Capitalism could be reconstructed after World War II because it was buttressed by three necessary types of regulation: social security, which served as a principal stabilizer, at least in the developed countries; Keynesian tools to fight domestic cyclical downturns; and a universal high-wage policy aimed at stimulating general consumption, without which the genius of capitalism – mass production – does not work.	二战之后资本主义之所以能够得到重建是因为它得力于三种必要管理形式的支持：社会保障，其至少在发达国家能够作为一种首选的稳定剂发挥作用； 凯恩斯方案，能用以制止国内恶性循环的经济低迷；


But the realignment of the rich, developed countries around the monetarist policies promoted by economists like Milton Friedman, which began around 1970, broke with all that.	但是始于1970年、围绕米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）推行的货币主义政策而进行的富有发达国家重组却结束了这一切。


Not long after, the dollar was detached from the gold standard.	不久之后，美元脱离了金本位制。


Ever since, the international financial system has endured almost constant instability.	自那以后，国际金融体系就几乎一直承受着长期动荡。


Crises have multiplied, with each seemingly worse than the one that came before.	危机次数不断增加，一次比一次看来更糟糕。


Throughout the rich world, poverty has come roaring back.	在整个富有世界，贫穷已经卷土重来。


Internal and international inequalities have been increasing at breakneck speed.	无论在国内还是国际上，不平等正在迅速加剧。


Employment is increasingly precariousness.	就业问题越来越成为一个不安定因素。


And where unemployment is preferred to universal job insecurity, it has become impossible to suppress.	在那些失业情况比普遍的工作不安全感更为严重的地方，这种动荡已经难以平息了。


It is to this state of affairs that the French and Dutch said “no” two months ago.	法国和荷兰正是在这种情况下在两个月前说了“不”。


Paradoxically, however, a united Europe is likely to be needed even more in the near future than it was in the past.	然而，自相矛盾的是，人们甚至比以往更需要一个团结的欧洲。


After all, beyond the social misery produced by the re-institutionalized cruelty of the current global economic system, the greatest danger facing the world nowadays is that very system’s inherent instability.	毕竟，除了当前全球经济体系重新制度化后的冷酷无情所带来的种种社会不幸之外，如今全世界所面临的最大危险，就是这个体系与生俱来的不稳定性。


I don’t see any institution other than the EU that has enough size and heft to protect Europeans from a possible implosion.	除了欧盟之外，我还从未看到任何组织具备如此的规模和份量能够保护欧洲人免受一次可能发生的内向爆炸。


Consider the simple fact that the American economy is now more than $600 billion in debt.	想想这个简单的事实，美国经济现在已经背负上了超过六千亿美元的债务。


The United States cannot function without being able to borrow $1.9 billion dollars each and every day of the year, mainly from the emerging economies of Asia, and China above all.	如果它无法每一天借到19亿美元，美国就不能正常运作，而这笔钱主要向亚洲的新兴经济体借用，首要就是中国。


But this support could weaken or even cease if the dollar falls too low, if the price of oil rises too high, or if the American economy backfires.	但是如若美元跌得太低，如若油价涨得太高，或者美国经济发展事与愿违，这种支持就有可能削弱或甚至暂停。


In fact, the US economy has become increasingly detached from reality.	事实上，美国经济已经愈来愈与现实脱节。


Its manufacturing sector now accounts for a mere 11% of America’s GDP.	它的制造业现在只占到美国GDP的11%。


Ford and General Motors are in dire financial straits.	福特公司和通用公司正陷入财政困难时期。


Meanwhile, two speculative bubbles – in the real estate market and in mortgages – have become grafted upon each other and now dominate economic activity in the US.	同时，两个投机泡沫——房地产市场和按揭——彼此相互影响作用并控制了如今美国国内的所有经济活动。


A crash, or at least a sharp spasm, is quite likely in the near future, and the consequences – for America and the world – may be catastrophic.	在不久的将来，很有可能导致经济崩溃，或至少是剧烈震荡，这对美国和全世界所造成的后果也许是灾难性的。


This instability also makes it difficult to address other grave problems affecting the global financial system.	这种动荡也加大了解决其他影响全球金融系统的严重问题的难度。


Sovereign debt, needed by all countries, but particularly by the poorest, suffers profoundly from erratic interest-rate and exchange-rate movements.	所有国家、尤其是贫困国家所需的国家债务深受利率和兑换率不稳定运动的影响。


The absence of a lender of last resort in today’s world only magnifies the threat involved in each crisis.	最后贷款人在当今全世界的缺失只会加深每个危机的威胁。


To make matters worse, national failures can no longer be addressed without aggravating the situation.	更糟的是，这种形势不恶化（到一定程度），这种国家性的失败就不会得到解决。


Of course – indeed, above all – in such circumstances the immense investments needed to overcome underdevelopment and the disabilities that it entails are increasingly forgotten by the world of international finance.	当然——实际也是最为重要的一点是——在这种环境下，为了改善欠发达和无能力国家所需的巨额投资正在渐渐被国际金融世界遗忘。


With rich countries threatened by instability and poor countries largely left to their own devices, the reconstruction of the world financial system should be at the top of the international agenda.	在富有国家受到这种动荡威胁而贫困国家被弃之不顾的情况下，重建世界金融体系应该被摆上国际议程的首要位置。


A new Bretton Woods could not be more urgent!	一个新的Bretton Woods体系才是燃眉之急！


Five Years in Limbo	断档的5年


NEW YORK – When the US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, triggering the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression, a broad consensus about what caused the crisis seemed to emerge.	发自纽约——当美国雷曼兄弟投资银行在2008年破产，引发自大萧条以来最严重的全球金融危机之后，一个关于危机成因的广泛共识似乎已经形成。


A bloated and dysfunctional financial system had misallocated capital and, rather than managing risk, had actually created it.	一个过度臃肿且丧失机能的金融系统错误配置了资本，而且非但没能管理危机，其本身就是危机的来源。


Financial deregulation – together with easy money – had contributed to excessive risk-taking.	金融管制的放宽——加上极易取得的贷款——都导致人们过度承担风险。


Monetary policy would be relatively ineffective in reviving the economy, even if still-easier money might prevent the financial system’s total collapse.	即便依然容易获取的资金能可以避免金融系统全面崩溃，但货币政策在重振经济方面的效用可能相对较低。


Thus, greater reliance on fiscal policy – increased government spending – would be necessary.	因此，对财政政策的更多依赖——增加政府支出——就成为了必需之策。


Five years later, while some are congratulating themselves on avoiding another depression, no one in Europe or the United States can claim that prosperity has returned.	五年之后，虽然有些人开始互相庆幸说他们制止了另一场大萧条的出现，但没有一个欧美人敢声称繁荣已经重新降临了。


The European Union is just emerging from a double-dip (and in some countries a triple-dip) recession, and some member states are in depression.	欧盟刚刚从一场二次衰退（有些国家是三次探底）中抬起头来，有些成员国还依然陷于衰退。


In many EU countries, GDP remains lower, or insignificantly above, pre-recession levels.	在许多欧盟国家，GDP要么低于危机前水平，要么只高出一点点。


Almost 27 million Europeans are unemployed.	有2700万欧洲人找不到工作。


Similarly, 22 million Americans who would like a full-time job cannot find one.	同样，这边有2200万美国人无法获得全职工作。


Labor-force participation in the US has fallen to levels not seen since women began entering the labor market in large numbers.	劳动参与率（经济活动人口占劳动年龄人口的比率）跌到了自妇女开始大量进入劳动力市场以来的最低水平。


Most Americans’ income and wealth are below their levels long before the crisis.	大多数美国人的收入和财富都比危机前少了一大截。


Indeed, a typical full-time male worker’s income is lower than it has been in more than four decades.	事实上，一个典型全职男性职工的收入已经降到了超过40年以来的最低水平。


Yes, we have done some things to improve financial markets.	没错，我们已经付出了一些努力去改善金融市场。


There have been some increases in capital requirements – but far short of what is needed.	在资本要求方面也有一些提升——但远比所需要的要低。


Some of the risky derivatives – the financial weapons of mass destruction – have been put on exchanges, increasing their transparency and reducing systemic risk; but large volumes continue to be traded in murky over-the-counter markets, which means that we have little knowledge about some of our largest financial institutions’ risk exposure.	一些高风险金融衍生品——金融界的大规模杀伤性武器——被归入交易所，增加了其透明度并减少了系统风险； 但还有大量衍生品依然在场外市场暗中交易，这意味着我们对某些最大型金融机构的风险状况知之甚少。


Likewise, some of the predatory and discriminatory lending and abusive credit-card practices have been curbed; but equally exploitive practices continue.	同样，一些掠夺性和歧视性的贷款以及信用卡滥用行为都受到了抑制； 但同样的剥削行为依然存在。


The working poor still are too often exploited by usurious payday loans.	那些打小工的穷人依然常常遭到发薪日高利贷的盘剥。


Market-dominant banks still extract hefty fees on debit- and credit-card transactions from merchants, who are forced to pay a multiple of what a truly competitive market would bear.	大银行照旧对商户的借记卡和信用卡交易收取高昂费用，比在一个真正自由竞争市场应当支付的高上数倍。


These are, quite simply, taxes, with the revenues enriching private coffers rather than serving public purposes.	简而言之，这些“税”和收益都肥了私人金库，并未服务于公共目的。


Other problems have gone unaddressed – and some have worsened.	其他一些问题也没能解决——其中一些甚至继续恶化下去。


America’s mortgage market remains on life-support: the government now underwrites more than 90% of all mortgages, and President Barack Obama’s administration has not even proposed a new system that would ensure responsible lending at competitive terms.	美国的抵押贷款市场依然无法靠自身存活：政府如今承担了超过90%的抵押贷款，而奥巴马政府甚至还未能提出一个能够确保在充分竞争条款下进行负责任贷款的新系统。


The financial system has become even more concentrated, exacerbating the problem of banks that are not only too big, too interconnected, and too correlated to fail, but that are also too big to manage and be held accountable.	金融系统变得更为集中，导致银行问题进一步恶化——它们不仅规模太大，关联和联系太紧密以致无法任由其破产，而且更加难以管理和对公众负责。


Despite scandal after scandal, from money laundering and market manipulation to racial discrimination in lending and illegal foreclosures, no senior official has been held accountable; when financial penalties have been imposed, they have been far smaller than they should be, lest systemically important institutions be jeopardized.	尽管丑闻接二连三，从洗钱，操纵市场到贷款种族歧视和非法收缴抵押品，却没有一个高级官员受到惩罚； 金融罚款的金额也远远低于理应支付的数额，以免些重要系统性金融机构受到损害。


The credit ratings agencies have been held accountable in two private suits. But here, too, what they have paid is but a fraction of the losses that their actions caused.	信贷评级机构也要为两起私人诉讼负责，但在这里，它们支付的赔款只不过自身行为所造成损失的一小部分而已。


More important, the underlying problem – a perverse incentive system whereby they are paid by the firms that they rate – has yet to change.	更重要的是，一个根本性问题——在这个有悖常理的激励系统中正是这些机构为那些付钱给它们的企业评级——却没有得到改善。


Bankers boast of having paid back in full the government bailout funds that they received when the crisis erupted.	银行家们都自夸说已经全部还清了危机爆发时从政府处得到的援助。


But they never seem to mention that anyone who got huge government loans with near-zero interest rates could have made billions simply by lending that money back to the government.	但他们似乎也没提到过任何人只要把手里那些接近零利率的（援助）贷款反过来贷给政府就能轻松赚取数十亿美元。


Nor do they mention the costs imposed on the rest of the economy – a cumulative output loss in Europe and the US that is well in excess of $5 trillion.	他们也不会提到强加在其他经济部门身上的成本——欧美两地不断累积的社会产能损失已经合计超过5万亿美元。


Meanwhile, those who argued that monetary policy would not suffice turned out to have been right.	与此同时，那些认为货币政策无法满足需要的人最终是对的。


Yes, we were all Keynesians – but all too briefly.	没错，我们曾都是凯恩斯主义者——但却转瞬即逝。


Fiscal stimulus was replaced by austerity, with predictable – and predicted – adverse effects on economic performance.	财政刺激被收紧开支所取代，随之而来的还有可预见——并已经被预见到了的——负面经济效应。


Some in Europe are pleased that the economy may have bottomed out.	一些欧洲人对经济可能已经触底反弹而感到庆幸。


With a return to output growth, the recession – defined as two consecutive quarters of economic contraction – is officially over.	随着生产恢复增长，衰退——也就是连续两个季度出现经济收缩——在官方意义上结束了。


But, in any meaningful sense, an economy in which most people’s incomes are below their pre-2008 levels is still in recession.	但在任何有意义的层面上看，一个大多数民众收入依然低于2008年前水平的经济体仍旧处于衰退之中。


And an economy in which 25% of workers (and 50% of young people) are unemployed – as is the case in Greece and Spain – is still in depression.	一个25%的职工（以及50%年轻人）还没找到工作——正如希腊和西班牙——的经济体依然处于萧条之下。


Austerity has failed, and there is no prospect of a return to full employment any time soon (not surprisingly, prospects for America, with its milder version of austerity, are better).	紧缩政策已经破产，同时却看不到任何在短期内回归全面就业的前景（不出所料，由于美国的紧缩措施相对温和，其前景相对看好）。


The financial system may be more stable than it was five years ago, but that is a low bar – back then, it was teetering on the edge of a precipice.	金融系统或许比5年前更加稳固了，但依然还是立在一根低单杠上——当年则是在悬崖边摇摇欲坠了。


Those in government and the financial sector who congratulate themselves on banks’ return to profitability and mild – though hard-won – regulatory improvements should focus on what still needs to be done.	那些庆祝银行重新盈利以及温和——虽然来之不易——监管状况改善的政界和财经界人士应该把注意力放在那些依然需要完成的事情上。


The glass is, at most, only one-quarter full; for most people, it is three-quarters empty.	这个杯子最多不过是装了1/4水； 而在大多数人眼中，还有3/4是空着的呢。


Exceptions Become the Rule	个例成为规则


NEW YORK – Long ago, I worked as an analyst on Wall Street.	纽约——很久以前，我在华尔街做过分析师的工作。


The first company that I analyzed was Federal Express, which at the time had not yet shipped its first package.	我分析的第一家公司是联邦快递，当时这家企业还没有寄出一份包裹。


The idea behind FedEx was simple and compelling: The cost of complexity was higher than the cost of air transport, so the company would ship all its packages overnight to Memphis, Tennessee.	联邦快递的理念既简单又令人信服：复杂的成本高于空运，因此这家公司把所有包裹连夜运往田纳西州的孟菲斯。


By radically simplifying the myriad combinations of start and end points – the only routes were to and from Memphis – all of the packages could be delivered the next day reliably.	这样出入孟菲斯就成了公司唯一一条线路，从根本上简化了始发点和目的地的无数组合，因此所有包裹都可以在第二天确定无疑的交付。


All of that has changed, thanks to developments in information technology.	信息技术的发展改变了所有这一切。


With today’s powerful computers, we can look at massive amounts of information and simulate complex situations, making pretty good predictions about many things: What will traffic flows look like on Tuesday at 5:00 in the afternoon if we put a detour at this highway intersection?	今天的大型计算机可以查阅海量信息、模拟复杂状况并对诸多问题做出可靠预测：周二下午5点要求路口车辆绕行会对交通状况产生何种影响？


What percentage of people on this drug will get better – and, more interestingly, which particular individuals will respond positively, and which ones are likely to be harmed?	服药患者有多大比例会出现好转——更有意思的是，哪些人会出现好转，而哪些人有可能恶化？


Indeed, with the ability to make reliable predictions, we can put people and things into categories, whether market segments, disease risks, likely loan defaulters, potential purchasers, and so on.	其实，可以按照可靠预测对细分市场、疾病风险、可能的贷款拖欠及潜在购买者等人和事物进行分类。


That’s big data.	这就是海量资料。


But now we can also do “small data.”	现在我们也可以处理“细分资料”。


We can treat many things, even packages, like individuals.	我们可以向对人那样处理包裹等很多东西。


The exceptions – whether individual genotypes, individual privacy preferences, or digital rights to use content in specific contexts – have become the rule.	个人基因类型、个人隐私偏好或特定情况下使用内容的数字版权等个别情况已经成为普适规则。


We don’t need to guess at everyone’s privacy preferences or settle for one-size-fits-all policies.	我们无需猜测每个人的隐私偏好，也不用制定一刀切的政策。


Over time, we will be able to figure out which people, based on their genotype, will be helped or harmed by a particular drug, or how children can learn best with personalized feedback, or how to produce furniture and clothing in a world of 3D printers and real-time modeling.	我们逐步可以根据基因类型确定某种药品对哪些人有益抑或有害、个性化反馈能对孩子的学习起到何种帮助，以及在3D打印、实时建模时代如何生产家具和服饰。


And so on.	类似的情况还有很多。


Would you like your customized car seat in leather or cloth, sir?	您想把汽车座椅定制成皮的还是布的？


The market will rise to the challenge.	市场将面临挑战。


People who care about something will be able to specify their preferences to an extremely precise degree and get exactly what they want.	要求特殊者将可以极端精确地说明自己的喜好，并获得同样精确的服务。


For others, actually setting those preferences or defining what they want may take more attention than they care to devote to the task.	而在另一些人看来，实际设定喜好或说明希望所耗费的精力可能超过其忍受限度。


So the design challenge of the future will be to create good defaults with easy editing/customization tools for those who care.	因此未来的设计难题是创建好的缺省设计，便于个性化推崇者轻松开展编辑/定制操作。


But this change will raise challenging social and political questions as well, particularly concerning privacy preferences and health care – both already controversial issues.	但相关变化同样会引发社会政治难题，尤其是在已经争议颇多的隐私偏好和医疗保健领域。


Of course, no one can define or guarantee privacy.	当然，没有人能界定或保证隐私。


But individuals could get the opportunity to control the use of their data – and entities that want to use it could negotiate with them.	但个人应该能有机会控制信息应用，而需要信息的机构则可以与之协商。


Currently, Web advertisers and publishers say that their businesses depend on their ability to track people and collect and resell the data that they gather.	目前，网络广告商及出版商表示其业务有赖于个人信息的追踪、搜集及转售。


They argue, further, that it is too complicated to respect individuals’ preferences, too difficult to tell them how their data is being used, and pointless to treat them as individuals.	他们还提出尊重个人偏好太过复杂、履行信息应用告知义务过于繁琐，以一对一方式处理个人隐私是毫无意义的。


Yet, somehow, the data collectors can manage to record individuals’ purchase histories, their airline seat preferences, and so on.	但不知何故数据采集者却可以保存个人购买历史，他们的飞机座位偏好等等诸如此类的记录。


There is no reason why they could not also record how and by whom each piece of such information can be used.	因此无法保存信息的使用者及使用方式根本不是理由。


Indeed, millions of people now do set specific privacy preferences within Facebook, opt out of being tracked, and the like.	其实，数百万人现在确实在Facebook上设置隐私偏好，退出内容追踪等诸如此类的服务。


At the same time, they gladly share data with vendors and even track their own data – whether airline mileage or steps walked, check-ins at their favorite venues (especially if they can earn discounts or special offers), or their movie, music, or book purchases.	与此同时，他们欣然与供应商共享甚至自我追踪航空里程、行走步数、进入喜爱场所的次数等数据（尤其如果因此可以获得折扣或者特别优惠），这些人还记录自己购买的电影、音乐和书籍。


Now suppose that you could tell people to whom you had sold their data.	假设你告诉人们谁买了他们的数据。


Most people would not care, but those who did would appreciate the transparency and perhaps want a little share.	多数人可能并不在意，但在意者会赞赏这种信息披露，也许还想分得一小部分收益。


Suppose you started a business that managed data on behalf of the users.	假设你创办了一家代表用户管理数据的企业。


That is not such a crazy idea – the airlines, among other companies, are already doing it to some extent.	这种想法并不疯狂——以航空公司为首的企业已经在某种程度上付诸实施。


United, American, and British Airways all know my travel patterns on their airlines, and help me manage both my past trips (and related rewards) and my future reservations.	联合航空、美航和英航都了解我乘坐其航班的旅行模式，协助我管理过去的出行（及相关奖励）和今后的订票操作。


Mint does the same for my financial data; WellnessFX for my blood biomarkers.	Mint掌握我的财务资料； WellnessFX掌握我的血液生物指标。


A new start-up called Moven plans to track small payments so that you can see in real time how you are sticking to or deviating from a budget.	一家叫做Moven的新兴创业企业计划跟踪小额付款，以便你能实时了解恪守还是偏离了预算目标。


All of this works well in markets for goods and services, where people who want choice can pay for it.	所有这些内容在商品和服务市场自有其价值，想要选择的人们可以花钱购买。


Businesses can treat customers as individuals, and give them the amount of special consideration that they are willing to pay for.	企业可以个性化地对待用户，根据出价为他们提供特殊服务。


Companies can also decide not to serve certain customers, focusing on the most profitable segments.	企业同样可以决定专注最有利可图的领域，拒绝为某些客户提供服务。


But this approach does not work for things that the government (that is, other people’s taxes) pays for.	但这种方法不适用于政府（即公众税收）支付。


In the public sector, the one-size-fits-all approach still prevails.	一刀切的方案在公共部门仍然压倒一切。


In democracies, each citizen gets one vote.	民主国家的每名公民都有投票权。


So shouldn’t everyone get the same benefits?	那么每人得到的福利是否应该相同？


Yes, we tax rich people more and give poor people some more benefits, and that is contentious enough.	没错，我们向富人多征税，向穷人多发福利，这种做法已经够有争议了。


But consider all of the qualitative services and conditions for which individuals have different preferences, needs, and outcomes that are now more predictable.	但现在预测如何为偏好、需求和结果不同的个人提供量化服务更为便利。


If we can predict individual outcomes, what is an individual’s responsibility, and what remains a collective task?	如果能够预测个体结果，那么个人责任和集体任务究竟是什么？


These questions will become especially acute in areas such as education and health care.	上述问题在教育和医疗领域将变得尤为严重。


For example, we treat children differently in school according to their potential – as we understand it.	比方说，我们根据理解到的潜能区别对待在校学生。


But, if we help some children “to realize their potential,” are we thereby limiting the potential of others?	但如果帮助某些孩子“发展潜能”，是否会因此限制其他人的潜能？


Likewise, how do we allocate health-care resources?	同样，我们如何分配医疗资源？


What responsibility do individuals have to modify their behavior in response to their individual vulnerabilities and predispositions?	个人有没有义务根据自身的弱点及素质修正自己的行为？


And, most important, who – if anyone – should impose that responsibility?	最重要的是，这项义务该由谁来落实？


The Social Dimensions of Globalization	全球化的社会层面


The war on terrorism and in Iraq has distracted much of the world's attention from the pressing issue of how globalization should be managed so that it benefits everyone.	对恐怖主义和伊拉克的战争将世界关注的焦点从如何管理全球化以使其造福所有人这一迫切问题上转移开了。


A new report, issued by the International Labor Organization's Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization, reminds us how far the Bush administration is out of line with the global consensus.	世界劳工组织下属的"全球化的社会层面委员会"新近发布的一份报告提醒我们布什政府的所作所为与全球性的共识大相径庭。


The ILO is a tripartite organization with representatives of labor, government, and business.	世界劳工组织是一个由来自劳工、政府和商界的代表所组成的三方组织。


The Commission, chaired by the presidents of Finland and Tanzania, has 24 members (of whom I was one) drawn from different nationalities, interests groups, and intellectual persuasions, including members as diverse as the head of Toshiba and the leader of the AFL-CIO.	全球化的社会层面委员会（以下简称"委员会"-译者）由芬兰和坦桑尼亚总统任主席，拥有24名来自不同国家，不同利益集团和不同学术背景的委员（本人也是其中一员），包括东芝公司总裁和"美国劳工联合会-产业工会联合会"的领导人。


Yet this very heterogeneous group was able to crystallize the emerging global consensus that globalization, despite its positive potential, has not only failed to live up to that potential, but has actually contributed to social distress.	而正是这个多元化的团体使得一个正日益显现的全球性共识明晰起来。 这便是：虽然全球化有着积极的潜力，但它并没有发挥出这种潜力，还造成了社会的困境。


The fault lies with how globalization has been managed - partly by countries, but most importantly, by the international community, including institutions like the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the IMF, which are responsible for establishing the "rules of the game."	症结在于我们管理全球化进程的形式-部分是由世界各国管理，但最重要的是由包括世界银行、世贸组织和国际货币基金组织等机构在内的国际机构进行管理。 正是这些机构负责制定"游戏规则"。


The Commission even reached consensus on a number of concrete measures to help put a "human face" on globalization - or at least mitigate some of its worst effects.	委员会甚至已就一些具体的举措达成了共识。 这些举措旨在增加全球化进程中"人性化"的一面-或至少减轻一些最坏的影响。


The gap between the emerging consensus on globalization, which this report reflects, and the Bush administration's international economic policies help explain today's widespread hostility towards America's government.	报告反映了日益显现的关于全球化的共识和布什政府的国际经济政策之间的隔阂。 这有助于我们了解当今广泛存在的对美国政府的敌视态度。


Consider two issues that have been part of recent bilateral trade agreements pushed aggressively by the Bush administration.	作为布什政府不遗余力地推进的双边协定的一部分，有两个问题值得深思。


The crises in East Asia and the recent recessions in Latin America show that premature capital market liberalization can result in enormous economic volatility, increasing poverty, and destruction of the middle class.	东亚的危机和拉美最近的经济衰退显示了不成熟的资本市场自由化能造成严重的经济不稳定，加重贫困并给中产阶级带来毁灭性的打击。


Even the IMF now recognizes that capital market liberalization has delivered neither growth nor stability to many developing countries.	甚至国际货币基金组织现在也承认资本市场自由化并没有给发展中国家带来增长和稳定。


Yet, whether driven by narrow ideology or responding to the demands of special interests, the Bush administration is still demanding an extreme form of such liberalization in its bilateral trade agreements.	然而，不知是被狭隘的意识形态驱动还是回应特殊利益的需要，布什政府仍然在其双边贸易协定中苛求一种极端的自由化。


The second issue concerns the unbalanced intellectual property provisions (TRIPs) of the Uruguay Round of trade talks, dictated by America's pharmaceutical and entertainment industries.	第二个问题是关于乌拉圭回合的贸易会谈中不平衡的知识产权条款(TRIPs)。 这些条款是在美国的制药业和娱乐业的主使下制定的。


These provisions restricted countries from making generic imitations of drugs, making many critically important medicines unaffordable in developing countries.	它们限制有关国家仿制药物，从而使发展中国家负担不起许多至关重要的药品。


Spearheaded by worries about AIDS, activists around the world demanded that something be done.	由于对艾滋病的忧虑已成为当务之急，全世界的活动家们都要求对这一问题采取行动。


Just before last year's trade talks in Cancun, the US made some concessions, so that it was no longer the only holdout.	就在去年的Cancun贸易会谈开始之前，美国做出了让步，不再一意孤行。


In its bilateral trade agreements, however, the US is demanding what is becoming known as "TRIPs plus," which would strengthen intellectual property rights further, to ensure that countries only have the right to produce inexpensive generic drugs during epidemics and other emergencies.	但在其双边贸易协定中，美国仍然要求通过所谓的"知识产权附加条款（TRIPs plus）"来进一步加强对知识产权的保护，以确保相关国家只有在疾病流行或其它紧急情况下才能仿制价格低廉的普通药品。


The global consensus, reflected in the Commission report, calls for more exceptions, so that, say, drugs can be made available in any case where to do so could save a life.	委员会的报告中所反映的全球性共识呼吁更多的特例，以便人们在任何性命攸关的情况下都能得到药品。


To those confronting the prospect of death, what matters is access to life-saving drugs, not whether what is killing the person is part of an epidemic.	对于那些面对死亡威胁的人来说真正重要的是能得到拯救生命的药品，而不是判定夺去人生命的是否是某种流行病。


Bilateral agreements form the basis of enhanced ties of friendship between countries. But America's intransigence in this area is sparking protests in countries facing the "threat" of such an agreement, such as Morocco, and is forming the basis of long-lasting resentment.	双边协定本应成为增进国与国之间友谊的基础，但美国在这一领域拒不妥协的态度正在面临这种协定"威胁"的国家中（如摩洛哥）激起抗议，并催生长久的憎恨情绪。


The Commission highlights other issues that have received insufficient global attention - such as tax competition among developing countries, which shifts more of the tax burden from business to workers.	委员会还强调了其他没有得到足够全球性关注的问题-如发展中国家之间的税率竞争。 这种竞争将更多的纳税负担由资方转嫁到劳方。


In still other areas, the Commission's report argues for more "balanced" perspectives.	在其他方面，委员会的报告力主更"平衡"的观点。


On exchange rates, for example, it is more sympathetic towards mixed systems - in contrast to the traditional belief that countries must choose between the extremes of a completely flexible system and a hard peg (of the kind that contributed so importantly to Argentina's woes).	如在汇率方面，它更倾向于一种混合的体系-这与传统的观点形成对照。 传统观点认为国家必须在完全自由浮动汇率和刚性的联系汇率机制（这种机制正是造成阿根廷目前困境的重要原因）之间做出选择。


As this example shows, bringing different voices to the table in discussions of globalization brings new perspectives.	正如这个例子所显示的那样，将不同的声音带到全球化的讨论当中可以激发新的观点。


Until now, the main worry for most experts on globalization has been excessive government intervention in the economy.	直到目前，大多数专家对全球化的主要担心是政府对经济的过度干预。


The Commission fears just the opposite.	而委员会所担心的正好与之相反。


It argues that the state has a role to play in cushioning individuals and society from the impact of rapid economic change.	它认为国家在为个人和社会缓冲急速的经济变革所带来的影响方面应该有所作为。


The way that globalization has been managed, however, has eroded the ability of the state to play its proper role.	但现行的管理全球化进程的方式已经侵蚀了国家行使其职责的能力。


At the root of this problem is the global political system - if such it can be called.	问题的根源是全球性的政治体制-权且这样称谓。


Key players like the IMF and World Bank must become more transparent and their voting structures must be changed to reflect the current distribution of economic power - as opposed to that prevailing in 1945 - let alone to reflect basic democratic principles.	其关键的参与者，如国际货币基金组织和世界银行，必须变得更加透明化； 它们必须改变表决权架构以反映当今世界的经济实力分化-而不是1945年的情况-更别说在这种情况下反映基本的民主原则。


Whatever one thinks of the many concrete suggestions made by the Commission, this much is clear: we need a more inclusive debate about globalization, one in which more voices are heard, and in which there is more focus on the social dimensions of globalization.	不论人们对委员会的具体建议评价如何，有一点是明确的：我们关于全球化的辩论需要更具包容性，以使我们听到更多的声音并更多地关注全球化的社会层面。


This is a message the world would do well to heed, lest discontent with globalization continue to grow.	全世界都应该重视这一讯息以免对于全球化的不满继续增生。


The Efficient Networker	有效的沟通者


NEW YORK – Long ago, I used to run a conference called PC Forum. People would say to me, “If only I could sit next to Bill Gates....”	纽约—很久以前，我曾经办过一个叫做PC论坛的会议。


Just last week, a friend pulled me aside at a conference to ask for advice. “What’s the best way to make conferences more efficient for meeting people?” he asked.	人们会对我说，“要是能坐在比尔·盖茨旁边就好了……”上周，一位朋友在一次会议上把我拉到一旁询问：“有什么好办法让会议更有利于人们会面？


“Just like marketing, it seems it’s only about 50% effective.”	”他问，“这和营销一样，好像只有50%的效率。 ”


He was asking the wrong question.	他问错了问题。


The interaction has to be two-way: Do other people really want to meet him?	互动必须是双向的：其他人真的想和他会面吗？


A conference optimized to help my friend would fail, because the people everyone wants to meet are unlikely to show up.	为了帮助我朋友精心安排的会议将以失败告终，因为所有人都想会面的人不会前来。


Indeed, does my friend have a right to their time?	事实上，我朋友有权利要求他们的时间吗？


He told me that he had actually sat in a breakout group with 20 people, each of whom he wanted to meet, but he managed to talk to only two of them.	他对我说，他其实曾跻身于一个20人的小团体，其中的每个人都是他想见的，但他只设法与其中两人说上了话。


I was a bit concerned.	我有些担心。


Was this guy I was trying to help actually a stalker?	难不成我在帮助的这位仁兄是个跟踪骚扰者？


What he wanted was a tool that would allow him to make contact with each person on the list of people he had picked out.	他想要的是一套工具，可以让他与每一位他选定清单中的人联系上。


This is probably a legitimate goal – he sells decent products – but the reality of the world is that relationships, even around so-called shared interests, are not necessarily symmetrical.	这或许是个合理的目标——他贩卖的东西相当好——但这个世界的现实是关系并不一定是对称的，甚至围绕所谓的共同利益的关系也是如此。


More people want to meet Bill Gates or Marissa Mayer than vice versa.	希望与比尔·盖茨和玛丽莎·梅耶（Marissa Mayer）会面的人比后两者希望会面的人更多。


If we were to create a real market, it would become unpleasantly commercial – a bit like those charity auctions where celebrities or tycoons donate the pleasure of their company for lunch with the highest bidder, except that the VIP pockets the money.	如果我们要创造一个真正的市场，这个市场将具有令人不快的商业性——这有点像慈善拍卖，名人或大佬以共进午餐招徕竞价者——除了最后的钱流向了VIP的腰包以外。


At yet another conference, I was musing about how to make introductions efficient but not transactional when I was introduced to Lisa Anderson of Werqit by Megan Smith of Google.	在另一个会议上，我被谷歌的梅根·史密斯（Megan Smith）引见给Werqit公司的丽莎·安德森（Lisa Anderson），那一刻，我对如何有效地引见某人而又不显得市侩产生了兴趣。


That was a useful signal.	这是个有用的信号。


Anderson did not just approach me on her own; she was introduced.	安德森不但让自己接近了我； 她是被引见给我的。


It turns out that Anderson is working on the answer to precisely this problem of asymmetry in introductions.	似乎安德森正是引见中的不对称性这一问题的答案。


The trick is not just to find the right target (that is, a person), as social networks such as LinkedIn and search tools can do, but to enlist allies and manage a campaign to achieve a specific goal with the ultimate help of, yes, the target.	技巧在于不仅要找到正确的目标（即一个人），这一点LikedIn等社交网络和搜索工具就可以做到，还要列出盟军，并设法动员全面帮助以实现具体目的。


Werqit’s workflow solution does a good job of discovering, through social activity, who is likely to help you – and, just as important, who will probably brush you off.	没错，要动员目标的全面帮助。 Werqit的工作流解决方案长于通过社会活动发现谁可能帮助你以及同样重要的谁可能冷落你。


In other words, the behavior her startup looks for is not purchasing behavior (like so many “social” tools), but actual social behavior.	换句话说，她的创业公司的所寻找的行为并不是购买行为（如同各种“社交”工具那样），而是实际社交行为。


Werqit plans to build a “collaboration graph” by looking not only at ability to help or collaborate, but also at indicators of willingness.	Werqit的计划是不仅着眼于帮助或合作的能力，也要着眼于意愿指标，以此创造“合作图表”。


Willingness reflects a complex mix of incentives influencing when, whom, and how to help – and also reflects how busy a potential ally or target is.	意愿反映了影响何时、何人以及如何帮助的复杂的激励组合，也反映了潜在盟军或目标有多繁忙。


(As in any market, you need to consider not just your targets, but also who is competing with you for their attention.)	（和在市场中一样，你需要考虑的不仅仅是你的目标，也要考虑谁在和你争夺目标的注意力。


The indicators of willingness might include the frequency with which someone engages with a particular person; how often people are asked (or overloaded with requests) for help; the types of requests they accept; which topics they engage with, and with whom; and what kind of help they give.	）意愿指标可以包括某人接触某个具体人物的频率、被要求（或不堪要求重负）帮助的频率、他们所接受的要求的类型、他们参与和谁的什么话题； 以及他们提供了何种帮助。


Werqit uses these indicators to suggest who in your network is likely to be most helpful in the context of a particular mission or goal, enabling you to enlist them as allies.	Werqit使用这些指标找出在你的人脉网络中谁有可能在某个特定任务或目标上最有帮助，你可以把他们列入盟军名单。


Then it helps to figure out whom to target to achieve that goal – whether it’s funding for a startup, a job for yourself, a sale for your product, a publisher for your book, or any other mission you can define (and add to a crowd-sourced collection).	接着，Werqit帮助你找出定位于谁来实现目标——可以是为创业公司找融资、为自己找工作、销售你的产品、出版你的书或任何你可以定义的东西（包括众包收集）。


The service, currently in beta, is not an app; it is a full-featured workflow tool that will use machine learning over time.	这项服务（目前还处在贝塔版阶段）并不是一项应用； 它是一套全功能工作流工具，使用机器学习长期改进。


The premise is that willingness to help is influenced not just by connections, but also by the kind of connections and by the requester’s ability to formulate a clear and specific request.	它的假设是帮助意愿的影响因素不但在于人际关系，还在于人际关系的种类以及需求者构造明确具体的要求的能力。


Clearly, Werqit is both a flattering compliment (and complement!) to LinkedIn and a competitor for what LinkedIn does only in part.	显然，Werqit既是对LinkedIn的直白致敬（以及补充！ ），也是LinkedIn只是部分涉足的领域的竞争对手。


LinkedIn provides “introduction” workflow, but Werqit includes mission-specific templates and a curated collaboration graph for finding allies.	LinkedIn提供“引见”工作流，但Werqit包括具体任务模板和组织好的合作图表以便找到盟军。


Currently, Werqit relies on what it can glean from public data and the user’s own Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn interactions.	当前，Werqit依赖于它能从公共数据和用户本人的Facebook、Twitter和LinkedIn互动中所抓取的信息。


Over time, it will develop its own database of users.	假以时日，它将开发出自己的用户数据库。


This is the first new tool that I have come across whose creators seem to understand that the problem is not simply to find the right people; it is to run the right process to succeed at a specific task with the help of those people.	我第一次发现这种新工具：它的创造者明白问题不仅仅在于找对人； 而在于通过正确的过程成功地在这些人的帮助下完成具体任务。


Consider my own interaction with Anderson.	就拿我自己与安德森的互动来说吧。


I frequently advise people who approach me without an introduction that they should start with someone who knows them, not with a stranger they would like to know.	我经常建议不经引见就接近我的人应该从认识他们的人开始，而不是从他们想认识的陌生人开始。


Even at a conference, that is good advice.	即使在会议上，这也是一个好建议。


Maybe my friend was lucky to speak with only two of the 20 people in his breakout group.	我的朋友在他的20人小团体中只和两人说上了话，这或许是种幸运。


As Werqit’s Anderson knows, the most effective introductions are those made by others.	Werqit公司的安德森知道，最有效的引见是通过他人进行。


The Soft Power of the United Nations	联合国的软实力


Joseph Stalin once dismissed the relevance of “soft power” by asking, “How many troops does the Pope have?”	斯大林一次在说到“软实力”的意义时，不屑一顾地问道“教皇有多少军队？


Today, many self-styled realists dismiss the United Nations as powerless, and argue that it can be ignored.	”今天，许多自诩为现实主义者的人不屑地认为联合国毫无实力可言，并且根本就应该不把它当一回事。


They are mistaken.	他们的想法是错误的。


Power is the ability to affect others to produce the outcomes one wants.	实力是能够影响他人产生其所希望的结果的能力。


Hard power works through payments and coercion (carrots and sticks); soft power works through attraction and co-option.	硬实力通过给予好处和施加强迫手段（胡萝卜和大棒）来发挥作用； 而软实力通过吸引和招安来发挥作用。


With no forces of its own and a relatively tiny budget, the UN has only as much hard power as it can borrow from its member states.	鉴于它没有自己的军队并且只有相对而言很少的预算，联合国所能够拥有的硬实力只能是借助它的成员国得来的。


It was created in 1945 to be the servant of its member states, and Article 2.7 of its charter protects the sovereign jurisdiction of its members.	联合国是1945年被创立用来服务其成员国的利益的，而其宪章的第2. 7条明确强调保护其成员国的主权。


After the failure of the League of Nations in the 1930’s, the UN was designed to have the Security Council’s permanent members act as policemen to enforce collective security.	在二十世纪三十年代创立的国际联盟遭到失败后，联合国的设计是让安理会的常任理事国担当起执行集体安全的警察角色。


When the great powers agreed, the UN had impressive hard power, as demonstrated in the Korean War and the first Gulf War.	当大国意见一致时，联合国就拥有强大的硬实力，正如在朝鲜战争和第一次海湾战争中所表现出的那样。


But such cases were exceptional.	但是这种情况却很少出现。


During the Cold War, the Council was divided.	在冷战期间，安理会内部出现了对立。


As one expert put it, its permanent members’ veto was designed to be like a fuse box in an electrical system: better that the lights go out than that the house burn down.	正如一位专家所说的，常任理事国的否决权就像是电子系统中的一只保险丝盒：断电总比让房子烧毁要好。


Despite those limits, the UN has considerable soft power that arises from its ability to legitimize the actions of states, particularly regarding the use of force.	尽管存在种种的限制，联合国因为可以让国家的行动尤其是在使用武力的方面合法化的能力而拥有很强的软实力。


People do not live wholly by the word, but neither do they live solely by the sword.	人们不会完全靠夸夸其谈而生活，但是他们也不能完全依靠动武而生活。


For example, the UN could not prevent the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but the absence of its imprimatur greatly raised the costs to the American and British governments.	比如，联合国没有能够阻止2003年对伊拉克的入侵，但是因为未能取得它的授权而使美英政府付出了高得多的代价。


Some American leaders then tried to de-legitimize the UN and called for an alternative alliance of democracies.	一些美国领导人后来试图否定联合国的合法性而另外组织一个民主国家的联盟。


But they missed the point: Iraq policy had divided allied democracies, and, with its universal membership, the UN remained an important source of legitimacy in the eyes of most of the world.	但是他们忽略了一点：伊拉克政策已经分化了原本联合的民主国家，而因为联合国是一个由所有国家参与的组织，在全世界绝大部分人的心目中它依然是合法性的一个重要来源。


The greatest damage to the UN’s legitimacy has been self-inflicted.	对联合国合法性最严重的损害都是自己造成的。


For example, in recent years the internal bloc politics among its member states produced a Human Rights Council with little interest in fair procedures or the advance of human rights.	比如，近几年成员国中间的内部集团政治炮制出的一个对正当的程序或推动人权发展很少有兴趣的人权委员会。


Likewise, administrative inefficiency has led to poor performance of high-profile efforts like the oil-for-food program.	同样地，管理上的低效导致了在像石油换食品计划这样引人注目的努力中低劣的表现。


The job of UN Secretary General involves very little hard power, but some people have filled the post with great effect, using their soft power resources to leverage the hard power of governments.	联合国秘书长的工作几乎没有什么硬实力及，但是有些人以巨大的努力来担当这份工作，运用他们的软实力资源来借助各国的硬实力。


For example, Dag Hammarskjold seized the opportunity of the Suez Crisis created by Britain and France’s invasion of Egypt in 1956 to persuade governments to create peacekeeping forces – an institution that is not mentioned in the UN original charter.	比如，哈马舍尔德抓住了因为英国和法国在1956年入侵埃及而造成苏伊士运河危机的机会，劝说各国组建维和部队，一个在联合国原先的宪章中并没有提到的机构。


In the wake of the UN’s failures to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Kosovo in the 1990’s, Kofi Annan worked with others to persuade governments to recognize a new responsibility to protect endangered peoples.	在联合国未能阻止二十世纪九十年代发生在卢旺达和科索沃大屠杀和种族清洗后，安南与其他人一道劝说各国政府承认一种保护面临危险的人们的新的责任。


But such innovations have their limits.	但是这种创新有它的局限性。


In the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, states turned once again to UN peacekeepers, as they have in dealing with the problems in the Congo and Darfur.	在2006年以色列与黎巴嫩的战争后，各国再次指望联合国维和部队出面干涉，就像他们在处理刚果和达尔富尔问题时所做的那样。


But, while there are currently more than 100,000 troops from various nations serving in UN peacekeeping missions around the world, member states are not providing adequate resources, training, and equipment.	但是，尽管全世界现在驻扎有来自多个国家的10万多联合国的维和部队，各个成员国并没有提供适当的资源、训练和装备。


Moreover, governments have found ways to delay effective international action, as has been the case in Sudan.	此外，各国政府总是以各种方式拖延采取有效的国际行动，就像在苏丹问题上出现的情况。


It remains to be see whether China, concerned that its oil trade with Sudan might jeopardize the 2008 Olympics, will decide to exert more pressure.	中国在看到它与苏丹的石油贸易可能会危及2008年奥运会的举办时是否会决定施加更大的压力还有待观察。


Similarly, while the General Assembly may have agreed that states have a “responsibility to protect,” many members agreed only in a very limited sense.	同样地，尽管联合国大会已经同意各国拥有“保护责任”，但是许多成员国只是在一个非常有限的程度上对此表示认可。


Many developing countries, in particular, remain jealous of their sovereignty and fear that the new principle could infringe it.	尤其是许多发展中国家依然惟恐失去它们的主权而担心这一新的原则或损害它的主权。


For example, in the aftermath of the recent government crackdown in Myanmar (Burma), the Secretary General was able to send a representative to the country, but with powers limited to reporting and attempted mediation.	比如，在缅甸政府最近发生镇压行径后，联合国秘书长所能做的就是委派一名代表到这个国家，但是其权力仅仅限于报告和试图调停冲突上。


That may be enough to influence some governments, but the Burmese junta recently expelled the UN’s representative after he warned of “a deteriorating humanitarian situation.”	那样做也许足够对某些国家的政府产生影响，但是缅甸军政府最近在联合国代表警告说“人道状况日趋恶化”后就将他驱逐出去了。


The UN has impressive power – both hard and soft – when states agree on policies under Chapter 7 of the Charter.	在成员国同意接受宪章第7章的条令时，联合国就拥有很强大的实力，无论是硬的还是软的。


It has modest but useful soft power when great powers disagree but are willing to acquiesce in a course of action.	如果大国不同意但是愿意在行动过程中保持默认的态度，那么它就能拥有中等但是很有用的软实力。


And it has very little power when the great powers oppose an action, or repressive member governments ignore the claims of the new “responsibility to protect.”	如果大国反对某项行动，或者专制的政府对新的“保护责任”的主张置之不理，那么它的实力就会很弱。


In such cases, it makes no sense to blame the UN.	在这种情况下，指责联合国是毫无意义的。


Soft power is real, but it has its limits.	软实力是真实存在的，但是却有它的局限性。


The fault lies not with the UN, but with the lack of consensus among member states.	错误并不在联合国这一边，而是因为各个成员国无法达成一致意见。


The Soft Underbelly of China’s Growth	中国增长的弱点


China’s explosive economic growth hinges on the rest of the world, radically changing the global production chain and challenging the global trading system.	中国爆炸式的经济增长无疑依赖了世界经济。 但它急剧改变了全球生产链并且挑战全球贸易体系。


If China maintains its growth momentum over the next two decades, the global system will face huge challenges.	如果中国在以后二十年中继续维持其增长势头，全球体系将面临巨大挑战。


Indeed, the question is not so much whether the global system will endure the imbalances spawned by China, but how severe those imbalances will prove to be.	实际上，真正的问题并不在于全球体系是否会忍受中国带来的不平衡，而在于评估这种不平衡有多么严重。


Much of the concern over the past few years has centered on America’s yawning current account and fiscal deficits, and its effort to get China to let the yuan float more freely against the dollar.	过去几年里，世界对于美国巨大的经常项目赤字和财政赤字，以及试图让中国允许人民币更为自由地针对美元浮动而忧心忡忡。 相比之下，中国认为其经济增长需要稳定的货币，并且即使在今年七月人民币上浮2.


China, by contrast, sees its growth as tied to a stable currency, and may not want to introduce a more flexible exchange-rate regime, even after the 2.1% revaluation in July, pending alleviation of structural problems for which it is extremely difficult to set a timetable.	1％，也并不想要引入更为灵活的汇率体系，而是等候结构性问题得以缓解。 中国想要为此制定一个时间表极为困难。


In fact, even as China’s economy has boomed over the past decade, structural adjustment in its domestic sectors slowed, mainly owing to political constraints.	实际上，尽管在过去十年中中国经济实现了腾飞，但是由于政治上的约束，其国内部门的结构性调整却放慢了。


The banking system remains unhealthy and fragile; capital markets are dying.	银行体系仍然不够健康而且弱不禁风； 资本市场则病入膏肓。


The private sector’s growth is hemmed in by its inability to invest in economic sectors that the government still monopolizes.	私营部门的增长由于无法投资于政府目前仍然垄断的经济部门而裹足不前。


Mounting regional disparities, as well as the widening urban-rural divide, impede household consumption growth, increasing the economy’s dependence on exports and foreign investment.	地区以及城乡差异突出限制了家庭消费增长，增加了经济对出口和外资的依赖。


For years, as optimists see it, China has been the world’s cheap assembly shop for shoes, clothing, and microwave ovens.	正如乐观人士所见，多年来，中国一直是世界鞋类、服装以及微波炉的廉价组装场。


Now, it is laying the groundwork to become a global power in more sophisticated, technology-intensive industries.	现在，中国自在为成为更为尖端以及技术密集型产业的全球性大国而奠定基础。


Billions of dollars are flowing into auto, steel, chemical, and high-tech electronics plants, setting the stage for China to be a major exporter of high-end products.	几十亿美元正在流入汽车、钢铁、化工以及高技术电子工厂，从而为中国变成高端产品的主要出口国做准备。


While this argument suggests that the global trading system must make more room for a rising China (and India), it overlooks the need to address the enormous structural problems in China’s domestic sectors if export-led growth is to become sustainable.	尽管有人主张全球贸易体系必须为崛起的中国（以及印度）提供更大的空间，但是他们却忽视了，为了维持出口型增长，中国必须解决其国内经济部门中庞大的结构性问题。


For these sectors, rapid investment-driven growth in the past decade has produced a mountain of excess capacity, reflected in stagnant prices and the banking sector’s soaring volume of bad loans, as price wars squeeze profitability and stimulate real-estate speculation.	对于这些部门而言，过去十年中由投资带动的快速增长造成了生产能力大量过剩，由于价格战挤压了利润并刺激了房地产投机，反映出的是通货紧缩压力，银行体系的坏帐急剧上升。


Postponing structural reforms eventually constrains any economy’s performance, as we saw in Japan in the 1980’s and 1990’s.	推迟结构性改革最终会限制经济增长，如同二十世纪八十年代和九十年代的日本一样。


China has similar problems, with the investment-growth nexus threatening macroeconomic stability – witness the overheating that occurred in 2003 and 2004.	中国存在相似的问题，其投资与增长的关系威胁了宏观经济稳定。 这一点只要看看发生在2003年和2004年的经济过热就可以知道。


Indeed, China faces tremendous challenges in maintaining macroeconomic stability under conditions of export-led growth, with huge repercussions for the rest of the world.	确实，中国在出口拉动增长的条件下面临维持宏观经济稳定的艰巨挑战，其对世界其他地方有着巨大影响。


Given China’s size and its rising share in the global market, macroeconomic instability there fuels volatility in global prices for basic commodities and raw materials.	鉴于中国国土庞大，在全球市场中的份额不断上升，宏观经济不稳将会加剧全球基本商品和原料价格的不稳定。


But the political reality is that China’s government favors rapid growth in the short run over the structural reforms needed to sustain long-term economic performance.	但是，政治现实是，中国的各级政府偏好于短期快速经济增长胜过长期经济表现所需要的结构性改革。


Fiscal consolidation and the abrupt closure and restructuring of inefficient banks and state enterprises would, after all, constitute a powerful brake on short-term growth, threatening social peace and political stability.	巩固财政的要求以及突然关闭和重组效率低下的银行及国有企业毕竟会对短期增长踩急刹车，威胁到社会安定和政治稳定。


This may explain the growing efforts of Chinese businesses in recent years to go global themselves.	这也是为何中资企业近年来不断努力走向世界的原因。


Globalization is increasingly viewed as an alternative to domestic structural complexity.	“走出去”战略正越来越被视为解决国内结构性复杂问题的替代手段。


This strategy will exact a heavy price, just as it did in Japan twenty years ago.	但是，这一战略的代价昂贵，正如二十年前的日本一样。


The main lesson of Japan’s approach is that launching an aggressive buying spree overseas merely upsets established international balances of interests – thus generating greater tensions with the rest of the world – while hiding the seriousness of structural problems at home.	日本做法的主要教训是发动海外收购狂潮，结果破坏了现存的国际利益平衡，从而造成于世界各国关系紧张，而与此同时却隐藏了国内结构性问题的严重性而陷入僵局。


China has much to gain by avoiding such a strategy.	中国如能避免这一战略将会大有益处。


Focusing squarely on structural reforms would allay some of the fears that China’s rise has inspired in the rest of the world, while winning praise from the international business community.	集中精力处理结构性改革会减少因中国的崛起而在世界各地所造成的担心，同时赢得国际工商界的赞誉。


Rather than scaring global corporations and their home states, China would retain strong political support abroad – and the financing that it needs for its continued development.	这样做，中国不仅不会令全球性公司及其所在国忧心忡忡，而且会在国外维持强大的政治资源的支持以及获得继续发展所需要的投资流入。


In economic terms, China has no choice: it must remove the structural obstacles that stand in the way of rapid growth over the next decade or two.	从经济意义上说，中国别无选择。 它必须消除未来十年到二十年快速发展道路上的结构性障碍。


Above all, truly secure and sustainable economic development requires that it build a large consumer base at home.	归根到底，要实现真正安全的和可持续的经济发展，中国需要依托一个广大的国内消费的基础支撑。


Of course, the global imbalances associated with China’s economic rise can take longer to adjust than they otherwise would, simply because the US welcomes it as being in America’s own interest.	当然，调整与中国经济崛起息息相关的全球性不平衡需要更长的时间。 这是因为这样符合美国的利益，因此受到美国的欢迎。


But China’s long-term interest, and that of the world, requires that it get serious about domestic structural reform.	中国严肃对待国内结构性改革也是中国自己乃至世界的长久利益的所在。


The Software of Life	生命的软件


Being alive, we tend to think that life is easy to grasp.	有生之年，我们总是觉得生活尽在掌握之中。


In the accepted classification of sciences, mathematics is thought to be the queen, and the most difficult to grasp, followed by physics, chemistry, and, finally, biology.	根据目前公认的科学分类，数学被誉为科学皇后，也是最难领会的一门，物理、化学紧随其后，最后，才是生物。


But this scientific hierarchy is false and misleading: we now know that biology contains more mathematics than we ever imagined.	但是这种科学等级划分却有偏颇误导之嫌：因为我们现在知道生物学中所包含的数学远远超过我们的想象。


When molecules entered the scientific understanding of life with the discovery of DNA, biology climbed one step up the scale, to chemistry.	随着DNA被发现，分子论进入生命科学殿堂，生物学才得以升堂入室迈入化学领域。


Then, with recognition of the abstract schemas dictating how genes are expressed, biology climbed even closer to mathematics.	随后，随着人类基因图绘制计划得到认可，生物学才离数学更近了一步。


Today’s buzzword in the study of life is “systems” biology.	如今生命研究的标志性口号就是“系统”生物学。


For a long time, those who studied the nature of life and heredity were divided into two camps: epigeneticists , who emphasized environmental influences on living organisms, and preformists , who stressed the similarities between parents and progeny.	长久以来，研究生命自然现象和遗传现象的学者分成两大阵营：表观遗传派和一般遗传派。 前者注重环境对生物体的影响，后者强调双亲与子女之间的相似性。


The epigeneticist view was clearly wrong, because something stable had to be transmitted across generations.	表观遗传派的观点显然是错误的，因为上下代之间必然存在稳定性遗传因素。


But the preformist view that the entity transmitted across generations was the whole organism was contradicted by the impossibility of segmenting objects infinitely.	但是一般遗传派认同的上下代之间的遗传物质决定整个有机体的观点却与细胞无法无限分裂的理论相为矛盾。


What had to be transmitted was not the final organism, but the recipe to make it.	须被遗传的并非最终那个有机体，而是导致遗传发生的“配方”。


Consider the old metaphysical puzzle: is a wooden boat whose planks are gradually replaced as they decay the same boat after all the planks have been changed?	想想那道古老的哲学谜题：当木船上的厚木板逐渐腐烂到面目全非，以至破坏原船，这些木板是不是一直处于不断的替换之中呢？


“Systems” biology is biology that recognizes that what remains the same is the design of the boat – that which determines the relationships between the planks.	“系统”生物学正是认识到了这一点，即不变的是木船的设计——它决定了木船与厚木板之间的关系。


This thought paved the way for the concept of a “genetic program,” akin to a computer program – a metaphor that became almost self-evident when the structure of DNA was discovered, because DNA could be visualized as a linear string of symbols, which is exactly what computers read as a program.	这种想法为“遗传程序”的概念铺平了道路。 DNA被发现后，与计算机程序颇为相似的“遗传程序”这一比喻说法不言而喻， 因为DNA可以被视化为一种线性符号，被计算机当作程序来识别。


Like a computer program, DNA does not preserve the final state of what it codes for; rather, it embeds in a symbolic but concrete way (it is a real “text”) the relationships between all the objects and agents that it specifies and controls.	如同计算机程序，DNA中并不存有遗传编码的最后目标状态，而是包含了能确定并控制所有遗传目标和遗传媒介之间的关系的方法。 这种方法（其实是一种真正的讯息）由具体的符号组成。


A remarkable observation supports this analogy: viruses behave like individual pieces of programs, using the cell as the machine needed to make them multiply and subsequently propagate (often by destroying the machine).	一项惊人的观察结果为此推论提供了依据：病毒就像程序中的独立小程序，利用细胞作为必需的机器进行繁殖（通常通过破坏核心组织）。


When computer programming became widespread, pieces of software were found to behave the same way, and were thus called “viruses.”	计算机编程普及时，人们发现有些软件也有此般表现,它们被称为“病毒”。


And when it became possible to manipulate DNA in vitro, the metaphor of a “genetic program” appeared even more precise: scientists could construct experiments that corresponded to the reprogramming of cells merely by working on symbols in silicon.	当人们有能力在试管内处理控制DNA时，“遗传程序”这一比喻变得更为准确：科学家可以设计实验，仅仅通过修改硅片上的记号重新编排分子序列。


The metaphor comes from the famous mathematician and computer scientist Alan Turing, who, along with John von Neumann and other theoreticians, uncovered the link between the mathematics of whole numbers and logic.	这一比喻说法来自著名数学家兼计算机科学家阿兰·图灵（Alan Turing），他和John von Neumann以及其他理论家，发现了所有数学数字和逻辑之间的联系。


Turing proposed that all computations and logical operations could be performed by a simple machine, which he called the Universal Turing Machine, reading and modifying a linear sequence of symbols.	图灵提出可以使用一种简单的、被他称之为“通用图灵机”的机器，来阅读并修改线性序列符号，以进行计算和逻辑推理。


This required only the physical separation of the symbols (visualized as a tape) handled by the machine and the machine itself. Moreover, the tape carried the data that allowed the machine to proceed.	这不仅需要机器本身将这些（可视化为一盘磁带的）符号进行物理分离，更需要磁带本身带有支持机器运行的数据。


So the data could be split into two types: a program that embedded the “meaning” of the logical sequence recognized by the machine, and the pure data that provided the context for the program to run.	因此该数据可分为两种类型：一种为含有能被机器识读的逻辑序列“含义”的程序； 以及提供支持程序运作内容的纯数据。


Genetic engineering rests on the manipulation of DNA molecules (whether real or artificially constructed) in order to reprogram foreign cells.	遗传工程依靠运用操纵DNA分子（无论是自然还是人工的） 来重组异质分子。


As a result, many bacteria today produce human proteins.	结果，如今许多细菌都能制造出人类蛋白。


But this represents only a small part of the genetic program.	但这只是遗传工程的冰山一角。


Transfer of genes between organisms is widespread. Nuclear cloning, illustrated by the sheep Dolly, has made the Universal Turing Machine a highly revealing, if not all explaining, model of the cell.	有机体之间的基因转移已得到普遍应用，由核克隆技术产生的多利羊，使“通用图灵机”成为极具启迪性的、尽管还难以解释清楚的分子模式。


If we take this metaphor at face value, there is a surprising consequence.	若我们考虑这个比喻说法的实际价值，将有一个惊人的结果。


It has been shown that, the outcome of some computer programs is at once entirely deterministic, innovative, and unpredictable.	我们已经发现，一些计算机程序成果立刻就被认为极具确定性和创新意义，但它们同时也是难以预知的。


The computer metaphor thus implies that living organisms are material systems that, facing an unforeseeable future, arrive at improbable solutions so that some of their progeny can survive in unpredictable conditions. Life is inherently creative.	面对无法预测的未来，这一比喻暗示着，作为物质系统的生物体，将找到一种目前看来不可能的解决方案，以使他们的后裔能在难以预测的条件中得以生存。


However, the metaphor is limited by a simple fact: computers do not make computers.	当然，这个比喻还受到一个简单事实的制约：计算机无法生产计算机。


The challenge for the new biology is to understand how they would.	新生物学的挑战就在于知晓如何才能使这变成现实。


The Sources of Chinese Conduct	中国行为的根源


BEIJING – Six decades ago, the American diplomat George Kennan wrote an article, “The Sources of SovietConduct,” that galvanized American and world opinion, which soon hardened into the rigid postures of the Cold War.	发自北京——60多年前，美国外交官乔治·凯南发表了一篇激起美国乃至世界舆论的文章《苏联行为的根源》。 该文促成了冷战时期的美国强硬外交。


Today, given China’s decisive influence on the global economy, and its increasing ability to project military power, understanding the sources of Chinese conduct has become a central issue in international relations.	如今，随着中国对全球经济的影响力益增大及其军事投送能力不断增纱，怎样理解中国行为的思想根源也就成为了国际关系中的核心问题之一。


Indeed, better understanding of China’s foreign policy motivations may help prevent relations between China and the United States from hardening into rigid and antagonistic postures.	事实上，深入理解中国外交政策的思想根源有助于防止中美两国之间出现类似美苏那样的强硬对抗。


Since 2008, discussions among Chinese scholars and strategists on the nature of their country’s foreign policy have focused on two issues: its ideological foundations, and China’s international appeal and standing – its “soft power.”	自2008年以来，中国的学者以及战略研究者对本国外交政策性质的讨论就主要集中在两个方面：即中国外交政策的意识形态基础，以及中国的国际号召力和国际立场——也就是所谓的“软实力”。


Mainstream thinking, known as the Chinese School, insists, with the government, on “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” as the bedrock principle of China’s foreign policy.	主流派被称为“中国学派”。 该派与政府观点一致，都坚持将“有中国特色的马克思主义”作为中国外交政策的基本原则。


But a minority school argues that China should rely instead on the country’s traditional political thought, emphasizing the universal value of traditional Chinese philosophy.	而少数派则认为中国应以本国传统政治思想为基础，强调传统中国哲学中的普世价值。


While People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s official newspaper, consistently attacks that position, the Party itself has been rehabilitating Confucius, the central figure in Chinese traditional thought, going so far as to erect a statue of him in Tiananmen Square.	就在中国共产党党报《人民日报》不断发文抨击普世价值这一理念的情况下，党却为中国传统思想的核心人物孔子恢复了名誉，以致在天安门广场东侧竖起孔子的塑像。


The Chinese School insists on adhering to Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of maintaining a low profile in international diplomacy, while the traditionalist group advocates taking on greater international responsibility.	当中国学派坚持在国际事务中实行邓小平的韬光养晦原则时，传统主义学派却呼吁中国要承担较多国际责任。


The mainstream school defines China as a developing country, pointing to China’s per capita GDP, which ranks only 104th in the world.	主流的中国学派坚持将中国定义为是发展中国家，其理由是中国目前的人均GDP仍排在世界第104位；


The traditionalists argue that China should assume responsibility for world affairs consistent with its status as the world’s second-largest economy, behind only the US.	而传统主义者则认为中国已经是仅次于美国的世界第二大经济体，因此应当在国际事务中承担起相应的责任。


Today, the impact of the Chinese School seems to be limited mostly to official statements, while the traditionalists are gradually gaining policy influence.	目前，中国学派的影响力似乎主要体现在官方的声明层面，而传统主义者对政策行为的影响却似乎有上升趋势。


For example, the Chinese government reiterated its core diplomatic principle of non-intervention in other countries’ affairs during the Libya crisis, yet China accepted the imposition of United Nations’ sanctions on Muammar Qaddafi’s government.	例如，中国政府在利比亚危机中一如既往地重申了不干涉内政的外交原则，但却批准了联合国对卡扎菲政府的制裁决议。


Moreover, China dispatched a warship and four military aircraft to the Mediterranean to help evacuate 35,860 Chinese nationals and 2,100 others from Libya.	此外中国还派出了一艘军舰和4架军用飞机赴地中海协助35860名中国公民以及其他国家的2100人撤离利比亚。


That measure, the first projection of Chinese naval power so far from home, is consistent with Confucianism, which regards morality as the top priority of policymaking, rather than Marxism, according to which economic interests alone drive foreign policy.	这一做法是中国政府第一次将中国海军部署到如此远的地方，这与儒家的理念是一致的，即将道义作为制定对外政策的首要标准，而不是像马克思主义理论那样将经济利益视为外交政策的唯一动力。


Early Confucian thinkers were writing in a world of small countries competing ruthlessly for territorial advantage.	早期的儒家思想家们著述时所面临的政治环境是诸多小国残酷地争夺领土。


For them, the key to international power was political power, and the central attribute of political power was a morally informed leadership.	他们认为，国际实力的关键要素是政治实力，而政治实力的核心则是有道义的政治领导。


Rulers, they believed, should act in accord with moral norms whenever possible.	他们认为，统治者应尽可能地依据道义规范行事。


And the sphere of concern for any humane ruler should be the whole world, not just the people of one state.	任何王者都从整个世界的角度考虑政策而不是一个国家。


Thus, thinkers such as Mencius, Confucius’s leading intellectual heir, argued that humane authorities should punish immoral rulers in other states who tyrannize their people.	因此，孔子思想的最大继承者孟子认为，王者应当惩罚那些在本国施行暴政的统治者。


Rulers who rely mostly on military or economic might divorced from morality, he argued, cannot achieve long-term success on the international stage.	他认为，不顾道义而仰仗军事或经济实力维持统治的君主是不可能长期屹立于国际舞台之上的。


Although China is building Confucius Institutes across the globe, China’s traditional political philosophy does not often play decisive role in policymaking.	虽然中国正在全世界范围内设立孔子学院，但中国传统政治哲学在决策中却并不具有决定性的作用。


China’s policy toward Libya, which differs significantly from previous policy, may or may not have been shaped by it; nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility of it becoming the mainstream of thinking in Chinese foreign-policy circles in the near future.	尽管我们无法判断是否是中国的传统思想对中国此次制定对利比亚的政策起了重大作用； 但我们不能排除这些传统思想在可见的未来成为中国外交政策圈的主流思想。


Indeed, Henry Kissinger once told me that he believes that Chinese traditional thought has a greater chance than any foreign ideology (say, Marxism or liberalism) of becoming the dominant intellectual force behind Chinese foreign policymaking.	有一次，亨利·基辛格对笔者说，他认为中国的传统思想将比任何外来的意识形态（例如马克思主义或者自由主义）都更可能成为中国外交政策制定中的主导思想。


Domestic politics is always an important factor influencing a country’s foreign policy.	内政经济是影响一国外交政策的重要因素。


At the recently concluded 11th People’s National Congress, the word heard most often in policy discussions was “happiness,” which had suddenly replaced “economic growth” as the official mantra.	在最近闭幕的第十一届全国人民代表大会上，讨论中听到最多的词是“幸福”，而不是以往官方词汇中的最常用的“经济发展”。


This change may augur future adjustments in China’s foreign policy as well, for “happiness” is a word used more frequently in Chinese traditional political thought than in Marxist political philosophy.	这个变化预示着中国外交政策在未来可能进行调整，因为“福”一词在中国传统政治思想中出现的频率要远高于马克思主义政治哲学。


According to early Confucian thinkers, a key task for rulers is to strive to improve a peoples’ happiness, which is itself grounded in a moral way of life.	早期儒家思想家认为，统治者的核心任务是提高民众福祉，其本质是基于生活的道义。


Because poverty was an obstacle to moral behavior, they believed that the state should be vitally concerned with eliminating it.	由于贫穷阻碍了实行道义，因此他们认为国家应致力于消除贫困。


The idea that the state should pursue economic growth without consideration for moral concerns was anathema to Confucius and his followers.	但是，孔子及其追随者是唾弃为求经济发展而罔顾道义的治国理念的。


In February 2010, at “Spring Festival” – one of China’s biggest holidays, marked by family reunions – Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the government should help people live with dignity and happiness.	春节是中国人家庭团圆的重要节日。 在2010年2月春节，中国国家总理温家宝发表讲话，他说，政府的工作是让人民生活得更加幸福和更有尊严。


At a press conference this month, he said that economic reform cannot succeed without political reform, and that corruption currently poses the gravest danger to China.	在2011年3月举行的一场记者招待会上，他说，没有政治体制改革经济改革不可能成功，当前面临的最大威胁是腐败。


Such statements sounded new to Chinese ears, because they accentuated politics rather than trumpeting the Party’s usual emphasis on economic determinism.	这些说法对于今天的中国人来说相当新鲜的，因为这些说法都是强调政治因素的重要性，而非党以往经常强调的经济决定论。


Today, it is impossible to tell what impact and how much influence Chinese traditional political thought – the traditional concern with moral duty, happiness, and honor – will have on China’s foreign policy. But it is certain that the influence of traditional ideas in Chinese public life is growing.	中国传统政治思想注重道义责任，我们如今还难以判断这种传统政治思想将中国外交政策产生何种以及什么程度的影响，但我们确知传统理念对中国政治生活的影响力正在增强。


Indeed, no force seems able to reverse this trend in the coming years.	在未来的几年里，没有任何力量都能在未来扭转这一趋势。


US Interest Rates Will Continue to Rise	美国利率将继续上升


CAMBRIDGE – Six months ago, I wrote that long-term interest rates in the United States would rise, causing bond prices to fall by so much that an investor who owned ten-year Treasury bonds would lose more from the decline in the value of the bond than he would gain from the difference between the bonds’ interest rate and the interest rates on short-term money funds or bank deposits.	美国剑桥—六个月前，我指出美国长期利率将上升，导致债券价格下降、拥有十年期美国国债的投资者遭受的债券价值下跌将超过他们所获得的债券利率与短期货币基金和银行存款利率之间的差额。


That warning has already proved to be correct.	这已警告被证明是正确的。


The interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds has risen almost a full percentage point since February, to 2.72%, implying a loss of nearly 10% in the price of the bond.	自2月以来，十年期美国国债利率上升了近一个百分点至2. 72%，这意味着债券价格下跌了近10%。


But what of the future?	但未来如何？


The recent rise in long-term interest rates is just the beginning of an increase that will punish investors who are seeking extra yield by betting on long-term bonds.	当前长期利率的上升只是涨势的开端，下注于长期债券寻求超额收益率的投资者将受到惩罚。


Given the current expected inflation rate of 2%, the real rate on ten-year bonds is still less than 1%.	由于目前通胀预期为2%，因此十年期债券的真实利率仍然低于1%。


Past experience implies that the real rate will rise to at least 2%, taking the total nominal interest rate to more than 4%, even if expected inflation remains at just 2%.	过去的经验表明，真实率将至少升至2%，即使通胀预期继续维持在2%，总名义利率也将升至4%以上。


The interest rate on long-term bonds has been kept abnormally low in the past few years by the Federal Reserve’s “unconventional monetary policy” of buying massive amounts of Treasury bonds and other long-term assets – so-called quantitative easing (QE) – and promising to keep short-term rates low for a considerable period.	过去几年来，美联储的买入超大量美国国债和其他资产的“非常规货币政策”——即所谓的“量化宽松”（QE）——以及在相当长的时间内维持短期利率低位导致长期债券利率一直处于反常的低水平。


Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s announcement in May that the Fed would soon start reducing its asset purchases and end QE in 2014 caused long-term interest rates to jump immediately.	5月，美联储主席伯南克宣布美联储很快就将开始减少资产购买量并将于2014年退出QE，这使长期利率应声上涨。


Although Bernanke’s announcement has focused markets on exactly when this “tapering” will begin and how rapidly it will proceed, these decisions will not affect the increased level of rates a year or two from now.	尽管伯南克的表态让市场关注“逐渐减少”将于何时开始以及将以何种速度实行，但这些决定不会影响未来一两年已经上升的利率水平。


The promise to keep the overnight interest rate low for an extended period was intended to persuade investors that they could achieve higher returns only by buying long-term securities, which would drive up these securities’ prices and drive down their yields.	在相当长的时期内将隔夜利率维持在低位的承诺本意是让投资者相信他们可以仅靠购买长期证券获得更高回报，这可以促使这些证券价格上涨、收益率下降。


But the current version of this promise – not to raise the overnight interest rate until the unemployment rate drops below 6.5% – no longer implies that short-term rates will remain low for an “extended” period.	但这一承诺的当前版本——在失业率下降到6. 5%之前不提高隔夜利率——不再意味着短期利率将在“相当长”的时间内维持低位。


With the unemployment rate currently at 7.4% – having fallen nearly a full percentage point in the last 12 months – markets can anticipate that the 6.5% threshold could be reached in 2014.	目前，失业率为7. 4%——在过去12个月中下降了近一个百分点——市场可以预期6.


And the prospect of rising short-term rates means that investors no longer need to hold long-term bonds to achieve a higher return over the next several years.	5%的的阈值将在2014年达到。 而短期利率上升的前景意味着在未来数年中，投资者不再需要持有长期债券来实现更高的回报。


Although it is difficult to anticipate how high long-term interest rates will eventually rise, the large budget deficit and the rising level of the national debt suggest that the real rate will be higher than 2%.	很难预测长期利率最终会升到什么水平，但巨额预算赤字和国民债务水平的升高意味着真实利率将高于2%。


A higher rate of expected inflation would also cause the total nominal rate to be greater than 5%.	更高的通胀预期还将导致总名义利率超过5%。


Today’s investors may not recall how much interest rates rose in recent decades.	今天的消费者可能不记得最近几十年中利率曾高到什么程度。


The interest rate on ten-year Treasuries increased from about 4% in the mid-1960’s to 8% in the mid-1970’s and 10% in the mid-1980’s.	十年期美国国债利率曾经从1960年代中期的4%左右升至1970年代的8%和1980年代的10%。


It was only at the end of the 1970’s that the Fed, under its new chairman, Paul Volcker, tightened monetary policy and caused inflation to fall.	直到20世纪70年代末，新上任的美联储主席保罗·沃尔克（Paul Walker）才开始收紧货币政策，使通胀下降。


But, even after disinflation in the mid-1980’s, long-term interest rates remained relatively high.	但是，即使在1980年代中期的通货紧缩之后，长期利率仍保持相对高位。


In 1985, the interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds was 10%, even though inflation had declined to less than 4%.	1985年，十年期美国国债利率为10%，尽管通胀已经降至不到4%。


The greatest risk to bond holders is that inflation will rise again, pushing up the interest rate on long-term bonds.	债券持有者的最大风险是通货膨胀再次上升，推高长期债券利率。


History shows that rising inflation is eventually followed by higher nominal interest rates.	历史表明，上升的通货膨胀最终会带来上升的名义利率。


It may therefore be tempting to invest in inflation-indexed bonds, which adjust both principal and interest payments to offset the effects of changes in price growth.	因此，这可能促使人们投资于通胀指数债券，这种债券调整本金和利息支付以抵消物价增长变化的影响。


But the protection against inflation does not prevent a loss of value if real interest rates rise, depressing the value of the bonds.	但若利率升高抑制了债券的价值，那么通胀保护并不能防止价值损失。


The relatively low interest rates on both short-term and long-term bonds are now causing both individual investors and institutional fund managers to assume duration risk and credit-quality risk in the hope of achieving higher returns.	短期和长期债券利率均相对较低目前正在导致个人投资者和机构资金管理者考虑久期风险和信用质量风险，以期获得更高的回报。


That was the same risk strategy that preceded the financial crisis in 2008.	这正是2008年金融危机前的风险战略。


Investors need to recognize that reaching for yield could end very badly yet again.	投资者需要认识到，追求收益率最后可能再次以悲惨结局收场。


The Specter of Global Stagflation	全球滞胀的幽灵


New York – Will rising global inflation lead to a sharp global economic slowdown?	纽约－不断加剧的全球通货膨胀会导致全球经济急剧放缓吗？


Even worse, will it revive stagflation, that deadly combination of rising inflation and negative growth?	或者更糟，它会引起不断加剧的通货膨胀和经济负增长的致命结合－滞胀吗?


Inflation is already rising in many advanced economies and emerging markets, and there are signs of likely economic contraction in many advanced economies (the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Japan).	在许多发达经济体和新兴市场国家，通货膨胀已经在不断地加剧，而且在许多发达经济体（美国，英国，西班牙，爱尔兰，意大利，葡萄牙和日本）已经有迹象表明可能会发生经济紧缩。


In emerging markets, inflation has – so far – been associated with growth, even economic overheating.	在新兴市场，通货膨胀－到目前为止－是和经济增长，有时候甚至是和经济过热联系在一起的。


But economic contraction in the US and other advanced economies may lead to a growth recoupling – rather than decoupling – in emerging markets, as the US contraction slows growth and rising inflation forces monetary authorities to tighten monetary and credit policies.	但是美国和其他发达经济体的经济紧缩可能导致新兴市场的增长挂钩－而不是脱钩－因为美国经济紧缩减缓了增长，并且不断加剧的通货膨胀迫使货币当局收紧货币和信贷政策。


They may then face “stagflation lite” – rising inflation tied to sharply slowing growth.	因而新兴市场可能面对“停滞性通膨”－不断加剧的通货膨胀和增长急剧放缓结合在一起。


Stagflation requires a negative supply-side shock that increases prices while simultaneously reducing output.	滞胀的发生需要具备这样的条件：负向供应冲击在提高价格的同时降低了产量。


Stagflationary shocks led to global recession three times in the last 35 years: in 1973-1975, when oil prices spiked following the Yom Kippur War and OPEC embargo; in 1979-1980, following the Iranian Revolution; and in 1990-91, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.	在过去35年中，滞胀冲击导致了三次全球性的经济衰退： 当石油价格在赎罪日战争以及OPEC禁运后暴涨时发生的1973-1975年经济衰退； 在伊朗革命之后发生的1979-1980年经济衰退；


Even the 2001 recession – mostly triggered by the bursting high-tech bubble – was accompanied by a doubling of oil prices, following the start of the second Palestinian intifada against Israel.	以及在伊拉克入侵科威特之后发生的1990-91年经济衰退。 即使是2001年发生的经济衰退－主要是由高科技产品泡沫破灭引起的－在反对以色列的第二次巴勒斯坦起义开始之后，也伴随着油价的翻番。


Today, a stagflationary shock may result from an Israeli attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.  This geopolitical risk mounted in recent weeks as Israel has grown alarmed about Iran’s intentions.	现在，滞胀冲击可能源自以色列对伊朗核设施的袭击。 在以色列对伊朗的意图发出强烈警告的时候，这个地区的地缘政治危机在最近几个星期加剧了。


Such an attack would trigger sharp increases in oil prices – to well above $200 a barrel.	这样的袭击可以导致油价的暴涨－稳稳地站在每桶200美元之上。


The consequences of such a spike would be a major global recession, such as those of 1973, 1979, and 1990.	油价这样暴涨的后果是全球经济的重大衰退，就像在1973年, 1979年和1990年发生的那样。


Indeed, the most recent rise in oil prices is partly due to the increase in this fear premium.	事实上，最近的油价上涨部分是由于这个恐惧溢价的增加。


But short of such a negative supply-side shock, is global stagflation possible?	但是缺少这种负向供应冲击，全球滞胀可能发生吗？


Between 2004-2006 global growth was robust while inflation was low, owing to a positive global supply shock – the increase in productivity and productive capacity of China, India and emerging markets.	在2004-2006年间，由于有正向全球供应刺激－中国、印度以及新兴市场的生产率提高和产能扩张，全球经济增长强劲但是通货膨胀水平却很低。


This positive supply-side shock was followed – starting in 2006 – by a positive global demand shock: fast growth in “Chindia” and other emerging markets started to put pressure on the prices of a variety of commodities.	这种正向供应冲击之后－从2006年开始－紧接着就是正向的全球需求冲击：“中印”和其他新兴市场经济的快速增长开始给许多的商品价格施加压力。


Strong global growth in 2007 marked the beginning of a rise in global inflation, a phenomenon that, with some caveats (the sharp slowdown in the US and some advanced economies), continued into 2008.	2007年强劲的全球经济增长标志着全球通货膨胀开始加剧，这一现象伴随着一些警示信号（美国和一些发达经济体经济增长急剧放缓），并持续到2008年。


Barring a true negative supply-side shock, global stagflation is thus unlikely.	除非有真正的负向供应冲击，全球滞胀不大可能发生。


Recent rises in oil, energy and other commodity prices reflect a variety of factors:	最近石油、能源和其他商品价格的上涨反映了多种因素的作用：


High growth in demand for oil and other commodities among fast-growing and urbanizing emerging-market economies is occurring at a time when capacity constraints and political instability in some producing countries is limiting their supply.	在快速成长及处于城市化进程中的新兴市场经济体对石油和其他商品的需求快速增长的时候，这些产品的生产国由于产能限制和政治不稳定却限制了这些产品的供应。


The weakening US dollar is pushing the dollar price of oil higher as oil exporters’ purchasing power in non-dollar regions declines. Investors’ discovery of commodities as an asset class is fueling both speculative and long-term demand.	美元的不断贬值在促使石油的美元价格上涨的同时，却使石油出口国在非美元地区的购买力下降。  投资者发现商品可以作为一种投资资产增加了投机性以及长期需求。


The diversion of land to bio-fuels production has reduced the land available to produce agricultural commodities.	将土地用于生物燃料的生产减少了可用于生产农产品的土地的数量。


Easy US monetary policy, followed by monetary easing in countries that formally pegged their exchange rates to the US dollar (as in the Gulf) or that maintain undervalued currencies to achieve export-led growth (China and other informal members of the so-called Bretton Woods 2 dollar zone) has fueled a new asset bubble in commodities and overheating of their economies.	宽松的美国货币政策，以及随之而来的正式将汇率盯住美元的国家的货币政策的放松（如海���国家）或者维持货币低估状态以取得出口带来的增长的国家（如中国和其他所谓的布雷顿森林体系II美元区的非正式成员），吹大了商品的新资产泡沫并使其自身经济过热。


Most of these factors are akin to positive global aggregate demand shocks, which should lead to economic overheating and a rise in global inflation.	这些因素中的绝大部分类似于正向全球累计总需求冲击，这一冲击会导致经济过热和全球通货膨胀加剧。


Exchange rate policies are key.	汇率政策是关键。


Large current-account surpluses and/or rising terms of trade imply that the equilibrium real exchange rate (the relative price of foreign to domestic goods) has appreciated in countries like China and Russia.	大额经常账户盈余和/或进出口交换比价的上升暗示着均衡实际汇率（外国商品对国内商品的比价）在诸如中国和俄罗斯这样的国家已经升值。


Thus, over time the actual real exchange rate needs to converge – via real appreciation – with the stronger equilibrium rate.	因此，随着时间的推移，实际真实汇率需要－通过真正的升值－和更强势的均衡汇率一致。


If the nominal exchange rate is not permitted to appreciate, real appreciation can occur only through an increase in domestic inflation.	如果不允许名义汇率升值，真正的升值只有通过国内通货膨胀加剧的方式才能实现。


So the most important way to control inflation – while regaining the monetary and credit policy autonomy needed to control inflation – is to allow currencies in these economies to appreciate significantly.	因此控制通货膨胀最重要的方法－在收紧控制通货膨胀必要的货币和信贷政策的同时－是允许这些经济体的货币大幅升值。


Unfortunately, the need for currency appreciation and monetary tightening in overheated emerging markets comes at a time when the housing bust, credit crunch, and high oil prices are leading to a sharp slowdown in advanced economies – and outright recession in some of them.	不幸的是，在经济过热的新兴市场国家需要货币升值以及收紧银根的时候，发达经济体里的房地产不景气，信贷紧缩以及高 油价正在导致经济急剧放缓－并且其中的一些国家发生了完全的经济衰退。


The world has come full circle.	又回到原来的问题。


Following a benign period of a positive global supply shock, a positive global demand shock has led to global overheating and rising inflationary pressures.	在一个良性的正向全球供应冲击时期之后，一个正向的全球需求冲击已经导致全球经济过热和通货膨胀压力的加大。


Now the worries are about a stagflationary supply shock – say, a war with Iran – coupled with a deflationary demand shock as housing bubbles go bust.	现在的人们的担忧是滞胀供应冲击－例如，和伊朗爆发战争－以及在房地产泡沫破灭时的通货紧缩需求冲击。


Deflationary pressure could take hold in economies that are contracting, while inflationary pressures increase in economies that are still growing fast.	通货紧缩压力会在正在紧缩的经济体中主导地位，然而通货膨胀压力却在快速成长的经济体里加大。


Thus, central banks in many advanced and emerging economies are facing a nightmare scenario, in which they simultaneously must tighten monetary policy (to fight inflation) and ease it (to reduce the downside risks to growth).	因此，许多发达经济体和新兴市场经济体的中央银行都面对着恶梦般的情形，它们必须同时既紧缩货币政策（以遏制通货膨胀）又放松货币政策（以减小经济下行的风险）。


As inflation and growth risks combine in varied and complex ways in different economies, it will be very difficult for central bankers to juggle these contradictory imperatives.	因为在不同的经济体中通货膨胀和增长风险以各种复杂的方式结合在一起，中央银行要同时处理这些对立的紧急任务将会变得十分困难。


The Spring of the Zombies	僵尸的春天


New York – As spring comes to America, optimists are seeing “green sprouts” of recovery from the financial crisis and recession.	纽约——随着美国春回大地，乐观的人看到了从金融危机和经济萧条中复苏的“绿芽”。


The world is far different from what it was last spring, when the Bush administration was once again claiming to see “light at the end of the tunnel.”	与去年春季布什政府又一次声称看到了“隧道尽头的光明”时相比，世界局势已发生了巨大变化。


The metaphors and the administrations have changed, but not, it seems, the optimism.	现在，用作比喻的东西和政府都不一样了，但乐观的想法似乎仍未改变。


The good news is that we may be at the end of a free fall.	好消息是，我们可能已经到了自由落体的尽头。


The rate of economic decline has slowed. The bottom may be near – perhaps by the end of the year.	经济下滑的速度已经减缓，低谷可能不远了——或许年底就是。


But that does not mean that the global economy is set for a robust recovery any time soon.	但这并不意味着全球经济肯定会在不远的将来强力回弹。


Hitting bottom is no reason to abandon the strong measures that have been taken to revive the global economy.	经济探底不是放弃用来振兴全球经济的强有力措施的理由。


This downturn is complex: an economic crisis combined with a financial crisis.	这段时期的低迷是复杂的：经济危机与金融危机联袂来袭。


Before its onset, America’s debt-ridden consumers were the engine of global growth.	危机发生之前，债台高筑的美国消费者是全球增长的发动机。


That model has broken down, and will not be replaced soon.	这个模式已经崩溃，而且短期内无可替代。


For, even if America’s banks were healthy, household wealth has been devastated, and Americans were borrowing and consuming on the assumption that house prices would rise forever.	因为，即便假设美国的银行是健康的，但家庭财富也已经损失殆尽，而美国人的借贷和消费是建立在房价会永远上涨的基础之上的。


The collapse of credit made matters worse; and firms, facing high borrowing costs and declining markets, responded quickly, cutting back inventories.	信用的崩溃使事情进一步恶化； 而面对高昂的借贷成本和不断衰退的市场，商家迅速做出反应，削减了库存。


Orders dropped abruptly – well out of proportion to the decline in GDP – and those countries that depended on investment goods and durables (expenditures that could be postponed) were particularly hard hit.	订单数量急剧减少——比例远远高于GDP的下降幅度——那些依赖投资货物和耐用品（可以推迟的开支）的国家受到的打击尤其严重。


We are likely to see a recovery in some of these areas from the bottoms reached at the end of 2008 and the beginning of this year. But examine the fundamentals: in America, real estate prices continue to fall, millions of homes are underwater, with the value of mortgages exceeding the market price, and unemployment is increasing, with hundreds of thousands reaching the end of their 39 weeks of unemployment insurance.	上述部分领域在2008年底和今年初探底之后可能会有所回升，但仔细考虑一下基本的问题：美国房价持续下降，数百万的住宅价格潜水，致使按揭价值高于市场价格，而且失业率仍在上升，数十万人的39周失业保险行将结束。


States are being forced to lay off workers as tax revenues plummet.	随着税收直线下跌，各州都在被迫裁减员工。


The banking system has just been tested to see if it is adequately capitalized – a “stress” test that involved no stress – and some couldn’t pass muster.	银行系统刚经受了一场资本状况的考验——一场没有压力的“压力”考验——有些银行没有及格。


But, rather than welcoming the opportunity to recapitalize, perhaps with government help, the banks seem to prefer a Japanese-style response: we will muddle through.	但是，这些银行并不乐意抓住机会，在政府可能给予的帮助下调整资产结构，而是倾向于采取一种日本式的态度：我们能将就。


“Zombie” banks – dead but still walking among the living – are, in Ed Kane’s immortal words, “gambling on resurrection.”	“僵尸”银行——已经死亡但仍混迹于生者之间——用Ed Kane不朽的话语来说，企图“置之死地而后生”。


Repeating the Savings ampamp; Loan debacle of the 1980’s. the banks are using bad accounting (they were allowed, for example, to keep impaired assets on their books without writing them down, on the fiction that they might be held to maturity and somehow turn healthy).	这些重蹈上世纪80年代储蓄与借贷大崩溃覆辙的银行正在使用不良会计行为（例如，他们获许在账簿上保留减值资产，而不需要降低账面价值，幻想这些资产可以持有到期，然后神奇地变成健康资产）。


Worse still, they are being allowed to borrow cheaply from the United States Federal Reserve, on the basis of poor collateral, and simultaneously to take risky positions.	更糟糕的是，他们还获许以极少的抵押从美联储借款，同时购入高风险资产。


Some of the banks did report earnings in the first quarter of this year, mostly based on accounting legerdemain and trading profits (read: speculation).	今年第一季度，某些银行的报告中的确有了收益，其中大部分是会计障眼术和交易利润（亦即：投机买卖）。


But thiswon’t get the economy going again quickly.	但是经济不会因此而迅速回暖。


And, if the bets don’t pay off, the cost to the American taxpayer will be even larger.	而且，如果这些投机不能赢利，美国纳税人付出的代价将会更大。


The American government, too, is betting on muddling through: the Fed’s measures and government guarantees mean that banks have access to low-cost funds, and lending rates are high.	美国政府也打算碰运气蒙混过关：美联储的措施和政府的担保意味着银行可以获得低成本的资金，而贷款利率则会很高。


If nothing nasty happens – losses on mortgages, commercial real estate, business loans, and credit cards – the banks might just be able to make it through without another crisis.	如果一切顺利——没有按揭、商业地产、企业贷款和信用卡方面的损失——银行说不定还能勉强过关，不会陷入另外一场危机。


In a few years time, the banks will be recapitalized, and the economy will return to normal.	几年后，银行会调整资本结构，经济会恢复正常。


This is the rosy scenario.	这是乐观的想法。


But experiences around the world suggest that this is a risky outlook.	然后世界各地的经验告诉我们，这个希望比较渺茫。


Even  were banks healthy, the deleveraging process and the associated loss of wealth means that, more likely than not, the economy will be weak.	就算银行是健康的，去杠杆化过程和连带的财富损失多半会造成经济的衰弱。


And a weak economy means, more likely than not, more bank losses.	而衰弱的经济又多半意味着银行的损失会更多。


The problems are not limited to the US.	这些问题不仅限于美国。


Other countries (like Spain) have their own real estate crises.	其他国家（例如西班牙）也各有各的地产危机。


Eastern Europe has its problems, which are likely to impact Western Europe’s highly leveraged banks.	东欧面临着自身的问题，而这些问题很可能会对西欧高度杠杆化的银行造成冲击。


In a globalized world, problems in one part of the system quickly reverberate elsewhere.	在全球化的世界里，整个系统的某一部分出现问题，会很快在其他地方激起回响。


In earlier crises, as in East Asia a decade ago, recovery was quick, because the affected countries could export their way to renewed prosperity.	在以往的危机里，例如十年前���东亚金融危机，经济复苏的过程很快，因为受到影响的国家可以通过出口重新实现繁荣。


But this is a synchronous global downturn.	但当前的危机是一场全球同步发生的衰退。


America and Europe can’t export their way out of their doldrums.	美国和欧洲不能通过出口摆脱萧条。


Fixing the financial system is necessary, but not sufficient, for recovery.	调整金融系统势在必行，但仅仅如此还不足以恢复经济。


America’s strategy for fixing its financial system is costly and unfair, for it is rewarding the people who caused the economic mess.	美国调整自身金融系统的策略代价高昂，而且不公平，因为它在奖励造成经济混乱的罪魁祸首。


But there is an alternative that essentially means playing by the rules of a normal market economy: a debt-for-equity swap.	其实我们还有另外一个基本上遵循正常市场经济规则的选择：债券转股权。


With such a swap, confidence could be restored to the banking system, and lending could be reignited with little or no cost to the taxpayer.	这样的转换可以重塑人们对银行系统的信心，纳税人无需付出或只需要付出一点点代价就可以重新引发借贷的浪潮。


It’s neither particularly complicated nor novel.	这个办法既不特别复杂，也不是新兴事物。


Bondholders obviously don’t like it – they would rather get a gift from the government.	债券持有人肯定不喜欢它——他们更希望得到政府的免费馈赠。


But there are far better uses of the public’s money, including another round of stimulus.	但是公众的财产可以用在更加有益的地方，包括又一轮的激励措施。


Every downturn comes to an end. The question is how long and deep this downturn will be.	每一次经济衰退都会结束，问题是衰退的长度和程度如何。


In spite of some spring sprouts, we should prepare for another dark winter: it’s time for Plan B in bank restructuring and another dose of Keynesian medicine.	尽管有一些春天的萌芽，但我们还是应该为下一个黑暗的冬天做好准备：是时候实施第二套银行重组的方案了，也是时候再打一剂凯恩斯主义的强心针了。


Autumn of the Patriarchs	独裁者的黄昏


MADRID – “How difficult it is to die!”	马德里—“死何其难也！


Francisco Franco is reputed to have exclaimed on his deathbed.	”这是弗朗哥的临终名言。


Death, it seems, is always particularly difficult for autocrats to manage, even when they succeed in dying of natural causes.	死亡似乎对于独裁者来说特别困难，即使在他们因自然原因成功死去时。


A dictator’s death throes are always a form of theater, featuring ecstatic masses, would-be successors fighting for political survival, and, behind the scenes, the dictator’s coterie locked in efforts to extend the life of their patriarch until they can secure their privileges.	独裁者的垂死挣扎总是大戏的开幕——欣喜若狂的大众、为政治生涯斗争的潜在继任者、还有独裁者的亲信，他们往往居于幕后，竭尽全力延长主子的生命以确保自己的地位。


Franco’s son-in-law, who was also the family doctor, kept the dying despot on life-support machines for more than a month.	弗朗哥的女婿兼家庭医生靠着生命支持设备将行将就木的独裁者的阳寿生生拉长了一个多月。


It is not exactly clear how long Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was actually dead before his passing was officially announced.	尚不清楚委内瑞拉的查韦斯在实际死亡了多久之后才被正式宣布死讯。


Buying time to secure their own political future, Venezuelan officials carefully stage-managed Chávez’s illness and eventual death, even suggesting near the end, while he was undergoing complex and agonizing cancer treatments, that he was still “walking and exercising.”	委内瑞拉官员需要时间来确保自身的政治未来，他们精心地安排着查韦斯的病情和最终的死亡，即使在查韦斯弥留之际、接受复杂而痛苦的癌症治疗时，他们仍宣称他仍在“散步和运动”。


The information vacuum was reminiscent of the secrecy surrounding the deaths of Stalin and Mao, and the practice in the Ottoman empire of keeping the sultan’s death a secret for weeks until the succession was settled.	其信息真空让人想起了斯大林和毛泽东逝世前后的故作神秘，以及土耳其帝国将苏丹死讯保密数周、直到继任者尘埃落定方才公布的做法。


The emotional manipulation of the mise-en-scene surrounding Chávez’s death appears certain to translate into electoral support for his grey successor, Nicolás Maduro.	围绕查韦斯之死的舞台布景的感情控制必然会演变为对其毫无个人魅力可言的支持者马杜罗的选举支持。


But will this suffice to create a Chávista lineage?	但这样就足以创造一个查韦斯世系吗？


In Argentina, despite the disaster of Juan Perón’s return to power in 1973, after an 18-year exile, Perónism was reincarnated in the 1980’s in the presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem, and again with the arrival of President Néstor Kirchner and, later, his wife, current President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.	在阿根廷，1973年庇隆的重掌大权带来了一场灾难，尽管如此，18年后，庇隆主义在20世纪80年代梅内姆总统任期内卷土重来，接着是基什内尔总统以及随后其妻、现任总统费尔南德兹。


Fernández’s melodramatic speeches are a transparent attempt to elevate her late husband to saintly status, just as Perón elevated his wife, Evita, to sainthood.	费尔南德兹夸张的演说显然意在将其已故丈夫提升到圣人的地位，一如庇隆神化其妻艾薇塔。


Upon taking office, she swore allegiance not only to the constitution, but to “Him” (Kirchner) as well.	执政以来，她不但宣誓效忠于宪法，也宣誓效忠于“他”（基什内尔）。


Unlike mere mortals, dictators do have a good chance of enjoying an afterlife.	与芸芸众生不同，独裁者确实更可能享受死后荣光。


In ancient Egypt, deceased Pharaohs were embalmed and deified.	在古埃及，死去的法老会做成木乃伊放入神庙。


After Augustus, the first Roman princeps, the Senate could vote deceased emperors into divine status.	在罗马第一公民奥古斯都之后，元老院可以投票赋予驾崩皇帝圣人地位。


Such an apotheosis, of course, served the political interests of the emperor’s successors, who could claim a godly lineage while aspiring to be raised to godlike status themselves.	当然，如此崇拜是为了满足皇帝继任者的政治利益，他可以自称神授君权，同时还可以授予自己神圣地位。


Chávez excelled in ridiculing his political enemies, but he was too much of a narcissist to approach the end with the kind of humor that, according to Suetonius, inspired Emperor Vespasian’s deathbed quip: “Oh dear, I must be turning into a God.”	查韦斯长于戏弄政敌，但他太过于自我陶醉，无法在弥留之际像维斯帕先那样临终自嘲：“天哪，我一定会成为神。 ”（苏维托尼乌斯记载）。


The grotesque idea of embalming Chávez’s body was finally discarded precisely because of the damage suffered by the corpse during its display to the masses in a chaotic exercise in political manipulation.	长久保持查韦斯遗体的可笑想法最终被放弃，正是因为尸体在政治操纵的匆忙之中向大众展示期间会遭受损坏。


A god, certainly not, but a saint, perhaps.	肯定不是。 圣人？


Indeed, what was good enough for “Santa Evita,” as the Argentine writer Tomás Eloy Martínez called her, might be good enough for Chávez.	有可能。 事实上，“圣艾薇塔”（阿根廷作家马丁内兹如是说）已足够好，查韦斯亦然。


Like the dying tyrant in Gabriel García Márquez’s The Autumn of the Patriarch, who righteously lamented the fate that would befall the poor after his passing, Chávez will remain for years to come the saintly benefactor, martyr, and redeemer of the destitute in the eyes of the Venezuelan masses.	就像马尔克斯《独裁者的黄昏》（The Autumn of the Patriarch）中的垂死独裁者——他道貌岸然地对身后穷苦大众的命运表示哀痛——查韦斯在多年中都会被委内瑞拉民众视为神圣的施主、殉道者和穷人的救世主。


Indeed, he is likely to achieve the kind of immortality that he always believed he deserved.	事实上，他有可能获得他认为自己该得的不朽。


Part of the legend is almost invariably the mystery surrounding the circumstances of the leader’s death.	传奇中有一部分几乎永远不会改变，它们是围绕在领袖之死周围的神秘感。


An ordinary, natural death does not accord with the superhero image of the patriarch fighting the nation’s enemies.	稀松平常的自然死亡与独裁者外御强敌内惩国贼的英雄形象格格不入。


Maduro’s conspiracy theory that his mentor’s cancer was the result of poisoning by “the dark forces that wanted him out of the way” is not particularly original, though it does raise the stakes.	马杜罗的阴谋论——他的革命导师的癌症是因为“想让他让路的黑暗势力”投毒造成的——并不新鲜，尽管这的确增加了传奇性。


Chávez himself always maintained that his idol, Simón Bolívar, was poisoned by his enemies in Colombia in 1830.	查韦斯本人一直说，他的偶像玻利瓦尔1830年在哥伦比亚死于敌手投毒。


History, more imaginary than real, offers Maduro a score of additional examples.	历史的想象力总是大于现实。 历史给了马杜罗的说法更多例证。


Was Napoleon slowly poisoned by arsenic during his exile in St. Helena?	拿破仑是因为在圣赫勒拿岛流放期间被砒霜慢慢毒死的吗？


Did Lenin die of syphilis, a massive stroke, or poisoning by Stalin?	列宁是死于梅毒、大中风还是被斯大林毒死的？


Given the bizarre circumstances of Stalin’s own death, was he poisoned by his secret police chief, Lavrentiy Beria, or perhaps by his archenemy, Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito?	斯大林本人也死得颇为离奇，他是被秘密警察头子贝利亚毒死的吗？ 又或许是被主要对手、南斯拉夫的铁托毒死的？


Did “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il suffer a heart attack in bed, or, more nobly, on a train trip while working for the welfare of his beloved people?	“敬爱的领袖”金正日的心脏病是在床上还是在火车上为他所爱的人民谋福利时发作的？


Allegations of poisoning by the wicked imperialists are, of course, a feature of the official Kim death story.	当然，指控邪恶帝国主义者投毒也是金正日之死官方消息的一部分。


Maduro himself invoked the rumor that the Israelis poisoned former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat.	马杜罗本人援引了以色列毒杀前巴勒斯坦总统阿拉法特的流言。


He could just as well refer to Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, who dropped dead of a heart attack in 1970; Nasser’s confidant, the journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, always maintained that the president had been poisoned by his deputy and successor, Anwar El Sadat.	他还提到了埃及1970年死于心脏病的纳赛尔； 纳赛尔的密友、记者西凯尔（Mohamed Hassanein Heikal）一直宣称纳赛尔是被其副手兼继任者萨达特毒死的。


Although Chávez’s legend may survive, Chávismo probably will not, for it is not truly a doctrine, but a sentiment based on the rejection of the old political order and the invention of enemies.	尽管查韦斯的传奇可能持续下去，但查韦斯主义未必能够，因为他并不是真正的意识形态，而只是基于对旧政治制度的抵制和树立新敌人的情绪。


It lacks the solid foundations of, say, Perónism, an inclusive movement that relied on a traditionally well-organized working class and a nationalistic bourgeoisie.	它缺少像（比如）庇隆主义这样的扎实的基础，前者是一场包容性运动，其根基在于具有良好组织性传统的工人阶级和民族主义资产阶级。


Chávismo, apart from its reliance on charismatic leadership, has never amounted to more than a social program hitched to an oil bonanza.	查韦斯主义全靠天赋异禀的领导力，无非是借着石油财富的东风推行的社会计划。


The Stem-Cell Race Continues	干细胞竞赛依旧


Scientific research is usually conducted to improve our lives, but it is also an industry, one that represents a massive investment by governments and corporations alike.	开展科学研究主要是为了改善提高我们的生活，但是，这也是一项产业，代表了来自政府和企业界的巨额投资。


The stakes and potential rewards for a few research topics are exceptionally high, which is why the recent finding that the Korean scientist Hwang Woo-suk fabricated the results of his work on stem cells has reverberated so widely.	某些研究课题所牵涉的利益和潜在的回报极为巨大，这也就是为什么最近披露韩国科学家黄禹锡炮制他的干细胞研究结果造成了巨大的反响。


The episode highlights the ongoing race in global health research that is playing out in the field of stem cells.	这一事件突出了在正在进行的全球医疗研究中干细胞方面的竞赛。


Possibly one of the biggest prizes in medical history is up for grabs, and anyone – truly anyone – could seize it.	有可能是医学史上最大的奖项正有待人争取，而且的确是任何人都有可能获得。


The last big scientific race of this type was the effort to map the human genome, which promises to alter future lives radically.	最近的这种大规模科学竞赛是争取绘制人类基因组，这一成果肯定会令我们的未来生活大为改观。


That study was initiated by the United States, which used insights developed in the wake of the atomic bombing of Japan to understand the extent of long-term genetic damage.	美国倡导了这一研究，该国利用在原子弹轰炸日本后所得到的深入了解来理解长期基因损害的程度。


The current research effort on stem cells and their potential is just as grand, because it will lead to an equally radical medical revolution.	目前对干细胞及其潜能的研究也同样恢宏巨大，因为这会引发同样剧烈的医学革命。


A stem cell is special because it is able to reproduce a form that is different from itself.	干细胞之所以特殊是因为它能够产生有别于自身的形式。


Whereas a skin cell or a liver cell, for instance, can reproduce only more skin or liver, stem cells, which are the most robust at the beginning of human development, are “master” cells.	例如，皮肤细胞或者肝脏细胞只能复制更多的皮肤或者肝脏。 作为人类发育开端中最为活跃的细胞，干细胞是“主”细胞。


As a fertilized egg turns into an embryo, and then a fetus, those initial stem cells somehow show their daughter cells how to become skin, liver, eye, or bone.	受精卵变成胚胎，然后变成胎儿，这些最初的干细胞不知怎的告诉他们的子细胞如何成为皮肤、肝脏、眼睛以及骨头。


We need to know how this transformation is activated.	我们需要了解这一转变是如何被激活的。


Such knowledge would lead to huge, patentable advances.	知道了这些就会导致巨大的、可以申请专利的科学进步。


Most attention is focused on genetic diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, and to muscular dystrophy.	我们主要把精力集中在基因疾病，例如阿尔茨海默氏病、帕金森氏病以及肌肉营养不良上。


In these cases, stem cells would be encouraged to restore nerve tissue.	在这些情况中，我们鼓励干细胞恢复神经组织。


This would also benefit patients with brain and spinal injuries, or those who have suffered strokes and paralysis.	这将有利于脑部和脊椎损伤以及遭受中风和瘫痪的病人。


There would be gains in parallel fields, too, such as gene therapy.	在某些相近的领域，例如基因治疗上也会取得进展。


A stem cell changes its identity through a process of “triggering” – a signal literally “turns on” the liver cell gene inside the stem version.	干细胞通过一种“触发”机制来改变其特征。 所谓“触发”，就是一种在干版本中“打开”肝脏细胞基因的信号。


When scientists figure out how to flip these switches, it might be possible to introduce stem cells into the body and activate them so that they correctly replace damaged tissue, whatever it is.	当科学家们知道了如果搬动这些开关时，就有可能将肝细胞引入人体并激活它们从而可以正确地取代任何受到损害的组织。


Not surprisingly, given its huge potential, teams of scientists have been mobilized almost everywhere for embryonic stem cell research.	鉴于其巨大的潜力，几乎世界各地的科学家都投身于胚胎干细胞的研究也就并不奇怪了。


The race has become all the more dramatic since the leading researcher, the US, dropped out, owing to the influence of religion on politics (although the state of California has decided not to miss out, and recently approved a $3 billion subsidy for embryonic stem cell research).	美国由于宗教对政治的影响而退出（尽管加利福尼亚州已经决定不退出，并且最近批准30亿美元补贴用于胚胎干细胞研究），从此以后，这一竞赛变得更为富有戏剧性。


Because the promise is so great, and the science does not require massive infrastructure, many smaller countries have rushed to take advantage of the absence of the US.	由于前景如此广阔，而且科学并不要求巨大的基础设施，许多小国都争先恐后地利用美国的空缺。


Any competent medical research center can enter the race, whether in Mexico, Ethiopia, Indonesia or Yemen.	任何一个合格的医学研究中心都可以加入到竞赛中来，而无论它是坐落在墨西哥、埃塞俄比亚、印尼还是也门。


Whoever wins will have added the equivalent of a Saudi oil field to their economy.	无论谁获胜，都将会把相当于沙特的一个油田增加到他们的经济中。


But, although anyone can win, science at this level is never a “eureka” event, with some single breakthrough suddenly ending the race.	但是，尽管任何人都可以赢，这一层面的科学决不是“尤里卡”式的事件，也就是某一个单独的突破突然间终结了竞赛。


Discoveries occur incrementally, and, because it is science, each step is announced and tested.	发现是递增出现的，而且，由于这是科学，所以要宣布和测试每一步。


Research establishments gain momentum this way, with the leaders sweeping up talent, resources, and prestige in a rough-and-tumble intellectual ecology.	研究机构以此来获得发展势头，而其领导人则在杂乱无章的知识生态环境中搜刮人才、资源以及显赫的地位。


Embedded in the larger race are many smaller ones, which jostle for early, impressive results.	在更大的竞赛中还有许多较小的竞赛，它们争取取得更早一点和印象深刻的结果。


In May 2005, Hwang’s research center in Seoul reported the first major achievement.	2005年5月，黄禹锡在汉城的研究中心报告了第一项重大成就。


They claimed that they had developed a technique whereby new, perfect stem cells could be cloned from ordinary ones.	他们宣称，他们已经开发了一项新的技术，可以从普通的干细胞中克隆出完美的干细胞。


This was big news, for it implied that sufficient numbers of stem cells could be made without controversy, thus allowing anyone to be able to do quality research while avoiding what US President George W. Bush described as “taking a life to save a life.”	这是重大新闻，因为这预示足够量的干细胞可以无需争议而获得，这样就可以让任何人做高质量的研究而避免美国总统布什所描述的“为了挽救一个生命而夺去另一个生命”。


More importantly, the Koreans did a common thing these days: they claimed patent rights over the process.	更为重要的是，韩国人做了一件当下时兴的事情，那就是他们对过程也宣称拥有专利。


It almost looked for a moment as though South Korea would become a world superpower in health matters.	有段时间看起来好像韩国将会成为健康医疗方面的超级大国。


We now know that the Seoul researchers made up the whole thing.	我们现在知道汉城的研究人员完全造假。


An investigation by a Seoul National University investigative panel has concluded that the “cloned” stem cells were really created by test-tube fertilizations.	汉城国立大学的调查小组调查结论为，“克隆”的干细胞确实是由试管受精制造的。


The fraud has bewildered the science community, particularly because the claim that the Korean researchers made was so transparently false.	这一诈骗行为令科学界大为不解，尤其是因为韩国研究人员所宣称的东西如此明显虚假。


Why, then, did they place their reputations and careers in jeopardy?	那么，他们为什么置声誉和事业于不顾呢？


Medical research has always faced many challenges, even when the scientific quest was simply one of discovery.	医学研究总是面临诸多挑战，即使是当科学探索仅仅是一项发现时。


Now, the challenges are complicated by politics, market forces, and national interests.	现在，政治、市场力量以及国家利益把挑战复杂化了。


With stem cell research, huge fortunes depend on which group takes the lead, wherever their laboratory is located.	对于干细胞研究而言，发迹取决于哪一个研究小组取得领先，而无论他们实验室坐落何处。


As the competition heats up, we should expect amazing developments – and no doubt more public relations gimmicks.	在竞争越发激烈之时，我们可以预料将会有令人惊叹的发展，而且，毫无疑问，会有更多的公关诡计。


The Stimulus Ostriches	经济“鸵鸟政策”


BERKELEY – Of all the strange things that have happened this winter, perhaps the strangest has been the emergence of large-scale Republican Party opposition to the Obama administration's effort to keep American unemployment from jumping to 10% or higher.	柏克利——今年冬天怪事不断，最为奇怪的事情莫过于是大批共和党人对奥巴马政府经济政策的抵制，难道为了控制失业率错了么? 难道他们希望失业率业率高达10%甚至更高？


There is no doubt that had John McCain won the presidential election last November, a very similar deficit-spending stimulus package to the Obama plan – perhaps with more tax cuts and fewer spending increases – would have moved through Congress with unanimous Republican support.	如果是约翰·麦肯恩赢得去年11月份总统大选，他也会推出类似于奥巴马的财政赤字救援方案——恐怕会是更多的减税和更少的政府支出——那自然会在国会得以通过，得到共和党的一致支持。


As N. Gregory Mankiw said of a stimulus package back in 2003, when he was President George W. Bush's chief economic advisor, this is not rocket science.	早在2003年，当时格里高利·曼昆出任小布什总统的首席经济顾问，他就提到过经济刺激方案，这并不是什么高深的问题。


Deficit spending in a recession, he said, “help[s] maintain the aggregate demand for goods and services.	“在经济衰退期间的政府的负债消费“，他说：“有利于维持商品及服务的持续需求，这并不是什么新鲜的事情。


There is nothing novel about this.	，而是非常传统的短期稳定市场的政策。


It is very conventional short-run stabilization policy: you can find it in all of the leading textbooks...”	你可以在任何经典教科书里找到。 ”


I can understand (though I disagree with) opponents of the stimulus plan who believe that the situation is not that dire; that the government spending will be slow and wasteful (whereas properly targeted tax cuts would provide a more effective stimulus); and thus that it would have been better to defeat Obama’s stimulus bill and try again in a couple of months.	虽然我不同意，但我可以理解，反对经济救援计划的人认为目前的局势还没有那么紧急，政府的支出也是迟缓且过于浪费。 （如果减税的目标群体明确，救援的效果就会明显）因此，杯葛奥巴马的救援计划，让它推迟几个月通过也不是什么错误的事情。


I can also understand (though I disagree with) opponents who believe that the short-run stimulus effect of the plan will be small, while America’s weak fiscal position implies a large long-run drag on the economy from the costs of servicing the resulting debt.	虽然我不同意，但我可以理解，短期的经济刺激计划效果有限，因为庞大的债务是导致的美国经济大幅衰退的原因，美国现在经济形势相当羸弱，财政政策的效果甚是有限。


What I do not understand is opposition based on the claim that the stimulus package simply will not work: the government will spend its money, households will receive their tax rebates, and nothing will happen afterwards to boost employment and production.	而我所不能够理解的是，反对者居然声称，经济救援方案根本不起任何作用。 难道政府增加支出，家庭得到减税实惠，就对失业率的下降和生产力的提高没有丝毫作用？


In fact, there is a surprisingly large current of thought that maintains that stimulus packages simply do not work, ever.	在现实中，居然有相当多数的人认为经济救援计划根本没有任何效果。


This opposition is not coming only from politicians who are calculating that opposition to whatever is proposed may yield electoral benefits; indeed, it does not even reflect any coherent right-wing or indeed left-wing political position.	这种反对的声音不仅仅是来自政客们，因为他们知道“抵制任何提案”都会给他们带来选票的好处； 实际上，这也不能完全归咎于一贯的“行右实左”政治立场。


Root-and-branch stimulus opponents whose work has crossed my desk recently include efficient-markets fundamentalists like the University of Chicago’s Eugene Fama, Marxists like CUNY’s David Harvey, classical economists like Harvard’s Robert Barro, gold bugs like the Council on Foreign Relation's Benn Steil, and a host of others.	纽约市立大学教授，马克思主义的捍卫者大卫·哈维； 哈佛大学教授，古典经济学者罗伯特·巴罗，还有对外关系委员会的本•斯泰尔这样的“金本位主义者”等。


I simply do not understand their arguments that government spending cannot boost the economy.	我实在不能理解他们的言论，难道政府的支出不能振兴经济么？


As far as I can tell, they are simply burying their heads in the sand.	我只能说，他们是“把脑袋埋在了沙子里”。