Some warned that the rejection of the European Constitution in the French and the Dutch referendums, combined with the summit’s decision effectively to suspend the ratification process and its failure to agree on EU finances, could trigger a serious political crisis in the EU.	一些人警告，欧洲宪法在法国和荷兰公投中所遭遇的反对，结合峰会决定延缓批准过程以及峰会难以在欧盟财政上达成一致两件事情，有可能在欧盟引发严重的政治危机。


This is why most new members were ultimately willing to support Luxembourg’s proposed compromise, under which the budget would be only 1.06% of the EU’s overall GDP and Great Britain’s annual rebate would be frozen at €4.6 billion.	这就是为什么大部分新成员国最终愿意支持卢森堡所提议的和谈方案，即预算将只占欧盟全部GDP的1. 06%且英国的年返款将封顶在46亿欧元。


Indeed, just before the ultimate collapse of the talks, five new members, including the Czech Republic and Slovakia, agreed to an even more radical plan, under which the budget would be only 1% of the EU’s GDP.	事实上，就在谈话最终失败之前，包括捷克共和国和斯洛伐克在内的五个新成员国，甚至同意了一项更过分的计划，在这项计划中，预算之占欧盟GDP的1%。


Cynics may argue that the new member countries could afford to make such concessions because they would end up with hefty EU subsidies anyway.	批评家也许会说，新成员可以承受这种让步，因为他们无论如何将会在欧盟获得丰厚的补贴。


The net contributors to the EU budget were the ones who stood to lose the most.	欧盟预算的捐助人是那些承受了最多损失的国家。


Viewed in strictly economic terms, it is not surprising that Great Britain would not give up its rebate, while France would reject attempts to cut farm subsidies.	从严峻的经济形势来看，英国不愿意放弃它的返款、法国反对削减农业补贴之举并不令人吃惊，


But what is surprising is that it was the old, experienced European democracies that so blithely ignored the political dangers stemming from the potential revival of intense nationalism on the European continent, while it was the new, inexperienced democracies from Europe’s east that called for caution.	但是，令人惊讶的是，那些元老级、有经验的欧洲民主国家却无忧无虑地对起欧洲大陆上潜在的强烈民族主义复兴即将引发的政治危机视而不见，而新的毫无经验的来自欧洲东部的国家却呼吁谨慎行事。


Perhaps this was because the eastern countries’ attitudes are more driven by recent historical memories and experiences.	或许，这是因为东部国家的态度更受到近代历史留下的记忆和经验的影响。


In a mere 15 years, all of these countries have endured economic and political changes unprecedented in their scope and speed in the history of Europe.	在短短15年之内，所有这些国家经历了欧洲史上无论从规模还是速度都史无前例的经济和政治的变革。


For most of these countries, EU membership was not merely a ticket to economic prosperity, paid for by rich EU old-timers.	对大部分这些国家而言，欧盟成员国的资格不仅仅是由欧盟富有的老成员国买单的一张通向经济繁荣的门票。


On the contrary, they knew that they would have to do most of the work themselves—albeit under EU guidance and with the help of EU know-how.	相反，他们知道他们必须自己完成大部分的工作——尽管他们会有欧盟的指引和欧盟秘诀的帮助。


Perhaps this is one reason why many in East Central Europe believe that EU funds, while helpful, are less important than being part of a united Europe, with the expanded opportunities that its common rules imply.	也许，这就是许多在东欧中部国家的人们相信欧盟的资金尽管有所帮助，但却没有成为一个联合的欧洲的一部分来的重要的原因之一，在这样一个欧洲中，它的共同规则预示着更多的机会。


Moreover, the EU offers the small countries sandwiched between Germany and Russia a degree of political stability and security that they never had in modern history.	此外，欧盟给小国提供了介于德国和俄罗斯之间的某种程度的政治稳定和安全，这是他们在现代史中从未有过的。


The rest they can manage on their own.	余下的，他们可以自己做到。


In contrast, West European states do no longer seem so concerned with the political dimension of European integration.	与之形成对比的是，西欧国家再也不那么关心欧洲一体化的政治面向了。


They take it for granted and are more concerned with their domestic constituencies.	他们认为一体化是理所当然的，并把更多的注意力放在国内的选民身上。


Perhaps understandably, most citizens of West European states—accustomed to the political stability and economic prosperity of the last several decades—do not want to give up the benefits that the European integration process has brought to them.	也许这是可以理解的，在过去几十年中已经对政治稳定和经济繁荣习以为常的大部分西欧国家公民是不愿意放弃欧洲一体化进程已经带给他们的利益的。


The French, for example, do not want to lose farm subsidies, just as they are not eager to give more money to the new members, whose reformed economies are taking away French jobs. British leeriness about giving up the EU rebate in the face of what is perceived as French egoism is equally understandable—despite the fact that this stance harms the enlargement process, which Great Britain otherwise supports.	以法国人为例，他们不愿意失去农业补贴，就像他们并不热衷于给那些新成员国更多财政支持一样，因为新成员国经过改革的经济正在夺走法国人的工作。


Even so, East Central Europeans, who are still recovering from the terrible political calamities caused by Europe’s historical demons, find the intensity of their Western counterparts’ national egoism a bit frightening.	虽然如此，那些正在从欧洲史上的恶魔们发动的可怕的政治灾难中恢复的东欧中部国家发现，他们的西方同伴国家的利己主义强烈程度已经有一点令人害怕。


Europe’s history is full of catastrophes that were produced by the shortsightedness of national political elites.	欧洲史上充斥着目光短浅的国家政治精英所引发的大灾难。


How many times have European leaders thought they had things under control, only to unleash the demons again?	欧洲领导人多少次地以为一切尽在掌握，结果却再一次放出了魔鬼？


This is not to suggest, of course, that just because the EU cannot agree on a budget or a constitution Europe is approaching yet another historical calamity.	当然，这不仅仅因为欧盟不能在财政预算上达成一致，也不意味着一个宪法体制的欧洲正在走向另外一个灾难。


But caution is in order, and the political elites of big national states, in particular, should ponder whether they are not overplaying their hands once again.	但是有一点值得警惕，大国的政治精英尤其应该考虑一下他们是否再一次对自己估计过高。


Although the collapse of the common currency area owing to political squabbles seems unlikely at this point, it cannot be ruled out entirely.	尽管从这点来看，由于政治争论而引发的共同货币地区的崩溃是不可能的，但是也不能完全排除在外。


Obviously, we also cannot completely rule out the possibility of a subsequent weakening or disintegration of Europe’s common political structures.	显然，我们也不能将其可能引发的欧洲共同政治结构的削弱或瓦解的可能性排除在外。


For the small, economically still-fragile states of East Central Europe, a Europe of national states, once again fighting ruthlessly for their own interests, is a nightmare.	对于那些位于东欧中部、经济仍然疲软的小国，一个各国再次为其各自利益争斗得不可开交的欧洲是一个恶梦。


But it should be a nightmare scenario for all European states.	但是对所有欧洲国家来说，它应该是只是一段恶梦。


Perhaps those in the West should listen more to their new partners.	或许那些西方国家应该更多地听听他们的新伙伴的意见。


By agreeing to significant compromises, the leaders of some new member states were, among other things, trying to show that rekindling strong national egoism in Europe is a dangerous, if not uncontrollable, game.	通过点头同意重要的和解方案，一些新成员国的领导人正试图表明，在欧洲大陆上死灰复燃的强烈国家利己主义苗头若不得到控制将会演变成一场危险的游戏。


Getting Anxiety Right	正确对待焦虑


NEW YORK – When researchers want to evaluate the efficacy of new anxiety treatments, the traditional approach is to study how rats or mice behave in uncomfortable or stressful situations.	纽约—如果研究者想要评估焦虑新疗法的效力，传统的方法是研究大白鼠或小白鼠在不舒服或压力状态下的行为。


Rodents shun brightly lit, open spaces, where, in the wild, they would become easy prey.	啮齿动物会避开明亮开放的空间，在野外，这样的环境很容易让它们成为猎物。


So their natural tendency in a test apparatus is to find areas that are poorly illuminated or close to walls.	因此，它们在测试装置中的自然倾向是找到光照较弱的地方或墙角边。


The longer a medicated animal spends in areas in which it is unprotected, the more effective the drug is judged to be in treating anxiety.	实验动物在无保护区域呆的时间越久，就可以认为药物对焦虑的疗效越好。


But the drugs that have resulted from this approach are not actually very good at making people feel less anxious.	但用这种方法研发的药物实际上在减轻人类焦虑中效果并不十分出色。


Neither patients nor their therapists consider the available options – including benzodiazepines like Valium and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors like Prozac or Zoloft – as adequate treatments for anxiety.	患者和医生都认为现有选择方案——包括地西泮等苯二氮卓药物和百忧解或左洛复等选择性羟色胺再摄取抑制剂——不足以治愈焦虑。


After decades of research, some of the big pharmaceutical companies are raising the white flag and cutting back on efforts to develop new anti-anxiety drugs.	在经过几十年的研究后，一些大型制药公司竖起白旗，削减研发新抗焦虑药物的资金。


But we cannot afford to give up on treatment for the so-called anxiety disorders, which encompass problems related to both fear and anxiety.	但我们决不能放弃对所谓的焦虑症的治疗。 焦虑症包括与恐惧和焦虑有关的问题。


Feelings of fear occur when a possible source of harm is nearby or likely to present itself, while feelings of anxiety usually involve the possibility of harm in the future.	当潜在伤害源位于附近或可能出现时就会产生恐惧感，而焦虑感常常与未来伤害可能性有关。


Worldwide, the lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorders is about 15%, and the cost to society is enormous.	从全球看，一生中罹患焦虑症的比例大约为15%，给社会造成巨大成本。


In the late 1990s, it was estimated that the economic burden of anxiety totaled more than $40 billion.	20世纪90年代末，据估计焦虑所造成的经济负担高达400亿美元以上。


The total cost is most likely significantly higher, because many anxiety disorders are never diagnosed.	总成本可能远远高于这个数字，因为许多焦虑症根本没有被诊断出来。


Counter-intuitively, the reason that the most frequently prescribed anxiety medications don’t address the underlying problem is that they are working exactly as they should – according to the criteria used to design them.	与直觉相反，最常用抗焦虑医药无法解决根本问题的原因是它们并没有起到应用的作用（庸设计初衷衡量）。


Most treatments based on studies using mice or rats do make anxiety disorders easier to live with.	大部分基于大鼠或小鼠的研究的疗法确实让焦虑症更加易于忍受。


What they fail to do is actually make people less fearful or anxious.	但其实它们并没有减轻人们的恐惧或焦虑。


The reason for this is simple.	原因很简单。


The brain systems that control behavioral responses in threatening situations are similar in rodents and humans, and involve older areas deep in the brain that work nonconsciously (for example, the amygdala).	啮齿类和人类控制威胁状态下的行为反应的大脑系统大同小异，都涉及到深藏于大脑中、不受意识控制的古老区域（比如杏仁体）。


On the other hand, the systems that produce conscious experiences, including feelings of fear and anxiety, involve evolutionarily new regions of the neocortex that are especially well developed in the human brain and poorly developed in rodents.	另一方面，产生意识体验——包括恐惧感和焦虑感——的系统涉及到新进化出来的新皮层，该区域在人类大脑中发育完善，而在啮齿类大脑中发育很不完善。


Conscious feelings are also dependent on our unique linguistic capacities – our ability to conceptualize and name our inner experiences.	意识感觉也取决于我们独一无二的语言能力——即将内在体验概念化和命名的能力。


It is telling that the English language has more than three dozen words for gradations of fear and anxiety: worry, concern, apprehension, unease, disquietude, inquietude, angst, misgiving, nervousness, tension, and so forth.	一个很有说明意义的例子是英语有三十多个表示不同程度恐惧和焦虑的词汇：worry、concern、apprehension、unease、disquietude、inquietude、angst、misgiving、nervousness、tension，等等。


Consequently, though animal studies are useful in predicting how a drug will affect nonconsciously controlled symptoms triggered by threatening stimuli, they are less effective when it comes to conscious feelings of fear or anxiety.	因此，尽管动物研究在预测药物如何影响因威胁刺激触发的不受意识控制的症候方面很有用，但对于有意识的恐惧或焦虑感，它们的效果就要打折扣。


The drugs we have can help patients who, in order to avoid situations that inspire fear or anxiety, such as crowded subways or being judged by their peers or superiors, have stopped going to work.	我们所有的药物能够帮助中止工作的患者继续工作。 他们为了避免引发恐惧或焦虑的状况，比如拥挤的地铁或受到同行或上司评议而无法继续工作。


Just as medicated rats are less behaviorally inhibited (more able to tolerate bright, open spaces), medicated anxiety sufferers are more likely to be able to return to their jobs.	正如接受治疗的大鼠的行为不再那么拘谨（更加能够忍受明亮开放的空间），接受治疗的焦虑患者也更有可能能够回到工作岗位中。


But, because the treatments do not directly address conscious brain processes, the anxiety itself does not always go away.	但是，由于治疗并未直接触及有意识的大脑过程，因此焦虑本身未必消失。


If treatments are to become more effective, our approaches will need to become more nuanced.	要想提高治疗效果，治疗方法需要更加细致。


We will need to treat the systems that operate nonconsciously differently from those that result in conscious experiences.	我们需要区别对待无意识系统和根据意识体验产生反应的系统。


This doesn’t necessarily mean better drugs.	这未必就一定要更好的药物。


Nonconscious responses can also be treated with exposure therapy, in which repeated interaction with a threatening stimulus is orchestrated in order to dampen its psychological effects.	无意识反应也可以用暴露疗法（exposure therapy）治疗。 暴露疗法让患者反复与精心安排的威胁刺激互动，从而遏制威胁刺激的心理影响。


Findings about how conscious and nonconscious brain systems work may enable us to make exposure therapy more effective.	关于有意识和无意识大脑系统的发现或许能提高暴露疗法的效果。


The basic idea is that the symptoms involving nonconscious processes should be targeted separately from those involving conscious processes.	基本思想是与无意识过程有关的症候应该和与有意识过程有关的症候分别处理。


I suggest the following sequence.	我建议采取以下顺序。


Start with nonconscious exposures (using subliminal stimulation to bypass conscious thoughts and feelings that can be aroused and interfere with the exposure process) to dampen the response of areas like the amygdala.	首先用无意识暴露（包括阈下刺激以避开可能产生并干扰暴露过程的有意识思考和感觉）抑制杏仁体等区域的反应。


Once the nonconscious systems are under control, use conscious exposures to treat conscious symptoms.	在无意识系统得到控制的情况下，用有意识暴露治疗有意识症候。


Finally, employ more traditional psychotherapies: Verbal interactions with the therapist aimed at helping patients work on changing beliefs, reevaluate memories, encourage acceptance of one’s circumstances, acquire coping strategies, and so on.	最后，使用较传统的心理治疗：治疗师进行语言互动以帮助患者改变信念、重估记忆、鼓励接受周边环境、制定处理战略等。


There is also a place for drugs in this approach, but not as a long-term solution.	药物在这一方法中也有用武之地，但不作为长期方案。


Rather, drugs can be used to make the exposure treatment more effective (the pharmaceutical d-cycloserine has shown some promise in this regard).	相反，药物可以用来增加暴露疗法的效果（药用D环丝氨酸在这方面已经表现出一些效果）。


The effectiveness of an approach that recognizes that different brain systems control different symptoms has yet to be properly evaluated, but research suggests that it should work.	承认不同大脑系统控制不同症候的方法的效果还有待合理评估，但研究表明它应该能起作用。


It would also be noninvasive and would require only a repurposing of frequently used procedures.	该方法是无创的，只要求替换被反复使用的流程。


Given the magnitude of the problem, a stone so easily reached should not be left unturned.	考虑到这一问题的严重性，如此容易抓住的助力点不应该轻易放弃。


How Data Can Save Children’s Lives	尸检如何拯救儿童生命


SEATTLE – In an age in which data are more plentiful and accessible than ever before, we are accustomed to basing our decisions on as much evidence as we can gather.	西雅图—如今，数据比以往任何时候都充足、都更容易获得，我们已经习惯于根据尽量多的证据作出决定。


The more important the decision, the keener we are to ensure that our research is thorough and our information is accurate.	越是重要的决定，我们就越渴望确保我们的研究已经彻底，我们的信息准确无误。


And yet, when it comes to what is arguably one of the most important decisions we face today, we have very little data.	但是，在一个有可能是如今我们所面临的最重要的决定之一上，我们几乎没有数据可用。


As part of the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations last September, the international community has pledged to end preventable deaths of children under the age of five by 2030.	作为去年9月联合国实施的可持续发展目标（SDG）的一部分，国际社会承诺到2030年消灭可预防5岁以下儿童死亡。


And yet, in the regions with the highest mortality rates, we lack the most basic information about why children die.	但是，在死亡率最高的地区，我们缺乏关于儿童死亡原因的最基本的信息。


We know that infectious diseases cause the most deaths, but we do not know which ones.	我们知道传染病造成的死亡最多，但我们不知道是哪些传染病。


When it comes to deciding how best to allocate our resources, we are effectively flying blind.	在决定如何最优地配置我们的资源时，我们就像是没头的苍蝇。


Since 1990, we have halved child mortality worldwide; but nearly six million children under the age of five still die from preventable causes.	1990年以来，全世界儿童死亡率下降了一半； 但仍有近六百万5岁以下儿童因为可预防原因而死亡。


Four out of five child deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia, regions where there are few doctors and even fewer pathologists.	五分之四的儿童死亡发生在撒哈拉以南非洲或南亚，这些地区缺少医生，更缺少病理学家。


Standard medical investigations of the causes of death are rare.	对死亡原因的标准医学调查极少进行。


In many cases, there is no official death record at all.	在许多情形中，根本没有正式死亡记录。


When the cause of death is investigated, it is almost exclusively through a “verbal autopsy.”	当我们死亡原因得到调查时，几乎全部是通过“口头尸检”进行。


Parents are asked, typically three months after their loss, about the circumstances surrounding their child’s death.	父母亲通常在失去孩子三个月后被问及关于孩子死亡的周边因素。


But while they may be able to report that their baby suffered from rapid breathing or diarrhea, they have no way of identifying the cause of these symptoms.	然而，他们也许能够报告婴儿出现呼吸急促或腹泻等症状，但无法辨别这些症状的原因。


The problem is aggravated when it comes to the nearly 45% of deaths that occur during the first month of life.	对于占45% 死亡人数的出生不到一个月便夭折的婴儿来说，这一问题更加严重。


In these cases, the cause of death is often recorded simply as a “neonatal death,” a label that provides no hint as to what caused the illness.	对于这些死亡案例，致死原因常常简单地归为“新生儿死亡”，这根本无助于找到致病原因。


This information is useless and cannot help prevent other families from suffering the same tragedy.	这一信息没有任何用处，也无法帮助防止其他家庭重蹈悲剧。


Experience from successful health campaigns, such as eradicating polio or controlling Ebola, shows that while early progress can be achieved relatively easily, lasting results require enormous efforts and very accurate surveillance data.	根除脊髓灰质炎和控制埃博拉等成功的卫生工作经验表明，尽管取得早期进展相对容易，但持续成果需要巨大的付出和非常准确的监控数据。


It is to collect this crucial information that the Child Health and Mortality Prevention Surveillance – or CHAMPS – program has been launched.	儿童健康和死亡预防监控（CHAMPS）计划正是为了收集这一关键信息而建立。


The CHAMPS program – a long-term initiative led by the Emory Global Health Institute, with partners including the International Association of National Public Health Institutes, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Task Force for Global Health – eventually will involve some 20 sites in areas with the highest child mortality rates.	CHAMPS计划是由埃默里全球卫生研究所（Emory Global Health Institute）发起的一项长期项目，合作者包括国家公共卫生研究所国际协会（International Association of National Public Health Institutes）、美国疾病控制和预防中心（US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention）以及全球卫生任务组（Task Force for Global Health），它最终将在儿童死亡率最高的地区建立20个左右的站点。


This will allow us to record causes of death more accurately and track progress as vaccination campaigns and other measures are introduced.	这将让我们能够更加准确地报告死亡原因，并追踪引入疫苗和其他措施后的进展。


These sites will rely on a new technique that allows tiny samples of key organs, such as the liver or lungs, to be extracted with a needle, causing minimal damage to the body of a deceased child.	这些站点将依靠新技术，只需要用针头采集微量的关键器官（如肝脏和肺脏）样本，对死亡儿童的尸体伤害降到了最低。


The samples will then be sent for analysis to strengthened local labs and reference centers to provide a more accurate and complete picture of all causes of death.	随后这些样本被送往加强的地方实验室和参考中心进行分析，为所有死亡原因提供更准确更完整的图景。


There are many possible interventions – such as providing folic acid to prevent birth defects, introducing new vaccines, or treating infections earlier – that we know could have an impact on child mortality.	我们知道有很多可能的干预手段可以影响儿童死亡率——如提供叶酸以预防出生缺陷，引入新疫苗，或尽早治疗传染病。


CHAMPS will provide the information needed to prioritize these measures.	CHAMPS将提供需要的信息为这些措施排定优先顺序。


Furthermore, each site will help build the capacity of partner countries’ public health systems, providing valuable data and technical support that will have an impact far beyond helping to reduce child mortality.	此外，每个站点都将帮助建设合作国家公共卫生体系的能力，提供影响远远不仅限于帮助降低儿童死亡率的有价值的数据和技术支持。


For example, the surveillance centers will generate the data needed to tackle infectious diseases, provide early warning of epidemics, and generally improve global health.	比如，监控中心将产生处置传染病所需要的数据，提供疫情早期预警，从整体上改善全球卫生。


The CHAMPS initiative is still in its early days.	CHAMPS计划仍处于早期阶段。


The sites – six of which are being funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation through an initial $73 million grant for the first three years – are just being established.	它旗下的站点——其中六个由比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会出资，前三年提供730万美元初始资金——刚刚建立。


More partners and more funding will be needed to expand the network and maintain it over the long term.	需要更多合作伙伴和更多资金扩大网络和长期维护。


And it will take time for the benefits to become clear.	而收益也需要时间显现。


But early results are encouraging.	但早期结果令人鼓舞。


Worries that parents would be reluctant to allow postmortem tests on their children have proved unfounded.	担心父母亲不愿参与孩子死后尸检被证明是没有根据的。


On the contrary, our experience so far shows that parents are very interested in finding out what killed their children.	相反，我们迄今为止的经验表明父母亲非常想知道是什么杀死了他们的孩子。


At a well-established pilot site in Soweto, South Africa, both mothers and fathers are returning to learn the results of the testing – an unprecedented level of interest.	在南非索维托（Soweto）的已臻成熟的实验站点，母亲和父亲都会回来了解测试结果——前所未有的兴趣水平。


I believe that CHAMPS’ work may have the greatest impact of anything in which I have been involved in my 20 years in public health.	我相信，CHAMPS的工作所产生的影响是我20年公共卫生工作生涯中最大的。


By accurately tracking the causes of child mortality, we can target treatments more precisely and usher in a new era – one in which preventable child deaths really will be a thing of the past.	通过准确跟踪儿童死亡原因，我们可以更加精准地对症下药，开启一个新时代——一个可预防儿童死亡真正成为历史的时代。


A New Beginning for Greece – and Europe	希腊和欧洲的新开始


KIEL – Greece is in urgent need of clear thinking.	基尔—希腊急需清晰思维。


The only reason the country has not long since defaulted on its debts is that the European Central Bank continues to provide funds to the Greek central bank through its emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme.	希腊此前没有违约的唯一原因是欧洲央行一直在通过其紧急流动性援助（ELA）机制为希腊央行提供资金。


The Greek central bank, in turn, lends money to the country’s commercial banks, which lend it to Greek citizens and foreign creditors.	希腊央行反过来将资金贷给本国商业银行，再由后者贷给希腊公民和外国债权人。


The problem is that both groups of borrowers have been transferring large sums of money to other countries.	问题在于这两类借款人一直在将大量资金转移到其他国家。


The result is that overdraft credits to the Greek central bank have grown by nearly €1 billion a day in recent months.	结果是近几个月来希腊央行的透支信用每天都要增加近10亿欧元。


If Greece defaults and leaves the eurozone, these overdrafts will not be repaid.	如果希腊违约并退出欧元区，这些透支额将不会偿还。


ELA funding assumes that the Greek economy is temporarily illiquid, but not insolvent.	ELA资金假设希腊经济只是暂时性流动性不足，而不是资不抵债。


This assumption is patently false.	这一假设大错特错。


Despite all the pain Greece has suffered – a 30% drop in aggregate demand since the last cyclical peak and a rise in unemployment to more than 25% of the workforce – the Greek economy is still nowhere near competitive enough to repay its debts.	尽管希腊遭受了巨大的痛苦——自上一个周期波峰以来总需求下降了30%，而劳动力失业率超过了25%——希腊经济的竞争力仍远远不足以偿还它的债务。


Part of the reason is that corruption remains high and administrative capacity to levy taxes remains woefully limited.	原因部分在于腐败情况依然严重，而政府的征税能力仍然极为有限。


Meanwhile, low-income Greek households have borne the brunt of austerity.	与此同时，低收入希腊家庭承受了紧缩的大部分影响。


In short, the mess continues.	简言之，混乱依旧。


But allowing Greece to default and still remain in the eurozone is not an option: it would signal that other eurozone countries could amass huge debts, funded by the ECB, without having any intention of repaying.	但允许希腊违约而继续留在欧元区绝不是选项之一：这将向其他欧元区国家释放一个信号，你可以累积巨额债务，由欧洲央行供应资金，根本不需要考虑偿还问题。


Fiscal responsibility in the eurozone would be fatally undermined.	欧元区的财政责任将遭到致命打击。


Yet forcing a defaulting Greece out of the eurozone – against its will – is not an option, either: it would plunge the country into economic, social, and political instability, and there would doubtless be serious repercussions beyond the country’s borders.	但违背其意愿强迫违约的希腊离开欧元区也不是一个选项：这将让希腊陷入经济、社会和政治动荡，并且毫无疑问会给其他国家带来严重影响。


In my judgment, there are only two viable options left.	在我看来，只剩下两个可行的选项。


The first – and more desirable – is for the ECB to assess realistically Greece’s lack of solvency and so stop providing ELA funds to its banking system.	首先——也是更值得追求的，欧洲央行要务实地评估希腊的资不抵债情况，停止为其银行体系提供ELA资金。


This would precipitate a payment crisis for Greece.	这将加速希腊的偿付危机。


But, recognizing the impending disaster, Greece would genuinely commit itself to the structural reforms that are in its own long-term interests: boosting the labor market’s flexibility, selling state-owned enterprises that most other European countries have already placed in private hands, and spending less on public-sector bureaucracy.	但是，意识到灾难即将到来，希腊将真正致力于长期有利的结构性改革：提高劳动力市场灵活性、出售国有企业（在其他大部分欧洲国家，这些企业早已私有哈），并减少公共部门呢官僚支出。


At the same time, Greece would ensure that these reforms do not hurt the poorest by introducing active labor-market policies (such as subsidies to train and hire the long-term unemployed).	与此同时，希腊要保证这些改革不会伤害最贫困人群，这可以听过引入积极的劳动力市场政策实现（如培训补贴和雇用长期失业者）。


Furthermore, Greece would commit itself to an automatically implemented fiscal plan, specifying the long-run ratio of national debt to GDP, the convergence rate to this ratio, and the degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality.	此外，希腊要致力于自动实施的财政计划，制定长期国民债务/GDP比率目标、向这一比率的趋近速度，以及财政反周期性的程度。


So much for what Greece must do.	希腊需要做的就是这么多。


In return, its creditors would agree to another one-time debt write-off – large enough to enable Greece realistically to repay its debts in the future, but small enough to avoid unnecessary transfers of credit.	反过来，其债权人将同意再次进行一次性债务减记——规模要大到足以让希腊在未来实际偿还债务，也要小到足以避免不必要的信用转移。


Greece would remain within the eurozone, having lost some of its fiscal and structural sovereignty.	希腊将留在欧元区，牺牲一些财政和结构性主权。


If this first option is not taken – the likely outcome, given the current game of political brinkmanship – Greece will default.	如果不采取这个第一选择——考虑当前的政治边缘政策博弈，这一幕很有可能发生——希腊将违约。


But that could set the stage for the second option, which I would call the “New Beginning Program.”	但这可以成为第二选择的基础，我称之为“新开始计划”（New Beginning Program）。


Under this program, creditor countries would write off Greece’s debts, on the condition that the country left the eurozone voluntarily.	根据这一计划，债权国将勾销希腊债务，条件是希腊自愿离开欧元区。


This would give Greece the opportunity to start afresh from outside the monetary union: it could restructure its economy without outside interference, and could be ready to re-enter the eurozone at a later point under new conditions – this time without false statistical pretenses or unrealistic expectations.	这将让希腊有机会在货币联盟之外重新开始：它可以在不受外部干预的情况下重组经济，并且在满足新条件——这次不能在有虚假数字和不切实际的预期了——的情况下在未来重新加入欧元区。


Such an option would allow the Greek government to make a new start in stimulating competition, fighting corruption, and otherwise building a basis for long-term growth.	这一选项将让希腊政府有一个新开始：刺激竞争、打击腐败，以及打好长期增长基础。


This would not be easy, but it would no longer be a process that Greece finds humiliating and creditor countries find exasperating.	这绝非易事，但不再是一个希腊感到难堪、债权国感到愤怒的过程了���


This second option would be less desirable than the first.	这一第二选项不如第一选项。


The speculative uncertainties associated with a “Grexit” might well threaten other eurozone economies (for example, Cyprus and Portugal), while Greece, with a devalued drachma, would find it painfully expensive to import the capital goods it needs to generate a broad base of high-wage jobs.	与“希腊退出”相关的投机性不确定性可能极大地威胁到其他欧元区经济体（如塞浦路斯和葡萄牙），而希腊在德拉克马贬值之后也将面临昂贵的进口资本品，而进口资本品是夯实高收入岗位的广泛基础的必要条件。


But the second option would also be a new beginning for the whole eurozone.	但第二选项还将给整个欧元区带来新的开始。


Its member states would accept that monetary union is impossible without fiscal and structural coordination.	欧元区成员国将接受一个观点：没有财政和结构性合作，就没有货币联盟。


The minimum fiscal coordination needed would involve automatically implemented national plans, formulated by each government in advance.	所需要的最低限度的财政合作包括由各国政府事先制定的自动实施的国家计划。


As a counterpart, structural coordination must, at a minimum, focus European Union funds on countries with long-term current-account deficits, the aim being to improve their competitiveness through investments in their human capital.	对应地，结构性合作最低限度必须将欧盟资金集中于存在长期经常项目赤字的国家，其目的必须是通过人力资本投资改善竞争力。


Given that its current arrangements are neither credible nor sustainable, the eurozone needs this “new beginning,” regardless of which option Greece eventually takes.	由于欧元区的当前安排既缺少可信度，也缺少持续性，因此欧元区需要这个“新开始”，不管希腊最终选择哪个选项。


New Directions for the UN	联合国的新方向


NEW YORK – The United Nations today leads what seems at times like a double life.	纽约——今天的联合国有时面临一种截然不同的选择。


On the one hand, pundits criticize it for not solving all the world’s ills.	一方面，权威人士批评联合国没能解决世界上的所有问题。


On the other hand, UN member states and people around the world are asking it to do more, in more places, than ever before – a trend that will continue in 2011.	而另一方面，联合国成员国和世界各地民众则要求联合国在更多地方发挥前所未有的作用——这种趋势在2011年不会发生改变。


It is not hard to see why.	理解个中原因并不困难。


We have only to read the newspaper, turn on the television, or go online to appreciate the sheer scale of the need.	我们只要打开报纸电视、或登录网络，就能切身感受到这种需求的规模。


Conflicts rage in too many places.	冲突在太多的地方蔓延。


Natural disasters strike with greater fury, and in greater numbers, than ever before.	自然灾害以前所未有的数量和破坏烈度降临到人们身上。


On top of all this, we face a new generation of threats, unlike any in history, which spill across borders and have global reach.	最重要的是，我们面临着全新的威胁，它们与以往的威胁有所不同，不再局限于某个国家的范围之内，而是影响遍及全球。


No single country or group, however powerful, can deal with them alone.	没有哪个国家或团体，无论其力量多么强大，能够独自应对这样的挑战。


All must work together – in common cause for common solutions – to address challenges like climate change, poverty, and nuclear disarmament.	所有人都必须携起手来——为了共同的事业寻找共同的解决方案——应对气候变化、贫困及核裁军等各项挑战。


But there is profound skepticism that we can do so.	但人们深深怀疑我们是否有能力面对这样的挑战。


The world looks to the UN as never before, yet the conventional wisdom is that we are not up to the job.	世界各国对联合国的期待前所未有，但大多数人认为我们完成不了这项任务。


The problems are too complicated.	问题太过错综复杂。


Resources are too few.	资源又太过有限。


The UN itself appears too divided to make the vital difference.	联合国自身似乎也矛盾重重，难以带来实质性的改变。


The conventional wisdom is, however, wrong; worse, it is dangerous, for we have all seen how quickly it can take hold, distort reality, and then harden like cement.	但多数人的看法不仅错误，而且危险，因为我们都知道错误的看法能快速生根，扭曲事实，而后像水泥一样固化。


For example, four years ago, when I came to office, only a handful of global leaders knew enough even to talk about climate change – the defining challenge of our times, whose effects we see every day, all around us.	比方说四年前，我刚刚就任的时候，多数全球领导人谈起气候变化这个时代议题时都知之甚少，但现在气候变化的影响已经深入人心、随处可见。


Today, we have moved climate change to the top of the global agenda.	今天，气候变化已经成为全球首要议题。


But make no mistake: it has been a difficult road.	但不要理解错误。 应对气候变化挑战的道路并不平坦。


In December 2009 in Copenhagen, world leaders talked far into the night, and emerged, according to the conventional wisdom, with virtually nothing.	2009年12月在哥本哈根，各国领导人一直谈到深夜，但按照大多数人的看法，他们没有取得任何进展。


In fact, though we did not get a comprehensive, legally binding treaty that would usher in an era of sustainable, low-carbon prosperity, as we had hoped, there were significant achievements in Copenhagen.	但事实上，尽管我们并没有像期望的那样达成开启可持续低碳发展时代的全面强制性协议，但哥本哈根会议已经取得了相当大的进展。


For the first time ever, developed and developing countries acknowledged their responsibility to curb emissions of greenhouse gasses and agreed on the goal of limiting global temperature rise to below two degrees Celsius.	有史以来第一次，发达国家和发展中国家承认有义务控制温室气体排放，并接受了将全球升温控制在两度以内的协议目标。


And, for the first time ever, countries made large pledges to finance mitigation and adaptation efforts: $30 billion over the next three years for fast-start financing, and $100 billion per year by 2020.	同样有史以来第一次，各国承诺投入巨资用于控温减排工作。 各国同意今后三年先拿出300亿美元的快速启动资金，其后每年投入1000亿美元，并一直持续到2020年。


The lesson is that we should not dream of overnight breakthroughs, or allow ourselves to fall into despair in the absence of immediate progress.	我们需要吸取的教训是不要总是梦想在一夜之间取得突破，或者在暂时看不到进展时让自己堕入失望。


Let us work, instead, to build on many smaller advances, wherever we can make them – by mobilizing support, creating broad alliances, building coalitions, and taking into account a web of moving parts and complex issues – because that will set the stage for the eventual breakthroughs of tomorrow.	相反，让我们竭尽全力争取哪怕是微小的进步，争取支持、建立联盟、充分考虑到问题的复杂性——因为这将会为明天的最终突破创造条件。


Collective action has never been easy, but it has never been more necessary than in achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals – the world’s blueprint for ending extreme poverty.	集体行动从来殊非易事，但要想实现世界终结极端贫困的蓝图——联合国千年发展目标，立即采取行动就显得前所未有的重要。


The conventional wisdom will tell you that the MDGs targets – reducing poverty and hunger, improving the health of mothers and children, combating HIV/AIDS, increasing access to education, protecting the environment, and forging a global partnership for development – are simply unattainable.	大多数人会告诉你战胜饥饿和贫困、改善母婴健康、攻克HIV/艾滋病、扩大受教育对象、保护环境和建立全球发展伙伴关系的千年发展目标是可以实现的。


In fact, we are controlling disease – polio, malaria, and AIDS – better than ever before, and making big new investments in women’s and children’s health – the key to progress in many other areas.	事实上，我们对小儿麻痹、疟疾和艾滋病的控制比以往更出色，同时大力投资于能带来其他增长的关键领域——母婴健康。


Nevertheless, on climate change, poverty, and other issues, the conventional wisdom is that the UN should cede responsibility to the G-20.	尽管如此，在气候变化、贫困和其他问题上，大多数人认为联合国应当让位于二十国集团。


But the G-20, by itself, is not the answer.	但二十国集团本身也并非解决问题的灵丹妙药。


Despite strenuous debate about currency issues and trade imbalances at its summit in Seoul in November, the sole area of agreement concerned an issue on the G-20’s agenda for the first time – economic development.	尽管在11月首尔会议上举行了有关货币和贸易失衡问题的艰苦辩论，但二十国集团议程首次也是唯一达成协议的领域是经济的增长。


Recognizing that global recovery depends on the emerging economies – that is, the developing world – G-20 leaders embraced investments aimed at lifting the world’s most vulnerable people out of poverty.	二十国集团领袖承认全球复苏有赖于新兴经济体（也就是发展中国家），并通过了旨在帮助全球最脆弱人群脱贫的投资计划。


That is why G-20 leaders accept the need to work closely with the UN – after all, no organization does development better.	二十国集团也因此认可与联合国密切合作的必要性，归根结底，没有哪家机构能在发展问题上超越联合国。


The G-20 and the UN are finding new ways to work constructively together – not as rivals, but as increasingly close partners.	二十国集团和联合国正在探索新的建设性合作方式——我们不是竞争对手，而是合作关系越来越密切的伙伴。


And that is the way it should be.	这原本也应当是事情的本来面目。


Forty years ago, a great American statesman, Dean Acheson, looked back at the excitement he felt in helping to build the post-World War II order.	40年前，一位伟大的美国政治家迪恩·艾奇逊回忆起参与战后秩序建设时自己难以名状的激动。


“Present at the Creation,” he called his memoir.	他选择《创世亲历记》作为自己回忆录的书名。


Today, we find ourselves at an equally exciting moment, no less critical to the future of humankind.	今天，我们发现自己正面临同样激动人心的时刻，现在对人类未来的关键意义不亚于战后秩序重建。


We, too, are present at a new creation.	我们也同样面临着创世纪的体验。


And the UN must constantly re-create itself as well.	联合国也必须不断重建。


We must evolve and keep pace with a rapidly changing world.	我们必须不断变化，跟上世界形势的发展。


We must be faster and more flexible, efficient, transparent, and accountable.	我们必须更加快速灵活、高效透明、并勇于负责。


In an age of austerity, resources are precious; we must make every dollar count.	在紧缩时代资源非常宝贵，我们必须最大限度地利用好每一分钱。


These are testing times for everyone.	这是对我们每个人的考验。


People everywhere live in growing anxiety and fear.	各国民众的焦虑和恐惧感与日俱增。


There is near-universal loss of trust in institutions and leaders.	对机构和领导人失去信心的现象非常普遍。


Amid such uncertainty, our future depends on a UN that brings together the countries of the world not only to talk and debate, but also to agree and to act; that mobilizes civil society, business, philanthropists, and ordinary citizens to help the world’s governments solve current problems; and that delivers peace, development, human rights, and global public goods – in a word, hope – to people around the world every day.	在未来无法确定的情况下，一个召集会谈和辩论，促成协议和行动、动员民间团体、企业、慈善家和普通公民帮助各国政府解决目前问题的联合国能够决定我们的未来。 联合国每天为世界各国人民带来和平、发展、人权和全球公共产品——一言以蔽之这里是希望所在。


A Better Economic Plan for Japan	日本的经济上计


NEW YORK – It’s been a quarter-century since Japan’s asset bubble burst – and a quarter-century of malaise as one “lost decade” has followed another.	纽约—日本资产泡沫破裂已经四分之一世纪，而其一个接一个的“失去的十年”也维持了四分之一世纪。


Some of the criticism of its economic policies is unwarranted.	增长本身不是目标；


Growth is not an objective in itself; we should be concerned with standards of living.	我们应该关注生活水平。


Japan is ahead of the curve in curbing population growth, and productivity has been increasing.	日本在遏制人口增长方面一直世界领先，生产率也一直在提高。


Growth in output per working-age person, especially since 2008, has been higher than in the United States, and much higher than in Europe.	工作年龄人口人均产出增长要高于美国，比欧洲更是要高出甚多，2008年以后尤其如此。


Still, the Japanese believe they can do better.	但日本人认为他们可以做得更好。


I agree.	我也同意。


Japan has problems on both the supply and the demand side, and in both the real economy and finance.	日本的供给侧和需求侧、实体经济和金融业都存在问题。


To address them, it needs an economic program that is more likely to work than the measures policymakers have recently adopted – and which have failed to achieve their inflation target, restore confidence, or boost growth to the level desired.	解决这些问题所需要的经济政策必须比决策者目前所采取的政策更有希望见效。 目前的政策没能实现通胀目标、重塑信心或将增长提振至希望水平。


For starters, a large carbon tax, if accompanied by “green finance,” would stimulate enormous investment to retrofit the economy.	首先，大规模碳税如能与“绿色金融”配合，能够刺激巨量投资令经济焕然一新。


Almost surely, this stimulus would exceed the contractionary effect of money being taken out of the system and the negative wealth effect of the decreased value of “carbon assets.”	这一刺激几乎肯定能盖过从现行体系中抽出资金所带来的萎缩效应以及“碳资产”贬值所造成的负财富效应。


The adverse wealth effect from the decrease in the value of carbon assets would be small; and, with the capital stock badly out of sync with the new price system, the investment unleashed would be large, unless there were bottlenecks in closing the gap.	碳资产贬值的负财富效应规模将相当小； 而由于资本存量与新价格体系的严重不同步，所释放的投资将十分巨大，除非存在弥合缺口的瓶颈。


In that case, the money generated by the tax could be used to reduce government debt; otherwise, it could be used to finance investments in technology and education – including supply-side measures to improve the productivity of Japan’s service sector.	在这一情形中，税收所得资金可以用于降低政府债务； 或者也可用于技术和教育投资融资——包括改善日本服务业生产率的供给侧措施。


These expenditures could simultaneously stimulate the economy in ways that would finally pull it out of deflation.	这些支出可以同时刺激经济，最终让日本摆脱通缩。


Many outsiders worry about Japan’s debt, which is easy to service at the low interest rates prevailing today, but would not be if rates increased to more normal levels.	许多外部人士担心日本的债务，在今天普遍低利率的环境中，债务很容易维持，但如果利率上升至更加正常的水平，维持债务的难度也将增加。


While I don’t see that happening anytime soon, Japan could undertake two policies to inoculate itself against such concerns.	尽管我并不认为利率会很快上升，但日本可以采取两项措施预防这些顾虑。


First, it could exchange some of its debt for perpetuities, bonds that are never repaid, but pay a (small) interest rate each year.	首先，它可以将一些债务转换为永续债券，即每年支付（一小笔）利率而永远还本。


This would shift the risk entirely off the government’s books.	这将完全解决政府账目上的风险。


Some might worry that this would be inflationary; but in Japan’s upside-down economy, inflation is exactly what’s needed.	你可能会担心这件带来通胀； 但在上下颠倒的日本经济中，通胀正是急需之物。


I believe worries about a sudden increase in interest rates are greatly overblown; but, out of an abundance of caution, the government could exchange say 5% of its debt every year, unless and until excessive inflationary pressures appeared.	我相信对利率突然升高的担忧被大大夸大了； 但是，出于谨慎考虑，政府可以每年转换（比如）5%的债务，除非（或直到）通胀压力显现。


Alternatively, the government could exchange the debt for non-interest bearing money – the long-feared monetization of government debt.	或者，政府可以���债务交换不生息货币——即人们长期以来视为洪水猛兽的政府债务货币化。


Even if monetary finance was more likely to boost inflation than the exchange of debt for interest-bearing perpetuities, this is hardly an argument against it: it is only an argument for going more slowly.	就算货币融资比将债务转换为生息永续债更有可能刺激通胀，这也不构成反对这样做的理由：最多只能作为缓慢实施这一政策的理由。


The second way Japan could protect itself from an interest-rate spike starts from the recognition that a large share of the money the government owes it owes to itself.	日本防止利率急升的第二个办法首先要求它认识到政府所欠的很大一部分钱是欠它自己的。


Many on Wall Street don’t seem to understand that what matters is the net debt – what the government owes to the rest of society.	许多华尔街人士似乎不理解，净债务——政府欠社会其他部门的部分——才重要。


If the government repaid the money it owes to itself – netting it out, in effect – no one would know the difference.	如果政府偿还它欠自己的钱——其实就是左手换右手——没人会知道其中的区别。


But those on Wall Street who look only at the headline debt-to-GDP ratio would suddenly feel better about Japan.	但两眼只盯着标题债务-GDP比率的华尔街人士将突然看好日本。


If after all of this, there is still evidence of a lack of demand, the government could reduce its consumer taxes, increase investment tax credits, expand programs to help low- and middle-income households, or invest more in technology and education, financing all of this by issuing money.	如果在做了所有这些之后，仍然存在需求不振的迹象，日本政府可以降低消费税、增加投资税收优惠、扩大政策以帮助中低收入家庭，或加大技术和教育投资，所有这些都用发行货币来融资。


Again, old economics would worry about inflation; but Japan wants those “fears” to come true.	旧经济学会再次担心通胀； 但日本就是希望这样的“恐慌”成为现实。


Japan does have more than a demand-side problem.	日本所面临的问题不仅仅在需求侧。


Data on output per hour worked suggest a supply-side problem, most clearly manifested in the service sector, where the impressive ingenuity seen in so many manufacturing industries typically is nowhere in evidence.	平均工时产出数据表明供给侧也存在问题，最为明显的是服务业，在制造业随处可见的令人印象深刻的巧思妙想往往不见了踪影。


A natural niche for Japan would be technology developments in the service sector – such as the development of diagnostic instruments in the health-care industry.	日本的一个天然利基是服务业技术开发——如医疗业诊断工具的开发。


Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, however, has taken a very different approach, supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal with the US and ten other Pacific Rim countries.	但是，日本首相安倍晋三采取了不同的方针，他支持与美国和其他十个环太平洋国家的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）贸易协定。


Abe believes that the TPP would force needed reforms in domestic agriculture (though, interestingly, no one in the US thinks it would help the US move away from its highly distortionary agricultural policies).	安倍认为，TPP将迫使国内农业采取必要的改革（尽管有趣的是，在美国没人认为TPP会有助于美国改变高度扭曲的农业政策）。


In fact, such reforms would have a miniscule effect on GDP, simply because agriculture is a very small part of output.	事实上，这些改革对GDP的影响微不足道，因为农业仅占产出的极小部分。


Nonetheless, such reforms remain desirable and provide another arena in which young Japanese could show their ingenuity (though the TPP is not the best way to bring that about).	尽管如此，这些改革仍然是可取的，并为日本年轻人提供了另一个施展才能的领域（尽管TPP并不是实现这一目的的最佳方式）。


On the other hand, Abe is right to pursue policies to integrate women more fully and equally into the labor force.	另一方面，安倍追求让女性更加充分和平等地融入劳动力大军的政策是正确的。


If successful, such measures should provide a boost to both productivity and growth.	如果获得成功，这些政策能够刺激生产率和增长。


Even after a quarter-century of stagnation, Japan remains the world’s third-largest single economy.	即使经历了四分之一世纪的停滞，日本仍然是世界第三大经济体。


Policies that can help raise standards of living there will stimulate demand and growth elsewhere in the global economy.	有助于提高日本生活水平的政策将刺激全球经济其他部分的需求和增长。


Equally important, just as it has shared its innovative goods and technologies with the world, Japan could end up exporting successful policies, with the same or similar measures increasing standards of living in other advanced countries as well.	同样重要的是，正如日本与全世界分享其创新产品和技术，日本也能够输出成功的政策，用同样或类似的措施提高其他发达国家的生活水平。


New Europe’s Old Problems	新欧洲的老问题


The riots in Budapest, incited by leaked tapes that show Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany openly admitting that his government had lied for over a year about the country’s dire finances, are but the latest evidence that things are going seriously wrong across Eastern Europe.	这场暴乱是由几卷走漏的录音带引发的。 总理Ferenc Gyurcsany在录音带中公开承认他的政府在一年多以来一直就匈牙利的财政问题撒谎。


Last June, the Slovaks evicted the government that brought the country out of the international isolation and economic malaise that it had suffered under the autocratic regime of Vladimir Meciar.	去年六月，斯洛伐克人将当时的政府赶下台。 而正是该政府让这个国家摆脱了它在Vladimir Meciar的专制政权下所遭受的国际孤立和经济病态。


Mikulas Dzurinda, whose reforms provided the country with growth and economic stability, was replaced by Robert Fico, a leftist who, having forged an alliance with Meciar and a neo-fascist party, has also adopted a worrisomely populist tone.	实行改革使该国经济稳定增长的Mikulas Dzurinda被Robert Fico取代。 后者是一个左派，他与Meciar和一个新纳粹政党建立了联盟，同时也是令人担忧的民粹主义思想的拥趸者。


That same month, Hungary reelected Gyurcsany, who had pursued a supposedly reformist program, but also oversaw a massive accumulation of public debt.	同一个月，Gyurcsany在匈牙利大选中获得连任。 他所追求的似乎是一种改良主义的路线，但同时也监督着公债的巨额攀升。


Earlier plans to adopt the euro quickly have now been shelved, with the target date pushed back to 2011 or 2012.	先前采用欧元的计划很快就被束之高阁，实施欧元化的日期被推迟到了2011或2012年。


But even that may be wishful thinking.	可就连这个计划也可能是一厢情愿。


Meanwhile, financial markets fret about the country’s budget deficit and talk of a serious crisis.	与此同时，金融市场对该国的预算赤字和严重危机的传闻也颇为不满。


Meanwhile, the Czechs managed to elect a perfectly hung parliament.	同时，捷克人也选出了一个悬而不决的议会。


Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek is an advocate of urgently needed reforms, but he lacks a parliamentary majority and is pressing for a fresh general election in the first half of 2007.	Mirek Topolanek总理是急需改革的倡导者，但他缺少议会的多数支持并正努力推动在2007年上半年进行新的大选。


With no means of stemming election-year fiscal expansion, the Czechs, too, have been forced to abandon their 2010 target date for euro adoption.	由于无法实现大选之年的财政扩张计划，捷克人也不得不放弃在2010年采用欧元的目标日期。


Then consider Poland, where the Kaczynski twins, who hold the presidency and the prime ministership, have allied themselves with populist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic parties.	再来看波兰，Kaczynski孪生兄弟把持了总统和总理的宝座，并与民粹主义者、仇外派和反犹太政党结盟。


One of their priorities is to attack the central bank and slander its governor, Leszek Balcerowicz, the iconic father of Poland’s economic transformation, with accusations that echo those of the Stalinist era.	他们的重要议程之一就是攻击中央银行并用斯大林时代式的指控中伤其行长，被称为波兰经济转型之父的Leszek Balcerowicz。


So much for the region’s “big four” countries.	以上说的都是该地区的“四大”国。


But bad news is emerging from the smaller countries as well, including the Baltic states.	但从包括巴尔干诸国在内的较小国家里也传来了坏消息。


Across Central and Eastern Europe, the scene is almost universally depressing.	在整个中欧和东欧，政治局面几乎普遍地令人沮丧。


When so much goes wrong at the same time, it is tempting to look for a common cause.	这同时发生的乱局，让人不由得想寻找一下共同的原因。


One factor that is often cited is “reform fatigue.”	常常被提到的一个原因是“改革倦怠”。


In barely 15 years, these countries have moved from central planning and economic backwardness to “normal” market economies with impressive GDP growth.	在短短的15年里，这些国家从中央计划和经济落后的状态过渡到“正常”的市场经济和GDP的快速增长状态。


But rapid change is always unnerving, and not everyone has emerged better off.	但迅速的变化多少会令人忐忑，而改革也不是给所有的人带来了好处。


Above all, uncertainty has become the norm, in contrast to the gray but predictable future offered by the old communist regimes.	首先，相较于在旧的共产主义体制下的灰暗但还可以预见的未来，不确定因素已经成为一种常态。


Today, many people now long for that period, which they see as less driven by material values.	现今，很多人还向往着那样的时代，因为他们认为那是较少被物质价值驱动的时代。


Communist parties, more or less reformed as socialists, appeal to a surprising number of voters.	经过改革在不同程度上成为社会党派的共产主义政党出人预料地赢得了众多的选民。


In some countries, like Slovakia and Poland, far-right nationalist parties provide another alternative, by offering the soothing appeal of traditional values and familiar enemies.	在如斯洛伐克和波兰等一些国家，极右的民族主义党派提供了另一种选择。 它们通过提供传统价值观和熟悉的敌人来慰籍民心，取得支持。


Reform fatigue implies that Central and Eastern Europe needs a respite to catch its breath.	改革倦怠意味着中欧和东欧需要缓步调整呼吸。


But another explanation of recent developments in the region begins by noting that post-communist reforms were largely dictated from outside, as a condition of admission to the European Union.	但对该地区最近形势发展的另一种解释认为首先后共产主义改革作为加入欧盟的条件，在很大程度上是由外部因素左右的。


With membership achieved and EU money starting to pour in, leaders feel secure enough to let economic policy slip.	随着欧盟成员国身份的确立和欧盟资金的涌入，领导人们便心满意足得不再恪守既定经济政策。


Thus, budget deficits are the rule, and where they are largest, as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, they have gained priority over euro adoption.	因此，预算赤字就是最重要的规则。 在预算赤字最大的国家，如捷克和匈牙利，它们就成为优先于加入欧元区计划的当务之急。


Indeed, only Slovenia has been admitted to join the euro area in 2007, the earliest possible date.	的确，只有斯洛文尼亚被批准在2007年加入欧元区，这已经是最早的期限了。


Estonia and Lithuania applied as well, but were refused entry.	爱沙尼亚和立陶宛也提出了申请，但却被拒之门外。


There is some truth in both explanations of Eastern Europe’s backsliding.	对东欧倒退的两种解释都有一定的道理。


But what is the phenomenon that such explanations are supposed to clarify?	但这样的解释旨在澄清什么样的现象呢？


There has been no general tilt to the right or left in the region.	该地区的政局总体上没有左或右的偏向。


Reforms that are attacked in one country continue to guide others.	在一个国家备受打击的改革模式还继续指引着其他国家。


Nevertheless, the EU’s newest members share some key features.	不论如何，这些欧盟的新成员都有着一些共同的特点。


Most importantly, they inherited from the Soviet era bloated and inefficient public sectors, which they are finding hard to downsize and professionalize.	最重要的是，它们都从苏联时代继承了膨胀而低效的国营经济部门，并且也认识到使其缩减和专业化困难重重。


The private sector has been entirely rebuilt and is vibrant, but it cannot remain competitive if fiscal demands are not reduced – a familiar problem in Europe as a whole.	私营经济被彻底重建，并充满活力，但如果财政需求不降低，它也不能保持竞争力—这是整个欧洲的老大难问题。


For now, the tension has been left unresolved, leading to high budget deficits.	目前还无法解决这些压力，所以就导致了高预算赤字的问题。


But the EU’s new member countries have no access to any safety net.	但欧盟的新成员国无法获得安全网。


They could well squander the significant transfers that they receive through the agricultural and structural funds, as many previous EU recipients did.	它们很可能会白白浪费掉通过农业和结构基金渠道获得的巨额拨款，就像此前许多的欧盟受惠国一样。


If they abandon macroeconomic discipline, as Hungary and possibly the Czech Republic may be doing, they alone will face the consequences.	如果它们放弃宏观经济原则，就像匈牙利和捷克可能做的那样，那么就必须独自面对后果。


Being outside the euro area, their currencies would fall, undermining growth in purchasing power and living standards.	由于置身欧元区之外，它们的货币就会贬值，从而影响购买力增长和生活水平。


As they are economically small, the rest of the EU would barely shudder.	由于它们的经济规模小，也不会影响到欧盟的其他成员国。


Fortunately, the main lesson to emerge from the region’s current troubles is that economies adapt faster than polities to changing conditions.	所幸的是，从该地区目前的麻烦中可以总结出的最主要的一条教训就是经济对形势变化的适应速度比政治制度快。 经济增长仍然强劲；


Growth has been strong; while it could have been stronger under more favorable policies, only huge mistakes could break the rise in living standards, given the region’s productivity gains.	虽然在更为有利的政策环境中，经济增长会更加强劲，但就该地区生产力增长的情况来看，只有出现重大的决策失误才会打断生活水平的持续提高。


Western Europe went through a similar phase of economic development in the 1950’s and 1960’s; now it is Central and Eastern Europe’s turn.	西欧��1950和1960年代都经历过相似的经济发展阶段； 现在轮到中欧和东欧了。


Sadly, then as now, countries never seem to learn from others’ mistakes.	遗憾的是，现在和当时一样，没有国家从他国的错误中汲取教训。


Innovation in Development Finance	发展金融的创新


ROME – More than four decades ago, the world’s wealthiest countries pledged that at least 0.7% of their GDP would be devoted to official development assistance (ODA).	罗马—40多年前，世界最富有国家承诺至少将GDP的0. 7%用于官方发展援助（ODA）。


But fewer than a half-dozen countries have actually met this goal.	但只有不到六个国家实际达到了这一目标。


In fact, ODA disbursements have not been stable, reliable, or reflective of need, and doubts about their effectiveness linger.	事实上，ODA支付一直不稳定、不可靠也没有反应需求，关于其有效性的怀疑也从未消散。


ODA declined significantly after the Cold War, dropping to 0.22% of developed countries’ combined GDP in 1997-2001, before rising again after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, the following year.	22%。 2001年9月11日美国遭遇恐怖袭击以及2002年墨西哥蒙特雷国际发展金融会议之后，ODA有所增加。


Then, as developed-country governments imposed strict fiscal austerity in the wake of the global economic crisis, ODA fell again, to 0.31% of GDP in 2010-2011.	接着，随着全球经济危机导致发达国家纷纷采取严厉财政紧缩，ODA再次回落，2010—2011年间只占GDP的0. 31%。


But, since the Monterrey conference, major additional development-finance needs have been identified, including aid-for-trade schemes and financing for climate-change mitigation and adaptation.	但是，自蒙特雷会议以来，发展金融需求大幅增加，包括贸易援助机制和气候变化抑制和适应融资。


And, while the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development – which includes 63 governments, as well as international organizations and civil-society groups – has contributed to significant progress in the last decade, the definition of innovative development finance remains in dispute.	尽管创新发展融资领导小组（Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development，由63国政府和国际组织和公民社会团体组成）在过去十年中起到了极大的推动作用，但创新��展金融的概念仍在争议中。


Indeed, critics contend that the international taxes – for example, on carbon emissions – that the Leading Group has identified as a potential source of finance infringe on national sovereignty.	事实上，批评者认为领导小组认定的作为潜在融资源的国际税——比如碳排税——损害了国家主权。


Moreover, the sources of finance do not necessarily determine how the funds are allocated, let alone how they are ultimately used.	此外，融资源并不能决定资金的配置，更不用说资金的最终用途了。


For example, although the so-called Tobin tax (a small levy on financial transactions) was originally intended to fund development assistance, a version of it was recently adopted in Europe in order to supplement national budget revenues.	比如，尽管所谓的托宾税（对金融交易收取少量税收）的初衷是为发展援助融资，但欧洲所实行的托宾税显然是为了补充国家预算收入。


Of course, such “off-label” uses of innovations in development finance do not discredit them.	当然，发展金融创新的这类“标签外”使用并未影响它们的信誉。


The UN’s 2012 World Economic and Social Survey on new development finance discusses various existing and proposed innovations in financing, intermediation, and disbursement.	联合国新发展金融2012年世界经济和社会调查（2012 World Economic and Social Survey）讨论了各种已有和规划中的融资、中介和支付创新。


Aside from allocating and trading greenhouse-gas (mainly carbon or “carbon equivalent”) emissions allowances, “solidarity levies” could be imposed on airplane tickets, and taxes imposed on aviation or ship fuel.	除了分配和交易温室气体（主要是碳和“碳等价物”）排放许可外，“互助税”（solidarity levy）还可以用于机票以及对飞机和轮船燃料所征的税收。


Another proposal involves creating new international liquidity by issuing special drawing rights (international reserve assets maintained by the International Monetary Fund).	另一个计划包括通过发行特别提款权（SDR，由IMF负责保管的国际储备资产）创造新的国际流动性。


The resulting funds, as well as those from existing unused SDRs, would be allocated or re-allocated to development projects and leveraged to augment investment resources.	由此带来的资金加上现有未使用SDR将配置或重新配置给发展项目和扩大投资源。


Yet another scheme would deploy royalties for natural-resource extraction from the global commons, such as Antarctica and other areas beyond “exclusive [national] economic zones.”	但另一项安排将使用全球共同领土（如南极洲和其他“专属（国家）经济区”之外的区域）自然资源开采特许费。


Some initiatives are already underway.	一些项目已经展开。


For example, the project (RED) is a corporate campaign that aims to raise money for The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria by donating a portion of proceeds from consumer products branded with the cause.	比如，（RED）工程是一项旨在为全球艾滋病、结核病和疟疾斗争基金筹资的项目，它将出售打有项目标识的消费品，将收入的一部分用于该基金。


While some are critical of the disparity between what these “altruistic” companies spend on advertising and the amount of money that they actually raise, such “cause marketing” could prove to be an effective mechanism for generating additional development finance.	尽管有人批评这些“利他”公司的广告支出和实际筹资额之间存在差距，但此类“公益营销”可以是有效的创造更多发展资金的机制。


Furthermore, some proposals entail no additional funds.	此外，一些项目还包含额外的资金。


Development-finance flows could be restructured, so that they are channeled through mechanisms like the International Finance Facility for Immunization, which binds ODA commitments over a long period and securitizes them in order to generate funds for immediate use.	发展金融流可以被构造，以便通过国际免疫金融便利（International Finance Facility for Immunization，它绑定长期ODA约束，并将其证券化从而产生资金立刻使用）等机制获得使用。


Similarly, debt-conversion schemes such as Debt2Health and debt-for-nature swaps would allow countries to redirect debt-service payments to development projects.	类似地，Debt2Health和债务换自然（debt-for-nature swap）等债务转换机制将能使各国把债务利息支付引导给发展项目。


Some worthwhile new risk-management proposals include advance commitments for new vaccines, subsidies to drug manufacturers to make their products more affordable, and regionally pooled catastrophe insurance.	一些颇有价值的新风险管理计划包括对新疫苗的进一步承诺、对药品制造的补贴以使产品变得更加廉价，以及地区级灾难保险资金池。


Over the last six years, roughly $6 billion has been allotted to innovative sources of financing, compared to current annual ODA of more than $120 billion – and far less than the almost $20 trillion committed by G-20 countries to economic recovery (including bailouts) since 2008.	过去六年中，大约有60亿美元被配置于创新性融资源，而当前每年的ODA为1200亿美元以上——更是远远低于2008年以来G20国家所承诺的近20万亿美元经济复苏（包括援助）资金。


But some recent proposals promise to raise far more resources for sustainable development.	但一些最新计划有助于为可持续发展筹集更多资源。


An internationally coordinated carbon tax could raise $250 billion annually, while a small financial-transaction tax could raise another $40 billion.	全球协调的碳排税每年能筹集2500亿美元，而低额金融交易税也能筹集400亿美元。


Likewise, regular SDR emissions to keep pace with the growth of global liquidity could yield roughly $100 billion annually for international development cooperation.	类似地，根据全球流动性定期释放SDR能为国际发展合作带来每年1000亿美元的资金。


Such emissions would reduce demand for US Treasury bonds and other liquid assets of preferred currencies.	这一资金释放将减少对美国国债和其他首选货币计价流动资产的需求。


At the same time, if the world’s most powerful countries stopped promoting full capital-account liberalization, developing countries would feel less pressure to protect themselves by accumulating foreign-exchange reserves.	与此同时，如果世界最强国停止敦促完全的资本账户自由化，那么发展中国家通过囤积外汇储备以自我保护的压力就会减轻。


By investing the funds in development projects instead, they could address both savings and foreign-exchange constraints.	通过将这笔资金投资于发展项目，它们可以同时解决储蓄和外汇约束。


Finally, innovative strategies are needed to align development finance with national development goals, transforming the multilateral system operationally so that it works more effectively with stakeholders on the ground.	最后，创新战略是协调发展金融和国家发展目标的必要条件，从而从操作层面改变多边体系，使其更有效地位相关利益者服务。


One model is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which has succeeded spectacularly in reducing levels of chlorofluorocarbons, highlighting the continued potential of inclusive multilateralism.	一个模式是《蒙特利尔破坏臭氧层物质议定书》（Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer），该议定书显著降低了含氯氟烃水平，彰显出包容性多边主义的潜力。


The New Generation Gap	新代沟


NEW YORK – Something interesting has emerged in voting patterns on both sides of the Atlantic: Young people are voting in ways that are markedly different from their elders.	纽约—大西洋两岸呈现出一些有趣的选举特征：年轻人的投票方式与年长者大相径庭。


A great divide appears to have opened up, based not so much on income, education, or gender as on the voters’ generation.	一个巨大的分歧已经开启，它与收入、教育或性别的关系不大，而与代际关系较大。


There are good reasons for this divide.	这一差异其来有自。


The lives of both old and young, as they are now lived, are different.	如今，年长者和年轻人的生活都不同。


Their pasts are different, and so are their prospects.	他们的过去不同，他们的前景也不同。


The Cold War, for example, was over even before some were born and while others were still children.	比如，冷战结束时一些人还没有出生，而另一些人还是孩子。


Words like socialism do not convey the meaning they once did.	社会主义等词语带来的含义和以前已经有了变化。


If socialism means creating a society where shared concerns are not given short shrift – where people care about other people and the environment in which they live – so be it.	如果社会主义意味着建立共同关注不会被忽视——人们关心其他人和他们生活的环境——这样也挺好。


Yes, there may have been failed experiments under that rubric a quarter- or half-century ago; but today’s experiments bear no resemblance to those of the past.	是的，在社会主义的名义下，四分之一或二分之一世纪之前有过一些失败的实验； 但今天的实验和过去绝无相似之处。


So the failure of those past experiments says nothing about the new ones.	因此，过去实验的失败和新实验没有任何关系。


Older upper-middle-class Americans and Europeans have had a good life.	年龄较长的中上阶级美国人和欧洲人已经过上了优渥的生活。


When they entered the labor force, well-compensated jobs were waiting for them.	当他们开始工作时，高薪工作在等着他们。


The question they asked was what they wanted to do, not how long they would have to live with their parents before they got a job that enabled them to move out.	他们的问题是想干什么，而不是必须得和父母亲住多久才能获得足以让他们独自生活的工作。


That generation expected to have job security, to marry young, to buy a house – perhaps a summer house, too – and finally retire with reasonable security.	这一代人期望获得工作安全，早早结婚，买套房子——最好再买个度假别业——最后带着相当丰厚的退休保障退休。


Overall, they expected to be better off than their parents.	总体而言，他们希望比父辈过得更好。


While today’s older generation encountered bumps along the way, for the most part, their expectations were met.	当今年长一代一路过来也经历了一些坎坷，但大部分情况下他们的期望实现了。


They may have made more on capital gains on their homes than from working.	他们从房子中获得的资本利得可能远远高于工作。


They almost surely found that strange, but they willingly accepted the gift of our speculative markets, and often gave themselves credit for buying in the right place at the right time.	他们几乎肯定认为这有些奇怪，但很乐意接受我们的投机市场给他们的礼物，还常常自矜于在正确的时候买了正确的东西。


Today, the expectations of young people, wherever they are in the income distribution, are the opposite.	如今，年轻人的期望正好相反——不管他们位于收入分布的哪个位置。


They face job insecurity throughout their lives.	他们一辈子都面临工作岗位的不安全性。


On average, many college graduates will search for months before they find a job – often only after having taken one or two unpaid internships.	平均而言，许多大学毕业生需要好几个月才能找到一份工作——常常必须先干一到两份无薪实习工作。


And they count themselves lucky, because they know that their poorer counterparts, some of whom did better in school, cannot afford to spend a year or two without income, and do not have the connections to get an internship in the first place.	而他们自认为是幸运儿，因为他们知道，还有一些更倒霉的同龄人，其中一些成绩比他们更好，他们无法承担工作一两年而没有收入，也没有人脉在一开始找到实习工作。


Today’s young university graduates are burdened with debt – the poorer they are, the more they owe.	今天的年轻大学毕业生背负着沉重的债务——越穷的学生负债越多。


So they do not ask what job they would like; they simply ask what job will enable them to pay their college loans, which often will burden them for 20 years or more.	因此他们不问喜欢什么工作，只想什么工作能让他们能够偿还学生贷款——常常需要20年甚至更长时间才能偿清。


Likewise, buying a home is a distant dream.	类似地，买房子是一个遥远的梦。


These struggles mean that young people are not thinking much about retirement.	这些难处意味着年轻人不再多想退休后的情况。


If they did, they would only be frightened by how much they will need to accumulate to live a decent life (beyond bare social security), given the likely persistence of rock-bottom interest rates.	如果试想一下这个问题，他们会被吓坏：在极低利率可能长久维持的情况下，需要那么多积累（除了聊胜于无的社会保障之外）才能过上体面的生活。


In short, today’s young people view the world through the lens of intergenerational fairness.	简言之，今天的年轻人从代际公平的角度看待世界。


The children of the upper middle class may do well in the end, because they will inherit wealth from their parents.	中上阶级儿童结局可能不错，因为他们可以从父辈继承财富。


While they may not like this kind of dependence, they dislike even more the alternative: a “fresh start” in which the cards are stacked against their attainment of anything approaching what was once viewed as a basic middle-class lifestyle.	他们也许不喜欢这种依赖性，但他们更讨厌另一条路：“全新开始”，手握一手无法让他们获得曾经被视为中产阶级生活方式基本要求的烂牌。


These inequities cannot easily be explained away.	这些不平等性无法轻易解释。


It isn’t as if these young people didn’t work hard: these hardships affect those who spent long hours studying, excelled in school, and did everything “right.”	这不是因为这些年轻人工作不努力：艰难时世影响到那些学习刻苦、成绩优秀、所有事情都做“对”的人。


The sense of social injustice – that the economic game is rigged – is enhanced as they see the bankers who brought on the financial crisis, the cause of the economy’s continuing malaise, walk away with mega-bonuses, with almost no one being held accountable for their wrongdoing.	导致了金融危机的银行家、经济持续萎靡的罪魁祸首带着巨额奖金离开，几乎没有人因为做错事而被问责，目睹这一切让他们跟家觉得社会不公平——经济游戏被操纵。


Massive fraud was committed, but somehow, no one actually perpetrated it.	欺诈层出不穷，但不知怎地，没人真正犯过这一罪行。


Political elites promised that “reforms” would bring unprecedented prosperity.	政治精英承诺“改革”将带来前所未有的繁荣。


And they did, but only for the top 1%.	确实如此，但只是顶层1%的繁荣。


Everyone else, including the young, got unprecedented insecurity.	所有其他人，包括年轻人，得到的是前所未有的不安全。


These three realities – social injustice on an unprecedented scale, massive inequities, and a loss of trust in elites – define our political moment, and rightly so.	这三样现实——前所未有的社会不公、大规模不平等以及对精英失去信任——是当下政坛的特色，确实如此。


More of the same is not an answer.	变本加厉不是办法。


That is why the center-left and center-right parties in Europe are losing.	这也是欧洲中左翼和中右翼政党失利的原因。


America is in a strange position: while the Republican presidential candidates compete on demagoguery, with ill-thought-through proposals that would make matters worse, both of the Democratic candidates are proposing changes which – if they could only get them through Congress – would make a real difference.	美国处于一个奇怪的位置：共和党总统候选人比赛谁更能蛊惑人心，纷纷抛出考虑欠周、可能适得其反的提案； 而两位民主党候选人正在提出能带来真正不同的变化——如果可以在国会通过的话。


Were the reforms put forward by Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders adopted, the financial system’s ability to prey on those already leading a precarious life would be curbed.	如果希拉里·克林顿和伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）提出的改革能得到实施，金融体系鱼肉生活已然飘摇的人们的能力将被遏制。


And both have proposals for deep reforms that would change how America finances higher education.	并且两人都提出了将改变美国高等教育融资的深度改革提案。


But more needs to be done to make home ownership possible not just for those with parents who can give them a down payment, and to make retirement security possible, given the vagaries of the stock market and the near-zero-interest world we have entered.	但从股市的瞬息万变和接近于零的利率看，还需要做更多的事，让父母亲出不起首付的人也能拥有房子，让退休保障成为可能。


Most important, the young will not find a smooth path into the job market unless the economy is performing much better.	最重要的是，除非经济表现大大提高，否则年轻人无法平稳地找到工作。


The “official” unemployment rate in the United States, at 4.9%, masks much higher levels of disguised unemployment, which, at the very least, are holding down wages.	美国4. 9%的“官方”失业率掩盖了大量伪装的失业，这一情况至少拉低了工资。


But we won’t be able to fix the problem if we don’t recognize it.	但如果我们不承认问题，就无法解决问题。


Our young do.	我们的年轻人承认问题。


They perceive the absence of intergenerational justice, and they are right to be angry.	他们感觉到缺少代际公平，并且理应为此愤怒。


New-Model Development Finance	新模式发展金融


WASHINGTON, DC – China’s success in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been widely regarded as a diplomatic fiasco for the United States.	华盛顿—中国成功地成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行，这被广泛认为是美国的一次外交惨败。


After discouraging all US allies from joining the AIIB, President Barack Obama’s administration watched as Great Britain led a raft of Western European countries, followed by Australia and South Korea, into doing just that.	美国总统奥巴马政府试图劝说所有美国盟友不要加入亚投行，但西欧国家在英国的领导下集体倒戈，澳大利亚和韩国随后也加入了亚投行。


Worse, the Obama administration found itself in the position of trying to block Chinese efforts to create a regional financial institution after the US itself was unable to deliver on promises to give China and other major emerging economies a greater say in the governance of the International Monetary Fund.	更糟糕的是，奥巴马政府发现，由于美国自身无法兑现增加中国和其他主要新兴经济体在国际货币基金组织（IMF）管理事务上的话语权的承诺，现在不得不竭力阻止中国成立一家新的地区金融机构。


The administration had pushed European countries to accept less representation on the IMF Board and increase China’s voting share from 3.65% to 6.07%, only to prove unable to win the support of the US Congress.	奥巴马政府提出欧洲国家减少在IMF董事会的代表权，并将中国的投票比例从3. 65%增加到6.


Once again, Obama found himself stymied abroad because of political paralysis at home.	07%，但这无法赢得美国国会的支持。 奥巴马再一次发现，国内政治瘫痪让他在国外举步维艰。


From a geopolitical perspective, China’s AIIB initiative is a bold and successful gambit in what Ely Ratner, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, describes as “an institutional competition for global governance that has now officially begun.”	从地缘政治角度看，中国的亚投行计划是一次成功的豪赌，新美国安全中心（Center for a New American Security）高级研究员艾利·拉特纳（Ely Ratner）称之为 “对全球治理的机构竞赛现在正式开始了。


China will control a majority of the voting shares in the AIIB, initially capitalized at $100 billion.	”中国将控制亚投行（初始资本10亿美元）一半的投票权。


Unless the Western victors of World War II can update the rules and institutions that underpinned the post-war international order, they will find themselves in a world with multiple competing regional orders and even dueling multilateral institutions.	除非西方二战战胜国可以跟新作为战后国际秩序基础的规则和机构，否则它们将进入一个多种地区秩序甚至多个多边机构相互竞争的时代。


From the point of view of developing countries in need of capital, competing banks probably look like a good thing.	从发展中国资本需求的角度看，银行间的竞争也许是件好事。


Developing-country governments will be only too pleased to borrow without the pesky conditions that the World Bank and existing regional development banks typically attach to their loans.	发展中国家政府会笑逐颜开，再也不用面对世界银行和现有地区开发银行常常十分严苛的贷款条件了。


And, as a region, East Asia will now get more of the roughly $8 trillion that the Asian Development Bank has estimated that the region will need to keep growing through 2020.	此外，亚洲开发银行估计，到2020年，东亚地区维持增长需要大约8万亿美元，而如今，该地区可以获得不止这个数。


But what about the impact on actual development, the likelihood that individual citizens of poor countries will live richer, healthier, more educated lives?	但对实际发展，即穷国个体公民过上更富有、更健康、教育程度更高的生活的可能性会有什么影响？


World Bank conditionality often includes provisions on human rights and environmental protections that make it more difficult for governments bent on growth at any cost to run roughshod over their people.	世界银行的条件常常包括人权和环境保护条款，对于下决心不惜付出一切代价刺激增长的政府来说，这增加了难度。


Competition is good, but unregulated competition typically ends up in a race to the bottom.	竞争是件好事，但没有监管的竞争常常会失去底线。


China’s establishment of the AIIB is the latest sign of a broader move away from the view that aid to developing countries is best provided in the form of massive government-to-government transfers.	更广泛的背景是人们日益不再采信一个观点，即对发展中国家的援助最好通过大规模政府间转移支付的形式提供，中国成立亚投行只是这一背景的最新信号。


Power and wealth are not only diffusing across the international system, but also within states, such that corporations, foundations, wealthy individuals, private investment funds, civil-society groups, and most recently, municipal governments all have a role to play in development.	权力和财富不但在国际体系中扩散，也在国家内部扩散，公司、基金会、富豪、私人投资基金、公民社会团体，最近还有市政政府，它们都在发展中起着作用。


Consider the second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, released last month by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development.	以上个月由美国国务院和美国国际发展署（Agency for International Development）发布的《外交和发展评估四年刊》（Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review，QDDR）第二版为例。


The QDDR emphasizes a “new model of development,” one based on the recognition “that the United States is one of many actors, and that countries require investments from multiple sources to achieve sustained and inclusive economic growth.”	QDDR强调一个“发展新模式”，该模式基于承认“美国是诸多行动方之一，而各国需要从多个源头获得投资以实现持续、包容的经济增长。


Initiatives such as Feed the Future, the US Global Development Lab, and Power Africa combine “local ownership, private investment, innovation, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and mutual accountability.”	”未来粮食保障（Feed the Future）、美国全球发展实验室（US Global Development Lab）、非洲力量（Power Africa）等项目结合了“地方所有权、私人投资、创新、多边股东合作和互相问责。 ”


This new model moves beyond the mantra of “public-private partnership.”	这一新模式超越了“公私合作”的魔咒。


It genuinely leverages multiple sources of money and expertise in broad coalitions pursuing the same big goal.	它真正利用了多重资金源和广泛的专家��盟追求同一个大目标。


Power Africa, for example, includes six US government agencies: the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the US Export-Import Bank, the US Trade and Development Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the US African Development Foundation.	比如，非洲力量包括了六家美国政府机构：海外私人投资公司（Overseas Private Investment Corporation）、美国进出口银行（US Export-Import Bank）、美国贸易和发展公司（US Trade and Development Corporation）、千年挑战公司（Millennium Challenge Corporation）和美国非洲发展基金会（US African Development Foundation）。


Together, they will commit more than $7 billion over five years in financing, trade credits, insurance, small business grants, and direct government support to the energy sector in six partner countries.	它们加起来将在未来五年向六个合作国家的能源部门提供70多亿美元的融资、贸易信用、保险、小企业补助和直接政府支持。


Those investments will leverage billions in private-sector commitments, starting with more than $9 billion from a range of companies, including General Electric.	这些投资将撬动数十亿美元的私人投资，首先就是包括通用电气在内的诸多公司的90多亿美元。


Power Africa takes a “transaction-centered approach,” creating teams to align incentives among “host governments, the private sector, and donors.”	非洲力量采取了“以交易为中心的方针”，建立团队理顺“东道国政府、私人部门和出资人”之间的激励。


Unlike big government-to-government transfers, which can often end up in the pockets of officials, the point is to ensure that deals actually get done and investments flow to their intended destination.	与大规模政府间转移支付不同——政府间转移支付常常肥了官员的腰包——非洲力量的核心是确保协议真正落实、投资流向意向目标。


This pragmatic focus on results is equally evident in the QDDR’s emphasis on working with mayors around the world on issues like climate change.	务实地以结果为重点的另一个体现是QDDR强调与全球市长合作解决气候变化等问题。


Targeting government officials with the incentives and ability to make a difference in regulating emissions on the ground yields results much more quickly than negotiations on an international treaty.	以有动力也有能力改变排放监管格局的政府官员为目标能够比谈判国际条约更快地产生成果。


Skeptics will say that the US is simply making a virtue of necessity.	怀疑派会说，美国将迫不得已装成好心而为。


The federal government no longer has billions of dollars to dole out to foreign governments, while China is far more centralized and less beholden to its taxpayers.	联邦政府不再阔气到抛洒数十亿美元援助外国政府，而中国远比美国更加集中化，也不必像美国那样对纳税人负责。


China and its partners in the AIIB can thus build the big things – roads, bridges, dams, railroads and ports – that unquestionably power an economy and that citizens notice, but that the US, and for that matter the World Bank, no longer funds.	因此，中国及其亚投行伙伴国可以办成大事——公路、桥梁、大坝、铁路和港口都不在话下——毫无疑问，这些项目能够增加经济实力、吸引公民注意，而美国——世界银行也是如此——不再提供资金。


The days of the Marshall Plan are long gone.	马歇尔计划时代早已成为历史。


That criticism contains some truth.	这一批评不乏真理。


But, over the longer term, the new US model of development is actually far more resilient and sustainable than the old government-to-government model.	但是，从长期看，新的美国发展模式实际上比旧的政府间模式恢复力更强，也更加可持续。


Only societies with thriving sectors free of government control can participate in these broad coalitions of public, private, and civic actors.	只有各部门不受政府控制的社会，才能参与这些公共、私人和公民团体行动方的大联盟。


Corporations, foundations, and civil-society groups, in turn, are much more likely to forge lasting ties with their counterparts in local communities in the host countries – relationships that will survive changes of government and fiscal turbulence.	反过来，公司、基金会和公民社会团体也更有可能与东道国的地方对等组织构建更加持续的联系——这一关系不会因为政府变化和财政动荡而崩溃。


Overall, the AIIB is a positive development.	总体而言，亚投行是一个积极的发展趋势。


More money aimed at helping poor countries become middle-income countries and at middle-income countries to help them provide transport, energy, and communication for their people is a good thing.	更多的资金将用于帮助帮助穷国成为中等收入国家和帮助中等收入国家为其人民提供交通、能源通讯，这是一件好事。


But the Asian way is not the only way.	但亚洲方式并不是唯一的方式。


Europe’s Foreign-Policy Resilience	欧洲外交政策复苏


RIGA – For decades, people have bemoaned the waning of Europe’s global political power.	里加—几十年来，人们为欧洲全球政治实力的式微而扼腕痛惜。


To add some precision to the debate, in 2010 we helped to write the European Council on Foreign Relations’ first Foreign Policy Scorecard.	2010年，我们参与撰写了《欧洲对外关系委员会首次外交政策计分表》（European Council on Foreign Relations’ first Foreign Policy Scorecard），可以让这一争论更加精确一些。


Back then, we wrote – rather mildly – that Europe had been “distracted” by the euro crisis.	当是时，我们以颇为含蓄地写道，欧洲因欧元危机而“分神”。


By the end of 2012, the crisis could be considered less acute.	到2012年末，这场危机可以认为已有所缓和。


Nevertheless, European leaders have continued to devote more time and effort to financial and institutional questions than to geopolitical issues.	尽管如此，欧洲领导人仍将更多的时间和精力用于金融和制度问题，而不是地缘政治怎提。


Europe’s image and soft power have undoubtedly continued to fade around the world (thought such a trend is difficult to quantify), while member states continue to cut defense and development budgets.	毫无疑问，欧洲在全世界的形象和软实力在继续式微（尽管这一趋势很难量化），而成员国仍在削减防务和发展预算。


The good news, however, is that European foreign policy has not unraveled in the crisis.	不过，好消息是欧洲外交政策并未因危机而崩溃。


Indeed, it has even shown some signs of progress.	事实上，其外交政策甚至出现了些许改善信号。


The European Union managed to preserve the essence of its acquis diplomatique.	欧盟设法维持了既有外交格局的基础。


In fact, the Scorecard’s assessment of European foreign-policy performance in 2012 shows modest signs of stabilization and resilience.	事实上，2012年欧洲外交政策表现计分表显示了一定的稳定和恢复信号。


Although the EU had no high-profile successes comparable to the military intervention in Libya in 2011, it performed surprisingly well in its external relations – especially given the deep crisis with which it continued to struggle.	尽管欧盟没有拿出堪与2011年对利比亚军事干预相比的巨大成功，但在外部关系上表现出人意料地好，特别是在考虑到它所处的深度危机环境的情况下。


For starters, the coherence of Europe’s policies toward Russia improved: the EU threatened to use the World Trade Organization’s dispute-settlement mechanism when the Kremlin announced new protectionist measures in late 2012.	首先，欧洲对俄政策表现出了更高的凝聚力：当克里姆林宫在2012年末宣布实施新的保护主义措施时，欧盟威胁将启动世贸组织的仲裁程序。


It also launched an antitrust probe against Russian gas giant Gazprom, and criticized human-rights abuses during the crackdown on demonstrations that accompanied the March election that returned Vladimir Putin to the presidency.	欧盟还对俄罗斯天然气巨头Gazprom采取了反垄断调查，批评了3月份大选期间的镇压游行过程中所出现的侵犯人权行为。 普京通过这次大选重回总统宝座。


There were also signs of modest improvement in Europe’s relations with China, despite a lack of unity that continued to undermine its leverage.	欧洲对中国关系也显示出了一定的改善信号，尽管尚未形成一致。


New EU missions to Niger, South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa under the aegis of the Common Security and Defense Policy were also launched – something that had not happened in the previous two years.	在尼日尔、南苏丹和非洲之角事务上，欧盟在共同安全和防御政策框架下采取行动，这是过去两年不曾发生过的事情。


Of course, there were also areas in which Europeans performed less well.	当然，在某些领域，欧洲表现得不尽如人意。


Above all, they could not break the frustrating diplomatic gridlock over Syria or stem the escalation in violence as the year went on.	首先，欧洲没能打破令人尴尬的叙利亚外交僵局或阻止叙利亚暴力状况的升级。


Europeans remained divided on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (though to a lesser degree than in previous years), and failed to have an impact on the United Nations vote in November to upgrade Palestine’s status.	在以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突问题上（尽管较前几年相比有所收敛），欧洲未形成一致，也没有在11月联合国投票表决升级巴勒斯坦地位中起到作用。


They also struggled to pursue a united approach to Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and continued to seek a coherent approach to Turkey as accession negotiations remained blocked.	在阿塞拜疆和乌克兰问题上，欧洲也没有统一意见，对于土耳其入盟谈判也是众说纷纭，导致谈判仍无法取得进展。


Nonetheless, the EU’s foreign-policy performance in 2012 was positive overall.	尽管如此，总体而言2012年欧盟外交政策表现是积极的。


It now remains to be seen whether this momentum can be maintained, which will depend largely on whether the EU can overcome the economic crisis (which continues to worsen in several member countries), restore growth, and curb unemployment.	如今，我们仍需观察这一势头能否持续，而这又在很大程度上取决于欧盟是否能够克服经济危机（在一些成员国，经济危机仍在深化）、重塑增长、遏制失业。


In this sense, European leaders are right to focus on solving the financial crisis in the eurozone.	在这个问题上，欧洲领导人专注于解决欧元区金融危机的做法是正确的。


Any future gains in global influence, however, will require Europeans to overcome their internal divisions and improve their foreign-policy coordination. In particular, success will require turning the European External Action Service (EEAS) into an effective diplomatic corps that can convert the EU’s huge resources into real power.	但是，欧洲要想在全球影响力方面再接再厉，就必须克服内部分歧，改善外交政策协调性，特别是，要想获得成功，就必须让欧洲对外事务部（EEAS）成为能够将欧盟的巨大资源转化为真实实力的高效外交机构。


The near future will present a growing list of challenges.	眼前挑战不少。


There are already indications from key strategic partners that they are beginning to regard the euro crisis as the “new normal”; in other words, they are planning for a future in which European power continues to erode.	有迹象表明，一些关键盟友开始将欧元危机视为“新常态”； 换句话说，他们正在为欧洲实力持续衰落的未来做准备。


Europe’s lack of a collective defense strategy, together with declining investment in military capacity, is also a serious obstacle to its continuing global influence as a security actor.	欧洲缺少集体防务战略，军力投资又在下降，这也是欧洲作为治安行动者的全球影响力的一大严重阻碍。


This makes it even more important for the EEAS to align the Common Security and Defense Policy with wider foreign-policy efforts.	因此，EEAS以更广泛的外交政策措施与共同安全和防务政策相辅相成就变得愈加重要了。


This is a daunting task, given the EU’s current structure.	从欧盟的现行结构看，这是个艰难的任务。


The specter of a British withdrawal from the EU will not make things any easier.	英国从欧盟退出的阴影将让形势更加严峻。


The US “pivot” to Asia further increases the pressure on Europe to deal with its own neighborhood.	美国的亚洲“支点”进一步增加了欧洲对付其四邻的压力。


Although the EU’s foreign policy toward Russia has become more effective, tensions have, if anything, grown – and may continue to do so.	尽管欧洲对俄罗斯外交政策比以前更加有效了，但紧张的局面并没有获得改观——今后可能也将如此。


Insecurity in Africa’s Sahel region, already a growing concern in 2012, has, in the first month of 2013, led one EU member state to go to war in a region not far from Europe’s doorstep.	非洲萨赫勒地区的不安全状况在2012年便已成为令人担心的问题，在2013年更是导致某欧盟成员国在这一离欧洲门户不远的地区动武。


Europeans are likely still to be dealing with the fallout of Islamist rebel groups’ attempted takeover of Mali this time next year, while the long-term consequences of developments in the Sahel are bound to be felt for years to come.	今年，欧洲可能要继续应付伊斯兰叛军控制马里图谋的余波，而萨赫勒地区的长期发展后果要好几年才会显现出来。


Despite the gravity of the euro crisis, the EU foreign-policymaking machine (such as it is) continued to function in 2012, with moderately successful results.	尽管欧元危机兹事体大，但在2012年里，欧盟外交政策机器仍然（一如既往地）运转着，取得了一定的成功。


Just getting by, however, is unlikely to be enough to address the challenges that Europe is likely to face this year.	但是，保持现状并不足以应对欧洲在今年所可能遇到的挑战。


The EU will need to do more – and do it better.	欧盟需要做得更多、做得更好。


We remain hopeful that it will be up to the task.	我们仍然抱有希望，能够游刃有余。


New Hope on Climate Change	气候变化中的新希望


The world has taken an important step toward controlling climate change by agreeing to the Bali Action Plan at the global negotiations in Indonesia earlier this month.	本月早些时候，世界各国在印尼举行的全球谈判中达成巴厘行动规划，从而在控制气候变化的道路上迈出了重要一步。


The plan may not look like much, since it basically committed the world to more talking rather than specific actions, but I am optimistic for three reasons.	这一规划貌不惊人，因为它基本上只是让各国承诺进行更多的会谈而非确实的行动。 但是出于三点原因我持乐观态度。


First, the world was sufficiently united that it forced the United States to end its intransigence.	首先，各国团结一致迫使美国结束了其顽固立场。


Second, the road map marks a sensible balance of considerations.	第二，路线图标志着各方考虑的有意义的平衡。


And, third, realistic solutions are possible, which will allow the world to combine economic development and control of greenhouse gases.	而且第三，现实的解决方案是可能的。 这些方案将会让世界各国把经济发展和控制温室气体结合起来。


The first step at Bali was to break the deadlock that has crippled the global response to climate change since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol a decade ago.	巴厘会议采取的第一个步骤就是打破十年前京都议定书签署以来破坏各国对气候变化做出反应的僵局。


This time the world united, even booing the US lead negotiator until she reversed position and agreed to sign the Bali Action Plan.	这一次世界团结一致，甚至给美国首席谈判代表起哄，直到她转变立场同意签署巴厘行动规划。


Likewise, the unwillingness of major developing countries such as China and India to sign on to a plan also seems to be ending, though considerable work remains to craft a global agreement to which both rich and poor countries can agree.	同样，尽管为达成一项富国和穷国都可以接受的全球性协议还任重而道远，但是包括中国和印度在内的主要发展中国家似乎也不再不愿同意一项规划。


Doing so requires balancing many concerns.	这样做就要求平衡各方忧虑。


First, we must stabilize greenhouse gases in order to avoid dangerous human interference in the climate system – the key goal of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the global treaty under which the Bali negotiations took place.	首先，我们必须稳定温室气体排放以便避免气候系统中危险的人为干预。


Second, we must accomplish this while leaving room for continued rapid economic development and poverty reduction.	这是1992年联合国气候变化框架公约的主要目标，而巴厘谈判会议就是在这一全球性协议框架下召开的。


Poor countries do not and will not accept a system of climate control that condemns them to continued poverty.	第二，我们必须在给持续快速经济发展和消除贫困留出空间的同时完成这一目标。


Third, we must help countries adapt to the climate change that is already occurring and that will intensify in the future.	第三，我们必须帮助各国适应业已发生并且将会在未来加剧的气候变化。


The Bali Action Plan addresses all three concerns.	巴厘行动规划处理了所有这些关注。


The plan’s main point is to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to reach a detailed global agreement by 2009 that will set “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” commitments to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.	该规划的要点是建立一个临时工作组以便在2009年前达成一项具体的全球性协议。 这一协议将确定降低温室气体排放的“可以衡量、可供汇报以及可以核实”的承诺。


Such commitments are to be taken in the context of “sustainable development,” meaning that “economic and social development and poverty reduction are global priorities.”	这些承诺将会被放置在“可持续发展”的框架下，也就是说，“经济和社会发展以及减轻贫困是全球重点问题”。


The plan also calls for knowledge transfer to enable poor countries to adopt environmentally sound technologies.	这一规划还呼吁知识转移来让穷国采用环境上可行的技术。


The great question, of course, is whether stabilization of greenhouse gases, continued economic development, and adaptation to climate change can be achieved simultaneously.	当然，一大问题就是稳定温室气体排放、经济持续发展以及适应气候变化是否能够同时实现。 如果使用我们现有的技术是行不通的。


Using our current technologies, no; but if we develop and rapidly adopt new technologies that are within our scientific reach, yes.	但是如果我们发展和快速采用我们的科研力量可以达到的新技术就可以实现。


The most important challenge is to reduce, and eventually nearly eliminate, carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal.	最为重要的挑战就是减少并最终接近消除燃烧矿物燃料例如石油、天然气以及煤炭等排放的二氧化碳。


These fuels are at the core of the modern world economy, supplying around four-fifths of the world’s commercial energy.	这些燃料居于现代世界经济的核心，为整个世界提供大约五分之四的商业能源。


Such emissions can be eliminated by either shifting to renewable forms of energy or reducing the emissions from fossil fuels.	可以通过转向可再生能源形式或者降低使用矿物燃料排放来消除这些排放。


The key insight is that roughly 75% of our fossil fuel use goes for just a few purposes: to produce electricity and heat at power plants, to drive automobiles, to heat buildings, and to power a few key industries such as refineries, petrochemicals, cement, and steel.	人们的关键觉悟是，我们75%的矿物燃料使用仅仅用于几个目的，就是在电厂中发电和提供热力、驾驶汽车、给建筑物供热以及为几个关键产业例如炼油、石化、水泥以及钢铁提供动力。


We need new environmentally sound technologies in each of these sectors.	我们在这些行业中需要在环境上可行的新技术。


For example, power plants can adopt solar energy or capture and safely dispose of the carbon dioxide they produce with fossil fuels – as can large factories.	例如，电厂可以采用太阳能或者捕获并且安全地处理其随着矿物燃料而所产生的二氧化碳，大型工厂也可以做到。


Automobiles can be engineered for much greater mileage through hybrid technology combining battery power and gasoline.	可以通过结合电池动力和汽油的混合技术来制造耗油更少的汽车。


Buildings can reduce their heating needs through improved insulation, or by converting from heating oil to electricity produced by clean technology.	可以通过绝缘或者把供热用油转化为由清洁技术制造的电降低建筑物供热需求。


According to the best economic and engineering estimates, if each key economic sector develops and adopts environmentally sound technologies in the coming decades, the world will be able to reduce carbon emissions dramatically for less than 1% of annual global income, thereby avoiding long-term damage that would cost far more.	根据最佳经济和工程估算，如果每个关键经济部门在未来几十年中发展和采用环境上可行的技术，那么，全世界各国将可以用1%不到的全年全球收入大幅度降低二���化碳排放，从而避免代价更为巨大的长期性破坏。


In other words, the world can combine economic growth with declining emissions of carbon dioxide.	换句话说，世界各国能够把经济增长和降低二氧化碳排放结合起来。


And rich countries will be able to afford to help poor countries pay for the new, cleaner technologies.	而富国将可以帮助穷国购买新的更为清洁的技术。


To reach agreement by 2009, we must move beyond current generalities by which rich and poor countries argue about who should be blamed for climate change and who should pay the costs.	富国和穷国对谁应该为气候变化负责以及谁应该承担更大的代价而争论不休。 为了在2009年前达到目标，我们就必须超越目前这样的坐而论道。


We will need a true global business plan that spells out how the new technologies are developed, tested, and adopted on an expedited basis worldwide.	我们需要一个真正的全球性商业规划来确定如何在全球范围内快速开发、测试以及采用新技术。


We must ensure that all countries adopt a verifiable strategy for environmentally sound technology, and that rich countries fulfill the Bali Action Plan’s promise to provide “financial and other incentives” to enable poor countries to adopt the new technologies.	我们必须确保所有国家采纳可以核查的、运用环境上可行技术的战略。 富国则必须履行巴厘行动规划的保证来提供“财政和其他激励措施”来让穷国采纳新技术。


With so many crises afflicting our world, there is perhaps cynicism that yet another global conference did little more than promise to continue talking.	我们的世界充满各种危机，人们不禁怀疑另一场国际会议只不过是保证继续会谈而已。


But let’s see the positive message instead: 190 countries agreed on a sensible plan, and the underlying science and technology gives us realistic hopes for achieving it.	但是让我们看到积极的一面，那就是，190个国家达成了一个有意义的规划，而基本科技给了我们实现规划的现实希望。


There is considerable and difficult work ahead, but the situation is better as a result of the deliberations in Bali.	我们任重而道远，但是由于巴厘会议的研讨形势好转。


Now it’s time to role up our sleeves and achieve what we’ve promised.	现在就是付诸行动大干一场兑现我们的承诺的时候。


New Rules for the Monetary Game	货币游戏的新规则


NEW DELHI – Our world is facing an increasingly dangerous situation.	新德里—我们的世界正面临越来越危险的局面。


Both advanced and emerging economies need to grow in order to ease domestic political tensions.	发达和新兴经济体都需要增长以缓和政治紧张。


And yet few are.	但只有极少国家能实现增长。


If governments respond by enacting policies that divert growth from other countries, this “beggar my neighbor” tactic will simply foster instability elsewhere.	如果政府的对策是从其他国家转移增长，那么这一“以邻为壑”策略将在别处造成动荡。


What we need, therefore, are new rules of the game.	因此，我们需要新的游戏规则。


Why is it proving to be so hard to restore pre-Great Recession growth rates?	重塑大衰退前增长率为何如此困难？


The immediate answer is that the boom preceding the global financial crisis of 2008 left advanced economies with an overhang of growth-inhibiting debt.	快速的回答是2008年全球金融危机前的繁荣让发达经济体积压了制约增长的债务。


While the remedy may be to write down debt to revive demand, it is uncertain whether write-downs are politically feasible or the resulting demand sustainable.	解决方法可以是减记债务以重振需求，但减记在政治上是否可行、是否能让需求可持续并不确定。


Moreover, structural factors like population aging and low productivity growth – which were previously masked by debt-fueled demand – may be hampering the recovery.	此外，结构因素，如人口老龄化和生产率增长无力——此前这些因素被债务助推的需求所掩盖——可能抑制复苏。


Politicians know that structural reforms – to increase competition, foster innovation, and drive institutional change – are the way to tackle structural impediments to growth.	政客们知道，结构改革——增加竞争、促进创新、推动制度变化——是消除增长的结构障碍之道。


But they know that, while the pain from reform is immediate, gains are typically delayed and their beneficiaries uncertain.	但他们知道，改革的痛苦马上就会出现，而好处常常要延迟显现，并且受益者是谁也不确定。


As Jean-Claude Juncker, then Luxembourg’s prime minister, said at the height of the euro crisis, “We all know what to do; we just don't know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it!”	时任卢森堡首相让-克劳德·容克在欧元危机最高峰时说：“我们都知道要怎么做； 我们只是不知道做了以后还如何获得连任！


Central bankers face a different problem: inflation that is flirting with the lower bound of their mandate.	央行行长则面临一个不同的问题：通货膨胀徘徊在他们的使命区间的下界。


With interest rates already very low, advanced economies’ central bankers know that they must go beyond ordinary monetary policy – or lose credibility on inflation.	在利率已然非常低的情况下，发达经济体的央行行长们知道他们必须超越常规货币政策——否则将失去在通胀方面的信誉。


They feel that they cannot claim to be out of tools.	他们感到他们不能宣布已经用尽了一切方法。


If all else fails, there is always the “helicopter drop,” whereby the central bank prints money and sprays it on the streets to create inflation (more prosaically, it sends a check to every citizen, perhaps more to the poor, who are likelier to spend it).	即使其他一切办法都失效，还能“直升机撒钱”，即央行印钞在街头散发以制造通货膨胀（更通俗地说，央行向所有公民派发支票，也许花钱可能性更大的穷人可以多派发一些）。


But they can also employ a range of other unconventional tools more aggressively, from asset purchases (so-called quantitative easing) to negative interest rates.	但他们也可以更激进地动用一系列其他非常规措施，如资产购买（所谓的量化宽松）和负利率。


But do such policies achieve their goal of strengthening demand and growth?	但这些政策达到了强化需求和增长的目标了吗？


Monetary policy works by influencing public expectations.	货币政策通过影响公共预期起作用。


If an ever more aggressive policy convinces the public that calamity is around the corner, households may save rather than spend.	如果越来越激进的政策让公众认为灾难已近在眼前，那么家庭就会储蓄而不是支出。


That tendency will be even greater if the public senses that the consequences (distorted asset prices, high government debt, etc.) eventually must be reversed.	如果公众感到结果（扭曲的资产价格、高企的政府债务等）最终必须扭转，这一倾向会更加严重。


Conversely, if people were convinced that policies would never change, they might splurge again on assets and take on excessive debt, helping the central bank achieve its objectives in the short run.	相反，如果人们认为政策不会改变，他们可能再次挥霍资产，承担过度债务，有助于央行在短期实现目标。


But policy inevitably changes, and the shifts in asset prices would create enormous dislocation when it does.	但政策难免会改变，此时，资产价格的变化将造成巨大的混乱。


Beyond the domestic impacts, all monetary policies have external “spillover” effects.	除了国内影响，所有货币政策都有外部“溢出”效应。


In normal circumstances, if a country reduces domestic interest rates to boost domestic consumption and investment, its exchange rate depreciates, too, helping exports.	在正常环境下，如果一国降低国内利率提振国内消费和投资，其汇率也会贬值，助力出口。


Today’s circumstances, however, are not normal.	但是，今天的环境不属于正常环境。


Domestic demand may not respond to unconventional policy.	国内需求可能不会响应非常规政策。


Moreover, facing distorted domestic bond prices stemming from unconventional policy, pension funds and insurance companies may look to buy them in less distorted markets abroad.	此外，面临因为非常规政策而扭曲的国内债券价格，退休基金和保险公司可能会着眼于在扭曲较小的海外市场购买债券。


Such a search for yield will depreciate the exchange rate further – and increase the risk of competitive devaluations that leave no country better off.	这一寻找收益率的行为将进一步抑制汇率——并提高让所有国家一损俱损的竞争性贬值的风险。


As matters stand, central banks in developed countries find all sorts of ways to justify their policies, without acknowledging the unmentionable – that the exchange rate may be the primary channel of transmission.	目前，发达国家央行寻找各种方法论证它们的政策，而不承认不可言说的原因——汇率可能是主要传播渠道。


If so, what we need are monetary rules that prevent a central bank’s domestic mandate from trumping a country’s international responsibility.	果真如此的话，我们需要的是防止央行的国内使命压倒一国的国际责任。


To use a traffic analogy, policies with few adverse spillovers should be rated “green”; those that should be used temporarily could be rated “orange”; and policies that should be avoided at all times would be “red.”	用交通打比方，几乎没有负面溢出效应的政策可以给予“绿灯”； 应该临时使用的政策应该给予“黄灯”；


If a policy has positive effects on both home and foreign countries, it would definitely be green.	如果一项政策给本国和外国同时带来正面效应，那么肯定可以获得绿灯。


A policy could also be green if it jump-starts the home economy with only temporary negative spillovers for the foreign economy (the policy will still be good for the foreign economy by eventually boosting the home economy’s demand for imports).	如果一项政策能大大提振国内经济，给外国带来的负面溢出效应只是暂时的，那么也应该获得绿灯（这项政策对外国经济也是有益的，因为最终本国经济的进口需求将得到提振）。


An example of a red policy would be when unconventional monetary policies do little to boost a country’s domestic demand – but lead to large capital outflows that provoke asset-price bubbles in emerging markets.	红灯政策的一个例子是非常规货币政策对于提振一国国内需求无济于事，却导致大量资本外流，引发新兴市场资产价格泡沫。


There will be plenty of gray areas (or orange, to stick to the analogy).	有很多灰色地带（或者黄灯，如果继续用交通的比方的话）。


A policy that has large positive effects for a big economy might have small negative effects for the rest of the world and yet still be positive overall for global welfare.	一项政策可能给一个大型经济体带来巨大的正面影响，但对世界其他地区带来微小的负面影响，但对全球福利的影响总体为正面。


Such a policy would be permissible for some time, but not on a sustained basis.	这样的政策可以允许维持一段时间，但不能持久。


We are far from having clear agreement on the color of policies today, even with the best data, models, and empirical work.	我们还远远没有就当今政策的颜色形成明确的一致，即使我们已经具备了最好的数据、模型和实证工作。


So we must begin a discussion.	因此我们必须从讨论开始。


We could start with background papers from eminent academics and move on to multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the G-20.	首先我们可以研读著名学者的背景论文，然后在国际货币基金组织（IMF）和G-20等国际机构讨论。


There will be a lot of fuzziness initially, but discussion will lead in time to better models and data – and will push policymakers to stay out of the clearly red.	一开始会有很多地方模糊不清，但讨论终将带来更好的模型和数据——并让决策者远离红灯区。


Arguably, what I have in mind will eventually require a new international agreement along the lines of Bretton Woods, and some reinterpretation of the mandates of internationally influential central banks.	可以说，我所构想的最终需要一个类似于布雷顿森林体系的新的国际协议，以及一些关于具有国际影响的中央银行使命的解释。


But we already have a basis for discussion.	但我们已经有了讨论的基础。


The IMF’s Article IV states: “In particular, each member shall … avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance-of-payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage over other members…”	IMF章程第四条说：“特别是，各成员应……避免为了防止有效的收支平衡调整或获得对其他成员的不公平的竞争优势而操纵汇率或国际货币体系……。 ”


Setting the rules will take time.	制定规则需要时间。


But the international community has a choice.	但国际社会可以选择。


We can pretend all is well with the global monetary non-system and hope that nothing goes spectacularly wrong.	我们可以装作全球货币无体系也无所谓，寄希望于不会出现重大纰漏。


Or we can start building a system fit for the integrated world of the twenty-first century.	我们也可以开始构建一个适合二十一世纪一体化世界的体系。


This article is based on work with Dr. Prachi Mishra at the Reserve Bank of India.	本文基于与印度储备银行的Prachi Mishra博士合作的工作。


The Curing Machine	治疗仪


VIRGINIA BEACH – Last year, the Nobel Prize in Medicine was awarded for a discovery that took 44 years to develop, and involved two different research teams.	弗吉尼亚海滩—去年的诺贝尔医学奖被授予一项耗时44年、牵涉两个研究团队的发现。


The breakthrough promises new kinds of diagnosis and therapy, but what if such insights could be developed by computers in minutes, rather than decades?	这项突破使新的诊断和诊疗成为可能，但如果说这样的洞见能够用计算机在几分钟而不是几十年内完成，你作何感想？


The recent appearance of a new coronavirus, which has killed nine people in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, is a reminder that novel treatments are sometimes needed in a hurry.	最近出现的在英国和中东夺去九条任命的新型冠状病毒提醒人们，有时我们急切地需要新疗法。


With different modeling abstractions, it might be possible to build an artificial-intelligence system (AI) that could design new treatments.	基于不同的模型抽象，可能建立能设计新疗法的人工智能系统（AI）。


That system would suggest surprising, effective therapies, because it would understand disease in ways that are difficult for humans to imagine.	该系统将给出惊艳的高效诊疗，因为它能以人类难以想象的方式理解疾病。


The notion seems like science fiction: everyone knows that AI is not particularly clever.	这个概念听起来像是科幻小说：人人都知道AI并不特别聪明。


In order to build a “curing machine” of this kind, at least one far-reaching innovation is needed: a better way of modeling entire systems, which would deliver new conceptual tools to both biology and computer science.	为了制造这样一种“治疗仪”，至少需要一项深远的创新：为整个系统建模的更加方法，该方法必须能为生物学和计算机科学带来新概念工具。


In both fields, the conventional approach has been reductionist, with problems modeled at the level of their most basic components.	在这两个领域，传统方法都是还原论的——在最基本要素的水平上为问题建模。


While this makes it possible to build “expert systems” that reason in narrow domains, or to design search engines that can find discrete facts, we are no closer to AI that reasons the way that we do – in and across multiple contexts, including time.	这使得建立在狭小领域推理的“专家系统”或是设计寻找离散事实的搜索引擎成为可能，但我们距离能够以我们的方式——在包括时间的众多环境中穿梭自如——进行推理的AI还有很长的路要走。


AI cannot integrate information about seemingly distinct processes, such as chemical, physiological, and psychological events, or anticipate novel outcomes.	AI无法将相去甚远的过程——比如化学、生理和心理事件——的信息整合在一起，也无法预测小说结局。


We do these things over dinner.	我们则可以一边吃饭一边对这些话题侃侃而谈。


Novelty is key.	关键之处就在新奇。


To build a curing machine, we would need a way for computers to assemble concepts so that unexpected arrangements could emerge.	为了建造治疗仪，我们需要为计算机设计一种收集概念的方法，从而让出乎预料的安排浮出水面。


In biology, there has been a similar reductionist approach, best exemplified by the Human Genome Project, which catalogued the molecular “recipe” for every aspect of the body, in order to discover how the most basic pieces interacted.	在生物学中也有类似的还原论方法，最佳的例子就是人类基因组计划，该计划把人体各个方面的分子“配方”予以归类，以便发现最基本的部分是如何互动的。


Alas, the expected revolution in therapies is yet to occur.	可惜，预料中的诊疗革命还是没有到来。


Worldwide, total annual investment in biomedical research is about $110 billion.	放眼全球，每年用于生物化学研究的投资总额约为1100亿美元。


HIV alone attracts many billions per year.	艾滋病一项每年就要耗资好几十亿美元。


Yet, despite 25 years of intense investment in structural biology, we remain unable to move from understanding molecules to an understanding of whole systems.	可是，尽管25年来在结构生物学上投入巨大，但我们仍无法从理解分子进步到理解整个系统。


A model of the dynamics between multiple processes – chemical, physiological, and psychological – would lend new insight into how diseases operate.	关于多重过程——化学的、生理的和心理的——之间动态的模型将为发现疾病如何发展提供新洞见。


Consider, for example, the sense of smell.	比如，我们可以考虑嗅觉。


The nasal cavity is unique, as the only place where brain cells (neurons) are directly exposed to the environment.	鼻腔是独特的，是唯一一个脑细胞（神经元）直接暴露在环境中的地方。