But when Putin invaded Ukraine, China showed the hollowness of its adherence to this principle. Instead of condemning Russia for invading and annexing Crimea, it abstained at the United Nations Security Council, and has offered more criticism of Ukraine’s new popular government than it has of Putin’s thuggish behavior.	但中国并没有谴责俄罗斯入侵并吞并克里米亚，而是在联合国安理会投了弃权票，更多地批评乌克兰新选出的政府而不是普京的暴行。


Every country in Asia is bound to draw only one conclusion from China’s tacit approval of Putin’s Crimean land grab: China, too, thinks that might makes right, and if it believes that it can get away with invading disputed territories, whether in the South China Sea or in the Indian Himalayas, it will do so.	每一个亚洲国家从中国对普京吞并克里米亚领土的默认中只能得出一个结论：中国也认为这是正确的，并且如果它认为可以侥幸成功地入侵纠纷领土时——不管是南海还是印度喜马拉雅地区——它也会这么做。


As a result, effective deterrence will require Asian countries to strengthen their defenses and unite to demand adherence to international law, so that China understands that any Putin-style land grabs will cost its economy dearly.	因此，有效的威慑要求亚洲国家加强防务，并团结起来要求遵守国际法，从而让中国明白，普京使的领土掠夺将付出沉重的经济代价。


In the immediate future, Japan will work with the G-7 to ensure that Putin’s reckless ambitions do not endanger other parts of Ukraine.	眼下，日本将继续与七国集团合作，确保普京的野蛮野心不会威胁到乌克兰的其他部分。


Already, Japan has decided to provide ¥150 billion ($1.5 billion) in economic aid for Ukraine, the largest pledge by any individual country, including the US, thus far.	日本已经决定向乌克兰提供1,500亿日元的经济援助，这是到目前为止包括美国在内的最大一笔单国援助承诺。


Before the Crimea invasion, territorial negotiations between Japan and Russia showed signs of progress.	在入侵克里米亚前，日本和俄罗斯的领土谈判表现出进展信号。


Moreover, several bilateral economic cooperation efforts, such as projects involving liquefied natural gas, were moving forward.	此外，一些双边经济合作计划，如与��化天然气有关的项目也在推进。


But it is now clear not only that Putin is returning Russia to the stagnation of the late-Soviet era, but also that he subscribes to former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s dictum that “what we have, we hold.”	但如今，显然不仅普京让俄罗斯回到了苏联末期的停滞时期，并且他还在按照前苏联领导人勃列日涅夫的“我们有的就要捍卫”的格言行事。


So Putin’s talk about reaching an agreement with Japan on the Northern Territories was likely as mendacious as his claims that Russians in Crimea were in peril, and thus in need of protection by Russian troops.	因此，普金所谓的与日本就北方四岛达成协议完全是个谎言，一如他宣称克里米亚的俄罗斯族面临着危险因此需要派遣俄罗斯军队予以保护。


More important, Japan understands that business as usual with an aggressive Russia that undermines the international order could embolden others closer to home to embrace Putin’s lawless tactics.	更重要的是，日本明白，像什么都没发生过一样继续正常与破坏了国际秩序的俄罗斯打交道将让更近的近邻效仿普京目无法律的做法。


The days of an inward looking Japan are over.	对日本来说，向内看的时期已经结束了。


Japan now sees threats elsewhere in the world in the context of its own security, and will react appropriately.	现在，日本在其自身安全环境中看到了来自世界其他地方的威胁，并将采取相应行动。


Abenomics’ Women Problem	安倍经济学的妇女问题


TOKYO – When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed the United Nations General Assembly last week, he emphasized his determination to build a society in which women shine.	东京—在上周的联合国大会演讲中，日本首相安倍晋三强调了建设让妇女放出光芒的社会的决心。


Indeed, creating opportunities for women in the workforce is an essential pillar of the government’s reform program, so-called “Abenomics.”	事实上，为参与劳动力大军的妇女创造机会是日本政府的改革方案，即所谓的“安倍经济学”（Abenomics）的重要支柱。


Abe is clearly on the right track.	显然，安倍的方向是正确的。


According to an analysis by researchers at Goldman Sachs, closing the gender gap could boost GDP by 9% in the United States and nearly 13% in Japan.	根据高盛（Goldman Sacks）研究人员的分析，缩小性别差异将给美国带来9%的GDP提振，给日本则能带来13%。


During his stay in New York, Abe also discussed “womenomics” with Hillary Clinton, who had made empowering women in the economy a key policy goal during her tenure as US Secretary of State.	在纽约之行期间，安倍也与希拉里·克林顿讨论了“妇女经济学”。 在担任美国国务卿期间，希拉里·克林顿将加强妇女在经济中的地位作为一项重要政策目标。


Abe, strange to say, is the first Japanese leader to grasp that the underutilization of women’s skills has been holding back Japan’s economy.	说来令人奇怪，安倍是第一个认识到妇女技能利用不足一直在拖累日本经济的日本领导人。


Japan ranked 105th out of 136 countries in the World Economic Forum’s “Global Gender Gap Report 2013,” down from 101st place in 2012.	在世界经济论坛（World Economic Forum）的《2013年全球性别差异报告》（Global Gender Gap Report 2013）中，日本名列136个国家的第150位，较2012年的第101位有所下降。


The problem begins in Abe’s own domain – politics.	问题起始于安倍自己的领域——政治。


In his cabinet reshuffle earlier this month, five female ministers were appointed, but in the face of strong opposition from male MPs.	在其本月重新改组的内阁中，有五名女性大臣被任命，但这一决定受到了男性国会议员的强烈反对。


More important, the appointments amounted to painting over the cracks: Only 39 of the 480 members of the Japanese Diet’s lower house, or 7.9%, are women.	更重要的是，此次任命有欲盖弥彰的嫌疑：在日本众议院的480个议席中，只有39个（或7. 9%）为妇女。


The Inter-Parliamentary Union ranks Japan 158th out of 189 countries in terms of its ratio of female MPs.	从妇女占议员总数比例看，日本名列国际议会联盟（Inter-Parliamentary Union）189个国家的第158位。


Things are just as bad at lower levels of government, where women account for a mere 13.1% of representatives in local parliaments, more than 40% of which have no female members at all.	低级别政府的情况也一样糟糕，妇女只占地方议会代表的13. 1%，有40%的选区一名妇女议员都没有。


As the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Abe should instruct local party branches to choose more female candidates to run in next April’s local elections.	作为自民党领袖，安倍应该要求地方党分支选择更多妇女候选人参加明年4月的地方选举。


But, at least so far, Abe seems to lack the will to do so (though he may choose to work with local party bosses behind the scenes to bring in more women).	但是，至少到目前为止，安倍似乎没有这样做的意愿（尽管他可能与地方党组织领导人达成幕后交易，提拔更多女性）。


It is also worrying that some of the women Abe has selected for his cabinet and for key party posts are arch-conservatives who advocate that women stay at home and take care of children.	另一个令人担心之处是一些被安倍选为内阁成员和党内重要职务人选的妇女是极端保守派，认为妇女应该呆在家里带孩子。


Given this, one cannot help feeling uncertain about the credibility of his womenomics initiatives.	基于此，我们无法不对其妇女经济学计划的可信性产生疑问。


That is especially true when one considers the lack of women in corporate management positions.	考虑到妇女在公司管理职位上的劣势，这一点更加明显了。


Everyone at the meeting of the Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organizations, to welcome US Ambassador Caroline Kennedy were men in dark suits.	出席经团联会议欢迎美国大使卡洛琳·肯尼迪（Caroline Kennedy）的清一色都是男性。


In 2003, Norway revised its corporation law to state that companies that failed to place women in 40% of management positions could face delisting.	2003年，挪威修改了其公司法，管理岗位妇女比例不到40%的公司将可能面临摘牌下市的风险。


If the same law were applied to Japan today, every company would be delisted.	如果今天日本也采取相同的法律，那么所有公司都得摘牌下市。


Women currently hold an estimated 9% of senior management positions in Japan, compared to 40% in the Philippines, 24% in France, and 22% in the United States.	据估计，目前妇女只占日本高级管理职位的9%，而菲律宾为40%，法国为24%，美国为22%。


One reason that Japan’s consumer electronics manufacturers are no longer world-beaters is that they have not fully used their female employees in managerial positions, despite their varied experiences.	日本消费电子产品制造商不再能够执世界之牛耳的一个原因就在于它们没有充分利用管理岗位上的妇女员工，尽管她们拥有丰富的经验。


The exceptions are instructive.	例外最具有说明性。


When Akira Matsumoto became CEO of the Japanese snack manufacturer Calbee, he began appointing both female executives and foreigners to the company’s leadership.	松本彰（Akira Matsumoto）成为日本快餐公司卡鲁比（Calbee）CEO后，任命女性高管和外国人担任公司领导层。


Revenues and earnings have increased, and net sales have grown threefold.	此后，收入和利润都有所上升，净销售额翻了三倍。


Though there is no proof that the former caused the latter, Matsumoto’s commitment to lead in this area suggests that corporate dynamism may well increase with a more prominent role for women.	尽管不能证明是前者带来了后者，但松本在这方面的敢为天下先先表明，让女性扮演更加主要角色可能让公司活力大增。


Likewise, Daiwa Securities CEO Shigeharu Suzuki has appointed women as executive officers to improve sales capabilities, with promising results.	类似地，大和证券（Akira Matsumoto）CEO铃木茂晴（Shigeharu Suzuki）任命女性为公私高管以改善销售能力，结果令人欣喜。


Although the employment rate of women in Japan reached 69.5% in 2013, more than 60% of women leave the workplace prematurely, mostly owing to childbirth.	尽管2013年日本妇女就业率达到了69. 5%，但60%多的妇女过早退出了劳动力大军，主要原因是为了照顾孩子。


This pattern results from institutional impediments to achieving a viable work-family balance – impediments that embody the harsh view of male superiors and colleagues toward working mothers.	这一模式的根源在于阻碍视线工作-家庭平衡的制度障碍——男性上司和同事对生了孩子还上班的母亲十分反感。


Changing this view is not easy, because the Confucian belief that women belong in the home remains embedded in Japanese and some other Asian societies.	改变这一观念绝不容易，因为妇女应该持家的儒家思想仍深深地植根于日本也其他一下亚洲国家。


Moreover, most of the people participating in forums or workshops focused on womenomics are women; too often, these events simply turn into platforms for women to complain among themselves.	此外，大部分参加妇女经济学论坛和讨论组的人都是妇女； 这些最后往往沦为妇女之间彼此抱怨的平台。


Abe’s womenomics will not work unless and until Japanese men change their thinking.	在日本男性改变思想之前，安倍的妇女经济学不会奏效。


If Abenomics is now stalling, as many fear, the reason may be found in a lack of capacity to implement the policies put forward, particularly with respect to women.	如果现在安倍经济学如同很多人所担心的那样停滞下来，其原因或许可以从缺乏推行政策特别是妇女政策的能力。


Indeed, the key to Abenomics’ success or failure may turn out to be whether the Japanese people are convinced that women are essential to their country’s economic revival, and are willing to support an earnest effort to establish institutions that support working women.	事实上，安倍经济学成败的关键也许是日本民族是否相信妇女对这个国家的经济复兴至关重要，并愿意支持建设支持职业妇女的制度的努力。


Tipping Points to Asia’s Future	亚洲未来的关键点


TOKYO – A week, it is said, is a long time in politics.	东京—据说一周的时间在政治界已经算得上长期了。


But events in Asia over the past week may define the region for decades to come.	但过去一周在亚洲发生的事件可能决定着该地区的未来几十年。


Thailand, one of Asia’s most prosperous countries, seems determined to render itself a basket case.	亚洲最繁荣的国家之一泰国似乎铁了心要自断手脚。


A military coup, imposed following the Thai constitutional court’s ouster of an elected government on spurious legal grounds, can lead only to an artificial peace.	在泰国宪法法院以可疑法律依据驱逐民选政府后，军事政变只能带来人为的平衡。


Unless Thailand’s military is prepared to serve as a truly honest broker between deposed Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (and her supporters) and the anti-democratic Bangkok elite, which has sought a right to permanent minority rule, today’s calm may give way to a new and more dangerous storm.	除非泰国军方准备充当被推翻的总理英拉（及其支持者）和反民主的曼谷精英（正在追求永久的少数派统治）之间的真诚的牵线人，否则今天的平静将让位给新的危险风暴。


To Thailand’s east, Vietnam is the latest Asian country to feel pinched by China’s policy of creating facts on the ground, or in this case at sea, to enhance its sovereignty claims on disputed territory.	泰国以东，越南是中国捏造土地事实——对越南来说是海洋事实——推行其在争议领土主权主张的最新的不堪忍受者。


Vietnam’s government reacted vigorously to China’s placement of a huge, exploratory oilrig near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Ordinary Vietnamese, taking matters into their own hands, reacted even more vigorously, by rioting and targeting Chinese industrial investments for attack.	越南政府对中国在存在争议的南海西沙群岛设置巨型钻井平台的反应非常强烈，而自力更生的普通越南人民的反应甚至更加强烈，掀起了针对中国产业投资的暴乱。


China’s unilateral behavior has exposed a strain of virulent anti-Chinese sentiment bubbling beneath the surface in many Asian countries.	中国的单方面行为将掩盖在许多亚洲国家平静表面下的汹涌的反中情绪揭开了一丝。


Renewed protests over China’s mining investments in Myanmar this week confirmed this trend, one that China’s leaders seem either to dismiss as trivial, or to regard as somehow unrelated to their bullying.	本周在缅甸发生的新一轮针对中国矿业投资的示威确认了这一趋势，而中国领导要么认为这一无关紧要，要么认为这与其恃强凌弱的行为没有什么关系。


Indeed, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, who faces widespread public antipathy in Ukraine, China’s leaders appear to believe that popular protests against them can only be the product of an American plot.	事实上，与在乌克兰饱受千夫所指的俄罗斯总统普京一样，中国领导人似乎认为针对他们的群众示威只不过是美国人煽动的产物。


Yet, despite their shared contempt for expressions of the popular will, China’s President Xi Jinping and Putin struggled, during Putin’s two-day visit to Shanghai, to agree on a new gas deal that the Kremlin desperately needs.	但是，尽管都对汹涌的群情嗤之以鼻，但中国国家主席习近平和普京仍在普京的两日上海之行中就克里姆林宫所急需的天然气合同展开了一番明争暗斗。


Putin had viewed China as his backup option should the West seek to isolate Russia following its annexation of Crimea.	普京将中国视为西方在其吞并克里米亚后寻求孤立俄罗斯时的备选项。


Putin’s idea was that he could pivot Russia’s economy into a partnership with China.	普京的算盘是他可以将俄罗斯经济的支点放在与中国的伙伴关系上。


But Xi balked, signing the gas agreement only after Putin offered a steep, long-term discount.	但习近平并不买账，在普京给出了很大的长期折扣后才签署了天然气协议。


Xi’s self-confidence reflected not only the Chinese leadership’s contempt for Putin’s mismanagement of the Russian economy, but also the fact that China’s energy worries have lessened considerably of late.	习近平的自信不但反映出中国领导层对普京治理俄罗斯经济不力的不屑，也体现了中国能源顾虑最近已大为缓解的事实。


Successful deployment of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technology in Xinjiang suggests that China, like America, will soon be able to draw on its own reserves of shale energy.	液压致裂法在新疆的成功应用意味着中国与美国一样，很快就将能够利用其自身的页岩能源储备。


Moreover, plentiful gas supplies from Myanmar and Central Asia will provide China with sufficient supplies of energy for at least a decade.	此外，来自缅甸和中亚的充足的天然气供应至少在十年内可以让中国没有供应短缺之忧。


China’s hard bargaining with Russia has exposed the limits of the two countries’ bilateral cooperation, which has important geo-strategic consequences for Asia and the world.	中国的强势还价暴露出两国双边合作的局限性，而这对亚洲和世界具有重要的地缘战略影响。


China, it now seems, is happy to see Putin poke his finger in the West’s eye and challenge America’s global leadership.	中国似乎乐于见到普京与西方顶牛、挑战美国的全球领导。


But it is not willing to underwrite with hard cash Russian pretensions to world power status.	但它不愿拿出真金白银支持俄罗斯的全球霸权之争。


Instead, China appears interested in turning Russia into the sort of vassal state that Putin is seeking to create in Ukraine.	相反，中国似乎更愿意让俄罗斯成为附庸国，一如普京对乌克兰的算盘。


But the most epochal events of the last week took place in two of Asia’s great democracies: India and Japan.	但上周最具划时代意义的事件发生在亚洲的两个民主大国：印度和日本。


Narendra Modi’s landslide victory in India’s general election was not only a huge personal triumph for the son of a tea seller, but may well mark a decisive break with India’s traditional inward-looking policies.	纳兰德拉·莫迪在印度大选中获得压倒性胜利，这不仅是这位茶商之子个人的辉煌胜利，也标志着印度传统内向政策的决定性突破。


Modi is determined to reform India’s economy and lead the country into the front rank of world powers.	莫迪决心改革印度经济，让印度走向世界强国前列。


Here, Modi will find no stauncher ally than Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was among the first Asian leaders to embrace him in his bid to lead India.	在这方面，莫迪最坚定的盟友莫过于日本首相安倍晋三。 安倍晋三是最早支持莫迪领导印度的亚洲领导人之一。


Given that both countries have almost perfectly aligned regional security interests, there should be plenty of scope for the two to act in tandem to improve regional security and mutual prosperity.	两国拥有几乎完美一致的安全利益，因此有充分的空间携手并进改善地区安全、增进共同繁荣。


Thailand’s crisis might well mark a good early test of their ability to work together, because both countries have strong interests in Thailand’s rapid return to democracy and the credibility needed to act as an honest broker in ending the country’s crisis.	泰国危机或许是很好的共事能力早期测试，因为泰国迅速回归民主十分符合两国的利益，并且两国也拥有作为终结泰国危机的真诚牵线人所必须具备的信誉。


In the past week, Abe created for himself considerably more political space to act as a strategic partner, not only to India, but also to Japan’s other allies, particularly the United States.	在过去一周里，安倍为自己创造很大的以战略合作伙伴身份施展的政治空间——不仅是对印度，也包括日本的其他盟国，特别是美国。


Quietly, a panel appointed by Abe’s government this week offered a reinterpretation of a key element of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution.	本周，安倍政府悄然任命的小组对日本宪法第九条的一项关键要素做出了重新解释。


For the first time since the Pacific War’s end in 1945, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces would be able to participate in “collective self-defense” – meaning that Japan could come to the aid of its allies should they come under attack.	自1945年太平洋战争以来，日本自卫队将首次能够参与“集体自卫”——这意味着日本可以在盟国受到袭击是给予支援。


Of course, China and others in Asia have tried to muddy this change with the alarmist charge of a return to Japanese militarism.	当然，中国和其他亚洲国家试图阻止这一变化，它们认��这是日本回归军国主义的危险信号。


But the new interpretation of Article 9 augurs just the opposite: it embeds Japan’s military within an alliance system that has been, and will remain, the backbone of Asia’s prevailing structure of peace.	但对宪法第九条的新解释的意义与此正好相反：它将日本的军力嵌入了一个联盟体系，这一体系一直是、将来也会是亚洲和平结构的基石。


Abe will make this clear when he delivers the keynote address in Singapore at this year’s Shangri La Dialogue, the annual meeting of Asian military and civilian military leaders.	安倍将在今年新加坡香格里拉对话（Shangri La Dialogue）的政策演说中阐释这一点。 香格里拉对话是亚洲军事和文职领导人年会。


Modi’s victory and Abe’s increased ability to stand by Japan’s allies can help to forge deeper bilateral ties and, if properly understood by China, foster a greater strategic equilibrium in the region.	莫迪的胜利以及安倍与日本盟友携手能力的日增有助于深化双边关系，如果中国能够恰当地理解这一点，更有助于形成更大的地区战略均衡。


It is now possible for Asia’s greatest powers – China, India, Japan, and the US – to form something akin to the concert system that gave Europe a century of almost complete peace in the nineteenth century.	如今，亚洲地区最大的国家——中国、印度、日本和美国——有望形成堪与给十九世纪给欧洲带来近一百年和平的体系相媲美的合作体系。


Of course, such a system would require China to set aside its goal of regional hegemony.	当然，这样一套体系需要中国放下其地区霸权目标。


Clear-sighted Chinese must already see that, short of a victorious war, such dominance is impossible.	头脑清醒的中国人必须看到，不通过大胜仗获得这一主导权是不可能的。


Now is the moment for China to anchor its rise within a stable and mutually acceptable Asian regional order.	如今，中国应该将其崛起的基础定在稳定的、可互相接受的亚洲地区秩序上。


Indeed, for China, this may be the ultimate tipping point in its modernization.	事实上，对中国来说，这将是其现代化进程中的终极关键点。


The Pyongyang Purge	平壤清洗


TOKYO – During the Cold War, the term “Kremlinology” referred to efforts to understand what was taking place at the commanding heights of the Soviet Union – indeed, behind the entire Iron Curtain.	东京—在冷战期间，“克里姆林学”（Kremlinology）一词用来描述对苏联制高点内部所发生的事情的研究——事实上，这需要穿透整个“铁幕”（Iron Curtain）。


Kremlinologists monitored (in whatever way possible) who was up and who was down among the core Soviet leadership.	克里姆林学家（无所不用其极地）监控苏联核心领导层的人事升降境况。


Great significance was read into who signed an official document, or who stood where atop Lenin’s Tomb in Red Square when reviewing military parades.	谁签署了一份官方文件，谁在阅兵时站在红场列宁墓上方，这些东西的微言大义都会被深入解读。


All of that was grammar-school stuff compared to efforts to decipher the regime in North Korea, where the truth is far more opaque.	所有这些与解密朝鲜政权比起来都是小儿科。 朝鲜政坛的真相远比苏联更加波诡云谲。


Consider what happened on December 17.	以12月17日发生的事件为例。


Choe Ryong-hae, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party, was conspicuously present on stage at the commemoration of the second anniversary of “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il’s death – the first major ceremony following the purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek, the former vice chairman of the National Defense Commission.	朝鲜劳动党中央军事委员会副主席崔龙海在“敬爱的领袖”金正日逝世两周年的纪念仪式上站在了显要位置。 该仪式也是前朝鲜国防委员会副主席张成泽被处决后的首次重大仪式。


Choe’s speech, with its threats against the United States and South Korea, seemed to set the stage for his political elevation.	崔龙海的演讲，以及他对美国和韩国的威胁，似乎在宣告他政治地位的抬升。


Jang Song-thaek had been seen as a kind of regent to Kim Jong-un, the young successor to the Kim family dynasty, and was thought to be number two in the regime.	张成泽被视为金氏王朝年轻继承人金正恩的摄政王，朝鲜政权的二号人物。


But he owed his position to his wife, Kim Kyong-hui, the only sister of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s deceased father.	但他的地位是由其妻、金正恩之父金正日唯一的妹妹金敬姬带来的。


Jang’s tact, as well as his usefulness as an interlocutor with China, enabled him to keep his position, despite his long-term separation from his wife.	张成泽老谋深算，并且在与中国的交往中作用显著，这让他得以保持自己的地位，尽管他与金敬姬早已分居。


But in North Korea, blood is paramount: everything, including ideology and the national interest, is subservient to the maintenance of the Kim dynasty.	但是，在朝鲜，血缘关系才压倒一切：包括意识形态和国家利益在内的所有东西都没有维持金氏王朝重要。


The “legacy” of the “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung and his son, “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il, determines all major decisions.	“伟大领袖”金日成和“敬爱的领袖”金正日的“遗志”决定了所有重要决策。


I have long believed that the true holder of power since Kim Jong-il’s death has been his sister, Kim Kyong-hui, and no one else.	长期以来，我一直认为金正恩死后的真正掌权者没有其他人，只有他的妹妹金敬姬一人。


North Korean culture would suggest that women do not take positions of leadership, but it appears that she was the only family member whom Kim Jong-il could trust.	朝鲜文化决定了女性不能占据领袖位置，但金敬姬似乎是金正日能够信任的唯一家人。


When he was incapacitated by illness, it was she who called the shots.	金正日因病丧失行动能力时，是金敬姬招来了枪手。


Her blood tie to the Kim dynasty is the reason why, even after her husband was purged and executed (and the rest of his family rounded up), she maintained her political position.	血缘关系决定了即便丈夫遭到清洗和处决（其家人也遭到禁锢），金敬姬仍能保持政治地位。


It has even been suggested that she made the decision to purge her husband.	甚至有消息说是她决定清洗丈夫。


Though it cannot be known whether she also proposed killing him, it is not surprising that she believed that, with her own health failing, she could not leave the family dynasty to her husband’s care.	尽管无法得知她是否还建议除掉张成泽，但健康状况日益恶化的她认为不能让金氏王朝落入其夫之手并不令人奇怪。


Perhaps the most chilling aspect of Jang’s execution is that it appears to be part of a feeding frenzy that has claimed the lives of a number of senior officials and generals.	或许处决张成泽最令人惊悚之处是这是让众多高官和将军丧命的大清洗的一部分。


And the bloodletting has been extremely personal: In August, Kim Jong-un reportedly ordered the execution by firing squad of an ex-girlfriend and other members of her musical ensemble; the killings are said to have been carried out in front of their families.	这场流血完全是个人主义的：据报道，8月份金正恩下令枪决他的一位前女友和她的乐队； 据说处决是当着他们家人的面进行的。


Elsewhere in the communist world, such murderous purges were renounced long ago, first in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev, following his denunciation of Stalin, and then in China by Deng Xiaoping, following his rehabilitation and return to power in the late 1970’s.	在其他共产主义国家，如此大清洗也早已是遥远的回忆了。 首先是苏联的赫鲁晓夫在批判斯大林进行过清洗，随后，邓小平在20世纪70年代末回到权力中心后写进行了清洗。


This “reform” did not make these regimes any more beneficent or efficient, but it did bring a degree of stability and predictability to their behavior.	这一“改革”并未让这些政权更仁慈、更有效率，但确实给政权行为带来了一定程度和稳定性和可预测性。


North Korea, always the least predictable of totalitarian communist states, remains in a twilight world.	而朝鲜依然是哪个隐密王朝，是所有集权主义国家中最难预测的那个。


More disturbing is the question of whether China is going down a parallel path under President Xi Jinping.	最令人不安的问题是中国是否会在习近平治下也走上这条路。


Ever since Deng’s rule, there has been an understanding that members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo are not to be touched, even in retirement.	自邓小平执政以来，一条不成文的规矩是中共政治局常委不能动，即使是退休常委也是如此。


But Xi, under the pretext of his anti-corruption battle, has targeted retired Politburo member Zhou Yongkang, who is now reportedly under house arrest, facing graft charges – and lurid allegations not only that he murdered his first wife but that he tried to assassinate Xi.	但习近平以反腐斗争为托辞将目标指向了退休政治局常委周永康。 据报道，目前周永康已被软禁，并将面临贪污指控——甚至谋杀发妻甚至试图刺杀习近平这样骇人听闻的罪行。


China’s emphasis since Deng on rule by consensus may not have made the country any more democratic, but it at least prevented the re-emergence of a new cult of personality à la Mao Zedong.	自邓小平以来，中国就强调根据共识治国，这或许并没有让中国变得更加民主，但至少防止了毛泽东式个人崇拜的卷土重来。


The question today is whether Xi’s flouting of this internal party convention is another step in re-creating one-man – and thus completely arbitrary – rule in China.	现在的问题是，习近平打破党内常规的做法是否是在中国重建独夫治国——从而实现彻底独裁的又一步骤。


In North Korea, of course, arbitrary rule – no matter how bizarre and inept – is always the norm.	当然，在朝鲜，独裁统治——不管多么奇怪和拙劣——永远是常规。


And now, with Jang purged, responsibility for economic failure in North Korea has been shifted to Choe.	现如今，随着张成泽的垮台，朝鲜经济失败的责任落在了崔龙海身上。


All officials and people related to him now live under the shadow of the executioner, for he is certain to bear the blame when the dynasty needs a scapegoat for its mounting problems.	与崔龙海有关的官员和人物无不生活在刽子手的阴影下，当金氏王朝需要给日益深重的问题寻找替罪羊时，崔龙海毫无疑问将是不二之选。


And Jang’s purge may make those problems worse.	张成泽的清洗让这些问题更加糟糕了。


While China lost a convenient point of contact with the Kim regime, North Korea may have lost the only channel by which to sustain itself.	中国失去了与金氏政权联系的方便点，但朝鲜失去的可能是维持生命的仅有渠道。


The economy cannot be revived so long as international sanctions are maintained, and the sanctions seem certain to remain in place so long as the regime continues with its nuclear brinkmanship.	如果国际制裁维持下去，朝鲜经济就无法维持，而只要金氏政权继续其核边缘政策，国际制裁肯定会维持下去。


China, which has been the Kim dynasty’s lifeline, no longer appears willing to offer it a blank check.	而作为金氏王朝生命线的中国也不再愿意向它提供空头支票了。


So the day is fast approaching when Kim Jong-un and his clan will have to take responsibility for the country’s dire condition, and it may come soon after Kim Kyong-hui dies.	因此，金正恩及其集团马上就要为朝鲜的惨状付出代价了，这可能会在金敬姬死后不久发生。


If so, the Kim dynasty’s last chapter may have begun with the current spasm of executions, though the ending – for the Korean Peninsula and East Asia alike – remains very much in doubt.	果真如此的话，金氏王朝的终章的开始就是最近的一系列处决，尽管其结局——对朝鲜半岛和东亚来说——仍有诸多疑点。


The New Neutrality	新中立


TOKYO – Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union used every imaginable threat and inducement – including the ultimate prize of reunification – to bring about a neutral Germany.	东京—在整个冷战期间，苏联用一切可以想象的手段——包括重新统一这一终极诱惑——威逼利诱中立的德国。


But German leaders of both the left and the right, from Konrad Adenauer to Willy Brandt, spurned every Soviet offer.	但不论是东德还是西德领导人，从阿登纳到勃兰特，都不为所动。


Will authoritarian mercantilism now succeed where communism failed?	在共产主义已经失败的地方，今天的极权重商主义能成功吗？


Countries join alliances, or entities such as the European Union, because these groups make the benefits and obligations of membership as unambiguous as anything in international relations can be.	国家加入联盟或欧盟这样的实体，因为组成这样的集团能让成员获得明确的好处和义务，这是任何国际关系都无法与之媲美的。


For Germany and South Korea, however, relationships with historic allies – NATO and the United States, respectively – appear to be changing before our eyes.	但是，对德国和韩国来说，与其历史盟友——分别是北约和美国——的关系似乎正在我们眼皮底下发生改变。


Through their huge purchases of goods, with promises of even more to come, today’s authoritarian/mercantilist regimes in Russia and China may be about to achieve by commerce what the Soviets could not achieve by bribery and threats.	今天的俄罗斯和中国极权/重商主义政权大量购买商品，并承诺在未来还会继续加码，大有以商业手段完成苏联靠贿赂和威胁无法完成的任务。


And the scale of that commerce is breathtaking, with German exports to China growing from $25.9 billion a decade ago to $87.6 billion in 2011, while South Korea’s exports have increased from $53 billion to $133 billion during the same period of time.	通商的规模令人咋舌，德国对华出口从十年前的259亿美元增长到2011年的876亿美元，而同期韩国出口从530亿美元增至1,330亿美元。


A form of stealth neutralism, indeed, appears to be entering both countries’ diplomacy.	事实上，一种隐中立形式正在进入两国外交。


Witness Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent trip to South Korea, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unwillingness to impose effective sanctions on Russia for its intervention in Ukraine, and the business-only focus of her just-concluded visit to China.	如国国家主席习近平最近的韩国之行、德国总理默克尔不愿就俄罗斯干预乌克兰对后者实施有效制裁以及她在最近的访华过程中只侧重商业。


In both Germany and South Korea, the idea that historic alliances may offer fewer tangible benefits than tacit neutrality – particularly in terms of exports – appears to be taking root, especially among business elites.	在德国和韩国，历史盟友比沉默中立带来的有形好处更少（特别是用出口衡量），这一思想已经站稳了脚跟，特别是在商业精英中间。


Xi’s visit to Seoul was another bold step in China’s systematic efforts to wean South Korea from its commitment to the US-led international economic order.	习近平对首尔的访问是中国系统性诱导韩国抛弃美国领导的国际经济秩序的新的重大举措。


By offering to permit South Korea to settle its bilateral trade accounts in renminbi, and to launch the first-ever Sino-South Korean initiative toward North Korea, Xi is seeking to convince South Korea’s leaders that the country’s future, including reunification, will be determined in Beijing.	习近平开出的条件包括允许韩国用人民币结算双边贸易账户以及开战史上首次中韩联合对朝行动，目的是让韩国领导人相信韩国的未来（包括重新统一）取决于北京。


China’s invitation to South Korea to participate in a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (alongside other countries in Asia and the Arab world, but excluding Japan and India) furthers Xi’s efforts to create an alternative financial system, with the AIIB mimicking the Asia Development Bank’s work.	中国邀请韩国参与新的亚洲基础设施投资银行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank，简称AIIB其他参与方包括亚洲和阿拉伯世界，但不包括日本和印度），这是习近平建立替代金融体系的新步骤——AIIB功能与亚洲开发银行相仿。


China’s embrace of South Korea is part of a long-term strategy to turn it into a subordinate state in terms of foreign and national security policy (much as Finland kowtowed to the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War).	中国拉拢韩国是其长期战略的一部分——让韩国沦为外交和国家安全政策的附庸国（正如冷战期间芬兰对苏联的俯首帖耳）。


And yet, though courted by all sides in the struggle to maintain stability in Northeast Asia, South Korea now runs the risk of becoming isolated.	但是，尽管在保持东北亚稳定的斗争中，韩国是各方争取的对象，但如今它却面临被孤立的危险。


Every gesture by the South toward one of the protagonists – China, the US, Japan, and North Korea – elicits so much pressure by the others that its government must then somehow devise a compensatory policy.	只要韩国向相关国家——中国、美国、日本和朝鲜——做出姿态，都会引起其他国家的施压，迫使韩国政府随后做出补偿性政策。


For example, following President Park Geun-hye’s request that Xi honor the Korean assassin of a Japanese prime minister, to which Xi readily agreed, she began to discuss joining the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade negotiations, in order to assuage the US.	比如，韩国总统朴槿惠要求习近平颂扬刺杀日本首相的韩国人（习近平早已准备好欣然接受），随后又开始准备讨论加入美国领导的跨太平洋合作伙伴（Trans-Pacific Partnership）自由贸易谈判，以此讨好美国。


As China continued to pursue an anti-Japanese propaganda campaign throughout 2013, Park felt obliged to make some effort to revive ties with Japan by sending a private envoy to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to seek talks on reconciling their disputes.	2013年，中国一直在进行反日宣传，与此同时，朴槿惠感到有必要采取行动修复与日本的关系，派遣个人特使与首相安倍晋三会晤，寻求谈判调和两国争端。


Given its insecurity, a by-product of the Korean Peninsula’s long division, South Korea requires, above all, calm and steady partners.	朝鲜半岛的长期分裂让韩国得不到安全，因此对韩国来说，最重要的莫过于时刻准备着的冷静伙伴。


But frequent changes in US policy toward Northeast Asia in recent years have disoriented South Korean policymakers, while Chinese policy, though consistent, confronts South Korea’s leaders with choices that they appear unprepared to make.	但近几年来，美国东北亚政策变化频繁，这令韩国决策者无所适从； 而中国政策尽管具有一致性，却让韩国领导人不得不面对尚未做好准备的选择。


As a result, South Korea’s elite appears to be splitting into pro-Chinese and pro-American factions that transcend party lines.	结果，韩国精英在亲中和亲美之间分裂为两个跨越党派的阵营。


Over a period of time, the only beneficiaries are likely to be those who call for “Finlandization” of the Korean peninsula.	在相当长的一段时间里，唯一的受益者或许只有呼吁朝鲜半岛“芬兰化”的人。


Meanwhile, the impact on German foreign policy of the country’s deepening economic ties with Russia has been evident throughout the Ukraine crisis.	与此同时，德国外交政策令该国经济与俄罗斯结成深刻关系的影响在乌克兰危机中尽显无疑。


Though Merkel frequently admonished the Kremlin about its intervention in Ukraine, German public opinion – particularly that of the country’s business leaders – tied her hands.	尽管默克尔频繁劝诫克里姆林宫不要干预乌克兰，但德国公众观点——特别是其商业领袖——令默克尔大受掣肘。


Indeed, German big businesses have been the main obstacle to imposing the type of systemic sanctions that might have dissuaded Russian President Vladimir Putin from annexing Crimea and continuing to back the insurgency (which Russia itself incited) in eastern Ukraine.	事实上，德国大企业正是对俄罗斯实施系统性制裁的主要阻挠力量。 系统性制裁本或许可以让俄罗斯总统普京三思其吞并克里米亚并继续支持俄罗斯自身也牵涉其中的东乌克兰叛乱。


This is not the only recent case in which Germany has distanced itself from its allies and partners.	这并非最近得多与其盟友和伙伴拉开距离的唯一例子。


In Libya in 2011, Germany refused to offer even rudimentary material support to the military intervention staged by its British and French allies.	在2011年的利比亚事件中，德国甚至拒绝为其英国和法国盟友所实施的军事干预提供基本物质支持。


Germany has also continuously failed to meet its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defense, at the same time that it has insisted that troubled EU economies stick to austerity budgets that limit their deficits to a fixed proportion of their economic output.	德国也一直没有满足其将GDP的2%用于防务的承诺，与此同时，德国坚持要求受困欧盟经济体采取将斥资限制在经济产出一定比例之内的紧缩性预算。


Indeed, throughout the eurozone crisis, Germany did the absolute minimum – and always at the last possible moment – to assist its EU partners.	事实上，在整个欧元区危机中，德国在援助欧盟伙伴国方面付出的是绝对最小值——并且总是在最后关头才付出。


And German leaders’ obsession with maintaining their country’s “golden decade” of exports appears to have gagged them on topics like China’s human rights abuses and its aggressive behavior toward its Asian neighbors.	德国李刚电脑人沉溺于保持德国出口的“黄金十年”，这令他们在中国侵犯人权以及冒犯亚洲邻国等问题上无从开口。


That silence is being rewarded with the first-ever joint cabinet sessions between a democracy and a communist dictatorship, which will take place in Berlin this autumn.	他们的缄默带来的好处是历史上首个民主国家与共产主义独裁政府间的联合内阁会议——将于今年秋天在柏林举行。


In both Germany and South Korea, economic strength seems to have produced an illusion of policy independence that is opening a chasm between the two countries and their allies – a chasm that revelations of US spying, on Merkel in particular, have deepened.	在德国和韩国，经济优势似乎营造出一个政策独立的幻觉，而这一幻觉正在两国与其盟友之间形成裂痕——并因为美国的间谍行为（特别是针对默克尔的行为）而深化。


Germany and South Korea, however, will gain little, and risk much, if they downgrade their alliance ties in favor of commercially motivated, if unofficial, neutrality.	但是，德国和韩国如果因为采取出于商业动机的中立（尽管不是正式中立）而弱化它们与盟友的关系的话，其风险将远大于利益。


Whatever short-term benefits they receive will be more than offset by their strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia and China.	不论它们收获什么短期利益，都无法弥补它们在俄罗斯和中国面前的战略弱势。


Ending East Asia’s History Wars	结束东亚的历史战争


TOKYO – Georges Clemenceau, who, as France’s prime minister, led his country to victory in World War I, famously said that “war is too important to be left to the generals.”	东京—担任总理带领法国打赢第一次世界大战的克莱蒙梭有一句名言：“兵者事大，不可付诸将。


Japan is now discovering that history is too important to be left to newspaper editors.	”日本现在发现，史者事大，不可付诸新闻编辑。


In the 1990s, the newspaper Asahi Shimbun caused a firestorm at home and in South Korea by publishing a series of articles, based upon testimony by the former Japanese soldier Seiji Yoshida, on “comfort women” – Koreans forced to provide sexual services to the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II.	20世纪90年代，《朝日新闻》发表了一系列基于前日军士兵吉田清治（Seiji Yoshida）回忆的关于“慰安妇”的文章。 二战期间，许多韩国妇女被迫为大日本帝国皇军提供性服务，被称为慰安妇。


Asahi has now admitted that the soldier’s confessions were unfounded, and has disavowed the core supporting evidence for the articles.	《朝日新闻》现在承认，吉田清治的自白根本是子虚乌有，该系列文章的核心支持证据也是假的。


That retraction appears to be causing as much embarrassment – and diplomatic vitriol – in Japan and South Korea today as the original series did.	如此翻供引起了轩然大波，其在今天的日本和韩国的影响不亚于文章发表之时。


But, at a time when both countries cannot afford to permit partisan or sloppy abuses of history to roil their bilateral relations, Asahi’s careless work has turned out to be more than abysmal journalism; it has introduced a dangerous element into regional diplomacy.	但是，如今两国都不能允许狭隘或草率的历史指责破坏双边关系，《朝日新闻》的鲁莽举动不仅是新闻业的污点； 还给地区外交带来了危险元素。


Some say that Japan and South Korea should follow the example set by France and Germany.	有人说，日本和韩国应该效仿法国和德国的例子。


Reconciling in the first two decades following the Nazi Occupation of France, these countries’ leaders understood that their security and economic ties were far too important to their citizens’ wellbeing to allow the old hatreds to fester.	在纳粹占领法国后的第一个二十年里，两国领导人互相妥协，他们明白，对于公民福祉来说，安全和经济合作远比放任旧恨发酵更重要。


They knew that the unimaginable violence of WWII was a direct result of the antagonisms that had festered since the Napoleonic Wars and that were allowed to persist after 1918.	他们知道，二战的难以想象的暴力乃是对抗的直接后果，而对抗的源头是拿破仑战争，并且在1918年后放任其不断壮大。


In Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, France and Germany had two of the twentieth century’s greatest statesmen, leaders who were able to discern the broad sweep of history through the fog of quotidian politics.	法国和德国拥有可跻身二十世纪最伟大政治家行列的戴高乐和阿登纳，他们能够拨开琐碎政治的迷雾，认清历史大势。


Their loyalty was not only to the citizens who elected them, but also to the generations of the past that had endured the consequences of Franco-German enmity, and to generations yet to come, which would benefit from reconciliation.	他们不仅忠诚于选他们做领导人的公民，也忠诚于经受了法德仇恨后果的先人和将从妥协中获益的尚未来到世上的后代。


Of course, given that Japan and Korea have not fought a series of wars against each other, their relationship is not the same as that between Germany and France.	当然，日本和韩国（朝鲜）之间交战频仍，其关系不同于德法关系。


But it is clear that no one will benefit from a new round of heated historical debate.	但显然，掀起新一轮激烈的历史争论不能让任何人受益。


To avoid this, political leaders like de Gaulle and Adenauer are needed.	为了避免这一点，日本和韩国需要戴高乐和阿登纳这样的政治领袖。


Only when we can discuss the past without endangering the future will the countries of Northeast Asia be able to establish a truly durable structure of peace.	我们什么时候能够平和地讨论过去、不给未来造成威胁，东北亚各国才能构建真正的持久和平框架。


As Admiral Dennis C. Blair, a former commander of the US Pacific Fleet, stated at a recent conference, “The history of Asia from the 1930s to about 1955 or so was not pretty in any way….I don’t think any country can have a monopoly on righteousness, or on guilt and shame” for that time.	前美国太平洋舰队司令布莱尔上将（Dennis C. Blair）在最近的会议上指出，“20世纪30年代到1955年左右的亚洲历史绝对算不上光彩，……我认为没有一个国家占据着全部的正确性，也没有一个国家需要承担所有罪恶和羞耻。


Blair added that “the attempt to hold a ‘we were right’ and ‘you were wrong’ sweepstakes is not going to help our children and grandchildren understand what happened there.”	”布莱尔还说，“一定要争出个对错对于让我们的子孙理解当时发生过什么毫无帮助。 ”


Japan and South Korea need to take responsibility for the future, not obsess about the past.	日本和韩国需要为未来负责，而不能被过去羁绊。


A recent Japanese government white paper called South Korea the country “that shares the closest relationship with Japan historically and in areas such as economy and culture.”	最新的日本政府白皮书称韩国“与日本有着最为紧密的历史关系和经济和文化等领域的联系。


No doubt, many, if not most, South Korean foreign-policy experts and strategists share that sentiment.	”毫无疑问，许多（甚至绝大部分）韩国外交政策专家和战略家都同意这一论断。


But it will take committed leadership to transcend the history wars and tap the full potential of Japanese-Korean cooperation, something that both countries’ key ally, the United States, strongly desires, as it seeks to draw China into a lasting and peaceful Asian order.	但只有有决心的领导层才能超越历史战争，充分激发日韩合作潜力，两国的关键盟友美国强烈支持日韩合作，以便让中国也加入持续的和平亚洲秩序。


For too long, intemperate historical debates – often driven by biased newspaper accounts – have poisoned bilateral relations.	历史争论——往往受有偏见的报纸文章煽动——毒害双边关系已有很长的时间。


Now, as another war of words heats up, Japanese and South Korean leaders need to step back, recognize where the real interests of their people lie, both today and in the future, and calmly begin to take the measures required to ensure durable reconciliation.	如今，又一场口水仗眼看着就要打响，日本和韩国灵动人应该后退一步，认清今天和未来人民的真正利益在哪里，冷静地开始采取必要措施确保持久妥协。


Taming the China Bears	驳中国崩溃论


BEIJING – The market is always in search of a story, and investors, it seems, think they have found a new one this year in China.	北京—市场总是在寻找故事，而投资者似乎认为今年在中国找到了一个新故事。


The country’s growth slowdown and mounting financial risks have spurred a growing wave of pessimism, with economists worldwide warning of an impending crash.	中国增长减速和金融风险积累让越来越多的人感到悲观，全球经济学家警告可能马上发生崩溃。


But dire predictions for China have abounded for the last 30 years, and not one has materialized.	但对中国的悲观预测在过去30年来早已见怪不怪，没有一个成为现实。


Are today’s really so different?	今天的预测真的会不同吗？


The short answer is no.	简单的答案是否定的。


Like the predictions of the past, today’s warnings are based on historical precedents and universal indicators against which China, with its unique economic features, simply cannot be judged accurately.	和过去的预测一样，今天的警告基于不利于中国的历史先例和普通指标，而中国的经济特征是独一无二的，因此这样的预测不可能准确。


The bottom line is that the complexity and distinctiveness of China’s economy mean that assessing its current state and performance requires a detail-oriented analysis that accounts for as many offsetting factors as possible.	说到底，中国经济的复杂性和特殊性意味着评估当前状况和表现需要以细节为导向的分析，尽可能多地考虑抵消性因素。


Predictions are largely pointless, given that the assumptions underpinning them will invariably change.	预测大部分毫无意义，因为基本假设总是在变化。


Consider China’s high leverage ratio, which many argue will be a key factor in causing a crisis.	以中国的高杠杆率为例，许多人认为，这将成为引发危机的重大因素。


After all, they contend, developing countries that have experienced a large-scale credit boom have all ended up facing a credit crisis and a hard economic landing.	他们指出，毕竟曾经经历过大规模信用繁荣的发展中国家最终都出现了信用危机和经济硬着陆。


But several specific factors must be accounted for in assessing whether this is China’s fate.	但在评估中国是否会蹈此覆辙时，必须考虑一些具体因素。


While China’s debt/GDP ratio is very high, the same is true in many successful East Asian economies, such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.	中国债务/GDP之比固然很高，但其他许多成功的东亚经济体也是如此，比如中国台湾、新加坡、韩国、泰国和马来西亚。


And China’s saving rate is much higher.	并且中国的储蓄率要高得多。


Ceteris paribus, the higher the saving rate, the less likely it is that a high debt/GDP ratio will trigger a financial crisis.	给定其他条件不变，储蓄率越高，高债务/GDP比触发金融危机的可能性越小。


In fact, China’s high debt/GDP ratio is, to a large extent, a result of its simultaneously high saving and investment rates.	事实上，中国的高债务/GDP比在很大程度上是储蓄率和投资率同时高企的结果。


And, while the inability to repay loans can contribute to a high debt burden, the nonperforming-loan (NPL) ratio for China’s major banks stands at less than 1%.	此外，尽管无法偿还贷款让债务负担加重，但中国主要银行的不良贷款率仍低于1%。


If, based on these considerations, one concludes that China’s debt/GDP ratio does constitute a substantial threat to its financial stability, there remains the question of whether a crisis is likely to occur.	基于这些考虑，如果你认为中国的债务/GDP比确实构成了金融稳定的巨大威胁，那么还有一个问题：危机是否可能发生。


Only when all of the specific linkages between a high debt burden and the onset of a financial crisis have been identified can one draw even a tentative conclusion about that.	只有所有高债务负担和金融危机爆发之间的具体联系都存在，你才可以做出假设性的论断。


China’s real-estate price bubble is often named as a likely catalyst for a crisis.	中国的房地产泡沫经常被认为是危机的一大可能催化因素。


But how such a downturn would unfold is far from certain.	但危机会如何展开谁也说不清。


Let us assume that the real-estate bubble has burst.	不妨假设房地产泡沫已经破裂。


In China, there are no subprime mortgages, and the down payment on the purchase price required to qualify for financing can exceed 50%.	中国不存在次贷，要获得按揭，首付比例可能超过50%。


Given that property prices are unlikely to fall by such a large margin, the bubble’s collapse would not bring down China’s banks.	给定房地产价格难以出现如此大幅的下跌，则泡沫的破裂拖不垮中资银行。


Even if real-estate prices fell by more than 50%, commercial banks could survive – not least because mortgages account for only about 20% of banks’ total assets.	即使房地产价格下跌超过50%，商业银行也可以存活下来——次贷仅占银行总资产的20%左右。


At the same time, plummeting prices would attract new homebuyers in major cities, causing the market to stabilize.	与此同时，价格剧降会吸引大城市的新买家，让市场企稳。


And China’s recently announced urbanization strategy should ensure that cities’ demographic structure supports intrinsic demand.	中国最近宣布的城市化战略应能确保城市人口结构支持内在需求。


If that were not enough to ward off disaster, the government could purchase unsold properties and use them for social housing.	如果这还不足以防止灾难，那么政府还可以收购未出售住房用于社会保障房。


Moreover, if necessary, banks could recover funds by selling collateral.	此外，如有必要，银行可以拍卖抵押品回收资金。


As a last resort, the government could step in, as it did in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, to remove NPLs from banks’ balance sheets.	最后，政府也可以介入，如20世纪90年代末、21世纪初那样将不良贷款从银行帐上剥离。


Indeed, China has a massive war chest of foreign-exchange reserves that it would not hesitate to use to inject capital into commercial banks.	事实上，中国有巨大的外汇储备，向商业银行注入资本根本不需要犹豫。


That remains a highly unlikely scenario.	这样的情景可能性很低。


China’s banking system does face risks stemming from a maturity mismatch between loans and deposits.	中国银行系统确实面临存贷款期限不匹配问题所产生的风险。


But the mismatch is less severe than some observers believe.	但这一不匹配的程度比一些观察者认为的轻。


In fact, the average term of deposits in China’s banks is about nine months, while medium- and long-term loans account for just over half of total outstanding credit.	事实上，中资银行平均存款期限是九个月左右，中长期贷款只是刚刚超出总未偿还信用的一半。


A more salient threat would arise if the government pursued too much capital-account liberalization too fast.	如果政府的资本账户自由化步子迈得太大太快，就会产生更大的风险。


If China eases restrictions on cross-border capital flows, an unexpected shock could trigger large-scale capital flight, bringing down the entire financial system.	如果中国放松跨境资本流限制，那么意外冲击就可能引发大规模资本外逃，拖垮整个金融体系。


Given this, it is vital that China maintains controls over short-term cross-border capital flows in the foreseeable future.	因此，中国，在可预见的未来，中国应该保持对短期跨净资本流的管制。


Likewise, the Chinese government must address a fundamental contradiction.	类似地，中国政府必须纠正一个基本矛盾。


Monetary interest rates have increased steadily, owing to rampant regulatory arbitrage (whereby banks find loopholes that enable them to avoid unfavorable rules) and the fragmentation of the credit market, while return on capital has fallen rapidly because of overcapacity.	由于监管套利肆虐（银行借此寻找漏洞规避不利规则）和信用市场分裂，货币利率稳步上升，与此同时，产能过剩却让资本回报快速下降。


If the Chinese government fails to reverse this trend, a financial crisis – in one form or another – will become inevitable.	如果中国政府不能扭转这一趋势，金融危机——不管以何种形式——就将难以避免。


But, given the authorities’ broad scope for policy intervention, the crash will not come anytime soon – if it comes at all.	但是，考虑到当局有很大的政策干预余地，即使不能完全排除崩溃的可能，短期也不太可能发生崩溃。


The Long March from the Third Plenum	三中全会，长征的起点


BEIJING – Though China’s leadership succession was completed earlier this year, the policy agenda for the coming decade has only just been revealed.	北京—尽管中国领导层交接已在今年早些时候完成，但未来十年的政策日程才刚刚揭开。


Following Chinese political tradition, the country’s new leadership had to wait for the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee – held 3-4 quarters after the First Plenum, where the succession was sealed – to unveil its economic-policy priorities.	根据中国政治传统，新领导层必须等到中共十八届三中全会——大约要在交接尘埃落定后3—4个季度召开——才能公布其经济政策顺序。


Third Plenums – and perhaps only Third Plenums – can bring about radical transformation.	三中全会——可能也只有三中全会——能够带来彻底的改变。


Indeed, it was at the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 11th Central Committee that Deng Xiaoping launched the reforms that opened up the Chinese economy and triggered more than three decades of rapid economic growth.	事实上，邓小平正是在中共十一届三中全会上拉开了改革开放的序幕，开启了三十年的快速经济增长时期。


The Third Plenums of the CCP’s 14th and 16th Central Committees – held in 1993 and 2003, respectively – also stand out.	中共十四届和十六届三中全会（分别于1993年和2003年召开）也相当突出。


At both meetings, CCP leaders put forward comprehensive plans for the creation and perfection of the so-called “socialist market economy” in China.	在这两次会议上，中共领导人推出了建立和完善“社会主义市场经济”的全面计划。


The 60-point “resolution” produced at the most recent Third Plenum covers six areas: the economy, the political system, the environment, culture, society, and Party capacity-building.	最近的十八届三中全会所公布的60点《决定》覆盖了六大领域：经济、政治制度、环境、文化、社会和党的能力建设。


This represents a significant departure from the agendas produced at previous Third Plenums, which focused exclusively on economic reform.	这与焦点全部集中在经济改革的前几次三中全会大不相同。


But, when it comes to economic-reform objectives, the resolution is not overwhelmingly innovative.	但是，对于经济改革目标，十八届三中全会的《决定》算不上十足的创新。


Indeed, most of the goals that it includes – like reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), development of private enterprise, reduction of government intervention, protection of property rights, and creation of a modern market system – can be found in the resolution of the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 16th Central Committee.	事实上，《决定》所包括的大部分目标——如国有企业改革、民营企业发展、减少政府干预、保护产权和建立现代市场制度——都可以在中共十六届三中全会《决定》中找到。


Even the decision to redefine the market’s role in resource allocation as “decisive” was not the breakthrough that many observers have claimed.	即使是重新定义市场在资源配置中起“决定性”作用的决定，也不像许多观察者所说的那样算得上突破。


After all, the 2003 resolution had already defined the market as “fundamental” to resource allocation.	毕竟，2003年的《决定》便已定义市场在资源配置中起“基础性”作用。


Given this, the latest resolution’s most important implication is that it has dispelled any doubt about the new leadership’s commitment to the market-oriented reform that Deng initiated in 1978.	基于此，最新的《决定》的最大影响在于打消了任何关于新领导层是否会遵循邓小平在1978年开始实施的市场改革的疑虑。


In line with tradition, the Third Plenum’s resolution did not discuss problems concerning growth and development, which one hopes the government will address in greater detail in the near future.	根据传统，此次三中全会《决定》没有讨论关于增长和发展的问题，而人们希望政府尽快给出这方面问题的详细方案。


That said, some of the resolution’s specific provisions for economic reform represent much-needed progress.	尽管如此，《决定》的一些具体经济改革措施直指急需的方向。


·         SOEs will be required to deliver 30% of their profits to the state, instead of keeping most – or even all – of their profits, as they have done for the last two decades.	·         国有企业将被要求把30%的利润上缴国家，而不是像在过去二十年中那样留存大部分甚至所有利润。


·         Farmers will be granted more property rights, allowing them, for example, to transfer and mortgage land-use rights, though the government understandably continues to exercise caution about rural-land privatization.	·         农民将获得更多的产权，允许转移和抵押土地使用权，尽管不难理解，政府对于农地私有化仍十分谨慎。


·         A real-estate property tax will be introduced, in order to suppress skyrocketing housing prices and reduce the vacancy rate – a controversial but perhaps necessary move.	·         将实施房地产税，以抑制高企的房价和降低空置率——这一措施会引起争议，但可能必须实施。


·         The one-child policy will be eased, allowing a couple to have two children if one parent is an only child.	·         独生子女政策将放松，允许一方为独生子女的夫妻生育二孩。


(Whether this change will be enough to reverse problematic demographic trends remains a topic of heated debate.)	（这一改变是否足以扭转不利的人口趋势仍是个争论激烈的话题。 ）


·         The government will “accelerate the reform of the household registration system,” in an effort to facilitate urbanization.	·         政府将“加快户籍制度改革”，以促进城镇化。


But emphasis seems to have shifted to encourage coordinated development between urban and rural areas.	但重点似乎转移到了鼓励城镇和农村地区的协调发展上。


While rural migrant workers will be encouraged to settle in small and medium-size cities, migration to metropolises will remain tightly controlled – or even be more strictly regulated.	尽管农民工将被鼓励在中小城市定居，但向大城市的转移仍将被高度控制——甚至管理更加严格了。


But the resolution’s genuinely groundbreaking objectives lie in other areas.	但《决定》真正的突破性目标在其他领域。


For starters, the resolution includes two potentially game-changing legal reforms.	首先，《决定》包含了两项具有改变局面效果的法律改革。


First, it emphasizes the government’s commitment to “respect and protect human rights,” prohibiting law-enforcement authorities from extracting confessions “by torture, corporal punishment, or abuse” and abolishing widely criticized programs for “re-education through the labor system.”	一是《决定》强调政府要“尊重和保护人权”，禁止执法当局“刑讯逼供，体罚虐待”，并废除了饱受批评的“劳动教养”制度。


Second, in order to strengthen judicial independence, the resolution includes a call “to explore the establishment of judicial jurisdiction systems that are suitably separated from administrative areas.”	第二，为了加强司法独立性，《决定》要求“探索建立与行政区划适当分��的司法管辖制度”。


In other words, the courts should be able to make decisions independently of the local governments that finance them.	换句话说，法院应该能够独立于向它们提供资金的地方政府做出决定。


In the political realm, the resolution includes measures to strengthen China’s so-called “consultative democracy.”	在政治领域，《决定》中包括了强化中国所谓的“协商民主”的措施。


While the concept of enhancing the role of non-CCP forces in Chinese politics is not new, its prominence in the resolution reflects the Party’s willingness to adopt a more democratic political system – as long as it retains its dominant position, of course.	尽管加强非共产党人士在中国政治中的作用并非新的概念，但期在《决定》中的显赫地位反映出中共准备采取更加民主的政治制度——当然，只要它能继续保持主宰地位。


In a one-party system, meritocracy is a prerequisite for good governance, which in turn plays a central role in maintaining social stability.	在一党制度下，精英治国是好治理的前提，而好治理又是维持社会稳定的关键。


Unfortunately, meritocracy has been eroded by a political culture of sycophancy and cynicism.	不幸的是，精英治国受到了谄媚和犬儒政治文化的侵蚀。


Designing a screening mechanism to minimize adverse selection in choosing bureaucrats and party officials has become one of the biggest challenges that China’s ruling elites confront.	设计监督机制以实现党政官员选拔中的逆向选择的最小化已成为中国执政精英所面临的最大挑战之一。


Although the resolution’s general message is encouraging, a shopping list of reform objectives is not a strategic analysis of the contradictions that are undermining China’s development, let alone an action plan for responding to these contradictions.	尽管《决定》的基本信息令人振奋，但改革目标清单算不上对破坏中国发展的矛盾的战略分析，更不用说应对这些矛盾的行动计划了。


Indeed, for China’s new leadership, the successful completion of the Third Plenum is only the first step in a new long march toward a more stable, prosperous future.	事实上，对中国的新领导层来说，成功完成三中全会只是通往更稳定繁荣的未来的长征的第一步。


China’s Trilemma	中国的三角困境


BEIJING – The Nobel laureate economist Robert Mundell showed that an economy can maintain two – but only two – of three key features: monetary-policy independence, a fixed exchange rate, and free cross-border capital flows.	发自北京——诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特·蒙代尔指出一个经济体能且只能维持三个关键特性（货币政策独立性，固定汇率和跨境自由流动）中的两个。


But China is currently juggling all three – an act that is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.	而中国当前正奋力同时实现这三者——但这种做法越来越难以掌控。


At first glance, this may not seem to be the case.	粗看之下，这种说法似乎不太正确。


Given that the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has largely maintained its monetary-policy independence over the last three decades, and actively manages the renminbi’s exchange rate, it is natural to conclude that China imposes strict controls on capital flows.	考虑到中国人民银行在过去三十年间绝大多数时间都能维持其货币政策独立性，并对人民币的汇率实施积极管理，人们也会自然而然地推断中国队资本流动给予了严格管制。


In fact, China liberalized inward foreign direct investment more than 20 years ago, and eased controls for much of the capital account thereafter.	但事实上，中国早在20多年前已经放开了面向本国的外国直接投资，自那以后也已对大部分资本账户松了绑。


China’s efforts to regulate cross-border capital flows have never been very effective.	中国试图控制跨境资本流动的努力从来都收效甚微。


During the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, China had to implement draconian measures to prevent capital flight.	在1990年代的亚洲金融危机期间，中国只得采取极为严苛的手段防止资本外流。


In the early 2000s, short-term capital began to flow into China, with investors betting on the renminbi’s appreciation and, from 2004-2006, on rising asset prices.	在本世纪初那几年，投资者们赌人民币升值，在2004~2006年间又押注资产价格升值，导致短期资本开始流入中国。


Since renminbi internationalization was launched in 2009, exchange-rate arbitrage and the carry trade have surged.	自从人民币国际化在2009年启动之后，汇率投机和套利交易也因此大幅增加。


Certainly, China’s capital controls, though porous, increase the transaction costs of moving short-term capital to and from China, thereby reducing upward pressure on the renminbi’s exchange rate; in extreme circumstances, this could play a decisive role in China’s financial security.	当然，虽然中国的资本管制漏洞百出，但也增加了短期资本进出中国的交易成本，因此也减少了人民币汇率的上行压力； 在极端情况下，这甚至可以在中国的金融安全方面扮演重要角色。


But capital continues to flow – if not entirely freely – across China’s borders.	但资本依然继续在不断穿越（若非完全自由的话）中国国境。


This raises an obvious question: How has China managed to defy the Mundell trilemma by maintaining all three policy objectives simultaneously?	因此就产生了一个显而易见的问题：中国是如何通过同时维持三大政策目标来逆转蒙代尔三重困境的？


The answer lies in China’s sterilization policy.	而答案就在中国的货币冲销政策之中。


China has run a capital-account surplus for most of the last 30 years, and a trade surplus every year since 1993.	中国在过去30年间绝大多数时候都拥有资本帐户顺差，并自1993年以来一直保持着贸易顺差。


The PBOC keeps the exchange rate stable by intervening heavily in the foreign-exchange market, creating so much liquidity that the authorities must engage in massive sterilization to avoid overshooting the targeted increase in the monetary base.	中国人民银行大力干预外汇市场以维持汇率稳定，并以此创造了巨额流动性，迫使当局采取大规模冲销措施以避免增量超出货币基础的设定目标。


In China, unlike in advanced countries, monetary and sterilization policy are often one in the same.	跟发达国家不同的是，中国的货币与冲销政策经常都是同一套做法。


The degree to which monetary policy is expansionary depends on the degree to which the liquidity created by currency-market intervention has been sterilized.	货币政策扩张的程度取决于有多少货币市场干预下产生的流动性是被冲销掉了。


The most frequently used monetary instrument in sterilization is open-market operations.	而冲销中使用最频繁的货币工具则是公开市场操作。


Given China’s twin surpluses, the PBOC sold all of the government bonds that it had accumulated in 2003, so it has been selling central-bank bills ever since, with CN¥5 trillion ($812 billion) in such bills currently held by banks.	考虑到中国的双顺差状况，人民银行在2003年全部出售了之前积累下来的政府债券，随后则开始出售中央银行票据，估计有价值5万亿元人民币（折合8120亿美元）的这类票据被银行所持有。


Another important instrument for sterilization is the reserve-requirement ratio, which, when raised, locks a large amount of liquidity in the banking system.	另一个重要的冲销工具则是存款准备金率，提升该比率就能锁定银行系统中的一大笔流动性。


The ratio, which the PBOC has changed 42 times since 1998, currently stands at 20% – double the ratio for large banks in the United States.	在人民银行自1998年以来修改了42次之后，该比率目前维持在20%——比美国大型银行高一倍。


Whatever the mechanism, the costs of sterilization are very high.	不管使用何种机制，冲销的成本都极为高昂。


For starters, by maintaining an undervalued real exchange rate, China has fallen into the so-called “dollar trap,” boosting the US dollar’s international importance at China’s own expense.	首先，为了维持一个低估的实际利率，中国陷入了一个所谓的“美元陷阱”，以牺牲自身为代价提升了美元的国际地位。


As time passes, the senselessness of this policy will become increasingly apparent.	随着时间推移，这一政策的不合理性也日益凸显。


Sterilization also leads to a serious misallocation of resources, most obviously by functioning as a subsidy to the export sector, at the expense of the rest of the economy.	冲销政策也导致了资源的严重错配，最明显的就是其异化成为对出口部门的补贴，却让其他经济部门因此受害。


A less noticed form of resource misallocation stems from the fact that only sellers of foreign exchange gain liquidity, but the whole economy feels the effects.	资源错配的另一个不明显形式则源自于只有外汇的卖出者们得到了流动性，但整体经济都感受到了影响。


As a result, small and medium-size enterprises that produce non-tradable products are denied much-needed funds and suffer from sterilization’s negative externalities.	结果生产非贸易类产品的中小型企业无法得到急需的资金并受到了冲销政策负面外部性的冲击。


Furthermore, the high reserve ratio and forced purchase of central-bank bills squeezes commercial banks’ profits severely – a phenomenon that will be intensified by interest-rate liberalization.	此外，高存款贮备金率和强制购买央行票据严重积压了商业银行的利润空间——该情况在利率管制放松之后还将进一步恶化。


The quest for yield on available funds will drive banks to make riskier investments.	为了在已有的资金水平下追求更高利润，各大银行职能涉足更高风险的投资。


There are also quasi-fiscal costs involved.	这还另外牵涉到准财政成本。


Fortunately, despite the low returns on foreign assets, this is not yet a major problem for China, owing to the low costs of the corresponding PBOC liabilities.	幸运的是，尽管国外资产的回报较低，但由于对应的中国人民银行借贷成本也不高，所以对中国来说还不算是个重大问题。


Nonetheless, though predictions that China would abandon its exchange-rate controls in order to uphold monetary autonomy have proved wrong over the last decade, this time may be different.	即便如此，虽然中国将放弃其汇率管制以提升货币自主性的预测在过去十年内都被证伪，但这此情况可能有所不同。


With China’s liberalization of interest rates and short-term capital flows making it increasingly difficult for the country to juggle Mundell’s “irreconcilable trinity,” one hopes that Chinese leaders will finally allow the renminbi to float, while keeping in place existing capital controls.	随着中国放宽利率和短期资本流动，该国也日渐难以反抗蒙代尔的“无可调和三角定律”，希望中国领导人最终能在维持现有资本管制的情况下，允许人民币自由浮动。


China’s Investment Addiction	中国的投资依赖


BEIJING – China’s economy slowed unexpectedly in the second quarter of this year.	北京—今年二季度，中国经济出人意料地放缓了。


Just as unexpectedly, most data released since July suggest that China’s growth has stabilized.	同样出人意料的是，7月以来的大部分公布的大部分数据表明中国的增长已经稳定下来。


Markets, not surprisingly, have breathed a collective sigh of relief.	毫不奇怪，市场同时大舒一口气。


But should investors still be nervous?	但投资者应该继续保持紧张吗？


Currently, the most severe problem confronting Chinese authorities is overcapacity.	目前中国当局所面临的最严重的问题是产能过剩。


For example, China’s annual production capacity for crude steel is one billion tons, but its total output in 2012 was 720 million tons – a capacity utilization rate of 72%.	比如，中国粗钢年产能为十亿吨，但2012年总产量只有7. 2亿吨——产能利用率为72%。


More strikingly, the steel industry’s profitability was just 0.04% in 2012.	更引人注目的是2012年钢铁业利润率只有0. 04%。


Indeed, the profit on two tons of steel was just about enough to buy a lollipop.	事实上，生产量吨钢所获得的利润只能买一根棒棒糖。


So far this year, the average profitability of China’s top 500 companies is 4.34%, down 33 basis points from 2012.	今年截至目前中国前500家公司平均利润率为4. 34%，比2012年下降33个基点。


Some say that today’s overcapacity is a result of China’s past overinvestment.	有人说今天的产能过剩来自过去的过度投资。


Others attribute it to a lack of effective demand.	也有人认为产能过剩是因为有效需求不足。


The government seems to come down in the middle.	政府的观点似乎是两者的折中。


On one hand, the authorities have ordered thousands of companies to reduce capacity.	一方面，当局要求数千家公司削减产能。


On the other hand, the government has introduced some “mini-stimulus” measures, ranging from exemptions for “micro firms” from business and sales taxes to pressure on banks to increase loans to exporters.	另一方面，政府引入了一些“迷你刺激”措施，比如“微型企业”免除营业税和销售税、要求银行增加出口企业贷款等。


The authorities’ official line is that China’s growth model requires less investment and more consumption.	当局的官方口径是中国的增长模式需要减少投资、增加消费。


But not all Chinese economists agree.	但并非所有中国经济学家都同意这一点。


They argue that capital stock is the key factor for growth, and that China’s per capita capital stock is still low relative to developed countries, which implies considerable scope for further investment.	他们认为资本存量是增长的关键因素，而中国的人均资本存量相对发达国家仍然很低，这意味着未来投资空间很大。


To be sure, capital accumulation is a driving force of economic growth, and catching up with developed-country income levels implies that China must increase its capital stock in the long run.	诚然，资本积累是经济增长的一大动力，而赶超发达国家收入水平要求中国必须在长期增加资本存量。


But what is at issue is not the size of the capital stock, or even the level of investment; the problem is the growth rate of investment, which has been significantly higher than that of GDP for decades.	但要紧的不是资本存量的规模，甚至也不是投资水平； 要紧的是投资的增长率，几十年来这一数字大大高于GDP增长率。


According to official statistics, China’s investment rate is approaching 50% of GDP.	根据官方统计数字，中国的投资率已接近GDP的50%。


Given absorption constraints, capital efficiency has been falling steadily amid increasing deadweight.	拜吸收约束所赐，资本效率随着资本规模的增加而稳步下降。


If environmental damage caused by breakneck investment growth were taken into account, China’s capital efficiency would be even lower.	如果把飞速增长的投资所造成的环境破坏考虑在内，中国的资本效率还会更低。


Human capital and technological progress are as important to economic growth as physical capital and labor, if not more so.	人力资本和技术进步对经济增长的作用不亚于实体资本和劳动。


If resource allocation is skewed toward physical capital at the expense of accumulating human capital – for which adequate consumption is indispensable – economic growth would be more likely to slow than rise.	如果资源配置向实体资本的倾斜以破坏人力资本积累为代价——而后者又是充分消费的不可或缺的条件——经济增长就更有可能放缓而不是加快。


So China should reduce the growth rate of investment and increase that of consumption, allowing the investment rate to settle at a more sustainable level.	因此，中国应该降低投资增长率，提高消费增长率，让投资率在更加可持续的水平上稳定下来。


Of course, it is not entirely untrue that China’s overcapacity reflects a shortfall of effective demand.	当然，说中国的产能过剩反映的是有效需求的不足也不是完全错误的。


But where can effective demand come from?	但有效需求来自何处？


Again, China’s steel industry provides a telling example.	在这方面，中国钢铁业再次提供了很好的例子。


Despite China’s lack of a comparative advantage for steel production, it has built approximately one thousand mills, with output accounting for roughly half of the global total.	尽管中国在钢生产方面并无比较优势，但仍建设了大约一千家钢铁厂，产出占了全球总产量的半壁江山。


As early as 2004, China’s government tried to clamp down on overinvestment; and yet output increased dramatically, from 300 million tons that year to a billion tons in 2012, owing to strong demand generated by investment in infrastructure and real-estate development.	早在2004年，中国政府就试图降温过度投资； 但由于基础设施投资和房地产开发所带来的强劲需求，产出仍然增长迅猛，从当年的3亿吨增加到2012年的10亿吨。


China’s investment consists of mainly three broad categories: manufacturing industry, infrastructure, and real estate.	中国的投资大体可分为三块：制造业、基础设施和房地产业。


In late 2008 and 2009, at the height of the global financial crisis, stimulus-fueled infrastructure investment sustained output growth.	2008年底和2009年全球金融危机顶峰时，经济刺激带来的基础设施投资提升维持了产出增长。


In 2010, investment in real-estate development replaced infrastructure investment as the main driver of growth.	2010年，房地产开发投资取代了基础设施投资成为增长的主要动力。


Today, both infrastructure and real estate are important drivers of China’s growth.	如今，基础设施和房地产都是中国增长的重要推动力。


China does need more infrastructure investment – particularly in power and water utilities, transport, and communications.	中国确实需要更多的基础设施投资——特别是在电力和水电、交通和通信方面。


But the pace of investment must take financial constraints fully into consideration.	但投资节奏必须充分考虑金融约束。


More important, China can and should invest more in social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, retirement homes, and so on.	更重要的是，中国可以也应该更多地投资学校、医院、养老院等社会基础设施。


However, real-estate investment is another story.	但房地产投资则是另一回事。


It is difficult to judge how serious China’s property bubble is and when it might burst.	很难判断中国地产泡沫的严重程度以及破灭时间。


But one thing is certain: China has invested too much in real-estate development.	但有一点是肯定的：中国在房地产开发上已经投资得太多了。


With per capita income at less than $6,000, homeownership in China is roughly 90%, compared to less than 70% in the United States.	中国的人均收入不到6000美元，但中国房屋自有率高达90%左右，而美国还不到70%。


Average floor space per capita is 32.9 square meters, while median floor space per family in Hong Kong is just 48 square meters.	人均住房面积为32. 9平米，而香港中位家庭住房面积才刚刚达到48平米。


China has 696 five-star hotels, with another 500 on the way.	中国有696家五星级饭店，另有500家在建。


Five of the ten tallest skyscrapers under construction worldwide are in China.	在建的十座最高建筑中有五座位于中国。


In my view, this is madness.	在我看来这只能用疯狂来形容。


China’s economy is being held hostage by real-estate investment.	中国经济正在被房地产投资绑架。


On one hand, China should not try to eliminate overcapacity by maintaining the high growth rate of real-estate investment.	一方面，中国不应该通过保持房地产投资的高增长率来解决产能过剩。


While investment in social housing should be welcomed, real-estate investment, currently running at 10-13% of GDP, is already far too high.	社会住房项目投资值得欢迎，但目前占GDP高达10—13%的房地产投资已经显得太高。


On the other hand, if real-estate investment growth falls, overcapacity will be difficult to eliminate.	另一方面，如果房地产投资增长回落，产能过生就无法消除。


This dilemma highlights the structural-adjustment challenge that China faces – and should give investors reason to hold their breath.	这��两难凸显出中国所面临的结构性调整挑战——也应该让投资者保持谨慎。


That said, there are two caveats.	总而言之，有两点值得警惕。


First, unlike other categories of investment, real estate investment does not increase productive capital stock.	首先，与其他投资类型不同，房地产投资并不增加生产性资本存量。


There is no fundamental difference between a house and an expensive durable consumer good.	房子和高价耐久消费品之间并无根本不同。


Second, in China’s statistics, the growth rate of gross fixed-asset investment is much higher than that of gross capital formation.	其次，在中国的统计数据中，总固定资产投资增长率显著高于总资本形成增长率。


This indicates that data on the growth rate of fixed-asset investment may have exaggerated the pace of capital-stock accumulation.	这表明固定投资的增长率数据可能夸大了资本存量积累的速度。


Hence, while the Chinese government should be firm on reducing the dependence of growth on investment, it must exercise utmost care when doing so.	因此，尽管中国政府应该坚决地减少经济增长对投资的依赖，但动作必须非常谨慎。


China’s Fire Next Time	中国的下一场火


BEIJING – Earlier this year, rumors of China’s impending financial doom – triggered by either a housing-market crash or local-government debt defaults – were rampant.	北京—今年早些时候，关于中国马上就要因为房地产市场崩溃或地方政府债务违约而爆发金融崩溃的传闻日嚣尘上。


But, in recent months, the economy has stabilized, leaving few doubts about China’s ability to grow by more than 7% this year.	但是，最近几个月来，中国经济趋向稳定，已无多少人怀疑中国有能力在今年保持GDP增长7%以上。


Given that the Chinese government had ample scope for policy intervention, this turnaround should come as no surprise.	中国政府有充足的政策干预空间，因此如此转折并不令人奇怪。


But the moment of financial reckoning has merely been postponed, not averted.	但金融清算的时刻只是被暂停了，而没有被消除。


The fundamental problems that triggered alarm bells in the first place – including real-estate bubbles, local-government debt, rapid growth in shadow-banking activity, and rising corporate leverage ratios – remain unresolved.	在一开始敲响警钟的根本问题——包括房地产泡沫、地方政府债务、影子银行活动迅速扩张、公司杠杆率高企等——仍没有解决。


Of these, the most immediate threat to China’s economic and financial stability is the combination of high borrowing costs, low profitability for nonfinancial corporations, and very high corporate leverage ratios.	在这些问题中，对中国经济和金融稳定最紧迫的威胁是高借贷成本、非金融企业利润低下以及企业杠杆率畸高的组合问题。


According to a study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the debt/GDP ratio for China’s nonfinancial corporations was 113% by the end of 2012.	根据中国社科院的一项研究，截至2012年末，中国非金融企业债务/GDP之比为113%。 标准普尔公司（Standard & Poor’s）认为，一年后，这些企业的总债务将达到14.


Standard & Poor’s found that, a year later, these firms’ total debt amounted to $14.2 trillion, eclipsing the $13.1 trillion of outstanding debt in the United States and making China the world’s largest issuer of corporate debt.	2万亿美元，超过美国未偿还债务规模（13. 1万亿美元），使中国成为世界上第一大企业债发行国。


There is no indication that the ratio will decline anytime soon, which is particularly worrisome, given the low profitability and high borrowing costs that China’s industrial enterprises face.	没有迹象表明这一比率会在短时间内下降，而这尤其令人担忧，因为中国工业企业面临着低盈利能力和高借贷成本。


Indeed, Chinese firms’ profitability amounted to just over 6% last year, with 2012 profits for China’s 500 largest (mostly state-owned) corporations barely exceeding 2%.	事实上，去年中国企业利润率仅为6%，前500大企业（大部分为国有企业）利润率勉强超过2%。


Meanwhile, interest rates on bank loans to nonfinancial enterprises remain close to 7%, despite having fallen slightly over the last year.	与此同时，尽管叫去年略有下降，非金融企业银行贷款利率仍接近7%。


And, in the second quarter of this year, the annualized interest rate on loans to small nonfinancial corporations surpassed 25%.	此外，今年二季度，小型非金融企业贷款年化利率超过了25%。


With insufficient profits to use for investment, nonfinancial corporations will become increasingly dependent on external finance.	非金融企业没有足够多的利润用于投资，因而将日益依赖外部融资。


As their leverage ratios increase, so will their risk premiums, causing their borrowing costs to rise and undermining their profitability further.	随着它们的杠杆率的提高，风险溢价也会随之上升，导致他们的借贷成本升高，从而进一步制约利润率。


This destructive cycle will be difficult to break.	这一恶性循环很难打破。


For example, if companies reduce investment, they will weaken growth and boost their leverage ratio further.	比如，如果公司降低投资，就会危及增长，从而进一步增加杠杆率。


To be sure, China overcame a similar challenge in its public sector from 1998 to 2001.	诚然，中国在1998—2001年期间曾经克服过公共部门类似的挑战。


It pursued growth-boosting investment in infrastructure and real-estate development to eliminate deflation, while maintaining artificially low interest rates to contain the rise of public debt.	当时中国追求提振增长的基础设施投资和房地产开发以消除通缩，同时人为维持低利率以遏制公共债务增加。


But a lot has changed since then.	但此后形势发生了巨大的变化。


In fact, the investment-led growth model that facilitated double-digit growth in the decade after 2001 has exacerbated structural weaknesses, which must now be addressed.	事实上，在2001年后的十年中推动两位数增长的投资拉动型增长模式加剧了结构性弱点，目前已到了必须纠正的地步。


Indeed, China must stem the pace of real-estate investment, which accounted for more than 13% of GDP in recent years – a move that will undoubtedly lead to slower economic growth and, in turn, reduce the profitability of China’s nonfinancial corporates further.	事实上，中国必须遏制近几年已占GDP 13%以上的房地产投资——这样做必然会导致经济增长减速，反过来进一步降低中国非金融企业的利润率。


Moreover, ongoing interest-rate liberalization – which has occurred both openly and surreptitiously – means that artificially low borrowing costs have become far more difficult to maintain.	此外，利率自由化的进行——既有公开的，也有暗地的——意味着人为压低的借贷成本维持难度大大加剧。


Though the People’s Bank of China still officially caps interest rates on deposits, commercial banks – in cooperation with nonbank financial institutions, especially trust companies – are using wealth-management products to attract deposits with de facto free-market interest rates.	尽管中国人民银行仍对存款利率上限实施着官方上限，但商业银行——在非银行金融机构特别是信托公司的合作下——正在利用理财产品以事实上的自由市场利率吸引存款。


As a result, the PBOC is losing control over interest rates on corporate loans, and thus has few options for constraining leverage ratios.	结果，中国人民银行正在失去对企业贷款利率的控制，因此也不再能够约束杠杆率。


Despite these risks, it is too early to bet on a corporate-debt crisis in China.	尽管存在这些风险，但预言中国发生企业债危机仍为时尚早。


For starters, no one knows at what corporate leverage ratio a crisis will be triggered.	首先，没人知道多高的企业杠杆率才会触发危机。


In 1996, when Japan’s public debt/GDP ratio reached 80%, many Japanese economists and officials worried about a looming crisis.	1996年，日本公共债务/GDP之比达到了80%，许多日本经济学家和官员担心危机随时可能爆发。


Almost two decades later, the ratio has surpassed 200% – and still no crisis has erupted.	近二十年过去了，如今日本的这一比率已超过200%——但危机仍然没有爆发。


Furthermore, China has not yet completed its market-orientated reforms, which could unleash major growth potential in many areas.	此外，中国尚未完成其市场改革，这意味着它可以在诸多领域释放巨大的增长潜力。


Given the role that institutional factors play in China’s corporate-debt problem, such reforms could go a long way toward resolving it.	制度因素在中国企业债问题上仍扮演着重要角色，因此这方面的改革可以在解决企业债问题上大放异彩。


China’s leaders should take advantage of this respite from instability and low confidence to redouble their reform efforts.	中国领导人应该利用动荡和信心不足的间歇期加倍努力实施改革。


Otherwise, they can expect alarm bells to begin ringing again – and, next time, they may not have the tools they need to silence them.	否则，警钟将再次敲响——而到那时就不一定有平息警报所必须的工具了。


The Enigma of European Defense	欧洲防务之谜


PARIS – While Europe’s citizens largely support the establishment of a common security and defense policy, most European leaders have demonstrated a clear lack of interest in creating one – including at last month’s European Council meeting.	巴黎——尽管欧洲民众大抵支持制定共同的安全及防务政策，但多数欧洲领导人明显对此兴味索然——上个月召开的欧洲理事会会议就是实例。


What accounts for this paradox?	是什么造成了这样的悖论？


One possible explanation is that financially strained European governments lack the means to fulfill their citizens’ expectations.	可能的解释之一是财政紧张的欧洲政府无力满足民众的愿望。


But that is unconvincing, given that the issue was framed in almost identical terms three decades ago, when budgetary constraints were not a problem.	但这种解释不够有说服力，因为30年前就已经提出过几乎相同的问题，而当时还根本不必考虑预算限制。


In fact, it could be argued that such constraints should spur, not impede, the creation of a European defense structure.	事实上，这样的限制甚至应该刺激、而不是阻碍欧洲防御机制的建设。


After all, member countries would then be able to pool their resources, harmonize programs, and rationalize costs, thereby reducing individual governments’ financial burden.	毕竟，届时成员国就能集中利用资源、协调计划、分摊费用，从而控制个别政府的财政负担。


Another, far more credible explanation is that Europeans’ interpretations of “a more active and stronger security policy” differ widely.	另外一种更为可信的解释是欧洲人对于“更积极强势安全政策”的看法大相径庭。


Indeed, current discussions in Europe concerning the use of force are dominated by three main perspectives, championed by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.	事实上，欧洲目前有关武力的讨论主要涉及三种观点，这三种观点分别由法国、英国和德国提出。


France, which has once again intervened in Africa – this time to restore order in the Central African Republic – is the only European Union country that seems genuinely interested in satisfying popular demand for more robust European security structures.	真正愿意满足公众强化欧洲安全结构要求的唯一国家似乎是法国，不久前它已再次对非洲进行干预——这次是为实现恢复中非共和国秩序的目标。


The French consider Europe to be a kind of superpower – a status that implies a corresponding military capacity.	法国将欧洲视为某种超级力量——而超级力量需要具备相应的军事实力。


While this view probably stems from France’s historical political and military prowess, it also reflects the country’s current interests.	虽然这种观点可能与法国过往的政治和军事实力有关，但也反映了法国目前的利益。


As Europe’s greatest military power (despite the UK’s larger defense budget), France would play a key role in any wide-ranging European military operation.	法国是欧洲军事实力最强的国家（虽然英国国防预算的规模更大），需要在一系列欧洲军事行动中扮演关键的角色。


The UK, for its part, shares France’s belief that military power is a prerequisite to strategic effectiveness.	英国和法国一样，相信没有军事实力就谈不上战略效率。


It claims that its opposition to a European defense structure stems from its belief that NATO – and thus the United States – is critical to European defense.	英国称之所以反对欧洲防务架构是因为相信北约——还有美国——是欧洲防务的关键要素。


But, given that no other EU country has seriously considered excluding NATO, this argument seems to be little more than an excuse.	但因为其他欧盟国家并没有真正考虑排斥北约，英国的说法似乎不过是一种借口。


The truth is that the only kind of defense the British accept is that conducted by a coalition of European states acting under their national flags, as occurred in Libya.	事实是英国唯一接受的防务形式是像在利比亚那样由欧洲国家联盟各自打着本国的旗号独立行动。


In the UK’s view, “European” operations should be limited to humanitarian and peacekeeping objectives.	英国认为人道主义和维和行动应该是“欧洲”行动的限度。


While it supported the fight against piracy off the Horn of Africa, that was more a policing operation than a military one, and it was guided by a shared interest in protecting trade routes from the Middle East and Asia.	虽然它支持把海盗从非洲之角赶出去，但那次行动与其说与军方有关还不如说是为了保护从中东到亚洲贸易航线共同利益的警方行动。


Germany’s vision of European defense is very different from the French and British perspectives.	德国对欧洲防务目标的看法与英法大相径庭。


Unlike the UK, Germany supports a European security and defense policy, proudly highlighting its consistent military budget and major presence in European missions (larger than that of the overstretched French).	和英国不同，德国支持欧洲安全与防务政策，自豪地炫耀自己稳定的军事预算和在欧洲行动中所起的重要作用（德国的作用超过捉襟见肘的法国）。


And, though Germany shares the UK’s belief that NATO bears primary responsibility for protecting Europe, its view of European engagement is even more restrictive.	而且，尽管德国同意英国保卫欧洲责任主要由北约承担的观点，但其欧洲参与观点的限制性更加严格。


In Germany’s view, European military intervention should be limited to the continent, and should not include combat operations.	德国认为欧洲军事干预应当局限在欧洲大陆，而且不应该参与战斗行动。


In fact, a majority of Europe’s citizens prefer that European forces be deployed only for non-combat missions.	事实上，欧洲多数民众倾向于欧洲军队仅限于执行非战斗任务。


And, so far, virtually all European military operations have been aimed at evacuating European nationals, delivering humanitarian aid, or maintaining peace in the aftermath of conflict.	而且，迄今为止，欧洲几乎所有军事行动都是为了保障欧洲国民的安全撤离，此外还包括提供人道主义援助或在冲突爆发后进行维和。


These differing views explain the uncertainty surrounding France’s recent interventions in Africa.	这些不同意见解释了法国不久前非洲干预行动的不确定性。


The French have lamented the miniscule support offered by the rest of Europe for its operations in Mali and the Central African Republic – exemplified by Germany’s refusal to create a fund for EU member-state operations.	法国人感叹欧洲其他国家对其马里和中非共和国行动给予的支持微乎其微——德国拒绝设立欧盟成员国行动基金就是最好的例子。


But, given the urgency of the situations in Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic, this lack of support has not undermined France’s efforts as much as prior consultation with European leaders would have done.	但是，鉴于利比亚、马里及中非共和国事态的紧迫性，这种支持的欠缺并没有给法国军事行动带来事先咨询欧洲领导人意见那样的困扰。


Had the Germans been consulted, they probably would have rejected the interventions anyway.	如果事先征询德国的意见，他们很可能会拒绝进行干预行动。


This conflict between the need for rapid response and the requirement for deliberation explains why the EU’s much-discussed “battlegroups” are unlikely ever to be deployed.	这种快速反应和深思熟虑之间的冲突说明了欧盟讨论最多的“战斗群”为什么永远不可能真正部署。


The fact that most Europeans are satisfied with limited political and military involvement outside of Europe makes increased defense cooperation even less likely.	多数欧洲人满足于对欧洲以外事务进行有限政治和军事干预的现实导致增强防务合作的可能性进一步减小。


A pessimist would say that Europeans are unable – or at least unwilling – to rethink their defense policy, because the US ultimately ensures their security through NATO.	悲观主义者会说欧洲人不能——或者至少不愿——重新思考其防御政策，因为美国最终通过北约保障了他们的安全需求。


According to this view, France’s efforts to encourage both transatlantic integration and autonomous political action are insufficient to change most Europeans’ minds.	按照这种说法，法国促进跨大西洋一体化和自治政治行动的努力并不足以改变多数欧洲人的想法。


A more optimistic interpretation is that Europe needs defense structures that account for the role of member states – not just for that of the EU.	更乐观的解释是欧洲需要其防御机制在明确欧盟作用的同时明确各成员国作用。


From this perspective, Europe does have a significant military presence, whether in Afghanistan and Libya or Mali and the Central African Republic.	从这个角度看，欧洲的确扮演了重要的军事角色，无论在阿富汗、利比亚还是马里和中非共和国。


That is a start.	这不过是个开头。


Zika and Reproductive Rights	寨卡和生育权


NEW YORK – Mosquitoes know no boundaries, and neither does fear.	纽约—蚊子不知道有国界这回事，也不懂得恐慌。


As public-health experts grapple with the Zika virus, panic continues to spread around the world.	如今，公共卫生专家正在集中关注寨卡病毒，而恐惧继续在全世界蔓延。


Yet the crisis has brought to light two important truths.	但这场危机让我们看到了两个重要事实。


The first revelation is how badly degraded public health systems have become, across Latin America and beyond.	第一个事实是拉丁美洲和其他地区公共卫生体系倒退严重。


This did not happen by chance.	这绝不是偶然。


In large part, it is the result of pressure on developing countries by concessionary lenders, such as the International Monetary Fund, to cut social sector expenses, including health spending, beginning in 1980.	从很大程度上说，这是拜国际货币基金（IMF）等优惠贷款人所赐。 从1980年开始，这些优惠贷款人施加越来越大的压力要求削减社会部门支出，包括卫生支出。


In Brazil and elsewhere, state authorities could have deployed well-known and cost-effective measures to control mosquito-borne diseases, but they did not.	在巴西和其他国家，有关部门本来能力部署著名的高性价比措施控制蚊子传播的传染病，但它们没有这样做。


Their most affected citizens, who tend to be poor, have been forced to live with the consequences.	而受影响最大的国民往往是穷人，他们被迫承受后果。


Second, the Zika epidemic has revealed, with particular poignancy, another dire threat to public health: the denial of women’s reproductive rights.	其次，尤其讽刺的是，寨卡疫情曝光了另外一个公共卫生的严峻威胁：剥夺妇女生育权。


Governments are shirking their responsibility in this regard too, often in a grotesque manner.	政府在这方面也在推脱责任，手段往往荒唐。


The reported spike in cases of microcephaly – a birth defect – among infants in Zika-affected areas led the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador to warn their female citizens “not to become pregnant.”	据报道，寨卡疫区婴儿小头症（一种出生缺陷）概率飙升让巴西、哥伦比亚、厄瓜多尔和萨尔瓦多政府警告女性公民“不要怀孕”。


This message, which places the blame and burden of the Zika epidemic on women, is as unjust as it is unreasonable.	这一做法将寨卡疫情的责任和负担都推给了妇女，是不公平也不合理的。


It is also toothless, as many women in the region do not have access to contraception or safe abortions.	这也是无能的表现，因为该地区许多妇女根本无法获得避孕和安全堕胎。


The Zika crisis has highlighted an obvious reality: Not providing women with reproductive health information and services places their lives – and those of their children – at grave risk.	寨卡危机彰显出一个显而易见的现实：不向妇女提供生殖健康信息和服务让她们——以及她们的孩子——的生命处于非常危险的境地。


Latin America’s abortion laws are among the world’s most restrictive.	拉丁美洲的堕胎法堪称世界最严。


El Salvador, for example, bans abortion in all circumstances and has incarcerated women who have gone to emergency rooms after miscarriages, charging them with seeking illegal abortions.	比如，萨尔瓦多禁止一切情况下的堕胎行为，任何妇女，如果她因为流产而进入急诊室，都会遭到监禁，被控试图非法堕胎。


Contraception can also be expensive or difficult to access across the region, despite high rates of teenage rape and pregnancy.	避孕在该地区也很昂贵并且很难获得，尽管青少年强奸和怀孕现象十分普遍。


The result, especially with the addition of the Zika virus, is a recipe for tragedy.	结果是反复发生悲剧，特别是在寨卡病毒爆发的情况下。


Brazil, the Latin American country hit hardest by the virus so far, is emblematic of the problem: Abortion is allowed only in cases of rape, danger to the woman’s life, or in the case of fetal anencephaly (the absence of a major portion of the brain).	目前，拉丁美洲受寨卡病毒影响最大的国家是巴西，它也成为这一问题的象征：堕胎只有在遭遇强奸、危及妇女生命或致命无脑儿（缺少大脑的主要部分）等情况才被允许。


In response to the Zika crisis, Brazil should immediately allow abortion in cases of suspected microcephaly as well.	为了应对寨卡危机，巴西应该立刻允许疑似小脑症的情况也进行堕胎。


The loosening of restrictions, however, should not stop there.	但是，放松限制不能仅限于此。


Over the last few years, conservatives in the Brazilian Congress have been trying to place limits on abortion in cases of rape.	在过去几年中，巴西国会中的保守派一直在试图限制被强奸后堕胎。


These efforts – which demonstrate complete disregard for the rights and dignity of women – must end.	这些做法必须叫停，因为它们完全无视妇女的权利和尊严。


Instead, women’s right to seek an abortion should be expanded – and quickly.	相反，妇女寻求堕胎的权利应该扩大——迅速扩大。


Governments must also ensure that services are accessible and affordable.	政府还必须确保服务能得到普及和平价化。


Wealthy Brazilian women can afford to pay private health providers for safe abortions.	富裕的巴西妇女能够负担私人安全��胎服务。


Poor women are forced to resort to poorly trained and equipped providers who operate in unsanitary conditions, sometimes as part of criminal networks.	贫困女性被迫在技术低劣、设备落后的诊所（有时甚至是犯罪团伙）在不卫生的条件下接受堕胎手术。


In September 2014, two women died in Rio de Janeiro following clandestine abortions.	2014年9月，两名妇女在里约热内卢接受地下脱胎后死亡。


In the region overall, 95% of abortions are unsafe.	在整个地区，95%的堕胎为不安全堕胎。


In Latin America and the Caribbean, 62% of women aged 15-49 want to avoid a pregnancy.	在拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区，62%的15—49岁女性希望避免怀孕。


But nearly a quarter of these women are not using an effective method of birth control.	但这些女性中有近四分之一用不上有效的生育控制方法。


Expense is only one barrier for poor women and girls; another is the lack of information.	对贫困妇女和女孩来说，开支只是其中一个壁垒；


Men and women need comprehensive sexuality education, so they are informed about their reproductive health and family planning options and know where they can get modern contraceptives.	另一个壁垒是信息不通。 女性和女性都需要全面的性教育，这样才能了解自己的生殖卫生条件和家庭规划选择，知道如何获得现代避孕技术。


Recent evidence suggesting that Zika might be transmitted sexually adds extra urgency to making male and female condoms and other contraceptives widely available.	最新证据显示，寨卡病毒可能经由性途径传播，这更加增加了普及男用和女用避孕套和其他避孕手段的紧迫性。


The movement for reproductive rights has a long history in Brazil and in other parts of Latin America.	生育权运动在巴西和其他拉丁美洲国家由来已久。


Over the last several months – even before Zika – feminists had been taking to the streets in outrage at the lack of access to safe and legal abortions.	在过去几个月中——甚至在寨卡病毒爆发前——女权主义者一直在举行街头游行愤怒地倾诉她们无法获得安全和合法的堕胎。


The Zika crisis may mark a turning point in the fight for women’s health and equality.	寨卡危机可能是妇女卫生和平等地位斗争的转折点。


It is certainly a wake-up call for governments everywhere to rebuild and strengthen public health systems, and to guarantee all women and girls access to contraceptives and safe abortions.	它毫无疑问是所有国家的警钟：必须重建和强化公共卫生系统，并保证所有妇女和女孩获得避孕和安全堕胎。


Women and girls around the world know the alternative – and it is terrifying.	全世界妇女和女孩都知道否则的话会怎样——令人颤抖。


Zimbabwe\u0027s Last Chance	津巴布韦的最后机会


As the world rooted for former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in his recent efforts to end the violence in Kenya, many also found themselves wondering whether a weary Annan, or some other global leader, will be battling another fire by the end of this month: this time in Zimbabwe.	尽管全世界都大力支持联合国前秘书长安南最近为结束肯尼亚的暴乱而进行的努力，但是许多人还是不禁会疑问疲倦的安南或者另一位世界领导人能够扑灭这个月底将会发生的另一场大火吗？ 这一次是在津巴布韦。


Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections, scheduled for March 29, offer both fear and hope to the millions trapped in or trying to escape the country’s hellish conditions.	津巴布韦将于3月29日举行的大选给数百万深陷于或者试图逃脱这个国家可怕的环境的人们既带来了担忧，也带来了希望。


Even official data now put the inflation rate at more than 100,000%, and the plight of ordinary Zimbabweans grows more desperate by the day.	即便根据官方的数据，那里的通货膨胀率也超过了100000%，而普通的津巴布韦人所面临的困境正在日益加剧。


The elections could bring Zimbabweans a chance to end the long dictatorship of President Robert Mugabe.	大选可以使津巴布韦人有机会终结穆加贝长期的独裁统治。


But, without supervision, they will be held in an environment that could dash Zimbabweans’ hopes.	但是在没有监督的情况下，津巴布韦人的希望很有可能会破灭。


Zimbabweans are denied their basic freedoms and subjected to violence.	津巴布韦人被剥夺了基本的自由，并且受到暴力迫害。


Torture is widespread.	滥用酷刑的现象非常普遍。


Civil society groups report the arrests of opposition electoral candidates, the manipulation of food supplies for political purposes, and violent incidents of voter intimidation.	民间社会团体报告说有反对派的候选人被拘捕、为了政治目的而控制食品的供应以及对威胁选民的暴力事件比比皆是。


The Zimbabwe Election Support Network has also expressed concern about the country’s state of readiness for this complex election, which will combine presidential, parliamentary, senatorial, and local government contests.	津巴布韦选举支持网络同样也对这个国家是否准备好迎接这场复杂的选举表示了担心。 这次选举将会选出总统、议会、参议员以及地方政府。


And this is to say nothing of the structural faults that continue to impede political progress – a defective constitution, censored media, and a partisan security and military establishment.	更别提继续阻碍政治进程的结构性缺陷了，包括有缺陷的宪法、受到严格审查的媒体以及党派的安全和军事力量了。


It didn’t have to be this way.	但是情况并非没有机会改变。


This past year has seen one missed opportunity after another.	过去的一年我们看到一个又一个的机会从我们的身边溜走了。


South African president Thabo Mbeki convened negotiations with Zimbabwe’s political groups; but they have been so unfruitful that opposition leaders recently all but accused Mbeki of lying to the world about the progress of the talks.	南非总统姆贝基召集津巴布韦的政治团体进行和谈，但是如此没有成果以致最近反对派领导人一致指责姆贝基在和谈进程的问题对世界撒了谎。


Some African leaders – notably Ghana’s president, John Kufuor, and outgoing African Union head Alpha Konare – have tried to cajole Mugabe towards reform, to no avail.	一些非洲领导人，主要的有加纳总统库福尔和现任非盟主席科纳雷试图劝说穆加贝进行改革，但是都无功而返。


Perhaps more significantly, the international community’s failure to address Zimbabwe seriously shows, once again, that it lacks the political will to prevent foreseeable crises.	也许更重要的是，国际社会没能站出来讨论如何处理津巴布韦的问题再一次严重地显示了它缺乏制止可预见的危机的政治意愿。


Last year, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour condemned the regime’s use of torture and its mistreatment of pro-democracy forces.	去年，联合国秘书长潘基文和联合国人权事务高级代表阿尔布尔严厉指责该国政府使用酷刑以及虐待民主力量。


Regrettably, the UN failed to follow up with institutional action.	令人遗憾的是联合国没有采取进一步的行动。


The UN would say it must be invited into a country before it can take certain forms of action, such as sending official election observers.	联合国也许会说它必须得到一个国家的邀请才能采取某种形式的行动，比如派遣官方选举观察员。


But it is also true that with adequate political will, the UN Security Council could live up to its responsibility to Zimbabweans by responding to the crisis more aggressively.	但是我们应该清楚，只要有足够的政治意愿，联合国安理会完全能够遵守它对津巴布韦人民的责任而对危机做出更为强有力的回应。


The UN should have put Mugabe on the defensive with a forceful public offer to help Zimbabwe prepare for internationally supervised elections.	联合国应该通过公开宣称愿意帮助津巴布韦准备一场受到国际监督的选举而迫使穆加贝采取守势。


Instead, the UN continues to defer to Mugabe, who hides behind claims of sovereignty while jailing a defenseless populace.	然而恰恰相反，联合国依然听任穆加贝为所欲为，他一面宣称主权不可侵犯，一面却在国内大肆拘捕手无寸铁的平民。


With so many lives at stake, what can be done to avert an intensification of the Zimbabwe crisis?	面对有这么多人的生命处于危险之中的状况，我们可以采取怎样的措施阻止津巴布韦的危机进一步恶化呢？


People of good will throughout the world, including those affiliated with multilateral organizations like the UN, should descend on Zimbabwe to observe this month’s elections.	全世界有良好意愿的人，包括那些在像联合国这样的多边组织工作的人，应该亲临津巴布韦观察这个月的大选。


Accredited or not, they should stand in solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe at this crucial moment, act as witnesses to the deteriorating pre-election environment, and serve as a bulwark against any escalation of state brutality during and after the vote.	不管有没有得到官方认可，他们都应该在这个关键时刻与津巴布韦的人民站在一起，作为不断恶化的选前环境的见证人，以及成为抵御投票期间和之后可能出现的任何国家暴力的升级的堡垒。


Mugabe would prefer to limit the presence of international observers to those sent by neighboring states – the same allies that somehow managed to deem the violent and fraudulent elections of the past seven years “legitimate.”	穆加贝肯定希望把国际观察员的存在限制在由他的那些邻国派遣的范围，那些邻国在过去七年那些充斥着暴力和欺骗性的选举说成是“合法的”。


Zimbabwe’s neighbors also face a choice: they can use their proximity to halt Mugabe’s abuses, or to shield him from international scrutiny and rebuke.	津巴布韦的邻国同样面临着一个抉择：它们可以利用它们的邻国地位制止穆加贝滥用暴力，也可以保护他免受国际监督和指责。


Their choice may depend on what the world demands of them.	它们的选择也许取决于国际社会对他们提出怎样的要求。


The people of Zimbabwe will play their part on March 29.	津巴布韦人民在3月29日这一天做出他们的选择。


As for the regional and world community, their actions today and in the coming weeks could make the difference between a reprise of the violence in Kenya and the first step towards a more stable and democratic future.	对于地区和国际社会来说，它们今天以及在接下来数周的行动将决定这里是否会重复肯尼亚的暴乱，还是朝一个更稳定和民主的未来迈出第一步。


Zimbabwe’s Permanent Guantánamo	津巴布韦的永久性关塔纳摩


JOHANNESBURG – Last week, the United States Supreme Court ruled that detainees at Guantánamo Bay have the right to habeas corpus – the right to challenge the factual and legal basis of their detention in a court of law. I was elated by the decision, having spent four years working on ensuring the rule of law in US detention and interrogation policy, including monitoring military commission trials at Guantánamo Bay. But my happiness is tempered by where I sit, close to the border with Zimbabwe – a country where the writ of habeas corpus and the rule of law have become obsolete.	我在过去四年时间里一直奔波，为的是确保美国的关押和审讯政策符合法治，包括监督关塔纳摩湾的军事审判。 但是，我现在身处津巴布韦边境，兴奋大为减少，因为这一国家的人身保护法令和法治遭到了践踏。


Habeas corpus, Latin for “you have the body,” is an old English common law principle incorporated into the US Constitution to ensure freedom from unlawful detention by the state.	拉丁文中的“人身保护”是英国习惯法的一个古老原则。 美国宪法吸纳了这一原则来确保人身自由不受国家的非法压制。


It was and continues to be a critical check against the imprisonment of individuals without oversight by independent courts.	它曾经是对在没有独立法院监督下拘禁人身的一个重要制衡，而且也将继续如此。


In Zimbabwe, this right – like so many other checks and balances – has been torn away by a repressive state.	在津巴布韦，这一权利如同其他许多制衡机制一样已经被专制国家所撕毁。


Just hours before the US Supreme Court ruling, Tendai Biti, the Secretary-General of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was arrested upon his return to Zimbabwe.	在美国最高法院做出裁决前几个小时，反对派民主变革运动秘书长彼迪在返回津巴布韦的时候被捕。


Despite immediate attempts by his lawyers to locate him, his whereabouts remained unknown for days.	尽管他的律师马上就开始寻找他，但是还是连续几天不知下落。


The police dismissed an initial court order demanding that Biti be produced before the court.	警方拒绝了法院最初要求把彼迪交付法院的命令。


After Biti was finally produced before the court days later, the government announced that he will be charged with treason – which carries the death penalty – for unofficially announcing the results of the March 29, 2008, elections.  Prior to his detention, Biti had responded to such allegations by stating that his only crime was to fight for democracy in Zimbabwe.	几天后彼迪终于出现在法庭，政府宣布将指控他犯有可判处死刑的叛国罪行，原因是他私自宣布2008年3月29日的选举结果。 在他被拘禁以前，彼迪回应这些指控说，他唯一的罪行就是在津巴布韦争取民主。


It is unlikely that he will be able to challenge the basis of his detention in an independent court.	他不大可能会在独立法庭质疑对其实行拘押的理由。


Since 1999, the MDC has offered a democratic alternative to President Robert Mugabe’s regime.	从1999年以来，民主变革运动对穆加贝总统政权提出了民主性的代替选择。


In the most recent elections, Zimbabweans made their choice known, despite serious obstacles and widespread repression, with the MDC’s presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, gaining more votes than Mugabe.	在最近的选举中，津巴布韦人们表达了他们的选择。 尽管存在严重阻碍和大规模压制，民主变革运动的总统侯选人茨万吉拉伊获得的选票超过穆加贝。


But, according to the vote counts released by the government after a suspicious month-long delay, the MDC’s margin of victory – 48% to 43% – fell short of the 50% required to avoid a run-off election.	但是，在经过一个月令人怀疑的耽搁后，政府公布投票结果，民主变革运动获得48%对43%的胜利，低于规定的50%，从而必须进行再次投票。


Biti is not the only MDC member to be “disappeared” for a period of time by Mugabe’s government.	彼迪并不是唯一在穆加贝政府统治时期“消失”的民主变革运动成员。


Over the past two years, police and government-supported paramilitaries have routinely jailed, beaten, and even killed MDC officials and suspected MDC members.	在过去两年的时间里，警察和政府支持的准军事部队时常拘押、殴打甚至杀害民主变革运动官员以及被怀疑是该运动的成员。


Last year, Biti was detained and beaten along with Tsvangirai and dozens of other MDC officials.	去年，彼迪和茨万吉拉伊以及其他十几个民主变革运动官员一同被拘押和遭到殴打。


The photos of Tsvangirai’s pummeled body led to an international outcry.	茨万吉拉伊遭到殴打的照片引发了国际社会的强烈抗议。


State-sponsored violence against the MDC and its supporters has escalated as the June 27 run-off vote draws near. Just weeks ago, Biti described the discovery of the mutilated body of Tonderai Ndira, an MDC youth leader.	随着6月27日再次投票的临近，针对民主变革运动及其支持者的由国家支持的暴力行为升级了。 仅仅在几个星期以前，彼迪讲述发现了民主变革运动青年领导人尼拉被肢解的尸体。


Ndira had been taken by the police from his home.	尼拉在家中被警察带走。 他失踪七天。


He was missing for seven days; when his body was found, it was recognizable only by a bracelet he always wore.	当他的尸体被发现的时候，人们只能从他总是戴着的手镯辨认出来。


Here in our offices in Johannesburg, we have two Zimbabwean lawyers who fled their country after receiving death threats for their work defending human rights.	在我们位于约翰内斯堡的办事处里有两位津巴布韦律师。 他们由于维护人权的工作而收到了死亡威胁，逃离了他们的国家。


At least five of their clients have been murdered in the past few weeks.	至少有五名他们的客户在过去两周内被谋杀。


Most recently, the Zimbabwean police suspended the work of numerous human rights organizations that were documenting the recent violence.	最近，津巴布韦警察中止了众多记录最近暴力事件的人权组织的工作。


It is hard to imagine that a free and fair election can take place against the backdrop of such intense and systemic violence.	很难想像在这样一种紧张而又系统化的暴力背景下可以举行自由公正的选举。


Indeed, even South African president Thabo Mbeki, who, despite an outcry from many of his citizens, has supported Mugabe, felt compelled to label it a “cause for serious concern.”	南非总统姆贝基过去不顾其人民的强烈反对支持穆加贝。 实际上连他也感到不得不把这一事态称为“令人严重关切”。


In the majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush , Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that “Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.”	美国最高法院法官肯尼迪在其布梅迪艾内诉布什一案中的多数意见中写到：“自由和安全可以两全； 在美国的体制中这二者在法律的框架内得以两全”。


But there is no rule of law left in Zimbabwe – no habeas corpus and no check on arbitrary state action.	但是津巴布韦已经没有了法治，没有了人身保护，也没有了对专制国家行为的制衡。


It is time for the international community to step in, call for an end to the detention and disappearance of MDC officials and perceived supporters, and push for a democratic transition in Zimbabwe.	现在国际社会应该干预，呼吁结束拘押民主变革运动官员及其支持者及其消亡，并且推动津巴布韦的民主转型。


Only then can the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s decision come within reach of ordinary Zimbabweans.	只有这样，普通津巴布韦人民才会享有最高法院决定中的原则基础。


Zoellick to the Rescue?	佐利克能否力挽狂澜？


Will newly anointed World Bank President Robert Zoellick be able to get the organization back on its feet after the catastrophic failed presidency of Paul Wolfowitz?	沃尔福威茨铩羽而归，刚刚获得任命的行长佐利克能否收拾世界银行的残局？


Although hardly a megawatt star of the Bob Rubin category, he certainly brings some positive attributes to the job.	尽管佐利克无法与明星级的鲁宾相提并论，但是他肯定给这一职位带来了某些积极的特点。


First, as a key player in bringing China into the World Trade Organization, Zoellick is a proven internationalist in an American administration where internationalists have sometimes seemed like an endangered species.	首先，佐利克是将中国带入世界贸易组织的关键人物。 在布什政府中，国际主义者有时候看起来像是濒危物种，而佐利克就是一位确定无疑的国际主义者。


Second, he is a firm believer in the power of markets and free trade, which have clearly done far more to alleviate poverty over the past half-century than any aid program.	第二，他坚信市场和自由贸易的力量，而这两者在过去本个世纪中在减轻贫困上发挥的作用明显要比任何援助项目都大。


Third, he seems to have been a consistent behind-the-scenes supporter of the Bank, whereas many of his Bush administration colleagues would be just as happy to see it shut down and its Washington headquarters turned into private condominiums and offices.	第三，他看起来好像是世界银行一贯的幕后支持者，而他的布什政府中的许多同僚巴不得把世界银行关闭，把银行的华盛顿总部改造成私人公寓和办公室。


So presumably he has a constructive vision for the Bank’s future.	所以他理应对银行的未来具有建设性的远见。


But Zoellick is not without his weaknesses.	但是佐利克也并非完人。


First and foremost, his appointment extends the embarrassingly outmoded practice of always installing an American in the job.	最为重要的是，这一任命延续了总是把一个美国人安插在这一位置上的令人难堪的过时做法。


With the Bank tirelessly preaching the merits of good governance, its failure to adopt democratic principles undercuts its own legitimacy.	尽管世界银行不知疲倦地宣扬良好管理价值，但是它不采纳民主原则却破坏了它自身的合法性。


The claim that the World Bank needs an American president to ensure that the US keeps donating money is ridiculous.	那种宣称世界银行需要一个美国人担任行长来确保美国继续捐款的说法是荒谬的。


The annual cost of the US contribution to the World Bank, even taking into account off-the-books loan guarantees, is relatively minor.	美国给世界银行的年度捐款即使加上不在册的贷款保证也是相对少的。


Any number of developing countries, from China to India to Brazil, could easily step up if the US foolishly stepped down.	如果美国愚蠢地退出，从中国、印度到巴西的任何发展中国家都可以轻松地增加拨款。


Zoellick’s background as a lawyer hardly makes him perfect for the job, either.	而且，佐利克的律师背景也很难让他成为完美的人选。


The World Bank presidency is not about negotiating treaties, as Zoellick did when he was US Trade Representative.	世界银行行长并不是像佐利克担任美国贸易代表那样谈判条约。