If we model smell on local terms, we can trace how nasal neurons interact with scent particles, sending signals through a network of other neurons to the brain.	如果我们用局部条件对嗅觉建模，我们可以追踪鼻腔神经元如何与气味粒子互动、通过其他神经元网络将信号输送给大脑。


We have good abstractions in structural biology to describe this.	我们有很好的结构生物学抽象来描述这一点。


But these neurons are also part of an adaptive, regenerative system.	但这些神经元也是自适应再生系统的一部分。


Sensory neurons die a programmed death; you literally have a new sense of smell every month.	感觉神经元会按计划死亡； 实际上，你的嗅觉每个月都会更新一次。


Modeling it requires the consideration of more than just local signaling.	对此建模要求考虑远超局部信号传递的内容。


Neurons operate as a cooperative group: more arrive at the location than are needed for a simple replacement.	神经元就像是一个合作团队：到达某地点的数量比简单替换所需量更多。


In order to facilitate the replacement, the extras become part of a dialog with surrounding cells, and others deep in the brain, then sacrifice themselves.	为了方便替换，多余神经元会成为与周边细胞和其他大脑深处神经元对话的一部分，然后自我牺牲。


To explain why they voluntarily die, we would need a new system-level vocabulary.	要解释为何它们会自愿死去，我们需要一套新的系统水平的术语。


It does not stop there.	到这里还没完。


When your neurons are replaced, they change.	当你的神经元被替换时，它们会改变。


If you are newly in love (or experience a trauma) and a scent is associated with it, you may develop a heightened sensitivity to that scent.	如果你陷入新的爱情（或受了伤），并且有一种伴随气味，你就会对该气味极为敏感。


Your physio-cognitive apparatus evolves.	你的生理感知设备进化了。


This process interests researchers enormously, because it is one of only two contexts in which neural regeneration occurs.	这一过程引起了研究者的浓厚兴趣，因为这是仅有的两个会发生神经再生的情况之一。


If it were understood, it could lead to cures for many crippling diseases, both neurological (like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s) and degenerative (including those, like cancer, associated with aging).	如果我们能弄明白这一过程，就能治疗许多恶疾，既包括神经疾病（如帕金森病和老年痴呆症），也包括衰退性疾病（包括癌症等与年纪相关的疾病）。


One way to understand how this higher-level coherence emerges is to study it in a more accessible form.	理解这种高水平一致性如何发生的一种办法是在更易接近的形式上研究它。


As it happens, there is a naturally occurring information structure in which the needed behaviors are easier to observe and explain.	恰好存在一个天然发生的信息结构，在其中可以更容易地观察和解释所需要的行为。


That structure can be found in stories.	这一结构可以在故事中找到。


Stories are remarkable for the way that they allow us to comprehend new concepts, and continue to make sense of them, even when they involve numerous contexts and unexpected associations.	故事有一个卓越的特点，它能让我们理解新概念，并持续地了解它们，即使它们包括大量上下文语境和预料之外的联系。


We take the resulting narrative effects for granted: surprise endings, intriguing situations, and a compulsion to read or watch until the finish.	我们会把由此产生的叙事效果当成理所当然：出人意料的结局、有趣的情节以及必欲卒读而后快的感觉。


If models of biology and AI included these dynamics, they would demonstrate how unexpected elements can emerge from an evolving coherence.	如果生物学和AI模型包括这样的动态，它们就能够展示出人预料的元素如何从进化的一致性中出现。


Indeed, incorporating this principle into both fields could result in new diagnostic capabilities and new forms of individualized treatment, with a different therapy designed for each person.	事实上，将这一原理契合到这两个领域能形成新的诊断能力和新的个性化治疗形式，每个人都能获得不同的诊疗。


An infection such as the coronavirus is currently countered with a vaccine tailored to block it.	冠状病毒感染等疾病现在遇到了专门针对它的疫苗。


But what if there was a way to “tune” bodies to reject all infections?	但用办法“设定”身体拒绝所有感染会怎么样？


For example, there are a few cases of natural immunity to HIV, but we are unable to understand why.	比如，对于艾滋病就存在一些自然免疫的情况，但我们还无法理解原因。


The challenge in biomedical and computational research is to model the dynamics between diverse processes at the level of whole systems.	生物医学和计算研究的挑战在于在全系统水平上对多样化的过程之间的动态建模。


Once we can do this, we are much more likely to develop AI tools that are capable of unexpected breakthroughs in understanding how the body supports and resists illness.	一旦我们能够做到这一点，开发出能够在理解身体支持和拒绝疾病方面取得出人预料突破的AI工具的可能性就会大大提高。


East Asia’s Turning Point	东亚转折点


NEW DELHI – Political transitions in East Asia promise to mark a defining moment in the region’s jittery geopolitics.	新德里—东亚政治交接将是该地区动荡不安的地缘政治的决定性时刻。


After the ascension in China of Xi Jinping, regarded by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as its own man, Japan seems set to swing to the right in its impending election – an outcome likely to fuel nationalist passion on both sides of the Sino-Japanese rivalry.	习近平成为中国领导人并获得了解放军的认可，日本似乎将在即将到来的选举中向右转——这一结果可能助长中日对峙双方的民族主义热情。


Japan’s expected rightward turn comes more than three years after voters put the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in power.	在左倾的民主党上台三年后，日本预计将再次向右转。


By contrast, South Korea’s election – scheduled for December 19, just three days after the Japanese go to the polls – could take that country to the left, after the nearly five-year rule of rightist President Lee Myung-bak, who proved to be a polarizing leader.	相反，韩国的选举——将于12月19日举行，就在日本选举三天后——将让该国在右倾总统李明博掌权五年后向左转，而李明博显然是个走极端的领导人。


These political transitions could compound East Asia’s challenges, which include the need to institute a regional balance of power and dispense with historical baggage that weighs down interstate relationships, particularly among China, Japan, and South Korea.	这些政治交接可能让东亚挑战复杂化，东亚需要形成一个地区全力平衡，摆脱让各国间交恶的历史负担，特别是中日韩三国之间的历史问题。


Booming trade in the region has failed to mute or moderate territorial and other disputes; on the contrary, it has only sharpened regional geopolitics and unleashed high-stakes brinkmanship.	地区贸易繁荣没能让领土和其他纠纷消声甚至缓和； 相反，还激化了地区地缘政治，导致了一系列高风险冒险政策。


Economic interdependence cannot deliver regional stability unless rival states undertake genuine efforts to mend their political relations.	经济上的相互依赖无法带来地区稳定，除非对峙国采取真心实意的措施修复它们之间的政治关系。


The scandals surrounding the top aides to Lee – nicknamed “the Bulldozer” from his career as a construction industry executive – have complicated matters for the ruling Saenuri Party’s candidate, Park Geun-hye, and buoyed the hopes of her leftist rival, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic United Party.	李明博的副手丑闻缠身——作为建筑业主管，他有个“推土机”的绰号——这让执政的新国家党候选人朴槿惠面临复杂的局面，也燃起了她的左翼竞选对手、民主统合党候选人文在寅的希望。


Park is the daughter of former president, General Park Chung-hee, who seized power in a military coup in 1961.	朴槿惠是前总统朴正熙将军之女，朴正熙1961年通过军事政变掌权。


Reining in South Korea’s powerful chaebol (family-run conglomerates) has become a key issue in the presidential election, with even Park favoring tighter control over them, although it was her father’s regime that helped build them with generous government support. Her populist stance on the chaebol suggests that, if elected, she might similarly pander to nationalist sentiment by taking a tough stance against Japan, especially to play down her father’s service in Japan’s military while Korea was under Japanese colonial rule.	驾驭韩国权势财阀已成为总统选举的关键问题，就连朴槿惠也支持加紧控制财阀，尽管后者是在其父政权的慷慨政府支持的帮助下建立起来的。 她在财阀问题上的民粹主义立场表明，当选后她可能会迎合民族主义情绪，对日本采取强硬立场，特别是要淡化其父在日本殖民统治时期为日军卖命的历史。


But, even if Moon becomes president, the new strains in South Korea’s relationship with Japan, owing to the revival of historical issues, may not be easy to mend.	但是，即使文在寅当选总统，韩日关系的新约束因素——拜历史问题死灰复燃所赐——也不会轻而易举地被解决。


Earlier this year, Lee, at the last minute, canceled the scheduled signing of the “General Security of Military Information Agreement” with Japan, which would have established military intelligence-sharing between the two countries, both US allies, for the first time.	今年早些时候，李明博在最后一刻决定不在日韩军事情报安全协定（General Security of Military Information Agreement）上签字，根据该协定，同为美国盟国的日本和韩国将首次建立军事情报共享机制。


Lee also scrapped a bilateral plan to finalize a military-related Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement.	李明博还取消了旨在最后完成与军事相关的物品役务相互提供协定（Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement）的双边计划。


Weeks later, he provocatively visited the contested islets known as the Dokdo Islands in South Korea (which controls them) and the Takeshima Islands in Japan.	几周后，他高调访问争议岛屿竹岛（日本称独岛，由韩国控制）。


China, meanwhile, has cast a long shadow over the Japanese parliamentary elections.	与此同时，中国一直是日本国会选举挥之不去的阴影。


In recent months, China has launched a new war of attrition by sending patrol ships frequently to the waters around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku islands, which China calls Diaoyu.	最近几个月中，中国发动了新消耗战，频繁派遣巡逻舰只前往日本控制的钓鱼岛（日本称尖阁列岛）附近水域。


This physical assertiveness followed often-violent anti-Japanese protests in China in September, while a continuing informal boycott of Japanese goods has led to a sharp fall in Japan’s exports to China, raising the risk of another Japanese recession.	这一实力上的自信在9月份演变成充斥暴力的反日游行，而非官方的抵制日货运动导致日本对中国出口大幅下降，给日本带来了再次衰退的风险。


The DPJ’s 2009 election victory had been expected to lead to a noticeable warming of Japan’s ties with China.	2009年，民主党在日本选举中胜出时，人们预期它能显著加强中日关系。


After all, the DPJ came to power on a promise to balance Japan’s dependence on the US with closer ties with the People’s Republic.	毕竟，民主党上台的承诺之一是加强日本同中华人民共和国的关系，平衡日本对美国的依赖。


But its bridge-building agenda foundered on growing Chinese assertiveness, leading successive DPJ governments to bolster Japan’s security ties with the US.	但这一大桥政策因中国自大情绪的日益膨胀而失败了，��导致后来的民主党政府转而寻求加强日美安全关系。


China’s behavior has fueled a nationalist backlash in Japan, helping to turn hawkish, marginal politicians like Shintaro Ishihara into important mainstream figures.	中国的行为助长了日本国内的民族主义情绪，有助于石原慎太郎等被边缘化了的鹰派重新回到了主流政坛。


Japan may be in economic decline, but it is rising politically.	日本的经济可能在衰落，但其政治正在崛起。


Indeed, Albert del Rosario, the foreign minister of the Philippines, which was under Japanese occupation during WWII, now strongly supports a re-armed Japan as a counterweight to China.	事实上，菲律宾（二战时被日本占领）前外交部长罗萨里奥（Albert del Rosario）如今强烈支持以重新武装的日本制衡中国。


But the resurgence of nationalism in Japan is only fanning Chinese nationalism, creating a vicious circle from which the two countries are finding it difficult to escape.	但日本民族主义的再现只能对中国民族主义起到煽风点火的效果，于是产生了一个两国难以摆脱的恶性循环。


Shinzo Abe of the Liberal Democratic Party, who is likely to become Japan’s next prime minister, has vowed to take a tougher line on Senkaku and other disputes with China.	自民党的安倍晋三很可能成为下一任日本首相，他已承诺将在钓鱼岛问题上和其他对中纠纷中采取更强硬的立场。


More important, the LDP has called for revising Article 9 of Japan’s US-imposed post-1945 constitution, which renounces war.	更重要的是，自民党呼吁重新修订美国设计的1945年日本宪法第九条，即放弃战争权利条款。


The risks posed by increasing nationalism and militarism to regional peace have already been highlighted by the rise of a new Chinese dynasty of “princelings,” or sons of revolutionary heroes who have widespread contacts in the military.	中国“太子党”——开国元勋之后，他们在军方有广泛的人脉——王朝的出现本已为地区和平蒙上了一层阴影，民族主义和军国主义的兴起则是火上浇油。


The real winner from the recent appointment of the conservative-dominated, seven-member Politburo Standing Committee is the PLA, whose rising clout has underpinned China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy.	新一届七人政治局常委中大部分是保守派，这样的结果，真正的赢家是解放军，而解放军军力的增强正是中国对外政策底气的源泉。


In fact, what distinguishes Xi from China’s other civilian leaders is his strong relationship with the PLA.	事实上，习近平和其他中国文职领导人的区别就在于他和解放军的密切关系。


As Xi rose through the Communist Party ranks, he forged close military ties as a reservist, assuming leadership of a provincial garrison and serving as a key aide to a defense minister.	习近平在党内升迁过程中曾在预备役中供职，做过省级军区领导人和国防部长重要助手。


His wife, Peng Liyuan, is also linked to the military, having served as a civilian member of the army’s musical troupe, and carries an honorary rank of general.	其妻彭丽媛也和军队有关系，曾是文工团成员，拥有文职将军军衔。


Against this background, the central challenge for East Asia’s major economies – particularly Japan and South Korea – is to resolve the historical issues that are preventing them from charting a more stable and prosperous future.	在这样的背景下，东亚主要经济体（特别是日本和韩国）的核心挑战是解决妨碍它们走向更稳定、更繁荣未来的历史问题。


As a Russian proverb warns, “Forget the past and lose an eye; dwell on the past and lose both eyes.”	正如俄罗斯谚语所警告的：“忘掉历史，你就瞎了一只眼，沉溺于往事，你会瞎掉一双眼。 ”


New Policy Paradigms for a New World	新世界的新政策范式


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last quarter-century, the global economy enjoyed a remarkable stretch of stable growth and low inflation.	发自华盛顿特区——在过去的1/4个世纪内，全球经济经历了一场持续稳定且低通胀的增长。


The so-called “Great Moderation” lulled many policymakers into a false sense of security about their ability to manage the economy and deal with financial crises.	这场所谓的“大稳定”令许多政策制定者产生了某些错误的安全感，高估了自己管理经济和处理金融危机的能力。


But, as the Great Moderation metastasized into the Great Recession, fatal flaws in conventional thinking came to light.	但当“大稳定”摇身一变成为“大萧条”，那些常规思维的致命弱点就暴露无遗了。


One of the most notable was just how poorly we grasped the linkages between the financial system and the broader economy – as well as the linkages between countries.	而其中最明显的一点就是我们对金融系统和经济大环境之间的联系——以及国家之间的联系——的理解是何等的拙劣。


Today, as policymakers seek new paradigms for managing the economy in 2011 and beyond, a better understanding of these linkages will be essential to promoting economic growth and reducing the risk of crises. Equally important is the realization that by working together, we can build a more successful and more stable global economy, for the benefit of all countries.	时至今日，随着政策制定者们都在寻求一种在2011年及以后进行经济管理的新范式，我们有必要加深对这些联系的理解，并以此促进经济增长并降低危机的风险。


Let me spell out what this means for three policy objectives: building a stronger and safer financial sector, achieving more balanced and more stable growth, and managing large and volatile capital flows.	请让我阐明一下下列三个政策目标的含义：建立一个抗风险能力更强也更安全的金融部门，实现更平衡也更稳定的增长，管理更大规模而且更为快速的资本流动。


A stronger and safer financial system is the bedrock of a successful economy.	抗风险能力更强且更安全的金融系统是一个成功经济的基石。


This requires strong regulation, with a sensible rulebook for financial markets and institutions.	而实现这一点需要强有力的管制，并制定一个针对金融市场和机构运作的合理规则。


And, to ensure that everyone plays by the rules, financial institutions must be supervised intensively.	与此同时，为了确保没个人都能遵守该规定，金融机构必须受到严密监控。


Now, even with the best rules and supervision, crises will still occur – which is why we need effective resolution mechanisms to deal with institutions that get into trouble.	目前，既便有了最完美的规定以及监管，也不一定能杜绝危机的发生——这也是我们为何要设立有效的应对机制来处理那些陷入困境的机构。


And, finally, given powerful interactions within the financial sector and across the broader economy, we need an overarching framework to manage risks in the financial system as a whole.	最后考虑到在金融部门内部以及经济大环境范围内存在的强大相互影响作用，我们需要建立一个总体框架，将金融系统视为一个整体来进行风险管理。


Much has already been done to advance regulatory reform, notably the recent agreement to strengthen bank capital (Basel III).	在推动管制改革方面已经取得了许多成果，其中比较引人注目的就是最近在加强银行资本协议方面达成的协议（巴塞尔III管制协议）。


Yet we are far from having the supervision needed for proper implementation of the rules.	但如果要正确贯彻这些规定的话，这些监管还是远远不够的。


Effective resolution mechanisms and systemic frameworks remain even more elusive.	对有效应对机制和系统框架的探索目前依然处于模糊之中。


Moving to the broader economy, we have learned that growth must be balanced in order to be healthy.	在经济大环境方面，我们已经了解到一个健康的经济首先必须是一个平衡的经济。


At the national level, this requires tools to prevent excesses in one sector from bringing down the entire economy.	在国家层面上来说，这要求具备一些工具以防止某些经济部门的过热最终拖垮整个经济。


At the global level, it requires a better distribution of growth across countries, in order to prevent destabilizing imbalances.	在全球范围上，这要求在各国之间更合理地分配增长以避免出现破坏稳定的不平衡状况。


What are the implications for macroeconomic policy?	那么这对于宏观经济政策又有何启示呢？


Monetary policy needs to look beyond its core focus on low and stable inflation and pay much greater attention to financial stability.	货币政策必须超越自身对低速和稳定通胀的关心，转而对金融稳定给予更多关注。


The debate now is how, exactly, to factor this imperative into monetary policy, and how to coordinate the work of monetary and regulatory authorities.	而目前争论的要点则是究竟如何将这个必要观点注入到货币政策当中去，同时如何协调货币发行部门和监管部门的工作。


For fiscal policy, the crisis showed the value of maintaining low public debt and deficits during good times: countries with healthier public finances have more space to cushion the economic impact of crises.	对于财政政策来说，危机显示出了在好年景时维持低水平公共债务以及低财政赤字的重要性：那些公共财政更为健康的国家有更多的余地去缓冲危机的冲击。


But the Great Recession has caused public debt and deficits in many advanced economies to soar.	但大萧条曾经导致许多发达经济体的公共债务和财政赤字同时飙升。


How quickly fiscal retrenchment should be launched – and the right balance between higher taxes and lower spending – will vary by country, reflecting factors like the strength of the economic recovery, the market’s appetite for debt, and initial spending and revenue ratios.	那么政府应当何时开始精简开支——以及更高税率和更低支出之间的平衡——也必须依据每个国家的不同情况来考虑，比如各国经济恢复的能力，市场对债务的吸收能力，以及最初的支出和收入比率。


But the common objective for fiscal policy must be to support durable medium-term growth and job creation.	而财政政策的共同目标则是维持持续的中期增长以及创造就业。


The distribution of income is another important issue.	收入分配也是另一个重要事务。


In the years leading up to the crisis, inequality rose in many countries, with worrisome consequences for social cohesion.	在逐渐滑向危机的前几年，收入不平等状况在许多国家进一步加剧，并对社会凝聚力带来了一些令人忧心的后果。


Rising inequality may also have increased vulnerability to crisis: with fewer people able to dip into savings during bad times, the impact on growth is even larger.	收入不平等的恶化也将削弱抵抗危机的能力：随着能在坏年景时动用储蓄的人越来越少，对增长的冲击也就越来越大。


Turning to the international dimension, understanding better how policies adopted in one country spill over onto other economies is key.	在国际层面上，关键是要理解一个国家执行的政策是如何溢出到其他国家的。


This approach lies at the heart of the G-20’s efforts to achieve strong, stable, and balanced global growth.	而这一理解方式恰恰就是G20集团试图实现强劲，稳定和平衡全球增长的核心。


The International Monetary Fund is also stepping up its work in this area, through “spillover reports” on China, the euro zone, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.	国际货币基金组织也在这方面加强了工作，并发布了针对中国、欧元区、日本，英国和美国的“政策溢出报告”


Gaining a better appreciation of the financial linkages between countries is also important.	对国家之间的金融联系进行更合理的评估也是非常重要的。


During the crisis, we saw how quickly capital fled from countries previously considered safe bets.	在危机中我们见证了资本是如何迅速从那些原本被认为是安全避风港的国家中流走的。


Today, many of these countries are reeling from a veritable tsunami of returning money.	时至今日，上述国家又都面临着同样海量的回流资金。


Policymakers in many emerging-market countries worry that surging capital inflows will drive up the value of the local currency, destabilize financial markets, and fuel economic overheating.	许多新兴市场国家的政策制定者都担心资本流入的冲击会抬高本地货币的价值，威胁市场稳定并导致经济过热。


Their reactions range from buying up the foreign money to prevent currency appreciation to adopting capital controls, and, in extreme cases, to keeping the money out altogether.	他们的应对策略包括买入外汇以防止本币升值又或者采取资金管制，在某些极端的案例中甚至完全禁止货币流入。


The situation has become quite tense, with talk of “currency wars” and a real risk of financial protectionism.	目前的情况已经非常紧张，���杂着对所谓“货币战争”的讨论以及金融保护主义的真实风险。


Clearly, we need to get a better handle on what is driving these capital inflows.	显然，我们需要更好地应对这些资本流的背后驱动因素。


We also need to identify the best policies for dealing with them – keeping in mind the impact of these policies on the global economy as a whole.	我们同样也需要定义究竟什么样的政策才是最好的应对政策——请记住要将全球经济是为一个整体来评估这些政策的影响。


And we should explore whether a system of global rules aimed at reducing the volatility of capital flows would be useful.	同时我们也应当仔细研究一个旨在减少资本流动速度的全球管制系统是否有效。


Global financial insurance is an important related issue.	全球金融保险是一个重要的相关事务。


Just as a family backstops its savings with insurance, countries should be able to tap into a global financial safety net.	就像普通家庭用保险来加强储蓄那样，各个国家也应当加入到一个全球金融安全网之中。


Much has already been achieved since the crisis, through more resources for the IMF and new financing instruments.	危机爆发之后世界货币基金组织和其他金融机构都得到了大量的资源，并在这方面已经做了大量工作。


But more is needed, and the Fund is exploring cooperation with regional financing mechanisms, as well as new ways to use its instruments in a systemic crisis.	但这还远远不够，基金组织也在寻求与区域性金融机制的协调合作，以及在一场系统性位置中应用其政策工具的新方法。


Let me tie all of this together.	请让我将上述几点全部综合起来。


One principal policy failure in the run-up to the crisis was a lack of imagination: we failed to appreciate just how intricate the global economic and financial web had become.	其实最终导致危机的一个重要政策失误就是我们缺乏想象力：我们无法明白全球经济和金融网络究竟复杂到了何种程度。


Let our next failing not be the result of a lack of cooperation.	但愿我们的下一次失误不是因为缺乏协调合作而导致。


We must reach across old dividing lines – both within economies and between them – and work together to build a stronger, more resilient global economy.	我们必须跨越旧有的分界线——不管是经济体内部还是之间的——并共同合作去建立一个更强健，复原能力更强的世界经济。


At the same time, fiscal policy has been constrained in some countries by high deficits and debts (which jeopardize market access), and in others (the eurozone, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for example) by a political backlash against further fiscal stimulus, leading to austerity measures that undermine short-term growth.	与此同时，一些国家的财政政策囿于高赤字和债务（这意味着难以进入市场），还有一些国家（比如欧元区、英国和美国）则囿于反对进一步财政刺激的政治阻力，这导致了破坏短期��长的紧缩措施。


New Refugee Homelands	新难民家园


WASHINGTON, DC – Countries across Europe and states across the United States are debating the danger of admitting more refugees from Syria or, indeed, any majority Muslim country where Al Qaeda or Islamic State (ISIS) members or sympathizers could slip in with their families.	华盛顿—欧洲各国和美国各州都在争论一件事：接受来自叙利亚——或者事实上，来自任何穆斯林占多数的国家的移民的危险性。 基地组织或伊斯兰国成员或同情者可能随着他们的家庭一起到来。


This debate misses the point in two important ways.	从两个方面看，这场争论根本没有找准要点。


First, no evidence yet exists that any of the Paris attackers actually came from Syria as refugees.	首先，没有证据表明任何一位巴黎袭击者真的是来自叙利亚的难民。


The Syrian passport found near the body of one attacker appears to have been stolen.	在一位袭击者尸体附近找到的叙利亚护照似乎是被盗的。


The attackers that the police have identified grew up in Belgium or France.	警察所辨认的袭击者在比利时或法国长大。


They are radicalized citizens, not fleeing foreigners.	他们是激进公民，而不是流窜的外国人。


Second, the world now has 60 million refugees.	其次，如今全世界有6,000万难民。


That is a number roughly the size of six Belgiums, Hungarys, or Swedens.	这一数字相当于六个比利时、匈牙利或瑞典。


If they were to create their own country, it would be the size of France.	如果他们建立自己的国家，其规模与法国相当。


In the face of such staggering numbers, commitments to take thousands or even tens of thousands of people will do almost nothing to alleviate the misery of millions.	面临如此庞大的数字，收留几千乃至几万难民的承诺对于减轻数百万人的痛苦来说只是杯水车薪。


Rather than conflating the issues of refugees and terrorism, politicians and policymakers should be addressing each separately.	政客和决策者不应该难民问题和恐怖主义问题混在一起，而应该各个击破。


On the question of refugees, Western countries should take in as many as their populations can assimilate, demonstrating a willingness to make good on the universal values they profess for both moral and political reasons.	在难民问题上，西方国家应该根据消化能力尽可能多地接收难民，证明它们愿意基于它们出于道德和政治原因所标榜的普世价值行善。


But the world also needs far bolder solutions than twentieth-century approaches like limited asylum quotas and “temporary” refugee camps.	但世界也需要比二十世纪的方法——如有限庇护配额和“临时”难民营——更果断的解决方案。


In particular, it is time to embrace the prospect not of camps but of cities – places where up to a million refugees of any particular nationality can live safely and learn how to build a better future.	特别是，应该直面难民“城”而非难民“营”的形势——为来自任何国籍的上百万难民提供能够安全生活、学习如何营建更美好未来的场所。


The National Democratic Institute has begun to reimagine refugee camps and camps for internally displaced persons as places where citizens can “find their voice” as voters and participants in democratic processes.	国家民主研究所（National Democratic Institute）已开始重新构思难民营和国内流民收容营，将它们视为公民能够作为选民和民主过程参与者“发出自己的声音”的场所。


Rather than remaining concentrations of desperate, dispossessed, and vulnerable people waiting for a day of return that may never come, refugee settlements should be fundamentally reconceived – as hubs of education, enterprise, and equal rights that can anchor networks of relatives and friends that extend back home and around the world.	难民定居点不应该仍然集中着等待亚旭永远不会到来的回家之日的绝望、失产、脆弱人群，而应该从根本上进行改造——成为教育、企业和平等权利的枢纽，成为难民祖国国内和全世界亲朋好友网络的“锚”。


Individuals seeking refuge from a toxic and deadly environment could be welcomed not into camps, but rather proto-cities where the “global community,” represented by international institutions, NGOs, governments, and citizens, can encourage hope of a different, more secure life by nurturing positive seeds of knowledge, capital, and liberal self-government.	因为糟糕且致命的环境而寻求避难的个人不应该在难民营中受到欢迎，他们应该被纳入原型城市中，在那里，国际机构、非政府组织、政府和公民所代表的“全球社会”可以通过培养知识、资本和自由自治政府的积极的种子刺激对不同的、更安全的生活的希望。


Impossible?	听上去不可能？


The Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawaris is currently negotiating with the owners of two Greek islands a plan to resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees and put them to work building homes and infrastructure.	埃及亿万富翁纳古伊布·沙瓦里斯（Naguib Sawaris）最近正在与两个希腊岛屿的所有者商谈一个计划，他准备重新安置数十万难民，让他们从事建设房屋和基础设施的工作。


If multi-millionaires already can buy an island as a vacation destination – through, for example, the website Private Islands Online – why not buy them as a destination for hundreds of thousands of displaced people who could then build the infrastructure necessary for a new life?	既然亿万富翁可以购买到与用来度假——比如通过Private Islands Online网站交易——为何不将这些岛屿用作数十万流民的目的地，让他们在那里建设新生活所需要的基础设施？


And why shouldn’t international organizations do the same?	为何国际组织不这么做？


Alternatively, neighboring countries could take the opportunity, with enough international assistance, to build cities that would be valuable centers of commerce and education for their own people.	或者，周边国家可以利用这一机会，在足够的国际援助的帮助下为本国人民建立能够作为无价的商业和教育中心的城市。


After all, China is pursuing precisely this strategy, building cities for millions of people to create nodes of economic and social activity across the countryside.	毕竟，中国所实施的正是这一战略，为数百万人建设城市，构建全国农村经济和社会活动的节点。


This approach would enable all countries to be better prepared for and resilient to the continuing flows of millions of miserable and ultimately angry people.	这一方法将让所有国家都能更好地为数百万蒙受痛���并出离愤怒的难民的持续流动做好准备，游刃有余地面对。


Today’s refugee camps are often breeding grounds for terrorism, revenge fantasies, and armed insurgency.	今天的难民营常常是恐怖主义、复仇幻想和武装叛乱的温床。


By contrast, cities of stateless people under the protection of international organizations could provide their citizens with the tools for a better life.	相反，获得国际组织保护的流民城市能够为其人民提供创造更好的生活的工具。


At the same time, we know far more about the radicalized Western citizens fighting for ISIS than most media reports suggest.	与此同时，我们所了解的激进西方公民为伊斯兰国而战的情况远比大部分媒体所报道的要多。


New America, the think tank I head, has compiled a database on 466 individuals from 25 Western countries who have left their homes to go to Syria.	由我主持的智库新美国（New America）建立了一个数据库，共发现来自25个西方国家的466名个人离开家乡来到叙利亚。


Last week, researchers Peter Bergen, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman released ISIS In The West: The New Faces of Extremism, in which a distinct profile of many of these individuals emerges.	上周，研究者彼得·卑尔根（Peter Bergen）、考特尼·舒斯特（Courtney Schuster）和大卫·斯特尔曼（David Sterman）发表了《西方的伊斯兰国：极端主义新面孔》（ISIS In The West: The New Faces of Extremism），其中清楚地描述了许多这类个人。


Perhaps most important, the majority are linked by family ties to other jihadists.	也许最重要的是，大多数人通过家庭关系与其他圣战者联系在一起。


Recent reports on Brussels’ Molenbeek municipality as a major incubator of ISIS and Al Qaeda supporters suggest that family and community ties are both important.	最新报道显示，布鲁塞尔莫伦比克（Molenbeek）自治市已成为伊斯兰国和基地组织支持者的主要据点，这表明家庭和社区关系都很重要。


“Hotspot mosques” have long been in the sights of counter-terrorist researchers and police task forces.	“热点清真寺”（hotspot mosques）很早以前便已进入了反恐研究者和警察的视野。


Charting these families, mosques, and suburbs reveals networks that look just like disease maps, tracking the spread of a microbe as it travels along routes where it can infect others.	勾勒这些家庭、清真寺和郊区的图景，我们看到的是类似于疾病地图的网络。 疾病地图追踪微生物在其可传染的人群中的传播轨迹。


Applying epidemiological techniques to finding, isolating, and disrupting the transmission of violence and the radical ideologies that breed it has already proved successful in the US context.	应用流行病学方法寻找、隔离和瓦解暴力及其背后的激进思想的传播已经在美国获得了成功。


For example, the organization Cure Violence works with urban gangs and treats violence “like an epidemic,” preventing it by “stopping it at its source.”	比如，解决暴力（Cure Violence）组织和城市黑帮合作，“像治疗传染病”一样治疗暴力，通过“将其扼杀在萌芽状态”预防暴力。


The ideological source of jihadist terrorism may ultimately be in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Mali, but the source of foot soldiers in the West is communities containing radically alienated youth.	圣战极端主义的思想根源也许最终源于叙利亚、伊拉克、阿富汗或马里，但其西方战士的来源是激进疏离年轻人所在的社区。


Frightened populations can all too easily summon images of radical refugees slipping across borders intent on wreaking mayhem.	恐慌的人群极易招致一种形象：他们是激进的难民，跨越边境就是为了制造混乱。


The realities for both refugees and terrorists are considerably more complicated.	难民和恐怖分子的现实都要复杂得多。


Fortunately, taking the time to study the facts in both cases can yield promising new paths to longer-term solutions that balance security and humanity.	幸运的是，花时间研究难民和恐怖分子能够带来新的希望之路，通向实现安全和人道平衡的长期解决方案。


New Rules for Finance At Last	金融新规则终于到来


PARIS – The World Monetary and Economic Conference took place in London 76 years ago, in June 1933, with 66 countries meeting to put an end to the unfolding monetary disorder and trade wars while trying to draw the lessons of the Great Depression.	巴黎报道——76年前的1933年6月，世界货币与经济会议在伦敦举行，与会的66个国家的首脑齐心协力地商讨着如何终结如火如荼的货币失调与贸易战争，并同时总结着大萧条给人的教训。


When it was over, the negotiators admitted failure.	会议结束之时，协商也以失败告终。


On April 2, 2009, world leaders will head to London again to find a solution to a financial and economic crisis as dire as that of 1929.	2009年4月2日，世界首脑们将再次前往伦敦为金融与经济危机寻找解决之道，而这次危机的可怕程度堪比1929年的那次。


We cannot let history repeat itself.	我们无法让历史再次重演。


If collective inaction prevails, we risk a return to the political and economic woes of the 1930’s, which paved the way to a devastating world conflict.	如果各国对危机都无动于衷，那么我们就面临危险，即重返20世纪30年代大萧条时的政治与经济的悲哀，那次危机最终让世界陷入一种毁灭性的冲突之中。


Of course, we must respond to both the weakening economy and financial instability in a virtual state of emergency.	当然，我们必须采取以近乎于处理紧急事件的姿态来同时对衰退的经济与金融市场的动荡进行回应。


This is why stimulus packages and financial rescue plans were for the first time adopted concomitantly in Europe, the United States, and some large Asian countries.	这也是刺激措施与金融拯救计划在欧洲、美国与亚洲的一些大国在第一时间被相继采纳的原因。


At the G-20 finance ministers meeting on March 14, all of our countries did their best and made massive efforts to repair their economic machinery as fast as possible.	3月14日举行了20国财长会议，所有国家都以尽可能迅猛的速度尽全力与超强的努力对其经济体系进行了修整。


The policies chosen are different, but all states favor solutions that seem most appropriate to them.	尽管采取的政策不尽相同，但所有国家都采用了最适应本国国情的解决方式。


All are daring and realistic regarding the tasks that await us.	这些国家都以大胆与适应现实的方式应对着这些需要我们去解决的难题。


Like its partners, France has launched significant stimulus measures, with a plan announced by President Nicolas Sarkozy last December, as well as public investments and early repayment of government debt.	法国同它的盟友国们一样，启动了意义重大的刺激措施，加之总统尼古拉斯·萨科奇在去年12月宣布的一项计划，并启动了公共项目的投资以及政府债务的提前偿还。


If we also take into account the strengthening of social services and legal policies launched last month, France’s stimulus in 2009 totals more than 2% of its GDP, with committed future outflows equaling the US.	如果我们考虑到上个月开启的加强社会事业服务与法律政策的话，那么法国在2009年的刺激措施总值就超过了国内生产总值的2%，且承诺未来的资本投入与美国持平。


Moreover, the impact of automatic stabilizers – which enable the government to mobilize more or less fiscal resources, depending on economic conditions – is more powerful in Western Europe than in most of the Anglo-Saxon countries.	此外，社会经济的自动稳定性（依照经济的状态，能让政府多少地动员财政资源）在西欧的影响力比英联邦的多数国家的影响力要大得多。


Yet America’s macroeconomic situation seems worse than Europe’s in terms of consumption, banking, or employment and housing markets.	然而，在提到消费、银行，或就业与房地产市场方面，美国的宏观经济调控的状态比欧洲的要糟糕得多。


But, as both Sarkozy and US President Barack Obama have insisted, we must go further.	但是，正如萨科奇与美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马坚持说道的那样，我们必须走得更远。


Economic stimulus will work efficiently only if confidence is restored.	只有在社会恢复信心之后，国家采取的经济刺激措施才能获得成效。


And confidence can be restored only if the financial system is fully overhauled.	而社会恢复信心则必须金融系统得到全面的整修。


We obviously need to strike at the root of the problem, which requires us to redefine the basic principles of the system.	很明显，我们需要摧毁问题的根本所在，这样则要求我们来重新定义金融系统的基本准则。


It would be counterproductive to focus on treating the symptoms, only to realize later that the unprecedented budgets for structural policies are neither economically efficient nor politically acceptable.	将精力放在诊断问题上将得到事倍功半的效果，这样只能让我们今后意识到一个道理，即为进行体系方针改革而投入的空前预算既不能在经济上收益，在政治上也无法执行。


At the Washington Summit last November, the EU suggested a basic principle: all markets, all territories, and all actors putting the global financial system at risk should be monitored.	在去年11月举行的华盛顿峰会上，欧盟提议了一个基本准则，即所有市场、所有区域与所有让全球金融体系陷入危险的行动人都应该被监视。


This principle, to which all agreed, must be enforced even if it upsets old habits and comfortable incomes.	受到与会国家的一致赞同的准则在任何情况下都需要强制执行，即使是它对传统习惯与收入丰盛的地区造成扰乱时也要执行。


I am especially convinced that we must closely monitor actors in financial markets such as hedge funds.	会议上提到的一点，我是非常信服的，那就是我们必须密切监视金融市场上的活动因素，比如对冲基金。


Although hedge funds sometimes account for 50% of market transactions, they are not registered or subject to rules on transparency.	尽管对冲基金有时构成了市场交易的50%份额，但它们都未经正式鉴定��或不符合市场透明度法则。


This is not sustainable.	这不利于经济的可持续发展。


Fighting for transparency also implies confronting states that refuse to collaborate on financial issues at a global level or to combat money laundering or prevent financial risks.	为市场透明度而争斗同样意味着，对于那么拒绝在全球范围内在金融事务上合作或拒绝打击洗黑钱或预防金融危险的国家，要实行抵制。


We cannot build a safer system if we do not raise global requirements and if we tolerate non-compliance with the rules.	如果我们让世界各国都有这种需要，如果我们对不符合法则的做法采取容忍的态度，那么我们就无法建立起更为安全的金融系统。


Together with Germany, France intends to draw up a list of uncooperative countries and to design a tool kit of appropriate sanctions.	法国会与德国一起，将打算草拟一份拒绝合作的国家清单，并筹划对它们采取适当的制裁手段。


New auditing standards must reflect an overhauled financial architecture that focuses on transparency.	新的审计准则必须反映出经过整修且重视市场透明度的金融体系结构。


The aim of such standards must be to attenuate the impact of financial failure, not amplify it, as has occurred in the crisis.	这些准则的目的必须是为了削弱金融衰退的影响力，而不是扩大这种影响力，就像危机中所出现的那样。


Indeed, the rating agencies, whose malfunctions contributed to the crisis, must be regulated.	的确，职能不当而导致危机的评级机构必须进行调整。


We demand an easy policy: stricter rules (especially when fighting conflicts of interest), a specific rating scale for complex products, and regular publication of their returns.	我们要求实行一项简单的措施：为复杂的产品执行更为严厉的规定（特别是在对抗利益冲突时），与特定的评级范围，并固定时间公布利润情况。


Europe followed this path when preparing, under the recent French presidency, a European regulation that will soon be adopted.	在最近法国担任欧盟轮值国时，欧洲在准备一项将很快被采纳的欧洲规章制度时就遵循了这种方式。


We expect all of our partners to do the same.	我们期待所有的盟友们都能这样做。


Responsibility must be put back at the heart of a system that has sunk into excess.	在一个陷入过度挥霍的体系当中，责任必须放在第一位。


The methods used to pay market operators reflected our collective mistakes.	给市场操盘手发放薪水的方法反映出了我们所共同犯下的错误。


We yielded to short-term incentives, and everything seemed to conspire to push us to accepting excessive risks.	我们过于关注短期的刺激因素，而所有的事务都似乎在促使我们接受过多的危险。


We must revise compensation schemes and delay bonus payments until the long-term profitability of a firm’s investments is known.	我们必须重新修正补偿方案，并推迟奖金的发放，知道公司投资的长远利益已得到回报。


Finally, we must express our solidarity for emerging and poor countries.	最后，我们必须对新兴国家与贫穷国家表达我们的团结力量。


Weakened by this crisis, they are the first to suffer from the cuts in financial flows.	在这次金融危机的打击下，它们是首先受金融交易影响的国家。


The international financial institutions must support them massively, and also have the resources needed to foresee global unbalances and prevent crises, rather than respond only when events become urgent.	国际金融机构必须大力地去支持它们，同样需要调用必须的资源来预示全球的金融失衡并预防危机，而不是当事态严重是才给予回应。


France and its European partners, in particular Germany, with which we worked in tight collaboration, will suggest all these points to the G-20.	法国与欧洲盟友们，特别是我们有着紧密协作的德国将在20国首脑会议中提到上述所有这些要点。


Indeed, just as a national fiscal stimulus is less efficient than a coordinated effort, strengthening financial regulations without combating the laxity that prevails elsewhere makes no sense in a globalized world.	诚然，正如国家财政刺激的效果比不上共同协作那样，不去解决到处蔓延的经济松弛状态就强调加强金融法则对于全球化的世界将是毫无意义的。


We should not delude ourselves; we cannot solve all the problems of this crisis in the coming days.	我们不该再蛊惑自己：我们在今后的日子里无法解决这次危机中的所有问题。


We must, however, reach several objectives and give clear signs of a true collective ambition.	然而，我们必须达到好几个目标，并清楚地传达共同努力的真正力量。


History has shown how risky it is to miss some opportunities.	历史已经向我们表明，错过机会是多么危险的事情。


On April 2, France and Europe will be present.	2009年4月2日，法国与欧洲国家将在峰会相见。


New Rules for Hot Money	怎么对付热钱？


NEW YORK – Capital flows to emerging-market economies have been on a boom-bust merry-go-round for decades.	纽约——几十年来，流入新兴市场经济体的资本潮起潮落，循环往复。


In the past year, the world has seen another boom, with a tsunami of capital, portfolio equity, and fixed-income investments surging into emerging-market countries perceived as having strong macroeconomic, policy, and financial fundamentals.	去年一场资本海啸又激起一轮高潮，股权投资和固定收益投资资金争先恐后涌入新兴市场，因为觉得那里的宏观经济、政策与金融基本面依然强劲。


Such inflows are driven in part by short-term cyclical factors (interest-rate differentials and a wall of liquidity chasing higher-yielding assets as zero policy rates and more quantitative easing reduce opportunities in the sluggish advanced economies). But longer-term secular factors also play a role.	这一轮资本流入一方面是受短期性、周期性因素的影响，（比如利率差，再比如复苏迟缓的发达经济体维持零利率且屡屡搞量化宽松，减少了资金的获利机会等等），但一些长期性、历史性因素的作用也不容忽视。


These include emerging markets’ long-term growth differentials relative to advanced economies; investors’ greater willingness to diversify beyond their home markets; and the expectation of long-term nominal and real appreciation of emerging-market currencies.	这些长期性的因素包括：新兴市场相对于发达经济体而言的长期性增速优势、投资者向海外市场分散资金的更强意愿以及新兴市场货币的名义与实际汇率长期升值的预期等。


Given all this, the most critical policy question in emerging markets today is how to respond to inflows that will inevitably drive up their exchange rates and threaten export-led growth.	有鉴于此，新兴市场眼下最严峻的政策考验就是，如何应对资本流入及其效应，即本币升值与出口受挫。


The first option is to do nothing and allow the currency to appreciate.	第一种办法是置之不理，任由本币升值。


This may be the right response if the inflows and upward pressure on the exchange rate are driven by fundamental factors (a current-account surplus, an undervalued currency, a large and persistent growth differential).	如果资本流入和汇率升值压力的原动力的确是经济基本面（经常项目盈余、本币低估、较大且持续的增速差距等等），这种对策兴许不坏。


But, in many cases, inflows are driven by short-term factors, fads, and irrational exuberance, which can lead to an overvalued currency, the crowding out of non-traditional export sectors or import-competing sectors, a loss of competitiveness, and eventually a large current-account deficit and thus tighter external constraints on growth.	但在许多情况下，驱动资本流入的是短期因素、市场狂热和非理性繁荣。 它们会导致货币高估，非传统出口行业（non-traditional export sectors）和进口竞争型行业（import-competing sectors）被挤出，出口竞争力丧失，最终导致经常项目下的大赤字，使得经济增长面临更严峻的外部制约。


This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the world’s biggest exporter, China, is aggressively intervening to minimize any appreciation of the renminbi.	有一件事使这个问题变得更严重了。 世界第一大出口国中国正在强力地干预汇率，尽可能弱化人民币升值势头。


If China doesn’t allow the renminbi to strengthen, other emerging markets will remain wary of letting their currencies appreciate too much and lose competitiveness.	只要中国不允许人民币走强，其他新兴市场经济体也将保持警惕，不让其本币过多升值，以免丧失出口竞争力。


If allowing a currency to appreciate freely is costly, the second option is unsterilized foreign-exchange intervention.	如果允许本币自由升值意味着高昂代价，那么第二种办法是非冲销式外汇干预（unsterilized foreign exchange intervention）。


This is effective in stemming upward exchange-rate pressure, but it feeds the beast: it exacerbates overheating in already fast-growing emerging markets, causing inflation and leading to excessive credit growth, which can fuel dangerous asset bubbles.	这一措施在抵消汇率升值压力方面很有效，但它也是养虎为患：它会令本已处于快速增长中的新兴市场出现严重的经济过热，加剧通货膨胀、促使信贷过度增长从而酝酿资产泡沫危险。


The third option is sterilized intervention.	第三种办法是冲销式干预。


This prevents monetary and credit growth, but, by keeping interest-rate differentials high, sterilized intervention feeds carry-trade inflows, thus contributing to the problem that it was supposed to solve.	这一措施不会导致货币量和信贷增长，但它会维持相对于低利率国家的高利率差，从而加剧与套息交易（carry trade）相关的资本流入，结果是抱薪救火。


The fourth option is to impose capital controls on inflows (or liberalize controls on outflows).  Leaving aside the issue of whether or not such controls are “leaky,” evidence suggests that controls on inflows of short-term “hot money” do not affect the overall amount of capital inflows.	第四种办法是对资本流入加强管制（或对资本流出放松管制）。 姑且不论此类管制是不是漏洞百出，有证据显示，对短期“热钱”流入实施的管制措施并不能影响总体的资本流入量。


Thus, such controls are ineffective in reducing short-term cyclical pressure on the currency to appreciate.	所以，此类管制在减小本币升值的短期周期性压力方面没有用处。


The fifth option is to tighten fiscal policy and reduce budget deficits with the aim of lowering the high interest rates that drive the inflows.	第五种办法是收紧财政政策、削减预算赤字，从而降低利率，减弱对资本流的吸引力。


But sounder fiscal policy might lead to even higher inflows as the country’s external balance and sovereign-risk outlook improve.	但是巩固的财���政策会强化该国的对外收支状况，改善主权风险评级，进而吸引更多的资本流入。


A sixth option – especially where a country has carried out partially sterilized intervention to prevent excessive currency appreciation – is to reduce the risk of credit and asset bubbles by imposing prudential supervision of the financial system.	第六种办法，加强金融体系监管，将会减小信贷和资产泡沫风险，尤其是配上旨在防止本币过度升值的局部冲销式干预以后。


This should be aimed at restraining excessive credit growth, which the monetary growth that follows currency intervention would otherwise cause.	这种监管的目标是节制信贷的过度增长，而这种过度增长是货币干预引起货币增长之后的自然后果。


However, direct controls on credit growth, while necessary, are often leaky and not very binding in practice.	尽管这种办法似乎可行，但是对信贷的直接管理往往是存在许多漏洞的，在实践上的效果不佳。


The final option is massive, large-scale, and permanent sterilized intervention – or, equivalently, the use of sovereign wealth funds or other fiscal-stabilization mechanisms – to accumulate the foreign assets needed to compensate for the effects on the currency’s value brought about by long-term inflows.	最后一种办法是采取大规模、大范围和持久的冲销式干预，或者换句话说，运用主权财富基金或其他财政稳定机制，去累积外币资产，以抵消资本长期流入对本币币值的影响。


The argument for this option is that long-term secular factors are important drivers of capital inflows, as advanced-economy investors discover that they are underweight in emerging-market assets and reduce their portfolios’ “home bias.”	支持这一办法的论据是，长期性、历史性因素是资本流入的重要驱动力，也就是说，发达经济体的投资者发现自己的资产组合中新兴市场资产比重过低，从而采取矫正举措。


Sterilized intervention usually doesn’t work: if assets in advanced economies and emerging markets remain perfectly substitutable, inflows will continue as long as interest-rate differentials persist.	冲销式干预本来是不会奏效的：假如发达经济体和新兴市场两边的资产是相互可以完全替代的，那么利率差维持多久，资本流入就会维持多久。


But the demand for emerging-market assets is neither infinite nor perfectly substitutable for the assets of advanced economies – even for given interest-rate differentials – because these assets have very different liquidity and credit risks.	但是，对新兴市场资产的需求不是无限的，它们同发达经济体资产也并非可以完全替代——即便存在利率差。 因为两种资产的流动性和信贷风险不可同日而语。


This means that at some point large-scale, persistent sterilized foreign-exchange intervention – amounting to several percentage points of GDP – would satisfy the additional demand for emerging-market assets and stop the inflows, even if interest-rate differentials remain.	这就意味着，在某些时间节点上，大规模的持续冲销式外汇干预（相当于GDP的几个百分点）将可以满足市场上对新兴市场资产的需求，从而使资本流入停止，哪怕利率差仍然存在。


As sterilization induces issuance of domestic assets, global investors’ desire for diversification would be met without causing excessive currency appreciation, with all its collateral damage, in emerging markets.	冲销过程就是国内资产对外发行的过程，它既可以满足全球投资者分散资产的需求，又不会导致本币过度升值，从而对新兴市场造成一系列打击。


Of course, currency appreciation should not be prevented altogether.	当然，也不应该把本币升值完全压死。


When justified by economic fundamentals, the exchange rate should be allowed to rise gradually.	如果有经济基本面的支撑，应允许本币汇率缓慢升值。


But when a currency’s appreciation is triggered by capital inflows that represent the asset-diversification preferences of advanced-economy investors, it can and should be resisted.	但如果升值的驱动力是由发达经济体投资者的资产分散偏好所促发的资本流入，那它就理应也可以得到抵制。


New Rules for the Global Economy	全球经济新规则


CAMBRIDGE – Suppose that the world’s leading policymakers were to meet again in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to design a new global economic order.	坎布里奇——假设全球主要决策者要在新罕布什尔州的布雷德森林集会，设计崭新的全球经济规则。


They would naturally be preoccupied with today’s problems: the eurozone crisis, global recovery, financial regulation, international macroeconomic imbalances, and so on.	当前的欧元区危机、全球复苏、金融监管、国际宏观经济失衡等诸多问题自然会成为他们的主要关注。


But addressing these issues would require the assembled leaders to rise above them and consider the soundness of global economic arrangements overall.	但解决这些问题需要与会领导人超越自身利益，从全球经济规则是否健全的角度对问题进行思考。


Here are seven commonsense principles of global economic governance that they might agree on.	下面是可能达成一致的全球经济规划七点常识性的原则。


(I discuss them in more detail in my new book, The Globalization Paradox.)	（我在新作《全球化悖论》中对这些原则进行了更深入的探讨）。


1.	1.


Markets must be deeply embedded in systems of governance.	市场必须与执行体系实现深度的融合。


The idea that markets are self-regulating received a mortal blow in the recent financial crisis and should be buried once and for all.	市场能自我调整的理念在不久前的金融危机中遭受了致命的打击，以此为基础的制度应当被彻底埋葬。


Markets require other social institutions to support them. They rely on courts, legal frameworks, and regulators to set and enforce rules.	市场需要得到其他社会制度的支持，需要法院、司法框架和监管机构来制定和执行规则。


They depend on the stabilizing functions that central banks and countercyclical fiscal policy provide. They need the political buy-in that redistributive taxation, safety nets, and social insurance help generate.	市场需要央行及反周期财政政策所发挥的稳定作用，需要调节性税收、安全网络和社会保险所赋予的政治支撑。


And all of this is true of global markets as well.	上述规则在全球市场同样适用。


2.	2.


For the foreseeable future, democratic governance is likely to be organized largely within national political communities.	在可以预见的未来，民主执政很可能主要在国家政治团体中发挥作用。


The nation state lives, if not entirely well, and remains essentially the only game in town.	即使结果不尽如人意，民族国家也会继续生存下去，而且成为实质上唯一的游戏规则。


The quest for global governance is a fool’s errand.	探索全球治理只是徒劳的奔波。


National governments are unlikely to cede significant control to transnational institutions, and harmonizing rules would not benefit societies with diverse needs and preferences.	国家政府不可能将控制权拱手让给跨国机构，而整齐划一的规则也无法适应多样的社会偏好和需求。


The European Union may be the sole exception to this axiom, though its current crisis tends to prove the point.	欧盟或许是之前唯一的例外，但它目前经历的危机似乎证明了这条法则。


Too often we waste international cooperation on overly ambitious goals, ultimately producing weak results that are the lowest common denominator among major states.	我们经常将国际合作浪费在不切实际的目标上，最终却只在主要国家间获得最微不足道的成果。


When international cooperation does “succeed,” it spawns rules that are either toothless or reflect the preferences of only the more powerful states.	即便国际合作真的“成功”，由此产生的规则要么不起作用，要么只反应大国的需求。


The Basle rules on capital requirements and the World Trade Organization’s rules on subsidies, intellectual property, and investment measures typify this kind of overreaching.	资本要求领域的巴塞尔规则和世贸组织的补贴、知识产权和投资策略规定最能反应此类越俎代庖。


We can enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of globalization by supporting rather than crippling democratic procedures at home.	支持而非损害国内民主制度可以令全球化的效率及合法性得到增强。


3.	3.


Pluralist prosperity.	多元繁荣。


Acknowledging that the core institutional infrastructure of the global economy must be built at the national level frees countries to develop the institutions that suit them best.	承认全球经济的核心制度基础必须存在于国家层面让各国得以放手发展最适合自己的制度。


The United States, Europe, and Japan have produced comparable amounts of wealth over the long term. Yet their labor markets, corporate governance, antitrust rules, social protection, and financial systems differ considerably, with a succession of these “models” – a different one each decade – anointed the great success to be emulated.	美国、欧洲和日本长期以来创造的财富具有可比性，但他们在劳动力市场、企业治理、反垄断规则、社会保障和金融体系方面的差异都非常显著，每十年更迭的国家典范为后世树立起模仿的榜样。


The most successful societies of the future will leave room for experimentation and allow for further evolution of institutions.	未来的成功社会需要留下实验的空间，为机构开辟进一步发展的余地。


A global economy that recognizes the need for and value of institutional diversity would foster rather than stifle such experimentation and evolution.	认识到制度多样化需求和价值的全球经济不仅不会扼杀实验和发展的空间，相反会起到促进作用。


4.	4.


Countries have the right to protect their own regulations and institutions.	各国有权保护自身的法律和制度。


The previous principles may seem innocuous.	上述原则看似并无恶意。


But they carry powerful implications that clash with the received wisdom of globalization’s advocates. One such implication is the right of individual countries to safeguard their domestic institutional choices.	但其深层内涵却与全球化倡导者的普遍信念相背离，其中之一是各国捍卫其国内制度选择的权利。


Recognition of institutional diversity would be meaningless if countries did not have the instruments available to shape and maintain – in a word, “protect” – their own institutions.	如果国家没有建立和保持（一言以蔽之，“保护”）其自身制度的方法，对制度多样性的认可就毫无意义。


We should therefore accept that countries may uphold national rules – tax policies, financial regulations, labor standards, or consumer health and safety rules – and may do so by raising barriers at the border if necessary, when trade demonstrably threatens domestic practices enjoying broad popular support.	因此应当承认各国有权维护税收政策、金融法规、劳动力标准、或消费者健康及安全规则等国家法律，并且有权在贸易显著威胁到广受公众支持的国内惯例的时候，在必要时设立过境屏障。


If globalization’s boosters are right, the clamor for protection will fail for lack of evidence or support.	如果全球化倡导者是对的，那么保护要求就会因缺乏证据或支持而无法通过。


If wrong, there will be a safety valve in place to ensure that contending values – the benefits of open economies versus the gains from upholding domestic regulations – both receive a proper hearing in public debates.	如果相反，那么必须设立疏导机制，确保开放经济和捍卫国��法律这两种矛盾的价值观都能在公众讨论中占据应有的位置。


5.	5.


Countries have no right to impose their institutions on others.	各国无权向别国强加自身的制度选择。


Using restrictions on cross-border trade or finance to uphold values and regulations at home must be distinguished from using them to impose these values and regulations on other countries.	必须严格区分利用跨境贸易和融资限制捍卫国内法律价值观及将自身法律和价值观强加给别国的政策。


Globalization’s rules should not force Americans or Europeans to consume goods that are produced in ways that most citizens in those countries find unacceptable. But nor should they allow the US or the EU to use trade sanctions or other pressure to alter foreign countries’ labor-market rules, environmental policies, or financial regulations.	全球化规则不能迫使美国和欧洲人消费以无法被本国大多民众所接受的方式生产的商品，但他们也不能听任美国或欧洲利用贸易制裁或其他压力试图改变外国的劳动力市场规则、环境或金融政策。


Countries have a right to difference, not to imposed convergence.	各国有权利各行其是，而不是被迫做出整齐划一的选择。


6.	6.


International economic arrangements must establish rules for managing interaction among national institutions.	国际经济秩序必须建立起对国家制度相互影响进行管理的规则。


Relying on nation states to provide the essential governance functions of the world economy does not mean that we should abandon international rules.	由民族国家进行世界经济职能的核心治理并不意味着应该放弃国际规则。


The Bretton Woods regime, after all, had clear rules, though they were limited in scope and depth.	归根结底，布雷顿森林体系尽管范围和深度有限，但依然制定了明确的规则。


A completely decentralized free-for-all would benefit no one.	分散化的完全自由主义不会带来任何好处。


What we need are traffic rules for the global economy that help vehicles of varying size, shape, and speed navigate around each other, rather than imposing an identical car or a uniform speed limit.	与其强制采用相同的车辆或规定统一的时速，我们所需要的是能让各种大小、形状和速度的车辆自由行驶的全球经济交通规则。


We should strive to attain maximum globalization consistent with the maintenance of space for diversity in national institutional arrangements.	我们要在为国家制度多样性留出空间的同时，力求最大限度地实现全球化目标。


7.	7.


Non-democratic countries cannot count on the same rights and privileges in the international economic order as democracies.	非民主国家在国际经济秩序中不能享有与民主国家同等的权利。


What gives the previous principles their appeal and legitimacy is that they are based on democratic deliberation – where it really occurs, within national states.	以上原则的吸引力及合法性在于民族国家内部真实存在的民主审议制度。


When states are not democratic, this scaffolding collapses.	如果国家不存在民主体制，那么整体框架就会崩塌。


We can no longer presume that its institutional arrangements reflect its citizens’ preferences.	我们无法继续假设非民主国家的制度架构真正反映民众的偏好。


So non-democracies need to play by different, less permissive rules.	因此必须有不那么宽松的不同规则约束非民主国家。


These are the principles that the architects of the next global economic order must accept.	以上即为今后全球经济秩序缔造者必须接受的原则。


Most importantly, they must comprehend the ultimate paradox that each of these principles highlights: globalization works best when it is not pushed too far.	最重要的是他们必须理解这些原则背后凸显的终极悖论：即过度推行全球化可能起到过犹不及的效果。


Taking the Offensive Against Tuberculosis	向结核病开火


SOLNA, SWEDEN – Tuberculosis is one of the world’s deadliest diseases.	索尔纳，瑞典—结核病是全世界最致命的疾病。


In 2013 alone, it accounted for 1.5 million deaths, including one-fifth of adult deaths in low-income countries.	光是在2013年，就有150万人死于结核病，其中五分之一是低收入国家成年人。


Although the estimated number of people contracting TB annually is decreasing, the decline has been very slow.	尽管每年患结核病的估计人数在下降，但降幅十分缓慢。


And, given the increasing prevalence of multidrug-resistant TB, the trend could be reversed.	而由于具有多重抗药性的结核病的普遍化，患病人数下降的趋势可能发生逆转。


Nonetheless, the world now has a narrow window of opportunity to eradicate TB.	尽管如此，如今世界仍有一丝希望根除结核病。


Taking advantage of it will require the rapid development and dissemination of effective diagnostic tools, novel drug treatments, and innovative vaccines, in conjunction with efforts to ensure that health-care systems are equipped to deliver the right care.	抓住这一机会需要迅速研发和普及高效诊断工具、新的药物治疗和创新性疫苗，并辅之以确保卫生系统能够及时对症下药的措施。


This will be no easy feat.	这绝不是简单的任务。


The good news is that the international community seems eager to act.	好消息是国际社会似乎热切地想行动起来。


The World Health Organization’s post-2015 Global TB Strategy, which was endorsed by the World Health Assembly in May 2014, aims to eradicate TB by 2035.	世界卫生组织的2015年后 全球结核病战略（2014年5月在世界卫生大会上通过）的目标是在2035年根除结核病。


The Sustainable Development Goals, which will be formally adopted in September by the United Nations’ 193 member states, foresee achieving that objective five years sooner.	9月，联合国的193个成员国将正式开始实施可持续发展目标，在2030年根除结核病也是目标之一。


To stem the development and spread of drug-resistant TB requires a two-pronged global effort: ensuring early detection and adequate treatment of patients with drug-sensitive TB, and finding new ways to treat patients infected with drug-resistant strains.	阻止抗药性结核病的发展和蔓延需要世界双管齐下：确保早期发现和充分治疗药物敏感性结核病患者； 以及找到新办法治疗抗药性结核菌株感染者。


The problem is that existing tools for TB diagnosis, treatment, and prevention have severe limitations.	问题在于现有结核病诊断、治疗和预防工具存在严重局限。


For starters, there is no fast point-of-care diagnostic test for TB.	首先，对于结核病，没有快速的床旁（point-of-care）诊断测试。


In low-income countries, the dominant diagnostic method is sputum microscopy, an outdated approach that fails to detect TB in about half of all infected patients, with an even lower success rate for young children and patients co-infected with HIV.	在低收入国家，主要诊断方法痰液显微镜检查，这种方法早已过时，测出率还不到受感染患者的一半，在幼儿和存在HIV交叉感染的患者中间检测率更低。


Indeed, no more than one in ten children with TB is diagnosed by sputum microscopy.	事实上，用痰液显微镜检查诊断出结核病的儿童还不到患病儿童的十分之一。


Moreover, for patients infected with multi-drug-resistant TB, treatment with the currently available drugs is successful only half the time, even under the best conditions.	此外，对于被多充抗药性结核病传染的患者，用目前可得药物治疗的成功率只有一半，即使在最佳条件下也是如此。


And the therapeutic process is tough, lasting at least two years and involving up to 14,600 pills and hundreds of injections – with severe side effects.	而治疗过程十分艰苦，至少要持续两年，吃多达14,600颗药丸，打几百次针——并有严重的副作用。


New TB drugs with novel mechanisms of action are badly needed, not only to treat multi-drug resistant TB, but also to shorten the treatment time for drug-sensitive TB.	我们非常需要药理创新的结核病药品，不仅仅用来治疗多充抗药性结核病，也用来缩短药物敏感性结核病的治���时间。


Here, there is some promising news: Bedaquiline recently became the first new TB drug to be approved by the US Food and Drug Administration in 40 years.	在这方面，目前有一些好消息：最近贝达喹啉（Bedaquiline）成为美国食品和药品监督局40年来所批准的第一种结核病新药。


But Bedaquiline has yet to prove its capacity to treat drug-resistant TB effectively, and there are very few other candidates in the pipeline.	但贝达喹啉并没有表现出有效治疗抗药性结核病的效力，而相近的药物也是少之又少。


Similar problems arise in prevention.	预防也有类似的问题。


The Bacille de Calmette et Guérin (BCG) vaccine – the only one available for the disease, and the main pillar of TB prevention – is only partly effective.	卡介苗是唯一一种现成的结核病疫苗，也是结核病预防的主要手段，但它只是部分有效。


Indeed, while it protects children from the worst forms of the disease, it does not protect anyone against the most common variant, pulmonary TB.	事实上，尽管它可以预防儿童罹患最险恶的结核病，但却无法保护任何人得最普通的结核病——肺结核。


As a result, it has done little to reduce the number of TB cases.	结果，卡介苗对于降低结核病病患数量收效甚微。


And, although several new vaccine candidates have passed preliminary clinical tests, BCG will remain the only available vaccine for years to come.	而尽管已有一些新的潜在疫苗通过了初步临床测试，但在未来多年内，卡介苗仍将是唯一可用的疫苗。


The challenges are clearly formidable.	显然，挑战时艰巨的。


But, with millions of lives at stake, backing down is not an option.	但是，此事关乎数百万人的性命，因此决不能束手不管。


It comes down to research – a fact that the WHO global strategy recognizes.	归根到底还要靠研究——世卫组织全球战略也认识到了这一事实。


But scaling up investment in diagnostic tools and treatments for TB costs more money than has been allocated.	但加强结核病诊断工具和治疗的研究的投资跟不上需要。 据估计，每年所需要的研发资金约为17.


Of the estimated €1.73 billion ($2 billion) that is needed annually for research and development, only €589 million was invested in 2013.	3亿欧元，而2013年的投资规模只有5. 89亿欧元。


Making matters worse, critical donor funding – provided by a very limited number of actors, mostly government agencies and philanthropic groups in OECD countries – fell by nearly 10% last year.	更糟糕的是，关键的资金来源——来自极少数行动方，主要是经合组织国家的政府机构和慈善组织——在去年减少了近10%。


At present, a single philanthropic donor, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, supports more than 25% of research on new tools to fight TB.	目前，一家慈善出资者——比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会——对打击结核病新工具研究的支持占了总出资的25%以上。


As for the private sector, pharmaceutical companies have been withdrawing from TB research, as part of a general trend away from anti-infective drugs toward the development of new drugs for chronic illnesses.	和私人部门一样，制药公司一直在缩减结核病研究，这也是从抗传染药物转向慢性病药物研发的大趋势的一部分。


Pfizer exited TB research in 2012, followed by AstraZeneca in 2013 and Novartis last year.	辉瑞在2012年退出了结核病研究，2013年阿斯利康退出，今年则是诺华。


Closing the funding gap and ending the scourge of TB will require the involvement of more – and more diverse – donors.	解决资金缺口、结束结核病之灾需要更多——也更多样化——的出资者参与。


If the private sector is unwilling to do its part, it is up to governments to step in with a sustained commitment – manifested in direct contributions, as well as efforts to create the right incentives – to achieving the SDG target to which they have agreed.	如果私人部门不愿意站出来，政府就必须做出持续承诺——可以是直接出资，也可以是实行正确的激励政策——实现它们所同意的可持续发展目标。


In short, eradicating the TB epidemic presupposes efforts to ensure that health-care systems are capable of delivering the right care.	简言之，根除结核病需要采取措施确保卫生系统有能力进行正确的治疗。


And the right care requires rapid development and dissemination of new tools, including quick point-of-care diagnostic tests, safe and fast-acting drugs, and an effective TB vaccine.	而正确的治疗需要快速开发和普及新工具，包括快速床旁诊断测试、安全的速效药和有效的结核病疫苗。


Suffer the Children, Suffer the Country	少年难则国家难


NEW YORK – Children are every country’s most vital resource.	纽约—儿童是一国最宝贵的财富。


This is true not just morally, but also economically.	这不仅在道德上正确，在经济上也正确。


Investing in the health, education, and skills of children offers the highest economic returns to a country.	投资于卫生、教育和儿童技能能给一国带来最高的经济回报。


A new study by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) shows which high-income countries are doing well when it comes to making these investments – and which are doing poorly.	联合国儿童基金会的一份新研究显示了哪些高收入国家在这些投资方面做得最好，哪些做得最差。


The report, Child Well-Being in Rich Countries, takes a holistic view of the conditions of children in the United States, Canada, and Europe – 29 countries in all.	这份题为《发达国家儿童福祉》（Child Well-Being in Rich Countries）的报告对美国、加拿大和欧洲29国的儿童状况进行了历史考察。


The top-ranked countries, where children are best off, are the social democracies of Western Europe.	排名最高的国家，即儿童福祉最高者，是西欧社会民主国家。


The Netherlands heads the list, followed by Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and Germany.	荷兰高居榜首，挪威、冰岛、瑞典和德国紧随其后。


At the bottom one finds a major surprise: the US, the richest large economy in the world, is in 26th place, followed by three much poorer countries: Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania.	垫底国家大出人们意料：世界第一大富国美国位居第26，在其身后的是比它穷得多的三个国家：立陶宛、拉脱维亚和罗马尼亚。


France and the United Kingdom are ranked in the middle.	法国和英国位居中游。


The study assesses children’s well-being in terms of material conditions (related to household-income levels); health and safety; education; risky behavior (such as excessive alcohol consumption); and physical environment, including housing conditions.	该研究评估儿童福祉的指标包括营养条件（相对家庭收入水平的比例）； 卫生和安全；


Although the study is limited to high-income countries, national governments – and even cities – in other parts of the world should replicate it to analyze their own children’s well-being.	硬件环境（包括居住条件）。 研究只限于高收入国家，但其他国家（甚至城市）的政府也应该仿照该研究来分析一下自身的儿童福祉水平。


The gaps between the northern European countries and the US are the most telling.	北欧国家和美国之间的差距很能说明问题。


Northern European countries generally provide cash support to families to ensure that all children are raised in decent conditions, and they undertake ambitious social programs to provide high-quality day care, pre-school, and primary and secondary education.	北欧国家一般会向家庭提供现金支持，以确保所有儿童都能获得体面的成长条件； 它们还有雄心勃勃的社会项目提供高质量的日常看护、学前、小学和中学教育。


Moreover, all children are well covered by effective health-care systems.	此外，所有孩子都能得到高效的医疗系统覆盖。


The US, with its individualist, free-market ideology, is very different.	深信个人主义、自由市场的美国就不同了。


There is little cash support for families.	家庭几乎得不到现金支持。


Government programs supposedly provide a social safety net, but politicians are, in fact, largely indifferent to the well-being of the poor, because poor voters turn out in lower numbers and do not finance America’s expensive election campaigns.	政府项目本可以提供社会安全网，但事实上，政客对穷人的福祉大多漠不关心，因为贫穷选民数量较低，也不能为美国昂贵的选举活动贡献资金。


Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that US politicians tend to listen and respond only to their richer constituents.	事实上，证据有礼地表明，美国政客往往只听得到有钱选民的声音并作出回应。


The so-called safety net has suffered accordingly, as have America’s poor.	所谓的社会安全网也因此遭受打击，美国穷人亦然。


The differences between the social democracies and the US show up strongly in category after category.	社会民主国家和美国之间的差异清楚地表现在分类指标中。


In the social democracies, less than 10% of children grow up in relative poverty (meaning households with less than half of the country’s median income).	在社会民主国家，只有不到一成的儿童成长于相对贫困（家庭收入不到该国中位收入的一半）的环境中。


In the US, the rate of relative poverty exceeds 20%.	在美国，相对贫困比率超过两成。


American children suffer far more from low birth weight (a major danger signal for later life); being overweight at ages 11, 13, and 15; and very high rates of teenage fertility.	美国孩子的出生重量显著较轻（这是日后生活的主要危险信号之一）； 而在11、13和15年龄段超重；


There are around 35 births for every 1,000 girls aged 15-19, compared to fewer than ten per thousand in the northern European countries.	十几岁青少年产子率极高。 每1000名15—19年龄段女孩会生下35个左右的婴儿，而北欧国家的这一比例不到千分之十。


Likewise, US children face considerably more violence in society than children in other high-income countries do.	类似地，与其他高收入国家相比，美国孩子面临着严重得多的社会暴力。


That may not be surprising, but it is deeply troubling, because children’s exposure to violence is a major threat to their physical, emotional, and cognitive development.	这或许并不令人奇怪，但是个大问题，因为孩子暴露于暴力中会对其生理、心理和认知发展造成严重危害。


Homicide rates in the US are roughly five times higher than in northern Europe.	美国自杀率大约比北欧高出五倍。


One fascinating aspect of the UNICEF study is its use of what is now called “subjective well-being.”	联合国儿童基金会研究的一个有趣角度是它用了现在所谓的“主观福祉”。


This means asking a person directly about his or her life satisfaction.	这意味着直接向个人询问其生活满意度。


There have been many recent studies of the subjective well-being of adults around the world.  But I know of no comparable research in which children were asked directly about their sense of well-being – a very smart question indeed.	关于成年人的主观福祉，世界各地的最新研究很多。 但我尚未见到可与之相比的直接向儿童询问其对福祉的看法的研究——事实上，这是一个相当机智的问题。


Here, the evidence suggests that northern Europe’s children generally appreciate their remarkable advantages.	在这里，证据表明北欧孩子总体上对他们的显著优势深怀感恩。


The children were asked to rate their “life satisfaction” on an 11-step ladder. In the Netherlands, a remarkable 95% of children set their rating at six or higher.	研究用了一套11级评价系统让孩子们为其“生活满意度”打分，令人瞩目的是，95%的孩子的评分在第六级及以上。


In the US, the proportion is much lower, at around 84%.	美国的这一比例要低得多，大约在84%。


These subjective rankings also correlate highly with the children’s reported quality of interactions with their peers and parents.	这些主观评分也与孩子们的同伴和父母互动报告质量高度相关。


Some 80% of Dutch children report their classmates to be “kind and helpful,” compared to just 56% of American children.	80%的荷兰孩子报告他们的同班同学是“淳朴益友”，而美国孩子的这一比例只有56%。


The costs to the US of allowing so many of its children to grow up in poverty, poor health, poor schools, and poor housing are staggering.	美国放任如此多的孩子成长于贫困、不健康、教育质量低下、住房条件低劣的环境，代价是沉重的。


A shocking proportion ends up serving time in prison – especially in the case of non-white poor children.	这最终导致了极高的入狱率，特别是非白人贫困儿童。


Even those fortunate not to fall into the trap of America’s vast prison system often end up unemployed and even unemployable, without the skills needed to obtain and keep a decent job.	即使有幸逃脱了美国庞大见于系统，往往也难逃失业甚至就业无能的状况，因为他缺乏获得并保住体面工作所需的技能。


Americans have been blinded to these calamitous mistakes partly by a long history of racism, as well as by a misplaced faith in “rugged individualism.”	美国之所以对这些具有灾难性后果的错误视而不见，部分是因为其长期的种族主义历史，以及对“粗放个人主义”的不当信仰。


For example, some white families have opposed public financing for education, because they believe that their tax money goes disproportionately to help poorer non-white students.	比如，一些白人家庭反对以公共资金支持教育，因为他们认为他们的税金会大量用于帮助非白人学生。


The result, however, is that everybody loses.	但是，结果却是所有人都遭遇损失。 学校表现不佳；


Schools underperform; poverty remains high; and the resulting high rates of unemployment and crime impose huge financial and social costs on US society.	贫困率居高不下； 而由此导致的高失业和犯罪率给美国社会带来了巨大的金融和社会成本。


The UNICEF findings are powerful.	联合国儿童基金会的发现是意义深远的。


High national incomes are not enough to ensure children’s well-being.	高国民收入并不足以保证儿童的福祉。


Societies that have a strong commitment to equal opportunity for all of their children – and that are prepared to invest public funds on their behalf – end up with much better outcomes.	致力于为所有儿童提供平等机会——并时刻准备着把公共资金投资于儿童——的社会最终会迎来更好的结局。


Every country should compare the conditions of its young people with those reported by UNICEF, and use the results to help guide expanded investment in their children’s well-being.	每个国家都应该将其青年所处环境与联合国儿童基金会所报告的相比，用比较结果来指导扩张儿童福祉投资。


Nothing could be more important for any society’s future health and prosperity.	没有什么比一个社会的未来健康和繁荣更重要的事了。


New World, Less Order	缺乏秩序的新世界


Looking back to the revolutions that shook Europe and the world 15 years ago this month, we should rejoice in what has been gained - freedom, democracy, and transcendence of Europe's 40-year division.	如果回顾一下15年前这个月发生的那次震撼欧洲和世界的革命，我们应该为取得的成绩感到骄傲－我们得到了自由、民主，跨越了长达40年的欧洲分裂。


But we should also take stock of missed opportunities in the wake of the Cold War's peaceful end.	但我们也应该清楚冷战结束后，我们究竟还失去了哪些机会。


Ultimately, the end of the Cold War came because of the revolution underway in the Soviet Union.	归根结底，是苏联发生的革命导致了冷战的终结。


But the pro-democratic policies of glasnost and perestroika that I unveiled in the mid-1980's did not appear out of thin air. They arose from Nikita Khrushchev's reforms of the 1950's and 1960's, and from Alexei Kosygin's reforms later on.	但20世纪80年代中期我所倡导的改革和开放的民主政策也绝非凭空而来，其根源就在于20世纪五六十年代尼基塔赫鲁晓夫、还有后来柯西金所做的改革努力。


Many people now view such efforts to "renew" the socialist system - to make it actually work for the people - as having been doomed from the start.	在如今的很多人看来，这种"更新"社会主义制度，使之能为人们所接受的努力从一开始就注定不会成功。


But these earlier reforms were in fact more difficult to undertake than the ones that I launched in the 1980's and 1990's.	但这些早期的改革实际上比我20世纪八九十年代的改革难度更大。


During my presidency, we had to nurture a democratic atmosphere, but this was possible only because fear was no longer overpowering.	就任总统期间，我们必须培养一种民主的氛围，但只有在恐惧不再统治一切的时候，这种努力才有可能成功。


We also tried to curtail the arms race and address other areas of conflict between East and West.	我们还力图减少军备竞赛，解决造成东西方冲突的其它问题。


But the Berlin Wall remained, standing in the heart of Europe as a symbol of division.	但柏林墙依然存在，它矗立在欧洲中央，成了欧洲分裂的标志。


When Chancellor Helmut Kohl and I talked about this in July 1989, we thought that the time had not come to end the division of Germany.	1989年7月我和赫尔穆特·科尔总理讨论这个问题的时候，我们认为结束德国分裂的时机还没有成熟。


Dismantling the Wall, we agreed, would likely be an issue for the twenty-first century.	我们都认为，柏林墙的拆除将很可能要留待21世纪。


Of course, the German people decided otherwise; they took history into their own hands by insisting that the Wall come down.	当然，德国人自己并不这么看，他们把握了历史，最终拆毁了柏林墙。


The rest of Eastern and Central Europe quickly followed, knocking down their own barriers to freedom.	中东欧的其它国家也纷纷仿效，拆毁了各自国内通向自由的障碍。


My conception of my role as Soviet president compelled me not to intervene.	我对自己身为苏联总统的职责理解使我没有干预。


I believed that I could not open our country while dictating to others.	我相信我们不能自己开放，却要求别人服从命令。


Indeed, from my first appearance as General Secretary of the USSR, at the funeral of my predecessor, Constantine Chernyenko, I said that every country should be responsible for its own politics.	实际上，从我在前任总统Chernyenko的葬礼上作为苏共总书记首次露面起，就曾说过每个国家都对自己的政治负有责任。


So the fall of the Berlin Wall less than half a decade later was a consequence of these thoughts.	这样的思想导致了不到5年后柏林墙的坍塌。


(But, even here, my ideas and policies were not novel: in 1955 Khrushchev talked - albeit in a very different context - about uniting two Germanys.)	（但即便在这个问题上，我的思想和政治原则也并不新鲜：尽管有着不同的背景，但1995年赫鲁晓夫就曾说起过两德的统一问题）。


My task, as I saw it, was to ensure Central and Eastern Europe's peaceful return to full sovereignty with a minimum of Soviet interference. To the surprise and delight of the world, the changes did take place peacefully almost everywhere.	在我看来，我的任务就是在尽量减少苏联干预的前提下，确保中东欧国家全面地恢复行使主权，令全世界惊奇并欣喜的是，这种变化几乎到处都在发生。


But did the Cold War's end merely make the world a more dangerous place - one of terrorism, insecurity, uncertainty, and growing disparities of wealth?	但冷战的结束是否只是让世界更加危险－充斥着恐怖主义、不安全不稳定因素和日益扩大的贫富差距。


My response is to remind people what terrors the Cold War held.	我的回答是提醒人们冷战种所蕴藏的危险。


The threat of nuclear Armageddon was real, with three trillion dollars spent on the arms race that could have been used to help the world's poor.	大规模核战争的威胁迫在眉睫，而花在军备竞赛上面的资金高达3万亿，而这些钱本来可以帮助很多的穷人。


On the other hand, an opportunity to create a safer, more secure post-Cold War world was lost.	另一方面，我们也失去了在冷战后创造安全世界的一次宝贵机会。


In the 1980's, when the communist-capitalist confrontation ended, there was a chance to create a "new world order."	20世纪80年代，当共产主义和资本主义的对抗结束时，我们曾有机会创造"新的世界秩序。


But the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that there was no negotiated settlement of this new order.	"但苏联的崩溃意味着这种新秩序已经无法通过谈判产生。


As a result, the subsequent spurt of globalization has proceeded with no one steering the wheel - and thus with no means to implement new thinking for a better world.	其结果是，已经没有人能够控制接下来飞速发展的全球化进程－能使世界变得更加美好的新的思想也就无法付诸实现。


We Russians obviously bear the most responsibility for the USSR's collapse, but America should also be called to account.	俄国人自己当然应该为苏联的崩溃承担主要责任，但美国人恐怕也脱不了干系。


When change came, instead of following a slow democratic process, Russia replaced its discredited communist model overnight with a Harvard-designed blueprint that was also unfit for the country.	当变革到来时，俄国没有经历缓慢的民主改革进程，而是在一夜间就用哈佛描绘的蓝图取代了臭名昭著的共产主义模式，而这种新的模式也并不适合我们的国家。


Eventually, the plan threw the country on its back.	最终，俄国尝到了失败的苦果。


This was no US-led conspiracy, but the collapse of the Soviet Union was convenient for America.	这并不是什么美国阴谋，但苏联的垮台确实对美国有利。


The US conceived of itself as the Cold War's winner, and winners, it seems, make the rules.	美国把自己看作冷战的胜利者，而他们似乎认为规则要由胜利者来制定。


The Iraq war proves this: a new American empire is asserting itself.	伊拉克战争证明：新的美帝国主义正在形成。


The victor of the Cold War now expects other nations to indulge its philosophy of self-righteousness.	冷战的胜利者现在希望别国纵容自己的自以为是。


Unfortunately, this type of old thinking breeds more crises than it can ever resolve.	不幸的是，这种老式思维造成的危机比它所能解决的还要多。


Indeed, unilateral policies can never succeed in a global world defined more and more by shared concerns rather than national interests.	实际上，在一个受共同利益影响远远大于国家利益的全球化世界里，单边政策永远也不会取得成功。


So, fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world remains more in need of new thinking than ever.	因此，柏林墙倒塌15年后，世界更需要新的思维。


We need a new world order that benefits all, a global civil society that will help fight terrorism.	我们需要惠及所有人的新的世界秩序，一个能帮助我们战胜恐怖的全球化的平民社会。


We know that bombs and special operations alone won't make us safer, for we must fight the poverty that breeds terrorism.	我们清楚地知道只靠炸弹和特种部队不能保证安全，因为我们必须战争蕴育恐怖的极端贫困。


That is no easy task.	这并不容易。


On the contrary, as in 1989, we are faced with the urgent need for change and responsible leadership.	恰恰相反，正如1989年一样，我们迫切需要变革和负责任的领导。


New Year, Same Crisis	新的一年，危机不变


DAVOS – The measures introduced by the European Central Bank last December, especially the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), have relieved the liquidity problems of European banks, but have not cured the financing disadvantage of the highly indebted member states.	达沃斯——去年12月份，欧洲央行推出的措施，尤其是“长期再融资操作”，缓解了欧洲各银行的流动性问题，但是并没有消除高负债成员国的融资劣势。


Since high-risk premiums on government bonds endanger the capital adequacy of banks, half a solution is not enough.	自从政府债券的高风险溢价危及各银行的资本充足性以来，治标不治本的解决办法已经不够。


Indeed, that supposed solution leaves half the eurozone relegated to the status of Third World countries that have become highly indebted in a foreign currency.	实际上，这种解决办法使一半欧元区成员国沦为了第三世界的国家，背负了大量以外币计价的债务。


Instead of the International Monetary Fund, it is Germany that is acting as the taskmaster imposing tough fiscal discipline on them.	迫使它们实行严厉财政纪律的不是国际货币基金组织而是德国，德国充当了监管者的角色。


This will generate both economic and political tensions that could destroy the European Union.	这会导致经济和政治关系紧张，破坏欧盟。


I have proposed a plan that would allow Italy and Spain to refinance their debt by issuing treasury bills at around 1%.	我提出了一个计划，它能够通过发行收益率约为1%的国库券为其债务重新融资。


I named it in memory of my friend Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, who, as Italy’s central banker in the 1990’s, helped to stabilize that country’s finances.	我有一位朋友叫托马索•派多亚•夏欧帕，他在20世纪90年代曾任意大利央行行长，帮助稳定了该国的金融业。 为了纪念他，我用他的名字命名了我的计划。


The plan is rather complicated, but it is legally and technically sound.	这个计划相当复杂，但是从合法性和技术上来说都是相当不错的。


I describe it in detail in my new book Financial Turmoil in Europe and the United States.	我在自己的新著《欧洲和美国的金融乱局》中详细介绍了这个计划。


European authorities rejected my plan in favor of the LTRO.	欧洲当局拒绝了我的计划，采用了“长期再融资操作”。


The difference between the two schemes is that mine would provide instant relief to Italy and Spain.	这两个方案的不同之处在于，我的方案能够立即为意大利和西班牙纾困。


By contrast, the LTRO allows Italian and Spanish banks to engage in a very profitable and practically riskless arbitrage, but has kept government bonds hovering on the edge of a precipice – although the last few days brought some relief.	相比之下，“长期再融资操作”能够让意大利和西班牙各银行参与利润丰厚、实际上毫无风险的套利活动，却让政府债券的收益率徘徊在危险的边缘——尽管最后一段时间会有所缓解。


My proposal is to use the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to insure the European Central Bank against the solvency risk on any newly issued Italian or Spanish treasury bills that it may buy from commercial banks.	我的提议是，利用欧洲金融稳定基金和欧洲稳定机制确保欧洲央行为意大利或西班牙新发行的国库券的偿付能力风险提供担保，欧洲央行可能会从各商业银行购买这些债券。


This would allow the European Banking Authority to treat these various T-bills as the equivalent of cash, because they could be sold to the ECB at any time.	这将允许欧洲银行管理局把各类国库券当做现金，因为这些国库券可以随时卖给欧洲央行。


Banks would then find it advantageous to hold their surplus liquidity in the form of T-bills as long as these bills yielded more than bank deposits held at the ECB.	只要这些国库券的收益率比欧洲央行的银行利率高，各银行就会发现以国库券的形式持有过剩的流动性有优势。


Italy and Spain would then be able to refinance their debt at close to the ECB’s deposit rate, which is currently 1% on mandatory reserves and 25 basis points on excess-reserve accounts.	那时意大利和西班牙就能以接近于欧洲央行存款利率的收益率为其债务重新融资了。 目前强制性存款的利率为1%，非强制性存款的利率要高25个基点。


This would greatly improve the sustainability of these countries’ debt.	这将大大改善这些国家的债务的可持续性。


Italy, for instance, would see its average borrowing cost decline from the current 4.3%.	比如，意大利的平均借贷成本将从当前的4. 3%降下来。


Confidence would gradually return, yields on outstanding bonds would decline, banks would no longer be penalized for owning Italian government bonds, and Italy would gradually regain access to the market at more reasonable interest rates.	信心将逐渐回升，未偿还债券的收益率将下降，各银行也不会再因持有意大利政府的债券受到惩罚，意大利将以比较合理的利率逐渐重返市场。


One obvious objection to this strategy is that it would reduce the average maturity of Italian and Spanish debt.	这项战略的一个明显目标是，将缩短意大利和西班牙债务到期的平均时间。


I believe that, on the contrary, this would be an advantage in the current exceptional circumstances, because it would keep the Italian and Spanish governments on a short leash; no country concerned could afford to lose the ECB facility.	相反，我认为，在当前的特殊时期，这是一种优势，因为这将使意大利和西班牙政府暂时受到约束； 没有一个相关国家能够脱离欧洲央行。


In the case of Italy, the short leash would dissuade former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi from seeking to topple Mario Monti’s new government (which has only a fragile majority), because if Berlusconi precipitated an election, the electorate would punish him.	就意大利而言，暂时的约束将打消前首相西尔维奥•贝卢斯科尼推翻马里奥•蒙蒂新政府（新政府只有脆弱的绝大多数）的念头，因为如果贝卢斯科尼仓促进行选举，选民将惩罚他。


This would help to reestablish political stability and accelerate Italy’s return to the market.	这将有助于重建政治稳定并促进意大利回归市场。


My proposal fulfills both the letter and the spirit of Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty.	我的提议体现了《里斯本条约》第123款的内容和精神。


The ECB’s task is to provide liquidity to banks, while the EFSF and ESM are designed to absorb solvency risk.	欧洲央行的任务是为各银行提供流动性，而欧洲金融稳定基金和欧洲稳定机制旨在承受偿付能力的风险。


The ECB would not be facilitating additional borrowing by member countries; it would merely allow them to refinance their debt at a lower cost.	欧洲央行不会助长成员国增加借贷，只允许它们以较低的成本为其债务重新融资。


Together, the ECB and the EFSF could do what the ECB cannot do on its own.	欧洲央行和欧洲金融稳定基金一起能够完成欧洲央行自身无法完成的任务。


This would provide temporary relief from a fatal flaw in the euro design’s until the member countries devise a more permanent solution.	在成员国没有想出更加永久的解决办法之前，这能够纾一时之困，减弱欧元设计中致命缺陷的影响。


The EFSF would have practically unlimited capacity to insure eurozone T-bills in this way, because no country could default as long as the scheme was in operation.	这样的话，欧洲金融稳定基金实际上就有无限的能力担保欧元区的国库券了，因为只要这个方案在运行，没有一个国家会违约。


Nor could a country abuse the privilege, lest it be automatically withdrawn, causing the country’s cost of borrowing to rise immediately.	也没有一个国家能滥用这项特权，否则会自动退出该方案，导致该国的借贷成本立即上升。


For the first time in this crisis, the European authorities would undertake an operation for which they have more than sufficient resources.	在这次危机中，欧洲当局将首次在没有足够资源的情况下采取行动。


Coming as a positive surprise to the markets, it would reverse their mood.	对市场来说，这是一个积极的惊喜，扭转了市场情绪。


After all, markets do have moods; indeed, that is what the authorities have to learn in order to deal with financial crises.	毕竟，市场是有情绪的； 实际上，要应对金融危机，这是当局必须知道的。


Contrary to the current discourse, the long-term solution must provide a stimulus to get Europe out of a deflationary vicious circle – structural reform alone will not do it.	与当前的论断相反，长期的解决方案必须提供刺激，让欧洲摆脱通货紧缩的恶性循环——单单进行结构性改革无济于事。


The stimulus must come from the EU, because individual countries will be under strict fiscal discipline.	必须由欧盟推出刺激计划，因为每个成员国都将遵守严肃的财政纪律。


It will have to be guaranteed jointly and severally – and that means eurobonds in one guise or another.	它必须获得共同和单独担保，而这意味着要采用欧元区债券的某种形式。


New York, the Dada Capital	纽约，达达的首都


I am looking down on Central Park and recall from half-a-century ago in a small town in Northern Romania a tall, white-haired man proclaiming his poem, “The Colors Red and Black.”  Gazing over the park, I remember those Stalinist era verses:	我俯瞰着中央公园，想象着半个世纪前在罗马尼亚北部的一个小镇，一位个子很高，头发灰白的人吟诵着自己的诗作，“红与黑”。 凝视着脚下的公园，那些斯大林主义时代的诗篇从我脑海中闪过：


In New York, everything is beautiful.	纽约的一切都是那么美丽。


Heroes come, heroes go.	英雄们来来往往。


Children, born for Sing-Sing,	生性适合新生监狱的孩子，


cover the streets like pellagra	就像皮癣般布满了街道


Yellow karate-blood	橙红的血液


pulses through each building.	在每幢建筑中流动。


In the harbor the Statue of Liberty!	海港的自由女神雕像！


Behind her elevated falsehood	在她虚伪的煞有介事背后


Yankee ghosts howl at the moon	是扬基人的鬼魂在对月嚎啕


tormented as if from pellagra	就像在忍受红与黑带来的


by the colors red and black.	牛皮癣的苦苦煎熬。


The red of the Revolution, of course, and the black of the oppressed race.	红色当然代表革命，而黑色则代表被压迫的民族。


Cliché was the common currency of all Communist dictatorships, but they had the opposite effect to what the regime intended, for they cast an aura of forbidden fruit around the slandered New World metropolis, making it seem a glowing Olympus of modernity, an urban Everest of adventure.	这样的陈词滥调在所有共产独裁政权中都司空见惯，但取得的效果却与预想中截然相反，诽谤恰恰赋予了这座新世界大都会非常浓厚的禁果意味，既像光彩奕奕的现代天堂，又像冒险城市的珠穆朗玛。


The few trips I was allowed to take as a citizen of Socialist Romania did, of course, have moments of rapture for me, novice that I was.	作为社会主义罗马尼亚的公民，与纽约的几次邂逅的确曾给眼界狭窄的我带来过惊喜。


Yet New York remained a dream, so foreign and distant that I never imagined I would have the chance to compare illusion with reality.	但纽约对我来讲仍然是个梦，如此奇异和遥远，我从未期望有机会比较幻想和现实。


My eventual escape to New York had nothing to do with tourism.	我最终逃亡纽约与旅游毫不相关。


Sudden terror before this omnipresent, all-devouring monster was soon overtaken by fascination.	在这无所不在、吞噬一切的魔鬼面前，突如其来的恐惧很快就化做了深深的迷恋。


The critic Irving Howe, a New Yorker of long standing, tried to temper my enthusiasm.	老资格的纽约人，批论家欧文·豪，曾试图控制我的热情。


“To enjoy this city you need a good apartment and a certain salary.”	“享受这座城市，你需要高档的公寓和稳定的收入。


I was living in a miserable hotel in a rundown neighborhood, consumed with a newcomer’s neurotic insecurity.	”当时我住在破旧社区的破旧旅馆，被新移民神经质的不安全感紧紧包围。


Yet I found everything irresistible, the city’s rhythms and colors, its contrasts and surprises.	即便如此，我还是无法抵御纽约的诱惑，无法抵御这座城市的节奏和色彩，还有她所展示的差异和惊奇。


That Walt Whitman and Mark Twain, Herman Melville, Henry James, and John Dos Passos had lived here, that Enescu, Brancusi, or Eugen Ionesco had been successful here in no way raised my hopes.	尽管沃尔特·惠特曼、马克·吐温、赫尔曼·梅尔维尔和约翰·多斯·帕索斯曾在此居住，埃内斯库、布朗库斯或尤内斯库曾在此成功，但所有这些都丝毫无法燃起我的希望。


Life in and with this city was as hypnotic as a drug.	纽约的城市生活就像毒品般令人沉醉。


Over the last seventeen years this addiction was established through daily negotiations with life’s routine.	过去17年来，日常生活中无处不在的变化成就了这种嗜好。


New York’s metabolism filled me with its energy and its toxins.	纽约的新陈代谢令我精力充沛，但也中毒日深。


Although I felt that I, an exile in the land of exiles, belonged ever more to a world to which no one can really be said to belong, on September 11, 2001, I was finally able to proclaim, “I am a New Yorker,” just as President Kennedy had declared himself a Berliner when that former National Socialist capital was in danger of becoming a Communist capital.	尽管是流亡者国度中的流亡者，尽管没有谁能够真正归属于这个国度，但我觉得自己的归属感却前所未有的强烈，2001年的9月11日，就像肯尼迪总统在柏林，这座前国家社会主义的首都即将沦为共产主义都会之际宣告自己是柏林人一样，我终于能够骄傲地宣称，“我是纽约人！ ”


The Old Testament tells how work on the tower in Shinar, in ancient Babylon, was disrupted because man aspired to reach the heavens and divinity.	《旧约》记载了人类触摸天堂和神灵的愿望是如何破坏了古巴比伦希纳尔城堡的建设。


Suddenly the builders could no longer understand each other. Different languages divided them.	突然之间，建设者们再也无法相互理解，不同的语言使他们无法交流。


In present-day Babylon in Chinatown, in Little Italy, in Russian Brighton Beach, and in the alleys and byways of New York, all the world’s languages are spoken.	中国城、小意大利、俄国布赖顿海滩以及纽约城的大街小巷就是今天的巴比伦，世界上所有的语言在这里交汇。


The builders of the twin towers, whatever their native tongues, wanted to be Americans, citizens of the New World, the towers they built symbolizing the stature of freedom.	世贸双塔的建造者无论来自何处，都无一例外地希望成为美国人，新世界的公民。 他们建造的大厦象征着自由的精神。


The attack on the towers of Babel was unexpected but not unpredictable in so far as it represented the hatred of Allah’s fanatical followers for the symbols of modernity.	对巴别塔的攻击虽然出人意料，但却并非无法理解，因为它代表了阿拉狂热的追随者对现代化标志的刻骨仇恨。


In the World Trade Center, human creativity and collaboration were universally codified.	在世贸中心，人类的创造力和合作精神得到了发扬光大。


Of course, the building lacked poetry.	当然，世贸双塔的确缺乏诗意。


Yet, the towers could have been a symbol of worldwide poetry, not commerce.	但也可以说双塔是全世界诗歌、而不是贸易的标志。


As the Surrealist poet André Breton said, “It is above all our differences that unite us.”	正如超现实主义诗人安德烈·布雷顿所说，“它超越了一切差异，把我们紧紧联系在一起。 ”


Surprisingly, for such an extensive, cynically efficient cluster of humanity, the city displayed surprising civility and solidarity during and after the attacks.	令人惊奇的是，面对如此广泛、效率不可思议的人性的汇聚，纽约城在袭击前和袭击后都表现出令人难以置信的礼貌和团结。


It immediately regained its strength, its sense of humor, and its industriousness.	它立刻重新找回了力量、幽默和勤勉。


After September 11, 2001, skyscrapers, clubs, and restaurants of all kinds sprang up like mushrooms, with almost more vitality than before.	2001年9月11日后，各式各样的摩天大厦、俱乐部和餐馆如雨后春笋般地拔地而起，几乎比以前更有活力。


Moreover, the city refused to give its votes to a president who exploited its disaster for political gain.	不仅如此，这座城市拒绝再次为从这次灾难中牟取政治利益的美国总统投票。


Romania is often called the Land of Dada, not because one of its sons, Tristan Tzara, was a founder of Surrealism, but because of the absurdity and paradoxes of its daily life, particularly in its politics.	人们常把罗马尼亚称为“达达之地”，不是因为那里有一位伟人，特里斯坦·查拉创立了超现实主义，而是因为罗马尼亚的日常生活中充满了荒谬和矛盾，在政治领域尤其明显。


In exile, I immediately identified with another capital of Dada, the “cosmic republic, that speaks all languages in a universal dialect,” as Johannes Baader put it.	流亡生活中，我立刻发现了另一座达达的首都，也就是巴德口中的“以世界方言讲述所有语言的宇宙共和国。


Here, the old and the new are accomplices in celebrating life “in all its incomprehensibility” – exactly the subversiveness that the Dadaists loved.	”在这里，新旧事物共同赞美着“不可思议”的生活¾特别是为达达派艺术家们所深爱的破坏性。


A famous map painted by my friend and compatriot Saul Steinberg depicts the global village as seen from Manhattan: the distance from the Hudson River to the Pacific Ocean is the same as the distance from Ninth to Tenth Avenue on the Upper West Side, and somewhere beyond the calm ocean float Russia, China, and Japan.	我的朋友和同胞索尔·斯坦伯格绘制的一幅著名地图描述了从曼哈顿看到全球村的模样：从哈得逊河到太平洋的距离与上西区第九到第十大街的距离大体相当，而在风平浪静的大洋对岸漂浮着俄国、中国和日本。 索尔的另一张地图追忆了他的过去：米兰，他年轻时所住的城市；


Saul’s other maps evoke his past: Milan, the city of his youth, Zurich, where Dada got its explosive start, and the Romanian city Buzau, where he was born.	苏黎世，达达爆炸性的起源之地； 以及罗马尼亚城市布泽乌，他的生身之所。


A map of my own fate would encompass Bukovina as my native land, the Transdnistrian concentration camp of my childhood, the Communist labor camp Periprava where my father’s identity was altered, the Bucharest of my student years and my adulthood, Berlin, my exile’s starting point, and finally New York, where my exile found its residence.	我自己的命运之图绘有出生地布科维纳，儿时生活过的Transdnistrian集中营，改变了我父亲身份的共产主义劳改所Periprava，见证过我学生与成年时光的布加勒斯特，我流亡生活的起点柏林，还有流亡生活最后的庇护所纽约。


This fate is its own “Babel,” a confused mixture of memories and places.	我的经历异常“混乱”，混杂了各式各样的记忆和地点。


Here on the Upper West Side, in the middle of a triangle formed by Central Park, Lincoln Center, and the Hudson River, I was once in the habit of beginning each day with an exotic act of devotion, a ritual of humility.	在上西区由中央公园、林肯中心和哈得逊河构成的三角形区域中心，我曾经习惯于每天清晨以一种奇异的献身方式和谦卑的礼仪开始一天的生活。


I now had a good apartment and a certain salary, so Irving Howe’s conditions for life in the city were fulfilled.	现在我有了高档的公寓和稳定的收入，因此欧文·豪提出的城市生活的条件已经得到了满足。


From my window, I watched the Rubbish Gangster: shaven head, bull neck, and swollen nose, from which dangled mucus-incrusted strands of hair, his short arms bursting with criminal power.	我可以从自家的窗口凝视着下面的拾荒者：刮得趣青的头皮、粗壮如牛的脖子，还有臃肿不堪的鼻子，呲着黏液覆盖的鼻毛，短粗的臂膀充满了罪恶的力量。


Every day, at the same hour, he appeared with his metal trunk stuffed with all that he had collected from street corner garbage cans; it was as if he wanted to ensnare me with his street sorcery so that I could see the city’s unfathomable contrasts.	每天，他都在同一时间出现，背上背着金属箱，里面塞满了从街角垃圾桶里拣拾的废弃物，我似乎受到了他街头巫术的诱惑，于是就看清了这座城市中令人难解的巨大差异。


The writer, caught up in the shelter of solitude, does not have much time to wander about.	作家深深地陷入孤独的包围，没有多少空闲时间可以用来闲荡。


His neighborhood is his world, the geography of his calendar.	社区就是他的世界，地形就是他的历法。


Luckily, the streets of New York offer extraordinary spectacles wherever one is.	令人庆幸的是，无论你身在何处，都能在纽约的街上找到特别的景观。


In the Bronx or in Soho, in Washington Square or Times Square, in front of the New York Public Library or near a hot dog stand, across all the planets’ races, the banal vies with the exceptional for one’s attention.	无论在布隆克斯还是SOHO，无论在华盛顿广场还是时代广场，也无论在纽约公共图书馆还是卖热狗的小摊前，这里有地球上所有的民族和种族，最陈腐与最出挑的景观争夺着人们的视线。


All faces, ages, and events, sooner or later, can be found here.	所有的面孔、年龄和林林总总，早晚都可以在这里找到。


Routine increases banality and thoughtlessness; the personal disappears.	一成不变滋生了平庸和懒惰，也扼杀了个性。


You pursue your business here as only New Yorkers can, but every once in a while you look up and wonder, “How did I get here?”	你在这里以纽约人独有的方式继续生活，但偶尔也会抬起头问问自己，“我怎么会到了这儿？


Or, rather, “How on earth did mankind come so far?”	”或者，“人类是怎么走到了今天？ ”


I often look at New York’s architecture as if looking at an art book.	我常常像浏览艺术书籍那样去欣赏纽约的建筑。


On my way home from Bard College, where I teach, I am greeted by the George Washington Bridge majestically suspended over the Hudson River.	从我教书的巴德学院回家的路上，迎面而来的是横跨哈得逊河的壮观的乔治·华盛顿大桥。


It is a glorious welcome, even in fog.	即便在浓雾弥漫的时刻，它的壮阔也无时无刻不吸引着我的目光。


The same is true of the skyline.	纽约的天际线也蔚为壮观。


Approach the city and you see the urban center of the world – a hard and harried place, marked by social contrasts as dizzying as its skyscrapers and with a sense of transience as elevated as its buildings.	走进纽约，你就走进了世界城市的中心¾一个艰难掠夺的城市，到处是强烈的社会反差，像摩天大楼一样令人目眩，像城市建筑一样令人感到稍纵即逝、不可捉摸。


Its workforce labors round the clock and its inventiveness, energy, and diversity counter provincialism with scorn.	这里的劳工日夜劳作，这里的创造力、能量和多样性骄傲地蔑视着地方风格。


Like America itself, although so utterly different, New York can only be comprehended “synthetically.”	就像美国一样，尽管风格窘异，人们只能从“综合”的角度来理解纽约。


This festively incoherent capital of Dada is a spectacular fusion of freedom and pragmatism. Misery and magnificence, seduction and neurosis create and recreate the dynamic, unmistakable spectrum of New York life.	这座达达主义的狂放首都是自由和实用主义巨大的熔炉，贫困和富贵、诱惑和虚弱时刻创造和再造着纽约生活充满活力、独一无二的光谱。


In this city you learn to limit yourself.	在这座城市要学会自我控制。


It is impossible to take in at once all of the innumerable symphonic or jazz concerts, or parades celebrating ethnic or sexual minorities.	同时吸纳所有不计其数的交响乐或爵士乐会、或赞美种族和性别弱势群体的游行绝无可能。


You can’t attend all the lectures, panel discussions, and auctions where everyday dramas and dreams are bartered.	你无法参加所有的讲座、小组讨论和拍卖，交易日常各种各种的情景和梦想。


You can’t sit in all the taxis driven by those loquacious ambassadors from India and Russia and Haiti, from Pakistan and Ghana and Guatemala.	你不可能乘坐所有的出租汽车，它们的司机是来自印度、俄国和海地，巴基斯坦、加纳和危地马拉的饶舌使者。


At best you can grab a mere crumb of this frenetic global kaleidoscope.	即便尽了最大的努力，你也只能窥见这个疯狂的全球万花筒中无尽景色的一鳞半爪。


In the end, in New York you own nothing more than the instant, the now, the right now.	最后，在纽约，即时、现在和立刻就是你所拥有的全部。


Again I look over Central Park.	我再次凝视着中央公园。


“Dada covers things with an artificial tenderness,” wrote Tzara. “It is snowing butterflies that have escaped from a prophet’s head.”	查拉曾经写道，“达达主义习惯用虚幻的柔情来看待事物，就像预言家脑中飞出的飘雪的蝴蝶。


Civilizing the Marketplace of Ideas	让思想市场变得文明


CAMBRIDGE – “When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,” US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in a famous dissenting opinion in 1919, “they may come to believe…that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”	美国剑桥—“当人们意识到时间扰乱了许多互相斗争的信仰时，”美国最高法院法官霍尔姆斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes）在其1919年的著名反对意见中写道，“他们开始相信……要追求至善，最好还是通过思想的自由交流来实现至善——即，真理的最佳检验乃是让思想接受市场竞争看其是否能被接受，而真理是人们的愿望可以安全实现的唯一土壤。 ”


Like any market, however, the marketplace of ideas needs regulation: in particular, its participants should be bound by norms of honesty, humility, and civility.	但是，与所有市场一样，思想市场需要监管：特别是，思想市场参与者必须受诚信、谦卑和礼貌规范的约束。


Moreover, every idea-trader should adhere to these principles.	此外，每一位思想交流者都应该遵守这些原则。


Of course, politicians through the ages have polluted the marketplace of ideas with invective.	当然，各时期的政客们用污言秽语污染着思想市场。


But in American politics, surprisingly, there has been progress.	但令人惊奇的是，美国政坛在这方面颇有进步。


According to a study by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, there has been less incivility in Congress in recent years than in the 1990’s or the 1940’s.	安能伯格公共政策中心（Annenberg Public Policy Center）的一份研究指出，近几年来国会中的失礼情况要好于20世纪90年代或40年代。


Republican Senator Ted Cruz was widely condemned for his aggressive questioning of incoming Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel back in January.	共和党参议员科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）因为在1月时猛烈质疑即将履新的国防部长哈格尔（Chuck Hagel）而饱受抨击。


But casting aspersions on a nominee’s patriotism was the norm in the McCarthy era; it is less common today.	但在麦卡锡时代蔚然成风的从爱国角度攻击被提名者的做法现如今早已不再是常态。


Academia, by contrast, appears to be moving in the opposite direction.	相反，学界似乎在朝相反的方向前进。


A “social science” like economics is supposed to be free of partisan vitriol.	像经济学这样的“社会科学”本应免疫于屁股决定脑袋的攻讦。


Yet economists now routinely stoop to ad hominem attacks and inflammatory polemics.	但经济学家如今却长于人身攻击和煽风点火。


As economists go, they do not come much mightier or more influential than Paul Krugman.	在经济学家中，战力最强、影响最大的莫过于克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）。


A Nobel laureate who teaches at Princeton University, Krugman is also a columnist for the New York Times, whose commentaries and blog, “The Conscience of a Liberal,” are read with an almost religious fervor by liberal (in the American sense) economists and journalists around the world.	克鲁格曼任教于普林斯顿大学，他是诺贝尔奖获得者，并在《纽约时报》辟有专栏，他的评论和博客“一个自由派的良知”（The Conscience of a Liberal）让全世界（美国标准的）自由派经济学家和记者们带着朝圣的狂热趋之若鹜。


He is a Twitter superstar, with more than a million followers.	他也是Twitter上的超级明星，粉丝超过100万。


A dozen ardent epigones blog in sync with him, re-posting the wisdom of the master.	一些热情的追随者的博客时刻与他同步，转载大师的智慧。


Many people today naively believe that the Internet is an unmitigated boon for free speech.	如今，许多人天真地认为互联网上可以存在十足的言论自由。


They underestimate the extent to which such a concentration of online power corrupts, just as surely as all forms of power corrupt.	他们低估了在线权力如此集中会产生怎样的腐败——完全不亚于任何形式的权力腐败。


Since Krugman and I began debating fiscal and monetary policy back in 2009, I have become increasingly alarmed by the way he abuses his power.	克鲁格曼和我的财政和货币政策争论可以追溯到2009年，在此期间我越来越对他对权力的滥用引起警惕。


Last week, I resolved to speak out in a three-article series, published squarely in the heart of the liberal blogosphere, the Huffington Post.	上周我决定撰写一个三篇文章组成的系列文章，全部发表在自由派博客圈的核心Huffington Post上。


As historians are trained to do, I based my argument on the archives.	历史学的训练促使我立论于资料的基础上。


By quoting his past writings, I showed, first, that Krugman’s repeated claims to have been “right about everything” in his economic commentary are false.	我引用了克鲁格曼此前的文章证明，首先，克鲁格曼在其经济评论中一再声称的“无往而不准”的东西是错误的。


Although (like many others) he identified a housing bubble in 2006, he did not foresee the financial chain reaction that would fuel a global crisis.	尽管（与其他很多人一样）他在2006年就看出了房地产泡沫，但他并没有预见到助长全球危机的金融反应链。


Having failed to predict the US crisis, he then incorrectly predicted the imminent disintegration of Europe’s monetary union, publishing more than 20 statements on that subject in 2011 and 2012.	他并没有预测到美国的危机，随后又错误地预测欧洲货币联盟将立刻解体，在2011年和2012年发表了关于这个主题的20多篇文章��他从未承认这些错误；


He has never admitted these errors; on the contrary, he has retrospectively exaggerated his own prescience.	相反，他在事后还夸大自己的正确性。


Second, Krugman’s claim that a vastly larger fiscal stimulus would have generated a more rapid economic recovery in the US depends entirely on conjecture.	其次，克鲁格曼所宣称的大大扩张财政刺激能让美国经济复苏得更快完全是推断。


But the macroeconomic model on which he bases his claim can hardly be called reliable, given its manifest failures to predict either the crisis or the euro’s survival.	但他据以下结论的宏观经济学模型很难称得上可靠，因为在预测危机和欧元区继续存在的问题上它都出现了错误。


Moreover, at least one of his pre-crisis columns flatly contradicts his view today that current – or even higher – levels of federal debt carry no risk whatsoever.	此外，在他在危机前所撰写的专栏文章中，至少有一篇与他现今的观点完全相悖。 他最近指出，当前——甚至更高的——联邦债务水平根本不会带来风险。


So he has no right to claim, as he has, “a stunning victory” in “an epic intellectual debate.”	因此，他宣称在“史诗般的知识分子争论”中“大获全胜”纯属意淫。


Finally – and most important – even if Krugman had been “right about everything,” there would still be no justification for the numerous crude and often personal attacks he has made on those who disagree with him.	最后也是最重要的是，即使克鲁格曼过去“无往而不准”，也不能作为他对意见相左者一再粗口甚至人身攻击的理由。


Words like “cockroach,” “delusional,” “derp,” “dope,” “fool,” “knave,” “mendacious idiot,” and “zombie” have no place in civilized debate.	像“鼠辈”、“妄想”、“见鬼”、“笨蛋”、“蠢货”、“无赖”、“白痴骗子”、“行尸走肉”这样的词绝不应该出现在文明的争论中。


I consider myself lucky that he has called me only a “poseur,” a “whiner,” “inane” – and, last week, a “troll.”	对于我，他只是称为“装腔作势”、“哀戚”、“空洞”，上周则称我为“钓鱼”——如此看来我还算幸运。


Far from engaging in Holmes’s free trade in ideas, Krugman has been the intellectual equivalent of a robber baron, exploiting his power to the point of driving decent people away from the public sphere – particularly younger scholars, who understandably dread a “takedown” by the “Invincible Krugtron.”	克鲁格曼的行为绝不是霍尔姆斯所谓的思想的自由交流，他堪为知识分子中的强盗贵族，用手中的权力将正派人士排挤出公共空间，特别是青年学者——不难理解，青年学者害怕来自“不可战胜的克鲁格曼大帝”的“突袭”。


My preferred solution would be accountability.	我所支持的解决方案是问责制。


But I have given up hope that the New York Times will perform its proper editorial function.	但我完全不寄希望于《纽约时报》会行使其正常的编辑权力。


So, instead, I would suggest the intellectual equivalent of an antitrust law.	因此，我建议出台约束斯文的反垄断法。


For every word that Krugman publishes, he must henceforth commit to having first read at least a hundred words by other writers.	从今以后，对于克鲁格曼所公开发表的每一个词，他都必须保证此前已经阅读过他人所写的至少100个词。


I cannot guarantee that reading more widely will teach him honesty, humility, and civility.	我不敢保证更广泛地阅读能教会他诚信、谦卑和礼貌。


But it will at least reduce his unjustifiably large share of the marketplace of economic ideas.	但这至少能减少他在经济思想市场上不相匹配的巨大份额。


As a Supreme Court justice, of course, Holmes opposed antitrust regulations.	当然，作为最高法院法官，霍尔姆斯反对反垄断监管。


But his arguments in this area failed his own “test of truth,” for they lacked “the power…to get…accepted in the competition of the market.”	但他在这一领域的观点无法通过他自己的“真理的检验”，因为这些观点缺少“在市场竞争中……被接受……的力量”。


Holmes accepted defeat with his customary grace.	霍尔姆斯以他惯有的优雅接受失败。


It is high time that Krugman – right or wrong – learned to behave that way, too.	克鲁格曼——不论对错——也应该这样做。


Education’s Buy-Down Option	教育贷款补贴计划


WASHINGTON, DC – Last year was an important one for developing countries, if only because the world was reminded of the true value of education there.	华盛顿—去年是发展中国家重要的一年，因为世界领教了发展中国家教育的真正价值。


Indeed, Malala Yousafzai, the young Pakistani girl who spoke up for children’s right to go to school – even after surviving an assassination attempt by the Taliban – served poignant notice that not educating a child in the developing world is significantly more costly than doing so.	事实上，马拉拉·尤沙夫赛（Malala Yousafzai）的例子深刻地表明，在发展中国家，不让孩子受教育比让孩子受教育的成本大得多。 马拉拉是一位年轻的巴基斯坦女孩，为儿童上学权利而疾呼，即使在遭遇塔利班的暗杀图谋后仍坚持不悔。