According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), 17 new reactors should have become operational between 2007 and 2009. But only five came onstream during this period – three in 2007 and two in 2009.	依照世界核能组织的数据，2007~2009年间本该有17座新反应堆投入运行，谁知最后只有5座得以发电——2007年3座，2009年两座。


Moreover, four reactors were de-commissioned during 2009, and a larger number of reactors in Japan and Germany are not in use, owing to various technical stoppages.	此外，还有4座反应堆于2009年退役，日本和德国都有相当数量的反应堆由于各种技术原因而处于闲置状态。


At least one hundred older and smaller reactors will most likely be closed over the next 10-15 years.	在未来10到15年内，至少会有100座旧式或小型反应堆停止运行。


Furthermore, during the past 10 years, only about two-thirds of worldwide demand for nuclear fuel – about 68,000 tons of natural uranium equivalent are needed for 2010 – was met from resources obtained from mining.	更重要的是在过去10年间，铀矿的开采只能满足全世界核能发电燃料总需求量的2/3——2010年度需求量约为6. 8万当量吨天然铀。


The remaining 20,000 tons came from so-called secondary uranium sources – mainly inventories held by utilities and governments, re-processed nuclear fuel, and stockpiles of depleted uranium.	而剩下的2万当量吨缺口就由所谓的“二次铀资源”来满足——主要是一些公营机构和政府的库存，再加工的核燃料以及贫化铀储藏。


The supply from these sources will drop by roughly 10,000 tons at the end of 2013, when the Megatons to Megawatt Program between Russia and the United States – which recycles highly-enriched uranium from Russian nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants – comes to an end.	但上述这类物资的储备量将在2013年末下降到约1万吨，因为那时美俄两国之间的“兆吨到兆瓦”项目（回收俄罗斯核弹头的高浓缩铀并将其转化为民用发电的低浓缩铀）就走到尽头了。


Current projections indicate that uranium shortages in the coming years can be avoided only if existing and new uranium mines operate according to plan.	照目前的预测，未来铀资源短缺问题的解决只能依靠现有及新铀矿的按步骤开采。


Indeed, extrapolations of global supply that foresee an increase in uranium mining are based on claims about the ability to expand output in Kazakhstan.	事实上，当前对铀开采量增加的预期都是基于哈萨克斯坦的产能提升。


So far, uranium mining in Kazakhstan has increased roughly as expected, from 4,357 tons in 2005 to 8,521 tons in 2008 to 14,000 tons in 2009.	而迄今为止该地的铀矿产量增长都与预期相符，从2005年的4357当量吨到2008年的8521当量吨，再到2009年的1. 4万当量吨。


But it remains to be seen if the uranium mining in this country can indeed increase further to 18,000 tons in 2010 and to 30,000 tons by 2018.	但该国铀矿产量是否能在2010年和2018年分别达到1. 8万和3万当量吨？


According to the WNA’s latest estimates, from July 2010, the expected uranium extraction figure for 2010 has actually been decreased to 15,000 tons.	这还有待观察。 按照世界核能组织的最新估算，从2010年7月开始，哈萨克斯坦的铀矿预计开采量将下降到1.


The view that the amount of energy derived from nuclear power worldwide will continue its slow decrease during the coming years is further supported by the 2008 annual report of the Euratom Supply Agency, which coordinates the long-term uranium needs of nuclear power plants within the European Union.	全球核能发电量将在未来持续走低的观点也在欧洲原子能共同体供应机构（Euratom Supply Agency，负责协调欧盟境内各国核电站的长期铀需求）的2008年报中得到了印证。 据该机构估计，欧洲铀资源需求量将从2010年的2.


According to the agency’s forecast, uranium demand in Europe will fall from 21,747 tons in 2010 to 17,378 tons by 2018 and roughly 16,000 tons by 2024.	1747万当量吨下降到2018年的1. 7378当量吨，最终降低到2024年的约1.


These numbers indicate that the EU, currently producing about 1/3 of the world’s nuclear electric energy, is heading for a reduction in nuclear-energy production of up to 20% over the coming 10 years.	这些数字显示欧盟——这个目前占全球核能发电量1/3的区域——有在未来十年内减少20%核能发电量的趋势。


One can also expect that the current worldwide economic crisis will not help to accelerate the construction of nuclear power plants and new uranium mines.	人们也同样可以预计当前的全球经济危机也无法加速反应堆的建设和新铀矿的开采。


In summary, the hard facts about nuclear energy are inconsistent with the possibility of a worldwide renaissance of nuclear energy.	总而言之，这些令人皱眉的数据都与核能的“文艺复兴”背道而驰。


Indeed, they point toward a continuing slow phase-out of civilian nuclear energy in most of the large OECD countries.	事实上，这些数据意味着在大多数经合组织大国，民用核能都将被逐步淘汰。


It thus seems unavoidable that energy consumers, especially in many rich countries, will have to learn to exchange their current worries about the distant future consequences of global warming for the reality of energy shortages during periods of peak demand.	而对于（尤其是富裕国家）的能源消费者来说，他们无可避免地要学会将自己对那些全球变暖的遥不可及的后果的忧虑，转化成用电高峰期能源短缺的现实认识。


Such shortages could result either in chaotic supplies and power outages or in a coordinated policy of energy rationing.	这些短缺要么将可能导致能源的混乱供应以及短缺，要么就是能源配给制度。


In the absence of nuclear-energy revival, most of us will be forced to reduce our direct energy consumption.	在核能复兴无望的情况下，大多数人将被迫减少自己的直接能源消费。


Let us hope that we can learn to adapt to simpler – though perhaps still satisfying – lifestyles.	让我们期望自己能适应那种更简单——或许也同样舒适——的生活方式吧。


What Reset Button?	重设按钮，什么重设按钮？


MOSCOW – The emergence of a Kremlin leader, President Dmitri Medvedev, without a KGB background, combined with the economic crisis, has inspired talk that when Barack Obama visits Moscow, America’s president will be seeing a country on the verge of a new political thaw, a revived perestroika .	发自莫斯科——作为一个没有克格勃背景的克里姆林宫领导人，迪米特里·梅德韦杰夫总统的成功崛起在加上经济危机的影响，令外界不禁猜测当美国总统奥巴马正式踏上莫斯科之行时，呈现在美国人眼中的俄罗斯会是一个政治桎梏即将解禁的国度，一个重焕改革之光的国度。


But pushing the “re-set button” on US-Russia relations may be harder than Obama and his team imagined.	但对奥巴马和他的团队来说，启动全新美俄关系的“重设按钮”可比他们想象中要更难触动。


Russian (or Soviet) leaders opt for perestroika or a thaw only when forced to do so by dire conditions that threaten the regime’s survival.	事实上，俄罗斯（或者苏联）领导人只会在情况已经糟糕到威胁其生存的情况下才会选择改革。


An atmosphere of mortal fear, mutual suspicion, and hatred among the Communist elite was the catalyst for Nikita Khrushchev’s post-Stalin thaw.	前苏联领导人尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫在斯大林死后的改革就是由共产体制内精英之间的极端恐惧，互相猜忌和仇恨来作为改革催化剂的。


For Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980’s, the catalyst for his perestroika was the USSR’s growing economic paralysis.	而对于1980年代的米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫来说，改革的催化剂则是苏联不断恶化的经济瘫痪局面。


For both men, the goal of clinging to power was a top priority.	对于上述两位领导人来说，想方设法攀附权力才是其首要目标。


Changing the system and easing their grip on power was a risky move that could undermine their authority.	而改革整个政治系统以及放松对权力的掌控则是一个极可能动摇其权威的危险行动。


But the risks of inertia seemed to be even higher. In the end, having opted for change, both were forced to leave their posts prematurely, against their will.	但整个政治系统的行为惯性似乎比他们的权力更强大，以致这两个迷恋权力的最高领导人最后都被过早地赶下了台。


As he revived centralized Kremlin control over Russian politics and public affairs, Vladimir Putin has been concerned primarily with minimizing challenges to state power, which he concentrated in his own hands.	而当弗拉基米尔·普京重新把决定俄罗斯政治和公共事务的大权集中在克里姆林宫的宫墙之内时，他的首要考虑则是如何把各方对他手中中央权力的挑战最小化。


To this end, he stripped the political system of competition, emasculated state institutions, marginalized the opposition, and basically eliminated public participation.	于是他废除了竞争性的政治体制，弱化国家机构的作用，排斥反对派并从根本上将公众屏蔽在政治生活之外。


His power-building project was facilitated by high oil prices, but came at the cost of a steady deterioration in the quality of governance and abandonment of the goal of modernization.	他的权力建构计划在高油价的帮助下大功告成，但却付出了政府管治水平不断下滑而国家现代化目标迟迟未能实现的代价。


With policymaking fully nontransparent and reduced to a very closed circle, and implementation delegated to an unaccountable bureaucracy, the inevitable result of Putin’s political model was pervasive corruption.	由于政府决策程序极端不透明且小圈子作业，而政策执行的任务又委派给了不可靠的官僚机构，因为普京政治模式所无法避免的结果就是深层次和大面积的腐败。


The desire to avoid public discontent and ensure social stability led to a suspension of reform.	与此同时对公众不满的压制和一定要保持社会稳定的思维则导致整个改革进程停滞不前。


Instead of creating incentives that would unleash public energies, the government pushed citizens farther and farther from politics and policymaking, thereby deepening social apathy and atomization.	对此政府不但没有设法去释放公众参与政治生活的能量，反而不断把公众与政治和政策制订领域隔离得越来越远，并因此加深了社会冷漠和分散化。


Moreover, the opportunity provided by the oil boom was wasted.	此外由高油价带来的改革契机则被浪费殆尽。


Indeed, today Russia risks lagging even further behind the developed countries.	事实上今天的俄罗斯已经面临着被发达国家抛离得越来越远的危险。


Its economy remains undiversified and uncompetitive, and its contribution to global technological progress is minuscule.	其国内经济结构单一而且缺乏竞争力，而对全球技术进步的贡献甚至微不足道。


Worse still, economic growth based on exports of natural resources has proved unsustainable.	更严重的是，通过出口自然资源来支撑的经济发展已被证明是不可靠的。


When oil prices were high and growing, the government could compensate for poor performance by throwing money at problems.	当油价保持在高位并不端攀升之时，政府可以通过大洒金钱来掩盖低劣的执政能力。


Today, with oil prices dramatically reduced, this largesse is no longer available, and economic experts agree that the growth potential of Russia’s petro-economy has been exhausted.	而在今时今日油价戏剧性回落之后，这种慷慨疏财之举就再也行不通了。 经济专家们更一致认为，俄罗斯石油经济的发展潜力已经被过早地耗尽了。


Despite all this, the situation is not sufficiently dire to push Russia’s leaders to open at least some channels of genuine public participation and yield any of their power.	但即便如此，情况还是没有坏到要让俄罗斯领导人对民众开放哪怕寥寥几条参与政治的渠道并下放权力的地步。


The price of oil, at around $70 a barrel, may be half of what it was a year ago, but up from around $40 earlier this year.	目前70美元一桶的原油价格可能只是一年前的一半，但至少也比年初的40美元一桶有所提升了。


Nor does the Russian economy’s contraction and the expected deepening of poverty (the World Bank’s report released in late June was grimmer about Russia than its previous report) presage an immediate catastrophe.	而即便俄罗斯正面临着经济紧缩和贫困问题恶化（世界银行在6月底发布的报告对俄罗斯的评语也比前几份要更为严厉），这也并不预示着改革的催化剂将立刻到来。


And, unlike in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, Russia is not indebted to foreign banks or international organizations, though it plans to resume foreign borrowing next year.	即便政府有计划在明年恢复向外国借贷，但当今的俄罗斯也几经不像上世纪80，90年代那样背负着外国银行或者国际组织的债务了。


So the government will prefer to muddle through the crisis, rather than risk any decisive reform.	因此政府会想方设法在危机中蒙混过关，而不是冒险去做出决定性的改革。


The goal of clinging to power remains the priority, and risk-aversion the main guideline.	对于官员来来说，攀附权力依然是最高要务，而逃避风险也是照样是重要的行事原则。


The ruling elite are known to be torn by disputes and rivalries.	而统治精英阶层也被争吵和敌意所分裂。


Just recently, two of Putin’s deputies gave interviews to two Western media outlets offering what sounded like starkly opposite visions for Russia’s development.	就在最近，普京的两个副手分别接受两家西方媒体的采访，谁知两人却对俄罗斯的未来发展提出了针锋相对的观点。


But such disputes never spill over into the broad public sphere; members of the elite are primarily concerned about social and political stability and would not stir the public by seeking support for an alternative policy course.	但这种争端可不会被扩散到民众中间去； 因为精英们也都小心翼翼地维持着社会和政治的稳定，断然不会为了某个其他的政治进程就贸然挑动民众。


These delaying tactics are enabled by a lack of pressure from below.	由于缺乏来自社会底层的压力，这些拖延战术也凑效了。


Russians may be concerned by growing unemployment and reduced incomes, but this is not manifesting itself in any drive to organize or try to effect political change.	俄罗斯人大都关注失业和收入减少的问题，但这并不意味着他们就有动力去组织起来并试图影响政治变革。


The public below, just like the leaders above, cherish political stability; the popularity ratings of both Prime Minister Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev remain above 70%.	跟上层领导一样，下层的公众也极为珍视政治稳定的局面，以至于普京总理和梅德韦杰夫总统的公众支持度都双双维持在70%以上。


Disgruntlement over the increasingly authoritarian governance may be common among business circles, elements of the neutered political opposition, liberal intellectuals, and even part of the bureaucracy.	而对独裁政治的不满可能也存在于商界、中立的政治反对派、自由派知识分子甚至一部分官僚的意识当中。


But these forces are too timid and fragmented, with no drive for political action.	但这些力量太过懦弱和分散，同时也缺乏发动政治行动的动机。


The current government’s tactic of muddling through without changing the political system or the structure of the economy is fraught with the risk of gradual decline.	在不改变政治系统或者经济结构的情况下，当今政府试图混过危机的策略使俄罗斯面临着逐步衰落的危险。


To the Kremlin’s rulers, this may seem an acceptable cost for retaining power, but postponing reform will only aggravate Russia’s countless problems.	对于那些克里姆林宫的当权者来说，这可能是为保住权力而付出的必要代价，但推迟改革只能令国内的诸多问题更加恶化。


Besides, muddling through may prove unaffordable even in the short run, if oil prices decline again.	这种蒙混策略甚至在短期看来都难以维持，因为油价又再次走低了。


A dramatic curtailment of state resources may eventually push the government toward modernization, but it might also produce an uglier shift— toward harder political crackdown, economic nationalism and an essentially isolationist course.	而政府手中资源的大幅度缩减可能最终将政府推上改革之路，但这也可能导致更可怕的蜕变——一连串更强力的政治高压，经济国有化和孤立主义政策。


This would be catastrophic for Russia— to say nothing of relations with the US.	这对于俄罗斯来说堪称灾难性的——而美国重启两国关系的期望，换来的可能只是沉默。


What Role for the State?	国家能承担什么角色？


WASHINGTON, DC – The financial crisis of 2008 has spurred a global debate on how much government regulation of markets – and what kind – is appropriate.	发自华盛顿特区——2008年的金融危机触发了一个关于政府应当对市场进行何种程度——以及何种形式——的监管才算恰当的全球讨论。


In the United States, it is a key theme in the upcoming presidential election, and it is shaping politics in Europe and emerging markets as well.	而这一点既是在美国总统大选临近的核心主题，还左右着欧洲和新兴市场的政治形势。


For starters, China’s impressive growth performance over the last three decades has given the world an economically successful example of what many call “state capitalism.”	首先，中国过去30年令人瞩目的增长表现塑造了一个被许多人称之为“国家资本主义”的成功经济范本。


Brazil’s development policies have also accorded a strong role to the state.	另一方面巴西的发展政策同时也与国家的强势角色相得益彰。


Questions concerning the state’s size and the sustainable role of government are central to the debate over the eurozone’s fate as well.	关于国家规模以及政府会否继续存在的问题也是欧元区命运讨论的核心议题。


Many critics of Europe, particularly in the US, link the euro crisis to the outsize role of government there, though the Scandinavian countries are doing well, despite high public spending.	虽然高公共支出的斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家都表现不错，但许多对欧洲的批评（尤其是来自于美国）都将欧元危机归咎于政府规模的过度膨胀。


In France, the new center-left government faces the challenge of delivering on its promise of strengthening social solidarity while substantially reducing the budget deficit.	在法国，新上台的中左翼政府也面临着挑战：一方面要兑现自己增强社会团结的承诺，另一方面又得持续减少预算赤字。


Alongside the mostly economic arguments about the role of government, many countries are experiencing widespread disillusionment with politics and a growing distance between citizens and government (particularly national government).	除了主要集中在经济层面上的对政府角色的争论之外，许多国家都在经历着民众对政治的大规模幻灭以及民众和政府（尤其是国家政府）之间不断增大的距离感。


In many countries, participation rates in national elections are falling, and new parties and movements, such as the Pirate Party in Germany and the Five Star Movement in Italy, reflect strong discontent with existing governance.	在许多国家，全国大选的参与率不断下降，而新的党派和运动，例如德国的海盗党（Pirate Party）和意大利的五星运动（Five Star Movement）都反映出人们对当前政府的极度不满。


In the US, the approval rating of Congress is at a record-low of 14%.	在美国，对国会的满意率已经跌落到了创纪录的14%。


Many there, such as my colleague Bruce Katz at the Brookings Institution, believe that the only solution is to bring a larger share of governance and policy initiation to the state and municipal level, in close partnership with the private sector and civil society.	许多美国人，例如我在布鲁金斯学会的同事布鲁斯·凯特兹（Bruce Katz），都相信唯一的解决方案就是给予州和市级层面更多的治理和政策动议，并与私人部门和公民社会建立紧密的伙伴关系。


But that approach, too, might have a downside.	但这种做法其实也有不足之处。


Consider Spain, where too much fiscal decentralization to regional governments contributed significantly to weakening otherwise strong public finances.	以西班牙为例，对地方政府的过度财政分权也大大削弱了在其他方面非常强大的公共财政。


A crucial problem for this global debate is that, despite the realities of twenty-first-century technology and globalization, it is still conducted largely as if governance and public policy were almost exclusively the domain of the nation-state.	在21世纪的技术进步和全球化背景下，这场全球讨论中依然存在着一个关键问题，那就是在讨论过程中似乎依然在很大程度上将治理和公共政策视为民族国家的专属地盘。


To adapt the debate to the real challenges that we face, we should focus on four levels of governance and identify the most appropriate allocation of public-policy functions to them.	而如果要让这场辩论与我们面临的真正挑战相适应的话，就应当把焦点集中在治理的四个层面上，并针对各个层面制定出最适合的公共政策职能分配方案。


First, many policies – including support for local infrastructure, land zoning, facilitation of industrial production and training, traffic ordinances, and environmental regulations – can largely be determined at the local or metropolitan level and reflect the wishes of a local electorate.	首先，许多政策——包括对地方基础设施，土地划分，对工业生产和训练的扶助，交通条例以及环境监管的支持——可以在很大程度上交由地方或是市级层面决定，并体现出本地选民的智慧。


Of course, defense and foreign policy will continue to be conducted primarily at the second level – the nation-state.	当然，国防和外交政策将依然由第二个层面（民族国家）来决定。


Most nation-states maintain national currencies, and must therefore pursue fiscal and economic policies that support a monetary union.	大多数民族国家都保有本国货币，并因此必须寻求能维护一个货币联盟的一系列财政和经济政策。


As the eurozone crisis has starkly reminded us, decentralization cannot extend too far into the budgetary sphere, lest it threaten the common currency’s survival.	但欧元区危机也明确提醒我们，权力下放不能过度延伸到预算领域，不然就会影响到共同货币的生存。


The US system is manageable, because the American states are largely constrained to running balanced budgets, while the federal government accounts for most fiscal policy.	美国的体系可以做到这一点，因为各州都在很大程度上被强制保持预算平衡，而联邦政府则为大部分财政政策负责。


Moreover, banking regulation and deposit insurance are centralized in the US, as they must be in a monetary union.	此外，美国的银行监管和存款保险都被收归联邦，因为它们必须存在于一个货币联盟之中。


The eurozone has finally recognized this.	欧元区最终也意识到了这一点。


So, governance at the nation-state level remains hugely important and is intimately linked to monetary sovereignty.	因此，在民族国家层面的治理依然非常重要而且与货币主权息息相关。


The key problem in Europe today is whether eurozone members will advance towards something resembling a federal nation-state.	但当今欧洲的关键问题��是各欧元区成员国是否会继续往前迈进，组成一个类似联邦民族国家的政体。


Unless they do, it is difficult to see how the common currency can survive.	除非他们能做到这一点，否则共同货币的生存就将面临极大困难。


There is also a third, regional or continental, level of governance, which is most advanced in the European Union (and is being tested in Latin America, Africa, and Asia) and can be very useful.	第三个层面的治理则是区域或者洲层面，这点在欧盟中最为深入，也在拉美，非洲和亚洲进行过相关测试，而且可以非常有用。


Customs unions, free-trade areas, or a single market, as in Europe, allow greater mobility of goods and services, which can lead to benefits from economies of scale that remaining trade impediments at the global level do not permit.	像欧洲那样的海关联盟，自由贸易区或者单一市场都可以使货物和服务获得更大的流动性，从而在依然存在贸易壁垒的全球层面上不允许的规模经济上得到好处。


Europe’s borderless Schengen Area is another example of regional supra-national governance.	欧洲无国界的申根区就是超国家治理的另一个例子。


There are also aspects of infrastructure that can best be addressed at the continental level.	而某些基础设施也能在洲际层面上进行更好的选址。


Finally, there is the global level.	最后就是全球层面。


The spread of infectious disease, global trade and finance, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and cyber security are just some of the issues that require broad international cooperation and global governance.	流行病、全球贸易金融、气候变化、核不扩散，反恐以及网络安全都是一些需要进行广泛国际合作以及全球治理的事务。


In today’s interdependent world, the debate about the role of public policy, the size and functions of government, and the legitimacy of public decision-making should be conducted with the four levels of governance much more clearly in focus.	在当今这个互相依存的世界上，针对公共政策所扮演角色，政府的规模与职能，以及公共决策制定的合法性的讨论应当在这四个治理层面被更加清晰聚焦的情况下进行。


The levels often will overlap (infrastructure and clean energy issues, for example), but democracy could be greatly strengthened if the issues were linked to the levels at which decisions can best be taken.	这些层面往往会发生重叠（比如说基础设施和洁净能源事务），但如果这些事务可以与那些能更好地执行决策的层面相联系的话，民主就能得到大大加强。


As Pascal Lamy, the director of the World Trade Organization, has said, it is not only the “local” that has to be brought to the “global”; the inherently “local” political sphere has to internalize the global or regional context.	正如世界贸易组织总干事帕斯卡尔·拉米（Pascal Lamy）所说，不仅仅是必须将“地方”推向“全球”； 依附在内的“地方”政治领域也必须融入到全球或者区域的大背景下。


That is a huge challenge for political leadership and communication, but, if it is not met, democracy and globalization will be difficult to reconcile.	这对政治领导力和沟通交流都是极大的挑战，但如果无法应对这一点挑战的话，民主和全球化就难以协调一致。


How to conduct democratic debate with reference to these local, national, continental, and global levels, and to structure a political space that better reflects economic and social space, will be the great challenge of the decades ahead.	如何在提及这些地方，国家，洲和全球层面的情况下进行讨论，如何并构建一个更好地体现经济和社会空间的政治空间，都将成为未来数十年内的重大挑战。


This is surprising, because, as developed economies with fully open capital accounts, they should have benefited from the free flow of capital and international risk sharing – and thus experienced little macroeconomic volatility.	这是有点���人意料，因为这些完全开放资本账户的经济体本应从资本的自由流动和国际风险分担中获益——并因此只会经历小范围的宏观经济波动。


What Should Bretton Woods II Look Like?	布雷顿森林体系II看起来应该是什么样子？


NEW YORK – For those of us who have long claimed that the world’s international financial architecture needed deep reform, the call for a “Bretton Woods II” is welcome.	纽约－对我们当中长期以来声称国际金融体系需要进行深刻改革的人来说，布雷顿森林体系II的倡议是很受欢迎的。


Of course, similar calls were made after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998, but were not taken seriously by the rich industrial countries.	当然，在1997年到1998年的亚洲和俄罗斯危机以后，有人提出了类似的倡议，但是这些倡议都没有得到富裕工业国家的认真对待。


Now that these countries are at the center of the storm, perhaps they will now be serious.	当前，这些富裕的工业国家处在金融风暴的中心地带，或许它们现在会对这个倡议认真起来。


Two fundamental problems exist with the call for reform.	当前，进行国际金融体系改革的呼吁存在两个基本问题。


First, it lacks content: it is unclear what any eventual Bretton Woods II discussions will be about.	首先，它缺乏内容：最终的布雷顿森林体系II要讨论什么，还不清楚。


Second, the process started the wrong way, by excluding most countries from the talks.	其次，这个过程是以将绝大多数国家排除在会谈之外的错误方式开始的。


It is obviously good for the G-7 or a subset of G-7 members to show leadership, but no fundamental reform can occur without an inclusive process that gives both industrial and developing countries, and both large and small countries an adequate voice.	显然，对G-7或G-7的一部分成员国来说，这对显示它们的领导地位是有好处的，但是，在没有给予工业国家以及发展中国家，大国以及小国足够的发言权的 包含过程 的情况下，根本性的改革是不可能出现的。


Global institutions, not ad hoc groups of countries, must be at the center of the reform effort.	是全球性机构，而不是是临时性的国家集团，是国际金融体系改革活动的中心。


The clearest issue right now is correcting the deficit of regulations that characterizes global financial markets.	现在，最明确的问题是要纠正全球金融市场表现出来的监管缺位。


Discussion must start by agreeing on regulatory principles .	改革全球金融体系的讨论应该以同意监管原则为开端。


An obvious one is that regulations must be comprehensive, to avoid the massive loopholes that led to the current turmoil.	一个显而易见的原则是监管必须全面，以避免产生导致当前的金融动荡的大量漏洞。


Regulations should also have a strong counter-cyclical focus, preventing excessive accumulation of leverage and increasing capital and provisions (reserves) during booms, as well as preventing asset price bubbles from feeding into credit expansion.	监管也应该具有很强的抗周期关注点，以便在繁荣时期防止金融杠杆的过渡累计，并且增加资本和供应（储备），同时防止资产泡沫助长信贷扩张。


Reliance on financial institutions’ internal models, the major focus of the Basel II agreement on banking regulation, should be discarded.	有关银行监管的巴塞尔协议II，其主要的观点是要依靠金融机构的内部模型，现在应该抛弃这种观点。


That strategy has now been exposed as perilous, and the use by financial institutions of similar risk models can lead to greater instability.	这种策略现在已经显示出其危险性，并且金融机构使用相似的风险模型会导致更大的不稳定。


Any new regulatory system should be based on a well functioning network of national and regional authorities (still missing in the European Union) and include truly international supervision of financial institutions with a global reach.	任何新的金融机构监管体系都应该建立在运作良好的国家以及区域机构（在欧盟仍然不存在这样的机构）网络之上，并且也应该包含用全球视野对金融机构进行的真正的国际监管。


Most agree that the International Monetary Fund should not be at the center of the regulatory system.	绝大多数人认为国际货币基金组织 不 应该处于这个监管体系的中心位置。


The Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee are better placed, but a fundamental reform is needed to broaden their membership and to avoid a major problem of the Basel Committee: its lack of representation of developing countries.	国际清算银行和巴塞尔委员会与国际货币基金组织相比处在更为有利的地位，但是要对它们进行根本性的改革以扩大它们的成员范围并避免巴塞尔委员会的主要问题：它缺乏对发展中国家的代表性。


Three central issues of IMF reform should also be taken on board.	国际货币基金组织改革的三个主要问题也应该提上日程。


The first is the need for a truly global reserve currency, perhaps based on the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).	第一个问题是确立真正的全球性储备货币的必要性，或许这种全球性储备货币会建立在国际货币基金组织的特别提款权(SDRs)上。


This would overcome both the inequities and the instability that is inherent in a global reserve system based on a national currency.	这样能克服建立在 国家 货币上的国际储备系统内在的不公平和不稳定。


Today’s system is plagued by cycles of confidence in the dollar and by periodic shocks due to American policies that are adopted independently of their global impact and thus imposed on the rest of the world.	对美元信心的周期性，以及由于独立于其全球影响而采用的美国政策，并进而将这样的美国政策施加给世界其他国家所造成的周期性冲击，都损害了现有的国际金融体系。


The second issue is the need to place the IMF, not the G-7 – or any other “G” – at the center of global macroeconomic policy coordination.	第二个问题是将国际货币基金组织，而不是G-7——或任何其他的G什么国家，置于全球宏观经济政策协调的中心���置的必要性。


This is the only way to give developing countries a voice.	这是让发展中国家拥有发言权的唯一途径。


The multilateral surveillance on global imbalances that the Fund launched in 2006 was an interesting step in this direction, but it has lacked commitment by the parties, as well as teeth.	国际货币基金组织在2006年启动的对全球失衡的多边监管，是朝向这个方向发展的一个引人兴味的措施，但是，这一措施缺乏成员国的承诺，也没有执行机构。


The third issue is developing countries’ major demand.  The IMF should lend during balance-of-payments crises rapidly and without overburdening conditions, particularly when the source of the crisis is a rapid reversal of capital flows or a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade.	第三个问题是发展中国家的主要需求。 国际货币基金组织应该在收支差额危机中迅速贷款，并且不对借款国家施加过重的负担条件，特别是当引起危机的原因是资本流向的快速逆转或者贸易收支的急剧恶化的时候。


This would make the IMF more like a central bank, providing liquidity in an agile way, just as advanced countries’ central banks have been providing funds on a massive scale recently.	这会使国际货币基金组织看起来更像是一个以灵活方式提供流动性的中央银行，这种方式就像发达国家的中央银行最近提供大规模资金所使用的那样。


In the case of the IMF, the financing for such liquidity could be counter-cyclical issues of SDRs.	就国际货币基金组织来说，提供这样的流动性的资金来源可以是特别提款权的抗周期发行。


In all these areas, the IMF should make more active use of regional institutions.	在所有这些领域，国际货币基金组织都应该更加积极地利用区域机构。


For a decade, I have proposed that the IMF of the future should be seen as the apex of a network of regional reserve funds – that is, a system closer in design to the European Central Bank or the United States Federal Reserve system.	十年来，我都在提议，未来的国际货币基金组织应该被看作是一个区域储备基金网络的顶点——也就是说，一个在设计上和欧洲中央银行或者美国联邦储备系统相近的体系。


A similar institutional design could be adopted for prudential policies.	为了实现审慎监管政策的目的，可以采用类似的制度设计。


A denser network of institutions seems better adapted to a heterogeneous international community, and it is likely to provide better services and give a stronger voice to smaller countries.	一个更密集的机构网络似乎更适合多样化的国际社会，而且，这个机构网络也可能提供更好的服务和使小国发出更强有力的声音。


Finally, one major deficiency of the current international financial architecture is the lack of an institutional framework – i.e., a court similar to those created to manage bankruptcies in national economies – to manage debt overhangs at the international level.	最后，当今的国际金融体系的一个重大不足是缺乏一个制度框架——例如，和国家建立的用于管理国民经济中的破产案件法庭类似的法庭——在国际范围内管理债务积压。


The current system relies on ad hoc mechanisms, which generally operate too late, after high indebtedness has already imposed devastating effects.	当前的国际金融体系依靠的是临时机制，这些临时机制通常在高额债务已经造成破坏性后果之后，才运转起来，这时通常已经为时已晚。


The only regular institutional mechanism is the Paris Club, which deals exclusively with official financing.	现在唯一经常性的制度机制是巴黎俱乐部，但是，它只处理政府的融资问题。


Bretton Woods II should resolve this problem by creating an international debt court.	布雷顿森里体系II应该通过建立一个国际债务法庭，来解决这个问题。


The current financial crisis has made the need for reform of the international financial architecture patently clear.	当前的金融危机已经使改革国际金融体系的必要性突显出来了。


But any summons to a “Bretton Woods II” conference must be concrete in its content.	但是，任何召开“布雷顿森里体系II”会议的号召，在内容上都应该具体。 审慎监管和指导的全球体系；


A global system for prudential regulation and supervision; a revamped IMF managing a global reserve currency, coordinating global macroeconomic policy, and providing agile credit lines; and an international debt court – all of these must be on the agenda.	完善后的国际货币基金组织管理一种全球储备货币，协调全球宏观经济政策，并提供灵活的信贷额度； 以及一个国际债务法庭——所有这些都必须提上“布雷顿森里体系II”会议的议程。


What’s Left of Confucianism?	儒家复兴


BEIJING – The Chinese government’s very public display of compassion and transparency in response to the devastating earthquake in Sichuan province appears to have strengthened its authority and its bonds with ordinary Chinese people.	北京--四川强烈地震后，中国政府表现出同情和透明。 这好像加强了其权威及与普通民众的情义。


The government and army worked hand in hand with legions of volunteers and private networks to rescue quake victims.	政府与军队携手，与大批志愿者和私人网络一道援救地震受害者。


Even die-hard cynics were won over by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s emotional comforting of the survivors.	总理温家宝动情安慰灾民的场景甚至感化了顽固的玩世不恭者。


But heroic rescue efforts will not be able to help the government forever, so it is worth asking what can provide long-term political legitimacy.	但是壮烈的赈灾之举无法一劳永逸地帮助政府，所以，人们就有必要探寻什么东西可以提供长期的政治合法性。


After all, communism has lost its capacity to inspire the Chinese.	毕竟，共产主义已经没有能力鼓舞中国人民了。


So what should replace it?	那么，用什么来代替它呢？


Most Westerners think the answer is liberal democracy, as did many Chinese liberals in the twentieth century.	大多数西方人认为自由民主制度是解决之道，二十世纪的许多中国自由派人士也是如此。 但是还有一个途径。


But there is another answer, which takes the form of the old and venerable tradition of Confucianism, which is being revived by government officials, critical intellectuals, and ordinary citizens.	这一途径采用古老而又受人仰重的儒家传统形式。 政府官员、具有独到见解的知识分子以及普通公民正在复兴这一传统。


The opening ceremony of the Olympic games will highlight this revival: it will feature not quotes from Marx, but sayings from the Analects of Confucius.	北京奥运会的开幕式将会突出这一复兴。 开幕式不会引用马克思的语录，而是引用论语。


Such sayings as “The world’s peoples are all brothers” and “Isn’t one of life’s greatest pleasures to have friends visiting from afar?” will be beamed to billions worldwide, expressing the best that Chinese culture has to offer.	诸如“四海之内皆兄弟”、“有朋自远方来，不亦乐乎”等等将传播给全球几十亿观众，展示中华文化精华。


Here, however, we run into trouble.	但是这样我们又陷入困局。


Ever since the Han dynasty (more than 2,000 years ago), Chinese governments have manipulated the most prominent political interpretations of Confucianism for their own purposes.	从汉朝(两千多年以前)以来，历代中国政府为自身目的而操纵对儒家思想最为重要的政治解释。


Confucianism has been combined with Legalism, China’s other main political tradition, to justify such practices as blind obedience to the ruler, subordination of women, and the use of harsh punishments.	儒家与中国另一个主要政治传统法家合二为一，用来为一些做法提供依据，例如对统治者的盲从、压制妇女以及使用重刑。


The “official” Confucianism being revived today may be less dangerous – it emphasizes social harmony, meaning the peaceful resolution of conflicts – but it remains a conservative morality.	如今正在恢复的官方儒家可能并不如此危险，它强调社会和谐，也就是和平解决冲突。 但是它依旧是传统道德。


But there is another interpretation of Confucianism – let’s call it “left Confucianism” – that stresses intellectuals’ obligation to criticize bad policies, obliges governments to provide for the people’s material well-being and support those without key family relations, and calls for governments to adopt a more international-minded outlook and to rely on moral power rather than military might to pursue political aims.	但是人们对儒家还有另一种解说，姑且称之为“左派儒家”。 它强调知识分子批评错误政策的责任，要求政府为百姓提供物质利益并且扶助无权无势之人，吁请政府更加具有国际视野并且更加依赖道德力量而非军力来实现政治目标。


It leaves open basic metaphysical commitments and takes a plural and tolerant view of religious life.	它开启基本的形而上学承诺并且对宗教生活采纳更为多元和宽容的观点。


It emphasizes equality of opportunity in education as well as meritocracy in government, with leadership positions being distributed to the community’s most virtuous and qualified members.	它强调教育机会平等以及政府为才是举，各级领导应当由最为德才兼备的人士担当。


Such values owe their origin to the “original Confucianism” of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, which existed before Confucianism became established as state orthodoxy.	此类价值观来源于独尊儒术之前的“原本儒家”、孟子和荀子。


In imperial times, the critical tradition was carried forward by such scholars as Huang Zongxi.	在帝王时代，黄宗羲等学者秉承批评传统。


Today, new Confucian leftists such as Gan Yang are calling for the creation of a “Confucian socialist republic.”	如今，新儒家左派人士甘阳等人呼吁建立“儒家社会主义共和国”。


Confucian scholars such as Jiang Qing openly acknowledge that their interpretation of Confucianism most closely parallels socialist ideals: not the “actually existing socialism” in today’s China, but the socialist ideals defended by Karl Marx and others.	儒家学者蒋庆等人公开承认其对儒家的解说最为贴近社会主义理想，亦即并非中国“现实存在的社会主义”，而是马克思等人所维护的社会主义理想。


This Confucian tradition aims to influence contemporary politics, but it also remains separate from state power and orthodoxy, always ready to point to the gap between ideals and reality.	这一儒家传统志在影响当今政治，但是又分立于国家权力和正统，时刻准备指出理想与现实之间的差距。


Indeed, left Confucianism’s departure from the status quo is precisely the point: it is meant to provide a moral standard for social critics and to inspire visions of a more desirable political future.	实际上，左派儒家从现状脱离切中要害。 它意在为社会批评人士提供道德标准并且激发一个更为可取的政治愿景。


Unlike communism, it offers a future that derives its legitimacy from tradition and building upon what the past has to offer – including the socialist tradition – rather than destroying it.	与共产主义不同，它设想一种未来，也就是其合法性取自于传统并且建立在历史之上、包括社会主义传统，而不是加以摧毁。


Thus, left Confucians favor institutional reform, arguing that the long-term stability and legitimacy of political institutions requires that they be founded on Chinese traditions.	因此，左派儒家人士倾向于机制改革。 他们主张社会长治久安以及政治机构的合法性要求建立于中国传统之上。


Jiang Qing advocates a tri-cameral legislature – a democratically elected People’s House representing the common people’s interests, a House of Exemplary Persons to secure the good of all those affected by government policies, including foreigners and minority groups, and a House of Cultural Continuity that would maintain China’s various religions and traditions.	蒋庆主张建立三远制，也就是民主选举产生的庶民院代表普通民众利益，道儒院确保受到政府政策影响的所有人的福祉，包括外国人和少数民族，还有国体院维护中国不同宗教和传统。


Such concrete proposals for political reform inspired by Confucian values can rarely be published in mainland China.	如此具体的、由儒家价值观引发而出的政治改革提议难以在中国大陆公开发表。


In fact, there are fewer constraints imposed on public discussion of liberal-democratic institutions precisely because few Chinese are inspired by Western-style liberal democracy.	实际上，正是由于鲜有中国人受到西方自由民主制度鼓舞，所以对于自由民主机制的公开讨论才限制较少。


Today, the most viable alternative to China’s political status quo is left Confucianism.	如今，中国政治现状最为可行的替换者就是左派儒家学说。


What’s Stopping Women?	什么在阻碍女性？


PRINCETON – When I wrote the cover article of the July/August issue of The Atlantic, entitled “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,” I expected a hostile reaction from many American career women of my generation and older, and positive reactions from women aged roughly 25-35.	普林斯顿—我在撰写《大西洋》（The Atlantic）7/8月号的封面文章《为什么女性仍然得不到这些》（Why Women Still Can’t Have It All）时就预料到许多和我一样大或者比我更年长的美国职业女性会对此心怀不满，而25—35年龄段的女性会对此反应积极。


I expected that many men of that younger generation would also have strong reactions, given how many of them are trying to figure out how to be with their children, support their wives’ careers, and pursue their own plans.	我还预料年青一代的许多男性也会有激烈的反应，因为他们当中有不少在家带孩子、支持老婆的事业，同时追求自己的计划。


I also expected to hear from business representatives about whether my proposed solutions – greater workplace flexibility, ending the culture of face-time and “time machismo,” and allowing parents who have been out of the workforce or working part-time to compete equally for top jobs once they re-enter – were feasible or utopian.	我还预料商界代表会对我所提出的解决办法评论一番，说它们可行或纯属乌托邦什么的。 我的方案包括更大的工作地点灵活性、终结坐班文化和“时间大男子主义”（time machismo）、允许不再工作或只从事兼职的父母在重回工作岗位后获得平等的竞争高管职位的机会，如此等等。


What I did not expect was the speed and scale of the reaction – almost a million readers within a week and far too many written responses and TV, radio, and blog debates for me to follow – and its global scope.	我不曾预料到的是反应如此之速、如此之大——短短一周之内便有近一百万读者和数不胜数的文章、电视、广播和博客与我争论这一话题，而且范围涉及全世界。


I have conducted interviews with journalists in Britain, Germany, Norway, India, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and Brazil; and articles about the piece have been published in France, Ireland, Italy, Bolivia, Jamaica, Vietnam, Israel, Lebanon, Canada, and many other countries.	我接受了英国、德国、挪威、印度、澳大利亚、日本、荷兰和巴西记者的采访； 与该文相关的文章在法国、爱尔兰、意大利、玻利维亚、牙买加、越南、以色列、黎巴嫩、加拿大和其他许多国家大量涌现。


Reactions differ across countries, of course.	当然，不同国家的反应各不相同。


Indeed, in many ways, the article is a litmus test of where individual countries are in their own evolution toward full equality for men and women.	事实上，从许多方面看，这篇文章可以称为一国在通往男女完全平等之路上处于何处的试金石。


India and Britain, for example, have had strong women prime ministers in Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher, but now must grapple with the “woman-as-man” archetype of female success.	比如，印度和英国已经有过强势的女性首相——英迪拉·甘地和玛格丽特·撒切尔，但如今必须与成功女性的“巾帼不让须眉”原型作斗争。


The Scandinavian countries know that women around the world look to them as pioneers of social and economic policies that enable women to be mothers and successful career professionals, and that encourage and expect men to play an equal parenting role.	斯堪的纳维亚国家知道，全世界女性把它们视为社会和经济政策的先锋——能让女性既当母亲，又成为成功职业妇女，并鼓励和期望男性承担同样的抚养责任。


But they are not producing as many women managers in the private sector as the United States is, much less at the top ranks.	但这些国家私人部门的女性管理者人数不及美国，获得顶尖职位的女性更是少之又少。


The Germans are deeply conflicted.	德国人在这个问题上颇为纠结。


One major German magazine decided to frame my contribution to the debate as “career woman admits that it’s better to be home.”	一家德国主要刊物决定把我的文章纳入“职业女性承认居家才是更好的归宿”这一议题。


Another (more accurately) highlighted my emphasis on the need for deep social and economic change to allow women to have equal choices.	另一家大刊（比前一家更靠谱一些）大肆渲染了我所强调的需要通过深刻社会和经济变革来促使女性获得平等选择机会的观点。


The French remain studiously aloof, even a little disdainful, as befits a nation that rejects “feminism” as an anti-feminine American creation and manages to produce a leader who is simultaneously as accomplished and as elegant as Christine Lagarde, the head of the International Monetary Fund.	法国人一如既往地刻意保持着旁观姿态，甚至略���嗤之以鼻之意，作为一个将“女权主义”视为反女性的美国产物加以拒绝、并出产了成就斐然又优雅绰约的IMF总裁克里斯汀·拉加德这样的领袖人物的国家，持有这样的态度倒也合适。


Of course, the example of her predecessor, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and other stories about French male behavior that would count as clear sexual harassment in the stodgy US, suggest that perhaps a bit more feminisme a la Française is in order.	当然，拉加德的前任多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩以及许多其他法国男性的行径在庸俗的美国人眼里属于如假包换的性骚扰，这表明大概有一种“法国式女权主义”（feminisme a la Française）在作祟。


Beyond Europe, Japanese women lament how far they must still go in a relentlessly male and sexist culture.	在欧洲之外，日本女性哀叹她们在无情的男权文化和性别歧视中仍然任重道远。


The Chinese now have a generation of educated, empowered young women who are not sure whether they want to marry at all, owing to the constraints that a husband (and a mother-in-law) would place on their freedom.	在中国，新一代女性受过教育，也拥有权利，她们犹豫着要不要结婚，因为害怕丈夫（和婆婆）限制自己的自由。


Brazilian women point with pride to their president, Dilma Rousseff, but also underscore how much discrimination remains.	巴西女性自豪地指出她们有一个女总统迪尔马·罗塞夫，但也强调仍然存在严重的歧视。


In Australia, with its robust work-life debate, women point to the success of Julia Gillard, the first woman prime minister, but note that she has no children (nor does German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the first woman to lead her country).	在澳大利亚，工作-生活的争论一直不温不火，女性将第一位女总理茱莉亚·吉拉德视为榜样，但也指出她没有孩子（德国第一位女领导人、总理默克尔也是如此）。


The global nature of this debate demonstrates at least three important lessons.	这场全球争论至少说明了三个问题。


First, if “soft power” means exercising influence because “others want what you want,” as Joseph Nye puts it, then women the world over want what American feminists began fighting for three generations ago.	首先，如果“软实力”意味着因“他人欲你之所欲”（约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye）语）而施加影响，那么全世界女性之所欲乃美国女权主义者已为之奋斗了三代人的东西。


Second, Americans, not surprisingly, have much to learn from other countries’ debates, laws, and cultural norms.	其次，毫不奇怪，美国人可以从其他国家的争论、法律和文化范式中学到很多东西。


After all, women have ascended the political ladder faster in many other countries than they have in the US.	毕竟，许多国家女性在政界的爬升速度要远快于美国。


Indeed, the US has never had a woman president, Senate majority leader, Secretary of the Treasury, or Secretary of Defense.	事实上，美国从来没有出过女总统、女参议院多数派领袖、女财政部长和女国防部长。


Finally, these are not “women’s issues,” but social and economic issues.	最后，这些都不是“女性的问题”，而是社会和经济问题。


Societies that discover how to use the education and talent of half their populations, while allowing women and their partners to invest in their families, will have a competitive edge in the global knowledge/innovation economy.	如果一个社会能够发现如何用好半边天所受的教育和天赋，同时又让女性及其伙伴为家庭进行投资，那么这个社会就能在全球知识/创新经济中赢得竞争优势。


Of course, hundreds of millions of women around the world can only wish that they had the problems about which I wrote.	上周，巴基斯坦又曝出一桩谋杀女性权利活跃分子的案子； 有证据表明埃及军方可能故意采用性侵犯阻止女性在开罗解放广场的示威；


Last week brought news of yet another murder of a women’s rights activist in Pakistan; evidence that the Egyptian military may be deliberately using sexual assault to deter women from demonstrating in Cairo’s Tahrir Square; a horrific report from the New York-based Women’s Media Center about Syrian government forces’ use of sexual violence and gang rape; and a video of a Taliban commander brutally executing a woman for adultery as his fellow soldiers and villagers cheered.	纽约女性媒体中心曝光了叙利亚政府军的性侵和轮奸行径； 一份视频显示塔利班某指挥官残忍地以通奸罪处决一名女性，而他的士兵和村民一边围观一边欢呼。


Those are just the most extreme cases of physical violence that many women face.	这些只是许多妇女所面对的身体暴力的极端例子。


Worldwide, more than a billion women confront grinding and overt gender discrimination in education, nutrition, health care, and salaries.	从全球看，超过10亿女性在教育、营养、卫生和薪酬方面面临着难以忍受的公然性别歧视。


Women’s rights are a global issue of the highest importance, and it is necessary to focus on the worst violations.	女性权利是最重要的全球性问题，关注最严重暴力行为刻不容缓。


Still, consider a recent matter-of-fact report from a sober and respected US magazine.	仍以某冷静客观、广受尊敬的美国杂志的最新事实报告为例。


In an article on “Women in Washington,” the National Journal observed that women in the US capital have come a long way, but “still face career barriers, and often the biggest one is having a family.”	在一篇题为《华盛顿的女性》（Women in Washington）的文章中，《国家杂志》（National Journal）观察道，在美国首都，女性地位已经得到了很大提高，但“仍然面临职业壁垒，其中最大的壁垒是成家。 ”


If “having a family” is still a career barrier for women, but not for men, that, too, is a matter of women’s rights (and thus of human rights).	如果“成家”依然是女性的职业壁垒，而对男性并非如此，那么这便是一个女性权利问题（从而也是人权问题）。


In the global debate about work, family, and the promise of gender equality, no society is exempt.	在全球工作、家庭和性别平等承诺的大论战中，没有哪个社会可以例外。


What’s the Beef in South Korea?	What’s the Beef in South Korea?


NEW YORK – At the outset of the ongoing violent protests in South Korea over imported beef from the United States, the entire cabinet of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak offered to resign.  Last week, President Lee fired three of them.	纽约－在韩国持续进行的反对从美国进口的牛肉的暴力抗议开始的时候，韩国总统李明博的内阁集体要求辞职。 上个星期，李明博总统解雇了其中的三人。


But beef, it turns out, represents just the tip of the iceberg of grievances against President Lee.	但是，事实是，牛肉仅仅代表了反对李明博总统愤怒情绪的冰山一角。


Only four months in office, his approval rating is down to single digits.	只任职了四个月，他的支持率已经降到了个位数。


Lee won the December 2007 election with 48.7% of the vote, having run on the “747” platform, promising 7% annual GDP growth, per capita income of $40,000, and to make Korea the world’s seventh largest economy (up from 13th currently).	李明博在2007年12月以48. 7%的得票数赢得了总统选举，并详细阐述了其“747”纲领，承诺使韩国年均GDP增长率达到7%，国民人均收入达到4万美元，以及使韩国成为世界第七大经济体（现在是第十三大）。


During his inauguration speech, he vowed to revive the economy, strengthen relations with the US, and deal with North Korea.	在他的就职演说中，李明博发誓要振兴经济，加强和美国的关系并对付北朝鲜。


So what went wrong?	那么，什么出了问题呢？


The economy is slowing – the Bank of Korea cut its growth forecast for this year to 4.7%, while the OECD expects only 4.3% growth – inflation is rising, and some are concerned that Lee’s policies are too geared toward foreign investors and big business.	经济在放缓——韩国银行将韩国经济增长预期降低至4. 7%，与此同时，经济发展与合作组织（OECD）预期韩国经济增长率只有4.


Lee also must confront factors beyond his control, such as soaring oil prices and the global credit crunch.	3%——通货膨胀在加剧，而且一些人担心李明博的政策过于迎合外国投资者和大企业。 李明博也必须面对他不能控制的因素，例如飙升的油价和全球信贷危机。


Beyond the economy, Lee has been faced with charges of appointing officials with questionable ethics and of heavy-handed leadership (his nickname is “Bulldozer”), which is reflected in efforts to push through a controversial cross-country canal system and an unpopular proposal to privatize the healthcare system.	除经济之外，李明博已经面临着任命道德可疑的官员以及领导方式过于严厉（他的绰号是“推土机”）的指责，这种严厉的领导方式反映在努力促成一个有争议的贯通全国的运河系统以及一个不受欢迎的私有化医疗系统的提议上。


Furthermore, Lee’s hard-line approach to North Korea – very different from that of his predecessors – has resulted in a popular backlash.	此外，李明博对北朝鲜的强硬态度——和他的前任态度非常不同——已经导致了支持率的下降。


To be sure, as North Korea seemingly snubbed the international community in recent years, there was considerable popular discontent with the previous two administrations’ “sunshine” policy, which emphasized peaceful cooperation prior to eventual Korean unification.	固然，因为最近几年北朝鲜公然漠视国际社会的态度，韩国民众对前两届政府的“阳光”政策——强调在朝鲜最终统一之前的和平合作——有许多的不满。


But now, with the North’s destruction of key elements of its nuclear program, international negotiations appear to be bearing fruit, and Lee’s tougher stance has gained less approval than might have been anticipated when he came to office.	但是现在，随着北朝鲜销毁了其核项目的主要设施，国际谈判似乎起作用了，对李明博对北朝鲜采取强硬态度的支持率比他在就职的时候预期得要低。


The combined effect of these developments has been to erode Lee’s reputation precipitously.	这些事态发展的结果结合起来，极大地损害了李明博的声誉。


Now, on top of everything, comes the beef controversy.	现在，迫在眉睫的是关于牛肉的争议。


In April, on his first foreign trip following his inauguration, Lee traveled to the US.	在四月份，作为就职典礼后的首次外国访问，李明博出访了美国。


On the eve of the visit, his government agreed to lift the five-year-old ban on US beef imports as part of efforts to improve bilateral ties following years of up-and-down relations during former President Roh Moo-hyun’s administration.	在李明博出访前夕，韩国政府同意解除对美国牛肉长达五年的进口禁令，以此作为在前任总统卢武铉政府期间两国关系起起落落之后增进双边关系努力的一部分。


While most in the West applauded Lee’s visit, the reaction in Korea was significantly more negative.	虽然西方的大多数人对李明博的访问表示欢迎，但是在韩国，人们对此次出访的反应非常负面。


Many in Korea viewed the beef decision as having been hastily taken, and without appropriate consultation of all relevant parties.	许多韩国人认为有关牛肉的决定是很草率的，并且没有在所有相关各方之间进行适当的协商。


In addition, significant segments of the population saw the agreement as Lee selling out or kowtowing to the Americans.	而且，相当多的韩国民众将这个协议看作是李明博出卖韩国或者讨好美国的行为。


The public reaction began with a demonstration in Seoul on May 2 in which hundreds of teenagers held a candlelight vigil.	韩国公众对此的反应以五月二日在首尔的游行示威开始，在此次游行示威中，许多青少年手持蜡烛守夜。


Soon, tens of thousands of Koreans joined the protests.	很快，上万的韩国人加入了抗议。


Lee seems to have misjudged the strength of his election victory and the currents of opinion in several important ways.	李明博似乎在几个重要的方面错误地判断了选举获胜的力量以及观点的走向。


Given the nationalist sentiments motivating the beef protesters, the strength of opposition forces, and widespread hostility to opening and privatizing the South Korean economy further, Lee, whose authoritarian style of management reminds many of the era of military rule, will now need to move forward carefully.	鉴于民族情绪激起了对牛肉的抗议，反对派的力量，以及对进一步开放和私有化韩国经济的普遍的不满，使用独裁式的领导方法使很多人想起军事统治时期的李明博，现在需要谨慎地前进。


Lee must reach out to the opposition, both within his party and outside it, to build agreement or negotiate compromise on the contentious issues that his administration faces.	李明博必须向党内以及党外的反对派伸出双手，以对其政府面临的有争议的问题达成协议或者谈判折衷的方案。


He must reach out to the people of Korea and demonstrate that he is willing to listen to their concerns and act accordingly.	他必须向韩国人民伸出双手，并显示他愿意倾听他们关心的问题并采取相应的行动。


Finally, he must act on his campaign promises to build a more prosperous and confident Korea.	最后，他 必须按照他的竞选承诺行动，来建立一个更加繁荣和自信的韩国。


The upside of all this political turmoil is that it demonstrates the vigor of Korean democracy.	这场政治混乱最重要的方面是，它显示了韩国民主的活力。


Lee’s task now is to discover how best to take advantage of this new political activism.	现在，李明博的任务是发现怎样能最好地利用这一新的政治行动主义。


He has faced political adversity before, and he will again.	他从前已经面对过政治逆境，他将来还会碰到。


And, with approval ratings in the single digits, there’s nowhere to go but up.	并且，随着对其的支持率降低到个位数，李明博除了奋起之外，没有其他的选择。


What’s Wrong with Ethnic Profiling?	“种族歧视”的弊端


BRUSSELS – Several years ago, as terrorism, immigration, and unrest in suburban Paris were at the top of the news in France, a French police officer confided to a researcher: “If you consider different levels of trafficking, it is obviously done by blacks and Arabs.	布鲁塞尔—几年前，当有关恐怖主义、移民及巴黎郊区骚乱的消息占据法国新闻媒体的头条时，一名法国警官私下里向一名学者透露：“一旦你想到各种非法交易时，很显然，这些事都是黑人和阿拉伯人干的。


If you are on the road and see a black man or a man with Arabic features, you say to yourself, ‘He doesn’t look French,’ and then you might stop him to see if he has papers.”	如果你在路上看见一个黑人或者一个长相有阿拉伯人特征的人，你会告诉自己，‘他看上去不是法国人。 ’然后你也许会拦住他，让他出示证件。


This police officer was describing a textbook example of “ethnic profiling”: law enforcement officials use of stereotypes, rather than specific information about behavior, in deciding to stop, search, or detain people.	这名警官所描述的正是一种教科书式的“以种族相貌取人”的例子。 执法人员在决定是否叫停、搜查或拘留当事人时，依据的信息不是关于当事人行为的，而是套用了一种思维定势。


Ethnic profiling is illegal in Europe. It is ineffective in apprehending criminals.	这种“以种族相貌取人”的方式在欧洲是不合法的。


It is counter-productive in the campaign against terrorism.	捉拿罪犯时并不奏效，同样的，在对抗恐怖主义活动也没有效果。


But police officers across Europe continue to use it.	但是，全欧洲的警官却沿用采用这种方式。


The inefficiency of ethnic profiling was highlighted in early May, when the British government released figures showing that, of the more than 117,000 police stops made between 2007 and 2008, only 72 led to an arrest for terrorism-related offences.	5月初，这种“以种族相貌取人”的方式引起重视，这源于当时英国政府发布的一组数据，数据显示，在2007至2008年间，警察展开的对当事人117，000次的叫停问询中，只有72次与恐怖犯罪有关，最后对当事人逮捕。


Other major European countries do not collect data on police stops broken down according to the targets’ ethnic or religious background.	关于警察根据调查对象的种族或者宗教背景对当事人进行问询的事例，其他一些主要欧洲国家还没有搜集相关数据。


But private research and anecdotal reports provide a frighteningly similar picture.	但私家调查机构和一些非正式渠道提供的数据却是令人惊人般的相似。


A massive data-mining exercise in Germany from 2001 to 2003 trawled through personal information on 8.3 million people and failed to find a single terrorist.	2001年至2003年间，德国曾在对830万人的个人信息开展了一次大规模的检索式调查，结果是没有发现一名恐怖分子。


Stops and searches conducted under counter-terrorism powers in Europe have produced few terrorism charges and no convictions.	在欧洲大陆，政府以反恐怖名义展开的问询和调查，最后的结果是只有个别的指控，但没有一宗被定罪。


Separate studies in Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States have concluded that ethnic profiling wastes time and resources.	在英国、荷兰、瑞典和美国开展的研究也表明，“以种族相貌取人”的判断方式只能是浪费时间和资源。


As a new report by the Open Society Justice Initiative shows, by targeting ethnic minorities, police alienate some of the very people on whom they depend for cooperation and intelligence.	由“开放社会正义行动”机构（Open Society Justice Initiative）新发布的一个报告显示，因为只将目标锁定在少数派种族上，警局疏远了那些他们本可以依赖于合作、提供情报的一些人。


And by pre-selecting fixed categories of people for heightened scrutiny, the authorities overlook those who do not fit the profile.	因为预先选择出一些固定群体进行详细审查，当局反而忽略了那些并不符合种族特征的人。


A young Spanish man who is a member of an ethnic minority group put it this way: “I worry when I go on the street that the police will stop me and ask me for my papers because of the color of my skin, by my tone of skin, by my way of walking.”	作为少数民族的一员，一名西班牙年轻人这样说：“我在街上走路时，会担心警察因为我的肤色、我的口音和我走路的姿势而叫住我，查问我的证件。 ”


Given its failings, why is ethnic profiling so widespread?	既然已经有这么多不成功的案例，可为什么这种以种族相貌取人的方式仍如此普遍？


The answer is simple.	答案很简单。


When the police use ethnic profiling, they project an image of being tough on crime and terrorism.	当警察采用这种方式的时候，他们展现给公众的是一种对犯罪和恐怖主义表现强硬的姿态。


This appeases public opinion, which demands robust anti-terrorism action.	对于要求严打恐怖主义的公众来说，警察的做法就是一种安抚。


Following the September 2001 attacks in New York, and again after the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, law-enforcement authorities across Europe launched mass-arrest operations, undertook widespread surveillance of mosques, carried out stops and searches of people who appeared to be Muslim, and used other intrusive measures that disrupted the lives of – and in many cases humiliated – law-abiding European citizens.	继2001年纽约911袭击事件、2004年马德里爆炸案和2005年伦敦爆炸案后，欧洲的执法当局就发动了大规模的逮捕行动，对清真寺进行监视、对于那些看上去像穆斯林教徒的人进行询问和搜查； 并采取其它一些侵犯性的措施，甚至一些让人难堪的方式、扰乱了欧洲遵纪守法的普通公民的生活。


As public anxiety has abated, and senior officials have felt less pressure to show that they are doing something, the most flagrant abuses have declined.	随着公众对恐怖主义的忧虑缓解下来后，高级官员们的压力就小了些，他们不再急于向公众表现。


But such practices are still being applied to a lesser degree, and they can be pulled out of the arsenal whenever political or social conditions dictate.	于是，那些最明目张胆的、滥用职权的行为减少了，但是这种方式时有发生，只是程度有所减轻。 一旦社会政治环境变得紧张时，它们就会卷土重��。


Fortunately, some of Europe’s leaders recognize the problem.	幸运的是，一些欧洲的领导人已经认识到了这个问题。


In late April, the European Parliament issued a report highlighting the danger that unrestricted data mining that relies on racial, ethnic, or national origin would subject innocent people to arbitrary stops, travel restrictions, and bans on employment or banking.	4月末，欧洲议会发布了一篇报告，对于以种族、民族或者国籍为依据对个人资料进行毫无限制的调查行为发出警告，声明这种行为十分危险，不但无辜的人遭到审查、人们的旅行受到限制，而且他们就业和金融权利也遭到禁止。


The report called for legislation to protect against ethnic profiling.	报告呼吁各国应该开展立法，以保护人们免遭这种以种族相貌取人方式的侵害。


The solution is not to ignore the threat of terrorism, but to address the threat more intelligently.	如此这般倒不是忽略恐怖主义的威胁，而是采取更明智的方法来处理恐怖问题。


Over the past two years, a project that our organization undertook with police forces and civil-society groups in Hungary and Spain found that, when stops were systematically monitored and data publicly reported, the proportion of stops that produced an arrest or other law-enforcement outcome actually increased. Police work became more efficient.	在过去2年间，我们机构与匈牙利和西班牙的警察及民权组织合作开展了一个项目，在调查中发现，当警察对当事人问询的行为被系统性地监督，信息公开化后，最终实施逮捕的概率增加，执法效果也变得显著，警察的工作更加富有效率。


This makes sense.	这才是正确的方法。


When officers are required to articulate grounds for suspicion, they are more likely to rely on behavioral factors rather than prejudice.	当我们要求警官说出他们为什么把当事人列为嫌疑人的理由时，他们就会更多考虑当事人行为的因素，而不是仅仅出自偏见。


In the future, the European Union and its member states should fund more collaboration between police and minority communities.	将来，欧盟和其成员国应该出钱资助警察与少数种族群体之间的合作。


The EU should combat radicalization by addressing exclusion, not by conflating conservative religious faith with terrorism.	欧盟应该反对激进和排外的行为，不应把宗教信仰和恐怖主义联系在一起。


And it should make clear that police may not use ethnic, racial, or religious stereotypes.	欧盟应该明确一点，就是警察不可以采用以民族、种族和宗教为依据来进行判断的思维定势。


By treating people as suspicious purely because of who they are, how they look, or where they pray, rather than what they do or have done, ethnic profiling threatens the very ethos of the EU, a union firmly rooted in values of liberty, democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.	只是因为人们的长相、信仰，而不是依据他们的所作所为，就把其认作是嫌疑人，这种以种族特征做出判断的方式威胁到欧盟的核心价值观，欧盟根深蒂固的信仰本来在于自由、民主和对人权和基本自由的尊重。


What’s Wrong with Transformational Leadership?	变革型领导错在何处？


CAMBRIDGE – This year’s presidential campaign in the United States has been marked by calls from Barack Obama’s would-be Republican challengers for a radical transformation of American foreign policy.	美国剑桥—今年的美国大选有一个特点：奥巴马的潜在共和党挑战者无不要求对美国外交政策来个彻底变革。


Campaigns are always more extreme than the eventual reality, but countries should be wary of calls for transformational change.	竞选口号总是比最后的落实要极端得多，但世界各国应该仍会对美国外交政策变革感到担忧。


Things do not always work out as intended.	事情并不总能遂人愿望的。


Foreign policy played almost no role in the 2000 US presidential election.	在2000年美国总统大选中，外交政策几乎没有起到任何作用。


In 2001, George W. Bush started his first term with little interest in foreign policy, but adopted transformational objectives after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.	2001年，小布什开始了他的首个任期，一开始，他对外交政策并不感兴趣，但在2001年9·11恐怖袭击之后倒向了变革型外交。


Like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman before him, Bush turned to the rhetoric of democracy to rally his followers in a time of crisis.	与伍德罗·威尔逊、富兰克林·罗斯福和哈里·杜鲁门等前任一样，当危机来临时，布什高举民主大旗，振臂一呼，应者云集。


Bill Clinton had also talked about enlarging the role of human rights and democracy in US foreign policy, but most Americans in the 1990’s sought normality and a post-Cold War peace dividend rather than change.	比尔·克林顿也曾谈及要在美国外交政策中加大人权和民主的作用，但大多数美国人在20世纪90年代追求的是正常化和后冷战时期的和平红利，而不是变化。


By contrast, Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy, which came to be called the Bush Doctrine, proclaimed that the US would “identify and eliminate terrorists wherever they are, together with the regimes that sustain them.”	相反，被称为布什主义的2002年国家安全战略高调宣布美国将“挖出并清除恐怖主义者，连同他们所依赖的制度一并消灭，无论他们藏身何处。


The solution to the terrorist problem was to spread democracy everywhere.	”解决恐怖主义的办法是将民主输送到世界各地。


Bush invaded Iraq ostensibly to remove Saddam Hussein’s capacity to use weapons of mass destruction and, in the process, to change the regime.	布什出兵伊拉克的表面理由是消灭萨达姆·侯赛因的大规模杀伤性武器，顺便改变伊拉克的政权。


Bush cannot be blamed for the intelligence failures that attributed such weapons to Saddam, given that many other countries shared such estimates.	不能把萨达姆拥有大规模杀伤性武器的情报失误归咎于布什，因为很多其他国家也有此定论。


But inadequate understanding of the Iraqi and regional context, together with poor planning and management, undercut Bush’s transformational objectives.	但对伊拉克及其所在地区理解不够充分以及行动缺乏规划和管理使得布什的大大妨碍了布什的变革型目标。


Although some of Bush’s defenders try to credit him with the “Arab Spring” revolutions, the primary Arab participants reject such arguments.	尽管布什的支持者中有人将“阿拉伯之春”革命归功与他，但阿拉伯之春的主要参与者否认了这一点。


Bush was described by The Economist as “obsessed by the idea of being a transformational president; not just a status-quo operator like Bill Clinton.”	《经济学人》杂志称布什“太想成为变革型总统，而不是像比尔·克林顿那样稳守现状。


Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised the virtues of “transformational diplomacy.”	”时任国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯对“变革型外交”的优点不吝赞美之词。


But, while leadership theorists and editorial writers tend to think that transformational foreign-policy officials are better in either ethics or effectiveness, the evidence does not support this view.	然而，尽管领导学理论家和评论员均认为变革型外交政策官员不管在道德还是效率方面都有所提高，但事实并没有证明这一点。


Other leadership skills are more important than the usual distinction between transformational and “transactional” leaders.	就变革型领导人和“维持型”领导人的区别而言，其他领导技能更加重要。


Consider President George H.W. Bush, who did not do “the vision thing,” but whose sound management and execution underpinned one of the most successful US foreign-policy agendas of the past half-century.	比如，老布什总统从来不做“远在天边的事”，但其踏实的管理和执行打造了美国过去50年中最成功的外交日程。


Perhaps genetic engineers will one day be able to produce leaders equally endowed with both vision and management skills; comparing the two Bushes (who shared half their genes), it is clear that nature has not yet solved the problem.	或许有朝一日基因工程师能够打造出兼具愿景和管理技能的领导人，比较布什父子（他们身上一半的血液是一样的），显然，天性并不是解决问题的全部。


This is not an argument against transformational leaders.	这么说并不是看低变革型领导人。


Mohandas Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr., played crucial roles in transforming people’s identity and aspirations.	圣雄甘地、纳尔逊·曼德拉和马丁·路德·金在改变人民心身方面均取得了巨大成就。 这么说也不是看低美国外交政策中的变革型领导人。


Nor is this an argument against transformational leaders in US foreign policy.	富兰克林·罗斯福和杜鲁门都做出过重大贡献。


Franklin Roosevelt and Truman made crucial contributions.	但是，在评价领导人时，我们既要看到成就，也要看到阙漏；


But, in judging leaders, we need to pay attention to acts of both omission and commission, to what happened and to what was avoided, to the dogs that barked and to those that did not.	���要看发生了什么，也要看避免了发生什么； 既要看听其言，也要观其行。


A big problem in foreign policy is the complexity of the context.	外交政策的一个大问题是环境的复杂性。


We live in a world of diverse cultures, and we know very little about social engineering and how to “build nations.”	我们生活在一个文化多元的世界中，我们对社会工程和如何“建设国家”所知甚少。


When we cannot be sure how to improve the world, prudence becomes an important virtue, and grandiose visions can pose grave dangers.	当我们不确定应该如何改善世界时，审慎就成了重要的美德，而宏伟蓝图可能给世界带来重大隐患。


In foreign policy, as in medicine, it is important to remember the Hippocratic Oath: first, do no harm.	外交政策应该像医学那样记住希波克拉底誓言：莫伤人。


For these reasons, the virtues of transactional leaders with good contextual intelligence are very important.	因此，拥有优秀相关情报的维持型型领导人的美德极其重要。


Someone like George H. W. Bush, unable to articulate a vision but able to steer successfully through crises, turns out to be a better leader than someone like his son, possessed of a powerful vision but with little contextual intelligence or management skill.	比如老布什尽管没有高瞻远瞩的能力，但却能游刃有余地在危机中应付裕如，和他的能高瞻远瞩但缺乏高质量相关情报和管理技巧的儿子相比，老布什更加优秀。


Former Secretary of State George Shultz, who served under Ronald Reagan, once compared his role to gardening –“the constant nurturing of a complex array of actors, interests, and goals.”	里根时代的国务卿乔治·舒尔茨曾把他的角色比作园丁——“不断地培育复杂的行动者、利益和目标的复杂综合体”。


But Shultz’s Stanford colleague, Condoleezza Rice, wanted a more transformational diplomacy that did not accept the world as it was, but tried to change it.	但舒尔茨的斯坦福同学康多莉扎·赖斯想要的是变革型外交，她拒绝接受世界的现状，试图改造它。


As one observer put it, “Rice’s ambition is not just to be a gardener – she wants to be a landscape architect.”	正如一位观察者所言，“赖斯可不甘于当一个园丁，她想当园林设计师。


There is a role for both, depending on the context, but we should avoid the common mistake of automatically thinking that the transformational landscape architect is a better leader than the careful gardener.	”两种类型世界都需要，取决于具体的情况，但我们需要避免的错误是想当然地认为变革型园林设计师就一定比谨慎的园丁更好。


We should keep this in mind as we assess the current US presidential debates, with their constant reference to American decline.	在考察当前美国总统竞选辩论时，我们应该时刻铭记这一点。 当前总统辩论三句话不离美国的衰落。


Decline is a misleading metaphor.	衰落是一个具有误导性的用语。


America is not in absolute decline, and, in relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that it will remain more powerful than any other country in the coming decades.	从绝对意义上说，美国并没有衰落； 从相对意义上说，在未来十年中，没有哪个国家具有在实力上超越美国的实质可能。


We do not live in a “post-American world,” but we also do not live in the American era of the late twentieth century.	我们并没有进入“后美国世界”，但20世纪末的美国时代已经过去了。


The US will be faced with a rise in the power resources of many others – both states and non-state actors.	美国将面临众多实力源的崛起，有些是国家，有些是非国家行动者。


It will also confront a growing number of issues that require power with others as much as power over others in order to obtain the country’s preferred outcomes.	为了获得美国所希望的结果，在越来越多的问题上，美国需要和其他势力联手处理，而不是凌驾于其他势力之上。


America’s capacity to maintain alliances and create cooperative networks will be an important dimension of its hard and soft power.	美国维持联盟和创造合作网的能力将是其硬实力和软实力的重要组成部分。


The problem of America’s role in the twenty-first century is not one of (poorly specified) “decline,” but rather of developing the contextual intelligence to understand that even the largest country cannot achieve what it wants without others’ help.	美国在21世纪的角色定位的问题并不在于（被错误定义的）“衰落”，而在于改善相关情报，认识到就算是最大的国家也无法单枪匹马为所欲为。


Educating the public to understand this complex globalized information age, and what is required to operate successfully in it, will be the real transformational leadership task.	教育公众，使之理解这一复杂的全球信息时代以及在这样一个时代获得成功所需要的条件才是真正的变革型领导任务。


Thus far, we are not hearing much about it from the Republican candidates.	到目前为止，共和党领导人在这方面并没有多少见地。


What’s Wrong With Turkey?	土耳其的问题何在？


On December 16, Orhan Pamuk, one of Turkey’s most famous writers, will enter an Istanbul court to face a charge of “insulting the national identity” after he advocated open discussion of the Turkish genocide of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 and 1916.	12月16日，土耳其著名作家奥罕·帕慕克将在伊斯坦布尔一家法庭接受审判，答辩针对他提起的“侮辱国家形象”的诉讼，事情的起因是他提出要对1915年和1916年土耳其屠杀150万亚美尼亚人一事举行公开的讨论。


Pamuk faces three years in prison.	帕慕克将因此面临长达三年的监禁。


Turkey’s effort to fine and imprison those who do not toe the official line convinces me that I was correct to oppose opening negotiations on the country’s European Union membership.	土耳其在对那些不服从政府路线的人士进行经济处罚和刑事监禁的做法使我确信：本人一贯反对谈判该国加入欧盟的问题是正确的。


In December 1999, the European Council granted Turkey the status of EU candidate-member, implying that Turkey would accede to the Union at some future, unspecified date.	欧盟理事会于1999年12月批准土耳其获得欧盟成员国候选国地位，这意味着土耳其将在未来某一不确定时间加入欧盟。


The Council subsequently asked the European Commission to decide by October 2004 whether Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria – including democracy, the rule of law, and respect for the rights of ethnic minorities – for membership.	理事会随后要求欧盟委员会在2004年12月之前对土耳其是否充分达到了成员国应具备的政治标准这一问题做出评判¾评判的内容包括民主、法制、对少数族裔权利的尊重三个方面。


That decision was one of the last taken by Romano Prodi’s Commission, of which I was a member.	该评判是由罗马诺·普罗迪领导的欧盟委员会所做出的最后一项评判，当时我是其中一员。


Of its 30 members, 29 said that Turkey had fulfilled the criteria sufficiently to proceed. I was the lone dissenter.	在30名委员当中，29人表示土耳其已经充分达到了这一标准，可以继续推进入盟程序，而我却是唯一的反对者。


The Commission’s own report on Turkey, prepared by Günter Verheugen, who was then in charge of EU enlargement, shaped my decision.	我反对的基础是当时欧盟执委会负责扩大事务的执委甘特·沃河根起草的一份委员会报告。


This report mentioned that in 2003 some 21,870 Turks submitted asylum claims in the EU, of which 2,127 were accepted.	报告中指出2003年约21870名土耳其人向欧盟提交了庇护申请，其中的2127人被给予相应援助。


In other words, the EU’s own governments acknowledged in 2003 that the Turkish government had persecuted more than 2,000 of its own citizens.	换句话说，欧盟成员国政府当时承认，2003年土耳其政府曾迫害2000多名本国公民。


Meanwhile, the Commission published a progress report on Turkey that granted that reforms were continuing, albeit at a slower pace, under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s mildly Islamic-minded government.	同时，委员会公布了一份关于土耳其的国家发展报告，承认在总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安带领的伊斯兰温和派政府的领导下，土耳其的各项改革正在进行中，虽然步伐比较缓慢。


Yet the report also presented serious misgivings: human rights violations, including torture, continued; the military’s influence remained too high; freedom of speech was not universally observed; non-Muslim religious and cultural minorities faced discrimination; and violence against women was not opposed strongly enough.	但是，报告也提出了某些严重疑虑：包括肉体折磨在内的侵犯人权的行为依然在继续、军事影响过于强大、缺乏广泛的言论自由、少数非穆斯林宗教和文化群体面临歧视、对妇女实施的暴力没有得到有效遏制等等。


Not much has changed since accession talks began this October.	今年10月入盟对话开始以来，这些状况没有明显的好转。


Beyond the current persecution of Pamuk, unacceptable behavior abounds.	除了对帕慕克实施的迫害之外，不可接受的行为还广泛存在。


In March 2005, the police violently disrupted a demonstration to celebrate International Women’s Day.	2005年3月，警方曾使用暴力驱散了庆祝国际妇女节的民众游行；


In May, the largest teachers’ union was banned for promoting the education of Turkey’s 14 million Kurds in their own language.	5月，最大的教师协会也因为提倡1400万库尔德人使用本民族语言进行教学而被取缔。


Indeed, intolerance goes right to the top of the Turkish government.	实际上，即便是土耳其政府的高层领导也抱有这种狭隘的排异观念。


Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül abruptly cancelled a recent press conference in Copenhagen when he spied a Kurdish journalist in the audience and the Danes refused to evict him.	当土耳其外长Abdullah Gül在最近一次记者招待会上发现一名库尔德人记者，并要求丹麦方面将其驱逐出去，而被拒绝的情况下，他竟然立刻取消了此次记者招待会。


Such actions and attitudes amply justify my dissent of October 2004.	这样的行为和态度足以证明我在2004年10月投反对票是有充分理由的。


But, even if these shortcomings were removed, Turkey should still not be admitted to the EU, because it is not a European country.	但即便这些不完善的地方都得到改进，土耳其还是不应该被准予加入欧盟，因为它根本不是一个欧洲国家。


Christianity, feudalism, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, democracy, and industrialization have made us what we Europeans are, but they have not made Turks who they are.	基督教、王朝制度、文艺复兴、思想启蒙运动、民主和工业化造就了现在的欧洲人，但这些并未能塑造出一个欧洲化的土耳其。


So I am not convinced that reforms in Turkey implemented at the insistence of the European Commission would continue after accession. Indeed, I suspect that there will be backsliding.	因此，我不相信土耳其在欧盟委员会的敦促下所实施的改革会在加入欧盟后继续下去，也十分怀疑将来是否会出现倒退的局面。


Moreover, Turkey’s accession would lead inevitably to that of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, and perhaps of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaïdjan.	不仅如此，土耳其入盟将不可避免的导致乌克兰、白俄罗斯、摩尔多瓦，也许还有格鲁吉亚、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆这些国家纷纷入盟。


The first three of these countries are certainly more European than Turkey. Leaving the three Caucasian republics aside but including the successor states to Yugoslavia, this would mean an EU of some 35 members.	前三个国家当然比土耳其更加欧洲化，再撇开后三个高加索地区的共和国不谈，单单把南斯拉夫的继任国包括进去，欧盟就将拥有35个成员国。


What sort of Union would that be?	这会是一个什么样的联盟呢？


It is based on freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The Commission, as the guardian of the Union’s treaties, must protect these four fundamental freedoms, which means that it must sometimes persuade, and if necessary force, member states to change their laws.	欧盟不单纯是一个盟友俱乐部，它建立在商品、服务、资金和人员自由运转的基础上，这意味着有时它要说服、甚至在必要的情况下强迫某些成员国修改它们自己的法律。


Alcohol policy in Sweden, the Volkswagen-law in Germany, and discrimination against foreign investment funds in France are examples of cases that made the Commission unpopular.	瑞典的酒品政策，德国的大众法以及法国对外国投资的歧视就是欧盟委员会不受欢迎的例证。


But they were necessary.	但这些又是必不可少的。


By the time I left the Commission, I was sitting on a pile of 1,500 such infringement proceedings.	离开欧盟委员会的时候，我面前还堆着多达1500份类似的侵害诉讼。


In short, EU membership entails having to accept incisive measures that deeply affect a state’s internal affairs.	简而言之，欧盟成员国资格要求成员国必须接受某些会给其国内事务管理带来巨大影响的尖锐措施。


That will be impossible with such disparate members.	对于那些观点根本分歧的成员，这些要求是不可能实现的。


The EU would fall victim to what the historian Paul Kennedy calls “imperial overreach.” The EU would become unacceptably diluted.	欧盟可能会因此沦为保罗·肯尼迪所谓“过度扩张”的牺牲品，变得相当脆弱无力。


That is why former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing feared that Turkey’s entry would lead to the EU’s breakup, and it is why former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said, “Accession of Turkey would be more than the EU could bear.”	这就是法国前总统吉斯卡尔·德斯坦担心土耳其的加入会导致欧盟解体的原因所在，也是��什么德国前总理赫尔穆特·施密特曾经表示“土耳其的加入将超出欧盟承受能力”的原因。


But the strongest reason to oppose Turkey’s accession is a question of democracy: a majority of the EU’s population simply does not want it.	但是反对土耳其入盟最有力的原因其实是个民主问题：欧盟成员国的大多数公民根本不希望它加入。


What Syria Means	叙利亚的意义


NEW DELHI – Syria’s agony has generated a variety of unproductive responses: verbal condemnation of the excesses of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime; disagreements about the wisdom of armed intervention; and all-around confusion about the possibility of finding a viable long-term solution.	新德里—叙利亚的惨象造成了诸多毫无意义的反应：对总统巴沙尔政权暴行的口头谴责； 在武装干涉问题上的莫衷一是；


Worse, in this sorry state of affairs, the world may be getting a glimpse of a very ugly future.	以及迟迟得不出形成可行长期解决方案的可能性。 更糟糕的是，叙利亚问题上的无法作为可能会让世界的未来极其悲观。


First, let us try to disentangle some of the cat’s cradle of ironies and contradictions that are bedeviling efforts to end the violence in Syria.	首先，让我们试着解开一些让结束叙利亚暴力的努力迟迟得不到进展的讽刺和矛盾之处。


Whereas Syria denies political freedom to its citizens, it tolerates significantly more social freedom than many other Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which is leading the charge to oust Assad.	叙利亚拒绝给予公民政治自由，但该国社会自由其实要胜过许多其他阿拉伯国家，特别是沙特，而沙特正是驱逐巴沙尔的领导者。


Governed by minority Alawites (a Shia sect), Syria harbors a kaleidoscope of distinct groups: Arabs, Armenians, Christians, Kurds, Druze, Ismailis, and Bedouin. 	叙利亚的政权掌握在占少数的阿拉维派（属于什叶派）手中，其国内存在数量极多的截然不同的集团：阿拉伯人、亚美尼亚人、基督徒、库尔德人、德鲁兹派、伊斯玛义派，还有贝多因人。


It is this tolerance of cultural and religious diversity that could be endangered if the Sunni-inspired revolt sweeps the country.	正是由于存在如此多样化的文化和宗教共存，才使得逊尼派激起的反抗席卷全国将可能导致危险。


And that is why Syria simultaneously generates revulsion at the regime’s atrocities and fear of what might follow if the regime is defeated.	这也正是叙利亚同时产生对巴沙尔政权的厌恶以及对巴沙尔政权被推翻后会出现何种情景的担心的原因。


In an ancient land such as Syria, there can be no examination of the problems of the present without reflecting upon the past.	在叙利亚这样一个古国，当下的问题所带来的考验一定可以从历史中找到参照物。


History, after all, is always the mother of the present, and geography the progenitor.	毕竟，历史总是当下的源头，而地理乃是源头中的源头。


In his history of the Arab world in the aftermath of World War I, A Peace to End all Peace, David Fromkin suggests that the Middle East today reflects the failure of the European powers to consolidate the political systems that they imposed.	在关于一战之后的阿拉伯世界的著作《用一个和平终结所有和平》（A Peace to End all Peace）中，大卫·弗洛姆金（David Fromkin）指出当下的中东反映了欧洲各大国在整合它们所强加给中东地区的政治制度方面的失败。


Britain and its allies “destroyed the old order,” smashing Turkish rule of the Arabic-speaking Middle East.	英国及其盟国“摧毁了旧秩序”，推翻了阿拉伯语中东的土耳其统治。


But then they “created countries, nominated rulers, delineated frontiers, [and introduced] a state system” that would not work.	但随后它们“创建了国家，指定了统治者，划定了边境，（并引入了）国家制度”，但这并没有奏效。


But, in the wake of the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the intervention in Libya, is not the same experiment being repeated almost a century later?	但是，美国领导的伊拉克和阿富汗战争以及对利比亚的干预无非是在近一个世纪后重复相同的实验吗？


That is the question that realistic policymakers should be asking themselves as they ponder what to do in Syria.	这个问题是现实决策者在思考如何解决叙利亚问题时应该扪心自问的。


In August 1919, British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour summarized the essence of the problem that is now confronting policymakers.	1919年8月，英国外交大臣亚瑟·贝尔福总结了今天困扰着决策者的问题的核心。


“The unhappy truth,” he wrote, “is that France, England, and America have got themselves…so inextricably confused that no…satisfactory answer is now possible.”	“令人不快的事实是”，他写道，“法国、英国和美国……陷入了无法解开的困惑，以至于如今找不到……令人满意的答案。 ”


Does that not sound familiar?	这样的论调难道不是很熟悉吗？


And is not an updated version of Syrian (and then Iraqi) King Faisal’s exhortation to Arabs – “Choose to be either slaves or masters of your own destiny” – echoed in the political pronouncements of new leaders in Egypt and elsewhere.	现如今埃及和其他地区新领导人的政治口号与叙利亚（以及后来的伊拉克）国王费尔撒（King Faisal）对阿拉伯人的训诫如出一辙——“要么做奴隶，要么主宰自己的命运”。


And let us examine the actions of the West in 1919 and the years that followed.	我们还可以考察一下1919年西方采取了些什么行动，接下去几年又发生了什么。


The French, as Fromkin reminds us, “shrank Syria, so that they could control it,” rewarding their “Christian allies by swelling the borders of Mount Lebanon with the Bekaa valley, the Mediterranean ports of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, and…land…north of Palestine.	弗洛姆金提醒我们，法国人“削减了叙利亚领土以便控制它”，“通过扩大黎巴嫩山和毕卡谷（Bekaa valley）、地中海港口泰尔（Tyre）、西顿（Sidon）、贝鲁特和的黎波里以及……巴勒斯坦北部……土地的边境”以奖励他们的“基督徒盟友。


Thousands of Muslims [suddenly] belonged to a state dominated by Christians.”	千万穆斯林（一夜之间）成了由基督徒主导的国家的国民。 ”


So, as the Oxford historian Margaret Macmillan argues in her book The Peacemakers, Syria’s leaders, remembering these events when Westerners probably did not, “took the opportunity” presented by the Black September crisis of 1970 to send troops to their country’s lost lands.	因此，正如牛津历史学家玛格丽特·麦克米兰（Margaret Macmillan）在其著作《和平缔造者》（The Peacemaker）中所指出的，在西方人忘记这些事情的时候，叙利亚领导人还记着，“利用”1970年黑色9月危机所创造的“机会”向该国失去的领土派遣军队。


The combination of ethnic and sectarian fears and rivalries, historical memories, and willful blindness among outside powers seems almost predestined to destabilize the entire Middle East again.	血统和信仰的担心和对立、历史记忆以及外部大国的视而不见，这些因素组合在一起，几乎早就注定了再次动摇整个中东的宿命。 土耳其有所复苏但仍麻烦缠身；


Turkey is resurgent yet troubled; Iraq has been invaded and abandoned; Iran is isolated and threatened; Israel is anxious and belligerent; and Afghanistan and Pakistan are internally imbalanced and politically fragile.	以色列焦虑而好战； 而阿富汗和巴基斯坦存在内部失衡，政治上十分脆弱。


Indeed, the great arc stretching from Cairo to the Hindu Kush threatens to become the locus of global disorder.	事实上，从开罗到兴都库什山的大弓形很有可能演变成全球失序轨迹。


Little wonder that Iranian envoy Saeed Jalili, after meeting Assad in Damascus recently, announced that “Iran will absolutely not allow the axis of resistance, of which it considers Syria to be a main pillar, to be broken in any way.”	毫不奇怪，伊朗特使贾里里（Saeed Jalili）在最近于大马士革会见巴沙尔后宣称“伊朗绝不会坐视以叙利亚为主要支点之一的防御轴崩溃。 ”


For Turkey, Syria’s plight is a strategic nightmare, because any breakup of Syria implies the possible rise of a greater Kurdistan, which would raise claims to a great swath of Turkish territory.	对土耳其来说，叙利亚困境是一场战略噩梦，因为叙利亚的分裂意味着大库尔德斯坦的崛起，而库尔德斯坦必然会主张很大一块土耳其领土。


Is there a solution to this grim impasse?	有办法走出这一残酷僵局吗？


Certainly, one will not be found in more United Nations resolutions, which is why US President Barack Obama is now believed to favor a “managed transition” in Syria that would not fatally erode the existing instruments of the Syrian state.	显然，联合国解决方案再多也不行，这也是美国总统奥巴马如今认为应支持叙利亚“有管理的转型”从而不至于毁掉叙利亚现存国家机器的原因。


As Michael Ignatieff has wisely observed, Syria’s crisis has revealed that this is “the moment in which the West should see that the world has truly broken into two.	迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫（Michael Ignatieff）明锐地观察到，叙利亚危机告诉我们，在“这样一个时刻，西方应该看到世界真的已经一分为二。


A loose alliance of struggling capitalist democracies” is faced by Russia and China.	由挣扎中的资本主义民主国家组成的松散联盟”正面临俄罗斯和中国的挑战。


Western countries’ national interests will no longer determine the moral and political impulses of today’s global community.	西方国家的国家利益不再能够决定当今全球社会的道德和政治动力。


Indeed, whatever the outcome, Syria’s agony has underscored a further irreversible weakening of the West’s dominant global role.	事实上，不论结果如何，叙利亚惨象所体现的是西方对全球主宰力的不可逆转的进一步削弱。


Three New Lessons of the Euro Crisis	欧元危机的三个新教训


WASHINGTON, DC – While some observers argue that the key lesson of the eurozone’s baptism by fire is that greater fiscal and banking integration are needed to sustain the currency union, many economists pointed this out even before the euro’s introduction in 1999.	华盛顿—一些观察者认为欧元区洗礼的关键教训是需要更深入的银行一体化来维持货币联盟，但许多经济学家在1999年引入欧元之前就已经指出了这一点。


The real lessons of the euro crisis lie elsewhere – and they are genuinely new and surprising.	欧元危机的真正教训并不在此，它们不但全新，而且令人惊讶。


The received wisdom about currency unions was that their optimality could be assessed on two grounds.	关于货币联盟的公认智慧是它们的最优性可以用两个问题来评估。


First, were the regions to be united similar or dissimilar in terms of their economies’ vulnerability to external shocks?	首先，组成联盟的地区的经济在应对极端冲击的脆弱性方面是相同还是不同？


The more similar the regions, the more optimal the resulting currency area, because policy responses could be applied uniformly across its entire territory.	越是相同，所组成的货币区越优，因为政策应对措施可以在整个区域内一刀切地使用。


If economic structures were dissimilar, then the second criterion became critical: Were arrangements in place to adjust to asymmetric shocks?	如果经济结构不同，那么第二个标准就变得至关重要：具有调整不对称冲击的安排吗？


The two key arrangements that most economists emphasized were fiscal transfers, which could cushion shocks in badly affected regions, and labor mobility, which would allow workers from such regions to move to less affected ones.	大部分经济学家强调两大关键安排，一是财政转移，它能缓冲受冲击重创的地区； 而是劳动力流动性，它让重创地区工人能够迁往受创较轻地区。


The irony here is that the impetus toward currency union was partly a result of the recognition of asymmetries.	讽刺之处在于，从某种意义上说，迈向货币联盟的动力是对不对称的认识。


Thus, in the aftermath of the sterling and lira devaluations of the early 1990’s, with their resulting adverse trade shocks to France and Germany, the lesson that was drawn was that a single currency was needed to prevent such disparate shocks from recurring.	因此，20世纪90年代初英镑和里拉贬值后，法国和德国受到了消极的贸易冲击，人们从中汲取的教训是需要单一货币来防止这类不同冲击再次发生。


But this overlooked a crucial feature of monetary unions: free capital mobility and elimination of currency risk – indispensable attributes of a currency area – could be (and were) the source of asymmetric shocks.	但这忽视了货币联盟的一个关键特征：资本自由流动和货币风险的消除——货币区必不可少的属性——可能成为（也确实成为过）不对称冲击的原因。


Currency unions, in other words, must worry about endogenous as much as exogenous shocks.	换句话说，货币联盟必须不但要考虑外生冲击，也要考虑内生冲击。


Free capital mobility allowed surpluses from large savers such as Germany to flow to capital importers such as Spain, while the perceived elimination of currency risk served to aggravate such flows.	资本的自由流动让盈余从德国等大储蓄国流向西班牙等资本进口国，而货币风险不再的感觉会放大这种资本流。


To investors, Spanish housing assets seemed a great investment, because the forces of economic convergence unleashed by the euro would surely push up their prices – and because there was no peseta that could lose value.	对投资者来说，西班牙房地产资产是伟大的投资，因为欧元所带来的经济趋同的力量必然会提升其价格，也因为西班牙不再有可以贬值的比塞塔。


These capital flows created a boom – and a loss of long-term competitiveness – in some regions, which was followed by an all-too-predictable bust.	这些资本流创造了一些地区的繁荣和长期竞争力损失，随之而来的是意料中的幻灭。


To the extent that monetary and fiscal arrangements fail to reduce or eliminate moral hazard, the risk that capital flows create these endogenous asymmetric shocks will remain commensurately high.	由于货币和财政安排没能抑制或消除道德风险，资本流造成这些内生不对称冲击的风险将继续维持相当高的水平。


A second insight from the case of the eurozone, advanced by the economist Paul de Grauwe, is that currency unions can be prone to self-reinforcing liquidity crises, because some vulnerable parts (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy at various points) lack their own currencies.	关于欧元区危机的第二项洞察——来自经济学家格劳维（Paul de Grauwe）——是货币联盟易受自我加强的流动性危机的冲击，因为脆弱部分（不同时点的希腊、西班牙、葡萄牙和意大利）缺少自己的货币。


Until the European Central Bank stepped in last August to become the central bank not just of Germany and France, but also of the distressed peripheral countries, the latter were like emerging-market economies that had borrowed in foreign currency and faced abrupt capital outflows.	直到去年8月，欧洲央行才不再仅仅是德国和法国的央行，也成为外围受困国的央行，后者就像是借入外币贷款、面临突发资本外流的新兴市场经济体。


These “sudden stops,” as the economists Guillermo Calvo and Carmen Reinhart call them, raised risk premiums and weakened the affected countries’ fiscal positions, which in turn increased risk, and so on, creating the vicious downward spiral that characterizes self-reinforcing crises.	经济学家卡尔沃（Guillermo Calvo）和莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）称之为“突停”，突停提高了风险溢价，削弱了受冲击国家的财政状况，而这反过来又反过来增加了风险，如此等等，最后造成了向下的恶性循环，自我循环的危机就此产生。


The most appropriate analogy is with a country like South Korea.	最恰当的比方是韩国。


In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, South Korea needed dollars, because its firms had borrowed in dollars that domestic savers could not fully supply.	2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭后，韩国需要美元，因为韩国企业借入了无法完全靠本国储蓄者提供的美元。


Thus, it entered into a swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve to guarantee that South Korea’s demand for foreign currency would be met.	于是，韩国与美联储签订了互换安排，韩国的外币需求将得到满足。


Of course, the euro crisis was not just a liquidity crisis.	当然，欧元危机不仅仅是流动性危机。


Several countries in the periphery (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) were responsible for the circumstances that led to and precipitated the crisis, and there may be fundamental solvency issues that need to be addressed even if the liquidity shortfall is addressed.	一些外围国（希腊、西班牙和葡萄牙）对于导致和恶化危机的环境负有责任，即使流动性短缺问题得到了纠正，也有根本性的偿债能力问题需要解决。


Finally, a less well-recognized insight from the euro-crisis concerns the role and impact of a currency union’s dominant members.	最后还有一个不被人重视的欧元危机教训，即货币联盟主导成员的角色和影响。


It is often argued that the United States, as the major reserve-currency issuer, enjoys what then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously called in the 1960’s an “exorbitant privilege,” in the form of lower borrowing costs (a benefit estimated to be worth as much as 80 basis points).	人们常说，美国作为主要储备货币发行者享受着时���法国财政部长德斯坦20世纪60年代的名言——“过分特权”，即更低的借贷成本（据估计，这一好处大约相当于80个基点）。


There was always a downside – previously ignored but now highly salient in our mercantilist era – to this supposed privilege.	想象的特权总有衰败的一天——此前一直被忽视，而在如今的重商主义时代显露无疑。


If investors flock to “safe” US financial assets, these capital flows must keep the dollar significantly stronger that it would be otherwise, which is an unambiguous cost, especially at a time of idle resources and unutilized capacity.	如果投资者涌向“安全”的美国金融资产，这些资本流必然会让美元大幅升值，这毫无疑问是一种成本，特别是在满是闲置资源和闲置产能的时期。


But, in the case of Germany, exorbitant privilege has come without this cost, owing solely to the currency union.	但是，对德国来说，过分特权是无成本的，这完全是因为货币联盟。


Weakness in the periphery has led to capital flowing back to Germany as a regional safe haven, lowering German borrowing costs.	外围国的疲软导致资本流回作为安全港的德国，降低了德国的借贷成本。


But, yoked to weak economies such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the euro has also been much weaker than the Deutschemark would have been.	但是，由于希腊、西班牙和葡萄牙等疲软经济体的存在，欧元比德国马克（如果存在）弱势得多。


In effect, Germany has had the double exorbitant privilege of lower borrowing costs and a weaker currency – a feat that a non-monetary-union currency like the US dollar cannot accomplish.	事实上，德国享有着低借贷成本和弱势货币的双重过分特权——这是美元等非货币联盟货币无法享受的。


The future of the eurozone will be determined, above all, by politics.	说到底，欧元区的未来将由政治决定。


But its development so far has forever changed and improved our understanding of currency unions.	但其到目前为止的发展态势永久地改变和改善了我们对货币联盟的理解。


And that will be true regardless of whether the eurozone achieves the closer fiscal and banking arrangements that remain necessary to sustain it.	不管欧元区实现更紧密的财政和银行安排与否——这仍是维系欧元区的必要条件——这一点都是正确的。


What the West Can Do	西方的应对之策


TBILISI – Given the tremendous damage that Russia has inflicted on Georgia, it is easy to conclude that the Kremlin has achieved its objectives.	& & & 第比利斯amp#45;amp#45;鉴于俄国已经在格鲁吉亚造成了巨大损失，人们很容易就得出结论说克里姆林宫已经实现了其目标。


But, so far, Russia has failed in its real goal – getting rid of Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s pro-democracy, pro-American president.	但是目前为止，俄国的真实意图没有得逞，也就是把亲民主、亲美的格鲁吉亚总统萨卡什维利赶下台。


To be sure, Russia has tightened its control of the separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.	& & & 毫无疑问，俄国加紧了其对南奥赛梯和阿布哈兹两块飞地的控制。


It shattered the Georgian military, grievously damaged Georgia’s economy, and stirred up discord within the Western alliance.	俄国击溃了格鲁吉亚军队，重挫其经济并在西方联盟内部引起了不和。


For three years, it has tried every conceivable tactic to bring Saakashvili down – fomenting a domestic uprising, imposing an economic blockade, beefing up its forces in the enclaves, and finally a war.	三年以来，俄国一直以各种可能的手段来推翻萨卡什维利，包括鼓动格鲁吉亚国内叛乱、实行经济禁运、在飞地内增兵，最后是发动战争。


Yet Georgia’s president remains in power.	但是格鲁吉亚总统依旧掌权。


Here in Tbilisi, tension is understandably high.	& & & 第比利斯的局势无疑高度紧张。


Russian tanks are less than 25 miles away, and the wheat fields along the main road to Gori were ablaze, set on fire by Russian troops, as I drove through Russian checkpoints to get to that deserted, occupied city.	俄国坦克就在距离戈里不到25英里的地方。 在我驾车穿过俄军检查站前往被俄军占领、已经是空城的戈里的时候看到交通要道两旁的麦田被俄国士兵放火焚烧。


(Most memorable sight: drunken Russian soldiers in stolen Georgian uniforms – “because they are better than ours.”)	(最为难忘的景象是喝得醉醺醺的俄军穿着偷来的格鲁吉亚军服，他们说那是因为他们军服的要比我们的好。 )


Russia’s invasion of Georgia has reshaped the strategic landscape.	& & & 俄国入侵格鲁吉亚重新描划了战略大局。


But, as the West debates how to “punish Russia,” it is vital to remember that the main front is still in Georgia.	但是，在西方辩论如何“惩罚俄国”之际，主要战线还是在格鲁吉亚。 记住这一点十分重要。


Talk about taking away the 2014 Winter Olympics or ejecting Russia from the G-8 may (or may not) have some effect on the Kremlin, but the most important thing the West can do now is strengthen the government in Tbilisi.	谈论剥夺2014年奥运会的主办权或者把俄国从工业八强集团中驱逐出去对于克里姆林宫而言或许有点效果(或许没有)，但是西方目前可以做的最为重要的事情就是巩固第比利斯政府。


The equation is simple: if Saakashvili survives, Vladimir Putin loses.	道理很简单，那就是，如果萨卡什维利坚持下来，普京就失败了。


The intense personal hatred between these men overlays two centuries of tortured history between Russia and Georgia.	& & & 萨卡什维利和普京二人之间个人恩怨很深，这掩盖了两国两百年来的仇怨。


Many people report that Putin simply “loses it” when discussing the upstart Saakashvili, who led his country from near bankruptcy into a golden age of economic growth and the world’s highest rate of foreign direct investment relative to GDP.	许多人都说只要一谈到冉冉升起的萨卡什维利，普京就不可耐烦。 而萨卡什维利把格鲁吉亚从破产的边缘带进了经济增长的黄金年代，其外国直接投资占国民生产总值的比例位居世界第一。


All this has been halted by Russian tanks.	所有的这些都被俄军的坦克阻止了。


The Kremlin has probably lost its chance to remove Saakashvili by overt force, although sinister, more stealthy means cannot be ruled out.	& & & 克里姆林宫或许丧失了用公开力量推翻萨卡什维利的机会，但是并不能排除使用阴险、更为狡猾的手段这样去做。


Having just dined with him in a public restaurant, I wish his security was a little tighter.	我刚刚和萨卡什维利在一家公开餐馆吃完晚餐。


(His predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a near-miss target for several assassination attempts that are widely believed to have been Russian-directed.)	我希望他的保安能够好一点。 (他的前任谢瓦尔德纳泽几次躲过谋杀企图，大家都认为是俄国策划的。


The Kremlin’s best hope now is that Georgia’s economy will crumble, its currency will collapse, and an unhappy populace, encouraged by some opposition leader (perhaps bankrolled by Russia), will force Saakashvili from power.	)& 克里姆林宫希望最好就是格鲁吉亚经济崩溃，货币一钱不值，积怨的民众在反对党领导人(或许得到俄国资助)的鼓励下迫使萨卡什维利下台。


The Western response to this challenge must go beyond rhetoric.	& & & 西方应对这一挑战不能停留在口头。


What matters most right now is massive economic and military assistance.	目前最为重要的是大规模经济和军事援助。


Public commitments to help rebuild Georgia are the best way to prevent Russia from achieving its goal.	公开承诺帮助重建格鲁吉亚是防止俄国实现企图的最佳方式。


Prime Minister Vladimir Gurgenidze estimates that rebuilding railroads, bridges, ports and other infrastructure will cost at least $1 billion; this does not include humanitarian relief, refugee resettlement costs, or rebuilding Georgia’s military.	格鲁吉亚总理古尔格尼泽估计，重建铁路、桥梁、港口以及其他基础设施将会花费至少10亿美元。 这还不包括人道主义援助、重新安置难民或者重建格鲁吉亚军队的费用。


Gurgenidze also foresees negative economic growth, a huge budget deficit, and a collapse of tourism, which was just taking off in this beautiful country.	古尔格尼泽还估计，经济将会倒退，大量的预算赤字以及旅游业萎缩，而旅游业则刚刚在这一美丽的国家起飞。


United States Senator Joseph Biden has called for an immediate $1 billion supplemental appropriation, a proposal quickly endorsed by Barack Obama.	& & & 美国参议员拜登呼吁立即增拨10亿美元，奥巴马立即表示支持。


But the Bush administration has not yet been specific on economic support.	但是布什当局目前对经济援助尚不明确。


Congress will be in session only briefly before the election, and a supplemental appropriation will pass only if President Bush pursues it vigorously as a bipartisan measure.	美国国会在总统选举前只会短暂开会，只有布什总统积极地以两党法案推动，增拨法案才会得以通过。


Even if delayed until next year, its immediate proposal by Bush and endorsement by both presidential candidates would help morale in Georgia.	即使这一法案推迟到明年，布什总统马上提出以及两党总统候选人予以赞同将会帮助格鲁吉亚的士气。


The European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development must match American support.	欧盟、世界银行、国际货币基金组织、欧洲复兴和发展银行都必须响应美国，给予同样的援助。


In the long run, Georgia and Russia must coexist peacefully.	& & & 长远而言，格鲁吉亚和俄国必须和平共处。


Here, Georgia must do its part.	格鲁吉亚必须尽到责任。


Saakashvili, an immensely talented 41-year-old, saved his country from utter collapse in 2003.	41岁的萨卡什维利才华横溢，在2003年把格鲁吉亚从废墟中拯救了出来。


But he must think strategically about the future.	但是他必须对未来做出战略性的思考。


On occasion, he has berated the Europeans for insufficient support – not a good tactic for someone trying to join the EU – and has used rhetoric about Russia that, while understandable, only increases the danger to himself.	& & & 有时，他严加责难欧洲援助不够，这对于想要加入欧盟并不是一个好计策。 他严加抨击俄国，尽管可以理解，但是这只会给他自己增加危险。


Saakashvili cannot pick up his tiny country and move it to Mexico.	萨卡什维利无法把国家打包搬到墨西哥。


He has to manage the situation with greater care.	他不得不更为小心地应对局势。


There will be consequences, of course, for Russia’s relations with the West.	& & & 当然，俄欧关系也会受到影响。


(Bush’s inattentiveness to this Russian threat – dramatically illustrated by his literal embrace of Putin in Beijing as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia – may have led the Kremlin to think it could get away with its invasion.)	(布什对于俄国的威胁不以为然，当俄军坦克开进格鲁吉亚的时候，他在北京几乎拥抱普京极大地表现出这一点。 这或许让克里姆林宫认为他们可以入侵格鲁吉亚而逍遥法外。


While the West will not going to war over Georgia, Russia must understand that it will pay for using force, or the threat of force, against neighbors that were once part of the Soviet space.	)尽管西方不会因为格鲁吉亚而开战，但是俄国必须知道，针对曾经是苏联一部分的邻国使用武力或者威胁使用武力，它就要付出代价。


This is especially true for Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which are likely to be Moscow’s next targets for intimidation.	& & & 这对于乌克兰和阿塞拜疆尤其如此。 这两个国家有可能成为莫斯科下面的恐吓目标。


The rules of the post-Cold War world are changing – but not to the ultimate benefit of Russia, which has underestimated the unifying effect its actions will have on the West.	后冷战时代世界的规则正在改变，但并不是符合俄国的最终利益。 俄国低估了其行动会让西方团结一致的效果。


Exactly how these relationships evolve depends on what each side does in the coming weeks – especially in Georgia.	这些关系究竟如何演变取决于各方在未来数周内特别是在格鲁吉亚如何动作。


What to Expect From the 44th President	对第44任总统的期待


NEW YORK – Campaigns, be they political or military, are waged to be won, and the current American presidential campaign is no exception.	纽约－活动，不管是政治的还是军事的，目的都是为了获胜，当前的美国总统竞选活动也不例外。


The Democratic and Republican candidates are doing all they can to distinguish themselves from an unpopular incumbent president and from one another in the remaining weeks before Americans vote.	民主党和共和党的总统候选人在美国人投票之前剩下的几个星期里，都竭尽全力去和不受欢迎的现任总统以及对方区别开来。


For good reason, much attention is focused on foreign policy differences between the two nominees, which in many areas are both obvious and considerable.	许多注意力都被集中到了两位总统候选人外交政策的不同上面，而这在许多方面是既明显又值得注意的，是有充分理由的。


Still, it is possible to discern some similarities between them, in part because some of their disagreements are not as pronounced as they seem, and in part because the constraints that the next president of the United States will face are certain to limit what either man could do in office.	然而，仍然能够在他们之间发现一些相似点，部分是因为他们的差别并不像他们宣称的那样，部分是因为美国下任总统面临的限制因素，肯定会限制不管谁当选后所能做的事情。


Consider Iraq, the most divisive issue in American politics for the past five years.	想想伊拉克，它是过去5年里美国政治中分歧最大的问题。


Barack Obama regularly points out that the decision to go to war was deeply flawed; John McCain emphasizes how much things have turned around since early 2007, when US troop numbers were increased and US strategy revised.	巴拉克·奥巴马经常指出，发动战争的决定是非常错误的； 约翰·麦凯恩强调从2007年初期开始，当美国军队数量增加并且美国的策略发生变化时，有多少事情发生了好转。


Observers could be forgiven for thinking that they are speaking about two entirely different conflicts.	如果观察员认为奥巴马和麦凯恩在说两个完全不同的冲突，是可以得到原谅的。


But what about the future?	但是将来呢？


No matter who wins this November, it is clear that Iraq will not dominate US foreign policy in the years ahead to anything near the degree that it has in recent years.	不管今年11月谁获胜，伊拉克在未来几年里都远远不会像在最近几年里那样，支配着美国的外交政策，这是很清楚的。


We are entering the post-Iraq era of American foreign policy.	我们正在进入美国外交政策的后伊拉克时代。


Consistent with this, the US military presence is decreasing.	与此一致，美国在伊拉克的军事存在在下降。


Where the two candidates differ is on the timing and pace of this drawdown, not on its general direction.	两位总统候选人观点不同的地方在于这个下降趋势的时间和节奏，而不是其基本方向。


By contrast, the US commitment to Afghanistan will increase, and troop levels will climb.	与之相对，美国对阿富汗承担的义务将会增加，驻军水平将会上升。


Behind this prediction is a widely shared assessment that the trends in Afghanistan (unlike in Iraq) are negative, and that the US must strengthen its military presence there and revise its strategy if the Taliban are not to gain the upper hand.	在这一预言的背后，是对阿富汗（和伊拉克不同）的趋势在向负面发展，以及如果不想让塔利班占上风，美国必须加强其在阿富汗的军事存在并修正其策略的广泛共识判断。


It is also widely understood that Pakistan has become part of the problem.	人们也普遍认为，巴基斯坦已经成为阿富汗问题的一部分。


Pakistan’s western reaches are now a sanctuary for militias and terrorists that are moving in and out of Afghanistan.	巴基斯坦的西部区域现在是进出阿富汗的武装分子和恐怖分子的避难所。


Here, Barack Obama appears more willing to have the US launch unilateral military raids against terrorists should the opportunity arise.	在此，巴拉克·奥巴马似乎更愿意在时机成熟的情况下，由美国启动单边打击恐怖分子的军事行动。


But whoever is elected will confront difficult choices if a nuclear-armed Pakistan remains unable or unwilling to act as an American partner and meet its responsibilities in the effort against terrorism.	但是，不管谁当选，都将会面临如果拥有核武器的巴基斯坦不能或不愿意当美国的合作伙伴，以及不能或不愿意承担其在打击恐怖主义活动中的责任时的困难选择。


A third area of some consensus (and some distance from George W. Bush) is climate change.	第三个有一些共识（和乔治·沃克·布什有一定距离）的领域是气候变化。


Under the next president, the US will no longer be a drag on international efforts to create a global regime that sets a ceiling on greenhouse gas emissions.	在下任总统任职期间，美国将不再会拖国际社会建立设定最大温室气体排放量的全球体制努力的后腿。


One result of this likely evolution in US policy is that pressure will shift to other countries, particularly China and India, to accept some limits on their own economic behavior.	这个美国政策可能的进步的结果是，压力会转移到其他国家，特别是中国和印度，迫使它们接受对自身的经济行为的一些限制。


A President McCain or Obama will take steps to improve America’s image in the world.	麦凯恩总统或奥巴马总统会采取措施提高美国在世界上的形象。


One of his first decisions will be to implement a ban on all forms of torture.	这个总统的首要任务之一就是禁止对囚犯所有形式的折磨。


Also to be expected early on is a decision to close the facility at Guantánamo Bay, where terrorism suspects have been held for years without trial.	也可以期待在总统上任后不久，就会决定关闭关塔纳摩湾的设施； 在关塔纳摩，恐怖嫌疑分子在没有审判的情况下被羁押多年。


Iran is another area where the differences – at least initially – may not be as sharp as the campaign suggests.	伊朗是另一个差别——至少开始是——不像竞选活动显示的那样尖锐的地方。


Both candidates have stressed that an Iran with nuclear weapons would be unacceptable.	两位总统候选人都强调拥有核武器的伊朗是不可接受的。


The victor will almost surely endorse a new diplomatic initiative aimed at ending Iran’s independent ability to enrich uranium.	总统竞选获胜者几乎肯定会签署一个新的旨在结束伊朗独立进行铀浓缩的能力的倡议。


Less clear are the details of such an initiative, or what the US would do if it were to fail.	不太清楚的是这个倡议的细节，或者如果它失败了美国会怎么做。


The candidates’ statements on Iran do suggest two different philosophies of diplomacy.	两位总统候选人对伊朗的申明确实显示了两种不同的外交哲学。


Obama seems to regard meeting with foreign leaders as a normal component of foreign policy, to be employed as one of many tools.	奥巴马似乎认为和外国领导人举行会谈是外交政策正常的组成部分，应该作为许多手段中的一种加以使用。


McCain appears to embrace the view that such meetings are something of a reward, to be offered when preconditions are met (Iran comes to mind) and withdrawn when certain lines are crossed, as Russia was judged to have done this August in Georgia.	麦凯恩的观点似乎认为这样的会谈是一种奖赏，当满足先决条件的时候（想想伊朗）就提供这种奖赏，当越过一定界限的时候就撤回这种奖赏，像有人认为俄罗斯在今年八月份在格鲁吉亚做的那样。


Despite such differences, either would carry out policies closer to those of Bush’s second term than his first.	尽管有这样的区别，但是，无论谁当选都会执行比起布什在第一任期的政策，更接近其第二任期政策的政策。


With a strained military and a struggling economy, the next president will often have little choice other than to talk.	在军队紧张经济困难的情况下，下一任总统经常会除了会谈外，几乎没有选择。


On other issues, such as trade, there are distinctions between the candidates.	在其他问题上，例如贸易，两位总统候选人的观点有明显的区别。


McCain is a stronger advocate of free trade than Obama is.	麦凯恩比奥巴马更强烈地支持自由贸易。


But this difference may have less impact than meets the eye.	但是，这种差异的影响要比表面上看起来小得多。


Congress plays a large role in trade policy, and the near certainty that the Democratic Party’s majority in Congress will grow after the election means that protectionism will grow as well.	议会在贸易政策中起重要作用，在大选后，民主党在议会中的多数席位几乎肯定会增长，这意味着保护主义也会增长。


Difficult economic times will make it hard to generate support for trade pacts, despite the current importance of export-oriented firms for the American economy.	经济困难时期很难产生对贸易协议的支持，尽管当前出口导向型的企业对美国经济非常重要。


There are real and important differences between the two candidates when it comes to how they would approach the world.	当谈到他们会怎样与国际社会相处时，两位总统候选人的观点有真正和重大的区别。


But there are also more similarities than might be evident from the debates and the campaign.	但是，和在辩论和竞选中可能明显表现出来的共同点相比，他们之间也有更多的共同观点。


Aspects of the next president’s foreign policy are there to see if observers read between the lines and take as much note of what is not said as what is.	如果观察员能体会言外之意并大量观察那些没有按照本来面目表述的东西，下任美国总统外交策的观点可以看清楚了。


What Went Wrong with America	美国怎么了？


The latest edition of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey shows that favorable opinions of the United States have fallen again in 12 out of 15 countries polled, a sad reflection of a country’s loss of image.	最新一期的佩尤全球态度调查（Pew Global Attitudes Survey）显示：在接受调查的15个国家中，12个国家对美国的欢迎程度再次下降，这反映出美国形象尽失的悲哀。


How can America recover international legitimacy?	美国如何才能重新赢得国际地位？


This is probably one of the most important challenges for today’s world, for America retains a unique power that should be used – and be perceived – as a force for good if global stability is to prevail.	这也许是当今世界最重要的挑战之一，因为如果我们希望全球稳定，美国人所掌握的独一无二的权力就需要被看作¾并且用作¾一种正义的力量。


Nearly two decades after the demise of the Soviet empire, what stands out is a prevailing sense of lost opportunities.	在苏维埃帝国解体近20年后，人们普遍地认为我们已经失去了绝佳的机会。


The US had a unique opportunity at the end of the Cold War to use its benevolent and enlightened superiority to establish a better international order.	冷战结束时，美国曾有过独一无二的机遇，能够利用其自身宽厚、文明的强大优势建立起更为理想的国际秩序。