With Trump’s election (and given America’s checkered foreign-policy legacy), we must discard this belief.	现在特朗普当选（鉴于美国多变的外交政策传统），我们必须抛弃这样的认知。


The EU should treat Trump’s election as a wake-up call to take charge of its own destiny.	欧盟应当将特朗普当选作为掌握自己命运的警钟。


Ongoing conflicts, such as Syria’s bloody civil war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine, directly affect EU member states’ security, economies, and societies.	持续不断的冲突，如叙利亚血腥内战和俄罗斯吞并克里米亚、干涉东乌克兰，直接影响着欧盟成员国的安全、经济和社会。


Yet Russians and Americans, rather than Europeans, have so far determined Ukraine’s fate, as well as the fate of other European borderlands.	但迄今为止是俄国人和美国人，而不是欧洲人，决定着乌克兰和其他欧洲边境地区的命运。


The EU has, as a result, forfeited ultimate control of its own security, trade relations, and migrant flows.	结果是欧盟彻底放弃了对自身安全、贸易关系和移民迁徙的掌控。


In 2014, a revealing conversation between US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and former US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt was leaked and posted online.	2014年，美国负责欧洲及欧亚事务的助理国务卿维多利亚·纽兰和前任驻乌克兰大使乔弗雷·皮亚特一段很能说明问题的谈话遭到泄漏并在网上曝光。


Discussing the US response in Ukraine – after former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych had fled to Russia – Nuland says, “Fuck the EU.”	在谈到美国在乌克兰前总统维克托·亚努科维奇逃往俄罗斯后所采取的对策时纽兰说，“去他的欧盟”。


This is an attitude that Europe has enabled.	纽兰这样的态度是欧洲自己造成的。


While it was bad enough to hear such sentiments expressed by an Obama administration official, one can only imagine what we will encounter under Trump, who might not even bother to appoint an official for “Europe and Eurasian Affairs.”	虽然听到奥巴马内阁官员这样的情绪表露已经糟糕透顶，我们甚至无法想象在特朗普治下会发生什么，特朗普甚至可能都不想费神任命一位官员负责“欧洲和欧亚事务”。


This is why the EU can no longer wait to build its own European Defense Community and develop its own security strategy.	因此欧洲必须立即建立自己的欧洲防务区并制定自身的安全战略。


It should start by streamlining and expanding bilateral and regional relations, not least among and between the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, as well as between Belgium and the Netherlands, and Germany and France.	欧洲应首先精简并扩大双边和地区关系，尤其是在波罗的海和斯堪迪那维亚国家当中，此外还有比利时及荷兰、德国和法国。


All of these disparate relations must be united under a single European command, with common funding and a shared defense-procurement system.	所有这些各自独立的关系必须团结在欧洲的统一指挥下，拥有共同的资金来源和国防采购系统。


The EU must become independently capable of ensuring its own security. Anything less will be insufficient to secure its territory.	欧盟必须有能力确保自身的安全防务，否则将无法保卫自己的领土。


This is a difficult but vital decision that the EU has postponed for too long.	这个艰难但却重要的决定欧盟已经拖延了太久。


Now that Trump has been elected, it can wait no longer.	现在，特朗普当选总统，我们不能再继续拖延下去。


Trump’s Extreme Oligarchy	特朗普的极端寡头


WASHINGTON, DC – US President-elect Donald Trump is filling his cabinet with rich people.	华盛顿—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普正在用富人填充他的内阁。


According to the latest count, his nominees include five billionaires and six multimillionaires.	据最新统计，他的提名人选包括五名亿万富翁和六名百万富翁。


This is what is known as oligarchy: direct control of the state by people with substantial private economic power.	这是所谓的寡头：用强大的私人经济力量直接控制民有之国。


Given that the Republicans also control both houses of Congress – and will soon make many judicial appointments – there is virtually no effective constraint on the executive branch.	考虑到共和党同时还控制着国会两院——并且很快还会拥有多个司法席位——行政权将进入几乎不存在有效约束的状态。


In many instances – including the United States today – the initial reaction to such a government includes the hope that perhaps rich people will be good at creating jobs.	在许多例子中——包括当今美国——对于这样的政府，一开始的反应包括希望富人或许擅长创造就业岗位。


They made themselves rich, goes the logic, so maybe they can do the same for the rest of us.	这一逻辑认为，既然他们自己能够发家致富，自然就有可能带领我们其他人也富裕起来。


Hope usually dies last, but the incoming administration’s proposed economic policies are not encouraging.	通常希望最后都会死去，但即将履新的政府所提出的经济政策并不鼓舞人心。


The organizing principle seems to be to discard pragmatism entirely and advance an extreme and discredited ideology.	其组织原则似乎是完全抛弃务实主义，推行极端的、不可信的意识形态。


The central theme of Trumponomics so far has been swift and sharp tax cuts.	到目前为止，特朗普经济学的核心主题是迅速剧烈地减税。


But Mick Mulvaney, Trump’s pick to run the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is a prominent and articulate deficit hawk; he will have a hard time supporting measures that increase the national debt.	但特朗普的国会预算办公室（OMB）主任人选米克·莫凡尼（Mick Mulvaney）是著名的鲜明赤字鹰派； 他将面临支持增加国民债务的措施的艰难选择。


To some extent, tax cuts will be justified with overly optimistic projections regarding their impact on economic growth, as was done under President George W. Bush, with generally disastrous effects.	从某种程度上讲，减税可以用关于其经济增长效应的过于乐观的预测来论证，小布什就这么干过，结果带来了灾难性后果。


But there is a limit to how much pressure can be put on the Congressional Budget Office, which is responsible for providing credible assessments of the fiscal impact of new policies.	但负责为新政策的财政影响提供可信评估的CBO能承受多大压力是有限度的。


Trump seems determined to lower income taxes for high-income Americans, as well as to reduce capital-gains tax (mostly paid by the well-off) and nearly eliminate corporate taxes (again, disproportionately benefiting the richest).	特朗普似乎决心要为高收入美国人降低所得税，同时削减资本利得税（主要由富人缴纳），几乎取消公司税（同样主要是最富有的人群受益）。


To do this, his administration will seek to increase taxes on others, and now we are beginning to see what this will look like.	要这样做，他的政府需要找到办法增加其他人的税收，现在我们已经开始看到特朗普会怎么干。


People close to the president-elect are considering an import tariff, set at around 10%.	接近当选总统的人士正在考虑进口关税，水平定在10%左右。


This tariff will undoubtedly be presented to the public as a move to make American manufacturing great again.	这一关税毫无疑问将以让美国制造业再次伟大的政策的面目呈现在公众面前。


But a tariff is just another name for a tax that increases the costs of all imported goods.	但关税只不过是增加所有进口商品成本的税收换一个名目。


This could help a few firms at the margin – and presumably Trump’s team will highlight news stories (real or fake) about a few hundred or even a few thousand jobs being “saved.”	它有助于改善一些企业的利润——想必特朗普团队将大谈几百乃至几千个就业岗位又被“拯救”的（真真假假的）新闻。


But the cost per job will be high: all imports will become more expensive, and this increase in the price level will filter through to the cost of everything Americans buy.	但每个岗位的成本都很高：所有进口品都将变得更加昂贵，并且这一价格水平的升高将渗透到美国人所购买的一切东西。


In effect, the oligarchs will reduce direct taxation on themselves and increase indirect taxation on everyone – much like increasing the sales tax on all goods.	事实上，寡头们将降低自己头上的直接税，增加所有人头上的间接税——和增加所有商品的销售税的效果差不多。


Under any such proposal, the burden of taxation would be shifted from the better off to those with less income and little or no wealth.	根据这一方案，税收负担将从富人头上转移给收入较低、几乎没有财富可言的人的头上。


And that may be just the start of the negative impact on most Americans’ wellbeing.	而这很可能只是大部分美国人福利遭到消极影响的开始。


If Trump increases tariffs on imported goods, some or all of America’s trading partners will most likely retaliate, by imposing tariffs on US exports.	如果特朗普增加进口商品关税，美国的一些乃至全部贸易伙伴很有可能采取报复措施，对美国出口商品征收关税。


As US export-oriented firms – many of which pay high wages – reduce output, relative to what they would have produced otherwise, the effect will presumably be to reduce the number of good jobs.	随着美国出口企业——其中许多薪酬很高——降低产出（相对于原本的生产水平），其效果必定是好工作岗位数量下降。


Some countries – such as China – may deploy other punitive measures against US firms operating on their territory.	一些国家——比如中国——可能针对在本国经营的美国企业采取其他惩罚性措施。


The net effect will again be to reduce employment, both worldwide and in the US.	净效果同样也是降低就业，全球和美国都沦为受害者。


The world has had much experience with “trade wars,” and it has never been positive.	世界经历过多次“贸易战”，没有一次的结果是积极的。


Why would a group of American oligarchs pursue such a disastrous policy?	一群美国寡头为何要追求如此危险的政策？


The Trump administration is taking shape as a coalition of businesspeople who wrongly believe that protectionism is a good way to help the economy and market fundamentalists who now dominate the Republican caucus in the US House of Representatives.	特朗普政府正在成为一个由错误地认为保护主义有助于经济的商人和目前主导着美国众议院共和党领导班子的市场原教旨主义者组成的联盟。


Before Trump’s rise to prominence, the House Republicans were developing a set of policies structured around deep tax cuts, sweeping deregulation (including for finance and the environment), and repeal of President Barack Obama’s signature health-care reform, the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”).	在特朗普崛起前，众议院共和党就制定了一系列围绕深度减税、取消监管（包括金融和环境监管）和废除作为奥巴马总统招牌的医保改革——平价医疗法（“奥巴马医保”）的政策。


They were, however, resolutely in favor of freer trade – and the Obama administration’s plan was to enact the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade agreement with 11 other Pacific Rim countries, with substantial Republican support in Congress.	但是，传统上他们支持自由贸易——奥巴马政府��计划是争取国会中大比例共和党人的支持，以落实跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP，与其他11个环太平洋国家签订的自由贸易协定）。


Trump’s election has not changed the core House Republican agenda – in fact, it has brought that agenda’s architects into government, at OMB, at the Department of Health and Human Services, the CIA, and other prominent positions, with more likely to follow.	特朗普的当选没有改变众议院共和党的核心日程——事实上，他还将这一日程的制定者请入政府、OMB、卫生与公共服务部、中央情报局和其他重要岗位，其中大部分人将接受邀请。


As my colleague James Kwak explains in his new book Economism, their pro-market thinking has gone too far and is unlikely to lead to good outcomes.	我的同事郭庾信（James Kwak）在他的新书《经济主义》（Economism）中解释道，他们的亲市场思维走得过远，不可能带来好结果。


Selling Trump’s signature issue – protectionism – to the House Republicans was not easy.	向众议院共和党兜售特朗普的标志——保护主义绝非易事。


But now they have started to think about an import tariff as part of their tax “reform” package, they will all start to get on board.	但如今他们开始考虑将进口关税作为税收“改革”计划的一部分，以此打开局面。


And they will offer various strange justifications that deflect attention from the essentials of their policy: lower taxes for the oligarchs and people like them, and higher taxes – not to mention significant losses of high-paying jobs – for almost everyone else.	他们还将进行各种奇特的论证，将人们的注意力从他们的政策的本质上分散：为寡头和喜欢寡头的人减税，为几乎所有其他人加税——更不用说高薪岗位的巨大流失了。


Trump’s Monetary Conundrum	特朗普的货币之谜


NEW YORK – When Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the United States’ presidential election, the market’s immediate negative response was to be expected.	纽约—当特朗普在美国总统竞选中击败希拉里时，市场立刻产生了消极反应，这是意料中事。


But by the next day, the market’s downward turn had already reversed itself.	但第二天，市场的跌势便已经彻底反转。


US equities and bond yields rallied after Trump delivered a victory speech that seemed to signal that he was tacking to the center, which investors had originally expected him to do this summer, after he won the Republican nomination and entered the general election campaign.	美国股票和债券收益率在特朗普发表胜选演讲后反弹，演讲给人一种他将走中间道路的信号，而这正是投资者在今年夏天他赢得共和党提名、正式开始大选选战时对他的期望。


In his speech, Trump promised to be a president for all Americans, praised Clinton for her past public service, and vowed to pursue massive fiscal-stimulus policies centered on infrastructure spending and tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy.	在演讲中，特朗普承诺成为全体美国人的总统，他赞扬克林顿过去所做出的公共服务，承诺采取大规模财政刺激政策，以基础设施支出和为公司和富人减税为核心。


Markets will give Trump the benefit of the doubt, for now; but investors are now watching whom he appoints to his administration, what shape his fiscal policies actually take, and what course he charts for monetary policy.	眼下，市场采取了疑点利益归于被告的立场； 但投资者正在观察他会怎样任命政府，他的财政政策会以何面目出现，以及他会采取怎样的货币政策。


They may be watching monetary policy most closely.	他们最关注的也许是货币政策。


During his campaign, Trump threatened the US Federal Reserve’s independence, and heaped criticism on Fed Chair Janet Yellen.	在选战期间，特朗普威胁要取消美联储的独立性，并大肆抨击美联储主席耶伦。


But Trump is a real-estate mogul, so we cannot immediately assume that he is a true monetary-policy hawk, and not a closet dove.	但特朗普乃房地产大亨，我们不可就此认定他是正宗的货币政策鹰派，而不是隐藏的鸽派。


His campaign rhetoric may have been directed at the Republican Party base, which is full of Fed-bashing gold bugs.	他的竞选修辞看上去像是为了迎合充斥着反美联储的黄金信徒的共和党基层


Trump could appoint hawks to the two Fed Board seats that are currently vacant, and he will certainly replace Yellen when her term expires in 2018.	特朗普可以任命两位鹰派填补美联储理事会现有的两个空缺，而在2018年耶伦任期到期时，她肯定会被替换。


But it is unlikely that he will force her to resign before then, because markets would punish such an obvious violation of central-bank independence.	但特朗普不可能强迫她在2018年前辞职，因为市场将对这一明显有违银行独立性的动作予以惩罚。


Even if Trump does choose a hawk to replace Yellen, his appointee would be only primus inter pares on the Federal Open Market Committee.	即使特朗普真的用鹰派替换耶伦，他的任命也只是美联储公开市场委员会（FOMC）的“老大”。


Yellen’s successor would not be able simply to impose his or her view on the FOMC’s seven-member Board of Governors and five Reserve Bank presidents.	耶伦的继任者根本无法让自己的观点凌驾于由七名理事和五名联储银行行长组成的FOMC理事会之上。


While the Fed did resemble an absolute monarchy under former Chairman Alan Greenspan, it became more of a constitutional monarchy under Greenspan’s successor, Ben Bernanke.	尽管在前主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）治下的美联储确实像是实君制，但在其继任者伯南克（Ben Bernanke）治下，美联储变得更加像是君主立宪制。


Under Yellen, it might best be described as a democratic republic.	在耶伦治下，美联储可以说是民主共和制。


This transformation cannot be reversed: each FOMC member holds strong views about which direction monetary policy should take, and each is willing to dissent when needed.	这一转变无法逆转：每一位FOMC成员都对货币政策应该采取什么方向持有强烈的观点，并且时刻准备着在必要时提出异议。


This means that a radical hawk appointed by Trump could end up in the minority, and would be consistently outvoted by the FOMC’s dovish majority.	这意味着由特朗普人命的激进鹰派可能只是少数派，一直受到FOMC的鸽派多数的压制。


Of course, Trump may be able to change the Fed Board’s composition over time, by appointing new governors when Stanley Fischer, Lael Brainard, Daniel K. Tarullo, and Jerome H. Powell’s terms end.	当然，特朗普也许可以随时间改变美联储理事会的组成，在斯坦利·费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）、莱尔·布莱恩纳德（Lael Brainard）、丹尼尔·塔鲁洛（Daniel K.


But if he takes this route, the market will still police the Fed’s actions.	Tarullo）和杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome H. Powell）任期到期时任命新理事。


If continued low growth and low inflation do not justify rapid interest-rate increases, a hawkish Fed that raises rates anyway will face harsh disciplining by the market – and, by extension, so will Trump.	但如果采取这种方法，市场仍将对美联储的行动作出裁决。 如果持续低增长和低通胀不支持快速提高利率，那么无论如何都要加息的鹰派美联储仍将面临严格的市场约束——推而广之，特朗普亦然。


Moreover, premature and excessive hawkishness would strengthen the US dollar and sharply increase the US trade deficit, undermining Trump’s stated goal of creating jobs and boosting incomes for his blue-collar, working-class electoral base.	此外，过早和过度转向鹰派将导致美元升值、大幅增加美国贸易赤字，不利于特朗普明确表示的为其蓝领工作阶级票仓创造就业和提高收入的目标。


If Trump cares about his base – or if he at least wants to avoid a political backlash from it – he should appoint dovish Fed governors who will favor easy-money policies that weaken the dollar.	如果特朗普在乎他的票仓——或者他至少希望避免这一政治后院不失火���—他就应该任命支持让美元走弱的宽松货币政策的鸽派美联储理事。


Ironically, President Barack Obama’s appointees, such as Brainard and Tarullo, are actually ideal for Trump’s agenda.	讽刺的是，奥巴马总统的任命——如布莱恩纳德和塔鲁洛——实际上是特朗普日程的理想人选。


If Trump does choose a more hawkish monetary-policy approach, it will have an ambiguous impact on the dollar, owing to his other proposals’ downstream effects.	如果特朗普真的选择更加鹰派的货币政策方针，其对美元的影响是模糊的，因为他的其他方案会产生贬值效应。


Looser fiscal policy and tighter monetary policy should, as in former President Ronald Reagan’s first term, strengthen the dollar; but if Trump pushes the US toward protectionism, he will generate economic and geopolitical tail risks that would weaken the dollar and increase US country risk.	更加宽松的财政政策和更加紧缩的货币政策应该如同里根总统的第一个任期那样让美元升值； 但如果特朗普采取更多的保护主义，就会带来经济和地缘政治尾部风险，从而让美元贬值并增加美国国家风险。


Similarly, Trump’s fiscal policies would also weaken the dollar over time – after an initial significant appreciation – as the substantially higher deficit spending would be financed either with easy money or bond issues that increase US sovereign risk.	类似地，特朗普的财政政策也将逐渐让美元贬值——在此之前则会出现显著升值——因为大幅增加的赤字支出要么通过宽松的货币融资，要么通过导致美国主权风险上升的债券发行融资。


The net impact of all these factors on the dollar will all depend on how loose fiscal policy becomes, and on how tight monetary policy becomes.	所有这些因素对美元的净影响将完全取决于财政政策会变得多么宽松，以及货币政策会变得多么紧缩。


Trump’s proposed policy mix would also have an ambiguous – and modest – impact on growth, if he appoints hawks to the Fed.	特朗普的政策方案组合对增长的影响也十分模糊——并且不会很大，如果他任命鹰派进入美联储的话。


Looser fiscal policy would help short-term economic growth; but tighter monetary policy would undercut those gains.	更加宽松的财政政策将有助于短期经济增长； 但更加紧缩的货币政策将破坏这些收益。


Similarly, if Trump really does want to redistribute some income from capital to labor, and from corporate profits to wages (admittedly a big “if”), his policies could boost consumption; but his populist, protectionist policies would undermine business confidence, and thus capital expenditures, while reducing consumers’ purchasing power through higher inflation.	类似地，如果特朗普真的想让一些收入从资本流向劳动力，以及从公司利润流向工资（诚然，这绝对只是“如果”），那么他的政策可以提振消费； 但他的民粹主义、保护主义政策将破坏企业信心，从而影响资本支出，同时也通过提高通胀限制消费者的购买力。


Equity markets will undoubtedly favor Trump’s proposals to loosen fiscal policy, deregulate business and finance, and cut taxes.	毫无疑问，股票市场将欢迎特朗普放松财政政策、企业和金融去监管以及减税的方案。


But investors will be on the lookout for protectionism, Wall Street- and immigrant-bashing, and overly aggressive monetary hawkishness.	但投资者也将仔细观察保护主义倾向、打击华尔街和移民的政策，以及过于强硬的货币鹰派立场。


Only time – and the market – will tell if Trump has struck the right balance.	只有时间——以及市场——能告诉我们特朗普是否实现了正确的平衡。


Trump’s Italian Prototype	特朗普的意大利原型


TOKYO – The rise of billionaire Donald Trump in the US presidential race has been met with a mixture of horror and fascination.	东京——人们以混杂着恐惧和迷恋的复杂情绪注视着亿万富翁唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统竞选中崛起。


As his campaign, once regarded with derision, continues to rack up successes – most recently, in the Michigan and Mississippi primaries and the Hawaii caucus – pundits are scrambling for some historical or foreign analogue that can shed light on the phenomenon.	虽曾一度被人嘲笑，但随着其竞选活动近来在密歇根和密西西比州初选及夏威夷党团会议上继续取得成功，权威人士都争先恐后地寻找某些历史或国外类似案例，以求能够解释这种现象。


While no comparison is perfect, the most apt comparison is with Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian media mogul who has served three terms as his country’s prime minister.	虽然没有那种比较是完美的，但最贴切的莫过于将特朗普比作贝卢斯科尼，这位意大利媒体大亨在国内连续三届担任总理。


It is not a reassuring model.	这并不是个让人放心的比喻。


Of course, Berlusconi and Trump share some superficial similarities, including multiple marriages and a generally vulgar style.	当然，贝卢斯科尼和特朗普表面看来有些相似之处，包括有过多次婚姻和总体格调低俗。


But the most important – and the most worrying – qualities they share is an ability to substitute salesmanship for substance, a willingness to tell bald-faced lies in pursuit of publicity and advantage, and an eagerness to intimidate critics into silence.	但最重要——同时也最令人忧虑的是，他们们所共有的特质包括以推销来替代实质、为宣传和取得优势愿意赤裸裸地撒谎，以及迫不及待地恐吓批评者让他们不再出声。


Berlusconi’s policy platforms, even his fundamental ideology, have always lacked consistency.	贝卢斯科尼的政策平台、甚至连他的基本思想从来就没有一致过。


During his successful campaigns, he said whatever it took to win votes; during his three terms in office, he used the same tactic to form coalitions.	在成功的竞选活动中，他为了赢得选票什么都敢说； 在三届任期中，他利用同样的手段组建了联合政府。


His only agenda was to protect or advance his own business interests.	保护和促进自身的商业利益才是他唯一的目标。


So far, Trump has followed much the same strategy, saying anything to grab another vote.	到目前为止，特朗普基本也采取了同样的策略，为了多赢得一张选票不惜什么都说。


The question is what this would mean if he were to make it to the White House.	问题在于如果他真的入主白宫，这将意味着什么。


The system of checks and balances established by the US Constitution has an unmatched capacity to prevent any single branch of government from going haywire.	美国宪法建立的制衡体系能够无与伦比地预防任何单一政府部门陷入失控。


But the manipulation of public opinion is a powerful weapon in any democracy, and it is a weapon that Trump, like Berlusconi, knows how to wield better than most.	但操纵舆论在任何民主国家都是一种强大的武器，而特朗普和贝卢斯科尼一样，比绝大多数人都清楚如何才能对其加以利用。


Berlusconi’s greatest successes – especially during his 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 terms (he also served in 1994-1995) – lay in the manipulation of media and public opinion.	贝卢斯科尼最大的成功——特别是在2001到2006年和2008到2011年任上（1994到1995年他同样担任总理）——就在于对媒体和公众舆论的操纵。


Though Italy is well known for low trust in government, with citizens largely resigned to the idea that virtually every public figure is self-serving, Berlusconi managed to numb the popular consciousness even further.	虽然众所周知意大利民众缺乏对政府的信任，大部分民众认为几乎所有公众人物都是为了追求自己的利益，但贝卢斯科尼还是成功地让大众意识进一步陷入麻木。


He somehow lulled Italians into believing that all was well in their economy and society, even in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, when plainly it was not.	他莫名其妙地哄骗意大利人相信他们的经济和社会一切都好，即使在2008年全球经济危机爆发初期局势明显很糟时也不例外。


Under his leadership, Italy lost many years when its government should have been pursuing critical reforms.	在他的领导下，意大利失去了多年时间，当时的政府本来应该推进重要改革。


How did Berlusconi achieve this?	贝卢斯科尼究竟是怎么做到的？


For the most part, he used the joke, the lie, and the smile.	多数情况下，他利用了玩笑、微笑和谎言。


When that didn’t work, he resorted to bullying, including through libel suits.	如果上述方式不起作用，他就开始动用包括发起诽谤诉讼在内的威吓手段。


In fact, few media tycoons – Berlusconi owns Italy’s main commercial television channels and several daily newspapers (either directly or through his family) – have ever been as freewheeling in their use of libel litigation to silence journalists and other critics.	事实上，几乎没有哪位媒体大亨比贝卢斯科尼更随心所欲地利用诽谤诉讼来让记者和其他批评人士闭嘴——贝卢斯科尼（直接或通过家人间接）拥有意大利主要的商业电视台及几家日报。


The famous Italian anti-mafia writer Roberto Saviano referred to Berlusconi’s “mud machine,” with which he would smear anyone who dared stand in his way.	著名的意大利反黑手党作家罗伯托·萨维亚诺称贝卢斯科尼的媒体为“抹黑机器”，他利用这些媒体对任何胆敢阻碍他的人进行诽谤。


(Full disclosure: As Editor of The Economist, I was the target of two libel suits by Berlusconi.)	（全面披露：作为《经济学家》杂志的主编，我曾两度成为贝卢斯科尼诽谤诉讼的对象。 ）


All of these tactics are in Trump’s inventory.	所有这些战术都进入了特朗普的武器库。


Trump is aggressive with his opponents, especially in the media.	特朗普在对手面前极具侵略性，尤其是在媒体上。


Throughout his business career, he has frequently invoked libel laws.	在商业生涯中，他经常会利用诽谤法。


If he wins the presidency, he has said, he will seek to control media criticism.	他曾表示如果他赢得总统宝座，他将试图控制媒体的批评声。


And yet his essential message is optimistic, delivered with a joke and a big smile.	但其核心信息是乐观的，采用了笑容满面和开玩笑的方式表达。


As Berlusconi has shown, when the population is feeling grumpy or disillusioned, as much of America is today, this approach can be highly effective – and for a very long time.	就像贝卢斯科尼的经历已经证明的那样，当民众感觉脾气暴躁或希望幻灭，就像今天美国大部分地区的民众一样，这种方法可以在很长一段时期内非常有效。


Some pundits who have invoked the Berlusconi comparison have highlighted one distinction between the bombastic billionaires: Berlusconi, they say, at least has some charm and much more business acumen.	以贝卢斯科尼为对比的某些权威人士强调这两位夸夸其谈的亿万富翁有一个不同：他们认为贝卢斯科尼至少有某种魅力，以及敏锐得多的商业头脑。


This assessment is not only far too generous toward Berlusconi; it also risks making it seem that Trump is less dangerous than his Italian counterpart.	这种评价不仅对于贝卢斯科尼而���过于慷慨； 而且还有可能使人对特郎普相对于其意大利对手的危险性估计不足。


The reality is that, while Berlusconi certainly has his charm, Trump’s swelling base of support seems to see a certain charm in him, too, even if it is a less seductive version.	现实情况是，虽然贝卢斯科尼肯定有他的魅力，但特朗普庞大的支持者群体似乎也在他身上看到了某种魅力元素（尽管特朗普的魅力可能没有那么富于诱惑）。


Moreover, while Berlusconi undoubtedly possesses business acumen, he has, like Trump, cut plenty of corners along the way.	此外，尽管贝卢斯科尼无疑具有商业头脑，但他和特朗普一样一直以来走了很多捷径。


The ties of Berlusconi’s close aides and friends to Italy’s various Mafia clans are well documented.	贝卢斯科尼的亲信和朋友与意大利各类黑手党组织的关系无疑有据可查。


But none of this is particularly important, in terms of its implications for the United States today.	但这些就今天对美国的影响而言都不是特别重要。


What is important is that both Trump and Berlusconi are ruthless and willing to resort to any means to achieve their (self-serving) ends.	重要的是特朗普和贝卢斯科尼同样冷酷无情，愿意采取任何手段来实现自己（自私自利）的目标。


Given this, underestimating Trump would be a huge mistake; he will always prove stronger, more slippery, and more enduring than expected.	有鉴于此，低估特朗普将是一个巨大的错误； 事实将证明他总会比人们想象的更强大、更狡猾，也更持久。


The only way to avoid Berlusconi-level disaster – or worse – is to continue criticizing him, exposing his lies, and holding him to account for his words and actions, regardless of the insults or threats he throws at those who do.	避免发生贝卢斯科尼级别的灾难——甚至出现更糟的局面——的唯一机会就是继续批评他、揭穿他的谎言，无论他对反对者如何侮辱或者威胁，都要求他对自己的言论和行为负责。


Too many Italians shrugged their shoulders at Berlusconi’s lies and failings, figuring that he would soon go away, having done little harm.	太多意大利人面对贝卢斯科尼的谎言和失败只是耸耸肩膀，心想他很快就会消失，不会带来多大害处。


But he did not go away, and he did plenty of harm.	但是他并没有消失，而且造成的损失非常大。


The US cannot afford to make the same mistake.	美国不能再犯同样的错误。


The price of liberty, Americans are fond of saying, is eternal vigilance.	美国人总喜欢说自由的代价是永远保持警惕。


In confronting Trump, there can be no discount.	在面对特郎普时，我们不能打任何折扣。


Trump’s Magical Economic Thinking	特朗普的魔法经济思维


WASHINGTON, DC – Donald Trump has finally put out a detailed economic plan.	华盛顿—唐纳德·特朗普终于拿出了详细的经济计划。


Authored by Peter Navarro (an economist at the University of California-Irvine) and Wilbur Ross (an investor), the plan claims that a President Trump would boost growth and reduce the national debt.	该计划由彼得·纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro，加州大学欧文分校经济学家）和威尔伯·罗斯（Wilbur Ross，投资者）执笔，宣称特朗普总统将提振增长、降低国民债务。


But its projections are based on assumptions so unrealistic that they seem to have come from a different planet.	但该计划的假定过于离谱，看上去不像是地球人写的。


If the United States really did adopt Trump’s plan, the result would be an immediate and unmitigated disaster.	如果美国果真接受了特朗普的计划，结果将是立刻发生如假包换的灾难。


At the heart of the plan is a very large tax cut.	该计划的核心是规模庞大的减税。


The authors claim this would boost economic growth, despite the fact that similar cuts in the past (for example, under President George W. Bush) had no such effect.	作者宣称，这将提振经济增长，尽管事实表明过去类似的减税措施（如小布什执政期间）并无此类效应。


There is a lot of sensible evidence available on precisely this point, all of which is completely ignored.	这方面有大量现成的合理证据，全部被完全忽视。


The Trump plan concedes that the tax cut per se would reduce revenue by at least $2.6 trillion over ten years – and its authors are willing to cite the non-partisan Tax Foundation on this point.	特朗普的计划承认，减税本身将导致十年内岁入至少下降2. 6万亿美元——在这一点上，作者也愿意引用无党派立场的税收基金会（Tax Foundation）。


But the Trump team claims this would be offset by a growth miracle spurred by deregulation.	但特朗普团对宣称用去监管化刺激增长奇迹可以抵消岁入的下降。


In fact, their estimates of the benefits of deregulation are completely exaggerated.	不幸的是，他们关于去监管化的收益的估算完全是夸大其词。


Serious independent analysis, for example by the World Bank or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, finds that the US does not have a high regulatory burden on the non-financial sector.	严肃的独立分析，如世界银行或经合组织的分析，认为美国非金融部门监管负担并不沉重。


In the World Bank’s widely used Doing Business indicators, for example, the US ranks seventh in the world – and there is not a lot of realistic room for improvement.	比如，在被广泛使用的世界银行营商指标中，美国位居世界第七——并且还有大量现实的改进空间。


Sure, some companies always like to complain about regulation, and exaggerated numbers regarding the impact of various rules abound.	诚然，一些公司总是喜欢抱怨监管，夸大各种冗余规则的影响数字。


But do you really want to base a country’s macroeconomic strategy on such meaningless claims?	但你真的想将一国的宏观经济战略建立在这些毫无意义的说辞的基础上吗？


At the same time, financial deregulation is exactly what led to the 2008 crisis – and to much lower growth, higher unemployment, and bigger deficits.	与此同时，金融去监管化正是导致2008年危机的原因，也是导致增长大大降低、失业增加和赤字膨胀的原因。


Trump seems determined to repeat all the big mistakes of the George W. Bush era.	特朗普似乎决定要重蹈小布什时代的所有重大错误覆辙。


My assessment is that Trump would run up much more than $2.6 trillion in new debt.	我的估计是特朗普将带来远多于2. 6万亿美元的新债务。


With regard to trade, the Trump economic plan makes no sense at all.	在贸易问题上，特朗普的经济计划也毫无是处。


The supposed increases in government revenue are based on an analysis that reads like word salad – I don’t recall ever seeing a document from a major party candidate that was so completely incoherent.	计划中的政府收入增加基于一项与文字游戏差不多的分析——我记不起来有哪位主要政党候选人拿出来的文件如此语无伦次。


As far as I can figure out, the argument is that Trump will magically make the trade deficit go away, and this, in turn, will miraculously boost jobs.	就我所见而论，其观点是特朗普将像变魔术那样让贸易赤字消失，并且这反过来又将像变魔术那样增加就业。


This kind of thinking should be confined to fairy tales; if it were actually tried in the real world, nobody would live happily ever after.	这种思维应该用来写童话，如果用在真实世界，每个人都得遭殃。


A few years ago, James Kwak and I wrote a history of US fiscal policy and the national debt – and called it White House Burning.	几年前，郭庾信（James Kwak）和我写了一本关于美国财政政策和国民债务的书，命名为《火烧白宫》（White House Burning）。


The historical reference was to the moment in 1814 when underinvestment in the federal government's military capability allowed the British to seize Washington, DC, where they burned most official buildings, including the White House (and the Treasury and Congress).	我们拿1841年作为历史参照点，联邦政府军力投入不足导致英军包围华盛顿，放火烧掉了大部分政府建筑，包括白宫（以及财政部和国会）。


But the broader point we were making is that, since the 1980s, the Republican Party’s approach to federal government finances changed.	但我们所提出的更广泛的观点是，自20世纪80年代以来，共和党的联邦政府财政方针发生了改变。


Instead of limiting deficits and debt, their top priority became cutting taxes – regardless of the consequences.	他们不再偏好限制赤字和债务，而将重点转向了减税——不管其后果如何。


Former Vice President Dick Cheney famously remarked, “deficits don’t matter” – meaning that there were no immediate political consequences of running a budget deficit and pushing up the national debt.	前副总统切尼（Dick Cheney）有一句名言：“赤字不重要”——意思是出现预算赤字和增加国民债务不会带来即刻的政治后果。


Under George W. Bush, US budget deficits and debt ballooned, and extreme financial deregulation created the conditions for the largest financial crisis since the 1930s, which further increased debt.	在小布什执政期间，美国预算赤字和债务大增，而极端金融去监管化为20世纪30年代以来最大的金融危机创造了条件，而这场危机进一步增加了债务。


Trump cannot tell the truth about the implications of his plan for the national debt.	特朗普不能说出他的计划对国民债务的影响的真相。


Instead, his team has constructed an elaborate and rather bizarre fantasy – building upon but also going far beyond several decades of Republican fiscal irresponsibility.	相反，他的团队构造了一个复杂而离奇的幻想——它建立在几十年来共和党财政不负责任的基础上并远远过之。


What would really happen is this: The big tax cut would help relatively few people, while also cutting federal government revenue sharply.	真正会发生的事情是这样的：大减税将帮助相对较少的人，但让联邦政府收入大幅减少。


Higher trade tariffs would raise the cost of imports, which would have a direct negative impact on ordinary Americans.	提高关税将提高进口成本，给普通美国人造成直接负面影响。


With trade wars breaking out, growth would decline, not increase – and the federal government deficits would be huge.	随着贸易战的爆发，增长将下降而不是上升——联邦政府赤字将十分巨大。


At the same time, financial deregulation would allow risks to build up throughout the banking system and more broadly.	与此同时，金融去监管化将导致风险在整个银行系统和实体经济中堆积。


According to the Wall Street Journal, no prominent economists have endorsed Donald Trump or lined up behind his economic plan.	据《华尔街日报》，尚无有名望的经济学家支持唐纳德·特朗普或为他的经济计划背书。


That is not a surprise: those economists have reputations to protect.	这毫不奇怪：这些经济学家可得珍惜羽毛。


If they signed on to Trump’s absurd plan, they would expose themselves to the ridicule of their colleagues.	如果他们在特朗普的荒唐计划上签上大名，将在同行之间留下笑柄。


More important, they would risk doing real long-term damage to their country.	更重要的是，他们可能让祖国遭受切实的长期伤害。


Slouching Toward Trump	步步为营靠近特朗普


LONDON – The Republican establishment has gone into overdrive to present President-elect Donald Trump as a guarantor of continuity.	伦敦—共和党建制派迫不及待地将当选总统特朗普呈现为延续性的捍卫者。


Of course, he is nothing of the sort.	当然，他绝不是这样的人。


He campaigned against the political establishment, and, as he told a pre-election rally, a victory for him would be a “Brexit plus, plus, plus.”	他在选战中挑战了政治建制派，并且在一次竞选前集会上说，他的获胜将是“英国退欧的加强版的加强版的加强版”。


With two political earthquakes within months of each other, and more sure to follow, we may well agree with the verdict of France’s ambassador to the United States: the world as we know it “is crumbling before our eyes.”	短短几个月中爆发了两次政治地震，并且后续肯定还有更多政治地震，也许我们得同意法国驻美国使馆的论断了：我们所熟知的世界“正在我们眼前崩塌。 ”


The last time this seemed to be happening was the era of the two world wars, 1914 to 1945.	上一次类似的情形发生在两次世界大战期间，即1914年到1945年。


The sense then of a “crumbling” world was captured by William Butler Yeats’s 1919 poem “The Second Coming”: “Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.”	当时的世界“崩塌”被叶芝1919年的《基督再临》（The Second Coming）所捕获：“一切都四散了，再也保不住中心，世界上到处弥漫着一片混乱。


With the traditional institutions of rule thoroughly discredited by the war, the vacuum of legitimacy would be filled by powerful demagogues and populist dictatorships: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst/are full of passionate intensity.”	”传统规则制度彻底被战争羞辱，合法性的真空被强大的煽动者和民粹主义独裁填补：“最好的人没人信，最坏的人充满激情。


Oswald Spengler had the same idea in his Decline of the West, published in 1918.	”斯宾格勒在1918年出版的《西方的衰落》（Decline of the West）中提出了相同的思想。


Yeats’s political prognosis was shaped by his religious eschatology.	叶芝的政治预言受其宗教末世观影响。


He believed the world had to wade through “nightmare” for “Bethlehem to be born.”	他相信世界必须通过“噩梦”消亡，以便“伯利恒诞生”。


In his day, he was right.	在他的时代，他是正确的。


The nightmare he discerned continued through the Great Depression of 1929-1932, and culminated in World War II.	他所看到的噩梦贯穿1929—1932年大萧条，并在二战中达到顶峰。


These were preludes to the “second coming,” not of Christ, but of a liberalism built on firmer social foundations.	这些是“再临”的序曲，不是基督再临，而是构建在更稳固的社会基础上的自由主义再临。


But were the nightmares of depression and war necessary preludes?	但噩梦和萧条是必不可少的序曲吗？


Is horror the price we must pay for progress?	我们必须付出恐怖的代价才能进步吗？


Evil has indeed often been the agent of good (without Hitler, no United Nations, no Pax Americana, no European Union, no taboo on racism, no decolonization, no Keynesian economics, and much else).	恶确实常常作为善的化身（没有希特勒，就没有联合国，没有美国治下的和平，没有欧盟，没有种族主义禁忌，没有殖民地独立，没有凯恩斯主义经济学，也没有其他很多东西。


But it does not follow that evil is necessary for good, much less that we should wish it as a means to an end.	）但这并不能说明恶是善的必要条件，更不能说明我们应该以恶为达到目的的手段。


We cannot embrace the politics of upheaval, because we cannot be sure that it will produce a Roosevelt rather than a Hitler.	我们不能接受剧变政治，因为我们无法确定它会产生罗斯福还是希特勒。


Any decent, rational person hopes for a milder method to achieve progress.	任何一位体面理性的人都希望能通过更加温和的道路实现进步。


But must the milder method – call it parliamentary or constitutional democracy – break down periodically in disastrous fashion?	但这条温和道路——称之为议会或宪政民主——必须具备定期崩溃的灾难性特征吗？


The usual explanation is that a system fails because the elites lose touch with the masses.	通常的解释是制度因为精英与群众脱节而失败。


But while one would expect this disconnect to happen in dictatorships, why does disenchantment with democracy take root in democracies themselves?	但既然我们能看到这一 脱节会发生在独裁制度下，那为何民主的祛魅会植根于民主本身？


One explanation, which goes back to Aristotle, is the perversion of democracy by plutocracy.	一个解释可以追溯到亚里士多德，即金钱政治颠覆民主。


The more unequal a society, the more the lifestyles and values of the wealthy diverge from those of “ordinary” people.	一个社会越不平等，富裕阶层的生活方式和价值观与“普通”人民的差距就越大。


They come to inhabit symbolically gated communities in which only one type of public conversation is deemed decent, respectable, and acceptable.	他们象征性地封闭的社区中，其中只有一种公共对话被认为是体面、值得尊重和可接受的。


This itself represents a considerable disenfranchisement.	这种情况本身就代表了穷人被剥夺巨大的权利。


To Trump’s supporters, his gaffes were not gaffes at all, or if they were, his supporters didn’t mind.	对特朗普的支持者来说，他的仪态尽失根本不是仪态尽失，或者说，即便这就是仪态尽失，他们也不在乎。


But it is economics, not culture, that strikes at the heart of legitimacy.	但位于合法性问题中心的是经济而不是文化。


It is when the rewards of economic progress accrue mainly to the already wealthy that the disjunction between minority and majority cultural values becomes seriously destabilizing.	当经济进步的收益主要流向已经十分富裕的群体时，少数和多数文化价值观的脱节就变得严重起来，形成动摇的效果。


And this, I think, is what is happening in the democratic world.	而我认为，这就是民主世界正在发生的情况。


The second coming of liberalism represented by Roosevelt, Keynes, and the founders of the European Union has been destroyed by the economics of globalization: the pursuit of an ideal equilibrium through the free movement of goods, capital, and labor, with its conjoined tolerance of financial criminality, obscenely lavish rewards for a few, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, and curtailment of the state’s role in welfare provision.	罗斯福、凯恩斯以及欧盟缔造者们所代表的自由主义再临被全球化的经济学所破坏：通过商品、资本和劳动力的自由流动追求���想均衡，以及与此联系在一起的对金融犯罪的容忍、一小撮人中饱私囊、高企的失业和半失业，以及国家在提供福利方面的作用的减弱。


The resulting inequality of economic outcomes strips away the democratic veil that hides from the majority of citizens the true workings of power.	由此造成的经济结果的不平等除去了民主的画皮，隐藏在大多数公民背后的权力的真实运作情况表露无遗。


The “passionate intensity” of the populists conveys a simple, easily grasped, and now resonant message: the elites are selfish, corrupt, and often criminal.	民粹主义者的“激情”释放出一个简单的、容易抓住的、现在引起广泛共鸣的信息：精英是自私、腐败的，并且常常还是罪犯。


Power must be returned to the people.	权力必须回归人民。


It is surely no coincidence that the two biggest political shocks of the year – Brexit and the election of Trump – have come in the two countries that most fervently embraced neoliberal economics.	今年两起最大的政治冲击——英国退欧和特朗普当选——发生在最热烈地拥抱新自由主义经济学的国家，这绝不是巧合。


Trump’s geopolitical and economic views should be judged against this background of disenchantment, not by an ideal moral or economic standard.	特朗普的地缘政治和经济观点应该放在这一祛魅背景下考察，而不是以理想的道德或经济标证衡量。


In other words, Trumpism could be a solution to the crisis of liberalism, not a portent of its disintegration.	换句话说，特朗普主义可能是自由主义危机的一个解决办法，而不是自由主义分崩离析的先兆。


Viewed this way, Trump’s isolationism is a populist way of saying that the US needs to withdraw from commitments which it has neither the power nor the will to honor.	从这个角度看，特朗普的孤立主义等于是以民粹主义的方式表达美国需要撤销它既没有实力也不愿意兑现的承诺。


The promise to work with Russia to end the savage conflict in Syria is sensible, even though it implies the victory of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	承诺与俄罗斯合作结束叙利亚的野蛮冲突是明智的，尽管这意味着巴沙尔·阿萨德政权取得胜利。


Disengaging peacefully from exposed global responsibilities will be Trump’s biggest challenge.	和平退出无险可凭的全球责任将是特朗普的最大的挑战。


Trump’s protectionism harks back to an older American tradition.	特朗普的保护主义可以追溯到更加古老的美国传统。


The US economy of high-wage, job-rich manufacturing has foundered with globalization.	美国的薪酬优厚、岗位丰富的制造业经济被全球化的浪潮所淹没。


But what would a feasible form of protectionism look like?	但可行的保护主义是怎样的？


The challenge will be to achieve stricter controls without beggaring the world economy or inflaming national rivalries and racist sentiment.	挑战在于实现更严格的控制而不是让世界经济“下跪”或煽动国家对立和种族主义情绪。


Trump has also promised an $800 billion-$1 trillion program of infrastructure investment, to be financed by bonds, as well as a massive corporate-tax cut, both aimed at creating 25 million new jobs and boosting growth.	特朗普还承诺了8,000—10,000亿美元的基础设施投资计划，该计划要通过债券融资。 他还承诺大幅降低公司税。


This, together with a pledge to maintain welfare entitlements, amounts to a modern form of Keynesian fiscal policy (though of course not identified as such).	这两个计划的目标是创造2,500万个新工作岗位和提振增长。 这与维持福利的承诺一道，意味着现代形式的凯恩斯主义财政政策（当然不会这样起名）。


Its merit is its head-on challenge to the neoliberal obsession with deficits and debt reduction, and to reliance on quantitative easing as the sole – and now exhausted – demand-management tool.	其好处在于这是与减赤和减债的死硬新自由主义挑战的正面碰撞，也是与量化宽松依赖症——将它作为唯一的需求管理工具，并且现在已是强弩之末——的正面碰撞。


As Trump moves from populism to policy, liberals should not turn away in disgust and despair, but rather engage with Trumpism’s positive potential.	随着特朗普从民粹主义转向政策，自由派不应该带着厌恶和绝望转身，而应该携手特朗普主义的积极潜力。


His proposals need to be interrogated and refined, not dismissed as ignorant ravings.	他的方案需要审问和精炼，而不是被驳斥为无知妄言。


The task of liberals is to ensure that a third coming of liberalism arrives with the least cost to liberal values.	自由派的任务是确保自由主义的三临以自由价值观的最小代价实现。


And there will be some cost.	总会有一些代价。


That is the meaning of Brexit, Trump’s victory, and any populist victories to come.	这就是英国退欧、特朗普胜选以及未来一切民粹主义胜利的意义。


Sustaining the Trump Rally	保持特朗普反弹


LONDON – Donald Trump’s victory in the United States’ presidential election surprised most of the world.	伦敦—特朗普在美国总统大选中胜出震惊了全世界大部分人。


But the president-elect is not finished defying expectations.	但这位当选总统最后并没有否定人们的预期。


Contrary to the predictions of many experts, stock markets have rallied strongly since his victory, with the three major US indices reaching record highs while the dollar has soared.	与许多专家预测的相反，股市在他胜选后强烈反弹，美国三大股指创下历史新高，美元也大幅升值。


Explaining these unexpected responses could provide a glimpse of what the next few months have in store for markets.	解释这些意料之外的反应可以让我们对未来几个月的市场略作窥探。


Before the election, most analysts predicted that a Trump win would trigger a large stock-market selloff and a rush into low-risk government bonds.	在大选前，大部分分析师预测特朗普获胜将导致股市大甩卖和争相买入低风险政府债券。


And, indeed, when the results began rolling in, that is what happened, beginning with Trump’s dramatic victory in Florida and gaining traction as his lead in the Electoral College grew.	而事实上，当大选结果出台时，从特朗普在佛罗里达大获全胜、选举人票优势不断扩大时，发生的正是人们所预测的。


By the time that lead appeared insurmountable, the Dow Jones index of US stocks had fallen by 800 points, and the broader S&P 500 was “limit down.”	当特朗普胜局已定时，美国股市道琼斯指数下跌800点，范围更广的标准普尔500指数“跌停”。


Moreover, the dollar began to slide, and a flight to quality in US Treasury markets caused bond yields to plummet.	此外，美元开始跳水，人们争相购入美国国债导致其收益率暴跌。


But market pessimism did not last long.	但市场的悲观没有维持多久。


Soon after the president-elect delivered his acceptance speech in New York, at nearly 3 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, stocks began to rally – and have ever since, helping to boost risk assets around the world.	东部标准时间接近3点时，当选总统在纽约发表了胜选演讲，不久，股市开始反弹——并且一直反弹到现在，引领全球风险市场上涨。


With capital pouring into the US, the dollar strengthened to levels not seen for some 13 years.	随着资本涌入美国，美元也升值至13年来所未见的水平。


In addition, many investors have abandoned the safety of government bonds, triggering a spike in interest rates even more pronounced than during the 2013 “taper tantrum” that followed former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke’s statement that the Fed intended to wind down its liquidity support.	此外，许多投资者抛弃了政府债券的安全性，引发利率暴涨，甚至比2013年美联储前主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）表示美联储倾向于逐渐降低其流动性支持时所引发的“削减恐慌”还要夸张。


Markets are now all but certain that the Fed will pursue an interest-rate hike next month.	如今，市场完全地确定美联储将在下个月提高利率。


The most likely explanation for the turnaround lies in Trump’s post-election remarks, which have focused largely on his economic agenda’s pro-growth features, such as deregulation, corporate-tax reform, and infrastructure spending.	这一转变最有可能的原因在于特朗普大选后的讲话——主要强调其经济日程中促进增长的特点，如去监管、公司税改革和基础设施支出。


Since the election, Trump has mostly avoided talking about his trade-protectionist campaign pledges, such as imposing punishing tariffs on China and Mexico, dismantling the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and rescinding America’s bilateral trade agreement with South Korea.	自大选以来，特朗普基本回避谈及其贸易保护主义竞选承诺，如对中国和墨西哥采取惩罚性关税、取消北美自由贸易协定（NAFTAS）、废除美国与韩国的双边贸易协定等。


Though he has reiterated his pledge to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that deal had not yet been ratified, anyway.	尽管他重申了退出跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）的承诺，但这一协议毕竟并未得到批准。


And he has also chosen not to repeat his criticisms of the Fed and its leadership.	他还避免重复对美联储及其领导层的批评。


This shift in focus has convinced markets that Trump may well decide not to follow through on the more growth-damaging measures he suggested during his campaign.	这一重点的转变让市场相信特朗普可能根本不准备遵循他在选战期间所提出的不利于增长的措施。


Trump has become far more conciliatory as well, telling the New York Times that he did not want to “hurt the Clintons” by appointing a special prosecutor to investigate his former opponent.	特朗普还变得更加具有妥协性，他对《纽约时报》说不想通过任命特别检察官调查他的前对手而“伤害克林顿家”。


Similarly, after years of criticizing President Barack Obama, Trump has spoken positively – even glowingly – about him.	类似地，在批评奥巴马总统多年后，特朗普给予了积极——甚至有些谄媚——的评价。


Similar tendencies can be seen in Trump’s approaches to his Republican campaign opponents, including House Speaker Paul Ryan and one of Trump’s most outspoken Republican detractors, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney.	类似的趋势还可见于特朗普对其共和党竞选对手的态度，包括众议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）和最直率的特朗普共和党内批评者、马萨诸塞州前州长米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）。


Given that Republicans won a majority in both houses of Congress and gained further ground at the state level, Trump’s détente with the party establishment bodes well for the enactment of his pro-growth policies.	考���到共和党参众两院都赢得了多数，并且在州级别选举中也大获全胜，特朗普与共和党建制派的关系缓和对于实施促增长政策十分有利。


Of course, to make faster and more inclusive growth a reality, thereby validating exuberant markets, more will be needed – namely, careful design, broad political buy-in, and sustained implementation.	当然，要想实现更快更包容的增长，从而带来繁荣的市场，还需要做更多的事——即谨慎的政策制定，广泛的政治认同，以及坚持不懈的实施。


Moreover, the team that will oversee that process has yet to be selected; like other appointees, its members could well face long vetting processes and, in some cases, confirmation challenges in the Senate.	此外，负责这一过程的团队还没有选定； 与其他任命一样，该团队成员很可能将面临漫长的审查过程，有的还会遭到参议院确认过程的刁难。


Once the team is in place, its members will need to figure out how to make Trump’s plans work for an economy that has – by necessity, not choice – been excessively reliant on unconventional monetary policies.	一旦这一团队就位，其成员需要找出如何让特朗普的计划在经济中取得成效的方法，美国经济无奈地——而不是出于主动选择——过度依赖于非常规货币政策。


The plan must recognize that, during this protracted period of monetary expansion, both financial markets and resource-allocation have been distorted, worsening wealth inequality.	特朗普团队的计划必须认识到，在这一漫长的货币扩张期内，金融市场和资源配置都被扭曲了，这恶化了财富不平等程度。


The good news is that the incoming administration can draw on measures that were formulated during Obama’s tenure, but which gained little traction because of the highly polarized and dysfunctional congressional politics that characterized most of Obama’s eight years in office.	好消息是即将成立的新政府可以利用奥巴马任职期间所制定、但因为伴随奥巴马执政八年大部分时间的国会的高度极化和瘫痪而几乎得不到落实的措施。


Such measures address imperatives such as infrastructure investment, tax reform, and job creation.	这些措施能解决诸如基础设施投资、税收改革和就业创造等当务之急。


But, of course, the US does not exist in a vacuum.	但是，美国显然不是存在于真空中。


External challenges must also be overcome – or, at least, contained – if the president-elect is to fulfill markets’ expectations.	外部挑战也必须克服——或者至少得到遏制——如果当选总统想兑现市场预期的话。


Developments in Europe, which faces a series of potentially destabilizing political events in the next few months, will be particularly consequential.	欧洲的发展态势尤其兹事体大，在未来几个月中，欧洲将迎来一系列可能造成动荡的政治事件。


Italy is about to hold a constitutional referendum that could result in the fall of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government.	意大利即将举行宪政公投，总理伦齐的政府可能因此解散。


The United Kingdom has to produce a plan to guide a credible and orderly Brexit process.	英国必须制定计划引导可信而有序的退欧进程。


In France, the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen will attempt to turn the upcoming presidential election into another anti-establishment upset.	在法国，极右翼的国民阵线（National Front）的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）将试图在即将到来的总统大选中掀起又一场反建制意外。


And, in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel will try to position herself to win another term next fall, in an environment that has been tripping up traditional politicians.	而在德国，总理默克尔将在明年秋天谋求连任，而她所面临的环境对于传统政客来说十分不利。


Notwithstanding the risk of instability in Europe, Trump is in a position not just to help boost growth in the US, but also to make it more inclusive.	尽管存在欧洲出现动荡的风险，但特朗普仍然有可能提振美国增长，同时也增加美国经济的包容性。


By pursuing a Congress-supported pivot toward a more comprehensive economic-policy stance, his administration’s policy surge could also spur the private sector to begin using its large amounts of cash not for short-term financial engineering, but for growth-enhancing investments in plant, equipment, and people.	通过争取国会支持的向更全面的经济政策立场的转向，特朗普政府的政策计划也有望刺激私人部门将大量现金从短期金融工程活动中抽出，用于刺激增长的厂房、设备和人力投资。


If the economic frustration that drove so many Americans to vote for Trump is to be dissipated during his presidency, and if the market gains are to be validated and augmented, this prospect must become a reality.	要想让促使大量美国人投票给特朗普的经济失望在任期中消失，要想让经济收益得到巩固和扩大，就必须让这一前景转变为现实。


America’s Failures of Representation and Prospects for Democracy	美国解释的失败和民主的前景


NEW YORK – As the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump approaches, the best way to assess the incoming administration may be to focus on the ultimate factors that led to his victory.	纽约—随着美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普就职典礼的临近，评估即将履新的美国新政府的最佳办法也许是聚焦于让特朗普赢得胜利的终极因素。


Trump was not elected in a vacuum, and, as his agenda takes shape, we can start to gauge its impact on the political economy whence his candidacy emerged.	特朗普不是凭空获胜，随着其执政日程的成型，我们可以开始看看它对于自特朗普成为候选人以来的政治经济学的影响。


Trump won by challenging the credibility of both the political and academic establishments, relentlessly highlighting discrepancies between their depiction of the United States’ political economy and the reality that many voters experienced.	特朗普的取胜之道是挑战政治和学术建制的信誉，不断地强调他们所描绘的美国政治经济与许多选民所亲身经历的现实之间的差异。


Like Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary, he started drawing large crowds by breaking ranks with his party’s mainstream.	和民主党初选中的伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）一样，他一开始通过与本党主流要人决裂吸引大众。


While Hillary Clinton and Republican rivals such as Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio tried to build coalitions based on cultural issues and partisan traditions, Trump and Sanders set their sights squarely on what mattered most to voters: a political economy in which elected officials strongly promoted a broad-based prosperity that included them.	在希拉里·克林顿以及杰布·布什（Jeb Bush）和马可·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）等共和党对手试图建立基于文化问题和党派传统的联盟时，特朗普和桑德斯果断着眼于选民最关心的事：当选官员强力推进包括他们在内的基础广泛的繁荣的政治经济。


How did the other candidates miss this central theme?	其他候选人为何会忽视这一核心问题？


My sense is that they didn’t; rather, their efforts to attract a broad spectrum of voters were constrained by a system that makes it extremely difficult to fund a credible political campaign without catering slavishly to the wealthiest sliver of American society.	我的感觉是他们并没有； 相反，他们吸引广大选民的尝试受到制度的制约，制度决定了如果不亦步亦趋地讨好美国社会中最富有的群体，就极难为可信的政治竞选活动筹集资金。


That system invited rebellion, and Trump and Sanders – by self-financing and grassroots fundraising, respectively – were ideally positioned to lead one.	这套制度不啻背叛的请帖，而特朗普和桑德斯——他们分别依靠自有资金和草根“众筹”——是理想的叛逆领袖。


The other candidates were also constrained by party orthodoxy, which has long kept Democrats and Republicans alike from willingly addressing the structural inequities in the American economy head-on.	其他候选人还受制于党派正统，长期以来，党派正统让民主党和共和党都无法心甘情愿地解决美国经济所面临的结构性不平等。


Doing so would require candor about such hard issues as technological disruption and globalization. It would also require confronting the legacy of decades of lobbyist-written free-trade agreements, regulations, bailouts, and tax policies that have been funneling economic gains up the income ladder, while imposing budget austerity in response to the needs of most Americans.	这样做需要坦率面对技术破坏和全球化等非常棘手的问题，也需要面对几十年来游说集团所写就的自由贸易协定、监管规则、援助和税收政策所留下的遗产——这些政策让经济收益向收入顶层集中，同时也收紧了响应大部分美国人的需要的预算。


The story Trump told of a “rigged” system resonated with voters more than anything they had heard from their political leaders in quite some time.	特朗普所谓的“受操纵的”制度在选民中所引起的共鸣要比他们在相当长的一段时间内所听到的其他政治领导人的东西都要大。


This points to a second, closely related misrepresentation: for many voters, the “expert” consensus about globalization does not ring true.	这引出了第二项密切相关的误解（misrepresentation）：对许多选民来说，关于全球化的“专家”共识听上去很假。


Economists, in particular, have touted free trade and global markets as an unalloyed good.	特别是，经济学家将自由贸易和全球市场吹得天花乱坠，简直有害利而无一害。


With few exceptions, such as Harvard’s Dani Rodrik and the Nobel laureate Michael Spence, none pointed out that many workers would be displaced and receive little or no compensation, and that rapid globalization can thus stretch a country’s social fabric beyond its elastic limit.	除了及少数例外，如哈佛大学的丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）和诺贝奖得主迈克尔·斯宾塞（Michael Spence），没有人指出许多工人将会被取代并且几乎或完全得不到补偿，并且快速的全球化可能让一国的社会弹簧伸展到弹性极限之外。


But any real expert on American political economy could see plain as day that the US would provide inadequate compensation to those disrupted by foreign competition.	但真正的美国政治经济专家一定可以清楚地看到，美国不会为受到外国竞争影响的群体提供充分的补偿。


Much of that disruption has come from America’s free-trade relationship with China, a very large country which has a far lower per capita income.	这一影响大多来自美国与中国的自由贸易关系。 中国是一个规模庞大的经济体，但其人均收入比美国低得多。


In fact, a recent paper by MIT’s David Autor and others shows that the social distress caused by US-China trade has polarized American politics, and probably increased certain voting cohorts’ support for “nativist politicians” such as Trump.	事实上，MIT的大卫·奥拓尔（David Autor）和其他人的最新论文指出，因美中贸易而引起的社会阵痛极化了美国政治，可能也增加了支持特朗普这样的“本土论政客”的选民人数。


In his 1922 essay “The Dismal Science,” H.L. Mencken suggested why economists would ignore the negative social effects that globalization can have on an advanced economy such as the US.	在1922年的论文《沉闷的科学》（The Dismal Science）中，蒙肯（H. L.


Such misrepresentations, Mencken argued, reinforce the power of those who already hold it.	Mencken）解释了为何经济学家会忽视全球化可能给美国这样的发达经济体所造成的负面社会影响。


Wittingly or not, experts know that they can curry favor and stay out of trouble by either keeping silent or affirming the policies that make the powerful better off.	蒙肯指出，这一误解加强了已经掌握了这一点的人的权力。 不管有意还是无意，专家们知道他们可以歌功颂德并通过保持缄默或为让权势人物更有权势的政策背书而置身麻烦之外。


But, eventually, something has to give.	但是，最终总要牺牲一些东西。


As wealth becomes ever more concentrated, a body politic suffering from widespread economic insecurity will begin to search for scapegoats – and the experts and pundits themselves were an ideal target this time around.	随着财富日益集中，饱受普遍的经济不安全困扰的政治共同体将开始寻找替罪羊——而专家和公众本身就是理想的目标。


This dual crisis of representation – political and intellectual – has become a toxic brew.	这一双重解释（representation）危机——包括政治和思想两方面——形成了一股邪恶合力。


Critiques of Trump’s policies gain no purchase with his supporters, because they come from experts who have lost their trust.	对特朗普的政策的批评根本不为他的支持者所接受，因为批评来自已经失去他们信任的专家。


This credibility deficit gives Trump latitude, but it also poses a challenge for him as he moves from campaigning to governing.	这一信誉赤字给了特朗普纵横捭阖的空间，但随着他从竞选阶段步入执政阶段，也给他构成了挑战。


As president, Trump will need to devise remedies to the social, economic, and political problems that he has described.	作为总统，特朗普需要为解决他所描述的社会、经济和政治问题开出药方。


But to do that, he will have to work within the same “rigged” system that he ran against, and he will have to craft policies that are actually feasible and will have a positive effect on Americans’ lives.	但要这样做，他就必须在他所反对的这套“被操纵的”制度内施展，并且必须制定实际可行并对美国人的生活产生积极影响的政策。


To be sure, the Republican-controlled Congress might work with Trump to implement a mini variant of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s.	诚然，共和党控制的国会或将与特朗普合作实施20世纪30年代罗斯福新政的迷你版。


But, without reform of the “rigged” system, it is likely that Trump’s proposed fiscal expansion will again disproportionately benefit the wealthy, without “trickling down” to the rest of Americans.	但是，不改革“被操纵的”制度，特朗普所提出的财政扩张很可能再次肥了富人而无法“滴灌”其他美国人。


“Public-private partnerships” have been championed as a means to direct capital toward a national rebuilding effort; but such measures can be manipulated, and often lead to “heads, I win; tails, the taxpayer loses” outcomes of the type that have benefited Wall Street and Silicon Valley in recent years.	“公私合作”被视为引导资本流向国家重建的手段； 但这些措施可能受到操控，并且常常导致近几年来让华尔街和硅谷大发利市的“赢了归我，输了归纳税人”的结果。


Surely this is not what Trump supporters were attracted to when Trump declared he would “Make America great again.”	显然这绝非特朗普支持者在特朗普宣布他要“让美国再次伟大”时所感到吸引的东西。


Twenty-three Democratic US senators (plus two independents who caucus with the Democrats), and only eight Republican senators, are up for reelection in 2018.	二十三名美国民主党参议员（以及其他两名与民主党立场相同的独立参议员）将在2018年改选，而面临同样局面的共和党参议员只有八名。


If the Republicans pass a Keynesian growth package in the next two years that tightens labor markets and raises wages, they could secure their grip on power for many years to come.	如果未来两年中共和党通过凯恩斯主义增长方案，收紧劳动力市场并提高工资，他们有望在此后多年中把持权力。


This, in turn, would enable them to appoint new Supreme Court justices willing to ignore or undercut women’s and workers’ rights, environmental protection, and public education.	这反过来又让他们能够任命愿意忽视或打压妇女和工人权利、环境保护和公立教育的最高法院法官。


Such an outcome, given Trump’s campaign rhetoric, would be farcical, if it were not so tragic.	如此结果用特朗普的竞选口号来说是荒谬的，也是可悲的。


Trump, a child of inherited wealth, now has a chance to define his place in history.	生于富贵之家的特朗普现在有机会青史留名。


Let us hope that he can rise to the challenge, imagine his role as one of repairing the flaws of American democracy, and not settle for presiding over a set of “deals” with, and for, the powerful.	但愿他能够直面挑战，将自己定位为美国民主缺陷的修正者，而不是一系列与权势者所达成并有利于权势者的“协议”的主持人。


An America that broadens economic prosperity and makes its political system more democratic will require reforms that reduce the power of money and increase responsiveness to citizens.	扩大经济繁荣、让政治制度更加民主的美国需要遏制金钱的权力、增加公民敏感性的改革。


Anything less would constitute a failure by Trump to honor those who brought him to power.	如果无法实现这样的改革，特朗普就辜负了让他问鼎权力的选民。


A failure to live up to America’s founding principles has long created a tension that provides impetus for the country’s political, economic, and social progress.	长期以来，无法坚守对美国建国原则所形成的紧张局面，总是能给美国政治、经济和社会进步带来动力。


If Trump refutes those principles – and if, in the despondency that follows, invoking them comes to be seen as a sentimental, romantic act – the price of the failures of representation that led to his election will be high indeed.	如果特朗普背弃这些原则——并且，如果在随之而来的沮丧情绪中坚持这些原则变成了多愁善感的浪漫之举——他赢得选举的解释失败的代价将极其高昂。


Trump and the Middle East Cauldron	特朗普和中东大甘埚


DENVER – One of the hallmarks of a presidential transition in the United States is a comprehensive policy review, aimed at determining which policies to retain and which to eliminate or change.	丹佛—美国总统交接的一大标志是全面的政策评估，其目标是确定保留哪些政策、撤销或改变哪些政策。


As President-elect Donald Trump moves toward taking office, he seems eager to make plenty of changes – some more positive than others.	随着当选总统特朗普即将入主白宫，他似乎急切地想要做出众多改变——其中一些比另一些更积极。


Some US policies seem destined not even to receive their day in court.	一些美国政策甚至等不到出台就要被扼杀。


The fate of the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement seems already to have been sealed, with Trump assuring the public that he would shelve that deal – concluded but not ratified by the US Senate – on his first day in office. This is unfortunate, as the TPP would have revolutionized intellectual property rights and boosted transparency to unprecedented levels, while lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers.	12个太平洋两岸国家之间的贸易协定似乎已经盖棺定论，特朗普向公众保证，他上任第一天就会搁置这个已经完成但仍有待美国参议院批准的协议


In another crucial policy area, however, change by the incoming Trump administration would be welcome: the Middle East.	但在另一个关键中策领域，即将上任的特朗普政府所做的改变是值得欢迎的。


The incremental approach to the region taken by the last two administrations, under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has meant that the US has failed to keep pace with events.	这个领域就是中东。 上两任政府——小布什政府和奥巴马政府——的渐进式地区方针意味着美国无法跟上事件的发展节奏。


The Obama administration, in particular, often hesitated to expand its role, anticipating a time when the US would not be absorbed in a region that, to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s line about the Balkans, had produced more history than it has consumed.	特别是奥巴马政府，其在扩大美国的作用的问题上常常表现犹豫，认为此时美国不能卷入这个——用丘吉尔平价巴尔干地区的话说——创造了比它消费的更多的历史的地区。


Nonetheless, Obama understood the value of maintaining a consistent stance in Iraq – something that his critics often fail to recognize.	尽管如此，奥巴马明白在伊拉克问题上保持一贯立场的重要性——而他的批评者常常没有这种认识。


The truth is that it was Bush who, having plunged the US into war in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2008 signed the Status of Forces Agreement that allotted three years to withdraw all US troops from Iraqi territory.	真相是，是布什——他让美国陷入了阿富汗和伊拉克战争——在2008年签署了部队地位协定（Status of Forces Agreement），根据该协定，美国要在三年内撤出所有驻伊拉克美军。


And Iraqi politicians would not agree to postpone that deadline on terms that could be justified to the American people.	而伊拉克政客也不会同意按照美国人民可以接受的条件中止这一期限。


One can only imagine the reaction of the US Congress, including those who wanted to keep US troops in Iraq as long as they have been in Germany or Japan, had the Obama administration agreed to Iraqi demands that US troops be subject to the Iraqi judicial system.	对于如果奥巴马政府答应伊拉克的要求——美国部队要受伊拉克司法系统约束——包括那些认为美国应该像保持德国和日本驻军那样保持伊拉克驻军的议员的美国国会会做出什么反应，我们只能想象了。


All of this left the Obama administration with little choice but to withdraw US forces – and take the associated blame.	所有这些让奥巴马政府几乎别无选择，只能撤出美军——并接受由此带来的指责。


Indeed, since that withdrawal was completed, the region’s struggles have only escalated, plunging an ever-larger area into conflict.	事实上，自撤军完成以来，该地区斗争升级，将越来越多的地区拖入冲突。


Trump and his team must now think carefully about what has happened in the Middle East, and what to do about it.	如今，特朗普及其团队必须仔细思考中东所发生的事情，以及如何应对这些事情。


This will require not just an investigation into region-wide challenges, such as Sunni radicalism, but also a careful consideration of bilateral policies.	这不但要求研究整个地区所面临的挑战，如逊尼派的激进化，也要求仔细考虑自由主义政策。


Start with the continued export of Sunni radicalism from the Arabian Peninsula, a complex issue that involves Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.	首先来看逊尼派激进主义从阿拉伯半岛持续输出的问题，这是一个复杂的问题，牵涉到沙特阿拉伯和其他波斯湾国家。


While extremist groups have traditionally received funding from the Peninsula, it is not sound policy simply to accuse the Saudis of incubating all that is bad in the Middle East, and punish them accordingly.	传统上，极端组织一直受到阿拉伯半岛的资金支持，但将中东乱局全然归咎于沙特并据此予以惩罚绝非明智。


While the US now enjoys greater energy self-sufficiency, thanks to shale oil and gas, that is not true of its allies in Europe.	尽管拜页岩油气所赐，如今美国的能源自给率有所提高，但其欧洲盟友并非如此。


Would a tougher position toward Saudi Arabia really be in America’s interest?	对沙特阿拉伯采取更强硬的立场是否真的符合美国的利益？


Nor is it wise to blame the Shia – who are, in many ways, the victims – for the onslaught of Sunni radicalism.	指责什叶派对逊尼派激进化负责也不明智——从很多方面看，什叶派是受害者。


The tough-minded Iraqi leader, Nouri al-Maliki, who won three terms as prime minister, may not have engaged in sufficient outreach to the country’s Sunnis, but that is only one reason why Sunni radicalism persists in Iraq.	坚定的伊拉克领导人、三次连任总理的马利基也许没有采取足够的措施与伊拉克逊尼派接触，但这只是逊尼派激进化在伊拉克持久存在的一个原因。


Another is that some elements of Iraq’s Sunni minority have refused to accept their status as the only Sunnis in the Arab Middle East to live under a Shia majority.	另一个原因是伊拉克逊尼派少数群体的某些派系拒绝接受他们是中东阿拉伯地区唯一一群生活在什叶派多数群体中的逊尼派。


Then there is Syria, now the main flashpoint of the region’s complex social and political dynamics.	然后是叙利亚，现在它是地区内复杂的社会和政治动态的主要导火索。


The civil war there is not just a matter of a ruthless dictator quelling the aspirations of a democratic-minded opposition.	内战不仅仅是因为残暴的独裁镇压民主反对。


Rather, it is a multi-sided conflict, in which identifying the “good guys” is no easy feat.	相反，这是一场多边冲突，从中识别谁是“好人”绝非易事。


The Islamic State (ISIS) is, to be sure, public enemy number one, and Trump has already recognized it as such.	当然，伊斯兰国才是头号公敌，特朗普也作如是观。


But how to eliminate ISIS not just from Mosul, but from the entire world, will require a thoughtful, subtle, and nuanced approach.	但如何不仅仅从摩苏尔、更要从全世界消灭伊斯兰国仍需要周到、细致、微妙的考虑。


Trump’s emerging national security team does not seem to understand this.	特朗普的新国家安全团队似乎并不理解这一点。


Moreover, defeating ISIS is just the first step.	此外，剿灭伊斯兰国只是第一步。


The Trump administration will also have to deal with the external actors involved in Syria.	特朗普政府还必须处理与叙利亚内战中的外部行动方的关系。


For example, it will need to devise an effective policy toward Turkey, a NATO member with strong interests in Syria – interests that, at times, conflict with America’s.	比如，它需要制定有效的土耳其政策。 土耳其是北约成员国，在叙利亚有很大的利益——并且有时候与美国存在利益冲突。


At a time when Turkish democracy is wobbling, and its leaders are less interested in Euro-Atlanticism than in reasserting century-old claims in the Middle East, the US will, again, need to adopt a tactful approach.	在土耳其民主岌岌可危、土耳其领导人对欧洲-大西洋主义的兴趣不及重新主张一个世纪前在中东的主导权的兴趣时，美国应该再次采取左右逢源方针。


Then there is Iran.	接下来是伊朗。


Is walking away from the Iran nuclear deal, as many supporters of the new US administration are demanding, conducive to easing the crisis in the Middle East?	退出伊朗核协议——许多美国新政府的支持者要求这样做——是否有利于缓解中东危机？


Iran may not offer much in the way of solutions; but, if the US abandoned the nuclear deal, the country could easily exacerbate the region’s turmoil.	伊朗可能无法在解决方案中做出让步； 但是，如果美国放弃该协议，伊朗可以轻易加剧地区动荡。


As if that were not enough, the US will also need to rethink its policy toward Egypt, which, until recently, often made important contributions to diplomatic efforts in the region.	好像这还不够似的，美国还必须反思其埃及政策。 直到最近，该政策常常对地区内外交政策形成重要影响。


Much of Israel’s security is based on an Egypt that supports the peace process with Palestine.	以色列的安全主要依赖于支持以巴和平进程的埃及。


As tattered as that process may look, there is still plenty of room for further deterioration.	尽管以巴和平进程已是满目疮痍，但仍有的是恶化空间。


Trump’s administration has often emphasized its plans to look inward, focusing on domestic policy and putting America first in foreign policy.	特朗普政府常常强调它的内向计划，聚焦于国内政策，在对外政策中则要将美国放在第一位。


But Trump will not be able to avoid playing a role in the Middle East.	但特朗普无法避免在中东扮演重要角色。


One hopes that it is a constructive one.	我们希望这个角色会是一个建设性角色。


Will Trump’s Plan Really Boost US Demand?	特朗普的计划真能提振美国的需求吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Ever since Donald Trump won the US presidential election, the press and financial markets have focused on his proposal to cut taxes and to spend $1 trillion on infrastructure over the next decade.	坎布里奇—自唐纳德·特朗普赢得美国总统竞选以来，媒体和金融市场便聚焦于他减税和未来十年支出1万亿美元用于基础设施的方案。


The expectation that these policies will increase aggregate demand has pushed up long-term interest rates by 50 basis points.	人们预期这些政策将提升总需求，这导致长期利率升高了50个基点。


But the assumption that Trump’s policies will lead to higher prices and wages doesn’t square with the details of his proposals.	但认为特朗普的政策将带来更高的物价和工资与其他的方案中的细节并不相符。


Anyone who listened to his speeches or read his campaign material should have noted that he was not proposing that the federal government should carry out the infrastructure investment.	只要你听了他的演讲，或读过他的竞选材料，就应该注意到他并没有提出联邦政府应该进行基础设施投资。


He was not calling for a Keynesian fiscal stimulus based on deficit spending.	他没有要求采取基于赤字支出的凯恩斯主义财政刺激。


Instead, Trump’s campaign called for a “deficit-neutral system of infrastructure tax credits” to provide incentives for private businesses to undertake projects to build roads, bridges, tunnels, airports, and so forth.	相反，特朗普的竞选材料提出“赤字中性的基础设施税收优惠制度”，以激励私人企业上马公路、桥梁、隧道、机场等项目。


Of course, it is not clear that Congress will agree to such large new tax credits.	当然，国会是否会同意这些规模巨大的新税收优惠尚不清楚。


And even if it does go along, there is no guarantee that businesses will respond as intended.	并且即使国会真的同意了，也不能就此保证企业一定会按照特朗普设想的那样做出反应。


Traditional investment tax credits have been used successfully in the past to encourage businesses to expand their capacity to produce the products they make and sell.	过去，传统投资税收优惠被成功地应用于鼓励企业扩大产能生产它们制造和销售的产品。


But how will businesses earn any revenue from owning roads, bridges, and tunnels?	但企业能从拥有公路、桥梁和隧道中收获什么收入？


And even when there are revenues to be earned, as there could be from airports, businesses might be deterred by the need to rely on long-term pricing agreements.	即使有收入可图——比如机场就可能带来收入——企业也有可能因为必须依赖长期定价协议而退缩。


It is also easy to fall into the trap of thinking of the tax cuts as a way to boost aggregate demand.	并且这很容易陷入将减税视为提振总需求之道的思维陷阱。


But congressional Republicans may insist on paying for the cuts in personal income tax by limiting the deductions that individuals now use to lower their tax bills.	但国会共和党可能坚持通过限制个人目前用来减少税单的抵扣项抵消个人所得税的削减。


The tax plan put forward on behalf of the Republicans by Paul Ryan, the speaker of the House of Representatives, calls for eliminating all deductions other than those for charitable contributions and mortgage interest.	众议院议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）代表共和党提出的税收计划要求废除除了慈善捐赠和按揭利息之外的所有扣减项。


That change would raise revenue equal to about 1% of GDP, enough to pay for very substantial reductions in individual tax rates.	这一变化将增加大约相当于GDP的1%的收入，足以抵消相当大幅度的个人税率扣减。


Ronald Reagan’s famous Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a supply-side policy designed to improve incentives, rather than a traditional demand-side policy designed to put more cash in people’s pockets.	著名的罗纳德·里根1986年税收改革法是一项旨在改善激励的供给侧政策，而不是旨在让人民兜里有更多现金的传统需求侧政策。


The Reagan tax plan used changes in deductions and other accounting rules to pay for major cuts in tax rates that lowered the top rate from 50% to 28%.	里根税收计划利用抵扣规定的变化和其他会计规则变化来抵消税率的大幅降低（最高税率从50%下降到28%）。


The lower marginal tax rates induced individuals to work more and to receive more of their potential income in taxable cash rather than in fringe benefits and other forms of compensation that are not subject to tax.	更低的边际税率诱导个人工作更长时间，让他们的潜在所得更多地以应税现金的形式而不是补贴福利和其他非应税报酬的形式获得。


If individuals had not responded to the changed incentives, the Reagan tax cut would have been revenue-neutral.	如果个人没有对激励的变化做出反应，里根减税就将是收入中性的。


But, because taxpayers did respond to the improved incentives, real pre-tax incomes rose and tax collection actually increased.	但是，由于纳税人确实因为激励的改善而做出了反应，真实税前所得出现了上升，税收也确实增加了。


The Republican Congress would do well to model the Trump tax cuts on Reagan’s supply-side policies.	共和党国会可以很好地在里根的供给侧政策的基础上设计特朗普的减税计划。


In the 30 years since the Reagan tax cuts were enacted, tax rates have increased substantially, particularly for higher-income taxpayers.	里根减税实施30年来，税率大幅提高，特别是对高收入纳税人而言。


The top rate has increased from 28% to 39.6% on wages and salaries, and to more than 43% on some forms of investment income.	工资和薪水最高税率从28%增加到39. 6%，某些形式的投资所得最高税率更是高达43%以上。


According to the Congressional Budget Office, the effective tax rate fell for most income groups in the 30 years from 1984 to 2013, but it rose substantially for the top 1%.	据国会预算办公室（CBO），在1984年到2013年的30年中，大部分收入群体的有效税率有所下降，但顶层1%的有效税率大幅上升。


More specifically, for households in the lowest quintile, the effective tax rate in 2013 was 3.3%, about half of what it had been on average over the previous 30 years.	具体而言，对于收入最低的五分之一家庭，2013年有效税率为3. 3%，大约相当于此前30年平均水��的一半。


Among the middle three quintiles, the effective rate in 2013 was 13.8%, down from an average of 16.6% over the three previous decades.	对中间五分之三的家庭，2013年有效税率为13. 8%，而此前30年平均水平为16.


For the next 19% of taxpayers, the effective tax rate fell only slightly.	6%。 对其上的19%纳税人，有效税率只是略微下降。


But for the top 1%, the effective tax rate rose 3.4 percentage points, to 34%.	但对最顶层的1%，有效税率升高了3. 4个百分点，达到了34%。


Against this background of rising tax rates and a shift in the tax burden to those with the highest income levels, it would not be surprising if Congress reduced the top tax rates and broadened the tax base in a revenue-neutral way.	在税率提高、税收负担向最高收入群体转移的背景下，国会以收入中性的方式降低最高税率、扩大税基不足为奇。


There is of course no reason to seek an increase in aggregate demand at this time.	当然，此时没有理由追求增加总需求。


The economy has essentially reached full employment, with the unemployment rate at 4.9% in October.	经济已经实际到达充分就业状态，10月份失业率为4. 9%。


The tight labor market caused the core consumer price index (which excludes food and energy) to rise 2.2% over the past year, up from 1.9% a year earlier.	趋紧的劳动力市场过去一年导致核心消费物价指数（剔除食品和能源）上涨了2. 2%，而此前一年的涨幅为1.


And production workers’ wages rose 2.4%, faster than prices.	9%。 生产工人的工资则增加了2.


The Federal Reserve can begin the process of raising interest rates in December without any need for an offsetting fiscal boost to demand.	4%，快于物价水平。 美联储可能在12月开始升息过程，而不需要抵消任何需求的财政刺激。


Trump Before Trump	特朗普前的特朗普


BERKELEY – Understanding the political success of US President-elect Donald Trump is not easy.	伯克利—理解美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的政治成功并不容易。


There have been many glib comparisons with populist politicians of the past, from Huey Long to George Wallace.	有人拿他和过去的民粹主义政客，如休·朗（Huey Long）和乔治·华莱士（George Wallace）等进行肤浅的比较。


But the most revealing comparison may be with an historical figure from another country: the British nativist firebrand Enoch Powell in the late 1960s and early 1970s.	但最有启发性的比较也许是来自另一个国家的历史人物：20世纪60年代末、70年代初的英国本土论煽动家以诺·鲍威尔（Enoch Powell）。


At first glance, the comparison might seem peculiar.	乍一看，这样的比较有些离奇。


Powell came from a lower-middle-class family.	鲍威尔来自中下阶级家庭。


He was a classical scholar of true erudition and a man of principle.	他是有真才实学的古典学者，一位有原则的人。


He was also a political insider, having served as Member of Parliament since 1950 and as the junior minister for housing in Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s government in 1955.	他也是政治局内人，从1950年开始就成为下议院议员，1955年出任首相艾登政府的住房大臣。


Still, the parallels with Trump are undeniable.	但是，他和特朗普的共同点不容否认。


In his notorious 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech, Powell, a skilled orator, broke decisively with the political mainstream.	在其臭名昭著的1968年《血河》（Rivers of Blood）演讲中，雄辩的鲍威尔与政治主流彻底决裂。


He decried immigration and denounced the Race Relations Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimination in housing, employment, and lending.	他谴责移民，批判禁止住房、就业和贷款歧视的1968年种族关系法。


The passage giving his controversial speech its name alluded to inner city riots in the United States and invoked Virgil: “Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood.’”	点明这篇颇受争议的演讲的主旨的段落暗指美国城市中心骚乱，并引用维吉尔的诗句：“如同罗马人，我仿佛看见‘台伯河河水尽赤’。 ”


Powell’s equivalent of Trump’s Mexican bogeyman was Indian and Pakistani immigration, which he portrayed as threatening the British way of life.	特朗普把墨西哥人妖魔化，鲍威尔口中的魔鬼则是印度和巴基斯坦移民，他说他们威胁到英国人的生活方式。


“Ordinary people,” he asserted, knew that the true number of immigrants was larger than official government figures showed.	“老百姓，”他说，知道移民的真实数字要比官方政府数字更大。


Powell went on to advocate large-scale repatriation of immigrants to their country of origin.	鲍威尔接着主张将移民大规模遣返回原籍。


The “Rivers of Blood” speech was denounced as evil by no less than The Times.	批判《血河》演讲最力的是《泰晤士报》。


But it won Powell a dedicated following among working-class voters experiencing hard economic times, discomforted by the “invasion” of their neighborhoods by Asian and Caribbean immigrants, and prone to conflate the two phenomena.	但该演讲为鲍威尔赢得了正在经历经济困难、不满于社区被亚洲和加勒比移民“入侵”、以及受这两种现象夹击的工作阶级选民拥趸。


Moreover, the parallels with Trump extend beyond hostility to immigration.	此外，鲍威尔和特朗普的共同之处不仅局限在对移民的敌意。


Powell was fervently pro-business.	鲍威尔非常支持商界。


He was a committed nationalist who rejected any and all foreign alliances that threatened Britain’s policy independence.	他是坚定的民族主义者，绝不容许对外联盟威胁到英国的政策独立性。


He implacably opposed joining the European Union (then the European Economic Community) on the grounds that doing so would compromise British identity and sovereignty.	他坚定不移地反对加入欧盟（当时的欧洲经济共同体），因为英国将因此妥协身份和主权。


He left the Conservative Party over the issue in 1974.	1974年，他因为这一问题而退出保守党。


Curiously, Powell, like Trump, was also pro-Russian.	有趣的是，和特朗普一样，鲍威尔也是亲俄派。


Notwithstanding his free-market principles, he appreciated the Soviet Union for its World War II sacrifices, its prideful nationalism, and as a counterbalance to other self-interested foreign powers (read: the US).	尽管他信奉自由市场原则，但他也欣赏苏联为二战所做出的牺牲，欣赏苏联高傲的民族主义，以及苏联作为其他自利外（美）部（国）力量的制衡。


The apex of Powell’s influence was bracketed by the “Rivers of Blood,” which made him a national figure, and his defection from the Tories.	《血河》让鲍威尔的影响力达到了巅峰，也让他成为全国性人物，使他退出保守党。


Quitting the party left him a political outcast.	退党让他沦为政治放逐者。


Although Powell left the House of Commons once and for all only in 1987, his political influence was increasingly marginal.	尽管鲍威尔直到1987年才卸任下议院议员，但他的政治影响力早已微不足道。


Why, then, did Powell – unlike Trump – fail to scale the higher reaches of power?	那么，为何鲍威尔没有像特朗普那样赢得更大的权力？


And what does his failure tell us about the Trump phenomenon and the prospects for its repetition in other countries?	他的失败对于我们理解特朗普现象以及其他国家的类似前景有什么意义？


First, there were limits on Powell’s ability to mobilize public opinion.	首先，鲍威尔煽动公共情绪的能力是有极限的。


He was able to attract attention mainly by delivering speeches and encouraging his followers to circulate the text.	他能够主要依靠发表演讲和鼓动追随者散播演讲文稿来吸引关注。


With the exception of two tabloids, coverage by the establishment press of his “Rivers of Blood” speech ranged from skeptical to outright hostile.	除了两家小报，建制派媒体对他的《血河》演讲的报道持怀疑乃至坚决反对的态度。


And the establishment press was all there was. The 1960s and 1970s, recall, were when the BBC ruled the airwaves.	回想一下，20世纪六七十年代是BBC主宰广播电视的时代。


Powell had no equivalent of Twitter to spread the word, and there was no Fox News or Breitbart to create an ideological echo chamber.	鲍威尔没有Twitter可用来散播他的言论，也没有福克斯新闻台或Breitbart来为他摇旗呐喊。


Second, Powell fundamentally believed in the British parliamentary system, having grown up in it.	其次，本质上鲍威尔仍相信英国议会制度，并成长于斯。


He was reluctant to harness his followers’ nativism and economic insecurity to build an anti-system movement that might weaken the foundations of the country’s parliamentary democracy.	他并不想利用其拥趸的先天论和经济不安全打造一场有可能动摇英国议会制民主根基的反制度运动。


Third, public dissatisfaction with British politics in Powell’s heyday was more limited than Americans’ political dissatisfaction in the age of Trump.	第三，在鲍威尔的鼎盛时期，公众对英国政治的不满比特朗普时代美国人的政治不满要低。


Even in the economically disastrous 1970s, British voters were not prepared to reject the political status quo.	即使在经济困难重重的20世纪70年代，英国选民也不准备拒绝政治现状。


Discontent and disillusion were not “accompanied by a basic questioning of British political institutions,” in the words of Powell’s biographer, Douglas Schoen.	用鲍威尔传记作者道格拉斯·肖恩（Douglas Schoen）的话说，不满和幻灭并没有“伴随对英国政治制度的根本性质疑”。


Finally, the structure of the political system worked against a maverick like Powell.	最后，政治制度的结构不利于鲍威尔这样的异端。


In Britain, MPs, not the electorate, choose the prime minister.	在英国，首相由议员而不是选民选出。


Only in a full-blown crisis can popular opinion effectively determine who becomes leader.	只有在爆发全面危机的情况下，公众观点才有可能真正决定谁成为领袖。


This institutional arrangement creates a high barrier to populist outsiders.	这一制度安排给民粹主义局外人制造了非常大的壁垒。


Maybe, then, the ultimate lesson of the Powell-Trump comparison is that a presidential system of government, like that in the US, is not superior in terms of the checks it imposes on political extremists.	因此，鲍威尔-特朗普对比的终极教训也许是美国这样的总统制政府在对政治极端主义者的制衡方面并不超人一等。


On the contrary, the opposite may be true.	相反，美国的制度要更差一等。


The Politics of Job Polarization	就业两极化的政治含义


WASHINGTON, DC – A core problem in the United States today – reflected in Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election earlier this month – is that too many Americans feel helpless and insecure in the face of the job polarization that has resulted from globalization and new technology.	发自华盛顿特区——今日美国的一个核心问题——以唐纳德·特朗普早些时候赢得总统大选胜利为标志——就是在面对全球化和新技术所造成的就业两极分化时，有太多的美国人感到无助和缺乏安全感。


While highly educated people at the top of the income distribution are doing better than ever, people with only a high school education face declining incomes, living standards, and prospects for themselves and their children.	虽然位于收入分配金字塔顶端的高学历阶层比以往任何时候都过得更好，但那些只接受过高中教育的人却面临着收入，生活水平和自身及子女发展前景三方面的败退。


The middle class is being torn apart.	令这些中产阶级中出现了分化的态势。


Trump won largely because he persuaded voters in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere that his policies will yield better outcomes in communities where manufacturing is declining.	特朗普的胜利主要是因为他成功说服了宾夕法尼亚州，密歇根州，威斯康星州和其他地区的选民，认为他的政策将在这些制造业衰退的社区产生更好的效果。


In fact, his administration, backed by Republican majorities in both houses of the US Congress, will likely only make things worse for hard-pressed Americans.	但事实上，他的政府，在美国国会两院的共和党多数派支持下，可能只会令那些本已艰难度日的美国人雪上加霜。


The underlying problem is new technology, specifically information technology, and the way it has transformed the nature of work.	潜在的问题是新技术，尤其是信息技术，及其运作方式已经改变了工作的本质。


As David Autor and David Dorn have shown, many middle-skill, middle-income, middle-class jobs have disappeared.	正如戴维·奥托（David Autor）和戴维·多恩（David Dorn）两位学者的研究指出，许多中等技能中等收入的中产阶级职位已经消失。


The new jobs that have emerged are well paid for highly educated people and poorly paid for people who have only a high school education.	已经出现的新工作对那些受过高等教育的人回报甚丰，而对只受过高中教育的人来说则相当苛刻。


A leading symptom – but only a symptom – is the disappearance of well-paid factory jobs.	一个主要的表象——但只是一个表象——就是那些高薪工厂职位的消亡。


Employment in manufacturing fell by more than two million from 2004 to 2014, and now accounts for just over 8% of total employment – continuing a long decline since the 1950s.	从2004~2014年间美国制造业的就业人数减少了近200多万，目前仅占总就业人数的8％多一点 ——这也延续了自1950年代以来的持续下降趋势。


This technology-driven trend has been compounded by the effects of decreased transportation and communication costs, making it cheaper to move goods over long distances.	这种技术驱动的趋势又与运输和通信成本的降低相结合，使得在长距离运输货物的成本更为低廉。


Growing networks of sophisticated suppliers make it easier to move manufacturing activity overseas to lower-wage locations.	成熟供应商的网络日益壮大，使得海外制造活动更容易被转移到低薪酬地区。


Many US companies have made this a significant part of their business strategy, with the resulting decline of US manufacturing going hand in hand with a decline in unionization.	许多美国公司已经将这一策略作为其业务战略的重要组成部分，导致美国制造业与工会势力双双沦陷。


When people lose a relatively high-wage and high-benefit union job, they often are reemployed at a lower wage and without the same level of benefits.	人们在失去了相对高工资高收益的工会工作后往往只能以较低的工资水平再就业，福利水平也大打折扣。


The 2008 financial crisis exacerbated income inequality and economic insecurity in part by accelerating the loss of manufacturing jobs.	2008年金融危机在某种程度上加速了制造业岗位的流失，从而加剧了收入不平等状况和经济的不安全性。


Arguments that it was necessary, or even “optimal,” to skew financial support from the government toward banks and their executives are not persuasive (at least, not outside Wall Street).	那些认为政府有必要，甚至是“最优解”的，将财政支持导向银行及其高管的论点是不具备说服力的——至少在华尔街之外。


Yes, well-off Americans experienced a big plunge in wealth when asset prices tanked.	虽然美国的富裕阶层也在资产价格下跌时遭遇财富缩水。


But they have since benefited from robust recovery in stock prices and high-end real estate.	但是他们随后又从股票价格和高端房地产的强劲复苏中得到了补偿。


In this environment, with so many people insecure about their economic prospects, the push by President Barack Obama’s administration for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a tone-deaf approach, at best.	在这种环境下，由于这么多人对自身经济前景担忧不已，奥巴马政府对跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）的推动变成了一种盲人摸象的方案。


The administration argued that TPP would create some good jobs – and that people who lost jobs as a result could be “compensated.” But such compensation always proves to be minimal and is widely viewed as meaningless.	行政当局认为TPP将创造一些好工作——以此“补偿”那些失去工作的人，但这种补偿往往被证明收效甚微且被普遍认定是无意义的。


That’s why Trump racked up large majorities in so many working-class bastions that had previously supported Obama.	这就是为何特朗普在从前支持奥巴马的工人阶级堡垒中攫取了大量多数支持。


Unfortunately, life is about to get worse for these voters.	但不幸的是，这些选民的生活将变得更糟。


With control of the presidency and Congress, the Republicans are likely to pursue three main economic policies. Lowering personal and corporate taxes will primarily help richer Americans.	在掌控了总统和国会的情况下，共和党人可能会寻求实施三项重大经济政策：降低个人和公司税将主要有利于更富有的美国人。


Repeal of Obama’s signature health-care reform will have a severe impact on many lower-income people as they lose affordable insurance coverage.	废除奥巴马医保改革将对许多低收入人群产生严重影响，令他们失去了可负担得起的保险。


And financial deregulation will mostly favor large global banks, encourage reckless risk-taking, and set the stage for another large-scale crisis.	而金融放松管制将主要扶助大型全球银行，鼓励冒险举动，并为另一次大规模危机奠定基础。


In addition, the confrontational trade measures that Trump has proposed are likely to make the employment situation worse.	此外特朗普提出的对抗性贸易措施也可能使就业情况变得更糟。


At the same time, the extent of any effective stimulus to the economy is likely to be very small.	与此同时，对经济进行任何有效刺激的程度可能非常小。


Overheating the economy – leading to higher inflation and higher interest rates – does not typically help lower-income people (remember the 1970s).	过热的经济——导致更高的通货膨胀和更高的利率——通常对低收入人群不太有利（1970年代时就是如此）。


Trump’s main substantive promise has been to bring back middle-class jobs, particularly in manufacturing.	特朗普的主要实质性承诺是要把那些重新中产阶级工作（特别是在制造业）重新搬回来。


But nothing in his policies or the broader Republican program will address the underlying issue of technological change.	但其政策或更广泛的共和党计划中并没有任何内容去应对技术变革的根本问题。


And the next wave of technology, including driverless vehicles, will have a major negative impact on the incomes and opportunities of everyone who currently delivers goods or transports passengers by car.	而下一波技术，包括无人驾驶车辆，将对那些客货运输从业者的收入和就业机会产生重大的负面影响。


Moreover, the rapid advance of artificial intelligence and robotics means that even if manufacturing output in the US stabilizes or ticks upwards, it will not involve anywhere near the number of middle-skill jobs that it did in the past.	此外，人工智能和机器人技术的快速发展意味着即使美国的制造业产出稳定或上升，也不意味着中等技能工作的数量能恢复到以往的水平。


Likewise, automation will erode the number of currently well-paid jobs in the service sector.	同理，自动化将削弱服务部门中当前某些高薪职位的数量。


Given the role of technology in displacing workers, protectionism – tearing up trade agreements and imposing tariffs on Chinese and Mexican goods – won’t bring back high-paying manufacturing jobs, and Trump has no plan B. That means the polarization of America that brought Trump to power will only become far more severe.	鉴于技术在替代工人中所发挥的作用，保护主义——撕毁贸易协议和对中国和墨西哥货物征收关税 ——将无从带来高薪制造业工作，对此特朗普也没有制定第二套方案。 这意味着在特朗普坐上总统宝座后，美国的两极分化只会变得更加严重。


From Tolstoy to Trump	从托尔斯泰到特朗普


LONDON – One of Leo Tolstoy’s preoccupations was the nature and limits of power.	伦敦——权力的本质和限度问题引发了列夫·托尔斯泰的关注。


What was it that made France so formidable an enemy, particularly of Russia?	是什么使法国这个敌人如此强大，尤其是对俄国？


This question was at the heart of his greatest novel, War and Peace – so much so that Tolstoy sometimes argued that his book was not a novel at all, but an inquiry into the philosophy of history.	这是托尔斯泰伟大小说《战争与和平》的核心问题——以至于有时托尔斯泰甚至认为他的书根本不是小说，而是对历史哲学的探索。


On the limits of power, Tolstoy might have thought a bit more about what Britain’s World War II-era Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery later called the first law of warfare.	在权力限度问题上，托尔斯泰可能对英国二战时期元帅伯纳德·蒙哥马利后世所谓的战争第一定律颇费了些思量。


“Do not march on Moscow.”	“不要进军莫斯科。


Winter was a more formidable agent of reality than even the German generals who helped the Russians in their successful defense against Napoleon (a lesson of which Hitler, fortunately, took no notice).	”严冬是一种就连曾帮俄国人成功击退拿破仑的德国人也无法逾越的更为可怕的现实力量（幸亏希特勒没有吸取这一教训）。


As for the nature of power, Tolstoy was neither an economic historian nor a demographer.	至于权力的本质，托尔斯泰既非经济历史学家亦非人口学家。


When War and Peace was published in 1869, on the other side of the Bering Strait stood the United States, which had purchased Alaska from Russia only two years earlier for about two cents an acre.	1869年，《战争与和平》发表之际，在白令海峡的对岸屹立着美国，该国两年前曾以每英亩约两美分的价格从俄国人手里买下了阿拉斯加。


America was just beginning to emerge as a world power during the surge of globalization in the last third of the nineteenth century, which coincided with the opening up of the American West.	美国是在19世纪进入后三分之一阶段随着全球化刚刚开始崛起的世界大国，这与美国西部开放的时间恰好是一致的。


With just 4-5% of the world’s population, America has accounted for 20-30% of world output ever since the early days of steam-ships, railways lines, and the building of Chicago.	从蒸汽轮船、铁路和芝加哥建成的早期，仅占世界人口4-5%的美国却贡献了世界20-30%的产量。


So at the heart of a great country’s power is its economic might, both aggregate and in terms of the prosperity of its individual citizens.	因此一个伟大国家力量的核心是其经济实力，无论体现在经济总量还是民众的个人繁荣。


China, with the world’s largest population, may challenge America’s overall wealth, but its per capita wealth is only about one-fifth that of the US.	拥有世界上最多人口的中国可能会挑战美国的财富总量，但其人均财富却仅有美国的1/5左右。


What has made America so prosperous is the country’s ability to mobilize the natural resources of an entire continent, along with political stability and an extraordinarily rare combination of sensible government action and individual entrepreneurial innovation.	美国如此繁荣是因为拥有政治稳定和动员整块大陆自然资源的能力，而且极为罕见地实现了政府理性治政及个人创新创业的完美结合。


From Alexander Hamilton on, government has helped to promote and sustain economic growth.	从亚历山大·汉密尔顿开始，政府就一直致力于推动和维护经济增长。


Among the fruits of that partnership are America’s world-class research universities and the technological developments stemming from defense-related research.	美国世界一流的研究型大学及国防研究促成的技术发展就是这种合作关系结出的硕果。


Another reason for America’s success is that it has been a magnet for the best and brightest from around the world, who have contributed their own talents and energy to the melting pot of America’s narrative.	美国成功的另一个原因是它像磁石一样吸引着来自世界各地最优秀的人才，他们为美国版的全球熔炉贡献着自身的才智和力量。


And that process continues.	今后仍将延续这一进程。


Demographers predict that the US is the only large developed country that will experience a significant increase in population in the first half of the twenty-first century.	人口学家预测美国是21世纪前半叶能实现人口显著增长的唯一一个大规模发达国家。


Whereas most of the world’s population increase will occur in its poorest countries, America’s multilingual, multiracial, and multinational population of 320 million will probably increase by around 100 million.	尽管世界人口绝大多数增长将发生在最贫穷国家，但美国3. 2亿多语言、多种族和多民族人口将有可能实现1亿左右的增长。


Fidelity to America’s motto, e pluribus unum (“out of many, one”), has made the country one of the greatest success stories in world history.	对美国座右铭“合众为一”（e pluribus unum）的忠诚已经使这个国家成为世界史上一个最伟大的成功榜样。


Given all this, Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy embodies dangerous fantasy at every level.	有鉴于此，唐纳德·特朗普的总统竞选体现出各个层面的危险幻想。


For one thing, erecting walls to protect America from the world, as he advocates, could not work.	一方面，像特朗普宣扬的那样通过修墙来保卫美国人根本行不通。


More important, who would want it to work?	更重要的是，谁会愿意这种方法真有效果？


While America’s population rises, Russia’s sinks like a stone.	在美国人口上升的同时，俄国的人口却像石头一样一直下降。


How many people would prefer to live in Moscow than in New York?	有多少人不愿住在纽约而愿住在莫斯科？


Trump’s agenda speaks to the big lie at the heart of the populism now roiling both America and Europe.	特朗普的议程迎合了现在席卷美欧的作为民粹主义核心的弥天大谎。


We want our sovereignty back, people shout.	我们想要回我们的主权，人们大声叫嚷。


We want to control our own lives and our own borders.	我们想要掌控我们的生活和我们的边境。


In Britain, which in June will hold a referendum on withdrawal from the European Union, these sentiments are crudely stirred by anti-EU ministers who lie about the extent to which an allegedly dictatorial regime in Brussels interferes with the discharge of their official duties.	今年6月英国将就退出欧盟举行全民公投，反欧盟部长们不遗余力地煽动这样的情绪，他们谎称自己在极大程度上受到了布鲁塞尔所谓独裁政权的干扰。


And too many are easily deluded into believing that there is a simple solution to Europe’s migration crisis.	太多人轻易受到了蒙蔽，认为欧洲移民危机有简单的解决办法。


Build walls.	修筑围墙。


Send them all home.	送他们回国。


Stop the world, we want to get off.	让世界停止运转，我们要下车。


The truth is that the pressure on Europe’s frontiers will continue, especially if more poor states to the south and east break down.	事实是欧洲边境的压力仍将继续，尤其是如果东南方更多贫困国家局面进一步失控。


Europeans can address this major problem of our generation only by working together to craft coherent foreign, security, economic-development, and immigration strategies, not by dismissing our neighbors and their policies.	欧洲人只有合作制定一致的外交、安全、经济发展和移民战略才能解决我们这代人面临的主要矛盾，无视我们的邻国及其政策其实于事无补。


We must tackle the problem at its sources, by rebuilding failed states and giving their populations a reason to stay at home.	我们必须从源头上解决这个问题，重建失败国家并给民众一个待在家里的理由。


Neither America nor Europe should abandon their policies to the populists’ dangerous virtual reality.	无论美国和欧洲都不能因为民粹主义危险的虚拟现实而放弃其自身政策。


Theirs is not the world we live in or a world we should want to live in.	他们的世界不是我们生活的世界，我们也不愿在这样的世界中生活。


It is a fictional world, but with none of the bearing on our problems that attracts generation after generation of readers to Tolstoy’s work.	这是一个虚幻的世界，但对解决曾吸引几代人阅读托尔斯泰著作的我们的现实问题却产生不了任何影响。


Republicans Ride the Trump Tiger	共和党人驾驭特朗普猛虎


CAMBRIDGE – During a typical week in late May, Donald J. Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee for the US presidency, grabbed headlines yet again.	坎布里奇——在5月下旬典型的一周，共和党的假定总统提名人唐纳德·特朗普再次登上了报纸的头版头条。


He declared a popular former president to be a “rapist,” flipped his position on one policy after another, bragged that his running mate could be “anyone” who supported him, and told the National Rifle Association that Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic nominee, would “release violent criminals from jail.”	他公然宣称一位颇受欢迎的前总统是“强奸犯”、在一项又一项政策上出尔反尔、并吹嘘他的竞选搭档可以是支持他的“任何人”。 特朗普还告知全国步枪协会可能的民主党提名人希拉里·克林顿将会“从监狱里释放暴力犯”。


Perhaps most worrisome from a global perspective, just hours after an EgyptAir plane crashed into the Mediterranean, and long before any certain facts were known, Trump began stating his own conclusions about what had happened and denouncing American “weakness” in the face of terrorism.	从全球角度看，最令人担忧的或许是在埃及航空公司航班坠毁地中海短短几小时后，并且在特定事实还远未澄清之前，特朗普就开始宣布他自己的结论，并谴责美国在恐怖主义面前的“软弱表现”。


Virtually all efforts to prevent Trump’s nomination have ended, and establishment Republicans are moving steadily to reconcile themselves with their party’s capture by an uncouth, narcissistic, unprepared, and mercurial bully.	事实上，阻止特朗普获得提名的一切努力均已告结束，传统的共和党人正逐渐接受其所在党派被一个粗鲁、自恋、毫无准备且滔滔不绝的恶霸所绑架的事实。


“You’re better off riding the beast than trying to ignore it,” explained a former GOP Senate aide.	前共和党参议院助理这样作出解释，“与其对猛兽视而不见，还不如试图驯服它。 ”


Many certainly did try to ignore it.	确实有很多人曾想对特朗普视而不见。


No sooner had Trump announced last summer that he would seek the Republican nomination than pundits and political scientists started to find compelling reasons to dismiss his bid.	去年夏天，特朗普一宣布他要争取共和党提名，各路学者和政治学家就开始寻找各种令人信服的理由来证明他的无足轻重。


I was less certain, because I assessed Trump’s emergence and prospects against the backdrop of my ongoing research on the US political right.	而我却没有那么肯定，因为我曾在对美国右翼政治长期研究的基础上对特朗普的出现和前景进行评估。


Back in 2010 and 2011, Vanessa Williamson and I studied the popular and elite forces that gave rise to the Tea Party and helped pull the Republican Party further rightward.	回到2010和2011年，凡妮莎·威廉姆森和我研究了导致茶党崛起和共和党进一步右倾的大众和精英力量。


More recently, I have worked with Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and other researchers to decipher shifts in organized conservative politics.	最近，我与亚历山大·赫特尔 - 费尔南德斯及其他研究人员合作破译了有组织保守政治的转变过程。


Such shifts include the rising influence of Charles and David Koch, billionaire brothers whose network of think tanks and advocacy organizations has encouraged an ultra-free-market economic agenda among Republican candidates and officeholders at state and national levels.	上述转变包括亿万富翁查尔斯和戴维·科赫兄弟的影响力日渐崛起，他们的智囊和宣传机构网促使州和全国级别的共和党候选人和执政官员采用超自由市场的经济议程。


Pulled in different directions by plutocratic funders and angry nativist populists, the GOP became ripe for a Trump-style hostile takeover.	在富豪资助者和愤怒的本土民粹主义者等各方势力的影响下，共和党沦为特朗普式敌意收购对象的时机已经成熟。


Starting early in Barack Obama’s presidency, as Tea Party populists took center stage, Trump became popular, because he championed efforts to delegitimize America’s first black president.	从奥巴马总统上任之初开始，随着茶党民粹主义者登上核心政治舞台，因为领导了抹黑美国首位黑人总统的运动，特朗普的受欢迎程度就开始与日俱增。


An April 2011 opinion poll found Trump leading all GOP presidential contenders for 2012, with especially strong backing from Republicans who firmly believed that Obama, as Trump insisted, had not been born in the United States, as the US Constitution requires.	2011年4月的民意调查显示特朗普在2012年的共和党总统候选人中遥遥领先，那些坚信奥巴马并未像美国宪法所要求的那样出生于美国的共和党人（就像特朗普一直坚持的那样）是特朗普特别坚定的支持者。


Trump did not run in 2012, but grassroots Tea Partiers were already focused on illegal immigration and hatred of Obama.	2012年特朗普并未参选，但草根茶党分子已经开始集中攻击非法移民和挑起对奥巴马的仇恨。


Over the course of that year’s presidential primaries, at least half of GOP voters repeatedly tried to find an alternative to the eventual Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, but could not coalesce around a viable contender.	在那年的总统初选过程中，至少半数的共和党选民一再尝试找人替代共和党提名人罗姆尼，但最终却未能找到可行的竞争者。


GOP leaders’ failure to stop Obama in 2012 and roll back his initiatives intensified populist Republicans’ anger at their own party.	共和党2012年未能阻止奥巴马并挫败其计划加剧了民粹主义者对自身政党的愤怒情绪。


By the beginning of the 2016 presidential cycle, it seemed clear that many would seek a unifying “anti-establishment” candidate.	到2016年总统竞选周期开始时，一个似乎显而易见的事实是很多人都在寻找一位统一的“反体制”候选人。


In an effort to capture this voter rebellion, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas repeatedly bucked GOP congressional leaders.	为了利用选民的这种逆反情绪，得克萨斯州参议员泰德·克鲁斯反复顶撞共和党国会领袖。


But the media-savvy Trump blindsided Cruz and all other contenders.	但深谙媒体之道的特朗普偷袭了克鲁斯和其他竞争者。


Starting in the summer of 2015, he embraced extremist rhetoric appealing to nativism, Islamophobia, and anger at GOP elites.	2015年夏天，他开始对能吸引本土主义、伊斯兰恐惧症和对共和党精英愤怒的极端主义言论加以利用。


Media outlets provided as much as $2 billion worth of free coverage, helping him grab and hold leads in polls and most primaries.	媒体渠道提供了高达20亿美元的免费宣传，协助他在民意测验和多数初选中取得并保持了领导地位。


Trump’s core supporters are wrongly thought to be displaced and economically insecure blue-collar workers.	认为特朗普的核心支持者是那些流离失所、在经济上缺乏安全感的蓝领工人是一种误解。


In fact, his voters’ average annual income, about $72,000, is well above the US median of $56,000.	事实上，特朗普选民平均年收入约72,000美元，远超美国56,000美元的中位数。


His supporters resemble the Tea Partiers: overwhelmingly older, male, middle class, and white.	他的支持者与茶党分子非常相似：绝大多数年龄较大、男性、中产阶级、白人。


They report anxieties about the economy – as most Republicans do – but what sets them apart is disbelief in Obama’s legitimacy, anger about immigration, and resentment over America’s supposed national decline.	他们对经济充满焦虑——多数共和党人也是如此——但让他们鹤立鸡群的是对奥巴马合法性的怀疑、对移民问题的愤怒和对美国所谓国家衰落的不满情绪。


Trump supporters are more likely than other Republicans to hold negative stereotypes about blacks and Latinos.	特朗普的支持者相比其他共和党人而言更有可能对黑人和拉美裔秉持负面的刻板态度。


And it seems quite likely that, as we found for Tea Partiers in 2011, Trump backers approve of social-welfare benefits that go to “real Americans” like themselves, while opposing public spending on minorities and low-income people.	而且就像2011年我们所看到的茶党分子那样，特朗普的支持者看上去似乎很可能赞成实行能让像他们这样“真正的美国人”受益的社会福利，而反对在少数族裔和低收入群体身上耗费公共开支。


Trump’s agenda thus resembles that of many European populist parties: a mix of anti-immigrant toughness, economic patriotism, and social benefits for native-born citizens.	因此，特朗普的议程与欧洲众多民粹主义政党十分相似：实际是反移民强硬态度、经济爱国主义和对本土出生的公民社会福利的组合。


But no major US party has offered such a program, and even now GOP leaders and major funders, having moved the party further toward the free-market right during the Obama years, oppose it.	但没有哪个美国主要政党提出过这样一种方案，甚至就连现在的共和党领导人和主要资助者（因为在奥巴马执政期间实现了共和党向自由市场权利的进一步倾斜）也对此持反对态度。


In Congress and state legislatures, Republicans hew to generally unpopular extreme positions – tax cuts for the rich, evisceration of business regulations, lower social spending, and curbs on union activities.	在国会和州立法机构，共和党人恪守不受普通民众欢迎的极端立场——为富人减税、取消商业规则、降低社会开支及遏制工会活动。


But, arguably, the GOP’s ultra-free-market extremism has backfired.	但似乎可以说，共和党的超自由市场极端主义造成了事与愿违的后果。


When virtually all GOP contenders for 2016 signed on to that agenda, Trump exploited an opening for “America First” nativism and protectionism.	当几乎所有参与2016年总统大选的共和党竞争者都认可上述议程的同时，特朗普却利用了以“美国第一”为代表的本土主义和保护主义漏洞。


In Trump’s disparagement of Latino immigrants, independent women, and “uppity” minorities, his base hears a promise to “make America great again” by reasserting white male hegemony.	在特朗普对拉美裔移民、独立女性和“不知天高地厚”的少数族裔的责难中，他的支持者听到了通过重申白人男性霸权而“实现美国伟大复兴”的承诺。


None of this is surprising.	所有这些都没有什么值得大惊小怪的。


For years, GOP elites have played with fire by stoking popular nativism and racial fears to mobilize older white voters.	多年来，共和党精英一直在煽动流行的本土主义和种族恐惧，以此煽起老年白人选民的怒火。


With US conservative media putting out a steady stream of racial innuendo, the GOP’s discourse was thoroughly debased well before candidate Trump, himself a media player, came along.	在美国保守派媒体长期宣扬种族影射的情况下，共和党的高谈阔论早在身为媒体从业者的候选人特朗普出现之前就已经没人相信了。


Could Trump actually win?	特朗普真能赢得大选吗？


Elected GOP officeholders, afraid to buck voter sentiment, are starting to declare their support.	当选的共和党执政官员害怕违逆选民的情绪，正在开始表态支持特朗普。


While some wealthy donors are redirecting their money to congressional and state-level candidates, many others have jumped on board – and others will, too, to the degree that Trump seems able to beat Clinton.	尽管有些财大气粗的捐助方转而支持国会和州一级的人选，但也有很多人选择支持特朗普——只要特朗普看似能够打败克林顿，未来还有更多人将会做出这样的选择。


In any two-party system as polarized and closely balanced as the current US electoral system, a single crisis, such as a terrorist attack, could tip the balance.	在像现行美国选举制度这样极化且弱平衡的两党体制下，像恐怖袭击这样的一次性危机就可以轻易将平衡打破。


GOP politicians, funders, and advocacy group leaders are now trying to convince themselves that Trump, in the White House, could be managed to implement the Republican agenda.	共和党、政客、资助者和宣传组织领袖现在正在说服自己，特朗普一旦入主白宫，他们可以做工作让他执行共和党的计划。


A pivotal Supreme Court nomination is at stake, and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan has a government-slashing budget ready for a Republican president to sign.	此事涉及至关重要的最高法院提名，而且众议院议长保罗·瑞安有一份削减政府预算的开支准备让共和党总统签署。


Ryan, who has not yet officially endorsed Trump, will come under growing pressure to do so.	还没有公开支持特朗普的瑞安支持特朗普的压力会越来越大。