They – along with Brazil, India, and South Africa (the BRICS) – have established their own development bank, motivated partly by the International Monetary Fund’s failure to fulfill its 2010 pledge to adjust voting rights to reflect the global balance of economic power.	它们与巴西、印度和南非（所谓金砖国家）一起成立了自己的开发银行，之所以要如此，部分是因为国际货币基金组织（IMF）没有履行其2010年调整投票权以反映全球经济实力平衡的承诺。


(Until the 2010 G-20 summit where that pledge was made, China had the same voting rights as Belgium.)	（在2010年该做出该承诺的二十国集团峰会前，中国的投票权与比利时相当。 ）


All of this uncertainty surrounding the world’s emerging and traditional superpowers has impeded efforts to address security challenges in the Middle East, from the enduring Israel-Palestine conflict and the aftermath of the Arab Spring to the new and potent threat posed by the Islamic State.	所有这些围绕世界新兴和传统超级大国的不确定性阻挠了解决中东安全挑战的努力，不管是以巴之间的持续冲突、阿拉伯之春的残局，还是伊斯兰国所带来的新的重大威胁。


Unlike Al Qaeda, the Islamic State is not a fragmented network of relatively small cells; it is a territorial entity operating as a pseudo-state in Syrian and Iraqi territory.	与基地组织不同，伊斯兰国不是由相对较小的部分组成的脆弱的网络； 而是一个类似于国家的领土实体，其势力范围包括叙利亚和伊拉克领土。


And the rest of the world does not seem to know how to stop its unrelenting advance.	世界其他地区似乎对如何阻止其野蛮推进束手无策。


The US has rushed to form a confusing coalition with nearly 30 countries, including ten Arab states.	美国急匆匆地建立了一个由近30个国家（包括十个阿拉伯国家）组成的令人困惑的联盟。


How the coalition will be organized and what results it will achieve remain to be seen.	该联盟如何管理、会带来什么结果仍有待观察。


Here, the European Union could help.	在这方面，欧盟可以助一臂之力。


In fact, when the US first employed its so-called “leading from behind” strategy during the 2011 intervention in Libya, European countries were forced to assume greater responsibility.	事实上，在2011年干预利比亚期间美国首次采用了所谓的“幕后领导”时，欧洲国家就被迫承担起更大的责任。


Instead of viewing that intervention as an anomaly, the EU should recognize the need to enhance its role in defending global security – not least to uphold its own interest in a prosperous and stable neighborhood.	欧盟不应该把利比亚干预视为例外，而应该认识到加强其在捍卫全球安全中的角色的必要性——不仅仅是捍卫其自身获得繁荣稳定周边环境的利益。


In this sense, the EU’s decision to delay implementing its association agreement with Ukraine in order to create space to pursue consensus with Russia is a positive indicator.	从这个角度讲，欧盟决定推迟实施乌克兰入盟协议以创造与俄罗斯达成共识的空间是一个积极信号。


In a multipolar world, actors with widely divergent worldviews must work together to advance their shared interest in security, stability, and prosperity.	在多极世界中，世界观大不相同的行动方必须合作推进其在安全、稳定和繁荣方面的共同利益。


It is time for all of the world’s powers to recognize their responsibility for making constructive cooperation a reality.	全球各强国应该认识到实现建设性合作的责任。


The World’s Central Banker	全世界的中央银行家


BERKELEY – The US Federal Reserve these days is broadly happy with its monetary policy.	发自伯克利——美联储在最近这段时间都对自身货币政策感觉相当满意。


But, since mid-2007, its policy has been insufficiently expansionary.	但自从2007年年中以来，其政策的扩张性都是不足的。


The policy most likely to succeed right now would be analogous to that implemented by the Fed in 1979 and 1933, Great Britain in 1931, and Shinzo Abe today.	而很可能随后推行的政策则会跟该机构在1979和1933年，英国在1931年和日本安倍晋三政府当前实施的类似。


Those of us who fear that the Fed’s approach has greatly deepened the US economy’s malaise and is turning America’s cyclical unemployment into permanent long-term structural non-employment have lost the domestic monetary-policy argument.	我们这类担心美联储的手段导致美国经济困境极大恶化并导致其周期性失业转变为持久性长期结构性非就业的人们已经在其国内货币政策讨论中败下阵来。


But there is another policy argument that needs to be joined.	但还有另一场政策讨论需要我们的参与。


The Fed is not just the US central bank; it is the world’s central bank.	美联储不仅是美国的中央银行，它也是全世界的中央银行。


America’s current exchange-rate regime is one of floating rates – or at least of rates that can float.	美国当前的汇率体系是浮动汇率的其中一种——或者至少是可以浮动的汇率中的一种。


Back in the 1950s and 1960s, economists like Milton Friedman assumed that a global regime of floating exchange rates would be one in which currency values moved slowly and gradually alongside differences in the economy’s inflation and productivity-growth rates.	在上世纪50~60年代，米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）等一批经济学家假设浮动汇率的全球体系将是一个货币价值沿着经济体的通胀及生产力增长率的各类差异变化缓慢而逐步变化的体制。


In the 1970s, the economist Rudi Dornbusch (and reality) taught us that that was wrong: a floating-rate regime capitalizes expected future differences in nominal interest rates minus inflation rates into today’s exchange rate.	到了1970年代，经济学家鲁迪·多恩布什（Rudi Dornbusch）——以及现实——令我们意识到上述说法是错的：一个浮动汇率体系会将名义利率减去通胀率之后的预期未来差异估值成为当前的汇率。


A country that changes its monetary policy vis-à-vis the US changes its current exchange rate by a lot; and, in today’s highly globalized world, that means that it deranges its import and export sectors substantially.	一个相对美国改变自身货币政策的国家也在极大改变其现行汇率； 同时，在当下这个高度全球化的世界上，这意味着极大地扰乱该国自身的进/出口部门。


Because no government wants to do that, nearly all governments today follow the US in setting monetary policy, diverging from it only tentatively and cautiously.	因为没有哪国政府想得到这样的结果，所以几乎所有的政府都在追随美国的脚步制定货币政策，也只会临时且小心翼翼的偏离这一方针。


So the US is not just one economy in a world of economies following their own monetary policies under a flexible exchange-rate regime.	因此美国不仅仅是全世界众多经济体中其中一个在弹性汇率体系下遵从其货币政策的国家。


The US is, rather, a global hegemon: the central bank for the world, with a responsibility not just to stabilize output, employment, and inflation and ensure financial stability in the US, but also to manage the world economy in its entirety.	美国更像是一个全球霸权：全世界的中央银行，其职责不仅是稳定本国的生产，就业，通胀及确保金融稳定，也包括管理作为一个整体的世界经济。


One area of concern is the health and stability of growth in emerging markets as they attempt to benefit from capital inflows; satisfy North Atlantic demands for open financial markets; and manage the resulting instability created by speculative “hot money,” the carry trade, irrational exuberance, and overshooting.	一个值得关注的领域是那些企图从资本流入中受益的新兴市场经济体的健康和稳定增长； 满足北大西洋地区对开放金融市场的要求；


Emerging-market central-bank governors fear a US that alternates between expansionary policy that fuels huge hot-money inflows and a domestic inflationary spiral, and rapid tightening that chokes off credit and causes a domestic recession.	并管理随之而来由投机性“热钱”，套利交易，非理性繁荣和汇率过度调整导致的不稳定状况。 新兴市场国家的央行行长们不愿意看见一个摇摆不定的美国：一会实施推动大量热钱流入及前者国内通胀螺旋上升的扩张性政策，一会又迅速实施收紧中止信贷并导致前者国内经济出现衰退。


Then there is the main problem facing the global economy today: the crisis of Europe and the eurozone.	然后就出现了当前全球经济所面对的主要问题：欧洲及欧元区的危机。


The creation of the euro without an appropriate fiscal union meant that transfers from surplus to deficit regions would not eliminate or even cushion demand imbalances.	在没有形成一个合适的财政联盟之前创设欧元意味着从盈余地区向赤字地区的转移支付不会消失甚至还维护了需求不均衡状态。


The fact that the eurozone lacked the labor-market flexibility needed to make it an optimal currency area meant that adjustment via regional reallocation of economic activity would be glacial, while its members’ loss of control over monetary policy ruled out adjustment via nominal depreciation.	欧元区缺乏一个令其成为理想货币区所需的劳动力市场灵活性的事实意味着通过区域性经济活动再分配进行的调整将是极其缓慢的，而同时其成员各国又失去了对货币政策的控制，因此也无法通过名义汇率贬值来进行调整。


Moreover, Europe lacks the governance institutions needed to choose the easiest path to manage economic rebalancing: moderate inflation in the north, rather than grinding deflation and universal bankruptcy in the south.	此外，欧洲缺乏选择管理经济失衡的最易路径——北部温和通胀，而非南部无休止的通缩和普遍破产——的治理制度。


The European Union’s institutional design amplifies the voices of those interests pushing for policies that have now set Europe on the deflationary road, thus all but guaranteeing lost decades during which the EU will fail to deliver growth and prosperity.	欧盟的制度设计增强了那些推动如今将欧洲推上通缩之路的政策的利益集团的声势，因此几乎确定会将欧洲拖入无法实现增长和繁荣的失落十年之中。


We have an example from the early twentieth century of the political consequences of such a period of economic depression and stagnation.	对于这么一个经济衰退停滞时期的政策后果，我们有一个20世纪早期的例子。


The reaction to what Karl Marx called “parliamentary cretinism” is the rise of movements that seek, instead, a decisive leader – someone to tell people what to do.	当时对卡尔·马克思（Karl Marx）所谓“议会痴呆症（parliamentary cretinism）”的反应就是人们不断发起运动试图寻找一个决策领导人——也就是告诉人们该怎么做的人。


Such leaders soon learn that their solutions are no better than anybody else’s and decide that the best way to remain in power is by blaming all problems on foreigners.	但这些领导人很快认识到他们的解决方案并不比其他人的更优秀，而把权力握在手里的最佳方式就是把所有问题都赖在别国人头上。


Thus they exalt the “nation” and focus their policies on zero-sum quarrels with other countries and on scapegoating deviant “aliens” at home.	于是他们对“民族”大加颂扬并将政策聚焦于与其它国家的零和争端之上，同时找那些国内的邪恶“异己”作为替罪羊。


This is not in Europe’s interest, and it is not in America’s interest to have to deal with such a Europe.	这对欧洲没有任何好处，美国也不会从跟这样一个欧洲的交往中获益。


A democratic, prosperous, and stable Europe implies a much better and safer world for the US.	对美国来说，一个民主，繁荣和稳定的欧洲意味着一个更好也更安全的世界。


Here is where the Fed comes in.	这也是美联储能发挥作用的地方。


By shifting its monetary-policy regime to target 4% annual inflation – or 6% annual nominal GDP growth – the US would set in motion rapid rebalancing in the eurozone.	通过将其货币政策体制转为实现4%的年度通胀——或6%的年度名义GDP增长——美国可以推动欧元区的迅速再平衡。


Rather than see the 30% euro appreciation that would follow from the ECB’s current monetary policy, German exporters would scream for measures to prevent America’s “competitive devaluation,” finally bringing about moderate inflation in the north rather than the current grinding depression in the south.	与其坐视欧洲央行当前货币政策可能导致的欧元升值30%，德国出口商们会想尽一切方式去防止美国的“竞争力贬值”，最终带来欧元区北部的温和通胀而不是当前南部的长期萧条。


A world in which the US has a proven record of honoring the trust that is required of it to play the role of global economic hegemon is a much better world for the US than one in which it is not trusted.	一个美国拥有扮演全球经济盟主所需的不负众望的可靠记录的世界要比一个美国不具备如此资质的世界更美好。


Simply put, the US must manage the global economy for the collective common good, or else confront a world in which global macroeconomic management results from race-to-the-bottom national policy struggles.	简而言之，美国必须为了全球的集体福祉去管理全球经济，要不然就将遭遇一个全球宏观经济管理被无下限国家政策竞争所左右的世界。


America’s medium- and long-term political, security, and, yes, economic interests require the Fed to recognize that its policy mission is not to focus narrowly on attempting to achieve and maintain internal balance.	美国的中期和长期政治，安全以及，毫无疑问，经济利益都需要美联储意识到自身的政策使命不仅仅是聚焦在尝试实现和维持内部经济平衡。


Rather, it is to embrace and fulfill its role as the world’s central bank, by balancing aggregate demand and potential supply for the global economy as a whole.	而是要接受并通过平衡全球经济作为一个整体的总需求和潜在供应，来完成作为世界中央银行的角色。


The Internet’s Next Act	互联网的下一个动作


BERKELEY – Ten years ago, the world emerged from the dot-com bust and started to look more soberly at the Internet’s potential.	伯克利—十年前，世界从互联网泡沫破裂后的废墟中复兴，并且开始以更冷静的目光看待互联网的潜力。


While speculative greed and fear of missing out might have overplayed the short-term outlook, the Internet’s immense longer-term prospects were never in doubt.	尽管投机的贪婪和对错过的恐惧夸大了短期展望，但互联网广阔的长期前景从未受到过怀疑。


I, and other optimistic economists, assumed that free information and communication would herald an era of rapid productivity growth and improved wellbeing – to a greater or lesser extent – for everyone, regardless of their skills, wealth, or social background.	我和其他乐观经济学家都认为，自由信息和通信将开启一个生产率迅速增长、福利迅速改善的时代，并且所有人都能或多或少地从总获益，不管他有多少技能和财富，有怎样的社会背景。


Were we right?	我们是对是错？


In many respects, the revolution in information and communications technology (ICT) has delivered more than it promised – and often in unpredictable ways.	从很多方面看，信息和通信技术革命所带来的东西超过了预期——并且是以无法预测的形式实现的。 对许多人来说，数字时代的真正令人惊奇之处在于它创造了一个平行宇宙。


For many, the true marvel of the digital age is its creation of a parallel universe.	任何人，只要拥有一台笔记本电脑和互联网接入，就可以与虚拟朋友对话（或谈论虚拟朋友）；


Anyone with a laptop and an Internet connection can gossip with (or about) virtual friends; witness extraordinary events that may or may not have happened; or play games in a mock world of incomparable complexity.	就可以见证可能发生也可能没有发生的重大事件； 就可以在无比复杂的虚拟世界中玩游戏。


The Internet has created a dreamscape that is accessible to all and that can inspire us to still greater heights of imagination.	互联网创造了一个幻境，任何人都可以走进其中，并刺激我们实现更高的现象里。


Indeed, those who scoff at the value of this should remember that ever since Homer sang around the hearth fire about the wrath of Achilles, dreams have been our greatest source of pleasure and inspiration.	事实上，任何对这一价值嗤之以鼻的人都应该想一想，从荷马在篝火旁吟唱阿克琉斯的传说开始，梦想就一直是我们的快乐和灵感之源。


But the benefits of the Internet have come not just to those who work or play online.	但互联网的好处并不局限于在线上工作或游戏的人。


Everyone has gained to some degree.	任何人都在某种程度上获得了好处。


Go to a WalMart, Costco, Tesco, or Lidl superstore anywhere in the world, and compare the price, quality, and range of today’s goods with those of a generation or two ago.	你可以去一下沃尔玛、好又多、乐购或利德尔（Lidl）等全球各地的超市，将当今的商品价格、质量和种类与几十年前比一比。


This dramatic change for the better largely reflects the rapid development of global supply chains, with real-time monitoring of customer preferences enabling manufacturers located on the other side of the world to know instantly what, when, and how much to produce.	我们的生活远比从前更美好，这主要反映了全球供应链的快速发展，对客户偏好的实时监控让位于地球另一端的制造商立刻就能知道应该生产什么、何时生产、生产多少。


There is much more to come.	远远不止这些。


Companies are using the Internet to “crowdsource” new ideas, and even let customers co-design their own products.	公司使用互联网实现新思想的“众包”，甚至让客户共同为他们自身设计产品。


New Web-based platforms allow ordinary people �� without money or special skills – to share their cars, spare bedrooms, or even do-it-yourself tools, thus challenging the dominance of global corporations.	新的基于网络的平台让普通人——没钱也没有特殊技能——共享汽车、闲置房间甚至DIY工具，从而对全球公司的主导构成了挑战。


The “Internet of Things” is connecting simple household items – like a thermostat – to the Web, helping owners to save money and even reduce their carbon emissions.	“物联网”正在将简单地家用物什——如恒温器——与网络连接起来，让所有者节约成本甚至降低碳排放。


And yet we must still ask: Is everyone really benefiting in the new economy?	但我们仍然要问：真是所有人都从新经济中获益吗？


Only a fortunate few, especially those who combine innovative thinking with financial acumen, have fully captured the monetary profits of the ICT revolution, becoming its poster children in the process.	只有少数幸运儿——特别是那些将创新思维与金融敏感性结合起来的人——充分捕获了信息和通信技术革命带来的货币利润，成为时代弄潮儿。


Lower down the economic scale, most people, though enjoying easy access to technology and low prices, have lost ground, with real wages falling for many years.	在他们之下，大部分人尽管享受着便捷而廉价的技术，却在节节败退，真实工资下降之势已经持续多年。


This is not a temporary decline: labor in advanced Western economies can no longer command a large wage premium, and workers’ situation may worsen further.	这不是暂时性的下降：发达西方经济体的劳动力已不再能够要求巨大的工资溢价，工人处境也有可能进一步恶化。


Moreover, white-collar managers and employees – the brainpower that keeps the intricate global corporate machinery whirring, and once the backbone of the middle class – are no longer in such high demand.	此外，对白领管理者和雇员——让复杂的全球公司机器保持运转的昔日中产阶级中间力量——的高需求不再。


Many of their skills, which long underpinned their status, careers, and livelihoods, are becoming redundant.	他们的许多技能正在变得过剩，而长期以来他们正是依靠这一技能维持着自己的地位、职业和生活。


For today’s ordinary middle-class family, a medical mishap can become a financial catastrophe.	对当今普通中产阶级家庭来说，胜一场大病就可以导致财务崩溃。


Owning a home involves a life of indebtedness.	买房子意味着终身负债。


Providing a decent education to one’s children requires struggle and sacrifice.	给孩子提供良好教育需要家长做出奋斗和牺牲。


The assumptions that defined middle-class households – and many working-class households – for at least two generations are disappearing before our eyes.	在过去两代人的时间里作为中产阶级家庭（以及许多工作阶级家庭）的标准的条件正在我们眼前消失。


Who is speaking out for them?	有谁为他们发声？


Most households stand to gain from the continuation of the ICT revolution.	大部分家庭将从信息和通信技术革命的不断演进中获益。


But middle-class and working-class families would benefit more if the hyper-cheap products and services, free information, and virtual leisure experiences augmented, rather than eroded, their marketable skills.	但如果超廉价产品和服务、自由信息和虚拟休闲体验能够扩展，中产阶级和工作阶级家庭将获得更多的好处。


The politician who can figure out how to steer the revolution accordingly might never lose another election.	能够领悟如何据此驾驭信息和通信技术革命的政客有望成为选举的常胜将军。


Greenspan Has Left the Building	格林斯潘走下神坛


BERKELEY – The first time I went to Washington, DC, as an adult was in 1993, when I arrived to work for President Bill Clinton in the Treasury Department.	伯克利—我长大成人后第一次来到华盛顿是在1993年，为克林顿总统的财政部做事。


Back then, America urgently needed to rebalance the federal budget to rein in explosive growth in the debt/GDP ratio; to overhaul America’s extraordinarily expensive and inefficient health-care system; and to begin to deal with global warming via a slow ramp-up of a carbon tax.	当是时，美国迫切地需要实现联邦预算再平衡以抑制成爆炸性增长之势的债务/GDP比率、修补美国靡费甚巨而效率低下的医疗体系，以及通过缓缓提高实施碳税开始应对全球变暖。


Beyond these three immediate issues were long-run policy challenges: updating the country’s pension system to deal with an aging population and the decline of defined-benefit pensions; improving the education system so that more people would bear the risk of pursuing higher education; and reversing the erosion of America as a middle-class society.	除了这三个紧迫的问题，还有长期政策挑战：更新美国退休制度以应对人口老龄化和给付固定型退休金减少的问题、改善教育体系从而让更多人能够承担追求更高层次教育带来的风险，以及扭转美国作为中产阶级社会的颓势。


None of these goals (perhaps with the exception of the last one) were partisan issues.	所有这些目标（大概最后一个是例外）都是跨越党派的问题。


The long-run deficit, health-care financing, and global warming, no less than securing retirement income and enabling educational opportunity, were issues on which bipartisan progress and agreement should have been easily attained.	长期赤字、医疗融资和全球变暖以及同样紧迫的捍卫退休金和增进教育机会，这些都应该是可以轻易取得跨党派进展和协议的领域。


Yet we Clintonites received absolutely no cooperation from either Republican officeholders or Republican policy intellectuals.	但不论是共和党公务员还是共和党政策知识分子，都完全不与克林顿政府合作。


Figures like Senators Pete Domenici and Alan Simpson, who talked a good game about the long-run deficit, never met a budget-busting Republican program that they would oppose or a deficit-reducing Democratic initiative that they could support.	参议员多梅尼西（Pete Domenici）辛普森（Alan Simpson）大谈长期赤字如何如何，但他们从没有见过他们会反对的共和党预算减少计划和会支持的民主党赤字削减动议。


Economists who, under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, talked such a good game about excessive tax burdens and the importance of balanced budgets went very quiet after Clinton took office in January 1993, and stayed quiet after January 2001, when George W. Bush’s administration dismantled so much of what the Clinton administration had accomplished.	在里根总统和老布什总统执政期间大谈税务负担过重和平衡预算重要性的经济学家在1993年1月克林顿入主白宫后就收了声，而在2001年后小布什政府把克林顿政府大肆败坏克林顿政府的成果时，他们仍旧保持沉默。


But back in 1993 there was one exception – one senior Republican officeholder and policy intellectual who did not forget his policy commitments of earlier years: US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.	但在1993年有一个例外，一位资深共和党公务员兼政策知识分子没有忘记他早些年的政策承诺，那就是美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘。


For Greenspan, putting the long-run financing of America’s federal government on a sound footing was an important and bipartisan goal, and in 1993-1994 he was willing to take monetary-policy risks to boost the chances of achieving it.	在格林斯潘看来，夯实美国联邦政府长期融资基础是一个重要的跨党派目标，在1993—1994年期间他愿意拿货币政策冒险博取实现这一目标的机会。


The Fed, in Greenspan’s view, had a responsibility not only to fight inflation but also to create a prosperous, entrepreneurial society, and he sought to achieve that dual mandate – with high employment as important as stable prices – during the high-tech boom of the late 1990’s.	格林斯潘认为，美联储不但有责任抗击通胀，也有责任创造繁荣的、具有企业家精神的社会，而他也在20世纪90年代末高科技泡沫期间致力于这一双重使命——高就业和价格稳定同样重要。


Unique among his Republican peers, after 2001 he spoke – quietly in public, but loudly in private – against the Bush administration’s feckless fiscal policies.	与他的共和党同侪不同，2001年后他反对小布什政府不负责任的财政政策——在公开场合，他保持沉默，但私下里，他大声反对。


That is why, despite the damage that his reputation suffered in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Greenspan retains enormous credibility among all those who hope to see rational economic policy in America.	为何格林斯潘在因2008年金融危机而名声大损后仍能在所有希望美国实施理性经济政策的人中间保有极高信誉？ 原因就在这里。


If there are going to be sensible negotiating partners on the Republican side, he should be at their head.	如果共和党要推��明智的谈判伙伴，格林斯潘应该是不二之选。


That is why I find his new book, The Map and the Territory, so disappointing.	这就是我认为他的新著《地图和领土》（The Map and the Territory）令人大失所望的原因。


Greenspan portrays the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and its affordable-housing goals as playing a big role in causing the 2008 crisis.	格林斯潘将美国住房和社会发展部及其“买得起房”目标为2008年危机的重要原因之一。


Moreover, he claims that the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation is a large factor holding back the recovery.	此外，他还认为多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革立法是复苏受阻的重要因素。


Likewise, he argues that the Earned Income Tax Credit – enacted in 1975 under Republican President Gerald Ford and expanded greatly under Reagan – is a threat to Americans’ moral fiber.	类似地，他指出劳动所得税扣抵（Earned Income Tax Credit，1975年福特总统实施并由里根总统大幅扩大）对于美国道德标准来说是一个威胁。


Too much of the book reads, as the Washington Post’s Steven Pearlstein put it, like it was lifted from the Web site of Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign.	正如《华盛顿邮报》的皮尔斯特恩（Steven Pearlstein）所指出的，该书很多内容看起来就像是从罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）2012年总统竞选网站上抄来的。


The six problems that confronted me and others when we arrived in Washington in 1993 have not been solved.	我和其他人在1993年来到华盛顿时存在的六个问题仍然没有解决。


The long-run fiscal situation remains discouraging, if not as dire as we feared it would become.	长期财政状况仍令人沮丧，无非比我们所担心悲惨程度稍稍轻点。


Health-care financing remains a mess, even if we have considerable reason to hope that Obamacare has started to address the problem.	医疗融资仍是一团乱麻，尽管我们有相当多的理由希望“奥巴马医保”已经开始纠正问题。


And we have made no progress on global warming, preserving a middle-class society, or improving the education system to make equality of opportunity a reality.	在全球变暖、保护中产阶级社会以及改善教育体系从而让机会平等成为现实方面我们也没有取得进展。


Nor have we dealt with the likely shortfall of pension income and assets in an aging America.	人口老龄化的美国的潜在退休金和资产缺口问题也没有得到解决。


But that is not what Greenspan sees.	但这并不是格林斯潘看到的。


For him, all of these problems boil down to a simple question: “What type of society do we wish to live in?”	对他来说，所有这些问题可以归结为一个简单问题：“我们希望生活在怎样的社会？


And the choice, in his view, is equally simple: either “a society of dependence” or one based on “self-reliance.”	”而在他看来，选择也同样简单：要么是“依赖型社会”，要么是“自力型社会”。


That is not an analysis; it is a sound bite.	这不是分析，这是嘴炮。


At a time when America desperately needs insight and ideas, Greenspan gives us only partisan bludgeons.	美国迫切需要洞见和思想，而格林斯潘给我们的只是跨党派大棒。


That is bad news for those of us who would like to see an effective, technocratic economic-policymaking process emerge in Washington.	对于我们希望看到有效的技术官僚经济决策过程出现在华盛顿的人来说，这是坏消息。


We must somehow come to grips with the fact that we no longer have negotiating partners on the Republican side.	我们最好直面一个现实：共和党这一端已经拿不出谈判伙伴了。


The Rise of the Robots	机器人崛起


BERKELEY – For decades, people have been predicting how the rise of advanced computing and robotic technologies will affect our lives.	伯克利—几十年来，人们一直在预测先进计算和机器人科技会如何影响我们的生活。


On one side, there are warnings that robots will displace humans in the economy, destroying livelihoods, especially for low-skill workers.	一方面，有人警告说机器人会在经济中取代人类，摧毁人们特别是低技能工人的生活。


Others look forward to the vast economic opportunities that robots will present, claiming, for example, that they will improve productivity or take on undesirable jobs.	也有人看到了机器人所带来的巨大经济机会，比如，他们说机器人能改进生产率、承担无人愿干的工作。


The venture capitalist Peter Thiel, who recently joined the debate, falls into the latter camp, asserting that robots will save us from a future of high prices and low wages.	风险资本家彼得·提尔（Peter Thiel）最近也加入了战团，他属于后一个阵营，认为机器人能让我们的未来避免高物价和低工资。


Figuring out which side is right requires, first and foremost, an understanding of the six ways that humans have historically created value: through our legs, our fingers, our mouths, our brains, our smiles, and our minds.	要指出哪一方是正确的，首先要理解历史上人类创造价值的六种方法：通过我们的腿、我们的手指、我们的嘴、我们的大脑、我们的笑容和我们的精神。


Our legs and other large muscles move things to where we need them to be, so our fingers can rearrange them into useful patterns.	我们的腿和其他大肌群将东西移到我们想让它们存在的地方，以便我们的手指将它们重新整理成有用的模式。


Our brains regulate routine activities, keeping the leg- and finger-work on track.	我们的大脑管理常规活动，让腿和手指保持协调。


Our mouths – indeed, our words, whether spoken or written – enable us to inform and entertain one another.	我们的嘴——事实上，使我们的语言，不论是口头的还是书面的——让我们能够互相传递信息和娱乐。


Our smiles help us to connect with others, ensuring that we pull roughly in the same direction.	我们的笑容让我们彼此保持联系，确保可以心往一处使。


Finally, our minds – our curiosity and creativity – identify and resolve important and interesting challenges.	最后，我们的精神——我们的好奇心和创造力——认识和解决重要而有趣的挑战。


Thiel, for his part, refutes the argument – often made by robot doomsayers – that the impact of artificial intelligence and advanced robotics on the labor force will mirror globalization’s impact on advanced-country workers.	提尔反驳了机器人末日论者常常持有的观点——人工智能和先进机器人对劳动力的影响将复制全球化对发达国家工人影响。


Globalization hurt lower-skill workers in places like the United States, as it enabled people from faraway countries to compete for the leg-and-finger positions in the global division of labor.	全球化伤害了美国等地的低技能工人，因为它让遥远他国的群众也得以参与全球劳动分工中的腿和手指竞争。


Given that these new competitors demanded lower wages, they were the obvious choice for many companies.	这些新竞争者要求的工资更低，因此许多公司的选择是不言而喻的。


According to Thiel, the key difference between this phenomenon and the rise of robots lies in consumption.	提尔认为，这一现象和机器人崛起之间的关键区别在于消费。


Developing-country workers took advantage of the bargaining power that globalization afforded them to gain resources for their own consumption.	发展中国家工人利用全球化带给他们的议价权获得他们自己的消费资源。


Computers and robots, by contrast, do not consume anything except electricity, even as they complete leg, finger, and even brain activities faster and more efficiently than humans would.	反之，计算机和机器人不消费除电力以外的任何东西，尽管他们完成腿、手指甚至大脑活动的速度和效率远远强于人类。


Here, Thiel offers an example from his experience as CEO of PayPal.	在这里，提尔提供了一个他在PayPal首席执行官任上��获得的经验。


Instead of having humans scrutinize every item in every batch of 1,000,000 transactions for indications of fraud, PayPal’s computers can approve the obviously legitimate transactions, and pass on the 1,000 or so that could be fraudulent for thoughtful consideration by a human.	PayPal没有聘用人手来检查每1,000,000笔交易中的每一件物品以发现欺诈迹象，它的计算机能批准显然合法的交易，然后提交1,000笔左右可能的欺诈交易供工作人员仔细检查。


One worker and a computer system can thus do what PayPal would have had to hire 1,000 workers to do a generation ago.	于是，一名工人加上一个计算机系统就可以完成一代人之前PayPal需要聘用1,000名工人完成的工作。


Given that the computer system does not need things like food, that thousand-fold increase in productivity will redound entirely to the benefit of the middle class.	计算机系统不需要食品之类的东西，其所带来的千倍生产率提高悉数转变为中产阶级的福利。


Put another way, globalization lowered the wages of low-skill advanced-country workers because others would perform their jobs more cheaply, and then consume the value that they had created.	换句话说，全球化拉低了低技能发达国家工人的工资，因为其他人能更廉价地完成它们的工作，然后将他们所创造的价值消费掉。


Computers mean that higher-skill workers – and the lower-skill workers who remain to oversee the large robotic factories and warehouses – can spend their time on more valuable activities, assisted by computers that demand little.	计算机意味着更高技能的工人——以及留下来看管大型机器人化工厂和车间的较低技能的工人——能将时间用于更有价值的活动中，并由几乎无所求的计算机来协助他们。


Thiel’s argument may be correct. But it is far from airtight.	提尔的观点也许是对的，但绝不是无懈可击的。


In fact, Thiel seems to be running into the old diamonds-and-water paradox – water is essential, but costs nothing, whereas diamonds are virtually useless, but extremely expensive – albeit in a sophisticated and subtle way.	事实上，提尔似乎陷入了经典的钻石和水悖论——水是必需品，但几乎无成本； 而钻石几乎毫无用处，却极其昂贵——只不过提尔的情形更加复杂和微妙。


The paradox exists because, in a market economy, the value of water is set not by the total usefulness of water (infinite) or by the average usefulness of water (very large), but by the marginal value of the last drop of water consumed (very low).	钻石和水悖论之所以存在，是因为在市场经济中，水的价值并不由水的总用途（无穷大）或水的平均用途（非常大）决定，而是由我们所消费的最后一滴水的边际价值（非常小）决定。


Similarly, the wages and salaries of low- and high-skill workers in the robot-computer economy of the future will not be determined by the (very high) productivity of the one lower-skill worker ensuring that all of the robots are in their places or the one high-skill worker reprogramming the software.	类似地，未来机器人-计算机经济中的低技能和高技能工人的工资和薪水并不由一名较低技能工人保证所有机器人就位或一名高技能工人重新编写软件程序的（非常高的）生产率决定。


Instead, compensation will reflect what workers outside the highly productive computer-robot economy are creating and earning.	相反，报酬将体现高生产率计算机-机器人经济之外的工人所创造和赚到的水平决定。


The newly industrialized city of Manchester, which horrified Friedrich Engels when he worked there in the 1840s, had the highest level of labor productivity the world had ever seen.	20世纪40年代，当弗雷德里希·恩格斯（ Friedrich Engels）在新兴工业化曼彻斯特工作时，他被前所未见的世界最高水平劳动生产率所震慑。


But the factory workers’ wages were set not by their extraordinary productivity, but by what they would earn if they returned to the potato fields of pre-famine Ireland.	但该工厂工人的工资并不由他们卓越的生产率决定，而由他们若回到闹饥荒之前的爱尔兰的土豆地能赚到多少决定。


So the question is not whether robots and computers will make human labor in the goods, high-tech services, and information-producing sectors infinitely more productive.	因此，问题不在于机器人和计算机是否能在商品、高科技和信息制造行业无限制地提高人类劳动的生产率。


They will.	它们能做到。


What really matters is whether the jobs outside of the robot-computer economy – jobs involving people’s mouths, smiles, and minds – remain valuable and in high demand.	真正重要的的是机器人-计算机经济之外的岗位——与人的嘴、笑容和精神有关的岗位——是否有价值和高需求。


From 1850 to 1970 or so, rapid technological progress first triggered wage increases in line with productivity gains.	从1850年到1970年左右，快速的技术进步首先导致工资与生产率同步增长。


Then came the protracted process of income-distribution equalization, as machines, installed to substitute for human legs, and fingers created more jobs in machine-minding, which used human brains and mouths, than it destroyed in sectors requiring routine muscle power or dexterity work.	接着，开始了滞后的收入再分配平等化过程，因为用于取代人类的腿的机器和手指创造了需要用到人类大脑和嘴的机器看管（machine-minding）岗位，数量超过了需要常规肌肉力量或灵巧工作的部门所损失的岗位。


And rising real incomes increased leisure time, thereby boosting demand for smiles and the products of minds.	而上涨的真实收入增加了闲暇时间，从而提振了笑容和精神产品的需求。


Will the same occur when machines take over routine brainwork?	当机器取代了常规大脑工作时，是否会发生同样的过程？


Maybe.	也许会。


But it is far from being a safe bet on which to rest an entire argument, as Thiel has.	但像提尔那样急吼吼地站队绝对是操之过急了。


Is America Turning Japanese?	美国在日本化吗？


BERKELEY – Back in the late 1980’s, Japan seemingly could do no wrong in economists’ eyes.	伯克利—20世纪80年代末，日本是经济学家眼中的完美典范。


They saw a clear edge in Japan’s competitiveness relative to the North Atlantic across a broad range of high-tech precision and mass-production industries manufacturing tradable goods.	从高科技精密行业到可贸易商品大规模制造业，日本对北大西洋都拥有显而易见的竞争优势。


They also saw an economy that, since reconstruction began after World War II, had significantly outperformed the expected growth of European economies.	从二战废墟中复兴的日本经济表现大大超越了欧洲经济体的预期增长率。


And they saw an economy growing considerably faster than North Atlantic economies had when they possessed the same absolute and relative economy-wide productivity levels.	与处于相同绝对和相对全经济生产率水平阶段的北大西洋经济体相比，日本经济增长速度要快得多。


The safe bet in the late 1980’s seemed to be that mechanization, computerization, and robotization would proceed.	20世纪80年代末的最靠谱的预测是，机械化、计算机化和机器人化将一一到来。


Political and economic pressure would lead more Japanese sectors to undergo the transformation to machine-intensive, high-productivity modes of organization that export-oriented manufacturing had already undergone (and that sectors like agriculture and distribution had undergone or were undergoing in the North Atlantic region).	政治和经济压力将引导更多日本行业经历向机械密集型高生产率组织模式的转变，这是出口导向型制造业已经经历过的（也是北大西洋地区农业和分销等部门已经或正在经历的）。


The Japanese work ethic would persist, the reasoning went, and Japan’s high savings rate and slow population growth would give it a substantial edge in capital intensity – and thus in labor productivity – on top of whatever economy-wide advantage it might develop in total factor productivity.	这一预测认为，日本的工作伦理将会持续，日本的高储蓄率和低人口增长率将让它获得显著的资本密集度——以及劳动生产率——优势，此外还有全要素生产率方面的全经济优势。


Moreover, proximity to a vast pool of low-wage workers would allow Japan to construct a regional division of labor that took full advantage of its high-paid, well-educated workforce and outsourced low-skill, low-wage, and hence low-productivity jobs to continental Asia.	此外，毗邻存在拥有大规模低工资工人储备的国家仍日本能够实现地区劳动分工，既能充分利用其收入高、教育层次高的劳动力，也能将低技能、低工资因而也是低生产率的岗位外包给亚洲大陆国家。


As Japan equaled and perhaps surpassed the North Atlantic in terms of capital intensity, industrial knowhow, and standard of living, the global economy’s most highly rewarded activities – research and development in high-tech industries, high-end consumer fashion, high finance, and corporate control – would increasingly migrate to Tokyo Bay.	在日本达到甚至超过北大西洋地区的资本密集度、工业技术水平和生活水平后，全球经济回报最高的行为——高科技行业研发、高端消费时尚、高端金融和公司控制——也开始日益向东京湾集中。


With one-third the population of the United States, Japan was unlikely ever to become the world’s preeminent economic superpower.	日本的人口只有美国的三分之一，不可能成为世界首屈一指的经济超级���国。


But Japan would close the 30% gap (adjusted for purchasing power parity) between its per capita GDP and that of the US.	但日本能够弥补其与美国接近30%的人均GDP差距（以购买力平价衡量）。


The prevailing belief was that, by 2015 or so, Japan’s per capita GDP would more likely than not be 10% higher than in the US (in PPP terms).	当时的普遍观点是，到2015年左右，日本的人均GDP很有可能将比美国高出10%（以购买力平价衡量）。


None of that happened.	这些情况都没有发生。


Japan’s economy today is some 40% smaller than observers back in the late 1980’s confidently predicted.	如今，日本经济的规模比观察者在20世纪80年代末所自信满满地预测的小40%。


The 70% of per capita US GDP that Japan achieved back then proved to be the high-water mark.	当时所达到的人均GDP水平——即美国的70%——也称为不可逾越的高峰。


Its economy-wide relative productivity level has since declined, with two decades of malaise eliminating the pressures to upgrade in agriculture, distribution, and other services.	日本全经济相对生产率水平也开始下降，二十年的低迷期让农业、分销和其他服务部不再有升级压力。


Japan’s export-oriented manufacturing industries have maintained their edge but have not attracted other high-end activities – in fashion, finance, or corporate control – to any significant degree.	日本的出口导向型制造业仍保持了优势，但并未大量吸引其他高端活动——如时尚、金融和公司控制。


On the contrary, since the late 1980’s, Japan’s high personal savings rate, rather than being a source of supply-side strength, has been a source of demand-side weakness, financing investment abroad and government debt rather than spurring a domestic investment boom that would boost capital intensity and labor productivity.	相反，自20世纪80年代末以来，日本的高个人储蓄率并没有成为供给面优势的来源，反而成为需求面劣势的原因，为对外投资和政府债务提供了融资而没有刺激国内投资繁荣、提振资本密集度和劳动生产率。


Japan is not a poor country today.	如今，日本不是穷国。


But its economic structure and level of prosperity make it look more like Italy than its counterparts in the eastern Pacific Rim – the US coastal states of Washington, Oregon, and California.	但其经济结构和繁荣水平看起来更像是意大利，而不是其所在环太平洋地区东沿——美国的华盛顿州、俄勒冈州和加利福尼亚州。


Seven years ago, prior to the global financial crisis, the overwhelming consensus among economists was that, in retrospect, Japan’s expected convergence in productivity levels to America’s Pacific coast was not in the cards.	七年前，在全球金融危机爆发前，经济学家间压倒性的一致是，事后看来，预期中的日本生产率向美国太平洋沿岸趋同的现象并未发生。


Japanese culture produced enormous blockages to employing half the population – women.	日本文化让人口的半壁江山——女性难以加入劳动力大军。


And Japanese politics entrenched rural and small-business interests in a way that impeded the diffusion of export-oriented manufacturing.	日本政治中存在根深蒂固的农业和小企业利益，妨碍了出口导向型制造业的扩散。


Japan, the argument went, was too different in too many ways for the North Atlantic to serve as an economic-development model.	这一观点指出，在经济发展模式上，日本在太多方面与北大西洋太过不同。


And the export-oriented manufacturing firms that had been stimulated and shepherded by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry were not the core around which the rest of the Japanese economy would crystallize, but rather a separate and walled-off estate.	有通产省刺激和引导的出口导向型制造企业并没有成为日本经济其他部门附着其上的结晶核，而变成了不开放的堡垒。


Thus, the Japanese economy’s potential annual growth rate slowed by roughly an additional two percentage points at the beginning of the 1990’s, as the post-WWII development model lost its steam.	因此，20世纪90年代初，随着二战后时代发展模式失去动力，日本经济的潜在年增长率又降低了两个百分点。


It was largely a fluke that this growth slowdown coincided with an asset-bubble collapse and a cyclical depression – one that caused Japanese output to shrink by about 10% in a few short years, followed by only a slow recovery to the new, lower potential growth rate.	不幸的是，这一增长放缓正好赶上了资产泡沫崩溃和周期性萧条，导致日本产出在短短几年收缩了约10%，随之而来的漫长的新的低潜在增长复苏之路。


But from the perspective of the past seven years, this clearly needs to be rethought.	但从过去七年的情况看，显然这一观点需要反思。


According to all evidence, the US economy’s fall from its long-run growth path has left America 7% poorer today (and into the indefinite future) than expected back in 2007.	根据现在的证据，美国经济从其长期增长路径的下滑让今天（以及一眼望不到边的未来）的美国人比2007年的预期水平穷了7%。


And this assumes that there is only a one-time permanent downward shock, with no additional slowdown in the rate of potential output growth.	并且这只是一次性的持久衰退冲击，不会造成潜在产出增长的进一步放缓。


Yet there are reasons to fear that there will be such a decline: slower growth means fewer competitive pressures for heightened efficiency; diminished risk tolerance means a lower appetite for innovation and experimentation; and nominal interest rates pinned at the zero lower bound means that society’s savings cannot be used effectively.	但是，有理由担心会发生这样的下降：放缓的增长意味着提高效率的竞争压力不再紧迫； 风险容忍度的下降意味着创新和实验倾向的减弱；


If a mostly well-handled bubble collapse in a low-inflation US economy could permanently push down potential economic growth by roughly 10% over a decade, is it out of the question that a poorly handled bubble collapse could, over a generation, leave Japan’s economy 40% poorer than it might have been?	如果低通胀的美国经济的得到良好处理的泡沫崩溃在十年时间里永久性地导致其潜在经济增长降低了10%，那么可以肯定处理不当的泡沫崩溃会在一代人的时间里导致日本经济比原本的预期穷40%吗？


One thing is clear: economists no longer dare to assume that trend is trend and cycle is cycle, and that their reciprocal interactions are small enough to neglect on the first pass.	有一点是肯定的：经济学家不再敢认为趋势就是趋势，周期就是周期，它们发生交错的情况很少，可以忽略不计。


That approach has left many economists themselves living in countries that are considerably poorer than they expected.	这一方针让很多经济学家生活在比远比他们的预期更穷的国家。


The Long Short Run	长短期


BERKELEY – Before 2008, I taught my students that the United States was a flexible economy.	伯克利—2008年以前，我给学生上课时说美国是一个灵活的经济体。


It had employers who were willing to gamble and hire when they saw unemployed workers who would be productive; and it had workers who were willing to move to opportunity, or to try something new in order to get a job.	美国的雇主在看到受雇员工生产率不错时愿意冒险和雇用员工； 美国的员工也愿意抓住机会，或尝试新东西以获得工作。


As bosses and entrepreneurial workers took a chance, supply would create its own demand.	老板具有企业家精神，员工愿意抓住机会，于是供给就创造了其自身的需求。


Yes, I used to say, adverse shocks to spending could indeed create mass unemployment and idle capacity, but their effects would be limited to one, two, or at most three years.	是的，我曾经说，不利的支出冲击确实可能造成大量失业和闲置产能，但这一效应将只会维持一两年，最多三年时间。


And each year after the initial downturn had ended, the US economy would recover roughly 40% of the ground between its current situation and its full employment potential.	而每一个最初衰退结束后的首年，美国经济都会收复当前状况和充分就业状况之间的约40%的失地。


The domain of the Keynesian (and monetarist) short run, I said, was 0-2 years.	我说，凯恩斯主义（和货币主义）的短期期限是0—2年。


When analyzing events at a horizon of 3-7 years, one could safely assume a “classical” model: the economy would return to full employment, while changes in policy and in the economic environment would alter the distribution but not the level of spending, production, and employment.	在分析3—7年期的事件时，我们最好假设“古典”模型：经济将回到充分就业，政策和经济环境的变化将改变支出、产出和就业的分配而不是水平。


Beyond seven years was the domain of economic growth and economic institutions.	超过七年则已经进入了经济增长和经济制度领域。


All of this is now revealed as wrong, at least for today, if not in the past or the future.	如今，所有这些都是错的，至少现在（姑且不论过去和未来）是如此。


Japan since the start of the 1990’s provides strong evidence that the short run can last for decades, and then be followed not by a return to the old normal, but by a transition to a new normal in which the Keynesian short run of economic depression casts a long shadow.	进入20世纪90以来的日本提供了一个强大的证据，短期可以维持几十年，随后仍不能回归旧范式，而是转向新范式——凯恩斯主义经济萧条的短期特征开始朝长期转变。


What we have seen since 2008 is that Japan is not an exception.	自2008年以来我们看到，日本并不是例外。


The default framework for thinking about these questions is a very old one: the market-and-natural-interest-rate framework of Knut Wicksell’s Geldzins und Guterpreis (“Interest and Prices”).	思考这些问题的默认框架是非常古老的思想：维克塞尔（Knut Wicksell）的《利息与价格》（Geldzins und Guterpreis）中的市场和自然利率框架。


In every economy, the argument goes, there is a market interest rate determined by the financial system, and there is a natural interest rate – the value at which desired savings at full employment equal desired investment at full employment, and at which the economy as a whole desires neither to leverage nor to deleverage.	该观点指出，在每一个经济都有一个由金融系统决定市场利率和一个自然利率，自然利率即充分就业时的期望储蓄等于充分就业时的期望投资的利率值，亦即经济作为一个整体既不需要杠杆也不需要去杠杆的利率值。


If the economy as a whole desires to leverage up, the result is an inflationary boom.	如果经济作为一个整体渴望增加杠杆，其结果便是通胀性繁荣。


If the economy as a whole desires to deleverage, a depression ensues.	如果经济作为一个整体渴望去杠杆，就会发生萧条。


It is then the central bank’s job to intervene in the banking system in order to push the market interest rate to the natural interest rate, thereby balancing the economy at full employment without excess inflation.	于是，中央银行的责任就在于干预银行系统，从而将市场利率调整到自然利率，让经济平衡在实现充分就业又没有过度通胀的状态。


The problem now is that the natural interest rate – that is, the liquid safe nominal interest rate on short-term US Treasury securities – is less than zero.	如今的问题是自然利率——即短期美国国债的高流动性安全名义利率低于零。


Thus, the central bank cannot push the market interest rate there.	于是中央银行无法将市场利率调整到这一水平。


Until something happens to raise the natural interest rate, we are stuck with a depressed economy.	除非自然利率有所提高，否则我们就会处于经济萧条中。


Some blame a global savings glut for this state of affairs, and call for less thrift.	一些人指责全球储蓄过剩是造成这一局面的罪魁，并要求不要如此节俭。


But if we were at full employment, we would recognize that the world still has mammoth growth opportunities, and to sacrifice future growth for current well-being is a second-best choice.	但如果我们处于充分就业，我们就将认识到仍有巨大的增长机会，为未来就业牺牲当前福利只是次有选择。


Others blame a global investment shortfall driven by a lack of technological opportunities.	也有人将矛头指向了缺乏技术机会导致的全球投资短缺。


But, given that this view is expressed in every deep depression, it appears to be an effect of economic stagnation, rather than a cause of it.	但是，这一观点在每一次深度萧条时期都会出现，与其说这是经济停滞的原因，不如说是经济停滞的结果。


Still others say that the problem would resolve itself, at least in the US, if the target for annual inflation were raised from 2% to 5%, because a loss of so much of the real purchasing power that people hoard in cash would induce the needed boost in real investment.	还有人说，这一问题会自己解决，至少在美国是如此，只要把年度通胀目标从2%提高到5%，因为囤积现金者所面临的实际购买力的如此大的损失将激发所需的实际投资提振。


I think they are probably right, but former central bankers like Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan would warn that a 5% inflation target is ultimately unsustainable.	我认为这些人可能是对的，但保罗·沃克尔和艾伦·格林斯潘等前央行行长会警告说，5%的通胀目标是完全不可持续的。


People can be happy with a stable 2% target (which is too low to notice), but 5% annual inflation would eventually become 10%, and 10% would eventually become 20%, and then the US would face another deep recession, like in 1982, or even more unpleasant alternatives.	人们乐于接受稳定的2%目标（这个目标很低，根本不会引起关注），但5%的年度通胀最终会变为10%，10%最终会变为20%，到此时美国将面临类似1982年的新一轮深度衰退甚至更糟糕的局面。


Finally, according to a fourth group of economists, centered around Ricardo Caballero of MIT, the problem is a global shortage of safe assets.	最后，以麻省理工学院的卡巴莱罗（Ricardo Caballero）为首的第四类经济学家认为，问题在于安全资产的全球性短缺。


This view translates into policies aimed at better mobilizing society’s financial risk-bearing capacity, and that use the public sector to outwit the forces of time and ignorance that curb willingness to engage in risky investments.	这一观点体现为政策就是将目标放在更好地动员社会的金融风险承受能力，以及利用公共部门智胜抑制参与高风险投资的意愿的时间和无知因素。


So we have four theories, all advocated by smart, thoughtful, and hard-working economists.	于是我们有了四个理论，每一个都是由天资聪颖、思想深邃、工作努力的经济学家所提出的。


In a better world, sophisticated debate in a vibrant public sphere would inform economic policy.	在美好世界中，在活跃的公开氛围中进行的成熟的争论能给经济政策带来足够的信息。


In the world as it is, we are all Japan in the early 1990’s, looking ahead to two or more decades of lost economic growth.	而在现实世界中，我们都处日本20世纪90年代初的局面，未来是二十年甚至几十年的经济增长迷失。


Asia’s Democratic Drama	亚洲的民主戏剧


GENEVA – Asia’s political spectrum ranges from the brutal despotism of North Korea to the enlightened constitutional monarchy of Bhutan (so enlightened that it developed Gross National Happiness as an alternative measure to Gross Domestic Product), with many shades in between.	日内瓦—亚洲是个政治多样化的地区，从朝鲜的残暴独裁到不丹的开明君主立宪（开明到什么程度呢？ 开发了一个国民幸福总值的测量指标来取代国内生产总值）都能在这里找到。


But the old charge that Asia is ill-suited for Western-style democracy is being leveled again.	但关于亚洲不适合西方式民主的论调再一次日嚣尘上。


Are the skeptics right?	这样的质疑正确吗？


In South and East Asia, democracies outnumber dictatorships by 17 to six.	在南亚和东亚，民主对独裁之比为17对六。


But democracies are facing turbulent times.	但民主国家面临着动荡。


Thailand’s political impasse, amid massive anti-democracy demonstrations, has hit world headlines, and elections have also been violently contested in Bangladesh.	泰国的政治僵局和大规模反民主游行充斥着世界媒体标题，孟加拉国的选举也变成了暴力冲突。


There have been widespread human-rights abuses in Sri Lanka.	斯里兰卡存在广泛的人权侵犯行为。


Cambodians have suffered a brutal political clampdown.	柬埔寨遭受过残酷的政治压迫。


And political life in the world’s largest democracy, India, is raucous and unruly.	世界最大的民主国家印度的政治生活也是喧闹难驭。


Nonetheless, the notion of democratic exclusivity is both wrong and historically short-sighted.	尽管如此，民主不适论的概念不但错误，而且短视。


Although almost all Western countries are currently democracies, this has only been the case since the 1990’s.	尽管几乎所有西方国家目前都进入了民主，但在20世纪90年代时并非如此。


Just a half-century earlier, one could count the number of Western democracies on one’s fingers.	而在半个世纪前，西方民主国家数量两只手都数得过来。


And even these were imperfect: using the most basic democratic yardstick – universal suffrage – the United States could not be seen as truly democratic until the civil-rights victories of the 1960’s.	而即使是这些国家也并不完美：用最基本的民主指标——普选权衡量，美国直到20世纪60年代民权运动胜利后才步入真正的民主国家。


Although Britain was a beacon of democracy in the twentieth century, it did not extend this principle to an empire that held sway over more people and territory than any previous world power.	尽管英国身为二十世纪民主世界的灯塔，它并没有把这一原则推广到比此前任何一个全球霸权领土更大、人口更多的整个大英帝国。


It suppressed independence movements in India and across the Middle East and Africa (though many of these movements’ members willingly fought for Britain during both World Wars).	它镇压印度、中东和非洲的独立运动（尽管这些运动的成员在两次世界大战期间都自愿为英国而战）。


Similarly, the Dutch did not extend their democracy to Indonesia.	类似地，荷兰也没有把它的民主推广到印尼。


Nor did France support free and fair elections in Indochina or in its Middle Eastern and African colonies.	法国也没有支持印度支那或中东和非洲殖民地的自由公平的选举。


The Belgians were particularly brutal in Congo.	比利时人在刚果暴行累累。


The Spanish and Portuguese ravaged Latin America.	西班牙和葡萄牙对拉丁美洲极尽掠夺之能事。


And the Germans were not much better in Southwest Africa.	德国在西南非洲的行径也好不到哪里去。


Indeed, two of history’s most terrifying ideologies, fascism and communism, were devised and embraced in continental Europe.	事实上，历史上最可怕的两种意识形态——法西斯主义和共产主义——都产生和兴盛于欧洲大陆。


The fact that the word “democracy” derives from ancient Greek, and that one can discern the kernel of democratic thought in Greek philosophy, by no means implies that democracy is embedded in the West’s political DNA.	“民主”一词来自古希腊语，你也可以在希腊哲学中找到民主思想的核心要素，但这一事实并不意味着民主只存在于西方政治DNA中。


Only after centuries of absolutist rule, extremism, war, revolution, and oppression can the West as a whole reasonably claim to be free, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous – and even now there are exceptions.	在经历了几百年的专制统治、极端主义、战争、革命和镇压后，西方才在整体上步入了自由、民主、和平和繁荣——即使在今天也仍然存在例外。


It is also debatable whether this so-called Western democracy was a cause or a consequence of peace and prosperity.	这一所谓的西方民主是和平与繁荣的因还是果也有待争议。


The West was not always the world’s most politically advanced region.	西方并非一直是世界上政治最发达的地区。


When Jesuit missionaries came to China in the seventeenth century, they enthused about how much Europeans could learn from the country’s enlightened political philosophy, Confucianism.	当十七世纪耶稣会传教士来到中国时，他们十分热心地关注欧洲可以从中国的开明政治哲学——儒家思想中学到什么。


The enlightenment philosophers Voltaire and Kant did just that.	启蒙运动哲学家伏尔泰和康德的成就便在于这方面。


Confucian concepts such as the “mandate of heaven” seemed infinitely more just than that of Europe’s “divine right of kings.”	“天命”等儒家概念比欧洲的“神授君权”合理得多。


The Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen traces the origins of Indian democratic dialogue to the third-century BC Buddhist Emperor Ashoka.	诺贝尔经济学奖获得者阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）认为印度民主对话的起源可以追溯到公元前三世纪的阿育王。


He also contrasts the religious tolerance preached and practiced by the Muslim Emperor Akbar in the 1590’s with the Inquisition, which was hounding heretics in Europe at around the same time.	他还把16世纪90年代莫卧儿帝国皇帝阿克巴所宣扬和实践的宗教宽容与同一时期对异教徒赶尽杀绝的欧洲宗教法庭作对比。


Our assumptions about the relative prosperity of Asia and the West should also be reconsidered.	我们所假设的亚洲和西方的相对繁荣也应该重新考察。


As recently as 200 years ago, Asia accounted for 60% of global GDP.	不出200年前，亚洲占据全球60%以上的GDP。


However, following the industrial revolution in northwestern Europe, the colonization of much of Asia, and the Opium Wars in China, their relative positions switched.	但是，在西北欧工业革命、亚洲大部的殖民地化以及中国鸦片战争后，亚洲和西方的相对地位发生了改变。


By the 1950’s, Asia’s share of global GDP had fallen to less than 20%.	到20世纪50年代，亚洲占全球GDP的比重降到了20%以下。


In his 1968 work Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Swedish economist and Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal considered the words “Asian” and “poor” to be synonymous.	在1968年的著作《亚洲的戏剧：国穷论》（Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations）中，瑞典经济学家、诺贝尔奖得主贡纳尔·缪尔达尔（Gunnar Myrdal）认为“亚洲”和“穷”是同义词。


But, over the past three decades, Asian prosperity appears to be within reach once more.	但是，在过去三十年中，亚洲的繁荣似乎再一次近在眼前。


It is of course impossible to say how Asia might have developed had Western imperial powers stayed away.	当然，我们不可能知道没有西方帝国主义侵略，亚洲现在可以发展到什么程度。


There is no reason to suppose that the region could not have found its own path to peace, prosperity, and democracy.	没有理由认为亚洲地区无法找到其自身的和平、繁荣和民主之路。


Socially and economically, Asia now stands roughly where Europe was at the start of the twentieth century; and one can only hope that its democratic journey will be shorter and less violent.	不管在社会上还是在经济上，今天的亚洲和��十世纪初的欧洲十分相似； 而亚洲的民主之旅只可能比西方更短、更少暴力。


Crucially, that path has already been taken by South Korea.	关键的是韩国已经采取了这条道路。


Despite 35 years of brutal Japanese colonization, three years of civil war, military dictatorship, and a lack of natural resources, the country has emerged from extreme poverty to become – in a volatile neighborhood – a stable, prosperous, and vibrant democracy.	尽管经历了35年的残酷日本殖民、三年内战、军事独裁并且自然资源匮乏，但韩国仍然从极端贫困中崛于动荡的四邻，成为稳定、繁荣、充满活力的民主国家。


Its neighbors could surely follow in its footsteps.	它的邻国显然可以效仿它的榜样。


Democracy is not a Western product; nor is it for Western citizens alone.	民主不是西方的产物； 也不是西方人民的专属品。


Asia has enough historical experience to suggest that even its six remaining dictatorships could, in time, embrace a fairer system of government – and the peace and prosperity that come with it.	亚洲有足够的历史经验证明，即使是其至今仍存在的六个独裁国家也可以及时采取更公平的治理制度，获得因此带来的和平与繁荣。


Solving Europe’s Credibility Problem	解决欧洲的信誉问题


PARIS – As the eurozone debates how to escape the stagnation trap in which it finds itself, one question has become increasingly important: Can governments credibly commit to trim public spending in the future while avoiding immediate cuts?	巴黎—在欧元区争论如何摆脱它身陷其中的停滞陷阱之际，一个问题变得越来越重要：政府能够可信地做出削减未来公共支出承诺、同时避免立刻削减支出吗？


Fortunately, the answer is a qualified yes: there are ways to ensure that fiscal accommodation now is followed by consolidation later.	幸运的是，答案是有条件的“是”：有办法保证现在进行财政调整，随后再进行整合。


Growth and inflation in the eurozone remain much too weak.	欧元区增长和通胀仍然太弱。


The European Central Bank’s latest assessment is bleak, and ECB President Mario Draghi has made no secret of the fact that risks remain on the downside.	欧洲央行的最新评估令人悲观，而其行长德拉吉早已不在掩饰风险仍在于衰退的秘密了。


Nominal GDP growth – that is, real growth plus inflation – will not exceed 1.5% this year and may well end up perilously close to 1%.	今年的名义GDP增长——即真实增长加上通货膨胀——不会超过1. 5%，很有可能只有1%左右。


Though monetary policy is supportive, it is close to reaching its limits, and the ECB’s initiative to stimulate credit by lending to commercial banks on super-cheap terms has not proved as effective as hoped.	尽管采取了支持性货币政策，但已接近极限，而欧洲央行通过以极优厚的条件向商业银行贷款来刺激信用的方案并没有达到预期中的效果。


AAA ten-year government bonds currently yield about 1%, suggesting that markets do not expect a strong rebound.	目前，AAA级十年期政府债券收益率在1%左右，表明市场并不预期会有强劲反弹。


This is the type of situation in which fiscal policy should come to the rescue.	这种类型的局面应该由货币政策出马救驾。


Draghi made that very point in his speech at the annual gathering of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in late August, and several economists have suggested that it is time for the eurozone to engineer a temporary fiscal expansion.	德拉吉在8月底的怀俄明州杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）央行行长年会的讲话阐明了这一点，而不少经济学家也指出，欧元区应该采取临时性财政扩张。


In a recent article, Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini of Bocconi University proposed a permanent tax cut, followed by gradual spending cuts.	在一篇最新文章中，博科尼大学的弗兰切斯科·加瓦齐（Francesco Jiavazzi）和圭多·塔贝里尼（Guido Tabellini）提出先进行永久性减税，再继之以逐步削减支出。


Combined with pro-growth reforms of product and labor markets, such a program could yield both lasting supply-side benefits (through lower taxation) and a temporary demand boost that would help to revive eurozone growth.	这一方案与产品和劳动力市场的提振增长的改革相结合，能产生持续性供给端效益（通过减税）和有助于欧元区增长复苏的暂时性需求提振。


Gradualism on spending cuts may have other merits, quite apart from its macroeconomic benefits. Efficient public-sector reform takes time.	除了宏观经济效益，渐进性支出削减可能还有其他好处���有效的公共部门改革需要时间。


Governments that trim public expenditures in a hurry rarely make informed choices.	急匆匆削减公共支出极少是明智的选择。


An expenditure review based on systematic policy evaluations is the best approach to sorting out good spending from bad spending and thus maximize value for money.	基于系统性政策评估的支出检查是区分好支出和坏支出、从而实现货币价值最大化的最佳方针。


There are two objections to this approach.	这一方针面临着两大反对观点。


First, it is argued that action of this sort would violate the requirements of the EU’s fiscal compact.	首先，有人指出这类行动违反了欧盟财政契约的要求。


That is not necessarily the case.	未必。


Of the eurozone’s 18 members, ten are no longer considered to be running an excessive deficit.	在欧元区18个成员国中，有十个已不再认为处于过度赤字状态。


Even for those under enhanced scrutiny, such as France and Spain, escape clauses exist: in case of a “protracted period of very low annual GDP growth,” the EU can grant an exemption from the required annual adjustment.	即使是那些受到严格审视的国家，如法国和西班牙，也有例外条款：在“年GDP增长长时间处于极低水平”的情况下，欧盟可以授予年度调整要求的豁免权。


These countries cannot launch stimulus measures, but the EU could let them fine-tune the pace of consolidation, provided that they are able to commit to comprehensive cuts in the future.	这些国家无法采取刺激措施，但欧盟可以让它们优化整合节奏，只要它们能够承诺在未来实现全面削减。


So the eurozone has some – albeit limited – fiscal space.	因此，欧元区仍有一定的财政空间，尽管颇为有限。


Debt levels and remaining deficits underscore the need for extreme caution, but, assuming a common will to undertake action, there would be room for maneuver within the European rules.	债务水平和剩余赤字意味着需要非常小心，但是，只要存在采取行动的共同意愿，就有在欧洲规则框架内调整的空间。


The second objection is that governments will fail to deliver on their promises.	第二个反对观点是政府无法兑现它们的承诺。


Responding to Giavazzi and Tabellini, Roberto Perotti (also of Bocconi) has argued that the gradualist strategy simply would not be credible.	罗伯特·佩罗蒂（Roberto Perotti，同样来自博科尼大学）批评加瓦齐和塔贝里尼，指出渐进战略根本不可信。


Spending cuts are bound to be politically difficult decisions, and governments cannot commit to delivering them with certainty.	削减支出注定是一个政治上十分艰难的决定，政府无法确定地兑现承诺。


So, says Perotti, the “cut taxes now, cut spending later” combination would involve enormous moral hazard.	佩罗蒂说，因此，“现在减税，日后减支”的组合包含着巨大的道德风险。


Perotti has a point.	佩罗蒂言之有理。


Carlo Cottarelli, appointed by the Italian government to oversee its expenditure review, noted recently that even before spending cuts were enacted, they were being used to finance new spending.	受意大利政府任命负责支出检查的卡罗·科塔雷利（Carlo Cottarelli）最近指出，即使是在采取支出削减前，它们已被用于为新支出融资。


The political economy of public-spending reform is tricky, and well-designed macroeconomic plans can be taken hostage by pork-barrel politics.	公共支出改革的政治经济学很复杂，精心设计的宏观经济计划可能被分赃政治（pork-barrel politics）绑架。


There is, however, a solution to this problem: Governments and parliaments can delay action without postponing decision.	但是，对于这一问题有一个解决办法：政府和议会可以推迟行动而不暂停决定。


Nothing prevents them from deciding now that pensions will be reduced in three years or that a given industrial subsidy will disappear on January 1, 2017.	没有东西现在阻止他们决定三年后削减养老金或从2017年1月1日起取消某项行业补贴。


If parliaments want to tie their own hands, they can do so simply by passing a law.	如果议会不想动手，只要通过一项法律就可以了。


Actual decisions whose effects are delayed could serve as a down payment, ensuring that, say, half of the spending cuts programmed for the years to come are already enacted.	效果延迟的实际决定可以视为首付，确保（比如）未来多年计划支出削减的一半得到实施。


To be sure, decisions can always be reversed; parliaments can simply pass another law.	平心而论，决定永远可以逆转； 议会只要通过另一项法律就可以了。


But this is also true of spending cuts that have already been implemented.	但已经实施的支出削减同样如此。


Everything is reversible in a democracy.	在民主制度中，没有什么是不可撤销的。


Moreover, Europe has instruments to ensure that commitments retain their long-term value.	此外，欧洲有办法确保承诺的长期信誉。


Its surveillance apparatus is mostly used to monitor budget deficits in real time, but it could also help to evaluate the future consequences of policy decisions.	其监督装置大部分被用来实时监测预算赤字，但也可以用来帮助评估政策决定的未来后果。


The so-called “costing” of policy measures (determining the exact amount of savings brought about by a reform) requires technical skills and access to extensive data.	所谓的政策措施的“成本计算”（确定某项改革所带来的节约的精确数字）需要专业技能和活的大量数据。


The European Commission is uniquely equipped to do this job; together with the independent national fiscal watchdogs, it could be asked to review draft laws in detail, assess their future budgetary effects, and thereby ensure that governments do not embellish their projections when promising that their reforms will yield future savings.	在这方面，欧盟委员会具有得天独厚的优势； 可以让欧盟委员会和独立的国家财政监督机构合作仔细审查法律草案，评估它们的未来预算影响，从而确保政府不会在承诺改革将带来未来节约时粉饰预测。


A “cut taxes now, cut expenditures later” strategy is therefore feasible.	因此，“现在减税，日后减支”战略是可行的。


Though such a strategy would be challenging to implement and enforce, it could be credible and remain compatible with fiscal responsibility if it were buttressed by strong commitment mechanisms at the national and European levels.	尽管这一战略会遇到实施和执行方面的挑战，但它能够做到可信并且不与财政责任冲突，只要有强大的国家和欧洲层面的承诺机制支持。


Of course, not everybody agrees that such a strategy, though possible, is desirable.	当然，并非所有人都同意这一战略值得追求——尽管可行。


But that is an entirely different matter.	但这完全是另一个问题。


Can Investment Save Europe?	投资能拯救欧洲吗？


PARIS – Economic growth in Europe remains disappointing.	巴黎—欧洲的经济增长仍然令人失望。


Virtually all European Union members are expected to post higher output in 2014; but, according to the International Monetary Fund’s latest projections, the average growth rate in the eurozone will barely exceed 1%.	几乎所有欧盟成员国2014年产出预计都会有所提高，但根据国际货币基金组织的最新预测，欧元区平均增长率很难超过1%。


And, whereas the British economy is displaying strong momentum, its GDP has only now surpassed the pre-crisis mark.	此外，尽管英国经济表现出强大的动力，其 GDP直到最近才超过危机前水平。


In per capita terms, the EU is still poorer than it was seven years ago.	用人均量衡量，英国仍比七年前要穷。


In this context, a new policy target has emerged: investment.	在这样的背景下，一个新的政策目标浮现出来：投资。


Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, has pushed for it, and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president-elect of the European Commission, has called it his “first priority.”	欧盟现任轮值主席、意大利总理伦齐强调投资的重要性，欧盟委员会当选主席容克称之为“首要任务”。


His goal for the next three years is to mobilize an additional €100 billion ($134 billion) per year (0.75% of GDP) for public and private investment.	他的目标是，未来三年每年新增1,000亿欧元（相当于GDP的0. 75%）用于公共和私人投资。


Investment is certainly a politically appealing theme.	毫无疑问，投资是一个在政治上颇为讨好的主题。


It can unite Keynesians and supply-side advocates; proponents of public spending and supporters of private business can stand together.	投资可以统一凯恩斯主义和供给面支持者； 公共支出派和私人企业派可以因此站在同一条阵线上。


And historically low long-term interest rates undoubtedly provide an exceptionally favorable opportunity to finance new ventures.	历史性的低利率毫无疑问为新投资政策的融资创造了极其有利的机会。


But it does not automatically follow that governments should pour money into public infrastructure projects or foster private investment by adding further incentives amid already auspicious market conditions.	但这并不是说政府应该把大量的钱投给公共基础设施工程，或通过在转向有利的市场条件下进一步增强激励来刺激私人投资。


At a time when private income has shrunk, public resources are scarce, and debt burdens are heavy, plans to stimulate investment should be carefully scrutinized.	如今，私人收入节节下降，公共资源非常稀缺，债务负担仍然沉重，刺激投资的计划应该谨慎审核。


Even seemingly purposeful projects can seriously backfire: only a few years ago, Europe’s well-intentioned efforts to stimulate renewables resulted in a solar energy bubble of macroeconomic proportions.	即使是带有明确目的的计划也有可能适得其反：几年前，欧洲带着良好的意愿尝试刺激可再生能源投资，结果导致了宏观经济出现太阳能泡沫。


Whereas cutting greenhouse-gas emissions is necessary, the current generation of relatively inefficient renewables should not be deployed at the expense of the development of more cost-effective technology.	尽管减少温室气体排放很有必要，但不能让当前效率相对较低的可再生能源阻挠成本效益更好的技术的发展。


That is why it is essential to determine, prior to any effort to boost investment, whether sluggish growth in Europe reflects abnormally low capital formation.	因此，在采取任何刺激投资的措施前，确定欧洲增长停滞不前是否是因为资本形成水平特别低下是十分重要的。


The data suggest that it does: from 2007 to 2013, investment has fallen by 18% in the EU, compared to just 6% in the United States.	数据表明确实如此：2007—2013年，欧盟投资规模下降了18%，而美国只下降了6%。


In Southern Europe, investment has literally collapsed; even in Germany, it will reach pre-crisis levels only this year.	在南欧，投资出现了崩盘； 甚至在德国，投资在今年才有可能回到危机前水平。


But this is hardly a sufficient observation, because excessive pre-crisis real-estate investment made a sharp downward adjustment inevitable.	但这不是故事的全部，因为过高的危机前房地产投资水平意味着急剧的向下调整是不可避免的。


The reckless construction of condominiums without buyers and airports without passengers had to stop.	匆忙上马建设的公寓没人来买，机场没有乘客。


More generally, investment tends to follow economic growth: companies add new capacity only if there is demand for their products.	更一般的情况是，投资总是跟随经济增长波动：公司在产品有需求时才会增加新产能。


A recession almost always implies a disproportionate fall in investment.	衰退几乎总是意味着投资的更大程度的下降。


For these reasons, determining whether low investment is a cause or a consequence of slow growth is not as easy as it may seem.	出于这些原因，确定低投资是低增长的原因还是结构并不像��面看起来那么简单。


Taking push and pull factors into account, DIW, the German economic institute, reckons that the investment gap is real; for the eurozone, it puts the gap at about 2% of GDP, or €200 billion.	德国经济研究所DIW在考虑了推动和拖累因素后认为，投资缺口是实实在在的； 对欧元区来说，这一缺口大约为GDP的2%，或2,000亿欧元。


That is a significant number, which suggests that there is a case for policy action.	这是个很大的数字，意味着应该为此采取政策动作。


That raises the next issue: what impedes investment, and what can be done to remove such obstacles?	这就引起了另一个问题：是什么阻碍了投资，可以做些什么打消这些阻碍？


Part of the answer concerns regulation.	部分答案与监管有关。


For example, investment in efficient energy production and conservation is being held back by pervasive uncertainty about the future path of climate policies.	比如，对高效能源生产和保护的投资因为未来气候政策路径充满不确定性而大受制约。


A European agreement on how to stabilize the price of carbon would help to catalyze private projects.	建立一个欧洲协议以稳定碳价格有助于刺激私人项目。


At the national level, well designed, stable schemes to improve domestic heating efficiency would also be helpful.	在国家层面，设计稳定合理的机制改善国内取暖效率也有所助益。


More generally, regulatory clarity and predictability are essential to private investment.	更一般地说，监管的明确性和可预测性对私人投资至关重要。


The answer is also partly financial.	答案部分也在于金融。


In Europe, the pre-crisis boom in real-estate investment was fueled by reckless credit flows from Northern to Southern Europe.	在欧洲，危机前的房地产投资繁荣受到从北欧往南欧的欠审慎信用流的推动。


Credit rationing has followed, as banks reduced their overburdened balance sheets and were discouraged from risk-taking.	随着银行开始缩减其债务过多的资产负债表并且不再愿意冒险，随之而来的是信用配给。


Moreover, money has flowed back to Northern Europe from the distressed periphery.	此外，资金从受困外围回流北欧。


As a result, credit for, say, a small Spanish company is neither cheap nor abundant.	结果，（比如）西班牙小企业的信用既不便宜，也不充裕。


This calls for immediate action.	这需要立刻采取行动。


Packaging existing loan portfolios and offloading them to non-bank investors, as many have proposed, should be encouraged.	许多人建议包装现有贷款组合并转移给非银行投资者，这应该予以鼓励。


Beyond short-term fixes, the main priority must be to encourage a resumption of savings flows across Europe, but this time in the form of equity, not bank deposits and loans.	除了短期修正，主要的当务之急必须是鼓励整个欧洲储蓄流的重新流动，但这一回应该通过股本形式而非银行存款和贷款形式。


For this, Europe needs an adequate regulatory and tax framework.	在这一点上，欧洲需要完善的监管和税收框架。


Official institutions could also be involved in a suitable way.	官方机构也可以以合适方式参与其中。


Oddly, the European Investment Bank, the EU’s financial arm, is authorized to provide only loans and guarantees, not equity investment.	奇怪的是，欧盟的金融部门——欧洲投资银行只获得了贷款和担保的权力而没有股本投资权力。


Substitutes should be found.	必须找到它的替代品。


There are, finally, a few fields where national governments could act directly.	最后，还有一些领域国家政府可以直接采取行动。


Infrastructure is a case in point, provided that the current interest in investment projects is not used as an excuse to revive Europe’s love for white elephants.	其中之一是基础设施，只要当前对投资项目的兴趣不被拿来作为欧洲重燃对无用之物的偏好的借口。


Will it be enough?	这样就足够了吗？


It is hard to know.	很难说。


The EU faces a delicate balancing act between the need to foster investment and the need to remain cautious, especially with public money.	欧盟面临着一个脆弱的平衡，一边是提振投资的需要，另一边是保持谨慎（特别是公共资金）的需要。


Juncker, for his part, will need to display both firm resolve and sound judgment.	容克需要表现出坚定的决心和可靠的判断。


Will Vladimir Putin Bolster the Eurozone?	普京会支持欧元区吗?


PARIS – Jacek Rostowski, Poland’s finance minister until last November, recently suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not have dared to annex Crimea if he had not observed Europe agonizing over a solution to the euro crisis.	巴黎—去年11月份卸任的亚采克·罗斯托夫斯基（Jacek Rostowski）最近指出，要不是俄罗斯总统普京看到欧洲因为寻找欧元危机解决办法而焦头烂额，他是不敢吞并克里米亚的。


Is Rostowski right?	罗斯托夫斯基的说法对吗？


At first sight, such a connection seems far-fetched.	乍一看，其中的联系有些牵强附会。


Putin’s show of strength involved military force and the implicit threat of a gas embargo, not monetary power (which he does not have).	普京表现出的强硬包括军事力量和切断天然气威胁，而不是货币实力（他也没有这一实力）。


Throughout the conflict over Crimea, the focus has been on Ukraine’s relationship with the European Union, not with the eurozone.	在整个克里米亚危机中，问题的焦点一直是乌克兰与欧盟而不是欧元区的关系。


Moreover, Ukraine’s recent monetary history has been defined by an exchange-rate peg to the US dollar, not the euro.	此外，乌克兰的当代货币史一直采取盯住美元而不是欧元的政策。


So how could the euro be relevant to Russia’s annexation of Crimea?	那么，欧元怎么会与俄罗斯吞并克里米亚扯上关系呢？


Rostowski’s point is that European countries demonstrated throughout the euro crisis that they had very little appetite for solidarity, even with their partners in the monetary union.	罗斯托夫斯基的论点是，欧洲国家在欧元危机期间表现出它们根本没有团结可言，即使与同一货币联盟中的伙伴也不团结。


How much solidarity would they be willing to display vis-à-vis a non-European Union country?	它们对一个非欧盟国家上又愿意拿出多少团结？


Russia, the reasoning goes, interpreted the EU’s hesitant management of the turmoil as a license to act.	根据这一逻辑，俄罗斯将欧盟在治理动荡上所表现出的犹豫不决解读为采取行动的通行证。


And it could go further for the same reason.	出于同样的理由，俄罗斯还会继续得寸进尺。


Clearly, the series of events following the financial meltdown in 2008 can be viewed as a crisis of solidarity.	显然，2008年金融动荡后的一系列事件可以看成是团结的危机。


When a common response to Europe’s banking debacle was needed, the answer was that each country should take care of its own financial institutions.	当欧洲需要对其银行困境采取共同应对时，它们给出的答案是各国应该各自负责照看自己的金融机构。


When Greece lost access to financial markets, several months were needed to engineer a response, which took great care not to rely on EU funds and to limit each country’s financial commitment.	当希腊无法进入金融市场时，欧洲花了几个月才出台了应对措施，并且唯恐要依赖欧洲资金，小心翼翼地限制了每个国家的金融义务。


Indeed, when a ��firewall” was finally created, its size was strictly limited and no form of joint liability was permitted.	事实上，当“防火墙”最终建起时，其规模严格受限，共同债务更是被明令禁止。


And Eurobonds were quickly rejected, because they would have created open-ended mutualized-debt obligations.	欧元债券很快就被否决，因为这会造成没完没了的债务共同化义务。


Similarly, though it had been envisaged that the European Stability Mechanism could be used to recapitalize banks, it was eventually decided that the ESM would lend only to governments, rather than assuming bank risk directly.	类似地，尽管人们设想欧洲稳定基金（European Stability Mechanism，ESM）可以用于重组银行，但最终的决定是ESM只能贷款给政府而不是直接为银行风险兜底。


And, most recently, negotiations to establish an EU banking union once again confronted the challenge of forging a common resolution mechanism while limiting each member state’s commitment.	此外，最近，关于建立欧盟银行联盟的谈判再一次遇到了如何在限制各成员国的义务的情况下达成共同解决机制的挑战。


In short, each time the question of European solidarity was raised, the answer was: “Yes, but only if absolutely necessary, and only to the minimum possible extent.”	简言之，每一次出现欧洲团结问题时，答案都是：“没问题，但必须在绝对必要并且可能范围最小的情况下。 ”


Russian reactions to the Ukrainian uprising, meanwhile, have shown how vivid the memory of World War II remains in Moscow.	与此同时，俄罗斯对乌克兰动荡的反应显示了二战给莫斯科留下的记忆是多么鲜活。


It is fair to assume that the Kremlin may have noticed that Europe had no wish to emulate the United States and engineer a Marshall Plan of its own.	克里姆林宫八成是注意到了欧洲不愿意效仿美国、实施欧洲版马歇尔计划。


More generally, Putin may have concluded that an EU that is so reluctant to take risks for the good of its own members would certainly not take risks for a mere neighbor.	更一般地说，普京可能认定，连冒险为其自身���员国谋利都不愿意的欧盟绝不可能愿意为仅仅是邻居的乌克兰冒险。


A key dimension of the current standoff over Ukraine is energy, and it raises the same question about European solidarity.	当前乌克兰僵局的一个重要方面是能源，在这个问题上，欧洲同样面临团结问题。


As a recent study by Bruegel has shown, the EU as a whole could, with some effort, dispense with gas imports from Russia.	根据Bruegel的最新研究，整体而言，欧盟可以采取一些行动摆脱来自俄罗斯的天然气进口。


But doing so would require EU member states to regard security of supplies as a matter of common concern, not as an issue that each country must address on its own.	但这样做要求欧盟各成员国将供应安全作为共同考虑事项，而不是各国必须自行解决的问题。


For example, in response to an embargo affecting a particular country, other EU members would draw on their reserves, increase their own production, pay more for imports, or cut consumption a bit.	比如，当禁运影响到某个具体国家时，其他欧盟成员国要拿出自己的储备，增加自己的产量，话更多的钱进口，或略微削减一些消费。


But this sense of solidarity has been consistently lacking in the EU’s energy-policy debate.	但在欧盟能源政策争论中你可以感到根本不存在这样的团结。


The underlying question is whether it is right to assume that the euro should have created more solidarity.	根本问题是认为欧盟能够增进团结的观念是否正确。


Those who first imagined the single currency expected it to have profound consequences.	最初设想出共同货币的人期待它可以产生生源影响。


In their eyes, it would be a means to forge a community.	在他们看来，欧元是塑造共同体的途径。


Currency borders generally coincide with political borders, so the creation of a monetary union was expected to give rise to some sort of common polity.	货币边界大体上与政治边界相同，因此创造货币联盟被认为可以孕育某种程度的共同政体。


Sharing a currency was expected to create a sense of common destiny, and hence solidarity, among the participants.	共享一种货币被认为你可以创造出一种同命运的感觉，从而在参与国之间营造团结。


That did not happen.	这一幕并没有发生。


Even before the crisis, it was clear that citizens and governments alike regarded (wrongly) the euro as a mere practicality.	即便在危机前，显然公民和政府都（错误地）认为欧元只不过是一种便利。


Its introduction was viewed as a technocratic affair, to be handled by central bankers and finance ministers, not as the cornerstone of a common European identity.	欧元的引入被认为是技术事务，由央行行长和财政部长负责，而不是同一个欧洲的身份的基石。


Its creation did not cause the EU budget to increase by a single euro, nor did it lead to deeper political integration.	欧元的创造并没有让欧盟预算增加一个欧元，也没有带来更深层次的政治一体化。


The commitment called for by a common currency was consistently underestimated.	共同货币所需要的承诺一直都被低估了。


In hindsight, it was a mistake to believe in the euro’s spontaneous community-creating power.	事后看来，认为欧元可以自动带来统一的力量是一个错误。


Though there clearly is a link between currency areas and political communities (consider the dissolution of the ruble zone at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse), it is political community that creates the solidarity needed to foster currency linkages, not vice versa.	尽管在货币区和政治共同体之间显然存在着联系（苏联解体导致卢布区崩溃就是明证），但是政治共同体创造了货币联系所需要的团结，而不是相反。


Rostowski is certainly right: the euro’s weakness has emboldened Putin.	罗斯托夫斯基显然是对的：欧元的弱势让普京变本加厉。


In the end, however, the right question may be whether the Crimea crisis will eventually bolster European solidarity – and thus the euro.	但是，说到底，正确的问题或许是克里米亚危机是否能最终提高欧洲——从而也提高欧元——的团结。


The New Growth Conundrum	新增长难题


PARIS – For most governments, the rate of economic growth that can reasonably be expected in the coming years is a key question.	巴黎—对大部分政府来说，未来几年合理预期的经济增长率是一个大问题。


And, at least for the advanced economies, it has become a particularly puzzling one.	至少对于发达经济体来说，这是一个特别邻人困惑的问题。


If the past is a good predictor of the future, the outlook is bleak.	如果历史可以作为未来的好指标，那么可以说前景堪忧。


Since 2008, economic growth has consistently disappointed expectations.	2008年以来，经济增长一直无法达到预期。


Of the countries most affected by the financial crisis, only a few – the United States, Germany, and Sweden – have rediscovered the path to sustained growth.	在受金融危机影响最大的国家中，只有少数几个——美国、德国和瑞典——重新回到了持续复苏之路。


Yet, even for them, GDP in 2013 was far below the level projected prior to the crisis.	但是，即使是这些国家，2013年GDP也远低于危机前的趋势水平。


The consensus view among economists and policymakers is that the financial crisis and the euro crisis have damaged both demand and supply, but that a gradual healing process has begun.	经济学家和决策者的一致观点是，金融危机和欧元危机同时破坏了需求和供给，但缓慢的回暖过程已经开始。


On the demand side, according to this view, the hangover from pre-crisis private indebtedness and crisis-generated public indebtedness still weighs on domestic demand.	根据这一观点，在需求端，危机前的私人债务积压和危机造成的公共债务仍然抑制着内需。


This is likely to persist for several more years, though the burden will diminish steadily.	这一状况可能还会持续几年，尽管这一负担在稳步减轻。


Gradually, consumers will start spending and investing again (as is becoming the case in the US), and fiscal policy will become neutral again (as is already the case in Germany).	消费者将逐渐重新开始花钱和投资（美国正在向这个方向靠拢），财政政策将重新回归中性（德国已经如此）。


On the supply side, the crisis has lowered potential output growth, because, in Europe at least, firms have invested less, impeding the adoption of new technologies.	在供给端，危机降低了潜在产出增长，这是因为，至少在欧洲，企业投资得更少了，这阻碍了新技术的采用。


Moreover, in some cases – for example, the United Kingdom – wage decreases and flexible layoff rules have encouraged firms to substitute labor for capital, reducing output per employee.	此外，在一些国家——比如英国——工资下降和弹性劳动法规鼓励企业用劳动力代替资本，从而降低了员工人均产出。


Clogged capital markets and resistance to social hardship have also delayed the replacement of incumbent firms by more efficient new entrants.	资本市场运行不畅和对苦日子的反对也阻碍了现有企业被效率更高的新晋企业取代的步伐。


The aggregate result has been lower-than-anticipated productivity: in the UK, more person-hours were needed to produce a unit of output in 2013 than in 2007.	总的结果是生产率低于预期：在英国，2013年生产一单位产出所需工时比2007年更多。


Here, too, the supply-side effect of the crisis is likely to persist until firms invest in new equipment, innovation accelerates, and the churning process in labor markets resumes.	在这方面，危机的供给端效应也可能会一直持续到企业开始投资新设备、创新开始加速、劳动力市场新陈代谢开始重启为止。


But the view that advanced economies are gradually healing is challenged from both sides.	但发达经济体正在逐渐回暖的观点受到了供需两方面的挑战。


Starting with demand, Larry Summers, the Harvard economist and senior US official under Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, recently proposed that advanced economies have found themselves in the grip of secular stagnation.	从需求端开始。 哈佛大学经济学家、克林顿和奥巴马政府高官拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）最近指出，发达经济体正陷入长期停滞。


Summers’s view is that pre-crisis indebtedness was not an exogenous anomaly; it was the consequence of insufficient global demand.	萨默斯的观点是，危机前债务并不是外生反常现象，而是全球需求不足的结果。


The global distribution of income had shifted away from the advanced countries’ middle class toward the rich and the emerging economies, resulting in excess worldwide savings.	全球收入分配正在从发达国家中产阶级向富人和新兴经济体倾斜，导致全球储蓄过剩。


The only way to avoid stagnation was to push the middle class deeper into debt, helped by low interest rates and lenient lending rules.	避免停滞的唯一办法是让中产阶级进一步负债，而手段就是低利率和宽松的贷款规则。


In other words, the savings glut (as former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called it) predated the crisis and could continue to affect global demand, unless the emerging countries’ middle class provides the global economy with a new consumer of last resort.	换句话说，储蓄过剩（前美联储主席伯南克语）先于危机发生并可能继续影响全球需求，除非新兴国家中产阶级能够充当全球经济的新的最后消费者。


This is likely to happen eventually; but, despite efforts by the US and the International Monetary Fund in the context of the G-20, this rebalancing process has not yet been completed.	或许这最终会发生，但是，尽管美国和国际货币基金组织（IMF）在G-20框架下做出了大量努力，但这一再平衡过程仍未结束。


The challenge on the supply side stems from a new dispute among economists and technology experts about the pace of technological progress.	供给端的挑战来自经济学家和技术专家关于技术进步速度的新争论。


For Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, information and communication technologies have already delivered most of the productivity boost that can be expected from them; there is no major innovation wave in sight that could offset the slowdown in potential growth.	西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）指出，信息和通信技术已经贡献了绝大部分可以期待的生产率提升效应； 放眼未来，已不再能够看到可以抵消潜在增长放缓的较大的创新潮。


Laggards can look forward to reaping catch-up dividends; but countries at the technology frontier should accept that very slow annual per capita growth – little more than 1% – is the new normal.	落后者可以着眼于收获赶超红利； 但身处技术前沿的国家应该接受缓慢的人均年增长——可能不到1%——成为新常态。


By contrast, the MIT scholars Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that the Second Machine Age is yet to come.	相反，MIT学者埃里克·布莱恩约尔弗森（Erik Brynjolfsson）和安德鲁·麦克菲（Andrew McAfee）指出，第二机器时代（Second Machine Age）还没有到来。


They claim that ever-increasing computing power, worldwide connectivity, and the almost unlimited potential for generating new innovations through recombining existing processes will trigger major transformations in both production and consumption, in the same way that the steam engine transformed the world in the nineteenth century.	他们认为，不断增长的计算能力、全球互联以及几乎无穷无尽的通过重组现有过程产生新创新的潜力将给生产和消费带来重大变化，一如蒸汽机在十九世纪改变世界。


Growth should accelerate as a consequence, at least if properly measured.	增长也应该因此加速——至少在测量得当的情况下是如此。


Combining the challenges cited by Gordon and Summers to the view that advanced economies are gradually healing leads to some depressing conclusions.	将戈登和萨默斯提出的挑战与发达经济体正在回暖的观点相结合，推出的结论令人沮丧。


If Gordon is right about slow productivity growth, the debt overhang inherited from the crisis and public-finance woes will persist for much longer than anticipated.	如果戈登关于生产率增长缓慢的看法是对的，那么危机和公共财政混乱导致的债务积压的持续时间将远大于预期。


If, in addition, Summers is right that demand is bound to remain deficient, the combination of financial troubles and persistent mass unemployment is likely to push governments toward radical solutions – debt default, inflation, or financial protectionism.	此外，如果萨默斯关于需求必定将维持不足状态的观点是对的，那么金融困境和持续大规模失业的组合可能导致政府采取激进方案——债务违约、通货膨胀或金融保护主义。


If, on the contrary, Brynjolfsson and McAfee are right, growth will be much more robust, and debt issues will be forgotten sooner than expected.	相反，如果布莱恩约尔弗森和麦克菲是对的，增长将会十分强健，那么债务问题将比预期更早被人遗忘。


The challenge, instead, will be to cope with the labor-reducing and income-inequality effects of emerging technologies.	而挑战也将是如何应对新兴技术带来的劳动力需求减少和收入不平等的效应。


That will be especially true if these transformations take place against the background drawn by Summers of persistent mass unemployment.	如果这些变化在萨默斯关于持续大规模失业的观点的背景下发生，则上述两种效应会更加明显。


The risk is that social problems become intractable, as technological advances come to be regarded as benefiting the rich while creating additional hardship for the masses.	风险在于社会问题可能变得不可收拾，人们会认为技术进步肥了富人，而给大众造成了新的生活困难。


In such a scenario, governments will have to look for innovative responses.	在这样的情况下，政府将需要拿出创新性应对措施。


Scenarios like these may seem far-fetched.	这样的情景好像有些牵强。


But, while certainly discomfiting, they are hardly irrelevant.	但是，尽管它们说出来令人不快，却绝非杞人忧天。


The Price of Scottish Independence	苏格兰独立的代价


NEW YORK – Though the world’s eyes now are on Scotland’s referendum on independence from the United Kingdom, Scotland is not alone in seeking to redraw national boundaries.	纽约—全世界的目光都集中在苏格兰脱离英国的公投上，但寻求重划国家边界的并不只有苏格兰。


There are independence movements in many other parts of the world; indeed, 39 new states have joined the United Nations since 1980.	世界其他许多地方都在进行独立运动； 事实上，自1980年以来，有39个新国家加入了联合国。


Many more aspirants are waiting in the wings, and would likely be encouraged by a Scottish “Yes” vote.	更有许多野心家时刻准备着，如果苏格兰对独立说“是”，他们有可能大受鼓舞。


The Scottish pro-independence campaign is based on four claims.	苏格兰亲独立阵营有四个立足点。


The first is cultural: to protect and strengthen the identity of the Scottish people.	第一是文化：保护和强化苏格兰民族身份。


The second is ideological: to move Scotland toward a Scandinavian-style social democracy.	第二是意识形态：让苏格兰向斯堪的纳维亚式社会民主靠拢。


The third is political: to bring democratic governance closer to the people.	第三是政治：让人们更接近民主治理。


And the fourth is economic: to lay claim to a larger share of North Sea oil and gas.	第四是经济：获得北海石油和天然气的更大比例。


UK political leaders and many European governments are strongly urging the Scots to vote against independence.	英国政治领导人和许多欧洲国家政府强烈敦促苏格兰人反对独立。


Scottish independence, the “No” campaign argues, would bring few if any of the claimed benefits; on the contrary, it would cause many economic calamities, ranging from financial panics to the flight of jobs and industry from Scotland.	“不”阵营指出，苏格兰的独立有百害而无一利； 会带来从金融恐慌到就业和产业逃离苏格兰在内的诸多经济灾难。


Moreover, an independent Scotland might be excluded from the European Union and NATO.	此外，独立的苏格兰可能被排除在欧盟和北约之外。


What should the rest of the world think about this debate?	世界其他国家应该如何看待这场争论？


Should the Scottish independence campaign be hailed as a breakthrough for claims to cultural identity and self-governance?	苏格兰独立运动应该被称为是文化身份和自治权利主张的突破吗？


Or should it be viewed as yet another source of instability and weakness in Europe – one that would increase uncertainty in other countries and parts of the world?	或者，它应该被视为欧洲动荡和软弱的又一源泉——会增加其他国家和世界其他地区的不确定性吗？


Secession movements can, no doubt, cause great instability.	毫无疑问，分裂运动可能造成重大动荡。


Consider the regional and even global turmoil over Kosovo, South Sudan, Kurdistan, and Crimea.	科索沃、南苏丹、库尔德斯坦和克里米亚等地区甚至全球动荡就是明证。


Yet national independence can also be handled peacefully and smoothly.	但国家独立也可以和平而平稳地进行。


The 1993 division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia – the famed “velvet divorce” – imposed no significant or lasting costs on either successor state.	1993年捷克斯洛伐克分裂为捷克共和国和斯洛伐克——著名的“天鹅绒离婚”（velvet divorce）——对两个后续国家都没有产生重大或持续的成本。


Both accepted the division, and, knowing that their future lay within the EU, focused their attention on accession.	两国都接受分离，并且明白它们的未来在于欧盟，因此将精力集中在入盟事宜。


Here, then, is a plausible and positive scenario for an independent Scotland.	于是，这也成了苏格兰独立的一个貌似可信的积极前景。


The rest of the UK (called the “RUK” in the current debate), including England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, would quickly and efficiently negotiate the terms of independence with Scotland, agreeing how to share the UK’s public debt and public assets, including offshore oil and gas. Both sides would be pragmatic and moderate in their demands.	英国的其余部分（在目前的争论中被称为“剩下的英国”）将包括英格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰，会迅速、高效地与苏格兰进行独立条件谈判，就如何分担英国公共债务和公共资产（包括离岸石油和天然气）达成一致。


At the same time, the EU would agree immediately to Scotland’s continued membership, given that Scotland already abides by all of the required laws and democratic standards.	与此同时，欧盟将立刻同意保留苏格兰的成员国地位，因为苏格兰已经符合所有所需法律和民主标准。


Similarly, NATO would agree immediately to keep Scotland in the Alliance (though the Scottish National Party’s pledge to close US and British nuclear-submarine bases would be a complication to be overcome).	类似地，北约也将立刻同意苏格兰留在联盟内（尽管苏格兰国民党（Sottish National Party）声称要关闭美国和英国核潜艇基地，这是一个需要克服的发杂因素）。


Both Scotland and the RUK might agree that Scotland would temporarily keep the British pound but would move to a new Scottish pound or the euro.	苏格兰和剩下的英国可能会同意苏格兰暂时使用英镑，但随后必须采用新的苏格兰镑或欧元。


If such monetary arrangements are transparent and cooperatively drawn, they could occur smoothly and without financial turmoil.	如果此类货币安排能做到透明与合作，就可以平稳过渡而不引起金融动荡。


But if the RUK, the EU, and NATO respond vindictively to a Yes vote – whether to teach Scotland a lesson or to deter others (such as Catalonia) – matters could become very ugly and very costly.	但如果剩下的英国、欧盟和北约对“是”的公投结果持敌意态度——不管是为了给苏格兰一个教训还是为了阻止其他分裂运动（如加泰罗尼亚）——情况就会相当糟糕，代价也会相当沉重。


Suppose that a newly independent Scotland is thrown out of the EU and NATO, and told that it will remain outside for years to come.	假设新独立的苏格兰被逐出欧盟和北约，并被告知未来多年内都没有加入的希望。


In this scenario, a financial panic could indeed be provoked, and both Scotland and the RUK would suffer economically.	在这一情形下，金融恐慌可能切实发生，苏格兰和剩下的英国都将遭受经济打击。


The key point is that the costs of separation are a matter of choice, not of inevitability.	关键点在于，分裂的成本是一个选择问题，而不是不可避免的。


They would depend mainly on how the RUK, the EU, and NATO decided to respond to a Yes vote, and how moderate a newly independent Scotland would be in its negotiating positions.	它们取决于剩下的英国、欧盟和北约决定如何应对“是”的结果，以及新独立的苏格兰在谈判中的立场有多温和。


If cool heads prevail, Scottish independence could proceed at a relatively low cost.	如果头脑保持冷静，苏格兰独立过程的代价可以相对较低。


The dangers of national secession are much greater in places without overarching entities like the EU and NATO to constrain the situation among the successor states.	国家分裂的危险在没有欧盟和北约等支配实体约束各后续国家局面的情况下会大大增加。


In such circumstances, unilateral claims of independence opposed by the national government or a sub-national unit often lead to a breakdown of trade and finance – and often to outright war, as we saw in the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and most recently, Sudan.	在这样的环境中，被国家政府或亚国家单元反对的单方面宣布独立常常会导致贸易和金融决裂——还常常导致大战，苏联、南斯拉夫以及最近的苏丹解体都是明证。


In those cases, separation was indeed followed by deep economic and political crises, which in some ways persist.	在这些情形中，分裂事实上是随着以某种方式持久维持的深度经济和政治危机而发生的。


Indeed, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, the EU and NATO absorbed some but not all of the successor states, thereby raising major geopolitical tensions.	事实上，在前南斯拉夫和前苏联的例子中，欧盟和北约吸收了其中一些（而非全部）后续国家，从而引起了严重的地缘政治冲突。


International politics in the twenty-first century can no longer be about nation-states alone.	二十一世纪国际政治可能不再只是民族国家的政治。


Most key issues that are vital for national wellbeing – trade, finance, the rule of law, security, and the physical environment – depend at least as much on the presence of effective regional and global institutions.	大部分决定国民福利的关键问题——贸易、金融、法治精神、安全和环境——至少在很大程度上取决于高效的地区和全球机构的存在。


Even if Scotland declares independence, it will – and should continue to be – bound by a dense web of European and global rules and responsibilities.	即使苏格兰宣布独立，它也会并且应该继续受到欧洲和全球规则和责任的恢恢之网的约束。


I am personally sympathetic to Scotland’s independence as a way to bolster Scottish democracy and cultural identity.	我个人对苏格兰以独立作为刺激苏格兰民主和文化身份的方式持同情态度。


Yet I support independence only on the assumption that Scotland and the RUK would remain part of a strong and effective EU and NATO.	但我只支持基于以下条件的独立：苏格兰和剩下的英国仍然是强大且高效的欧盟和北约的一部分。


Certainly, a Yes vote would put an even higher premium on effective EU governance.	毫无疑问，“是”的结果将给高效欧盟治理带来更高的溢价。


But, if the EU and NATO were to “punish” a newly independent Scotland by excluding it, real disaster could ensue, not only for Scotland and the UK, but also for European democracy and security.	但是，如果欧盟和北约要通过排斥它来“惩罚”新独立的苏格兰，真正的灾难就会随之而来，不仅对苏格兰和英国是如此，对欧洲的民主和安全也是如此。


Cities and Sustainable Development	城市与可持续发展


NEW YORK – Tacloban in the Philippines has now joined the growing list of cities – including New Orleans, Bangkok, Moscow, New York, Beijing, Rio de Janeiro, and Port-au-Prince, to name just a few – pummeled in recent years by climate catastrophes.	纽约—菲律宾的塔克洛班（Tacloban）成为近几年来因气候灾难而被毁的城市名单上的新名字。 这一名单包括新奥尔良、曼谷、莫斯科、纽约、北京、里约热内卢、太子港……等等。


Many of the world’s largest cities, built on seacoasts and rivers, face the threat of rising sea levels and intensifying storms.	许多临河和临海的世界上大城市面临着海平面上升的威胁和越来越严重的风暴。


So the new global development agenda now taking shape should empower cities to help lead the way to sustainable development in the twenty-first century.	因此，正在确定中的全球发展新日程必须赋予城市力量，让它们成为二十一世纪可持续发展的领导者。


The importance of cities in today’s world economy is unprecedented.	如今，城市对世界经济的重要性前所未有。


Until the Industrial Revolution, human history was overwhelmingly rural.	在工业革命前，人类历史可以说是一部农业史。


Only around 10% of people lived in cities.	只有大约10%的人类生活在城市中。


Today, the share of urbanites is around 53% and is likely to rise to around 67% by 2050.	如今，这一比例为53%左右，并有望在2050年升至67%左右。


Because per capita incomes are higher in cities than in rural areas, the world’s cities today are estimated to account for more than 80% of global income, with the largest 600 accounting for around half.	城市的人均收入高于农村，因此预计如今世界城市占据着全球收入的80%以上，其中最大的600个城市就占据了一半。


Most of the new jobs over the next few decades will be created in cities, offering livelihoods to hundreds of millions of young people and, as China and Brazil have demonstrated, helping to slash extreme poverty.	未来几十年中新增就业岗位大部分也将出现在城市，为数亿年轻人提供安身立命之本，在中国和巴西等国家更能有助于减少极端贫困。


Cities are also the innovation hubs for public policy.	城市也是公共政策创新中心。


Every day, mayors are called on to get the job done for residents.	每一天，各位市长都必须满足市民的要求。


They are the ones responsible for providing safe water, garbage collection, safe housing, infrastructure, upgraded slums, protection from disasters, and emergency services when catastrophes hit.	他们必须负责提供安全水源、垃圾收集、安全住房、基础设施、改善贫民窟、保护受灾者，以及在灾难发生时采取紧急措施。


So it is not surprising that while national governments often are paralyzed by partisan politics, city governments foster action and innovation.	因此，毫不奇怪，尽管国家政府常常因为党派政治陷入瘫痪，城市政府却在促进行动和创新。


In the United States, for example, Martin O’Malley, Baltimore’s former mayor and now Maryland’s popular governor, pioneered the use of advanced information systems for urban management.	比如，在美国，巴尔的摩前市长、广受欢迎的现任马里兰州州长奥马利（Martin O’Malley）率先使用现金的信息系统来进行城市管理。


New York City’s outgoing mayor, Michael Bloomberg, worked relentlessly to implement a new sustainability plan (called PlaNYC).	即将离任的纽约市市长布隆伯格（Michael Bloomberg）不懈地实施新的可持续计划（即PlaNYC）。


And the city’s incoming mayor, Bill de Blasio, is championing a bold program of educational innovations to narrow the vast gaps in income, wealth, and opportunity that divide the city.	而该市即将上任的新市长布拉西奥（Bill de Blasio）正在领导一项大胆的教育创新计划，旨在弥合纽约市所存在的巨大的收入、财富和机会差距。


Sustainable development offers a new concept for the world economy in the twenty-first century.	可持续发展为二十一世纪世界经济提供了新概念。


Rather than focusing solely on income, sustainable development encourages cities, countries, and the world to focus simultaneously on three goals: economic prosperity, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability.	可持续发展鼓励城市国家和世界不再专注于收入，而是同时关注三个目标：经济繁荣、社会包容和环境可持续。


Economic prosperity speaks for itself.	经济繁荣自不待言。


Social inclusion means that all members of society – rich and poor, men and women, majority and minority groups – should have equal rights and equal opportunities to benefit from rising prosperity.	社会包容意味着所有社会成员——无论贫富、男女、多数群体还是少数群体——都应该由平等的权利和平等的从繁荣昌盛中获益的机会。


And environmental sustainability means that we must reorient our economies and technologies to provide basic services like safe water and sanitation, combat human-induced climate change, and protect biodiversity.	环境可持续意味着我们必须改变经济和技术的方向，提供安全水源和卫生措施等基本服务，战胜人类引起的气候变化，并保护生物多样性。


Achieving these three goals will require good governance, public finance, and effective institutions.	实现这三个目标需要良好的治理、公共财政和高效机构。


Cities will be in the front lines of the battle for sustainable development.	城市将是可持续发展之战的最前线。


Not only do they face direct threats; they also have the best opportunities to identify and deliver solutions.	城市不但面临着直接的威胁，也拥有最好的机会认识并给出解决防范。


As high-density, high-productivity settlements, cities can provide greater access to services of all kinds – including energy, water, health, education, finance, media, transport, recycling, and research – than can most rural areas.	作为高密度、高生产率的居民区，城市可以比农村更好地提供各种服务便利，包括能源、水源、卫生、教育、金融、传媒、交通、循环利用和研究。


The great challenge for cities is to provide this access inclusively and sustainably.	城市所面临的重大挑战是包容地、可持续地提供这些服务便利。


A significant part of the solution will come through advanced technologies, including information systems and materials science.	解决方案很大一部分来自技术进步，包括信息系统和材料科学。


The information and communications revolution has spawned the idea of the “smart city,” which places the relevant technologies at the heart of systems that collect and respond to information: smart power grids, smart transport networks (potentially including self-driving vehicles), and smart buildings and zoning.	信息和通信革命催生了“智慧城市”的概念，这一概念将相关技术放在收集信息并据此作出反应的系统的核心，如智能电网、智能交通网（很可能包括自动驾驶汽车）、智能楼宇和智能区划等。


The advances in materials science open the possibility of much more energy-efficient residences and commercial buildings.	材料科学的进步开启了大量提高住宅楼和商业用楼能源效率的可能性。


Cities also give rise to the opportunity to combine public utilities, as when urban power plants use the steam released in electricity generation to provide hot water and heating to residents.	城市还提供了将整合公用设施的机会，比如让城市发电厂用发电过程中释放的蒸汽提供民用热水和取暖。


Yet technology will be only part of the story.	但技术只是整个故事的一部分。


Cities need to upgrade their governance, to allow for a greater role for poorer and more marginalized communities, and to enable much more effective coordination across city lines when a metropolitan area is home to many individual cities.	城市需要升级其治理体系，让较贫穷、被边缘化的社区起更大作用，并在由许多个体城市组成的大都市圈中促进更有效的协调。


Metropolitan governance is therefore crucial, as smart cities require networks that operate at the metropolitan scale.	因此，大都市治理至关重要，因为智能城市需要能在大都市规模运转的网络。


When the metropolitan scale is recognized, the importance of leading urban areas is even more remarkable.	在大都市规模实现后，领导城市地区的重要性就更加显著了。


New York City has around 8.4 million people, but the NYC metropolitan area has roughly 25 million people, with an economy estimated at about $1.4 trillion per year.	纽约市拥有约840万人口，但纽约市大都市圈拥有约2500万人，每年经济量高达1. 4万亿美元。


If this metropolitan area were a country, it would rank about 14th in the world in GDP terms.	如果这一大都市圈是一个国家的话，其GDP将位居世界第14位。


A wise political doctrine known as subsidiarity holds that public-policy challenges should be assigned to the lowest level of government able to address them, thereby ensuring maximum democratic participation in problem solving and the greatest opportunity to tailor solutions to genuine local needs.	被称为辅助性原则（subsidiarity）的政治思想认为，公共政策挑战应该分派给能解决挑战的最低层次的政府，从而在问题解决过程中确保最大化的民主参与，最大限度地让解决方案切合真正的地方需要。


While some issues – for example, a national highway or rail system – require national-level problem solving, many key challenges of sustainable development are best confronted at the urban level.	一些问题——比如全国高速公路或铁路系统——要求国家层面的问题解决机制，但许多可持续发展方面的重要挑战更适合在城市层面解决。


The world’s governments are now negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals, which will guide the world’s development agenda from 2015 to 2030.	世界各国政府正在谈判可持续发展目标（SDG），这套目标将指导2015—2030年的世界发展日程。


In an important meeting on September 25, the United Nations General Assembly agreed that the SDGs would be adopted at a global summit in September 2015, with the next two years used to select the priorities.	在9月25日的重要会议上，联合国大会一致决定SDG应该在2015年9月的全球峰会上推出，未来两年时间将用于决定优先事项。


An urban SDG, promoting inclusive, productive, and resilient cities, would greatly empower tens of thousands of cities worldwide to take up the cause of sustainable development for their own citizens, their countries, and the world.	承诺建设包容性、高生产率、高恢复力城市的城市SDG将极大地强化全世界几万座城市，帮助它们开启为其市民、国家和世界建设可持续发展的伟业。


Why Bill Gates Gets It Wrong	比尔·盖茨为什么错了


NEW YORK – In his review of Nina Munk’s error-filled and out-of-date book, Bill Gates oddly abandons the rigorous approach to measurement and evaluation that defines his foundation’s invaluable work.	纽约—在给妮娜·孟克（Nina Munk）错误百出并且早已过时的书写的书评中，比尔·盖茨反常地抛弃了已成为其基金会宝贵工作的标志——严格的衡量和评估方法。


He simply accepts Munk’s assertion that the Millennium Villages Project – an ongoing development project across more than 20 African countries – has failed.	他简单地接受了孟克关于千年村计划（Millennium Villages Project）失败的论断。


In fact, it is flourishing.	事实上，这一正在20多个非洲国家展开的发展项目可谓方兴未艾。


This credulousness is puzzling.	如此轻信令人感到奇怪。


Munk’s book covers only a sliver of the first half of a ten-year project, and only two of 12 villages.	孟克的书只是对十年计划的前半段略作窥视，并且只考察了12个村庄中的两个。


And she never “lived for extended periods in the Millennium Villages.”	并且她从未“在千年村中生活很长一段时间。


Munk spent an average of around six days per year – around 36 days over six years – actually visiting the villages, and usually at a stretch of 2-3 days.	”事实上，孟克平均每年花六天时间——六年来总共花了36天左右——访问这些村庄，访问期通常为2—3天。


Moreover, she came to the story as a reporter for the magazine Vanity Fair, with no training or experience in public health, agronomy, economics, or African development.	此外，她是以《名利场》记者的身份来到村庄的，她没有接受过公共卫生、农学、经济学和非洲发展等方面的训练，也没有这些方面的经验。


Worse, Munk’s observations frequently seem to have been, at the very least, greatly exaggerated for narrative effect.	更糟��的是，孟克的观察至少因为追求叙事效果而被大大夸张了。


Does Bill Gates really believe that I advocated specific crops without worrying about whether there was a market for them, or that I failed to consider national taxation in my ongoing advice to government leaders?	比尔·盖茨真的相信我会在不考虑是否存在市场的情况下推广某些作物吗？ 我会在不断地给政府领导人所提的建议中不考虑国家税收吗？


Moreover, the agricultural strategies and choices in the MVP have been led by African agronomists, some of the very best in Africa – often working hand in hand with Bill’s own agricultural staff in the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).	还有，千年村计划的农业战略和选择是有非洲农学家主导的，其中不乏非洲最出色的农业专家——许多人还与比尔自己的非洲绿色革命同盟（Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa，AGRA）的农业工作人员共事。


Bill will be happy to know that the MVP will be properly and professionally evaluated next year – on time at its conclusion (and at the end of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015).	比尔一定很乐于见到千年村计划将在明年得到恰当而专业的评估，以及时得出结论（也正逢2015年千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals）到期）。


The assessment will be based on the very considerable data that have been collected over the past decade, and on extensive new survey data that will be collected in 2015.	评估将根据过去十年中所收集的大量数据以及将在2015年得到的大量新调查数据做出。


Moreover, the evaluation will include comparisons with areas surrounding the Millennium Villages.	此外，评估还将包括与千年村周边地区的对比。


In fact, I hope that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation will help to carry out the detailed, independently supervised survey work needed for a full evaluation of this complex project.	事实上，我希望比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会（Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation）能协助组织独立监督的详细调查工作，以满足充分评估这一复杂项目的需要。


Let me provide some more good news, based on the detailed data on community health delivery, morbidity (disease), and mortality that the MVP collects each month.	在这里，我可以提供一些好消息。 这些消息来自千年村计划每月采集的社区卫生服务提供情况、患病率和致死率数据。


Mortality rates are down sharply in the Millennium Villages.	致死率在千年村中出现了显著下降。