German Consumer	不相干的德国消费者


MUNICH – With global rebalancing set to be high on the agenda at the next G-7 and G-20 meetings, Germany, with its persistent export surplus, will again come under pressure to boost domestic demand and household consumption.	慕尼黑—在下一次七国集团和二十国集团会议上，全球再平衡将是日程上的当务之急，而长期存在出口盈余的德国将再次承受提振内需和家庭消费的压力。


But the German consumer is a sideshow.	但多国消费者可谓“躺着也中枪”。


What is needed is an investment surge in Germany and Europe, and a coordinated exit from ultra-loose monetary policies.	真正需要的是德国和欧洲增加投资，以及极宽松货币政策的有序退出。


Massive external-account imbalances were a major factor behind the global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008, as well as in the eurozone instability that followed.	大规模对外账户失衡是2008年全球金融和经济危机及其后欧元区动荡背后的一个主要因素。


Now the world economy is in the process of rebalancing – but not in a way that many people had expected.	现在，全球经济正处于再平衡过程中，但并不是以许多人预期的那样进行的。


Asia’s formerly huge external surpluses have declined astonishingly fast, and Japan’s trade balance has even slipped into deficit.	曾经巨大的亚洲外部盈余以极快的速度减少，日本甚至出现了贸易赤字。


China’s current-account surplus has fallen to 2% of GDP, from 10% in 2007.	中国经常项目盈余降至GDP的2%，而2007年为GDP的10%。


Investment is still the Chinese economy’s main driver, but it has led to soaring debt and a bloated shadow banking sector, which the authorities are trying to rein in.	投资仍是中国经济的主要引擎，但也导致了债务飙升和影子银行部门繁荣，当局正在设法遏制。


The European Union, however, has built up a large external surplus, owing mainly to positive trade balances in the eurozone.	但是，欧盟出现了巨大的外部盈余，这主要是因为欧元区的正贸易余额。


The EU’s current-account surplus in 2014, at around $250 billion, will be even higher than that of emerging Asia.	2014年，欧盟经常项目盈余（大约将达到2,500亿美元）将比新兴亚洲还要大。


With oil prices still above $100 a barrel, the combined surplus of oil-exporting countries is of a similar magnitude.	石油价格仍在每桶100美元以上，因此石油出口国的总盈余也会达到相当水平。


The United States, meanwhile, continues to run a sizeable current-account deficit of around $350-400 billion.	与此同时，美国继续保持巨大的经常项目赤字，在3,500—4,000亿美元左右。


The surprise here is the continued growth in the EU’s surplus.	令人惊奇之处在于欧盟盈余的持续增长。


The collapse in imports suffered by bailed-out countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain – was entirely predictable, given how sharply their economies declined.	被援助国（希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙）的进口暴跌是完全可以预料的，因为这些国家的经济出现了严重衰退。


But few economists expected that these countries’ exports would improve as quickly as they did, especially in a subdued international environment.	但很少有经济学家预期到这些国家的出口能改善得如此之快，特别是在考虑到国际环境不利的情况下。


While Germany’s current-account surplus is roughly where it was in 2007, the combined external balance of the bailout beneficiaries plus Italy (which has been part of the trade turnaround) has swung from a pre-crisis deficit of more than $300 billion to an expected surplus of around $60 billion this year.	尽管德国经常项目盈余还在2007年的水平，但援助受益国加上意大利（它也是贸易局面改变的一部分）的总外部余额从危机前的3,000多亿美元赤字变为今年的（预期）6,000亿美元左右盈余。


Looking ahead, the appreciating euro (another surprise, especially to the many observers who doubted its survival less than two years ago) will compress the eurozone’s current-account surplus to some extent.	放眼未来，欧元升值（另一个令人惊奇之处，特别是对许多不到两年前还在担心欧元生存的观察者来说）将在一定程度上抑制欧元区的经常项目盈余。


An exchange rate of close to $1.40 poses a challenge for many European exporters, including German companies.	1欧元兑近1. 40美元的汇率将是许多欧洲出口国商面临的一大挑战（包括德国公司）。


And the euro has revalued even more against the yen and a number of emerging-market currencies.	而欧元对日元和许多新兴市场货币的升值幅度更大。


Nonetheless, the European surplus is too large to ignore, and Germany in particular will be asked once more to rebalance its economy toward higher domestic demand, which for many people implies the need for a fiscal boost.	尽管如此，欧洲的盈余仍然很大，不容忽视，特别是德国，它将再次被要求提高内需以实现经济再平衡，许多人认为这意味着财政刺激。


But the government is not obliging: Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has just presented a balanced budget for 2015 – the first since 1969.	但政府不准备就范：财政部长朔伊布勒刚刚公布了2015年将实现平衡预算——这是1969年来的首次。


And, while some observers are calling for Germany to “end wage restraint” and thereby encourage higher household spending, this has actually happened already.	此外，尽管一些观察者呼吁德国“结束工资管制”从而鼓励家庭增加支出，但事实上这已经开始发生了。


There is, however, a lot that the government could do about investment, which has fallen by almost four percentage points of GDP since 2000, to just over 17% in 2013 – low by international standards.	但是，在投资方面政府有很多事可以做，自2000年以来，投资已经下降了GDP的四个百分点，到2013年只占GDP的17%——按国际标准看算是低水平了。


The government could shift more government spending toward infrastructure investment.	政府可以将更多的政府支出用于基础设施投资。


But, even more important, it should improve conditions for corporate investment at home, rather than watch German businesses move their capital expenditures abroad.	但是，更重要的是，政府应该改善国内公司投资环境，而不是关注德国企业将资本支出投向国外。


Germany’s attractiveness to investors would rise with simpler and more investment-friendly taxation, improved incentives for business start-ups and R&D, less bureaucracy and red tape, and no further energy-cost increases.	如能简化税收使之对投资者有利、改善创业和研发激励、减少官僚主义和官样文章并遏制能源成本的进一步增加，德国对投资者的吸引力就会提高。


Getting there will take time.	实现这一点需要时间。


But, given the favorable earnings situation and the corporate sector’s large cash balances, a rebalancing of the tax system could have a rapid impact.	但是，在盈利状况有利、公私部门持有大量现金余额的情况下，税收系统再平衡能够很快见��。


Investment from retained earnings should be as attractive as debt financing.	留存收益投资的吸引力应该不亚于债务融资。


And some temporary adjustments of depreciation allowances could kick-start capital spending.	一些折旧方面的临时调整也能够刺激资本支出。


The need for more investment in transport, telecoms, energy, and education certainly is not only a German issue.	加大交通、通信、能源和教育方面的支出的需要显然不止是德国的问题。


Given most European governments’ debt problems, the challenge is to attract more private capital into these areas.	大部分欧洲政府都有债务问题，因此挑战在于吸引更多的私人资本。


Improved regulatory conditions for long-term investments and savings would help.	改善长期投资和储蓄监管环境是有裨益的。


So would expansion of financing instruments for infrastructure investment – for example, by substantially increasing the supply of project bonds supported by the European Investment Bank.	扩大基础设施投资融资工具亦然——比如大幅提高有欧洲投资银行支持的项目债券供给。


Indeed, why not create “European Infrastructure Bonds,” backed by revenues generated by the investments or tax income from the countries that emit EIBs?	事实上，何不创造“欧洲基础设施债券”（EIB），以发行国得自投资和税收的收入作为支持？


This would not only spur jobs and long-term growth; it would also stem the rise in Europe’s external surplus.	这不仅能刺激就业和长期增长； 还有助于遏制欧洲外部盈余的增加。


But the challenge of rebalancing the global economy is also closely connected to central banks’ monetary policies.	但实现全球经济再平衡的挑战也与央行的货币政策密切相关。


With credit and asset bubbles slowly but surely reappearing, the authorities’ goal should be to keep growth on a balanced and sustainable path – and thus to discouraging excessive risk taking.	信用和资产泡沫正在重现，虽然缓慢但无可置疑，因此当局的目标应该是保持增长走向平衡和可持续之路——从而阻止过度冒险行为。


This justifies the US Federal Reserve’s gradual exit from ultra-loose policies.	这就是美联储逐渐退出其极度宽松政策的正确性所在。


Somewhat surprisingly, the Fed’s reduction of its monthly asset purchases has been accompanied so far by dollar weakness against the euro, which is fostering external adjustment.	有些令人惊奇的是，到目前为止，美联储减少其月度资产购买量的动作导致了美元对欧元的贬值，而这刺激了外部调整。


Looking forward, however, this may change.	但是，放眼未来，这或许会出现变化。


If the Fed remains alone in scaling back its monetary stimulus and bond yields rise further, the dollar will almost certainly strengthen.	如果仍然只有美联储在收回货币刺激，并且债券收益率进一步上升，美元几乎肯定会出现升值。


Clearly, a coordinated effort to limit exchange-rate variations is advisable.	显然，应该采取协调动作限制汇率变化。


If all countries try to keep their currencies weak, monetary expansion on a global scale will be over-extended.	如果所有国家都想让货币贬值，则全球范围得的货币扩张就会规模过度。


The fact that inflationary pressure is still low is not a reason to postpone planning an exit from ultra-loose policy; on the contrary, the time for such discussions is when inflation is low and markets are calm.	通胀压力仍然很低这一事实并不构成中止退出极度宽松政策计划的理由； 相反，通胀低、市场稳的时候正是展开讨论的良机。


Twenty years ago, markets panicked and bond rates soared as central banks hiked interest rates in the face of rising inflation.	二十年前，央行因为通胀的上升而提高利率，导致市场恐慌、债券利率飙升。


They should not repeat that mistake by waiting for inflationary pressures – fueled by rising oil and commodity prices and economic recovery – to return.	如今，央行应该不会重蹈覆辙，坐等通胀压力——受石油和商品价格上涨以及经济复苏推动——回归了。


The Climate-Change Agenda Heats Up	气候变化日程渐热


LONDON – For many people around the world this year, the weather has become anything but a topic for small talk.	伦敦—对全世界的很多人来说，今年的天气已经成为一个不小的话题。


Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, America’s record-breaking freeze, California’s year-long drought, and flooding in Europe have put the long-term dangers of climate change back on the political agenda.	菲律宾的海燕台风、美国创纪录的冰冻、加利福尼亚一整年的干旱以及欧洲的洪水让气候变化的长期危害回到了政治日程上。


In response, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has sent an urgent letter to government, business, civil society, and finance leaders, urging them to attend a special Climate Summit in New York in September.	联合国秘书长潘基文也因此给政府、企业、公民社会和金融领袖发去了紧急信，敦促他们出席9月的纽约特别气候峰会。


The event will be the first time that world leaders have met to discuss global warming since the UN’s fateful Copenhagen climate-change summit in 2009.	这将是自2009年具有决定意义的联合国哥本哈根气候变化峰会后世界领导人再次聚首讨论全球变暖问题。


Amid high expectations – and subsequent recriminations – that meeting failed to achieve a comprehensive, legally-binding agreement to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	人们对哥本哈根峰会寄予了很高的期望，但结果却令人失望——这次峰会没能达成全面的、具有法律约束力的减少温室气体排放协议。


So, at September’s summit, leaders will be asked to re-boot the diplomatic process.	因此，在9月的峰会上，领导人们将被要求重启外交程序。


The goal is a new agreement in 2015 to prevent average global temperatures from rising by two degrees Celsius, the level that the international community has deemed “dangerous” to human society.	其目标是在2015年启用新的协定以防止全球温度升高二摄氏度——国际社会认为如此程度的升温对人类社会来说“很危险”。


At first sight, that looks like a hard task.	乍一看，这是个艰难的任务。


Since Copenhagen, climate change has slipped down the global agenda, as the restoration of economic growth, voter concern about jobs and living standards, and violent conflict in key trouble spots have taken precedence.	自哥本哈根峰会以来，随着经济增长的恢复、选民的担心就业和生活水平，以及各个关键节点暴力冲突的频发，气候变化已经告别了全球日程。


But the tide may be turning.	但趋势可能正在回归。


More people are grasping the true extent of the dangers ahead.	更多的人开始理解未来危险到底有多严重。


In its latest authoritative assessment, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded last year that scientists are now 95% certain that human activities are the principal cause of rising temperatures.	在其最新的权威评估中，政府间气候变化委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change，IPCC）指出，去年科学家95%地确定人类活动是造成升温的主因。


Over the next two months the IPCC will release further reports detailing the human and economic impacts of probable climate change and the costs and benefits of combating it.	两个月后，IPCC将发布进一步报告，详细阐述可能的气候变化所造成的人道和经济影响以及对抗气候变化的成本和收益。


US Secretary of State John Kerry recently described climate change as “perhaps the world’s most fearsome weapon of mass destruction,” warning of “a tipping-point of no return.”	美国国务卿克里最近称气候变化“也许是世界上最可怕的大规模杀伤性武器”，并警告存在“无法回头的引爆点”。


Few serious commentators now dispute the science.	如今，严肃的评论家已经很少有人反对这一科��结论。


So the key question now is how the world’s leaders will respond.	因此，现在的关键问题是世界领导人们如何应对。


There are grounds for cautious optimism.	我们有理由对此保持谨慎乐观。


First, New York will not be like Copenhagen.	首先，纽约不是哥本哈根。


Leaders are not being asked to negotiate a new agreement themselves; that job will remain with their professional negotiators and environment ministers.	领导人们没有承受亲自谈判新协定的压力； 谈判的责任仍在专业谈判员和环境部长身上。


Moreover, the process will not be concluded this year but at the UN climate conference in Paris in December 2015.	此外，谈判过程不会在今年结束，而是要等到2015年12月的巴黎联合国气候会议。


That provides plenty of time to translate political commitments made in New York into a legally-binding accord.	这意味着有充足的时间将纽约所作出的政治承诺转化为有法律约束力的条约。


Second, the world’s two largest greenhouse-gas emitters, the United States and China, are now more committed to action than they were five years ago.	其次，世界两大温室气体排放国——美国和中国做出了比五年前更重大的承诺。


US President Barack Obama has announced a far-reaching plan that authorizes the Environment Protection Agency to take dramatic measures in the next few months to limit power-station emissions, virtually ending coal-fired electricity generation altogether.	美国总统奥巴马公布了一份意义深远的计划，授权环境保护署（Environment Protection Agency）在未来几个月中采取重大措施限制电厂排放，并在事实上取缔燃煤发电。


In China, worsening air pollution and growing concerns about energy security have led the government to consider a cap on coal use and an absolute reduction in emissions within the next 10-15 years.	在中国，恶化的空气污染和日益增加的能源安全忧虑促使政府考虑在未来10—15年内限制煤炭使用并制定绝对减排目标。


The government is experimenting with carbon pricing, and investing heavily in low-carbon wind, solar, and nuclear energy.	政府正在尝试碳定价，并大量投资于低碳的风能、太阳能和核能。


Further, the two countries are actively cooperating.	此外，两国正在积极合作。


Last year Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to phase out hydrofluorcarbons, a potent greenhouse gas.	去年，奥巴马和中国国家主席习近平承诺取缔强力温室气体氢氟碳化物。


In February, they announced their intention to work together on climate policy – a marked contrast to Sino-US tensions over Pacific security and trade issues.	2月，他们还表示愿意在气候变化上进行合作——这与中美两国在太平洋安全和贸易问题上的对峙态度形成了鲜明对比。


With the European Union also preparing to commit to new 2030 climate targets, hopes for a global deal are rising.	欧盟也在准备做出2030年气候目标承诺，因此达成全球协议的希望在增加。


A third cause for optimism is the re-appraisal of climate-change economics.	第三个值得乐观的理由是对气候变化经济学的重估。


Five years ago, policies aimed at cutting greenhouse-gas emissions were seen as a cost burden on the economy.	五年前，旨在降低温室气体排放的政策被视为经济的成本负担。


Negotiations were therefore a zero-sum game, with countries seeking to minimize their obligations while asking others to do more.	因此谈判是一种零和博弈，各国都在尽力推卸自己的责任，同时要求他国承担更大责任。


However, new evidence may be altering the economic calculus.	但是，最新的证据可能改变这一经济算盘。


According to research conducted by the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, far from hurting the economy, well-designed climate policy may actually boost growth.	根据全球经济和气候委员会（Global Commission on the Economy and Climate）的研究，设计合理的气候政策非但不会伤害经济，还能实际提振增长。


Chaired by former Mexican President Felipe Calderón and comprising former prime ministers, presidents, and finance ministers, the Commission is analyzing how investments in clean-energy infrastructure, agricultural productivity, and urban transport could stimulate sluggish economies.	以墨西哥前总统卡尔德隆为首、由众多前总理、总统和财政部长组成的该委员会正在分析清洁能源基础设施、农业生产和城市交通方面的投资如何刺激陷入停滞的经济。


Its conclusions will be presented at September’s summit; if accepted, the Commission’s work could mark a turning point, transforming the way in which climate policy is perceived by the world’s economic policymakers.	他们将咋9月的峰会上呈现研究结果； 如果结果能被接受，将是一个转折点，改变气候政策在世界经济决策者眼中的分量。


None of this guarantees success.	所有这些都不能保证成功。


Powerful vested interests – not least the world’s fossil-fuel industries – will no doubt seek to limit progress, and most governments are not yet focused on the problem.	强大的既得利益——不仅仅是化石燃料行业——必然会试图阻挠进步，并且大部分政府也尚未将注意力集中在这一问题上。


But one thing is certain: the reality of climate change is making it impossible to ignore.	但有一点是肯定的：气候变化的现实不容忽视。


Combating Konzo	战胜Konzo


EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN – Too many preventable diseases, from AIDS to yellow fever, have long afflicted Sub-Saharan Africa.	东兰辛，密歇根��从艾滋病到黄热病，太多可预防的疾病长期以来一直困扰着撒哈拉以南非洲。


But eradicating them requires an understanding of the disease in question, money, education, government support, planning, and, not least, an interest from the community and the wider world in solving the problem.	但根除这些疾病需要理解这些疾病，需要资金、教育、政府支持、计划，以及社区乃至全世界对解决问题的兴趣。


Consider a preventable disease that most people have never heard of: konzo, a permanent, irreversible, upper-motor neuron disorder, common in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa that rely on the bitter varieties of the cassava plant as a staple crop.	以一种大部分人从未听说过的可预防疾病为例。 这种疾病叫做konzo，一种永久性、不可逆的上层运动神经元失调病，这种病在撒哈拉以南非洲农村很常见，该地区以一种较苦的木薯类植物为主食。


Konzo occurs when cassava tubers are not properly prepared before consumption, which usually requires soaking them until they ferment and then drying them in the sun to allow for the breakdown of cyanogenic compounds.	如果食用了处理不当的木薯块茎，就会得这种病。 通常，处理木薯需要把它们浸在水中直到发酵，然后在太阳底下晒干，从而让其中的生氰物质分解。


Hundreds or thousands of people in a village region can be affected with every outbreak.	Konzo病每一次发作，都会导致数十万农村地区的人受到影响。


Konzo is especially common in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Tanzania, and often follows droughts or conflicts, when food is scarce.	Konzo病在民主刚果、中非共和国、莫桑比克和坦桑尼亚尤其普遍，并且通常在经历了旱灾和冲突、粮食比较匮乏时爆发。


Women and children are the worst affected, especially during times of economic hardship, when they have the least access to meat, beans, and other sources of sulfur amino acids necessary for the liver to detoxify cyanide in the body.	女性和儿童受影响最为严重，特别是在经济困难期他们最难获得肉类、豆类和其他含硫氨基酸来源的时候。 含硫氨基酸可以帮助肝脏分解体内的氰化物。


The effects are not easy to miss.	其影响是显而易见的。 世界卫生组织把konzo定义为走路或跑步时的可见的痉挛性异常；


The World Health Organization defines konzo as a visible spastic abnormality of gait while walking or running; a history of onset within one week in a formerly healthy person, followed by a non-progressive course; and exaggerated jerking of the knees or ankles without signs of spinal disease.	健康人会在一周内发病，然后进入非演进性过程； 膝盖或脚踝颤抖会加大，但无脊椎疾病信号。


Konzo’s severity varies.	Konzo的严重性有好几种。


According to the WHO’s 1996 classification, the disease is deemed mild when the victim does not need to use walking aids regularly; moderate when one or two sticks or crutches are used; and severe when he or she is bedridden or unable to walk without support.	根据世界卫生组织1996年的分类，当病人行走一般不需要辅助时，可以认为症状较轻； 需要用一到两根拐杖或支撑物时可以认为中度症状；


Because konzo was initially characterized as a pure upper-motor neuron disease confined to motor pathways in the central nervous system, it was suggested that the cognitive effects were minimal.	由于konzo最初被归类为纯粹上层运动神经疾病，仅限于中枢神经系统的运动路径，因此认为其对认知的影响极小。


But electrophysiological evidence later emerged suggesting that higher-level brain functioning may be affected as well.	但后来电生理学证据证明，konzo也可以影响更高层次的大脑功能。


In documenting neurocognitive impairments in children with konzo, my colleagues and I also noted sub-clinical symptoms even in konzo-free children living in konzo-affected households, a finding based on their performance on more specialized neurocognitive tests of memory and learning.	我的同事和我在记录konzo对儿童神经认知的伤害时还注意到，即使未得konzo的儿童，如果生活在被konzo影响的家庭中，也会出现亚临床症状，这是在他们在更专业的记忆和学习的神经认知测试中的表现的基础上发现的。


These subtler symptoms may constitute a pre-konzo condition, providing a warning that a child is approaching the disease’s threshold.	这些微妙症状可能构成有利于konzo病的条件，形成了一个儿童正在接近konzo病门槛的警告信号。


Thus, the neurocognitive effects documented for non-konzo children in konzo-affected households and communities make it all the more important to ensure food safety in regions dependent on bitter varieties of cassava with high levels of cyanogenic compounds.	因此对受konzo影响的家庭和社区的儿童的神经认知影响的记录便十分重要，甚至比确保依赖于生氰含量较高的苦木薯地区的粮食安全更加重要。


To this end, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has supported research leading to the development of nontoxic, high-yield varieties of cassava.	在这方面，比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会（Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation）所支持的研究已经帮助开发出了无毒高产的木薯。


These genetically engineered strains can thrive even in degraded soil, so that people no longer have to turn to the more toxic varieties.	这些转基因种株在相当退化的土壤中也可以存货，因此人们不再需要吃毒性较高的品种。


But disseminating these safer strains is proving difficult.	但传播这些更安全种株十分困难。


Konzo-affected regions lack the agricultural, educational, and public-health capacity and infrastructure needed to implement the necessary changes.	Konzo影响地区缺少农业、教育和公共卫生能力和基础设施，因此无法推进必须的变化。


For the same reasons, these regions fail to diversify their food staples to include safer crops such as millet, maize, or beans.	同理，这些地区也无法实现主食多样化，纳入小米、玉米和大豆等较安全的作物。


Because there is no cure for the neurological damage that konzo causes, the battle against the disease must focus on prevention.	由于konzo造成的神经伤害无药可医，因此与konzo的斗争必须以预防为中心。


While that means continuing to demonstrate the benefits of new strains of cassava and other staples, the first priority must be to educate people, especially village women, about the hazards of eating unprocessed cassava, and to teach them how to prepare it safely.	这意味着需要继续说明新木薯种株和其他主食的好处，但最重要的仍是教育人民，特别是农村妇女，让他们知道食用未处理木薯的危害，并教会他们如何安全地处理木薯。


Using culturally appropriate social marketing, similar to those used in anti-HIV education, the message can be spread through social networks, mobile phones, radio, and television.	我们可以利用恰当的社会营销——就像在防艾滋病教育中那样——让这些信息通过社交网络、移动电话、广播和电视传播。


To be sure, communities in affected regions have long followed safe, traditional practices.	平心而论，受影响地区的社区早已开始遵循安全、传统的做法。


But they may be unaware of why these practices are so important, and therefore of the consequences of not adhering to them.	但他们也许不知道这样做为何重要，也不知道不这样做的后果。


Especially during times of upheaval and increased food scarcity, soaking the peeled tubers for three days until fermentation, and then sun-drying them for a day, might seem like an unaffordable luxury.	特别是在动乱和粮食紧缺时期，将去皮块茎在水里浸三天等待其发酵、再花一天晒干似乎是一种不可承受的奢侈。


It is not.	并非如此。


Millions are at risk of konzo, and outbreaks can occur at any time.	数百万人有罹患konzo病的风险，其爆发随时随地都可能发生。


The neurological injury can be debilitating, and it is permanent.	神经伤害可能并不严重，但它是持久的。


Because we know how to prevent it, we are obliged to act.	我们知道如何预防它，因此我们有义务行动起来。


The UN’s Half-Full Glass	联合国的半满水杯


NAIROBI – Families trapped by the fighting in Syria are reportedly eating “salads’’ made of leaves and grass to stave off hunger.	内罗毕—据说受困于叙利亚内战的家庭正在靠树叶和草做成的“沙拉”果腹。


According to the United Nations refugee agency, more than two million Syrians have fled to neighboring countries.	据联合国难民机构的数据，超过两百万叙利亚人曾经逃往邻国。


Back home, many more face a brutal winter without adequate food, medicine, or shelter.	回国后，许多人面临着缺少食物、药品和居所的严冬。


And, as if conditions could not be worse, the country is facing a polio outbreak.	此外，更糟糕的是，叙利亚正面临着脊髓灰质炎爆发。


The international response to Syria’s crisis has been nothing short of disastrous.	对于叙利亚危机，国际社会的反应可谓是一场灾难。


Indeed, Syria seems to be the embodiment of failure on the part of the UN.	事实上，叙利亚可以说变身为联合国失败的化身。


The Security Council is deadlocked.	安理会陷入了僵局。


In Damascus, would-be peacemakers come and go, talking diplomacy but achieving nothing.	在大马士革，可能的和平缔造者来来往往，说些外交辞令，却没有实现任何成果。


Relief agencies are blocked from operating where they are needed most.	纾困机构无法在最需要它们的地方展开工作。


Yet it is clear that without the UN, the situation would be even worse.	但是，毫无疑问，如果没有联合国，叙利亚的局势会更加糟糕。


Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey would be under even more pressure from the refugees flooding across their borders.	黎巴嫩、约旦和土耳其将承受更大的难民涌入的压力。


And while efforts to achieve a ceasefire have failed, diplomacy has not – at least not entirely.	而尽管实现停火的努力失败了，但外交努力并没有失败——至少没有完全失败。


In October, UN inspectors took initial steps to destroy Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpiles and facilities, with the government’s full cooperation.	10月，联合国检察人员开始了销毁叙利亚化学武库和设施的第一步，叙利亚政府予以全面配合。


In Syria – as in so many other conflict-affected areas, where the UN is fighting to promote peace and stability – there is no such thing as a clear victory.	在叙利亚——和其他许多联合国正在竭力促进和平与稳定的冲突地区一样——明确的胜利信号并不存在。


As an experienced statesman once told me, “At the UN, we do not settle for failure, nor do we expect success.”	正如一位经验丰富的政治家曾经告诉我的，“在联合国，我们不会满足于失败，也不会期待成功。


In diplomatic negotiations, you take what you can get.	”在外交谈判中，你拿走你可以拿到的。


In humanitarian crises, you do what is possible – usually too little, and often too late.	在人道主义危机中，你做可以做的——通常你做得太少，并且往往做得太迟。


“We drink from a cup that is eternally half full,” he concluded.	“我们的水杯永远是半满的。 ”他总结说。


This conflicted view aligns with public perceptions of the UN.	这一矛盾的观点与公众对联合国的感觉是一致的。


In the United States, for example, a recent poll by Better World Campaign suggested that 57% of Americans view the UN favorably; but, according to a more recent Gallup survey, only 35% of Americans believe the UN is doing a good job.	比如，在美国，美好世界运动（Better World Campaign）所做的最新民调现实57%的美国人对联合国持肯定态度； 但是，根据盖洛普的最新调查，只有35%的美国人认为联合国的行动很出色。


When the UN was founded in 1945, polls showed similarly conflicted views.	1945年联合国成立时，民调也显示出类似的矛盾观点。


While slightly more than 60% of Americans embraced the importance of the UN and its global mission, only 39% believed that its lofty goals for peace and human development were achievable.	略高于60%的美国人同意联合国及其全球使命的重要性，但只有39%相信其和平与人类发展的崇高目标可以实现。


This discrepancy reflects a deep divide – in the US and elsewhere – between people’s hopes for the UN and their expectations of its ability to deliver.	这一差异体现出美国和其他地区的人们对联合国的希望和对其实现目标的能力的期望之间深刻的分歧。


In fact, the UN’s contribution to peace and development should not be understated, though its successes clearly do not receive the publicity they deserve.	事实上，联合国对和平与发展的贡献不应该被低估，尽管其成功显然没有得到赢得的宣传。


For example, UN peacekeepers were recently deployed successfully in Mali.	比如，联合国维和人员最近成功地开进了马里。


Last month, they defeated the M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ending a major threat to regional peace and security.	上个月，他们挫败了民主刚果的M23叛军，消灭了地区和平与安全的一大隐患。


But most of the UN’s achievements have had shortcomings.	但联合国的大部分成就尤其缺陷。


In 2011, after Côte d’Ivoire’s President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power following his electoral defeat the previous year, the UN, backed by French forces, arrested him and transferred him to the International Criminal Court, cutting short a potentially devastating civil war.	2011年，在科特迪瓦总统巴博（Laurent Gbagbo）拒绝在上一年的大选失败后交出权力时，联合国在法国军队的支持下逮捕了他，并把他送上了国际刑事法庭，快刀斩乱麻地解决了可能的灾难性的内战。


Nonetheless, their intervention came too late for the hundreds of civilians who were killed in the city of Duékoué.	但是，联合国的干预来得太晚，杜埃奎（Duékoué）已有数百平民遇难。


When Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi threatened to kill his rebellious detractors like “rats,” a UN coalition intervened under an emerging global doctrine: the responsibility to protect.	当利比亚的卡扎菲威胁要把反对派批评者像“老鼠”一样杀掉时，联合国军根据新的全球信条——保护责任（responsibility to protect）实施了干预。


But three years after Qaddafi’s ouster, Libya remains hobbled by weak national institutions and roiled by factional fighting.	但在卡扎菲被推翻三年后，利比亚的国家机构仍孱弱不堪，派系斗争仍层出不穷。


During the early days of the Arab Spring protests, the UN, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, spoke out forcefully for human rights and democracy.	在阿拉伯之春起义初期，在秘书长潘基文的领导下，联合国强力支持了人权和民主。


But the UN’s capacity to ensure desirable outcomes is limited; while the hope that drove the Arab Spring may not be depleted, it has clearly diminished significantly.	但联合国确保希望的结果的能力十分有限； 尽管驱动阿拉伯之春的希望可能并未耗尽，但显然大幅削弱了。


In just a few years, the UN has managed to push climate change – which, until recently, was barely understood by world leaders – toward the top of the global agenda.	在短短几年中，联合国设法成功地将气候变化——迄今这一问题仍未所得到的世界领导人的充分认识——推动到了全球日程的最顶层。


But a comprehensive agreement on climate change remains a distant hope.	但关于气候变化的全面协定仍是遥远的希望。


And while the Millennium Development Goals have produced remarkable progress in key areas – including education, infant mortality, and diseases like malaria and tuberculosis – there is still a long way to go.	此外，尽管千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals）在教育、婴儿死亡率和疟疾和结核病等疾病等关键领域取得了令人瞩目的成就，但仍有很长的路要走。


In pursuing a political solution in Syria, it is important to set realistic expectations.	在叙利亚问题的政治解决方案方面，树立现实的期望很重要。


The country has descended into warlordism – a take-no-prisoners fight among armed groups, some allied with the government, others with Al Qaeda, and all preying on innocent civilians.	叙利亚已经陷入了军阀混战——在武装集团的斗争中没有正邪之分，一些与政府结盟，一些与基地组织结盟，而所有军阀都在掠夺无辜的平民。


In such an environment, the prospects for diplomacy are dim.	在这样的环境下，外交前景十分黯淡。


The UN must settle for what it can get and do the most it can to help those in need.	联合国必须认清可以做什么，并竭尽全力提供需要的帮助。


After all, a half-full glass is better than an empty one.	毕竟，半满的水杯总比全空的好。


Beyond the Nairobi Massacre	内罗毕大屠杀之外


NAIROBI – Kenya heaved a collective sigh of relief when the four-day siege at Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall finally ended.	内罗毕—为期四天的内罗毕韦斯特盖特（Westgate）购物中心攻坚战结束了，整个肯尼亚都为此大舒一口气。


Yet the aftermath of the massacre is in many ways turning out to be as dramatic – and grisly – as the event itself.	但从很多方面看，大屠杀的后事与事件本身一样引人注目。


The sophistication of the plot has stunned investigators.	局面之复杂让调查者大吃一惊。


The attackers – members of the Somali Islamist extremist group al-Shabaab – spent weeks reconnoitering the site.	袭击者——索马里伊斯兰极端组织青年军（al-Shabaab）花了数周时间踩点。


They knew every exit and safe haven, and they appear to have leased a shop where they pre-positioned ammunition, explosives, and heavy weaponry.	他们请出每一个出口和安全站，他们似乎还租了一个店面用来预先放好枪支、炸药和重型武器。


Their use of social media was a case study in digital virtuosity.	他们对社交媒体的使用也可以成为数字营销的经典案例。


The attackers issued a clear demand: Kenya must withdraw the forces that it deployed two years ago as part of an international effort to drive al-Shabaab out of Somalia and return the country to government rule and a semblance of normal life.	袭击者提出了明确的要求：肯尼亚必须把两年前部署在索马里的军队（作为将青年军赶出索马里的国际行动的一部分）撤出索马里，把索马里还给政府，恢复正常生活的表象。


Their strike, they said, was intended chiefly as a warning to Kenya’s government: change your policy, or else.	他们说，此次袭击主要是作为对肯尼亚政府的警告：改变政策，否则后果自负。


The attackers also made a great show of telling the world that they had taken special care to safeguard the lives of fellow Muslims during the assault.	袭击者还做足了戏告诉全世界，他们采取了特别措施，在整个事件中保证穆斯林安然无恙。


Tell that to a colleague here in Nairobi who was trapped in the mall for five hours as gunfire echoed all around.	我的一位内罗毕同事可以证明绝非如此。 她因为交火而在购物中心被困了五小时。


She emerged unharmed to find that two members of her family were dead and a third wounded.	她毫发无伤地走了出来，但两位家人丧生，另有一位家人受伤。


The survivor was a nine-year-old boy, shot in the hip.	幸存者是一名九岁男孩，臀部中弹。


As he lay bleeding, terrorists trained their guns on his mother and 15-year-old sister.	在他流血倒地时，恐怖分子朝他的母亲和15岁的姐姐开了枪。


Recite a passage from the Koran, they ordered.	他们喝令他们背诵古兰经段落。


Being Muslim, they did so.	作为穆斯林，他们照办了。


The terrorists shot them anyway.	但恐怖分子还是开了枪。


“Why did you do that?	“为什么这么做？


Why did you shoot them?” the little boy wailed.	为什么朝她们开枪？ ”小男孩哭喊。


“Because,” replied one of the gunmen, “they were not wearing the hijab.”	“因为，”一位恐怖分子说，“她们没有穿戴头巾。


Amid the chaos, a French woman grabbed the child and carried him to safety.	”在混乱中，一名法国妇女抢下男孩，把他带到了安全地带。


We have heard many such stories in recent days.	近几天来，我们听到了许多类似的故事。


Brutal as they sound, worse is likely to come.	不可不谓耸人听闻，但还会有更糟糕的事。


A police doctor working with forensic teams left the scene in shock, telling reporters of seeing bodies beheaded, and others bearing clear evidence of unspeakable torture.	一名与法医团队共事的警医离开现场时大受震动，他对记者说看到了身首异处的尸体，还有许多显然受到了难以启齿的虐待的受害者。


He recounted entering the still-smoldering ruins of the mall last week and seeing bodies hanging from hooks.	他讲述了上周进入硝烟未尽的购物中心废墟时的情景。 他看到一些尸体被挂在钩子上。


Many of those taken hostage suffered terrible deaths.	许多人质在受尽折磨后被杀。


There were bodies with their noses and ears wrenched off with pliers.	很多尸体的鼻子和耳朵被钳子钳下。


Others had their eyes gouged out.	一些尸体被挖去了双目。


The terrorists seem to have used knives to shave some victims’ fingers like pencils, he said, forcing them to write their names in their own blood.	他说，恐怖分子用刀把一些受害者的手指削成铅笔状，然后逼他们用自己的血写下名字。


At least 72 people were killed in the attack.	至少72人在袭击中被杀。


How much that toll increases, and how graphic investigators will be in describing the scenes they encounter, remains to be seen.	受害者名单最终会有多长、他们所经历的过程到底有多残忍还有待调查。


It is important to understand what is at stake in this gruesome episode, not only for Kenya but for the region and beyond.	很重要的一点是你要明白这起恶性事件的含义，不仅是对肯尼亚，也是对整个地区甚至全世界。


President Uhuru Kenyatta made clear almost immediately that last week’s events will not weaken Kenya’s determination to maintain its policy on Somalia, even as he confirmed that he, too, lost loved ones in the Nairobi massacre.	肯尼亚总统肯雅塔（Uhuru Kenyatta）几乎立刻阐明了态度——上周的事件不会削弱肯尼亚维持其索马里政策的决心，即使他坦诚自己也在内罗毕大屠杀中失去了至亲。


The warlords of al-Shabaab are not the only threat to the region’s security.	青年军军阀并非该地区安全的唯一威胁。


Today, an arc of crisis stretches from Somalia on the Indian Ocean across the African Sahel to the Atlantic coast.	如今，危机危险区包括印度洋沿岸的索马里到大西洋沿岸的整个萨赫勒地区。


Sudan, another country in Kenya’s neighborhood, is fractured by rebellion.	肯尼亚的另一个邻国苏丹因为叛乱而陷入了分裂。


In the south, secessionist groups are fighting in Kordofan and Blue Nile.	在南部，分裂主义团伙在科尔多凡和青尼罗地区战斗。


To the west, in Darfur, protesters burned government buildings in the provincial capital of Nyala while the siege in Nairobi played out.	在内罗毕攻坚战进行的同时，西部达尔富尔地区的示威者焚烧了省会尼亚拉的政府大楼。


Days later, riots erupted in cities across Sudan, including the capital, Khartoum.	几天后，动乱席卷了包括首都喀土穆在内的苏丹各大城市。


According to news reports, security forces have shot over 100 people, adding to a toll of casualties that has made this year one of the deadliest in Sudan’s recent history.	据新闻报道，安全部队射杀了100多人，加上今年早些时候的死亡人数，今年已经成为苏丹近几年来死亡人数最血腥的一年。


Diplomats view these developments with alarm.	外交家们紧张地关注着发展势态。


Over the past year, Darfur has spun out of government control.	在过去的一年中，达尔富尔已不在政府的控制之下。


As Darfur goes, many analysts say, so goes Sudan.	许多分析家说，达尔富尔的今天就是苏丹的明天。


Conditions across the wider Sahel are similarly worrisome.	整个萨赫勒地区的情况都令人担忧。


Mali may be stable for now, but, with the separatist Tuareg rebels in country’s north having just suspended their participation in peace talks, many experts believe that it is only a matter of time before the conflict there reignites and spreads.	马里暂时恢复了稳定，但北部的分裂主义的图阿雷格叛军刚刚退出了和平谈判，因此许多专家认为马里冲突重燃和扩大只是时间问题。


Drug barons and local warlords control increasingly large swaths of territory from Guinea on the Atlantic coast through Senegal to Mali, Niger, and beyond.	在从圭亚那开始穿过塞内加尔直到马里、尼日尔和其他国家的大西洋沿岸，毒枭和军阀控制着大片领土。


Libya is already partitioned among rival warlords, with a “national” government that operates only at the indulgence of the armed groups that support it.	利比亚已经陷入了军阀混战，“国家���政府职能在武装集团的支持下维持运转。


Against this background, the stakes in Kenya’s fight against terrorism in and emanating from Somalia are high.	在这样的背景下，肯尼亚对索马里国内外恐怖主义的战斗兹事体大。


It is not a struggle that Kenya should wage alone.	我们不能让肯尼亚单枪匹马地战斗。


Small Countries’ Big Successes	小国的大成功


ZURICH – Scotland’s vote on independence from the United Kingdom has spurred widespread debate about the secession of small states, such as Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, or the independence drive today in Spain’s autonomous region of Catalonia.	苏黎世—苏格兰脱离英国独立的公投引起了关于小国分立（如1991年的斯洛文尼亚和克罗地亚）和如今西班牙加泰罗尼亚自治区背后的独立力量的广泛讨论。


But the narrow focus on the political and economic implications for Scotland and the UK – or, for that matter, the referendum’s decisive pro-union outcome – should not overshadow one of the more overlooked geopolitical trends of our time: the rise of small countries.	但不管是着眼于对苏格兰和英国的政治和经济影响的狭义讨论，还是（就此事件而言）公投的支持统一的决定性结果，都不应该阻碍我们体会现时代的一个被更多地忽视的地缘政治趋势：小国的崛起。


Roughly 75% of today’s small countries were formed in the last 70 years, mostly as a result of broader democratic transitions and in tandem with trade growth and globalization.	大约75%的现今小国是过去70年中形成的，其中大部分是范围更广的民主转型以及与之同时发生的贸易增长和全球化的结果。


Their successes and failures are more germane to current discussions than, say, the fiscal implications of Scottish independence.	它们的成败与当前的讨论议题的联系比（比如）苏格兰独立的财政影响更大。


The lessons to be learned from these cases are useful not only to new and potentially new small countries.	这些例子中所能几区的教训不仅仅对新的小国和潜在的新小国有用。


Relatively young small countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East can also benefit by examining the secrets of Singapore’s success, the causes and effects of Ireland’s property bubble, and Denmark’s decision to build strong counter-terrorism capabilities, despite its relative safety.	相对年轻的非洲、加拉比和中东国家也可以从考察新加坡成功的秘密、爱尔兰房地产泡沫的成因和影响、以及相对安全的丹麦也决定构建强大的反恐力量等活动中获益。


Indeed, such considerations can help them to chart a path to economic prosperity and social cohesion.	事实上，这样的思考能有助于它们找到经济繁荣和社会凝聚之路。


Of course, in learning from one another, countries must always be careful to avoid the “folly of imitation.”	当然，在相互学习中，各国必须时刻警惕“东施效颦”。


The Nordic countries, for example, have benefited significantly from deeply entrenched social, legal, and political characteristics that are not easy to transfer to their developing-country counterparts.	比如，北欧国家从根深蒂固的社会、法律和政治特征中获益良多，而这些特征很难转移给发展中国家。


Moreover, young small countries must recognize that building the institutions and economies to which they aspire will take time.	此外，年轻小国必须认识到，建立它们所渴望的制度和经济需要时间。


In fact, age may well be the most important factor in small-country performance, with per capita GDP in small countries that were established before 1945 some four times larger than in their newer counterparts.	事实上，对小国表现来说，年龄也许是最重要的因素，1945年前建立的小国人均GDP是此后建立的小国的四倍多。


More established small countries also lead the rankings in other metrics.	更老牌的小国在其他方面也往往居于领先地位。


For example, they occupy nearly half of the top 20 positions in the United Nations Human Development Index.	比如，它们在联合国人类发展指数（United Nations Human Development Index）前二十强中占据近一半江山。


In general, older small countries outstrip medium-size and large countries in terms of economic and social performance, openness to international trade, and enthusiasm for globalization – features that younger countries should work to promote.	总体而言，较老的小国在经济和社会表现、国家贸易开放程度以及对全球化的热情程度方���都要胜过中等和大型国家——这是较年轻国家所应该效仿的特征。


But small countries’ economic growth is often more volatile – a tendency that younger states must learn to contain if they are to prosper in the long term.	但小国的经济增长通常波动更大——如果较年轻国家想获得长期繁荣，就必须学习如何遏制这一趋势。


The question of “large” or “small” government is less relevant, despite the impression given by heated debates in large countries like the United States.	“大”政府还是“小”政府的问题重要性较低，尽管美国等大国在这一问题上争议重重给人们造成了这很重要的印象。


Overall government expenditure is only weakly correlated with the size of the government.	政府总支出与政府规模的相关性相当弱。


A better proxy would be public-sector salaries – the only area where large countries appear to benefit from economies of scale.	更好的指标是公共部门薪水——这也是大国唯一获得规模经济优势的领域。


Smaller countries spend more, as a percentage of GDP, on education and health care – another habit that new small countries would do well to uphold.	较小国家的教育和健康支出占GDP比重更大——这一倾向也是新小国应该很好地坚持的。


Indeed, there is a strong positive correlation between the pace of economic growth and “intangible infrastructure” – the combination of education, health care, technology, and the rule of law that promotes the development of human capital and enables businesses to grow efficiently.	事实上，经济增长速度和“无形基础设施”——促进人力资本发展、让企业得以高效成长的教育、医疗、技术和法治精神之间存在强正相关关系。


Small countries account for seven of the top ten countries for intangible infrastructure.	小国在无形基础设施排行榜十强中占据七席。


Add to that measures like the quality of institutions, suitability to thrive in a globalized world, stability of economic output, and level of human development, and one can generate a country strength index, in which 13 of the top 20 performers are small, with the most successful being Switzerland, Singapore, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway.	除此之外，再考虑制度质量、在全球化世界中繁荣的可持续性、经济产出的稳定性以及人力发展水平等指标，就可以形成一个国家优势指数，该指数前20名中有13个是小国，瑞士、新加坡、丹麦、爱尔兰和挪威更是跻身最成功的行列。


A cluster of larger countries is led by Australia, the Netherlands, and the UK.	澳大利亚、荷兰和英国则是大国中的佼佼者。


Other “resilient” small countries include Finland, Austria, Sweden, and New Zealand.	其他“坚韧”小国包括芬兰、奥地利、瑞典和新西兰。


To be sure, there is a clear “old European” bias here.	平心而论，在这里存在显而易见的“老欧洲”偏见。


Developing small states like Croatia, Oman, Kuwait, and Uruguay may consider exhortations to emulate countries like Switzerland and Norway to be impractical.	发展中小国，如克罗地亚、阿曼、科威特和乌拉圭，可以视为模仿瑞士和挪威而不得的反面例子。


But a useful set of priorities can be gleaned from their experiences.	但从它们的经验中可以总结出一套有用的优先事项。


Specifically, small developing countries should focus on building institutions, such as central banks and finance ministries, that explicitly seek to minimize the macroeconomic volatility associated with globalization.	具体而言，发展中小国应该专注于明确寻求将与全球化相关的宏观经济波动最小化的制度建设，如中央银行和财政部。


They should also advance the rule of law, develop strong and efficient public education and health-care systems, and encourage domestic industry to emphasize return, rather than cost of capital, as their guiding metric.	它们还应该推进法治精神、发展强大高效的公共教育和医疗体系、鼓励本国产业强调回报而非资本成本作为指导原则。


Beyond emulation, small countries can help one another through direct alliances.	除了模仿，效果还可以通过直接结盟彼此帮助。


Surprisingly, very few such alliances exist, with many small countries – especially developing ones – cultivating close ties with “big brother” countries or immersing themselves in regional federal structures.	令人惊讶的是，这样的联盟十分稀少，许多小国——特别是发展中小国——致力于培养与“老大哥”国家的关系或者加入地区联邦结构。


The risk, of course, is that their voices become drowned out by larger entities, impeding their ability to do what is best for their own citizens.	当然，这样做的风险在于它们往往国微言轻，不为大国所重视，这阻碍了它们为公民谋取最大利益的能力。


In a fast-changing geopolitical and economic environment – characterized by challenges like interest-rate rises spurred by high debt levels; competitive corporate-tax reductions; changing immigration patterns; and a possible slowdown in the pace of globalization – small countries must be able to identify and assess risks, and adjust their strategies accordingly.	在快速变化的地缘政治和经济环境中——充满了各种挑战，如高债务水平促使利率上升、竞争性公司税降低、移民模式变化、全球化节奏可能下降等——小国必须能够识别和评估风险，并相应调整战略。


Indeed, even without full independence, this is precisely what Scotland, which has been promised even greater autonomy within the UK than it already has, will have to do if it is to succeed.	事实上，即使没有完全独立，被承诺获得英国内部更大自治权的苏格兰如要获得成功也必须做到这些。


Politics-Proof Economies?	抗政治经济?


MILAN – Governments’ inability to act decisively to address their economies’ growth, employment, and distributional challenges has emerged as a major source of concern almost everywhere.	米兰—政府无法采取决定性的措施解决经济的增长、就业和分配问题已经成为各国的主要问题。


In the United States, in particular, political polarization, congressional gridlock, and irresponsible grandstanding have garnered much attention, with many worried about the economic consequences.	特别是美国，政治两极分化、国会僵局和不负责任的哗众取宠获得了大量的关注，许多人担心由此造成的经济后果。


But, as a recent analysis has shown, there is little correlation between a country’s relative economic performance in several dimensions and how “functional” its government is.	但是，一份最新分析表明，一国在某些方面的相对经济表现与其政府的“功能性”基本无关。


In fact, in the six years since the global financial crisis erupted, the US has outperformed advanced countries in terms of growth, unemployment, productivity, and unit labor costs, despite a record-high level of political polarization at the national level.	事实上，自全球金融危机爆发六年来，美国在增长、失业、生产率和单位劳动成本方面的表现都胜过其他发达国家，尽管其国内存在创纪录的政治两极分化程度。


Of course, one should not paint with too broad a brush.	当然，你不能做过多的引申。


Unemployment is lower in Germany, Canada, and Japan.	德国、加拿大和日本的失业率更低。


And America’s income distribution is more unequal than most advanced countries’ – and is trending the wrong way.	美国的收入分配也比大部分发达国家更不公平，并且发展趋势也十分不利。


Still, in terms of overall relative economic performance, the US clearly is not paying a high price for political dysfunction.	此外，从整体相对经济表现看，美国显然没有为政治功能失调付出沉重代价。


Without dismissing the potential value of more decisive policymaking, it seems clear that other factors must be at work.	不必忽略更果断地决策的潜在价值就可以看出，显然一定有其他因素在起作用。


Examining them holds important lessons for a wide range of countries.	考察这些因素对许多国家具有重要意义。


Our premise is that the global integration and economic growth of a wide range of developing countries has triggered a multi-decade process of profound change.	一个前提是全球一体化和许多发展中国家的经济增长开启了一个为期数十年、影响深远的变化过程。


These countries’ presence in the tradable sector of the global economy is affecting relative prices of goods and factors of production, including both labor and capital.	这些国家在全球经济可贸易部门的表现正在影响商品和生产要素（包括劳动力和资本）的相对价格。


At the same time, declining semi-conductor costs have encouraged the proliferation of information and communication technologies that are replacing labor, dis-intermediating supply chains, and reducing routine jobs and lower-value-added jobs on the tradable side in advanced economies.	与此同时，半导体价格的下跌助长了信息和通信技术的兴盛，从而取代了劳动力，促使供应链脱媒，并减少了发达经济体可贸易端的常规工作岗位和低附加值工作岗位。


These are secular trends that call for forward-looking assessments and long-term responses.	这些都是长期趋势，需要前瞻性评估和长期应对措施。


Relatively myopic policy frameworks may have worked reasonably well in the early postwar period, when the US was dominant, and when a group of structurally similar advanced countries accounted for the vast majority of global output.	相对短浅的政策框架在战后早期运转得相当好，在此期间，美国出于主导地位，结构类似的发达国家贡献了全球产出的绝大部分。


But they cease working well when sustaining growth requires behavioral and structural adaptation to rapid changes in comparative advantage and the value of various types of human capital.	但当持续增长需要在行为和结构上适应比较优势和各种人力资本价值的变化时，这套安排就不管用了。


What, then, accounts for the US economy’s relatively good performance in the post-crisis period?	那么，什么能够解释美国经济在危机后相对出色的表现？


The main factor is the American economy’s underlying structural flexibility.	主要因素是美国经济在结构上的灵活性。


Deleveraging has occurred faster than in other countries and, more important, resources and output have quickly shifted to the tradable sector to fill the gap created by persistently weak domestic demand.	去杠杆化比其他国家更快，更重要的是，资源和产出快速向可贸易部门倾斜，从而填补了内需持续低迷造成的缺口。


This suggests that, whatever the merit of government action, what governments do not do is also important.	这表明，不管政府行动取得了什么作用，政府不做什么也很重要。


Many countries have policies that protect sectors or jobs, thereby introducing structural rigidities.	许多国家都采取了保护经济部门或就业的措施，从而造成了结构刚性。


The cost of such policies rises with the need for structural change to sustain growth and employment (and to recover from unbalanced growth patterns and shocks).	这些政策的代价随着采取结构性变革以维持增长和就业（以及从失衡增长路径和冲击中复苏）的需要的增加而增加。


No country is frictionless in this regard, but there are substantial differences.	在这方面，没有哪个国家是无摩擦的，但国与国之间存在重大差异。


Relatively speaking, Germany, northern Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australian, New Zealand, and the US are relatively free of structural rigidities.	相对而言，德国、北欧、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰和美国的结构钢性相对较低。


Japan intends to get there.	日本也在往这方面努力。


Southern Europe has a substantial agenda of flexibility-enhancing reform ahead of it.	南欧在增强灵活性方面还有很长的路要走。


Removing structural rigidities is easier said than done.	打消结构钢性说起来容易做起来难。


Some stem from social-protection mechanisms, focused on jobs and sectors rather than individuals and families.	一些刚性来自社会保障机制，其关注点是就业和部门，而不是个体和家庭。


Others reflect policies that simply protect sectors from competition and generate rents and vested interests.	其他刚性反映了仅仅保护经济部门免于竞争并产生了经济租和既得利益的政策。


In short, resistance to reform can be substantial precisely because the results have distributional effects.	简言之，对改革的抵制很大，其因为就在于改革结果具有分配效应。


Such reform is not market fundamentalism.	这类改革不是市场原教旨主义。


The goal is not to privatize everything or to uphold the mistaken belief that unregulated markets are self-regulating.	改革目标不是私有化一切或者死抱不受监管的市场能够自我监管的错误观念不放。


On the contrary, government has a significant role in structural transitions.	相反，政府在结构转型中扮演着重要角色。


But it must also get out of the way.	但它必须把路让开。


Relative to the US, Europe has two sets of problems.	相对美国而言，欧洲有两类问题。


One is the need, especially in several southern European countries, to enhance structural flexibility and boost productivity.	其一是需要加强结构灵活性并提高生产率，特别是南欧国家。


In the euro’s first decade, the southern economies’ unit labor costs diverged from those in Germany and the north, with growth sustained either by excess public debt and the government component of domestic aggregate demand, or, in the case of Spain, by a leveraged housing bubble.	在欧元的第一个十年中，南欧经济体的单位劳动成本与德国和北欧拉开了差距，而它们的增长要么通过过度的公债和太高的政府占总内需比重维持，要么（如西班牙）通过房地产泡沫维持。


In the absence of the exchange-rate mechanism, resetting the system to allow the tradable sectors to generate growth involves painful relative deflation, a process that takes longer in a low-inflation environment.	在缺少汇率机制的情况下，重构经济体系、让可贸易部门成为增长引擎就必须采取痛苦的相对通缩，而在低通胀环境下这需要更长时间。


Second, the eurozone permits these divergences because policies that affect growth are decentralized.	其次，欧元区放任这些差距的发展，因为影响增长的政策是分散的。


The common currency and monetary policy are in constant tension with decentralized policymaking on taxation, public-sector investment, and social policies – all of which affect countries’ structural flexibility.	共同货币和货币政策与分散的税收、公共部门投资和社会政策决策之间存在永恒的矛盾，而后三者都会影响国家的结构灵活性。


Moreover, the single market is relatively complete in goods but not in services.	此外，单一市场在商品市场上相对比服务市场完全。


This is not a stable situation.	这不是稳定状态。


Europe eventually must gravitate either toward deeper political, fiscal, and policy integration, or toward a structure that includes adjustment mechanisms – for example, greater labor mobility – to accommodate divergences in productivity.	欧洲最终要么迈向更深层次的政治、财政和政策一体化，要么迈向包括适应生产率分化的调整机制——比如更大的劳动力流动性——在内的结构。


Many countries, not only in Europe, must undergo structural adjustment in order to achieve sustainable growth patterns.	许多国家（不仅是欧洲国家）必须经历结构调整以实现可持续增长路径。


All advanced economies’ structures and portfolios of employment opportunities are facing similar competitive and technological forces, and all are tending to shift income toward the upper end of the distribution and toward owners of capital.	所有发达经济体的结构和就业机会组合都面临着类似的竞争和技术约束，并都趋向于收入向分配的高端和资本所有者移动。


The cross-country differences in performance partly reflect past policy choices affecting the speed of adjustment.	国家间的表现差异部分反映了影响调整速度的过去的政策选择。


Initial conditions matter, and in this respect America’s policy framework seems to have ensured the US economy’s relatively higher resilience not only to the global crisis, but also to domestic political volatility.	初始条件很重要，在这方面，美国的政策框架似乎确保了美国经济拥有相对较高的恢复力，不仅在面临全球危机时如此，在面临国内政策动荡时亦然。


Structural flexibility is not the whole answer; higher levels of public-sector investment would also help to generate sustainable recovery, especially in the advanced countries.	结构灵活性不是答案的全部； 更高水平的公共部门投资也有助于产生可持续复苏，特别是在发达国家。


But, with severe fiscal constraints in many countries likely to delay that element of the policy response, flexibility-enhancing reforms are the right place to start.	但是，在许多国家，严重的财政约束有可能推迟这一政策反应要素，因此，加强灵活性的改革是正确的起点。


Europe’s Bargain	欧洲的交易


MILAN – In July, the European Commission published its sixth report on economic, social, and territorial cohesion (a term that can be roughly translated as equality and inclusiveness).	米兰—7月，欧盟委员会发布了第六期经济、社会和领土凝聚力（这个词可以大致解读为平等性和包容性）报告。


The report lays out a plan for substantial investment – €450 billion ($583 billion) from three European Union funds – from 2014 to 2020.	报告列出了一个巨大的2014—2020年投资计划——从欧盟三大基金筹资4,500亿欧元。


Given today’s difficult economic and fiscal conditions, where public-sector investment is likely to be crowded out in national budgets, this program represents a major commitment to growth-oriented public sector investment.	考虑到如今的经济和财政条件，公共部门投资极有可能在国家预算中被挤出，该计划代表了增长导向型公共部门投资的重大承诺。


The EU’s cohesion strategy is admirable and smart.	欧盟的凝聚力战略值得追求，也十分明智。


Whereas such investment in the past was heavily tilted toward physical infrastructure – particularly transport – the agenda has shifted to a more balanced set of targets, including human capital, employment, the economy’s knowledge and technology base, information technology, low-carbon growth, and governance.	在过去，大量类似的投资被投入到实体基础设施——特别是交通设施——而如今，该日程已转变为更加平衡的目标组合，包括人力资本、就业、经济的知识和技术基础、信息技术、低碳增长以及治理等。


That said, one can ask what the economic and social returns on these investments will be.	因此，我们要问，这些投资的经济和社会回报如何。


True, sustaining high growth rates requires sustaining high levels of public investment, which increases the return to (and hence the levels of) private investment, in turn elevating output and employment.	诚然，维持高增长率需要维持高公共投资水平，这样才能增加私人投资（以及公共投资本身）的回报，反过来提振产出和就业。


But public investment is only one component of successful growth strategies.	但公共投资只是成功的增长战略的一部分。


It will do some good in all scenarios, but its impact will be much larger beyond the short term if other binding constraints are removed.	不论何种情形，公共投资都能带来一些好处，但如果能解决掉其他约束条件，它的影响将远远不止于短期。


Three complementary issues seem crucial.	三个补充性问题十分关键。


One, mainly the province of the European Central Bank, involves price stability and the value of the euro.	第一个问题主要与欧洲央行有关，包括价格稳定和欧元的价值。 第二个问题是财政问题。


The second is fiscal, and the third is structural.	第三个问题是结构性问题。


Inflation rates, now well below the ECB’s 2% annual target, are in the deflationary danger zone.	如今，通货膨胀率远远低于欧洲央行2%的年度目标，处于通缩危险区间。


Because deflation drives up the real burden of sovereign debt and public non-debt liabilities such as pension systems, its emergence would undermine the already fragile state of many countries’ public finances and kill growth.	由于通缩会抬高主权债务（debt）和养老金等非债务责任（liability）的真实负担，它的出现将破坏许多国家已经相当脆弱的公共财政状况并扼杀增长。


In a post-crisis environment of aggressive and unconventional monetary policy in other advanced countries, the ECB’s less aggressive policies (owing to its more restrictive mandate) have resulted in an exchange rate that has damaged competitiveness and the growth potential of many eurozone economies’ tradable sectors.	危机以来，其他发达国家纷纷采取了积极的非常规货币政策，在这样的背景下，欧洲央行积极性不足的政策（因其权力受限更大）已经导致了汇率过高，危害了竞争力，也制约了许多欧元区经济体可贸易部门的增长潜力。


This is crucial, because most economies experienced pre-crisis growth patterns characterized by unsustainably high levels of domestic aggregate demand.	这一点十分关键，因为大部分经济体危机前的增长模式都有一个特征：总内需达到了不可持续的高水平。


So rebalancing requires shifting toward the tradable sector and external demand.	因此，再平衡需要向可贸易部门和外需的转变。


A weakening euro will help.	贬值的欧元将有所助益。


The ECB understands this, and, without being explicit about it, is expanding its asset-purchase programs to elevate inflation and bring down the euro.	欧洲央行知道这一点，尽管没有明说，也正在扩张其资产购买计划以推高通胀、拉低欧元。


ECB President Mario Draghi has been clear that restoring target inflation and weakening the currency is not a growth strategy.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉一直清楚，重塑目标通胀和贬值货币不是增长战略。


Difficult reforms are needed to put many national economies’ fiscal affairs in order and to increase their structural flexibility.	需要艰难的改革才能让众多国家的财政恢复秩序并增加它们的结构灵活度。


The ECB cannot do it alone.	欧洲央行无法独力实现这一目标。


On the fiscal side, sovereign-debt levels are too high and still rising.	在财政方面，主权债务水平已经过高并且仍在增长。


But the bigger challenge is the unfunded non-debt liabilities in pension funds and social-security systems, which are estimated to be four times or more the size of sovereign debt.	但更大的挑战是资金不足的非债务责任，如养老金和社会保障体系，据估计，它们的规模是主权债务的四倍或以上。


It is clearly necessary to implement credible plans to arrest the growth of these liabilities.	显然，实施阻止这些责任增加的可信计划是必不可少的。


But these liabilities also have to be reduced, because they are already imposing a crushing fiscal burden, largely owing to rapid aging, with rising longevity a major contributor.	但这些责任还必须下降，因为它们已经为财政造成了不堪承受的负担，主要原因在于快速的老龄化（其中寿命延长是主要推动力）。


The US has a similar problem, though it is more distant.	美国也存在类似的问题，尽管没有欧洲那么紧迫。


A recent analysis for the US suggests that entitlements programs’ liabilities will hit the public budgets in about ten years.	最新分析表明，美国福利计划的责任将在大约十年后达到与公共预算持平的水平。


By contrast, in Italy, for example, with its less favorable demographics, they have already hit.	相反，在（比如）人口结构更加不利意大利，福利计划责任现在就达到了与公共预算持平的水平。


Growth would reduce this burden, but growth in the short and medium term is highly problematic.	增长能减轻这一负担，但短期和中期增长是很有问题的。


Inflation would reduce the real value of both debt and other non-indexed non-debt liabilities.	通胀将减少债务和其他非指数化非债务责任的真实价值。


But even controlled inflation at higher levels has been ruled out; again, the current risk is deflation.	但即使是有控制的更高通胀水平也已被排除； 现在的风险是通缩。


Governments could raise taxes to cover a larger fraction of the required expenditures.	政府可以用增税来覆盖所需支出的更大比例。