The new Middle East includes Dubai, the Gulf emirates, and Israel, as well as Hezbollah, Hamas, and jihadi terrorism – and, partly, Iran and Saudi Arabia.	新的中东则包括迪拜、海湾各酋长国和以色列，以及真主党、哈马斯和圣战恐怖主义—以及一定程度上的伊朗和沙特阿拉伯。


Jordan and Morocco are also trying to associate themselves with the new Middle East.	约旦和摩洛哥也正试图将自己与新中东关联起来。


Obviously, as these examples suggest, “new” does not necessarily mean better, but simply different and more modern.	显然，正如这些例子所显示的，“新”并不一定意味着更好，而只是不同和更现代。


Indeed, modernization by no means implies a solution to the conflicts that continue to fester in the region.	的确，现代化决不意味着是对该地区继续恶化中的冲突的解决之道。


Instead, these conflicts are themselves “modernized,” which could make them even more dangerous than in the past.	相反，这些冲突本身也“现代化”了，这可能使它们比以往更为危险。


An aspect of such modernization could be seen in the 2006 Lebanon war between Israel and Hezbollah, where tank warfare was rendered obsolete by missiles and Katyushas.	这种现代化的方面在2006年以色列和真主党之间的黎巴嫩战争中可见一斑：坦克站在导弹和“喀秋莎”火箭炮面前显得过时了。


At the same time, non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, have taken the place of traditional armies, and suicide bombers equipped with road-side and car bombs or explosive belts have replaced guerrilla fighters with their Kalashnikovs.	同时，非国家实体，如真主党、哈马斯和“基地组织”等已经取代了传统军队。 而装备了路边和汽车炸弹和炸药皮带的自杀人弹带着他们的AK冲锋枪取代了游击战士。


Perhaps the most important change is the shift in the region’s political and military center of gravity.	可能最重要的变化是该地区政治和军事重心的转移。


While Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon defined the most important hot spots in the old Middle East, regional power and politics in the wake of the Iraq war is now centered in the Persian Gulf.	以色列、巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩是旧中东最重要的热点地区，而伊拉克战争之后的地区权力和政治现在是波斯湾的中心议题。


The dominant conflict is no longer the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, but the threat of a confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia for sub-regional supremacy, and between Iran and the US for regional hegemony.	首要的冲突不再是巴以斗争，而是伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间争夺副区域控制权和伊朗与美国之间争夺地区霸权的冲突威胁。


Indeed, it is by now virtually impossible to implement any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without Iran and its local allies – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.	的确，当前要在没有伊朗及其地区盟友—黎巴嫩真主党和巴勒斯坦哈马斯的情况下实施任何针对巴以冲突的解决方案几乎都是不可能的。


In a way, then, the war in Iraq forms the strategic and military bridge between the old and the new Middle East.	也就是说，伊拉克战争在一定程度上形成了新旧中东之间的战略和军事桥梁。


The US intervention has brought about four far-reaching changes in the region:	美国的干预给该地区造成了四项长远的影响：


·    Iran’s hegemonic ambitions have been unleashed, and the country has been helped to a strategic position that it could never have reached on its own.	u      伊朗的霸权野心被释放，并乘势达到了一个仅靠自身无论如何也无法企及的战略地位。


·    The democratization of Iraq has empowered the Shi’a majority, which in turn greatly strengthened Iran’s influence.	u      伊拉克的民主化使占大多数的什叶派穆斯林掌权，而这又极大强化了伊朗的影响。


Indeed, the war in Iraq has transformed the centuries-old Shi’a-Sunni conflict by infusing it with modern geopolitical significance and extending it to the entire region.	的确，伊拉克战争通过为其注入现代政治意义并将其延伸到整个地区，转变了数个世纪以来的什叶—逊尼派冲突。


·    The rise of Iran poses an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, because the country’s oil-rich northeast is populated by a Shi’a majority.	u      伊朗的崛起对沙特阿拉伯是一种现实存在的威胁，因为该国石油资源丰富的东北地区的人口以什叶派为���。


A Shi’a government in Baghdad, dominated by Iran, would, in the medium term, threaten Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity – a scenario that the Saudis cannot, and will not, accept.	由伊朗控制的巴格达什叶派政府在中期会对沙特的领土完整造成威胁—这种情况是沙特人不能也不会接受的。


·    Should Iran manage to become a nuclear power, the Saudis’ existential fears would dramatically escalate.	u      一旦伊朗成功跻身核国家之列，沙特人业已存在的恐惧就会急剧升级。


More generally, the currency of conventional military power in the Middle East would largely lose its value, inevitably resulting in a regional nuclear arms race.	更广泛而言，常规军力在中东就会大幅贬值，从而不可避免地引发地区性核军备竞赛。


Emanating from this new situation is the threat of disintegration of the whole Anglo-French system of states in the Middle East.	这种新情况所放射出的威胁是整个英法国家体系在中东的解体。


The first candidate is, of course, Iraq.	当然，首当其冲的就是伊拉克。


Whether Iraq can be held together despite the ethnic and religious confrontations that pit Kurds against Arabs and Sunnis against the Shi’a is one of the most pregnant questions for the new Middle East.	尽管面临库尔德人和阿拉伯人之间以及逊尼派和什叶派之间的种族和宗教对峙，伊拉克是否还能保持统一将是新中东意义最重大的问题之一。


For Iraq’s disintegration would be hard to contain; indeed, it could bring about a thorough balkanization of the region.	因为伊拉克的分裂将会难以控制； 的确，它将造成该地区的全面巴尔干化。


Another important question is whether political Islam will move toward democracy and acceptance of modernity or remain trapped in radicalism and invocation of the past?	另一个重要的问题是政治伊斯兰教是会朝着民主和接受现代性的方向发展还是继续沉陷在过去的激进主义和符咒之中？


The forefront of this battle is, at the moment, not in the Middle East, but in Turkey; nevertheless, the result is bound to have more general significance.	当下，这场战斗的最前沿不在中东而在土耳其； 不论如何，其结果必定会具有更为广泛的意义。


The emergence of the new Middle East may present an opportunity to establish a regional order that reflects the legitimate interests of all the actors involved, provides secure borders, and replaces hegemonic aspirations with transparency and cooperation.	新中东的出现可能会提供一次机遇以建立一种反映相关各方合法利益，提供安全的边界并用透明与合作取代霸权欲望的区域秩序。


If not, or if such an opportunity is not seized, the new Middle East will be much more dangerous than the old one.	如果上述机遇没有出现或没有被把握住，那么新中东将会比旧中东更危险。


The Emotional Clash of Civilizations	文明社会的情感冲突


Throughout the so-called “war on terror,” the notion of a “clash of civilization” between Islam and the West has usually been dismissed as politically incorrect and intellectually wrongheaded.	在整个所谓“恐怖战争”时期，伊斯兰与西方之间的“文明冲突”这一概念一直因政治上不准确、知性上固执而遭到驳斥。


Instead, the most common interpretation has been that the world has entered a new era characterized by conflict “within” a particular civilization, namely Islam, with fundamentalist Muslims as much at war against moderates as against the West.	然而，最常见的解释是，世界已进入一个新时期，其特征是一种特定文明“内部”的冲突，即伊斯兰连同原教旨穆斯林对温和主义者争战，一如对西方国家争战。


The strategic conclusion derived from such an analysis was clear, ambitious, and easily summarized: democratization.	上述分析所得出的战略结论既清晰大胆又易于概括，那就是民主化。


If the absence of democracy in the Islamic world was the problem, bringing democracy to the “Greater Middle-East would be the solution, and it was the historical duty of the United States, as the most powerful and moral nation, to bring about that necessary change.	如果伊斯兰世界缺乏民主是问题所在，那么，将民主引入“大中东”就是解决方案； 而且，造成必要的变化正是美国作为最强大、最道德的国家的历史职责。


The status quo was untenable.	现状难以维持。


Implementing democracy, with or without regime change, was the only alternative to chaos and the rise of fundamentalism.	无论是否改变体制，实行民主是解决混乱状态和原教旨主义兴起问题的惟一备选方案。


Today, Iraq may be on the verge of civil war between Shiites and Sunnis.	今天，伊拉克可能面临什叶派教徒和逊尼派教义之间的内战。


Iran under a new and more radical president is moving irresistibly towards possessing a nuclear capacity.	伊朗在一位更激进的新总统的领导下，正义无反顾地要取得核能力。


A free electoral process brought Hamas to power in Palestine, and the unfortunate episode of the Danish newspaper cartoons illustrated the almost combustible nature of relations between Islam and the West.	自由选举进程将哈马斯推上巴勒斯坦的领导地位，而丹麦报纸漫画的不幸事件却阐明了伊斯兰和西方之间的关系到了一触即发的境地。


All of these developments are paving the way to new interpretations.	所有这些事态发展为新的诠释铺平了道路。


Rather than a “clash of civilizations,” we might instead be faced by multiple layers of conflict, which interact with each other in ways that increase global instability.	我们面临的不是“文明的冲突”，而是冲突的多个层面，它们相互作用的结果是造成全球日益不稳定。


Indeed, it appears that the world is witnessing a triple conflict.	的确，世界似乎正在经历三重冲突。


There is a clash within Islam, which, if the violence in Iraq spreads to neighboring countries, risks causing regional destabilization.	伊斯兰内部存在冲突，如果伊拉克暴力蔓延到邻国，这种冲突就会造成区域动荡的危险。


There is also a clash that is best described not as being between Islam and the West, but between the secularized world and a growing religious one.	还有一种冲突通常不是描述为伊斯兰与西方之间的冲突，而是世俗社会和日益宗教化社会之间的冲突。


At an even deeper and atavistic level, there is an emotional clash between a culture of fear and a culture of humiliation.	在更深刻的返祖遗传层面上，恐慌文化和屈辱文化之间存在情感冲突。


It would be a gross oversimplification to speak, as some are doing, of a clash between civilization and barbarism.	像某些人那样来谈论文明与野蛮之间的冲突显然过于简单化。


In reality, we are confronted with a widening divide over the role of religion, which runs between the West (with the US being a complicated exception) and much of the rest of the world (the most notable exception being China), but particularly the Islamic world.	事实上，我们面临宗教作用的拓展性分隔，这就将西方（美国是例外令人费解）和世界其他大部分地区（最明显的例外是中国）特别是伊斯兰世界分隔开来。


The divide reflects how religion defines an individual’s identity within a society.	这种分隔反映了一个社会宗教是如何确定个人的身份的。


At a time when religion is becoming increasingly important elsewhere, we Europeans have largely forgotten our (violent and intolerant) religious past, and we have difficulty understanding the role that religion can play in other peoples’ daily lives.	宗教在各地日显重要的时候，我们欧洲人很大程度上忘记了我们那（暴力、偏狭）的宗教过去，并且我们很难理解宗教可能在其他人的日常生活中所起的作用。


In some ways, “they” are our own buried past and, with a combination of ignorance, prejudice, and, above all, fear, “we” are afraid that “they” could define our future.	在某种程度上，“他们”是我们自己已埋葬的过去，同样埋葬的是无知、偏见，最重要的是，恐慌，“我们”害怕“他们”会界定我们的未来。


We live in a secular world, where free speech can easily turn into insensitive and irresponsible mockery, while others see religion as their supreme goal, if not their last hope.	我们生活在世俗的世界里，自由言论很容易转变成不得体、不负责任的嘲讽，而其他人视宗教为其最高目标，甚至是最后一线希望。


They have tried everything, from nationalism to regionalism, from communism to capitalism.	他们做出各种尝试，从民族主义到宗教狂热，从共产主义到资本主义。


Since everything has failed, why not give God a chance?	既然所有尝试均告失败，何不给上帝一个机会？


Globalization may not have created these layers of conflicts, but it has accelerated them by making the differences more visible and palpable.	全球化可能不会产生这些冲突层面，但会通过使差别更加明显而加速冲突的产生。


In our globalized age, we have lost the privilege – and, paradoxically, the virtue – of ignorance.	在我们全球化时代，我们已丧失无知的特权—及反论上的优势。


We all see how others feel and react, but without the minimal historical and cultural tools necessary to decipher those reactions.	我们都明白别人是如何感觉和做出反应的，但尚未拥有破译那些反作用所必需的最起码的历史和文化工具。


Globalization has paved the way to a world dominated by the dictatorship of emotions – and of ignorance.	全球化已为情感（和无知）的独裁所主宰的世界铺平了道路。


This clash of emotions is exacerbated in the case of Islam.	情感冲突在伊斯兰问题上恶化了。


In the Arab world, in particular, Islam is dominated by a culture of humiliation felt by the people and nations that consider themselves the main losers, the worst victims, of a new and unjust international system.	特别是，在阿拉伯国家，伊斯兰受民族和国家所感受的屈辱文化所主宰，这些民族和国家自认为在一种新型的不公平国际体系中遭受了重大挫折，是最严重的受害者。


From that standpoint, the Israel-Palestine conflict is exemplary.	基于这种立场，巴以冲突即为典型。


It has become an obsession.	它已成为一种成见。


It is not so much that Arabs and Muslims really care about the Palestinians.	阿拉伯人和穆斯林人未必确实非常关心巴勒斯坦人。


On the contrary, the Islamic world left the Palestinians without real support for decades.	相反，伊斯兰世界数十年来未曾真正支持国巴勒斯坦人。


In reality, for them the conflict has come to symbolize the anachronistic perpetuation of an unfair colonial order, to represent their political malaise, and to embody the perceived impossibility of their being masters of their destiny.	事实上，对他们而言，冲突终归象征不公正殖民秩序的时代错误永存，代表其政治抑郁，并且显示其绝无可能主宰自己的命运。


In the eyes of the Arabs (and some other Muslims), Israel’s strength and resilience is a direct consequence of their own weakness, divisions, and corruption.	在阿拉伯人（和其他一些穆斯林人）看来，以色列的实力和复原力是其自身薄弱、分裂和腐败的直接后果。


The majority of Arabs may not support al-Qaeda, but they do not oppose it with all their heart.	大多数阿拉伯人可能不支持基地组织，但他们不完全反对。


Instead, there is the temptation to regard Osama bin Laden as a type of violent Robin Hood, whose actions, while impossible to condone officially, have helped them to recover a sense of Arab pride and dignity.	相反，奥萨马·本·拉登视为暴虐的罗宾汉很具诱惑力，其行为虽然不可饶恕，却帮助他们赢得了阿拉伯人的自豪感和尊严。


Here, perhaps, is the real clash of civilizations: the emotional conflict between the European culture of fear and the Muslim, particularly Arab, culture of humiliation.	或许，这就是真正的文明冲突：欧洲恐慌文化和穆斯林特别是阿拉伯屈辱文化之间的情感冲突。


It would be dangerous to underestimate the depth of so wide an emotional divide, and to recognize its existence is the first step to overcoming it.	低估如此广大的情感隔离的深度是非常危险的，而认识其存在是解决问题的第一步。


But that will be difficult, for transcending the emotional clash of civilizations presupposes an opening to the “other” that neither side may yet be ready to undertake.	但这一行动会遭遇困难，因为超越文明社会的情感冲突预示着向“他人”敞开大门，而双方对此可能尚未做好准备。


The Empire of Human Rights	人权帝国


NEW YORK – Why are French, British, and American warships, but not Chinese or Malaysian warships, sitting near the Burmese coast loaded with food and other necessities for the victims of Cyclone Nargis?	纽约-为什么是法国、英国和美国的军舰满载着用于救助受到纳吉斯风暴袭击的灾民的食品和其他必需品停靠在缅甸海岸的附近，而不是中国或马来西亚的军舰呢？


Why has the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) been so slow and weak in its response to a natural calamity that ravaged one of its own members?	为什么东盟在一场自然灾害袭击了它自己的一个成员国时反应如此缓慢并且孱弱呢？


The French junior Human Rights Minister, Rama Yade, declared that the United Nations’ principle of the “responsibility to protect” should be applied to Burma, forcibly if necessary.	法国人权事务国务秘书拉马·亚德指出联合国“保护责任”的原则应该适用于缅甸，如果必要的话可以强制适用。


And the Malaysian opposition leader Lim Kit Siang has said that Asian countries’ inaction “reflects dismally on all ASEAN leaders and governments.	而马来西亚反对派领导林吉祥则说亚洲国家不作为“影响了所有东盟领导人和政府的声誉。


They can definitely do more.”	他们绝对可以做更多的事情。 ”


So, are Europeans and Americans simply more compassionate than Asians?	难道欧洲和美国人真的就是比亚洲人更富同情心吗？


Given the West’s record of horrendous warfare and often brutal imperialism, this seems unlikely.	鉴于西方国家骇人的战争记录和常常表现出的残忍的帝国主义，这似乎不太可能。


Moreover, the way ordinary Chinese rallied to help victims of the earthquake in Sichuan has been quite remarkable, as have been the spontaneous efforts of people in Burma to assist their fellow citizens, even as the military did very little.	此外，普通中国百姓团结一致帮助四川地震灾区的灾民的行为令人钦佩，还有缅甸人自发组织起来帮助他们的同胞的事迹，尽管他们的军队所做的非常少。


Buddhism stresses compassion and mercy as much as Christianity does.	佛教像基督教一样提倡同情和怜悯。


Indifference to suffering is not inherent to any Asian culture.	对别人遭受的痛苦漠不关心绝对是违背任何亚洲文化的。


Indeed, none of the Asian members disagreed when the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.	事实上，当联合国大会在1948年通过《世界人权宣言》时没有哪个亚洲表示反对。


The declaration held that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”	该宣言主张“尊重人的固有尊严以及接受所有人类大家庭的成员都有着平等和不可剥夺的权利是世界自由、公正和和平的基础。 ”


Nevertheless, there may be cultural differences in understanding how compassion should be applied.	然而，在理解应该如何运用同情心的问题上也许存在着文化差异。


The ideal of universal equality and rights does owe something to the history of Western civilization, from Socrates’ “natural justice” to Christianity and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man.	人人平等和拥有平等的权利的思想在很大程度上确实是出自西方文明史，从苏格拉底的“自然公正”到基督教教义再到法国的人权宣言无不传递这样的思想。


Western peoples have not always lived up to their universalist ideals, but they have in modern times built institutions designed to implement them, in Europe and beyond.	西方人在历史上并非总是能遵守他们普救说的理想，但是他们现代在欧洲以及之外的地方建立起了用来实施这些理想的体制。


There is, so far, no Asia-wide institution to protect the human rights of Asians, let alone mankind.	而亚洲并没有保护整个亚洲人民的人权的体制，更别说是保护人类了。


In fact, Chinese and other Asians frequently criticize the West for using human rights as an excuse to impose “Western values” on former colonial subjects.	事实上，中国人和其他亚洲国家的人总是批评西方人把人权用作把“西方价值观”强加给他们以前的殖民地的借口。


To be sure, such accusations are especially common in autocracies whose rulers, and their apologists, view the idea of universal human rights as a threat to their monopoly on power.	这种批评在那些专制国家尤其常见，他们的统治者和为它们的体制极力辩护的人把普遍人权看成是对他们专制统治的威胁。


But distrust of universalism in Asia is not confined to autocrats.	但是在亚洲，对普救论的不信任的人并不仅仅局限于那些独裁者。


In many Asian countries, favors invariably create obligations, which is perhaps why people are sometimes disinclined to interfere in the problems of others.	在许多亚洲国家，恩惠总是与义务相伴随的，这也许是为什么人们有时并不喜欢干涉他人的事务的原因。


You are obliged to take care of your family, your friends, or even your fellow countrymen.	你有义务照顾你的家人、朋友甚至你的同胞。


But the idea of universal charity is too abstract, and smacks of the kind of unwelcome interference that Western imperialists – and the Christian missionaries who followed them – practiced in the East for too long.	但是普善的思想实在是太抽象了，而西方帝国主义者以及跟随他们而来的基督教传教士那种不受欢迎的干涉在东方国家所造成的恶劣影响却是他们久久不能忘怀的。


The notion of “Asian values,” promoted mostly by Singaporean official scribes, was partly a critique of universalist Western claims.	“亚洲价值观”的理念主要是在新加坡官方作者的推动下形成的，这部分是出于对西方普救论者主张的批判。


Asians, according to this theory, have their own values, which include thrift, deference to authority, the sacrifice of individual to collective interests, and the belief that countries should not stick their noses into others’ affairs.	根据他们的理论，亚洲人有他们自己的价值观，它包含了节俭、对当权者的遵从、个人为了集体利益的牺牲以及各国不得干涉他国内部事务的信念。


Hence, the hesitant response of Southeast Asian governments – and public opinion – to the Burmese disaster.	因此，东南亚各国政府以及它们公众的观点对于缅甸灾害反应的犹豫不决也就不值得奇怪了。


One possible line of criticism of this kind of thinking is simply to claim the superiority of Western values.	对于这种思想的一种可能的批评方式就是西方自以为其价值观优越。


But another, more sympathetic response would be to show that individual rights and notions of freedom are by no means alien to non-Western civilizations.	但是另一种更富同情心的回应应该是展示个人的权利和自由的观念并非仅仅是西方文明所拥有的事物。


Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, has pointed out that great Indian rulers, such as Ashoka (third century BC) and Akbar (sixteenth century), advocated pluralism, tolerance, and reason long before the European Enlightenment.	诺贝尔经济奖获得者阿马蒂亚·森曾指出印度历史上伟大的统治者，比如公元前三世纪的阿育王和十六世纪的莫卧儿皇帝，在欧洲启蒙运动开始前很久就已经提倡多元性、容忍和理智了。


He has also observed that famines don’t occur in democracies, because freedom of information helps to prevent them.	他还指出在民主国家不会出现饥荒，因为信息的自由流通帮助阻止了这种情况的发生。


Sen, not surprisingly, is a trenchant critic of the “Asian values” school.	毫不奇怪，森对持“亚洲价值观”思想的人提出了尖锐的批评。


It has, nonetheless, become a commonly held opinion that democracy, like universal human rights, is a typically Western idea, and that Asian autocracy, as practiced in China, for example, is not only more suited to Asians, but also more efficient.	然而，有一种很普遍的观点似乎认为民主像普遍人权一样是一种典型的西方思想，而亚洲国家的专制体制，比如中国的体制，不仅更适合于亚洲国家，并且更加有效。


Democratic governments are hampered by lobby groups, special interests, public opinion, party politics, and so forth, while Asian autocrats can make unpopular but necessary decisions.	民主国家的政府常常受到游说集团、特殊利益集团、公众的观点、党派政治以及其他许多因素的干扰，而亚洲的独裁者却能够做出不被大众接受但却是必需的决策。


The two recent natural disasters in Burma and China have put this idea to a severe test.	最近在缅甸和中国发生的两场自然灾害是对这种思想一场严峻的考验。


China has not fared too badly, largely because its government was forced by the Burmese example, bad publicity surrounding the Tibetan demonstrations, and the impending Olympic Games to allow far more freedom of information than it normally does.	中国的表现还不错，这很大程度是因为它的政府受到缅甸的事例、围绕西藏抗议所产生的恶劣的公众影响以及即将到来的奥运会所带来的巨大压力，因而允许信息比往常更自由地流通。


One can only hope that this crack of freedom will widen in time.	我们希望这个自由的缝隙在今后能够开得更大。


Burma failed miserably, and, despite belated efforts to make the best of terrible circumstances, so has ASEAN.	但是缅甸的表现令人大失所望，东盟也是如此，尽管它们在拖了很久后终于开始投入救援，期望能在恶劣的环境下做出最大的努力。


In the end, of course, it doesn’t matter much whether or not we ascribe the failures of autocracy and non-intervention to anything specifically “Asian.”	到最后，我们是否将专制体制以及不干涉政策的失败归咎于任何带上“亚洲”记号的事物已经不再重要了。


Whatever the cause, the consequences remain deplorable.	不管根源在什么地方，它所带来的结果却永远值得我们去思索。


The Endgames in Iraq and Afghanistan	伊拉克和阿富汗事务的终结


NEW YORK – For nearly a decade, American foreign policy has been dominated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.	发自纽约——近十年以来，美国的外交政策一直都处在伊拉克和阿富汗这两场战争的支配之下。


As 2011 begins, with 50,000 US soldiers still in Iraq and another 100,000 in Afghanistan, it may not look like that era is coming to an end. But it is.	在2011年到来之际，依然各有5万和10万名美军士兵驻守在伊拉克和阿富汗两地——这一切似乎永无宁日，但它确实即将走向终结。


Iraq, the second most expensive “war of choice” (after Vietnam) in American history, is for the United States reaching a level of effort that will no longer absorb substantial military and economic resources or garner significant domestic political attention.	作为美国历史上消耗人力物力仅次于越战的“选择之战”，伊拉克战争已不再会被注入大量军事/经济资源或是获取大范围的国内政治关注。


All US troops are due to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. 	所有美军部队都应当于2011年末撤离伊拉克。


Even if, as seems likely, several thousand soldiers remain, the number will be small and their role limited to advising and training Iraqi military and police forces and conducting missions against terrorists.	即便会有数千名士兵留守，但他们的数量已经非常少，所扮演的角色也只限于提供顾问意见，训练伊拉克军警以及执行反恐任务。


Eight years, 4,300 lost American lives, and more than a trillion dollars later, it will be, for better or worse, mostly Iraqis who determine their country’s future.	在历时八年，4300名美国人丧命并耗费了1万亿美元之后，不论情况是好是坏，都应该是由伊拉克人决定自己国家未来的时候了。


The initial performance of an Iraq run by Iraqis is less than encouraging.	由伊拉克人来管理伊拉克的最初效果并不令人感到满意。


To be sure, there have been a number of relatively fair elections, political life is active, and the economy is growing.	但可以确定的是，已经进行了一系列公平选举，政治生活也相当活跃，经济也得到了发展。


But Iraqi leaders’ difficulty in forming a government following last spring’s elections bodes poorly.	但伊拉克领导人未能在今年春天选举之后成功组建政府的情况确实是个不祥之兆。


Indeed, a political culture of compromise has not taken root, and the country continues to be divided by geography, ethnicity, religion, and politics.	事实上，一种以妥协为核心的政治文化尚未扎根，整个国家依旧处于地理，民族，区域和政治等因素的割裂之下。


There is no consensus on how to share the potential wealth from Iraq’s vast energy resources.	各方对于如何分配伊拉克的庞大能源资源尚未达成共识。


The Kurdish north is largely autonomous; where its writ ends and the central government’s begins is unsettled.	北部库尔德人在很大程度上进行着自治； 而自治政府和中央政府之间的权力分配方案也无法确定。


Iranian influence is pervasive in the south and extensive in the center.	在伊拉克南部地区，伊朗的影响无处不在，甚至正在向中部渗透。


Moreover, the country still experiences regular bombings, and millions of Iraqis are either internally displaced or refugees.	此外，爆炸事件依然时有发生，数百万伊拉克人要么在国内流离失所，要么沦为难民流落国外。


In short, conditions in Iraq, while significantly better than five years ago, are more likely to deteriorate than improve.	简而言之，伊拉克国内的情况虽然比5年前有显著改善，而如今却更可能走向恶化而非变好。


Afghanistan is moving at a much slower pace when it comes to US troop reductions.	在美国开始撤军的同时，阿富汗的进度则更加缓慢。


The Obama administration is likely to remove a small number of US soldiers in July, the date selected by the president for the beginning of the American military drawdown.	奥巴马政府希望在2011年7月（这是总统选定的撤军起始日期）撤出第一批美军。


But it will be only the beginning of an extended, gradual process of American military reduction, one that looks like it will take four years – and quite possibly longer.	但这仅仅是美国军事力量的削减范围逐步扩大的开端，整个过程大概会持续4年——并很可能拖得更长。


What the US will have to show then for more than a decade of sacrifice and investment in Afghanistan is anybody’s guess.	大家都想知道在付出了超过10年的牺牲和投资之后，美国究竟会展示自己在阿富汗取得的哪些成果。


The sum total of the US effort in terms of American money and lives will likely be less than in Iraq, but still substantial.	虽然美国在阿富汗的总投入无论在金钱和伤亡方面都比伊拉克要少，但却依然是非常可观的。


And it is difficult to be optimistic about Afghanistan, given the Taliban’s resilience, the weakness and corruption that plague the government, and the reality that Pakistan will continue to be a sanctuary for the Taliban and other armed groups seeking to gain a foothold (or more) in Afghanistan. An Afghanistan that resembles a normal country is virtually impossible to foresee.	塔利班重新得势，软弱和贪腐之风又弥漫于政府之中，再考虑到巴基斯坦会继续为塔利班及其他武装组织提供庇护，以期在阿富汗建立一个（或更多）立足点，阿富汗的前景难言乐观，也无法预见阿富汗究竟何时才能成为一个正常国家。


Nevertheless, the decisions to scale back American involvement decisively in Iraq, and gradually in Afghanistan, will ultimately have significant consequences for the US – many of them welcome. One is financial.	不过，这些减少介入（对伊拉克是果断退出，对阿富汉则是逐步减少）的决策将对美国产生重大的后续影响——其中许多是值得欢迎的。


Current US policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan costs roughly $150 billion per year, which is more than 20% of total US defense spending.	其中一个是经济，目前美国对伊阿两国的政策每年耗资约1500亿美元，占了美国国防支出的20%以上。


Cutting this sum will free up much-needed money for other defense needs and for deficit reduction, arguably the principal national security challenge facing the US.	削减这部分开支将为其他国防项目带来经费并减少政府债务，而后者据说是对美国国家安全的最大威胁。


Troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan will also allow the US military to begin to recover from these two conflicts.	减少派驻两国的部队数量同时也可以使美军在这两场冲突中得到喘息的机会。


Neither soldiers nor equipment can sustain the performance that has been demanded of them.	目前无论是人员和装备都无法持续维持所需的作战要求。


Recruitment and retention of highly skilled individuals in the US armed forces will increase as the level of effort in the two conflicts winds down, and a great deal of deferred military modernization will occur.  	而对美军高技术人才的招募和挽留情况也将随着对两场冲突的介入力度减弱而有所上升，一再推迟的军事现代化进程也将重新启动。


More fundamentally, reducing US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan will permit a rebalancing of US foreign and defense policy.	更根本的是，减少美国对伊拉克和阿富汗的介入将可以令美国的外交和国防政策重新实现平衡。


The two conflicts have absorbed a disproportionate share of the country’s resources – military and economic to be sure, but also the time and attention of policymakers and diplomats.	两场冲突都过多地消耗了这个国家的资源——其中当然有军事和经济资源，还包括了政策制定者和外交人员的时间和精力。


In the short run, doing less in Iraq and Afghanistan will allow the US to concentrate on the two most immediate external threats to US interests: Iran and North Korea.	在短期内，减少在伊拉克和阿富汗的行动能使美国将精力集中在对国家利益影响最为紧迫的两个外部威胁之���：伊朗和朝鲜。


In the long run, the US needs to generate domestic and international support for regional and global arrangements designed to manage the defining problems of this era, from the spread of nuclear materials and terrorism to maintaining an open world economy and slowing climate change.	长期来说，美国需要获取国内外对区域性和全球协议的支持，以应对这个时代的种种重大问题：从核材料和恐怖主义的扩散，维持开放的世界经济，到减缓气候变化的进程。


This will require a foreign policy that focuses on the emerging powers of the twenty-first century, many of which are in Asia.   	这需要一个聚焦于21世纪新兴势力的外交政策，而这些势力绝大部分都分布在亚洲。


The US largely squandered the opportunity to shape the international system in the first decade of the new century.	在新世纪的第一个十年，美国基本上放弃了构建国际机制的机会。


Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be strategic distractions, and,  particularly in Afghanistan, the US should resist pressures to prolong a substantial military presence.	伊拉克和阿富汗已经打乱了美国的战略思维，尤其是阿富汉，因此美国应当抵制所有试图让其继续在该地区维持大量军事存在的压力。


There is now an opportunity to reorient American foreign policy to concentrate on what matters most.	如今时机已经降临，美国也可以借此将外交政策重新导向那些更重要的事务。


It is in the interest of the US and the world that this opportunity not be missed.	而如果无法把握这个机会的话，无论是对美国还是全世界的利益，都是一种损害。


The Endless Iranian Nuclear Crisis	无休止的伊朗核危机


Iran will continue to enrich uranium regardless of whether a Republican or a Democrat is America’s president.	不论美国总统是共和党人还是民主党人，伊朗都会继续增加铀储备。


At the same time, the United States will oppose any Iranian nuclear program – even a civilian program – because this will contribute to the stability of the regime in Tehran.	同时，美国会反对任何形式的伊朗核计划—即使是民用计划—因为这会使德黑兰的政权更为稳固。


As a result, nuclear tensions are likely to bedevil US-Iranian relations for years to come.	因此，核紧张的局面会在未来相当长的时间里困扰美伊两国的关系。


Iran, it is often claimed, has no need for nuclear power, given its abundant oil and natural gas reserves.	通常的意见认为伊朗由于有着丰富的石油和天然气储量所以没有必要发展核电。


But the Iranian government is under economic and political pressure to supply increasing amounts of electricity to its growing population and fragile economy.	但伊朗政府由于要为日益增长的人口和脆弱的经济提供越来越多的电力而面临着经济和政治的压力。


Using oil or natural gas for domestic electricity threatens oil and gas exports, which are the principle source of government revenues.	使用石油和天然气进行国内的电力供应会威胁到伊朗政府的主要收入来源，即石油和天然气的出口。


Indeed, with domestic oil consumption growing at a higher rate than production, government revenues from oil exports are already in decline.	的确，随着国内石油消费量增长超过产量，来自石油出口的政府收入已呈下降之势。


Thus, nuclear power will halt the decline in government revenues by freeing more oil and natural gas for export.	因此，发展核电会通过使更多的石油和天然气能够出口而遏制政府收入的下滑。


Iran’s natural gas resources, if developed, would not be a substitute for cheap nuclear power, because gas is more profitable in other uses than in power generation.	伊朗的天然气资源即使得到充分开发也不会替代廉价核电，因为天然气用于其它用途比用来发电具有更高的经济效益。


The Iranian government fears that electricity shortages, slow economic growth, and high unemployment will turn the populace against it.	伊朗政府担心电力短缺、经济增长缓慢和高失业率会引发人民反对政府。


As social tensions increase, political turmoil will follow.	随着社会紧张局面日益严重，政治动荡也会随之而来。


Nuclear power offers the possibility of cheap, plentiful electricity, which will contribute to social and political stability.	核电使得廉价而丰富的电力供应成为可能，而这又会增加社会和政治的稳定。


Iranian experts argue that, in considering the trade-off between internal unrest and external sanctions, the Iranian government must choose between domestic security and international security.	伊朗的专家们认为在考虑内部的不安定与外部制裁之间的平衡时，伊朗政府必须在国内安全与国际安全之间做出选择。


Domestic pressure could very well bring down the regime, but international pressure will not.	国内的压力可能足以使政权垮台，但国际的压力则不会。


History is on the side of the Iranian government.	历史站在伊朗政府一边。


The Islamic Revolution has survived a brutal war with Iraq, economic sanctions, and decades of international pressure and isolation from the US.	伊斯兰革命经历了与伊拉克的残酷战争、经济制裁、数十年的国际压力和美国的孤立而仍然继续。


Moreover, Iran’s leaders remember that the Shah was forced to flee the country in 1979, despite having strong international support.	另外，伊朗的领导人们还记得尽管有着强大的国际支持，伊朗国王还是被迫在1979年逃亡国外。


While there may be security reasons for any future US administration to oppose even a civilian nuclear program, American policymakers also recognize the strategic impact that nuclear energy will have in stabilizing the Iranian regime.	尽管任何一届未来的美国政府都可能出于安全原因反对伊朗的民用核计划，但美国的政策制定者们也应该承认核能对稳定伊朗政权会产生的战略影响。


The US and Iran have been fighting proxy wars since 1979, and their ongoing conflict means that proxy wars will continue in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea region, as will trade and investment wars.	美国和伊朗从1979年开始就打起了代理战争，两国之间的现时冲突意味着代理战争将会在黎巴嫩、伊拉克、阿富汗和里海地区继续，就如同在贸易和投资方面的战争一样。


Indeed, as long as China and Russia have money to invest and arms to sell, most UN sanctions will be toothless.	的确，只要中国和俄罗斯有钱投资、有武器可卖，多数的联合国制裁都会成为一纸空文。


Iran will continue to threaten the world community that it will use its oil weapon, but this is highly unlikely.	伊朗会继续以其石油武器来要挟国际社会，但将此付诸行动的可能性却很小。


It is not in Iran’s interest, under any scenario, to decrease oil exports, let alone halt them.	在任何情况下，减少石油的出口对于伊朗都是不利的，更不用说停止出口。


However, domestic pressure, a sense of nationalism, and the need to improve its bargaining position with Western countries might force the Iranian government to respond to harsh UN sanctions or an air attack on its nuclear facilities.	然而，国内的压力、民族主义情绪和提升向西方国家要价的能力的需要，都可能迫使伊朗政府对严厉的联合国制裁或对其核设施的空中打击做出反应。


But even under these extreme circumstances, Iran will still need its oil revenue.	但即便在如此极端的情况下，伊朗还是需要来自石油的收入。


A symbolic cut or embargo, while possible, would have little impact on world oil markets.	一种象征性的减产或禁运，虽然有可能，但却几乎不会对世界石油市场产生影响。


Iran’s government has more effective options to respond to attacks from the US and its allies.	伊朗政府还能采取更有效的策略回应美国及其盟国的打击。


Its supporters in Iraq might cripple Iraqi oil exports from Basra, which would damage US plans in Iraq while boosting Iran’s oil revenues, or limit the availability of fuel to the US Army by attacking roads and bridges, especially the Kuwait City-Baghdad highway.	其在伊拉克的支持者可能会令从巴士拉的石油出口陷于瘫痪，这样就会破坏美国在伊拉克的计划同时又能增加伊朗的石油收入。 或者他们还能通过打击道路和桥梁来限制美军的燃料供给，特别是破坏从科威特城到巴格达的公路。


The world community will continue to pay a high price for the nuclear standoff, which will cast a shadow over world oil markets for years to come.	国际社会会继续为这一核僵局付出高昂的代价。 这种局面所造成的阴影将在相当长的时间里笼罩世界石油市场。


Some experts argue that it has already raised oil prices by about $15 per barrel.	有些专家称它已经使每桶原油的价格上涨了约15美金。


Ironically, an Iranian civilian nuclear program would enhance US and world energy security by making more oil and gas available in the global market.	不无讽刺的是，伊朗的民用核计划会通过使更多的石油和天然气供应到全球市场从而增强美国和世界的能源安全。


But America’s determination to destabilize Iran and the Iranian government’s determination to retain power reduce the likelihood of this scenario.	但美国搅乱伊朗的决心和伊朗政府获得控制权的决心却大大降低了这种情况出现的可能性。


The End of Banks?	银行的末日？


BARCELONA – Are banks doomed as a result of the current financial crisis?	巴塞罗那—目前的金融危机会导致银行的末日么？


The securitization of mortgages originally was seen as a triumph, because it shifted risk to financial markets, while taking deposits and making and monitoring loans – the purview of traditional banks – was regarded as narrow and old-fashioned.	按揭的证券化起初曾被视为一项成就，因为它将风险转移到金融市场，而吸纳存款和发放及监控贷款—传统银行的业务范围—则被认为是狭窄而老派的。


By contrast, modern banks would seek finance mainly in the interbank market and securitize their loan portfolios.	相较之下，现代银行主要通过银行间市场和贷款组合证券化的方式融资。


In theory, such banks should be immune to runs, because the interbank market is supposed to be extremely efficient, and risk would be shifted to investors willing to bear it.	从理论上讲，这样的银行不会出现挤兑，因为银行间市场应该极为高效，而风险会被转移到愿意承担的投资者那里。


Deposits would be replaced by mutual funds, which, as we know, are also immune to runs, and the risk of structured investment vehicles (SIV’s) would be assessed accurately by rating agencies.	存款会被共同基金取代，而后者如我们所知，也不会出现挤兑。 结构性投资工具(SIV) 会被评级机构精确评估。


All this financial engineering would avoid the obsolete capital requirements that burden banks’ operation.	所有这些金融设计都能够规避束缚银行经营的、过时的资本要求。


The current crisis killed off  this optimistic scenario.	目前的危机让这种乐观的情况不复存在。


The interbank market has almost collapsed, because banks do not trust each other in the same way that we tend not to trust an eager seller of a second-hand car.	银行间市场几乎已经崩溃，因为银行之间彼此不再信任，就如同我们不太会相信一个急于将二手车脱手的卖家一样。


This is a textbook market failure.	只是一种课本式的市场失灵。


The origin of the problem is uncertainty about banks’ exposure to sub-prime mortgages, the risks of which have been carelessly assessed by rating agencies due to conflicts of interest.	问题的源头是对各银行受次贷影响程度的不确定性。 由于利益冲突使评级机构对次贷风险的评估甚为草率。


Northern Rock in the United Kingdom has been a victim of this modern banking strategy, as has Bear Stearns in the United States.	英国的北石银行成为这种现代银行战略的受害者，美国的贝尔斯登也同命相连。


Others may follow soon.	其他的受害者会很快出现。


Moreover, institutions that thought they had transferred risk to the market realized that the demise of sponsored SIV’s would damage their reputations irreversibly.	另外，那些认为已经将风险转移到市场的机构也意识到渡让自己的SIV会给它们的声誉造成无法弥补的损害。


This implied that they had to rescue these SIV’s.	这就意味着它们必须拯救这些SIV。


Alas, they failed to set aside enough capital for this unforeseen contingency, and external investors such as the sovereign wealth funds of China, Singapore, and the Middle East have had to come to the rescue.	然而，他们未能留出足够的资本来应对这些不可预见的紧急情况，而外部投资者，如中国、新加坡和中东的主权财富基金就不得不出手相救。


Finally, mutual funds are at risk as well, because their supposedly safe investments may sour and the insurance that backs them now appears shaky.	最后，共同基金同样有风险，它们本应安全的投资可能会失败，而它们身后的保险现在看起来也并不可靠。


The sub-prime contamination of money market funds would prove disastrous, with consequences far beyond what we have seen up to now.	次贷对货币市场的感染会是灾难性的，其后果远远超过我们现在所见的。


The supposed transfer of risk would turn out to have been a mirage.	本来被看好的风险转移最终只是一种幻想。


Are banks, markets, or regulators to blame?	我们应该归罪于银行、市场或监管者么？


The answer may indicate what future awaits banks.	答案可能会预示着银行的未来。


Some regulators were irresponsible for not anticipating the rational profit-maximizing behavior of institutions with a limited liability charter and of executives effectively protected from failure.	有些监管者未能预见到有限责任机构和不会为自己失败承担后果的高管们理性的利益最大化行为，这是不负责任的。


After all, what should banks do when, instead of keeping sub-prime mortgages on their books, monitoring their performance, and incurring capital requirements, they can securitize them advantageously (because the rating agencies have a stake in the business), avoid capital requirements, and profit from investors’ inexperience with such products.	毕竟，当银行能够将次贷有利地证券化（因为评级机构也能从中获益），规避资本要求并利用投资者对这种产品的经验缺乏来牟利，而不用将次贷记录在账面上，监控其表现并招致资本要求时，它们会怎么做呢？


Indeed, even if things turned ugly and banks’ equity suffered, executives knew that their own generous bonuses and pension packages most likely would not.	的确，就算操作失败，银行的资产受损，高管们也知道他们自己可观的分红和养老金计划不大可能会受到影响。


Given this, regulators should have thought twice before permitting off-balance sheet operations without any further provision.	有鉴于此，监管者们本应该对允许在没有任何进一步规范的情况下进行资产负债表以外的操作慎之又慎。


The fundamental question today is who monitors opaque loans, whether of the sub-prime or any other variety.	现在根本的问题是谁来监控不透明贷款，不管是次贷还是任何其他种类。


Traditionally, the answer was banks; in the securitized world, it remains a question.	从传统上讲，答案是：银行； 在证券化的世界里，这个问题依旧没有答案。


So, is there an alternative to the old-fashioned monitoring of loans by banks?	因此，除了由银行对贷款进行监管的传统方式以外还有别的选择么？


Perhaps if those securitized packages had been properly rated, the originating institution would be obliged to retain a share to signal to the market that risk was being controlled.	如果起初这些证券化的一揽子次贷被恰当地评级，那么其原始发行机构就会有义务保留一部分从而向市场表明风险在掌控之中。


And, clearly, the idea that capital requirements were not needed for banks’ off-balance sheet activities (because the banks were not bearing the risk), was simply wrong.	同时显而易见的是，对银行的资产负债表之外的经营活动没有资本要求（因为银行不承担风险）的观念根本就是错误的。


Appropriate regulation – including regulation of rating agencies – would most likely make traditional banks popular again.	恰当的监管—包括对评级机构的监管—极可能恢复公众对传统银行的信心。


A reconsideration of banks’ limited liability charter would go even further in restoring credibility.	对银行有限责任章程的重新考量也会有助于进一步重建其公信力。


The principle is simple: when your own money is at stake, you tend to be careful.	这条原则很简单：当你自己的钱面临风险时，你会小心翼翼。


But when you can play with others’ money and expect a very high reward for success and no punishment for failure, the incentives for irresponsible risk-taking become enormous.	但当你可以操控他人的金钱，成功有赏，失败却无罚时，肆无忌惮冒险的欲望就会急剧膨胀。


The End of History Comes to Tunisia	突尼斯面临历史的结束


PARIS – Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” is still unfolding, but we can already read into it lessons about democracy and democratization that extend far beyond the Maghreb.	巴黎——突尼斯的“茉莉花革命”还没有结束，但从中我们已经可以看到民主和民主化进程的影响将远远超出马格里布。


To set the Jasmine Revolution in historical perspective, we must recall June 4, 1989 – that pivotal Sunday when the Poles voted the communists out of power and, at the other end of Eurasia, the Communist Party of China crushed a burgeoning democratic movement on Tiananmen Square.	要想从历史的角度解读“茉莉花革命”，我们必须记住1989年6月4日那个关键的星期日，在波兰人投票推翻共产主义统治的同时，中国共产党在欧亚大陆的另一端粉碎了天安门广场一次新兴的民主运动。


In retrospect, that day looks like a fork in the road of human history.	现在回想起来，那一天就像是人类历史的岔路口。


One path led to the demise of communism and a new birth of freedom and democracy – at times bloody and painful – in Europe.	其中一条通往欧洲共产主义的灭亡和自由民主的新生，虽然有时仍免不了伴随着血腥和痛苦。


The other path traced an alternative course, with China remaining under the grip of its ruling party, but delivering prosperity to its impoverished masses through astounding and sustained growth.	而另一条则通往一个完全不同的方向，中国仍处在原执政党的统治之下，但却通过惊人的持续发展为贫困民众送去繁荣。


As the revolutionary year of 1989 was unfolding, Francis Fukuyama, presciently yet controversially pondered whether the path chosen in Europe heralded the “end of history.”	在1989年革命进行得如火如荼之际，弗朗西斯·福山提出了一个充满预言意味但同时又不无争议的想法，即欧洲选择的道路是否预示着“历史的结束”。


Following Hegel, Fukuyama made the case that history is directional – that it is leading somewhere – for two reasons.	继黑格尔之后，福山再次提出由于以下两种原因，历史的发展具有方向性。


First, the ceaseless spread of technology and of the economic liberal order, which has a homogenizing effect.	首先，技术和自由经济秩序的不断扩张会产生同质化效应。


Second, the Hegelian “struggle for recognition” has been a pervasive driving force of mankind, powerful enough to lead countless individuals to the ultimate sacrifice.	其次，黑格尔哲学中“为争取承认的斗争”一直是人类社会最普遍的驱动力量，这种力量强大到足以引领无数个体做出终极牺牲。


But, while a widespread consensus held that communism was nothing but a dead end, China’s economic success, and the authoritarian backlash in Russia following Boris Yeltsin’s departure from the Kremlin a decade ago, prompted a more pessimistic analysis.	但即使舆论普遍认为共产主义不过是死胡同，中国的经济成就和俄罗斯在鲍里斯·叶利钦十年前离开克里姆林后的专制主义反弹还是引发了更加悲观的猜测。


Theories of “democratic rollback” and of a resurgence of “authoritarian great powers” surfaced to unveil the potential of systems that combined nationalism and state-led growth-yielding capitalism.	“民主回落”和“专制强国复兴”的理论浮出水面，明确揭示出专制制度有能力实现民族主义和国家主导增长资本主义之间的融合。


Some argued that authoritarian rule provided a much surer and safer path to welfare than democracy could offer, others extolled the virtues of “Asian values,” and still others argued that democracy in the Arab or Muslim world would only pave the way for Islamic fundamentalists to take power.	有人声称专制统治比民主制度更能安全地实现民众福利，也有人为“亚洲价值观”大唱颂歌，更有人提出在阿拉伯或穆斯林世界推行民主只能让伊斯兰原教旨主义得逞。


Not surprisingly, autocrats everywhere embraced such views.	这种观点在各地独裁政权中广受欢迎，这原本也是在意料之中。


But the message of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution rings loud and clear: democracy – and the liberal political order in which it is rooted – is not merely a Western concept (or a Western conspiracy), but holds universal attraction, powered by the craving for “recognition.”	但突尼斯“茉莉花革命”所传递的信息既明确又响亮： 民主及其扎根其中的自由政治秩序并非仅仅是一种西方理念（或者说西方阴谋），它的确有着广泛的吸引力，人类对于“承认”的渴望就是其背后的推动力量。


Moreover, it can be accessed at an early stage of a country’s modernization.	此外，民主制度所带来的好处在国家现代化的初期就可以享受到。


To be sure, authoritarian rule can manage the early stages of industrialization.	有一点可以肯定，独裁专制能够胜任工业化早期的管理。


But a “knowledge economy” cannot operate with muzzled minds.	但“知识经济”从本质上无法兼容受禁锢的思想。


Even the smartest authoritarian rulers are unable to manage complexity on this scale – not to mention the corruption that inevitably breeds in the protected shadows of autocracy.	即便是最智慧的专制统治者也无法管理如此复杂的问题——更不要说在独裁政体保护的阴影下注定会滋生出腐败现象。


Challenging the “myth of the autocratic revival,” the American political scientists Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry have examined China and Russia, finding “little evidence for the emergence of a stable equilibrium between capitalism and autocracy such that this combination could be dignified as a new model of modernity.”	美国政治学家丹尼尔·杜德尼和约翰·伊肯伯里深入研究中俄实例后勇敢向“专制复兴神话”发出挑战，他们找不到任何证据证明资本主义及独裁政体实现了稳定的平衡，更无法证明上述组合是新现代化模式的组成元素。


While neither country qualifies as a liberal democracy, both “are much more liberal and democratic than they have ever been, and many of the crucial foundations for sustainable liberal democracy are emerging” – one main hurdle being the centrifugal forces that democracy might unleash.	” 尽管中俄两国还不能算作自由民主政体，但“两者都处于有史以来自由民主的高峰，可持续自由民主政体的许多关键基础也都开始萌芽”——民主所释放的离心力是它们面临的主要障碍。


But most countries that are unburdened by such a threat have, quietly or spectacularly, rallied to the liberal order over the past decades.	但多数未受上述威胁拖累的国家数十年来平静而壮观地汇聚到自由秩序的旗帜下。


Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia have done so without being hampered by their supposed “Asian values.”	日本、韩国、台湾和印尼等亚洲国家克服了所谓“亚洲价值观”的障碍，真正实现了这一目标。


Similarly, Latin America, once the playground of myriad juntas and golpes, is now largely anchored in political liberalism.	与此相似，曾几何时毒品和军政府遍地的拉美已经基本建立了政治自由主义制度。


Turkey is ruled by a mildly Islamist party that plays by the rules of democracy.	遵守民主规则的温和的伊斯兰政党控制着土耳其政权。


And, in the spring of 2009, the presidential campaign in Iran evinced a formidable craving for freedom.	2009年春天，伊朗的总统竞选展现出民众对自由的强烈渴望。


What is obvious from these cases is that development activates the two channels that Fukuyama identifies as shaping the direction of history: cumulative economic and technological change and the desire for recognition.	上述案例带给我们明确的启示，即发展可以激活福田所说的确定历史方向的两条渠道： 经济技术变革效果的累计和人类寻求承认的渴望。


Both foster individual empowerment, which is the gateway to freedom and democracy.	这两者都可以提升个人的自主权，而个人自主权是通往自由民主的���由之路。


The paths differ between countries, setbacks are not uncommon, and it can take decades, but the leap can occur when the circumstances are ripe – as in Tunisia.	各国所走的道路不尽相同，遭遇挫折也属于普遍现象，实现民主目标可能需要好几十年，但时机一旦成熟就可能出现跨越式的进步——就像突尼斯革命所证明的那样。


Indeed, the Jasmine Revolution embodies all the tenets of the liberal political order that the West has been advocating since the Atlantic Charter of 1941: a yearning for freedom, opportunity, and the rule of law.	事实上，茉莉花革命包含了西方自1941年《大西洋宪章》后一贯宣扬的所有自由政治秩序原则： 对自由、机遇和法治的渴求和向往。


Moreover, Tunisia’s revolution was indigenous, not imported as part of some forcible regime change.	此外，突尼斯革命不是作为强制政权改革的组成部分从国外强行输入，而是这个国家内部土生土长的产物。


The Tunisian people, led by a frustrated middle class that refused to be cowed, thus provide a healthy reminder of the steady and compelling forces driving the behavior of individuals and nations nowadays.	突尼斯民众在拒绝压榨的愤怒中产阶级领导下，自然而然地让人们重温了当今驱动个人和国家行为的稳定而不可抗拒的力量。


They illustrate the catalytic effect of digital connectivity (clearly visible, too, among China’s “twittering classes”).	他们诠释了数字化连接的催化效应（这一点在中国的“推特阶层”中也不难看到）。


And they might embolden other Arab peoples, as may be happening in Egypt, to force accountability upon their rulers.	他们会像在埃及那样为其他阿拉伯国家的民众壮胆，迫使统治者接受问责制度。


Whatever the outcome in Tunisia, those who believe that democracy, to paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, makes the world a safe place – and that more democracy makes it safer – have every reason to rejoice at such an auspicious development.	无论突尼斯革命的最终结果如何，那些相信民主能像伍德罗·威尔逊所说让世界更安全——而且民主国家越多安全性也越高——的人们有理由为这样一个美好的进展而欢欣鼓舞。


The End of Population Growth	人口增长的终点


NEW DELHI – According to the United Nations’ Population Division, the world’s human population hit seven billion on October 31.	新德里——根据联合国人口司的数据，10月31日，世界人口总量已经突破了70亿大关。


As always happens whenever we approach such a milestone, this one has produced a spike in conferences, seminars, and learned articles, including the usual dire Malthusian predictions.	与往常一样，这样一个里程碑成了众多会议、讨论会和研究论文的主题，其中就包括悲观的马尔萨斯预言。


After all, the UN forecasts that world population will rise to 9.3 billion in 2050 and surpass 10 billion by the end of this century.	毕竟，据联合国预测，世界人口将在2050年达到93亿，在本世纪末超过100亿。


Such forecasts, however, misrepresent underlying demographic dynamics.	但是，这样的预测误解了基础人口学动态。


The future we face is not one of too much population growth, but too little.	我们所面临的未来绝非人口增长过多，而是过少。


Most countries conducted their national population census last year, and the data suggest that fertility rates are plunging in most of them.	大多数国家都在去年完成了最新人口普查，数据表明，大部分地区的生育率都在下降。


Birth rates have been low in developed countries for some time, but now they are falling rapidly in the majority of developing countries.	发达国家出生率低下的状况已经维持了较长时间，但这一次，大部分发展中国家的出生率也开始迅速下降。


Chinese, Russians, and Brazilians are no longer replacing themselves, while Indians are having far fewer children.	中国、俄罗斯和巴西都已不再大量生育下一代，印度的生育数量也大大降低了。


Indeed, global fertility will fall to the replacement rate in a little more than a decade.	事实上，不出10年，世界生育率就将下降到替换率以下。


Population may keep growing until mid-century, owing to rising longevity, but, reproductively speaking, our species should no longer be expanding.	人口增长大概可以持续到本世纪中叶（拜寿命延长所赐），但就新人替旧人而言，人类规模将不会再扩张了。


What demographers call the Total Fertility Rate is the average number of live births per woman over her lifetime.	人类学中有一个总体生育率（Total Fertility Rate）的概念，指每个女性在其一生中的平均生育数量。 从长期看，若总体生育率等于替换率，则称人口规模是稳定的。


In the long run, a population is said to be stable if the TFR is at the replacement rate, which is a little above 2.3 for the world as a whole, and somewhat lower, at 2.1, for developed countries, reflecting their lower infant-mortality rates.	就全世界而言，替换率为略高于2. 3，但某些地方（主要是发达国家，因为那里的新生儿死亡率更低）要低一些，为2.


The TFR for most developed countries now stands well below replacement levels.	如今，大部分发达国家的总体生育率远低于替换率。


The OECD average is at around 1.74, but some countries, including Germany and Japan, produce less than 1.4 children per woman.	经合组织国家的平均总体生育率为1. 74，但在德国和日本等国，平均每个女性只生育1.


However, the biggest TFR declines in recent years have been in developing countries.	4个孩子。 不过，近几年来，总体生育率下降最明显的是发展中国家。


The TFR in China and India was 6.1 and 5.9, respectively, in 1950.	1950年，中国和印度的总体生育率分别为6. 1和5.


It now stands at 1.8 in China, owing to the authorities’ aggressive one-child policy, while rapid urbanization and changing social attitudes have brought down India’s TFR to 2.6.	8——拜计划生育政策所致； 而印度的总体生育率因快速城市化和社会观念的改变而下降到了2.


An additional factor could depress future birth rates in China and India.	还有一个因素可能在未来进一步降低中国和印度的出生率。


The Chinese census suggests that there are 118.6 boys being born for every 100 girls.	中国人口普查表明，男女出生比率为118. 6:100。


Similarly, India has a gender ratio at birth of around 110 boys for every 100 girls, with large regional variations.	类似地，印度的出生性别比率（男:女）也在110:100左右（地区差别较大）。


Compare this to the natural ratio of 105 boys per 100 girls.	而自然男女比应该是105:100。


The deviation is usually attributed to a cultural preference for boys, which will take an additional toll on both populations, as the future scarcity of women implies that both countries’ effective reproductive capacity is below what is suggested by the unadjusted TFR.	其中的差别通常被归因于重男轻女文化。 这种文化将进一步压低两国的人口，因为未来女性数量短缺意味着两国的有效再生能力将低于未经调整的总体生育率。


Indeed, after adjusting for the gender imbalance, China’s Effective Fertility Rate (EFR) is around 1.5, and India’s is 2.45.	事实上，在经性别失衡调整后，中国的有效生育率为1. 5左右，印度为2.


In other words, the Chinese are very far from replacing themselves, and the Indians are only slightly above the replacement rate.	45。 换句话说，中国根本不能实现人口替换，而印度也只是略高于替换率。


The EFR stands at around 2.4 for the world as a whole, barely above the replacement rate.	世界有效生育率水平为2. 4左右，比替换率高了没多少。


Current trends suggest that the human race will no longer be replacing itself by the early 2020’s.	当前趋势表明，到21世纪20年代早期，人类将不再能够实现人口替换。


Population growth after this will be mostly caused by people living longer, a factor that will diminish in significance from mid-century.	此后的人口增长将主要由寿命增加导致，到本世纪中叶，这一因素的效力也将大大降低。


These shifts have important implications for global labor supply.	这样的变迁对全球劳动力供给具有重要影响。


China is aging very rapidly, and its working-age population will begin to shrink within a few years.	中国正在迅速老龄化，其工作年龄人口将在数年内开始下跌。


Relaxing the one-child policy might have some positive impact in the very long run, but China is already past the tipping point, pushed there by the combined effect of gender imbalance and a very skewed age structure.	放松独生子女政策或许可以在超长期产生积极影响，但中国已经度过了转折点，原因就是性别失衡和极度扭曲的年龄结构的共同影响。


The number of women of child-bearing age (15-49 years) in China will drop 8% between 2010 and 2020, another 10% in the 2020’s and, if not corrected, at an even faster pace thereafter.	中国的生育年龄女性（15—49岁）将在2010—2020年的十年中下降8%，如果这一趋势得不到修正，未来还会加快。


Thus, China will have to withdraw an increasing proportion of its female workforce and deploy it for reproduction and childcare.	因此，中国将被迫放缓职业妇女比例的增长，让一部分女性加入生育大军。


Even if China can engineer this, it implies an immediate outflow from the workforce, with the benefits lagging by 25 years.	即使中国能够完成这一工作，也将致使劳动力立刻流出，而好处要到25年后才能显现。


Meanwhile, the labor force has peaked or is close to peaking in most major economies.	与此同时，大多数主要经济体的劳动力也已经或即将达到顶峰。


Germany, Japan, and Russia already have declining workforces.	德国、日本和俄罗斯的劳动力数量已经开始下���。


The United States is one of a handful of advanced countries with a growing workforce, owing to its relative openness to immigration.	美国是少数劳动力仍在增长的国家之一，这要归功于其相对开放的移民政策。


But this may change as the source countries become richer and undergo rapid declines in birth rates.	但随着移民母国逐渐发达、出生率逐渐下降，美国的情况也会很快有所改变。


Thus, many developed countries will have to consider how to keep people working productively well into their seventies.	因此，许多发达国家将不得不考虑如何让其国民高效地工作到70岁。


India, the only large economy whose workforce will grow in sufficient scale over the next three decades, may partly balance the declines expected in other major economies.	印度是唯一一个劳动力可以继续充分增长30年的大型经济体，它或许可以在一定程度上平衡其他主要经济体的预期人口下降。


But, with birth rates declining there, too, current trends suggest that its population will probably stabilize at 1.55 billion in the early 2050’s, a full decade ahead of – and 170 million people below – the UN’s forecast.	但是，印度的出生率也在下降，当前趋势表明，印度人口将在21世纪50年代早期达到15. 5亿人时稳定下来，比联合国的预测早整整十年，人口数量也要少1.


Given this, it is likely that world population will peak at nine billion in the 2050’s, a half-century sooner than generally anticipated, followed by a sharp decline.	如此看来，世界人口将在21世纪50年代达到90亿的顶峰，比普遍的预测早半个世纪，此后将大幅下降。


One could argue that this is a good thing, in view of the planet’s limited carrying capacity.	你可以认为这是件好事，因为地球的承载力是有限的。


But, when demographic dynamics turn, the world will have to confront a different set of problems.	但是，当人口学动态逆转时，世界将面临一组不同的问题。


The End of Secularism?	世俗主义的终结？


When the end of ideology was celebrated – first in the 1950’s and then, more emphatically still, in the 1990’s – no one foresaw that religion, the bane of politics in the first half of the twentieth century, would return to that role with a vengeance.	首先是在二十世纪五十年代，更为突出的是在二十世纪九十年代，当意识形态的终结被庆祝的时候，没有人预见到宗教这个二十世纪前半叶政治的祸根会卷土重来，变本加厉。


Daniel Bell and Raymond Aron wrote about the end of fascist and communist ideology in the hope that we would enter an age of pragmatism in which politics would be a subject of argument and debate, not belief and total worldviews.	Daniel Bell 和Raymond Aron 写过法西斯主义和共产主义意识形态的终结，希望我们能进入一个实用主义的时代。 在这个时代中，政治只是争执和辩论的话题，而不是信仰和纯粹世界观的话题。


Karl Popper’s approach to politics, one of reason and critical discourse, had come to prevail.	Karl Popper对政治的态度，即一种辩论和批判性的论述开始占据了上风。


And when, after the collapse of communism, the end of history seemed near, ideological politics was thought to have vanished forever.	而在共产主义垮台以后，我们似乎已经很接近于历史的终结，意识形态政治被认为已经永远地消失了。


But history does not end, and it is forever full of surprises.	但是历史并没有终结，并且它永远充满了惊奇。


Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations appeared within a mere three years of each other in the 1990’s, and a decade later the return of religion to politics is visible for all to see – and for many to suffer.	福山的《历史的终结》和亨廷顿的《文明的冲突》在二十世纪九十年代的不到三年时间内相继问世，可是十年以后宗教的回归政治已经是再明显不过的事情了并且让许多人为此而遭受痛苦。


Those books are not just academic discourse, but mirror real developments.	那些书并不仅仅是学术上的论述，而是反映了真实的发展。


By the time the false religions of totalitarian ideologies were defeated, real religions – so it seemed – had long passed from the political scene.	当伪宗教的极权主义意识形态被击败时，真正的宗教，至少看上去是如此，已经早就退出了政治舞台。


In some countries, formal allegiance to religious faith was symbolized by gestures and rites.	在某些国家，对宗教信仰正式的忠诚是以姿势和仪式来表现的。


Yet no one thought much about it when American presidents of different faiths swore their oath of office to God and country.	然而当美国属于不同信仰的总统们对上帝和国家宣誓时没有人会对此有更多的想法。


In Westminster, every parliamentary sitting begins with Christian prayers presided over by Speakers who could be Christians or Jews or non-believers.	在威斯敏斯特大教堂，每一位新议会成员都要进行基督教的祈祷仪式，作为主持的议长可能是基督教徒、犹太教徒甚至是无神论者。


Not all democracies were as strict as France in their formal secularism but all were secular: the law is made by the sovereign people and not by some superhuman being or agency.	并不是所有的民主国家都像法国那样有如此严格的正式的世俗主义，但是它们都是世俗论的。 法律是由拥有主权的人民而不是由某个超人或其代理来制定的。


Suddenly, however, this secular commitment is no longer so clear.	然而，突然间，这一对世俗论的坚持变得不再那么清晰了。


Religious fundamentalists claim that the law must be anchored in the belief in a supreme being, or even be based on revelation.	宗教原教旨主义者宣称法律必须基于有一个超人存在的信念，或者甚至是基于启示录。


Christian fundamentalism in the United States has come to dominate large segments of the Republican Party.	美国的基督教原教旨主义已经占据了共和党的大壁江山。


In Europe, the Vatican lobbied for acknowledgement of God in the preamble to the proposed European Constitutional Treaty.	在欧洲，梵蒂冈展开游说要在拟议中的欧洲宪法的序言中承认上帝的存在。


Israel has long avoided drafting a constitution, because its secular citizens fear that orthodox Jews would impose their values on them.	以色列很久以来就拒绝制定一部宪法，因为其世俗论的公民担心正统的犹太教徒会把他们的价值观强加给他们。


Likewise, the sharia , Islamic law, entered political life in its least enlightened version in hopeful democracies like Nigeria, to say nothing of Iran.	同样地，伊斯兰的法律沙里阿以其最不开明的形式进入了像尼日利亚这样有望成为民主国家的政治生活中，更别提伊朗了。


Islamic fundamentalism – Islamism – has spread to all countries in which there are significant numbers of Muslims.	伊斯兰的原教旨主义即伊斯兰教已经传遍了所有其绝大部分国民是伊斯兰教徒的国家。


Why has religion returned to secular and democratic politics?	为什么宗教会回归到世俗论和民主的政治中？


The main reason is probably that the enlightened countries of the world have become unsure of their values, even of the Enlightenment itself.	主要原因也许在于世界上开明的国家对它们的价值观甚至就启蒙本身变得不那么确信了。


A moral relativism has spread, leading many to accept the taboos of all religious groups in the name of tolerance and multiculturalism.	一种道义上的相对论在蔓延着，使得许多人在包容和多元文化的名义下接受了所有宗教团体的禁忌。


Cartoons of Mohammed are not published, and Mozart’s opera Idomeneo is not performed in order to avoid offending religious sensitivities; and when, in the end, the publication and the performance take place, they become a demonstration almost intended to offend.	因为其宗教上敏感性，关于穆罕穆得的漫画书不得出版，莫扎特的戏剧伊多梅纽斯也不被上演； 而当它们最终被出版和上演时，却变成了几乎是故意地要加以冒犯的证明。


One can understand that enlightened believers in Islam (of whom there are many) find it upsetting that the world in which they want to live is in fact frail and vulnerable.	人们能够理解开明的伊斯兰教信仰者（他们为数众多）会不安地发现他们想要在此生活的世界原来竟是如此地脆弱和容易受攻击。


The return of religion to politics – and to public life in general – is a serious challenge to the rule of democratically enacted law and the civil liberties that go with it.	宗教的回归政治以及大体上的回归民众的生活是对在民主体制下颁布的法律的规定以及由此而来的公民的自由权的一个严正的挑战。


The response by enlightened communities is therefore important.	因此开明的社会对此作出的反应就显得尤其重要。


Perhaps it is right that the use of religious symbols has become the subject of public debate, though I think that wearing headscarves and even veils is as much a part of individual freedom as is the wearing of Jewish skullcaps and Christian crosses.	也许对于宗教标志的使用成为公众辩论的议题是正确，尽管我认为佩戴头巾甚至面纱应该是个人自由的一部分，就像犹太教徒戴的小圆帽以及基督教徒戴的十字架。


But there are far more important issues – above all, freedom of speech, including the freedom to say and write things that annoy, even upset, many.	但是还有一些重要得多的问题存在。 首要的就是言论自由，包括说和写会激怒甚至搅乱许多人的事情的自由。


In the interest of enlightened discourse, the limits of free speech should be drawn as widely as possible.	为了有助于开明的交谈，对自由言论的限制应该越宽越好。


In the free world, people are not forced to read a newspaper or listen to a speech that they do not like, and they can oppose without fear what is said by those in positions of authority.	在自由世界，人们不会被强迫去读一张他们不喜欢的报纸或听一段他们不喜欢的演讲，并且他们可以毫无畏惧地反对那些处于统治地位的人所讲的话。


Today’s counter-Enlightenment fashion can easily get out of hand.	今天对抗启蒙的风潮会很容易就失去控制。


Those who are committed to liberty must learn to appreciate and defend it now, lest they someday have to fight to get it back.	那些忠于自由的人现在必须重视并保护它，否则有一天他们将不得不努力抗争以赢回自由。


The End of the Age of Friedman	弗里德曼时代的终结


BERKELEY – Harvard professor Dani Rodrik – perhaps the finest political economist of my generation – recently reported on his blog that a colleague has been declaring the past three decades “the Age of Milton Friedman.”	伯克利—哈佛教授Dani Rodrik—可能是我们这一代最好的政治经济学家—最近在他的博客里说他的一位同事将过去的三十年称为“米尔顿•弗里德曼时代”。


According to this view, the coming to power of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping led to an enormous upward leap in human liberty and prosperity.	根据他的观点，里根、撒切尔和邓小平执政使人类自由与繁荣的水平得到极大的提升。


I say yes – and no – to this proposition.	对这一观点，我既认可也否定。


Friedman adhered throughout his life to five basic principles:	弗里德曼在一生中都始终坚持五项基本原则：


1.	1．


Strongly anti-inflationary monetary policy.	强有力的反通胀货币政策。


2.	2．


A government that understood that it was the people’s agent and not a dispenser of favors and benefits.	政府明白自身的职能是人民的代理人而不是福利的发放者。


3.	3．


A government that kept its nose out of people’s economic business.	政府不干涉人民的经济活动。


4.	4．


A government that kept its nose out of people’s private lives.	政府不干涉人民的私生活。


5.	5．


An enthusiastic and optimistic belief in what free discussion and political democracy could do to convince peoples to adopt principles (1) through (4).	积极而乐观地相信自由讨论和政治民主能够使人民遵循1-4的原则。


Measured against these principles, Reagan failed on (2) and (4) and adopted (1) only by default – Paul Volcker’s anti-inflation policy in the 1980’s dismayed many of Reagan’s close aides.	用这些原则来衡量，里根在第2和第4项上是失败的，并也只是在默认的情况下采取了第1项—Paul Volcker在1980年代的反通胀政策让里根及其亲信们深感沮丧。


Thatcher failed on (4).	撒切尔在第4 项上失败了。


And Deng – while a vast improvement over his predecessors Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao – failed on all five, with the possible exception of (3).	至于邓小平—虽然比起其前任的列宁、斯大林、赫鲁晓夫和毛泽东都进步了许多—在可能除了第3项以外的各项原则上都失败了。


We do not know what Deng’s desired set of economic arrangements for a system of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was, and, in all likelihood, he did not know, either.	我们不明白邓小平理想中的一套“有中国特色的社会主义制度”的经济安排是如何的。 我想他自己也很可能不甚清楚。


But I say yes in part to the “Age of Friedman” proposition, because only Friedman’s set of principles self-confidently proposed both to explain the world and to tell us how to change it.	但我认可“弗里德曼时代”命题的一部分原因是因为只有弗里德曼自信地提出的那套原则才既用于解释这个世界又告诉我们如何改变它。


Still, I would build up a counterbalancing set of principles, because I believe that Friedman’s principles do not, ultimately, deliver what they promise.	然而我还是要建立一套与之抗衡的原则，因为我认为弗氏的原则最终不能实现其承诺。


My principles would start from the observation that market economies and free and democratic societies are built atop a very old foundation of human sociability, communication, and interdependence.	我的原则始于这样一个认识，即：市场经济和自由、民主的社会是建立在人类的社会性、沟通和相互依赖这一非常古老的基础之上。


That foundation had a hard enough time functioning when human societies had 60 members – eight orders of magnitude less than our current global society’s six billion.	这一基础在人类社会只有60个成员的情况下难以发挥作用—现代全球社会的60亿人口要高出8个数量级。


So my principles would then be developed from Karl Polanyi’s old observation that the logic of market exchange puts considerable pressure on that underlying foundation.	因此我的原则是从Karl Polanyi的固有认识发展而来，即：市场交流的逻辑给这一基础施加了巨大的压力。


The market for labor compels people to move to where they can earn the most, at the price of potentially creating strangers in strange lands.	劳动力市场迫使人们流向收益最大的地区，所付出的代价就是可能在陌生的地方成为陌生人。


The market for consumer goods makes human status rankings the product of responsiveness to market forces rather than the result of social norms and views about justice.	消费品市场使人类的（社会）地位成为对市场力量的反应的产物，而不是社会规范和公平观念的结果。


This critique of the market is, of course, one-sided.	对市场的这种批评当然是片面的。


After all, other arrangements for allocating labor appear to involve more domination and alienation than the labor market, which offers people opportunities, not constraints.	毕竟，其他的劳力分配方式比起劳力市场来似乎有更多主导和疏离的意味。 后者为人们提供机会而不是制约。


Similarly, “social norms” and “views about distributive justice” usually turn out to favor whomever has the biggest spear or can convince others that obedience to the powerful is obedience to God.	同理，“社会规范”和“分配公平的观念”也往往更有利于那些最有权力或那些能说服他人听命于强权者就是顺从上帝的人。


Market arrangements have a larger meritocratic component than the alternatives, and they encourage positive-sum entrepreneurship, making it easier to do well by doing good.	市场安排比其他的方式有更多的精英成分，它们鼓励正和的企业家精神，使得人们更容易通过善行获得成功。


Nevertheless, the distribution of economic welfare produced by the market economy does not fit anyone’s conception of the just or the best.	然而，通过市场经济进行的��济福利分配不符合任何人关于公平和最佳的概念。


Rightly or wrongly, we have more confidence in the correctness and appropriateness of political decisions made by democratically-elected representatives than of decisions implicitly made as the unanticipated consequences of market processes.	不论如何，比起披着不可预测的市场后果外衣的暗箱操作，我们还是对由民选代表所做政治决策的正确性和恰当性更有信心。


We also believe that government should play a powerful role in managing the market to avoid large depressions, redistributing income to produce higher social welfare, and preventing pointless industrial structuring produced by the fads and fashions that sweep the minds of financiers.	我们还相信政府应该在管理市场以避免萧条，再分配收入以创造更高的社会福利和防止由影响金融从业人员的头脑的跟风逐流所造成的毫无意义的产业结构调整等方面发挥更强的作用。


Indeed, there is a conservative argument for social-democratic principles.	的确，对于社会民主原则而言有一种保守的观点。


Post-WWII social democracy produced the wealthiest and most just societies the world has ever seen.	二战后的社会民主产生了人类历史上从未有过的最为富有和公平的社会。


You can complain that redistribution and industrial policy were economically inefficient, but not that they were unpopular.	你可以抱怨说再分配和产业政策在经济上是低效的，但它们却并非不受欢迎。


It seems a safe bet that the stable politics of the post-WWII era owe a great deal to the coexistence of rapidly growing, dynamic market economies and social democratic policies.	二战后的政治稳定在很大程度上要归功于快速成长、充满活力的市场经济和社会民主政策共存的局面似乎是一个合理的论断。


Friedman would respond that, given the state of the world in 1975, a move in the direction of his principles was a big improvement.	弗里德曼会回应说鉴于世界在1975年时的情况，朝着他的那套原则方向的行动是一大进步。


When I think of Jimmy Carter’s energy policy, Arthur Scargill at the head of the British mineworkers’ union, and Mao’s Cultural Revolution, I have a hard time disagreeing with Friedman about the world in the mid-1970’s.	当我回想起吉米•卡特的能源政策、亚瑟•斯卡吉尔领导英国矿工工会和毛泽东的文化大革命，我很难不认同弗氏关于1970年代中期的世界的观点。


But there I would draw the line: while movement in Friedman’s direction was by and large positive over the past generation, the gains to be had from further movement in that direction are far less certain.	但我还是要划出一道界线：尽管上一代人沿着弗里德曼的方向前进在很大程度上是积极的，但继续沿着这一方向行进所能带来的益处却很难确定。


The End of the Beginning of Ending Poverty	结束贫困的开端的终结


With President Bush at the table, the “spin masters” who put a victorious gloss on all his actions had little need to lower expectations concerning the outcome of the G-8 meeting in Scotland. Any agreement would be seen as a major achievement.	有了布什总统的御驾亲征，那些为他的一举一动讴歌的“军师”们就没有必要降低他们对在苏格兰举行的八国首脑峰会的成果的期望值。 任何 协议都会被看作是一项重大成就。


The write-off of multilateral debt for the world’s poorest countries – thanks to Britain’s leadership – is nonetheless especially welcome.	免除世界上最穷的国家（们）的多边债务—在英国的倡导下—自然受到特别的欢迎。


Agreement by the G-8 to debt relief is a major event, but we should not be fooled by the seeming magnanimity of the gesture: much of the debt would not have been repaid in any case.	八国首脑峰会在免除债务问题上达成协议是一个重大事件。 但我们不应该被这一姿态表面上的重大意义迷惑：这些债务中的大部分本来就是无法偿还的。


More debt relief – encompassing more countries and more debt (including bilateral debt) – is needed.	更大力度的债务免除-纳入更多的国家和更多的债务（包括双边债务）--是有必要的。


But debt relief should be viewed as just a start.	但债务免除只应被看作是一个开端。


As Britain itself has pointed out, developing countries need more assistance and a fairer international trade regime.	正如英国自己指出的，发展中国家需要更多的援助和更公平的国际贸易体制。


Perhaps not surprisingly, the IMF has tried to pour cold water on international enthusiasm for its generosity.	或许不足为奇的是，国际货币基金组织努力地向针对这种慷慨的国际热情泼冷水。


New studies, it warns, suggest that aid does not in general lead to faster growth.	它警告说，新的研究表明援助通常不会带来快速的增长。


This came as a relief for the Bush administration, which claims to have given as much as its “budgetary processes” allow.	这一消息可是让布什政府松了口气。 它总是宣称已经在“预算程序”允许的范围内尽可能地提供了援助。


The world’s richest country, which blithely gave its richest citizens a series of tax cuts worth hundreds of billions of dollars, now says that it simply can’t afford to spend much more on aid.	这个欣然给予最富有的公民总计千亿美金的一系列减税措施的，世界上最富有的国家，现在居然说自己无力负担更多的援助。


Even after the increases in annual assistance promised by Bush at the UN’s meeting in Monterey, Mexico, in 2002, the United States is still giving less than a quarter of its commitment of 0.7% of GDP.	甚至就在布什于2002年墨西哥蒙特利召开的联合国会议上承诺增加年援助额后，美国的实际付出也仍然只有其所承诺的GDP 0. 7%的四分之一都不到。


Now, the IMF offers the following reassurance: ”You may be stingy, you may not be living up to your commitments, but the money probably wouldn’t have made much difference anyway.”	现在，国际货币基金组织又提供了下面一针安慰剂：“你可能很吝啬，也可能没有信守你的承诺，但你的钱说到底可能也起不到什么作用。 ”


Of course, not all foreign-aid money is well spent.	当然，并不是所有的对外援助资金都物尽其用了。


But the same is true of money spent on, say, national defense.	但我们在国防预算的使用上也有同样的问题。


Even if Americans have not been cheated by Defense Department suppliers like Halliburton, it is clear that the money spent in Iraq has not bought the promised peace and security in the Middle East. But no one argues that the US should cut off defense expenditures.	就算美国人没有被如哈里伯顿（Halliburton）之流的国防部供应商们欺骗，但至少我们花在伊拉克问题上的钱也没能买到中东的和平与安全。


The objective should be to improve the efficiency of government, to make sure that we get the most value for what we spend.	我们的目标应该是提高政府效率，确保花出去的钱实现最大的价值。


In this, surprisingly, there have been marked improvements in recent years.	出人意料，在这一点上，近几年还是有了明显的改善。


The World Bank, for example, has been allocating more of its money to countries with a proven track record in spending money well.	例如，世界银行将更多的资金分配给被证明有良好的用款纪录的国家。


It has been exploring new ways of “delivering” aid, sometimes using state and local governments where that appears more effective.	世行也开始尝试新的“发放”援助的方式，有时通过国家和地方政府发放似乎更有效率。


Similarly, so-called “Social Funds,” whereby communities design projects and compete for money, have enhanced participation and “ownership” of development projects.	同样，所谓的“社会基金”，由于需要社区设计项目并争取资金，也提升了发展项目的参与度和“拥有度” （“ownership”）。


In one village, a bridge was built to connect two neighborhoods separated during the rainy season.	在一个村庄里，人们就以这样的方式修了一座桥来连接在雨季被分割开来的两个居住区。


A simple project like this can make an enormous difference to the life of a community.	这样一个简单的工程可以极大地改变一个社区的生活。


For instance, children who live on one side of the river can now attend school on the other side during the rainy season.	例如，居住在河的一边的小孩在雨季也可以到另一边去上学了。


Likewise, micro-credit schemes throughout the developing world have provided finance for the poor to expand their economic enterprise, with repayment rates that are truly impressive.	同理，在发展中国家普遍实施的小额信贷计划（micro-credit schemes）以非常优惠的还款利率为贫困的人们融资，使他们能够扩展经济事业。


The IMF warns about “Dutch disease” problems, when an influx of foreign exchange drives up the local currency’s exchange rate, making it difficult to create jobs in the export sector or to protect jobs against an onslaught of cheaper foreign imports.	国际货币基金组织警告我们小心“荷兰病”，即外汇的涌入使本地货币汇率攀升，从而很难在出口行业创造就业机会，或很难在廉价的进口货的冲击下进行就业保护。


On this, the IMF is partly right.	在这点上，国际货币基金组织的观点有一定的道理。


Countries need to rely on themselves and mobilize domestic resources (although the IMF frequent insistence on tight monetary and fiscal policies often makes this more difficult.)	各国需要自力更生并充分调动国内资源（虽然该组织���持紧缩的货币和财政政策的要求常常使这变得困难。


But there continues to be an enormous need for imported goods – medicines to promote health, technology to reduce the knowledge gap between the developing countries and the rest of the world, and machines to enhance productivity.	）然而，进口货物的需求仍然巨大—促进健康的药物，缩小发展中国家和世界其他地区知识鸿沟的技术，以及用于提高生产力的机器设备。


In any case, not much weight, in my judgment, should be given to the IMF’s statistical studies of the impact of foreign aid on growth, partly because the results do not appear to be very robust.	我认为在任何情况下，我们都不应该太看重国际货币基金组织关于外援对经济增长的作用的统计性研究。 部分原因是其结果似乎不那么积极健康。


Different studies, with slightly different data sets, different countries, different techniques, and different years yield markedly different results.	在不同国家，不同时间，采用不同方法，使用稍有不同的数据组的不同研究，得出了颇为不同的结论。


An earlier set of studies, for instance, showed that aid does make a difference in countries with good governance and sound macro-economic policies.	例如，一组早些时候完成的报告显示，援助 的确 在有着良好的治理和健全的宏观经济政策的国家取得了积极的成果。


Equally important, historically much foreign aid was provided not to promote development, but to purchase friendship, especially during the Cold War.	同样重要的是，从历史上看，大量的对外援助都没有用于促进发展，而是由来收买友谊，特别是在冷战时期。


When the West gave money to Mobutu, they knew that the funds were going to Swiss bank accounts rather than benefiting the people of Zaire (now Congo).	当西方给予莫布图（Mobutu）资金时，他们知道钱款进入了瑞士的银行账户，而并没有用于赈济扎伊尔（现刚果）人民。


The money worked as intended – not to promote development, but to keep Zaire on the side of the West.	这些资金的用途是刻意的—不是用于促进发展，而是确保扎伊尔站在西方一边。


Of course, Mobutu’s boundless corruption challenges us to be thoughtful about foreign aid, both about how the money is spent and who is responsible for “delivering” assistance.	当然，莫布图（Mobutu）肆无忌惮的腐败令我们不得不更审慎地进行对外援助，既要重视资金的用途，还要关注谁在负责“发放”资金。


Some governments have demonstrated a better capacity than others for using funds well.	有些政府在专款专用方面做得比其他政府更好。


In countries where governments are deficient, there are often alternative ways of providing assistance, including NGO’s.	在政府治理不力的国家，通常还有其他的援助方式，包括非政府组织的援助。


Global support for “making poverty history” shows how the issue of Third-World poverty has finally struck a responsive chord.	对“让贫穷成为历史”的全球性支持表明了第三世界的贫困问题如何最终拨动了（西方）回应的心弦。


Debt relief is a good beginning.	债务免除是一个良好的开端。


But that is all it is.	但仅此而已。


After the Gold Rush	淘金潮退去之后


VENICE – The run-up in gold prices in recent years – from $800 per ounce in early 2009 to above $1,900 in the fall of 2011 – had all the features of a bubble.	发自威尼斯——黄金价格近年来的持续走高——从2009年初的800美元每盎司上升到了2011年秋的1900美元每盎司——拥有泡沫的一切特征。


And now, like all asset-price surges that are divorced from the fundamentals of supply and demand, the gold bubble is deflating.	而如今，跟所有脱离了供需基本面的资产价格上涨现象一样，这个金色的泡沫终于开始破灭了。


At the peak, gold bugs – a combination of paranoid investors and others with a fear-based political agenda – were happily predicting gold prices going to $2,000, $3,000, and even to $5,000 in a matter of years.	在高峰时期，那些黄金狂人——某些偏执投资者以及其他对政治议程充满恐惧者的集合——都兴致勃勃地预测黄金将在未来几年中不断上涨至2000美元，3000美元，甚至到达5000美元每盎司。


But prices have moved mostly downward since then.	但自那以后金价就不断走低。


In April, gold was selling for close to $1,300 per ounce – and the price is still hovering below $1400, an almost 30% drop from the 2011 high.	在今年4月，金价还维持在约1300美元每盎司的水平——后来就一直在1400美元以下徘徊，相比于2011年的高点已经下跌了约30%。


There are many reasons why the bubble has burst, and why gold prices are likely to move much lower, toward $1,000 by 2015.	泡沫破灭的原因有很多，而金价可能在2015年下探1000美元每盎司水平的依据也不少。


First, gold prices tend to spike when there are serious economic, financial, and geopolitical risks in the global economy.	首先，金价一般都会在全球经济面临严重经济，金融和地缘政治危机时攀升。


During the global financial crisis, even the safety of bank deposits and government bonds was in doubt for some investors.	在全球金融危机期间，投资者们甚至对银行储蓄和政府债券的安全性都满腹狐疑。


If you worry about financial Armageddon, it is indeed metaphorically the time to stock your bunker with guns, ammunition, canned food, and gold bars.	如果你担心会出现金融末日的话，那么最好得在自己地窖里储备好枪支弹药，罐头食品和金条了。


But, even in that dire scenario, gold might be a poor investment.	但即便在如此极端的情境中，黄金也不是一项好的投资。


Indeed, at the peak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, gold prices fell sharply a few times.	事实上，在2008~2009年金融危机高峰期时金价也出现过几次急跌。


In an extreme credit crunch, leveraged purchases of gold cause forced sales, because any price correction triggers margin calls.	在极端信贷紧缩的情况下，用杠杆来购买黄金的行为会导致被迫抛售，因为任何的价格纠正都会触发保证金追缴。


As a result, gold can be very volatile – upward and downward – at the peak of a crisis.	因此在危机高峰期黄金也可以是极为不稳定的——无论是向上还是向下。


Second, gold performs best when there is a risk of high inflation, as its popularity as a store of value increases.	其二，在可能出现高通胀风险时黄金投资的表现最好，因为它被普遍认为是一个增值的储备品。


But, despite very aggressive monetary policy by many central banks – successive rounds of “quantitative easing” have doubled, or even tripled, the money supply in most advanced economies – global inflation is actually low and falling further.	但尽管许多中央银行都实施了非常激进的货币政策——连串的“量化宽松”使大多数发达经济体的货币供应增加了两倍甚至是三倍，全球通胀率实际上是维持在一个低水平并进一步下行的。


The reason is simple: while base money is soaring, the velocity of money has collapsed, with banks hoarding the liquidity in the form of excess reserves.	原因很简单：虽然基础货币猛增，但货币的流通速度却在降低，因为银行都在用过量储备的方式来吸收流动性。


Ongoing private and public debt deleveraging has kept global demand growth below that of supply.	当前进行的私人和公共债务区杠杆化使得全球供应的增长低于供应量的增加幅度。


Thus, firms have little pricing power, owing to excess capacity, while workers’ bargaining power is low, owing to high unemployment.	因此，由于产能过剩，企业只有很低的定价权，而由于就业率低下，工人的工资待遇议价权也不多。


Moreover, trade unions continue to weaken, while globalization has led to cheap production of labor-intensive goods in China and other emerging markets, depressing the wages and job prospects of unskilled workers in advanced economies.	此外，工会的力量继续被削弱，因为全球化导致那些劳动密集型产品的生产被转移到中国和其他新兴国家，使得发达经济体中那些低级能工人的工资和就业前景一片灰暗。


With little wage inflation, high goods inflation is unlikely.	随着工资增长放缓，产品价格的高通胀也变得不可能。


If anything, inflation is now falling further globally as commodity prices adjust downward in response to weak global growth.	如果不出意外的话，全球层面上的通胀会继续下跌，因为全球增长疲弱导致了商品价格向下调整。


And gold is following the fall in actual and expected inflation.	而金价也会随着实际和预期通胀的下跌而走低。


Third, unlike other assets, gold does not provide any income.	第三，与其他资产不同，黄金并不能提供任何收入。


Whereas equities have dividends, bonds have coupons, and homes provide rents, gold is solely a play on capital appreciation.	当股票提供分红，债券提供利息，住宅提供租金之时，黄金却仅仅是一个资本增值的游戏。


Now that the global economy is recovering, other assets – equities or even revived real estate – thus provide higher returns.	如今随着全球经济复苏，其他资产——股票或甚至是走出低谷的房地产——都能提供更高的回报。


Indeed, US and global equities have vastly outperformed gold since the sharp rise in gold prices in early 2009.	事实上自从2009年初金价大幅上行后美国和全球股市的表现都大大超过黄金。


Fourth, gold prices rose sharply when real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates became increasingly negative after successive rounds of quantitative easing.	第四，金价会在连续多轮量化宽松导致实际（计入通胀水平后）利率逐渐成为负数后大幅攀升。


The time to buy gold is when the real returns on cash and bonds are negative and falling.	买黄金的时机就是在现金和债券的实际回报为负并不断走低的时候。


But the more positive outlook about the US and the global economy implies that over time the Federal Reserve and other central banks will exit from quantitative easing and zero policy rates, which means that real rates will rise, rather than fall.	但对美国和全球经济的更积极展望暗示假以时日美联储和其他各国央行都将退出量化宽松和零政策利率，而这意味着实际利率将会攀升而非下降。


Fifth, some argued that highly indebted sovereigns would push investors into gold as government bonds became more risky.	第五，有些人认为高负债的主权国家其债券的风险也越高，因此迫使投资者购买黄金。


But the opposite is happening now.	但如今的情况恰恰相反。


Many of these highly indebted governments have large stocks of gold, which they may decide to dump to reduce their debts.	许多这类高负债政府都拥有大量黄金储备，而它们也决定去出售这些储备以减少债务。


Indeed, a report that Cyprus might sell a small fraction – some €400 million ($520 million) – of its gold reserves triggered a 13% fall in gold prices in April.	事实上，一则声称塞浦路斯将出售其少量——价值4亿欧元（折合5. 2亿美元）——黄金储备的报道就能在今年四月导致金价下跌13%。


Countries like Italy, which has massive gold reserves (above $130 billion), could be similarly tempted, driving down prices further.	而像意大利这类拥有庞大黄金储备（价值超过1300亿美元）的国家会做出类似行为，导致金价进一步下行。


Sixth, some extreme political conservatives, especially in the United States, hyped gold in ways that ended up being counterproductive.	第六，有些极端政治保守派（尤其是在美国）用一种最终起到反作用的方式来鼓吹黄金。


For this far-right fringe, gold is the only hedge against the risk posed by the government’s conspiracy to expropriate private wealth.	对于这些极右派别来说，黄金是唯一能抵御政府没收私人财产阴谋的东西。


These fanatics also believe that a return to the gold standard is inevitable as hyperinflation ensues from central banks’ “debasement” of paper money.	这些狂热者同时还相信随着中央银行不断“贬低”纸币而导致超高通胀，回归金本位是不可避免的。


But, given the absence of any conspiracy, falling inflation, and the inability to use gold as a currency, such arguments cannot be sustained.	但考虑到这些阴谋的荒谬性，不断下降的通胀和黄金无法作为货币的特性，这些观点都是站不住脚的。


A currency serves three functions, providing a means of payment, a unit of account, and a store of value.	货币会起到三种作用：支付方式，计价单位和价值储备。


Gold may be a store of value for wealth, but it is not a means of payment; you cannot pay for your groceries with it.	黄金可以使一个财富的价值储备，但却不是一个支付方式； 你无法用它来买到日用品。


Nor is it a unit of account; prices of goods and services, and of financial assets, are not denominated in gold terms.	同时它也不是一个计价单位； 因为商品服务价格以及金融资产都不是以黄金来计价的。


So gold remains John Maynard Keynes’s “barbarous relic,” with no intrinsic value and used mainly as a hedge against mostly irrational fear and panic.	因此黄金依然是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所谓的“野蛮的遗迹”，并无真实价值，主要被作为非理性恐惧和恐慌的抵抗物。


Yes, all investors should have a very modest share of gold in their portfolios as a hedge against extreme tail risks.	当然，所有投资者都应该在自己的投资里培植一点点的黄金以低于极端的尾部风险。


But other real assets can provide a similar hedge, and those tail risks – while not eliminated – are certainly lower today than at the peak of the global financial crisis.	但其他实物资产也可以提供类似的功能，而如今那些尾部风险——虽然并未彻底消失——确实也比全球金融危机高峰期要低了。


While gold prices may temporarily move higher in the next few years, they will be very volatile and will trend lower over time as the global economy mends itself.	尽管金价可能会在未来几年短期走高，它们依然会变得非常不稳定而且会随着全球经济的自我修复而下降。


The gold rush is over.	简而言之，淘金潮已经结束了。


The End of the New Normal?	新常态的末日？


WASHINGTON, DC – Just when the notion that Western economies are settling into a “new normal” of low growth gained mainstream acceptance, doubts about its continued relevance have begun to emerge.	华盛顿—在西方经济体正在进入低增长“新常态”的概念获得主流意见接受的同时，其现实意义已经开始受到质疑。


Instead, the world may be headed toward an economic and financial crossroads, with the direction taken depending on key policy decisions.	相反，世界可能正在迈向一个经济和金融十字路口，选择哪个方向取决于关键政策决定。


In the early days of 2009, the “new normal” was on virtually no one’s radar.	2009年初，“新常态”几乎还不为人知。


Of course, the global financial crisis that had erupted a few months earlier threw the world economy into turmoil, causing output to contract, unemployment to surge, and trade to collapse.	当然，几个月前爆发的全球金融危机让世界经济陷入到动荡之中，导致产出萎缩、失业飙升、贸易崩溃。


Dysfunction was evident in even the most stable and sophisticated segments of financial markets.	即使在金融市场最稳定、最成熟的部分，也出现了瘫痪症状。


Yet most people’s instinct was to characterize the shock as temporary and reversible – a V-shape disruption, featuring a sharp downturn and a rapid recovery.	但大部分人直觉地认为这次冲击属于暂时性，是可以扭转的——也就是说，这是一个V型破坏，下跌剧烈，复苏也迅速。


After all, the crisis had originated in the advanced economies, which are accustomed to managing business cycles, rather than in the emerging-market countries, where structural and secular forces dominate.	毕竟，危机源自早已习惯于管理商业周期的发达经济体，而不是结构和长期力量占主导的新兴市场国家。


But some observers already saw signs that this shock would prove more consequential, with the advanced economies finding themselves locked into a frustrating and unusual long-term low-growth trajectory.	但一些观察者已经看到一些迹象表明这次冲击将带来更大的后果，发达经济体将陷入令人沮丧的反常长期低增长轨道。


In May 2009, my PIMCO colleagues and I went public with this hypothesis, calling it the “new normal.”	2009年5月，我的PIMCO同事和我提出了这个假说，称之为“新常态”。


The concept received a rather frosty reception in academic and policy circles – an understandable response, given strong conditioning to think and act cyclically.	学界和政策界对这个概念反应颇为冷淡——这不难理解，因为他们受到的训练是周期性思考和行动。


Few were ready to admit that the advanced economies had bet the farm on the wrong growth model, much less that they should look to the emerging economies for insight into structural impediments to growth, including debt overhangs and excessive inequalities.	几乎没有人愿意承认发达经济体将宝押在了错误的增长模式上，认为应该向发展中经济体取经研究增长的结构性障碍（包括债务积压和过度不平等）的人就更少了。


But the economy was not bouncing back.	但经济没有恢复原状。


On the contrary, not only did slow growth and high unemployment persist for years, but the inequality trifecta (income, wealth, and opportunity) worsened as well.	相反，不但低增长和高失业持续多年，不平等性三驾马车（收入、财富和机会）也在日渐恶化。


The consequences extended beyond economics and finance, straining regional political arrangements, amplifying national political dysfunction, and fueling the rise of anti-establishment parties and movements.	后果超出了经济学和金融学范畴，开始影响地区政治安排，加剧了国家政治瘫痪，助长了反现状政党和运动的兴起。


With the expectation of a V-shape recovery increasingly difficult to justify, the “new normal” finally gained widespread acceptance.	V型复苏预期日益难以服众，“新常态”终于被广泛接受。


In the process, it acquired some new labels.	在此过程中，这一概念获得了一些新的标签。


International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned in October 2014 that the advanced economies were facing a “new mediocre.”	国际货币基金组织总裁克里斯汀·拉加德在2014年10月警告说，发达经济体面临着“新平庸”。


Former US Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers foresaw an era of “secular stagnation.”	美国前财政部长拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）预测将出现“长期停滞”时代。


Today, it is no longer unusual to suggest that the West could linger in a low-level growth equilibrium for an unusually prolonged period.	如今，认为世界可能在反常的长时间内陷入低增长均衡已不再反常。


Yet, as I explain in my new book The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse, growing internal tensions and contradictions, together with over-reliance on monetary policy, are destabilizing that equilibrium.	但是，我在我的新书《唯一的游戏：中央银行、不稳定性和避免下一次崩溃》（The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse）中指出，日益激烈的内部紧张和矛盾，以及对货币政策的过度依赖，正在破坏这一均衡。


Indeed, with financial bubbles growing, the nature of financial risk morphing, inequality worsening, and non-traditional – and in some cases extreme – political forces continuing to gain traction, the calming influence of unconventional monetary policies is being stretched to its limits.	事实上，随着金融泡沫的成长，金融风险性质的变化，不平等性的恶化，以及非传统——有时甚至是极端——政治力量继续得势，非常规货币政策的镇静作用正在走向极限。


The prospect that such policies will be able to keep the economic engines humming, even at low levels, looks increasingly dim.	这类政策能够维持经济引擎轰鸣——哪怕是以低转速轰鸣——的前景日益渺茫。


Instead, the world economy seems to be headed for another crossroads, which I expect it to reach within the next three years.	相反，世界经济似乎正在走向另一个十字路口，我认为会在三年内达到。


This may not be a bad thing.	这也许并非坏事。


If policymakers implement a more comprehensive response, they can put their economies on a more stable and prosperous path – one of high inclusive growth, declining inequality, and genuine financial stability.	如果决策者实施更加全面的反应措施，是可以让经济走向更稳定和��荣的路径的——即高包容性增长，不平等性下降以及实现真正的金融稳定。


Such a policy response would have to include pro-growth structural reforms (such as higher infrastructure investment, a tax overhaul, and labor retooling), more responsive fiscal policy, relief for pockets of excessive indebtedness, and improved global coordination.	这一政策反应必须包括促增长的结构改革（比如更高的基础设施投资、税收改革和劳动力再培训）、更有响应力的财政政策、环节过度负债问题，以及改善全球协作。


This, together with technological innovations and the deployment of sidelined corporate cash, would unleash productive capacity, producing faster and more inclusive growth, while validating asset prices, which are now artificially elevated.	这，再加上技术创新和闲置公司现金，能够释放生产力、带来更快更包容的增长，同时纠正目前被人为抬高的资产价格。


The alternate path, onto which continued political dysfunction would push the world, leads through a thicket of parochial and uncoordinated policies to economic recession, greater inequality, and severe financial instability.	相反，如果继续放任政治失灵让世界经济走向错误的路径，就会导致一系列狭隘的费协作经济衰退对策、更大的不平等性和严重的金融动荡。


Beyond harming the economic wellbeing of current and future generations, this outcome would undermine social and political cohesion.	除了危及当前和子孙后代的经济福利，这一结果还会破坏社会和政治凝聚力。


There is nothing pre-destined about which of these two paths will be taken.	在这两条路中选择哪一条绝非事先注定。


Indeed, as it stands, the choice is frustratingly impossible to predict.	相反，从目前的情况看，选择令人沮丧地无法预测。


But in the coming months, as policymakers face intensifying financial volatility, we will see some clues concerning how things will play out.	但在未来几个月中，决策者面临着金融波动加剧的局面，他们将得到一些事态将如何变化的线索。


The hope is that they point to a more systematic – and thus effective – policy approach.	我们希望他们能指引一条更加系统性——因此也更加有效——的政策道路。


The fear is that policies will fail to pivot away from excessive reliance on central banks, and end up looking back to the new normal, with all of its limitations and frustrations, as a period of relative calm and wellbeing.	令人担心的地方是政策可能无法改变过度依赖中央银行的局面，最终当我们回顾新常态的时候发现，尽管它存在诸多局限并且令人沮丧，但仍是一段相对平静和幸福的时期。


The End of the Russia-China Debate	俄中辩论的结束


Ten years ago, comparing the reform processes in China and Russia was an intellectual fashion.	就在十年前，把中俄改革相互比较还是知识界的一种潮流。


Was it preferable to start with economics – try and get rich, quick, but don’t rock the boat politically – in the manner of the Chinese?	回想起来，当时是否更应该遵循中国的模式，从经济入手¾尝试发展，然后快速繁荣，而不掺杂政治的因素；


Or was it better to start with politics – recover liberty and prosperity may follow – which seemed to be Russia’s path under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin?	或者更应该遵循米凯尔•戈尔巴乔夫和鲍里斯·叶利钦倡导的俄式路线，从政治入手，在恢复自由的基础上再重建繁荣？


Today, a new comparative debate has started.	今天，一场新的对比辩论已经开始。


This time the subject is no longer Russia versus China, because Russia has long ceased to be a point of comparison.	但这次不是在俄罗斯和中国之间，因为俄罗斯早已没有资格成为比较的对象。


Instead, the new comparative debate involves Asia’s two new economic, demographic, and political giants, China and India.	取而代之的较量是在亚洲两个新兴经济、人口、和政治巨人¾印度和中国之间展开的。


China’s annual economic growth has been roughly 8-9% for the last 26 years; India has recorded similar rates for the last decade.	中国的年经济增长率在过去的26年中始终保持在8－9%，印度在过去十年间发展速度也大致相当。


In the “flat world” of globalization – to borrow Thomas Friedman’s powerful metaphor – it seems that Russia no longer has a place.	借用托马斯·弗里德曼的一个有力的比喻，在全球化的“扁平世界”中，俄罗斯似乎已经失去了它原有的地位。


Of course, Russia is still the second-largest nuclear power in the world, and, as one of the world’s leading exporters of oil and gas, it benefits from today’s high energy prices.	当然，俄罗斯仍然是第二大核强国，也是世界石油和天然气最主要的出口国之一。


But Russia’s population is disappearing before our eyes.	但是，俄罗斯的人口正在人们眼前消失。


With average male life expectancy just 57 years, the country is losing close to 800,000 people annually.	男性平均寿命只有57岁，这意味着，这个国家每年将会失去80万的人口。


Indeed, Russia is more a fragile oil-producing state than a modernizing economic giant.	实际上，俄罗斯更像是一个脆弱的产油国，而不是现代化的经济巨人。


To put it bluntly, Russia is no longer in the same category as China.	坦率的说，俄罗斯和中国已经再不能同日而语。


Whereas the “Middle Kingdom” is proudly regaining its former global status after centuries of decline, Russia is defiantly trying to resurrect its former imperial status, but in a manner that appears doomed to fail.	在“地球中心的王国”衰落了几个世纪之后，正在骄傲地崛起，恢复它曾经拥有的辉煌。 与此同时，俄罗斯也在跃跃欲试地企图恢复从前的帝国地位，但这似乎注定不会成功。


Russia has clearly taken giant steps in the wrong direction, at a time when China has taken steps, however small, in the right direction.	很明显，俄罗斯在朝着错误的方向迈着大步，而中国，别管步子有多小，却在这个时候朝着正确的方向迈进。


When you meet today’s “new Russian Nomenklatura,” you experience a sudden feeling of being 20 years younger, awash as they are in nostalgia for Cold War posturing.	今天，当你目睹“新俄罗斯干部私有化”的时候，仿佛又回到了20年前，和他们一样再次沉浸于对冷战时局的怀旧氛围中。


By contrast, seen from afar, in their new suits, you might think that Chinese economic elites are Japanese.	与此形成鲜明对照的是，当中国的经济精英们西服革履地出现在你面前时，远远望去你会把他们当作日本公民。


Where Russia represents a return to the past, one sees in China an opening, however ambiguous, to the future.	俄罗斯所代表的是回归过去，而人们在中国看到的却是虽不确定但却面向未来的开端。


Of course, some bias is involved here.	当然，这里面存在着一些偏见。


As a European, I and people like me almost instinctively expect more from Russia.	作为欧洲人，我和像我一样的人们本能地寄予俄罗斯更大的期望。


It is, after all, a European nation in cultural, if not political terms, whereas progress in China will not be measured by the introduction of Western-style democracy, but eventually, one hopes, by Singapore-style rule of law.	毕竟，即便在政治上有所差异，俄罗斯在文化上仍然是一个欧洲国家。 而对于中国的发展，我们很难用西方的民主标准来加以衡量，但我们期望最终中国的法治能够与新加坡的相互媲美。


The diverse paths followed by Russia and China may be explained in part by how the two peoples perceive themselves.	俄罗斯和中国选择的不同道路从某种意义上讲可以从两国人民对自己的看法中得到解释。


The Chinese are comforted in their self-image by the world’s combination of admiration for their dynamism, greed for the market they constitute, and apprehension for the competition they represent.	世界对中国活力的羡慕、对中国市场的贪欲和对中国竞争力的恐惧使中国人感到安慰。


Russians, by contrast, seem to be animated by a dark form of narcissism.	而恰恰相反，俄罗斯人却在被一种自我陶醉的阴暗模式所驱动。


They do not find anything to be proud of in the eyes of others.	在旁人眼中，他们没有任何东西能够引以为荣。


They are respected for what they control – the Soviet legacy of nuclear arms and “Christian energy resources,” to quote Vladimir Putin’s bizarre remark on his first official trip to Paris – but not for their economic performance or their essence.	他们受到尊重纯粹是因为他们所掌握的力量¾苏联遗留下来的核武器和 “基督教能量之源”（这个奇怪的措辞来自普京第一次对巴黎进行的官方访问），而不是来自他们的经济表现或者核心制度。


China and Russia tend to relate to their respective pasts and futures in very different ways – with self-confidence in China’s case, with self-diffidence in the case of Russia.	中国和俄罗斯往往会以截然不同的态度谈及他们的历史和未来¾中国人充满自信，而俄罗斯人却提心吊胆。


Chinese elites are convinced that time is working in their favor, and that it is only natural that China should regain its rank amongst the world leading powers, perhaps even emerging on top one day.	中国的精英们非常肯定国家会日渐强大，中国恢复从前世界大国的地位是再自然不过的事情，甚至有一天，中国会再次坐上头把交椅。


Indeed, their serene patience stands in stark contrast to the anxious reticence of Russian leaders, who have yet to surmount the humiliation that Russia suffered as a result of the Soviet Union’s disintegration at the end of the Cold War.	的确，他们平静的耐性和俄罗斯领导人焦虑的沉默形成了鲜明的对比。 俄罗斯领导人还需要战胜冷战结束时苏联解体留给他们的耻辱。


Russia may be experiencing a global “restoration” phase, but in politics and economics, and also with respect to its empire, restoration is headed in the wrong direction.	俄罗斯可能正在经历着全面的“复兴”阶段，但在政治和经济、还有帝国版图等问题上，这种复兴都在沿着错误的方向行进。


With Putin’s current clampdown on civil society, re-nationalization of key segments of the economy, failure to develop any political approach to resolving the conflict in Chechnya, and cultivation of imperial nostalgia, Russia is killing its only chance to matter in the future.	目前，普京对俄国的公民社会予以压制、对俄罗斯的关键经济部门重新实行国有、找不到解决车臣地区冲突的政治途径以及时时酝酿着对过去帝国的怀旧情绪，所有这些无一不在扼杀俄罗斯未来发展的唯一机会。


Yet there is no reason for China to declare victory.	然而，中国也没有理由宣布胜利。


The gap between the respective qualities of China’s economic and scientific elites, on the one hand, and its ruling political elites, on the other, is simply too monumental – and still growing – for stability to be taken for granted.	中国的经济和科技精英与大权在握的政治人物间的差距已经过于悬殊，而且还在继续拉大，因此，稳定并不是想当然的事情。


One senses in China the birth pangs of civil society, making the introduction of the rule of law increasingly urgent.	在中国能够感觉到公民社会诞生的分娩之痛，这使得法制的引入变得尤为迫切。


Without political reforms, China’s confidence in herself will quickly turn into disillusion, or even delusion.	没有政治改革，中国的内在信心会很快破灭，并最终沦为幻想。


If that happens, the Russia-China debate might be revived, this time as a comparison of competitive decadence.	如果事情这样发展下去，俄中之间的辩论又将重演，而这次则会是两国颓废势头之间的较量。


The End of the Special Relationship?	特殊关系的终结？


TEL AVIV – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington highlighted fundamental disagreements between Israel’s current government and President Barack Obama’s administration.	特拉维夫——以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡近期对华盛顿的访问突显了当前以色列政府和美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马政府存在着根本的分歧。


Netanyahu persists in questioning Obama’s infatuation with the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and he refuses to see the link that Obama believes exists between an Israeli-Palestinian peace and his capacity to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions.	内塔尼亚胡不断地责问奥巴马，在解决以色列和巴勒斯坦冲突中，为什么如此热衷“两个国家”的解决方案。 他也拒绝奥巴马将以巴和平议题与伊朗核武器计划挂钩。


Nor is Netanyahu especially happy with Obama’s reluctance to set a firm deadline for talks with Iran.	除此之外，对奥巴马至今没有对伊朗的谈判设置最终的时间表，他也表达了不满之情。


Israelis believe that Iran is galloping into the nuclear club, and will shrewdly use the prospect of talks with the US to pre-empt tougher sanctions or a military strike.	以色列人认为为了避免更严厉的经济制裁和军事打击，伊朗狡猾地利用美国对和谈的幻想，加紧研发的脚步，实际上，伊朗正在飞奔地加入核俱乐部的行列，


Crises and profound disagreements are not new in the relations between these two unequal allies.	对于美以这两个不寻常的盟国来说，危机和分歧一向不是新鲜事。


But, however fundamental the current differences might be, it is the underlying suspicion that Obama is poised to shift America away from its unique relationship with the Jewish state that most worries Israelis.	目前的局势却有点不同：双方存在着根本的分歧。 以色列最担心的是奥巴马会改变美国和这个犹太人国家的特殊关系。


A convergence of interests and a profoundly emotional attitude to Israel’s story and to the Jewish narrative since the Holocaust have been the motive forces behind what is perhaps one of the most intriguing alliances in international relations.	自从犹太人种族灭绝大屠杀之后，美国和以色列共同的利益加上对犹太人的深刻同情，这恐怕是目前国际关系中最有趣的联盟关系主要的推动力。


In fact, there is no single, exclusive explanation for America’s persistent vindication of its commitment to Israel, and for the uniquely vigorous resonance that Israel’s cause has had in the United States.	实际上，没有一种单一和独特的原因来解释说明美国总统对以色列所做出的承诺，以色列在美国一直以来产生的特殊共鸣的原因也很复杂。


American presidents since Harry Truman, the first world leader to recognize Israel in 1948 (against the advice of then Secretary of State General George C. Marshall), have embodied in varying degrees either the emotional or the realpolitik aspect – some represented both – of the relationship.	1948年，美国总统哈利·杜鲁门成为第一个承认以色列的大国的世界领袖（他当时不顾当时的国务卿乔治·C. 马歇尔的反对），原因可能是基于情感或现实上的，或者是两者综合因素的考虑。


The suspicion today is that Barack Obama is committed to neither.	但如今，奥巴马总统的态度却不甚明朗。


Obama is a revolutionary phenomenon in American history; he certainly does not fit the traditional pattern of American presidents after World War II.	奥巴马的出现显然是美国历史上具有革命性的现象，他显然不能归类于二战以后美国总统的传统印象。


He was far less shaped by religious and biblical teachings than all of them, and the narrative of Jewish history and of Israel’s heroic emergence out of the ashes of the Holocaust is not the primordial sentiment in his attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.	他较少受到宗教和圣经教义的影响，在阿拉伯世界和以色列的冲突中，犹太人的苦难历史和在种族大屠杀后奇迹般的崛起也不是他感兴趣的话题。


The narrative of the Palestinian tragedy is certainly no less central in defining his view of the Middle East.	巴勒斯坦人的苦难故事也不能左右他在中东问题上的立场。


But even when US administrations have not embodied an emotional attachment to Israel, they have still backed Israel’s cause, provided that doing so can be sustained by considerations of realpolitik.	即使美国政府对以色列没有什么感情因素，处于现实的考虑，他们也仍然会战在以色列一边。


That was clearly the case with Richard Nixon, who never suffered from an excess of love for Jews, but was nonetheless one of the staunchest allies that Israel ever had in the White House.	理查德·尼克松就是一个最好的例子，虽然他从来没有表达过对犹太人的好感，但不用质疑，在他的执政时期，以色列仍然是白宫最坚定的盟友。


Devoid of sentimental attachment to Israel’s cause and deeply disturbed by its policies in the occupied territories, Obama represents the specter of a White House where neither love nor interests are shared with the Jewish state.	奥巴马显然是历届美国总统的异类，他对以色列没什么情感因素，对以色列现有占据领土政策也表示出不满。 同时，他对这个犹太国家即不热爱也没有兴趣。


The thrust of Obama’s Middle East policy – reconciling America with the Arab and Muslim world – clashes with Netanyahu’s strategy. For Obama’s emerging policy assumes that the best way to address the challenge of Islamic terrorism and stop the region’s decline into uncontrolled nuclear proliferation is to force Israel to stop building new settlements, withdraw from the occupied territories in order to allow the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and make peace with Syria by giving back the Golan Heights.	现任美国政府和内塔尼亚胡的冲突表现在于美国对中东政策的改变，也就是美国对阿拉伯穆斯林世界的缓和关系，在处理伊斯兰极端分子和如何阻止该地区朝着不可控制的核国家发展的问题上，奥巴马的解决方案是：以色列必须停止建立新的定居点，从已经占领的领土上撤出，以便建立一个以东耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国家，为了换取和叙利亚的和平，以色列应该从戈兰高地上撤军。


But this does not necessarily mean that we are witnessing the end of the US-Israel “special relationship.”	虽然如此，这并不意味着我们能够看到美国以色列“特殊关系”的终结。


Even a revolutionary president will not depart from America’s core commitments to an Israel that fights for reasonable and morally defensible positions.	即使一个具有革命性的总统也不会偏离美国对以色列政策核心的承诺，那就是为了保卫以色列的安全，美国可以合理且防御性地进行战斗。


So far, Obama has been careful not to depart from any of the traditional American positions pertaining to Israel’s security.	至今为止，奥巴马小心地执行着美国传统上对以色列安全的一贯承诺。


He has accepted the logic of Israel’s special nuclear status and its position as a major recipient of American military aid.	他接受以色列作为一个特殊核武器国家的地位，把以���列作为美国军事援助的主要对象。


Moreover, the watchdog of Israel’s interests, the US Congress, remains vigilant.	作为以色列的忠实守护者的美国国会，它的作用也不可小视。


Netanyahu knows that the daunting task of maintaining Israel’s relationship with the US is as much a vital strategic necessity as it is a compelling domestic requirement.	内塔尼亚胡深知和美国保持战略关系的重要性，这也是他在国内获得支持的基础。