The most important priorities include boosting the efficiency of government spending and developing new sources of revenue to replace oil exports.	最重要的优先目标包括提高政府支出效率，开发新的收入来源以取代石油出口。


The government has a number of options for new revenue, including a reform of wasteful energy subsidies and the introduction of levies that are standard in the G-20, such as value-added tax.	政府可以选择一系列新收入来源，其中包括改革不经济的能源补贴，及引入G20国家普遍采用的增值税等税收。


Weaning Saudi Arabia’s economy off oil will not be easy, and the kingdom has an uneven track record in this regard.	实现沙特阿拉伯经济逐步摆脱石油绝非易事，该国在这方面也不具备令人振奋的记录。


But there are encouraging early signs about the government’s focus, energy, and determination.	但已有令人鼓舞的早期迹象表明了政府的决心、能力和一心一意的关注。


One is the recent decision to levy a tax on unused land that could be developed for housing.	其一是不久前做出的对本可用于住宅开发的未利用土地征税的决策。


Another is the new inter-ministerial coordination and cooperation that appears to be taking place under the auspices of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, a body established in January 2015.	还有就是在2015年1月成立的经济发展事务委员会主持下似乎正在开展的全新部门间协调合作。


If the government is able to sustain its resolve over the years it will take to set the economy firmly on a new trajectory, the kingdom will be thoroughly transformed – for the better.	如果政府能在开辟经济新轨道的过程中保持决心，国家将会彻底改变——而且越变越好。


Living the Saudi Dream	沙特之石油霸主梦


IRVING, TEXAS – Saudi Arabia wants it all: to salvage OPEC, achieve income diversification and industrialization, and preserve its market share in crude oil, petroleum products, petrochemicals, and natural gas liquids (NGLs).	发自德克萨斯州欧文市——沙特希望占尽所有好处：挽救石油输出国组织（欧佩克），实现收入多元化和产业化，保持其原油、石油产品、石油化工和液态天然气的市场份额。


Whether the Saudis succeed will be determined largely by the shale-energy industry in the United States.	而沙特人的愿望是否真的能实现，主要取决于美国的油页岩能源行业。


The US shale revolution divided OPEC according to the quality of its members' crude oil.	美国页岩气革命将欧佩克成员国依据各自的原油质量分成了三六九等。


Exporters of light sweet crude – such as Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria – lost nearly all of their market share in the US, while exporters of sour or heavier crude, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have lost little.	当沙特阿拉伯和科威特等重质原油出口者只失去了很少一部分美国市场份额时，轻质低硫原油出口者——如阿尔及利亚、安哥拉和尼日利亚——几乎丢失了所有在美市场份额。


Because almost all crude oil produced by the Gulf States is sour, and most of the global surplus is sweet, any production cut by Saudi Arabia and its neighbors would not drive prices back up and rebalance the oil market.	由于几乎所有海湾国家生产的原油都是重质油，而全球富余的大多是轻质油，因此无论沙特及其邻国如何减产都不会驱动价格回归和恢复石油市场的平衡。


The only way to do that – and prevent an OPEC breakup – would be to reduce the production of light sweet crude, including by US producers, which would thus lose market share.	要实现上述目标并防止欧佩克解体，唯一的办法可能是包括美国在内的生产商减少轻质原油生产并因此失去市场份额。


If this occurred, oil prices could be expected to rise again relatively quickly.	只要能做到这点，油价将有望再次急升。


If, however, Saudi Arabia remains more committed to its strategic development objectives, low oil prices could persist.	然而，如果沙特仍更多注重其战略发展目标，低油价可能会持续。


Since the 1970s, several OPEC members, led by Saudi Arabia, have worked to diversify their industrial base by promoting sectors with a comparative advantage, such as petrochemicals, and building mega-refineries to enable the export of value-added products.	自20世纪70年代以来，沙特带领几个欧佩克成员国致力于通过推动自身类似石化等拥有比较优势的行业来实现工业多元化，同时修筑巨型冶炼厂以促进高附加值产品的出口。


At the same time, to boost revenues, they expanded exports of NGLs, which are not counted in OPEC quotas.	同时为了增加收入，它们还扩大了不计入欧佩克配额的液态天然气出口。


But just when these countries were beginning to achieve success, the US shale revolution emerged, threatening all three of their main strategic objectives.	但当这些国家开始看到成功的曙光之时，美国页岩气革命出现了并对这三个主要战略目标构成了威胁。


The key to the competitiveness of Saudi Arabia's petrochemical industry was its use of natural gas and ethane, which was far less expensive than the oil product naphtha on which its global competitors depended.	沙特石化工业的核心竞争力是其使用的天然气和乙烷原料远比其全球竞争对手所仰赖的石脑油便宜。


Now that the US is producing massive amounts of low-price natural gas and ethane, Saudi Arabia's competitive advantage – and market share – is beginning to deteriorate.	如今美国大量生产低价天然气和乙烷，沙特的竞争优势——以及市场份额——立刻开始恶化。


The same goes for refining.	这同样适用于炼油行业。


Since the US does not allow exports of crude oil, the shale revolution pushed down the US benchmark price, the West Texas Intermediate, relative to international crude prices, sometimes with differentials as wide as $20.	由于美国不允许原油出口，页岩革命拉低了美国基准价格，西德克萨斯交易所的原油价格相对于国际原油价格有时相差20美元之多。


US refiners took advantage of lower prices to increase their exports of petroleum products – so much so, that they are now threatening the market share of Saudi refineries in Asia and elsewhere.	美国炼油商利用较低的价格来增加自身石油产品出口，并因此威胁到沙特企业在亚洲及其它地区的市场份额。


Likewise, US companies have increased NGL production considerably, enabling the country to slash its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imports and expand its NGL exports significantly.	同样，美国公司液态天然气产量大增，使该国显著减少其液化石油气(LPG)进口并扩大液态天然气出口。


As a result, Saudi Arabia has lost market share to US producers in Central and South America.	结果沙特在中美洲和南美洲的市场份额又遭美国生厂商抢占。


But the recent collapse in oil prices could change this dynamic.	但最近石油价格暴跌可能会改变这种状态。


In refusing to cut its own production, Saudi Arabia seems to be hoping that low oil prices will drive down investment in US shale energy, undermining production growth there.	通过拒绝削减自身产量的做法，沙特似乎希望低油价能抑制美国对页岩能源的投资，进而削弱其产量增长态势。


Low prices may already have contributed to delays in America's decision to begin exporting crude oil, as well as to the political viability of US President Barack Obama's veto of the Keystone XL pipeline, intended to transport oil from the Canadian tar sands to the Gulf of Mexico for export.	低价格可能已导致美国推迟下达实施出口原油的决定，并增加了美国总统奥巴马否决旨在将原油从加拿大油砂田输送到墨西哥湾的Keystone XL石油出口管道的政治可行性。


Add to that the delay in the opening of the Mexican energy sector, and it seems that low oil prices could amount to a net gain for the Kingdom.	再加上墨西哥能源部门的延迟开放，似乎低油价能为沙特这个石油王国带来净收益。


Though Saudi Arabia's motivation in not cutting production was probably almost entirely economic, low oil prices could also offer distinct political advantages.	尽管沙特不减产的动机几乎完全出于经济考虑，低油价也可以为其带来独特的政治优势。


Most notably, the decline in prices is creating serious challenges for Iran, the Kingdom's main rival in the region, as well as for the unstable, oil-dependent economies of Russia and Venezuela.	但最值得注意的是，价格的下跌为沙特在该地区的主要竞争对手伊朗，以及政局不稳的且依赖石油经济的俄罗斯和委内瑞拉带来了严峻挑战。


None of these countries has adequate savings to cushion the blow of reduced revenues.	这些国家都没有足够的储备去缓冲收入的减少。


Under these circumstances, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia will continue to refuse to cut oil production, leaving prices low until market forces trigger a rebound.	在这种情况下，沙特似乎将继续拒绝削减石油产量，让价格降低直至市场力量引发反弹为止。


And even then, the price increase could be limited. After all, game theory dictates that, once the surplus is eliminated, the dominant producer must prevent oil prices from rising high enough to cause it to lose market share again.	即使如此，油价上涨也将是有限的，毕竟博弈论表明一旦这种过剩情况消失，占主导地位的生产者就必须防止石油价格上升过高使其再次丢失市场份额。


That means that Saudi Arabia will try to compel non-OPEC countries, mainly in North America, to keep oil-production increases commensurate with growth in global demand.	这意味着沙特得尝试迫使（主要在北美的）几个非欧佩克国家保持石油生产与全球需求增长同步。


In short, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest for oil prices to rise high enough to sustain its own economy, but not so high that they can sustain significant increases in non-OPEC supply.	简而言之，最符合沙特利益的情况就是让油价飞得足够高以维持本国经济，但又不能特别高，以免引发非欧佩克国家的供应增加。


In order to keep prices in this ideal range, Saudi Arabia may even increase production again.	为了将价格维持在理想区间内，沙特甚至可能再次增加产量。


This strategy is not without risk.	这种策略也并非没有风险。


In the short run, excessively low prices could trigger political instability in some oil-producing countries, driving up prices.	在短期内，过低价格在一些产油国可能引发政治动荡，推高价格。


Similarly, delays in upstream investment, especially megaprojects, could push prices above the ideal level in the medium and long term.	同样，推迟上游投资，尤其是大型项目，可能导致价格在中长期内高于理想水平。


But perhaps the biggest risk lies with the US shale-oil industry.	但也许最大的风险在于美国页岩油行业。


Over the next few years, US producers are likely to retrench, focus on sweet spots, improve technology, reduce costs, and increase production once again.	在未来几年里美国生产商可能会节约开支，专注于低硫石油，改进技术，降低成本，并再次增产。


At that point, Saudi Arabia's current strategy may no longer be adequate to sustain its market dominance.	一旦出现了这一点，沙特的当前策略可能就不再足以维持其市场主导地位。


Saudi Arabia’s Democratic Baby Step	萨特阿拉伯的民主第一步


This month’s elections in Iraq and for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority may be claiming all the world’s headlines, but another potentially far-reaching ballot is also underway, albeit to far less acclaim: the registration process for the municipal elections in Saudi Arabia in mid-February.	这个月全世界各大媒体头条大概都被伊拉克选举和巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席的选举所占据，不过同时还有另外一场投票也在进行之中。 虽然它远没有前两场那么瞩目，但可能影响深远。


As the heartland of some of the strongest Islamist forces anywhere, this Saudi effort – if successful and a harbinger of other needed changes – may have an even more profound impact than the elections in Iraq and Palestine.	那就是今年二月中旬在沙特阿拉伯进行的市政选举登记。 作为某些伊斯兰最强势力的心脏地区，一旦沙特的这一举措得以成功并引发其他相应变革的话，其产生的影响要比伊拉克和巴勒斯坦的选举更为深远。


Roughly 40,000 Saudis are expected to compete for 1,700 seats in 178 municipal councils.	大约有4万名沙特人将竞争178个市政委员会中的1700个席位。


The enthusiasm is obvious, and the campaign is already under way and highly spirited.	人们的热情显而易见，投票活动也进行得如火如荼。


Members of the Saudi royal family are not entering the race, as they already enjoy ultimate political power.	由于沙特皇室成员早已掌控了绝对政治权力因而并未加入角逐。


But, sensing the public’s excitement, they have made sure to be photographed by local and international media while registering to get their electoral ID card.	但是，当感受到民众们的满腔热情后，皇室成员决定登记申请竞选身份证并允许国内外媒体摄影。


By the standards of Western, and even emerging Third World democracies, the Saudi municipal elections are an extremely modest affair.	按照西方的标准，甚至在崛起中的第三世界民主国家眼里，沙特的市政选举并非大事。


But in the Saudi context they are a real breakthrough.	但是对沙特人而言，这意味着一个真正的突破。


For Saudi Arabia is a country in which both rulers and ruled are equally arch- conservative, adhering, for the last two centuries, to the puritanical Wahhabi doctrine of Islam.	两个世纪以来，沙特阿拉伯的统治者和被统治者遵循着伊斯兰教瓦哈比教派的教条，极其保守，相互依靠。


During the last fifty years, repeated attempts by reform-oriented elements to open up Saudi Arabia’s society and polity had failed.	近50年来，把改革因素引入沙特阿拉伯、试图开放沙特阿拉伯的社会和政体的努力从未间断，但是屡战屡败。


But recent democratic trends worldwide have now reached the shores of this medieval desert kingdom and can no longer be ignored.	不过最近全球的民主浪潮已经冲上了这个中世纪沙漠王国的海滩，并再也不能被忽视了。


To begin with, members of the small but steadily growing Saudi middle class have increasingly expressed their discontent publicly.	首先，少数的沙特中产阶级开始公开表示他们的不满，而且这一人数正在不断增长。


Despite legal prohibition, Saudi women have defiantly driven their cars in the streets of Riyadh, while prominent intellectuals have published open letters to King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah demanding social and political reform.	尽管法律上明文禁止，沙特的妇女已经敢于冒天下之大不韪在首都利雅得的街道上开起了车。 同时，一些有名的有识之士在向法德国王和沙特王储阿卜杜拉的公开信中要求进行社会和政治改革。


This pressure for change has been building for years.	要求改革的压力由来已久。


The first Gulf War (1990-91), brought nearly one million foreign fighters from 35 countries to the Arabian Peninsula, along with their modern weapons systems, communications gear, and different lifestyles.	第一次海湾战争（1990-1991）把来自35个国家的近100万外国士兵带到了阿拉伯半岛，随之而来的还有他们先进的武器系统、通讯传动装置和不同的生活方式。


Such a massive foreign influx into so hermetic a country could not but have a significant domestic impact.	如此大规模的外来事物涌入一个与世隔绝的国家不可能不给这个国家带来巨大的影响。


Nearly all countries neighboring Saudi Arabia already practice one form of electoral participation or another, although most of these nods toward democracy are defective in some way.	几乎所有沙特阿拉伯的邻国都承认，民主制度在某种程度上是有缺陷的，尽管如此，他们都已经尝试了一两种选举制度。


For years, ordinary Saudis watched with envy parliamentary debates on Arab satellite channels, in countries richer than theirs, such as Kuwait, as well as in poorer ones, such as Yemen and Jordan.	几年来，沙特的平民百姓羡慕地看着卫星电视上一些其他国家进行议会辩论，其中不乏比他们富裕的国家，如科威特，以及比他们贫穷的国家，比如也门和约旦。


Even the tiny state of Qatar has the rabble-rouser Al-Jazeera television channel, which is watched by more viewers in Saudi Arabia than in any other Arab country.	甚至是卡塔尔国这样的小国都有一个颇具煽动性的半岛电视台，观看这个电视台节目的沙特阿拉伯人比任何一个其他阿拉伯国家的人都要多。


Messages by their dissident compatriot Osama Bin Laden are periodically beamed from that channel, inciting Saudis against the royal family.	这个电视台还定期播放他们的同胞——专唱反调的奥萨姆 · 本拉登的言论，鼓动沙特民众反对皇室。


Bin Laden’s constantly highlights the House of Saud’s corruption and repugnant connections with the United States.	本拉登常常强调沙特议院的腐败，突出沙特政府与美国的令人反感的联系。


While democracy is not part of his agenda, his messages, as well as his followers’ periodic armed attacks inside the country, have no doubt contributed to the erosion of the regime’s legitimacy.	虽然民主未列入他的议程，但他的言论及其追随者在国内不断制造的武装冲突毫无疑问是要瓦解当朝政权的合法性。


But it was the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 that brought a sea change in the thinking, if not yet the practice, of at least part of the Saudi regime.	但是美国9 · 11恐怖袭击让人们对沙特政权的认识至少在思想上发生了巨大变化，即使在行动上还不明显。


The fact that most of the perpetrators of the attacks were identified as Saudis highlighted the country’s backward realities and provoked mounting international pressures for change.	大多数恐怖袭击者被确认为沙特人，这一事实凸现了沙特日况愈下的现状，引发了呼吁变革的国际舆论。


No doubt some of these pressures were motivated by sincere concerns, but others were driven by the desire of anti-Saudi groups in the US to settle old scores.	毫无疑问，有些压力来自于人们真诚的关心，但有些也来自于想要算清旧账的美国的反沙特组织。


The call for democratizing the Middle East has become a battle cry for the Bush administration, especially after the invasion and occupation of Iraq.	尤其在美国入侵和占领伊拉克以后，呼吁中东民主化对美国政府而言已成为一种战争口号。


Despite its reluctance to change, the Saudi royal family is obviously yielding to these multiple pressures from within, from neighbors, and from the wider world, although the extent of change is still nominal and obviously leaves much to be desired.	尽管沙特皇室不愿改革，但面对来自国内、邻国和世界的多重压力，他们不得不让步，当然变革的程度还仅停留在表层，有待加深。


Thus, for example, Saudi women, but not convicts, are barred from participating in the forthcoming municipal elections.	比如，沙特妇女被禁止参加即将举行的市政选举，而囚犯却可以。


Moreover, tens of human rights activists are currently in prison or on trial.	更何况，还有数千名人权主义分子正在接受牢狱之灾或等待审判。


To be sure, the Saudi system is still worlds away from being a Westminster-style democracy; indeed, it will probably never become one.	但可以确定的是，沙特体系与韦斯敏斯特式的民主相差甚远截然不同。 事实上，它可能永远不会变成那样。


All the same, this municipal election should be looked upon as a giant first step in the arduous journey toward Saudi democracy.	尽管如此，这次市政选举还是应该被看作沙特通向民主的艰辛旅程中的第一步，也是巨大的一步。


Despite many misgivings regarding its conduct in other areas, the Saudi regime should be commended for this initiative.	虽然沙特在其他领域有很多令人疑虑和担忧之处，沙特政权的这次主动变革还是值得赞赏的。


Saudi Arabia’s Old Regime Grows Older	沙特阿拉伯政权日薄西山


LONDON – The contrast between the deaths, within two days of each other, of Libya’s Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz is one of terminal buffoonery versus decadent gerontocracy.	伦敦——在两天的时间里，卡扎菲和哈特皇储阿齐兹相继去世，他们的死法大相径庭，可谓对式微的老人政治的绝大讽刺。


And their demise is likely to lead to very different outcomes: liberation for the Libyans and stagnation for the Saudis.	两人身故可能会导致大不相同的结果：利比亚人民获得了解放，而沙特人民将继续生活在专制之下。


But the death of Sultan, at 86, marks the beginning of a critical period of domestic and foreign uncertainty for the Kingdom.	但阿齐兹以86岁之龄谢世标志着沙特迎来国内外不确定性的关键时期。


After all, Sultan’s half-brother, King Abdullah, 87, is still hospitalized in Riyadh, following a major operation last month.	阿齐兹的同父异母兄阿卜杜拉国王仍然身处利雅得医院，上个月刚刚接手了一次大手术。


The regime is aging and ailing, and is perceived by the population as being on life support.	沙特政权正在衰老和衰竭，沙特人民相信，阿卜杜拉如今是靠生命支持手段才得以不死的。


Meanwhile, the succession is still being argued.	与此同时，接班人之争远未尘埃落定。


Sultan’s death is the first time that the burial of a Saudi royal has been delayed to give the ruling family time to decide on the next in line – a sign of internal discord (and concord on the continuation of dynastic rule).	阿齐兹的葬礼因为统治家族需要时间来确定接班人而被推迟，这是破天荒第一回，表明统治家族存在内部分歧（但在延续王朝统治这一问题上是一致的）。


The Saudi regime’s stability now depends on its ability to maintain unity and establish clarity in its system of succession.	沙特政权的稳定性现在取决于其维持团结并增加体制传承透明度的能力。


With the Crown Prince’s death, schisms are particularly threatening to the Kingdom’s stability (and that of oil exports), because the ruling Al Saud have swelled to 22,000 members, which has given rise to factional clashes among increasingly numerous claimants to power.	随着王储的逝世，分与合严重威胁着沙特王国（以及石油出口）的稳定性，因为掌权的沙特（Al Saud）家族已有22 000名成员，提出继承权力要求者层出不穷，因而派系横生。


Sultan had already been dead – politically, that is – for the last three years; indeed, since June 2011, when he left for New York for medical treatment, young Saudis speculated on numerous Web sites that this was also literally the case.	从政治意义上说，阿齐兹三年前就已经死了； 事实上，从2011年6月他前往纽约接受治疗以来，沙特年轻人就在网络上流传各种阿齐兹身故的传言。


Abdullah’s octogenarian line of successors recalls the final years of the Soviet Union, when one infirm leader after another succeeded to power for a brief period of inert rule.	这位耄耋之年的阿卜杜拉继承人让人想起了苏联的最后岁月，领导人一代不如一代，体制不断僵化。


Many Saudi subjects feel the same pattern of continuous uncertainty and torpor.	许多沙特人感受到了同样的持续的不稳定和僵化模式。


Making matters worse, the rule of succession is ambiguous.	雪上加霜的是，权力继承规则模糊不清。


After Abdullah succeeded his brother Fahd, who ruled for 23 years until his death in 2005, he created an Allegiance Council, an ambiguous and mysterious family body that resembled the Vatican’s College of Cardinals.	阿卜杜拉继承其父法赫德（执政23年，2005年去世）后，建立了一个效忠委员会（Allegiance Council），这是一个外人莫名其妙的神秘家族机构，类似于梵蒂冈枢机主教团。


But here, restrictions are not based entirely on age, but on family bloodlines.	但在阿卜杜拉的效忠委员会中，入选资格并不纯以年龄为界，而是根据家族血统挑选。


The Council included the surviving royal princes of the 43 sons of Ibn Saud, the Kingdom’s founder, and the sons of their deceased brothers – for example, the late King Faisal’s brood.	该委员会包括了沙特王国建立者伊本·沙特（Ibn Saud）仍健在的43位皇子以及他们已故兄弟的儿子，比如前国王费沙尔（Faisal）的子嗣。


But, as Sultan’s health deteriorated, Abdullah bypassed his own creation and appointed Prince Naif, the interior minister, as a second deputy.	但是，随着阿齐兹健康状况的恶化，阿卜杜拉绕过自己建立的效忠委员会，任命内政部长奈伊夫（Naif）王子为第二王储。


In other words, Naif will be anointed Crown Prince.	换句话说，奈伊夫将是阿齐兹的王储。


But, befitting this increasingly exsanguinous imperium, Naif, 82, is known to suffer from leukemia.	但是，奈伊夫虽然适合作为日渐贫血的沙特帝制大统继承者，但他也已经82岁了，而且人人都知道他患上了白血病。


Sultan’s fortune is estimated at $270 billion, which he distributed between his sons prior to his death in order to shore up their political position in the competitive princely arena.	阿齐兹的财富大概有2700亿美元，死前就分配给了各位儿子，以便巩固他们在激烈的王子竞争中的政治地位。


The reality is that every senior prince has placed his favorite sons in important positions in the Kingdom.	目前，所有年长王子都安插器重的儿子到沙特王国的重要位子上。


Sultan secured the defense ministry for his son Khaled, and brought back Khaled’s notorious brother, Bandar to head the Intelligence Security Council.	阿齐兹确保了赫勒德（Khaled）身居国防部长之位，还将赫勒德声名狼藉的弟弟班达尔（Bandar）召回担任沙特情报安全委员会（Intelligence Security Council）主管。


Abdullah guaranteed his son Mitaeb’s position as head of the National Guard.	阿卜杜拉则保证其子米塔伊布（Mitaeb）国民预备役司令的地位。


The new Crown Prince-in-waiting, Naif, has established his son Mohammed as the next interior minister.	即将成为王储的奈伊夫则让儿子穆罕默德（Mohammed）担任下一任内政部长。


In short, despite Abdullah’s innovations in the succession process, it is an open secret that nothing guarantees a transition to a younger generation of leaders – or that an effective ruler will emerge.	简言之，尽管阿卜杜拉在接班程序上有所创新，但权力大棒不可能交给下一代领导人——也不可能会有高效统治者出现——仍然是众所周知的秘密。


The story of the Al Saud’s succession struggle is no longer whispered behind closed doors.	沙特家族的接班之争已经从幕后走向了台前。


The Internet has opened a window on all of the royal family’s plots, ambitions, and double-dealings.	互联网打开了一扇窗，让人们得以一窥皇室的阴谋、野心和口是心非。


The Al Saud resembles a family business, established in 1932.	沙特类似于一个家族产业。


Ibn Saud managed to conquer and unite the vast territory of the Arabian Peninsula, give it his family name, and alienate, divide, and control his cousins and brothers in order to establish a clear and undisputed line of succession through his sons.	1932年，伊本·沙特设法征服并统一了阿拉伯半岛的广袤领土，为家族设立了名号，对兄弟和从兄弟采取分而治之的策略，以期建立一套明晰的、毫无争议的、由其子孙接班的权力大统。


After Ibn Saud’s death, his sons, though never entirely united, maintained enough coherence to keep the store running.	伊本·沙特死后，他的儿子虽然从来不曾真心团结过，但仍足以凝聚在一起守住伊本的祖业。


That is no longer true of the thousands of princes that they produced.	但对于他们的数以千计的王子来说，情况已有所不同。


As the older generation dies off, the new generation has fallen to fighting in front of the customers.	随着老一代相继去世，新一代已经陷入了内斗的局面。


Indeed, with the ratio of royals to commoners now at one to a thousand (compared to one to five million in the United Kingdom), the challenge of managing princely privileges, salaries, and demand for jobs has never been more intense.	事实上，如今沙特贵族-平民比例大约为1:1000（而英国的比例为1:500万），如何治理王子特权和收入已经成为一项挑战，而王子们对职位的要求也越来越高。


Royal perks include lifetime sinecures and domination of the civil service, which enable the princes to award contracts and receive commissions on top of their salaries.	王室特权包括终身政府闲职以及政府部门各个要职，以便王子们在薪水之外大肆招揽合同、收取佣金。


So the Saudi regime is divided, its legitimacy is questioned, and sectarian tensions are growing.	沙特政权已经分裂了，因此其正统性也受到了质疑，宗派之争正在抬头。


Moreover, while oil-export revenue is booming, the neighborhood is in revolutionary flames.	此外，虽然石油出口收入在大涨，但周边国家已被革命之火所席卷了。


In the short term, the iron-fisted Naif, as Crown Prince, will push the Kingdom into greater repression, in part by strengthening the hardline Wahhabi clerics’ place in the country’s power nexus.	从短期看，铁腕人物奈伊夫成为王储将进一步增加沙特王国的高压，比如巩固强硬的瓦哈比派牧师在沙特权力网中的地位。


Magnificent sums of money, backed by Wahhabi dogma, will be deployed to ensure popular submission and silence.	银弹加上瓦哈比派教义将确保民众顺服和安静。


Whereas Abdullah at least talked about reform (though with no real consequences), Naif can barely bring himself to utter the word.	阿卜杜拉至少对改革有所谈及（虽然只是光说不练），奈伊夫则连说都懒得说。


Denial remains the Saudi rulers’ dominant mindset.	封闭仍是沙特统治者的主导思想。


The royals believe that custodianship of Islam’s holy places gives them a special status in the Arab world, and that no revolution can touch them.	王室相信，伊斯兰教圣地守护者的地位将让他们在阿拉伯世界中占据独一无二的地位，没有哪个革命能动摇他们。


And, if anyone tries, they will follow Naif’s counsel: “What we took by the sword we will hold by the sword.”	胆敢以身试法者，先想想奈伊夫的忠告：“我们马上得天下，亦以马上治天下。 ”


Throughout the region, newly mobilized (and thus empowered) Arab youth are trying to move their countries towards reform and liberalization.	放眼阿拉伯地区，新动员起来（因此获得权力）的年轻一代阿拉伯人正在试图引导祖国走向改革和自由化。


Saudi Arabia, unfortunately, is moving in the opposite direction.	不幸的是，沙特阿拉伯正在逆这股潮流而动。


Saudi Arabia’s Bold Vision for Economic Diversification	沙特阿拉伯的野望：经济多元化


LOS ANGELES – Saudi Arabia has captured the world’s attention with the announcement of an ambitious agenda, called Vision 2030, aimed at overhauling the structure of its economy.	洛杉矶—沙特阿拉伯宣布了一项名为《愿景2030》（Vision 2030）的宏大计划，吸引了全世界的注意。


The plan would reduce historical high dependence on oil by transforming how the Kingdom generates income, as well as how it spends and manages its vast resources.	该计划旨在修正经济结构，改变沙特王国形成收入以及支出和管理其巨量资源的方式，从而降低历史上对石油的巨大依赖。


It is supported by detailed action plans, the initial implementation of which has already involved headline-grabbing institutional changes in a country long known for caution and gradualism.	《愿景2030》由许多详细的行动计划作为支撑，第一批实施的计划包括这个长期以来以谨慎和渐进著称的国家的吸引眼球的制度变革。


While the immediate catalyst for economic restructuring is the impact of the sharp fall in international oil prices, the rationale for these reforms has been evident for much longer.	刺激经济结构调整的直接催化剂是国际油价的暴跌，但这些改革背后的道理早已显而易见。


With oil sales generating the bulk of government revenues, and with the public sector being the predominant employer, Saudi officials have long worried that the Kingdom’s lack of economic diversity could place at risk its long-term financial security.	石油销售贡献了政府收入的大部分，公共部门成为最主要的雇主，沙特官员一直担心沙特王国经济多元化不足可能威胁到其长期金融稳定。


The more than halving of oil prices in the last 18 months has been accompanied by a major change in how the oil market functions.	过去18个月中，石油价格跌去一大半，石油市场运行的���式也发生了重大变化。


With growth in non-traditional sources of energy – particularly the “shale revolution,” which drove a near-doubling in US production, to almost ten million barrels per day, in just four years – the Saudi-led OPEC oil cartel has less influence on market prices.	非传统能源资源的增长——特别是“页岩革命”让美国产量在短短四年之内几乎翻倍，达到每天一千万桶——让沙特领衔的石油卡特尔欧佩克对市场价格的影响力有所下降。


In addition, certain members of OPEC, again led by Saudi Arabia, are now less willing to try to moderate fluctuations in the price of oil, as they correctly recognize that “swing producers” risk durable losses in market share.	此外，欧佩克的一些成员——又是以沙特阿拉伯为首——现在不再情愿尝试遏制石油价格波动，因为它们正确地认识到，“摇摆生产国”的市场份额可能受到持久影响。


That’s why Vision 2030 is so important.	《愿景2030》的重要性正在于此。


Seeking to regain better control over its economic and financial destiny, the Kingdom has designed an ambitious economic restructuring plan, spearheaded by its energetic new deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud.	沙特王国寻求能更好地控制其经济和金融命运，因此制定了一套雄心勃勃的经济结构重组计划，由其新任副王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼·沙特（Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud）负责。


In simplified terms, Vision 2030 focuses on three major areas, together with efforts to protect the most vulnerable segments of the population.	简言之，《愿景2030》注重三个主要领域，并包括保护人口中最脆弱群体的措施。


First, the plan seeks to enhance the generation of non-oil revenues, by raising fees and tariffs on public services, gradually expanding the tax base (including through the introduction of a value added tax), and raising more income from a growing number of visitors to the Kingdom.	首先，该计划寻求加强开辟非石油收入，办法包括提高公共服务的费用和关税、逐渐扩大税基（包括通过引入增值税）以及从日益增加的游客身上获得更多的收入。


Second, the authorities want to reduce spending by lowering subsidies, rationalizing the country’s massive public investment program, and diverting spending on arms away from foreign purchases.	其次，沙特当局希望通过削减补贴、理顺大规模公共投资计划和减少军备的外国采购来降低开支。


Third, the Kingdom seeks to diversify its national wealth and, in the process, increase current investment income.	第三，沙特王国寻求国民财富的多元化，并在此过程中增加经常性投资收入。


For example, the plan would raise funds via the IPO of a small part (up to 5%) of Saudi-Aramco, the giant oil conglomerate, and invest the proceeds in a broader range of assets around the world.	比如，该计划将通过首次公开发行石油巨头阿美公司的少数股份（不超过5%）筹集资金，并将所得资金投资于范围更广的全球资产。


This bold economic vision is not without risks.	这一大胆的经济愿景当然拖离不了风险。


Economic transitions are inherently tricky, especially one of this scale and scope.	经济转型天生棘手，特别是如此规模和范畴的转型。


Early successes are often needed to solidify the overwhelming buy-in of key constituencies, particularly those that naturally may be resistant to change at first (especially change that eliminates some of the traditional financial entitlements in moving from a familiar, albeit less secure, present toward what is now an unfamiliar future).	早期的成功常常是巩固关键利益群体大举跟进的必要条件，特别是那些一开始出于本能抵制变化的人（特别是取消一些传统金融权利、从尽管不太安全当更熟悉的现在朝目前仍不太熟悉的未来的变化）。


The action plans underpinning the implementation of Vision 2030 inevitably involve progressing on multiple fronts simultaneously and in a carefully coordinated and monitored fashion.	作为《愿景2030》的实施的基础的行动计划难免包括多条战线齐头并进，并且需要谨慎协调和监控。


Requiring invigorated administrative and operational resources, it comes at a time when the Kingdom is not only dealing with lower oil earnings and drawing down its large reserves, but also is increasingly asserting its regional role, including in Syria and Yemen.	这需要动员管理和经营资源，而与此同时，沙特王国不但有面对石油收益下降、巨额储备流失，同时也在日渐强调其地区角色，包括在叙利亚和也门。


Against this background, it is encouraging that the announcement of Vision 2030 has been followed rapidly by the implementation of some initial and notable steps.	在这样的背景下，《愿景2030》宣布之后很快就有初步和可观的实施步骤跟进，这令人振奋。


Sustaining this momentum in a manner that maintains consistent communication with key domestic stakeholders will likely prove critical in determining the plan’s success.	保持这一势头，并保证与关键国内相关利益方不断进行沟通可能将是该计划成功与否的关键。


How the Saudis proceed on this important economic restructuring is being closely watched by the other five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and by many other countries as well.	沙特人如何进行这场重要的经济结构调整正在受到海湾合作委员会其他五个成员国——以及其他许多国家——的密切关注。


The attention attracted by Vision 2030 is not surprising.	《愿景2030》吸人眼球并不意外。


The plan, after all, is about a lot more than fundamental economic reforms.	毕竟，该计划的意义远远不止于基础性经济改革。


If Saudi Arabia succeeds in transforming its economy, including reforming institutions and restructuring economic incentives, other countries that face similar challenges, in the region and beyond, will be inspired to follow suit.	如果沙特阿拉伯的经济转型——包括制度改革和经济激励重组——取得成功，该地区内外面临类似挑战的其他国家也会受到启发，争相效仿。


Saudi Arabia’s Reform Path	沙特阿拉伯的改革路径


BEIRUT – Nearly two years after oil prices began their precipitous decline, leading global producers are facing the prospect of major adjustments that will have far-reaching economic, social, and political consequences.	贝鲁特—石油价格暴跌近两年后，主要全球生产国正面临重大调整，这些调整将产生深远的经济、社会和政治后果。


While such adjustments will surely be enormously challenging – especially for middle-income countries like Saudi Arabia, which lack the massive wealth funds of, say, the United Arab Emirates – they present these countries with an important opportunity to consider more productive ways to organize their societies.	这些挑战固然极具挑战性——特别是对沙特阿拉伯这样的缺乏（比如）阿联酋的大规模财富基金的中等收入国家而言——但也给这些国家带来了重要的机会考虑效率更高的组织社会的方式。


It seems that Saudi Arabia has embraced this challenge.	沙特阿拉伯似乎已经接受了这一挑战。


The long-time oil minister was replaced last week, soon after the Kingdom issued its Vision 2030 plan for ensuring sustainable long-term growth.	本周，沙特发布了《愿景2030》（Vision 2030）计划以确保长期增长。


The plan has been both hailed and criticized for its ambition, exemplified by the goal of turning the Kingdom into the world’s 15th largest economy over the next two decades – an economy characterized by its skilled labor force, open markets, and good governance.	该计划的雄心毁誉参半，比如，它提出沙特王国在未来二十年内成为世界第15大经济体的目标，并让高技能劳动力、开放的市场和良好的治理成为沙特经济的特色。


One key way Saudi Arabia hopes to achieve that is by diversifying its asset portfolio, selling shares in the state oil giant Aramco to create a sovereign-wealth fund.	沙特阿拉伯实现这一点的一个关键方法是资产组合多样化，出售国有石油巨头阿美公司（Aramco）股份以成立主权财富基金。


But Vision 2030 fails to address one critical issue: low labor-force participation.	但《愿景2030》没有解决一个关键问题：低劳动力参与度。


Only 41% of the working-age population currently is employed, compared to a 60% average across the OECD.	目前只有41%的工作年龄人口有工作，而经合组织的平均水平为60%。


Those who do work are employed largely by overstaffed public agencies.	而用工作的也主要是在人事臃肿的公共机构上班。


This is the Saudi economy’s largest inefficiency, and addressing it will be more difficult that addressing any other.	这是沙特经济最大的无效率之处，而解决这个问题要比解决其他所有问题都更加困难。


The key will be not just to increase employment, but also to boost productivity.	关键不仅仅是增加就业，还在于刺激生产率。


After all, unlike more sparsely populated Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, such as the UAE and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, with its population of nearly 20 million (excluding non-nationals), can no longer afford low labor productivity.	毕竟，不同于阿联酋和卡塔尔等人口更少的海湾合作委员会（GCC）成员国，沙特阿拉伯人口接近2,000万（不包括非本国国民），无法承受低劳动生产率。


Indeed, oil revenues now amount to only $5,500 per capita – far from enough to act as a sustainable alternative.	事实上，石油收入目前只有人均5,500美元——远远不足以充当可持续的替代方案。


To succeed, Saudi Arabia will have to transform its incentive structure, so that Saudis, not migrants, fill newly created private-sector jobs.	要想成功，沙特阿拉伯必须改变其激励结构，从而让沙特人而不是移民填补新创造出来的私人部门岗位。


As it stands, the Kingdom’s underlying political settlement depends on the royal family’s alliances with businesses, which have a free hand to import labor, and guaranteed public-sector jobs for citizens.	目前，沙特王国的基本政治安排取决于皇室和企业的联盟，它们能自由进口劳动力，并确保公民获得公共部门岗位。


This settlement is traceable to the 1970s, when ambitious infrastructure programs turned local trading families into contractors, which then lobbied for more visas to staff up.	这一安排可追溯到20世纪70年代，当时，雄心勃勃的基础设施项目让本地贸易家族演变为承包商，他们游说发行更多的签证招工。


As these firms evolved into mighty commercial and industrial companies, cheap foreign labor became central to their profitability.	随着这些企业发展成为强大的商业和产业公司，廉价外国劳动力也成为它们盈利能力的核心。


The GCC is now the only region open to global labor, ensuring that its businesses have the world’s lowest wages-to-skill ratio.	，目前，GCC是唯一的劳动力市场开放的地区，以其企业拥有世界最低的工资-技能比。


As a result, the Kingdom’s reliance on foreigners has no parallel in modern economic history.	结果，沙特王国对外国人的依赖程度在现代经济史上没有可以匹敌者。


In 2015, there were about nine million migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, constituting 60% of its labor force.	2015年，沙特阿拉伯有约九百万移民工人，占其劳动力的60%。


The private sector has become a preserve for expatriates, who fill at least 83% of positions.	私人部门成为外国工人的乐园，占据了至少83%的工作岗位。


In few other countries would nationals accept such open competition by foreign labor.	极少有其他国家的国民允许如此开放的外国劳动力竞争。


Saudi nationals do, because they are employed by the state at above-market “reservation” wages.	沙特国民接受了，因为他们由国家以高于市场“保留”工资的水平雇用。


Roughly 3.4 million Saudis currently work in public administration and the security forces, at wages 2-4 times those in the private sector.	大约340万沙特人目前在公共部门和安全部队工作，工资是私人部门的2—4倍。


If the wage gap between migrant and Saudi public-sector wages does not narrow dramatically, nationals simply will not be employable in the private sector.	如果移民和沙特公共部门工资的工资差距不迅速降低，沙特国民就不可能去私人部门工作。


But whenever the Kingdom has tried to reduce public-sector hiring, unemployment has increased.	但只要沙特王国尝试降低公共部门雇用量，失业就会上升。


Under the current incentives system, the authorities’ plans to privatize companies and improve civil-service productivity will actually destroy jobs occupied by Saudis.	在当前激励体系下，当局私有化公司、改善公务部门生产率的计划实际上将危及沙特人占据的工作岗位。


The challenge of creating jobs for Saudis may seem like a problem of riches.	为沙特人创造工作岗位的挑战看似是富人的问题。


Some would argue that all the Kingdom needs to do is to substitute Saudi for foreign workers in existing positions.	一些人认为，沙特王国所需要的只是用沙特人代替外国工人从事现有岗位。


But simple substitution will not do.	但简单的替代是不够的。


Current jobs are either too skill-intensive or not skill-intensive enough.	当前的工作岗位要么过于技能密集，要么不够技能密集。


Structural change will be needed to upgrade manual jobs.	需要结构改革来升级人力工作。


Greater reliance on capital and technology will also eliminate many menial positions.	更多依赖资本和技术也将消灭许多人工岗位。


At the same time, many high-skill jobs, largely a product of massive energy and capital subsidies, need to be downgraded to create more medium-skill positions.	与此同时，许多高技能岗位——主要是大规模能源和资本补贴的产物——需要降级以产生更多的中等技能岗位。


Companies must not only pay sufficiently to attract Saudis into these positions, but also begin training them, in order to boost productivity.	公司不可以仅靠提供优渥的薪酬吸引沙特人加入这些岗位，还必须开始培训他们以提高生产率。


All of this presupposes that the labor market will become much tighter.	所有这些都要求劳动力市场变得更紧。


The productive solution thus requires a dramatic reduction in the number of foreign workers, so that private-sector wages can rise to levels commensurate with Saudi reservation wages.	因此，生产性解决方案需要大幅降低外国工人数量，以使私人部门工资能够上升到与沙特人保留工资相当的水平。


The alternative is to slowly become a poor welfare state.	否则沙特阿拉伯将逐渐沦为低福利国家。


The Kingdom has thus embarked on a “Saudization” program that requires businesses in some sectors to hire nationals.	因此，沙特阿拉伯开始了一个“沙特化”计划，该计划要求某些部门的企业雇用本国人。


So far, the private sector has largely resisted these policies.	目前，私人部门大多抵制这些政策。


Managing the labor market by decree is difficult.	用法令管理劳动力市场是困难的。


More effective methods to ration migrant jobs will have to be found, requiring both regulatory capacities and political will.	必须找到更有效的方法配给移民工作岗位，这要求监管能力和政治意愿双管齐下。


Already, official unemployment stands at 11.6% – and at 32.8% for women and 29.4% for young people – while the rate would likely be much higher if discouraged workers were included.	目前，官方失业率为11. 6%——而青年女性为32.


More than 200,000 young people enter the labor market annually.	8%，青年为29. 4%——但如果将丧失信心的工人包括在内，这个数字可能大幅增加。


And as education levels continue to rise – nearly two-thirds of Saudi youth go to university – social pressure is set to grow as well.	每年有200,000多青年进入劳动力市场。 而随着教育水平继续提升——近三分之二的沙特青年能上大学——社会压力也将日益增加。


The real constraint to job creation in Saudi Arabia is found in its particular political economy.	沙特阿拉伯真正的就业岗位创造制约因素正在于其政治经济。


With lower oil rents to share, the domestic social contract is coming under strain.	在可分享的石油租减少的情况下，国内社会契约正在受到影响。


Cutting support for either businessmen or the population will weaken it further.	商人或群众支持的降低将让情况进一步恶化。


How the ruling House of Saud will adjust remains uncertain.	执政的沙特皇室如何调整仍是个未知数。


Backing the country’s entrepreneurs may require a rise in repression; backing the population will generate demands for democratization down the line.	支持沙特阿拉伯企业家可能需要加强高压； 支持群众将随之形成民主化要求。


Either way, the choices made, whether implicit or explicit, will be profoundly important to the success of Vision 2030 and similar reform agendas.	无论如何，最后的选择，不论直接还是间接，将深远地影响《愿景2030》和类似改革日程的成功与否。


Saudi Arabia vs. the Arab Spring	沙特vs. 阿拉伯之春


PRINCETON – Saudi Arabia is widely perceived as leading the counter-revolution against the Arab Spring uprisings.	发自普林斯顿——沙特阿拉伯一直被广泛认为是反阿拉伯之春阵营的领头羊。


In reality, the Kingdom’s response is centered, as its foreign and domestic policy has long been, on “stability.”	实际上这个王国对整个事件的反应——正如其长期以来的对内对内外政策一样——都集中在“稳定”上。


The Saudis don’t want anti-Saudi forces, including such enemies as Iran and Al Qaeda, to increase their influence in the Middle East.	沙特人不希望那些包括伊朗和基地组织在内的反沙特力量能在中东地区发展壮大。


Some of the older Saudi leaders have seen this movie before.	其实有些沙特早期领导人早已见证过类似的一幕。


The nationalist revolutions of the 1950’s and 1960’s, inspired and galvanized by Gamel Nasser’s Egypt, nearly toppled the House of Saud.	1950~1960年代的沙特同样受到了埃及贾迈勒·纳赛尔运动的影响并爆发了民族主义革命，甚至差点推翻了沙特王室。


Nonetheless, today’s Saudi princes appear to recognize that something has genuinely changed in the Middle East: The younger generation of Arabs is no longer prepared to accept unaccountable, corrupt, and brutal governments.	即便如此，当今的沙特王子似乎也意识到中东地区已经发生了某些真正的变化：年轻一代阿拉伯人已不再愿意接纳那些不负责任，腐败和残暴的政府。


Saudi Arabia, a self-proclaimed bulwark of Islamic conservatism, where popular democracy has never been considered a legitimate form of rule, has been more aggressive in some arenas than in others.	沙特这个自认伊斯兰保守主义大本营且从未将人民民主视为统治合法性来源的国家，其实在某些领域比其他国家手段更为狠辣。


Domestically, the royal family struck quickly, adopting a ban on public demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.	在国内，其王室迅速出手颁布了禁止公开示威以及进行任何表达公民不服从行为的法令。


The Kingdom’s traditional interpretation of Islam construes political legitimacy in terms of a ruler’s proper application of Islamic law. In return, his subjects owe him obedience within the constraints of Sharia religious law.	长期以来沙特王国对统治合法性的传统解释取决于统治者是否正确实施了伊斯兰律法，而臣民则应当在伊斯兰教法的限制下服从其统治。


Dissent, should it arise, must always take the form of well-intentioned advice given to the ruler in a private setting.	任何人有出现了异议都必须出于善意的目的通过私下方式告知统治者。


Public demonstrations of dissent are regarded as contrary to Islam, because they foster divisiveness and lead to civil strife.	公开示威被视为是反伊斯兰的，因为这些行为会引发分歧并导致民众冲突。


The highest council of Saudi religious scholars recently declared demonstrations to be categorically un-Islamic.	沙特最高乌里玛（宗教学者）委员会最近裁定示威行动是彻底的反伊斯兰行为。


Confronted with the possibility of mass demonstrations on March 11 – the so-called Day of Rage on a Facebook page – the Saudi rulers enforced that ruling by deploying massive numbers of security forces in the streets.	面对可能在3月11日——Facebook页面上所谓的“愤怒之日”——爆发的大规模示威，沙特统治者则用遍布大街小巷的保安人员来维护这一裁决。


They also played the Shia card, an effective trump in Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia.	他们同时也会利用什叶派因素——这一手在以逊尼派为主的沙特社会无往而不利。


The rulers argued that public protests throughout the region were being orchestrated by Shia Iran, and were anti-Sunni and sectarian.	统治者宣称蔓延整个中东地区的民众抗议活动都是什叶派伊朗幕后操纵的，而且是反逊尼派和号召实施世俗主义的。


The threat of chaos, evident now in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, also weighed in the royal family’s favor.	如今在利比亚，叙利亚和也门上演的动乱威胁也可以被王室利用。


The House of Saud has a long historical claim on rule in Arabia, and its promise of stability remains key to its durability.	历史以来沙特王室都自认是阿拉伯半岛的统治者，而对稳定的承诺也成为王室得以维持统治的关键因素。


A massive government subsidy package also accounted for domestic calm.	一揽子大规模政府补贴计划被用来安抚国内民众。


Abruptly, some $130 billion was added to spending projections over the next five years.	价值1300亿美元的支出项目被迅速列入未来五年的预算之中。


Salaries for all public servants, a majority of the national work force, were raised, as was the total number of public-sector jobs.	作为全国劳动力主力军的所有公务员都被加了工资，相关政府工作职位数量也有所增加。


King Abdullah pledged large numbers of new housing units, an important gesture in a country where young people, especially young married couples, cannot easily access the housing market.	阿卜杜拉国王承诺兴建大量新住宅，这对于一个年轻人尤其是年轻夫妇难以承担房价的国家来说堪称关键举措。


In neighboring Bahrain, the Saudis also moved quickly to bolster the Sunni-minority regime against a rising tide of protest led by the island kingdom’s Shia majority.	在邻国巴林，沙特人也迅速对这个由少数逊尼派统治的政权给予支持，以免它被这个岛国的什叶派民众示威所颠覆。


Saudi troops marched into Bahrain under the banner of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Saudi rulers issued clear instructions to adopt an iron-fisted policy with the demonstrators, again arguing that Iran’s nefarious hand was at play in subverting the country.	沙特军队以海湾合作委员会的名义进驻巴林，沙特统治者明确表示将对示威者采取铁腕手段，同时也不忘再次强调是伊朗的黑手在幕后捣乱。


No doubt, the Saudis believe that a Shia-led Bahrain would lead to Iranian dominance at their very doorstep.	毫无疑问，沙特人相信一个什叶派领导的巴林将意味着伊朗的影响力已经逼近自己家门口了。


Here, too, the Kingdom employed its policy of largesse through the GCC, promising Bahrain $10 billion over the next decade.	于是沙特王室通过海湾合作委员会的名义大撒金钱，承诺在未来十年内支援巴林100亿美元。


Other large-scale financial commitments were made to Oman and Jordan, both Saudi allies that have managed to silence early whispers of mass protest.	此外还对阿曼和约旦这两个成功扼杀了示威苗头的盟友许下类似的大规模经济承诺。


Farther away, in Libya and Syria, the Saudis have said little, perhaps to avoid picking the losing side in uncertain circumstances.	而沙特人对更遥远的利比亚和叙利亚却甚少发表意见，或许是害怕在局势不明朗时把宝押在了失败的一方身上。


The Kingdom has no love for Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, who tried to assassinate King Abdullah and has waged a concerted anti-Saudi propaganda campaign for at least a decade.	对于卡扎菲这个曾试图暗杀阿卜杜拉国王，甚至连续十多年资助反沙特宣传的利比亚领导人沙特王室可没什么好感。


The Saudis would surely like to see Qaddafi deposed, but they have no real stake in the Libyan uprising’s outcome.	沙特人当然希望卡扎菲下台，但他们跟利比亚起义的最终结果并无实际利害关系。


Closer to home, the Kingdom despises Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for his alliance with Iran and duplicity in Lebanon.	至于离本土更近的叙利亚，其总统巴沙尔·阿萨德因为与伊朗结盟并不断介入黎巴嫩内政而被沙特人所不齿。


But his fall would present the Saudis with the risk of a country led by the Muslim Brotherhood.	而他的下台对沙特人来说则意味着可能出现一个由穆斯林兄弟会领导的国家。


Even worse is the prospect of Syria falling into chaos, dragging Lebanon – and maybe the broader region – with it.	更糟糕的则是一旦叙利亚陷入混乱就会连累黎巴嫩——甚至扩散到更广大区域。


The Assad regime’s use of excessive force, especially the deliberate killing of thousands of mainly Sunni civilians, has nonetheless recently spurred a tougher stance.	阿萨德政府滥用武力，尤其是故意屠杀数千名(主要为逊尼派)平民的行���，已经在叙利亚和沙特特两国之间造成了强硬对立。


King Abdullah has called the killings unacceptable, and has withdrawn his ambassador from Damascus.	阿卜杜拉国王指出这种杀戮行为是无法接受的，并因此召回了驻叙利亚大使。


The actual policy implications, however, remain to be determined.	但实际上的政策影响依然是未知之数。


Neighboring Yemen is a much more immediate threat.	而临近的也门则是个更加迫切的威胁。


The opposition is hopelessly divided, and the tribal and military leadership is utterly compromised.	其国内反对派软弱无能，自己内部先发生了分裂，而各部族和军队领袖已先后与统治者妥协。


Ominously, the south is being taken over by hardcore Islamists, some allied with Al Qaeda.	但不利的则是其南部地区已经落入了死硬派伊斯兰极端分子之手，其中一些还与基地组织有往来。


Throwing money around won’t work in Yemen, which is too large and complex to be pacified.	金钱政策在也门行不通，因为这个国家太大也太复杂，极为难以安抚。


In fact, the country is on the verge of total collapse.	事实上这个国家已经在完全崩溃的边缘。


Today, the Saudis see 24 million Yemenis – hungry, heavily armed, and envious of Saudi wealth – looking across the border.	事到如今在沙特人眼中，这2400万饥肠辘辘，武装到牙齿，且对沙特财富垂涎不已的也门人对自己觊觎已久。


If civil war erupts, the Saudis will not be able to stop the waves of refugees.	一旦也门内战爆发，沙特很快就会被难民潮所吞没。


But the Kingdom remains paralyzed, still wavering on whether to allow President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is convalescing in Riyadh from injuries sustained in a bomb attack, to return to Sana to resume his rule.	但这个王国却依然无动于衷，犹豫于是否让遭到炸弹袭击而在利雅得就医的也门总统阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫回国恢复统治。


For all of their wealth and planning, the Saudis remain vulnerable to the turmoil surrounding them.	虽然拥有财富和权谋，但沙特人在周边这场混乱面前依然极端脆弱。


At home, the legacy of Saudi family rule, fear of chaos, increased public spending, and abundant security forces have produced calm.	在国内，王室统治的余威，对混乱的恐惧，增加的支出以及大量的安保力量维持了局势的稳定。


But a modest political opening and economic diversification away from state-owned industry have been sacrificed.	但一个温和的政治开放政策以及除国有产业之外的经济体制多样化则因此止步不前。


In Bahrain, things are quiet now as well, but the chances of further radicalization of the country’s Shia majority have increased, possibly benefiting Iran in the long run.	在巴林，局势也很平静，但占该国人口大多数的什叶派民众进一步极端化的可能性不断增加，而最终得益的很可能是伊朗。


Great change is coming to the Middle East.	一场大变革正在降临中东。


It is far from clear that a Saudi policy of stability at all costs will strengthen the regime.	而沙特不惜一切代价维稳的政策是否能强化其统治，则是未知之数。


Saudi Arabia’s Shock Therapy	沙特阿拉伯的休克疗法


BEIRUT – Saudi Arabia has long relied on oil to fuel its economic growth and development.	贝鲁特——沙特阿拉伯长期以来依赖石油资源来推动国内经济增长和发展。


Last year, oil accounted for about three-quarters of the Kingdom’s total export revenues and around 90% of government revenue.	去年，石油占王国出口总收入的3/4和大约90%的政府收入。


But the recent collapse in oil prices highlighted what should long have been clear: Saudi Arabia, like the other oil and gas rich nations of the Middle East, needs a more diverse development model.	但近期油价崩盘再次凸显了长期以来已经非常明确的事实：沙特阿拉伯像中东其他石油天然气富集的国家一样，需要更加多样化的发展模式。


Since oil prices began to drop in mid-2014, Saudi Arabia has experienced a sharp decline in GDP growth, as well as lower liquidity and credit growth.	从2014年中石油价格开始下降后，沙特阿拉伯经历了GDP增长急剧下滑、以及流动性及信贷增长下降的阶段。


Fiscal and current-account surpluses were transformed into deficits.	财政和经常账户盈余转变为赤字。


This year, the two deficits are expected to reach 13% and 6.4% of GDP, respectively.	今年，这两项赤字 预计分别将达到GDP的13%和6. 4%。


Moreover, despite past growth, the Kingdom’s real national wealth has declined.	此外，尽管有过去的经济增长，但王国真实的国民财富仍呈下降之势。


Oil revenues, as is the case elsewhere in the region, were not efficiently transformed into human capital, infrastructure, and the innovative capacity needed to generate productivity growth and diversify economic activity.	石油收入像该地区其他国家一样，并未被有效地转化为人力资本、基础设施和推动生产力增长及多样化经济行为所需的创新能力。


So, beyond adjusting to the “new normal” in oil prices, Saudi Arabia must design a radically new economic model that addresses structural impediments to productivity and growth.	因此，除适应油价“新常态”外，沙特阿拉伯必须设计一套能扫除生产力和经济增长结构性障碍的全新经济模式。


It is a tall order, one that most governments would pursue gradually.	这是一项艰巨的任务，多数政府都会采取循序渐进的策略。


But Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s National Transformation Program (NTP), announced last June, suggests that Saudi Arabia will take the opposite approach, subjecting the economy to a kind of shock therapy.	但去年6月公布的王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼的国家转型计划（NTP）显示沙特阿拉伯将采取相反的方法，即用某种休克疗法来治疗经济。


In a 110-page list of policies and targets for ministries and governmental bodies to pursue in 2016-2020, the NTP identifies 543 specific reforms, with a price tag of SAR270 billion ($72 billion), excluding adjustment costs by the private sector.	在一份长达110页的部委及政府机构2016到2020年政策目标名单中，国家转型计划明确包括543项具体的改革，总耗资为2700亿沙特里亚尔（约合720亿美元），这还不包括私营部门的调整成本。


And, in fact, the crux of the proposed reforms is to expand the private sector’s role in the state-dominated economy, thereby creating more employment in higher-productivity areas.	而且事实上，拟议改革的关键问题是要拓展私营部门在国家主导经济中的作用，从而在高生产率领域创造出更多的就业机会。


Financing the reforms – not to mention a massive $2 trillion public investment fund to support a post-oil economy – will require improved efficiency, rapid privatization, effective public-private partnerships, broad-based taxation (including a value-added tax of 5%, to be introduced in 2018), and spending cuts on existing infrastructure projects.	为改革进程融资——更不要说筹集高达2万亿规模的公共投资资金以支持后石油时期经济——将需要提高工作效率、实现快速私有化、建立有效的公私伙伴关系、采纳基础广泛的税收制度（包括将于2018年开始实行的5%的增值税），以及削减现有基础设施的项目开支。


All of this will need to be achieved efficiently, in order to facilitate the government’s other key goal: a balanced budget by 2020.	所有这些目标都必须有效地实现，才能推动政府其他的关键目标：到2020年实现预算平衡。


The specific policy targets are tremendously ambitious.	具体的政策目标表现出非凡的雄心。


Saudi leaders will first partly privatize the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco), and establish the investment fund.	沙特领导人将首次部分私有化沙特阿拉伯国家石油公司（沙特阿美公司），并同时设立投资基金。


They will also gradually reduce energy subsidies, in order to promote a shift away from energy-intensive activities.	他们还将逐步减少能源补贴，目的是逐步促成摆脱能源密集活动的转型。


The plan includes specific targets to increase the contributions of real estate, information technology, services, tourism, and the defense and pharmaceutical industries to GDP.	计划包括增加房地产、信息技术、服务、旅游、国防和制药行业对GDP贡献的一系列具体目标。


If the NTP is to deliver greater economic diversification, Saudi Arabia will need to harness high value-added, export-led growth and, eventually, greater regional and international integration.	如果国家转型计划想要实现更大程度的经济多元化，沙特阿拉伯有必要利用出口导向的高附加值增长，并最终实现更深层次的地区和国际融合。


The program lays the necessary groundwork with plans to reform education to promote innovation and meet the needs of a changing labor market.	该计划为改革教育推动创新和满足劳动力市场不断变化的需求奠定了必要的基础。


Specifically, the NTP includes plans to achieve a 15% increase in mathematics and English-language attainment levels within five years, to be followed by an increasing focus on “STEM” subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics).	具体而言，国家转型计划包括在五年内实现数学及英语水平提升15%的相关计划，之后逐步强化对“STEM”学科的重视（包括科学、技术、工程和数学）。


The NTP also aims to increase female labor-force participation, from 22% today to 28% by 2020.	国家转型计划同样旨在提高女性对劳动力的参与，从今天的22%提高到2030年占劳动力总量28%的比率。


That, together with improved support and opportunities for the fast-growing population of young people, should reduce the unemployment rate from 11.6% to 9% in the next five years.	上述举措再加上为快速增长的青年人口更好地提供支持和机遇一道，理应在未来五年内将失业率从11. 6%降到9%。


From subsidy cuts to a lower public-sector wage bill, the NTP reforms effectively represent a new social contract for the Kingdom.	从削减补贴到降低公共部门工资法案，国家转型计划改革有效地体现了王国新的社会契约。


The plan is thus a kind of “long march,” requiring effective public-private cooperation, broad public buy-in, and an explicit communication strategy to implement deep economic restructuring supported by fiscal and other macro-policy reforms.	因此该计划意味着某种“长征”，需要有效的公司合作、广泛的公众入股以及明确的沟通政策以落实财政和其他宏观政策改革所支持的深层次经济重组。


There is some precedent for this strategy: the oil-rich countries of Norway, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mexico have all diversified their economies.	同样的策略存在某些先例：挪威、马来西亚、印度尼西亚和墨西哥等石油资源丰富的国家均已实现了多元化经济。


But the external context in which those countries reformed – characterized by surging globalization and rapid growth – was very different from that prevailing today.	但上述国家改革的外部环境是以全球化激增和快速经济增长为特色——与今天的普遍环境存在很大的差别。


And the transformations still took up to 20 years.	而且这些国家仍然花费了二十年的时间来完成转型。


The implementation of the NTP, by contrast, will be a race against time and a fight against the external headwinds of low oil prices, a weaker global economy, and retreat from globalization.	相比之下，国家转型计划的实施将意味着与时间赛跑，需要顶住低油价、全球经济疲软和全球化后退等来自外部的压力。


Moreover, short-term domestic growth is likely to be stifled by policy uncertainty, fiscal consolidation, the immediate impact of reforms, and the needed reversal of the country’s monetary- and fiscal-policy stances, from pro- to counter-cyclical.	此外，短期国内经济增长很可能受到政策不确定性、财政整顿和改革的直接影响，还需要王国的货币及财政政策立场从支持转变为反对周期。


Whether Saudi Arabia can meet these challenges remains uncertain.	沙特阿拉伯能否应对这样的挑战仍属未知。


Success will depend, for example, on the economy’s absorptive capacity and the government’s institutional competence.	成功将取决于经济的吸收能力和政府的制度潜力。


It will also depend on the country’s ability to galvanize the energies and ambitions of impatient young Saudis and unleash private investors’ “animal spirits.”	此外还取决于该国能否刺激焦躁的沙特年轻人焕发能量和志向，同时激发私人投资者的“动物精神”。


To succeed, Saudi Arabia will have to take additional steps.	沙特阿拉伯需要采取其他举措才能取得成功。


It should liberalize the foreign direct investment regime, allowing 100% foreign ownership in select cases, attract and retain foreign talent through the proposed “green card” immigration policy, and promote openness and tourism through an “open skies” policy.	它应当放开外商直投制度，允许特定情况下100%的外资所有权，通过拟议中的“绿卡”等移民政策吸引并留住国外人才，并通过“开放天空政策”推动开放和旅游业的发展。


Moreover, domestic capital markets are needed for financing infrastructure and government deficits.	此外，还需要国内资本市场为基础设施和政府赤字融资。


And the country should embrace the disruptive power of financial technology and establish a second-tier stock exchange, which would advance financial inclusion and facilitate access to finance for dynamic small and medium-size firms.	同时该国应当接受金融技术的破坏力并设立二级证券交易所，从而促进金融融合并便利活跃的中小型企业实现融资。


As if these macro-reforms were not enough, the NTP will also require a gradual move to a civil law system for managing the economy and business.	就好像上述宏观改革仍然不够，国家转型计划还需要逐步过渡到民事法律系统来管理企业和经济。


And the new social contract will need to be accompanied by increased transparency and accountability from the public sector and greater public engagement.	而新的社会契约将需要增加公共部门透明度和问责制度，并吸引更广泛的公众参与。


The NTP embodies the Saudi leadership’s awareness of the challenges it faces – and its willingness to tackle them.	国家转型计划体现沙特领导层已经意识到所面临的挑战——并愿意解决这些问题。


But the only certainty is that there will be many a slip twixt the cup and the lip on the long road to Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation.	但可以肯定在沙特阿拉伯经济转型的漫漫长路上很多困难仍会阻碍转型任务的完成。


Savable Africa	可拯救的非洲


The G-8 Summit in Scotland in early July will bring together the political leaders of the richest countries to consider the plight of the poorest countries.	将于7月初在苏格兰召开的G8峰会上，世界上最富有的国家的政治领袖们将汇聚一堂商讨最穷的国家的困境。


So far, President George W. Bush has resisted Prime Minister Tony Blair’s call for a doubling of aid to Africa by 2010.	到目前为止，布什总统一直抵制着布莱尔首相关于在2010年将对非洲的援助增加一倍的呼吁。


This is a tragic mistake, one that results from a misunderstanding of the challenges facing Africa and of America’s responsibilities.	这是一个悲剧性的错误，它源自对非洲面临的挑战和对美国自身责任的误解。


American policy is based overwhelmingly on the idea that Africa can lift itself out of extreme poverty through its own efforts, that aid is largely misused because of corruption, and that the United States already gives generous amounts.	美国（对非洲）的政策是建立在非洲能够通过自身的努力摆脱极端贫困状态，由于腐败使大部分援助被滥用，以及美国已经提供了数额慷慨的援助等根深蒂固的理念之上的。 但这些理念都是错误的：非洲陷入了贫困之中；


This is wrong on all counts: Africa is trapped in poverty, many countries are well poised to use aid effectively, and America’s contribution is tiny relative to Africa’s needs, America’s promises, and America’s wealth.	许多国家都具备有效使用援助的条件； 较之于非洲的需求、美国的承诺和富裕程度，美国的贡献是微不足道的。


Africa suffers simultaneously from three challenges that trap it in poverty. First, Africa does not grow enough food.	非洲同时面临着使其陷入贫困不能自拔的三大挑战：首先，非洲不能生产足够的粮食。


Unlike Asia, Africa did not have a Green Revolution in food production.	与亚洲不同，非洲不曾有过粮食领域的“绿色革命”。


In 1965, India averaged 854 kilograms of grain per hectare in use, while Sub-Saharan Africa averaged almost the same, 773 kilograms per hectare.	1965年，印度每公顷可用农田的平均粮食产量是854公斤，撒哈拉以南的非洲地区的产量与之相当，每公顷773公斤。


But, by 2000, India was producing 2,293 kilograms per hectare, while Africa was producing only 1,118.	但到了2000年，印度每公顷的平均粮食产量达到了2293公斤，而非洲同比却只有1118公斤。


Second, Africa suffers from disease unlike any other part of the world.	其次，非洲疾病肆虐的情况比世界其他地方都要严重。


Africa’s AIDS pandemic is well known; its malaria pandemic, which will claim three million lives and a billion illnesses this year, is not.	非洲的艾滋病流行是世人皆知的； 而今年会夺去300万人生命，造成10亿粒病患的疟疾却不是。


India controlled malaria after the 1960’s, while Africa did not, one reason being that Africa’s malaria-bearing mosquitoes are particularly adept at transmitting the disease.	在1960年代以后，印度就控制了疟疾，而非洲却没有，其中很重要的一个原因就是非洲携带疟原虫的蚊子传播这种疾病的能力极强。


Third, Africa is economically isolated, owing to very poor infrastructure, large over-land distances, and many landlocked countries.	再次，由于基础设施落后，地域广懋和众多交通不便的内陆国家，非洲在经济上是孤立的。


These geographical barriers keep much of Africa, especially rural Africa, out of the mainstream of international trade.	这些地理障碍使非洲的许多地区，特别是农村地区，被排除在主流的国际贸易之外。


Without the benefits of trade, much of rural Africa struggles at subsistence levels.	由于未能从贸易中受惠，非洲的广大农村还在温饱线上挣扎。


Bush might think that America is doing a lot to help overcome these problems, but the truth is that US aid is minimal.	布什可能认为美国在帮助非洲克服这些困难方面正不遗余力，而事实是，美国的援助是最低限度的。


Blair’s Africa Commission, as well as the UN Millennium Project, found that Africa needs about $50 billion per year in aid by 2010.	布莱尔的“非洲委员会”和联合国“千年项目”认为到2010年，非洲每年需要援助约500亿美元。


America’s fair share of the total is about $15 billion per year.	美国在其中的总份额约为每年150亿美元。


Yet official US aid to Africa is only $3 billion per year, and much of that covers salaries for American consultants rather than investments in Africa’s needs.	然而，美国对非洲的官方援助仅为每年30亿美元，而其中的大部分被用来支付美国顾问们的薪酬而不是投资于非洲的需要。


This tragically small sum amounts to just three cents for every $100 of US gross national product, which is less than two days of US military spending.	这笔微不足道的资金只相当于每100美元美国国内生产总值中的3美分。 美国军方两天的开销也超过这一数目。


Not only is US aid a tiny fraction of what it should be, but American explanations for the lack of aid are wrong.	不仅美国的援助是杯水车薪，其对援助不足的解释也是站不住脚的。


Bush and others imply that Africa wastes the aid through corruption.	布什及其他一些人暗示非洲的腐败使很多援助被浪费。


But impoverished and slow-growing African countries like Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, and Malawi are ranked as having less corruption than fast-growing Asian countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.	然而，如加纳、塞内加尔、马里、贝宁和马拉维等经济增长缓慢的非洲穷国的腐败程度却要好于越南、孟加拉国和印度尼西亚等快速发展的亚洲国家。


Indeed, America’s own Millennium Challenge Account has already recognized such African countries for their strong governance.	的确，美国自己的“世纪挑战账户”也已经认可了上述非洲国家健康的治理。


Good governance surely will help in Africa and elsewhere, but corruption should not be used as an excuse not to help Africa.	良好的治理当然会使非洲及其他地方获益匪浅，但腐败也不能成为不给予非洲援助的借口。


On hunger, the key is to help Africa achieve its own Green Revolution.	在解决饥饿方面，关键是帮助非洲实现自身的“绿色革命”。


Rich countries should help African farmers use improved seed varieties, more fertilizer, and better water management, such as small-scale irrigation.	富国应该帮助非洲农民使用更多改良的种子，更多的肥料和进行更好的水资源管理（如小规模的灌溉系统）。


The techniques are known, but Africa’s farmers are too poor to get started.	技术是现成的，但非洲的农民却往往因为贫穷而无力负担。


With increased help to African farmers to grow more food (as opposed to shipping food aid from the US), it would be possible to double or even triple crop yields.	随着对非洲农民粮食生产的援助的增加（而不是把美国的粮食运到非洲），粮食产量可能会提高两倍甚至三倍。


On disease, malaria could be controlled by 2008 using proven, low-cost methods.	在疾病方面，使用已被证明有效的低成本方法，疟疾有望在2008年得到控制。


But, again, Africa cannot afford them.	然而，问题依然是非洲负担不起。


The first goal should be to distribute long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets to all of Africa’s rural poor within four years.	首要的目标应该是在4年内将长效的、经过杀虫剂处理的蚊帐发放到非洲农村的贫困家庭。


The best estimates show that Africa needs about 300 million bed nets, and that the cost per net (including shipping) is around $10, for a sum of $3 billion.	最精确的估计显示非洲需要约3亿顶蚊帐，每顶蚊帐的成本（包括运费）约合10美金，总共约需要30亿美金。


This cost would be spread over several years.	这一成本会��摊到若干年。


In addition, Africa needs help with anti-malaria medicines, diagnostic equipment, and training of community health workers.	另外，非洲还需要在抗疟疾药物，诊断设备和社区保健人员培训方面得到帮助。


On economic isolation, Africa needs help with the basics – roads and ports – but there is also an opportunity to “leapfrog” technology.	在经济孤立方面，非洲需要得到最基本的帮助—公路和港口—但也有采用“跨越式”技术的机会。


Cell phones and Internet connectivity could reach all of Africa at low cost, ending the economic isolation of hundreds of millions of people.	移动电话和因特网联接能够以低成本在非洲普及，从而结束亿万非洲人的经济孤立状态。


Some reasonable estimates put the cost at around $1 billion for an Africa-wide fiber-optic network that could bring Internet connectivity and telephone service across the continent’s villages and cities.	一些合理的估计显示建设一个全非洲范围的光纤通信网的成本约为10亿美金。 而这就能将因特网和电话服务引入到非洲大陆上的所有城市和乡村。


Africa is ready to break out of poverty if the US and other rich countries help.	如果美国和其他富国施以缓手，非洲是能够摆脱贫困的。


Europe appears poised to do more, while the US appears to be the main obstacle.	欧洲似乎准备在这方面更努力，而美国却似乎成为主要的障碍。


The G-8 Summit provides an opportunity for the US, which will spend $500 billion on its military this year, to make a lasting – and certainly more cost-effective – contribution to global security by saving millions of lives in Africa and helping its people escape extreme poverty.	G8峰会为美国，这个今年军费开支将达到5000亿美元的国家，提供了一个机会为全球安全作出持久—当然也是更具有成本效益的—贡献。 其方式就是拯救非洲成千上万的生命并帮助那里的人们摆脱极端的贫困。


Saved by Taxes	税收救世


What do we owe to our great-great-great-grandchildren?	我们究竟亏欠我们的千秋万代什么？


What actions are we obligated to take now in order to diminish the risks to our descendants and our planet from the increasing likelihood of global warming and climate change?	我们应该采取什么样的行动才能降低我们的后代和这个星球将来所要面临的来自于全球变暖和气候变化的风险？


Almost everyone – except the likes of ExxonMobil, US Vice President Dick Cheney, and their paid servants and deluded acolytes – understands that when humans burn hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide goes into the atmosphere, where it acts like a giant blanket, absorbing infrared radiation coming up from below and warming the earth.	几乎每一个人—除了埃克森美孚和美国副总统切尼之流和他们御用的、备受蛊惑的奴仆—都明白当人类燃烧碳氢化合物时，二氧化碳就散发到空气中，形成一张巨氅，并吸收来自地面的红外辐射从而使地球变暖。


Likewise, almost everyone understands that while global warming might be a much smaller or larger problem than existing models suggest, this uncertainty is no excuse for inaction.	同样，几乎所有的人都明白虽然全球变暖可能是一个比现有模型所展示的更大或更小的问题，但这种不确定性并不是无所作为的借口。


In fact, uncertainty about global climate change should lead us to do more to guard against it than if we knew it would proceed exactly according to the central-case projections.	实际上，关于全球气候变化的不确定性应该促使我们对它比对主流的预测更加保持警惕。


Finally, almost everyone agrees that governments, non-profit institutions, and energy companies should be spending far more to develop technologies that generate non-carbon-emitting power, that remove it from the atmosphere to forests or oceans, and that cool the earth by reflecting more of the sunlight that lands on it.	最后，几乎所有人都认为政府、非营利性机构和能源公司应该在开发产生非碳排放电能、将碳从空气中去除并转移到森林和海洋以及通过反射更多照射到地球上的阳光从而为其降温的技术方面投入更多。


Clearly, the world’s rich countries should carry the burden of dealing with climate change over the next generations.	很明显，世界上的富国应该承担应对未来世代气候变化的重担。


After all, they could take an easy, emissions-intensive path to industrialization and wealth.	毕竟，它们可以走一条容易的、排放密集型的道路实现工业化、聚敛财富。


Today, China, India, and other developing countries cannot, and it would be unfair to penalize them for that.	今天，中国、印度和其它发展中国家却不能，而为此惩罚它们则是不公平的。


So now is the time to build, not disrupt or impede, the international institutions that will manage our response to global climate change in the years ahead.	因此，现在就到了我们建设，而不是干扰和妨碍各种国际机构来管理我们对未来岁月里的全球气候变化的回应的时候了。


But should we be doing anything else now and in the next decade?	但是，我们还应该在目前和未来十年做其它的一些什么事情呢？


Economists like to think of things in terms of prices.	经济学家习惯以价格来考虑事情。


And when economists see behavior that has destructive side effects, we like to tax it.	当经济学家们看到某种行为有着破坏性的副作用时，就喜欢对其征税。


Taxation makes individuals feel in their wallets the destruction they are causing.	税收使个人通过钱包感受到他们正造成的破坏。


Imposing a tax on those who, say, drive low-mileage SUV’s is a way of harnessing humanity’s collective intelligence to decide when bad side effects are a reason to alter behavior.	比如，对那些驾驶低里程数SUV的人征税就是利用人类的集体智慧来决定何时不良的副作用会成为我们改变行为的原因。


But it has to be the right tax.	但这样的税收必须是恰当的。


An SUV going ten miles in the city and burning a gallon of gasoline pumps about three kilograms of carbon into the atmosphere.	一辆在城市里行驶十英里的SUV会燃烧一加仑的汽油并向空气中排放约三公克的碳。


Should the extra “global warming” tax be $0.05 a gallon, $0.50 a gallon, or $1.50 a gallon?	那么额外的“全球变暖”税到底应该是0. 05美金、0.


Our views will change as we learn more, but at the moment the size of the tax hinges on a question of moral philosophy: how much do we believe we owe our distant descendents?	5美金一加仑呢？ 我们的观点会随着我们认知的加深而变化，但现在该税收的额度是基于一个道德问题：我们自认为究竟亏欠我们的子孙后代多少钱呢？


The Australian economist John Quiggin has an illuminating discussion on his website ( http://johnquiggin.com ) that comes down on the side of a $0.50/gallon tax, because he projects that spending today to reduce carbon emissions is a good investment for the future.	澳大利亚经济学家John Quiggin在他的网站上 （http://johnquiggin. com ）有一段令人耳目一新的探讨，其结论是将税额定为每加仑0.


Assuming that annual per capita income grows at about 2% per year worldwide, a marginal expenditure of roughly $70 today to cut carbon emissions would be worth it if, accounting for damage from global warming and adjustment costs, the world of 2100 would be $500 richer in year-2006 purchasing power.	5美金，因为他预测今天在减少碳排放方面的支出是着眼未来的一笔好的投资。 假设全球人均收入年增长率为2%，如果以2006年的购买力计算，2100年的世界比现在要富500美金，那么我们今天的一笔用于减少碳排放的约70美金的支出就非常明智。


On the other hand, critics point out that the world today is poor: average annual GDP per capita at purchasing power parity is roughly $7,000.	而另一方面，批评家们指出今天的世界是贫穷的：年平均人均GDP按购买力平价是约7000美金。


We expect improved technology and its spread to make the world of 2100, at a 2% annual growth rate, much richer: $50,000 per capita of year-2006 purchasing power.	我们期望技术的进步及其扩展以2%的年增长率使2100年的世界比现在富裕得多：以2006年的购买力计算达到5万美金。


So the critics argue that we need the marginal $70 per capita today much more than the richer people of 2100 will need the $500 that they would gain from being spared the effects of global climate change.	因此，批评家们认为比起2100年更为富裕的人们对于未受全球气候变化影响而获得的500美金的需求度而言，今天的我们更需要这人均70美金。


But what the critics often don’t say is that the same logic applies to the world today.	但批评家们常常不会言明的是，同样的逻辑也适用于当今世界。


Average annual per capita incomes in the US, Japan, and Western Europe are currently around $40,000, and less than $6,000 for the poorer half of the world’s population.	美国、日本和西欧的人均年收入约4万美金，而世界上另一半较贫穷的人口的人均年收入则少于6000美金。


The same logic that says we need our $70 more than the people of 2100 need an extra $500 dictates that we should tax the world’s rich more, as long as each extra $500 in first-world taxes generates as little as an extra $70 in poor countries per capita incomes.	那么，说我们今天对70美金的需求度大于2100年的人们对500美金额外收入的需求度的这一逻辑就意味着只要向第一世界征收的每一笔500美金的额外税收都能为穷国增加至少70美金的人均收入，那么我们就应该对世界上的富国征收更多的税。


In short, if the world’s rich are stingy today toward our much richer descendants, and if we want to leave our environmental mess to them to deal with, we should be lavish toward the world’s poor.	简言之，如果世界上的富人对比我们富裕得多的子孙后代表现吝啬，并且如果我们想要让他们来为我们留下的环境烂摊子买单，我们就应该对世界上的穷人出手阔绰一点。


Likewise, if we are stingy today toward the world’s poor, we should be lavish toward our descendents.	同理，如果我们对��今世界上的穷人吝啬，那么就应该对我们的子孙后代大方。


At least, that is what we should do, if our actions are based on some moral principle, rather than that of Leonid Brezhnev: what we have, we hold.	至少，如果我们的行动是基于某些道德原则，那么这就是我们应该做的，而不是像Leonid Brezhnev所说的：我们要守住我们拥有的一切。


Save our Soils	拯救我们的土壤


BERLIN – The United Nations has declared 2015 to be the International Year of Soils, and April 19-23 marks this year’s Global Soil Week.	柏林—联合国宣布2015年为国际土壤年，4月19—23日将是今年的全球土壤周。


Such events, though not exactly glamorous, do not receive nearly the amount of attention they deserve.	这些活动也许并不十分令人着迷，但它们收获的关注与应有的不符。


Intact soils are an invaluable and irreplaceable resource, one that performs myriad functions in achieving the international community’s main development and environmental goals.	完好的土壤是不可替代的无价资源，对于实现国际社会的主要发展和环境目标起着无比巨大的作用。


And now they are in urgent need of protection.	如今，它们急需保护。


Healthy soils are crucial to human nutrition and the fight against hunger.	健康的土壤对于人类营养和战胜饥饿至关重要。


We rely on them not only for food production, but also to create new drinking water.	我们不但仰仗土壤提供食品产品，也仰仗土壤制造新的饮用水。


They help to regulate Earth’s climate, storing more carbon than all of the world’s forests combined (only the oceans are a larger carbon sink), and are essential to maintaining biodiversity: a handful of fertile soil contains more microorganisms than there are humans on the planet.	土壤有助于改变地球气候，它们所储藏的碳比世界森林之和还要多（在固碳方面，土壤的作用仅次于海洋），它们还是保持生物多样性的关键：一小撮肥沃的土壤所包含的微生物数量比地球人口还要多。


Two-thirds of Earth’s species live beneath its surface.	三分之二的地球物种生活在地表之下。


But erosion and contamination are placing soils under severe stress.	但侵蚀和污染正在给土壤造成严重压力。


Worldwide, 24 billion tons of fertile soil is lost annually, partly owing to the growth of cities and infrastructure.	从全球看，每年要损失240亿吨肥沃土壤，部分是拜城市和基础设施增长所赐。


In Germany alone, construction projects claim an average of more than 75 hectares per day.	光是在德国，建筑工程平均每天就要消耗75英亩土壤。


Inappropriate agricultural practices are also to blame: the liberal use of synthetic fertilizer, for example, decimates organisms inhabiting the soil and changes its structure.	不恰当的农业行为也是侵蚀和污染的来源：比如，大量使用合成肥料大量杀害存在于土壤中的生物，改变土壤的结构。


It takes millennia for fertile topsoil to form; in many places, a cloudburst is now all it takes to wash it away.	肥沃表层土的形成需要几千年，但在许多清下中，只要一场大暴雨就能把它们冲刷干净。


At the same time, global demand for food, fodder, and biomass for fuels is growing, in turn driving up the value of land – a fact that has not escaped international investors’ attention.	与此同时，对粮食、饲料和燃料生物质的全球需求在不断增加，这反过来推高了土地的价值——这一事实从未逃脱国际投资者的目光。


According to a World Bank estimate, 10-30% of arable land worldwide – land that would be used by millions of smallholders, pastoralists, and indigenous people – has been affected by large-scale investment.	根据世界银行的估计，全球10—30%的适耕土地——被数百万佃农、牧民和原住民使用的土地——受到了大规模投资影响。


The struggle to secure land rights for individuals and communities has thus become a matter of survival in much of the world.	因此，在世界大部，保护个人和社区地权的斗争事关生死。


Access to land is one of the key determinants of hunger, and it is even more unequally distributed than income.	能否获得土地是饥饿的关键决定因素之一，而土地的分配比收入还要不平等。


Some 20% of households affected by hunger are landless, and 50% of food-stressed households are smallholder families.	大约20%的受饥饿影响的家庭没有土地，50%的存在食品压力的家庭是佃农家庭。


In Europe, we have long since outgrown our domestic agricultural land, so now we “import” it on a grand scale from the global South.	在欧洲，人口数量早已超出了本地农业用地，因此如今我们大量从南方国家“进口”农业用地。


Just producing the fodder needed to cover the European Union’s meat consumption requires an area of agricultural land in Brazil the size of the United Kingdom.	光是为满足欧盟肉类消费所需要的饲料，就需要在巴西用相当于英国大小的农业用地���产。


If every human ate as much meat as the average EU citizen, 80% of the world’s arable land would have to be dedicated to producing it, compared to 33% currently.	如果所有人都吃掉欧盟公民平均水平的肉食，那么80%的世界适耕土地都得用来生产饲料，而目前的比例为33%。


And let us be clear: given that 100 calories of fodder produce at most 30 calories of meat, using fertile land for this purpose is sheer waste.	我们得弄清楚一点：100卡路里饲料最多只能生产30卡路里肉类，因此将肥沃土地用于这一目的是巨大的浪费。


This trend will be exacerbated to the extent that the “green growth” that many governments are promising relies on biofuels to replace fossil fuels like oil and coal.	这一趋势还会加剧，因为许多政府所承诺的“绿色增长”需要依靠生物燃料取代石油和煤炭等化石燃料。


Biofuels do not benefit the climate nearly as much as wind or solar energy systems, yielding only one-tenth the energy per square meter.	生物燃料对气候的好处不如风能或太阳能系统，每平方米只能产生相当于后两者的十分之一的能源。


As a result, the biofuel requirements contained in the EU’s 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy would need a further 70 million hectares of land – an area larger than France.	结果，欧盟2030年气候和能源框架所需要的生物燃料得增加7,000万英亩土地才能生产出来——比法国的面积还要大。


Protecting soils need not undermine prosperity.	保护土壤并不一定会影响繁荣。


On the contrary, sustainable soil-protection practices can actually boost agricultural yields – especially those of smallholders.	相反，可持续土壤保护行动实际上可以增加农业产量——特别是佃农的产量。


Crop diversification, recycling, and soil cover can all contribute to living, fertile, and active soil capable of optimal water management.	作物多样化、回收利用和土壤恢复都有助于可实施最优水管理的、适合生物生存的肥沃、活跃的土壤。


One approach, so-called agro-ecology, is based on small farmers’ traditional knowledge and experience, making it readily adaptable to local conditions.	有一种所谓的农业生态法，它基于小农的传统知识和经验，因此可以适应地方条件。


A study of agro-ecological farming practices by Jules Pretty in 2006 examined 286 sustainable agricultural projects in 57 countries and concluded that yields had increased an average of 79%.	2006年朱尔斯·普雷迪（Jules Pretty）所做的农业生态实践研究考察了57个国家的286个可持续农业项目，结论是产量平均提高了79%。


Despite the proven success of such methods, the use of synthetic fertilizers has increased by a factor of more than five over the past 50 years, and many African governments spend up to 60% of their agricultural budgets to subsidize them.	尽管这些方法已经证明是成功的，但合成肥料的使用在过去50年里仍增加了五倍有余，而许多非洲国家政府将多达60%的农业预算用于合成肥料补贴。


Particularly in tropical environments, such products lead to the destruction of the topsoil and biodiversity loss (and the runoff is transported to the oceans, where it damages marine ecosystems).	特别是在热带环境中，合成肥料会导致表层土壤退化和生物多样性丧失（并且水土流失会进入海洋，危害海洋生物系统）。


And, though their main component, nitrogen, could be produced biologically and sustainably, that would run counter to the interests of a handful of powerful fertilizer producers and distributors.	此外，尽管合成肥料的主要成分——氮可以用生物方法可持续地生产，但这种生产方法不利于一小撮权势肥料生产商和分销商的利益。


Policymakers must address the following question: How can poor people produce enough food to escape hunger and destitution in a manner that protects soils, mitigates climate change, and preserves biodiversity?	决策者必须解决以下问题：穷人如何生产足够的粮食摆脱饥饿和贫困，同时又能保护土壤、减轻气候变化并保护生物多样性？


Despite the issue’s urgency, approaches like agro-ecological production are not being promoted to any serious extent anywhere.	尽管这一问题十分紧迫，但生态农业生产等方法在所有地区都没有得到积极推进。


Events like the International Year of Soils and Global Soil Week offer an opportunity to change that – from the ground up.	国际土壤年和全球土壤周等活动提供了一个彻底改变这一局面的机会。


Saving Europe By Reversing Brexit	用逆转英国退欧拯救欧洲


LONDON – “Never let a crisis go to waste” has always been one of the European Union’s guiding principles.	伦敦—“决不让危机浪费了”这一直是欧盟指导原则之一。


But what about five simultaneous crises?	但如果五场危机同时发生呢？


Today, the EU faces what Frans Timmermans, European Commission Vice President, describes as a “multi-crisis”: Brexit, refugee flows, fiscal austerity, geopolitical threats from East and South, and “illiberal democracy” in central Europe.	如今，欧盟面临欧盟委员会副主席提默曼斯（Frans Timmermans）所说的“多重危机”：英国退欧、难民流入、财政紧缩、东部和南部地缘政治威胁，以及中欧“不自由的民主”。


Rather than wasting its crises, the EU could be laid to waste by them.	欧盟所面临的不是浪不浪费危机的问题，而是可能因危机而废的问题。


If so, Brexit will be the detonator for that demolition.	果真如此的话，英国退欧就是爆炸的引信。


By legitimizing the concept of an EU breakup, and thus turning a fantasy among political extremists into a realistic option of mainstream politics throughout Europe, Brexit threatens to trigger an irresistible disintegration process.	英国退欧导致欧盟解体的概念合法化，从而让政治极端分子的幻想转变为全欧洲主流政治的现实选项，它有可能引发不可逆转的解题过程。


It will also transform economics, by paralyzing the European Central Bank in the next euro crisis: while the ECB can always defeat market speculation, it is powerless against breakup pressures from voters.	它还有可能改变经济，让欧洲中央银行在下一次欧元危机中无可作为：欧洲央行总是能够击退市场投机，但对来自选民的解体压力毫无反抗之力。


The EU therefore urgently needs to put the genie of disintegration back in its bottle.	因此，欧盟急需将解体的精灵捉回瓶中。


That means persuading Britain to change its mind about Europe, which, according to conventional wisdom on both sides of the English Channel, is impossible.	这意味着说服英国改变对欧洲的看法，而根据英吉利海峡两岸的传统智慧，这是一个不可能的任务。


But many “impossible” things are happening in politics nowadays.	但如今，许多政治上的“不可能”都正在发生。


The referendum majority on June 23 was much narrower than that in Scotland’s 2014 independence referendum, or the negative votes on EU treaties in Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, all of which were subsequently reversed.	6月23日全民公投的多数优势远远不及2014年的苏格兰独立公投，也不如爱尔兰、丹麦和荷兰的欧盟条约公投，而以上这些公投结果后来都被逆转了。


More important, the 52% who voted for Brexit were sharply divided in their aims, with some prepared to accept economic sacrifice for a “hard Brexit” (total separation from Europe), and others hoping for a “soft Brexit” that would minimize the impact on the UK economy.	更重要的是，在支持英国退欧的52%中，目标也存在巨大分歧，一些人准备接受“硬退欧”（与欧洲完全分离）的经济牺牲，其他人则希望“软退欧”，将英国经济所受影响最小化。


According to post-referendum polling, three-quarters of “Leave” voters expect Britain’s economy either to strengthen or to be unaffected by Brexit, and 80% believe the government will have more money to spend on public services as a result of their vote.	据公投后民调，四分之三的“退欧”支持者认为英国经济会因为退欧而得到强化或不受影响，80%认为他们的投票将让政府拥有更多的钱用于公共服务。


Brexit voters are so optimistic because they were told (most prominently by current Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson) that Britain could “have our cake and eat it” – a new deal that would preserve all of the economic benefits of EU membership with none of the obligations or costs.	退欧支持者如此乐观是因为有人告诉他们（主要是现任外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson））英国“能得到蛋糕并吃下去”——新的协议将保留所有欧盟成员资格的经济好处，而不必承担义务或成本。


When these expectations are disappointed, public opinion will change.	当这些期望落空时，民意也会改变。


Already, 66% of voters say maintaining market access is more important than restricting immigration, if Britain cannot have both.	目前，已有66% 的选民说，如果两者不可兼得，维持市场准入比限制移民更重要。


This directly contradicts Prime Minister Theresa May’s stated priorities – and probably explains why she refuses to talk about her Brexit strategy.	这与首相梅所提出的重点直接矛盾——也许也解释了为何她拒绝谈及她的退欧战略。


Because public expectations of an economically innocuous soft Brexit will be impossible to reconcile with the rejection of all EU obligations demanded by the Conservative Party’s “hard Brexit” faction, May cannot win.	公众所期待的对经济无害的软退欧与保守党“硬退欧”派所提出的拒绝一切欧盟义务的要求无法调和，因此梅不可能胜出。


Whichever course she chooses, she will antagonize half her party and a large proportion of Brexit supporters, not to mention the 48% of voters who want to stay in the EU.	不管她选择哪条路，都将让一半的党员和很大一部分退欧支持者不满，更不用说希望留在欧盟的48%选民了。


Once this backlash starts, plenty of ambitious Conservative politicians whom May purged from government will be eager to exploit it.	这一冲突一旦爆发，就会有大量被梅清洗出政府的野心勃勃的保守党政客竞相利用。


Already, George Osborne, immediately sacked as Chancellor of the Exchequer when May took office, has thrown down the gauntlet, challenging her democratic mandate: “Brexit won a majority.	目前，梅上任后立即被解职的财政大臣乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）已经向梅下了战书，质疑她的民主授权：“英国退欧赢得了多数。


Hard Brexit did not.”	硬退欧没有。


Even the weakness of Britain’s opposition parties works against May, allowing opponents to plot against her, secure in the knowledge that they cannot lose power.	”就连英国反对党的弱势也不利于梅，因为这意味着反对者可以暗中与梅作对，不必担心失去权力。


All this implies that British politics will become very fluid as economic conditions deteriorate and voters start to change their minds.	所有这些意味着，随着经济状况恶化、选民开始改变想法，英国政坛将变得波诡云谲。


The EU should encourage such second thoughts, which means that it must stop treating Brexit as inevitable and instead offer the possibility of a compromise that would meet British voters’ concerns, but only on the condition that Britain remains in the EU.	欧盟应该鼓励这样的反思，它意味着立即停止将英国退欧视为不可避免，转而提供打消英国选民顾虑的妥协的可能，但必须以英国留在欧盟为条件。


The obvious way to accomplish this would be to conclude an EU-wide agreement on greater national control over immigration and other symbolic issues related to national sovereignty.	完成这一目标的一个显而易见的方法是制定一份泛欧盟协定，授予国家更大的控制移民和其他与国家主权相关的象征性问题的权力。


Such an agreement need not be seen as a concession to British blackmail if it were extended to all EU countries and presented as a response to public opinion throughout the Union.	这一协定不必视为对英国“逼宫”的妥协，它可以扩大到全部欧盟国家，以应对欧盟整体民意的措施的面目出现。


By making a virtue of its response to democratic pressures, the EU could regain Europe-wide support.	通过如此应对民主压力，欧盟能够重新赢得泛欧洲支持。


But to send a positive message to voters, European leaders will have to rediscover the knack for pragmatic compromise and inter-governmental bargaining that used to be the hallmark of EU diplomacy.	但要向选民释放积极信号，欧洲领导人必须重新发现务实妥协和政府间讨价还价的诀窍，这曾经是欧盟外交的招牌式特征。


For starters, defusing both Brexit and the refugee crisis will require some modest changes in immigration and welfare rules.	首先，解决英国退欧和难民危机需要移民和福利规则方面的些许微调。


Such reforms, which would be popular in almost all member countries, need not conflict with the EU’s founding principles if they preserve the right to work throughout Europe, but return some control over non-economic migration and welfare payments to national governments.	这些改革在几乎所有成员国都将大受欢迎，而如果保留在全欧洲工作的权利而返还一定的控制非经济移民的权利和福利支出给国家政府，它们并不一定与欧盟立盟原则冲突。


Second, the interaction of the refugee and euro crises demands new fiscal rules.	其次，难民与欧元危机的互动意味着需要新财政规则。


Dealing with immigrants is expensive and should ideally be funded by mutually guaranteed EU bonds.	应对移民花费甚巨，在理想情况下，应该通过共同担保欧盟债券融资。


Alternatively, Mediterranean countries must be offered budgetary leeway, in exchange for assuming front-line responsibility for immigration controls.	或者，地中海国家必须获得预算豁免，作为交换，它们要承担移民控制的前线责任。


Third, the need for immigration reform, combined with “illiberal democracy” in Central Europe, calls for changes in EU spending priorities and foreign policy.	第三，移民改革的需要，加上中欧“不自由的民主”，意味着欧盟支出重点和外交政策需要改变。


Poland and other countries will accept restrictions on their citizens’ mobility only if offered additional structural funds and stronger security cooperation.	要让波兰和其他国家接受针对其国民的迁徙限制，必须向它们提供额外的结构性融资和加强安全合作。


Such incentives, in turn, could provide more levers to ensure respect for human rights.	这些激励反过来能够为确保尊重人权提供更大的力量。


Finally, restoring the EU’s democratic legitimacy means ending the institutional tensions between the eurozone and the broader EU.	最后，重塑欧盟民主合法性意味着结束欧元区和更广泛的欧盟之间的制度紧张。


The EU authorities must acknowledge that many member countries will never join the euro, which means abandoning their rhetoric about a “two-speed Europe,” with all heading – whether at high or low speed – toward the “ever closer union” that a single currency implies.	欧盟当局必须承认，许多成员国永远不会加入欧元区。 加入欧元区这意味着放弃它们的“两个速度的欧洲”论，让所有国家——不管是高速还是低速——一同走向单一货币所隐含的“日益紧密的联盟”。


Instead, the EU must reshape itself into two concentric circles: an inner core committed to deeper integration, and an outer ring whose voters have no interest in a single currency and a shared fiscal space.	相反，欧盟必须重组为两个核心圈：致力于加深一体化的内核，以及选民对单一货币和共同财政空间不感兴趣的外围。


Such reforms may seem impossible, but EU disintegration seemed impossible before the Brexit vote.	这些改革看上去不可能发生，但欧盟解体在英国退欧投票前看上去也不可能发生。


In revolutionary periods, the impossible can become inevitable in a matter of months.	在革命年代，不可能的事情在几个月之内就变得势在必行。


This week, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy called unexpectedly for a new European treaty and a second British referendum on its EU membership.	本周，法国前总统萨科齐出人意料地呼吁签订新欧洲合约、英国就其欧盟成员资格进行第二次公投。


In Europe, a revolutionary period has begun.	欧洲的革命年代才刚刚开始。


Save the Emerging Markets	拯救新兴市场


CAMBRIDGE – If the world were fair, most emerging markets would be watching the financial crisis engulfing the world’s advanced economies from the sidelines – if not entirely unaffected, not overly concerned either.	剑桥-如果世界是公正的，那大多数新兴市场现在应该是对吞没世界发达经济体的这场金融危机隔岸观火。 它们即便不是完全不受影响，也不致受太大的影响。


For once, what has set financial markets ablaze are not their excesses, but those of Wall Street.	这一次，使金融市场着火的不是因为它们的恶行，而是华尔街的恶行。


Emerging markets’ external and fiscal positions have been stronger than ever, thanks to the hard lessons learned from their own crisis-prone history.	新兴市场的外部头寸和财务状况从未像今天这样强大，这得益于它们从自己常常爆发危机的历史中所获得的痛苦教训。


We might even have allowed these countries a certain measure of schadenfreude in the troubles of the United States and other rich countries, just as we might expect kids to take perverse delight from their parents’ getting into the kinds of trouble they so adamantly warn their children against.	我们甚至应该允许这些国家对于美国和其他富有国家所陷入的麻烦抱以某种幸灾乐祸的态度，正如我们应该允许孩子们在父母不以身作则而遇到麻烦时窃喜。


Instead, emerging markets are suffering financial convulsions of possibly historic proportions.	然而，新兴市场正在承受着前所未有的金融动荡。


The fear is no longer that they will be unable to insulate themselves. It is that their economies could be dragged into much deeper crises than those that will be experienced at the epicenter of the sub-prime debacle.	现在人们担心的不再是它们是否置身度外，而是其经济可能会陷入比处于次贷危机震中的那些国家所遭受的更严重的危机中。


Some of these countries should have known better and might have protected themselves sooner.	其中一些国家本应该更懂得以及更迅速地保护好它们自身。


There is little excuse for Iceland, which essentially turned itself into a highly leveraged hedge fund.	冰岛几乎不值得原谅，因为它基本上把它自己变成了一个高度杠杆性的对冲基金了。


Several other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Hungary, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, were also living dangerously, with large current-account deficits and firms and households running up huge debts in foreign currency.	还有其他一些中东欧的国家，比如匈牙利、乌克兰和波罗的海国家也处于极大的危险中，它们拥有庞大的经常项目赤字并且公司和家庭都背负着巨额的外汇债务。


Argentina, the international financial system’s enfant terrible , could always be relied on to produce a gimmick to spook investors – in this case a nationalization of its private pension funds.	阿根廷这个国际金融体系中使大人难堪的孩子总是会制造出某种花招使投资者感到胆战心惊，这一次是其私人养老金的国有化。


But financial markets have made little distinction between these countries and others like Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, or Indonesia, which until just a few weeks ago appeared to be models of financial health.	但是金融市场似乎很少对这些国家与其他一些国家加以区分，比如墨西哥、巴西、韩国或者印度尼西亚这些在几周前还被视为财政健康的典范的国家。


Consider what has happened to South Korea and Brazil.	看一看韩国和巴西所发生的情况。


Both economies have experienced currency crises within recent memory – South Korea in 1997-1998 and Brazil in 1999 – and both subsequently took steps to increase their financial resilience.	这两个经济体在不久以前都遭受过货币危机。 韩国是在1997-1998年而巴西是在1999年，随后它们都采取步骤提高了金融韧性。


They reduced inflation, floated their currencies, ran external surpluses or small deficits, and, most importantly, accumulated mountains of foreign reserves (which now comfortably exceed their short-term external debts).	它们降低了通货膨胀，让货币自由浮动，保持对外盈余或者很小的赤字，并且更重要的是积聚了巨额的外汇储备（其数额现在已经大大超出了它们的短期外债）。


Brazil’s financial good behavior was rewarded as recently as April of this year when Standard & Poor’s raised its credit rating to investment-grade. (South Korea has been investment-grade for years.)	巴西在财政上的良好表现使标准普尔甚至在今年四月将它的信用评级提高到了投资级（而韩国多年来一直被评为投资级）。


But both are nonetheless getting hammered in financial markets.	然而这两个国家还是在金融市场遭受了沉重打击。


In the last two months, their currencies have lost around a quarter of their value against the US dollar. Their stock markets have declined by even more (40% in Brazil and one-third in South Korea).	过去两个月，它们的货币对美元的汇率跌去了大约四分之一，而股票市场跌得甚至更厉害（巴西下跌了40%，而韩国下跌了三分之一）。


None of this can be explained by economic fundamentals.	这些都根本无法从经济基本面上得到解释。


Both countries have experienced strong growth recently.	两国最近都保持了强劲了经济增长。


Brazil is a commodity exporter, while South Korea is not.	巴西是一个商品出口国，而韩国则不是。


South Korea is hugely dependent on exports to advanced countries, Brazil much less so.	韩国严重依赖与发达国家的出口，巴西的依赖性则小得多。


They and other emerging-market countries are victims of a rational flight to safety, exacerbated by an irrational panic.	它们和其他新兴市场国家都是在非理性的恐慌下理性地逃向安全地的牺牲品。


The public guarantees that rich countries’ governments have extended to their financial sectors have exposed more clearly the critical line of demarcation between “safe” and “risky” assets, with emerging markets clearly in the latter category.	富有国家对金融部门所作出的公共担保更清晰地暴露了“安全”和“有风险”的资产之间的界线，而新兴市场上的资产显然属于后一类。


Economic fundamentals have fallen by the wayside.	在这里经济基本面被甩在了一边。


To make matters even worse, emerging markets are deprived of the one tool that the advanced countries have employed in order to stem their own financial panics: domestic fiscal resources or domestic liquidity. Emerging markets need foreign currency and, therefore, external support.	更加严重的是，新兴市场缺乏发达国���所具备的工具以制止它们国内的金融恐慌即国内的财政资源或国内的流动资金新兴市场需要外汇，而这需要外部的支持。


What needs to be done is clear.	需要做的事情是很明确的。


The International Monetary Fund and the G7 countries’ central banks must act as global lenders of last resort and provide ample liquidity – quickly and with few strings attached – to support emerging markets’ currencies.	国际货币基金组织和七国集团国家的中央银行必须担当起作为最后手段的全球借款者的角色并提供大量的流动资金，迅速地并且不附加太多条件地支持新兴市场的货币。


The scale of the lending that is required will likely run into hundreds of billions of US dollars, and exceed anything that the IMF has done to date.	所需要的贷款规模可能会达到数千亿美元，超过国际货币基金组织迄今为止所提供的任何贷款的规模。


But there is no shortage of resources.	但是这里并不存在资源短缺的问题。


If necessary, the IMF can issue special drawing rights (SDRs) to generate the global liquidity needed.	如果需要，国际货币基金组织可以授予特别提款权以获得所需要的全球流动资金。


Moreover, China, which holds nearly $2 trillion in foreign reserves, must be part of this rescue mission.	此外，中国作为一个拥有将近2万亿美元外汇储备的国家也应该参与到这项拯救任务中来。


The Chinese economy’s dynamism is highly dependent on exports, which would suffer greatly from a collapse of emerging markets.	中国经济的活力很大程度上依靠出口，而一旦新兴市场倒下了，它的出口也会遭受沉重打击。


In fact, China, with its need for high growth to pay for social peace, may be the country most at risk from a severe global downturn.	事实上，鉴于中国需要经济的高速增长来保持社会的稳定，一旦全球经济陷入严重衰退，它可能将面临最严重的风险。


Naked self-interest should persuade the advanced countries as well.	即便完全从自身利益考虑，发达国家也需要这样做。


Collapsing emerging-market currencies, and the resulting trade pressures, will make it all the more difficult for them to prevent their unemployment levels from rising significantly.	新兴市场货币的崩溃以及由此产生的贸易压力将使它们更难防止它们的失业率急剧上升。


In the absence of a backstop for emerging-country finances, the doomsday scenario of a protectionist vicious cycle reminiscent of the 1930’s could no longer be ruled out.	在缺乏新兴市场财政支持的情况下，类似二十世纪三十年代的那种保护主义恶性循环的末日情景恐怕很有可能会重演。


The United States Federal Reserve and the International Monetary Fund have both taken some positive steps.  The Fed has created a swap facility for four countries (South Korea, Brazil, Mexico and Singapore) of $30 billion each.  The IMF has announced a new quick-dispersing short-term facility for a limited number of countries with good policies.  The questions are whether these will be enough and what happens to those countries that will not be able to avail themselves of these programs.	美联储与四个国家（韩国、巴西、墨西哥和新加坡）分别互换了300亿美元的货币。 国际货币基金组织宣布为少数有良好政策的国家创设了一个新的短期流动性贷款机制。


So when the G-20 countries meet in Washington on November 15 for their crisis summit, this is the agenda item that should dominate their discussion.	因此当11月15日20国集团在华盛顿召开危机峰会时，这一问题应该成为它们讨论的主要议题。


There will be plenty of time to debate a new Bretton Woods and the construction of a global regulatory apparatus.	讨论建立一个新的布雷顿森林体系以及全球监管体系还有的是时间。


The priority for now is to save the emerging markets from the consequences of Wall Street’s financial follies.	现在最首要的问题是不让新兴市场因为华尔街在金融上的愚蠢行为而遭受损失。


SOS for China’s SOEs	中国国有企业告急


BEIJING – China’s economic slowdown has been the subject of countless debates, discussions, articles, and analyses.	北京—以中国经济减速为主题的争论、讨论、文章和分析数不胜数。


While the proposed remedies vary considerably, there seems to be a broad consensus that the illness is structural.	各人提出的方案不尽相同，但似乎都有一个广泛的共识，即中国经济病在结构。


But while structural problems, from diminishing returns to capital to the rise in protectionism since the global economic crisis, are certainly acting as a drag on growth, another factor has gone largely unnoticed: the business cycle.	结构性问题——从资本回报递减到全球经济危机以来保护主义日盛——固然对增长起到了拖累作用，但另外一个因素几乎没有人注意到：商业周期。


For decades, China’s economy sustained double-digit GDP growth, seemingly impervious to business cycles.	几十年来，中国经济保持两位数GDP增长，似乎丝毫不受商业周期影响。


But it wasn’t immune: in fact, the six-year slowdown China experienced after the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a symptom of precisely such a cycle.	但中国经济毕竟不能“免俗”：事实上，1997年亚洲金融危机后中国经历了为期六年的放缓，这正是商业周期的症候。


Today, China’s business cycle has led to the accumulation of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the corporate sector, just as it did at the turn of the century.	如今，中国商业周期导致公司不良贷款累积，一如世界之交时的情况。


While the rate of NPLs is, according to official data, lower than 2%, many economists estimate that it is actually more like 3-5%.	据官方数据，不良贷款率不到2%，但许多经济学家估算实际可能高达3—5%。


If they are right, NPLs could amount to 6-7% of China’s GDP.	如果他们的估算正确，不练贷款占中国GDP比重可能高达6—7%。


Most of this debt is held by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which account for just one-third of industrial output, yet receive more than half of the credit dispensed by China’s banks.	这些债务大部分为国有企业持有，国有企业只占工业产出的三分之一，但得到了中资银行一半以上的信用。


Though the debt-equity ratio of the industrial sector as a whole has declined over the past 15 years, the SOEs’ has increased since the global financial crisis, to an average of 66%, 15 percentage points higher than that of other kinds of firms.	尽管工业部门总体债务-股本比率在过去15年中有所下降，但国有企业的该比率自全球金融危机以来有所上升，目前平均为66%，比其他所有制企业高出15个百分点。


A looming recession undoubtedly spurred this debt accumulation, possibly aided by former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s massive 2009 stimulus package.	呼之欲出的衰退显然刺激了这一债务积累，也许前总理温家宝在2009年所实施的巨大财政刺激方案也起到了推波助澜的作用。


But it was lax financial discipline that enabled the debt buildup.	但宽松的财务纪律才是让债务得以累积的原因。


Banks feel safe lending to SOEs, no matter how indebted, because the government implicitly guarantees the debt.	银行认为贷款给国有企业是安全的，不管它们的债务负担多么沉重，因为政府会对债务提供隐性担保。


As a result, the SOEs, not surprisingly, have developed a habit of debt-financed growth.	结果，国有企业毫无悬念地养成了债务融资增长的习惯。


That may not have been a problem when China’s economy was growing, but it represents a serious economic risk today, which is why the government has set deleveraging as one of its major tasks for this year.	当中国经济节节增长时，这也许不是问题，但如今，这是一个严重的经济风险，也是政府将去杠杆列为今年主要任务之一的原因。


But execution has been slow, owing partly to China’s failure to enforce its bankruptcy law fully.	但去杠杆执行得非常缓慢，部分原因在于中国无法充分实施破产法。


The fact that commercial banks are not allowed to hold shares in companies has also impeded deleveraging, as it prohibits the use of direct debt-equity swaps to reduce SOE debt.	商业银行不允许持有公司股票，这一事实也阻碍了去杠杆化，因为这意味着无法使用直接债转股降低国有企业债务。


This should change.	这应该改革。


China has employed debt-equity swaps to reduce NPLs in the state-sector before.	此前，中国曾经利用债转股降低国有部门不良贷款。


In 1999, it established four asset-management companies (AMCs) to take on the weakest loans of the four largest state-owned banks, thereby improving those banks’ financial stability.	1999年，中国成立了四家资产管理公司接管四大国有银行不良程度最高的贷款，从而改善了这些银行的财务稳定性。


Given China’s high growth rates in 2003-2012, the AMCs made handsome profits from those shares.	考虑到2003—2012年间中国的高增长率，这些资产管理公司从这些股份中获得获利颇丰。


Today, too, debt-equity swaps may be the only viable solution to the NPL problem.	今天，债转股也许仍然是解决不良贷款问题的唯一可行办法。


But the government does not need to rely on government-owned entities to assume the debt.	但政府不需要依靠政府所有实体接收债务。


Instead, it should allow private equity funds, which have accumulated large amounts of savings as they await good investment opportunities, to act as AMCs, bidding for the NPLs at a discount.	相反，政府应该允许民营私募基金——它们聚集了大量储蓄，等待着投资良机——来充当资产管理公司的角色，折价购买不良贷款。


Such an approach would not just address the NPL problem; by giving the private sector a stake in the SOEs, it would also help to spur performance-enhancing reforms.	这一方针不仅将解决不良贷款问题； 它还能通过让民营部门持有国有企业股份有助于刺激加强绩效的改革。


After all, despite their grim financial performance, many of China’s SOEs have a lot going for them, including state-of-the-art equipment, first-rate technical staff, and competitive products.	毕竟，尽管财务绩效低劣，但许多中国国有企业拥有很多资产，包括最先进的设备、一流的技术团队、有竞争力的产品等。


Their problem is bad governance and poor management – a problem that, as China’s top leaders recognized in 2013, private-sector involvement can help resolve.	它们的问题是治理不善和管理拙劣——对于这个问题，中国最高领导层在2013年已经承认民营部门的参与有助于它的解决。


Of course, there are some obstacles to introducing debt-equity swaps between the public and private sectors, beginning with concern about the loss of state assets.	当然，引入公共和民营部门之间的债转股存在一些障碍，首先是担心国有资产流失。


Given the severity of SOEs’ debt problem – the National Railway Company alone holds CN¥3 trillion (over $40 billion) in debt – discounts are inevitable when SOE debts are transferred to private AMCs.	考虑到国有企业债务问题的严重性——光是中国铁路总公司就存在3万亿人民币债务——当国有企业债务转手到民营资产管理公司时，免不了要有些折价。


This could cause some to assert that the private firms are realizing unjust gains.	这可能导致一些人认为民营企业从中获取不公平收益。


In order to overcome this obstacle, China should engage in local experimentation – a tried-and-tested approach that has long guided the country’s reform efforts – beginning in the regions where the SOE debt problem is the most acute.	为了克服这一障碍，中国应该采取地方试点——摸着石头过河一直是中国改革的指导方针——从国有企业债务问题最为突出的地区开始。


The resulting revitalization of SOEs would also help quell any doubts about debt-equity swaps with the private sector.	如能让国有企业重焕生机，将十分有助于打消任何对与民营部门进行债转股的质疑。


Another obstacle is the fear that, by allowing SOEs, yet again, to escape market discipline, debt-equity swaps would set a dangerous precedent.	另一个障碍是人们担心，债转股等于允许国有企业再次逃脱市场纪律，因此将树立一个危险的先例。


But the improvements to corporate governance that would follow from the introduction of private shareholders would reduce substantially the likelihood that SOEs would continue to abuse the financial system.	但引入民营股东所带来的公司治理的改善将显著降低国有企业继续滥用金融系统的可能性。


Moreover, their NPLs are essentially sunk costs; debt-equity swaps are pretty much the only way to claw back anything at all.	此外，它们的不良贷款本质上是沉没成本； 债转股是竭力收回些许价值的唯一办法。


By allowing private-sector participation in debt-equity swaps, China could kill three birds with one stone: advance SOE deleveraging, strengthen corporate governance in the state sector, and enhance economic efficiency.	对中国来说，允许债转股公私合作可谓一石三鸟：推进国有企业去杠杆； 强化国有部门公司治理；


With local experimentation, Chinese authorities map out that stone’s most effective trajectory.	以及增进经济效率。 通过地方试点，中国当局可以摸清过河石头的最有效轨迹。


Saving Face and Peace in the Gulf	维护海湾地区的面子与和平


PRINCETON – The West and Iran are playing a dangerous game.	发自普林斯顿——西方与伊朗正在玩一场危险的游戏。


In the past ten days, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and warned the United States against sending an aircraft carrier back into the Persian Gulf.	在过去十天内，伊朗先是威胁要封锁霍尔木兹海峡，继而又对美国将“约翰·斯滕尼斯”号航母重新派往波斯湾的举动发出警告。


The US predictably responded that its aircraft carriers could and would patrol wherever necessary to promote freedom of navigation.	美方的回应也不出所料，声称这些航母只要有需要都可以且将会到该地区巡逻——以保障其自由航行权。


Iran then announced that it would conduct naval exercises in the Strait.	而伊朗随后又宣布将会在海峡区域进行海上军事演习。


In the game of “chicken,” two cars drive straight at each other at top speed; either one driver “chickens out” and swerves, or they collide in a fireball.	在一种名为“胆小鬼”的游戏中，两个对手都驾车以最高速笔直冲向对方； 结果要么一个人“临阵脱逃”改变方向；


Governments around the world cannot stand by and watch that game play out across the world’s energy lifeline.	要么两辆车撞成一团废铁。 世界各国政府不可能站在那里眼睁睁看着这样的游戏在全球能源的生命线上上演。


It is time for third parties to step in and facilitate solutions that allow Iran to save face while significantly and credibly reducing its supply of enriched uranium.	也是时候有第三方介入并推动相关解决方案，使得伊朗可以在保全面子的情况下显著并可靠地减少其浓缩铀供应。


Iran may or may not be planning to go all the way to production of a nuclear weapon.	伊朗或许并非一意孤行要造核武器。


Nonetheless, it is in clear violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is charged with monitoring the treaty.	但即便如此，根据国际原子能组织的监察结论，该国已经明显违反了对《核不扩散条约》所负有的相关责任。


Its continuing non-compliance is destabilizing the entire Middle East, with serious repercussions for global security.	伊朗这种持续的不服从行为正在破坏整个中东地区的稳定，同时也对国际安全形势造成了严重冲击。


Although the Iranian government could most likely be deterred from using a nuclear weapon, the price of a nuclear Iran could well be a regional arms race – a nuclear Saudi Arabia, possibly followed by Turkey and Egypt.	虽然伊朗政府在很大程度上都无法使用核武器，但一旦该国拥有核武，代价将是整个地区的军备竞赛——沙特可能进行核武装，随后则是土耳其和埃及。