Tempers are rising in both Russia and Europe, yet, paradoxically, when it comes to the major challenges they face, their interests are largely identical.	俄国和欧洲的火气都在上升，但是奇怪的是，在它们所面临的主要挑战上其利益又大体相同。


Both are threatened by Islamic extremism and growing unrest.	双方都受到伊斯兰极端主义和日益上升的动乱的威胁。


Both have much to lose if the Middle East erupts into fresh violence.	如果中东爆发新的暴力，双方都会有大的损失。


And both face serious demographic problems, given shrinking and aging populations, as well as the challenge of Asia’s rising superpowers.	而且，由于人口老化和减少以及亚洲正在崛起的超级大国的     挑战，双方都面临严重的人口问题。


The breakdown in relations has been gradual and undramatic – more a morose and resentful refusal to see each other’s point of view than a succession of rows.	双边关系的破裂是渐进而非剧烈的，更多的是不断吵架，郁闷和仇恨地拒绝审视对方观点。


This owes much to the humiliations that Russia suffered when the end of communism forced its economy to its knees, and to Western short-sightedness about Russia’s fundamental strengths and resilience.	这主要是由于共产主义结束迫使其经济瘫痪而使俄国遭受屈辱，以及西方对于俄国的基本力量和韧性没有长远眼光。


The EU is as much to blame as the Kremlin.	欧盟的责任和克里姆林宫一样大。


In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither EU nor European national policymakers have devised a coherent strategy setting out the relationship that Europe wants with the Russian Federation.	苏联解体以来的几年来，欧盟和欧洲各国决策者都没有制定一个规划欧洲谋求的与俄罗斯联邦关系的一贯战略。


Today, it is more important than ever that the EU, which now includes not only former Soviet satellites but countries that were part of the USSR, should create a strategic policy framework.	欧盟现在不仅包括前苏联卫星国家，而且也包括几个前苏联加盟共和国。 如今，欧盟应该建立一个战略政策框架。


This reflects not only worries about energy and shared security concerns, but also the need to head off any looming crisis in the Middle East that could plunge large parts of the world into turmoil, if not armed conflict.	这不仅反映出有关能源以及共同的安全担忧，而且反映出需要防止在中东出现滚滚欲来的危机。 这些危机即使把世界很多地方陷于武装冲突，也会把令其陷于动乱。


There, and in the volatile Caucasus, a significant improvement in Europe’s relations with Russia is crucial to defusing tensions.	在那里以及动荡的高加索地区，欧洲与俄国明显改善关系对于缓解紧张局势十分关键。


For its part, Europe needs to mount a charm offensive to persuade Putin and Medvedev that Russia’s real interest is in improving bilateral relations.	在欧洲方面，它需要展开魅力攻势来劝说普京和梅德韦捷夫，表明俄国的切实利益是改善双边关系。


Russia needs to collaborate on energy in ways that bring genuine security.	俄国需要在能源问题上合作，其方式应当带来实际的安全。


In the Middle East, it needs to persuade Iran to hold in check the military elements of the nuclear program that Russia has made possible.	在中东问题上，它需要劝说伊朗停止其核子项目的军事成分，而正是俄国促成了这些成分。


None of this will be easy, not only because Europe’s relationship with Russia has grown so chilly, but also because Putin is understood to despise the EU as politically impotent.	所有这些都不会轻而易举。 这不仅是因为欧洲和俄国的关系变得如此冷淡，而且是由于人们觉得普京认为欧盟在政治上无足轻重。


Russian leaders may have misinterpreted as a sign of weakness Europe’s representation at last month’s EU-Russia summit by two Portuguese politicians – European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso and Prime Minister Jose Socrates, whose government currently holds the revolving EU presidency.	上个月的欧盟俄国首脑会议上两位葡萄牙政坛人物即欧盟委员会主席巴罗索和欧盟轮值主席国葡萄牙总理苏格拉底代表欧盟出席。 俄国领导人将此误解为软弱的迹象。


Most telling in Russian eyes has been EU countries’ competition for oil and gas contracts, which has done much to convince the Kremlin that Europe is not a political force to be reckoned with.	在俄国眼中最为明显的莫过于欧盟各国竞相争取石油和天然气合同，这就让克里姆林宫确信欧洲并不是一个值得重视的政治力量。


On the European side, engineering a new spirit of détente will be tough.	在欧洲方面，建立一个新的缓和精神是困难的。


There is widespread disapproval of Putin’s autocratic style and of his government’s human rights record.	很多人对普京的独裁风格以及俄国政府的人权记录不满。


Extending an olive branch to Russia will have little or no voter appeal in most EU countries, and Putin’s efforts to retain power de facto if not de jure after Medvedev wins his likely victory next March are certain to make matters worse.	向俄国伸出橄榄枝对于大多数欧盟国家的选民并没有什么吸引力，而明年三月选举梅德韦捷夫稳操胜券后，普京即使不是在法律上也会在事实上握住权力不放也肯定让形势更加不妙。


The question, therefore, is whether Europe and Russia can establish a new framework for talking to one another.	因此，问题就是欧洲和俄国可以建立一个新的对话框架。


There are plenty of well-worn diplomatic paths, so it’s not structures that are lacking.	有许多众所周知的外交途径，因此并不缺乏框架。


What’s needed is a more positive frame of mind, and specific ideas about what to do.	现在所需要的是更为积极的心态以及行动的具体想法。


Europe’s Scientific Meltdown	欧洲的科研危机


After World War II, most Europeans agreed that scientific research would not only boost their economies, but also deliver greater technological autonomy from the United States and act as a catalyst for social change.	二战之后，大多欧洲人都一致认为科学研究不仅能够促进他们的经济发展，还能提升他们相对于美国的技术自治并对社会变革起到催化作用。


The British Royal Society advocated creating the German Max Planck Society on the ground that solidarity between international scientific communities could contribute to reconciling former enemies.	基于国际科学界之间的团结能够有助于改善前敌国之间的关系的认识，英国皇家科学院大力倡导创立德国马普学会（German Max Planck Society）。


As a result, big projects such as the European Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN), the European Space Agency (ESA), and the European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO), were founded to help unite European research efforts in basic science.	由此，旨在联合欧洲基础科研工作的大型项目，如欧洲核研究机构(CERN)、欧洲宇航局(ESA)和欧洲分子生物学组织(EMBO)才得以成立。


Today, however, European science is declining in almost all countries (Sweden, Finland, and Iceland are exceptions), wasting existing talent and losing attractiveness for young people.	而当今，科学研究却在几乎所有的欧洲国家（瑞典、芬兰和冰岛除外）呈衰退之势。 现有人才被浪费，对年轻人的吸引力不断丧失。


On average, a young European scientist working in the US receives 2.5 times more research support than in Europe.	平均而言，一位在美国工作的年轻欧洲科学家所得到的研究支持是在欧洲的2. 5倍。


No surprise, then, that a brain drain has developed.	因此，在欧洲形成人才流失的局面也就不足为奇了。


Indeed, Europe has only five scientific researchers per 1000 inhabitants, compared to eight in the US and nine in Japan.	的确，相较于美国的8名和日本的9名，欧洲每千人中的科研人员仅5名。


Despite its strong scientific tradition, figures for Central Europe are even worse, and the cost of EU integration is likely to further shift priorities away from science and education.	尽管有着深厚的科研传统，这一数字在中欧则更为严峻。 欧盟一体化的成本还可能会进一步将发展重点从科学和教育方面转移开去。


Shrinking budgets are also damaging established scientists.	日益压缩的预算也令资深科学家们举步维艰。


In the life sciences, for example, foundations find it hard to identify high-level Europeans for awards.	例如，在生命科学领域，基金会们发现寻找高层次的欧洲科研人员颁发奖金成为难题。


This is not due to lower scientific quality, but to the higher levels of sustained support available to American group leaders to transform new ideas into discoveries.	这倒不是因为科研水平的下降，而是因为高水准的可持续支持使美国科研机构的领导者们更能将新的理念转化为科学发现。


Massive military and health investments by the US government have generated a critical mass of research, which in turn attracts private funding – including from European companies, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry.	美国政府在军事和卫生领域的巨额投入引发了关键性的科研，这些科研工作又进一步吸引了民间资金—包括来自欧洲的公司，特别是制药公司的资金。


Something similar can and does work in Europe.	同样的情形能够，也正在欧洲发生。


In Finland, for example, ten years of sustained public funding is now catalyzing private investments and fueling regular increases in R&D budgets.	例如在芬兰，十年以来的可持续性公共基金支持正对私人投资产生催化作用，从而促成了研发预算的规律性增长。


Edith Cresson, a former European Commissioner for Research, once said that, “funding directly nanotechnologies would have been more rewarding than creating CERN.”	伊迪斯·克里森（Edith Cresson），前欧盟研究专员曾表示：“直接资助纳米技术的研究本可以比创建CERN更有成效。


She was wrong: the complexity of modern science does not allow anyone, least of all bureaucrats, to predict where innovation will emerge.	”她错了：现代科学的复杂性不允许任何人，更不允许官僚们对科学创新将会出现的领域进行预测。


Public funding of basic research  and industrial investments are both needed to achieve long-term technological development.	对基础研究的公共基金支持和行业投资都是实现长期的技术发展所必需的。


Although most national funding agencies lack imagination when it comes to European cooperation, several institutions are aware of Europe’s deteriorating research and the handicaps European scientists face in competition with those in the US and Japan (and also, increasingly, India and China).	虽然绝大多数的国家拨款机构在欧洲合作的问题上都缺乏想象力，仍有少数几家意识到了欧洲不断恶化的科研形势和欧洲科学家们在面对美、日同僚（还有日益来自印度和中国）的竞争中的劣势。


At a meeting organized for November 2005 by the Collège de France, Nobel laureates, science historians, and managers of European universities and research facilities will stress the need for a new science policy, including in the social sciences and humanities, in the presence of ministers and European commissioners.	在法兰西学院组织的一次将于2005年11月召开的会议上，诺贝尔奖得主、科学史专家和欧洲大学及研究机构的管理者们会在各国部长和欧盟专员出席的情况下强调包括在社会和人文科学领域的新的科研政策的必要性。


Euroscience and the European Science Foundation have also made suggestions aimed at shoring up political will:	Euroscience和欧洲科学基金会也提出了相关建议以增强政治意愿：


·  Establish a European Research Council. This initiative, originally presented by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the magazine  Nature , proposes to create a pan-European funding agency to organize international competition in “hard” and “soft” basic science.	这一动议起初是由德国研究联合会和《自然》杂志提出。 其主要内容是创建一个泛欧洲的拨款机构来组织“硬”、“软”基础科研方面的国际竞争。


Most national research organizations and the European Commission support the idea, but questions persist: who will provide the budget (at least €2 billion is needed, which is roughly half of the increase promised by EU governments to raise R&D to 3% of the GNP in 2010)?	大多数国家科研组织和欧盟委员会都支持这一建议，但还有一些悬而未决的问题：谁来提供预算经费（该计划至少需要200亿欧元，约占欧盟各国政府所承诺的到2010年将科研投入提高到国民生产总值的3%这一总额的一半）？


What mechanisms will ensure the Council’s autonomy, a key condition for basing research awards strictly on scientific quality?	什么样的机制才能确保该理事会的独立性—严格按照科研质量来决定经费划拨的关键条件？


·  Implement general European training schemes. Large facilities have trained a few generations of genuinely European scientists.	u  实施普遍的欧洲培训计划 。 大型的科研设施已经培训出了几代真正的欧洲科学家。


But they cover only a small range of scientific disciplines; in most others, education is still overwhelmingly national.	但它们只涵盖了为数不多的学科； 在大多数其它学科，教育仍然是以国家范畴为主导。


The Bologne protocol, which aims at harmonizing university training throughout Europe, could prove useful here.	旨在协调全欧洲大学培训的《波伦亚协议》在这方面应该有用武之地了。


In parallel, European post-doctoral schemes need reappraisal.	同时，欧洲的博士后计划也需要重新审定。


In the US, such schemes contribute to widespread dissemination of expertise, whereas European laboratories still use them as waiting lines without putting enough emphasis on multinational and multidisciplinary trajectories.	在美国，这样的计划对科技专长的广泛传播做出了贡献，而欧洲的各个实验室却仍然将其作为一种后备手段而没有纳入到多国和多学科的重点轨道上来。


·  Give appropriate recognition, salaries, and autonomy to young scientists. Unfortunately, young scientists are largely viewed as a source of cheap manpower, deterring the best students from embracing scientific careers.	u  给予年轻科学家适当的认可、薪酬和自主性 。 不幸的是年轻科学家在很大程度上仍然被看作是廉价人力的来源，从而使最优秀的学生对科研生涯望而却步。


The new Charter of Scientists now under discussion in the European Commission should improve the situation, by making flexible career tracks compatible with transferable social benefits.	正在欧盟委员会审议当中的新《科学家宪章》应该通过提供与可转移的社会福利相匹配的灵活的职业发展轨道来改善这一情况。


Europe needs proactive policies to meet the challenges of new research needs – and to take advantage of subsequent job opportunities – in areas like sustainable development, climate change, natural hazards, and public health.	欧洲需要前瞻性的政策来应对可持续发展、气候变化、自然灾害和公共卫生等领域的新科研需求的挑战，并充分利用随之而来的就业机会。


Creating an international pool of expertise could become an important asset for European universities, while enabling European industries to create new jobs.	建立一个国际性的科技资源库在为欧洲的各大产业创造新的就业机会的同时也能成为欧洲大学的一笔重要资产。


Europe’s science policies should also frame a new deal for developing countries.	欧洲的科研政策也应该为发展中国家的利益着想。


Today, scientific relations between developed and developing countries are unequal; important genetic discoveries based on Third World diseases provide neither appropriate credit to local scientists nor fair returns to the populations that made them possible.	当今，发达国家和发展中国家间的科研关系是不平等的； 以第三世界国家的疾病为基础的重要遗传学发现中既没有合理体现当地科学家的功劳，也没有给予使其成为可能的当地民众公平的回报。


Moreover, the North-South gap in public health is a major threat to the future of mankind.	再者，公共卫生领域的南北差距也是对未来人类的一个主要威胁。


Europe should seek to make science more user-friendly, both to its own researchers and would-be scientists and those in developing countries.	欧洲应致力于使科学研究更加使用者友好，这既是针对其自己的科研人员和科研后备军也是针对发展中国家的科研人员。


Let us hope that Europe’s politicians have the foresight to meet these challenges before European science becomes irreversibly marginalized.	让我们祈望欧洲的政治家们能有远见卓识，在欧洲科研不可逆转的边缘化以前就应对这些挑战。


Europe’s Second Chance in the Balkans	欧洲在巴尔干的第二次机会


Confronting the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, former EU Council President Jacques Poos made his famous but now derided statement: “This is the hour of Europe… not the hour of the Americans.”	欧盟委员会前任主席珀斯在1991年面临南斯拉夫解体的时候曾经发表现在受到嘲笑的著名声明。 他说：“这是欧洲的时刻，而不是美国人的时刻。


What the EU learned from the subsequent four years of Balkan disasters under its management is now being tested by another major turning point and potential crisis – when and how Kosovo is to become independent.	”现在，另一重大转折点和潜在的危机正在考验欧盟从随后四年管理巴尔干灾难中所学到的东西。 这也就是科索沃在何时以何种方式独立。


Once again, Europe’s role may well prove decisive.	欧洲的作用将再一次被证明是决定性的。


The decision on Kosovo may not imply the prospect of renewed large-scale conflict, but it does raise serious questions for Europe’s relations with Russia and the United States, as well as for stability throughout the Balkans.	有关科索沃的决定并不一定预示着重新开始大规模的冲突，但是这却针对欧洲与俄国和美国的关系以及整个巴尔干的稳定提出了严肃的问题。


While the US has a major stake in the outcome, EU countries obviously have the most significant interests in the region, and perhaps this time they will assume a corresponding leadership role.	其结果对于美国而言息息相关，而欧盟国家明显地在该地区有着最为重大的利益，而且这一次它们可能会发挥相应的领导作用。


For at least the next two months, the United Nations Security Council will debate a blueprint for Kosovo’s future, arduously worked out during a year of “negotiations” between the governments in Belgrade and Pristina by UN envoy and former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari.	在未来至少两个月中，联合国安理会将会就有关科索沃的蓝图举行辩论。 贝尔格莱德和普里斯蒂纳政府之间经由联合国特使、芬兰前总统阿赫蒂萨里经过一年时间的艰苦“谈判”方才打成了这一蓝图。


The bluebrint provides for Kosovo’s “supervised independence,” maximum protection for Serb and other minorities, and a supervisory role for the EU.	这一蓝图规定了科索沃“受到监督的独立”、对塞尔维亚和其他少数民族语以最大程度的保护以及欧盟发挥监督作用。


Ahtisaari’s proposal is an acknowledgement that no agreement between the parties is possible, and that there is no constructive alternative to Kosovo’s independence.	阿赫蒂萨里的建议实际上承认有关各方的协议是无法达成的，而且对于科索沃独立没有其他建设性的选择。


Together with the US, the EU collectively has rallied around the Ahtisaari proposal.	欧盟同美国一道共同支持阿赫蒂萨里的建议。


But individually, a number of European countries – Spain, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Austria – are skeptical or negative toward Kosovo independence, which raises profound questions about the EU’s resolve.	但是就个别国家而言，即西班牙、希腊、意大利、塞浦路斯、罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克以及奥地利等几个国家对于科索沃独立表示怀疑或者反对。 这一情况就对欧盟的决心提出了深刻疑问。


Meanwhile, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica is waging a tireless and remarkably effective diplomatic campaign denouncing both Ahtisaari and his proposal.	与此同时，塞尔维亚总理科什图尼察正在发动一场不知疲倦而又十分有效的外交战役，指责阿赫蒂萨里及其建议。


He has strengthened the position of many in Europe and elsewhere who are skeptical of challenging a country’s territorial integrity or who still claim to believe in a negotiated settlement.	他已经加强了欧洲和其他地方许多人的立场，这些人对否定国家领土完整表示怀疑，或者依旧宣称相信可以谈判解决问题。


More worrisome is the current uncertainty about whether a shaky Europe will stand up to Russia, upon which Serbia depends to maintain sovereignty over Kosovo.	更加令人担心的是，欧洲摇摆不定，能否在俄国面前坚持立场目前还不得而知，而塞尔维亚则依赖俄国维持对科索沃的主权。


So far, the Kremlin has resolutely stated that it will accept only a settlement agreed to by both parties, in effect endorsing Serbia’s position.	目前为止，克里姆林宫坚定地表示，它只会接受双方都同意的解决方案，这样实际上是在支持塞尔维亚的立场。


While conveying the possibility of a veto, Russia’s current strategy is to delay a Security Council vote as long as possible by prompting a new fact-finding mission to Kosovo, which will most likely be followed by renewed insistence on another effort to negotiate a settlement.	俄国一方面表示有可能行使否决权，另一方面，其当前的战略是通过促成组织一个新的前往科索沃的真相调查团来尽可能地拖延安理会表决，几乎随之而来的将会是重新坚持再一次谈判解决问题。


Serbia welcomes delay in the hope that this will stimulate violence by frustrated Kosovars, thereby increasing Europe’s opposition to independence and bolstering Serbia’s dedication to maintaining the status quo, or, as a last resort, to partitioning Kosovo.	塞尔维亚欢迎拖延，希望这将会激发受挫的科索沃人的暴力，从而增强欧洲反对独立的立场，巩固塞尔维亚维持现状，或者作为最后手段分割科索沃的坚定立场。


Some European countries apparently believe that they can maintain an EU consensus in support of Ahtisaari’s plan but allow Russian foot-dragging on the grounds that delay is not unreasonable and something better may turn up with additional negotiations.	某些欧洲国家显然相信它们可以维持欧盟的共识，支持阿赫蒂萨里计划，但是却允许俄国拖延，其理由是拖延并非没有道理以及附加谈判中或许可以出现某些更好的东西。


But, by adopting such a stance, they thwart their own envoy and may well stimulate the violence they profess to abhor.	但是，通过采取这一立场，这些国家阻碍了其自身的特使，并且很有可能激化它们所痛恨的暴力。


History offers little consolation.	历史并不令人安慰。


The EU’s handling of relations with Serbia in the past only encouraged intransigence.	欧盟过去处理与塞尔维亚的关系只会助长不妥协。


Instead of repeatedly making clear that Kosovo independence is an indispensable requirement for EU membership – so important to Serbia’s modernization and Balkan stability – EU leaders like Javier Solana laud Kostunica as a great democratic leader.	欧盟成员国资格对与塞尔维亚的现代化和巴尔干稳定极为重要。 欧盟领导人例如索拉纳不仅没有反复表明科索沃的独立是其入盟不可缺少的条件，相反却称赞科什图尼察为杰出的民主领导人。


They relentlessly but unsuccessfully pressured Montenegro’s leaders to remain in a dysfunctional union with Serbia, condoned Kostunica’s dubious 2006 referendum on a new constitution enshrining Kosovo as a part of Serbia, and weakened demands for Serbia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.	他们不遗余力地迫使黑山领导人留在机能不良的与塞尔维亚的联盟内但却没有成功，宽恕了科什图尼察令人怀疑的2006年将科索沃确定为塞尔维亚一部分的新宪法全民公决，并削弱了要求塞尔维亚与海牙国际刑事法庭的合作。


Realizing Ahtisaari’s proposal will depend on EU solidarity and persistence, coupled with strong American support, to manage the vicissitudes of UN debate, lobby skeptical non-permanent Security Council members, such as Indonesia and South Africa, and persuade Russia to abstain rather than exercise its veto.	认识到阿赫蒂塞利的建议将会取决于欧盟的团结和坚持，以及美国的坚决支持，处理联合国辩论变化无常，游说持怀疑态度的安理会非常任理事国像印尼和南非，并且劝说俄国弃权而不是行使否决权。


Many believe that Russia will not risk its relations with Europe and the US, ultimately abstaining if Western countries hold firm.	许多人相信俄国不会冒损坏其与欧洲和美国关系的风险，如果欧洲国家立场坚定则会最终会弃权。


But Russia appears to be in a Gaullist mood, and has other outstanding issues causing friction with the US and Europe.	但是俄国好像处于戴高乐主义情绪之中，还有其他造成与美国和欧洲摩擦的突出事件。


Putin’s Russia is not Yeltsin’s Russia, when the West could simply shunt aside Russian concerns.	普京的俄国不是叶利钦的俄国，那时西方国家可以干脆对于俄国的担忧置之不理。


Europe is vulnerable on many fronts, particularly in view of its dependence on Russian energy, while America’s weakened presidency has diminished US influence in Russia.	欧洲在许多方面都有弱点，特别是鉴于其依赖俄国的能源，而美国总统权威受到削弱，降低了其在俄国的影响。


If Russia does veto the Ahtisaari plan, the EU’s united facade will likely fracture, with many European countries refusing either to join the US in recognizing an independent Kosovo without the UN’s blessing or to send a supervisory mission there.	如果俄国果真否决阿赫蒂萨里的计划，欧盟联合的门面就会破裂，众多欧洲国家将会拒绝在没有联合国认可或者向该地派遣监督团的情况下跟随美国承认独立的科索沃。


That would open a new and tumultuous era in the Balkans, with more than Kosovo at stake.	那将会在巴尔干地区开启一个新的动荡时代，与其攸关的不仅仅是科索沃。


Indeed, with the UN and the Western alliance in disarray, the region could fall victim to further Russian policy mischief.	实际上，由于美国和西方联盟遭到破坏，这一地区有可能成为俄国进一步政策恶作剧的牺牲品。


Europe’s Shaky Foundations	欧洲基石堪忧


BERLIN – Slowly, word is getting round – even in Germany – that the financial crisis could destroy the European unification project in its entirety, because it demonstrates, quite relentlessly, the weaknesses of the eurozone and its construction.	柏林——慢慢地，人们开始认为（即使德国人也是如此），金融危机可能破坏欧洲统一前景，因为这场危机残酷地显示了欧元区及其基础的脆弱性。


Those weaknesses are less financial or economic than political.	这些脆弱性与其说是金融或经济上的，不如说是政治上的。


The Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union, but the political union that is an indispensable precondition for the common currency’s success remained a mere promise.	马斯特里赫特条约诞生了一个货币联盟，但共同货币之成功必不可少的先决条件——政治联盟至今仍留在空谈阶段。


The euro, and the countries that adopted it, are now paying the price.	欧元以及采用欧元的国家如今正在为此付出代价。


The eurozone now rests on the shaky basis of a confederation of states that are committed both to a monetary union and to retaining their fiscal sovereignty.	欧元区如今的基础是不稳定的国家联盟，这些国家使用共同货币，但各自保留了财政主权。


At a time of crisis, that cannot work.	当危机来袭时，这种机制根本无法运转。


At the beginning of the crisis, in 2007-2008, the eurozone’s fundamental flaws could have been corrected had Germany been willing to support a joint European crisis response.	2007—2008年危机开始时，如果德国愿意支持联合欧洲危机应对机制，那么欧元区的基本漏洞可能已经弥补上了。


But German officials preferred to maintain national primacy – and thus a confederational approach to Europe.	但德国官员更愿意将国家利益置于首位，他们只把欧洲看成是国家联盟。


Throughout history, confederations have never really worked, because the question of sovereignty (and thus of power and legitimacy) remains unresolved.	纵观历史，国家联盟从来没有成功过，因为主权问题（以及随之而来的权力和立法问题）没有得到解决。


The United States is a case in point.	在这一点上，美国是个很好的例子。


After winning independence, the American colonies united loosely under the Articles of Confederation.	赢得独立战争后，美国各殖民地在十三州宪法下组成了一个松散联邦。


But that arrangement failed financially and economically, and the US soon moved towards a full federation.	但这一安排从财政和经济上破了产，不久，美国转型为完全的联邦。


Today, Europe – or, more precisely, the eurozone – faces an almost identical situation, except that the historical conditions for further integration are much more complex and difficult than they were in post-independence America.	如今，欧洲——或更确切地说，是欧元区——面临着几乎一样的情景，唯一的不同点是，欧洲进一步一体化的历史条件比独立后的美国更复杂，也更困难。


Europe has three choices.	欧洲有三个选择。


Muddling through as before would only escalate and prolong the crisis.	如往常一样得过且过只能加剧和延长危机。


Ending the monetary union would end the European project itself, and wreak unmanageable havoc.	结束货币联盟会把欧洲一体化大计一起结束，还会引起不可收拾的混乱。


Finally, Europe could move forward to real economic and political integration – a step that today’s leaders lack the confidence to take, because they don’t believe that they have the necessary public support at home.	最后，欧洲还可以知难而进，实现真正的经济和政治一体化——但如今的领导人缺乏迈出这一步的信心，因为他们认为不可能得到足够的国内公众支持。


Much, therefore, speaks for starting with a combination of the first and second options.	于是，将第一种和第二种选择相结合之声四起。


Then, once the European project is halfway over the cliff, the federalist moment might arrive.	而当欧洲一体化进程走向终结之日，也许就是联邦时刻到来之时。


But the operative word is “might”: a headlong plunge into the abyss might prove equally likely.	但这里的关键词是“也许”：彻底分裂也是一种“也许”，而且可能性不比迈向联邦低。


Europe’s do-nothing approach to the crisis has already produced visibly adverse consequences.	欧洲对危机所采取的不作为态度已经造成了看得见的不良后果。


Elected officials’ passivity has stoked popular mistrust, which now threatens the European project.	当选官员消极行事已经引起了公众不信任，如今这种不信任已威胁到欧洲一体化前景。


Indeed, the crisis is beginning to erode the very foundations – the Franco-German and transatlantic partnerships – of a post-war European order that has ensured a period of peace and prosperity without precedent in the history of the continent.	事实上，危机正在侵蚀欧洲一体化的基石——法德合作伙伴关系和跨大西洋合作伙伴关系。 二战以来，这一秩序保证了欧洲大陆没有重蹈历史覆辙，实现了长时间的和平与繁荣。


Financial-market pressure has now reached France, and poses a danger that is far from over.	金融市场压力如今已经威胁到了法国，且其危险还远未消除。


If France is brought to its knees and Germany doesn’t stand by its partner unwaveringly and with everything that it has to offer, the European catastrophe will be complete.	如果法国倒下，而德国又不愿毫不犹豫地倾其所有力挺合作伙伴，那么欧洲就将陷入完全崩溃。


And that could happen sooner rather than later: France cannot and will not give up on the Mediterranean region, so the exit fantasies entertained by rich northern Europeans (Germans, above all) endanger the Franco-German pillar of European peace.	而这一幕迟早要发生：法国不能也不愿放弃地中海地区，因此由北欧国家（以德国为首）提出的退出机制将动摇法国-德国这一欧洲和平支柱。


Across the Atlantic, America’s fiscal crisis and weak economic growth will force it to reduce its global military commitments.	在大西洋彼岸，美国的财政危机和疲软的经济增长将迫使它削减全球军力。


Moreover, the US will orient itself increasingly towards the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.	此外，美国也将更多地采取太平洋而不是大西洋导向。


For Europeans, with our turbulent eastern and southern neighborhoods, this presents an additional security challenge for which we are materially and intellectually unprepared.	对欧洲人来说，我们的东方和南方邻居都不太安生。 这意味着我们将面临从物质到精神都未做好充分准备的新的安全挑战。


Even today, Europe’s military weakness is working to undermine the transatlantic relationship.	即使在今天，欧洲在军事上的弱势仍然是跨大西洋关系的软肋。


An additional threat to the transatlantic alliance arises from the emerging new world order.	跨大西洋联盟的另一大威胁来自新世界秩序的崛起。


The coming years, indeed decades, will be characterized by an increasingly aggressive US-Chinese dualism as China becomes stronger and America’s weakness persists.	未来几年（事实上是几十年）的显著特征将是美国-中国的此消彼长——中国变得越来越强，而美国将持续弱势。


While this rivalry will have a military component, as evidenced by China’s enormous military buildup, it will manifest itself primarily in terms of economic, political, and normative spheres of influence.	美中之间的较量包含一定的均是因素，中国大规模的军事建设就是明证，但主要领域还是经济、政治以及影响力。


East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific will play the central role here.	在这方面，东南亚和太平洋地区将扮演中心角色。


But China will try to draw Europe into this new global game.	但中国会试图把欧洲也拖如这场新的全球较量。


Indeed, it has already begun to do so.	事实上，中国已经开始这么做了。


The recent visits by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Europe’s crisis countries, to which he offered generous loans and assistance, made this strikingly clear.	温家宝总理最近访问了欧洲��机国家，带去了慷慨的贷款和援助，这清楚地表明了中国的意图。


And America’s weakness, the growing dependence of European (especially German) exports on the Chinese market, and the enticements of the Far East more generally, will nurture a new and promising Eurasian perspective as Transatlanticism declines.	而随着跨大西洋主义的日渐衰落，美国的弱势、欧洲（特别是德国）出口的越来越依赖中国市场以及远东地区越来越大的诱惑将促使新的欧亚主义的形成。


European illusions about Asia will no longer be directed at Russia, which, apart from its natural resources, will simply have nothing to offer.	欧洲的亚洲幻想不再会以俄罗斯为对象，因为除了自然资源之外，俄罗斯什么都拿不出来。


No, this time, the temptation will spring from China, which well understands Europe’s significance in its emerging geopolitical contest with (and against) the US.	这一回，诱惑将来自中国，它能很好地理解欧洲在其与美国日益明显的地缘政治博弈中的重要性。


As with Germany vis-à-vis France, here, too, Europe must stand unwaveringly by its transatlantic partner to avoid putting itself in great jeopardy.	至于欧洲，除了德国-法国轴心外，还必须毫不动摇地与其跨大西洋合作伙伴团结一致，以免让自己陷入更大的危险。


The two foundations of Europe’s seven decades of peace are cracking.	维系了欧洲70年和平的两大基石正在产生裂缝。


Repairing them requires nothing less than pressing ahead, at long last, toward a strong, united Europe.	修复这两大基石无异于要求欧洲人至少在长期能够向前看，迈向强大、统一的欧洲。


Europe’s Short Vacation	欧洲的短暂假期


NEW YORK – Since last November, the European Central Bank, under its new president, Mario Draghi, has reduced its policy rates and undertaken two injections of more than €1 trillion of liquidity into the eurozone banking system.	纽约—自去年11月以来，欧洲央行在其新行长德拉吉的领导下降低了政策利率，并分两次向欧元区银行系统注入了超过1万亿欧元的流动性。


This led to a temporary reduction in the financial strains confronting the debt endangered countries on the eurozone’s periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland), sharply lowered the risk of a liquidity run in the eurozone banking system, and cut financing costs for Italy and Spain from their unsustainable levels of last fall.	这暂时减缓了欧元区外围债务困扰国（希腊、西班牙、葡萄牙、意大利和爱尔兰）的财政负担，减轻了欧元区银行系统爆发流动性枯竭的危险，也降低了意大利和西班牙去年秋天以来不可持续的融资成本。


At the same time, a technical default by Greece was avoided, and the country implemented a successful – if coercive – restructuring of its public debt.	与此同时，希腊避免了技术违约，并实施了成功的（也可以说是强迫的）公债重组。


A new fiscal compact – and new governments in Greece, Italy, and Spain – spurred hope of credible commitment to austerity and structural reform.	新的财政契约——以及希腊、意大利和西班牙新政府——燃起了人们对可信紧缩和结构性改革承诺的期望。


And the decision to combine the eurozone’s new bailout fund (the European Stability Mechanism) with the old one (the European Financial Stability Facility) significantly increased the size of the eurozone’s firewall.	将欧元区新旧援助计划（欧洲稳定性机制和欧洲金融稳定基金）合并极大地扩大了欧元区防火墙规模。


But the ensuing honeymoon with the markets turned out to be brief.	但由此带来的市场蜜月很快就过去了。


Interest-rate spreads for Italy and Spain are widening again, while borrowing costs for Portugal and Greece remained high all along.	意大利和西班牙的利差再次开始抬头，葡萄牙和希腊的借贷成本则一直居高不下。


And, inevitably, the recession on the eurozone’s periphery is deepening and moving to the core, namely France and Germany.	与此同时，欧元区外围的衰退不可避免地正在深化并向核心区（即法国和德国）蔓延。


Indeed, the recession will worsen throughout this year, for many reasons.	事实上，衰退将在今年恶化，原因如下。


First, front-loaded fiscal austerity – however necessary – is accelerating the contraction, as higher taxes and lower government spending and transfer payments reduce disposable income and aggregate demand.	首先，先行财政紧缩——不管多么必不可少——在加速经济收缩，因为更高的税收和更低的政府支出和转移支付拉低了可支配收入和总需求。


Moreover, as the recession deepens, resulting in even wider fiscal deficits, another round of austerity will be needed.	此外，随着衰退的深化，财政赤字将进一步扩大，从而需要新一轮紧缩。


And now, thanks to the fiscal compact, even the eurozone’s core will be forced into front-loaded recessionary austerity.	如今，由于财政契约的存在，即使是欧元区核心国家也将被迫采取先行衰退性紧缩。


Moreover, while über-competitive Germany can withstand a euro at – or even stronger than – $1.30, for the eurozone’s periphery, where unit labor costs rose 30-40% during the last decade, the value of the exchange rate would have to fall to parity with the US dollar to restore competitiveness and external balance.	此外，尽管竞争力强大的德国可以忍受欧元兑美元1. 3甚至更高的汇率，但对单位劳动成本在过去十年中上涨了三四成的欧元区外围国来说，欧元汇率要下降至与美元相当的水平才能重新获得竞争力和外部平衡。


After all, with painful deleveraging – spending less and saving more to reduce debts – depressing domestic private and public demand, the only hope of restoring growth is an improvement in the trade balance, which requires a much weaker euro.	毕竟，在痛苦的去杠杆过程中（即减少开支、增加储蓄以降低债务），国内私人和公共需求将受到抑制，重塑增长的唯一希望是贸易平衡的改善，而这要求欧元大幅贬值。


Meanwhile, the credit crunch in the eurozone periphery is intensifying: thanks to the ECB long-term cheap loans, banks there don’t have a liquidity problem now, but they do have a massive capital shortage.	与此同时，欧元区外围的信贷动荡正在加剧：拜欧洲央行长期低息贷款所赐，外围国银行现在不会有流动性问题，但却存在大规模资本短缺。


Faced with the difficulty of meeting their 9% capital-ratio requirement, they will achieve the target by selling assets and contracting credit – not exactly an ideal scenario for economic recovery.	外围国银行难以达到9%资本充足率的要求，只能变卖资产、收缩信用来满足，这可不是经济复苏的好兆头。


To make matters worse, the eurozone depends on oil imports even more than the United States does, and oil prices are rising, even as the political and policy environment is deteriorating.	更坏的是，欧元区对原油进口的依赖比美国更甚，而原油价格在不断上涨，政治和政策环境却在不断恶化。


France may elect a president who opposes the fiscal compact and whose policies may scare the bond markets.	法国可能诞生一位反对财政契约、采取令债券市场恐慌的政策的总统。


Elections in Greece – where the recession is turning into a depression – may give 40-50% of the popular vote to parties that favor immediate default and exit from the eurozone.	希腊选举——那里的衰退正在向萧条迈进——可能会有40—50%的选票投给支持立刻违约并退出欧元区的政党。


Irish voters may reject the fiscal compact in a referendum.	爱尔兰选民可能在公投中拒绝财政契约。


And there are signs of austerity and reform fatigue both in Spain and Italy, where demonstrations, strikes, and popular resentment against painful austerity are mounting.	西班牙和意大利也存在厌倦紧缩和改革的信号，反对痛苦紧缩的游行、罢工和群众抗议比比皆是。


Even structural reforms that will eventually increase productivity growth can be recessionary in the short run.	即便是最终有利于提高生产率增长水平的结构性改革，在短期也可能起到衰退作用。


Increasing labor-market flexibility by reducing the costs of shedding workers will lead – in the short run – to more layoffs in the public and private sector, exacerbating the fall in incomes and demand.	通过减少裁员成本来增加劳动力市场弹性的做法可能会在短期导致公司部门裁员增加，进一步加深收入和需求萎缩。


Finally, after a good start, the ECB has now placed on hold the additional monetary stimulus that the eurozone needs.	最后，欧洲央行尽管头炮打得震天响，现在却对欧元区所需要的进一步货币刺激踯躅不前。


Indeed, ECB officials are starting to worry aloud about the rise in inflation due to the oil shock.	事实上，欧洲央行官员一开始公开担忧石油冲击所带来的通胀压力。


The trouble is that the eurozone has an austerity strategy but no growth strategy.	麻烦在于，欧元区只有紧缩战略，却没有增长战略。


And, without that, all it has is a recession strategy that makes austerity and reform self-defeating, because, if output continues to contract, deficit and debt ratios will continue to rise to unsustainable levels.	而没有增长战略，就意味着紧缩战略是一种衰退战略，紧缩和改革都将弄巧成拙。 这是因为，如果产出继续萎缩，赤字和债务比率就会继续上升，达到不可持续的水平。


Moreover, the social and political backlash eventually will become overwhelming.	此外，社会和政治障碍也将最终���得不可克服。


That is why interest-rate spreads in the eurozone periphery are widening again now.	这就是为何欧元区外围国利差再度上升的原因。


The peripheral countries suffer from severe stock and flow imbalances.	外围国经受着严重的存量和流量失衡。


The stock imbalances include large and rising public and private debt as a share of GDP.	存量失衡包括庞大且不断上涨的公私债务-GDP比重。


The flow imbalances include a deepening recession, massive loss of external competitiveness, and the large external deficits that markets are now unwilling to finance.	流量失衡包括深化中的衰退、外部竞争力的大幅流失以及市场已不再愿意提供融资的庞大外部赤字。


Without a much easier monetary policy and a less front-loaded mode of fiscal austerity, the euro will not weaken, external competitiveness will not be restored, and the recession will deepen.	除非大幅放松货币政策、减少先行财政紧缩，否则欧元就不会贬值，外部竞争力就得不到重塑，衰退就会深化。


And, without resumption of growth – not years down the line, but in 2012 – the stock and flow imbalances will become even more unsustainable.	而不能重回增长——不是说几年后，而是说2012年——存量和流量失衡就将变得更加不可持续。


More eurozone countries will be forced to restructure their debts, and eventually some will decide to exit the monetary union.	更多的欧元区国家将被迫重组其债务，最终，将有一些国家选择退出货币联盟。


Europe’s Silent Pro-Treaty Majority	欧洲赞成条约的沉默多数派


At the European Union’s coming EU summit, debate will center on whether to go forward with a “mini” EU Constitutional Treaty.	在即将召开的欧盟峰会上，争论将主要集中在是否应该朝达成一个“缩小”的欧盟宪法条约的方向迈进。


That debate is the result of the rejection of the draft treaty by French and Dutch voters in 2005.	之所以会有这样的争论是由于法国和荷兰在2005全民公决否决了条约草案。


But those “no” votes have obscured the fact that 18 of the EU’s 27 member states have ratified the treaty.	但是那些“说不”的投票人掩盖了欧盟的27个成员国中已经有18个国家批准了该条约的事实。


Luxembourg’s voters, for example, approved it by a 56.5% majority immediately after the Dutch and French no votes.	比如说，卢森堡的投票人在荷兰和法国的选民投票反对后立即以56. 5%的多数批准了该条约。


Indeed, with two-thirds of member states and a majority of European citizens supporting the Treaty, it cannot simply be abandoned.	事实上，面对三分之二的成员国和大多数欧洲公民同意该条约的事实，它不应该被简单地抛弃。


At the same time, French and Dutch citizens’ voices cannot be ignored – all the more so because it is unimaginable that an identical text could be submitted to a second referendum in either country.	与此同时，法国和荷兰民众的声音也不应该被忽视，尤其是因为在它们中随便哪一个国家就同一个文本进行二次全民公决都是不可想象的事情。


Because all 27 states must ratify the Treaty, it therefore seems obvious that it cannot enter into force in its current form, and that the “yes” countries cannot push ahead with it unchanged.	因为所有27个成员国都必须批准该条约，因此显然它不可能被以现在的形式生效，同时“说是”的国家也不可能在不修改该条约的情况推动条约的批准。


But it is equally impossible to start from scratch.	但是要由零重新开始同样也是不可能的。


So we must try to reconcile the “yes” and “no” countries if we are to overcome the crisis into which Europe has been plunged.	所以如果我们想要战胜这个欧洲所陷入的危机，就必须想办法调和“说是”和“说不”的国家的意见。


And we need to do so quickly if the EU is to deliver on its citizens’ expectations.	而如果欧盟想要满足其公民的期待，我们就必须立即展开行动。


This is because Europe faces many complex challenges in a globalized world.	这是因为欧洲在当今全球化的世界中面临着许多复杂的挑战。


In areas as diverse as employment and social inclusion, environmental protection and climate change, health, external and internal security, and the fight against illegal migration and poverty in the Third World, European citizens are demanding effective policies.	在就业和社会包容、环境保护和气候变化、医疗、外部和内部安全以及与第三世界的非法移民和贫困做斗争等诸多领域中，欧洲的公民要求有效的政策。


It is also obvious that member states cannot solve these problems alone, but only through coordinated EU action and common policies.	同样地没有哪个成员国能够单独解决这些问题，而必须依靠欧盟统一的行动和共同政策。


But to achieve these results, and thereby convince our citizens of the EU’s value, Europe’s decision-making capacity must be strengthened and democratized.	但是要实现这些结果，并因而让我们的公民确信欧盟价值，欧洲的决策能力必须得到加强和民主化。


This does not mean that enlarging the EU’s competencies should be the aim at any cost.	这并不意味着为了增强欧盟的竞争力可以不惜一切代价。


In fact, the Constitutional Treaty defines more clearly which competencies should be shared between the EU and its member states, and how.	事实上，宪法条约非常清楚地表明了欧盟和它的成员国应该以及如何分享权力。


It also reinforces the principle of subsidiarity by giving a stronger say to national parliaments.	同时它还通过给各国的议会更大的发言权以强化辅助原则。


So the objective is not automatically “more Europe,” but rather a “better Europe” capable of acting effectively and more transparently in areas where collective action is clearly necessary.	所以其目的并不是要自动地“更欧洲化”，而是要追求一个在明显需要集体行动的领域能够更有效和更透明地行动的“更好的欧洲”。


For all these reasons, the institutional reforms that are contained in the constitutional treaty are still urgently needed.	出于所有这些原因，宪法条约所要求的机构改革依然是我们所迫切需要的。


If Europe is to fulfill its role as a major global actor, its scope cannot be limited to that of a large common market.	如果欧洲要实现其作为一个主要全球行动者的角色，它的范围就不应该被限制在一个大的共同市场上。


It must be an integrated economic, political, and social force.	它必须成为一支统一的经济、政治和社会力量。


In order to realize the full potential of the common market, the EU must adapt its economic governance to the challenges of globalization – research, technological development, and knowledge must be at the heart of the European economy, particularly given Europe’s efforts to be at the forefront of combating climate change.	为了充分实现共同市场的潜力，欧盟必须使它的经济管理能适应全球化的挑战，即研究、技术开发和知识必须成为欧洲经济的核心，尤其是欧洲努力希望站在应对气候变化行动的前沿。


It also needs to speak with one voice on matters of foreign policy in order to play a more important international role in solving major conflicts and shaping a more peaceful and balanced world order.	它还必须保持外交政策上用同一种声音说话，以便在解决重大的冲突和形成一种更和平和平衡的国际秩序的问题上扮演一个更重要的国际角色。


Finally, the EU needs to promote social cohesion while adapting Europe’s social model to globalization’s challenges.	最后，欧盟需要促进社会团结，同时使欧洲的社会模式适应全球化的挑战。


It is no exaggeration to say that a large majority of member states and their citizens has already expressed its wish for this vision of the EU by voting for the Constitutional Treaty.	说大多数成员国和他们的公民已经通过投票支持宪法条约表达了他们对于欧盟这种前景的期望一点都不夸张。


At a meeting convened by Spain and Luxembourg in Madrid in January to which all the “yes” countries were invited, this view was also supported by four other member states that are committed to the constitutional treaty.	在一月份由西班牙和卢森堡召集在马德里召开的所有对宪法条约“说是”的国家的会议上，这种观点也得到了其他四个坚定支持宪法条约的成员国的支持。


It may well be impossible to press ahead with the Treaty without any changes to the text.	不对文本作任何修改就推进条约是不太可能的。


However, the Madrid meeting made clear that there is a consensus among these member states in favor of a Europe that can play a key role in our globalized world, and whose actions are based on the principles – effectiveness, transparency, and democracy – that inspire the European integration process.	不过，马德里会议清楚地表明了这些成员国一致认为欧洲应该在我们全球化的世界中扮演一个重要角色，并且推动欧洲统一进程的行动的原则应该是：高效、透明和民主。


The solution to the impasse over Europe’s Constitutional Treaty certainly does not lie in the direction of diminishing its scope, and thus perhaps making it just an “ordinary” treaty.	要解决欧洲在宪法条约上面临的僵局显然不能够用缩小它的范围的方式，那可能会使它变成一个“普通”的条约。


Minimalist solutions respond to neither the expectations of the citizens nor the requirements of a rapidly changing world.	最低纲领主义的解决方案既不符合民众的期待也不符合一个迅速变化的世界的要求。


The answer is more likely to be found in the Treaty’s simplification, taking out those elements that are not absolutely necessary, and also enriching it in such areas as climate change.	答案也许存在于简化条约，把那些并非完全必要的条款拿掉，同时丰富在诸如气候变化领域的条款。


The EU’s German Presidency, which I know shares the “ambitious” view of the Treaty, is working hard on finding a way out of the deadlock at this month’s European Council.	我知道欧盟的轮值主席国德国也对条约抱有“雄心”，正在努力寻找在本月的欧洲理事会上走出目前的停顿方式。


Those countries that have stepped forward as “friends of the Constitution” have also been making clear that the initiative they launched in Madrid will support the German Presidency’s efforts.	那些已经先迈出一步成为“宪法的朋友”的国家也已经清楚地表明他们在马德里发起的倡议是支持轮值主席国德国的努力。


If not all the EU’s members are ready to take this path, flexible solutions of the sort that have been a feature of European compromise in the past may be needed.	如果不是所有的欧盟成员国准备好走这条路，也许我们可以采取某种变通性的解决方案，因为这是欧洲在过去寻求妥协的一个特征。


By all means, let us try to preserve the solidarity of all 27 EU states.	不管怎样，让我们努力保持所有27个欧盟成员国的团结。


But those member states that are willing to move forward should not be prevented from doing so.	但是那些希望向前迈进的国家不应该受到阻拦。


Differentiation should not mean division, but rather progress at variable speeds.	观点不同并不意味着分裂，而是以不同的速度向前迈进。


Europe’s Solidarity Imperative	欧洲需要团结


LONDON – When Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, publicly proclaimed that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to ensure the future stability of the euro, the effect of his remarks was immediate and remarkable.	伦敦—当欧洲央行行长德拉吉公开宣布欧洲央行将“竭尽全力”确保欧元未来稳定时，所引起的效果可谓立竿见影、引人注目。


Borrowing costs fell dramatically for the governments of Italy and Spain; stock markets rallied; and the recent decline in the external value of the euro was suddenly checked.	意大利和西班牙国债借贷成本大幅下降、股市反弹、欧元外部价值下降等结果接踵而至。


It remains unclear how long-lasting the effects of Draghi’s intervention – or of the public support offered to him by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, and Italian premier Mario Monti – will prove to be.	德拉吉的干预（或者说德国总理默克尔、法国总统奥朗德和意大利总理蒙蒂给他的公众支持）能产生多久的效果还未可知。


What we can say with certainty is that Draghi’s remarks and the reaction they evoked demonstrate that the fundamental problems of the eurozone are not primarily financial or economic; they are political, psychological, and institutional.	我们所能肯定的是，德拉吉的话以及它们所激起的反应表明，欧元区的基本问题主要不在于金融和经济，而在于政治、心理和制度。


International observers took such notice of Draghi’s commitment to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro because so many of them have come to doubt other leading European players’ commitment to do likewise.	国际观察者如此注重到德拉吉说要“竭尽全力”拯救欧元，这是因为他们当中有很多人原本怀疑其他欧洲领导人不会这么做。 （当然，一些疑虑纯属政治和金融上的自私；


(Some of these doubts are, of course, politically or financially self-serving; a certain model of financial capitalism perceives the euro as a threat, and its adherents will do everything they can to bring about its demise.)	某些金融资本主义模式将欧元视为一种威胁，这种模式的追随者将竭尽全力让欧元消失。 ）


But eurozone leaders’ inability to assuage doubt about their commitment to the euro after two and a half years of crisis suggests that the problem is deeply rooted.	但欧元区领导人在消除人们对其欧元承诺的怀疑方面的无能表明，这场爆发了两年半的危机具有深层次根源。


In their own defense, eurozone ministers point to the raft of reforms that they have introduced over the past 30 months, which will promote economic modernization, the restoration of sound government finances, and closer economic coordination.	在各自的祖国，过去30个月以来欧元区的部长们提出通过改革寻找生路，改革将刺激经济的货币化、重塑政府财政健康、加强经济合作。


Unfortunately, these reforms have all too often served as displacement activity – worthwhile in themselves, but failing to answer unambiguously the question posed with increasing urgency by international markets: Are the eurozone’s largest and currently most prosperous members absolutely committed to its continuation?	不幸的是，这些改革大多沦为了替换活动——本身极有价值，但并没有明确解决国际市场日益告急所暴露的问题：欧元区最大以及当前最繁荣的成员国到底有没有决心让欧元活下去？


No one doubts that Germany and most other eurozone members would prefer the single currency to continue.	没人会怀疑德国和其他大部分欧元区成员国更希望单一货币可以继续。


Today’s uncertainty concerns whether this preference may be overridden by pressing considerations of national politics, or resentment at the slow pace of reform in certain eurozone countries.	如今的不确定性是，这一偏好可能被更紧迫的国内政治形势或对某些欧元区国家改革进度缓慢的不满情绪压倒。


Indeed, a German proverb to the effect that “trust is good, but control is better” has been the basis of eurozone leaders’ policy since the developed world’s debt crisis engulfed the single currency’s system of governance.	事实上，自单一货币治理制度被发达世界债务危机所吞噬以来，德国谚语“信任不错，但掌控更好”已成为欧元区领导人政策的基础。


The implication is clear: trust between the members of the eurozone cannot be taken for granted, but must be earned and maintained.	其影响是显而易见的：欧元区成员国之间的信任不再是理所当然之事，而必须去争取和维系。


The limitations of this approach have now been revealed.	这一观点的局限性如今已经显露无疑。


While the eurozone’s richer countries have indeed done much to help their troubled neighbors, they have done so in an obtrusively conditional, transitional, and incremental fashion.	欧元区较发达成员国确实已经做了很多帮助它们陷入麻烦的邻居，但它们的做法都带有不体面的条件性、过渡性和渐进性。


At one level, it is entirely understandable that Germany and other eurozone countries should demand assurances that their resources will not be wasted.	一方面，我们完全可以理解德国和其他欧元区国家应该要求确保它们所提供的资源不被浪费。


But this constant need for reassurance, for the limiting of risk and involvement to the minimum necessary, provokes a fear that at some point Germany and others will judge their partners’ assurances insufficient and the risks run in helping them intolerable.	但这一永恒的保证要求、这一限制风险和最小程度介入的要求引起了人们的担忧：德国和其他国家随时随地都���能认定其伙伴国的保证不够充分，帮助伙伴国得不偿失。


If that happens, the euro’s demise cannot be far behind.	如果发生了这一情况，欧元也就离崩溃不远了。


The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, represented a noble and ambitious departure in European history.	1957年签署的罗马条约代表欧洲决定与历史来一个史诗般雄心勃勃的决裂。


Solidarity and predictability in international relations, based on common institutions and common interests, would ensure Europe’s prosperity and stability much more effectively than had the traditional balancing act of high-wire diplomacy, whose practitioners had too often crashed to the ground.	基于共同制度和共同利益的团结和国际关系的可预测性在确保欧洲的繁荣与稳定方面将远胜于走钢丝外交等传统均势行为——走钢丝太容易掉下去了。


The euro was founded in this spirit of solidarity, and its contribution to limiting economic and financial instability in Europe over the past five years should not be underestimated.	欧元便是创建在这一团结精神的基础上的，其在过去5年中限制欧洲经济和金融不稳定性方面的贡献也不可磨灭。


The example of the 1930’s is a reminder of how much worse things might have been.	20世纪30年代的教训提醒我们事情究竟可以变得多么糟糕。


Eurozone leaders’ temptation to revert to earlier, discredited models of European relationships was bearable for a time, but it has now reached the limit of its tolerability.	欧元区领导人受到回复从前败事有余的欧洲关系模式的诱惑，在短期是可以忍受的，但如今，忍受力已经达到了极限。


My impression is that German public and political opinion is beginning to recognize the economic devastation for Europe and Germany implied by a euro breakup.	我的感觉是，德国公众和政治意见已开始意识到欧元崩溃将对欧洲和德国造成怎样的经济灾难。


German politicians bear the important democratic responsibility of reinforcing this realization and advocating the steps needed to avert a catastrophe.	德国政客肩负着强化这一意识、宣传避免灾难必须步骤的重要民主责任。


It can be no part of a well-functioning democracy for leaders to hide unwelcome truths from their electorates.	领导人在选民面前隐瞒不受欢迎的真相，这不是运转良好的民主的特征。


It would be a delusion to imagine that the eurozone need only follow its current path to ensure the single currency’s future.	认为欧元只需沿着当前的轨迹前进就能确保单一货币的未来，这种感觉纯属幻觉。


If nothing else, that current path unacceptably accentuates the differences between member states in a way that is politically and economically unsustainable in the longer term.	别的姑且不论，这条当前轨迹以一种不可接受的方式强调成员国之间的差异，不管从政治上还是经济上，从长期看都是不可持续的。


The philosophy of control and reciprocity that until now has characterized the eurozone’s approach to its crisis of governance needs to be replaced by one of solidarity and all that follows from it.	此前，控制和互惠原则一直是欧元区危机治理的方法，该原则需要替之以团结原则以及一切据此引申出的原则。


This means a more balanced economic policy within the eurozone, an enhanced role for the ECB, a real banking and financial union, and a road map to partial and conditional mutualization of legacy debt.	这意味着欧元区内的经济政策必须更加均衡，欧洲央行的作用必须强化，必须建立真正的银行和金融联盟，必须出台遗留债务的局部和有条件的共同化路线图。


Eurozone leaders have spoken about all of these, but the time has come for unequivocal commitments and a realistic timetable for action.	这些都是欧元区领导人的老生常谈，但现在需要的是明确的承诺和行动的现实路线图。


We are now perilously close to the moment when “muddling through” could give way to renewed crisis.	眼下，我们的处境非常危险，“得过且过”可能成为催生新危机的温床。


So the Bundesbank’s self-righteous zeal in asserting that its responsibilities are somehow graver – and more binding – than those of other central banks is dangerously wrong-headed.	因此德国央行自以为是的声明——出于个中原因它的责任要比其他央行更大，也更紧迫——大错特错了。


“Nein” merely brings calamity closer.	“不”只能让欧洲离灾难更近。


None of Europe’s financial problems would look remotely as challenging today if doubts about the eurozone’s future had been dispelled two years ago, and the reputational and financial costs would have been dramatically less than they have been in the past 30 months.	如果关于欧元区未来的疑虑在两年前就被打消，欧洲的诸多金融问题就都不会像今天那样具有挑战性，而名誉和金融成本也会大大低于30个月以前。


In the long run, solidarity is cheaper for all involved, while its absence could become ruinously expensive in the foreseeable future.	从长期看，团结比其他任何方案成本都要低，而若没有团结，那么在可预见的未来成本将会毁灭性地高。


Europe\u0027s Solidarity With Ukraine	欧洲与乌克兰的团结


Many generations of Poles dreamt of the day when Europe's postwar division would be undone.	几代波兰人都梦想着欧洲战后的分裂状态有一天能够改变。


Many generations of Ukrainians were also deprived of a right to their own country, language, and culture.	几代乌克兰人的国籍、语言和文化权利也被无情地剥夺。


What united prisoners of conscience in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's was the faith that one day their countries would find their place in a united Europe.	20世纪的60、70和80年代，一个信念将倍受良知谴责的欧洲人联系在一起，那就是终有一天，他们的国家将在统一的欧洲大地上站稳脚跟。


For Poles, the dream was realized on May 1 with EU accession.	5月1日加入欧盟实现了波兰人的梦想。


For Ukraine, the situation is more uncertain, but momentous decisions about its future are also about to be made.	虽然乌克兰人依旧前途未卜，但未来走向的重要决策也已迫在眉睫。


In May, the European Union will specify the principles that will guide relations with its new neighbors. In June, a NATO summit will discuss prospects for Ukraine's entry into the alliance.	欧盟将在5月确立与新邻居们和平共处的原则，而6月召开的北约会议将探讨乌克兰加入联盟的前景。


And this autumn Ukraine's presidential election will determine the country's development for decades to come.	今年秋天，乌克兰的总统大选将决定该国今后数十年的发展。


At this crucial moment, we call on Europe to open itself toward Ukraine, a great European country whose needs and aspirations cannot be forgotten in the process of constructing the new Europe.	在这关键时刻，我们呼吁欧洲向乌克兰这个伟大的国家张开双臂，建设新欧洲的过程中，我们不能忘记它的需求和渴望。


Europe should go beyond defining its relationship with Ukraine as a neighbor: it should clearly state that Ukraine has a realistic chance of entry into NATO and the EU.	欧洲与乌克兰不应仅限于邻里，我们应该明确表示：乌克兰有现实的机会加入北约和欧盟。


Such a statement is essential to support democratic forces in Ukraine at a time when they stand a realistic chance of shaping Ukraine's future.	上述声明对支持乌克兰内部的民主力量至关重要，它们拥有现实的机遇，真正决定国家的未来。


Ukraine's ruling elite is brutally suppressing opposition, limiting freedom of speech, and curtailing economic liberty.	乌克兰当局残酷镇压反对派，限制言论自由和经济开放。


The coming presidential election is thus a test that will answer several fundamental questions.	在这种情况下，即将举行的总统选举就成为回答根本问题的一次测试。


Will Ukrainian society maintain its right to choose its representatives, or will a so-called "managed democracy" win out, with power transferred back and forth within small circles of oligarchic clans?	乌克兰社会是否有选择代言人的权利，还是所谓"管理下的民主"会占到上风，权力只在寡头圈子里来回传递？


Will a free market flourish, or will oligarchic capitalism serve the interests of the few?	是自由市场即将繁荣兴旺，还是寡头资本将迎合少数人的利益？


Will civil society thrive, or will Ukraine be a society of obedient subjects?	是民主社会终将飞速发展，还是对当权者依旧言听计从？


Will the law serve all, or only the elites?	法律是为大众服务，还是沦为当权者欺压民众的工具？


The victory of the opposition in the parliamentary election of 2002 attests to the potential that may be unleashed with a victory by democratic forces in the presidential election.	反对派在2002年议会选举中获胜证明了总统选举中民主力量的胜利将释放多么大的潜能。


As a result of the policies initiated in 2000, and particularly the struggle against oligarchic omnipotence, Ukraine's economy has been growing for five years in a row.	2000年开始推行的政策，特别是与寡头政治的艰苦斗争带来了乌克兰经济连续5年的迅速增长。


The parliamentary victory of the opposition also forced the reluctant authorities to declare Ukraine's readiness to enter NATO and the EU.	反对派在议会选举中的胜利也迫使当局承认乌克兰愿意加入北约和欧盟。


To complete the process of democratic transformation, Ukraine needs a declaration by Europe affirming Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic prospects.	乌克兰需要欧洲出面认可其欧洲和欧洲¾大西洋国家的地位，才能完成民主改革的进程。


Such a declaration would mean that Europe is not closing its doors on Ukraine, a country with a European cultural identity and a long tradition of struggle for democracy and human rights.	上述声明意味着欧洲的大门没有对乌克兰关闭，这个国家有着欧洲文化的特色，和争取民主人权的悠久历史。


It would be hard to overestimate the importance of such a declaration.	上述声明的重要性的确不可低估。


The example of Poland and that of the other countries of Central Europe shows that the clear prospect of EU membership may be one of the engines of effective reforms and may significantly enhance the ability of local leaders to persuade their people to accept the need for reforms that are sometimes painful.	波兰和中欧其它国家的实例表明：加入欧盟的明确承诺也许是推动有效改革的动力之一，可以大大增强当地领袖号召民众参与改革的说服力，因为改革的过程有时可能会充满艰辛。


More generally, discussions about the future of Europe should be permeated by a spirit of solidarity with respect to the states and nations that are not yet members and whose membership is not envisioned in the near future.	更笼统地讲，对于尚未成为欧盟成员或短期内不可能加入欧盟的国家来说，对欧洲未来的探讨更应充满了团结精神。


Otherwise, the continent will again be divided into rich and poor, into peoples living under democracy and those subjected to authoritarian regimes.	如若不然，欧洲大陆将再次被割裂为富国与穷国，有人生活在民主制度下，其它人则在专制社会里苦苦挣扎。


We do not want a new Iron Curtain on the Polish-Ukrainian border.	我们不希望看到铁幕在波兰¾乌克兰边境再度出现。


In the years since it regained its independence, Ukraine has proved that it can play an important and constructive role in the region.	重获独立后，乌克兰已经证明它能在欧洲事务中扮演重要的建设性角色。


In the early 1990's, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. Since then, it has participated in UN and NATO peace missions, and it has settled its borders with all its neighbors.	20世纪90年代初，乌克兰销毁核武器，此后又参与了联合国和北约的维和行动，与所有的邻国解决了边界争端。


Independent Ukraine has been free of ethnic conflicts, even though there has been no shortage of attempts to incite them.	尽管寻衅滋事者大有人在，独立后的乌克兰仍然消灭了种族冲突。


In terms of its historical heritage, economic interest, and ethnic composition, Ukraine belongs to both Central and Eastern Europe.	从历史传承、经济利益和民族构成上看，乌克兰与中欧和东欧都有很深的渊源。


Its location on the Black Sea ties it to Southeast Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, as well as Turkey.	地处黑海的地理位置将它与东南欧、巴尔干、高加索和土耳其密切相联。


Ukraine has formed a regional association with Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and its ambition is to play the role of a center of democracy and economic freedom in this huge area.	乌克兰与格鲁吉亚、乌兹别克、阿塞拜疆及摩尔多瓦都有着地区性联系，并希望在这片辽阔的土地上成为民主和经济自由的核心。


Both Ukraine and Poland pay special attention to good neighborly relations with Russia.	乌克兰和波兰都特别关注与俄国建立睦邻合作关系。


Strengthening Russian democracy is in the interest of Ukraine, Poland, and all of Europe.	加强俄国的民主符合乌克兰、波兰和整个欧洲的利益。


A democratic Ukraine, closely cooperating with Poland within the framework of the European community, will open new possibilities for developing and strengthening partnership with Russia.	民主的乌克兰与波兰在欧盟框架内密切合作，将为发展和加强与俄国的伙伴关系开辟新的可能。


We are aware of the problems inherent in the creation of a European prospect for Ukraine.	我们清楚地知道让乌克兰回归欧洲还面临着很多问题。


Integrating the ten new member countries that joined the EU on May 1 will demand tremendous effort on the part of the Union, as well as a fair division of the burdens. But this should not make us lose sight of other challenges.	5月1日加入的10个新成员国在承担责任的同时，也需要欧盟付出巨大的努力，但我们不能因此对其它的挑战视而不见。


One of the most important is the fate of Ukraine, and the need to strengthen liberty and democracy there.	当务之急是乌克兰的前途和命运，以及在那里推动自由和民主的需求。


Europe’s Squandered Minority	被放逐的欧洲少数民族


BUDAPEST – Today, millions of Europeans are afraid and frustrated as they face unemployment, loss of savings and pensions, radically reduced social benefits, and other economic hardships.	布达佩斯——如今，数百万欧洲人又担心又沮丧——他们面临着失业、失去储蓄和养老金、社会福利大幅削减以及其他经济困境。


Their fears are warranted, because the current financial crisis is undermining the very union that was established to heal Europe’s wounds at the end of World War II.	他们的担心是有道理的，因为当前的危机正在破坏欧洲为治疗二战的伤痕而建立起来的统一局面。


But, in the midst of the general suffering, one group – the Roma – has been ignored.	但是，在困难中，有一个群体——罗姆人被忽视了。


Europe’s largest and most disadvantaged ethnic minority, with a population equal to that of Greece, millions of Roma are trapped in extreme poverty and ignorance, compounded by widespread discrimination.	罗姆人是欧洲最大、最落后的少数民族，人口数与希腊总人口相当。 数百万罗姆人困于极端贫困和被忽视的境地，雪上加霜的是，他们还受着广泛的歧视。


Indeed, the 2009 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey found that Roma experience more severe discrimination than any other ethnic-minority group in Europe.	事实上，《2009年欧盟少数民族和歧视调查》（2009 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey）发现，罗姆人所经受的歧视要远远高于其他任何欧洲少数民族。


Hard times provoke aggressive, vindictive, and intolerant attitudes, and Roma have become scapegoats in this economic crisis.	艰难时世会造成侵略性、仇恨心和狭隘观念，而罗姆人已经沦为这场经济危机的替罪羊。


In fact, Roma-bashing is helping far-right political parties to mobilize and nationalist leaders to win votes.	事实上，抨击罗马人正在成为极右翼政党煽动民众和民族主义领导人赢得选票的助推器。


Even some mainstream political parties have resorted to using anti-Roma rhetoric that would have been inconceivable a decade ago.	就连主流政党中也不乏重拾十年前便已破产的反罗姆言论者。


But the Roma have refrained from reciprocating the sometimes lethal violence inflicted on them.	但罗姆人保持着克制，没有对施加在他们头上的、有时是致命的暴力以牙还牙。


Six years ago, the Open Society Foundation, the World Bank, and nine national governments addressed the issue by elaborating a step-by-step plan to integrate the Roma into European society.	60年前，开放社会基金会、世界银行和九国政府通过一个逐步让罗姆人融入欧洲社会的计划解决了这一问题。


Known as the “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-15,” the program prioritized four areas: health, housing, education, and employment.	这个计划被称为“2005—15：包融罗姆人的十年”，包括四大优先事项：卫生、住房、教育和就业。


This year, the European Commission has requested that all EU member states develop and implement strategies to promote Roma social inclusion in these areas.	今年，欧盟委员会要求所有欧盟成员国发展并实施促进罗姆人融入当地社会的战略。


The Decade of Roma Inclusion provides a blueprint for how to achieve integration and equality, and to eliminate unlawful discrimination.	 “包融罗姆人的十年”给出了如何达到融合和平等、消除非法歧视的蓝图。


But these goals can be achieved only if the EU resolves its financial crisis, embarks on a sustainable recovery, and, above all, becomes an inclusive economy.Otherwise, Roma will inevitably serve as the EU’s convenient scapegoats.	但这些目标只有在欧盟解决自身金融危机、迎来可持续复苏并（也是最重要的）成为包融性经济体的情况下才能实现。 否则的话，欧盟将心安理得地把罗姆人当作替罪羊。


Social exclusion is not only morally and legally repugnant; it also defies economic sense.	社会排斥不但在道德上和法律上站不住脚，即使在经济上也是不合理的。


Roma are Europe’s youngest and fastest-growing population with an average age of 25, in contrast to the European average of 40.	罗姆人是欧洲最年轻、数量增长最快的民族，平均年龄只有25岁，而欧洲平均年龄为40岁。


According to recent World Bank research, Roma comprise approximately 23% of new entrants into Bulgaria’s labor market.	根据最新的世界银行研究，在保加利亚劳动力市场新军中，大约有23%是罗姆人。


In Romania, the figure is 21%.	在罗马尼亚，这一比例为21%。


The vast majority of working-age Roma, however, lack the requisite education to compete successfully in the labor market.	但是，绝大部分处于工作年龄的罗姆人缺少必要的教育，无法在劳动力市场的竞争中胜出。


By continuing to shunt Roma children into “special” schools, where expectations are low and results still lower, EU member states are squandering hundreds of millions of euros annually in productivity and tax revenues.	年复一年，欧盟成员国把罗姆人的孩子送进“特殊”学校，这种学校期望低、结果更低，每年因此产生的生产率损失和浪费掉的税收收入都要以上亿欧元计。


The message is simple: improving opportunities for Roma is morally right and economically smart.	其中所包含的信息很简单：改善罗姆人的机会在不但在道德上正确，而且在经济上精明。


Integration is possible.	包融是可行的。


I grew up in a small, impoverished town in central Serbia, where my parents lifted themselves out of extreme poverty and deprivation.	我便是在塞尔维亚中部的一个贫穷小镇战打得，我的父母自力更生摆脱了极端贫困剥削。


My father obtained a high school diploma and became a taxi driver, while my mother attended university and worked in a state office.	我的父亲读完了高中，后来成为一名的士司机； 而我的母亲上了大学，然后在国家机关工作。


We were proud of the two-room house my parents managed to build before we moved into a larger home in an ethnically mixed area.	在搬入多民族混居地区的大房子之前，我们住在一套两居室的房子里，这套房子是我父母亲自己建的，我们对此感到十分自豪。


Having grown up in a family that struggled to rise from poverty to the middle class, I went on to study law and completed an NGO-management training program at Harvard University.	我成长在一个从贫困奋斗到中产接近的家庭中，长大后，我学习了法律，并在哈佛大学完成了一项非政府组织管理培训计划。


Thousands of Roma have made similar journeys.	成千上万的罗姆人都有过类似经历。


And hundreds of thousands more are capable of doing the same.	更有数十万罗姆人有能力走相同的道路。


Europe cannot continue to marginalize one of its own minorities; anti-Roma prejudice and unlawful discrimination must not go unchallenged.	欧洲不能再继续边缘化其自身的少数民族了； 反罗姆人偏见和非法歧视的状况必须改变。


The status quo is damaging the lives of millions of Roma, but it is also hurting Europe economically and morally.	欧洲的现状威胁着数百万罗姆人的生活，也在经济上和道德上伤害着欧洲。


The historical truism applies here – Europe’s greatness will be judged by how it treats its most vulnerable members.	历史真理表明，欧洲是否伟大取决于它怎样对待最脆弱的成员。 对罗姆人也是如此。


Europe’s Stifled Celebration	欧洲：被压抑的庆典


LONDON – This could have been a year of joy for Europe.	发自伦敦——对于欧洲来说，今年本应是充满欢乐的一年。


The 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall will be commemorated in November, and it has been five years since the European Union’s “Big Bang” enlargement.	推倒柏林墙20周年的纪念活动将于11月举行，而距离欧盟上一轮“宇宙大爆炸”式的大规模扩张也已整整5年。


The Cold War division of Europe is well and truly over.	一切都说明，由冷战导致的欧洲分裂局面已经彻底走向了终结。


But, instead of setting off fireworks, the EU finds itself under fire, as the global economic crisis confronts it with the greatest challenge it has seen since 1989.	然而，庆祝的焰火尚未升起，欧盟就已处在后院失火的危险境地，全球经济危机是自1989年以来欧盟所面临的最大挑战。


After years of strong growth and remarkable resilience, the Union’s new member states in the east are being hit hard by the economic turmoil that started in the west.	在经历了持续多年的强势增长与令人瞩目的经济复原之后，那些新入盟的东欧国家都遭受了缘自西欧的经济震荡所带来的重创。


Integration into the global economy, a crucial source of capital, stability, and innovation, has become a threat to many of these countries.	这些国家原本都一直努力将自身整合到全球经济当中，并将之视为吸引资本、促进稳定和创新的重要来源，但如今这一举措却反而对大多数东欧欧盟成员国造成了威胁。


This is true both of the region’s financial sectors and its real economies.	而这一威胁对于整个区域内的金融部门和实体经济都是切实存在的。


But the tough question that has to be asked is whether the crisis could lead to the unraveling of European integration.	而除此之外还有个严峻问题不得不提：那就是经济危机是否会导致欧洲一体化进程分崩离析？


There are four key issues that need to be tackled if we are to ensure that Europe emerges from this crisis strengthened.	如果要确保欧洲能够摆脱危机并变得更加强大的话，有四个关键性事务是需要我们处理的。


The first issue concerns the continuation of enlargement.	第一项事务和欧盟的持续性扩张有关。


The EU is an indisputable success, constituting the largest integrated economic area in the world and accounting for more than 30% of world GDP and around 17% of world trade.	作为GDP占全球30%以上，贸易额占全球17%的世界第一大经济一体化区域，欧盟毫无疑问是成功的。


Even with this year’s marked contraction of some central and eastern European countries’ economies, their accession to the EU boosted its overall economic growth, with the European Commission estimating that GDP in the new member states increased by extra 1.75 percentage points in the period 2004-2009.	即便今年某些中东欧国家经济明显收缩，他们的加入仍从总体上拉动了欧盟的经济增长，根据欧盟委员会的估算数据，在2004-2009年间，新成员国的GDP增长额外增加了1. 75个百分点，对于东扩之前的欧盟15国来说，扩张也对他们的经济增长做出了贡献，因为对外投资机会增加，而来自国外的需求也有所增长。


For the pre-Big Bang EU-15, enlargement significantly contributed to their growth through investment opportunities and increased foreign demand: 7.5% of the older member states’ exports went to the newcomers in 2007, up from 4.7% in 1999.	在2007年，老成员国出口中7. 5%的需求是来自新成员国，而在1999年这个比例只有4.


Indeed, by 2007, central and eastern Europe had become the second most important export destination for euro-zone countries.	9%。 实际上到2007年，中东欧地区已经成为欧元区国家在世界上的第二大出口目的地。


But EU membership has always been about more than economic integration and trade flows.	但取得欧盟成员国身份不仅仅意味着经济一体化和贸易流动。


The prospect of a “return to Europe,” as Václav Havel once put it, provided the backing for essential, if sometimes painful, economic, social, and political reforms.	如同捷克前总统瓦茨拉夫‧哈维尔所指出的那样，“回归欧洲”的前景意味着需要进行一系列非常有必要，甚至是痛苦的经济，社会与政治改革。


Today, EU membership is a more powerful incentive than ever for what the EU calls three “candidate countries” (Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Turkey) and five “potential candidate countries” (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Montenegro, and Serbia).	而时至今日，欧盟成员国身份已经具有了有史以来最强有力的诱惑——欧盟目前拥有三个“候选国”（克罗地亚，马其顿共和国及土耳其），以及五个“潜在候选国”（阿尔巴尼亚、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国、联合国安理会1244号决议下的科索沃、黑山共和国和塞尔维亚）。


These countries are increasing their efforts to prepare for EU admission, and the EU must not shut its doors on them.	这些国家都为申请加入欧盟正在不断努力，而欧盟也不应向他们关上大门。


On the contrary, it should finalize further enlargement: the economic crisis has clearly demonstrated that the EU cannot afford black holes on the map of Europe.	相反，欧盟应该定下更进一步的扩大方案：因为经济危机已经清楚的表明，欧盟无法承受欧洲版图上的那些经济黑洞国家所带来的冲击。


The second key issue concerns the EU’s internal structure.	第二项事物则牵扯到欧盟的内部架构问题。


The Lisbon Treaty offers a fundamental redesign of how the Union works, but, despite the pressing need to enhance EU institutions’ mobility and flexibility, it is still awaiting ratification.	《里斯本条约》在联盟如何运作的问题上重新设计了一个基本框架，然而即便提升欧盟机构灵活性和适应性的需要已经迫在眉睫，条约却依然停留在等待批准的阶段。


The economic crisis makes it more important than ever to introduce these reforms.	而经济危机则使得这些改革比以往任何时候都更为重要。


Third, there is the euro.	第三，欧元问题。


The 12 new member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 committed themselves to its adoption, but with no set date.	分别在2004和2007年加入欧盟的12个新成员国都承诺要采用欧元，但却没有订立一个时限。


Expansion of the euro zone has therefore been slow, especially in central and eastern Europe, where to date only Slovenia (2007) and Slovakia (2009) have become members of the single currency.	欧元区的扩张速度因而放缓，尤其是在中东欧地区，至今只有斯洛文尼亚和斯洛伐克（分别在2007和2009年）成为这个单一货币体系的一员。


But the financial and economic crisis has demonstrated the benefits of euro membership.	但如今这场金融和经济危机已经彰显出成为欧元体系成员国的有利之处。


Ten years after the common currency’s introduction, the 16-member euro zone has the world’s second most important currency, accounting for more than a quarter of all central banks’ foreign-exchange reserves and having overtaken the dollar as the currency of choice for international bond issues.	引入共同货币10年以来，16个欧元国家拥有了世界上第二大货币，占据了全球中央银行外汇储备的1/4强，并正逐步取代美元，成为国际债券发行的可选货币。


The euro’s increasingly important role brings stability, something that is never more important than in times of upheaval.	而欧元日趋重要的地位所带来的好处则是稳定，这点在国家经济发生问题的时期显得尤为重要。


The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development therefore encourages all new EU member states that have not yet started doing so to draft credible and convincing plans for euro-zone admission.	因此欧洲重建与开发银行呼吁所有尚未采用欧元的新成员国立刻开始行动，起草可靠而令人信服的计划来申请加入欧元区。


But there must be no softening of the criteria for joining the euro.	但要注意的是，原先规定的欧元区准入标准可不能因此而放宽。


The final issue concerns European solidarity.	最后一项事物涉及到的则是欧洲的团结。


EU enlargement brought greater prosperity, with living standards improving throughout the Union, particularly in the new member states.	欧盟扩张带来了更加巨大的繁荣，全联盟，尤其是在新成员国内，人民生活水平都得到了提高。


But many of the older member states also benefitted, and not only in economically measureable ways.	而大多数老成员国亦从中受益，他们所得到好处也不仅限于可以测量的经济领域。


The growing together of people, regions, and countries underpins the foundations on which Europe rests.	只有在人民、地区和国家共同发展的基础之上，欧洲才会得以巩固。


The EU’s newcomers have adopted growth models that rely to varying degrees on foreign capital to finance domestic investment, and on banking systems that are largely owned by west European banks.	欧盟新成员国所采用的发展模式，既依靠多种形式的国外资本为国内建设融资，也有赖于主要由西欧银行所拥有的银行体系。


It is a model that has served new and old member states well.	这是一个对新老成员国都卓有贡献的模式。


Investors from the EU-15 committed €37.2 billion in central and eastern Europe in 2006, roughly double the €19.1 billion spent there in 2004.	单在2006年，欧盟15个成员国就向中东欧提供了372亿欧元的投资，比2004年的191亿欧元几乎翻了一倍。


Over the past five years, foreign direct investment in the new member states topped the €100 billion mark.	过去5年里，新欧盟成员国接收的国外直接投资总额已经超过了一千亿欧元。


This process enabled western European companies and banks to expand into new markets with higher growth rates and, thereby satisfying pent-up demand and tapping unrealized potential.	此项进程使得西欧的公司和银行能够在高增长的新市场里扩展疆域，从而满足被压抑的需求并开发尚未受到注意的市场潜力。


This has created jobs in central and eastern Europe, while boosting prosperity in the older member states.	而这些举措已经在中东欧地区创造了众多工作岗位，同时还拉动了老成员国财富的增长。


To turn our backs on these countries would have serious economic ramifications.	如果我们现在背弃这些国家，必将引起严重的经济分歧。


The EU drew the right conclusions when it stressed that national bank rescue packages must not be designed in ways that starve subsidiaries, and also by doubling – to €50 billion – the crisis funds available to EU countries outside the euro zone.	而在此次经济危机中，欧盟也得出了一条正确的结论，它强调针对其内部成员的中央银行一揽子拯救计划不得以牺牲次要国家的方式来制定，并将针对欧元区以外欧盟国家的救济基金翻倍至5百亿欧元。


The EU must not stand aside when solidarity is needed.	因为当整个集体最需要团结一致的时候，欧盟可不能袖手旁观。


Today’s crisis offers an opportunity to show that the EU can provide stability, support, and solidarity.	当前的经济危机给予了欧盟一次机会，以显示其确有能力向其成员国提供稳定，支援和团结。


By taking the right steps now, the Union is laying the foundations that will enable it to emerge from today’s difficulties strengthened and more united.	通过采取一系列正确措施，欧盟将构筑一个坚实的基础，以确保其有能力在当前的种种困难中强势崛起，并变的更加团结，统一。


The 60-Year Itch?	60年之痒？


JERUSALEM – “Europe is boring: thank God, for you and for us,” my interlocutor told me.	耶路撒冷—“欧洲好无聊：感谢上帝，为了你，也为了我，”我的对话者对我说。


“Today, drama is in the Middle East, growth is in Asia, hope is in Africa, and proximity to the United States is in Latin America.	“如今，好戏在中东，增长在亚洲，希望在非洲，抱紧美国看拉美。


Europe is nowhere – it has become the lost continent.”	欧洲什么都没有——它就是一片失去的大陆。 ”


There is, of course, a little provocation and a lot of irony in these remarks.	当然，这番评论有点挑衅的意味，也充满了讽刺。


A few years ago, their speaker occupied important positions within US diplomacy; he is now a key figure of the New York establishment.	几年前，说话者是美国外交界的重磅人物； 如今，他是纽约的要人。


And his provocation highlights a sad reality that Europeans must accept and confront: Europe no longer interests America.	他的挑衅凸显了一个欧洲必须接受和面对的悲惨的现实：欧洲已不再对美国有吸引力。


Yes, the European Union’s enlargement since 2004 was preceded by NATO’s eastward expansion.	是的，2004年以来的欧盟扩大不及北约东扩。 但这并没有造成真正的区别；


But that has not made a real difference; at the end of the day, America is also losing interest in NATO, which turned in a not-fully-convincing performance in Libya and a downright poor one in Afghanistan.	时至今日，美国对北约的兴趣也在减退，这导致美国在利比亚事件中并未全力投入，对阿富汗也显然心不在焉。


Earlier this month, I gave a talk in Washington, DC, entitled “Hollande’s France: A Year After.”	本月早些时候，我在华盛顿参与了题为“奥朗德的法国：一年回顾”的对话。


The audience members’ average age was significantly higher than mine (and I am 66).	观众的平均年龄比我大多了（我今年66岁）。


The complexities of French politics do not interest young Americans – and why should they?	法国政治的复杂性激不起美国年轻人的兴趣——活该如此。


Would I have had a younger and larger audience if my talk had been called “Merkel’s Germany on the Eve of the Upcoming Election”?	如果我参与的对话叫做“选举前夕的默克尔德国”，观众就会更多一些、更年轻一些吗？


Whereas young Europeans look for jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities in America, young Americans go to Europe as tourists.	欧洲年轻人来美国寻觅就业和创业机会，而美国年轻人去欧洲是为了旅游。


For them, Europe is a continent undergoing museumification – a place to "do," not a place to be.	对他们来说，欧洲是一片博物馆化的大陆——是一片陈列之地，而不是一片行动之地。


This disinterest in Europe is not recent, but it has deepened over recent years.	对欧洲失去兴趣并不是新鲜事物，但最近几年有所加深。


Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has no longer been the first line of defense of the United States.	自冷战结束以来，欧洲便不再是美国的第一条防线。


And, since the end of the Balkan wars, the continent’s security problems have disappeared (except at the margins, as in Georgia, or potential threats stemming from its near-abroad, particularly the Arab world).	而自巴尔干战争结束以来，欧洲大陆的安全问题已不复存在（除了边缘地带，如格鲁吉亚； 以及来自近邻，特别是阿拉伯世界的潜在威胁）。


Many American scholars who were once interested in Europe’s social model have moved on to other research interests or retired, with no new generation to replace them.	许多曾经对欧洲社会模式饶有兴趣的美国学者要么退休了，要么转向了其他研究兴趣，新一代研究者又无法顶替他们。


Learning European languages is no longer popular in American schools, with the possible exception of Spanish.	学习欧洲语言不再是美国学校的潮流，或许西班牙语是个例外。


To some extent, Mandarin has become the new French, but with a major difference: The language of Molière was a cultural tool, not (or not entirely) an instrument of economic success.	从某种程度上说，汉语成了新的法语，但有一个极大的不同点：莫里哀的语言是一种文化工具，而不是（或者说不完全是）经济成功的工具。


Of course, it would be wrong to overemphasize disenchantment and push self-flagellation too far.	当然，过度强调认清形势和自我鞭策是不对的。


Europe still exists in the US, though probably more among the Washington administrative and political elite than within the world of New York finance and business, despite the fundamental importance of transatlantic trade for both economies.	欧洲仍存在于美国体内，只不过更多地存在于华盛顿政府和政治精英，而不是纽约金融和商业世界，尽管跨大西洋贸易对于欧洲和美国来说都具有根本重要性。


But is the US interested in Europe or only in parts of it?	但是，美国对欧洲感兴趣，还是只对部分欧洲感兴趣？


In Washington – as in Beijing, for that matter – the temptation to approach Europe in a bilateral manner is strong and growing.	在华盛顿（在这一点上，北京也一样），与欧洲开展双边关系的诱惑力仍然很强而且在增加。


President Barack Obama’s America, rendered prudent by the costs of the country’s military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, is only too happy to count on the interventionist traditions of Great Britain and France.	总统奥巴马的美国因为用兵伊拉克和阿富汗的沉重代价而转向审慎，乐于见到英国和法国的干预主义传统。


From Libya to Mali, France and Britain are largely seen as the extended arm of an America that is increasingly reticent to commit its own troops – or even weapons.	从利比亚到马里，法国和英国被广泛视为美国之手，后者对于出兵（甚至出武器）越来越谨慎。


Similarly, for the US government, as for China’s leaders, Germany has become Europe’s key economic actor.	类似地，对美国政府（以及中国领导人）来说，德国已经成为欧洲的关键经济体。


Of course, faced with the Chinese economic challenge, America would be happy to forge a united front – especially in matters of trade – with the continent that is still the world’s leading commercial power.	当然，在面临中国经济挑战的环境下，美国乐于与欧洲大陆构筑统一战线——特别是在贸易问题上，而欧洲仍是世界领先的商业势力。


But Europe’s interest in successfully concluding a proposed EU-US free-trade agreement may be even stronger.	但欧洲在成功推行欧盟-美国自由贸易协定方案上的兴趣更大。


Without America by its side, Europe would be more vulnerable in the face of a rising China than America would be without the EU.	没有美国的欧洲比没有欧洲的美国更难面对崛起的中国。


So America needs Europe, but now at the margins.	因此美国需要欧洲，但这种需要无关紧要。


Europe, given its current divisions and the growing gap between its northern and southern economies, still needs America.	而陷入分裂、南北经济差距越来越大的欧洲仍然需要美国。


In security terms, Europe would be quite lonely without the US, whatever the nature of the threat.	从安全角度看，没有美国的欧洲将相当孤立，不管对何种性质的威胁来说都是如此。


Of course, the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s revelations of the global reach and the extent of America’s Internet and telephone surveillance are, to say the least, unpleasant.	当然，前NSA合同工斯诺登（Edward Snowden）揭露美国互联网和电话监视监听可谓无处不在，无孔不入，此事至少令人不快。


But America’s questionable means of satisfying its legitimate security concerns are certainly less damaging for Europe in the long run than is Chinese industrial espionage.	但从长期看，美国安抚其合理安全担忧的问题手段对欧洲的伤害显然小于中国的工业间谍。


America is taking risks with the rule of law, but China has a long way to go before it becomes a country ruled by law.	美国在拿法治精神冒险，但中国还远远称不上法治国家。


In the immediate aftermath of Snowden’s revelations, the French satirical newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné ran a headline that said: “For once, Obama is interested in what we are saying.”	斯诺登曝光的一个直接后果是法国讽刺报纸《鸭鸣报》（Le Canard Enchaîné）刊登了一则标题：《奥巴马总算有兴趣知道我们怎么说了》。


Europeans should be pleased – and relieved – that they are no longer America’s first line of defense.	欧洲人应该感到高兴——和如释重负——他们不再是美国的第一条防线。


But if they want the US to listen to them, they need to have something to say, and they need to say it together.	但如果他们想让美国听他们的，那么他们需要说些什么，而且需要异口同声。


Europe’s Summer Reading List	欧洲的暑期书单


BERKELEY – In August, Europeans head for the beach.	伯克利—8月份，欧洲人纷纷涌向海滩度假。


The continent shuts down on the assumption that nothing of consequence will happen until everyone returns, suitably tanned, in September.	欧洲大陆沉寂着，所有人都认为，要等到9月份大家带着一身晒成古铜色的皮肤重新开始工作时，后续才会展开。


Never mind the subprime crisis of August 2007 or, closer to home, the European monetary crisis of August 1992: the August holiday is a venerable tradition.	即使是2007年8月的次贷危机和离欧洲人更近的1992年8月的货币危机也没能让欧洲人打消这一念头：8月假期是神圣不可侵犯的传统。


So, what should Europeans be reading beneath their sun umbrellas this year?	那么，这个8月，欧洲人应该躺在遮阳伞下读些什么呢？


Milton Friedman’s and Anna Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States belongs at the top of the list.	米尔顿·弗里德曼和安娜·施瓦茨（Anna Schwartz）的《美国货币史》（A Monetary History of the United States）是第一等必读书。


At the center of their gripping narrative is a chapter on the Great Depression, anchored by an indictment of the US Federal Reserve Board for responding inadequately to the mounting crisis.	在这部扣人心弦的著作中，最核心的是关于大萧条的一章，这一章的主线是美国联邦储备委员会对货币危机的应对不力。


Friedman and Schwartz are generally seen as reproving the Fed for failing to react swiftly to successive waves of bank failures, first in late 1930 and then again in 1931 and 1933.	大体上，弗里德曼和施瓦茨被视为在指责美联储没能迅速地对接二连三的银行倒闭潮——第一波在1930年末，接着在1931和1933年两度再次发生——做出反应。


But a close reading reveals that the authors reserve their most scathing criticism for the Fed’s failure to initiate a concerted program of security purchases in the first half of 1930 in order to prevent those bank failures.	但通过更仔细的解读可以发现，两位作者保留了对美联储的最严厉的批评——没能在1930年上半年实施购买证券的联合计划以防止银行倒闭。


That is a message that the European Central Bank’s board members could usefully take to heart, given their announcement on August 2 that they were ready to respond to events as they unfolded but were taking no action for now.	这个教训应该被欧洲央行委员会成员们小心地铭记在心，8月2日，他们宣布已准备好应对事态的进一步发展，但在当下还没采取任何措施。


Reading Friedman and Schwartz will remind them that it is better to head off a crisis than it is to rely on one’s ability to end it.	读一读弗里德曼和施瓦茨的书可以提醒他们，阻止危机要比依靠一个人的力量终结它好。


A second recommendation is another account of the crisis of the 1930’s, Charles Kindleberger’s The World in Depression, 1929-1939. (If vacationing officials detect a pattern in their summer reading, all the better.)	第二要推荐的书是关于20世纪30年代危机的：查尔斯·金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberger）的《萧条中的世界，1929—1939》（The World in Depression, 1929-1939，如果休假中的官员们在暑期阅读中能领会到一种模式，那么再好不过了）。


Kindleberger’s point is that avoiding a crisis – and when failing to avoid one, successfully exiting from it – requires leadership.	金德尔伯格指出，避免危机——以及在没能避免危机时成功地走出危机——需要领导力。


Specifically, it requires leadership by a country with the power of the purse and the willingness to use it.	具体而言，需要一个既有财力，又准备好动用财力的国家来充当领导者。


The problem in the interwar period, as Kindleberger recounts it, was the reluctance of the leading power, the US, to provide the leadership and financial wherewithal to resolve the crisis.	问题在于，金德尔伯格发现，在两次大战之间，领先大国美国不愿意担起领导之责、提供财政资源来解决危机。


In Europe today, reunified and reinvigorated Germany is the only country capable of assuming this role.	如今，在欧洲，重新统一走向复兴的德国是唯一有能力担起领导责任的国家。


It could agree to swift bank recapitalization, a banking license for the European Stability Mechanism, and a more expansionary ECB policy.	它应该赞成快速银行资本重组、为欧洲稳定性机制颁发银行执照并加大欧洲央行货币政策的扩张程度。


If Germany provided this kind of leadership, other countries would be quick to follow.	如果德国能够提供此类领导力，其他国家就会马上跟进。


Europe’s crisis would then be well along the path to resolution.	欧洲危机就能走上解决之路。


Germans sunning themselves on Greek islands, one hopes, would be inspired by such reading.	我希望德国可以从金德尔伯格的书中受到启发，给希腊送去阳光。


But it is hard to be confident.	但形势让人很难有信心。


Of course, books by economics professors about the Great Depression hardly a summer holiday make.	当然，经济学家关于大萧条的著作不是一个短短的暑期读得完的。


For variety, European leaders could take along Ron Chernow’s biography of Alexander Hamilton.	欧洲领导人也可以换换脑子，读一读罗恩·切恩诺（Ron Chernow）的亚历山大·汉密尔顿传。


Hamilton was a colorful character, born out of wedlock, raised in the West Indies, and captain of an artillery company in America’s revolutionary war.	汉密尔顿是个多彩的人物，私生子出身，张于西印度群岛，在美国独立战争期间担任炮兵连长。


More to the point, as George Washington’s Treasury secretary, he crafted the bargain that successfully rationalized the US states’ debts.	更重要的是，他是华盛顿的财政部长，正是他精心安排的讨价还价成功地化解了美国州债务问题。


US states entered their new union with different debt loads and different capacities to service them.	美国各州在组成新联盟时各有各的债务负担，各有各的偿债能力。


Hamilton made the case that the federal government should assume responsibility for their liabilities stemming from the costs of financing the war.	汉密尔顿认为，联邦政府应该将各州因战争融资成本产生的债务揽下。


He identified a source of revenue – the tariff – that could be devoted to this end, and he rendered the bargain politically palatable by making clear that if state governments accumulated additional debts, and again got into trouble, they would not be bailed out a second time.	他还找到了收入源——关税——来作为偿债资金源，并明确表示如果州政府积累了更多的债务，从而再一次陷入麻烦，将不会获得第二次援助，从而将讨价还价过程包装得十分具有政治诱惑力


European officials will argue that their problem is more difficult.	欧洲官员会争辩说，他们的问题更加困难。


Not only does Europe lack a federal government, but there is no desire to create one.	欧洲不但缺少联邦政府，而且也没有创造一个的意愿。


A close reading of Hamilton’s accomplishments, however, will remind European readers that there was an equally deep aversion to federalism in the early US.	但是，仔细阅读汉密尔顿的成就，欧洲读者就能发现，在美国建国之初，同样存在根深蒂固的厌联邦情绪。


It took politicians with vision and diplomatic skills to craft the political entity that emerged after independence.	政治家用远见和外交手段在独立后建成了合众国这一政治实体。


Finally, European leaders should consider adding to their book bag Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August (again, notice the month).	最后，欧洲领导人还可以一读芭芭拉·塔克曼（Barbara Tuchman）的《八月之抢》（The Guns of August，注意标题中的月份）。


Tuchman describes how a series of individual decisions, all of which seemed sound when considered in isolation, had the unintended consequence of leading Europe into World War I.	塔克曼描述了一系列单独决策——每个决策在单独考虑时都无比合理——是如何在无意中将欧洲拖入一战的。


No one is predicting war in Europe today.	如今，没人会认为欧洲将爆发大战。


But what is true of international diplomacy – that a series of seemingly reasonable decisions can have cataclysmic consequences if no one bothers to figure out the endgame – is equally true of international finance.	但国际外交的历史对于国际金融来说同样是正确的——一系列看似合理的决策可能产生灾难性后果，如果没人愿意挑明结局的话。


Europe is dangerously close to its financial Sarajevo.	欧洲正在危险地靠近金融萨拉热窝。


The continent’s leaders, while relaxing on southern Europe’s crisis-ridden shores, should take Tuchman’s message to heart.	正在南欧危机国海滩度假的欧洲大陆领导人应该好好领会一下塔克曼的著述。


Europe’s Test in North Africa	北非带给欧洲的考验


LONDON – Europe’s reaction to the historic revolutions in North Africa has vacillated between exhilaration and fear.	发自伦敦——欧洲对北非这场历史性变革的反应非常矛盾，自始至终都在兴奋与恐惧之间踌躇。


The natural instinct to celebrate and support democratization across the Mediterranean has been tempered by concerns that the crisis will spill onto European shores.	一方面各国都本能地欢庆并支持民主在地中海沿岸推行的局面，但另一方面又被危机可能蔓延到欧洲的恐惧所困扰。


A few leaders have invoked the post-World War II Marshall Plan as a model for large-scale European development assistance for the region, the aim being to ensure the sustainability of a democratic transformation and generate long-term political and economic benefits for Europe.	少数几位欧洲国家领导人希望能向北非提供类似二战后马歇尔计划那样的欧洲发展援助，以确保该地区民主转型过程中的稳定并为欧洲带来长期的政治和经济效益。


But the mainstream reaction has been much more fearful: media and politicians throughout the European Union are obsessing about the threat of waves of migrants reaching their borders.	但大多数人的反应则更偏向恐惧：欧盟各国的媒体和政治家们都忧心将会有大批难民源源不断地涌入自己的国家。


Such a threat should not be taken lightly.	这种危胁是无法被忽略的。


Already, the controversy over Tunisian migrants in Italy has started to fray the political underpinnings that allow free movement in the Schengen area.	事实上，对意大利境内突尼斯难民问题的争议已经动摇了允许在申根条约区域内自由流动的政治基础。


The war in Libya, meanwhile, could lead to many more thousands of civilians fleeing the violence and needing international protection.	而与此同时，利比亚战争也产生了数以万计逃离暴力冲突并急需国际保护的难民。


So far, nearly 400,000 people have filled refugee camps in Tunisia and Egypt, and an estimated 20,000 have reached Italy’s shores.	截至目前为止，突尼斯和埃及境内的难民营已收容了40万难民，同时估计有2万名难民已经抵达意大利沿岸。


Dealing with any surge of asylum seekers will require the EU to strengthen its capacity to offer temporary protection – and possibly to reconsider how its overall asylum system works.	对大批避难者的应对要求欧盟加强其提供短期保护的能力——或者需要对整个避难系统的运作进行重新检讨。


That the Union has been moving towards a common approach to border security, most visibly with the expansion of the Frontex border agency, will be of help here.	鉴于目前欧盟在边境管制方面逐渐走向统一，Frontex边境管理局的规模也不断扩大，预计将对这一事务有所帮助。


But if Europe allows itself to be consumed by the short-term crisis, it risks squandering an extraordinary long-term opportunity.	但如果欧洲仅仅埋头应付这一短期危机，那么就可能挥霍掉一个绝佳的长期机遇。


By using this moment strategically and wisely, the EU would have a chance to reframe its relationship with the southern Mediterranean (as it is being redubbed) to promote generational development and growth in ways that can address Europe’s interests, too.	通过有策略且明智地利用这一时刻，欧盟有机会重新建构自身与重组中的地中海南岸地区的关系，并推动符合欧洲利益的总体发展和增长。


The best way to allay European fears and prevent uncontrolled migration is to establish positive incentives, and the practical means,for potential migrants to stay home – most significantly by creating jobs in the southern Mediterranean. After all, the vast majority of migrants leave home reluctantly.	减轻欧洲的恐惧并防止难民潮失控的最佳办法就是创造积极的激励因素以及实施切实可行的运作方式，使得那些潜在的难民能留在原居地——最有效的方法莫过于在地中海南岸地区创造更多职位，毕竟大部分难民都是极端不情愿的情况下离家出走的。


Yet, at the same time, as its baby boomers retire en masse in the coming decade, Europe will need workers at all skill levels.	而与此同时，随着战后婴儿潮一代在未来十年内逐渐步入退休年龄，欧洲需要补充各个层次的劳动者。


The southern Mediterranean can be the source of this labor, given its huge youth bulge.	而拥有大批年轻人口的地中海南部地区则有望成为这些劳动者的来源地。


The trick will be to ensure that migrants are given the chance to acquire the skills that European employers need, and that they have the chance to move in a safe, legal, and orderly fashion.	实现这一目的的窍门就在于确保这些移民有机会学习欧洲企业所需要的技能，并能以一种安全，合法和有秩的方式来流动。


Policies that help train the next generation of North Africans, and allow them to circulate more freely between Europe and their home countries, are a much smarter solution than the current approach, which sustains illegal migration without meeting Europe's labor needs. This is an argument not for more migration, but for better migration – well thought out and planned.	相对于目前接纳非法移民却无法满足欧洲的劳动力需求的政策手段，帮助训练下一代北非人并允许他们更加自由地在本国和欧洲之间流动的政策显然更为明智。 该理念并非宣扬要接纳更多移民，而是深思熟虑且计划周详的手段来接纳更优质的移民。


Of course, if Europe helps North Africa build sustainable, prosperous democracies, this would be the greatest long-term deterrent to illegal migration of all.	当然，遏制非法移民的最佳长期手段莫过于使北非在欧洲的协助下建立持续而繁荣的民主制度。


It is worth recalling that 50 years ago, the largest immigrant populations in northern Europe hailed from Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.	回想50年前，北欧地区最大的移民群体都来自于意大利、希腊，葡萄牙和西班牙。


As those countries prospered, the émigrés returned home: their countries eventually became engines of European growth, and major export markets for Germany, France, and other EU member states.	随着上述国家逐渐走向繁荣，这些移民纷纷回国：他们的国家也最终成为了欧洲的增长引擎以及德国，法国和其他欧盟成员国的出口市场。


The same arc of development can and should be limned for the southern Mediterranean.	同理，这样的发展弧线也可以并应当在地中海南岸勾勒出来。


Fortunately, research on migration and development in recent years has helped foster a range of policy tools that Europe should be considering. Experts and policymakers have been devising many innovative programs, including low-cost remittances from migrants to their home countries, efforts to strengthen ties between diasporas and their homelands, and initiatives that help skilled migrants find proper employment, so that qualified surgeons are not driving taxis.	幸运的是，近年来对移民与发展的研究创造了一系列欧洲应当考虑使���的政策工具。 专家和政策制定者们设计了许多创新性项目，包括减低移民向其来源国的汇款费用，加强海外流散者与祖国的联系，以及帮助有技能的移民寻找合适工作的创新性政策，确保不令合资格的外科医生沦为出租车司机。


In thinking about how to reframe the EU’s relationship with the southern Mediterranean, we should draw on these ideas as expansively as possible.	在考虑如何重新构建欧盟与地中海南部地区关系的时候，我们应当在尽可能大的范围内推广这些理念。


In order to connect our societies in positive ways, we should seriously consider liberalizing trade regimes, opening new avenues for legal migration, and vastly expanding the number of students from the region who come to Europe for education and professional training.	为了用积极的方式将各自的社会对接起来，我们必须认真考虑放宽贸易管制，为合法移民开辟新的通道，并大规模增加那些前来欧洲接受教育和专业培训的学生数量。


After all, it was the youth of North Africa, both at home and abroad, whose notions of freedom helped bring down dictators in Egypt and Tunisia. Their talents and energy should now be cultivated and harnessed to help rebuild their societies.	毕竟正是国内外的北非年轻人对自由的渴望将埃及和突尼斯的独裁者赶了下台，而他们的才干和活力也应当被培养和引导去帮助重建本国社会。


Responding to the challenges and opportunities of this moment demands the creation of strong partnerships among states, international institutions, and non-governmental actors.	对这些挑战和机遇的回应要求在各个国家，国际机构和非政府组织之间建立强大的伙伴关系。


Since its inception in 2006, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) has provided a much-needed platform for dialogue among states and other stakeholders on issues related to migration and development.	自2006年创立以来，全球移民和发展论坛（Global Forum on Migration and Development）为各国以及其他利益攸关者之间关于移民和发展事务的对话提供了急需的平台。


Its annual plenary sessions facilitate the exchange of experiences and good practices in a way that transcends traditional “North-South” conflicts.	论坛的年会也为相关经验交流和超越传统“南北”冲突的有益实践提供了便利。


Among other changes that it has spurred, the GFMD has compelled governments to understand migration more holistically, and to develop a “whole of government” approach to addressing the opportunities and challenges that it poses.	在其推动的各项变革之中，论坛说服政府更全面地理解移民问题，并发展出一套“政府整体应对”方案去处理这一事务所带来的机遇和挑战。


It also has highlighted the importance to development of protecting migrant rights and of fighting illegal migration.	它同时也强调维护移民权益和打击非法移民的重要性。


The Global Forum has done its job by generating and fostering ideas that can make migration benefit the development of countries of origin and destination.	全球论坛致力于创造和培育能使移民对来源国和目的地国家发展都有所裨益的理念。


It is high time that these ideas are implemented.	而目前也正是推行这些理念的最佳时刻。


There could be no greater opportunity for doing so than this strategically crucial window in the history of Europe and the southern Mediterranean.	没有比在这个在欧洲和地中海南岸地区历史上至关重要的战略窗口执行这一理念的更佳机会了。


If we do not seize this moment for action, history could well pass us by.	如果我们能把握住这一时刻，历史将以优厚的成果回报我们。


Europe’s Three Eastern Questions	欧洲的三大东部问题


WASHINGTON, DC – Today, the European project is shaking.	华盛顿——今天，整个欧洲项目发生了动摇。


Of course, I am confident that the eurozone’s ongoing sovereign-debt crisis will be overcome, and that a more integrated and effective Europe will emerge.	当然，我相信欧元区终将战胜持续的主权债务危机，并因此而诞生出一个一体化程度及效率更高的欧洲。


But, to get to that improved Europe, not only must the sovereign debt crisis be resolved; relations with three major countries to Europe’s east – Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine – will need to be put on more secure footing.	但要改善欧洲的现状，不仅必需解决主权债务危机； 与土耳其、俄罗斯和乌克兰等欧洲东部三国的关系也需要进一步稳固。


I was of the generation in my country that lived through the transition from dictatorship to democracy four decades ago.	40年前，我们这代人亲身经历了从专制到民主的过渡。


For us, the European Union was a dream.	我们的梦想就是欧盟。


Indeed, we used to quote Ortega y Gasset: “If Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution.”	实际上，我们曾经引用奥尔特加·伊·加塞特的名言：“如果西班牙有了问题，欧洲可以解决。 ”


I continue to believe, very deeply, that Europe is the solution, particularly for societies that need to deepen – if not establish – a democratic tradition.	尤其是对需要深化乃至建立民主传统的社会，我仍然深信欧洲就是解决方案。


Closer relations between Europe and Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine can deliver for them many of the same benefits that we in Spain always associated with Europe.	密切欧洲与土耳其、俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的关系可以为他们带来我们在西班牙总是与欧洲联系在一起的收益。


Turkey is, of course, already a candidate for EU membership, but accession negotiations are moving very slowly, which is strategically unwise, because Turkey’s great authority in the wider Middle East is vitally important to Europe (and probably greater than its own).	当然，土耳其已经是欧盟成员的候选国，但入盟谈判进展的非常缓慢，这在战略上是不明智的，因为土耳其在中东广大地区所树立的权威对欧洲来讲至关重要（可能比欧洲自身的权威还要重要）。


From Syria to all of the Arab Spring countries, Turkey’s influence is highly significant, and further cooperation with the EU can only prove beneficial.	从叙利亚到阿拉伯春天各国，土耳其的影响力非常显著，事实会证明深化与欧盟的合作只能带来好处。


The EU has created a channel of communication with Turkey on political matters.	欧盟已经与土耳其建立了政治问题的沟通渠道。


But it has not resolved the relationship’s endgame.	但还没有解决最后阶段的关系问题。


My passionate hope is that Turkey becomes an EU member, because a country that is Muslim, democratic, and overwhelmingly young could strengthen the Union in vital ways.	我热切地希望耳其成为欧盟成员国，因为这样一个年轻人占绝大多数的民主的穆斯林国家可以在很多关键领域强化欧盟的力量。


The debate around Turkish membership is set to become hotter in the second half of this year, when Cyprus assumes the EU’s rotating presidency.	围绕土耳其成员国资格的辩论注定要在今年下半年塞浦路斯担任欧盟轮值主席国时更加引人注目。


Turkey, to be blunt, will not recognize today’s divided Cyprus as the sole representative of that island.	坦率地讲，土耳其不会承认今天四分五裂的塞浦路斯作为该岛的唯一代表。


Further complicating matters is the discovery of oil close to the Cypriot coast.	塞浦路斯海岸附近发现石油导致问题进一步复杂化。


Anyone planning to drill there will become embroiled in a major maritime dispute, with Cyprus claiming that the reserves lie within its territorial waters, and Turkey countering that Cyprus has no territorial waters, because Cyprus, at least for the Turks, does not exist.	任何计划在那里钻探的人都将卷入一场严重的海事纠纷，塞浦路斯自称石油储备位于自己的领海范围内，而土耳其则反驳说塞浦路斯根本没有领海，因为塞浦路斯至少在土耳其人看来是根本不存在的。


Russia has become a different type of complicating factor for Europe.	俄罗斯已经成为欧洲另外一个复杂因素。


Vladimir Putin, who has now returned to the presidency, may be the same person as before, but Russia has changed.	重新担任总统职务的弗拉基米尔·普京或许和以前一样，但俄罗斯已经发生了变化。


The recent wave of protests in Moscow and throughout the country has exposed the limits of his power.	最近在莫斯科和全国各地的抗议浪潮已经暴露出他的权力是有限度的。


I believe that Putin understands this, which is an important fact for future diplomacy.	我相信普京明白这一点，这也是未来外交的一个重要事实。


In the next few days, the formation of Russia’s new government will reveal much about power relations between conservatives and liberals.	接下来的几天中，俄罗斯新政府的构成将会揭密保守派和自由派之间更多的权力关系。


Notably, billions of dollars of public property are at stake, owing to a privatization plan designed by former President Dimitri Medvedev.	值得注意的是，因为前总统迪米特里·梅德韦杰夫设计的私有化计划，数十亿美元的公共财产正受到威胁。


Here, the EU has a framework – the Partnership for Modernization, negotiated with Medvedev – that could potentially be very positive.	在此问题上欧洲有一个和梅德韦杰夫谈判达成的现代伙伴关系框架，如果运用得当可能会产生非常积极的作用。


Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2011 should also help to ensure that it plays by international rules, as occurred with China when it joined the WTO.	俄罗斯在2011年加入世贸组织也有助于确保它遵守国际规则，就像中国加入世贸组织的时候一样。


Russia’s adherence to the WTO’s legal framework should begin to make economic relations with it much more stable and predictable.	俄罗斯遵守世贸组织的法律框架应该开始令它的经济关系变得更加稳定和可控。


Previously, Russia’s admission to the WTO had been blocked by Georgia, which lifted its veto last year after a feat of elegant diplomacy that established a border-control mechanism without recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia either as part of Georgia or as independent countries.	此前，俄罗斯加入世贸组织曾遭到格鲁吉亚的阻挠，在去年优雅的外交举措既没有承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹分离地区是格鲁吉亚的组成部分，也没有承认其独立国家地位的前提下确立了边境管制机制，格鲁吉亚才取消了其否决投票。


That solution, while complicated, is a good outcome for the region.	这样的解决方案虽然复杂，但却是上述地区一种很好的结果。


Given the scale of Ukraine’s current problems and dysfunction, an elegant solution may neither be available nor sufficient.	鉴于乌克兰当前问题及障碍的规模，优雅的解决方案可能既不存在也远远不够。


Ukraine, with which I have been engaged since its independence, has been a great frustration to me.	自从独立以来一直与我结下不解之缘的乌克兰一直让我感到非常沮丧。


I was involved in the negotiations that helped to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005.	我参与了促成2004-2005年橙色革命和平解决的谈判。


But subsequent infighting between the revolution’s leaders, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, was so destructive that Viktor Yanukovych, whose efforts to manipulate the 2004 presidential election incited the revolution, is now President and Tymoshenko is in jail.	但之后革命领导人季莫申科和尤先科之间的内讧极具破坏性，以致于企图操纵2004年总统大选并因此引发革命的亚努科维奇现在成了总统，而季莫申科则被关进了牢房。


For the EU, Ukraine continues to be a serious problem.	乌克兰对欧盟而言仍然是一个严重问题。


A comprehensive free-trade and association agreement with the Union remains unsigned, owing to the incarceration of Tymoshenko and others.	由于季莫申科和其他人遭到监禁，全面的自由贸易和入盟协定至今仍未能签署。


Fortunately, given the Union’s attraction for most ordinary Ukrainians, there is still hope that simple realism will persuade Yanukovych and Ukraine’s ruling elite to return to a path that would allow for the association agreement to be signed.	幸运的是，鉴于欧盟对多数普通乌克兰民众的吸引力，纯粹的现实主义仍有希望说服亚努科维奇和乌克兰的执政精英回心转意并允许签署入盟协议。


Europe’s soft power has changed many things in many countries over the past two decades, spurring leaders and citizens to reform their economies and embrace or strengthen democratic values and institutions.	过去二十年来，欧洲的软实力已经改变了很多国家的很多东西，并带动领导人和公民进行经济改革，采纳或者强化民主价值观和制度。


It can continue to do so in Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine, or, through inattention and inaction, Europe could lose credibility, influence, and economic opportunities.	欧盟可以在土耳其，俄罗斯和乌克兰继续完成这样的使命，但也有可能因为漫不经心和无所作为而丧失公信力、影响力和经济机遇。


Europe’s Time to Learn	欧洲参加主权债务危机补习班


PRINCETON – Crises are a chance to learn.	普林斯顿——一次危机就是一次学习的机会。


For the past 200 years, with the exception of the Great Depression, major financial crises originated in poor and unstable countries, which then needed major policy adjustments.	过去的200年里，除了大萧条这个例外，历次大的金融危机都是在穷国和不稳定的国家爆发的，促使它们进行大规模的政策调整。


Today’s crisis started in rich industrial countries – not only with sub-prime mortgages in the United States, but also with mismanagement of banks and public debt in Europe.	如今，危机却是从富国开始的——不仅源自美国的次贷，而且还源自欧洲失控的银行和公债管理。


So what will Europe learn, and what relevance will those lessons have for the rest of the world?	那么，欧洲该吸取什么教训？ 这些教训对世界其他地方又有什么警示呢？


Europe’s contemporary problems offer striking parallels with previous problems on the periphery of the world economy.	欧洲当前的问题同此前困扰世界经济边缘地带的问题惊人地类似。


In successive waves of painful crisis – in Latin America in the 1980’s, and in East Asia after 1997 – countries learned a better approach to economic policy and developed a more sustainable framework for managing public-sector debt.	20世纪80年代的拉美、1997年的东亚，从一波又一波危机的沉痛教训中，有关国家提升了经济政策的水平，并且摸索出一套管理公共债务的行之有效的办法。


Today it is Europe’s turn.	如今，轮到欧洲来上这一课了。


The European crisis is coming full circle.	欧洲的危机差不多走完了一个循环。


Initially a financial crisis, it morphed into a classic public-debt crisis after governments stepped in to guarantee banks obligations.	最初的一场金融危机，随着政府介入，为银行负债担保，演变为一场经典意义上的公债危机。


That, in turn, has created a new set of worries for banks that are over-exposed to supposedly secure government debt.	公债危机反过来又引起新的担忧——银行持有的所谓安全的政府债，头寸是不是太大了？


Sovereign debt no longer looks stable.	国债似乎不再稳妥了。


One of the most important precedents is the debacle of Latin American debt almost 30 years ago.	最重要的前车之鉴是差不多30年前的拉美债务危机。


In August 1982, Mexico shocked the world by declaring that it was unable to service its debt.	1982年8月，墨西哥宣布失去偿债能力，震惊世界。


For most of that summer, Mexico, with a projected fiscal deficit of around 11% of GDP, was still borrowing on international financial markets, though at an increasing premium.	当年夏天，尽管墨西哥的财政赤字估计在GDP的11%上下，它仍然在国际金融市场上举债，只是溢价更高了。