As the Palestinians and their friends in the international community might realize when the dust settles, it does not preclude the city’s eventual division into two capitals as part of a peace settlement, much less guarantee Israel sovereignty over all of Jerusalem as its “eternal capital.”	当尘埃落定后，巴勒斯坦人和他们的国际社会朋友们也许会发现，这并不能阻止这座城市最终分裂为两个首都（作为和平协议的一部分），更远远不能保证以色列拥有耶路撒冷的全部主权并将其作为“永恒的首都”。


In fact, it is a fantasy to assume, as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems to do, that Trump’s support is the key to getting the Palestinians and their Arab and Muslim supporters to acquiesce to Israeli-Jewish rule over a city that is so important to both sides.	事实上，认为特朗普的支持是让巴勒斯坦人和他们的阿拉伯和穆斯林支持者默许以色列-犹太人统治一座对双方都至关重要的城市的关键——以色列总理内塔尼亚胡似乎就是这么认为的——这样的想法可谓魔幻。


Even Trump himself admitted the limits of Israel’s sovereignty in Jerusalem, and affirmed his commitment to the status quo regarding East Jerusalem’s holy sites.	就连特朗普本人都承认，以色列在耶路撒冷的主权是有限的，并重申他承认东耶路撒冷胜迹的现状。


Moreover, the restrained response of Arab leaders should not be interpreted as a vindication of Netanyahu’s assumption that his newfound allies in Saudi Arabia and Egypt could force the Palestinians into a US-brokered peace deal that would not meet the core requirements of their national narrative.	此外，阿拉伯领导人的克制反应不可解读为证实了内塔尼亚胡的观点——他结下的新盟友沙特阿拉伯和埃及能够迫使巴勒斯坦人就范于美国调停、无法满足巴勒斯坦的国家叙事的和平协议。


In any case, the days of Netanyahu’s expansionist government are numbered.	无论如何，内塔尼亚胡的扩张主义政府已经时日无多。


The clumsy Jerusalem declaration cannot save Netanyahu’s current coalition government from massive corruption scandals and irreconcilable internal conflicts.	拙劣的耶路撒冷决定无法拯救内塔尼亚胡的现任联合政府于大面积腐败丑闻和不可调和的内讧。


Not even an Israel-friendly peace plan spearheaded by Trump (assuming his declaration does not foreclose it altogether) could do that.	甚至由特朗普牵头的有利于以色列的和平计划（假设特朗普的决定没有完全扼杀这一可能）也不能。


Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition simply is no partner for a historic deal, on Jerusalem or on any other element of the dispute.	内塔尼亚胡的右翼执政联盟根本不可能成为历史性协议的合作方，不管是对耶路撒冷还是其他任何纠纷要素。


The only way forward is for Israel to produce a new, more centrist coalition, while the Palestinians adopt a more sober and strategic approach.	对以色列来说，唯一的进展之道是建立一个新的、更偏中间道路的联盟，同时，巴勒斯坦人采取更加冷静的战略性方针。


In that case, Trump’s Jerusalem declaration would not preclude a solution according to the peace parameters put forward by Bill Clinton.	如此，特朗普的耶路撒冷决定便无法扼杀按照克林顿定下的和平参数制定的方案。


And, in fact, when I led the Israeli negotiating team almost two decades ago, both sides accepted the idea of Jerusalem being partitioned, albeit with flexible borders, along ethnic lines.	而事实上，近二十年前我领导以色列谈判团队时，双方都接受了将耶路撒冷根据种族边界一分为二的方案（尽管这一边界具有一定灵活性）。


To improve the chances of success, America’s monopoly on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should end.	要提高成功的可能，就必须结束美国对以巴和平进程的垄断。


Instead, the negotiations should be handled more like those that produced the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, with a group of countries – in that case, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US), plus Germany – working together to achieve results.	相反，谈判更应该像2015年伊朗核协议那样组织，由一组国家——在伊朗的例子中，是联合国安理会五大常任理事国（中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国和美国）加上德国——合作实现成果。


Donald Trump Versus Mideast Peace	特朗普和中东和平


JERUSALEM – In a matter of three weeks, the United States government has attacked the Palestinian people on three fronts.	耶路撒冷—在三周时间里，美国政府给了巴勒斯坦人民三重打击。


First, on November 17, President Donald Trump’s administration announced its decision (subsequently reversed) to close the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic office in Washington, DC.	首先是11月17日，特朗普总统政府宣布一项决定（随后取消）关闭巴勒斯坦解放组织在华盛顿的外交办事处。


Then, on December 5, the US Congress voted unanimously to adopt the Taylor Force Act, which blocks aid to the Palestinian Authority from 2018 to 2024, unless the PA stops paying monthly salaries and other benefits to the families of killed or convicted Palestinian militants.	然后，12月5日美国国会一直投票通过了泰勒强制法（Taylor Force Act），禁止在2018—2024年间援助巴勒斯坦权力机构，除非后者停止向巴勒斯坦死亡或定罪军属发放月薪和其他福利。


But it was the third attack, which came the following day, that will prove most devastating to efforts to achieve peace.	但第二天的第三项打击才是对实现和平最不利的动作。


In defiance of overwhelming global opposition, not to mention past United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, Trump announced that the US will officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.	在全球的一直反对声浪中——更不用说联合国大会和安理会过去的决议了——特朗普宣布美国正式承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都。


The message is clear: the Trump administration is determined to dictate the Israeli version of peace with the Palestinians, rather than to mediate an equitable agreement between the two sides.	个中含义显而易见：特朗普政府决定要强制巴勒斯坦人接受以色列的和平方案，而不是调停双方之间的平等协议。


Of course, that is not how Trump’s administration presents it.	当然，特朗普政府不是这么说的。


As the New York Times reported just before the announcement, Trump administration officials believe the decision, which entails moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, could actually hasten the peace process, “by removing a source of ambiguity from the American position.”	《纽约时报》在特朗普宣布决定前夕报道，其政府的官员相信该决定——其中包括将美国驻以色列大使馆迁往耶路撒冷——真能“通过让美国的立场不再模糊不定”而加快和平进程。


After all, they point out, the embassy question comes up every six months, when the president has to sign a new waiver to keep the embassy in Tel Aviv – a process that, from their perspective, repeatedly stokes political tension.	他们指出，毕竟大使馆问题每六个月就要重新决定一次，总统必须签署新授权让大使馆留在特拉维夫——在他们看来，这一过程不断地煽动着政治紧张。


In his address on the topic, Trump reiterated this argument.	在其关于这个问题的讲话中，特朗普重申了该观点。


Officially recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, he asserted, “is a long-overdue step to advance the peace process and to work towards a lasting agreement.”	正式承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都，他说，“是一个早就应该做出但迟迟未动的，能够推动和平进程和长期协议的动作。


He also claimed that the decision “is not intended, in any way, to reflect a departure from our strong commitment to facilitate a lasting peace agreement,” one “that is a great deal for the Israelis and a great deal for the Palestinians.”	”他还宣称，该决定“绝不是为了表明我们抛弃了推动长期和平协议的承诺，”这是一个“对以色列和巴勒斯坦都非常好的方案。 ”


But, in that same speech, Trump betrayed the superiority he ascribes to Israel: “Israel is a sovereign nation with the right like every other sovereign nation to determine its own capital.”	但在同一篇讲话中，特朗普也背叛了他授予以色列的更高的地位：“以色列是一个主权国家，他和其他任何主权国家一样，有权选择自己的首都。


Despite its best efforts, Palestine, of course, is not recognized as a sovereign state by the US.	”尽管巴勒斯坦尽力示好，但它显然不被美国承认为主权国家。


So, far from seeking a fair peace deal between the two parties, Trump has effectively declared victory for Israel – and instructed the Palestinians to accept defeat quietly.	因此，特朗普并没有追求双方之间形成公平的和平协议，而是实际上宣布以色列胜出——并通知巴勒斯坦人静静地接受失败。


Yet the Palestinians have displayed a profound capacity for resistance.	但巴勒斯坦人表现出了极强的抵抗力。


Just last summer, when the Israeli government decided unilaterally to install metal detectors at the entrances of Al Haram Al Sharif/Al Aqsa Mosque, Palestinians demonstrated outside the mosque for two weeks, forcing the Israelis to reverse the decision.	在刚刚过去的夏天，当以色列政府单方面决定在谢里夫/阿克萨（Al Haram Al Sharif/ Al Aqsa）清真寺入口安装金属探测器时，巴勒斯坦人在清真寺外进行了为期两周的示威，迫使以色列收回了这一决定。


Moving the US embassy to Jerusalem is a far more powerful symbolic move, suggesting that it could spur even more formidable resistance – and not just from the 300,000 Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, or even from the more than 12 million Palestinians around the world.	将美国使馆迁往耶路撒冷是一个更加强力的象征性动作，意味着有可能导致更可怕的抵抗——不仅仅来自生活在东耶路撒冷的300,000巴勒斯坦人，还包括散布在全世界的其他1,200多万巴勒斯坦人。


What Trump’s administration fails to recognize is that Jerusalem – the third-holiest site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina – isn’t just an Israeli-Palestinian issue; all of the world’s 350 million Arabs and 1.5 billion Muslims have a direct and vital stake in it.	特朗普政府没有认识到，耶路撒冷——仅次于麦加和麦地那的伊斯兰教第三圣城——不仅仅是以巴和平问题； 全世界3.


Trump may think that his current honeymoon with Saudi Arabia will allow him to escape pushback from Arab leaders.	特朗普可能认为，目前他和沙特阿拉伯处于蜜月期，这使他能够摆脱阿拉伯领导人的反对。


But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is facing too much opposition to his own reforms to side openly with Israel on so emotive an issue as Jerusalem.	但穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼王储自身个改革也面临着巨大的反对，他不可能公开在耶路撒冷这样的情绪性问题上站边以色列。


The fact is that leaders across the Muslim and Arab world are not going to allow Trump to hand Jerusalem to Israel unilaterally, simply to satisfy his small base of US Christian Zionist evangelicals (he received the support of less than a quarter of American Jews).	事实上，整个穆斯林和阿拉伯世界的领导人都不会允许特朗普单方面将耶路撒冷送给以色列，只为满足为数甚少的美国锡安主义福音派基督徒票仓（他只获得了不到四分之一美国犹太人的支持）。


And, indeed, Mohammad Shtayyeh, a member of the Fatah central committee, has already pledged that the Palestinian leadership, in coordination with Jordan and other Arab states, will resist the dictate.	法塔赫中央委员会成员穆罕默德·沙塔耶（Mohammad Shtayyeh）已经宣布，巴勒斯坦领导层将在约旦和其他阿拉伯国家的合作下，抵制这一美国的这一独裁决定。


Yet it is not just Arabs or Muslims who support the Palestinians’ just demands for a fair peace agreement.	但支持巴勒斯坦人民对公平和平协议的正义要求的不仅仅是阿拉伯人和穆斯林。


Innumerable people worldwide – of all faiths and backgrounds, as well as resolutions by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice – also support this stance.	全世界有无数人民——他们的信仰和背景各不相同，还有联合国安理会、联合国大会以及国际法庭的决议——都支持这一立场。


This is true even in the US: according to a poll released by the Arab American Institute, only 20% of Americans (including American Arabs and American Jews) favor moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.	即使在美国国内也是如此：据阿拉伯美国研究所（Arab American Institute）的一项民调，只有20%的美国人（包括美国阿拉伯人和美国犹太人）支持将美国驻特拉维夫大使馆迁往耶路撒冷。


The Palestinians are calling for a two-state solution, with East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state and West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.	巴勒斯坦人要求两国方案，其中东耶路撒冷作为巴勒斯坦国的首都，而西耶路撒冷作为以色列的首都。


The Israelis, by contrast, have consistently thwarted a two-state solution, and demanded to have Jerusalem all to themselves.	相反，以色列人一贯阻挠两国方案，并要求耶路撒冷全部归以色列。


In short, it is the Israeli government’s position – and that of the Trump administration – that must change, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ever to be resolved.	简言之，如果以巴冲突想要解决的话，必须改变的是以色列政府的立场——以及特朗普政府的立场。


Many in Israel recognize this: 25 prominent Israelis, including former diplomats, army generals, and academics, signed a letter to Trump’s Mideast peace envoy denouncing the Jerusalem decision.	许多以色列人都认识到这一点：25位以色列名人，包括前外交官、军队将领和学者，联署了一封致特朗普中东和平特使的信，谴责耶路撒冷决定。


“The status of Jerusalem,” they wrote, “lies at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and must be determined within the context of resolving that conflict.”	“耶路撒冷的地位，”他们写道，“是以巴冲突的核心，必须置于解决以巴冲突的大环境下决定。 ”


Any viable peace deal must be able to stand the test of time.	任何可行的和平协议都必须能够经受时间的考验。


And that means it must be fair and just, rather than leaving one party seething with resentment – especially if that resentment extends to millions of people worldwide.	而这意味着它必须公平且正义，而不是让一方不堪其辱——特别是当这种怨恨扩大到全世界无数人民的话。


Attempting to ram a solution down Palestinians’ throats will increase the likelihood of even more violence, not peace.	将方案强加给巴勒斯坦人只能提高更多暴力而不是和平的可能性。


A Dangerous Game of Chicken	危险的胆小鬼游戏


SEOUL – So far, the war between US President Donald Trump and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un over the latter’s nuclear program has been fought only in words.	首尔—目前，美国总统特朗普和朝鲜独裁者金正恩之间关于后者的核计划的战争仍然停留在嘴仗阶段。


But each turn of the rhetorical screw deepens the risk that, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, “jaw-jaw” could turn into “war-war.”	但每一回合嘴炮往来，都将深化——用丘吉尔的话说——“哔哔”转化为“啪啪”的风险。


Last month, following North Korea’s second intercontinental ballistic missile test of the summer, the United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed to impose new and even stricter sanctions on the tiny country.	上个月，在朝鲜进行了今年夏天第二次洲际弹道导弹试射后，联合国安理会一致同意向这个蕞尔小国实施新的更加严厉的制裁。


The response, reported in North Korean state-run media, was a pledge that “strategic steps accompanied by physical action will be taken mercilessly with the mobilization of all [North Korea’s] national strength.”	朝鲜国家媒体声称，朝鲜的应对之道是发誓“要动员[朝鲜的]全部国家优势，毫不客气地采取战略步骤和具体行动双管齐下。 ”


The next day, Trump went off script, asserting that further threats from North Korea would be met with “fire and fury like the world has never seen before.”	第二天，特朗普开始了自由发挥，声称如果朝鲜继续威胁，将遇到“世界前所未有的火与怒。


North Korea immediately did just that, threatening to carry out an “enveloping” strike on the US territory of Guam.	”朝鲜立刻照办，威胁要对美国领土关岛采取“包络式”打击。


Trump shot back that the US military is “locked and loaded.”	特朗普回击道，美军已经“锁定目标，上膛完毕。 ”


And, indeed, as this exchange of rhetorical fire has unfolded, the US has reportedly been preparing revised military options for striking North Korea.	事实上，在嘴仗日益升级的同时，据说美国一直在准备新的打击朝鲜的军事计划。


More ominous, according to a confidential US intelligence report, North Korea has achieved the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, and may have as many as 60 bombs.	更加不祥的预兆是，据一份机密美国情报，朝鲜已经拥有了核弹头微型化的能力，核弹数量高达60枚。


The stakes are rising in Kim and Trump’s game of chicken.	金正恩和特朗普之间的胆小鬼游戏，赌注越来越大了。


It is unlikely that either North Korea or the US actually wants war.	朝鲜和美国都不可能真的想要打仗。 但是，已故的英国历史学家泰勒（A.


But, as the late English historian A.J.P. Taylor concluded, after studying eight great wars since the late eighteenth century, wars have often “sprung more from apprehension than from a lust for war or for conquest.”	Taylor）在研究了十八世纪末以来的八次大战后作出结论，战争常常“源于恐惧，而不是追求战争或征服。 ”


According to Taylor, many European wars “were started by a threatened power, which had nothing to gain by war and much to lose.”	泰勒认为，许多欧洲战争“由受威胁的一方开启，战争对它赢无可赢，而输的话损失惨重。


If Taylor were alive to witness the current situation – characterized by fear-enhancing misperception, miscalculation, and overreaction – he would undoubtedly be feeling an alarming sense of déjà vu.	”如果泰勒还活着，看到目前的局面——各种加剧恐慌的误解、误算和过度反应——他将毫无疑问地体会到似曾相识的警钟。


The question now is: what can be done to avoid catastrophe?	现在的问题是：如何避免灾难？


For starters, both the US and North Korea will have to avoid cornering one another.	首先，美国和朝鲜必须避免逼迫彼此。


During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, US President John F. Kennedy was firm in his stance that Soviet missiles would not be permitted in Cuba.	在1962年古巴导弹危机期间，美国总统肯尼迪坚持不允许苏联在古巴部署导弹的立场。


But he knew better than to pursue a total American victory and a total Soviet defeat.	但他没有追求美国的全面胜利和苏联的全面失败。


Instead, Kennedy offered a deal that would protect Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s reputation in the eyes of Kremlin hawks: the US would withdraw its missiles from Turkey (which were superfluous already), in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.	相反，肯尼迪提出了一个能够挽回苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫在克林姆林宫鹰派眼中的颜面的协议：美国从土耳其撤出导弹（已经部署得太多），换取苏联从古巴撤出导弹。


That pragmatic and courageous approach created the necessary space for the two leaders – neither of whom actually wanted a nuclear war – to retreat from the brink without losing face.	这一务实而勇敢的方针为两位领导人创造了必要的空间，在不失体面的前提下收回边缘政策——两人都不想掀起核战争。


To bring today’s crisis to a peaceful conclusion, Kim will have to tone down his aggression.	要想今天的危机得到和平解决，金正恩必须弱化他的侵略性。


But, for that to happen, the Trump administration needs to demonstrate clearly that its goal is not regime change, but policy change – that is, denuclearization – in North Korea.	但是，要想让金正恩软化口风，特朗普政府需要明确表示其目标不是推翻朝鲜政权，而是改变朝鲜政策——即去核化。


Unfortunately, the signals coming out of the US are still mixed.	不幸的是，美国所发出的信号仍然模棱两可。


While Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s recent remarks on the crisis focused on diplomacy, CIA Director Mike Pompeo has mentioned regime change, and National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster has raised the possibility of a preventive war.	国务卿蒂勒森最近主要站在外交立场上谈论这场危机，中央情报局局长麦克·蓬皮欧（Mike Pompeo）提到了推翻政权，而国家安全顾问麦卡斯特（H. R.


While it is important to put pressure on Kim to bring him to the negotiating table, such pressure must be more carefully calibrated.	向金正恩施压，迫使他坐到谈判桌前固然重要，但这样的压力必须小心安排。


If the US appears to be seeking regime change or a preemptive war, a panicked Kim will be more likely to lash out.	如果美国表现出寻求推翻政权或采取先发制人的战争的迹象，恐慌的金正恩就更有可能予以痛批。


The goal should be relative, not absolute, security for both sides.	目标应该是相对而不是绝对安全，对双方都是如此。


To this end, it is crucial to maintain rigorous civilian control of the military.	在这方面，保持严格的文官控制军队制度至关重要。


World War I broke out largely because of the militarization of the political decision-making process.	第一次世界大战之所以爆发，主要是因为政治决策过程的军国主义化。


By not taking national military-mobilization processes off of autopilot, European political leaders allowed for an international chain reaction to occur.	欧洲政治领导人没有打断国家军事动员过程的自动化，而是放任国际反应链的发生。


Once the march to war had begun, there was not much room left for diplomacy.	一旦通向战争的过程开启，就不再会有多少外交余地。


Yet, far from making space for diplomacy, Trump adviser Sebastian Gorka recently told the press that, “The idea that Secretary Tillerson is going to discuss military matters is simply nonsensical.”	但是，特朗普的顾问塞巴斯蒂安·戈尔卡（Sebastian Gorka）不去创造外交空间，反而在最近向媒体透露，“让蒂勒森国务卿去讨论军事问题，这样的想法是毫无意义的。


But why shouldn’t America’s top diplomat have significant influence over military matters?	”但为何美国首席外交官不能对军事问题产生重要影响？


If this does not change soon, we may, as then-British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wrote of World War I, “[muddle] into war” yet again.	如果这一点不马上发生改变，我们就有可能如同一战时期的英国首相劳埃德·乔治评论一战那样，再次“稀里糊涂地进入战争。 ”


South Korean political leaders must also avoid being swept up by this intensifying war rhetoric.	韩国政治领导人也必须避免因为战争修辞的升级而受到牵连。


After North Korea’s 2010 sinking of the Cheonan warship and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, the South Korean military toughened its rules of engagement.	2010年朝鲜击沉天安舰、炮轰延坪岛后，韩国军队加强了交火法则。


Now, South Korean military leaders are warning that if North Korea attacks again, it will face retaliation not just against the proximate source of those attacks, but against the North’s command leadership.	目前，韩国军方领导人发出警告，如果朝鲜再次发动袭击，不但将面临对袭击源头的报复，还将面临针对朝鲜司令部的反击。


Much like Trump’s threats, this policy is intended to deter North Korea, but it is more likely to fuel a rapid escalation of conflict.	这一政策和特朗普的威胁颇为相似，是为了威慑朝鲜，但它更有可能导致冲突迅速升级。


China also has a key role to play.	中国也可以起到关键作用。


On June 10, 1994, at the peak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China informed Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, that it would no longer veto UN sanctions on North Korea, driving the elder Kim to adopt a less antagonistic position.	1994年6月10日，第一次朝鲜核危机最危险的时候，中国通知金正恩之父金正日它将不会否决联合国对朝鲜制裁决议，迫使金正日软化了对立立场。


China may be using a similar tactic today, as it declares publicly, via state media, that North Korea should not count on China’s support in a military conflict of its own making.	如今，中国可能正在使用相同的策略，通过国家媒体公开宣布，如果朝鲜自己造成军事冲突，不用指望中国支持它。


Neither Trump nor Kim seems to have sufficient political capital to spearhead a shift from military threats to diplomatic solutions.	特朗普和金正恩都没有足够的政治资本引导军事威胁转向外交解决。


Given the far-reaching risks posed by this rapidly escalating crisis, it may well be up to other stakeholders to take the lead.	而这场快速升级的危机所造成的风险是巨大的，因此，很可能需要其他相关利益方来领导。


Will China act as the regional stabilizer it so often proclaims itself to be?	中国会扮演其经常自诩的地区稳定器的角色吗？


President Xi Jinping is being tested in this crisis as much as Trump and Kim.	习近平主席在这场危机中所经受的考验不比特朗普和金正恩小。


The End of Trump’s Market Honeymoon	特朗普的市场蜜月结束


NEW YORK – When Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, stock markets rallied impressively.	纽约—特朗普当选为美国总统时，股市令人印象深刻地大涨。


Investors were initially giddy about Trump’s promises of fiscal stimulus, deregulation of energy, health care, and financial services, and steep cuts in corporate, personal, estate, and capital-gains taxes.	投资者最初被特朗普所承诺的财政刺激、能源、医疗和金融服务去监管以及大幅削减公司、个人、房产和资本利得税的花言巧语“忽悠”得晕头转向。


But will the reality of Trumponomics sustain a continued rise in equity prices?	但特朗普经济学的现实能够维持股票持续攀升吗？


It is little wonder that corporations and investors have been happy.	公司和投资者如此高兴，这有些奇怪。


This traditional Republican embrace of trickle-down supply-side economics will mostly favor corporations and wealthy individuals, while doing almost nothing to create jobs or raise blue-collar workers’ incomes.	特朗普的承诺都是些传统的共和党涓滴式供给侧经济学，它们主要有利于公司和富人，对于创造就业岗位和提高蓝领工人收入几乎毫无用处。


According to the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center, almost half of the benefits from Trump’s proposed tax cuts would go to the top 1% of income earners.	据无党派立场的税收政策中心（Tax Policy Center），特朗普提出的减税计划的近一半收益将流向最顶层的1%收入者。


Yet the corporate sector’s animal spirits may soon give way to primal fear: the market rally is already running out of steam, and Trump’s honeymoon with investors might be coming to an end.	但公司部门的动物精神可能很快让位给一级恐惧：市场反弹已经失去动力，特朗普与投资者的蜜月可能即将结束。


There are several reasons for this.	原因是多重的。


For starters, the anticipation of fiscal stimulus may have pushed stock prices up, but it also led to higher long-term interest rates, which hurts capital spending and interest-sensitive sectors such as real estate.	首先，财政刺激预期可能确实推高了股价，但也导致更高的长期利率，这不利于资本支出和利息敏感部门（如房地产）。


Meanwhile, the strengthening dollar will destroy more of the jobs typically held by Trump’s blue-collar base.	与此同时，强势美元将摧毁更多通常属于特朗普的蓝领票仓的工作岗位。


The president may have “saved” 1,000 jobs in Indiana by bullying and cajoling the air-conditioner manufacturer Carrier; but the US dollar’s appreciation since the election could destroy almost 400,000 manufacturing jobs over time.	总统也许通过威逼利诱空调制造商开利公司（Carrier）“拯救了”印第安纳州的1,000个工作岗位； 但自其当选以来的美元升值日后可能毁掉近400,000个制造业岗位。


Moreover, Trump’s fiscal-stimulus package might end up being much larger than the market’s current pricing suggests.	此外，特朗普的财政刺激方案可能比当前市场价格所暗示的规模大得多。


As Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush showed, Republicans can rarely resist the temptation to cut corporate, income, and other taxes, even when they have no way to make up for the lost revenue and no desire to cut spending.	里根和小布什等总统证明，共和党很难抵挡降低公司、所得和其他税收的诱惑，即使他们没办法弥补因此丧失的税收手术如，也不准备削减支出。


If this happens again under Trump, fiscal deficits will push up interest rates and the dollar even further, and hurt the economy in the long term.	如果这一幕在特朗普任上重演，财政赤字将推高利率，甚至进一步促使美元升值，在长期有损于经济。


A second reason for investors to curb their enthusiasm is the specter of inflation.	投资者热情不再的第二个原因是通胀幽灵。


With the US economy already close to full employment, Trump’s fiscal stimulus will fuel inflation more than it does growth.	美国经济已经接近充分就业，因此特朗普的财政刺激对通胀的助推作用要大于增长。


Inflation will then force even Janet Yellen’s dovish Federal Reserve to hike up interest rates sooner and faster than it otherwise would have done, which will drive up long-term interest rates and the value of the dollar still more.	通胀反过来将迫使持鸽派态度的耶伦的美联储更早更快地提高利率，而提高利率将推高长期利率，进一步使美元升值。


Third, this undesirable policy mix of excessively loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy will tighten financial conditions, hurting blue-collar workers’ incomes and employment prospects.	第三，这一令人厌恶的政策组合——过于宽松的财政政策和紧缩的货币政策——将导致金融条件趋紧，危及蓝领工人的收入和就业前景。


An already protectionist Trump administration will then have to pursue additional protectionist measures to maintain these workers’ support, thereby further hampering economic growth and diminishing corporate profits.	已经转向保护主义的特朗普政府将因此不得不采取更加保护主义的措施以维持这些工人的支持，从而进一步制约经济增长、吞噬公司利润。


If Trump takes his protectionism too far, he will undoubtedly spark trade wars.	如果特朗普在保护主义之路上走的太远，将毫无疑问引发贸易战。


America’s trading partners will have little choice but to respond to US import restrictions by imposing their own tariffs on US exports.	美国的贸易伙伴们别无选择，只能用美国的进口限制反制美国之身，对美国出口品征收关税。


The ensuing tit-for-tat will hinder global economic growth, and damage economies and markets everywhere.	由此导致的持续的以牙还牙将拖累全球经济增长，伤及所有经济体和市场。


It is worth remembering how America’s 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act triggered global trade wars that exacerbated the Great Depression.	不要忘记，美国的1930年史穆特-哈雷关税法曾经触发了全球贸易战，导致大萧条进一步加深。


Fourth, Trump’s actions suggest that his administration’s economic interventionism will go beyond traditional protectionism.	第四，特朗普的行为表明，其政府的经济干预不会局限于传统保护主义。


Trump has already shown his willingness to target firms’ foreign operations with the threat of import levies, public accusations of price gouging, and immigration restrictions (which make it harder to attract talent).	特朗普已经表示他随时准备用进口税、公开指责价格欺诈和移民限制（这导致美国更加难以吸引人才）威胁企业的海外经营。


The Nobel laureate economist Edmund S. Phelps has described Trump’s direct interference in the corporate sector as reminiscent of corporatist Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.	诺贝尔经济学奖得主埃德蒙德·菲尔普斯（Edmund S. Phelps）说特朗普直接干预公司部门让人想起了社团主义的纳粹德国和法西斯主义的意大利。


Indeed, if former President Barack Obama had treated the corporate sector in the way that Trump has, he would have been smeared as a communist; but for some reason when Trump does it, corporate America puts its tail between its legs.	事实上，如果前总统奥巴马像特朗普一样对待公司部门，他可能早已被贴上了共产主义者的标签； 但在特朗普这么做时，出于某些原因，美国公司街只能夹起尾巴做人。


Fifth, Trump is questioning US alliances, cozying up to American rivals such as Russia, and antagonizing important global powers such as China.	第五，特朗普质疑盟国，与俄罗斯等对手打得火热，并挑衅中国的重要全球力量。


His erratic foreign policies are spooking world leaders, multinational corporations, and global markets generally.	他的反覆无常的外交政策让世界领导人、跨国公司和全球市场无所适从。


Finally, Trump may pursue damage-control methods that only make matters worse.	最后，特朗普可能追求损害控制路线，而这只能让情况雪上加霜。


For example, he and his advisers have already made verbal pronouncements intended to weaken the dollar.	比如，他和他的顾问们已经放出口风，想要美元贬值。


But talk is cheap, and open-mouth operations have only a temporary effect on the currency.	但说总是容易，而用嘴办事只能给美元造成暂时性影响。


This means that Trump might take a more radical and heterodox approach.	这意味着特朗普可能会采取更激进、更加非正统性的方针。


During the campaign, he bashed the Fed for being too dovish, and creating a “false economy.”	选战期间，他抨击美联储过于鸽派，创造了一个“虚假经济”。


And yet he may now be tempted to appoint new members to the Fed Board who are even more dovish, and less independent, than Yellen, in order to boost credit to the private sector.	但如今，他可能指派比耶伦更加鸽派、更不独立的人进入美联储理事会，以便增加对私人部门的信用。


If that fails, Trump could unilaterally intervene to weaken the dollar, or impose capital controls to limit dollar-strengthening capital inflows.	如果失败，特朗普可能单方面干预，让美元贬值，或实施资本管制限制令美元升值的资本流入。


Markets are already becoming wary; full-blown panic is likely if protectionism and reckless, politicized monetary policy precipitate trade, currency, and capital-control wars.	市场已经开始担忧； 如果保护主义和鲁莽的政治化货币政策引发贸易、货币和资本管制战，大恐慌也不是没有可能。


To be sure, expectations of stimulus, lower taxes, and deregulation could still boost the economy and the market’s performance in the short term.	诚然，对于刺激、减税和去监管化的预期在短期可能仍可以提振经济和市场表现。


But, as the vacillation in financial markets since Trump’s inauguration indicates, the president’s inconsistent, erratic, and destructive policies will take their toll on domestic and global economic growth in the long run.	但是，从市场在特朗普就职期间犹豫不决的表现看，这位总统的前后不一、反覆无常的破坏性政策将给国内和全球经济增长带来长期后果。


Can Trump Prove His Sanity?	特朗普能否证明自己理智？


LONDON – Since Donald Trump took over the United States presidency a year ago, doubts over his mental stability and his very sanity have been mounting.	伦敦——自从一年前唐纳德·特朗普继任美国总统之后，外界对其精神是否稳定和健全已经越来越怀疑。


With the release of Michael Wolff’s book Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House, which claims to offer a behind-the-scenes look at the president’s dysfunctional administration, those doubts seem to have taken on a new salience and urgency.	随着迈克尔·沃尔夫据称从幕后窥探这位总统治下混乱政府的火焰与暴怒：揭秘特朗普的白宫一书的出版，这些疑虑似乎更显得紧迫和突出。


But, beyond claiming on Twitter that he is a “very stable genius,” what could Trump actually do to prove that he is psychologically fit for what, by some definitions, is the world’s highest office?	但除了在推特上声称自己是一位“情绪非常稳定的天才外”，特朗普还能做些什么来证明自己在心理上适合担任这个在某种程度上全球最高的政府公职？


There is no clear physical test for mental illness.	精神疾病不存在明确的体检结果。


Even if Trump were subjected to a battery of blood tests and brain scans, the results would most likely prove nothing.	就算特朗普接受一系列血液测试和脑部扫描，结果极有可能也证明不了任何东西。


The vast majority of people with psychosis would have normal results.	绝大多数精神病患者都会得出正常的结果。


Likewise, an abnormal test wouldn’t necessarily imply impaired mental capacity: a person can retain their intelligence, even after losing a significant amount of their brain.	同样，不正常的结果也并不一定意味着精神心智受到损失：即使失去很大一部分大脑，人一样可以保持智力。


For example, a recent study showed that all but four of 54 children who underwent a hemispherectomy, in which half the brain is removed to treat severe and intractable epilepsy, showed the same or even improved intellectual capacity.	例如，最近一项研究结果显示，在54名接受大脑半球切除术切除半个大脑用以治疗严重和顽固性癫痫的儿童当中，除4人外均表现出相同甚至更好的智力。


So Trump could literally have half a brain, and it still wouldn’t prove that he was mentally ill.	因此特朗普完全可以只有半个大脑，而且仍然无法证明他在精神方面有问题。


Another approach to determining Trump’s mental fitness would be to have psychiatrists examine him and share their findings.	确定特朗普心理健康与否的另外一种方法是让他接受精神医生的检查并公开检查结果。


But, however unbiased the psychiatrists were, such assessments would ultimately be subjective.	但无论这些精神科专家多么公正无私，这样的评估归根到底都是主观的。


As any trial judge or criminal lawyer can attest, for every psychological expert produced by the defense in a legal case, prosecutors can produce one to argue the opposite.	任何审判法官或刑事律师都可以证明，在法律案件中辩方每邀请一名心理学家，控方都可以邀请另一位证明相反的观点。


Consider the case of Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011.	比如安德斯·布雷维克的案例，2011年，他在挪威杀死了77人。


At his trial, two teams of court-appointed psychiatrists disagreed with each other over whether he was insane.	在他的审判过程中，两组由法庭指定的精神病专家团队无法就他是否精神不正常达成一致。


If psychiatrists can’t agree on whether a mass murderer is insane, what hope is there that they could agree about Trump?	如果精神病学家无法就杀害多人的凶手精神是否正常达成一致，那么又有什么理由指望他们能确诊特朗普？


In any case, Trump seems to have no interest in bringing in experts.	无论如何，特朗普对引入专家都不感兴趣。


Instead, he has pursued his own – and, from a psychiatric perspective, ill-advised – strategy for rebutting questions about his sanity.	恰恰相反，他更愿意采取自己的——而从心理医生的角度看，非常不明智的——策略，反驳有关他心智是否正常的问题。


One of Trump’s go-to defenses has been that he is highly intelligent – or, as he put it recently on Twitter, “like, really smart.”	特朗普针锋相对的一个辩护策略是说自己非常聪明——或者就像他最近在推特上所说的那样，“聪明之极。


But, even if true, this, too, proves nothing.	”但即使他说的是真话，这同样证明不了任何东西。


Many highly intelligent people suffer from mental illness.	许多智商很高的人都患有精神病。


In fact, studies have shown that the populations of countries with higher average IQs suffer higher rates of suicide.	事实上，研究表明平均智商较高的国家民众有着较高的自杀率。


And suicide rates at the prestigious universities of Oxford and Cambridge are in line with average suicide rates for university-age people, highlighting again that being smart – or even smart and privileged – does not immunize a person against mental illness.	而牛津及剑桥等著名大学的自杀率与大学适龄人口的平均自杀率没有区别，从而再次凸显了高智商——甚至高智商并且特权在握——也不能确保一个人对精神疾病免疫。


Trump also claims that he is too successful to be mentally ill.	特朗普还声称像他这么成功的人不可能患上精神病。


But Howard Hughes’s success as a film producer and airline owner made him one of the richest Americans to emerge during the first half of the twentieth century.	但霍华德·休斯作为电影制片人和航空公司老板的成功使得他跻身20世纪前半叶最富有的美国人行列。


He also set several world airspeed records.	他还创造了几项世界空速记录。


Yet he suffered from severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, and he died suffering from extreme malnutrition and possible drug addiction.	但他仍然患有严重的强迫症，并最终死于极度营养不良或许还有吸毒上瘾。


Likewise, John Paul Getty, the US-born industrialist who was the world’s richest person during his time, was so obsessively frugal and paranoid that, when his grandson was kidnapped, he negotiated down the ransom demand, even after the kidnappers sent him a lock of his grandson’s hair and one of his ears.	同样，出生于美国的实业家约翰·保罗·盖提也曾是他那个时代最富有的人。 但他却着魔式的偏执和节俭，以至于当他的孙子被绑架时，他与绑匪就赎金的数额讨价还价，即使在绑匪寄给他孩子的一缕头发和一只耳朵后也依然如此。


Trump’s third key defense is to turn allegations about his sanity against his accusers and political opponents.	特朗普的第三个辩护方法是将关于其自身理智与否的指控转而引向指控方和政治对手。


That tactic is not new.	这种策略并不新鲜。


In the Soviet Union – and, many argue, in China today – political dissidents would be committed to psychiatric care, precisely to discredit them.	在苏联——还有许多人认为在今天的中国——政治异见人士都被强制接受精神病治疗，而这正是为了毁坏他们的声誉。


Russia actually withdrew from the World Psychiatric Association for most of the 1980s, in order to avoid being expelled for such practices.	实际上，俄罗斯在20世纪80年代的绝大部分时间都从世界精神病学协会退出，就是为了避免这种做法导致被开除的厄运。


As an experiment led by David Rosenhan of Stanford University in the 1970s demonstrated, a label of mental illness can be difficult to remove.	正如斯坦福大学的戴维·罗森汉在20世纪70年代所领导的实验所证明的那样，很难清除被贴上的精神病标签。


Healthy volunteers invented a hallucination, in order to find out whether the psychiatric system could distinguish genuine mental illness.	健康的志愿者发明了一种妄想症，目的是确定精神科系统能否辨识出真正的精神病患。


The volunteers ended up being admitted to psychiatric institutions, where they behaved normally and claimed no symptoms.	这些志愿者最终被送进精神病院，他们在精神病院里表现正常，没有任何症状出现。


But, with the psychotic label already affixed to their files, whatever they did was assumed to be a symptom of their insanity.	但因为精神病患者的标签已经贴在了他们的病历上，无论他们做什么都被认为是精神不正常的表现。


At best, they would be declared to be “in remission.”	充其量，他们会被宣布“处在缓解期”。


Rosenhan’s experiment suggests that questions about Trump’s mental health might never go away, no matter what steps he takes to change his detractors’ minds.	罗森汉的实验表明无论采取什么样的措施改变诋毁者的想法，有关特朗普心理健康问题的疑虑可能永远都不会消失。


Even if he stops ranting on Twitter or speaking in convoluted and incoherent sentences, at best he will be viewed as being “in remission.”	即使他停止在推特上发表言论或者改变复杂、不连贯的说话方式，充其量他将被视为“正处在缓解期”。


Modern psychiatrists would argue that they have taken to heart the lessons of the Rosenhan experiment, and now make diagnoses much more cautiously and rigorously.	现代精神病学家会争辩说他们已经吸取了罗森汉实验的教训，现在以更加谨慎严格的方式作出诊断。


Yet irresponsible political uses of psychiatric medicine still abound.	但对精神病学诊断不负责任的政治利用仍然比比皆是。


To name one example, the British government recently attempted to recruit National Health Service mental-health professionals to report those suspected of being psychiatrically vulnerable to extremist ideology.	举个例子，英国政府最近试图招募国家卫生服务机构的精神卫生专家来报告哪些人疑似容易接受极端意识形态。


In the original Rosenhan experiment, the only people who reliably recognized that the “impostor patients” were, in fact, mentally healthy were their fellow psychiatric inmates.	在最初的罗森汉实验中，唯一能够确认“冒牌患者”其实在精神上没有问题的是与他们共同生活的精神病人。


By this logic, perhaps we are asking the wrong people to assess Trump’s sanity.	按照这样的逻辑，也许我们没有找对人来评估特朗普的精神状态。


In any case, if Trump’s detractors hope to drive him from office, they will need more than armchair psychiatry.	无论如何，如果特朗普的反对者希望赶他下台，需要的不仅仅是纸上谈兵的精神病学。


Trump’s Fateful Mistake on Consumer Financial Protection	特朗普在消费者金融保护上的致命失误


WASHINGTON, DC – The founding myth of US President Donald Trump’s administration is that it will look out for ordinary Americans, and that cutting taxes on companies, deregulating finance, and rolling back environmental protections will achieve that.	发自华盛顿特区——美国特朗普政府的创始神话是声称会关怀好普通美国人，而削减企业税，放松金融管制和撤出环保协议正是为了实现这一目标。


None of this makes any sense, and the administration’s claims that these measures will spur an economic boom – with annual growth accelerating from 2% to 3% – are pure fantasy.	但这一切根本站不住脚，而政府所谓这些措施将刺激经济繁荣——将年增长率由2％提升到3％——的说法都纯粹只是些空想而已。


American voters are beginning to figure this out – as indicated by recent election results in Virginia and elsewhere.	正如近期在弗吉尼亚州和其他地方的选举结果所体现的那样，美国选民已经开始意识到了这一点。


But it will take a while for the falsity of Trump’s promises to be exposed, partly because many macroeconomic changes are complex and become apparent (or don’t) over time.	但是特朗普承诺的虚伪性还需要一段时间才能暴露出来，部分原因在于许多宏观经济变化较为复杂，还会随着时间的推移变得明显（或不明显）。


Now, however, Trump has made a major tactical mistake.	但如今特朗普犯下了一个重大的战术性错误。


By seizing control of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and placing an ideological extremist in charge, he has brought to the fore the deepest flaws in his administration’s founding myth.	通过攫取消费者金融保护局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）的控制权并任命一位意识形态极端主义者来领导该署，他已经把自己政府创始神话中的最大缺陷暴露无疑。


The CFPB was established by the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation to do exactly what its name implies: protect consumers in their various financial transactions.	消费者金融保护局是依据2010年多德-弗兰克金融改革立法而建立的，这一名称意味着该署的任务就是在各类金融交易中保护消费者。


A new agency was needed because existing regulators, including the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, had manifestly and repeatedly failed to protect consumers from abuses, such as deceptive and fraudulent mortgage-lending practices, some of which were at the heart of what went wrong in 2007-08.	而之所以需要一个新机构，原因在于包括联邦储备体系理事会在内的各大现行监管机构都已屡次明确证明自己无力去保护消费者免受侵害，例如遭遇误导和欺诈性的抵押贷款行为，更何况其中一些行为正是2007~08年间危机的主要成因。


As Elizabeth Warren (then a consumer advocate, now a US senator from Massachusetts) powerfully pointed out, there was a lot more protection for people buying toasters than for someone taking out a 25-year mortgage.	正如伊丽莎白·沃伦（当年曾是一名消费者权益维护者，现为马萨诸塞州参议员）有理有据地指出的那样，一个购买烤面包机的人所得到的保障可比起进行25年抵押贷款的人多得多。


Finance is complex, and a lot of devils could be, and were, hidden in the details.	金融交易较为复杂，许多恶魔可能（或已经）被隐藏在细节中。


The CFPB was designed, above all, to bring greater transparency to consumers’ financial transactions – actually a very pro-market contribution.	消费者金融保护局的构建首先就是为了给消费者的金融交易带来更大透明度——这实际上是一个非常有利于市场的贡献。


And the CFPB has done exactly what Congress designed it to do.	消费者金融保护局的行为完全体现了国会的意图。


So far, the Bureau has arranged for the return of almost $12 billion to 29 million consumers.	到目前为止，署方已经安排将120多亿美元退回给了2900万名消费者。


At the same time, banks are reporting record profits – on the order of $171 billion, according to the latest data.	与此同时，最新数据显示银行业利润创下了历史新高——约为1710亿美元。


The CFPB is good for business, or at least for the straightforward, transparent business of traditional lending.	消费者金融保护局有利于商业，或者至少对那类直接透明的传统贷款业务是有益的。


Unfortunately, some in the financial sector – such as payday lenders (which charge very high interest rates) – have never liked the scrutiny that the CFPB brings.	不幸的是，金融领域的某些人（比如那些收取极高的利息发薪日贷款者）从来不喜欢消费者金融保护局带来的审查。


These players, among others, have worked hard to abolish or severely curtail the agency, donating a great deal of money to members of the House Financial Services Committee for the same end.	除此之外，这些参与者还想方设法要去撤销或严重削弱该机构，并出于这一目的向众议院金融服务委员会成员捐赠了大量的资金。


Anyone who appears before the committee on anything CFPB-related can expect to hear scorn and venom from its Republican members, who claim – on the basis of no real evidence whatsoever – that the agency impedes growth, destroys jobs, holds down wages, or something else.	任何因消费者金融保护局相关事务出席委员会会议的人都可能会遭到其共和党成员的嘲笑和怨恨，后者会毫无理由地宣称该机构存在阻碍增长，破坏就业，压低工资或者有其他什么问题。


Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, appointed – and the Senate confirmed – Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s first director.	特朗普的前任奥巴马任命——并由参议院批准——理查德·柯德瑞（Richard Cordray）作为保护局的首任局长。


By all reasonable accounts, Cordray did a terrific job. With his term about to expire in 2018, all Trump needed to do was wait him out.	大家都切实认定柯德瑞出色地完成了他的任务，无奈他的任期即将于2018年届满，而特朗普所要做的就是安静地等待他下台。


Last week, however, Cordray unexpectedly resigned, naming his chief of staff as his successor.	谁知柯德瑞在上周出乎意料地提出辞职，并提名他的办公室主任继任。


Trump responded by appointing Mick Mulvaney, the head of the Office of Management and Budget, to run the CFPB.	而特朗普却任命白宫管理和预算办公室负责人米克·马尔瓦尼（Mick Mulvaney）来接管保护局。


A federal court has now ruled that Mulvaney may hold the position until the Senate can confirm a new director.	一个联邦法庭现在裁定马尔瓦尼可以留任这一职位直至参议院确认新局长人选为止。


Trump’s first mistake was to call attention and bring drama to an appointment that was going to be his to make in any case. His second mistake was to appoint Mulvaney, an anti-government radical who wants to cut as many federal agencies as he can (and is now presiding more broadly over a tax plan that will greatly boost the budget deficit and national debt).	特朗普的第一个错误是在一个无论如何都将落入他手中的任命上引发了争议和乱局，而他的第二个错误则是任命马尔瓦尼这个想尽办法削减联邦机构（现在还正在更宏观范围上主持一项将大大增加预算赤字和国家债务的税务计划）的反政府主义激进分子。


Naturally, Mulvaney has already announced an immediate freeze on all CFPB rules.	不出所料，马尔瓦尼已经宣布立即冻结所有消费者金融保护局制定的规则。


Over time, whatever the short-term outcome of any judicial appeals, we should expect key people to be forced out of the agency, procedures to break down, and consumers to receive less redress.	无论司法上诉的短期结果如何，随着时间的推移我们都应该预计会有一些关键人物被迫离开该机构，一些程序遭到破坏，消费者也只能获得较少的赔偿。


The effect of institutional turmoil will be dramatically chilling.	这一机构动荡的影响将令人不寒而栗。


The CFPB is currently one of the most responsive government bureaucracies, focused on a specific set of achievable tasks.	消费者金融保护局是目前最能回应民生需求的政府官僚机构之一，专注于一系列可实现的任务。


This will now end, likely quite soon.	不过这一切很快都将成为历史了。


But protecting consumers from financial abuses is not like macroeconomic policymaking or even budget making, which very few people understand.	但保护消费者免受金融侵害并不像宏观经济政策制定甚至预算制定那样让人难以理解。


Consumers know if they have been ripped off. And they know if someone helps them get their money back.	消费者是能意识到自己是否中了圈套的，同时也知道是否有人在他们把钱拿回来。


In a year or two, the newspapers will be full of stories of people – some of them Trump supporters – being exploited by unscrupulous financial operators and then ignored (or worse) by the federal government.	不出一两年，报纸上就会充斥着一些人——其中不乏一些特朗普的支持者——被不择手段的金融机构所利用然后遭联邦政府忽视（或者情况更糟）的报道。


The backlash against Mulvaney-style minimal government – which means no protection whatsoever for ordinary people – begins at the CFPB.	对马尔瓦尼式的最小政府——这意味着对普通民众完全缺乏任何保护——的抵制将发端于消费者金融保护局。


A founding myth that so visibly harms those whom it claims to defend will return to the political fringe, where it has belonged all along.	而一个一面口口声声要捍卫民众利益，另一方面又明目张胆地损害他们的创始神话最终只能龟缩到政治谱系的边缘，正如从前那样。


A Trump New Year	特朗普新年


WASHINGTON, DC – As US President Donald Trump decamped to his mansion-cum-private club in Palm Beach, Florida, for the holidays, he left Washington, DC, on edge.	华盛顿—美国总统特朗普去了他位于佛罗里达州棕榈滩的豪华私人庄园度假，离开华盛顿的他心理惴惴不安。


It’s obvious that Trump and his strong allies in Congress – he has more than one might expect – are determined to torpedo what’s supposed to be an independent legal inquiry into whether Trump and his campaign colluded with Russia in its efforts to defeat Hillary Clinton in 2016.	显然，特朗普和他的强大的国会盟友们——他的盟友要比你想象得更多——决定要打破理应独立进行的关于他是否在2016年的选战中与俄罗斯勾结击败希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）的调查。


The Trump camp’s behavior toward Special Counsel Robert Mueller and the FBI, which is aiding Mueller’s investigation, makes Richard Nixon and his aides’ behavior toward the Watergate investigators look tame and respectful by comparison.	从特朗普阵营对特别检察官罗伯特·穆勒（Robert Mueller）以及协助他调查的联邦调查局（FBI）的所作所为看，尼克松和他的助手们对水门事件调查者的所作所为算得上相当配合和尊重了。


Although Nixon did fire the first independent prosecutor, Archibald Cox, in the infamous “Saturday Night Massacre,” another was installed and Nixon ultimately resigned rather than face impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate.	诚然，尼克松在臭名昭著的“周末夜晚大屠杀”中炒了第一任独立检察官阿奇巴尔德·考克斯（Archibald Cox）的鱿鱼，但第二任检察官再接再厉，尼克松也最终辞职而不愿面对众议院的弹劾和参议院的确认。


(In that case, he would have had to leave office without a valuable pension.)	（如果被弹劾，他下台后将不会获得优厚的退休金）。


Oddly, Trump and his advisers seem not to have learned from more recent history, either.	奇怪的是，特朗普及其幕僚似乎也没有从更近的历史中汲取教训。


In firing FBI director James Comey, Trump opened himself up to the appointment of a special counsel.	特朗普将FBI局长詹姆斯·科米（James Comey）解职，这就让他自己暴露在了任命特别检察官的局面面前。


Whether an impeachment effort will be made cannot be known now.	是否会发动弹劾，目前还不得而知。


But most observers believe that key Republicans in the House of Representatives, where impeachment would begin, have thrown in their lot with Trump, mainly because they fear his loyal base (about a third of the country, clustered in many congressional districts).	但大部分观察者相信众议院（弹劾流程的起点）的共和党要人坚定“站边”特朗普，主要原因是他们担心他的票仓（大约占全国的三分之一，集中在许多国会选区）。


That could change if the Democrats take over the House in next November’s midterm elections.	如果在明年11月的中期选举中，民主党掌控了众议院，那么情况有可能生变。


But even if the Democrats won both houses of Congress, they would most likely be unable to muster the two-thirds majority needed to convict Trump in the Senate.	但即使民主党赢得参众两院，他们也有可能无法构成参议院批准弹劾特朗普所需要的三分之二多数。


Trump clearly fears that Mueller will find grounds to indict him.	特朗普显然害怕穆勒找到起诉他的“实锤”。


One strong possibility is that the president would be charged with obstructing justice – both an impeachable offense and a crime.	一种强烈的可能是总统会因妨碍公正被起诉——这既是弹劾理由，也是刑事罪名。


A criminal charge of obstruction requires proof of intent to convict, but Trump’s serial efforts to impinge on or halt the investigation suggest that he worries that he would be vulnerable.	妨碍公正的刑事指控需要证明犯罪意图，但特朗普一系列掣肘或阻止调查的举动证明他担忧自己不堪一击。


Whether a president can actually be indicted is an unsettled question; but if Mueller believes that the president shouldn’t be indicted, he would submit his charges to the House, which would then decide whether to proceed with impeachment.	总统实际能否被起诉，仍是一个悬而未决的问题； 但如果穆勒认为总统不应被起诉，那么他会把诉状呈给众议院，由众议院决定是否发起弹劾。


Trump is determined to head off both outcomes, and he’s clearly worried that he might fail.	特朗普决心要阻止这两个结果，并且他显然担心自己可能失败。


But it’s not just Trump who could be in legal trouble.	但可能陷入司法麻烦的不仅仅是特朗普。


Mueller has run a disciplined and tight-lipped shop, free of leaks; but it’s widely expected that Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, will be indicted.	穆勒的调查纪律严明，口风极紧，毫无消息泄漏； 但人们广泛预期特朗普的女婿贾雷德·库什纳（Jared Kushner）将会被起诉。


That may explain why Trump is treading where Nixon never dared to go, by trying to smear both Mueller and the FBI.	这也许可以解释为何特朗普要为尼克松所不敢为，抹黑穆勒和FBI。


Until now, both had enjoyed bipartisan respect.	到目前为止，穆勒和FBI赢得了跨党派尊重。


But Trump has been frustrated by the warnings he has received that firing Mueller would set off a political firestorm.	但特朗普则受到了挫折，他被警告如果将穆勒解职将引发政治轩然大波。


(Because Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein must make the call to dismiss Mueller, and has said that he sees no reason to do so, Trump would first have to fire Rosenstein, which would look too much like the Saturday Night Massacre, the turning point in Nixon’s presidency.)	（必须由司法部副部长罗德·罗森斯坦（Rod Rosenstein）来通知穆勒解职，而罗森斯坦已经表示他没有理由这样做。 因此，特朗普必须首先把罗森斯坦解职，而这与后来成为尼克松总统生涯转折点的周末夜晚大屠杀极其类似。


So, by raising questions about Mueller’s integrity and that of the FBI, Trump and his allies are trying to set the stage for a widespread public dismissal of whatever Mueller reports.	）因此，特朗普及其盟友对穆勒和FBI的诚信提出质疑，这是在营造气氛让公众不认可穆勒的报告。


It’s been a dismaying spectacle.	结果令人失望。


Trump denounces the FBI in his tweets and other statements.	特朗普在推特和其他场合的言论中批评FBI。


His right-wing allies in the House of Representatives (even more partisan than the Senate) have subjected the new FBI director, Christopher Wray, to hostile questioning in various committee hearings.	他的众议院（比参议院的党派氛围还要重）右翼盟友已经指示新任FBI局长克里斯托弗·雷（Christopher Wray）在多次委员会听证中进行敌意提问。


And they have grilled the deputy director, Andrew McCabe – who was close to Comey and could verify his claims that Trump tried to persuade him to limit the investigation – for eight and nine hours at a time.	他们还对FBI副局长安德鲁·麦凯布（Andrew McCabe，他与科米关系密切，可以作证特朗普试图说服他掣肘调查）进行过动辄八九小时的盘问。


The bullying of senior Justice Department and FBI officials by House committees has been without precedent since the anti-communist witch hunts of the 1950s.	自20世纪50年代的排共运动以来，众议院委员会对司法部和FBI高官的“霸凌”从未发生过。


This strategy seeks to force the dismissal or reassignment of troublesome FBI and Justice officials.	这一策略的目的是迫使有麻烦的FBI和司法部官员下台或辞职。


Sadly, it is having some success.	悲哀的是，它起到了一些效果。


McCabe will reportedly retire in 2018, and a recent poll showed a significant drop in public support for Mueller’s investigation over the past six months.	据称麦凯布将在2018年退休，而最新民调显示过去六个月来公众对穆勒的调查的支持率显著下降。


This is what has the capital on edge.	华盛顿最紧张的地方就在这里。


No one can be sure that Trump won’t take some dramatic action – whether related to international affairs or to the Russia investigation – during his sojourn in Palm Beach.	没人能确定在棕榈滩度假期间特朗普不会采取极端措施——不管是关于国际关系问题还是俄罗斯调查。


While Trump continues to succumb to Vladimir Putin’s blandishments (retired US intelligence official James Clapper recently remarked that Putin, a former KGB agent, is a great case officer in his handling of Trump), US relations with Russia are deteriorating.	特朗普对普京的甜言蜜语越陷越深（美国退休情报官员詹姆斯·克莱普（James Clapper）最近评论说，身为前克格勃特工，普京对特朗普的操纵可谓经典），而美国和俄罗斯的关系则在不断恶化。


Both sides are taking steps that are deepening bilateral tensions.	双方都在采取加深双边紧张的动作。


Russian submarines have been trolling near vital Western communications cables on the Atlantic Ocean floor, implying a risk of serious damage to the US and European economies and way of life.	俄罗斯潜艇游弋在大西洋底的重要的西方通讯电缆周围，给美国和欧洲经济以及生活方式造成了严重威胁。


In response, NATO plans to establish a new command center to monitor such activities.	为此，北约计划建立一个新指挥中心监控俄罗斯的行动。


Russian military planes have also been flying close to NATO aircraft.	俄罗斯军机也开始飞近北约战机。


Moreover, the Trump administration recently announced that it would permit the sale of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine, to counter Russian aggression there – a move that Russia says will only beget more violence.	此外，特朗普政府最近宣布允许向乌克兰销售致命防御武器，以遏制俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略——俄罗斯表示这一举动只能引发更多暴力。


Then there’s North Korea, with which a war is quite possible, according to some retired military officials.	还有朝鲜问题，据一些退休军官的消息，开战的可能性相当大。


Trump is known to be volatile and impulsive, but so far his major advisers have restrained him.	特朗普以反覆和冲动而闻名，但到目前为止，他的重要幕僚能够约束他。


They work hard at this, trying to avoid taking actions or telling him things that might upset him.	他们十分努力，试图避免采取行动或告诉他可能令他不安的消息。


The Washington Post recently disclosed that his intelligence briefers avoid talking about Russia.	《华盛顿邮报》最近披露，他的情报官会避免提到俄罗斯。


But the constellation of foreign-policy and intelligence officials around Trump is understood to be about to change.	但特朗普周边的外交政策和情报官员将发生更迭。


It is widely expected that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will be replaced by a more hawkish figure early in 2018.	人们广泛预期，国务卿蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）将在2018年初被一位更加鹰派的人物取代。


An exodus of White House staff members has begun, owing to dissatisfaction on their or Trump’s part.	因为对他们或对特朗普的不满，白宫工作人员将开始更新换代。


Even if we get through the holidays in relative peace, it’s clear that 2018 will be a tumultuous year.	即使假期相对平静，显然2018年也必将是动荡的一年。


Trump’s Missing North Korea Strategy	特朗普的朝鲜战略失误


DENVER – US President Donald Trump certainly has a point when he complains that he inherited the difficult problem in North Korea.	丹佛—当美国总统特朗普抱怨他接手了朝鲜难题时，确实不无道理。


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has shown no interest in negotiation, or even in listening to what anyone has to say about his reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles needed to deliver them.	朝鲜领导人金正恩没有表现出任何谈判兴趣，甚至不愿意听到任何人对他不顾后果追求核武器和发射核武器用的远程导弹置喙。


But the fact that Trump inherited the problem does not absolve him of responsibility for addressing it.	但特朗普接手问题这一事实并不能意味着他可以撇清解决问题的责任。


So far, he has failed even to articulate, much less implement, a strategy for dealing with North Korea.	到目前为止，他甚至没有对应对朝鲜的战略做出过论述，更不用说实施了。


Almost one year into his presidency, his only achievement has been to secure additional sanctions at the United Nations.	他上任总统已近一年，唯一的成就是确保了联合国升级制裁。


Worse still, his bitter complaints about his predecessors suggest that he has no idea what to do next.	更糟糕的是，他对前任的怨声载道表明他根本不知道接下来该怎么办。


Trump’s latest attempt to deal with the problem came earlier this month, when he noisily announced that his administration was putting North Korea back on the US Department of State’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.	特朗普应对朝鲜问题的最新尝试发生在本月早些时候，他大声宣布其政府将朝鲜重新打入了美国国务院的支持恐怖主义国家名单。


His decision, though justified in light of Kim’s behavior, was largely symbolic, as was former President George W. Bush’s October 2008 decision to remove North Korea from that list in the first place.	从金正恩的行为看，这一决定固然相当合理，但基本上属于象征意义，一如前总统小布什在2008年10月决定将朝鲜从这个名单中移除。


The Trump White House claims that re-designating North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism is a “critical step.”	特朗普的白宫宣称，重新将朝鲜列为支持恐怖主义国家是一个“关键动作”。


It is not.	并不是。


In fact, the US Department of the Treasury does not even require such a designation to formulate additional sanctions.	事实上，美国财政部甚至不要求对这样的国家升级制裁。


State sponsors of terrorism are ineligible for US military support – which was hardly a possibility for North Korea.	支持恐怖主义的国家无法得到美国的军事支持——但朝鲜原本就没有什么希望。


And the United States is legally prohibited from supporting any loans or other forms of assistance offered to state sponsors of terrorism by international financial institutions of which the US is a member.	美国法律也禁止其通过美国所加入的国际金融机构为支持恐怖主义的国家提供贷款或其他形式的援助。


North Korea, however, is not a member of any international financial institution.	但朝鲜没有加入任何国际金融机构。


As many have pointed out, the terrorism list is by no means a complete compendium of countries whose security services may have been involved with terrorist groups.	许多人指出，恐怖主义名单并不是安全部门涉及恐怖组织的国家的完整集合。


Currently, the full list includes just four countries: Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.	目前，整个名单中只有四个国家：伊朗、朝鲜、苏丹和叙利亚。


Despite the late Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez’s well-known ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – which the US State Department designates as a terrorist organization – Venezuela managed to stay off the list.	尽管已故的委内瑞拉独裁者查韦斯与哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）有着众所周知的关系——FARC被美国国务院认定为恐怖组织——但委内瑞拉仍然逍遥于这个名单之外。


Similarly, many believe that Pakistan’s security services maintain ties with groups that would clearly qualify the country for inclusion on the list.	类似地，许多人认为巴基斯坦安全部门与许多恐怖组织保持着关系，这足以使它也登上这个名单。


Still, even as a symbolic gesture, the context of Bush’s decision to remove North Korea from the list was entirely different from that of Trump’s decision to restore it.	尽管如此，就算是个象征性的姿态，布什将朝鲜移除名单的决定与特朗普将其重新列入名单的决定有着完全不同的背景。


In 2008, North Korea had satisfied certain conditions.	2008年，朝鲜满足了一定的条件。


First, it agreed to participate in the six-party talks with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US (which I represented as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).	首先，它同意参加与中国、日本、俄罗斯、韩国和美国进行的六方会谈（我以负责东亚和太平洋事务的助理国务卿的身份代表美国）。


The talks’ explicit goal was to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and they resulted in North Korea closing its nuclear facility in Yongbyon.	会谈有明确的目标，即朝鲜半岛去核化，并成功说服朝鲜关闭了其在宁边的核设施。


Moreover, at the time of its delisting, North Korea was also participating in talks to establish a verification system for its nuclear activities.	此外，布什将朝鲜移出名单时，朝鲜还参与了制定检查其核行为的制度的谈判。


The regime invited international inspectors to Yongbyon, and provided substantial records of the Yongbyon reactor’s operations, which are still one of the most accurate resources for measuring the amount of plutonium actually produced there.	朝鲜政权邀请国际调查员前往宁边，并提供了大量关于宁边核反应堆操作的记录，迄今它们仍然是测算实际制造的钚的数量的最准确的资源。


At the time, North Korea had agreed to blow up the Yongbyon reactor’s cooling tower, to reciprocate the US’s symbolic act with one of its own.	当时，朝鲜同意炸毁宁边核反应堆的冷却塔，作为美国象征性举动的回应。


It was a partial deal, to be sure.	诚然，这只是一个局部的成果。


But Trump would have taken it in a New York minute.	但特朗普会不假思索地接受它。


Subsequently, the agreement did begin to unravel, owing to North Korea’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge that it ever had a program, past or present, to develop fissile material through highly enriched uranium (HEU).	后来，协议确实变成了一张废纸，因为朝鲜坚决否认其曾经有过通过高浓缩铀制造核燃料的计划，过去没有，现在也没有。


The regime failed to explain international purchases of equipment consistent with such a program; and samples of specialized materials that it provided to US diplomats raised suspicions further.	朝鲜政权无法解释在国际上采购与这一计划向契合的设备的行为； 而它提供给美国外交部门的特殊材料样本让人更加生疑。


After a several-year hiatus, the Yongbyon nuclear reactor is operational once again.	在停转了多年后，宁边核反应堆再次启动。


Notably, all six of the underground nuclear tests that North Korea has conducted since 2006 have been consistent with plutonium harvested from the reactor before the six-party talks.	值得注意的是，2006年以来朝鲜所进行的所有六次地下核试验都与六方会谈前从核反应堆中获得的钚一致。


The possibility that North Korea is operating an HEU facility somewhere in its tunneled landscape is undoubtedly a cause for great concern.	朝鲜在地下某处运行着一座高浓缩铀设施，这一可能性显然导致了极大的关注。


But Yongbyon, contrary to those who have argued that it was on its last legs, has always constituted a clear and present danger.	但和认为宁边核设施已经奄奄一息的人的观点相反，这里永远是明确的、近在眼前的危险。


The fact that Trump can put North Korea back on the terrorism list with little bureaucratic fuss and virtually no international repercussions demonstrates why the list is a useful sanction for the US to have at its disposal.	特朗普能够将朝鲜重新打入支恐名单，而丝毫没有引起官僚混乱和国际反应，这表明了为何这个名单是美国可以随意支配的有用的制裁。


The standard for de-designation – no acts of terrorism or cooperation with terrorist groups in the past six months – is flexible enough that removal from the list can readily be used as a diplomatic bargaining chip.	移出名单的标准——过去六个月中没有恐怖活动或与恐怖组织合作——足够灵活，因此可以用来作为现成的外交谈判筹码。


Likewise, de-designation can easily be reversed when conditions merit it – such as when Kim orchestrates the assassination of his half-brother in a Malaysian airport.	类似地，当条件符合时——比如金正恩策划在马来西亚机场刺杀其同父异母兄弟时——移出名单的决定也可以轻易地扭转。


Solving the North Korea problem will require a seriousness of purpose and a level of discipline that Trump has not yet exhibited.	解决朝鲜问题需要有严肃的目标和一定的纪律水平，而特朗普在这两个方面都没有表现。


An effective policy would include cooperation with China, not gushing flattery for China’s leaders.	有效的政策需要与中国合作，而不是阿谀中国领导人。


That cooperation would have to be based on a long-term commitment, not one-off transactions.	这一合作必须基于长期的承诺，而不是一次性交易。


And, perhaps more importantly, it would require daily engagement not just with China, but with all of the other regional stakeholders as well.	此外，也许更重要的是，不仅需要与中国，还需要与其他地区相关利益方保持日常合作。


Needless to say, such a policy would benefit from a US secretary of state who is committed to maintaining a team of experienced diplomatic professionals, and from recognition by Trump and his advisers that building on the efforts of one’s predecessors is more effective than accusing them of making the job harder.	不消说，如果美国国务卿决定保持一支有经验的专业外交团队，或者（并且）特朗普及其幕僚认可在前任的基础上再接再厉要比指责他们让工作变得更难更加有效的话，这一政策将大受裨益。


Unfortunately, that last lesson continues to elude this administration.	不幸的是，现任政府不会吸取最后一条教训。


Donald Trump’s Historic Mistake	特朗普的历史性错误


PARIS – US President Donald Trump has announced that the United States will no longer participate in the 2015 Paris climate agreement, the landmark United Nations treaty that many of us worked so hard to achieve.	巴黎—美国总统特朗普宣布美国不再参与2015年巴黎气候协定。 巴黎气候协定是一项里程碑式的联合国条约，我们所有人付出了极大的努力才取得了这一成果。


Trump is making a mistake that will have grave repercussions for his own country, and for the world.	特朗普正在犯一个巨大的错误，将给他的祖国和全世界引起巨大的余波。


Trump claims that he will try to renegotiate the deal reached in Paris, or craft a new one.	特朗普说他要试图重新谈判巴黎所取得的协议，或起草一份新协议。


But leaders from around the world have already hailed the agreement as a breakthrough for the fight against climate change, a victory for international cooperation, and a boon to the global economy.	但当时全世界领导人都盛赞巴黎协定是遏制气候变化的一次突破，是国际合作的一次胜利，是全球经济的一个福音。


That remains true today.	今天仍然如此。


Among the many challenges we face today, climate change is unique in its global scale.	在当今我们所面临的诸多挑战中，气候变化以其全球性独树一帜。


It affects every element of life on this planet – from ecosystems and food production to cities and industrial supply chains.	它影响到地球上的所有生命要素——从生态系统和粮食生产，到城市和工业供应链。


Viewing climate change as strictly an “environmental” problem misses the point entirely.	将气候变化严格地看成是“环境”问题完全没有切中要害。


We might charitably assume that Trump simply does not understand the implications of his decision.	我们可以心怀好意地假设特朗普只是不理解他的这一决定的影响。


And yet, regardless of what Trump thinks, we know that he is surrounded by advisers who know very well what is at stake.	但是，不管特朗普怎么想，我们知道他身边有的是对此事的意义心知肚明的顾问。


On the campaign trail, Trump promised to create jobs and protect American workers from the ravages of the world.	在竞选过程中，特朗普承诺要创造就业岗位，保护美国工人免受世界劫掠。


And he signed off his tweet announcing that he had made a decision on the Paris accord with the words, “MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!”	他还在推特上宣布，他对巴黎协定做出了一个决定，即“让美国重新伟大！ ”


But Trump’s decision undermines every one of these goals, and it goes against the wishes of a vast majority of Americans, including many of his own supporters.	但特朗普的决定妨碍着多有这些目标，并且有悖于绝大多数美国人民的意愿，包括许多他自己的支持者。


By turning his back on the Paris agreement, he is increasing Americans’ exposure to the devastating effects of climate change – many of which they are already experiencing.	背弃巴黎协定的他增加了美国暴露于气候变化的毁灭性后果的风险——其中不少后果他们已经开始体验到了。


Moreover, he is undercutting jobs in the thriving renewable-energy and electric-vehicle sectors, which are increasingly employing the very workers he purports to represent.	此外，他也正在扼杀欣欣向荣的可再生能源和电动汽车行业的就业岗位，这两个行业正雇用越来越多他宣称代表的工人。


More broadly, Trump has diminished America itself, and abdicated its global leadership role.	更广泛地说，特朗普矮化了美国自身，也放弃了它的全球领导角色。


When I was a member of the French government participating in a global tour to build consensus for climate action – an effort that eventually culminated in the Paris agreement – I experienced firsthand what American leadership can achieve.	当我在法国政府中任职、参与构建气候行动共识的全球之旅时——这一努力最终促成了巴黎协定——我获得了美国领导力能够实现怎样的成就的第一手经验。


It is tragic to watch that force for good be subverted by denial and myopia.	目睹这股向善的力量被否认和近视所颠覆，这实在令人痛心。


By burying their heads in the sand, Trump and his advisers must be hoping that reality will simply go away.	特朗普及其顾问就像是把头埋在沙子里的鸵鸟，他们想必寄希望于气候变化的现实会自动消失。


They have somehow concluded that America will be spared from the droughts already destroying farms in California’s Central Valley, the rising sea levels already flooding coastal cities, the storms and wildfires routinely ravaging vast swathes of the American countryside, and the water- and food-supply disruptions that threaten us all.	在某种意义上，他们认定美国不会因为已在破坏加利福尼亚中央河谷的农场的旱灾、已经开始倒灌沿海城市的海平面升高、时不时将美国农村的广袤区域焚为焦土的风暴和野火，以及威胁到我们所有人的水和粮食供应中断而蒙难。


Other parties to the Paris agreement have responded to Trump’s decision with strength, thus proving the resilience of the agreement itself.	巴黎协定的其他各方对特朗普的决定的反应相当强硬，这证明了协定自身的坚韧性。


The rest of the world will be sad to see an America that has been left behind, owing to Trump’s decision.	看到美国因为特朗普的决定而落后，其他国家十分悲哀。


But we will not wait; in fact, we are already moving on.	但我们不会等待； 事实上，我们已在前行。


The world’s response will be clear at the G20 meeting in Germany this July.	世界对此的反应将在今年7月的G20会议上明确。


Already, Europe, China, India, Canada, and Pacific Rim and South American countries have recommitted to the goals of the Paris agreement.	目前，欧洲、中国、印度、加拿大和环太平洋和南美国家均重申对巴黎协定目标的承诺。


These countries understand the dangers of climate change, as do ExxonMobil’s global shareholders, who, just this week, rejected that company’s attempts to ignore the impact of climate change on its business.	这些国家明白气候变化的危险，埃克森美孚公司的全球股东们也明白气候变化的危险，上周他们拒绝该公司忽视其业务对气候变化的影响的企图。


By placing America in the company of the only two countries that have not joined the Paris agreement – Syria and Nicaragua – Trump’s decision is completely at odds with the current global atmosphere of cooperation.	特朗普的决定让美国加入了仅有的两个未参与巴黎协定的国家——叙利亚和尼加拉瓜的行列，这完全与当今全球合作氛围背道而驰。


The world’s major economies are reaching new agreements every day to collaborate on research and development, infrastructure investment, and industrial strategy.	世界主要经济体每天都在形成新的协议，在研发、基础设施投资和产业战略等方面开展合作。


They are working together to achieve a low-carbon economy, and to make 2020 the year that global greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked.	它们齐心协力致力于实现低碳经济，让2020年成为全球温室气体排放见顶之年。


European leaders are already meeting with their Indian and Chinese counterparts to find areas where they can cooperate on developing clean energy and green infrastructure.	欧洲领导人已经同印度和中国领导人会晤，寻找可以合作开发清洁能源和绿色基础设施的领域。


Massive investments will be made in these areas, and the European Central Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and many other institutions are devising mechanisms to finance them.	这些领域将迎来大手笔投资，欧洲央行、亚洲基础设施投资银行和其他许多机构都在制定融资机制。


Likewise, sovereign wealth funds with immense clout in the global financial system are redirecting their investments toward the green economy.	类似地，在全球金融体系中具有巨大影响力的主权财富基金也在将投资转向绿色经济。


Even the most optimistic among us did not predict that the old fossil-fuel paradigm would change so quickly.	即便是我们当中最乐观的人士，也认为旧化石燃料范式不会很快改变。


But Europe is phasing out coal-fueled energy production.	但欧洲正在逐步淘汰燃煤能源生产。


And India, China, and South Korea are rapidly shifting their investments away from coal, and toward renewable-energy sources.	印度、中国和韩国也在讯速地将投资从煤炭转向可再生能源资源。


Worldwide, the competition is about “who can go green the fastest.”	放眼全球，大家比的是“谁能最快变绿”。


New industries are springing up, at scale, in areas ranging from electrification and smart-grid design to electric vehicles, green construction and recycling technologies, and organic chemicals.	从电气化和智能电网设计到电动汽车、绿色建筑和循环技术、有机化工，新行业正在这些领域成规模地出现。


The renewable-energy revolution, now spreading at an unprecedented rate, is already transforming entire sectors, not least transportation.	可再生能源革命正在以前所未有的速度蔓延，目前已经开始改变整个部门——不仅仅是交通业。


In all of these sectors around the world, the excitement and growth potential is palpable.	在全世界的所有这些部门，振奋和增长潜力显而易见。


It is a shame that Trump has decided to shirk America’s global responsibility and turn his back on these developments.	特朗普决定逃避美国的全球责任，自绝于这些发展趋势，这令人羞耻。


His decision is a blow to so many people – including a great many Americans – who have worked hard to be a successful part of the new economy.	他的决定对许多努力地想成为新经济的成功组成部分的人来说是一次打击——包括大量美国人。


Still, Trump cannot take all of America with him.	但是，特朗普不能让全体美国人就范。


State- and city-level climate action is sweeping across the US, increasing in scale and ambition.	州和市政层面的气候行动遍及全美，规模和雄心都在提升中。


Trump’s historic mistake represents an obstacle to that collective action; but it can hardly stop it.	特朗普的历史性错误是这一集体行动的一个障碍； 但几乎不可能阻挡它。


Just as Chinese companies are now training US coal workers to build wind farms, the rest of the world will continue to work together, and build the markets and workforce of the future.	正如中国公司如今在培训美国煤炭工人建设风电场，世界其他部分将继续齐心合力打造未来市场和劳动力大军。


Profiles in Discouragement	沮丧的剖面


NEW YORK – Some specialists in the life sciences say that no one is ever fully cured of any injury or disease, because our cells forever retain traces, memories, of even the slightest attacks on the body’s integrity.	纽约—一些生命科学专家说，没有人可以从伤害或疾病中完全治愈，因为我们的细胞会永远保留哪怕是对身体完整性的最为轻微的攻击的痕迹和记忆。


So it will be with the United States.	美国也是如此。


One day, the US will turn the page on Donald Trump.	总有一天，美国会将特朗普的那一页翻篇。


But America will never recover completely from the unstanchable wound that his presidency’s baseness, bull-headed stupidity, and puzzling passivity in the face of China’s global ambitions has inflicted on its culture and international standing.	但美国永远无法从其担任总统时的卑劣、颟顸和面对中国的全球野心的令人迷惑的消极态度对美国文化和国际地位所造成的伤口中完全恢复。


Is Trump a symptom? Or is he a terminal disease?	特朗普只是一个症候，还是已经病入膏肓？


Demoralization and defeatism have not spared the Democrats, as I found recently in New York and on a recent visit to Chicago to address a seminar at the University of Chicago’s Institute of Politics.	堕落和挫败还没有蔓延到民主党。 我最近在纽约以及赴芝加哥大学政治研究所主持研讨会时发现了这一点。


At the home of the Iranian-American Nazee Moinian, whose Manhattan apartment recalls the patrician abodes of the members of the Algonquin Round Table, the assembled elites are in agreement.	在伊朗裔美国人纳齐·莫伊尼安（Nazee Moinian）家中，齐聚一样的精英们达成了共识。 莫伊尼安的公寓位于曼哈顿，模仿阿冈昆圆桌会（Algonquin Round Table）成员的高贵居所。


Trump, by not backing the Kurds in their bid for independence from Iraq, committed not just a moral error, but also an irreparable political mistake.	特朗普不支持库尔德人脱离伊拉克独立，这不仅是一个到的错误，也是不可挽回的政治失策。


He betrayed his Kurdish ally.	他背叛了他的库尔德盟友。


He strengthened his Iranian adversary.	他增强了他的伊朗对手。


The German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt might say that Trump had confused his friend and his enemy, dealing with the former as he should have dealt with the latter.	德国法律和政治学家卡尔·施密特（Carl Schmitt）也许会说，特朗普混淆了朋友和敌人，结果用对待后者的方式对待前者。


Inexplicably, Trump sacrificed (once again) a crucial US national interest, this time by abandoning the sole force in the Middle East region (outside of Israel) on which America could safely and seriously rely.	令人难以理解的是，特朗普（再次）牺牲了美国的关键国家利益——这一次是放弃了美国唯一能够安全和严重依赖的（以色列之外的）中东地区力量。


How does one respond to such a forfeiture?	我们如何面对这样的局面？


With what resources?	凭借什么面对？


Was there really no way to counter the club of bad neighbors who refuse to countenance any discussion of Kurdish sovereignty?	真的没有办法对付拒绝讨论库尔德主权问题的邪恶邻居了吗？


Some Democrats swallow their national pride and say that France’s young president, Emmanuel Macron, newly crowned by Time magazine as king of Europe, is in a better position to step in and stay the hand of Iraq and Iran.	一些民主党人放下了他们的民族自豪感，说最近被《时代》杂志冠以欧洲国王名号的法国的年轻总统马克龙更适合介入接手伊拉克和伊朗问题。


Older Democrats express not the slightest reservation about the use of US power during the Cold War.	老一辈民主党人毫无保留地表示要使用美国在冷战时期的实力。


But here they are, paralyzed, disarmed, when the time comes to raise their voice – merely their voice! – against the sinister but motley gang of four (Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria) blocking Kurdish independence.	但在这里，他们软绵无力，手无寸铁，他们发出声音——也只能发出声音——反对阴险的四个小丑（伊朗、伊拉克、土耳其和叙利亚）阻挠库尔德独立。


At Temple Emanu-El on Fifth Avenue, the most beautiful synagogue in New York and one of the largest in the world, I was recently interviewed by Pamela Paul, editor of the New York Times Book Review.	我最近在第五大道上的以马内利会堂——这里堪称纽约最美轮美奂的犹太教堂，也是世界最大的犹太教堂之一——接受了《纽约时报书评》（New York Times Book Review）编辑帕梅拉·保罗（Pamela Paul）的采访。


The conversation again turned to Macron.	我们的对话再次转到了马克龙身上。


I tried to explain that his trademark phrase, en même temps (at the same time), which tends to be heard here as an expression of American-style pragmatism, may instead be one of the most visible traces of his doctrinal proximity to the French Protestant philosopher Paul Ricœur.	我试图解释，他的招牌式用语——en même temps（与此同时）听上去就像是美国式实用主义的表达，但实际上堪称是其在思想上接近法国新教哲学家保罗·里克尔（Paul Ricœur）的最佳写照。


Far from reflecting careful deliberation over an ambiguous choice, “at the same time” is the credo of someone suspended in fear and trembling before the unsolvable and terrifying mystery of the double nature – physical and spiritual, mortal and resurrected – of the tormented body of Christ.	“与此同时”绝意味着对模棱两可的选择的深思熟虑，而是一个在无法解决的可怕难题面前畏而却步的人的信条。 这个难题就是饱受摧残的基督的肉身的双重性之谜——身体和精神，凡人和神祇。


But very soon we arrive at the question of anti-Semitism in America.	但很快我们就来到了美国的反犹问题。


On the one hand, it is to be found in that horde of nativists, white supremacists, and neo-confederates who descended on Charlottesville, Virginia, in August to break some black and Jewish heads.	一方面，8月份在弗吉尼亚州夏洛特维尔（Charlottesville）出现了大量本土论者、白人至上主义者和新联盟派（neo-confederates）拧断了不少黑人和犹太人的脖子。


On the other hand, it is seen among leftists on US campuses who have caught the fever of BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions), the global campaign against Israeli products that is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate from a quasi-overt campaign against products and businesses that are just plain Jewish.	另一方面，在美国校园的左翼中间，很多人热衷于BDS（抵制、撤资和制裁）。 BDS是一场针对以色列产品的全球性运动，但越来越难以区分它到底是不是一场针对显然属于犹太的产品和企业的半公开运动。


In this sense, are we living in the époque of Trump, in which Trump’s revival of the “America First” slogan of the American Nazis in the 1930s has encouraged a loosening of bigoted tongues?	从这个角度讲，我们是生活在特朗普时代吗？ 在这个时代里，特朗普复兴了美国纳粹分子在20世纪30年代所高举的、鼓动偏隘的“美国优先”口号。


Could it be that Trump himself, despite his officially pro-Israel positions, is a closeted anti-Semite?	有没有可能特朗普本人——尽管其官方基调是支持以色列——在私下里是反犹主义者？


The truth is that the question of Trump – the enigma of the man and even his very name – takes up much too much space in public debate.	真相是特朗普问题——这个人，乃至他的名字的谜团——在公共争论中占据了过多的空间。


The truth is that in spending time wondering whether Trump is insane, or, like an overstuffed and obscene Hamlet, he feigns madness to confuse his adversaries, we are all falling into the trap of a narcissism that, here in the US, is the new face of nihilism.	真相是我们在花时间困惑特朗普是不是疯了，或者困惑他是不是活像一个“油腻”又猥琐的哈姆雷特那样，在装疯卖傻迷惑对手时，我们落入了自恋的陷阱，在美国，这是虚无主义的新面孔。


What’s a President to Do?	总统会干些什么？


SEOUL – Donald Trump took office promising a raft of sweeping economic-policy changes for the United States.	首尔—特朗普上台时承诺要全盘改革美国的经济政策。


He has quickly discovered, like previous US presidents, that America’s political system is designed to prevent rapid, large-scale change, by interposing formidable institutional obstacles, from the Congress and career civil servants to state governments and the courts.	和此前诸任美国总统一样，他很快就发现，美国的政治制度就是为了防止大规模的迅速变化而设计的，方法就是引入巨大的制度障碍，国会、公务员、州政府、法院都属此列。


Start with reform of personal income tax.	从个人所得税改革开始说起。


This should be a slam-dunk, because the president and congressional Republican leaders are on the same page.	这应该易如反掌，因为总统和国会共和党领袖站在同一条战壕里。


Trump’s goal of removing the government’s groping hand from Americans’ pockets, by cutting the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income from 39.5% to 33%, is entirely consistent with mainstream Republican ideology, according to which high tax rates penalize success and stifle innovation.	特朗普要将政府的“咸猪手”赶出美国人的钱包，将一般所得税最高边际税率从39. 5%降低到33%，这与共和党主流意识形态——高税率在惩罚成功、遏制创新——完全一致。


But, to be politically viable, significant tax cuts for the wealthy would have to be accompanied by at least token tax cuts for the middle class.	但是，要具备政治可行性，为富人大幅减税的政策必须辅之以为中产阶级减税，至少要装装样子。


And broad-based tax cuts would blow a hole in the budget and excite congressional deficit hawks, of whom there are still a few.	而全面减税将令预算不堪重负，刺激国会中仍有不少人的赤字鹰派。


One can imagine closing loopholes to render rate cuts revenue neutral.	你可能会想到用填补避税漏洞的方法来抵消降低税率所带来的政府收入下降。


But one person’s loophole is another’s entitlement.	但甲的避税漏洞可能是乙额权利。


Even if there are economic arguments for eliminating, say, the deductibility of mortgage interest payments, imagine the howls of protest from homeowners, including many Trump voters, who borrowed to purchase their houses.	即使有经济上的理由可以取消（比如）按揭利息抵税，这样做也必将引起贷款买房的屋主的强烈抗议，包括许多特朗普的选民。


Imagine the reaction of Trump’s friends in real estate.	特朗普的房地产界的朋友们更是如此。


Cuts on the spending side would assuage the deficit hawks.	削减支出可以安抚赤字鹰派。


And big cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency, the US Agency for International Development, and National Public Radio are high on the Republican hit list.	大幅削减环境保护署、美国国际开发署、和国家公共广播电台的预算是共和党打击名单上的前几名。


But the vast majority of federal spending is on entitlements, the military, and other proverbial “third rail” items that elected officials touch at their peril. Simply put, broad-based spending cuts to match broad-based income-tax reductions are not politically feasible.	但联邦支出的大头是福利、军事和其他众所周知的当选官员誓死捍卫的“第三轨道”项目。


Eliminating federal subsidies for health-insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) would save the government a little over $100 billion a year, about 3% of federal spending.	取消平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）所覆盖的医疗保险的联邦补贴可以让政府每年节约略多于1,000亿美元，或联邦支出的3%左右。 但这些补贴主要由他们自身的税收抵扣支付。


But those subsidies are largely paid for by their own dedicated taxes.	此外，特朗普和国会共和党正在领教，取代奥巴马医保说起来容易做起来难。


Moreover, Trump and congressional Republicans are learning that replacing Obamacare is easier said than done.	希拉里·克林顿可能会告诉他们，医疗改革是一件无比复杂的事情。


Health-care reform, as Hillary Clinton could have told them, is fearsomely complex.	越来越清楚的是，医改会改头换面（“特朗普医保”，或者其他？


It is increasingly clear that the name will change (“Trumpcare,” anyone?), and it can be expected that the Republican plan will cover fewer people; but much of the substance will remain the same.	），可以预计共和党的计划将覆盖更少的人； 但大部分实质内容将完全相同。


Because corporate taxes are less significant in terms of overall federal revenue, rate cutting doesn’t pose a comparable threat to the budget balance.	公司税对联邦总税收收入来说并不那么重要，因此，相对来说降低公司税率对于预算平衡不会造成很大的影响。


But here there is no agreement between Congress and the Trump administration on the form such cuts should take.	但国会和特朗普政府尚未对如何操作达成一致。


House Speaker Paul Ryan and others favor moving to a border adjustment tax that would tax corporate cash flows regardless of where the goods sold by US companies are produced, while exempting exports.	众议院议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）和其他人支持采取边境调节税，即对美国公司所销售的商品所产生的现金流征税，不论产品产自何处，而出口可以免征。


Others, such as Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, are evidently skeptical.	其他人，如财政部长史蒂文·努钦（Steven Mnuchin）显然对此抱怀疑态度。


And an important part of Trump’s business constituency – import-dependent retailers like Target and Walmart – are actively hostile.	而特朗普的重要商界票仓——塔吉特（Target）和沃尔玛等依赖进口的零售商——将强烈反对。


Agreement on a plan won’t come easily.	一致的计划将十分难产。


Trump’s other flagship proposal is a $1 trillion infrastructure program.	特朗普的另一个主要方案是1万亿美元基础设施计划。


But this initiative will run headlong into deficit concerns, and it is fundamentally at odds with Republican skepticism about big government, and specifically about the public sector’s capacity to carry out investment plans efficiently.	但该计划将引起巨大的赤字担忧，并且在根本上与共和党质疑大政府的精神相悖，尤其是对公共部门落实投资计划的效率的质疑。


Trump will want to be able to point to a few signature projects.	特朗普还希望能够指定一些标志性项目。


He will want his border wall with Mexico.	他还想在墨西哥边境筑墙。


But any new federal infrastructure spending is likely to be more symbolic than real.	但任何联邦基础设施支出都是象征意义大于实际意义。


So what will an impatient president, frustrated and hemmed in on all sides, do?	那么，一位没有耐心的、在所有方面都饱受挫折和掣肘的总统会做些什么？


First, Trump will focus on the one set of economic policies a president can pursue without close congressional cooperation, namely those affecting trade.	首先，特朗普将专注于一些总统不必获得国会合作就能采取的经济政策，即贸易政策。


He can invoke the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, restricting imports on the grounds that they threaten US “material interests.”	他可以援引1962年贸易扩张法，以进口威胁美国的“实质利益”为借口限制进口。


He can invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 on the grounds that the loss of jobs to Mexico and China constitutes an economic emergency.	他可以以就业岗位向墨西哥和中国流失构成经济紧急情况为借口，援引1977年国际紧急情况经济权力法。


He can even invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 on the grounds that the US has Special Forces active in the Middle East.	他甚至可以以美国在中东部署特种部队为借口，援引1917年与敌贸易法。


Second, Trump will respond, as populists do, by attempting to distract attention from his failure to deliver the economic goods.	其次，特朗普可以和民粹主义者那样，试图将注意力从他无法兑现经济承诺上引开。


This means directing his ire and that of his supporters toward others – whether internal enemies like the press, the intelligence community, and Barack Obama, or external adversaries like the Islamic State and China.	这意味着将他和他的支持者的愤怒引向其他人——不管是媒体、情报机构和奥巴马等国内敌人，还是伊斯兰国和中国等国外对手。


It wouldn’t be the first time a politician used a domestic political crusade or a foreign policy adventure to divert attention from his economic failures.	这不是第一次有政客利用国内政治运动或外交政策来将注意力从他的经济失败上引开。


We have already seen Trump’s tendency to lash out at perceived enemies, foreign and domestic.	我们已经看到，特朗普惯于痛击他所认定的敌人，不管是国外还是国内。


And we know that this confrontational style is the modus operandi of senior White House advisers like Stephen Bannon and Stephen Miller.	我们也知道，这一冲突风格也是史蒂芬·班农（Stephen Bannon）和史蒂芬·米勒（Stephen Miller）等白宫幕僚的惯用伎俩。


We can hope that cooler heads prevail.	我们可以寄希望于冷静战胜冲动。


But, given the constraints on implementing Trump’s economic agenda, it’s hard to be optimistic.	但是，考虑到特朗普实施经济日程所受到的约束，我们很难保持乐观。


Donald Trump Thought	特朗普思想


LONDON – After US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to China, it can only be a matter of time before right-wing media outlets like Breitbart News and Fox News suggest that he should take a page from President Xi Jinping’s playbook, despite the overwhelmingly Leninist nature of its contents.	伦敦—美国总统特朗普访问中国后，布莱巴特新闻社（Breitbart News）和福克斯新闻台等右翼媒体开始宣传他应该效仿习近平主席的策略将只是时间问题。 尽管习近平的策略内容充满了列宁主义的性质。


At last month’s 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi was effectively anointed his country’s supreme leader.	在上个月的中共十九大上，习近平事实上加冕了中国最高领袖。


By enshrining so-called Xi Jinping Thought in the CPC charter, Party members established Xi alongside the People’s Republic’s two historical giants, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping – the only other Chinese leaders with officially recognized eponymous ideologies.	所谓的习近平思想被写入中共党章，与共和国的两位历史巨人——毛泽东和邓小平相提并论。 毛和邓是仅有的两位被正式认可用本人姓名命名意识形态的中国领导人。


The content of Xi’s intellectual contribution to Marxist-Leninism further entrenches his position.	习近平对马列主义的思想贡献的内容进一步巩固了他的地位。


Light on Marxism and heavy on Leninism, Xi Jinping Thought merges central control with nationalism.	习近平思想受马克思主义较浅，受列宁主义影响较深，它结合了中央控制与民族主义。


And it firmly establishes Xi as his country’s most powerful leader since Mao, enabling him, to paraphrase Trump, to “make China great again.”	习近平被牢固地树立为自毛泽东以来权力最大的领导人，这使得他能够——借用特朗普的话——“让中国再次伟大”。


Trump can only envy Xi.	特朗普只能艳羡习近平。


After all, changing the CPC charter is straightforward: Anyone who dares to disagree openly with a proposed amendment can look forward to a visit from the Party’s anti-corruption police.	毕竟，修改中共党章非常简单：任何人胆敢公开反对修改提议都会迎来党的反腐警察的拜访。


Changing the US Constitution is not so simple.	修改美国宪法可没这么简单。


But just consider the possibility: Amend the US constitution, as has happened 27 times, to include “Donald Trump Thought,” and fire up the masses, yet again, with the hope of “America First.”	但不妨考虑一下可能性：修改美国宪法——此前已经有过27次——将“特朗普思想”写入其中，并再次用“美国优先”的希望煽动群众。


Donald Trump Thought is easy to understand and requires little intellectual strain to master.	特朗普思想通俗易懂，也不需要多少智力就能掌握透彻。


First, be nice to countries where there is, or could be, a Trump Tower or other family franchise.	首先，要对有或可能有特朗普大厦或其他家族特许经营物业的国家保持善意。


Be particularly friendly to countries that roll out a long red carpet – or, better yet, a golden welcome mat – when Trump stops by.	尤其要对用长长的红地毯——最好还要加上金色欢迎垫——迎接特朗普驻跸的友好。


Don’t worry if the country in question is a democracy or a dictatorship.	不要在意这个国家是民主国家还是独裁国家。


Actually, a country may be a better friend – to Trump, if not the US – if it is run by a “tough guy” who locks up (or worse) critics and opponents.	事实上，如果一个国家由“强人”统治，他能够把批评者和反对者关起来（或者用更糟糕的手段对付他们），那就更好了——对特朗普，而不是对美国而言。


Democracies require leaders to answer too many questions, jump through too many hoops, and face too much resistance.	民主国家要求领导人回答各种问题，经受各种考验，面对各种反对。


The second tenet of Donald Trump Thought provides a way to circumvent these inconveniences at home: Any news the leader doesn’t like is fake news.	特朗普思想的第二个信条提出了一条规避国内麻烦的计策：任何领袖不喜欢的新闻都是假新闻。


Reality is whatever makes the leader look good.	让领袖看起来很好的就是现实。


This tenet dictates the following imperative: Keep every idea so simple that it can be expressed in less than 280 characters, tweeted from the sofa, Fox News blaring.	这一信条引出了下面这条要务：每个概念都要足够简单，能够用不到280个字说清楚，坐在沙发上用Twitter发出，或者由福克斯新闻台播送。


These ideas should appeal to the electorate’s most atavistic urges.	这些概念应该直击选民最“返祖”的紧迫要求。


Their defining message should be “blood and soil.”	打出的旗号应该是“鲜血与土地”。


Hostility toward previous US presidents is a must as well.	对美国的前总统们保持敌意也是必须的。


By definition, anything Barack Obama said or did was wrong.	根据这个要求，奥巴马所说的、所做的无不是错误的。


Trump need not acknowledge that his predecessor saved the US economy from the depths of depression; he can simply take credit for the results, including rising job creation and asset prices.	特朗普不需要承认他的前任挽救美国于深度萧条之中； 他只需要“摘桃子”就行了——就业岗位增加了，资产价格上涨了。


Donald Trump Thought takes aim at two of Obama’s signature achievements: the 2010 Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.	特朗普思想瞄准了奥巴马的两大招牌式成就：2010年平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）和2015年伊朗核协议。


But repealing Obamacare has proved much harder than Trump expected.	但取消奥巴马医保看起来要比特朗普预期的困难得多。


It would be a lot easier if only Trump could find something to replace it that would not leave poor and sick people – including his own constituents – much worse off.	只有特朗普找到办法能够取消奥巴马医保，又不会让穷人和病人——包括他自己的票仓——情况大幅变差，才有可能得逞。


As for the nuclear deal, Trump has moved beyond demonizing Iran publicly to decertifying the agreement, even though Iran has kept up its end of the bargain.	至于伊核协议，特朗普大肆公开妖魔化伊朗，以此抹黑该协议，尽管伊朗一直信守协议承诺。


According to Donald Trump Thought, it doesn’t matter if that decision intensifies the Sunni-Shia clash in the Middle East.	根据特朗普思想，即使这一决定会加剧中东逊尼派-什叶派冲突也没什么大不了的。


Nor should a Trumpian thinker care if America’s closest democratic allies – in this case, the Europeans – disagree; on the contrary, European support for the agreement with Iran is yet another reason to scrap it.	特朗普思想信徒也不会在乎美国最紧密的民主盟友的反对——在这个例子中，是欧洲； 相反，欧洲支持伊核协议正是要废除协议的又一个原因。


Trump’s creed includes three more key principles.	特朗普的教条包括三个重要原则。


First, trade surpluses with other countries are important – so important that it does not matter if the increased US exports mentioned in press releases after foreign visits are real or virtual.	首先，对其他国家的贸易盈余很重要——重要到了出访后媒体所报道的美国出口增加是真是假都无关紧要的程度。


The key is to be able to announce and even sign deals that sound big – the more billions in the boasts, the better.	关键是要能够宣布甚至签署听上去很重磅的协议——可吹嘘的数字越大越好。


(Questions about how to execute this requirement should be directed to China, where phantom deals for gullible foreigners are a diplomatic specialty.)	（至于如何执行这一要求的问题应该留给中国，与好骗的外国人签订阴阳协议是其外交特长。 ）


Second, evidence and facts are no basis for policy.	其次，证据和事实都不是政策的基础。


A Trumpian thinker diligently ignores all the mumbo jumbo about climate change.	特朗普思想信徒将孜孜不倦地忽视一切关于气候变化的胡言乱语。


Let the winds blow, the storms rage, the rain pour, the sea levels rise, and the air pollution kill, while denying that it could possibly have any relationship to humans greenhouse-gas emissions.	让风吹吧，让风暴肆虐吧，让大雨瓢泼吧，让海平面升高吧，让空气污染杀死人吧，反正这不可能与人类温室气体排放有任何关系。


If scientists offer evidence to the contrary, call it a hoax, concocted to weaken America.	如果科学家拿出了相反的证据，那肯定是在骗人，目的是削弱美国。


Above all, accept no limitations on coal production and hold the oil industry’s interests close to your heart at all times.	最重要的是，决不能对煤炭生产设限，而石油行业的利益永远要成为你最关切的问题。


Finally, believe whom you want to believe – even if that means trusting Russian President Vladimir Putin, the ex-KGB man, over America’s own security and intelligence agencies.	最后，相信你愿意相信的——即使这意味着信任俄罗斯总统、前克格勃特工普京而不是美国自己的安全和情报机构。


The closer Special Counsel Robert Mueller and his team of investigators get to the truth about Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, the more you must insist that Putin “means” what he says.	特别检察官罗伯特·穆勒（Robert Mueller）和他的调查短腿越是接近俄罗斯干预2016年大选的真相，你就越必须坚持普京对他的话是“当真”的。


This can also be applied in the United Kingdom, where evidence is mounting that Russian money and social media activities played a role in securing victory for the Brexiteers in June 2016.	这也适用于英国，越来越多的证据表明俄罗斯资金和社交媒体活动在2016年6月英国退欧派赢得公投中扮演了角色。


In Donald Trump Thought, Putin is both a prophet and a patron saint.	在特朗普思想中，普京是先知和守护圣徒。


Putin, like Trump, is a warrior for national greatness against the evil forces of multilateralism and cultural pluralism.	和特朗普一样，普京也是对抗多边主义和文化多元主义、捍卫国家伟大的战士。


And, like Trump, he knows who his friends are.	和特朗普一样，他也知道谁是他的朋友。


America’s Tax-Cut Peronists	美国的庇隆主义减税派


WASHINGTON, DC – Name the country.	华盛顿—说一个国家。


Its leader rails against foreigners, erects various import barriers, and pushes for low interest rates and lots of cheap credit for favored sectors.	它的领导人怒“怼”外国人，树立各种进口壁垒，还为他所偏爱的行业推动低利率和各种便宜信贷。


Government debt is already high, but the would-be strongman in power decides to pile on even more by increasing the budget deficit, arguing that this will boost prosperity to previously unattainable levels.	政府债务已经很高了，但这位掌了权的所谓的强人仍决定提高预算赤字，从而增加更多债务，说这能够让繁荣达到此前无法达到的水平。


While the government claims to represent the common people, state contracts are awarded to friends of friends.	政府声称代表普通老百姓，但国家合同都给了“朋友圈”。


The answer, of course, is Argentina under Juan Perón, who was in power from 1946 to 1955 (and again briefly in 1973 and 1974), and many of his successors.	答案当然是，这是庇隆及其多位继任者治下的阿根廷。 庇隆在1946—1955年间掌权（以及1973—1974年再度短暂掌权）。


One of the richest countries in the world around 1900 was laid low by decades of unsustainable economic policies that made people feel good in the short run but eventually ended in disaster, such as runaway inflation, financial crisis, and periodic debt defaults.	这个在1900年前后跻身世界最富裕行列的国家，因为几十年来的不可持续的经济政策而衰落，这些政策让人们在短期感觉良好，但最终以灾难收场，引发诸如失控的通胀、金融危机和时不时的债务违约等事件。


(To be clear, Argentina’s economic policies today are quite different; for deep and up-to-date analysis, I recommend the work of my colleague Alberto Cavallo.)	（澄清：今天的阿根廷的经济政策已经大不相同，深度的最新分析我推荐我的同事阿尔贝托·卡瓦洛（Alberto Cavallo）的工作。 ）


But if your answer was the United States under President Donald Trump, you would not be far off.	但如果你的答案是特朗普总统治下的美国，也不算太离谱。


There is reason to fear that the US is now on the path to what was previously known as Latin American populism.	有理由担心美国现在正走在此前被称为拉丁美洲民粹主义的道路上。


Consider the remarkable volte-face of the Republican Party on fiscal responsibility.	以共和党在财政责任上的“翻脸”为例。


There used to be a national debt clock in the hearing room of the House Financial Services Committee, and Republicans would rant about government profligacy as it ticked upward.	过去，众议院金融服务委员会（Financial Services Committee）听证室里有一个国民债务钟，当这个钟向上走动时，共和党就会批评政府乱花钱。


When I was in that room recently, the clock was “under repair.”	最近，我去这里参加听证时，这只钟正在“修理中”。


Self-proclaimed “fiscal conservatives,” such as Mick Mulvaney (a former member of the House of Representatives who now runs government finances as head of the Office of Management and Budget), are close to enacting a massive tax cut, despite knowing that it will drive up the deficit and the national debt.	米克·马尔瓦尼（Mick Mulvaney，前众议员，现任国会预算办公室主任，负责政府财务）等自称的“财政保守派”们眼看就要实施大规模减税了，尽管他们知道这将提高赤字和国民债务。


Mulvaney and his colleagues could not care less.	马尔瓦尼和他的同事们对此毫不在乎。


Despite controlling both Houses of Congress and the presidency, the Republicans are beset by internal divisions.	尽管控制着国会两院和白宫，但共和党仍然因为内部分歧而难以有所作为。


As a result, they are finding it hard to “pay for” the tax cuts with any reduction in tax expenditures (incentives for various activities such as corporate borrowing, mortgage financing, or retirement saving).	结果，他们无法通过削减税收支出（对诸如公司借贷、按揭融资和退休储蓄等各种活动的激励）来“支付”减税。


But Republicans are deeply committed to gigantic tax cuts, in large part because their donors are demanding that they enact them.	但共和党铁了心一定要大幅减税，主要原因是他们的“金主”要求他们实施减税。


As a result, the US will merely end up with bigger budget deficits.	因此，美国的预算赤字必然还会变得更大。


Facts used to matter in Washington, at least a little bit.	曾经，事实在华盛顿还挺重要，至少有点用。


But this is no longer the case in the age of Trump, at least not when it comes to taxes.	但在特朗普时代不再如此，至少在税收问题上不再如此。


Instead, the strategy has been to state, in a bald-faced manner whatever one wants to believe and heap ill-mannered abuse on anyone who cites evidence to the contrary.	相反，特朗普的策略是理直气壮地说瞎话，说人们愿意相信的话，对任何拿出相反证据的人，无情地加以鞭挞。


In Chapter 3 of White House Burning, James Kwak and I reviewed what happened after the tax cuts enacted in 2001 under George W. Bush.	在《火烧白宫》（White House Burning）第三章中，郭庾信（James Kwak）和我回顾了2001年小布什实施减税后所发生的事情。


Great promises were made about the cuts, including that they would help most Americans.	关于减税政策，小布什做出了很大的承诺，包括说减税能够帮助大部分美国人。


But while they did help rich people become richer, there is no evidence that they delivered faster growth or higher incomes for the middle class.	但尽管减税确实让富人变得更富了，却并没有证据表明它们带来了更快的增长或提高了中产阶级的收入。


Instead, they boosted the budget deficit and contributed significantly to increasing the US national debt (by around $3 trillion through 2010), which weakened the government’s ability to respond to crises, either in terms of national security or financial instability.	反之，它们提高了预算赤字，也大大增加了美国国民债务（到2010年，达到了3万亿美元左右），这削弱了政府响应危机的能力，不管是从国家安全角度还是从金融动荡角度。


I have testified repeatedly before Congress on matters of fiscal policy.	我多次在国会参与财政政策问题的听证。


During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Republicans were certainly interested in the facts.	在2008—2009年金融危机期间，共和党显然是对事实感兴趣的。


But this quickly tapered off, most notably in the House of Representatives.	但情况很快就起了变化，特别是在众议院。


In fact, Kevin Brady, the representative who told me most clearly that he was not interested in looking at even moderately inconvenient facts, is now Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, which plays a key role in what happens with taxes.	事实上，那位以最明确的态度告诉我，他对哪怕只是略微令人不快的事实也没有任何兴趣的众议员，即凯文·布雷迪（Kevin Brady）如今身居众议院筹款委员会（Ways and Means Committee）主席。 该委员会在税收政策方面起着关键作用。


Ron Wyden, the senior Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, calls the proposed Republican tax cuts “a middle-class con job.”	参议院金融委员会资深民主党议员罗恩·韦登（Ron Wyden）将共和党提出的减税方案称为“中产阶级骗局”。


He is being polite.	他算是嘴下留情了。


The cut in corporate taxes that the Republicans are likely to support will not boost wages significantly.	共和党可能支持的公司税减税方案不会大幅提振工资。


As the Congressional Research Service, describing the broader blueprint put forward by House Speaker Paul Ryan, has put it, “the plan’s estimated output effects appear to be limited in size and possibly negative.”	国会研究局（Congressional Research Service）在描述众议院议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）所提出的整体蓝图时指出，“该计划的预估产出效应颇为有限，可能为负。 ”


Including all possible positive effects of the Republican proposals, the Tax Policy Center has concluded that federal government “revenue would fall by between $2.4 trillion and $2.5 trillion over the first ten years and by about $3.4 trillion over the second decade.”	税收政策中心（Tax Policy Center）在将共和党方案的所有可能的积极效应都考虑进去后总结道，联邦政府“税收收入将在第一个十年下降2. 4万亿到2.


The Trump administration has responded to this type of sensible, fact-based analysis in the way one has come to expect: by being rude.	特朗普政府对这类基于事实的理智分析的反应是人们可以预料到的：粗鲁地顶回去。


American populism in the Trump era, though promising great gains for working people, will in fact benefit only those who are already rich.	特朗普时代的美国民粹主义尽管承诺要给工作阶级带来巨大收益，其实只能惠及已经跻身富裕行列的人。


To be fair, this is quite a twist on anything Perón could have imagined pulling off.	平心而论，这与庇隆可能的构想完全不符。


The results of irresponsible populism, however, are always the same.	但是，不负责任的民粹主义的结果永远是相同的。


Populist Plutocracy and the Future of America	民粹主义财阀统治以及美国的未来


NEW YORK – Donald Trump won the US presidency with the backing of working-class and socially conservative white voters on a populist platform of economic nationalism.	发自纽约——栖身于经济民族主义的民粹主义平台之上的唐纳德·特朗普借助工人阶级和社会保守派白人选民的支持登上了美国总统大位。


Trump rejected the Republican Party’s traditional pro-business, pro-trade agenda, and, like Bernie Sanders on the left, appealed to Americans who have been harmed by disruptive technologies and “globalist” policies promoting free trade and migration.	他拒绝了共和党传统的亲商，亲贸易议程，转而跟左翼的伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）一样去讨好那些受到破坏性科技和“全球主义”自由贸易和移民政策压迫的美国人。


But while Trump ran as a populist, he has governed as a plutocrat, most recently by endorsing the discredited supply-side theory of taxation that most Republicans still cling to.	可虽然特朗普在竞选时走的是民粹主义，他的统治手段却是财阀式的，最近的例子就是他为大多数共和党人仍然坚信的那种极不可靠的供给侧税收理论背书。


Trump also ran as someone who would “drain the swamp” in Washington, DC, and on Wall Street.	拉票时特朗普也把自己包装成一个能为华盛顿特区和华尔街“排污堵漏”的人。


Yet he has stacked his administration with billionaires (not just millionaires) and Goldman Sachs alumni, while letting the swamp of business lobbyists rise higher than ever.	然而他却把自己的政府和亿万富豪（不仅是百万富翁）和高盛公司大佬们搅和在一起，还让商业游说团体的这趟浑水比以往任何时候都更深了。


Trump and the Republicans’ plan to repeal the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) would have left 24 million Americans – mostly poor or middle class, many of whom voted for him – without health care.	特朗普和共和党废除2010年平价医疗法案的计划将使2400万美国人——大多是贫穷或中产阶级，其中许多人投了他一票——失去医疗保健。


His deregulatory policies are blatantly biased against workers and unions.	他的放松管制政策公然和工人及工会对着干。


And the Republican tax-reform plan that he has endorsed would overwhelmingly favor multinational corporations and the top 1% of households, many of which stand to benefit especially from the repeal of the estate tax.	而他所背书的共和党税收改革计划将极大有利于跨国公司和收入最高层那1％的家庭，而房产遗产税的废除将令其中许多人尤为受益。


Trump has also abandoned his base in the area of trade, where he has offered rhetoric but not concrete action.	特朗普也辜负了自己在贸易领域的选民，只是嘴上说说而不愿拿出具体行动。


Yes, he scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but Hillary Clinton would have done the same.	虽然他确实放弃了《跨太平洋伙伴关系协议》，但换成希拉里·克林顿也会如此。


He has mused about abandoning the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), but that may be just a negotiating tactic.	他曾声言放弃《北美自由贸易协定》，但这可能只是一项谈判策略而已。


He has threatened to impose a 50% tariff on goods from China, Mexico, and other US trade partners, but no such measures have materialized.	他还威胁要对来自中国，墨西哥和其他美国贸易伙伴的货物征收50％的关税，但是没有一项措施能付诸现实。


And proposals for a border adjustment tax have been all but forgotten.	而关于开征边境调整税的议案则几乎被遗忘了。


Trump’s bullying tweets against US firms that move production offshore or undertake tax inversions have been no more than cheap talk, and business leaders know it.	特朗普还曾在推特上对那些将生产移往国外或利用税负倒置来避税的美国企业大加讨伐，但商界领袖们都知道这不过是放空炮而已。


Manufacturers who fooled Trump into thinking they would keep production in the US have continued to transfer operations quietly to Mexico, China, and elsewhere.	那些让特朗普误认为它们将继续在美国生产的制造商都继续悄悄将业务转移到了墨西哥，中国以及其他地方。


Moreover, international provisions in the pending tax legislation will give US multinationals an even greater incentive to invest, hire, and produce abroad, while using transfer pricing and other schemes to salt away profits in low-tax jurisdictions.	此外即将出台的税收立法中的国际条款将令美国跨国公司更有动力在海外投资，雇佣和生产，同时利用转移定价以及其他手段来在低税收地区保留利润。


Likewise, despite Trump’s aggressive rhetoric on immigration, his policies have been relatively moderate, perhaps because many of the businesspeople who supported his campaign actually favor a milder approach.	同样，尽管特朗普在移民问题上言辞激烈，但他的政策却相对温和，这或许是因为许多投钱支持他竞选的商人确实更喜欢比较温和的方式。


The “Muslim ban” doesn’t affect the supply of labor in the US.	“穆斯林禁令”并未影响美国的劳动力供应。


Although deportations have accelerated under Trump, it’s worth remembering that millions of undocumented immigrants were deported under Barack Obama, too.	尽管在特朗普治下驱逐出境的速度有所加快，但也别忘了奥巴马时期也递解过数百万无证移民出境。


The border wall that Trump was going to force Mexico to pay for remains an unfunded dream.	特朗普声称要强迫墨西哥出钱修建的边界墙依然是个资金没到位的美梦。


And even the administration’s plan to favor skilled over unskilled workers will not necessarily reduce the number of legal migrants in the country.	即使政府计划相对于非数量工人来说更倾向于熟练技术工人，也不一定会减少合法移民的数量。


All told, Trump has governed like a plutocrat in populist clothes – that is, a pluto-populist.	总而言之，特朗普就像个披着民粹主义外衣的财阀统治者——也就是一个财阀民粹主义者。


But why has his base let him get away with pursuing policies that mostly hurt them?	但为什么他的选民们会坐视他去实施一些主要对自己不利的政策呢？


According to one view, he is betting that social conservatives and white blue-collar supporters in rural areas will vote on the basis of nationalist and religious sentiment and antipathy toward secular coastal elites, rather than for their own financial interests.	有一种观点认为，农村地区的社会保守派和白领蓝领支持者会基于民族主义，宗教情绪和对世俗沿海精英的反感——而非自身的经济利益——去投票。


But how long can anyone be expected to support “God and guns” at the expense of “bread and butter”?	但这种“面包和黄油”为代价支持“上帝和枪支”的做法能维持多久呢？


The pluto-populists who presided over the Roman Empire knew that keeping the populist mob at bay required substance as well as diversion: panem et circenses – “bread and circuses.”	当年主政罗马帝国的财阀民粹主义者知道，如果想控制住这帮民粹主义暴民就得提供物质和消遣：面包和角斗。


Raging tweets are meaningless to people who can scarcely afford a dignified living, let alone tickets to the modern-day Colosseum to watch football.	而对于那些几乎无法维持有尊严的生活，更别提花钱买票去现代“斗兽场”看场橄榄球赛的人来说，愤怒的推特显然是毫无意义的。


The tax legislation that Republicans have rushed through Congress could prove especially dangerous, given that millions of middle-class and low-income households will not only get little out of it, but will actually pay more when income-tax cuts are phased out over time.	共和党人拼命催促国会通过的税收立法可能会尤为凶险，因为数以百万计的中产阶级和低收入家庭不但没有得到什么好处，反而会因所得税减免政策的逐步取消而掏出更多的钱来。


Moreover, the Republican plan would repeal the Obamacare individual mandate.	此外，共和党的计划将废除奥巴马平价医疗法案的个人强制参保。


According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, this will cause 13 million people to lose health insurance, and insurance premiums to rise by 10%, over the next decade.	根据非党派的国会预算办公室的预测，这将导致1300万人失去健康保险，未来十年内的保费将上涨10％。


Not surprisingly, a recent Quinnipiac poll found that a mere 29% of Americans support the Republican plan.	难怪最近的昆尼派克民调（Quinnipiac poll）显示只有29％的美国人支持共和党的计划。


Nevertheless, Trump and the Republicans seem willing to risk it.	然而特朗普和共和党似乎甘愿去冒这个险。


After all, by pushing the middle-class tax hikes to a later date, they have designed their plan to get them through the 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 general election.	虽然他们已经制定了借助2018年中期选举和2020年大选来对中产阶级加税的计划，但该政策至少目前是被延后了。