It is no coincidence that the demand by Congress for the list of RFC loans occurred in 1932, also a presidential election year.	国会在1932年——也是一个总统选举年——要求复兴金融公司公布接受贷款的银行名录，这可绝非巧合。


Fed officials understand that their institution can remain independent only if it is accountable for its actions in the court of public opinion.	美联储的官员明白只有在公众舆论的法庭上为自身行为���担责任，它才能保持独立。


That is why the Fed has been taking steps to become more transparent: it releases the minutes of Federal Open Market Committee meetings and publishes transcripts with appropriate delay, while FOMC members give speeches detailing their views.	这也是美联储采取措施增加透明度的原因：它发布了美国联邦公开市场委员会会议记录以及在适当延迟后发布了会议的文字记录，同时委员会成员纷纷发言对自身观点进行了详细阐述。


Moreover, in a recent innovation, the Fed now publishes the inflation and interest-rate forecasts of FOMC members and Reserve Bank presidents.	此外，近期的革新则是美联储发布了委员会成员以及储备银行各总裁对通货膨胀和利率的预测。


The Fed almost certainly will move even further in the direction of transparency.	美联储肯定会在提高透明度上走得更远。


Other central banks are doing likewise.	其他中央银行也在做同样的事情。


No less is required to reconcile independence with accountability in a democratic society.	要在一个民主社会实现独立和问责的协调一致就必须做到这些。


But an audit overseen by politicians is not the right way.	但由政治家来监督的审计可不是一个正确的方法。


A Universal Library	环球图书馆


MELBOURNE – Scholars have long dreamed of a universal library containing everything that has ever been written.	墨尔本——一座网罗一切书面资料的环球图书馆早已是学者们的梦想。


Then, in 2004, Google announced that it would begin digitally scanning all the books held by five major research libraries.	2004年，谷歌宣布将开始数字化扫描五大研究图书馆的全部馆藏。


Suddenly, the library of utopia seemed within reach.	突然间，乌托邦式的图书馆似乎已触手可及。


Indeed, a digital universal library would be even better than any earlier thinker could have imagined, because every work would be available to everyone, everywhere, at all times.	事实上，环球数字图书馆比此前思想家们想象的还要美好，因为任何人在任何地点、任何时间都可以查阅任何著作。


And the library could include not only books and articles, but also paintings, music, films, and every other form of creative expression that can be captured in digital form.	而且图书馆可能不仅涵盖书籍和文章，还收录绘画、音乐、电影和能以数字形式捕获的所有其他形式的创意表达。


But Google’s plan had a catch.	但是谷歌的计划有一个漏洞。


Most of the works held by those research libraries are still in copyright.	那些研究图书馆馆藏的多数作品版权限制依然生效。


Google said that it would scan the entire book, irrespective of its copyright status, but that users searching for something in copyrighted books would be shown only a snippet.	谷歌说不管版权状况如何，它都将扫描整部书籍，但搜索版权书籍内容的用户只能看到这本书的片段内容。


This, it argued, was “fair use” – and thus permitted under copyright laws in the same way that one may quote a sentence or two from a book for the purpose of a review or discussion.	谷歌说这种方法“公平合理”，版权法也有类似的规定，可以从版权书籍中引用一两句话用于评论和探讨。


Publishers and authors disagreed, and some sued Google for breach of copyright, eventually agreeing to settle their claim in exchange for a share of Google’s revenue.	这种观点无法得到出版商和作者的认同，有人起诉谷歌侵犯版权，最终同意以谷歌收入的一定份额作为补偿。


Last month, in a Manhattan court, Judge Denny Chin rejected that proposed settlement, in part because it would have given Google a de facto monopoly over the digital versions of so-called “orphan” books – that is, books that are still in copyright, but no longer in print, and whose copyright ownership is difficult to determine.	上个月，在曼哈顿法庭上，法官丹尼·金驳回了这样的解决方案，部分原因是对所谓“孤本”书籍数字版的实际垄断权将因此归属谷歌——孤版书是指仍有版权限制、但已不再出版的作品，此类作品已经很难确定其版权归属。


Chin held that the United States Congress, not a court, was the appropriate body to decide who should be entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, and on what terms.	金认为决定孤版书籍托管归属及其条件的合理机构是美国国会，而不是法院。


He was surely right, at least in so far as we are considering matters within US jurisdiction.	至少在美国司法辖区内考虑问题的前提下，他无疑是对的。


These are large and important issues that affect not only authors, publishers, and Google, but anyone with an interest in the diffusion and availability of knowledge and culture.	这些带有普遍性的重要问题不仅关系到作者、出版商和谷歌，还关系到涉及知识和文化传播应用的所有人。


So, while Chin’s decision is a temporary setback on the way to a universal library, it provides an opportunity to reconsider how the dream can best be realized.	因此，虽然金的判决令环球图书馆暂时受挫，但正好可以借此机会重新思考该如何实现这一梦想。


The central issue is this: how can we make books and articles – not just snippets, but entire works – available to everyone, while preserving the rights of the works’ creators?	核心问题在于：我们怎样在保护作者权利的同时，让所有人不止看到片段，而是看到完整的书籍和文章？


To answer that, of course, we need to decide what those rights are.	当然要回答这个问题，首先要确定作者权利的内容。


Just as inventors are given patents so that they can profit from their inventions for a limited time, so, too, authors were originally given copyright for a relatively short period – in the US, it was initially only 14 years from the first publication of the work.	正如发明人被授予专利进而可以在有限时间内利用其发明获利，著作人起初也只在相对较短的一段时间内拥有版权——美国规定是自作品首次出版以后的14年。


For most authors, that would be enough time to earn the bulk of the income that they would ever receive from their writings; after that, the works would be in the public domain.	这段时间足够绝大多数著作人获得作品可能带来的绝大部分收入； 之后，作品将进入公共领域。


But corporations build fortunes on copyright, and repeatedly pushed Congress to extend it, to the point that in the US it now lasts for 70 years after the creator’s death.	但版权是企业的获利基础，因此它们反复要求国会延长时限，现在美国已经延长到作者死后的70年。


(The 1998 legislation responsible for the last extension was nicknamed the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act” because it allowed the Walt Disney Company to retain copyright of its famous cartoon character.)	（最后一次延期的1998年法案绰号“米老鼠保护法”，因为法案允许沃尔特·迪斯尼公司保留其著名卡通人物的版权。 ）


It is because copyright lasts so long that as many as three-quarters of all library books are “orphaned.”	正因为版权时间太长，以致于四分之三的图书馆藏书都沦为“孤版”。


This vast collection of knowledge, culture, and literary achievement is inaccessible to most people.	如此海量的知识、文化和文学成果却无法为多数人所用。


Digitizing it would make it available to anyone with Internet access.	数字化将使所有网民都能看到这些作品。


As Peter Brantley, Director of Technology for the California Digital Library, has put it: “We have a moral imperative to reach out to our library shelves, grab the material that is orphaned, and set it on top of scanners.”	正如加州数字图书馆技术总监彼·勃兰特莱所说：“从道德上考虑，我们有义务检查图书馆的书架，找出所有孤版作品进行扫描。 ”


Robert Darnton, Director of the Harvard University Library, has proposed an alternative to Google’s plans: a digital public library, funded by a coalition of foundations, working in tandem with a coalition of research libraries.	哈佛大学图书馆馆长罗伯特·达顿已经提出了不同于谷歌的备选方案：在研究图书馆联盟之外，建立由联盟基金资助的数字公共图书馆。


Darnton’s plan falls short of a universal library, because works in print and in copyright would be excluded; but he believes that Congress might grant a non-commercial public library the right to digitize orphan books.	达顿的方案不能算是严格意义上的环球图书馆，因为在版和有版权限制的作品将被排除在外； 但他认为国会可以将孤版书籍数字化授权给一家非商业目的的公共图书馆。


That would be a huge step in the right direction, but we should not give up the dream of a universal digital public library.	那将是向正确方法迈出的一大步，但我们也不该放弃建设环球数字公共图书馆的梦想。


After all, books still in print are likely to be the ones that contain the most up-to-date information, and the ones that people most want to read.	毕竟，在版书籍可能包含最有效的信息，这些信息最符合人们的阅读需要。


Many European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, Israel, and New Zealand, have adopted legislation that creates a “public lending right” – that is, the government recognizes that enabling hundreds of people to read a single copy of a book provides a public good, but that doing so is likely to reduce sales of the book.	很多欧洲国家，以及澳大利亚、加拿大、以色列和新西兰，已经通过了承认“公共借阅权”的法案，换句话说，政府认可让成百上千的人阅读书籍符合公共利益，但同时可能影响这本书籍的销售。


The universal public library could be allowed to digitize even works that are in print and in copyright, in exchange for fees paid to the publisher and author based on the number of times the digital version is read.	环球公共图书馆可以对在版和仍有版权限制的书籍进行数字化，并根据数字版的阅读次数向出版商和作者支付费用。


If we can put a man on the Moon and sequence the human genome, we should be able to devise something close to a universal digital public library.	如果我们可以登月和确定人类基因序列，就应该可以想方设法建成环球数字公共图书馆。


At that point, we will face another moral imperative, one that will be even more difficult to fulfill: expanding Internet access beyond the less than 30% of the world’s population that currently has it.	那时我们将面对一个难度更大的道德目标：向全世界目前不到30%网民以外的人推广互联网应用。


A Universal Revolution	普世革命


NEW YORK – The most important contribution of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 60 years ago, on December 10, 1948, was to assert a powerful idea: rights are universal.	纽约--联合国大会在六十年前，也就是1948年12月10日通过了世界人权宣言。 这一文件最为重要的贡献就是宣告了一个强有力的观点，那就是人权是普世的。


Rights do not depend on membership of a particular community or citizenship in a certain state.	人权并不取决于某一特别社区或者某一国家的国籍。


They do not derive from a social contract.	人权并不来源于社会契约。


Rather, because rights are universal, they are attributes of all human beings.	由于人权是普世的，因此就是人类的特征。


Indeed, they are part of what makes us human.	确实，人权是我们之所以为人的原因。


Each of us may enjoy rights.	我们每个人都可以享有人权。


Those who exercise power may do so only in limited ways. The limits are set by rights.	那些行使权力的人有所顾忌，而正是人权设定了这些顾忌和限制。


It is, of course, possible to trace the concept of universal rights at least as far back as seventeenth-century English thinking about natural law.	当然，人们可以把普世人权的概念最早追溯到十七世纪英国自然法思想。 1789年的法国人权宣言部分地包含了这一概念。


The concept was partially embraced in the French Declaration of Rights of 1789 and, to a greater extent, in Thomas Jefferson’s language in the same era about “inalienable rights.”  It also shaped the thinking of those in England who led the anti-slavery struggle of the second half of the eighteenth century, the first human rights movement.	杰菲逊在同一时代有关“不可分离的权利”的语言在更大程度上体现了这一观点。 这一观点也造就了英国十八世纪后期反对奴隶制斗争领导人的思维，而这一斗争成为第一场人权运动。


Yet the Universal Declaration marked a giant step forward, as the world’s governments – with abstentions from the Soviet bloc states, Saudi Arabia, and apartheid South Africa, but with no votes in opposition – agreed that rights should take precedence over state power.	然而，世界人权宣言还是向前迈进了一大步。 当时，除了苏联集团国家、沙特阿拉伯以及实行种族隔离制度的南非弃权以外，世界各国政府没有一个投票反对，一致同意人权应该高于国家权力。


One way to think about the six decades that have elapsed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration is as a struggle to implement its promises.	人们可以把世界人权宣言通过六十年的经历视为实践其诺言的斗争。


For a long time, it was a losing struggle, marked especially by the spread of both communist and anti-communist tyrannies.	很长时间以来，这一斗争都难以获胜，尤其是由于共产主义和反共极权的扩散。


Things began to change in the 1980’s with the fall of military dictatorships in Latin America and in such East Asian countries as the Philippines and South Korea, and with the growing number of people engaged in the struggle for human rights in the Soviet empire.	二十世纪八十年代，拉丁美洲和菲律宾和南韩等东亚国家的军事独裁者纷纷倒台，苏联帝国中越来越多的人参与争取人权的斗争，这时候形势开始变化。


By the end of the decade, many Soviet bloc regimes had collapsed.	到了八十年代末，许多苏联集团政权已经倒台了。


A factor that contributed to their demise was a shift in thinking that transformed the conflict between East and West away from one that emphasized economic systems.  Instead, it was the contrast between totalitarianism and respect for rights that completely discredited the oppressive regimes linked to Moscow and helped to bring them down.	导致其倒台的一个因素就是思维的改变把东西方冲突从强调经济制度转移开来。 正是极权制度和尊重人权的对比让依附莫斯科的政权们完全丧失信誉并最终让它们垮台。


South Africa’s largely peaceful transition to a multi-racial democracy in the early 1990’s was a further advance for rights.	九十年代早期南非平稳地向多种族民主转型进一步推动了人权。


But the last decade of the twentieth century was also indelibly stained by ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda, and during the current decade the tide has seemed to turn against the rights cause.	但是二十世纪的最后十年还是由于前南斯拉夫以及卢旺达的种族灭绝而蒙垢。 在现今的十年中，潮流好像逆转对人权事业不利。


Powerful states such as China and Russia are not limiting themselves to authoritarian rule at home, but are also supporting those in other countries engaged in similar practices.	中国、俄国等强国不仅在国内实行极权统制，而且支持其他国家的极权制度。


The same is true of lesser powers such as Iran and Venezuela.	伊朗和委内瑞拉等小国也是如此。


Moreover, the United States has been squandering much of its capacity to promote human rights internationally.  In responding to the terrorist attacks on its own soil on September 11, 2001, the US has resorted to such measures as prolonged indefinite detention without charges, trials before military commissions lacking due process safeguards, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees, including torture.	而且，美国在国际上浪费了大量促进人权的能力。 美国针对发生在自己领土上的9/11恐怖袭击采用了未经指控延长拘押、缺乏合理程序的军事审判以及包括酷刑在内羞辱在押人员等手段。


Other governments and intergovernmental bodies have not filled the gap left by the US.	其他国家政府和国际组织也没有填补美国留下的空白。


The new UN Human Rights Council has so far disappointed those who hoped that it would be a more principled and effective body than its discredited predecessor, the UN Human Rights Commission.	人们希望，新成立的联合国人权理事会要比其受到非议的前联合国人权委员会更为坚持立场和具有效力。


The European Union has been a positive force in promoting rights in those countries aspiring to membership, but it has not demonstrated a capacity to exercise influence worldwide.	但是他们还是大失所望。 欧盟积极推动申请入盟国家的人权，但是并没有表现出它有能力在全世界施加影响力。


Today, the most effective force promoting human rights is global public opinion, informed and mobilized by the large and growing nongovernmental human rights movement, which, as in the recent war between Georgia and Russia, has focused international attention on violations of the laws of armed conflict that protect noncombatants.	如今，促进人权最为有效的力量是全球舆论。 大规模和不断成长的非政府人权运动动员这些舆论并且提供信息。


It has also led the way in creating international criminal tribunals that prosecute and punish those who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.	在最近格鲁吉亚和俄国的战争中，这些人权运动让国际社会关注违反保护非作战人员的武装冲突法的事例。


These achievements are not stopping war, but they are reducing the number of terrible human rights violations that accompany armed conflict.	它们还主导建立了国际刑事法庭，起诉和惩罚那些犯下战争罪、反人类罪以及种族灭绝罪行的人。 它们的成就并不是阻止战争，而是减少伴随武装冲突而来的骇人听闻的违反人权事例。


It is, of course, dismaying that 60 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so many governments disregard the principles that they endorsed so long ago.	当然，世界人权宣言通过六十年后还有如此多的国家不顾自己早就支持的原则的确令人痛心。


Yet without the legitimacy derived from the Universal Declaration and its role in promoting compliance, the nongovernmental human rights movement could not have developed into a global force.	但是，如果没有从世界人权宣言引发的合法性及其促进遵守的作用，非政府人权组织是无法发展成为全球势力的。


The fact that the movement continues to secure advances even in difficult times is an indication of the enduring significance of what was achieved in 1948 when the world’s governments declared that rights are universal.	当各国政府在1948年宣布人权是普世的时候，其成就具有长久的意义。 人权运动即使在困难时期依旧取得进展这一事实说明了这一点。


A US-China Climate Surge	美中气候关系激流涌动


LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA – There are numerous aspects to the United States-China relationship – some currently contentious, others cooperative.	利弗莫尔，加利福尼亚——美中关系纷繁多样，某些方面目前还争吵不休，其他则协同合作。


One area that presents an opportunity for cooperation is energy policy and climate change, because the two countries’ account for more than 50% of total coal consumption, while their combined share of both global greenhouse-gas emissions and the world economy is 40%.	而能源政策与气候变化领域，就显现出合作契机，概因两国煤炭消耗量超过全球总量一半，与此同时，两国合起来也占据了全球温室气体排放量与世界经济总量的40%。


If an international agreement to protect the world’s climate is to be reached, much greater action to reduce CO2 emissions will be needed on the part of the US, as well as  binding commitments on China’s part to reduce its carbon burden.	若一项旨在维护全球气候公约的国际协议达成，美国方面须采取更大行动削减二氧化碳排放量，而中国方面也应履行承诺削减其碳排放量。


Ultimately, though, without US-China cooperation, a global climate agreement will be held hostage.	但若美中最终不合作，全球气候协议将受到挟制。


That is why a US-China standoff is a worldwide problem.	因此，美中僵局是一个世界问题。


China has engaged only very reluctantly in the global effort to bring down overall emissions.	全球致力于降低总排量，中国却一向极不情愿参与。


The US Congress’s deep reservations regarding the passage of a climate bill has been exacerbated by China’s positions, especially on issues such as international monitoring and accountability for its emissions, which China considers an affront to its sovereignty.	美国国会在通过气候法案上态度相当保留，中国的立场加剧了这种状况，尤其是像一些将其温室气体排放量纳入国际监管问责机制的问题，中国认为这是对其主权的冒犯。


But make no mistake: despite its less-than-constructive role in multilateral efforts, China is not just sitting still on energy and environmental issues.	不过毋庸置疑的是：尽管中国在多边努力上所起的作用缺乏建设性，但其在能源与环境问题上却并未坐视不动。


Within the next ten years, China will build 100,000 megawatts of wind-power generation plants (10 times the US amount), 50,000 MW of nuclear capacity, 10,000 MW of solar photovoltaic power, and 10,000 MW of solar thermal power.	在下一个十年内，中国将建造10万兆瓦的风力发电厂（是美国总量的十倍），5万兆瓦核电站，1万兆瓦太阳能光伏电站以及1万兆瓦太阳能热电站。


Moreover, China will cut its energy intensity by 40% and is investing $440 billion in clean-energy technology, as well as $9 billion per month in energy R&D. The Chinese are testing on a grand scale novel technologies in coal conversion, solar, wind, and carbon sequestration.	此外，中国将降低40%的能源密集度，在清洁能源技术上投入4400亿美元，并每月在能源研发上投入90亿美元。 而在煤炭转化、太阳能、风能与碳吸附方面，中国正尝试规模宏大的新技术。


These efforts dwarf expected US initiatives.	这些努力令美国预计采取的行动相形见绌。


Nevertheless, in the near future, China also will build 500,000 MW of coal-fired power plants (more than the entire existing US stock), at great risk to the global atmosphere and environment.	然而在不远的将来，中国还会建造50万兆瓦的燃煤电厂（比美国现有的发电总量还多），这对全球大气与环境风险巨大。


The harsh mathematics of greenhouse gas accumulations in the atmosphere simply does not allow for another lost decade.	大气中温室气体累积的数学计算严酷无情，根本不容许再失去一个十年。


To get past these challenges this decade, the world – and especially the US – must create a strong and sustaining partnership with China concerning emissions reduction.	为了通过这个十年的种种挑战，世界，尤其是美国，必须同中国在温室气体排量削减上创建一个牢固而持续的伙伴关系。


This can best be achieved through institutional relationships based on trust, as well as deep understanding of each other’s needs and capabilities.	实现这一目标的最佳途径，是建立基于信任及深入理解彼此需求与能力的机构关系。


The Obama/Hu meetings in Washington appear to have improved the atmosphere for the ongoing discussions on climate.  But, given the two countries’ direct and stiff competition in energy technology, taking advantage of this will require them also to find new ways to coalesce around joint goals for atmospheric stabilization, even as they seek to meet their own undeniable national needs.	奥巴马与胡锦涛在华盛顿的会晤，似乎已经改善了正在进行的气候协商氛围。 不过，鉴于两国在能源技术上存在直接而激烈的竞争，要利用这一优势，将要求两国在围绕实现大气稳定的共同目标上，也应找到新途径。


In short, what is needed is a massive, joint initiative in innovation, applied science, development, and demonstration.	总之，需要两国在创新、应用科学、发展与示范方面，发起一个联合倡议。


The US component should involve a new, sustained campaign for clean-energy development that involves large and small companies, national laboratories, universities, and non-governmental organizations (a sustained and expanded version of the Department of Energy’s energy investments under Obama’s stimulus legislation).	美国方面要做的，是参与一项针对清洁能源发展、持续不断的新运动，该运动涉及大小公司、国家实验室、高校及非政府组织（这是按照奥巴马经济刺激法案条款、美国能源部能源投资一种持续而扩大的形式）。


The object should be to accelerate and vet the next generation of clean-energy technologies, as well as to meet the level of demand reductions that will be necessary to reduce greenhouse-gas pollution.	该项目是，加快开发并审查下一代清洁能源技术，并满足减少温室气体污染所必须要求削减的能源水平。


While expensive, such an initiative would help give companies and banks the surety they need to invest the capital that these emerging technologies require.	由于花费不菲，这个倡议将有助于给予公司和银行担保，他们需要这种担保来投入清洁能源技术所需的资金。


If so stimulated, the domestic energy market for cheap, low-carbon energy would be a massive force multiplier in the US – or any – economy.	若进行如此激励，则廉价低碳能源的国内能源市场，将是美国或任何国家经济中的一个巨大力量，会令收益倍增。


A US initiative that is not assured of gaining government support would be insufficient, and only if the US forms a partnership with China would adequate scale and speed be attained to meet the challenge.	一项由美国提出、尚未确保政府会支持的倡议，远远不够，只有美国与中国结为伙伴关系，才能获得足够的规模与速度来迎接挑战。


For the reality is that China will build its “nth” plant before the US builds its first.	因为现实就是，在美国建造第一家发电厂之前，中国将建造第N家。


This means that US groups, institutions, and even government agencies must begin sharing with – and sometimes even funding – Chinese companies and organizations.	这意味着美国的团体机构甚至政府部门，必须与中国公司机构合作——有时甚至要为其提供资金。


Such partnerships would cut by half the cost and time of experimenting and learning for the US, while avoiding redundancy and waste.	这种伙伴关系，将为美国减少一半的实验学术成本跟时间，还会避免冗余浪费。


The cost of this effort would be a fraction of what the US would spend on even a single large-scale demonstration project.	这种努力的成本，甚至只是美国在一个大型示范项目上花费的一部分。


But, perhaps more importantly in the long run, it would create the framework of collaboration and trust that is required if the world is to achieve a larger global climate agreement.	不过从长远来看，或许更为重要的是，若世界要达成一项更大的全球气候协议，这种伙伴关系将创建必需的合作与信任框架。


The international energy-technology market is brutal and competitive.	国际能源技术市场竞争残酷。


Every country must selfishly use a surge strategy to gain advantage.	各国都必须不顾他人，采取一种突飞猛进的技术来赢得优势。


But the global environment will not respond to isolated national efforts alone.	但全球自然环境却不会对这种单打独斗各自为政做出应对。


It requires new and deeper forms of collaboration, and the US and China are the most important pieces in the larger mosaic that needs to be assembled.	它需要一种崭新而深入的合作方式，而美中就是这幅需要拼贴组合的大型��赛克蓝图上，最重要的部分。


Should Europe be Fracking?	欧洲应该采用液压致裂法吗？


BRUSSELS – The global energy community is abuzz with excitement about hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” a newish technology that has opened formerly inaccessible reserves of gas trapped in underground shale formations.	布鲁塞尔—国际能源业因“液压破碎法”而欢欣鼓舞，这项新技术可以用于开采蕴藏于页岩层之下的天然气。


The boom in this so-called shale-gas production has allowed the United States to become almost self-sufficient in natural gas.	所谓的页岩气产量的激增能够让美国天然气基本实现自给。


Europe, by contrast, is clearly lagging.	相反，欧洲显然落后了。


Exploration is proceeding only hesitantly and shale-gas production has not even started, prompting many observers to lament that Europe is about to miss the next energy revolution.	勘探工作进行得犹犹豫豫，页岩气的生产更是八字都没有一撇，这让许多观察者哀叹，欧洲就要输掉下一场能源革命了。


Should Europeans be worried?	欧洲应该因此担忧吗？


Critics of Europe’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for fracking miss two key points.	关于欧洲显然缺乏对液压致裂法的热情的批评忽略了两大关键要点。


First, Europe’s geology is different from that of America.	首先，欧洲抵制结构于美国不同。


There is a huge difference between potential deposits hidden somewhere in large shale formations and recoverable reserves that can actually be produced economically.	蕴藏于大规模页岩层中的潜在储量和可以以经济的方式生产的可开采储备是截然不同的。


In fact, estimates by the International Energy Agency suggest that the most significant recoverable reserves of shale gas are in the US and China, not Europe. Moreover, even these estimates are really not much more than educated guesses, because only in the US have shale formations been subject to intense exploration over a period of decades.	事实上，国际能源署的估计表明，大部分可开采页岩气储量在美国和中国，而不是欧洲，此外，这一估计无非就是有点根据的猜测，因为几十年内只有美国的页岩气进行了密集开采。


This process is starting in Europe only now.	欧洲的开采过程则刚刚开始。


Poland appears to have Europe’s most favorable geology, and it might become a significant producer on a local scale in about ten years.	波兰的地质结构是欧洲最优的，有望在十年后成为欧洲主要页岩气生产国。


This is a fortunate coincidence, because shale-gas production would probably make it politically easier to phase out Poland’s economically and environmentally irrational subsidies to local coal production (and consumption).	这是个幸运的巧合，因为页岩气的生产将使停止波兰在经济和环境上都不划算的煤炭生产（和消费）补贴变得更具政治可行性。


Fracking would also be a strategic boon, because it would diminish the country’s dependence on Russia for gas.	液压致裂法也将具有战略利益，因为这能够降低波兰对俄罗斯的天然气依赖。


But pro-fracking critics of the European Union miss a second point: the EU has no authority over the development of shale gas in Europe.	但支持欧盟进行页岩气开采的批评还忽略了第二点：欧盟没有权力在欧洲开发页岩气。


Licensing and regulation of exploration and production are decided at the national level.	开采和生产的许可和管制权属于国家层面的权力。


One must admit, however, that in Europe the “Nimby” phenomenon (not in my backyard) is a much more serious obstacle than it is in the US.	但是，必须承认，在欧洲，“邻避”现象（别在我的后院中搞）的阻碍作用比美国大得多。


While it might be true that Europeans are too sensitive to environmental concerns, incentives also play a role.	欧洲人或许确实对环境问题太过敏感，但激励在其中也起到了作用。


In particular, whereas ownership rights over natural resources in the US typically belong to the individual owner of the land under which the resources lie, in Europe ownership belongs to the state.	特别是，在美国，天然资源的所有权通常归该资源所在土地的所有者所有，而在欧洲，这一所有权是国家的。


As a result, Europeans, facing uncertain environmental consequences while receiving none of the revenues, tend to oppose fracking nearby.	因此，欧洲人既担心环境后果，有得不到任何开采的好处，故而会反对在自家附近开采页岩气。


In the US, by contrast, local residents benefit handsomely from being able to sell their ownership rights to gas companies – a strong counter-balance to fears of environmental costs.	相反，在美国，本地居民可以从向天然气公司出售页岩气所有权获得巨大的好处——这在很大程度上可以抵消对环境成本的担忧。


But private versus state ownership of natural resources is not the only institutional factor underlying the US gas boom.	但自然资源的私人所有权和国家所有权之争并不是美国天然气繁荣的唯一制度性因素。


A seldom-mentioned reason is that shale-gas development in the US has benefited from important tax incentives – a model that Europe has no reason to emulate.	一个鲜被提及的原因是美国的页岩气开发有重要的税收激励——对此欧洲无需模仿。


Governments certainly have a role to play in supporting the development of new technologies, such as fracking; but, once the technology has been developed, there is no reason why one form of gas production should be subsidized via tax breaks.	政府显然应该在支持新技术的开发中扮演角色，液压致裂法就是一例； 但是，当技术已经成熟时，就没有理由要求某种天然气的生产方式应该通过税收减免的形式予以补贴。


But the most crucial – and almost always overlooked – point about fracking is that shale gas, like all hydrocarbons, can be used only once.	但关于液压致裂法���最关键（通常也总是被忽略）的一个要点是页岩气和其他碳氢化合物一样，都是不可再生的。


The real issue is thus not whether shale gas should be developed in Europe, but when it should be used: today or tomorrow.	因此，真正的问题不在于欧洲应不应该开采页岩气，而在于什么时候开采：现在还是将来。


Europe is already a heavy user of gas, but its consumption is stagnating (along with its economy).	欧洲已经是天然气的大用户，但消费量正在（与经济一起）陷入停滞。


Despite the hype about the shale-gas revolution, the extraction cost of (onshore) conventional gas remains below that of shale gas.	尽管人们对页岩气革命兴奋不已，但开采（在岸）传统天然气的成本仍在页岩气之下。


Moreover, an existing pipeline network implies that this conventional gas can be brought to Europe at a low marginal cost.	此外，现有输气管道网意味着传统天然气可以以较低的边际成本运往欧洲。


From an economic (and environmental) standpoint, fracking is thus unlikely to bring large benefits for Europe: shale gas might simply substitute for plentiful conventional gas.	从经济（以及环境）的角度看，液压致裂法并不会给欧洲带来大的好处：页岩气只能对充足的传统天然气起到补充作用。


In an environment of ultra-low interest rates, the economic cost of being late is low.	在利率极低的环境下，动作迟缓的经济成本很低。


The best option for Europe might be to wait and let the market operate.	欧洲的最佳选择或许是等待，让市场来选择。


Fracking is not yet a mature technology, and thus it is very likely to improve over time.	液压致裂法还不是成熟的技术，因此很有可能会随时间的推移而改善。


Maybe Europe will become a leader in “advanced fracking” when the shale-gas deposits in the US have already been exhausted.	或许在美国页岩气储量开采殆尽的时候，欧洲会成为“高级液压致裂法”的领先者。


Austere Growth?	财政紧缩下的增长？


WASHINGTON, DC – The German government’s reaction to newly elected French President François Hollande’s call for more growth-oriented policies was to say that there should be no change in the eurozone’s austerity programs.	华盛顿——法国新任总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德提倡施行更多促进经济增长的政策，德国政府对此的回应是，欧元区的紧缩项目不能做任何改变。


Rather, growth-supporting measures, such as more lending by the European Investment Bank or issuance of jointly guaranteed project bonds to finance specific investments, could be “added” to these programs.	不过，促进增长的配套措施，如，欧洲投资银行提供更多贷款或是发行联合担保债券来给具体的投资提供资金，这些政策可以“添加”到紧缩项目里。


Many inside and outside of Germany declare that both austerity and more growth are needed, and that more emphasis on growth does not mean any decrease in austerity.	许多德国的内部和外界人士都宣称，财政紧缩和更多的增长都是必要的，而且重视增长并不意味着在削弱紧缩政策。


The drama of the ongoing eurozone crisis has focused attention on Europe, but how the austerity-growth debate plays out there is more broadly relevant, including for the United States.	正在上演欧元区危机主要集中在欧洲，但是紧缩和增长的论战如何在那里收场，这关系到更多的国家，包括美国。


Three essential points need to be established.	 有三个重点需要明确。


First, in a situation of widespread unemployment and excess capacity, short-run output is determined primarily by demand, not supply.	第一，在失业和产能过剩普遍存在的情形下，短期的产量则主要是由需求而不是由供给决定。


In the eurozone’s member countries, only fiscal policy is possible at the national level, because the European Central Bank controls monetary policy.	在欧元区的成员国中，只有财政政策是国家级的，可以有各国自己决定，因为欧洲银行控制着货币政策。


So, yes, more immediate growth does require slower reduction in fiscal deficits.	所以，是的，更直接的增长确实需要缓慢地减少财政赤字。


The only counterargument is that slower fiscal adjustment would further reduce confidence and thereby defeat the purpose by resulting in lower private spending.	唯一的反驳观点是，缓慢的财政调整，将会进一步减少消费信心，导致私人消费更低，从而使财政调整计划泡汤。


This might be true if a country were to declare that it was basically giving up on fiscal consolidation plans and the international support associated with it, but it is highly unlikely if a country decides to lengthen the period of fiscal adjustment in consultation with supporting institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.	如果一个国家完全放弃财政整顿计划以及国际支持，这种情况的确会成真。 但是，如果一个国家决定与国际货币基金组织磋商，延长财政调整期限，这种情况就不可能发生。


Indeed, the IMF explicitly recommended slower fiscal consolidation for Spain in its 2012 World Economic Outlook.	事实上，国际货币基金组织在2012年的《世界经济展望》报告中明确建议西班牙进行缓慢的财政整顿。


Without greater short-term support for effective demand, many countries in crisis could face a downward spiral of spending cuts, reduced output, higher unemployment, and even greater deficits, owing to an increase in safety-net expenditures and a decline in tax revenues associated with falling output and employment.	没有更多的短期有效需求的支持，处于危机中的许多国家面临着多种螺旋式下跌，缩减预算，降低产量，更高的失业率，更严重的赤字，这些都是由经济“安全网”投入的增加和税收收入的下降导致的，这些税收的减少与产量和就业率的降低息息相关。


Second, it is possible, though not easy, to choose fiscal-consolidation packages that are more growth-friendly than others.	第二，虽说不容易，但是选择一些更有利于经济增长的财政调整一揽子计划也不是不可能的。


There is the obvious distinction between investment spending and current expenditure, which Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti has emphasized.	投资支出和经常支出有着很明显的区别，意大利总理马里奥·蒙蒂如是强调。


The former, if well designed, can lay the foundations for longer-term growth.	前者，如果设计合理，将可能为更长期的发展奠定基础。


There is also the distinction between government spending with high multiplier effects, such as support to lower-income groups with a high propensity to spend, and tax reductions for the rich, a substantial portion of which would likely be saved.	那些具有倍数效应的政府开支，例如，对低收入却高消费群体的支援，与对富人的减税也是有区别的，相当一部分支出是没有必要的。


Last but not least, there are longer-term structural reforms, such as labor-market reforms that increase flexibility without leading to large-scale lay-offs (a model rather successfully implemented by Germany).	最后一项要点是，长期的体制改革，如，劳动力市场改革，增加了市场灵活性却并未导致大规模的裁员（这种模式在德国成功施行）。


Similarly, retirement and pension reforms can increase long-term fiscal sustainability without generating social conflict.	同样，退休金和养老金改革，可以促进长期的财政稳定，而不带来社会冲突。


A healthy older person may well appreciate part-time work if it comes with flexibility.	如果工作有了灵活性，一个健康的老年人很有可能会喜欢做一些兼职。


The task is to integrate such work into the overall functioning of the labor market with the help of appropriate regulation and incentives. 	关键任务就是在合理的管理和激励下，将这种工作与劳动力市场的全面运作相融合。


Finally, particularly in Europe, where countries are closely linked by trade, a coordinated strategy that allows more time for fiscal consolidation and formulates growth-friendly policies would yield substantial benefits compared to individual countries’ strategies, owing to positive spillovers (and avoidance of stigmatization of particular countries).	最后，尤其是在欧洲，各国被贸易紧密地联合在一起。 这种为财政调整提供更多时间并形成有利于经济增长政策的协调战略，与单个国家战略相比，将会产生大量的益处，这些益处来源于正面溢出效应（同时避免了某些国家的偏见）。


There should be a European growth strategy, rather than Spanish, Italian, or Irish strategies.	所需要的是欧洲经济增长策略，而不是西班牙，意大利，或是爱尔兰战略。


Countries like Germany that are running a current-account surplus would also help themselves by helping to stimulate the European economy as a whole.	像德国一样拥有经常账户盈余的国家，也可以通过帮助刺激整个欧洲的经济增长来帮助它们自己。


Slower fiscal retrenchment, space for investment in government budgets, growth-friendly fiscal packages, and coordination of national policies with critical contributions from surplus countries can go a long way in helping Europe to overcome its crisis in the medium term.	更慢的财政调整，给政府预算投资留空间，建立有利于经济增长的财政一揽子计划以及将国家政策与盈余国家的关键性贡献相协调，这些对帮助欧洲克服其中期贷款危机大有益处。


Unfortunately, Greece has become a special case, one that requires focused and specific treatment, most probably involving another round of public-debt forgiveness.	不幸的是，希腊已经成为一个特例，需要特别的关注和对待，很有可能需要另一轮的公债减免。


But insufficient and sometimes counterproductive actions, coupled with panic and overreaction in financial markets, have brought some countries, such as Spain, which is a fundamentally solvent and strong economy, to the edge of the precipice, and with it the whole eurozone.	但是一些不充分的或是事与愿违的行为，加上金融市场的惊慌和过度反应，导致许多国家，如西班牙，这个��经经济繁荣，完全有偿债能力的国家，现在到了悬崖边缘，整个欧元区都同它一起到了这种境地。


In the immediate short run, nothing makes sense, not even a perfectly good public-investment project, or recapitalization of a bank, if the government has to borrow at interest rates of 6% or more to finance it.	从短期来看，如果政府不得不以6%的利率贷款来为一个看似完美的公共投资项目或者一个银行的资本重组来融资，这一切都什么没意义。


These interest rates must be brought down through ECB purchases of government bonds on the secondary market until low-enough announced target levels for borrowing costs are reached, and/or by the use of European Stability Mechanism resources.	这些利率必须通过欧洲央行在二级市场上购买政府债券来下调，直到借贷成本利率足够低，达到已宣布的目标水平，或者利用欧洲稳定机制的资源，或者二者并用来达到目的。


The best solution would be to reinforce the effectiveness of both channels by using both – and by doing so immediately.	最好的解决办法就是二者并用，而且立刻行动，来增加这两种方式的有效性。


Such an approach would provide the breathing space needed to restore confidence and implement reforms in an atmosphere of moderate optimism rather than despair.	这种方式会在一种适当乐观而不是绝望的气氛中，为恢复信心，施行改革提供必要的呼吸空间。


The risk of inaction or inappropriate action has reached enormous proportions.	不作为或行动不当带来的风险已经很大了。


No catastrophic earthquake or tsunami has destroyed southern Europe’s productive capacity.	没有灾难性的地震或海啸摧毁欧洲南部的生产能力。


What we are witnessing – and what is now affecting the whole world – is a man-made disaster that can be stopped and reversed by a coordinated policy response.	我们正在经历的——正在影响整个世界的——是一场人为的灾难，但是通过协调一致的政策来回应，这些灾难是可以制止或是逆转。


Austerity and Debt Realism	紧缩和债务的现实


CAMBRIDGE – Many, if not all, of the world’s most pressing macroeconomic problems relate to the massive overhang of all forms of debt.	美国剑桥—当今世界许多（如果不是所有的话）最重要的宏观经济问题都与各种各样的债务大规模积压有关。


In Europe, a toxic combination of public, bank, and external debt in the periphery threatens to unhinge the eurozone.	在欧洲，外围国的公共债务、银行债务和对外债务相互交错，已经威胁到了欧元区的生存。


Across the Atlantic, a standoff between the Democrats, the Tea Party, and old-school Republicans has produced extraordinary uncertainty about how the United States will close its 8%-of-GDP government deficit over the long term.	在大西洋对岸，民主党、茶党和老派共和党之间的僵局不禁让人疑惑：从长期看，美国应该怎样消除占GDP 8%政府预算？


Japan, meanwhile is running a 10%-of-GDP budget deficit, even as growing cohorts of new retirees turn from buying Japanese bonds to selling them.	日本的预算赤字相当于GDP的10%，即便不断增加的退休群体从日本国债的买入者转变为卖出者。


Aside from wringing their hands, what should governments be doing?	除了焦躁不安之外，政府应该怎样做？


One extreme is the simplistic Keynesian remedy that assumes that government deficits don’t matter when the economy is in deep recession; indeed, the bigger the better.	一个极端是简单照搬凯恩斯主义疗法，认为在经济陷入深度衰退时，政府赤字无关紧要，甚至可以说是越大越好。


At the opposite extreme are the debt-ceiling absolutists who want governments to start balancing their budgets tomorrow (if not yesterday).	另一个极端是债务上限绝对论，认为政府应该从明天（既然往者不可追）就开始平衡预算。


Both are dangerously facile.	这两种观点都太过轻率。


The debt-ceiling absolutists grossly underestimate the massive adjustment costs of a self-imposed “sudden stop” in debt finance.	债务上限绝对论者大大低估了自我发生的债务融资“骤停”所造成的巨大调整成本。


Such costs are precisely why impecunious countries such as Greece face massive social and economic displacement when financial markets lose confidence and capital flows suddenly dry up.	这类调整成本正是希腊等缺钱国在金融市场失去信心、资本流突然告竭时出现重大社会和经济混乱的原因。


Of course, there is an appealing logic to saying that governments should have to balance their budgets just like the rest of us; unfortunately, it is not so simple.	当然，你可以站着说话不腰疼地认为政府应该像我们大家那样平衡它们的预算； 不幸的是，事情并非那么简单。


Governments typically have myriad ongoing expenditure commitments related to basic services such as national defense, infrastructure projects, education, and health care, not to mention to retirees.	一般来说，政府都做出了为数据大的支出承诺，通常与国防、基础设施项目、教育和卫生（更不用说退休者了）等基本服务有关。


No government can just walk away from these responsibilities overnight.	没有哪个政府可以一觉醒来拍拍屁股甩掉这些责任包袱。


When US President Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, he retroactively rescinded all civil-service job offers extended by the government during the two and a half months between his election and the inauguration.	1981年1月20日，罗纳德·里根就任美国总统。 上任后，里根逆势而动，废除了在他当选和上任之间两个半月时间里政府所增加的公共服务职位。


The signal that he intended to slow down government spending was a powerful one, but the immediate effect on the budget was negligible.	这表明他削减政府支出的坚定决心，但由此造成的即期预算效应却是负面的。


Of course, a government can also close a budget gap by raising taxes, but any sudden shift can significantly magnify the distortions that taxes cause.	当然，政府可以通过增税来缩小预算差额，但任何税法的骤变都会放大扭曲。


If the debt-ceiling absolutists are naïve, so, too, are simplistic Keynesians.	如果说债务上限绝对论者有些幼稚，那么凯恩斯主义者同样头脑简单。


They see lingering post-financial-crisis unemployment as a compelling justification for much more aggressive fiscal expansion, even in countries already running massive deficits, such as the US and the United Kingdom.	他们认为，居高不下的后金融危机时期失业率足以表明应该采取更为激进的财政扩张，就算美国和英国这样已经存在巨额赤字的国家也是如此。


People who disagree with them are said to favor “austerity” at a time when hyper-low interest rates mean that governments can borrow for almost nothing.	任何意见相左者都被他们视为是在利率极低因而政府几乎可以无成本借贷的情况下鼓吹“紧缩”。


But who is being naïve?	但到底是谁幼稚？


It is quite right to argue that governments should aim only to balance their budgets over the business cycle, running surpluses during booms and deficits when economic activity is weak.	政府应该只追求在整个经济周期内实现预算平衡，在繁荣期积累盈余，在经济活动疲软期增加赤字，这当然是正确的。


But it is wrong to think that massive accumulation of debt is a free lunch.	但认为巨额债务积累是免费午餐就大错特错了。


In a series of academic papers with Carmen Reinhart – including, most recently, joint work with Vincent Reinhart (“Debt Overhangs: Past and Present”) – we find that very high debt levels of 90% of GDP are a long-term secular drag on economic growth that often lasts for two decades or more.	在与卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）合作的一系列学术论文中——包括最近的与文森特·莱因哈特（Vincent Reinhart）的工作《债务积压：过去和现在》（Debt Overhangs: Past and Present）——我们发现，达到GDP的90%的高债务水平是在长期拖累经济增长的重要因素，其效果通常会持续二十年以上。


The cumulative costs can be stunning.	累计成本可能达到惊人的程度。


The average high-debt episodes since 1800 last 23 years and are associated with a growth rate more than one percentage point below the rate typical for periods of lower debt levels.	自1800年以来，高债务时期平均会维持23年，且通常伴随增长率比低债务时期低1个百分点以上的现象。


That is, after a quarter-century of high debt, income can be 25% lower than it would have been at normal growth rates.	也就是说，在经历了四分之���的高债务时期后，收入会比正常增长率情形低25%。


Of course, there is two-way feedback between debt and growth, but normal recessions last only a year and cannot explain a two-decade period of malaise.	当然，债务和增长之间的反馈是双向的，但常规衰退只维持1年时间，无法解释长达二十年的萎靡。


The drag on growth is more likely to come from the eventual need for the government to raise taxes, as well as from lower investment spending.	对增长的拖累更有可能来自政府最终需要增税以及投资支出的下降。


So, yes, government spending provides a short-term boost, but there is a trade-off with long-run secular decline.	因此，诚然政府支出可以提供短期刺激，但需要在它和长期非周期性衰退之间做出权衡。


It is sobering to note that almost half of high-debt episodes since 1800 are associated with low or normal real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates.	注意，自1800年以来，几乎一半的高债务时期伴随着低或正常水平的真实（经通胀调整）利率，这一点令人警醒。


Japan’s slow growth and low interest rates over the past two decades are emblematic.	日本在过去二十年中的低增长和低利率就是明证。


Moreover, carrying a huge debt burden runs the risk that global interest rates will rise in the future, even absent a Greek-style meltdown.	此外，即使希腊是的崩溃不发生，背负沉重的债务包袱也要承受全球利率在未来有所升高的风险。


This is particularly the case today, when, after sustained massive “quantitative easing” by major central banks, many governments have exceptionally short maturity structures for their debt.	这一点在今天尤其适用——在主要央行持续大规模“量化宽松”后，许多国家的国债期限结构变得极短。


Thus, they run the risk that a spike in interest rates would feed back relatively quickly into higher borrowing costs.	因此，它们面临着利率升高将相对较快地反映为借贷成本升高的风险。


With many of today’s advanced economies near or approaching the 90%-of-GDP level that loosely marks high-debt periods, expanding today’s already large deficits is a risky proposition, not the cost-free strategy that simplistic Keynesians advocate.	如今，许多发达国家都达到或在接近90%GDP的债务水平，很显然已经步入了高债务时期，将已然规模很大的赤字进一步扩张到了危险水平，头脑简单的凯恩斯主义者所鼓吹的无成本战略已经站不住脚了。


I will focus in the coming months on the related problems of high private debt and external debts, and I will also return to the theme of why this is a time when elevated inflation is not so naïve.	在未来几个月中，我将关注与高私人债务和对外债务有关的问题，也将回归为何这一回通胀高企不再是杞人忧天这一主题。


Above all, voters and politicians must beware of seductively simple approaches to today’s debt problems.	总而言之，选民和政客必须当心，不要落入当今债务问题存在简单解决之道这一观点的陷阱。


Weimar 2013?	魏玛2013？


NEW YORK – The worst crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression of the 1930’s has reawakened grim memories on both sides of the Atlantic.	发自纽约——最近这场自上世纪30年代经济大萧条以来最严重的经济危机再次唤醒了大西洋两岸人们的惨痛回忆。


The ghost of Franklin Delano Roosevelt haunts Barack Obama’s United States.	富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福（Franklin Delano Roosevelt）的幽灵正困扰着奥巴马领导下的美国。


Historical arguments over whether FDR’s New Deal worked now form an important part of American debates over current monetary and fiscal policy in general, and the US Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing in particular.	对于罗斯福新政是否起作用的历史争议现已成为美国国内对当前总体货币及财政政策争议的一个重要部分，尤其针对美联储的量化宽松政策。


In Europe, where national economic failure once led to the collapse of democracy itself, people are now asking if it could happen again.	而在欧洲这个国家经济失败曾经导致民主崩溃的大陆，人们则担忧着历史会否重演。


Some see another Weimar moment, reminiscent of the belt-tightening and surging unemployment that characterized Heinrich Brüning’s Germany and helped to bring the Nazis to power.	有些人觉得这将是另一个魏玛时代，因为这令人想起了海因希里·布吕宁（Heinrich Brüning）领导下的德国——开支紧缩，失业率激增，随后就是纳粹掌权。


At first sight, the reasons to dismiss this scenario seem overwhelming.	初看之下，有很多理由可以用来反驳这种联想。


If the European Union has done one thing, it is to make war between France and Germany unthinkable.	如果说欧盟曾取得过任何成就，那就是它消除了德法之间爆发战争的可能性。


Thus, the entire geopolitical context is far less threatening than it was in the 1930’s.	因此欧洲的整个地缘政治环境也远比上世纪30年代安全得多。


Moreover, the ideological extremes that excited and polarized the continent back then are hardly in vogue today.	此外，当时那种挑拨并分化欧洲大陆的意识形态困境现在已经不流行了。


Discredited by the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, communism is effectively moribund, and its core constituencies – where communist parties manage to hang on – are aging and incapable of reproducing themselves.	随着东欧的苏维埃阵营和苏联集团土崩瓦解，共产主义实际上已经奄奄一息了，而在它的核心选区——那些共产党设法坚持下来的地方——正在不断老化并失去了重整旗鼓的能力。


As for fascism, its political heirs in countries like Italy and France must contend with the stigma of the past.	在法西斯主义方面，它在意大利和法国这些国家的政治继承人必须面对其过去的耻辱。


Vivid memories of total war and genocide, frequently revived, hinder any revival of the totalitarian parties of the right.	人们对全面战争和种族灭绝的鲜活回忆至今仍在不断被提起，遏制了任何右派极权主义政党的复苏。


This is also why we are unlikely to see the return of military regimes in southern Europe or anywhere else; the suffering that they caused is too vivid in the collective memory.	这也是我们不大可能看到南欧或其他任何地方回归军政府统治的原因； 这类政权所引发的苦难在人们的集体记忆中太过深刻了。


The last thing the Portuguese or Greek armies want to do is assume responsibility for governing.	而葡萄牙或希腊军队最不愿意做的事就是承担治理国家的责任。


Then there is the most fundamental – and hence easily overlooked – difference of all.	然后还有一个最基本——因此也最容易被忽略的——差异。


In the 1930’s, politics attracted the masses because people believed in the future.	上世纪30年代，政治能够吸引群众是因为人们相信未来。


Millions marched for the great causes of the day, and hundreds of thousands joined political parties – often for life.	数百万的人为了当时的目标游行，成千上万的人加入各个政党——而且往往把自己的对党派的忠诚延续终生。


Today’s marches and demonstrations are a feeble reminder of those times, while parties everywhere are hemorrhaging members.	而如今的游行和示威只不过让人们隐约想起了过去那些时代，各地的政党也在大批量地流失党员。


But it would be rash to conclude that the interwar crisis has nothing to teach us. Quite the contrary.	然而就此得出我们无法从发生在两次大战之间的危机中得到任何教训的结论又太轻率了。


In the 1930’s, the US and Britain were among the few countries in the world where multi-party democracy survived.	上世纪30年代，美国和英国是世界上为数不多的可以保留多党民主体制的两个国家。


Almost everywhere else veered sharply to the right.	几乎所有其他国家都急转走向极端右派。


In Germany and Italy, fascist parties came out on top, while elsewhere, dictators were backed by armies or kings.	在德国和意大利，法西斯政党旗开得胜，然而在别的国家，军队或国王都支持独裁者。


Analyzing these events much later, historians constructed elaborate typologies to distinguish between fascist and merely authoritarian regimes.	在分析后来这些的事件的时候，历史学家们建立起复杂详尽的类型学来区分法西斯主义政权和仅仅是独裁的政权。


These differences were not trivial.	这些差别并不是微不足道的。


But much more important was what the fascist and authoritarian regimes shared – all were beneficiaries of a sweeping collapse of the legitimacy of democratic politics.	然而更重要的是法西斯主义政权和独裁政权的共同点是什么——它们都是民主政治合法性全面崩溃的受益者。


They all thereby indicated that democracy is not some kind of natural condition, nor some end-point of history whose stability and permanence can be taken for granted.	因而它们都显示出民主政治并不是什么自然状态，也不是历史的终点——历史的稳定性和永久性并不是想当然的存在。


On the contrary, democracy’s strength lies not just in its character, but in its achievements as well.	相反地，民主政治的优势不仅在于它的特性，也在于它的成就。


Its popularity can ebb quickly when it becomes associated with crippling and systemic failure, whether on the battlefield – as in France in 1940 – or in the corporate boardroom and on the factory floor.	当它产生严重且系统性失败时，不管是在战场上——正如1940年在法国——还是在公司董事会或工厂车间，它的受欢迎程度都会迅速衰落。


Those who doubt that this could happen again should consider the European country hardest hit in the current crisis – Greece.	那些怀疑这类形势是否还会出现的人应该考虑一下当前危机中受创最严重的欧洲国家——希腊。


After the colonels’ junta there fell in 1974, a democratic system sprang up.	在希腊的军政府于1974年倒台后，民主体制应运而生。


Two main parties began to alternate in power and European integration acted as a stabilizer for domestic politics.	国内两大政党开始轮流掌权，而欧洲一体化则充当国内政治的稳定剂。


It is not doing so now.	而现在不是这样了。


On the contrary, Greece’s creditors – and its own politicians – have handled the crisis in a way that has thrown the entire constitutional achievement of the past four decades into doubt.	相反地，希腊的债权人——还��希腊本国的政治家们——处理危机的方式使过去40年的宪政成就都遭到了质疑。


Indeed, the political turmoil caused by the crisis has broken the back of the old two-party system.	确实，由这次危机引起的政治动乱彻底颠覆了旧有的两党制。


Between 2010 and 2012, the center-left PASOK was in government, doing whatever it took to preserve Greece’s membership of the euro and ward off formal default.	在2010到2012年间，偏左翼的泛希腊社会主义运动党执政，它实施了一切可以保持希腊欧元成员国身份并避免正式违约的措施。


The result was that its electoral support plunged from 44% to 12%.	结果却是其选举支持率从44%暴跌至12%。


It is now a wizened and humiliated husk of a party.	现在该党只剩下一个衰落而耻辱的外壳。


The entire center left is in flux, and new parties will probably come and go.	而整个中左翼阵营都处于动荡不安之中，而新的政党可能会不断涌现然后又有销声匿迹。


The center-right New Democracy has also lost ground, though not as badly.	中左翼的新民主党也处于不利的地位，虽然情况还没有那么坏。


But a new force has emerged on its flank: Golden Dawn, a frankly neo-Nazi party that is spreading violence on the streets and in public life, and seeing its popular support increase as a result.	但它的旁边则出现了一股新的力量：金色黎明党（Golden Dawn）——这个新纳粹政党正在街头和公共生活中宣扬暴力，而它得到的公众支持竟因此不断上升。


The catalyst of Golden Dawn’s sudden rise is not Greece’s large population of illegal immigrants – their presence predates the rightward shift by many years – but rather the massive rise in poverty and unemployment over the last three years and, above all, growing popular anger with the political class as a whole.	而刺激金色黎明党突然崛起的因素并不是希腊庞大的非法移民人口——这些移民在政治右倾之前好多年已经出现了——而是过去三年里贫困率与失业率的飙升，尤其人们是对整个政治阶层不断膨胀的愤怒。


In short, the crisis has produced a deep delegitimization of Greece’s democratic politicians and their supposed achievements.	简而言之，这场危机剥夺了希腊民主政治家和他们本该取得的成就的合法性。


This is not Weimar.	然而这并不是魏玛时代。


But it does illustrate how rapidly in early twenty-first-century Europe democracy has been undermined through the endless application of the economics of austerity, and by the failure of political leadership at home and abroad.	但它确实说明了由于无休止地实施经济紧缩以及政治领导在国内外的失败，欧洲民主制度在21世纪初是如何迅速被破坏的。


What might replace democracy is another matter.	什么政体能取代民主是另外一个问题。


But we should not be complacent merely because we cannot imagine the alternatives.	但我们也不应该仅仅因为想不到替代品而止步不前。


Austerity and the Modern Banker	紧缩政策与现代银行家


WASHINGTON, DC – Santa Claus came early this year for four former executives of Washington Mutual (WaMu), a large US bank that failed in fall 2008.	发自华盛顿特区——对于华盛顿互惠银行（已于2008年秋倒闭）的四名前高管来说，今年的圣诞老人已经提前降临了。


The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had brought a lawsuit against the four, actions that included taking huge financial risks while “knowing that the real estate market was in a ‘bubble.’”	联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）早前向这四人发起诉讼，指控他们在“明知房地产市场正处于‘泡沫’的情况下”依然承担巨额财政风险等行为。


The FDIC sought to recover $900 million, but the executives have just settled for $64 million, almost all of which will be paid by their insurers; their out-of-pockets costs are estimated at just $400,000.	原告试图追回9亿美元款项，但四名被告最终将赔款额锁定在6400万美元，且绝大部分都由其保险公司支付； 他们自己需要掏的估计只有40万美元。


To be sure, the executives lost their jobs and now must drop claims for additional compensation.	毫无疑问，这几名高管不但丢了工作，同时也必须放弃向原倒闭企业追讨额外补偿金。


But, according to the FDIC, the four still earned more than $95 million from January 2005 through September 2008.	但据联邦存款保险公司称，这四人在2005年1月至2008年9月间已经取得了超过9500万美元的收入。


So they are walking away with a great deal of cash.	可见他们这次可算是成功脱身且依然富得流油。


This is what happens when financial executives are compensated for “return on equity” unadjusted for risk.	而这也是以往金融企业在未衡量风险的情况下向高管们发放“股本回报率”补偿时所发生的情景。


The executives get the upside when things go well; when the downside risks materialize, they lose nothing (or close to it).	年景好的时候高管们赚了大头； 而当经济下滑风险爆发的时候，他们照样（几乎）毫发未伤。


At the same time, their actions – and similar actions by other bankers – are directly responsible for both the run-up in housing prices and the damaging collapse that followed.	与此同时，他们的行为——以及其他银行家的类似行为——却直接导致了住宅价格的上涨以及随后的毁灭性崩溃。


That collapse has impacted non-bankers in many negative ways, including through the loss of more than eight million jobs.	此次崩溃以许多负面方式对银行界以外的人们造成了影响，其中就包括了超过800万职位的流失。


It is also leading to austerity – taxes are increasing and government spending is falling at the local and state level around the country.	崩溃也导致了紧缩政策的出台——全国各地，无论是州还是地方层面都出现了加税以及缩减政府支出的状况。


A difficult fiscal conversation still lies ahead at the federal level, but cuts and contractions of various types seem likely.	而在联邦财政层面虽然面对着一个艰苦的讨价还价过程，但各种形式的削减和收缩措施似乎都有可能出台。


Some people argue that Americans need to tighten their belts.	有些人提出美国人应该勒紧裤带过日子。


That’s an interesting discussion, particularly at a time with unemployment is still above 8% (with recent declines largely the result of many jobless workers’ decision to stop looking and drop out of the labor force altogether).	这个讨论相当有趣，尤其是在失业率还维持在8%以上的时候（而最近的下降则源自于许多失业劳动者停止求职并退出劳动力大军的决定）。


Precipitate austerity is hardly likely to help the economy find its way back to higher employment levels.	仓促出台的紧缩政策似乎也无法帮助经济重回高就业率的轨道。


But what about government support for the big banks?	但政府对大银行的支持是否也会因为当前的财政压力而减弱？


Is this contracting in the light of our current fiscal pressures?	很不幸，答案是否定的；


Unfortunately, it is not; much government support remains, implicitly through allowing banks to be “too big to fail,” and explicitly through various kinds of backing provided by the Federal Reserve.	大部分的政府支持依然存在，一方面是暗中默许银行“大而不倒”，另一方面则公然通过美联储输送各种形式的支援。


The rationale – or perhaps we should call it ideology – behind supporting big banks is that they are needed for the economy to recover.	而支持大银行的背后逻辑——或者应该称之为理念——则是国家需要它们来实现经济复苏。


But this position looks increasingly doubtful when the banks are sitting on piles of cash while creditworthy consumers and businesses are reluctant to borrow.	但在当前银行坐拥大量现金而信用良好的消费者和企业却都不愿意贷款的情况下，这一立场就逐渐令人难以信服了。


The same situation exists in Europe today, where the reality is even starker.	欧洲当前也存在同样的情况，而且更加残酷。


Banks are receiving ever-larger bailouts, while countries that borrowed are cutting social programs and face rising social tensions and political instability as a result.	银行获得了规模史无前例的援助，而那些向银行贷款的国家却在削减社会福利项目，并因此面临着不断高涨的社会矛盾和政治不稳定状况。


Countries like Greece, Italy, and arguably Portugal over-borrowed, and now their citizens face severe consequences.	希腊（或许还能算上葡萄牙）这样的国家过度借债，而他们的人民正面对着严重后果。


But the bankers face no consequences whatsoever for over-lending.	但那些过度发放贷款的银行家们却无需为任何后果买单。


To be sure, some major European financial institutions may now face difficulties, and – who knows – perhaps some of their executives will end up being fired.	可以肯定的是，一些主要欧洲金融机构如今可能正面临着困境，而它们的某些高管（说不定）最终会丢掉工作。


But does anyone think that the people who ran European banks into the ground will leave their positions with anything less than considerable wealth?	但是否有人认为这些把欧洲银行带入如斯境地的人不会带着巨额财富离职？


There is no real austerity – now or possibly in the future – for leading bank executives.	可见对于那些过度发放贷款的银行家来说，不管是现在还是未来，紧缩都是不存在的。


The protesters of “Occupy Albany” issued a powerful consensus statement recently, which reads in part:	对此 “占领奥尔巴尼（美国纽约州首府）”运动的示威者们最近发布了一份有说服力的共识宣言，其部分内容如下：


“The interests of those who purchase influence are rewarded at the expense of the People, from whom the government’s just power is derived.	“那些金钱来换取影响力的人通过牺牲人民的利益来实现自己的利益，而政府的公平权力却来自于人民。


We believe that this failure in our system is at the core of many interconnected issues we face as a society, and its resolution is key to a just future.	我们相信该系统的失灵正是这个社会当前所面对的许多相联问题的核心，而对此的解决方案则是通往一个更公平未来的钥匙。


We therefore demand true democracy, decoupled from the corrosive influence of concentrated economic power, and we call all who share in this common goal to stand with us and take action toward this end.”	有见及此，我们要求实现一个与经济寡头势力的腐蚀性影响脱钩的真正民主，同时呼吁那些认同这一共同目标的人们与我们一起行动起来，共同实现这一点。 ”


Big banks represent the ultimate in concentrated economic power in today’s economies.	在当今的经济中大银行恰恰代表着金融寡头势力的利益。


They are able to resist all meaningful reform that could really change their compensation schemes.	它们有能力去阻止任何影响其补偿方案的切实改革。


Their executives want to get all the upside while facing none of the true downside.	它们的高管们想占尽所有的便宜却逃避任何风险。


But capitalism without the prospect of failure is not any kind of market economy.	但市场经济下的资本主义怎么可能完全排除失灵的可能性？


We are running a large-scale, nontransparent, and dangerous government subsidy scheme for the benefit primarily of a very few, extremely wealthy people.	因此我们正在执行一个大规模，不透明而且危险的政府资助计划，而该计划却仅仅是为了一小撮极端富有者的利益服务。


Jon Huntsman, a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, is addressing this directly – insisting that we should force the largest banks to break up and to become safer. No other candidate for the presidency is seriously confronting this issue head-on: just saying “we’ll let them fail” is no kind of answer when the failure of megabanks would cause so much damage.	美国共和党候选人洪博培（Jon Huntsman）直接提出了这一点——他坚持我们应当迫使那些大银行进行分拆并因此变得更为安全稳健——而其他候选人都未对此问题作出认真回应：随口说一句“我们会让它们破产”在那些大银行破产可能导致巨大破坏的情况下就是一句空话。


We should learn from both the WaMu and the Occupy movement. In both cases, the lesson is the same: concentrated financial power is a gift that keeps on giving – but not to you.	我们应当从华盛顿互惠银行和占领运动上吸取教训，而这两件事的教训其实是一样的：金融寡头势力就是一个不断发放好处的善人——只不过受益者不是你罢了。


Back to the Brink for the Eurozone?	欧元区再临悬崖？


ISTANBUL – When European Central Bank President Mario Draghi announced in late July that the ECB would “do whatever it takes” to prevent so-called “re-denomination risk” (the threat that some countries might be forced to give up the euro and reintroduce their own currencies), Spanish and Italian sovereign-bond yields fell immediately.	伊斯坦布尔—当欧洲央行行长德拉吉在7月底宣布欧洲央行将“尽一切努力”防止所谓的“重新计价风险”（即一些国家可能被迫放弃欧元、重新使用本国货币的风险）时，西班牙和意大利主权债务收益率马上出现了下跌。


Then, in early September, the ECB’s Council of Governors endorsed Draghi’s vow, further calming markets.	接着，在9月初，欧洲央行委员会主席的发言又支持了德拉吉的誓言，进一步稳定了市场情绪。


The tide of crisis, it seemed, had begun to turn, particularly after the German Constitutional Court upheld the European Stability Mechanism, Europe’s bailout fund.	危机潮流似乎已经开始逆转，特别是在德国宪法法院支持欧洲援助基金——欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）之后。


Despite the ECB’s imposition of conditionality on beneficiaries of its “potentially unlimited” bond purchases, financial markets across Europe and the United States staged a major rally.	尽管欧洲央行的强调，享受其“实质无限量”债券买入计划好处是有条件的，但整个欧洲和美国的金融市场都出现了大反弹。


It seems, however, that the euphoria was short-lived.	但是，兴奋期很快就过去了。


Yields on Spanish and Italian government bonds have been inching up again, and equity investors’ mood is souring.	西班牙和意大利政府债券收益率已经开始回升，股票投资者的情绪也在消沉。


So, what went wrong?	那么，哪里出了问题？


When I welcomed Mario Draghi’s strong statement in August, I argued that the ECB’s new “outright monetary transactions” program needed to be complemented by progress toward a more integrated eurozone, with a fiscal authority, a banking union, and some form of debt mutualization.	8月份，我为德拉吉的强硬发言欢欣鼓舞，我指出，欧洲央行新的“直接货币交易”（OMT）计划需要辅之以更加一体化、拥有财政当局、银行联盟和某种形式的债务共同化的欧元区。


The OMT program’s success, I argued, presupposed a decisive change in the macroeconomic policy mix throughout the eurozone.	我指出，OMT计划的成功需以欧元区宏观政策组合的决定性变化为前提。


There has been some progress, albeit slow, toward agreement on the institutional architecture of a more integrated eurozone.	尽管有些缓慢，但在达成更一体化的欧元区的制度框架方面还是取得了一定进展。


The necessity of a banking union is now more generally accepted, and there is a move to augment the European budget with funds that could be deployed with policy or project conditionality, in addition to ESM resources.	银行联盟的必要性被更多人接受了，在ESM之外，欧洲预算资金也有所增加，可以根据政策和预先确定的条件使用。


(Germany and its northern European allies, however, insist that this be an alternative to some form of debt mutualization, rather than a complement to it.)	（不过，德国及其北欧盟国仍坚持这是某种形式的债务共同化的替代方案，而不是补充方案）。


The ESM, supported by the ECB, could become a European version of the International Monetary Fund, and the new funds in the European budget could become, with support from the European Investment Bank, Europe’s World Bank.	欧洲央行所支持的ESM可以成为欧洲版的IMF，而欧洲预算的新资金可以在欧洲投资银行的支持下成为欧洲版的世界银行。


All of this will take time, but there is some movement in the right direction.	所有这些都需要时间，但至少已经开始向正确的方向前进。


Where there has been virtually no progress at all is in the recalibration of the macroeconomic policy mix.	几乎在原地踏步的领域是宏观经济政策组合的改变。


The prevailing strategy in Europe remains simply to force internal devaluation on the southern countries, with excessive austerity aimed at causing severe wage and price deflation.	欧洲主流战略仍是强迫南欧国家进行内部贬值，实施旨在引导工资和价格大通缩的过度紧缩。


While some internal devaluation is being achieved, it is producing so much economic and social dislocation – and, increasingly, political upheaval – that there is no supply response, despite the accompanying structural reforms.	某些内部贬值目标已经实现，但造成了大规模的经济和社会混乱——政治局势也开始日渐趋乱，以至于尽管实施了相应的结构性改革，仍然没有带来供给面的反应。


Indeed, the deflationary spiral, particularly in Greece and Spain, is causing output to contract so rapidly that further spending cuts and tax increases are not reducing budget deficits and public debt relative to GDP.	事实上，通缩循环，特别是希腊和西班牙的通缩循环，正在造成产出的快速下降，致使进一步的减支和增税并不能拉低预算赤字和公债占GDP的比重。


And Europe’s preferred solution – more austerity – is merely causing fiscal targets to recede faster.	欧洲所偏好的解决方案——紧缩的唯一效果是把财政目标推得更远了。


As a result, markets have again started to measure GDP to include some probability of currency re-denomination, causing debt ratios to look much worse than those based on the certainty of continued euro membership.	结果，市场开始重新评估GDP，考虑货币重新计价的可能性，导致债务比率看上去比确定将留在欧元区内的国家糟糕得多。


While all of this is happening in Europe’s south, most of the northern countries are running current-account surpluses.	所有这一切都发生在南欧，大部分北欧国家都存在经常项目盈余。


Germany’s surplus, at $216 billion, is now larger than China’s – and the world’s largest in absolute terms.	德国的盈余高达2160亿美元，已经超过了中国，以绝对值衡量，为世界之最。


Together with the surpluses of Austria, the Netherlands, and most non-eurozone northern countries – namely, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway – northern Europe has run a current-account surplus of $511 billion over the last 12 months.	在加上奥地利、荷兰和未加入欧元区的北欧国家——瑞士、瑞典、丹麦和挪威，北欧国家去年经常项目盈余总量为5110亿美元。


That is larger than the Chinese surplus has ever been – and scary because it subtracts net demand from the rest of Europe and the world economy.	这一数字比中国任何一年的盈余都要大，也更可怕，因为这是牺牲欧洲其他国家和世界经济的净需求得来的。


Inflicting excessive austerity on the southern European countries while limiting their exports by restricting effective demand in the north is like administering an overdose to a patient while withholding oxygen.	让南欧实施过度财政紧缩，同时又通过限制北欧有效需求束缚了它们的出口，这就好比是一边给病人过度用药，一边拔掉病人的氧气管。


The political and economic success of southern Europe’s much-needed structural reforms requires the proper dose and timing of budgetary medicine and buoyant demand in the north.	南欧所急需的结构性改革是否可以取得政治和经济上的成功，取决于改革剂量是否合理以及预算药方是否及时、北欧需求是否坚挺。


The northern countries argue that permitting wage growth and boosting domestic demand would reduce their competitiveness and trade surplus.	北欧国家指出，增加工资、提振内需会削弱它们的竞争力、影响贸易盈余。


But that misses the entire point: surplus countries must contribute no less than deficit countries to global and regional rebalancing, because the world economy cannot export to outer space.	但这纯属无稽之谈：盈余国必须理应在实现全球和地区再平衡方面做出比赤字国更大的贡献，因为世界经济不可能向太空出口商品。


This argument was always emphasized when the Chinese surplus was deemed excessive, but it is virtually ignored when it comes to northern Europe.	在论及中国盈余过量问题时，这一论点一再被强调，但在牵涉北欧国家时，它又被忽略了。


If conservative politicians and economists in Europe’s north continue to insist on the wrong overall macroeconomic policy mix in Europe, they could yet bring about the end of the eurozone, and, with it, the end of the European project of peace and integration as we have known it for decades.	如果北欧保守政客和经济学家坚持实施错误的欧洲整体宏观经济政策组合，那么欧元区可能将因此走向末日，几十年来的欧洲和平和统一工程也将随之寿终正寝。


This is not to argue against the need for vigorous structural and competitiveness-enhancing reforms in the south; it is to give those reforms a chance to succeed.	这并不在反对南欧国家必须实施的结构性改革和竞争力强化改革； 而是在增加这些改革成功的机会。


Austerity Politics, Then and Now	巩固财政：大萧条与今天


PRINCETON – Britain’s policy of fiscal consolidation, recently announced by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, sent shock waves around the world.	普林斯顿——英国财政大臣乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）近日宣布了财政巩固政策，震惊全球。


Osborne argued that Britain was on the brink: that there was no alternative to his policy if the country was to avoid a massive crisis of confidence.	奥斯本辩称，英国正站在悬崖边上——若想避免一场严峻的信心危机，除此之外别无他法。


Other countries, such as Greece, needed to have a full-blown crisis in order to prompt such adjustment measures, whereas Britain was acting prudently and preemptively.	如希腊等国，非待到危机充分爆发不可，才被迫出台此类调整政策，相形之下，英国可谓虑事周详、出手果决。


If Britain, with a relatively low share of public debt to GDP (64.6%) is worried, the implication is that many other countries should be much more concerned.	英国的公债GDP占比（64. 6%）其实不算最高，连它都着急了，说明好些别的国家更应该是如坐针毡。


But drastic attempts at fiscal consolidation immediately evoke memories of the Great Depression.	然而财政巩固这剂猛药令人立即回想起大萧条。


Andrew Mellon, the United States Treasury Secretary at the time, talked about liquidating workers, farmers, stocks, and real estate in order “to purge the rottenness out of the system.”	时任美国财政部长的安德鲁·梅林（Andrew Mellen）曾主张将工人、农场主、证券和房地产债务清盘，“把脓水挤掉”。


In Britain back then, Philip Snowden, a small man with a narrow, pinched face, who needed a cane to walk, seemed to want to remake the British economy in his physical image.	当年的英国财相菲利普·斯诺登（Philip Snowden）——一个脸庞瘦削、不良于行的小个子，也厉行财政收缩，仿佛是要把英国经济照他自己的模子重新刻一个出来似得。


Given these historical analogies, a slew of heavyweight Keynesian critics are warning that the world is about to repeat all the disasters caused by bad fiscal policy in the 1930’s.	由于有这样一番历史联想，一大批重量级的凯恩斯派评论家如今正齐声警告，说我们将重蹈20世纪30年代恶劣财政政策的覆辙，将遭受一切可能导致的灾难。


But this interpretation of the Great Depression, common though it is, is misguided.	但关于大萧条的这种解释版本，虽很流行，却是错的。


In the first place, the critics get their history wrong.	首先，这些评论家没学好历史。


US President Herbert Hoover’s administration did not initially respond to the depression by emphasizing the need for fiscal austerity.	当时主政美国的胡佛（Herbert Hoover）总统当局，对萧条的最初反应并不是强调紧财政。


On the contrary, Hoover and other figures argued in a perfectly modern, Keynesian fashion that large-scale public-works programs were needed to pull the economy out of the trough.	恰恰相反，胡佛和其他一些人物曾抱有一种十足现代、凯恩斯式的主张，认为只有出台大规模公共就业项目，才能把经济拉出泥潭。


Moreover, today’s Keynesians ignore the urgency behind the depression-era concern with balanced budgets.	此外，当今的凯恩斯派没看到，大萧条时代之所以那么在乎预算平衡，背后是有苦衷的。


When the Hoover administration did swing to fiscal tightening, it was responding to pressures from the capital and foreign-exchange markets, which in turn were responding to the crises in Latin America and Central Europe, where public finances had been a major part of the problem.	胡佛政府后来之所以转向财政紧缩，是为了应对来自资本和外汇市场的压力，也就是由拉美和中欧的经济危机所引起的反应，而后者的问题恰恰是主要出在公共财政方面。


Beginning in September 1931, the markets became nervous about the US, causing large outflows from American banks – and thus from the dollar.	从1931年9月开始，市场紧张起美国来了，出现了资本从美国各银行大规模流出的现象——也就是逃离美元。


The Depression had rendered capital markets incapable of absorbing large quantities of government (or, indeed, any other) debt.	大萧条使得资本市场无力吸收巨量的政府债（其实连什么债都吸收不了了）。


As a result, fiscal consolidation appeared to be the only way to restore confidence.	结果，财政巩固成了重振信心的唯一出路。


Great Britain in 1931 already grasped this logic.	1931年英国已照此逻辑行事。


Snowden was worried that any attempt by the British government to borrow would fail, which would constitute an “admission of national bankruptcy.”	斯诺登担心英国政府的任何举债尝试都将无功而返，可能导致“承认国家破产”。


That September, concerns about public debt and the British government’s ability to enforce austerity led to a run on the pound.	当年9月，对公债以及英国政府是否能推行紧财政的忧虑导致对英镑的恐慌式抛售。


Rather than trying to mount a last-ditch defense of the fixed exchange rate, the government, at the suggestion of the Bank of England, agreed to abandon the gold standard and devalue the pound.	英国政府没有为捍卫固定汇率而背水一战，而是在英格兰银行的建议下，放弃了金本位，让英镑贬值。


A third problem with the conventional Keynesian interpretation is that the balanced-budget approach during the Great Depression did actually work.	大萧条的传统凯恩斯式解释版本的第三个问题是，预算平衡方法在当时的确起了作用。


It calmed markets, and Britain’s departure from the gold standard freed monetary policy from its previous constraints, and allowed a monetary stabilization.	它安抚了市场，英国放弃金本位令货币政策由先前的束缚中解放出来，使得货币性的稳定政策得以可能。


The country was no longer subject to imported deflation via the fixed exchange rate.	该国再也不用担心通货紧缩经由固定汇率传导到国内。


But an equally important part of the recovery process was that Britain had left gold with a more or less balanced budget.	但同样重要的是，英国在抛开金本位的同时，也在相当程度上平衡了预算。


That was why monetary policy could be managed with greater flexibility.	这样一来，它才能够以更大的灵活性来管理其货币政策。


The balanced budget thus allowed Britain to have a strong recovery, ensuring that the 1930’s were a much better decade for the British economy than the 1920’s had been.	预算平衡使得英国强劲复苏，确保英国经济在30年代中远远好过20年代。


Finally, those who view the Great Depression as fundamentally a product of tight fiscal policies and “Treasury orthodoxy” overlook the much greater culpability of a fixed exchange-rate regime for the transmission of bad monetary policy, and thus for fueling the contraction.	最后，认为大萧条基本上是紧财政政策和“财政正统思想”产物的那些人忘记了，固定汇率体制才是更大的罪人，它使得恶劣的货币政策四处传导，引发通缩。


The major question today should be whether the failure of capital markets (and the implications for government debt) after 2007 has been as severe as during the Great Depression.	今日的主要问题在于，2007年之后累积起来的资本市场失灵（以及由此而来的政府负债问题），是否已经严重到大萧条的水平。


At the moment, there has not been widespread revulsion against all government debt, and some countries today clearly have better access than others to capital markets, enabling them to finance their deficits externally.	眼下，尚未出现对所有政府债的普遍厌恶���某些国家在资本市场的信誉也相对较好，它们还可以由外部筹措资金来支付赤字。


The debate about room for fiscal maneuver in practice soon becomes a debate about whether countries that have easily financed debt in the past can automatically continue to do so.	关于财政操作空间的辩论实际上很快会变成另一种辩论，即过去能够轻易获得融资的国家将来是否仍然有此能力。


We are still in the last stages of a bubble in government debt that arose in the first stage of the financial crisis from the “flight to security” of US Treasuries.	我们仍处于政府债泡沫的最后阶段，这个泡沫是金融危机最初阶段市场资金纷纷向美债“寻求避风港”所堆积起来的。


When that bubble collapses, it will hit not just the weaker countries – the equivalent of sub-prime mortgages – but also stronger creditors.	这个泡沫一旦破灭，将不仅仅冲击脆弱的债务国——引发另一场相当于次贷危机的危机，而且也将冲击强大的债权国。


In the Great Depression, one of the big surprises was the devastating abruptness with which markets turned on the US.	大萧条中的一大惊人现象是，市场在百般慌乱之中突然向美国寻求救命稻草。


In the late summer of 1931, the dollar, alongside the French franc, appeared to be the strongest currency in the international system.	1931年夏末，美元连同法国法郎一起，变成国际体系中最坚挺的货币。


That precedent should serve as a warning of how vulnerable governments and their finances can rapidly become, and of how fiscal policy can stand in the way of a monetary approach oriented toward stability.	这个前车之鉴触目惊心地说明了，政府及其财政会在一夜之间变得何其脆弱，而不适当的财政政策会成为稳定性货币政策多么大的绊脚石！


Greece in the spring of 2010 sent a wake-up call to Great Britain.	2010年春天的希腊危机把英国从睡梦中惊醒。


The British response should prompt other industrial economies, above all the US, to tackle their long-term fiscal weaknesses.	英国的应对措施理应带动其他工业化经济体——尤其是美国，去治理它们长期性的脆弱财政。


The Austerity Pandemic	紧缩传染病


NEW YORK – At this year’s International Monetary Fund/World Bank spring meetings in Washington, DC, the IMF urged European countries to ease their austerity policies and focus on investment, marking a shift from past rhetoric.	纽约—在今年春天的IMF/世界银行华盛顿会议上，IMF口风一变，敦促欧洲国家放松紧缩政策并专注于投资。


But, in the corridors of those two multilateral institutions, there was talk of double standards.	但是，在这两个多边机构内部，人们在大谈双重标准。


In fact, most countries are cutting public expenditures – with the IMF’s support.	事实上，大部分国家在削减公共支出——在IMF的支持下。


So, even as some northern countries begin to question the austerity prescription, their southern counterparts (including southern European countries) are increasingly adopting fiscal-adjustment measures.	因此，尽管北方国家开始质疑紧缩药方，南方国家（包括南欧国家）正在日渐采取财政调整措施。


According to IMF projections, of the 119 governments that are shrinking their 2013 budgets (relative to GDP), three-quarters are in developing countries (including 21 low-income and 68 middle-income countries).	据IMF的预测，有119个国家2013年缩减了预算（相对GDP），其中四分之三是发展中国家（包括21个低收入国家和68个中等收入国家）。


Fiscal consolidation affects an estimated 80% of developing-country citizens, and its impact is expected to intensify steadily through 2015.	财政整合影响了约80%的发展中国家人民，到2015年，其影响面预计还会稳步扩大。


During this time, the magnitude of contraction will be significant, with roughly one-quarter of all developing countries expected to cut expenditures below pre-crisis levels.	在此期间，收缩幅度将相当大，发展中国家大约四分之一将把支出削减至危机前水平。


A review of policy discussions from 314 IMF country reports published since 2010 – part of a comprehensive update on the global shift toward austerity – shows that many adjustment measures are most prevalent in developing countries, where citizens are especially vulnerable to austerity’s economic and social consequences.	2010年以来发布的314个IMF国家政策讨论观点报告——部分反映了全球转向紧缩的全面更新情况——表明，许多调整措施��要在发展中国家普遍实行，而发展中国家的人民特别容易受紧缩的经济和社会后果影响。


The most common adjustment measure, which governments in 78 developing countries are considering, is subsidy reduction.	最普遍的调整措施是削减补贴，有78个发展中国家政府在考虑该措施。


Deliberations on the subject are often – indeed, in 55 developing countries – accompanied by discussion of the need for a targeted social safety net to offset higher food, energy, or transport costs for the poorest citizens.	对这一主题的审议——事实上，有55个发展中国家是如此——伴随着定向社会保障网的需要，以抵消最贫困人民食品、能源和交通成本的提高。


But developing and implementing a social-protection floor takes time, and governments do not seem to be willing to wait.	但发展和实施社会保障需要时间，而政府似乎不愿意等待。


At a time when the need for food assistance is particularly high, some governments have withdrawn food subsidies and others have scaled back subsidies for agricultural inputs like seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, hindering local food production.	如今，食品援助需求特别迫切，一些政府却取消了食品补贴，另一些国家削减了对种子、肥料和杀虫剂等农业投入品的补贴，妨碍了地方粮食生产。


Similarly, public-sector wage cuts and caps – currently being pursued by 75 developing countries – threaten to undermine service delivery to citizens, particularly at the local level in poor rural areas, where a single teacher or nurse can determine whether a child receives an education or health care.	类似地，公共部门工资削减和封顶——目前有75个发展中国家实施该措施——有可能破坏人民得到的服务，特别是在贫困农村地区，在这些地区，一名教师或护士的去留决定着儿童是否能获得教育和卫生服务。


This danger is heightened as policymakers in 22 developing countries consider health-care reforms and those in 47 developing countries discuss pension reforms.	22个发展中国家的决策者考虑进行卫生改革，47个发展中国家在讨论退休金改革，这使得这一问题更加迫切了。


On the revenue side, as many as 63 developing countries are considering raising consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax.	在收入端，63个发展中国家在考虑提高增值税等消费税。


But taxing basic foods and household items can have a disproportionate impact on lower-income families, whose limited disposable incomes are already stretched thin, and thus can exacerbate existing inequalities.	但对基本食品和住房项目征税会对可支配收入早已捉襟见肘的低收入家庭造成不相称的冲击，加剧已有的不平等性。


Instead of slashing expenditures, developing-country leaders should focus on providing decent job opportunities and improved living standards for their citizens.	发展中国家领导人不应该削减支出，而应该专注于为人民提供体面工作机会和改善生活水平。


They must recognize that austerity will not help them to achieve their development goals.	他们必须认识到，紧缩无助于他们实现发展目标。


On the contrary, spending cuts will hurt their most vulnerable citizens, widen the gap between rich and poor, and contribute to social and political instability.	相反，支出削减会伤害最脆弱的人民，拉大贫富差距，增加社会和政治不稳定。


Indeed, civil unrest is already on the rise across the developing world.	事实上，国内动荡已经在发展中世界愈演愈烈。


From the Arab Spring to the violent food riots that have erupted in recent years across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, populations are reacting to the cumulative effects of pervasive unemployment, high food prices, and deteriorating living conditions.	从阿拉伯之春到近几年在亚洲、非洲和中东发生的暴力食品动乱，民众正在对普遍失业、食品价格高企和生活条件恶化的累积效应产生反弹。


Ours does not have to be an age of austerity; governments, even in the poorest countries, have options to foster a socially responsive economic recovery.	我们的时代并不注定是紧缩的时代； 政府，即使是最贫困国家的政府，也可以选择打造能引起社会反响的经济复苏。


These include, among other measures, debt restructuring, increasing the progressivity of taxation (on personal income, property, and corporations, including the financial sector), and curbing tax evasion, the use of tax havens, and illicit financial flows.	这些选择包括（但不限于）债务重组、增加税收的累进性（对象可以是个人所得、物业和公司，包括金融部门）以及减少逃税、遏制避税场所和违法金融流。


Ultimately, reducing wages, public services, and household income impedes human development, threatens political stability, lowers demand, and delays recovery.	说到底，降薪、减少公共服务和降低家庭收入阻碍人类发展，威胁政治稳定，抑制需求，推迟复苏。


Rather than continuing to adhere to policies that do more harm than good, policymakers should consider a new approach – one that actually contributes to their countries’ social and economic progress.	决策者不应该继续坚持弊大于利的政策，而应该考虑新方法——能真正有助于国家社会和经济进步的方法。


No Agnostics in the Climate Foxhole	在气候避弹坑中没有不可知论者


SYDNEY – On a recent 14.5-hour flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, I had time to read the columnist Charles Krauthammer’s collection of essays, Things that Matter.	悉尼——最近在从洛杉矶到悉尼的一次14个半小时的飞行中，我抽时间拜读了专栏作家查尔斯·克劳萨默的散文集《最重要的事》。


It made for a disturbing flight.	看完后令人不安的情绪挥之不去。


I have enjoyed Krauthammer’s writing over the years, but there was something in his book that I found deeply troubling: his description of himself as an “agnostic” on climate change.	多年来我一直很喜欢克劳萨默的著作，但我在他的著作中觉察到一种令人不安的情绪：他以气候变化的“不可知论者”来形容自己。


He “believes instinctively that it can’t be very good to pump lots of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere,” and yet he “is equally convinced that those who presume to know exactly where that leads are talking through their hats.”	他“凭直觉认为向空气中排放大量二氧化碳肯定不是好事，”但同时他又“同样相信那些认为自己确切知道结果的人是在胡言乱语。 ”


The word that I found most galling was “agnostic” – not only because Krauthammer is a trained scientist, but also because the word was used repeatedly by former Australian Prime Minister John Howard when he addressed a group of climate-change deniers in London in late 2013.	最令我感到难堪的词是“不可知”——这不仅因为克劳萨默是一位训练有素的科学家，也因为澳大利亚前总理约翰·霍华德在2013年末的伦敦面对一群气候变化否定者讲话时也反复使用过这个词。


“Part of the problem with this debate,” Howard told the assembled skeptics, “is that to some of the zealots involved their cause has become a substitute religion.”	霍华德告诉聚在一起的怀疑者，“这类辩论的部分问题是某些狂热的参与者已经把这项事业变成了宗教的代名词。 ”


As Howard and Krauthammer should know, the subject of climate change is not a matter of religion, but of science.	霍华德和克劳萨默应该知道，气候变化不是宗教而是科学。


According to a 2013 survey of peer-reviewed publications on the subject, some 97% of scientists endorse the position that humans are causing global warming.	据2013年同行评审出版物的一项调查显示，约97%的科学家赞同人类造成全球变暖问题。


Anyone familiar with the scientific process is aware that researchers are trained to disagree, to contest one another’s hypotheses and conclusions.	任何熟悉科学流程的人都知道研究人员受过专门的训练提出异议，质疑彼此的假设和结论。


A consensus of such magnitude is as close as we ever get to a recognized scientific fact.	如此大面积的共识几乎代表了有史以来最接近于公认的科学事实。


Given that even Krauthammer concedes that pumping the atmosphere full of carbon dioxide “can’t be very good,” the next logical step in the debate is to determine the best way to address the problem.	鉴于即使克劳萨默本人也承认向空气中排放二氧化碳“不是什么好事”，那么接下来的合理步骤是确定解决问题的最佳途径。


As an economist, I favor an auction-based cap-and-trade system to put a price on carbon.	作为经济学家，我更愿意建立以拍卖为基础的碳价限额交易体制。


But I also understand the potential usefulness of regulatory measures like targets for renewable energy, bans on incandescent light bulbs, and mandates for the use of biofuels.	但我也理解可再生能源目标、禁用白炽灯泡和授权使用生物燃料等监管措施的潜在有效性。


What I cannot accept is for somebody who offers no solutions to claim that those of us who do are “talking through our hats.”	但我无法接受有人不但不提供解决方案还声称我们这些提供的人是在胡言乱语。


Fortunately, voices like Krauthammer’s are becoming increasingly rare.	幸运的是，像克劳萨默这样的论调越来越罕见。


To be sure, there are still holdouts, like Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who replaced a carbon tax with a plan to tax the country’s citizens in order to pay polluters to cut emissions.	无疑确有澳大利亚总理艾伯特这样的顽固份子，打算用公民税计划取代碳税以求付钱让污染者减排。


As a policy, this is inequitable, inefficient, and unlikely to lower emissions at a pace that is sufficient to meet the conditions of the global climate-change agreement expected to be reached in Paris in December.	这是一项不公平的低效政策，而且不太可能将排放速度降到能满足12月将在巴黎达成的全球气候变化协议所规定的条件。


A sure sign of a shift in mentality is the growing recognition by financial institutions that loans and investments may be overexposed to the risks of climate change.	心态转变的一个明确迹象是金融机构日益认识到贷款和投资可能会过度暴露于气候变化的风险。


These risks include natural disasters, more extreme weather, efforts by governments to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and the knock-on effect of a technological revolution in renewables, energy efficiency, and alternative technologies.	上述风险包括自然灾害、极端天气、减少温室气体排放的政府行动以及可再生能源、节能和替代技术等技术革命所产生的连锁效果。


According to the Asset Owners Disclosure Project, which I chair, the top 500 global asset owners are alarmingly exposed to the dangers of climate change.	据我本人任主席的资产所有者披露项目显示，全球资产500强所有者惊人地遭受到气候变化威胁。


More than half of their investments are in industries exposed to the dangers of climate change; less than 2% are in low-carbon intensive industries.	他们超过一半的投资都是在面临气候变化威胁的领域； 只有不到2%是低碳密集型产业投资。


As a result, there is a risk that their investments and holdings will become “stranded,” as changes in policy or market conditions cut the value of infrastructure, other property, and fossil-fuel reserves.	结果是他们的投资和控股将面临“搁浅”的危险，因为政策和市场条件的变化削减了基础设施、其他财产和化石燃料储备的价值。


As Hank Paulson, Secretary of the US Treasury when the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, once warned, the risks of a climate-induced financial crisis would dwarf those of the sub-prime crisis.	正如2008年全球金融危机爆发时任美国财长的保尔森曾经警告的那样，气候变化引发的金融危机风险将使次贷危机风险相形见绌。


The price of coal, for example, has plunged to around half of its peak level, with plenty of room remaining on the downside.	比如煤炭价格就已经下跌到将近峰值一半的水平，而且还有足够的空间继续下行。


Consequently, shares in coal companies have fallen by as much as 90%, leaving asset owners scrambling to divest.	因此，煤炭企业的股价已经下跌了90%，导致资产所有者争先恐后地撤出投资。


By contrast, investing in a company like Tesla Motors – which has now developed a rechargeable battery for home use, which could lead to a sharp increase in the number of households switching to solar power – looks far more attractive.	相反，对像特斯拉这样已成功研发出家用充电电池的公司的投资（这一发明可能导致改用太阳能发电的家庭数量急剧增加）看上去更有前景。


As this realization percolates through the market, asset owners are hedging their bets by increasing their investments in low-carbon industries and companies like Tesla.	随着这样的认识逐渐渗透市场，资产所有者通过增加对低碳产业和类似特斯拉等企业的投资进行风险对冲。


Over time, this will have a significant effect on the allocation of global investment funds.	随着时间推移，这将对全球投资资金分配产生显著的影响。


Krauthammer may think that I am talking through my hat, but I am confident that soon enough he – and those who listen to him – will be eating theirs.	克劳萨默或许认为我是在胡言乱语，但我相信他——和他的追随者很快就会悔不当初。


International law tolerates some such building – as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have been doing for years, though on a much smaller scale.	国际法容忍某些这样的建设活动——比方说菲律宾、越南和马来西亚这样做已经有多年历史，虽然规��要小得多。


What’s the Matter With Austria?	奥地利怎么了？


MUNICH – Last month, Austria avoided the election of a president from the xenophobic Freedom Party by the skin of its teeth.	发自慕尼黑——上个月，奥地利人差一点就将一位持排外主义立场的奥地利自由党候选人为总统。


Indeed, the Freedom Party is now challenging the result.	事实上自由党依然在质疑这一败选结果。


Given the worrying nature of the populist challenge, and its implications for European politics and the handling of the refugee crisis, it is important to diagnose what ails Austria, so that the cure doesn’t end up being worse than the disease.	鉴于民粹主义挑战令人担忧的本质，及其对欧洲政治和难民危机处理的影响，要紧的事情莫过于搞清楚奥地利究竟得了什么病，好让治疗方案不至于最终变得比疾病本身更糟。


Austria was once lauded as Germany’s more successful neighbor, one of Europe’s fastest-growing countries.	奥地利曾一度被誉为比德国更成功的邻邦，欧洲增长最快的国家之一。


But its economy has been sputtering since 2012, with GDP up last year by a meager 0.7%; only Greece and Finland performed more poorly.	但其经济自2012年以来逐渐放缓，GDP同比去年只实现了0. 7％的微薄增长；


And Austria’s unemployment rate has soared, from 5% in 2010 to 10% today.	只比垫底的希腊和芬兰好一点，而失业率则从2010年的5%飙升到当前的10％。


These developments have their origins in how Austria engaged with Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism.	这些发展要从奥地利如何与共产主义倒台后的中东欧国家相处说起。


At first, Austria benefited from the European Union’s eastern enlargement.	起初奥地利从欧盟东扩中受益。


International trade soared, Austrian firms invested heavily in the region, and Austrian banks opened subsidiaries there, financing these countries’ modernization.	国际贸易额猛增，奥地利公司在该地区投入巨资，该国各大银行纷纷开设当地分支机构，为这些国家的现代化提供融资。


All of this was good for business, and the Austrian economy grew rapidly.	所有这一切都是非常有利于企业经营，令奥地利经济迅速发展。


But a hidden dynamic ultimately turned the tables on this success.	但一个潜藏的动力最终将令这一有利形势发生了逆转。


Central and Eastern European countries had low per capita income, but were rich in skills. Austria, far wealthier, was not.	中欧和东欧国家的人均收入虽低，却蕴藏着丰富的高素质人力资源，而富裕程度远高于此地的奥地利则并非如此。


In 1998, 16% of Central and Eastern Europeans (including Russia and Ukraine) had academic degrees, compared to just 7% of Austrians.	1998年，中东欧地区（包括俄罗斯和乌克兰）有16％的人口拥有学位，奥地利只有7％。


So, when Austrian firms invested in Eastern Europe, they did not just relocate low-skilled manufacturing jobs; they also offshored the parts of the value chain that required specialized skills and produced valuable research.	所以，当奥地利公司投资于东欧之时，他们不只是搬迁低技能的制造业职位； 同时也将需要专业技能并生产有价值的研究成果的一部分价值链外包了出去。


According to my research, from 1990 to 2001, Austrian subsidiaries in Eastern Europe employed five times as many people with academic degrees, as a percentage of staff, as their parent firms did. They also engaged 25% more research personnel in their labs.	根据我的研究，1990至2001年间，奥地利企业在东欧子公司的雇员中拥有学位者的比例是其母公司的五倍，在东欧地区设立的研究室配备的研究人员数量也比母公司多出25%。


This relocation of research activity lowered growth in Austria and boosted growth in Eastern Europe.	研究工作的迁移令奥地利和东欧的经济此消彼长。


Research spills over to the rest of the economy, as new knowledge diffuses into commercial activities. Tapping the knowledge produced by Austrian subsidiaries was one of the ways Eastern European economies were able to grow so quickly.	随着新的知识不断扩散到商业活动之中，研究溢出到经济的其他部分，利用奥地利企业东欧子公司所生产的知识也成为东欧经济体实现快速增长的途径之一。


Today, Bratislava, Prague, and Warsaw – the location of most Austrian subsidiaries – have higher per capita incomes than Vienna.	如今，布拉迪斯拉发，布拉格和华沙——大多数奥地利企业分公司的所在地——人均收入都高于维也纳。


Indeed, according to the Hungarian economist Zsolt Darvas, in terms of purchasing power parity, all three cities surpassed Vienna in 2008.	事实上匈牙利经济学家佐尔特·达瓦斯（Zsolt Darvas）的研究表明，以购买力平价计算，这三个城市都在2008年超过了维也纳。


This is a remarkable development, given that Vienna has served as a reference point for these capitals for centuries.	这堪称一个令人刮目相看的发展，因为几个世纪以来维也纳一直是这几座首都的参照系。


Germany’s growth was not similarly affected, for three reasons. To begin with, after the fall of Communism, Austria reoriented its foreign direct investment almost exclusively to Eastern Europe, which accounted for nearly 90% of its FDI outflows.	德国的经济增长并没有受到类似的影响，原因有三：首先，共产主义垮台之后，奥地利的对外国直接投资方向几乎全部指向东欧，占其外国直接投资额近90％。


In Germany, just 4% of FDI moved to Eastern Europe in the 1990s, reaching 30% at the turn of the century. As a result, Austria became much more integrated with Eastern Europe.	而德国转向东欧的外国直接投资在1990年代只有4%，在世纪之交才达到30％，可见奥地利与东欧的整合程度更高。


Second, Germany was richer in skills than Austria.	其次，德国的高素质人力资源比奥地利更丰富。


In 1998, the share of the German population with academic degrees was 15%, more than double the Austrian level.	1998年时拥有学历的德国人口比例为15％，是奥地利的一倍。


German firms did relocate high-skilled work to the east, but not to the extent that Austria did.	德国公司也将高技能工种向东迁移，但并未达到奥地利那样的程度。


As a proportion of the workforce, German affiliates in Eastern Europe employed three times as many people with academic degrees as their parent firms did. And German subsidiaries employed 11% more researchers than their parent companies.	德国企业在东欧子公司的雇员中拥有学位者的比例是其母公司的三倍，在东欧地区研究室配备的研究人员数量也比母公司多出11%。


Finally, many of the Austrian parent companies were themselves subsidiaries of foreign firms, while German firms were German multinationals, which transplanted their corporate culture to their Central and Eastern European subsidiaries.	最后，许多奥地利母公司本身也是外国公司的子公司，而德国公司就是德国人自己的跨国企业，后者不断将自身的企业文化移植到中东欧的子公司。


They employed more German managers relative to local managers, which gave them more control over innovation.	他们雇用的德国管理人员数量比当地管理人员数量更多，令企业能减少创新技术的外流。


Furthermore, most German investments were based on the transfer of an established technology; only 8% of the country’s FDI in the region involved cutting-edge research.	此外，大多数德国投资是基于成熟技术的转移； 只有8％的中东欧外国直接投资涉及前沿研究。


By contrast, Austrian firms adapted their business to the region’s environment and employed more local managers than Austrians.	相比之下，奥地利公司针对当地环境调整了业务和并雇佣了更多的本地管理人员。


As a result, their subsidiaries were more autonomous in their innovation decisions. There was no mechanism that guaranteed that the knowledge created in a subsidiary also benefited the parent company.	这样一来，他们的附属机构在创新决策方面的自主性更高，也有没有机制保��去子公司创造的知识能同时有利于母公司。


If Austria is to return to its previous growth path, it will have to become more attractive as a location for innovation.	如果奥地利想恢复到以前的增长路径的话，就必须成为更具吸引力的创新产地。


And to do this, Austrian firms must employ highly qualified people in their research labs.	而要做到这一点，奥地利企业必须将高素质的人才导流到本国的研究实验室。


Educating a highly skilled workforce takes time, of course.	培养高技能人才当然需要时间。


But fortunately, Austria has another option: immigrants.	但幸运的是奥地利可以选择另一种方案：移民。


Austrian policymakers could choose to follow Canada’s example and introduce a selective immigration policy that welcomes highly skilled migrants and refugees.	政策制定者效仿加拿大那样制定选择性的移民政策来引入高技能移民和难民。


Austrians nearly closed the door on that option.	但问题是奥地利人差点就关闭了通往该选项的大门。


Now they must recognize that what populists call a weakness could be Austria’s best hope for reviving growth.	如今他们必须认识到民粹主义者口中的弊端可能就是重振增长奥地利的最大希望。


Authentic Leadership	真性情领导力


COLOMBO – The theme of this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, is “Responsible and Responsive Leadership.”	科伦坡—今年瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛的主题是“领导力：应势而为，勇于担当”。


But one possible reading of Donald Trump’s victory in the United States presidential election is that voters these days care less about responsibility than “authenticity.”	但对唐纳德·特朗普赢得美国总统竞选的一个可能的解读是如今选民更多地关注“真性情”而不是“勇于担当”。


Voters welcomed Trump’s reckless comments on sensitive issues because he was speaking his mind and being true to himself.	选民对特朗普关于敏感话题的鲁莽评论趋之若鹜，因为他说出自己的想法，坦诚面对自己。


Ordinary politicians, by always saying the “right” thing, seem packaged and staged.	普通政客总是说“正确”的东西，看起来像是包装好在演戏。


But does authenticity need to involve recklessness?	但真性情就一定要鲁莽吗？


Alternatively, can “politically correct” behavior be a form of recklessness, to the extent that it evades difficult issues and focuses on what is easier to justify rather than what is right?	或者，“政治正确”的行为可以以鲁莽的形式出现，只要它能规避难题、聚焦于更容易论证而不是正确的内容吗？ 真性情是否包括直面焦虑和痛苦？


Does authenticity involve facing the anxiety and anguish that Jean-Paul Sartre thought was the inevitable companion of freedom and responsibility?	让-保罗·萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre）认为，自由和担当与焦虑和痛苦是相辅相成、密不可分的。


These are questions for economic policymakers as much as for anyone else.	这些问题对于经济决策者很重要，对其他所有人也同样重要。


Policymakers approach their task in two fundamentally different ways.	决策者完成任务可以通过两种完全不同的方法。


One paradigm regards economic policies as a set of universal best practices.	第一种范式将经济政策视为一组放之四海而皆准的最佳实践。


The more you adopt, the more they (investors) will come.	你采取得越多，他们（投资者）来的也越多。


The other paradigm views policies as solutions to specific problems.	另一种范式将政策视为具体问题的解决方案。


Because each society has a unique set of characteristics, constraints and goals, policies are necessarily idiosyncratic: the path is made by walking.	各个社会都有各自独一无二的特征、约束和目标，因此政策也必然是异质的：路是走出来的。


This does not mean that one should disregard what can be learned from others; but imitation without adaptation is a recipe for ineffectiveness, if not worse.	这并不意味着应该否认从他人的经验中学习； 但照搬的模仿必然导致低效甚至更加糟糕的情况。


It can easily imply importing solutions to non-existent problems, while letting real problems fester.	这很有可能意味着引进针对根本不存在的问题的解决方案，而真正的问题继续恶化。


Colombia and Panama illustrate the contrast between these approaches.	哥伦比亚和巴拿马可以说明这两种方针之间的对比。


For much of the recent past, economic policymaking in Colombia has been driven by two goals: signing a free-trade agreement with the US (in effect since 2012) and joining the OECD (in negotiation since 2013).	在最近的大部分时间里，哥伦比亚经济决策一直由两个目标推动：与美国签订自由贸易协定（2012年生效）和加入经合组织（2013年开始谈判）。


(True, other important initiatives have been the peace process and the expansion of the road network, though these are not, strictly speaking, economic policies).	（诚然，其他重要计划包括和平进程和扩张道路系统等，但严格讲这些不属于经济政策。 ）


In the meantime, Colombia’s main obstacle to growth, which arguably is the lack of export dynamism, given the fall in oil prices, has not been addressed.	与此同时，哥伦比亚的主要增长障碍——很可能是石油价格下跌背景下的出口乏力——没有得到解决。


Despite the FTA – and a 38% depreciation of the peso since 2014 – exports to the US have gone nowhere: they have stagnated overall, fallen as a share of overall exports, and become even more concentrated in traditional products such as oil, coffee, gold, and flowers.	尽管与美国签订了自由贸易协定——以及2014年以来比索38%的贬值幅度——对美国出口仍不见起色：总量没有增长，占总出口之比反而下降，并且更加集中于石油、咖啡、黄金和花卉传统产品等。


This stands in marked contrast to the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Mexico’s exports: between its entry into effect in 1994 and 2000, exports to the US tripled, from $50 to $150 billion.	这与北美自由贸易协定对墨西哥出口的影响形成了鲜明对比：自1994年生效到2000年，墨西哥对美出口增长了两倍，从50亿美元增加到150亿美元。


In the following decade, Vietnam generated an even larger export boom, with no major trade agreements.	此后十年，越南在没有签订大型贸易协定的情况下实现了规模更大的出口繁荣。


Clearly, NAFTA was crucial for Mexico; but whatever is preventing Colombia from becoming a more successful exporter is not the kind of transaction costs that FTAs can address.	显然，北美自由贸易协定是墨西哥成功的关键； 但阻止哥伦比亚成为更加成功的出口国的绝非自贸协定所能解决的交易成本问题。


But it is highly unlikely that these issues will be tackled by joining the OECD.	但这些问题也很难通过加入经合组织而解决。


The OECD demands a smorgasbord of reforms affecting corporate governance, private insurance markets, competition policy, statistics, health, technology, agriculture, and many other regulatory areas.	经合组织要求采取大杂烩式的改革，这将影响到公司治理、私人保险市场、薪酬政策、统计数据、医疗、技术、农业和其他许多监管领域。


Whether any of these reforms nurture a new suite of export industries that can propel Colombia forward is, to put it bluntly, a crapshoot.	直截了当地讲，这些改革是否能够培养出新的出口产业集群、助推哥伦比亚前进完全是碰运气。


Now consider Panama – by far Latin America’s fastest-growing economy during the 2004-2014 commodity price boom.	现在我们来看看巴拿马——2004—2014年大宗商品价格繁荣期间它是拉丁美洲增长最快的经济体。


Panama’s annual GDP growth averaged 8.2%, despite the fact that it did not profit directly from the commodity bonanza that benefited Colombia and much of South America.	巴拿马年GDP增长平均为8. 2%，尽管它并未从哥伦比亚和大部分南美国家获益良多的大宗商品大繁荣中直接获益。


Now that the boom is over, Panama is still growing at 5%, while Colombia is bordering on a recession.	现在，这场繁荣已经结束，巴拿马仍能保持5%的增长率，而哥伦比亚已经接近衰退。


How did Panama do it?	巴拿马是如何做到这一点的？


After the Panama Canal reverted to national control in 1999, policymakers started to think about how to maximize the Canal’s potential spillover effects.	1999年巴拿马运河收归国有后，决策者开始思考如何最大化运河的潜在溢出效应。


Ultimately, they transformed the US military bases into special economic zones.	最终，他们将美国军事基地改造为经济特区。


They granted concessions to build new ports, in order to facilitate logistics activities around the Canal.	他们颁发特别许可权用于建设新港口，以便利运河周边的物流活动。


They developed the airport, to support the local private airline COPA as it became a regional player.	他们开发机场以支持根底私营航空公司COPA成为地区性企业。


They invested 7% of GDP in expansion of the Canal, a project completed in 2016.	他们将7%的GDP用于扩建运河，并于2016年完工。


And they created a special tax and migration regime to attract regional headquarters of multinational companies.	他们还制定了特殊的税收和移民机制以吸引跨国公司前来建立地区总部。


Panama’s leaders also authorized a pipeline to transport oil across the isthmus, with port facilities on either side.	巴拿马领导人还授权建造穿越巴拿马地峡的输油管道，连接两端的港口设施。


Together with the pre-existing Colon Free Trade Zone and the International Financial Center, the whole ended up being much more than the sum of its parts.	再加上已经存在的科隆（Colon）自由贸易区和国际金融中心，所有这些最终形成了整体大于局部之和的效果。


The synergies between the airport, the new ports, the logistics facilities, banks, and the regional headquarters generated a boom in services exports and investment, underpinning rapid economic growth.	机场、新港口、物流设施、银行和跨国公司地区总部之间的协同效应创造了服务业出口和投资的发繁荣，奠定了经济高速增长的基础。


And with it have come gastronomy, arts, and tourism.	美食、艺术和旅游业随之繁荣。


The non-residential construction boom this created helped not only to absorb the labor force that was leaving rural areas but also to achieve a remarkable reduction in inequality.	由此带来的非住宅建设繁荣不但有助于吸收离开农村地区的劳动力，也大大降低了不平等程度。


In this services-export-led growth strategy, skill shortages did not become a major problem, thanks to a fairly open immigration policy, which allowed the country to use the talent that Colombia, among other countries, was unable to keep.	在这一服务-出口拉动的增长战略中，技能短缺并没有成为主要问题，这要归功于非常开放的移民政策让巴拿马能够利用哥伦比亚和其他国家留不住的人才。


The comparison between these two approaches is clear.	这两种方针之间的对比是鲜明的。


Colombia’s policymakers have been hoping that if they adopt best-practice legislation and regulation, somebody will come.	哥伦比亚决策者希望采取最佳实践立法和监管能够起到吸引效果。


And if they do not, they can still bask in the international accolades they receive from foreign entities.	如果不成功，他们仍能收获外国机构的掌声。


Panama, by contrast, took the risk of imagining some key strategic, export-oriented investments, and then focused on creating the conditions to make them happen.	相反，巴拿马冒着风险设想了一些重要的战略性出口导向型投资，然后将精力集中于实现这些投资的条件。


In many cases, the private sector took the initiative.	在许多例子中，项目的落实依靠私人部门。


But policymakers did not shy away from large strategic public investments when needed, as in the case of the Canal expansion or the airport.	但在必要时决策者也绝不回避大型战略性公共投资，比如运河扩建计划和机场。


The special tax regimes and other policies they adopted may make some at the OECD cringe.	他们所采取的特殊税收制度和其他政策可能令一些经合组织国家汗颜。


But, arguably, this helped create the ecosystem that makes Panama so attractive to so many Fortune 500 companies.	但是，这显然帮助创造了一个生态系统，使巴拿马能够吸引众多《财富》500强公司。


Authentic leadership requires a commitment to real goals.	真性情领导力需要致力于真正的目标。


But, to achieve them, there are no prêt-à-porter solutions.	但是，要实现它们，没有现成的解决方案可用。


Tailoring policies to specific problems, without disregarding the lessons from the past or from elsewhere, involves risks, and any responsible leader will necessarily feel the anxiety this creates.	为具体问题量身定制政策，不忽视来自历史和其他国家的教训，拥抱风险，顺势而为的领导人未必会因此而焦虑。


Authenticity does not, in the end, require Trumpian recklessness.	说到底，真性情并不一定意味着特朗普式的鲁莽。


But abandoning economic goals and imitating the means taken by others is not only inauthentic: it is also deeply irresponsible.	但抛弃经济目标、模仿他人的方法不但是假惺惺，更是严重的无担当。


Russia and China: The Movie	俄罗斯和中国：电影


NEW YORK – The times we live in are often most clearly reflected in the mirror of art.	纽约——艺术这面镜子往往最清晰地反映出我们所生存年代的现实。


Much has been written about post-communism in Russia and China.	后共产主义俄罗斯和中国涌现出众多作品。


But two recent films, Jia Zhangke’s A Touch of Sin, made in China in 2013, and Andrey Zvyagintsev’s Leviathan, made in Russia in 2014, reveal the social and political landscapes of these countries more precisely than anything I have seen in print.	但最近的两部电影：2013年中国拍摄的贾樟柯的《天注定》，以及2014年俄罗斯拍摄的安德烈·萨金塞夫的《利维坦》，比我所见过的任何印刷作品都更准确地揭示两国社会及政治的实际内容。


Jia’s movie is episodic; four loosely linked stories about lone acts of extreme violence, mostly culled from contemporary newspaper stories.	贾樟柯的电影是回幕式的； 取材于现代报纸报导的四则松散故事描绘了极端暴力的长期实景。


Leviathan is about a decent man whose life is ruined by the mayor of his town in collusion with the Russian Orthodox Church and a corrupt judiciary.	《利维坦》描述的则是市长勾结俄国东正教会和腐败的司法系统毁掉了一位正派的俄罗斯人。


Both films are visually stunning, despite their stories’ bleakness.	虽然故事本身凄凉惨淡，但这两部电影都实现了令人惊叹的视觉效果。


The dark skies over the northern Russian coast in Leviathan look ravishing, and Jia even manages to make the concrete and glass jungle of Shenzhen, the monster city between Guangzhou and Hong Kong, look gorgeous.	《利维坦》片中俄罗斯北部海岸的阴暗天空异常引人入胜，而贾樟柯甚至设法让广州和香港间魔都深圳的混凝土玻璃丛林看起来雄伟绚丽。


The other thing both films share is a fascination with mythical stories, the Book of Job in Leviathan, and martial-arts fiction in A Touch of Sin.	两部电影另一个共同点是迷恋神话故事，《利维坦》片中的《约伯记》和《天注定》片中的武侠小说就是实例。


Real estate plays a major part in both movies.	房地产在两部电影中都扮演了重要角色。