It is these women’s voices that deserve support – not that of a scary stalking-horse for eight more years (or more) of rule by the thugs who looted America’s treasury, wrecked its economy, and sent 4,000 brave young men and women to die in a war based on lies.	这些女性的声音应该受到重视，而不是那些掠夺了美国的财富、糟蹋了它的经济并且把4000名勇敢的男性和女性送到一场用谎言堆积起来的战争去送死的强盗们为了再统治这个国家八年（甚至更长时间）而编造出来的漏洞百出的托词。


The Palin Non-Factor	佩林是个非要素


LONDON – Senator John McCain is a genuine American hero.	伦 敦-参议员麦凯恩是一个真正的美国英雄。


He was a brave airman, with a fine war record.	他曾是个勇敢的飞行员，有着良好的军中服役纪录。


Unlike the so-called “chicken hawks” who avoided service in the Vietnam War themselves but could barely wait to send young Americans into Iraq to fight, McCain’s life is not at odds with his politics.	而那些所谓的“鸡鹰”，他们自己逃避到越南战争服役，却迫不及待地把美国年轻人送到伊拉克的战场，但麦凯恩和他们不同，他的生活和他的政治主张并不矛盾。


In the Senate, while supporting President Bush’s war of choice in Iraq, he has been prepared to stand up for his independent judgment on issues such as campaign finance reform and climate change.	在参议院，即使他支持美国总统布什的向伊拉克开战的选择，他却一直准备捍卫他对问题的独立判断，比如在改革竞选资金的募集和气候变化的问题上。


So when, as a presidential candidate, McCain said that, if elected, he would seek to work with Democrats and independents, and that he would search for consensus, it was easy to believe him. After all, this is exactly how he had behaved as a senator.	因此，作为一个总统候选人，当麦凯恩说，如果他当选，他将寻求与民主党人和独立党派人士的合作并寻求共识，人们当时很容易相信他的话，毕竟，这正是他作为一个参议员的一贯的作风。


There seemed every chance that he would apply this approach to the choice of his running mate.	看来，在竞选伙伴的挑选上，他肯定也会采用相同的立场。


His friend Senator Joseph Lieberman, a former Democrat and a hawk on the Iraq war, appeared to be the most likely pick.	他的朋友，参议员约瑟夫·利伯曼，一位前民主党人和在伊拉克战争问题上的鹰派人物，似乎是最有可能的候选人。


We know what happened.	后来发生的事情我们都知道了。


With his campaign apparently dead in the water, McCain reached out all right – to the right-wing fundamentalists in his own party.	随着他的竞选显然陷入泥潭，麦凯恩极力接触本党内的右翼原教旨主义者。


Governor Sarah Palin strode onto the national stage, rhetorical guns blazing.	莎拉·佩林州长便大步跨上全国性的政治舞台，并大放令人眩目的华丽词藻。


Whatever else you say about the governor’s views, no one could call the choice of the “hockey mom” from Alaska a bold bid for consensus.	不管你对佩林州长的观点还有其它任何的评价，没有人可以将选择阿拉斯加“冰球妈妈”为竞选伙伴这一举动视为对共识的一个大胆寻求。


She was chosen, to borrow the commentators’ jargon, to energize the party base, which comprises hard-liners suspicious of McCain’s lack of enthusiasm for the causes that fire them up, such as creationism and a ban on abortion.	选择她，借用评论家的行话，是为了给共和党的基础注入活力，其中有对麦凯恩存有疑虑的强硬派，他们觉得麦凯恩对激起他们热情的议题如上帝创造人类灵魂论和禁止堕胎缺乏兴趣。


According to the McCain campaign’s calculus, a political outsider with redneck views would appeal to white working-class voters.	麦凯恩竞选团队的如意算盘是，一个政治外行并观念保守的人会对白人工薪阶层选民具有吸引力。


Moreover, a woman on his ticket might attract some of those disappointed by Senator Hillary Clinton’s loss to Senator Barack Obama in the Democratic race.	此外，他的选票上有一个女人可能会吸引因参议员希拉里·克林顿在民主党候选人提名竞选中败给参议员巴拉克·奥巴马而感到失望的一部分选民。


So far, the selection of Palin seems to have paid off.	到目前为止，对佩林的选择似乎已见成效。


Questions about her record have been sidestepped; her inexperience is lauded as a virtue; any criticism is dismissed as sexism.	有关她的过去的历史的疑问已消退;她经验的缺乏却被赞扬为是一种优点;任何对她的批评都以性别歧视为由被击退。


Speaking as a one-time campaign manager in British politics, there seem to be three important points for the Democrats to remember.	我以英国政界中曾担任过竞选经理的身份，认为民主党人似乎有以下重要的三点须牢记在心。


First, Palin is not at the top of the ticket.	首先，帕林不是来竞选正职总统的。


It is impossible to imagine her surviving a primary campaign.	无法想象她能经受住正职总统的选举活动。


She would never have withstood the searching inquiries of months of campaigning.	她绝不会顶得住数月的总统竞选活动中她要经受的对她要进行的搜索和调查。


But no one seems disposed to contemplate her heroic lack of qualifications to sit a heartbeat away from the Oval Office.	但是，似乎没有人愿意考虑她的英雄般的资格的缺乏，可以在万一总统心跳停止倒下时她是否有能力接任总统的职位。


Second, it is McCain whom the Democrats should attack.	其次，民主党要攻击的人应该是麦凯恩。


He would be president, not the Alaskan.	是他将成为总统，而不是那位阿拉斯加人。


It is McCain’s views on the economy and foreign policy, not Palin’s on Darwin and the wickedness of sex education, which should be the targets.	攻击的目标应是麦凯恩对经济和外交政策的观点，而不是佩林对达尔文主义和邪恶的性教育的观点。


The economy is not McCain’s strong suit.	经济方面不是麦凯恩的特长。


He was arguing as Wall Street went into meltdown that the American economy’s fundamentals were still strong.	他认为，当美国金融界崩溃的时候，美国经济的基本面仍然强劲。


McCain’s solution seems to be more of Bush’s policies – tax cuts for the rich plus promises to curb public spending.	麦凯恩的解决方案似乎更多来源于布什的政策，即对富人减税并承诺遏制公共开支。


How credible is that?	这些话有多大的可信度呢？


The Republicans under Bush have turned huge surpluses into terrifyingly large deficits.	共和党人在布什政府的领导下，把政府财政从巨额盈余变为大得恐怖的赤字。


The mortgage crisis and the credit crunch have led to bailouts for the banks and the nationalization of housing finance and insurance.	次贷危机和信贷紧缩已经导致对银行的救市和对住房贷款公司和保险业的国有化。


America needs to rein in its household and fiscal spending, so that it can cut the amount of money that it borrows and owes.	美国需要遏制家庭和财政支出，以便它能够削减借用和拖欠的金额。


It is not easy to do this when the rich get richer – enjoying their biggest spree since the Roaring Twenties – and average household income remains stagnant for the third decade running.	当富者愈富，富人们享受着自从“黄金繁荣的二十年代”以来最大的狂欢，而当家庭的平均收入连续第三个十年停滞不前的时候，要做到这一点是不容易的。


Social equity is not irrelevant even in America, the land of opportunity.	社会公平即使在美国这片充满机会的土地上也不是无关紧要的事。


When they get into the polling booth in November, will Americans vote on “culture wars” issues – sex and guns – or on the basis of whether they can afford to pay their mortgages?	当美国人11月进入投票站决定将选票投给谁时，他们考虑的是性别和枪支的“文化战争”的问题呢，还是是否能付得起房屋的抵押贷款呢？


As for foreign policy, it is Obama who has rightly said that America needs to switch the focus of its military operations from Iraq to Afghanistan.	至 于外交政策方面，正是奥巴马正确地指出了，美国需要把军事行动的重点从伊拉克转到阿富汗。


His opponent originally derided what has rapidly become the conventional wisdom.	以前他的对手曾嘲笑过的观念，现在已迅速成为基本常识。


Al-Qaeda still has bases with the Taliban on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.	基地组织还在在阿富汗和巴基斯坦边界与塔利班设有基地。


A serious effort to contain them and stamp them out requires an effective campaign in Helmand Province, North and South Waziristan, and the troubled areas between the poppy fields of Afghanistan and the madrasas of Pakistan.	认真努力去遏制和消灭他们，需要一个有效的运动在赫尔曼德省、北方和南方瓦济里斯坦和阿富汗的罂粟田和巴基斯坦宗教学校之间的动乱地区展开。


Finally, if America wants change, why vote for a ticket that has embraced the very attitudes that gave the Bush years their character, and exemplifies some of the reasons for its unpopularity and failures, from partisan bigotry and the assault on reason and science to the “America First” dismissal of the opinions of the rest of mankind?	为什么要投票给那些体现了布什政府不得人心的失败的一些理由的候选人呢？ 这些理由包括从党派偏见到对理智和科学的攻击，一直到“美国第一”而对人类其它地区的意见不闻不问的做法。


If I were a Democrat, I would leave Palin to the mercies of the investigating bloggers.	如果我是民主党人，我将把佩林留给热衷于调查的博客写手们去纠缠。


The election is too important to all of us to begin and end with her.	这次选举对我们大家来说太重要了，我们不能从开始到结束都围绕着她转。


I would get back to the central issues. That is where the election will be lost or won.	我还是会回到核心问题上来，那才是决定这场选举是胜是负的因素。


The Pandemic That Wasn’t	算不上流行病的流行病


PALO ALTO – Last June, the United Nations’ World Health Organization, responding to an outbreak of the H1N1 virus, or swine flu, boosted the pandemic alert to the highest level, Phase 6, meaning that a pandemic was under way – the first time in 41 years that the organization had taken that declared step.	帕洛阿尔托——去年6月，联合国世界卫生组织对H1N1病毒爆发性流行做出反应，将流行病警报级别提升到最高级别6级，也就是流行病已经爆发——这是世卫组织近41年来首次采取这样的公开行动。


But the outbreak appears to have ended less like the rogue wild boar that WHO bureaucrats predicted and more like a roasted pork tenderloin with apples and sage.	但这次病毒爆发似乎并不是世卫组织官员预想中的那头暴戾的野猪，而更像是一份配有苹果和鼠尾草烤猪脊肉。


In fact, the WHO repeatedly violated Sherlock Holmes’ warning, “It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence.”	事实上，世卫组织一而再、再而三地违反了夏洛克·福尔摩斯的警告，“在掌握所有证据之前就上升到理论高度是一种严重的错误。


And the pandemic alert was doubly strange, given that ordinary seasonal flu sweeps the world annually, is invariably far more lethal than the currently circulating low-virulence H1N1, and certainly meets the WHO’s definition of a pandemic: infections over a wide geographic area and affecting a large proportion of the population.	”而流行病警告更是让人感到双倍奇怪，因为普通的季节性流感每年都会席卷世界各地，而且无一例外地较之目前流行的低毒性H1N1病毒危害更大，这无疑符合世卫组织对于流行病的定义：在广泛的区域造成感染，影响很大一部分人的身体健康。


Ironically, the appearance of the H1N1 flu during the past nine months might be thought of as a net public-health benefit, because it appears to have suppressed, or at least supplanted, the far more virulent and lethal seasonal flu strains.	颇具讽刺意味的是，可以将九个月来H1N1流感病毒的出现看作一种公共健康的净造福因素，因为它似乎抑制、至少也是取代了毒性更大、致命性更强的季节性流感病毒。


During the second week of January, 3.7% of Americans tested positive for the seasonal flu, compared to 11.5% during the same week in 2009.	1月的第二个星期期间，有3. 7%的美国人季节性流感测试呈阳性，而在2009年的同一个星期，上述比率高达11.


The official death toll worldwide from H1N1 is under 14,000, while seasonal flu kills about 36,000 on average in the United States and hundreds of thousands elsewhere.	5%。 全世界因H1N1造成死亡的官方统计人数不到14，000人，而季节性流感仅在美国就平均导致36,000人的丧命，在世界其他国家更是杀害数十万人的元凶。


Most flu and public-health experts consider the WHO to have been overly alarmist.	多数流感和公共卫生专家认为世卫组织在H1N1病毒的问题上过于危言耸听。


The decision in April 2009 to raise the pandemic flu threat to the penultimate level, Phase 5 (“Pandemic Imminent”), already raced far ahead of the accumulated data, so the Phase 6 declaration in June revealed the organization’s paradigm to be fundamentally flawed.	2009年4月将流行病警报提高到次高级别5级（“流行病一触即发”）的决策已经远远超出了积累的统计数据，而6月又进一步提升为6级的决策更是一次暴露世卫组织根本缺陷的实例。


A warning system based solely on how widely a virus has spread, but that does not consider the nature and severity of the illness it causes, would classify as “pandemics” not only seasonal flu, but also the frequent but largely inconsequential outbreaks of virus-caused colds and gastroenteritis, for example.	如果警报系统只考虑病毒流行范围是否广泛，而不考虑其所造成疾病的性质和严重性，就会不仅将季节性流感划入“流行病”的范畴，同时也将病毒性感冒和肠胃炎等后果轻微的病毒爆发囊括进去。


(The WHO has never explained why these obvious examples do not meet their criteria.)	（世卫组织从来没有向公众解释为什么这些显而易见的实例不符合他们的流行病定义）。


False alarms make the “pandemic under way” designation almost meaningless and diminish its usefulness.	错误警报导致“流行病爆发”的结论不仅毫无意义，而且还降低了整个警报系统的可信度。


And that, in turn, has important consequences: as Jack Fisher, a professor of surgery at the University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine, observed, “Keep crying ‘wolf,’ and WHO can expect lower than customary compliance with flu vaccine advisories next fall.”	而这反过来造成的后果又非常严重：正如圣迭戈加州大学医学院的外科教授杰克·费舍尔所说的那样，“不停地喊‘狼来了’，人们对世卫组织明年秋天流感疫苗公告的重视程度就会降低。


Worse, imagine what would happen when we encounter a genuinely dangerous new pathogen, such as a strain of H5N1 avian flu (which in its current form has a mortality rate more than 100 times higher than H1N1) that is easily transmissible between humans.	”如果我们碰到了像H5N1禽流感病毒那样真正危险又很容易在人间传播的新病原体（其目前形式的致死率比H1N1病毒高100倍），那情况就会更加糟糕。


The UN’s false alarms also have had more immediate negative effects.	联合国的错误警报也带来了直接的副作用。


According to Matthew Hingerty, the managing director of Australia’s Tourism Export Council, the country lost thousands of tourists because of the WHO’s pandemic declaration.	按照澳大利亚旅游出口委员会总裁马修·辛格提的说法，世卫组织的流行病公告给该国造成了数千名旅游者的损失。


Egyptian public-health authorities overreacted and ordered the slaughter of all pigs in the country.	埃及公共卫生当局反应过度，下令屠宰国内的所有生猪。


In addition to the direct economic losses, because the pigs were no longer available to consume much of the garbage produced in Cairo, the numbers of rodents rose to fearsome levels.	除直接造成的经济损失外，因为没有生猪来消耗开罗市产生的大量垃圾，导致啮齿类动物的数目上升到吓人的地步。


The publicity and resulting panic surrounding the WHO’s announcement of Phase 5 and 6 alerts – especially in the absence (until December) of widely available vaccine – also brought out fraudsters peddling all sorts of ineffective and possibly dangerous protective gear and nostrums: gloves, masks, dietary supplements, shampoo, a nasal sanitizer, and a spray that supposedly coats the hands with a layer of anti-microbial “ionic silver.”	人们对世卫组织5级和6级公告的关注及由此带来的恐慌情绪——特别是在（12月前）没有可供人们广泛使用的疫苗的情况下——也催生了为数众多的骗子，他们推销各式各样无效甚至可能有害的秘方和护具：手套、面罩、膳食补充剂、香波、鼻腔清洁剂、还有一种据说能在手上镀上一层抗微生物“银离子”的喷雾剂。


For all these reasons, the declaration of a pandemic must not be a prediction but rather a kind of real-time snapshot.	由于所有这些原因，流行病公告不应是一种预测，而应当是事实情况的反应。


The WHO’s performance has been widely criticized: the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, for example, said on January 12 that it plans to debate “false pandemics, a threat to health” later this month.	世卫组织的所作所为受到了广泛的批评：如欧洲理事会议会大会就在1月12日提出计划在本月下旬就“威胁健康的虚假流行病”展开讨论。


And yet WHO officials continue to defend their actions.	但世卫组织的官员们却继续维护自己的举措。


In a January 14 conference call with reporters, Keiji Fukuda, the special adviser to the WHO’s director general for pandemic flu, argued that the organization did not overplay the dangers but “prepared for the worst and hoped for the best.”	在1月14日举行的媒体电话会议上，世卫组织总干事流感事务的特别顾问福田敬二就辩解说该组织并未夸大危险因素，而只是“在怀着最美好希望的同时做好最坏的准备。 ”


The WHO’s dubious decisions demonstrate that its officials are either too rigid or incompetent (or both) to make necessary adjustments to the pandemic warning system – which is what we have come to expect from an organization that is scientifically challenged, self-important, and unaccountable.	世卫组织令人怀疑的决策表明其官员或者过于死板、或者没有能力（或者两种原因兼有）对流行病警报系统做出必要的调整，这家机构不仅在科学上受到挑战、妄自尊大、而且对自己的所作所为不负责任。


It may be able to perform and report worldwide surveillance – i.e., count numbers of cases and fatalities – but its policy role should be drastically reduced.	它或许可以组织实施全球范围内的监督和报告——即统计发病和死亡人数——但它的政策作用应该受到严格的限制。


The Paracetamol Dilemma	扑热息痛的两难困境


WELLINGTON – Paracetamol (known as acetaminophen in the United States) is one of the world’s most commonly used drugs.	惠灵顿-扑热息痛（在美国又名醋氨酚）是世界上最常用的药物之一。 由于其安全性，它成为解热镇痛的首选药物。


It is the preferred medication for relieving fever and pain because of its safety profile.  However, 10 years ago, a hypothesis was proposed that the use of paracetamol may increase the risk of developing asthma.  It was suggested that a change from the use of aspirin to paracetamol among children in the US during the 1980’s may have contributed to the increasing prevalence of childhood asthma noted during this period.	但是10年前，有人曾推测扑热息痛的使用可能会增加感染哮喘病的危险。 有人认为二十世纪八十年代美国儿童不再使用阿斯匹林转而使用扑热息痛可能正是导致那段时期儿童哮喘病流行的原因所在。


Substitution of paracetamol for aspirin, researchers proposed, may have led to an enhanced allergic immune response, thereby increasing susceptibility to asthma and other allergic disorders.	研究人员认为用扑热息痛替代阿斯匹林可能导致过敏免疫反应的增强，由此增加了对哮喘和其他过敏性疾病的易感性。


Since then, a number of epidemiological studies have reported an association between asthma and exposure to paracetamol in the womb, in childhood, and in adulthood.	从那时起，多项流行病研究报告了哮喘与在怀孕期间、儿童以及成年阶段服用扑热息痛之间的关联性。


These studies led to the suggestion that the use of paracetamol may represent an important risk factor in the development of asthma.	这些研究使人们认识到服用扑热息痛可能是引起哮喘病感染的一个重要的危险因素。


The latest evidence to support this hypothesis comes from a large international epidemiological study of childhood asthma that was recently published in the medical journal The Lancet .	最近在医学杂志柳叶刀发表一项针对儿童哮喘病的大型国际流行病研究所得到的最新证据也支持这一推测。


This analysis, from the International Study of Asthma and Allergies in Childhood (ISAAC), involved more than 200,000 six- and seven-year-old children from 73 centers in 31 countries.	这项由国际儿童过敏气喘病研究组织所进行的研究分析了31个国家里的73个中心超过20万名六七岁的儿童。


The children’s parents or guardians completed written questionnaires about current symptoms of asthma, rhinitis (hayfever), and eczema, and about several risk factors, including use of paracetamol for fever in the child’s first year of life and frequency of paracetamol use in the past 12 months.	这些儿童的父母或监护人都完成了一份书面问卷调查。 该问卷询问了有关哮喘、鼻炎（花粉病）和湿疹的当前症状以及几个危险因素，包括在孩子一周岁以前使用扑热息痛治疗发热的情况以及在过去12个月中使用扑热息痛的频率。


The study identified that the reported use of paracetamol for fever in the first year of life was associated with symptoms of asthma in the six- and seven-year-old children.	该项研究揭示了在孩子一周岁以前使用扑热息痛治疗发热与孩子长到六七岁时的哮喘症状之间的关联性。


The association was present in all major regions of the world, with an estimated 46% increased risk following adjustment for other risk factors.	这种关联在世界所有主要的地区都存在，在经过对其他危险因素的调整后估计会使患哮喘的危险性增加46%。


A dose-dependent association between asthma symptoms at 6-7 years and paracetamol use in the previous 12 months was also observed.	研究人员还发现了六七岁儿童的哮喘病症状与此前12个月服用扑热息痛之间的关联性。


Similar associations were observed between the use of paracetamol and the risk of severe asthma symptoms.	同时还发现服用扑热息痛与严重的哮喘病症状之间也存在类似的关联性。


The proportion of asthma cases that could be attributed to exposure to paracetamol was calculated to be between 22% and 38%.	可能因服用扑热息痛而产生的哮喘病在所有哮喘病中所占的比例大约在22-28%之间。


Paracetamol use both in the first year of life and in children aged 6-7 was also associated with an increased risk of symptoms of rhinitis and eczema.	在一周岁以前以及六七岁时均服用扑热息痛的孩子被发现感染鼻炎和湿疹的可能性更高。


This suggests that the potential effect of paracetamol is not restricted to the airways and may affect a number of organ systems.	这表明扑热息痛的潜在影响并不只限于气管，还可能对多个器官系统有影响。


Identifying the potential mechanisms that might underlie the association between paracetamol and asthma (and other allergic disorders) was not a part of this study.	该项研究并不涉及找出可能引发扑热息痛与哮喘（以及其他过敏性疾病）之间关联性的潜在机制。


But other researchers have proposed a number of plausible mechanisms, primarily related to paracetamol’s negative effect on the body’s ability to withstand oxidant stress and its potential enhancement of the allergic immune response.	但是其他研究人员已经提出了多个似乎有道理的机制，这些机制主要指出了扑热息痛对人体抵抗氧化压力的能力的负面影响以及它能够潜在增强过敏免疫反应。


The authors emphasised that causality could not be established from a retrospective study of this design due to the numerous potential biases that may confound the association.  For example, it is known that viral respiratory tract infections in infancy such as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) are associated with an increased risk of asthma in later childhood and that paracetamol use for such episodes could have caused confounding in the study.	作者强调由于存在很多可能混淆这种关联性的潜在偏差，所以无法从对回顾性研究中确定其因果关系。 比如，大家都知道婴儿时期的病毒性呼吸道感染，如呼吸道合胞病毒（RSV）会增加该婴儿在儿童时期感染哮喘的可能性；


The study has contributed to the debate as to whether it is beneficial to treat fever in children, an issue comprehensively reviewed by Fiona Russell and colleagues in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization.	这项研究再一次引发了人们关于对儿童的发热症状是否有益的争论，Fiona Russell及其同事在世界卫生组织的公告中对这一问题进行了全面的探讨。


They propose that the available scientific evidence suggests that fever is a universal, ancient, and usually beneficial response to infection, and that its suppression under most circumstances has few if any demonstrable benefits.	他们指出目前可获得的科学证据表明发热是对感染的一种通用、古老并且通常是有益的回应，大多数情况下对它的抑制所获得的可论证的益处即便有也是极少的。


On the contrary, they suggest that suppressing fever may occasionally produce harmful effects, and conclude that widespread use of drugs to reduce fever should not be encouraged.	相反，他们指出抑制发热偶尔会产生有害的影响，并且得出结论说不应该鼓励广泛使用药物来抑制发热。


They recommend that in children their use should be restricted to situations of high fever, obvious discomfort, or conditions known to be painful.	他们建议只能在高烧、明显的不适或者非常疼痛的情况下才能对儿童使用这种药物。


What is agreed is the need for randomized controlled trials of the long-term effects of repeated use of paracetamol in children.	大家一致的看法是需要对儿童频繁使用扑热息痛的长期影响进行随即对照试验。


Only then will it be possible to develop evidence-based guidelines for its recommended use.	只有那样才有可能对它的建议使用制定出有证据为基础的指导方针。


Pending the results of such research, paracetamol remains the preferred drug to relieve pain and fever in childhood, to be used in accordance with WHO guidelines, which recommend that it should be reserved for children with a high fever (38.5Co or above).	在该项研究尚未得出明确的结果前，扑热息痛依然是为儿童解热镇痛的首选药物。 根据世界卫生组织的指导方针，它只能在儿童发��烧（38.


The use of aspirin in young children is contraindicated, owing to the risk of Reye’s syndrome, a rare but serious complication.	由于会感染雷氏综合征的危险，这是一种罕见但却非常严重的并发症。 禁止在年幼的孩子身上使用阿斯匹林。


Paracetamol also remains the preferred drug to relieve pain or fever in children or adults with asthma, because aspirin or other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs may provoke attacks of asthma in susceptible people with this condition.	扑热息痛依然是为感染哮喘的儿童或成人解热或镇痛的首选药物，因为阿斯匹林或其他不含类固醇的消炎药可能会使存在该症状的易感人群反复感染哮喘。


The Paradox of Blinking	争端的悖论


SINGAPORE – The world has recently witnessed two major diplomatic blinks.	发自新加坡——全世界最近见证了两件重大外交争端。


Japan, facing mounting pressure from China, unconditionally released a Chinese trawler captain whose ship had rammed a Japanese naval patrol boat.	首先是在中国不断加码的压力之下，日本无条件释放了一名曾驾船与日本海洋巡逻船相撞的中国渔船船长；


And US President Barack Obama did nothing when Israel refused to extend its freeze on new building construction in the West Bank, causing Israeli West Bank settlers to rejoice.	另外就是以色列拒绝延长西岸定居点冻结期，而美国总统奥巴马对此束手无策，当地的以色列定居者更是欢庆不已。


In the short run, it is clear who lost. In the long run, however, the outcome of backing down may not be so clear.	这些事件在短期内似乎胜负已定，但长远来看，示弱的一方也不是没有卷土重来的机会。


China, in particular, should weigh carefully the long-term political price of celebrating its supposed victory over Japan.	中国尤其要小心掂量这场所谓“对日胜利”所带来的长期政治成本。


According to Newton’s third law of motion, “for every action there is always an equal and opposite reaction.” Geopolitics has a similar law: whenever the world sees a new emerging power, the world’s greatest existing power tries, directly or indirectly, to block its rise.	按照牛顿第三运动定律——“物体A作用在物体B上的力必然产生一个大小相等方向相反的反作用力”，而地缘政治学也有条类似的法则——“每当世界出现一个新势力之时，旧有的统治势力必将想方设法遏制其崛起，不管使用直接还是间接的手段。


Today, the world’s greatest power is the US, and the greatest emerging power is China.	”当今世界的霸主当属美国，而中国则是最大的新兴势力。


So far, surprisingly, the US has not forged a strategy to thwart China’s rise.	但令人惊讶的是，美国迄今为止都未能制定一个阻挠中国崛起的战略。


The reasons for this geopolitical aberration are complex. But a key factor is that, until recently, China’s leaders have abided by the wise counsel of Deng Xiaoping: taoguang yanghui (conceal [our] capabilities and avoid the limelight), and shanyu shouzhuo (be good at keeping a low profile).	上述法则之所以失效，原因很复杂，但最关键的因素只有一条，那就是中国领导人一直都牢记着邓小平的箴言：韬光养晦，善于守拙。


China’s decision to browbeat the Japanese into submission over the fishing trawler, suggests that China may be throwing Deng’s geopolitical caution out the window.	而如今中国逼迫日本在船长事件上做出让步的行为，意味着邓小平的那一套已经被抛诸脑后了。


More recklessly, after securing the release of the trawler, China demanded an apology from Japan.	更让人觉得鲁莽的是，在确保船长将被释放之后，中方还要求日方做出道歉。


A major rule in international relations is never to make a demand that cannot be met.	须知外交中的一条重要守则就是永远不要提出对方无法满足的要求。


Having already been humiliated by China, such an apology would be politically suicidal for the Japanese government.	对于已经遭到了羞辱的日本政府来说，做出这样的道歉无异于政治自杀。


In fact, China should hope that no such apology is forthcoming.	事实上，中国不应期望日本会最终做出道歉。


In the past few decades, Japan has become a sleeping tiger.	在过去几十年，日本已经变成了一只沉睡的老虎。


Having outperformed the rest of Asia for more than a century, the Japanese have decided to slow down.	在超越了其他亚洲国家近一个世纪之后，日本人决定放缓脚步。


Japan has lost its drive to remain one of the world’s greatest powers, and it may never regain it.	日本已经失去了维护其世界大国地位的动力，而且似乎永远也找不回这种精神了。


But, given Japan’s history, one would be foolish to underestimate the country.	如果我们以日本的历史为鉴，就知道任何低估这个国家的人都是不智的。


While the world frets about North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons, it is useful to remind ourselves that Japan, should it choose, could become a nuclear power in a matter of weeks.	当全世界都在朝鲜和伊朗核武问题上焦头烂额之时，我们有必要提醒自己：只要日本愿意，它也能在几周内造出核武器。


It has all the ingredients, though painful memories of World War II and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have so far kept its leaders well away from developing a nuclear stockpile.	虽然广岛长崎的惨痛经历让日本领导人一直对核武器敬而远之，但日本人手里却是拥有全套核武原料和技术的。


Moreover, if Japan needs allies to balance the rise of China, it could easily turn not only to the US, but also to Russia and India.	此外，如果日本需要盟友来抗衡中国崛起的话，它不但可以依靠美国，连俄罗斯和印度也是人选之一。


In short, the geopolitical cards could turn out in Japan’s favor if China overplays its hand.	简而言之，如果中国做得过火的话，地缘政治因素很快会倒向对日本有利的一方。


Similarly, geopolitics does not work in Israel’s favor on the West Bank issue.	同理，地缘政治在西岸问题上并不对以色列有利。


When US global dominance was unquestioned, as in the 1990’s, it made sense for Israel to secure its long-term future by maintaining a stranglehold over the US Congress.	当美国的全球统治力在1990年代如日中天之时，以色列通过牢牢控制美国国会来谋求一个长远未来的做法无疑是明智的。


But American power has peaked.	但美国势力如今却正在走下坡路。


At its high water mark, the US, with 5% of the world’s population, accounted for close to 30% of global GDP.	当年风头正劲的时候，美国用占全世界5%的人口占据了全世界30%的GDP。


Given this spectacular economic performance, Americans could spend more on defense than the rest of the world combined.	而这种强大的经济实力令美国的国防军费几乎超过世界其他国家军费的总和。


All this, quite naturally, led to geopolitical hubris, in Washington and in Tel Aviv.	这正是这一切令华盛顿和特拉维夫当局在地缘政治上不可一世。


While US power will inevitably decline in relative terms, that of the 1.3 billion people who live in the Islamic world – the vast majority of them in Asia – will inevitably increase.	当美国的实力渐弱，13亿穆斯林（大部分居住在亚洲）的力量无疑将得到提升。


The rising economic tide that is lifting China and India will lift them as well.	而造就了中国和印度奇迹的经济增长也将使这些穆斯林受益。


Asian Muslims have the same mentality as the Chinese and Indians. What China and India are doing today, Asia’s Muslim societies will do tomorrow.	亚洲穆斯林的心智与中国和印度人不相上下，中国和印度的今天就是亚洲穆斯林的未来。


As a result, the combined GDP of the 57-member Organization of the Islamic Conference nations – now only about 13% of global output – will easily double in the coming decades.	届时57个伊斯兰会议组织成员国的GDP总量（目前只占全球的13%）将在未来几十年内轻易翻一番。


So time is no longer on Israel’s side.	所以以色列时日无多了。


The security fostered by America’s unchallenged global power has been shown to be an illusion.	由美国全球霸权所提供的保护伞将很快化为泡影。


Soon America will have to make major geopolitical adjustments, especially if its economy underperforms in the coming decade or two. Like the former Soviet Union, the US will have to carry out perestroika and cut defense spending.	很快美国将被迫做出地缘政治调整，尤其是其经济在未来10~20年内表现疲软的时候，并走上前苏联式的体制改革和军费削减之路。


As a friend of Israel, I am surprised that more of us are not calling on the country’s leaders to seize the brief geopolitical opportunity of a viable two-state solution, while the offer remains on the table.	当两国方案有效时，以色列却未能趁机把握住这个地缘政治机会，而作为以色列的友人，我对其他大多数友人的无所作为而感到震惊。


Israel’s continued humiliation of the Palestinians, now telecast live into hundreds of millions of Muslim homes, is generating unnecessary reservoirs of hate.	以色列��巴勒斯坦人的不断羞辱已经随着电视直播进入了数百万穆斯林家中，并积累着越来越深的仇恨。


The scenes of exultant West Bank settlers only aggravate this.	而那些西岸定居者欢天喜地的表现只能令这一切雪上加霜。


Israel’s recent falling out with its best friend in the Islamic world, Turkey, should have provided its leaders a premonition of the new world that is coming.	对于以色列领导人来说，该国最近与其最亲密的伊斯兰友邻土耳其之间所爆发的争端意味着一个新的世界正在降临。


The fallout with Turkey was a minor tremor.	与土耳其的争端只是一个微小的先兆。


With larger geopolitical earthquakes coming, the time for Israel to act is now.	更剧烈的地缘政治地震就在不远处，以色列只有立刻行动，才能趋吉避凶。


The Paranoid Style in Russian Politics	俄罗斯政治风格中的偏执


An old saying in politics in Moscow is that relations between the United States and Russia are always better when a Republican rules in the White House.	在莫斯科政坛有一个老的说法，那就是美国和俄罗斯的关系在共和党掌管白宫时总是会更好一些。


We are statesmen, and the Republicans are statesmen.	我们是政治家，而共和党人也是政治家。


Because we both believe in power, it is easy for the two of us to understand each other.	因为我们都相信强权，所以我们容易相互理解。


The problem with this saying is the paranoid mindset behind it, for it implies that the nature of Russian-US relations has not changed fundamentally since the Cold War’s end; that the animosities that exist between the two countries are those of two permanently implacable geopolitical opponents.	这一说法的背后隐藏的是偏执的思维定势，因为它表明冷战结束后俄美关系的实质并没有在根本上得到改变； 两国之间所存在的敌意是这两个永远无法缓和的地缘政治的对手之间的。


Russians, it seems, can only feel good about themselves if they are contesting the world’s great power head to head.	俄罗斯似乎只有在他们与世界上的强权直接对抗时才会感觉良好。


Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the Soviet Union’s collapse “the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.”	事实上，俄罗斯总统普京认为苏联的瓦解是“二十世纪最大的地缘政治灾难。 ”


As a result of this mindset, key elements in the Russian elite have tried mightily – and with some success, especially in recent years – to bring about a deterioration in Russian-US relations.	在这一思维定势的推动下，俄罗斯上层的重要部门极力恶化俄美关系。 他们特别是在过去几年中取得了某些成功。


The Kremlin appears to be seeking systematically to obstruct the US, even when obstruction does not seem to be in Russia’s national interest.	克里姆林宫似乎在系统性地寻求阻碍美国，即便这样做似乎并不符合俄罗斯的国家利益。


Thus, Russia sells high-technology weapons, including bombers, submarines, and perhaps an aircraft carrier, to China, which not only shares the world’s longest border with Russia, but also disputes parts of that border.	由此，俄罗斯把高科技的武器，包括轰炸机、潜艇甚至可能还有一艘航空母舰卖给了中国这个不仅与俄罗斯有着世界上最长的国界线，并且在部分国界线上还存在争端的国家。


Russia’s assistance to Iran in realizing its nuclear ambitions also falls into the category of self-destructive folly.	俄罗斯帮助伊朗实现其核梦想同样也是一种自毁性的愚蠢行为。


Not only is Russia building a civilian nuclear reactor in Iran, thereby helping to advance Iranian knowledge of the nuclear process; it is also reluctant to support efforts by the United Nations Security Council to press Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.	俄罗斯不但在伊朗建造了一座民用核反应堆，由此增进了伊朗人对核聚变过程的认识； 并且还不愿意支持联合国安理会要求伊朗不要发展核武器的努力。


Diplomatic obstruction is not the only means Russian elites use to foster antagonism with the US.	设置外交障碍并不是俄罗斯上层与美国实行对抗的唯一方式。


They also seek to inflame domestic public opinion.	他们还寻求激化国内民众的情绪。


To maintain their influence, it seems, they believe that they need to create an image of America as Russia’s implacable enemy, which, by extending NATO membership to ex-communist countries, is bringing an existential threat right to the country’s doorstep.	为了保持他们的影响力，似乎他们认为需要把美国树立为俄罗斯不可调和的敌人，因为美国授予前共产主义国家北约成员国的地位，从而把现实的威胁带到了这个国家的家门口。


Of course, this demonization is nothing like what we saw during the days of the USSR.	当然，这种妖魔化跟我们过去在苏联的时代所看到的完全不是一回事。


Nevertheless, Putin still considers it necessary to pose in front of television cameras every few months to report that Russian scientists have developed some new missile that can penetrate any anti-ballistic missile system that the US may erect.	尽管如此，普京依然认为他有必要每隔几个月时间就在电视镜头前露面报告说，俄罗斯的科学家们又研制出了某种新的导弹，能够冲破美国设立的任何反弹道导弹系统。


Why Putin’s advisors and public-relations managers encourage him to make these banal triumphalist announcements is difficult to fathom unless one comprehends the sense of grievance that almost all Russians feel at the loss of Great Power status.	为什么普京的顾问和公关指导会鼓励他去作这些老一套的必胜主义论调是很难让人理解的，除非你能认识到几乎所有俄罗斯面对他们强国形象的丢失所感受到的悲痛。


That trauma burns even deeper among Russia’s rulers, where it has generated a powerful and persistent psychological complex.	这种心理创伤在俄罗斯的执政者心中更为强烈，从而催生出一种强烈而又持久的心理情结。


For them, America and the West remain the ultimate enemy.	对于他们来说，美国和西方国家依然是他们最终的敌人。


Descartes famously said, “I think, therefore I am.”	笛卡尔曾经说过一句著名的话，“我思故我在。


Russia’s rulers appear to live by the credo, “I resist America, therefore I am great.”	” 俄罗斯的执政者似乎也有一个信条，“我抵抗美国，所以我很伟大。 ”


Consider the words of Vitaly Tretyakov, the editor of the weekly Moscow News , on the recent US elections. According to Tretyakov, “the coming to power of a Democrat as president in America is incomparably worse for us than the savage imperialism of today’s Republican administration.”	《莫斯科新闻周刊》的编辑Vitaly Tretyakov针对最近的美国大选有过这样的论调，“当美国是由一位民主党的总统掌权时对我们来说会比今天的共和党政府野蛮的帝国主义更糟糕。


Whereas “the Republicans’ actions are not aimed at us,” but instead “at Islamic terrorists and rogue states,” under a Democratic president, Russia would likely “become a prime focus of antagonism, due to our authoritarianism, our lack of democracy, stifling of freedom, and violation of human rights.”	”因为共和党的行动针对的不是我们，而是“伊斯兰恐怖分子和流氓国家，”如果出现的是一位民主党的总统，俄罗斯很有可能“会因为我们的独裁主义、我们的缺乏民主、压制自由和践踏人权而成为对抗的主要焦点。


Thus, for Tretyakov, “bad Bush and his Republicans are better for us than the very bad Democrats.”	”因此，对于Tretyakov来说，“糟糕的布什和他的共和党对我们来说会比更糟糕的民主党更好。 ”


Tretyakov is hardly alone.	Tretyakov不是唯一有这种想法的人。


On the contrary, his morbid logic is a perfect reflection of the paranoid vision that has taken hold in the Kremlin.	恰恰相反，他病态的逻辑恰好反映了克里姆林宫偏执的观念。


But what if these people get their wishes, and NATO collapses and Islamists triumph?	但是如果这些人真的实现了他们的愿望，而北约垮台了并且伊斯兰主义者成功了怎么办？


Who then will stop their advance towards Russia’s southern borders from Afghanistan and Central Asia?	到那时候谁来阻止他们越过俄罗斯南面的边界向阿富汗和中亚挺进？


The problem with diplomatic paranoia is not that someone is after you, but that you are unable to tell the difference between a real enemy and an imagined one.	外交上的多疑症的问题不是在于 有人跟在你的背后，而是你无法分清一个真正的敌人和一个臆想的敌人。


The Particle-Emissions Dilemma	颗粒物排放的两难抉择


STOCKHOLM – Particle emissions into Earth’s atmosphere affect both human health and the climate.	斯德哥尔摩——进入地球大气层的颗粒物排放会影响气候和人类的健康。


So we should limit them, right?	因此应该竭力限制，对不对？


For health reasons, yes, we should indeed do that; but, paradoxically, limiting such emissions would cause global warming to increase.	从健康的角度考虑，上面的答案是肯定的； 但矛盾的是，限制此类排放会导致全球变暖情况恶化。


Why?	这究竟又是为什么？


The combustion of fossil fuels, wood, and other biomass increases the amount of airborne particles, which, in a somewhat simplified manner, we can describe as “white” or “black.”	燃烧化石燃料、木材和其他生物物质会增加“黑”、“白”两类空气悬浮颗粒。


Both types can be found in varying amounts in all emissions.	所有排放中均含有数量各异的这两种物质。


Most black particles stem from small-scale and inefficient burning of biofuels, and, in Asia and Africa, from the burning of agricultural waste.	黑色颗粒大多来自小规模、低能效的生物燃料燃烧，也可能来自亚洲和非洲的农业废弃物焚烧。


By contrast, white particles consist largely of sulfur from the burning of coal and oil.	相比之下，白色颗粒则主要来自于燃烧煤和石油所产生的硫。


Because black particles contain soot and absorb sunlight, they are believed to increase global warming.	因为黑色颗粒含烟尘并能吸收阳光，他们被认为会导致全球变暖增加。


White particles, however, reflect some of the incoming sunlight back into space, producing a cooling effect on Earth’s climate.	但白色颗粒能将射入的部分阳光反射回宇宙，因此对地球气候会产生冷却的效果。


Indeed, according to the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the cooling effect of white particles may counteract as much as about half of the warming effect of carbon dioxide.	事实上，按照联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会的估算，多达半数的二氧化碳增温效果可以被白色颗粒物的冷却效果所抵消。


So, if all white particles were removed from the atmosphere, global warming would increase considerably.	因此，如果彻底清除了大气中所有的白色颗粒物，会导致全球变暖问题大幅度增加。


The dilemma is that all particles, whether white or black, constitute a serious problem for human health.	问题在于无论黑色还是白色，所有颗粒物都会严重影响人类的健康。


Every year, an estimated two million people worldwide die prematurely, owing to the effects of breathing polluted air.	每年，全球估计有200万人由于呼吸遭到污染的空气而过早死亡。


Furthermore, sulfur-rich white particles contribute to the acidification of soil and water.	此外，富硫的白色颗粒也会造成土壤和水源的酸化。


Lowering the level of black particles in the atmosphere would benefit both human health and the climate.	降低大气中黑色颗粒物的水平将会对气候和人类健康产生积极的影响。


Measures aimed at accomplishing this could be particularly effective in countries where emission standards for diesel-fueled vehicles have not yet been introduced, and in countries, especially in Asia and Africa, where rural dwellings are heated by primitive stoves and food is prepared over open fires, causing large emissions of soot particles.	在尚未出台柴油车废气排放标准以及在亚洲和非洲等农户依靠原始炉具取暖和明火烹制食品导致烟尘颗粒物大量排放的国家，降低大气中黑色颗粒的相关措施可能取得特别的效果。


In 2011, the United Nations Environment Program published a report comparing measures targeting soot particles and other so-called “short-lived climate pollutants” to measures reducing CO2, which showed that the former would achieve a more rapid decrease of global warming in the coming decades.	2011年，联合国环境计划署发表了一份比较烟尘颗粒物及其他所谓“短效气候污染物”的减排和二氧化碳减排措施的报告，显示前者能够在未来几十年内更快地缓解全球变暖现象。


The proposal in this report is now gaining support among governments in many countries and may become an important complement to measures to limit CO2 emissions of.	这份报告中的建议正得到越来越多国家政府的支持，并可能成为限制二氧化碳排放的重要补充措施。


Naturally, measures targeting soot and other short-lived particles must not undermine efforts to reduce CO2 emissions.	当然，针对烟尘和其他短效颗粒物所采取的措施不应影响到二氧化碳的减排努力。


In the long term, emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases constitute the main problem.	长远来看，二氧化碳和其他长效温室气体的排放才是必须解决的主要问题。


But a reduction in emissions of soot (and other short-lived climate pollutants) could alleviate the pressures on the climate in the coming decades.	但减少烟尘（和其他短效气候污染物）排放可能会在今后几十年减轻对气候造成的压力。


So, what do we do about white particles?	因此，我们应该对白色颗粒物采取哪些措施？


How do we weigh improved health and reduced mortality rates for hundreds of thousands of people against the serious consequences of global warming?	在数十万人健康状况改善、死亡率降低和全球变暖的严重后果之间我们该如何取舍？


It is difficult to imagine that any country’s officials would knowingly submit their population to higher health risks by not acting to reduce white particles solely because they counteract global warming.	很难想象有哪个国家的官员会明知白色颗粒物对国民造成的健康危害而不采取行动，就因为这样做能抵消全球变暖所造成的后果。


On the contrary, sulfur emissions have been reduced over the last few decades in both Europe and North America, owing to a desire to promote health and counter acidification; and China, too, seems to be taking measures to reduce sulfur emissions and improve the country’s terrible air quality.	相反，过去几十年来由于希望增进健康和抵御酸化，欧洲和北美国家的硫排放量已经开始减少； 中国也似乎正在采取措施减少硫的排放，改善国内可怕的空气质量。


But, in other parts of the world where industrialization is accelerating, sulfur emissions continue to increase.	但是，随着世界其他地区工业化速度的逐步加快，硫排放量也开始持续增加。


One way out of the dilemma could be to allow higher sulfur emissions in sparsely populated areas where the soil is not vulnerable to acidification.	解决难题的办法之一是在人烟稀少的地区允许更多硫的排放，因为那里的土壤不那么容易酸化。


Here, emissions from ship traffic on the open seas come to mind.	公海上航行的船只是个很容易想到的例子。


However, this is probably not a viable alternative.	但这或许不是一个可行的选择。


The most reasonable conclusion is that we should limit particle emissions to reduce health risks.	最合理的结论是我们应该为了降低健康风险而限制颗粒物的排放。


As a consequence, the greenhouse effect would come more fully into view, which we could then hope would further strengthen the resolve to reduce emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.	这样的话温室效应会变得更为显著，我们希望二氧化碳和其他温室气体减排的决心会因此进一步增强。


Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen has suggested another solution: manipulate the climate by releasing white sulfur particles high up in the stratosphere, where they would remain for several years, exerting a proven cooling effect on Earth’s climate without affecting human health.	诺贝尔奖得主保罗·克鲁岑提出了另外一种解决方案：即向高空平流层释放白色的含硫颗粒，让其在那里停留数年，并在不影响人体健康的情况下发挥可以证实的冷却效果。


In 1991, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines created a haze of sulfur in the higher atmosphere that cooled the entire planet approximately half a degree Celsius for two years afterwards.	1991年菲律宾皮纳图博火山喷发释放到高空大气层的硫烟雾在之后的两年时间内导致全球气温降低了摄氏半度。


Other methods of geoengineering – that is, consciously manipulating the climate – include painting the roofs of houses white in order to increase the reflection of sunlight, covering deserts with reflective plastic, and fertilizing the seas with iron in order to increase the absorption of CO2.	把屋顶漆成白色以增强阳光反射、用反光塑料覆盖沙漠、以及在海水中注入铁离子以增加对二氧化碳的吸收，这些地球工程方法都可以刻意操控气候。


According to the Royal Society in Britain, releasing sulfur particles into the stratosphere would probably be the most cost-effective method.	按照英国皇家学会的估算，向平流层中释放硫粒子也许是性价比最高的方法。


But our goal should be to avoid such a hazardous enterprise, which future generations would have to continue for hundreds of years.	但我们应该避免采用这种危险的办法，因为我们的子孙后代将不得不在今后几百年内继续使用。


Instead, we should aim to reduce emissions of CO2 and other pollutants that contribute to global warming.	相反，我们应该减少导致全球气候变暖的二氧化碳和其他污染物的排放。


The Party is Over	狂欢结束了


MUNICH – With the United States teetering into recession, the global economic boom has ended.	慕尼黑amp#45;amp#45;随着美国经济进入衰退，全球经济繁荣已经结束。


The boom was unusually long and persistent, with four years of roughly 5% growth – a period of sustained economic dynamism not seen since around 1970.	这一繁荣不同寻常地长久和具有韧性，四年来每年增长5%，这一持续经济活力时期为1970年左右以来所罕见。


The clearest sign that the boom is ending is the IMF’s forecast of 1.5% growth for the US in 2008.	这一繁荣正在结束最为明显的迹象就是国际货币基金组织预计美国经济在2008年增长1.


That may not sound like a recession, but the Fund’s marginally positive projection primarily reflects the growth overhang from 2007, with hardly any new contribution in 2008.	5%。 这听起来或许不是衰退，但是该组织勉强正面的预计主要反映了2007年的增长剩余，而2008年则基本没有什么新的增长贡献。


It is compatible with three consecutive quarters of zero growth in 2008.	这与2008年连续三个季度零增长是相符合的。


Many argue that a US recession will no longer affect the world because China has supplanted America as an engine of the global economy.	许多人认为美国经济衰退不会再影响世界，因为中国已经取代美国成为全球经济的发动机。


Wrong.	这是错误的。


Although China is growing fast, its economic power remains tiny.	尽管中国正在快速增长，但是它的经济实力还是不足为道。


While the US contributes 28% to world GDP, China accounts for only 5%.	美国经济占全球GDP总量的24%，中国只有5%。


The whole of Asia, from Turkey to China, contributes 24%, less than the US alone.	从土耳其到中国的整个亚洲占24%，比美国一个国家还要少。


At some stage, the world may no longer catch a cold when the US sneezes, but that is far from being true now.	在某些阶段，当美国打喷嚏的时候，世界或许不会再感冒，但是现在还远远不是这样。


Twenty-one percent of China’s exports and 23% of the EU’s exports to non-member countries go to the US.	中国出口的21%和欧盟非成员国之间出口的23%销往美国。


Thus, the world cannot help but be pulled down by a US slump.	这样，世界必然会被美国的经济衰退拉下来。


The most recent CESifo World Economic Survey (WES) from 90 countries confirms this.	来自90个国家最新的CESifo世界经济调查(WES)确认了这一观点。


Assessments of the current economic situation and expectations for the next six months have worsened everywhere.	各地对当前经济形势和对今后六个月的评估都恶化了。


In both western and eastern Europe, the index sank more than in Asia or Latin America.	在东欧和西欧，指数下降超过亚洲和拉美。


The decline in the WES indicator during the last two quarters was the sharpest since 2001, when the stock market bubble burst.	过去两个季度的WES指数下降是2001年以来最为剧烈的，当时股票市场泡沫破裂。


In the US, the WES indicator is now below the level of September 11, 2001 and so is the Michigan index of consumer confidence.	在美国，WES指数现在低于2001年9月11日，密执根大学消费者信心指数也是如此。


For many years, the US has lived beyond its means: a household saving rate close to zero and investment financed solely with foreign funds.	多年来，美国一直是入不敷出。 家庭储蓄率接近零，而且投资全部由外资提供。


The US current account deficit, which is identical to net capital imports, grew steadily to an annual $811 billion in 2006, or 6% of GDP – by far the largest since the Great Depression.	美国的经常项目赤字与资本净流入相等，在2006年稳步增长到每年八千一百一十亿美元，相当于GDP的6%，这是经济大萧条以来最大的。


Year after year, the US managed to sell its assets abroad and enjoy the high life at home.	美国年复一年地向国外出售其资产，在国内享受高端生活。


No longer.	现在不会再这样了。


The world has caught on.	世界已经觉醒了。


Banks everywhere are learning the hard way that the debt with which the US financed its consumption boom will not necessarily be repaid.	各地的银行都在痛苦地醒悟到美国用来提供消费繁荣的债务并不一定会偿还。


The mortgage-backed securities that US banks succeeded in selling to the world are not comparable to European assets with similar names.	美国银行成功地销往世界的用房屋按揭贷款支持的证券无法与名字相似的欧洲资产相比。


In Europe, particularly Germany, a mortgage-backed security ( Pfandbrief ) is an ultra-safe asset, as normally banks finance no more than 60% of a house’s value.	在欧洲，特别是德国，用房屋按揭贷款支持的证券是极为安全的资产，因为银行提供的按揭贷款一般不超过房产价值的60%。


By contrast, such US securities are like a lottery ticket.	与此相比，美国的这种证券就像是彩票。


US banks finance up to 100% of a house’s value, sometimes even more, and the sub-prime market even includes loans to people without jobs and income.	美国银行提供房屋价值100%的贷款，有时甚至更多，而次级房贷市场甚至包括向没有工作和收入的人提供贷款。


Many European banks may not have understood this, yet they still shied away from revealing these dubious investments on their balance sheets.	许多欧洲银行或许还不会理解这一点，但是它们还回避披露它们的资产负债表上这些含糊不清的投资。


Instead, they placed them in conduits based in low-tax countries.	相反，它们把这些放在了低税收国家的投资管道上。


Those conduits are now showing gigantic losses that have to be covered by the parent banks, some of which are being driven to the brink of bankruptcy.	这些投资管道目前损失惨重，不得不由母银行出面掩护，有些已经濒临破产。


This spring will show the necessary write-offs in the annual balance sheets, but the full truth will not become known before the 2008 balance sheets are published in the spring of 2009.	今年春天的年度资产负债表里将会有必要的销帐，但是在2009年春季发表2008年的资产负债表以前人们还是无法知道整个真相。


As American assets have lost their attractiveness, their prices have dropped.	在美国资产丧失吸引力的时候，它们的价格下降。


This has meant either a decline in asset prices quoted in dollars or in dollars quoted in other currencies.	这就意味着要么以美元计价的资产价格下降，要么以其他货币计价的美元价格下降。


Indeed, adjusted for inflation, the dollar is now nearly as low against the euro as it was against the deutschmark in 1992, when German unification resulted in the breakdown of the European currency system.	实际上，在计入通货膨胀以后，现在美元与欧元相比就和1992年美元后德国马克相比那样低，当时德国统一造成欧洲货币体系的崩溃。


The prices of US homes are also declining at an accelerating rate, in many areas by more than 10% per year.	美国房产价格同样也以加速度下降，在许多地区每年下降超过10%。


The prices of traded mortgage-backed securities have followed house prices down.	用��交易的用房屋按揭贷款支持的证券价格也随着房产价格下降。


Only US stock market prices have remained relatively stable.	只有美国的股市保持相对稳定。


But it is only a matter of time until they fall, too.	但是股市下跌也只是一个时间上的问题。


After all, the Standard ampamp; Poor’s US price-earnings ratio is still above its long-term average – 26.84 in 2007, compared to its long-term average since 1881 of 16.31.	毕竟，标准普尔的美国市盈率还是高于其长期平均水平，在2007年达到26. 84，而自1881年以来的长期平均水平是16.


This asset meltdown is the reason for the likely recession.	这一资产破灭就是可能到来的衰退的原因。


First, consumers, faced with tighter credit and falling house values, will need to cut spending, slowing the US economy and affecting all countries via world trade.	首先，消费者面临银根紧缩和房价下降就会不得不减少开支，从而减缓美国经济并且通过世界贸易影响所有国家。


Second, with banks losing substantial amounts of equity capital – estimates now reach $300 billion and more – the need to maintain minimum equity-debt ratios will force them to curtail business lending, hindering investment demand.	第二，银行的资产资本损失惨重，估计达到三千亿美元或者更多。 为了维持资本负债率，它们被迫限制企业借贷，从而阻碍投资需求。


True, the US Federal Reserve has tried to prevent a recession by cutting its interest rates.	的确，美联储已经通过降息来试图防止经济衰退。


But the Fed cannot endow the banks with new equity capital and prevent a credit crunch.	但是美联储无法赋予银行新的资产资本并且防止信贷紧缩。


More promising is the $150 billion tax cut that the US Congress recently enacted.	更为具有前途的是美国国会最近通过的一项一千五百亿美元的减税措施。


Equivalent to 1% of US GDP, it is large by all accounts.	这一减税相当于美国GDP的1%，其规模无论用什么标准来说都是庞大的。


Whether it is enough to compensate homeowners for the wealth losses resulting from declining house prices and to prevent the impending recession remains to be seen.	这一减税是否足以补偿房主们由于房价下降而带来的财富损失并且防止山雨欲来的衰退还有待观察。


But, whatever happens, the party is over.	但是无论如何，狂欢结束了。


The PC Turns 25	个人电脑年满25周岁


In August 1981, IBM introduced the 5150 personal computer.	1981年8月，IBM推出5150个人电脑。


It was not really the first personal computer, but it turned out to be “The Personal Computer,” and it revolutionized not just business life, but also the way people thought about the world.	它并不是第一台个人电脑，但却是“独一无二的个人电脑”，而且它不仅将商业生活、而且将人们看待世界的方式进行了翻天覆地的变革。


The 1981 PC was a break with IBM’s previous business model, according to which it did not sell computers, but leased them.	1981年的个人电脑与IBM先前的商业模式迥然而异。 根据以往的模式，IBM并不出售电脑，而是租赁电脑。


With the 5150, IBM moved into mass production of a standardized commodity using components produced by other companies.	随着5150电脑的来临，IBM转而使用由其他公司生产的配件大规模生产电脑这一标准化商品。


“Big Blue” (as IBM is known) allowed other companies (notably the infant Microsoft) to develop its software.	“蓝色巨人”（人们这样称呼IBM）允许其他公司（著名的是襁褓之中的微软）来开发软件。


No good deed goes unpunished: by making the PC, IBM practically destroyed itself as a company.	最终还是恩将仇报。 IBM制造了个人电脑，结果几乎自取灭亡。


Its innovation gave rise to a huge number of new and dynamic companies, forcing IBM to reinvent itself completely in order to compete with them – just one example of the socially transformative effects of the PC.	它的创新导致了一大批新兴和充满活力的公司，迫使IBM为了与它们竞争而洗心格面。 这仅仅是个人电脑的社会转变效力的一个例子而已。


Before 1981, visionaries who thought about the impact of technology on society believed that the computer would allow a centralization of knowledge and power.	1981年以前，高瞻远瞩、思考技术对社会影响的人士相信，计算机将会形成知识和权力的集中。


This was the world of George Orwell’s Big Brother, the extrapolation of the twentieth century’s experience of totalitarianism.	这是一个奥维尔推断二十世纪极权主义体验的小说《老大哥》中的世界。


Powerful computers led to potent states and powerful and centrally directed business corporations.	功能强大的电脑导向强权国家以及强大集权的商业公司。


The PC seemed at first to promise a restoration of the balance in favor of the individual.	个人电脑起初看起来会恢复有利于个人的平衡。


Computing became decentralized, and the new flexibility produced a sense that control was moving away from big agglomerations of power – whether governments or companies.	计算变得集权，而新的灵活性产生了一种感觉，那就是控制正在从政府或者公司等权力集中之处转移出来。


It is not surprising that the triumph of the PC seemed to be accompanied by a revival of the nineteenth-century vision of classical liberalism and individualism.	个人电脑的胜利看起来伴随着十九世纪古典自由主义和个人主义的复苏，这也就不足为奇了。


The idea was that an individual could buy a computer and the software needed for a specific (and increasingly complicated) purpose, and immediately generate a productive result.	当时的想法是，个人可以购买电脑以及专门（以及越发复杂）目的所需要的软件，然后立即产生效果。


Indeed, within a few years, individuals would possess in a small machine as much computing power as the mainframe IBM 360’s that had revolutionized centralized computing in the 1960’s.	确实，在几年之内，个人将会在一个小机器中拥有像在二十世纪六十年代将集中计算进行革命性改变的IBM360巨型机那样的计算能力。


But this initial triumph of the PC (and very substantial sales in the 1980’s) did not immediately fulfill all the initial hopes for individual empowerment and social transformation.	但是个人电脑的最初胜利（以及二十世纪八十年代实质性的销售业绩）并没有实现所有对个人拥有权力以及社会变革的最初希望。


It did not seem to produce many efficiency gains, despite enormous investments in information technology.	尽管在信息技术上投入巨资，它看起来并没有提高多少效率。


Immense amounts of time were wasted in enterprises by informal requests for assistance, forcing knowledgeable workers to become computer gurus in order to aid their colleagues.	非正式的援助要求浪费了大量的时间，迫使知识广博的员工成为计算机权威以便帮助他们的同事们。


The initial disappointment about electronic productivity was thus a vivid demonstration of the limits of classical individualism.	对于电子生产效率的最初的失望因此也就展示了古典个人主义的局限。


Only with inter-connection in the 1990’s, above all through the Internet, did the PC realize its potential.	只是随着二十世纪九十年代的互联、最重要的是通过互联网，个人电脑才实现了它的潜力。


Suddenly, economists (especially in the United States) began to measure substantial productivity gains.	突然之间，经济学家们（特别是美国的）开始衡量起实质性的生产效率提高来了。


New forms of activity – Internet auctions, Internet encyclopedias, Internet chat rooms –reproduced over a much wider area the interactions of individuals.	互联网拍卖、互联网百科全书、以及互联网聊天室等新形式的活动在更大的领域内繁衍了个人之间的互动。


Interlinked PC’s really created a sense of a vibrant social market.	内部连接的个人电脑的确产生了充满活力的社会市场的感觉。


Individuals could realize themselves, as in the old nineteenth-century model, but only to the extent that they interacted with as many other people as possible.	个人可以以老的、十九世纪的模式实现自我，但是限度在于他们与尽可能多的人互联。


It was these interactions, rather than the individual on his or her own, that created value and set in motion a dynamic process.	正是这些互动，而不是个人自身才创造了价值，并开启了一个充满活力的进程。


The potential was alluring, but also terrifying.	潜力是诱人的，但也是令人害怕的。


The linking of PC’s produced scares about the potential dangers of the new world.	个人电脑的连接产生了有关新世界潜在危险的恐惧。


People were afraid of malevolent computer viruses that would sweep the world and destroy information and programs in the space of a few hours.	人们害怕恶意的、在几个小时内横扫世界并摧毁信息和程序的计算机病毒。


There was widespread fear that dependence on computers would produce a millennial catastrophe, as hospitals, airplanes, power grids, and communications would all grind to a halt when 1999 became 2000.	许多人担心在1999年变成2000年的时候，由于依赖电脑，医院、飞机、电网以及通讯都会陷于瘫痪而产生千年灾难。


These traumas required responses very different from previous technological changes.	这些灾难要求的对应措施与先前的技术变革大不相同。


Government regulation was incapable of dealing with the issues involved, although it was certainly helpful to devise ways of making destructive hackers criminally responsible.	政府法规尽管采取了手段让破坏性的骇客们承担刑事责任，无疑有所帮助，但是却无法处理所涉及的问题。


Nor would innovation by one company help.	某一单个公司的发明也无济于事。


A solution required generally collaborative efforts – of a sort that corresponded to an ancient vision of civic republicanism rather than the modern ideas of centralized power or isolated and autonomous individuals.	解决方案要求的是通力协作，这种协作对应的是民间共和主义的古老愿景，而不是集权或者各自为营、独立自主的个人的现代观念。


Some observers believe that this interconnectivity has now, after a quarter-century, made the PC obsolete.	有些观察家们相信，在四分之一世纪以后，这一互联使得个人电脑过时了。


There are more specialized applications of computing and information technology in smart machines and mobile telephones, whose defining characteristic is that they communicate with each other.	现在，灵巧的机器和手机中有了专业化的计算程序以及信息技术，它们与众不同的特点是可以相互交流。


But the alleged obsolescence of the PC is actually a sign of how basic it has become to a new vision of society.	但是，指称中的个人电脑过时实际上表明，对于一个新的社会愿景而言，个人电脑是多么的基本。


We need to celebrate, advertise, and propagandize new innovations only when their success is questionable, before they have become widely accepted.	只有当新的创新成功还不确定、尚未被广泛接受的时候，我们才需要庆贺、传播以及宣扬��们。


In the eighteenth century, cheap and washable cotton undergarments produced a revolution in hygiene, but soon this had become so commonplace that the cotton revolution no longer generated any excitement.	在十八世纪，廉价的、可以洗涤的棉制内以产生了卫生的革命，但是马上这就变得司空见惯，以至于棉花革命不再产生任何激动。


The PC has become the modern equivalent of cotton: so basic has it become to our lives that, despite the fact that around 200 million PC’s are sold each year, it now simply generates an electronic yawn.	个人电脑已经相当于现代的棉花。 它对于我们的生活是如此基本，尽管每年大约销售两亿台个人电脑，产生的只不过就是一个电子哈欠而已。


But, like the cotton revolution, the true measure of the social and political transformations wrought by the PC will become clear only after a much longer time.	但是，就象是棉花革命一样，个人电脑所制造的社会和政治变革的真实程度只有在更长的一段时间以后才可以见分晓。


The People Versus Putin	人民与普京


I helped select Vladimir Putin to succeed Russia’s first democratically elected President, Boris Yeltsin.	选择普京来接替俄国第一位民选总统叶利钦，我是起了作用的。


Because KGB/Mafia structures now rule Russia and manipulate the judicial system, it is assumed that Yeltsin wanted to handpick his successor in order to avoid future prosecution.	由于克格勃/黑手党体制现在统治着俄国，操纵着我们的司法系统，人们都认为叶利钦希望亲自指定自己的继任者，以避免在未来遭受迫害。


But we who chose Putin were charged with finding someone to continue Yeltsin’s reforms, not shield him and his family.	有人指责我们这些普京的拥戴者只顾找人继续叶利钦的改革，而不顾他和他的家庭在未来是否安全。


Indeed, Yeltsin was fearless, and sought not his personal survival, but the survival of the democratic idea that he introduced to Russia.	实际上，叶利钦是无所畏惧的，他追求的不是个人安全与否，而是自己引入俄国的民主思想能否最终实现。


Yet that idea is now under threat because of the successor we chose.	但我们所选择的继任者正在对这种民主思想构成威胁。


I don’t deny my responsibility for supporting Putin.	我并不否认在支持普京这件事上，自己是有责任的。


We weren’t close friends, but he and I worked together in critical situations, and I never doubted his sincerity.	我们虽然算不上密友，但曾在危急关头亲密合作，我也从未对他的真诚产生过任何怀疑。


Putin acts according to his convictions. The problem is that his convictions – including his belief that Russia can prosper only if it is ruled by a single source of power – are wrong.	普京的一切所作所为都源自于他的信仰，但问题是他的信仰有误，因为他认定只有单一权力的统治才能给俄国带来繁荣。


This gross error is leading Russia to political ruin.	这个严重的失误正在把俄国引向政治毁灭的边缘。


Of course, no one holds high office without making mistakes, even fundamental ones, and this is especially true in tumultuous periods.	当然，没有人鼓吹政府能够不犯错误，甚至是根本性的错误，而且时局越是动荡就越是如此。


Yeltsin was no exception, but he recognized his errors.	叶利钦也犯过错误，但是他勇于承认。


When he retired on New Year’s Eve 1999, for example, he asked forgiveness for launching the war in Chechnya.	举例来讲，叶利钦在1999年新年前夜退休时，就曾请求人民原谅他发动了车臣战争。


Putin, by contrast, seems incapable of recognizing and admitting his mistakes, and persists in a policy long after its failure is visible to the world.	而普京却似乎恰恰相反，他不但没有勇气承认自己的错误，而且还在政策失败已经成为人所共知的事实以后，继续推行根本无效的政策。


One of Yeltsin’s errors was his failure to put moral priorities at the head of his reform agenda.	叶利钦的失误之一是没有把道德建设作为改革的一项首要任务。


Russia should have repented for Stalinism and the gulag system.	俄国理应对斯大林主义和古拉格体系表示忏悔。


The whole nation, with no exception, should have repented, the way the Germans have repented since 1945.	全国上下无一例外都应该表示忏悔，就像德国人从1945年以来一直坚持的那样。


This failure matters, for it allowed Putin’s unqualified belief in central authority to lead to the recapture of the state by the security services.	这项失误非常重大，它没能阻止普京对中央集权的顽固信仰使国家重新陷入安全机构的统治之下。


Indeed, a direct result of national repentance for the gulag era should have been the banning of the communist party and the disqualification from political office of those who worked in the KGB.	实际上，对古拉格时代进行全民忏悔的直接结果应该是取缔共产党，剥夺所有克格勃工作人员的参选资格。


Although such political screenings are complicated in postcommunist societies, where both victimhood and collaboration were so widespread – and the lines between them so often blurred – a sound solution could have been found, as in the Czech Republic.	尽管受害者和协作者的普遍存在使得后共产主义时代的政治筛选变得非常复杂，区分的界限也含混不清，但我们本来可以像捷克共和国一样，找到相对完善的解决办法。


Doing nothing left Russia’s security structures unscathed and able to make a political comeback, which they have now achieved.	无所作为使俄国的安全机构侥幸逃脱，伺机发动政治反扑，他们的反扑已经在今天取得了成功。


The political resurrection of KGB structures under Putin, and their efforts to silence dissent, has once again turned Russia into a country of defectors.	克格勃在普京统治下的政治复苏，以及他们为压制反对意见所做的一切努力，终于再一次使俄国变成了背叛者的天堂。


It is impossible to silence independent politicians and independent media without choking off independent sources of money, which is why Putin’s Kremlin has concentrated its attacks on the so-called “oligarchs.”	不先断绝独立的资金来源，就根本不可能压制独立的政治家和媒体，这也是普京领导的克里姆林宫集中全力打击所谓“寡头政治”的原因所在。


Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest and trial were orchestrated for precisely this reason.	逮捕和审判米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基正是出于这样的原因。


By removing independent sources of money, the security services that dominate the Kremlin hope to destroy independent political life in Russia.	统治克里姆林宫的安全势力希望掐断独立的资金来源，进而摧毁俄国独立的政治生活。


Without independent bases of thought, a climate of fear is taking hold. But fear is not only degrading; it makes for poor governance.	失去了独立的思想基础，恐怖的气氛就会抬头，而这不但可耻，还可能导致管理混乱。


Yeltsin intuitively understood that fear and top-down, centralized decision-making were no way to rule a modern country, and he therefore insisted on reforming relations between citizens and the state.	叶利钦自然知道恐惧和自上而下、中央集权的决策绝不是统治现代社会的好方法，因此他坚持把改革公民和国家之间的关系作为重点。


Putin still doesn’t understand that a centralized political system is as incapable of comprehending and correcting mistakes now as it was in the Soviet era.	迄今为止，普京仍没有意识到现行的集权政治体系与苏联时代一样，无法认识并改正自己所犯的错误。


Not being a well-educated man Putin is, in full and deep sincerity, leading Russia toward the same disintegration that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet state.	由于认识水平有限，普京正诚心诚意地带领俄国向着曾导致苏联解体的分裂状态一步步迈进。


People are beginning to realize this.	而人民却已经开始醒悟。


They see that Putin’s desire to create a strong and effective modern state cannot be realized, because a modern state is governed not from above, but by an informed citizenry that forces its rulers to acknowledge and correct their mistakes.	他们认识到普京建设强大高效现代化国家的意愿根本无法实现，因为现代化国家不是来自自上而下的统治，它赖以存在的基础是见多识广的人民能够迫使统治者承认并改正自己的错误。


Putin, too, also seems to suspect his regime’s impotence.	就连普京自己似乎也对政府的能力产生了怀疑。


This is one reason why Russia has become so aggressive with its neighbors, Ukraine and Georgia, and seeks to maintain a military presence in places like Transdniestria, the breakaway region of Moldova.	这也是俄国对乌克兰和格鲁吉亚等邻国态度强硬，并力求在分裂出摩尔多瓦的德涅斯特河左岸等地保留驻军的原因之一。


By throwing its weight around in Russia’s near abroad, the Kremlin thinks that it can convince Russians back home of its omnipotence.	通过在周边地区四处插手，克里姆林宫认为自己能够向俄国人民展示政府有多么强大。


Given the neutered debates in Russia, and the Kremlin’s ability to manipulate elections, regime change is the only option left for those who want to preserve the democratic idea in Russia.	俄国正在进行的中立辩论和克里姆林宫操纵选举的强大力量使得政府更迭成为希望保留俄国民主的人们唯一可行的选择。


There is no use holding onto illusions.	紧紧抓住幻想不放是毫无用处的。


Those who oppose Putin must decide what they want and declare that, if the regime fails to uphold the constitution, they have the right to force it to do so by any means necessary.	反对普京的人必须弄清自己想要什么，并大声说出来，如果政府不能遵守宪法，他们就有权采取任何必要的手段，强制政府回到正确的轨道。


Today, the question of power in Russia can no longer be decided solely at the ballot box.	今天，俄国的权力问题已经不是单纯的投票所能解决的了。


As in Ukraine, Lebanon, and Kyrgizstan, it will be decided in the streets.	和乌克兰、黎巴嫩和吉尔吉斯斯坦一样，权力问题要到大街上才能解决。


The Perfect Storm of a Global Recession	全球衰退的完美风暴


NEW YORK – The probability is growing that the global economy – not just the United States – will experience a serious recession.	纽约－全球经济——不仅仅只是美国经济——将会经受严重衰退的可能性正在增加。


Recent developments suggest that all G7 economies are already in recession or close to tipping into one.	最近的发展表明，所有G7国家的经济正处于衰退之中或者接近陷入衰退。


Other advanced economies or emerging markets (the rest of the euro zone; New Zealand, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and some Southeast European economies) are also nearing a recessionary hard landing.	其他发达经济体或新兴市场（欧元区除G7外的其他国家； 新西兰，冰岛，爱沙尼亚，拉脱维亚以及一些欧洲东南部经济体）也在进入衰退的硬着陆。


When they reach it, there will be a sharp slowdown in the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other emerging markets.	当它们真正衰退的时候，金砖四国（巴西，俄罗斯，印度和中国）以及其他新兴市场的经济会急剧放缓。


This looming global recession is being fed by several factors: the collapse of housing bubbles in the US, United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland and other euro-zone members; punctured credit bubbles where money and credit was too easy for too long; the severe credit and liquidity crunch following the US mortgage crisis; the negative wealth and investment effects of falling stock markets (already down by more than 20% globally); the global effects via trade links of the recession in the US (which still counts for about 30% of global GDP); the US dollar’s weakness, which reduces American trading partners’ competitiveness; and the stagflationary effects of high oil and commodity prices, which are forcing central banks to increase interest rates to fight inflation at a time when there are severe downside risks to growth and financial stability.	降低了美国的贸易伙伴的竞争力的美元的弱势； 迫使各国中央银行在增长和金融稳定有严重下行风险的时候，提高利率来抵御通货膨胀的高油价和高商品价格带来的滞胀效应。


Official data suggest that the US economy entered into a recession in the first quarter of this year.	官方数据显示在今年第一季度，美国的经济陷入了衰退。


The economy rebounded – in a double-dip, W-shaped recession – in the second quarter, boosted by the temporary effects on consumption of $100 billion in tax rebates.	经济——以双底W形的衰退——在第二季度有所反弹，这一反弹由消化1000亿退税的临时效应所推进。


But those effects will fade by late summer.	但是，这些效应会在夏末消失。


The UK, Spain, and Ireland are experiencing similar developments, with housing bubbles deflating and excessive consumer debt undercutting retail sales, thus leading to recession.	英国，西班牙以及爱尔兰都经历着同样的事情，伴随着住房泡沫的缩小和过度的消费者债务减少零售销售，从而导致衰退的发生。


Even in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Iceland, and the Baltic states, frothy housing markets are starting to slacken.	即使在意大利，法国，希腊，葡萄牙，冰岛以及波罗的海国家，泡沫化的住房市场增长也开始放缓。


Small wonder, then, that production, sales, and consumer and business confidence are falling throughout the euro zone.	那么，难怪生产、销售以及消费者和商业信心的下降遍及欧元区。


Elsewhere, Japan is contracting, too.	在其他的地方，日本经济也在收缩。


Japan used to grow modestly for two reasons: strong exports to the US and a weak yen.	日本过去因为两个原因保持了温和地增长：强劲的对美国出口以及日元的疲软。


Now, exports to the US are falling while the yen has strengthened.	现在，日本对美国的出口在下降然而日元却在走强。


Moreover, high oil prices in a country that imports all of its oil needs, together with falling business profitability and confidence, are pushing Japan into a recession.	而且，对一个所有石油需求都依靠进口的国家，高油价以及商业利润和信心的下降也在将日本推入衰退。


The last of the G7 economies, Canada, should have benefited from high energy and commodity prices, but its GDP shrank in the first quarter, owing to the contracting US economy.	G7经济体的最后一个国家加拿大应该已经从能源和商品价格的高涨中获益，但是由于美国经济的收缩，其GDP在第一季度有所收缩。


Indeed, three quarters of Canada’s exports go to the US, while foreign demand accounts for a quarter of its GDP.	事实上，加拿大四分之三的出口是出口到美国，同时，外国需求占其GDP的四分之一。


So every G7 economy is now headed toward recession.	所以每一个G7经济体现在都在走向衰退。


Other smaller economies (mostly the new members of the EU, which all have large current-account deficits) risk a sudden reversal of capital inflows; this may already be occurring in Latvia and Estonia, as well as in Iceland and New Zealand.	其他小型经济体（主要是欧盟的新成员，它们有很大的经常账户赤字）面临着资本流入突然逆转的风险； 这可能已经在拉脱维亚，爱沙尼亚，冰岛以及新西兰发生。


This G7 recession will lead to a sharp growth slowdown in emerging markets and likely tip the overall global economy into a recession.	G7的衰退会导致新兴市场增长的急剧放缓，并可能使全球经济总体上陷入衰退。


Those economies that are dependent on exports to the US and Europe and that have large current-account surpluses (China, most of Asia, and most other emerging markets) will suffer from the G7 recession.	那些依靠向美国以及欧洲出口产品并拥有大量经常账户盈余的国家（中国，亚洲的大部分国家以及大部分其他新兴市场国家）会因为G7的衰退受到不利影响。


Those with large current-account deficits (India, South Africa, and more than 20 economies in East Europe from the Baltics to Turkey) may suffer from the global credit crunch.	那些经常账户赤字数额巨大的国家（印度，南非，以及从波罗的海国家到土耳其的位于东欧的20多个国家）会因为全球信贷紧缩受到不利影响。


Commodity exporters (Russia, Brazil, and others in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America) will suffer as the G7 recession and global slowdown drive down energy and other commodity prices by as much as 30%.	商品出口国（俄罗斯，巴西以及位于中东，亚洲，非洲和拉丁美洲的国家）会因为G7衰退和全球经济放缓致使能源和其他商品价格下降高达30％中受到不利影响。


Countries that allowed their currencies to appreciate relative to the dollar will experience a sharp slowdown in export growth.	那些允许其货币对美元升值的国家会经受出口增长的急剧放缓。


Those experiencing rising and now double-digit inflation will have to raise interest rates, while other high-inflation countries will lose export competitiveness.	那些经受不断上涨现在高达两位数的通货膨胀的国家将不得不提高其利率，同时其他高通胀国家将失去出口竞争优势。


Falling oil and commodity prices – already down 15% from their peaks – will somewhat reduce stagflationary forces in the global economy, yet inflation is becoming more entrenched via a vicious circle of rising prices, wages, and costs.	石油和商品价格的下降——已经从最高点下降了15%——会在一定程度上降低全球经济中的滞胀力量，然而，由于价格上涨、工资增加以及成本提高这一恶性循环造成的通货膨胀变得更加难以改变。


This will constrain the ability of central banks to respond to the downside risks to growth.	这会抑制中央银行响应增长下降风险的能力。


In advanced economies, however, inflation will become less of a problem for central banks by the end of this year, as slack in product markets reduces firms’ pricing power and higher unemployment constrains wage growth.	但是，在发达经济体中，通货膨胀到今年底会变得对中央银行来说不是一个大问题，因为产品市场的疲软降低了公司的定价能力以及高失业率抑制了工资的增长。


To be sure, all G7 central banks are worried about the temporary rise in headline inflation, and all are threatening to hike interest rates.	固然，所有的G7国家都担心一般通货膨胀的临时上升，并且都威胁要提高利率。


Nevertheless, the risk of a severe recession – and of a serious banking and financial crisis – will ultimately force all G7 central banks to cut rates.	然而，严重衰退的风险——以及严重的银行和金融危机的风险——将会最终迫使所有的G7中央银行降低利率。


The problem is that, especially outside the US, this monetary loosening will occur only when the G7 and global recession become entrenched.	问题是，特别在美国国外，货币的放松只有在G7和全球衰退变得难以改变才会发生。


Thus, the policy response will be too little, and will come too late, to prevent it.	因此，政策反应对阻止衰退来说作用太小，并且太晚。


The Perilous Fantasy of Energy Independence	危险的能源独立幻想


The paradox of today’s quest for energy independence is that pursuing it actually increases energy insecurity.	今天追求能源独立的悖论是，对它的追求实际上 增加 了能源的不安全性。


However much politicians who call for energy independence might prefer it otherwise, the market has chosen oil as a staple energy source.	不管呼吁能源独立的政治家们对其有怎样不同的看法，是市场选择了石油作为一个主要的能源来源。


So governments should ignore neither the valid interests of oil exporters, on whom consumers in their countries depend, nor exporters’ reaction to the rhetoric of energy independence or to steps taken to achieve it.	所以各国政府应该不要去管石油出口国应得的正当利益，这些国家的消费者依赖于这些出口国，也不要去管石油出口国对于能源独立的豪言壮语或者为了实现这一目标而采取步骤的反应。


Isolationist politicians may not care about other countries, but they should think twice lest they harm their own.	孤立主义的政治家可以不去关心其他国家，但是在会伤害他们自己国家的问题上他们应该三思而行。


The biggest threats to the world’s energy security are not terrorist attacks or embargoes by oil-producing countries – short-term events that can be dealt with quickly and effectively through various measures, including reliance on strategic petroleum reserves, increases in production, and diversion of oil shipments.	对于世界能源安全的最大威胁不是来自恐怖主义的袭击或者石油生产国的禁运。 这些短期事件可以通过各种措施而得到迅速和有效的解决，包括依赖战略石油储备、增加石油产量以及分散石油运输等。


Instead, the main threat to the long-term sustainability of energy supplies is the mismatch between investment in additional capacity and energy infrastructure, on one hand, and growth in demand for energy on the other.	事实上，对于长期可持续的能源供应的主要威胁是在额外的生产能力和能源基础设施上的投资与对于能源越来越大的需求之间的不协调。


Major oil exporters could respond in a variety of ways to political posturing on energy, most of which would exacerbate rather than ameliorate the global energy situation.	主要的石油出口国对于能源诉求的政治姿态可以作出多种不同的反应，其中绝大多数会恶化而不是改善全球的能源形势。


One of the most plausible scenarios in response to calls by governments and politicians around the world to reduce or even eliminate dependence on oil is a relative decline in investment in additional production capacity in the oil-producing countries.	面对世界各国政府和政治家要求减少或者甚至是取消对于石油的依赖的呼吁，石油生产国一个最可行的应对方案是相应地减少在额外生产能力上的投资。


An energy crisis in this case is almost certain if those who press for energy independence fail to provide a workable alternative in a timely manner.	在这种情况下，如果那些呼吁能源独立的人未能及时找到一个可行的替代产品的话，那么一场能源危机无可避免会产生。


Of course, these efforts will almost surely fail to replace oil within a reasonable time, as they are not market-driven and require heavy subsidies.	当然，这些努力几乎肯定无法在一个合理的时间内替代石油，因为它们不是被市场需求所驱动的，并且需要高额的补贴。


Indeed, confronted by political leaders’ hostile rhetoric, oil producers have a strong incentive to increase production in order to lower oil prices to levels that undermine the economic feasibility of alternative energy sources – a logical interventionist policy to counter the anti-oil interventionist policies of consuming countries.	事实上，面对政治领导人怀有敌意的豪言壮语，石油生产国有着增加产量的强烈动力以便把油价降到足以颠覆替代能源产品的经济可行性的水平。 这是为了对抗石油消费国反石油干涉主义政策的一个符合逻辑的干涉主义政策。


After all, a collapse in oil prices would be a death sentence for several new energy technologies, and, not incidentally, would increase demand for oil.	不管怎样，油价暴跌是对许多新能源技术的死亡判决，并且无疑会增加对于石油的需求。


Even if the oil producing countries do not intentionally bring about an oil price collapse, they might accelerate production as much as they could in the short term, while oil still had some value.	即便石油生产国并不有意想看到油价的下跌，它们也会在石油还有价值的时候短期内尽可能地加快生产。


But lower oil prices, coupled with expectations of a decline in demand, would in turn put pressure on oil-producing countries to reduce planned investments in production capacity or even to mothball major projects, as they have done in the past, leading to a decline in oil supplies.	但是更低的油价，加上预期的需求下降，会反过来迫使石油生产国减少计划中对于生产能力的投资，或者甚至把一些重大的项目束之高阁。 过去它们正是这样做的，从而带来石油供应的下降。


Thus, if alternative energy technologies did not come on-line by the time oil production started to fall, global shortages would become inevitable, while closing the investment deficit would take years, even in the face of rising oil prices.	这样的话，如果替代的能源技术未能在石油供应开始下降的时候面世的话，那么将无可避免会产生全球供应的短缺，而即便是在不断上升的油价面前，要弥补以前投资上的赤字也要花费数年时间。


In spite of these possibilities, let’s assume that plans for energy independence succeed, and that several European countries, the United States, Japan, China, and India become self-sufficient.	尽管存在这些可能性，让我们假设能源独立计划取得了成功，并且几个欧洲国家和美国、日本、中国以及印度实现了自给自足。


Major oil exporters could then seek to use their now less-valuable oil at home as cheap fuel for an expanded heavy industrial sector.	那时主要的石油出口国可以寻求将它们国内那时不再那么值钱的石油用作扩大的重工业的廉价燃料。


Instead of exporting oil directly, they could export their energy embedded in metals, chemicals, and manufactured products at prices that undercut anything producers in the oil-consuming countries, especially Europe and the US, could match, given their dependence on higher-cost alternative energy sources.	不再直接出口石油，它们可以把能源融入金属、化工和制造品中以石油消费国，尤其是美国的生产商无可匹敌的价格出口出去，因为这些生产商依赖的是成本要高得多的替代能源。


Energy independence thus could destroy entire industries, especially petrochemicals, aluminum, and steel.	这样的能源独立会破坏整个的产业，尤其是石化、铝和钢铁业。


In fact, cheap energy in oil-producing countries might make their new industries competitive with those in China, India, and Southeast Asia.	事实上，石油生产国廉价的能源可以使它们的新产业对抗那些中国、印度和东南亚的产业。


The net result would be a loss of jobs and weakened economies.	最后的结果是工作岗位的丢失和经济的削弱。


Countries might end up energy-independent, only to become steel-dependent or petrochemical-dependent.	这些国家也许最后能够做到能源的独立，但是它们最后会变成对于钢铁或者石化的依赖。


So what would come next?	那么我们下一步应该怎样做呢？


Would politicians, with their perpetual fascination with “independence,” attempt to eliminate dependence one commodity at a time?	政治家们带着他们永恒的对于“独立”的迷恋，会尝试在某个时候消除对于某种商品的依赖吗？


Put another way, would the cause of “energy independence” seek to reverse globalization?	换句话说，“能源独立”是在寻求对于全球化的倒转吗？


Oil is a finite resource.	石油是一种有限的资源。


Only long-term, market-oriented, economically viable, and sustainable energy options can ensure economic growth in both producing and consuming countries.	只有长期的、以市场为导向的、经济上可行的并且可持续的能源选择才能确保石油生产国和出口国都能保持经济的增长。


Isolationist policies, by contrast, always lead to shortages and discontent.	相反，孤立主义政策只会导致能源供应的短缺和不满。


No matter how energy independence is pursued, it will never amount to anything other than an unattainable – and potentially dangerous – fantasy.	不管能源独立是以怎样的方式来追求，它所追求的只会是一个无法实现的、并且可能是很危险的幻想。


The Perils of 2012	2012的危险


KOLKATA – The year 2011 will be remembered as the time when many ever-optimistic Americans began to give up hope.	加尔各答——许多美国人都会铭记2011年这一年，因为在这一年里许多曾经乐观的美国人都开始放弃了希望。


President John F. Kennedy once said that a rising tide lifts all boats.	肯尼迪总统曾经说过水涨船高这句话。


But now, in the receding tide, Americans are beginning to see not only that those with taller masts had been lifted far higher, but also that many of the smaller boats had been dashed to pieces in their wake.	但是现如今，在不断缩水的经济发展过程中，美国人不仅开始看到了那些拥有较高桅杆的人们可以爬得更高，而且还看到了那些较小的船只最终被浪花拍打地粉碎。


In that brief moment when the rising tide was indeed rising, millions of people believed that they might have a fair chance of realizing the “American Dream.”	当经济确实在增长的短暂时期里，上百万的美国人相信他们可能会有一次公平的机会去实现“美国梦想”。


Now those dreams, too, are receding.	但现如今，这种梦想也随之减弱。


By 2011, the savings of those who had lost their jobs in 2008 or 2009 had been spent.	到了2011年，那些在2008年或者2009年失业的人们，已经花光了所有的积蓄。


Unemployment checks had run out.	失业保险也已经到期。


Headlines announcing new hiring – still not enough to keep pace with the number of those who would normally have entered the labor force – meant little to the 50 year olds with little hope of ever holding a job again.	报纸的头条刊登着各种各样的新的就业信息，但这仍然满足不了那些即将步入劳动市场的年轻人的就业需要。 这些消息对那些想要再次获得就业机会的50岁左右的人们来意义并不是很大。


Indeed, middle-aged people who thought that they would be unemployed for a few months have now realized that they were, in fact, forcibly retired.	事实上，那些认为自己只是短暂失业几个月的中年人现在已经意识到了他们实际上已经处于长期失业的状态。


Young people who graduated from college with tens of thousands of dollars of education debt cannot find any jobs at all.	刚刚毕业的年轻大学生，身上还背负着上万美元的教育贷款，却根本找不到工作。


People who moved in with friends and relatives have become homeless.	那些无家可归的人只好搬到朋友或者亲戚家一起住。


Houses bought during the property boom are still on the market or have been sold at a loss.	在房地产业繁荣时期购买的房子有的仍然在市场上等待出售，而有的已经亏本卖出。


More than seven million American families have lost their homes.	超过700万的美国家庭已经失去了自己的房子。


The dark underbelly of the previous decade’s financial boom has been fully exposed in Europe as well.	在欧洲，过去十年经济繁荣时期里隐藏着的最脆弱的部分现在也已经暴露了出来。


Dithering over Greece and key national governments’ devotion to austerity began to exact a heavy toll last year.	希腊和一些主要国家的政府致力于紧缩政策，随之引起的动荡从去年开始就产生了巨大的副作用。


Contagion spread to Italy.	这种副作用蔓延到了意大利。


Spain’s unemployment, which had been near 20% since the beginning of the recession, crept even higher.	自从积极危机爆发以来，西班牙的失业率一直处在20%左右，随着副作用的蔓延，这一数字甚至在不断上涨。


The unthinkable – the end of the euro – began to seem like a real possibility.	欧元的瓦解，这一无法想象的事情似乎也有了成为事实的可能性。


This year is set to be even worse.	今年的情况注定会变得更糟。


It is possible, of course, that the United States will solve its political problems and finally adopt the stimulus measures that it needs to bring down unemployment to 6% or 7% (the pre-crisis level of 4% or 5% is too much to hope for).	当然，美国很有可能解决其政治难题，最终采取所必需的刺激手段，使失业率下降到6%到7%（经济危机前的失业率是4%到5%，但在这一时期，这是不敢奢望的数字）。


But this is as unlikely as it is that Europe will figure out that austerity alone will not solve its problems.   On the contrary, austerity will only exacerbate the economic slowdown.	但是，就像欧洲明白仅仅依靠紧缩政策是无法解决问题一样，美国采取这种手段的可能性是比较小的。 相反，紧缩政策仅仅会加剧经济衰退。


Without growth, the debt crisis – and the euro crisis – will only worsen.	经济得不到增涨，债务危机，以及欧元危机只会变得越发严重。


And the long crisis that began with the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 and the subsequent recession will continue. 	随着2007年房价泡沫破裂所引发的时间持续长久的危机和其所带来的经济萧条仍会继续。


Moreover, the major emerging-market countries, which steered successfully through the storms of 2008 and 2009, may not cope as well with the problems looming on the horizon.	再者，主要的新兴市场国家，成功地避开了2008年和2009年的金融风暴，也同样可能不会插手解决即将来临的问题。


Brazil’s growth has already stalled, fueling anxiety among its neighbors in Latin America.	巴西的经济增长已经搁浅，这使得其拉丁美洲的邻邦国家平添了几分忧虑。


Meanwhile, long-term problems – including climate change and other environmental threats, and increasing inequality in most countries around the world – have not gone away.	与此同时，一些长期的问题，包括气候变化和其他环境问些，以及在世界大多数国家中日益增长的不平等问题仍旧没有得到解决。


Some have grown more severe.	一些问题甚至变得更加难以解决。


For example, high unemployment has depressed wages and increased poverty.	例如，居高不下的失业率使工资下降，增加了贫困人群。


The good news is that addressing these long-term problems would actually help to solve the short-term problems.	解决这些长期问题实际上会有助于解决一些短期问题，这无疑是一个好消息。


Increased investment to retrofit the economy for global warming would help to stimulate economic activity, growth, and job creation.	增加在全球变暖问题上的投资，不断变化经济模式，会有助于活跃经济，刺激经济增长，创造更多的就业岗位。


More progressive taxation, in effect redistributing income from the top to the middle and bottom, would simultaneously reduce inequality and increase employment by boosting total demand.	增加累进所得税，有效地将财富从高收入人群到中等收入人群再到低收入人群进行重新分配，同时通过促进整体需求降低不公平性，增加了就业率。


Higher taxes at the top could generate revenues to finance needed public investment, and to provide some social protection for those at the bottom, including the unemployed.	对高收入人群收取更多的所得税可以产生收入，用来资助所需的公共投资，同样也为那些包括失业人口在内的底层人民提供一些社会保障。


Even without widening the fiscal deficit, such “balanced budget” increases in taxes and spending would lower unemployment and increase output.	甚至不需要进一步扩大财政赤字，这种在税收和开支方面的“平衡预算”也会降低失业率，增加出口量。


The worry, however, is that politics and ideology on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially in the US, will not allow any of this to occur.	但是，有人担心大西洋两岸的政治和思想意识，尤其是美国方面，不会允许这种情况出现。


Fixation on the deficit will induce cutbacks in social spending, worsening inequality.	对赤字的依赖会导致社会开支的削减，从而使不公平性问题恶化。


Likewise, the enduring attraction of supply-side economics, despite all of the evidence against it (especially in a period in which there is high unemployment), will prevent raising taxes at the top.	同样地，供应方经济体具有长久的吸引力，尽管有很多证据反驳这一观点（尤其是在失业率居高不下的时期），这会阻止向高收入人群征得更多的税收。


Even before the crisis, there was a rebalancing of economic power – in fact, a correction of a 200-year historical anomaly, in which Asia’s share of global GDP fell from nearly 50% to, at one point, below 10%.	这种平衡事实上是对200年来历史的反常行为的一种纠正。 期间，亚洲地区在全球国民生产总值的份额下降了近50%，曾经一度不到全球国民生产总值的10%。


The pragmatic commitment to growth that one sees in Asia and other emerging markets today stands in contrast to the West’s misguided policies, which, driven by a combination of ideology and vested interests, almost seem to reflect a commitment not to grow.	可以看到，目前整个亚洲和一些新兴国家正在致力于增长国家的实际经济实力，这和西方国家误导民众的政策产生了鲜明的对比。 这些政策被思想体系和既定的利益驱使着，这些政策反映出的是一种不求增长的坚定态度。


As a result, global economic rebalancing is likely to accelerate, almost inevitably giving rise to political tensions.	结果是，全球经济重新平衡很有可能会加剧政治紧张局面，导致了这场几乎不可避免的政治紧张局面。


With all of the problems confronting the global economy, we will be lucky if these strains do not begin to manifest themselves within the next twelve months.	伴随着全球经济所面临的种种问题，倘若在未来的十二个月里，这些紧张的压力没有开始显现出来，那么我们无疑是幸运儿。


Going Against Conventional Wisdom	对抗传统智慧


CAMBRIDGE – When I finished my graduate studies in 1974, I had the wonderful fortune of doing postdoctoral work with Harvard Medical School’s Judah Folkman.	剑桥——1974年修完研究生课程后，我有幸与哈佛医学院的福克曼博士一起从事博士后研究工作。


Dr. Folkman had a theory that the progression of tumors could be arrested by cutting off their source of nourishment.	福克曼博士有理论认为切断营养来源可以遏制肿瘤的生长。


He suggested that tumors emit a substance called tumor-angiogenesis factor, which causes surrounding blood vessels to grow toward it, supplying nutrition and removing waste.	他认为肿瘤会分泌一种叫肿瘤血管生成因子的物质，导致周围的血管向其生长，并为其输送营养、排出废物。


Folkman hypothesized that this process, angiogenesis, is crucial to the tumor’s survival.	福克曼推测血管生成过程是肿瘤存活的关键因素。


This theory went strongly against conventional wisdom.	这种理论完全有悖于传统智慧。


Scientists who reviewed Folkman’s grants said that the new blood vessels were simply due to inflammation.	审核福克曼科研拨款的科学家认为新血管的生成仅仅是因为炎症。


But Folkman persevered, and eventually he proved that such chemical substances do exist.	但福克曼仍坚持研究，并最终证明这种化学物质确实存在。


Today, four decades later, such substances have been used to treat more than 10 million people with neovascular diseases such as macular degeneration and many different forms of cancer.	四十年后的今天，已有1000多万患者接受过这种物质的治疗，其中既包括黄斑变性等新生血管性疾病，也包括各式肿瘤。


I had a similar experience when I was working in his lab, trying to isolate the first inhibitors of blood-vessel growth (which were large-molecular-weight substances).	我在他的实验室工作时也有过类似的经历，我当时负责分离抑制血管生长的主要大分子量物质。


This required developing a bioassay that would enable us to observe the inhibition of blood-vessel growth in the presence of tumors.	这需要发明一种生物测定法，让我们在肿瘤生长过程中观察对血管生长的抑制。


Given that tumors take several months to grow, biocompatible systems had to be developed that could release proteins and other large-molecular-weight substances slowly and continuously in the body – something that scientists were convinced was impossible.	肿瘤需要几个月才能逐渐长大，因此必须研制出一套生物相容性系统，从而缓慢但持续地在体内释放蛋白质和其他大分子量物质。 科学家们坚信上述目标可以实现。


However, after two years of work, I discovered that I could modify certain types of polymers to release molecules of virtually any size over a 100-day period.	但经过两年的研究，我发现可以改良特定种类的聚合物，在100天内释放几乎任意大小的分子。


For several years, many of the field’s most respected chemists and engineers said that our work had to be incorrect.	最初几年，业内许多最德高望重的药剂师和工程师众口一词地说我们的工作肯定有误。


The negative feedback had practical consequences, inhibiting my ability not only to secure research grants, but also to find faculty positions (especially given the work’s interdisciplinary nature, which made it difficult to fit into a single university department).	这些消极的反馈产生了切实的影响，不仅让我难以拿到科研经费，而且也很难找到教师工作（尤其考虑到这份工作的跨学科性质，导致它很难归属于单一的大学院系）。


But I kept at it, and, step by step, addressed different key issues – such as biocompatibility, manufacturing, reproducibility of release, and bioactivity.	但我依然坚持步步推进，解决了生物相容性、制造、重复释放和生物活性等各式各样的关键问题。


Today, systems based on these principles have been used to treat more than 20 million people.	今天，基于上述原则的系统已经治疗了超过2000万人。


Another area I started thinking about involved creating new polymer materials.	我又开始考虑发明新高分子材料的问题。


Working in a hospital, I saw that almost all polymers used in medicine were derived from household objects.	因为在医院工作，我知道几乎所有的医用聚合物全部取材于家用物质。


For example, the materials used in girdles for women are used in artificial hearts because of their good flex life.	打个比方，女性束腰材料因其出色的韧性被用来制造人工心脏。


The polymers in mattress stuffing are used in breast implants.	而填充床垫的聚合物则被用于制造乳房假体。


Yet such an approach often leads to problems.	但这种做法常常会导致问题。


Artificial hearts, for example, can cause clots to form when blood hits their surface – the girdle material – and these clots can cause strokes and death.	比方说，人工心脏在血液接触其表面（束腰材料）时可能形成血栓，而血栓则可能导致中风及死亡。


So I began thinking that we needed to find alternatives to solving medical problems other than by searching for materials in everyday settings.	因此我想我们需要在日常环境之外寻找替代材料来解决医疗问题。


I believed that researchers could take an engineering-design approach: Ask the question, “What do we really want in a biomaterial from the standpoints of engineering, chemistry, and biology?” and then synthesize the materials from first principles.	我相信科研人员可以采用工程设计的方法：问自己，“从工程、化学和生物学的角度我们究竟需要什么样的生物材料？ ”之后再根据首要原则合成上述材料。


As a proof of principle, we decided to synthesize a new family of biodegradable polymers, called polyanhydrides, for medical use.	为证明这项原则，我们决心为医用目的合成一种叫聚酸酐的生物分解高分子全新系列材料。


The first step was to select monomers – a polymer’s building blocks – that would be safe in the human body.	第一步是选择单体——即聚合物的建筑模块——并确保在人体之中的安全性。


We then synthesized these polymers and discovered that by changing their composition, we could make them last in the body for a period ranging from days to years.	之后我们合成了高分子聚合物，并发现通过改变聚合物的构成，我们可以让它们在体内维持几天到几年不等的时间。


With Henry Brem, now the chief of neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins Hospital, we thought we could use these polymers to deliver drugs locally in the treatment of brain cancer.	我们觉得可以和约翰霍普金斯医院的神经外科主任亨利·布莱姆一起用这种高分子聚合物局部给药来治疗脑癌。


But I had to raise money for this project, so I wrote grant applications to government agencies that were reviewed by other professors.	但我需要为这个项目筹集资金，因此我向政府机关提交书面材料申请经费，并由其他教授进行审查。


Their reviews were very negative.	他们的审查结果非常不利。


In our first grant proposal, in 1981, the reviewers said that we would never be able to synthesize the polymers.	1981年首次申请经费时，评审人员说我们永远无法合成这样的高分子聚合物。


Yet one of my graduate students synthesized the polymers for his doctoral thesis.	但我的一名研究生为撰写博士论文完成了高分子聚合物的合成任务。


We sent the proposal back for another review, only to be told that the grant should still not be funded, because the polymers would react with whatever drug we wanted to deliver.	我们再次提交审查，结果却被告知仍然不能拨付经费，因为聚合物可以和我们希望应用的任何药物产生反应。


Several researchers in our lab showed that there was no reaction.	我们实验室的几名研究人员证明没有反应。


We returned the proposal for another review; it came back with the comment that the polymers were fragile and would break.	我们再次申请审核，批复意见是聚合物非常脆弱、有可能断裂。


This time, two other researchers addressed the problem.	这次，另两名研究人员解决了这个问题。


The revised proposal was sent again for evaluation, and now the reviewers’ reason for rejecting it was that new polymers would not be safe to test on animals or people.	修改后的方案再次送审，这次审核人员的拒绝理由变成新聚合物无法安全进行动物或人体试验。


Another graduate student showed that the polymers were safe.	另一位研究生证明聚合物是安全的。


Such reviews continued for a long time; but, in 1996, the Food and Drug Administration approved the treatment – the first new treatment for brain cancer to be approved in more than 20 years.	类似的审核持续了很长时间； 但1996年，美国食品药品管理局批准了治疗方案——这是20年来首次批准新的脑癌治疗方案。


Moreover, the FDA’s approval of polymer-based local chemotherapy created a new paradigm in the drug-delivery field, helping to pave the way for drug-eluting stents and other local delivery systems.	此外，食品药品管理局批准高分子聚合物局部化疗也开创了全新的给药方式范例，为药物涂层支架和其他局部给药系统做好了准备。


Something similar happened when Jay Vacanti, a surgeon at Massachusetts General Hospital, and I had an idea in the 1980’s to combine three-dimensional synthetic polymer scaffolds with cells to create new tissues and organs.	美国马萨诸塞州总医院外科医生杰伊·森提和我在20世纪80年代提出用三维合成高分子聚合物支架和细胞一起创造新的组织和器官时也经历过同样的境遇。


Once again, the idea was met with great skepticism, and it was extremely difficult to obtain peer-reviewed government grants.	我们的想法再次遭受了莫大的怀疑，并导致极难申请须经过同行评议的政府科研经费。


Today, this concept has become a cornerstone of tissue engineering and regenerative medicine, leading to the creation of artificial skin for patients with burns or skin ulcers – and someday, one hopes, to the creation of many other tissues and organs.	今天，这一理念已经奠定了组织工程学和再生医学的基础，并因此创造出烧伤或皮肤溃疡患者的人造皮肤——希望有一天众多其他组织和器官能够由此诞生。


My experiences are hardly unique.	我的经历可以说司空见惯。


Scientists throughout history have often had to fight conventional wisdom to validate their discoveries.	有史以来科学家往往不得不对抗传统智慧，才能验证他们的发现。


In modern times, Stanley Prusiner’s discovery of prions, Barry Marshall and Robin Warren’s findings that bacteria can cause peptic ulcers, and Dan Shechtman’s determination of the structure of quasicrystals are just a few examples (all received Nobel Prizes for their research).	近代斯坦利·普鲁西纳发现朊病毒，巴里·马歇尔和罗宾·沃伦发现细菌能导致消化性溃疡，以及丹·舍特曼确定准晶体结构仅仅是几个例子（以上所有研究都获得了诺贝尔奖）。


The lessons are simple to understand, if difficult to master: Don’t believe everything you read, be willing to challenge dogma, and recognize that you may pay a price for it career-wise in the short run, even if you are correct.	其中的经验教训简单易懂，但却很难把握：不要相信你读到的东西、敢于挑战教条、一定要意识到即使你是对的，短期也可能付出事业上的代价。


But the rewards of scientific discovery are worth it: technology advances, and the world can become much better for it.	但科学发现的回报值得这些牺牲：技术因此而进步，世界也因此变得更加美好。


The Perils of Financial Historicism	金融历史主义的危害


Every financial crisis is inherently unknowable – before it occurs, and as it occurs.	每一次经济危机天生就是不可知的——在发生之前以及过程之中。


By contrast, we understand past crises very well.	与此相比，我们对已经过去的危机了解得非常清楚。


Accountants go over the books, the participants tell their tales to the newspapers (or sometimes before a judge), politicians explain why they are sorting out a mess, and in the end historians put together a story.	会计复查账本，经历者把自己的故事告诉报纸（有时则是向法官陈述），政客解释清理混乱的原因，最后由历史学家汇成一个完整的故事。


Because the past is knowable, the best way of understanding a current crisis is to search for a model in past experiences, even those that are long past.	因为过去是可知的，所以了解当前危机的最佳途径就是从过去、甚至是很早以前的经验中寻找一种模式。


But which is the right template?	但是哪一种模式才是正确的？


Often the choice depends less on a rational assessment of similarities and differences than on gut feelings, proclivities to optimism or pessimism, or political orientation.	很多时候，这样的选择更多地取决于知觉、乐观或悲观主义倾向，或者政治取向，而不是建立在对相似点和不同点的理性分析之上。


Currently, two dates are circulating widely, 1907 and 1931.	当前，有两个年份正在甚嚣尘上，1907和1931。


At the beginning of the current credit crunch, many historically minded people picked 1907 as the key precedent.	当前信用危机之始，许多喜欢以史为鉴的人将1907年拎出来作为关键性的先例。


Not only is it an arithmetically neat 100 years in the past, but it also looked like an attractive parallel.	这一年不仅恰好是100年前，而且看似与现在的情况有很大的可比性。


The crisis of 1907 was both immediately devastating, provoking a massive but short economic downturn, and, as it turned out, easily resolved.	1907年的危机虽然迅速造成了破坏性的影响，引起了规模极大但时间不长的经济衰退，但是最后得以轻松化解。


The 1907 panic started in the United States, owing to a rise in interest rates as farmers in the West were paid for their crops and financial scandals in New York that seemed to implicate a large financial institution, the Knickerbocker trust.	1907年的恐慌始于美国，肇因是利率随着西部农民的庄稼收益而上涨，以及纽约大型金融机构尼克波克信托公司卷入金融丑闻。


Suddenly, as today, even big banks did not trust each other.	和今天一样，即便是大银行也在一夜之间不再相互信任。


The breakdown was fundamentally a liquidity crisis, and liquidity was easily restored in several ways: the New York banks issued their own liquidity through a clearing house; one massively powerful financial institution, J.P. Morgan, bought up collapsing shares, and thus reversed a market panic and a scramble for liquidity; and European central banks supplied gold to the American market.	从根本上讲，这是一场流动性危机，而流动性通过几个途径得以轻易恢复：纽约各大银行通过一家票据交换机构注入各自的流动资金； 一家实力强劲的金融机构J.


The obvious lesson of 1907 that Americans learned was that central banks were the best placed institutions to restore liquidity in a financial panic, and, in the longer run, monetary reform gave the US its own central bank, the Federal Reserve, by 1914.	美国人从1907年的危机中学到了明显的一课，即在发生金融恐慌时中央银行是最适合恢复流动性的机构，并且在1914年，美国通过货币改革建立了自己的央行，美联储。


So 1907 became a comforting mantra in times of financial stress: a crisis cannot happen as long as the central bank understands the problem of liquidity.	因此，1907年成为遇到金融压力时给人安慰的咒语：只要中央银行明白流动性的问题，危机就不可能发生。


There are modern parallels.	当代不乏与此相似的例子。


The Fed and the European Central Bank have recently pumped massive amounts of liquidity into the global financial system.	美联储和欧洲央行不久前向全球金融体系注入了大量流动资金。


Strategically placed private institutions have done their part to shore up confidence.	拥有战略重要性的私营机构也为保持公众信心尽了自己的力量。


Goldman Sachs, for example, has made a point of publicly buying endangered assets in its Global Equities Opportunity Fund.	例如，高盛专门用它的全球证券机会基金公开买入濒危资产。


The darker parallel is to the Great Depression of the 1930’s, when no amount of liquidity helped.	20世纪30年代的大萧条则是一个较为灰暗的先例，当时再多的流动资金也没起作用。


This is the historical analogy drawn by those who want governments to do more, particularly banks that feel vulnerable and desperately need a public bailout.	采用这个历史类比的是希望政府发挥更大作用的人，尤其是那些前途堪忧、急需公开紧急融资的银行。


In August 2007, some German banks, at the earliest signs of difficulty because of their exposure to US sub-prime mortgages, started to talk only of 1931.	2007年8月，某些德国银行因为受美国次级房贷的影响，一看到不好的苗头，就开口闭口都是1931。


In the Great Depression, bank collapses made the downturn far worse. They were contagious across national frontiers.	大萧条期间，银行的倒闭使经济衰退大大恶化，并在各国之间蔓延。


Governments not only needed to help by providing a combination of public assistance and new legislation guaranteeing deposits, but also were called on to shield their constituencies from destabilizing international influences.	各国政府为了缓解危机，不但要提供一系列公开援助，制定保障存款的新法律，还要帮助他们的选民抵御日渐不稳的国际影响。


This nationalist-minded rhetoric has returned in the financial crisis of 2007.	这种国家主义诡辩在2007年的金融危机中死灰复燃。


Germans do not see why they should be vulnerable because of poor quality mortgage lending in American inner cities.	德国人看不懂自己为什么要因为美国国内城市糟糕的按揭状况而受牵连。


Depositors with the British bank Northern Rock blame American developments for the credit turbulence that made it impossible for the bank to continue to fund its lending.	英国银行Northern Rock的储户则指责美国的开发商造成了信用动荡，使该银行无力继续维持贷款。


Neither of these apparent historical parallels is convincing.	上述两个表面上的历史先例都不让人信服。


We are not living in 1907, when the gold standard limited the ability of central banks to supply additional liquidity.	我们并非活在央行注入额外流动资金的能力受限于黄金标准的1907年；


Nor, following the fastest five-year period of economic growth in human history, are collapsing prices endangering the financial system, as they did during the Great Depression.	而且，在经历了人类历史上经济发展最快的五年之后，金融体系也并没有像大萧条时期那样因价格崩溃而受到致命威胁。


Today, the responses to the 1907 and 1931 crises would only make matters worse.	今天，沿用对付1907年和1931年危机的方法只能使事情更糟。


The continuous injection of liquidity would imply a greater likelihood of renewed asset bubbles in housing, equities, or modern art.	不断注入流动资金会增大房地产、证券或当代艺术领域出现新一轮资产泡沫的可能性。


Government stabilization of the banking system can either be international, provoking complaints by outraged taxpayers about subsidizing others, or national, but only at the cost of greatly extended regulation of capital movements.	政府稳定银行系统的措施如果是国际性的，会激起愤怒的纳税人对补贴别国的不满，如果是国内的，则必须付出资本流动管制大大加强的代价。


Both courses are unnecessary.	两条路线都不是非走不可。


If today’s credit crunch has historical parallels, they are closer to nineteenth-century “normal crises” like 1837, 1847, or 1857.	如果说今天的信用危机在历史上有类似的先例，那也应该是19世纪的“正常危机”，例如1837年、1847年或1857年。


In those panics, financial innovation caused uncertainty and nervousness, but also induced an important and beneficial learning process.	在这些危机中，金融改革带来了不稳定因素和紧张情绪，但是也触发了一个重要的、有益的学习过程。


The financial institutions that survived the crises went on to play a crucial role in pushing further development, and they had enhanced reputations because they withstood a crisis.	成功度过这些危机的金融机构再接再厉，在推动进一步的发展中发挥了关键性的作用，并且因为经受住了危机的考验而获得了更高的声誉。


Sometimes monetary and fiscal authorities have an obligation to ignore the wilder historical parallels and look at a broader picture.	有时候货币和财政部门有义务忽略毫无根据的历史类比，而着眼于宏观的局势。


Sometimes, too, the best response to a crisis is this: don’t just do something; stand there and do nothing.	有时候，对付危机的最好办法是：不要忙着做些什么； 袖手旁观即可。


The Perils of Prophecy	预言的风险


BERKELEY – We economists who are steeped in economic and financial history – and aware of the history of economic thought concerning financial crises and their effects – have reason to be proud of our analyses over the past five years.	伯克利—我们这些熟谙金融史、明白金融危机及其影响相关经济思想史的经济学家有理由为我们过去五年中的分析感到自豪。


We understood where we were heading, because we knew where we had been.	我们知道我们在向何处去，因为我们有前车之鉴。


In particular, we understood that the rapid run-up of house prices, coupled with the extension of leverage, posed macroeconomic dangers.	特别是，我们知道房价的快速上涨加上杠杆的扩张给宏观经济带来了危险。


We recognized that large bubble-driven losses in assets held by leveraged financial institutions would cause a panicked flight to safety, and that preventing a deep depression required active official intervention as a lender of last resort.	我们看出杠杆金融机构所持资产因泡沫破裂而遭受的损失将导致人们朝安全性多路狂奔，明白阻止深度萧条需要作为最后贷款人的官方干预的积极介入。


Indeed, we understood that monetarist cures were likely to prove insufficient; that sovereigns need to guarantee each others’ solvency; and that withdrawing support too soon implied enormous dangers.	事实上，我们知道货币主义疗法很可能并不足够； 知道各国需要互相担保偿债能力；


We knew that premature attempts to achieve long-term fiscal balance would worsen the short-term crisis – and thus be counterproductive in the long-run.	也知道过早撤销支持意味着巨大的风险。 我们明白过早追求长期财政平衡会恶化短期危机，从而不利于长期生产。


And we understood that we faced the threat of a jobless recovery, owing to cyclical factors, rather than to structural changes.	我们也理解，我们面临着无就业复苏的威胁，这是由周期性因素而非结构性变化导致的。


On all of these issues, historically-minded economists were right.	在所有这些问题上，重视历史的经济学家都说对了。


Those who said that there would be no downturn, or that recovery would be rapid, or that the economy’s real problems were structural, or that supporting the economy would produce inflation (or high short-term interest rates), or that immediate fiscal austerity would be expansionary were wrong.	说经济不会下行者、说会有很快复苏者、说经济的真正问题乃结构性问题者、说支持经济会导致通货膨胀（或短期利率高企）者、说立刻采取财政紧缩将收到扩张性效果者都错了。


Not just a little wrong. Completely wrong.	不是错一点，而是大错特错。


Of course, we historically-minded economists are not surprised that they were wrong.	当然，我们重视历史的经济学家对于他们的错误并不惊讶。


We are, however, surprised at how few of them have marked their beliefs to market in any sense.	让我们惊讶的是他们的信条根本不是基于市场的。


On the contrary, many of them, their reputations under water, have doubled down on those beliefs, apparently in the hope that events will, for once, break their way, and that people might thus be induced to forget their abysmal forecasting track record.	相反，他们当中有很多人——他们的名声早已一片狼藉了——死抓错误信念不放，显然是寄希望于形势有朝一日能够发生逆转，如此，人们或许会忘了他们此前糟糕透顶的预测记录。


So the big lesson is simple: trust those who work in the tradition of Walter Bagehot, Hyman Minsky, and Charles Kindleberger.	因此，主要教训相当简单：相信那些站在白芝浩、明斯基（Hyman Minsky）、金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberg）肩膀上的人。


That means trusting economists like Paul Krugman, Paul Romer, Gary Gorton, Carmen Reinhart, Ken Rogoff, Raghuram Rajan, Larry Summers, Barry Eichengreen, Olivier Blanchard, and their peers.	这意味着相信克鲁格曼、保罗·罗默、加里、高登（Gary Gorton）、卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）、肯·罗格夫（Ken Rogoff）、拉古兰· 拉贾（Raghuram Rajan）、拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）、巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）、奥利佛·布兰查德（Oliver Blanchard）及其同侪。


Just as they got the recent past right, so they are the ones most likely to get the distribution of possible futures right.	他们说准了刚刚过去的形势，也最有可能掌握正确的未来概率分布。