That is why it is so important that presidents have aides and advisers, both in and out of the White House, who are willing to tell them when they are veering off course.	正因如此，白宫内外的助手和幕僚对总统就至关重要，他们愿意在总统偏离正道时发出提醒。


By publicly rebuking his aides, Trump has made it even more difficult, but also more necessary, for those around him to tell him what he needs to hear.	公开诘难助手让特朗普更加难以——也更加必须——从周边人员那里听到需要的东西。


At this point, his administration’s top priority should be to develop more disciplined processes to ensure that the president is being given accurate information and effective policy options.	目前，他的政府的工作重点应该是制定更规律的过程，以确保总统能够获得正确的信息和有效的正确选项。


To that end, Trump’s decision to appoint John Kelly, a retired Marine Corps general, as White House Chief of Staff was an important first step.	在这方面，特朗普决定任命海军陆战队退役将领约翰·凯利（John Kelly）为白宫幕僚长是重要的第一步。


So, too, were the decisions to push out his hard-edged chief strategist, Steve Bannon, and to carry out a deliberative Afghanistan policy review, which changed Trump’s mind about US policy there.	决定炒掉他的强硬派首席策略师史蒂夫·班农（Steve Bannon）、对阿富汗政策进行慎重的重估（并改变了特朗普对美国阿富汗政策的看法）亦然。


Kelly now fully controls the flow of information and people reaching the president.	现在，凯利完全掌控了能接触到总统的情报和人事。


But it remains to be seen if Trump himself can be more disciplined.	但特朗普本人能否变得更有规律还有待观察。


One rarely gets a second chance to make a first impression.	很少有人有改变第一印象的机会。


But such opportunities do sometimes present themselves for US presidents.	但有时候确实也有这样的机会自动出现在美国总统面前。


Bill Clinton’s administration began with a lack of discipline, a failed attempt at health-care reform, and a loss for the Democrats in the 1994 midterm elections.	克林顿政府一开始就缺乏规律，尝试进行医疗改革失败，民主党也在1994年的中期选举中败北。


But Clinton turned things around, appointing new aides, moving toward the political center, winning reelection in 1996, and working with a Republican-controlled Congress to balance the budget and reform welfare.	但克林顿转换了方针，认命了新助手，转向政治中间派，在1996年赢得连任，并与共和党控制的国会一起实现了平衡预算和鼓励改革。


Similarly, Ronald Reagan endured large Republican losses in the 1982 midterm election.	类似地，里根在1982年中期选举中也遇到了共和党的败北。


At that time, the US was in a deep recession, owing to the Federal Reserve’s tough disinflation policy, which Reagan had supported.	当时，由于美联储采取了强硬的抑制通胀政策，美国陷入了深度衰退。 而里根是美联储政策的支持者。


But the economy made a strong recovery, helped by Reagan’s tax cuts and increased military spending.	但在里根的减税和增加军事支出的政策下，经济实现了强劲复苏。


In 1984, Reagan won an overwhelming reelection victory.	1984年，里根以压倒性优势赢得连任。


Jimmy Carter’s administration, by contrast, never overcame its problems, and is now regarded as a dismal failure.	相反，卡特政府没有能够克服它的问题，现在人们普遍认为他的总统任期是个彻头彻尾的失败。


Upon taking office, all US presidents soon realize that their domestic and economic policymaking authority is constrained by Congress and the courts, but that they have much more sway over foreign and national-security affairs.	一旦开始执政，所有美国总统很快就会意识到，他们的国内和经济决策权威受到国会和法院的约束，但在外交和国家安全事务上，他们的运作空间会大得多。


Trump, for his part, has made a point of being more forceful than Obama with allies and foes on security matters.	至于特朗普，他已经证明，他对待安全问题的友邦和敌国要比奥巴马强力得多。


With North Korea making alarming strides in its nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile programs, Trump’s approach is undergoing its first real test.	朝鲜正在令人警惕地大踏步推进核和洲际弹道导弹计划，特朗普的方针也受到了第一次真正的考验。


Here, President John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provides the best analogy.	在这里，肯尼迪总统在1962年古巴导弹危机期间的表现可以提供最好的榜样。


The Kennedy administration stumbled badly when it tried to destabilize Fidel Castro’s communist regime in Cuba – an effort that culminated in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.	肯尼迪政府在动摇卡斯特罗的古巴共产主义政权方面昏招频出——最终导致了猪湾惨败。


But by standing firm against the Kremlin, Kennedy brought the crisis to a peaceful end: the Soviet Union removed its nuclear missiles from Cuba, and the US quietly removed its missiles from Turkey.	但肯尼迪面对克里姆林宫毫不让步，最终实现了危机的和平解决：苏联从古巴撤出核弹，美国悄悄从土耳其撤出导弹。


North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is undoubtedly operating according to a different political calculus than the Soviets, and the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula is even more daunting than in Cuba.	朝鲜独裁者金正恩的行事显然与苏联有着不同的政治算盘，而朝鲜半岛的战略局势也比古巴更加棘手。


North Korea has a large conventional arsenal that could rain down havoc on ten million South Koreans in nearby Seoul.	朝鲜拥有规模庞大的常规军力，可能让首尔附近的一千万韩国人遭受浩劫。


Still, if Trump’s firm response ends up being successful, it could widen his appeal.	尽管如此，如果特朗普的强硬反应最终获得成功，将会提高他的号召力。


Trump’s actual decisions matter far more than his confrontational behavior.	特朗普的实际决定要比他的对抗性行为重要得多。


But his behavior can still affect the options that are available to him.	但他的行为仍然可能影响到他的选择范围。


If his public approval sinks too low, fewer members of Congress will work with him, and more will work against him.	如果他的公共支持率降得过低，国会中与他合作的成员就越少，而与他作对的成员就越多。


Moreover, his remarkable penchant for overshadowing good news with unrelated Twitter attacks allows an overwhelmingly leftist, unsympathetic media to overemphasize his personality, while ignoring his administration’s substantive successes.	此外，他的引人注目的癖好——用无关的推特抨击让好消息黯然失色——导致全盘左倾、与他毫无同理心可言的媒体过于强调他的个性，而忽略他的政府的实质性的成功。


For example, earlier this month, while many were fixated on Trump’s rhetoric, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson secured United Nations Security Council approval for increased sanctions on North Korea, and China said that it would curtail its imports from the North.	比如，本月早些时候，当许多人的目光完全集中在特朗普的“大嘴巴”上的时候，美国国务卿蒂勒森确保了联合国安理会批准升级对朝制裁，而中国也表示将削减从朝鲜的进口。


Soon thereafter, North Korea called off planned test launches of missiles that it had threatened to aim at the waters around the US territory of Guam.	此后不久，朝鲜便放弃了此前威胁要对准美国关岛领土附近水域的导弹试射。


Politically, America is deeply polarized.	政治上，美国陷入了深度极化。


But on most issues, Americans want commonsense solutions to real problems, with government playing a limited role in their lives.	但在大部分问题上，美国人希望用常识来解决现实问题，政府不要过多影响他们的生活。


Trump has an opportunity to cut taxes, improve US infrastructure, and replace or amend the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).	特朗普有机会削减税收、改善美国的基础设施、取消或修改平价医疗法（奥巴马医保）。


To succeed, he needs to demonstrate respect for reasonable opposing viewpoints and tone down his more extreme positions to broaden his popular support.	要想获得成功，它需要表现出尊重合理的反对意见，软化其比较极端的立场，以扩大他的公众支持。


But, above all, he needs to cooperate with Congress, just as Reagan and Clinton did.	但最重要的是，他需要与国会合作，一如此前的里根和克林顿。


If he does that, he could turn his presidency around, confound his critics, and leave a positive legacy.	如果他在这方面取得成功，就有望扭转执政的颓势，在批评者面前证明自己，并留下积极的遗产。


Can he?	他能做到吗？


A Spanish Disquisition	西班牙研究


GOTHENBURG – Within a few days, the Catalan regional parliament may declare Catalonia’s independence, after 500 years of history with Spain.	哥德堡——就在几天内，加泰罗尼亚地区议会很可能宣布加泰罗尼亚独立，这个地区作为西班牙的领土已经有500年历史。


A few hours afterwards, the Spanish government may respond by sending thousands of police to detain top Catalan officials, putting an end to 40 years of prosperous self-rule.	几小时后，西班牙政府可能会派遣数千警察扣押加泰罗尼亚高级官员，从而终结长达40年繁荣的自治。


In turn, many Catalans may take to the streets, launching a revolt with scary consequences.	反过来，许多加泰罗尼亚人可能走上街头，发起反抗并造成可怕的后果。


At first sight, the idea that Spain could descend into chaos is puzzling.	乍看之下，西班牙可能陷入混乱的想法令人感到迷惑。


The country is ranked among the world’s top-performing democracies – ahead of France, Italy, and the US according to some indicators.	该国位列世界表现最好的民主政体之一——某些指标甚至领先于法国、意大利和美国。


And it is one of the favorite destinations for investors and tourists worldwide.	而且西班牙是全球投资者和游客最喜欢的目的地之一。


Having strolled through the magnificent and charming streets of Barcelona, the possibility of violent clashes there seems as unlikely as a guerrilla in the forests of British Columbia.	漫步于巴塞罗那宏伟而迷人的街道，在那里爆发暴力冲突的可能性比在英属哥伦比亚丛林发现大猩猩还不可思议。


Nonetheless, a physical confrontation between the Spanish authorities and Catalan insurrectional forces is a possible outcome, unless the major actors change their course of action.	尽管如此，西班牙当局和加泰罗尼亚叛乱部队之间爆发身体对抗的确是可能的结果，除非主要参与方改变其行动方式。


And none of them has incentives to do so.	但他们都没有这样做的动机。


Like James Dean and Buzz in “Rebel Without a Cause,” the Spanish and Catalan governments are speeding their cars toward a cliff, with each expecting the other to be the first to jump out.	就像电影《无因的叛逆》中的詹姆斯·迪恩和布赞一样，西班牙和加泰罗尼亚政府正加速将汽车驶向悬崖，希望对方成为先跳车的那一个。


The Spanish government assumes that Catalan’s parliament will not dare to declare independence unilaterally, because the move would receive no international recognition.	西班牙政府认为加泰罗尼亚议会不敢单方面宣布独立，因为国际社会不会承认加泰罗尼亚独立。


And the Catalan government is confident that a repressive response by the Spanish authorities, reviving the images of police beating unarmed old women and teenagers that the world saw during the referendum on October 1, would pave the way for a peaceful rebellion within Catalonia and widespread international acquiescence.	而加泰罗尼亚政府则信心满满地认为西班牙政府所采取的压制性对策重新唤起了人们对曾经看到的10月1日公投期间警察殴打手无寸铁的老妇和少年的记忆，西班牙当局此举将为加泰罗尼亚和平叛乱铺平道路，而国际社会有可能普遍对此表示默许。


In addition, both governments enjoy strong popular support.	此外，西班牙和加泰罗尼亚政府都享有强烈的民意支持。


The ruling conservative People’s Party (PP) in Madrid can comfortably win a national election without courting voters in Catalonia, where it obtained a meager 11% of the vote in 2015.	马德里执政的保守派人民党（PP）即使不讨好加泰罗尼亚选民也可以轻松地在全国选举中获胜，人民党仅有区区11%的选票来自于加泰罗尼亚选民。


Likewise, the separatist parties can easily secure a majority in the Catalan parliament.	同样，分离主义政党可以轻松地在加泰罗尼亚议会赢得多数。


Besides, thanks to governmental control of public broadcasters and generous public subsidies to private media outlets, both sides can deploy a reliable army of fiercely motivated journalists and intellectuals whose incendiary comments are contributing to the conflict’s escalation.	此外，由于政府对公共广播机构的控制和对私人媒体渠道的大量公共补贴，双方都可以召集一支可靠而狂热的知识分子和新闻记者部队，这些人煽风点火的评论正在促使冲突不断升级。


The actors in the Spanish drama are facing what political scientists call a social dilemma: either side gains from selfish behavior unless the other side behaves selfishly, too, in which case both sides lose.	这台西班牙大戏的演员们正面临着被政治学家称之为社会困境的局面：冲突的任何一方均可从自利行为中获益，除非另外一方也同样采取自利的行为。 但如果双方都坚持自利的原则，那么双方都会失败。


Both unionists and separatists would be better off with a second-best solution.	采用次佳方案可能对联合主义者和分离主义者双方都更有利。


For example, the separatists could renounce a unilateral declaration of independence in exchange for talks on constitutional reforms that would move Spain in a federal direction.	举例来讲，分离主义者可以放弃单方面独立宣言，以换取进行有关宪法改革的谈判，从而促成西班牙走向联邦制。


A constitutional amendment that allowed symbolic changes, like an official declaration of Catalonia as a “nation,” or substantive initiatives, like a fiscal pact, would satisfy most Catalans while maintaining Spain’s territorial integrity.	允许对宪法进行象征性修改的宪法修正案，比如正式宣布加泰罗尼亚为“民族”的宣言或实质性举措，比如财政协定，将满足绝大多数加泰罗尼亚人的独立愿望，并保持西班牙领土的完整性。


The problem is that both sides believe that showing willingness to compromise would weaken their future bargaining situation.	问题在于，双方都认为表现出妥协的意愿可能损害他们未来的议价能力。


Research in political science, however, indicates that the opposite may be true.	而政治学研究表明情况可能恰恰相反。


Following insights by the Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, we know that social dilemmas can be solved using the inverse strategy: giving instead of demanding.	诺贝尔奖得主埃里诺·奥斯特罗姆（Elinor Ostrom）的研究成果表明我们可以用给予而非索取的反向策略来解决社会困局。


If one party exhibits cooperative behavior, its rival may feel forced to reciprocate, leading to a spiral of cooperation instead of retaliation, and of trust instead of suspicion.	如果一方表现出合作行为，其对手可能感受到回报的压力，从而导致一系列合作而非报复，以及信任而非怀疑。


This is what is required now in Catalonia.	奉行这种理论现在对加泰罗尼亚有利。


Both the Spanish government and the Catalan separatists must acknowledge that, if they act with sensible generosity, the other side may respond with further concessions.	西班牙政府和加泰罗尼亚分离主义者都必须承认，如果他们以明智而大度的姿态行事，另一方可能以未来的让步作出回应。


It will not be easy, given the current mental disconnect between the Madrid and Barcelona elites.	鉴于马德里和巴塞罗精英当前完全隔绝的心理状态，实现这一目标并不容易。


Yet they need to consider how their behavior is endangering the hard-earned welfare of millions of Spaniards, after four decades of successful democracy.	但他们需要思考他们的行为在近40载成功实行民主制度后，正如何危及数百万西班牙人来之不易的福利。


In sunny Spain, there should always be light at the end of the tunnel.	在阳光明媚的西班牙，隧道的尽头应当是光明的未来。


Spain’s Crisis is Europe’s Opportunity	西班牙的危机，欧洲的机会


ATHENS – To revive the ailing European project, the ugly conflict between Catalonia’s regional government and the Spanish state may be just what the doctor ordered.	雅典—要想复兴每况愈下的欧洲工程，加泰罗尼亚地区政府和西班牙国家之间的丑陋冲突也许正是良方。


A constitutional crisis in a major European Union member state creates a golden opportunity to reconfigure the democratic governance of regional, national, and European institutions, thereby delivering a defensible, and thus sustainable, EU.	一场欧盟主要成员国所爆发的宪政危机，为理顺地区、国家和欧洲机构的民主治理，从而实现一个合情合理因而可持续的欧盟创造了一个黄金机会。


The EU’s official reaction to the police violence witnessed during Catalonia’s independence referendum amounts to dereliction of duty.	对于加泰罗尼亚独立公投期间所发生的警察暴力，欧盟官方的反应可谓玩忽职守。


To declare, as the President of the European Commission did, that this is an internal Spanish problem in which the EU has no say is hypocrisy on stilts.	欧盟委员会主席宣称这是西班牙内部问题，欧盟无可奉告，这简直伪善到家了。


Of course, hypocrisy has long been at the center of the EU’s behavior.	当然，伪善早已成为欧盟行为的核心。


Its officials had no compunction about meddling in a member state’s internal affairs – say, to demand the removal of elected politicians for refusing to implement cuts in the pensions of their poorest citizens or to sell off public assets at ridiculous prices (something I have personally experienced).	其官员可以毫无愧疚之心地干涉成员国的内部事务——比如要求当选政客下台，因为他拒绝减少最贫穷公民的退休金或以跳楼价甩卖公共资产（这种事情，我本人就深有体会）。


But when the Hungarian and Polish governments explicitly renounce fundamental EU principles, non-interference suddenly became sacrosanct.	但当匈牙利和波兰政府赤裸裸地践踏欧盟基本原则时，不干预又突然之间成为神圣不可侵犯的原则了。


The Catalan question has deep historical roots, as does nationalism more broadly.	加泰罗尼亚问题有其深刻的历史根源，也有更广的民族主义根源。


But would it have erupted the way it recently did had Europe not mishandled the eurozone crisis since 2010, imposing quasi-permanent stagnation on Spain and the rest of the European periphery while setting the stage for xenophobia and moral panic when refugees began crossing Europe’s external borders?	但要不是欧洲对2010年以来的欧元区危机处理不当，导致西班牙和其他欧洲外围国家陷入了半永久的停滞，同时也在难民潮开始穿越欧洲外部边境的情况下为仇外主义和道德恐慌创造了条件，加泰罗尼亚问题还会爆发吗？


An example illustrates the connection.	一个例子说明了其中的关联。


Barcelona, Catalonia’s exquisite capital, is a rich city running a budget surplus.	美丽的加泰罗尼亚首府巴塞罗那是一个富裕的城市，预算有盈余。


Yet many of its citizens recently faced eviction by Spanish banks that had been bailed out by their taxes.	但许多巴塞罗那市民最近却面临被用他们的税金拯救的西班牙银行的驱逐。


The result was the formation of a civic movement that in June 2015 succeeded in electing Ada Colau as Barcelona’s mayor.	结果是形成了一场民权运动，并在2015年成功地助阿达·卡洛（Ada Colau）当选巴塞罗那市长。


Among Colau’s commitments to the people of Barcelona was a local tax cut for small businesses and households, assistance to the poor, and the construction of housing for 15,000 refugees – a large share of the total number that Spain was meant to absorb from frontline states like Greece and Italy.	卡洛许诺巴塞罗那人民要为小企业和家庭减税、支持穷人，并为15,000难民建造住房——占西班牙需要从希腊和意大利等前沿国家接收的难民总量的很大一部分。


All of this could be achieved while keeping the city’s books in the black, simply by reducing the municipal budget surplus.	所有这些都可以在市政收支相抵的前提下实现，只不过会让预算盈余减少一些。


Alas, Colau soon realized that she faced insurmountable obstacles.	可惜，卡洛很快就意识到，她难以克服的障碍。


Spain’s central government, citing the state’s obligations to the EU’s austerity directives, had enacted legislation effectively banning any municipality from reducing its surplus.	西班牙中央政府援引其对欧盟紧缩指引所负的国家义务，实施了事实上禁止所有市降低盈余的立法。


At the same time, the central government barred entry to the 15,000 refugees for whom Colau had built excellent housing facilities.	与此同时，中央政府还禁止卡洛已经为他们建好了良好住宿设施的15,000名难民进入。


To this day, the budget surplus prevails, the services and local tax cuts promised have not been delivered, and the social housing for refugees remains empty.	时至今日，巴塞罗那预算仍然保持盈余，服务和地税削减承诺没有能够兑现，为难民而建的社会住房空置。


The path from this sorry state of affairs to the reinvigoration of Catalan separatism could not be clearer.	导致这一令人遗憾的情况的过程，显然就是让加泰罗尼亚分离主义复兴的原因。


In any systemic crisis, the combination of austerity for the many, socialism for bankers, and strangulation of local democracy creates the hopelessness and discontent that are nationalism’s oxygen.	在所有系统性的危机中，对大部分人实行紧缩，对银行家实行社会主义，对地方民主实行扼杀，这样的组合必然会造成绝望和不满，成为民族主义的温床。


Progressive, anti-nationalist Catalans, like Colau, find themselves squeezed from both sides: the state’s authoritarian establishment, which uses the EU’s directives as a cover for its behavior, and a renaissance of radical parochialism, isolationism, and atavistic nativism.	卡洛这样的进步派反民族主义加泰罗尼亚人，发现自己夹在中间：一边是国家的威权建制，拉起欧盟指引的虎皮做大旗； 另一边是激进地方主义、孤立主义和倒行逆施的本土主义的复兴。


Both reflect the failure to fulfill the promise of shared, pan-European prosperity.	两者都反映出在兑现共同的泛欧洲繁荣承诺方面的失败。


Catalonia provides an excellent case study of Europe’s broader conundrum.	加泰罗尼亚为欧洲的更广泛的谜题提供了绝佳的案例。


Choosing between an authoritarian Spanish state and a “make Catalonia great again” nationalism is equivalent to choosing between Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the President of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, and Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s far-right National Front: austerity or disintegration.	在威权的西班牙国家和“让加泰罗尼亚再次伟大”的民族主义之间做出选择，一如在由欧元区财政部长组成的欧元集团主席杰罗恩·迪塞尔布罗姆（Jeroen Dijsselbloem）和法国极右翼政党国民阵线领导人玛丽娜·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）之间做出选择：选择紧缩还是选择分裂。


The duty of progressive Europeans is to reject both: the deep establishment at the EU level and the competing nationalisms ravaging solidarity and common sense in member states like Spain.	进步派欧洲人的责任是两者都要拒绝：欧盟层面的根深蒂固的建制和与之竞争的破坏西班牙等成员国的团结和共识的民族主义。


The alternative is to Europeanize the solution to a problem caused largely by Europe’s systemic crisis.	相反，必须将用来解决主要由系统性的欧洲危机造成的问题的方案欧洲化。


Instead of impeding local and regional democratic governance, the EU should be fostering it.	欧盟不应该妨碍地方和地区民主治理，而应该支持这样做。


The EU treaties could be amended to enshrine the right of regional governments and city councils, like Catalonia’s and Barcelona’s, to fiscal autonomy and even to their own fiscal money.	可以修订欧盟条约，将地区政府和市议会（如加泰罗尼亚和巴塞罗那）的财政自主乃至拥有自身财政货币（fiscal money）的权利写入其中。


They could also be allowed to implement their own policies on refugees and migration.	地区政府和市议会还应该被允许实施自己的难民和移民政策。


If there was still demand for statehood and separation from the internationally recognized state to which they belong, the EU could invoke a code of conduct for secession.	如果仍然有建国和从所属的被国际承认的国家脱离的要求，欧盟可以援引分离程序规则。


For example, the EU could stipulate that it will sanction an independence referendum if the regional government requesting it has already won an election on such a platform with an absolute majority of the voters.	比如，欧盟可以规定，如果要求进行独立公投的地区政府已经凭借绝对多数通过这一平台赢得了一场选举，它就将批准独立公投。


Moreover, the referendum should be held at least one year after the election, to allow for a proper, sober debate.	此外，公投应该在选举完成至少一年后举行，以确保合理、冷静的辩论。


As for the new state, it should be obligated to maintain at least the same level of fiscal transfers as before.	对于新国家，应该负有至少保持与此前同等水平的财政转移的义务。


Rich Veneto could secede from Italy, for example, as long as it maintained its fiscal transfers to the South.	富裕的威尼托大区可以从意大利脱离，只要它保持向意大利南方的转移支付。


Moreover, the new state should be prohibited from erecting new borders and be compelled to guarantee its residents the right to triple citizenship (new state, old state, and European).	此外，新国家应该被禁止建立新边界，必须确保其居民拥有三重公民身份（新国家、旧国家和欧洲）。


The Catalonia crisis is a strong hint from history that Europe needs to develop a new type of sovereignty, one that strengthens cities and regions, dissolves national particularism, and upholds democratic norms.	加泰罗尼亚为机是一次强烈的历史暗示，表明欧洲需要制定新的主权类型，这种主权类型强化城市和地区，淡化国家忠诚，坚持民主规范。


The immediate beneficiaries would be Catalans, the people of Northern Ireland, and maybe the Scots (who would in this manner snatch an opportunity out of the jaws of Brexit).	立即可以从中受益的包括加泰罗尼亚人、北爱尔兰人民，也许还有苏格兰人（他们可以通过这种方式，获得摆脱英国退欧影响的机会）。


But the longer-term beneficiary of this new type of sovereignty would be Europe as a whole.	但这一新主权类型的长期受益者将是作为整体的欧洲。


Imagining a pan-European democracy is the prerequisite for imagining a Europe worth saving.	想象一个泛欧洲民主实体，是想象一个值得拯救的欧洲的前提。


Why Catalonia’s Independence Bid Is Failing	加泰罗尼亚的独立诉求为什么正在经历失败？


BARCELONA – In the confusing aftermath of Catalonia’s messy independence referendum, the Catalan regional government’s president, Carles Puigdemont, has wanted to have his cake and eat it.	巴塞罗那——在加泰罗尼亚一片混乱的独立公投结束后，加泰罗尼亚地方政府主席卡尔斯·普伊格蒙特想收获一箭双雕。


His long-awaited speech to the regional parliament, in which he had promised to declare independence from Spain, ended up being a muddled effort to placate his radical nationalist allies, the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), without further alienating the central government in Madrid.	外界期待已久的他在地方议会的发言（他曾在发言中承诺宣布加泰罗尼亚从西班牙独立）最终演变为在不进一步疏远西班牙中央政府的情况下，安抚激进民族主义盟友人民团结候选党（CUP）的一次混乱的行动。


He achieved neither objective.	最终他哪一个目的都没有达到。


Puigdemont did declare a Catalan state “in the form of a republic.”	普伊格蒙特确实宣布加泰罗尼亚国“采取共和国的形式”。


But he immediately “suspended” the declaration to allow for negotiations with the Spanish government.	但其后他立即发表暂缓声明，允许与西班牙政府展开谈判。


To the Spanish government, Puigdemont’s address was an implicit declaration of independence, and to the impatient CUP, it was a moment of inadmissible betrayal.	在西班牙政府看来，普伊格蒙特的讲话是一篇隐性的独立宣言，而在迫不及待的人民团结候选党眼中，却是一次无法接受的背叛。


It is now highly probable that the central government will invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, which allows it to take direct control of Catalonia, a step that would undoubtedly provoke more civil unrest throughout the region.	中央政府现在很有可能会援引《西班牙宪法》第155条的规定，该条款允许西班牙政府接管加泰罗尼亚，而这样的举措无疑可能在整个地区引发进一步内乱。


Historically, national independence has usually been achieved through violent, even cataclysmic processes of decolonization.	历史上看，国家独立往往要通过暴力甚至灾难性的去殖民化进程才可能实现。


New states have almost invariably been born in blood, sacrifice, and deprivation.	新国家的诞生几乎无一例外地伴随着流血、牺牲和贫困。


In the case of the former Yugoslavia, independent states emerged out of civil war and even genocide.	以前南斯拉夫为例，国家独立的代价是内战乃至种族灭绝。


Enslaved nations have also recovered sovereignty through state failure and imperial collapse.	被奴役的国家也通过国家失败和帝国崩溃恢复了主权。


Amicable breakups, like that of Czechoslovakia, or of Norway and Sweden, are a historical rarity, however laudable.	捷克斯洛伐克、挪威和瑞典那样友好分手的先例不管多么值得称颂，但却在历史上非常罕见。


Catalonia’s bid for independence, as Puigdemont probably knows, lacks the compelling revolutionary élan that has characterized struggling national movements throughout history.	加泰罗尼亚的独立诉求缺乏历史上民族斗争运动所具有的引人瞩目的革命热忱，这一点普伊格蒙特很可能也知道。


Real, and sometimes imagined, grievances can explain the recent nationalist tide in Catalonia.	真实，但有时也是凭空想象的不满可以解释最近爆发的加泰罗尼亚民族主义大潮。


But the independence project mainly reflects Catalan elites’ extravagant dreams of grandeur and condescension toward the supposedly inferior Spaniards.	但独立事业主要体现了加泰罗尼亚精英对被视为低人一等的西班牙人的崇高而傲慢的奢侈梦想。


Those elites should now ask themselves whether their middle-class constituency is capable of enduring blockades, massive capital flight (which is already happening), a collapsing standard of living, and the enmity of both Spain and Europe.	那些精英现在应当反躬自问他们的中产阶级选民是否能够忍受封锁、（现在已经真实发生的）大规模资本外逃、生活水平大幅下降以及同时惹怒西班牙和欧洲。


In Iraq, the Kurds base their demand for independence on the claim that the Iraqi state is oppressive and failing.	在伊拉克，库尔德人声称伊拉克国家的压迫和失败迫使他们提出独立要求。


But Catalonia is not an oppressed nation, and Spain is not a failed state.	但加泰罗尼亚并非是受压迫民族，而西班牙也并非是失败的国家。


Invoking Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s long dictatorship – now four decades in the past – is a feeble attempt to disguise the separatists’ economic pretensions and overblown sense of cultural superiority.	借口弗朗西斯科·弗朗哥已经过去40年的长期独裁很难掩盖住分离主义者在经济上的自负和过于夸大的文化自豪。


The West does not support Kurdish independence for the same reason it would not support Catalan independence.	西方不支持库尔德独立，出于同样原因，想要西方支持加泰罗尼亚独立也是不可能的。


Just as Spain is not an occupying power in Catalonia, the West does not regard the countries seeking to prevent Kurdish independence – Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran – as true colonial powers.	就像西班牙不是加泰罗尼亚的占领国一样，西方并不将试图阻止库尔德独立的土耳其、伊拉克、叙利亚和伊朗视为真正的殖民国家。


Conversely, the cause of Palestinian independence is supported worldwide precisely because Israel is perceived as the last Western colonial power in Arab lands.	相反，巴勒斯坦独立事业得到世界各国的普遍支持，恰恰因为以色列被视为阿拉伯世界最后一个西方殖民者。


Such perceptions matter, because what frequently seals the fate of independence movements is the response of third countries.	这样的看法至关重要，因为第三国的反应往往决定了独立运动的结果。


And it is all but unimaginable that any European country would see any political advantage in facilitating Catalonia’s independence, which would alienate a key member of the European Union and boost myriad nationalist movements across the EU and in nearby states.	几乎难以想象有哪个欧洲国家会认为支持加泰罗尼亚独立能带来政治优势，这样做只会疏远欧盟的一个重要成员国，并助推整个欧盟和邻近国家无数大大小小的民族主义运动。


Catalonia does have a legitimate dispute with the Spanish government over finances and the attributes of autonomy.	加泰罗尼亚在财政和自治属性方面的确与西班牙政府存在合理的争端。


But while the government in Madrid could have managed the Catalan conflict more wisely by addressing it politically, not just legally, the dispute comes nowhere near the threshold of justifying independence.	但尽管马德里政府本来可以不仅通过法律、而且通过政治渠道更为明智地解决加泰罗尼亚冲突，但既便如此，冲突也完全不足以成为独立的借口。


The “Catalan differential fact” is a historical reality; and it deserves to be addressed properly.	“加泰罗尼亚的差别现实”在历史上是真实存在的； 这个问题应当得到恰当的解决。


Yet the persistent move toward independence appears to be driven mostly by the excitement and kneejerk responses of some of Catalonia’s leaders.	但目前的情况似乎是某些加泰罗尼亚领导人的狂热和下意识反应推动了持续不断的独立运动。


At no point before or since the independence referendum have any of them offered an articulate explanation of why a separate Catalan state is necessary or what it would look like.	公投前和公投以来没有任何加泰罗尼亚精英提供一种明确的解释，告诉外界为什么必须建立独立的加泰罗尼亚国家或者对这个即将建立的国家进行描述。


Would the Republic of Catalonia have its own armed forces?	加泰罗尼亚共和国是否要有自己的武装力量？


Would its own national currency replace the euro?	它是否会发行本国货币，取代欧元来进行流通？


How could it possibly persuade Spain and other EU member states not to veto its accession to the bloc?	它该怎样说服西班牙和其他欧盟成员国不否决其加入集团的申请？


Which countries would risk alienating Spain by recognizing an isolated Catalan state?	哪些国家有可能冒着得罪西班牙的危险承认这个孤立的加泰罗尼亚国？


Invariably, unless nations march virtually united to independence, they don’t get there.	总之，除非国内几乎所有人一致要求独立，否则根本无法实现独立的目标。


Catalonia is now almost evenly divided over the question, in a manner unseen since the Spanish Civil War.	目前加泰罗尼亚在独立问题上几乎平分秋色，在西班牙内战结束后这样的情况几乎是史无前例的。


Only 43% of Catalonia’s population voted in the referendum, which even Barcelona’s mayor, Ada Colau, a supporter of statehood, has questioned as a foundation for a unilateral declaration of independence.	仅有43%的加泰罗尼亚民众参与了公投，就连建国的支持者巴塞罗那市长阿道·科罗也质疑单方面宣布独立能否基于这样的结果。


Any vote not cast can legitimately be construed as a protest against the referendum – and a vote for unity with Spain.	人们可以合理地认为未参与投票者都是在抗议公投——因此他们都是统一的支持者。


Colau is right.	科罗是对的。


To say that the referendum produced a clear winner, and to base a declaration of independence on that vote, is a travesty of common sense and of democratic norms that would tarnish the nascent state as a grossly illegitimate enterprise.	宣称公投产生了明确的赢家并在这样的投票结果基础上宣布独立是一种对常识和民主规则的歪曲，有可能玷污新生国家的整体合法性。


Similar deep internal divisions doomed Quebec’s bid for independence – and Scotland’s as well.	同样深刻的内部分歧也笼罩着魁北克的独立诉求——苏格兰也属于类似的情况。


Even the Confederate leaders at the time of the American Civil War understood that without a unified people fully behind their bid for independence, their slave-owner’s republic was doomed.	就连美国内战时期的邦联领导人也清楚如果没有团结一心的民众完全支持他们的独立诉求，他们的奴隶主共和国从一开始就注定不会成功。


A shakeup of Spain’s political and constitutional status quo is long overdue, and the entire country could emerge stronger if the reforms enacted in response to the Catalonia crisis help unleash the energies of one of Europe’s most diverse nations.	西班牙早就应当重组政治和宪法现状，如果针对加泰罗尼亚危机进行的改革能协助发挥这个欧洲最多样化国家之一的潜力，那么整个国家就会更上一层楼。


But this is no time for petty minds and narrow visions.	但现在绝不是小心眼儿和短视的时候。


The malignant effects of today’s identity politics should not be allowed to tear Spanish society apart in the way that ideological politics did 80 years ago.	我们不能允许今天身份政治的恶性影响像80年前的意识形态政治那样撕裂西班牙社会。


What’s Really at Stake at the CCP Congress?	关于中共十九大的核心问题


LONDON – This month, international media are understandably focused on the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress, a carefully choreographed event that will reveal who’s “in” and who’s “out” with Chinese President Xi Jinping.	发自伦敦——本月，各国际媒体都不出意料地将目光聚焦在中国共产党第十九届全国代表大会上，而这场一个精心策划的大会将揭示中国国家主席习近平身边谁走谁留。


But while it is important to know who Xi’s favorites are, I do not find the theater and intrigue of the event to be as interesting as it is made out to be.	而虽然很有必要去知道是谁得到了习主席的重用，但我并不觉得这一事件的场景和阴谋论跟它所呈现的那般有趣。


Far more important is whether China’s leadership is acting in accordance with what the CCP has promised the country’s 1.3 billion people.	在我看来更重要的是中国的领导层是否有遵照中国共产党对13亿人民许下的承诺来行事。


Just before the last congress, in 2012, Xi’s two-week absence from public view raised concerns.	就在2012年上届大会之前，习近平在公众视野中消失了两周时间，引发了外界极大关注。


In the unlikely event that the same thing happened again this year, alarm bells would have rung.	虽然今年不太可能再度出现同样的事件，但这也相当于一道警钟。


Moreover, if the agenda that Xi presents for the next five years suggests that he and the rest of the CCP leadership are losing credibility and struggling to maintain the party’s economic and social contract with the people, the 19th Congress will be very relevant.	此外，如果习近平在会上所提出的今后五年议程表明他和其他中共的其他领导人正在失去信誉且无力维护党与人民群众订下的经济和社会契约，那么十九大就将意义重大。


But I doubt we should worry too much.	不过我觉得没必要担心太多。


More pertinent questions come to mind – two in particular.	有更多相关问题浮现在我的脑际——其中两个最为突出。


First, will the modest rise of the Chinese consumer continue to fuel 6-7% annual growth?	首先，中国消费者的温和崛起能否持续支撑6~7％的年增长率？


And, second, will the somewhat undefined Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – continue to be a major priority for China’s leadership?	另一方面，那个在某种程度上尚未定义的“一带一路倡议”是否将继续成为中国领导层的重点优先事务？


As for the first question, despite the slower growth trend this year, China will still add around $1 trillion or more to its nominal GDP, giving it a $12 trillion economy by the end of this year – nearly double the economy’s size in 2010.	针对第一个问题，尽管今年增长放缓，中国的名义GDP仍将增加1万亿美元出头，以此在今年年底达到12万亿美元的总规模，比2010年增长近一倍。


To be sure, $12 trillion is just two-thirds the size of the US economy; but the $1 trillion added this year is more than all but the top 15 economies in the world.	当然，12万亿美元只相当于美国经济规模的2/3，但今年增加的这1万亿美元已经高过了世界前15大经济体的合共增长量。


It is larger than the entire GDP of Indonesia or Turkey, and almost as large as the Mexican economy.	这个数字大于印尼或土耳其的整体GDP，几乎与墨西哥的经济规模相当。


According to official data, private consumption in China accounts for just 39.2% of GDP.	据官方数据显示，中国的私人消费占到了GDP的39. 2％。


This is very low by the standards of most high-income economies, but it has increased from 35.5% of GDP in 2010.	这个数字虽然相对大多数高收入经济体的标准来说很低，但相对2010年的35. 5％来说已经有所上升。


When that increase is translated into hard numbers, it amounts to an additional $2.58 trillion since 2010 – an increment that is larger than the entire Indian economy.	如果要将这一增长率换算成数字的话，等于自2010年以来额外增加了2. 58万亿美元——增长额比印度的整个经济体量还大。


The growth of Chinese consumption is easily the most important factor in global consumption growth today.	显而易见中国的消费增长已经成为当今全球消费增长的最重要因素。


If Chinese consumption growth were to continue on its modest upward trajectory until 2020, it would account for just over 41.5% of GDP, which is to say, almost another $2 trillion.	如果中国的消费增长能在2020年之前继续保持温和上涨的态势，那么它将占到国内生产总值的41. 5％，也就是再增长近两万亿美元。


And yet there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that Chinese consumption growth might actually be accelerating faster.	然而还有一些有待验证的证据表明，中国的消费增长的实际加速度可能会更高。


So, the real question for China watchers around the world is whether anything that happens at the 19th Congress will affect this trend.	那么全球各地中国观察家的真正问题是，在十九大上是否会发生一些影响到这个趋势的事件。


If the trend continues or accelerates, Chinese consumption could start to approach half that of the United States, which would be an extremely encouraging sign that the world economy is undergoing a badly needed rebalancing.	如果趋势持续或加速，中国消费总量可能会逐渐达到美国的一半，这将是一个非常令人鼓舞的迹象，说明世界经济正在迎来一个迫切需要的再平衡态势。


As for the second question, I suspect that China will stay the course on the BRI, especially given the growing concerns about trade elsewhere in the world.	至于第二个问题，我想中国会继续推动“一带一路”进程，尤其是考虑到对世界其他地区贸易的日益关注。


While we don’t yet know the precise dynamics of this grand project, it is safe to assume that linking China, Europe, and everywhere in between through better infrastructure will have a significant positive impact on world trade.	虽然我们还不知道这个大型项目背后的确切动力是什么，但可以确信的是，通过更完善的基础设施来连接中国，欧洲一起其他地区的做法将对世界贸易产生重大的积极影响。


To be clear, I do not think that the BRI is as important as the Chinese consumer to the world economy.	要明确的是，我不认为“一带一路”对世界经济的重要性可以比肩于中国消费者。


But in terms of trade, specifically, its impact could be enormous.	但具体到贸易方面其影响可能是巨大的。


The BRI stands to have a direct effect on as many as 65 countries, including Russia and India, which along with China constitute three of the four BRIC countries (the other one is Brazil).	“一带一路”将直接影响到包括俄罗斯和印度在内的多达65个国家，涵盖金砖四国中的三个（剩下那个是巴西）。


And nine of the 11 most populous emerging countries after China lie within the BRI’s broad geographical scope.	而位列中国之后的11个人口最多的新兴国家中有9个位于“一带一路”覆盖的广泛地域范围内。


Most of these countries have not yet matched China’s success in unlocking their economic potential.	这些国家中的大多数仍未能借助中国的经济繁荣来解放自身的经济潜力。


Many of them devote more resources to domestic infighting or conflict with one another than to participating in international trade.	其中许多国家都将资源投入到国内斗争或冲突而非参与国际贸易。


But with BRI, cross-border trade could increase, and some of the feuds could be laid to rest, benefiting the region’s citizens.	但是，随着“一带一路”的推进，跨境贸易可能会增加，有些国内冲突可以搁置，使该地区的人们得以受益。


Indeed, far more interesting than the BRI’s infrastructure projects are its geopolitical implications.	事实上，比“一带一路”的基础设施项目更有意义的是它对地缘政治的影响。


The BRI could subtly but significantly improve relationships between China and its neighbors, and between the neighbors themselves.	“一带一路”可以潜移默化地大大改善中国与邻国之间以及各邻国之间的关系。


China’s relationship with India and other countries on the Indian subcontinent is of particular importance.	中国与印度以及南亚次大陆其他国家的关系尤为重要。


When Xi held a regional conference to promote the BRI in May, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend, much to Chinese leaders’ chagrin.	当习近平在5月召开区域性会议推动“一带一路”倡议时，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的缺席多少让中国领导人有点懊恼。


But then, at a BRICS summit in September, China and India seemed to achieve a significant diplomatic breakthrough over a territorial dispute.	但在9月份的金砖四国首脑会议上，中国和印度似乎在领土争端方面取得了重大外交突破。


If this turns out to be the beginning of a limited Sino-Indian rapprochement, and if other rivals in the region follow suit, then the BRI could end up being a landmark policy indeed.	如果事实证明这是中印局部和解的开端，而该地区的其他对手也从善如流，那么“一带一路”可能最终成为一个具有里程碑意义的政策。


So, when you are reading your favorite newspaper’s analysis of the CCP’s 19th National Congress, don’t be too distracted by the court intrigue.	因此当你看到你最常看的报纸中对中共十九大的分析文章时，不要过度关注其中的阴谋论。


The two questions that really matter are whether China’s consumer-led growth will stall; and whether the BRI will be abandoned.	真正重要的两个问题是中国的消费主导型增长是否会停滞以及“一带一路”是否会被放弃。


Neither would be good for the global economy.	倘若这两个问题都得到了肯定的答案，那么对全球经济必定不利。


But, fortunately, neither seems likely.	但幸运的是，这两个状况似乎也都不可能出现。


Central Banks in the Dock	被审问的央行


LONDON – On November 11, 1997, the Bank of England took a big step toward independence, courtesy of the second reading in the House of Commons of a bill amending the Bank Act of 1946.	发自伦敦——1997年11月11日，在下议院二读通过了对1946年《银行法案》的修正案后，英国央行向独立迈出了一大步。


The bill gave legislative affirmation to the decision, taken by then-Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, to free central bank operations from governmental control.	修正案在法律意义上确认了时任财政大臣的戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）将中央银行业务从政府控制下解放出来的决定。


This was a landmark event for an institution that had been under the yoke of government for a half-century. It symbolized how the need for central bank independence had become conventional wisdom.	对于这个半个世纪以来一直处于政府枷锁之下的机构来说这堪称一项标志性事件，象征着对中央银行独立性的要求已经成为了常识。


Now, however, this wisdom is being questioned, and not just in the United Kingdom.	但如今这一常识正遭到质疑，而且不仅是在英国。


So long as inflation was the real and present danger, it made sense to delegate monetary policy to conservative central bankers insulated from pressure to finance government budget deficits.	过去一旦出现真实且迫切的通胀风险，那么只需将货币政策委托给保守的中央银行家，让他们去承受为政府预算赤字融资的压力就好了。


Today, in contrast, the problem is the opposite, namely the inability of central banks to raise inflation to target levels.	如今的问题则恰恰相反，即央行无法将通胀提升到目标水平。


To achieve this, it is necessary for monetary and fiscal policymakers to work together, including by allowing the central bank, in extremis, to monetize budget deficits.	为此货币和财政政策制定者必须共同努力，包括允许央行在极端情况下将预算赤字货币化。


But when it comes to cooperating with the fiscal authorities, central bank independence is a hindrance, not a help.	但在与财政部门合作时，央行的独立性却毫无裨益，反而成为了一项障碍。


Independence was also easier to defend when central bankers’ task was limited to keeping inflation low and stable.	当央行行长的任务仅限于保持通胀低速稳定时，其独立性也更容易得到维护。


Given this narrow remit, the distributional consequences of central banks’ decisions were limited.	鉴于其职权范围较为狭窄，央行决策所产生的分配性结果相对有限。


It was easier, moreover, to explain how a central bank’s policy instruments were linked to its politically mandated targets.	此外也很容易解释中央银行动用的各类政策工具是如何与其政治授权目标联系起来的。


But after the global financial crisis highlighted the dangers of consigning monetary and fiscal policy to separate silos, central banks acquired additional responsibilities.	但在全球金融危机爆发后货币和财政政策的风险凸显了出来，央行也承担了更多的责任。


Deciding whether or not to rescue a specific financial institution, whether to ensure systemic stability or for other reasons, has visible consequences for individual investors.	不管央行是为了确保系统稳定还是其他原因去决定是否营救特定金融机构，对个人投资者都会产生明显的影响。


The same is true of unconventional interventions in markets for corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities.	央行对公司债券和抵押贷款证券市场的非常规干预也是如此。


Not surprisingly, the notion of independence for central banks that visibly aided specific financial institutions – and this at a time when society as a whole was under unprecedented economic stress – quickly became politically toxic.	不出意料，在整个社会都承受着空前经济压力时央行竟敢公开出手援助特定金融机构，很快就令央行独立性这个概念成为了政治雷区。


Independence is even more problematic in an age when the cross-border spillovers of national monetary policies have become powerful.	在这个国家货币政策的跨国溢出效应更为强大的时代，保持独立性也变得更有问题。


Those spillovers make it important for central banks to take into account the impact of their policies on foreign countries and the global system.	这些溢出效应让央行必须考虑到其政策对外国和全球体系的影响。


But the pursuit of global objectives is difficult, bordering on the impossible, when central banks function under the kind of narrow, domestically focused mandates that independence requires.	但当中央银行在维持独立性所需的那种狭隘且只关注国内事务的政治授权下运作时，追求全球目标就极为困难甚至近乎不可能。


Today, central banks are under attack for all of these reasons: for missing their inflation targets, for failing to maintain financial stability, for failing to restore stability in transparent ways, and for not adequately taking into account the global repercussions of their policies.	当前中央银行因为诸多原因而受到了冲击：无法达致通胀目标，未能维持金融稳定，没有透明的手段来恢复稳定，没有充分考虑其政策的全球影响。


Dissatisfied by their performance, politicians are seeking to reassert control.	而那些不满央行表现的政治家们正在试图重夺控制权。


We hear the Bank of England criticized for voicing worries about the macroeconomic repercussions of Brexit. We encounter speculation that US President Donald Trump is intent on packing the Federal Reserve Board with politically compliant appointees.	因此我们看到意大利银行因处理该国银行危机而遭到抨击，听到英国央行由于对英国脱欧的宏观经济影响表示担忧而被批评，还碰到有推测说美国总统特朗普有意在美联储里安插一批政治上效忠于他的人。


But compromising central bank independence in order to enhance political accountability would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater.	但为了加强政治问责而在央行独立性方面做出妥协无异于买椟还珠。


Monetary policy is complex and technical. Returning control to politicians is no more prudent than handing them the keys to a country’s nuclear power plants.	货币政策相当复杂且对技术要求较高，将其控制权交还给政治人物必须跟把一国全部核电站的钥匙交给他们一样慎重。


Some will say that the way for central banks to ensure their independence is to abandon macroprudential and microprudential policies and foreswear unconventional interventions in securities markets.	有人会说，中央银行维护自身独立性的方式是放弃宏观审慎政策和微观审慎政策，并在证券市场采取非常规干预措施。


But a key lesson of the crisis is that macroeconomic and financial policies are closely intertwined, and that their coordination is most effective when the two tasks are housed in the same institution, if run by separate committees.	但本次危机的一个重要教训在于宏观经济和金融政策紧密相连，当这两个任务在同一个机构中并交由不同的委员会管理时，它们的协调也是最有效的。


Given the prevailing low level of interest rates, moreover, it is all but certain, come another crisis, that unconventional policies will be back.	此外考虑当前的低利率水平，万一又来一场危机，那么非常规的政策一定会被重新捡起来。


What central banks can do to head off threats to their independence is become more transparent.	中央银行可以用来抵抗其独立性威胁的做法就是变得更为透明。


They can announce the votes of individual board members on all policy-relevant matters and release minutes without undue delay.	它们可以在所有政策相关事宜上公布各个董事会成员的投票情况，并及时发布会议记录；


They can hold more press conferences and be less platitudinous in explaining their policies.	可以召开更多的新闻发布会并避免在解释自身政策时引用太多陈词滥调；


They can avoid pontificating on questions remote from their mandates.	可以避免对那些跟自身政治委任不相关的问题发表评论；


They can acknowledge the right of politicians to define the goals the central bank is tasked with achieving.	也可以承认政治家们有权去定义中央银行的任务目标。


And to shape the views of those politicians, they can better explain why cooperation with fiscal authorities and foreign central banks is in the public interest.	而为了左右这些政治家的观点，央行可以更好地解释为什么与财政当局和外国央行的合作符合公共利益。


They can publish more detailed financial accounts, including on their individual security transactions and counterparties.	他们可以发布更详细的金融账户数据，包括自身和交易对手的证券交易情况。


Above all, they can avoid intervening in parliamentary politics, as the European Central Bank did when it hastened the fall of Silvio Berlusconi’s government in Italy in 2011. Then they can keep their heads down and hope for the best.	最重要的是，它们可以避免像欧洲央行在2011年加速意大利西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼政府倒台时所做的那样干预议会政治，这样就不会再惹上麻烦，并占据最有利的地位。


The Dangerous Delusion of Price Stability	危险的物价稳定错觉


BASEL – The major central banks’ vigilant pursuit of positive but low inflation has become a dangerous delusion.	巴塞尔—主要央行谨慎采取正但低的利率已经成为一个危险的幻觉。


It is dangerous because the policies needed to achieve the objective could have unwanted side effects; and it is a delusion because there is currently no good reason to be pursuing the objective in the first place.	之所以危险，是因为实现目标所需要的政策可能会带来有害副作用； 之所以是幻觉，是因为目前并没有理由应该追逐现在的目标。


In the 1970s, when inflation in the advanced economies rose sharply, central banks rightly resisted it.	20世纪70年代，发达经济体通胀急剧上升，央行正确地进行了遏制。


The lesson central bankers took from that battle was that low inflation is a necessary condition for sustained growth.	央行从这场战役中得到的教训是低利率是持续增长的必要条件。


But, subtly and over time, this lesson has morphed into a belief that low inflation is also a sufficient condition for sustained growth.	但这一教训随着时间发生了微妙的变化，演变成低通胀同时也是持续增长的充分条件的信念。


That change may have been due to the benign economic conditions that accompanied the period of disinflation from the late 1980s to 2007, commonly referred to as the “Great Moderation.”	这一变化可能是因为20世纪80年代至2007年间的通胀低迷时期同时也伴随着有利的经济环境，这段时间也被人们共同称之为“大稳健”。


For central bankers, it was comforting to believe that they had reduced inflation by controlling demand, and that their policies had many beneficial side effects for the economy.	央行欣慰相信，它们通过控制需求降低了通胀，以及它们的政策给经济带来了诸多有利的副作用。


After all, this was the demand-oriented narrative they had used to justify tight money to begin with.	毕竟，它们一开始用来论证紧缩货币的正是需求导向叙事。


But then the world changed.	但接着，世界发生了变化。


From the late 1980s onward, low inflation was largely due to positive supply-side shocks – such as the Baby Boomer-fueled expansion of the labor force and the integration of many emerging countries into the global trading system.	20世纪80年代末以来，低通胀主要是因为积极的供给侧冲击——如婴儿潮带来的劳动力扩张和许多新兴国家融入全球贸易体系。


These forces boosted growth while lowering inflation.	这些力量提振了增长，同时也降低了通胀。


And monetary policy, far from restricting demand, was generally focused on preventing below-target inflation.	而货币政策主要集中在防止通胀低于目标上，而不是限制需求上。


As we now know, that led to a period of easy monetary conditions, which, together with financial deregulation and technological developments, sowed the seeds of the 2007 financial crisis and the ensuing recession.	现在我们知道，这导致了一段货币条件宽松期，再加上金融去监管化和科技的发展，酿成了2007年金融危机和随后的衰退。


The fundamental analytical error then – as it still is today – was a failure to distinguish between alternative sources of disinflation.	当时——今天仍然如此——的基本分析错误便是没能区分通胀低迷的不同原因。


The end of the Great Moderation should have disabused policymakers of their belief that low inflation guarantees future economic stability.	大稳健的结束理应给决策者当头棒喝，让他们不再执着于低通胀保证未来经济稳定的信念。


If anything, the opposite has been true.	但事实正好相反。


Having doubled down on their inflation targets, central banks have had to rely on an unprecedented array of untested policy instruments to achieve their goals.	央行在变本加厉地认准通胀目标，不得不依靠前所未有的、从未试验过的政策工具组合来实现这些目标。


For example, many central bankers are now recommending the use of “macroprudential” instruments to manage systemic risks in the economy – which, in turn, will allow them to keep interest rates “lower for longer.”	比如，许多央行现在推荐运用“宏观审慎”工具来管理经济中的系统风险——这反过来让它们能够保持利率“更低水平更长时间”。


The problem with this approach is that there is little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest that such policies will work as intended.	这一方针的问题在于没有什么实证证据能证明这些政策会产生想要的结果。


Central bankers sometimes rationalize their current policies not by extolling the benefits of low inflation, but by underscoring the heavy costs of even mild deflation.	有时，央行不是通过颂扬低通胀的好处，而是通过强调哪怕是温和通缩的严重代价来论证目前的政策。


Yet while there is ample evidence showing that high inflation is more costly than low inflation, it is hard to find similar evidence that mild deflation is all that costly.	尽管有充分的证据表明高通胀比低通胀代价高昂，但很难找到类似的证据证明通缩会有什么代价。


In fact, the widely held assumption that consumers and corporate investors will extrapolate from past price declines and hold off on making purchases as a result of deflation has essentially no empirical support behind it.	事实上，普遍接受的假定是消费者和公司投资者会将过去的物价下跌推演到未来，因此通缩会导致采购延后，这一假定基本没有实证支持。


Recent consumer responses to sectoral price declines in various countries, not least Japan, all suggest the very opposite.	最近多国（不仅仅是日本）消费者对部门性物价下跌的反应表明结果正好相反。


True, as a matter of arithmetic, deflation increases the real (inflation-adjusted) burden of debt service.	诚然，从算术角度，通缩会增加真实（经通胀调整的）债务维持负担。


But if debt levels are at onerous heights as a result of easy-money monetary policies, it is not obvious that the solution to the problem is still more easy money.	但如果债务水平是因为宽松货币政策而高企，很难说解决问题的办法是进一步宽松货币。


Central banks’ fixation on positive but low inflation under today’s prevailing economic conditions is also increasingly dangerous.	央行对支持今天普遍的经济条件的正但低的通胀的执着也变得越来越危险。


Global debt ratios have risen sharply since the financial crisis began, while traditional lenders’ margins have been squeezed, raising questions about their overall health.	自金融危机开始爆发以来，全球债务比率急剧升高，而传统贷款人的利润率受到挤压，导致它们的总体健康情况也出现了问题。


And as lending has continued to migrate further into the “shadows,” price discovery in financial markets has become severely compromised, to the point that many assets now seem to be overvalued.	而随着贷款不断地转移到“影子”中，金融市场的价格发现功能受到了严重制约，以至于许多资产现在都表现出价值高估。


These developments constitute a threat not just to financial stability, but also to the workings of the real economy.	这些发展趋势不但构成了对金融稳定性的威胁，也不利于真实货币的运行。


Moreover, one could argue that easy money itself has contributed to the unexpectedly strong disinflationary forces seen in recent years.	此外，可以说宽松货币本身造成了近几年所发生的意料外的强烈通缩力量。


Owing to easy financing and regulatory forbearance, aggregate supply has risen as “zombie” companies have proliferated.	拜宽松的融资和监管克制所赐，“僵尸”公司遍地开花，总供给随之上升。


Meanwhile, aggregate demand has been restrained by the debt headwinds – yet another result of easy monetary conditions.	与此同时，总需求因为债务负担而大受掣肘——而这也是宽松货币条件的结果。


In view of these conditions, continuing to insist on monetary easing seems particularly ill advised.	从这些条件看，继续坚持货币宽松绝对是不合时宜的。


With so many potential dangers on the horizon, central bankers should at least consider rethinking the fundamental assumptions underlying their policies.	面对重重潜在危险，央行至少应该反思它们的政策背后的基本假设。


So, what should policymakers do?	那么，决策者应该怎么做？


In the immediate future, governments must stop relying so much on central bank policies to restore sustainable growth.	在即期，政府必须停止严重依靠央行政策重塑可持续增长的做法。


Rather than obsesses over inflation targets, policymakers should (belatedly) start asking themselves what practical measures they can take to prevent another crisis from erupting.	决策者不应该沉溺于通胀目标，而应该（亡羊补牢地）问问自己可以采取哪些切实措施防止新的危机爆发。


Equally important, they need to ensure that they have done everything they can to prepare for such a scenario, in case their preventive measures prove inadequate.	同样重要的是，他们需要确保竭尽全力为这一情景做好准备，如果他们的预防措施不够充分的话。


Looking even further into the future, when some semblance of “normality” has been restored, central banks should focus less on hitting near-term inflation targets, and more on avoiding “boom-bust” credit cycles.	如果着眼于更加长远的未来，当某些“常态”的假想得以重塑时，央行不应该过多关注实现短期通胀目标，而应该更多关注避免信用的“枯荣”循环。


Unlike slight deviations from inflation targets, or even slight deflation, the latter actually are costly.	和略微偏离通胀目标甚至轻微通缩不同，后者真的会带来严重代价。


Central Banking Goes Negative	央行奔负


NEW HAVEN – In what could well be a final act of desperation, central banks are abdicating effective control of the economies they have been entrusted to manage.	纽黑文—央行也许已经祭出了绝望的最后一招——放弃对人们委托它们进行管理的经济的有效控制。


First came zero interest rates, then quantitative easing, and now negative interest rates – one futile attempt begetting another.	先是零利率，然后是量化宽松，现在则是负利率，政策在徒劳之间切换。


Just as the first two gambits failed to gain meaningful economic traction in chronically weak recoveries, the shift to negative rates will only compound the risks of financial instability and set the stage for the next crisis.	正如前两次豪赌没能给陷入长期萎靡复苏的经济带来有意义的动力，采取负利率也只能加剧金融动荡的风险，给下一次危机创造条件。


The adoption of negative interest rates – initially launched in Europe in 2014 and now embraced in Japan – represents a major turning point for central banking.	采取负利率——首见于2014年的欧洲，现在日本也在实行——是央行政策的一个巨大的转折点。


Previously, emphasis had been placed on boosting aggregate demand – primarily by lowering the cost of borrowing, but also by spurring wealth effects from appreciating financial assets.	此前的重点一直是提振总需求——主要通过降低借贷 成本，但也通过刺激金融资产升值带来的财富效应。


But now, by imposing penalties on excess reserves left on deposit with central banks, negative interest rates drive stimulus through the supply side of the credit equation – in effect, urging banks to make new loans regardless of the demand for such funds.	但如今，负利率是对存在央行的超额准备的惩罚，它通过信用方程的供给端推动刺激——事实上，就是迫使银行不顾资金需求发放新贷款。


This misses the essence of what is ailing a post-crisis world.	这偏离了后危机世界的致病原因。


As Nomura economist Richard Koo has argued about Japan, the focus should be on the demand side of crisis-battered economies, where growth is impaired by a debt-rejection syndrome that invariably takes hold in the aftermath of a “balance sheet recession.”	野村证券经济学家辜朝明评论日本时指出，重点应该放在受危机影响的经济体的需求端，这些经济提的增长受到作为“资产负债表看衰退”的必然结果的拒绝债务综合征的制约。


Such impairment is global in scope.	这一制约效应是全球性的。


It’s not just Japan, where the purportedly powerful impetus of Abenomics has failed to dislodge a struggling economy from 24 years of 0.8% inflation-adjusted GDP growth.	设想中应该具有强大推力的安倍经济学没有让日本经济从24年来年均0. 8%（经通胀调整）的低迷GDP增长中走出。


It’s also the US, where consumer demand – the epicenter of America’s Great Recession – remains stuck in an eight-year quagmire of just 1.5% average real growth.	不仅日本如此，美国也是这样，消费需求——美国大衰退的震中——八年来停滞不前，而这八年的平均真实经济增长率只有1. 5%。


Even worse is the eurozone, where real GDP growth has averaged just 0.1% over the 2008-2015 period.	欧元区的情况更加糟糕，真实2008—2015年间GDP平均每年只能增长0. 1%。


All of this speaks to the impotence of central banks to jump-start aggregate demand in balance-sheet-constrained economies that have fallen into 1930s-style “liquidity traps.”	所有这些都表明央行根本无力推动受资产负债表约束、陷入20世纪30年式“流动性陷阱”的经济的总需求。


As Paul Krugman noted nearly 20 years ago, Japan exemplifies the modern-day incarnation of this dilemma.	保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）在近20年前指出，日本是这一难题的现代“典范”。


When its equity and property bubbles burst in the early 1990s, the keiretsu system – “main banks” and their tightly connected nonbank corporates – imploded under the deadweight of excess leverage.	20世纪90年代初，日本股市和房地产泡沫破裂，“经连会”（keiretsu）体系——“主银行”以及与之关系密切的非银行公司——因为不堪过度杠杆的重负而倒闭。


But the same was true for over-extended, saving-short American consumers – to say nothing of a eurozone that was basically a levered play on overly-inflated growth expectations in its peripheral economies – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.	但支出过多、储蓄过少的美国消费者也是如此——欧元区就更不用说了，其外围经济体（葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊和西班牙）从根本上说就是一场增长预期过度膨胀的杠杆游戏。


In all of these cases, balance-sheet repair preempted a resurgence of aggregate demand, and monetary stimulus was largely ineffective in sparking classic cyclical rebounds.	在所有这些例子中，资产负债表修复挤出了总需求的复振，货币刺激基本上没有起到刺激经典周期性反弹的作用。


This could be the greatest failure of modern central banking.	这可能是现代央行政策最大的失败。


Yet denial runs deep.	但这一点被一致否认。


Former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan’s “mission accomplished” speech in early 2004 is an important case in point.	美联储前主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）2004年初发表的“任务完成”讲话是一个显例。


Greenspan took credit for using super-easy monetary policy to clean up the mess after the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, while insisting that the Fed should feel vindicated for not leaning against the speculative madness of the late 1990s.	格林斯潘使用超宽松货币政策清理2000年互联网泡沫破裂后的乱局，同时坚持美联储不应该因为对20世纪90年代末投机疯狂无动于衷而受到谴责。 他的这一观点受到广泛赞誉。


That left Greenspan’s successor on a very slippery slope.	这让格林斯潘的继任者陷入滑坡困境。


Quickly out of ammunition when the Great Crisis hit in late 2008, former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke embraced the new miracle drug of quantitative easing – a powerful antidote for markets in distress but ultimately an ineffective tool to plug the hole in consumer balance sheets and spark meaningful revival in aggregate demand.	2008年底的大危机让美联储前主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）很快手段用尽，不得不祭出新的魔力药丸——量化宽松。 量化宽松是解救受困市场的灵丹，但绝非填补消费者资产负债表、刺激总需求有效复苏的有效工具。


European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s famous 2012 promise to do “whatever it takes” to defend the euro took the ECB down the same path – first zero interest rates, then quantitative easing, now negative policy rates.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉在2012年所做的著名承诺——“不惜一切代价”捍卫欧元——让欧洲央行也走上了同样的道路——先是零利率，然后是量化宽松，现在是负政策利率。


Similarly, Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda insists that so-called QQE (quantitative and qualitative easing) has ended a corrosive deflation – even though he has now opted for negative rates and pushed back the BOJ’s 2% inflation target to mid-2017.	类似地，日本银行行长黑田东彦坚持认为所谓的QQE（量化和质量宽松）已经结束了有害的通货紧缩——即使如今他也采取了负利率并将日本银行2%的通胀目标实现日期延后至2017年年中。


It remains to be seen whether the Fed will resist the temptation of negative interest rates.	美联储是否能抵御住负利率的诱惑仍有待观察。


But most major central banks are clinging to the false belief that there is no difference between the efficacy of the conventional tactics of monetary policy – driven by adjustments in policy rates above the zero bound – and unconventional tools such as quantitative easing and negative interest rates.	但最主要央行坚持错误的信念——传统货币政策策略（利率政策在零水平之上进行调整）和非常规工具（如量化宽松和负利率）的效力没有什么区别。


Therein lies the problem.	问题就在于此。


In the era of conventional monetary policy, transmission channels were largely confined to borrowing costs and their associated impacts on credit-sensitive sectors of real economies, such as homebuilding, motor vehicles, and business capital spending.	在常规货币政策时代，传导渠道主要局限于借贷成本以及相应的对实体经济的信用敏感部门（如房屋建设、汽车和商业资本支出）的影响。


As those sectors rose and fell in response to shifts in benchmark interest rates, repercussions throughout the system (so-called multiplier effects) were often reinforced by real and psychological gains in asset markets (wealth effects).	当这些部门因为基准利率的变化而起落时，整个系统的反响（所谓的乘数效应）常常因为资产市场的真实和心理收益（财富效应）而加强。


That was then.	今时不同往日。


In the brave new era of unconventional monetary policy, the transmission channel runs mainly through wealth effects from asset markets.	在全新的非常规货币政策时代，传导渠道主要是通过资产市场的财富效应。


Two serious complications have arisen from this approach.	这一方法引起两个严重的并发症。


The first is that central banks have ignored the risks of financial instability.	首先，央行忽视了金融动荡的风险。


Drawing false comfort from low inflation, overly accommodative monetary policies have led to massive bubbles in asset and credit markets, resulting in major distortions in real economies.	低通胀给过于友好的货币政策造成了虚假的安全感，导致资产和信用市场出现大量泡沫，从而引起实体经济的大扭曲。


When the bubbles burst and pushed unbalanced economies into balance-sheet recessions, inflation-targeting central banks were already low on ammunition – taking them quickly into the murky realm of zero policy rates and the liquidity injections of quantitative easing.	当泡沫破裂并将失衡的经济打入资产负债表衰退时，以通胀为目标的央行已经黔驴技穷——这让它们迅速进入了零利率和量化宽松的流动性注入等未知领域。


Second, politicians, drawing false comfort from frothy asset markets, were less inclined to opt for fiscal stimulus – effectively closing off the only realistic escape route from a liquidity trap.	其次，政客因为繁荣的资产市场而获得虚假的安全感，他们不再倾向于选择财政刺激——从而在事实上封住了走出流动性陷阱的唯一的现实道路。


Lacking fiscal stimulus, central bankers keep upping the ante by injecting more liquidity into bubble-prone financial markets – failing to recognize that they are doing nothing more than “pushing on a string” as they did in the 1930s.	在财政刺激缺位的情况下，央行继续向易于产生泡沫的金融市场注入流动性——而没有意识到它们无非是在重复20世纪30年代的“推绳子”政策（绳子只能拉不能推，指适得其反的政策）。


The shift to negative interest rates is all the more problematic.	转向负利率问题更加严重。


Given persistent sluggish aggregate demand worldwide, a new set of risks is introduced by penalizing banks for not making new loans.	全世界总需求持续萎靡，惩罚不发放新贷款的银行将带来一系列新风险。


This is the functional equivalent of promoting another surge of “zombie lending” – the uneconomic loans made to insolvent Japanese borrowers in the 1990s.	在功能生，这等价于刺激新一波“僵尸贷款”——20世纪90年代贷给毫无偿债能力的日本借款人的不符合经济学原理的贷款。


Central banking, having lost its way, is in crisis.	央行政策已经迷失了方向，陷入了危机。


Can the world economy be far behind?	世界经济还会远吗？


Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces on Economic Areas	经济领域的离心力和向心力


STANFORD – Several years ago, I predicted that there would be a tectonic shift toward devolution, secession, and independence around the world, owing to the failure of political institutions to manage economic, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences.	发自斯坦福——早在几年前笔者就预测说由于政治机构无力应对经济，文化，种族和宗教方面的差异，全球各地都将出现权力下放，分裂和独立等结构性转变。


Supranational economic and political institutions were clearly generating a backlash, as they concentrated more power in central governments.	超国家经济和政治制度将权力集中于中央政府的做法显然引起了反弹。


Citizens in many countries started to feel as though their sovereignty had been eroded.	许多国家的公民开始觉得本国主权受到了侵蚀。


And they worried that the costs of increasing immigration were too high, given the slow recovery from the Great Recession, weak productivity growth, and labor’s declining share of income.	此外他们也担心由于大衰退后复苏缓慢，生产力增长乏力和劳动力占收入份额下降，导致日渐增加的移民所产生的成本过高。


Since then, the United Kingdom has decided to withdraw from the European Union.	自那以后，英国决定退出欧盟。


“Divorce” discussions are now underway to determine how much the British will pay the EU, and what future trade relations will look like.	现在双方已经在进行“离婚”讨论以确定英国该向欧盟支付的金额以及未来的贸易关系。


The process has not been easy, because EU negotiators are worried that if the exit terms are too generous, other member states might follow the UK out of the bloc.	这一过程绝非轻而易举，因为欧盟谈判代表担心如果自己开出退出条款太过慷慨，其他成员国可能会纷纷仿效英国退盟。


Meanwhile, the United States, under President Donald Trump, has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and abandoned the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the EU.	与此同时，特朗普治下的美国已经退出了《跨太平洋伙伴关系》协议，放弃了与欧盟的《跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系》协议。


Now it is threatening to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement unless Mexico and Canada make concessions.	如今他还逼着墨西哥和加拿大作出让步，否则就威胁要退出《北美自由贸易协定》。


In Spain, on October 1, the government of the semi-autonomous region of Catalonia held a referendum in which an estimated 43% of Catalans took part, voting overwhelmingly for independence.	在西班牙，10月1日，加泰罗尼亚自治区政府举行全民公投，有约43％的加泰罗尼亚人参加了投票且绝大多数选择独立。


After the Catalan parliament declared independence, the Spanish national government invoked a constitutional provision to take administrative control of the region, escalating the crisis.	加泰罗尼亚议会宣布独立后，西班牙国家政府援引一项宪法规定正式接管该地区，令危机进一步升级。


Not to be outdone, more than 90% of those who participated in recent referenda in Lombardy and Veneto, Italy’s two richest regions, voted for more control over local education spending and taxes.	最近在意大利伦巴第和威尼托这两个最富庶地区举行的公民投票中，超过90%的投票者赞成要对当地的教育支出和税收拥有更多控制权。


Italy’s massive public debt and subsidies to poorer regions were certainly on these voters’ minds.	这些人显然对意大利的大量公共债务和对较贫困地区的补贴相当在意。


But Giuseppe Garibaldi, the general who united Italy’s city-states in the nineteenth century, must be turning over in his grave.	但在十九世纪统一了意大利各城邦的朱塞佩·加里波第（Giuseppe Garibaldi）将军肯定会气得从坟墓里跳起来了。


Elsewhere, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government, having held an independence referendum in late September, is now trying to negotiate with the central government in Baghdad, which has sent troops to reclaim the region’s oil fields.	此外，伊拉克的库尔德斯坦地区政府也在9月底举行了独立公投，现在正试图与派出部队收回该地区油田的巴格达中央政府进行谈判。


And Chinese President Xi Jinping used this month’s 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China to consolidate his position further, by shifting more power from the provinces to the central government in Beijing.	而中国国家主席习近平利用本月召开的中共十九大会议将更多的权力从各省转移到了北京的中央政府，从而进一步巩固了自身的权力。


Even in countries long known for stability, there is a clear tension between centralized and decentralized political authority.	即使在那些长期保持稳定的国家，中央集权和分权化政治机构之间也存在明显的紧张关系。


For example, a group called Calexit is trying to introduce a California ballot proposition to secede from the US.	例如，一个名为“加州退美”（Calexit）的团体正在试图促成一个加利福尼亚脱离美国的投票议案。


According to early polls, one-third of Californians would support such an initiative.	根据初期民意调查，1/3的加利福尼亚人会支持这一举措。


And early this month, California Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill declaring California a “sanctuary state” – a mostly symbolic gesture indicating that the state will not fully cooperate with the Trump administration’s efforts to enforce federal immigration law.	本月初，加利福尼亚州州长杰里·布朗（Jerry Brown）签署了一项法案，宣布加利福尼亚州是一个“庇护州”——这一重大象征性姿态表明该州不会全面配合特朗普政府执行联邦移民法的做法。


At the national level, congressional Republicans’ ill-fated attempt to repeal and replace the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) sought to shift more responsibility to the states through federal block grants.	在国家层面上，美国国会共和党人徒劳地试图废除和取代2010年《平价医疗法案》（Obamacare），想利用联邦整笔拨款的方式向各州转移更多的责任。


And yet, the Republican tax-reform proposal that is now being discussed would eliminate a federal tax deduction for state and local taxes that other states consider a subsidy for high-tax states like California and New York. (Netting all the fiscal interactions and transfers, the reverse is closer to the truth.)	然而眼下正在讨论的共和党税收改革却建议消除联邦对各州和地方税收的减免，因为其他州认为这是对加州和纽约这类高税率州的补贴（但考虑到所有的财政互动和转移支付状况，其实是高税率州在补贴它们）。


In Europe, the EU has continued to kick the can down the road, rather than deal with its crises in sovereign debt, banking, growth, and unemployment.	在欧洲，欧盟继续在这个问题上虚与委蛇，而非处理主权债务，银行业，增长和失业方面的危机。


EU leaders are hoping that a modest cyclical upturn will buy them time.	欧盟领导人希望温和的周期性上涨将会给他们争取点时间。


But, at the end of the day, they will still have to confront a core problem: Germany, which has benefited the most from a monetary union in which its trading partners have no currency to depreciate, doesn’t want to foot the bill for bailing out profligate member states.	但是最后还是要面对一个核心问题：德国这个从货币联盟中受益最大且贸易伙伴没有货币可以贬值的国家可不愿意为那些挥霍无度的成员国擦屁股了。


It may come as no surprise that a recent Pew Research Center poll found that 70% of Europeans, Canadians, and Americans favor more direct democracy, “in which citizens, rather than elected officials, vote on major issues.”	因此不出所料，最近皮尤研究中心的调查结果显示，70％的欧洲人，加拿大人和美国人赞成实施更直接的民主“好让公民而不是民选官员来对重大问题投票”。


This would horrify America’s founders, who regarded direct democracy as a precursor to mob rule, and established a system of checks and balances precisely to prevent such an outcome.	不过这会令美国的国父们大惊失色，须知他们可是将直接民主视为暴民统治的前兆，并建立了一个制衡制度来防止这样一幕。


Each of the aforementioned examples of centralization and devolution is unique. But it is worth asking if there are also commonalities among them.	上述每一个集权和权力下放的例子都有其特殊性，但也值得了解一下它们之间是否存在一些共同点。


When the Nobel laureate economist Robert Mundell, the intellectual “father of the euro,” set out to determine an optimal currency area, he put a premium on natural trade and macroeconomic ties.	当诺贝尔奖经济学奖获得者，理论层面的“欧元之父”，经济学家家罗伯特·蒙代尔（Robert Mundell）在确定最优货币区域时，他将自然贸易和宏观经济关系置于优先地位。


As a Canadian, he was struck by the “horizontal” nature of the Canadian and American currency areas.	作为加拿大人，他不喜欢加拿大和美国货币区域“横向”性质。


To his mind, “vertical” areas comprising the Canadian and American west might make more economic sense.	在他看来，涵盖加拿大和美国西部的“垂直”区域可能会有更多的经济意义。


Mundell’s insight can be applied much more broadly.	蒙德尔的见解可以得到更广泛的应用。


Economic areas are continually forming, combining, and dissolving as a result of competing centrifugal and centripetal forces.	由于离心和向心力量的竞争，经济地区会不断形成，结合和分化。


Constant shifts in comparative advantages, economies of scale, and transaction costs affect the benefits of accommodating more homogeneous localized preferences.	而比较优势，规模经济和交易成本的不断变化会影响到适应更为同质的本地化偏好所带来的好处。


Likewise, “optimal” political areas change over time, owing to changes in technology and demography, and their interaction with evolving cultural, ethnic, religious, and other factors.	同样，由于科技和人口的变化，以及两者与不断变化的文化，种族，宗教等因素的相互影响，“最佳”政治区域也随着时间的推移而发生变化。


These processes of coming together and falling apart can be beneficial or harmful.	而这些分分合合的过程可能有益或有害。


The EU has certainly been a great success as a trade area, but less so as an integrated labor market and currency union; and it has altogether failed as a banking and fiscal area.	欧盟作为贸易区域无疑取得了巨大的成功，但作为劳动力市场和货币联盟就差强人意，作为银行和财政区域则是完完全全的失败。


Or consider the Indian subcontinent, where distrustful neighbors armed with nuclear warheads pose a danger to themselves and the world.	再看看拥有核弹头且互不信任的各邻国对自身和世界构成危险的印度次大陆。


Given that India still has almost as many Muslims as Pakistan, it is possible that religious tensions could have been mitigated within the confines of a single country.	鉴于印度与巴基斯坦的穆斯林人口数目几乎相当，那么把这些人归于单一国家的范围内可能会有助于缓解宗教紧张局势。


By my estimate, Pakistan and India’s current volume of trade should be 25 times higher than it is.	据笔者估计，巴基斯坦和印度之间的贸易额应该比目前大25倍。


That would greatly benefit both countries, not least because they would each have a greater stake in the other’s success.	这将大大有利于两国，尤其是因为它们都能从对方的成功中获取更大的收益。


Governing well in a context of economic, political, ethnic, and religious diversity is not easy.	在经济，政治，种族和宗教多样性的背景下做好治理并不容易。


But failure to do so can mean substantially less growth – and substantially more political risk.	但是如果不这样做可能意味着极低的增长，以及极大的政治风险。


Are Nazis as American as Apple Pie?	纳粹是否像苹果派一样美国？


NEW HAVEN – Is the United States threatened by Nazism?	纽黑文——美国是否受到纳粹主义的威胁？


The short answer is no, notwithstanding the frightening events in Charlottesville, Virginia, this past weekend.	简短的答案是没有，尽管弗吉尼亚夏洛茨维尔刚刚过去的周末发生的事情非常可怕。


In Charlottesville, the home of the University of Virginia, founded by Thomas Jefferson, white nationalists, separatists, neo-Nazis, members of the Ku Klux Klan, and other likeminded groups rallied behind Swastika banners and marched in a Nazi-style torchlight procession.	在由托马斯·杰斐逊创立的弗吉尼亚大学所在地夏洛茨维尔，白人民族分子、分离分子、新纳粹分子、3K党徒和其他具有类似思想的团体团结在纳粹十字标记的周围，举行纳粹风格的火炬游行。


By the end of the next day, there had also been thuggish violence.	游行第二天结束时发生了暴力事件。


One white supremacist went so far as to drive a car into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing one and injuring 19 others.	一名白人至上主义者竟然开车冲进持反对意见的抗议人群中，造成1人死亡，19人受伤。


The groups responsible for the violence in Charlottesville reveled in US President Donald Trump’s election last November.	制造夏洛茨维尔暴力事件的团体去年11月曾狂欢庆祝美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的当选。


And Trump has often hesitated to disavow them; during the election campaign, when former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke publicly backed him, Trump was scandalously slow to reject Duke and his followers.	而特朗普则经常在否定他们时表现出犹豫的态度； 在总统大选期间，当前3K党大咖大卫·杜克对其表示公开支持时，特朗普令人愤慨地犹犹豫豫，不愿拒绝杜克及其追随者。


Trump also repeatedly incited violence during the campaign, while evincing a bottomless affection for authoritarian leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin.	特朗普还在竞选期间一再煽动暴力冲突，并表达了对独裁领袖俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京无穷无尽的仰慕。


After the events in Charlottesville, Trump initially offered a bland statement that condemned hate “on many sides,” thereby drawing a moral equivalence between the racists and those who gathered to oppose them.	夏洛茨维尔事件发生后，特朗普起先发表了一个温和的声明，谴责“来自多方的”仇恨，并借此机会混淆了种族主义者和反对者之间的区别。


Two days later, under intensifying pressure, Trump issued a more forceful statement, in which he explicitly condemned the KKK, neo-Nazis, and other white supremacists, only to revert the following day to blaming “both sides” for the violence.	两天后，因为压力越来越大，特朗普才发表了一份更加有力的声明，新声明明确谴责3K党、新纳粹分子和其他白人至上主义者，但后来却又改变立场指责“双方”制造了暴力活动。


All of this is abhorrent.	所有这些都令人心生厌恶。


But any sober observer can see that the US is still a long way from the nightmarish atmosphere of Germany in 1933.	但任何清醒的旁观者都可以看出美国还远未到1933年德国噩梦般氛围的时候。


American democratic institutions are holding up, just as they did in the crisis years of the 1930s.	美国的民主制度仍在发挥作用，这一点与20世纪30年代危机时没有任何差别。


Opposition parties have not been banned, and the courts have not lost their independent authority.	反对党并没有遭到禁止，而法院也没有丧失独立权威。


Moreover, Trump is not the supreme leader of a political party with a paramilitary arm.	不仅如此，特朗普也并非手握准军事部门政党的最高领袖。


There are no facilities such as Dachau, Auschwitz, or Treblinka under construction.	现在没有达豪、奥斯维辛、特雷布林卡这样的设施正在建设当中。


Even Trump’s planned border wall with Mexico remains stuck in the planning stage, with no funding from the US Congress.	就连特朗普计划中的墨美边境隔离墙也仍然处在规划阶段，没有得到美国国会的拨款资助。


And Congress is not about to pass an Enabling Act conferring dictatorial powers on the president, as the Reichstag did for Hitler in March 1933.	而且国会也没有打算通过一项授予总统独裁权力的法案，就像德意志帝国议会1933年3月授权希特勒时那样。


Last but not least, the American press is more tenacious and energized than it has been in years.	最后但同样重要的是，美国媒体比前些年更加活跃和顽强。


Trump’s yearning for authoritarian rule is clear for all to see.	特朗普对专制统治的渴望显而易见。


But he will not achieve it.	但他无法实现这一目标。


There will be no Nazi dictatorship in America.	美国将不会实行纳粹独裁制度。


But whether America is threatened by such a dictatorship is not the right question.	但问题不在于美国是否受到上述独裁制度的威胁。


American democratic institutions might be holding up, but history has taught us that they are not immune to the machinations of racially virulent political programs.	美国的民主制度可能正在发挥作用，但历史告诉我们它们无法完全不受恶性种族政治计划的影响。


In fact, the US produced some of the laws that would later serve as a foundation for the Nazi movement in Germany.	事实上，美国制定了某些法律，这些法律日后很有可能会为德国纳粹运动在美国的发展打下基础。


America, with its vibrant democratic institutions, was the leading racist jurisdiction in the world in the early twentieth century.	美国尽管拥有活力四射的民主机构，但仍拥有20世纪初规模最大的种族主义司法制度。


An obvious example is the Jim Crow South, where white legislatures passed laws imposing racial segregation and reversing many of the gains of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period.	一个明显的例子是在信奉种族歧视的南方，白人管辖的立法机构通过了法律强制种族隔离并逆转内战后重建时期的诸多成就。


But that is hardly the only example.	但这并不是唯一的实例。


Those on the far right in Europe also admired America’s early-twentieth-century immigration policies, which were designed to exclude “undesirable” races.	欧洲极右翼同样羡慕美国20世纪初期的移民政策，这些政策设计的初衷是排除“不受欢迎的”种族。


In his manifesto Mein Kampf, Hitler singled out America as “the one state” that was progressing toward the creation of a healthy race-based order.	在宣言作品我的奋斗中，希特勒将美国列为一个正在创建健康的以种族为基础的秩序的“国度”。


Indeed, during this period, 30 US states had anti-miscegenation laws intended to safeguard racial purity.	事实上，在这一时期，美国有30个州出台了旨在维护种族纯洁性的反异族通婚法。


America’s democratic institutions did not stand in the way of such policies in the early twentieth century.	20世纪初，美国的民主制度并没有反对这样的政策。


On the contrary, anti-miscegenation laws were the product of America’s democratic system, which gave full voice to many Americans’ racism.	相反，反异族通婚法恰恰是美国民主制度的产物，让许多美国种族主义者有机会充分表达。


And US courts upheld these legal innovations, using flexible common-law precedents to decide who would acquire the privileged status of “white.”	而美国法院维护了这样的法律创新，利用灵活的普通法判例来决定“白人”特权地位的归属。


The Nazis paid close attention.	纳粹分子对此保持了密切的关注。


As they concocted their own racial statutes – the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 – they pored over American race law as a model.	在炮制自己的种族法律时——也就是1935年的纽伦堡法——他们全神贯注地效仿美国种族法律的榜样。


So today, instead of asking whether American institutions will survive the Trump presidency, we must ask how American institutions can be put in the service of wrongful ends.	因此今天，与其纠结美国制度能否在特朗普任职期间生存下来，我们必须搞清这套制度怎样才能服务于错误的目标。


After all, while America’s early-twentieth-century race laws are gone, it still has the same overheated democratic order and common-law flexibility that it had back then.	毕竟，尽管美国20世纪初的种族法律已经不复存在，但它仍拥有当时那样过热的民主秩序和普通法的灵活裁量；


These institutions might no longer produce Jim Crow laws; but the American criminal-justice system, for example, remains a poster child for institutionalized racism.	上述制度也许无法再制定歧视黑人的法律； 但举例来讲，美国的刑事司法制度仍然是制度化种族主义的模范代表。


Americans should be ashamed that their country’s institutions laid the groundwork for Nazi race law.	美国人应当为其国内制度为纳粹种族法律奠定基础而感到耻辱。


But they should not be worrying about the threat of renascent Nazism, despite Trump’s clear ambivalence in condemning white supremacists.	但他们不应担心纳粹主义重生的威胁，即使特朗普在谴责白人至上主义者方面表现出明显的矛盾态度。


Rather, Americans should worry about the potential of their institutions to facilitate evils that are, as loath as we are to admit it, as American as apple pie.	相反，美国人应当担心本国制度催生这种邪恶的可能性，尽管我们不愿承认，但这种可能性的存在就像苹果派一样代表着美国。


Sex, Lies, and Leadership	性、谎言和领导力


LONDON – News events can often serve as important catalysts for introspection, not least for members of company boards.	伦敦—新事件常常是自我反省的重要催化剂，至少对公司董事是如此。


Recent revelations of the Russian government’s involvement in hacking into the Democratic National Committee’s computer system – just two years after North Korea’s hack of Sony Pictures – has spurred a push in boardrooms around the world to tighten their organizations’ cyber security.	最近曝光的俄罗斯政府牵涉入侵民主党全国委员会计算机系统的事件——距离朝鲜侵入索尼影业仅仅两年——促使全世界各大公司董事会纷纷要求狠抓公司网络安全。


Likewise, stories of illegal or unethical labor practices – for example, among Apple suppliers in China – have inspired companies to take a close look at their supply chains.	类似地，关于非法或不道德劳工使用情况的报道——比如中国的苹果供应商——促使公司严密关注供给链。


And criticism of excessive executive remuneration has led to frantic meetings by many boards’ compensation committees.	关于高管薪酬过高的批评让许多公司董事会薪酬委员会匆忙召开会议讨论应对之策。


But there is one issue in the news that has not yet received sufficient attention in boardrooms: child sexual abuse.	但有一类被报道的情况尚未引起董事会足够的关注：儿童性骚扰。


In the United Kingdom, the last month has brought harrowing reports about child abuse in youth soccer teams, where promising young athletes attempt to play their way to the professional level.	在英国，上个月曝光了耸人听闻的新闻，足球俱乐部梯队——年轻选手通往职业水平的捷径——存在侵犯儿童的情况。


At last count, 98 amateur and professional clubs in the UK were implicated in some way.	上个月，98家英国业余和职业俱乐部或多或少地被此事涉及。


While the public has been shocked by the revelations, the affected clubs’ leaders may not have been – at least not in every case.	公众被这一消息的曝光所震惊，但涉事俱乐部领导未必——至少不是所有俱乐部都对此大惊小怪。


After all, many clubs had previously heard allegations of sexual abuse of young players, but had chosen to ignore them or cover them up, at times even doling out hush money to the victims – all for the sake of protecting their own reputations.	毕竟，许多俱乐部此前早已听闻关于小球员遭受性侵犯的指控，但选择了忽视和掩盖，有时甚至用钱封受害者之口——所有这些都是为了保护自己的名誉。


Crewe Alexandra’s board, for example, actively discussed sexual abuse allegations against a coach, Barry Bennell, in the late 1980s, but decided not to report him to the police or even to fire him. Bennell turned out to be a serial pedophile.	比如，克鲁亚历山大（Crewe Alexandra）俱乐部董事会积极讨论了针对该俱乐部一名教练——巴里·贝奈尔（Barry Bennell）在20世纪80年代末进行性侵犯的指控，但决定不把他交给警察，甚至也不解雇他。


Though he was ultimately tried and sentenced in 1998, he first got to spend several more years abusing young boys, thanks in no small part to Crewe’s spineless and venal board.	尽管他最终还是在1998年受审并判刑，但在此之前他又多了好几年虐待小男孩的时间，而这都是拜克鲁俱乐部怯懦无骨、见利忘义的董事会所赐。


Even today, boards are sometimes choosing to defend their reputations at the expense of basic human decency.	即使在今天，董事会有时也会选择保护名誉，牺牲基本人道尊严。


Last July, Chelsea Football Club paid a former footballer £50,000 ($62,000) to agree not to speak of the abuse he allegedly endured in the 1970s.	去年7月，切尔西足球俱乐部用50,000英镑让一位前球员封口，不要说出他据称在20世纪70年代所经历的虐待。


The five-year review of child safety measures, launched by the Football Association (the governing body of UK soccer) in 2001, was dropped after just two years, reportedly in response to resistance from some FA staff.	2001年，英国足总（英国足球监管机构）启动了为期五年的儿童安全措施评估，但只开展了两年便不了了之，据说是因为一些足总工作人员的抵制。


Yet the scandal plaguing UK soccer is hardly unique.	但英国足球丑闻绝不是孤例。


According to a just-released joint investigation by the IndyStar and USA Today, at least 368 gymnasts in the United States have alleged some form of sexual abuse over the last 20 years.	据刚刚发布的IndyStar和《今日美国》的联合调查，过去20年，美国至少有368名体操运动员曾指控某种形式的性侵犯。


Top officials at USA Gymnastics, one of the country’s most prominent Olympic organizations, not only failed to alert police to those allegations; they hid the complaints.	美国体操协会——它是美国最著名的奥林匹克运动组织之一——高级官员不但没有将这些指控转告警方； 反而隐瞒投诉。


Even coaches who were fired, the report asserts, were often not flagged, meaning that predatory coaches could simply start training children at a new gym.	报道说，即便是被炒鱿鱼的教练，也常常不会留下污点，这意味着这些“禽兽”教练只需要换一个体操俱乐部就可以重操旧业。


And then there is the Penn State scandal, in which the university’s trustees turned a blind eye to a long-running cover-up of the serial pedophilia of Jerry Sandusky, a former assistant football coach who gained access to his victims through his own charity for troubled youth.	还有宾夕法尼亚大学丑闻，校理事会对该校前橄榄球助理教练杰瑞·山杜斯基（Jerry Sandusky）系列恋童案长期遭到隐瞒一事置若罔闻。 山杜斯基通过自己的问题少年慈善组织接近受害者。


Two former university officials have been charged in the alleged cover-up.	两名该大学前官员因隐瞒该丑闻而被起诉。


Now that the truth has come out, there is nowhere to hide.	如今，真相已经大白，因此已无必要隐瞒。


The FA and clubs across the UK are scrambling to conduct investigations and reviews.	英国足总和英国各俱乐部也在纷纷进行调查和评估。


USA Gymnastics has hired a former prosecutor to help it strengthen its child-protection policies, and its board of directors has established a policy review panel.	美国体操协会派聘请前检察官助其加强儿童保护政策，其理事会也成立一个政策评估小组。


Penn State fired the coach under whom Sandusky worked, Joe Paterno, for failing to pursue an allegation against Sandusky that a subordinate brought to his attention in 2002.	宾夕法尼亚大学解雇了山杜斯基的上司教练乔·帕特尔诺（Joe Paterno），因为2002年曾有一位下属向他揭发山杜斯基，但他没有对后者进行指控。


But it should not be only the affected organizations that take action.	但不应该只有涉事组织才采取行动。


Even “innocent” companies and organizations must evaluate and upgrade their policies for protecting vulnerable people, along with their means for enforcing those policies.	即便是“无辜”的公司和组织，也必须评估和升级其弱势群体保护政策，并加强政策执行力度。


They must also review their records, to identify lapses and ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.	它们还必须评估历史记录，检讨过失并确保绝不再犯。


Such reviews are needed not just in obviously child-related sectors, like education or sports, but wherever power differentials are a permanent feature of operations.	与儿童相关的部门，如教育和体育，显然必须进行这样的评估，但只要具有永久性权力差别的运营特征的组织，都必须进行这样的评估。


Any organization operating in countries or communities where it has a great deal of influence and leverage must take action to ensure that no staff are using their positions to take advantage of vulnerable people or groups.	任何组织，如果它在所在国家或社会中拥有巨大的影响力，都必须采取行动确保工作人员不利用地位欺凌弱势人员或群体。


Examples include the oil and gas sector, the health sector, and the humanitarian sector, including aid agencies and United Nations peacekeepers.	这样的例子包括石油和天然气行业、卫生部门和人道主义部门，包括援助机构和联合国维和部队。


The responsibility extends beyond the organizations themselves.	责任不仅在于组织自身。


As we have seen with the FIFA corruption scandal, sponsors and investors can use their influence to bring about change.	从国际足联腐败丑闻可以看出，金主和投资者利用他们的影响力带来变化。


Beyond the moral imperative, doing so is in these actors’ self-interest.	除了道德要求，这样做是因为符合这些行动方的私利。


Hiding from a scandal may help you in the short term, but it is harder than ever to keep a secret nowadays – and those who cover it up enable crimes and ethical violations are complicit in them.	隐瞒丑闻在短期有助于你，但如今保密比以往任何时候都要困难——而隐瞒秘密以至于罪行和违反道德的行为得逞的人也是帮凶。


In the same vein, companies should be holding other organizations in their supply chains accountable.	公司应该以同样的方式问责供给链中的组织。


As with unfair or illegal labor practices, businesses must refuse to sponsor, supply, or work with organizations that fail to protect their workers from sexual abuse.	在不公平或非法劳工行为方面，企业必须拒绝资助、供应无法保证工人不受性侵犯的组织或与其合作。


Otherwise, they, too, are guilty.	否则，它们也有罪。


Child sexual abuse is not a new problem.	儿童性侵犯不是新问题。


What has become apparent lately is the power that boards of companies – as well as large investors, like pension and sovereign-wealth funds – have to help stop it.	最近才浮出水面的问题是公司董事会——以及退休基金和主权财富基金等大投资者——必须具备怎样的权力才能帮助阻止性侵犯。


At a time of collapsing confidence in “elites” – from political leaders to, yes, board members – actively using this power to protect young people would have the added benefit of fostering trust within divided societies.	如今，对“精英”的信心崩塌——不管是对政治领袖还是，是的，对公司董事——在这样的情况下，积极使用这一权力保护年轻人将给重塑分裂社会内部的信任带来额外的好处。


There is no excuse to delay.	我们没有理由迟迟不采取行动。


China’s New Emperor	中国的新皇帝


HONG KONG – An anecdote about US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 has long been regarded as confirmation of the long view of history taken by Chinese leaders.	香港—关于1972年美国总统尼克松访华有一则趣闻，中国领导人一直把它当做长期胜利的证明。


Zhou Enlai, Mao’s dutiful number two, is said to have responded to a question about the lessons of the French Revolution by saying that it was too soon to tell.	据说，毛泽东的忠实副手周恩来在回答关于法国大革命的问题时说，现在下结论为时过早。


In fact, according to diplomats who were there, Zhou was discussing not the revolution of 1789, but the 1968 student uprising in Paris, so it probably really was too soon to tell.	事实上，据在场外交官说，周恩来讨论的并不是1789年大革命，而是1968年法国学生动乱，因此也许确实是现在下结论为时过早。


After this false start, lessons from the French Revolution have made a comeback in China.	始于这个错误的开始，法国大革命的教训在中国引起了反响。


Shortly after the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, it was reported that Alexis de Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the Revolution, written in 1856, had become a “must-read” for senior CCP cadres.	2012年中共十八大召开后不久，据说托克维尔写于1856年的著作《旧制度与大革命》成为中共高级干部的“必读书”。


The book’s merits were most enthusiastically touted by Wang Qishan, the man at the helm of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and perhaps Xi’s closest ally.	习近平主席的反腐运动负责人、可能也是他的最亲密盟友的王岐山竭力宣传这部著作的好处。


Toqueville argued that growing prosperity in eighteenth-century France had actually made it more difficult to govern the country.	托克维尔说，十八世纪法国的不断增长的繁荣实际上使得治理国家变得更加困难。


As people became wealthier, they also became more aware of social and economic inequalities and thus increasingly resentful of the rich and powerful.	随着人民变得更加富裕，他们也更加关注社会和经济不平等，从而更加仇恨富人和贵人。


Attempts to reform the system only highlighted its vulnerabilities.	改革制度的尝试只是让这一脆弱性暴露无遗。


Revolution followed, sweeping away the monarchy and aristocracy. Their heads literally rolled.	革命随之而来，君主和贵族被扫荡一空，人头落地。


The CCP’s just-completed 19th National Congress showed the extent to which China’s leaders have taken Toqueville’s insights to heart.	刚刚结束的中共十九大表明中国领导人深刻领会了托克维尔的洞见。


Xi asserted his undisputed authority over his party and country.	习近平树立了他在党和国家的绝对权威。


Xi consolidated his position during his first term, by reversing much of Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, including the opening of China’s economy, the separation of the CCP from government, and a low-key approach to foreign and security policy.	习近平在第一个任期中，通过推倒许多邓小平的遗产（包括经济开放、党与政府分离，以及低调的外交和安全政策等），巩固了他的地位。


Xi has also swept aside potential rivals, relying primarily on his far-reaching anti-corruption campaign to target officials previously thought to be untouchable.	习近平还扫清了潜在对手，这主要通过用深入的反腐运动拿下此前认为不可撼动的官员实现。


He has just overseen the largest-ever purge of the CCP Central Committee.	他刚刚主持了中共中央委员会规模最大的清洗运动。


He has cracked down on even the most restrained criticism or signs of dissent, and has even banned Internet jokes, including memes comparing him to Winnie the Pooh.	他镇压哪怕最克制的批评或异见迹象，甚至禁止网络笑话，包括将他比作维尼熊的“段子”。


In another country, such measures might trigger harsh reproach, with critics accusing Xi of turning his country into an old-school Leninist dictatorship.	在别的国家，这样的手段可能会引起严厉批评，指责习近平将中国变成了老派列宁主义独裁。


In China, however, they have drawn praise from observers who believe that Xi is leading the way to the fulfillment of the “Chinese dream” to rejuvenate the country.	但在中国，这些手段受到了观察者的赞美，他们认为习近平是实现国家复兴的“中国梦”的领路人。


But, for some, the dream is on the verge of becoming a nightmare.	但一些人看来，这个梦眼看就要变成一场噩梦。


Demographic trends are threatening to turn the labor surplus that helped drive China’s rapid growth over the last few decades into a labor shortage at an unprecedented pace.	人口趋势正在以前所未有的速度将过去几十年中推动中国高速增长的劳动力盈余转变为劳动力短缺。


Water contamination and scarcity, alongside carbon dioxide emissions and lethal levels of air pollution, are imperiling people’s health and jeopardizing the sustainability of China’s economic performance.	水污染和匮乏，以及二氧化碳排放和致命的污染水平，正在威胁人民的健康，制约中国经济表现的可持续性。


Moreover, Chinese GDP growth, while welcome, is being fueled largely by a combination of fast-rising debt and widespread property bubbles.	此外，中国的GDP增长尽管值得庆贺，主要受迅速膨胀的债务和蔓延的房地产泡沫的合力的推动。


Even Chinese researchers admit that their country has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world.	甚至中国研究者也承认，他们的国家的收入不平等性位居世界最高之列。


As the poor get poorer and the rich get richer, many are asking if this is what “socialism with Chinese characteristics” really means.	随着穷者愈穷、富者愈富，许多人证遭拷问这是不是“中国特色社会主义”的真正含义。


Of course, there is always an optimist around to offer a positive spin.	当然，永远会有乐观派提供积极的信号。


China owes most of its debt to itself, because political priorities guide lending as much as commercial considerations do.	中国的大部分债务是自己欠自己，因为政治重点和商业考虑一样，都是引导借贷的决定因素。


China supports international efforts to address environmental degradation and climate change.	中国支持解决环境恶化和气候变化的国际措施。


Most people are becoming better off, if unevenly.	大部分人生活越来越好，尽管程度各不相同。


And Xi’s administration is at least doing something to stamp out the endemic corruption in the CCP.	并且习近平的政府至少对于党内的腐败顽疾有所动作。


We should all hope that at least some of what China’s cheerleaders say is true; if Chinese growth collapses, the entire global economy will suffer.	但愿这些欢呼者提出的东西中至少有一些是真的； 如果中国增长崩溃，整个全球经济都将跟着遭殃。


But, even if the optimists are partly vindicated, Xi’s claim that China has found a better way to run a modern society and economy seems far wide of the mark.	但是，即便乐观派有一些道理，习近平所宣称的中国已经找到了一条更好的社会和经济现代化之路也似乎难以令人信服。


To be sure, from the stupefying antics of US President Donald Trump to the damaging rise of populist nationalism in Europe, democratic countries are experiencing their share of trials.	诚然，从昏庸滑稽的美国总统特朗普，到欧洲民粹民族主义的破坏性崛起，民主国家也在经历各自的“审判”。


But democratic systems have built-in stabilizing mechanisms that enable them to right themselves without resorting to violence or repression.	但民主制度有其内在稳定机制，能够在不需要暴力和镇压的情况下纠正自我。


That is not the case in Xi’s China.	而习近平的中国并非如此。


For years, there was a serious debate in China about the state’s proper role in economic affairs.	多年来，在中国国内，关于国家在经济中的合适角色问题存在激烈的争论。


One camp maintained that if the CCP relaxed its grip on the economy, it would inevitably lose control of the state.	一拨人坚持认为，如果中共放松对经济的掌控，就会不可避免地失去对国家的掌控。


Others argued just the opposite: unless the Party ceded more economic control, it would lose political power, as the economy’s contradictions multiplied and development became less sustainable.	另一派认为正好相反：如果党不让出更多的经济控制权，就有可能失去政治权力，因为经济矛盾将成倍放大，发展也将不可持续。


Xi clearly falls into the statist camp.	习近平显然属于国家控制派。


But it is not just the Party that Xi is empowering; he is also empowering himself.	但习近平不仅仅在给党赋权； 他也在给他自己赋权。


In fact, it is hard to know who is ascending the CCP’s commanding heights and who will be struck down for disagreeing with the paramount leader.	事实上，很难获知谁在接近制高点，谁会因为与最高领袖存在分歧而下台。


This hasn’t deterred outsiders from speculating, but there is not much point in playing that guessing game.	这并没有阻止外部人士的猜测，但这场猜谜游戏没有什么玩的意义。


Xi, like any other emperor, will continue to appoint courtiers who follow him wherever he leads.	和其他皇帝一样，习近平将继续任命唯他马首是瞻的朝臣。


But with great power comes great responsibility – and, at this point, Xi’s power is virtually absolute.	但随大权力一同到来的是大责任——而就这一点而论，习近平的权力几乎是绝对的。


That is a heavy burden for one man.	这对一个人来说是沉重的负担。


Xi may be much smarter than Trump (not a high hurdle to clear), but that is not enough to guarantee a stable and prosperous future for China.	习近平也许比特朗普聪明得多（特朗普并不是一个难以清除的障碍），但这并不足以保证中国能获得稳定繁荣的未来。


And, if things go wrong, everyone will know whom to blame.	而一旦出现任何不妙的迹象，所有人都知道把矛头指向谁。


There is a reason why dictatorial dynasties tend to end up the same way.	这就是独裁往常总是走向同样的结局的原因。


You don’t have to read Toqueville to know that.	你不需要阅读托克维尔就能明白这一点。


Empowering China’s New Miracle Workers	登堂入室的中国新奇迹创造者


MILAN – As the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress has unfolded, much of the focus has been on who will occupy the key positions in President Xi Jinping’s administration for the next five years.	发自米兰——在中共十九大会议期间，外界的焦点大都放在了习近平政府关键位置的人事任命之上。


But China’s future trajectory depends crucially on another group of leaders, who have received far less attention: the technocrats who will carry out the specific tasks associated with China’s economic reform and transformation.	但是中国的未来发展轨迹其实在很大程度上取决于另外一批受关注较少的领导者：那些执行与中国经济改革和转型相关具体任务的技术官员们。


Over the last four decades, China’s technocrats have collectively engineered a miraculous transformation.	在过去四十年来，中国技术官员们集体推动了一场奇迹般的转型。


The current generation, a gifted group of policymakers, will step down in or around March 2018, passing the baton to a new generation.	目前这代极具天赋的决策者团体将在2018年3月左右下台，将指挥棒传给新一代。


That generation – highly educated, experienced, and, for the most part, successful on their own merits – is prepared to carry China’s economic and social progress forward with great skill and dedication.	新一代人——受过高等教育，经验丰富，而且在很大程度上都是依靠自身的努力取得的成就——正准备以高超的施政技巧和奉献精神来推动中国的经济和社会进步。


The question is whether they will have an open field on which to run.	而问题在于是否能有一个开放的空间来让他们大展拳脚。


One thing is certain: the next generation of technocrats will face very different conditions from those confronted by their predecessors.	有一点是肯定的：下一代的技术官员将面临与前辈不同的境况。


China has reached a moment of significant uncertainty.	中国已经走到了一个充满极大不确定性的时刻。


Beyond the questions inherent in the process of generational turnover, there has been a dramatic shift in China’s dominant policy framework under Xi.	除了在队伍交接过程中存在的固有问题之外，习近平领导下的主导政策框架也出现了巨大的转变。


Under Deng Xiaoping – the leader who initiated China’s radical “reform and opening up” in 1978 – the singular policy goal was domestic economic transformation and growth, to be achieved with a collaborative decision-making model that included vigorous internal debate.	在1978年发起激进式“改革开放”的邓小平治下，政策目标只有一个，就是国内经济的转型和增长，并通过包含了激烈内部讨论的协同决策模式来实现。


Deng explicitly ruled out a broader international agenda for China – a dictate that China’s policymakers followed for more than three decades.	邓小平将中国明确排除在了更广泛的国际议程之外——这也是中国决策者三十多年沿袭下来的教条。


Since taking power in 2012, Xi has changed this policy framework in several key ways.	自2012年上台以来，习近平在几个关键方面改变了这一政策框架。


For starters, he tackled the endemic corruption that had been undermining the credibility of the CCP (and, by extension, China’s governance model), by launching an unprecedented anti-graft campaign that reached the highest levels of the Party’s leadership.	首先，他通过发起了一场史无前例且触及党内最高领导层的反贪运动来打击破坏中国共产党公信力（往大了说就是中国治理模式）的特有腐败现象。


Many expected Xi’s anti-corruption campaign to be a temporary initiative, intended to pave the way for implementation of the aggressive economic reforms announced at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in 2013.	许多人都认为习近平的反腐运动只是昙花一现，不过要为2013年第十八届三中全会宣布的积极经济改革铺平道路。


Instead, the campaign has become essentially a permanent feature of Xi’s administration.	但如今反腐已经成为了习近平政府的一个鲜明特征。


Xi believes that a government’s legitimacy is mainly a function of consistently delivered values, together with economic and social progress, with strict commitment to the public interest taking precedence over the form of governance.	习近平认为政府的合法性在很大程度上是一个包含持续传递的多项价值观，经济和社会进步，以及严格承诺将公共利益放在治理形式之上的集合。


While few Western observers have fully recognized this perspective, developments in the West over the last ten years – the 2008 financial crisis, widening income and wealth inequality, and intensifying political polarization – have reinforced this mindset.	虽然西方观察家很少能充分认识到这一观点，但过去十年来西方的发展——2008年金融危机，收入和财富不平等状况的扩大以及不断加剧的政治上两极分化都强化了这一理念。


As a result, Chinese leaders and citizens are more convinced than ever that government by a strong single party is an essential pillar of stability and growth.	因此，中国领导人和民众比以往任何时候都更加坚信强大的一党执政政府是稳定和增长的重要支柱。


The focus in the West on the form of governance, as opposed to inclusive economic and social outcomes, is misguided, they believe, because both democratic and autocratic systems can be corrupted.	他们认为，西方对治理形式而非包容性经济和社会发展成果的关注是有误导性的，因为民主和专制制度都可能滋生腐败。


Moreover, China’s economic agenda under Xi has expanded beyond its narrow focus on domestic growth and development to include a concerted effort to expand Chinese influence in the global economy, especially in the developing world.	同时习近平的中国经济议程已经超越了对国内增长和发展的狭隘重视，转而涵盖一个力求扩大中国在全球经济（特别是在发展中国家）影响力的协同性工作。


This broad and expanding external agenda generates claims on resources – you can’t be the dominant external investor in Africa and Central Asia without spending a lot of money – while influencing policy choices.	这个宏大且不断扩展的外部议程在影响政策选择的同时也会催生对资源的需求——成为非洲和中亚地区的主要外部投资者显然需要一大笔钱。


For example, state-owned enterprises, including banks, may respond more flexibly than purely private enterprises to a variable mix of public and private incentives and investment returns.	例如，包括银行在内的国有企业可能会比纯私营企业更灵活地处理公共/私人激励因素和投资回报的不同组合。


Finally, in recent years, China’s policy frameworks have increasingly reflected the inherent tension between the long-standing imperative of ensuring social and political stability and the more modern objective of market liberalization.	最后，近年来中国的政策框架越来越多地反映出长期下达的社会/政治维稳目标与更现代的市场自由化目标之间蕴含的紧张关系。


China’s leadership remains steadfastly committed to protecting the Party’s interests, which it views as coterminous with those of society.	中国的领导层继续坚定不移地保护党的利益，因为在其眼中这是与全社会的利益是一致的。


For that reason, the CCP continues to focus on upholding order and instilling values in all aspects of Chinese life, maintaining an active presence not only in policy debates, but also in private-sector activities and social affairs.	为此中国共产党继续把重点放在秩序维护上，并将价值观灌输到民众生活的方方面面，不仅积极主导政策辩论，在私营部门的活动和社会事务中也经常能看见党的身影。


At the same time, the government is seeking to give markets a more decisive role in the economy, unleash the power of entrepreneurship and innovation, and respond more effectively to the needs and desires of a young, educated, and fast-growing middle class.	与此同时，政府力图让市场在经济中发挥更为重要的作用，释放创业精神和创新力量，更有效地满足年轻化，教育程度较高且不断发展壮大的中产阶级的需求和愿望。


And for good reason: these are the internal engines that have enabled China to achieve 6-7% annual GDP growth amid a difficult structural shift and middle-income transition, carried out in a relatively weak global economy.	有理由认为这些内部引擎将使中国在全球经济相对疲软，结构转型和中等收入阶段转换遇阻的情况下实现6~7%的年均GDP增长。


It is hard to say for sure whether these two objectives are in direct conflict with each other.	这两个目标是否相互矛盾还很难说，但担心也不是毫无根据的。


But there is reason for concern. The kind of dynamic competition that leads to innovation is, after all, far from a centrally guided process, though public-sector choices in areas like basic research do have a substantial impact.	虽然公共部门在基础研究等领域的决策确实能产生重大影响，但催生创新的动态性竞争毕竟跟集中指导的程序在本质上存在较大差异。


Moreover, in both policymaking and academia, active debate is indispensable to sorting good ideas from bad ones.	此外，在政策制定和学术界，如果要把好想法和坏的区分开来，就必须展开积极的辩论。


Yet while the Chinese system has proved its capacity for high-level internal policy debate among highly trained and experienced participants whose loyalty is not in question, and then act quickly and decisively, China’s leaders remain suspicious of unfettered public debate and commentary.	虽然中国的体制已经证明了在训练有素和经验丰富的参与者（这些人的忠诚度毋庸置疑）之间进行高层次内部政策辩论然后迅速果断采取行动的能力，中国领导人仍然对不受约束的公开辩论和评论存有疑虑。


But many complex policy choices – for example, about financial-sector reform and opening up – would benefit from the winnowing process that greater openness affords.	但是许多复杂的政策选择——比如金融部门的改革和开放——其实能够从扩大开放所赋予的去芜存菁过程中获益。


Over the next five years, China’s success will depend largely on how well the government’s complex agenda, and the tensions it entails, are managed.	在未来五年间，中国的成功将在很大程度上取决于政府能否打理好这一复杂议程及其营造的紧张态势。


To achieve their objectives, China’s leaders will need to strike a delicate balance between a muscular, disciplined, and ubiquitous Party, setting standards and protecting the public interest, and innovative, empowered, and potent markets, driving the economy into the future.	要达到目标，中国领导人将需要在一个负责制定标准和保护公众利益的强有力，富有纪律性且无所不在的党与推动经济进入未来的创新性，被赋予权利和充满潜力的市场之间实现精巧的平衡。


The Economic Case for China’s Belt and Road	中国一带一路倡议的经济意义


NEW YORK – Since 2013, China has been pursuing its “Belt and Road” initiative, which aims to develop physical infrastructure and policy linkages connecting more than 60 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa.	发自纽约——自2013年以来，中国一直致力于推动“一带一路”倡议，旨在为亚洲，欧洲和非洲国家的60多个国家建立起物质基础设施和政策联系。


Critics worry that China may be so focused on expanding its geopolitical influence, in order to compete with the likes of the United States and Japan, that it may pursue projects that make little economic sense.	有批评者担心中国此举可能主要是为了扩大地缘政治影响力以便与美国和日本竞争，因此会着力于一些缺乏经济意义的项目。


But, if a few conditions are met, the economic case for the initiative is strong.	但如果能满足几个条件的话，这一倡议就会产生相当大的经济意义。


As a recent Asian Development Bank report confirms, many Belt and Road countries are in urgent need of large-scale infrastructure investment – precisely the type of investment that China has pledged.	亚洲开发银行最近的一份报告证实，许多一带一路国家迫切需要大规模的基础设施投资，而这恰恰是中国所承诺的投资类型。


Some, such as Bangladesh and Kyrgyzstan, lack reliable electricity supplies, which is impeding the development of their manufacturing sectors and stifling their ability to export.	孟加拉国和吉尔吉斯斯坦这类国家缺乏可靠的电力供应，阻碍了制造业的发展并压抑其出口能力。


Others, like Indonesia, do not have enough ports for internal economic integration or international trade.	而印尼等国家则需要足够的港口来实施国内经济一体化或国际贸易。


The Belt and Road initiative promises to help countries overcome these constraints, by providing external funding for ports, roads, schools, hospitals, and power plants and grids.	“一带一路”倡议承诺会帮助各国克服这些限制，为港口，道路，学校，医院，发电厂和输电网的建设提供外部资金。