Corporations are attempting to achieve by stealth – through secretly negotiated trade agreements – what they could not attain in an open political process.	公司试图通过公开政治流程无法提供的地下途径实现这一点——如秘密贸易协定谈判。


Even the notion that this is about protecting foreign firms is a ruse: companies based in country A can set up a subsidiary in country B to sue country A’s government.	即使是这事关保护外国企业的概念也只是一条诡计：以A国为总部的公司可以在B国开设分公司起诉A国政府。


American courts, for example, have consistently ruled that corporations need not be compensated for the loss of profits from a change in regulations (a so-called regulatory taking); but, under the typical investment agreement, a foreign firm (or an American firm, operating through a foreign subsidiary) can demand compensation!	比如，美国法院一直判定不必因为监管变化导致的利润损失（所谓的监管征收）赔偿公司； 但是，在典型的投资协定中，外国企业（或者通过外国分公司经营的美国企业）可以要求赔偿！


Worse, investment agreements enable companies to sue the government over perfectly sensible and just regulatory changes – when, say, a cigarette company’s profits are lowered by a regulation restricting the use of tobacco.	更糟糕的是，投资协定让公司能够因为完全合理合规的变化起诉政府——比如当某香烟公司利润因为监管规则限制烟草的使用而利润下降时。


In South Africa, a firm could sue if it believes that its bottom line might by harmed by programs designed to address the legacy of official racism.	在南非，企业若认为其利润因为旨在纠正官方种族主义遗留问题的计划而受损，就可以提起诉讼。


There is a long-standing presumption of “sovereign immunity”: states can be sued only under limited circumstances.	关于“主权豁免”的推定由来已久：国家只有在极为有限情形中可以被提起诉讼。


But investment agreements like those backed by the US demand that developing countries waive this presumption and permit the adjudication of suits according to procedures that fall far short of those expected in twenty-first-century democracies.	但美国所支持的投资协定要求放弃这一推定，允许根据与21世纪民主要求差距甚远的先例的裁定诉讼。


Such procedures have proved to be arbitrary and capricious, with no systemic way to reconcile incompatible rulings issued by different panels.	这些先例早已被证明是武断的、反复无常的，缺少协调不同方面给出的不相容规则的系统性办法。


While proponents argue that investment treaties reduce uncertainty, the ambiguities and conflicting interpretations of these agreements’ provisions have increased uncertainty.	支持者指出投资条约能减少不确定性，但这些协定条款的模糊性和解读的冲突性实际上增加了不确定性。


Countries that have signed such investment agreements have paid a high price.	签署了这类投资协定的国家为此付出了沉重代价。


Several have been subject to enormous suits – and enormous payouts.	一些国家诉讼缠身，并付出了巨额赔付。


There have even been demands that countries honor contracts signed by previous non-democratic and corrupt governments, even when the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral organizations have recommended that the contract be abrogated.	协定要求签署国尊重在非民主时期的腐败政府所签署的契约，即便IMF和其他多边机构建议废除这些契约。


Even when developing-country governments win the suits (which have proliferated greatly in the last 15 years), the litigation costs are huge.	即使发展中国家赢得诉讼（在过去15年中，这样的案例很多），法律成本也极其高昂。


The (intended) effect is to chill governments’ legitimate efforts to protect and advance citizens’ interests by imposing regulations, taxation, and other responsibilities on corporations.	其（有意造成的）结果是制约了政府通过对公司施加监管、税收和其他责任来保护和促进公民利益的合法努力。


Moreover, for developing countries that were foolish enough to sign such agreements, the evidence is that the benefits, if any, have been scant.	此外，对不慎签署了这类协定的发展中国家而言，证据表明利（如果有的话）大于弊。


In South Africa’s review, it found that it had not received significant investments from the countries with which it had signed agreements, but had received significant investments from those with which it had not.	在南非看来，它并未从签署了协定的国家那里获得多少投资，反而从未签署协定的国家中获得了大量投资。


It is no surprise that South Africa, after a careful review of investment treaties, has decided that, at the very least, they should be renegotiated.	毫不奇怪，南非在再三权衡投资条约后决定至少应该进行重新谈判。


Doing so is not anti-investment; it is pro-development.	这样做并不是反投资； 而是支持发展。


And it is essential if South Africa’s government is to pursue policies that best serve the country’s economy and citizens.	而如果南非政府意在推行最适合本国经济和国民的政策，这样做更是必不可少的。


Indeed, by clarifying through domestic legislation the protections offered to investors, South Africa is once again demonstrating – as it has repeatedly done since the adoption of its new Constitution in 1996 – its commitment to the rule of law.	事实上，通过国内立法明确对投资者的保护，南非再一次证明了——自1996年采取新宪法以来已经有过多次先例——其对法治精神的坚持。


It is the investment agreements themselves that most seriously threaten democratic decision-making.	投资协定本身才是民主决策的最大威胁。


South Africa should be congratulated.	南非应该获得掌声。


Other countries, one hopes, will follow suit.	我们希望其他国家也能效而仿之。


American Delusions Down Under	美国妄想症贻害无穷


NEW YORK – For better or worse, economic-policy debates in the United States are often echoed elsewhere, regardless of whether they are relevant.	纽约—不管是好是坏，美国经济政策争论常常在未必有关系的别国引起回响。


Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s recently elected government provides a case in point.	澳大利亚总理阿伯特的新当选政府就提供了这样一个例子。


As in many other countries, conservative governments are arguing for cutbacks in government spending, on the grounds that fiscal deficits imperil their future.	和其他许多国家一样，保守派政府认为要削减政府支出，以免财政赤字威胁国家的未来。


In the case of Australia, however, such assertions ring particularly hollow – though that has not stopped Abbott’s government from trafficking in them.	但是，在澳大利亚，这一主张显得特别空洞，但这并没有阻止阿伯特政府推行它。


Even if one accepts the claim of the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff that very high public debt levels mean lower growth – a view that they never really established and that has subsequently been discredited – Australia is nowhere near that threshold.	即使你同意哈佛经济学家莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff），认为高公债水平意味着低增长——这一观点从来没有真正提出过，并且随后就被推翻了——澳大利亚也远远没有达到阈值水平。


Its debt/GDP ratio is only a fraction of that of the US, and one of the lowest among the OECD countries.	其债务/GDP 之比只有美国的几分之一，为经合组织最低水平之一。


What matters more for long-term growth are investments in the future – including crucial public investments in education, technology, and infrastructure.	影响长期增长的重要因素是未来投资——包括教育、科技和基础设施等方面的关键公共投资。


Such investments ensure that all citizens, no matter how poor their parents, can live up to their potential.	这些投资确保所有公民，不管家庭出身是穷是富，都能实现自己的潜能。


There is something deeply ironic about Abbott’s reverence for the American model in defending many of his government’s proposed “reforms.”	阿伯特奉美国模式为圭臬，顽固坚持他的政府所提出的“改革”，这看起来相当讽刺。


After all, America’s economic model has not been working for most Americans.	毕竟，美国经济模式对大部分美国人也不灵光。


Median income in the US is lower today than it was a quarter-century ago – not because productivity has been stagnating, but because wages have.	如今，美国中位收入还不如二十五年前——不是因为生产率没有增长，而是因为工资停滞不前。


The Australian model has performed far better.	澳大利亚模式的表现远好于美国。


Indeed, Australia is one of the few commodity-based economies that has not suffered from the natural-resource curse.	事实上，澳大利亚是极少数逃脱自然资源魔咒的大宗商品经济体之一。


Prosperity has been relatively widely shared.	相对而言，其经济增长被广大国民所分享。


Median household income has grown at an average annual rate above 3% in the last decades – almost twice the OECD average.	过去十年中位家庭收入年均增长率超过3%，是经合组织平均水平的近两倍。


To be sure, given its abundance of natural resources, Australia should have far greater equality than it does.	平心而论，考虑到丰富的自然资源，到达利亚的平等性应该更加出色。


After all, a country’s natural resources should belong to all of its people, and the “rents” that they generate provide a source of revenue that could be used to reduce inequality.	毕竟，一国的自然资源应属于全体人民，这些自然资源所产生的“租”提供了可用于降低不平等性的收入。


And taxing natural-resource rents at high rates does not cause the adverse consequences that follow from taxing savings or work (reserves of iron ore and natural gas cannot move to another country to avoid taxation).	而对自然资源租课以高额税率并不会产生对储蓄或工作课税所引起的消极后果（铁矿石和天然气储量不可能为了避税而转移到他国）。


But Australia’s Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, is one-third higher than that of Norway, a resource-rich country that has done a particularly good job of managing its wealth for the benefit of all citizens.	但澳大利亚的基尼系数（衡量不平等程度的指标）比挪威高三分之一。 同为资源丰富国的挪威在管理国家财富以使全民受益方面做得非常出色。


One wonders whether Abbott and his government really understand what has happened in the US?	你或许会感到奇怪，阿伯特及其政府真的明白美国发生了什么吗？


Does he realize that since the era of deregulation and liberalization began in the late 1970s, GDP growth has slowed markedly, and that what growth has occurred has primarily benefited those at the top?	他意识到自20世纪79年代末开始去监管化和自由化以来，GDP增长显著放缓，并且增长果实主要被最顶尖人群攫取了吗？


Does he know that prior to these “reforms,” the US had not had a financial crisis – now a regular occurrence around the world – for a half-century, and that deregulation led to a bloated financial sector that attracted many talented young people who otherwise might have devoted their careers to more productive activities?	他知道在这些“改革”之前，美国已有半个世纪没有经历过金融危机（眼下金融危机倒成了全球范围内见怪不怪之事了），并且去监管化导致了金融部门不断坐大、吸引了本应将职业生涯贡献给生产率更高的活动的年轻才俊吗？


Their financial innovations made them extremely rich but brought America and the global economy to the brink of ruin.	他们的金融创新给自己带来了巨富，但却将美国和全球经济推向了毁灭边缘。


Australia’s public services are the envy of the world.	澳大利亚的公共服务令全世界艳羡。


Its health-care system delivers better outcomes than the US, at a fraction of the cost.	其医疗体系比美国效果更好，而成本只有美国的几分之一。


It has an income-contingent education-loan program that permits borrowers to spread their repayments over more years if necessary, and in which, if their income turns out to be particularly low (perhaps because they chose important but low-paying jobs, say, in education or religion), the government forgives some of the debt.	澳大利亚拥有基于收入的教育贷款机制，允许借款人在必要时延长还款年限，如果他们的收入非常低（也许是因为他们选择了重要但低薪的工作，如教育或宗教方面的工作），政府还可以豁免一些债务。


The contrast with the US is striking.	澳大利亚与美国可谓对比鲜明。


In the US, student debt, now in excess of $1.2 trillion (more than all credit-card debt), is becoming a burden for graduates and the economy.	在美国，学生债务目前已超1. 2万亿美元（比信用卡债务还要高），成为毕业生和经济的一大负担。


America’s failed financial model for higher education is one of the reasons that, among the advanced countries, America now has the least equality of opportunity, with the life prospects of a young American more dependent on his or her parents’ income and education than in other advanced countries.	美国的机会平等状况在发达国家中垫底，与其他发达国家相比，美国年轻人的生活前景更多地取决于父母亲的收入和教育，之所以如此，失败的高等教育金融模式难辞其咎。


Abbott’s notions about higher education also suggest that he clearly does not understand why America’s best universities succeed.	阿伯特的高等教育观也表明，他完全不知道为什么美国顶尖大学能获得成功。


It is not price competition or the drive for profit that has made Harvard, Yale, or Stanford great.	让哈佛、耶鲁和斯坦福名垂世界的并不是价格竞争或逐利。


None of America’s great universities are for-profit-institutions.	美国顶尖大学都不是营利组织。


They are all not-for-profit institutions, either public or supported by large endowments, contributed largely by alumni and foundations.	它们都是非盈利组织，或者是公立学校，或者拥有庞大的捐赠（主要来自校友和基金会）。


There is competition, but of a different sort.	竞争是存在的，但是另一种竞争。


They strive for inclusiveness and diversity.	美国顶尖大学竞争的是包容性和多样性。


They compete for government research grants.	它们竞争政府研究补助。


America’s under-regulated for-profit universities excel in two dimensions: the ability to exploit young people from poor backgrounds, charging them high fees without delivering anything of value, and the ability to lobby for government money without regulation and to continue their exploitative practices.	美国不受监管的盈利性大学在两方面很在行：一是剥削出身贫寒的年轻人，向他们征收高额学费，而提供的教学内容毫无价值； 二是游说政府给它们不受监管的拨款，继续从事剥削行动。


Australia should be proud of its successes, from which the rest of the world can learn a great deal.	澳大利亚应该为它的成功而骄傲，世界其他国家能够从澳大利亚身上学到很多教益。


It would be a shame if a misunderstanding of what has happened in the US, combined with a strong dose of ideology, caused its leaders to fix what is not broken.	不能理解美国所发生的事情而又被意识形态所蒙蔽，以至于其领导人向根本不必纠正之处开刀，这将是澳大利亚之祸。


Europe’s Austerity Zombies	欧洲的紧缩僵尸


NEW YORK – “If the facts don’t fit the theory, change the theory,” goes the old adage.	纽约—“如果事实和理论不符，那么就改理论，”老话如是说。


But too often it is easier to keep the theory and change the facts – or so German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other pro-austerity European leaders appear to believe.	但往往保持理论改变事实才更容易——或者说，德国总理默克尔和其他支持紧缩的欧洲领导人是这么认为的。


Though facts keep staring them in the face, they continue to deny reality.	尽管频繁被事实打脸，他们仍拒绝接受现实。


Austerity has failed.	紧缩失败了。


But its defenders are willing to claim victory on the basis of the weakest possible evidence: the economy is no longer collapsing, so austerity must be working!	但紧缩的辩护者仍要以极其脆弱的证据宣布胜利“经济不再崩溃，因此一定是紧缩见效了！


But if that is the benchmark, we could say that jumping off a cliff is the best way to get down from a mountain; after all, the descent has been stopped.	但如果以此为准，我们可以说跳下悬崖是最好的下山方式； 毕竟，下坡之势被止住了。


But every downturn comes to an end.	但所有的衰退总有重点。


Success should not be measured by the fact that recovery eventually occurs, but by how quickly it takes hold and how extensive the damage caused by the slump.	成功不能用复苏终于发生这一事实来衡量，而应该用复苏多快、衰退创造的伤害多大来衡量。


Viewed in these terms, austerity has been an utter and unmitigated disaster, which has become increasingly apparent as European Union economies once again face stagnation, if not a triple-dip recession, with unemployment persisting at record highs and per capita real (inflation-adjusted) GDP in many countries remaining below pre-recession levels.	从这些标准看，紧缩是一场彻头彻尾的灾难。 我们日益明确地看到，欧盟经济体再次面临着停滞甚至三次探底，失业高居创纪录的水平，许多国家的人均真实（经通胀调整的） GDP仍低于衰退前水平。


In even the best-performing economies, such as Germany, growth since the 2008 crisis has been so slow that, in any other circumstance, it would be rated as dismal.	即使在德国等表现最好的经济体，2008年以来的增长也变得非常缓慢，若是换作其他时期，只能用凄凉来形容。


The most afflicted countries are in a depression.	受冲击最大的国家则陷入了萧条。


There is no other word to describe an economy like that of Spain or Greece, where nearly one in four people – and more than 50% of young people – cannot find work.	除此之外你找不到其他词汇来形容西班牙和希腊的经济了——每四个人中就有一个无法找到工作，年轻人的这一比例更是超过50%。


To say that the medicine is working because the unemployment rate has decreased by a couple of percentage points, or because one can see a glimmer of meager growth, is akin to a medieval barber saying that a bloodletting is working, because the patient has not died yet.	说解药正在起效，因为失业率下降了几个百分点或者能够看到一丁点儿微弱的增长迹象，就好比是中世纪理发师宣布放血疗法起了效果，因为病人还没有死一样。


Extrapolating Europe’s modest growth from 1980 onwards, my calculations show that output in the eurozone today is more than 15% below where it would have been had the 2008 financial crisis not occurred, implying a loss of some $1.6 trillion this year alone, and a cumulative loss of more than $6.5 trillion.	从1980年以来欧洲温和增长出发，我测算今天的欧元区产出比2008年不发生金融危机的情形要低15%以上，这意味着光是在今年，损失就高达1. 6万亿美元，累计损失则超过6.


Even more disturbing, the gap is widening, not closing (as one would expect following a downturn, when growth is typically faster than normal as the economy makes up lost ground).	5万亿美元。 更令人担忧的是，这一缺口还在扩大而不是缩小（按理说缺口应该减小，因为随着经济收复失地，增长通常要快于常态）。


Simply put, the long recession is lowering Europe’s potential growth.	简言之，长期衰退正在拖累欧洲的潜在增长。


Young people who should be accumulating skills are not.	理应积累技能的年轻人没有这样做。


There is overwhelming evidence that they face the prospect of significantly lower lifetime income than if they had come of age in a period of full employment.	压倒性证据表明，与充分就业时期进入劳动力市场的轻型相比，他们面临着显著更低的终身收入。


Meanwhile, Germany is forcing other countries to follow policies that are weakening their economies – and their democracies.	与此同时，德国正在强迫其他国家跟进削弱经济——以及民主的政策。


When citizens repeatedly vote for a change of policy – and few policies matter more to citizens than those that affect their standard of living – but are told that these matters are determined elsewhere or that they have no choice, both democracy and faith in the European project suffer.	如果公民一再将选票投给政策变革——并且很难找出比影响人民生活水平的政策对人民的影响更大的政策了——却被告知此事由其他国家决定，他们别无选择，那么民主和对欧洲工程的信任都将遭到打击。


France voted to change course three years ago.	三年前，法国人把选票投给了改变道路。


Instead, voters have been given another dose of pro-business austerity.	但他们得到的却是又一波有利于商业的紧缩。


One of the longest-standing propositions in economics is the balanced-budget multiplier – increasing taxes and expenditures in tandem stimulates the economy.	经济学中历史最悠久的一个理论是平衡预算乘数——同时增加税收和支出能刺激经济。


And if taxes target the rich, and spending targets the poor, the multiplier can be especially high.	而如果课税目标是富人而支出目标是穷人，该乘数将非常大。


But France’s so-called socialist government is lowering corporate taxes and cutting expenditures – a recipe almost guaranteed to weaken the economy, but one that wins accolades from Germany.	但法国的所谓社会主义（socialist）政府却在降低公司税、削减支出——这一组合几乎肯定会削弱经济，但它得到了德国的赞扬。


The hope is that lower corporate taxes will stimulate investment.	人们寄希望于更低的公司税能刺激投资。


This is sheer nonsense.	纯属无稽之谈。


What is holding back investment (both in the United States and Europe) is lack of demand, not high taxes.	拖累投资（不管在美国还是在欧洲）的是缺少需求，而不是高税率。


Indeed, given that most investment is financed by debt, and that interest payments are tax-deductible, the level of corporate taxation has little effect on investment.	事实上，由于大部分投资通过债务融资，而利息偿付可以抵扣应税项目，因此公司税水平对投资几乎没有影响。


Likewise, Italy is being encouraged to accelerate privatization.	类似地，意大利被鼓励加快私有化。


But Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has the good sense to recognize that selling national assets at fire-sale prices makes little sense.	但总理伦齐明智地认识到以跳楼价出售国家资产无济于事。


Long-run considerations, not short-run financial exigencies, should determine which activities occur in the private sector.	长期考虑而不是短期金融之急才是决定私人部门行为的因素。


The decision should be based on where activities are carried out most efficiently, serving the interests of most citizens the best.	决策应该基于哪些活动效率最高、最能符合大多数人民的利益。


Privatization of pensions, for example, has proved costly in those countries that have tried the experiment.	比如，试水养老金私有化的国家无不发现代价沉重。


America’s mostly private health-care system is the least efficient in the world.	美国的医疗体系私有化程度最高，但效率堪称全世界最低。


These are hard questions, but it is easy to show that selling state-owned assets at low prices is not a good way to improve long-run financial strength.	这些问题很困难，但很容易看到，低价出售国有资产不是改善长期金融健康的好办法。


All of the suffering in Europe – inflicted in the service of a man-made artifice, the euro – is even more tragic for being unnecessary.	更加悲剧的是，欧洲的所有苦难——为了有利于人为造成的阴谋欧盟服务——根本毫无必要。


Though the evidence that austerity is not working continues to mount, Germany and the other hawks have doubled down on it, betting Europe’s future on a long-discredited theory.	尽管紧缩没有奏效的证据一天比一天多，但德国和其他鹰派仍在加倍下注，根据早已站不住脚的理论赌欧洲的未来。


Why provide economists with more facts to prove the point?	为什么还要为经济学家提供更多事实证明这一点呢？


A Healthier, Wealthier Africa	更健康、更富有的非洲


ZURICH – The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have long been the focus of emerging-market investors.	苏黎世—金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）一直是新兴市场投资者关注的焦点。


But it is in Africa, a region with the world’s second-fastest growth, where the next big business opportunities lie.	但增长速度位居世界第二的非洲地区才是下一个大商业机会的所在地。


In about one-third of the continent’s 55 countries, annual GDP growth is above 6%, and Sub-Saharan Africa grew at an estimated 5.1% pace in 2013.	非洲大陆55个国家中有大约三分之一年GDP增长率超过6%，2013年撒哈拉以南非洲地区预计增长率为5. 1%。


Foreign investors report that their return on investment in Africa is higher than in any other emerging region.	外国投资者报告其在非洲的投资回报率比其他任何新兴地区都要高。


By 2040, the continent’s working-age population will total an estimated 1.1 billion people, providing businesses with a larger labor pool than even China or India.	到2040年，非洲大陆的工作适龄人口预计将达到11亿人，成为比中国和印度更大的劳动力储备大军。


Moreover, economic expansion is taking place not just in urban centers, but in small towns and villages as well.	此外，经济扩张并不局限于城市中心，小村镇也在增长。


However, Africa also faces major challenges.	但是，非洲也面临着重大挑战。


One of the biggest concerns is inadequate health care.	最大的担忧之一是医疗不足。


Preventable and treatable diseases plague the population.	可预防和可治愈疾病困扰着大量人口。


Life expectancy is 14 years below the global average.	非洲预期寿命比全球平均水平低14岁。


Nearly one in 20 adults in the 15-49 age group in Sub-Saharan Africa lives with HIV – roughly six times the global average.	撒哈拉以南非洲地区的15—49岁年龄段人口中每20人就有一人携带艾滋病毒——大概是全球水平的六倍。


Every minute, an African child dies from malaria.	每一分钟都有一名非洲儿童死于疟疾。


Africa’s rapid economic growth and urbanization are also creating new health challenges.	非洲的快速经济增长和城市化也在造成新的健康挑战。


Non-communicable diseases are projected to become the most common causes of death by 2030.	据估计，到2030年，非传染性疾病将成为最大的死因。


The number of diabetes cases, for example, is expected nearly to double over the next two decades.	比如，糖尿病人数量预计会在未来二十年里翻一番。


If left unaddressed, the dual burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases could jeopardize Africa’s economic potential.	如果放任问题发展，传染性和非传染性疾病的双重压力可能压垮非洲的经济潜力。


To avoid this, three critical areas of health care must be addressed: technology, infrastructure, and education.	为了避免这一幕，必须解决好医疗领域的三个关键问题：技术、基础设施和教育。


Africa has witnessed some remarkable technological leaps.	非洲已经有了一些令人瞩目的技术进步。


A decade ago, telecoms infrastructure was almost non-existent.	十年前，通信基础设施基本上不存在。


Today, one in six people owns a mobile phone, the benefits of which go far beyond easy communication.	如今，每六个人就拥有一部移动电话，移动电话带来的好处远远不止于通信的便捷。


Africa has pioneered the use of mobile banking, with local players like M-Pesa and global corporations like Citi demonstrating how new technology can provide vital financial services to the unbanked population.	非洲是移动银行的先锋，M-Pesa等本地公司和花旗银行等跨国公司证明了新技术可以为无法接触到银行的人口提供至关重要的金融服务。


Mobile money and digital wallets accessed on cellphones eliminate the need for physical cash in rural areas, where financial services are limited and carrying large amounts of cash is risky.	可以通过手机操作的移动支付和数字钱包消除了在农村地区携带实体现金的需要。 由于金融服务的缺乏，在非洲农村地区携带大笔现金是很危险的。


Joining this mobile-phone revolution, Novartis is working with five African governments and private-sector partners to improve drug distribution and monitor the supply of anti-malaria medicines in rural areas, using text messaging and electronic mapping.	诺华制药公司也加入了这场移动电话革命，与五个非洲国家的政府和私人部门合作使用手机短信和电子地图改善药品分销和监测疟疾药物在农村地区的供应情况。


Previously, patients would travel to distant health clinics only to find that the medicines that they needed were no longer in stock.	此前，病人必须长途跋涉前往诊所买药，并且时常遇到所需药品没有库存的情况。


Now, thanks to the SMS for Life project, vital medicines can be quickly redistributed to where they are most needed.	如今，有了“生命短信”（SMS for Life）项目的支持，关键药品可以迅速地分配给最需要的地区。


A second crucial aspect of improving Africa’s health care is infrastructure.	改善非洲健康状况的第二个关键领域是基础设施。


Good rail lines, roads, and ports allow products and services to be distributed widely at lower cost, and to benefit from economies of scale.	良好的铁路、公路和港口能让产品和服务以低廉的成本得到广泛的分销，并能获得规模经济带来的好处。


This is an essential component of any country’s economic development.	这对于任何一个国家的经济发展来说都是必不可少的。


And nowhere are the benefits more evident than in the provision of health care.	而非洲更是从医疗供���中获益最大的地区。


Fortunately, several companies are rising to the challenge.	幸运的是，一些公司正在应对这一挑战。


Coca-Cola, for example, is contributing its supply-chain expertise to map out health facilities and implement stock-management software to support the distribution of bed nets, contraceptives, anti-AIDS drugs, and vaccines to remote villages.	比如，可口可乐正在改善其供应链的专业水平，优化医疗设施布局，改善库存管理软件，从而支持面向偏远村庄的蚊帐、避孕药、艾滋病治疗药和疫苗的分配。


Meanwhile, Novartis is piloting a “social venture” business model to give poor people in remote villages access to vital medicines that are packaged in small, affordable doses.	与此同时，诺华制药公司正在试验一套“社会创业”模式，让偏远村庄的穷人也能获得廉价的小包装必须药物。


Finally, education is one of the most powerful tools for reducing poverty and generating sustainable, inclusive economic growth.	最后，教育是消除贫困、产生可持续的包容性经济增长的最有力的武器。


But, given limited resources and few teachers, too many children are being left behind.	但是，由于教育和教师资源的局限，太多儿童输在了起跑线上。


Public-private partnerships are helping to change this.	公私合作正在改变这一状况。


The IT company Cisco, for example, works with NGOs to connect communities and help students develop skills in information and communications technology.	比如，IT行业的思科公司与非政府组织合作建立了社区之间的联系并帮助学生发展信息和通信技术方面的技能。


Poor education also affects health.	拙劣的教育也影响健康。


Although Africa accounts for one-seventh of the world’s population, it bears one-quarter of the global disease burden, yet has a mere 2% of the world’s doctors.	尽管非洲拥有世界七分之一的人口，但却承受了全球四分之一的疾病负担，只拥有全世界2%的医生。


Unsurprisingly, many health problems stem from ignorance about diseases and basic hygiene.	毫不奇怪，许多健康问题源自对疾病和基本卫生知识的无知。


So Novartis has formed a partnership with the Earth Institute, the United Nations, and private-sector groups to train and deploy by 2015 a million community health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa to deliver basic treatment and preventive care, and to track disease outbreaks.	因此，诺华制药公司与地球研究所（Earth Institute）、联合国和私人部门集团建立了合作伙伴关系，致力于到2015年在撒哈拉以南非洲地区培训和部署一百万社区健康工作者提供基本治疗和预防措施并追踪疾病的爆发。


The idea is that local people will learn how to support their communities, rather than rely on handouts, and thereby lift themselves out of poverty permanently.	这一方案的构想是让本地人学到如何支持他们的社区，而不是依赖宣传，从而让他们本身永远摆脱贫困。


Africa is increasingly showing signs of its promise, but innovative solutions to improve its people’s health are essential if the continent is to approach its potential.	非洲正在日益显示出未来的活力，但如果这片大陆要实现它的潜力，就必须有创新型方案来改善其人民的健康。


This will require more than philanthropy: it will demand new commercial models that solve health-care issues, help the economy to grow, and benefit those who invest in Africa’s future.	这不光光是慈善问题：这需要新的商业模式来解决健康问题、刺激经济增长并让投资非洲未来的人获益。


The Old World’s New Roles	旧世界的新角色


CAMBRIDGE – China’s rise has raised many questions for the West, with some wondering whether it is set to usurp a struggling Europe’s global leadership role.	美国剑桥—中国崛起给西方造成了很多问题，一些人担心中国是否意在夺取举步艰难的欧洲的全球领导角色。


As one columnist put it, “there is nothing much European governments can do in East Asia, save serve as marketing managers for their domestic businesses.”	某专栏作家指出，“欧洲政府在东亚没什么事可干，无非是为本国企业当好营销经理。


With neither the diplomatic weight nor the military heft to make an impression in the region, Europe had better leave the heavy lifting to the United States.	”欧洲既没有外交分量，也没有军事实力可以在东亚留下痕迹，最好还是把重点放在美国身上。


But this does not have to be the case.	但事实并非如此。


For Europe, the implications of China’s rise are far-reaching, beginning with the United States’ strategic “pivot” toward Asia.	对欧洲来说，中国崛起的影响是深远的，其起始点是美国战略性“转向”亚洲。


After more than 70 years as a top US priority, Europe is beginning to lose its privileged position in the eyes of American policymakers.	欧洲身为美国最重要着眼点已有70多年，但在美国决策者眼中，它正在失去这一超然地位。


Moreover, European sales of high-tech dual-use products that complicate America’s security role in Asia is bound to create friction.	此外，欧洲销售与美国在亚洲的安全角色相冲突的高科技军民两用产品也必然会造成摩擦。


Nonetheless, warnings that the Atlantic partnership is eroding are unduly dire.	尽管如此，关于大西洋合作伙伴关系正在销蚀毫无疑问是言过其实的。


Tellingly, US President Barack Obama’s administration has replaced the term “pivot,” which implies a turn away from something, with “rebalancing.”	很能说明问题的是，美国总统奥巴马政府已经将隐含离开含义的“转向”一词替换为“再平衡”。


This change reflects a recognition that China’s increasing economic dominance does not negate the importance of the European Union, which remains the world’s largest economic entity and a leading source of economic innovation, not to mention values like the protection of human rights.	这一变化反映出美国认为中国经济主宰力的增加并非欧盟重要性的对立面，欧盟仍是世界最大经济实体，也是经济创新的主要源泉，更不用说人权保护方面的价值了。


This is not to say that Asia’s rise will not demand adjustments.	这并不是说亚洲的崛起不需要调整。


When the Industrial Revolution began, Asia’s share of the global economy began to decline from more than 50% to just 20% by 1900.	当工业革命开始时，亚洲占全球经济比重也开始从50%以上下降至1900年的只占20%。


By the second half of this century, Asia is expected to recover its former economic dominance – that is, account for 50% of global output – while lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.	到本世纪下半叶，预计亚洲将恢复此前的经济���导地位，即占全球产出的50%，同时让数亿人摆脱贫困。


This power shift – perhaps the most consequential of the twenty-first century – implies serious risks.	这一实力变迁——也许是二十一世纪最重要的事件——隐含着严重的风险。


Historians often warn that the fear and uncertainty generated by the emergence of new powers like China can trigger serious conflict, like that which Europe experienced a century ago, when Germany overtook the United Kingdom in industrial production.	历史学家经常警告，中国等新强国的出现所造成的恐慌和不确定性可能引发严重冲突，就像一个世纪前德国在工业生产上赶超英国时欧洲所经历的那样。


With Asia riven by territorial disputes and historical tensions, maintaining a stable security balance will not be easy.	面对饱受领土争端和历史恩怨纠缠的亚洲，保持稳定的安全平衡并非易事。


But there are levers in place that can help.	但我们也可以找到支点以供利用。


In the 1990s, when US President Bill Clinton’s administration was considering how to respond to China’s increasing economic might, some urged a policy of containment.	20世纪90年代，美国总统克林顿政府考虑如何应对不断增长的中国经济实力，有人敦促采取遏制政策。


Clinton rejected that advice: It would have been impossible to forge an anti-China alliance, given the enduring desire of China’s neighbors to maintain good relations with it; more important, such a policy would have guaranteed future enmity with China.	克林顿拒绝了这一建议：建立反中同盟是不可能的，因为中国的邻国向来有与中国搞好关系的强烈愿望； 更重要的是，这一政策不啻于让中国彻底成为未来敌人。


Instead, Clinton chose a policy that could be called “integrate and insure.”	相反，克林顿选择了可以称之为“融合与确保”（integrate and insure）的政策。


While China was welcomed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), America revived its security treaty with Japan.	中国被接纳为世贸组织成员国，而美国则修订了与日本的安保条约。


If China pursues a “peaceful rise,” its neighbors will focus on building strong economic relationships with it.	如果中国追求“和平崛起”，其邻国将专注于建立与中国的密切经济联系。


If it throws its weight around – which some say is implied by its recent actions on the Indian border and in the East and South China Seas – its neighbors will seek to balance its power, with an American naval presence offering backup.	如果它向周边耀武扬威——有人认为其最近在中印边界和东海和南海的动作便属此类——其邻国就会追求实力平衡，而美国海军的身影将为它们提供底气。


Where does Europe fit into this picture?	欧洲在这一局势中处于什么地位？


For starters, it should monitor and restrain sensitive exports to avoid making the security situation more dangerous for the US.	首先，它应该监控和克制敏感出口，以避免让安全局势变得对美国更加危险。


Even in trading terms, Europe has an interest in regional stability and secure sea lanes.	即使在贸易条件方面，地区稳定和安全的海路也有利于欧洲的利益。


Furthermore, Europe can contribute to the development of the norms that shape the security environment.	此外，欧洲能够帮助发展决定安全环境的范式。


For example, Europe can play an important role in reinforcing a universal interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, rather than China’s idiosyncratic version – especially given that the US has not even ratified the treaty.	比如，欧洲可以在执行联合国海洋法公约（United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea）的普通解释而非中国提出的特殊解释方面起到重要作用——特别是在美国尚未签署该条约的情况下。


Contrary to the claims of some analysts, China is not a revisionist state like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, eager to overthrow the established international order.	与一些分析家的观点相反，中国并非类似纳粹德国或苏联那样的修正主义国家，它并不急于推翻现有国际秩序。


Indeed, it is not in China’s interest to destroy international institutions – such as the United Nations, the WTO, and the International Monetary Fund – that have helped to facilitate its rise.	事实上，破坏在其崛起过程中起到促进作用的国际机构——如联合国、世贸组织和国际货币基金组织——不符合中国利益。


Given Europe’s leading roles in such institutions, it can help China gain the multilateral legitimacy that it seeks, in exchange for responsible behavior.	由于欧洲在这些机构中扮演着领导角色，因此它可以帮助中国获得其所追求的多边合法性，以换取中国的负责任的行为。


Though China is not attempting to upend the global order, it is now undergoing a profound – and destabilizing – transformation.	尽管中国并不试图颠覆全球秩序，但眼下它正在经历一场深远的——也是破坏性的——转型。


With the rise of transnational issues like climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cyber crime – brought about by rapid technological progress and social change – power is being diffused not among states, but among a wide range of non-governmental entities.	在气候变化、恐怖主义、传染病和网络犯罪等跨国问题上——快速的科技进步和社会变革是造成这些问题的原因——实力并不是在国家间分布的，而是在非政府实体间分布的。


Addressing these challenges will require broad international cooperation, with China, the US, and Europe each playing an important role.	解决这些挑战要求广泛的国际合作，中国、美国和欧洲都可以扮演重要角色。


Finally, there is the question of values.	最后还有价值问题。


Europe, together with the US, has already resisted Chinese (and Russian) demands for greater Internet censorship.	欧洲，以及美国，拒绝了中国（和俄罗斯）加强互联网审查的要求。


And European countries like Norway and Germany have willingly taken economic hits in the name of human rights.	挪威和德国等欧洲国家也愿意以人权为名采取经济打击。


While it is impossible to predict how Chinese politics will evolve, other countries’ experiences suggest that political change often occurs when per capita income reaches roughly $10,000.	预测中国政治会如何演进是不可能的，但其他国家的经验表明政治变革通常发生在人均收入达到10,000美元左右水平的时候。


If such change does occur, Europe will have an opening to promote its core values even more effectively.	如果这一变革真的发生，欧洲将有机会更有效地推广其核心价值。


Whether China’s economic interest in an impartial world order based on the rule of law will lead to greater protection of individual rights remains to be seen.	中国在基于法治精神的公平世界秩序中的经济利益能否带来个人权利的更大保护还有待观察。


Only China will decide that.	只有中国能够决定着一点。


But Europe can make a strong case.	但欧洲可以起重要作用。


Duties Without Borders	不分国界的责任


CAMBRIDGE – More than 130,000 people are said to have died in Syria’s civil war.	美国剑桥—据说已有130,000多人在叙利亚内战中丧生。


United Nations reports of atrocities, Internet images of attacks on civilians, and accounts of suffering refugees rend our hearts.	联合国的暴行报告、互联网上关于袭击平民的图片以及流离失所的难民的口述让我们揪心。


But what is to be done – and by whom?	但我们可以做些什么呢？ 又由谁来做呢？


Recently, the Canadian scholar-politician Michael Ignatieff urged US President Barack Obama to impose a no-fly zone over Syria, despite the near-certainty that Russia would veto the United Nations Security Council resolution needed to legalize such a move.	最近，加拿大学者型政治家迈克尔·伊格纳提夫（Michael Ignatieff）敦促美国总统奥巴马在叙利亚设置禁飞区，但俄罗斯几乎肯定会否决这一措施合法化所必须的联合国安理会决议。


In Ignatieff’s view, if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is allowed to prevail, his forces will obliterate the remaining Sunni insurgents – at least for now; with hatreds inflamed, blood eventually will flow again.	伊格纳提夫认为，如果放任叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德继续统治，他的部队将击溃省下的逊尼派起义军——至少现在是如此，而仇恨会蔓延，流血终将再次发生。


In an adjoining article, the columnist Thomas Friedman drew some lessons from the United States’ recent experience in the Middle East.	在一篇类似的文章中，专栏作家托马斯·弗里德曼（Thomas Friedman）从了美国最近在中东的经验中总结了几个要点。


First, Americans understand little about the social and political complexities of the countries there.	首先，美国人对中东国家的社会和政治复杂性所知甚少。


Second, the US can stop bad things from happening (at considerable cost), but it cannot make good things happen by itself.	其次，美国可以停止坏事的发生（要付出很大的代价），但好事是不会自己发生的。


And, third, when America tries to make good things happen in these countries, it runs the risk of assuming responsibility for solving their problems.	第三，当美国试图让这些国家发生好事时，就要承担解决这些国家问题的责任的风险。


So what are a leader’s duties beyond borders?	因此，领导人超越国界的责任在哪里？


The problem extends far beyond Syria – witness recent killings in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and other places.	这一问题的意义远不止于叙利亚——放眼全球，南苏丹、中非共和国、索马里和其他很多地方都在发生杀戮。


In 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously recognized a “responsibility to protect” citizens when their own government fails to do so, and in 2011 it was invoked in UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of military force in Libya.	2005年，联合国大会一致通过了在政府无作为时对人民的“保护责任”，2011年这一责任被联合国安理会1973号决议援引，授权对利比亚动武。


Russia, China, and others believe that the principle was misused in Libya, and that the guiding doctrine of international law remains the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force except in self-defense, or when authorized by the Security Council.	俄罗斯、中国和其他国家认为这一原则在利比亚滥用了，国家法的指导思想仍应是联合国宪章，而宪章禁止在除自卫或得到安理会授权之外的情形中使用武力。


But, back in 1999, when faced with a Russian veto of a potential Security Council resolution in the case of Kosovo, NATO used force anyway, and many defenders argued that, legality aside, the decision was morally justified.	但是，1999年，尽管俄罗斯否决了科索沃问题的潜在安理会决议，但北约仍然使用了武力，许多人为此辩护说，抛开法律问题不谈，这一决定是合乎道德的。


So which arguments should political leaders follow when trying to decide the right policy to pursue?	那么，在决定什么政策值得追求时，政治领袖应该考虑哪些因素？


The answer depends, in part, on the collectivity to which he or she feels morally obliged.	答案部分取决于他认为在道德上负有义务的集体。


Above the small-group level, human identity is shaped by what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined communities.”	在小团体水平之上，人的身份由本尼迪克特·安德森（Benedict Anderson）所谓的“想象的共同体”决定。


Few people have direct experience of the other members of the community with which they identify.	很少有人拥有其所认同的社会的其他成员所拥有的直接经验。


In recent centuries, the nation has been the imagined community for which most people were willing to make sacrifices, and even to die, and most leaders have seen their primary obligations to be national in scope.	在近几个世纪中，国家便是大部分人甘愿作出牺牲甚至献身的想象的共同体，大部分领导人的首要义务是代表国家利益。


In a world of globalization, however, many people belong to multiple imagined communities.	但是，在一个组织的世界中，许多人同时属于很多想象的共同体。


Some – local, regional, national, cosmopolitan – seem to be arranged as concentric circles, with the strength of identity diminishing with distance from the core; but, in a global information age, this ordering has become confused.	其中一些——地方的、地区的、国家的、世界的——被认为是核心圈，身份的强度随其与核心的距离的增长而缩小； 但是，在全球信息时代，这一秩序变得不那么清晰了。


Today, many identities are overlapping circles – affinities sustained by the Internet and cheap travel.	徐进，众多身份属于互相重叠的圈子——以互联网和廉价旅行维系的亲密关系。


Diasporas are now a mouse click away.	天涯若比邻耳。


Professional groups adhere to transnational standards.	专业团体往往基于跨国标准。


Activist groups, ranging from environmentalists to terrorists, also connect across borders.	活动团体——从环保分子到恐怖分子——也进行着跨境联系。


As a result, sovereignty is no longer as absolute and impenetrable as it once seemed.	因此，主权已不再像从前那样绝对和不可逾越。


This is the reality that the UN General Assembly acknowledged when it recognized a responsibility to protect endangered people in sovereign states.	联合国大会在承认其保护主权国家危险之中的人民的责任时也承认了这一现实。


But what moral obligation does this place on a particular leader like Obama?	但对于像奥巴马这样的特殊领袖，道德义务在此处有何作用？


The leadership theorist Barbara Kellerman has accused former US President Bill Clinton of the moral failure of insularity for his inadequate response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.	领导力理论家芭芭拉·克莱曼（Barbara Kellerman）指责美国前总统克林顿在对1994年卢旺达种族屠杀事件应对不力中存在偏隘的道德失职。


In one sense, she is right.	从某种程度上说，她是正确的。


But other leaders were also insular, and no country responded adequately.	但其他领导人也偏隘了，没有一个国家采取了有力的应对措施。


Had Clinton tried to send American troops, he would have encountered stiff resistance in the US Congress.	如果克林顿尝试派兵，他将在美国国会遇到重大阻力。


Coming so soon after the death of US soldiers in the 1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the American public was in no mood for another military mission abroad.	当时，年美国士兵刚刚在在索马里人道干预中伤亡惨重，美国公众没有想法再进行海外军事任务。


So what should a democratically elected leader do in such circumstances?	那么，民选领导人在这样的环境下应该如何做？


Clinton has acknowledged that he could have done more to galvanize the UN and other countries to save lives in Rwanda.	克林顿承认他本可以更大力度地敦促联合国和其他国家拯救卢旺达人的生命。


But good leaders today are often caught between their personal cosmopolitan inclinations and their more traditional obligations to the citizens who elected them.	但今天的优秀领导人往往会在个人的世界主义倾向和对选举他们的人民的更加传统的义务之间难以抉择。


Fortunately, insularity is not an “all or nothing” moral proposition.	幸运的是，偏隘并不是一种“非此即彼”的道德命题。


In a world in which people are organized in national communities, a purely cosmopolitan ideal is unrealistic.	在一个人民根据国家社区组织的世界中，纯粹的世界主义理想是不现实的。


Global income equalization, for example, is not a credible obligation for a national political leader; but such a leader could rally followers by saying that more should be done to reduce poverty and disease worldwide.	比如，全球收入平等对国家政治领袖来说就不是一个可信的义务，但同样是这位领袖，他可以声称应该做更多事减少全世界的贫困和疾病，以此招徕追随者。


As the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah has put it, “Thou shalt not kill is a test you take pass-fail. Honor thy father and thy mother admits of gradations.”	哲学家科瓦姆·安东尼·阿皮亚（Kwame Anthony Appiah）指出：“‘汝不可杀人’是及格测试，‘尊重你的父母’是承认等级。


The same is true of cosmopolitanism versus insularity.	世界主义和偏隘之间也是如此。


We may admire leaders who make efforts to increase their followers’ sense of moral duties beyond borders; but it does little good to hold leaders to an impossible standard that would undercut their capacity to remain leaders.	我们敬仰试图增加追随者超越国界的道德责任感的领袖； 但以会影响到领袖地位的难以企及的标准要求领袖也是于事无补的。


As Obama wrestles with determining his responsibilities in Syria and elsewhere, he faces a serious moral dilemma.	在竭力权衡其在叙利亚和其他地方的责任时，奥巴马面临着严重的道德困境。


As Appiah says, duties beyond borders are a matter of degree; and there are also degrees of intervention that range from aid to refugees and arms to different degrees of the use of force.	正如阿皮亚所说，跨国责任是程度问题； 干预也有程度，从援助难民、武器援助到不同程度的使用武力。


But even when making these graduated choices, a leader also owes his followers a duty of prudence – of remembering the Hippocratic oath to first of all, do no harm.	但即使是在做出这些成熟的选择时，领袖也对其追随者负有审慎责任——时刻铭记“首先不要伤害”的希波克拉底誓言。


Ignatieff says Obama already owns the consequences of his inaction; Friedman reminds him of the virtue of prudence.	伊格纳提夫说，奥巴马已经领教了不作为的后果； 而弗里德曼则提醒他审慎的美德。


Pity Obama.	可怜的奥巴马。


Safeguarding Cyberspace	捍卫网络空间


CAMBRIDGE – Brazil recently hosted NETmundial, the first global conference on Internet governance, attended by 800 representatives of governments, corporations, civil-society organizations, and technologists.	坎布里齐——巴西最近举办了互联网管理领域首届全球会议NETmundial，有800名政府、企业、民间社会组织和技术界代表与会。


Based on the notion of “multi-stakeholderism,” the meeting produced a 12-page “outcomes” document.	在“多利益相关者”的理念基础上，此次会议拿出了一份12页的“成果”文件。


Nonetheless, at the end of the conference, there was still no consensus on global cyber governance.	然而会议结束时，仍然没有就全球网络治理问题达成共识。


Many governments continued to advocate traditional United Nations voting procedures for making global decisions, and defend their right to control domestic cyber activities.	许多政府主张继续沿用联合国表决的传统程序进行全局决策，捍卫政府控制国内网络活动的权利。


In a sense, this is not surprising.	从某种意义上讲，这并不值得大惊小怪。


After all, though the Internet is a complex, fast-evolving, and all-encompassing global resource, it has not been around for very long.	毕竟，虽然互联网是种复杂、发展迅速且包罗万象的全球资源，但它的历史还不是很长。


While the World Wide Web was conceived in 1989, it was only in the last 15 years that the number of Web sites burgeoned, and Internet technology began to transform global supply chains.	虽然万维网的构想起源于1989年，网站数量突飞猛进、互联网科技开始改变全球供应链还仅仅是近15年的事。


Since 1992, the number of Internet users has exploded from one million to nearly three billion. Just like that, the Internet became a substrate of economic, social, and political life.	从1992年起，网民数量从一百万激增到近30亿，互联网成为经济、社会和政治生活的基石。


In its early days, the Internet was often characterized as the ultimate egalitarian conduit of free-flowing information – a harbinger of the end of government controls.	成立初期的互联网往往被定义为信息自由流动的终极平等主义管道——亦即结束政府控制的先驱。


But the reality is that governments and geographical jurisdictions have always played a central role in regulating the Internet – or at least have tried.	但现实状况却是政府和地域管辖机构一直在互联网监管中发挥着核心作用——至少他们力求如此。


Ultimately, however, the Internet poses a major governance challenge, exemplified in ongoing efforts to understand the implications of ubiquitous mobility and the collection and storage of “big data.”	但归根结底，互联网构成了重大的治理挑战，这既体现在努力理解流动性无所不在的影响，也体现在“大数据”的存储和搜集。


The governance challenge stems from the fact that cyberspace is a combination of virtual properties, which defy geographical boundaries, and physical infrastructure, which fall under sovereign jurisdictions.	治理挑战源于网络空间是虚拟资产的组合，它既不存在地域界限，也不属于物理基础设施，因此不归属主权司法辖区管理。


Control of the physical layer can have both territorial and extraterritorial effects on the virtual layers.	物理层的控制可以对虚拟层产生域内和域外效力。


At the same time, attacks can be launched from the low-cost virtual realm against the physical domain, where resources are scarce and expensive.	同时可以从低成本的虚拟领域对资源稀缺而昂贵的实体领域发动攻击。


The Internet began as a small village of known users, where an authentication layer of code was unnecessary and the development of norms was simple.	互联网用户开始时都相互认识，因此无需进行代码验证，制定规则也并非难事。


But then it grew, and everything changed.	但随着互联网发展壮大一切不再像起初那样容易。


Though cyberspace offered the advantages of access to information and easy communication to a growing number of people, it became a breeding ground for crime, hacker attacks, and threats to governments.	虽然网络空间让越来越多人掌握了信息获取及沟通便捷的优势，但它也逐渐成为滋生犯罪、黑客攻击的温床，并威胁到政府的利益。


Efforts to limit the risks incurred in this volatile environment have focused on creating private networks and “walled gardens” (closed platforms) – cyber equivalents to the seventeenth-century enclosures that were used to solve that era’s “tragedy of the commons.”	人们一般通���创建私有网络和“围墙花园”（即封闭平台）来控制环境动荡所带来的风险——这与17世纪解决“平民悲剧”的圈地运动何其相似。


But this raises the risk of fragmentation, which, if allowed to go far enough, could curtail the Internet’s economic benefits.	但这样做增加了“隔离”的风险，如果任由这种趋势发展下去，可能会影响互联网的经济效益。


Given that security is a traditional function of the state, some observers believe that growing insecurity will lead to a greater role for governments in cyberspace.	鉴于安全是政府的一项传统职能，一些观察家认为越来越多的不安全因素会导致各国政府在网络空间中更为活跃。


Indeed, accounts of cyber war may be exaggerated, but cyber espionage is rampant, and more than 30 governments are reputed to have developed offensive capabilities and doctrines for the use of cyber weapons.	事实上，宣扬网络战争可能有些夸大其辞，但网络间谍活动的确非常猖獗，30多个国家政府被认为具备了网络武器应用的学说和攻击力。


Ever since the Stuxnet virus was used to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program in 2009-2010, governments have taken the threat posed by cyber weapons very seriously.	自从2009-2010年震网病毒被用于破坏伊朗核计划后，各国政府开始认真对待网络武器所造成威胁。


Governments also want to protect their societies from what comes through the Internet.	政府还希望保护本国社会不受互联网内容的损害。


For example, China’s government has not only created a “Great Firewall” of software filters; it also requires that companies take responsibility for censoring their public content.	比方说中国政府不仅建成了用于软件过滤的“长城防火墙”； 还要求企业承担起审查公共内容的职责。


And, if China is attacked, it has the capacity to reduce its Internet connections.	而且在受到攻击的情况下，中国有能力减少其互联网连接。


But China’s government – and others that practice Internet censorship – still want to reap the economic benefits of connectivity.	但中国政府和其他实施互联网审查的机构却不愿放弃联网带来的经济效益。


That tension leads to imperfect compromises.	这样的紧张状况最终导致了不完美的妥协。


A similar tension exists in the effort to create international Internet-governance norms.	在创建国际互联网治理规范领域也存在相似的紧张态势。


While authoritarian countries like China and Russia seek “information security,” including the kind of overt censorship that would be prohibited in countries like the United States, Western democracies pursue “cyber security.”	中国和俄罗斯等专制国家寻求的所谓“信息安全”也包括美国和西方民主国家追求“网络安全”的公开审查制。


This divergence was starkly apparent in 2012, at a conference convened in Dubai by the UN’s International Telecommunications Union (ITU).	联合国国际电信联盟（ITU）在迪拜召开的会议毫不掩饰地体现了这种分歧。


Though the meeting was ostensibly about updating telephony regulations, the underlying issue was the ITU’s role in Internet governance.	虽然会议的表面议题是更新电话章程，但国际电信联盟在互联网治理中的作用才是根本性问题。


Authoritarian regimes and many developing countries believe that their approach to sovereignty, security, and development would benefit from the multilateral processes that the ITU employs.	独裁政权和许多发展中国家认为其主权、安全和发展策略将受益于国际电信联盟采用的多边程序。


But democratic governments fear that these processes are too cumbersome, and would undercut the flexibility of the “multi-stakeholder” approach, which stresses the involvement of the private and non-profit sectors, as well as governments.	但民主政府却担心上述程序过于繁琐，并且会影响到强调政府和私有及非营利部门参与并重的“多方利益攸关者”策略的灵活性。


The vote in Dubai was 89 to 55 against the “democratic” governments.	迪拜投票的结果是“民主政府”以55对89票落败。


This outcome raised concerns about a crisis in Internet governance – concerns that the recent conference in Brazil alleviated, but only slightly.	投票结果凸显了对互联网治理危机的担忧——这种担忧在最近的巴西会议上有所缓解，但却远没有消失。


Stayed tuned.	请您一定继续关注。


There are many more conferences scheduled on cyber governance – and a lot more work to be done.	今后还将召开很多互联网治理方面的会议——要做的工作还有很多。


Governance in the Information Age	信息时代的治理


ABU DHABI – As the year comes to an end, it is only natural to ask what might lie ahead.	阿布扎比—随着岁末的来临，一个很自然的问题是明年会怎样。


But, instead of asking what may lie ahead in 2014, let us jump to mid-century.	但是，现在我们不问2014年会怎样，而是跳到世纪中叶。


What will governance look like in 2050?	2050年的治理会怎样？


That is what the World Economic Forum (WEF) asked at a recent meeting in Abu Dhabi that focused on the future of governance under three potential scenarios arising from the ongoing information revolution.	这就是最近的世界经济论坛（WEF）阿布扎比会议所提出的问题。 这次会议集中讨论了信息革命所带来的三种潜在情景中的未来治理。


With that revolution already marginalizing some countries and communities – and creating new opportunities for others – the question could hardly be more timely.	这场革命已经让一些国家和社区边缘化了——也为其他国家和社区创造了新机会——因此提出这一问题可以说正逢其时。


The first scenario that participants considered is a world ruled by so-called “megacities,” where governance is administered largely by major urban agglomerations.	第一种情景是，参与者考虑一个有所谓“特大城市”主宰的世界，治理主要由大型都市圈来管理。


The second possibility is a world in which strong central governments use big data to fortify their control.	第二种可能是强大的中央政府使用大数据来加强控制。


And, in the third scenario, central governments are fundamentally weak, with markets – and the enterprises that dominate them – providing almost all services.	而在第三种情景中，中央政府从根本上十分脆弱，市场——以及主宰市场的企业——提供几乎所有服务。


Each of these scenarios is an extrapolation of a current trend.	这些情景都是当前趋势的外推。


While all of them could be beneficial in some respects, they also have features that, if left unchecked, could lead to dystopian outcomes.	从不同角度看，这三种情景都有有利的一面，但如果不仔细检视，也都可能导致反乌托邦结果。


Policymakers should already be implementing policies aimed at guiding trends like urbanization, the rise of big data, and the grouping of people into narrow communities, often based on their relationship to the market.	决策者应该已在实施旨在指导城镇化、大数据崛起和将人群编入（通常基于关系和市场的）小社区的政策。


The goal should be to take advantage of these trends’ potential benefits, while ensuring that they do not undermine other critical aspects of governance.	目标应该是利用这些趋势的潜在好处，同时确保它们不会破坏治理的其他关键方面。


For example, although megacities have the potential to create new opportunities for workers and businesses, they cannot solve universal problems like climate change or manage the production and protection of national and global public goods.	比如，尽管大都市有望为工人和企业创造新机会，但它们无法解决气候变化等全球性问题，也无法管理国家和全球层面公共品的生产和保护。


Likewise, while the use of big data has substantial problem-solving potential, important questions remain about who owns, who controls, and who regulates the use of the data.	类似地，尽管大数据具有巨大的解决问题的潜力，但仍存在重要问题：谁拥有、控制和监管大数据的运用？


The notion of a “datocracy” incites fear of an Orwellian “e-1984.”	“数据民主”的概念带来了奥威尔式的“电子1984”恐慌。


Indeed, the recent revelations about National Security Agency surveillance programs barely scratch the surface of the issue.	事实上，最新披露的国家安全局监控计划最多只能算冰山一角。


After all, the use of big data is not confined to governments and corporations; anonymous criminal groups can easily abuse the information, too.	毕竟，大数据的运用不受政府和公司的约束； 匿名犯罪团伙也可以轻易地滥用信息。


Finally, while individual choice within markets is often the most efficient way to allocate resources, markets do not produce a sufficient supply of public goods.	最后，尽管市场中的个人选择通常是资源配置最高效的方式，但市场无法提供充足的公共品。


Indeed, there are some goods that the private sector is simply unable to provide.	事实上，有一些商品私人部门根本无法提供。


This system may seem acceptable to those within the “gated communities” that benefit from it, but what about all those left outside?	这套体系对于处于从中获利的“封闭社区”者来说可以接受，但“封闭社区”之外的人怎么办？


The WEF’s Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government, of which I am a part, has considered ways in which information technology can improve governance and reduce feelings of alienation among the governed.	WEF的未来政府全球日程委员会（Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government，我也参与其中）考虑了信息技术改善治理、减弱被治理者的疏离感的方法。


The most effective initiatives, the council observed, often arise from partnerships between government and the private sector.	委员会观察到，最有效的方案通常来自政府和私人部门的合作。


For example, in Kenya, a private company developed a mobile-payments system that allows users to transfer money using cell phones, effectively creating a banking system much more quickly than the government could have done.	比如，在肯尼亚，一家私人公司开发了一套移动支付系统，该系统允许用户使用手机转账，事实上创造了远比政府所能提供的更快捷的银行系统。


Once the system was privately created, the government was able to use it to provide additional services.	一旦这一系统被私人部门创造出来，政府也可以使用它来提供更���的服务。


As a result, a Kenyan farmer in a remote district can now obtain information about crop prices or transfer funds, without having to travel long distances and wait in lines.	于是，如今肯尼亚偏远地区的农民能够获得关于作物价格或转移支付资金的信息而不必长途跋涉和排长队。


While such initiatives cannot solve the problem of inequality, they can help to relieve some of its most damaging effects.	尽管这类方案无法解决不平等性问题，但它们有助于减轻不平等性问题最严重的后果。


At a time of rapid social change and relentless technological advancement, efforts to improve governance – at the local, national, or international level – will require careful thought and experimentation, in order to determine how to balance inclusive decision-making with the ever-evolving needs of markets.	现时代，社会变化日新月异，技术进步层出不穷，改善治理的努力——不管在地方、国家还是国际层面——需要谨慎的思考和实验，以确定如何平衡包容性决策和不断演化的市场需求。


As the American diplomat Harlan Cleveland once asked, “How will we get everybody in on the act, and still get some action?”	美国外交家克利夫兰（Harlan Cleveland）曾提出一个问题：“我们如何让所有人都动起来，然后仍能产生行动？ ”


Consider international institutions.	考虑国际机构。


Today, the world is organized into some 200 countries; in all likelihood, it will be in 2050 as well.	如今，整个世界被分为200多个国家； 无论如何，2050年也将是如此。


But only 16 governmental entities account for two-thirds of the world’s income and two-thirds of its population.	但16个政府实体就占据了世界收入的三分之二和人口的三分之二。


Many have advocated the use of “double majorities” – which require a majority of votes according to two separate criteria, population and economic output – to elicit action from a manageable number of states while enhancing weaker states’ influence in decision-making.	许多人助长应该采取“双重多数”——根据人口和经济产出这两个独立的标准衡量的多数票——从可管理数量的国家中产生行动，同时增强弱国对决策的影响力。


But, though the G-20 has moved in this direction, the approach to setting a global agenda remains flawed.	但是，尽管G-20正在朝这一方向努力，其设置全球日程的方式仍是有缺陷的。


Indeed, it seems to be most effective in times of crisis; in more normal times, as we have seen, the G-20 struggles to get things done.	事实上，这一方式在危机时期最有效； 但在正常时期我们看到，G-20难以很难产生什么成果。


Moreover, even if the double-majority system helps to empower some weaker states, it does not account for the role of the world’s smallest countries in global decision-making processes.	此外，即使双重多数制度有助于增强弱国权力，它也并未考虑世界最小国家在全球决策程序中的角色。


Although these countries represent a small share of the global population, they comprise a significant majority of the total number of countries.	尽管这些国家只占据了世界人口的极小部分，但它们组成了国家数量的极大部分。


One potential solution would be for states to represent each other, as occurs in the International Monetary Fund.	一个潜在解决方案时让国家代表彼此，就像在国际货币基金组织（IMF）中那样。


But the IMF’s experience exposes significant challenges in implementation.	但IMF的经验暴露出实施方面的巨大挑战。


World leaders have not yet figured out how to reconcile the moral conviction that all people are equal with the simple fact that all countries are not.	世界领袖还没有指出，如何让人人平等的道德结论与所有国家并不平等这一简单事实协调起来。


In a global information age, governance systems capable of addressing fundamental issues like security, welfare, liberty, and identity will require coalitions that are small enough to function efficiently and a decision concerning what to do about those who are underrepresented.	在全球信息时代，能解决安全、福利、自由和身份等根本问题的治理制度需要足够小因此能有效运转的联盟以及关注可以为未得到代表的群体做些什么的决定。


Obviously, all of this calls for a lot more investigation.	显然，所有这些都要求更多的研究。


Exploring potential future scenarios, as the WEF has done, is an important step in the right direction.	如WEF那样探索潜在未来情景是这一方向的重要一步。


Japan’s Self-Defense Defense	日本的自卫防御


CAMBRIDGE – Since the end of World War II, Japan has been ruled by an American-written “peace constitution,” Article 9 of which prohibits war and limits Japanese forces to self-defense.	美国剑桥—二战结束以来，日本一直由美国起草的“和平宪法”治理，其中的第九条禁止日本参与战争，也限制了日本的自卫力量。


Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is now seeking legislation to enable Japan to reinterpret the constitution to include “collective self-defense,” whereby the country would enhance its security cooperation with other countries, particularly its closest ally, the United States.	如今，首相安倍晋三正在寻求立法让日本重新解释宪法，纳入“集体自卫权”，使日本能够强化与其他国家，特别是其最紧密盟友美国的联系。


Critics view this as a radical departure from seven decades of pacifism.	批评者认为这严重偏离了七十年来的和平主义。


But Abe’s central objectives – improving Japan’s ability to respond to threats that do not amount to armed attack; enabling Japan to participate more effectively in international peacekeeping activities; and redefining measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 – are actually relatively modest.	但安倍的核心目标——提高日本响应未达到武装袭击程度的威胁的能力并重新定义宪法第九条所允许的自卫措施——实际上相对比较温和。


Fears that the move would lead to Japanese involvement in distant US wars are similarly overblown.	担心这一举动会导致日本卷入遥远的美国战争同样有过分渲染之嫌。


Indeed, the rules have been carefully crafted to prohibit such adventures, while allowing Japan to work more closely with the US on direct threats to Japanese security.	事实上，精心修改后的规则禁止这样的动作，尽管它允许日本就直接的安全威胁与美国开展更紧密的合作。


It is not difficult to see why Abe is pursuing broader rights to self-defense.	不难看出为何安倍要追求更广泛的集体自卫权利。


Japan lies in a dangerous region, in which deep-rooted tensions threaten to erupt at any moment.	日本位于一个危险的地区，该地区有着根深蒂固的紧张局势，随时可能爆发冲突。


Given that East Asia, unlike Europe after 1945, never experienced full reconciliation among rivals, or established strong regional institutions, it has been forced to depend on the US-Japan Security Treaty to underpin regional stability.	与1945年后的欧洲不同，东亚的诸对立国家从未有过完全的妥协，也没有建立地区机构，而一直依靠美日安保条约（US-Japan Security Treaty）维持地区稳定。


When US President Barack Obama’s administration announced its “rebalancing” toward Asia in 2011, it reaffirmed the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration, which cited the US-Japan security alliance as the foundation for stability – a prerequisite for continued economic progress – in Asia.	2011年，美国总统奥巴马政府宣布将“重返”亚洲时重申了1996年克林顿-桥本宣言（ Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration）。 该宣言将美日安全同盟称为亚洲稳定的基础和持续经济进步的先决条件。


That declaration served the larger goal of establishing a stable, albeit uneven, triangular relationship among the US, Japan, and China.	这一宣言服务于一个更大的目标：在美国、日本和中国之间建立一个不完全平均但稳定三角关系。


Subsequent US administrations have upheld this approach, and opinion polls show that it retains broad acceptance in Japan – not least owing to close cooperation on disaster relief following the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011.	随后的几届美国政府都坚持这一方针，而民调显示这在日本人中间也有很高的接受度——不仅是因为2011年东北地震和海啸后的紧密救灾合作。


But Japan remains extremely vulnerable.	但日本仍然十分脆弱。


The most immediate regional threat is North Korea, whose unpredictable dictatorship has invested its meager economic resources in nuclear and missile technology.	最紧迫的地区威胁来自朝鲜，其不可预测的独裁统治将十分有限的军事资源用于核技术和导弹技术。


A longer-term concern is the rise of China – an economic and demographic powerhouse whose expanding military capacity has enabled it to take an increasingly assertive stance in territorial disputes, including with Japan in the East China Sea.	更长期的忧虑是中国崛起。 这个经济和人口超级大国正在扩张军力，使其得以在领土争端中采取日益强硬的立场，包括与日本在东海的岛屿争端。


China’s territorial ambitions are also fueling tensions in the South China Sea, where sea-lanes that are vital to Japanese trade are located.	中国的领土野心也助长了南海的紧张局势，而南海航线对日本贸易来说至关重要。


Complicating matters further is the fact that China’s political evolution has failed to keep pace with its economic progress.	让局面更加复杂的事中国的政治演化跟不上经济进步的步伐。


If the Chinese Communist Party feels threatened by a public frustrated with insufficient political participation and enduring social repression, it could slip into competitive nationalism, upending the already-delicate regional status quo.	如果中共因为公众对政治参与不足和长期社会压迫的不满而感到威胁，就可能滑向竞争性民族主义，颠覆已然摇摇欲坠的地区现状。


Of course, if China becomes aggressive, Asian countries like India and Australia – which are already disturbed by China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea – will join Japan in the effort to offset China’s power.	当然，咄咄逼人的中国将使印度和澳大利亚等亚洲国家——它们已经因为中国在南海的独断专行而愤懑不已——将加入日本，一起遏制中国的实力。


But, as things stand, a strategy of containment would be a mistake.	但是，就目前情况而言，遏制战略将是一个错误。


After all, the best way to engender enmity is to treat China as an enemy.	毕竟，最容易点燃敌意的做法正是将中国作为敌人对待。


A more effective approach, spearheaded by the US and Japan, would focus on integration, with a hedge against uncertainty.	一个更有效的方针是由美国和日本牵头，注重一体化并规避不确定性。


American and Japanese leaders must shape the regional environment in such a way that China has incentives to act responsibly, including by maintaining strong defense capabilities.	美国和日本领导人必须引导地区环境以使中国有动力负责任地行动，维持强大的防御实力是办法之一。


Meanwhile, the US and Japan must rethink the structure of their alliance.	与此同时，美国和日本必须反思联盟结构。


While the expected revisions to Japan’s defense framework are a positive development, many Japanese still resent the lack of symmetry in the alliance obligations.	尽管预期中的日本防务框架调整是积极的发展动态，但许多日本人仍不满于联盟义务的不对等性。


Others chafe at the burden of US bases, particularly on the island of Okinawa.	也有人不满于美军基地（特别是冲绳基地）的负担。


A longer-term goal should thus be for the US gradually to transfer its bases to Japanese control, leaving American forces to rotate among them.	因此，更长期的目标应该是美国逐渐将军事基地转交给日本人控制，而美军则在周围巡航。


In fact, some bases – notably, Misawa Air Base north of Tokyo – already fly Japan’s flag, while hosting American units.	事实上其中一些军事基地——特别是东京以北的三泽空军基地——尽管仍驻扎着美军，但已经竖起了日本旗帜。


But the process must be handled carefully.	但这一过程必须小心控制。


As China invests in advanced ballistic missiles, the fixed bases on Okinawa become increasingly vulnerable.	随着中国投资于先进弹道导弹，冲绳固定军事基地正在变得越来越脆弱。


To avoid the perception that the US decided to turn the bases over to Japan just when their military benefits were diminishing, and to ensure that the move represented America’s recommitment to the alliance, a joint commission would have to be established to manage the transfer.	为了避免让人觉得美国出于军事利益日益消失才把军事基地转交给日本，也为了保证这样做代表了美国对美日同盟关系的重新承诺，必须建立联合委员会管理转交事宜。


For Japan, becoming an equal partner in its alliance with the US is essential to securing its regional and global standing.	对日本来说，成为与日本平等的合作伙伴对于确保其地区和全球地位至关重要。


To this end, Abe’s modest step toward collective self-defense is a step in the right direction.	在这方面，安倍朝向集体自卫权的温和步骤代表着正确方向。


The Return of Japan	日本的回归


TOKYO – “Japan is back!” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared during a visit to Washington, DC, earlier this year.	东京——安倍晋三首相在年初访问华盛顿时曾向外界宣布 “日本回来了！


But, while Japan may be on the right track after two decades of economic stagnation, there is still much to be done to secure the country’s long-term future.	”不过虽然日本有可能在二十年的经济停滞后重新走上了正轨，但确保国家的长远未来还有许多工作要做。


In July, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won control of both houses of parliament – a resounding electoral victory that amounts to the strongest political mandate any Japanese leader has received in many years.	7月，安倍所在的自由民主党（LDP）得到了议会两院的控制权——这次彻底的选举胜利带来了多年以来日本领导人最强的政治权力。


As a result, Abe seems likely to remain in power longer than his ineffectual predecessors, most of whom did not last more than a year.	因此安倍的掌权时间似乎会超过他徒劳无功的前任，他们中的多数人在任时间只有短短1年多。


Meanwhile, Japan’s economy seems to be recovering from a generation of malaise, with this year’s annualized growth rate exceeding 3%.	此外，日本经济似有从一代人的萎靡不振中复苏的迹象，今年的年增长率超过3%。


Moreover, following the triple shock of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe in 2011, Japan has managed (at considerable cost) to replace the 25% of its energy supply that the disabled reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant provided.	不仅如此，在经过2011年地震、海啸及核灾难的三重打击之后，日本（付出极大代价）成功取代了曾由福岛第一核电站报废反应堆提供的25%的能源供应。


The announcement that Tokyo will host the 2020 Olympic Games has also boosted public confidence.	东京将举办2020年奥运会的宣告也提振了公众信心。


Skeptics worry that the economic progress may not last, arguing that the high growth rate is simply a reflection of loose monetary policy and fiscal stimulus – a strategy that inflation will render unsustainable.	持怀疑态度的人担心现在的经济进步可能不会持久，认为较高的增速不过是宽松货币政策和财政刺激的反映——通胀最终会让这项策略不可持续。


Abe’s supporters reply that the third “arrow” of “Abenomics” – productivity-enhancing structural reforms – has only now been removed from its quiver.	安倍的支持者则回应说安倍经济学的第三只“箭”—— 提高生产率的结构性改革——现在不过刚刚抽出箭袋而已。


They point to Abe’s ability to overcome resistance from small rice farmers, part of the LDP’s electoral base, to Japan’s participation in negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would open Japan’s economy to increased global competition.	他们指出安倍成功地克服了小稻农的阻力加入到跨太平洋伙伴关系谈判，该谈判会让日本经济面对更为剧烈的国际竞争，而稻农传统上一直是支持自民党的势力。


Nevertheless, Japan faces serious long-term challenges.	尽管如此，日本面临的长期挑战依然严峻。


First, with its birth rate well below replacement level, Japan’s population is aging and shrinking.	首先，因为出生率远低于正常的更新水平，日本人口一直呈现老龄化及萎缩态势。


Offsetting this trend will require increased immigration and greater female labor-force participation – neither of which will be easy to bring about.	平衡这一态势需要更多吸收移民，并让更多女性加入劳动力队伍——实现这两项目标中的哪项都很不容易。


Japan has not traditionally been a country of immigration, and the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report, which ranks 136 countries, has Japan in 105th place.	日本从传统上就不是移民国家，而世界经济论坛的全球性别差距报告总共统计了136个国家，其中日本排在第105位。


But, of course, this can change – and Japan does have a history of successfully reinventing itself.	但毫无疑问这些都可以改变——而日本的确有过成功自我重塑的历史。


Perhaps the most critical question about Japan’s future concerns its relationship with its neighbors – North Korea, South Korea, and China.	事关日本未来最关键的问题或许是与朝鲜、韩国和中国的邻国关系。


While recent polls suggest that Japan retains substantial soft power globally, this is not the case in its immediate neighborhood.	虽然最近的民意调查显示日本在全球范围内仍具有可观的软实力，但与相邻国家的状况却并非如此。


Unlike Europe, where Germany overcame World War II’s legacy through its integration into the European Union, Northeast Asia remains burdened by history.	与德国通过加入欧盟克服二战的遗存影响不同，东北亚仍然背负着沉重的历史。


According to its neighbors, Japan’s apologies for is past aggression are inadequate.	邻国一致认为日本没有足够的诚意为过去的侵略道歉。


It does not help that some Korean and Chinese leaders have used anti-Japanese rhetoric to win domestic support.	某些朝中领导人利用抗日情绪赢得国内支持也加剧了这种情况。


In Japan, the relentless criticism has triggered a nationalist backlash, spurring politicians to respond in kind during last year’s election campaign.	不留情面的批评在日本国内引发了民族主义的反弹，推动政界在去年的竞选活动中做出某种反应。


For example, Abe threatened to rescind the official apologies issued by former leaders or officials for abuses and atrocities committed by Japan’s army during WWII, and stated his intention to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which honors not only Japan’s war dead, but also many of its war criminals.	比方说，安倍就曾威胁要收回前领导人或官员就日本二战侵害及暴行的正式道歉，并表示打算参拜备受争议的靖国神社，那里不仅供奉着日本的阵亡将士，同时还供奉着很多战犯。


While Abe has not acted on these campaign statements, some observers remain convinced that he will visit Yasukuni at some point, further straining Japan’s relations with South Korea and China.	尽管安倍尚未采取行动兑现这些竞选承诺，但某些观察家仍然相信他将在某一时刻参拜靖国神社，从而导致日本与韩国和中国的关系进一步紧张化。


Territorial disputes have exacerbated these tensions significantly.	领土争端显著加剧了上述紧张局势。


China challenges Japanese control over more than seven square kilometers of islets – called the Senkaku Islands in Japan, and the Diaoyu Islands in China – in the East China Sea.	中国挑战日本对一座7个多平方公里小岛的控制权——这座小岛地处中国东海，日本称之为尖阁列岛，而中国则称之为钓鱼岛。


While the rival claims date back to the late nineteenth century, the latest flare-up – which has included widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations in China – was triggered in September 2012, when Japan’s government purchased three of the tiny islets from their private Japanese owner.	虽然针锋相对的主权之争可以追溯到19世纪末，但最新的事态升级——包括中国举行大规模的反日游行——触发点却是在2012年9月，因为日本政府从私人岛主手中收购了这些小岛中的三座。


Then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that he decided to purchase the islands for the Japanese central government to prevent Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara from purchasing them with municipal funds.	时任首相野田佳彦称他决定由日中央政府购买这些小岛是为防止东京都知事石原慎太郎利用市属资金将其买下。


Noda feared that Ishihara, who was well known for nationalist grandstanding, would try to occupy the islands or find other ways to use them to provoke China.	野田害怕以民族主义著称的石原会占领这些岛屿，或找其他方式利用它们来刺激中国。


But Chinese officials viewed the move as proof that Japan was trying to disrupt the status quo.	但中国官员认为此举恰恰证明日本企图破坏现状。


Some even claimed that Japan was trying to reverse the territorial outcome of WWII.	有人甚至声称日本正试图改变二战后的领土分配格局。


The May 1972 transfer back to Japan of Okinawa, which the United States had administered, included the Senkaku Islands.	1972年5月原来由美国代管的冲绳归还给日本，尖阁列岛也在其中。


A few months later, when China and Japan were working to normalize relations, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the islets; Zhou responded that the dispute should be left to later generations, in order to avoid any delay of normalization.	几个月后，当中日两国实现关系正常化时，日本首相田中角荣曾询问中国总理周恩来这些岛屿的归属问题； 周回应为避免延误关系正常化，所有争议应留给后代解决。


As a result, both countries maintained their sovereignty claims.	两国因此都保持了主权要求。


So, though Japan has administrative control, Chinese ships and planes frequently enter Japanese waters to assert China’s claim.	因此虽然日本手握行政控制权，中国的舰艇和飞机会频频进入日本领海，以显示中国的领土要求。


While Japan’s security treaty with the US serves as a deterrent, there is always a danger of miscalculation.	虽然日美安全条约一直在发挥威慑力量，但误判形势的风险却始终没有消除。


A quick resolution of the Senkaku Islands dispute (or of Japan’s lower-profile conflict with South Korea over the Korean-controlled Liancourt Rocks) is improbable, but Japan could be more proactive.	快速解决尖阁群岛争端（抑或没那么显眼的日本和韩国就韩属独岛的争端）是不可能的，但日本却可以更加主动。


For example, by stating their willingness to take any territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice, Japanese authorities could help to dispel perceptions of militarism.	比方说，借声明愿意把任何领土争端交由国际法院仲裁，日本政府或许可以消除军国主义的名声。


Furthermore, Japan should take the sovereign act of designating the Senkaku Islands as an international maritime preserve free of habitation or military use.	此外，日本应行使主权将尖阁群岛划为不允许居住或军事用途的国际海上保护区。


China might not agree, but such a move might at least return the issue to the back burner, while reinforcing Japan’s image as a peaceful power.	中国可能不赞同这种做法，但此举可能至少能让领土争端回到次要位置，并同时巩固日本和平大国的形象。


Japan and Northeast Asia need bold initiatives that focus on the future.	日本和东北亚地区需要采取着眼未来的大胆举措。


It is time to give history a rest.	是时候让历史成为历史了。


The Myth of Isolationist America	孤立主义美国的神话


CAMBRIDGE – Is the United States turning inward and becoming isolationist?	美国剑桥—美国正在内向化和孤立主义化吗？


That question was posed to me by a number of financial and political leaders at the recent World Economic Forum at Davos, and was heard again a few days later at the annual Munich Security Conference.	在最近的达沃斯世界经济论坛上，很多金融和政治领袖想我提出了这样一个问题，在几天后举行的慕尼黑安全会议上也是如此。


In a strong speech at Davos, Secretary of State John Kerry gave an unambiguous answer: “Far from disengaging, America is proud to be more engaged than ever.”	在达沃斯，国务卿克里发表了强力演说，毫不含糊地指出：“美国绝没有减少参与，反而因为比从前更多地参与而自豪。


Yet the question lingered.	”但这一问题仍没有得到解答。


Unlike the mood at Davos a few years ago, when many participants mistook an economic recession for long-term American decline, the prevailing view this year was that the US economy has regained much of its underlying strength.	在几年前的达沃斯，许多参与者都把经济衰退误认为美国的长期衰落，与此不同的是，今年的普遍感觉是美国经济重新获得了大部分基础优势。


Economic doomsayers focused instead on previously fashionable emerging markets like Brazil, Russia, India, and Turkey.	经济末日论者转而关注此前的大热门巴西、俄罗斯、印度和土耳其等新兴市场。


The anxiety about US isolationism is driven by recent events.	对美国孤立主义的担忧的背后是最近发生的一系列事件。


For starters, there is America’s refusal (thus far) to intervene militarily in Syria.	首先，美国（到目前为止）拒绝对叙利亚进行军事干预。


Then there is the coming withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.	其次是美国即将从阿富汗撤军。


And President Barack Obama’s cancellation of his trip to Asia last autumn, owing to domestic political gridlock in the US Congress and the resulting government shutdown, made a poor impression on the region’s leaders.	此外，奥巴马在去年春天因为美国国会政治僵局及其导致的政府关门而取消了亚洲之行，这给地区领导人造成了不良的印象。


Indeed, with Kerry’s time and travel focused on the Middle East, many Asian leaders believe that Obama’s signature foreign policy – strategic “rebalancing” toward Asia – has run out of steam, even as tension between China and Japan, evident in their leaders’ statements at Davos, continues to mount.	事实上，克里的精力和行程都集中在中东，这让很多亚洲领导人认为奥巴马的招牌外交政策——战略性地转向亚洲、实现“再平衡”——已是明日黄花，尽管中国和日本之间的紧张态势仍在发酵，从双方领导人在达沃斯的言论便可见一斑。


Particularly egregious from the point of view of “Davos” was the recent refusal by Congress to approve the reform and refunding of the International Monetary Fund, even though a plan that added no significant burden to the American taxpayer had been agreed years earlier by the G-20 under Obama’s leadership.	在“达沃斯”视角看来，最令人担心的莫过于最近国会拒绝国际货币基金组织（IMF）的改革和再融资，尽管这一计划并没有给美国纳税人造成重大的额外负担，并且在几年前就已经得到了奥巴马所领导的G-20的同意。


When I asked a prominent Republican senator why Congress had balked at keeping an American commitment, he attributed it to “sheer orneriness,” reflecting the mood of right-wing Tea Party Republicans and some left-wing Democrats.	我问一位显赫的共和党参议员，为何国会不让美国作出承诺，他表示这 “纯属故意刁难”，反映的是右倾的茶党共和党和一些左倾民主党的思维。


Further evidence of American isolationism can be found in a recent opinion poll taken by the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations.	更多的美国孤立主义证据可以从皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）和外交关系委员会（Council of Foreign Relations）的最新民调中看出。


According to the survey, fifty-two percent of Americans believe that the US “should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.”	这项调查表明，52%的美国人认为美国“应该以国际视角考虑其自身的商业，让其他国家自己决定最好的应对方式”。


About the same number said that the US is “less important and powerful” than it was a decade ago.	同样比例的美国人认为美国比几十年前“更加不重要、更加不强大”了。


The problem with these perceptions – both at home and abroad – is that the US remains the world’s most powerful country, and is likely to remain so for decades.	这些感觉（不论在国内还是在国外）的问题在于美国仍是世界最强��的国家，并且可能在未来几十年中都是如此。


China’s size and rapid economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-à-vis the US.	中国的规模和快速经济增长几乎必然会增加它相对于美国的优势。


But even when China becomes the world’s largest economy in the coming years, it will still be decades behind the US in terms of per capita income.	但即使中国在未来几年中成为世界最大经济体，其人均收入要想超过美国还需要几十年之久。


Moreover, even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, projections based on GDP growth alone are one-dimensional and ignore US military and soft-power advantages. They also ignore China’s geopolitical disadvantages within Asia.	此外，即使中国不在爆发国内政治倒退，基于GDP一个维度的预测也忽视了美国的军事和软实力优势，也忽视了中国在亚洲的地缘政治劣势。


America’s culture of openness and innovation will ensure its role as a global hub in an age when networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power.	美国的开放和创新文化将确保其在网络大大影响（如果不是完全取代的话）层级制权力的时代的全球枢纽地位。


The US is well positioned to benefit from such networks and alliances, if American leaders follow smart strategies.	美国的地位让它十分便于从这样的网络和盟友关系中获益，只要美国领导人战略明智。


In structural terms, it matters greatly that the two entities in the world with economies and per capita income similar to the US – Europe and Japan – are both American allies.	在结构性问题上，经济和人均收入与美国相近的两个经济体——欧洲和日本——都是美国的盟友，这十分重要。


In terms of balance-of-power resources, that boosts America’s net position, but only if US leaders maintain these alliances and ensure international cooperation.	从实力平衡资源角度看，这有利于美国的净地位，但有一个前提——美国领导人维持好这些同盟关系并确保国际合作。


Decline is a misleading metaphor for today’s America, and Obama fortunately has rejected the suggestion that he should pursue a strategy aimed at managing it.	衰落是对当代美国的错误解读，所幸奥巴马没有接受关于他应该追求遏制美国衰落的战略。


As a leader in research and development, higher education, and entrepreneurial activity, the US, unlike ancient Rome, is not in absolute decline.	作为研发、高等教育和创业活动方面的领袖，美国和古罗马不同，并没有绝对衰落。


We do not live in a “post-American world,” but we also no longer live in the “American era” of the late twentieth century.	我们没有生活在“后美国世界”，但也不再生活在二十世纪末的“美国时代”。


In the decades ahead, the US will be “first” but not “sole.”	在未来几十年，美国将是“首要”的，而不是“唯一”的。


That is because the power resources of many others – both states and non-state actors – are growing, and because, on an increasing number of issues, obtaining America’s preferred outcomes will require exercising power with others as much as over others.	这是因为其他国家和非国家行动者的实力源泉正在增长，也是因为在越来越多的问题上，取得美国所中意的结果将日益需要与其他行动者共同运用实力而不是凌驾于其他行动者运用实力。


The capacity of US leaders to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of America’s hard and soft power.	美国领导人维持同盟、建立网络的能力将是美国硬软实力的一个重要维度。


The problem for US power in the twenty-first century is not just China, but the “rise of the rest.”	美国在二十一世纪所面临的实力问题不仅仅是中国，而是“其他国家的崛起”。


The solution is not isolation, but a strategy of selectivity similar to what President Dwight Eisenhower advocated in the 1950’s.	解决办法不是孤立，而是艾森豪威尔总统在20世纪50年代所提倡的选择战略。


A smart power strategy starts with a clear assessment of limits.	一个明智的战略始于对限度的明确评估。


The preeminent power does not have to patrol every boundary and project its strength everywhere.	超然的实力并不一定要在任何边界上都突出、在每个问题上都建立优势。


That is why Eisenhower prudently resisted direct intervention on the French side in Vietnam in 1954.	正因如此，艾森豪威尔审慎地拒绝在1954年越南战争中站在法国一边出手干预。


Eisenhower was right about something else, too: America’s military strength depends on preservation of its economic strength.	艾森豪威尔还有一个正确的地方：美国的军事优势取决于捍卫其经济优势。


Nation-building at home is not the isolation that critics fear; on the contrary, it is central to a smart foreign policy.	在国内的国家建设并不是批评者所担忧的孤立主义； 相反，这是明智外交政策的核心。


A smart strategy would avoid involvement of ground forces in major wars on the Asian continent.	明智的战略将避免派遣地面部队参与亚洲大陆上的大战。


Yet such prudence is not the same as isolationism.	但这一审慎并不等同于孤立主义。


The US needs to combine its soft- and hard-power resources better.	美国需要更好地结合其软实力和硬实力。


As Obama said in his 2014 State of the Union address, “in a world of complex threats, our security depends on all elements of our power – including strong and principled diplomacy.”	奥巴马在2014年国情咨文中指出：“在充满复杂威胁的世界中，我们的安全取决于我们的实力的所有要素——包括强势的有原则的外交。


Eisenhower could have said that, and no one would accuse him of being an isolationist.	”艾森豪威尔也会这样说，并且每人会因此指责他是孤立主义者。


Judgment Day for the Eurozone	欧元区审判日


MUNICH – Europe and the world are eagerly awaiting the decision of Germany’s Constitutional Court on September 12 regarding the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the proposed permanent successor to the eurozone’s current emergency lender, the European Financial Stability Mechanism.	慕尼黑—欧洲和世界正在焦急地等待德国宪法法院9月12日对欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）的判决。 ESM是作为欧元区现行紧急贷款人欧洲金融稳定机制（EFSM）的永久性替代方案推出的。


The Court must rule on German plaintiffs’ claim that legislation to establish the ESM would violate Germany’s Grundgesetz (Basic Law).	德国宪法法院必须就德国原告提出的成立ESM的立法决定违反了德国基本法的意见作出裁决。


If the Court rules in the plaintiffs’ favor, it will ask Germany’s president not to sign the ESM treaty, which has already been ratified by Germany’s Bundestag (parliament).	如果裁决有利于原告，那么宪法法院将要求德国总统拒绝在已被德国议会批准的ESM条约上签字。


There are serious concerns on all sides about the pending decision.	各方均对即将到来的裁决严重关注。


Investors are worried that the Court could oppose the ESM such that they would have to bear the losses from their bad investments.	投资者担心德国宪法法院将反对ESM，因此他们将不得不承受坏投资带来的损失。


Taxpayers and pensioners in European countries that still have solid economies are worried that the Court could pave the way for socialization of eurozone debt, saddling them with the burden of these same investors’ losses.	经济仍然坚挺的欧洲国家的纳税人和退休者担心宪法法院的裁决会扫清欧元区债务社会化的障碍，投资者的损失将因此由他们来承担。


The plaintiffs represent the entire political spectrum, including the Left Party, the Christian Social Union MP Peter Gauweiler, and the justice minister in former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic government, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, who has collected tens of thousands of signatures supporting her case.	原告代表了整个德国政坛，包括左翼党、基督教社会联盟议员高威勒（Peter Gauweiler）和前总理施罗德的社会民主党政府司法部长道勒-格梅林（Herta Däubler-Gmelin），后者更是收集了数万人的支持签名。


There is also a group of retired professors of economics and law, and another of “ordinary” citizens, whose individual complaints have been selected as examples by the Court.	还有一群退休经济学和法学教授，以及另外一批“普通”公民，后者的抱怨被德国宪法法院采纳为参考例子。


The plaintiffs have raised several objections to the ESM.	原告提出了诸多反对ESM的原因。


First, they claim that it breaches the Maastricht Treaty’s “no bail-out” clause (Article 125).	首先，他们诉称这违反了马斯特里赫特条约“不救援”条款（第125条）。


Germany agreed to relinquish the Deutsche Mark on the condition that the new currency area would not lead to direct or indirect socialization of its members’ debt, thus precluding any financial assistance from EU funds for states facing bankruptcy.	德国同意放弃德国马克是有条件的，那就是新货币区不能导致其成员国债务的直接或间接社会化，从而排除了任何动用欧盟资金对面临破产的国家进行金融援助的可能性。


Indeed, the new currency was conceived as a unit of account for economic exchange that would not have any wealth implications at all.	事实上，新货币被认为仅仅是经济交换账户的单位，不具有任何财富效应。


The plaintiffs argue that, in the case of Greece, breaching Article 125 required proof that its insolvency would pose a greater danger than anticipated when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted.	原告指出，在希腊的案例中，对马约第125条的违反需要有希腊破产将产生比马约起草时所预料到的情况更大的危险的证明。


However, no such proof was provided.	但是，希腊案例并没有提供这类证明。


Second, Germany’s law on the introduction of the ESM obliges Germany’s representative on the ESM Council to vote only after having asked the Bundestag for a decision.	其次，德国关于引入ESM的法律规定，德国代表在ESM委员会上的投票只有在要求德国央行作出决定后才能进行。


According to the plaintiffs, this is not permissible under international law.	根据原告的说法，这是国际法所不允许的。


If Germany had wished to constrain its governor’s authority in this way, it should have informed the other signatory states prior to doing so.	如果德国意��以此限制其官员的权力，那么它应该在如此行动之前通知其他签署国。


On the other hand, Germany’s representative on the Governing Council is sworn to secrecy, which, the plaintiffs argue, precludes any accountability to the Bundestag.	另一方面，德国在ESM理事会的代表作过保密宣誓，原告指出，这使得德国央行的行为变得无法问责。


Moreover, the plaintiffs claim that, while the ESM treaty is restrictive in granting resources to individual states, requiring a qualified majority vote, it does not specify the conditions under which losses are acceptable.	此外，原告还诉称，尽管ESM条约对于向个体国家提供资源做了限定，要求通过多数票授权，但并没有具体规定可接受损失的条件。


Losses can result from excessive wages paid by the ESM Governing Council members to themselves, a dearth of energy in efforts to collect debts from countries that have received credit, or other forms of mismanagement.	损失可能产生于ESM向其理事会成员支付的工资过高、缺乏获得信用的国家讨债的动力，以及其他形式的管理不当。


And, because Governing Council and Executive Board members enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution, misbehavior cannot be punished.	此外，由于ESM理事会和执行董事会成员享用刑事诉讼豁免权，他们的不当行为无法追究。


If losses arise, they must be covered by the initial cash contribution of €80 billion ($100 billion), which then would be topped up automatically by all participating countries according to their capital shares.	如果产生了损失，那么必须用800亿欧元的初始筹集现金来弥补，而因此用掉的钱将自动由参与过根据各自的资本权重予以补足。


If individual countries are no longer able to make the necessary contributions, others must do so on their behalf.	如果有的国家无力履行必要的资金提供义务，其他国家必须替它们完成。


In principle, a single country might have to assume the entire burden of losses.	从理论上说，可能出现一个国家承担整个损失负担的情况。


Such joint and several liability, the plaintiffs assert, contradicts the Court’s previous statements that Germany should not accept any financial commitments stemming from other states’ behavior.	原告指出，如此连带责任违反了德国宪法法院先前关于德国不应接受因他国而起的金融承诺的裁决。


Worse, according to the plaintiffs, although the liability of any country vis-à-vis external partners is limited to that country’s share of capital, this limitation does not apply to other signatory states.	更糟糕的是，根据原告所诉，尽管任何国家对外部伙伴的债务被限制在该国资本权重之内，但这一限制并不适用于其他签署国。


It is theoretically possible that a single country could be held liable for the ESM’s total exposure of €700 billion.	从理论上说，有可能出现一个国家不得不承担ESM所有风险暴露（7000亿欧元）的情况。


Finally, the ESM cannot be considered on its own, but must be seen in the context of the total exposure amount, which includes the €1.4 trillion in bailout funds that have already been granted.	最后，ESM问题不能只从ESM本身着眼，而是必须考虑到总风险暴露规模，其中包括已经用出去的1.


In particular, the Target2 credit drawn by the crisis-afflicted countries’ central banks, which already totals almost €1 trillion, should also be taken into consideration.	4万亿欧元援助资金。 特别是，拨给危机影响国央行的Target2信用（总数已达近1万亿欧元）必须考虑在内。


Nobody knows how the Constitutional Court will rule on these objections.	没人知道德国宪法法院将如何裁决这些反对。


Most observers believe that the Court is unlikely to oppose the ESM treaty, though many expect the judges to demand certain amendments, or to ask Germany’s president to make his signature subject to certain qualifications.	大部分观察者认为德国宪法法院不可能反对ESM条约，但许多人预期最后判决将要求ESM条约进行一定的修改，或者要求德国总统必须在满足一定条件才能签字。


It is good that the Court’s decisions cannot be forecast, and even better that the Court cannot be lobbied or petitioned.	裁决结果无法预测，这是件好事，特别是考虑到德国宪法法院不为游说和请愿所动。


The European Union can be based only on the rule of law.	欧盟的唯一基石只能是法治精神。


If those in power can break its rules on a case-by-case basis, the EU will never develop into the stable construct that is a prerequisite for peace and prosperity.	如果当权者可以在每一庄案例中破坏欧盟规则，那么欧盟将永远不可能发展成和平和繁荣所必须的稳定大厦。


The OPEC Oil Embargo at 40	欧佩克石油禁运40年


DENVER – Forty years ago, the United States and much of Europe learned difficult lessons about their dangerous addiction to fossil fuels.	丹佛——四十年前，美国和欧洲绝大部分国家因为对化石燃料的危险依赖而得到了教训。


Following Israel’s victory in the Yom Kippur War, the Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced an oil embargo on Israel’s supporters.	继以色列赎罪日战争获得胜利后，石油输出国（欧佩克）组织阿拉伯成员国宣布对支持以色列的国家实行石油禁运。


Developed countries, faced with the sudden cutoff of a key energy source and a major spike in world oil prices, felt powerless.	面对主要能源供应的突然中止及世界油价的大幅上涨，发达国家感到前所未有的力不从心。


But, as it turned out, developed countries did have options for reducing their dependence on Arab oil.	但事实表明发达国家有能力降低对阿拉伯石油的依赖。


They just had not recognized – or had not cared to recognize – the need for action until OPEC had them over a barrel.	他们只不过还没意识到——也可能是不愿承认——遭到欧佩克的石油绑架前有这个必要。


While consumers waited in long lines – and even fought – to fill their gas tanks, governments attempted to encourage innovative solutions by, for example, raising efficiency requirements for automobiles and certain appliances, like refrigerators.	当消费者排长队等候——甚至为了加满油箱而发生斗殴时，政府却在鼓励创新方案，比方说提高汽车和冰箱等某些电器的能效要求。


In 1977, the US created the Department of Energy (DOE); a year later, it enacted the National Energy Act, which employed tools like industrial regulation and tax incentives to promote fuel efficiency and renewable energy.	美国能源部于1977年创立； 一年后颁布了《国家能源法》，采用行业法规及税收优惠政策等工具来推动可再生能源发展、提高燃油效率。


These efforts led to major improvements in energy efficiency.	上述努力极大地改善了能效。


From 1973 to 1985, US energy consumption per dollar of GDP declined by 28% – five times faster than during the previous quarter-century, according to the DOE.	从1973年到1985年，美国单位美元GDP能耗下降28%——按照能源部的说法，比之前的25年速度快5倍。


But the corresponding decline in demand caused the price of oil to plummet in 1986, ushering in a new era of cheap energy.	但由此带来的需求下降导致1986年石油价格暴跌，开启了廉价能源的新时代。


This facilitated a two-decade-long economic boom, while reducing pressure on governments to sustain the momentum of progress toward greater energy efficiency.	由此促成了长达二十年之久的经济繁荣，同时大大缓解了政府继续保持能效进步的压力。


But oil prices do not reflect the true costs of fossil-fuel consumption.	但石油价格并不反映化石燃料消费的真实成本。


Beyond the economic and human costs of wars fought to maintain reliable oil supplies are the tremendous costs – which are set to rise substantially in the coming years – associated with human-induced climate change.	除为确保可靠石油供应而发动战争的经济和人力成本外还有与人类活动引起气候变化相关的重大成本——今后若干年内此类成本一定会大幅提高。


The recently released Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides further evidence that human-induced climate change is happening.	最近发布的联合国政府间气候变化专业委员会（IPCC）第五次评估报告进一步表明由人类活动引起的气候变化正在发生。


Continued greenhouse-gas emissions on the massive scale of today would have devastating consequences, including more frequent and more intense weather events.	今天的持续大规模温室气体排放可能造成包括更频繁、更剧烈天气事件在内的灾难性后果。


Reversing this trend demands urgent action.	扭转这种颓势需要采取紧急行动。


As was true in the 1970’s, innovation is the key to effective solutions.	与20世纪70年代时一样，有效方案的关键依然是创新。


But, unlike 40 years ago, governments cannot be expected to drive progress.	但不同于40年前的是这次不能再指望政府推动技术进步。


In recent years, governments have clearly demonstrated their lack of willingness to pursue the kind of bold policies and regulatory action that are needed to curb climate change.	近年来，政府已经清楚地表明他们不愿执行遏制气候变化所需的大胆政策及监管行动。


Indeed, since world leaders failed to achieve a climate-change agreement at the COP15 conference in Copenhagen in 2009, the issue has remained on the back burner, with policymakers focusing instead on containing the fallout of the global economic crisis.	其实从各国领导人未能在2009年的哥本哈根COP15会议上达成气候变化协议后，这个问题就一拖再拖，因为决策者都在全力关注遏制全球经济危机的后果。


The recent budget gridlock in the US will only reinforce this approach.	美国最近的预算僵局只能让这样的局面进一步巩固。


While many would welcome top-down solutions like those that emerged in the 1970’s, such outcomes are unlikely in the foreseeable future.	虽然不少人都欢迎20世纪70年代那样自上而下的方案，但在可以预见的未来不太可能实现这样的结果。


Fortunately, there is another way.	幸运的是还有其他办法。


Business-led innovation and market-based solutions can drive a decisive global shift from crippling fossil-fuel dependency to more efficient renewable-energy systems.	企业主导创新和市场化解决方案可以驱动从化石燃料依赖到更高效可再生能源系统决定性的全球转化。


Rocky Mountain Institute’s Reinventing Fire analysis shows that such a future is possible, offering market-driven strategies for powering a US economy that is 158% larger in 2050 – without reliance on oil, coal, or nuclear energy.	落基山研究所的《革新之火》分析报告表明在不依赖石油、煤炭或核能的情况下，为2050年增长达158%的美国经济提供市场化能源战略是完全可能的。


Swift and determined action to make buildings more energy-efficient, design automobiles that require little or no fossil fuels, and increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity supply could ensure that the substantially hotter and less pleasant world of 2050 that the IPCC warns against does not materialize.	迅速果断地采取建筑节能、设计少用或不用化石燃料汽车、提高可再生能源供电比重等行动可以确保IPCC警告过的2050年令人不快的炎热世界不会真的发生。


Our livelihoods, not to mention those of future generations, should not be held hostage by our ongoing addiction to fossil fuels.	我们对于化石燃料的持续依赖不应威胁到自己和子孙后代的生存。


Four decades ago, countries not only endured the immediate economic impact of the OPEC embargo; they leveraged the potential of the resulting oil shortages to spur innovation.	四十年前，各国不光承担了欧佩克禁运对经济的直接影响； 他们还利用由此产生的石油短缺来刺激创新潜能。


Today, the world needs the same kind of bold action – but this time, it is up to the market to provide it.	今天，世界同样需要这样的大胆行动——但这次需要由市场来驱动。


Mandela’s Children	曼德拉的孩子


NAIROBI – Before I knew that Nelson Mandela existed, I thought our then-leader, Kenyan President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, was the world’s only statesman.	发自内罗毕——在我知道有尼尔森·曼德拉这个人存在之前，我觉得自己国家的领袖，时任肯尼亚总统的丹尼尔·阿拉普·莫伊（Daniel Toroitich arap Moi）是世界上唯一的政治家。


I was five years old, and no world existed for me outside Nairagie Enkare, my birthplace in rural Maasailand.	当时我才五岁，对我来说除了出生地——马赛地（Maasailand）乡下的Nairagie Enkare地区——之外的世界是一片空白。


Moi was a mythical figure to me, because he didn’t live in Nairagie Enkare, yet he was always present through radio, a technology too complicated for a child like me to understand.	莫伊只是我心目中一个虚构的人物，因为他并不住在Nairagie Enkare地区，但他经常在收音机里出现，而收音机这种高科技对一个孩子来说实在太难理解了。


Every newscast from the government-controlled radio station began with what “His Excellency, Holy President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi” had said or done.	来自政府电台的每一条新闻都是关于“尊敬而神圣的总统丹尼尔·阿拉普·莫伊”干了或说了些什么。


He visited a school. He planted a tree.	他到哪儿访问了一所学校，又去哪儿种了一棵树。


He helped a women’s group.	他扶助妇女组织。


He attended church.	他进教堂作礼拜。


He said agriculture was the backbone of our nation.	他说农业是我们国家的主心骨。


He said we were fortunate to live in Kenya.	他说我们能生活在肯尼亚是很幸福的一件事。


Throughout the day, the airwaves were filled with songs repeating the Father of the Nation’s message, and reminding Kenyans to follow in his footsteps.	一天到晚，电波里都充斥着一些传达国父教诲的歌曲，并提醒国民要追随他的脚步。


Perhaps because what came over the radio was so predictable, people sought alternative news from the BBC Swahili Service.	或许以为早已对电台里的说辞滚瓜烂熟了，人们转而收听英国广播公司（BBC）的斯瓦西里语频道。


On most evenings, at six o’clock, men gathered to listen at the homes of the few, like my father, who had radios.	每到晚上6点的时候，男人们就聚在那几个有电台的人家——比如我家——来收听节目。


The news lasted only 30 minutes, so everyone had to be absolutely quiet.	新闻只会播放半个小时，因此每个人都必须保持极端安静。


But, on February 11, 1990, the men began to say repeatedly, “He is free! He is free!	但在某一天（我后来才知道是1990年2月11日），人们开始不断重复着一句话：“他自由了，尼尔逊·曼德拉自由了！


Nelson Mandela is free!”	”


I’m sure that my father and his friends had heard earlier from government radio that Mandela had been released, but they waited for verification from the BBC.	我确信父亲和他的朋友们早就在政府电台中听到了曼德拉获释的消息，但他们需要等BBC来确证这一点。


They left before the news was over to go to a bar to celebrate.	还没等到新闻播完，他们就冲到一家酒吧开始了庆祝。


When my father came home that night, he was singing praises for Mandela.	当我父亲当晚回到家的时候还高唱歌颂曼德拉的歌。


I never asked my father who Mandela was.	不过我从来没问他曼德拉究竟是谁。


The following year, I enrolled in school and began to learn that the world extended beyond Nairagie Enkare.	接着那年，我开始读书并发现原来世界不止是Nairagie Enkare那么大。


My teachers explained to me why Mandela’s freedom, after 27 years in prison, meant so much to Africans – from big cities to small villages.	我的老师向我解释为何曼德拉在被囚禁27年后的获释对非洲人——无论是城市居民还是乡野村夫——来说是如此重要


Europeans, I learned, had colonized Africa and stripped Africans of the right to self-governance.	我学到，欧洲人把非洲变成了殖民地并剥夺了非洲人的自治权。


As African countries began to gain independence in the 1950’s, the white minority in South Africa was tightening its grip on power through a racial-segregation system known as apartheid. It was Mandela’s fight against apartheid that led to his imprisonment.	随着非洲国家自1950年代以来先后获得独立，在南非的白人少数派政府开始利用一套名为种族隔离的体制来维护自己的手中权力，而曼德拉正是因��抗这一体制入狱的。


By 1980, black Africans had taken over governance in every country on the continent except South Africa.	在1980年，除了南非之外的所有非洲黑人都获得了自治权。


Mandela’s release from prison ten years later moved Africa one step closer to absolute independence.	而曼德拉在十年后的获释则使非洲更进一步实现了一种近乎完全独立的状态。


That mission was completed in 1994, when apartheid fell and South Africans chose Mandela as their first democratically elected president.	这个使命最终在1994年完成，种族隔离制度终于崩溃，南非人也将曼德拉选为本国首位民选总统。


As I learned more about Mandela, I wondered how he had achieved the unimaginable, overcoming a 27-year ordeal to become the leader of Africa’s largest economy.	随着我对曼德拉了解越多，我就越想知道他是如何完成这个不可想象的任务，熬过了27年牢狱并最终成为非洲最大经济体的总统。


And, just when I thought that he had already made his mark on history, he shocked the world by announcing that he would not seek re-election after the end of his first term in 1999.	而当我认为他已经创造了历史的时候，曼德拉却再次震惊了世界，宣布自己将不会在第一任总统任期结束后继续参选连任。


I was 14 then, old enough to understand how unusual it was for an incumbent African president to retire willingly.	当时我14岁，已经可以明白一位大权在握的非洲总统能自愿退休是件极不寻常的事。


In my own country, for example, people were beginning to wonder whether Moi would leave office in 2002, when his second term expired.	在我自己的国家肯尼亚，人们已经开始猜想莫伊总统究竟是否会在2002年第二任任期届满后退位。


He had ruled Kenya for 13 years before a move in 1991 to reintroduce multi-party democracy paved the way for an election the following year.	在1991年重新引入多党民主制并决定在1992年举行大选之前莫伊已经统治了肯尼亚14年。


Moi was allowed to run again, as long as he honored the constitutional two-term limit.	他被允许在新法令下重新参选，条件是要服从只可连任一届的宪法规定。


I feel extremely fortunate and honored that the start of my formal education coincided with Mandela’s re-emergence in African politics.	我的求学生涯恰好与曼德拉在非洲政治的重新崛起重合，对此我感到非常荣幸。


His patience, civility, and politics of reconciliation provided me a better example of democracy and good governance than any civics class could have done.	他的耐心，文雅以及和解政治都为我提供了一个民主和优秀治理和的绝佳范本，比所有公民教育都要更加生动和深刻。


Mandela embodied the type of leader that Africans had in mind when they struggled for freedom from the European empires.	曼德拉正是那些为摆脱欧洲帝国统治而抗争的非洲人心目中的领袖。


Africans wanted leaders who would reconcile and reunite them – leaders who would restore to them the dignity that colonialism had robbed.	他们希望有一个能促成各族和解并将所有人重新联合在一起的领袖——一个能重新让他们找回被殖民主义夺去的自尊的人。


Unfortunately for many African countries, freedom and independence ended up in the hands of a few who had tasted and become addicted to the repressive practices that Africans had spent decades fighting.	但不幸的是，在许多非洲国家自由和独立依然是一纸空文。 自由终结在了某些曾经遭受，抗争，但却最终沉迷于残酷镇压手段的暴君手里。


They amassed untold wealth as hunger and disease ripped their societies apart and pushed more Africans deeper into poverty.	在他们聚敛巨额财富的同时饥饿与疾病却撕裂了非洲社会并将更多非洲人推向了贫穷的深渊。


Indeed, more than two decades after Mandela walked through the prison gates, supposedly completing Africa’s struggle for freedom, “Big Men” in countries like Congo and Zimbabwe continue to cling to power against the will of their people.	事实上，就在曼德拉走过罗本岛监狱大门，宣告非洲自由斗争胜利20年后的今天，科特迪瓦和津巴布韦等国的“强人”却继续罔顾人民的意愿，紧抱着权力不放。


Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the fact that, since Mandela left office, many African presidents – including Moi and Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor – have adhered to their countries’ constitutions and left office without a fight.	但即便如此我还是保持乐观，因为许多非洲总统——包括莫伊还有曼德莱的继任者姆贝基——都能服从本国的宪法并平静地交出了权力。


I am also hopeful that Mandela has inspired other young people like me to continue Africa’s liberation peacefully – the Mandela way.	我也希望曼德拉能激励其他像我这样的青年人继续走上和平解放非洲的道路——这就是曼德拉路线。


Jumpstarting Europe’s Economy	提振欧洲经济


PARIS – Not so long ago, the notion of the European Central Bank handing out money to governments or directly to citizens – so-called “helicopter money” drops – would have seemed outlandish.	巴黎—不久前，欧洲央行向政府或直接向公民派钱的概念——即所谓的“直升机撒钱”——看上去还荒诞不经。


But today a surprising number of mainstream economists and centrist politicians are endorsing the idea of monetary financing of stimulus measures in different forms.	但如今，令人意外地，大量主流经济学家和中间派政客支持不同形式的刺激计划货币融资的概念。


This represents a much-needed change in the conversation – one that, at long last, finally puts the focus squarely on stimulating the demand side of the European economy.	这表明话语出现了急需的改变——重点终于对准了刺激欧洲经济的需求端。


After years of stagnant growth and debilitating unemployment, all options, no matter how unconventional, should be on the table.	在经历了多年的增长停滞和就业萎靡后，所有选项，不管它多么反常规，都应该摆上台面。


The United Kingdom’s referendum decision to leave the European Union only strengthens the case for more stimulus and unconventional measures in Europe.	英国全民公决决定脱离欧盟，这进一步加强了欧洲加码刺激和非常规措施的理由。


If a large majority of EU citizens is to support continued political integration, strong economic growth is critical.	要让绝大部分欧洲公民支持继续推进政治一体化，强劲的经济增长至关重要。


As research by McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) shows, despite bold quantitative easing and record low interest rates – the ECB was the first major central bank to introduce negative interest rates in 2014 – anemic demand continues to hobble GDP growth throughout Europe.	麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）的研究表明，尽管采取了激进的量化宽松和创纪录的低利率——欧洲央行在2014年率先在主要央行中引入了负利率——但萎靡的需求仍然拖累着整个欧洲的GDP增长。


In several EU countries, more than a quarter of the population has been unemployed for close to a decade, and political discontent is boiling over into extremism.	在一些欧盟国家，超过四分之一人口已经接近十年找不到工作，政治不满也日益走向极端。


The uncertainty and volatility in financial markets in the aftermath of the Brexit vote will further cripple demand.	金融市场在英国退出投票后的不确定性和波动将进步一制约需求。


The wave of corporate investment that was supposed to be unleashed by a combination of fiscal restraint (to rein in government debt) and monetary easing (to generate ultra-low interest rates) has never materialized.	财政约束（遏制政府债务）和货币宽松（形成极低利率）的组合理应带来公司投资潮，但这一幕并未发生。