For example, an attack in 2014 in which 76 million client addresses were stolen from JPMorgan Chase was widely attributed to Russia.	比方说，外界普遍认为2014年一次从摩根大通窃取7，600万客户地址的袭击是俄罗斯的杰作。


By 2015, however, the US Department of Justice identified the perpetrators as a sophisticated criminal gang led by two Israelis and an American citizen who lives in Moscow and Tel Aviv.	但到了2015年，美国司法部认定由生活在莫斯科和特拉维夫的两名以色列人和一名美国公民领导的复杂的犯罪团伙才是真正的肇事者。


Attribution, however, is a matter of degree.	但追踪可以达到一定的程度。


Despite the dangers of false flags and the difficulty of obtaining prompt, high-quality attribution that would stand up in a court of law, there is often enough attribution to enable deterrence.	虽然在有可能遭遇虚假标识的同时很难获取法庭承认的及时高质量鉴证，但现有的追踪水平足以遏制犯罪行为。


For example, in the 2014 attack on SONY Pictures, the United States initially tried to avoid full disclosure of the means by which it attributed the attack to North Korea, and encountered widespread skepticism as a result.	比方说在2014年针对索尼影业的袭击事件中，美国最初试图避免公开用何种方法确定朝鲜为袭击的肇事者。 外界因此普遍怀疑美国所得出的结果。


Within weeks, a press leak revealed that the US had access to North Korean networks.	几周内，一份媒体报道透露美国可以侵入朝鲜网络。


Skepticism diminished, but at the cost of revealing a sensitive source of intelligence.	外界的质疑声逐渐隐退，但却付出了公开敏感情报来源的代价。


Prompt, high-quality attribution is often difficult and costly, but not impossible.	及时、高质量的来源追踪往往既困难又昂贵，但却不是不可能的。


Not only are governments improving their capabilities, but many private-sector companies are entering the game, and their participation reduces the costs to governments of having to disclose sensitive sources.	不仅政府在提高这方面的能力，很多私营企业也介入其中，而它们的介入降低了政府被迫公开敏感来源的代价。


Many situations are matters of degree, and as technology improves the forensics of attribution, the strength of deterrence may increase.	很多情况都只是程度问题，随着技术的发展提高跟踪取证能力，威慑的强度也可能会增加。


Moreover, analysts should not limit themselves to the classic instruments of punishment and denial as they assess cyber deterrence.	此外，分析人士在评估网络威慑时不应仅限于传统的惩戒和防卫手法。


Attention should also be paid to deterrence by economic entanglement and by norms.	还需要关注通过经济关联和既定标准来进行震慑。


Economic entanglement can alter the cost-benefit calculation of a major state like China, where the blowback effects of an attack on, say, the US power grid could hurt the Chinese economy.	经济关联可以改变中国等大国的成本收益思考，因为袭击美国电网可能导致中国经济受损的后果。


Entanglement probably has little effect on a state like North Korea, which is weakly linked to the global economy.	经济关联或许对朝鲜这样的国家不起���用，因为它与全球经济的联系非常微弱。


It is not clear how much entanglement affects non-state actors.	目前还不清楚经济关联对非国家主体能产生多大影响。


Some may be like parasites that suffer if they kill their host, but others may be indifferent to such effects.	有些可能像宿主被杀的寄生虫那样迅速覆灭，而有些可能根本不在乎这样的后果。


As for norms, major states have agreed that cyber war will be limited by the law of armed conflict, which requires discrimination between military and civilian targets and proportionality in terms of consequences.	具体到标准而言，主要国家一致认为网络战争应受武装冲突规则的管辖，即要求区分军事和民用目标，并在袭击后果方面遵循对应原则。


Last July, the United Nations Group of Government Experts recommended excluding civilian targets from cyberattacks, and that norm was endorsed at last month’s G-20 summit.	去年7月，联合国政府专家小组建议将民用目标排除在网络袭击之外，这一规定刚刚在上个月举行的20国集团峰会上得到通过。


It has been suggested that one reason why cyber weapons have not been used more in war thus far stems precisely from uncertainty about the effects on civilian targets and unpredictable consequences.	有人提出网络武器尚未在迄今为止的战争中得到运用的原因之一恰恰是因为无法确定对平民目标的损害程度和难以预料的后果。


Such norms may have deterred the use of cyber weapons in US actions against Iraqi and Libyan air defenses.	上述规范或许遏制了网络武器在美国军事行动中对伊拉克和黎巴嫩防卫力量的应用。


And the use of cyber instruments in Russia’s “hybrid” wars in Georgia and Ukraine has been relatively limited.	而在俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚和乌克兰发动的“混合型”战争中，网络手段的应用也是相对有限的。


The relationship among the variables in cyber deterrence is a dynamic one that will be affected by technology and learning, with innovation occurring at a faster pace than was true of nuclear weapons.	网络威慑变量之间关系不断变化且受到技术和学习能力的影响，大大超过此前核武器的创新速度。


For example, better attribution forensics may enhance the role of punishment; and better defenses through encryption may increase deterrence by denial.	比方说，改善追踪取证技术可以提高惩罚机制的作用； 而改善加密防御技术可以强化防卫威慑力量。


As a result, the current advantage of offense over defense may change over time.	因此目前进攻相对于防御的优势很可能会随时间的流逝而逐渐发生变化。


Cyber learning is also important.	网络学习能力也同样重要。


As states and organizations come to understand better the importance of the Internet to their economic wellbeing, cost-benefit calculations of the utility of cyber warfare may change, just as learning over time altered the understanding of the costs of nuclear warfare.	随着国家和组织更深入地理解互联网对其经济福祉的重要性，网络战运用的成本收益衡量可能会发生变化，就如同随着时间推移学习改变了对核战争代价的理解一样。


Unlike the nuclear age, when it comes to deterrence in the cyber era, one size does not fit all.	与核时代不同，在涉及网络时代的威慑问题上，并不存在一劳永逸的做法。


Or are we prisoners of an overly simple image of the past?	抑或我们只是屈从于过去过于简单的景象？


After all, when nuclear punishment seemed too draconian to be credible, the US adopted a conventional flexible response to add an element of denial in its effort to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.	毕竟，在核惩罚因太过严厉而缺乏可信度的情况下，美国采取了常规的灵活策略，在遏制苏联入侵西欧的行动中加入了防卫的元素。


And while the US never agreed to a formal norm of “no first use of nuclear weapons,” eventually such a taboo evolved, at least among the major states.	并且尽管美国从未同意“不首先使用核武器”的正式规范，最终这一禁忌仍然持续扩散，至少涉及主要国家。


Deterrence in the cyber era may not be what it used to be, but maybe it never was.	网络时代的威慑或许不是它曾经的样子，但也许固定的模式就从未有过。


The Politics of Moral Hazard	道德风险的政治


BRUSSELS – It is an old and never-ending contest.	布鲁塞尔—这是一场从未停止过的旧争论。


On one side are the moral-hazard scolds, claiming that one of the major responsibilities confronting policymakers is to establish incentives that demonstrate that imprudent behavior does not pay.	一方是道德风险批评家，他们认为决策者所面临的主要责任之一是给出证明鲁莽行为不会有好处的激励。


On the other side are the partisans of financial stability, for whom confidence in the financial system is too precious to be endangered, even with the best possible intentions.	另一方是金融稳定支持者，对他们来说，对金融系统的信心至关重要，不容有失，不管初衷多善，都不能影响信心。


Cyprus is the latest battleground between the two camps.	塞浦路斯是这两大阵营的新战场。


On March 25, after the decision had been taken to wind up the country’s second-largest bank, and to impose large losses on uninsured depositors in the process, Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister, declared that a healthy financial sector requires that “where you take on the risks, you must deal with them.”	3月25日，塞浦路斯决定关闭其第二大银行，在此过程中，无保险储户将蒙受巨大损失。 决定做出后，欧元集团主席、荷兰财政迪塞尔布隆姆（Jeroen Dijsselbloem）声称健康的金融部门要求“你在哪里承担风险，就必须在哪里处理风险。


The aim, he added, should be to create an environment in which Europe’s finance ministers “never need to consider a direct recapitalization” of a bank by the European Stability Mechanism. He was apparently reading from a textbook on moral hazard.	”他还说，目标应该定在创造欧洲各国财长“永远不需要考虑”通过欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism）对银行进行“直接资本重组”的环境。


Immediately after this declaration, however, prices of European bank stocks plunged, and Dijsselbloem was accused by many (including some of his colleagues) of having poured oil on a burning fire.	但是，迪塞尔布隆姆话音刚落，欧洲银行股应声暴跌，而他也被许多人（其中不乏他的同事）指责火上浇油。


Within hours, he issued a statement indicating that “Cyprus is a specific case with exceptional challenges,” and that “no templates are used” in the approach to the European crisis.	几小时后，他发表声明指出“塞浦路斯是个特别的例子，其挑战特别艰巨，”且应对欧洲危机“没有现成模式”。


This is not convincing.	这并不令人信服。


Markets learn from a current crisis which principles will be applied in the next one.	市场从一场危机中学习可用于下一场危机的原则。


And letting them learn is precisely what the fight against moral hazard is about.	而让它们学习正是道德风险之争的关键。


European policymakers have been agonizing over the same dilemma throughout the Cyprus crisis.	在塞浦路斯危机期间，欧洲决策者一直在经历同样的两难。


The burden of bailing out the country’s ailing financial institutions was too heavy for an already-indebted Cypriot state, and the International Monetary Fund was adamant that it would not pretend otherwise.	援助国内麻烦重重的金融机构对已然债务深重的塞浦路斯来说负担太重，IMF坚持它不会假装没看见。


So, in mid-March, Cyprus was heading for a precipitous retrenchment of its banking system, resulting in the loss of a very large part of the country’s financial wealth.	因此，在3月中旬，塞浦路斯开始走向银行系统的突然崩溃，导致该国金融财富的巨大损失。


For the IMF and Germany, which pushed for such an outcome, the rationale was the need to prevent moral hazard.	对IMF和德国来说——它们是这一结果的推手——重要的是防止道德风险的需要。


Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades, reportedly with some support from European institutions, desperately tried to avoid this fate – in the name of financial stability.	据说塞浦路斯总统阿纳斯塔夏季斯（Nicos Anastasiades）及其在欧洲机构的支持者渴望避免这一结果——以金融稳定的名义。


The solution found during the night of March 15 – a one-time tax on deposits – was defensible from the Cypriot viewpoint.	3月15日夜间性策划那个的解决方案——一次性存款税——在塞浦路斯的立场看来不无道理。


Preserving domestic financial stability required limiting taxation of large deposits, because a substantial proportion belonged to foreign account-holders.	保护国内金融稳定要求限制对大储户的课税，因为其中很大一部分属于外国账户。


Avoiding a massive withdrawal of foreign capital therefore implied taxing all deposits below the €100,000 ($130,000) threshold.	于是，避免外资大规模撤离意味着对10万欧元门槛以下的储户课税。


Absent a foreign bailout, no other solution was on offer.	如果没有外国援助，就不会有其他解决方案。


But this solution was detrimental to financial stability in the rest of Europe, because it signaled that the €100,000 threshold below which deposits are guaranteed was not sacrosanct.	但这一方案对欧洲其他地区的金融稳定不利，因为这表明10万欧元门槛以下的储户不再受神圣不可侵犯的担保。


Legally, of course, this guarantee is only worth the solvency of the guarantor – in this case the near-bankrupt Cypriot state.	当然，从法律上说，担保无非是担保者的偿付能力——在这个例子中是濒于破产的塞浦路斯国。


But its abrogation would nonetheless be symbolically powerful, sparking anxiety throughout Europe.	但担保的废除仍将具有巨大的象征意义，激发整个欧洲的忧虑。


The obvious way out of this dilemma would have been for Cyprus’s eurozone partners to assume the cost of the tax on deposits below €100,000.	走出这一两难的显而易见的方法是塞浦路斯的欧元区伙伴国承担10万欧元以下储户的税收成本。


Doing so would have cost them an estimated €1.3 billion, or roughly 0.01% of their GDP – a ridiculously low price to pay for financial stability.	这样做会让它们拿出约13亿美元，或GDP的约0. 01%——对于维持金融稳定来说，这一带价不可谓不小。


It would not have created much moral hazard: large depositors would have been taxed, and the Cypriot government would still have suffered the strictures of an IMF/eurozone program – bitter enough medicine.	这样做不会产生多少道德风险：大储户将被课税，而塞浦路斯政府也将遭受IMF/欧元区计划的苛责——这颗药不可谓不苦。


But, at a time when northern European citizens are full of resentment against banks and seething with anger over transfers to the south, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her peers did not want to ask their taxpayers to pay for a partner country’s mistakes.	但是，在北欧人民强烈反对银行、反感向南欧的转移支付的当口，德国总理默克尔及其同道并不想要求他们的纳税人为伙伴国的错误买单。


The March 15 agreement was not politically viable, and was overwhelmingly rejected by the Cypriot parliament.	3月15日的协议在政治上不可行，也被塞浦路斯议会以一边倒的优势否决。


So, ten days after the ill-fated solution was proposed, the Eurogroup ministers changed course and adopted the approach that they had tried to avoid.	于是，在这个夭折的解决方案提出十天后，欧元集团改变思路，采取了他们此前竭力避免的方法。


Banks are being precipitously resolved.	迅速清算银行。


The consequences are already visible: to avoid a complete meltdown, Cyprus has been forced to introduce capital controls – which everyone had thought were illegal and unthinkable within the eurozone.	后果已经显现：为了避免完全崩溃，塞浦路斯被迫采取了资本管制——在欧元区，这是人人视为非法且不可想象的动作。


As a result, investors and depositors have learned that the erection of financial barriers within the currency area is indeed a genuine risk.	结果，投资者和储户意识到，在货币区内部建立金融壁垒是个实实在在的风险。


And the Cypriots are so angry at Europe that a deliberate exit from the eurozone has become a distinct possibility.	塞浦路斯人对欧洲充满了忿恨，极有可能主动退出欧元区。


Ultimately, the true contest is less between moral hazard and financial stability than it is between financially sensible and politically acceptable solutions.	最终，真正的争论与其说在于道德风险和金融稳定，不如说在于明智的金融解决方案和政治可行方案。


In Europe, as elsewhere, financial policy used to be the remit of specialists – central bankers, regulators, and supervisors.	与别处一样，在欧洲金融政策是专家的事——央行、监管者和监督者。


Not anymore: the experts have lost their legitimacy.	仅此而已：专家早已失去了正统性。


Nowadays, angry citizens are in charge, and politics is driving financial policy.	如今，愤怒的人民在决策，政治在推动者金融政策。


But politics in Europe is national, and what one national parliament regards as the only possible solution another national parliament regards as entirely unacceptable.	但欧洲的政治是国家政治，一国议会所认定的唯一解决方案，换一个国家的议会会认为完全不可行。


Europe has not yet found a response to this problem, and it is not on the way to finding one.	欧洲尚未找到这一问题的应对措施，也没有走在找出应对措施的道路上。


Europe’s Perpetual Crisis	欧洲的永久危机


ATHENS – The Cyprus bailout deal is a watershed in the unfolding eurozone crisis, because responsibility for resolving banks’ problems has been shifted from taxpayers to private investors and depositors.	雅典—塞浦路斯援助协议是欧元区危机发展的分水岭，因为解决银行问题的责任从纳税人转移到了私人投资者和储户头上。


But imposing major losses on Cypriot banks’ depositors violates the deposit-insurance guarantee that forms part of the proposed European banking union, while the imposition of capital controls further erodes the monetary union’s foundations.	但让塞浦路斯银行储户承受巨大损失违反了存款保险保证，而这一保证又是欧洲银行联盟方案的组成部分，与此同时，资本管制的加强进一步削弱了货币联盟的基础。


So, is Europe chasing its tail?	那么，欧洲在搬起石头砸自己的脚吗？


Germany and the other countries of the eurozone core are signaling that debt mutualization within the monetary union is out of the question, and that bailouts of countries or financial institutions will be balanced by “bail-ins” of their creditors.	德国和其他欧元区核心国放出的信号是，欧元区内部债务共同化绝无可能，对国家和金融机构的援助（bailout）必须由其债权人的“自救”（bail-in）来平衡。


Increased uncertainty concerning the safety of deposits will push up interest rates and deepen Europe’s recession, and may also trigger capital outflows from the eurozone’s weaker peripheral economies to the core.	存款安全的日益不确定将推高利率、加深欧洲衰退，可能还会导致资本从欧元区疲软外围国流出，流向核心国。


The implications of this shift may be far-reaching.	这或许将是一个意义深远的变化。


The German model for resolving the debt crisis and returning to internal or external balance relies on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms for the deficit countries.	解决债务危机、回归内部和外部平衡的德国模式依赖于赤字国的财政整固和结构性改革。


But, if all countries simultaneously attempt to improve their fiscal or external balances by cutting spending and raising taxes, all will fail, because each country’s austerity implies less demand for other countries’ output, in turn perpetuating both domestic and external imbalances.	但是，如果所有国家同时尝试通过减支和增税改善其财政和外部平衡，那么所有国家都将失败，因为一国的紧缩意味着对其他国家产出需求的减少，反过来导致国内和外部失衡持续。


“Bailing in” creditors will exacerbate these trends.	“自救”债权人会放大这一趋势。


Moreover, a deep and prolonged recession implies vanishing support for reforms, as governments fail to convince citizens that current sacrifice will ensure a better future.	此外，深度而长期的衰退意味着对改革的支持下降，因为政府无法说服公民相信当下的牺牲能确保未来更好的生活。


Privatization, market liberalization, the opening of closed professions, and government downsizing involve conflicts with powerful vested interests, such as businesses in protected industries, public-sector unions, or influential lobbies.	私有化、市场自由化、开放封闭产业以及减小政府规模意味着与强大的既得利益起冲突，比如受保护产业中的企业、公共部门工会和强势游说集团。


Resolving such conflicts requires social alliances, which are invariably undermined by discontent, civil disorder, and political instability.	解决这些冲突需要社会凝聚力，而不满、社会失序和政治动荡必然会破坏社会凝聚力。


The recent Italian election has shown how toxic the association of austerity policies with the pursuit of reform has become.	最近的意大利选举表明，紧缩政策和追求改革的合力可以造成极坏的效果。


Anti-austerity anger swept away the reform agenda of Mario Monti’s previous technocratic government, leaving Italy, its future uncertain, to continue muddling through.	反紧缩愤怒扫荡了蒙蒂的前技术官僚政府的改革日程，未来充满不确定性的意大利走回了得过且过的老路。


The same scenario seems to be emerging in Greece, where the depth of the austerity-induced recession, with output down by 25% over five years and unemployment at 27%, is paralyzing a reform-minded center-right government.	相同的情景还出现在希腊，紧缩引发的深度衰退让产出在五年中下降了25%，失业率上升到27%，也在严重削弱持改革态度的中右翼政府。


The gaps in the strategy are clear.	这一战略的空白显而易见。


First, the eurozone authorities misread the real causes of the debt crisis, which stemmed mainly from a growing competitiveness gap between the core and periphery countries.	首先，欧元区当局误解了债务危机的真正根源。 债务危机的主要原因是核心国和外围国的竞争力差距拉大。


The resulting private-sector imbalances culminated in banking problems that were eventually transferred to sovereigns.	由此产生的私人部门失衡累积为银行问题，并最终转移为主权信用问题。


Greece’s fiscal profligacy was the exception rather than the rule.	希腊的财政挥霍与其说是例外，不如说是常规。


Indeed, in contrast to the United States, eurozone authorities were slow to consolidate the banking system after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, and failed to sever the ties between sovereigns’ and banks’ balance sheets.	事实上，与美国相反，欧元区当局在2008年全球金融危机爆发后迟迟没有对银行系统进行整固，也没有切断主权信用和银行资产负债表之间的关联。


Nor did they push strongly for structural reforms.	欧元区当局也没有强力推进结构性改革。


Instead, they emphasized harsh austerity, which was to be pursued everywhere.	相反，它们强调严厉的紧缩政策，并将其推而广之。


Second, the effects of austerity were exacerbated by the choice to pursue nominal, rather than structural, fiscal-deficit targets.	其次，紧缩的效果因为追求名义而非结构性财政赤字目标而被放大了。


Countries with a stronger fiscal position (that is, smaller structural deficits) should be encouraged to adopt more expansionary policies in order to contribute to lifting overall demand.	应该鼓励财政情况较好（即结构性赤字较低）的国家采取更具扩张性的政策，以提振总需求水平。


Moreover, the European Investment Bank’s lending capacity could be increased substantially, and European Union structural funds mobilized, to finance investment projects in the peripheral economies.	此外，欧洲投资银行的贷款能力也可以大大提高，欧盟结构性基金应该被动员起来，为外围国的投资项目提供资金。


Third, the European Central Bank’s announcement last August of its “outright monetary transactions” program – through which it guarantees eurozone members’ sovereign debt, subject to policy conditionality – has contributed significantly to subduing financial turbulence in the eurozone.	第三，欧洲央行去年8月宣布的“直接货币交易”（OMT）计划——通过担保欧元区成员国主权债务实现，但有相应的政策条件——在抑制欧元区金融波动方面居功至伟。


But the OMT scheme has not been reinforced by a reduction in key interest rates, which would boost inflation in core countries with external surpluses and thus help to close the competitiveness gap with the periphery.	但OMT机制并未通过降低关键利率得到强化。


Crucially, monetary-policy measures do not address the underlying problem of lack of demand.	降低关键利率能够刺激存在外部盈余的核心国的通胀，有助于减小外围国竞争���差距。


Last, but not least, the eurozone authorities misread the confidence factor.	第四，欧元区当局误读了信心因素。


In theory, simultaneous fiscal consolidation and supply-side reform facilitates economic recovery, because it increases confidence among consumers and investors, thereby inducing higher spending and production.	从理论上说，同时进行财政整固和供给面改革有利于经济复苏，因为这会增加消费者和投资者信心，从而带来更高的支出和产量。 但对于一个不完美运行的货币联盟，这并不一定必然发生。


But this does not necessarily work in an imperfectly functioning monetary union, such as the eurozone, where the continual appearance of systemic flaws erodes confidence; in such circumstances, the result may be hoarding and capital outflows, rather than increased spending.	欧元区正是如此，持续的系统性缺陷侵蚀了信心。 而在这样的环境下，其结果可能是囤积和资本外流，而不是支出增加。


The eurozone’s flaws reflect its conceptual distance from the US, which is the only model of a well-functioning monetary union.	欧元区的缺陷反映了其在概念上与美国的差距，后者才是唯一的成功运行的货币联盟。


Europe’s history rules out emulating the US model.	欧洲的历史排除了模仿美国模式的可能。


But, to make the eurozone work, monetary unification should extend to the fiscal and financial fields, thereby creating an integrated economic union.	但是，为了让欧元区运转起来，货币统一应该扩大至财政和金融领域，从而形成一体化的经济联盟。


The longer that European authorities postpone the introduction of Eurobonds, an effective banking and fiscal union, and lender-of-last-resort status for the ECB, the longer the crisis will last.	欧洲当局越是在引入欧元债券、有效银行和财政联盟以及欧洲央行的最后贷款人地位等问题上逡巡不前，危机就会维持越久。


By effectively defaulting on a deposit-insurance guarantee through its actions in Cyprus, the eurozone backtracked on the planned banking union.	通过塞浦路斯存款保险担保的事实违约，欧元区在银行联盟计划中退后了一大步。


Pursuing a strategy that simultaneously deepens recession and weakens confidence will not resolve the debt crisis.	追求同时深化衰退和削弱信心的战略无法解决债务危机。


As funding problems recur in the recession-hit economies, governments may resist “bailing in” and the associated losses.	由于衰退经济体一再爆发融资问题，政府可能会抵制“自救”以及相应的损失。


Civil unrest and political destabilization could erupt into financial and social crises that ultimately threaten the monetary union’s survival.	社会动荡和政治动荡可能转化为金融和社会危机，最终威胁货币联盟的生存。


In short, the “solution” to the Cyprus crisis is no solution at all for the eurozone.	简言之，塞浦路斯危机的“解决方案”对欧元区来说根本称不上是解决方案。


Unless the authorities embrace a growth strategy – and do so quickly – the eurozone’s prospects will become increasingly bleak.	除非当局采取增长战略——并且快速实施——否则欧元区的前景将越来越暗淡。


Cyprus’s Last Best Chance	塞浦路斯最后也是最好的时机


NICOSIA – It is tempting to see the results of the recent parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus as a blow for the peace process.	尼科西亚——人们不禁要把北塞浦路斯最近一次议会选举的结果看作是对和平进程的一次打击。


Voters in the Turkish Cypriot north rejected the party of their leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, who has been meeting almost weekly for eight months with his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Demetris Christofias, to work out the terms of a settlement to reunify the island.	土耳其北部塞浦路斯聚居区的选民拒绝让他们领袖麦赫迈特·阿里·塔拉特的政党与他在希腊的塞浦路斯同僚季米特里斯·赫里斯托菲亚斯谈判，制定统一塞浦路斯半岛的条款协议。 近八个月以来，塔拉特几乎每周都要与赫里斯托菲亚斯举行会谈。


But the election result has more to do with the dire state of the economy than it does with the peace process.	不过与政治进程相比，选举结果与糟糕的经济状况有着更密切的联系。


Voters are feeling the pain of economic isolation, made worse by the global downturn.	选民们切身感受到经济孤立的痛苦，全球经济低迷让这种痛苦进一步加剧。


While he has lost his parliamentary majority, Talat is still head of the Turkish Cypriot administration and will continue to lead negotiations on behalf of the north.	尽管失去了议会中的多数席位，但塔拉特仍然领导着土耳其塞浦路斯政府，而且仍将继续代表北方领导谈判的进程。


Both he and Christofias remain committed to finding a solution, despite the difficulties they face.	尽管面临着重重困难，但他和赫里斯托菲亚斯双方都决心找到解决的办法。


The election result nonetheless underscores the fact that time is running out to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.	不过选举结果仍然凸显了这样一个事实：那就是为塞浦路斯问题找到解决方案的时间已经所剩无几。


Talat has set the presidential election in early 2010 as a deadline for agreement, while Christofias is not without political challenges within his own coalition.	塔拉特已经把2010年初的总统选举确定为达成协议的最后期限，而赫里斯托菲亚斯在自己的联盟内部并非没有政治阻力。


Cyprus presents visitors with a deceptive image.	塞浦路斯给来访者留下的印象颇具欺骗性。


The sunny climate of the eastern Mediterranean draws a steady stream of tourists, and European Union membership in the south has pushed income levels for Greek Cypriots higher than the EU average.	东地中海艳阳高照的气候吸引着源源不断的旅游者，而南部的欧盟成员地位已经把希腊塞浦路斯人的收入水平推到比欧盟的平均水平还高。


The island might be divided, but life for many is comfortable.	半岛也许还处在分裂状态，但许多人却享受着舒适安闲的生活。


However, Cyprus remains a conflict zone: there are still fortified streets in Nicosia, a United Nations peacekeeping operation patrols the buffer zone, and there is a substantial Turkish military force in the north.	不过，塞浦路斯仍然是一个冲突区域：尼科西亚仍然可以见到建有防御工事的街道，一支联合国维和部队在缓冲区内巡逻，而且有大量的土耳其军队在北部地区驻扎。


This is all the more reason to make sure that the energy and courage of Talat and Christofias are not squandered.	因此我们有更多理由确保塔拉特和赫里斯托菲亚斯的勇气和努力不会被白白地浪费掉。


These two leaders have limited political capital, and they need more than their own goodwill to succeed.	这两位领袖政治资本有限，要想取得成功也不能只靠自身的良好愿望。


First, they need their own people to join them in the peace process.	首先，他们需要自己人加入到和平进程当中。


An overwhelming majority of Cypriots are unhappy with the status quo, believe a settlement is possible, and reject any return to violence, but are deeply distrustful of each other and of the peace process.	绝大多数的塞浦路斯人都对现状不满，相信有和平解决的希望，拒绝再次陷入暴力，但却对谈判对手和和平进程抱有深深的不信任。


They have seen too many previous efforts fail.	他们看到过太多的失败。


A culture of cynicism and complacency seems to be the default position, especially among politicians and the media.	特别是在政治家和媒体圈子里，愤世嫉俗和沾沾自喜的文化似乎成了一种自然而然的立场。


Opening up the debate about what peace could look like would help.	开启和平应当是什么样子的辩论可能会有所帮助。


When we visited Cyprus late last year, we noticed how few women and young people were engaged in politics.	去年访问塞浦路斯时，我们注意到参政的妇女和青年是多么稀少。


Old men (like us) dominate public debate, and we strongly urge Cyprus’s leaders to make more space for those whose voices are not so readily heard.	像我们这样的老年男性主导了公众辩论，我们强烈敦促塞浦路斯领导人为那些被忽略的人留出更多空档。


Second, strengthening links between the two communities is essential.	其次，加强两派民众的交流至关重要。


The island has been split for so long that generations have grown up with no idea of life on the other side.	塞浦路斯岛已经分裂了太长时间，以致于几代人在成长过程中根本不了解另一方的生活状况。


It is very difficult for schools, law enforcement agencies, soccer clubs, and telephone, electricity, and water companies to cooperate across the Green Line.	学校、执法机构、足球俱乐部和电话、电力和自来水公司都很难跨过军事分界线进行合作。


Teenagers can’t even send text messages across the divide.	青少年甚至无法跨越障碍发送短信。


Trade between the communities is limited.	两派民众之间的贸易联系非常有限。


Lowering these barriers with respect and sensitivity would help to heal the wounds of the past and, importantly, to build trust.	以尊重和敏感的态度降低这些障碍可以有助于弥合过去的创伤，而且更重要的是建立相互信任。


Researchers already estimate that reunification could raise annual incomes by about €1.8 billion – more than €5,500 per household.	研究人员已经估计统一可以提升18亿欧元的年度收入——相当于每个家庭增加5，500欧元之多。


Everyone needs to see that there are benefits to reunification that will simplify life, strengthen the economy, and outweigh the compromises that any settlement will require.	人人都应该认识到统一能够带来很多好处，比如简化生活、增强经济、以及抵消任何协议都必不可少的妥协让步。


Third, the major regional powers, whose presence hangs heavily over the island, need to play their part.	第三，岛上各派主要地区势力必须尽到自己的职责。


Greece is urgently called upon to play a more constructive role in the peace process by explaining the benefits of its own normalization of relations with Turkey and its support for that country’s EU membership.	我们迫切呼吁希腊在和平进程中扮演更加建设性的角色，详细说明与土耳其实现关系正常化的好处，明确支持这个国家获得欧盟成员资格。


And Turkey could give a tremendous boost to confidence in the peace process by announcing a symbolic withdrawal of some troops from northern Cyprus as a goodwill gesture – a move that would also greatly assist Turkey’s convergence with Europe.	而土耳其可以宣布从北塞浦路斯象征性撤军，借助这种善意的表示极大地推动人们对和平进程的信心——这一举动也会对土耳其与欧洲的融合有很大的帮助。


Finally, explicit international expressions of support for a settlement would help to persuade the leaders of both communities that success would bring proper recognition and reward.	最后，国际社会明确表示支持和平协议可以有助于说服双方领导成功的努力会带来相应的认可和酬劳。


It would certainly help if the EU promised substantial development funds, including for resolution of property issues, once an agreement is in place.	如果欧盟许以大笔的发展基金肯定会有所帮助，其中也包括在协议达成后解决财产问题。


This is the best chance in 30 years for a federal settlement in Cyprus, and it may be the last.	这是30年来塞浦路斯最好、也许也是最后一次联邦和解机会。


If these talks fail, partition will probably be permanent, and, no matter how benign the environment today, geopolitics will catch up with the island over time.	如果这些谈判失败，那么岛屿可能陷入永久的分裂状态。 无论今天的环境多么良好，地缘政治都会随着时间的流逝逐渐笼罩这个小岛。


Failure to resolve the Cyprus problem is a potentially serious threat to good relations between NATO, Turkey, and the EU.	无法解决塞浦路斯问题是对北约、土耳其和欧盟间良好关系的一种严重的潜在威胁。


Cypriots must seize this chance to build a healthy, reunited country that can make the most of its economic potential in the region, and play its part in world affairs with confidence and security.	塞浦路斯人必须抓住这个机会建设一个健康、统一的国家，最大限度地发掘地区经济潜力，并且安全自信地在世界事务中发挥自身的作用。


Damaged Democracy	被损害的民主


New York – Even before the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, decided to throttle what little legitimacy was left of Iran’s “managed democracy,” it was a peculiar system, indeed.	纽约——即使在最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊决定压制伊朗“受管理的民主”所剩无几的合法性之前，它实际上也是一种特殊的体制。


Although Iranian citizens had the right to elect their president, the candidates had to be vetted by the Council of Guardians, half of whom were picked by the unelected Supreme Leader.	虽然伊朗公民有权选举他们的总统，但是候选人却必须接受宪法监护委员会的审查。 这个组织的半数成员是由不经选举产生的最高领袖来挑选的。


The only candidates allowed to run were men with impeccable religious credentials, loyal to a regime whose most important decisions are made by unelected clerics.	唯一允许参选的候选人都具有无懈可击的宗教信仰，效忠一个体制——虽然在这个体制里最重要的决定是由非选举产生的神职人员来做出的。


Mir-Hossein Mousavi, chosen by the late Ayatollah Khomeini to be prime minister in 1981, was such a figure.	米尔·侯赛因·穆萨维就是这样一个人。 1981年，他被后来的最高领袖阿亚图拉·哈梅内伊挑选成为总理。


Mousavi ran as a reformist who said he would strive for greater freedom of the press, more rights for women, and fewer restrictions on the private lives of Iranians.	穆萨维作为一个改革派来参与本次竞选，表示自己将为争取更多的新闻自由，妇女的更大权益和减少对伊朗人私生活的限制而奋斗。


He also hinted at more flexibility in negotiations with the United States.	他还暗示将在对美谈判时采取更为灵活的立场。


Yet Mousavi’s defeat by the hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in what looked like a rigged electoral process, was greeted by some neo-conservatives in the US with relief.	然而在一场看起来类似作弊的选举程序中，穆萨维被强硬派艾哈迈迪·内贾德击败了。 美国的一些新保守主义者对此如释重负。


One prominent commentator, Max Boot, took “some small degree of satisfaction from the outcome of Iran’s elections,” because Obama would now find it harder to stand in the way of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.	一位卓越的评论家马克思·布特“对伊朗选举的结果略感满意”，因为奥巴马现在将发现阻挡以色列向伊朗的核设施发动袭击更困难了。


Since Iran is the enemy (remember George W. Bush’s “axis of evil”?), it is better to deal with a president who talks and acts like a crazy thug, than with a reasonable-sounding figure who promises reforms.	由于伊朗是敌人（还记得乔治·W·布什的“邪恶轴心论”吗？ ），与该国一个说话行事类似疯狂暴徒的总统打交道，总比和一位理性健全，承诺改革的总统要好一些。


This would seem like the height of cynicism, which of course it is.	看起来这似乎是格外玩世不恭或犬儒主义，当然也的确如此。


It reminds us of the closeness, in spirit, between extreme neo-cons and communist idealogues.	它提醒我们极端的新保守主义和共产主义的意识形态在精神上是极其接近的。


Compromise is anathema to the radical mind.	激进者的头脑对于采取妥协深恶痛绝。


Some radical leftist Muslims, obsessed with their opposition to Western “imperialism” and Israel, saluted Mousavi’s defeat, for, as one such activist put it, “the [anti-Zionist] resistance cannot afford a pro-American velvet revolution.”	一些极端左翼穆斯林，满怀着对西方“帝国主义”和以色列的反感，欢迎穆萨维的落败，其原因就像一位行动者表述的那样“（反犹太复国主义的）抵抗可不能承受一场亲美的天鹅绒革命”。


Communists always had a tendency to dismiss the differences between candidates in liberal democracies (let alone “managed” ones).	共产主义者总是趋向无视自由民主政体中选举人的差别（更不用说受“管理”的体制了）。


They were just different faces of the same rotten system.	他们只不过是同一个溃烂体制中的不同脸孔而已。


In fact, social democrats were regarded as more dangerous than hard-line conservatives, because their moderate left-wing talk only served to postpone the revolution.	实际上，社会民主党人被认为比强硬的保守派更危险，因为他们温和的左翼谈话只是用来延迟革命而已。


This kind of thinking helped the Nazis destroy German democracy in the 1930’s.	这种思维帮助纳粹在1930年代摧毁了德国的民主制度。


The reaction of Boot, and others of his persuasion, points to a genuine dilemma that always occurs in authoritarian systems that use some semblance of democracy to bolster their legitimacy.	布特的反应，还有他的其他说服之道，指出了一个真实的困境。 这一困境总是发生在极权体制之下，而这些体制采用一些民主的假象来支持它们的合法性。


What are opposition candidates to do when they are asked to take part in elections that they know they cannot win, or that, even when they can win, will give them only minimal authority?	当反对派的候选人被要求参加选举，而且知道他们无法获胜，或者，即使他们赢得选举，也只会被赋予很少的权威，他们该怎么办？


If they agree, they help to legitimize a system in which they do not really believe. If they refuse, they have no influence at all.	如果他们同意，就是在帮助一个自身并不信任的体制合法化，如果他们拒绝，他们就全无影响力。


There are valid arguments to made for either course.	这两种原因都有其正确之处。


Any chance for people to voice their views, even in rigged elections, is a good thing.	任何能够表达自己观点的机会，即使是在作弊的选举中，对于人民而言都是一件好事。


And, because democracy is about institutions as much as about individual candidates, it is also good for citizens to exercise their right to vote.	而且，由于民主事关机构也同样事关候选人，公民行使投票权也是一件好事。


Then, when real change does occur, no one can claim that the people “are not ready for it.”	这样，当真正的变化的确发生之时，没有人能够宣称人民“还没有准备好”。


Still, if voting confers dignity on citizens, participation in a fraud is humiliating.	然而，如果投票赋予公民尊严，被卷入舞弊就是屈辱。


There is no absolute yardstick on how to behave in these impossible circumstances, so people must judge every election on its merits.	并没有一个绝对准绳来衡量如何在这些难有作为的情形下行事，所以人们必须依据每次选举的实质来评判。


Since 85% of Iranian voters decided that it was worth taking part in the last election, their decision must be respected.	因为有85%的伊朗选民决定值得参加上一次的选举，他们的决定必须得到尊重。


Although their options were limited, many of them had enough confidence that the reformist candidate would not only get elected, but also make life a little better.	虽然他们的选择有限，许多人却有足够的信心相信改革派的候选人不仅能够当选，还能改善他们的生活。


This is also why 70% voted for Mohammed Khatami, the reformist president, in 1997.	这也是为什么70%的选民在1997年把票投给了改革派的总统候选人莫哈默德·卡塔米。


Khatami, too, had good ideas about press freedom, individual rights, and democratic reforms.	卡塔米对于新闻自由，个人权利和民主改革同样有出色的见解。


They were mostly quashed by the clerics who held ultimate power.	他们主要是被掌握终极权力的神职人员击溃的。


It probably did not help that the Bush administration gave up on Khatami.	布什政府放弃卡塔米可能于事无补。


Like some neo-cons today, Bush’s foreign policy advisers saw no difference between reformists and hardliners.	就像今天的一些新保守主义者一样，布什的外交政策顾问看不到改革派和强硬派之间的区别。


This undermined Khatami’s authority even further.	这甚至进一步破坏了卡塔米的权威。


Mousavi was regarded by many Iranians as a second chance.	穆萨维被许多伊朗人视为是第二次机会。


Unfortunately, Khamenei thought so, too, and made sure that Ahmadinejad held onto his presidency.	不幸的是，哈梅内伊也这样想，同时确保艾哈迈迪·内贾德保住了他的总统席位。


This was a sickening blow to all Iranians who crave the dignity of democratic politics.	对于所有渴望民主政治尊严的伊朗人而言，这是一次痛苦的打击。


But it does not mean that they were wrong, or naïve, to try.	但是，这并不意味着他们的尝试是错误或者天真的。


Mousavi’s campaign, and its aftermath, showed clearly that those who professed to see no difference between the candidates, except in style and presentation, were wrong: even if the election was rigged, the voices of opposition to clerical authoritarianism were heard.	穆萨维的竞选及其后果清楚地显示出：那些只表示看出候选人之间在风格和陈述上的差别，而对其他不同视而不见的人错了——即使存在选举舞弊，反对神职威权主义的声音也被世界听到了。


The quiet dignity of the protests that followed did more for Iran’s standing in the world than any amount of belligerent posturing by a populist president.	对于伊朗在世界的形象而言，选举后的抗议所体现出的静默的尊严，远胜于任何一位民粹派总统摆出的或多或少的好战姿态。


There may have been a more important consequence.	也许已经产生了一个更重要的后果。


The election, the fraud, and the violent crackdown on the subsequent protests revealed, and clearly widened, deep rifts inside the regime.	选举，舞弊，以及对随后抗议的暴力镇压显示出了，而且显然加剧了体制内部的纵深裂痕。


This is the best reason why in most cases it is best to contest elections, even in unpromising circumstances.	这就是为什么在大多数情况下争夺选举是最佳方法，即使是在不太乐观的情况下。


They expose cracks in the wall of dictatorial power.	他们暴露出了独裁政权墙壁上的裂纹。


Ahmedinejad won the election, but the regime is weakened as a result.	艾哈迈迪·内贾德赢得了选举，但结果是体制受到削弱。


Terror can prolong the agony, but in the end an illegitimate regime is doomed.	恐怖能够延长痛苦，然而最终一个非法的政体的命运已经注定。


To persist in the belief that reformists and hardliners are just masks of the same enemy, and to take pleasure in the victory of the latter, is not merely cynical, but is an added insult to a people that has already been humiliated enough.	坚持相信改革派和强硬派只是同一个敌人的面具，并且因为后者的胜利而心生喜悦，这不仅仅是玩世不恭、犬儒主义，而且还是对一个已经蒙受羞辱的民族再施加额外的侮辱。


A Grand Unified Economic Theory?	大一统的经济理论？


NEW YORK – Last month’s US government shutdown – the result of a partisan standoff in congressional budget negotiations – epitomizes the polarization that prevails in modern economic-policy debates.	纽约—上个月，美国政府因为两党在国会预算谈判中陷入僵局而关门，这堪称是现代经济政策争论中普遍存在的两极分化现象的缩影。


On one side, John Maynard Keynes’s cohort argues that government intervention can help any economy grow its way out of crisis by spurring aggregate demand and, in turn, raising the employment rate.	一方面，凯恩斯阵营认为政府干预可以通过刺激总需求并反过来提高就业率从而有助于一切经济体走出危机。


A country’s government, Keynesians contend, has the capacity – and responsibility – to solve many, if not all, of its economic problems.	凯恩斯主义者主张，一国政府有能力——也有责任——解决许多（如果不是全部的话）经济问题。


On the opposite side, followers of the Austrian School of economic thought, especially the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, assert that limited government and free enterprise form the only viable path to liberty and prosperity.	另一方面，奥地利学派经济思想（特别是哈耶克的思想）的追随者认为有限政府和自由企业构成了唯一可行的自由和繁荣之路。


The market is the best arbiter of how to allocate scarce resources, and thus should serve as an economy’s main driver.	市场时如何配置稀缺资源的最佳裁判，因此应该成为经济的主要推动力。


In recent years, this long-running debate has become increasingly contentious – and the costs of stalemate are mounting.	近几年来，这一长期存在的争论变得越来越激烈——而僵局造成的代价也越来越高。


In order to restore growth in developed economies, while sustaining strong GDP growth and reducing poverty in the developing world, a more unified approach to economic policymaking that draws from both traditions is needed.	为了重塑发达经济体的增长，同时保持发展中世界GDP增长的强劲势头并减少贫困，我们需要兼顾这两派的更加统一的经济政策方针。


Official responses to the global economic crisis highlight the interventionist model’s merits, proving that decisive government action can help to enhance efficiency and clear unbalanced markets, thereby protecting the economy from the demand shortfall caused by falling investment and rising unemployment.	针对全球经济危机的官方反应凸显出干预主义模式的优点，证明了果断的政府行动能够有助于增强效率、出清失衡的市场，从而保护经济免受投资下降、失业增加所导致的需求短缺的影响。


But the free market also has a crucial role to play, with longer-term, incentive-based policies catalyzing scientific and technological advancement – and thus boosting economies’ growth potential.	但自由市场也起了关键作用，长期的基于激励的政策促进了科学和技术进步，从而提振经济体的增长潜力。


In determining how to promote innovation without sacrificing social protection, economists and policymakers should take a lesson from the field of physics.	在决定如何促进创新又不必牺牲社会保障时，经济学家和决策者应该借鉴物理学。


For nearly a century, physicists have attempted to merge the competing ideas of the field’s titans, including Wolfgang Pauli, the first physicist to predict the existence of neutrinos (the smallest particles of matter), and Albert Einstein, who explained the curvature of space-time.	近一个世纪以来，物理学家试图将物理学巨擘之间针锋相对的思想统一起来，包括第一位预言中微子（最小微粒）的泡利和解释了时空曲率的爱因斯坦。


The so-called “theory of everything” would reconcile the inconceivably small with the unimaginably large, providing a comprehensive understanding of the universe’s physical properties.	所谓的“万有理论”将不可感知的微观与不可想象宏观调和起来，提供了对宇宙物理性质的全面理解。


Policymakers should be working to unite seemingly disparate theories to align policy decisions with the business cycle and the economy’s level of development.	决策者应该致力于将看似分裂的理论统一起来，从而让政策决定与商业周期和经济的发展水平相协调。


Such an approach should seek to protect economies from the destabilizing impacts of politically motivated policy changes, without impeding governments’ ability to correct dangerous imbalances.	这一方针应该寻求保护经济体免受政治驱动的政策变化的破坏性冲击，同时又不妨碍政府纠正危险失衡的能力。


Officials must be at least as vigilant about reducing expenditure and withdrawing stimulus measures during periods of growth as they are inclined to introduce such policies during downturns.	官员对于在增长时期减支和退出刺激措施的警惕性至少不能亚于在衰退时期引入这些政策。


To the extent that this approach reflects the view that policymaking is an art, not a science, that is a good thing: the world needs more flexibility in economic policymaking.	这一方针体现了决策是一种艺术而不是一种科学的观点，这是件好事：在经济决策中，我们需要更多的灵活性。


But some might consider it a cause for concern, especially given growing suspicion of incentive-based economic policies in the wake of the global economic crisis.	但一些人可能会认为这值得担忧，特别是在全球经济危机导致越来越多的人怀疑基于激励的经济政策时。


Many blame the crisis on the decades-long ascendancy of a laissez faire approach to economic policymaking, and rightly credit government intervention with facilitating recovery.	许多人指责危机的根源是几十年来自由放任经济决策方针一直占据支配地位，并正确地赞扬了政府以促进复苏的手段进行的干预。


The tremendous economic success of countries like China, where hundreds of millions of people have escaped abject poverty in a single generation, has reinforced support for state-led systems.	中国等国家取得了巨大的经济成功，在不到一代人的时间里，几亿人摆脱了极端贫困状态，这更��加强了对国家领导体系的支持。


In developed countries, too, many advocate a greater role for the state, in order to ensure that promised social benefits are delivered to rapidly aging populations.	在发达国家也有很多人支持国家扮演更重要角色，从而确保迅速老化的人口能够获得承诺的社会福利。


In fact, in many countries, the government’s capacity is already strained.	事实上，在许多国家，政府的能力已经左支右绌。


As German Chancellor Angela Merkel has pointed out, though Europe is home to just 7% of the world’s population and produces 25% of the world’s wealth, it accounts for 50% of global welfare payments.	正如德国总理默克尔所指出的，尽管欧洲以占全世界7%的人口生产了25%的财富，但也占据了50%的全球福利支出。


When the United States is included, 11.5% of the global population receives 88% of the world’s welfare payments.	若把美国也包括进来，那么全球11. 5%的人口拿了88%的世界福利支出。


But relegating free-market principles to the past would simply create a new set of imbalances.	但让自由市场原则彻底成为历史只能造成新的失衡。


Rather than allow extremists to continue to hijack economic-policy debates, policymakers must work to bridge competing schools of thought.	决策者不能允许极端主义者继续劫持经济政策争论，而必须致力于弥合针锋相对的四象阵营。


Only then will productive discourse – the kind that does not end in government shutdown – be possible.	惟其如此，才可能出现有利于生产的学说，并且不会因为政府关门而终结。


Keynes once wrote that he agreed with “almost all” of Hayek’s ideas.	凯恩斯曾经写道，他同意“几乎所有”哈耶克的思想。


And Hayek found it “reassuring” to know that he and Keynes agreed “so completely.”	哈耶克也认为他和凯恩斯“如此全面”的一致“令人安心”。


This raises the question: What is really preventing economists and policymakers from devising – or even seeking – a unified theory of economics?	这就带来了问题：到底是什么在阻挠经济学家和决策者设计——或者说寻找——大一统的经济学理论？


Damming China’s Rivers	中国大兴水利


Of all China’s problems, none will be more critical over the long run than how it resolves the tension between economic development and environmental protection.	从长远来看，在中国的所有问题中，没有比如何解决经济发展和环境保护之间的尖锐矛盾更为关键的了。


Nowhere are consequences of this struggle clearer than in the Himalayan foothills of the southwestern province of Yunnan.	没有其他地方的斗争结局比中国西南的云南省喜马拉雅山脚下的更为明显。


Yunnan is home to three great Asian rivers: the Mekong, the Salween (or Nu), and the Jinsha.	云南省是亚洲三条大河的发源地。 它们是湄公河、怒江和金沙江。


All start on the great Tibetan Plateau and flow in parallel through the northwest corner of the province into Southeast Asia.	三条河流都发端于青藏高原，平行流淌，穿过云南省的西北角进入东南亚。


They are China’s last pristine rivers, but are now slated for sacrifice to satisfy the country’s insatiable thirst for power.	它们是中国未遭破坏的河流，但是现在却注定牺牲来满足中国对能源动力无法满足的饥渴。


Plans call for dozens of dams to be placed along their serpentine courses through the mountains of Yunnan.	根据规划，将沿着蜿蜒于云南山谷中的河道中修建几十个水坝。


I had the chance to see one of these rivers – and the proposed site of one of the country’s most controversial dams – on a recent trek through the stunning Tiger Leaping Gorge, north of the town of Lijiang in northern Yunnan.	我最近在云南省北部小镇丽江北面雄伟的虎跳峡游历，从而有机会参观其中一条河流以及规划中的该国最为有争议的水坝。


On its descent from the roof of the world, the Jinsha River, tributary of the mighty Yangtze, cascades through this ten-mile gorge on its way to Shanghai and the East China Sea.	奔腾的长江其支流金沙江从世界屋脊流淌，从这个十英里长的峡谷倾泻而下，直奔上海和中国东海。


If, or rather when, the river is dammed, it will help power the cities and factories of coastal China.	如果在这条河流上修建水坝，或者说水坝修建以后，金沙江将为中国沿海城市和工厂提供电力。


The sun was high above white-crowned Jade Dragon Snow Mountain when my guide pointed down the gorge at the brown waters churning thousands of feet below.	玉龙雪山白雪皑皑，晴空万里。 我的导游小春是一个17岁纳西族少年。


“That’s where they will build the dam,” Xiao Chun, a 17-year-old Naxi, one of Yunnan’s 22 ethnic minorities, said.	纳西族是云南22个少数民族之一。 他手指数千英尺下翻滚的棕色江水峡谷对我说：“那里就要建水坝了，这对我们非常不好。


“It will be very bad for us.	会有很多污染。


There will be a lot of pollution.	我希望这不会发生。


I hope it doesn’t happen.”	”


The dam will have its uses.	水坝将有用武之地。


Dianchi Lake near the provincial capital, Kunming, is so shrunken and polluted that the city faces a serious water shortage.	云南省会昆明附近的滇池已经极度萎缩和污染，昆明面临着严重的用水短缺。


Water from the Tiger Leaping Gorge will be diverted to flush out Dianchi Lake, without which Kunming will not prosper.	从虎跳峡引来的水将冲刷滇池。 昆明没有滇池就无法兴旺繁荣。


As China seeks to keep its economic engine running, dams and hyrdopower do represent a cleaner alternative to coal.	中国努力保持其经济发动机运转，水坝和水电的确是煤的清洁替代品。


China plans to double its hydropower capacity to over 120 GW by 2010 and to build more hydropower-projects for at least another 20 years.	中国计划到2010年将其水电容量翻一番，达到120百万千瓦，并且至少在以后的20年中修建更多的水电工程。


Experts reckon that only a quarter of China’s hydropower has yet been tapped.	专家预计，中国的水电目前只有四分之一得到了利用。


Yet the costs may outweigh the benefits.	但是，有可能得不偿失。


Northwestern Yunnan is one of the world’s most biologically diverse areas, home to half of China’s animal species and a quarter of its plant species.	西南部的云南省是世界上生物物种最为多样的地区之一，拥有中国一半的动物种类和四分之一的植物种类。


Whatever portions of this ecosystem that the dams don’t submerge are certain to be disrupted in potentially disastrous ways.	这些生态系统即使不被水坝所吞没，也几乎肯定会被打破，后患无穷。


A more immediate concern is the immense number of people who will need to be resettled when reservoirs inundate the region’s densely populated valleys.	更为迫切的担忧是，当水库淹没该地区人口稠密的峡谷时，将有大量人口需要被重新安置。


Since 1949, 16 million people have been displaced by reservoirs.	从1949年以来，1,600万人由于修建水库而流离失所。


Some 10 million of them still live in poverty.	大约1,000万人生活贫困。


At Tiger Leaping Gorge, where a mere 100,000 residents will have to be relocated, residents fear that they will be ordered to move up the steep mountainsides to open marginal land at 6,000 to 9,000 feet.	在虎跳峡，只有10万居民迁移。 但是，当地居民担心他们会被下令迁往陡峭的山坡上，在6,000 到9,000英尺的高度上开垦贫瘠土地。


Dam opponents, including vocal indigenous environmental groups, have waged a seemingly successful battle to protect Tiger Leaping Gorge and the Salween (the Nu River).	反对修建水坝的人士，包括当地敢于直言的环保团体展开了一场看似成功的斗争来保护虎跳峡以及怒江。


In early 2005, three years after a new law on environmental impact assessments (EIA’s) was passed, the State Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPA), ordered the halt of 30 large projects, including 26 hydropower plants that had failed to submit proper EIA’s.	2005年初，在新的环境影响评估法规通过三年之后，国家环保总局下令30个大型工程停工，包括26个没有提交合格的环境影响评估的水电厂。


Among the suspended projects was the first dam across the Nu/Salween.	其中之一就是怒江上的第一个水坝。


These efforts appear to have catalyzed greater environmental sensitivity among the country’s leaders.	这些努力看起来在该国的领导人中激发了更大的环境敏感度。


The government recently called for more balanced development, even proposing a “green index” to measure growth.	政府最近呼吁更为平衡的发展，甚至提出用“绿色指标”来衡量发展。


Indeed, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has declared that he wants to see more “scientific development” in China’s approach to its problems, and even called for a temporary halt of the Salween (Nu) River dam.	温家宝总理说，解决中国的问题时，他想要看到更为“科学发展”，甚至要求暂停怒江水坝。


Environmentalists were even permitted to take part in a public hearing on the Tiger Leaping Gorge project, a first for China.	环保人士被允许参加有关虎跳峡工程的公开听证会，这是破天荒的第一次。


Unfortunately, the Communist Party’s tolerance of such civic activity blows hot and cold.	不幸的是，中共对此类民间活动的容忍反复无常。


The Party, alarmed by the “color revolutions” that toppled post-Soviet leaders in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, is cracking down on domestic non-government organizations for fear that they, too, might become catalysts for popular uprisings.	推翻格鲁吉亚、乌克兰以及吉尔吉斯坦后苏联领导人的“颜色革命”另中共大惊失色。 中共害怕国内非政府组织也会成为大众起义的催化剂而予以打压。


Support for “green development” inside central government organizations like SEPA offers little assurance of an effective countervailing force.	在像国家环保总局那样的中央政府机关内对“绿色发展”的支持根本无法保证有效地抵消对环境的破坏。


“We must sharpen our teeth,” Pan Yue, SEPA’s deputy director, said when the agency halted the dam projects.	国家环保总局副局长潘岳在该局停止水坝工程时说：“我们必须加大力度。


But China has seen a steady decentralization of power in recent years, making it harder for SEPA to affect policies at the regional and local levels.	”但是，中国近年来中央权力分散，使得环保总局难以影响省市和地方的政策。


Indeed, local governments appear less afraid of Beijing’s bite than before.	实际上，地方政府对于北京的权威不像以往那样惧怕。


When boundaries were negotiated for Three Parallel Rivers Park – designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2003 – local authorities won a fight to exclude Tiger Leaping Gorge, knowing that a dam there would triple tax revenues.	2003年，联合国教科文组织将云南三江并流公园列为世界自然遗产地。 地方当局意识到虎跳峡水坝可以将税收提高三倍，因此在进行边界谈判的时候，将虎跳峡排除在外赢得了胜利。


China urgently needs to maintain an annual growth rate of over 9% as a bulwark against social disorder.	中国急需维持9％的年增长率用以防止社会动荡。


As a result, however, China is slowly consuming itself, and no major part of China may remain pristine.	但是，结果却是中国正在耗尽自己，没有任何主要区域可以保持原始状态了。


The Danger of a Weak Europe	弱欧洲的危险


CAMBRIDGE – In 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, following a period of American preoccupation with Vietnam and China, declared a “year of Europe.”	坎布里奇——1973年，美国国务卿亨利·基辛格在对越南和中国一段时间的全神贯注后，却宣布了“欧洲年”的决策。


More recently, after President Barack Obama announced a US strategic “pivot,” or rebalancing, toward Asia, many Europeans worried about American neglect.	最近，在美国总统奥巴马宣布美国战略“支点”，或再平衡转向亚洲后，许多欧洲人担心为美国所忽略。


Now, with an ongoing refugee crisis, Russia’s occupation of eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea, and the threat of British withdrawal from the European Union, 2016 may become, by necessity, another “year of Europe” for American diplomacy.	现在，由于正在上演的难民危机、俄罗斯占领东乌克兰并非法吞并克里米亚、以及英国威胁退出欧盟，美国外交在2016年或许有必要再次做出“欧洲年”的决策。


Regardless of slogans, Europe retains impressive power resources and is a vital interest for the United States.	无论喊什么口号，欧洲都仍具备相当的实力，并对美国的切身利益至关重要。


Although the US economy is four times larger than that of Germany, the economy of the 28-member EU is equal to that of the US, and its population of 510 million is considerably larger than America’s 320 million.	尽管美国经济比德国大四倍，但由28个成员国组成的欧盟经济体量与美国对等，其5. 1亿的人口规模则要比美国的3.


Yes, American per capita income is higher, but in terms of human capital, technology, and exports, the EU is very much an economic peer.	诚然，美国的人均收入较高，但就人力资本、技术和出口领域而言，欧盟完全当得起美国的经济对手。


Until the crisis of 2010, when fiscal problems in Greece and elsewhere created anxiety in financial markets, some economists had speculated that the euro might soon replace the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency.	2010年危机爆发（即希腊和其他国家的财政问题引发金融市场焦虑）前，有些经济学家纷纷猜测欧元很可能迅速取代美元而成为世界主要储备货币。


In terms of military resources, Europe spends less than half of what the US allocates to defense, but has more men and women under arms.	就军事资源而言，欧洲花在国防领域的开支还不到美国的一半，但服役人数却比美国更多。


Britain and France possess nuclear arsenals and a limited capacity for overseas intervention in Africa and the Middle East.	英法两国拥有核武器及在非洲和中东实施海外干预的有限能力。


Both are active partners in the airstrikes against the Islamic State.	两者同是打击伊斯兰国空袭战争中活跃的合作伙伴。


As for soft power, Europe has long had wide appeal, and Europeans have played a central role in international institutions.	就软实力而言，欧洲感染力其实早已有之，而欧洲人一直在国际体系中发挥着核心作用。


According to a recent study by the Portland Group, Europe accounted for 14 of the top 20 countries.	波特兰集团近期一项研究表明，欧洲在排名前20位的国家中占了14席之多。


The sense that Europe was uniting around common institutions made it strongly attractive for the EU’s neighbors, though this eroded somewhat after the financial crisis.	欧洲团结在统一制度下的认知对欧盟邻国产生了强大的吸引力，尽管这种吸引力在金融危机后有所减弱。


The key question in assessing Europe’s power resources is whether the EU will retain enough cohesion to speak with a single voice on a wide range of international issues, or remain a limited grouping defined by its members’ different national identities, political cultures, and foreign policies.	评估欧洲实力源泉的关键问题是欧盟能否保持足够的凝聚力在一系列国际问题上发出统一的声音，抑或仍然是由成员国不同的民族身份、政治文化和外交政策所定义的有限的机构。


The answer varies by issue.	答案因事而异。


On questions of trade, for example, Europe is the equal of the US and able to balance American power.	比方说在贸易问题上，欧洲与美国完全对等，并且能够对美国力量进行制衡。


Europe’s role in the International Monetary Fund is second only to that of the US (although the financial crisis dented confidence in the euro).	欧洲在国际货币基金组织（IMF）的作用仅次于美国（尽管金融危机削弱了对欧元的信心）。


On anti-trust issues, the size and attractiveness of the European market has meant that American firms seeking to merge have had to gain approval from the European Commission as well as the US Justice Department.	在反垄断问题上，欧洲市场的规模和吸引力意味着想要寻求合并的美国企业一定要获得欧盟委员会及美国司法部的双重批准。


In the cyber world, the EU is setting the global standards for privacy protection, which US and other multinational companies cannot ignore.	在网络世界，一个美国和其他跨国公司不能忽视的事实是欧盟正在制定隐私保护的全球标准。


But European unity faces significant limits.	但欧洲统一面临着很大的局限性。


National identities remain stronger than a common European identity.	民族身份仍然压制着统一的欧洲身份。


Right-wing populist parties have included EU institutions among the targets of their xenophobia.	右翼民粹主义政党已经将欧盟机构纳入了他们仇外的对象。


Legal integration is increasing within the EU, but the integration of foreign and defense policy remains limited.	欧盟内部的法律融合不断加强，但外交和防务政策融合仍停留在很低限度。


And British Prime Minister David Cameron has promised to reduce the powers of EU institutions and to subject the results of his negotiations with the Union’s leaders to a popular referendum by the end of 2017.	英国首相戴维·卡梅伦已经承诺削减欧盟机构的权力，并将其与欧盟领导人的谈判结果于2017年底前付诸公投。


If Britain votes no and exits the EU, the impact on European morale will be severe – an outcome that the US has made clear should be avoided, though there is little it could do to prevent it.	如果英国最终投反对票并退出欧盟，这将对欧洲士气造成严重的影响——美国已明确表态要避免这样的结果，虽然它对阻止上述结果的发生束手无策。


In the longer term, Europe faces serious demographic problems, owing to low birth rates and unwillingness to accept mass immigration.	从长远看，由于出生率低且不愿接受大���模移民，欧洲所面临的人口问题非常严重。


In 1900, Europe accounted for a quarter of the world’s population.	1900年，欧洲人口占世界的四分之一。


By the middle of this century, it may account for just 6% – and almost a third will be older than 65.	但到本世纪中叶，欧洲人口占比可能下降到6%——而且几乎三分之一的人达到65岁以上。


Although the current immigration wave could be the solution to Europe’s long-term demographic problem, it is threatening European unity, despite the exceptional leadership of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	尽管有着德国总理默克尔的卓越领导，尽管目前的移民潮可能解决欧洲长期的人口问题，但它正在对欧盟团结构成威胁。


In most European countries, the political backlash has been sharp, owing to the rapid rate of the inflows (more than a million people in the past year) and the Muslim background of many of the newcomers.	多数欧洲国家都产生了强烈的政治反弹，原因是移民流入速度过快（仅去年一年移民人数就超过百万）和许多新移民的穆斯林背景。


Again, an important American diplomatic interest is at stake, but there is not much the US can do about it.	这同样关系到美国重要的外交利益，但美国所能采取的措施却非常有限。


There is little long-term danger that Europe could become a threat to the US, and not only because of its low military expenditure.	欧洲成为美国长期威胁的几率很低，而且军费开支低并非唯一的决定因素。


Europe has the world’s largest market, but it lacks unity.	欧洲拥有全世界最大的市场，但却缺乏统一性。


And its cultural industries are impressive, though, in terms of higher education, whereas 27 of its universities are ranked in the global top 100, the US accounts for 52.	欧洲文化产业十分发达，但就高等教育而言，有27家欧洲大学跻身全球百强行列，而美国则高达52家。


If Europe overcame its internal differences and tried to become a global challenger to the US, these assets might partly balance American power, but would not equal it.	如果欧洲克服其内部分歧试图成为美国的全球挑战者，上述资产或许可以部分平衡美国的力量，但却不足以和美国平起平坐。


For US diplomats, however, the danger is not a Europe that becomes too strong, but one that is too weak.	对美国外交官而言，危险不在于欧洲变得过于强大，而在于它变得过于弱小。


When Europe and America remain allied, their resources are mutually reinforcing.	如果欧洲和美国保持同盟，两者的资源可以相辅相成发挥作用。


Despite inevitable friction, which is slowing the negotiation of the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, economic separation is unlikely, and Obama will travel to Europe in April to promote the TTIP.	虽然不可避免的摩擦导致拟议中跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系谈判放缓，但经济分离的可能性不大，而奥巴马将于四月前往欧洲推进跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系。


Direct investment in both directions is higher than with Asia and helps knit the economies together.	美欧的双向直投高于亚洲，有助于双方的经济融合。


And while Americans and Europeans have sniped at each other for centuries, they share values of democracy and human rights more with each other than with any other regions of the world.	而且虽然美国人和欧洲人几个世纪来一直互相攻击，但与世界其他地区相比他们的民主和人权价值观是共同的。


Neither a strong US nor a strong Europe threaten the vital or important interests of the other.	美国和欧洲都不会威胁对方的关键或重要利益。


But a Europe that weakens in 2016 could damage both sides.	但2016年欧洲的削弱可能会对双方利益造成损害。


Europe’s Lessons for China’s Reformers	中国改革者可以从欧洲教训中学到什么


BRUSSELS – The most important economic-policy decision of 2013 might well have been taken in November at the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, which pledged that the market should be given a “decisive” role in guiding China’s economy.	布鲁塞尔—2013年所做出的最重要经济政策决策大概要数11月中共十八大三中全会的决定了——市场应该在指导中国经济中起“决定性”作用。


Because China is now the world’s largest exporter after the European Union, and accounts for about half of global growth, decisions taken in Beijing could have a more important impact on the world economy than those taken in Berlin, Brussels, or Washington, DC.	目前中国是世界上仅次于欧盟的最大出口国，贡献了大约一半的全球增长，因此北京的决策对世界经济的影响力是最大的，要超过柏林、布鲁塞尔和华盛顿。


But, while China’s embrace of the market and opening to the outside world has enabled it to achieve astonishing economic progress over the last three decades, the country might now have reached a level of income at which the problem is no longer “too little market.”	但是，尽管中国采取市场经济和改革开放让它在过去三十年中取得了令人惊异的经济成就，但其收入可能已经达到了问题不再是“太少市场”的水平。


On the contrary, some of China’s key problems today require a stronger role for government.	相反，如今不少中国的关键性问题需要政府扮演更强大的角色。


Air and water pollution, for example, can be addressed only by more state intervention, at both the central and local levels.	比如，空气和水污染问题只有在更多的国家干预（包括中央和地方层面）下才能解决。


The authorities have now made solving the problem a high priority, and there can be little doubt that China has the resources to do so – much as it created the world’s largest manufacturing sector.	当局目前已将解决这一问题列为当务之急，并且毫无疑问中国有这样做的资源——正如它创造了世界最大的制造业部门。


The fight against smog and water pollution plays to the country’s strength: the availability of huge domestic savings to finance the necessary investment in pollution-abatement equipment.	与雾霾和水污染的斗争关系到国家优势：巨量国内储蓄可以用来为治污设备投资提供必需的融资。


The dilemma for China’s leaders is that meeting the need for more in pollution control and infrastructure makes it more difficult to achieve their goal of shifting the country’s economic-growth model from one based on investment and exports to one based on consumption.	中国领导人所面临的的两难在于，花更大力气治理污染和建设基础设施的需要增加了实现其将经济增长模式从依靠投资和出口转变为依靠消费的目标的难度。


But more consumption today would further aggravate the pollution problem.	但今天的更多消费会进一步加剧污染问题。


As a result, economic rebalancing may be delayed by the more urgent need for environmental investment.	因此，经济再平衡可能因为更加紧迫的环境投资需要而被推迟。


Other areas of the economy require greater government oversight as well.	其他经济领域也需要更多地政府监督。


Network industries like telecoms, gas, electricity, and water tend to become monopolistic or oligopolistic if left to market forces alone.	如果任由市场力量起作用，通信、天然气、电力和水务等网络型行业将趋向于形成垄断或寡头垄断。


Well-run economies achieve higher levels of welfare not because there is less regulation of these sectors, but because more efficient regulation prevents the emergence of cartels, thereby protecting consumers.	运转良好的经济之所以能实现更高水平的福利，不是因为减少了对这些部门的监管，而是因为更有效的监管防止了卡特尔的出现，从而保护了消费者。


Similar reasoning applies to reform of the state-owned-enterprise (SOE) sector.	同样的逻辑也适用于国有企业改革。


The key problem is less the form of ownership (state or private) than it is the need to ensure that these enterprises operate according to market principles and within a competitive environment.	关键问题不在于所有权形式（国有还是民营），而在于必须保证这些企业根据市场原则在竞争环境下经营。


The European experience confirms this.	欧洲经验肯定了这一点。


The Treaty of Rome, which established the common market back in 1957, did not distinguish between state-owned and private enterprises, though vast sectors of the economy (most of the coal and steel industry, and in many countries banking) were in state hands at the time.	1957年建立了共同市场的《罗马条约》并未区分国有和私营企业，尽管当时经济中的大量部门（煤炭和钢铁行业的大部分，以及许多国家的银行业）都掌握在国家手中。


Instead, the treaty established internal-market rules that barred governments from giving their companies unfair advantages.	相反，《罗马条约》建立了内部市场规则，阻止了政府给它们的公司带来不公平的优势。


The prohibition of state aid was a game changer for Europe, because it forced SOEs to operate on a level playing field and thus to become as efficient as their domestic or foreign competitors.	对欧洲来说，禁止国家援助是一大局面改变因素，因为这迫使国有企业在平等竞技场中经营，从而变得与国内外竞争对手一样高效。


Once local politicians could no longer use the SOEs for their own goals, most member countries decided that they might as well privatize many of them.	而随着地方政客不再能够利用国有企业实现个人目的，大部分成员国都决定不妨将其中许多国有企业私有化。


Of course, downsizing the SOE sector took time; but the direction of the process was never in doubt, because the SOEs’ foreign and domestic competitors naturally provided strong political support for the European Commission’s vigorous policing of state aid.	当然，收缩国有企业部门规模需要时间； 但这一过程的方向从未受到质疑，因为国有企业的国内外竞争对手自然而然地强烈支持欧盟委员会对国家援助的严格监管。


In China, too, the key issue today is the rules under which the SOEs’ operate.	中国也是如此，今天的关键问题就在于国有企业经营的规则。


Instead of large-scale privatization, it might be better to limit state aid and give competitors legal recourse to seek redress if state aid distorts competition.	与大规模私有化相比，或许更好的做法是限制国家援助，并让竞争者可以在国家援助扭曲竞争时拿起法律武器要求纠正。


The area that has attracted the most attention is finance, and for good reason.	吸引了最多关注的领域是金融业，这不是没有原因的。


In most of the advanced world, investment amounts to little more than 15% of GDP, compared to close to 45% for China.	在大部分发达国家，投资不会超过GDP的15%，而中国接近45%。


Financial markets are thus even more important for China than for the US or Europe, and there are clear signs that the productivity of investment has been declining rapidly in China.	因此，金融市场对中国的重要性甚至比美国和欧洲还要高，并且有清晰的信号表明中国的投资生产率在快速下降。


The lynchpin of the China’s planned financial-sector reforms – interest-rate liberalization – might not address the problem.	中国所计划的金融部门改革的关键点——利率自由化或许无法解决这一问题。


In principle, higher interest rates on lending should help to reduce over-investment.	理论上，贷款利率提高应该有助于减少过度投资。


But, in a system with many – often implicit – government guarantees, it is not always the most efficient enterprises that are willing and able to pay more to borrow.	但是，在存在各种（通常是隐性的）政府担保的制度下，愿意和能够以更大代价举债的未必是效率最高的企业。


Liberalizing lending rates might merely lead those with government guarantees to outbid smaller and more efficient enterprises, resulting in more misallocation of capital.	贷款利率自由化可能只会导致有政府担保的企业凌驾于规模更小、效率更高的企业之上，导致更严重的资本错配。


This suggests that financial liberalization might be dangerous until even SOEs are subject to a hard budget constraint.	这意味着金融自由化可能是危险的，除非国有企业也受到预算硬约束。


The global economy’s most powerful growth engine does not need simply “more market.”	全球经济的最强增长引擎并不需要简单的“更多市场”。


It needs a stronger regulatory framework to ensure that its markets maximize efficiency and social welfare.	它需要更强的监管框架以确保其市场能够让效率和社会福利最大化。


What Makes Greece Special?	什么让希腊如此特殊?


BRUSSELS – The euro crisis seems to be largely over.	布鲁塞尔—欧元危机似乎已经大致结束了。


Risk premiums continue to fall across the board, and two countries – Ireland and Portugal – have already exited their adjustment programs.	风险溢价在全面下降，两个国家——爱尔兰和葡萄牙——已经退出了调整计划。


They can now finance themselves in the market, and their economies seem to have started growing again.	现在它们已经能够在市场上为自己融资，它们的经济似乎也已重新开始增长。


By contrast, Greece is still having problems fulfilling the goals of its adjustment program and is engaged in seemingly endless negotiations over yet another multilateral financing package.	相反，希腊在实现调整计划目标方面仍然存在问题，并且似乎陷入了关于新一轮多边融资计划的没完没了的谈判。


The problem can be summed up in one word: exports (or, rather, lack of export growth).	问题总结起来就是两个字：出口（或者说是出口增长乏力）。


The news from Greece these days has been dominated by the announcement that the government achieved a primary budget surplus (the fiscal balance minus debt service) in 2013.	最近这些天来，来自希腊的最重要的消息是政府宣布实现了2013年初级预算盈余（财政余额减去债务利息）。


For the first time in decades, the Greek government has been able to pay for its expenditure with its own revenues.	这是几十年来希腊政府第一次能够依靠自己的收入支付自己的支出。


This is indeed a milestone.	这毫无疑问是一个里程碑。


But another, much more important news item has received much less attention: Greece exported less in 2013 than in 2012.	但另一个重要得多的新闻却没有吸引多少注意。 那就是2013年希腊的出口还不如2012年。


This lackluster performance, which followed years of decline in market shares, is difficult to explain, given that all other countries on the eurozone periphery recorded solid export growth.	在多年的市场份额下跌之后，这一萎靡的表现难以解释，因为欧元区外围国的所有其他国家都录得稳健的出口增长。


For example, Portuguese exports increased by about 5-6% per year over the last years, despite challenging external conditions (Spain is its biggest market) and a credit crunch, which made it difficult for exporters to obtain financing.	比如，葡萄牙出口在过去几年中每年可以增长约5—6%，尽管它面临着不利的外部环境（西班牙是其最大的市场）和信用动荡，这意味着其出口商很难获得融资。


Neither weak foreign demand nor a lack of financing, therefore, can be the reason for Greece’s poor export performance.	因此，不管是外部需求萎靡还是缺少融资，都不能作为希腊出口表现拙劣的理由。


Low competitiveness, too, is not an explanation, as real (inflation-adjusted) wage costs have declined by more in Greece in recent years than in any other eurozone country, with the exception of Ireland.	竞争力低下也不是理由，因为近几年来希腊实际（经通胀调整的）工资成本的降幅比任何其他欧元区国家（爱尔兰除外）都要大。


But it would be strange to conclude from Greece’s experience that wage deflation is a useless tool for improving competitiveness, given the widespread assumption that Germany benefited massively from it.	但从希腊的经验得出工资通缩对改善竞争力毫无效果也令人难以接受，因为人们广泛认为这正是德国大量获益的原因。


So the only explanation for Greece’s poor export performance must be that the Greek economy has remained so distorted that it has not responded to changing price signals.	因此，希腊出口表现拙劣的唯一解释就剩下希腊经济仍然极度扭曲，以至于没有对改变的价格信号做出反应。


This lack of adjustment capacity is crucial.	调整能力的缺失是关键性的。


In Ireland, Spain, and even Portugal, exports grew strongly when the domestic economy collapsed and wages adjusted.	在爱尔兰、西班牙甚至葡萄牙，在国内经济崩溃、工资调整时，出口增长都十分强劲。


But these countries were already more flexible and, in some cases, undertook strong reforms.	但这些国家的灵活性均相当大，有的已经采取了强力改革。


In Greece, by contrast, there is no evidence that the many structural reforms imposed by the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) have led to any real improvement on the ground.	相反，在希腊，没有证据表明“三驾马车”（欧盟、欧洲央行和IMF）所要求的许多结构性改革带来了任何扎实的改善。


On the contrary, many indicators of efficiency of the way the government and the labor market work have actually deteriorated.	相反，许多关于政府和劳动力市场效率的指标实际上还有所恶化。


The facile argument that Greece has little to export is irrelevant here.	希腊没什么东西可供出口的论点是站不住脚的。


The problem is not that Greek exports are low, but rather that they have failed to grow, which should have been possible, especially from a low base.	问题不在于希腊出口水平低，而在于它没有增长，而��长是完全可能的，特别是在基数较低的时候。


Several years ago, Greek exports of goods and services were equal to those of Portugal.	几年前，希腊商品和服务出口与葡萄牙相当。


Today, Portugal is ahead by almost €20 billion ($27.5 billion).	如今，葡萄牙已经领先希腊近200亿欧元。


This represents a potential loss of more than 10% of output for Greece.	这意味着希腊产出蒙受了10%以上的潜在损失。


Lack of export growth thus has made the recession in Greece much longer and deeper than it would have been otherwise.	因此，出口没有增长导致希腊衰退比增长情况长得多、深得多。


If Greek exports had increased at the same rate as those of Portugal (or Spain), the recession would have ended by now.	如果希腊的出口增长与葡萄牙（或西班牙）保持相同速度，那么衰退现在应该已经结束了。


Moreover, the lack of export growth made the fiscal adjustment much more difficult.	此外，出口增长不力导致财政调整难度大大增加。


Higher exports would not only have yielded directly higher revenues; they would have had a multiplier effect on the domestic economy as well, thereby increasing consumption tax revenues.	更高的出口不但可以直接带来更高的收入，还能对国内经济产生乘数效应，从而增加消费税收入。


Greece now has a balanced current account – quite an achievement after double-digit deficits (as a percentage of GDP) a few years ago.	如今，希腊经常项目处于平衡状态——与几年前两位数的赤字（占GDP比重）相比，着实是一个成就。


But, in contrast to other economies on the eurozone periphery, this improvement was achieved entirely through import compression.	但与欧元区外围的其他经济体相反，这一改善完全是通过压缩进口实现的。


This implies that there cannot be any hope for a sustained recovery unless exports start growing.	这意味着除非出口开始增长，否则就不可能看到持续复苏。


It is often argued that with less austerity, domestic demand would be stronger.	人们常说，如果紧缩松一点，内需就会强一点。


That might be true, but stronger domestic demand would lead to higher imports, which would need to be paid for with higher export revenues, because the country cannot afford to accumulate more foreign debt.	这也许是正确的，但更强的内需会导致更高的进口，而这需要用更高的出口收入来支付，因为希腊无法承受外债的继续累积。


No exports, no growth: Greece’s debt sustainability ultimately depends on this key parameter.	没有出口，就没有增长：希腊的债务可持续性最终取决于这一关键参数。


What went wrong in Greece was not the fiscal adjustment.	希腊的问题不在于财政调整。


On the contrary, austerity was perhaps too successful (and painful).	相反，紧缩也许是太成功（也太痛苦）了。


But it was the wrong target.	但这是错误的目标。


The really important target for any country starting an adjustment program with a double-digit current-account deficit must be export growth.	对任何以两位数的经常项目赤字为起点的国家来说，调整计划开始时的真正重要的目标必须是出口增长。


Missing this target is what has set Greece apart.	错失这一目标正是希腊走上歧路的原因。


Unfortunately, there is very little the outside world can to do to ensure that the Greece exports more.	不幸的是，外部世界对于确保希腊提高出口几乎无能为力。


The government can be forced to pass decrees, and Parliament can be pressured to adopt all the reform legislation known to humanity. But, in the end, it is how reform is applied on the ground, and how the economy responds, that counts.	政府必须强迫它通过裁决，议会可以施压使之接受所有人们已知的改革立法，但说到底，改革如何落实、经济如何反应才是最重要的。


An adjustment program succeeds or fails at home, not in Brussels or Washington.	调整计划成功与否体现在采取调整的国家，而不是体现在布鲁塞尔或华盛顿。


The Transatlantic Growth Gap	大西洋两岸的增长差距


BRUSSELS – The global financial crisis that erupted in full force in 2008 affected Europe and the United States in a very similar way – at least at the start.	布鲁塞尔—2008年大爆发的全球金融危机对欧洲和美国的影响是非常相似的——至少在一开始是如此。


On both sides of the Atlantic, economic performance tanked in 2009 and started to recover in 2010.	在大西洋两岸，经济表现在2009年见底，并从2010年开始复苏。


But, as the financial crisis mutated into the euro crisis, an economic gulf opened between the US and the eurozone.	但是，随着金融危机变异为欧元危机，美国和欧元区之间逐渐产生了一条经济鸿沟。


Over the last three years (2011-2013), the US economy grew by about six percentage points more.	在过去三年中（2011—2013年），美国经济大约增长了六个多百分点。


Even taking into account the increasing demographic differential, which now amounts to about half a percentage point per year, the US economy has grown by about 4.5 percentage points more over these three years on a per capita basis.	即使考虑人口差异的增加（目前可以达到每年大约0. 5个百分点的水平），这三年中美国人均经济增长仍能达到大约4.


The main reason for the gap is the difference in private consumption, which grew in the US, but fell in the eurozone, especially in its periphery.	个中差异的主要原因是私人消费的不同，美国私人消费在增加，而欧元区在下降，特别是欧元区外围。


A retrenchment of public consumption actually subtracted more demand in the US (0.8 percentage points) than in the European Union (0.1 points).	公共消费的裁抑给美国需求造成的收缩（0. 8个百分点）比欧盟（0.


This might appear to be somewhat surprising in light of all of the talk about Brussels imposed austerity.	1个百分点）更严重。 这可能有些令人吃惊，因为布鲁塞尔所施加的紧缩政策一直是人们热议的话题。


In fact, public consumption in the eurozone has de facto remained fairly constant over the last three years, whereas it has declined substantially in the US.	事实上，在过去三年中，欧元区公共消费基本维持不变，而美国大幅下降。


(The same is true of public investment, though this constitutes such a small proportion of GDP that transatlantic differences could not have had a large impact on growth over a three-year horizon.)	（公共投资也是如此，尽管该指标占GDP比重很小，大西洋两岸的差异不足以在三年时间里造成彼此增长的重大差异）。


The contraction of private investment in Europe accounts for only a small part (one-third) of the growth gap.	欧洲私人投资收缩只是增长差异的次要原因（约占三分之一）。


Though the financial-market tensions that accompanied the euro crisis had a strong negative impact on investment in the eurozone periphery, investment demand has also remained weak in the US, minimizing the overall difference.	尽管伴随欧元危机而生的金融市场紧张对欧元区外围投资造成了很大的消极影响，但美国投资需求也一直萎靡不振，这缩小了总体差异。


The resilience of private consumption in the US, the key to the growth gap, is not surprising, given that American households have reduced their debt burden considerably from the peak of more than 90% of GDP reached just before the crisis.	增长差距的关键因素——美国私人消费的高恢复力——并不令人奇怪，因为美国家庭大幅削减了债务负担（危机前，美国家庭负担占GDP比达到了90%以上）。


The lower debt burden is also a key reason why consumption is expected to continue to grow much faster in the US than in the eurozone this year and next.	债务负担的减轻也是消费有望继续成为推动今年和明年美国增长远快于欧元区的关键因素。


But the crucial question – and one that is rarely asked – is how US households were able to reduce their debt burden during a period of high unemployment and almost no wage gains while sustaining consumption growth.	但鲜有人问及的关键问题是为何美国家庭能够在高失业和工资几无增长的时期减少债务负担，同时还能维持消费增长。


The answer lies in a combination of “no recourse” mortgages and fast bankruptcy procedures.	答案在于“无追索权”按揭和迅速的破产程序。


Millions of American homes that were purchased with subprime mortgages have been foreclosed in recent years, forcing their owners, unable to service their debt, to leave.	近几年来，数百万通过次级按揭购买的美国住房被收回了赎回权，强迫无法维持债务的屋主离开。


But, as a result of no-recourse mortgages in many US states, the entire mortgage debt was then extinguished, even if the value of the home was too low to cover the balance still due.	但是，由于美国许多州都实行了无追索权按揭，总体按揭债务也因此被消灭了，即使房屋的价值已经跌落至无法覆盖剩余按揭的水平。


Moreover, even in those states where there is full recourse, so that the homeowner remains liable for the full amount of the mortgage loan (that is, the difference between the balance due and the value recovered by selling the home), America’s procedures for personal bankruptcy offer a relatively quick solution.	此外，即使在有完全追索权的州——因此屋主仍有义务偿还所有按揭贷款，即剩余贷款减去由卖方所得所覆盖的债务——美国个人破产程序也提供了相对快速的解决办法。


Millions of Americans have filed for personal bankruptcy since 2008 , thereby extinguishing their personal debt.	2008年以来，数百万美国人申请了个人破产，从而摆脱了个人债务。


The same applies to hundreds of thousands of small businesses.	数十万家小企业也是如此。


Of course, there has also been a surge of bankruptcies in the eurozone’s periphery.	当然，欧元区外围也出现了大量破产。


But in countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece, the length of a bankruptcy proceeding is measured in years, not months or weeks, as in the US.	但在意大利、西班牙和希腊等国家，破产程序耗时需要以年计，而不像美国那样只需要几周到几个月。


Moreover, in most of continental Europe a person can be discharged of his or her debt only after a lengthy period, often 5-7 years, during which almost all income must be devoted to debt service.	此外，在大部分欧洲大陆国家，个人只有在相当长的一段时间——通常需要5—7年——才能摆脱债务，在此期间，他的大部分收入都必须用于偿还债务。


In the US, by contrast, the corresponding period lasts less than one year in most cases.	相反，美国的对应时期通常少于一年。


Moreover, the terms of discharge tend to be much stricter in Europe.	此外，欧洲的免除债务条款也比美国严苛得多。


An extreme case is Spain, where mortgage debt is never extinguished, not even after a personal bankruptcy.	一个极端的例子是西班牙，西班牙按揭债务即使在个人破产后也不能免除。


This key difference between the US and (continental) Europe explains the resilience of the US economy to the collapse of its credit boom.	这一美国和（大陆）欧洲的关键差异解释了为何美国经济在信用繁荣崩溃面前有如此强大的恢复力。


The excessive debt accumulated by households has been worked off much more rapidly; and, once losses have been recognized, people can start again.	家庭所积累的过度债务以快得多的速度被消灭； 而一旦损失得到承认，人们可以重头开始。


The cause of the transatlantic growth gap thus should not be sought in excessive eurozone austerity or the excessive prudence of the European Central Bank.	因此，大西洋两岸之间的增长差距起因不应该从欧元区过度紧缩或欧洲央行过度审慎上寻找。


There are structural reasons for the eurozone economy’s slow recovery from the financial meltdown in its periphery.	欧元区经济从其外围金融崩溃中复苏换面有其结构性原因。


Most important, compared to the US, the excess debt created during the boom years has been much more difficult to work off.	最重要的是，与美国相比，繁荣年份所创造的过度债务清除难度要大得多。


European officials are right to promote structural reforms of EU countries’ labor and product markets.	欧洲官员推动欧洲国家实施劳动力和产品市场的结构性改革是正确的。


But they should also focus on overhauling and accelerating bankruptcy procedures, so that losses can be recognized more quickly and over-indebted households can start afresh, rather than being shackled for years.	但他们还应该修正并加速破产程序，以使损失能够得到更快的承认，让过度负债的家庭能够重新开始，而不是被债务束缚多年。


Restarting Ukraine’s Economy	重启乌克兰经济


BRUSSELS – In capitals East and West, one question currently looms large: “Who lost Ukraine?”	布鲁塞尔—在东西方各国，有一个大问题扑面而来：“谁失去了乌克兰？


Unfortunately, that is not the most important question to be asking right now.	”不幸的是，这并不是现在最重要的问题。


The more relevant question is how to stabilize the situation in Ukraine.	关系更大的问题是如何稳定乌克兰的局面。


Given that little can be done in practice to dislodge Russia from Crimea, the key challenge now is to keep the rest of the country united and to restart its economy, which is now in a state of suspended animation, owing to unsustainable fiscal and external deficits.	既然无法让俄罗斯远离克里米亚，那么现在的主要挑战就是保持乌克兰其余部分统一并重启其经济。 由于不可持续的财政和外部赤字，乌克兰经济现在毫无活力。


The key reform issues are well known: the price of gas must be increased substantially to reflect its cost, subsidies for domestic coal production must be stopped, and governance of the country’s pipelines, which still earn huge royalties for carrying Russian gas to Western Europe, must be overhauled.	关键改革问题已是众所周知：天然气价格必须大幅提高以反映其成本； 国内煤炭生产补贴必须停止；


Ever since these pipelines were effectively handed over to nominally private companies in murky deals, earnings from transit fees have gone missing, along with vast amounts of gas, while little maintenance has been carried out.	仍在产生巨大特许费的俄罗斯至西欧输气管道的治理问题应该修正。 这些管道通过暗中交易转到了名义上的私人公司手中，至此以后，巨大的输气费收入就和大量天然气一起人间蒸发了，维护工作也陷入了停顿。


All three of these issues are crucial to the fight against corruption.	所有这三个问题都是反腐斗争的关键。


An energy ministry that decides who can obtain gas at one-fifth of its cost and who cannot is obviously subject to irresistible pressures to distribute its favors to whomever offers the largest bribes or kickbacks.	决定谁能以五分之一的成本获得天然气、谁不能的能源部长显然要面临难以抗拒的压力将这个好处分给能够带来最大贿赂或回扣的人。


The same applies to coal subsidies, except that the subsidies go to the most inefficient producers.	同样的逻辑也适用于煤炭补贴，只不过这笔补贴给了效率最低的生产者。


The International Monetary Fund will certainly require Ukraine to reform its gas and coal subsidies as a precondition for implementing its package of financial support (of which a substantial contribution comes from the European Union).	国际货币基金组织（IMF）必然会要求乌克兰改革其天然气和煤炭补贴，以此作为实施金融援助计划的先决条件（金融援助计划大部分将来自欧盟）。


The first steps are already being taken, with the authorities recently announcing that household gas prices will rise by 50% next month.	第一批步骤已进入实施阶段，当局最近宣布居民天然气价格将在下个月上调50%。


But, while abolishing energy subsidies is absolutely essential to balance the budget and put the economy on a sound footing, these steps also risk hitting eastern Ukraine, which contains a substantial Russophone minority, particularly hard.	但是，取消能源补贴固然对平衡预算、巩固经济基础具有绝对必要的作用，但这些措施也有可能大大影响东乌克兰，而东乌克兰有大量俄裔居民。


Some there might be tempted by the allure of a better life in “Mother Russia,” with its vast resources of cheap energy.	其中一些必然会受到拥有巨大廉价能源资源的“俄罗斯母亲”更美好生活的诱惑。


Eastern Ukraine is dominated by old-fashioned energy-intensive coal and steel industries.	东乌克兰的主导产业是过时的能源密集型煤炭和钢铁业。


But it also harbors some centers of technological excellence, such as the factories that produce important spare parts for Russian military helicopters.	但那里也有不少高科技枢纽，比如为俄罗斯军用直升机生产重要部件的工厂。


The challenge for policymakers will thus be to ensure that the creation of new jobs in these competitive enterprises keeps pace with the job losses arising from higher gas prices and the elimination of subsidies for coal production.	因此，决策者面临的挑战是确保这些高竞争力企业创造新岗位的速度能够超过提高气价和取消煤炭生产补贴所导致的就业岗位减少。


The EU should support this in two ways.	欧盟必须从两个方面提供支持。


It should provide special marketing assistance to enterprises that have suddenly lost their Russian markets.	它应该为突然失去俄罗斯市场的企业提供特别市场援助。


And it should open its markets, not only by abolishing its import tariffs on Ukrainian products, which has already been decided, but also by granting a temporary exemption from the need to meet all of the EU’s complicated technical standards and regulations.	它也应该开放它的市场，不仅仅取消乌克兰产品的进口关税（已经决定），还要授予必要的临时性豁免，即不要求乌克兰产品必须满足所有欧盟的复杂技术标准和监管。


Winning the people’s “hearts and minds” is the key to victory in an insurgency.	赢得“民心”是动乱时期获得胜利的关键。


In the case of eastern Ukraine, winning the support of those who are still nostalgic for the “good old days” must go beyond creating productive jobs that fill their wallets.	在东乌克兰，要赢得仍在怀念“昔日好时光”者的支持，光是创造填满他们的钱包的工作是不够的。


Here, too, the EU could help this process along.	在这方面，欧盟也可以提供帮助。


For starters, it could alleviate the social hardship that will arise when the price for heating alone exceeds household income.	首先，欧盟可以帮助缓和取暖价格一项便超过家庭收入所造成的社会问题。


At the same time, the EU should help to address the cause of extraordinary heating costs: the woeful energy inefficiency of most of the existing housing stock.	与此同时，欧盟可以帮助解决取暖成本高企的根源：几乎所有建成房屋的能源效率都十分低下。


The EU should thus quickly implement a targeted program of social support for the “energy poor,” coupled with financial support for investment in energy efficiency.	因此，欧盟应该快速行动起来，实施面向“能源穷人”的定向社会支持计划，并辅之以能源效率投资方面的金融支持。


Experience in Eastern Europe, where energy prices had to be increased substantially in the 1990’s, demonstrated that simple measures – such as better insulation, together with maintenance and repair of the region’s many long-neglected central heating systems – yield a quick and substantial payoff in reducing energy intensity.	20世纪90年代，东欧也不得不大幅提高能源价格。 其经验表明，简单的措施——如更好的分隔加上维护和修补该地区的大量长期被忽视的中央供暖系统——就可以迅速地大幅度降低能源密集度。


Even a slight improvement in Ukraine’s energy efficiency would contribute more to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions than the vast sums currently being spent to develop renewable energy sources.	即使是能源效率的微小改善，也能让乌克兰的减少温室气体排放效果胜过花在可再生能源资源上的巨资。


But, given widespread government corruption and inefficiency, such a program would have to be administered directly by a joint EU-Ukrainian task force.	但是，由于无处不在的政府腐败和低效，这一计划必须由欧盟-乌克兰联合小组直接管理。


Nearby member states, especially those whose languages are similar to Russian and Ukrainian, should be able to mobilize quickly the required technical expertise.	临近的成员国，特别是语言与俄语和乌克兰语相近的国家，应该能够快速动员所需要的技术专家。


Finally, the revenues from the gas pipelines must be returned to the state’s coffers.	最后，来自天然气管道的收入必须还给国库。


Here the EU can also play a prominent role by recognizing Russia’s special interest in proper pipeline maintenance and a proper accounting for the gas they carry.	在这方面，欧盟也可以起到主要作用，承认俄罗斯在合理维护管道上的特殊利益以及因为供气获得合理的收入。


Of course, no one should expect the Ukrainian government to trust the word of a country that has just annexed part of its territory.	当然，不应期待乌克兰政府相信刚刚吞并了其部分领土的国家的话。


But, as a confidence-building measure, Russia should be invited into a tripartite agreement under which operational control over the pipelines would be entrusted to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, an institution in which all parties have a stake.	但是，作为提振信心措施，俄罗斯应该获邀参与三方协议，讨论将管道的运营控制权转移给各方都有利益在其中的欧洲复兴开发银行（EBRD）。


The EBRD would safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties (including Russia), ensuring the proper operation and maintenance of the pipelines and overseeing the distribution of transit fees.	EBRD将捍卫所有各方（包括俄罗斯）的合法利益，确保合理的管道运营和维护，监管输气费的分配。


Regardless of whether Ukraine is “lost,” or who lost it, the country can still offer an attractive future for all of its citizens if unavoidable economic reforms can be made compatible with regional cohesion.	不论乌克兰是否会“失去”，或谁会失去乌克兰，这个国家都可以为所有人民提供有吸引力的未来，只要不可避免的经济改革能够与地区凝聚力相容。


The EU can play an important role by opening its market and providing funding and technical assistance in crucial areas.	欧盟可以开放其市场、提供关键领域的资金和技术援助，从而起到重要作用。


The Government Europe Deserves?	欧洲应有的政府？


BRUSSELS – With the final allocation of portfolios within its executive branch, the European Commission, the European Union has completed its change of guard.	布鲁塞尔—随着行政分支——欧盟委员会内部的最终配置的完成，欧盟也完成了人事交替。


The process took almost four months, following the European Parliament election in late May, and the end result was inevitably based on a series of compromises – to be expected for an EU of 28 prickly nation-states.	整个过程从5月底的欧盟议会选举后开始，总共进行了近四个月，最终结果免不了经过了一系列妥协——对于由28个脾气火爆的民族国家组成的欧盟来说，这并不出人意料。


Indeed, the proper functioning of EU institutions requires that no important constituency (left or right, East or West, and so forth) feels left out.	事实上，欧盟机构的正常运行需要让所有重要选区（左翼和右翼、东欧和西欧，等等）都不会感到自己被排挤。


And the new European Commission looks rather strong, given that more than 20 of its 28 members previously served as prime ministers, deputy prime ministers, or ministers.	而新的欧盟委员会看起来相当强大，在其28个委员中，有超过20人曾经是总理、副总理或部长级的人物。


People who have held high political office at home find it worthwhile to come to Brussels.	这些在曾在国内位居要职的人认为，担任布鲁塞尔的职位是值得的。


But most attention has focused on the EU’s three top positions: the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council, and the High Representative for external affairs.	但大部分关注都集中在欧盟的三个顶级职位上：欧盟委员会主席、欧洲理事会主席以及对外事务高级代表。


The Commission’s new president, Jean-Claude Juncker, was the first ever to be selected based on his faction’s strong showing in the European Parliament election.	欧盟委员会新主席——让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）是第一位凭借其所在派系在欧洲议会选举中的强劲表现而问鼎这一宝座的人。


As a seasoned Brussels insider, he was not one to move the crowds.	作为老练的布鲁塞尔内部人士，他不是能发动群众的人。


But sometimes this can be an advantage.	弹有时这也是一种优势。


An insider knows best how to reconcile contrasting interests and how to get the institutional machinery moving again, as Juncker showed with his deft handling of the distribution of tasks among the individual Commissioners.	内部人士最清楚如何协调互相冲突的利益、如何让制度再次运转起来，容克驾轻就熟地给各委员分配任务就证明了这一点。


Selecting the president of the European Council required considerable time and horse-trading, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk emerging as the final choice.	选择欧洲理事会主席需要长时间的讨价还价，最终的人选是波兰总理唐纳德·塔斯克（Donald Tusk）。


But, though Tusk now has an important-sounding position, the European Council President decides nothing.	但是，尽管塔斯克现在位高权重，但欧洲理事会主席并不能决定任何事情。


The president mainly presides over the meetings of the EU’s national leaders, and an incumbent’s influence depends on his or her ability to set the agenda and facilitate compromises.	欧洲理事会主席的主要职责是主持欧盟成员国领导人会议，而任职者的影响力取决于他指定日称、促进妥协的能力。


The experience of the previous incumbent, former Belgian Prime Minister Herman van Rompuy, in dealing with his own country’s fractious coalitions proved very useful when he had to persuade national leaders to make decisions during the euro crisis.	前任主席、钱比利时首相赫尔曼·范龙佩（Herman van Rompuy）拥有处理本国派系联盟的经验，在需要说服国家领导人就欧元危机做出决定时，这一经验派上了大用场。


Tusk will have to achieve something similar in the face of the new challenges confronting Europe today, which include Russian aggression in Ukraine, the rise of terrorism in the Middle East, and a stagnant economy at home.	塔斯克也需要在面临现今欧洲新挑战时完成类似的任务，包括俄罗斯队乌克兰的进犯、中东恐怖主义和内部经济停止等。


On the EU’s most immediate challenge, posed by Russia, Tusk will have to broker decisions with leaders from countries that feel immediately threatened (like his own) and those for which economic ties with Russia outweigh any threat to European security, which they feel to be remote.	欧盟的最���迫挑战来自俄罗斯，塔斯克必须调和各国的决定，有的国家（包括他的祖国）感受到来自俄罗斯的紧迫威胁，而有的国家与俄罗斯有着密切的经济关系，欧洲的安全不是它们的近忧。


On the economy, he must reconcile the priorities of full-employment Germany with those of Greece and Italy, which remain in the grip of recession and sky-high unemployment.	在经济方面，他必须让充分就业的德国的当务之急与仍在衰退和大量失业中苦苦挣扎的希腊和意大利的当务之急协调起来。


Being able to converse directly with the Council’s members, mostly in English, might be the biggest immediate challenge, as he admitted immediately.	而正如他爽快承认的，能够与理事会委员（大部分说英语）直接对话也许才是当下最大的挑战。


The appointment of the Italian foreign minister, Federica Mogherini, as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has been widely questioned, owing to her limited executive experience in foreign policy.	任命意大利外交部长费得利卡·莫格里尼（Federica Mogherini）为欧盟对外事务和安全政策高级代表受到了广泛的质疑，因为她在对外政策方面经验十分有限。


But, since the de facto invasion of Ukraine in late August, her government has changed its position on Russia, and she has sought to convince many critics that she knows the problems facing Europe well (her university thesis, for example, was about political Islam).	但是，自8月乌克兰遭遇事实侵略以来，她的政府已经改变了对俄立场，她也成功地让许多批评者认为她十分清楚欧洲所面临的问题（比如，她的大学毕业论文就是关于伊斯兰政治的）。


But can she lead?	但她有领导能力吗？


Europe’s foreign service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), is a huge bureaucracy, which must be managed well if it is to be effective.	欧洲外交机构欧洲对外行动局（European External Action Service，EEAS）是一个巨大的官僚机构，要想让它具有效率，就必须进行很好的管理。


And, though the head of the EEAS has been dubbed the “EU’s foreign-policy chief,” Mogherini should be seen as its CEO, with key decisions taken by the member states’ leaders when they convene in the European Council.	此外，尽管EEAS主管被称为“欧盟首席外交官”，但莫格里尼应该被视为首席执行官，重要决定由成员国领导人在欧洲理事会开会时做出。


Her lack of managerial experience is thus her key weakness, and she will have to find a strong team to support her.	因此，缺少管经验是她的重要劣势，她需要一个强大的团队支持她。


But there is at least one encouraging, if hidden, signal from Mogherini’s appointment: The fact that the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is also an Italian was not an impediment.	但任命莫格里尼至少有一点令人振奋，尽管这个振奋点不太明显：欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）也是意大利人，这是一个有利因素。


This implies that the ECB presidency is not counted among the posts to be distributed according to nationality quotas, and that Draghi’s nationality is not regarded as having influenced his decisions in any way.	这意味着欧洲央行行长不属于根据国籍分配的职位行列，德拉吉的国籍没有被认为影响了他的任何决定。


Leaders of the EU’s institutions have to be political entrepreneurs if they are to leave a mark on history.	欧盟机构领导人要想青史留名，就必须具有政治开拓精神。


Their decision-making power is limited.	他们的决策力是饱受局限。


But they can often frame the choices and broker coalitions to push the existing boundaries of European integration.	但他们常常可以影响选择，引导联盟推进欧洲一体化的现有边界。


None of the EU’s top three new faces (Juncker, Tusk, and Mogherini) has a track record in this sense.	欧盟最顶级的三个职位（容克、塔斯克和莫格里尼）在这方面都没有历史成绩。


Evidently the national bosses like it that way.	显然，各国领导人也喜欢这样的安排。


The most sobering message from the appointment process is thus that the member states’ leaders will not suffer anyone who might rock the boat and push integration forward.	因此，任命过程中最令人警醒的信息是，成员国领导人不会接受任何可能打破现状、推进一体化的人选。


There will be little movement toward the “ever closer union” envisioned in the Treaty of Rome.	《罗马条约》（Treaty of Rome）中所规划的“日益紧密的联盟”将不会有什么进展。


That might come as a relief for those in the United Kingdom and elsewhere who fear domination by Brussels, but it can only dismay those who hope that, despite its sluggish economy and declining population, Europe can become a relevant global actor.	这对于英国人或其他害怕被布鲁塞尔主宰的人来说是个好消息，但对于希望欧洲克服经济停滞、人口下降等困难，成为重要全球行动方的人来说，这令人沮丧。


Sanctions and Solidarity	制裁与团结


BRUSSELS – The European Union has finally agreed on its “third-level sanctions” against Russia for its actions in Ukraine.	布鲁塞尔—欧盟终于同意因为俄罗斯在乌克兰的行为对其实施“三级制裁”。


As is usual for the EU, arriving at this point has been a long and difficult process.	与往常一样，欧洲达成这一一致经历漫长而艰难的过程。


A key problem all along has been that, though sanctions serve a common purpose, the costs of implementing them are borne by individual member states.	一个一直伴随其间的关键问题是，尽管制裁符合共同目的，但实施制裁的成本是由个体成员国承担的。


Moreover, the costs are very concrete and visible, as jobs in enterprises that depend on exports to Russia seem to be at stake.	此外，制裁成本是实实在在、看得见摸得着的，依赖对俄出口的企业的就业将受到冲击。


So it was not surprising that many member states were more concerned about the potential cost of the sanctions on their economies than they were about the overall foreign-policy goal of signaling to Russia that its disregard of international law and norms has consequences.	因此，毫不奇怪许多成员国更关心制裁对本国经济造成的潜在影响，而不是像俄罗斯证明其无视国际法和规范将造成后果这一总体外交政策目标。


That is why a common fund to provide compensation for the economic costs of sanctions should be an integral part of the EU’s emerging foreign-policy stance toward Russia.	正因如此，应该成立一个共同基金作为欧盟对俄外交政策立场的一部分，补偿制裁造成的经济成本。


Creating such a fund would provide a potent symbol of solidarity within the EU, while providing an ideal opportunity to reflect on the nature of the sanctions’ costs.	建立这样一个基金可以成为欧盟内部团结的有力标志，同时提供深思制裁成本的性质的理想机会。


From an economist’s perspective, a key point is that losing export sales does not represent a cost per se.	从经济学家的视角看，一个关键点是出口销售的损失在本质上并不是成本。


For example, if a company that produces a generic consumer good like food, or even cars, sells less in Russia than it did before, one should not necessarily count the reduction as a loss.	比如，如果某生产一般消费品的公司——如食品公司，甚至汽车公司也是如此——对俄销售较以前有所下降，你并不一定要把这一下降记为损失。


After all, if such goods have a global market, a loss of sales in one market can be compensated by higher sales in another.	毕竟，如果产品面临全球市场，那么一个市场的损失可以通过另一个市场销售的增加弥补。


In fact, a large proportion of Russian imports from the EU are precisely of these generic consumer goods, which are not affected by sanctions.	事实上，相当大一部分俄罗斯从欧盟进口的商品正属于这些一般消费品，它们不会受到制裁影响。


Thus, reports claiming that sanctions imply a high cost – because EU exports to Russia amounted to €120 billion ($161 billion) last year and represent tens of thousands of jobs – are highly misleading.	因此，宣称制裁意味着高昂成本的报告——因为欧盟对俄出口去年高达1,200亿欧元，并且贡献了成千上万工作岗位——具有相当的误导性。


An economic loss arises only if a firm produces some specialized good that can be sold only in Russia using labor and capital that are also specialized and cannot be employed to produce something else.	只有当某企业生产只能在俄罗斯出售的专门商品，并且在生产过程中使用的是无法用于其他商品生产的专业化的劳动力和资本时，才会产生经济损失。


This applies especially to Germany: The famous German Mittelstand often does produce highly specialized goods; but it also prides itself on its flexibility and adaptability.	德国正是如此：举世闻名的德国中小企业往往生产高度专业化的商品； 但它同时也以灵活性和适应能力强而骄傲。


Given this, there might be a case for compensation in some cases, but it should be strictly limited in time.	因此，或许有的企业需要补偿，但时间会极其有限。


It would not be difficult to develop objective criteria for access to an EU “Sanctions Compensation Fund.”	不难制定获得欧盟“制裁补偿基金”的客观标准。


A firm could be eligible for compensation if it operated in the sectors covered by sanctions, and if the product in question had special characteristics that prevented sales from being redirected elsewhere.	如果企业在制裁所覆盖的领域经营，并且受影响产品的特殊性质决定了很难在其他地方出售，那么它有资格获得补偿。


A quantitative test of eligibility could be that sales to Russia over the previous three years accounted for more than one-quarter of total sales and diminished by more than a certain percentage this year.	一个补偿资格的定量考察指标可以是过去三年对俄销售额至少占总销售额的四分之一，并且在今年下降程度超过一定百分比。


Compensation would take the form of retraining programs for personnel, and maybe refinancing of loans taken to finance specialized machinery.	补偿的形式可以是员工再培训计划，或许还可以包括针对专业化机器设备的再融资贷款。


But there are two sectors in which no compensation is needed: energy and finance.	��有两个部门不需要补偿：能源和金融。


Why?	为何？


For starters, the risk to Europe’s energy imports from Russia is negligible.	首先，对欧洲进口俄罗斯能源的威胁可以忽略不计。


Should Russia demand a higher price for its oil, Europe could simply turn to the global market.	如果俄罗斯要求提高其石油的价格，欧洲只要转向全球市场就行了。


Likewise, Russian gas giant Gazprom could increase the price it charges its European customers only by breaking existing contracts.	类似地，俄罗斯天然气巨头俄气集团（Gazprom）要想提高对欧洲客户的要价，只有打破现有合同才行。


Moreover, Europe is the only customer for a large share of Russian gas exports, which, at least in the short run, must be transported through the existing pipelines.	此外，欧洲是俄罗斯很大一部分天然气出口的唯一客户，至少在短期，这部分天然气必须由已有管线输送。


Given this, the case for compensation in the energy sector is exceptionally weak.	因此，对能源部门的补偿需要十分微小。


Only the makers of highly specialized equipment, perhaps for exploration under Siberian conditions, might have grounds for drawing on the compensation fund.	只有高度专业化的设备制造商——比如在西伯利亚环境条件下的勘探设备——有必要求助于补偿基金。


The case for compensation is even weaker in the European financial sector.	欧洲金融部门的补偿必要性甚至比能源部门还要小。


Providing the kind of medium- to long-term financing that is now subject to sanctions constitutes an infinitesimal fraction of European banks’ business.	目前受到制裁约束的中期和长期融资只占欧洲银行业务微不足道的一小部分。


Moreover, as Russia’s political system becomes ever more oppressive, and its legal system ever more arbitrary, rich Russians will be more inclined than they already are to establish a safe base abroad for their wealth and families.	此外，随着俄罗斯政治制度变得日益高压、司法制度变得日益专断，俄罗斯富人将比现在更想在海外为财富和家庭建立安全港。


The freedom and rule of law provided by financial centers such as London will become even more attractive.	伦敦等金融中心所提供的自由和法治精神将变得更加有吸引力。


In 2006, the EU established a “Globalization Adjustment Fund” to cushion those sectors hardest hit by rising imports.	2006年，欧盟成立了“全球化调整基金”（Globalization Adjustment Fund）以补偿受进口增加冲击最大的部门。


Though the Fund initially was allocated only €500 million, a rather modest sum compared to the overall annual EU budget of around €100 billion, its creation was an important signal of the EU’s readiness to compensate those who lose out from a common policy.	尽管这一基金一开始只获得5亿欧元，只占欧盟年度总预算（约1,000亿欧元）的九牛一毛，但其成立是一个重要信号，表明欧盟准备补偿因为共同政策而蒙受损失的部门。


A similar political signal is needed today to overcome EU member states’ resistance to decisions that advance a common foreign policy.	今天，欧盟需要同样的政治信号克服其成员国对推进共同外交政策的决定的抵制。


Here, too, the sum needed would probably be rather small compared to the overall EU budget.	而所需要的总数相对欧盟总预算来说可能也将是九牛一毛而已。


Who Won Europe?	谁赢得了欧洲？


BRUSSELS – The fight over who will be the European Commission’s next president is heating up.	布鲁塞尔—关于谁出任下一任欧盟委员会主席的斗争正在白热化。


Several European Union leaders were recently spotted in a small rowboat on a Swedish lake, reportedly scheming against the frontrunner, and British Prime Minister David Cameron has launched a public campaign to reassert the right of EU member states’ governments to decide who will occupy the EU’s executive arm.	一些欧盟领导人最近被拍到现身瑞典某个湖泊的一艘小船，据说正在密谋打击领先者，而英国首相卡梅伦公开宣扬重新评估成员国政府决定谁能进入欧盟执行机构的权利。


The process of choosing the Commission’s president appears to be a conflict between the voice of the people, as expressed in the results of last month’s European Parliament election, and backroom deal-making by governments.	选择欧盟委员会下任主席的过程似乎成了人民的声音（表达于上个月的欧洲议会选举中）和政府幕后交易之间的冲突。


But reality is more complex, and the genuine democratic mandate did not go to the person who claims to have “won” the election.	但现实要更加复杂，真正的民主权力并没有来到声称“赢得”选举的人手中。


In the run-up to the election, the major European party “families” (there are no pan-European parties, only loose alliances of national parties) each nominated a Spitzenkandidat as their choice for President of the European Commission.	在走向选举期间，主要欧洲政党“家族”（泛欧洲政党均不在其列，只是国家政党的松散联盟）无不提名了首席候选人作为欧盟委员会主席人选。


The center-right European People’s Party, which gained a narrow plurality of 221 seats in the 751-seat parliament, has claimed victory in the election; and many others, including socialists, greens, and liberals, concur that the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat, Jean-Claude Juncker, has a moral right to be selected as President of the Commission.	略微占优的中右翼的欧洲人民党（European People’s Party在欧洲议会的751个议席中赢得221个）宣布在选举中获胜； 其他许多阵营，包括社会党、绿党和自由派，都 同意欧洲人民党首席候选人容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）拥有被选为欧盟委员会主席的道德权利。


In fact, though the EPP won 29% of the seats, versus 24% for the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the S&D can claim victory.	事实上，尽管欧洲人民党赢得了29%的席位，而社会党和民主党进步联盟（Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats，简称S&D）只获得了24%，但后者仍可以宣布获胜。


After all, its affiliated parties at the national level won a greater number of votes – a combined total of 40 million, compared to 39.9 million for parties affiliated with the EPP.	毕竟，S&D旗下政党在国家层面赢得了更多选票——加起来达到了4,000万，超过了欧洲人民党旗下政党的3,990万。


The difference is small, but there can be no doubt that the S&D won the popular vote (24.4% to 23.8%).	差距很小，但毫无疑问S&D的支持率更高（24. 4%对23.