To be sure, we could have handled that confrontation better.	平心而论，我们本可以更好地处理这一冲突。


But for an analyst to blame the victim of such financial violence is not only morally reprehensible, but also constitutes terrible service to his clients (who, for example, may be lulled into a false sense that Greece is on the mend now that Varoufakis has been forced out).	但对一名分析师来说，谴责这一金融暴力的受害者不仅道德不正确，对其客户来说也是非常糟糕的服务（比如，其客户可能因此错误地认为希腊的情况正在因为瓦鲁法基斯被迫下台而好转）。


Thankfully, there are diligent analysts, like Mohamed El-Erian, to whom sensible investors can turn.	谢天谢地，勤勉的分析师还是有的，比如，穆罕默德·艾利安（Mohamed El-Erian）就是明智的投资者可以信赖的对象。


And their verdict is clear: Greece’s downturn in 2015 was due to the “Troika effect.”	这些分析师的结论很明确：2015年希腊衰退是拜“三驾马车效应”所赐。


Yes, political risk in Europe is clear and present.	是的，欧洲的政治风险显而易见。


But it emanates from the Troika’s unwillingness to reform itself and to rethink its failed policies.	但它源自三驾马车不愿改革自身、反思失败的政策。


Author’s postscript: Following the publication of this article, the pernicious “Troika effect” became even clearer when it was revealed that the chart Holger Schmieding used to demonstrate the “Varoufakis effect” was rather economical with the truth.	作者补充：本文发表后，据披露，施米丁用来说明“瓦鲁法基斯效应”的图表对于真相做了诸多保留，这更加清楚地揭示了“三架马车效应”的险恶。


The original chart (published here) shows clearly that business confidence dove at the end of 2014, well before the Greek election and my appointment as Minister of Finance.	原始图表（发布在这里）清楚地表明，2014年底商业信心就已经崩盘，远早于希腊选举和我被任命为财政部长。


In Schmieding’s letter to his investors, the horizontal axis was stretched to show that business confidence fell well into 2015, once I was in office.	在施米丁致投资者的信中，横轴被拉长，以显示商业信心在进入2015年后的下跌，当时我在任。


Nothing could better illustrate that investors have much to fear from analysts like Schmieding.	没有比这更能说明投资者绝对需要更加担心施米丁这样的分析师得了。


The Political Consequences of Financial Crises	金融危机的政治后果


LONDON – I may not be the only finance professor who, when setting essay topics for his or her students, has resorted to a question along the following lines: “In your view, was the global financial crisis caused primarily by too much government intervention in financial markets, or by too little?”	伦敦—我想必绝非唯一这样的金融学教授：在为学生设定文论主题时，会提出诸如“在你看来，全球金融危机的主因是政府对金融市场的干预太多还是太少？ ”这样的问题。


When confronted with this either/or question, my most recent class split three ways.	在面对这类是/还是问题时，我最近带的一批学生分成了三个阵营。


Roughly a third, mesmerized by the meretricious appeal of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, argued that governments were the original sinners.	大概有三分之一的学生被有效市场假说的故弄玄虚所折服，他们认为政府有原罪。


Their ill-conceived interventions – notably the US-backed mortgage underwriters Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the Community Reinvestment Act – distorted market incentives.	政府的考虑不周的干预——特别是美国政府支持的按揭承销商房利美和房地美，以及社区再投资法（Community Reinvestment Act）——扭曲了市场激励。


Some even embraced the argument of the US libertarian Ron Paul, blaming the very existence of the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort.	有些人甚至信奉美国自由派罗恩·保罗（Ron Paul）的观点，批判美联储作为最后贷款人的存在。


Another third, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, saw former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan as the villain.	另有三分之一的学生的政治立场正好相反，他们认为美联储前主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）是罪魁祸首。


It was Greenspan’s notorious reluctance to intervene in financial markets, even when leverage was growing dramatically and asset prices seemed to have lost touch with reality, that created the problem.	格林斯潘以不愿意干预金融市场而闻名，即使在杠杆大幅提高、资产价格看起来早已脱离现实支撑的情况下也是如此，这才是问题的根源。


More broadly, Western governments, with their light-touch approach to regulation, allowed markets to career out of control in the early years of this century.	更广泛地说，西方政府的其象征性监管方针导致了市场在本世纪初失控。


The remaining third tried to have it both ways, arguing that governments intervened too much in some areas, and too little in others.	剩下三分之一学生则两可之，认为政府在某些方面干预过多，在另一些方面干预过少。


Avoiding the question as put is not a sound test-taking strategy; but the students may have been onto something.	回避问题可不是通过考试的好办法； 但学生们也许已经做过了深入思考。


Now that the crisis is seven years behind us, how have governments and voters in Europe and North America answered this important question?	如今，危机已经过去了七年，政府和欧洲及美国的选民如何回答这一重要问题？


Have they shown, by their actions, that they think financial markets need tighter controls or that, on the contrary, the state should repudiate bailouts and leave financial firms to face the full consequences of their own mistakes?	他们用行动证明了他们认为金融市场需要更严格的监管，还是相反，国家应该拒绝提供援助，让金融企业直面自身错误的全部后果？


From their rhetoric and regulatory policies, it would appear that most governments have ended up in the third, fence-sitting camp.	从政府的言辞和监管政策看，大部分政府属于骑墙派的那三分之一。


Yes, they have implemented a plethora of detailed controls, scrutinizing banks’ books with unprecedented intensity and insisting on approving cash distributions, the appointment of key directors, and even job descriptions for board members.	诚然，它们实施了众多详细的控制，以前所未有的力度检查了银行的账目，并批准派发现金、任命重要董事甚至对董事会成员的职业描述。


But they have ruled out any future government or central-bank support for ailing financial institutions.	但它们排除了一切未来政府或央行对告急金融机构的支持。


Banks must now produce “living wills” showing how they can be wound down without the authorities’ support.	现在，银行必须订好“生前遗嘱”，说明在没有当局支持的情况下如何进行清算和关门。


The government will wash its hands of them if they run into trouble: the era of “too big to fail” is over.	当它们陷入麻烦时，政府将袖手旁观：“太大而不能倒”的时代已经结束了。


Perhaps this two-track approach was inevitable, though it would be good to know the desired end-point.	也许这一双轨制方针是不可避免的，不过了解其预期终点仍然是有裨益的。


Is it a system in which market discipline again dominates, or will regulators sit on the shoulders of management for the foreseeable future?	这是一套市场纪律再次成为主导的制度，还是监管者将在可预见的未来凌驾于管理层之上？


But what have voters concluded?	但选民的结论是什么？


In the first wave of post-crisis elections, the message was clear in one sense, and clouded in another.	在危机后的第一波选举中，从某种程度上看结论是明确的，但从另一个角度看又有些模糊。


Whichever government was in power when the crisis hit, whether left or right, was booted out and replaced by a government of the opposite political persuasion.	危机爆发时在台上执政的���府，不管是左翼还是右翼，都被赶下了台，取而代之的是政治口号相反的政府。


That was not universally true – see Germany’s Angela Merkel – but it certainly was true in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere.	并非全部如此——德国的默克尔可以证明——但显然在美国、英国、法国和其他国家是如此。


France moved from right to left, and the UK went from left to right.	法国从右转向左，而英国从左转向右。


But voters’ verdict on their governments was more or less identical: things went wrong on your watch, so out you go.	但选民对政府的评价或多或少是一样的：你在台上，情况不好，所以请你下台。


But now we can see a more consistent trend developing.	但如今，我们可以看到一个更加一致的趋势正在发展。


Three German economists, Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularik, and Christoph Trebesch, have just produced a fascinating assessment based on more than 800 elections in Western countries over the last 150 years, the results of which they mapped against 100 financial crises.	三位德国经济学家——曼努埃尔·芬克（Manuel Funke）、莫里茨·舒拉里克（Moritz Schularik）和克里斯托弗·特雷贝施（Christoph Trebesch）最近对西方国家过去150年中的800多次选举进行了出色的评估，并根据100起金融危机进行了排列分析。


Their headline conclusion is stark: “politics takes a hard right turn following financial crises.	他们的结论十分醒目：“金融危机后政治会急转向右。


On average, far-right votes increase by about a third in the five years following systemic banking distress.”	平均而言，极右翼选票在系统性银行困境出现五年内会增加三分之一。 ”


The Great Depression of the 1930s, which followed the Wall Street crash of 1929, is the most obvious and worrying example that comes to mind, but the trend can be observed even in the Scandinavian countries, following banking crises there in the early 1990s.	1929年华尔街崩盘后发生的20世纪30年代的大萧条是最显著、最令人担忧的例子，但这一趋势即便在斯堪的纳维亚国家也有迹可循，比如20世纪90年代银行危机之后。


So seeking to explain, say, the rise of the National Front in France in terms of President François Hollande’s personal and political unpopularity is not sensible.	因此，试图用法国总统奥朗德个人和政治上的不受欢迎来解释法国国民阵线的崛起是很牵强的。


There are greater forces at work than his exotic private life and inability to connect with voters.	有比奥朗德混乱的私生活和无力连同选民更加深刻的因素在起作用。


The second major conclusion that Funke, Schularik, and Trebesch draw is that governing becomes harder after financial crises, for two reasons.	芬克、舒拉里克和特雷贝施的第二个重要结论是治理在金融危机后会更加困难，原因有二。


The rise of the far right lies alongside a political landscape that is typically fragmented, with more parties, and a lower share of the vote going to the governing party, whether of the left or the right.	极右翼的崛起带来了常常是支离破碎的政治局面，政党数量增加，执政党（不管是左翼还是右翼）所获选票比重降低。


So decisive legislative action becomes more challenging.	因此决定性的立法行动更加难以做出。


At the same time, a surge of extra-parliamentary mobilization occurs: more and longer strikes and more and larger demonstrations.	与此同时，院外动员情况会出现爆发式增长：罢工更加普遍，时间更长； 游行示威规模也会更大。


Control of the streets by government is not as secure.	政府的街头管制未必管用。


The average number of anti-government demonstrations triples, the frequency of violent riots doubles, and general strikes increase by at least a third.	平均而言，反政府游行示威数量会增加两倍，暴力动乱的频率会增加一倍，大罢工至少会增加三分之一。


Greece has boosted those numbers recently.	最近的希腊把这些数字又提高了一些。


The only comforting conclusion that the three economists reach is that these effects gradually peter out.	三位经济学家唯一令人放心的结论是这些影响会逐渐消散。


The data tell us that after five years, the worst is over.	数据表明，五年后，最坏的情况就过去了。


That does not seem to be the way things are moving now in Europe, if we look at France’s recent election scare, not to mention Finland and Poland, where right-wing populists have now come to power.	而目前的欧洲似乎并非如此，法国最近的选举恐慌就是明证，更不用说芬兰和波兰了，那里的极右翼民粹主义者已经掌权。


Maybe the answer is that the clock starts ticking on the five years when the crisis is fully over, which is not yet true in Europe.	也许答案在于时间要从危机完全结束后开始计算，而目前欧洲的危机显然还没有结束。


So politics seems set to remain a difficult trade for some time.	因此，在一段时间内，政治似乎会继续焦灼。


And the bankers and financiers who are widely blamed for the crisis will remain in the sin bin for a while yet, until voters’ expectations of economic and financial stability are more consistently satisfied.	被广泛指责为危机原因的银行家和金融家将继续背负罪名，直到选民对经济和金融稳定的预期得到更加一致的满足。


Financial Crisis and War	金融危机与战争


PRINCETON – The approach of the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 has jolted politicians and commentators worried by the fragility of current global political and economic arrangements.	普林斯顿——随着1914年一战百年庆典在即，政界及评论界人士正为当前脆弱的全球政治经济环境而忧心忡忡。


Indeed, Luxembourg’s prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, recently argued that Europe’s growing north-south polarization has set the continent back by a century.	事实上，卢森堡首相让－克洛德·容克最近提出欧洲日趋严重的南北分化让这块大陆倒退了整整一个世纪之多。


The lessons of 1914 are about more than simply the dangers of national animosities.	1914年大战的教训不仅是民族仇恨的危险性。


The origins of the Great War include a fascinating precedent concerning how financial globalization can become the equivalent of a national arms race, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the international order.	一战的起因中包括金融全球化在何种情况下会等同于国家军备竞赛，进而对国际秩序构成威胁的有趣先例。


In 1907, a major financial crisis emanating from the United States affected the rest of the world and demonstrated the fragility of the entire international financial system.	1907年，一场源自美国的大规模金融危机开始影响其他国家，并显露出国际金融体系的脆弱特征。


The response to the current financial crisis is replaying a similar dynamic.	对当前金融危机所采取的对策也具备类似的特征。


Walter Bagehot’s 1873 classic Lombard Street described the City of London as “the greatest combination of economic power and economic delicacy that the world has ever seen.”	沃尔特·白芝浩1873年的经典著作《朗伯德街》将伦敦形容为“全球有史以来经济力量和经济脆弱性最完美的结合。


In one influential interpretation, popularized by the novelist, Labour Party MP, and future Nobel Peace Prize laureate Norman Angell in 1910, the interdependency of the increasingly complex global economy made war impossible.	”根据小说家、工党议员兼1910年诺贝尔和平奖获得者诺曼·安吉尔的著名解释，复杂全球经济的相互依赖彻底消除了战争的可能。


But the opposite conclusion was equally plausible: Given the extent of fragility, a clever twist to the control levers might facilitate a military victory by the economic hegemon.	但反向结论同样站得住脚：鉴于全球经济脆弱性，巧妙地操纵控制能协助经济霸主取得军事成功。


The aftermath of the 1907 crash drove the hegemonic power of the time – Great Britain – to reflect on how it could use its financial clout to enhance its overall strategic capacity.	1907年股灾后，当时的霸主英国开始反思如何利用金融影响提升其整体战略优势。


That is the conclusion of an important recent book, Nicholas Lambert’s study of British economic planning and the First World War, entitled Planning Armageddon.	这是尼古拉斯·兰伯特最近一部研究一战及英国经济规划的重要著作《规划大决战》的结论内容。


Lambert demonstrates how, in a grand strategic gamble, Britain began to marry its military – and especially naval – predominance and its global financial leadership.	兰伯特展示了在一场宏伟的战略赌局中，英国如何把其军事——尤其是海军优势与全球金融领导力相结合。


Between 1905 and 1908, the British Admiralty developed the broad outlines of a plan for financial and economic warfare against Europe’s rising power, Germany.	1905年到1908年，英国海军部制定了对欧洲新兴强国德国发动金融经济战的大致计划轮廓。


Economic warfare, if implemented in full, would wreck Germany’s financial system and force it out of any military conflict.	经济战计划全面实施将破坏德国的金融体系，迫使其退出任何军事冲突。


When Britain’s naval visionaries confronted a rival in the form of the Kaiser’s Germany, they understood how power could thrive on financial fragility.	当英国海军梦想家遭遇凯撒德国式的竞争对手，他们非常清楚如何利用对手的金融脆弱性增强自身的军事力量。


Pre-1914 Britain anticipated the private-public partnership that today links technology giants such as Google, Apple, or Verizon to US intelligence agencies.	1914年前，英国就对今天将谷歌、苹果或威瑞森等科技巨头与美国情报机构相联系的公私伙伴关系有所预测。


London banks underwrote most of the world’s trade; Lloyds provided insurance for the world’s shipping.	伦敦银行为大部分世界贸易提供担保； 劳埃德当之无愧地成为世界航运险的巨头。


These financial networks provided the information that enabled the British government to discover the sensitive strategic vulnerabilities of the opposing alliance.	上述金融网络提供的信息使英国政府能够发现敌对联盟战略上敏感的薄弱环节。


For Britain’s rivals, the financial panic of 1907 demonstrated the necessity of mobilizing financial power themselves.	而对英国的对手，1907年的金融恐慌向他们展示了掌握金融力量是多么必要。


The US, for its part, recognized that it needed a central bank analogous to the Bank of England.	如美国就意识到需要成立与英格兰银行相似的中央银行。


American financiers were persuaded that New York needed to develop its own commercial trading system to handle bills of exchange in the same way as the London market and arrange their monetization (or “acceptance”).	现实告诉美国金融家纽约需要建设自身的商业交易系统，像伦敦市场那样处理汇票并实现汇票的货币化（也叫“承兑业务”）。


The central figure in pushing for the development of an American acceptance market was Paul Warburg, the immigrant younger brother of a great Hamburg banker who was the personal adviser to Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II.	开创美国承兑市场的核心人物是保罗·沃伯格，保罗是曾任德皇威廉二世私人顾问的那位伟大的汉堡银行家移民美国的亲弟弟。


The Warburg brothers, Max and Paul, were a transatlantic tandem, energetically pushing for German-American institutions that would offer an alternative to British industrial and financial monopoly.	沃伯格兄弟（马克斯和保罗）在大西洋两岸共同努力推动德美金融体系的发展，打破英国在工业和金融领域的垄断地位。


They were convinced that Germany and the US were growing stronger year by year, while British power would erode.	他们深信英国的实力会随着德美两国实力的逐年增强而不断削弱。


Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now reemerging.	1914年前世界金融市场的某些动态如今再度出现。


In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass economic destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power.	在2008年那场金融危机的余波中，金融机构似乎既是大规模经济破坏的危险武器，又是国家权力应用的潜在工具。


In managing the 2008 crisis, foreign banks’ dependence on US-dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve.	在2008年的危机管理中，外国银行对美元资本的依赖构成一种主要弱点，需要美联储保证较大的换汇额度。


Addressing that flaw requires renationalization of banking, and breaking up the activities of large financial institutions.	解决这个问题需要对银行重新执行国有化，并停止大型金融机构的活动。


For European bankers, and some governments, current efforts by the US to revise its approach to the operation of foreign bank subsidiaries within its territory highlight that imperative.	在欧洲银行家和某些政府看来，美国当前修改对外国银行附属机构在美经营态度的做法凸显了上述趋势的势在必行。


They view the US move as a new sort of financial protectionism and are threatening retaliation.	他们将美国此举视为一种新的金融保护主义，并威胁要予以报复。


Geopolitics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere as well.	地缘政治因素在其他国家也开始对银行经营起干扰作用。


Russian banks are trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe.	俄罗斯银行正竭力在中东欧地区收购资产。


European banks are playing a much-reduced role in Asian trade finance.	亚洲贸易融资领域正不遗余力地限制欧洲银行的作用。


Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce.	中国银行被迫扩大其对全球商务活动的参与。


Many countries have begun to look at financial protectionism as a way to increase their political leverage.	很多国家已开始运用金融保护主义的方法扩大政治领域的杠杆作用。


The next step in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic conflict.	这种逻辑的下一步是思考如何让金融实力在外交冲突中转化为国家优势。


Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states like Iran and North Korea.	制裁是对伊朗和朝鲜等无赖国家施压的常规程序，但却并不十分成功。


But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the global economy.	但向更深植根于全球经济的国家施压的效果却可能好得多。


In 1907, in the wake of an epochal financial crisis that almost brought a complete global collapse, several countries started to think of finance primarily as an instrument of raw power that could and should be turned to national advantage.	1907年，随着一场几乎令全球陷入崩溃的划时代的金融危机，一些国家开始把金融视为能够而且应当转化为国家优势的代表原始力量的工具来加以运用。


That kind of thinking brought war in 1914.	这种想法导致在1914年一战爆发。


A century later, in 2007-2008, the world experienced an even greater financial shock, and nationalistic passions have flared up in its wake.	一个世纪后的2007-2008年，世界经历了规模更大的金融震荡，并随后点燃了民族主义激情。


Destructive strategies may not be far behind.	破坏性战略也许并非遥不可及。


A Financial Early-Warning System	金融早期预警系统


NEW YORK – Recent market volatility – in emerging and developed economies alike – is showing once again how badly ratings agencies and investors can err in assessing countries’ economic and financial vulnerabilities.	纽约—最近的市场波动——新兴市场和发达经济体都一样——再一次证明，评级机构和投资者在评估各国经济和金融脆弱性时会犯下极其严重的错误。


Ratings agencies wait too long to spot risks and downgrade countries, while investors behave like herds, often ignoring the build-up of risk for too long, before shifting gears abruptly and causing exaggerated market swings.	评级机构需要太长的时间认识风险、调降国家评级，而投资者的行为就像是羊群，常常在太长的时间里忽视风险的累积，然后突然转变方向，导致市场波动放大。


Given the nature of market turmoil, an early-warning system for financial tsunamis may be difficult to create; but the world needs one today more than ever.	从市场动荡的性质看，金融海啸早期预警系统也许很难构建； 但如今世界比任何其他时候都更加需要这样一套系统。


Few people foresaw the subprime crisis of 2008, the risk of default in the eurozone, or the current turbulence in financial markets worldwide.	几乎没有人预见到2008年的次贷危机、欧元区违约风险和当前全球金融市场动荡。


Fingers have been pointed at politicians, banks, and supranational institutions.	指责之声纷纷指向政客、银行和超国家机构。


But ratings agencies and analysts who misjudged the repayment ability of debtors – including governments – have gotten off too lightly.	但错判债务人（包括政府）偿还能力的评级机构和分析师的责任却被一笔带过。


In principle, credit ratings are based on statistical models of past defaults; in practice, however, with few national defaults having actually occurred, sovereign ratings are often a subjective affair.	理论上，评级机构基于过去违约的统计模型； 但是，在实践中，国家违约的情况十分罕见，主权评级常常是基于主观做出的。


Analysts at ratings agencies follow developments in the country for which they are responsible and, when necessary, travel there to review the situation.	评级机构的分析师追踪他们所负责的国家的发展趋势，必要时到相应的国家去看看情况如何。


This process means that ratings are often backward-looking, downgrades occur too late, and countries are typically rerated based on when analysts visit, rather than when fundamentals change.	这一过程意味着评级往往是后瞻的，降级总是来得太晚，而国家获得评级通常取决于分析师何时到访，而不是基本面何时改变。


Moreover, ratings agencies lack the tools to track consistently vital factors such as changes in social inclusion, the country’s ability to innovate, and private-sector balance-sheet risk.	此外，评级机构缺少连贯追踪重要因素的工具，如社会凝聚力变化、国家创新能力、私人部门资产负债表风险等。


And yet sovereign ratings matter tremendously.	但主权评级影响甚大。


For many investors, credit ratings dictate where and how much they can invest.	对许多投资者来说，信用评级决定了投资在哪里、投资多少。


Ratings affect how much banks are willing to lend, and how much developing countries – and their citizens – must pay to borrow.	评级影响银行愿意贷款多少，以及发展中国家（及其公民）必须获得多大的代价才能借到钱。


They inform corporations’ decisions regarding whom to do business with, and on what terms.	它们决定着公司和谁做生意，开出什么条件。


Given the problems with ratings agencies, investors and regulators recognize the need for a different approach.	由于评级机构的这些问题，投资者和监管者认识到需要采取不同的方法。


Investors have tried to identify good alternatives – and have largely failed.	投资者试图寻找好的替代品——基本以失败告终。


Assessments of risk such as sovereign interest-rate spreads and credit default swaps react (and often over-react) fast; but, because they reflect only the market’s understanding of risk, they are not a systematic mechanism for uncovering hidden risks and avoiding crises.	主权利差和信用违约互换等风险评估手段反应（常常过度反应）迅速； 但是，由于它们仅仅反映了市场对风险的理解，因此并非揭示隐藏风险和避免危机的系统性机制。


Indeed, the recent sudden rise in market volatility suggests that they are as bad as rating agencies at detecting the early warning signs of trouble.	事实上，最近市场波动性猛然上升表明它们在侦测早期麻烦预警信号方面和评级机构一样糟糕。


Regulators, meanwhile, are now starting to require banks to develop their own internal ratings processes.	与此同时，监管者现在开始要求银行开发自身的内部评级程序。


The problem is that few institutions have the tools and expertise to do this alone.	问题在于只有极少数机构拥有独力完成这项任务的工具和知识。


A comprehensive assessment of a country’s macro investment risk requires looking systematically at the stocks and flows of the national account to capture all dangers, including risk in the financial system and the real economy, as well as wider risk issues.	全面评估一国的宏观投资风险需要系统性地研究国民账户的存量和流量，捕捉所有危险情况，包括金融系统和实体经济的风险以及更广泛的风险问题。


As we have seen in recent crises, private risk taking and debt are socialized when a crisis occurs.	我们在最近的危机中看到，危机发生时，私人冒险行为和债务就会社会化。


So, even when public deficits and debt are low before a crisis, they can rise sharply after one erupts.	因此，即使危机前公共赤字和债务很低，也可能在危机爆发后急剧升高。


Governments that looked fiscally sound suddenly appear insolvent.	财政状况看上去十分可靠的政府可能一夜之间变得资不抵债。


Using 200 quantitative variables and factors to score 174 countries on a quarterly basis, we have identified a number of countries where investors are missing risks – and opportunities.	我们使用200个量化变量和因素，为174个国家进行季度评分，发现对于很多国家，投资者们正在错过风险和机会。


China is a perfect example.	中国是很好的例子。


The country’s home developers, local governments, and state-owned enterprises are severely over-indebted.	中国住房��发商、地方政府和国有企业都有严重的过度负债问题。


China has the balance-sheet strength to bail them out, but the authorities would then face a choice: embrace reform or rely once again on leverage to stimulate the economy.	中国有强大的资产负债表，足以救助它们，但当局因此面临一个选择：采取改革，或再次依靠杠杆刺激经济。


Even if China continues on the latter course, it will fail to achieve its growth targets and will look more fragile over time.	即使中国继续选择后者，也无法实现增长目标，并且会随着时间的推移而日益脆弱弱。


Brazil should have been downgraded below investment grade last year, as the economy struggled with a widening fiscal deficit, a growing economy-wide debt burden, and a weak and worsening business environment.	巴西在去年就应该被降级到投资级以下，因为巴西经济存在不断扩大的财政赤字、日益增加的总体经济债务负担，以及疲软且不断恶化的商业环境。


The corruption scandal at energy giant Petrobras is finally causing ratings agencies to reassess Brazil, but the move comes too late, and their downgrades probably will not be sufficient to reflect the true risk.	能源巨头巴西石油公司（Petrobras）的腐败丑闻最终导致评级机构重新评估巴西，但这一动作来得太迟了，并且降级幅度也许也不足以反映真正的风险。


Other emerging markets also look fragile and at risk of an eventual downgrade.	其他新兴市场看上去也十分脆弱，有可能遭遇降级。


In the eurozone, shadow ratings already signaled red flags in the late 2000s in Greece and the other countries of the periphery.	在欧元区，影子评级在2010年之前便给希腊和其他外围国亮起了红灯。


More recently, Ireland and Spain may deserve to be upgraded, following fiscal consolidation and reforms.	后来，爱尔兰和西班牙进行了财政整合和改革，也许应该获得升级。


Greece, however, remains a basket case.	但是，希腊毫无改善迹象。


Even with substantial reform to improve its growth potential, Greece will never be able to repay its sovereign debt and needs substantial relief.	即使采取了重大改革刺激增长潜力，希腊仍无法偿还期主权债务，需要大规模债务纾困。


An assessment of sovereign risk that is systematic and data-driven could help to spot the risks that changing global headwinds imply.	系统性、以数据为基础的主权风险评估有助于发现全球不利因素改变所隐含的风险。


To that extent, it provides exactly what the world needs now: an approach that removes the need to rely on the ad hoc and slow-moving approach of ratings agencies and the noisy and volatile signals coming from markets.	从这个角度讲，它提供了世界现在所需要的：让人们不再需要依靠临时性的、变化缓慢的评级机构方法以及充满噪声和波动的来自市场的信号的方法。


Financial Hypocrisy	金融伪善


This year marks the tenth anniversary of the East Asia crisis, which began in Thailand on July 2, 1997, and spread to Indonesia in October and to Korea in December.	今年是亚洲金融危机十周年。 这场危机于1997年7月2日从泰国发端，分别于10月份和12月份蔓延到印尼和韩国。


Eventually, it became a global financial crisis, embroiling Russia and Latin American countries, such as Brazil, and unleashing forces that played out over the ensuing years: Argentina in 2001 may be counted as among its victims.	最终成为全球金融危机，俄国和拉美国家，例如巴西卷入其中，并且释放出了在随后几年中显现出来的力量。 2001年的阿根廷可以被算做是受害者之一。


There were many other innocent victims, including countries that had not even engaged in the international capital flows that were at the root of the crisis.	还有许多无辜的受害者，包括那些没有参与是危机根源的国际资本流动的国家。


Indeed, Laos was among the worst-affected countries.	实际上，老挝成为受到打击最为严重的国家。


Though every crisis eventually ends, no one knew at the time how broad, deep, and long the ensuing recessions and depressions would be.	尽管所有的危机最终都会结束，当时没有人知道随之而来的衰退和萧条的范围会有大，程度会有多深，历时会有多长。


It was the worst global crisis since the Great Depression.	这是从大萧条以来最严重的全球危机。


As the World Bank’s chief economist and senior vice president, I was in the middle of the conflagration and the debates about its causes and the appropriate policy responses.	作为世界银行的首席经济学家和高级副总裁，我亲身经历了这一危机以及有关这一危机根源和适当的政策对策的辩论。


This summer and fall, I revisited many of the affected countries, including Malaysia, Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia.	今年夏天和秋天，我再度访问了许多受到危机影响的国家。


It is heartwarming to see their recovery.	这些国家现在的经济增长速度是5%和6%，甚至更快。


These countries are now growing at 5% or 6% or more – not quite as fast as in the days of the East Asia miracle, but far more rapidly than many thought possible in the aftermath of the crisis.	尽管不是在亚洲经济奇迹的年代那么快，但是也要比危机后人们认为可能的要快很多。


Many countries changed their policies, but in directions markedly different from the reforms that the IMF had urged.	许多国家改变了政策，但是改变的方向与国际货币基金组织所敦促的大为不同。


The poor were among those who bore the biggest burden of the crisis, as wages plummeted and unemployment soared.	当工资锐减和失业率上升的时候，穷人承受了危机中最大的负担。


As countries emerged, many placed a new emphasis on “harmony,” in an effort to redress the growing divide between rich and poor, urban and rural.	在各国崛起得时候，许多都新近强调“和谐”，以便解决贫富之间和城乡之间不断拉大的差别。


They gave greater weight to investments in people, launching innovative initiatives to bring health care and access to finance to more of their citizens, and creating social funds to help develop local communities.	它们更为重视对人力的投资，实行了创新性的项目来为本国人们带来医疗和信贷，并且建立社会基金来帮助发展地方社区。


Looking back at the crisis a decade later, we can see more clearly how wrong the diagnosis, prescription, and prognosis of the IMF and United States Treasury were.	十年之后回首这一危机，我们可以更为清晰地看到国际货币基金组织和美国财政部的判断、处方以及预测是多么错误。


The fundamental problem was premature capital market liberalization.	根本问题是过早地开放资本市场。


It is therefore ironic to see the US Treasury Secretary once again pushing for capital market liberalization in India – one of the two major developing countries (along with China) to emerge unscathed from the 1997 crisis.	因此，我们具有讽刺意味地看到美国财政部长再次敦促印度开放资本市场。 印度和中国是从1997年金融危机中从容脱身的两大发展中国家。


It is no accident that these countries that had not fully liberalized their capital markets have done so well.	没有完全开放资本市场的国家表现优异并不足为奇。


Subsequent research by the IMF has confirmed what every serious study had shown: capital market liberalization brings instability, but not necessarily growth.	国际货币基金组织随后的研究已经确认了每个严肃认真的研究所表明的东西，那就是资本市场开放带来不稳定，而不一定是增长。


(India and China have, by the same token, been the fastest-growing economies.)	由于同样的原因，中国和印度是增长最快的经济体。


Of course, Wall Street (whose interests the US Treasury represents) profits from capital market liberalization: they make money as capital flows in, as it flows out, and in the restructuring that occurs in the resulting havoc.	当然，华尔街(美国财政部代表了华尔街的利益)从资本市场开放中获益。 当资本流入流出并且在随后混乱中的重组的时候，华尔街从中受益。


In South Korea, the IMF urged the sale of the country’s banks to American investors, even though Koreans had managed their own economy impressively for four decades, with higher growth, more stability, and without the systemic scandals that have marked US financial markets with such frequency.	韩国人自己在过去四十年中管理经济出色，具有更高的经济增长和更大的稳定，也没有美国金融市场如此频繁的丑闻。 尽管如此，国际货币基金组织还是敦促其将银行出售给美国的投资者。


In some cases, US firms bought the banks, held on to them until Korea recovered, and then resold them, reaping billions in capital gains.	在某些情况中，美国公司购买银行，在韩国复苏之前一直持有这些银行，随后创新出售它们，从中赚取几十亿美元的利润。


In its rush to have westerners buy the banks, the IMF forgot one detail: to ensure that South Korea could recapture at least a fraction of those gains through taxation.	国际货币基金组织仓促地让西方人购买银行，却忘记了一个细节，那就是确保韩国可以通过税收重新获取至少些许收益。


Whether US investors had greater expertise in banking in emerging markets may be debatable; that they had greater expertise in tax avoidance is not.	美国投资者在新兴市场的银行业是否具有更大的专长或许值得讨论，但是他们在避税方面具有更大的专长则是无须讨论的。


The contrast between the IMF/US Treasury advice to East Asia and what has happened in the current sub-prime debacle is glaring.	国际货币基金组织和美国财政部给东亚国家的建议和当前次级房贷危机的形成鲜明的对照。


East Asian countries were told to raise their interest rates, in some cases to 25%, 40%, or higher, causing a rash of defaults.	它们告诉东亚国家要提高利率，在某些情况下达到25%、40%甚至更高，造成一大片拖欠。


In the current crisis, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank cut interest rates.	在当前的危机中，美联储和欧洲央行则在降息。


Similarly, the countries caught up in the East Asia crisis were lectured on the need for greater transparency and better regulation.	同样地，卷入金融危机的国家被教训说要更加透明和更好地管理。


But lack of transparency played a central role in this past summer’s credit crunch; toxic mortgages were sliced and diced, spread around the world, packaged with better products, and hidden away as collateral, so no one could be sure who was holding what.	但是透明度的缺乏在今年夏天的信贷紧缩中发挥了重要的作用； 毒性的房屋贷款被重组，扩散到全球，和更好的产品一起包装起来，然后以抵押的形式隐藏起来，因此没人确切知道谁持有什么东西。


And there is now a chorus of caution about new regulations, which supposedly might hamper financial markets (including their exploitation of uninformed borrowers, which lay at the root of the problem.)	现在又有很多人异口同声地反对新的管理条例。 人们认为这些条例将会可能阻碍金融市场(包括盘剥信息不灵的借贷者，这是问题的根源)。


Finally, despite all the warnings about moral hazard, Western banks have been partly bailed out of their bad investments.	最后，尽管对道德危险发出了警告，西方银行则部分地被从糟糕的投资中拯救出来。


Following the 1997 crisis, there was a consensus that fundamental reform of the global financial architecture were needed.	1997年危机以后人们形成了共识，就是需要对全球金融建筑结构进行根本性的改革。


But, while the current system may lead to unnecessary instability, and impose huge costs on developing countries, it serves some interests well.	但是，当前的体系或许会导致不必要的不稳定并给发展中国家造成巨大的代价，它还是很好地满足了某些利益。


It is not surprising, then, that ten years later, there has been no fundamental reform.	因此，十年以后还是没有根本性的改革也就不足为奇了。


Nor, therefore, is it surprising that the world is once again facing a period of global financial instability, with uncertain outcomes for the world’s economies.	全世界再一次面临全球金融不稳定，世界经济前景不明朗同样也不足为奇了。


A Banker’s Revolution	银行家的革命


KUALA LUMPUR – Financial regulators are generally known for taking a measured and cautious approach to change.	吉隆坡—一般认为，金融监管者对于变化采取克制慎重的态度。


But in the developing world, that reputation is being turned upside down.	但在发达世界，这一名声正在发生颠覆。


In some of the world’s poorest countries, central bankers have proved willing to make bold decisions – embracing innovative approaches in their quest to broaden participation in the formal financial system, increase financial stability, and put their countries on the path to inclusive, sustainable economic growth.	在一些世界上最贫困的国家，央行官员愿意采取果断措施——为了加大在正式金融体系中的参与、增加金融稳定以及让国家走上包容的可持续经济增长之路，他们实施了创新方针。


Increasing financial inclusion requires fundamentally rethinking how a country’s financial system is structured and operates.	增加金融包容性需要从根本上反思一国的金融体系是如何构造和运行的。


It also frequently necessitates the use of instruments outside of the central bankers’ traditional toolkit.	此外，通常还必须用到传统央行工具箱之外的工具。


In Kenya, for instance, officials altered the regulatory framework to allow for the growth of mobile money.	比如，在肯尼亚，官员改变监管框架以便利移动资金（mobile money）的增长。


In Malaysia, the central bank took a lead role in raising the public’s level of financial literacy.	在马来西亚，央行在提高公共金融知识水平方面起着领导作用。


And in the Philippines, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas helped double the number of access points where consumers could obtain financial services, supporting the opening of 517 micro-banking offices, many of them in municipalities with no traditional bank branches.	在菲律宾，菲律宾央行将消费者能够获得金融服务的接入点数量扩大了一倍，支持517家微银行开张，其中许多开在没有传统银行网点的行政区。


Likewise, in 2011, the Bank of Tanzania made a specific commitment to increase financial inclusion under the Alliance for Financial Inclusion’s Maya Declaration, a commitment by policymakers in the developing world to unlock the social and economic potential of the poor.	类似地，2011年，坦桑尼亚银行根据金融包容联盟（Alliance for Financial Inclusion）的玛雅宣言，做出了增加金融包容性的具体承诺。 玛雅宣言是发展中国家决策者解放穷人社会和经济潜力的承诺。


The result was dramatic and vastly exceeded expectations.	结果是造成了巨大的、大大超过的预期。


Tanzania reached its goal of providing 50% of its adult citizens with access to banking a year ahead of schedule, making the country a global leader in digital financial services.	坦桑尼亚提前一年实现了其为50%成年公民提供银行服务的目标，该国也成为数字金融服务的全球领先者。


As in neighboring Kenya, the game changer was the widespread adoption of mobile money.	在其邻国肯尼亚，局面改变因素是移动资金的广泛使用。


“It may sound maverick,” said Benno Ndulu, the bank’s governor. “But we must let innovation run ahead of regulation.”	“听起来也许有点不可思议，”肯尼亚央行行长尼杜杜（Benno Ndulu）说，“但我们必须让创新走在监管之前。


While East Africa is blazing the trail when it comes to electronic money, other parts of the world are adopting different innovative approaches.	在电子货币方面，东非可谓开路先锋，而世界的另一端正在采取不同的创新方针。


Last year in Colombia, Congress passed a law creating a new type of financial institution called a Specialized Electronic Deposit and Payment Institution.	去年，哥伦比亚议会通过了一项法律，成立一种新类型的金融机构——电子存款和支付专门局（Specialized Electronic Deposit and Payment Institution）。


While not technically banks, these institutions are able to accept customer deposits and payments electronically through mobile phones or at licensed locations like a post office.	在技术上，它们不是银行，但这些机构能够通过移动电话或在邮局等特许场所接受客户的电子存款和支付。


The effort is part of a larger national strategy, launched in 2014, to provide 76% of adults with financial access and 56% with active savings accounts by the end of 2016.	这一政策是2014年所发布的更大的国家战略的一部分——到2016年底为76%的成年人和56%的活跃储蓄账户提供金融服务。


And in the Pacific region, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Vanuatu have banded together to create the Pacific Islands Regional Initiative (PIRI), which will enable every Pacific Island state, even those without a central bank, to share knowledge on improving access, quality, and usage of financial services in geographically challenging environments.	在太平洋地区，斐济、巴布亚新几内亚、萨摩亚、所罗门群岛、东帝汶、汤加和瓦努阿图共同成立了太平洋岛国地区计划（Pacific Islands Regional Initiative，PIRI），该计划将让所有太平洋岛国——即使它没有央行——共享关于在不利的地理环境下改善金融服务的普及、质量和用途的知识。


Each of these efforts started as a country-led initiative, born of particular challenges and designed to meet the specific needs of the local population.	这些政策一开始都是国家领导的项目，诞生于特定的挑战面前，目的是为了满足当地人口的具体需求。


But the accumulation of experience is proving invaluable.	���经验的累积正在起到极有价值的作用。


As lessons are shared and successes provide inspiration for others, the impact is becoming exponential, with even the smallest countries demonstrating that they have a significant contribution to make.	教训获得共享，成功则为其他国家提供启发，所形成的影响力可谓巨大，即使是最小的国家，也证明了它们能够做出巨大贡献。


Meanwhile, as central banks change how they operate, retail banks are responding with new ways of doing business.	与此同时，随着央行改变其经营方式，零售银行也开始响应新生意经。


Kenya’s Equity Bank has grown enormously by explicitly targeting the financially excluded; in just six years, it has expanded from a half-million customers to almost six million.	肯尼亚公平银行（Equity Bank）明确地定位于金融受排斥群体，结果迅速成长； 在六年时间里，该银行的客户数量从五十万增加到近六百万。


Telecommunication companies are also pioneering new services.	通讯公司也在创新新服务。


Tigo, for example, now serves more than 56 million customers in 14 countries in Latin America and Africa with products such as cross-border mobile payments and cashless services for sales agents.	比如，Tigo公司目前为14个拉丁美洲和非洲国家的5,600万客户提供跨境移动支付和经销商无现金服务等产品。


As with any period of great change, it is not easy to see what lies ahead.	和任何大变革时代一样，看清楚前方的路绝不容易。


As Stephen Kehoe, Head of Global Financial Inclusion at Visa, recently noted, “The last seven years provide absolutely no indication of what the next seven years will be.”	维萨公司全球金融包容性主管史蒂芬·吉欧（Stephen Kehoe）最近指出，“过去七年对于未来七年毫无指导意义。


What is clear, however, is that there still remains much to be done – and that the opportunities are nearly limitless.	”但是，清楚的是，我们还有很多事需要做——而机会可以说无穷无尽。


Bringing the world’s two billion unbanked people out of the shadows and into the mainstream financial system will require new partnerships among regulators, the private sector, non-profits, regional bodies, and international organizations.	让全世界二十亿无法获得银行服务的人走出阴影，进入主流金融体系需要监管者、私人部门、非营利组织、地区机构和国际组织之间的新合作。


That may seem like a tall order, but filling it would help build a brighter future for everyone.	看上去这是个艰巨的任务，但完成这个任务有助于为所有人带来更加光明的未来。


Financial Inclusion and Beyond	金融包容与超越


CAMBRIDGE – Because traditional financial services are not designed for small depositors and borrowers, several non-traditional models have been able to scale up rapidly in this untapped market.	坎布里奇——因为传统金融服务并非为小储户和借款人设计，若干非传统模式已经能在这片未开发的市场上迅速发展壮大。


But, without a strategic policy roadmap to guide further financial-technology (fintech) development, these new “connector” models will remain limited in terms of the services they can provide.	但如果没有战略性政策路线图来指导进一步的金融技术（fintech）研发，这些新的“连接”模式所能提供的服务依然是有限的。


In Kenya, the success of M-Pesa, a mobile payments app, has been nothing short of transformational.	在肯尼亚，移动支付应用M-Pesa的成功可谓具有变革性意义。


It took PayPal two NASDAQ listings and almost two decades operating in the world’s largest economy to reach 188 million active customers and $282 billion in annual payments.	PayPal两次在纳斯达克上市、几乎在世界最大经济体经营了二十年，才积累了1. 88亿活跃客户和2820亿美元的年支付额。


Although M-Pesa has been operating for less than a decade in a much lower-income market, it had nearly 17 million active users conducting more than $50 billion in cashless transactions last year.	而尽管M-Pesa在一个相比之下收入低得多的市场只经营了不到十年，但去年已经积累了近1700万活跃用户，实际操作了超过500亿美元的无现金交易。


Similarly, bKash now dominates the payments system in Bangladesh to such a degree that “bKashing” has become common Bengali parlance, just as “Xeroxing,” “Hoovering,” and “Googling” are in English.	同样，bKash现在主宰着孟加拉国的支付系统，以至于“bKashing”就像英语中的“Xeroxing”、“Hoovering”和“Googling”一样，已经成为孟加拉语中的常用词汇。


Other models, such as Microensure and Bima, have also gained ground, offering micro-insurance solutions in emerging countries.	Microensure和Bima等提供小额保险解决方案的其他模式也在新兴国家快速成长。


Jan Dhan Yojana, a high-priority Indian federal-government program that provides access to the banking sector for the poor, has enabled 250 million new bank accounts to be opened in less than two years.	Jan Dhan Yojana是高优先级的印度联邦政府计划，为穷人提供银行服务，并在不到两年内促成开立了2. 5亿个新银行账户。


New fintech products will have to clear several hurdles to move beyond just improving access to financial services.	为超越仅仅是改善金融服务的范畴，新型金融科技产品必须跨越几大障碍。


Services fostering financial-inclusion must deliver a high volume of low-value output, which means they often have to rely on partnerships to meet certain consumer demands.	促进金融包容的服务必须提供大量的低价值产出，这意味着它们通常必须依赖伙伴关系来满足某些消费者需求。


Problems arise when these partners have their own constraints or different priorities.	当这些合作伙伴有各自不同的约束或优先级时，问题就会出现。


For example, Microensure and Bima have made insurance solutions available to millions of people; but their services ultimately depend on independent insurers to allocate capital and underwrite insurance policies.	例如，Microensure和Bima已经为数百万人提供了保险解决方案； 但它们的服务最终要靠独立保险企业来分配资本和承保保单。


Likewise, while there are green shoots of insurance-industry growth in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, global insurers must constantly adapt to regulatory changes in their primary or home markets, and it is unclear if they have the capacity to expand meaningfully into low-income countries.	同样，尽管撒哈拉以南非洲等地区的保险业增长刚刚出现萌芽，但全球保险企业必须不断适应其主要市场或国内市场的监管变化，且目前尚不清楚它们是否有能力针对低收入国家进行有意义的扩展。


Or consider M-Pesa itself.	或者来审视一下M-Pesa本身。


Four years ago, it formed a partnership with the Commercial Bank of Africa to add a lending tool, M-Shwari, to its suite of products.	四年前，它与非洲商业银行建立了合作关系，将贷款工具M-Shwari添加到其产品组合。


It has since opened more loan accounts than any Kenyan bank.	自那以后，它开设的贷款帐户比任何肯尼亚银行都要多。


But such accounts still number less than a quarter of active M-Pesa users, and M-Shwari still supports only small 30-day loans.	但这些帐户仍不到活跃M-Pesa用户的四分之一，且M-Shwari仍然仅提供小额30天贷款服务。


M-Shwari is not a core part of either partner’s business.	M-Shwari尚未成为任何一个合作伙伴的核心业务。


Nor is it the only product of its kind on the market.	它也不是市场上唯一的同类产品。


The most recent competitor to challenge M-Pesa is mVisa, a partnership between Visa Inc. and two other Kenyan banks.	最近挑战M-Pesa的竞争对手是mVisa，这是Visa Inc. 和其他两家肯尼亚银行联手创办的合伙企业。


With $400 million in 2016 revenues at stake, Safaricom – M-Pesa’s parent company – will likely focus on defending its core offering before it tries to introduce new products.	因为关系到2016年的4亿美元收入，M-Pesa的母公司Safaricom很可能重点保护其核心产品，然后���尝试推出新的赢利点。


In Safaricom’s current list of new product priorities to expand financial inclusion, saving-and-loan products are ranked almost last.	在Safaricom当前扩大金融包容性的新产品优先序列中，储蓄和贷款产品几乎排在最后。


Unfettered innovation and entrepreneurship are necessary for connecting the poor to the formal financial system; but, from a policy and development perspective, we need to shift our efforts toward improving the larger ecosystem to realize new fintech products’ full potential.	必须依靠无障碍创新创业将穷人接入到正规金融系统； 但从政策和发展的角度来看，我们需要过渡到改善大规模生态系统，以确保发挥新金融科技产品的全部潜能。


For example, M-Pesa’s cashless transactions are underpinned by cash contributed by its customers, which is held in trust at any given time.	比方说，M-Pesa的无现金交易由客户提供的现金支持，并在任何特定时点以信托的形式持有。


Interest income from these funds is currently disbursed through the M-Pesa Foundation.	这些基金的利息收入目前通过M-Pesa基金会支付。


With a carefully constructed system, this money could be put to even greater productive use.	通过精心构建的系统，这笔钱可以被用于更有效率的生产用途。


India’s Jan Dhan Yojana program has mobilized an estimated $6 billion from newly acquired customers, which could be used to provide additional tailored products.	印度的Jan Dhan Yojana计划已从新晋客户处筹集了大约60亿美元，这笔钱可以用于额外定制产品的提供。


Emerging fintech services can take a lesson from the Chinese e-commerce company Alibaba, which was quick in leveraging its payments platform, Alipay.	新兴金融技术服务可以吸取中国电子商务企业阿里巴巴的经验，该公司迅速对其支付平台——支付宝加以利用。


After Alibaba launched its money market fund, Yu’e Bao, in June 2013, it began reinvesting its Alipay customers’ unproductive micro-deposits.	阿里巴巴推出货币市场基金后，2013年6月，余额宝开始对支付宝客户的非生产性小额存款进行再投资。


By the end of 2015, the Yu’e Bao fund manager was overseeing $165 billion in assets and had converted Alipay’s millions of small, financially unsophisticated savers into investors collecting respectable returns.	截至2015年末，余额宝基金经理管理着1,650亿美元资产，并将支付宝数百万缺乏财务知识的小额储户转化为得到可观回报的投资者。


To develop its platform, Alibaba relied on big data to manage the fund’s unique liquidity dynamics; and it benefited from China’s unsettled regulatory framework, though this could change in the future.	为开发其平台，阿里巴巴依靠大数据来管理基金独特的流动状态； 同时受益于中国不稳定的监管框架，虽然未来这或许会成为可变因素。


The Chinese context may be unique; and, indeed, there are growing concerns about risks inherent in the Yu’e Bao model.	中国的情况可能非常独特； 事实上，外界对“余额宝模式”所隐含的固有风险越来越关注。


But regulators and fintech firms should take note of examples like Alipay to develop rational strategic possibilities for this emerging sector.	但是监管机构和金融技术企业应当注意像支付宝这样的例子，为这个新兴行业制定合理的战略政策。


Most important, they should remember that access to finance is not an end in itself, but a means to improve one’s lot.	最重要的是，他们应当牢记获得融资本身不是目的，真正的目的是通过获得融资来获得自我提升的方法。


A recent Indian Express investigation revealed what can happen when access to financial services is provided in a vacuum.	最近一期印度快讯报调查显示，在真空中提供金融服务会带来什么样的后果。


The paper found several instances where officials at Indian public-sector banks were depositing one rupee into customer accounts without customers’ knowledge.	这份调查发现几例印度公共银行官员在客户并不知情的情况下将一卢比存入客户账户。


These officials were apparently under pressure to reduce the number of zero-balance accounts, all of which, it turns out, were related to the Jan Dhan Yojana program.	这些官员显然面临减少零余额账户数的压力，而所有零余额账户都被证明关系到Jan Dhan Yojana计划。


Similar chicanery, we now know, was a routine practice at the US bank Wells Fargo.	我们现在知道，同样的欺骗曾是美国富国银行的常规做法。


The difference is that customers at the bottom of the pyramid have few banking alternatives.	不同之处是金字塔底部的客户几乎鲜有银行选择。


Financial-services access is a much needed start, but it must lead somewhere.	获取金融服务是非常必要的开始，但它必须要达到某个目标。


A Hacker’s Market?	黑客的市场？


NEW YORK – Never in the history of written communication could 140 characters have the impact that they can have now.	纽约——140个字符所能造成的影响已经在书面交流史上达到了顶峰。


Two weeks ago, after gaining access to the Associated Press’s main Twitter account (@AP), the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) posted a fake tweet reporting two explosions in the White House and the injury of President Barack Obama.	两周前，叙利亚电子军（SEA）在侵入美联社主推特账户（@AP）后发布了报导白宫两起爆炸事件和奥巴马总统受伤的虚假推特。


Within seconds, US financial markets dropped by about 1%.	短短几秒钟后，美国金融市场就出现了约1%的跌幅。


Minutes later, Twitter was abuzz with refutations.	过了几分钟，不少人发表推特进行反驳。


Reporters at the White House tweeted that they felt no explosion, and AP reporters and the AP Politics Twitter account announced that @AP had been hacked.	白宫记者的推文说没有感觉到爆炸，美联社记者和美联社政治推特账户宣布@AP遭黑客劫持。


At his afternoon briefing, White House press secretary Jay Carney confirmed that Obama was indeed unharmed.	白宫新闻秘书杰伊·卡尼在下午举行的发布会上证实奥巴马其实安然无恙。


Financial markets returned to their pre-hoax level.	金融市场应声反弹至骗局前的水平。


The @AP Twitter hoax represents systemic risk that cannot be eliminated, for it arises from the interaction of highly integrated financial markets and increasingly democratized news delivery.	@AP推特骗局表现出无法消除的系统风险，上述风险来自高度一体化的金融市场和日益民主化的新闻发布。


Given strong incentives for malicious parties to perpetrate such hoaxes, we should expect to see an increase in incidents.	鉴于恶意方具备布下此类骗局的强烈动机，我们看到的类似事件一定会大幅增加。


Financial markets are vulnerable to manipulation, because they are not in the business of evaluating the truth.	金融市场容易被操纵，因为他们不评价真相。


Trading often favors first movers, so being fast but wrong can still be profitable.	交易行为往往是先下手为强，因此抢先犯错或许仍然有利可图。


Imagine that a sophisticated trading firm has invested significant resources to develop an algorithm that quickly evaluates the potential market impact of news, and then automatically sends orders to trade based on that predicted impact.	试想某家成熟的贸易公司投入大量资源开发快速评估新闻潜在市场影响的一种算法，之后再根据预测影响自动发出交易指令。


When that algorithm parses a tweet from the AP containing important keywords (explosion, White House, and Obama), it will send orders to sell with the expectation that the market will drop as others – first, slower algorithms, then even slower humans – start to process the same news.	该算法从美联社推特解析出重要关键词（爆炸、白宫和奥巴马）之后，将在其他参与者（速度较慢的算法、甚至是反应较慢的人）开始消化这条消息的同时，基于市场下跌预期而发送卖出指令。


The first mover is happy to make such trades without verifying that the news is true.	先行者无需核实消息真假即可交易。


If it is true, the market will stay down or continue dropping, and the first mover will profit from the sales that it has made.	如果后来消息��明属实，市场将筑底或继续下探，而抢先卖出将使先行者有利可图。


If the story is a hoax, the market will probably return to its earlier, fairly valued level, and the first mover will break even on its sales, and possibly profit from any position purchased as a hedge when the market was down.	如果故事最终被证明是个骗局，市场可能会恢复早先的合理估值，而先行者最终将打成平手，甚至可能借市场下跌时买入的对冲头寸获利。


The first mover’s algorithm worked, regardless of the story’s veracity.	无论事件真实与否，先行者算法都能够奏效。


The likely losers in the @AP Twitter hoax were later movers who did not react quickly to the news, but reacted instead to the market’s movement.	对消息反应不够迅速，却对市场运行做出反应的后觉者可能会沦为@AP推特骗局的失利方。


These late movers were also likely to have been sophisticated electronic or institutional traders; some were probably using arbitrage-based strategies that relied on the futures market for a calculation of the fair price.	这些后觉者同样可能是久经沙场的电子或机构交易员； 有些人可能还在运用以期货市场公平价值为基础的套利策略。


The market’s vulnerability to hoax stories is thus difficult to eliminate, for it is inherent in its structure.	由于内在结构使然，市场在骗局面前的脆弱性断乎难以消除。


It cannot be regulated away or fixed by technology or surveillance.	监管自然难以奏效，技术或监控同样于事无补。


Even if markets moved more slowly, there would still be a first mover who responded before such a news story was revealed as a hoax.	即便市场反应稍缓，仍有人会在消息证实为骗局前率先采取行动。


This dynamic is similar to that of an asset bubble, albeit faster.	上述机制类似于资产泡沫，只不过反应更加迅速。


In a bubble, valuations are based on collectively evaluated evidence, and those who enter the market earliest often benefit.	泡沫估值基于共同评估证据，抢先入市者往往获利丰厚。


Whether evaluating an assumption about the rise of house prices or whether a news story is true, the market does not provide a definitive answer instantaneously.	无论是评估房价上涨假设还是消息真实与否，市场确定答案都不会在瞬间给出。


If protecting against hoaxes is not the market’s purview, can news agencies or new media entities like Twitter prevent such deception?	如果防范恶作剧不属于市场的职责范畴，像推特这样的新闻或新媒介机构能否预防骗局的发生？


To be sure, they have suffered reputational damage from this fiasco and will likely try to improve.	他们无疑因为此次惨败而声誉受损，也可能会试着亡羊补牢。


But their efforts will not be enough.	但他们的努力远远不够。


Twitter’s vulnerabilities were technically understood before this event, and the service was already moving toward a more sophisticated authentication model (a password paired with a one-time key from a text message or other device).	推特服务的技术漏洞在此之前已经引发关注，目前正在向复杂的验证模型过渡（密码搭配经由短信或其他设备发送的一次性密钥）。


Twitter will likely implement this soon.	推特可能会尽快落实这种方式。


It should also consider adding an optional “two-key” system, in which an independent signoff from a separate account is required before a proposed tweet is broadcast.	推特还应该考虑增加选择性“双密钥”系统，即在相关推特发出前由其他账户进行独立签发。


But, while such measures would increase the difficulty of hacking the system, no technological fix can make it impenetrable.	但尽管上述措施可以加大黑客攻击系统的难度，但任何技术措施都并非牢不可破。


What about the AP’s vulnerabilities?	美联社的漏洞是什么？


Attackers launched a “phishing” attempt against the AP’s emails shortly before the hoax tweet was sent.	攻击者在发布欺骗性推特前曾对AP的电子邮件发起了“网络钓鱼”式的攻击。


Phishing attacks, in which an employee is duped into sending a password to a third party or clicking an untrusted link that installs malicious software, represent a hybrid of cultural and technological failures.	网络钓鱼诱使员工向第三方发送密码或点击不可信链接安装恶意软件，凸显出文化技术故障的组合。


As attackers become more sophisticated, they send better-crafted emails, sometimes impersonating trusted sources that lure unwary users.	随着袭击者的技术越来越高超，他们制作的邮件质量越来越过硬，有时冒充可以信赖的信息源引诱粗心的用户上钩。


Crafting a culture of security is difficult and often at odds with the dynamic and decentralized work environment of a fast-moving newsroom.	构建安全文化难度很大，因为这往往和编辑部快速反应的动态及分散工作环境背道而驰。


As technologies change, so must awareness of vulnerabilities, and this awareness must be disseminated through means other than corporate memos that are disconnected from day-to-day business realities.	对漏洞的认识必须随技术变化而变化，并借助除与日常实务脱节的公司备忘录以外的形式加以传播。


Empirically, few firms get this right: America’s National Public Radio and the BBC were both recently hacked by the SEA, while McDonald’s and Burger King recently had their Twitter accounts compromised.	凭经验判断，没有几个公司能完成好这个任务：美国全国公共广播电台和英国广播公司最近都曾受叙利亚电子军的攻击，而麦当劳和汉堡王最近都曾被侵入推特账户。


The proliferation of security lapses means that people are more likely to shrug their shoulders than to cast the first stone at a company that is breached.	安全漏洞的扩散意味着人们可能对被侵犯的企业耸耸肩表示遗憾，而不会投出第一块石头。


Finally, the AP is unlikely to face financial penalties for this mistake.	最后，美联社不太可能因此而遭受经济处罚。


A lawsuit for losses stemming from the hoaxed tweet would face nearly insurmountable obstacles.	因欺骗性推特引发的索赔诉讼面临着几乎无法逾越的障碍。


Because few mechanisms can prevent the proliferation of hoaxed tweets, and given the high-profile response that successful hackers can expect, Twitter will remain a vehicle of malicious hoaxes, even as technological barriers make attacks more challenging.	因为鲜有制度可以防止欺诈推特蔓延，且鉴于成功的黑客可以期待高调回应，推特仍将成为恶意欺骗的载体，即使技术壁垒可以加大攻击的难度。


Indeed, the SEC recently approved the use of social media like Facebook and Twitter for publicly traded companies’ disclosures to investors.	事实上，美国证券交易委员会最近批准将Facebook和推特等社交媒体用于上市公司面向投资者的信息披露。


Imagine what might happen if @BP_America tweets: “#Explosion reported at Gulf well.	试想如果@BP_America发表推文：“海湾油井发生爆炸。 详情随后播出。


Details to follow.”	”将产生什么后果。


The incentives to try to hack such accounts are obvious: not only significant publicity for hackers, but highly lucrative profit opportunities from the almost inevitable stock-market movements that will result.	攻破上述账户的动机显而易见：不仅黑客能因此声名大噪，随后不可避免的股市波动还能带来丰厚的获利机会。


On Twitter, as elsewhere, caveat emptor.	不管在推特还是其他地方，我们只能提倡买者自慎。


Who’s Right on US Financial Reform?	关于美国金融改革，谁才是对的?


CAMBRIDGE – Eight years after triggering a crisis that nearly brought down the global financial system, the United States remains plagued by confusion about what reforms are needed to prevent it from happening again.	坎布里奇—八年前，美国引发了一场几乎让全球金融体系破产的危机，如今，美国仍然没有弄清楚需要怎样的改革防止危机再次发生。


As Americans prepare to choose their next president, a better understanding of the policy changes that would minimize the risk of future crises – and which politicians are most likely to implement them – is urgently needed.	美国人正在准备选举下一任总统，急需更好地认识能让未来危机风险最小化的政策变革——以及最有可能实施这些变革的政客。


What Americans are sure about is that they are angry with the financial sector.	美国人可以确定的是他们对金融业愤怒不已。


This is reflected in the success of recent Hollywood movies such as The Big Short (which has been rightly praised for making complex instruments like derivatives broadly understandable).	《大空头》（The Big Short）等好莱坞芯片的大热就是明证（《大空头》获得广泛赞誉，认为它让金融衍生品等复杂工具变得通俗易懂，这是正确的）。


And it is reflected in the current presidential campaign – most notably, in remarkable support for Senator Bernie Sanders’s leftist bid for the Democratic nomination.	最近的总统选战——其中最引人关注的是伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）参议员为竞选民主党提名而提出的左倾方案受到广泛支持——也是明证。


At the center of Sanders’s campaign is a proposal to break up the big Wall Street banks into little pieces, thereby ensuring that no bank is so big that its failure would endanger the rest of the financial system.	桑德斯阵营提出的核心方案是将华尔街大银行分解成小机构，从而确保任何银行都不会过于庞大以至于其倒闭会危及金融体系的其他部分。


The appeal of that goal is understandable.	这一目标的号召力不难理解。


But achieving it would require a massive sledgehammer.	但实现这一点需要大刀阔斧的改革。


Though the American banking system historically featured thousands of small banks, the “too big to fail” phenomenon is not exactly new.	历史上，美国银行体系由成千上万家小银行组成，但“太大而不能倒”现象其实并不新鲜。


The first bank that was declared “too big to fail” was Continental Illinois, which received a bailout in 1984 from President Ronald Reagan.	第一家被称为“太大而不能倒”的银行是伊利诺伊大陆银行（Continental Illinois），1984年，它获得了里根总统的援助。


With banks now bigger than ever – America’s four largest each held more than $1 trillion in assets in 2011 – breaking them down to the point that no segment is systemically important would be a long and complex process, to say the least.	如今，银行规模比任何时候都要庞大——2011年美国前四大银行每一家的资产规模都超过了1万亿美元——把它们分解，让所有细分都不具有系统重要性将是一个漫长而复杂的过程。


Merely turning the deregulatory clock back 30 years would not do the trick.	仅仅将去监管化的潮流扭转到30年前是无法完成这一目标的。


But even if Sanders did somehow manage to break up the banks sufficiently, it would not solve the problem.	但即便桑德斯果真设法对银行进行了足够的分解，也不能解决问题。


After all, the US experienced a run on depositary institutions in the 1930s, when its financial system still comprised thousands of small banks.	毕竟，20世纪30年代，美国曾经迎来一阵存托机构大爆发，当时的美国金融体系仍有成千上万家小银行构成。


Yet Canada, with a financial system dominated by just five large banks, sailed through the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 more easily than almost any other country.	而加拿大——其金融体系由五家大银行主宰——比几乎其他所有国家都更轻松地度过了2008—2009年全球金融危机。


Yet Sanders has indicated that he would even prohibit anyone with past experience on Wall Street from serving in his administration.	但桑德斯表示他甚至要禁止所有有过华尔街工作经验的人进入他的政府。


Such blanket statements and superficial judgments do not belong in the selection of individuals for important positions.	如此一刀切的论调和肤浅的判断绝非遴选要职人选之道。


Consider Gary Gensler, a former co-head of finance at Goldman Sachs, whose appointment as Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Sanders tried (and failed) to block in 2009.	以加里·詹斯勒（Gary Gensler）为例，他是高盛公司前联席财务主管，2009年被任命为商品期货交易委员会主席。


In that position, to the consternation of many former Wall Street colleagues, Gensler spent five years working vigorously to implement financial-reform legislation, including pursuing the aggressive regulation of derivatives.	桑德斯曾在2009年试图（失败地）阻挠这一任命。 出乎许多前华尔街同事的意料，詹斯勒上任后花了五年时间大力实施金融监管立法，包括对衍生品进行激进监管。


Gensler also supported the prosecution of five financial institutions that had colluded to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor, the benchmark rate that some major banks charge one another for short-term loans).	詹斯勒还支持起诉五家合谋操纵伦敦银行间拆放利率（Libor，一些大银行彼此短期贷款的基准利率）的金融机构。


Attacking banks is emotionally satisfying.	攻击银行能带来心理上的满足。


But it won’t prevent financial crises.	但这并不能阻止金融危机。


In fact, the financial industry’s biggest problems lie elsewhere: hedge funds, investment banks, and other non-bank financial institutions that face less regulatory oversight and restrictions (such as on capital standards and leverage) than commercial banks.	事实上，金融业最大的问题在其他地方：对冲基金、投资银行和其他非银行金融机构，它们受到的监管监督和限制（如资本标准和杠杆）少于商业银行。


Recall that Lehman Brothers was not a commercial bank, and AIG was an insurance company.	想一想，雷曼兄弟可不是商业银行，而AIG则是保险公司。


Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – Sanders’s opponent for the Democratic nomination – recognizes the need to place a high priority on regulating non-banks, and she has proposed specific measures to do so.	前国务卿希拉里·克林顿——桑德斯的民主党提名竞争对手——认识到必须将监管非银行机构列为重中之重，并提出了具体的措施建议。


For example, she is calling for a small tax targeting certain kinds of high-frequency trading prone to abuse.	比如，她呼吁对某些容易滥用的高频交易征收小额税收。


Clinton also aims to close the “carried interest” loophole that currently allows hedge-fund managers to pay lower tax rates on their incomes than almost everyone else, and she proposes imposing a “risk fee” on big financial institutions that would rise as they grow.	克林顿还间矛头指向了填补“附带利益”（carried interest）漏洞，目前这一漏洞导致冲基金经理的所得税率低于几乎所有人。 她还建议向大金融机构征收“风险费”，该费用将随着它们的规模的增加而增加。


Clinton’s proposed risk fee resembles one advanced by President Barack Obama’s administration in 2010 in order to discourage risky activity by the largest banks, while helping to recoup some revenue from bailouts.	克林顿所建议的风险费类似于奥巴马总统政府2010年所提出的旨在遏制大银行高风险行为、同时从援助中回首一些收入的方案。


But that plan was thwarted by three Republican senators who would support critical financial-reform legislation – the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – only if the fee was dropped.	但这一计划被三位共和党参议员阻挠，他们坚持只有在取消这一费用的情况下才会支持关键性金融改革立法——多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法。


Even without the risk fee for large banks, the Dodd-Frank legislation was a step in the right direction.	即使没有大银行风险费，多德-弗兰克立法也是正确的一步。


Among other things, it increased transparency for derivatives, raised capital requirements for financial institutions, imposed additional regulations on “systemically important” institutions, and, per the suggestion of Senator Elizabeth Warren, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).	与其他政策一起，它增加了衍生品透明度，提高了金融机构资本要求，增加了对“具系统重要性的”机构的监管，并在伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）参议员的建议下成立了消费者金融保护局（CFPB）。


But Dodd-Frank was far from complete.	但多德-弗兰克法案距离完善还差之甚远。


Making matters worse, many in Congress have spent the last six years chipping away at it, such as by exempting auto dealers from the CFPB and restricting the budgets of the regulatory agencies.	更糟糕的是，在过去六年中，许多国会议员对该法案动手动脚，比如豁免汽车经销商的CFPB约束和限制监管机构的预算。


Those who worked to undermine the financial regulatory-reform legislation – mostly Republicans – appear to have paid no political price for it.	致力于破坏金融监管改革立法的议员——主要是共和党——似乎并未因此付出政治代价。


Meanwhile, those who, like Gensler, worked tirelessly to implement the reforms are judged according to superficial criteria by the very politicians who should support them.	与此同时，像詹斯勒那样不知疲倦地实施改革的人却被理应支持他们的政客以肤浅的标准判了“死刑”。


There is a place in political campaigns for bumper-sticker slogans.	在政治选战中，汽车保险杠标语拥有一席之地。


And there is definitely a place for ambitious goals.	显然，宏大的目标也有一席之地。


But the danger is that those who are attracted to inspirational rallying cries and sweeping proposals will lack the patience required to identify which side to support in the numerous complex battles over financial regulation that take place every year.	但危险在于被激动人心的呐喊和彻底的方案吸引的人没有必需的耐心辨别应该在每年都要发生无数起的复杂的金融监管之战中支持哪一边。


To get the details of financial regulation right, the US needs leaders with the wisdom, experience, and perseverance to identify the right measures, push for their enactment, and then implement them effectively.	要正确认识金融监管的细节，美国需要领导人拿出智慧、经验和韧性辨别正确的措施，推动立法，然后有效地执行。


If such people are not the ones who receive political support, we should not be surprised if the financial sector again escapes effective regulation and crises recur.	如果这些人得不到政治支持，那就不必因为金融业再次摆脱有效监管、危机再次爆发而大惊小怪。


Consider, for example, regulations regarding money market funds, which, according to the FSB, only a few countries have developed since 2008.	比如，以对货币市场基金的监管为例��据FSB的数据，自2008年以来，只有少数国家制定了这项监管。


Is Financial Repression Here to Stay?	保持金融抑制？


LONDON – There are several definitions of financial repression – and the repressors and the repressed tend to see things differently.	伦敦—金融抑制的定义不一而足——抑制者与被抑制者看到的东西往往不一样。


But what financial repression usually involves is keeping interest rates below their natural market level, to the benefit of borrowers at the expense of savers.	但金融抑制通常包括保持利率低于正常市场水平，牺牲储户让借款人得益。


The borrowers are often governments, and in many emerging economies the state has funded its extravagances by paying bank depositors derisory rates of interest.	借款人通常是政府，在许多新兴经济体，国家给储户的利息低得可怜，以此为自己的铺张浪费筹集资金。


But in the last seven years, since central banks in developed countries pushed down their base rates almost to zero, we have seen a First-World version of financial repression.	但在过去七年中，自发达国家央行将基准利率削减至近零水平以来，我们看到第一世界也开始了金融抑制。


A recent research report from the insurer Swiss Re describes who has won and lost as a result, and questions the sustainability of the policies pursued by institutions such as the United States Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of England.	瑞士再保险公司（Swiss Re）的一篇最新研究报告研究了谁是这一政策的赢家和输家，并质疑美联储、欧洲央行和英格兰银行等机构所采取的政策的可持续性。


The report’s argument is that while the stated motivation for ultra-loose monetary policy might be to guard against deflation and promote economic growth at a time when demand is weak, low interest rates also help governments fund their debt very cheaply.	报告的观点是，极度宽松货币政策的公开动机可能是阻止通缩，在需求疲软时刺激经济增长，但低利率也有助于政府以非常低的代价为其债务融资。


Moreover, as we enter the eighth year of aggressive easing, unintended consequences are starting to appear – notably asset-price bubbles, increasing economic inequality (as wealthier investors able to hold equities benefit at the expense of small savers), and the risk of higher inflation in the future.	此外，激进宽松已经进入了第八年，意料外的后果开始显现——主要有资产价格泡沫、经济不平等性加剧（富裕投资者牺牲小储户获得股票收益）、未来高通胀风险等。


The jury may be out on the last point, but the first two are well established.	审判可能要到最后时刻才会到来，但前两个后果已经形成。


Many countries now have over-heated property and equity markets; in the US, the S&P 500 index since 2009 has closely tracked the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet.	许多国家的房地产和股票市场已呈现出过热之势，2009年以来美国标准普尔500指数紧跟美联储资产负债表扩张而上涨。


As a result, price-earnings (P/E) ratios, which reflect investors’ enthusiasm for equities, are now high by historical standards (Swiss Re has a Financial Market Excess index, which has returned to its 2007 level).	结果，反映投资者对股票的热情的市盈率已处于历史较高水平（瑞士再保险公司有一个金融市场过度指数，该指数已回到2007年水平）。


Moreover, according to the Swiss Re report, “monetary policy and central bank asset purchases have aggravated economic inequality via equity price inflation.”	此外，据瑞士再保险公司报告，“货币政策和央行资产购买操作通过股价通胀放大了经济不平等。


The top 1% of US households have enjoyed a 50% gain in their financial wealth, while the bottom 90% have registered only a 12% profit.	”美国顶尖1%家庭的金融财富上涨了50%，而底层90%家庭只获得12%的利润。


The bottom 20% have probably not benefited at all.	最底层20%也许没有获得��毫收益。


Not surprisingly, central banks do not like this argument.	毫不奇怪，央行不喜欢这一观点。


Fed Chair Janet Yellen insists that years of near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not intended to make it easier for the US government to fund its deficit.	美联储主席耶伦强调，多年来的近零利率和量化宽松不是为了让美国政府更便利地为其赤字融资。


She argues that focusing on asset prices ignores the role – helpful for all income groups – of the Fed’s monetary policy in maintaining growth and thus warding off the threat of a wholesale depression.	她指出，聚焦于资产价格忽略了美联储货币政策在维持增长、从而遏制全面萧条风险方面的作用，而这有助于所有收入阶层。


But central banks accept that their policies have led to distortions in financial markets.	但央行也接受其政策导致金融市场扭曲的观点。


For example, institutional investors, especially insurance companies and pension funds, have suffered badly.	比如，机构投资者，特别是保险公司和退休基金，损失惨重。


They are major holders of fixed-interest securities, and their investment income has fallen sharply.	它们是固定利息证券的主要持有人，它们的投资收入大幅下降。


The returns they can provide to investors and pensioners have similarly fallen.	它们能够像投资者和退休者提供的回报也相应减少。


Logically, therefore, individuals need to save much more to guarantee their income in retirement.	因此，逻辑上，个人需要储蓄更多的钱以保证退休收入。


That in itself may have a depressing effect on the economy, partly offsetting the monetary stimulus.	这本身就可能对经济产生抑制作用，部分抵消货币刺激。


Indeed, it may be one reason why highly expansionary policies by the Fed and other central banks have taken so long to generate growth.	事实上，这也许是美联储和其他央行的高度扩张性政策迟迟不能推动增长的原因之一。


A further distortion stems from the prudential regulation adopted in reaction to the global financial crisis.	为了应对全球金融危机，各国采取了审慎监管措施，这造成了进一步扭曲。


The imposition of higher capital requirements on riskier investments has pushed financial institutions into holding government debt, which in turn means that they have less money available to lend for productive investment.	提高高风险投资的资本要求促使金融机构大量持有政府债务，而这反过来意味着它们可用于生产性投资贷款的资金减少了。


Most countries have yet to see investment recover to pre-crisis levels.	大部分国家的投资都没有回到危机前水平。


On this analysis, a return to “normal” interest rates cannot come soon enough.	在该分析中，回归“正常”利率越快越好。


The alternative is further financial repression and, with it, low investment, rising economic and social tensions, and the emergence of a generation of impoverished pensioners.	否则是进一步金融抑制以及随之而来你的低投资、经济和社会紧张加剧，以及一代贫困潦倒的退休者。


Like Monty Python’s city-terrorizing “Hell’s Grannies,” tomorrow’s elderly will surely make their voices heard.	就像巨蟒剧团（Monty Python）的都市恐怖故事《地狱奶奶》（Hell’s Grannies），未来的老者必然会发出他们的声音。


But can we really expect the old normal – positive long-term interest rates on government bonds – to return?	但我们真的可以期待旧常态——政府债券正长期利率——回归吗？


Maybe it is unreasonable for investors to expect positive rates on safe assets in the future.	也许对于投资者来说，期待未来安全资产还能有正利率已不再合理。


Perhaps we should expect to pay central banks and governments to keep our money safe, with positive returns offered only in return for some element of risk.	也许我们应该预期给央行和政府钱以保护我们的资金安全，只有包含风险要素的资产才会产生正回报。


One reason is that investment may never reach its previous levels.	一个理由是投资也许再也无法企及此前的水平。


If a service-based economy simply has less need for expensive fixed capital, why should we expect a return to the days when business investment was a strong component of demand?	如果基于服务业的经济不再需要那么多昂贵的固定资本，为何我们还可以预期回报像商业投资仍是需求主要成分的时期那么高？


Apps are cheap.	应用是廉价的。


Furthermore, excess savings could be more than just a cyclical phenomenon.	此外，过度储蓄也许不再仅仅是一个周期性现象。


Individuals may have come to value future consumption, in retirement, over current consumption – the reverse of the traditional relationship.	个人也许需要比当前消费更重视退休后的未来消费——这与传统关系正好相反。


We are beginning to appreciate that in our productive years we must work harder, because our retirement years will be longer and healthier, and the income support provided by our governments and employers will be far less generous than they used to be.	我们正在开始认同，在工作年份，我们必须更加努力地工作，因为我们的退休生活将会更长更健康，而我们的政府和雇主所提供的收入支持将比过去大大减少。


In other words, it is rational to save more now.	换句话说，现在增加储蓄是一种理性行为。


In the long run, such a brave new world might not be an intolerable place.	在长期，这一崭新世界也许并非难以忍受。


But the transition from here to there will be very challenging for financial firms, be they banks, asset managers or, particularly, insurers.	但从现在到将来的转变对于金融企业来说将是个艰巨挑战，不管是银行、资产管理人还是（尤其是）保险商。


The types of products that the latter offer to their customers will need to change, and the mix of assets in which they invest will be different, too.	保险商向客户提供的产品需要改变，而它们的资产投资组合也将变得不同。


The question for regulators is whether, in responding to the financial crisis, they have created perverse incentives that are working against a recovery in long-term private-sector investment.	对监管者来说，问题将是为了应对金融危机，它们是否制造了不利于长期私人部门投资的不当激励。


The Quiet Financial Revolution Begins	静悄悄的金融革命开始了


LAGUNA BEACH – Steadily and indisputably, the financial services industry – with which we all interact, whether as borrowers, savers, investors, or regulators – has embarked on a multiyear transformation.	拉古娜海滩—金融服务业——我们所有人都与它有往来，不管是借款人、储蓄者、投资者还是监管者——已经进入了为期多年的转型，这是一个稳定的、无可争议的趋势。


This process, slow at first, has been driven by the combined impact of two sets of durable forces.	这一过程一开始很慢，它是由两大持久力量的合力推动的。


On one hand, top-down factors – regulatory change, unusual pricing, and what Nouriel Roubini has cleverly termed the “liquidity paradox” – are at work.	一方面，至上而下因素——监管变化、反常定价和努里埃尔·鲁比尼（Nouriel Roubini）巧妙提出的“流动性悖论”——在起作用。


Then there are disruptive influences that percolate up from below: changing customer preferences and, even more important, outside visionaries seeking to transform and modernize the industry.	还有自上而下的破坏性影响：客户偏好的变化，以及更重要的，寻求改变和现代化金融业的外部远见者。


Beginning at the top, the regulatory pendulum is still swinging toward tighter supervision of traditional financial institutions, particularly large banks and insurance companies deemed “systemically important.”	从顶层开始，监管趋势仍然倾向于加紧对传统金融机构的监督，特别是被认为“具系统重要性”的大银行和保险公司。


Moreover, re-designed regulatory frameworks, phased implementation, and stepped-up supervision will gradually extend to other segments, including asset management.	此外，重新设计的监管框架、阶段性实施和监督升级将逐渐扩大到其他细分领域，包括资产管理领域。


This will contribute to further generalized de-risking within the regulated sectors, as part of a broader financial-sector movement toward a “utilities model” that emphasizes larger capital cushions, less leverage, greater disclosure, stricter operational guidelines, and a lot more oversight.	这将导致被监管部门内部去风险化的进一步普及，并成为金融部门通往“公用设施模型”（utilities model）的更广大的趋势的一部分。 这一公用设施模型强调增加资本缓冲、减少杠杆、增加披露、更严格的经营指引和大大加强监督。


The pricing environment compounds the impact of tighter regulation.	定价环境加剧了收紧监管的影响。


Like utilities, established financial institutions are facing external constraints on their pricing power, though not of the traditional form.	与公用设施一样，现有金融机构面临定价权的外部约束，只是形式上与传统不一样罢了。


Rather than being subjected to explicit price regulations and guidelines, these institutions operate in a “financial repression” regime in which key benchmark interest rates have been held at levels below what would otherwise prevail.	金融机构不受明确的价格监管和指引约束，而是在一个“金融抑制”机制中经营，在这个机制中，关键基准利率保持在比无该机制的情况下更低的水平。


This erodes net interest margins, puts pressure on certain fee structures, and makes certain providers more cautious about entering into long-term financial relationships.	这压缩了净利息利润，给某些费用结构造成了压力，也让某些提供者对于建立长期金融关系更加谨慎。


As a result of these two factors, established institutions – particularly the large banks – will be inclined to do fewer things for fewer people, despite being flush with liquidity provided by central banks (the “liquidity paradox”).	在这两大因素的作用下，现有机构——特别是大银行——倾向于为更少的人做更少的事，尽管央行提供了大量流动性（即“流动性悖论”）。


And banks and broker-dealers can be expected to provide only limited liquidity to their clients if a large number of them suddenly seek to realign their financial positioning at the same time.	而如果大量银行和自营经纪商突然同时寻求重组金融状况，可以预期它们像客户提供的流动性将十分有限。


But this is not just about them.	但这并不只事关它们。


The fact is that providers of all long-term financial products, particularly life insurance and pensions, have no choice these days but to streamline their offerings, including a reduction of those that still provide longer-term guarantees to clients looking for greater financial security.	事实上，所有长期金融产品，特别是寿险和退休金的提供者，如今都别无选择，只能简化产品，包括减少哪些仍然为寻求更大金融安全的客户提供长期保证的产品。


The impact on the financial-services industry of these top-down factors will gradually amplify the importance of the bottom-up forces.	这些自上而下因素对金融服务业的影响将逐渐放大自下而上力量的重要性。


Over time, this second set of factors will fuel more direct and efficient provision of services to a broader set of consumers, contributing to a reconfiguration of the industry as a whole.	假以时日，后一类因素将给更广大的消费者带来更直接、更有效的服务供给，重组整个行业。


For starters, customer expectations will evolve as the millennial generation increasingly accounts for a larger portion of earning, spending, borrowing, saving, and investing.	首先，客户预期将随着千禧年一代占收入、支出、借贷、储蓄和投资的比重日渐上升而发生改变。


With many of these newer clients favoring “self-directed” lives, providers of financial services will be pressed to switch from a product-push mindset to offering more holistic solutions that allow for greater individual customization.	许多这些新客户喜欢“自我导向”的生活，金融服务提供者也将被迫从产品推广思维转换为提供更具个性化的全套解决方案。


Market-communication functions will also be forced to modernize as more clients expect more credible and substantive “any place, any time, and any way” interactions.	更多客户期待可信的、名副其实的“随时随地、任何方式”的互动，市场沟通功能将因此被迫现代化。


Then there is the influence of outside disruptors.	然后是外部破坏者的影响。


Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, expressed it well in his 2015 shareholder letter, observing that “Silicon Valley” is coming.	JP摩根大通CEO杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）在2015年致股东的信中说得好——“硅谷”正在逼近。


These new entrants want to apply more advanced technological solutions and insights from behavioral science to an industry that is profitable but has tended to under-serve its clients.	这些新来者希望将��加先进的技术方案和来自行为科学的洞见应用到有利可图但常常客户服务不足的行业。


Airbnb and Uber have demonstrated that disruption from another industry is particularly powerful, because it involves enabling efficiency-enhancing structural changes that draw on core competencies and strategies that the incumbent firms lack.	Airbnb和Uber说明了来自另一个行业的破坏力特别巨大，因为它带来了增进效率的结构变化，而现有企业缺乏其中的核心能力和战略。


Many other companies (for example, Rent the Runway, which provides short-term rentals of higher-end fashion) are in the process of doing the same thing.	许多其他公司（如提供高端时装短租服务的Rent and Runway）也开始做这样的事。


Be it peer-to-peer platforms or crowd-funding, outside disruptors already are having an impact at the margin of finance, particularly in serving those who were previously marginalized by traditional firms or had lost trust in them.	不管是点对点平台还是众筹，外部破坏者已经开始对金融的利润空间产生冲击，特别是在服务此前被传统企业边缘化或失去对传统企业信任的消费者方面。


The end result will be an industry that serves people via a larger menu of customizable solutions.	最终结果将是一个通过更多的个性化方案服务人民的行业。


Though traditional firms will seek to adjust to maintain their dominance, many will be challenged to “self-disrupt” their thinking and operational approach.	尽管传统企业将试图调整以保持主导地位，但其中许多将受到“自我破坏”其思维和经营方针的挑战。


And, while emerging firms will offer better services, they will not find it easy to overcome immediately and decisively the institutional and regulatory inertia that anchors traditional firms’ market position.	此外，新兴企业将提供更好的服务，但它们将发现，马上就想彻底克服作为传统企业市场地位基础的制度和监管惯性不是件容易的事。


As a result, a proliferation of financial providers is likely, with particularly bright prospects for institutional partnerships that combine the more agile existing platforms with exciting new content and approaches.	因此，金融提供商可能出现激增，结合了更便捷的现有平台和令人激动的新内容和方法的机构合作关系将拥有特别光明的前景。


Failure at the Financial Stability Board	金融稳定委员会的失败


WASHINGTON, DC – At least since the fall of 2008, leading economies’ officials have agreed – in principle – that something must be done about financial firms that are “too big to fail.”	华盛顿—至少从2008年秋天开始，领先经济体官员们都——在原则上——同意必须对“太大而不能倒”的金融企业做些什么。


Great efforts, including countless international meetings, working papers, and communiqués have been devoted to this end.	在这方面，人们已经做出了巨大的努力，包括数不清的国际会议、工作论文和公告。


Earlier this month, the Basel-based Financial Stability Board (FSB) announced, to some fanfare, the completion of a major stage in this project.	本月早些时候，位于巴塞尔的金融稳定委员会（FSB）带着一丝炫耀宣布，这项工程已经完成了一个重要阶段。


But the announcement only served to underscore how little progress has been made.	但这只能说明我们所取得进步是多么小。


The world’s largest banks remain too big to fail, and this is likely to have dire consequences in the near future.	世界最大规模的银行仍然太大而不能倒，而这可能对短期未来造成恶劣后果。


The problem of too big to fail is not new – the phrase was first used in the United States in the 1980s.	太大而不能倒问题并不新鲜——这个词首次在美国使用是在20世纪80年代。


It refers to any firm – usually in the financial sector – whose failure would have major negative spillover effects for the rest of the financial system and for the real (non-financial) part of the economy.	它可以用于任何企业——通常是金融企业——只要其倒闭会对金融体系以及实体（非金融）经济带来巨大的消极溢出效应。


Prior to September 2008, there was some doubt as to whether large non-bank financial firms would be regarded as too big to fail.	在2008年9月之前，还有人质疑大型非银行金融企业是否能达到太大而不能倒的程度。


Bear Stearns came close to failing earlier that year, before the Federal Reserve stepped in to facilitate a purchase by JPMorgan Chase.	这一年早些时候，贝尔斯登几乎倒闭，但美联储介入为JP摩根大通收购贝尔斯登提供了方便。


Bear Stearns’ shareholders did not do well and much of its management immediately left the scene, but creditors were fully protected (in fact, ensuring this protection was a central motivation for the Fed’s intervention).	贝尔斯登的股东损失惨重，其管理层大多也就地免职，但债权人获得了完全的保护（事实上，确保保护债权人正是美联储干预的核心动机）。


When Lehman Brothers came under severe pressure in September 2008, uncertainty reigned in financial markets (and at the top of Lehman): perhaps the Fed would help out again in some fashion.	2008年9月，雷曼兄弟公司遭遇严重压力，金融市场（以及雷曼兄弟顶层）再次面临不确定性：也许美联储会用某种方式再次出手相助。


By all accounts, the US Treasury and the Fed did indeed consider providing assistance, but then held back, worried about overstepping their legal authority and sufficiently confident that permitting Lehman to fail would not have dire consequences for the broader economy.	江湖传闻，美国财政部和美联储确实考虑过提供援助，但后来又收回了，担心这样做越过了合法权力范围，同时也有充分的信心雷曼兄弟倒闭不会给整体经济带来灾难性后果。


The second view proved to be spectacularly wrong.	第二个观点大错特错。


Within 24 hours of Lehman’s failure, the US authorities were scrambling to prevent asset fire sales, a run on money market mutual funds, the collapse of other investment banks (such as Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs), and even the demise of large, integrated, global banks (such as Citigroup).	雷曼兄弟倒闭不出24小时，美国当局就不得不四处奔波防止资产紧急甩卖、货币市场共同基金挤兑以及其他投资银行（如美林、摩根士丹利和高盛）甚至大规模综合性全球银行（如花旗）破产。


While deploying an unprecedented amount of financial firefighting equipment, officials and lawmakers – on both sides of the Atlantic – were clear that this was a “never again” situation.	尽管部署了前所未有规模的金融救火措施，但官员和立法者——大西洋两岸都一样——十分清楚这是一个“不容再犯”的局面。


As soon as the fires were out, they pledged, they would work diligently to ensure that the “next Lehman” could fail in a government-managed “resolution” process that would not cause panic and a collapse of credit.	他们承诺，等紧急情况过去后马上开足马力确保“下一个雷曼兄弟”可以在政府管理的“清算”程序中倒闭，不会引起恐慌和信用崩盘。


This task was taken up at the international level by the FSB, established after the G-20 summit in London in April 2009.	在国际层面，这一任务落到了FSB头上。 FSB于2009年4月在G-20伦敦峰会上成立。


After many years of working closely with leading national authorities (including in the US and Europe), on November 9 the FSB published “Removing Remaining Obstacles to Resolvability,” along with a number of related technical papers.	在与领导国家当局（包括美国和欧洲）密切合作多年后，11月9日FSB发布了《解决剩余破产障碍》（Removing Remaining Obstacles to Resolvability）报告以及大量相关技术文档。


Unfortunately, there are three flaws in the FSB’s framework that will prevent it from being effectively applied to large global banks.	不幸的是，FSB的框架存在三大缺陷，这决定了其无法有效适用于全球性大银行。


First, by definition, global banks operate across borders, and there is no agreement among different national authorities regarding how to respond in a crisis.	首先，顾名思义，全球性银行跨国经营，而不同国家当局间不存在如何应对危机的协议。


There is, arguably, better communication than there was before 2008, but when the chips are down, this will be worth little.	诚然，与2008年前相比，沟通情况有了改善，但当危机爆发时，沟通一文不值。


The countries involved have different legal rules, different procedures for protecting local assets, and different court systems.	危机所牵涉到的国家法律规则不同、保护本地自产的程序不同，法庭系统也不同。


A major international treaty could address all of this, but the immediate prospects for one are nonexistent.	重大国际条约能够解决所有这些问题，但在近期看不到形成这样的条约的可能性。


Second, the FSB proposes to require a Total Loss Absorbing Capacity for all large banks.	其次，FSB建议对所有大银行要求一定的总损失吸收能力（TLAC）。


But TLAC is just jargon for saying that these banks should fund themselves with both equity and “bail-in-able debt” – debt that can be converted to equity (or wiped out) when there is an official resolution event.	但TLAC只是一个术语化的说法，其实质是这些银行应该同时运用股本和“可自我援助的债务”（bail-in-able debt）融资。 在发生清算事件时，可自我援助的债务可以转换为股票（或被清除）。


All this really means is that some debt can fall dramatically in value when government officials pull the trigger.	所有这些的真实含义是某些债务在政府官员扳动扳机时可以暴跌。


This may seem elegant in theory, but it is completely unworkable in practice.	这在理论上十分漂亮，但在实践中完全不可行。


In any real crisis, the authorities’ real fear is that the fall in one asset price (the equity value of big banks) will cause other asset-price declines – leading to a broader contraction of credit.	在任何真正的危机中，当局真正害怕的是一种资产价格（大银行的股票价值）的下跌触发其他资产价格下跌——导致全面信用萎缩。


The idea of “loss-absorbing debt” is an oxymoron.	“损失吸收债务”的概念自相矛盾。


Third, what really matters for financial systems is the extent of equity financing – including how much equity banks are required to have.	第三，对金融体系来说，真正重要的是股权融资的程度——包括要求银行拥有多少股本。


Current levels are so low – debt funds around 95% of total credit exposure in most big US banks (and a slightly higher share in big European banks) – that banks’ equity can be substantially wiped out by even moderate negative shocks.	目前的要求水平太低了——大部分美国大银行的总信用暴露有大约95%来自债务融资（欧洲大银行的比例比美国还要略高一些）——即使是温和冲击也可能侵蚀大部分银行股本。


The good news is that the Fed increasingly seems to be taking this point on board – and inching toward higher capital requirements for the biggest banks.	好消息是美联储似乎正在日益重视这一点——并且开始逐步提高最大银行的资本要求。


Unfortunately, the failure of the international FSB approach means that the Fed must largely go it alone.	不幸的是，国际FSB方针的失败意味着美联储基本上只能依靠自己单打独斗。


The Spider of Finance	金融蜘蛛


LONDON – The global system of financial regulation is extraordinarily complex.	伦敦—全球金融监管体系极其复杂。


Partly for that reason, it is little understood.	部分出于这一原因，很少有人能够理解这一体系。


In order to explain it to my students at Sciences Po in Paris, I have devised a kind of wiring diagram that shows the connections among the different bodies responsible for the various components of oversight.	为了向我的巴黎政治大学学生们解释这一体系，我构思了一个布线图以显示负责各个监督角度的不同机构之间的联系。


It makes a circuit board look straightforward.	这样可以直观地看出其中的关系。


Many people show some spark of recognition at the mention of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which sets capital standards for banks.	许多人在提到巴塞尔银行监督委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision）做恍然状，表示认识这个为银行规定资本标准的机构。


They may also have heard of the Bank for International Settlements, the central banks’ central bank, in which the Basel Committee sits.	他们也可能听说过中央银行的中央银行、巴塞尔委员会所属的国际清算银行。


And the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which sets standards for exchanges and securities regulators, has name recognition in some quarters.	为交易所和证券监管机构设立标准的国际证券委员会组织（International Organization of Securities Commissions，IOSCO）也有人认得。


But when you get to the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, brows furrow.	但当你提到国际保险监督者协会（International Association of Insurance Supervisors，IAIS）时，迎接你的是一片茫然。


There are many other groupings.	还有其他各种组织。


The International Accounting Standards Board does roughly what you might expect, though the Americans, while members, do not in fact use its standards – which are now confusingly called International Financial Reporting Standards.	国际会计标准委员会（. The International Accounting Standards Board，IASB）做的事和你想的估计差不多，尽管身为其中一员的美国人事实上使用着自己的标准，这个标准的名字容易让人混淆——国际财务报告标准（International Financial Reporting Standards）。


But the IASB has spawned other committees to oversee auditing.	但IASB衍生出其他监督审计的委员会。


There is even – reminiscent of Hermann Hesse’s last novel, The Glass Bead Game – an international body that audits the bodies that audit the auditors.	甚至还有一个国际机构审计审计审计师的机构——这让人想起赫尔曼·黑塞的最后一部小说《玻璃球游戏》（The Glass Bead Game）。


The Financial Action Task Force sounds dynamic, like a rapid-response team one might send to a troubled country.	金融行动专责委员会（Financial Action Task Force）看起来动力十足，好像是随时随地可以派往受困国的快速反应部队似的。


In fact, it is the part of the OECD that monitors the implementation of anti-money-laundering standards.	事实上，它是经合组织的一部分，负责监控反洗钱标准的实施情况。


Why it is part of the OECD when its remit is global is a mystery few can explain.	它是经合组织的一部分，却管着全球洗钱，这也算是个难解之谜。


This elaborate architecture (and there is a lot more) was assembled piecemeal in the 1980s and 1990s.	这一精巧结构（出资之外还有很多机构）在20世纪八九十年代被拼凑起来。 亚洲金融危机前，它就好比是一张中央没有蜘蛛的蛛网。


Until the Asian financial crisis, it was a web without a spider at its center.	前德意志联邦银行行长汉斯·提特梅尔（Hans Tietmeyer）受七国集团财政部长要求评估它的效率。


When Hans Tietmeyer, a former head of the Bundesbank, was asked by G-7 finance ministers to review its effectiveness, he recommended a new spider, known as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which would examine the financial system as a whole and try to identify vulnerabilities that might cause future trouble.	他建议加入一只蜘蛛，即为人所熟知的金融稳定论坛（Financial Stability Forum，FSF）。 金融稳定论坛考察金融体系整体，并试图找到可能引发未来麻烦的弱点。


I was a member of the FSF for five years.	我做过五年的金融稳定论坛成员。


I confess that I am rather afraid of spiders, but even an arachnophobe like me found little reason to be worried.	坦白说，我很害怕蜘蛛，但像我这样的蜘蛛恐惧症患者也觉得这没什么好怕的。


The FSF was not a scary creature, and the individual regulators, national and international, were largely left to their own devices, with all of the unhappy consequences with which we have become acquainted.	金融稳定论坛不是恐怖生物，而个体国家和国际监管者也有很大的自主空间，所造成的不愉快后果现在早已众所周知了。


Before 2007, there was little political interest in tougher global standards, and individual countries resisted the idea that an international body might interfere in their sovereign right to oversee an unsound banking system.	2007年前，收紧全球标准不符合政治利益，个体国家也不接受国际机构干预主权权利监督不可靠的银行体系。


So when the next crisis hit, the FSF was found wanting, and in 2009 the G-20 governments decided that a tougher model was needed – the Financial Stability Board.	因此，当日后危机来袭时，金融稳定论坛表现得有待加强，2009年二十国集团政府决定采取更严格的模式——金融稳定委员会（Financial Stability Board）。


The FSB has now been in operation for five years, and is currently working on some new proposals to deal with too-big-to-fail banks, which will be on the menu of the forthcoming G-20 meeting in Brisbane (along with surf and turf, Pavlovas, and other Australian delicacies).	目前，金融稳定委员会已���运营了五年，目前正在构思新的处理太大而不能倒的银行的方案，即将到来的布里斯班二十国集团会议将讨论这一议题（当然少不了龙虾、牛排、Pavlovas和其他澳大利亚佳肴）。


There is not (yet) an international group that audits the FSB’s effectiveness.	（尚）没有一家国际组织审计金融稳定委员会的效率。


But if there were, what would it say about the FSB’s performance so far, under the leadership of Mario Draghi and then of Mark Carney, each of whom did the job in his spare time, while running important central banks?	但如果有的话，对于金融稳定委员会到目前为止在马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）和马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）的先后领导下（两人都是在业余时间担任这一职务的，他们的主业是管理重要央行）的表现，它会做出什么评价呢？


On the asset side of the balance sheet, the auditors would be bound to note that the Board has done much useful work.	在资产负债表的资产端，审计者肯定会注意到该委员会做了大量有用的工作。


Its regular reports to the G-20 pull together the diverse strands of regulation in a clear and comprehensible way.	其向二十国集团所做的定期报告以明晰、全面的方式汇集了为数众多的各种监管条缕。


There is no better source of information.	没有比这更好的信息源了。


They would also record that pressure from the FSB has accelerated the work of sectoral regulators.	审计者还会报告，来自金融稳定委员会的压力加快了部门监管者的工作。


The second Basel accord took more than a decade to conclude; Basel 3 was drawn up in little more than 24 months (though implementation is taking quite long).	第二巴塞尔章程花了十多年时间才完成，而巴塞尔3的起草时间不过24个月稍多（尽管其实施花了很久）。


The performance of the IOSCO and the IAIS has similarly been sharpened by the need to report progress through the FSB.	IOSCO和IAIS也因为需要通过金融稳定委员会报告进展而取得了类似的进步。


The Board has also issued some valuable warnings in its so-called “vulnerabilities” assessments.	该委员会还通过其所谓的“弱点”评估发出了一些颇有价值的警告。


It has pointed to emerging tensions in the system, without falling into the trap of forecasting ten of the next three crises.	它指出了体系中所出现的紧张，并且没有落入“预测了未来三次危机中的十次”这样的窠臼。


And its peer review mechanism is prodding individual countries to strengthen their regulatory institutions.	其同行评议机制也促使个体国家加强监管机构。


Nonetheless, a frank assessment would acknowledge that this spider has so far caught few flies.	尽管如此，坦诚的评估必须承认，这只蜘蛛目前并没有抓住几只苍蝇。


To switch animal metaphors, it is a watchdog without teeth.	用动物作比喻，这是一只没牙的老虎。


It can neither instruct the other regulators what to do (or not do) nor force member countries to comply with new regulations.	它既不能通知其他监管者做什么（或不做什么），也不能强制要求成员国遵守新监管。


Indeed, the entire edifice of global financial regulation is built on a “best endeavors” basis.	事实上，整座全球金融监管大厦是建立在“竭尽全力”的基础上的。


The FSB’s charter, revised in 2012, says that signatories are subject to no legal obligations whatsoever.	2012年修订的金融稳定委员会章程说，签署国不会有任何法律义务。


Unlike the World Trade Organization, for example, no international treaty underpins the FSB, which means that countries cannot be sanctioned for failing to implement the standards to which they are ostensibly committed.	和（比如）世贸组织不同，金融稳定委员会背后没有国际条约，这意味着不能因为某国没有实施其表面上承诺的标准而制裁它。


So a fair verdict would be that the FSB has done no more and no less than what its political masters have been prepared to allow it to do.	因此，公正的结论是金融稳定委员会做得不多也不少，恰好等于炮制它的政治领导人所准备让它做的。


There is no political will to create a body that could genuinely police international standards and prevent countries from engaging in competitive deregulation – and prevent banks from engaging in regulatory arbitrage.	没有人有政治意愿建立真正可以监督国际标准、阻止各国竞相去监管化——从而防止银行从事监管套利——的机构。


It seems that we must await the next crisis for that resolve to emerge.	看上去我们得等到下一场危机才会下定决心行动。


In the meantime, the FSB, with all of its weaknesses, is the best we have.	与此同时，金融稳定委员会虽然弱点重重，已是我们所能有的最佳方案。


The Debtor Prisoner’s Dilemma	现代债务魔咒：了犹未了


PRINCETON – Any economic slowdown increases debt burdens, whether for households or for states.	普林斯顿——一切经济放缓总会加剧债务负担，不论对家庭还是国家而言都是如此。


Today, both are looking for ways to reduce the weight of debt – and some would prefer to escape it.	现如今，它们都在想方设法减轻债务，有些人甚至想逃避债务。


Deeply frustrated and angry people – especially in southern Europe – frequently hold up Argentina’s defiance of the international community in 2001 as a model.	一些沮丧和愤怒的国家，尤其是南欧国家，经常把2001年公然蔑视国际社会的阿根廷当成榜样。


Argentina then used a mixture of coercion and negotiation to get out from under the mountain of debt that it incurred in the 1990’s, effectively expropriating foreign creditors, who were viewed as dangerous and malign.	当年，阿根廷依靠半是强迫、半是协商的手段，从20世纪90年代堆积起来的债务大山下脱身，实际上强行剥夺了外国债主的权益，而后者则被视作危险和邪恶的化身。


In the 1990’s, Argentina tied its hands with a dollar-pegged currency in order to enhance its credibility as a borrower.	在90年代，为了增强举债的信誉，阿根廷用本币盯住美元的办法自缚手脚。


The strategy worked too well: the large credit inflows that it attracted triggered an inflationary boom that reduced the country’s competitiveness.	结果这个战略成功地过了头：巨量信贷循味而来，流入阿根廷经济，引发通胀式繁荣，削弱了出口竞争力。


By 2001, a combination of devaluation (exit from the currency straitjacket) and partial default was inevitable.	到了2001年，本币贬值（脱掉货币紧身衣）和部分违约的前景变得不可避免。


Default was followed by nominally voluntary restructurings in which creditors were invited to take some losses.	违约之后，又搞了名义上自愿的重组，让债权人承担了一定损失。


Up to now, the Argentine model has seemed successful, yielding substantial economic growth for the country since 2001.	迄今为止，阿根廷模式看上去还算成功——阿根廷经济从2001年起稳步增长。


That is what has made the model so appealing to debt-burdened southern Europeans.	也正因此，阿根廷模式对南欧债务国极具吸引力。


But a recent New York court ruling against Argentina in a case brought by a holdout hedge-fund creditor has dramatically raised the stakes of sovereign default and bankruptcy.	但最近，在一起对冲基金债权人诉阿根廷的案子中，纽约一法庭判阿根廷败诉，这一裁决令其主权违约和国家破产的可能性激增。


When holdouts are rewarded by court decisions, and the rights of recalcitrant creditors are recognized in other jurisdictions, efforts at “voluntary” restructuring become unsustainable.	因为一旦法庭裁决支持了不妥协的债权人，而债权人的抗辩权利又得到其他司法行动的承认，那么“自愿”重组的一切努力就会付诸东流。


More and more parties will resist writing down some debt in favor of trying to seize whatever assets they can.	越来越多的债主会群起抵制债务减记，转而用尽一切手段控制阿根廷的资产，抓住多少算多少。


For Argentina, the writing is now on the wall.	对阿根廷而言，这已成了眼前的现实。


One of the creditors favored in the New York case, Elliott Capital, had already successfully requested the seizure in Ghana of the Argentine Navy’s three-mast sailing ship ARA Libertad.	纽约一案中胜诉的债权人之一Elliott Capital已在加纳成功扣留了阿根廷海军的一艘教学舰——三桅帆船ARA Libertad。


If the fallout of the New York decision is an extensive Argentine default on other obligations, foreign trade will become practically impossible, many goods will become scarce, and domestic inflation will increase further.	如果纽约裁决引发阿根廷其他债务的连锁违约，实际上将中止该国的外贸，导致国内多重商品短缺和通胀的进一步攀升。


In short, the Argentine model of debt reduction in the 2000’s has collapsed as completely as its borrowing model in the 1990’s did.	简言之，就像20世纪90年代的阿根廷举债模式一样，21世纪头十年里搞的阿根廷减债模式已经完全破产。


Two fundamental facts have created an apparently insoluble dilemma for the global economy, and have turned countries like Argentina and Greece into victims of an impossible logic.	两大基本事实造成了全球经济无解的两难处境，也把诸如阿根廷和希腊的一些国家变成一种“不可能的逻辑”的受害者。


First, debt continually grows; second, there is no really satisfactory way of getting rid of it.	第一，债务持续增加； 第二，不存在摆脱债务的好方法。


The financial sector’s explosive growth over the past two decades has fueled the accumulation of exceptionally large volumes of debt.	过去20年间，金融业的爆发式成长造成了规模空前的债务积累。


In the absence of some positive shock – such as an acceleration of GDP growth – servicing that debt becomes impossible for at least some borrowers.	但缺乏一些积极的突进——例如GDP激增——使得至少一些债务人无力还债。


Real debt defaults are historically rare.	真正的债务违约在历史上并不多见。


For both borrowers and creditors, the risks and costs are enormous.	对债务人和债权人来说，违约的风险和成本是巨大的。


The borrower is cut off from international markets, and essential imports can no longer be purchased, while large-scale defaults threaten to plunge creditors into insolvency.	债务人将被逐出国际市场，无从购买基本的进口商品，而大规模违约的拖累则可能导致债权人破产。


The consequence is a complicated game – currently exemplified by the saga of Greek voluntary restructuring – in which both sides stare into the abyss and then turn away from the out-and-out conflict that would send them plummeting into it.	结果产生了一个复杂的博弈——最近的例子就是希腊自愿重组的传说——双方都看到了前面的深渊，然后回过头来不再对抗到底，以避免双双沉没的结局。


Latin America experienced this dilemma in the 1980’s, when its debt arithmetic had become unsustainable.	20世纪80年代拉美就经历过这种两难局面，当时它的债务算术已经难以为继。


At the outset of that crisis, major US financial institutions’ capital exposure to Latin America was near 200%, making candid recognition of debt unsustainability the surest route to wiping out the global financial system.	在危机伊始，美国各大金融机构在拉美债务上的风险敞口达到200%，在这种情况下，过于坦率地承认债务不可持续性几乎一定会搞垮全球金融体系。


Most of the big Latin American debtors took extraordinary pains to avoid an explicit default.	为了避免赤裸裸的违约，拉美的主要债务国多数接受了异常痛苦的解决方案。


The only sustained exception was Peru, which defaulted in 1985 and became an international pariah.	唯一的例外是秘鲁，该国于1985年违��，沦为国际弃儿。


Of the largest borrowers, only Brazil, in 1987, formally defaulted – and only briefly.	在主要债务国当中，只有巴西曾于1987年正式出现过短暂违约情况。


As President José Sarney, backing down, admitted, “The fact is that we cannot destroy the international system.	正如时任巴西总统若泽·萨尔内（José Sarney）后来所承认的：“事实上我们不可能摧毁国际体系。


We can scratch it, but it can destroy us.”	我们能抓伤它，但最终是它能摧毁我们。 ”


Instead, banks in the 1980’s offered new money in an attempt to extricate themselves from the crisis.	但它并没有这么做。 20世纪80年代，各国银行继续出钱，好让自己从危机中脱身。


Managing modern debt crises always involves the extraordinary logic of throwing good money after bad in the hope of masking the underlying unsustainability.	管理现代债务危机总是绕不开一种超越常轨的逻辑——在出现“坏”账之后继续往里砸“好”钱，希望借此掩盖债务难以为继的事实。


The same logic has been applied in the euro crisis, with official money taking the place of private-sector exposure.	在欧元危机中，同样的逻辑也在起作用，公共部门的现金接手了私人部门的坏账。


The emergence of inextinguishable debt replicates other troubling aspects of contemporary life.	无法去除的债务这个现象反映了当代生活其他棘手的方面。


Governments, businesses, and individuals all face the build-up of other sorts of liabilities in the form of accumulations of information that cannot be deleted.	政府、企业和个人都要面对堆积如山的其他类型的负担，尤其是无法删除的信息积累。


E-mail, Facebook, and Twitter accounts all produce a permanent record that perpetually accompanies users, even when their circumstances change.	电子邮件、社交网站和微博账户都留下持久的纪录，即使时过境迁，也将伴随用户。


The legacy of the past continually resurfaces to constrain action in the present.	过去的遗产不断浮出水面，给当前的行动设限。


Just as countries might want to wipe out their debt and start anew, individuals might like to erase their electronic past in a dramatic act of liberation.	就像国家也许想要勾销债务从头开始一样，个人也可能生出过断然擦除电子痕迹让自己解放一下的念头。


But that would destroy the useful together with the embarrassing or irrelevant.	但这样做会把有用信息连同干扰信息和无关信息一起毁灭。


If a clean start is impossible, the best that can be done is to try to bury the old information with such an inflationary flood of new data that it simply dwindles into insignificance.	如果干干净净重新开始是做不到的，那么最好的办法就是用新信息的洪水淹没旧信息，将后者稀释到无足轻重。


The analogue in the world of debt negotiation is that a new start that allows borrowing to begin all over again is also impossible.	引申到债务谈判领域，将一切债务一笔勾销从头再来也是做不到的。


A cleanup is impossible. That leaves only one solution: pile on new claims to such an extent that old debts appear paltry.	既然如此，只有一条出路：源源不断地提出新诉求，让旧债相形见绌。


Those who cannot forget the past are condemned to inflate it.	既然你不能忘掉过去，就注定只能稀释它。


The Harm of Regulatory Disharmony	监管不一致的害处


LONDON – In the alphabet soup of institutions involved in the regulation of global financial markets, the FMLC – the Financial Markets Law Committee – is not very prominent.	伦敦—在全球金融市场监管机构的“字母汤”中，FMLC——金融市场法律委员会（Financial Markets Law Committee）——并不十分显眼。


Given that it is based only in London, having grown out of an initiative by the Bank of England 20 years ago, and that most of its members are lawyers, most banks have not even heard of it (though some of them are represented on its Council).	它由英格兰银行在20年前成立，除了伦敦之外再无分号，其成员大部分是律师，而大部分银行从未听说过它（尽管一些银行在其理事会中有代表）。