To take a trivial example, think about the annoyance of trying to reach a real person on the phone, only to be passed along from one automated menu to another.	举一个日常的例子，想象一下你想打电话给一个真人，却被自动菜单转来转去。


Sometimes, this is vexing simply because you cannot get the answer you need without the intervention of human intelligence.	有时候，你之所以烦恼，只是因为你无法在没有人类智能干预的情况下获得你需要的答案。


Or, it may be emotionally frustrating, because you are barred from expressing your feelings to a fellow human being, who would understand, and might even share your sentiments.	或者，这令你心情沮丧，因为你不再能够向人类同胞表达你的感觉，而人类能够理解你的情绪甚至与你感同身受。


Other examples are less trivial, and I am particularly worried about computers being used as “carers” or “companions” for elderly people.	其他例子没有那么日常，而我特别担心用来当作老年人“看护者”或“陪伴者”的计算机。


To be sure, AI systems that are linked to the Internet and furnished with personalized apps could inform and entertain a lonely person, as well as monitor their vital signs and alert physicians or family members when necessary.	平心而论，连上互联网、提供个性化应用的AI系统可以提醒和娱乐孤独的人，也可以监测这些人的重要信号，在必要时向医生或家庭预警。


Domestic robots could prove to be very useful for fetching food from the fridge and completing other household tasks.	居家机器人可以在从冰箱中取食物和完成其他家务方面派上巨大的用场。


But whether an AI system can provide genuine care or companionship is another matter altogether.	但AI系统能否提供真正的看护或陪伴完全是另一个问题。


Those who believe that this is possible assume that natural-language processing will be up to the task.	认为这可能的人觉得自然语言处理可以胜任这一任务。


But “the task” would include having emotionally-laden conversations about people’s personal memories.	但“任务”还包括关于个人记忆的充满感情的对话。


While an AI system might be able to recognize a limited range of emotions in someone’s vocabulary, intonation, pauses, or facial expressions, it will never be able to match an appropriate human response.	AI系统或许能够从人的用语、声调、停顿和表情中识别有限的感情，但它不可能匹配合理的人类反应。


It might say, “I’m sorry you’re sad about that,” or, “What a lovely thing to have happened!”	我可能说“很抱歉你伤心了，”或者“这真是太好了！


But either phrase would be literally meaningless.	”但这些语句在字面上毫无意义。


A demented person could be “comforted” by such words, but at what cost to their human dignity?	一个焦躁不安的人可能被这些语句“安抚”，但他们的人格尊严会付出怎样的代价？


The alternative, of course, is to keep humans in these roles.	当然，另一条路是继续让人类扮演这些角色。


Rather than replacing humans, robots can be human aids.	机器人不取代人，而是作为人的助手。


Today, many human-to-human jobs that involve physical and emotional caretaking are undervalued.	如今，许多与身心看护有关人际互动岗位被低估了。


Ideally, these jobs will gain more respect and remuneration in the future.	在理想情况下，这些岗位应该在未来获得更多的尊重和报酬。


But perhaps that is wishful thinking.	但也许这只是一厢情愿。


Ultimately, the future of AI – our AI future – is bright.	说到底，AI的未来（future of AI）——我们的AI未来（AI future）——是光明的。


But the brighter it becomes, the more shadows it will cast.	但它越是光明，投下的阴影也越大。


ASEAN at 50	东盟50年


SINGAPORE – We live in troubled times, with pessimism clouding even the most prosperous parts of the planet.	新加坡—我们生活在一个麻烦的时代，在大部分地球最繁荣的地区，照样萦绕着悲观情绪。


Many are convinced that the international order is falling apart.	许多人认定国际秩序正在分崩离析。


Some fear that a clash of civilizations is imminent, if it has not already begun.	有人担心文明的交锋近在眼前，甚至已经开始了。


Yet, amid the gloom, Southeast Asia offers an unexpected glimmer of hope.	但是，在一片黯淡中间，东南亚为人们提供了一丝希望的曙光。


The region has made extraordinary progress in recent decades, achieving a level of peace and prosperity that was previously unimaginable.	该地区近几十年来进步巨大，实现了此前无法想象的和平与繁荣。


And it owes much of this success to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which marks its 50th anniversary this month.	而这一成功很大程度上要归因于东盟。 本月，东盟将迎来成立50周年。


Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most diverse regions.	东南亚是全世界最多元化的地区之一。 其6.


Its 640 million people include 240 million Muslims, 120 million Christians, 150 million Buddhists, and millions of Hindus, Taoists, Confucianists, and Communists.	2亿基督徒、1. 5亿佛教徒，还有数以百万计的印度教徒、道教徒、儒家和共产主义者。


Its most populous country, Indonesia, is home to 261 million people, while Brunei has just 450,000.	域内人口最多的国家印度尼西亚有2. 61亿人，而文莱只有45万人。


Singapore’s per capita income of $52,960 per annum is 22.5 times that of Laos ($2,353).	新加坡人均收入高达每年52,960美元，是老挝（2,353美元）的22. 5倍。


This diversity puts Southeast Asia at a distinct disadvantage in terms of fostering regional cooperation.	这一多样性让东南亚在形成域内合作方面处于严重的劣势。


When ASEAN was founded in 1967, most experts expected it to die within a few years.	1967年东盟成立时，许多专家认为其维持不了几年。


At the time, Southeast Asia was a poor and deeply troubled region, which the British historian C.A. Fisher had described as the Balkans of Asia.	当时，东南亚是一个既贫穷，又问题重重的地区，英国历史学家费雪（C. A.


The Vietnam War was underway, and the Sino-Vietnamese War was yet to be fought.	Fisher）称之为亚洲的巴尔干。 越南战争尚未结束，中越战争等着开打。


Many viewed the five non-Communist states that founded ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – as dominoes, set to be tipped over by a neighbor’s fall to communism or descent into civil strife.	许多人将成立东盟的五个非共产主义国家——印尼、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡和泰国——视为多米诺骨牌，只要有一个邻国导向共产主义，或陷入内乱，这些国家就会逐个崩溃。


But ASEAN defied expectations, becoming the world’s second most successful regional organization, after the European Union.	但东盟打破了这些预言，成为全世界第二成功的区域组织，仅次于欧盟。


Some 1,000 ASEAN meetings are held each year to deepen cooperation in areas such as education, health, and diplomacy.	每年，东盟都要举行1,000次会议深化教育、卫生和外交等领域的合作。


ASEAN has signed free-trade agreements (FTAs) with China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and established an ASEAN economic community.	东盟与中国、日本、印度、韩国、澳大利亚和新西兰签署了自由贸易协定（FTA），并成立了一个东盟经济共同体。


Today, ASEAN comprises the world’s seventh-largest economy, on track to become the fourth largest by 2050.	如今，东盟是世界第七大经济体，有望在2050年跃居第四大经济体。


As I explain in my book The ASEAN Miracle, several factors have underpinned the bloc’s success.	我在我的新书《东盟奇迹》（The ASEAN Miracle）中指出，多重因素奠定了该地区的成功。


At first, anti-communism provided a powerful incentive to collaborate.	首先，反共产主义提供了强大的合作激励。


Strong leaders, like Indonesia’s Suharto, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, and Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew, held the group together.	强力领导人，如印尼的苏哈托、马来西亚前总理马哈蒂尔、新加坡国父李光耀，让这一组织保持团结。


It helped that as ASEAN was getting off the ground in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the strategic interests of America, China, and the bloc’s members converged.	东盟在20世纪60年代末、70年代初起航的时机也恰到好处，美国、中国和域内成员国的战略利益形成了趋同。


But even when the Cold War ended, the region did not erupt into conflict, as the real Balkans did.	但即使在冷战结束后，该地区也没有像巴尔干地区一样爆发冲突。


ASEAN countries maintained the cooperative habits that had become established in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s.	东盟国家保持了合作的习惯，到20世纪70和80年代，合作已成为东南亚的常态。


In fact, ASEAN’s erstwhile communist enemies – Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam – decided to join the bloc.	事实上，东盟此前的共产主义敌人——柬埔寨、老挝和越南都决定加入其中。


So, too, did Myanmar, ending decades of isolation.	结束了几十年的孤立的缅甸亦然。


ASEAN’s policy of engaging Myanmar attracted criticism from the West, but it helped lay the groundwork for a peaceful transition from military rule.	东盟接纳缅甸的政策导致了西方的批评，但帮助其奠定了和平结束军事统治的转型。


(Compare this to the West’s policy of isolation toward, say, Syria, which certainly won’t lead to a similar outcome.)	（与此形成鲜明对比的是，西方对叙利亚等国家采取了孤立的政策，这显然无法实现同样的结果。 ）


To be sure, ASEAN is far from perfect.	诚然，东盟绝非完美。


Over the short term, it seems to move like a crab – two steps forward, one step back, and one step sideways.	在短期看，它的行动像一只螃蟹——前进两步，后退一步，再横着爬一步。


Yet ASEAN’s long-term progress is undeniable.	但东盟的长期成功是不容否认的。


Its combined GDP has grown from $95 billion in 1970 to $2.5 trillion in 2014.	其GDP总和从1970年的950亿美元增加到2014年的2.


And it is the only reliable platform for geopolitical engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, unique in its ability to convene meetings attended by all of the world’s great powers, from the United States and the European Union to China and Russia.	5万亿美元。 它也是亚太地区地缘政治的唯一可靠的平台，拥有召集全世界所有大国——从美国和欧盟到中国和俄罗斯——齐聚一堂的独特能力。


ASEAN continues to face serious challenges.	东盟国家仍然面临着艰巨挑战。


Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have created deep divisions, and the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the US and China poses a further threat to cohesion.	南海领土纠纷制造了深刻的分歧，而美国和中国质检的地缘政治对立的加剧带来了更多的凝聚力威胁。


And domestic politics in several member states, including Malaysia and Thailand, is becoming increasingly chaotic.	马来西亚和泰国等成员国的国内政局也早日益混乱。


But ASEAN’s history suggests that the bloc can weather these storms.	但东盟的历史表明，该地区能够抵御这些风暴。


Its impressive resilience is rooted in the culture of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus) championed by Indonesia.	其令人印象深刻的恢复力植根于印尼所引领的协商（musyawarah）和共识（mufakat）文化。


Imagine how other regional organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, could benefit from adherence to such norms.	试想，如果其他地区组织，如海湾合作委员会、南亚地区合作协会等，如果能够坚守类似的规范，能够尝到多大的甜头。


The EU once amounted to the gold standard for regional cooperation.	欧盟曾经是地区合作的金本位。


But it continues to struggle with a seemingly never-ending series of crises and weak economic growth.	但它似乎陷入了一系列没完没了的危机，经济增长萎靡。


Add to that the impending departure of the United Kingdom, and it seems only prudent to seek other models of cooperation.	此外，英国即将从欧盟中脱离，看起来，寻求其他合作模式才是正途。


ASEAN, however imperfect, provides an attractive one.	而东盟尽管存在各种缺陷，可以提供一个有吸引力的榜样。


The EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.	2012年，欧盟被授予诺贝尔和平奖。


But ASEAN’s approach may turn out to be the way of the future, enabling other fractious regions to develop sturdy bonds of cooperation, too.	但东盟的方针也许才代表着未来方向，让其他动乱地区也建立起稳固的合作联系。


To Resist the Robots, Invest in People	抵御机器人、投资民众


MANILA – A knitting factory in Bangladesh brings together the past, present, and future.	马尼拉——孟加拉的一间针织厂汇聚了过去，现在和未来。


On one floor, workers knit by hand.	在其中一层，工人们在手编生产。


On another, people and machines do the work together.	而在另一层，人和机器则在一起工作。


And on a third floor, there are only robots.	而在第三层，只有机器人在工作。


This building might seem like an anachronism, given the accepted wisdom that robots will replace humans in textiles and many other industries.	这座建筑看似弄错了年代，因为人们普遍认为机器人将在纺织和其他许多行业顶替人的位置。


But it is actually a savvy response to how the Fourth Industrial Revolution will likely play out in Asia.	但这其实是对第四次工业革命如何在亚洲展开的明智回应。


As is the case elsewhere, technological advances are rapidly transforming industries and economies, by blurring the boundaries between the physical, digital, and biological worlds.	像在其他地方一样，技术进步正在通过模糊物理、数字和生物世界之间的界限来实现行业和经济体的快速转型。


And yet much of Asia isn’t ready for robots, for reasons that go beyond fears of mass unemployment.	但亚洲绝大部分地区还没有为机器人做好准备，个中理由不仅限于对大规模失业的担忧。


In 2014, China had just 11 robots per 10,000 employees in non-automotive industries, and just 213 per 10,000 employees on automotive assembly lines.	在2014年，中国非汽车行业每一万名员工中仅有11台机器人，而在汽车组装线上213台机器人则对应着每万名员工。


That is hundreds fewer than in Japan, the United States, or Germany.	这比日本、美国或德国的状况少数百台还多。


Although China is closing the gap by increasing its spending on robots, poorer countries face significant barriers to adopting new technologies.	虽然中国正在通过加大机器人开支来缩小差距，贫困国家在采用新技术方面的确困难重重。


Moreover, the region’s lower wages give firms an incentive to retain human workers.	不仅如此，该地区薪酬较低使得企业有动力保留人工。


At the factory in Bangladesh, human workers can step in if power outages or equipment failures knock the machines offline.	在孟加拉国的工厂，工人可以在停电和设备故障致使机械设备无法工作时介入。


At the same time, having a fully automated section allows production to continue if workers go on strike.	与此同时，拥有完全自动化的生产部门可以在工人罢工时继续完成生产任务。


Conventional wisdom decrees that this dual-track approach isn’t sustainable, and that low- to middle-skilled workers will eventually make way for robots.	传统观点认为这样的双轨制是不可持续的，中低技能工人归根结底会为机器人让路。


A landmark 2013 study by Carl Frey and Michael Osborne of Oxford University suggests that, in the coming decades, 47% of total US employment will be at risk of automation.	牛津大学卡尔·弗雷和迈克尔·奥斯伯恩在2013年所进行的一项标志性研究表明在今后几十年，自动化将威胁美国47%的就业总人数。


Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has warned that 56% of total employment in Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam is “at high risk of displacement due to technology over the next decade or two.”	同样，据国际劳工组织警告 ，柬埔寨、印尼、菲律宾、泰国和越南就业总人数的56%“将在未来十年或20年因为技术的发展而面临失业的威胁。 ”


But these grim predictions ignore the fact that most jobs comprise a bundle of tasks, some of which cannot be automated.	但上述严峻的预测忽视了这样一个事实，那就是绝大多数岗位都包含部分无法被自动化取代的系列任务。


According to a 2016 OECD study that breaks down occupations by task, only 9% of jobs on average across 21 OECD countries are really at risk.	经合组织2016年按任务对职业进行分解的研究表明，在21个经合组织国家中仅有9%的工作岗位确实处在危险之中。


The same logic applies to Asia.	同样的逻辑也适用于亚洲。


In Vietnam, for example, the share of jobs at risk falls from the ILO’s predicted 70% to just 15% when the country’s large informal economy is taken into account.	例如在越南，如果考虑到该国规模庞大的非正规经济领域，面临威胁的工作岗位比例从国际劳工组织预测的70%下降到仅15%。


Street sweepers in developing countries are arguably less threatened by automation than their counterparts in developed countries, because their jobs are less mechanized and lower paid.	发展中国家的环卫工人面对的自动化威胁可能比发达国家要低，因为他们的工作机械化程度较低，而且工资也十分微薄。


Still, robots are gaining a foothold in the region, particularly in economies such as China and South Korea.	但机器人仍然在该地区站稳了脚跟，尤其在中国和韩国这样的经济体就更是这样。


In 2015, robot sales in Asia increased by 19% – the fourth record-breaking year in a row.	2015年，亚洲地区的机器人销量增长了19%——这也是连续第四年打破记录。


When less-developed Asian countries eventually join the technology bandwagon, layoffs will inevitably ensue.	当亚洲欠发达国家最终融入技术潮流时，随之而来的必定是裁员的结果。


To soften the blow, governments urgently need to pursue labor-market reforms and overhaul their education systems, starting with technical and vocational education and training (TVET).	为减轻这一打击，政府迫切需要从技术和职业教育培训开始（TVET），推动劳动力市场改革并彻底改革教育体系。


Although TVET is becoming increasingly popular in Asia’s developing economies, its quality is often poor.	尽管技术和职业教育培训在亚洲发展中经济体越来越受欢迎，但教育的质量却往往相对低劣。


Governments should ensure that TVET courses focus on more relevant skills, while remaining flexible so that students can study without sacrificing income.	政府应当确保职业技术教育培训更多地侧重于实用技能，并在突出重点的同时保持灵活性，以允许学生能在不牺牲收入的前提下学习新技能。


One option is to expand the availability of modular short courses, which take less time, train for specific tasks rather than entire jobs, and are more manageable for entrants who need, first and foremost, to earn money.	方法之一是扩大模块化短期课程的供应量，这种课程耗时更少，仅为特定任务而非整个岗位提供培训，同时对那些首先需要赚取收入的课程参与者来说能降低管理难度。


In Myanmar, for example, the government has launched a pilot program to target the country’s “missing million” students who drop out of school each year.	例如在缅甸，政府已经启动了一项针对该国每年失学的“百万失踪”学生的试点项目。


The program offers short courses on welding and other skills needed to repair rural machinery.	该项目开设有关焊接和其他技能的短期课程，以便教授学员学会修理农业机械。


Competency-based assessment systems could also be particularly useful, given Asia’s large informal workforce.	鉴于亚洲拥有庞大的非正规劳动力，以能力为基础的评估系统也可能发挥特别的作用。


Programs offering skilled workers a chance to earn certifications based on their work experience would allow for, say, uncertified electricians to find formal employment in robotics.	根据自身的工作经验，为熟练工人提供考证机会的项目能够允许尚未得到认证的电工在机器人行业找到正式的工作。


The private sector can also help produce more graduates with job-ready skills.	私营部门还可以协助提供更多具备就业技能的毕业生。


Asian countries should take a cue from India’s National Skill Development Corporation, which works with private training firms to match skills curricula with industry needs.	亚洲国家应当从印度国家技能开发公司的榜样中得到启示，它与私营培训企业合作匹配技能课程与行业需求。


So far, India’s program has helped train more than 63,000 people.	到目前为止，印度项目已经协助培训了超过6，3000名民众。


Furthermore, governments should offer subsidies or tax incentives to companies that invest in the skills that humans master better than machines, such as communication and negotiation.	不仅如此，政府应当向那些投资于更适宜人类掌握的技术，如沟通和谈判技巧的企业提供补贴或税收激励。


They will also have to adopt more flexible labor regulations, because firms won’t hire skilled workers who cost too much.	政府还应当采取更灵活的劳动规则，因为要价太高的技工不会得到企业的聘用。


At the end of the day, Asia’s developing countries need policies that support workers, rather than jobs.	归根结底，亚洲发展中国家需要支持工人而非岗位的各项政策。


All parties can benefit from flexible contracts and lifelong learning and retraining opportunities.	灵活的合同以及终身学习和再培训的机会可以令各方受益无穷。


Retraining is particularly important, because automation will create entirely new industries and occupations.	再培训尤为重要，因为自动化将创造全新的行业和职业。


The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that automation could boost global productivity growth by 0.8-1.4% annually, generating large savings and performance gains for businesses.	据麦肯锡全球研究院估计自动化可以使全球生产率每年提高0. 8-1.


Improving access to training and certification would help countries capitalize on these advances and ensure more equitable growth, by giving workers the skills needed to handle the new jobs.	4%，从而在为企业节约大笔经费的同时带来效益的提升。 扩大获取培训和认证的机会将有助于各国利用这些进步并确保实现更公平的增长，并为工人提供处理新工作所需的技能。


That outcome would be good for workers and for Asian economies.	这样的结果对工人和亚洲各国经济都有好处。


It would mean that businesses like the factory in Bangladesh could operate solely with robots, while its former workers would be gainfully employed elsewhere, most likely in jobs that don’t even exist yet.	这意味着像孟加拉工厂那样的企业可以只用机器人，而那些以前为这些企业工作的员工则可以在其他地方从事更有利可图的工作，而且很有可能是在目前还并不存在的工作岗位上。


Asian Cities’ Endless Summer	亚洲城市的无尽之夏


POTSDAM/MANILA – It’s monsoon season in Asia – marking an end to months of scorching temperatures.	波茨坦/米兰——现在是亚洲的季风季——季风季的到来标志着数月高温的结束。


But the extreme heat will return, with cities facing particularly brutal conditions.	但极端热浪还会回来，城市将面临特别严重的状况。


Already, Asia’s urban areas experience twice as many hot days as its rural areas do – and could experience ten times as many by 2100.	亚洲城市地区的高温日数已经是农村地区的两倍——到2100年甚至可能达到十倍之多。


At that point, there will be no reversing the trend.	真到那时，人们已经看不到逆转趋势的希望。


The first detailed assessment of climate risk for Asia, carried out by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), makes clear that Asia’s cities stand at the frontline of the fight against climate change.	由亚洲开发银行（ADB）和波茨坦气候影响研究所（PIK）联合进行的亚洲气候风险首次详细评估表明亚洲城市正处在对抗气候变化战斗的第一线上。


Indeed, many consequences of a hotter planet – such as more extreme weather events, sea-level rise, environmental migration, and mounting social tensions – intersect in urban areas.	事实上，地球变热的诸多后果——包括极端气候事件、海平面上升、环境移民和社会紧张局势加剧——都将在城市地区出现相交。


This is particularly true in Asia, where cities house more than half of the population and produce almost 80% of economic output.	亚洲的情况尤其如此，那里的城市拥有近半数的人口并支撑着近80%的经济增长。


By 2050, Asia’s urban population could nearly double, to three billion people.	截至2050年，亚洲地区的城市人口可能接近翻番，达30亿人以上。


Without new climate initiatives, the region’s cities could contribute more than half of the increase in global greenhouse-gas emissions over the next 20 years.	如果不出台新的气候措施，该地区的城市有可能贡献今后20年全球温室气体排放增长的一半以上。


Such a scenario is often called “business as usual.”	这种情况通常被称为“一切照旧”。


Yet, in reality, it is business as usual that would be disrupted by the consequences of climate change, with unfettered warming impeding or even reversing Asia’s recent economic progress.	但在现实中，一切照旧将会被气候变化的现实后果所打破，不受控制的温度变暖将阻碍甚至逆转亚洲近期的经济进步。


The longer we wait to address the climate challenge, the more devastating the disruption will be.	我们解决气候难题等待的时间越长，就会造成越严重的破坏后果。


And we may not get much warning, because climate effects generally do not evolve in a linear fashion, but rather emerge suddenly and powerfully, once certain tipping points have been reached.	而且可能不会有太多警告，因为气候影响通常不会以线性方式逐渐演变，而是突然剧烈出现，一旦我们实现对某个临界点的突破。


So far, not nearly enough has been done to assess Asia’s exposure to climate impacts, much less to strengthen protections for vulnerable areas or reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	到目前为止，评估亚洲气候变化影响的工作还做得远远不够，更不用说加强对脆弱地区的保护或减少温室气体排放。


The region needs low-carbon green growth strategies that use less land, water, and energy.	亚洲地区需要减少土地、水资源和能源占用的低碳绿色经济增长战略。


These strategies will help to slow rapid urbanization, which entails dense construction, sealed roads, and private cars – all of which contribute to the “urban heat island” effect.	上述战略将有助于减缓快速城市化进程，减少密集建设、封闭道路和私家车辆——而这一切一直是加剧“城市热岛”效应的罪魁祸首。


If we continue on our current path, the mean temperature over the Asian landmass could soar by more than 6°C (10.8°F), relative to pre-industrial levels, by 2100.	如果我们继续延续目前的做法，到2100年，亚洲大陆的平均气温可能比前工业化阶段飙升超过6℃（10. 8华氏度）。


People may fall ill and even die from respiratory and other ailments caused by heat stress or pollution.	热应激或污染所引发的呼吸系统和其他疾病可能导致人们生病甚至死亡。


Beyond the human costs, higher temperatures would undermine agricultural and industrial productivity.	除人力成本外，温度升高还有可能对农业和工业效率造成影响。


Climate-driven migration flows will exacerbate the challenges Asian cities face.	气候造成的移民流动将导致亚洲城市面临更严峻的挑战。


Unless a sufficient number of decent jobs are created, climate migrants could become a permanent underclass.	除非创造足够数量的体面工作，否则气候移民就可能永久沦为底部阶层。


Even if jobs are available, the environmental pressure created by ever-more populated cities will pose a grave threat.	即使有足够的工作机会，越来越拥挤的城市所造成的环境压力也将对这些国家构成严重的威胁。


Yet projections of the impact of climate change on migration in Asia remain indefensibly limited in number, scope, and predictive power.	即便如此，对亚洲气候变化移民影响的预测性研究无论在数量、范围还是预测能力方面都仍然是严重不足的。


In order to improve city planning and health-care services, we need a simple and accurate way to assess current and future heat-tolerance levels among urban populations.	为了改善城市规划和医疗卫生服务，我们需要一种简单而准确的方式来对城市人口当前和未来的耐热能力进行评估。


We also need strategies to decrease urban heat stress, including a shift toward polycentric urban configurations, with economies and societies built around multiple regional hubs, rather than concentrated around a single city, and natural assets maintained through eco-corridors and connected green spaces.	我们还需要减少城市热应激反应的策略，包括转向多中心城市构造、实现经济和社会集中在多个区域中心周围，而不是集中在某个单一城市，并通过生态走廊和城市连接部的绿色空间来实现对自然资源的保护。


But rising temperatures are far from the only threat posed by climate change.	气温升高还远不是气候变化所造成的唯一风险。


Extreme weather events, from droughts to floods, will intensify and become more frequent.	从旱灾到洪灾的极端天气事件将更加频繁，而且造成的破坏将越来越严重。


In Asia, increased rainfall and worsening tropical cyclones will wreak havoc on food production, driving down rural incomes.	在亚洲，降雨量增加和热带气旋恶化将严重破坏粮食生产，从而导致农村收入下降。


In Sri Lanka, for example, rice yields could drop by up to 20% by 2050; in Fiji, cassava output could plummet by 36%.	比如，在斯里兰卡，稻米产量到2050年可能下降高达20%； 而在斐济，木薯产量可能暴跌36%。


All of this would be exacerbated by rising sea levels, which could be 1.4 meters (4.6 feet) higher by the end of the century, potentially causing many countries to lose more than 10% of their land area.	这一切会因为海平面上升而进一步恶化，本世纪末海平面可能上升1. 4米（4.


If countries meet their commitments under the Paris climate agreement, the total sea-level rise could be halved, with more ambitious schemes promising even greater reductions.	6英尺），可能导致诸多国家丧失超过总面积10%的领土。 如果各国履行其在巴黎气候协定下所作出的承诺，海平面的上升幅度有可能被控制在一半左右，更雄心勃勃的计划甚至可能实现更高的目标。


If, however, we continue on our current path for just a couple more decades, we could trigger centuries of rising sea levels, even if we subsequently ended all greenhouse-gas emissions. The effects would be gradual but merciless.	但如果我们在今后数十年继续维持原来的状况，我们可能触发长达数百年的海平面上升，即使我们随后结束所有的温室气体排放仍将造成渐进但却无情的后果。


The risks are arguably highest on Asia’s crowded coastlines, where millions of people are exposed to flooding.	亚洲拥挤的海岸线可以说风险最大，那里有成百上千万民众面临着洪灾的威胁。


And those risks continue to mount: in countries such as Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, coastal populations are expected to double by 2060.	而且风险仍然在不断提升：在孟加拉、印度、菲律宾和越南等国，到2060年沿海地区人口预计将增长一倍。


Asia is home to 13 of the 20 global cities expected to experience the sharpest increases in annual economic loss due to floods between now and 2050.	从现在到2050年间，预计将遭受最大幅度年度经济损失的20个全球城市中有13个都位于亚洲。


As it stands, the risks of sea-level rise for Asia’s coastal urban centers are still not sufficiently understood, nor have they been adequately integrated into planning processes.	就目前而言，亚洲沿海城市中心海平面上升的风险仍没有得到充分的认识，更没有被充分融入到规划过程当中。


This must change.	我们必须改变这种状况。


In flood-prone countries, city-planning schemes should blend gray infrastructure, such as drainage systems, dikes, and sea walls, with green measures, like conservation of wetlands and forests.	在易受洪灾影响的国家，城市规划方案应当综合运用包括排水系统、堤坝和海墙等灰色基础设施，以及湿地和森林保护等绿色举措。


Improved meteorological observations and early-warning systems would also help substantially.	改善气象观测和早期预警系统也可以提供很大帮助。


But here, again, there is a lack of adequate knowledge and preparation.	但在这方面，人们可能再次面临知识匮乏和准备不足。


There is no systematic analysis of the economic costs and benefits of coastal fortification relative to other approaches.	对沿海设防相对于其他方法的经济成本和效益状况仍然缺乏系统的分析和比较。


“Softer” interventions, like better land-use planning and ecosystem-based approaches, are widely supported, but their effectiveness has been assessed in only a few small-scale studies.	“软性”干预措施，像加强土地使用规划和以生态系统为基础的方法得到了人们的广泛支持，但仅有少数小规模研究对其效果进行了评估。


Flood risks could complicate energy-infrastructure development in coastal cities in countries like Bangladesh and India.	洪水风险可能导致孟加拉和印度等国沿海城市的能源基础设施开发进一步复杂化。


Here, at least, the way forward is clearer: closer regional cooperation would help to offset power shortages, while off-grid energy from renewables and climate-resilient supply networks would help countries to enhance their energy security.	至少在这方面，前进的方向是明确的：加强地区合作将有助于缓解电力短缺，而可再生和与气候相适应的供应网络所提供的离网能源将改善各国的能源安全状况。


Given Asia’s massive size, population, and economic importance, it must be at the center of global efforts to mitigate climate change.	鉴于亚洲的地域面积、人口规模和经济重要性，它必须在缓解气候变化的全球工作中发挥核心的作用。


In many ways, Asia’s cities hold Earth’s future in their hands.	在许多方面，亚洲城市将决定地球的未来。


They must do their utmost to protect it.	他们必须竭尽全力来保护它。


Asia’s Hierarchies of Humiliation	亚洲的羞辱链


PHILADELPHIA – Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in a standoff in Doka La – where the borders of Bhutan, China and India meet – for almost a month now, the longest such impasse between the two armies since 1962.	费城—印度和中国军队在多克拉（Doka La，不丹、中国和印度三国交界处）的对峙已经持续了近一个月，是两军自1962年以来维持时间最长的僵持。


In a not-so-subtle reference to that last conflict, in which India suffered a disastrous defeat, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Colonel Wu Qian has warned India to “learn from historical lessons.”	中国国防部发言人吴谦上校毫不讳言地援引印度惨败的上一次冲突，警告印度“吸取历史教训”。


But the lessons of history have a peculiar tendency to adapt to the perspective of those citing them.	但历史教训有一个奇怪的趋势，它会去适应援引教训的一方的角度。


The current Chinese leadership sees in the 1962 conflict the price an uppity neighbor had to pay for not acceding to its territorial demands.	中国现任领导层将1962年的冲突视为傲慢的邻国不屈从于其领土主张而必须付出的代价。


But, for India, that conflict was a humiliation that has rankled the country for more than a half-century.	但对印度来说，这场冲突是一次羞辱，压在它的心头已经超过半个世纪。


The reminder of it is therefore likely to have the opposite effect than Wu anticipated.	因此，提到这次冲突有可能会产生和吴谦预料中完全相反的效果。


In international relations, to be humiliated means more than to be embarrassed.	在国际关系中，受辱要比难堪意义还要重大。


It amounts to the public degradation of another actor, a denial of its bid for status, and the establishment of a clear hierarchy.	这会导致与另一方的国际地位下降、地位要求不予承认，并形成明确的等级链。


Wars provide the opportunity for humiliation in very stark ways, because defeat on the battlefield tends to bring not just ridicule and derision, but also clear losses, particularly of territory.	战争是赤裸裸的羞辱机会，因为在战场上的失败不但会带来奚落和嘲笑，还会导致明确的损失，特别是领土损失。


If any country should understand the impact that such humiliations can have, it is China.	按理说，论羞辱的影响，没有国家比中国更加清楚。


In fact, as Wu was relaying his message to India, Chinese President Xi Jinping was asserting, at the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to China, that the move had ended the “humiliation and sorrow” inflicted by Britain when it took over the city in 1842.	事实上，就在吴谦向印度传递信息的同时，中国国家主席习近平在香港回归祖国20周年庆典上表示，香港回归标志着英国1842年割占香港所带来的“耻辱和悲伤”的结束。


This reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s broader use of China’s “century of humiliation,” which allegedly ended only when the CCP established the People’s Republic in 1949, to fuel a resurgent nationalism.	中国共产党也广泛使用“耻辱的世纪”煽动复兴的民族主义。 这个耻辱的世纪自1949年中共建立中华人民共和国正式结束。


During that period, China’s self-image as East Asia’s preeminent power was shattered by a series of defeats, which were particularly painful when inflicted by the upstart Japan.	在此期间，中国作为东亚第一强国的自我印象，被一系列战败撕得粉碎，被后起之秀日本入侵的历史尤其令人痛苦。


Despite this acute awareness of the enduring impact of its own humiliations, China often fails to recognize how its own past actions might have spurred similar feelings in others.	尽管中国对于自身受到的羞辱持久影响有着充分的认识，但常常不顾其自身过去的行为给其他国家造成的类似的感受。


Its 1962 defeat of India was the culmination of a decade-long competition for leadership of the newly independent countries that had emerged from decolonization.	1962年击败印度是这两个新近从殖民地状态崛起的新独立国家十年来对领导地位的争夺的顶峰。


It therefore amounted to a devastating blow to India’s aspirations to be the undisputed leader of the Non-Aligned Movement.	因此，这对于印度成为无可争议地不结盟运动国家领袖的雄心来说，是一次致命打击。


India is far from the only country that has been humiliated at the hands of China.	印度也绝非唯一一个受到中国羞辱的国家。


In Vietnam, the phrase “1,000 Years of Chinese Domination” has as much resonance as “100 Years of Foreign Humiliation” has in China.	在越南，“被中国统治1,000年”和中国的“百年外辱”异曲同工。


But China is not the only country to have been humiliated and humiliated others in turn.	但中国也绝非唯一一个既遭到过羞辱，也反过来羞辱其他人的国家。


While India was humiliated by China in 1962, it also inflicted what its neighbor Pakistan remembers as a humiliating defeat nine years later.	尽管印度在1962年遭到了中国的羞辱，但九年后它入侵邻国巴基斯坦，给了巴基斯坦羞辱性的大败。


Since independence in 1947, Pakistan had vied to establish itself as India’s equal in South Asia, joining alliances led by the United States or cozying up to China to demonstrate its strategic relevance.	1947年独立后，巴基斯坦一直自视为与印度地位等同的南亚国家，用加盟美国领导的联盟或倒向中国证明其战略重要性。


The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which led to the independence of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), crushed those hopes.	1971年的印巴战争将这一希望击得粉碎，也导致了东巴基斯坦（现在的孟加拉国）独立。


Yet Pakistan, too, remains oblivious to the humiliating impact of its own actions: its nearly four-decade-long history of interference in Afghanistan to secure “strategic depth” will leave Afghanistan traumatized for years to come, in a way that Russia-inflicted losses did not.	但巴基斯坦也不曾关注其自身行为的羞辱作用：近四十年来，它一直干预阿富汗以确保“战略纵深”，让阿富汗在此后多年一直陷于混乱，这是俄罗斯的入侵都没有造成的结果。


The same is true of all the aforementioned humiliations: they are particularly painful because an Asian neighbor, not a distant power, inflicted them.	前述所有羞辱都是如此：它们之所以令人特别痛苦，是因为入侵者是亚洲邻国，而不是遥远的列强。


Such humiliations, as we have seen with China, have a long-lasting impact.	这些羞辱，如同我们在中国身上看到的那样，影响非常长远。


Indeed, they can create an all-consuming desire for vengeance that overwhelms more sober foreign-policy motivations.	事实上，它们可能造成强烈的复仇欲望，压倒冷静的外交动机。


That is why, for example, Pakistan’s army is prepared to undermine all other institutions in the country it is sworn to defend, in the name of wounding India.	比如，正因如此，巴基斯坦军方时刻准备着高举打击印度的旗号，破坏一切在法理上它应该捍卫的巴基斯坦制度。


With nationalism on the rise across Asia, leaders have strong incentives to craft a version of history that advances their cause, and few historical memories are as effective for this purpose as those of traumatic humiliation.	在民族主义在亚洲全面崛起的今天，领导人有很强的激励炮制历史为其所用，而对于这个目的，很少有历史记忆能和痛苦的羞辱史一样有效。


China has mastered this art, but it can be seen elsewhere, too, including in India.	中国精于此道，但在其他国家也可以看到这样的做法，包括印度。


The key is to create a hierarchy of humiliations, according to which those inflicted on one’s own country are regarded as vitally important, and those inflicted on others are diminished, remembered only to reaffirm the status hierarchy.	关键在于要建立一套羞辱链，根据这个羞辱链，施加在本国头上的羞辱是最为重要的，而施加在他国头上的羞辱会被贬低，只有在重申地位等级链时会被想起。


Yet, as the ongoing dispute in Doka La makes clear, such an approach can create serious risks.	但是，没完没了的多卡拉纠纷清楚地表明，这套方法可能造成严重的风险。


After World War I, when Europe failed to address adequately its legacy of humiliation, the results were catastrophic.	第一次世界大战后，欧洲没有充分解决羞辱的遗留问题，结果是灾难性的。


After World War II, however, Europe rose to the challenge, setting the stage for unprecedented regional cooperation.	但是，第二次世界大战后，欧洲直面这一挑战，为前所未有的地区合作奠定了基础。


One hopes that Asia takes a similar tack – before simmering anger over historical humiliations boils over.	我们希望亚洲也走上类似的道路——而且要在历史耻辱的愤怒沸腾之前。


Asia’s New Entente	亚洲的新友好关系


PERTH – US President Donald Trump is arriving in Asia at a moment when the region’s security situation is practically white-hot.	珀斯—美国总统特朗普出访亚洲之际，正逢该地区安全局势白热化之时。


US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, recognizing that the world’s “center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific,” called on the region’s democratic powers to pursue “greater engagement and cooperation.”	美国国务卿蒂勒森认识到世界“重心正在转向印度-太平洋心脏地带”，呼吁域内民主力量寻求“更大的参与和合作”。


They – including Trump’s US – should heed that call.	它们——包括特朗普的美国——应该遵循这一吁求。


In fact, only an alliance of democracies can ensure the emergence of a strong rules-based order and a stable balance of power in the world’s most economically dynamic region.	事实上，只有民主国家联合起来，才能确保这个全世界经济最有活力地区的基于规则的强大秩序和稳定的实力平衡。


In recent years, as Tillerson acknowledged, China has taken “provocative actions,” such as in the South China Sea, that challenge international law and norms.	蒂勒森坦承，最近几年中国发动了“挑衅性行动”，如在南海等行为，这些行动挑战了国际法和规范。


And this behavior is set to continue, if not escalate.	并且这些行动必然会继续进行下去，甚至有所升级。


Last month’s 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China effectively crowned President Xi Jinping – who has spearheaded a more muscular foreign policy, in service of his goal of establishing China as a global superpower – as the country’s emperor.	上个月的中共十九大事实上使中国国家主席习近平加冕了中国皇帝。 他主导了更加强势的外交政策，以推动其让中国成为全球超级大国的目标。


Just as Germany’s rapid ascent prior to World War I spurred a “triple entente” among France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, China’s increasingly assertive behavior is creating strong impetus for the Asia-Pacific democracies to build a more powerful coalition.	正如德国在一战前的迅速崛起出城了法国、俄罗斯和英国之间的“三方友好”，中国日益侵略性的行动也在强力刺激亚太民主国家构建更加强大的联盟。


After all, as recent experience in the South China Sea has made clear, no single power can impose sufficient costs on China for its maritime and territorial revisionism, much less compel Chinese leaders to change course.	毕竟，最近在南海的经验清楚地表明，任何力量都无法单枪匹马让中国为其领海和领土修正主义付出足够代价，更不用说迫使中国领导人改变算盘了。


This is not to say that no country has been able to challenge China.	这不是说没有一个国家能够挑战中国。


Just this summer, India stood up to its muscle-flexing neighbor in a ten-week border standoff.	今年夏天，印度与其耀武扬威的邻国进行了为期十周的边境对峙。


China has been using construction projects to change the status quo on the remote Himalayan plateau of Doklam, just as it has so often done in the South China Sea.	中国利用建设计划改变位于偏远的喜马拉雅山区的洞朗的现状，一如其在南海所惯用的做法。


India intervened, stalling China’s building activity.	印度进行了干预，阻止了中国的建设活动。


Had US President Barack Obama’s administration shown similar resolve in the South China Sea, perhaps China would not now be in possession of seven militarized artificial islands there.	如果美国总统奥巴马政府在南海也表现出类似的决心，也许中国现在就无法在南海拥有七座军事化的人工岛。


In any case, securing a broader shift in China’s foreign policy and stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region’s power dynamics will require more than one country holding the line on any one issue.	无论如何，要保证中国外交政策发生总体性转变、稳定亚太地区实力动态，在任何一个问题上只有一个国家坚守底线是不够的。


A US that is willing to employ new tools, a more confident Japan and India, and an Australia vexed by China’s meddling in its domestic affairs must work together to constrain Chinese behavior.	愿意采取新措施的美国、更有信心的日本和印度，以及对中国干涉内政忍无可忍的澳大利亚必须联合起来约束中国。


The good news is that an entente has already begun to emerge among the region’s key democracies.	好消息是友好关系已经在域内重要民主国家间开始浮现。


America’s relationship with India, in particular, has been undergoing what Tillerson called a “profound transformation,” as the two countries become “increasingly global partners with growing strategic convergence.”	特别是，美国与印度的关系一直在经历蒂勒森所谓的“重大转变”，两国“日益成为在战略上越来越趋同的全球合作伙伴”。


The US now holds more joint defense exercises with India than with any other country.	眼下，美国与印度进行的联合防御演习比任何其他国家都要多。


Such cooperation puts the two countries in a strong position to fulfill Tillerson’s vision of serving “as the eastern and western beacons of the Indo-Pacific.”	这一合作让两国处于非常有利的位置实现蒂勒森的成为“印度-太平洋东西两极”的愿景。


Engagement with Japan, too, has deepened.	与日本的合作也在加深。


This year’s Malabar exercise – an annual naval exercise in the Indian Ocean involving the US, India, and Japan – was the largest and most complex since it began a quarter-century ago.	今年的马拉巴（Malabar）演习——美国、印度和日本联合参加的年度印度洋海军演习——是其自四分之一个世纪开始以来规模最大、复杂程度最高的一次。


Focused on destroying enemy submarines, it involved more than 7,000 personnel from the US alone, and featured for the first time aircraft carriers from all three navies: America’s nuclear-powered USS Nimitz, Japan’s Izumo helicopter carrier, and India’s aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya.	此次演习的重点是摧毁敌方潜艇，光是美国就派出了7,000多人，并且第一次出现了三国海军均派出航空母舰的情景：美国的核动力航母尼米兹号、日本的出云号直升机航母，以及印度的维克拉玛蒂亚号（Vikramaditya）航母。


As Tillerson pointed out, this trilateral engagement among the US, India, and Japan is already bringing important benefits.	蒂勒森指出，美国、印度和日本的三方参与已经产生了重要收益。


But “there is room to invite others, including Australia, to build on the shared objectives and initiatives.”	但“仍有空间邀请包括澳大利亚在内的其他国家加入进来，构建共同目标和计划。 ”


So far, Australia has sought to avoid having to choose between its security ally, the US, and its main economic partner, China.	到目前为止，澳大利亚都避免在其安全盟友美国和主要经济伙伴中国之间选择站边。


Despite Defense Minister Marise Payne’s recent declaration that “Australia is very interested in a quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan, and the United States,” the government seems to be hedging its bets.	尽管其国防部长佩恩（Marise Payne）最近宣布“澳大利亚很有兴趣与印度、日本和美国组成四方联合”，但政府似乎想要寻求对冲。


For example, while it sought this year to rejoin the Malabar exercise – from which it withdrew a decade ago to appease China – it sought to do so only as an “observer.”	比如，今年它既寻求重新加入十年前为了取悦中国而退出的马拉巴军演，但只是以“观察员”的身份。


This approach is untenable.	这一方针是站不住脚的。


If Australia is to free itself of Chinese meddling, it will need to go beyond implementing new domestic safeguards to take a more active role in defending rules and norms beyond its borders, both on land and at sea.	如果澳大利亚想要彻底摆脱中国的干涉， 不但需要实施新的国内防御，还需要更加积极的参与捍卫国际（不论是陆上还是海上）规则与规范。


In the coming years, the Indo-Pacific power balance will be determined, first and foremost, by events in the Indian Ocean and East Asia.	在未来几年中，印度-太平洋实力平衡将首先由印度洋和东亚局势决定。


Containing China will therefore require, first, efforts to restrict the country’s maritime activities – such as measures to safeguard vital sea lines and build maritime domain awareness – and, second, geo-economic initiatives to counter China’s coercive leverage over smaller countries.	因此，遏制中国首先需要致力于限制中国的海军活动——如采取保护重要航道、构建海域改制（maritime domain awareness）等等——其次要采取地缘-经济措施防止中国裹挟利用小国。


All of Asia’s democratic powers must be on board.	所有亚洲民主力量都必须团结起来。


Calls by the US for closer cooperation bode well for this process, though the US still needs to focus more on the globally ascendant and aggressive China than on a declining Russia.	由美国出面呼吁加紧合作有利于这一过程，尽管美国仍需要更专注于全球崛起和侵略性的中国，而不是衰落的俄罗斯。


The overwhelming victory of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – who has touted the idea of establishing a “democratic security diamond” in the Asia-Pacific – in his country’s recent general election is also likely to help to drive cooperation forward.	日本首相安倍晋三——他提出了构建亚太地区“民主安全钻石”的概念——在最近举行的日本大选中大获全胜，这或许也有助于推动合作。


To be sure, any entente among Asian democracies is unlikely to take the shape of a formal alliance.	平心而论，亚洲民主国家之间的友好无法以正式联盟的形式出现。


Rather, the objective should be for democratic powers to reach a broad strategic understanding, based on shared values.	相反，其目标应该是让民主力量之间在共同价值观的基础上形成广泛的战略性谅解。


It is those values, after all, that set them apart: as Tillerson recognized, while Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing will undoubtedly draw much global attention, the US cannot have the kind of relationship with non-democratic China that it can have with a major democracy.	毕竟，正是这些价值观让它们产生了分裂：蒂勒森承认，尽管即将到来的特朗普北京之旅肯定会吸引全球关注，但美国不能与不民主的中国产生与民主大国所能产生的那种关系。


By pursuing cooperation, the Indo-Pacific’s democratic powers can shore up an inclusive, rules-based order that underpins peace, prosperity, stability, and freedom of navigation in the region.	通过寻求合作，印度-太平洋民主力量能够巩固一个基于规则的包容性秩序，成为域内和平、繁荣、稳定和航行自由的基础。


That is the only way to thwart China’s effort to establish itself as the hegemon of an illiberal regional order.	这是阻止中国成为反自由地区秩序霸权的唯一办法。


Maintaining Growth in a Fast-Aging Asia	在迅速老龄化的亚洲保持增长


SINGAPORE – Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception.	新加坡—几十年来，亚洲一直是世界经济增长冠军，今年也不会例外。


According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook (REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018.	据最新的国际货币基金组织（IMF）地区经济展望（REO），预计2017年亚太地区GDP增长为5. 5%，2018年为5.


Despite escalating geopolitical tensions, most countries in the region have maintained their economic momentum.	尽管地缘政治紧张升级，但大部分域内国家都保持了经济动力。


They have benefited from policies supporting strong domestic demand in China and Japan, and from favorable global conditions.	它们受益于中国和日本支持内需的政策，以及有利的全球环境。


Growth is picking up across many advanced and emerging market economies, and financial markets have, for the most part, proven to be resilient.	许多发达和新兴市场经济体增长正在起势，金融市场也大多具有强大的恢复力。


Nonetheless, Asia will still have to confront fundamental medium- and long-term challenges, not least the aging of its population – a problem that is well known to most policymakers.	尽管如此，亚洲仍必须面临中期和长期的基本挑战，如人口老化——这一问题对大部分决策者来说已是耳熟能详。


In past decades, the region reaped a demographic dividend from its young, expanding workforce and strong growth policies.	在过去十年中，亚洲从其不断增加的年轻工作人口和强势增长政策中获得了人口红利。


But this dividend has already run out for “old” countries such as Japan and China.	但这一红利在日本和中国等“老”国家已经耗尽。


With fertility rates declining and people living longer, the workforce is shrinking and getting older at the same time.	随着生育率的下降和寿命的提高，劳动力同时出现人数下降和年轻增长的情况。


To be sure, not all Asian countries are aging at the same rate.	诚然，不同的亚洲国家老龄化速度各不相同。


In China, Japan, Korea, and Thailand, these demographic trends could subtract anywhere from 0.5 to a full percentage point from annual growth over the next three decades.	在中国、日本、韩国和泰国，人口趋势将导致未来三十年年经济增长下降0. 5到1个百分点不等。


But in “young” countries such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the working-age population will actually increase, adding from 1-1.5 percentage points to average annual growth over the same period.	但在印度、印尼和菲律宾等“年轻”国家，工作年龄人口实际将有所增加，未来三十年可以让平均年增长提高1—1. 5个百分点。


And yet, even these young countries will not be spared from the effects of an aging population.	但是，即使是这些年轻国家，也无法摆脱人口老龄化的影响。


In this year’s Asia-Pacific REO, we point out a little known fact: almost all of Asia is at risk of growing old before ever becoming rich.	在今年的亚太REO中，我们指出了一个鲜为人知的事实：几乎所有亚洲国家都面临未富先老的风险。


Why is this occurring?	为什么会这样？


For starters, although Asia is not the most aged region in the world today, it is aging remarkably fast.	首先，尽管如今亚洲并不是世界老龄化最严重的地区，但其老龄化速度很快。


One indicator of this is the old-age dependency ratio: the share of the population that is 65 and older.	一个指标是老龄赡养比：即65岁及以上人口占比。


In Europe, it took 26 years, on average, for this ratio to increase from 15% to 20%; in the United States, it took more than 50 years.	在欧洲，这一比例平均需要26年从15%提高到20%； 在美国则花了50多年。


Among Asian countries, only Australia and New Zealand aged at similar speeds.	在亚洲国家中，只有澳大利亚和新西兰的老龄化速度与此相仿。


In most other countries in the region, this transition took – or will take – less than 15 years.	在其他大部分域内国家，这一转变只用了——或将只用——不到15年时间。


So, being the world growth champion simply isn’t enough.	因此，成为世界增长冠军还不够。


To see why, consider each country’s per capita income (in terms of purchasing power parity) when its old-age dependency ratio, benchmarked against the US experience, peaked or will peak.	要究其原因，可以考虑各国的人均收入（以购买力平价衡量）在老龄赡养比达到或将达到峰值时的表现（以美国的经验为基准）。


As the chart above shows, with the exception of already-rich Asian economies such as Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore, per capita income in Asian economies falls, or will fall, far short of other advanced economies at similar stages of the aging cycle.	上图表明，除了已经跻身富裕行列的澳大利亚、香港、日本和新加坡等经济体，其他亚洲经济体的人均收入要远低于——或将远低于——其他发达经济体在老龄化周期相近阶段的水平。


For example, when China reached its old-age-population peak in 2011, its per capita income was still only at 20% of the US level; and when Vietnam reached it in 2014, that figure was just 10%.	比如，中国在2011年达到其老龄人口峰值时，人均收入仍只有美国水平的20%； 越南在2014年达到老龄人口峰值时，人均收入只有美国的10%。


And despite its young population and strong growth, India’s per capita income will only have reached 45% of the US level when its old-age population peaks in or around 2040; and that assumes, optimistically, that India will maintain very strong growth over the next few decades.	而尽管印度年轻人口数量增长强劲，其人均收入在2040年左右老龄人口达到峰值时仍将只能达到美国水平的45%； 而这需要乐观假设印度可以在未来几十年保持非常强劲的增长。


This demographic trend has far-reaching implications for the region.	这一人口趋势对于亚洲地区影响深远。


Asian countries will have significantly less time than advanced economies have had to prepare for the transition to an aged society.	亚洲国家可以用来准备向老龄化社会转型的时间远远短于发达经济体。


Worse, they will have to manage the high fiscal costs of aging while they are still relatively poor, which will create new social pressures, which are already apparent in the “old” Asian countries.	更糟糕的是，它们必须在仍处于相对较穷水平时就面临高昂的老龄化财政成本，这将造成新的社会压力，在“老”亚洲国家中已经显现出来。


Moreover, slowing productivity growth could compound Asia’s demographic problem.	此外，生产率增长的放缓可能加剧亚洲的人口问题。


Since the 2008 financial crisis, productivity growth has decelerated in Asia’s advanced economies and, to a lesser extent, in its emerging economies, too.	自2008年金融危机以来，亚洲发达经济体的生产率增长出现了减速，新兴经济体亦然，只是程度较低。


Thus, the region’s push to catch up with countries at the global technology frontier has stalled over the past decade.	因此，该地区赶超全球技术前沿国家的进程在过去十年出现了停滞。


To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.	要提振未来生产率，亚洲各国政府需要在今天实施精准定向的结构性改革。


Considering Asia’s rapidly aging population, it is crucial that such reforms include policies to protect the elderly, enhance social safety nets, and drive long-term growth.	考虑到亚洲人口迅速老化，这些改革措施必须包括保护老人、增强社会安全网和驱动长期增长的政策，这一点至关重要。


Governments will also need to make it easier for women and older workers to participate in the labor force, by expanding child-care facilities and creating incentives for firms to relax their retirement-age requirements.	政府还必须让妇女和年长工人更加容易参与劳动力，这可以通过扩大育儿设施、为企业提供弹性退休年龄的激励等方式实现。


As Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore have shown, immigration can soften the blow from rapid aging.	澳大利亚、香港、新西兰和新加坡的经验表明，移民可以缓冲迅速老龄化的冲击。


And by strengthening pension systems, including through minimum guaranteed benefits, governments can provide a safety net for the vulnerable elderly and reduce incentives for precautionary savings.	而通过强化退休金制度，包括通过最低保障福利，政府可以为脆弱的老人群体提供安全网，降低预防性储蓄的激励。


These policies should be supplemented by productivity-enhancing reforms.	这些政策应该辅之以提高生产率的改革。


Different countries will have different priorities, but all will need to make larger investments in education and life-long training, while pressing ahead with labor- and product-market reforms.	不同国家各有不同的重点，但都需要加大教育和终身培训的投资，同时推进劳动力和产品市场改革。


Finally, advanced Asian economies should focus on improving innovation, by allocating research and development spending more effectively, and by raising productivity in the services sector.	最后，亚洲发达经济体应该注重改善创新——通过更有效地配置研发支出以及提高服务业生产率实现。


Emerging and developing countries, for their part, will need to attract more foreign direct investment, boost domestic investment, and expand their capacity to adopt new technologies.	新兴和发展中经济体则需要吸引更多的外国直接投资，提振国内投资，加强适应新技术的能力。


Playing by the Rules in Asia	在亚洲遵守游戏规则


CANBERRA – China’s adventurism in the South China Sea has prompted a change in Australian policymaking that merits wide international attention.	堪培拉——中国的南海冒险主义已经促成了澳大利亚政策制定的改变，这一点应当引起国际社会的注意。


In making maintenance of a “rules-based global order” a core strategic priority, Australia’s new Defense White Paper adopts language not often found at the heart of national defense charters.	本着以维护“以规则为基础的全球秩序”为核心战略任务的原则，澳大利亚最新发布的国防白皮书所采用的语言并非是国防章程核心段落表述所经常用到的。


It is all the more surprising coming from a conservative government that is usually keen to follow the United States down any path it takes.	更令人意想不到的是新白皮书的始作俑者是一向热衷于追随美国的保守派政府。


Australia wanted a readily defensible basis for contesting China’s claims that could not be portrayed as just another reflexive embrace of the American position.	澳大利亚想为挑战中国的主张寻找一个充分的理由，又不想被外界视为仅仅是本能地拥护美国的立场。


For a country trying – as are others in the region – to avoid zero-sum choices between our strategic partner, the US, and our economic partner, China, the White Paper’s words were astutely chosen and deserve emulation.	对于美国、我们的经济伙伴中国和试图避免战略伙伴间上演零和游戏的澳大利亚（和该地区其他国家）而言，白皮书的措辞经过谨慎的选择并且值得其他国家效仿。


Part of the attraction of a “rules-based global order” is that it would constrain all relevant players.	“以规则为基础的全球秩序”其吸引力部分在于能够限制所有的相关方。


US policymakers, unlike those in most of the rest of the world, don’t find the concept inherently attractive.	和世界多数其他国家决策者不同，美国的决策者对这一理念从本质上并不看好。


Although they – like everyone else – do pay lip service to it, willingness to be bound by international rules is not part of US officials’ DNA.	尽管他们像其他人一样给予口头上的支持，但美国官员在基因当中并不愿意接受国际规则的束缚。


The invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains Exhibit A. But there are others, including the overreach (alongside the United Kingdom and France) of the UN Security Council’s mandate in Libya in 2011, and what Jessica Mathews has described as the “wasteland for multilateral commitments” in the US approach to binding treaties, including the Convention on Biodiversity, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Protocol on Torture, and, most relevant to the South China Sea, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).	2003年入侵伊拉克依然是证据甲。 但这并不是唯一的证据，包括联合国安理会（会同英法两国）于2011年越权发布的利比亚命令，以及杰西卡·马修斯所描述的美国在面对包括《生物多样性公约》、《全面禁止核试验条约》、《酷刑议定书》以及与南中国海直接相关的《联合国海洋法公约》（UNCLOS）等约束性协定时所制造的“多边承诺的荒漠”。


The more immediate sting in the Australian White Paper is for China.	澳大利亚白皮书最直接批评的是中国。


Whatever else is going on in the South China Sea, it is not respect for a rules-based global order.	南中国海正在发生的一切绝对谈不上尊重“以规则为基础的全球秩序”。


Playing by the rules would imply a number of changes to Chinese behavior.	遵守游戏规则意味着中国应当改变其某些行为。


First, it would mean clearly articulating specific sovereignty claims, based on long use or occupancy of particular habitable islands, in the Paracel or Spratly groups or elsewhere.	首先，这意味着针对西沙群岛、南沙群岛或其他地方明确提出基于长期使用或占领个别可居住岛屿的具体的主权要求。


When those claims overlap with claims by other states, as most of them do, China must be prepared to resolve them, preferably by international adjudication or arbitration, which it has so far strongly resisted, or at the very least by genuine give-and-take negotiation.	当上述主张与其他国家的主张相冲突（其中多数确实如此），中国必须做好解决这些问题的准备，最好能通过国际判决或仲裁，但迄今为止中国一直强烈抵制这样的做法，或者至少也应当是真正能够做出妥协和退让的协商。


Second, China would have to abandon its “nine-dash line” as a basis not only for sovereignty claims relating to land features bounded by it, but also for claims to ill-defined “historical waters” or “traditional Chinese fishing grounds.”	其次，中国应当放弃其“九段线”理论，中国不仅以此为基础对周围土地提出主权要求，而且还主张并不明确的“历史水域”或“中国民众的传统渔场。


With Chinese fishing vessels constantly intruding into what have hitherto been others’ undisputed 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under UNCLOS, these claims are now causing real friction with countries like Indonesia.	”因为中国的渔船时常侵入他国根据《联合国海洋法公约》规定迄今为止无可争议的200海里专属经济区（EEZ），上述主张正在与印尼等国间制造出真正的摩擦。


UNCLOS – now generally accepted as customary international law even by countries that have not joined it, like the US – is the only acceptable framework for resolving these issues.	即使美国等从未加入的国家现在也普遍将《联合国海洋法公约》视为习惯国际法，而且是解决上述问题唯一可以接受的框架。


Even if every one of China’s current sovereignty claims to particular habitable islands were to be accepted, the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, and the 200 nautical miles of EEZ associated with each of them, would not begin to add up to the 80% of the South China Sea now encompassed by China’s nine-dash line.	即使中国目前对每个可居住岛屿所提的主权要求都被接受，12海里领海和与之相关的200海里专属经济区加起来也不可能达到中国九段线所涵盖的南中国海80%的水域规模。


Third, China would need to limit severely its actions relating to reefs and shoals, never previously habitable, where it has been reclaiming land and building airstrips and other installations capable of military use, and seeking to deny others’ the use of adjacent waters and airspace.	第三，中国应着力限制其与之前无法居住的暗礁和浅滩有关的行动，中国正在重新对土地提出主权要求，并建设可用作军事用途的跑道和其他设施，同时试图限制他人使用邻近的海域及领空。


International law tolerates some such building – as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have been doing for years, though on a much smaller scale.	国际法容忍某些这样的建设活动——比方说菲律宾、越南和马来西亚这样做已经有多年历史，虽然规模要小得多。


But it does not tolerate any military use, or support more than a 500-meter “safety zone” around such installations – not a territorial sea, EEZ, “air defense identification zone,” or anything else.	但它绝不会容忍任何军事用途，也不支持围绕上述设施设立超过500米的“安全区”——不属于领海、专属经济区、“防空识别区”或其他任何范畴。


Fourth, China should moderate its position that no foreign ship or aircraft may engage in surveillance or intelligence collection not only within its territorial waters, about which international law is clear, but within its entire EEZ, about which China’s argument is not at all strong.	第四，中国应改变其不仅不允许外国船只或飞机在其领海从事监视或情报搜集活动（关于这一点国际法有明文规定），而且不允许在整个专属经济区进行上述活动的立场（在这个问题上中国的依据并不牢靠）。


Adherence to this position sustains a constant risk of inflammatory incidents.	坚持这一立场有可能导致热点事件随时爆发。


So long as China refuses to play by accepted international rules, others are entitled to push back, including with the fly-by or “freedom of navigation” sail-by exercises in which the US has been engaging, and which Australia and others should separately emulate.	只要中国拒绝遵守公认的国际规则，其他国家就有权进行反击，包括美国一直在执行的飞越或“航行自由”海上通过，澳大利亚和其他国家应当分别仿效美国的举措。


China’s insistence that it has no intention to disrupt commercial shipping or flight lanes should be believed; to do otherwise would be to cut off its nose to spite its face.	我们应当相信中国无意破坏商业航运或飞行航线的一贯声明； 否则的话就是自找苦吃。


But its behavior is testing the limits of regional and global understanding and patience.	但中国的行为正在测试地区和全球理解和耐心的限度。


The remaining attraction of making a “rules-based global order” central to Australia’s policy is the discipline this imposes on Australia itself – as it would on any state that adopts this language.	属于澳大利亚政策核心的“以规则为基础的全球秩序”仅存的吸引力在于澳大利亚本身——和其他认同这种语言的国家——自己必须遵守。


To be taken seriously, we have to put our money where our mouths are, by accepting international duties and responsibilities – like helping to stop atrocity crimes in faraway places – that are consistent with our claims to good international citizenship but serve no immediate traditional national security or economic interest.	要想得到别人的认真对待，我们必须践行我们的诺言，接受国际责任和义务——如帮助遥远的国家制止残暴的犯罪——这与我们良好的国际公民主张相一致，但却并不直接服务于传统的国家安全和经济利益。


In Australia’s case, this means thinking again about some of our efforts to limit our exposure to the International Court of Justice and certain dispute-resolution mechanisms under UNCLOS.	具体到澳大利亚的情况而言，这意味着按照《联合国海洋法公约》的相关规定重新思考限制我们与联合国国际法院和特定争议解决机制接触的工作。


In this imperfect world, there is considerable tolerance for all sorts of imperfect behavior.	人们在很大程度上容忍各种不完美行为，因为这是一个不完美的世界。


But hypocrisy always catches up with you.	但伪善肯定会让人深受其害。


Preaching the virtues of a rule-based order to others, but being coy about some of those rules oneself, is not a good look.	向别人宣讲“以规则为基础的秩序”是种美德但轮到自己时就扭捏作态的确有些尴尬。


Rage Against the Machine?	机器所引发的愤怒？


BERKELEY – Intelligent machines are transforming the way we produce, work, learn, and live throughout the world.	伯克利——遍布整个世界，智能机器正在改变我们生产、工作、学习和生活的方式。


Almost every aspect of our economies will be radically altered.	我们经济的几乎方方面面都将发生彻底的变革。


Major logistics companies and individual drivers are using new technologies to optimize their route planning.	大型物流企业和个人司机正在利用新技术来优化路线规划。


Companies like BMW and Tesla have already released self-driving features in their automobiles, which are produced with the help of sophisticated robots.	像宝马和特斯拉这样的企业已经发布了汽车自动驾驶功能，人类是在精密机器人的协助下实现这一目标的。


The Associated Press is using artificial intelligence to help write news stories.	美联社正在利用人工智能协助撰写新闻报道。


3D printers are being used to produce replacement parts – for both machines and humans.	人们正在使用3D打印机生产用于更换的零部件——无论是用在机器还是人类身上。


AT&T, in collaboration with Udacity, is offering online “nanodegrees” in data analytics.	美国电话电报公司与优达学城合作，正在提供数据分析领域的在线“纳米学位”。


Drones are delivering health supplies to remote locations in poor countries.	无人机正在将卫生用品运送到贫困国家的边远地区。


These marvelous new technologies promise higher productivity, greater efficiency, and more safety, flexibility, and convenience.	这些奇妙的新技术可以提高生产率、提升效率，同时也可以使生产活动更加安全、方便和灵活。


But they are also stoking fears about their effects on jobs, skills, and wages.	但它们也引发了新技术对岗位、技能和薪酬影响的担忧 。


Feeding these fears is a recent study by the University of Oxford’s Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, and another by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), which find that large shares of employment in both developing and developed countries could technically be automated.	最近牛津大学卡尔·佛雷和迈克尔·奥斯本以及麦肯锡全球研究院（MGI）所发布的另一项研究成果加深了人们的恐惧，这两项研究发现发达和发展中国家大量的就业机会在技术上均可通过自动化来完成。


History and economic theory, however, suggest that anxieties about technological unemployment, a term coined by John Maynard Keynes nearly a century ago, are misplaced.	但历史和经济理论表明人们对技术失业问题（这个词由约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在近一个世纪前发明）的焦虑是没有道理的。


In the future, as in the past, technological change is likely to fuel productivity gains and income growth, boosting demand for labor.	未来其实与过去一样，技术变革很可能会促进生产率提高和收入增长，同时拉动对劳动力的需求。


Add to that lower prices and rising quality, and demand for goods and services will also increase.	再加上价格的下降和质量的提升，对商品和服务的需求也将是上升的。


Many of the jobs created cannot even be imagined today, just as few people a century ago could have anticipated that automobiles would give rise to drive-through restaurants and roadside motels.	许多新技术创造的工作今天甚至无法想象，就像一个世纪前，很少有人能够预料到汽车的普及会催生免停车外卖餐厅和路边汽车旅馆一样。


A new MGI report finds that under a moderate scenario for the speed and breadth of automation, about 15% of the global workforce, or 400 million workers, could be displaced between now and 2030.	一份新的麦肯锡全球研究报告发现在自动化发展速度和广度相对温和的情况下，从现在起到2030年，全球大约15%的劳动力（约4亿人）可能会失去工作。


A faster pace of automation would trigger greater displacement.	如果自动化速度加快可能导致更多人失去工作。


The good news is that as a result of projected increases in demand for goods and services – driven primarily by rising incomes, the growing health-care needs of aging populations, and investment in infrastructure, energy efficiency, and renewables – enough new jobs are likely to be created to offset job losses.	好消息是由于预计商品和服务需求增加——背后的推动力量主要是收入增加、老龄化人口的卫生保健需求增加以及在基础设施、能源效率和可再生能源领域的投资——很可能会创造出足够数量的新工作以弥补原有工作岗位的损失。


But the new jobs will differ mightily from the jobs displaced by automation, imposing painful transition costs on workers, businesses, and communities.	但新工作却与被自动化所取代的旧工作差异巨大，从而将痛苦的转型成本强加在工人、企业和社团身上。


Depending on the pace of automation, 75-375 million workers, or 3-14% of the global workforce, will need to change occupational categories by 2030.	根据自动化的速度，到2030年，共有7，500万-3亿7，500万劳动者，也就是3~14%的全球劳动人口需要完成职业类别转型。


In the United States and other developed economies where automation is likely to occur more rapidly, 9-32% of the workforce may need to change occupational categories and the skills associated with them.	在可能更快实现自动化的美国和其他发达经济体，9~32%的劳动者可能需要转换职业类别和与之相适应的技能。


In these countries, jobs in major occupational categories like production and office support, and jobs requiring a high school education or less, are likely to decline, while jobs in occupational categories like health and care provision, education, construction, and management, and jobs requiring a college or advanced degree, will increase.	在这些国家，生产及办公室支持等领域主要的职业岗位，以及需要高中及以下学历就能胜任的岗位很可能会逐步下降，而像医疗保健服务、教育、建筑和管理等职业类别的工作岗位，以及需要大学或高等学历才能胜任的工作岗位，将会逐渐增加。


According to one recent survey, the majority of Americans are concerned that automation will increase income inequality.	一份近期调查结果显示，绝大多数美国人担心自动化会加剧收入不平等。


Their concern appears warranted.	他们的担忧似乎是有道理的。


As many middle-wage occupations succumb to automation, income polarization in the US and other developed countries is likely to continue.	随着许多中等薪酬职业让位于自动化，美国和其他发达国家很可能会继续上演收入两极分化的状况。


If workers displaced by automation are unable to find new jobs quickly, frictional unemployment will rise, putting downward pressure on wages.	如果因自动化而被取代的工人无法很快找到新工作，那么摩擦性失业将会上升，从而对工资产生下行压力。


So, what can be done to speed and ease the occupational transitions that automation will compel?	那么，我们应采取哪些措施来加速及缓解自动化所带来的职业转型呢？


For starters, fiscal and monetary policies to sustain full-employment levels of aggregate demand are critical.	首先，保持充分就业和总需求的财政和货币政策至关重要。


Policies to promote investment in infrastructure, housing, alternative energy, and care for the young and the aging can boost economic competitiveness and inclusive growth, while creating millions of jobs in occupations likely to be augmented, rather than displaced, by automation.	促进基础设施、住房建设、替代能源和儿童及老人看护服务的投资可以加强经济竞争力及促进包容性增长，同时还可以在自动化可能拓展、而非替代的职业领域创造数以百万计的就业机会。


A second response must be a dramatic expansion and redesign of workforce training programs.	还有一项对策应当是对劳动者培训计划的大幅拓展和重新设计。


Over the past two decades, government outlays for skills training and labor-market adjustment have fallen in most OECD countries.	在过去20年中，绝大多数经合组织国家政府的技能培训和劳动力市场调整支出均呈下降趋势。


That has been compounded in the US by a sizeable decline in business spending on training as well.	伴随上述趋势的还有美国企业培训支出的大幅下降。


These trends must be reversed.	我们必须扭转这样的趋势。


Lifelong learning needs to become a reality.	终身学习需要成为现实。


Jobs will change as machines take over some tasks, and human activities will require different skills.	随着机器接管某些工作，人类的工作岗位会发生改变，而人类活动则会需要截然不同的技术。


MGI’s analysis shows that higher-level cognitive abilities – such as logical reasoning, stronger communication skills, and enhanced social and emotional skills – will become more important, while machines take over routine capabilities common in the workplace today, including in cognitive tasks like data collection and processing.	麦肯锡全球研究院的分析表明高级认知能力——如逻辑推理、强大的沟通技巧以及社交和情感技巧——将在重要性上大幅提升，而机器则将逐步取代当今工作场所随处可见的常规能力，包括数据搜集和处理等认知类工作。


For mid-career workers with children, mortgages, and other financial responsibilities, training that is measured in weeks and months, not in years, will be necessary, as will financial support to undertake such training.	对已有子女、抵押贷款和其他财务责任的中年劳动者来说，必须接受以周或月、而非年计的培训，同时接受上述培训的资金支持也是不可或缺的。


Sending people for two-year degrees at their own expense is not the answer.	不能像我们所习惯的那样让人们自费攻读两年学位。


Instead, nanodegrees and stackable credentials are likely to gain in importance.	相反，纳米学位和可拓展证书可能越来越重要。


German-style apprenticeships combining classroom work and practical work, and enabling participants to earn a salary while learning, could be important solutions even for middle-aged displaced workers.	德国式的学徒制结合课堂作业和实际操作，可以让参与者在拿工资的同时不断学习，即使对中年失业的劳动者而言也可以成为重要的出路。


Collaboration between companies and educational institutions, as AT&T (on whose board one of the authors serves), Starbucks, and other firms are showing, can provide workers with the new or enhanced skills that are increasingly needed.	美国电话电报公司（本文一名作者为该公司董事会成员）、星巴克和其他企业所展现的企业与教育机构之间的合作可以为工人提供所需的强化新技术。


Tax and other incentives to encourage more business investment in workforce training, especially by small and medium-size companies, may be necessary.	鼓励更多企业（尤其是中小型企业）对劳动力培训投资的税收和其他激励机制可能是必须的。


Governments will also need to offer universal and portable social benefits like health care, child care, and retirement security, as well as transition support, to workers who are forced to change jobs, occupations, and employers frequently.	政府也需要提供全面和方便的医疗、育儿和退休保障等社会福利，以及为劳动者提供转型支持，协助他们更换岗位、职业和雇主。


Sweden’s job-security councils, run by the private sector and funded by a payroll tax on companies, provide displaced workers with a comprehensive suite of income support, training, coaching, and assessment with caseworkers.	由私营部门运营并由企业工资税出资的瑞典职业安全委员会为失业工人提供全套的收入支持、培训、指导和社会工作人员评估等服务。


Like previous technologies, automation today promises major productivity gains, benefiting individuals, communities, and societies.	像此前的技术一样，今天的自动化有望实现重大的生产力提升，从而使个人、团体和社会受益。


But, for millions of workers, the path to an increasingly automated future could be long and difficult.	但对数以百万计的劳动者而言，通往自动化未来之路可能是艰苦而漫长的。


It is up to us to make the policy and investment choices that can ease the transition, reduce its costs, and ensure that the income gains are equitably shared.	我们应当做出政策和投资选择，缓解转型期所带来的痛苦，降低转型成本，并确保收入的增长部分在各团体间得到公平分配。


Racing the Machine	与机器竞赛


LONDON – Dispelling anxiety about robots has become a major preoccupation of business apologetics.	伦敦—减轻机器人焦虑已经成为商业辩护学的一个主要焦点。


The commonsense – and far from foolish – view is that the more jobs are automated, the fewer there will be for humans to perform.	常识认为，越多工作岗位被自动化，就越少的人的有工作。 这样的看法绝非愚蠢。


The headline example is the driverless car.	一个显著的例子是无人驾驶汽车。


If cars can drive themselves, what will happen to chauffeurs, taxi drivers, and so on?	如果汽车可以自己驾驶，司机和的士司机等职业会怎么样？


Economic theory tells us that our worries are groundless.	经济理论告诉我们，这是杞人忧天。


Attaching machines to workers increases their output for each hour they work.	给工人配属机器能增加他们每一小时的产出。


They then have an enviable choice: work less for the same wage as before, or work the same number of hours for more pay.	然后便是不可避免的选择：工资不变，工作减少，或工作时间不变，工资增加。


And as the cost of existing goods falls, consumers will have more money to spend on more of the same goods or different ones.	而随着现有商品价格的下降，消费者将有更多的钱用于买更多商品或不同的东西。


Either way, there is no reason to expect a net loss of human jobs – or anything but continual improvements in living standards.	无论如何，都没有理由认为会出现人类工作岗位的净损失——或发生除了生活标准改善之外的任何情况。


History suggests as much.	历史经验亦然。


For the last 200 years or so, productivity has been steadily rising, especially in the West.	过去两百年来，生产率稳步上升，特别是在西方。


The people who live in the West have chosen both more leisure and higher income.	西方人选择了更多的闲暇和更高的收入。


Hours of work in rich countries have halved since 1870, while real per capita income has risen by a factor of five.	1870年以来，富裕国家的工作时间减少了一半，而真实人均收入上升了五倍。


How many existing human jobs are actually “at risk” to robots?	有多少现有人类工作岗位真的因为机器人而“面临风险”？


According to an invaluable report by the McKinsey Global Institute, about 50% of time spent on human work activities in the global economy could theoretically be automated today, though current trends suggest a maximum of 30% by 2030, depending mainly on the speed of adoption of new technology.	据麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）的一份重磅报告，在当今全球经济中，大约50%的人类工作活动时间理论上都可以自动化，但照目前的趋势，到2030年最多实现30%的自动化，主要的影响因素是采用新技术的速度。


The report’s midpoint predictions are: Germany, 24%; Japan, 26%; the United States, 23%; China, 16%; India, 9%; and Mexico, 13%.	报告中点预测是：德国24%； 日本26%；


By 2030, MGI estimates, 400-800 million individuals will need to find new occupations, some of which don’t yet exist.	墨西哥13%。 到2030年，有4亿到8亿个人需要寻找新工作，其中一些工作现在还不知道在哪里。


This rate of job displacement is not far out of line with previous periods.	工作岗位的流失速率和此前的时代相比并不离谱。


One reason why automation is so frightening today is that the future was more unknowable in the past: we lacked the data for alarmist forecasts.	今天的自动化之所以如此可怕，一个原因是未来在过去更为不可知：我们缺乏数据做出预警。


The more profound reason is that current automation prospects herald a future in which machines can plausibly replace humans in many spheres of work where it was thought that only we could do the job.	更深层次的原因是当前的自动化前景预示着，对许多此前被认为专属于人类的工作岗位，未来也极有可能被机器取代。


Economists have always believed that previous waves of job destruction led to an equilibrium between supply and demand in the labor market at a higher level of both employment and earnings.	经济学家一直相信，此前的工作岗位毁灭潮会形成一个劳动力市场的新供求平衡，在这个平衡上，就业和收入都会比以前更高。


But if robots can actually replace, not just displace, humans, it is hard to see an equilibrium point until the human race itself becomes redundant.	但如果机器人真的能够取代人类（replace humans）——而不仅仅是让人换岗（displace humans）——那么在人类本身变得过多之前，很难看到均衡点。


The MGI report rejects such a gloomy conclusion.	麦肯锡全球研究所的报告认为不会出现如此悲观的情况。


In the long run, the economy can adjust to provide satisfying work for everyone who wants it.	在长期，经济能够作出调整，为所有想要的人提供满意的工作。


“For society as a whole, machines can take on work that is routine, dangerous, or dirty, and may allow us to use our intrinsically human talents more fully and enjoy more leisure.”	“对于作为一个整体的社会，机器可以从事常规、危险或肮脏的工作，并有望让我们更加充分地运用人类固有才能，享受更多闲暇。 ”


This is about as good as it gets in business economics.	这和商业经济学的看法一样好。


Yet there are some serious gaps in the argument.	但其论点存在一些重大缺陷。


The first concerns the length and scope of the transition from the human to the automated economy.	第一个问题是从人力经济到自动化经济的转型的长度和规模。


Here, the past may be a less reliable guide than we think, because the slower pace of technological change meant that job replacement kept up with job displacement.	对于这个问题，过去的指导作用并不像我们认为的那样可靠，因为过去的技术变迁速度较慢，这意味着工作岗位的取代能跟得上工作岗位的变换。


Today, displacement – and thus disruption – will be much faster, because technology is being invented and diffused much faster.	如今，换岗——即干扰——要迅速得多，因为技术的发明和扩散比以前快得多。


“In advanced economies, all scenarios,” McKinsey writes, “result in full employment by 2030, but transition may include periods of higher unemployment and [downward] wage adjustments,” depending on the speed of adaptation.	“在发达经济体，所有情景，”麦肯锡写道，“都表明到2030年将实现充分就业，但转型可能包括失业率高企和[趋于下降的]工资调整时期，”这取决于适应的速度。


This poses a dilemma for policymakers.	这让决策者面临一个困境。


The faster the new technology is introduced, the more jobs it eats up, but the quicker its promised benefits are realized.	新技术引入得越快，吞噬的就业岗位就越多，但它的收益憧憬实现得也越迅速。


The MGI report rejects attempts to limit the scope and pace of automation, which would “curtail the contributions that these technologies make to business dynamism and economic growth.”	麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）的报告认为不应该限制自动化的规模和速度，否则将“削弱这些技术给商业活力和经济增长做出的贡献”。


Given this priority, the main policy response follows automatically: massive investment, on a “Marshall Plan scale,” in education and workforce training to ensure that humans are taught the critical skills to enable them to cope with the transition.	根据这一轻重缓急的顺序，主要政策响应手段便自动浮出了水面：以“马歇尔计划的规模”大量投资于教育和劳动力训练，以确保人们获得关键技能的培训，从而能够应对这一转型。


The report also recognizes the need to ensure that “wages are linked to rising productivity, so that prosperity is shared with all.”	报告还认识到需要确保“工资与生产率的提高挂钩，从而让繁荣被所有人所共享。


But it ignores the fact that recent productivity gains have overwhelmingly benefited a small minority.	”但这忽视了一个事实：最近的生产率增长基本上只令极少数群体受益。


Consequently, it pays scant attention to how the choice between work and leisure promised by economists can be made effective for all.	结果，对于如何面向所有人有效做出经济学家所许诺的工作和闲暇之间的选择的问题，很少有人关注。


Finally, there is the assumption running through the report that automation is not just desirable, but irreversible.	最后，报告全文贯穿着一个假设，即自动化不仅值得可求，并且不可逆转。


Once we have learned to do something more efficiently (at lower cost), there is no possibility of going back to doing it less efficiently.	一旦我们学会了如何（以更低的成本）更有效率地做事，便没有可能回到效率更低的做事方式。


The only question left is how humans can best adapt to the demands of a higher standard of efficiency.	剩下的唯一的问题是人类如何最好地适应更高的效率标准。


Philosophically, this is confused, because it conflates doing something more efficiently with doing it better.	从哲学层面看，这令人困惑，因为这结合了更有效地做事和更好地做事。


It mixes up a technical argument with a moral one.	它混合了技术问题和道德问题。


Of the world promised us by the apostles of technology, it is both possible and necessary to ask: Is it good?	对于技术的使徒许给我们世界，有可能、也有必要问一问：这是个好世界吗？


Is a world in which we are condemned to race with machines to produce ever-larger quantities of consumption goods a world worth having?	一个我们注定要与机器竞赛生产越来越大数量的消费的世界真的是值得拥有的吗？


And if we cannot hope to control this world, what is the value of being human?	如果我们没有希望控制这个世界，生而为人还有什么价值？


These questions may be outside McKinsey remit, but they should not be off limits to public discussion.	这些问题，麦肯锡的报告都没有回答，但不能把它们排除在公共讨论的界限之外。


Awakening from the Trump Nightmare	从特朗普制造的噩梦中醒来


PARIS – The American people can escape from the ordeal of Donald Trump’s presidency in one of three ways.	巴黎——美国民众可以以三种方式中的一种避开唐纳德·特朗普的总统任期。


But if and when they do is an irreducibly political question, not one that hinges on legal possibilities.	但他们是否会这样做以及何时会这样做是一个不以法律几率为转移的无法简化的政治问题。


First, there’s the Nixonian method, in which the president, worn down by the fight, simply resigns, scared and unwilling to submit to the proceedings that he sees mounting around him.	首先，是尼克松式的方式，被斗争折磨得筋疲力尽的总统因为害怕和不愿接受身边愈演愈烈的诉讼而干脆辞职。


But could that really be the exit taken by Trump?	但这能否真的成为特朗普的退出方式？


Does he share with his distant Republican predecessor a strong enough predisposition to melancholy?	他是否与这位很久以前的共和党前任一样有着忧郁的特质？


Can one picture a childish man, compulsive and narcissistic, surrendering without a fight the larger-than-life toy that is the top job in the most powerful country on the planet?	是否能够想象一个孩子气、冲动和自恋的男人不经过一番挣扎就放弃地球上最强大国家的最高领袖这样一个意义超乎生命的玩具？


I doubt it.	我对此深表怀疑。


Second, there is Article 4 of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1967, which spells out a process by which the vice president and cabinet can act to replace a president who has died or is prevented by reasons of health from governing.	其次，1967年批准的宪法第25条修正案第4款规定了副总统和内阁可以采取行动，取代因死亡或健康原因无法继续执政的总统的程序。


Such might have been the case, four years earlier, following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, had Kennedy not died from his wounds.	约翰·F·肯尼迪被刺后，如果没有因伤死亡，那么就有可能按照这项程序的规定提前四年结束任期。


The possibility briefly resurfaced when President Ronald Reagan began to show the first signs of Alzheimer’s disease.	当罗纳德·里根总统开始表现出阿尔茨海默症的早期迹象时，在短暂的时间内再次出现了这样的可能性。


But the current situation does not resemble those cases.	但当前情况并不类似于上述案例。


Trump may be unstable and unfit to govern, as his detractors claim.	特朗普可能像他的诋毁者所说的那样反复无常、不适合执政。


But is he any more so now than he was when the American people elected him?	但他现在是不是比美国民众选他的时候情况更糟？


Probably not.	或许并非如此。


Finally, there remains the remedy of impeachment, which is being discussed more and more openly in Washington these days, accompanied (in a sign of the times) by a book, The Case for Impeachment, by Allan J. Lichtman.	最后还有弹劾这种补救办法，这些日子这种办法在华盛顿引发了越来越公开的讨论，伴随这样的讨论还流行一本书，那就是艾伦·J·里奇曼的弹劾案例。


(A political historian, Lichtman is famous for having devised a model that has enabled him to predict the election of every American president from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump.)	（里奇曼是一位政治历史学家，他因为设计了一个成功预测从罗纳德·里根到唐纳德·特朗普的所有当选总统的模型而闻名于世。 ）


Impeachment, set out in Article 2 of the Constitution, is a procedure for the removal from office of a president, vice president, or other top executive official (or judge) suspected of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”	宪法第二条的弹劾程序适用于对被怀疑犯有“叛国、受贿或其他严重罪行和不端行为的总统、副总统或其他最高行政官员（或法官）的免职。


It is a complex process that unfolds in two phases: first, the House of Representatives must decide, by a simple majority, that the charges are serious enough to be tried; second, a full-fledged trial is conducted in the Senate, which must reach a two-thirds majority to convict the official and trigger immediate removal from office.	”上述过程十分复杂，一般分为两个阶段：首先，众议院必须以简单多数决定指控是否严重到需要进行审判； 其次，全面审判将在参议院进行，必须达到2/3的多数才能认定某位官员有罪并即刻触发撤职程序。


There are two main reasons to doubt that impeachment would rid the world of Trump.	有两个主要理由质疑弹劾能使世界摆脱特朗普。


First, there is the balance of power in the Senate.	首先是参议院的权力平衡。


At least 19 Republican senators would have to join the Democrats to convict Trump.	至少19名共和党参议员需要加入民主党阵营才能认定特朗普有罪。


At the moment, at most five can be counted on to do so.	目前，可以有把握这样做的只有五个人。


The only two presidential precedents (Andrew Johnson, impeached in 1868 for abuse of power, and Bill Clinton, impeached in 1998 for perjury and obstruction of justice) are hardly encouraging: both ended in acquittal by the Senate.	唯一两例总统弹劾的先例（包括1868年弹劾安德鲁·约翰逊滥用权力，以及1998年弹劾比尔·克林顿作伪证和妨碍司法）其结果均不尽如人意：这两者最终都被参议院无罪开释。


Second, there is the reluctance of Democratic Party bosses to see ultraconservative Vice President Mike Pence assume the place vacated by a fallen Trump.	其次，民主党大佬们不愿看到超级保守的副总统迈克·彭斯接替特朗普倒下后所空出的职位。


Wouldn’t he enjoy the same state of grace enjoyed by recent vice presidents who entered the Oval Office under exceptional circumstances (Lyndon Johnson after Kennedy; Gerald Ford after Nixon)?	他难道不会享受在特殊情况下入主椭圆形办公室的近期副总统（林登·约翰逊接替肯尼迪； 杰拉尔德·福特接替尼克松）所享有的同样恩惠？


And what if he remained in office, not only for the remainder of Trump’s term, but for two four-year terms of his own?	而且如果他继续任职，不仅完成特朗普余下的任期，而且再次依靠自己的力量获得四年连任？


All of this is logical enough.	所有这一切都合乎逻辑。


But times have changed since Johnson, Ford, and even Clinton.	但从约翰逊、福特甚至克林顿之后情况已经发生了变化。


In post-modern democracies, there is one and only one boss: public opinion.	在后现代民主国家，有且只有一个大佬：那就是公众舆论。


And public opinion operates according to its own logic.	而且公众舆论有其自身的运作逻辑。


How long will the American public tolerate the almost-daily doses of new evidence of conflicts of interest, starting with the licensing to Chinese investors, at the height of the presidential primary, of the Trump brand for use on spas, luxury hotels, and other real-estate projects?	美国公众对几乎每天爆出的利益冲突新证据究竟能忍受多久，首先是向中国投资者发放许可证，而后在总统初选的高潮期间，授权特朗普品牌被用于水疗、豪华酒店和其他房地产项目？


What about Trump’s financial ties with Russia, and those of his associates, including his former national security adviser, Michael Flynn, and his former campaign manager, Paul Manafort?	该如何处理特朗普及其同伴（包括特朗普的前国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林及其前竞选经理保罗·马纳福特）与俄罗斯的金融联系？


What leverage can be wielded by the Russian oligarchs who, in 2004, when Trump was mired in one of his bankruptcies, stepped in for the American banks that had blacklisted him to recapitalize his companies and bought – sight unseen and at premium prices – luxury apartments in Trump World Tower?	俄罗斯寡头可以挥舞什么样的筹码，2004年，特朗普陷入破产时，俄寡头代替将其列入黑名单的美国银行对他的公司进行资本重组并在事先未亲临现场的情况下高价收购了特朗普世界大厦的豪华公寓？


Won’t all of this eventually take its toll?	难道所有这一切最终都不会带来损失？


And, finally, there is the gross obstruction of justice represented by the firing of FBI director James Comey, whose main offense seems to have been his refusal to exclude Trump from his investigation of the Kremlin’s criminal interference in the 2016 campaign.	最后还有解雇联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科米所代表的严重妨碍司法，后者的主要过错似乎是拒绝将特朗普从他对2016年竞选期间克里姆林宫干涉罪行的调查中排除出去。


What will voters make of the damning revelations that are sure to come to light, now that Comey’s predecessor, Robert Mueller, has been appointed as special counsel to investigate the ties between Russia and Trump’s election campaign?	选民们将如何解释注定要浮出水面的该死真相，现在科米的前任罗伯特·米勒已经被任命为调查俄罗斯和特朗普竞选活动联系的特别顾问。


The signs of public disgust are mounting.	公众的厌恶情绪正在不断累积。


A petition drive to impeach Trump, organized by Massachusetts lawyer John Bonifaz, has gathered more than a million signatures.	由马萨诸塞州律师约翰·博尼法兹组织的弹劾特朗普的请愿活动已经搜集了超过一百万个签名。


Polls indicate that a majority of the electorate would favor Trump’s resignation if it were proved that his campaign colluded with Russia to sway the election.	民意调查显示大多数选民在有事实证明特朗普的竞选活动与俄国共谋影响选举结果的情况下希望看到特朗普辞职。


And growing numbers of voters are now saying as much to their representatives, who, sooner or later, will have to start listening if they want to avoid imperiling their own electoral chances.	越来越多的选民现在正在告诉他们的代表，这些代表如果想要避免危及自身的当选机会迟早不得不开始倾听。


For Trump, the real danger will come as the crowd he captivated and captured during the campaign begins to turn on him.	对特朗普而言，真正的危险将会在被他迷惑和俘虏的选民开始攻击他时降临。


That crowd, as astute political observers from Plato to de Tocqueville amply demonstrated, becomes harder to evade the more you make it master.	正如从柏拉图到托克维尔等精明的政治观察家所充分证明的那样，越受这样的群体掌控他们就愈加如影随形。


The worst case is never inevitable.	最坏的情况永远不是不可避免。


May the mob of the populist tide become once again the great American people, a people of citizens.	但愿民粹主义浪潮的乌合之众再次成为伟大的美国民众和市民。


When that happens, Trump will be history.	当这一天真的到来，特朗普将成为历史。


Mending Bangladesh’s Garment Industry	改造孟加拉国的制衣业


KUALA LUMPUR – Four years ago, the deadly collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh pulled back the curtain on the employment practices of the global apparel industry.	吉隆坡——四年前，孟加拉国拉纳广场制衣企业的致命灾难掀起了全球制衣业雇用黑幕。


We had hoped that the tragedy, which killed more than 1,100 workers – the deadliest accident in the industry’s history – would have brought meaningful change to a business long left to its own devices.	我们曾经期望这次造成超过1，100名工人死亡的制衣史上最致命的事故悲剧能在真正意义上变革这个长期野蛮生长的行业。


Unfortunately, our research suggests the opposite has happened.	不幸的是，我们的研究表明，真实情况恰恰相反。


Media reports highlight the industry’s ongoing transgressions in Bangladesh, in particular the persistent reliance on child labor.	媒体报道凸显了孟加拉国制衣业持续的犯罪行为，特别是持续依赖童工的现象。


In 2014, the British current-affairs program Exposure found evidence of children as young as 13 working in factories (often under harsh conditions) producing clothes for retailers in the United Kingdom.	2014年，英国时事新闻计划曝光发现证据，证明年仅十三岁的儿童在（非常恶劣的工作条件下）为给英国零售商生产服装而在工厂里工作。


Another undercover report by CBS News interviewed a 12-year-old girl who obtained a factory job using a certificate that falsified her age.	CBS新闻的另一则秘密报道采访了一位年仅十二岁的女孩，她用一张伪造的年龄证书得到了一份制衣厂的工作。


And journalists from The Australian Women’s Weekly found girls as young as ten stitching clothes for top Australian brands.	澳大利亚妇女周刊的记者发现十岁大的女孩为顶级澳大利亚品牌缝制衣物。


While the media reports are troubling, they do not provide the entire picture.	尽管媒体报道令人不安，但它们并没有反应整体状况。


How many minors and adolescent girls are employed overall in factory jobs?	工厂总共雇用了多少未成年和青少年少女？


More important, should they be barred from such jobs entirely?	更重要的是，是否应当完全禁止她们参与这样的工作?


Access to factories is restricted, and most employees will not disclose their actual age in the workplace.	进厂工作有年龄限制，但多数员工不会在工作场合透露她们的实际年龄。


Indeed, journalists often mask their identity to document abuses.	事实上，记者在报道侵权行为时往往掩盖她们的身份。


We took a different approach to assess the prevalence of underage workers in the garment industry, and to determine the sector’s value to Bangladeshi society.	我们改变了制衣业未成年员工比例的评估方法，并以此来确定制衣业对孟加拉国的社会价值。


As part of a recent nationwide census, we collected data from thousands of mothers and girls in Bangladesh’s three industrial districts with the highest concentration of ready-made garment factories (particularly those operating outside the Export Processing Zones): Ashulia, Gazipur, and Narayanganj.	作为最近全国人口普查的一部分，我们搜集了成衣厂集中率最高的孟加拉国三个工业区数千名母亲和女童的数据（尤其是那些位于Ashulia、Gazipur和Narayanganj这三个出口加工区以外的成衣厂的数据）。


The majority of the country’s female garment workers are concentrated in these areas.	该国大部分女性制衣工人都集中在上述区域。


For comparison, we also carried out interviews in 58 urban areas where garment factories are not located.	为了比较，我们还在58个城市区域进行了采访，这些区域都没有开设制衣企业。


During our research, we identified 3,367 women and girls in the survey areas who reported being employed in the apparel industry.	在研究中，我们确认调查区内有3，367名女性和女童承认她们受雇于制衣业。


Of them, 3% were between the ages of ten and 13, and 11% were 14-17 years old.	在她们当中，3%的人年龄在10到13岁之间，11%的人为14到17岁。


Of the 861 girls below the age of 18 who were engaged in any kind of work, 28% said they worked in the garment industry.	在十八岁以下从事任何工作的861名少女当中，28%的人表示他们受雇于服装企业。


Based on this evidence, it would appear that Bangladesh’s garment factories are using child labor (particularly that of young girls) more pervasively than even the most sensational media reports suggest.	基于上述证据，孟加拉国制衣厂雇用童工（尤其是年轻女童）的现象似乎比最耸人听闻的媒体所报道的更加严重。


But for us, the real question is whether this practice should be eradicated or reformed.	但对我们来说，真正的问题在于是否应当彻底禁止或改革这种现象。


Global brands relying on cheap labor have promised eradication.	依赖廉价劳工的全球品牌已经承诺禁止这种现象。


In 1992, about 10% of the garment sector’s workforce was below the age of 14.	1992年，约10%的制衣业员工年龄在 十四岁以下。


The following year, after the introduction of the Child Labor Deterrence Act in the United States – the so-called Harkin Bill, which barred US imports of products made with child labor – some 50,000 underage workers were removed from the factory floor.	第二年，在美国实行童工抑制法案——也就是所谓禁止美国进口童工生产产品的“哈金法案”后——约有 50,000 名未成年工人被赶出工厂。


Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association has pledged to phase out child labor and put children back in school – female school enrollment is typically lower in areas of high garment-industry employment than in other areas – upholding a 2010 law prohibiting employment of children under 14.	此外，孟加拉国服装制造和出口协会已经承诺要逐步淘汰使用童工的陋习，并让孩子们重返学校——女性入学率在制衣业雇佣率高的地区尤其低——禁止雇用的目的是维护2010年禁止雇用十四岁以下童工的一项法律。


Clearly, our data suggest that the industry’s promises have yet to be fulfilled (though the government of Bangladesh claims that there currently is “no child labor” in garment processing units).	显而易见，我们的数据表明制衣业并没有兑现它们的承诺（虽然孟加拉国政府声称服装加工企业目前“不存在雇用童工”的现象）。


But that may not be entirely bad for underage female workers in Bangladesh.	但那对孟加拉国未成年女性员工来说也许并不完全是坏现象。


Thanks to pressure on garment manufacturers in the wake of the Rana Plaza disaster, the industry’s minimum wage was increased 77%, to $68 a month.	由于拉纳广场灾后制衣企业所面临的压力，该行业最低工资提高了77%，达到每月68美元。


This has made it more attractive for young girls to take up paid employment in the sector, which, paradoxically, does have some social benefit.	这导致年轻少女在该行业从事有报酬劳动更具吸引力，而尽管十分矛盾，但这却具备一定的社会效益。


The majority of young girls who are working in Bangladesh are from poor families.	在孟加拉国工作的少女主要来自贫困家庭。


Even in garment manufacturing areas, relatively better-off families rarely send their daughters to work in factories.	即使在成衣制造区，相对富裕的家庭也很少将她们的女儿送去工厂工作。


Although recent initiatives have lowered the cost of schooling for girls (through cash stipends and the elimination of school fees), many young women still drop out of secondary school, even without the opportunity to engage in paid work.	尽管近期的举措降低了女童上学的成本（通过发放现金补助和取消学费），但许多少女仍然从中学退学，即使她们找不到能赚取工资的工作。


That often leaves girls with one option: marriage.	这种情况往往造成女孩只剩下婚姻一个选择。


And in a country where minimum marriage-age laws are rarely implemented, earning a paycheck is the best way to avoid a premature wedding day.	而且在一个很少执行最低结婚年龄规定的国家，赚取工资是避免过早结婚的最佳方式。


In such a situation, when many young girls must choose between factory work and marrying young, banning factory employment for girls under 18 would do more harm than good.	在这样的情况下，因为许多少女必须在工厂工作和嫁人之间作出选择，禁止工厂雇用十八岁以下少女带来的坏处可能多于好处。


To help young girls avoid this choice, and to reduce the presence of minors and young girls in factories, requires greater emphasis on poverty reduction in rural areas.	为帮助少女避免这种选择，并减少制衣厂雇用未成年人和少女，需要更加强调农村地区的减贫工作。


Bangladesh’s garment industry is expected to quadruple in size over the next two decades, attracting millions more female workers, young and old, to the production floor.	孟加拉国服装业预计将在未来二十年内翻两番，并吸引成百上千万成年和青年女性员工到工厂工作。


According to our estimates, one of every ten of these new employees will be between 10-17 years of age.	根据我们的估算，这些新员工的1/10将在10到17岁。


Consumers around the world reject clothing stitched by child labor, which is commendable.	世界各地的消费者拒绝接受童工生产的服装，这是值得赞扬的举动。


Children under 18 should be in school and learning important life skills, not working long hours under difficult conditions.	十八岁以下儿童应当在学校学习重要的生存技能，而不是在艰苦的条件下长时间工作。


But the lessons from the 2013 tragedy at Rana Plaza are more complicated than much of the international media make them out to be.	但2013年拉纳广场悲剧的教训比多数国际媒体所总结的更加复杂。 服装行业的确需要改革；


The garment industry does need to reform; but, for the time being, if women and girls are not to suffer needlessly again, promising to eradicate child labor may not be the right answer.	但在目前情况下，如果不想让女性和少女更多无谓的受苦，承诺彻底禁止童工可能不是正确的选择。


Don’t Bank on Bankruptcy for Banks	不可指望银行的破产


CAMBRIDGE – In the next month, the US Treasury Department is expected to decide whether to seek to replace the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s regulator-led process for resolving failed mega-banks with a solely court-based mechanism.	坎布里奇—下个月，美国财政部将决定是否寻求用完全基于法院的机制取代2010年多德-弗兰克法案（Dodd-Frank Act）规定的由监管者主导破产大型银行处置的流程。


Such a change would be a mistake of potentially crisis-size proportions.	这一变化将是一个可能造成未来危机的错误。


Yes, creating a more streamlined bankruptcy process can reduce the decibel level of a bank’s failure, and bankruptcy judges are experts at important restructuring tasks.	诚然，建立更顺畅的破产程序能够降低银行破产的影响，破产法官也是重要重组任务的专家。


But there are critical factors that cannot be ignored.	但有一些关键性因素不可忽视。


Restructuring a mega-bank requires pre-planning, familiarity with the bank’s strengths and weaknesses, knowledge of how to time the bankruptcy properly in a volatile economy, and the capacity to coordinate with foreign regulators.	重组一家大型银行需要事先规划、熟悉银行的优势和劣势、了解如何在高波动的经济中确定合理的破产时机，以及能够与外国监管者协调。


The courts cannot fulfill these tasks alone, especially in the time the proposal under consideration has allotted – a 48-hour weekend.	法院无法单独胜任这些任务，特别是在所考虑的方案时间有限——周末的48小时——的时候。


Unable to plan ahead, the courts would enter into the restructuring process unfamiliar with the bank.	无法事先规划意味着法院将在不熟悉银行的情况下进入重组流程。


Moreover, the courts cannot manage the kind of economy-wide crisis that would arise if multiple mega-banks sank simultaneously.	此外，如果多家大银行同时倒闭，将引发整个经济的危机，而法院无法处置这类危机。


And they cannot coordinate with foreign regulators.	他们也无法与外国监管者协调。


In short, completing a proper restructuring would require contributions from regulators, including pre-planning, advice, and coordination.	简言之，完整的合理重组流程需要监管者的参与，包括事先规划、建议和协调等方面。


Yet, far from accepting these contributions, the plan would largely cut regulators out of the process.	但是，目前的计划非但没有考虑监管者的这些作用，反而要让他们隔绝在破产流程之外。


For example, the plan would bar regulators from initiating a mega-bank’s bankruptcy, leaving it to the discretion of the bank’s own managers.	比如，财政部将禁止监管者发动大银行的破产流程，破产流程将完全成为银行管理层的自由裁量权。


In the nonfinancial sector, failing companies often wait too long before declaring bankruptcy, so creditors may step in to do some pushing, potentially even forcing a bankruptcy of a failed firm.	在非金融部门，倒闭的公司常常要等太久才能宣布破产，因此债权人可能介入，甚至迫使倒闭企业进入破产流程。


While bank regulators have tools to push banks similarly, their most effective one is the power to initiate a bankruptcy when it is best for the economy.	监管者也拥有推动银行破产的工具，但它们最有效的工具还是在对经济最有利的时机启动破产程序。


Taking this tool away could have severe adverse consequences.	取缔这个工具可能带来严重的负面后果。


Bank executives, like sinking industrial firm executives, have reason to “pray and delay,” hoping that some new development will save them.	和倒闭的产业企业高管一样，银行高管也有理由“祈祷和拖延”，以期新的发展趋势能够拯救他们。


But if a failing mega-bank runs out of cash during such a delay, the risk that its bankruptcy will be disorderly – as with Lehman Brothers in 2008 – rises, as does the potential that it will wreak havoc on the real economy.	但如果倒闭大银行在这一拖延过程中耗尽现金，就有可能陷入无序破产——2008年的雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）就是如此——并给实体经济造成严重破坏。


The simple fact is that government regulators can do things that courts cannot.	简单的事实是政府监管者能够做一些法院不能做的事。


Courts lack the staff and expertise to come up with a nation-wide recovery plan.	法院缺少人手和专业知识制定全国性的复苏计划。


Moreover, they cannot lend to a cash-poor wobbly bank until it can stand on its own.	此外，它们也无法给现金不足的濒临倒闭的银行贷款直到它能够自立。


The government can do that – and it can make sure that either the bank will repay the loans (by getting good collateral) or that the financial sector overall will cover the repayment (as Dodd-Frank authorized and required).	政府可以做到这些——还能确保银行将偿还贷款（通过要求优质抵押品实现），或者金融业整体能够覆盖贷款偿还额（多德-弗兰克法案授权并要求这样做）。


When courts preside over nonfinancial bankruptcies, they depend on private lenders to provide emergency liquidity.	法院在主持非金融业破产案时，它们依靠私人贷款人提供紧急流动性。


But in a financial crisis, weakened banks cannot lend, meaning that the government must serve as the lender of last resort.	但在金融危机中，虚弱的银行无法贷款，这意味着政府必须承担最后贷款人的角色。


And to play that role well, the government must be deeply involved in the bankruptcy process, so that it can jump in if needed.	要想扮演好这一角色，政府必须深度参与到破产流程中，从而能够在需要时挺身而出。


The current proposal, which the US House of Representatives has already passed, has other major flaws.	当前的方案——它已经在众议院通过——还有其他严重缺陷。


For starters, American mega-banks operate worldwide, typically with a significant presence in London and other financial centers.	首先，美国大银行在全世界都有经营，通常在伦敦和其他金融中心都有很大的分支。


If creditors and depositors of a failed American mega-bank’s foreign affiliate run off with the cash they held there, or if a foreign regulator shuts down that affiliate, the US bank would be in an untenable position.	如果一家倒闭美国大银行的海外分行的债权人和存款人挤兑他们存在那里的现金，或者如果外国监管者关闭了该分行，那么这家美国银行将陷入无法挽回的境地。


Yet courts cannot negotiate understandings with foreign regulators.	但法院无法与外国监管者协商谅解。


American regulators can, but only if they can control the timing of the bankruptcy, and otherwise engage in the process.	美国监管者可以，但只有在它们能够控制破产时机（或者要么参与到破产流程中）时才可以。


To be sure, the bankruptcy bill now in play is useful.	平心而论，现行破产法案是有用的。


But it is not robust.	但它不够强大。


It would not allow broad-spectrum, full-scale bankruptcies, in which failing operations are closed under the court’s aegis, viable operations are sold, and debts are restructured up and down a company’s balance sheet.	它不允许大范围的全面破产，在这类破产中，倒闭的业务将在法院保护下关闭，有盈利能力的业务将被出售，债务将围绕公司资产负债表进行重组。


Rather, the current proposal envisages a limited-scale weekend restructuring, requiring that a precise loan structure be put in place years ahead of time.	相反，当前方案构想了一个规模有限的周末重组，这要求准确的贷款结构在几年前就已经准备就绪。


The bank would be closed on Friday evening, unburdened of pre-positioned evaporating debts over the weekend, and reopened on Monday morning, without (in the best-case scenario) needing a government bailout.	银行将在星期五晚上关门，在周末期间卸下预先确定的缩水债务，然后在星期一早上重新开张，而不必（在最佳情景中）需要政府援助。


If successful, this kind of rapid-fire bankruptcy process would be valuable.	如果取得成功，这种速战速决式破产流程很有价值。


But it has never been tried.	但它从未实行过。


To have any chance of re-opening on Monday morning, a bankrupt bank’s billions of dollars in long-term debt would already have to be structured in such a way that a bankruptcy court could eliminate it over a weekend.	要想在星期一早晨有机会重新开张，破产银行的数十亿美元长期债务需要事先组织，从而让破产法院能够在周末消除它。


But bankruptcy judges would have no knowledge in advance of a bank’s debt, and they would need more than a weekend to determine whether that debt could be properly stripped out.	但破产法官无法实现获得关于一家银行债务的知识，短短一个周末也不足以让他们确定债务是否能够被合理消除。


Government regulators, on the other hand, could do this in advance.	另一方面，政府监管者能够事先做好这些。


And yet, under the current proposal, their official means of doing so would be sharply rolled back.	然而，在当前方案中，它们这样做的官方手段被严重制约了。


Bankruptcy, if it works, is a good way for a failing firm to restructure or shrink.	能够见效的话，破产是实现倒闭企业重组或分解的好办法。


But if a failing mega-bank cannot open on Monday morning, the financial system will need backup.	但如果倒闭的大银行无法在星期一早晨开门营业，金融体系就需要支持。


Under the current proposal, the absence of a regulatory safety net could result, if the weekend restructuring fails, in a global chaotic free-for-all, just like the one that followed the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.	根据当前方案，缺乏监管安全网可能导致——如果周末重组失败的话——全球性的混乱崩盘，一如2008年雷曼兄弟破产后的情景。


Maintaining financial stability in a crisis is too important for us to pin our hopes on a narrow bankruptcy channel.	在危机中保持金融稳定对于我们无比重要，因此不能将希望寄托在狭窄的破产渠道上。


The courts can help, especially after they have developed a routinized process for restructuring banks, as they have done with airline restructurings.	法院能起到帮助作用，特别是在它们制定出一套常规化的银行重组流程之后——就像它们对航空公司重组所做的那样。


But we should be wary about relying on courts to do things they have never been asked to do before.	但我们应该对依靠法院来完成它们此前从未被要求完成的任务保持谨慎。


The House already voted, precipitously, to replace the regulator-led restructuring system with a weaker court-led setup.	众议院已经仓促投票支持用更弱的法院领导的安排取代监管者领导的重组制度。


Let’s hope that wiser heads at the Treasury Department prevail.	但愿在财政部，更清醒的头脑能够胜出。


A letter to Congress with a similar conclusion was signed by 120 academics with expertise in bankruptcy, banking regulation, finance, or all three.	120名破产、银行监管、金融或这三方面兼顾的专家学者联署了一份相同的结论并致信国会。


The Last Basel Round?	最后一轮巴塞尔谈判？


LONDON – After long and sometimes painful negotiations, which stress-tested the personal relationships between many countries’ central bankers and regulators to the limit, the Basel Committee laid a long-expected egg in December.	发自伦敦——在经历了漫长且不时令人痛苦，将许多国家的中央银行家和监管者之间私人关系考验到极致的谈判后，巴塞尔银行监管委员会终于在12月酝酿出了一个期望已久的成果。


Described as a package that finalizes the post-2008 reforms to the global regime for bank capital, it brings to an end the process known as Basel 3.	而这个据说总括了2008年后全球银行体系改革的一揽子计划也宣告了巴塞尔协议3进程的落幕。


Bankers have dubbed the result “Basel 4,” arguing that the final package contains many new and more burdensome requirements.	银行家将这一成果称之为“巴塞尔协议4”，认为最终方案包含了许多新制定且更繁重的要求。


But the Committee is adamant that the new rules should be regarded as part and parcel of the reform program begun in 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis. Basel 4 may come one day, but this is not it, they insist.	但委员会坚决认为在全球金融危机后这套新规则应被视为2009年启动之改革方案的一个组成模块，坚持说巴塞尔协议4或许某一天会到来，但绝不是这一份。


What problem does the new package seek to resolve?	那么新一揽子计划究竟试图要解决什么问题？


In the preamble, the regulators refer to “a worrying degree of variability in banks’ calculations of [risk-weighted assets].”	在序言部分，监管机构提到“银行在定义和计算‘风险加权资产’方面的随意性令人担忧。


They have found that applying the major banks’ different internal models to the same portfolio of loans can produce very different numbers, meaning that some banks would be carrying significantly less capital than others for the same quantum of assumed risk.	”他们发现将各主要银行使用的不同内部模型在应用于相同贷款组合时会产生非常不同的数字，这意味着一些银行在承担相同量级风险的情况下准备的资本明显少于其他银行。


The logical answer to that problem, one might think, is to interrogate the models closely, to see what is driving the differences, and demand calibration changes where the resultant asset reductions are deemed excessive.	人们可能会认为对这个问题的逻辑应对方式是仔细考察各个模型，看看是哪些部分促成了这种差异，并对导致资产过度减少的部分进行校准。


But the regulators clearly doubt their capacity to penetrate the dark recesses of banks’ internal models; so, instead, they have imposed a so-called “output floor.”	但监管机构显然觉得自己没能力深入探究到银行内部模型的核心之处； 所以他们实行了所谓的“产出底线”。


In other words, however much your model reduces risk-weighted assets, you cannot take credit for more than a 27.5% cut.	换句话说，无论模型如何减少风险加权资产，产生的减值都不得超过27. 5％。


The output floor is expressed as a net figure, of 72.5%, below which you cannot go.	因此产出底线被确定为一个72. 5％的净数字，低于此数就是违规。


Why the unusually precise figure of 72.5%?	那么为何会精确到72.


The answer is obvious.	5％？


It is half way between 75%, which was the final US bid, and 70%, which was the French offer. They agreed to split the difference.	答案是显而易见的——谈判中美国要求定在75％而法国要求70％，最后一人让了一步。


Although this may make no sense, even affected banks had come to the view that some kind of agreement was better than none.	虽然这可能没什么意义，但即便受影响的银行也认为有协议总比没协议好。


Continuing uncertainty made capital planning very difficult. So bankers favored a deal, and will live with the outcome, if it is genuinely the end of the program.	由于持续的不确定性使得资本规划变得非常困难，所以银行家们希望能达成一个协议，也接受协议的结果——只求这确实是整个进程的终结。


Unfortunately, this new agreement is unlikely to draw a line under the capital debate.	不幸的是，这个新协议不太可能为这场资本辩论划清界限。


Even though senior central bankers like Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the Financial Stability Board, think there is now enough capital in the banking system, many do not share his view.	尽管像英国央行行长兼金融稳定委员会主席马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）这样的高级别中央银行家认为银行体系目前已经拥有足够的资本，但许多人不同意他的看法。


Anat Admati of Stanford would like capital ratios well above 20%.	斯坦福大学教授阿纳特·阿德玛蒂（Anat Admati）希望资本比率远高于20％。


Martin Wolf of the Financial Times makes a similar case. He thinks banks are still dangerously unstable.	而《金融时报》的马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）也提出了类似的建议，因为他认为银行仍然处于危险的不稳定状态。