The cheapest system, generating two watts of power, can cost as little as $10-20 and be expanded to almost any level, depending on the size and number of photovoltaic (PV) modules and the size of the battery storage unit.	能发两瓦电的最便宜的系统成本仅10-20美元，而且只要光伏（PV）模块的数量和电池存储单元的容量允许，可以拓展到几乎任何水平。


It is simple, too.	这种方法同样非常简单。


A residential solar-power system consists of just three components: the PV modules, a battery storage unit, and a charge controller.	住宅太阳能发电系统由光伏组件、电池存储单元和充电控制装置等三部分组成。


Such a system can supply low-voltage DC electric power at five volts for mobile phones, and 12V for LED lighting, pumps for outdoor use, and electrical appliances such as computers and televisions.	这样一套系统可以满足5V手机低压直流充电、以及12V LED照明、户外水泵及电脑电视等各式家电的用电需求。


When single-phase or three-phase 230V AC power is needed (say, to power larger machines), an inverter must be used.	当涉及单相或三相230V交流电（为大型机械供电时），就必须用到变频装置。


This makes sense only for systems that are larger than a kilowatt of peak power and that have sufficient battery capacity.	变频装置仅适用于功率峰值大于1千瓦、且电池容量充足的系统。


Local systems in one building could be connected to local low-voltage DC or 230V AC grids to improve the security of supply.	建筑供电系统可以和当地低压直流或230V交流电网相连，以此来改善供电的安全性。


One major challenge to the boot-strap approach is developing cheap and durable batteries.	自给自足方案的难点在于研发出经济耐用的电池。


Many residential systems break down after 3-5 years when the battery dies, undermining confidence in the system among owners who assumed that they had a lifetime supply of energy.	3-5年后电池寿命终结导致很多住宅供电系��无法继续使用，大大影响了那些本以为可以终身供电的房主对于系统的信心。


But it is not a complicated process to demonstrate how to extend a battery’s life to as much as ten years.	但向房主说明将电池寿命延长至十年的方法其实并不是复杂的过程。


Indeed, getting the most out of a battery may require only that its owner fully charges it at least once every two weeks and never discharges it to less than 50% capacity.	事实上，尽可能延长电池寿命只需所有者至少每两星期将电充满，并且永远不要放电超过50%。


In addition, our own research team is currently exploring ways to rejuvenate old solar or car batteries – without requiring any chemical treatment or disassembly – for re-use in a residential solar-power system.	此外，我们自己的研究团队目前正在探索如何不进行任何化学处理或拆解即可恢复老旧太阳能或汽车电池——用于住宅太阳能发电系统。


Once such technologies have been perfected, we can turn our attention to developing a boot-strap business model.	一旦这种技术得以完善，我们就可以集中开发自给自足的商业模式。


We believe that existing distribution, sales, and maintenance networks for other goods and services could be adapted to supply and provide customer support for solar-power systems as well.	我们相信可以对其他产品和服务的现有分销、销售和维护网络进行调整，令其为太阳能发电系统提供客户支持。


For example, bicycle mechanics, who are plentiful in Africa and rural India, or small shop and kiosk owners could be trained to install and maintain these systems.	比方说非洲和印度乡下都有不少自行车维修点、报摊和小商店，可以对店主进行培训，让他们学会安装并维护这些系统。


The combination of low-investment electricity generation for households and the ability to sell surpluses, scale up output, and access pre-existing distribution and maintenance networks bridges a crucial gap in the energy market.	低投资家庭发电、剩余电量出售、扩大产能和利用现有的分销及维修网络可以填补能源市场的重要空白。


It is a simple idea that would allow millions of people in poor, rural areas worldwide to integrate their activities with the wider economy, accumulate capital, and improve their lives.	这一简单理念能使世界各地成百上千万贫困的农村居民与全球经济接轨、积累资本并改善他们的生活。


What the West Owes Ukraine	西方欠乌克兰什么


WASHINGTON, DC – Ukraine may not be grabbing as many headlines now as it did a year ago, but the crisis there is far from over.	华盛顿—如今，乌克兰也许已不再如去年那样吸引如此多的眼球，但危机还远未结束。


The latest ceasefire agreement, concluded in Minsk in February, has contained, but not stopped, Russian military aggression.	2月达成的最新的明斯克停火协议遏制但并未停止俄罗斯的入侵行为。


And, though the stabilization program that Ukraine agreed with the International Monetary Fund last month is superior to last year’s deal – this one includes both more financing from the IMF and a more credible economic-reform plan from the government – it will be insufficient to repair the country’s economy.	此外，尽管上个月乌克兰与国际货币基金组织（IMF）达成一致的稳定计划比去年的协议更近了一步——新协议包括了IMF的融资和更加可信的乌克兰政府经济改革计划——但仍不足以修复乌克兰经济。


What Ukraine really needs is to escape the old Soviet order – and, for that, it needs the West’s help.	乌克兰真正需要的是摆脱旧的苏联秩序——而对于这一目标，它需要西方的帮助。


Ukraine never managed to recast its state after the Soviet Union’s collapse.	苏联解体后，乌克兰从未重建国家。


Instead, the old Soviet elites held onto power – and most of the country’s wealth – through corrupt practices that became entrenched in the country’s economy and political system.	相反，旧苏联精英通过根深蒂固于乌克兰经济和政治体系的腐败把持着权力——以及大部分财富。


Reforming both will be a major challenge – one that Ukraine’s leaders have lately committed themselves to meeting.	改革经济和政治将是一项艰巨挑战——乌克兰领导人最近承诺直面这一挑战。


Since February of last year, when the parliament voted then-President Viktor Yanukovych out of power by more than a two-thirds majority, Ukraine has held fresh elections for both institutions.	自去年2月议会以三分之二以上多数罢免时任总统亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）以来，乌克兰两大机构已经举行了新选举。


Hundreds of top officials have been replaced by young, Western-educated professionals, and the government is now working feverishly to implement deep and comprehensive reforms, including a new law on public procurement and a package of anti-corruption legislation.	数百高级官员被受西方教育的年轻专业人士和取代，政府如今正干劲十足地实施全面的深度改革，包括一部关于公共部门采购的法律和一系列反腐败立法。


Dozens of superfluous inspection agencies have been abolished, significantly reducing the regulatory burden.	数十家没有必要的监察机构被取消，大大降低了监管负担。


Just last month, President Petro Poroshenko sacked the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, the billionaire tycoon Igor Kolomoisky	上个月，总统波罗申科撤掉了第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克地区主席、亿万富翁伊格尔·科洛莫伊斯基（Igor Kolomoisky）。


More recently, the authorities have been working to reform the energy sector – a hub of corruption.	最近，当局一直在致力于能源部门改革。 能源部门是腐败重灾区。


On April 1, household gas prices were quadrupled, taking them to half the market price, with offsetting compensation provided to the poor.	4月1日，家庭天然气价格提高了四倍，达到了市场价格的一半，穷人可以获得抵价补贴。


And the parliament has enacted a law that harmonizes energy standards with those of the European Union, thereby delineating clearly the state’s role and opening the gas market to investors.	议会也实施了使能源标准与欧盟看齐的法律，从而廓清了政府的角色、将天燃气市场向投资者开放。


But Ukraine still has a long way to go.	但乌克兰仍有很长的路要走。


The good news is that the public largely understands and supports the government’s reform efforts.	好消息是公众大多理解并支持政府的改革措施。


The bad news is that Ukraine still faces considerable destabilizing threats – beginning with a renewed Russian military offensive.	坏消息是乌克兰面临着诸多破坏性威胁——如俄罗斯军事进攻卷土重来。


A Russian attack on, say, Mariupol, eastern Ukraine’s second-largest port (accounting for roughly one-third of the country’s exports), would devastate an economy that is already tanking.	俄罗斯对（比如）乌克兰东部第二大港口马里乌波尔（Mariupol，贡献了乌克兰出口的三分之一左右）的袭击将摧毁已然步履蹒跚的乌克兰经济。


Though several factors – including Western sanctions, a lack of public support for war in Ukraine, and the Russian economy’s rapid decline – should discourage the Kremlin from taking such a step, they may not be enough.	尽管诸多因素——包括西方制裁你、对乌战争缺乏公众支持，以及俄罗斯经济的快速衰落——应该让克里姆林宫不会采取这一举动，但也许还不够。


After all, Russia’s leaders have shown themselves to be unpredictable.	毕竟，俄罗斯领导人早已证明了自己的不可预测性。


Even absent further Russian aggression, Ukraine’s economic woes could prevent further progress on reform.	即使没有俄罗斯的进一步侵略，乌克兰经济换乱也可能阻挠进一步改革。


The economy contracted by 6.8% year on year in 2014, and output has plunged by 15% in each of the two last quarters.	2014年，乌克兰经济同比收缩6. 8%，过去两个季度同比产出均大降15%。


Moreover, at the end of February, with the country running low on reserves, Ukraine’s currency, the hryvnia, lost half its value; as a result, annualized inflation surged to 45% in March.	此外，2月底，由于储备减少，乌克兰货币格里夫尼亚价值跌去一半； 结果，3月份年化通胀率飙升至45%。


A full-scale financial meltdown was avoided only when the IMF provided an early disbursement that doubled Ukraine’s reserves, to $9.9 billion; by the end of the month, the exchange rate more or less recovered.	要不是IMF的首笔援助让乌克兰储备翻了一番，回到99亿美元按，全面金融崩溃已在所难免； 3月底，汇率总算有所恢复。


Nonetheless, the international financing that Ukraine has received, though invaluable, remains insufficient to support genuine recovery and reform.	尽管如此，乌克兰所收到的国际融资虽然重要，但仍不足以支持真正的复苏和改革。


The latest bailout program foresees about $40 billion in funding, nearly half of which will come from the IMF, over the next four years.	最新援助计划预计将在未来四年达到400亿美元左右，其中近一半将来自IMF。


That means that, this year, Ukraine will receive only $10 billion – not enough to enable the country to replenish its reserves and service its debts.	这意味着今年乌克兰只能收到100亿美元——不足以补充储备和维持债务。


Indeed, given Ukraine’s large bond debts, many of which will mature in the next two years, there is a $15.3 billion funding gap in the bailout package, which the IMF and Ukraine’s government hope to plug with a debt restructuring.	事实上，由于乌克兰有巨量债券债务将在未来两年内到期，援助计划还有153亿美元的资金缺口，IMF和乌克兰政府希望通过债务重组解决。


But, even if they succeed, Ukraine would need more funding than it is getting.	但是，即使它们成功，乌克兰仍需要比其所获得的更多的资金。


It needs more strategic support as well.	乌克兰还需要更多的战略支持。


European politicians’ overwhelming opposition to supplying Ukraine with defensive arms is difficult to fathom.	欧洲政客一边倒地反对向乌克��提供防御武装，这一态度令人难以琢磨。


Europe’s leaders claim that they want to avoid giving Russia reason to escalate its war on Ukraine.	欧洲领导人宣称他们是想避免给俄罗斯口实发动对乌战争。


But that is already happening, and Ukraine’s fight against Russia is, after all, a defense of core European values – and, indeed, of Europe itself.	但对乌战争已经发生了，并且乌克兰与俄罗斯的战斗归根结底是捍卫欧洲核心价值的战斗——事实上也是捍卫欧洲自身的战斗。


The EU flag has draped the caskets of Ukrainians killed in that fight.	在这场战斗中死去的乌克兰人棺木上都覆盖着欧盟旗帜。


Europe’s leaders argue that the central focus of their policy toward Ukraine must be to support its economic recovery.	欧洲领导人指出，他们的对乌政策的核心关注点必须放在支持其经济复苏上。


But here, too, Europe is doing too little, offering paltry credits of €1.8 billion ($1.9 billion) this year, when €10 billion would be more appropriate.	但在这方面欧洲做得也远远不够，今年只提供了微不足道的18亿欧元信贷，合理的数字应该在100亿欧元。


If the United States then met Europe halfway (at least), Ukraine’s financial crisis could finally be contained.	如果美国可以提供（至少）相当于欧洲的一半的援助，那么乌克兰金融危机最终可以遏制。


On April 28, Ukraine’s government will host a donor conference in Kyiv.	4月28日，乌克兰政府将在基辅举行援助者会议。


At a time when the country’s leaders and public are more committed than ever to combating corruption, building a welfare-creating economy, and becoming a normal liberal democracy, Europe should be eager to support it.	乌克兰领导人和乌克兰公众许下了前所未有的打击腐败、建设创造福祉的经济、成为正常自由民主国家的承诺，欧洲应该热情地支持他们。


It is time for Western politicians to remember their ideals – and stand up for them.	西方政客应该铭记他们的理想——并为它们而奋斗。


The Age of Financial Repression	金融抑制时代


TILBURG – Following his re-election, US President Barack Obama almost immediately turned his attention to reining in America’s rising national debt.	蒂尔堡—美国总统奥巴马获得连任后，几乎立刻将注意力转向了控制美国节节攀升的国民债务的问题。


In fact, almost all Western countries are implementing policies aimed at reducing – or at least arresting the growth of – the volume of public debt.	事实上，几乎所有西方国家都在实施旨在减少公债规模的政策，至少不能再让公债继续上升。


In their widely cited paper “Growth in a Time of Debt,” Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart argue that, when government debt exceeds 90% of GDP, countries suffer slower economic growth.	在他们广为引用的《债务时代的增长》（Growth in a Time of Debt）中，肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）和卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）指出，当政府债务突破GDP的90%时，国家就会遭受经济增长减速。


Many Western countries’ national debt is now dangerously near, and in some cases above, this critical threshold.	许多西方国家的国民债务距离这一门槛已相当接近，不少国家更是已经超出。


Indeed, according to the OECD, by the end of this year, America’s national debt/GDP ratio will climb to 108.6%.	事实上，根据经合组织的数据，到今年年底，美国国民债务/GDP比率将攀升至108. 6%。


Public debt in the eurozone stands at 99.1% of GDP, led by France, where the ratio is expected to reach 105.5%, and the United Kingdom, where it will reach 104.2%.	欧元区公债水平将达到GDP的99. 1%，其中法国的公债/GDP比率将达到105.


Even well disciplined Germany is expected to close in on the 90% threshold, at 88.5%.	2%。 即使最守纪律的德国预计也将逼近90%的门槛，达到88.


Countries can reduce their national debt by narrowing the budget deficit or achieving a primary surplus (the fiscal balance minus interest payments on outstanding debt).	各国可以通过降低预算赤字或实现基本盈余（财政余额减去存量债务的利息）降低国民债务水平。


This can be accomplished through tax increases, government-spending cuts, faster economic growth, or some combination of these components.	要达到这一目标，可以通过增税、削减政府支出、加快经济增长或以上三者的结合实现。


When the economy is growing, automatic stabilizers work their magic.	当经济开始增长时，自动稳定器就会发生魔力。


As more people work and earn more money, tax liabilities rise and eligibility for government benefits like unemployment insurance falls.	随着更多的人开始工作挣钱，纳税额会上升，申领失业救济等政府福利者会减少。


With higher revenues and lower payouts, the budget deficit diminishes.	收入增加和支出减少双管齐下，预算赤字就会开始降低。


But in times of slow economic growth, policymakers’ options are grim.	但在经济增长缓慢的时期，决策者的选择范围极其有限。


Increasing taxes is not only unpopular; it can be counter-productive, given already-high taxation in many countries.	增税不但会为民众所反对； 同时也不利于生产，因为许多国家的税负已经相当高了。


Public support for spending cuts is also difficult to win.	对支出削减的民众支持也很难胜出。


As a result, many Western policymakers are seeking alternative solutions – many of which can be classified as financial repression.	结果，许多西方决策者只能寻找替代方案——其中很多可以归类为金融抑制。


Financial repression occurs when governments take measures to channel to themselves funds that, in a deregulated market, would go elsewhere.	当政府采取措施将自由市场条件下会流向他处的资金引导到自己手中时，金融抑制就发生了。


For example, many governments have implemented regulations for banks and insurance companies that increase the amount of government debt that they own.	比如，许多政府实施了银行和保险公司监管，增加了后两者所持有的政府债务数量。


Consider the Basel III international banking standards.	考虑巴塞尔III国际银行标准。


Among other things, Basel III stipulates that banks do not have to set aside cash against their investments in government bonds with ratings of AA- or higher.	巴塞尔III规定银行不必为AA-及以上信用级别的政府债券投资拔备现金。


Moreover, investments in bonds issued by their home governments require no buffer, regardless of the rating.	此外，投资母国政府发行的债券也不要求缓冲资金，不管评级如何。


Meanwhile, Western central banks are using another kind of financial repression by maintaining negative real interest rates (yielding less than the rate of inflation), which enables them to service their debt for free.	与此同时，西方各大央行在使用另一种金融抑制——维持实际利率为负（收益率低于通胀率），这让它们能够免费地维持债务。 欧洲央行的政策利率维持在0.


The European Central Bank’s policy rate stands at 0.75%, while the eurozone’s annual inflation rate is 2.5%.	75%，而欧元区年通货膨胀率为2. 5%。


Likewise, the Bank of England keeps its policy rate at only 0.5%, despite an inflation rate that hovers above 2%.	类似地，英格兰银行政策利率只有0. 5%，而其通货膨胀率在2%以上。


And, in the United States, where inflation exceeds 2%, the Federal Reserve’s benchmark federal funds rate remains at an historic low of 0-0.25%.	在美国，通胀率也超过2%，而美联储的基准联邦基金利率仍维持在0—0. 15%的历史低点。


Moreover, given that the ECB, the Bank of England, and the Fed are venturing into capital markets – via quantitative easing (QE) in the US and the UK, and the ECB’s “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) program in the eurozone – long-term real interest rates are also negative (the real 30-year interest rate in the US is positive, but barely).	此外，由于欧洲央行、英格兰银行和美联储正在涉足资本市场——美国和英国以“量化宽松”（QE）的方式，欧元区的欧洲央行以“直接货币交易”（OMT）的方式——长期真实利率也呈现出负水平（美国30年期真实利率虽然为正，但比零高不了多少）。


Such tactics, in which banks are nudged, not coerced, into investing in government debt, constitute “soft” financial repression.	这些措施诱导而非强迫银行投资于政府债券，属于“软”金融抑制。


But governments can go beyond such methods, demanding that financial institutions maintain or increase their holdings of government debt, as the UK’s Financial Service Authority did in 2009.	但政府可以超越这些手段，要求金融机构维持或增持政府债务，2009年英国金融服务局便如此做过。


Similarly, in 2011, Spanish banks increased their lending to the government by almost 15%, even though private-sector lending contracted and the Spanish government became less creditworthy.	类似地，2011年，西班牙银行的政府贷款数量增加了将近15%，而与此同时，私人部门贷款量在减少，西班牙政府的信誉也在走下坡路。


A senior Italian banker once said that Italian banks would be hanged by the Ministry of Finance if they sold any of their government-debt holdings.	一位意大利银行业资深人士曾说，意大利银行会被财政部追杀，如果它们胆敢出售所持有的政府债务的话。


And a Portuguese banker declared that, while banks should reduce their exposure to risky government bonds, government pressure to buy more was overwhelming.	某葡萄牙银行家也说，尽管银行应该减少其高风险政府债务敞口，政府却在强迫他们买入更多。


In addition, in many countries, including France, Ireland, and Portugal, governments have raided pension funds in order to finance their budget deficits.	此外，在许多国家（包括法国、爱尔兰和葡萄牙），为了给财政赤字融资，政府还把手伸向了养老基金。


The UK is poised to take similar action, “allowing” local government pension funds to invest in infrastructure projects.	英国也即将采取类似措施，“允许”地方政府养老基金投资基础设施项目。


Direct or indirect monetary financing of budget deficits used to rank among the gravest sins that a central bank could commit.	曾几何时，直接或间接的货币融资被视为央行最大的犯罪之一。


QE and OMT are simply new incarnations of this old transgression.	QE和OMT无非是披着新衣的老罪行。


Such central-bank policies, together with Basel III, mean that financial repression will likely define the economic landscape for at least another decade.	这类央行政策与巴塞尔III一道，意味着金融抑制至少将在未来十年继续决定经济图景。


Westernize the Black Sea Region	黑海地区的西化


The bloody end to the schoolhouse hostage crisis in North Ossetia, and recent clashes in Georgia between government troops and separatist forces, have put the troubled Black Sea region on the front pages of newspapers once again.	北奥塞梯校园人质事件的血腥结尾和格鲁吉亚政府军及分离武装不久前发生的冲突使本来就麻烦不断的黑海地区再次登上了各大报章的头版。


This rising violence is also a wake-up call for the West, highlighting the need for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy in a vitally important region that lies at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East.	日益严重的暴力也呼唤着西方的觉醒，也再次告诉我们建立新的欧洲－大西洋战略关系有多么必要。 黑海地区地处欧洲、欧亚大陆和中东地区的交叉地带，其战略位置的重要性无需讳言。


Indeed, the Black Sea region is the Euro-Atlantic community's eastern frontier with the wider Middle East.	实际上，黑海地区与幅员辽阔的中东地区接壤，构成了欧洲－大西洋共同体的东侧边境线。


With Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran topping the list of strategic challenges facing the West, anchoring democracy and security in these new borderlands of the Euro-Atlantic community has become imperative for both the United States and the EU.	由于西方目前最严峻的挑战来自阿富汗、伊拉克和伊朗等中东国家，因此对欧盟和美国来讲，在欧洲－大西洋共同体的新边界实现民主与安全确实刻不容缓。


Moreover, success here can provide lessons in how to facilitate the daunting process of reform and modernization in the wider Middle East.	另外，这里的成功还可以积累经验，从而推动中东地区令人生畏的改革和现代化进程。


Georgia's "Rose Revolution" last winter demonstrated that the will to implement radical reform now exists.	时至今日，推行极端改革的意愿依然存在，这从去年冬天发生在格鲁吉亚的"玫瑰革命"中可见一斑。


For the first time, a country in the region is matching its aspirations with the concrete steps needed to become a viable candidate for eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions.	有史以来第一次，该地区的国家制定了加入欧洲－大西洋共同体的具体实施计划。


A visitor to Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, now sees the same level of determination to join the West that existed a decade ago in the Baltic states.	如果去格鲁吉亚首都第比利斯看一看，就可以感受到他们加入西方共同体的坚定决心与10年前的波罗的海诸国几乎没什么两样。


America and Europe share an interest in the success of these efforts, particularly as they seek to diversify energy supplies away from Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil.	如果努力成功，美国和欧洲都会从中受益，尤其是他们都希望从沙特阿拉伯和波斯湾以外获取石油资源。


The Black Sea is poised to become a key conduit for non-OPEC, non-Gulf oil and natural gas flowing into European markets and beyond.	黑海注定会成为欧佩克和海湾以外原油和天然气流入欧洲市场的重要渠道。


The Black Sea region's long-term stability and integration with the West is thus critically important to the long-term energy security strategy of EU and NATO members.	也正因如此，黑海地区实现长期稳定和与西方的融合对欧盟和北约各国的长期能源安全战略将产生至关重要的影响。


Anchoring these countries to the West will not be easy.	把这些国家纳入西方的体系并不简单。


Whether the end result is better relations or full integration of these countries into the EU and NATO is an open question.	最终结果到底是改善关系还是加入欧盟或北约还不得而知。


But both organizations need to reach out to these countries, a process that should be seen as the next phase in completing the wider Europe.	但欧盟和北约必须对黑海国家伸出双手，这是实现大欧洲计划下一阶段必不可少的一个过程。


What should a new bold yet realistic EU and NATO outreach strategy for the Black Sea region look like?	对欧盟和北约的黑海扩张大胆却又现实的估计是什么？


Clearly, the region's countries are weaker and further behind previous candidates for Western integration.	显而易见，该地区国家国力较弱，比起从前融入西方社会的国家也是如此。


But the good news is that the EU and NATO are much better positioned to develop an ambitious strategy than they were vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe a decade ago.	但有利的一面是，与10年前吸纳中东欧国家入盟时相比，欧盟和北约能够更好地执行扩张的宏图大略。


If the EU and NATO decide to launch a bold outreach strategy for the region, they will be able to draw on existing tools, conceptual talent, and practical experience.	如果欧盟和北约决意采用大胆地扩张战略，他们将可以利用现有的工具、理念和实践经验。


For example, NATO already has three members - Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey - bordering the Black Sea.	举例来讲，北约已经有保加利亚、罗马尼亚和土耳其三个成员国临近黑海。


As for the EU, the candidacies of Romania and Bulgaria need to be concluded successfully, together with the issue of Turkey's membership aspirations.	而对欧盟来讲，先要成功解决罗马尼亚和保加利亚的资格问题，然后才谈得上土耳其。


An EU that includes Sofia and Bucharest, and that is on track with Ankara, will be well positioned to engage the wider region.	吸纳了索非亚和布加勒斯特之后，安卡拉会谈如果再走上正轨，欧盟就能为进一步扩张获取足够的资本。


The EU also needs to put meat on the bones of its new Neighborhood Policy, while NATO must apply new mechanisms for strengthening ties with the region.	欧盟还要进一步细化新的睦邻政策，而北约则要采纳与该地区加强关系的新机制。


As opposed to a 100- or 200-meter sprint, both organizations need to think more in terms of a much longer race, perhaps a marathon.	对两个组织来讲，这都不是什么100或200米短跑，而需要付出长期、甚至是马拉松般的努力。


If countries in the region embrace the idea, a network of current EU and NATO members could step forward with projects and assistance aimed at promoting a Black Sea identity and community.	如果上述想法能够为该地区各国所接受，那么现有的欧盟和北约成员国就可以开始进一步合作，以推动成立黑海国家共同体。


Recent events in Georgia remind us that resolving the region's "frozen conflicts"- i.e., those in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, of Transdneistria in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan - must be a priority.	最近发生在格鲁吉亚的事件提醒我们：必须先铲除该地区"根深蒂固的矛盾"－也就是南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹、摩尔多瓦托斯德尼查、阿塞拜疆纳哥诺-卡拉巴赫的分离主义势力。


In reality, these conflicts are not frozen; they are festering wounds that breed corruption and organized crime.	事实上，这些冲突不仅没有被"冻结"，还像伤口一样迅速溃烂，成了滋生腐败和有组织犯罪的温床。


They inhibit democratization and incite instability.	它们制约了民主，引发了动荡。


While these conflicts involve historical grievances, outside actors - particularly Russia - contribute to their lack of resolution, which is essential for successful reform.	因为这些冲突牵扯到很多历史问题，外来势力－特别是俄国的介入－使它们的解决难上加难，但解决这些遗留问题却是改革成功不可缺少的前提。


So far, neither America nor Europe has made these conflicts a top priority.	到目前为止，美国和欧洲都还没有把化解冲突列为今后工作的重点。


Resolving these semi-dormant wars requires stepped-up political involvement, economic engagement, and a willingness to provide Western peacekeeping forces and monitors if and when they are needed.	我们需要在政治上更多介入、在经济上更多支持和在必要时派出西方维和部队进行监管，才能使这场处于半休眠状态的战争消弭于无形。


But the long-term peace and stability needed to advance economic and political reform in the region will also require either a change in Russian behavior or a reduction in Russian influence.	但推动该地区经济和政治改革所需的长期的和平与稳定还需要改变俄国的行为方式、或削弱俄国的影响。


The experience of the last decade suggests that a policy of engaging the Kremlin intensely while protecting fundamental Western interests may be the best way to proceed.	10年前的经验表明：在与克里姆林宫密切合作的同时保护西方的根本利益，也许是继往开来的最佳途径。


Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region must start with the democracies of North America and Europe recognizing their moral and political stake in the outcome.	要想制定黑海地区新的欧洲－大西洋战略，北美和欧洲必须先认可黑海诸国的道德和政治权益。


Projecting stability and security in these countries is the next logical step in building a Europe "whole and free" and securing the Euro-Atlantic community's eastern frontier with the Middle East.	下一步是预先规划好地区的安全和稳定，然后再建设一个"完整自由"的欧洲，确保欧洲－大西洋共同体与中东边界线的安全。


This task will be as important over the next decade as integrating Central and Eastern Europe into the West was in the 1990's.	今后10年内这项任务的意义绝不亚于20世纪90年代中东欧国家与西方的融合。


The Despotic Temptation	专制的诱惑


MADRID – US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, when asked about American support for the notorious Nicaraguan despot Anastasio Somoza, purportedly replied, “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”	马德里——据称美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福在被问及美国是否支持臭名昭著的尼加拉瓜暴君索莫查时回答说，“他或许是个恶棍，但却是我们的恶棍。


Whether or not the quip is apocryphal, it sums up a longstanding Western approach to much of the world – and one that underpinned US foreign policy throughout the Cold War.	”无论杜撰与否，这则轶事都准确地总结了西方国家对世界的态度——上述态度奠定了冷战时期美国外交政策的基础。


But lately an even more troubling sentiment seems to have emerged, with Western leaders willing to settle not for “our son of a bitch,” but for just about any son of a bitch who can impose stability, whatever the cost.	但近来出现了一种更令人不安的情绪，即西方领导人不仅满足于“我们的恶棍”，而且满足于任何能稳定局势的恶棍，而不管会因此付出多大的代价。


It is an alluring but dangerous mindset.	这是一种颇具诱惑力但却危险的心态。


Experience should have pushed Western leaders in the opposite direction.	经验本该推动西方领导人走向相反的方向。


After all, as time passed, the ostensibly pragmatic clientelism of the Cold War proved far from ideal.	毕竟，随着时间的推移，事实证明貌似务实的冷战庇护主义其实远远不够理想。


Indeed, in many cases – the Shah of Iran, Cambodia’s Lon Nol, Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Mobutu Sese Seko, to name a few – it led to long-term insecurity and disorder.	事实上，在很多情况下——比如伊朗国王，柬埔寨的朗诺，智利的奥古斯托·皮诺切特和刚果民主共和国的蒙博托——冷战庇护主义都造成了长期动荡和混乱的后果。


But these are desperate times.	但现在是绝望的时刻。


Unable to contain the violence, suffering, and chaos engulfing the Middle East and North Africa – the consequences of which are increasingly being felt in Europe – Western leaders are falling back into the Cold War trap.	因为无法遏制席卷中东和北非的暴力、痛苦和混乱——欧盟能越来越明显地感觉到上述后果——西方领导人正再度陷入冷战陷阱之中。


All they want is for someone – and now virtually anyone – to enforce order.	他们只希望有人——现在几乎是任何人——来稳定秩序。


This desperation is perhaps most apparent in Syria.	这种绝望也许在叙利亚最为显著。


After years of insisting that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was the problem, a growing number of Western policymakers and strategists are now suggesting that he may actually be part of the solution – or at least the transition.	西方多年来一直坚持叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德是问题所在，但现在却有越来越多的西方决策者和战略家将其视为解决方案——或至少是过渡方案的组成部分。


Last month, German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted the necessity of including Assad in talks about Syria’s future.	上个月，德国总理默克尔强调必须让阿萨德参与叙利亚未来谈判。


Likewise, both US Secretary of State John Kerry and British Prime Minister David Cameron now concede a role for Assad in a hypothetical transition.	同样，美国国务卿克里和英国首相卡梅伦现在承认阿萨德要在假设的过渡中扮演一定的角色。


Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy went so far as to say that the world had to “count on” Assad in the fight against the Islamic State.	西班牙首相拉霍伊甚至表示世界必须“依靠”阿萨德打击伊斯兰国。


Whether driven by realism or resignation, this shift reflects a distinct desire for stability – a desire that is reinforced, especially in Europe, by the presence of another governance black hole in Libya.	无论出于现实主义还是心灰意冷，上述转变都反映了一种对稳定的渴望：尤其在欧洲，利比亚的另一个治理黑洞强化了这种愿望。


The same desire has already driven the West to support Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt – despite its dubious origins and continuing repression – with only the slightest of pressure for reform.	同样的愿望已推动西方支持埃及的塞西政权——西方仅对其施加了轻微的改革压力，尽管该政权来源可疑且持续镇压民众。


When confronted with anarchy, this eagerness to secure stability by whatever means necessary is understandable.	面对无政府状态时，这种不惜采取任何必要手段确保稳定的急切愿望是可以理解的。


But it is a slippery slope.	但这是个危险的斜坡。


And, in fact, it is based on a false dichotomy between autocracy and instability.	而且实际上基于专制和动荡错误的二分法。


Of course, autocratic figures like Russian President Vladimir Putin have a strong interest in promoting this dichotomy.	当然，像俄罗斯总统普京这样的专制人物对推动这样的二分法兴趣浓厚。


As the Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev recently noted, Putin – a long-time ally of Assad – is doing his best to promote the idea that Western efforts to promote good governance lead only to volatility.	保加利亚政治分析家克拉斯杰夫最近指出，阿萨德的长期盟友普京正竭力宣传西方促进良好治理的努力所换来只有动荡。


“Rather than bringing about reforms,” Putin declared in a recent address to the UN General Assembly, “aggressive foreign interference has resulted in…violence, poverty, and social disaster.”	普京在面向联合国大会的最近一次讲话中说，“激进的外交干预不仅没能带来改革，反而引发了暴力、贫困和社会灾难。


A strong Assad-led government, the logic goes, would have the opposite effect – a point that Russia is now trying to prove on the ground in Syria.	”俄国试图在叙利亚战场上证明，按照这样的逻辑，阿萨德领导的强势政府能够带来相反的效果。


However compelling this idea might be, and however weary the West feels, the reality, demonstrated starkly during the Cold War and its bloody aftermath, is that tyranny is never genuinely stable – certainly not in the long run.	无论这种想法看似多么可信，也无论西方如何感到疲惫，冷战及其血腥后果所展示的赤裸裸的现实是从长期来看，专制从来不可能带来真正稳定的结果。


The desire for human dignity and respect – the cornerstones of good governance – cannot be quelled, especially at a time when people have unprecedented access to information through the Internet and mobile technologies.	特别是在人们前所未有地通过互联网和移动技术了解信息的当下，人类对尊严和尊重的渴望——也是善政的基础——根本不可能被压制住。


So good governance is the key to long-term stability.	因此善政是长期稳定的关键。


But, like stability, good governance cannot be imposed from the outside; rather, it must develop organically, supported by sturdy roots within a society.	但善政和稳定一样无法从外部强加； 而是必须从内部滋长，在国内社会树立牢固的根源。


This does not mean that there is nothing Western governments can do.	这并不是说西方政府无事可做。


On the contrary, by helping to cultivate a strong civil society at the local and national levels, external forces can play an important role in creating a strong foundation for good governance in crisis-stricken countries.	相反，外部力量可以通过在地方和国家层面上协助培育强大的民间机构，从而在危机国家创建牢固的善政基础方面发挥重要作用。


The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet – the group of civil-society organizations that was awarded this year’s Nobel Peace Prize for its “decisive contribution” to democracy after the country’s 2011 revolution – has shown just how effective a strong civil society can be in supporting stability.	2011年突尼斯革命后因对民主做出“决定性贡献”而被授予今年诺贝尔和平奖的民间组织突尼斯全国对话四方机构已经向世人证明强大的民间组织可以如何有效地支持稳定工作。


To make a real difference in stabilizing today’s most tumultuous regions, the international community should hold Tunisia up as a model (and remain committed to ensuring that it continues on the path toward stable democracy), rather than falling prey to Putin’s cautionary fables about Syria and Libya.	要想在稳定当前最动荡地区的工作中真正发挥作用，国际社会应该将突尼斯引为榜样（并确保其沿着稳定的民主道路继续前进），而不是成为继普京叙利亚和利比亚警世寓言之后的又一个牺牲者。


Unfortunately, Western leaders have repeatedly shown that they lack the patience and dedication needed to engage consistently and humbly with communities in crisis-stricken countries or to provide the reliable, incremental, and prolonged governance assistance needed to prevent state collapse.	不幸的是，西方领导人一再证明他们缺乏怀着谦逊之心与危机国家社会持续接触的耐心和奉献精神，也无力提供防止国家崩溃所需的可靠、渐进和长期的治理援助。


With their short attention spans and heightened sense of their own importance, they prefer the option of simply installing a despot to deal with it.	因为西方自视甚高且集中注意力的时间非常有限，他们更愿意扶植独裁者完成治理国家的任务。


They need to get over themselves – for everyone’s sake.	为了所有人的利益，他们必须克服自己的短处。


The Politics of Islamophobia	伊斯兰恐惧症的政治学


NEW YORK – There are many roads to political disaster: greed, hubris, the charisma of the demagogue, and, perhaps most dangerous of all, fear.	纽约—可谓条条大路通政治灾难：贪婪、狂妄、魅力超凡又蛊惑人心的政客，但也许最危险的是恐惧。


When people panic, they can become hysterical, and hysteria often leads to mass violence.	当人们开始恐慌时，他们会变得歇斯底里，而歇斯底里常常导致群体暴力。


When politicians convince people that they are in a life-or-death battle – that survival is a matter of “us or them” – anything becomes possible.	当政客让人们相信，他们到了“最危险的时候”——生存成为一件“我们还是他们”的事——任何事情都可能发生。


Adolf Hitler combined all the elements of political catastrophe: hubris, charisma, greed, and the idea that “Aryans” and Jews were locked in a struggle for survival.	希特勒就集中了所有政治灾难的要素：狂妄、魅力超凡、贪婪，以及“雅利安人”和犹太人已经进入你死我亡的生存斗争状态的概念。


Of course, none of the demagogues in the West today – from Donald Trump in the United States to Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders in Europe – are comparable to Hitler.	当然，如今，蛊惑人心的西方政客——从美国的唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）到欧洲的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）或吉尔特·怀德斯（Geert Wilders）——都无法与希特勒相提并论。


None has promoted dictatorship, let alone mass murder.	没有一个人宣扬独裁，更不用说大屠杀了。


But they are definitely stirring up the politics of fear.	但他们显然都在煽动恐慌政治。


Trump, for one, also promotes greed, openly boasting of his wealth, and has somehow refined outlandish hubris and contradictory posturing into a bizarre form of charisma.	其中，特朗普也在煽动贪婪，公开炫耀他的财富，并将古怪的狂妄和矛盾的姿态融合为一种奇异的魅力。


On the one hand, he promises to fix all the world’s problems, and to show China, Russia, the Islamic State, or anyone else who is boss.	一方面，他承诺要解决世界上所有问题，让中国、俄罗斯、伊斯兰国和其他所有人知道谁才是“老板”。


On the other hand, he claims that his vast and powerful country cannot take in desperate refugees from Syria, because, he warns, Muslim asylum-seekers might stage “one of the great military coups of all time.”	另一方面，他宣称他的广袤而强大的祖国不能接受绝望的叙利亚难民，因为，他警告说，寻求庇护的穆斯林可能“在酝酿有史以来最大的军事政变”。


Trump’s Republican colleagues in the race for the US presidency, such as Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Marco Rubio, stoke similar fears about refugees.	特朗普的共和党美国总统竞选对手同志——如泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）、本·卡尔森（Ben Carson）和马克·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）——也在煽动类似的难民恐惧。


Cruz, as well as the supposedly more moderate Jeb Bush, even suggested that only Christians should be allowed into the US.	科鲁兹，以及理应更加温和的杰布·布什，甚至建议美国只允许基督徒进入。


More than 10,000 people are killed every year by gun violence in the US – all but a handful for reasons having nothing to do with Islam.	在美国，每年有10,000多人死于枪支暴力——其中只有极少数与伊斯兰教有关。


And yet all of the Republican candidates are proud of opposing gun-control measures; indeed, they have no problem allowing people to enter a school or a bar bearing concealed weapons.	但所有共和党候选人都以反对枪支管制措施为豪； 事实上，对于允许人们深藏武器进入学校或酒吧，他们一点问题都没有。


But even a relative handful of Muslim refugees is too dangerous to contemplate.	但一小撮穆斯林难民对他们来说却过于危险，根本不予考虑。


This is not to say that terrible acts of Islamist terror could not happen in the US, or elsewhere.	这并不是说美国或其他地区不可能发生伊斯兰恐怖袭击。


They have, and there probably will be more of them, so long as the Middle East remains in turmoil and revolutionary Islam appeals to disaffected Western youth.	这种袭击早已发生过，并且未来也许还会更多，如果中东继续动荡、伊斯兰革命继续吸引心怀不满的西方青年的话。


But it is hardly an existential threat.	但这绝非生存威胁。


An American friend of mine speculated that, “We might be one terrorist act away from a Trump presidency.”	我的一位美国朋友猜测，“我们距离特朗普当总统大概也就相差一次恐怖行动。


A spectacular murder spree by Islamists could spook Americans enough to vote for the greatest fear-monger.	”如果伊斯兰教徒进行一次大凶杀，便可能让吓坏了的美国人选出散播恐惧最力的候选人。


Anything is possible, but I don’t believe American voters would be that stupid.	一切都有可能，但我不相信美国选民有那么蠢。


The greater danger is, however, that the demagogues will drive even mainstream politicians into their camp.	但是，更大的危险是蛊惑人心的政客甚至会导致主流政客加入他们的阵营。


Since the November 13 terror attacks in Paris, François Hollande, the unpopular but altogether sensible French president, has been so afraid of being labeled a weakling by politicians of the right and far right that he has declared a national state of emergency – and war on the Islamic State (ISIS).	11月13日巴黎恐怖袭击以来，尽管支持率不高但十分明智的法国总统奥朗德生怕被右翼和极右翼政客贴上怯懦的标签，宣布法国进入紧急状态，并向伊斯兰国宣战。


As long as France’s state of emergency lasts, police may arrest people without warrants, break down the doors of private residences in the middle of the night, take over restaurants and other public places with armed force, and generally behave like agents in a police state.	只要法国保持紧急状态，警察就可以不经许可抓人，可以半夜破门进入私宅，可以动用武力搜查餐厅和其他公共场所，可以像警察国家的特工那样行动。


Most French citizens are now so frightened of Islamist attacks that such measures are widely supported.	目前，大部分法国公民因为伊斯兰袭击而胆战心惊，因此这些措施受到了广泛支持。


But they are almost certainly counter-productive.	但它们几乎肯定将适得其反。


A national leader can declare war on a state, not on a network of revolutionaries.	国家领导人可以对一个国家宣战，但无法向一个革命者网络宣战。


ISIS, despite its claims, is not a state, and Hollande should not treat it as one.	伊斯兰国不是一个国家（尽管它自称是一个国家），奥朗德也不应该把它当一个国家对待。


Besides, even if bombing ISIS strongholds in Iraq or Syria makes military sense, it won’t break the spell of Islamist revolution for frustrated, bored, and marginalized young people in French slums.	此外，尽管轰炸伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国据点有军事上���意义，但并不能摧毁伊斯兰革命对法国贫民窟的沮丧、无聊和边缘化青年的吸引力。


On the contrary: The canny leaders of ISIS also rely on an apocalyptic “us or them” view of the world.	情况正好相反：伊斯兰国的精明领导人也依靠启示录式的“我们或他们”世界观。


Most Muslims are not violent revolutionaries who condone, let alone admire, mass violence.	大部分穆斯林都不是容忍甚至崇尚群众暴力的暴力革命者。


ISIS seeks to broaden its support, especially among young Muslims, by convincing them that true Muslims are in an existential war with the West – that the infidels are their mortal enemies. For them no less than for Trump, fear is the most powerful weapon.	伊斯兰国试图通过让他们相信真正的穆斯林正在与西方进行一场生存战争、异教徒就是他们的死敌来扩大其支持面，特别是年轻穆斯林中的支持面。


So the more a Western government allows its policemen to humiliate and bully Muslims in the name of security, the more ISIS is likely to win European recruits.	因此，更多西方政府允许警察以安全名义羞辱和迫害穆斯林，伊斯兰国就越容易在欧洲招到人手。


The only way to combat revolutionary Islamist violence is to gain the trust of law-abiding Muslims in the West.	打击革命伊斯兰暴力的唯一办法是赢得西方守法穆斯林的信任。


This will not be easy, but arbitrary arrests are surely the wrong way to go about it.	这绝非易事，但肆意逮捕显然是错误的方法。


Likewise, when it comes to civil wars in the Middle East, Western restraint is usually a better strategy than hasty military intervention driven by domestic fear.	类似地，对于中东内战，西方的约束常常是比出于国内恐惧而进行仓促的军事干预更好的策略。


Republican candidates in the US are already using the recent murder spree in Paris to blame President Barack Obama, and by extension any future Democratic candidate, for being weak.	美国共和党候选人已开始利用最近的巴黎大谋杀指责总统奥巴马——并将指责对象扩大到所有未来民主党候选人——表现软弱。


Trump has promised to “bomb the shit out of ISIS.”	特朗普承诺要“把伊斯兰国炸出屎来”。


This bellicosity has had the effect of pushing Hillary Clinton, the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination, into distancing herself from Obama.	如此好斗的结果是让在民主党候选人提名竞争中领先的希拉里·克林顿与奥巴马撇清界线。


Like Hollande, she has to assuage public fear by talking tough and promising more military action.	和奥朗德一样，她必须通过强硬表态和承诺增加军事行动平息公共恐慌。


Obama has consistently resisted the temptation to unleash more wars.	奥巴马一直在抵制发动更多战争的诱惑。


His policies have sometimes been inconsistent and irresolute.	他的政策有时前后矛盾、犹豫不决。


But in his refusal to give in to panic and act rashly, he has been far braver than all the big talkers who accuse him of being a wimp.	但他拒绝屈服于恐慌、轻率行事，在这一点上，他比指责他是懦夫的“嘴炮”更加勇敢。


What About the World?	把世界晾在一边了吗？


As America’s primaries move beyond Iowa and New Hampshire, it is simply impossible to predict who will be the Democratic and Republican nominees, much less who will become the 44th president of the United States.	尽管美国已经完成了在艾奥瓦州和新罕布尔什州的预选，但是现在还很难预测谁将被民主党和共和党提名为候选人，更别说谁将成为美国的第44任总统了。


But it is not too soon to address the question of what effect US foreign policy is having on the campaign and what it reveals about how Americans see the world.	但是现在来讨论美国的外交政策将对竞选活动产生怎样的影响以及它显示了美国人是如何看待世界的问题却并不嫌早。


To the surprise of many seasoned observers, foreign policy is having only a modest impact on voters.	令许多老资格的观察家感到惊讶的是，外交政策只对选民产生了很小的影响。


This is unexpected, because only six months ago the war in Iraq dominated the political landscape.	这是大家所没有预料到的，因为仅仅是在六个月前关于在伊拉克的战争的争论还一直是政治上的热点。


Although Iraq still matters a lot to Americans, its importance for determining how they vote has receded, partly because US casualties there are markedly down as the security situation appears to be gradually improving.	尽管伊拉克问题对于美国人来说依然还是一个重要问题，它在决定他们把票投给谁的问题上的重要性却大大减弱了，这部分是因为美国在那儿的伤亡情况随着安全状况的逐步好转已经大大减少了。


As a result, there is considerably less public pressure to do something dramatically different.	其结果是，公众要求做出一些引人注目的不同的举动的压力大大减弱了。


Foreign policy has also become less salient than it was only months ago as the chance of war between the US and Iran has diminished, following the recently published National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program.	外交政策问题没有几个月以前那么突出的另一个原因是随着国家情报评估机构最近有关伊朗核计划报告的出台，美国和伊朗爆发战争的可能性已经减少了。


The judgment by America’s intelligence community that Iran has suspended its nuclear weapon development program – and, more importantly, that its large-scale uranium enrichment capacity is likely years away – postpones the day when a US president may have to decide between living with or attacking a nuclear Iran.	根据美国情报部门的判断，伊朗已经搁置了它的核武器开发计划，并且，更重要的是，它大规模浓缩铀的能力似乎还要花很多年才能实现，这也使得某位美国总统必须对与一个拥有核武器的伊朗相处还是发起攻击做出决定的日期被大大延后了。


A third reason for the modest impact of international issues on voters’ choice of the next president is another surprising development: more agreement between and among the leading candidates than meets the eye.	国际问题对于选民选择下一任总统的决定影响不太大的第三个原因是事态另一个惊人的发展：就是居于领先的候选人在许多问题上的观点有很大的相似之处。


There is something of a consensus, for example, emerging around the notion that the US should remain in Iraq for some time to come, albeit with a reduced level of military forces.	比如说，大家对美军应该在伊拉克停留相当长一段时间有某种共识，尽管他们对于应该削减多少兵力意见也许不尽一致。


There is also widespread acknowledgement that the US must do more both at home and diplomatically to address global climate change; that the US must work with its European allies to prevent Afghanistan from slipping back into anarchy; and that the US must take the strongest possible stand against terrorism and those who would support it in any way.  No major candidate is advocating anything remotely resembling isolationism.	另外大家对于美国为应对全球气候变化问题而应该在国内和国外做出更大的努力、美国必须与它的欧洲盟友一道防止阿富汗滑向无政府状态以及美国采取最强硬的手段对抗恐怖主义以及以任何方式支持恐怖主义的人也有广泛的共识。 另外也没有哪个主要的候选人提出任何哪怕是与孤立主义沾一点边的主张。


Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the deterioration of America’s economy is now overshadowing foreign policy.	最后，但也许是最重要的，人们对美国经济低迷的担忧现在盖过了对外交政策的关心。


The greatest crisis facing many Americans is their increasing inability to meet their monthly mortgage payments.	许多美国人现在所面临的最大危机是他们越来越无力支付每月的房屋按揭。


Recession, job loss, and expensive oil, not war, is what Americans fear most for 2008.	经济衰退、失业以及越来越昂贵的油价而不是战争是美国人在2008年最担心的问题。


This is not to suggest that foreign policy is absent from the campaign.	这并不是说竞选活动不会涉及到外交政策问题。


Along with the economy, a dominant issue on the political agenda – and one that has affected Republican politics in particular – is immigration.	除开经济问题，在政治议程上的一个主要问题，也是对共和党的政治家影响最大的问题是移民问题。


There is growing opposition to illegal entry, but no consensus about what to do about those who have been in the country illegally for years or those who want to come to the US in the future.	公众对于非法入境问题的抗议声越来越大，但是对怎样处理那些已经在国内非法居住了数年或者未来想要到美国来的那些人并没有达成一致的意见。


It is also possible to see in the politics of both parties mounting concern about globalization.	我们还有可能看到两党的政治家都越来越关注全球化问题。


With tougher economic times inevitably come tougher positions toward foreign competition and outsourcing.	随着经济形势越来越严峻，公众对于外国竞争和外包问题的态度也会变得越来越强硬。


There may also be latent concern about foreign policy in the attention being given to the quantity and quality of candidates’ relevant experience.	在大家关注候选人相关经验的数量和质量时，也可能会潜在涉及到外交政策问题。


A desire for “change” is a common refrain of the American debate, but it is far from the only one.	对“变革”的渴望已经成为美国辩论中最常引用的一个词语，但是这远远不是人们唯一关心的问题。


Renewed interest in foreign policy and the rest of the world could surface if there were a dramatic overseas development.	如果外部形势出现某些戏剧性的发展，大家可能会重新燃起对外交政策和外部世界的兴趣。


We saw this a few weeks ago, when former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated.	几周前当巴基斯坦前总理贝·布托遇刺身亡时我们就看到了这样的情况。


Democratic and Republican candidates alike were called upon to explain what they would be prepared to do if there were an opportunity to capture Osama Bin Laden or a need to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.	民主党和共和党的候选人都被要求解释如果他们遇到有机会抓住本·拉登或者需要保护巴基斯坦的核武器时他们准备如何应对。


Likewise, Iraq could return to center stage if the positive momentum of recent months were suddenly reversed, perhaps following a new outbreak of violence between the country’s Sunnis and Shia.	同样地，如果近几个月伊拉克好转的形势发生突然的倒转，比如这个国家的逊尼派和什叶派爆发新一轮的暴力冲突，那么伊拉克问题就会重新回到人们视野的中心。


The US and Iran could go to war not over nuclear issues but because of reckless behavior by the Revolutionary Guards (as occurred recently in the Strait of Hormuz), with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad possibly seeking to provoke a crisis in order to distract domestic attention from his economic failures.	美国和伊朗也许会走向战争，不是因为核问题，而是因为国民卫队的鲁莽行为（就像最近在霍尔姆兹湾发生的事件），以及伊朗总统内贾德可能会寻求挑起危机以分散国内对于他在经济问题上的失败的注意力。


Order in Pakistan could break down irretrievably.	巴基斯坦国内的秩序可能会遭到无法挽回的破坏。


A terrorist attack could remind Americans of their fundamental vulnerability.	一次恐怖袭击可能会提醒美国人他们在本质上的脆弱性。


The possibilities are endless.	这里存在着种种的可能性。


America’s next president will face a host of pressing and difficult foreign policy challenges – and how he or she responds will affect not only the US, but the entire world.	美国的下一任总统将会面临一系列紧迫并且艰难的外交政策上的挑战，而他或她对此将如何回应将不仅会影响美国，而且会影响整个世界。


In the meantime, though, foreign policy will have only an indirect influence on Americans’ choice.	不过，与此同时外交政策对于美国人的选择只会产生某些间接的影响。


What Are Homebuyers Thinking?	购房者在想什么？


Many places around the world have been in a housing boom since the late 1990’s.	从20世纪90年代末开始，世界很多地方的住宅市场都一派繁荣。


As I argued last year, in the second edition of my book Irrational Exuberance , the boom is rooted in speculative investment by ordinary homebuyers, fueled substantially by the worldwide perception that capitalism has triumphed, and that all people must look out for themselves by acquiring property.	正如去年我在拙作《非理性繁荣》第二版中所提到的那样，这种繁荣的根源在于普通购房者的投机性买入，而认为资本主义已经在全球范围内获胜，所有人都必须购进财产的普遍看法在很大程度上起了推波助澜的作用。


Convinced that private ownership has become essential to smart living, buyers bid up home prices.	购房者坚信私有制已经成为明智生活不可或缺的组成部分，他们相互竞价，房价也跟着水涨船高。


Moreover, the fear that one must get in on the boom before it is too late often drives people to bid up home prices faster now.	不仅如此，在无论如何要赶上这波繁荣浪潮，否则将追悔莫及的恐惧驱使下，人们更加不遗余力的抬高房价。


This certainly seems to be the market psychology in China and India, where rapidly rising incomes and newly successful people are widely expected to put pressure on markets for land, real estate, and construction materials.	中国和印度无疑受到这种市场心理的左右，人们普遍认为那里快速增长的收入和飞黄腾达的新贵给土地、房地产和建筑材料市场带来了很大压力。


Real estate booms have been going on in these countries’ major cities for years.	房地产繁荣已经在这些国家的主要城市上演了数年之久。


In China, despite some signs of weakness – the Shanghai market is down, for example – price growth is still robust in much of the country.	尽管中国的房地产市场已经出现了转弱的迹象¾比如上海的房价就在下跌¾但绝大多数城市的房价上涨仍然风头正劲。


But the boom generated by such beliefs cannot go on forever, because prices can’t go up forever, and there are already signs of a hard landing.	但这种心理所造就的繁荣不可能永远继续下去，因为价格不可能永远上涨，而且已经出现了硬着陆的迹象。


In the United States, newspapers and magazines are trumpeting reports in the last few months that the decade-long boom in home prices may be at an end, and that the bubble may be bursting.	过去几个月来，美国的报纸和杂志一直在鼓吹长达10年之久的房价上涨也许即将结束，泡沫的破灭也许就在眼前。


The psychology has suddenly changed, creating widespread fear of sharp drops in US home prices.	心理预期在眨眼之间发生了改变，人们普遍对美国房价骤跌充满了恐惧。


The new futures market for single-family homes at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (which I helped establish last May with our firm MacroMarkets LLC) is predicting that by next August prices will fall between 6% and 8% in all ten US cities traded.	据芝加哥商品交易所新设立的独立住宅期货市场（去年5月我所在的宏观证券研究有限公司曾经对该市场的筹建起到过辅助作用）预测：截至明年8月，在全部10座参与交易的美国城市中，房价的跌幅将达到6%到8%。


If home prices crash in the US, the bastion of capitalism, could it destroy confidence and end the boom in other countries?	如果作为资本主义堡垒的美国房价骤跌，人们的信心是否会受到影响，从而给其他国家的房地产繁荣划上句号？


If so, could a worldwide recession follow?	如果这种情况真的出现，世界性的经济衰退是否不可避免？


This scenario is a distinct possibility, although there are reasons to be skeptical.	尽管人们有理由抱着怀疑的态度，但出现上述情况也绝非天方夜谈。


Most importantly, the ultimate sources of the housing boom – the beliefs about capitalism and future economic growth – seem solidly entrenched.	最重要的是，住宅繁荣的终极源泉¾也就是人们对资本主义和未来经济发展所抱有的信心¾似乎是坚不可摧的。


The downward price trend in the US market, for example, does not seem to reflect underlying changes in long-run economic confidence.	例如，美国市场的价格回落似乎并不是长期经济信心发生变化的标志。


The survey that Karl Case and I conducted in May and June of this year, under the auspices of the Yale School of Management, shows sharp declines in short-term expectations for home prices in the US, but relatively little change in long-term expectations.	今年五、六月份卡尔·凯斯（Karl Case）和我在耶鲁管理学院的赞助下共同进行的民意调查表明：人们预期住宅价格会在短期内大幅下跌，但对长期房价的预测却变化不大。


Most people still believe that housing is a great long-term investment.	绝大多数人依然相信住宅是长期投资的最佳方式。


Maybe real estate prices are unlikely to fall to pre-boom levels because the fundamental change in perceptions concerning capitalism’s triumph will be longstanding.	也许房价不太可能跌落到暴涨之前的水平，因为从根本上改变人们对资本主义优越性的认识是一个长期的过程。


Changes in people’s fundamental ways of thinking are not easily reversed.	人们最基本的思维方式很难改变。


Nor, therefore, is their interest in housing as a major speculative investment asset likely to change.	因此，他们对住宅作为主要投机资产的兴趣似乎也将延续下去。


The transformation in investors’ beliefs is striking.	投资人观念的变化令人震惊。


Before the real estate boom of the late 1970’s, hardly anyone was worried about rising home prices.	20世纪70年代末房地产价格上涨之前，很少有人对房价的上涨表示忧虑。


A search of old newspapers finds surprisingly few articles about the outlook for home prices.	翻遍过去的报纸也找不到几篇有关未来房价的评论。


Those that did appear generally seem to be based on the assumption that minor fluctuations in construction costs, not massive market swings, drove the modest home price movements that they noted.	有限的几篇评论一般也认为建筑成本的小幅波动、而非大规模的市场振荡是造成小幅房价涨落的驱动力量。


Indeed, hardly anything interesting about home prices was ever reported at all, aside from an occasional comment in an article about something else.	实际上，除去以其他内容为主题的某篇文章中偶尔可见些零星的评论，此外几乎看不到有关房价的任何有趣报道。


For example, an article in The Times of London in 1970 argued that rising home prices reflected the switch to a new British Standard Time (imposed as a three-year experiment in 1968 to facilitate commerce with Western Europe by putting Britain in the same time zone).	例如，1970年《泰晤士报》上的一篇文章指出：房价上涨是实行新英国标准时间的反映（新标准时间从1968年开始，试行3年，目的是使英国处在与西欧各国相同的时区，从而推动相互之间的贸易）。


The article claimed that the change raised costs by forcing British construction workers to perform more of their jobs in relative darkness.	那篇文章声称这项改变提高了建筑成本，因为英国建筑工人不得不在相对较暗的天色中完成大部分工作。


Speculative investment behavior was hardly an issue in those rare instances in which home prices were discussed.	在讨论房价的少数几篇文章中，投机获利行为几乎没能引起任何关注。


To understand the nature of the subsequent shift, consider that it is hard to find anyone today who worries that automobile prices will soar because rising demand in China and India for steel and other materials will push automobile prices out of reach in the future.	要想对接下来的变化性质有所了解，只要类比一下今天很少有人会担心车价飞涨，以及中国和印度对钢铁和其他材料日益增长的需求会使未来车价变得高不可攀的事例就够了。


Though a small group of collectors invests speculatively in antique or specialty cars, the idea of speculating in automobiles just is not in the public consciousness.	尽管一小群收藏爱好者对古董或特制汽车情有独钟，但投机汽车的想法根本没有被公众所广泛接受。


That is how it was with housing until the late 1970’s.	直到20世纪70年代末，住房的情况也大同小异。


Now that we think differently about real estate, we will never be the same again.	现在我们对房产的看法已经发生了改变，再也回不到原来的样子了。


But, of course, housing prices can only rise so fast.	但勿庸置疑，房价的上涨实在是太快了。


High and rapidly rising home prices tend to stimulate new housing supply, which in turn tends to undermine prices.	快速上涨的高昂房价将刺激新的住宅供应，而新增住宅供应又反过来威胁到价格。


Over a period of years, as people see how much new supply there is, they may begin to revise their view that homes are such a terrific investment, causing a gradual, but eventually significant, drop in home prices.	在若干年内，随着人们对新房供应量的认识，房产是一种完美投资的看法就有可能发生改变，从而导致缓慢、但最终却是大幅度的房价回落。


Indeed, while changes in fundamental perceptions may not occur easily or fast, they should never be ruled out.	实际上，尽管基本观念的转变艰难而又缓慢，但这样的变化却永远也无法彻底排除。


Urban land prices in major Japanese cities have steadily dropped over much of the period since 1991, as the enormous faith in the miraculous powers of Japanese capitalism gradually faded.	随着对日本资本主义神奇力量信心的逐渐减退，1991年以后日本主要城市的地价一直处在稳步的回落当中。


The same kind of erosion in home prices could occur in many cities around the world.	房价的下降同样也可能发生在世界许多城市。


All that is required is that growth in housing supply eventually outstrips investors’ faith in capitalism to sustain faster growth in demand.	只需住宅供应的增长最终超过投资者对资本主义的信心，这样需求的更快增长则必将难以为继。


The Ghosts of North Korea	朝鲜的鬼魂


TOKYO – For most people, the arrival of a new year prompts a moment of reflection on what has been working and what needs to change.	东京——对多数人来说，新一年的到来促使他们反思哪些应该保持、哪些需要改变。


Not for the people of North Korea.	但朝鲜人除外。


In that benighted country, “New Year’s resolutions” are not really an option for ordinary citizens.	在这个愚昧的国家，“新年决策”的权利不属于普通民众。


What happens to them depends entirely on their supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, and typically involves grim paranoia and deprivation.	他们的未来完全取决于最高领导人金正恩，并且往往伴随着冷酷与偏执的剥夺。


North Koreans endure plenty about which outsiders can only speculate.	朝鲜人忍受的苦难很多都不为外人所知。


Consider the mysterious “ghost ships” that are carried to the Sea of Japan each autumn by southwesterly winds.	比如每年秋天被西南季风吹到日本海的神秘的“鬼船”。


The boats are crude, small (about ten meters in length), and equipped with little more than basic fishing gear.	这些船粗糙、狭小（长约10米），除了最基本的渔具以外几乎没有任何其他设施。


Some are empty; others carry the dead bodies of unidentified men.	其中有些空无一人，有些则携带着身份不明的男性尸体。


Last month alone, 13 boats and 26 bodies (most already largely decomposed) were found.	仅上月一个月就发现了13艘这样的小船和26具尸体（其中多数都已大体腐烂）。


In 2014, more than 60 such boats turned up.	2014年一年，就发现了超过60艘这样的小船。


Some of the boats and their contents bore markings in Korean Hangul script.	有些船及船上物品印有韩语标识。


One carried a handwritten sign stating that it belonged to unit 325 of the North Korean army.	其中一条带有朝军325部队的手写标志。


Another contained a tattered cloth that appeared to have once been part of a North Korean flag.	另一条船上有一块破布，似乎曾经是一面朝鲜国旗。


Add to that the boats’ dilapidated condition and lack of equipment, and the conclusion that they were North Korean seems fairly certain.	再加上破旧且缺乏设备，这些船属于朝鲜似乎没有多少怀疑。


What is more difficult to discern is what the ships were for, and why they have been making their way, in such large numbers, to Japan’s shores and territorial waters.	这些船是做什么的、它们为什么要成群结队前往日本领海及海岸似乎更难判断。


After all, they seem like fishing boats, not military vessels, though North Korean soldiers are frequently also fishermen.	毕竟，尽管朝鲜士兵往往同时是渔民，这些船似乎并非军舰而仅仅是渔船。


It has been widely speculated that the boats were filled with would-be defectors, not least because they resemble boats on which living defectors arrived in Japan.	人们普遍猜测这些船载有可能的叛逃者，这不仅因为它们像极了活的叛逃者逃往日本所坐的小船。


Another explanation is that the boats are filled simply with fishermen who, under pressure from the government to boost their yields, ventured out too far into the open sea.	另一种解释是船上只是普通的渔民，在政府提高产量的压力下冒险驶入远海。


Sadly, that explanation is all too plausible.	可悲的是，这种解释完全合情合理。


North Korea’s government goes to great lengths to conceal the country’s abysmal food shortages, even going so far as to unveil to the foreign media an advanced indoor vegetable-farming facility near Pyongyang.	朝鲜政府竭力掩盖国内粮食极度短缺的事实，甚至不惜向外媒公开平壤附近一座先进的室内蔬菜种植设施。


But the fact is that there have been no sustained improvements to food production since the mass starvation of the 1990s and early 2000s, despite slightly greater tolerance of private production by farmers.	但实际情况是尽管对农民私人种植的容忍度略有提高，但20世纪90年代和21世纪初大规模饥荒爆发后粮食生产并未得到持续改善。


Indeed, although Kim identified “food for the people” as one of his regime’s top three priorities for 2015, little investment in this effort was actually made.	事实上，尽管金正恩将“保障人民粮食供应”列为2015年政府三件大事之一，但在这方面实际投资却并不多见。


Not even the resumption of fertilizer supplies by a private South Korean organization was enough to make a real difference.	就连韩国一家私营机构恢复供应化肥都不足以真正改变局面。


With fallow soil and a poor climate inhibiting agriculture, North Korea’s government has indeed apparently been encouraging a growing number of fishing boats to go farther out in search of bigger catches.	由于土地撂荒和恶劣气候限制农业发展，朝鲜政府其实一直在鼓励更多渔船为提高产量而驶向远海。


Given the boats’ poor quality, it is no surprise that many do not make it home.	鉴于这些船只质量低劣，其中很多有去无回也并不意外。


The ghost ships are not the only source of odd questions and speculation about North Korea.	鬼船并非引发朝鲜奇特问题和猜测的唯一来源。


Just this month, the all-girl Moranbong Band – reportedly organized and sponsored by Kim himself – canceled its first performance in China, intended for Chinese Communist Party officials.	就在这个月，全部由女孩组成的牡丹峰乐团——据称由金本人亲自出资筹建——取消了面向中国共产党官员的对华首演。


Soon after arriving by train in Beijing, the band’s members were quickly bundled onto a plane back to Pyongyang.	乘火车抵达北京后不久，乐队成员很快又被塞进了返回平壤的飞机。


Some have speculated that a song praising North Korea’s nuclear program was too much for China’s leadership to stomach, especially so soon after Kim declared (probably falsely) that his regime had detonated a hydrogen bomb.	有人猜测一首赞美朝鲜核计划的颂歌令中国领导人难以忍受，尤其是金正恩刚刚宣布（可能是假消息）其政府引爆了一颗氢弹。


Others think that Kim was angered by the news that Chinese President Xi Jinping and other top Chinese leaders would not be attending the concert.	也有人认为中国国家主席习近平等高层领导人不出席音乐会的消息激怒了金正恩。


In any case, the relationship with China, on which North Korea has long depended, seems to be coming under increasing strain.	无论如何，朝鲜长期依赖的对华关系紧张程度似乎在不断升高。


As for Japan’s relationship with North Korea, the outlook remains far from rosy.	至于日本和朝鲜的关系，其前景离乐观也相去甚远。


Discussions of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s – a major impediment to official relations – have stalled.	20世纪七八十年代有关朝鲜绑架日本公民的谈判——一直是正式关系的主要障碍——已经停滞不前。


North Korea has stubbornly maintained its official line that only 13 Japanese were kidnapped; eight died and five were returned to Japan before ever making it to Pyongyang.	朝鲜一直固执地坚持只有13名日本人被绑架的官方说法； 其中有八人死亡，五人在抵达平壤前就已经归还给日本。


Japan insists – with good reason – that there were more kidnappings.	但日本坚持认为——而且理由非常充分——有更多的绑架事件。


The five abductees who were repatriated in 2002 included Hitomi Soga, who was not included among the 13 acknowledged kidnappings.	2002年遣返的5名被绑架者中包括曾我瞳，此人并未包含在13名已知被绑架者之内。


This creates the impression that North Korea may still be holding some kidnap victims to use as bargaining chips in discussions on economic cooperation.	日本据此认为朝鲜可能仍然扣押着某些被绑架者，并打算以此为筹码进行经济合作谈判。


Japan continues to demand a new comprehensive investigation into the matter, though North Korea has not been particularly cooperative so far.	日本一直要求就此事展开新的全面调查，但朝鲜迄今为止并未表现出合作的姿态。


During bilateral talks in Stockholm in 2014, the Kim regime agreed to pursue a new investigation, in exchange for Japan’s agreement to lift some sanctions once the inquiry began.	2014年斯德哥尔摩双边谈判期间，金正恩政府同意开始新一轮调查，条件是调查开始后日本同意解除部分制裁。


In July, however, the North reportedly notified the Japanese government of its intention to postpone submitting the results of the reinvestigation.	但7月，朝鲜据称知会日本政府打算延期提交其调查结果。


If the report is eventually submitted and includes the names of one or two abductees available to be sent back to Japan, how should Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government respond?	如果最终提交的报告包括一两名可以送回日本的被绑架者，日本首相安倍晋三的政府应当如何应对？


This kind of manipulation may not merit a visit to North Korea by Abe or the lifting of sanctions.	这样的操纵可能并不值得安倍访问朝鲜或者取消制裁。


So ends another bizarre year (which makes it similar to previous years) in the history of North Korea.	又是朝鲜历史上（与之前非常相似的）奇怪的一年。


The only factor suggesting that 2016 could be different lies in the North’s estrangement from China.	2016年唯一不同的因素也许就是朝鲜与中国的疏远。


Perhaps Japan could take advantage of the strains in that relationship to make some headway in other talks, say, on the nuclear issue.	或许日本可以利用中朝关系紧张在核问题等其他谈判中取得某些进展。


The main question, however, is whether Kim is able and willing to act in his country’s real interests, and not those of his fantasies.	但主要问题是金正恩是否能够并愿意按照国家真正的利益行事，而不是一味满足自己的幻想。


Carpet Bombing History in America	美国地毯式轰炸史


NEW YORK – Ted Cruz, one of the Republican candidates for the US presidency, recently said that his solution to the turmoil in the Middle East would be to “carpet bomb” the Islamic State (ISIS) and see if “sand can glow in the dark.”	纽约—美国共和党总统候选人之一泰德·克鲁兹（Ted Cruz）最近说，他有办法解决中东乱局，那就是“地毯式轰炸”伊斯兰国，看看“沙子是否能在黑暗中发光”。


Donald Trump, the Republican frontrunner, promised to “bomb the shit out of ISIS.”	共和党竞选阵营领先者唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）承诺“把伊斯兰国炸出屎来”。


A third candidate, Chris Christie, has threatened war with Russia.	另一位候选人克里斯·克里斯蒂（Chris Christie）威胁与俄罗斯开战。


With such rhetoric from their candidates, it is no wonder that, according to a recent poll, some 30% of Republican voters (and 41% of Trump supporters) favored bombing Agrabah, the central (and fictional) location of the Disney film Aladdin.	总统候选人说出这样的话来，无怪乎最新民调表明30%左右的共和党选民（以及41%的特朗普支持者）支持轰炸阿格拉巴（Agrabah，迪士尼电影《阿拉丁》中虚构的中央地区）。


The place sounded Arabic, and that was enough.	这个地方听着像阿拉伯，这就足够了。


One way to read such bellicose rhetoric is to assume that those who indulge in it must be bloodthirsty monsters.	一种解读这些好斗言论的方式是认为执迷于此的都是嗜血狂魔。


A more charitable view is that they suffer from an appalling lack of historical memory and moral imagination.	更善意的观点是他们极度缺乏历史记忆和道德想象力。


None has any personal experience of war.	这些人都没有对战争的个人体验。


And they clearly find it impossible to comprehend the consequences of what they are saying.	他们显然无法理解他们的厥词的后果。


And yet even a cursory acquaintance with fairly recent history is enough to know that “bombing the shit” out of people does little to win wars.	而即便是对最近一段历史的最粗浅的了解也足以让我们知道，把人“炸出屎来”根本无法赢得战争。


It didn’t work in Vietnam, and it is unlikely to work in Syria or Iraq.	这在越南不起作用，在叙利亚或伊拉克也不可能起作用。


Even the Nazis were not defeated by carpet bombing.	就连纳粹也不是被地毯式轰炸打败的。


As postwar studies undertaken by the US and British air forces demonstrated, Russian tanks did more to bring down the Wehrmacht than did aerial bombing of German cities.	美国和英国空军的战后研究表明，俄式坦克对于击败德国国防军的作用要大于对德国城市的轰炸。


This raises the question, suitable for the beginning of a new year, of whether history really can teach us many lessons.	这就引出了一个适合新年的问题，即历史是否真的教会了我们许多教训。


After all, nothing is ever exactly the same as what went before.	毕竟，现在发生的事情永远不会与过去完全相同。


It is probably true that we cannot expect history to tell us what to do in any given crisis.	也许我们确实无法期待历史告诉我们在某场危机中应该怎么做。


But, given that some patterns of human behavior recur, knowledge about the past can help us understand our own times better.	但是，人类的某些行为模式会反复发生，因此关于过去的知识能够帮助我们更好地理解现时代。


The problem is that politicians (and commentators) often pick the wrong examples to bolster their ideological positions.	问题在于政客（和评论家）常常选取错误的例子论证他们的意识形态立场。


For example, because few people apparently can think back further than World War II, examples from the 1930s and 1940s are the most commonly abused.	比如，能将记忆追溯到二战前的人非常少，因此20世纪30和40年代的例子最常被滥用。


Whenever we are encouraged to oppose a dictator, the specter of Adolf Hitler is invoked, and the ghosts of 1938 are resurrected to counter skepticism about hasty “preemptive” war.	每当我们被鼓励反对某位独裁者，希特勒的幽灵就会浮现，而1938年常常被用来反驳质疑仓促的“预防性”战争的人。


Those who had doubts about George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq were “appeasers,” akin to Neville Chamberlain.	质疑小布什入侵伊拉克的人被认为都是张伯伦式的“绥靖派”。


Our almost exclusive focus on Nazis and WWII blinds us to other – and possibly more instructive – historical parallels.	我们的关注点几乎完全集中在纳粹和二战，而对其他可能更具说明性的历史案例视而不见。


The terrible wars in the Middle East today, pitting revolutionary religious sects and tribal chiefs against ruthless dictatorships backed by one great power or another, have much more in common with the Thirty Years War that devastated much of Germany and central Europe from 1618 to 1648.	今天可怕的中东战争是革命宗派和部落领袖反抗受到某个列强支持的独裁统治的战争，它们与1618—1648年间让德国和中欧大部化为焦土的三十年战争更加相似。


For three decades, marauding armies murdered, plundered, and tortured their way through villages and towns.	在三十年中，军队如游寇般一路烧杀抢掠。


Many who weren’t killed died of starvation or disease, spread by vast numbers of armed men.	许多没有被杀的也死于大量武装部队散播的饥饿和疾病。


Like today’s wars, the Thirty Years War is often assumed to have been an essentially religious conflict, but between Catholics and Protestants.	和今天的战争相似，三十年战争常常被认为主要是宗教冲突，只不过发生在天主教和新教之间。


In fact, again like the current violence in which the Arab world is embroiled, it was much more complicated.	事实上，和今天阿拉伯世界深陷其中的暴力相同，三十年战争要复杂得多。


Mercenary soldiers, Protestant or Catholic, switched sides whenever it suited them, while the Vatican backed the Protestant German princes, Catholic France backed the Protestant Dutch Republic, and many other alliances were forged across sectarian lines.	雇佣兵——不管是新教徒还是天主教徒——只要形势不对就倒戈，梵蒂冈支持信奉新教的德国贵族，天主教法国支持新教荷兰共和国，其他许多联盟也包括众多不同宗派。


In reality, the Thirty Years War was a struggle for European hegemony between the Bourbon and Habsburg monarchies.	事实上，三十年战争是波旁和哈布斯堡王朝争夺欧洲霸权的战争。


As long as one was not strong enough to dominate the other, the war continued, causing horrendous suffering among innocent peasants and city dwellers.	只要一方不足以强大到主宰另一方，战争就无法结束，导致无辜农民和城市居民惨遭横祸。


And just like in the Middle East today, other major powers – France, Denmark, and Sweden, among others – took part, backing one side or the other, hoping to gain advantage for themselves.	而正如今天的中东，其他主要力量——法国、丹麦、瑞典等——也参与其中，支持其中一方，以期从中渔利。


The similarity to the wars in Syria and Iraq is striking.	叙利亚和伊拉克战争有着惊人的相似性。


ISIS is a brutal Sunni rebellion against Shia rulers.	伊斯兰国是逊尼派对什叶派统治的残酷反抗。


The US opposes it, but so do Iran, a Shia power, and Saudi Arabia, which is run by Sunni despots.	美国反对它，什叶派力量伊朗和逊尼派君主统治的沙特阿拉伯亦然。


The main axis of conflict in the Middle East is not religious or sectarian, but geopolitical: the struggle for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran.	中东的主要冲突轴心不是宗教或宗派，而是地缘政治：沙特阿拉伯和伊朗争夺地区霸权。


Both have backers among the major powers, and both deliberately whip up religious fanatics; but theological differences are not the key to understanding the escalation of violence.	两国都有主要力量撑腰，都有意识地借助宗教狂热； 但神学方面的分歧并不是理解暴力升级的关键。


What is to be learned from all this?	从所有这些当中我们可以学到什么？


Some might argue that only a thorough religious reformation will bring about long-term peace in the Middle East.	有人会说，只有彻底的宗教改革能给中东带来长期和平。


But, though reformation of Islam might be desirable in itself, it will not bring an end to the war at hand.	但是，即便伊斯兰教改革本身值得追求，但它无法结束当下的战争。


Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad is not fighting for a particular sect of Islam (the Alawites in his case), but for his survival.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德不是在为某个伊斯兰教派而战（他属于阿拉维派），而是在为自己的生存而战。


ISIS is not battling for Sunni orthodoxy, but for a revolutionary caliphate.	伊斯兰国不是在为逊尼派正统而战，而是在为革命的哈里发而战。


The struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not religious, but political.	沙特阿拉伯和伊朗之间的战争不是宗教战争，而是政治战争。


There were moments during the Thirty Years War when a political settlement might have been possible.	在三十年战争期间，不乏有可能实现政治和解的时刻。


But the will to take advantage of such opportunities was lacking; one party or another still sought greater advantage by fighting on (or encouraging others to do so).	但缺乏抓住这些机会的意愿； 总有一方仍试图通过继续战斗（或鼓励其他人继续战斗）赢得更大优势。


It would be a tragedy if similar opportunities were missed today.	如果今天也错失这样的机会，将是一个悲剧。


Settlements demand compromise.	和解需要妥协。


Enemies will have to talk to one another.	敌人将不得不互相谈判。


Braggadocio about carpet bombing, and accusations of appeasement against those who try to negotiate, will only prolong the agony, if not cause an even greater catastrophe.	自负于地毯式轰炸、指责试图谈判者为绥靖，这些做法只能延长痛苦甚至造成更大的灾难。


And that will affect almost all of us.	而这将影响到我们几乎每一个人。


What Can Save the Euro?	怎样拯救欧元？


NEW YORK – Just when it seemed that things couldn’t get worse, it appears that they have.	纽约——有时候事情看上去并不会变得很糟，但实际上却并非如此。


Even some of the ostensibly “responsible” members of the eurozone are facing higher interest rates.	即就是欧元区一些看似“负责”的成员国也将面临更高的利率。


Economists on both sides of the Atlantic are now discussing not just whether the euro will survive, but how to ensure that its demise causes the least turmoil possible.	而大西洋两岸的欧美经济学家们现在讨论的已经不是欧元能否生存下来的问题，而是如何确保欧元体系的崩溃只带来最小的动荡。


It is increasingly evident that Europe’s political leaders, for all their commitment to the euro’s survival, do not have a good grasp of what is required to make the single currency work.	尽管欧洲各国领导致力于挽救欧元，但在维系欧元运作的必要措施方面，各国领导对此的认识缺陷却逐渐暴露出来。


The prevailing view when the euro was established was that all that was required was fiscal discipline – no country’s fiscal deficit or public debt, relative to GDP, should be too large.	欧元体系建立伊始，主流观点认为维系欧元体系的运作只需在财政方面进行约束，即，各成员国的财政赤字或公共债务应与各国国内生产总值相适应。


But Ireland and Spain had budget surpluses and low debt before the crisis, which quickly turned into large deficits and high debt.	经济危机前，爱尔兰和西班牙仍有预算结余，并保持较低的债务值。 然而，很快一切都化为乌有，两国都陷入财政赤字，债台高筑。


So now European leaders say that it is the current-account deficits of the eurozone’s member countries that must be kept in check.	所以，当今欧洲各国领导都指出控制各成员国的经常项目赤字才是当务之急。


In that case, it seems curious that, as the crisis continues, the safe haven for global investors is the United States, which has had an enormous current-account deficit for years.	如果真是这样，那么随着经济危机的蔓延，美国这个常年保持经常项目赤字的国家却成了全球投资者的避风港，就显得不合常理了。


So, how will the European Union distinguish between “good” current-account deficits – a government creates a favorable business climate, generating inflows of foreign direct investment – and “bad” current-account deficits?	而欧盟将如何分辨政府为创造有利投资环境以及增加外国直接投资而造成的“良性”经常性项目赤字和“不良”经常性项目赤字呢？


Preventing bad current-account deficits would require far greater intervention in the private sector than the neoliberal and single-market doctrines that were fashionable at the euro’s founding would imply.	要想避免“不良”经常性项目赤字，那么对于私营部门的干预则应该远远大于欧元区建立时颇受欢迎的新自由主义以及单一市场原则所倡导的程度。


In Spain, for example, money flowed into the private sector from private banks.	以西班牙为例，私营部门的资金主要来自私有银行。


Should such irrational exuberance force the government, willy-nilly, to curtail public investment?	而受这种非理性繁荣的影响，政府是否应被迫削减公共投资呢？


Does this mean that government must decide which capital flows – say into real-estate investment, for example – are bad, and so must be taxed or otherwise curbed?	而这是否又意味着政府必须决定这其中哪一种资金流是不良的（如，投资房产的资金），从而这种投资是否应缴纳税款或者被限制呢？


To me, this makes sense, but such policies should be anathema to the EU’s free-market advocates.	我个人觉得这样的政策会行之有效。 但是对于欧盟自由市场的倡导者而言，这些政策只会招来极大的不满。


The quest for a clear, simple answer recalls the discussions that have followed financial crises around the world.	为了寻求一个明确简单的答案。 人们的注意力再一次集中到每次金融危机过后的讨论之上。


After each crisis, an explanation emerges, which the next crisis shows to be wrong, or at least inadequate.	每一次金融危机结束，总有相应的解释出现。 而这些解释总是在下一次金融危机到来时被推翻或者至少证明其不全面。


The 1980’s Latin American crisis was caused by excessive borrowing; but that could not explain Mexico’s 1994 crisis, so it was attributed to under-saving.	二十世纪八十年代的拉美经济危机是由于过度贷款造成的。 而这个解释却不适用于1994年的墨西哥经济危机，因为这一次危机的原因是由于储蓄不足。


Then came East Asia, which had high savings rates, so the new explanation was “governance.”  But this, too, made little sense, given that the Scandinavian countries – which have the most transparent governance in the world – had suffered a crisis a few years earlier.	东亚拥很高的储蓄率，但这一次问题出在“管理方式”之上。 在享有世界上最透明管理方式的斯堪的纳维亚国家几年前遭受金融危机时，这个解释则又成了无稽之谈。


There is, interestingly, a common thread running through all of these cases, as well as the 2008 crisis: financial sectors behaved badly and failed to assess creditworthiness and manage risk as they were supposed to do.	但值得注意的是，这些金融危机，包括2008年的金融危机，都有一个共通的线索，即，金融行业表现欠佳，未能准确评估信用度，在危机出现时，未能及时处理。


These problems will occur with or without the euro.	无论有没有欧元，这些问题都会出现。


But the euro has made it more difficult for governments to respond.	但是对于政府来说，欧元的出现使得这些问题变得更加棘手。


And the problem is not just that the euro took away two key tools for adjustment – the interest rate and the exchange rate – and put nothing in their place, or that the European Central Bank’s mandate is to focus on inflation, whereas today’s challenges are unemployment, growth, and financial stability.	而现在的问题不仅只是：欧元的崩溃将使得各国丧失两大调节方式（利率以及汇率），以及欧洲央行的权限主要集中于控制通货膨胀； 而且，现在各国政府还面临失业，增长速度慢，以及金融市场不稳定的挑战。


Without a common fiscal authority, the single market opened the way to tax competition – a race to the bottom to attract investment and boost output that could be freely sold throughout the EU.	失去了共同财政管理体系的统一市场只会为税收竞争敞开大门。 各国会通过降低税收的方式来吸引投资并增加可以在欧盟区自由交易产品的产出。


Moreover, free labor mobility means that individuals can choose whether to pay their parents’ debts: young Irish can simply escape repaying the foolish bank-bailout obligations assumed by their government by leaving the country.	再者，自由劳动流动意味着个人可以选择是否为自己的父母辈还债——爱尔兰的年青人只需要离开自己的国家就不用在为政府愚蠢的银行担保买单。


Of course, migration is supposed to be good, as it reallocates labor to where its return is highest.	当然，移民可以使劳动力按照收益重新分配，本身当然无可厚非。


But this kind of migration actually undermines productivity.	但是，这种方式的移民实际是在削弱生产力。


Migration is, of course, part of the adjustment mechanism that makes America work as a single market with a single currency.	当然，移民正是美国调节机制的一部分。 它使得美国能够以使用单一货币的统一市场的形式来运作。


Even more important is the federal government’s role in helping states that face, say, high unemployment, by allocating additional tax revenue to them – the so-called “transfer union” so loathed by many Germans.	更为重要的是：联邦政府通过分配更多的额外税收来缓解各州面临的问题（如高失业率）时所扮演的角色，即所谓的“转移联盟”，让很多德国人深恶痛绝。


But the US is also willing to accept the depopulation of entire states that cannot compete. (Some point out that this means that America’s corporations can buy senators from such states at a lower price.)	而美国同样也愿意在那些失去竞争力的州采取减少人口的方式来解决问题（一些人指出美国企业可以通过这种方法来从这些竞争力低的州购买议员的席位）。


But are European countries with lagging productivity willing to accept depopulation?	但是生产力相对落后的欧洲愿意通过减少人口来解决问题吗？


Alternatively, are they willing to face the pain of “internal” devaluation, a process that failed under the gold standard and is failing under the euro?	或者，欧洲愿意忍痛采取“内部”贬值的方式——这种方式在过去在黄金标准体系下曾经惨遭失败，而在如今在欧元体系也下日趋崩溃？


Even if those from Europe’s northern countries are right in claiming that the euro would work if effective discipline could be imposed on others (I think they are wrong), they are deluding themselves with a morality play.	即便一些欧洲北部国家所宣称的通过采取一些有效的管理方法可以使欧元重获生机方法是正确的。 （我个人认为是错误的）他们也不过是在上演一出自欺欺人的道德剧罢了。


It is fine to blame their southern compatriots for fiscal profligacy, or, in the case of Spain and Ireland, for letting free markets have free reign, without seeing where that would lead.	当然，采取奢侈财务政策的南部同盟，或者将自由市场等同为没有限制，对于后果毫无顾忌的西班牙和爱尔兰本身责无旁贷。


But that doesn’t address today’s problem: huge debts, whether a result of private or public miscalculations, must be managed within the euro framework.	但指责并不能解决今天面临的问题：欧盟的巨额债务，无论是无私有还是公有行业造成的，必须从起自身出发着手解决。


Public-sector cutbacks today do not solve the problem of yesterday’s profligacy; they simply push economies into deeper recessions.	往昔欠下的巨额债务并不能通过减少当下公共部门的预算来减少。 这样做只会适得其反，使经济更为衰退。


Europe’s leaders know this.	欧洲的领导人明白这一点。


They know that growth is needed.	他们知道欧洲需要经济增长。


But, rather than deal with today’s problems and find a formula for growth, they prefer to deliver homilies about what some previous government should have done.This may be satisfying for the sermonizer, but it won’t solve Europe’s problems – and it won’t save the euro. 	但是与其去解决问题，寻求经济增长的方式，还不如喋喋不休地去指责前几任政府的失职。 对于说教者而言这是个让人满意的行为，但是这并不会解决欧洲的问题，当然也拯救不了欧元。


What China Wants in 2012	2012年，中国想要什么


BEIJING – With economic globalization and the advent of a multi-polar world, China and other emerging countries are clearly set to play much more important roles not only in 2012, but in the coming decades.	北京——随着经济的全球化以及多极世界的形成，中国和其他新兴国家必定会扮演更加重要的角色，不仅在2012年如此，在今后的数十年间都是如此，这已是众人皆知了。


As China’s economic power and influence in the world economy have increased following the financial crisis of 2008, the idea has been floated that China and the United States should co-lead the world under some sort of “G-2” arrangement.	2008年金融危机以来，随着中国在世界经济中的经济实力和影响，出现了一种新观点：中国和美国应该被称为“G2”，共同领导整个世界。


But such a G-2 framework is not consistent with China’s independent foreign policy, nor with the general trend towards wider dispersion of geopolitical power within the international community.	但这种G2框架与中国的独立外交并不一致，与国际社会地缘政治日渐分散化的趋势也不相符。


Although China’s senior leadership will change this year, this position will not change.	尽管中国的高层领导人将在今年易届，但这一立场是不会随之改变的。


Indeed, when China’s Premier Wen Jiabao visited Prague in May 2009 for the 11th China-European Union summit, he explained that China is opposed to the G-2 concept.	事实上，温家宝总理在2009年5月访问布拉格出席中欧峰会时就解释说，中国反对G2的概念。


It is China’s firm intention never to seek hegemony, nor to support global domination by a small minority of countries.	中国永不追求霸权，也不支持一小撮国家主导全球，这是中国的坚定立场。


What China does believe in is deepening cooperation with all of the world’s major regions.	中国坚信，世界各主要地区的合作将越来越深入。


Consider Europe – a splendid and time-honored civilization, and now a major player on the world stage.	比如欧洲，这里有着历史悠久的灿烂文明，也是今日世界舞台的主角。


The progressive deepening of EU integration has brought dynamic vigor to the European continent; despite Europe’s current difficulties, it still boasts extraordinary overall strength and international influence.	欧盟一体化的深化进程给欧洲大陆带来了动力； 尽管欧洲当前遇到了一些困难，但它仍具有引以为豪的实力和国际影响力。


China has always supported European integration, and hopes that the EU will become a pillar of international order.	中国一贯支持欧洲一体化，也希望欧盟能成为国际秩序之一级。


In the wake of the global financial crisis and the eurozone’s sovereign-debt crisis, China has bought government bonds, made direct investments, and sent business delegations to Europe.	随着全球金融危机和欧元区主权债务危机的爆发，中国已经购买了欧洲政府债券、对欧洲进行了直接投资，并派遣了商业代表团赴欧。


During Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero’s visit to Beijing in April 2011, Wen reaffirmed China’s willingness to continue purchasing Spanish government bonds as a further demonstration of our support for Europe’s efforts to emerge from its crisis.	2011年西班牙首相萨帕特罗访问中国时，温家宝总理确认，中国愿意继续购买西班牙政府债券，以进一步表明我们对欧洲应对危机的支持。


Moreover, China’s huge market and labor pool have created important opportunities for Europe.	此外，中国的巨大市场和劳动力储备也未欧洲创造了重要机会。


In this new multi-polar era, China and Europe must work together, and they are now at a critical moment if they are to deepen their cooperation.	在这个新的多极时代，中国和欧洲必须精诚合作，而如若双方意欲深化合作，那么现在就是关键时刻。


What we do to share opportunities, meet challenges, and pursue development will be directly relevant not only to our own peoples’ welfare, but also to the world’s future.	我们分享机会、直面挑战和追求发展的举措不仅直接与我们自己的人民福祉有关，也关系到世界的未来。


China-EU cooperation will be essential to maintaining global peace and stability.	中欧合作将是维持世界和平与稳定的关键。


We share a commitment to resolving international issues through political means, and both sides have already played a constructive role in addressing global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.	我们对通过政治途径解决国际问题有着共同承诺，双方在应对气候变化、恐怖主义、大规模杀伤新武器扩散方面已做出了建设性贡献。


The parallel launch of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and Europe’s 2020 Strategy has also helped to deepen our cooperation.	同时公布中国的十二五规划和欧洲的2020战略也有益于深化我们的合作。


China and Europe worked together after 2008 to prevent a global financial meltdown, oppose protectionism, and promote reform of the international financial system, thus facilitating worldwide economic recovery.	2008年以来，中国和欧洲精诚合作，以防止全球金融体系的崩溃、反对恐怖主义、促进国际金融体系改革从而助力世界经济复苏。


China also takes its relations with the US very seriously.	中国对于和美国的关系也很重视。


Indeed, our bilateral relationship is among the most important in the international community.	事实上，我们的双边关系是国际社会中最重要的关系之一。


That relationship has gone through some rough patches since diplomatic ties were established in 1979, but, overall, it has continued to grow and benefit both sides.	自1979年双方建立外交关系以来，中美关系经历了不少困难时刻，但总体而言在持续改善，双方均因此获益良多。


Today, China and the US share more interests than ever, and there are encouraging prospects for still broader cooperation.	如今，中美的共同利益之大前所未见，双方的合作前景令人鼓舞。


When President Hu Jintao visited Washington, DC in January 2011, he and President Barack Obama agreed to build what Hu referred to as “a China-US cooperative partnership based on respect and mutual benefit.”	2011年1月，胡锦涛主席访问华盛顿，他和奥巴马总统同意建设胡主席所谓的“基于尊重和共同利益的中美合作伙伴关系。


They reaffirmed their deference for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and reached agreements on major strategic issues, including efforts to strengthen cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and in multilateral institutions, and to respond jointly to regional and global challenges to peace and stability, for example, on the Korean Peninsula.	”两人重申彼此尊重主权完整，并在包括强化亚太地区合作和多变制度、联合应对地区和全球和平与稳定的挑战（如朝鲜半岛问题）等重要战略问题上达成了一致。


China is the world’s largest developing country; Europe is the largest bloc of developed countries; and the US is the largest single developed country.	中国是世界上最大的发展中国家，欧洲是世界上最大的发达国家联合体，美国是世界上最大的单一发达国家。


Together, we account for nearly a third of humanity and two-thirds of the world economy.	三国加起来占据着全球三分之一的人口和三分之二的经济总量。


As the three major global powers, China, the EU, and the US must strengthen their cooperation, and must work with the rest of the world to face the complex international issues that challenge us all.	作为全球三大势力，中国、欧盟和美国必须强化合作，与世界其他国家精诚合作，应对困扰我们所有人的复杂多变的国际问题。


Together, we must shoulder the great task of upholding world peace and promoting common development.	我们必须联合起来承担维持世界和平、促进共同发展的重大任务。


While China is committed to its own independent foreign policy, it cannot achieve development in isolation.	中国做出了独立外交政策的承诺，但它无法单枪匹马地发展。


Likewise, the world cannot develop without China.	类似地，世界也无法在没有中国的情况下发展。


Hu once said that the twenty-first century should be a century of peace, development, and cooperation.	胡主席曾说，21世纪应该是和平、发展和合作的世纪。


China is willing to join with the EU, the US, and the rest of the world to realize the potential of a truly harmonious world.	中国愿意与欧盟、美国和世界其他国家一起，实现真正和谐的社会。


Over the Cliff We Go	跨越财政悬崖


BERKELEY – Unless something unexpected happens, the United States’ many legislated reductions in taxes over the past 12 years – all of which have been explicitly temporary – will expire simultaneously at the start of 2013.	伯克利——除非发生意外，否则12年来美国众多法律规定的减税措施（其中很多都被明确规定为临时性措施）将于2013年伊始同时终止。


American tax rates will revert overnight to their Clinton-era levels.	一夜之间，美国将恢复克林顿时代的税率。


Some of these reductions were implemented to fight what was seen four years ago as a temporary downturn.	实行减税措施是为了抵御四年前暂时性的经济低迷。


Although their supporters wanted to make them permanent, claiming that they were temporary allowed for the circumvention of procedural requirements in the legislative process that Democrats had created in a vain effort to guarantee fiscal sanity.	但支持者希望实现其永久化，称当时只是为了规避立法过程中民主党保证财政合理性的无效的程序性规定才将其确定为临时性措施。


The immediate increase in tax rates is only part of the story.	减税计划到期后税率即刻调升还不是全部问题。


At the same time, automatic reductions in the defense budget and “discretionary” domestic spending – agreed to by both Democrats and Republicans in the summer of 2011 – will take effect.	与此同时，民主共和两党于2011年夏达成的自动削减国防预算和“自由裁量”国内消费的协议也将开始实施。


Couple these tax increases and spending cuts with the provisions of “Obamacare,” the US health-care reform championed by President Barack Obama, and, as of January 1, 2013, America’s  long-run structural budget deficit disappears.	增税减支措施将于2013年1月1日生效，辅之以奥巴马总统倡导的“奥巴马医改”即可消除美国的长期结构性财政赤字。


The restored tax rates will, for the foreseeable future, be sufficient to support the US defense establishment, the growing US social-insurance system, and a moderate – albeit inadequate and suboptimal – amount of other “discretionary” federal spending.	恢复后的税率在可以预见的未来足以支撑美国的国防建设、不断发展的社保系统和虽不理想但却适度稳健的其他“自由裁量”的联邦开支。


The US national debt/GDP ratio will be on track to fall from its current level of 75% to 50% by 2035.	美国国债占国内生产总值的比例将有望从目前的75%下降到2035年的50%。


Moreover, the US will begin running primary budget surpluses – the fiscal balance minus interest payments on existing debt – by 2015.	此外截止2015年，美国将开始实现基本预算盈余——在扣除现有债务利息支出后实现财政收支平衡。


So why isn’t the prospect of going over the fiscal cliff greeted with enthusiasm?	那么民众为什么对平安跨过财政悬崖的前景并不热衷？


Yes, there will be big spending cuts – which will hit defense contractors, doctors with Medicare patients, and all who benefit from or rely on government discretionary spending – and substantial tax increases.	是的，我们需要大幅削减开支——而这将打击国防承包商、为联邦医疗保险（Medicare）患者看病的医生和受惠于政府可自由支配开支的所有人——同时大幅增加税收。


But, to balance the budget in the long run, either taxes have to go up or spending has to go down relative to some baseline, or both.	但为实现长期预算平衡，税收必须相对于一定基准上升而开支则必须下降，或者两者兼而有之。


There are two reasons why deficit hawks are not declaring victory.	赤字鹰派没有宣布胜利有两个原因。


First, many who call themselves deficit hawks are really spending hawks: they believe that US social insurance is too generous to the unemployed, the disabled, the elderly, and the sick, and that by far the best policy is to cut back on such programs rather than raise taxes to pay for them.	其一，许多自诩的赤字鹰派其实应该叫支出鹰派：他们认为美国社会保险对失业者、残疾人、老年人和患病者过于慷慨，因此迄今为止的最佳政策不是提高税收，而是削减社保开支。


But, they fear that calling for spending cuts will be unpopular, unlike, they hope, demands to balance the budget.	但他们害怕削减开支的要求不得人心，而平衡预算就不会引起那么大的反应。


For them, the problem with the fiscal cliff is that it does not cut spending enough and raises taxes too much.	对他们而言，财政悬崖的问题在于加税加得过多，而开支减得不够。


Second, and more important for those who worry about the US economy’s health, the process is not well-described by the term “fiscal cliff.”	第二点在为美国经济健康忧心忡忡者看来尤为重要，即“财政悬崖”一词无法贴切地形容整个过程。


It is, rather, an austerity bomb that hits an economy in which unemployment remains high, the employment-to-population ratio remains horrifyingly low, and there are only feeble signs that the large gap between current and potential output is closing.	这相当于命中高失业率经济体的一枚紧缩炸弹，就业人口占总人口的比例依然低得惊人，且只有微弱迹象表明当前及潜在产值之间的巨大落差正在逐步弥合。


The past two months’ run-up to the austerity bomb’s detonation has already reduced projected real GDP growth in 2013 from 3% to 2.5%, and has raised likely end-2013 unemployment from 7.5% to 7.7%.	紧缩炸弹爆炸前两个月的准备阶段，2013年实际国内生产总值预期增长已经从3%降至2. 5%，2013年底预期失业率也从7.


Each day from January 1 to June 30 that the damage continues will have a roughly linear impact on economic performance in 2013, reducing the likely full-year real GDP growth rate by 0.0084% – and only if a deal is ultimately reached that would have caused no economic harm in 2013 had it been reached on November 10, 2012.	2013年1月1日至6月30日的每一个日夜都会对经济表现造成大致线性的影响，导致可能的全年实际国内生产总值增速下降0. 0084%——只有在2012年11月10日前最终达成一致才不会损害2013年的经济发展。


If no deal is reached by June 30, America’s likely 2013 real GDP growth rate will be -0.5%, with the likely unemployment rate returning to 8.9%.	如果到6月30日还未达成一致，美国2013年实际国内生产总值增长率将有可能降至负0. 5%，而失业率有可能重新升至8.


Spending cuts and tax increases that in the long run restore fiscal sanity and balance are good.	长远看能削减开支、增加税收，恢复财政平衡稳健的措施都有好处。


Having them all hit a weak, still-depressed economy simultaneously is not good.	但任由它们同时打击仍然疲弱低迷的经济却绝非明智的选择。


Thus, US officials face four tasks.	因此，美国官员必须完成四项任务。


First, Republicans and Democrats must negotiate a bipartisan agreement to stretch out the spending cuts and tax increases that take effect on January 1, 2013.	首先，共和及民主两党必须谈判两党协议，从2013年1月1日起削减开支并增加税收。


That way, they will affect the economy gradually over five years, rather than all at once.	相关措施对经济影响不是一次性的，而将在今后五年内逐步释放。


Second, the Federal Reserve should expand its quantitative easing and forward guidance programs.	其次，美联储应扩大其量化宽松政策和前瞻性的指导方案。


Consumers will be spending less in 2013, owing to higher taxes, as will government, which means that someone has to be spending more.	2013年消费者和政府将因为税收提高而紧缩开支，这也意味着有些领域需要多花钱。


Housing construction and exports are the obvious candidates, and both can be boosted somewhat by more aggressive balance-sheet operations by the Fed, together with promises of continued low nominal interest rates and higher inflation in the medium term.	住宅建设和出口是显而易见的候选领域，美联储对资产负债表的积极运作，加之中期维持低名义利率和高通胀的承诺将在一定程度上刺激上述两个领域的复苏。


Third, the large government-sponsored mortgage enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, should be used as macroeconomic-policy tools to restore housing construction to its long-term trend level.	第三，政府资助的大型抵押贷款企业房利美和房地美应当发挥宏观经济政策工具的作用，让住房建设恢复到其长期趋势水平。


This should have been done five years ago, but better late than never.	原本五年前就应当这样做，但亡羊补牢、犹未为晚。


Finally, and also five years too late, the US Treasury secretary should announce that while the strong-dollar doctrine was appropriate (and in America’s interest) during the dot-com boom, the country needs a weak dollar in the aftermath of the austerity bomb’s detonation.	最后，虽然本来也应在五年前着手，但美国财政部长盖特纳应当宣布，因为网络繁荣期间盛行（符合美国利益的）字符串美元主义，美国在紧缩炸弹爆炸后需要弱势美元。


Reaching the wrong agreement to defuse the austerity bomb, or cushion the economy from its impact, would merely recreate America’s long-run structural budget deficit – a very bad outcome.	就拆除紧缩炸弹或化解经济影响达成错误的共识只会重新造成美国的长期结构性预算赤字，这个结果非常糟糕。


Failure to take all four steps outlined above all but guarantees renewed recession in America, even if a good agreement is reached on stretching out the tax hikes and spending cuts.	即便就增税减支达成了稳妥的协议，未能实行上述四个步骤就几乎注定了美国将重新陷入经济危机之中。


And if no agreement is reached on that, undertaking the last three steps would at least reduce somewhat the subsequent damage.	如果未能就此达成协议，采取上述三个步骤至少能在一定程度上降低随之而来的损害。


What Communism Still Teaches Us	共产主义至今仍留给我们的教训


PRAGUE - The fifteenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution on November 17, 1989, which brought an end to 41 years of communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, is an opportunity to ponder the meaning of moral behavior and free action.	1989年11月17日发生的“丝绒革命”给捷克斯洛伐克长达41年的共产主义独裁政治划上了句号。 今年是其十五周年，是我们思考道德行为和自由行动的意义的契机。


Today we live in a democratic society, but many people - not only in the Czech Republic - still believe that they are not true masters of their destiny.	今天，我们生活在民主社会中，但是许多人——不仅仅在捷克共和国内——仍然相信自己无法真正主宰自己的命运。


They have lost faith that they can really influence political developments, much less influence the direction in which our civilization is evolving.	他们已失去信心，不相信自己能对政治的发展产生现实的影响，更不用说影响我们的文明演进的方向。


During the communist era, most people believed that individual efforts to effect change did not make sense.	在共产主义时期，绝大多数人认为个人的努力没有作用。


Communist leaders insisted that the system was the result of history's objective laws, which could not be challenged, and those who refused this logic were punished - just in case.	共产主义领导人坚称其制度是历史客观规律的产物，是不可动摇的，任何拒不接受这个逻辑的人都要受到惩罚——以防万一。


Unfortunately, the way of thinking that supported Communist dictatorships has not disappeared entirely.	不幸的是，这种支持共产主义独裁政治的思维方式还没有完全消失。


Some politicians and pundits maintain that Communism merely collapsed under its own weight - again, owing to "objective laws" of history.	某些政客和学究还坚持认为共产主义的崩溃是出于其自身的原因——同样属于历史的“客观规律”。


Again, individual responsibility and individual actions are belittled.	个人的责任和个人的行为再次被低估。


Communism, we are told, was only one of the dead ends of Western rationalism; therefore, it was sufficient to wait passively for it to fail.	我们听到的说法是，共产主义只是西方理性主义的死胡同之一； 因此，只需要坐等它的消亡即可。


The very same people often believe in other manifestations of inevitability, such as various supposed laws of the market and other "invisible hands" that direct our lives.	同样是这批人还常常相信必然性的其他表现方式，如各种假想中的市场规律和其他指挥我们的生活的“看不见的手”。


As there is not much space in such thinking for individual moral action, social critics are often ridiculed as naive moralists or elitists.	由于这种思想没有给个人的道德行为留下多少空间，社会批评家经常被嘲笑为天真的道德论或精英论者。


Perhaps this is one of the reasons why 15 years after the fall of Communism, we again witness political apathy.	或许这就是为什么在共产主义垮台15年后，我们再次见到政治冷漠现象的原因之一。


Democracy is increasingly seen as a mere ritual.	民主越来越被看作仅仅是一种仪式。


In general, Western societies, it seems, are experiencing a certain crisis of the democratic ethos and active citizenship.	总的说来，西方社会似乎正在经历某种民主思潮和活跃公民的危机。


It is possible that what we are witnessing is a mere change of paradigm, caused by new technologies, and we have nothing to worry about.	也许我们看到的现象只是一种由新的科技引起的范式转变，没有什么好担心的。


But perhaps the problem is deeper: global corporations, media cartels, and powerful bureaucracies are transforming political parties into organizations whose main task is no longer public service, but the protection of specific clienteles and interests.	但是问题的根源也许比这要深刻：全球化的公司、媒体卡特尔、以及强势的官僚制度正在把政党的主要任务转变成不再是服务大众，而是保护特定客户群和利益。 政治正在变成说客的战场；


Politics is becoming a battleground for lobbyists; media trivialize serious problems; democracy often looks like a virtual game for consumers, rather than a serious business for serious citizens.	媒体把严肃的问题大事化小； 民主常常看起来像是一场消费者的虚拟游戏，而不是严肃的公民面对的严肃问题。


When dreaming about a democratic future, we who were dissidents certainly had some utopian illusions, as we are well aware today.	今天我们清楚，当初在梦想民主的未来时，作为持不同政见者的我们肯定有某些乌托邦式的幻想。


However, we were not mistaken when we argued that Communism was not a mere dead end of Western rationalism.	但是，当我们辩称共产主义并非仅仅是西方理性主义的死胡同时，我们没有错。


Bureaucratization, anonymous manipulation, and emphasis on mass conformism were brought to "perfection" in the Communist system; however, some of the very same threats are with us today.	官僚主义、匿名操纵、以及对群众顺从的强调在共产主义制度中被发挥至“极致”； 然而，同样的威胁中有一部分今天仍然存在。


We were already certain then that if democracy is emptied of values and reduced to a competition of political parties that have "guaranteed" solutions to everything, it can be quite undemocratic.	当时我们就明白，如果掏空民主的价值，把民主降格成“保证”能解决所有问题的政党之间的竞争，这样的民主其实相当不民主。


This is why we put so much emphasis on the moral dimension of politics and a vibrant civil society as counterweights to political parties and state institutions.	这就是为什么我们花如此大的力气强调政治的道德方面和活跃的民众社会，以此作为政党和国家制度的平衡力。


We also dreamed about a more just international order.	我们还梦想建立更加公正的国际秩序。


The end of the bipolar world represented a great opportunity to make the international order more humane.	两极世界的结束是使国际秩序更加人性化的重大机遇。


Instead, we witness a process of economic globalization that has escaped political control and, as such, is causing economic havoc as well as ecological devastation in many parts of the world.	相反，我们看到了经济全球化。 这个过程绕过了政治控制，并在世界上许多地方造成了经济浩劫和生态灾难。


The fall of Communism was an opportunity to create more effective global political institutions based on democratic principles - institutions that could stop what appears to be, in its current form, the self-destructive tendency of our industrial world.	共产主义的垮台是在民主原则的基础上建立更加有效的全球政治制度——一种能够遏止我们的工业化世界当前似乎具有的自毁趋势的制度的机会。


If we do not want to be overrun by anonymous forces, the principles of freedom, equality and solidarity - the foundation of stability and prosperity in Western democracies - must start working globally.	如果我们不想被无名的力量践踏，那么，自由、平等和团结的原则——西方民主的��定和繁荣的基础——就必须在全球范围内发挥作用。


But, above all, it is necessary - just as it was during the Communist era - that we not lose faith in the meaning of alternative centers of thought and civic action.	但是，最重要的是——如同在共产主义时期一样——我们决不能丧失对另一种思维核心和民众行为的意义的信心。


Let's not allow ourselves to be manipulated into believing that attempts to change the "established" order and "objective" laws do not make sense.	我们决不能允许自己在别人的操纵下相信改变“既定”秩序和“客观”规律的努力是无用的。


Let's try to build a global civil society, and let's insist that politics is not just a technology of power, but needs to have a moral dimension.	让我们尝试建立一个全球性的民众社会。 让我们坚持政治不仅是舞弄权力，而更需要有一个道德的层面。


At the same time, politicians in democratic countries need to think seriously about reforms of international institutions, because we desperately need institutions capable of real global governance.	同时，民主国家的政客应该严肃地思考国际制度的改革，因为我们迫切地需要一种能真正覆盖全球的制度。 比如说，我们可以从联合国开始。


We could start, for example, with the United Nations, which, in its current form, is a relic of the situation shortly after the end of World War II. It does not reflect the influence of some new regional powers, while immorally equating countries whose representatives are democratically elected and those whose representatives speak only for themselves or their juntas, at best.	当今的联合国已经沦为二战刚结束时世界格局的遗物，并不能反映某些新兴地区强国的影响力，同时又不道德地把通过民主选举产生代表的国家和那些代表只为自己或（充其量）为其小圈子代言的国家等同起来。


We, the Europeans, have one specific task.	我们欧洲人有一个特殊的任务。


Industrial civilization, which now spans the whole world, originated in Europe.	如今横跨全球的工业文明源自欧洲。


All of its miracles, as well as its terrifying contradictions, can be explained as consequences of an ethos that is initially European.	工业文明带来的所有奇迹，连同那些可怕的副作用，都可以被看作是一种源自欧洲的社会思想的产物。


Therefore, unifying Europe should set an example for the rest of the world regarding how to face the various dangers and horrors that are engulfing us today.	因此，一体化的欧洲应该给世界上其他地区树立一个如何应对充斥于当今世界的各种危险和恐怖的榜样。


Indeed, such a task - which is closely tied to the success of European integration - would be an authentic fulfillment of the European sense of global responsibility.	的确，这样的任务——与欧洲一体化的成功与否密切相关——将真正地实现欧洲人的全球责任感。


And it would be a much better strategy than cheaply blaming America for the contemporary world's various problems.	而且比起草率地斥责美国造成了当今世界的各种问题，这个策略将有意义得多。


What Corporate Tax for Europe?	欧洲的公司税制


The European Commission is considering a common model of corporate taxation for the European Union that cannot possibly work.	欧盟委员会正在考虑一种适用于整个欧盟的公司税收共同模式。 但这种模式肯定是行不通的。


Instead, it should consider a simpler, and more viable, alternative that already exists.	因此，它应该考虑一种业已存在的，更为简单和可行的方案。


Corporate income in the EU is currently taxed under widely divergent national rules, based on separate accounting (SA) of income earned in each country.	对公司收入的征税目前欧盟各国都有不同规定。 其基础都是将公司在各个国家所得收入进行分别核算(SA)。


Cross-border intra-company transactions are accounted for according to market prices for similar transactions – the so-called “arm’s-length principle” (ALP).	公司内部的跨国交易根据类似交易的市场价核算—即所谓的“常规交易原则” (ALP)。


The system is complex, expensive to administer, and can result in double taxation because members usually do not allow full write-offs for losses and tax liabilities incurred abroad.	这种会计体系颇为复杂，管理成本高昂，并可能造成双重征税—因为各成员国通常不允许对发生在国外的亏损和税收义务进行完全销账。


It is also prone to tax evasion, owing to different definitions of corporate income in the member states and the vast opportunities for cheating offered by ALP (since reference market prices often do not exist), not to mention profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions.	由于各成员国对公司收入的定义不同，再加上ALP所提供的大量舞弊机会（因为市场参考价通常不存在），使得避税非常容易，更别说将利润转移到低税收国家。


The Commission is now proposing that EU companies operating in more than one member state be taxed on a common definition of earned income – the Common Consolidated Base Taxation (CCBT).	欧盟委员会正提议对在一个以上的欧盟成员国营运的欧盟公司采用共同的所得收入征税—即统一共同税基（CCBT）。


Earned income would be calculated on a consolidated basis for the group and then “apportioned” among the member states according to a formula reflecting each business unit’s contribution to overall group income.	该体系会把集团公司作为一个整体来计算所得收入，然后按照一个反映各业务单元对集团公司总收入的贡献的公式将收入“分配”到各成员国。


The formula could include such factors as sales, payroll, and tangible assets, as in Canada and the United States, or value-added, adjusted to exclude imports in order to measure the value-added “produced” in each country.	这一公式可能包括销售额、薪资和有形资产等要素（就像加拿大和美国那样）； 或者是计算不包括出口的增加值，以便衡量各国所“产出”的增值部分。


Each member state would remain free to decide the tax rate applicable to its portion of group income.	每个成员国都有权决定适用于该国那一部分公司收入的税率。


Under this approach, taxable income would be determined from the consolidated accounts based on international accounting standards (IAS), which since 2005 have become legally binding for EU-listed companies’ financial reports.	按照这种方式，可征税收入就会通过基于国际会计准则的(IAS)统一账目来决定。 从2005年起，该准则成为欧盟上市公司财务报告的法定标准。


This offers full tax write-offs for losses within company groups, and transfer prices would no longer matter.	这就为公司内部的亏损提供了完全的税务注销，而交易价格也不再重要。


Even so, the Commission’s proposal has fatal shortcomings.	即便如此，欧盟委员会的提案也有着致命的弱点。


For one thing, the factors included in the apportionment formula would in practice be taxed at the national rates, creating fresh incentives for factor- and profit-shifting.	就其中一点来看，分配公式中所包含的要素在实际操作中适用国家税率，这就为要素和利润的转移提供了动机。