It is hard for me to believe that if Greece had abandoned the euro in 2010, the economic fallout would have amounted to even a quarter of that.	我很难相信，如果希腊在2010年就放弃欧元，经济损失回达到这个数字的四分之一。


Furthermore, it seems equally improbable that the immediate impact of exiting the eurozone today would be larger than the long-run costs of remaining, given the insistence of Greece’s creditors on austerity.	此外，考虑到希腊债权人坚持紧缩要求，现在退出欧元区的即时影响也不太可能大过留在欧元区的长期成本。


That insistence reflects the attachment of policymakers in the EU – especially in Germany – to a conceptual framework that has led them consistently to underestimate the gravity of the situation and recommend policies that make matters worse.	债权人的坚持表明，欧元区决策者——特别是德国人——死守着一个概念框架，这个框架导致他们一直低估了情况的严重性、要求采取让情况雪上加霜的政策。


In May 2010, Greece’s GDP had fallen by 4% year on year.	2010年5月，希腊GDP同比下降4%。


The EU and the European Central Bank predicted that the first bailout program would drive Greek GDP down by another 3% below 2010 levels, before the economy began to recover in 2012.	欧盟和欧洲央行预测，首个援助计划将让希腊GDP继续下滑2010年水平的3%，然后在2012年开始经济复苏。


By March 2012, however, reality had set in.	但是，到2012年3月，现实是残酷的。


With GDP headed to 12% below 2010 levels, a second program was put in place.	GDP比2010年水平低了12%，第二个援助计划开始实施。


By the end of the year, GDP had fallen to 17% below 2010 levels.	到当年年底，GDP比2010年水平下降17%。


Greece’s GDP is now 25% below its 2009 level.	如今，希腊GDP比2009年水平低25%。


And while some predict a recovery in 2016, I fail to see how any analysis of demand flows can justify that forecast.	尽管有人预测2016年会开始复苏，但我无法看到任何需求流分析能够证实这一预测。


The main reason the forecasts were so wrong is that those making them chronically underestimated the impact of government spending on the economy – especially when interest rates are near zero.	预测错得如此离谱，主要原因是一直在做预测的人低估了政府支出对经济的影响——特别是在利率接近于零的时候。


And yet the clear failure of austerity to restart the economy in Greece or the rest of the eurozone has not caused policymakers to rethink their approach.	而紧缩政策显然无法重新启动希腊和欧元区其他国家的经济，但这并没有促使决策者反思他们的方针。


Instead, they seem to be doubling down, on the theory that the deeper the crisis, the more successful the push for structural reforms will be.	相反，他们似乎准备加码原有政策，他们的理论是，危机越是深入，结构改革措施就会越成功。


Such reforms are needed to boost long-term growth, the thinking goes, and if that growth does not rapidly emerge, it is because the need for them was even greater than originally thought.	这一思维认为，这些改革是提振长期增长的必要条件，而如果增长没有马上出现，那是因为对这些改革的需要比一开始预想的还要大。


This, sadly, is the story of the 1930s as well.	悲哀的是，这正是20世纪30年代发生过的事。


As the American commentator Matthew Yglesias points out, Europe's major center-left parties at that time recognized that what was being done was not working, but nonetheless failed to offer an alternative.	美国评论家马修·伊���莱西亚斯（Matthew Yglesias）指出，当时欧洲主要中左翼政党意识到采取的政策根本无效，但也没有拿出替代方案。


“It was left to other parties with less worthy overall agendas – Hitler, for example – to step in and say that if the rules of the game led to prolonged spells of mass unemployment, then the rules of the game had to be changed.”	“这让拿下总体日程价值更低的政党——比如希特勒——站出来说，既然游戏规则导致长期大面积失业，那么就应该改变游戏规则。 ”


Today, Yglesias adds, Europe’s center-left politicians similarly “don’t have a strategy for changing the rules, and they don’t have the guts to tear up the rulebook.”	如今，伊格莱西亚斯又说，欧洲中左翼政党同样“没有改变规则的战略，也没有勇气抛弃规则。


As a result, austerity reigns, and dissent is left to populists like France’s Marine Le Pen or Italy’s Beppe Grillo – whose economic proposals seem even less likely to be effective.	”结果，紧缩横行，只有法国的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）和意大利的毕普·格里洛（Beppe Grillo）等民粹主义者提出异议，而他们的经济方案更加不可能见效。


One would have thought we were capable of learning from the past, and that the Great Depression was important enough in European history that policymakers there would not be repeating its mistakes.	你也许认为，我们有能力从历史中汲取教训，并且大萧条对于欧洲历史足够重要，欧洲决策者绝不会重蹈覆辙。


And yet, at the moment, that is precisely what seems to be happening.	但是，眼下，正在发生的恰恰是重蹈覆辙。


Europe’s 4% Solution	欧洲的4%方案


WASHINGTON, DC – This is a momentous summer for Europe, because both the eurozone and the European Union could be in danger of unraveling, despite the important steps toward a banking union and direct recapitalization of Spanish banks taken at the June meeting of eurozone leaders.	华盛顿—对欧洲来说，这是一个重要的夏天，因为尽管6月的欧元区领导人会议朝着银行联盟和对西班牙银行直接进行资本重组迈出了重要的步骤，欧元区和欧盟仍面临着分崩离析的危险。 改革计划实施缓慢；


Implementation of the proposed reforms is lagging; there may be legal challenges to the European Stability Mechanism in Germany; and the Netherlands and Finland seem to be backtracking on some parts of the agreement.	欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）在德国可能遇到法律挑战； 荷兰和芬兰似乎在协定的某些方面打起了退堂鼓。


Even in a worst-case scenario, some degree of intra-European cooperation will surely survive.	即使在最坏情形中，一定程度的欧洲内部合作也必定可以存活。


But it is hard to see how the EU as we know it could survive even a partial disintegration of the eurozone.	但很难说我们所知道的欧洲能够���免于哪怕是欧元区的部分解体。


Those who argue that one or more countries on the eurozone’s periphery should take a “holiday” from the euro underestimate both the economic and political repercussions of such a move.	如果你认为一个和数个欧元区外围国家应该脱离欧元“休个假”，那你必定低估了这一事件的经济和政治后果。


The sense of failure, loss of trust, and the damage inflicted on so many if two or three countries had to leave would shake the entire Union.	如果两个或三个国家不得不离开，那么许多国家都会感到挫败感、信任的缺失以及深深的伤害，这将振动整个欧盟。


One of the key challenges is the negative feedback loop between the weaknesses of many banks and the doubts about the peripheral countries’ sovereign debt.	一个关键挑战是大量银行的疲软以及外围国主权债务疑云之间的负反馈环。


The sovereign-debt and banking crises have become even more closely interlinked as banks bought greater amounts of their home countries’ sovereign debt.	由于银行买入了大量的母国主权债务，主权债务和银行危机之间的关系越来越紧密而错综复杂。


That said, Europe’s disparities in production costs and competitiveness, reflected in the “problem” countries’ substantial current-account deficits, may prove to be an even more difficult problem to resolve.	因此，“问题”国家巨量经常项目赤字中所反映的欧洲生产成本和竞争力的两极分化可能将成为更难解决的问题。


Unit labor costs in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy grew 20-30% faster than in Germany in the euro’s first decade, and somewhat faster than unit labor costs in northern Europe as a whole.	在欧元历史的第一个十年中，希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利的单位劳动成本上涨速度比德国快20—30%，比北欧整体单位劳动成本上升速度也要快。


This disparity reflected some differences in productivity growth but even more so differences in wage growth.	这一分化一定程度上体现了生产率增长差异，但更多体现的是工资增长差异。


Broadly speaking, capital inflows led to real revaluation and a lower domestic savings rate relative to investment in the southern countries, resulting in structural current-account deficits.	总整体上说，资本流入导致了南欧国家真实升值和更低的储蓄/投资比率，从而引发了结构性经常项目赤字。


In Greece, large fiscal deficits accompanied and exacerbated this trend.	在希腊，大规模财政赤字伴随并恶化了这一趋势。


In Spain, the counterpart to the current-account deficit was private-sector borrowing.	在西班牙，与经常项目赤字相伴而生的是私人部门借贷。


The eurozone crisis will not be resolved until this internal imbalance is reduced to a sustainable level, which requires not only fiscal adjustment in the troubled peripheral economies, but also balance-of-payments adjustments across the eurozone as a whole.	只要这一内部失衡不降低至可持续水平，欧元区危机就不可能解决，而要实现前者，不仅要求受困外围国实行财政调整，亚要求整个欧元区实现收支平衡调整。


That, in turn, implies the need for a real exchange-rate adjustment inside the eurozone, with peripheral countries’ production costs falling relative to those in the core.	而这反过来又意味着需要出现欧元区内部的真实汇率调整，让外围国生产成本相对核心国有所下降。


Real exchange-rate adjustments inside a monetary union, or among countries with fixed exchange rates, can take place through inflation differentials.	货币联盟内部或固定汇率国家间的真实汇率调整可以通过通胀水平差异发生。


The real value of the Chinese renminbi, for example, has appreciated considerably relative to the US dollar, despite limited nominal exchange-rate changes, because China’s domestic prices have risen faster than have prices in the United States.	比如，人民币真实价值较美元有了明显的升值，尽管名义上汇率变化十分有限。 这是因为中国国内价格上涨快于美国。


A similar adjustment within the eurozone, assuming similar productivity performance, would require wages in the troubled peripheral countries to rise more slowly than in Germany for a number of years, thus restoring their competitiveness.	假定欧元生产率表现类似，则类似的欧元区内部调整要求受困外围国工资增长慢于德国，且这一情形需维持多年，从而重塑外围国的竞争力。


But, because Germany and the other northern surplus countries remain hawkish on price stability, real exchange-rate adjustment within the eurozone requires actual wage and price deflation in the distressed southern economies.	但是，因为德国和其他北欧盈余国对物价稳定采取强硬态度，因此欧元区内部的真实汇率调整要求受困南欧国家发生真实工资和物价通货紧缩。


This pressure on the peripheral countries to deflate their already stagnant economies is turning into the eurozone’s greatest challenge.	外围国的这一压力——在经济已然停滞时实行通货紧缩——正在成为欧元区最严峻的挑战。


The ECB’s provision of liquidity can buy time, but only real adjustment can cure the underlying problem.	欧洲央行提供流动性的举措可以赢得时间，但真实调整才能解决基本问题。


That could be achieved with less wage contraction and loss of real income if productivity in the peripheral economies were to start growing significantly faster than in the core, thereby allowing prices to fall without the need for lower wages.	如果外围国生产率能以比核心国快得多的速度提高，从而让价格在工资不必下降的情况下就能有所降低，那么工资削减和真实收入损失就不必那么严重。


But, while structural reforms could undoubtedly lead over time to faster productivity growth, this is unlikely to happen in an environment in which credit is severely constrained, investment is plummeting, and many skilled young people emigrate.	但是，尽管结构性改革毫无疑问能随着时间的推移提高生产率增速，却不可能在信贷严重受限、投资大幅下滑、大量高技能年轻人移居国外的环境下发生。


Price deflation is not conducive to bringing about the sort of relative price changes that could accelerate reallocation of resources within the countries under stress and increase overall productivity.	价格通缩不利于形成能够加速受压国资源再配置、提高整体生产率的相对价格变化。


Relative prices are much easier to change when there is modest inflation than when nominal price reductions are required.	相对价格在通胀温和时更容易变化，而不是在名义价格被迫减低的时候。


The need for higher productivity in the troubled countries is undeniable; but achieving it in the current climate of extreme austerity and deflation is unlikely, given an atmosphere of latent, or open, social conflict.	受困国需要提高生产率，这一点是毫无疑问的，但在当前极端的紧缩和通缩气候下，要达到这一目标是不可能的任务，因为潜在或公开社会冲突相当激烈。


These economic adjustments could occur much more smoothly if the eurozone as a whole were to pursue a more expansionary policy.	这些经济调整可以以平稳得多的方式发生，如果欧元区整体追求更加扩张性的政策的话。


If the target inflation rate for the eurozone were to be set temporarily at, say 3.5%, and if the countries with current-account surpluses encouraged domestic inflation rates somewhat above the eurozone’s target, there could be real price adjustment within the eurozone without price deflation in the troubled countries.	如果欧元区目标通胀率被临时定在（比如）3. 5%，且经常项目盈余国鼓励国内通胀高于欧元区目标一定程度，那么欧元区内部就可以在受困国不发生价格通缩的情况下实现真实价格调整。


There are finally some signs that Germany will welcome more rapid domestic wage growth and somewhat higher inflation.	如今终于有了些许信号，表明德国将会欢迎较快的国内工资增长和一定程度的高通胀。


This could and should be accompanied by an overall depreciation of the euro, though that would be no panacea.	这可以，也应该辅之以欧元贬值，尽管这并非万灵丹。


High public-debt levels would still have to be reduced to create fiscal space and keep interest rates low enough to restore long-term confidence.	高公债水平仍必须有所削减，以创造财政空间并保持利率水平足够低从而重塑长期信心。


That means that courageous structural reforms must still be pursued in the peripheral countries – indeed, throughout Europe.	这意味着外围国（事实上，是整个欧洲）仍必须实行大胆的结构性改革。


Similarly, the eurozone would still need to strengthen its firewalls, as well as its mechanisms for cooperation.	类似地，欧元区仍然需要强化其防火墙和合作机制。


But a temporary and modestly higher inflation rate would facilitate the adjustment process and give reforms a chance to work.	但暂时而温和的较高通胀率有助于调整过程和为改革提供起效的机会。


Deflation discourages optimism about the future.	通缩会抑制未来的乐观。


Shifting the entire adjustment burden onto peripheral countries with current-account deficits, while core countries continue to run surpluses, obstructs adjustment.	把整个调整负担推给存在经常项目赤字的外围国，而核心国继续保持盈余会对调整形成阻碍。


The eurozone’s inflation target is not a magic number, and it is irrational to let it determine the overall macroeconomic framework.	欧元区通胀目标并不是神奇数字，用它来决定整体宏观经济框架也是不理性的。


If lower is always better, why not set the target at 1%, or even zero?	如果越低总是越好的话，那为什么不把目标定在1%甚至零呢？


In fact, there are times when 3-4% is better than 2%.	事实上，在不少时期，通胀目标为3—4%要好于2%。


Europe is at such a moment.	欧洲就处于这样一种时期中。


Europe\u0027s Anchor of Stability	欧洲稳定的定针


FRANKFURT – At less than ten years old, the euro is by all measures a young currency.	法兰克福 – 对于诞生不到十年的欧元来说，无论从何种角度来看，它都是一个年轻的币种。


Yet it has become a reality of daily life for almost 320 million people in 15 European countries.	但是，它已经成了15个欧洲国家的近三亿二千万人们日常生活中实实在在的一部分。


In the wake of the euro’s performance during this year’s global financial crisis, even its strongest critics cannot deny that the euro is an astounding success.	对于欧元在今年全球金融危机中的表现，即使是其最强烈的批评者也不能否认欧元获得了令人吃惊的成功。


This past summer, millions of travelers avoided paying cumbersome and expensive charges to change their currency.	刚刚过去的这个夏天，数以百万计的旅行者避免了的兑换本国货币的高昂的收费。


But the advantage for trade and investment implied by the absence of foreign-exchange risks within the euro area is of greater economic importance.	但是，由于少了外汇兑换的风险而给贸易和投资带来的好处，在经济上的意义远比这更为重要。


The common currency completes the single market for the euro area’s member states.	统一的货币促成了欧元成员国的单一市场。


Since 1999, members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) have experienced a number of severe exogenous shocks: the rise in the price of a barrel of oil from around $10 to $150; the collapse of equity markets after the dot-com bubble imploded; the spreading risk of terrorism after the September 11, 2001, and two wars.	自从1999年以来，欧洲货币联盟（EMU）的成员国经历了一系列的外部打击：油价从每桶10美元左右上升到150美元； 互联网泡沫破裂后股票市场的崩盘；


Starting last summer, the breakdown of the market for US sub-prime mortgages triggered turbulence in financial markets, with no end in sight.	2001年911事件后不断扩大的恐怖主义威胁以及两场战争。 从去年夏天以来，美国次贷危机的市场的问题引起了金融市场的震荡，至今仍不见底部。


From past experience with national currencies, Europeans could have expected that any of these shocks would trigger a severe crisis in foreign-exchange markets.	以过去各国本币的经验，上述任何一项冲击都会让欧洲人预期外汇市场将引发严重的危机。


It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened during the recent financial-market crisis if the euro-area countries still had all their national currencies: immense speculation against some currencies, heavy interventions by central banks, and finally a collapse of the parity system.	如果欧元区的国家仍然各自使用本国货币的话，是不难想象在近来的金融市场危机中会发生什么样的情况的：对一些币种的巨大的投机，央行重大的干预，以及平衡机制最后垮台。


The years 1992-1993 witnessed a dramatic crisis in the European Exchange Rate System.	1992和1993年见证了欧洲汇率机制的巨大危机。


Since that period the amount of capital ready to exploit any opportunity in foreign exchange markets has multiplied, which would make any comparable situation today much more dangerous.	自从那个时期以来，虎视眈眈准备利用外汇市场机会的资本量成倍地增加，如果今天出现当时类似的危机，这些资金会让情况更加危急。


Indeed, the crisis of the early 1990’s put the status quo within the EU common market at risk.	1990年代初的危机确实把欧盟共同市场的现状推到了危险的境地。


It is hard to believe that, with today’s vast capital flows, the single market would have survived a series of sharp and abrupt exchange-rate changes.	很难相信，以目前的巨大的流动资本量，这一单边市场还能度过一系列的巨大并突发的汇率变化。


Changes in exchange rates of the type seen in 1991-1992 have a strong impact on relative prices for goods traded between different countries.	1991-1992年出现的那样的汇率变化，对在不同国家间进行贸易的货物的相对价格，产生了重要影响。


In countries that experienced strong currency appreciation, companies (and unions, for that matter) are exposed to a sudden and severe loss in competitiveness.	在那些货币升值强劲的国家中，公司（也包括工会，也为了同样的原因）遭遇了突现的严重的竞争力的丧失。


Such firms undoubtedly start to clamor for protection against supposedly “unfair” conditions.	这样的公司当然要开始叫嚷针要针对所谓的“不公平”环境采取保护措施。


True, the euro did not prevent risky investment decisions by European financial institutions or the consequences for financial markets of these decisions.	诚然，欧元没有避免欧洲金融机构作出高风险的投资决定，或避免这些决定给金融市场带来的后果。


But it was never intended to do that.	但是，欧元本来就没有想要那么做。


Instead, the euro achieved what it was meant to achieve: the crisis was contained, because it could not inflict damage on foreign-exchange markets within the euro area.	相反，欧元取得了它原先想要取得的成果：危机被抑制了，因为欧元不能在欧元区内对外汇汇率造成破坏。


After the outbreak of turbulence in financial markets last year, the European Central Bank immediately provided ample liquidity to calm the situation, and has continued to do so ever since.	在去年金融市场的动荡开始后，欧洲中央银行立刻提供了充裕的资金来平息事态，至今仍在这样做。


At the same time, the ECB never lost sight of its main goal – maintaining price stability.	同时，欧洲中央银行从未忘记其主要的目标 – 维持物价稳定。


Indeed, the ECB has successfully anchored inflation expectations right from the start at a level consistent with its definition of price stability.	事实上，欧洲中央银行已经从一开始就按照其对物价稳定的定义水准，成功地稳定了对通货膨胀的预期。


This achievement contrasts starkly with all the critical voices that warned against the experiment of European Monetary Union and even predicted its early failure.	这个成就与所有的曾经批评过欧洲货币联盟的声音，形成了鲜明的对照。 这种声音曾警告欧洲货币联盟所做的实验，甚至预期其早期就夭折。


It was in the first weeks after the establishment of the ECB in June 1998 that I received a letter by the late Nobel Prize laureate Milton Friedman, who congratulated me on my appointment as member of the Executive Board – which he called “an impossible job.”	在1998年6月欧洲央行成立的最初几周内，我收到了诺贝尔奖获得者Milton Friedman的信，他祝贺我被任命为行政理事会成员，这一他称之为“不可能完成的工作”。 他坚信欧洲的货币联盟注定要失败。


He was convinced that monetary union in Europe was doomed to fail.	可是今天，很难再找到不承认欧元是个巨大成功的人。


Today, however, it is hard to find anybody who does not consider the euro a great success, and the ECB has been so sure-footed that people now take that success for granted.	欧洲央行一直走得很稳，以至于人们认为它的成功理所当然地来之毫不费力。


But this was not a matter of good luck.	但这确实并非运气所致。


The fundamentals of the euro’s success are hard work, dedicated commitment to the common currency’s unique historical mission, and, not least, a well chosen monetary policy strategy.	欧元的成功的基石是辛勤的努力和对共同货币独特历史使命的孜孜以求，而且，很重要的一点，是选择了恰当的货币政策策略。


But this success is no reason for complacency.	但是这个成功不能成为我们自满的理由。


Major challenges lie ahead.	巨大的挑战还在前头。


In the context of weakening growth, the Stability and Growth Pact will face a severe new test.	在愈加疲弱的经济增长的大背景下，稳定和发展协议将面临新的严峻考验。


And, just as important, reforms aimed at ensuring greater flexibility of markets still lag behind what is needed to exploit fully the advantages of the single monetary policy.	同样重要的是，旨在保证更大的市场弹性的改革仍然滞后于对于充分利用单一货币政策的优势的需求。


Europe’s Anti-Ideological Election	欧洲的反意识形态大选


PARIS – In each of the 27 states of the European Union, the campaign for the just concluded elections for the European Parliament occurred in an atmosphere of indifference, with voters, candidates, and the media focusing mostly on domestic issues.	发自巴黎-刚刚落下帷幕的欧洲议会竞选活动在欧盟的27个成员国当中都有着相似的氛围，那就是选民、候选人和媒体都把主要焦点放在了各国的国内议题之上。


Perhaps for precisely this reason, the abstention rate (an average of  57%), was the highest since the first vote in 1979, while the composition of the Parliament, with its right-wing majority, underwent no significant changes.	而或许恰恰因为这样，本次选举的弃权率平均高达57%，创下了自1979年首次选举以来的新高，与此同时，整个议会被右派阵营把持的现状，也没多大变化。


Following the 2004 elections, the European People’s Party (EPP), which regroups right and center right parties, held 288 MPs of the Parliament’s 785 seats.	在2004年的选举中，重新整合了诸多右派和中右派小党的欧洲人民党团（EPP）拿下了全部785个议员席位中的288个。


In 2009, it is still the first force in the new parliament, with 267 deputies out of a total of 736: the decrease in its membership is also due to the stated commitment of the British Conservatives and the Czech right party to defect from the EPP to create their own party, with a stronger right-wing line. That opens the way to the possible return for a second term of José Manuel Barroso as president of the Commission.	虽然今年英国保守党和捷克右翼党派相约脱离EPP另组右翼色彩更浓厚的新党团参选，令EPP会员数目有所减少，不过它仍然是最强大的力量，把736个席位中的267个收入囊中，而这也为何塞·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐再次当选欧盟委员会主席铺平了道路。


This situation is paradoxical, as Europe is experiencing one of the worst economic crises in its history, with falling employment and living standards and rising worries about the future.	这个选举结果显得相当荒谬，因为欧洲正经历着有史以来其中一次最严峻的经济危机，就业岗位流失、生活水平下降，人们对未来生活的担忧也不断增加。


One should have expected the right-wing to be punished in countries where they govern. But that threat did not materialize.  The latest returns, indeed, show quite the opposite – in France, Italy, Poland, Denmark, and even Germany, where the CDU had won a large number of representatives in the 2004 elections.	照理说这种情况下选民们应该用选票去惩罚在本国执政的右翼党派，然而这种威胁非但未能实现，反而在法国、意大利、波兰、丹麦以及在2004年选举中由基督教民主联盟赢得大多数议会席位的德国都显示了相反的结果。


Where the right is in opposition, such as in Spain and Portugal, it has improved its position.	甚至在西班牙和葡萄牙这些右翼党派沦为在野党的国家，右翼的地位也有所提升。


On the other hand, the Socialist Party lost support almost everywhere, especially in countries – Spain, Portugal, Hungary, and the Netherlands – where it is in power.	另一方面，左翼的社会党几乎在任何一个国家，尤其是在其执政的西班牙、葡萄牙、匈牙利和荷兰都丧失了支持，以致曾在上届议会中拥有215席的欧洲社会党团（ESP）在本次选举中也只保住了160个席位。


The European socialist party (ESP), which held 215 deputies in the old parliament, secured only 160 seats.  In France and Denmark, where the Socialist Party is in opposition, it did no better.	而在社会党只是在野党的法国和丹麦这些国家，情况也未好转，只有希腊是个例外。


The only exception is Greece. In France, the Socialist Party is almost outnumbered by Europe Ecologie, a green coalition gathered by the charismatic Daniel Cohn-Bendit.	在法国，社会党的得票率甚至几乎被由魅力超凡的丹尼尔·科恩-本迪特所领导的绿党联盟——欧洲生态党——所赶超。


The liberals remain the third force of the European parliament, with around 80 deputies, less than its previous 100 members.	此外，先前拥有100个席位，现有大约80席的自由民主党仍是欧洲议会排名第三的势力。


The Greens appear to be the main beneficiaries of the elections and become the forth force: they will get around 55 seats, a gain of more than 10 seats.	而比上届多获得10个席位，目前占据55席的绿党似乎成为本次选举的主要受益者，并升级为第四股势力。


Extreme parties also benefited from the elections, as well as some “eurosceptic” parties.	而与此同时，极端党派以及一些“欧洲怀疑派”党团也在本次选举中出尽了风头。


In France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s party has been substantially weakened, but in the Netherlands, the anti–Islam party led by Geert Wilders won 17% of the votes, and in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Slovakia, and even in the UK the far right did better than expected.	虽然让-马里·勒庞的极右翼政党在法国选战中被极度削弱，但由吉耶特·威尔德茨所率领，宣扬反伊斯兰教的荷兰自由党得票率则高达17%。 不仅如此，极右党派在奥地利，丹麦，匈牙利，斯洛伐克，甚至在英国都表现得比预想的要好——极右的英国国家党甚至赢得了建党以来的第一个席位。


Indeed, the far-right British National Party won its first ever seat. But those worried about the rise of extremism in Europe should take some heart from the fact that there are many differences of views between these parties.	虽然有人为极端主义在欧洲的崛起而忧虑，但这些极端党派的政纲其实千差万别，并非铁板一块，大可不必担心。


The predominance of the right in the future European Parliament calls for some explanation.	那么右翼党派凭什么能在未来欧洲议会中占有如此优势？


The main reason might be the poor fortunes of social-democratic parties, which now head only eight governments in the EU, despite their efforts since 2000 to minimize their waning influence within their traditional electorate – blue-collar workers and white-collar public-sector employees, middle managers, and civil servants.	其中的主要原因可能要归咎于左翼社会民主党派的不幸命运，现在全欧盟由它们执政的只剩8个国家，尽管自2000年他们就努力最大限度地减少在其传统票仓——包括蓝领工人和公共部门白领，中级管理人员和公务员中日趋下降的影响力。


This is true for Northern Europe’s large social-democratic parties (Denmark and Sweden) but also for parties that attempted to “modernize” themselves by combining socialism and liberalism (the UK and Spain), and even for Europe’s more traditional socialist parties (Belgium and France), which, despite local successes, have found it difficult to re-gain national power.	而这一解释不但适用于对北欧地区那些较大的社会民主政党（比如丹麦和瑞典），更对那些试图通过将社会主义和自由主义相结合来“革新”自己的政党（比如英国和西班牙），甚至对那些在地方选举上大获全胜，却一直难以重获全国政权的比较传统的社会主义政党（比利时和法国��也是有效的。


Meanwhile, those parties that intend to move left, such as die Linke in Germany, risk being overwhelmed by the radical anti-capitalist left.	同时，一些尝试向左倾的党派，如德国的左翼党，也面临着被更激进的反资本主义左翼党派所压垮的危险。


It all seems as if, in the face of a crisis that calls into question decades of finance– driven capitalism and the dominance of free-market ideology, and despite widespread expectations of a revival of the welfare state, the social-democratic ideal has failed to convince a majority of Europeans that it can provide effective solutions.	这一切迹象似乎表明，虽然经济危机使人们开始质疑数十年沿用的金融资本主义和自由市场理论，尽管人们普遍对福利国家的复苏抱有幻想，但社会民主所代表的意识形态已经不能使大多数欧洲人相信这套理念就能提供有效地解决方案。


When it comes to managing a deep and complex crisis, indeed, European voters tend to prefer the experience of conservative politicians.	因此，当问题涉及到解决一场严峻复杂的经济危机时，欧洲选民会更偏爱保守派政治家的经验。


This is all the more remarkable at a time when right-wing governments embrace regulation and even state intervention – the cornerstones of leftist ideologies.	更意义重大的则是如今右翼政府也转而采取政府监管甚至政府干预手段——这等于挖了左派意识形态的墙角。


At the same time, a request for transparency and a care for ecology are growing in the youngest generations across Europe, which explains the progress of the Green vote in many countries.	与此同时，对施政透明度的呼声以及对生态环境的关注也在欧洲年轻一代中不断滋长，这也正好解释了为什么绿党支持率在许多国家都获得了提高。


In short, the global economic crisis has destabilized the ideological divides that have long defined the European political scene and has created new dividing lines. These new chasms might be the most important long term outcome of the European Parliament elections.	总而言之，一场全球经济危机已经动摇了长期定义欧洲政治舞台的意识形态分歧并创造了新的分界线，而这些新的分裂很可能就是由本次欧洲议会选举所产生的，最重要的长期效应。


Europe\u0027s Calamity	欧洲的灾难


It has happened.	终于发生了。


After France and the Netherlands rejected the European Constitutional Treaty, Ireland’s “No” vote is the second and probably decisive blow against a united and strong Europe.	在法国和荷兰否决《欧洲宪法条约》之后，爱尔兰的“否决”投票给了强大团结的欧洲第二次、或许也是致命的一击。


June 12, 2008, will have to be remembered as the day that made European history.	2008年6月12日，将会作为书写欧洲历史的日子而被载入史册。


No matter what desperate rescue efforts will be undertaken, they cannot hide the fact that the European Union has left the world stage as a serious foreign policy player for at least ten years (if not for much longer).	无论要采取何种孤注一掷的补救措施，也无法掩盖这样一个基本事实：那就是至少在未来10年内（也许更加遥遥无期），欧盟将不再是世界舞台上一股严肃的外交力量。


This has happened at a time when the problems on the Balkans remain unresolved, America is experiencing a relative decline, Russia is regaining strength, Turkey’s domestic policy is taking a wrong turn, the Near East – the EU’s direct neighbor – threatens to explode, and the speed of China’s and India’s rise as emerging powers will define the global economy and politics of tomorrow.	这一变化发生在巴尔干问题依旧悬而未决的时刻。 在这样一个时刻，美国的影响力日渐衰落、俄国正在重新崛起、土耳其的国内政策正朝着错误的方向发展、紧挨着欧盟的邻居——近东地区——局势一触即发、而中国和印度作为新兴力量的崛起将决定明天的全球经济和政治局势。


Poor Europe!	可怜的欧洲！


With the Irish referendum, it has blindly and needlessly thrown itself into a political calamity.	爱尔兰全民公决后，欧洲盲目而毫无必要地把自己推入了一场政治灾难之中。


Certainly, the EU will continue to exist and its institutions will continue to function, for better or worse, on the foundation of the Treaty of Nice.	勿庸置疑，按照《尼斯条约》的规定，无论是好是坏，欧盟都将继续存在，欧盟的制度也将继续发挥作用。


But a proactive, strong Europe capable of determining its own fate will not be in the cards for quite some time.	可是一个能够决定自己命运的积极、强大的欧洲却在未来一段时间内都不会浮出水面。


When respectable British media such as Financial Times warn against a renewed European psychodrama and instead call for working toward a “Europe of results,” this should be regarded rather as a bad joke than a serious alternative.	当 《金融时报》 等德高望重的英国媒体告诫人们要警惕再度上演的欧洲心理闹剧，转而呼吁为“硕果累累”的欧洲努力奋斗的时候，这与其说是一个严肃的备选方案，还不如说是一场恶作剧更为妥当。


Neither by cajoling nor by beating can a donkey be turned into a racehorse, unless one is secretly satisfied with the donkey.	无论是哄骗还是责打都不能让一头毛驴变成一匹赛马，除非我们暗地里对毛驴心满意足。


And that is exactly Europe’s core problem: several members do not want more than a donkey.	这也正是欧洲的核心问题所在，有几个国家不想成为毛驴以外的任何东西。


Institutions, however, may be reformed if they no longer work, and this is exactly what the EU has been futilely trying to do for 20 years.	尽管如此，我们可以改革已经过时的制度，而这也正是欧盟已经徒劳无功地做了20年的事情。


After 1989, history has made EU enlargement indispensable, but, without institutional reform, a Europe of 27 member states will inevitably deliver ever worse – and, to its citizens, increasingly disappointing – results.	1989年后，历史已经让欧盟东扩成为必然，但是，如果没有制度改革，由27个成员国组成的欧洲不可避免地会产生更糟——而对欧盟居民来讲，也更令人失望的结果。


What will be the consequences of the Irish referendum?	爱尔兰全民公决的后果是什么？


1) A strong European foreign policy, badly needed given the current state of the world, was buried on June 12, for the time being.	1)考虑到目前世界局势的迫切需求，强大的欧洲外交政策在6月12号那天被暂时埋葬了。


The nation states will have control over foreign policy once again.	民族国家将重新开始掌控外交政策。


The same is true for the democratization of the EU and thus for its greater proximity to, and acceptance by, ordinary citizens.	欧盟的民主化进程和欧盟与普通民众的亲近和被普通百姓的认可也暂时陷入了停滞状态。


Given this point, the Irish decision is especially grotesque, because it rejected exactly what it called for.	考虑到这种状况，爱尔兰的决策就显得愈发奇怪，因为它否决的正是它所一直倡导的东西。


2) The EU will stagnate.	2)欧盟将会陷入停滞。


The process of enlargement will either be delayed or stopped completely, because the EU can no longer admit new members on the basis of the “Nice constitution.”	东扩的进程或者将被推迟，或者将彻底陷入停滞，原因是欧盟无法继续按照《尼斯条约》的规定吸收新加盟的成员。


The price will first be paid in the Balkans, and then by Turkey.	巴尔干半岛将会首先付出代价，接下来是土耳其。


3) The EU’s smaller and mid-sized members, above all, will pay the price for the Irish decision when foreign policy becomes re-nationalized.	3)归根结底，在外交政策重新民族化的情况下，欧盟的中小型成员国将为爱尔兰的决定付出代价。


They will lose influence.	它们将会丧失影响力。


There is nothing really new in that if one only looks at the foreign policies of France and Great Britain.	如果只考虑法国和英国的外交政策，这里并没有什么东西真正令人感到新奇。


But the case of Germany is different.	但德国的情况却有所不同。


Germany has long seen its strategic interests from within the framework of an integrated EU.	德国一直以来就在欧盟统一的框架下考虑自己的战略利益。


A long-term blockade of a strong EU will necessarily change this viewpoint.	如果强大的欧盟遭到长期封锁，德国将被迫改变自己的重心。


4) As an alternative to a large and strong EU, the German-French relationship will return to the fore.	4)作为对强大欧盟的一种替代，德法关系将重新回到前台。


In the future, close cooperation between Germany and France will more than ever form the old and new center of gravity in a blocked EU.	在未来的日子里，德法之间的紧密合作在欧盟受阻的前提下将前所未有地成为新老体系的重中之重。


But, given the Treaty of Nice, this will lead to the EU’s internal disintegration and the formation of two camps: the EU of integration and the EU of the Common Market.	但是，考虑到《尼斯条约》，德法关系的重新崛起将会导致欧盟的内部分裂和两大阵营的形成：那就是统一欧盟阵营和共同市场阵营。


Basically, the old European Economic Community and the old European Free Trade Agreement will de facto emerge anew within the framework of the EU.	从根本上讲，原有的欧洲经济共同体和欧洲自由贸易协定将在欧盟的框架中实际回到前台。


5) Within the wider EU, solidarity threatens to decline.	5)在东扩后的欧盟内部，团结的氛围受到了威胁。


Solidarity is not a one-way street.	团结不是一条单向车道。


Ireland, one of the countries that benefited the most in material terms from the idea of European unification, has rejected this idea.	爱尔兰，这个在物质利益上从欧洲统一理念中受益最多的国家之一，却否决了欧盟统一的理念。


Thus, negotiations on European financial transfers, the core of European solidarity, will be much tougher in the future than they were in the past (when they were already difficult enough).	这样，就欧洲财政转移所进行的谈判，也就是欧洲团结的核心，在未来将面临着比过去严峻得多的考验（过去的情况已经不容乐观）。


The poorer EU countries will suffer from this development.	较为贫困的欧盟国家将因为这一进展而深受其害。


There is still a minuscule chance to avert the debacle if Ireland with its “No” vote remains isolated within the EU.	如果爱尔兰否决条约只是欧盟内部的个别现象，防止欧盟统一进程的崩溃似乎还有一线希望。


Beyond that, however, we should seriously consider whether, within the framework of the Treaty of Nice and on the basis of the Common Market, all parties involved and Europe would be better off parting ways: members favoring political integration should move on, while those satisfied with the Common Market should stay behind.	可是除此之外，我们应该认真考虑在《尼斯条约》和共同市场的基础之上，是否分道扬镳对欧洲和所有涉及各方更为有利：这样支持政治统一的成员国将会继续努力下去，而那些对共同市场感到心满意足的成员国则将维持现状。


This formula worked with the Monetary Union.	这一公式曾经在货币联盟中卓有成效。


So why not with political integration?	那么为什么不能在政治统一中加以应用？


At any rate, comprehensive opt-outs are better than long-lasting blockades and disintegration of the European project.	无论如何，全面撤退总比欧洲计划的土崩瓦解和长期停滞要更加妥当。


Europe’s Challenges in 2012	2012年欧洲面临的挑战


MADRID – For more than six decades, Europe’s integration process has been steadily evolving.	马德里——60多年来，欧洲一体化进程稳步发展。


Each step, from the European Coal and Steel Community to today’s European Union, was taken with the common good in mind, and was based on shared values (democracy, human rights, and social justice) and goals (economic growth, prosperity, and the consolidation of Europe’s international prestige).	从欧洲煤钢共同体到如今的欧盟，迈出的每一步都是基于共同的利益、共同的价值观（民主、人权和社会公平）和目标（经济增长、繁荣和巩固欧洲的国际声誉）。


In the coming year, the result – the common rules and institutions that we Europeans have painstakingly forged – will be tested like never before.	明年，所取得的成果——我们欧洲人努力推进的共同规则和机构——将受到前所未有的考验。


In 2011, Europe’s foundations began to tremble, as the eurozone’s sovereign-debt crisis, set in motion by the global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008, moved from the eurozone’s periphery to its core countries.	2011年，2008年爆发的全球金融和经济危机催生了欧元区主权债务危机，该危机从欧元区的边缘国家蔓延到核心国家，欧洲的根基已经开始动摇。


The EU’s resilience – indeed, its very survival – is being called into question at a time of profound geopolitical transformation, in which a stronger Europe is essential.	在发生深刻的地缘政治转型时期，更加强大的欧洲必不可少，欧盟的恢复力——确切的说是其生死存亡——却受到了质疑。


Global power is shifting towards Asia and the Pacific.	全球力量正向亚洲和太平洋转移。


New – and newly influential – non-state actors have appeared, in some cases (for example, terrorist organizations) jeopardizing states’ capacity to guarantee national security.	出现了新生——以及具有新影响力——的非国家成员，在一些情况下（比如，恐怖组织）危及到了各国保证国家安全的能力。


Nuclear proliferation is a growing menace, as shown by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s recent report on Iran.	核扩散的威胁越来越大，从国际原子能机构有关伊朗发布的最新报告中可见一斑。


Progress on other crucial global issues – particularly energy security and climate change – has been disappointing.	全球其他重要问题的进展令人失望——尤其在能源安全和气候变化领域。


And the scourge of poverty and famine – most vividly urgent today in Somalia – continues to offend the very idea of civilization.	贫困和饥荒问题——如今在索马里最为紧迫——仍然困扰着文明的理念。


All of this stands in stark contrast with the predictions of a peaceful, predictable, and safe “post-historical” world that were popular at the Cold War’s end.	这与冷战结束后，和平、可预测和安全的“后历史”世界（当时非常流行）将来临的预测形成鲜明的对比。


The Arab revolts, unthinkable a year ago, now challenge a regional order that has prevailed for more than a half-century.	一年前，阿拉伯起义还是无法想象的，如今该起义对盛行了半个多世纪的地区秩序构成了挑战。


The Japanese tsunami has called into question the future of nuclear energy worldwide.	日本的海啸使人们对世界各地核能的未来产生了疑问。


And, perhaps most remarkably, the relative global decline of the United States, the world’s economic and security anchor since 1945, became unmistakable in 2011, reflected in political polarization and paralysis – and punctuated by a credit-rating downgrade.	此外，或许最显著的是，2011年，美国（自1945年以来一直是世界经济和安全的领导者）在全球相对衰落日益明确无误，表现有政治极端化和瘫痪以及信用评级遭降。


So the strategic challenges facing the EU are vast.	因此欧盟面临巨大的战略挑战。


To meet them, it must first restore its international credibility.	应对这些挑战，首先欧盟必须重建国际信誉。


Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, great advances have been made – and should continue to be made – toward reform and regulation of the financial system.	自从2009年实施《里斯本条约》以来，金融制度的改革和监管取得了巨大的进展，不过还应该进一步努力。


But many decisions came too late or have not gone far enough, with far-reaching consequences, because current tools are inadequate to address the seriousness of the crisis.	但是许多决策出台太迟或者力度不够，产生了深远的影响，因为目前的手段不足以解决这一严重的危机。


As the sovereign-debt crisis has proven, the euro requires mechanisms to confront asymmetrical shocks, which implies the creation of a common treasury.	主权债务危机已经证明，欧元需要应对不对称性冲击的机制，这意味着创建一个共同的财政部。


An important first step in confronting the speculative attacks that eurozone economies suffer today is a commitment to greater risk-sharing and greater authority for the European Central Bank.	如今欧元区经济体遭到了投机性的攻击，应对这类攻击的首要措施是给予欧洲央行更大的权力，让它承担更大的风险。


Confirmation of a stricter and more rigorous Stability Pact is also imperative to achieve greater integration.	批准更加严格和严密的《稳定公约》对于实现进一步一体化也必不可少。


Here, the EU summit in December was an important step forward in terms of deepening political union and strengthening governance among the eurozone’s member states.	在这方面，12月份召开的欧盟峰会在欧元区成员国深化政治联盟和加强治理方面向前迈出了重要一步。


Nevertheless, more will be needed to restore financial stability, such as enlarging the total firepower of the European Financial Stability Facility.	尽管如此，恢复金融稳定仍需更多的努力，比如扩充欧洲金融稳定基金的总量。


Moreover, if we want the EU to emerge strengthened from the crisis, it must also strike a better balance between austerity and pro-growth policies, because, without growth and higher employment, the eurozone’s problems cannot be resolved.	此外，如果我们希望欧盟经历危机后更加强大，欧盟还必须在财政紧缩和促增长的政策之间实现更好的平衡，因为没有经济增长和较高的就业率，欧元区的问题就无法解决。


More importantly, the EU must tie its economic strategies to long-term competitiveness, which is ultimately determined by the value added to goods and services.	更加重要的是，欧元区经济体必须将其经济增长策略与长期的竞争力联系在一起，而竞争力最终由产品和服务的附加值决定。


China and India have learned that lesson well. In less than 15 years, they will account for 20% of global spending on investment in research and development, more than twice their current share.	中国和印度深知这一点：在不到15年的时间内，它们将占到全球研发投入的20%，比当前的比重多一倍多。


Meanwhile, the EU will run up against serious demographic constraints: in 2025, Europe will represent just 6.5% of the world’s population, compared to Asia’s 61%, and its average age will be 45, compared to 28 in India, 37 in China, and 38 in the US.	与此同时，欧盟将面临严重的人口制约：到2025年，欧洲将只占到世界人口的6. 5%，相比之下，亚洲将占到61%，欧洲的平均年龄将达到45岁，而印度为28岁，中国为37岁，美国为38岁。


In the absence of adequate strategies for immigration, integration, health care, education, and much else, Europe’s growth and competitiveness will decline, and social tensions will worsen and multiply.	没有足够的移民、一体化、医疗保健和教育等战略，欧洲的经济增长和竞争力将下降，社会紧张关系将进一步恶化并增多。


Europe must also contribute to reforming the traditional system of international relations.	欧洲还必须促进改革国际关系的传统制度。


The existing multilateral institutions were designed for a vanishing Western-centric world.	现存的多边机构是为以西方为中心的世界设计的，而以西方为中心的世界正在消失。


At the same time, the dispersion of power, the degree of interdependence, and the sheer dimension of the challenges confronting the world require effective, accountable, and legitimate global governance.	同时，力量分布、相互依赖的程度以及世界所面临的巨大挑战都需要有效、负责任以及合法的全球治理。


The inability to achieve a consensus on acute issues, such as Syria’s internal repression, or on chronic problems, like climate change, highlights the (increasing) complexity of global governance and responsibility.	在迫切问题（比如叙利亚的国���压迫）和长期问题（比如气候变化）上无法达成共识凸显出全球治理和责任越来越复杂。


Accommodating today’s institutions to the new global powers is a key challenge that cannot be postponed further in 2012.	调整当前的机构以适应全球新强国是一项重要的挑战，在2012年，必须加以应对，不可再拖延。


An example is the IMF’s general revision of quotas, due in 2014.	2014年，国际货币基金组织将进行配额大修订就是一例。


Here, no one is better positioned than Europe to advocate for effective multilateralism and facilitate agreement and adjustment, by adopting a common position to correct today’s overrepresentation.	在这方面，欧洲占据着最有利的位置，倡导有效的多边主义，通过采用一致立场促进达成协议和调整，从而纠正如今过多的代表性。


Speaking clearly will enable us to promote our interests more successfully by developing partnerships not only with traditional allies, like the US, but also with new leaders, like China and Brazil, and strategic players, like Turkey and Russia – and with the increasingly important regional blocs that are forming around them.	说清楚能够让我们更加成功地增加自身利益，有下列途径：不仅要与美国等传统盟友发展伙伴关系，还要与中国和巴西等新领导者、土耳其和俄罗斯等具有战略意义的国家以及日益重要的地区集团（这些集团正在欧洲周边形成）发展伙伴关系。


In the Middle East – a region that, unlike Eastern Europe, has no landing strip – our support is essential to the construction of a new regional framework.	在中东——与东欧不同，该地区没有着陆地带——我们的支持对构建新地区框架必不可少。


No one claims that meeting all of these challenges will be easy.	没有人认为应对这些挑战是轻而易举的事。


All roads have ups and downs, just as every crisis imparts a lesson.	所有道路都不是平坦的，正如每次危机都能给我们一次教训一样。


In 2012, the lesson should be the need for greater political integration and financial regulation, a legitimate and transparent institutional framework, and consensus.	2012年的教训应该是：推进政治一体化，加强金融监管，构建合法透明的机构框架以及达成共识必不可少。


All problems can be worked out if we keep the lights on high and analyze the situation with a clear strategic vision.	如果我们立意高远，以清晰的战略远见分析形势，所有难题便能迎刃而解。


Europe’s Competitiveness Shell Game	欧洲的竞争力骗局


BRUSSELS – For seasoned observers of Europe’s economy, the most recent European Union summit delivered a bizarre sense of déjà vu.	发自布鲁塞尔——对于那些长期关注欧洲经济的人说，最近的欧盟峰会有种似曾相识的怪诞感觉。


Little more than a decade ago, European leaders announced to great fanfare the “Lisbon Agenda,” a policy blueprint to make Europe “the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world.” The new “Competitiveness Pact,” proposed at the EU summit by France and Germany, did not make the same pretensions to global grandeur, but was instead sold as a step required to ensure the survival of the euro.	就在10年多以前，欧洲各国领导人隆重推出了《里斯本议程》——一份旨在将欧洲建成为“世界上最具竞争力知识经济体”的政治蓝图，而由英法两国在本次欧盟峰会上提出的《竞争力协议》却缺乏如斯宏图大志，仅仅是确保欧元能继续生存下去的一步棋而已。


With the exception of what appears to be a covert effort to force EU countries to raise corporate taxes to French and German levels, there is ostensibly nothing unreasonable in the Competitiveness Pact.	除了暗中想将欧盟各国企业税项提高到法德水平之外，这份《协议》大体上并无任何不妥之处。


Raising the retirement age to 67, abolishing wage indexation, and compelling countries to enshrine a debt brake in their national constitutions are reasonable measures to enhance competitiveness and restore confidence in the euro.	将退休年龄提高到67岁，废除工资指数化制度（雇员货币工资随物价指数浮动并按照价格指数自动调节收入的制度），以及强迫各国将负债上限写入宪法等措施都是有道理的，既能提升竞争力，又有助于维持欧元的信誉。


Unfortunately, however, government leaders have apparently learned nothing from the lessons of the failed Lisbon Agenda.	但不幸的是，各国首脑们显然没能从《里斯本议程》的失败中吸取教训。


Indeed, the current plans seem doomed to fail for two reasons.	实际上这一计划注定夭折，原因有二：


First, a credible policy agenda needs firm targets with clear deadlines.	首先，一个可靠的政策议程必须包含切实的目标和明确的实施期限。


But, notwithstanding their leadership pose vis-à-vis the Competitiveness Pact, the French have already distanced themselves from the commitment to raise the retirement age to 67.	而尽管法国人在《竞争力协议》中扮演着领导角色，但却对提高退休年龄到67岁的政策承诺避而不谈。


According to Bloomberg, a French official told reporters at the summit that there was no question of that after the retirement age was lifted to 62 from 60 last year.	据布隆伯格新闻社报道，一位与会法方官员告诉记者：自从去年将退休年龄从60岁升到62岁后就不能再提这件事了。


Given the huge public protests sparked by that move, the official’s statement seems eminently believable.	回想去年那波大规模抗议风潮，这位官员的言论显然极为可信。


The likely outcome – in typical European, consensus-driven fashion – will be to forgo deadlines and concrete targets in favor of an ambiguous, open-ended pledge to undertake further pension reform.	对此可能产生的后果——在一个以达成共识为目标的典型欧洲做派下——就是放弃对限期以及明确目标的坚持，转而发表一个含糊不清且不设期限的养老金改革承诺。


Similar exceptions will probably be made for other countries that cannot reconcile aspects of the new pact with their national circumstances.	而类似的例外也将出现在那些无法使《协议》要求与本国情况相一致的国家身上。


Belgium, for example, insists on its system of automatic wage indexing.	例如比利时就一心要实行自动工资指数化制度。


After every country has received its “opt-out,” and the Competitiveness Pact’s targets have been sufficiently diluted to ensure its passage, there will most likely be very little of substance left.	随着每个国家都选择性地拒绝某些条文，这份《协议》的目标将最终被极大弱化以确保获得通过，自然也无法奢望能取得多少实质性成果了。


Second, targets need to be not only specific, but also binding.	其二，这些政策目标不但要明确，还必须有强制力。


Sanctions for non-compliance must be enforced – without political meddling.	对那些不服从者必须制裁且不能有任何政治让步。


One of the most important lessons of the Lisbon Agenda is that the so-called Open Method of Coordination – a harmless peer-review procedure without repercussions for non-performance – is clearly the wrong approach to kick-starting national-level reforms.	《里斯本议程》的其中一条最重要教训就是所谓的“开放性合作方略”（一个完全不存在负面手段，不执行者无需承担后果的国家间互相监督程序）显然是一项启动国家改革的错误方式。


But even where the European Commission had the legislative tools and political mandate to impose sanctions – for example, to punish non-compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact – member states managed to avoid punishment by “reforming” the requirements.	但即便欧盟委员会掌握了实施制裁的相关法律工具和政治授权——比如用《稳定与增长公约》的相关条文来制裁不服从者——各成员国依然可以用“改革”相关规定的方式来逃避制裁。


Indeed, Germany and France spearheaded the effort to make the Stability and Growth Pact more “flexible” when they could no longer comply with its 3%-of-GDP fiscal-deficit ceiling.	在这方面德法两国可算始作俑者，当年它们发现自己无法满足《公约》中关于财政赤字不能超过GDP3%的要求，于是便想办法让《公约》变得更“灵活”一点。


It is this history that makes the current moves to sideline the European Commission in enforcing the Competitiveness Pact suspicious.	正是过去这段历史令人们对欧盟委员会贯彻《竞争力协议》的可能性充满了怀疑。


Organized purely as an intergovernmental policy program, the pact cannot work, because EU member states cannot be trusted to monitor their own performance and enforce sanctions on their peers – or on themselves.	单纯作为一项国际间政策项目的《协议》是无法取得成果的，因为你既无法依靠欧盟国家来监督自身的表现，也无力借助他们对其他盟国（及其自身）实施制裁。


Such a system would be the political equivalent of letting the inmates guard the prison.	这样一个系统在政治上的效果就跟让囚犯管理监狱一样荒谬。


In fact, the Competitiveness Pact’s failure even to mention the Europe 2020 strategy, which EU leaders enacted less than a year ago as a blueprint for economic development, reinforces the impression of uncoordinated, ad hoc, and downright erratic policymaking that is heavy on theatrics and light on implementation.	实际上《竞争力协议》甚至连欧盟领导人在不到一年前推出的“欧盟2020年战略”经济发展蓝图都没有提及，也更加加深了人们对其的负面印象：这一切只不过是场华而不实的政策闹剧，既无协调可言，也完全不靠谱。


The lack of consensus on basic features of an economic framework – be it a retirement age commensurate with Europe’s demographic outlook or a legislative commitment to budgetary discipline – makes one wonder how eurozone countries could enter a monetary union in the first place.	对一个经济框架的某些基本要素缺乏共识的现状——从一个与欧洲人口前景相适应的退休年龄到对预算控制的立法承诺——使人不禁怀疑当年欧元区国家是如何组建一个货币联盟的。


That question is in the past, of course, but publicly demonstrating the eurozone’s arrested convergence is bound to undermine confidence in the common currency further – and at a most unfortunate moment.	这个问题虽然很耳熟，但同时也公开表明欧元区这种强迫性的集中议事制度注定会进一步动摇共同货币的信心——而且在一个最不恰当的时刻。


Just as financial markets seem to have calmed, European leaders have once again raised expectations of a major policy move – only to see yet another summit devolve into squabbling.	而正如金融市场似乎变得平静那样，欧洲领导人再一次燃起了实现重大政策跨越的期望——却也再一次见证了峰会沦在一片争吵中破裂。


It is hard to imagine how Europe’s policy differences can be overcome by the leaders’ self-imposed March deadline, when the next summit will take place.	很难想象欧洲各国的政策差异能在领袖们自我下达的期限内——他们宣称“到下次峰会召开时就能解决”——得到弥合。


One thing is certain: it will require a lot more than a warmed-over Lisbon Agenda, with easy targets and toothless enforcement, to restore confidence in the euro and safeguard the monetary union.	只有一件事是肯定的：如果要提升人们对欧元的信心并巩固这一货币联盟的话，我们就必须将那个陈旧过时的《里斯本议程》（连同那些过分轻易的目标以及毫无强制力的实施措施）一起抛弃，并付出更多的努力。


Europe’s Conscience Police	欧洲的信仰政策


The story of the rejection last autumn of my appointment to be a member of the European Commission is notorious.	去年秋天欧洲执委会否决我候选资格一事闹得沸沸扬扬。


Nominated to the Commission by the Italian Government, I was compelled to withdraw because of some allegedly homophobic remarks I was said to have made before the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs.	意大利政府向欧洲委员会提名我为欧盟专员，而有人却宣称我曾在欧洲议会公民自由、司法和内政执委会前发表反同性恋言论，因此我被迫退出选举。


Now that the dust from that dispute has settled, and with a new Commission in place, it is time to ask what lessons can be drawn from this affair.	如今当所有的争论都尘埃落定，新委员会也已就位，该来看看从此事件中我们可以汲取何种教训了。


The first lesson concerns the indispensability in politics of accurate information and reporting.	第一个教训涉及到政治信息和报道准确的必要性。


Democracy works only if there is a fair reporting of the issues being debated.	只有对热点事件进行公正报道，才能有民主政治。


Of course, everyone is free to comment on and evaluate events as he or she pleases.	当然，每个人都有权利根据各自喜好发表评论、评价事件。


But a high standard of fidelity to the truth is needed in the media; otherwise, debates become too distorted for citizens to evaluate correctly their meaning.	但是媒体必须高度忠实于事实，否则，讨论就会过于失真以至于公民们不能准确评估它们的意义。


Reporters are not entitled to so twist the facts as to reinvent them.	记者没有权利为了歪曲事实而重造事件。


In my case, the main charge against me was invented: I made no homophobic statement. Nor did I did introduce the issue of homosexuality into the debate over my appointment.	在我的案例中，对我的主要控诉可谓无中生有：我没有发表过任何有关反同性恋的评论，也没有越权将同性恋引入辩论。


My opponents did.	这都是我的对手做的。


I did not introduce the emotionally charged word “sin” and tie it to homosexuality in the debate.	我没有引用最招非议的“罪孽”一词，也没有在辩论中将它与同性恋联系在一起。


Once again, my foes did this.	再次申明，那是我的对手做的。


What I said, instead, was this: I might, as a practicing Roman Catholic who adheres to his Church’s teachings, think that homosexuality is a sin.	而我所说的是：作为一个严格遵守教会教义的罗马天主教徒，也许，我会认为同性恋是一种罪孽。


This belief could not be construed to have any influence on my decisions, unless I also said and believed that homosexuality is also a crime.	但是，除非我说过并且也相信同性恋是一种罪孽，否则我的信仰不应该被曲意理解为会对我的决定产生任何影响。


But I said nothing of the sort.	但是我没有说过这类话。


A liberal society is a society in which people holding different moral opinions are bound together through a common rule of law.	在一个自由社会中，持不同道德观点的人们在法律的共同约束下结合在一起。


In the fields of both law and politics, I have consistently and clearly supported the principle of non-discrimination.	无论是在法律还是在政治领域，我都一贯明确支持无歧视政策。


The distinction that I was drawing in my testimony, between law and morals, was not accepted. Worse, it was turned into a caricature, and then declared false.	我在听证会上引用的介于法律和道德之间的区分概念不但不被人们所接受，更糟糕的是，它被夸张讽刺后，被宣布为是错误的。


Indeed, the committee entered in the sphere of moral conscience by stating that anyone who does not adhere to a positive moral evaluation of homosexuality is unfit to serve as a European commissioner.	事实上，执委会进入了这样一个道德信仰的范围：宣称任何对同性恋坚持消极道德评价的人不适合当选欧盟执委会委员。


This means that anyone holding to the moral doctrines of most Christian churches should nowadays be considered a second-class citizen in the European Union.	这意味着任何坚守大部分基督教义的人们如今将在欧盟中被视为二等公民。


According to this principle, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Alcide de Gasperi – three of the EU’s founding fathers – would not measure up.	根据这一原则，Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, 和Alcide de Gasperi这三位缔造欧盟之父，也难以符合标准。


What is wrong with the fact that a parliamentary committee passes a political judgment against a Commissioner for purely political reasons?	如果一个议会委员会纯粹因为政治原因通过一项反对一名议员的政治判决，又有什么错呢？


The rejection of my nomination was, according to many, just another political battle: you win some, you lose some, but you cannot say that you have been unfairly discriminated against simply because you lost.	从很多方面来说，我被否决提名一事， 只是另外一场政治斗争：输赢各有其人，但是你不能因为你输了就说你受到了非公正的歧视。


But the European Commission is not accountable to the European Parliament in the same way that a national government is accountable to its parliament.	但是欧洲执委会对欧洲议会并不负责，就像国家政府对本国议会不负责一样。


The EU’s member governments name the members of the European Commission, and the Parliament lacks an explicit right to veto them.	欧洲议会对欧盟成员国提名的欧盟执委会委员候选人没有直接否决权。


A hearing over a nomination to be a Commissioner before an EU parliamentary committee should simply examine whether the person is competent in the area he or she is to oversee on the Commission, and whether there are elements of moral indignity – i.e., such obvious moral failings as to be disqualifying.	在欧盟议会委员会之前召开的提名委员候选人公听会只应该简单地考察此人是否胜任他（或她）将在执委会内主管的领域，是否有道德污点——即，明显存在此类道德缺陷将失去资格。


Now it seems that, according to the committee that rejected my nomination, adhering to the principles of most Christian churches is a cause for such a “moral” disqualification.	现在根据否决我提名资格的执委会来看，坚守大部分基督教信条是导致这一“道德”不合格的原因。


The implication of this position is profound and shocking.	这种观点所包含的意义深远且惊人。


If it were generally accepted, it would imply that the EU now holds official moral doctrines, and that allegiance to these doctrines is required in order to exercise the full right of citizens to serve in a public capacity.	万一它被普遍接受，那就将暗示着，只有拥护欧盟目前持有的官方道德准条，才能全权行使公民权利，获得公共权力。


That implication is intolerable, and it will progressively weaken and divide the EU through a type of semi-official hostility to religious faith.	这种暗示不仅令人难以忍受，而且它还会通过一种半官方的、对宗教信仰的对抗，日益削弱并分离欧盟。


Moreover, the demand for such an allegiance is a renunciation of one of the most important steps in Europe’s development.	此外，对这种忠诚拥护的要求是对欧洲发展重要步骤之一的一种摒弃。


It has been roughly 300 years since religious people came to understand that being of a different faith, or being agnostic, did not disqualify one from public office.	大约300年以前，信奉宗教的人们就已经明白，无论是持不同信仰者还是不可知论者，都不能被剥削其在公务办公室内任职的资格。


If the moral test that I endured stands, it means that Europe has come full circle: agnostics are no longer willing to accept that being religious – and having different moral views – should not bar someone from holding an official post.	如果我所忍受的道德测试站得住脚，那就意味着欧洲已经又回到了原点：不可知论者不再愿意接受这样的观点：持有宗教信仰和持有不同道德观点不应该是把某些人拒在公务职位门外的原因。


I hope that the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs will reconsider its behavior, and that the “Buttiglione affair” will remain only an ordinary political injustice against a single individual rather than the harbinger of second-class citizenship for religious believers.	我希望欧洲议会公民自由、司法和内政执委会将重新考虑它的行为，“卜丁格利昂事件”也将会仅仅作为一起普通的针对个人的不公正政治事件，而不是预示着持有宗教信仰者的二等公民身份的开端。


If, on the other hand, the European Parliament’s members follow through on the logic of my case – if my shunning becomes the basis for a consistent policy – the EU will be on its way to creating a kind of morality police and launching a modern-day inquisition, one that crassly violates both freedom of religion and freedom of conscience.	另一方面，如果欧洲议会成员顺势遵循我的案例逻辑，如果我的回避为一贯的政策提供了依据，欧盟就会走上一条建立道德警察、重设现代宗教法庭之路，那将会彻底毁掉宗教自由和信仰自由。


The European Oasis	欧洲绿洲


PARIS – Are non-Europeans much less pessimistic about Europe than Europeans themselves?	巴黎—非欧洲人对欧洲不像欧洲人那样悲观吗？


Could distance be a prerequisite for a more balanced view of the continent’s predicament?	对于某个大陆的问题，距离是产生更平衡观点的必要条件吗？


In an interview a few months ago, Wang Hongzhang, the chairman of China Construction Bank, indirectly expressed his subdued enthusiasm for Europe.	在几个月前的一次采访中，中国建设银行董事长王洪章委婉地表达了他对欧洲克制的热情。


Quoting the Chinese proverb, “A starved camel is still bigger than a horse,” he went on to say that Europe’s economies are much stronger than many people believe.	他引用中国成语评价欧洲：“瘦死的骆驼比马大”，接着又说欧洲经济比许多人想象得坚挺得多。


And, without saying so explicitly, he suggested that the time was right to go on a European buying spree at the right price.	此外，尽管没有明说，但他表示在正确的价格买入欧洲的时机已经对头了。


Of course, not everyone would share this optimistic vision.	当然，不是所有人都抱着如此乐观的态度。


Across the English Channel, British Euroskeptics rejoice that they have kept their distance from a “sinking ship.”	英吉利海峡另一头，英国的疑欧派对于远离“下沉的船”踌躇满志。


But, while The Economist recently described France as being “in denial,” the same could be said of the United Kingdom.	但是，尽管《经济学人》最近说法国“拒绝承认出了问题”，其实英国人自己也是如此。


True, the French had neither the Olympic Games nor a royal celebration this year; but, when it comes to the state of their economies, the two countries are largely in the same boat.	诚然，法国今年既没有举办奥运会，也没有王室生日，但是，就经济而言，两国可以说坐在一条船上。


If one travels to America or Asia, as I did this autumn, Europe’s image becomes selectively brighter: while it continues to be perceived as a positive model, it is no longer considered a global actor.	如果你像今秋的我一样去过美国或亚洲，那么欧洲的形象大概会有选择地更加光明一些：尽管欧洲仍被视为积极的模式，但已不再被看作全球行动者。


Seen from the United States, Europe may no longer be a problem, but it is not considered a part of any solution to the world’s problems, either – with the possible exception of those that concern Europe directly (and, even then, doubts linger).	从美国的角度看，欧洲不再是个问题，但也没有被当成世界问题解决方案的一部分——大概直接考虑欧洲的人例外（但是，即使对这些人来说，也是疑虑重重）。


Yet, for many international investors, Europe continues to be, or is once again, a risk worth taking, if not – as in the case of Wang – a golden opportunity.	但是，对许多国际投资者来说，欧洲仍然是，或者说再次成为值得冒风险的目标，甚至——比如在王建章眼中——是黄金机会。


In a time of growing complexity – and thus uncertainty – investors want to hedge their bets.	在复杂性——以及随之而来的不确定性——与日俱增的时候，投资者需要对冲赌注。


At least some of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) appear to be running out of steam economically; and, while new emerging powers, such as Mexico, are tempting, they may prove to be more fragile than they look.	至少部分金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）正在失去经济动力； 而墨西哥等新新兴大国虽然看起来诱人无比，但实际上可能相当脆弱。


In this context, Europe may be a tired, aging, and depressed continent, but, as its luxury and aeronautics industries attest, it would be premature to bury it.	在这样的环境下，欧洲或许是疲倦、衰老和压抑之洲，但正如其奢侈品和航空业所证明的，现在就判定它一蹶不振还为时过早。


Relative decline is obvious: Europe accounted for 20% of the world’s population at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but only around 7% today, while its share is expected to be even lower in 2050.	相对衰落是显而易见的：18世纪伊始，欧洲人口占世界的20%，如今只占7%，到2050年预计将进一步下降。


But demography is not destiny: a small population has not prevented Singapore from sustaining a hyper-competitive economy.	但人口并不能决定命运：人口稀少并不能阻止新加坡保持强大的经济竞争力。


Europe may not be a source of economic inspiration, but it still makes people dream.	欧洲也许不再是经济灵感之源，但仍可以称为人们的梦想。


It is perceived as a model of “civility.”	欧洲仍被当成“礼仪”模式。


Whatever their other disagreements, Chinese and Japanese concur on one point: if Asia today, with its rising nationalist tensions, evokes Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, it is precisely because Asia has not embarked on a reconciliation process such as that which enabled France and Germany to transcend their centuries-old rivalry.	不管有多不认同，中国人和日本人动同意一点：如果说民族主义紧张局势不断抬头的今日亚洲和20世纪上半叶的欧洲极为相似的话，其原因正在于亚洲缺少让法国和德国泯去几百年仇怨的妥协程序。


Likewise, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, may emphasize the specificity of “Russian civilization” in a manner evocative of nineteenth-century anti-Western thinkers; but many in the Russian elite still consider the European Union, despite its many weaknesses, the most civilized model of governance that exists.	类似地，俄罗斯总统普京强调“俄罗斯文明”特征的语调很可能唤起人们对十九世纪反西方思想家的回忆； 但俄罗斯国内的很多精英仍将欧盟（尽管它有各种各样的弱点）视为现存最文明的治理模式。


When Chinese seek a benchmark model for social protection, they go on study trips to Scandinavia.	当中国人寻找社会保护的基准模式时，他们会去斯堪的纳维亚取经。


But can Europe remain a model if it is no longer a serious geopolitical actor?	但如果欧洲不再是资深的地缘政治行动方，他还能成为一种模式吗？


When US officials say to the Europeans, “We need you,” what they mean is quite minimal: “Please do not collapse and bring down the global economy with you.”	当美国官员对欧洲人说“我们需要你们”时，他们的意思是轻蔑的：“请不要在崩溃时把全球经济也拖下水。


Europeans have become the Japanese of the West – financial contributors who at best play a supporting role in global strategic affairs.	”欧洲人成了西方的日本人——资金提供者，充其量只是全球战略要务的支持角色。


For example, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can still be resolved, a solution can come only with strong US involvement.	比如，如果以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突仍能够解决的话，那么解决方案只有寄希望于美国的强力参与。


Barack Obama, who wants to be a transformative president like his role model, Abraham Lincoln, could do worse to deserve the Nobel Peace Prize that he received prematurely than to facilitate a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.	奥巴马希望和他的偶像林肯一样成为划时代总统更有可能为他过早获得的诺贝尔和平奖抹上污点，而不是促成全面的中东和解。


Few expect such a colossal achievement, of course, but far fewer expect anything remotely similar from Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy czarina, or, for that matter, any European leader.	当然，没多少人会期待能够完成这一伟大成就，但期待欧盟外交政策女皇凯瑟琳·阿什顿（Catherine Ashton）���其他欧洲人完成这一伟大成就的人显然更少。


Europe remains a significant economic and commercial actor – one that can rebound at any time, now that it has at least partly transcended its systemic crisis.	欧洲仍然是重要的经济和商业行动者——可能在任何时候重获生机，因为它至少已经部分走出了系统性危机。


It also remains a model of reconciliation in which people can continue to dream, despite unacceptably high levels of unemployment, particularly among the young.	欧洲也仍然是妥协模式，在这一模式中，尽管存在高得难以接受的失业率（特别是年轻人失业率），但你仍可以有梦。


But Europe is no longer perceived as a global actor – and rightly so.	但欧洲已不再被认为是全球行动者——本应如此。


It is an oasis of peace, if not dynamism.	它是一片和平绿洲——如果不是动力之源的话。


The question for Europeans today is whether they can – and, more important, should – be content with their status.	今日欧洲的问题是是否能——以及更重要的的，是否应该——满足于这一地位。


Europe’s Contribution to Peace in Sudan	欧洲在苏丹和平中的角色


WASHINGTON, DC – Sudan sits at the proverbial crossroads between potential peace and possible nationwide conflict, which would undoubtedly become the world’s deadliest conventional war in 2011.	发自华盛顿特区——众所周知，苏丹已经走到了和平与内战的分叉路口上，一旦开战，势必会上演一场本年度最为血腥的常规战争。


A referendum on South Sudan’s independence, scheduled for January 9, 2011, will likely split the country in two, with southerners finally achieving the freedom for which they have long fought. Such an outcome, however, would also leave the South with most of Sudan’s oil reserves.	将于本月9日在南部地区举行的全民公投很可能将这个国家一分为二，苏丹南部民众从此赢得他们苦苦奋斗多年的自由，而另一方面，这一结果也会将大部分石油储备划归南部所有。


Little wonder, then, that on the precipice of this historic moment, there are many snakes in the grass.	而这一历史时刻背后无疑潜藏着众多危险。


The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) appears poised to challenge the result of the referendum.	执政的苏丹国大党（National Congress Party）似乎早有预谋推翻公投结果。


Critical negotiations between the NCP in the North and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the South on issues that divide the North and South have stalled.	代表北部的国大党与代表南部的苏丹人民解放运动（Sudan People’s Liberation Movement）在划界事务上的谈判已经瘫痪。


The Sudanese armed forces have bombed areas along the North-South border.	苏丹军队轰炸了南北边界的沿线地区。


In Darfur, the human rights and humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, and the peace process there has made little headway.	达尔富尔地区的人权和人道主义状况持续恶化，而该地区的和平进程也鲜有进展。


All of this should be seen in the context of the NCP’s long track record of human-rights abuses and reneging on agreements.	我们应当将上述事实放到国大党长期侵犯人权以及违背条约的大背景下进行审视。


For more than 20 years, the Sudanese government fought a war against the South, in which more than two million people died. It has committed genocide and other atrocities in Darfur, where about 400,000 people have died.	在近20年以来，苏丹政府对南部的镇压已经导致200多万人丧命，在达尔富尔地区实施的种族灭绝及其他暴行夺去了40万人的生命。


The NCP has a history of dividing and manipulating groups to achieve its aims, and it regularly ignores its commitments.	为了实现自己的目标，苏丹国大党早已惯于分裂和操纵各种团体，承诺对他们来说只不过是张废纸而已。


As part of the effort to support negotiations over the post-referendum issues that could lead to renewed North-South war, the United States has presented a range of incentives for the parties to choose peace and has committed to imposing serious measures should they choose violence.	为了阻止南北战火重燃并推动公投后相关事务的谈判，美国已经提出了一系列激励政策诱导各方走向和平，并声明将对挑起暴力冲突的各方采取严厉措施。


Most European countries, and the European Union as a whole, however, have not matched this commitment by offering their own incentives for peace and consequences for war.	但与此同时，大多数欧洲国家以及欧盟却尚未提出任何激励或者惩罚措施来响应美国的承诺。


European commitments in this regard, however, could help buttress the calculations of the parties in favor of peace.	须知欧洲在这一点上的承诺将能够影响南北各方的政治考量，进一步推动和平。


Commitments regarding increased debt relief, further normalization of relations, and additional aid and investment are possible incentives that European states could put on the table, particularly in the hard push before January 9.	欧洲国家可以提出的激励政策包括进一步减免债务，双边关系正常化以及额外的援助和投资（尤其是在1月9日之前这段谈判最艰难的时刻提出）。


Consequences could include new sanctions or the strengthening of existing ones (asset freezes, travel bans, an arms embargo, and capital-market sanctions); increased cooperation with the International Criminal Court on current and potential cases against those most responsible for war crimes in Darfur and the South; postponement of debt relief; and a freeze on oil transactions conducted in euros.	而惩罚措施则可以是新制裁或是对当前手段（资产冻结、旅行限制，武器禁运以及资本市场制裁）的升级； 进一步与国际刑事法庭展开合作，调查那些在达尔富尔/南部地区已经曝光或者尚未揭发的战争罪行，并追究相关领导人的责任；


If effective carrots and sticks are put on the table and war is averted, the international community and Sudan would save more than $100 billion, according to a recent Aegis Trust report.	按照最近由Aegis Trust发布的报告，如果上述软硬皆施的手段能阻止战争爆发的话，国际社会和苏丹将省下超过1000亿美元。


For Europe, this means that money that would otherwise go to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance can largely be saved and used in part for development.	对欧洲来说，这意味着省下大笔维和以及人道主义援助的开支，并转而投资到苏丹国内的发展之上。


The EU can play an important role in forging a common international response to the result of the referendum.	而欧盟则可以在国际社会对公投结果的整体回应方面发挥其重要角色。


The large and widely recognized EU electoral observation mission on the ground should issue a strong and timely final report that comes down clearly on whether the vote represented the will of the people of South Sudan.	欧盟派驻当地的选举观察团不但数目庞大，而且拥有极佳公信力，因此也应当在选举结束后及时发布一份有说服力的最终报告，表明这场投票是否真实地反映了苏丹南部人民的意愿。


Such leadership can stymie politically motivated challenges to the referendum’s result and preempt a period of uncertainty that increases tensions on the ground.	这些体现欧盟领导能力的举动将有助于遏制针对公投结果的政治阴谋，并减少可能加剧当地紧张局势的不确定性。


European states can influence whether or not war consumes Sudan in 2011.	欧洲国家有能力决定苏丹会否在2011年爆发战争。


One concrete contribution – above all others – would be to make clear that there would be significant benefits for those in Sudan who choose peace, and clear consequences for the party that plunges the country back into war.	而一个切实的贡献——优先于其他任何政策——就是向苏丹各方明确表明：选择和平，大有好处； 挑起战争，必受惩罚。


Europe’s Corner of Despair	欧洲绝望的角落


CHISINAU – Three floors of Moldova’s parliament building are a charred ruin.	基希讷乌——三层摩尔多瓦议会大厦成了一片烧焦的废墟。


So is democracy in Moldova, a former Soviet republic that is now Europe’s poorest country.	摩尔多瓦的民主也同样如此，这个前苏联共和国现在是欧洲最贫困的国家。


Of Moldova’s 3.5 million people at the time of independence, 15% have already left the country to seek better lives elsewhere.	在摩尔多瓦独立时的350万人中，15%已经背井离乡寻找更好的生活。


More than 63% of Moldova’s young people say they want out.	超过63%的摩尔多瓦年轻人都说想出国。


In early April, a disputed election victory by Moldova’s ruling Communists triggered protests.	四月初，摩尔多瓦执政共产党倍受争议的选举胜利引发了抗议。


Political opponents and disaffected people, many of them young and with few prospects of finding jobs, took to the streets.	政治反对派和不满的群众，其中有很多就业希望渺茫的年轻人，举行了街头游行。


A violent few broke into the offices of the country’s president and its parliament building, which was set on fire.	少数暴乱份子闯入了摩尔多瓦总统及议会大厦并放火焚烧。


In response, the Communists blamed the violence on the opposition political parties, which it called “fascists,” and on Romania and Romanian irredentists in Moldova.	共产党继而把暴力事件归咎于政治反对党，称其为“法西斯份子”，并指责罗马尼亚及摩尔多瓦境内的罗马尼亚民族统一势力。


The police cracked down on young people and took hundreds into custody.	警方对年轻人进行了镇压，并拘押了数百人。


Several died, apparently from beatings.	其中有几个人显然因殴打而丧生。


President Vladimir Voronin later granted the detainees amnesty.	弗拉迪米尔·沃罗宁总统后来批准对被拘禁者进行特赦。


Nevertheless, many remain in detention and Voronin continues to hurl accusations at the opposition and Romania of organizing a coup d’état.	但仍有很多人被继续关押，而沃罗宁也继续大肆指责反对党和罗马尼亚组织政变。


Legal proceedings have been opened against opposition parties.	针对反对党的法律诉讼已经开始。


Restoring stability and a fair democratic system to Moldova is important, first and foremost, because Moldovans deserve a government that is accountable.	首先，恢复摩尔多瓦的稳定和公平民主体制非常重要，因为摩尔多瓦有权赢得真正负责任的政府。


Stability is also important because the country borders on Romania, a European Union member state.	稳定也同样重要，因为摩尔多瓦与欧盟成员国罗马尼亚接壤。


The two countries share a language and culture, and, until Stalin separated them, were even part of the same state.	这两个国家拥有共同的语言和文化，直到斯大林把它们隔开之前，都还是同一个国家的组成部分。


A vocal minority of Moldova’s people believe that merging their country with Romania would put the country into the express lane to EU membership, with its generous financial perks and, perhaps most enticing of all, passports that would enable them to escape a no-hope economy to build lives elsewhere.	少数自由表达意见的摩尔多瓦民众认为与罗马尼亚合并会使国家走上通往欧盟成员资格的快车道，从而获得慷慨的财务津贴，但最具诱惑力的也许还是拿到能让他们摆脱国内毫无希望的经济，到别处重建生活的护照。


Many Moldovans, indeed, already have Romanian passports so that they can travel and work in the EU.	事实上，很多摩尔多瓦人已经拿到罗马尼亚护照，可以在欧盟内部旅行和工作。


Some Romanian officials, including President Traian Basescu, have bandied about the idea of distributing Romanian passports to as many as a million Moldovan citizens, a quarter of the entire population.	有些罗马尼亚官员，包括总统特拉扬·伯塞斯库，一直在讨论向占总人口四分之一的多达百万摩尔多瓦公民颁发罗马尼亚护照。


Of course, the Moldovan government balks at any attempt to lure away its citizens.	当然，摩尔多瓦政府回避任何诱使民众离开摩尔多瓦的企图。


The United States should do more to help bring stability to Moldova.	美国应采取更多措施帮助摩尔多瓦恢复稳定。


Together with the EU, the US can help ensure a credible investigation of the post-election violence and complaints against the police.	美国可以和欧盟携手，确保对选举后发生的暴力事件和民众对警方的投诉进行可信的调查。


Amerca should be more energetic in demanding that the Moldovan authorities respect the rule of law, issue a roster of all detained persons, provide them access to lawyers and family members, and guarantee that they are not harassed.	美国应更积极地要求摩尔多瓦当局尊重法治，公布所有拘留人员花名册，让他们能接触律师和家人，并确保他们不会受到骚扰。


Opposition leaders and democracy watchdogs say Moldova’s election process was fundamentally flawed.	反对党领袖和民主监督人士说摩尔多瓦的选举过程存在着根本性的缺陷。


The country’s broadcast media, especially its television stations, gave a disproportionate amount of air time to the ruling Communists during the election campaign.	这个国家的广播媒体，特别是电视台，在竞选期间给执政共产党的播出时间较之其他党派根本不成比例。


The Communists are alleged to have rigged the balloting by adding names to the voter rolls and reviving the dead for the day.	共产党被指操纵投票，在选民名单中增加名字，并冒用去世者的名义参与投票。


In the long run, the US and EU should support civil society organizations in pressing Moldova’s government to guarantee more equitable distribution of television time, to stop police harassment of opposition political leaders and workers as well as journalists, to reform the police and end the ruling party’s abuse of state institutions, and to allow all political parties more opportunity to inspect election rolls and monitor polling stations.	从长远来看，美国和欧盟应当支持民间社团组织，迫使摩尔多瓦政府保证对电视宣传时间更公平的分配，阻止警察骚扰反对党政治领袖、工作人员和记者，推行警务改革并结束执政党对国家机构的滥用，让所有党派有更多机会检查选举名单并对投票站进行监督。


They should insist that opposition parties are included in a dialogue.	他们应当坚持让反对党参与对话。


The US can put weight behind its demands by placing conditions on its financial assistance to Moldova.	美国可以通过为摩尔多瓦的财政援助附加条件来增加要求的分量。


The EU has even more leverage.	欧盟则有更多方法可供利用。


Moldova is more dependent on the EU than any other former Soviet republic.	摩尔多瓦比任何前苏联共和国更依赖欧盟。


More than half of the country’s trade is with the Union, and Moldova receives significant EU financial assistance.	与欧盟贸易在其国家贸易中超过了半数，摩尔多瓦还从欧盟得到巨额的财政援助。


Most Moldovan emigrants work in the EU, and almost 75% of Moldova’s population support EU membership.	绝大多数摩尔多瓦移民在欧盟工作，且摩尔多瓦总人口的约75%支持加入欧盟。


Romania, too, should play its part and offer to sign a basic treaty and a border agreement with Moldova.	罗马尼亚也应当发挥应有的作用，主动提出与摩尔多瓦签订基础条约和边境协议。


The last thing impoverished Moldovans need is an autocratic, unaccountable government that lacks sufficient imagination to find a way to revive the country. And just about the last thing the EU needs is an influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants fleeing poverty, political repression, and despair in Moldova and other countries of the former Soviet Union.	缺乏足够想象力找到复兴国家方法的独裁、不负责任的政府最不符合贫困的摩尔多瓦人的需要，而欧盟最不愿看到的则是摩尔多瓦和前苏联其他加盟共和国为逃避贫困、政治压迫和绝望而涌入边境的数十万移民潮。


Europe’s Crisis of Leadership	欧洲的领导力危机


BRUSSELS – The global financial crisis has already highlighted both the strengths and the weaknesses of the European Union.	布鲁塞尔—全球金融危机已经突出显示了欧盟的优势与弱点。


Had it not been for the euro, the shock waves from the meltdown of September and October would have spread to the currency markets, creating tensions that would have set Europe’s political and economic integration back by decades, perhaps imperiling the whole project.	如果没有欧元，九月和十月的危机震荡波早已波及货币市场，其破坏力将会使欧洲的政治和经济一体化倒退十年，并很可能使整个进程岌岌可危。


Much less positively, EU member states have been slow to act in concert.	但欧盟各成员国在同心协力方面的反应迟缓则远没有那么积极了。


At first it was the European Commission that drew criticism for its slowness in making proposals to rally national governments and their policymakers.	起初是欧洲委员会因为在提出动议团结各国政府及其政策制定者方面动作迟钝而招致批评。


Now it is the member states that are resisting the urgent need for a coordinated EU-wide policy response to the deepening crisis.	而现在受到责难的则是欧盟各成员国政府。 它们无视对不断加深的危机采取欧盟范围内的协调回应的迫切需要。


The speed and the severity of the economic slowdown are far greater than any of the post-war downturns of the past 60 years.	经济放缓的速度和程度远超过二战之后过去六十年里的任何一次经济衰退。


In Europe, we by and large failed to heed the warning signals of America’s sub-prime mortgage crisis when it erupted in the late summer of 2007, and thus were unprepared when the next phase of the crisis engulfed European banks, too.	在欧洲，我们很大程度上未能对2007年夏天美国次贷危机爆发的警告信号予以足够的重视。 因此当危机的第二阶段席卷欧洲各银行时，我们毫无防备。


The lesson to be drawn is that the EU must move more quickly and with greater determination than has been the case so far.	从中应吸取的教训是比起到目前为止所做的一切欧盟应该行动更快、决心更大。


Throughout the EU, people are asking, “What is Europe doing to address the crisis?”	在整个欧盟，人们都在质问：“欧洲正在为应对危机做些什么呢？


The answer is “not nearly enough,” and the political price may be high at next summer’s European Parliament elections.	”而答案是“远远不够。 ”在明年夏天的欧洲议会选举中我们可能会付出高昂的政治代价。


The remaining weeks of 2008 will be crucial to Europe’s efforts to regain the initiative and to attempt to attenuate the effects of the crisis while also addressing unresolved problems on the EU reform agenda.	余日无多的2008对于欧洲重振旗鼓并力求在解决欧盟改革日程上的未决问题的同时减少危机的影响至关重要。


As Trustees of Friends of Europe , we would urge the European institutions and EU political leaders to renew their efforts regarding both the Lisbon Treaty and the Lisbon Agenda.	作为“欧洲之友”的理事，我们敦促欧洲各相关机构和欧盟的政治领袖们在执行《里斯本条约》和《里斯本议程》上重新振奋起来。


France’s EU Presidency has done much to improve coordination between member states’ responses to the financial crisis, and the European Commission has also begun to play the more active role that Friends of Europe called for on October 10.	法国作为欧盟轮值主席国在改善各成员国之间应对金融危机的协调度方面作了大量的工作。 而欧洲委员会也已经开始发挥更积极的作用（响应“欧洲之友”在10月10号的呼吁）。


The challenge now is for the presidency and the Commission to give fresh political impetus to the EU’s stalled reform drive.	现在的挑战就是主席国和委员会要给欧盟停滞不前的改革注入新的政治动力。


The December 11-12 European Council should signal clearly the timetable envisaged for re-opening the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification process.	12月11至12日的欧盟理事会应该明确公布为重启《里斯本条约》的批准程序所制定的时间表。


Failure to do so would bring the risk of still greater political problems after next June’s European elections.	如果不能做到这一点，就将在明年6月的欧洲大选之后造成更大的政治问题风险。


The Lisbon Treaty is a step towards adapting the EU’s decision-making mechanisms to the twenty-first century and a membership of 27 or more countries.	《里斯本条约》使我们向着让欧盟的决策机制适应二十一世纪和27个或更多成员国的情况迈进了一步。


The global nature of the current crisis makes it plain that Europe must be able to decide quickly and coherently, or suffer adverse consequences.	目前危机的全球性明确指出欧洲必须做出迅速而一致的决策，否则就要承担不良后果。


There seems little doubt that public opinion across the EU is increasingly drawing the same conclusions.	几乎毫无疑问，欧洲各地民意调查的结论也正越来越与此趋同。


The sovereign right of the Irish people to decide their own future is unchallengeable.	爱尔兰人民决定自己未来的主权无可辩驳。


But Ireland should also allow the EU’s other member states to proceed with the Lisbon Treaty if that is what they wish.	但如果那是真实的意愿，爱尔兰也应该允许欧盟的其他成员国执行《里斯本条约》。


Even if another referendum is to be held in Ireland, the Irish government should foresee a procedure that, irrespective of the outcome, allows other member states to implement the essential parts of the Lisbon treaty.	即便在爱尔兰会进行另一场全民公决，该国政府也应该预设一种程序，不管公决的结果如何，都能让其他的成员国实施《里斯本条约》中的关键部分。


The Commission now needs to take action to ensure that member states redouble their efforts with regard to the Lisbon Agenda for overhauling Europe’s global competitiveness.	欧洲委员会现在需要采取行动确保各成员国在推进旨在重塑欧洲全球竞争力的《里斯本议程》方面加倍努力。


In 2000, the EU set a ten-year program of agreed reform targets, yet in many cases its member states have lacked the political will to implement them.	在2000年，欧��制定了一个经过协议的改革目标的十年计划，然而在很大程度上其成员国缺乏实施这些目标的政治意愿。


Europe’s increasingly gloomy prospects make these reforms more necessary than ever.	欧洲日渐灰暗的前景令这些改革目标具有了前所未有的必要性。


Europe’s Dangerous Banalities	欧洲危险的陈词滥调


JERUSALEM – Europe’s vocation for peacemaking and for international norms of behavior is bound to become the base upon which Barack Obama will seek to reconstruct the transatlantic alliance that his predecessor so badly damaged.	耶路撒冷－欧洲对缔造和平和国际行为规范的号召，必定会成为巴拉克·奥巴马寻求重建被其前任严重破坏的大西洋两岸国家联盟的基础。


How fast America’s new president addresses the Arab-Israeli conflict will be of paramount concern to Europeans in this effort.  For to them, Jerusalem has always mattered more than Baghdad, but George W. Bush refused to listen.	在这一努力中，美国新任总统以多快的速度回应阿拉伯－以色列冲突，对欧洲来说是至关重要的。 因为对欧洲来说，耶路撒冷一直比巴格达更加重要，但是，乔治·沃克·布什却拒绝听取这一点。


Europe’s inability to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict does not stem from its positions on the core issues, which are only microscopically different from those held by the United States.	欧洲无力帮助解决阿拉伯－以色列冲突，不是源自其在核心问题上的立场，这些立场只在细小的方面和美国所持的立场不同。


Its impotence stems, instead, from its attitude toward the Jewish state.	相反，欧洲在这一问题上的无力源自其对以色列这个犹太国家的 态度 。


In essence, dialectic of attraction and rejection is embedded in our collective conscience as Jews and Europeans.	本质上，吸引和排斥的辩证关系植根于作为犹太人和欧洲人的集体良知之中。


Europe, as Denis de Rougemont put it in 1946, is “la patrie de la memoire,” a tormenting and tormented memory, one must admit.	像丹尼·德·鲁格蒙在1946年所说的那样，欧洲是一个痛苦而饱受折磨的记忆，人们必须承认这一点。


The old continent suffers from two guilt complexes that have much to do with Israel: the colonial and the Jewish complex.	欧洲这个古老的大陆承受着两个和以色列有很大关系的负疚情结：殖民和犹太情结。


The Palestinian tragedy is directly affected by this European affliction.	巴勒斯坦的灾难受到这种欧洲负疚的直接影响。


Israel was born as a state out of the gravest crisis of the European conscience.	以色列在欧洲良知最严重的危机中诞生为一个国家。


For Europeans, Israel’s creation was to compensate for the sins committed against the Jewish people.	对欧洲人来说，以色列的建立是为了补偿他们对犹太人所犯的罪行。


But the price that was supposedly paid by the Palestinians touched another neuralgic lobe in the European mind.	但是，巴勒斯坦人对此可能付出的代价，又触动了欧洲人神经的另一痛处。


Because Europe remains entangled in this seemingly insoluble conundrum, Israelis see it as trying to compensate for its lack of political effectiveness in Middle East diplomacy with unbearably self-righteous and moralistic talk.	因为欧洲仍然纠缠于这个表面上无法解决的难题，所以，以色列将此看作是用令人难以忍受的自以为是和说教式的会谈，来努力弥补其在中东外交中政治效能的不足。


To the Israelis, Europe became the essayist Mario Andrea Rigoni’s “old lady, who after she had allowed herself all sorts of liberties…and a great number of horrors, would like, once she has reached the age of society, fatigue, and weakness, to see the world adapt itself to her needs for moderation, equity, and peace.”	对以色列人来说，欧洲成了散文家马里奥·安德烈·瑞贡尼(Mario Andrea Rigoni)笔下的“在经历过对自己进行种种放任行为…以及从事过许多糟糕的事情之后，一旦到达社交，疲累以及虚弱的年龄，就想看到世界变成适应她对节制、公正和和平的需求的老太太。 ”


It took Europe gruesome religious wars, two world wars, and more than one genocide to resolve its endemic disputes over borders and nationalism.	欧洲进行了可怕的宗教战争，两次世界大战以及不只一次的大屠杀，来解决其在边界和民族主义上的地方性争端。


Its record in colonialism wrote monstrous pages in human history.	欧洲有关殖民主义的记录，在人类历史上留下了恐怖的印记。


Now Europe is making Israelis feel not only that it is indifferent to their existential predicament, but that, rather than fighting for life against tremendous odds, Israel is committing European-style crimes.	现在，欧洲让以色列觉得，它不仅对以色列现存的困境漠不关心，而且，以色列不是为了生存而和巨大的困难作斗争，反而是正在犯欧洲式的罪行。


Are some Europeans, many Israelis ask, attempting to use Israel as a means to rid themselves of guilt over the Jewish question, and with it the Jews’ unbearable claim to moral superiority, by lightheartedly equating them with the perpetrators of the Shoah?	许多以色列人质问，通过任意将以色列人和浩劫的制造者等同起来的方式，有些欧洲人是在试图利用以色列作为其将自己从对犹太问题上的负疚感解脱出来，以及消除与之相随的犹太人令人难以忍受的道德优越感的手段吗？


Israel, as the territorial answer to the old Jewish fears , tends to take decisions only on the basis of worst-case scenarios.	以色列，作为对长久以来的犹太族忧虑的领土回答，习惯于将决定建立在最坏情形的基础上。


Its new doctrine of “brutal response” when attacked from lands from which it has withdrawn – as happened in Lebanon and Gaza – might be reprehensible, and it may even doom the country to international opprobrium.	当遭到来自其已经撤出的领土上的袭击时——像在黎巴嫩和加沙所发生的那样，以色列的“残酷回应”新主张可能应该受到谴责，并且甚至可能使这个国家遭到国际骂名。


But “genocide” it is not.	但是，这不是“种族灭绝”。


Indeed, Israel’s critics in Europe are indulging in a frivolous banalization when they compare the recent Gaza conflict or the battle of Jenin in 2002 – with its 58 casualties among Palestinian combatants (Israel lost 25 soldiers) – to Auschwitz, a death factory where 30,000 Jews were slaughtered daily.	事实上，当以色列在欧洲的批评者在将最近的加沙冲突或2002年的杰宁战斗（在这场战争中，巴勒斯坦有58名武装人员伤亡，以色列有25名士兵死亡）和奥斯威辛集中营——一个每天都有30000名犹太人被屠杀的死亡工厂——相比的时候，他们陷入了一个无聊的陈词滥调之中。


Israel should not, however, rejoice at being so far away from Europe, because Europe’s way is not far-fetched; the world cannot be allowed to operate for long outside a reasonable international system of rules and laws.	但是，以色列不应该对和欧洲距离如此遥远感到欣慰，因为欧洲的态度并不是难以理解的； 世界上的一个国家不应该被允许在合理的国际规则和法律之外运行很久。


Moreover, Israel is painfully aware of the many legitimate interests that Europe has in the region.	而且，以色列痛苦地意识到欧洲在该地区拥有许多正当利益。


Instability is a threat to those interests, and with Europe becoming a cosmopolitan continent with a huge Muslim population, the Arab-Israeli conflict has, for Europeans, an undeniable domestic dimension as well.	动荡对这些利益来说是一个威胁，并且，随着欧洲成为一个拥有大量穆斯林人口的世界性大陆，对欧洲人来说，阿拉伯－以色列冲突也是一个不可否认的内部问题。


Europe might not intimidate, but it certainly inspires, and Israel should have an interest in encouraging a judicious role for Europe in building a framework for peace, stability, and cooperation in the region.	欧洲可能不会进行威胁，但是它肯定会进行鼓动，以色列应该有兴趣鼓励欧洲在该地区建立和平、稳定和合作框架上起到明智的作用。


It can also teach many lessons.	它也可以给出许多教训。


The EU is not proof of the decay of the nation-state.	��盟不是民族国家衰败的证据。


It teaches us, instead, that nationalism (if respected) can become a responsible force for broader international cooperation.	相反，它教会我们，民族主义(如果它得到了尊重)，能够成为更广泛的国际合作的可靠力量。


Nationalism degenerates into violent narcissism only when denied its fundamental rights.	民族主义只有在其基本权利遭到否认的时候，才会沦为暴力的自我陶醉。


The EU has shown the difference between voluntarily limited sovereignty and involuntarily stolen sovereignty.	欧盟已经展示了自愿限制的主权和在非自愿情况下被窃取的主权间的差别。


For Europe to play the role to which it is entitled in producing a Middle East peace, it needs to restore its credibility with Israel.	为了扮演其所应扮演的在缔造中东和平中的角色，欧洲需要恢复对以色列的信任。


The vigorous and equitable reaction of European leaders to the Gaza war, and the visit of five of them to Jerusalem to help seal the ceasefire can, now that President Obama has launched his “aggressive” quest for peace in the region, launch a promising era of American-European partnership in Middle East peacemaking.	由于奥巴马总统已经开始对该地区和平进行“积极”的追求，所以欧洲领导人对加沙战争所作的强有力而且公正的反应，以及五位欧洲领导人为敲定停火协议而对耶路撒冷所作的访问，可以在中东缔造和平中开启一个光明的美国－欧洲伙伴关系时代。


Europe’s Flawed Banking Union	有缺陷的欧洲银行联盟


PARIS – The European Union is now the proud owner of a Nobel Peace Prize.	发自巴黎——欧盟最近荣膺诺贝尔奖。


When the choice alighted on Barack Obama three years ago, the Norwegian Nobel Committee was criticized for honoring someone whose achievements were still to come.	当美国总统奥巴马在3年前时被授予该奖时，有人批评挪威诺贝尔奖评选委员会把奖颁给了一个尚未拥有成绩的人。


The Committee took that criticism to heart, and this time decorated an institution with a proud past, but a clouded future.	委员会记住了这一点，于是这次把奖颁给了一个坐拥辉煌过去但前途尚不明朗的机构。


The eurozone is distinct from the EU of course, but it is the Union’s most ambitious undertaking to date, and it is still struggling to equip itself with the structures needed to bolster a currency union.	欧元区显然与欧盟有所区别，但它也是后者迄今为止最具雄心的事业，并依然在努力用支撑一个货币联盟所需的架构去充实自身。


A common fiscal policy remains a distant dream, as does a genuine political union.	一个共同财政政策依然是个遥远的梦想，一个真正的政治联盟也一样遥不可及。


But Europe’s policymakers claim to be making progress toward a so-called “banking union,” which means collective banking supervision, rather than a merger of banks themselves.	但欧洲的政策制定者们却宣称自己正向着一个所谓的“银行联盟”推进，这意味着集体式的银行监管，而不仅仅是把全部银行整合起来。


In September, the European Commission announced a plan to make the European Central Bank the supervisor of all 6,000 of Europe’s banks.	在9月，欧盟委员会公布了一项使欧洲央行成为所有6000多家欧洲银行监管者的计划。


The reaction among national politicians, central banks, and banks themselves was not universally favorable.	各国政治家，央行和各家银行对此的反应不一。


The Germans want the ECB to focus only on large systemic banks, and leave smaller savings banks (like those that invested heavily in subprime mortgages) to national authorities.	德国人希望欧洲央行把注意力仅仅放在大型系统性银行之上，把较小型的储蓄银行（比如那些曾经大笔投资在次级贷上的）留给各国当局。


The United Kingdom and Sweden argue that they cannot be made subservient to a central bank of which they are, at best, semi-detached members.	英国和瑞典认为它们不能听令于这么一个中央银行，因为两国充其量只是部分意义上的成员国而已。


The case for a pan-European supervisor is widely accepted, especially as the European Banking Authority (the EU’s banking regulator) proved feeble in carrying out financial stress tests: the first tests were so weak that even Spain’s now-bankrupt savings banks could pass with flying colors.	一个泛欧洲监督者的做法是得到广泛接受的，尤其是当欧洲银行管理局（欧盟的银行监管者）在执行金融压力测试方面非常不得力的情况下：首次测试是如此轻松，以至于西班牙那些如今面临破产的储蓄银行都能高分通过。


Europe must break the vicious circle linking distressed sovereign borrowers with banks that are obliged, or at least encouraged, to buy their bonds, which in turn provide the funding for bank rescues.	那些受压的主权借款者和银行之间已经形成了一种恶性循环，后者被迫，或者至少是被鼓励去购买前者的债券，而这些钱反过来又被用于拯救银行，而欧洲必须打破这一循环。


But the method chosen by the Commission to implement a banking union is fatally flawed.  Moreover, according to a leaked opinion from the EU Council’s chief legal adviser, the proposed reform is illegal, because, according to the Financial Times (which received the leak), it goes “beyond the powers permitted under law to change governance rules at the European Central Bank.”	但委员会选择来实施一个银行联盟的手段注定是有缺陷的。 此外，依照从欧洲理事会首席法律顾问处泄露出来的观点，提议的改革是不合法的，因为据英国《金融时报》（也是该泄密的接收者）报道，它“超出了法律所允许的关���更改欧盟中央银行治理规则的权力”。


Throughout the crisis, European leaders have tried to respond to the gaps in the monetary union without proposing a new treaty, because they fear that any new treaty proposing more centralization of authority in Brussels would be rejected, either by national parliaments or by voters in a referendum. So they have tried to proceed by intergovernmental agreement, or by using existing treaty provisions.	在危机期间，欧洲的领导人们尝试去在不提出一个新条约的情况下对货币联盟内的分歧做出回应，因为他们害怕任何要求把权威更加向布鲁塞尔集中的新条约都会遭到否决——要么被各国议会，要么被参与全国公投的民众。


In the case of the banking union, they plan to use Article 127(6) of the Lisbon Treaty which allows the European Council to grant authority to the ECB to perform specific tasks concerning “policies relating to the prudential supervision” of certain financial institutions in the Union.	在银行联盟这方面，他们计划用里斯本条约的第127（6）条——该条款允许欧洲理事会授权欧洲央行在对联盟内特定金融机构实施“与谨慎监管相关的政策”方面采取特别行动。


That is a thin legal basis for establishing a pan-European supervisor with direct responsibility for individual institutions, and it was clearly not intended for that purpose.	但这并不能为建立一个对单一机构直接负责的泛欧监管者提供足够的法律基础，而且该条款的订立显然也不是为了这一目的的。


Indeed, Germany agreed to the wording only on the understanding that the ECB could not be a direct supervisor.	事实上，德国就是在欧洲央行不能作为直接监管者的情况下才同意了这一条款的措辞。


The consequences of choosing this inadequate, if expedient, route are serious.	而选择这一不恰当——如果只是权宜之策——路径的后果是极为严重的。


For starters, the existing treaty cannot be used to create a single European resolution authority, leaving an awkward interface between the ECB and national authorities.	首先，现有的条约不能被用来创设一个单一的欧洲解决方案机构，这令欧洲央行和各国政府难以协调互动。


Nor can it be used to establish a European deposit protection scheme, which is arguably the most urgent requirement, to stem the outflow of deposits from southern European banks.	同时它也无法建立一个当前最为急需的欧洲存款保障计划来遏制南欧地区各银行的存款流失。


There will also be potentially dangerous consequences for the ECB itself.	此外这对欧洲央行自身来说也存在着潜在的危险后果。


The use of the Lisbon Treaty clause means that the ECB must be given these additional responsibilities.	对《里斯本条约》条款的运用意味着欧洲央行必须被赋予这些额外的责任。


But it is impossible to create a separate bank-supervision entity within the ECB, as has been done in France, for example, with the Prudential Control Authority, or in the UK with the new Prudential Regulatory Authority, which has its own board and accountability arrangements within the Bank of England.	但又不可能像法国的谨慎监管局或者英国在英格兰银行内部设立的，拥有独立董事会和责任安排的新谨慎监管局那样，在欧洲央行内部设立一个单独的银行监管实体。


The importance of these structures is that they insulate the central bank’s monetary-policy independence from corruption by the tighter accountability requirements that inevitably come with banking supervision.	这些架构的重要性就是可以令央行的货币政策独立性不被无可避免地来自于银行监管的更紧密责任要求所腐蚀。


Because supervisors’ decisions affect individuals’ property rights – and their actions or omissions can put taxpayers on the hook to bail out banks – governments, parliaments, and the courts are bound to hold the watchdogs on a tight leash.	因为监管者的决策会影响个人的财产权——而它们的行动或者疏忽可能令纳税人陷入援助银行的圈套——因此政府，议会和法院都必须要小心管好这只看门狗。


That is why Germany’s Bundesbank, which always guarded its monetary-policy independence so assiduously, has once again found itself in the rejectionist camp, expressing severe doubts about the route that the Commission plans to take.	这也是为何一直极为珍视自身货币政策独立性的德意志银行再次站到了反对阵营，并对委员会计划采用的路径多有质疑的原因。


This time, they are right.	这次，它们是对的。


There are other serious issues, too.	此外还存在着其他的关键事务。


According to the Commission’s model, the European Banking Authority will remain in place, and is charged with producing a single rulebook for all 27 EU member states.	依照委员会的模式，欧洲银行管理局将继续存在，并负责制作一个适用于全部27个欧盟国家的单一规则手册。


But, while its work is carried out under the normal qualified majority voting system, the 17 eurozone countries will have a single supervisor, so will have a block vote.	但由于该机构的运作是在一个普通特定多数投票系统之下的，17个欧元区国家将有一个单一的监管者，也将因此拥有一个集团投票权。


The Commission is trying to find ways to protect the rights of the non-eurozone countries.	委员会尝试去维护非欧元区国家的权利。


But the very complexity of what is proposed shows just how inadequate the scheme is.	但提案的极端复杂性却体现出该计划是多么的不成熟。


Non-Europeans, in particular, may find the entire topic impenetrably abstruse.	人们（尤其是欧洲以外的人）会觉得整个议题完全无法理解。


But it illustrates a simple point: Europe is trying to achieve a stronger federal model that responds to the weaknesses revealed by the eurozone crisis.	但它说明了一个简单的点：欧洲正尝试实现一个更强大的联邦模式以应对欧元区危机所暴露出来的弱点。


But it is doing so without addressing the crucial need to bring its citizens along.	但在执行这一切的过程中却未能处理关键的需要以把自己的人民带动起来。


Indeed, the devices that the EU is adopting are designed specifically to avoid having to consult them.	事实上，欧盟所采用的机构就是专门设置来避免咨询民众的。


The proposed construction of a banking union reveals this fundamental flaw at the heart of the European project today.	由此可知，提议中的银行联盟构建反映了当今欧洲项目中存在的核心缺陷。


It is difficult to be optimistic about the success of an initiative built on such flimsy legal foundations, and lacking democratic legitimacy.	人们也难以对一个奠基于这么一个薄弱法律基础上并缺乏民主合法性的动议感到乐观。


Europe’s banks and their customers deserve better.	对欧洲的银行及其客户们来说，他们理应得到更好的。


Europe’s Distant Mirror?	欧洲的前车之鉴


It is tempting for Europeans to project their own history onto Asia and to view current developments there as a mere repetition, if not an imitation, of what occurred in Europe.	欧洲人很容易把他们自己的历史投射到亚洲身上，并把现在的发展看作不过是对欧洲曾经发生过的事情的一种重复，如果不是模仿的话。


In fact, Asians themselves encourage this temptation, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) openly aiming to become increasingly like the European Union.	事实上，亚洲人自己也鼓励这种引诱，东盟就公开宣称他们的目标是越发类似欧盟。


In trying to decipher Asia’s diplomatic future, Europeans are confronted, so to speak, with an “embarrassment of riches.”	在试图诠释亚洲外交未来时，可以说，欧洲人面临的是一个富人的尴尬。


Is Asia today replaying the balance of power games of late nineteenth-century Europe, with China in the role of Germany?	亚洲今天是不是在重新进行着十九世纪后期欧洲的大国平衡游戏，而中国就像是当时的德国呢？


Or is South Asia, through the growth of ASEAN, poised to one day become the Far Eastern equivalent of the EU?	或者，南亚通过东盟的发展，将来会不会在远东成为类似欧盟的这样一个组织呢？


These comparisons are not neutral, and one may detect in the analogy between China today and nineteenth-century Germany an element of that guilty pleasure in others’ troubles that the Germans call “Schadenfreude.”	这些对比并非是中立的，人们也许会看到，用今天的中国和十九世纪的德国相比较，是对别人的麻烦抱着一种幸灾乐祸的态度，用德语说就是“Schadenfreude”。


Asia may be doing well economically now, according to this view, but just wait: rising nationalism, China’s appetite for power, and the rest of Asia’s desire to curb its ambitions will necessarily impede economic growth and restore the West’s global primacy.	根据这种观点，亚洲今天也许在经济上发展得很好，但是请不要急着下结论。 民族主义上升，中国对权力的欲望，以及其他亚洲国家阻止其野心的企图必然会阻碍经济的发展，从而恢复西方国家独霸全球。


But this scenario does not correspond to reality.	但是这与现实并不相符。


China at the beginning of the twenty-first century is not Bismarck’s newly unified Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century.	二十一世纪的中国并不是十九世纪下半页俾斯麦新近统一的德国。


The Chinese do not view themselves as a rising new power, but instead as Asia’s traditional power, now experiencing a renaissance.	中国并不把自己看成是一支新兴力量，而是正在复兴的亚洲传统强国。


China, they believe, is regaining the status and prestige that it enjoyed until the end of the eighteenth century.	他们相信，中国正在重新获得直至十八世纪末他们一直享有的地位和威望。


As a result, unlike Wilhelmine Germany, the Chinese are not in a hurry to prove how strong and powerful they have become.	其结果是，与威廉二世时期的德国不同，中国人并不急于证明他们已经变得多么强大。


In strategic terms, China is not a revisionist power, but instead a “satisfied,” status-quo power.	从战略上讲，中国并不是一个修正论的强国，而是一个“满足于”现状的强国。


The only exception to this, of course, would be a declaration of independence from Taiwan, which the Chinese would consider a casus belli.	唯一会使中国动用其武力的当然就是台湾宣布独立，那被中国人看作是等同于宣战。


To be sure, the Chinese are indeed rearming – and even entering the military space race – but they are doing so at a pace and to a proportion that reflects their new economic prosperity.	中国确实在重新装备它的军事力量，甚至进入了太空军备竞赛，但是他们发展的步伐和所占的比例是与他们所取得的经济上的成功是相称的。


China’s fundamental priorities remain economic, reflecting its leaders’ belief that their regime’s long-term survival presupposes the continuation of rapid growth.	中国最优先考虑的问题还是经济，反映他们的领导人相信他们政权的长治久安依赖于经济的持续快速增长。


For that, they need access to energy, but they are not about to engage in military or even diplomatic adventures.	因此，他们需要获得能源，但是他们不会进行军事甚至是外交上的冒险。


Nor are they set to become a benevolent, altruistic power, ready to use their new strength and reputation to improve the stability of the international system.	他们也不会成为一个乐善好施、利他主义的大国，运用他们新的力量和声望促进国际体制的稳定。


Chinese cynicism and spontaneous selfishness, however, is now tempered by what they perceive as growing recognition of their unique status.	但是，当前中国认为对其独一无二的地位的认可在改变中国人的玩世不恭和自发的自私。


The combination of respect and interest they see in the way the world now views China can only reinforce their sense of confidence.	当他们看到世界现在既充满敬重又满怀兴趣地看待中国时，只会增强他们自信的感觉。


So why should they take unnecessary risks?	所以他们为什么要去进行不必要的冒险呢？


The resounding success of the Africa-China summit, which was attended by more African leaders than purely African gatherings; the diplomatic rapprochement between India and Japan; and the democratic alliance in the making between India, Japan, and Australia can only be interpreted as signs of China’s newly regained position.	中非峰会取得了令人惊异的成功，来参加的非洲领导人比纯粹的非洲峰会上的还要多、印度和日本修好、与印度、日本和澳大利亚正在酝酿中的民主联盟只能被解释为中国新获得的地位的标志。


Why would they jeopardize such real and symbolic gains with rash and untested moves?	为什么他们要冒失去这种真实以及象征性的已经得到的东西的危险，去进行轻率并且未被证明可行的行动呢？


There is no Bismarck at the helm of Chinese diplomacy, but there is no impetuous Kaiser either: just relatively prudent and competent technocrats.	中国的外交不是俾斯麦式的，也没有冲动的凯撒式的：而是带有那么一点谨慎小心，仅仅带有相当的专家治国论。


In reality, what may threaten the stability of the region, and above all that of China, is not an excess of Chinese ambitions or a failure to democratize, but the Chinese regime’s inability to establish the rule of law.	真正会威胁到这个地区，尤其是中国的稳定的因素不是中国过分的野心或者没能民主化，而是中国的统治集团无法建立法治。


In 1978, China’s newly installed leader, Deng Xiaoping, viewed Singapore as living proof of the superiority of capitalism over communism.	1978年的时候，刚刚成为中国领导人的邓小平把新加坡看成是资本主义超越共产主义的一个活生生的例子。


He remembered the impoverished backwater that Singapore was in the 1920’s, and now he saw the gleaming city that free enterprise – together with Lee Kwan Yew’s quasi-authoritarian leadership – had wrought.	他还记得二十世纪二十年代的新加坡还是一个赤贫的穷乡僻壤，而现在他看到的是自由的开拓精神加上李光耀类似独裁的领导所造就的令人眩目的城市。


It was after visiting Singapore that Deng introduced “special economic zones” in southern China.	正是在访问新加坡后邓小平在中国的南部创立的“经济特区”。


But the rule of law, even Singapore-style, is far harder to implement than capitalism, and its absence represents the major obstacle to the establishment of an Asian community based on the EU model.	但是，即便是新加坡模式的法治也要比资本主义更加困难，而它的缺失是亚洲要按照欧盟模式建立一个共同体最主要的障碍所在。


Twenty years ago, one of the main obstacles to creating an Asian Union was Japan – Asia’s most advanced and successful country, but one that did not feel Asian.	二十年前，成立一个亚洲联盟的主要障碍之一是日本这个亚洲最先进同时也是最成功，但是对亚洲并没有认同感的��家。


Moreover, the rest of Asia resented the Japanese for reveling in this difference.	此外，亚洲其他国家因为日本人对这种差异表现得洋洋得意而憎恨日本人。


That resentment remains, sustained in part by historical grievances, but the Japanese have now come to perceive themselves as Asians, helped by their realization that the economic miracle that they initiated in the region has gone well beyond them.	那种憎恨依然存在，部分是因为历史上日本人所带给他们的痛苦，但是现在日本人因为认识到由他们在这一地区所开创的经济奇迹已经远远超出了本国的范围而重新把自己看成是亚洲人了。


In Europe, transcending nationalism required not only two devastating world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, but also the prevalence of democratic regimes.	在欧洲，超越民族主义不仅仅付出了二十世纪上半页的两次毁灭性的世界大战的代价，同时也是依靠各国都实施了民主政治体制而换来的。


The rule of law is the equivalent for Asia today of what democracy was for Europe yesterday.	今天亚洲的法治建设正像欧洲当年的民主建设。


Without its gradual imposition, an Asian Union could at best remain only a pale and hollow copy of its European model.	如果不能慢慢地推行法治，那么亚洲联盟最多只能是其欧洲模式的一个苍白和空洞的复制品。


Europe’s Divided Visionaries	欧洲的分裂式愿景


BERKELEY – Europe’s leaders, unlike former US President George H. W. Bush, have never had trouble with the “vision thing.”	发自伯克利——不像美国前总统小布什，欧洲的领导人们从来不曾遇到过所谓“愿景问题”。


They have always known what they want their continent to be.	他们一直都知道自己期望把欧洲大陆变成什么样。


But having a vision is not the same as implementing it.	但拥有一个愿景和将其付诸实施并不是一回事。


And, when it comes to putting their ideas into practice, the European Union’s leaders have fallen short repeatedly.	而当到了该把理想变成现实的时候，欧盟的领导人就会一而再再而三地栽跟头。


This tension between Europeans’ goals and their ability to achieve them is playing out again in the wake of the recent EU summit.	这种欧洲人的目标与其实现目标的能力之间的不和谐在最近的欧盟峰会上再次出现。


Europe’s leaders now agree on a vision of what the EU should become: an economic and monetary union complemented by a banking union, a fiscal union, and a political union.	欧洲领导人如今就未来欧洲应当走向何处达成了同样的愿景：一个经济和货币联盟，并辅以一个银行联盟，财政联盟和货币联盟。


The trouble starts as soon as the discussion moves on to how – and especially when – the last three should be established.	而当讨论转移到应该如何——尤其是何时——建立后面这三个联盟时，麻烦就来了。


Banking union, Europe’s leaders agreed, means creating a single supervisory authority.	欧洲领导人达成一致的银行联盟意味着创立一个单一的监管权力机构。


It means establishing a common deposit-insurance scheme and a mechanism for closing down insolvent financial institutions.	这意味着建立一个共同的存款保险方案以及一个关闭破产金融机构的机制。


It means giving the EU’s rescue facilities the power to inject funds directly into undercapitalized banks.	它还意味着给予欧盟的拯救机构以权力，让它们可以向资本不足的银行直接注资。


Likewise, fiscal union means giving the European Commission (or, alternatively, a European Treasury) the authority to veto national budgets.	同样，财政联盟意味着给予欧盟委员会（否则就是一个欧洲财政部）否决国家预算的权威。


It means that some portion of members’ debts will be mutualized: individual governments’ debts would become Eurobonds, and thus a joint obligation of all members.	这意味着成员国的某部分债务将会被重组：单一政府的债务将变成欧洲债券，并因此产生一个所有成员国共同承担的联合责任。