The lengthy communiqué issued at the end of the Hamburg summit includes a statement on AMR that is bolder than I would have expected.	汉堡峰会结束后发布的长长的公报中包括了一份关于AMR的声明，比我所预想还要果断。


Not only have G20 leaders reaffirmed their previous support for efforts by the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, and the Organization for Animal Health to tackle AMR. They have also taken important steps in three crucial areas: agricultural usage, diagnostics, and the market for new useful drugs.	G20领导人不但重申了他们此前对世贸组织、联合国粮农组织以及动物健康组织的遏制AMR行动的支持，还在三个领域迈出了重要的步骤——农业用途、诊断以及新用途药物市场。


There are clear opportunities for breakthrough commitments in each of these three areas.	在所有这三个领域，都显然存在着突破性承诺的机会。


In agriculture, G20 countries have promised to restrict the use of antibiotics outside of veterinary medicine.	在农业方面，G20国家已经承诺限制除兽医用药之外的抗生素使用。


That alone is a big step forward, given that, in big countries such as the United States, and possibly China and India, antibiotics are now used more for growth promotion in agriculture than for fighting infections in humans.	光是这一点就已经是一个进步，因为在美国（也许还有中国和印度）这样的大国，如今抗生素的使用更多是为了促进农业增长，而不是治疗人类传染病。


The European Union has prohibited this practice for a decade now, but its policy has not spread globally because vested interests in major food-producing countries have stood in the way.	欧盟十年前就已经禁止这样的行为，但其政策没有在全球范围得到推广，因为主要粮食生产国的利益集团挡在了路前。


Still, countries such as the US and Brazil could now have their own “Volvo moments”: policymakers simply need to tell food producers what will and will not be allowed.	但是，美国和巴西等国家现在可以有其自身的“沃尔沃时刻”：决策者只需要让粮食生产上知道可以做什么、不可以做什么。


And the private sector, too, needs to show leadership on this front.	而私人部门也需要在这方面表现出领导力。


Food producers and retailers should follow in the footsteps of the Devon-based bacon producer that recently committed to using only antibiotic-free pigs.	粮食生产商和零售商应该效仿最近承诺只是用不含抗生素的猪的德文郡火腿生产商。


Will Walmart, Asda, Tesco, and others now do the same?	沃尔玛、艾斯达（Asda）和乐购会跟进吗？


To win the war against AMR, we must stop doling out antibiotics like sweets.	要想赢得AMR战争，我们决不可再像吃糖那样使用抗生素。


To that end, we will need new technologies and other measures to change how antibiotics are prescribed and administered.	在这方面，我们需要新技术和其他措施改变抗生素的处方和管理方法。


For example, in the Review on AMR, which I chaired, we urged developed countries to require, by 2020, that certain diagnostic tests be conducted before antibiotics can be prescribed.	比如，在一度由我主持的AMR评估中，我们敦促发达国家在2020年前开始要求开抗生素处方之前先进行诊断测试。


By enacting such a policy, any developed country can now establish itself as a global leader.	通过引入这样的政策，任何发达国家都能够让自己成为全球领导者。


So, too, can companies that commit to providing the necessary diagnostic technology at an affordable price, or pharmaceutical companies that support such technologies as a complement to new gram-negative antibiotics, which will have to be set at a higher price to discourage overuse.	公司如果能够致力于提供平价的必要诊断技术，或者制药公司如果支持将这类技术作为新革兰氏阴性抗生素的补充（这种抗生素必须通过涨价来减少滥用），也可以成为全球领导者。


Which pharmaceutical company will be the Volvo or Tesla of its industry?	哪家制药公司将成为本行业的沃尔沃或特斯拉？


If one company takes the lead on developing new drugs to respond to antibiotic-resistant pathogens that the WHO has identified as urgent priorities, it will free others from their conventional strait jackets, and force them to stop thinking so narrowly about quarterly returns.	如果一家公司能够在研发应对被世卫组织列为紧迫重点项目的耐抗生素病原体的药物方面起到领导作用，就能让其他公司摆脱束缚，迫使他们不再狭隘地只关注季度盈利。


In the Review on AMR, we recommended 27 interventions that could solve the AMR crisis for a generation.	在AMR评估中，我们建议采取27项干预，为一代人解决AMR危机。


So far this decade, however, three US-based pharmaceutical manufacturers have already spent more money buying back their own shares than would be needed to see those interventions through.	但是，这个十年到此为止，已经有三家美国制药公司，在回购股票上花的钱，超过了这些干预所需要的钱。


Pharmaceutical companies have essentially become balance-sheet managers first, and drug makers second.	制药公司本质上已经变成首先是资产负债表管理者，其次才是药品发明者。


Someone needs to flip that model on its head.	需要有人来彻底颠覆这一模式。


The Review also proposed market-entry rewards to encourage innovation. If the major pharmaceutical producers were to make meaningful investments in antibiotics research, they could vastly improve the current environment for developing new drugs.	AMR评估还提出用市场进入奖励来鼓励创新，如果大制药公司能够对抗生素研究进行有意义的投资，可以大大改善当前的新药研发环境。


The G20’s proposed “R&D Collaboration Hub” will, one hopes, help in this effort.	我们希望，G20所提出的“研发合作枢纽”能够起到帮助作用。


Only when the industry comes together will AMR go the way of the gasoline- and diesel-powered car.	只有当整个行业团结起来，才能让AMR也走上汽油和柴油燃料汽车的命运。


What’s Blocking Gender Equality?	什么在阻挡性别平等？


BERKELEY – One year ago, the United Nations adopted the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), one of which aims for true gender equality by 2030.	伯克利—一年前，联合国开始实施17个可持续发展目标（SDG），其中之一是到2030年实现真正的性别平等。


Empowering women and girls is morally right and economically smart.	赋权妇女和女孩在道德上正确，在经济上明智。


Several recent studies confirm that there are substantial economic- and human-development costs associated with pervasive and significant gender gaps in economic opportunities and outcomes.	一些最新研究确认，如果在经济机会和结果上存在普遍而严重的性别差距，其经济和人类发展代价是巨大的。


A recent report by the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel, which we authored, identifies actions that governments, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral development agencies can take now to close these gaps and accelerate progress toward achieving the SDGs’ overarching goal of inclusive economic growth.	一份由联合国秘书长高规格委员会组织、我们执笔的最新报告指出了政府、企业、非政府组织和多边发展机构可以采取什么措施弥合这些差距，加快实现SDG的首要目标——包容性经济增长。


The report shows that greater gender equality in a country is associated with better education and health, higher per capita income, faster and more inclusive economic growth, and greater international competitiveness.	报告发现，一国性别平等程度的提高伴随着更好的教育和卫生、更高的人均收入、更快更包容的经济增长，以及更强的国际竞争力。


A widely cited McKinsey Global Institute study finds that closing gender gaps in labor-force participation rates, part-time versus full-time work, and the composition of employment would add 12-25% to global GDP by 2025.	一份受到广泛引用的麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）研究发现，到2025年，弥合劳动力参与率、兼职与全职工作，以及工作报酬等方面的性别差距可以让全球GDP增加12—25%。


Other studies, using a variety of methodologies, find similar prospective gains, especially in low-fertility countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Germany, and in countries (for example, in the Persian Gulf) with low labor-force participation rates for women.	其他研究使用不同的方法也发现了类似预期收益，特别是在日本、韩国和德国等低生育率国家以及女性劳动力参与率较低的国家（如波斯湾国家）。


The business case for gender quality is also compelling, because women make substantial contributions to all parts of the value chain.	性别平等还能带来巨大的经济收益，因为妇女对价值链的每个部分都做出着卓越贡献。


The UN report identifies numerous benefits for companies that have pursued gender equality in employment, pay, and leadership, including the ability to attract, motivate, and retain talented workers, and to address complex problems with more diverse teams.	联合国报告发现，公司如果追求雇用、薪酬和领导力（包括吸引、动员和保留有才能的员工的能力）等方面的性别平等，并采用更加多元化的团队解决复杂问题，将得到巨大的好处。


And several new studies find that companies with more women in top leadership and board positions have higher financial returns.	不少新研究发现最高领导层和董事会中妇女数量较多的公司财务回报也越高。


More than 90% of girls worldwide now finish primary school, and more women than men are now graduating from college in most regions.	放眼全球，如今有超过90%的女孩可以完成小学教育，在大部分地区，大学毕业生的妇女数量也多于男性。


Yet, despite these gains, large gender gaps persist in all kinds of work – whether paid or unpaid, formal or informal, public or private, agricultural or entrepreneurial.	但是，尽管取得了这些进步，各行各业仍然存在巨大的性别差距——不管是带薪还是不带薪工作、正式还是非正式就业、公共还是私人岗位、农业还是企业部门。


Globally, only 50% of women aged 15 and above are in paid employment, compared with about 75% of men.	全球而言，只有50%十五岁及以上妇女从事带薪工作，而男性高达75%。


At the same time, women do about three times more unpaid work than men do.	与此同时，妇女从事不带薪工作的时间是男性的三倍。


When women are paid, their jobs tend to reflect gender stereotypes and provide relatively low earnings, poor working conditions, and limited opportunities for career advancement.	即使女性能得到薪酬，她们的岗位也往往带有性别刻板印象痕迹，工资相对较低，工作条件相对较差，职业发展机会相对有限。


Even when women perform the same or equal-value jobs as men, they are paid less, on average (although the size of the pay gap varies considerably around the world).	即使妇女从事与男性同样或价值等价的岗位，平均而言她们的薪酬也比男性更少（尽管薪酬差距大小在世界各地大相径庭）。


Women are under-represented in leadership positions in both business and government.	妇女在企业界和政府界领导层中都难觅踪影。


And, compared to businesses owned by men, enterprises owned by women are smaller, employ fewer people, and are more concentrated in sectors with limited opportunities for profit and growth.	此外，与男性拥有的企业相比，女性拥有的企业往往更小，雇员人数更少，更集中于盈利和增长机会有限的行业。


The UN report identifies four overarching and interconnected factors that impede gender equality in all forms of work, and at all levels of development: adverse social norms, discriminatory laws and insufficient legal protections, gender gaps in unpaid household and care work, and unequal access to digital, financial, and property assets.	联合国报告发现有四个相互作用的主要因素阻止了各行各业、各个发展水平上的性别平等：不利的社会规范、歧视性法律和法律保护不力、无薪家政和看护工作中的性别差距，以及获得数字、金融和产权资产机会的不平等。


Social norms determine economic outcomes for women in several ways: they shape women’s decisions about which occupational and educational opportunities to pursue; they affect the distribution of unpaid work within households and wages in paid care activities such as nursing and teaching, which employ a high proportion of women; and they reflect and reinforce discriminatory gender stereotypes and implicit biases that limit women’s pay and promotion prospects.	社会规范通过多种方式决定妇女的经济成就：它们影响妇女决定追求哪些就业和教育机会； 它们影响无薪家政工作在家庭中的分配以及护士和教师等带薪看护活动的工资；


In many countries, adverse social norms are also codified in laws that limit women’s professional choices and their ability to obtain passports, travel outside their homes, start businesses, and own or inherit property.	在许多国家，不利的社会规范还写入法律，限制妇女的职业选择和获得护照、外出旅行、开办企业、拥有或继承产权的能力。


A recent International Monetary Fund analysis finds that this kind of legal discrimination is associated with lower levels of educational attainment for women, wider gender-pay gaps, and fewer women-owned businesses.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的一项最新分析发现，这类法律歧视与妇女教育成就较低、薪酬性别差距扩大、女性拥有企业较少等现象息息相关。


Moreover, according to the World Bank, 103 countries do not legally mandate gender non-discrimination in hiring, and 101 do not require equal remuneration for work of equal value in formal-sector jobs.	此外，据世界银行，103个国家没有雇用性别歧视的法律义务，101个国家不要求正式部门做到同等价值的工作获得同等报酬水平。


Hundreds of millions of women work informally, without any protection, either in law or in practice, of their social and labor rights.	数亿妇女从事着非正式工作，得不到任何社会和劳动权利保护（不管是在法律上还是在实践中）。


In India, for example, some 120 million women (around 95% of women in paid labor) work informally, as do around 12 million women in Mexico (around 60% of employed women).	比如，在印度，大约1. 2亿妇女（占带薪妇女劳动力的95%）从事非正式工作，墨西哥也有1,200万妇女（大约占妇女就业量的60%）。


People working informally often have no voice to demand better workplace conditions or pay, and this is especially true for women, who also face sexual harassment, violence, and restrictions on their reproductive rights.	从事非正式工作的人常常没有力量要求更好的工作场所或报酬，妇女尤其如此，并且她们还要面对性骚扰、暴力和生育权限制。


Large gender gaps in unpaid work and care are a major driver of diminished economic opportunities for women.	无薪工作和看护中的巨大的性别差距是妇女经济机会受到抑制的主要原因。


The household work and care responsibilities of women are reflected in a sizeable “motherhood pay penalty.”	妇女的家政工作和看护责任体现在规模庞大的“母亲薪酬惩罚”（motherhood pay penalty）中。


Around the world, mothers with dependent children earn, on average, less than women without dependent children, and less than fathers with similar household and employment characteristics.	放眼全球，带着尚未独立的子女的母亲平均而言收入要少于没有未独立子女的妇女，也要少于具备类似家庭和就业特征的父亲。


In fact, there is some evidence of a “fatherhood pay premium” – a positive relationship between a man’s wages and how many children he has.	事实上，有证据表明存在“父亲薪酬溢价”（fatherhood pay premium）——男性工资与他有几个子女呈现出正相关关系。


Reducing and redistributing the time required for unpaid care responsibilities requires investments by both the private and public sectors – in infrastructure, affordable care services, early childhood education, family leave, and family-friendly workplaces.	减少和重新分配无薪看护责任所需要的时间需要私人和公共部门的投入——在基础设施、平价看护服务、早教、育儿假、家庭友好型工作场所等方面。


Such investments are beneficial not only for individuals and families, but also for businesses and the economy as a whole, because they increase women’s labor-force participation rates and productivity, create paid jobs in care services, and improve children’s school performance, boosting their future educational-attainment levels and productivity.	这些投资不但对个体和家庭有利，也对企业和整体经济有利，因为它们增加了妇女劳动力参与率和生产率，创造了看护服务的带薪职位，并改善了儿童的学校表现，提升了他们的未来教育成就和生产率。


Drawing on evidence from around the world, the UN report provides numerous examples of proven and possible measures to tackle the constraints on women’s economic opportunities.	联合国报告根据来自全世界的证据，为消除妇女经济机会约束提供了大量被证明的和可能的措施。


At this year’s annual World Bank and IMF meetings, world leaders sought policies to spur faster, more inclusive growth.	在今年的世界银行和IMF年会上，世界领导人试图找出刺激更快、更包容的增长的政策。


They would do well to move gender equality to the top of the list.	把推动性别平等作为重中之重将大有裨益。


Germany’s Hour	德国的时刻


LONDON – Who runs the European Union?	伦敦—谁主持欧盟？


On the eve of Germany’s general election, that is a very timely question.	在德国大选前夕，这是一个非常及时的问题。


One standard reply is, “The EU’s member states” – all 28 of them.	一个标准答案是“欧盟成员国”——所有28个成员国。


Another is, “The European Commission.”	另一个标准答案是“欧盟委员会”。


But Paul Lever, a former British ambassador to Germany, offers a more pointed answer: Berlin Rules is the title of his new book, in which he writes, “Modern Germany has shown that politics can achieve what used to require war.”	但英国前驻德国大使保罗·勒佛（Paul Lever）提出了一个更有见解的回答：他的新书以《柏林统治》（Berlin Rules）为标题，写道，“现代德国证明，政治家能够实现原来需要战争才能实现的东西。 ”


Germany is the EU’s most populous state and its economic powerhouse, accounting for over 20% of the bloc’s GDP.	德国是欧盟人口最多的国家，也是经济最强大的国家，其GDP占整个欧盟的20%多。


Determining why Germany has been so economically successful appears to be elusive.	理解德国为何在经济上如此成功很难。


But three unique features of its so-called Rhineland model stand out.	但其所谓的莱茵地区（Rhineland）模式拥有三个独特的突出特点。


First, Germany has preserved its manufacturing capacity much better than other advanced economies have.	首先，德国比其他发达经济体都更好地保护了制造业产能。


Manufacturing still accounts for 23% of the German economy, compared to 12% in the United States and 10% in the United Kingdom.	目前制造业仍占德国经济的23%，而美国只占12%，英国只占10%。


And manufacturing employs 19% of the German workforce, as opposed to 10% in the US and 9% in the UK.	制造业雇用了德国19%的劳动力，美国为10%，英国为9%。


Germany’s success in retaining its industrial base contradicts rich countries’ standard practice of outsourcing manufacturing to locations with lower labor costs.	德国成功保留了其工业基础，这与富裕国家的标准做法——将制造业外包给劳动力成本更低的地区形成了鲜明对比。


But Germany has never accepted the static theory of comparative advantage on which this practice is based.	但德国并没有全盘接受一成不变的比较优势理论作为其实践的基础。


True to the legacy of Friedrich List, the father of German economics, who wrote in 1841, “the power of producing wealth is therefore infinitely more important than wealth itself,” Germany has retained its manufacturing edge through a relentless commitment to process innovation, backed by a network of research institutes.	德国经济学之父弗雷德里希·李斯特（Friedrich List）在1841年写道，“因此，创造财富的力量要比财富本身不知道重要多少倍，”确实如此，德国通过不懈地创新，以研究所网络为基础，保持着制造业优势。


Its export-led growth has given it the benefit of increasing returns to scale.	其出口拉动型增长给它带来了规模报酬递增的好处。


The second feature of the German model is its “social market economy,” best reflected in its unique system of industrial “co-determination.”	德国模式的第二个特点是“社会市场经济”这一点最鲜明地体现在其独特的产业“共同决定”（co-determination）体系上。


Alone among the major advanced economies, Germany practices “stakeholder capitalism.”	德国是发达经济体中唯一践行“相关利益者资本主义”（stakeholder capitalism）的。


All companies are required by law to have works councils.	法律要求所有公司都要成立工作委员会（works council）。


Indeed, large companies are run by two boards: a management board and a supervisory board, divided equally between shareholders and employee representatives, which take strategic decisions.	事实上，大公司由两个委员会管理：管理委员会和监督委员会，股东和员工代表各占半边，共同决定战略决策。


The resistance to offshoring is therefore much stronger than elsewhere, as is a willingness to restrain wage costs.	因此，离岸化受到的阻力在德国比其他地方大得多，限制工资成本的意愿亦然。


Finally, there is Germany’s firm commitment to price stability.	最后，德国企业执着于稳定价格。


Germany needed no lessons from Milton Friedman on the evils of inflation.	德国不需要米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）提醒他们通货膨胀的危害。


They were already hard-wired into its most famous post-war institution, the Bundesbank.	通胀的教训早已深刻地烙印在了其最著名的战后机构——德意志联邦银行体内。


Lever suggests that it was as much the memory of the currency collapse of 1945-1948 as of the hyperinflation of the 1920s that drove home this lesson.	勒佛指出，对1945—1948年的货币崩盘和20世纪20年代的恶性通货膨胀一样，让德国没齿难忘。


Likewise, an aversion to public deficits mirrors the population’s resistance to private indebtedness.	同样地，对公共赤字的厌恶正是德国人民拒绝个人负债的镜像。


Institutionally, the EU has become Germany writ large.	从制度上讲，欧盟是一个放大版的德国。


The Commission, the European Parliament, European Council, and the European Court of Justice mirror the decentralized structure of Germany itself.	欧盟委员会、欧洲议会、欧洲理事会和欧洲法院是德国本身分散化结构的复刻。


The EU’s gospel of “subsidiarity” reflects the division of powers between Germany’s federal government and states (Länder).	欧盟“辅助原则”的福音体现了德国联邦政府和州之间的权力分割。


Germany ensures that Germans fill the leading positions in EU bodies.	德国保证德国人在欧盟机构中担任要职。


The EU rules through its institutions, but the German government rules those institutions.	欧盟通过其机构实现治理，但德国政府统治着这些机构。


Yet talk of “hegemony,” or even “leadership,” is taboo in Germany – a reticence that stems from Germans’ determination not to remind people of their country’s dark past.	但在德国，谈论“霸权”甚至“领导”都是禁忌——这源自德国人不愿让人们想起这个国家的黑暗历史。


But denying leadership while exercising it means that no discussion of Germany’s responsibilities is possible.	但否认领导地位又在实际上执行领导权意味着无从讨论德国的责任。


And this inflicts costs – especially economic costs – on other EU member states.	而这给其他欧盟成员国带来了代价——特别是经济代价。


Germany has created a system of rules that entrenches its competitive advantage.	德国创造了一套规则体系，巩固了其比较优势。


The single currency rules out devaluation within the eurozone.	单一货币排除了欧元区内部的贬值。


It also ensures that the euro is worth less than a purely German currency would be.	它还确保欧元要比单纯的德国货币更加便宜。


The EU’s recent Treaty on Fiscal Union – the successor to the Growth and Stability Pact – prescribes binding legal commitments to balanced budgets and modest national debt, backed by supervision and sanctions.	当前的欧盟财政联盟条约——即增长与稳定公约的后继条约——规定平衡预算和温和国民债务为约束性法定义务，并要接受监督和制裁。


This precludes deficit finance to boost growth.	这就排除了用赤字融资来提振增长。


And Germany’s insistence that non-wage costs be equivalent throughout the EU is less a device for enhancing Germany’s competitiveness than for reducing others’.	德国还坚持，欧盟内部非工资成本应该相同，这更多地起到了降低其他成员国的竞争力，而不是提高德国的竞争力。


The EU, especially the 19-member eurozone, thus functions as a vast home base for Germany, from which it can launch its assault on foreign markets.	欧盟，特别是有19个成员的欧元区，因此就成为德国巨大的基地（home base），供它发动对外国市场的进攻。


And that base is strong.	这个基地十分强大。


Germany exports to the EU 30% more than it imports from it, and runs one of the world’s largest current-account surpluses.	德国对欧盟出口要比从欧盟进口多30%，它也是全世界经常项目盈余最大的国家之一。


This is a benign rather than a brutal hegemony.	这一仁慈而不是残暴的霸权。


But at its heart lies a massive contradiction.	但其核心存在一个巨大的矛盾。 国民账户必须平衡。


National accounts must balance.	欧盟一部分的盈余意味着另一部分的赤字。


A surplus in one part of Europe means a deficit in another.	欧元区虽然成立了，但没有财政转移支付机制援助陷入麻烦的成员；


The eurozone was established without a fiscal transfer mechanism to succor members of the family who get into trouble; the European Central Bank is prohibited from acting as lender of last resort to the banking system; and the Commission’s proposal for Eurobonds – collectively guaranteed national bond issues – has foundered on Germany’s objection that it would bear most of the liability.	欧洲央行被禁止充当银行体系的最后贷款人； 欧盟委员会所提出的欧元债券方案——有集体担保的国家债券发行计划——因为德国抗议它会因此承担大部分义务而搁浅。


Germany has been willing to provide emergency finance to debt-strapped eurozone members like Greece on the condition that they “put their houses in order” – cut social spending, sell off state assets, and take other steps to make themselves more competitive.	德国一直愿意为希腊等陷入债务危机的欧元区成员国提供紧急融资，条件是它们要“打扫好房子”——即削减社会支出、出售国家资产、采取其他措施加强竞争力。


The Germans see no reason to take measures to reduce their own super-competitiveness.	德国人认为没有必要采取行动降低其自身的超强竞争力。


What can be done to achieve a more symmetric adjustment between Europe’s creditors and debtors?	如何实现欧洲债权国和债务国之间更加系统性的调整？


Barring a fiscal transfer mechanism, John Maynard Keynes’s 1941 plan for an International Clearing Union might be adapted for the eurozone.	在排除了财政转移支付机制的情况下，凯恩斯在1941年提出的计划——国际清算联盟也许适用于欧元区。


Member countries’ central banks would hold their residual euro balances in accounts with a European Clearing Bank.	成员国央行通过欧洲清算银行账户持有欧元差额。


Pressure would be simultaneously placed on creditor and debtor countries to balance their accounts, by charging rising interest rates on persistent imbalances.	债权国和债务国都有压力实现账户平衡，方法对持续的失衡提高利率。


An EU clearing union would be a less visible intrusion on German national interests than a fiscal transfer union would be.	相较于财政转移支付联盟，欧盟清算联盟对德国国家利益的影响没有那么显眼。


The essential point, though, is that for the eurozone to work, the strong must be prepared to show solidarity with the weak.	但基本点是，要想欧元区能够运转，坚挺国就必须时刻准备着表现出与疲软国团结一致。


Without some mechanism to realize that, the EU will limp from crisis to crisis – probably shedding members along the way.	如果不通过某个机制来实现这一点，欧元区就将从一场危机滑向另一场危机——在此期间，还存在流失成员国的危险。


A Test for Europe’s German Anchor	欧洲的德国之锚经受考验


BERLIN – The outcome of Germany’s federal election holds a crucial lesson for the European Union: even the country that has been the EU’s bedrock of stability amid crisis is not immune to political fragmentation and polarization.	柏林—德国联邦大选的结果给欧盟带来了一个重要教训：即使是欧盟稳定基石的德国，也无非对政治分裂和极化免疫。


Although Chancellor Angela Merkel will almost certainly gain a fourth term, her new government is likely to be considerably weaker than the three that preceded it.	尽管默克尔几乎肯定将得到第四个任期，她的新政府也可能比此前几届弱势得多。


The Bundestag now counts six factions, compared to four in the previous electoral term.	如今，德国联邦众议院分为六个阵营，而上一次选举只有四个阵营。


Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union took 33% of the vote, its worst result since 1949, though still enough to give the CDU the most seats in parliament.	默克尔的中右翼基督教民主联盟（CDU）获得33%的选票，是自1949年以来的最差表现，但仍足以使其成为议会第一大党。


The center-left Social Democrats (SPD) – Germany’s second-largest political party, and a part of Merkel’s last governing coalition – also hit a post-war low, receiving just 20.5% of the vote.	中左翼的社会民主党（SPD，德国第二大政党，也是默克尔上一个任期的执政联盟之一）的得票数也创出了战后新低，只赢得20. 5%的选票。


Meanwhile, the populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) won 12.6%, making this anti-euro, pro-Russia, and staunchly xenophobic party the first far-right party to enter the Bundestag in almost 60 years.	与此同时，民粹主义的德国另类选择党（AfD）赢得12. 6%的选票，使这个反欧元、亲俄和顽固仇外的党派成为近60年来第一个跻身德国联邦众议院的极右翼政党。


And the SPD has thrown in the towel, vowing to spend the coming electoral term in opposition.	SPD承认失败，宣布将在这个选举周期中成为反对党。


In this context, Germany is likely to be ruled by a so-called Jamaica coalition, named for the colors of the parties – the CDU, the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP) – that would comprise it.	在这样的背景下，德国有可能将由所谓的牙买加联盟（Jamaica coalition）来治理——这个名字来自组成它的三个政党CDU、绿党和自由民主党（FDP）。


But such a coalition will be unruly, owing to the parties’ heterogeneous foreign-policy positions.	但这个联盟很难驾驭，因为三党各自的外交政策立场各不相同。


Similarly, the SPD-led opposition will be beset by deep divisions.	类似地，SPD领导的反对派也将陷入深度分裂。


Indeed, it is unlikely to cooperate on any issue at all with its fellow opposition party, the AfD.	事实上，它在一切问题上都不太可能与同为反对党的AfD形成合作。


The SPD shares almost no values with the AfD, which has already declared that its main goal will be to hound the other parties with populist and nationalist bombast.	SPD的价值观和AfD格格不入。 AfD 已经宣布其主要目标将是用民粹主义和民族主义大论抨击其他政党。


As a result, decades-old parliamentary norms of decorum and collegiality are in jeopardy.	因此，德国议会几十年来庄严分权的规范岌岌可危。


Given the Bundestag’s central role in shaping Germany’s EU policy, this could weaken the capacity of Merkel’s government to provide the kind of leadership Europe now needs.	联邦众议院对德国的欧盟政策有着至关重要的影响，因此，目前的局面可能削弱默克尔政府提供欧洲目前所需要的领导力的能力。


To be sure, there is some good news.	平心而论，也有一些好消息。


The victory of Merkel’s CDU, however weak, implies elements of continuity on which to build.	不论优势多么微弱，默克尔的CDU终究取得了胜利，这表明它的基础具备一些连续性要素。


Merkel’s prompt decision to take responsibility for forming a viable coalition government means that her commitment to preserving the EU and her staunch defense of democracy and Western values will continue to guide German policymaking.	默克尔随即决定承担责任组建可行的联合政府，这意味着她维持欧盟的承诺和她对民主和西方价值观的坚决捍卫将继续成为德国的政策制定指南。


Moderation, stability, and international openness will remain Germany’s watchwords, no matter how much ugly rhetoric the AfD spews.	温和、稳定和国际开放将继续成为德国的口号，不论AfD吐出怎样的脏字。


But, in terms of action on international challenges, Germany’s partners will have to be patient.	但在国际挑战的行动方面，德国的伙伴国必须保持耐心。


In particular, though Merkel is expected to cooperate closely with France’s pro-European president, Emmanuel Macron, to forge a new model of EU integration for the post-Brexit age, she is unlikely to do so right away.	特别是，尽管默克尔预计将与法国的亲欧总统马克龙紧密合作构建英国退欧后的欧盟一体化新模式，但她不会立刻就这样做。


The formation of a coalition alone – in particular, a conservative-liberal-green coalition – will likely take months.	光是组建执政联盟——特别是一个保守派-自由派-绿党联盟——就有可能耗费几个月时间。


Next month’s state election in Lower Saxony, where the AfD secured significant support, adds another element of uncertainty to the mix.	下个月的下萨克森州选举则是另一个不确定性因素，AfD在该州支持率很高。


Even after that election, compromise may not come easily.	即使通过了下萨克森州选举的考验，妥协也未必容易达成。


The Bavaria-based Christian Social Union (CSU) – the CDU’s sister party – will face a state election next autumn.	以巴伐利亚州为大本营的基督教社会联盟（CSU，CDU的姊妹党）将在明年秋天面临州选举。


Feeling the hot breath of the AfD on its neck, the CSU has already sharpened its criticism of Merkel’s immigration policy, and is likely to try to push the chancellor further to the right in the coming year.	在AfD的围追堵截情况下，CSU已经对默克尔的移民政策提出了比较尖锐的批评，在未来几个月中，CSU可能会试图让总理更加偏右。


Perhaps the stickiest issue for the coalition parties will be the eurozone.	也许对执政联盟来说，最棘手的问题是欧元区。


The stances of the FDP and the Greens are opposed on this front, particularly when it comes to joint crisis management, mutual insurance mechanisms, and fiscal tools.	FDP和绿党对欧元区的立场截然相反，特别是在联合危机管理、共同保险机制和财政工具等问题上。


But this struggle to find common ground may prove useful for the wider EU, as its leaders attempt to strike a balance between the responsibility of member governments and the eurozone-wide institutions that the monetary union needs to function effectively.	但德国执政联盟难以找到共同点对整个欧盟来说也许是件好事，因为其领导人试图要在成员国政府的责任和货币联盟有效运转所需要的泛欧盟机构之间取得平衡。


It may turn out to be easier for Germany’s coalition parties – not to mention the French and German governments – to forge a new framework for bilateral and European security cooperation.	对德国执政联盟来说——更不用说法国和德国政府了——为双边和欧洲安全合作构建新框架也许更为容易。


Polls show that concerns about terrorism and internal security outweigh fears over immigration.	民调显示，对恐怖主义和内部安全的担忧要胜过对移民的担忧。


If those pressing issues are addressed at the European level, as Merkel suggested in her victory statement, support for Europe could end up winning back the discontented voters who cast their ballots for the AfD.	如果这些紧迫问题能够在欧盟层面得到解决——就像默克尔在她的胜选词中所说的那样——对欧盟的支持就有可能最终战胜将票投给的AfD的不满的选民。


Whatever government emerges in Germany in the weeks ahead, its leaders will need to devote more effort to explaining their policy choices to citizens and international partners alike.	不管几周后德国出现一个什么政府，其领导人都需要花更大的力气向公民和国际伙伴解释政策选择。


With the AfD in the Bundestag, the German public will be exposed to more radical positions on foreign affairs – from EU leadership to relations with Russia – than have been heard in over a generation.	在AfD进入联邦众议院的情况下，德国公众将在外交事务上看到更加激进的立场——从欧盟关系到俄罗斯关系都是如此——这是他们几十年来所不曾遇到的。


While Germany’s center has held, its consensus is about to be tested.	尽管德国中间派仍能够坚持，但其共识即将遭受考验。


The Populist Tail Wagging the German Dog	摇着民粹主义尾巴的德国狗


WARSAW – Initially, the big losers in Germany’s federal election in September were a Frenchman and a Luxembourger: French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker.	华沙—一开始，9月德国联邦选举的最大输家是一个法国人和一个卢森堡人：法国总统马克龙和欧盟委员会主席容克。


Each has his own plan for reforming the European Union, and both envision deeper integration, starting with the eurozone.	他们有各自的欧盟改革计划，都着眼于从欧盟开始加深一体化。


For his part, Juncker has called on all non-euro member states to adopt the single currency, and has even proposed a roadmap for them to do so.	容克呼吁所有非欧元成员国都接受单一货币，甚至还给出了路线图。


Macron, meanwhile, has called for a more deeply integrated eurozone with a common budget, which would be funded, in part, by an EU-wide financial transactions tax (currently only France and the United Kingdom levy an FTT).	与此同时，马克龙呼吁建立一个有共同预算的更加深入一体化的欧元区，共同预算部分可以用泛欧盟金融交易税筹集（目前只有法国和英国征收金融交易税）。


He has also called for the appointment of a eurozone finance minister, and for measures to harmonize corporate taxes and minimum wages across member states.	他还呼吁任命一位欧元区财政部长，并采取措施协调各成员国的公司税和最低工资。


Both Juncker and Macron’s plans would require German cooperation.	但容克和马克龙的计划需要德国的配合。


Germany, however, has little enthusiasm for EU-level economic reforms, because it benefits from the status quo.	而德国对于欧盟层面的改革没有什么热情，因为它是现状的受益者。


A common monetary policy in the absence of a common fiscal policy creates an imbalance that works decidedly in Germany’s favor.	在共同财政政策缺位的情况下，共同货币政策制造了一个非常有利于德国的失衡。


Because Germany, the eurozone’s largest economy, shares a currency with poorer member states, it enjoys an artificial boost to export competitiveness.	作为欧元区最大经济体，德国和较穷的成员国共用一种货币，享受着人为提高的出口竞争力。


Moreover, while Germany is the world’s second-largest exporter (after China), it does not buy much with its surpluses, which means that other EU countries, particularly in the poorer south, cannot earn.	此外，尽管德国是世界第二大出口国（仅次于中国），它并没有用这一盈余来购买什么，这意味着其他欧盟国家，特别是较穷的南方成员国，无法从中获益。


The result is a crisis-generating arrangement that has so far been impossible to correct, even with social transfers and other instruments to rebalance economic development across the eurozone.	结果是形成了一个容易导致危机的安排，并且始终无法得到纠正，即使采用了社会转移支付和其他欧元区经济发展再平衡措施也无济于事。


Germany has essentially dropped an anchor that is now preventing all of Europe from moving forward.	从本质上说，德国抛下了一个锚，拽住了整个欧洲前进的脚步。


And that would be the case even if German Chancellor Angela Merkel had managed to forge a coalition between her Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Bavaria-based Christian Social Union (CSU), the Free Democrats (FDP), and the Greens.	而即使德国总统默克尔成功地让她的基督教民主联盟（CDU）、巴伐利亚姊妹党基督教社会联盟（CSU）、自由民主党（FDP）和绿党结成联合政府，这一点也无法改变。


After all, the FDP is essentially the political arm of German business.	毕竟，FDP本质上是德国商界的政治工具。


Of course, things might be different if the Social Democrats (SPD) agree to rejoin the CDU and CSU in a grand coalition government.	当然，如果社会民主党（SPD）同意重新加入CDU和CSU结成执政大联盟，局面会有所不同。


But just how different remains unclear.	但如何不同还有待观察。


Having received its smallest share of the popular vote since World War II, the SPD is severely weakened, and may be unable to pursue anything but the least controversial items on its domestic agenda.	SPD的支持率降到了二战以来最低点，它已经严重削弱，可能无法追求其自身的哪怕是争议最少的国内日程。


Hans Kundnani of the German Marshall Fund surmises that by voting for the Euroskeptic FDP and the far-right Alternative für Deutchland (AfD), rather than the CDU and SPD, German voters have already expressed their views on Macron’s plan to reform the eurozone.	德国马歇尔基金会（German Marshall Fund）的汉斯·坤德纳尼（Hans Kundnani）总结道，德国选民将选票投给疑欧派的FDP和极右翼的德国另类选择党（AfD），而不是投给CDU和SPD，这已经表达了他们对于马克龙的欧盟改革计划的看法。


If he is right, the SPD would be committing political suicide if it supported EU-level reforms.	如果他的总结正确，那么SPD支持欧盟层面的改革无异于政治自杀。


Then again, all of the ongoing debates about EU reform could prove to be irrelevant, given that the power to decide the bloc’s fate may lie not in Western Europe, but in the East.	然而，所有这些关于欧盟改革的未竟的争论可能都毫无意义，因为决定欧盟命运的力量不在西欧，而在东欧。


While Merkel weighs Macron’s proposals, she is undoubtedly thinking of Germany’s primary economic partner: the Visegrád Group (V4), comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.	在默克尔权衡马克龙的方案的同时，她毫无疑问也要考虑德国的主要经济合作伙伴：高堡集团（Visegrád Group，V4），即捷克、匈牙利、波兰和斯洛伐克。


The numbers speak for themselves.	数字说明一切。


According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,the combined volume of trade between Germany and the V4 in 2016 was €256 billion ($303 billion), far outweighing China (€170 billion) and France (€167 billion).	据《法兰克福汇报》（Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung）2016年德国和V4的总贸易量为2,560亿欧元，远超中国（1,700亿欧元）和法国（1,670亿欧元）。


The Czech and Slovak economies are often regarded as extensions of the German economy; and Germany is an equally crucial partner for Hungary and Poland.	捷克和斯洛伐克经济常常被看成是德国经济的外延； 而德国同样也是匈牙利和波兰的关键贸易伙伴。


Moreover, Germany’s trade with the V4 is growing fast, with a year-on-year increase of 9% in 2016, while its trade with France, traditionally its largest trading partner, grew at a sluggish 0.6% that year.	此外，德国与V4的贸易增长迅猛，2016年同比增加了9%，而与其传统最大贸易伙伴国法国的贸易增长只有0. 6%。


But while Germany has managed to assert its economic dominance across the region, it has also become more dependent on its increasingly populist eastern neighbors.	但是，在德国成为欧盟经济霸主的同时，也变得越来越依赖其民粹主义的东方邻居。


German businesses cannot simply replace their current trading partners on a whim.	德国企业无法随心所欲地将目前的贸易伙伴替换掉。


And besides, no other region has the same ideal combination of low-cost labor, a well-educated workforce, high rates of economic growth, geographic proximity, and even political stability.	此外，其他地区也找不到同样的劳动力成本低、工作人口受教育程度高、经济增长率快、地理相近、政治稳定的组合。


That’s right: while almost every other European country (including Germany) is struggling to form a government, or has settled for an unstable ruling coalition, the provincial strongmenin Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary can guarantee stability.	正是如此：其他欧洲国家（包括德国）为了组建政府而焦头烂额，或者只能形成不稳定的执政联盟，但波兰、斯洛伐克和匈牙利外乡强人却能够保证稳定。


Whatever one thinks of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his brand of “illiberal democracy,” there is no denying that he has created a secure environment for German business interests.	不管你怎么看待匈牙利总理欧尔班和他的“反自由民主”的名声，你都不能否认他为德国商业利益集团创造了一个有保障的环境。


The same cannot be said for Russia – whose volume of trade with Germany is only around the same as that of Hungary.	俄罗斯便非如此——其对德贸易和对匈贸易差不多。


While Germany justifies its populist appeasement economically, other countries have also started to recognize the V4’s appeal.	德国从经济上需要绥靖民粹主义，而其他国家也开始意识到V4的吸引力。


Just this week, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced that the Chinese Development Bank will invest an additional €2 billion in Central and Eastern Europe.	上周，中国总理李克强宣布中国国家开发银行将增加20亿欧元的中东欧投资。


China is positioning itself as an economic and technological rival to the EU and the United States.	中国正在把自己打造成与欧盟和美国抗衡的经济和科技对手。


And, because China itself is ceasing to be a source of cheap labor, it is looking for potential subcontractors – like the V4.	而由于中国本身不再是廉价劳动力的源泉，它也开始寻找潜在分包者——比如V4。


The title of the Bulgarian public intellectual Ivan Krastev’s new book says it all.	保加利亚公共知识分子伊万·克拉斯特夫（Ivan Krastev）的新书书名说明了一切。 其英文版叫做《欧洲之后》（After Europe）；


In English, it is After Europe; in French, it is Le destin de l’Europe (Europe’s Destiny); and in Germany, it is Europadämmerung (The Twilight of Europe).	法文版叫做《欧洲的命运》（Le destin de l’Europe）； 而德文版叫做《欧洲的黄昏》（Europadämmerung）。


The German edition is already a bestseller.	德文版已经成为畅销书。


Germany, the G20, and Inclusive Globalization	德国、G20和包容性全球化


BERLIN – Globalization is getting increasingly bad press in the West nowadays.	柏林—如今，全球化在西方正在日益成为一个贬义词。


Populist movements allege that it does not benefit the average citizen very much, if at all.	民粹主义运动指责全球化并未给普通公民带来多少好处，甚至没有任何好处。


Instead, they tout protectionism and unilateralism.	相反，他们到处兜售保护主义和单边主义。


National policies, whether with respect to trade or financial regulation, are seen as the surest way to restore national greatness.	国家政策，不管是在贸易还是金融监管方面，都被视为重塑国家荣光的最稳妥的方式。


But this populist agenda is based on the deeply flawed premise that international cooperation and international trade are zero-sum games, producing only winners and losers.	但这一民粹主义日程的基础前提有很大的漏洞，即国际合作和国际贸易是零和博弈，有赢必有输。


In fact, cooperation and trade can deliver benefits to all countries.	事实上，合作和贸易可以给所有国家带来收益。


For many years now, they have increased global security and certainly global prosperity, with hundreds of millions of people lifted out of poverty, both in the developed and the developing world.	多年来，我们增进了全球安全，当然也增进了全球繁荣，发达和发展中国家的数亿人摆脱了贫困。


To be sure, globalization needs rules and a recognized framework to ensure that it benefits everybody, delivering sustained and inclusive economic growth.	诚然，全球化需要规则和受到承认的框架以确保它惠及所有人，能带来持续而包容的经济增长。


As with national legislation, it is a framework that requires constant adjustments.	对于国家立法，这是一个要求不断地调整的框架。


But to abandon it altogether and retreat from globalization is the wrong answer.	但一股脑儿抛弃这一框架，从全球化中退出是错误的。


On the contrary, we should be seeking ways to deepen and broaden international economic cooperation.	相反，我们应该寻找办法深化和广化国际经济合作。


In my view, the G20 is the best forum for increased and inclusive cooperation.	在我看来，G20是增进合作与包容的最佳论坛。


Of course, the G20 is not perfect, but it is the best institution we now have for achieving a form of globalization that works for everyone.	当然，G20并不完美，但它是我们目前所拥有的实现惠及全民的全球化形式的最佳机构。


Through it, the world’s main industrialized and emerging countries have worked together toward constructing a shared global order that can deliver increasing prosperity.	通过G20，世界主要工业化和新兴国家共同致力于构建能带来不断增进繁荣的共同全球秩序。


Indeed, the G20 is the political backbone of the global financial architecture that secures open markets, orderly capital flows, and a safety net for countries in difficulty.	事实上，G20是确保开放市场、有序资本流动和困难国家安全网的全球金融结构的政治基础。


The G20 has achieved much in recent years, including better coordination on financial regulation and international taxation.	近几年来，G20取得了重大成就，包括更好的金融监管合作和国际税收。


And, as the country that holds the G20 presidency this year, Germany is committed to continuing the important work begun under our most recent predecessors in China and Turkey.	此外，作为今年G20的轮值主席国，德国将致力于延续由最近的前任主席国中国和土耳其开创的重要工作。


For example, more needs to be done to strengthen the global economy’s resilience against sudden shocks.	比如，我们需要做更多的事情增强全球经济面对突发冲击的恢复力。


So one of the G20’s top priorities this year will be our work to prevent a recurrence of a global financial and economic crisis like that of 2008-2009, which stemmed from a myopic, debt-based growth model.	因此，今年G20的一个最重要主题是预防类似于2008—2009年的全球金融和经济危机复发，这场危机肇因于缺乏远见、依赖债务的增长模式。


But, in order to tackle the gulf between the richest and the poorest countries, we need to go beyond the G20.	但是，为了填补最富裕和最贫困国家之间的鸿沟，我们需要超越G20。


In particular, the G20 – indeed the entire world – must reach out to Africa at this critical moment in the continent’s development.	特别是，G20——事实上是全世界——必须在非洲发展的关键时刻着眼于那里。


Beyond the moral question of raising Africans’ living standards, the continent’s development is crucial to reducing geopolitical risks.	除了提高非洲人民的生活水平这一道德问题，非洲的发展也是降低地缘政治风险的关键所在。


But investment in Africa is still low, depriving people in African countries of opportunities to improve their lives.	但非洲的投资仍然低迷，致使非洲国家的人民无法赢得改善生活的机会。


For these reasons, the G20 during the German presidency is working to intensify its partnership with Africa.	出于这些原因，德国担任主席国期间的G20致力于加强与非洲的合作。


A central pillar of this effort is the “Compact with Africa,” which provides a framework for supporting private investment, including in infrastructure.	这方面的一个核心支柱是“非洲契约”，它提供了一个支持私人投资（包括基础设施投资）的框架。


We propose that, with the G20’s political backing, African governments, international organizations, and bilateral partners prepare comprehensive, country-specific investment compacts to encourage private-sector investment.	我们建议，在G20的政治支持下，非洲各国政府、国际组织和双边合作伙伴准备一套全面的、根据各国具体情况制定的投资契约，以鼓励私人投资。


Each country is to implement a bespoke package of measures to decrease its investment risks.	各国都要实施一套量身定制的方案，降低投资风险。


Essentially, the Compact with Africa is a contribution to implementing the African Union’s Agenda 2063 blueprint for economic development.	从本质上讲，非洲契约有助于实施非盟2063日程提出的经济发展蓝图。


That AU agenda provides guidance for improving macroeconomic, business, and financial frameworks across the continent.	这一非盟日程为改善整个非洲的宏观经济、企业和金融框架提供了指导。


While the Compact with Africa is open to all African countries, five have already committed to pioneering this new approach: the finance ministers of Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia want to work on compacts and have expressed this in writing.	非洲契约向所有非洲国家开放，其中有五个国家已经开始率先尝试这一新方针：科特迪瓦、摩洛哥、卢旺达、塞内加尔和突尼斯的财政部长希望根据契约采取行动，并提供了书面意愿。


I have invited them to attend the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting on March 17-18 in Baden-Baden.	我邀请他们出席3月17—18日在巴登巴登（Baden-Baden）举行的G20财政部长和央行行长会议。


At that meeting, my G20 peers and I will offer these countries an international platform to present their plans.	在会上，我的G20同事和我将为这些国家提供一个国际平台展示他们的计划。


We want to discuss with them, and the heads of the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, what the elements of country-specific investment compacts could be.	我们希望与他们以及非洲开发银行、世界银行和国际货币基金组织的首脑们一起讨论视各国具体情况制定的投资契约需要具备哪些要素。


Afterwards, these five countries, together with international organizations and bilateral partners, will select the specific measures and instruments to be included in each individual investment compact.	之后，这五个国家，以及国际组织和双边合作伙伴，将选择各国的投资契约要包含哪些具体措施和工具。


The G20 will provide high political visibility, helping to raise investors’ awareness of these changes.	G20将提供相当大的政治能见度，帮助投资者提高对变化的认识。


I am confident that significant progress can be achieved when all partners involved work together closely and on an equal footing.	我有信心，当所有合作伙伴齐聚一堂，在平等的基础上紧密合作，将带来巨大的进步。


International cooperation is the only way to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive global growth.	国际合作是实现强劲、可持续、平衡、包容的全球增长的唯一办法。


Germany is committed to do its best as an honest broker within the G20 and beyond to ensure that globalization truly does benefit all.	德国将作为诚恳的中间人，在G20内部和更大的舞台上致力于确保全球化真正惠及全民。


Germany’s Götterdämmerung	德国的诸神的黄昏


MUNICH – Germany is experiencing a political watershed.	慕尼黑—德国正在经过一个政治分水岭。


It is not just that the exit of the Free Democrats (FDP) from coalition talks has cast doubt on whether Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will remain in power.	不仅仅自由民主党（FDP）退出执政联盟谈判让人们质疑总理、基督教民主联盟（CDU）的默克尔是否能够保持权力。


The FDP’s departure from negotiations with the CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Greens marks the end of a willingness to forge stable coalition governments that has defined German politics since the last days of Konrad Adenauer’s postwar chancellorship.	FDP退出与CDU、CDU的巴伐利亚姊妹党基督教社会联盟（CSU）和绿党的谈判标志着其不再愿意结成稳定的政府，而这又是阿登纳战后执政末期以来德国政治的最大特征。


Of course, without the FDP’s participation, Merkel could pursue a coalition government with the Social Democrats (SPD).	当然，没有了FDP的参与，默克尔可以寻求与社会民主党（SPD）结成联合政府。


But the decimated SPD says that it is determined to remain in opposition, in order to recover from its crushing defeat at the polls.	但铩羽而归的SPD说它已决定要做反对党，以期从大选的惨败中恢复。


Any other possible coalition is out of the question, because neither the far left nor the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are seen as acceptable partners.	其他可能的执政联盟都不用考虑，因为极左翼和极右翼的德国另类选择党（AfD）都被视为不可接受的合作伙伴。


A minority government under Merkel, however, is conceivable.	但由默克尔领导的少数派政府仍是可能的。


Given that President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has expressed his distaste for calling a new election, such a scenario could become likely if Merkel does not resign on her own.	德国总统施坦因迈尔已经表示反对重新进行大选，因此，如果默克尔本人不辞职，这一情景可能性就很大。


And even if there is a new election, the outcome would not be much different, unless SPD leader Martin Schulz steps down.	而即使进行新大选，结果也不会有多少不同，除非SPD领导人马丁·舒尔茨（Martin Schulz）下台。


A minority government might be formed by the CDU and the CSU without the formal participation of other parties.	少数派政府可以由CDU和CSU组成，而不与其他党派进行正式合作。


A minority coalition that included the Greens would force the CSU to compromise on migration issues and climate policy, which would be unnecessary otherwise, given the inability of the SPD, Die Linke (The Left), and the Greens to block legislation.	如果少数派执政联盟要将绿党也包括在内，将迫使CSU在移民问题和气候政策上作出妥协，但这不是必须的，因为SPD、左翼党（Die Linke） 和绿党都没有阻止立法的实力。


And Merkel herself will try to avoid a minority coalition with the FDP, in order to avoid becoming dependent on it.	默克尔本人也将试图避免与FDP结成少数派执政联盟，免得染上FDP依赖症。


The FDP, for its part, would like to participate in such a government for exactly that reason.	至于FDP，它则有可能出于同样的原因参与到少数派联合政府中。


It would then be able to contain Merkel’s red-green affinity.	这样，它就能够利用默克尔的红绿亲和力。


A minority government, whatever its composition, would not necessarily be a bad thing.	不论如何组建，少数派政府都未必是一件坏事。


With the government seeking partners to enact legislation on an ad hoc basis, the Bundestag would finally become the site of genuine public debate once again.	政府正在寻求合作伙伴实施临时性立法，在这样的情况下，德国联邦议院终于将再次成为真正的公共辩论场。


For too long, coalition partners have negotiated government decisions behind closed doors, with the Bundestag either rubber-stamping or vetoing the results.	长期以来，执政联盟的合作伙伴之间都是闭门讨论政府决定，联邦议院要么充当橡皮图章，要么否决结果。


Those who stand to gain the most from such a strengthening of parliament will be the small parties that otherwise have little chance of asserting their influence.	议会强势化的最大受益者是小党派。 因为若非如此，它们几乎没有机会能够施加影响。


Above all, the AfD, Germany’s version of the French National Front, which emerged from nothing as Germany’s third-largest party in the September election, will benefit from open debate.	毕竟，作为法国国民阵线（National Front）的德国版的AfD从什么也不是，在9月的大选中一举成为德国第三大党，它将从公开辩论中获益。


So far, the media have largely focused on discrediting the party.	目前，媒体基本上都在重点抨击AfD。


But a more proactive Bundestag would inevitably become a showcase for the AfD’s arguments and rhetoric.	但如果联邦议院变得更加主动的话，AfD的观点和言辞肯定能够得到更好的展现。


At the same time, a minority federal government’s foreign policy would undoubtedly be weakened, and Merkel would find it difficult to play an active part in European politics.	与此同时，少数派联邦政府的外交政策必然会有所削弱，默克尔将难以在欧洲政坛上扮演积极角色。


This would also mean, however, that Germany’s European partners would struggle to force compromise upon the German government.	但这也意味着德国的欧洲伙伴国们需要竭力推动德国政府问题上的妥协。


This dynamic will be particularly important for France, given President Emmanuel Macron’s goal of consolidating the eurozone by providing it with more attributes of statehood, and his desire to push ahead with a two-speed Europe comprising a eurozone and a large non-euro fringe consisting of northern and eastern EU countries.	这一动态对于法国尤其重要，因为其总统马克龙的目标——通过赋予欧元区更多国家属性来巩固它，以及他的愿望——推出两速的欧洲，其中包括一个欧元区和一个由北欧和东欧欧盟国家组成的庞大的非欧元外围。


A German minority government would have to hold lengthy debates with all of the Bundestag’s parliamentary groups on every major decision before it could assent to Macron’s proposals – or any other, for that matter.	德国少数派政府将不得不经历漫长的争论，在它能够支持马克龙的方案——其他方案也一样——之前，必须先与联邦议院的各派别就每一项重大决策进行讨论。


Effective opposition at home means that the government would no longer be able to acquiesce in the dead of night to various rescue operations for Germany’s EU partners.	国内的有效反对意味着德国政府不再能够在夜深人静时默许各种援助德国的欧盟伙伴的行动。


That’s what happened in May 2010, when Merkel’s government was forced by the French triumvirate of European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy to violate the Maastricht Treaty by establishing a rescue fund for Greece’s foreign creditors, primarily French banks.	2010年5月曾经发生过这样的事情，默克尔政府在法国三巨头——欧洲央行行长特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）、IMF总裁斯特劳斯-卡恩（Dominique Strauss-Kahn）和法国总统萨科齐——的压力下，不得不违反马斯特里赫特条约，为希腊的外国债权人（主要是法国银行）成立了一个救助基金。


Germany was also forced to compromise in 2012, when Merkel was pushed into agreeing to a banking union and the ECB’s “outright monetary transactions” program, which effectively turned European government bonds into Eurobonds.	2012年德国也被迫做出过妥协，默克尔同意了银行联盟和欧洲央行的“直接货币交易”计划，该计划在事实上将欧洲政府债券变成了欧元债券。


Likewise, kneejerk decisions by Merkel – such as her move to phase out nuclear power within a few months of the Fukushima accident in Japan, or to allow refugees to enter Germany from safe third countries – will now be impossible.	类似地，默克尔的膝跳反射式决定——如日本福岛事故不出几个月就宣布德国逐步退出核电，以及允许难民从安全的第三国进入德国等——也将无法推行。


That is welcome, because too often politicians, driven by the momentum of their own thoughts, make decisions that have serious adverse consequences in the long term.	这是值得欢迎的变化，因为政客总是受到自身思维的推动，做出长期来看有严重消极后果的决定。


With the nuclear phase-out, for example, Germany can now honor its commitments to combat climate change only by damaging, and perhaps losing, part of its industrial base.	比如，在核能被排除的情况下，如今德国想要兑现其遏制气候变化的承诺，只能通过伤害——并有可能失去——部分工业基础来实现。


By admitting 1.5 million migrants in just two years, Germany has also placed a massive burden on its welfare state, inadvertently encouraged the Brexiteers, and rallied all of Eastern Europe against it.	而在短短两年内允许150万移民入境也给德国的福利国家制度带来了沉重负担，无心插柳地鼓动了英国退欧派，也激起了东欧国家的全体反对。


It is too early to tell how the political uncertainty now confronting Germany and Europe will be resolved.	确定德国和欧洲目前所面临的政治不确定性还为时过早。


But a Merkel who can be called to account by the Bundestag may be the best alternative Germany has.	但如果德国联邦议院获得了问责默克尔的能力的话，这也许是德国最好的另类选择了。


While Germany Slept	当德国睡着


BERLIN – Few people outside Germany are familiar with the caricature of themselves that many Germans hold in their minds.	柏林—除了德国人，很少有人熟悉许多德国人脑海中有一幅关于他们自己的讽刺画像。


Far from the aggressive bully of twentieth-century war propaganda, the perfectionist engineer of Madison Avenue car advertisements, or the rule-following know-it-all of the silver screen, the German many picture today is a sleepy-headed character clad in nightgown and cap.	今天，这幅画像远非二十世纪战争宣传画上的咄咄逼人的“小霸王”，不是麦迪逊大道汽车广告上的完美主义工程师，也不是银幕上循规蹈矩的万事通，而是一个身穿睡衣睡帽，耷拉着脑袋沉睡的角色。


Sometimes clutching a candle, this German cuts a naïve, forlorn figure, bewildered by the surrounding world.	有时候他还拿着一支蜡烛——这是一个对周边世界无比困惑的天真的弃儿形象。


This figure is not new.	这一形象并不新鲜。


On the contrary, referred to as “Der deutsche Michel” or “the German Michel,” it was popularized in the nineteenth century as a character whose limited perspective causes him to shun great ideas, eschew change, and aspire only to a decent, quiet, and comfortable life.	相反，它被称为“德国人米切尔”（Der deutsche Michel），流行于十九世纪，是一个眼界狭隘的角色。 狭隘的眼界导致他无法接受伟大的思想，逃避着变化，一心只想着体面、宁静、舒适的生活。


But Michel has now made a comeback.	但如今，米切尔卷土重来了。


And who can blame him?	谁又能指责他呢？


Germany now boasts a booming economy, near full employment, rising wages, and content unions.	如今，德国经济繁荣，接近充分就业，工资节节攀升，工会志得意满。


The financial crisis is long forgotten, public budgets are under control; and the 2015 influx of migrants has been relatively well managed.	金融危机早已被人忘却，公共预算尽在掌控； 2015年移民流入也得到了相对较好的管理。


What bad news there is – industrial scandals (like that at Volkswagen), airline bankruptcies, endlessly delayed infrastructure projects – does little to dampen the general sense of safety and wellbeing enjoyed by Germany’s Michels.	坏消息——产业丑闻（如大众汽车丑闻）、航空公司破产、基础设施项目无尽的拖延——并没有妨碍德国的米切尔们的总体安全感和所享受的福利。


The only real threat, it seems, is the world outside Germany’s borders.	看起来，唯一的真正威胁是国境线之外的世界。


In this sense, last autumn’s election campaign was perfectly suited to Germany’s Michels.	从这个角度讲，去年秋天的选战很适合德国的米切尔们。


“A land where we live well and happily,” the campaign slogan of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), resonated with them, as did the rather provincial and mostly empty messages of rival parties.	“我们优渥而幸福地生活着的土地”——总理默克尔的基督教民主联盟（CDU）的竞选口号让他们感同身受，反对党的粗俗且往往流于空洞的口号也是如此。


With the exception of the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the parties displayed a rote civility and drowsy acceptance of consensus that pacified the electorate.	除了极右翼民粹主义政党德国另类选择党（AfD），各政党无不例行公事般地礼尚往来，接受者让选举变得平淡无奇的共识，令人昏昏入睡。


After the election, the real politicking began, but even then, pains were taken to obscure those activities from Germany’s Michels.	选举后，真正的政治活动开始了，但即便如此，也要不惜承受痛苦来让这些活动从德国的米切尔们的眼前消失。


Indeed, though party officials had been in place for some time, they waited until the votes were cast before putting their cards on the table, and even then did so behind closed doors.	事实上，尽管政党官员就位已有一段时间，但他们一直等到投票过后，才把手里的牌摊上桌面，而且还是闭门进行。


Even the leaks from these closed-door coalition talks were so well managed that they created the illusion that the “Sondierungsgespräche” – that is, the preparatory talks among party officials – were politically rather harmless.	就连这些闭门结盟谈判所泄露的消息也被小心翼翼地管理，以营造出一种“Sondierungsgespräche”（政党官员间的预谈判）在政治上基本无害的幻觉。


But Germany’s political class, like its ordinary Michels, are in denial.	但和普罗大众一样，德国的政治阶层也拒绝接受。


The soporific federal elections, the breakdown of coalition talks among the CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP), and the timid dance between the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since then all point to a serious deficit in German politics.	有如催眠剂般的联邦选举，CDU、其巴伐利亚姊妹党基督教社会联盟（CSU）、绿党和自由民主党（FDP）组阁谈判 的破裂，以及此后CDU和社会民主党（SPD）的小心翼翼的眉来眼去，都表明德国存在巨大的政治赤字。


The truth is that the various party platforms, meant to inform the electorate and provide a basis for coalition talks, reveal a shocking lack of imagination and paucity of new ideas.	真相是各种政党平台——原本它们应该起到让选民知情、为组阁谈判打下基础的作用——表现出现象力和新思维方面的惊人的缺乏。


Second-order issues are presented as red lines, with largely technical questions – for example, about refugee family reunions, a new health insurance scheme no one asked for (Bürgerversicherung), or the role of the federal government in funding education – taking center stage.	次要问题被当成是红线，而主要是技术性质的问题——比如难民家庭团聚、无人问津的新医疗保险机制（rgerversicherung），以及联邦政府的教育拨款等——成了核心议题。


Considering the state of Europe and the world – and the hopes many outsiders are pinning on German leadership – these issues seem rather marginal.	从欧洲和世界的状态来看——以及外部对德国领导层所寄予的厚望来看——这些问题都只是边缘性问题。


But the real problem is that they are distracting from larger issues relating to, say, the euro, security and defense, migration, infrastructure, and taxation.	但真正的问题是它们将注意力从（比如）欧元、安全与防务、移民、基础设施以及税收等更大的问题上转移开去。


Lacking any forward-looking political visions, German politics has degenerated to tactical plays being carried out by established players.	没有高瞻远瞩的政治愿景，德国政治沦为建制派行动方的策略交锋场。


The CDU, in a War of the Roses with the CSU, can live neither with or without Merkel, while the SPD is unsure of itself and fears further political decline.	CDU正在与CSU进行一场玫瑰战争，有没有默克尔都行，而SPD自我定位不明确，害怕进一步的政治衰落。


None of this bodes well for a country whose parliament has already been diminished, after these three parties, during their eight years forming a coalition government, marginalized the opposition and failed to build up new leadership cadres.	所有这些对于德国来说绝非好事，在联合执政的八年时间里，这三个政党将反对派边缘化，却没能构建新的领导层，这让德国议会变得孱弱不堪。


Coalition agreements in Germany have always been elaborate documents of a quasi-contractual nature.	德国的联合组阁协议向来是具有准契约性质的字斟句酌的文件。


But there is a growing tendency to plan out four years of governing, with leaders then using legislative periods not to debate laws, but rather to enact previously agreed policies.	但一个日益明显的倾向是做好执政四年的计划，从而领导人不再将立法时期用于法律争论，而是用于实施此前形成一致的政策。


Moreover, no major reform has been successfully implemented in Germany since the 2000s, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pushed through labor-market reforms.	此外，自21世纪初时任总理施罗德推出劳动力市场改革以来，德国从未成功实施过成功的重大改革。


No forward-looking reforms of the caliber of Schröder’s Agenda 2010 were even attempted under Merkel in over a decade.	在默克尔执政的十多年里，和施罗德的《2010日程》一样高瞻远瞩的改革甚至不曾尝试过。


The CDU/CSU and the SPD are now pursuing a grand coalition that would keep Germany roughly on the same path it has taken during the last eight years.	如今，CDU/CSU和SPD正在寻求结成执政大联盟，如若成功，德国将继续沿着和过去八年大体相当的道路前进。


The 28-page agreement that will allow formal coalition talks to proceed is overly detailed, technocratic, unambitious, and lacks vision.	为正式组阁谈判准备的28页长的协议过于详细、技术官僚化、含混不清、缺少愿景。


It is thus unsurprising that, though CDU/CSU and SPD negotiators have touted the deal as a breakthrough, many, especially in the SPD, are unhappy with the outcome, with some calling for renegotiation.	因此，丝毫不令人奇怪，尽管CDU/CSU和SPD的谈判员们将协议称作一次突破，但许多人，特别是SPD成员，对于结果并不满意，甚至有人要求重新谈判。


The SPD now faces a choice: at its special party congress this weekend, its leaders must decide whether to join yet another grand coalition government that promises more of the same, or move into opposition, probably triggering new elections.	如今，SPD面临一个选择：在本周末的特别党大会上，其领导人必须决定是再次加入承诺毫无新意的执政大联盟，还是转为反对党并有可能触发新大选。


But there is another option, which many have ignored: a CDU-led minority government, with Merkel as chancellor.	但还有另一个被许多人所忽视的选项：一个默克尔担任总理的、CDU领导的少数派政府。


Freed of stifling coalition agreements with a reluctant SPD or a coldly calculating FDP, Merkel could choose her cabinet based on competence and vision, rather than party politics.	从与心不甘情不愿的SPD，以及冷冰冰算计的SPD的组阁谈判中摆脱出来，默克尔可以基于能力和愿景，而不是基于党派政治来选择阁僚。


She could even appoint ministers from other parties.	她甚至可以认命来自其他政党的部长。


Most important, Merkel could finally tackle the important issues that have fallen by the wayside in recent years, to which the current coalition agreement pays only lip service.	最重要的是，默克尔终于可以着手处理近几年来被搁置一旁的重要问题了，目前的组阁协议对这些问题光说不练。


This means cooperating with French President Emmanuel Macron to move the European project forward; modernizing Germany’s public administration system; preparing the labor force for digitization; and tackling immigration issues.	这意味着与法国总统马克龙合作推进欧洲工程、实现德国公共管理体系现代化、促使劳动力为数字化做好准备、解决移民问题等。


Parliament is integral to success on any of these fronts.	在这些方面，议会都是不可或缺的。


Mainstream parties must embrace the kind of open and constructive debate that nurtured parliamentary democracy in the Federal Republic’s early years, rather than remaining focused on political tactics.	主流政党必须接受开放的建设性争论——这些争论在联邦共和国到早期培养了议会民主，而不是继续专注于政治手腕。


Michel may prefer the modest policy initiatives and incrementalism that have characterized Merkel’s chancellorships.	米切尔可能更喜欢温和的政策措施和作为默克尔执政风格的渐进主义。


But a minority government forced to muster coalitions of the willing to address the critical issues confronting Germany and Europe could escape the constraints of Michel’s expectations, freeing German politics from party tacticians and enabling real and much-needed reform.	但少数派政府必须得构建愿意解决德国和欧洲所面临的关键问题的联盟，这能够摆脱米切尔的期望的束缚，将德国政治从政党军师手中摆脱出来，促成真正的、急需的改革。


In other words, the modicum of political insecurity Germany faces today may well be just what the country needs to give rise to new ideas and voices, and a better future.	换句话说，德国目前所面临的一点点政治不安全，可能正是这个国家产生新思维、新声音和获得更好的未来所需要的。


Germany’s Economic Road Ahead	德国的经济前途


MUNICH – The next German government will face economic-policy challenges in five key areas: digitalization and automation, demographic change, globalization, climate change, and European integration.	慕尼黑—下一届德国政府将面临五个重要领域的经济政策挑战：数字化和自动化、人口变化、全球化、气候变化以及欧洲一体化。


With respect to digitalization, Germany tends to fluctuate between excessive enthusiasm for expanding fiber-optic networks and fear of the impact of new, largely unregulated business models, such as those underpinning avatars of the “sharing economy” like Uber and Airbnb.	在数字化方面，德国总是在过度热衷于扩张光纤网络和担心基本不受管制的新商业模式的影响之间来回摇摆，后者包括优步和爱彼迎等“共享经济”的支柱企业。


But German policymakers must not respond to such sentiments with kneejerk reactions.	但德国决策者切不可用本能反应应对这些情绪。


Rolling out a nationwide fiber-optic network, rather than simply servicing the locales that are most in need, would be both expensive and inefficient.	铺设全国光纤网络，而不仅仅只满足最需要光纤网络的地区，可谓事倍功半。


And politicians should focus their regulatory efforts on ensuring that sensible digital business models and private investment are not obstructed.	政客应该关注监管政策，确保合理的数字商业模式和私人投资不被阻挠。


With digitalization also comes automation and robotization, which many fear will lead to job losses.	和数字化齐头并进的是自动化和机器人化，许多人担心这会导致就业损失。


Consequently, one now regularly encounters proposals for an unconditional universal basic income (UBI), to be paid for, perhaps, with a tax on robots.	结果，现在我们时常可以看到无条件的全民基本收入（UBI）方案，资金可以来自机器人税。


But such a response would be a terrible mistake – a capitulation to the challenges that we face.	但这样的应对之道是可怕的错误——是面对挑战的投降主义。


Instead of making a large swath of the population dependent on transfers earned by others, Germany’s leaders should ensure that all workers receive the training needed to pursue opportunities in the labor market of the future.	德国领导人绝不应该让大部分人口依赖于其他人赚得的转移支付，而应该确保所有工人都能获得需要的培训，能够在未来劳动力市场中获得机会。


As it happens, Germany’s aging population and declining workforce will create labor shortages in the years ahead.	目前，德国人口的老龄化和劳动力数量的下降将在未来造成劳动力短缺。


But instead of seizing the opportunity in front of them, German policymakers have been busy worrying about the elimination of skilled labor altogether.	但德国决策者并没有抓住摆在眼前的机会，而是一直忙于担心熟练工人的彻底消失。


These fears make no sense.	这样的担心没有任何意义。


In 1900, 38% of the labor force in Germany worked in agriculture; in 2000, only 2% did.	1900年，38%的德国劳动力在农业部门工作； 2000年，这一比例只有2%。


And yet the full-scale automation of agriculture did not lead to mass unemployment.	而全方位的农业自动化并没有导致大面积失业。


Germany’s demographic transformation will have significant implications for the country’s public finances, and especially for its social-insurance system.	德国的人口结构变化将给德国公共财政造成显著影响，特别是其社会保险体系。


But in the recent federal election campaign, both of Germany’s main political parties ruled out proposals to raise the retirement age to 70, even though there are good reasons for doing precisely that.	但在最近的联邦大选选战中，德国两大主要政党都排除了将退休年龄提高到70岁的方案，虽然有很强的理由支持这样做。


Raising the retirement age to shore up a statutory pension scheme is often denounced as unfair, because people with physically demanding jobs, such as nurses and manual laborers, cannot be expected to work until they are 70.	提高退休年龄来巩固法定退休金制度常常被抨击为不公平，因为体力劳动者，如护士和力工，无法工作到70岁。


But that is a problem that should be addressed through higher wages and disability insurance, not with pension insurance.	但这个问题应该通过提高工资和残疾保险解决，而不是用退休保险来解决。


And besides, early retirement can still be made an option, as long as it is marked down accordingly.	此外，早退休仍然可以作为一个选择，只要相应少拿退休金即可。


Globalization – whether it takes the form of migration or flows of trade, capital, and data – poses an equally large challenge, even though it has been a boon to Germany in recent decades.	全球化——不管以移民形式还是以贸易、资本和数据流形式表现——也构成了一个同样规模的挑战，尽管在近几十年中，德国从全球化中受益良多。


Generally speaking, globalization implies a narrower scope for national policy.	总体而言，全球化缩小了国家政策的空间。


And this is particularly true for Germany, because it has signed on to international agreements brokered by the European Union as a whole.	对德国尤其如此，因为它也是欧盟作为一个整体参与协商的国际协定的签署国。


Growing cross-border mobility has put Germany under severe competitive pressure.	跨境流动性的增加让德国饱受竞争压力。


Germany wants to attract companies and investment, but it also wants to create as many high-paying jobs as possible.	德国希望吸引公司和投资，也希望尽可能多地创造高薪岗位。


Germany thus benefits from immigrants with above-average qualifications, because they will earn enough to pay more in taxes than they receive in state benefits.	因此，德国从高于平均资质的移民中获益，因为他们的收入足够高，缴纳的税收多于获得的国家福利。


To bring in capital and high-skill immigrants, Germany needs to keep taxes low.	为了吸引资本和高技能移民，德国需要保持低税收。


But this limits its ability to use taxation as a mechanism for redistribution.	但这限制了其利用税收作为再分配机制的能力。


For now, Germany can still finance its welfare state.	目前，德国仍能够负担得起福利国家。


But with such a globalized economy, it cannot count on subsidies funded by general tax revenues to offset future shortfalls in its social-security system.	但在全球化的经济中，德国无法靠一般税收收入所支持的补贴来解决社会保险体系的未来短缺问题。


More to the point, Germany cannot indefinitely keep taxes low while offering generous social transfers to lower-skill workers; eventually, its welfare system would collapse.	更重要的是，德国无法永远既保持低税收，又向低技能工人提供慷慨的社会转移支付； 最终，其福利制度将会崩溃。


And the government should work with other countries and within the EU to ensure that immigration is not motivated by a desire for welfare benefits.	政府应该和其他国家和欧元区成员国合作，确保移民不是为了渴望福利而来。


To remain competitive, Germany needs to change how it taxes investment and innovation.	要保持竞争力，德国需要改变投资和创新税。


French President Emmanuel Macron’s government has announced plans to abolish France’s wealth tax and significantly reduce its corporate-tax rate.	法国总统马克龙的政府一斤刚宣布了废除财富税并大幅削减公司税率的计划。


The governments of Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States have also announced plans to cut taxes.	瑞典、英国和美国政府也宣布了减税计划。


The German government, whether it likes it or not, cannot escape the effects of global tax competition.	不管它喜不喜欢，德国政府都无法摆脱全球税收竞赛的影响。


But as it looks for ways to improve its tax regime, it must not allow certain sectors – not least those with heavily digitalized business models – to evade taxation entirely.	但在它设法改善税收制度时，决不能让某些部门——包括商业模式严重数字化的部门——完全规避税收。


Climate change is another facet of globalization, because here, too, there is nothing that Germany can do by itself to halt global warming.	气候变化是全球化的另一个侧面，因为在这方面，德国也无从单枪匹马阻止全球变暖。


Rather, the government must work with its European partners to forge global climate agreements, while enacting measures to mitigate the effects of climate change at home.	但是，政府必须与欧洲伙伴合作推进全球贸易协定，同时采取措施降低气候变化对国内的影响。


But as Germany pursues its emissions reductions, it should keep an eye on cost-effectiveness, because no climate agenda can succeed without social acceptance.	但德国在追求减排时，应该同时着眼于性价比，因为只有为社会所接受的气候日程，才能取得成功。


Viewed from this perspective, selective interventions, such as a proposed ban on internal combustion engines after 2030, would thus be counterproductive.	从这个角度看，有选择地进行干预，如建议在2030年后禁用内燃机，将适得其反。


A far better approach would be to include road traffic in the emissions-metering system under the Paris climate agreement, because this would allow emissions cuts to be made at the lowest possible cost.	一个更好的方针是将公路交通纳入巴黎协定下的排放测量体系，因为这样做能够让减排以最低成本实现。


The last major challenge for Germany’s next government is its policy toward Europe.	德国下一届政府的最后一项重大挑战是欧洲政策。


Germany needs the EU to surmount its current crisis, deepen the internal market, and develop a common defense and security policy, so that it can reap the benefits of European integration.	德国需要欧盟解决当前的危机，深化内部市场，以及制定共同防务和安全政策，从而使其从欧洲一体化中受益。


Joint arms procurement and closer operational cooperation would yield significant efficiency gains, and reduce the burden on EU member states’ budgets.	联合军备采购和更紧密的军事行动合作能够大大增进效率并降低欧盟成员国的预算负担。


Moreover, the European Monetary Union is in desperate need of reform.	此外，欧洲货币联盟急需改革。


Instead of waiting for the next crisis to erupt, Germany should see to it that European banks hold fewer domestic government bonds.	德国不应该坐等新危机爆发，而应该督促欧洲银行减少持有本国政府债券。


In cases where individual member states have incurred too much debt, private creditors – not taxpayers of other countries – should bear the burden of debt restructuring.	对于个别发行了过多债务的成员国，债务重组负担应该由私人债权人，而不是其他国家的纳税人承担。


The Chimera of Franco-German Reform	法德改革空想


CAMBRIDGE – An abiding truth in the United States is that all politics is local.	坎布里奇—所有政治都是本地政治，这是美国的一个永恒的真理。


Apparently, the same wisdom can be applied (to some extent) to the European Union, whose agenda ultimately depends on key member states’ national politics.	显然，同样的智慧也（在某种程度上）适用于欧盟，欧盟日程归根到底取决于关键成员国的国家政策。


This is particularly true with respect to eurozone institutions, which almost everyone agrees are in urgent need of reform.	对欧元区机构而言，这一点尤其正确。 几乎所有人都同意，欧元区需要立刻改革。


Indeed, shoring up the eurozone was the common thread in major speeches by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and French President Emmanuel Macron last month.	事实上，巩固欧元区是上个月欧盟委员会主席容克和法国总统马克龙的重要讲话的共同主题。


In his State of the Union address, Juncker boldly outlined his ambitious vision for Europe’s future.	在盟情咨文中，容克大胆地提出了他的欧洲未来的宏大愿景。


He called on the EU to complete its banking union, establish a European finance ministry (fully integrated into the Commission), and expand the EU-level budget.	他要求欧盟完成银行联盟，建立欧洲财政部（完全并入欧盟委员会），扩大欧盟层面预算。


Macron, in a speech at the Sorbonne, touched on issues ranging from defense and security to eurozone reform and Europe’s political divides.	马克龙在索尔伯恩（Sorbonne）讲话中提到了从防务和安全到欧元区改革和欧洲政策分歧在内的一系列问题。


But he left much unsaid.	但他还有很多东西没有说到。


And, in line with his role as a national leader, his was an inter-governmental, not a community perspective.	与其国家领导人的身份一致，他采用了政府间视角，而不是共同体视角。


Still, both speeches were clearly intended to frame the political debate now underway in Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is trying to form a new coalition government.	尽管如此，两次讲话显然都想要左右德国目前正在发生的政治争论。 德国总理默克尔的基督教民主联盟（CDU）正在试图组建一个新的联合政府。


Many observers had hoped that Germany’s recent federal election would open a “window of opportunity” for EU-level reforms.	许多观察者希望德国的最新联邦选举可以为欧盟层面改革开启一扇“机会之窗”。


But it is now starting to look like that window has already closed.	但目前看来，这扇窗已经关上了。


The fate of any EU agenda – whether Juncker’s or Macron’s – rests with Merkel, who is unlikely to make any significant political moves.	欧盟日程的命运——不管是容克的日程还是马克龙的日程——都取决于默克尔，而她不可能做出任何重大政治举措。


Indeed, bold action of the type Juncker and Macron have proposed would not just be uncharacteristic for Merkel; it would also require her to invest all of her remaining political capital.	事实上，像容克和马克龙所提出的那种激进的动作，不仅仅不是默克尔的风格； 更需要她为此投入全部剩余政治资本。


Throughout her career, Merkel has always behaved, not unreasonably, as if her main goal was to be reelected.	纵观默克尔的职业生涯，她的主要目标似乎永远是连任——这不可谓不理性。


And because the CDU would prefer to dominate a government – and if possible, govern without coalition partners – it has always sought to win a majority by appealing to German voters in the middle of the political spectrum.	而由于CDU更希望主导政府——如果可能的话，最好在不结成联合政府单独执政——因此它永远渴望通过吸引政治谱系的中间派选民赢得多数。


Merkel has a keen sense of where the middle is, and how and when it might shift.	默克尔对中间派在哪里、可能在何时和如何变化有着敏锐的感觉。


Accordingly, she often adopts her competitors’ ideas.	据此，她市场采纳竞争对手的概念。


While in office, she has established a minimum wage, lowered the retirement age to 63 (for those with 45 years of contributions), and legalized same-sex marriage – policies that are anathema to traditional conservatism, but that now have broad popular support.	执政期间，她制定了最低工资制度，将退休年龄下调到63岁（对工龄超过45年者），实现了同性恋婚姻合法化——这些政策对于传统保守派而言是不可接受的，但受到广泛的群众支持。


As the American economist Harold Hotelling explained in 1929, those competing for the middle have an “undue tendency … to imitate each other.”	美国经济学家哈罗德·霍特林（Harold Hotelling）在1929年解释道，争取中间派的人有一种“彼此效仿的……过犹不及的趋势”。


Accordingly, the CDU and its main competitor, the Social Democrats (SPD), have become increasingly indistinguishable.	因此，CDU及其主要竞争对手社会民主党（SPD）变得越来越难以区分。


And, as a corollary, smaller parties seeking an electoral foothold have had to target political minorities, many of whom have strongly held preferences and beliefs.	而由此造成的必然结果是，寻求在选举中留下痕迹的小政党彼得不把目标对准政治少数派，他们之中有很多人有着强烈的偏好和信念。


Because the CDU and the SPD lost support in the recent election, with the latter deciding to spend the coming electoral term in the opposition, Merkel will need to form a coalition with such parties.	由于CDU和SPD在最近的选举中失去了支持，后者更是决定在新的选举周期中成为反对党，因此默克尔需要与小政党组成执政联盟。


But no mainstream German party, let alone Merkel’s, would govern with the third-largest faction in the Bundestag, Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right anti-EU party that garnered 13% of the vote.	但没有一个主流德国政党——更不用说默克尔自己的政党——会与联邦众议院第三大党德国另类选择党（AfD）联合执政。 AfD是一个极右翼反欧盟政党，它赢得了13%的选票。


That leaves the Free Democrats (FDP), who are liberal in a European sense, but also frustrated with the eurozone’s malaise.	于是CDU只能选择自由民主党（FDP），它属于欧洲意义上的自由派，但对欧元区的问题非常不满。


Giving voice to German “transfer fatigue”, the FDP is adamantly opposed to any arrangement that transfers German money to underperforming member states.	FDP认为德国已经“转移疲劳”，强烈反对任何将德国的钱转移支付给表现欠佳的成员国的安排。


During the campaign, the FDP thus drew a red line against furnishing the EU with a fiscal capacity, under any guise.	因此，在竞选期间FDP划定了一条红线：不能给予欧盟任何形式的财政权。


Two other FDP proposals – a sovereign-debt-restructuring mechanism, to force creditors to take responsibility for their decisions, and temporary withdrawal from the common currency for over-indebted member states – could further complicate matters for eurozone reformers.	FDP的其他两个主张——主权债务重组机制以迫使债权人为他们的决定负责； 以及让负债国度的成员国暂时退出共同货币——可能让欧元区改革进一步复杂化。


The FDP’s ideas have broad support in Germany and among German economists (and are shared by a number of other European economists).	FDP的概念在德国人和德国经济学家中间支持者甚众（不少其他欧洲经济学家也赞同他们）。


And they are consistent with positions taken by the German Ministry of Finance under the previous government.	他们也和前届政府的德国财政部长的立场一致。


But policies that might work in a perfect world of efficient and resilient financial markets could be dangerous if applied in highly imperfect real-world markets.	但在完美世界和恢复力强的金融市场中有效的政策，如果应用到非常不完美的真实世界市场中，可能非常危险。


As we saw a decade ago, financial institutions operating in an environment of uncertainty can become fragile and collapse, imposing high costs on society.	十年前我们曾经看到，在不确定性环境中经营的金融机构可能变得非常脆弱甚至倒闭，给社会带来高昂的成本。


The idea of a temporary exit from the euro is particularly ill-advised.	暂时退出欧元的概念也非常不恰当。


If that option were formalized, markets would price it in, and member states without deep capital markets would pay a premium.	如果这一选择被形式化，市场就会用价格体现这一安排，不具备深度资本市场的成员国需要支付溢价。


Their interest rates would be structurally higher.	它们的利率将结构性地升高。


And under volatile conditions, they are prone to face runs from fickle institutional investors, wary of rolling over their credit lines.	而在波动环境中，它们很容易面临反覆无常的机构投资者的挤兑，对信用展期非常小心。


The FDP campaigned on an exit option, and its leaders, having been out of parliament for four years, will not want to risk their credibility by backing away from it now.	FDP站边退出选项，其已经四年没能进入议会的领导人绝不希望因为背弃这一承诺而承担信誉扫地的风险。


And besides, some deputies in the CDU, and many in its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, are sympathetic to the FDP’s positions.	此外，一些CDU议员，以及许多CDU姊妹党基督教社会联盟成员，都对FDP的立场持同情态度。


The third likely member in Merkel’s new coalition, the Greens, would hardly be able to counterbalance these internal forces.	默克尔新执政联盟的第三个可能的成员——绿党也很难制衡这些内部力量。


Another problem is that neither Juncker nor Macron has offered much in the way of detail.	另一个问题是容克和马克龙都没有给出多少细节。


The actual design of a future eurozone budget – and the types of expenditure it would include – is still unclear.	未来欧元区预算的实际结构——以及它所包含的支出类型——仍不清楚。


So, too, is the process for holding a eurozone finance minister accountable and ensuring his or her democratic legitimacy.	问责欧元区财政部长、保证其民主合法性的程序亦然。


It is also not evident how much national sovereignty would be lost, in the name of a shared fiscal capacity.	各国需要因为共同财政而牺牲多少主权也不清楚。


Sorting out these questions will require a level of political entrepreneurship unlike anything Merkel has ever shown.	厘清这些问题需要政治企业家精神，而默克尔从未表现出她具备这一精神。


To join in Macron’s European project, she would have to assume an entirely new role and expose herself to substantial political risks.	要加入马克龙的欧洲工程，她必须接受一个全新的角色，承担巨大的政治风险。


Germany would have to take the initiative: rather than rejecting proposals, it would have to offer its own.	德国必须起到带头作用：不是拒绝方案，而是必须拿出自己的方案。


Such behavior can hardly be expected from a government that, beholden to the median German voter, plays it safe.	掌控在中间派德国选民手中的德国政府做出这样的行为希望渺茫。


The German political center has been shifting, and it is heading in a different direction than Juncker and Macron.	德国的政治中间派的含义一直在改变，目前，其改变方向和容克和马克龙的方向并不相同。


As a result, the eurozone’s institutional design will likely remain incomplete.	因此，欧元区的制度设计可能仍然无法完全化。


Plan B for the Global Economy	振兴全球经济的B方案


HONG KONG – In March, meetings of the G-20, the Chinese National People’s Congress, and multiple think tanks all reflected a growing awareness of the risks to the global economy posed by deflation and intensifying financial instability.	发自香港——今年三月，G20集团、全国人大以及多个智库机构召开的会议都表明，全球各方已经逐渐意识到了由通缩压力和金融不稳定性增强所导致的全球经济风险。


In mitigating these risks, the path that China takes will be particularly important.	而中国为减轻这些风险所选择的路径至关重要。


But avoiding a hard landing in China is a necessary but insufficient condition for global recovery.	避免中国经济硬着陆只是实现全球经济复苏的必要条件，但不是充分条件。


Contrary to the advice of many Chinese economists, the country’s policymakers have opted not to follow the conventional Western approach of using flexible exchange rates as the main shock absorber for volatile capital flows and thereby freeing monetary policy to provide liquidity for domestic structural adjustments.	许多中国经济学家都建议采用西方常规的浮动汇率制度，将其作为应对变化莫测的资本流动的减震机制，并为货币政策松绑以便为国内经济结构调整提供流动性，但中国的政策制定者们却并未采纳放开汇率的政策。


This satisfied both Western economists and global financial markets, which breathed a collective sigh of relief when Chinese leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining a stable renminbi.	这让众多西方经济学家和全球金融市场如释重负，大家都在中国领导人再次重申会致力于维持人民币汇率稳定时松了一口气。


The fear was that, if China sought a weaker exchange rate to escape deflation, the result would be another round of global competitive devaluations and even more deflation.	许多人原本担心中国会用汇率贬值来摆脱通缩，而其后果必然是全球范围的竞争性货币贬值以及进一步全球通缩。


Fortunately, China’s leaders recognize that, if the world remains mired in a balance-sheet recession, the lack of aggregate demand, by continuing to weaken trade, will drag down their own country’s growth.	幸运的是，中国领导人意识到如果坐视世界经济深陷资产负债表衰退状态，那么因国际贸易形势持续疲软而导致的全球总需求缺乏就将进一步拖累中国的经济增长。


But, of course, China still needs to find a way to cope with capital outflows, while pursuing the structural reforms that are needed to place its economy on a sustainable long-term growth path.	当然，中国仍然需要找到应对资本外流的手段，同时推动一系列能让其经济走上可持续长期增长道路的结构性改革。


As we recently argued, the key will be to maintain an annual growth rate of roughly 6.5%, while pursuing a multifaceted short-term stabilization plan that aims to stimulate job creation to offset the losses from restructuring inefficient industries and eliminating excess capacity.	正如我们最近撰文指出的那样，关键是保持大约6. 5％的经济年均增速，这就需要实施一系列旨在创造更多就业机会的多层面短期稳定经济计划，以抵消重组低效率产业和消除产能过剩所带来的短期增长及收入的损失。


Meanwhile, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) would face the unenviable task of both maintaining exchange-rate stability and combating deflation, by ensuring that the liquidity needed to support the shift away from manufacturing toward services and consumption is available at reasonable rates.	与此同时，中国人民银行将承担着既要保持汇率稳定又要打击通缩的艰难重任，包括确保能以合理的利率提供中国经济从制造业向服务业和消费驱动转型所需的流动性。


Given how much of its official reserves China has already spent stimulating the economy and stabilizing the exchange rate, as well as the size of capital outflows – equivalent to three times the current-account surplus last year – tactics like reducing reserve requirements would be key here.	考虑到中国为刺激经济和稳定汇率所动用的官方外汇储备金额，以及去年资本外流的规模——相当于去年全年经常账户盈余的三倍——稳妥降低存款准备金率这类宽松策略将是关键。


The PBOC would, of course, have to tighten controls on foreign exchange.	当然，中国人民银行不得不相应地适当收紧外汇管制。


But it is also contemplating other macro-prudential instruments, such as a kind of Tobin tax, the levy on financial transactions first suggested in 1972 by the Nobel laureate economist James Tobin, in order to discourage volatile capital flows.	它也在考虑是否需要其它宏观审慎监管工具，比如某种托宾税（在1972年由诺贝尔经济学奖得主托宾首次提出的金融交易税）以遏制资本的急剧跨境流动。


All of this amounts to Plan A – an unavoidable strategy for stopping deflation in China.	所有这些政策措施都可以归纳为振兴全球经济的A方案，它们是为防止中国陷入通缩而不得不采取的必要策略。


But, in today’s multipolar global system, no single country can save the global economy from debt deflation.	但在当今多极化的全球体系下，没有任何一个国家能够单枪匹马让全球经济免于债务通缩。


That is why the world must also consider implementing a shared strategy; call it Plan B.	这就是为什么世界各国还必须考虑实施一项更积极的共同战略，也就是振兴全球经济的集体行动B方案。


Of course, collective action will not be easy – not least because some measures, such as a global monetary or fiscal policy, were ruled out at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, where world leaders created the international economic and financial architecture that prevails today.	当然，集体行动并不容易。 比如，构建并实行一个全球一致的货币或财政政策，就被世界各国领袖在1944年布雷顿森林会议上排除，而那个会议上订立的国际经济和金融体系我们现在还在用。


But, in the face of unprecedented threats to global economic stability, it may be time to convene another Bretton Woods-type conference to determine what collective measures are possible.	当我们面临前所未有的全球经济稳定威胁之时，或许是时候再召开一次布雷顿森林那样的会议，以确定哪些集体行动措施是现在有可能实施的。


There is plenty of incentive for action.	环顾全球，好像有足够的激励因素去促使我们行动起来。


With the advanced economies facing rapid population aging, large public-debt burdens, overstretched monetary policies, and fractious politics, the global economy’s capacity to escape its current rut depends largely on the emerging economies.	随着发达经济体面临快速的人口老龄化、庞大的公共债务负担、捉襟见肘的货币政策、以及难以驾驭的党派政治，全球经济摆脱目前通缩道路的能力将在很大程度上取决于新兴经济体。


After all, while these economies are facing challenges of their own, they enjoy more favorable demographics and are experiencing rapid urbanization.	虽然这些经济体也都各自面临着挑战，但它们的人口结构更为合理、正在经历快速的城市化、并拥有极大的生产力增长潜力。


As a result, they have huge potential for productivity gains, which would strengthen global economic growth, and massive demand for sustainable infrastructure to reduce resource depletion and address global warming.	这些新兴经济体的高增长可以激活庞大的需求并强化全球经济增长，特别是通过在当地建设旨在减少全球资源消耗和应对全球变暖的可持续基础设施。


The main constraint on realizing the emerging economies’ potential is financial, with the Bretton Woods institutions unable to provide the needed capital.	令新兴经济体增长潜力无法发挥的主要制约因素之一是资金短缺，而布雷顿森林体系下的各类国际机构却无能力施以援手。


If the world is to escape the debt-deflation trap – not to mention address rising income and wealth inequality – this must change.	如果世界要摆脱债务通缩陷阱的话——更不用说要解决不断恶化的收入和财富不平等状况——这种窘况就必须有所改变。


The recent panic over the renminbi’s depreciation highlights another compelling reason for collective action.	近期对人民币贬值的恐慌也点出了另一个令人信服的集体行动理由。


In today’s world, nobody is safe from large and volatile capital flows – not even countries that have built up huge amounts of self-insurance in the form of foreign-exchange reserves.	在当今世界，没有那个经济体能在庞大而急剧的跨境资本流动下保持稳定，——甚至那些以巨额外汇储备的形式为自己买了保险的国家也不例外。


In 2007-2009, the advanced economies managed to escape a liquidity crisis, largely because the US Federal Reserve was willing to engage in liquidity swaps with key central banks, mostly those of US allies.	发达经济体之所以能在2007~2009年间摆脱流动性危机，在很大程度上靠的是美联储愿意与各大发达国家（多为美国盟友）的中央银行进行流动性货币互换。


Only with a global liquidity-insurance system – underpinned by multilateral currency-swap arrangements – can countries pursue much-needed reflation, without excessive fear of capital flight and/or exchange-rate devaluation.	只有建立一个全球流动性货币互换保险体系——以多边货币互换安排为基础提供紧急流动性援助——各国才能实施急需的全球一致性通货再膨胀政策，而免于对资本外逃和/或汇率贬值的过度恐惧与担忧。


Finally, collective action is needed to make unconventional monetary policy more effective.	最后，我们需要集体行动来使目前各主要大国的非常规货币政策变得更有效。


Thus far, such policies have failed to revive the global economy largely because commercial banks and other lenders retained the liquidity they received from their central banks, instead of channeling it to the real economy by providing credit to small and medium-size enterprises and investing in long-term infrastructure projects.	到目前为止，这些政策都未能重振全球经济的主要原因是商业银行和其他贷款人都将从央行获得的流动性留在了金融体系内，而没有投资于中小型企业贷款、长期基础设施、及其它实体经济项目中。


It is no coincidence that from 2010 to 2014, the largest banks, firms, and investment funds increased their cash holdings by $3 trillion – roughly the amount by which central banks in reserve-currency countries expanded their balance sheets over the same period.	这不是巧合，2010~2014年间，全球最大的银行、企业和投资基金手中持有的现金增加了3万亿美元——大致相当于同期各储备货币发行国央行资产负债表的扩张规模。


By enabling countries to eliminate excess capacity, reduce leverage, and balance tax policies – all while reducing geopolitical uncertainty – collective action to escape deflation and boost growth would mitigate financial institutions’ risk aversion, thereby improving the transmission mechanisms of unconventional monetary policies.	我们今天急需通过全球集体行动使各国消除产能过剩，降低杠杆率，并平衡税收政策——同时降低地缘政治的不确定性。 这些有助于摆脱通缩和刺激经济增长的集体行动将降低金融机构的风险厌恶情绪，从而提高各国非常规货币政策的传导机制效率。


Reaching global consensus is always difficult. But, in today’s context, there is no avoiding it.	达成全球共识一直以来都是极为困难的，但是在今天的背景下也是无法回避的。


If countries continue to try to go it alone, the entire world will suffer.	如果各国继续这样单打独斗下去的话，整个世界都将因此陷于苦难之中。


Preempting the Next Pandemic	预防下一场传染病


SYRACUSE – Recent disease outbreaks, like Ebola and Zika, have demonstrated the need to anticipate pandemics and contain them before they emerge.	锡拉丘兹—最近埃博拉和寨卡等疾病的爆发证明，我们需要在传染病爆发之前就有所预见并遏制。


But the sheer diversity, resilience, and transmissibility of deadly diseases have also highlighted, in the starkest of terms, just how difficult containment and prevention can be.	但致命疾病巨大的多样性、顽固性和传染性也以最突出的方式证明了遏制和预防是多么困难。


One threat to our preparedness is our connectedness.	对我们的准备工作来说，一个威胁是连通性。


It was thanks to easy international travel that in recent years the dengue, chikungunya, and Zika viruses were all able to hitch a ride from east to west, causing massive outbreaks in the Americas and Caribbean.	拜便利的国际旅行所赐，近几年来，登革热、基孔肯亚病和寨卡病毒都能搭顺风车自东而西，在美洲和加勒比地区造成大规模爆发。


Another threat is more mundane: failing to agree about money.	另一个威胁比较陈词滥调：钱没有谈拢。


Whatever the reason, the fact is that as long as humans fail to organize a collective and comprehensive defense, infectious diseases will continue to wreak havoc – with disastrous consequences.	不管什么原因，事实是，只要人类不能组织起集体全面的防御，传染病就会继续作乱——并带来灾难性后果。


Building an effective prevention and containment strategy – being bio-prepared – is the best way to reduce the threat of a global contagion.	制定有效的预防和遏制战略——在生化上做好准备——是降低全球传播威胁的最佳方法。


Preparedness requires coordination among agencies and funders to build networks that enable quick deployment of and access to vaccines, drugs, and protocols that limit a disease’s transmission.	准备工作需要各个机构和出资人之间的协调，构建能够迅速部署和推广疫苗、药品和协议的网络，从而限制疾病的传播。


Simply stated, preparing for the next pandemic means not only building global capacity, but also paying for it.	简言之，为下一场传染病做好准备不但意味着构建全球能力，要需要为它掏钱。


That’s the idea, at least.	至少在概念上是如此。


The reality of bio-preparedness is far more complicated.	生化准备的现实则要复杂得多。


For starters, the absence of dedicated funding is impeding implementation of long-term prevention strategies in many countries; a new World Bank report finds that only six countries, including the United States, have taken the threat seriously.	首先，缺少专用资金阻碍了长期预防战略在许多国家的部署； 世界银行的新报告发现只有包括美国在内的六个国家，认真对待传染病威胁。


Meanwhile, public health officials in many parts of the world struggle to respond to disease outbreaks, owing to a dearth of labs and clinics.	与此同时，由于实验室和诊所的不足，世界许多地区的公共卫生官员，难以有效应对疾病啊播发情况。


And many funding agencies, including governments and NGOs, typically offer only one-year commitments, which rules out long-term planning.	更有许多出资机构，包括政府和非政府组织，通常只提供一年的资金，从而无从实现长期规划。


For years, scientists, physicians, and civil-society actors have voiced concern over the lack of reliable, meaningful, and institutionalized investment in pandemic preparedness.	多年来，科学家、医生和公民社会行动方都对缺乏可靠、有效和制度化的传染病预防投资表示关注。


These pleas have come, frustratingly, as military funding to thwart bio-attacks, consciously mounted by human actors, has remained robust.	令人失望的是，在他们提出这些关注的同时，遏制人类有意为之的生化袭击的军事拨款却保持在巨额水平。


But while purposeful and nefarious infectious-disease outbreaks could do massive damage, they remain relatively unlikely.	但是，尽管有目的、罪恶的传染病暴发可能造成严重伤害，可能性相对来说却非常低。


Naturally occurring outbreaks, by contrast, occur regularly and are far more costly, even if they lack the sensational “fear factor” of bioterrorism.	相反，自然发生的传染病爆发时不时就会发生，且代价更加高昂，即使它们并不具备引起轰动的生化恐怖主义的“恐慌因子”。


Not that long ago, those of us engaged in the prevention of infectious-disease outbreaks felt more secure about the availability of the resources required to prepare.	不久前，我们这些参与过传染病爆发的预防工作人，对于准备工作能够得到需要的资源这一点，曾经有过更强的信心。


But in many places, budgets are stagnating, or even declining.	但在许多地方，预算停滞不前甚至被削减。


This is astonishingly shortsighted, given the relative costs of prevention versus response.	这是令人震惊的短视，因为与响应相比，预防的成本要低得多。


For example, what would it have cost to build the clinical and laboratory infrastructure and provide the training needed to identify and prevent the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa?	比如，建设医疗和实验基础设施、提供辨别和预防培训以阻止最近在西非爆发的埃博拉病毒，需要付出多大成本？


Precise figures are elusive, but I have no doubt it would have been less than the billions of dollars spent on containment.	具体的数字很难计算，但我丝毫不怀疑它要比遏制埃博拉的成本低数十亿美元。


Preparedness pays.	准备工作是物有所值的。


It is not only the lack of funding that is raising alarms; so are restrictions on how available funds can be used.	敲响警报的不只是缺乏资金； 对现成资金如何使用的限制也是个问题。


It is not uncommon for a grant to be restricted to specific activities, leaving major gaps in a program’s capacity to meet its objectives.	拨款被限定在具体的用途上，导致项目无法实现其目标，这样的情况绝非罕见。


A funder may, for example, allow the renovation of an existing lab but not the construction of a new one; or funds may support the purchase of a diagnostic machine but not the training of those required to operate it.	比如，出资者可能允许修葺现有实验室，但不允许建设新实验室； 或者资金可以用于支持采购诊断机器，但不能用于培训这些机器的操作员。


In many developing countries, communities do not even have the physical buildings in which to test, monitor, or store dangerous pathogens.	在许多发展中国家，社区甚至无法拥有能用来测试、监控和存放危险病原体的实体建筑。


Myopic funding that overlooks key elements of the big picture is money poorly spent.	缺乏远见的资金管理完全忽视大格局中的关键要素，导致资金得不到很好利用。


Add to these challenges the difficulty of paying staff or ensuring reliable electricity and other essential services, and it becomes clear that preparing for disease outbreaks requires broad engagement with the international aid community.	除了这些挑战之外，还有为工作人员发薪水和确保可靠的电力和其他基本服务方面的困难，此外，很显然预防疾病爆发还需要国际援助组织的广泛参与。


But at the moment, onerous spending rules and weak financial commitments are tying the hands of those working to prevent the next serious disease outbreak.	但目前的情况是，繁琐的支出规则和金融承诺的不足正在束缚致力于下一场严重的疾病爆发的人员的手脚。


The number of obstacles faced by scientists and public health experts in the race to contain deadly infectious diseases is staggering.	科学家和公共卫生专家在遏制致命传染病这场竞赛中面临着数量惊人的险阻。


To overcome them, we need to redefine how we think about preparedness, moving from a reactive position to a more proactive approach.	要想克服这些险阻，我们需要重新定义疾病准备工作，从响应立场转为预防方针。


Money earmarked for preparedness must be allocated at levels sufficient to have the required impact.	用于准备工作的资金必须多层次配置，以产生必要的效果。


Limitations on how it can be spent should be loosened.	对如何支出资金的限制，应该予以放松。


Funding sources must be opened to allow for multi-year commitments.	资金源必须敞开，从而让多年期的准备工作成为可能。


Health-care providers and first responders must receive proper training.	医疗服务提供者和一线响应人员必须接受适当的培训。


And long-term solutions such as establishing and connecting bio-surveillance systems should be expanded and strengthened, to enable public-health professionals around the world to track and report human and animal diseases and plan defenses together.	长期方案，比如建立和连通生化检测系统等，应该予以扩大和强化，让全世界公共卫生专业人员能够追踪和报告人类和动物疫情，共同规划防御方案。


Public health is an essential element of global security.	公共卫生是全球安全的重要一环。


Failing to invest appropriately in prevention of infectious-disease outbreaks puts all of us at risk, whenever or wherever the next one occurs.	不再预防传染病爆发方面做出适当的投资将让我们所有人都面临风险，不管下一次爆发的是什么传染病、什么时候爆发。


The Global Economy’s Surprising Resilience	全球经济恢复力令人惊喜


LONDON – Disconcerting political developments in the United States and the United Kingdom might lead one to conclude that an already challenged world economy will struggle even more in the near term.	伦敦—美国和英国的令人不安的政治发展动向可能让我们觉得已经面临重重挑战的世界经济在短期内将特别艰难。


But as we continue into 2017, the cyclical evidence actually suggests otherwise.	但随着2017年的深入，周期性证据表明正好相反。


Since my days as Chief Economist at Goldman Sachs, I have kept an eye on six indicators from around the world that, taken together, provide a reliable snapshot of what the global economy will look like for the next six months.	自我担任高盛公司首席经济学家以来，我一直关注全世界的六个指标，它们一起构成未来六个月全球经济动向的可靠指南。


Right now, all six indicators show more promise than they have for some time, and only one of them has fallen slightly from a recent high.	目前，所有者六个指标都要比一段时间以来更加令人振奋，并且只有一个从近期高点略有下跌。


The first indicator is weekly unemployment claims in the US, from which one can gauge the overall strength of the US economy.	第一个指标是美国周失业数字，它表明美国经济的整体强度。


Economists are rightly trained to treat unemployment as a lagging indicator, but these data can also be useful in forecasting the near future.	经济学家受到正确的训练，将失业看作滞后指标，但这些数据对于预测近期未来也很有用。


US jobless claims are always up to date, because they are produced weekly, and statistical evidence suggests that they are a leading indicator for US equity prices.	美国失业报告总是最新值，因为它们每周都要更新，统计证据表明，它们是美国股价的领先指标。


As of last week, jobless claims remained rather low, as they have for some time, which bodes well for US stock markets.	上周，失业数字仍然非常低，这一状态已经保持了一段时间，对美国股市是利好。


Similarly, the Institute for Supply Management Manufacturing Index provides a pretty good preview of the US economy for the next 3-6 months, even though manufacturing comprises a relatively small share of GDP.	类似地，供给管理研究所（ISM）制造业指数是非常好的美国经济未来3—6个月的前瞻指标，尽管制造业只占其GDP的相对较小比重。


Like the latest jobless claims, the ISM’s numbers are currently giving cause for optimism.	和最新失业数字一样，ISM数字也让人们感到乐观。


A third indicator is a subcomponent of the same ISM survey: manufacturers’ new orders and inventories.	第三个指标是ISM调查的一个组成部分：制造商新订单和库存。


Currently, new orders are increasing and inventories are low, which suggests that businesses will have to produce more in the coming months to satisfy those orders.	目前，新订单正在增加，而库存较低，这表明企业需要在未来几个月中增加产量消化这些订单。


Looking beyond the US, a fourth indicator is the ratio of Chinese retail spending relative to industrial production (adjusted for inflation).	将目光投向美国之外。 第四个指标是中国零售支出与工业产出（经通胀调整）之比。


These figures give us a glimpse of both cyclical trends and China’s structural rebalancing away from exports and toward domestic consumption.	这些数字能让我们了解周期性趋势和中国从出口转向国内消费的结构再平衡情况。


This will arguably be one of the most important indicators for both China and the rest of the global economy for years to come.	这也许是中国和全球经济未来几年情况的最重要的指标之一。


The ratio of Chinese monthly retail sales to industrial production, while erratic, has been slowly trending higher since 2008, and there appears to have been another uptick in consumption recently.	中国月度零售业销售与工业产出之比虽然存在起伏，但自2008年以来总体缓慢上升，而最近的消费又出现一个小高峰。


This is why I am less worried than others about frequently cited risks confronting the Chinese economy.	因此，我不像其他人那样担心那些老生常谈的中国经济风险。


Chinese consumer spending has remained strong despite the slowdown in industrial output and investment and the government’s efforts to constrain spending on luxury goods.	尽管工业产出和投资放缓，政府也采取措施遏制奢侈品支出，但中国消费支出仍然保持强势。


Some might object that Chinese data cannot be trusted.	有人或许会反对，认为中国的数据不可信。


But I do not see why the data on one side of the ratio would be any more or less reliable than data on the other side.	但我看不出为何这一比值的其中一项比另一项更不可靠。


Why would Chinese officials fiddle with consumption data while allowing the industrial-output figures to register a decline.	中国官员为何要粉饰消费数据而放任工业产出数字下降？


In any case, we have to work with what we have.	无论如何，我们得从我们得到的数据出发。


A fifth indicator is South Korean trade data, which is consistently reported on the first day of each month after trades occur – faster than any other country.	第五个指标是韩国贸易数据，通常在每个月贸易发生后的第一天记录——比其他国家都要早。


South Korea has an open economy and trading partners around the world, including the US, China, Japan, and the European Union, so one can extrapolate from its trade data to draw conclusions about the state of global trade.	韩国是开放经济，贸易伙伴遍布全球，包括美国、中国、日本和欧盟等，因此我们可以从韩国贸易数据中窥探全球贸易状态。


After trending down in recent years, South Korean trade since November has shown signs of recovering, notably in terms of export growth; and in January, it bounced back significantly.	在经历了近几年的下跌后，11月以来韩国贸易出现复苏信号，主要表现在出口增长上； 1月份，韩国贸易数字强劲反弹。


To be sure, this finding is at odds with all of the eulogies for globalization that one hears these days, and Donald Trump’s decidedly protectionist administration in the US could now send global trade into a long retreat.	诚然，这一情况与最近全球化哀声一片形成了鲜明反差，而铁了心要采取贸易保护主义的美国特朗普政府可能让全球贸易陷入长期衰退。


But South Korea’s recent data suggest that globalization still has some life left in it, and that 2017 is off to a decent start.	但韩国的最新数据表明全球化仍有生命力，2017年有一个良好的开端。


In fact, barring the worst-case scenario under Trump, it is possible that the slowdown in global trade in recent years will turn out to be a temporary phenomenon.	事实上，剔除特朗普执政的最糟糕的前景，有可能近几年来的全球贸易下降趋势只是一个暂时性现象。


It may have been a singular occurrence that reflected a variety of factors, including the euro crisis; continued economic weakness in many European countries; the sharp decline in commodity prices; dramatic slowdowns in Brazil, Russia, and other emerging economies; and tighter regulations for international banks, which might have hindered trade finance.	它可能是一个例外，反映了各种因素，包括欧元危机、欧洲国家经济持续萎靡、大宗商品价格暴跌、巴西、俄罗斯和其他新兴经济体大幅放缓、国际银行监管收紧（可能拖累贸易融资）等。


The last key indicator is the monthly Ifo Business Climate Index in Germany, which contains useful cyclical data for Europe overall, owing to Germany’s centrality in the continent’s economy.	最后一个关键指标是每月公布的德国Ifo商业气候指数，它是体现欧洲整体情况的有用的周期性数据，因为德国欧洲经济当之无愧的核心。


The Ifo survey has reported positive results in recent months, although the data were more promising in December than in January.	Ifo调查结果在最近几个月来都录得正值，尽管1月的数据不如12月亮眼。


Taken together, these six indicators suggest to me that the global economy might now be growing at a rate of more than 4%.	综合来看，这六个指标让我相信，全球经济的当前增长率可能超过了4%。


This is the fastest growth in a number of years – although the last decade’s average growth rate of 3.3% was barely lower than the rate in the previous decade – and close to the pace of the previous two decades before that.	这是多年来最快的增长数字——尽管过去十年的平均增长率3. 3%略低于前一个十年——也接近于二十年前的速度。


At the same time, the six indicators cannot tell us anything about what will happen after the next few months.	与此同时，这六个指标无法告诉我们未来几个月会发生什么。


It is an open question whether global economic growth will remain strong, strengthen further, or start to weaken.	全球经济是保持强势、进一步走强还是开始疲软仍有待观察。


It has been interesting to watch growth accelerate in the face of shocks such as the UK’s Brexit referendum and Trump’s election.	在英国退欧公投和特朗普当选的背景下，还能看到增长加速，这着实有趣。


And yet it is unclear why this is happening.	但为何会如此尚不清楚。


Some might say the trend is a result of policy decisions in the US and the UK, but far more would probably say that it is happening despite those decisions.	一些人也许认为这一趋势是美国和英国政策决定的结果，但更多的人会认为在这样的决定的情况下增长仍然出现了加速。


Unfortunately, there are no indicators that provide an answer to this question – only time will tell.	不幸的是，对于这一问题没有指标可以提供答案——只有时间可以。


Three Scenarios for the Global Economy	全球经济的三个情景


NEW YORK – For the last few years, the global economy has been oscillating between periods of acceleration (when growth is positive and strengthening) and periods of deceleration (when growth is positive but weakening).	纽约—在过去几年中，全球经济在加速（增长为正并不断强化）和减速（增长为正但不断弱化）之间来回震荡。


After over a year of acceleration, is the world headed toward another slowdown, or will the recovery persist?	在经历了一年多加速后，世界会走向又一次减速，还是能够持续复苏？


The current upswing in growth and equity markets has been going strong since the summer of 2016.	最近的增长和股市上升趋势自2016年夏天以来一直保持强劲。


Despite a brief hiccup after the Brexit vote, the acceleration endured not just Donald Trump’s election as US president, but also the heightening policy uncertainty and geopolitical chaos that he has generated.	尽管在英国退欧公投后略有反复，整个加速过程不仅没有因为特朗普当选美国总统而夭折，还挺过了他所造成的巨大的政策不确定性和地缘政治混乱。