It also paved the way for a parliament in which over a quarter of the members are women – this in a country where, just five years ago, women were not even allowed to leave the house without a male relative.	它还为议会铺平了道路，超过四分之一的议员是妇女。 仅仅在五年前，该国的妇女还不准在没有男性亲属陪同的情况下离开家门。


Moreover, most of the 20,000 village councils were elected through secret ballot.	而且，两万个村落委员会中的大多数都是通过秘密投票选举产生的。


In a nod to the importance of the councils to realizing change at the most local level, the World Bank and its partners have adopted a highly innovative program that channels rural development aid through the councils, which have been empowered to decide how the funds will be spent.	世界银行及其伙伴们首肯了这些委员会在最基层实现变革的重要性，并且制定了一个极为创新的项目来通过这些委员会发放农村发展援助。 最近，这些委员会被授权决定如何使用这些资金。


At the national level, the government recently approved a new development strategy that goes far to advance a vision for Afghanistan’s future stability and growth.	在全国性的层面上，政府最近批准了一项高瞻远瞩的新发展战略。 该战略为阿富汗的未来稳定和增长提供了远景构想。


Public opinion reflects widespread support for the latest changes.	舆论反映出对最新变革的广泛支持。


A recent poll shows that Afghans overwhelmingly favor their country’s new direction – backing the participation of women in public life and international intervention against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the drug economy.	最近的一项民意调查显示，绝大多数阿富汗人赞成该国的新走向，也就是支持妇女参与公众生活以及针对基地组织、塔利班以及毒品经济的国际干预。


But Afghanistan’s potential for progress must be bolstered by concerted international action.	但是，阿富汗潜在的进步必须得到协调一致的国际行动支持。


At the London Conference, world leaders should support the counter-narcotics strategy recently approved by the Afghan government, which would reduce economic dependence on opium production, punish traffickers and dealers, and provide sustainable economic alternatives for poppy farmers.	世界领导人在伦敦会议上应当支持由阿富汗政府最近批准的反毒品战略。 这一战略将减少对鸦片生产的经济依赖，惩罚毒贩和经销人，并且为罂粟种植农提供可持续的经济性替代。


Afghanistan is grappling with the world’s biggest narcotics problem and donors must commit to a long-term drug control strategy.	阿富汗正在应付全世界最大的毒品问题，捐助国必须为一项长期的毒品控制战略作出承诺。


The conference should follow up on a resolution by the European Parliament to consider whether Afghanistan should become one of the countries licensed to produce opium for medical purposes.	这一会议应当落实由欧洲议会通过的一项决议，即考虑阿富汗是否应该成为获得许可为医学目的生产鸦片的国家之一。


Furthermore, instead of pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into technical assistance and short-term capacity-building programs, the London conference should strive to help meet the Afghan government’s benchmark for equipping young people with the skills and education necessary to lead their nation to a future of peace and prosperity.	而且，伦敦会议应当力争帮助实现阿富汗政府为年轻人提供带领该国走向未来和平与繁荣所必需的技能和教育的基准，而不是把数以亿计美元投入技术援助和短期能力建设项目之中。


International support could help educate 40,000 Afghans each year in urgently needed fields, such as engineering, management, agriculture, law, and economics.	国际支持可以帮助每年在诸如工程、管理、农业、法律以及经济等急需的领域教育四万名阿富汗人。


Judicial reform is another pressing issue.	司法改革也是另一项急迫问题。


Currently, the judiciary is incapable of trying a case of petty theft much less of ensuring human rights.	目前，该国司法体系无法审理小额的偷盗案件，更不用提保障人权。


A Supreme Court dominated by conservative factions has selected judges and prosecutors, and Afghans have little legal redress in a system that allows local commanders, who hold sway over the judiciary, to act with impunity.	由保守派别控制的最高法院挑选法官和检察官。 而且，该国的体制允许控制司法的地方指挥官为所欲为，阿富汗人在这一体制中基本得不到法律赔偿。


Without a viable legal system, foreign investment will remain elusive.	没有可以存活的法律体系就无法留住外国投资。


Even Afghan expatriates in the Gulf states, who have invested roughly $5 billion in regional and global trading networks, are reluctant to invest in their homeland.	移居海湾国家的阿富汗人已经在地区和全球贸易网络中投资了大约50亿美元，但即使是他们也不愿意在祖国投资。


Reform is nonetheless clearly possible.	但是，改革毫无疑问是可能的。


Last month, the Afghan leadership finally adopted – albeit half-heartedly – a transitional justice plan that could remove from power the biggest war criminals who have consolidated their grip on the country over the past five years.	上个月，尽管不情愿，但是阿富汗领导层还是批准了一项过渡期司法规划。 这一规划将剥夺那些在过去五年中巩固了对该国控制的最大战犯们的权力。


Implementation of this plan would not only give a boost to the rule of law, but also would enhance security and lead to better governance.	实施这一规划不仅会极大地促进法制，而且会增强安全并导向更好的管制。


Failure to act would mean a betrayal of the Afghan people, who in 2001 welcomed the US army and NATO forces as liberators.	无所作为意味着背叛阿富汗人民。 他们在2001年把美国和北约军队当作解放者来欢迎。


For their sake, and ours, we must not let them down.	为了他们、也是为了我们起见，我们不应该让他们失望。


Back-to-School Letter to the US Congress	给美国国会的返校信


NEWPORT BEACH – What if members of the United States Congress, now returning from their summer recess, were to receive a “back to school” letter from concerned citizens?	纽波特海滩—如果现在纷纷结束夏季休假的美国国会议员们收到来自焦虑的公民的“返校”信会怎样？


Here is what a first draft might look like.	这封信的大概会是这样子的。


Dear Member of Congress:	亲爱的国会议员：


Welcome back to the Capitol.	欢迎回到国会大厦。


We hope that you had a good summer break, and that you return to Washington not just rested, but also energized to take on our country’s mounting economic challenges.	我们希望你们刚刚度过了一个愉快的夏季休假，现在你们回到了华盛顿，不但身心放松，而且充满了能量，做好了处理我们国家的重重经济挑战的准备。


The news has been mixed during your absence.	在你们们离开国会大厦期间，各路消息喜忧参半。


We have seen some improvement in economic data, but not enough to suggest that we are any closer to overcoming decisively this painful period of low growth and high unemployment.	经济数据存在一些改善，但并不足以表明我们离决定性地克服此次低增长、高失业时期迈进了一步。


And, with a self-inflicted fiscal cliff looming – one that could send our country back into recession, pulling the rest of the world with us – businesses are reluctant to hire and invest in new capital goods.	此外，随着自我形成的财政悬崖步步逼近——可能将我们国家重新推向衰退，并将世界其他地区也拖下水——企业不愿招聘，也不愿投资新的资本品。


Fortunately, the Federal Reserve has signaled its intention to remain active, but its policy tools are poorly suited to the challenges that we face.	幸运的是，美联储释放了继续积极的信号，但它的政策工具对我们所面临的挑战作用有限。


Meanwhile, global difficulties remain substantial.	与此同时，全球困难仍然很大。


We continue to face strong headwinds originating from the deepening European debt crisis, as well as geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.	我们仍然面临着巨大的阻力——既来自深化中的欧债危机，也来自中东的地缘政治紧张局势。


China, once the world’s unstoppable growth engine, is slowing.	中国——曾经不可阻挡的世界增长引擎——正在减速。


And, despite all the happy talk, multilateral policy coordination is essentially non-existent.	而尽管表面一团和气，但多边政策合作基本上等于零。


All of this calls for courageous and visionary economic leadership; otherwise, our problems will fester and grow, and the solutions will become even more complex.	所有这些都表明需要果断勇敢、远见卓识的经济领导； 否则的话，我们的问题会恶化和增长，而解决方案会变得更加复杂。


Already, too many of our economy’s difficulties, including worrisome trends in youth joblessness and long-term unemployment, risk becoming structurally embedded.	我们经济中的太多困难——包括年轻人失业和长期失业的可怕趋势——正在演变为结构性问题。


No doubt you have also noticed that, with less than ten weeks to go until the November presidential election, our country is in the grip of an increasingly ugly political campaign.	毫无疑问，你们已经注意到，在距离11月总统大选已不到十周之际，我们的国家牢牢地掌握在丑陋的政治把戏手中。


So, with this combination of bad economics and bad politics, we look to you for direction and leadership.	因此，在经济和政治的双重暗淡局面下，我们需要你们们提供方向和领导。


It is that simple, and that important.	就这么简单、这么重要。


We need you to overcome a prolonged period of congressional paralysis and polarization in order to address the country’s malaise.	我们需要你们克服旷日持久的国会扯皮和两极分化，从而治愈我们国家的顽疾。


We need you to pivot in your responses from the tactical to the strategic, from the cyclical to the secular, from the partial to the comprehensive, and from sequential to simultaneous reforms.	我们需要你们的改革方案从战术思维转变为战略思维，从周期思维转变为长期思维，从局部思维转变为整体思维，从按部就班思维转变为同时推进思维。


If this call to national duty is not enough, we would remind you of your own self-interest.	如果这一国家责任的呼吁还不够，那么我们还可以加上你们们的自身利益。


According to the latest NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, your support among us, the electorate, stands at just 12%.	根据最新的NBC新闻/《华尔街日报》调查，我们选民对你们的支持度只有12%。


We concede that there is no magic wand to overcome our country’s problems.	我们认为，没有什么魔法能够克服我们国家的问题。


After all, for too many years leading up to the global financial crisis, America “bought” and “borrowed” its growth by leveraging balance sheets, rather than “earning” it through increased competitiveness.	毕竟，在迈向全球金融危机的这么多年中，美国的增长是通过资产负债表杠杆化而不是 “买”来和“借”来的，而不是通过增加竞争力“赚”来的。


The result was massive misallocation of human resources, insufficient infrastructure investment, over-reliance on credit entitlements, and, of course, unsustainable debt.	其结果是大规模人力资源配置不当、基础设施投资不足、对授信的过度依赖，当然还有不可持续的债务。


To make matters worse, this occurred at a time when systemically important emerging economies hit their “developmental breakout phase,” powered by trade and other aspects of globalization.	让情况更糟糕的是，与此同时，在贸易和其他全球化位面的推动下，具系统重要性的新兴国家步入了它们的“发展突破阶段”。


We do not expect you to solve America’s problems overnight.	我们不指望你们一夜之间就解决美国的问题。


Instead, we look to you to embark on an appropriate and sustainable policy path.	但我们希望你们能给出合理而可持续的政策路径。


So, as you unpack your bags and renew old friendships and rivalries, please keep the following in mind.	因此，当你们放下包裹、结交新朋友、树立新敌人时，请谨记以下事项。


Changing course requires that you, together with the president, have a much more open and consistent economic dialogue with us, the general public, about the challenges that we face.	改变国运要求你们和总统一起与我们——社���公众开展更开放、更一致的经济对话，探讨我们所面临的挑战。


It also requires that you and the president converge on a multi-prong, multi-year policy initiative that, at a minimum, makes simultaneous advances in six critical areas:	它还要求你们和总统形成统一的多目标多年政策计划，该计划至少要同时顾及六个关键领域：


·         Fiscal reform: We desperately need you to eliminate the looming fiscal cliff in the context of medium-term reforms of both the tax system and entitlements.	·         财政改革：我们迫切需要你们来消除税收制度和福利制度中期改革环境中的财政悬崖。


This would also allow for greater fiscal stimulus at a time when other components of aggregate demand are slowing.	这也有利于当其他总需求成分开始减速时出台更大的财政刺激。


·         Labor-market reform: Persistently high unemployment and large-scale withdrawal from the labor force are a constant reminder of a malfunctioning labor market that needs support through better training and retooling.	·         劳动市场改革：持续的高失业和大量劳动力的退出向来都是劳动市场出现故障、需要通过更好的培训和再评寻予以支持的信号。


Reform must also address the related challenges of a lagging education system and an insufficient social safety net.	改革还必须解决与此相关的挑战：教育制度落后以及社会安全网不足。


·         Housing and housing finance: At the root of the global financial crisis, the troubled US housing market continues to act as a millstone around the economy’s neck.	·         房地产和房地产金融：萎靡不振的美国房地产市场是全球金融危机的根源，并仍然是经济的重负之一。


The longer the problems persist, the greater the pressure on consumer and business sentiment, and the harder it is for the unemployed to find and relocate to new job opportunities.	房地产问题拖得越久，消费者和企业情绪的压力就越大，失业者找到和被配置到新就业机会的机会就越小。


·         Clogged credit pipes: With banks’ balance sheets contracting, too many small and medium-size companies are unable to mobilize credit for investment and growth.	·         信用渠道不畅：银行资产负债表仍在收缩，太多中小规模企业无法动员足够的信用用于投资和增长。


Recognizing that it will take years until banks are properly stabilized, America needs to build new conduits for credit.	意识到银行稳下来需要几年才能实现，美国需要打造新的信用渠道。


·         Infrastructure: Those of you who have traveled abroad know that our infrastructure is desperately lagging that of a growing number of countries.	·         基础设施：你们出国旅行过就会明白，我们的基础设施正大大落后于越来越多的国家。


This makes it even harder for our companies to compete and prosper.	这让我们国家的公司竞争和发展难上加难。


·         Global policy coordination: America’s traditional leadership role has evaporated in recent years as our problems have made us more insular and inward-looking.	·         全球政策合作：随着我们的问题让我们变得更孤立、更内向，近几年来美国的传统领导地位不复存在。


This would not be a major problem if the resulting vacuum had been filled.	如果由此产生的真空被填补，那么这并不是一个问题。


But that has not happened.	但事实并非如此。


On the contrary, the G-7 has lost relevance, the International Monetary Fund is hampered by its representation and legitimacy deficits, and the G-20 is still finding its feet.	相反，G7已名存实亡，IMF因代表和正当性问题而被削弱，而G20还没有站稳脚跟。


Engineering such an agenda is not an overwhelming challenge.	出台这样一个日程并不是不可能完成的任务。


But that will provide little comfort if you, our elected representatives, do not collaborate effectively.	但如果你们——我们选出来的代表——不能精诚合作的话，这一点并不能令人放心。


The choice Congress faces this term is simple: either address head on America’s challenges, or risk being remembered as the body whose dithering condemned future generations to being worse off than their parents.	国会在这个任期中的选择很简单：要么解决美国面临的挑战； 要么背上因犹豫不决而使子孙后代过得连祖先都不如的恶名。


Yours sincerely,	此致


Concerned citizens	焦虑的公民


Back to the Brink in Ukraine	乌克兰重临深渊


The campaign for Ukraine’s parliamentary election of September 30th is scarcely underway and yet Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych is already trying to steal it.	乌克兰9月30日的国会大选还没有开始，总理维克托·亚努科维奇就已经在想法暗渡陈仓。


Yanukovych was the man who sought to falsify the result of the presidential election of 2004, inciting the Orange Revolution. Back then, a peaceful and honest result was reached in the end because Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma refused to heed Yanukovych’s call to use violence to defend his rigged election.	2004年的总统大选结果亚努科维奇就曾试图弄虚作假，结果激起了橙色革命，最后因为乌克兰总统列昂尼德·库奇马没有理会亚努科维奇的要求用暴力保住作弊赢得的大选，才得以取得一个和平、真实的结果。


This time it appears that Yanukovych is prepared to do anything to remain in power.	这一次，为了保住权势，亚努科维奇似乎准备无所不用其极。


The dirty tricks began in the midnight hours of August 11th, when Ukraine’s Central Election Commission (which is packed with Yanukovych placemen) refused to certify the largest opposition party, the bloc of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, to participate in the election.	他的卑鄙手段始于8月11日午夜，乌克兰的中央选举委员会（里面挤满了亚努科维奇的走狗）拒绝让最大的反对党（前总理尤丽雅·季莫申科的政治团体）参与竞选。


The technicality the commission cited would be absurdly funny if its potential results were not so incendiary: the CEC objected to the fact that the Tymoshenko bloc candidates listed only their home towns on the party list, not their precise street address.	委员会援引的技术细节几近荒谬可笑，而其可能造成的后果则极具煽动性：委员会反对季莫申科集团的理由是其候选人在政党名单上只列出了各自的籍贯，没有写明具体的街道地址。


But Tymoshenko’s party successfully submitted its list in the very same format at the March 2006 election, which demonstrates the glaringly partisan nature of the election commission’s ruling.	然而季莫申科的政党曾在2006年3月的选举中成功地提交名单，格式一模一样，这说明选举委员会的政治偏向有多么明显。


By seeking to cling to power by hook or by crook, Yanukovych is likely to bring on the deluge.	为了不择手段地保住权力，亚努科维奇很可能带来一场大洪水。


In Ukraine that means not only violent unrest, but economic decline and renewed repression. At the end of the day it could lead to the sort of huge street protests that marked the Orange Revolution, and their attempted violent suppression.	在乌克兰，这不仅意味着暴动，还有经济滑坡和新一轮的压迫，最终可能导致橙色革命那种大规模的街头抗议活动，以及暴力镇压企图。


Recent history is replete with alarming examples of dictators and would be dictators who refuse to recognize when their time has run out.	近代史上到处是令人惊惧的独裁者，以及不愿承认自己的辉煌已经结束的潜在独裁者。


But for the past twenty years their blatant political chicanery has been met with a potent new force: the massed voices of ordinary people who refuse to be cowed.	然而，过去二十年来，他们明目张胆的政治欺骗遭到了一股有力的新生力量的抵抗：那些不愿在恐吓面前屈服的普通人联合起来发出的声音。


From the “People Power” revolution that toppled Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 to Boris Yeltsin’s defiance of the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev of August 1991, to the Rose, Orange, and Cedar Revolutions of recent years, dictators have been forced to admit defeat when enough people stand up to them.	从1986年菲律宾推倒费迪南德·马科斯的“人民权力”革命，到1991年8月叶利钦反抗针对戈尔巴乔夫的政变阴谋，再到近年来的玫瑰革命、橙色革命和雪杉革命，只要有足够的人站出来，独裁者只能被迫承认失败。


Will it really be necessary for Ukrainians to repeat the Orange Revolution by again gathering in their millions to shame Yanukovych (a twice convicted violent felon before he entered politics) to change course?	乌克兰人是否真的必须再次发动橙色革命，聚集数百万人反抗亚努科维奇（此人进入政坛之前曾两次因暴力获罪），才能改变事态？


There is a person who might compel Yanukovych to retreat to democratic norms and thus hold off such protests -- Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.	有一个人或许可以迫使亚努科维奇退回民主准则，从而阻止这样的抗议——俄罗斯总统普京。


It is certainly in Russia’s national interest to prevent chaos in the country’s big next door neighbor.	帮助俄罗斯最大的邻国避免混乱肯定符合该国的国家利益。


But Putin’s idea of what constitutes Russia’s national interest makes that type of intervention unlikely.	但是，根据普京心目中的俄罗斯国家利益，这样的干预不大可能发生。


Weak neighbors are states that the Kremlin can control, so why not expand Russian power by letting Ukraine slide into protest and anarchy if by doing so it brings that country back under Putin’s thumb?	弱小的邻国可以为克里姆林宫所控制，因此，如果可以使这个国家重新回到普京的掌中，何不让乌克兰陷入纷争和无政府状态，从而扩大俄罗斯的权威？


Moreover, Putin himself is in the business of sterilizing Russia’s democratic processes by handpicking his successor and having his courts and electoral commissions block his opponents from political participation, often tarring them as traitors.	而且，普京本人也在抑制俄罗斯的民主进程。 他亲手挑选自己的继任者，授意法院和选举委员会阻挠对手参与政治（通常是给对方泼上叛国者的污水）。


Someone with such contempt for the democratic rights of his own people is unlikely to champion them abroad.	一个如此藐视本国人民民主权利的人，怎么可能捍卫外国人的民权？


As is usual with this ex-KGB man, Putin is being cunning about Ukraine, but he is deluding himself if he thinks that siding with Yanukovych will bring back effective Russian overlordship of Ukraine.	在乌克兰问题上，这位前克格勃情报人员故伎重施，老奸巨猾，不过如果他以为偏袒亚努科维奇可以让俄罗斯重新称霸乌克兰，那他就是在妄想。


The days of empire are over, no matter how much wealth oil and gas is bringing to Russia.	不管石油和天然气给俄罗斯带来多大的财富，帝国的时代已经结束。


Only if Ukraine maintains its independence will the imperial nostalgia of Russia’s elites be shattered.	乌克兰只有保持独立，才能打破俄罗斯精英阶层的帝国梦。


So other pressure will need to be applied, primarily by the European Union and the United States.	因此，乌克兰需要其他方面的压力，主要来自欧盟和美国。


In 2004, both the EU and US were tardy in speaking in defense of Ukraine’s democrats. Only when the courage of millions of ordinary Ukrainians gathered in central Kyiv galvanized world opinion did the US and EU marshal the courage to stand up for an honest election result.	2004年，欧盟和美国对于声援乌克兰的民主人士都显得不情不愿，直到数百万聚集在基辅市中心的乌克兰百姓展现的勇气唤醒了世界舆论，美国和欧盟才站出来捍卫真实的选举结果。


And the one state that did stand with Ukraine from the start back then, Poland, has now antagonized much of EU opinion, particularly in Germany, because of the paranoid behavior of its current leaders.	而当时自始至终一直站在乌克兰身边的国家波兰，由于其当前领导人的偏执行为，如今已惹恼了欧盟的许多人，特别是德国。


So Polish influence in Union councils is at rock bottom.	因此波兰在欧盟委员会上的影响力已跌倒谷底。


Luckily, the leaders of Europe’s three biggest states are different people than in 2004.	幸运的是，欧洲最大三个国家的领导人已不是2004年的那些人。


Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Gordon Brown appear to have a clearer appreciation of the Union’s security problems to its east, and so may find the will to act decisively now, rather than dither as their predecessors did when Ukraine moved into crisis in 2004.	安格拉·默克尔、尼古拉·萨科奇和戈登·布朗似乎更加清楚欧盟东部的安全问题，因此或许愿意立即采取决定性的行动，而不是像2004年乌克兰陷入危机时他们的前任那样不知所措。


Unless Ukraine’s democratic opposition is allowed to take part in the election, a new crisis is certain.	除非乌克兰的民主势力获准参与竞选，否则一场新的危机迫在眉睫。


Tymoshenko, who has survived three assassination attempts, is not the type of woman to surrender her campaign on a technicality.	经历了三次刺杀而不倒的季莫申科可不是会因为技术细节而放弃竞选的女性。


While the Orange Revolution made ordinary Ukrainians more conscious of their rights than ever before, this alone cannot guarantee that they are certain to see those rights vindicated in the coming weeks.	橙色革命使乌克兰老百姓的权利意识空前高涨，但仅靠革命无法保证这些权利在接下来的几周里得到维护。


However, it will make the job of repressing them much harder.	不过，要镇压他们也将变得更加困难。


And isn’t that what the battle for democracy is all about?	这不正是民主斗争的目的吗？


Back to the Future in Finance	回到金融史上的解决方案


FLORENCE – Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker provided the central inspiration for President Barack Obama’s proposal for overhauling banking.	佛罗伦萨 —— 美国总统奥巴马最近出台的银行业“大修”草案，其核心思想来自美联储前主席保罗·沃尔克。


Without question the most successful central banker of the twentieth century, Volcker was an early and persistent voice warning of the problems of what he called “the bright new financial system.”	沃尔克无疑是 20 世纪最成功的中央银行家，从很早起，他就一直在警告人们，那个“光鲜的金融新体系”存在种种问题。


But Volcker has also been a prominent critic of the dangers of currency volatility.	但沃尔克也是批评货币波动性危险的代表人物之一。


What is the link between nostalgia for a simplified and less risky banking sector and the wish to reintroduce a currency system that also seems a relic of the past?	他一方面缅怀昔日那种较为简单、低风险的银行体系，另一方面试图重建一种带有旧时代痕迹的货币体系，在这两者之间存在什么关联呢？


There was already much discussion about reviving 1930’s-style regulation of banks before Obama’s dramatic and combative announcement on January 21.	1 月 21 日，奥巴马以极富戏剧性和战斗姿态的方式宣布了改革草案，在此之前，关于是否要恢复 20 世纪 30 年代式的银行监管制度，已有大量讨论。


The proposals for what is now called the “Volcker rule,” which would ban proprietary trading and prevent banks from “owning, investing in, or sponsoring” hedge funds or private equity funds, is an updated version of the Glass-Steagall Act, the law enacted in the United States in 1933 to separate investment banking from commercial banking.	该草案主张的是所谓“沃尔克法则”：禁止自营交易、不让银行“拥有、投资或资助”对冲基金或私募股权基金，可谓是格拉斯 — 斯蒂格尔法案的一个升级版。 该法案于 1933 年在美国通过，旨在令投资银行和商业银行分业经营。


The drive in the 1930’s to restrict banking activities occurred in many countries.	20 世纪 30 年代时，许多国家都想要限制银行业活动。


In Belgium, where the first universal banks had been established in the early nineteenth century, investment and commercial banking were also separated.	虽然在 19 世纪早期就建立起第一个全能银行，比利时当时也勒令投行和商行业务分开。


Italian banks were banned from holding securities in industrial corporations.	意大利的银行则不许持有工业企业证券。


The argument of the 1930’s was cast less in terms of banks that were “too big to fail” than as a response to the faulty advice that banks had offered their clients.	当年主张分业经营的理由与今日不同，不是要拆分某些“大到不能倒”的银行，而是要防止银行蒙骗客户。


Investment banks had sold shares and bonds (especially for foreign corporations and governments) to their retail customers, offloaded their own risk, and created a large revenue stream of fees for themselves.	当时的投行经常搞的一个勾当是，把自己承销的（尤其是外国企业和政府所发行的）股票和债券卖给自己的零售客户，从而转嫁风险，并赚取高额佣金。


Then, as now, many people demanded some punishment for the banks and bankers.	跟现在一样的是，当时也有许多人要求惩处涉嫌舞弊的银行和银行家。


But they also wanted banks to direct more resources to financing domestic investments and industry.	但他们也要求银行配置更多资金于国内投资和产业领域。


The bank reforms generally did punish the bankers, but they were not successful in promoting new bank lending.	当年的银行改革的确惩处了不少银行家，但在促进银行放贷方面却乏善可陈。


Today’s discussion focuses less on the danger that banks pose to their customers than on the risks they create for taxpayers.	今日讨论的焦点主要不是银行给客户造成的危险，而是给纳税人造成的风险。


Proprietary trading was justified not because it created large profits for banks (it did), but because it was supposed to create markets and provide liquidity for rarely traded instruments.	为自营交易辩护者，不说它能给银行带来巨额利润（这一块利润的确丰厚），而是说它有做市功能，能够为那些罕有人交易的金融工具提供流动性。


The banks themselves established what in effect were their own substitute markets, which allowed their customers and themselves to price instruments that would otherwise have been impossible to value.	据说，银行建立起来的市场实际上是它们的内测市场，主要功能是方便银行及其客户对某些金融工具进行定价 —— 没有市场交易，这种定价通常是不可能的。


The huge profits were supposed to be the reward for the provision of a public service.	而由此得来的巨额利润则被说成是提供一种公共服务所应得回报。


Such large banks are needed because small players alone cannot make a market.	大银行之所以有用，是因为光靠小银行是无法做市的。


Big banks are also major players in international currency markets, and accumulate major foreign-exchange positions both between their subsidiaries and on a consolidated basis.	在国际货币市场上，大市场也是主要玩家，它们或者通过支行间的操作，或是以一种坚实的货币为基础，积累起巨大的外汇头寸。


If modern banks are too big and too dangerous because they are too vulnerable, the most obvious way to make them safer is to demand higher capital requirements.	如果说现代的银行规模太大太危险，是因为它们太脆弱； 要把它们改造得更安全，最直接一个办法是提高法定资本金。


Historically, that was the course advocated in most international discussions.	历史上的讨论多数是遵循这个思路。


But, unfortunately, the most obvious way for banks to increase their capital ratios is to curtail their lending.	然而不幸的是，这个最直接的办法会削弱银行的放贷。


In an economic downturn, that is the last thing that businesses need or want.	在经济下行期，这是最不受欢迎的一个结果。


The new answer to the dilemma is to legislate what sorts of activity should be cut out completely.	走出这个两难困境的新思路是，立法规定哪些种类的业务应被剔除。


The hope is that refocusing financial activities in this way will revive other types of lending.	这个思路希望重新界定金融活动的重点，修剪枝蔓，从而促进核心领域的放贷。


In the 1930’s, the control of banks went hand in hand with the control of capital movements and in the end with the fixing of exchange rates.	在 20 世纪 30 年代，伴随着银行管制的加强，资本流管制日益趋紧，最终迎来了固定汇率。


The alternative of continued capital movements, facilitated by major financial institutions, and flexible exchange rates was set out by a few economists, notably the Austrian Gottfried Haberler, but found no political resonance.	有一些经济学家，尤其是奥地利人哥特弗里德·哈勃勒（ Gottfried Haberler ）曾经构想了一套替代方案：由大金融机构和浮动汇率促成持续的资本流动，但是政治上的响应者寥寥。


In celebrating the conclusion of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, which created the post-war world’s financial architecture, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s used his closing address to the conference to call for a more effective banking system that provided more money on cheaper terms: “The effect would be …to drive only the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance.”	1944 年布雷顿森林协议签署，创立了战后世界金融构架，时任美国财政部长的亨利·摩根索（ Henry Morgenthau ）在布雷顿森林会议的闭幕演讲上呼吁，建立一个更有效的银行体系，以更优惠的条件提供信贷：“其效果将是， . .


After the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange-rate regime in the early 1970’s, it was widely supposed that a flexible currency system would bring more stability.	自从 20 世纪 70 年代早期布雷顿森林汇率制度崩溃以来，人们普遍认为浮动汇率体系能带来更高的稳定性。


But, whereas we only recently learned that financial behemoths create financial instability, foreign-exchange markets for a long time were characterized by volatility and uncertainty.	尽管我们直到最近才明白，金融巨无霸也会导致金融动荡，但是长期以来，外汇市场的特点就是波动性与不确定性。


These markets needed the big banks to act as stabilizers and take the other side of bets.	这些市场需要大银行充当稳定器和交易对家。


When large banks are unable to play this role, and are forced to retrench, the likelihood of market volatility increases.	一旦大银行不再能够扮演这一角色，被迫收缩规模，市场波动的概率就会上升。


The continuation of the current crisis is likely to produce more foreign-exchange crises, as governments’ creditworthiness and the position of their banks go hand in hand.	本轮危机如果持续下去，就可能导致更多外汇危机，因为各国政府的信用跟它们国家银行的风险敞口紧密相关。


In 1992, during the crisis that rocked the European Monetary System, France’s finance minister, Michel Sapin, spoke in parliament about how the French Revolution had used the guillotine on speculators.	1992 年，当危机冲击欧洲货币体系之际，法国财政部长，米歇尔·萨潘（ Michel Sapin ）对议会说起，法国大革命是如何用断头台对付投机客。


Could we go back to 1944, when the lessons of the 1930’s were drawn at an international level, and fix exchange rates once more?	我们是否能够回到 1944 年，吸取 20 世纪 30 年代的国际教训，再一次确立固定汇率？


That would run counter to almost every argument of modern economics, but, at a moment when we are looking to the past for financial solutions, it is no longer unthinkable.	那可能同一切现代经济学的理论背道而驰，但如果我们回顾金融解决方案的历史，它也并非不可考虑。


Back to the Great Game in Kazakhstan	重回哈萨克斯坦的大棋局


BRUSSELS – Those who oppose Western rapprochement with Kazakhstan cite the country’s lack of political and human rights.	布鲁塞尔--那些反对与哈萨克斯坦和好的人指出该国缺乏政治权利和人权。


But, while Kazakhstan has not gone down the “color revolution” route to democracy that other post-Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia have followed, its timidity about reform does not justify isolation.	但是，尽管哈萨克斯坦并非像乌克兰和格鲁吉亚等其他后苏联共和国那样走向民主的“颜色革命”之路，其在改革上的软弱并不应当为孤立该国提供理由。


After all, the West is not deterred in the slightest from dealing with authoritarian Russia and communist China.	毕竟，西方在与专制的俄罗斯和共产主义中国打交道上丝毫并不怯步。


Moreover, Kazakhstan, though a Muslim majority country, has established the type of secular, multi-ethnic, and multi religious polity that the West is seeking to encourage throughout the Muslim world.	而且，哈萨克斯坦尽管是一个穆斯林占多数的国家，但是它建立了一种世俗、多种族以及宗教多元的政治体制，而这种体制正是西方想要在整个穆斯林世界加以鼓励的。


But the principal reasons for the West not to isolate Kazakhstan are geostrategic.	但是西方不得孤立哈萨克斯坦的主要原因是地理政治上的。


The Kazakhs are keen to sell their oil and gas to the West at the very moment that the European Union is anxious to shed its dependence on Russian supplies.	正当欧盟急于想要摆脱其对俄国石油供应依赖的时候，哈萨克斯坦乐意向西方出售其石油和天然气。


Yet the window of opportunity for an EU-Kazakh partnership may be closing.	但是欧盟和哈萨克斯坦夥伴关系的机遇之窗可能正在关闭。


Kazakhstan’s historical ties to Russia and its geographical proximity to China have caused a keen competition between those two countries for influence.	哈萨克斯坦与俄国的历史联系及其与中国在地理上的接近造成这两国相互竞争获得对哈萨克斯坦的影响力。


It is vital that Europe join in this “great game” for influence and draw Kazakhstan’s political orientation westwards.	因此，欧洲加入这一获得影响力的“大棋局”并且把哈萨克斯坦的政治取向向西方转移极为重要。


There are signs that Europe is finally waking up to the possibilities that Kazakhstan offers.	现在有迹象表明欧洲终于看到了哈萨克斯坦提供的可能性。


Indeed, two recent developments may help anchor Kazakhstan as a Western ally.	确实，最近的两个事态可以帮助把哈萨克斯坦稳定为西方的一个盟国。


The first is the country’s election to the annual rotating chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010.	第一是该国当选为欧洲安全与合作组织2010年度的轮值主席国。


Kazakhstan had lobbied for years for this opportunity in the face of fierce opposition from Britain and other EU countries.	哈萨克斯坦不顾英国和其他欧洲国家的强烈反对，多年来一直争取这一机会。


Its selection to lead the OSCE is seen as a reward for President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s policy of engagement with the West.	它当选领导欧安组织被认为是对纳扎尔巴耶夫总统与西方接触政策的奖励。


Russia is deeply suspicious of the OSCE – the Kremlin recently restricted the number of OSCE observers for Russian elections – so Kazakhstan’s future stewardship hints that the Kazahks are anxious to move closer to the West, and unafraid to challenge their former masters in the Kremlin.	俄国极为怀疑欧安组织，克里姆林宫最近限制了欧安组织前往俄国选举的观察员人数，所以哈萨克斯坦将来主持欧安组织表明该国急于接近西方，并且并不害怕挑战其原先克里姆林宫的主子。


In the long term, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU’s blueprint for relations with states on its periphery, offers the best chance for nurturing this relationship.	长远而言，作为欧盟与其近邻国家关系的蓝图的欧洲邻国政策提供了培植这一关系的最佳机会。


The ENP is designed to forge a “circle of friends” around the EU based on shared interests in security, economic development, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.	这一政策是用来在安全、经济发展、法治以及尊重人权的基础等共同利益的基础上在欧盟周围建立“朋友圈”。


The European Parliament has, for now, rejected the idea that Kazakhstan could one day become an ENP member.	欧洲议会目前已经拒绝了哈萨克斯坦未来一天成为欧洲邻国政策成员国的可能。


But this narrowness of vision will have to be overcome if Kazakhstan is not to be lured into either the Chinese or Russian orbits.	但是，如果不让哈萨克斯坦被拖入中国或俄国轨道，就要克服这一狭隘的观点。


Kazakhstan is a suitable partner for the ENP in every respect.	在所有方面，哈萨克斯坦都是这一政策合适的夥伴。


The country’s southwest edge is on the same longitude as the countries of the south Caucasus and Turkey, all of which are already ENP countries or in the case of Turkey an EU candidate.	该国西南边境与南高加索和土耳其处于同一纬度，这两个国家都已经是这一政策的国家，而土耳其还是欧盟成员候选国。


This alone makes a strong geographical case for Kazakhstan’s ENP status.	仅仅是这一点就足以在地理上应该让哈萨克斯坦成为欧洲邻国政策成员国。


There are of course concerns about freedom of speech and a lack of media diversity, but conditions in Kazakhstan are no worse than in, say, Azerbaijan, its ethnic Turkic cousin, which is fully in the ENP.	当然，人们担心言论自由以及缺乏媒体的多样性，但是哈萨克斯坦的情况并不比其土耳其兄弟的阿塞拜疆差，而阿塞拜疆则是这一政策完全成员国。


Moreover, Kazakhstan is already in formal talks with the EU about human rights issues.	而且，哈萨克斯坦已经与欧盟就其人权问题正式谈判。


But it is Kazakhstan’s strong secular tradition, inherited from its Soviet past, and a very large European Christian minority (approximately 40% of its 15.2 million people) that make it a society that the West needs to encourage, given the Islamic arc of instability upon which it sits.	但是，鉴于哈萨克斯坦处于伊斯兰动荡新月的边缘，正是其从其苏联历史继承下来的强大世俗传统以及很大的欧洲基督教少数人口(占其1520万人口的大约40%)才让它成为一个西方想要鼓励的社会。


Drawing Kazakhstan westward would help embed this secular tradition.	把哈萨克斯坦拖向西方将会巩固这一世俗传统。


The challenge is clear.	挑战是一目了然的。


Russia and China will not wait for the EU to make up its mind about whether Kazakhstan is a worthy partner.	俄国和中国不会等待欧盟决定哈萨克斯坦是否是一个有价值的夥伴。


Kazakhstan already plays a key role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a group that comprises Central Asian countries, along with Russia and China.	哈萨克斯坦已经在上海合作组织中发挥关键作用。 上合组织包含中亚国家以及俄国和中国。


The SCO focuses on regional security, economic ties, and cultural cohesion in much the same way as the OSCE and EU do.	上合组织很像欧安组织和欧盟，关注于地区安全、经济联系以及文化团结。


There is little doubt that the SCO is an instrument for Russia and China to make the case for a multi-polar world based on regional security blocs that counterbalance American strategic hegemony.	毫无疑问，上合组织是俄国和中国用来对抗美国战略霸权的地区安全集团基础上建立多极世界的工具。


It would therefore be tragic if the EU missed the opportunity to tie Kazakhstan firmly to the West.	因此，如果欧盟坐失把哈萨克斯坦紧密联系到西方的机遇，那将会是悲剧。


There may not be many more chances.	将来或许不会有这么多机会了。


Back to the Politics of Cultural Despair	回归对文化绝望的政治


Some years ago the historian Fritz Stern wrote a book about Germany entitled The Politics of Cultural Despair.	若干年前，历史学家弗里茨·施特恩写过一本有关德国的书，书名是《对文化绝望的政治》。


He used the example of three (now forgotten) bestselling authors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show the deep aversion of many Germans to the modern world, notably to market economics and democratic politics.	书中列举了十九世纪末二十世纪初三位畅销书作家（现在已经少有人知了），来说明很多德国人对现代世界，特别是市场经济和民主政治的切齿憎恶。


For Stern, this was part of the cultural soil in which National Socialism flourished.	施特恩认为，正是在这样的文化土壤之上国家社会主义得以滋生。


Much has changed since the Nazi era.	纳粹时代以后发生了巨大的变化。


The murderous triumph and bloody defeat of the politics of cultural despair was followed by an economic miracle that made Germany one of the world’s most prosperous countries, with nearly six decades of increasingly stable democracy.	对文化绝望的政治经历了自杀式的疯狂和血腥的失败，随后诞生了经济奇迹，德国也成了世界上最繁荣的国家之一，近60年来德国的民主制度也日益巩固。


Yet there are still traces within Germany of an attitude that finds modern economics distasteful and the opening of all frontiers to a globalized world frightening.	尽管如此，有些德国人仍然认为现代经济令人厌恶，向世界各国开放经济令人毛骨悚然。


“Pure capitalism” and “globalization” evoke horrific images.	“纯粹的资本主义”和“全球化”唤起了人们可怕的遐想。


Swarms of capitalist “locusts” threaten to descend on defenseless, hardworking people, to quote the unfortunate metaphor used in a recent speech by Franz Müntefering, the chairman of the governing Social Democrats.	引用执政的社会民主党主席弗兰茨·明特费林在前不久一次演讲中所打的一个不幸的比喻：成群结队的资本主义“蝗虫”马上会扑到毫无防备的劳苦大众身上。


Of course, revulsion for liberal economies and global markets is not confined to Germany.	当然，对自由经济和全球市场的厌恶并不仅限于德国。


A similar sentiment formed one of the motives for the French and perhaps even the Dutch to reject the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty, which some regarded as too “Anglo-Saxon” in its economic liberalism.	法国，也许甚至是荷兰否决欧盟《宪法条约》的动机中都有类似的情感在作祟，在某些人看来，欧盟《宪法条约》的经济自由主义有着太多的盎格鲁撒克逊式内容。


For many, the alternative to capitalism and globalization is an idyllic image of a “European social model,” which no one has yet defined.	在很多人的心目中，代替资本主义和全球化的是“欧洲社会模型”式的田园图画，尽管谁都未曾见过这幅图画的庐山真面目。


Indeed, it would be difficult to do so.	实际上，要想看清这幅景象真的非常困难。


Social policies in Europe – like everything else – vary widely, and popular attitudes cover a spectrum, from tired protectionism and longing for subsidies in some of “old Europe” to the free-market enthusiasm of more recent EU members in the West (Ireland and Portugal) and the East (Poland and Slovakia).	和其它政策领域一样，欧洲各国的社会政策也千差万别，而在流行的观点中社会政策涵盖很广，从疲惫保护主义到某些“老牌”欧洲国家的补贴要求，再到欧盟西部新成员（爱尔兰和葡萄牙）和东部新成员（波兰和斯洛伐克）们高涨的自由市场热情。


In fact, Europe’s much-vaunted social model is more a dream than a reality, the dream of a cozy world in which a benevolent state looks after us.	事实上，欧洲大肆鼓吹的社会模式更像是个梦，而不像现实。 在人们梦中的温暖世界，慈善的国家会照顾每个人的需求。


This world has ceased to be viable in large part for reasons of demography, as ever more claimants for assistance make costs unaffordable.	但由于人口数量太大，这样的世界已经不再可能，援助申请者的数量激增，国家已经拿不出这笔费用。


Some people – and even a few politicians – are drawing the right conclusions from this.	有些人¾甚至还有些政治家¾已经得出了正确的结论。


They know that ultimately we all must rely on our own initiative and effort, and they make use of the opportunities of open markets.	他们知道，我们最终必须依靠自己的才华和力量，而他们则利用开放市场带来的机会。


But others in Europe treat such attitudes like a cartoon whose caption could be in French or German: “Self-reliance is absolutely important, we depend on politics for it”.	但其它欧洲人的态度活脱脱像张漫画，漫画的法语或德语标题是：“依靠自己太有必要了，但我们需要政府帮忙实现。 ”


Behind such differences lie deep political and cultural traditions concerning the role of the state in everyday life.	在这些分歧的背后隐藏着深刻的政治和文化传统，内容是国家在日常生活中所起的作用。


This is where the United States really is different from France and Germany, while Britain has a similar tradition of distrusting the state rather than relying on it.	正是在这一点上，美国与法国和德国有着本质的不同，而英国与美国却非常相似，他们都不信任国家，更不会依靠国家。


In a different way, this is true of Italy as well.	虽然在方式上略有不同，但意大利确实也是这样。


Italy has long had a large Communist Party, and the left may be in power again; but there is no gut antagonism to the freedoms that capitalism encourages.	很久以来，意大利的共产主义势力十分强大，左翼党派很可能再次掌权，但却对资本主义鼓励的自由丝毫没有感到抵触。


Poland is another country in which individual initiative flourishes – to the point that the apocryphal “Polish plumber” came to epitomize the threats posed by globalization in France.	个人热情高涨的另外一个国家是波兰¾甚至连假冒的“波兰管道工”都煞有介事地总结全球化会给法国带来哪些威胁。


Needless to say, there are no such hang-ups in many of the high-growth economies of Asia.	勿需多说，在亚洲很多高速增长的国家中根本不存在这样的障碍。


True, in India the inertia of an indigenous version of Fabian socialism had to be overcome; but this has happened.	没错，印度必须克服费边社会主义在当地造成的长期影响，但他们已经做到了。


In fact, new models to square the circle of economic growth, social cohesion, and political liberty may be emerging in some of the countries that have grasped the mantle of globalization.	实际上，完成经济增长、社会凝聚和政治自由等高难度任务的新模型可能会在抓住了全球化外衣的某些国家中最先显现。


The entrenched anti-capitalist, anti-globalization mood elsewhere is a source of concern.	其它地方根深蒂固的反资本主义、反全球化情绪也很值得关注。


After all, Fritz Stern wrote his book to warn of the dangers posed by a romantic abhorrence of modernity.	毕竟，弗里茨·施特恩在他的著作中警告了对现代事务罗曼蒂克的憎恨所带来的危险。


High, often long-term unemployment and cuts in social benefits nurture, but do not cause such attitudes; their deep-seated cultural roots matter far more.	失业率长期居高不下和缩减社会福利培养，却没有造就这样的观点，深层次的文化根源远比现实因素重要得多。


So do their consequences.	从后果上来讲也是如此。


A sense of frustration that results from anti-capitalist, anti-globalization sentiment leads to a lethal combination of Arcadian dreams (“France to the French”) and the reality of ruthless, if seductive, leaders on the right (Jean-Marie Le Pen in France) and the left (Oskar Lafontaine and his new party in Germany).	反资本主义、反全球化情绪产生的挫折感带来了田园美梦和残酷事实的致命组合，充满魅力的右翼领导人（法国的让-马利-勒庞）和左翼领导人（拉方丹及其德国新党）。


Prosperity and liberty will be the victims, unless those who grasp the opportunities of the new world prevail.	繁荣和自由将成为牺牲品，除非那些抓住新世界机遇的人能获得成功。


Back to the Sixties	时光倒流50年


BERKELEY – Complaints about the inflationary effects of American monetary policy are rampant, despite there being barely a hint of inflation in the United States.	发自伯克利——虽然美国国内未有一丝通胀的迹象，但对美国货币政策助推通胀的抱怨早已喧嚣尘上了。


Rapidly growing catch-up economies are paddling furiously to avoid being dragged down by a torrent of capital inflows.	各大新兴经济体都竭力避免被汹涌流入的资本冲垮。


Prominent policymakers, desperate for alternatives to America’s malfunctioning monetary system, have gone so far as to allude to a return to the gold standard.	而那些高明的政策制定者们则殚精竭虑，誓为美国问题丛生的货币系统找一个替代品，甚至暗示要回归金本位了。


I am not talking about 2011, but about 1964. We have been here before.	请注意，我说的可不是2011年，而是1964年，历史又一次重演了。


In 1964, it was the rapidly growing economies of Europe, still catching up to the US, that were howling about the Federal Reserve.	当年对美联储怨声载道的是一批发展迅猛，大有赶超美国之势的欧洲国家。


As a result of a recklessly expansionary American policy, they argued, they were being flooded with imported finance. The US was “exporting inflation.”	各国一致认为随着美国货币政策的剧烈扩张，国外资金将充斥各国，美国人正在“输出通胀”。


American officials countered that the financial inflows reflected Europe’s underdeveloped capital markets.	对此美方官员则反驳说资金流入其实反映了欧洲资本市场的不成熟状况。


Europe’s inflation problem was a byproduct of its central banks’ reluctance to tighten policy more aggressively, and European countries’ hesitancy to let their currencies rise, reflecting their long-standing commitment to export-led growth.	通胀其实是各国央行不愿进一步收紧货币政策所产生的副作用，此外欧洲长期奉行的出口型增长政策也导致各国在本国货币升值问题上踌躇不定。


Plus ça change, as the French would say.	正如一句法国谚语所说：Plus ça change（万变不离其宗）。


What the French under General Charles de Gaulle actually did say was that fiat monies should be jettisoned in favor of the gold standard. The US would then be subject to tighter policy discipline.	当年戴高乐治下的法国建议废除以政府信用担保的法定货币，以金本位制度取而代之，最终迫使美国收紧财政政策。


But the French never explained exactly how restoration of the gold standard might be accomplished, or how it would translate into price and economic stability, given gold markets’ volatility and the disastrous consequences of the gold standard – not least in France – in the 1930’s.	但法国人从未明确说明究竟要在何种程度上回复到金本位制度，也没能解释该做法如何有助于实现物价和金融稳定，因为1930年代黄金市场的剧烈波动及其对金本位制度的灾难性影响（法国尤甚）足已令大家对此满腹狐疑了。


The debate, in other words, was as confused and confusing as it is today.	换句话说，类似的争论不但糊弄了前人，也令今人迷惑不已。


Its one positive effect was to launch an effort to reform the international monetary system.	它的积极影响就是启动了一场改革国际货币系统的运动。


So now that the French government – not them again! – has committed to making international monetary reform the centerpiece of its G-20 presidency in 2011, it is worth recalling the cautionary tale of the 1960’s.	因此当如今的法国政府（又是这帮法国人！ ）承诺将在2011年担任G20集团轮值主席国时将国际货币改革作为核心任务时，自当检讨一下1960年代的教训。


Back then, international monetary diplomacy focused on creating a new form of international reserves, what became the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights.	当年国际货币外交主要集中在创设一个新型国际储备，并最终演化成为国际货币基金组织的特别提款权（Special Drawing Rights）。


The idea was that by issuing SDRs, the IMF would provide catch-up economies seeking to accumulate reserves with an alternative to piling up dollars. The US could no longer run balance-of-payments deficits “without tears.��� American policy could be reined in without starving the global economy of liquidity.	该理念认为通过特别提款权的发行，国际货币基金组织可以给那些只能不断囤积美元的新兴经济体提供另一种增加储备的方式，而美国也无法“毫不心疼地”运行在贸易赤字之上，一方面遏制美国货币政策的扩张，另一方面也不至于使全球经济面临流动性枯竭的局面。


The effort failed completely.	这些努力最终一败涂地。


Special Drawing Rights never became an attractive alternative to the dollar, only modestly supplementing dollars and other national units in international use.	特别提款权从未成为一种有吸引力的美元替代品，只是在国际间中作为美元和其他国家货币的补充物存在。


Because they did not trust the IMF to assume the powers of a global central bank, the Fund’s members established high hurdles to creating SDRs.	世界货币基金组织的成员国都不信该组织能承担全球中央银行的重任，因此为特别提款权的创设设置了极高的门槛。


Private markets in SDR-denominated instruments similarly failed to develop, in turn limiting their appeal to central banks.	用特别提款权作为结算工具的私人市场同样也无法发展起来，于是也抹杀了其对各国央行的吸引力。


The other focus of negotiations in the 1960’s was an effort to enhance exchange-rate flexibility.	1960年代的另一个国际争论焦点是增加汇率的灵活性。


Proposals to this effect – a response to the emergence of chronic surpluses in Germany and Italy, and chronic deficits in the US – attracted growing attention once the SDR negotiations sputtered to a close in 1968.	相关计划方案——主要是针对德国和意大利两国的持续贸易盈余以及美国的持续赤字——在特别提款权谈判于1968年落下帷幕后越来越引人注目。


But, with other countries having enjoyed two decades of export-led growth as a result of pegging their currencies to the dollar, there was a reluctance to mess with success.	但另外一些出口导向型经济体都已在紧盯美元的情况下享受了20年的好时光，谁也不愿意搅乱了大好局面。


While the IMF, in a high-profile report on exchange rates in mid-1970, endorsed the principle of greater flexibility, it offered no new ideas for getting countries to move in this direction and proposed no new sanctions against countries that resisted.	虽然国际货币基金组织在1970年中期发布了一份关于汇率问题的高级别报告，并承诺实施更高汇率灵活性的相关原则，但它既未提出任何新理念去吸引各国加入，也未对那些拒绝加入的国家制定任何新的制裁方案。


International imbalances continued to mount until the system came crashing down in 1971-1973.	结果国际贸易失衡状况持续恶化，直到该系统在1971-1973年间轰然倒塌。


The French government’s recent hints about its reform agenda for 2011 suggest that, contrary to earlier speculation, an enhanced role for the SDR will not be at the center of its efforts.	法国政府最近对2011年改革方案的相关暗示显示出：相对于早前的猜测，它并未集中精力在增加特别提款权的角色方面。


Rather, the Sarkozy administration will seek to develop mechanisms for managing the transition to an international currency system in which the dollar, the euro, and the renminbi all play consequential global roles.	相反，萨科齐政府试图发展另一套机制，争取实现向一个美元，欧元和人民币同时扮演全球重要角色的过渡。


This is a step forward, one that reflects real learning from history.	这堪称正确的一步，也说明他们确实从历史中吸收了教训。


But the French have not indicated that they will push for sanctions against chronic surplus countries that fail to adjust their currencies.	但法国人也没有提出会对那些不愿调整本国货币的长期贸易盈余国家实施制裁。


The absence of such sanctions was a critical weakness of the original Bretton Woods system, and it remains a central weakness of our own – not coincidentally referred to as Bretton Woods 2.	而制裁的缺失恰恰是布雷顿森林体系的最关键弱点，而它也体现了我们自身的某个重要弱点——而不仅仅是意味着下一个布雷顿森林体系。


Without sanctions to police global imbalances, the French step forward will take us halfway across a yawning chasm.	如果缺乏相应的制裁手段去规范全球贸易失衡的话，法国人的进步之举将把我们带到一个沉闷的分歧点上。


In mid-air, with neither firm ground below nor enough momentum to make it to the other side, is not where the global economy should be.	孤悬半空，既缺乏坚实的基础，又缺乏向上的动力，这可不是全球经济想达到的局面。


Back to Utopia?	回归乌托邦?


PARIS – France no longer claims center stage in world history, but it remains influential beyond its national borders.	发自巴黎——法国早已不再屹立于世界历史舞台的中心，但却依然拥有超越自身国界的影响力。


From the eighteenth century on – including Charles de Gaulle’s epic role in World War II, decolonization in Africa, and the May 1968 student revolt – France has been a frequent bellwether of deep societal changes across Europe.	从18世纪至今——期间涵盖了夏尔·戴高乐在二战中扮演的伟大角色，非洲的去殖民化，以及1968年5月的学生运动——法国一直都是全欧各类深刻社会变革的引领者。


Will its recent presidential election continue that tradition?	那么最近选出来的新法国总统又是否将延续这一传统？


François Hollande, bland and bureaucratic, campaigned on a promise to be a “normal” president, unlike the colorful incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy – and, indeed, unlike all of his predecessors since the Fifth Republic was established in 1959. Hollande’s victory thus may be a sign that democratic countries have become reluctant to be led by flamboyant or charismatic presidents or prime ministers.	弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande），性清寡淡，有点官僚，其竞选承诺就是要做一个“平平常常的”总统，而这也是他与花蝴蝶般的现任总统尼古拉·萨科齐——事实上，跟法兰西第五共和国自1959年成立以来的历任总统——截然不同的地方。


Indeed, across Europe, no democracy is currently led by a strong or charismatic personality.	其实在当今的欧洲大地，没有一个民主国家处于一个强硬或者魅力型领导人的领导之下。


Italy remains under an interim administration, but there, too, voters appear to have turned their backs on a rococo ruler.	意大利虽然依然是过渡政府，但那里的选民似乎都不愿选择一位为人如洛可可建筑般浮夸的领袖。


Europe has no Sarkozy or Silvio Berlusconi, but also no Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, or José Maria Aznar.	欧洲没有了萨科齐或者贝卢斯科尼，也没有了英国前首相撒切尔夫人，德国前总统赫尔穆特·科尔以及西班牙前首相何塞·玛丽亚·阿斯纳尔这样的人。


At a time of economic and institutional crisis in Europe, all European leaders appear to be, well, extremely normal.	在欧洲遭遇经济和体制危机的时候，所有的欧洲领导人看上去……没错……都极端平常。


For many, the victory of normalcy over charisma should be cause for celebration.	对许多人来说，这场平常对魅力的胜利无疑是值得庆祝的。


Democracy is about normal citizens electing normal men and women to lead them for a limited period according to established rules.	民主制度，其实就是平常的公民选举出些平常的男女，让他们在既定的规则下领导大家一段有限的时间。


But the trend toward normalcy among European leaders coincides with a remarkable absence of vision and strategy.	但欧洲领导人中这股向平常化发展的趋势同时也伴随着显而易见的远见和战略缺失。


If any of these normal leaders have a long-term strategy for Europe (can anyone imagine such a thing from EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy or the Union’s foreign-policy supremo, Catherine Ashton?), they are remarkably unable to convey it.	就算这帮平常的欧洲领导人中有任何一位身怀欧洲长期战略（你能想象欧盟委员会主席范龙佩或者欧盟外交政策舵手凯瑟琳·阿什顿身上有这东西吗？ ），他们显然也无法将其传达出来。


In Hollande’s case, the rare glimpses of a comprehensive vision recall France’s successful social democracy of the 1960’s: a strong welfare state, together with abundant public investment to revive economic growth and boost employment.	而如果说到奥朗德的全面远景规划，粗看之下会令人想起1960年代法国成功的社会民主制度：一个强大的福利国家，拥有充足的公共投资去复苏增长并推动就业。


Hollande’s reference point seems to be the post-war idyll of his youth, a time of rapid growth, demographic recovery, scarce immigration, and scant global competition.	奥朗德的参照点似乎是他年轻时那种二战后的田园牧歌，一个飞速增长的时代，人口年龄分布恢复到合理水平，没什么移民，也缺乏全球竞争。


In other words, Hollande will try to entice other European leaders with a vision for a world that no longer exists.	换句话说，奥朗德正在尝试用一个早已不复存在的世界图景来诱惑其他欧洲领导人。


This politics of nostalgia is troubling, not only because France and Europe confront severe economic challenges, but also because France and other democracies are confronted with real challenges to their legitimacy.	这种怀旧政治很有问题，不仅因为法国和欧洲都正面临着严峻的经济挑战，还由于法国和其他民主国家都在面对着对自身合法性的真正挑战。


In hindsight, the 2012 French Presidential election could well be remembered not so much for Hollande’s victory and the triumph of normalcy, but as the decisive step in populist parties’ long march to power.	如果在很多年后再回首，2012年这场法国总统选举最令人难忘的可不是奥朗德的胜利以及平常派的登顶，而是民粹主义政党长久以来向权力进发的决定性一步。


In the first round of the French presidential election, the far left, a motley collection of anti-capitalists and radical environmentalists garnered 14% of the vote.	在第一轮选举中，极左派这个混杂着反资本主义者和极端环保主义者的杂牌军获得了14%的选票。


On the far right, Marine Le Pen’s National Front, the political heir of French fascism, won 18%, the party’s best result ever.	而在极右那一侧，马琳·勒庞的国民阵线，这个法国法西斯主义的政治继承人，夺得了18%的选票，也是该党有史以来最高的得票率。


In other words, one-third of French voters are now attracted to candidates with extreme ideologies that share an anti-liberal rejection of the euro, capitalism, and globalization.	换句话说，1/3的法国选民都被持有极端意识形态，共同反对欧元，资本主义和全球化等自由主义理念的候选人所吸引。


Both sides find their roots in an idealized past: the French Revolution and its egalitarian promise for the far left, and the French Empire and its domination of the world’s non-white peoples for the far right.	两派都能在一个理想化的历史中找到自己的根据：极左那边，是法国大革命及其平等主义承诺，极右那边则是法兰西帝国及其对所有非白色人种的统治。


Moreover, both extremes are strongly nationalistic. Persuaded as they are that France should act alone, they would close the economy to foreign competition, suppress financial markets, and send immigrants back to their homelands.	此外，两派都是强硬的民族主义者，都使用法国要单独行动，封闭本国经济防止外国竞争，打压金融市场以及遣返移民这一套说辞来说服选民。


The convergence goes beyond their agendas’ common irrationality.	虽然两派的政治议程同属胡说八道，但在这方面的一致程度却有过之而无不及。


Both the far left and the far right find their core constituency among the vast number of French who feel economically insecure and politically disenfranchised – in essence, all those who perceive themselves as having no opportunity in an open society.	极左极右都能在大批经济上缺乏安全感，政治上感觉被夺权的法国人身上找到自己的核心支持者——本质上，也就是那批自觉在一个公开社会中无法找到机会的人。


Hollande’s brand of normalcy does not appeal to these populist voters.	奥朗德的“平常”招牌对这些民粹主义选民不起作用。


But to dismiss them would be unwise, because their utopian aspirations are based on genuine and legitimate anxieties.	但忽略这些人也是不明智的做法，因为他们的乌托邦愿望正是构建于真实且合理的恐慌之上。


Slow growth and globalization have divided all European societies – and the United States – into two new classes: those whose education and social capital enable them to cope with today’s globalized economy, and those stuck in low-paid, often transient jobs (and thus most directly affected by competition from legal and illegal immigrants).	低增长以及全球化已经将所有欧洲社会——以及美国——分化成了两个新的阶层：一批人拥有足够的教育和社会资本去应对当今的全球化经济，另一批人则挣扎在低收入泥潭中，只能找到些临时工干干——因此来自合法和非法移民的竞争对他们的直接影响也更大。


No mainstream European leader, including Hollande, even mentions this new division.	没有一个主流的欧洲领袖，包括奥朗德，提到过这种新的分化。


Indeed, both Hollande and Sarkozy represented those adapted to globalization and viewed the rest as a reservoir of voters to be seduced, not as a new underclass.	事实上，无论是奥朗德还是萨科齐都代表着那些适应全球化的群体，并将在此之外的人视为一批可供引诱的选民，而不是一个新的下层阶级。


This superficial understanding of populism makes the French presidential election an ominous symptom of Europe’s blind leadership.	这种对民粹主义的肤浅理解使得法国总统选举成为了欧洲瞎指挥的一个不祥症状。


A façade of normalcy cannot withstand the real dangers threatening the foundations of European societies.	而一个平常化的外表也无法抵御那些威胁欧洲社会基础的真正危险。


Bad Money, Good Money	坏钱·好钱


London – The British comic genius Spike Milligan once observed that he would love to have the opportunity to discover that money wouldn’t make him happy.	发自伦敦 —— 英国喜剧天才斯帕克·米利根 ( Spike Milligan ) 曾经说，他很高兴自己能有机会去发现一件事，那就是钱这玩意并不能给他带来快乐。


Big lottery winners, it is claimed, end up miserable, though real-life research suggests that they are as happy as you and I would be with a check for a million dollars.	据说那些巨额彩票的中奖者最终都晚景凄凉，但实际调查研究却显示当手握一张百万美元支票的时候 ， 那些人跟你我一样兴高采烈 。


Money, however, can trigger all sorts of other emotions – like rage, for example.	此外，钱还能激发人类所有的情感 —— 比如火暴的脾气 .


That is pretty much how most people reacted to the stories about bankers’ bonuses, when the great crash of 2007-2008 wiped out banks, businesses, shareholders’ savings, growth, and jobs.	而 这恰好也是人们面对银行家巨额分红时的反应 , 尤其在 2007-2008 年的大海啸将银行 , 企业 , 股东的积蓄 , 国家的增长和人们的工作毁于一旦的时候。


There was, as one banker charmingly conceded, a bit of asymmetry between what bankers were being paid and what their banks had lost.	正如一位银行家面带笑容地坦白说，银行家的收入和银行的亏损之间，确实有“一点”不平衡 .


The Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen notes in his latest magisterial book The Idea of Justice that most people understand that a process is fair when they can detect a connection between effort and reward.	对此 1998 年诺贝尔经济学奖得主阿马蒂亚·森 (Amartya Sen) 在其最新著作《正义的理念》（ The Idea of Justice ）中指出，当人们意识到在自己的付出和回报之间存在某种联系的时候，就会认为这个程序是公平的。


The bankers failed this test dismally.	但可耻的是，银行家们却未能通过这个原则的检验。


We gritted our teeth and for the sake of our national economies supported our governments as they bailed out the banks with public money.	当时我们咬紧牙关，一心为自己国家经济的利益着想，支持我们的政府用纳税人的钱去拯救那些银行。


It was a necessary, if infuriating, act of salvation to avoid economic disaster.	虽然这一做法令人恼火，但为了把国家从一场经济大灾难中拉出来，就是必须的。


Having socialized banks’ losses after we had seen the privatization of their gains, our rage quotient has shot up once more at the news that the banks we saved are again filling the troughs into which all those snouts are enthusiastically dipped.	在年景好的时候，公众眼巴巴地看着银行家赚得盘满钵满，后来出了问题，却又被迫要为银行的损失买单，如今人们的怒气又开始喷发出来，因为新闻上说纳税人一手救活的银行如今又开始往“食槽”里倒满了“粮食”，而那群“猪”则意气风发，埋头吃得正欢。


The sheer unseemliness of what is happening raises blood pressure as well as eyebrows.	这种巨大的反差不仅吸引眼球，更令人血压急升。


How do they have the nerve?	公众不禁要问：这些人怎么能这样呢？


We should not, however, allow this sentiment to turn into an all-purpose rant against personal wealth.	然而我们不能任由这种愤怒进一步扭曲为对个人财富的全面指责。


Sometimes its owners use it in hugely generous amounts for great public gain.	因为有时财富的拥有者散尽千金，只为了大众的福祉。


Consider the cases of two of the world’s biggest philanthropists, George Soros and Mo Ibrahim.	比如 两位世界级的大慈善家，乔治·索罗斯 (George Soros) 和莫· 易卜拉辛 （ Mo Ibrahim ） 。


George Soros, the enormously successful investor, has used much of his own wealth to establish the Open Society Institute, which has helped to underpin the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern Europe and to press for human rights worldwide.	作为一位威名赫赫的投资家，乔治·索罗斯将其大部分财富都花在了“开放社会研究院（ Open Society Institute ）”上，而成立这个机构的目的，就是为了帮助巩固中东欧地区的民主革命成果，并在全世界范围内促进人权的保护。


Mo Ibrahim is one of Africa’s most distinguished entrepreneurs. He built a business empire on technology, software, and mobile telecommunications.	而莫·易卜拉辛则是非洲地区最负盛名的企业家，一手执掌着一个覆盖科技，软件和移动通讯的庞大商业帝国。


Ibrahim has established a foundation whose main purpose is to raise standards of governance in Africa.	他成立了一个基金会，致力于提高非洲大陆的政府治理水平。


The continent certainly needs to pay heed.	而这也是非洲大陆目前所急需倾听的呼声。


With a billion people living in more than 50 countries, Africa is wracked by poverty and, in too many places, torn apart by war.	作为一片拥有 50 个国家， 10 亿人口的大陆，非洲贫困缠身，且许多的地方都留有被战争所撕裂的伤口。


The Oxford development economist Paul Collier reckons that 75% of the poorest people in the world live in countries that have only recently recovered from conflict or are still in conflict. Most of them are in Africa.	牛津大学的发展经济学家保罗·科利尔（ Paul Collier ）估计全世界最贫困的人口中有 75% 生活在那些刚刚从冲突中复原或者依然深陷于冲突之中的国家，而非洲国家就占了绝大多数。


These are countries where it sometimes seems easier to start an uprising than to start a business.	在非洲这个地方，发动一场暴动似乎比开一家公司更顺手。


Guinea, with a nasty military junta in power, is on the brink of disaster.	比如几内亚，这个残暴的军政府统治下的国家目前正徘徊在灾难的边缘。


In Sudan, the Darfur conflict is unresolved and divisions between the north and the south once again threaten peace, with a promised referendum on southern independence due by 2011.	在苏丹，达尔富尔冲突依然没能得到解决，而南北双方的分歧一再对和平构成威胁，因为南部地区声称要在 2011 年发动独立公投。


Hundreds of thousands of displaced people huddle in camps in Somalia, where warlords rule.	在军阀割据的索马里，成百上千无家可归的人们蜷缩在难民营里。


The list, alas, goes on.	除了这几个国家之外，类似的情况在非洲简直数不胜数。


It is not as though Africa lacked resources or the ability to govern itself well.	但这并不是因为非洲国家的政府缺乏善治的资源或者能力。


Peaceful Botswana is a good example of what can be achieved.	因为平静祥和的博茨瓦纳就是一个成功的范例。


While climate, geography, and the colonial past share some of the blame for today’s misery, most of the responsibility belongs to those African governments that have behaved so badly.	而当人们将混乱的原因归咎于气候，地理以及历史上的殖民统治时，其实绝大部分的责任都在那些胡作非为的非洲国家政府身上。


Ibrahim wants to stamp out corruption, to see the rule of law applied everywhere, to foster policy environments that encourage businesses to start up and thrive, and to strengthen the role of women.	易卜拉辛希望驱除腐败，希望看到法治之光普照各国，培养出鼓励商业生长繁荣的政策土壤，并加强女性的作用。


He wants to reward those who support pluralist democracy and is a champion of civil society and a free press, and the Ibrahim Foundation is also deeply involved in the fight against global warming.	他希望奖励那些支持多元主义民主，拥护公民社会以及媒体自由的人，而易卜拉辛基金会也深入地参与到与全球变暖的斗争当中。


He also points out that less than 5% of total trade in Africa is undertaken between African countries.	易卜拉辛同时也指出非洲各国之间的贸易额只占全非洲贸易总额不到 5% 。


There is a powerful argument for regional economic integration on the continent, abolishing trade barriers, sharing infrastructure like power generation, and allowing free movement of people, goods, money, and jobs.	这对于这个大洲的区域经济整合来说是一个有力的论据，这种整合包括了消除贸易壁垒，供用发电厂等���施，允许人员，货物和资金的自由流动等措施。


Some countries in East Africa are now trying to do something about that for themselves.	而东非的一些国家已经开始从自身考虑开展相关的尝试了。


Philanthropists like Mo Ibrahim and George Soros – or Bill Gates and Warren Buffett – can use their fortunes to make the world a better place.	像莫·易卜拉辛和乔治·索罗斯这样的慈善家 —— 或者是比尔·盖茨和沃伦·巴菲特 —— 可以用自己的财富去令这个世界变得更美好。


We shouldn’t allow our exasperation with bankers to morph into an assault on the creation of wealth.	因此我们也不能让自己对银行家的愤怒演变成一种对财富创造行为的野蛮攻击。


As Spike Mulligan was unable to discover for himself, money really can make people happier, producing a more just world with greater opportunity for the poor and disadvantaged.	正如斯帕克·米利根所未能发现的那样，钱确实可以令人们变得更快乐，制造出一个能为那些贫苦大众提供出更多机会的，更公平的世界。


Let’s hope that we move in that direction in 2010.	让我们在 2010 新的一年，向着这个方向奋进吧！


Bailout Blues	救市的忧虑


NEW YORK – It doesn’t take a genius to figure out that the United States’ financial system – indeed, global finance – is in a mess.	纽约——不需要多有天才就能看出美国金融体系——实际上是全球金融体系——陷入了危机。


And now, with the US House of Representatives having rejected the Bush administration’s proposed $700 billion bailout plan, it is also obvious that there is no consensus on how to fix it.	而现在随着美国众议院否决布什政府提出的7000亿美元救市计划，很显然我们在如何解决危机方面也没有达成共识。


The problems in the US economy and financial system have been apparent for years.	几年来，美国的经济和金融体系一直存在问题。


But that didn’t prevent America’s leaders from turning to the same people who helped create the mess, who didn’t see the problems until they brought us to the brink of another Great Depression, and who have been veering from one bail-out to another, to rescue us.	可那并没有阻止美国领导人向这场危机的始作俑者求助，这些人在危机将我们带到又一次大萧条的边缘之前根本看不到问题的存在，现在却提出一个又一个救市计划想救我们于水火之中。


As global markets plummet, some version of the rescue plan will almost certainly be put to another vote in Congress.  Unless the plan is markedly different from the current one, while it may help Wall Street,  what about the economy?	随着全球市场迅速滑落，救市计划几乎肯定要再次提交国会投票表决。 这个计划也许救得了华尔街，但能否救得了经济？


What about taxpayers, already beleaguered by unprecedented deficits, and with bills still to pay for decaying infrastructure and two wars?	纳税人又怎么办？ 他们已经被史无前例的赤字所困扰，到现在仍然背负着基础设施衰退和两场战争的债务负担。


In such circumstances, is there any bailout plan that can work?	在这种情况下， 任何一项 救市计划真能起作用吗？


To be sure, the rescue plan that was just defeated was far better than what the Bush administration originally proposed.	可以肯定，刚刚被否决的救市计划确实比布什政府原来的提议要好很多。


But its basic approach remained critically flawed.	但救市的基本方法仍然存在着致命的缺陷。


First, it relied – once again – on trickle-down economics: somehow, throwing enough money at Wall Street would trickle down to Main Street, helping ordinary workers and homeowners.	首先，它再次依赖涓滴经济学：由于某种原因，向华尔街砸进足够的钞票就能惠及社会民众，帮助普通工人和房屋业主。


Trickle-down economics almost never works, and it is no more likely to work this time.	涓滴经济学几乎从来没有发挥过作用，而这次的效果恐怕也不会比以前更好。


Moreover, the plan assumed that the fundamental problem was one of confidence.	此外，救市计划假定根本的问题是信心丧失。


That is no doubt part of the problem; but the underlying problem is that financial markets made some very bad loans.	这无疑的确是问题的 一部分 ，但深层次的问题却是金融市场发放的一些贷款质量很差。


There was a housing bubble, and loans were made on the basis of inflated prices.	当时出现了住房泡沫，而这些贷款正是基于被抬高以后的住房价格。


That bubble has burst.	现在泡沫已经破灭。


House prices probably will fall further, so there will be more foreclosures, and no amount of talking up the market is going to change that.	住宅价格也许会进一步下跌，更多抵押品赎回权也因此会被取消。


The bad loans, in turn, have created massive holes in banks’ balance sheets, which have to be repaired.	市场无论怎样坐而论道都无法改变这样的现状。


Any government bailout that pays fair value for these assets will do nothing to repair that hole.	这些坏账又反过来导致银行的资产负债表出现亏空，必须要对这些亏空进行弥补。


On the contrary, it would be like providing massive blood transfusions to a patient suffering from vast internal hemorrhaging.	可这样做就像是为内出血的病人大量输血，根本无法收到根本的疗效。


Even if a bailout plan were implemented quickly – which appears increasingly unlikely – there would be some credit contraction.	就算救市计划可以立即实施——这种可能性似乎越来越小——也无法避免一定程度的信贷收缩。


The US economy has been sustained by a consumption boom fueled by excessive borrowing, and that will be curtailed.	过度借贷所带来的消费繁荣一直维持着美国经济的发展，这种情况无法再继续下去。


States and localities are cutting back expenditures.	中央和地方都在缩减开支。


Household balance sheets are weaker.	家庭的资产负债情况更加脆弱。


An economic slowdown will exacerbate all our financial problems.	经济发展放缓将加剧所有的金融问题。


We could do more with less money.	我们可以用更少的钱取得更好的效果。


The holes in financial institutions’ balance sheets should be filled in a transparent way.	我们可以用透明的方式来填补金融机构资产负债表上的亏空。


The Scandinavian countries showed the way two decades ago.	斯堪地纳维亚国家20年前就为我们做出了榜样。


Warren Buffet showed another way, in providing equity to Goldman Sachs.	沃伦·巴菲特向高盛注资为我们指明了另一种方法。


By issuing preferred shares with warrants (options), one reduces the public’s downside risk and ensures that they participate in some of the upside potential.	通过发行有担保的优先股（期权），我们可以抵消市场向下的风险，共同创造一种向上的可能。


This approach is not only proven, but it also provides both the incentives and wherewithal needed for lending to resume.	这种方法不但被事实证明有效，而且还提供了恢复信贷的积极性和必要的资金。


It avoids the hopeless task of trying to value millions of complex mortgages and the even more complex financial products in which they are embedded, and it deals with the “lemons” problem – the government gets stuck with the worst or most overpriced assets.	它避免了为成百上千万复杂抵押贷款和作为其载体的更复杂的金融产品估价，而且也解决了可能导致政府被最差或最高估的资产套牢的“失败”问题。


Finally, it can be done far more quickly.	最后，这种方法的推进速度更快。


At the same time, several steps can be taken to reduce foreclosures.	同时，可以采取几项措施来限制取消赎回权的操作。


First, housing can be made more affordable for poor and middle-income Americans by converting the mortgage deduction into a cashable tax credit.	首先，可以通过将抵押品的贬值转化为可变现的税收信贷来降低中低收入美国人购买住宅的价格。


The government effectively pays 50% of the mortgage interest and real estate taxes for upper-income Americans, yet does nothing for the poor.	政府实际上为高收入美国人支付了50%的抵押利息和不动产税，却没有向穷人提供任何帮助。


Second, bankruptcy reform is needed to allow homeowners to write down the value of their homes and stay in their houses.	其次，需要进行破产改革来允许房主减记自有住房的账面价值，同时继续住在房子里。


Third, government could assume part of a mortgage, taking advantage of its lower borrowing costs.	第三，政府可以承担部分抵押贷款的偿付义务，充分利用借款时低廉的信贷利率。


By contrast, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s approach is another example of the kind of shell games that got America into its mess.	恰恰相反，美国财长亨利·保尔森的办法是使美国陷入危机的骗局的又一个实例。


Investment banks and credit rating agencies believed in financial alchemy – the notion that significant value could be created by slicing and dicing securities.	投资银行和信贷评级机构相信金融点金术——也就是认为拆分债券可以创造巨大的价值。


The new view is that real value can be created by un-slicing and un-dicing – pulling these assets out of the financial system and turning them over to the government.	现在新的提法是解除拆分可以创造真实的价值——具体的做法是从金融体系中剥离这些资产，并把它��交由政府掌握。


But turning them over to the government at market value doesn’t improve banks’ balance sheet; to do that requires overpaying for the assets, a transfer of wealth from ordinary taxpayers to the banks..	但那样做需要政府为这些资产付出过高的代价，只有银行能够从中受益。


In the end, there is a high likelihood that if such a plan is ultimately adopted, American taxpayers will be left on the hook.	最后，如果这项计划最终得以采纳，很可能要由美国的纳税人来收拾残局。


In environmental economics, there is a basic principle, called “the polluter pays principle.”	在环境经济学中有一个基本原则，叫做“由污染者出资治理”。


It is a matter of both equity and efficiency.	这个问题关乎资金和效率。


Wall Street has polluted the economy with toxic mortgages. It should pay for the cleanup.	华尔街用有毒的抵押贷款污染了经济，应该由它来承担清理的开支。


There is a growing consensus among economists that any $750 billion bailout based on Paulson’s plan won’t by itself do the trick of resuscitating our economy.	以保尔森计划为基础的任何救市计划都不会产生效果，经济学家们越来越就这一点达成共识。


If so, the huge increase in the national debt and the realization that even $700 billion is not enough to rescue the US economy will erode confidence further and aggravate its weakness.	如果被不幸言中，那么国家债务的巨额增长和即便7000亿美元也不足以挽救美国经济的认识将进一步侵蚀人们的信心，加剧经济的疲弱态势。


But it is impossible for politicians to do nothing in such a crisis.	但政治家们不可能在这样一场危机中什么也不做。


So we may have to pray that a agreement crafted with the toxic mix of special interests, misguided economics, and right-wing ideologies that produced the crisis can somehow produce a rescue plan that works – or whose failure doesn’t do too much damage.	因此我们可能应该祈祷由导致这场危机的特殊利益、错误经济理论和右翼意识形态等毒素混合而成的这份协议能够以某种方式制定出正确的救市计划——至少这个计划如果失败不会造成太大的损失。


Getting things right – including a new regulatory system that reduces the likelihood that such a crisis will recur – is one of the many tasks to be left to the next administration.	做出正确的决策——包括建立新的监管体系降低危机再次爆发的风险——是下届政府将要完成的任务之一。


Balancing the State and the Market	平衡国家与市场


BERLIN – The financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008 will, in retrospect, be regarded as a transformative moment, because it raised fundamental questions about the future shape of our economic systems. These questions are not so much about the end of capitalism – as some perceive or even desire – but rather about the different ways in which capitalism is understood in different countries.	柏林——


What we are witnessing today is a reversal of the debates of the 1980’s. Back then, Ronald Reagan used to joke: “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the government and I’m here to help!”	当人们回首往昔之时，爆发于2008年的金融与经济危机将会被视为一个变革性的时刻，这是因为这场危机就经济体系的未来形态提出了具有根本意义的问题。


Now that governments have spent trillions of dollars, euros, yen, and pounds on stabilizing financial markets and the economy in general, those words seem far less terrifying.	这些问题并不像某些人所认为、甚至所期望的那样，与资本主义的终结有多大关联，而是与不同国家对资本主义的不同理解方式有关。


In fact, faith in the market has been dented, while trust in government and regulation is increasing.	我们如今所见到的景象，正是上世纪八十年代那些争论的相反版本。


After decades of consensus that the state should set the rules and otherwise leave the private sector alone, the state is now widely seen as a beneficial force that should play an active role in the economy.	彼时，罗纳德·里根常常戏称：“英语中最可怕的九个词是：我来自政府，我来帮你！ ”现在，政府为稳定金融市场和整体经济已经投入了数万亿美元、欧元、日元和英镑，那九个字也显得远没有那么可怕了。


This is happening despite the lack of a clear indication of the superiority of the state.	事实上，人们对市场所抱有的信念已被削弱，而对政府和规制的信任却与日俱增。


On the contrary, the US government’s heavy intervention in the American housing market is probably the most pertinent example of the state’s shortcomings, one that no doubt contributed significantly to the crisis.	数十年来，存在着一种国家应当订立规则、而后放任私营部门自行发展的共识； 而在此之后，国家正被普遍视为一种应当在经济中发挥积极作用的有益力量。


I sense a growing willingness to forego the benefits of innovation – not least financial innovation – in exchange for a slower pace of change, which is assumed to be more controllable.	上述情况发生的同时，却没有明确迹象能显示国家具有优越性。


This shift will not only impede future growth, but could bring other dangers as well.	相反，美国政府对该国房地产市场的大力干涉，或许正是国家缺陷的最恰当例证，毫无疑问，这种做法对于危机的发生有着重大的推动作用。


The fiscal balances of the G-20 economies will deteriorate dramatically as a result of the crisis. Deficits will improve somewhat as economies recover and support measures are withdrawn.	我察觉到这样一种意愿正在日渐增强，即我们应舍弃创新带来的好处（特别是金融创新），以换取较慢的变革速度，后者被认为更易为人们所控制。


Most governments have used their stimulus packages to serve vested interests as well. The accumulated debt will constitute a lasting burden on public finances.	这种意愿的变化不但会阻碍未来的增长，同时它还会带来其他的风险。


Moreover, we must remember that budgets were already strained before the crisis, and that governments’ balances do not reflect all aspects of reality.	这场危机将会导致二十国集团经济体的财政平衡状况大幅恶化。 随着经济走向复苏、政府取消支持措施，财政赤字状况将会有所改观，但并非所有的措施都是一时之计、或在经济方面具有合理性。


In Germany, for example, overall debt jumps from the current 65% of GDP to 250% when pension liabilities are included.	大部分政府也将其一揽子刺激方案用来服务于既得利益者。 日积月累的债务将会构成公共财政的长久负担。


Interest payments account for an ever-larger share of budgets – and will continue to grow when interest rates start to rise again.	此外我们还需牢记，预算在危机爆发之前便已吃紧；


In the absence of strong political commitment and credible plans for gradual fiscal consolidation, there is a distinct risk that at some point sovereign yields will rise markedly – with negative implications for the economy and politics.	而且政府的财政平衡状况并不能反映出现实的所有方面。 比如在德国，若将养老金债务计入其中，则整体负债与国内生产总值之比将从目前的65%跃升为250%。


The second danger is that governments will continue to see it as their duty to decide which firms to save and which to let fail.	利息偿付在预算中的比重正不断增大，而当利率再次开始上升之际，其比例还将继续上升。


A line must be drawn between a time of crisis, when emergency measures are needed to avert economic collapse, and normal circumstances, in which the full force of market mechanisms applies.	如果政府在财政稳固方面没有强有力的政治承诺和可信的计划，那么还存在着这样一种明显风险：即某一时刻，主权债务的收益率将会显著上升，这将会给经济和政治两方面带来不利影响。


The instinct of governments, however, may be to revert to the idea of protecting national champions or reasserting national sovereignty in some sectors.	第二个风险则在于，政府将会继续以决定哪些公司应被救助、哪些可以任其破产为己任。


But instinct is not necessarily a sound basis for decision-making.	人们必须划清危机时期与普通情况间的界线，在前一时期，我们需要紧急措施以避免经济崩溃；


And in times of globalization, distinguishing between “national” and “foreign” is neither appropriate nor feasible.	而在后一种情况下，则应由市场机制完全发挥作用。


In order to preserve the state’s ability to act while avoiding competitive distortions between and within industries, we should establish criteria to guide future decisions in this area.	然而，政府的本能或许将是回归这样一种理念，即保护本国领头企业、或在某些领域重新伸张国家主权。


As a matter of principle, companies that were in trouble prior to a severe economic crisis should not be eligible for state assistance of the type that the world recently witnessed. Moreover, aid must be limited, lest firms become addicted to it.	不过，本能并不一定是决策的可靠基础，而且在全球化的时代里，区分“本国”和“外国”的做法既不合适、也不可行。


Governments should also be aware of the long-term costs: large-scale state interference in market processes will produce its own set of corporate winners and losers.	为了在避免出现产业间或产业内竞争性扭曲的同时、保持国家的行动能力，我们应当在这一领域制定出指导未来决策的标准。


Structural change may be delayed, depriving us of the opportunities offered by the crisis to build more competitive and dynamic industries – and accelerating the relative global decline of mature economies.	其中一种原则是，在严重经济危机爆发前便身陷困境的公司，不应有资格获得近来世人所见到的那种国家援助。 此外，援助必须有限，以免公司对此上瘾。


Indeed, the third danger is that greater state intervention in the economy entails a shift away from globalization, paving the way for various forms of national protectionism.	政府也应意识到此举的长期代价：国家在市场进程中的大规模干涉，将会造就出自己的一套企业赢家与败者。


We can see this in the financial industry, where increased state ownership has led to a distinct danger of re-nationalization and re-fragmentation of financial markets.	结构变化或将受到延误，这会使我们失去由危机所提供的、构建更具竞争力、且更有活力的产业之机会，同时加速全球成熟经济体的相对衰落速度。


Many financial institutions that received government funds have concentrated on their respective home markets and scaled back their activities abroad.	事实上，第三种风险还在于：国家在经济领域更大规模的干预将导致世界偏离全球化的方向，为五花八门的国家保护主义铺平道路。


Similarly, there is a risk that new regulation may, either deliberately or as an unintended side effect, lead to re-nationalization of markets.	金融产业便是例证，在这一产业中，更高的国有程度带来了金融市场重新国有化与重新碎片化的明显风险。


It is understandable that governments seek solace in the presumed safety of national markets. But the shelter that national markets provide is illusory: the only way to increase the resilience of financial markets and to ensure that recurrence of this kind of crisis becomes less likely is to build a regulatory framework that is commensurate with integrated markets.	许多接受政府资金的金融机构已经专注于各自的母国市场，并削减其海外运作规模。


We need global (or at least European) rules, and we need strong institutional structures to enforce these rules – a requirement that is not necessarily limited to the financial markets.	同样，无论是刻意为之还是无心插柳，都存在着新规制导致市场重新国有化的可能。


We must resist the temptation to believe that a meddling, paternalistic state is the way of the future. Not only business, but also society as a whole, would lose out if we moved in that direction.	政府在本国市场假定具有的安全性中寻求慰藉的做法是可以理解的，但本国市场所提供的庇护却是水中之月：强化金融市场稳健程度、并确保降低此类危机重演概率的唯一方法仍在于，建构一种与一体化市场相称的规制框架。


Or, as has been said by many: “A government big enough to give you everything you want is strong enough to take everything you have.”	我们为此需要制定出全球范围的（或至少是欧洲范围的）规则，我们还需要强有力的机制结构以执行这些规则，而且这种需求也不一定局限在金融市场这一方面。


This text is an abridgment of a keynote address given at a Berlin conference on post-crisis economic policies, hosted by the Center on Capitalism and Society, Columbia University, 11-12 December 2009.	如果我们向着这种方向前进的话，则受损的将不只是商业，还包括整个社会。 抑或像许多人曾经说过的那样：“一个大到足以赐予你一切所求之物的政府，也强到足以剥夺你所拥有的一切。


Balancing the World’s Imbalances	平衡失衡的世界贸易


Good times – and these are good times for the global economy – are rarely the moment for concrete initiatives to deal with difficult problems.	现在绝对是全球经济的美好时光，但是美时光很少会使人们真正主动去解决困难的问题。


It is against this backdrop that I find welcome this weekend’s announcement by a group of major economies acknowledging their shared responsibility for the orderly resolution of global imbalances while sustaining robust growth.	正是在这种背景下我很高兴地看到本周末几大经济体联合作出声明，表示它们在保持经济强劲增长的同时，将共同努力寻求有序解决全球贸易失衡的问题。


For the past year, China, the euro zone, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States have been discussing these plans among themselves and with the IMF.	在过去一年里，中国、欧元区、日本、沙特阿拉伯和美国相互之间以及与国际货币基金组织讨论了这些方案。


Behind the somewhat forbidding label of “multilateral consultation” are discussions that are the first of their kind, and that have proved to be a promising tool for dealing with an issue of global importance.	在多少有些令人生畏的“多边商讨”的标签背后，它们进行了第一次此类形式的讨论，并且这被证明是处理全球重大问题的一个行之有效的手段。


These five economies are relevant to global imbalances in different ways: either on account of their current account deficits or surpluses, or because they represent a very large share of world output.	这五大经济体以不同的方式与当前的全球贸易失衡有关联。 要么因为它们当前的经常项目逆差或顺差，要么它们的产值在世界上占据了很大的比重。


They all agree that resolving these imbalances is in each of their interests.	它们一致同意解决这种失衡的状况符合它们自身的利益。


But they also recognize that it is a multilateral challenge and a shared responsibility for them all.	但是它们同时也认识到这对它们是一个多边挑战，它们应共同担负责任。


Over the last year, partly reflecting past policies in these countries, the imbalances have shown signs of stabilizing and, indeed, even of improving slightly.	过去的一年，部分源于这些国家过去所采取的政策，全球贸易的失衡显示出常态化的迹象，事实上，甚至有所改善。


But these countries must signal that policies will continue to ensure a progressive and orderly reduction in imbalances together with sustained growth.	但是这些国家必须向人们发出这样的信息，就是它们所实行的政策在保持经济增长的同时，也将确保不断并且有序地减少贸易的不平衡。


Otherwise, the global economy will remain at risk from renewed protectionist pressures and economic or political events that might trigger a disorderly resolution of the imbalances and undermine growth.	否则，全球的经济将继续面临新保护主义压力的威胁，或者因某些经济或政治事件而触发对贸易失衡的无序的解决方案以及破坏经济的增长。


The five economies spelled out their policy plans in considerable detail to the semi-annual meeting of the IMF’s membership, which gave them a warm welcome.	五大经济体在国际货币基金组织成员国的半年会上非常详细地阐述了它们的政策计划，从而受到了各国的一致好评。


This is the first time such plans have been presented together.	这是第一次这样的计划被放在一起进行阐述。


As Gordon Brown, the chairman of the Fund’s International Monetary and Financial Committee, noted, these plans are fully in line with the medium-term approach to solving imbalances that the Fund’s membership has consistently supported:	正如国际货币基金组织国际货币和金融委员会主席戈登·布朗所说的，这些计划完全与国际货币基金组织的成员国一直支持的解决贸易不平衡的中期方案相一致。


China has elevated the reduction of external imbalances to a major national objective in 2007.	中国已经把减少外部的不平衡上升到其在2007年国家要实现的一个重要目标的地位。


It intends to boost domestic demand and is committed to moving gradually toward greater exchange rate flexibility.	它准备大力扩大内需，并且承诺将逐步推进货币实现更大的浮动幅度。


Euro-zone countries reaffirmed their intention to press ahead with structural reforms across a broad front, in product, labor, and financial markets.	欧元区国家再次重申了它们决心继续在广泛的领域内，包括产品、劳动力和金融市场，推进结构改革。


Japan plans to accelerate labor market reforms, strengthen competition, and advance fiscal consolidation to sustain domestic confidence.	日本计划加快其劳动力市场的改革，强化竞争，并且促进财政稳固从而保持国民的信心。


Saudi Arabia is boosting its spending on social and infrastructure investments substantially, as well as expanding oil sector capacity.	沙特阿拉伯将大大增加其在社会和基础设施上投资的力度，并且将扩大石油的产能。


And the US is taking steps to balance its budget, boost private savings, and enhance energy efficiency.	而美国将采取步骤平衡预算，促进私人储蓄，以及改善其能源的使用效率。


The US also intends to strengthen capital market competitiveness and ensure that it remains an attractive environment for foreign investment.	同时美国还准备强化资本市场的竞争性，确保其依然能吸引大量的外国投资。


Just as global imbalances were not built up overnight, nor will they be solved quickly.	正如全球的贸易不平衡不是一天内造就的，它也不可能很快得到解决。


The aim of multilateral consultation was not to seek to solve imbalances in one fell swoop, but rather to solidify agreement on a medium-term approach that could reduce imbalances gradually over time.	多边商讨的目的并不是为了一蹴而就地解决贸易不平衡，而是为了达成一个中期的解决方案，慢慢地减少贸易的不平衡。


The policies outlined by the participants will, when implemented, constitute a step in that direction.	协议各方所描述的政策一旦得到实施，将会成为朝解决这一问题迈出的坚实步伐。


Publication of their plans sends an additional signal of their commitment and provides a valuable roadmap with which to assess progress, and thus help build confidence that all countries are working to reduce imbalances.	它们公布计划的举动表明了它们所作出的承诺，同时也为评估其进展提供了一个颇有价值的路线图，从而有助于使所有努力减少贸易不平衡的国家建立起信心。


The IMF, for its part, will monitor these plans regularly as part of our responsibility to provide policy analysis and advice.	而国际货币基金组织按照其提供政策分析和建议的职责，将定期监督这些计划的实施情况。


The countries have made it clear that their future policy plans will continue to be consistent with the strategy called for by the IMF’s membership.	这些国家已经清楚地表明它们未来所采取的政策计划将继续与国际货币基金组织的成员国所呼吁的战略保持一致。


The five participants and the rest of our members, as well as we at the Fund, all agree that this has been a fruitful exercise.	五大经济体和其他的成员国以及国际货币基金组织本身一致认为这是一个富有成果的实践。


An indicator of success is that a second multilateral consultation, aimed at fostering dialogue on how financial globalization and innovation influence growth and stability, is under consideration.	其成功的一个标志就是各国正在商讨要进行第二次多边讨论，以推动关于金融全球化和金融创新怎样影响了世界经济的增长和稳定的对话。


Like the first round of talks, this consultation would occur between a group of economies that have special relevance to the issue.	像第一轮会谈一样，这一讨论将在与这一问题有紧密联系的经济体之间进行。


Bangladesh Goes Taliban	孟加拉国走上塔利班之路


Is Bangladesh headed into the black hole that consumed Afghanistan under the Taliban?	孟加拉国正在被带向一个已经吞噬了塔利班统治下的阿富汗的黑洞吗？


Fears are mounting, as official and fundamentalist religious forces now seem to operate with impunity – and the apparent support of local police, the ruling Bangladeshi National Party, and local authorities.	当官方和原教旨主义力量毫无顾忌地发挥作用，当当地警察、孟加拉国民族主义党（BNP）和当地政权公开对此表示支持之时，恐惧正在不断加剧。


For many years Bangladesh was an exception in the Islamic world, pursuing an independent course in a peaceful, secular, and democratic fashion.	多年来，孟加拉国一直是伊斯兰世界的一个例外，用一种和平的、世俗主义的民主方式追求着独立事业。


Traditionally, under Bengali Sufi mystical teachings, the majority Muslim population lived peacefully with other religions, and Bangladesh had a good record on education and civil rights for women.	从传统来看，在Bengali Sufi神秘的宗义教导下，大部分穆斯林人与其他宗教信仰者和平相处，并且孟加拉国在妇女教育和妇女人权方面拥有良好纪录。


Until recently, Muslim fundamentalists were discredited, because militias such as “al-Badr” and “Razakar” had supported atrocities against civilians during the civil war of 1971.	然而最近， 穆斯林原教旨主义却因诸如“al-Badr”和“Razaker”等曾在1971年内战中支持过残害平民暴行的民兵组织而蒙羞。


That began to change in 2001, when Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of the assassinated military strongman General Zia, replaced secularism in the Constitution with the “Sovereignty of Allah.”	当2001年孟加拉国总理卡莉达·齐亚（Begum Khaleda Zia）——遇刺的军事铁腕人物齐亚将军的遗孀，用“阿拉的主权”取代了宪法中的宗教和世俗分离的世俗主义，那个改变由此开端。


Encouraged by this change the BNP’s junior coalition partner, Jamaat-e-Islami, which has links with the militias and remains close to Pakistan, has been calling for imposition of Sharia (Islamic law).	在这种改变的驱使下，BNP的下级联盟伙伴、与民兵组织有一定关系并一直与巴基斯坦保持亲密关系的伊斯兰大会党（Jamaat-e-Islami），一直呼吁强制实行Sharia（伊斯兰法律）。


The BNP appears to view religious extremism as a tool to break the power of the opposition Awami League, which is largely supported by the secular and urban middle classes.	BNP似乎将宗教极端主义看作一个打破反对党——受到世俗主义的城市中产阶级大力支持的孟加拉国人民联盟（Awami League）权力的武器。


Similarly, the massive rise in the number of madrassas (religious schools) financed by Saudi and Gulf money – totalling roughly 64,000 and operating under the same fundamentalist Deobandi Islam that inspired the Taliban – is part of a clear effort to change Bangladesh’s culture of religious tolerance.	同样地，在沙特和海湾国家的资助下，madrassas（伊斯兰学校）数量的大幅增长是为改变孟加拉国宗教忍让文化的明确行动的一部分。 现在madrassas总数已经高达约64,000所，并在激发过塔利班的同一个原教旨Deobandi伊斯兰教下运作。


The danger inherent in Bangladesh’s course is very real.	孟加拉国独立事业内在的危险是真实的。


Indian intelligence officials allege that the leader of a BNP coalition partner, Mufti Fazlul Haque Amini, maintains ties to the banned armed Islamist group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, or Huji, which in turn is allegedly linked to Al Qaeda.	印度情报官员宣称BNP某联盟伙伴领导人，Mufti Fazlul Haque Amini与被取缔的伊斯兰武装团体孟加拉伊斯兰圣战运动 （Huji）保持着联系，而该组织又与基地组织关系密切。


In 1999, Huji members attempted to assassinate the moderate poet Shamshur Rahman with an axe.	1999年，Huji成员试图用一把斧子刺杀温和派诗人Shamshur Rahman。


Forty-four Huji members were arrested, two of whom claimed to have been sent from South Africa and Pakistan by Osama Bin Laden to distribute money to the extremist madrassas.	44名Huji成员遭到逮捕，其中2名据称是由奥索玛·本·拉登（Osama Bin Laden）从南非和巴基斯坦派来将钱分发给极端主义madrassas的。


Bangladeshi migrant workers in the Gulf States who return home imbued with radical Wahhabi and Salafi teachings fan the fires even more.	那些在海湾国家当移民的孟加拉国工人带着激进的瓦哈比（Wahhabi）和Salafi所教授的思想回到祖国，愈加地煽风点火。


Competing for influence among radical Islamist leaders in northwestern Bangladesh is Bangla Bhai, who in 2004 attempted an Islamist revolution in several provinces bordering India.	2004年，在为获得激进伊斯兰领导人中最大影响力而竞争的Bangla Bhai在几个与印度接壤的地区发起伊斯兰革命。


Supported by local police and 10,000 followers, the rebellion ended only after a government crackdown.	由于受到当地警察和10,0000余名追随者的支持下，这场叛乱直到政府镇压后才宣告结束。


The NGO Taskforce against Torture has documented over 500 cases of torture and intimidation by radical Islamists, who also have murdered supporters of the Communist Party, such as Abdul Kayyam Badshah.	非政府组织的反刑罚工作组已经证明了超过500宗激进伊斯兰分子的刑罚和胁迫案件，他们曾谋杀过诸如Abdul Kayyam Badshah之类的共产党支持者。


Indeed, Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists have been targeted as well, and religious extremists more recently have attacked Sufi shrines deemed to be idolatrous, and even Bengali cultural events that unite all religions in a common identity.	事实上，印度教徒、基督教和佛教徒也被他们视为目标，并且宗教极端分子最近还袭击了被奉若神明的Sufi圣地，甚至还攻击了孟加拉国联合了各宗教以共同名义举行的文化活动。


For example, during Ramadan prayers last October, a mob of a 1,000 people razed a mosque of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community.	例如，在去年10月的Ramadan祷告中，1,000人的暴徒之众将一个Ahmadiyya穆斯林团体的清真寺夷为平地。


The 100,000 members of this Muslim sect, which believes that Muhammad was not the last prophet, have been declared infidels, and the government outlawed their publications until the ban was reversed by the Bangladeshi High Court.	这个穆斯林教派的100,000名相信Muhammad并非最后一位先知的成员被认为是异教徒，并且，直到孟加拉国高级法院推翻这个宣判之前，他们的出版物一直被政府宣布为不合法刊物。


Hindus, Ahmadiyyas, and tribal people in the Chittagong hills, fearful for their safety, have been leaving the country in droves.	印度教教徒、Ahmadiyyas教徒以及居于Chittagong山的部落民族出于对他们人身安全的担忧，正成群结队地离开孟加拉国。


The atmosphere of violence is palpable in other ways.	暴力氛围在其他方面也很明显。


Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League’s leader and the daughter of the Bangladesh’s founding father, survived a grenade attack last summer that killed at least 20 people and injured hundreds more. The killers have never been apprehended.	Sheikh Hasina——孟加拉国人民联盟领导人兼孟加拉国建国之父的女儿，在去年一场导致约20人死亡、百来人受伤的手榴弹袭击中死里逃生，凶手却至今未被缉获。


Britain’s High Commissioner in Bangladesh was wounded in a similar bomb attack this May.	英国驻孟加拉国高级大使也在今年5月一场类似的炸弹袭击中受伤。


To its credit – albeit under pressure from donor countries – the Bengali authorities seem to sense that their country is drifting toward becoming a failed state and are making greater efforts to arrest Islamist killers, despite some of them being part of the ruling coalition.	虽然孟加拉国政府受到捐助国的重重压力，但好就好在他们已经感觉到他们的国家正在滑向一条失败国家之路，为此他们正尽最大的努力以逮捕伊斯兰凶犯，尽管这些凶手中有些还是统治联盟中的成员。


Two radical Islamist groups have also been banned.	两个激进伊斯兰团体已经被取缔。


But piecemeal arrests will not be enough to reverse the drift if a culture of intolerance is allowed to fester.	但是，如若不相容的文化得以根深蒂固，一一捕获这些凶手也不足以扭转孟加拉国的下滑趋势。


One encouraging note is that annual economic growth has been a steady 5% for the past few years.	一个令人鼓舞的消息是，过去几年中孟加拉国的经济年增长率一直稳定地保持在5%。


But now many Bangladeshis fears for their livelihoods, owing to unlimited Chinese textile imports following the end of quotas last year.	但是现在，由于继去年结束配额制之后中国纺织品的无限量进口，许多孟加拉国人对他们生计十分担忧。


Economic deterioration in Bangladesh would only worsen inter-communal tensions and provide a fertile breeding ground for jihadis, but the reforms needed to head off decline are often blocked by political infighting and opposition boycotts.	孟加拉国的经济恶化将不仅加剧了种族间的紧张关系并为吉哈德分子（jihadis）提供了一个适宜的成长环境，但是能够阻止这种下滑趋势所必需的改革却通常被政治混战和反对联合抵制所阻扰。


The world cannot afford a second Afghanistan in Bangladesh, where Huji members are believed to have given sanctuary to many Taliban fighters after the fall of their regime.	这个世界无法承受在孟加拉国出现第二个阿富汗，据信孟加拉伊斯兰圣战运动（Huji）成员在那里为政权垮台后的许多塔利班分子提供了避难所。


Pressure from India will not be enough to force the Bengali government to adhere to the tolerant form of Islam that the country pursued during its first three decades of independence.	印度施加的压力还不足以迫使孟加拉国政府坚持该国在寻求独立的前三百年过程中所奉行的伊斯兰教容忍性。


All of Asia’s powers, including China and Japan, will have to play a part in stopping Bangladesh’s drift into fanaticism and chaos.	亚洲所有的力量，包括中国和日本，将会为阻止孟加拉国滑向狂热和混乱出一份力。


The rest of the world should support them before it is too late.	世界其他国家也应该在为时已晚之前支持他们。


Banishing Starvation	驱逐饥饿


VIENNA – Of the world’s almost seven billion people, about one billion are starving, owing to a long list of unfortunate local events and circumstances, together with steadily increasing demand, unpredictable weather patterns, and poor financial management.	发自维也纳——在全世界70亿人口中约有10亿人正遭受着饥饿的折磨，这一方面是由于各地发生的一连串不幸事件和状况，另一方面则源自于不断增加的粮食需求，无法预测的天气状况以及低下的财政管理手段。


And food shortages could grow much worse, as world population is expected to reach nine billion by 2050 or earlier.	而随着全球人口预计将在2050年左右达到90亿，粮食短缺问题很可能会进一步恶化。


But, with the right programs, we can produce enough food for everyone.	但只要实施了合理的政策项目，我们其实是可以为所有人提供足够食物的。


Indeed, by taking the right actions now, we can eradicate starvation.	事实上只要立即采取恰当的行动，我们就能完全根除饥饿。


To meet expected demand over the next 20 years, global food supplies must increase by an estimated 50%.	全球粮食供应量必须增加50%来满足未来20年内的需求。


So we need sustainable agriculture-led growth to increase supplies and keep prices affordable while also boosting the incomes of poor farmers in developing countries.	因此我们在着手增加发展中国家贫困农民收入的同时也需要建立可持续的农业发展来增加粮食供应，并将价格维持在民众可承受的水平。


This can be achieved through a program for subsistence farmers that not only improves productivity, but also reduces weather dependency and provides simple financing instruments to encourage investment in new technologies and equipment, increased land ownership, and easier access to local markets.	对于那些种田为生的农民来说，这类项目不但能提高其生产力，减低他们对气候的依赖程度，还能提供简单的金融工具鼓励他们投资新技术设备，购买土地并增加当地市场渠道。


Lifting subsistence farmers out of their precarious position would be equivalent to halving the number of hungry people.	而帮助这些农民摆脱原来的不利境地就等同于将饥饿人口的数量减半。


But it’s a program that can be achieved only if international organizations like the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) work hand-in-hand with national governments and with private donors and partners.	但这些项目只有在联合国粮食及农业组织（FAO）这类国际组织能与各国政府与私人捐赠者/合作伙伴的携手合作下才能实现。


The European Union and other developed countries are already intent on tackling the problem of global food security, and could easily tailor their own schemes to become part of this wider program.	欧盟以及其其它发达国家已决心解决全球粮食安全的问题，也很容易来将自身的方案结合到更宏大的项目之中。


For example, the EU supports the growth of agriculture and rural development through two types of instruments.	比如欧盟就是通过两种政策工具来支持农业增长和农村地区发展的。


Geographical initiatives, like the European Development Fund (EDF), support implementation of agricultural policies in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (the Development Cooperation Instrument provides similar support in Latin America, Asia, and South Africa).	第一种是地理概念上的机制，例如欧洲开发基金（EDF）就专门扶持农业政策在非洲，加勒比海地区和太平洋岛国的推行——欧盟的发展合作机制（DCI）也对拉美，亚洲国家以及南非提供类似扶持。


Such programs already add up to significant spending – the current EDF, which runs from 2007-2013, has set aside more than €1 billion to support agriculture, rural development, and food security in Africa alone.	而这类项目也已实现了巨额投资——仅仅是在非洲，计划于2007年~2013年间运作的本轮欧洲开发基金项目就拨付了超过10亿欧元来支持农业进步，农村地区发展以及粮食安全项目。


The second type of instrument is emergency funding to deal with unforeseen events, such as natural disasters, market breakdowns, and political instability.	第二种政策工具则是应对自然灾害，市场崩溃或者政治危机这类突发事件的紧急专款。


The EU’s ad hoc €1 billion Food Facility, created in 2008 for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries, is a good example.	在此欧盟专门为应对发展中国家粮食价格飞涨而在2008年创立的10亿欧元临时食品基金就是一个绝佳范例。


Its objectives also include boosting agriculture in the short to medium term in selected countries.	而这类政策工具的目的也包括了在特定国家推动中短期的农业发展。


As part of an FAO project in Burkina Faso, the EU’s Food Facility has helped to provide high-quality seeds to 100,000 vulnerable farmers, benefiting roughly 700,000 people amid the growing food crisis in the Sahel region.	作为联合国粮农组织布基纳法索项目的一部分，欧盟食品基金为10万名小农提供了优质粮食种子，使70万人得以在萨赫勒（Sahel）地区不断加剧的粮食危机中幸免于难。


With EU support worth €18 million, this operation will improve food security for around 860,000 rural households, or more than six million people.	在欧盟约合1800万欧元的支持下，该行动将提升近86万农村家庭（约600万人）的食品安全水平。


Similarly, two Food Facility projects in Mozambique, worth a total of €2.5 million, are benefiting almost 50,000 farmers and nearly 300,000 rural families by increasing agricultural production, improving conditions for commercializing products, and addressing food security issues that affect rural households.	与此同时，约值250万欧元的两个莫桑比克食品基金项目也增加了农业产量，提高商业化农产品质量并解决了影响农村家庭的食品安全事务，使5万农民以和30万农村家庭得到了实惠。


Beyond these financial instruments, we need to improve on the status quo by investing in the research and development needed to modernize agriculture and reduce the risk of crop failures.	除了这些金融工具之外，我们还需要通过投资现代化农业并降低减产风险的方式来改善现状。


Better, environmentally sustainable livestock production systems need to be developed, and we must boost investment in capacity-building, services training, market access, and efforts to strengthen supply chains.	对此必须研究发展出更合理也更加可持续的禽畜饲养方式，同时也必须增加在产能建设，服务训练，市场渠道和强化供应链方面的投资。


Equally important is research into the most effective measures to combat cross-border animal and plant diseases.	同样重要的还有研究对付跨区域动植物病害的最有效手段。


Agriculture, after all, must be viewed in the context of the wider eco-system, which also means developing improved methods for conserving resources such as soil, forests, and fisheries.	毕竟农业必须被放到一个更宏大的生态系统来进行研究，而这就意味着发展更有力手段来保护土地，森林和鱼业资源。


To tackle global food security successfully, we must change the way we treat rural development, which requires adopting a much more bottom-up approach.	为了成功应对全球食品安全问题，我们必须改变自己处理农村发展的方式，而这就意味我们必须采取一个更加至下而上的手段。


Again, I think that the EU is leading the way in developing countries with development policies that promote broad-based rural economic growth by boosting primary production and increasing its efficiency. Indeed, by promoting agricultural practices and technologies that are environmentally sustainable and raise rural incomes, these policies also stimulate rural non-farm activities.	另一方面，我认为欧洲在这方面是起表率作用的，因为他们协助发展中国家推行开发政策，而该政策恰好就是通过增加基本农作物产量并提高效率的方式来促进基础更加广泛的农村经济发展。


But problems at the top of the food system must be addressed as well.	但粮食系统的首要问题也必须得到解决。


An important step would be better regulation of global financial markets in order to end the derivatives speculation that forces food prices up.	而其中的重要步骤就是合理监管全球金融市场，避免金融衍生品投机行为不断推高粮食价格。


Moreover, the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of global trade negotiations desperately needs to be concluded, and the EU has made a number of positive moves in this direction by proposing vast changes to its export subsidies regime.	此外世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判必须取得成果，而欧盟对此也提议改革其内部出口补贴制度，为推动回合圆满完成贡献了一系列积极举动。


European spending on export refunds has declined considerably in recent years – from 30% of agricultural expenditure in the early 1990’s to less than 1% today (if rural development is excluded). This huge drop results from successive reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, owing to commitments made by the EU to the WTO and to other developments on world markets.	近年来欧洲在出口补贴/退税方面的支出已经显著减少——从1990年代占农业总支出的30%下降到今天的不足1%（农村发展资金除外），而这种大幅削减其实就是欧盟向世贸组织以及其他国家做出承诺并成功改革《共同农业政策》的成果。


Last year, Europe’s spending on export refunds dropped by more than 40% from 2009, to just €400 million.	去年欧盟的农业补贴额比2009年下降了超过40%。 只有约4亿欧元。


With more and more subsistence farmers being driven off their land by pressures far beyond their control, we need to find better ways to balance the needs and rights of rural and urban populations.	随着越来越多农民被他们无法控制的力量驱逐出自己的土地，我们需要找到一个更好的方式来平衡农村和城市人口之间的需求和权利。


Unless we begin to do so, succeeding generations will fail to realize an environmentally sustainable world where people live in dignity.	除非我们立刻行动起来，否则下一代人将无法有尊严地生活在一个环境可持续的世界之上。


The Next Global Boom – and Bust	下一轮全球繁荣——和破灭


WASHINGTON, DC – The mood at the International Monetary Fund-World Bank spring meetings here earlier this month was grim.	华盛顿—本月早些时候在这里举行的国际货币基金组织（IMF）-世界银行春季会议的情绪是阴沉的。


The latest IMF forecast for global growth has been revised downward yet again – suggesting the world will grow at an annual rate of just over 3% this year and again in 2017.	最新IMF全球增长预测再次调低——认为今年和2017年世界年增长率将只能略高于3%。


If realized, this would be a dismal performance.	如果成为现实的话，这将是非常糟糕的表现。


Before 2007, global growth (using the IMF’s methodology) was in the 4.5-5% range, based on steady productivity improvements in industrial countries and rapidly rising living standards in large emerging markets such as China, Brazil, and Russia.	2007年前，全球增长（用IMF的方法）落在4. 5—5%区间，其基础是工业国生产率稳步改善以及中国、巴西和俄罗斯等新兴市场生活水平的迅速提高。


Now the US faces the uncertainty of a presidential election, weaker parts of the eurozone continue to struggle, and Japan is teetering on the edge of outright economic contraction.	如今，美国面临总统选举的不确定性，欧元区疲软部分仍在挣扎，日本徘徊在全面经济萎缩边缘。


Brazil is in the midst of a political crisis, China is dealing with the aftereffects of prolonged fiscal expansion and explosive growth in its shadow banking system, and lower commodity prices are undermining economic performance in many other emerging markets.	巴西陷入了政治危机，中国正在处置长期财政扩张和影子银行体系的爆发式增长带来的后遗症，而大宗商品价格低迷正在动摇许多其他新兴市场的经济表现。


On top of all this, the British may vote in June to leave the European Union.	除了所有这些情况，英国可能在6月投票脱离欧盟。


Economic activity is affected by confidence: Do consumers believe their incomes are likely to rise (or even prove secure), and do companies believe that future growth will be buoyant enough to warrant current investment?	经济活动受信心的影响：消费者相信他们的收入可能上升（或者能够保住）吗？ 公司相信未来增长足够强劲，能保证当前投资的回报吗？


And today’s macro mood is shared pessimism.	而今天的宏观情绪是普遍悲观。


Yet the medium-term scenario is unlikely to be global stagnation.	但中期不可能出现全球停滞。


New technologies continue to be invented, and billions of people aspire to improve their standard of living through education and hard work.	新技术不断发明，数十亿人想要通过教育和努力工作提高生活水平。


Leading industrial economies have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of large negative financial-sector shocks over the past decade – as has China.	领先工业经济体在面临过去十年巨大的消极金融部门冲击，表现出令人瞩目的恢复力——比如中国。


Unemployment in the United States is down to 5%, and parts of Europe are doing fine.	美国失业率下降至5%，欧洲也有一些部分表现良好。


And the most important point about the commodity price cycle is that it is indeed a cycle: Demand for commodities rises and falls, while supply changes only slowly.	而大宗商品价格周期最重要的一点是它是货真价实的周期：大宗商品需求有起有落，而供给变化缓慢。


We should expect volatility in commodity prices – as well as in the price of oil.	我们应该预料到大宗商品价格的波动——石油亦然。


The biggest question is whether we can get off the economic roller coaster and return to robust global growth without debt-fueled overconsumption (as seen in the pre-2008 US), overinvestment (as in China), and overexpansion of government spending (still an issue in some parts of Europe).	最大的问题是我们能否摆脱经济过山车，回归强劲增长而不靠债务推动的过度消费（如2008年前的美国）、过度投资（如中国）和政府支出过度扩张（至今依然是欧洲一些国家的问题）。


Debt can fund productive investments and improvement in human capital.	债务可以为生产性投资和人力资本的改善提供资金。


But why do we always seem to like it too much?	但我们为何总是表现出过度喜爱债务？


Part of the reason stems from tax systems, which in some countries allow some consumer interest payments (for example, mortgages in the US) to be deducted from taxable income.	部分原因在于税收制度，一些国家的税制允许消费者利息支出（如美国的按揭）从应税收入中扣除。


Corporate interest payments are typically deductible, too.	公司利息收入通常也可以抵扣。


But the main appeal of debt is that it is a very simple contract: Either you pay the agreed amount or you don’t.	但债务的主要魅力在于它是非常简单的契约：你要么支付约定数额，要么不支付。


And when things go well, a highly leveraged enterprise – a company or your house – will show a great return on equity.	光景好时，高杠杆单位——公司或你的房子——能带来不错的股本回报。