China needs to rein in these processes.	中国需要减缓这些进程。


However it is done (which is for the Chinese to figure out), China has no choice but to embrace a world order based on stable relationships among countries – including its own neighbors.	不管它做了什么（这需要中国人来弄明白），中国都别无选择，只能拥抱一个构建在国与国之间稳定关系——包括其邻国——的世界秩序之上。


Indeed, whether nationalists like it or not, this is the future that China has, in effect, already chosen.	事实上，不管民族主义者喜欢与否，这是中国实际上已经选择好了的未来。


China’s leaders need to stand up and articulate more clearly to the country’s restive public this vision of membership in an interdependent world.	中国的领导人需要站出来并向焦躁不安的公众更清楚地阐明作为一个互相依存的世界上的成员所需具备的前景蓝图。


Regardless of whether it charts a course toward a brighter or darker future, a country’s political leadership by definition plays the central role at the helm.	无论是沿着一个更加光辉或者黑暗的进程航行，一个国家的政治领导人在定义上都是掌舵人。


Leaders of both China and Japan need to accept their position in this process and, above all, not simply ride on the froth of current events.	中日两国的领导人需要接受自身在该进程中所处的位置，而且最重要的是，不要仅仅着眼于当前事件的一些旁枝末节之上。


It was the choice of governments to loosen regulations on finance and aim for full cross-border capital mobility, just as it was a choice to maintain these policies largely intact, despite a massive global financial crisis.	各国政府为实现跨境资本全自由流��选择放松金融管制，就像他们在面对大规模全球金融危机时选择让上述政策基本维持下去。


The Politics of Anger Management	愤怒管理的政治


DENVER – Shortly after John Roberts, the conservative United States Supreme Court Chief Justice, sided with the Court’s four liberal justices to uphold President Barack Obama’s major health-care reform, he joked that he was leaving the country for the “impregnable island fortress” of Malta.	丹佛——在持保守观点的美国最高法院首席法官约翰·罗伯茨与法院系统其他4名自由派法官联手支持奥巴马总统的大规模医疗保健改革计划后不久，罗伯茨就半开玩笑地说要离开美国前往马耳他“坚不可摧的孤岛城堡”。


Roberts was referring not so much to the mainstream media’s speculation about the reasons for his surprise vote, but rather to the fury and thirst for retribution among conservative bloggers and pundits.	罗伯茨在这里所指的并非主流媒体对他出人意料的投票原因的炒作，而是保守派博主和批评家们的愤怒和对报复的渴望。


Indeed, “traitor” was one of their common epithets, as were “coward” and “sellout.”	其实，这些人的共同绰号除了“叛徒”之外，还有“懦夫”和“出卖者”。


Real-estate mogul Donald Trump, with his customary charm, thought it appropriate to refer to the brilliant and scholarly Roberts as a “dummy.”	房地产巨头唐纳德·特朗普带着特有的翩翩风度指出应该把智慧儒雅的罗伯茨称之为“蠢货”。


The apoplectic rage that followed the Supreme Court’s decision on Obama’s health-care legislation is becoming routine in America’s public discourse, and it is a bipartisan malady.	最高法院就奥巴马的医疗保健法案做出裁决后，愤怒就已成为美国公开辩论中的家常便饭，而且还是两党的通病。


Though it may have started on the left – in response to Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush – it has become increasingly a right-wing phenomenon.	虽然始作俑者可能是响应理查德·尼克松，罗纳德·里根和乔治·W·布什号召的左派人士——但这种情绪在右翼群体中也越来越普遍。


Radio personalities like Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck (who recently signed a $100 million deal to spew more hatred on the airwaves) dwarf liberal commentators in audience size.	拉什·林堡和格伦贝克（不久前刚刚签署了一份1亿美元的合同，要求他们通过无线电波煽动起更多的仇恨），他们的受众规模令自由派评论家们相形见绌。


The age of information and communications has given way to an age of anger.	愤怒已经取代信息和沟通而成为时代的主基调。


Of course, this is not the first time that anger and fear have ruled US public discourse: Father Charles Coughlin’s toxic radio broadcasts in the 1930’s paved the way for today’s stars, who would feel similarly at home during the Red Scare of the 1920’s or the McCarthy era in the early 1950’s.	当然，由愤怒和恐惧主宰美国的公众讨论也曾有过先例：20世纪30年代查尔斯·库格林神父毒害人们思想的电台广播为今天的明星们奠定了基础，如果换做是在20世纪20年代的赤色恐怖期间或者20世纪50年代初的麦卡锡时代这些人同样能够如鱼得水。


But this contemporary ugly mood, unlike those times, seems to be independent of the real threats that America faces in the world: a weak global economy, terrorism, failed states, and protracted wars, to name a few.	但与当时不同的是，这种现代丑恶思想似乎与全球经济疲软、恐怖主义、失败国家和旷日持久战争等美国所面临的真正威胁无关。


Americans have been angry for some time now, and their ire shows no sign of abating.	美国人长期以来一直非常愤怒，而且这种愤怒并没有随着时间推移而减弱的迹象。


This sentiment is perhaps most obvious – and damaging – in foreign policy, where the choices facing officials are seldom obvious or risk-free.	这种情绪或许在外交政策领域最为显著，也最具杀伤力，因为外交领域的官方决策一般都不会没有风险或显而易见。


For example, the bloody conflict in Syria is fraught with challenges and unforeseen consequences.	比方说，叙利亚的流血冲突充满了挑战性和不可预知的后果。


But such realities are lost on bloggers who blithely hold forth on what they claim are patently obvious solutions – and on the stupidity, cynicism, or insanity of leaders who fail to implement them.	但那些愉快地大谈特谈他们口中显而易见的解决方案以及没有执行上述方案的领导人的愚蠢、疯狂和玩世不恭的博主们却根本无视这样的现实情况。


Officials have an obligation to look beyond the current news cycle, and especially to understand that policy aimed at Syria, for example, engages policy toward Russia, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Israel.	政府官员必须摆脱眼前利益的羁绊去理解叙利亚政策，比方说与俄罗斯、伊拉克、黎巴嫩、埃及和以色列保持必要接触。


As a result, it is profoundly difficult to develop policies that enjoy support at every excruciating phase of their implementation.	因此，制定在所有痛苦的实施阶段都能受到支持的政策是非常困难的。


Wise policy is not always popular (a cliché that happens to be true).	明智的政策并不一定受到公众欢迎（这是真理，但同时也是老生常谈）。


Instant access to information does not mean instant access to knowledge, much less wisdom.	即时了解信息并不等于即时掌握知识，更不等于即时做出明智的决策。


One aspect of knowledge, as we know from nineteenth-century philosophy (and who studies that anymore?), reflects the integration of information with experience.	正如19世纪哲学（谁还学这个？ ）告诫我们的那样，知识的某一方面所反映的是信息与经验的整合。


Today, information is integrated with emotion – and with suspicion, sometimes bordering on paranoia, about the underlying motives of the leadership classes.	今天，信息与情感和有时近乎于偏执的怀疑纠缠在一起，进而质疑领导阶级的根本动机究竟是什么。


Compare this behavior to that of people who have truly suffered at the hands of political leaders – for example, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi, or Poland’s Adam Michnik – and who managed to conduct respectful dialogue with their tormentors.	如果将这些与真正曾在政治领袖手中受难者的行为进行比较——比方说南非的纳尔逊·曼德拉、缅甸的昂山素季或波兰的亚当·米奇尼克，这些伟人与折磨自己的人展开了相互尊重的对话。


Their tolerance, one suspects, would not have been diminished had they had access to the Internet during their incarceration.	人们怀疑如果他们在监禁期间能够联网，会不会因此破坏他们的宽容。


Nevertheless, technology does seem to be playing a central role in facilitating anger.	不过，技术的确看似在煽动愤怒方面可以发挥核心作用。


Establishing a blog, downloading photos, and creating catchy, sarcasm-drenched captions is not a particularly challenging activity.	建立博客、下载照片并且想出浸透讽刺意味的吸引人的标题并非是一件难事。


(Fortunately, making a living from it is another matter!)	（幸运的是以此谋生则是另外一个问题！


Mainstream media (whatever that expression means anymore) woo viewers by enabling them to “sound off” at the press of a button.	）主流媒体（无论这个词现在意味着什么）为了吸引观众而让他们一按键就能表达自己的看法。


As anyone who has read a thoughtful article or news story can attest, bitter, vituperative responses usually follow.	任何读过深刻文章或新闻报道的人都可以证明，接下来回应的将会是痛苦、刻毒的谩骂。


Have these unhappy legions somehow always been there, waiting only for a button to push to register their views?	这些不快乐的人难道不是总在那里，迫不及待地点击按键发表他们的看法？


Clearly, there is something more going on than just an increase in clickable menu options.	现实情况显然不仅仅是可供点击的菜单选项的增加。


One fundamental issue seems to be dwindling respect for established institutions, many of which are drowning in the noise of opinion.	一个根本问题似乎是人们对现有机构越来越缺乏尊重，这些机构很多都被各种意见形成的噪声所吞没。


The editorial of the local newspaper used to carry weight.	当地报纸的社论曾经很有份量。


Now it is just another view among many (and, worse, it relies on a platform whose business model is in trouble).	但现在不过是众多观点中的一个（更糟的是，这种意见以一个商业模式出现问题的平台为依托）。


Digital technology has played another important role in fostering this atmosphere of bad manners, vicious personal attacks, intolerance, disrespect, and general rudeness.	数字技术在促成这种不礼貌的恶毒人身攻击、以及欠缺包容和尊重的粗鲁氛围中起了非常重要的作用。


Sitting in one’s basement in pajamas, spewing out venom on a keyboard like a Batman movie villain who was poorly treated in a past life, one is at a safe distance from one’s target.	人们可以穿着睡衣坐在地下室，像蝙蝠侠电影中过去生活一团糟的坏蛋那样依靠键盘向安全距离外的目标喷射毒液。


Bullying has gone virtual.	欺凌已经实现虚拟化。


Indeed, perhaps the most damaging aspect of all of our wonderful technology is that it enables us to live blissfully apart from those with whom we disagree.	事实上，我们精彩技术最具破坏性的作用或许就是能使我们远离意见不同者幸福地生活。


Our access to news can be tailored to our preconceived opinions.	新闻可以根据我们先入为主的主张量身定制。


Even where people live seems to be having an effect.	甚至就连人们居住的地点似乎都会产生同样的效果。


The proliferation of gated communities across America has increased the odds that people will live only with those who vote the same way.	有门的社区在美国迅速增加，人们有更大的机率与同样的投票者共同生活。


The age of anger will end when Americans decide that they have had enough.	只有当美国人已经受够了这种状况，愤怒的时代才有可能结束。


For starters, they could make a mid-summer resolution to buck the trend.	首先，他们可以制定仲夏决议来抵制这种潮流。


They might, for example, resist the Internet algorithm that suggests which book to buy or film to rent, based on what they read or watched previously.	举例来讲，他们可以抵制根据他们以前看过的书籍或影片而向他们推荐购买书目或租赁影片的互联网算法。


And they might begin to re-learn the useful democratic art of respectful debate with those who happen to hold views different from their own.	他们可以重新学习实用的民主艺术，与那些碰巧持有与自己不同意见的人在相互尊重的基础上展开辩论。


The Politics of Cosmic Catastrophe	太空灾难的政治


WASHINGTON, DC – One weighty decision that the world will need to make in 2010 is whether to support an idea raised by Anatoly Perminov, the head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, to launch an unmanned mission to redirect a large asteroid that might collide with Earth after 2030.	华盛顿特区 ——2010 年，世界各国得做一个颇为棘手的决定：是否支持俄罗斯联邦航天局（ Roscosmos ）局长阿纳托利·佩尔米诺夫（ Anatoly Perminov ）的提议，发射无人驾驶航天器，使一颗小行星偏出轨道，以免它在 2030 年之后撞击地球。


At more than 360 meters in diameter, the asteroid, Apophis, is a dozen times larger than the Tunguska space object (presumably a meteorite or comet) that devastated a large part of eastern Siberia a century ago.	这颗小行星名叫“阿波菲斯”（ Apophis ），直径 360 米，比一世纪前导致西伯利亚“通古斯大爆炸”的天体（可能是一颗陨石或 彗 星）大 12 倍。


As far as can be determined, that object detonated on June 30, 1908, with the power of a nuclear weapon, felling 80 million trees over a 2,000-square-kilometer area.	据推测，该天体于 1908 年 6 月 30 日发生爆炸，能量相当于核弹，冲击波推到了方圆 2000 公里内的 8 千万棵树木。


According to NASA, if Apophis hit the Earth, it could release more than 100,000 times the energy of the Tunguska event.	据美国航天局（ NASA ）预测，如果阿波菲斯撞击地球，其释放出来的能量将比通古斯大爆炸强 10 万倍以上。


Thousands of square kilometers could vaporize in the blast, but the whole Earth would suffer from the loss of sunlight and other effects of the dust released into the atmosphere.	爆炸将摧毁数千平方公里内的一切事物，扬起的尘埃将遮蔽太阳光并引发其他后果，使全球都受到影响。


This danger explains why a Russian analyst has called Apophis a “space terrorist.”	难怪俄罗斯研究人员给阿波菲斯起了个绰号，叫“来自太空的恐怖分子”。


Current projections are that Apophis, which was discovered in 2004, will orbit near the earth several times between 2029 and 2036.	阿波菲斯是 2004 年发现的。 按照目前的预测，在 2029 年和 2036 年之间，它将有若干次机会从接近地球的轨道上通过。


In October 2009, near-Earth object (NEO) trackers Steve Chesley and Paul Chodas of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, placed the odds of Apophis striking Earth in 2036 at about one in 233,000, lower than previous estimates.	2009 年 10 月， NASA 加州喷气动力实验室的近地天体追踪人员切斯利（ Steve Chesley ）和乔达斯（ Paul Chodas ）估算出，阿波菲斯于 2036 年撞上地球的几率约为 1/233000 ，低于之前的历次估算。


But their forecast that it would come within 30,000 kilometers of our planet in 2029 (closer than some geostationary communications satellites, as well as the Moon) is more likely to please astronomers than international security experts.	但据他们预测，阿波菲斯将于 2029 年迫近到距地球 3 万公里以内（比一些地球通讯卫星乃至月亮距离地球更近），天文学家可能会为此感到兴奋，而国际安全专家却忧心 忡忡 。


Some unknown comet or other space object could fly near enough to the asteroid in the next few decades to change its predicted path, perhaps in a way that redirected it toward Earth.	在未来几十年内，某些未知的 彗 星或其他天体接近这颗小行星，改变其运行轨道，使它对准地球撞过来，这种可能性并非没有。


According to Perminov, the proposals that Roscosmos is considering do not envision trying to destroy the asteroid, but rather to use the laws of physics to change its path.	据佩尔米诺夫介绍， Roscosmos 的方案不是想摧毁这颗小行星，而是想利用物理学法则改变它的轨道。


He says that if Roscosmos’s management decided to act, it would work with experts from Europe, the United States, China, and other space powers to decide how best to proceed.	他说，只要 Roscosmos 的领导层下决心启动这一方案，该机构将同来自欧洲、美国、中国和其他有太空实力的国家共同研究最佳方案。


Scientists have proposed various ways to deflect an asteroid away from the Earth.	让小行星避开地球，科学家提出过几种办法。


Some have suggested placing a large object nearby to change its trajectory through mutual gravitational attraction.	有人建议在它近旁放置一个巨大物体，通过万有引力吸引它偏离轨道。


Another method is to use mirrors, light, or painted colors to change the way the asteroid absorbs heat, which could also shift its direction.	有人说可以用镜子、光照或上色的办法改变小行星吸收的热量，从而迫使它改道。


Attaching “solar sails” to the asteroid could cause the Sun’s particles to steer it along a different course.	有人提议给它安上“太阳帆”，借助太阳粒子的力量使它转向。


Others have suggested ramming a spacecraft or other object into the asteroid to alter its momentum.	还有人主张索性用一个人造飞行器或其他物体撞击这颗小行星，把它撞到一边去。


A few scientists, and many science-fiction writers, have also speculated about using nuclear weapons to destroy or damage an asteroid, comet, meteor, or alien spacecraft heading toward the earth.	有一些科学家和许多科幻作家则大胆想象，说可以发射核弹摧毁那些飞向地球的小行星、 彗 星、流星或外星飞船。


The Outer Space Treaty bans placing nuclear weapons in orbit, on celestial bodies, or stationing “such weapons in outer space in any other manner,” but may be interpreted to permit their one-time use.	国际“外层空间条约”禁止在地球轨道、太阳系天体上架设核武器，或“以其他形式在外层空间部署此类武器”，但按照某种解释，可以允许一次性使用。


It also could be amended, or the states “attacking” the asteroid could withdraw from the agreement by giving one year’s notice.	大不了还可以修改这个条约，决心参与小行星大作战的那些国家还可以退出条约，只要提前一年通知就行。


The more practical problem is that even a nuclear explosion might not prove sufficiently powerful.	但现实问题是，也许核弹的威力不足以摧毁那颗小行星。


Even if the nuclear warhead broke the asteroid into many small pieces, they could have time to re-combine into another large object.	或者即便能够把它击碎，那些碎片马上又聚集成另一个较大的天体。


In addition, the space vehicle carrying the weapon might malfunction, and the nuclear warhead could land (and perhaps detonate) somewhere on Earth.	此外，万一要是运载核弹的火箭出故障，栽到地球上来并且发生爆炸怎么办？


The safest approach might be to test several techniques on nearby asteroids before using them against Apophis when it approaches Earth.	最稳妥的办法也许是，先拿地球附近的其他小行星来做实验，测试几种技术的可行性，然后再用来对付阿波菲斯。


Unfortunately, it is estimated that “attacking” an asteroid would cost billions of dollars, especially since multiple space launches would likely be needed to ensure that the required number of probes could complete the mission.	可惜，据估计，攻击一颗小行星动 辄 要耗费几十亿美元，若要保证万无一失，得搞好几次实验呢。


This raises the issue of who should pay for such a mission and, more fundamentally, who can authorize it.	这样问题就来了：谁来为这个大工程埋单呢？ 再往深里说，谁有资格授权启动这个计划呢？


These global governance questions also apply to other worldwide threats, such as climate change, that threaten humanity’s survival.	同样的全球治理难题也干扰着其他世界性威胁的解决，例如同样威胁全人类生存的气候变化。


In 2008, a report by space experts called for the United Nations Security Council to make the final decision about how to counter potential threats from near-Earth objects.	2008 年，一份由太空专家提交的报告呼吁，让联合国安理会来最终决定，如何处理近地天体的潜在威胁。


The Security Council normally votes on issues that threaten international peace and security, but this method would allow only a small number of governments to decide Earth’s fate.	就威胁国际和平和安全的问题投票是安理会的常规工作，但是这个办法等于让一小撮国家来决定整个地球的命运。


Perminov similarly seemed to suggest that only countries with large existing space programs could participate in the Apophis decision.	佩尔米诺夫的态度跟这差不多，他似乎认为只有那些已经有能力搞大型航天项目的国家才有资格加入阿波菲斯方案的决策圈。


Since an asteroid collision could, like global climate change, affect all of humanity, should not everyone have some say in the decision?	既然小行星撞击威胁同全球气候变化一样，是事关全人类命运的大事，那么是不是人人都有参与决策的权利呢？


Perhaps every country should vote in the UN General Assembly on how to proceed; the option receiving the most votes – with a possible mandatory minimum requirement, such as requiring an alternative to win a majority or some higher number of votes – would prevail.	也许应该让所有国家在联合国大会上投票，得票最多的方案就得到采纳 —— 可以设定最低门槛，比如简单多数原则或更严格的要求。


Another option would be to allow every adult to vote directly in a global referendum for his or her preferred option.	另外一种办法是让全世界的成年人参加一场全球公投，选择他 / 她所支持的方案。


An interesting issue would arise if some countries wanted to act, but others did not.	一种有趣的情况是，如果某些国家想要行动，其他一些不愿行动，怎么办？


Would Russia or a coalition of willing countries have the right to attempt to alter Apophis’ orbit without the approval of other states?	单凭俄罗斯一个国家或志愿参与行动的国家联盟，有没有权利不经其他国家同意就采取行动呢？


What are the rights and duties of scientists and governments who consider the risks to be graver than their counterparts in other countries do?	有些国家的科学家和领导人可能比其他国家的同事们更重视小行星撞击的风险，他们有哪些权利和义务呢？


Are they precluded from acting without unanimity?	他们是不是无权单独行动呢？


Perminov’s proposal has raised important questions – both scientific and political.	佩尔米诺夫方案牵出来许多重要问题，既有科学问题，也有政治问题。


Whatever the danger posed by Apophis, we would do well to begin addressing them.	无论阿波菲斯的威胁到底有多大，对这些问题我们得认真对待。


The Politics of Frustration	挫折的政治


Does extreme poverty breed violence and ultimately revolution?	极端贫困是否酝酿暴力并最终导致革命？


Many people believe that it does, and seek to explain phenomena ranging from guerrilla insurgencies to Islamist terrorism accordingly.	许多人这样认为，并且寻求用这一理论来解释从游击队叛乱到伊斯兰恐怖主义的现象。


But Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville, the two great social analysts of the nineteenth century, knew better what makes people tick, and what makes societies change.	但是，十九世纪两位伟大的社会学家卡尔·马克思和阿利克西斯·德托克维尔更为深刻理解是何种力量驱动人们并改变社会。


Extreme poverty breeds apathy, not rebellion.	极端贫困酝酿的是无动于衷，而非谋反。


The very poor can at most be used for occasional demonstrations of anger, but they are not the stuff from which either terrorists or revolutionaries are made.	穷苦的人们可资利用来不时地示威表达愤怒，但他们并非是恐怖份子或革命者的前体。


A far more critical group in any society are those who have begun to move forward to new conditions, but then find their path blocked.	那些已经开始朝着新的环境转变、但是发现其转变之路被封死的人们是社会中远更为决定性的团体。


Their desires and ambitions are not unrealistic in the circumstances, but they are frustrated.	他们的愿望和抱负在那些境况下并非不切实际，但是他们遭受挫折。


Things do not move as fast as they want them to, or not at all, owing to conditions that they do not control.	由于他们所无能为力的原因，事情并非如他们所想得一般快速改变，甚至纹丝不动。


Opportunities exist, but they cannot be seized or realized.	机会存在，但是无法把握或实现。


This group, not the desperately poor and helpless, forms the great mobilizing force of violent protest, and ultimately of major change.	正是这一团体而非赤贫无助者才是暴力抗议以及最终巨大变革的主要驱动力量。


The politics of frustration has been particularly apparent in the postcommunist world during the last fifteen years.	过去15年来，这一挫折的政治在前共产世界尤为明显。


The heavy hand of nomenklatura rule was gone, and the vision of a new life like that in the open societies of the West seemed real.	共产特权阶层的高压统治已经结束，类似西方开放社会那样的新生活看似垂手可得。


Yet, in fact, things initially got worse.	然而事实上，情况在一开始却恶化。


The route to prosperity and freedom was not straightforward.	通向繁荣和自由之路并非平坦。


On the contrary, it led through a valley of tears.	相反，这条路充满荆棘坎坷。


People reacted in a variety of ways.	对此，人们反应不一。


Those who had the chance migrated, first to their homeland’s centers of economic progress, then abroad, to countries and places where the new world could be found immediately.	那些有机会的人迁徙，首先到本国的经济发展中心，然后出国，到那些可以立即找到新世界的国家和地方。


Those who stayed behind began to vote in strange ways – electing, for example, the successors of the old Communist parties that they had been glad to get rid of only a few years before.	那些被甩在后面的人开始用奇怪的方式投票，例如，选举那些原共产党的继承者，而他们仅仅在几年前还巴不得让这些共产党份子下台。


The European Union, for all its weaknesses, has helped the postcommunist countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe immensely.	欧盟尽管有缺陷，但是却大力帮助了东欧和东南欧前共产国家。


It made the valley of tears bearable both by offering financial and other assistance and by holding out the promise of membership and economic prosperity in the near future.	它通过提供财政和其他援助、保证在不远的将来接纳入盟和经济繁荣等手段来使得荆棘之路可以忍受。


Equally important, had the EU not supported the creation of an administrative and social infrastructure of liberty, there might well have been a more serious communist or even fascist backlash in Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere.	同等重要的是，如果欧盟没有支持建立自由的行政和社会基础设施，波兰、匈牙利和其他地方就会出现更为严重的共产主义甚至是法西斯主义的强烈反应。


While the politics of frustration was thus controlled in the postcommunist world, it broke out with a vengeance in the Islamic world.	挫折的政治在前共产国家得到了控制，但是在伊斯兰世界却一发不可收拾。


Here, too, the phenomenon was not new.	其实这也不是新的现象。


With the onset of modernization, millions of people were uprooted from their traditional communities and ways of life.	随着现代化的发端，数以百万计的人们被从他们的传统社区和生活方式连根拔起。


Young men, in particular, saw the prospect of a life more like that presented to them by Western television.	特别是年轻人看到了更像通过西方电视所看到的生活前景。


But they soon discovered that realizing this prospect would require a longer and more arduous journey than they had anticipated.	但是，他们马上发现，实现这一前景之路原比预期的要漫长艰辛。


In fact, it would take at least a generation, during which much of the effort of modern life would have to be made, while the fruits of this effort would remain elusive.	实际上，至少需要一整代人才能做到。 这段时间里，他们不得不为现代生活奔波劳累，而辛苦劳作的果实却可望不可及。


Earlier generations may have borne the burden of working and waiting more readily, but nowadays people want results here and now.	早先一代人可能辛勤耕耘，耐心等候。 但是，如今的人们想一蹴而就。


If the benefits do not come quickly – and for most people they do not – they get restless.	大多数人并不能马上受益。 他们因此浮躁不安。


The massive migration processes that have only just begun will be the major issue of the coming decades.	开始不久的移民迁徙之潮将成为未来几十年中的主要问题。


Particularly in Africa, migration will be almost the only quick route to modernization.	特别是在非洲，移民几乎已经成为现代化的唯一捷径。


Those who do not manage to get to other countries, or who fail in the countries to which they have migrated, are in a quandary.	那些无法前往其他国家，或者移民后失落的人们都处于窘境。


For them, the old world of traditional ties and customs is gone, but the new world of modernity remains out of reach.	对于他们而言，丢失了原先传统的联系和习惯，而新的现代世界又遥不可及。


They are lost in a limbo of uncertainty and disappointment.	他们丧失在前途未谱和失望的窘境。


It has been argued that this was one of the problems of “belated nations” like Germany a hundred years ago.	有人主张，这是类似一百年前的德国那样“落伍国家”的众多问题中的一个。


Seductive leaders (Hitler among them) exploited the resulting sense of frustration.	蛊惑人心的领导人（希特勒是其中之一）利用随之而来的挫折感。


Whatever the value of such theories, it is evident that the frustration of young people’s ambitions in modernizing countries makes them the object of preachers of hate and tempts them to leave the course of plodding progress and turn to more dramatic action.	无论这种理论的价值，正在现代化的国家中年轻人经历挫折，使得他们成为仇恨布道者的目标并且诱使他们偏离迟缓的进步之路而转向更为激进的行动。


What we call “terrorism” has many causes, and one must beware of facile explanations.	所谓的“恐怖主义”原因多种多样，我们必须警惕肤浅的解释。


However, the politics of frustration, of ambitions raised and then thwarted, is clearly one such cause.	但是，挫折的政治以及抱负被唤起随之又无法实现，明显地是原因之一。


It is thus also a challenge to those of us living in more fortunate circumstances.	对于我们这些生活在更为有幸的环境下的人们而言，这也是一个挑战。


If we do not wish to be submerged in violence and authoritarian responses to it, international institutions must do for the modernizing world what the EU has managed to do for the postcommunist countries.	如果我们不希望淹没在暴力和随之而来的专制主义反应之中，国际机构必须像欧盟为前共产国家做的那样为正在现代化的国际做一点事情。


For the world’s democracies, there is no greater or more important task.	对于世界上的民主国家而言，没有比这个更为重要的任务了。


Why Are the Wealthier Healthier?	为什么富人更健康


DURHAM – In 1842, the English social reformer Edwin Chadwick documented a 30-year discrepancy between the life expectancy of men in the poorest social classes and that of the gentry.	杜伦—1842年，英国社会改革家查德威克（Edwin Chadwick）的文章披露，最穷社会阶层和上流人士之间存在30年的寿命预期差。


Today, people in the most affluent areas of the United Kingdom, such as Kensington and Chelsea, can expect to live 14 years longer than those in the poorest cities, such as Glasgow.	如今，英国最丰裕地区的人民（如肯辛顿和切尔西）期望寿命比最贫穷城市（比如格拉斯哥）高14岁。


Such inequalities exist, to varying degrees, in all developed countries.	如此不平等性在所有发达国家或多或少地存在。


Poorer groups fare particularly badly in the neo-liberal system of the United States; gaps in life expectancy in some US cities, such as New Orleans, are as large as 25 years.	贫穷阶层的生活在美国新自由主义制度下尤其悲惨，在某些美国城市（比如新奥尔良），预期寿命差距可达25年。


Understanding and reducing these health inequalities remains a major public-policy challenge worldwide.	理解并减少这一健康不平等性仍是全世界面临的主要公共政策挑战。


It is not only a moral issue; health inequalities carry significant economic costs.	这不仅是个道德问题； 健康不平等性导致了严重的经济成本。


But the causes of such inequalities are complex and contested, and the solutions are elusive.	但这一不平等性的原因是复杂的，仍有待争议，解决方案也难以出台。


The prevailing explanation for health inequalities is rooted in the social determinants of health – that is, the environments in which people work and live.	健康不平等性的普遍解释植根于健康的社会决定因素——即人们工作和生活的环境。


Affluent people have better access to health-promoting environments, such as well-maintained schools that offer a good education, high-quality housing, and stable jobs in secure, safe settings.	丰裕人群更能获得有益于健康的环境，如提供优质教育的维护良好的学校、高质量的住房、稳定的有安全保障的工作。


The poorer you are, the more exposed you are likely to be to health-damaging environments.	你越是贫穷，就越有可能处于危害健康的环境中。


Various theories draw on this basic framework – and each competing explanation suggests different strategies for reducing health inequalities.	许多理论都吸收了这一基本框架——每种竞争性解释都给出了不同建议减少健康不平等性。


For example, the “cultural-behavioral” approach explains health inequalities in terms of differences in individual behaviors, asserting that poorer people have worse health outcomes, owing to a higher propensity to smoke, drink alcohol, and eat less healthy foods.	比如，“社会-文化”论用个体行为的不同解释健康不平等性，主张穷人之所以健康状况更差，是因为他们吸烟饮酒的倾向更明显，饮食也比较不健康。


This view naturally underpins interventions like targeted smoking-cessation services or health-education initiatives.	这一观点自然地成为定向戒烟服务或健康教育计划等干预手段的理论基础。


The “materialist” approach takes a broader view, arguing that people with more money can essentially purchase better health through superior education, health care, and social services.	 “物质”论的着眼点更加广泛，认为钱更多的人可以通过优良的教育、卫生和社会服务买到更好的健康。


Accordingly, countries can reduce health inequalities by introducing higher minimum incomes for their poorest citizens and guaranteeing universal access to public services.	据此，国家可以通过引入更高的最穷人群最低收入标准和保证公共服务的全民覆盖降低健康不平等性。


By contrast, “psychosocial” theories suggest that it is the psychological experience of inequality – the feelings of inferiority or superiority generated by social hierarchies – that matters.	相反，“心理”论认为重要的是关于不平等性的心理体验——由社会层级造成的劣等人和优等人的感觉。


This view implies that the poorest individuals and communities need to feel productive, valued, and empowered to take control of their own lives, rather than feel trapped in a subordinate position.	这一观点意味着最贫穷个人和社区需要感到自己有生产力、有价值、有能力控制自己的生活，而不是被二等公民的感觉吞噬。


The “life course” approach combines multiple theories to contend that the unequal accumulation of social, psychological, and biological advantages or disadvantages over time, beginning in utero, produces health inequalities.	 “生命过程”论将诸多理论结合起来，主张社会、心理和生物方面的优势和劣势随时间而不平等地积累，这一过程从子宫中便已开始，并造成健康不平等性。


It demands early intervention to put children on a positive health path, together with an adequate social safety net throughout citizens’ lives.	它要求早期干预，让儿童走上积极的健康道路，并辅之以充分的贯公民一生的社会安全网。


The most encompassing view is that of the “political-economy” school, which argues that health inequalities are determined by capitalist economies’ hierarchical structure and the associated political choices about resource distribution.	最广泛的观点是“政治经济”学派，该学派指出健康不平等性是由资本主义经济的层级结构以及相应的关于资源分配的政治选择决定的。


This analysis calls for the most radical action: to develop an economic and social system in which resources, particularly wealth and power, are more evenly distributed.	这一分析呼吁最彻底的行动：发展一套资源——特别是财富和权力——均匀分配的经济和社会制度。


Given that all of these theories can, to some extent, be supported by scientific evidence, politics can matter more than science in determining which strategies policymakers pursue to reduce health inequalities.	这些理论从某种程度上都有科学证据支持，因此在决定决策者用哪种战略降低健康不平等方面，政治的作用更大。


After all, some potential solutions are politically easier to implement within existing systems than others.	毕竟，从政治上说，一些潜在解决方案在现有制度下比其他方案更容易实施。


For example, interventions aimed at changing individual behavior are far less challenging to prevailing power structures than those that demand extensive social investment or revitalization of the entire system.	比如，旨在改变个体行为的干预对现有权力结构的挑战远比要求大面积社会投资或更新整个体系的干预药要小。


Thus, governments interested in closing the health gap – such as the British Labour government in 1997-2010 – usually end up pursuing such relatively painless “downstream” interventions.	因此，有意缩小健康差距的政府——比如1997—2010年的英国工党政府——通常会选择痛苦相对较少的“下游”干预。


But this approach has proved to be only partly successful in reducing health inequalities, leaving little doubt that more comprehensive measures are needed.	但这一方法在降低健康不平等方面充其量只是部分成功，毫无疑问，我们需要更全面的措施。


Indeed, most of the health gains over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were brought about by far-reaching economic, political, and social reforms.	事实上，19世纪和20世纪的大部分健康收益都是由深远的经济、政治和社会改革带来的。


Ultimately, more equal societies have better health outcomes.	最终，更平等的社会会有更好���健康结果。


While even the most egalitarian developed countries have health inequalities, all of their citizens are better off and live longer.	尽管即便是最平等的发达国家也存在健康不平等问题，但这些国家的所有人民都能获得更好、更长的生命。


The poorest and most vulnerable groups in social-democratic countries like Sweden and Norway are far healthier and live longer than their counterparts in neo-liberal countries such as the UK or the US.	瑞典和挪威等社会民主国家的最贫困、最脆弱群体的健康和生活质量远远好于英国和美国等新自由主义国家。


These more egalitarian countries have also achieved comparatively stable, inclusive economic growth and a high standard of living.	这些更平等的国家也比较而言更稳定、更包容的经济增长和高生活水平。


So, if assessed from a neutral standpoint, social democracy is clearly the better choice for all.	因此，从中立角度看，社会民主显然是更优选择。


The Politics of Revolutionary Surprise	突发革命背后的政治


DURHAM – In setting himself ablaze following a humiliating encounter with the police, the university-educated Tunisian vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi triggered a wave of protests across the Arab world.	发自达拉漠——在遭受了警方的殴打和羞辱之后，念过大学的突尼斯菜贩默罕默德·博阿茲茲点火自焚，并随之掀起了席卷整个阿拉伯世界的示威浪潮。


Several Arab dictators who had held power for decades have already been ousted or forced to announce that they will retire.	群情汹涌之下，那些稳坐钓鱼台几十年的阿拉伯独裁者要么被罢黜，要么被迫宣布退休，不再连任。


But protesters in Cairo, Tunis, and Sana want much more.	但开罗，突尼斯和萨那（也门首都）的示威者们要的可不仅仅是这些。


They also seek efficient governance, economic reforms to stimulate growth, the ouster of collaborators, democratic rights, freedom of religion (and perhaps also from religion) – in short, a comprehensive social transformation.	他们还希望有高效的政府治理、推动发展的经济改革、惩办那些出卖国家利益者，民主权利以及信仰（或不信仰）宗教的自由——简而言之，就是一场全面的社会转型。


Everywhere, incumbent regimes have mounted resistance. The unforgettable scene of camel- and horse-riding Mubarak supporters beating tech-savvy Egyptian protesters signals that the old order will not yield without a fight.	各地的执政者都被不断升温的反抗所包围，而那些熟练运用现代科技的埃及示威者们遭到骑着骆驼和大马的穆巴拉克支持者殴打的难忘画面则告诉我们：不经过斗争，旧秩序是不会垮台的。


The revolts themselves caught seasoned observers, even Arab leaders, off guard.	而这一连串起义也打了那些资深观察家，甚至是阿拉伯领导人一个措手不及。


Had the United States known what lay ahead, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would not have remarked, after demonstrations broke out in Egypt, that the Egyptian government was “stable.”	如果美国知道形势会如此走向的话，国务卿希拉里就不会在示威爆发时宣称埃及政府是“稳定的”。


Arab leaders now showering their key constituencies with pay raises and food subsidies would have done so earlier, thus avoiding the impression of vulnerability.	而阿拉伯领导人能早点意识到这一点的话，他们就会尽早用提升工资和食品补贴安抚民众，不至于暴露出外强中干的本质来。


Longtime regime opponents, too, were caught off guard.	连那些老牌反对派也一时间失了方寸。


For days after Egypt erupted, the Muslim Brotherhood did not know how to react, making it seem out of touch with the “Arab street.”	在埃及示威爆发后的几天，穆斯林兄弟会甚至不知如何应对，让人觉得他们似乎与“阿拉伯街头政治”脱节了。


For decades, most Arabs, however unhappy, kept their political grievances private, for fear of persecution if they turned against their leaders publicly.	数十年以来，大多数阿拉伯人虽然对政治不满，但也只能忍气吞声，因为他们害怕自己会因公开反对领袖而遭到迫害。


Through private discussions with trusted friends, everyone sensed that discontent was common, yet no one knew, or could know, the extent of it.	透过朋友间的私下交流，大家都知道到不满是非常普遍的，但没有人知道（或可能够知道）这种不满的波及面究竟有多广。


Even harder to gauge was what it would take for the disaffected to say “enough is enough” and begin challenging their regime openly, defiantly, and in concert.	更难以判定的是，究竟是什么令这些受压迫者“忍无可忍”并开始大胆公开地一齐挑战执政者。


If a sufficient number of Arabs reached that threshold at the right time, the long-docile Arab street would explode in anger, with each group of new protesters encouraging more to join in, giving people elsewhere in the Arab world the courage to initiate protests of their own.	如果能在恰当的时候出现足够数量的阿拉伯示威者的话，那么那些空旷的街道就将充斥着愤怒，示威者前赴后继地加入游行队伍，令其他阿拉伯国家的人们也有了上街示威的勇气。


That much was understood widely by entrenched Arab dictators, who saw to it that their intelligence and security corps extinguished any flame before it could spread.	照理说那些老谋深算的独裁者们对此也早有准备，他们靡下的情报安全机构也时刻准备着扑灭任何示威苗头。


History will record that the match Bouazizi lit on December 17, 2010, became the fortuitous spark that ignited an Arab prairie fire.	但历史将记住这一天，2010年12月17日，博阿兹兹手中的火柴无意中成为了点燃阿拉伯革命之火的火种。


The fire spread so fast that by the time Arab leaders understood what it would consume, it was beyond anyone’s control, and in more than one country.	这场大火蔓延的如此迅速，以至于当阿拉伯领袖们意识到其严重性时已无法控制，并延烧到各国。


The overthrown Tunisian dictator must now regret that his security forces did not arrest Bouazizi and lock him up, rather than allow his public self-immolation.	被罢黜的突尼斯独裁者如今肯定很后悔当初自己的安全部门为何没把博阿兹兹关起来，而是任其公开自焚。


As it turned out, by the time the seriousness of the rebellion became clear, fear was already changing sides even within the halls of Tunisian power.	随着示威之火愈烧愈烈，而反抗的严重性也日渐明了，恐惧即便在突尼斯政权内部也发生了转变。


President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s aides had started worrying more about being caught on the wrong side of Tunisian history than about facing the wrath of their beleaguered boss.	总统扎因·阿比丁·本·阿里的幕僚们不害怕面对针对总统的愤怒围攻，而是开始担心自己正在逆突尼斯历史潮流而动。


Fissures within the Egyptian regime suggest that in Hosni Mubarak’s entourage, too, fear is in flux.	埃及政权的内部分裂也意味着恐惧在穆巴拉克的随行人员中不断蔓延。


The mechanisms underlying this political unpredictability are not unique to the Arab world.	诱发这种政治突变的幕后机制其实并非阿拉伯世界的专利。


Unforeseen uprisings are possible wherever repression keeps people from expressing their political preferences openly.	任何压制人民表达自身政治偏好的地方都可能会爆发意料之外的起义。


In 1989, the fall of repressive East European regimes in quick succession stunned the world, including dissidents who had long recognized communism’s vulnerabilities.	在1989年，东欧极权政府的接连倒台震惊了世界，连那些早已意识到共产政权脆弱性的异见分子也吃了一惊。


Just before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a CIA report characterized the Iranian monarchy as an “island of stability.”	就在1979年伊朗爆发伊斯兰革命之前没多久，一份美国中情局报告还将伊朗王朝比作“汪洋中不沉的海岛”。


A month before the Russian Revolution of February 1917, Lenin predicted that his country’s great explosion lay in the distant future.	1917年2月俄罗斯革命前一个月，列宁预计说要很长时间之后革命才能爆发。


All of these cases involved the mushrooming of public protest by long-quiescent constituencies with no prior record of coordinated action.	所有这些事例都体现了公众示威是如何在那些长期处于静止状态的地区剧烈爆发，而这些地区甚至从未有过人们协同行动的经历。


The aftermath of an unanticipated revolution will itself present surprises.	这种突发式革命所带来的后果往往也是让人吃惊的。


In Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, no one knows where power will lie in the months to come.	在埃及，突尼斯和也门，没人知道未来几个月权力将移交给谁。


As in Iran in 1979, demonstrators united in opposition to the old regime have wildly differing goals.	正如1979年时的伊朗，团结一致反对旧政权的各派示威者其实也有不同（甚至相反）的��求。


Their biggest demands – secure jobs, faster growth, low food prices – are not necessarily compatible, and they may require policies that inflict pain.	他们最大的诉求——稳定的工作，更迅速的增长，低食品价格——并不是协调一致的，甚至有些人还要求实施一些错误的政策。


Divisions within the opposition movements are thus inevitable.	反对派内部的分裂因此也无法避免。


If the Arab societies now in turmoil had democratic traditions, they could be expected to find compromises peacefully, through open and honest debate.	如果这些陷入风暴中的阿拉伯社会能有民主的传统，他们将能通过开诚布公的辩论和平地达成妥协。


Alas, given their histories of autocratic rule, giant leaps forward to full-blown democracy are unlikely.	但无奈的是，他们的独裁历史导致向成熟民主的大跨步迈进难上加难。


Though steps toward democracy are possible, when the euphoria of the moment passes, political contenders will realize that, if only in self-defense, they must restrict their opponents’ freedoms.	虽然可能推动民主进程，但在革命的高潮过后，那些政治竞争者们将发现如果要自保的话就必须限制对手的自由。


Adding to the complexity of the situation are the Islamists, who have so far kept a low profile.	令复杂程度进一步加剧的还有至今保持低调的伊斯兰教主义者。


They themselves are divided, with preferences ranging from Sharia rule in one form or another to a “Turkish model” involving mild Islamism capable of achieving mass support through the ballot box.	他们本身已经分歧众多，从或轻或重的伊斯兰教法统治到“土耳其模式”这种赢得大量选票的温和伊斯兰主义，不一而足。


Several things are certain. The Arab street has changed the calculus of fear not only in the countries that have witnessed major protests, but also in the rest of the Arab world, where rulers are on notice that discontent need not remain submerged forever.	但有几件事是确定的：阿拉伯街头抗议不但改变了爆发国的恐惧内涵，还波及到其他阿拉伯国家，使这些国家的统治者们意识到民众的不满是无法永远被压制的。


Arab leaders old and new will implement policies designed to alleviate popular dissatisfaction.	新老阿拉伯领袖都将推行旨在缓和民众不满情绪的政策。


They will consider both easing repression, in order to gain sympathy, and tightening it, in order to prevent uncontrollable protests.	他们会考虑减少镇压力度来获取同情，同时又会想方设法加强控制以防止示威失控。


But, whatever they do, they – and the rest of the world – must now expect surprises.	但无论他们——以及世界其他地区的领导人们——怎样做，也永远无法阻止意料之外的事情发生。


The Politics of Values	价值观政治


The debate about the American elections has still not abated.	有关美国大选的争论势头依然不减。


How did President George W. Bush manage to get three million votes more than Senator John Kerry, and, in addition, to have a Republican majority elected in both houses of Congress?	乔治·W·布什总统如何获得胜出参议员约翰·克里的三百万选票？ 并且，如何使共和党续掌参、众两院优势？


There is not much agreement on the answers, but two themes recur in many explanations.	面对种种答案，人们难以达成一致，但有两个观点却不断出现在各种解释中。


One is personality.	首先是人格。


At a time of uncertainty and threat, people had more confidence in the president they knew than in the candidate who seemed unproven.	在一个充满无常和威胁的年代，比起未经证实的候选人，人们对于他们已经了解的总统更为信任。


The second theme is values.	第二个问题是价值观。


People voted for a set of values rather than for specific policies.	与其说人们投票给某种特定政策，还不如说他们为某一套价值体系投票。


Indeed, some (it is said) agreed with Kerry’s policies but nevertheless gave their vote to Bush, because they felt “at ease” with his general attitudes.	事实上，（据说）一些认同克里政策的选民却投票给了布什，正是因为他们对布什全面的看法感到放心。


Clearly, the United States is now deeply divided in electoral terms.	很明显，如今的美国已经随着选举形势被严重分裂。


An arch of blue (Democratic) states in the East, North, and West spans a huge red (Republican) area in the middle and the South.	东部、北部各州组成了一道蓝色（民主）拱形，自西部中心到南部横跨着一块巨大的红色（共和）区域。


More than that, the divisions are reproduced at the local level.	除此之外，在各地，这种分裂也被再次加剧。


Gerrymandering – the drawing of electoral boundaries to benefit a particular political party – is no longer necessary.	Gerrymandering，即对选区进行不公正的划分以使某一政党受益的做法已经不再必要。


People actually tend to move to areas in which a majority of others share their values, whether Republican or Democratic.	不管是共和党还是民主党的支持者，他们都趋于搬往一个与大部分其他人享有一致价值观的地区。


What exactly are these values?	这些价值观究竟是什么呢？


They have to do, or so we hear, with “god, guns, and gays.”	正如我们听到的那样，它们必须忍受“上帝、枪支和同性恋”。


Religion plays a part in them, including the literal truth of the bible when it comes to the story of the creation.	宗教在这些价值观中起了一定作用，包括有关圣经创世故事的字面真实性。


The possession of a gun is the ultimate test of individualism, and using guns in wars is not abhorrent.	拥有枪支是个人主义的最终考验，在战争中使用枪支却不引恶感。


Gays and other “modern” practices are rejected as self-indulgent.	同性恋和其他一些“现代”行为被指责为自我放纵而遭到反对。


As the political scientist Andrew Hacker recently put it, “the Bush candidacy was framed to make a majority by giving some 60 million people a chance to feel good about themselves.”	正如一位政治科学家安德鲁·海克最近所说的，“布什正是给了超过六千万的人们一个对他们自己感觉良好的机会，才得以多票当选。 ”


Is all this an American phenomenon, or are there similar trends elsewhere?	这是美国才有的现象吗？ 还是在其他地方也有类似趋势？


One answer is that as an American phenomenon, the politics of values may command a majority now, but it is by no means general.	一种解答是，作为一种美国现象，价值观政治现在也许掌控了大多数人，但无论如何也不能掌控全部。


Europe and other parts of the world are equally divided.	欧洲和世界其他地方也同样存在这种分裂。


Personality undoubtedly matters, and beneath overt political differences there may also be issues of values that have not yet come to the fore.	毋庸置疑，人格起了很重要的作用，并且，在公开的政见不和之下也许还有未浮出水面的价值观问题。


But traditional political differences based on disagreement over fundamental values play a diminishing part in elections.	但是在选举中，建立在基要价值观不同上的传统型政见不和的影响正在逐渐减小。


For example, Prime Minister Tony Blair, the next major leader to face an election, plays the personality card and talks about policies, but he represents above all a set of middle-class values.	比如，作为下一个即将面临选举的主要领导人的英国首相托尼·布莱尔大打人格魅力牌并大谈政治事务，但是他代表的毕竟是中层阶级的价值观。


When he speaks of “modernization,” or of “bringing things into the twenty-first century,” he manages to suggest a strange but appealing mixture of change and stability.	当他说到“现代化”或“把事情带到二十一世纪”时，他设法暗示了一个陌生但具有吸引力的变化与平稳混合体。


This has left the Conservative opposition without an effective response.	这使得保守党反对派无力做出有效回应。


Even questions like tax cuts and stricter asylum rules do not quite hit the value chords that the Republican Party in the US has managed to touch.	即使是像减税和更棘手的收容制度这种美国共和党已经触及的问题，也没有引起多少价值观的共鸣。


The picture is similar in Germany, where the overt influence of value politics is even smaller.	在受公开价值观政治影响甚至更小的德国，情况也颇为相像。


The German debate is still largely a policy debate.	德国的辩论从很大程度上来说仍然是政治辩论。


When the opposition offers the government talks on health-care reform or, most recently, on combating unemployment, the underlying competition is about competence rather than values.	当反对党向政府提出有关健康医疗改革或者最近抵抗失业的辩论话题时， 最根本的竞争与其说有关价值观还不如说有关权限。


Yet underneath the common battlegrounds of political debate in Britain and Germany and elsewhere in Europe, value clashes are lurking. Parties fight for those who can be made “to feel good about themselves,” but they may not fully realize that this is only partly a matter of policy.	尽管在英国、德国和欧洲其他地方的普通政治辩论战场下，价值观的冲突还未凸现，政党们已经开始争夺那些他们能够使其“对自己感觉良好”的选民，但他们也许未能全面意识到这只是政策的一小部分。


Religion is not likely to become a major factor in European politics; opinion polls show that religious observance marks one of the few major differences between Americans and Europeans.	宗教不太可能成为欧洲政治的一个主要因素； 民意测验表明，宗教仪式是美国与欧洲为数不多的区别之一。


Guns also have a different place in the European mind; it is their absence that most Europeans regard as important.	欧洲人对枪支问题也持不同看法，大部分欧洲人认为禁止枪支十分重要。


A pacifist streak of values is also unmistakable in Europe.	在欧洲，略带几分和平主义价值观也肯定错不了。


But the issue of political correctness (“gays”) plays a so-far underrated part in Europe as well.	但是主体意识正确（“同性恋”）问题目前为止在欧洲也同样是个被低估的问题。


Most importantly, the Europe itself divides Europeans, as the “national question” arises in each European state.	最重要的是，当“民族问题”出现在欧洲各国时，欧洲本身就将欧洲人分离了。


It is an issue of values, inspired by fear.	这是一个由恐惧引发的价值观问题。


People want to know where they belong, and in the process they turn against the US and toward Europe, or against Europe and toward their country.	在他们反美亲欧，或者抵制欧洲支持本国的过程中，人们要知道他们究竟属于哪里。


Either way, we leave the realms of policies, and even of politics, and enter the murky domain of symbols and myth.	无论是哪一种情况，我们都离开了政策、甚至政治领域，进入了模糊不清的符号和虚构范畴。


This, at any rate, is the main risk that democratic countries face, for the politics of values is a dangerous development.	无论它在以何种速度发展，这是民主国家面临的主要风险，因为价值观政治是一个危险的发展方向。


It reintroduces fundamental divisions in societies whose greatest democratic achievement was precisely to banish fundamentalism from politics.	它再次将基要主义分裂引入社会，而该社会最伟大的民主成就正好就是将基要主义从政治中清除。


Enlightened public debate must be a dispute about policies contained by a community of values.	开明的公共讨论必须是一场包含政策的团体价值观的辩论。


Insisting on this is therefore a primary objective of the politics of freedom.	因此，坚持这一点才是政治自由的首要目标。


The Post-Nuclear Transition	后核时代变革


BERLIN – The Fukushima disaster in March reminded the world, 25 years after Chernobyl, that nuclear energy is anything but clean, secure, and affordable.	柏林——切尔诺贝利事故25年后，3月发生的福岛灾难为全世界敲响了警钟，提醒人们核能绝不是洁净、安全、价廉物美的能源选择。


Unfortunately, another nuclear catastrophe was needed to trigger a fresh debate on the use of nuclear power.	不幸的是，需要再次爆发核灾难才能引发核能应用领域的全新讨论。


Germany’s decision in June to phase out nuclear power by 2022 has provoked irritation among its pro-nuclear neighbors.	德国6月做出的到2022年逐步淘汰核能应用的决策刺激了周边支持核能应用的邻国。


Other European countries have yet to indicate whether they will follow Germany’s example; a world free from nuclear energy is hard for its supporters to imagine.	其他欧洲国家还没有表态他们是否会仿效德国的决策； 核能支持者无法想象一个没有核能的世界。


Europe’s economic and ecological future, however, depends upon the rising opposition to this high-risk technology, such as in Italy, where a recent referendum delivered a large popular majority against nuclear energy.	意大利最近一次公投显示大部分民众反对核能应用，对这项高风险技术越来越强的反对力量将决定欧洲在经济和生态方面的未来。


In Germany, the idea of a nuclear phase-out has been gaining support ever since the Chernobyl disaster.	切尔诺贝利事故发生后，德国逐步淘汰核能的想法就已经开始酝酿。


Over the past few decades, anti-nuclear activists, together with their political representatives in the Green Party, have succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of thousands of protesters.	过去几十年间，反核人士连同他们在绿党中的政治代表一道，成功地动员了数十万抗议者。


In 2000, growing political pressure finally led to a consensus between the German government and energy companies, which agreed to limit the life span of nuclear-power plants to 32 years.	2000年，越来越强的政治压力最终导致德国政府和能源企业达成共识，同意将核电厂的寿命限制在32年之内。


Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government withdrew from this agreement in 2010, but Fukushima forced the authorities to reconsider – and to permanently end the use of nuclear energy.	安格拉·默克尔总理的政府曾于2010年退出这项协议，但福岛事故迫使当局重新思考——并永久叫停核能应用政策。


German energy policy now depends once more on the future deployment of renewable energy sources.	德国的能源政策如今再次取决于可再生能源未来的部署情况。


The Renewable Energy Sources Act, for instance, introduced in 2000 by a Social Democrat-Green government, has enabled the country to exceed all growth expectations in the alternative-energy sector, which now accounts for 20% of Germany’s total electricity consumption.	比方说社会民主绿党政府2000年推出的《可再生能源法》使得德国替代能源领域的发展超出了所有人的预期，现在已经在德国用电总量中占据了20%的份额。


But, while Germany is now heading in the right direction, the security risks of nuclear power plants in neighboring countries, such as France and the Czech Republic, remain.	虽然德国正朝着正确的方向发展，但法国和捷克等邻国核电站安全风险依然存在。


There must be a general shift in both European and global energy policies.	欧洲及全球能源政策必须发生整体性的变化。


The current European stress tests of nuclear-power plants are a first step; but, as long as they are voluntary and under the operators’ control, they will be nothing more than political window dressing.	目前欧洲对核电站进行的压力测试仅仅是个开始，但只要测试仍自愿参与并处在经营者的控制之下，这种测试就不过是一种政治摆设。


For example, there are no plans to test any of the 143 nuclear power plants currently operating in the European Union for core safety risks, such as a terrorist attack or a plane crash.	比方说，没有任何计划要模拟坠机或恐怖袭击发生的状况，对欧盟目前运营的143座核电厂的堆芯安全进行检测。


The economic argument for renewable energy is also compelling.	利用可再生能源在经济方面也有着充分的理由。


Nuclear power is an antiquated technology that requires billions of euros in subsidies; so far, German taxpayers have contributed €196 billion for this purpose.	作为一种过时的技术，核电需要数十亿欧元的补贴，迄今为止，德国纳税人已经为此付出了1960万欧元的巨资。


A German government study has estimated that, between 2010 and 2050, Germany could save more than €700 billion by relying on non-nuclear renewable energy instead of nuclear power or imported fossil fuels such as coal, gas, and oil.	一项德国政府研究预测在2010到2050年间，德国用非核可再生能源取代核能或煤、天然气和石油等进口化石燃料可以节省7000多亿欧元的投资。


The expansion of renewable energy production also holds great potential for boosting economic growth.	扩大使用可再生能源还极有可能拉动经济增长。


Over the past decade, 370,000 new jobs have been created in the sector, and exports of renewable-energy technology are rising rapidly, totaling roughly €30 billion from 2006 to 2008.	过去10年间，可再生能源领域创造了370，000个新增就业岗位，2006－2008年可再生能源技术出口总值约为300亿欧元，同样出现了快速的增长。


At the same time, it would be short-sighted to assume that fossil fuels, especially coal, are a profitable and sustainable energy source.	与此同时，将化石燃料、尤其是煤炭视为一种有利可图的可持续能源无疑是一种目光短浅的看法。


First, increased reliance on fossil fuels runs contrary to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol’s targets for reducing carbon emissions, as well as to the EU’s own climate-change objectives.	首先，越来越多地依赖化石燃料与1997年《京都议定书》碳减排目标背道而驰，此外也违反了欧盟自身的气候变化目标。


Moreover, fossil-fuel costs fluctuate wildly with oil prices, and the centralized nature of nuclear and coal-fired power stations creates distribution problems.	此外，化石燃料成本随油价涨跌而剧烈波动，而且核电及火电厂的集中分布也为电能输送设置了障碍。


The last decade has shown that increases in renewable-energy production actually reduce its costs.	过去10年的应用已经表明，可再生能源产量增长反而会滩低它的成本。


Wind energy is now competitive with conventional power plants, while rising gas and coal prices and the steady decline in renewable-energy costs imply that, within a few years, fossil fuels will be even less attractive.	风能现在已经可以和传统电厂发电一较高下，而燃气煤炭价格攀升及可再生能源成本不断下降意味着在若干年内，化石燃料的吸引力将会进一步减弱。


Moreover, revenues from “home-grown” energy tend to remain where they are generated, while the import bill for fossil fuels would be eliminated.	此外，“土生土长”的能源收入更能造福本地经济，而化石燃料的进口法案将被逐步取消。


All of this can be done without having to bear the immense risk (and costs) of a nuclear catastrophe.	在无需承担核灾难巨大风险（和成本）的前提下，所有这些目标都可以实现。


Indeed, the idea of a “nuclear renaissance” is a myth.	事实上，“核复兴”的概念不过是一个神话。


Nuclear accidents, public opposition, and high capital costs have already provoked a drastic drop in nuclear-energy investment; in the United States, no nuclear-power plant has been commissioned since the late 1970’s.	核事故、公众反对和高投资成本已经导致核能投资急剧下降； 20世纪70年代后期以来，美国再没有委托建造任何核电厂。


In Europe, the number of nuclear plants is declining, as old plants are decommissioned and public opinion in even traditionally pro-nuclear countries like France begins to shift: almost two-thirds of the French now believe that nuclear power stands in the way of an increase in renewable energy.	随着老厂的退役，就连像法国这样传统上支持核能应用的国家公众舆论也开始转向，欧洲的核电厂数量正在下降：近三分之二的法国人现在认为核电阻碍了可再生能源的应用。


In Italy, more than 90% of voters rejected Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s plan for a return to nuclear-power generation, and the Japanese government recently announced that it plans to phase out nuclear energy in stages.	意大利超过90%的选民不赞成西尔维奥·布鲁斯科尼总理恢复核能发电的计划，而日本政府不久前宣布了分阶段逐步淘汰核能的计划。


More needs to be done to accelerate the post-nuclear transition.	加快推动后核能时代变革还有很多工作要做。


More money from the EU budget now goes to nuclear research than to non-nuclear research and development, and more infrastructure funding goes to carbon capture and storage (CCS) and conventional energy than to renewable energies.	如今欧盟预算拨出更多资金用于核能而非核能以外能源的研究和开发，还有更多基础设施投资用于传统能源及碳的捕获和储存（CCS）而非可再生能源的发展应用。


The forthcoming negotiations on the EU’s 2014-2020 European budget are an opportunity to change direction and cut the funding for unpromising mega-projectslike the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) effort in southern France.	欧盟即将展开的2014－2020年欧洲预算谈判是转变方向的绝好机会，应该削减像法国南部国际热核试验反应堆（ITER）这样没有前途的大型项目的资金投入。


Shifting to renewable-energy sources will require enormous effort and major infrastructure investment.	必须付出巨大的努力和基础设施投资才能完成向可再生能源的过渡。


High-voltage transmission lines across the EU and storage facilities to overcome the problem of meeting basic energy demands will be crucial, as will decentralized distribution grids and higher investment in energy conservation.	为满足基本能源需求而在欧盟全境建设高压输电线路和蓄电设施至关重要，此外还需要建设分散的配电网络及大规模投资节能项目。


Germany has taken the first step, but the transition to a fully renewable-energy-based economy must be a common European effort.	德国已经迈出了第一步，但朝着完全可再生能源经济的过渡必须是全欧洲的共同选择。


Robots on the Brain	脑中机器人


CALGARY – When Harvey Cushing and William Bovie introduced electrocautery (which uses a high-frequency current to seal blood vessels or make incisions) in 1926, their innovation transformed neurosurgery.	卡尔加里—当哈维·库欣（Harvey Cushing）和威廉·博威（William Bovie）于1926年引入电灼（用高频电流封闭血管或制造切口），他们的创新改变了神经外科学。


Given the precision required to operate on an organ as delicate as the brain, the convergence of mechanical technologies with the art of surgery catalyzed progress in the field.	对于像大脑这样精致的器官，手术的精密度要求极高，医疗技术和手术艺术的结合刺激了该领域的进步。


Neurosurgical advances always pursue minimalism.	神经外科的进步永远追求简约。


As in any other surgical field, the less the procedure interferes with the body, the less likely it is to affect the patient’s quality of life adversely, and the sooner the patient will be able to return to normal activity.	与其他外科领域一样，手术过程干预肢体越少，对病人生活质量的副作用就越小，病人恢复正常活动所需的时间也越短。


This imperative is even more pronounced when it comes to sensitive neurological procedures.	这一点在敏感神经手术中愈加重要。


Tasks like maneuvering small blood vessels that are 1-2 millimeters in diameter, or removing a brain tumor without damaging the surrounding tissue, require technologies, such as the operating microscope and multimodal imaging tools, that complement surgeons’ skills and augment their abilities.	摆弄直径一二毫米的小血管，或在不伤害组织的情况下切除脑部肿瘤，这样的任务需要手术显微镜和多态成像工具（multimodal imaging tool）等技术，以补充完善外科医生的技能、增强他们的能力。


A step further would be to allow a human-controlled robot to enter the brain.	更进一步，我们可以让人工控制机器人进入大脑。


Robots are capable of performing repetitive tasks with a higher degree of precision and accuracy than are humans, and without muscle fatigue.	机器人能以比人类更高的精度和准确度完成重复工作，且不会出现肌肉疲劳。


And they can be upgraded periodically to integrate new features seamlessly.	它们还可以定期升级，无缝加入各种新功能。


What robots lack is the human brain’s executive capacity.	机器人所缺少的是人类大脑的执行能力。


Given that comprehending – and reacting appropriately to – the immense number of variables that can arise during surgery would require enormous computing power, surgical robots aim to integrate human experience and decision-making ability with mechanized accuracy.	理解——并据此反应——在手术期间可能出现的大量变数要求极高的运算能力，外科手术机器人的目标是将人类经验和决策能力与机械化的准确度结合起来。


One example of this convergence is neuroArm, developed by my research team at the University of Calgary in conjunction with engineers at MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates.	这个方向的一个例子是我的卡尔加里大学研究团队和MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates工程师联合研发的神经之手（neuroArm）。


The neuroArm actually has two arms, which can hold various surgical tools while the surgeon maneuvers them from a remote workstation.	神经之手实际上有两只手，外科医生可以在远端工作站操纵它们，使用各种外科手术工具。


The workstation provides a multitude of data – including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), a three-dimensional image of the surgical field, sonic information, and quantifiable haptic (or tactile) feedback from tool-tissue interaction – that enable the surgeon to experience the surgery through sight, sound, and touch.	工作站提供各种数据——包括磁共振成像（MRI，手术区域的三维图像）、声波信息以及工具-组织互动反馈而得的可量化触感（或触觉）——让外科医生通过影响、声音和触摸体验手术。


Because the human brain makes decisions based on sensory input – and, of course, experience – such data are essential for the surgeon to make the most informed choices possible during surgery.	由于人类大脑根据感觉输入变量决策——当然还包括经验——因此这些数据对于让外科医生在手术期间基于尽可能的充分信息做出决策来说至关重要。


Technologies like MRI can help in surgical planning, resection control, and quality assurance.	MRI等技术有助于手术规划、切除控制和质量保证。


Magnetic-resonance-compatible robotics allow for real-time imaging, providing information about anatomical structures and changes in the brain relative to surgical pathology while operating, thereby minimizing risk.	磁共振兼容机器人能带来实时影像，提供关于解剖结构和手术期间大脑相对外科病理学的变化，从而实现风险最小化。


Given that the robot receives the MRIs and provides haptic feedback, electronic highways or surgical corridors can be established before the procedure, as can “no-go” zones.	机器人接收MRI，并提供触感反馈，因此电子高速公路（electronic highway，或称外科手术通路，surgical corridor）可以在手术之前建立，“禁通”区亦然。


Tool manipulation can thus occur only within the predetermined corridor, preventing unintended injury to the brain.	工具操控因此只在事先确定的通道中进行，防止对大脑产生意料之外的损伤。


Furthermore, robotic surgery has the potential to progress beyond the scope of unaided human capability.	此外，机器人手术具有超过无辅助人类能力的潜力。


Motion scaling – which allows the robotic arms to mimic the exact movements of the surgeon’s hands, but on a much smaller scale – will enable surgeons to manipulate tissue that is too small for the naked eye to detect.	按比例动作缩放——该技术让机器手在小得多的规模上精确模拟外科医生的动作——将能使外科医生操纵肉眼无法察觉的组织。


With the development of smaller microsurgical tools and high-performance cameras and monitors, operating at the cellular level will be possible.	围着更小规模微型外科手术工具和高性能相机和显示器的发展，细胞层面的手术将成为可能。


A related area with important implications for neurosurgery is virtual reality.	另一个对神经外科具有重要影响力的相关领域是虚拟现实（virtual reality）。


Building on simulation technology, virtual reality will allow surgeons to rehearse procedures, including with surgical robots, in a digital environment.	虚拟现实基于模拟技术，它让外科医生在数字环境中预演手术，并可将外科手术机器人也纳入其中。


The ability to map out complex cases and practice rare procedures before performing them on a patient will undoubtedly lead to better surgical performance and improved medical outcomes.	在给病人动手术之前勾画复杂情形和实践罕见手术毫无疑问能带来更好的手术表现，改善治疗结果。


Virtual reality will also enhance surgical training, by providing students with a wider range of experience and enabling quantification of their performance.	虚拟现实还能为医科学生提供范围更广的体验，量化医科学生的表现，从而增强手术训练。


Surgeons operating manually know how much force they exert only by the way it feels; a surgical simulator, by contrast, could measure that force and indicate when a trainee is applying excessive or insufficient pressure.	手术台上的外科医生只有通过实地感受才能了解自己所施加的力道的大小； 而手术模拟器可以测量力道大小，并在受训者用力过大或不足时给出提示。


Moreover, instructors will be able to program controlled scenarios to assess how a trainee copes in challenging circumstances.	此外，教师也能够编写控制情景，以评估受训者是否能处理好挑战性环境。


The ability to reset and retry surgeries without any risk or additional cost will enhance neurosurgical training significantly.	在没有风险和新成本的情况下重置和重试外科手术的能力能显著增强神经外科手术训练。


After all, practice makes perfect.	毕竟，熟练才能生巧。


To be sure, virtual reality remains a relatively young technology.	平心而论，虚拟现实仍是相对年轻的技术。


Given that realistic neurosurgical simulations, which must account for a large number of variables and potential outcomes, are particularly difficult to develop, virtual reality is not yet being used widely in the field.	逼真的神经外科手术模拟——必须计算大量变量和潜在结果——开发难度仍然极大，因此虚拟现实尚未在该领域中大量使用。


But surgical-simulation technology is advancing rapidly, bolstered by developments in parallel computing.	但在并行计算能力的发展的刺激下，手术模拟技术在快速进步。


As these simulations become more realistic, their training value will increase.	而随着模拟变得越来越逼真，它们的培训价值也在增加。


The merging of human surgical experience with machines and computerized technologies is driving neurosurgical advancement, with robotic surgery serving as an important model of the benefits of the human-machine interface.	人类外科手术经验与机器和计算机化技术的结合正在推动神经外科进步，机器人手术是人机互动大有裨益的重要模式。


Add virtual reality to the equation and the future of neurosurgery takes shape – a future in which the discipline is elevated to new levels of excellence.	在这一模式中加入虚拟现实，就得到了未来神经外科学的轮廓——在未来，这一学科将取得新的卓越高度。


The Powerlessness of the Powerful	弱势和强势


NEW YORK – Elites are under siege in every corner of the world.	纽约——当前，精英阶层在世界各地都受到围攻。


“Tea Party” activists in exurban America rant and rage against the so-called liberal elites of New York, Washington, and Hollywood.	在美国，边远地区的“绿党运动”攻击的是是在纽约，华盛顿和好莱坞所谓“自由派精英”。


In Europe, populist demagogues, such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, rant and rage against the elitist “appeasers” of Islam.	在欧洲，民粹主义的鼓动者，例如荷兰的哥特·怀尔德斯大肆攻击精英阶层的伊斯兰“绥靖主义”。


In Thailand, red-shirted demonstrators from the country’s rural northeast rant and rage against the military, social, and political elites of Bangkok.	在泰国，来自东北部农村的“红衫军”也在反对曼谷的军方及政界社会名流。


The first principle of democracy is that government must be based on popular consent, even if the government is made up of parties for which many people did not vote.	即便相当多数人不愿参与投票，民主的首要价值还是政府必须以民意为基础。


It is clear from the worldwide rage against elected governments that this consent is becoming dangerously threadbare.	很清楚的是，全球范围对执政当局的愤怒已经演变成一种危险的俗套。


More and more people in democratic countries feel unrepresented, anxious, and angry.	在民主国家中，越来越多的人感到没有被代表，焦虑和愤怒。


And they blame the elites.	于是他们将矛头指向了精英阶层。


The phenomenon is worldwide, but its causes differ from country to country.	这在当今非常普遍，但各国情况迥异。


American populism is not the same as Thai populism.	美国的民粹运动和泰国相似。


Culture and race play important roles in the United States – the culture of carrying guns, for example, and the discomfort at having a black, Harvard-educated president who talks like a law professor.	文化种族在美国有着非常重要的位置——例如传统的持枪文化，敌视有着哈佛教育背景的黑人总统等。


In Thailand, the rage stems from the perceived neglect of the rural poor by the ruling class, backed by big business, the army, and the king.	在泰国，广大穷人的愤怒来源于长期受到统治阶级的忽视，这些统治阶层包括商界，军界和国王。


The populist billionaire and former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, appeared to be different.	民粹主义者的亿万富翁，泰国前总理他信看起来就大不相同。


He used some of his vast wealth to shower money on rural areas.	他利用自身巨额财富布施于农村地区。


Rural people, grateful for his largesse, voted for him twice.	受到恩惠的农民们感激于他的慷慨，两次将他推向总理宝座。


Authoritarian, crude, and somewhat megalomaniacal (almost as though he were a king himself), Thaksin was a Thai version of Silvio Berlusconi.	专制率性，甚至有些狂妄的他信（有时候他把自己当成国王）是泰国版本的贝卢斯科尼。


He was removed from office in 2006, following a bloodless military coup that was supported by the Bangkok middle class, whose members took to the streets in yellow T-shirts (the color of the Thai monarchy).	2006年，在一场由曼谷中产阶级支持的没有流血军事政变中，他信被赶下台。 中产阶级的支持者，也就是所谓黄衫军（黄色代表着泰国王室。


Today’s ongoing pro-Thaksin red-shirt rebellion is a form of revenge.	）展开了街头运动。 如今支持他信的红衫军也如法炮制。


In Europe, the power of the European Union, often-uncontrolled immigration, and economic globalization are challenging feelings of national belonging, of being represented by national governments, or of sharing national cultures.	在欧洲，欧盟的权力，失控的移民潮及经济的全球化运动都在挑战着国家这个概念。 各国政府和各自的文化都感到了威胁。


Demagogues who denounce multiculturalism and warn of the “Islamization” of the West are exploiting the resultant fears about the loss of national identity.	反对多文化论的煽动者和警惕“伊斯兰化”的西方人士正是利用人们这种害怕失去国家归属感的恐惧心理。


The sense that globalization is creating new classes of haves and have-nots is a factor that inflames most current forms of populism, regardless of national differences.	全球化创造出一个新的贫富差距是促使目前各国民粹主义的主要原因。


At the same time, new technology, without which globalization would not be possible, is being used to mobilize people for populist causes, too.	以此同时，受益于全球化产生的新科技也在被民粹主义者用于动员自身的支持者。


The heroine of the US Tea Party movement, Sarah Palin, is as much a creature of twittering and the vast new blogosphere as she is of television and radio – perhaps more so.	美国绿党运功的的女先锋佩林就是这样一个典型，她利用Twitter博客作为自己的广播电台来炒作自己。


Indeed, the shift of public debate from the mainstream press to the Internet has helped to break down the authority of traditional elites: newspaper editors, political columnists, academics, politicians.	实际上，公众讨论正从主流报纸向互联网转移，这打破了传统精英阶层的权威：报纸主编，政治专栏作家，学者和政界人物。


In cyberspace, anyone can have his or her say.	在互联网上，任何人都可以自由发声。


This is more democratic, no doubt, but it has made it harder for people to sift nonsense from truth, or demagoguery from rational political debate.	这固然很民主，但也会使得民众很难区分真实和谎言，国家政治正常讨论和别有用心的煽动。


The tone of populist movements, whether in Europe, Asia, or the US, would suggest that the elites are too powerful, that they dominate the little people, whose voices are drowned out by the liberals, the multiculturalists, and the city slickers.	如今，不论在欧洲，亚洲还是美国，民粹运动者的论调是，精英阶层过于强大，他们主宰者普通民众一切，广大民众的声音被那些自由派人士，多文化主义者和城市精英所淹没。


This is a common form of populist paranoia, promoted in the US by radio talk-show hosts and Fox television, and in Europe by men like Wilders.	在美国电台的脱口秀和福克斯电视的鼓噪下，典型的民粹主义者展开了自身的宣传攻势，欧洲的代表人物就是怀尔德斯。


To some extent, the elites have themselves to blame.	从某种程度来说，精英阶层也要承担部分责任。


Immigration in Europe has been messy, and those who complained were too quickly dismissed as racists.	欧洲的移民潮日益混乱，而那些对此稍有怨言的人们就会被贴上种族主义的标签。


After endorsing a military coup to get rid of Thaksin, the yellow-shirts of Bangkok can hardly blame the red-shirts for using undemocratic tactics to force the current government to step down.	在主导了一场反他信的军事政变之后，曼谷的黄衫军很难再指责红衫军也同样以这种非民主的方式要求现任政府下台。


American liberals, too, are often guilty of sneering at the tastes and habits of their provincial countrymen.	美国的自由派人物也应该对自己过去调侃和蔑视乡下人的行为感到内疚。


There is, however, another way to look at the worldwide surge of populism.	但是，我们也可以从另一个角度来观察民粹运动的兴起。


The real problem of traditional elites may not be too much power, but too little.	传统精英阶层势力或许不是过于强大，而是太弱小。


The lack of trust in political elites is linked to a suspicion, which is not entirely irrational, that elected governments have little authority.	缺乏政治互信导致相互之间非理性的猜疑，这使得政府缺乏应有的权威。


The real power, people suspect, is lodged elsewhere – on Wall Street, in the unelected EU bureaucracy, in the Royal Thai Army and the Royal Palace.	而真正的权力却被转到到了——华尔街，未经选举的欧盟官僚以及泰国皇家部队和泰王手中。


What people crave in uncertain times is strong leadership from charismatic figures who promise to sweep the stables, get rid of corruption, and stand up for the little man against selfish politicians and against foreigners who threaten us with strange habits and religions.	在乱世中，人们需要一个具有个人魅力的强有力的领导者，他可以稳定军心，消除腐败，代表升斗小民对自私的政客说不，抵御外来文化的入侵。


Such times are dangerous for democracy, because they endanger popular consent to democratic governments.	这段时期不能有什么民主，因为民意已被操弄。


To regain respect, our elected politicians will have to show more authority, not less.	为了重获尊严，当选的政治人物必须显示出自身的权威性。


US President Barack Obama is right to call for more regulation of financial markets.	在监管金融市场的问题上，美国总统奥巴马做的就很好。


In Europe, either the EU must become more democratic, which will take a long time, or national governments must delegate less to the bureaucrats in Brussels.	欧洲的欧盟要么更加民主，这或许会经过相当长的时间，要么各国政府必须尽可能地减少参与布鲁塞尔官僚的决策机制。


Thailand might face the hardest problems.	泰国正处于非常艰难之时。


Reliance on a self-promoting tycoon like Thaksin is not the best way to boost democracy, but nor is reliance on military coups and kingly intervention.	虽然，选择自我炒作的大亨，例如说他信不是推动民主的上策，但军事政变和王权干政也同样不可行。


Most Thais would agree about the military. And it is illegal to even begin to discuss the role of the king.	绝大多数的泰国人都对军方都有共识，但讨论国王的地位在泰国是被认为非法。


But without discussion, democracy is surely doomed.	如果没有讨论，哪里来的民主。


The Power of China’s Powerless	中国无权者的权力


LONDON – No sooner had I finished reading an article that eulogized Václav Havel, the playwright turned dissident turned peaceful revolutionary turned president who had just died, than two subsequent news stories set Havel’s extraordinary career in context: the death of Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s pornography-addicted and nuclear-armed supreme leader, and the peaceful protests against land expropriation by the villagers of Wukan in Guandong province, southern China.	伦敦——我刚刚看完两篇颂扬瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔——转型为持异议者，再转型为和平革命家，再转型为总统的刚刚去世的剧作家——的文章，就传来两则凸显哈维尔杰出生涯的消息：沉溺美色和核武器的朝鲜最高领导人金正日死了； 中国广东省乌坎村爆发了村民反对土地征用的示威。


If Havel ever had any moments of doubt about his lasting positive impact on the world, I hope he was able to see reports from Wukan before he died.	如果哈维尔对于他给这个世界带来的积极影响的持续性有一丝一毫的怀疑，那么我衷心希望他在逝世前看到了关于乌坎的报道。


In that fishing village of 6,000, the “power of the powerless” that Havel promoted as a means to undermine totalitarian rule was demonstrated anew, and with such enormous dignity and discipline that it has galvanized China like no protest since those in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989.	在这个只有6000名村民的渔村里，“无权者的权力”——哈维尔所大力宣扬的反对极权统治的利器——正在发出新的光芒，那里的村民显示出了中国自1989年春天安门广场示威以来从未体现过的尊严与纪律。


Kim, in a sense, was the anti-Havel, lacking not only moral scruples, but even the usual dictatorial concern for how a country is managed.	从某种程度上讲，金正日是反哈维尔的，他不仅在道德上肆意妄为，也不具备一般独裁者对如何治国的关心。


His death made me recall that of Mao Zedong, with all the mass hysteria – real and feigned – that accompanies the demise of a self-anointed god.	金正日之死让我想起了毛泽东，在当时的中国，这个自封为神的人物的陨落引发了全体中国人的歇斯底里——不管是真是假。


But Mao’s death did at least end the era of caesarism in China.	但毛泽东的去世至少终结了中国的家天下。


Because he had no son to succeed him, Mao appointed a five-person politburo to do the job.	毛泽东没有儿子可以继承他的权力，因此他任命了一个5人政治局，成员包括侄子毛远新、情妇张玉凤和最后一任妻子江青。


Its members, which included his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, his mistress, Zhang Yufeng, and Jiang Qing, his last wife – were as incompetent at governing as Kim, but, following the disaster of the Cultural Revolution, antagonism to them in the military and other state institutions was too widespread for them to last.	这批人和金正日一样治国无能，与此同时，在饱受文化大革命摧残的中国，军队和其他政府机构中早已出现了普遍的反对情绪。


They, and the Gang of Four (of which Jiang Qing was a member), were soon ousted.	他们和四人帮（江青也是其中之一）很快就被驱逐出了政治核心。


China’s transit from caesarism to despotism, and then from Marxism to capitalism, has been fortunate for China’s citizens.	中国的从家天下向专制以及随后的从马克思主义转向资本主义是中国人民的大幸。


North Korea’s bad luck is that, despite his incompetence, Kim Jong-il seems to have managed to bequeath the dynasty he inherited to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un.	朝鲜的不幸在于治国无能的金正日似乎成功地把江山传给了幼子金正恩。


Given other North Korean institutions’ apparent indifference to the mess that the Kims have made of their country, there seems scant chance of any serious change of course being initiated from within.	其他朝鲜机构似乎对金家给国家带来的混乱无动于衷，因此我们看不见朝鲜发生由内而外的重大变革的可能性。


A fight for power, however, might yet spell the end of the regime.	但是，权力的斗争仍然有可能让朝鲜的体制崩溃。


North Korea is a kind of looking-glass world to Havel’s dictum that, to survive under totalitarianism, one must live in truth.	朝鲜便是哈维尔的名言的对立面——为了在集权主义中生存，你必须生活在真相中。


Fortunately for Havel, Czechoslovakia’s small-minded communist rulers were also small-minded in their lies.	哈维尔是幸运的，目光短浅的捷克斯洛伐克共产党执政者的谎言也是目光短浅的。


But when every aspect of society is built, as in North Korea, on a Big Lie, and then an Even Bigger Lie, it is probably hard to maintain one’s sanity, let alone the ability to live in truth.	但在朝鲜这样的方方面面都建立在大谎言以及随后的更大谎言的社会中，要想保持头脑清醒便已十分困难，更不用说生活在真相中了。


In any case, Kim Jong-un’s reign is unlikely to last or be as certifiably crazed as those of his father and grandfather.	不管怎样，金正恩的统治不可能像其父和其祖父那样持续或造成如此的群众疯狂了。


Communism, thanks to the lure of successful market economies and the example set by people like Havel, has put the system under such external strain that Kim III has nowhere to turn for effective help.	在成功市场经济的诱惑和哈维尔等人所树立的榜样面前，共产主义体制已陷入了重重外患，金三世将无处寻找有效的援手。


Indeed, even the two regimes most eager to maintain the Kim dynasty – China’s and Russia’s – are feeling pressure from their disaffected but, it now seems, not-so-powerless populations.	事实上，就连最愿意维持金家王朝的两大体制——中国体制和俄罗斯体制——也在日益感受到其心存不满且表现得并不那么无权的民众的压力。


In Wukan, simple villagers were unafraid to challenge the might of the local party and police when officials stole their land for a development project.	在乌坎村，当官员打着开发土地的名号盗用村民土地时，手无寸铁的村民无惧挑战当地党组织和警察的力量。


In Henan, policemen have gone into the streets demanding that human rights be protected.	在河南，警察也上街游行，要求保护人权。


In Dalian, hundreds of thousands of people protested against the construction of petrochemical plant.Unlike what has happened so far in Wukan, the Dalian protest was crushed, but it – like the tens of thousands of other protests across China last year – signaled to the ruling party that ordinary Chinese are no longer interested only in the politically passive pursuit of material gain.	在大连，成千上万人民游行反对化工厂项目的建设。 与如今在乌坎发生的事情不同，大连游行被镇压了，但它与中国去年所发生的成千上万起游行一样，是在对执政党说，普通中国人民已经不满足于单纯的物质好处，开始有政治要求了。


In Russia, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s situation is much the same.	在俄罗斯，总理普京的日子也不好过。


Following the sham elections in early December, massive protests erupted in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.	12月的选举弊案之后，莫斯科和圣彼得堡爆发了大规模游行。


And those marching were not the usual impoverished rabble-rousers, but Russia’s new middle classes.	这些游行的参与者并非与往常一样都是些穷困潦倒的暴动煽动者，而是新兴中产阶级。


Like the villagers of Wukan, they have simply had enough of official dishonesty.	与乌坎村村民一样，他们已经受够了官员的不诚实。


North Koreans have suffered coercion for a long time, and although they are brainwashed to be docile and loyal to Kim’s dynasty, you just cannot imagine how they will remain at the beck and call of Kim Jong-un, who has no credentials, military or otherwise, to rule.	朝鲜人民早已饱受苦难，尽管他们被洗脑要求忠于金家王朝，但是很难想象他们会对在军事和其他方面毫无建树的金正恩俯首帖耳。


Given its increasingly isolated international position in Asia, if North Korea’s internal conflicts become acute, China may find it difficult to behave toward Kim Jong-un with anything but cold and anxiety-ridden indifference.	朝鲜在亚洲已陷入越来越孤立的状态，如果其内部冲突变得更加尖锐，那么中国可能会发现很难再自持金正恩，只能漠然地看着他自生自灭。


And recall that it was indifference to the non-reforming East European communist regimes on the part of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union that ultimately sealed  their fate and delivered Havel from a prison cell to Prague Castle.	想想这与不肯改革的东欧共产主义体制吧。 冷眼旁观的戈尔巴乔夫和苏联葬送了他们的命运，把哈维尔从阶下囚送上了捷克总统的宝座。


Havel, of course, was a beneficiary of such indifference, but he never practiced it, remaining a fighter for truth and freedom throughout his life.	当然，哈维尔是苏联的冷漠的受益者，但他从来没有利用过这种冷漠，终其一生，他始终是真相和自由斗士。


For Chinese concerned about how to live in truth, Havel remains our exemplar.	对于关心如何生活在真相中的中国人来说，哈维尔仍是榜样。


The Charter 77 movement that he founded provided the template for men like the imprisoned Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, who helped to found Charter 08, which proclaimed that Chinese, too, could live in dignity and freedom.	���创立的77宪章运动便是身陷囹圄的诺贝尔和平奖获得者刘晓波等人的榜样，激励他们创立了08宪章，宣布中国人同样可以生活在尊严和自由中。


Kim Jong-il’s demise reminds us that all people are equal before death.	金正日的殒命提醒我们，死亡面前人人平等。


Havel’s passing reminds us that the value of life will eventually gain respect.	哈维尔的实施提醒我们，生命的尊严终将赢得尊重。


The Power to End Poverty	终结贫困的力量


NEW YORK – Growing up as a child during the Korean War, I knew poverty first hand.  I saw it around me every day; I lived it.	纽约——作为一名在朝鲜战争中成长起来的孩子，我对贫困感同身受。 每天我都要面对贫困；


One of my earliest memories is walking up a muddy track into the mountains to escape the fighting, my village burning behind me and wondering what would happen to my family and me.	我就生活在其中。 在我最早的记忆中，我曾沿着泥泞小道走入大山以躲避战火，身后是陷入熊熊大火的村庄，不知道我和我的家庭将面临什么样的命运。


The answer was the United Nations and other international agencies.	答案是联合国和其他国际机构。


With the help of many countries and friends, my country was able to get back on its feet and carry on after that terrible and devastating conflict.	在许多国家和朋友的帮助下，韩国得以在可怕的战乱后重新站稳脚跟并崛起。


Thanks to decades of hard work and sacrifice by millions of Koreans, the Republic of Korea rose from desperate poverty to prosperity in less than a half-century.	数百万韩国人几十年的辛劳和牺牲终于让大韩民国在不到半个世纪的时间里走出了极端贫困，走向了繁荣。


As Secretary-General of the UN, I am still living that story.	作为联合国秘书长，我仍然在继续着这个故事。


Every day, I work to help end the extreme poverty that traps nearly a billion of the world’s people.	每天，我的工作便是帮助终结困扰着全世界近10亿人口的极端贫困。


You may imagine, then, the powerful memories that I felt when I visited the Mwandama Millennium Village in the deeply impoverished southern African country of Malawi.	因此，你可以想象得到，当我第一次参观马万达马千禧村（Mwandama Millennium Village）时所得到的是怎样的震撼。


As in my youth, I saw once again the challenges and hardship of rural poverty.	马万达马位于深受贫困困扰的非洲南部国家马拉维，那里再一次勾起了我年轻时对农村贫困的挑战和艰难的回忆。


Yet I also saw, once again, the power of community spirit to overcome it – the same sense of solidarity and determination that launched Korea’s rural modernization five decades ago.	不过，我也再一次看到了战胜贫困的社区精神力量——那种让五十年前让韩国实现农村现代化的团结与坚定。


In 2000, the world’s leaders committed to achieve major reductions in poverty, hunger, and disease by 2015.	2000年，全世界领导人承诺要在2015年实现大量消除贫困、饥饿和疾病的目标。


These targets, endorsed by all UN member countries, comprise the eight Millennium Development Goals.	这些目标将由联合国全体成员国共同支持，由8个迁徙发展计划目标（Millennium Development Goals）组成。


The Millennium Village Project, a partnership of academia, business, and UN agencies, aims to show how these goals can be achieved in even the poorest communities in the world.	由学术界、商界和联合国机构合作开展的千禧村计划致力于向人们展示如何在世界最贫困社区达到这些目标。


Like South Korea’s own experience in fighting poverty, Millennium Villages in Africa, and similar projects elsewhere, are now surging ahead in food production, children’s health, and in forging a sustainable pathway out of poverty itself.	与韩国的扶贫经验相似，非洲千禧村及其他类似计划正在大幅提升粮食产量、改善儿童健康状况，并打造一条可持续的脱贫之路。


At the same time, I was impressed with one crucial difference between Korea’s efforts in the 1960’s and what is possible today.	与此同时，给我留下深刻印象的是，当今社会与20世纪60年代的韩国经验有一绝大不同点。


Touring the Mwandama Village, I saw the potential of modern technologies – smart phones and mobile broadband, improved seed varieties, the latest in drip irrigation, modern diagnostic tests for malaria, and low-cost solar-energy grids – to advance human well-being in ways that simply were not feasible even a few years ago.	参观马万达马村时，我看到了现代技术的力量——智能电话和移动宽带、高产种子、最新的滴灌技术、现代疟疾诊断手段，以及低成本的太阳能电网。 这些技术能够以几年前还无法想象的方式增进人类福利。


I saw a community health worker using a smart phone to manage malaria treatment within a household.	我看到一位社区卫生工作者使用智能电话管理疟疾治疗，实现了居家治病。


The worker used a low-cost diagnostic kit to confirm the malaria diagnosis, circumventing the need for a microscope and laboratory; a smart phone to key in the test results and receive advice from an “expert system” designed by public-health specialists; and state-of-the-art combination drug therapy to cure the illness.	这位工作者使用一种低成本诊断试剂来确诊疟疾，从而不再需要显微镜和实验室； 通过智能电话，他可以键入测试结果并收到来自由卫生专家设计的“专家系统”的建议；


The child was cured within the home; a few years ago, that same child would have faced a high risk of death unless he was somehow brought to a distant clinic in time.	儿童可以在家里得到诊治； 换成几年前，同样的儿童会因此面临极高的生命危险，除非他可以被及时送往遥远的诊所。


I saw other breakthrough changes in daily life.	我还看到了另一项日常生活的突破性变化。


In a community that once could not feed itself, a giant warehouse was almost bursting with tons of surplus grain.	在一个曾经无法养活自己的社区，突然之间有了一个装满了成吨盈余谷物的大谷仓。


By using high-yield seeds, better soil management, and proper row planting, the community has more than tripled its crop production, and villagers who previously were hungry grain buyers are now food-secure grain sellers.	通过使用高产种子、更好的土地管理以及合理的耕种计划，该社区将粮食产量提高了三倍有余，从前身为饥饿谷物买家的村民翻身成了有了食品保障的谷物卖家。


That surplus, in turn, has contributed directly to improved education, as families donate a portion of their surplus to the school’s mid-day meal program.	产量盈余反过来直接有助于改善教育，因为家庭会将部分盈余用于孩子的校园午餐计划。


Now the students get a nutritious bowl of porridge and fruits, giving them the energy to pursue their studies throughout the school day.	如今，学生们可以获得营养粥和水果，这给了他们完成全天学业所需的能量。


As so many schools have discovered, mid-day meals lead to an end-of--year jump in performance on national exams.	很多学校也发现，营养午餐能大大提高学生在年终国家考试中的表现。


This month, the Millennium Villages Project launches its second five-year stage on the way to the MDGs target date of 2015.	本月，千禧村计划公布了其第二个5年计划，该计划将延续到2015年千禧发展目标截止期。


Around Africa, and now around the world, governments are scaling up the lessons from this particular project and others like it: empower communities, help them to invest in their futures using cutting-edge technologies, and thereby end extreme poverty.	环顾非洲以及世界，如今各国政府正在复制千禧村及类似计划：提升社区实力，帮助它们使用尖端技术为未来投资，从而终结极端贫困。


The MDGs might once have seemed to be merely a set of hopes and aspirations.	千禧发展目标曾经被视为仅仅是一组希望和愿景。


Now we know that they are actually a practical roadmap out of poverty.	如今我们知道，这实际上是一条走出贫困的实践地图。


The world leaders who met at the UN in September for the annual General Debate all agreed on a central point: the importance of fighting poverty, hunger, and disease is crucial for our collective survival.	9月，世界领导人齐聚联合国参与了年度讨论，他们一致通过了以一个中心点：战胜贫困、饥饿和疾病的重要性事关人类整体生存大事。


They know that extreme poverty threatens the lives of hundreds of millions of people who lack reliable access to adequate nutrition, potable water, health care, and education.	他们知道，极端贫困威胁着几亿缺乏获得足够营养、饮用水、医疗和教育的人口的生命。


They also know that the dangers don’t stop at the edge of the village or slum; today’s hunger hotspots all too frequently become tomorrow’s violent hotspots.	他们也知道，这一危险不会止于村庄和贫民窟； 今日之贫困区很容易变为明日之暴力区。


Regardless of whether we are rich, poor, or in between, we share an overwhelming interest in the MDGs’ success, so that every region trapped in extreme poverty can break free, grow, and prosper.	不管我们是穷、是富还是不穷不富，我们在千禧发展目标中都有着共同的最高利益，因此，每个极端贫困地区都能够冲破障碍，实现增长和繁荣。


Austere Illusions	紧缩幻象


LONDON – The doctrine of imposing present pain for future benefit has a long history – stretching all the way back to Adam Smith and his praise of “parsimony.”	发自伦敦——用当前的节俭换取将来的幸福这种主张由来已久——可以追溯到亚当·史密斯（Adam Smith）对“吝啬”大加赞赏的时期。


It is particularly vociferous in “hard times.”	这种主张在“艰难时世”时尤其叫嚣得厉害。


In 1930, US President Herbert Hoover was advised by his treasury secretary, Andrew Mellon: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.	1930年，美国总统赫伯特·胡佛（Herbert Hoover）的财政部长安德鲁·梅隆（Andrew Mellon）劝他“清算劳工，清算股票，清算农场主，清算房地产。


It will purge the rottenness out of the system...People will...live a more moral life...and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people.”	这样能肃清系统中的腐败……人们可以过上更道德的生活……那些更有雄心的人会从那些能力不足的人们手上接过残局。 ”


To “liquidationists” of Mellon’s ilk, the pre-2008 economy was full of cancerous growths – in banking, in housing, in equities – which need to be cut out before health can be restored.	对梅隆门下的“清算主义者”来说，2008年之前的经济充斥着危险的增长——无论是银行业、房地产还是股票——要使经济恢复稳健增长就得将其切除。


Their position is clear: the state is a parasite, sucking the lifeblood of free enterprise.	他们的立场很清晰：国家是条寄生虫，吸食着自由企业的血肉；


Economies gravitate naturally to a full-employment equilibrium, and, after a shock, do so fairly quickly if not impeded by misguided government action.	经济会自然走向充分就业的均衡，如果没有政府误导性举措的妨碍，危机爆发之后就会以相当快的速度实现这一均衡。


This is why they are fierce opponents of Keynesian interventionism.	因此他们激烈反对凯恩斯干预主义。


Keynes’s heresy was to deny that there are any such natural forces, at least in the short term.	凯恩斯的离经判道之处在于他否认经济有这种自然恢复的能力——至少短期不会。


This was the point of his famous remark, “In the long run we are all dead.”	这在他的名言“长期而言我们都会死亡。 ”中体现了出来。


Economies, Keynes believed, can become stuck in prolonged periods of “under-employment equilibrium”; in such cases, an external stimulus of some kind is needed to jolt them back to higher employment.	凯恩斯认为经济可能会陷入长期性的“不充分就业均衡”； 在这种情况下，就需要某种外部刺激来使其恢复到更高的就业水平上。


Simply put, Keynes believed that we cannot all cut our way to growth at the same time.	简单地说，凯恩斯相信我们不能既同时削减开支又让经济增长。


To believe otherwise is to commit the “fallacy of composition.”	如果相信这一点的话就相当于陷入了“合成谬误”。


What is true of the parts is not true of the whole.	适用于局部并不等于整体正确。


If all of Europe is cutting, the United Kingdom cannot grow; if the entire world is cutting, global growth will stop.	如果整个欧洲都在缩减开支，那么英国经济不可能增长； 如果全世界都在削减开支，全球经济增长就会停止。


In these circumstances, austerity is exactly the opposite of what is needed.	在这些情况下，财政紧缩所起的作用刚好相反。


A government cannot liquidate its deficit if the source of its revenues, the national income, is diminishing.	如果一国政府的收入来源——国民收入——在减少，那么该政府就不可能降低其财政赤字。


It is deficit reduction, not debt, that is profligate, because it implies wastage of available human and physical capital, quite apart from the resulting misery.	真正作恶的是赤字削减而不是债务，因为削减意味着浪费可用的人力和物质资本，更别提其导致的痛苦后果了。


Austerity’s advocates rely on one – and only one – argument: If fiscal contraction is part of a credible “consolidation” program aimed at permanently reducing the share of government in GDP, business expectations will be so encouraged by the prospect of lower taxes and higher profits that the resulting economic expansion will more than offset the contraction in demand caused by cuts in public spending.	财政紧缩倡导者只是基于一个（且唯一一个）论点：如果财政紧缩属于可靠的旨在永久减少政府所占GDP份额的“巩固”计划中的一部分，那企业预期将会受到低税收和高利润前景的激励，由此产生��经济扩张也能抵消由削减公共支出所引起的需求紧缩。


The economist Paul Krugman calls this the “confidence fairy.”	对此经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）称之为“信心的童话”。


The pro-austerity argument is pure assertion, but it is meant to be a testable assertion, so econometricians have been busy trying to prove that the less the government spends, the faster the economy will grow.	赞同紧缩的论点纯粹只是一个主张，但它应该是一个可测量的主张，所以计量经济学家一直忙于证明政府支出越少，经济增长越快。


Indeed, just a year or two ago, “expansionary fiscal contraction” was all the rage, and a massive research effort went into proving its existence.	确实，仅一两年前，“扩张性财政紧缩”论调曾风靡一时，大量的研究被用来证明这一论点。


Economists arrived at some striking correlations.	经济学家们在其中找到了一些惊人的关联性。


For example, “an increase in government size by ten percentage points is associated with a 0.5-1% lower annual growth rate.”	例如，“政府规模每增长10%，那么经济年增长率就会降低0. 5-1%。


In April 2010, the leader of this school, Harvard University’s Alberto Alesina, assured European finance ministers that “even sharp reductions of budget deficits have been accompanied and immediately followed by sustained growth rather than recessions even in the very short run.”	”2010年四月，这个学派的领袖，哈佛大学的阿尔贝托·阿尔塞纳（Alberto Alesina），就向欧洲的财政部长们保证“长期而言，即使是大幅度的预算赤字削减后也马上会有持续的经济增长而不是衰退。 ”


But two fallacies vitiated the “proofs” offered by Alesina and others.	但有两个错误使得阿尔塞纳和其他经济学家提供的“证据”无效。


First, because the cuts had to be “credible” – that is, large and decisive – the continuing absence of growth could be blamed on the insufficiency of the cuts.	首先，由于削减必须是“可靠的”——也就是大规模且决定性的——那么如果经济增长持续放缓人们就会认为是削减不足。


Thus, Europe’s failure to recover “immediately” has been due to a lack of austerity, even though public-sector retrenchment has been unprecedented.	因此，欧洲经济不能“立刻”恢复可以归咎为缺乏紧缩——即使公共财政紧缩已经到达了史无前例的程度。


Second, the researchers committed the arch-statistical mistake of confusing correlation with causation.	其次，研究人员犯下了统计学错误——那就是错把相关性当作因果关系。


If you find a correlation between deficit reduction and growth, the reduction could be causing the growth or vice versa.	如果你发现赤字削减和经济增长之间有关联，削减可能会引起经济增长或衰退。


(Or both the deficit reduction and the growth could be due to something else – devaluation or higher exports, for example.)	（也有可能赤字削减和经济增长都是由别的因素导致的——比如货币贬值或更高的出口）。


An International Monetary Fund paper in 2012 brought Alesina’s hour of glory to an end.	结果国际货币基金组织2012年发表的一份报告使阿尔塞纳颜面扫地。


Going through the same material as Alesina had, its authors pointed out that “while it is plausible to conjecture that confidence effects have been at play in our sample of consolidations, during downturns they do not seem to have ever been strong enough to make the consolidations expansionary.”	仔细研究过阿尔塞纳拥有的同一批材料后，该报告作者指出“尽管我们有理由推测信心在财政巩固政策样本中起到了作用，在低迷时期却似乎没有强大到足以使巩固政策实现扩张”。


Fiscal contraction is contractionary, period.	在特定时期，财政紧缩是会导致经济收缩的。


An even more spectacular example of a statistical error and sleight of hand is the widely cited claim of Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff that countries’ growth slows sharply if their debt/GDP ratio exceeds 90%.	而统计方法错误和捏造事实的更惊人例子是哈佛经济学家卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）最为广泛引用的断言——如果一国债务对GDP比率超过90%，其经济增长会大幅度放缓。


This finding reflected the massive overweighting of one country in their sample, and there was the same confusion between correlation and causation seen in Alesina’s work: high debt levels may cause a lack of growth, or a lack of growth may cause high debt levels.	这个结论反映了他们加重了一国在其所有调查国家的比重，同时还有混淆相关性和因果性的错误（在阿尔塞纳的论文中也是如此）：高债务水平也许会导致经济增长停滞，或经济增长停滞会导致高的债务水平。


On this foundation of zombie economics and slipshod research rests the case for austerity.	紧缩的情况就建立在这种呆板的经济学基础和草率的研究之上。


In fact, the austerity boosters in the UK and Europe frequently cited the Alesina and Reinhart/Rogoff findings.	事实上，英国和欧洲的紧缩支持者就经常引用阿尔塞纳和莱因哈特/罗格夫的研究结果。


The results of austerity have been what any Keynesian would have expected: hardly any growth in the UK and the eurozone in the last two and a half years, and huge declines in some countries; little reduction in public deficits, despite large spending cuts; and higher national debts.	紧缩的结果就是凯恩斯所断言的那样：过去两年半英国和欧元区国家几乎没有任何经济增长，在某些国家经济衰退得很快； 尽管有大额的开支削减，公共赤字并没有下降多少；


Two other consequences of austerity are less appreciated.	另外人们还没有意识到的两个紧缩后果。


First, prolonged unemployment destroys not just current but also potential output by eroding the “human capital” of the unemployed.	第一个是长期的不充分就业不仅伤害了目前也伤害了潜在的产出——通过腐蚀失业人员的“人力资本”。


Second, austerity policies have hit those at the bottom of the income distribution far more severely than those at the top, simply because those at the top rely much less on government services.	第二，紧缩政策对低收入人群的影响要远远大于对高收入人群的影响，这是因为高收入人群对政府公共服务的需求相对小得多。


So we will remain in a state of “under-employment equilibrium” until policy in the UK and the eurozone is changed (and assuming that policy in the US does not become worse).	因此我们将会一直自在“未充分就业均衡”之下，除非英国和欧元区国家的政策发生改变（前提是美国的政策不会变得更糟糕）。


In the face of clamor from the right to cut even more savagely, statesmen who are too timid to increase public spending would be wise to ignore their advice.	面对右翼分子要求更疯狂削减开支的叫嚣，那些谨慎胆小不敢增加公共支出的政治家至少会理智地忽略这些意见。


After Ahmadinejad	后内贾德时代


WASHINGTON, DC – Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s preferred successor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, will not be running in the June 14 election.	华盛顿——伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德的首选继任者埃斯凡·拉希姆·马沙伊将不会参与6月14日的选举。


Neither will former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.	前总统拉夫桑贾尼也不会参与。


The disqualification of both sends a strong message from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei.	同时取消两者的竞选资格是最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·侯赛尼·哈梅内伊发出的一个强烈讯息。


Simply put, Khamenei will not tolerate any diminution of his power, and he is determined to avoid the type of friction that has characterized his relationships with previous presidents, particularly Ahmadinejad.	简言之，哈梅内伊不会容忍自身权力的削弱，并且决意避免与前任总统、特别是艾哈迈迪内贾德之间的矛盾再次产生。


The disqualification of Mashai and Rafsanjani reveals, once again, the schism embedded at the heart of Iran’s political structure by the dual executive of Supreme Leader and President.	马沙伊和拉夫桑贾尼被取消资格再次揭示了伊朗最高行政领袖兼任总统的政治结构。


When Khamenei publicly supported Ahmadinejad’s controversial reelection in 2009, no one could have predicted the unprecedented tensions that would subsequently emerge between the country’s two main authorities.	在哈梅内伊公开支持内贾德2009年充满争议的竞选连任时，没有人能够预料这两大权威将随后陷入史无前例的紧张关系。


But supporting Ahmadinejad turned out to be a costly decision for Khamenei – and for the Islamic Republic.	但事实证明支持内贾德让哈梅内伊和伊朗伊斯兰共和国付出了沉重的代价。


Instead of aligning himself with Khamenei, as expected, Ahmadinejad began to promote a nationalist, anti-clerical agenda, effectively using Khamenei’s resources to challenge the supreme leader’s authority and to establish his own economic network and sphere of influence.	内贾德不仅没有像预想的那样和哈梅内伊联手，反而开始推动民族主义的反教计划，有效地利用哈梅内伊的资源挑战这位最高领袖的权威，同时建立自己的势力范围和经济网络。


Over the last four years, Ahmadinejad has repeatedly tried to undermine the ruling clerics’ control over political and policy decisions.	过去四年来，内贾德曾多次试图破坏执政神职人员对政治决策的控制。


In 2011, he attempted to dismiss Heider Moslehi, an ally of Khamenei, from his position as intelligence chief, but was quickly overruled.	2011年，他曾试图罢免哈梅内伊的盟友情报部长海达尔·穆斯利赫，但是很快就遭到了否决。


He has also reduced the resources channeled to certain religious institutions, helped those in his circle to establish private banks by easing regulations, and challenged Iran’s most powerful economic and military institution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).	他还削减为某些宗教机构输送的资源，通过放松管制协助其党羽成立私人银行，并且试图对伊朗势力最大的经济和军事机构伊斯兰革命卫队的地位提出质疑。


But, as the rift between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad has grown, support for the president has declined significantly, with even state-run media referring to Ahmadinejad’s loyalists as a “deviation circle.”	但是对总统的支持随哈梅内伊和内贾德之间裂痕的扩大而大幅下降，就连国有媒体也用“叛徒帮”来形容忠实于内贾德的份子。


Moreover, unlike during Ahmadinejad’s first term, non-state media now publicly criticize his economic and political agenda.	另外，与内贾德首个任期不同，非国有媒体开始公开批评他的经济和政治计划。


With the end of Ahmadinejad’s second and final term fast approaching, it seems unlikely that the disgraced, unpopular president will abandon his efforts to destabilize Iran’s ruling establishment.	随着内贾德第二也是最后一任任期临近结束，这位灰头土脸、不受欢迎的总统看似不会放弃他动摇伊朗执政制度的努力。


In fact, he had long promoted Mashai as his successor, but Khamenei curtailed his illegal efforts – and has now put a stop to Mashai’s candidacy altogether.	事实上，他早就开始宣扬让马沙伊继任，但哈梅内伊破坏了他的非法努力，现在干脆取消了马沙伊的候选资格。


Mashai is among Iran’s most controversial figures, widely reviled among conservative leaders for his reformist, anti-clerical views.	马沙伊是伊朗最具争议的人物，因其散布反教改革言论而广受诟病。


In 2009, after Khamenei rejected Ahmadinejad’s decision to appoint Mashai as his first deputy, Ahmadinejad brazenly appointed him Chief of Staff, a move that infuriated Khamenei.	2009年哈梅内伊否决内贾德任命马沙伊为第一副总统的决定后，内贾德公然任命其为参谋长的举动彻底激怒了哈梅内伊。


Ahmadinejad is not the first high-ranking official in Iran to challenge the supreme leader.	内贾德并不是挑战最高领袖权威的首位高官。


Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of Iran’s most senior clerics, would have been Supreme Leader himself had he not fallen out with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder, a few months before Khomeini’s death.	大阿亚图拉侯赛因·阿里·蒙塔泽里曾是伊朗最高级的神职人员，假使他没有在霍梅尼死前数月和最高领袖兼伊斯兰共和国创始人大阿亚图拉霍梅尼闹翻他自己就会继任成为伊朗的最高领袖。


One of the most influential figures in Iran during the Republic’s first decade, Montazeri provided an extensive justification for the supreme leader’s absolute authority, which many ayatollahs considered heretical.	蒙塔泽里是伊朗共和国首个十年间最具影响力的人物，曾经是被众多阿亚图拉视为异端的最高领袖绝对权威的坚定捍卫者。


But he soon began to challenge the Islamic Republic’s hardline leadership – and continued to do so until he died in 2009.	但他很快开始对伊斯兰共和国的强硬领袖提出挑战，并一直坚持到他于2009年去世。


Montazeri, whose status as Grand Ayatollah (the most senior of Shia Muslim theologians) gave him more religious authority than Khamenei, challenged Khamenei’s qualifications to issue fatwas (Islamic religious rulings) or to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader.	身为大阿亚图拉（最高级别的什叶派穆斯林神学家）的蒙塔泽��掌握的宗教权威在哈梅内伊之上，并对哈梅内伊颁布宗教裁决及继任霍梅尼担任最高领袖的资格提出质疑。 蒙塔泽里遭到长达六年的软禁；


Montazeri was placed under house arrest for six years; demonstrations of support for him were suppressed; and many of his disciples and close friends were imprisoned, tortured, killed, or forced to flee the country.	支持他的示威活动遭到镇压； 他的众多弟子和亲密友人被监禁、折磨、杀害，或者被迫逃离。


Likewise, Abulhassan Banisadr, the Islamic Republic’s first president, fell out with Khomeini over the division of authority.	同样，伊朗伊斯兰共和国首任总统巴尼萨德尔因权力分配问题与霍梅尼闹翻。


He was impeached in 1981, after only a year in power, and fled to France, where he continues to reside.	他于上任短短一年后的1981年遭到弹劾，之后逃往法国并一直居住在那里。


Violent street clashes between Banisadr’s supporters and opponents resulted in deaths on both sides.	巴尼萨德尔支持者和反对者的街头暴力冲突导致双方人员伤亡。


In many ways, Ahmadinejad’s story resembles that of Banisadr.	内贾德的故事在很多方面都与巴尼萨德尔非常相似。 这两人在出任总统前都籍籍无名；


Both were relatively unknown before their presidencies; both depended on the supreme leader’s backing to gain power; and both gradually lost support as they attempted to reduce the influence of the clerical hierarchy and the IRGC.	同样仰仗最高领袖的支持来获得权力； 并在试图削弱神职人员和伊朗革命卫队的势力后逐渐丧失了支持。


Most important, both failed to create an external organization on which they could rely if their official protection failed.	最重要的是，他们都未能在官方保护失效的情况下建立起可以依赖的外部组织。


The fact that Ahmadinejad has been allowed to serve out his entire second term – an outcome that the media often doubted – reflects the importance to Khamenei of maintaining an image of a stable Iran.	事实上，内贾德获准完成他的第二任期（媒体常常质疑这一结果）显示出哈梅内伊对保持伊朗的稳定形象有多么重视。


But achieving that goal will require Khamenei to account for Ahmadinejad’s unpredictability.	但哈梅内伊必须充分考虑内贾德反覆无常所带来的后果才能达到这一目的。


With nothing to lose, Ahmadinejad could decide to destabilize the Islamic Republic if he considers it necessary for his survival.	为抓住最后的救命稻草，一无所有的内贾德可能决定颠覆伊斯兰共和国。


Indeed, now that the Guardian Council has disqualified Mashai from the presidential race, Ahmadinejad’s resentment will probably manifest itself in behavior before and after the election, such as releasing information on high-level corruption.	事实上，因为宪法监督委员会已取消马沙伊的候选资格，内贾德可能通过选举前后的种种行为表达自己的不满情绪，比方说释放高层的腐败信息。


He might also oppose Khamenei directly, portraying himself as a patriotic anti-clerical figure.	他也可能以爱国反教人士的身份直接与哈梅内伊分庭抗礼。


But such an approach would be dangerous; indeed, it could cost Ahmadinejad his life.	但这样的做法非常危险； 甚至可能让内贾德死无葬身之地。


After the election, the kind of factional disputes that have long paralyzed policymaking in Iran will likely persist.	选举后，导致伊朗决策长期瘫痪的派系纷争可能会继续下去。


But stalemate over Iran’s nuclear policy could have serious consequences.	但伊朗核政策僵局可能产生严重后果。


Indeed, the lack of a strong, unified government capable of shaping a consensus could make it impossible even for Khamenei to change course, leaving Iran no choice but to persist in its diplomatic standoff with the West.	事实上，缺少能达成共识的强大统一的政府可能导致连哈梅内伊都无法改变方向，并因此导致伊朗别无选择只能延续与西方的外交僵局。


The Press versus Privacy	新闻对隐私


LONDON – Privacy has become a big issue in contemporary jurisprudence.	伦敦－隐私在当代法学中成为一个非常重大的问题。


The “right to privacy” is enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.	“隐私权”被庄严写入《联合国人权宣言》，并在《欧洲人权公约》第八条中加以保护。


But Article 8 is balanced by Article 10, which guarantees “free expression of opinion.”	但是，《欧洲人权公约》第八条为该公约第十条规定的“表达观点的自由”所制衡。


So what right has priority when they conflict?	因此，当这两者有冲突的时候，哪一个权利优先呢？


Under what circumstances, for example, is it right to curtail press freedom in order to protect the right to privacy, or vice versa?	例如，在什么情况下，为了保护隐私权而减少新闻自由是正确的呢？ 或者在什么情况下，为了保护新闻自由而减少对隐私的保护是正确的呢？


The same balance is being sought between the right of citizens to data privacy and government demands for access to personal information to fight crime, terrorism, and so on.	人们正在公民的数据保密和政府需要取得个人信息以打击犯罪、恐怖主义等等之间寻求同样的平衡。


Freedom of speech is a fundamental democratic liberty.	言论自由是一个基本的民主自由。


It is a necessary protection against abuses of power and cover-ups of wrongdoing by public officials.	它是对抗公共官员滥用权力和掩盖不道德行为的必要保护措施。


It was never more effectively displayed than in the Watergate investigation, which brought down Richard Nixon in 1974.	这一点不可能比水门调查中得到更有效的反映，该调查在1974年将查理·尼克松拉下台。


So it is no surprise that press freedom is the freedom that authoritarian governments are keenest to curtail.	所以毫不奇怪，新闻自由是独裁政府最渴望遏制的自由。


Indeed, provided they can sufficiently muzzle the media they can even allow (relatively) free elections, as in Putin’s Russia.	事实上，倘若独裁政府能够有效地箝制媒体的言论，他们甚至可以允许（相对）自由的选举，就像普京时代的俄罗斯那样。


With the press heavily shackled in large parts of the world, freedom of speech is still a worthy slogan.	在世界上绝大部分地区的新闻媒体被严重压制的情况下，言论自由仍然是一个有价值的口号。


But one can have too much press freedom.	但是，有时候媒体的新闻自由过度了。


Over the years, the tabloid press has become increasingly intrusive, claiming the right not just to expose corruption and incompetence in high places, but to titillate readers with scandalous revelations about the private lives of the famous.	在过去的几年里，小报变得越来越刺探隐私，声称新闻自由不仅仅是要暴露高层的腐败和无能，而且要通过对名人不光彩私生活的曝光来撩拨读者。


What started off as entertaining gossip about royalty and film stars has burgeoned into a massive assault on privacy, with newspapers claiming that any attempt to keep them out of the bedroom is an assault on free speech.	以皇室和电影明星开始的娱乐八卦已经成长为对隐私的大规模的侵犯，报纸声称任何试图将他们置于卧室之外的行为都是对言论自由的侵害。


The issue has just been tested in Britain’s High Court.	这个问题已经在英国高等法院进行过较量。


In March, Britain’s leading scandal sheet, The News of the World published an “exclusive” front page story, under the headline “F1 BOSS HAS SICK NAZI ORGY WITH 5 HOOKERS.”	在三月份，英国的主要黄色报刊《世界新闻》以“F1老板和5个妓女进行恶心的纳粹狂欢”为标题，发表了一个“独家”头版报道。