For too long, governments have neglected this divide.	长期以来，政府忽视了这一分歧。


Some put faith in trickle-down economics, others in a monetary-policy-driven revival of growth and employment, and still others in fiscal redistribution.	一些政府相信涓滴（trickle-down）经济学，也有一些政府相信货币政策驱动的增长和就业复苏，还有一些政府相信财政再分配。


But these solutions have delivered little respite.	但这些方案都没有起到什么效果。


Evidence speaks against the naive hope that prosperity will eventually reach all areas.	繁荣终将惠及所有人，这一天真的愿望与证据相悖。


Modern economic development relies heavily on interactions, which in turn require a high density of firms, skills, and innovators.	现代经济发展严重依靠互动，而互动需要高密度的企业、技能和创新者。


It puts a premium on agglomeration, which is why larger cities tend to thrive, while smaller cities struggle.	这就给聚集（agglomeration）带来了溢价，也是大城市更容易繁荣、小城市举步维艰的原因。


Once an area has started losing skills and firms, there is little hope that the trend will naturally reverse.	一旦一个地区开始失去技能和企业，就很难指望这一趋势会自然逆转。


Being without a job can quickly become the new normal.	失业很快就会成为新常态。


Aggregate demand expansion hardly alleviates the pain.	总需求扩张很难缓解这一痛苦。


Even if it remains true that a rising tide lifts all boats, it does not do so in an even way.	即使水涨必定船高的道理仍然成立，也并不一定所有的船都会涨得一样高。


For those who feel left out, stronger national growth often means even more prosperity and dynamism in the better-off cities, and little, if any, gain for themselves – hence a sharper, even more unbearable divide.	有些人感到自己被抛弃，对于这些人，国家增长的上扬常常意味着境况更好的城市更加繁荣、更有活力，而对他们自身来说毫无意义——因此造成了更加尖锐乃至不可忍受的分歧。


Growth itself has become divisive.	增长本身成为分歧因素。


And whereas fiscal transfers help counter inequality and fight poverty, they do little to repair the social fabric.	而尽管财政转移支付有助于遏制不平等和贫困，对于修复社会结构效果甚微。


Furthermore, their long-term sustainability is increasingly in doubt.	此外，财政转移支付的长期可持续性也日益可疑。


In her inaugural address, British Prime Minister Theresa May committed herself to a “unionist” approach to the country’s economic and social woes.	英国首相梅在其就职演说中承诺要采取“统一”（unionist）方针对付英国的经济和水乱象。


US presidential candidates have also rediscovered the strength of the demand for national and social cohesion.	美国总统候选人也重新强调国家和社会凝聚需求的重要性。


Similar concerns will no doubt be raised in the coming French presidential campaign.	类似的关注毫无疑问在即将到来的法国总统选战中也将出现。


Yet, if the ends are clear, politicians are often clueless about the means.	但是，虽然目的是清楚的，但对于手段，政客们一筹莫展。


In the US presidential campaign, trade protection is fashionable again.	在美国总统选战中，贸易保护再次成为热门。


But, while import restrictions may alleviate the pain of some manufacturing districts, they will not prevent companies from relocating where growth opportunities are the strongest.	但是，尽管进口限制或能减轻一些制造业选区的痛苦，并部门阻止公司迁往增长机会最大的地区。


They will not protect workers from technological change.	它们不会保护工人免受技术变化的影响。


And they will not recreate yesterday’s development patterns.	它们也不会复制昔日发展模式。


Most prominently in the UK, but elsewhere as well, economic migration is increasingly being called into question.	在英国最为明显、但在其他地区也显而易见的现象是经济移民越来越受到质疑。


But here, too, while restricting the entry of Eastern European workers may alleviate wage competition or stem the rise in housing prices, it will not change the relative fate of small and big cities.	但在这里，尽管限制东欧工人的进入或能缓解工资竞争或阻止房价上涨，并不能改变小城市和大城市的相对命运。


Rather than claiming the opposite, politicians should acknowledge that there are no quick fixes to the uneven geography of modern economic development.	政客不应该反其道而行之，而应该承认现代经济发展的地理不平衡问题没有速效药。


Inconvenient as it may be, the rise of the metropolis is a fact – one that should not be resisted, because it is not a zero-sum game.	这也许令人不快，但大都会的崛起是一个事实——对于这一事实，我们不应该抵制，因为这不是一个零和博弈。


Big cities do yield aggregate economic benefits.	大城市确实能产生总需求收益。


What public policy must do is ensure that economic agglomeration does not threaten equality of opportunity.	公共政策必须做的是确保经济聚集不会影响机会平等。


Governments cannot decide where companies locate; but it is their responsibility to ensure that, although where you live affects your income, where you were born does not determine your future.	政府不能决定公司开在哪里； 但它们 有责任确保，尽管住在哪里会影响你的收入，但出生于哪里不会决定你的未来。


In other words, public policy has a major responsibility in limiting the correlation between geography and social mobility.	换句话说，公共政策的一个主要责任是限制地理和社会流动之间的相关性。


As Raj Chetty of Stanford and others have shown, this is far from being the case in the US, and similar patterns can be observed in other countries.	斯坦福大学的拉伊·切蒂（Raj Chetty）和其他人指出，这绝非美国现在的情况，并且其他国家也能观察到类似的模式。


Infrastructure can help.	基础设施有所助益。


Efficient transportation, quality health services, and broadband Internet access can help smaller cities attract investment in sectors that do not rely on agglomeration effects.	高效的交通、高质量的医疗服务和宽带网络接入有助于小城市吸引不依赖聚集效应的行业的投资。


Back-office services, for example, may have an advantage in being located where office space and housing are cheap.	比如，把后台服务放在办公空间和住房便宜的地区更有利。


Finally, there is a case for limiting the selfishness of better-off areas.	最后，应该限制情况较好的地区的自私。


The distribution of competences between national and subnational levels, as well as the structure of taxation, was defined in a very different environment.	国家和省级之间的能力分配，以及税收结构需要在截然不同的环境中制定。


To mitigate the geo-economic divide, they may have to be rethought fundamentally.	要减轻地理经济分歧，必须从根本上对这些问题进行反思。


The Global Economy Confronts Four Geopolitical Risks	全球经济面临四大地缘政治风险


CAMBRIDGE – The end of the year is a good time to consider the risks that lie ahead of us.	坎布里奇—年底是考察未来风险的好时候。


There are of course important economic risks, including the mispricing of assets caused by a decade of ultra-low interest rates, the shifts in demand caused by the Chinese economy’s changing structure, and European economies’ persistent weakness.	重要的经济风险固然存在，包括十年来的极低利率所导致的资产定价错误、中国经济结构改变所导致的需求变化以及欧洲经济体的持续萎靡。


But the main longer-term risks are geopolitical, stemming from four sources: Russia, China, the Middle East, and cyberspace.	但主要的长期风险是地缘政治风险，主要来自四个方面：俄罗斯、中国、中东和网络空间。


Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia remains a formidable nuclear power, with the ability to project force anywhere in the world.	苏联已不复存在，但俄罗斯仍是可怕的核力量，并且具备在世界任何一个地方动武的能力。


Russia is also economically weak because of its dependence on oil revenue at a time when prices are down dramatically.	俄罗斯在经济上也十分疲软，因为它依赖石油收入，而石油价格出现了暴跌。


President Vladimir Putin has already warned Russians that they face austerity, because the government will no longer be able to afford the transfer benefits that it provided in recent years.	俄罗斯总统普京已经警告俄罗斯人，他们需要面临紧缩，因为政府已无力提供最近几年所提供的转移支付福利。


The geopolitical danger arises from Putin’s growing reliance on military action abroad – in Ukraine and now in Syria – to maintain his popularity at home, using the domestic media (now almost entirely under Kremlin control) to extol Russia’s global importance.	地缘政治风险来自普金越来越依靠对外动武——在乌克兰和现在的叙利亚——保持国内支持度，用国内媒体（现在几乎完全由克里姆林宫掌控）吹捧俄罗斯的全球重要性。


Russia also uses its gas exports to Western Europe and Turkey as an economic weapon, although Turkey’s recent decision to source gas from Israel shows the limits of this strategy.	俄罗斯还将其对西欧和土耳其的天然气出口作为经济武器，尽管土耳其最近决定从以色列输入天然气，说明俄罗斯的这一战略存在局限性。


As Putin responds to this and other challenges, Russia will remain a source of substantial uncertainty for the rest of the world.	只要普京需要应对这些挑战，俄罗斯就会对世界其他地区带来重大不确定性。


China is still a poor country, with per capita GDP at roughly a quarter of the US level (on the basis of purchasing power parity).	中国仍然是一个穷国，其人均GDP大约为美国的四分之一（以购买力平价衡量）。


But, because its population is four times larger, its total GDP is equal to America’s (in PPP terms).	但是，由于其人口比美国多四倍，因此其总GDP与美国持平（以购买力平价衡量）。


And it is total GDP that determines a country’s ability to spend on military power, to provide a strategically significant market for other countries’ exports, and to offer aid to other parts of the world.	而决定一国军事支出、为他国提供据战略重要性的出口市场以及援助世界其他国家的能力的正是总GDP。


China is doing all of these things on a scale commensurate with its GDP.	在这些方面，中国都在有与其GDP规模相称的表现。


Looking ahead, even with the more moderate growth rates projected for the future, China’s GDP will grow more rapidly than that of the US or Europe.	放眼未来，即使在可预见的未来其经济增长率将更加平庸，但中国GDP仍将比美国或欧洲增长更快。


China is now expanding its strategic reach.	目前，中国正在扩大其战略影响范围。


It is asserting maritime claims in the East and South China Seas that conflict with claims by other countries in the region (including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam).	它在东海和南海的领海主张与地区内其他国家（包括日本、菲律宾和越南）存在冲突。


In particular, China is relying on the so-called “nine-dash line” (originally created by Taiwan in 1947) to justify its claim to most of the South China Sea, where it has created artificial islands and asserted sovereignty over their surrounding waters.	特别是，中国依据其“九段线”（最初由蒋介石在1947年划定）论证其在南海的大部分领海主张，建造人工岛，并宣布对周边水域拥有主权。


The US characterizes China’s policy as “anti-access area denial”: an effort to keep the US Navy far from the Chinese mainland and therefore from the coasts of America’s allies in the region.	美国将中国的政策形容为“反介入区域阻绝”：试图让美国海军远离中国本土，从而也远离美国在该地区的盟友的海岸线。


China also is expanding its geopolitical influence through initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, aid programs in Africa, and its “One Belt, One Road” plan to establish maritime and territorial links through the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, extending all the way to Europe.	中国还通过亚洲基础设施投资银行、对非援助和“一带一路”计划（建立贯通印度洋和中亚、一路直达欧洲的海路和陆路联系）等工程扩大其地缘政治影响力。


The current Chinese political leadership wants a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the US and other Western countries.	中国新政治领导层希望与美国和其他西方国家构建和平合作的关系。


But, looking to the future, the challenge for the US and its allies will be to deter future generations of Chinese leaders from adopting policies that threaten the West.	但是，放眼未来，美国及其盟友的挑战将是遏制中国未来领导人采取威胁西方的政策。


In the Middle East, much of the world’s focus has been on the threat posed by ISIS to civilian populations everywhere – including Europe and the United States.	在中东，全世界的目光大多集中在伊斯兰国对全球文明人口带来的威胁上——包括欧洲和美国。


But the bigger issue in the region is the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims, a divide that has persisted for more than a thousand years.	但是该地区更大的问题是什叶派和逊尼派穆斯林之间的冲突，这一分歧已经存在了一千多年。


For most of that time, and in most places, the Shia have faced discrimination – and often lethal violence – at the hands of Sunnis.	在大部分时间、大部分地区，什叶派都受到逊尼派的歧视乃至致命暴力威胁。


Thus, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-ruled Gulf states view Iran, the region’s Shia power, as their strategic nemesis.	因此，沙特阿拉伯和其他逊尼派统治的波斯湾国家视地区什叶派力量伊朗为战略是死对头。


Saudi Arabia, in particular, fears that Iran wants to settle old scores and attempt to shift custodianship of Islam’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina to Shia control.	特别是沙特阿拉伯，它担心伊朗算旧账，试图让伊斯兰教圣城麦加和麦地那由什叶派控制。


A conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would also be a fight over the vast oil riches of the Arabia Peninsula and the enormous financial wealth of small Sunni states like Kuwait and Qatar.	沙特阿拉伯和伊朗之间的冲突也将是一场争夺阿拉伯半岛巨大的石油财富和科威特和卡塔尔等逊尼派小国的巨大金融财富的斗争。


The final source of risk, cyberspace, may soon overshadow all the rest, because borders and armies cannot limit it.	第四个风险源头——网络空间也许很快就会让其他三个相形见绌，因为你无法依靠边境和军队阻止它。


The threats include denial-of-service attacks on banks and other institutions; unauthorized access to personal records from banks, insurance companies, and government agencies; and industrial espionage.	网络空间威胁包括对银行和其他机构的拒绝服务攻击； 入侵银行、保险公司和政府机构获取个人信息；


Indeed, widespread theft of technology from US companies led to a recent agreement between China and the US that neither government will assist in stealing technology to benefit its country’s firms.	以及商业间谍。 事实上，美国公司大量发生技术失窃，这促使中国和美国一致同意双方政府都不要为了让本国企业获利而支持偷取技术的行为。


These are important issues, but not nearly as serious as the threat that malware poses to critical infrastructure – electricity grids, air traffic systems, oil pipelines, water supplies, financial platforms, and so on.	这些都是重要问题，但和恶意软件对关键性基础���施——电网、空中交通系统、石油管道、水供给、金融平台等——的威胁相比只能算小巫见大巫。


Recent cases of malware use have been attributed to China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea.	最近的恶意软件案件被认定为中国、伊朗、俄罗斯和朝鲜所犯。


But states need not be involved at all: Individuals and non-state actors could deploy malware simply by hiring the needed talent in the international underground marketplace.	但这类案件根本不需要国家介入：个体和非国家行动者只要在国际地下市场招几个所需的人才都可以部署恶意软件。


Cyber weapons are relatively cheap (and thus widely accessible) and capable of reaching anywhere in the world.	网络武器相对廉价（因此可以轻松获得），无论身在何处都能接触到。


They are the future weapons of choice for attacking or blackmailing an adversary.	它们是袭击或勒索对手的未来武器选择。


And we still lack the ability to block such attacks or to identify unambiguously their sources.	我们仍难以阻止这类袭击或明确找出它们的来源。


These four sources of risk constitute an unusually serious set of geopolitical challenges.	这四大风险源构成了极其严重的地缘政治挑战集合。


By highlighting them, I don’t mean to downplay the importance of other issues – US monetary policy, weak commodity prices, debt crises, and the like – that are likely to affect the global economy in the year ahead.	我强调它们不是为了淡化其他问题——比如美国货币政策、大宗商品价格低迷、债务危机等——在影响明年全球经济方面的重要性。


What’s special about the threats emanating from Russia, China, the Middle East, and cyberspace is that they will persist and threaten our economic future for years to come.	源自俄罗斯、中国、中东和网络空间的威胁的特殊之处在于它们持久存在，并将在多年内一直威胁我们的经济未来。


Last Man Standing	最后一个站着的人


LONDON – Much of modern geopolitics seems to be following the plot from Game of Thrones, with many countries under so much political and economic stress that their only hope is that their rivals collapse before they do.	伦敦—现代地缘政治的许多内容都符合《权力的游戏》的情节，许多国家饱受政治和经济压力，唯一的希望是对手比自己先崩溃。


So their governments cling to power while exploiting rivals’ internal weaknesses.	因此，它们的政府一面紧紧抓住权力，一面利用对手的内部弱点。


Russian President Vladimir Putin is the prime example.	俄罗斯总统普京就是非常好的例子。


His recent campaigns in Syria and Ukraine may look like the actions of a geopolitical buccaneer.	它最近在叙利亚和乌克兰的动作看起来就像是地缘政治海盗。


But the root of his adventurism is domestic weakness.	但其冒险主义的根源在于国内弱势。


Russia’s annexation of Crimea, for example, was in large part an attempt to provide Putin’s regime with renewed legitimacy following a winter of discontent, during which demonstrators took to the streets to protest his return to the presidency.	比如，俄罗斯吞并克里米亚很大程度上是为了给普京政权提供新的合法性。 此前，俄罗斯经历了一个不满的冬天，示威者走上街头反对普京回归总统宝座。


Rival powers – most notably the United States and the European Union – have introduced sanctions in the hope of widening cracks in the Russian elite, exploiting the fact that Putin has not diversified his economy away from oil and gas.	敌对势力——主要是美国和欧盟——对俄罗斯实施了制裁，希望以此扩大俄罗斯精英阶层的裂缝，这是在利用普京尚未让俄罗斯经济摆脱石油和天然气依赖实现多元化的事实。


Putin, in turn, is hoping that Russia’s economy stays afloat long enough for Ukraine to collapse.	反过来，普京希望俄罗斯经济能撑到乌克兰率先崩溃。


To hasten that process, the Kremlin has left no lever of destabilization unpulled: It has launched military incursions, manipulated Ukraine’s politics, used energy blackmail, and engaged in information warfare.	为了加速这一过程，克里姆林宫可谓无所不用其极：它发动军事入侵，操纵乌克兰政坛，进行能源勒索，并参与信息战。


Putin believes that the EU suffers from the same flaws as the former Soviet Union, regarding it as a utopian, multinational project that will crumble under the weight of its contradictions.	普京相信欧盟具有与前苏联一样的弱点，他将欧盟视为一个乌托邦式的多国联盟将因为内部矛盾而解体。


Here, too, the Kremlin has done its best to help the process along, by supporting far-right parties throughout the EU.	在这方面，克里姆林宫也是竭尽全力加快这一进程，s支持全欧洲的各个极右翼政党。


Putin seems to be hoping that if the United Kingdom votes for “Brexit” and the National Front’s Marine Le Pen is elected President of France, the EU will lose its ability to maintain the sanctions.	普京似乎寄希望于，如果英国投票选择“英国退出”，并且国民阵线（National Front）的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）当选法国总统，那么欧盟将失去维持制裁的能力。


He hasn’t stopped with Europe.	他没有止于欧洲。


After Turkish forces shot down a Russian warplane near its border with Syria in November, Putin adopted a series of measures designed to destabilize Turkey from within.	11月，土耳其军方在其与叙利亚边境附近击落一架俄罗斯战机，随后普京采取了一系列措施从内部动摇土耳其。


He imposed economic sanctions, spread rumors of corruption in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inner circle, invited the leader of a Kurdish party to Moscow, and allegedly sent arms to the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).	他采取了经济制裁，散布流言宣传总统埃尔多安亲信圈的腐败，邀请库尔德政党领袖访问莫斯科，据说还为库尔德工人党（PKK）提供军备。


The political scientist Ivan Krastev believes that “Putin seems to have dug in for a long-term policy of sapping Turkey’s economy and undermining Erdoğan politically.”	政治学家伊凡·克雷斯特夫（Ivan Krastev）相信“普京似乎制定了一个长期政策，破坏土耳其经济，并从政治上削弱埃尔多安。 ”


Elsewhere in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s monarchy and Iran’s theocracy are in a race for survival.	在中东其他地区，沙特阿拉伯王室和伊朗的神权政体也在进行生存竞赛。


The Iranian economy is a wreck after years of international sanctions, and the government has not yet managed to take advantage of the nuclear deal it struck with the US to rebuild it.	伊朗经济因为国际制裁而多年萎靡不振，政府也没有成功利用与美国达成核协议的机会重建经济。


But it has managed to rally public support by posing as a leader of the world’s Shia Muslims and undermining Saudi Arabia in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.	但它成功通过树立全球什叶派穆斯林领袖和削弱沙特阿拉伯在伊拉克、叙利亚、巴林和也门的影响力而赢得公众支持。


Predicting the collapse of the House of Saud has become a mainstay of Middle East commentary.	预测沙特王室的倒台已经成为中东评论的热门话题。


But Saudi Arabia is betting that it can keep oil prices low enough for long enough to destabilize Iran and put the US shale-energy industry out of business.	但沙特阿拉伯下注于它可以在足够长的时间里保持石油价格足够低，让伊朗先动摇并让美国页岩能行业破产。


The Saudi oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, has said that he will not cut production even if prices hit $20 a barrel.	沙特石油部长阿里·纳伊米（Ali al-Naimi）说他不会削减产量，即便石油价格触及20美元/桶。


“If the price falls, it falls,” he said. “Others will be harmed greatly before we feel any pain.”	“���果价格下跌，就跌吧，”他说，“在我们感受到痛苦之前，其他人已经饱受伤害了。


Farther east, the Chinese juggernaut is beginning to stumble.	在远东，中国神话开始步履维艰。


The analyst Minxin Pei speculates that the Chinese Communist Party’s rule may be about to come to an end. “Growth is slowing,” he writes.	分析家裴敏欣预测，中国共产党的统治快要结束了。


“The party is in disarray, because the rules it has established to limit internecine political warfare have collapsed…. Middle-class acquiescence is beginning to erode because of environmental degradation, poor services, inequality, and corruption.”	“增长在放缓，”他写道，“党也陷入了混乱，因为限制内部政治斗争的规则已经崩溃……中产阶级的顺从因为环境破坏、服务低劣、不平等性和腐败而开始动摇。


China’s rulers, for their part, are betting that they can survive a sharp economic slowdown and that the country will outgrow the US, changing the balance of power in Asia.	而中国的统治者则下注于他们能够抵挡急剧经济减速，而中国将超越美国，改变亚洲实力均衡。


One reason for President Xi Jinping’s optimism is the dire state of US politics.	国家主席习近平的一个乐观的理由是美国政治的严重状态。


For years, Congress has been gridlocked on domestic reforms, and now the world is contemplating the consequences of a victory by Donald Trump in November’s presidential election.	多年来，国会对国内改革从中作梗，而如今世界正在考虑唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）在11月的总统选举中获胜会带来什么后果。


Chinese nationalists hope that the decline of America’s relative power in East Asia will cause it to pull back, as it has from other regions, including the Middle East and Europe.	中国民族主义者希望美国在东亚的相对实力的衰落将促使其收手，就像包括中东和欧洲在内的其他地区一样。


An article published last month in China’s People’s Daily speculated that a Trump administration would snub key Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea, allowing China to become the dominant military power in the Pacific.	上个月发表于中国《人民日报》的一篇文章预测特朗普政府将冷落日本和韩国等关键亚洲盟国，让中国成为太平洋主要军事力量。


Even if Hillary Clinton wins the election, they think that the American public has lost its appetite for internationalism and that the country will turn its back on free trade and foreign intervention.	即使希拉里·克林顿赢得选举，他们也认为美国公众已经失去了对国际主义的偏好，美国将抛弃自由贸易和对外干预。


Trying to undercut a rival – even at the risk of harming oneself – is a familiar tactic in the world of business, where firms engage in price wars, hoping their competitors will go bust first and exit the industry.	削弱对手——甚至不惜自损——是商界的惯用伎俩，企业参与价格战，寄希望于竞争对手先破产并退出行业。


But it has been less common in geopolitics.	但在地缘政治中并不总是如此。


In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the end of socioeconomic development.	在1992年的著作《历史的终结和最后之人》中，弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）指出世界将达到社会经济发展的尽头。


Liberal democracy, he concluded, was the “last man,” the end point of this development.	他认为，自由民主是“最后之人”，是这一发展的终点。


He could not have been more wrong.	大错特错。


Today, the world’s great powers are no longer claiming to be the last man; all they can do is hope to be the last man standing.	如今，世界大国不再自称最后之人； 他们所能做的是希望自己是最后一个站着的人。


Angela Merkel’s Pyrrhic Victory	默克尔的惨胜


BUDAPEST – As far as Germany is concerned, the drama of the euro crisis is over.	布达佩斯—在德国人看来，欧元危机闹剧已经结束了。


The subject was barely discussed in the country’s recent election campaign.	欧元危机在最近的德国大选中几乎无人提及。


Chancellor Angela Merkel did what was necessary to ensure the euro’s survival, and she did so at the least possible cost to Germany – a feat that earned her the support of pro-European Germans as well as those who trust her to protect German interests.	总理默克尔对欧元的生存做了必要的保证，并且是以让德国的成本尽可能小的方式做出的——这一招让她同时获得了亲欧洲德国人和相信她能捍卫德国利益的人的支持。


Not surprisingly, she won re-election resoundingly.	毫不奇怪，她以压倒性优势赢得连任。


But it was a Pyrrhic victory.	但这是一场惨胜。


The eurozone status quo is neither tolerable nor stable.	欧元区现状是不可容忍不稳定。 主流经济学家称之为劣均衡；


Mainstream economists would call it an inferior equilibrium; I call it a nightmare – one that is inflicting tremendous pain and suffering that could be easily avoided if the misconceptions and taboos that sustain it were dispelled. The problem is that the debtor countries feel all the pain, while the creditors impose the misconceptions and taboos.	我则称之为噩梦，它带来了巨大的痛苦和罪过，而若维持这一噩梦的误解和禁忌被破除，它本可以轻松避免。


One example is Eurobonds, which Merkel has declared taboo.	一个例子是欧元债券，默克尔所宣布的禁忌之一。


Yet they are the obvious solution to the root cause of the euro crisis, which is that joining the euro exposed member countries’ government bonds to the risk of default.	但欧元债券是解决欧元危机根源——加入欧元让成员国政府债券暴露在违约风险之下——的显而易见的方案。


Normally, developed countries never default, because they can always print money.	通常，发达国家不会违约，因为它们可以随时印刷钞票。


But, by ceding that authority to an independent central bank, the eurozone’s members put themselves in the position of a developing country that has borrowed in foreign currency.	但是，将这一主权让渡给独立央行导致欧元区成员国沦为借贷外币的发展中国家的地位。


Neither the authorities nor the markets recognized this prior to the crisis, attesting to the fallibility of both.	当局和市场在危机前都没有意识到这一点，这表明这两者都具有易错性（fallibility）。


When the euro was introduced, the authorities actually declared member states’ government bonds to be riskless.	引入欧元后，当局实际上宣告了成员国政府债券是无风险的。


Commercial banks could hold them without setting aside any capital reserves, and the European Central Bank (ECB) accepted them on equal terms at its discount window.	商业银行可以持有这些债券而不必拔备任何资本，欧洲央行的贴现窗口也对它们一视同仁。


This created a perverse incentive for commercial banks to buy the weaker governments’ debt in order to earn what eventually became just a few basis points, as interest-rate differentials converged to practically zero.	这造成了一种不当激励，促使商业银行购买疲软国，而随着利差趋近至近零水平，这样做带来的好处最终只不过是区区几个基点。


But interest-rate convergence caused economic divergence.	但利率趋同造成了经济趋异。


The weaker countries enjoyed real-estate, consumption, and investment booms, while Germany, weighed down by the fiscal burden of reunification, had to adopt austerity and implement structural reforms.	疲软国享受了房地产、消费和投资繁荣，而承受重新统一带来的财政重担的德国彼得不采取紧缩、实施结构性改革。


That was the origin of the euro crisis, but it was not recognized at the time – and is not properly understood even today.	这就是欧元危机的起源，但当时这一点并未被识别——即使在今天也没有得到正确的理解。


Converting all outstanding government bonds – with the exception of Greece’s – into Eurobonds would be by far the best remedy.	把所有现存政府债券——希腊除外——转换为欧元债券是目前为止的最佳解决方案。


It would require no transfer payments, because each country would remain responsible for servicing its own debt.	这样一来就不需要转移支付，因为各国将继续自己负责自己的债务本息偿还。


And it would impose stricter market discipline on debtor countries than they currently face, because they could issue Eurobonds only to refinance maturing ones; any additional borrowing would have to be in their own name, and markets would impose penalty rates for excessive borrowing.	这还将让债务国面临比目前更严格的市场纪律，因为它们发行的欧元债券只能用来为到期债务再融资； 任何额外的借贷都必须以它们自己的名义进行，市场会对过度借贷课以惩罚性利率。


Yet Eurobonds would substantially reduce the heavily indebted countries’ borrowing costs and go a long way to reestablishing a level playing field in the eurozone.	但欧元债券课以大大降低重债国借贷成本，大大增加欧元区的平等性。


Germany’s credit rating would not be endangered, because Eurobonds would compare favorably with bonds issued by other major countries.	德国信用评级不会受到影响，因为欧元债券课以和其他大国债券等量齐观。


Eurobonds would not cure disparities in competitiveness; eurozone countries would still need to undertake their own structural reforms.	欧元债券无法解决竞争力不同的顽疾； 欧元区国家仍需要实施各自的结构性改革。


But they would remedy the euro’s main design flaw.	但欧元债券课以弥合欧元的主要设计缺陷。


All the alternatives are inferior: they either involve transfer payments, perpetuate an uneven playing field, or both.	所有其他解决方案都要等而下之：要么包含转���支付，要么造成欧元区的不平等，要么两者兼有。


And yet, owing to Merkel’s opposition, Eurobonds cannot even be considered.	然而，拜默克尔的反对所赐，欧元债券根本不会得到考虑。


Greece, too, is a victim of its creditors’ misconceptions and taboos.	希腊也是其债权国的误解和禁忌的受害者。


Everyone knows that it can never pay back its debt, most of which is held by the official sector: the ECB, eurozone member states, or the International Monetary Fund.	所有人都知道希腊无法偿还其债务，而其债务大部分掌握在正式部门手中：欧洲央行、欧元区成员国以及IMF。


After undergoing a lot of pain and suffering, Greece is close to posting a primary budget surplus.	在经历了大量痛苦和罪过后，希腊距离基本预算盈余已经只有一步之遥。


If the official sector could forgo repayment as long as Greece meets the conditions imposed by the Troika (the ECB, the European Commission, and the IMF), private capital would return and the economy could recover rapidly.	如果正式部门可以在希腊满足三驾马车（欧洲央行、欧盟委员会和IMF）的要求的情况下放弃索偿，私人资本就会回流到希腊，希腊就可以快速复苏。


I can testify from personal experience that investors would flock to Greece once the debt overhang was removed.	从我的个人经验看，只要债务积压得到解决，投资者就会迅速回到希腊。


But the official sector cannot write down its debt, because that would violate a number of taboos, particularly for the ECB.	但正式部门无法减记其债务，因为这会违反许多禁忌，特别是欧洲央行。


Germany would do well to remember that it has benefited from debt write-downs three times in its history.	德国应该好好想想其历史上三次大大受益于债务减记的经历。


The Dawes Plan of 1924 sought to stagger Germany’s reparations payments for World War I. The Young Plan of 1929 reduced the sum that Germany owed in reparations and gave the country much more time to pay.	1924年的道威斯计划（Dawes Plan）缓解了德国对一战赔款的偿付。 1929年杨格计划（Young Plan）减少了德国赔款债务总额，延长了赔付时间。


The post-World War II Marshall Plan provided debt relief as well.	二战后的马歇尔计划（Marshall Plan）也提供了债务纾解。


French insistence on harsh reparations payments after World War I clearly prepared the ground for the rise of Hitler.	一战结束后，法国人坚持要求对德国人施加严苛的赔款偿还，这显然为希特勒的崛起提供了温床。


The rise of Greece’s neo-fascist Golden Dawn is a similar phenomenon.	希腊的新法西斯主义政党金色黎明（Golden Dawn）的崛起亦然。


These two examples justify my description of the euro crisis as a nightmare.	这两个例子解释了为什么我把欧元危机称为一场噩梦。


Only Germany can end it, because, as the country with the highest credit rating and largest and strongest economy by far, it is in charge.	只有德国可以终结它，因为，作为目前信用评级最高、最大最坚挺的国家，德国拥有主宰地位。


Germany, mindful of its recent history, does not want to be cast in the role of a hegemonic power; the current situation is not the result of some evil German plot.	囿于最近的历史经验，德国不愿意扮演霸权的角色； 当前的局面绝非德国阴险图谋的结果。


Still, Germany cannot escape the responsibilities and liabilities that go with that role.	尽管如此，德国无法摆脱这一角色带来的责任和负担。


It must learn to act as a benign hegemon.	它必须学会成为温和霸权。


Doing so would earn Germany the lasting gratitude of the countries that are currently subordinated to it, just as the Marshall Plan earned the United States the lasting gratitude of Europe.	这样能让德国收获目前附庸于它的国家的感激，正如马歇尔为美国赢得了欧洲的长期感激。


Failure to seize this moment would, I believe, lead to the disintegration and eventual collapse of the European Union.	我认为，抓不住这一时机将导致欧元区走向分裂并最终崩溃。


Of course, many countries have lived through nightmares and survived.	当然，许多国家曾经遭遇过噩梦并最终恢复了元气。


But the EU is not a country; it is an incomplete association of sovereign states that will not survive a decade or more of stagnation.	但欧盟不是国家； 它是由主权国家组成的不完整的联盟，它无法精力十年甚至更长时间的停滞而不分崩离析。


That is not in Germany’s interest, and it would leave Europeans worse off than they were when they embarked on the EU project.	这不符合德国的利益，也会让欧洲人的境况比欧盟工程启动前更差。


Making a U-turn is never easy for political leaders, but elections do provide an opportunity for a policy change.	对政治领袖来说，一百八十度的转弯从来不是易事，但大选确实为政策改变提供了机会。


The best way to make one would be for Merkel’s next government to appoint an independent expert commission to evaluate the alternatives, without regard to the prevailing taboos.	最好机会摆在默克尔面前——她的新政府应该任命独立的专家委员会评估替代方案，不要被现存禁忌所束缚。


George W. Bush and America\u0027s Neglected Hemisphere	乔治·W·布什和美国忽略的半球


When the NATO Allies gather in Istanbul, much of the talk will concern the divisions between America and Europe over Iraq.	当二战盟国在诺曼底海滩聚会，庆祝D日登陆60周年时，人们都在谈论美欧对伊拉克问题的分歧。


But Europe is not alone in its estrangement from the United States under President George W. Bush's leadership.	但在乔治·W·布什总统的领导下，对美国日益疏远的还不仅仅限于欧洲。


Among the vast list of unforeseen consequences springing from the US fiasco in Iraq is the vital fact that, across Latin America, anti-Americanism is on the rise and is rapidly generating myriad grim effects on the region's politics.	对伊战争惨败会带来很多不可预知的后果，但最重要的是整个拉美地区的反美情绪日益高涨，并且很快对地区政治造成了复杂的影响。


The parallel with Europe does not end there.	这还不是拉美问题的全部。


Before the Bush administration, various American presidents worked hard to change the US relationship with Latin America from one of hegemon and dominated states to something like the relations that exist with the European allies.	布什执政前，历任美国总统呕心沥血，将与拉美的关系从霸主和属国间的关系转变成了类似欧洲盟友间的关系。


All of that is now gravely at risk - a dangerous turn of events.	所有这些都面临着严峻的考验¾这是个非常危险的转折点。


Complete estrangement from the US in Latin America will not only harm hemispheric relations, but may discredit broader ideas that are closely associated with the US.	拉美国家彻底疏远美国不仅会损害半球关系，还可能对与美国密切相关的其它问题产生怀疑。


Many of these pernicious side effects can already be perceived.	很多负面效果已经开始显现。


The first, and deepest, consequence consists in plummeting prestige of and respect for the US and the Bush administration in Latin American public opinion.	其中首当其冲并且影响深远的后果是：在拉美公众的心目中，美国和布什政府的声誉和威望已经开始直线下降。


This was not the case at the beginning of Bush's term as president.	布什执政开始时情况并非如此。


On the contrary, many capitals south of the Rio Grande had high expectations for the team that moved into the White House in 2001.	恰恰相反，格兰德河以南的很多国家对2001年入主白宫的班底抱有很高的期望。


After all, during his first nine months in office, Bush declared that he would devote tremendous attention to the hemisphere, and his actions seemed to back up his rhetoric.	毕竟在开始执政的前九个月，布什宣布他将对半球事务投入很大精力，接下来的行动似乎也证实了他的诺言。


He visited Mexico before any other country, renewed Temporary Protection Status for Central American immigrants, maintained President Bill Clinton's waiver of certain trade restrictions on countries and companies doing business with Cuba, and gave new impetus to the negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas.	他在上任之初首先访问了墨西哥，延长了《中美洲移民临时保护状态》，延续了克林顿总统的做法，废除了向与古巴贸易的国家和企业强加的不合理限制。 不仅如此，他还再次促动谈判，建立覆盖美洲的自由贸易区。


Iraq changed all of this.	伊拉克局势改变了所有一切。


The invasion, the absence of any weapons of mass destruction or any link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, the pictures of Iraqi civilian casualties, and the subsequent scenes of humiliating mistreatment or torture of Iraqi prisoners and detainees have all contributed to a wide, deep, and probably lasting collapse of sympathy for the US in the region.	在没找到大规模杀伤性武器或萨达姆·侯赛因与基地组织任何联系的情况下入侵伊拉克，平民伤亡惨重的资料图片，以及随之而来的羞辱虐待伊拉克战俘和被囚禁者的种种暴行，共同造成了该地区亲美情绪的广泛、深入，也许是持久的坍塌。


This can be measured in public opinion polls, in newspaper editorials, congressional resolutions, summit declarations, and street demonstrations.	这在当地的民意测验、新闻评论、议会决议、峰会宣言和街头游行中都有所反映。


A second effect follows directly from the first.	附带效果随之而来。


At least rhetorically speaking, government parties or leaders with a strong anti-US tilt are gaining ground, from Mexico City's Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador to the Frente Amplio party in Uruguay, from Schaddick Handal in the old FMLN in El Salvador to Evo Morales in Bolivia, not to mention governments like Hugo Chávez's in Venezuela and Nestor Kirchner's in Argentina.	至少从讲话上看，带有强烈反美情绪的政党和领袖占据了上风。 从墨西哥城市长Andrés Manuel López Obrador到乌拉圭Frente Amplio党，从萨尔瓦多老马蒂民族解放阵线（FMLN）的Schaddick Handal到玻利维亚的Evo Morales，更不用说委内瑞拉的查韦斯政府和阿根廷总统基什内尔。


These anti-US forces are not all necessarily left wing; they are, however, stridently critical of the US. In all likelihood, they will become more vociferous and vituperative before they mellow, because public opinion seems to be rewarding stances and tones such as theirs.	这些反美力量不一定都是左翼联盟，但都尖锐地抨击美国，而且在最终消弭前可能还会更变本加厉，因为目前的公众舆论似乎对这样的立场和态度非常有利。


America's friends in Latin America are feeling the fire of this anti-American wrath.	美国在拉丁美洲的朋友亲身感受到了这种反美怒火。


They are finding themselves forced to shift their own rhetoric and attitude in order to dampen their defense of policies viewed as pro-American or US-inspired, and to stiffen their resistance to Washington's demands and desires.	他们被迫改变自己的说辞和态度，以免被贴上亲美或美国授意的标签，加大力度抵制华盛顿的要求和希望。


In many cases, American demands and desires are contrary to Latin interests, and should be resisted.	很多情况下，美国的要求和希望与拉美利益背道而驰，应该遭到抵制。


But in other cases, opposition to America's preferences is wrought by public sentiment and goes against the instincts of leaders who know better.	但有些情况下，公众情绪的压力迫使领导者抵制美国的要求，虽然有见地的领袖们清楚应该这么做。


The Bush's administration has brought all of this upon itself.	这些都是布什政府自找的。


It could have either avoided a monumental mistake, as Iraq has now proved to be, or it could have brought the United Nations on board from the outset, ensuring that military action, and the subsequent occupation and reconstruction of the country, would have broad multilateral support.	它本可以避免如此极端的错误，伊拉克眼下的局势即是如此。 或者它本可以从一开始就让联合国参与进来，确保军事行动和接下来的占领及重建享有广泛的国际支持。


At worst, the Bush administration could have acted alone, but with sufficient force, skill, and diligence - and with the appropriate and imperative respect for human rights and international law - to get the job done quickly.	最坏情况下，布什政府可能单独行动，但也可以动用更多的力量和技巧，按照对人权和国际法适度尊重的原则，迅速地完成这项任务。


Instead, the Bush administration, for reasons that are increasingly perplexing, went at it alone.	相反，布什政府出于日益令人困惑的原因单独采取了行动。


Moreover, it did so without an endgame strategy, and with a level of force so "underwhelming" that it made the outrageous behavior at the Abu Ghraib prison almost inevitable.	不仅如此，采取行动时并未设计终结策略，力度也差之千里，才使阿布格莱布监狱令人发指的行为变得不可避免。


By so doing, Bush's team left America's friends in Latin America - no less than in Europe and elsewhere - in a hapless situation: rightly unable and unwilling to support the US march of folly, and understandably reluctant to poison hemispheric relations in general with the type of strident criticism that local public opinion demands.	这样，像欧洲和世界各地一样，布什政府将美国在拉美的盟友置于两难的境地：他们自然不能也不愿支持美国这种愚蠢的行动，但也不愿按照当地公众舆论的要求抨击美国的做法，最终损害半球关系。


Europe’s Middle East Mission	欧洲的中东使命


LONDON – America’s gradual withdrawal from the Middle East puts increasing pressure on Europe to help foster peace in the region.	伦敦——美国从中东逐步撤军使得欧洲协助维护地区和平的压力越来越大。


With complex and heated wars threatening to bring about the collapse of states like Syria and Iraq, and the long-simmering conflict between Israel and Palestine seemingly as far from resolution as ever, it is almost easier to ask what Europe should avoid than what it should do.	在激烈而复杂的战争可能造成叙利亚伊拉克崩溃、解决以色列和巴勒斯坦长期冲突似乎像以往一样遥遥无期的时候，与其纠结欧洲应该做什么，还不如想想不做什么。


The starting point must be a simple, fundamental principle: Europe should not take sides.	必须以一项简单、基本的原则为出发点：那就是欧洲不应该偏袒任何一方。


Allowing preconceptions or emotional reactions to overshadow facts could make the situation much more dangerous.	任由先入为主的偏见或情绪化的冲动掩盖事实可能加剧局势的危险性。


Consider sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shia Muslims – now the prime mover of events in the Middle East.	以现在推动中东事态发展的主要因素即逊尼和什叶派穆斯林的教派斗争为例。


Fueled by religious rhetoric and a bloody history, the conflict engenders a degree of passion and irrationality that is difficult to moderate.	在宗教煽动和血腥历史的推动下，教派冲突造成了难以控制的激情和非理性。


As has been said: “Where the fires of faith are burning, the goddess of reason tiptoes silently out of the room.”	就像人们所说的那样：“哪里燃烧着信仰之火，理性女神就蹑手蹑脚地离开了。 ”


Likewise, when it comes to the Israel-Palestine conflict, Europe must recognize that both sides are hypersensitive.	同样，当涉及巴以冲突时，欧洲必须意识到双方都极度敏感。


If they are faced with criticism that they deem unfair, they will resort to the kind of truculence and bitterness that has long thwarted efforts to reach an agreement.	如果感觉遭到不公平的批评，他们会拿出一直阻碍协议达成的那种怨恨和好战态度。


At least two-thirds of Israelis, recognizing the benefits that lasting peace would bring to the region, would prefer a two-state solution.	至少三分之二的以色列人认可长期和平将给中东带来的利益，并愿意达成双边和解协议。


But the same majority fears that the Palestinians – with the split leadership of a relatively moderate Fatah under Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and a Gaza administration under the implacable, terror-supporting leadership of Hamas – are not ready for a conventional peace and good neighborly relations.	但同时这些人也害怕巴勒斯坦人摆脱不了目前处于领导地位的相对温和的巴勒斯坦权力机构主席马哈茂德·阿巴斯和支持恐怖活动的无情的哈马斯治下加沙政府的内部分歧，以色列人因此担心巴勒斯坦人尚未准备好接受传统的和平与睦邻友好关系。


Making matters worse, concessions on either side appear to leave no impression on the other.	更糟的是，任何一方的让步似乎都得不到对方的认可。


On the contrary, they are usually met with lethal provocations that push any agreement even further away.	相反，对方却往往报之以致命的挑衅，使达成协议的前景变得更加渺茫。


Palestine’s response to Israel’s release in December of 26 political prisoners – the third batch from a total of 104 detainees that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu pledged to release when the peace talks were revived last summer – is a case in point.	一个很好的例子是巴勒斯坦对12月6日以色列释放26名政治犯（去年夏天恢复和谈时以色列总理内塔尼亚胡承诺释放的共104名拘留人员中的第三批）的反应。


Many of the prisoners had committed heinous acts of terror.	这批关押者中很多人都犯下过令人发指的恐怖罪行。


For example, Juma Ibrahim Juma Adam and Mahmoud Salam Saliman Abu Karbish firebombed a civilian bus, killing a pregnant woman, three of her preschool-age children, and the Israeli soldier who tried to save them.	比方说朱马·易卜拉欣·朱马·亚当和马哈茂德·萨拉姆·萨利曼·阿布·卡比什曾向民用巴士投掷燃烧弹，杀死一名孕妇，她3个没有上学的孩子和试图解救他们的以色列士兵。


Yet Abbas received them upon their release, praising them as heroes of the Palestinian people and examples for Palestinian youth.	但阿巴斯接见了被释放人员，并盛赞其为巴勒斯坦青年的榜样和巴勒斯坦人民的英雄。


In this fragile context, EU threats to halt business with Israeli companies present in the country’s West Bank settlements are problematic, as are academic and scientific boycotts against Israel.	在这样牵一发而动全身的大背景下，欧盟威胁中止与西岸定居点以色列企业的业务往来似乎很成问题，此外还有针对以色列的学术和科研抵制。


Indeed, such moves would be dangerously close to favoring Palestine – a sure-fire way to turn Israel against cooperation.	事实上，这些举动非常接近于偏袒巴勒斯坦——长此以往以色列肯定会停止合作。


Of course, given the role that the continual expansion of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine has played in hampering progress toward peace, it merits a more thorough and sober examination by all relevant parties – especially Israel.	当然，鉴于以色列在巴勒斯坦被占领土持续扩建定居点对和平的阻碍作用，各方，特别是以色列，需要全面清醒地审视这一举措。


This requires, first and foremost, an understanding of the issue’s scale.	这首先需要了解问题的规模。


During previous rounds of negotiations, the Palestinian Authority agreed, in principle, to exchange up to 1.9% of West Bank land for Israeli territory.	前几轮谈判中，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构同意原则上用不超过西岸面积的1. 9%交换以色列领土。


This means that Israel would be able to annex some settlements adjacent to its border, while giving up only a small share of its land – an exchange to which it should be open when serious negotiations are underway.	这意味着以色列可以吞并某些临近边界定居点，而只需要放弃一小部分领土——谈判真正开始时以色列应该认真考虑这项建议。


The good news is that Tzipi Livni, Israel’s main negotiator, recently stated that Israel would not claim isolated settlements on Arab land.	好消息是以色列主要谈判代表齐皮·利夫尼最近表示以色列不会对阿拉伯领土上的孤立定居点提出主权要求。


Through all of this, Europe must present itself as an unbiased mediator.	面对复杂局势，欧洲必须扮演公平调解员的角色。


If negotiators on both sides view it as a credible broker of a lasting and balanced agreement, they may be more receptive to each other’s concessions.	如果双方代表能将欧盟看做持久平衡协议的可靠调停人，那么他们或许更容易接受对方的让步。


The same is true of religious conflicts throughout the Middle East.	中东其他地区的宗教冲突也是如此。


Instead of getting sucked into historical enmities and impassioned disputes, Europe must be resolved to fight implacably against all forms of jihadism, while consistently supporting progress toward conflict resolution.	与其被卷入历史敌意和激烈纠纷，欧洲必须坚决反对一切形式的圣战主义，并一以贯之地支持冲突解决中取得的进步。


This does not apply only to diplomats; the European media also have a critical role to play.	不仅外交官需要努力； 欧洲媒体也必须发挥关键作用。


New and traditional outlets alike must ensure that they portray the facts accurately and dispassionately, in order to foster a constructive, fair-minded discussion.	传统和新兴渠道都必须确保冷静准确地描述事实，以促进建设性的公正探讨。


Those directly involved in the Middle East’s myriad conflicts do not need any help generating heat.	中东大小冲突的直接参与者不需要外界帮忙制造任何紧张。


Georgia on Europe’s Mind	欧洲心头的格鲁吉亚


The era in which Europe could rely on America to wage war, make peace, and establish democracy in its own backyard is over.	欧洲依赖于美国在其自己的后院发动战争、媾和以及建立民主的时代已经结束了。


With European Union enlargement, and as the recent Russian gas crisis demonstrated, that backyard now includes not just Ukraine, but Georgia as well.	欧盟东扩以及最近的俄国天然气危机表明，这个后院不仅包括乌克兰，也包括格鲁吉亚。


Indeed, as in Ukraine, Georgia is undergoing a test of democracy that Europe cannot afford to ignore.	的确，正如乌克兰一样，格鲁吉亚正在经历一场民主的考验，欧洲对此不可等闲视之。


Georgia was the first post-Soviet country to stage a “color revolution,” and thus to demonstrate, with dignity and maturity, its people’s choice for democracy and European values.	格鲁吉亚是后苏联第一个发动“颜色革命”的国家，因而表明了其人民在有尊严的条件下以及成熟地选择民主和欧洲价值观。


The European Union flags that have flown on all Georgian public buildings since then signal a natural attachment, as old as the history of a country that, for the ancient Greeks, was an integral part of the world as it was then known.	从此以后飘扬在格鲁吉亚公共建筑上的欧盟旗帜表明一种天然的、和这个国家的历史一样久远的情感。 在古希腊人的眼中，格鲁吉亚在当时是世界固有的一部分。


Prometheus, Medea, the Amazons and, in neighboring Armenia, Noah’s Ark – the Europe of our myths starts here.	普罗米修斯、美狄亚、亚马孙族女战士 以及在邻国亚美尼亚的诺亚方舟等等，我们神话的欧洲起源于这里。


With its history, culture, and traditions – including its critical, independent, and even rebellious spirit within the former Soviet Union – Georgia would seem to be an ideal candidate for successful democratization.	鉴于其历史、文化以及传统，包括其在前苏联中重要、独立乃至反叛精神，格鲁吉亚看起来都是成功民主化的理想候选人。


So it is all the more worrisome that democratization there is foundering.	因此，民主化在那里搁浅就越发令人担忧了。


Everything seemed to have started well enough.	开始看起来一切顺利。


Political reforms, privatization, anti-corruption measures, a search for new leaders untainted by compromise with the former regime, and implementation of a pro-European foreign policy met no resistance.	政治改革、私有化、反腐败措施、寻找没有与前政权妥协而有污点的新领导人以及实施亲欧洲的外交政策并没有遇到抵抗。


But the totalitarian mindset has since resurfaced in leaders who, with their claim to represent the will of the majority, appropriate more and more power.	但是，极权主义的心态重新浮现在领导人中。 他们宣称代表大多数人的意愿，攫取越来越多的权力。


Like the ancient Greeks’ Hydra, Georgia’s political elite never ceases to die and be reborn.	格鲁吉亚的政治精英们就像是古希腊的九头怪蛇从来不停止死而复生。


The same people and governing methods that the “Rose Revolution” of November 2003 sought to defeat have reemerged at the center of power by using their personal networks, which extend outside Georgia’s borders, as well as their tremendous wealth and finely honed skills at political scheming and manipulation.	2003年11月“玫瑰革命”所要推翻的人们以及统治方式通过使用其跨越格鲁吉亚边境的个人网络以及巨额财富和在政治阴谋和操纵方面长袖善舞重新浮现在了权力中心。


This bears little in common with the essence of democracy, which consists not merely in ballot boxes, but in the separation of powers.	民主要义不仅包括投票，也包括分权。 这种情况与民主要义与毫不相容。


The government meddles in the affairs of the parliament, which in turn seeks to micro-manage the government – including, in my case, the nomination of ambassadors and their daily routines!	政府干预议会事务，而议会又反过来试图对政府进行宏观管理，就我而言包括任命大使及其日常活动！


Finally, and more seriously, the judiciary is not yet independent, undermining the rule of law and thus deterring badly needed private investment.	最后，而且更为严重的是，司法还不独立，从而破坏法制而赶走急需的私人投资。


Georgia’s democracy exists in its head, but not yet in its body: citizens still spurn politics as a dirty pursuit, abandoning the ground to those who should have been retired long ago.	格鲁吉亚的民主存在于它的脑袋里，而不是它的身躯中。 国民把政治视为肮脏的追求而予以唾弃，向那些早就该退休的人退让。


But the hope of democracy remains strongly rooted in Georgia’s people, civic organizations, and media.	但是，民主的希望依然顽强地扎根于格鲁吉亚人民、公众组织以及媒体之中。


Now is the time for Europe to ensure that this hope is not extinguished.	现在，欧洲应当确保这一希望不会破灭。


The US has already done as much as it can to support political stability in Georgia since independence.	自独立以来，美国已经尽全力支持格鲁吉亚的政治稳定。


To be sure, stability was not always identified with democracy during the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Union foreign minister who was ousted as our president by the Rose Revolution.	的确，在谢瓦尔德纳泽统治时期，稳定并不总是与民主相关。 谢瓦尔德纳泽是前苏联外长，在玫瑰革命中被赶下总统宝座。


But Americans invested generously in the survival of democratic ideas and leaders.	但是，美国人慷慨地投资于民主思想及其领导人的生存。


Although the foundation backed by the financier George Soros did not fabricate the Rose Revolution, as Russian nationalists claim, it certainly nurtured, encouraged, and supported democracy’s preconditions.	尽管金融家索罗斯支持的基金会并没有像俄罗斯民族主义者宣称的那样制造玫瑰革命，但是它的确培育、鼓励以及支持了民主的先决条件。


But, to help consolidate its democracy, Georgia now requires support of a different nature, which Europe is better equipped to offer.	但是，为了巩固其民主，格鲁吉亚现在需要一种不同性质的支持，而欧洲更为便于提供这种支持。


The models for the balance of powers, the functioning of the judiciary, and local democracy must be inspired by European forms, which are closer to Georgian reality than Anglo-Saxon models of the American type.	权力制衡的模式、司法运作以及地方民主必须由欧洲形式得到鼓舞。 与美国类型的盎格鲁萨克逊模式相比，欧洲的形式更为接近格鲁吉亚的现实。


Europe’s rejection of this challenge would betray its fundamental duties in a place – small, Mediterranean, flexible, with old historical traditions – where democracy stands a much greater chance of success than in Ukraine, which is both huge and still very Soviet-minded, not to mention Central Asia.	格鲁吉亚是个小国，具有地中海式传统，灵活，而且具有古老的历史传统。 乌克兰则既是一个大国，又非常具有苏联观念。


Indeed, refusal to support Georgia’s struggling democracy would most likely postpone democratic progress in Ukraine, Belarus, even in Russia itself.	欧洲如果回绝这一挑战将会背叛其在格鲁吉亚的根本性义务。 实际上，拒绝支持格鲁吉亚奋斗中的民主将肯定推迟在乌克兰、白俄罗斯甚至是俄罗斯自身的民主进程。


This clearly raises the stakes.	这就明显地提高了忧关的利益。


Russia, while never renouncing its imperial dreams and instruments of domination, was nonetheless coming to terms with the inevitability of democracy, at least on its margins.	俄罗斯尽管从未放弃其帝国梦想以及操控手段，但还是接受民主的不可避免，至少是在它的边际上。


But this hesitant acceptance of a certain normality in its relations with its neighbors has always been vulnerable to a sudden eruption of Russia’s famously irrational “derzhava” – an aggressive ethos that glorifies the state and asserts its strength by pouncing on weakness.	但是，俄罗斯不情愿地接受其与邻国之间某种程度上的正常关系却总是会被其突如其来、为世人所知而且是毫无理性的“大国情怀”所破坏。 这是一种挑衅性的、美化国家并且通过欺压弱小来展示其力量的民族精神。


This is the key to understanding the recent Russian gas crisis.	这也就是理解最近的俄罗斯天然气危机的关键。


Just as surely, any sign of a retreat from democracy in Georgia and other post-Soviet states will merely fuel Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions.	毫无疑问，格鲁吉亚以及其他后苏联国家中任何从民主退缩的迹象将会助长俄罗斯的新霸权主义野心。


It is Europe’s responsibility to convince Russia that there is no hope of a return to the past.	让俄罗斯相信没有希望回到过去是欧洲的责任。


Europe must assume this role not only to ensure the future independence of its energy supply, but also to demonstrate that European values of freedom, democracy, and justice between peoples have real force.	欧洲必须承担这种责任，不仅仅是确保其能源供应未来的独立，而且表明在人民中间的自由、民主以及正义的欧洲价值观具有实在的力量。


To succeed, Europe must equip itself with the necessary instruments: a large semi-public foundation to promote Europe and support political reform, a university to train future executives of nascent democracies, a police force, and an army of judges and magistrates to breathe life into the models that we want to emulate.	为了成功，欧洲必须拥有必要的手段，也就是一个大规模的、半公共基金会来促进欧洲以及支持政治改革，一所培训新生民主国家未来领导人的大学，一只警力，以及一大群将生气带入我们想要模仿的模式中的法官和执法官。


Above all, Europe needs conviction.	最重要的是，欧洲需要信念。


If Europe today cannot convince itself that it has a vital interest in its neighbors’ future, who will believe in Europe tomorrow?	如果欧洲今天无法让自己确信其邻国的未来与其息息相关，谁会相信欧洲的明天？


The DNA of German Foreign Policy	德国外交政策DNA


BERLIN – The harsh reality of the past year has created unprecedented challenges for Germany and its foreign policy.	柏林—去年的严峻现实给德国及其外交政策造成了前所未有的挑战。


The crisis in Ukraine spiraled out of control, with Russia's annexation of Crimea, followed by military escalation in the eastern Donbas region, calling into question the post-1945 European order.	乌克兰危机逐渐失控，俄罗斯入侵克里米亚，随后乌克兰东部顿巴斯地区军事冲突升级，1945年后的欧洲秩序告急。


And, though the measures agreed in Minsk earlier this month offer an opportunity to enter into a political process, other crises – for example, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa and the advance of ISIS – have presented new, urgent challenges.	此外，尽管本月早些时候在明斯克达成一致的措施有望让乌克兰危机走向政治进程，但其他危机——比如西非埃博拉病毒的肆虐和伊斯兰国的兴起——带来了新的紧迫挑战。


Whether Germany should assume greater responsibility for seeking to resolve such issues is a hotly debated question, both inside and outside the country.	德国是否应该承担更大的责任寻求这些问题的解决之道是一个在德国内外引起热议的问题。


During a year-long “Review 2014," experts, officials, and the wider public discussed challenges, priorities, and instruments of German foreign policy, and tried to define Germany's role in the world.	在为期一年的《2014评估》（Review 2014）过程中，专家、官员和大众讨论了德国外交政策的挑战、当务之急和工具，并试图明确德国在世界中的角色。


At the end of the day, outcomes are always concrete.	最后的结果总是具体的。


In some areas, we have been successful over the last year; in others, we can and want to do better.	在一些领域，我们在过去的一年中做得相当成功； 在令一些领域，我们可以也希望做得更好。


Germany is widely appreciated for its commitment to promoting peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law, and a sustainable economic model.	德国致力于推进和平解决冲突、法治精神和可持续经济模式，这一点受到了广泛赞誉。


Yet it is abundantly clear from the Review that our partners expect a more active – and even more robust – German foreign policy in the future.	但《2014评估》清楚地表明，我们的伙伴期望在未来看到更加活跃——甚至更加坚挺——的德国外交政策。


Expectations are high – perhaps too high at times.	期望很高——有时也许过高了。


So it is up to Germany's people to answer the difficult questions: Where do our interests lie?	因此，德国人民需要回答艰难的问题：我们的利益何在？


How far do our responsibilities extend?	我们的责任多大？


What, in short, is the “DNA" of German foreign policy?	简言之，德国外交政策的“DNA”为何？


The basic tenets of Germany's foreign policy – close partnership with France within a united Europe and a strong transatlantic alliance in terms of both security and economic cooperation – have withstood the test of time, and will remain a cornerstone of our approach.	德国外交政策的基本原则——在统一的欧洲中与法国紧密合作以及在安全和经济合作等问题上打造强大的跨大西洋联盟——经历了时间的考验，并将继续成为我们的方针的基础。


But now we must address three key challenges: crisis management, the changing global order, and our position within Europe.	但如今我们必须解决三大关键挑战：危机管理、全球秩序的变化以及我们在欧洲内部的地位。


For starters, we must face the fact that globalization has made crises the rule, not the exception.	首先，我们必须面临一个事实：全球化让危机成为规则而不是例外。


Though globalization and digitization are driving rapid economic growth, they are also putting pressure on governments worldwide to meet citizens' rising expectations – even as they constrain in unprecedented ways governments' ability to act.	尽管全球化和数字化推动了快速经济增长，但它们也给全球政府带来了满足人民不断增加的期望的压力——即使他们一前所未有的方式制约着政府的行动力。


In our globalized world, many people feel a growing desire for the clear answers and timeless validity offered by straightforward and clear-cut identities.	在我们的全球化世界中，许多人感到越来越渴望获得来自直接而清晰的身份的明确答案和永恒效力。


When these identities take the form of nationalism or rigidly defined religious or ethnic categories, the consequence, all too often, is brutal and unrestrained violence, whether through terrorism or civil war.	当这些我身份以民族主义或顽固的宗教或种族类别出现时，结果往往是不受约束的野蛮暴力，不管是通过恐怖主义还是内战显现出来。


In confronting crises, German foreign policy must strengthen its focus on reconciliation, mediation, and prevention – or risk being left with no other option but damage control.	在面临危机时，德国外交政策必须强化其对调和、斡旋和预防的强调——否则就有可能只剩下控制伤害一条路。


Germany is willing to do more in this area internationally.	德国愿意在这一方面起到更大的国际作用。


We want to act sooner, more decisively, and in a more substantial manner – not just when crises become acute, but also by focusing on conflict prevention and post-conflict management.	我们希望更迅速、更果断、更大手笔地行动——不仅在危机尖锐的时期，也通过着重于冲突预防和冲突后管理实现。


This requires that we hone our tools and develop new ones, ranging from early-warning mechanisms to enhanced means of international cooperation.	这要求我们锤炼旧工具、开发新工具，比如早期预警机制、强化国际合作的手段等。


We will review how we can help the United Nations more significantly in safeguarding and building peace.	我们将评估我们如何在捍卫和构建和平方面更大地帮助联合国。


We must address, with restraint and prudence – rather than with a reflexive “nein" – the difficult question of whether military means are necessary to safeguard political solutions.	我们必须以克制和审慎——而不是以反射性的“否”——解决军事手段是否确保政治解决方案的必要条件这一难题。


We do not know when and where the next crisis will erupt, but we do know that it will – and that we must be better prepared when it does.	我们不知道下一场危机何时发生，在哪里发生，但我们能知道它会发生——并且我们必须在它发生时做出更好的准备。


But foreign policy must not focus exclusively on crises.	但外交政策不可只关注危机。


It must also prepare for future scenarios.	外交政策也必须为未来情景做好准备。


And, because Germany is connected to the rest of the world like few other countries, a commitment to a just, peaceful, and resilient international order is a fundamental interest of our foreign policy.	而由于德国与世界其他部分的联系方式不同于其他国家，致力于公平、和平和有恢复力的国际秩序是我们的外交政策的根本利益。


That means adjusting to the long-term changes in the existing order's parameters – changes that have been wrought, above all, by China's rapid rise.	这意味着适应现有秩序要素的长期变化——主要由中国的快速崛起带来的变化。


As the tectonic plates of world politics shift, Germany must be more precise in defining its own contributions to maintaining existing structures of international order and establishing new ones.	随着世界政治的构造板块的变迁，德国必须更准确地定位自身在维持现有国际秩序结构和建立新结构过程中的作用。


We must think more deeply about ways to safeguard valuable public goods: the seas, space, and the Internet.	我们必须跟深入地思考捍卫宝贵的公共品——海洋、空间和互联网——的方法。


As a result, we must strike the right balance between reinforcing indispensable structures and organizations like the UN and developing new norms and institutional means of minimizing long-term risks.	因此，我们必须在强化不可或缺的结构和组织（如联合国）以及制定让长期风险最小化的新范式和机构手段之间找到正确的平衡。


The key challenge is to develop a proactive foreign policy that invests in order, international institutions, and the intelligent strengthening of international law.	关键挑战是制定前瞻性外交政策，投资于秩序、国际机构和对国际法的理论强化。


Then there is Europe, which remains the foundation of Germany's foreign policy.	然后是欧洲。 欧洲仍是德国外交政策的基础。


But here, too, new challenges require new answers.	但在这里，也有新挑战需要获得新答案。


Above all, we must prevent a strategic dilemma in which Germany felt forced to decide between its competitiveness in a globalized world and European integration.	毕竟，我们必须预防德国陷入一个战略困境，被迫在德国的全球竞争力与欧洲一体化之间做出选择。


Europe should benefit from Germany's strength, just as we benefit from Europe's.	欧洲应该从德国的强大中获益，一如我们从欧洲的强大中获益。


As Europe's largest economy, we must invest in integration.	作为欧洲最大经济体，我们必须投资于一体化。


That is the source of our strength.	这是我们的优势之源。


At the same time, we must withstand the temptations that come with Germany's current stature.	与此同时，我们必须抵制与德国的现有实力一同出现的诱惑。


In very different ways, the US, Russia, and China are offering Germany a privileged relationship.	美国、俄罗斯和中国以非常不同的方式向德国提出构建特殊关系。


But, though we want to maintain and strengthen bilateral ties with important partner countries, when it comes to shaping global development, Germany is capable of acting effectively only within a solid European framework.	但是，尽管我们希望保持和强化与重要伙伴国家的双边关系，但在影响全球发展方面，德国只能在可靠的欧洲框架之内高效行动。


We have no reason to shrink from these challenges.	我们没有理由在这些挑战面前畏缩。


Even under the pressures of a globalized world, democratic systems that champion the rule of law are more resilient than the illiberal regimes that many – including some in Europe – are praising nowadays.	即使面临全球化世界的压力，拥护法治精神的民主制度也比许多人——包括一些欧洲人——所宣扬的不自由政权拥有更大的恢复力。


But this does not mean that we can defuse any crisis by means of preventive action or clever intervention.	但这并不意味着我们能够通过预防性行动和明智的干预解决所有危机。


Now more than ever, understanding the limits of one's capabilities is an essential part of a viable foreign policy.	如今，认识自身能力边界对于可行的外交政策比以往任何时候都更重要。


This does not mean embracing moral relativism.	这并不意味着采取道德相对论。


Our foreign policy must retain its hopefulness and ability to act responsibly.	我们的外交政策必须保持希望和负责任地行动的能力。


Yet holding firm to our moral precepts must go hand in hand with a realistic assessment of constraints.	但严守道德戒律必须与对约束条件的现实评估双管齐下。


Germany's global inter-connectedness, which has long been vital for our prosperity and security, does not allow us to pretend that we are either an island or a world historical force.	德国的全球连通性长期以来一直是我们的繁荣与安全的基础，它不允许我们装作是一座孤岛或者世界的历史力量。


Within any effective peace strategy for the twenty-first century, foreign policy must simultaneously focus on crisis prevention and diplomacy, and bolster efforts that support transformation.	二十一世纪的有效和平战略要求外交政策必须同时关注危机预防和外交，并加大支持转型的动作力度。


For Germany, all of these objectives must be pursued within the framework of a strong and integrated European Union in which we assume our leadership responsibilities for global peace and prosperity.	对德国来说，所有这些目标必须在强大统一的欧盟这一框架内去追求。 我们在这一框架中确定我们在全球和平与繁荣事务中的领导责任。


Germany has much to offer to the world, and we will do so with self-confidence and humility.	德国可以为世界作出重大贡献，我们将带着自信和谦卑完成我们的使命。


The Limits of German Guilt	德国罪恶的界限


MUNICH – This month marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel.	慕尼黑—本月是德国和以色列建立外交关系50周年纪念。


The bilateral relationship, born in the wake of the Nazis’ annihilation of European Jewry, has developed into a solid one.	德以双边关系诞生于纳粹种族清洗欧洲犹太人之时，如今已经进入稳定阶段。


But fading memories of the Holocaust among younger Germans, together with Israel’s declining international standing, have lately challenged the official discourse about “special” ties between the two countries.	但德国年轻人对大屠杀的记忆已经日渐模糊，再加上以色列国际形象的破坏，这些构成了两国“特殊”关系的官方定性的挑战。


David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding father and the architect of Israel’s reconciliation with Germany, was a pragmatist through and through.	以色列国父、以色列与德国和解的缔造者大卫·本-古里安（David Ben-Gurion）是一个彻头彻尾的务实主义者。


He knew that forging a partnership with Germany, which included reparations that would help boost Israel’s capabilities, could go a long way toward securing Israel’s survival.	他明白，建设对德关系——包括有助于提升以色列能力的赔款——极大地有利于确保以色列的生存。


Of course, the reparations – which began in 1952 – served Germany’s interests, too.	当然，赔款——从1952年开始——也符合德国的利益。


The best way to regain international legitimacy after World War II was to atone publicly for the atrocities committed by the Nazis, and reconcile with the world’s Jewish population.	在二战后重新赢得国际合法性的最佳办法莫过于公开弥补纳粹所犯下的暴行，并与全球犹太人和解。


But the case for establishing full diplomatic relations was not so clear.	但建立完全外交关系的理由并不那么充分。


Fearing that such a move would undermine its relationships with Arab countries, and thus its objective of maintaining an impartial Middle East policy, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s government resisted Israeli pressure to establish full ties until 1965.	德国总理艾哈德（Ludwig Erhard）政府担心这样做会影响到德国与阿拉伯国家的关系，进而影响保持公平中东政策的目标，因此一直不同意以方建立完全外交关系的压力，直到1965年才有所改变。


Even then, German policy in the Middle East continued to reflect a domestic consensus that Germany’s responsibility for Israel’s security must be balanced with an effort to remain neutral in the region’s affairs.	即使在1965年，德国的中东政策仍反映出德国对以色列安全的责任必须与保持其在该地区事务中立立场的措施相平衡的国内共识。


Still, over the last half-century, the bilateral relationship has become a formidable one.	但是，在过去半个世纪中，德以双边关系变得十分强大。


Germany is Israel’s largest trading partner in Europe, and its third-largest overall, after the United States and China.	德国是以色列最大的欧洲贸易伙伴，也是以色列第三大贸易伙伴，仅次于美国和中国。


Moreover, Germany has been among Israel’s most reliable allies, exemplified by its role as a major arms supplier.	此外，德国一直是以色列最可靠的盟友，其身为以色列主要武器提供国的地位便是明证。


Chancellor Angela Merkel has emerged as a staunch defender of the country, exemplified in a 2008 address to the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), in which she identified Israel’s security as an essential feature of Germany’s Staatsraison.	总理默克尔已成为以色列国的坚定捍卫者，她2008年在以色列议会的演讲便是明证——在这次演讲中，她将以色列的安全列为德国“国家理性”（Staatsraison）的关键要素。


But Germany also appears to be increasingly uneasy about having to continue supporting Israel even when its policies are clearly reproachable.	但德国也越来越感到不安：它必须一致支持以色列，哪怕以色列显然应该受到谴责。


Seventy years after the liberation of Auschwitz, can the bilateral relationship withstand the rising tide of anti-Israel sentiment in Europe?	奥斯维辛集中营解放七十年后，德以双边关系能够抵挡住欧洲日益高涨的反以潮流吗？


History has its ironies.	历史是讽刺的。


Post-war Germany could regain international legitimacy only through reconciliation with the Jewish people.	战后德国还只有通过与犹太人的和解才能重新获得国际合法性。


Today, it is Israel’s legitimacy that is being challenged in international institutions and Western public opinion for its mistreatment of the Palestinians.	如今，以色列的合法性因其压迫巴勒斯坦人而受到了国际机构和西方民意的挑战。


The role reversal has been remarkable.	角色的反转引人注目。


Both Jews and Germans emerged from WWII as defeated and crippled peoples, but the Jews had the moral high ground, while the Germans very much did not.	犹太人和德国人都是在二战后在战败和残破中崛起的，但犹太人占据着道德制高点，而德国人承受着道德污点。


Yet, in a global opinion poll conducted in 2013 by the BBC World Service, Israel ranked as one of the least popular countries – just above North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran – whereas Germany emerged as the most popular.	但是，在2013年BBC世界频道（World Service）进行的全球民调中，以色列名列最不受欢迎国家行列——仅仅高于朝鲜、巴基斯坦和伊朗——而德国名列最受欢迎国家行列。


But the extent of this inversion is best exemplified in the increasing prevalence of obscene comparisons between Israel’s policies toward Palestine and the Nazis’ treatment of the Jews.	但最能说明这一反转的是将以色列对巴勒斯坦政策与纳粹对犹太人的政策的比较。


A study conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in January showed that 35% of Germans have no problem making that connection.	1月份，一份贝塔斯曼基金会（Bertelsmann Foundation）所做的研究表明35%的德国人能轻松指出其中的关联。


In what might presage a shift in the bilateral relationship, the poll also revealed that 58% of Germans believe that the past should be consigned to history, and 62% disapprove of Israel’s policies today.	这份可能预示着双边关系变化的民调中还揭示，58%的德国人认为过去应该留给历史，而62%的德国人不赞同如今的以色列政策。


Of course, Germany’s eagerness to discharge the burden of history is not new.	当然，德国渴望甩下历史包袱并非新鲜事。


Back in 1998, the renowned intellectual Martin Walser publicly attacked the pervasiveness of Auschwitz in Germany’s remembrance culture, declaring that the Holocaust had become a “moral cudgel” with which to intimidate all Germans and keep them “in a perpetual state of guilt.”	1998年，著名知识分子马丁·瓦泽尔（Martin Walser）公开抨击德国纪念文化中无处不在的奥斯维辛身影，称大屠杀已经成为“道德大棒”，恐吓着所有德国人，让他们“永久背上负罪感”。


Walser’s stance amounted to a desperate call to allow his country to shape a new national identity – one that reflected its resolute repudiation of fascism and adoption of democracy, rather than its highly regrettable (and regretted) history.	瓦泽尔的立场演变成允许德国形成新的国家身份的大声疾呼——体现在其坚决与法西斯主义决裂、走民主道路上，而不是体现在其令人极其遗憾（也十分后悔）的历史中。


And it drew a standing ovation from all but one of the 1,200 illustrious members of the audience in Frankfurt’s Pauluskirche, where Walser was being awarded the German Booksellers Association Peace Prize.	这迎来了法兰克福保罗教堂（Pauluskirche，瓦泽尔在这里被授予德国书商协会和平奖）1,200位知名听众异口同声的赞同。


The lone exception was Ignatz Bubis, the head of Germany’s Jewish community.	唯一的例外是德国犹太人领袖伊格纳茨·巴比斯（Ignatz Bubis）。


As Israel’s policies have become increasingly indefensible, the Germans’ will to shape national policy independent of Holocaust guilt has grown even stronger.	随着以色列的政策越来越难以服众，德国改变国家政策、摆脱大屠杀罪恶的意愿也变得越来越强烈。


The poem “What Must Be Said,” written in 2012 by the late Nobel laureate Günter Grass, may be frivolous and cliché-laden, but it is no less revealing of the growing fatigue of German society with the paralyzing memory of the Holocaust.	2012年，已故的诺贝尔奖得主君特·格拉斯写了一首叫做《什么必须说》的诗，这首诗读起来也许相当无聊，毫无新意，但它充分揭示了德国社会对于大屠杀记忆的日��疲劳。


Not only did Grass define Israel as “a threat to world peace”; he also noted that he had remained silent for so long simply because he believed that his own origins, “tarnished by a stain that can never be removed,” denied him the right to speak the truth.	格拉斯不但将以色列定义为“世界和平的威胁”； 他还指出他之所以长期保持沉默，完全是因为他认为他 “带着无法洗清的污点” 的出身让他无权讲出真相。


Like Grass, Germans – especially the younger generations, who feel further removed from the events of WWII – are increasingly abandoning the notion that they owe it to Israel to remain its silent, steadfast supporters.	和格拉斯一样，德国人——特别是年轻一代，他们对二战的记忆更加遥远——正在日益抛弃他们欠以色列因此必须保持沉默，必须坚决支持它的观念。


Indeed, as Israel’s right-wing government moves to bury the two-state solution for good, Germans are joining other Europeans in vocally opposing Israeli policy in Palestine.	事实上，随着以色列右翼政府永久性地葬送了两国方案，德国与其他欧洲人一起谴责以色列的巴勒斯坦政策。


Simply put, historic guilt is no longer adequate to compel Germany to support Israel’s wrongheaded policies – especially when those policies are victimizing another group, the Palestinians.	简言之，历史罪恶不再足以迫使德国支持以色列的错误政策——特别是当这些政策伤害另一个群体——巴勒斯坦人时。


Israel’s current leaders should take note.	以色列的现任领导人应该引起注意。


German Reunification and the New Europe	德国统一与新欧洲


PARIS – I began writing this column shortly after a remarkable anniversary. October 3, 1990, was the effective date for the implementation of a stunning decision taken barely a month earlier.	发自巴黎——就在我这篇专栏落笔之前恰好是一个意义重大的周年纪念日。


On August 23, East Germany’s House of Representatives, the Volkskammer, voted for unilateral adherence by the East German Länder to West Germany’s Constitution.	1990年10月3日，一个震惊世人的决议正式生效的日子，此之前的8月23日，东德人民议院投票决定，单方面将东德各州并入西德。


Article 23 of the West German Basic Law permitted this, but neither West Germany’s government nor its Parliament had been consulted!	更令人吃惊的是，虽然当时的西德《基本法》第23条允许这一行为，但西德政府和议会却还蒙在鼓里！


Reunification terms were subsequently defined in a Treaty signed in Berlin on August 31, 1990, and ratified by both the East and West German parliaments on September 20.	双方随后于1990年8月31日在柏林正式签署了各项统一条款，并在20天后获得各自议会机构的通过。


The Peace Treaty between the two German states and the four victorious Allies was signed in Moscow on the same day, and reunification was officially proclaimed on October 3.	就在通过的同一天，东西德和美苏英法四占领国代表在莫斯科签署和平条约，而德国也在10月3日正式宣布统一。


These events, accomplished by three actors, shook the world – and changed it forever.	这些事件与其中三位参与者一道震惊了世界，也永远改变了这个世界。


The first actor was Mikhail Gorbachev, who approved the act – the opening of the border between Austria and Hungary – that triggered the chain of events leading to reunification.	第一位参与者是戈尔巴乔夫，是他批准开放奥地利和匈牙利两国边界，并引发了最终实现统一的一系列事件。


And it was Gorbachev who proclaimed that Soviet forces would not intervene to support troubled communist regimes against the will of their people – a declaration aimed directly at East Germany.	也正是戈尔巴乔夫宣布苏联军队不会干涉风雨飘摇的东德政府尊从其人民的意愿——这堪称是一项对东德至关重要的声明。


The second key figure was West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who rushed into the opened breach, overriding his Allies’ caution, while the third actor was the East German people, who rushed into the streets, regardless of the risks, to demonstrate and push reunification forward.	第二号人物则是时任西德总理的赫尔穆特·科尔，当时他不顾西方盟友的警告冲向柏林墙的缺口，而第三个重要的人物则是冒着危险涌向街头的东德人民，正是他们的示威推动了统一的进程。


These events had a profound impact on relations between Germany and its allies.	这些事件对德国及其盟友都产生了深远的影响。


The United States, Great Britain, and France all seemed to think that everything was happening too fast, that international security was at risk should the new Germany not confirm its membership in NATO (which Germany finally did).	美英法三国都认为事情来得太过突然，如果当时新德国不确认其北约成员国资格的话（德国随后确认了），那么国际安全将危如累卵。


But for a few months, there were fears that Russia would demand Germany’s withdrawal from the Alliance as a condition of its agreement to reunification.	在那几个月间，各国都担心俄罗斯会将德国退出北约作为同意其统一的先决条件。


While the US masked its doubts, Great Britain and France were less at ease.	当美国还在对自己的担忧遮遮掩掩之时，英法两国则坐立不安。


British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher limited herself to worried public statements, but French President François Mitterrand felt it necessary to improvise a visit to East Berlin, against the opinion of his Foreign Ministry and despite the French people’s great enthusiasm for German reunification. Mitterrand hoped to slow the process and to link negotiations to some international guarantees.	英国首相撒切尔夫人发表了一系列忧心忡忡的公众声明，而法国总统密特朗则罔顾其外交部长的反对和法国人民对两德统一的极大热情，认为很有必要临时出访东柏林，并希望延缓统一进程并试图让各方许下某些国际承诺。


His effort was a fiasco, remembered in Berlin to this day.	他的努力最终鸡飞蛋打，至今仍被柏林人耻笑不已。


The motive of Mitterrand’s “mission” was to determine what precautions could or should be taken against the potential vagaries of this powerful but unpredictable people.	面对这些力量强大但喜欢突然行事的德国人，密特朗这次“出使”的动机其实是想判定究竟可以（或应该）采取何种预防措施来应对他们的未来动向。


The response was eventually enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, which extended the European Union’s competences to foreign affairs and judicial matters, making them partly supranational.	而对他这一想法的反馈最终在《马斯特里赫特条约》中得到了体现，条约中包含了欧盟对各国外交和司法事务的管辖权，并使之在某种意义上成为了超国家行为。


Great Britain and Denmark, however, insisted that these new competences be exercised on intergovernmental grounds only, not by the European Commission, and thus only through consensus.	但英国和丹麦坚持这些新管辖权只能通过政府间合作，而不是交给欧盟委员会这么一个机构来行使，换句话说欧盟委员会不能擅自决定，只有在各国形成共识后才能行事。


France did not vote, so Great Britain and Denmark won by default.	对此法国没有投票，结果英国和丹麦的提议自动通过。


Europe would take common action related to foreign affairs only on unanimous grounds.	欧盟只能在全体一致的情况下才能行使外交权力。


Political Europe was stillborn at the moment of greatest potential.	一个政治统一的欧洲最终在无限可能中流产。


This was a major disappointment for Germany, particularly as it could no longer count on France, its main ally in Europe.	德国对此非常沮丧，特别是它意识到自己不能再依赖法国这个最重要的欧洲盟友了。


In Germany itself, failure to achieve a politically integrated federal Europe baffled pro-integration political forces and dented the war generation’s moral authority.	对德国自身来说，不能实现一个政治上整合的联邦制欧洲不但打击了统一派政治势力，还削弱了二战那代人脑中所留存的道德合法性。


The New Germany and its post-war generation felt tempted to recover a reunified, yet lonely, German identity, one with influence in Europe and worldwide.	新生的德国及其战后一代都盼望着能恢复一个重新统一（虽然略显孤立）的德国身份定义，一个足以影响欧洲和全世界的符号。


As a result, reunified Germany naturally fell back on its old sphere of dominance, Eastern Europe.	谁知最终新德国还是缩回���其旧有势力范围——西欧。


But Germany’s leaders were uneasy with these changes.	德国的领导人对这些变化也不甚满意。


In September 1994, two MPs from the majority Christian Democratic Union published a political statement on Europe, questioning its future, particularly the prospect of federalism.	在1994年9月，执政基督教民主联盟的两位议员发表了一份对欧洲的政治声明，对欧洲的未来，尤其是大欧洲联邦的前景提出了自己的想法。


A dismal silence greeted its publication, which left Germany’s pro-European establishment isolated and dispirited.	而迎接他们的却是令人抓狂的沉默，以至于德国的大欧洲雄心当即陷入了孤立和沮丧之中。


Indeed, in May 2000, Joschka Fischer, the ex-leader of the Green Party and German Foreign Minister, gave a long speech about the necessity of European integration. The question about European federalism was posed to all member states, and none answered.	事实上，曾任德国外长和绿党领导人的约施卡·费舍尔曾在2000年5月就欧洲整合问题发表了长篇论述，并将欧洲联邦制的问题摆在了各欧盟成员国面前，不过无人响应罢了。


France, obviously in the limelight, remained silent, again leaving Germany to feel abandoned by its partners.	而作为众人焦点的法国继续沉默是金，使德国感到自己已经被伙伴所抛弃了。


A process of erosion, catalyzed by British diplomacy, was under way. It succeeded.	在英国的外交手腕操弄之下，某种消磨德国理想的进程被不断推进，并最终获得了成功。


The prospect of genuine European integration on foreign affairs and defense issues was denied time and again, at each step of the successive negotiations for the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, the aborted constitutional project, and Lisbon.	完全整合欧洲外交和防务的愿望在随后于阿姆斯特丹、尼斯，废弃的欧盟宪法，以及里斯本制定的各项条约中犹如弃儿，处处不讨好。


Time passed, generations changed.	而随着时间一点点流逝，二战一代逐渐被后辈所取代。


In today’s Germany, because no one with decisive power in business, finance, or government experienced the war, the European project is no longer viewed as conditioning Europe’s collective future.	在今日的德国，没有人拥有在商业和金融方面一锤定音的权力，政府官员也没有经历过二战，欧洲计划不再被认为是实现欧洲集体未来的必要条件。


These new leaders envision Europe only as a trade regime.	新领导只是将欧洲视为一个贸易共同体。


Meanwhile, German diplomacy is actively reconstructing the country’s economic and cultural spheres of influence, and not only in Eastern Europe.	与此同时，德国外交正积极重建其在经济和文化上的影响力，而且不仅仅止步于西欧。


The impact of this lost European perspective became clear in the autumn of 2008 when, in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis and the failure of Lehman Brothers, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first impulse was nationalistic and wholly anti-European.	欧洲远景的失落所造成的影响在2008年秋次贷危机和雷曼倒闭的过程中展露无遗，德国总理默克尔一开始的反应极为民族主义，而且是彻底反欧洲的。


There would be no common European plan to address the crisis, and no call for public funds. Germany would protect its banks’depositors on its own and through private means.	德国不接受任何应对危机的欧洲共同方案，也不要求建立共同基金，只动用自有资金来保护本国的存款人。


Only the sheer gravity of the situation brought Germany back within the European realm for the subsequent G-20 meeting.	只不过随后情况急转直下，才迫使德国在随后的G20会议中回归到欧盟的框架之下。


Twenty years after reunification was completed, Germany has become one of the world’s great democracies.	两德统一已经过去了20年，德国也已经晋身为全世界最伟大的民主国家之一。


Many wish that it were also more European in its outlook and behavior.	许多人也希望德国能在观点和行为上与欧盟靠得更近。


But Germany does not bear the main responsibility for killing off the vision of political Europe.	但须知当年政治大一统欧洲的理念最终破灭之时，德国可不是罪魁祸首。


Germany is Not Volkswagen	德国不是大众


MUNICH – The Volkswagen scandal has raised questions about the German model of production.	慕尼黑—大众丑闻让人们对德国生产模式产生了质疑。


If the success of the company’s diesel-powered vehicles was due in part to fraudulent efforts to conceal the amount of harmful pollutants they emitted, will similar revelations at other companies call into questions the country’s transformation from “the sick man of Europe” to an export-driven economic powerhouse?	既然大众公司柴油汽车的成功部分要归因于通过作弊隐瞒汽车排放有害污染物的量，那么其他公司类似丑闻的曝光是否会让人质疑德国从“欧洲病夫”向出口拉动型经济巨人的转型？


Fortunately, the answer is almost certainly no.	幸运的是，答案几乎可以肯定是否定的。


Germany’s competitive advantage has less to do with chicanery than with how its firms are structured and the culture in which they operate.	德国的竞争优势与舞弊关系不大，而与企业结构和经营文化关系很大。


Germany’s leading car company is an exception to the manufacturing rules that have driven the country’s success, not an example of them.	大众汽车公司只是推动德国成功的制造业的例外，而绝非是典型。


Indeed, Germany’s success is frequently cited as a model that other countries should emulate, and rightly so.	事实上，德国的成功常常被当作其他国家应该效仿的模板。 理应如此。


Since the beginning of the century, the country has grown to become one of the world’s leading exporters, outstripping all other major European countries.	本世纪初以来，德国已成长为世界领先的出口国之一，将其他所有欧洲大国甩在身后。


From 2000 to 2013, Germany’s exports grew by 154%, compared to 127% for Spain, 98% for the United Kingdom, 79% for France, and 72% for Italy.	从2000年到2013年，德国出口增长了154%，而西班牙增长了127%，英国98%，法国79%，意大利72%。


The leading explanation for Germany’s impressive recent export performance is wage restraint.	近几年来德国出口的抢眼表现的主要解释是工资约束。


But, as a comparison with Spain reveals, faster wage growth elsewhere cannot be the entire story.	但是，与西班牙的比较表明，其他地区工资的较快增长并不是故事的全部。


To be sure, from 2000 to 2008, German wages increased by 19%, compared to 48% in Spain.	诚然，从2000年到2008年，德国工资增长幅度为19%，而西班牙为48%。


But after the 2009 financial crisis, the roles were reversed.	但2009年金融危机后，角色发生了倒置。


From 2009 to 2013, German nominal wages increased by more than 14%, compared to 4% in Spain.	从2009年到2013年，德国名义工资增长了14%强，而西班牙只有4%。


And yet, despite the more rapid rise in German wages, the country’s exports rebounded faster than Spain’s – or those of any other European Union country.	但是，尽管德国工资增长得更快，但德国出口的反弹也快于西班牙——或其他任何欧盟国家。


The most important factor behind Germany’s success is that the structure of its firms improves the quality of their products.	德国成功背后的最重要的因素是德国企业的结构改善了产品质量。


German exporters are organized in a way that is less hierarchical and more decentralized than other European firms.	与其他欧洲企业相比，德国出口商的组织结构层级性较低，更加分散。


This gives them several advantages.	这给了它们诸多优势。


Decentralization enables employees at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy to devise and implement new ideas.	分散化让公司层级较低的员工也能参与构想和实施新观点。


As these employees are often closer to customers than those higher up, their collective knowledge about what the market is demanding is an important source of value.	这些员工比层级较高的员工更贴近客户，他们关于市场需求的集体认知是重要的价值源。


Tapping this knowledge allows Germany to compete on quality, not price.	利用这一集体认知让德国能够拼质量而不是价格。


Indeed, if wage restraint were the main factor in Germany’s success, it would be hard pressed to outperform French, Italian, British, and Spanish exporters, who compete mainly on price by offshoring production to low-wage countries.	事实上，如果工资约束是德国成功的主要因素，那么德国出口商很难战胜法国、意大利、英国和西班牙同行，它们主要通过将生产离岸化到低工资国家实现价格竞争。


Instead, the German focus on quality allows its firms to charge higher prices and gain new customers.	相反，德国专注于质量，这让德国企业能够获得更高的价格并赢得新客户。


When exporters are asked to rank their products relative to a market average, 40% of German exporters classify their goods as top quality, while only 10% of French exporters do so.	当出口商被问及它们的产品与市场平均水平相比如何时，40%的德国出口商将自己的产品归为质量顶尖，而只有10%的法国出口商这样做。


Decentralized management has helped German exporters triple their share of the global market for top-quality goods compared to those firms that did not reorganize.	分散化管理让德国出口商占全球顶尖质量商品市场的比重相对没有进行重新组织的企业扩大了三倍。


Indeed, when I studied the top 1% of German exporters – the country’s export superstars – I found that they more than doubled their share of the world export market when they opted to decentralize their organizations.	事实上，在我研究最顶尖1%的德国出口商时——它们是出口超级巨星——我发现，当它们选择组织分散化时，它们占世界出口市场的比重翻了一番多。


This focus on quality could explain why German exports rebounded quickly after 2009, despite the rise in nominal wages.	关注质量可以解释为何德国出口商可以在2009年后迅速反弹，尽管名义工资有所增加。


Quality makes exporters less vulnerable to changes in price – including those driven by rising wages.	质量让出口商较少受到价格变化的影响——包括因工资增长带来的价格变化。


By contrast, those countries in which firms compete on price may have felt more pressure to move production abroad as domestic wages rose.	相反，企业打价格战的国家，当国内工资升高时将面临更大的产品出口压力。


Germany’s relative insensitivity to rising costs could also explain why its government is comfortable with a strong euro, whereas France and Italy have been calling on the European Central Bank to weaken the currency.	德国对成本升高的相对不敏感性还可以解释为何德国政府可以安然面对欧元升值，而法国和意大利一直在要求欧洲央行对欧元进行贬值。


Volkswagen, it turns out, took a different approach from that of most other German firms.	看起来，大众公司采取了一条不同于其他大部分德国企业的道路。


Rather than decentralizing power, CEO Martin Winterkorn sat at the head of a centralized, command-and-control organization in which he acted as a patriarch.	大众CEO马丁·温特科恩（Martin Winterkorn）没有分散权力，而是稳坐集中化指令-控制型组织的最高宝座，如同君主。


His desire to take the company to the very top of the global car industry, surpassing Toyota, put enormous strain on his managers to deliver growth.	他渴望让大众公司超越丰田成为全球汽车行业的领头羊，给手下的经理们施加巨大的压力追求增长。


The result – a decision to cheat on emissions tests – says less about Germany’s culture of manufacturing than about rot at the car company, beginning at the very top.	结果——在排放测试中舞弊——体现的与其说是德国制造业文化，不如说是大众公司从最顶层开始的腐败。


According to the World Value Survey, Germany is a high-trust society, in which citizens have confidence in one another’s behavior and act accordingly.	据世界价值调查，德国是一个高信任度社会，德国公民对彼此的行为很有信心，并据此行动。


Indeed, the lesson of the Volkswagen scandal is that this culture may be necessary for its export model to work.	事实上，大众丑闻的教训是，这一文化是德国出口模式起作用的必要条件。


French and Italian exporters that introduced decentralized management did not increase their share of the global market for top-quality goods. The likely reason is that providing division managers with greater autonomy not only frees them up to respond to market demands; it also allows them to put their own career interests above the wellbeing of the firm.	引入分散化管理的法国和意大利出口商没能增加它们在顶尖质量商品上的全球市场份额，原因可能是授予事业部经理更大的自治权不但能够让他们自由地响应市场需求，也让他们将个人职业礼仪置于企业利益之上。


If Germany is to maintain its economic dominance, it will have to do something far harder than keeping wages in check or restructuring hierarchies.	如果德国想要保持其经济主导力，它必须做的远不仅仅是保持工资水平或重组层级。


It will have to ensure that the culture of integrity underlying its success remains unchanged by the pressures of global competition.	德国必须确保作为其成功过基础的诚信文化不因全球竞争压力而改变。


The Visible Hand of Economic Prosperity	看得见的经济繁荣之手


FRANKFURT – Germany has weathered the financial crisis much better than most of its neighbors.	法兰克福——德国应对金融危机的情况比绝大多数邻国要好得多。


Regarded as the sick man of Europe as recently as 1999, today the country boasts the continent's strongest economy, accounting for roughly a quarter of its exports.	虽然1999年还戴着欧洲病夫的帽子，但今天的德国拥有欧洲大陆最强势经济，以及约占欧洲四分之一的出口份额。


Its unemployment rate, at just below 5%, is half the European average.	失业率还不到5%，比欧洲平均失业率低一半左右。


The federal budget is balanced for the first time in a decade.	德国还在十年来首次实现了平衡联邦预算的目标。


But it would be a mistake to assume that Germany's economic performance vindicates its policymaking.	但如果就此认为经济表现证明了决策正确性将是个错误。


In fact, Germany's current economic dominance has been built on a policy framework that stands in direct opposition to that championed by former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the father of its post-World War II “economic miracle."	事实上，德国目前的经济霸权地位背后的政策构架与二战后“经济奇迹”的缔造者，前总理路德维希·艾哈德所倡导的构架截然不同。


In lieu of Erhard's so-called ordoliberalism – in which the state lays the groundwork for a functioning market economy by actively managing the legal environment – the economic strategy pursued by Chancellor Angela Merkel's government has been haphazard, driven more by political expediency than by any underlying philosophy.	与艾哈德所谓的秩序自由主义（即政府通过积极监管法律环境为正常市场经济奠定基础）形成鲜明的对照，默克尔政府推行的经济战略具有很大随意性，相比于基础理念更多受到政治功利目标的推动。


Germany would be wise not to take its economic success for granted.	德国最好不要以理所当然的姿态来看待自己取得的经济成功。


In a time of increasing economic and political uncertainty, Erhard's guiding principles are more important than ever.	在经济和政治变数不断扩大的背景下，更凸显出艾哈德指导原则前所未有的重要性。


Indeed, Germany's policymakers seem to be stumbling from decision to decision.	事实上，德国决策者踉踉跄跄做出一个又一个决定。


Instead of steering the economy, they are being driven by it, reacting with no clear sense of direction to the demands of the moment.	他们非但没能引导经济，反而被经济牵着鼻子走，在没有明确方向的情况下面对当前要求被动作出反应。


The country's celebrated de-carbonization is putting its industry at risk.	德国著名的去碳化运动正威胁到国内的工业发展。


Collective bargaining, once left to economic actors, is becoming increasingly politicized.	集体谈判一旦任由经济参与者摆布，就开始变得越来越政治化。


Changes in pension policy are boosting public spending and contributing to rising levels of debt.	修改养老政策正推动公共开支和债务水平不断上升。


At the heart of Germany's troubles is the stubborn – and internationally widespread – idea that the economy is a large, clock-like mechanism into which the state can intervene without consequences.	德国问题的核心就在于受国际流行理念的影响，固执地认为经济是钟表般巨大的机械构造，可以任由政府随意干预而不会产生任何副作用。


The increasing mathematization of economics in recent decades has abetted this development.	近几十年来经济学的数学化倾向也助长了这一趋势。


The central weakness of democratic systems also contributes to the problem: The quest for votes favors the extension of social benefits and discourages unpopular measures that would put the economy on a more sustainable footing.	民主制度的核心弱点也使问题变得愈加严重：拉选票需要扩大社会福利，从而使能确保经济可持续发展但不受民众欢迎的举措无人问津。


As the German economist Herbert Giersch once put it, what is politically expedient is rarely economically beneficial.	正像德国经济学家赫伯特·吉尔施曾经说过的那样，追求功利政治目的的举措很少能在经济上可行。


It is for this reason that a return to ordoliberalism is more important than ever.	因此当前局势前所未有地凸显了回归秩序自由主义的重要性。


Erhard's objective was to counter political pragmatism and activism with an orderly vision of economic and social policy.	艾哈德的目的是实现政治实用主义和积极性与经济社会政策有序目标之间的平衡。


The need to take a holistic view of the economy was self-evident.	从全局角度看待经济的必要性不言自明。


For today's social engineers and economists, this is no longer the case.	但这已经不再是今天社会工程师和经济学家的座右铭。


Erhard's vision of a social market economy was a third way, an alternative to both large-scale state intervention and the risks of laissez-faire liberalism.	艾哈德的社会市场经济目标是一条折衷道路，在大规模政府干预和放任自由主义所带来的危险间寻找平衡。


Germany's historical experience had demonstrated that freedom without order led to chaos, and order without freedom resulted in coercion and the renunciation of democracy.	德国的历史经验表明没有秩序的自由导致混乱，但没有自由的秩序会导致强迫和民主丧失作用。


Unguided capitalism undermined itself, according to Erhard, as monopolists cornered markets and captured the state.	艾哈德认为，无原则的资本主义可以造成自我破坏，因为垄断势力控制市场、胁迫国家。


But the attempt to perfect life through increasingly comprehensive state intervention, until even the smallest injustices were compensated, was also bound to fail.	但意图通过不断扩大的政府干预来弥补哪怕是最不起眼的不公、从而实现完美生活注定将无法成功。


Human society simply does not follow the rules of a termite colony; order must accommodate freedom and individuality.	人类社会根本不可能遵守白蚁殖民地的规则； 秩序、自由和个性缺一不可。


The continuing relevance of Erhard's ideas can be seen in the growing number of protest movements – strengthened by social networks – challenging the market economy and neoliberalism.	社交网络推动下不断增长的抗议运动可以证明艾哈德思想对今天的意义——那就是挑战市场经济和新自由主义的核心价值。


Any increase in the market's perceived legitimacy brought about by the failure of communism was temporary at best.	共产主义失败所带来的公众眼中任何市场合法性的增加即使从最乐观的角度都是暂时的。


Market-oriented policies today are seen as cold and anti-social, especially in Western industrialized countries.	今天以市场为导向的政策被视为冷血、反社会，尤其是在西方工业化国家。


The paternalistic welfare state is viewed as more humane, despite the loss of freedom and the financial distortions associated with it.	尽管因此丧失自由并造成财政扭曲，但家长式的福利国家在公众眼中仍然更加人性化。


Erhard was well aware of the tension between economic freedom and the democratic state.	艾哈德深谙经济自由和民主政府之间的矛盾。


He and his followers never envisaged ordoliberalism as an unchangeable dogma, but rather as a model that could be adapted to new challenges.	他和追随者更愿意将秩序自由主义设想成随挑战不断变化的模式，而不是不可改变的教条。


Erhard even attempted to adjust it to the sociopolitical changes of the 1960s, developing the concept of a “formed society," whereby factionalism would be minimized and the state governed by consensus.	艾哈德甚至试图调整秩序自由主义，以使其适应20世纪60年代的社会政治变革。 他提出“缔造社会”的理念，并以此最大限度地控制宗派主义，在社会共识的基础上治理国家。


Erhard failed to gain support for this controversial idea.	艾哈德未能为这个充满争议的观点争取到足够的支持。


But, given rising inequality and growing disenchantment with politics and political parties, it addresses questions that remain relevant for representative democracy today.	但鉴于政治政党不平等现象日益严重导致希望幻灭，它能够解决代议制民主目前依然存在的问题。


As Erhard himself would have argued, ordoliberalism is not a one-size-fits-all solution.	艾哈德自己也会强调，秩序自由主义并非放之四海而皆准的解决办法。


But there can be no question that in today's globalized world, the economy – and perhaps politics as well – would benefit from the imposition of order.	但当今的全球化世界、经济——也许还有政治——将受益于秩序的建立恐怕是毫无疑问的。


No political system capable of overcoming hardship and misery can be built without first realizing improvements in the economy's potential.	如果不发挥经济潜力，就不可能奢谈建立能克服困难、消除痛苦的政治制度。


That must be achieved by minimizing state intervention, bureaucracy, and privileges for the chosen few.	要想实现这一目标，就必须尽可能减少国家干预、消灭官僚主义和少数人的特权。


Erhard's guiding principle was simple: there must be guiding principles.	艾哈德的指导原则其实非常简单：那就是必须制定指导原则。


It is an idea that remains as important as ever – in Germany and beyond.	无论在德国还是全世界，这一理念的重要性都没有任何变化。


Germany, Europe, and Russia	德国，欧洲和俄罗斯


European unity is indivisible.	欧洲各国紧密相连，不可分割。


When one nation is intimidated or ostracized, all are not free.	当一个国家受到威胁或被放逐时，其他国家也无法自由。


Every aspect of our shared culture, if not the last century of shared suffering, confirms that for us.	所有我们所共享的文化，也许不包括上个世纪所共同承受的灾难，都证明了这一点。


So a prime objective of the European Union is to promote stability and security through a dynamic structure of economic and political inter-dependence in which all nations have a vested interest.	所以欧盟的一个首要目标是通过一个经济和政治上相互依赖、生气勃勃的结构来促进稳定和安全。 所有的国家在这个结构中都有既得利益。


But such a structure is lacking today between the EU and Russia, to the detriment of all the countries that lie between them.	但是，今天在欧盟和俄罗斯之间缺少这样一种结构，这给夹在它们中间的国家造成了伤害。


Thus it is vitally important that Germany has made this a central issue for its EU presidency, which is just beginning.	因此德国作为欧盟的下任主席国应该把这作为一个中心议题。


With high prices for crude oil and natural gas bloating its coffers, Russia is once again aggressively confronting the small and still relatively weak states that fled the eroding Soviet empire 15 years ago.	因为原油和天然气的高价所带来的巨额财富，俄罗斯再次对在15年前逃离正在腐蚀的苏联帝国的弱小的国家施展淫威。


Given the residual economic and institutional ties born of the Soviet era, Russia’s external influence in this region remains enormous.	因为苏联时期所残留下的经济和制度上的联系，俄罗斯在该地区的外部影响力依然非常强大。


But Russia is also now extending its grasp of energy markets beyond those of its immediate neighbors.	然而俄罗斯还把它的能源市场触角伸到了它的近邻之外的地方。


Europe’s relationship with Russia is too important for it to be developed in an ad hoc fashion through bilateral arrangements.	欧洲与俄罗斯的关系极为重要，无法通过双边安排来形成一种临时关系。


Today is Europe’s moment of maximum flexibility; as dependence on Russian energy supplies grows, the EU’s leverage weakens.	今天的欧洲是它在历史上表现得最具灵活性的时期； 因为越来越依赖俄罗斯的能源供应，欧洲的影响力弱化了。


So Europe’s strategy cannot be to take the historically well-trodden path of least resistance.	所以欧洲的战略不应该再走历史上几乎不作抵抗的老路了。


Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the Cold War, it has often been assumed that Russia’s hostile intentions have disappeared, and foreign policy toward Russia has been conducted as if traditional diplomatic considerations no longer apply.	不幸的是，在冷战结束后的一段时期，它经常认为俄罗斯的敌意已经消失了，并且它对俄罗斯的外交政策也似乎显得传统的外交考虑已经用不上了。


But, of course, they do apply.	可是，它们确实还用得上。


Encouraging economic and political reform are important objectives, but they can never serve as a substitute for a serious effort to contain Russia’s deep-seated expansionism.	鼓励经济和政治改革是重要的目标，但是这些并不能够作为抑制俄罗斯根深蒂固的扩张主义的替代品。


To be sure, Russia has legitimate security interests in what has been called its “near abroad.”	俄罗斯当然会对它的“近邻”表现出合理的安全利益方面的考虑。


But Europe’s stability and commitment to economic growth across the continent require that these interests be satisfied without economic pressure or unilateral intervention.	但是欧洲的稳定和使整个大洲经济增长的责任要求在实现这种利益时不能施加经济压力或者进行单边干涉。


A viable Russia policy for Europe must recognize Europe’s growing dependence on Russian energy resources.	对于欧洲来说一个切实可行的俄罗斯政策必须要考虑到欧洲对于俄罗斯能源资源越来越强烈的依赖。


To proceed otherwise would discount the most important question: the reliability of Russia as an energy supplier.	否则，就会忽视一个最最重要的问题，就是俄罗斯作为一个能源提供者是否可靠。


Despite controlling the world’s largest gas reserves, Russia’s state-owned monopoly Gazprom is not producing enough for an economy growing at 6% a year.	尽管掌握了世界上最大的天然气储备，俄罗斯的国有垄断企业俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司出产的天然气并不能满足6%的年经济增长的需求。


Gazprom’s three largest fields, which account for three-quarters of its output, are in decline.	俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司三个最大的油田的产量占其总产量的四分之三，而且正在下降。


This domestic shortage means that Gazprom is unable to increase supply to Europe, at least in the short term, unless it can buy gas at below-market rates from its Eastern European and Central Asian neighbors and in turn sell it to its European customers at market prices.	这种国内的供应短缺表明，俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司至少在短期内无力提高其对欧洲的供应，除非它以低于市场的价格从东欧和中亚的邻国购买天然气，然后再以市场价卖给它的欧洲客户。


At the same time, Russia wants to cater to other markets, notably along its eastern frontier.	与此同时，俄罗斯还试图满足其他市场的需要，尤其是其东部的邻国。


The problem is not a lack of reserves, but Gazprom’s investment strategy.	问题并不在于储备的缺乏，而是俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的投资战略。


In recent years, the company has spent vigorously on everything but developing its reserves.	最近几年，该公司积极投身于所有的项目，而非其能源储备的开发。


It has built or is building pipelines to Turkey and Germany, taken over an oil company, and sought footholds in European distribution markets.	它建造了或正在建造通往土耳其和德国的管道，接管了一家石油公司，并且试图在欧洲的营销市场分得一杯羹。


Instead of investing in discovering oil, Gazprom has become the biggest media group in Russia.	俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司没有把钱投在寻找石油上，而是成了俄罗斯最大的媒体集团。


All this is done in the name of creating and supporting a national energy champion which also serves as a foreign policy arm of the Kremlin.	所有这些都是在创造和支持一个国家能源捍卫者的名义下去做的，同时也是出于对克里姆林宫外交政策的支持。


Meanwhile, with investment in Gazprom’s core activity – production – steadily declining, a crisis is looming, one that requires the stewardship and steady hand of the EU.	与此同时，在俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司对其核心活动，即生产的投资持续下降的情况下，一场危机正在降临，而这需要欧盟出面来掌控局势。


Gazprom’s ambitions for gaining control of pipeline and energy transport infrastructure must be slowed, which requires allowing independent producers to prosper.	俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司想要掌握天然气管道和能源运输基础设施的欲望必须受到控制，这就要求大力促进独立生产商的发展。


Indeed, independent producers already account for 20% of domestic gas sales in Russia.	事实上，独立生产商已经占到了俄罗斯国内天然气市场20%的份额。


To boost their output and allow them direct access to European markets will require market-based incentives.	要使它们的产量大大增加，以及允许它们直接进入欧洲市场，需要采取市场化的激励机制。


Europe can help by insisting that Russia participate in the European Energy Charter, which calls for Gazprom to grant its production competitors access to Russian pipelines, and for all disputes to be settled by international arbitration.	欧洲应该努力让俄罗斯加入到欧洲能源共同纲领中来，后者要求俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司允许它的生产竞争者进入俄罗斯的天然气管道，并且所有争端都应该通过国际仲裁来解决。


European competition policy, which successfully brought giant companies like Microsoft into line to promote competition, could help to turn Gazprom into a normal competitor, too.	欧洲的竞争政策曾成功地使微软这样的巨无霸公司遵循鼓励竞争的路子，同样也能使俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司成为一个正常的竞争者。


Europe’s leaders should engage in frank discussions about where European and Russian interests converge or differ, and these discussions should include regional neighbors that are both producer and transit nations, like my own country, Ukraine.	欧洲的领导人应该在欧洲与俄罗斯的利益重合或者不同的地方进行坦诚的讨论，并且这些讨论也应该把既是生产者又是中转国家的地区邻国包括进来，就像我的祖国乌克兰。


Moscow will understand a policy based on mutual respect for each other’s interests better than simple appeals to goodwill and friendship.	相比单纯地呼唤善意和友好，莫斯科会更加理解一项兼顾双方利益的政策。


Russia should be welcome in institutions and agreements that foster cooperation, with reciprocal rights and responsibilities.	应当欢迎俄罗斯加入到旨在促进合作、并且权利责任共享的机构和协议中来。


Russian reform will be impeded, not nurtured, by turning a blind eye to political and economic aggression.	如果我们对其政治和经济上的侵犯置若罔闻的话，那么俄罗斯的改革只会被妨碍，而不是得到培育。


The hard-fought independence of the former Soviet republics must not be tacitly traded away in acquiescence to Russia’s desire for regional hegemony.	前苏联共和国努力争取来的独立地位不能因为对于俄罗斯妄图拥有地区霸权的野心的默认而被出卖。


Russia’s leaders are entitled to the world’s understanding as they struggle to overcome generations of Soviet misrule.	俄罗斯的领导人在他们努力克服数代以来的苏联暴政时有权得到世界的理解。


But they are not entitled to the sphere of influence that Russian tsars and commissars coveted for 300 years.	但是他们无权拥有俄罗斯的沙皇和人民委员们300年来所觊觎的势力范围。


If Russia is to be a serious partner for Europe, it must be ready to accept the obligations of stability along with the benefits.	如果俄罗斯想要成为欧洲一个严肃的伙伴，它在获取利益的同时也必须接受保持稳定的责任。


If Europe is to ensure its prosperity and energy security, it must demand nothing less.	如果欧洲想要确保繁荣和能源安全，它就必须提出这样的要求。


Europe’s Franco-German Dream Team	欧洲的法德梦幻团队


PARIS – When the International Monetary Fund lowered its global growth forecast for 2014 and 2015 from 3.7% and 3.9%, respectively, to 3.3% and 3.8%, it cited the eurozone’s increasingly gloomy prospects, including significantly slower growth in Germany, as a leading cause.	巴黎—国际货币基金组织（IMF）将其2014年和2015年全球增长预期分别从3. 7%和3.


After all, the eurozone still accounts for about 13% of world output at market prices – about the same as China.	8%时给出的原因是欧元区前景日益暗淡，而德国增长大幅放缓是主要因素。 毕竟，欧元区仍贡献了全世界13%的产出（以市场价格衡量），与中国大致相当。


Europe’s economic struggles are reflected in its political situation, with many European electorates now mired in a sense of hopelessness and sliding toward ideological extremes.	欧洲经济低迷反映在其政治局面中，许多欧洲选民如今陷入了无望的情绪，日益滑向极端意识形态。


But a forthcoming report by two highly respected economists – Jean Pisani-Ferry, the French government’s Commissioner-General for Policy Planning, and Henrik Enderlein, a key leader of a reformist group of German economists – will propose a way forward.	但两位极有名望的经济学家——法国政府政策规划总顾问让·皮萨尼-费里（Jean Pisani-Ferry）和德国改革派经济学家领袖人物亨里克·恩德莱恩（Henrik Enderlein）在他们即将发表的文章中设计了一条前进道路。


The task facing Pisani-Ferry and Enderlein is to create a new reform strategy for Europe’s two largest economies, focusing on structural reforms in France and increased investment in Germany.	皮萨尼-费里和恩德莱恩的任务是为欧洲两大经济体设计新的改革战略，法国的关注点是结构性改革，德国的关注点是增加投资。


The hope is that the report, which will be made public on December 1, will provide a breakthrough that can revive, at long last, the eurozone’s growth engine.	我们希望这篇将在12月1日发表的文章能够实现突破，让长期宕机的欧元区经济引擎重新发动。


The paper was commissioned a few days after the IMF’s Annual Meetings last month, at a gathering of the French finance and economy ministers, Michel Sapin and Emmanuel Macron, and their German counterparts, Wolfgang Schäuble and Sigmar Gabriel.	该文章在上个月IMF年会结束后几天寿命而作。 在IMF年会上，法国财政部长米歇尔·萨宾（Michel Sapin）和经济部长艾曼努尔·马科伦（Emmanuel Macron）和他们的德国同侪沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）和西格玛尔·加布里埃尔（Sigmar Gabriel）举行了会晤。


Though the meeting produced no concrete policy action – as the French daily Le Monde put it, “nothing was asked for, and nothing was obtained” – it could signal the beginning of more effective Franco-German cooperation, guided by the Pisani-Ferry/Enderlein report.	尽管这次会议没有产生实质政策行动——法国《世界报》（Le Monde）称“没有任何要求，也没有得到任何东西”——但也许仍释放出信号表明法国和德国将在皮萨尼-费里/恩德莱恩报告的指引下进行更有效的合作。


Such cooperation could not come at a better time.	这一合作可谓正逢其时。


A couple of weeks after the project was initiated, France and Italy submitted revised annual budgets to the European Commission, in which they demanded more fiscal room for maneuver.	在该项目启动几周后，法国和意大利向欧盟委员会递交了修订后的年度预算，其中要求获得更大的财政空间以供施展。


The Commission now has until the end of this month to determine whether France has pursued reform diligently enough to avoid penalties for breaking its pledge to cut its budget deficit to less than 3% of GDP by next year.	现在，欧盟委员会要等到本月底才能确定法国是否足够认真地对待改革，因而可以避免因为没有履行其明年将预算赤字削减至GDP的3%以下的承诺而遭受惩罚。


An effective reform strategy would have to balance the need for budget restraint and macroeconomic stability with growth-enhancing policies.	有效的改革战略必须平衡预算约束需要和宏观经济稳定与增长强化政策。


When it comes to the latter, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s proposals in August – expanded monetary easing, structural reforms (particularly in France and Italy), and some fiscal expansion by countries like Germany – provide a useful framework to be supplemented with concrete measures.	对后者而言，欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉8月所提出的建议——扩大货币宽松、结构性改革（特别是法国和意大利）、德国等国家实施一些财政扩张——提供了一个有用框架，现在需要拿出具体政策进行补充。


The ECB governing council has already agreed, in principle, to use the first of these policy tools.	欧洲央行理事会已经在原则上同意这些政策工具中的第一个。


But monetary expansion alone will be inadequate to lift the eurozone out of stagnation.	但光靠货币扩张不足以把欧元区带出停滞。


Moreover, many of the structural reforms that are currently being considered or implemented, despite boosting growth in the long term, can have short-term contractionary effects.	此外，目前正在考虑或实施的许多结构性改革尽管能够提振长期增长，但也会产生短期副作用。


This is particularly true of greater labor-market flexibility, a key asset for long-term growth that can lead to a short-term increase in unemployment.	特别是提高劳动力市场灵活性的改革，它是长期增长的关键，但可能导致短期失业上升。