How will all of this influence the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which appears stuck? It may be difficult to know, especially as the fundamentalist Hamas, now in control of Gaza, might be encouraged by the rising power of its parent organization in Egypt.	我们难以得知这一切将对如今陷入僵局的以巴和平进程产生何种影响，尤其是在控制加沙地区的极端组织哈马斯可能被其兄弟组织在埃及的壮大所鼓舞的情况下。


The recent escalation of violence along Gaza’s border with Israel does suggest that events are developing in a dangerous direction.	而最近在以色列和加沙地区边境上爆发的暴力行动则显示情况正向危险的方向发展。


As for Israel, it initially responded to the Arab revolts in a confused way.	以色列最初以一种矛盾的方式来回应这场阿拉伯革命。


Now its leaders maintain that they would welcome democratic changes in the region as a guarantor of peace and common values, though they express skepticism about whether such developments are actually imminent.	如今其领导人都对该区域的民主变革表示欢迎，并将其视为以确保和平与共同价值观的基石，但他们同时也怀疑这些状况能否真正到来实现。


Skepticism is in order also with respect to the unknown consequences of Western military intervention in Libya: it may have been asked for by the Arab League and legitimized by the UN Security Council, yet the outcome is far from certain. Whatever happens in Libya will have repercussions across the region.	另一种怀疑则关注西方军事干预可能在利比亚产生的未知后果：虽然这些举动由阿拉伯联盟提出并得到了联合国安理会授权，但其结果却难以预测，而发生在利比亚的一切也将反过来对整个区域造成影响。


The road to democracy has always been rocky – look at a century of upheavals in Europe and the difficulties the US faced when dealing with slavery and the rights of its black population.	民主之路从来都是荆棘遍地——这点从欧洲持续一个世纪的变革以及美国废除奴隶制并赋予黑人政治权利时所面对的困难可知一二。


It is to be hoped that there will be a light at the end of the tunnel in the Arab Middle East as well, but the tunnel may be a long one.	我们希望中东走过的这条隧道尽头将是光明，但这条隧道可能会非常漫长。


The Road to Food Security	通往粮食安全之路


ROME – Recently, I was on a road in the Southern Choma District of Zambia to meet with Rosemary Pisani, a smallholder farmer and mother of eight who struggled to feed her children prior to joining a farmer’s cooperative to raise goats.	发自罗马——我最近一直都在赞比亚的佐马区南部奔波，与罗丝玛丽·皮萨尼会面，她是一位小佃农，也是8个孩子的母亲，她过去总要为填饱孩子们的肚皮犯愁，甚至连加入农业合作社养羊的事都无暇顾及。


Thanks to the cooperative and support from other farmers, she now has a thriving business and all of her children are in school.	但幸好有合作社以及其他农民的帮助，她如今生意兴旺，孩子们也都上了学。


On the way to meet her, I passed women walking through mud to the market with large loads of fruit and vegetables stacked on their heads.	在前去与她会面的路上，我不时能看到一些妇女头顶着大量的农产品，沿着泥泞的小路赶往市场。


I imagined how I might be on my way to a very different rural community if the road we were on was paved and well maintained.	我幻想要是自己脚下的路能宽阔平整的话，那么路尽头的农村社区将是一派多么截然不同的景象。


Often in Africa, the few paved roads that do exist are littered with potholes and lead to unpaved ones that are nearly impossible to navigate without a proper vehicle.	在非洲，仅有的一些铺好的路都坑坑洼洼，而这些路则连接着一些只能靠特种车辆才能通过的土路。


Closer to farming communities, roads disappear entirely.	在末端的种植区附近根本无路可走。


This leaves rural areas, which have the potential to feed the more than one billion hungry people, cut off and isolated.	这等于将那些有潜力养活10亿饥民的农村地区直接切断并隔离开来。


In sub-Saharan Africa, almost 70% of all people living in rural areas live more than a 30-minute walk from the nearest maintained road.	在撒哈拉以南非洲，大约有70%的人居住在距离公路30分钟步行距离的农村地区。


Kofi Annan, Chairperson of the Board of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), has acknowledged this isolation: “The average African smallholding farmer swims alone. She has no insurance against erratic weather patterns, gets no subsidies, and has no access to credit.	身兼非洲绿色革命联盟（Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa ，AGRA)董事会主席的联合国秘书长科菲·安南已经注意到了这种隔离的状态，他指出：“非洲的小农业生产者都处在各自为战的状态，她没有保险来应对天气变化，没有政府补贴。


I say ‘she’ because the majority of small-scale farmers in Africa are women.”	也无法贷款，而我之所以用‘她’这个词，就是因为这些小农业生产者大多都是女性。


Indeed, half of the world’s smallholders are women, and we must keep in mind their punishing task of walking long lengths to get their produce to market.	”事实上，世界上一半的小农业生产者都是女性，而我们必须记住她们将极大精力耗费在了将产品送往市场的路上。


At the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), we believe that farming, regardless of size or scale, must be seen as a business, and smallholder farmers as small-scale business owners rather than poor people who need handouts.	作为世界农业发展基金的一员，我们相信农业无论规模大小，都应被当作一门生意来看待，这些小农场生产者就是一批小老板，而不是等待救济的穷人。


There is growing recognition that these smallholder farmers and their rural communities are a major part of the solution to food insecurity and poverty – but only if they have what they need to do their jobs.	而人们也越来越意识到：这些小农场生产者以及她们所在的农村社区将是解决是粮食安全以及贫困问题的重要组成部分——但这必须得在她们得到了必要的协助之后。


The Green Revolution of the last century had a tremendous impact on agricultural yields and food production, transforming the lives of millions of people.	上个世纪诞生的绿色革命对农业产量和食品生产都产生了巨大的影响，改变了数百万人的生活。


Much of this success stemmed from infrastructure that was already in place.	而其中大多数成功都来自于一些已经建好了的基础设施。


India’s road density at the start of its Green Revolution in the 1970’s was 388 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometres.	在绿色革命初期的1970年代，印度的公路密度是388公里每1000平方公里。


This compares with 39 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers in Ethiopia today and 71 per 1,000 in Senegal.	而如今，埃塞俄比亚和塞内加尔每1000平方公里的公路密度也分别只有39和71公里。


New roads bring other essential services to rural communities.	新的公路为农村地区带来了其他必要的公共服务。


In Ethiopia, only 2% of rural people have access to electricity, and telephone communication is more or less absent.	在埃塞俄比亚，只有2%的农村人口能用上电，而电话服务则几乎没有。


Researchers believe that this is because only 17% of rural communities in the country live within one mile of a paved road.	研究人员认为这种情况的成因就是该国只有17%的农村社区位于公路的1公里范围内。


Together with poor infrastructure, many small farmers in Africa have insufficient access to productive assets, such as land, water, and new technologies.	除了公共设施不足之外，非洲的许多小农业生产者都无法获得足够的生产资料，比如土地，水以及新的农业技术。


As a result, yields are generally too low to allow the millions of rural households to generate marketable surpluses.	因此农产品产量通常都比较低下，无法令数百万农村家庭生产出可供贩卖的多余农产品。


Even if smallholders are able to produce a surplus, their lack of access to downstream activities, such as processing and marketing, prevents them from selling it easily.	而即便某些小生产者能够生产出多余的产品，他们也缺乏向产业链下游延伸的能力（比如加工和市场推广），这导致他们无法顺利地将产品卖出去。


The cause of these missing, but vital, resources lies in the shameful neglect of agriculture in the past two decades.	而造成这种必需资源缺失的原因则是过去20年对农业的错误忽视。


Both developed and developing countries – caught up in rapid economic expansion and technological development – got distracted.	无论是发达国家还是发展中国家——两者都忙于在快速经济扩张和技术发展中你追我赶——都犯了同样的错误。


They turned off the tap to agriculture, leaving small farmers to rely on basic farming practices and on government and donor handouts.	他们减少了对农业的扶持，让那些小农业生产者只有依靠最基本的农业技术进行生产，靠政府和捐助者的施舍勉强维生。


That tap must be turned back on.	事到如今，这种做法必须彻底扭转过来。


In IFAD’s experience, working simply to double the income of a smallholder farmer who scrapes by on less than a dollar a day is poverty management, because at two dollars a day, he or she still remains poor.	根据非洲绿色革命联盟的经验，仅仅将一个每天收入不足1美元的小生产者收入提高一倍，这只能算是救济，因为即便日收入达到了2美元，他/她依然生活在贫困线之下。


But supporting that smallholder in launching a farming business that could generate a five-fold increase in income amounts to poverty eradication.	但支持同样的一个人，令其农场能成为一盘为他带来5倍收益的生意，才是真正的根除贫困。


If smallholder farmers are to be given the opportunity to become viable businesses, it is essential that they be connected to markets.	如果想赋予小农业生产者一个发展机会，让他们发展切实可行的生意的话，那就必须让他们与市场对接。


Indeed, support for rural infrastructure – including last-mile roads, electrification, post-harvest facilities, support for agricultural associations and cooperatives, and access to land and irrigation facilities – is a crucial element in the value chain.	事实上，支持农村地区基础设施建设——包括连接村落的公路、供电、收割后的处理设备、支持建立农业联盟以及合作社，以及获取土地以及灌溉设施——就是整个产业价值链的关键部分。


Each link in the value chain, from the smallholder to the local trade agents and agro-processors to regional and national markets, needs to be strengthened.	产业价值链中的每一个环节，从小生产者到本地经销商，加工商再到区域和全国市场，都需要得到加强。


We need to link food producers with the people who need their product through viable and well maintained infrastructure.	我们需要运作正常且保养良好的基础设施，以便将生产者和他们消费者联系起来。


In addition, we need to provide them with research and technology to ensure that they can grow the best-quality produce, and storage capabilities so that they can sell at peak prices.	此外，我们还必须提供技术和研究支持���他们能生产出更加优质的产品，并提供冷藏设备以便农民能在价格最高时出售自己的产品。


If smallholder farmers have the basic infrastructure they need to get their goods to market, they will not only be able to feed themselves and their communities, but will contribute to wider food security.	如果小农业生产者能借助基本的基础设施来将自己的产品送往市场的话，他们将不仅能养活自己以及社区，还能为更大范围内的粮食安全做出贡献。


We just need to put the pavement down so that farmers like those I saw in Zambia can more easily make their way on the road to food security.	而我们所要做的仅仅是铺好公路，这样那些我在赞比亚所见到的农民就能更顺利地走上自己的粮食安全之路。


The Road to Post-War Recovery	战后复苏之路


For the world’s advanced countries, a key challenge is to broaden economic and social inclusion without diminishing the economic dynamism they already have. .	对于世界先进国家而言，一项关键的挑战就是在不削弱已有的经济动力的情况下扩大经济和社会包容。


The problems of war-ravaged countries are far more acute and their choices much more constrained.	饱受战乱之苦的国家的问题更为突出，而其选择则更为有限。


Indeed, they confront a double challenge: to create dynamic economies and to promote, at the same time, economic and social inclusion.	确实，这些国家面临双重挑战，也就是建立富有活力的经济并且与此同时促进经济和社会包容。


Without both of these elements, national reconciliation will likely prove impossible.	没有这两项因素，民族和解就遥遥无期。


Social exclusion in industrial countries imposes costs throughout society that policymakers must address with effective and targeted measures.	工业化国家的社会排斥在全社会造成很大的成本，决策者们必须采用有效而又具有针对性的手段处理这些问题。


Lack of jobs, for example, often leads people, particularly the young, away from work and into dependency on drugs and crime.	例如，缺少工作机会经常会让人们，特别是年轻人远离工作并依赖于毒品和犯罪。


Society, then , needs to pay for the costs of crime prevention policies and the administration of justice.	如此，社会就需要支付预防犯罪以及实施司法的成本。


A flexible labor market, as many suggest, will not in itself promote inclusion.	正如许多人士所指出的那样，灵活的劳动力市场本身并不会促进包容。


Welfare programs in war-ravaged countries often aggravate joblessness by reducing work incentives and creating a culture of dependency.	饱受战乱之苦的国家里的福利项目经常由于减少工作激励并且创造一种依赖文化而增加失业。


Minimum-wage laws and labor agreements often make the least productive workers unaffordable to law-abiding employers.	最低工资法律以及劳动协议经常让守法的雇主无法支付最没有生产效率的工人。


So what these countries need are more employment opportunities and higher salaries in the private sector for these workers.	那么，这些国家所需要的是私营部门中给这些工人更多的就业机会和更高的工资。


Specifically, a wage subsidy program that lowers the cost of hiring full-time unskilled workers could make it more attractive for firms to hire them.	具体而言，降低雇佣低技能的全职工人成本的工资补贴项目有可能让公司雇用这些工人更有吸引力。


At the same time, on-the-job training would make the program attractive to workers and to society as a whole.	与此同时，在职培训可能让这一项目对于工人们和社会整体具有吸引力。


Governments could afford the cost of the subsidies since cutting unemployment would not only lower public security costs, but would also reduce the need for welfare programs.	由于降低失业率不仅会降低公共治安费用，而且也会减少福利项目的需要。 因此，政府有能力支付这些补贴的费用。


In countries coming out of war or other conflicts, efforts at inclusion are futile in stagnant economies.	在摆脱战乱或者其他冲突的国家中，如果经济停滞，包容的努力就会没有效果。


Without both dynamism and inclusion, the path to peace will be elusive, as recent experiences in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many countries in Africa illustrate.	没有活力和包容，通向和平的道路就会迷惘。 近年来科索沃、东帝汶、阿富汗、伊拉克以及其他许多非洲国家都说明了这一点。


Thus, post-war transitions require that policies that encourage dynamism and inclusion go hand in hand.	这样，战后的转型就要求鼓励经济活力和包容的政策同步进行。


Economic recovery needs to begin as soon as possible, not only because this is essential to maintaining political and social stability, but also because donors are unwilling to support economic reconstruction unless countries do their part to create an environment conducive to ensuring its sustainability.	经济复苏需要尽早开始，这不仅仅是由于这对于维持政治和社会稳定极为重要，而且是因为除非这些国家创造一种有利于确保可持续的环境，否则，捐助国家不愿意支持经济复兴。


In the midst of political, social, and institutional vulnerabilities, as well as the vast damage to human and physical infrastructure that are the legacy of conflict, this is a monumental task.	在政治、社会以及机制乱局中，以及冲突所留下的对人力和实物基础设施的巨大破坏的情况下，实现这一点就异常艰难。


Policymaking in these war torn economies is unique.	这些饱经战乱之苦的经济中的决策是独一无二的。


Most countries in post-conflict situations suffer from weak fiscal positions, rendering the provision of internally financed subsidies impractical in most cases.	大多数后冲突国家受到财政紧张之苦，从而在大多数情况下无法提供本国自己资助的补贴。


Moreover, foreign assistance, while stable in “normal” developing countries, often exhibits sharp spikes in countries undergoing war-to-peace transitions.	而且，在“正常”发展中国家稳定的外国援助在那些经历从战争到和平转型的国家中会大幅上升。


In many cases, post-conflict aid can reach extraordinarily high levels after the conflicts ends, both in per capita terms and relative to the size of the recipient economies.	在许多情况下，冲突后的援助在冲突结束后会达到非常高的水平，对于人均和受援经济规模而言都是如此。


Typically, however, this type of aid declines very rapidly.	但是，这种援助通常会很快下降。


Low-income countries in the normal process of development, for example, receive steady inflows of official foreign assistance of about 3% of their gross national income.	例如，正常发展进程中的低收入国家比较稳定地接受相当于国民生产总值3％的正式外国援助。


By contrast, aid reached 95% of gross national income in Rwanda soon after the conflict ended, but fell to 20% within five years.	与此相比，卢旺达冲突结束后，援助马上达到了其国民生产总值的95％，但是在五年之内下降到20％。


Consolidating peace following violent conflict has little chance of success unless jobs are created and the economy is quickly stabilized and brought onto a path of investment and growth with low inflation.	除非创造就业机会、经济迅速得到稳定并且走上低通胀的投资和增长之路，否则，暴力冲突后巩固和平就几乎没有成功的希望。


The United Nations reckons that if economic reconstruction fails in terms of promoting dynamism and inclusion, countries in the transition to peace have an even chance of reverting to war.	联合国估计，如果经济重建在促进活力和包容方���失败，转向和平的国家回到战争的可能性甚至更大一些。


Leaving aside the cost in terms of human lives, the economic costs of maintaining peace are but a fraction of what would be required for humanitarian assistance, military intervention, and peacekeeping operations should the country relapse into conflict.	且不谈牺牲人命的代价，如果国家重新回到冲突之中，与其所需要的人道主义援助、军事干预以及维和行动相比，维持和平的经济代价只是一小部分。


Hence, effective financing for peacetime is a good investment of donors’ resources and a major factor in conflict prevention.	所以，在和平期间有效地予以资助是援助国资源的良好投资以及防止冲突的主要因素。


But donors need to avoid some common mistakes.	但是，援助国家需要避免某些常见的错误。


In many cases, economic reconstruction has failed partly because donors required that their own nationals or companies be used.	在许多情况下，部分是由于援助国要求使用其自己的国民或者公司，因此经济重建失败。


This policy has often led to programs that countries do not want and to employment of foreign experts for tasks that nationals could and should have performed.	这一政策通常导致受援国所不需要的项目，并且聘用了外国专家来执行那些本国国民可以胜任而且本应执行的任务。


By providing domestic firms with wage subsidies for hiring unskilled workers, donors would increase the effectiveness and fairness of their assistance in support of national-led reconstruction and conflict prevention.	通过向国内公司提供工资补贴用于雇用低技能的工人，援助国家就可以提高其援助的有效性和公平性，从而支持由本国国民主导的重建和预防冲突。


Given lower labor costs, local businessmen could decide to invest under the conditions of uncertainty and high risk that characterize post-conflict situations.	鉴于较低的劳动力成本，当地的商人可以决定在构成战后局势特点的不确定以及高风险的条件下进行投资。


The advantages in terms of employment creation, reintegrating former combatants into productive activities, savings from safety-net programs, and improved public security would be many.	创造就业、重新把原先的战斗人员融入到生产性活动、从社会保障网络项目节省下来的资金以及改善公共治安所带来的优势将会是众多的。


This type of aid would also provide political support for the authorities from a population grateful for policies that promote job creation.	这种援助还将会为政权从人民中提供政治支持。 这些人民对促进就业的政策感恩戴德。


At the same time, this policy would have neither the fiscal cost associated with government-financed subsidies, nor the distortions caused by the difficulty of cutting subsidies once the government has offered them.	与此同时，这一政策既不会有政府资助的补贴所带来的财政成本，也不会有政府提供补贴后减少补贴的难度。


Grant-supported subsidies would remain in place for a finite period, and donors would gradually phase them out as aid programs expire.	赠款支持的补贴在一定时间内有效，而在援助项目到期的时候援助国逐渐予以取消。


Furthermore, such subsidies would help reactivate the private sector, which is essential as large-scale post-conflict aid withers to the low levels that are common under conditions of normal development.	而且，这样的补贴将会帮助重新激活私营部门。 这对于在正常发展条件下冲突后大规模援助减少到低水平是十分重要的。


The Roar of the Democratic Wave	咆哮的民主浪潮


PARIS – Has the uprising in Tunisia sparked a new democratic wave that will conquer Egypt and eventually sweep away the authoritarian “Arab exception”?	巴黎——突尼斯起义是否真的掀起一股新的民主浪潮，能够在征服埃及后最终横扫专制的“阿拉伯特例”？


After southern Europe in the 1970’s, Latin America in the late 1980’s, and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, it seems that now it is the Mediterranean region’s turn.	继20世纪70年代的欧洲、20世纪80年代的美洲、20世纪90年代的中东欧爆发民主革命后，这次似乎轮到地中海国家接过革命的火炬。


For Europe, democratization immediately to its south is a vital interest.	欧盟南部边境的民主化进程关系到欧洲各国的切身利益。


Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s ouster in Tunisia signalled the collapse of the Arab “stability” model, praised by many Western leaders, consisting of authoritarianism and overrated economic performance.	突尼斯罢黜因·阿比丁·本·阿里标志着曾备受西方领袖赞誉的阿拉伯“稳定”模式一败涂地，这种模式的实质是独裁主义和高估的经济业绩。


The surge of anger and revolt in Egypt, whatever its final outcome, marks the beginning of the end for authoritarian nationalist Arab regimes.	无论最终结果如何，埃及掀起的愤怒和反抗浪潮都标志着阿拉伯民族主义独裁政权终结的开始。


In contrast to Tunisia, the military is a pillar of the Egyptian regime.	与突尼斯截然不同的是，军队是埃及专制政权的支柱。


But it is unlikely that Egypt’s huge (mostly conscript) army will engage in massive, violent repression, which would be unprecedented in that country.	不过埃及数量庞大的军队（其中多数士兵为应征入伍）不大可能参与大规模暴力镇压，这在埃及称得上是史无前例。


Even if President Hosni Mubarak hangs on to complete the remainder of his term, the ruling National Democratic Party’s regime, its legitimacy irreparably shaken, will not survive for long.	即使胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统真能坚持到任期结束，合法地位已遭动摇的国家民主党政权剩下的日子也屈指可数。


Omar Suleiman’s appointment as Vice-President (and heir-apparent) indicates that the army has accepted that Mubarak must leave sooner or later.	奥马尔·苏莱曼被指定为副总统（和确定的接班人）表明军队已经接受穆巴拉克迟早要卸任的现实。


Nor, it seems clear, will Mubarak secure the succession of his son, Gamel, before he goes.	还有一点似乎同样显而易见，那就是穆巴拉克在卸任前无法达到让其子贾迈勒继承的目的。


The regime’s international legitimacy is equally in a shambles.	埃及独裁政府在国际地位方面同样留下个烂摊子。


The United States, Egypt’s main ally, while stopping short of siding with the protesters, is holding the regime to Mubarak’s promise of a “better democracy,” and demanding swift action to meet the people’s legitimate demands.	埃及的主要盟国美国差一点支持抗议群众，同时要求穆巴拉克政府在兑现“改善民主”承诺的同时，立即采取措施满足群众的合理要求。


By hinting strongly that its $1.5 billion in largely military aid would be withheld in the event of unacceptable levels of repression, the US revealed that the post-Mubarak era is already being contemplated.	美国一再暗示如果出现大规模镇压活动，以军事援助为主体的15亿美元款项将有可能暂停支付，上述信息表明后穆巴拉克时代已经纳入美国的严肃考虑。


The US – and Europe – are keen to avoid a sudden collapse of the Egyptian regime.	无论是美国还是欧洲都急于避免埃及专制政府的突然崩溃。


But a protracted and incremental process of small steps towards economic and then political reform – the sequence contemplated by the European Union – is no longer an option.	虽然符合欧盟设想中的预期顺序， 但朝着先经济后政治方向逐步改革这样长期渐进的过程已经退出了选择的行列。


The regime is past reforming, and must give way to a new democratic republic, with a new constitution.	埃及专制政府已经错过了改革的机会，因此必需给新民主共和国和新宪法让位。


Ideally, this should come about in a manner similar to democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980’s, when authoritarian, army-backed rulers yielded to popular demands for radical, democratic regime change.	理想情况下，政权更迭应当采取类似拉美20世纪80年代的民主过渡形式，当时军队支持下的独裁统治者顺应民众要求，进行了激进的民主政权更替。


Resorting to thugs to carry out widespread intimidation, and blaming violence on the largely peaceful protests of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Egyptians, as their government has done, is not a good omen.	像埃及政府那样利用暴徒实行广泛恐吓绝非吉兆，专制政权对几十万普通埃及民众以和平抗议为主的运动进行了暴力歪曲。


Unlike in Tunisia, Europeans and Americans should increase the pressure on Egypt’s leaders – primarily the military at this stage – to start fulfilling the regime’s promises of political reform.	与突尼斯不同，欧洲和美国人应当加大对埃及领导人的压力——现阶段主要是指军事领袖——要求他们开始兑现政治改革的承诺。


This will lack credibility under Mubarak, whose refusal to stand down is a recipe for chaos.	这种改革在穆巴拉克领导下缺乏可信度，而穆巴拉克拒绝下台很可能埋下混乱的种子。


It is necessary that the international community:	因此国际社会有必要采取以下措施：


·        Withdraw support for Mubarak;	·        停止支持穆巴拉克；


·        Support the formation of a transitional authority, supported by the military and the “street,” and including independent political figures untainted by the regime, to prepare free and fair elections;	·        支持成立由军队和“街头群众”支持的过渡当局，吸纳没有被独裁政权玷污的独立政界人士，准备进行自由和公正的选举；


·        Call for an amnesty for all political prisoners.	·        呼吁对所有政治犯实施大赦。


Many of the conditions needed for a democratic transformation – a vibrant and organized civil society, a relatively free press, and well-respected opposition figures, as well as a variety of battered but breathing political parties of different persuasions – are already present.	实现民主转型所需的许多条件已经齐备——包括活跃有序的民间社会，相对自由的媒体，广受尊敬的反对派领袖，以及虽身受重创但仍坚持不懈的各个政党派别。


Fear of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is only marginally involved in an uprising that it did not initiate and has no hope of controlling, is no excuse for trying to save a failing regime.	害怕穆斯林兄弟会掌权无法成为试图挽救失败政府的借口，该组织只是有限地参与了这场起义，它既不是起义的发起者也不能控制起义。


The tragic consequences of eleventh-hour attempts to save the Shah in Iran should not be forgotten.	我们不应忘记最后一刻试图挽救伊朗国王的悲剧后果。


There is also no reason to believe (contrary to the regime’s insistence) that the Brotherhood would emerge victorious from a democratic transition.	我们同样没有理由相信（与独裁政权反复强调的观点相反）穆斯林兄弟会能够窃取民主转型的胜利果实。


Of course, there are concerns about the future of Egypt’s foreign policy, especially toward Israel.	当然对埃及外交政策未来的担忧不可避免，尤其以色列政策更是其中的核心忧虑。


But there is no indication that a non-authoritarian Egyptian regime would call into question the bilateral peace treaty, though a definite end to the Gaza blockade and a shift in attitude towards Hamas – in the sense of a more serious attempt at forging Palestinian unity – are to be expected.	但没有任何迹象表明非专制的埃及政府会怀疑双边和平协议的有效性，尽管结束加沙封锁和转变对哈马斯态度当属题中应有之意——目的是逐步建立巴勒斯坦的团结意识。


For Europe, the best option is to support the mass movement calling for regime change led by Mohammed ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency.	就欧洲而言，支持诺贝尔奖得主兼国际原子能机构前主席穆罕默德·厄尔巴拉迪领导的要求改革专制政权的群众运动无疑是最佳选择。


The joint declaration by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister David Cameron, calling for a “broad-based government” and “free and fair elections” in Egypt stands in stark contrast to the embarrassed silence that was heard at the outset of Tunisia’s democratic uprising.	德国总理安格拉•默克尔、法国总统尼古拉·萨科奇和英国首相大卫·卡梅伦呼吁在埃及成立“广泛的联合政府”并举行“自由及公正选举”的号召与突尼斯民主起义初期令人尴尬的沉默形成了鲜明的对比。


It is still too soon, however, to conclude that Europeans have finally overcome their fear of Arab democracy and will not be tempted to accept milder forms of “liberal authoritarianism” should the crisis drag on or a military takeover occur.	不过，如果这场危机继续发展或爆发军事政变，认为欧洲人已经克服对阿拉伯民主政权的恐惧心理、不会甘心接受形式温和的“开明专制”则未免显得缺乏依据。


That would be a grave mistake, for such an outcome would most likely pave the way for extreme alternatives.	这肯定会诱发严重的错误，因为这样的结果只会让极端情况变为现实。


Europe and the US must be as supportive of democracy in the Mediterranean region as they are within Europe itself.	欧洲和美国必需像支持欧洲民主一样支持地中海民主。


When tides are turning, people will remember who stood with them and who did not.	当形势扭转时，民众会记住谁曾与他们站在一起。


As it did during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, Europe needs to show that it stands for democracy, not merely for stability.	就像2004年乌克兰橙色革命时一样，欧洲需要明确表示出对民主、而不只是稳定的全力支持。


The Rocky Road to Recovery	曲折的复苏之路


NEW YORK – A consensus now exists that America’s recession – already a year old – is likely to be long and deep, and that almost all countries will be affected.	纽约-现在存在着这样一种共识，已经持续了一年的美国经济衰退可能会漫长而且深入，而且几乎所有国家都将受到影响。


I always thought that the notion that what happened in America would be decoupled from the rest of the world was a myth.	我始终认为，在美国发生的事情和世界其它国家脱钩的观念是一个迷思。


Events are showing that to be so.	一些列事件正在表明，这确实是个迷思。


Fortunately, America has, at last, a president with some understanding of the nature and severity of the problem, and who has committed himself to a strong stimulus program.	幸运的是，美国终于有了一位对问题的性质和严重性有一些了解的总统，他坚定不移地执行强有力的刺激计划。


This, together with concerted action by governments elsewhere, will mean that the downturn will be less severe than it otherwise would be.	再加上其他国家的政府的协调一致的行动，这将意味着经济衰退的严重性将比可能出现的情况要低。


The United States Federal Reserve, which helped create the problems through a combination of excessive liquidity and lax regulation, is trying to make amends – by flooding the economy with liquidity, a move that, at best, has merely prevented matters from being worse.	美联储造成的流动性过剩加上疏于监管，推动了危机的发生。 因此美联储正在努力用给经济大量增加流动性的方式进行弥补，而此举最多只能阻止事态进一步恶化。


It’s not surprising that those who helped create the problems and didn’t see the disaster coming have not done a masterly job in dealing with it.	那些过去推动问题的出现且未能遇见灾难的人，现在也并未能娴熟地处理已经出现的灾难，可这也并不奇怪。


By now, the dynamics of the downturn are set, and things will get worse before they get better.	目前看来，经济下滑的势态已经形成，情况在改善之前将会变得更糟。


In some ways, the Fed resembles a drunk driver who, suddenly realizing that he is heading off the road starts careening from side to side.	在某些方面，美联储就如同一个醉酒司机，他突然意识到汽车正在冲出道路，于是便开始从来回地从道路一边急冲向另一边。


The response to the lack of liquidity is ever more liquidity.	其应对流动性不足的方法是提供更多的流动资金。


When the economy starts recovering, and banks start lending, will they be able to drain the liquidity smoothly out of the system?	当经济开始复 苏，银行开始贷款的时候，他们是否能将这些流动资金顺利退出系统呢？


Will America face a bout of inflation?	美国是否将面临新一轮通货膨胀呢？


Or, more likely, in another moment of excess, will the Fed over-react, nipping the recovery in the bud?	或者，更有可能的是在新的流动性过剩时期中，美联储是否会过度反应，把复苏掐死在萌芽状态呢？


Given the unsteady hand exhibited so far, we cannot have much confidence in what awaits us.	鉴于目前为止显示出的不稳定的做法，我们对前景无法有太大的信心。


Still, I am not sure that there is sufficient appreciation of some of the underlying problems facing the global economy, without which the current global recession is unlikely to give way to robust growth – no matter how good a job the Fed does.	不过，我还不能肯定人们对全球经济所面临的一些基本问题有足够的理解，没有这一点，目前的全球经济衰退是不太可能给强劲的经济增长让路的-无论美联储的工作做得有多么出色。


For a long time, the US has played an important role in keeping the global economy going.	长期以来，美国一直在维持全球经济成长方面发挥了重要作用。


America’s profligacy – the fact that the world’s richest country could not live within its means – was often criticized.	美国的挥霍-即世界上最富有的国家也不能量入为出这一事实-曾广遭批评。


But perhaps the world should be thankful, because without American profligacy, there would have been insufficient global aggregate demand.	但也许世界应 该心存感激。 因为没有美国的挥霍，就会出现全球总需求的不足。


In the past, developing countries filled this role, running trade and fiscal deficits. But they paid a high price, and fiscal responsibility and conservative monetary policies are now the fashion.	在过去，发展中国家以出现贸易和财政赤字的方式填补了这一角色，但是，他们付出了高昂的代价，而现在承担财政责任和采取 保守的货币政策成为了时尚。


Indeed, many developing countries, fearful of losing their economic sovereignty to the IMF – as occurred during the 1997 Asian financial crisis – accumulated hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves.	事实上，许多发展中国家，因为害怕如发生在1997年亚洲金融危机中的情况出现，即把经济主权丧失给了国际货币基金组织，它们因此积累了数千亿美元的外汇储备。


Money put into reserves is income not spent.	投入储备的资金就是没有花掉的收入。


Moreover, growing inequality in most countries of the world has meant that money has gone from those who would spend it to those who are so well off that, try as they might, they can’t spend it all.	此外，在世界上大多数国家中越来越严重的不平等现象意味着钱已经从那些能花钱的人手里转移到富裕得再怎样花也花不掉钱的人手里。


The world’s unending appetite for oil, beyond its ability or willingness to produce, has contributed a third factor.	世界对石油永无休止需求，超出了地球的产油能力或是产油国的意愿，这是第三个因素。


Rising oil prices transferred money to oil-rich countries, again contributing to the flood of liquidity.	石油价格不断上涨使资金转向石油资源丰富的国家，这又有助于产生大量的流动资金。


Though oil prices have been dampened for now, a robust recovery could send them soaring again.	虽然当前油价已经跌落，但强有力的复苏可能使其再次飙升。


For a while, people spoke almost approvingly of the flood of liquidity.	有一阵子，人们以几乎以赞许的口气谈论大量的流动资金。


But this was just the flip side of what Keynes had worried about – insufficient global aggregate demand.	但这只是凯恩斯曾担心的问题的另一面：全球总需求的不足。


The search for return contributed to the reckless leverage and risk taking that underlay this crisis.	对回报的追求对造成这次危机的鲁莽的杠杆作用和冒险起了推波助澜的作用。


America’s government will, for a time, partly make up for the increasing savings of US consumers.	美国政府将在一段时间内，部分弥补美国消费者对储蓄的增加。


But if America’s consumers go from their near zero savings to a modest 4% or 5% of GDP, then the depressing effect on demand  (in addition to that resulting from declines in investment, exports, and state and local  government expenditures) will not be fully offset by even the largest government expenditure programs.	但是，如果美国的消费者把他们的接近零的储蓄率提高到温和的占国内生产总值的4 ％或5 ���的话，那么，甚至最大的政府开支计划也不能完全抵消令人沮丧的对需求的影响，（还要加上由投资、出口、以及州和地方政府开支的下降的影响）。


In two years, governments, mindful of the huge increases in the debt burden resulting from the mega-bailouts and the mind-boggling deficits, will be under pressure to run primary surpluses (where government spending net of interest payments is less than revenues.)	在两年内，各国 政府考虑到由特大救助计划和和令人难以置信的赤字所造成的巨大的债务负担增加，它们将有压力力求做到基本盈余（其中政府的扣除利息的支出低于收入。 ）


A few years ago, there was worry about the risk of a disorderly unwinding of “global imbalances.”	几年前，人们为“全球经济的不平衡 ”的无序展开的风险而担忧。


The current crisis can be viewed as part of that, but little is being done about the underlying problems that gave rise to these imbalances.	当前的危机可以被看作是其一部分。 而人们目前对引起这些不平衡的基本问题无动于衷。


We need not just temporary stimuli, but longer-term solutions.	我们需要的不只是暂时的刺激，而是长期的解决办法。


It is not as if there was a shortage of needs; it is only that those who might meet those needs have a shortage of funds.	不是出现了短缺的需要;而是那些可能满足这些需要的人缺乏资金。


First, we need to reverse the worrying trends of growing inequality.	首先，我们必须扭转令人担忧的不平等现象日益加剧的趋势。


More progressive income taxation will also help stabilize the economy, through what economists call “automatic stabilizers.”	更多的累进所得税政策也将有助于经济的稳定，即通过经济学家所谓的“自动稳定器 ”。


It would also help if the advanced developed countries fulfilled their commitments to helping the world’s poorest by increasing their foreign-aid budgets to 0.7% of GDP.	如果先进的发达国家履行其承诺以帮助世界上最贫穷的人，增加其对外援助预算到占国内生产总值的0. 7 ％，这也将起一定作用。


Second, the world needs enormous investments if it is to respond to the challenges of global warming.	其次，如果世界要应对全球气候变暖的挑战，需要巨大的投资额。


Transportation systems and living patterns must be changed dramatically.	运输系统和生活模式必须发生巨大变化。


Third, a global reserve system is needed.	第三，有必要建立全球储备制度。


It makes little sense for the world’s poorest countries to lend money to the richest at low interest rates.	世界上最贫穷的国家以低利率借钱给最富裕的国家，这是荒唐的。


The system is unstable.	目前这个系统是不稳定的。


The dollar reserve system is fraying, but is likely to be replaced with a dollar/euro or dollar/euro/yen system that is even more unstable.	美元储备制度是不稳定的，但用美元/欧元或美元/欧元/日圆的系统来取 代它，可能会更不稳定。


Annual emissions of a global reserve currency (what Keynes called Bancor, or the IMF calls SDRs) could help fuel global aggregate demand, and be used to promote development and address the problems of global warming.	全球储备货币的年发行量（凯恩斯所谓的Bancor ，或国际货币基金组织所谓的SDR）可以有助于引发全球的总需求以及用于促进发展和解决全球变暖的问题。


This year will be bleak.	今年将是暗淡的一年。


The question we need to be asking now is, how can we enhance the likelihood that we will eventually emerge into a robust recovery?	我们要问的问题是，我们如何才能增加最终将出现一个强劲复苏的可能性？


Did Taxes Cause the Financial Crisis?	税收引起了金融危机吗？


CAMBRIDGE – After the financial crisis erupted in 2008, many observers blamed the crisis in large part on the fact that too many financial firms had loaded up on debt while relying on only a thin layer of equity.	美国剑桥—2008年金融危机爆发后，许多观察者认为危机很大程度上是拜一个事实所赐：太多的金融机构累积了大量债务，但可以依赖的股本太少。


The reason is straightforward: whereas equity can absorb a business downturn – profits fall, but the firm does not immediately fail – debt is less forgiving, because creditors do not wait around to be paid.	这里的道理很直观：股本能吸收业务衰退——利润下降，但企业并不会立刻倒闭——但债务很难赦免，因为债权人在偿付时不愿等待。


Short-term creditors cash out or refuse to roll over their loans, denying credit to financially weakened firms.	短期债权人要求按条款付清现金，拒绝贷款展期，不给财务恶化的企业信用。


Long-term creditors demand to be “made whole” and sue.	长期债权人要求“整体化”并提出上诉。


Without cash, the firm fails.	没有现金，企业就得倒闭。


Financial firms in the United States pay about 34% of their profits in taxes, and, while they can deduct interest payments to creditors from taxable income, equity is not taxed as favorably.	美国的金融企业利润中34%要缴税，此外尽管它们可以把向债权人支付的利息从应税所得中扣除，但股本仍需要纳税。


Most countries have similar tax preferences for debt over equity, thereby encouraging financial and other corporations to use more debt, as financial analysts have long known.	大部分国家都存在类似的在税务上优惠债务而不利于股本的情况，这鼓励金融业和其他公司更多地使用债务，这是财务分析师早就知道的事情。


And yet the argument that this tax preference for debt played a role in the financial crisis – and that it remains an ongoing risk to financial stability – was quickly rejected.	但认为这一偏袒债务的课税偏好在金融危机中也扮演了角色——且依然是金融稳定的风险来源——的观点立刻遭到了否认。


After all, the tax preference for debt has existed for a long time, and nothing heightened it before the crisis hit.	毕竟，偏袒债务的课税偏好存在已经很长时间，但在危机爆发前一直无人强调。


On the contrary, if anything, the tax preference has decreased somewhat over time.	相反，真要细究起来，课税偏好随着时间的推移还有了一定程度的减弱。


And the crisis was quite clearly tied to the explosion in risky mortgage-backed securities in the US; when the market abruptly realized that these securities could not be paid off in full, many systemically important financial firms were seen to be much weaker than they had seemed.	且危机显然与美国高风险按揭支持证券问题爆发有关； 当市场突然意识到这些证券无法获得全额偿付时，许多具系统重要性的金融企业就被视为比以前孱弱得多。


Catastrophic economic consequences followed.	随之而来的是灾难性的经济后果。


All of this is true, but, given the possibility of a major overhaul of US corporate taxation, which President Barack Obama has proposed, we should revisit the conventional wisdom concerning the supposedly weak connection between corporate taxation and the financial crisis.	所有这些都是事实，但是，美国公司税制有望迎来重大改革——总统奥巴马已经提出了计划——因此我们应该重新审视关于公司税和金融危机无甚关系的传统智慧。


Indeed, in my view, policymakers, academics, and the media have rejected too resolutely the idea that corporate taxation played no more than a minor role.	事实上，在我看来，决策者、学者和媒体否认公司税制起着很大作用的做法太过武断。


To be sure, the tax preference for debt has been embedded in the economy for a long time, with no financial crises for most of that period.	是的，偏袒债务的课税偏好在经济中已经存在了很长时间，并且绝大多数时间里并没有金融危机发生。


And, yes, tax incentives are not the only – and perhaps not even the most important – reason why financial institutions use a lot of debt and minimize equity.	是的，税收激励并不是金融机构使用大量债务而最小化股本的唯一理由——甚至也不是最重要的理由。


Most important, while reliance on debt made financial institutions riskier, creditors knew that, in a crisis, the government would probably bail out the largest, if not all of them.	最重要的是，尽管依赖债务让金融机构风险增加，但债权人知道，危机来袭时政府可能会援助最大的金融机构（如果不是所有金融机构的话）。


Government was less likely to bail out equity.	政府援助股本的可能性就比较小。


Viewed from this perspective, it is no wonder that the question of how debt is taxed has played a small role in financial-reform packages.	从这个角度看，毫不奇怪债务如何课税在金融改革方案中只扮演了较小的角色。


Financial institutions fell off the cliff in 2008, it is argued, because they got too close to the edge.	人们指出，金融机构之所以在2008年掉下了悬崖，是因为它们离悬崖挨得太近。


Destabilized by too much short-term debt and too much exposure to risky, overvalued, low-quality mortgage-backed securities, they tripped and fell over it.	它们短期债务过多、价值高估的高风险低质量按揭支持证券敞口过大，因此遭遇了动荡，最终掉下了悬崖。


So regulators have focused on command-and-control orders to financial firms to increase their equity, and to reduce the riskiness of their investments.	于是监管者便将注意力放在了勒令并控制金融企业提高股本、降低投资风险上。


But consider another way of viewing the crisis and our financial institutions: the financial system was never all that far from the cliff’s edge, even before 2008, because the tax system encouraged financial firms to overload themselves with debt.	但不妨换一个角度看待危机和我们的金融机构：金融系统距离悬崖边缘从未如此之远，即使是在2008年之前。 这是因为税收制度鼓励金融企业过度负债。


They generally managed themselves and their risks well, so they did not fall.	总体而言，它们很好地管理着它们自己和它们的风险，因此它们不会掉下去。


But then, in the run-up to the crisis, they miscalculated, taking on too much short-term debt and over-investing in risky securities.	但此后，在通往危机的过程中，它们出现了误算，承担了太多的短期债务，过度投资于高风险证券。


The added risks pushed the financial system past the tipping point, but the baseline problem was that it always contained too much risky debt.	增加的风险将金融系统推过了触发点，但根本问题在于它始终囤积着太多的高风险债务。


From this perspective, it becomes clear that the baseline tax-induced risks should not be ignored.	从这个角度看，显然税收导致的基本风险不应该被忽视。


The policy consensus has properly focused first on the new risks that were added.	政策一致首先关注新增风险，这是正确的。


But focusing on those added risks should be only the first step; doing so should not lead us to ignore the baseline risks that the tax system creates.	但关注这些新增风险应该只是第一步，这样做不能让我们忽视税收制度造成的基本风险。


The taxation issue may go deeper.	税收问题可以更深一步。


The tax system first encourages financial firms to use more debt than is safe, but there is a parallel effect on non-financial firms and many homeowners.	税收制度首先鼓励金融企业使用超过安全量的债务，但非金融企业和许多屋主也受到了同样的影响。


Tax deductions for interest payments encourage them to borrow, too, an issue that has long been understood.	利息的税收扣减性质也鼓励他们借钱，这一问题早已众人皆知。


But, less obviously, these borrowers then demand more tax-induced lending from financial institutions, because tax benefits make their own use of debt cheaper.	但是，不那么显而易见的是，这些借款人接着需���来自金融机构的更多的税收诱发的贷款，因为纳税好处让他们自身使用债务变得更廉价了。


Were their demand for debt lower – and, in the case of corporate debtors, were they to rely more on equity – financial institutions would face less pressure to use so much debt themselves.	如果他们对债务的需求没有那么高——并且，对于公司债务人来说，如果他们更多地依赖股本——金融机构本身使用大量债务的压力就会较小。


Much consideration has already been devoted to how to reform corporate taxation in a way that levels the playing field for equity relative to debt; more than 20 years ago, the US Treasury conducted a major analysis and devised a plan to do so.	人们花了很多心思考虑如何改革公司税从而让股本和债务享有同样地位； 20多年前，美国财政部就做了大量分析，而且设计了一个计划。


As the Obama administration moves ahead with its new proposals, it should look back at the financial crisis, which provides strong grounds for implementing such a change.	随着奥巴马政府也推出了它的新方案，我们应该回顾金融危机，因为它提供了实施这一变革的强有力的原因。


One Flew Over the Resource Curse	飞跃资源诅咒


GENEVA – Geopolitical insight is often gained through real-life experience, rather than big-picture thinking.	日内瓦—地缘政治见解通常来自真实生活的经验而不是高瞻远瞩的思考。


Arriving at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris from Conakry, Guinea, is a case in point: Conakry’s airport, located in one of the world’s poorest countries, outperforms France’s prestigious global hub in terms of cleanliness, service, and pride.	从圭亚那科纳克里来到巴黎戴高乐机场就是这样一种经验：坐落于世界最贫穷国家之一的科纳克里的机场比法国闻名世界的全球交通枢纽更干净、服务更好，也更加充满了自豪。


By amplifying such exemplars into a national project, Guinea could join the small group of commodity-rich countries that have bucked the curse of corruption and economic decay that often accompanies large natural-resource endowments.	圭亚那将科纳克里机场精神渗透到了整个国家，作为商品资源丰富国家，圭亚那是少数逃脱了自然资源禀赋丰富国常见的腐败诅咒和经济衰退的国家之一。


History demonstrates the difficulty of avoiding the so-called “resource curse” – and that it does not plague only less-developed countries like Nigeria, as many assume.	历史表明，避免所谓的“资源诅咒”是十分困难的，正如很多人所认为的，并非只有尼日利亚等欠发达国家才会受这一诅咒的困扰。


In the 1980’s, the United Kingdom’s North Sea-driven oil and gas boom undermined the country’s broad-based economic competitiveness, while Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government wasted much of the revenue on handouts that encouraged excessive consumption.	20世纪80年代，英国北海石油和天然气开发破坏了该国基础广泛的经济竞争力，而首相撒切尔夫人的政府将大笔收入浪费在鼓励过度消费的宣传上。


While a handful of commodity-rich countries have managed to buck the curse, including Botswana, Chile, and Norway, they have, nevertheless, failed to diversify their economies, remaining dependent on natural resource-based exports.	少数商品丰富国——如博茨瓦纳、智利和挪威——成功地抵制了资源魔咒，但也没能实现经济的多元化，仍然依赖于基于自然资源的出口。


But history is not destined to repeat itself, and leaders of commodity-rich countries are seeking alternative futures.	但历史并不只会简单重复自己，商品丰富国领导人也在寻求不一样的未来。


Countries across Africa – including Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda – are showing early signs of success.	非洲各国——包括加纳、利比里亚、莫桑比克、卢旺达和乌干达——已显露出成功的早期信号。


Zambia recently issued a $750 million inaugural ten-year bond at an annual interest rate of 5.375%.	赞比亚最近发行了7. 5亿美元10年期债券，年利率3.


Oversubscribed by 24 times, the issue will allow Zambia to borrow more cheaply than many European countries can.	375%。 此次发行超额认购率高达24倍，使得赞比亚得以以比许多欧洲国家更低的成本实现融资。


Such developments reflect growing confidence in Africa’s economic prospects and, thus, in its ability to escape the resource curse.	这样的发展势头体现了人们对非洲经济前景、进而对其摆脱资源诅咒的能力越来越有信心。


But these countries still face significant obstacles to development.	但这些国家仍然面临发展的重大障碍。


First, governments must balance long-term goals with short-term achievements.	首先，政府必须平衡长期目标和短期成就。


Given unlimited time, less-developed commodity-rich countries would first invest in human capital and institutions, then direct their growing commodity revenues into infrastructure, and move on to diversify their economies by strengthening the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors.	如果时间没有限制，那么欠发达的商品丰富国将首先投资于人力资本和制度，然后将不断增长的商品收入投入基础设施，并继续通过增强农业、制造业和服务业实现经济的多元化。


In the real world, of course, such countries’ political economies demand short-term gains, beginning with basic services like potable water and electricity.	当然，在现实世界中，这些国家的政治经济要求的是短期成果，最基本的便是饮用水和电力。


If governments fail to respond to these basic demands, citizens take to the streets, often destructively.	如果政府不能满足这些基本需求，公民就会走上街头，并且引发破坏性后果。


This summer in Guinea, for example, citizens’ frustration with widespread poverty and weak institutions, memories of ethnic persecution, and distrust of unfamiliar democratic processes fueled violent protests.	比如，今年夏天，由于普遍的贫困和制度缺失、种族迫害阴魂不散以及对不熟悉的民主进程的不信任，圭亚那人民走上了街头，引发了暴力示威。


Second, development requires both money and the right conditions.	其次，发展既要有资金，也要有正确的环境。


But, in many cases, the conditions placed on funding create barriers to investment.	但是，在很多情况下，融资环境构成了投资障碍。


The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank lead the chorus of traditional players eager to help, offering debt write-offs and concessionary finance.	以IMF和世界银行为首的传统资金提供者急切地想施以援手，提供债务减记和优惠贷款。


But the stringent institutional reforms that they demand, while beneficial in theory, might not stabilize, let alone enhance, the development process.	但与此同时，它们所要求的严格的制度改革尽管在理论上大有裨益，却可能种下了不安定的种子，根本不能刺激发展进程。


Newcomers, most notably China, have become a ready alternative source of cheap finance.	新来者——最令人注目的要数中国——已成为现成的廉价融资新来源。


But, in exchange, the Chinese expect business opportunities and, to some extent, political influence.	但是，作为交换，中国要求获得商业机会，在某些情况下更是要求政治影响。


Sovereign-wealth funds, too, are increasingly involved in financing development.	主权财富基金也越来越多地参与发展融资。


But, despite being state-owned and subject to policy decisions, they function as commercial enterprises (with the possible exception of Norway’s hydrocarbon-funded state-owned investment vehicles).	但是，尽管这些基金多为国有、受政策决定左右，但说到底仍是商业企业（挪威的以石化资金为后盾的国有投资基金是个例外）。


Financing for the most expensive projects – implementing green-energy systems, building transport infrastructure, and developing modern cities – must come from foreign institutional investors.	对最昂贵项目——实施绿色能源体系、建设交通基础设施以及开发现代城市——的融资必须来自外国机构投资者。


But high-quality private investors are resistant to financing lumpy, illiquid investments in fragile, volatile states.	但高质量私人投资者不愿意为脆弱而动荡国家的劣质低流动性投资项目提供融资。


Those who are willing to engage often demand steep risk premiums that dramatically increase the cost of capital, often to usurious levels.	愿意参与者也往往要求极高的风险溢价，这将大大提高资本成本，与高利贷不遑多让。


Global mining companies like Rio Tinto are increasingly working alongside emerging-economy leaders like China’s Chalco to support development.	力拓等全球矿业公司正日渐与中国等新兴经济龙头一起支持发展。


As the most heavily invested, they have the most experience using cheap debt to create value.	作为出手规模最大的投资者，它们拥有最丰富的利用廉价债务创造价值的经验。


But, with commodity prices beginning to drop, even the most bullish companies are reassessing ambitious investment plans – a trend reflected in the Brazilian mining giant Vale’s recent decision to put its investment in Guinea on hold.	但是，随着商品价格的下跌，即使最有信心的公司也在重新评估雄心勃勃的项目——巴西矿业巨头淡水河谷公司最近搁置其在圭亚那的投资便是明证。


Bucking the resource curse requires, first and foremost, strong, legitimate domestic political leadership, underpinned by effective institutional arrangements.	说到底，阻止资源魔咒要求强大、合法的国内政治领导力，并辅之以有效的制度安排。


But it also requires a global investment community – public, private, and mixed – that can move beyond short-term thinking, ideological bias, ignorance, and cynicism.	但这同样要求超越短期思维、意识形态偏见、无知和犬儒主义的全球投资机会——公共投资、私人投资以及公私联合投资。


After all, bets on leadership, vision, and earnings potential should not be limited to investments in California-based technology start-ups.	毕竟，对领导力、愿景和盈利潜力的下注不应该仅仅局限在加州新技术企业上。


Guinea, which is making progress despite annual per capita income of roughly $450, exemplifies the potential of the world’s poorest countries to surpass expectations.	圭亚那的年人均收入只有450美元左右，但它在快速发展，它是一个榜样——世界最穷国家也有超预期增长的潜力。


Investors should take note.	投资者应该引起注意。


Getting Prices Right	如何建立一个好的资本价格发现机制？


HONG KONG – Building and maintaining the infrastructure of property rights – the rules, laws, registers, and administrative and judicial structures that define, protect, and enforce such rights and regulate economic transactions – has traditionally been the responsibility of national governments.	香港——产权基础设施是界定、保护并执行产权规则和规范经济交易的制度体系。 与产权基础设施相关的规章、法律、注册制度及行政司法体制历来都由各国政府负责。


But, as the world economy has become increasingly interconnected, a global property-rights infrastructure (PRI) has emerged – further raising the stakes of developing effective national PRIs and accurate price-discovery mechanisms.	但随着世界各国经济联系日趋紧密，一个全球层面的产权基础设施体系也已经初具规模，并使得建立有效的国家层面的产权基础设施和准确的价格发现机制显得更加重要。


The global PRI has arisen through countries’ widespread accession to the World Trade Organization, international accounting and regulatory criteria like the Basel Accords, standards established by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and some aspects of international law.	随着各国纷纷加入世贸组织等国际机构并采纳国际会计与监管标准 （例如《巴塞尔协定》，国际证监会组织制定的规则标准，以及国际法某些领域的规定），全球产权基础设施体系开始形成。


As national economies and multinational companies compete for market share, global standards of market behavior become increasingly important.	在国家经济体和跨国企业之间彼此激烈争夺市场份额的国际环境下，制定全球统一的市场行为标准越来越有必要。


Consider the smart-phone industry, in which corporations like Apple, Samsung, Sony, Nokia, and Huawei compete fiercely to secure their global market shares.	以智能手机行业为例，苹果、三星、索尼、诺基亚和华为等来自各国的企业为争夺全球市场份额激烈竞争。


Given that companies cannot compete effectively in global markets without a sound domestic PRI, such firm-level competition has driven countries to improve the national PRI over the longer term.	如果一个国家的国内产权基础设施不完善，其企业在全球市场的竞争力就会受到影响，这种企业层面的竞争会逐渐推动各国改善本国的产权基础设施。


Furthermore, establishing accurate asset-price levels is essential to a well-functioning market.	但是，一个好的资本市场不仅需要好的产权基础设施，还需要一个好的资本价格发现机制。


The state affects asset prices indirectly through its influence on inflation, interest rates, and the strength of the currency. Governments can directly influence the prices of key resources like energy, money, and public goods and services through taxation, customs duties, production quotas, and natural-resource ownership.	而这个机制仅仅依靠市场是不现实的，因为政府可以通过调整通胀率、利率及汇率直接或间接影响资产价格，还可以通过税收、关税、生产或消费配额及对自然资源的拥有和控制来影响能源、货币、公共产品及服务等关键资源的价格。


Government intervention in benchmark prices can be justified in the name of macroeconomic management or regulatory action to improve the provision of public goods and services. After all, the state determines the supply of fiat money and is responsible for energy and natural-resource conservation.	政府通常以改善公共产品服务、宏观经济管理或监管行动为由对一些重要的基准价格实施干预，毕竟政府决定法定货币供应量，并负责保护能源和自然资源。


But there is a risk that the state can get important prices seriously wrong.	但政府严重扭曲重要基准价格的风险是切实存在的。


This is particularly true of money, which has two prices.	这在资产的定价过程中尤其突出。


The government (the visible hand) sets the benchmark price for risk-free financial assets through monetary policy and control over fiscal deficits, while the market (the invisible hand) sets the risk premia of risky assets above the benchmark rate.	在金融理论里，资产价格一般由两个要素组成：无风险资产基准利率与风险溢价。 政府（有形之手）通过货币政策及财政赤字控制并制定无风险主权金融资产的基准利率，而市场（无形之手）则在基准利率的基础上发掘风险资产的风险溢价。


The distinction between the two prices is the foundation of modern finance theory.	对这两种价格的区分奠定了现代金融理论及实践体系的基础。


But the system rests on the assumption that the government will set accurate benchmark interest rates for risk-free assets.	但该体系的前提在于政府能够正确制定无风险资产的基准利率。


As the recent crises in advanced countries demonstrated, this is not a safe assumption: Unsustainable public debt and fiscal deficits forced central banks to expand their balance sheets massively, causing benchmark rates to turn negative in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.	发达国家近期的金融危机表明这一假设并不一定总成立：不可持续的公共债务和财政赤字迫使央行大规模扩张资产负债表，进而导致通胀调整后的实际基准利率往往变为负值。


In fact, lowering the benchmark rates for risk-free assets changes the distribution of the risk premia on risky assets, making it too low when asset bubbles are forming and too high when they burst.	事实上，过度降低无风险资产的基准利率会改变风险资产的风险溢价分布，从而导致资产泡沫形成期利率过低、破裂期则利率过高。


This pattern was evident in the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the eurozone crisis that erupted in 2010.	这在1997-1998年的亚洲金融危机、2008年的全球金融危机和2010年的欧元区危机中都得到印证。


The logic and the mechanism that the government uses to set benchmark prices are very different from those that the market uses to set risk premia.	政府发现及制定基准利率与市场发现及形成风险溢价的逻辑和机制完全不同。


The former implements policy decisions, based on economic, social, and political considerations, while profit-maximizing behavior – anchored by the state-determined price and requiring a robust PRI – determines the latter.	前者在经济、社会和政治考量基础上进行决策，而后者则是在政府制定基准利率与建设完善产权基础设施的基础上由一个追求利润最大化的市场过程来实现的。


Thus, the role of the market in price discovery is inextricable from that of the government.	因此，资本市场无法脱离政府在主导基准利率发现及制定过程中的影响。


Indeed, there is a complex, non-linear feedback relationship between the two, so developing an accurate capital-pricing system depends on both actors.	事实上，两者之间存在复杂、非线性的相互影响。 因此建立一个好的资本定价系统需要政府与市场共同发挥作用。


Until recently, advanced-country markets predominated in setting risk premia, owing to their mature and well-functioning PRIs, which include clear rules and a high level of transparency in price formation.	直到不久前，发达国家市场还主宰着风险溢价发现及定价机制，这归功于他们运行良好及成熟的产权基础设施——包括明确的规则和高度透明的市场价格形成机制。


But, even in advanced countries, the influence of vested interests can lead to collective-action failures and, in turn, to incorrect benchmark rates.	但即使在发达国家，既得利益的影响也可能导致集体行动失败，进而形成错误的基准利率。


Last year’s LIBOR scandal, in which banks were found to be reporting inaccurate interest rates in order to manipulate the prices of financial instruments, epitomized this risk.	去年的伦敦银行同业拆借利率丑闻揭露了银行为操纵金融工具价格而人为地扭曲 利率，这恰恰是上述风险的集中反映。


Meanwhile, given that many emerging economies have incomplete or immature PRIs, their influence over market-price discovery is relatively weak.	同时，鉴于许多新兴经济体产权基础设施尚不成熟完善，他们在市场价格发现方面的影响相对较弱。


In state-dominated systems like China’s, developing an effective PRI – delineating market participants’ rights and responsibilities, ensuring the exchange platform’s transparency, and creating a fair and equitable process of dispute resolution – is particularly challenging, because the state acts as a regulator, asset owner, enterprise operator, and competitor in the market.	在中国这样的政府主导体制中，建立起有效的产权基础设施——界定市场参与者权利和责任、确保交换平台透明并创造公平公正纠纷解决过程——特别具有挑战性，因为政府同时扮演了市场的监管者、资产所有者、企业经营者和竞争者等多重角色。


In such systems, the government directly controls the benchmark interest rates.	在这样的系统中，政府可以直接控制基准利率。


But setting the correct rate for risk-free assets is difficult when capital flows easily across borders, enabling market participants to exploit discrepancies between countries’ rates.	但如果资本能够轻松跨境流动，政府正确设定无风险资产利率则会比较困难，因为市场参与者可以轻松利用各国的利率差异套利并影响利率形成。


Herein lies the dilemma (one that China currently faces) of market-oriented reforms.	这里就凸显出中国目前所处的市场化改革困境。


While cross-border capital flows and interest and exchange rates must be liberalized to maintain economic development, such reforms raise the risk of asset bubbles if implemented under distorted benchmark prices.	虽然必须实现跨境资本流动及汇率、利率市场化以保持经济增长，但是如果基准价格扭曲，这些改革将增加资产泡沫风险。


Emerging economies have watched the leveraged power of investors distort the price-formation process in crisis-stricken advanced economies.	新兴经济体目睹了投资者的杠杆力量扭曲深陷危机的发达经济体的价格形成。


Preventing this from occurring in emerging economies requires that these countries’ leaders balance monetary, fiscal, and macro-prudential policies in a way that enables correct pricing of risk-free assets.	新兴经济体为避免同样情况发生，其领导人需要平衡货币、财政和审慎的宏观政策，从而正确制定无风险资产价格。


Striking this balance is made even more complicated by the influence of advanced-country policies on emerging economies.	发达国家对新兴经济体的政策影响使新兴国家实现这一平衡变得更加复杂。


Exceptionally low interest rates and quantitative easing may be appropriate for advanced economies experiencing slow growth, but they can be problematic for emerging economies struggling to promote market-oriented price-discovery mechanisms.	超低利率及量化宽松政策对低增长的发达经济体或许是恰当的举措，但对于正在奋力推行市场化价格发现机制的新兴经济体则可能问题重重。


In this environment, it may be appropriate to strengthen the global PRI further.	在这种环境下，进一步加强全球产权基础设施也许是合宜之举。


The Root of All Sovereign-Debt Crises	所有主权债务危机的根源


NEW YORK – The Greek debt crisis has prompted questions about whether the euro can survive without a nearly unimaginable centralization of fiscal policy. There is a simpler way.	发自纽约——希腊债务危机引发了诸多对追问，质疑如不推行一场近乎异想天开的财政政策中央集权的话，欧元这种货币是否还能继续存在下去。


Irresponsible borrowing by governments in international credit markets requires irresponsible lending. Bank regulators should just say no to such lending by institutions that are already under their purview.	还有一个更简单的方法：既然各国政府在国际信用市场的不负责任借款行为需要有同样不负责任的贷款行为才能实现，那么银行监管者只需叫停那些受监管金融机构的这类借款行为就行了。


Lending to foreign governments is in many ways inherently riskier than unsecured private debt or junk bonds.	在许多方面来说，贷款给外国政府都要承受更大的内在风险，甚至比不安全的私人债务或者垃圾债券危险得多。


Private borrowers often have to offer collateral, such as their houses. The collateral limits the lenders’ downside risk, and the fear of losing the pledged assets encourages borrowers to act prudently.	私人借款者通常需要提供房屋等担保物，而这些担保物又减低了贷款者的风险，何况对失去抵押资产的忧虑也会促使借款者谨慎行事。


But governments offer no collateral, and their principal incentive to repay – the fear of being cut off by international credit markets – derives from a perverse addiction. Only governments that are chronically unable to finance their outlays with domestic taxes or domestic debt must keep borrowing large sums abroad.	但是政府可提供不了担保物，而它们还债的基本激励因素——对被国际信贷市场所抛弃的恐惧——其实源自于一个荒谬的依赖行为：只有那些长期无法用国内税收或者国债来满足自身支出需求的政府才会向国外大举借钱。


A deep craving for the favor of foreign lenders usually derives from some deeply engrained form of misgoverance.	而对那些海外贷款者的渴求往往根源于这些国家内部某些根深蒂固的治理失败问题。


Commercial debt usually has covenants that limit the borrower’s ability to roll the dice.	商业债务通常都会附带一些防止借款人狗急跳墙的限制条款。


Loan or bond covenants often require borrowers to agree to maintain a minimum level of equity capital or cash on hand.	贷款或者债券协议书通常都要求借款者同意持有一个最低限度的股票或者现金。


Government bonds, on the other hand, have no covenants.	而另一方面政府债券却没有这类契约。


Similarly, private borrowers can go to prison if they misrepresent their financial condition to secure bank loans.	同理，私人借款者如果为了获取银行贷款而瞒报自身财务状况将面临牢狱之灾。


Securities laws require that issuers of corporate bonds spell out all possible risks.	而证券法也规定企业债券的发行者必须列明所有潜在风险。


By contrast, governments pay no penalties for outrageous misrepresentation or fraudulent accounting, as the Greek debacle shows.	相比之下，政府就算大肆隐瞒实际经济状况或者操纵审计也不会受到任何惩罚——正如我们在希腊政府身上看到的那样。


When private borrowers default, bankruptcy courts supervise a bankruptcy or reorganization process through which even unsecured creditors can hope to recover something.	当私人借款者无力还贷时，破产法庭会执行一个破产或重组程序，务必使最高风险的借贷者都不至于血本无归。


But there is no process for winding up a state and no legal venue for renegotiating its debts.	但却没有任何程序能够终止一个国家或者法定区域来重组其债务。


Worse, the debt that states raise abroad is usually denominated in a currency whose value they cannot control.	更糟糕的是，这些国家的海外债务往往都与一个超出自身控制能力之外的货币挂钩。


So a gradual, invisible reduction in the debt burden by debasing the currency is rarely an option.	因此通过贬值该货币来逐步且无形地减轻债务负担的做法往往无法实现。


The power to tax is thought to make government debt safer: private borrowers have no right to the profits or wages that they need to satisfy their obligations.	收税的权力似乎能令政府债务看上去风险较低，因为私人借款者无法确保一定会有收益或者工资来偿还自身债务。


But the power to tax has practical limits, and governments’ moral or legal right to bind future generations of citizens to repay foreign creditors is questionable.	但收税权也有实际操作上的限制，而政府要求下一代公民来偿还现今债务的道德和法律权力也饱受质疑。


Lending to states thus involves unfathomable risks that ought to be borne by specialized players who are willing to live with the consequences.	因此借款给国家所冒的风险堪称深不可测，应该由那些愿意承担这些后果的特殊市场参与者来承担。


Historically, sovereign lending was a job for a few intrepid financiers, who drove shrewd bargains and were adept at statecraft.	历史上主权贷款都是一些勇敢贷款者的专利，他们精于讨价还价，也不缺治国手腕。


Lending to governments against the collateral of a port or railroad – or the use of military force to secure repayment – was not unknown.	甚至要求用港口或者铁路来作为贷款抵押物——或者动用军事力量来确保对方还贷——都不乏先例。


After the 1970’s, though, sovereign lending became institutionalized.	而1970年代以后主权借贷行为逐渐制度化。


Citibank – whose chief executive, Walter Wriston, famously declared that countries don’t go bust – led the charge, recycling a flood of petrodollars to dubious regimes.	花旗银行——其总裁沃尔特·李斯顿有句名言说国家不会破产——先拔头筹，从那些不可靠的政权手里回收了大量石油美元。


It was more lucrative business than traditional lending: a few bankers could lend enormous sums with little due diligence – except for the small detail that governments plied with easy credit do sometimes default.	这种方式比传统的贷款获利更加丰厚：一些银行家可以在不为人知的情况下放出大量贷款——除了一个细节：那些积累了低成本借款的政府有时确实会赖帐。


Later, the Basel accords whetted banks’ appetite for more government bonds by ruling them virtually risk-free.	随后的《巴塞尔协议》又增大了各大银行对政府债券的胃口，因为协议认定这些债券是无风险的。


Banks loaded up on the relatively high-yield debt of countries like Greece because they had to set aside very little capital.	由于只需要拨备很少一部分资本作为杠杆，所以这些银行都积累了大量来自希腊等国的相对高回报政府债券。


But, while the debt was highly rated, how could anyone objectively assess unsecured and virtually unenforceable obligations?	但当这些债券被评级机构捧到天上的时候，为何没有人去客观地评价这些高风险且无法强制履行的还款责任呢？


Bank lending to sovereign borrowers has been a double disaster, fostering over-indebtedness, especially in countries with irresponsible or corrupt governments.	银行对主权借款人的贷款已经成为了一个双重悲剧，并导致了过度负债——尤其是那些政府不负责任或者腐败的国家。


And, because much of the risk is borne by banks (rather than by, say, hedge funds), which play a central role in lubricating the payments system, a sovereign-debt crisis can cause widespread harm.	同时由于大多数风险都由银行（而非对冲基金）这种对金融支付系统起核心润滑作用的机构来承担，所以一个主权债务危机往往会造成大范围冲击。


The Greek debacle jeopardized the well-being of all of Europe, not only Greeks.	正如希腊人的恶行不仅影响了自己，还危及到整个欧洲的福祉。


The solution to breaking the nexus between sovereign-debt crises and banking crises is straightforward: limit banks to lending where evaluation of borrowers’ willingness and ability to repay isn’t a great leap in the dark.	而打破主权债务危机和银行危机之间联系的解决方案其实相当直接：限制银行只能向那些确认真正有还款意愿和能力的政府贷款。


This means no cross-border sovereign debt (or esoteric instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations).	这意味着不再有跨国主权债务（或者类似用担保债务凭证这样的复杂金融工具）。


This simple rule would require no complex reordering of European fiscal arrangements, nor would it require the creation of new supra-national entities.	这一简单的规则不需要欧洲财政安排的复杂重整，也不需要创立新的超国家实体。


It would certainly make it difficult for governments to borrow abroad, but that would be a good outcome for their citizens, not an imposition.	它将使各国的海外融资变得困难，但对于这些国家的人民来说堪称一个善果，而不是一个负担。


Moreover, curtailing governments’ access to international credit (and, by extension, inducing more fiscal responsibility) could actually help more enterprising and productive borrowers.	此外，减少政府与国际信贷（以及因此带来更多的财政负担）之间的联系将为那些企业和生产型贷款者带来更多的帮助。


Such constraints wouldn’t solve the current crisis in Portugal, Ireland, Greece, or Spain.	这类限制虽然无助于缓解目前葡萄牙、爱尔兰，希腊或者西班牙等国所遭遇的危机。


But it is high time that Europe, and the world, stopped lurching from one short-term fix to the next and addressed the real structural issues.	但对欧洲乃至全世界来说，也是时候停止在短期方案之间纠缠不休，并应对真正的结构问题了。


The Rules of Reconstruction	重建的规则


Lebanon’s reconstruction, so painstakingly carried out in the 1990’s, is now at risk of being undone.	黎巴嫩在1990年代历尽艰难实施的重建现在正面临毁于一旦的危险。


But Lebanon is not alone in that respect: according to the UN and several independent studies, countries in transition from war to peace face roughly a 50% chance of sliding back into warfare.	无独有偶：根据联合国及几项独立研究显示，从战争向和平过渡的国家大多都有50%的可能性会重新陷入战乱。


Indeed, in East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and many other countries, the transition to peace seems to be failing.	的确，在东帝汶、伊拉克、阿富汗、科索沃和其他许多国家，向和平的过渡似乎正在失败。


Likewise, there is unfinished business in many other countries undergoing reconstruction.	同样，在其它许多正进行重建的国家也有未完成的任务。


The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, just held its first elections in 40 years.	例如，刚果民主共和国(DRC)刚结束了它40年来的第一次选举。


The stability of the Great Lakes region of Africa, perhaps that continent’s most violent area, will depend on the success of its transition and reconstruction.	在非洲大湖区（可能是这片大陆上最暴力的地区）的稳定将依赖与其过渡和重建的成功。


When wars end, countries confront a multi-pronged transition.	对国民而言，暴力必须让位于安全； 无法无天和政治排除必须让位于法制和民享政府；


Violence must give way to security for inhabitants; lawlessness and political exclusion must give way to the rule of law and participatory government; ethnic, religious, or class/caste polarization must give way to national reconciliation; and ruined war economies must be transformed into functioning market economies that enable ordinary people to support themselves.	种族、宗教或社会阶级/等级分化必须由民族和解取代； 千疮百孔的战争经济必须转型为健全的市场经济，从而让普通民众能够安身立命。


These multiple tasks make economic reconstruction fundamentally different from “development as usual.”	这多项任务使得经济重建和“常规发展”有了根本性的不同。


To succeed, the transition to peace requires demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation of services and infrastructure.	要想成功，这种向和平的过渡就必须要遣散军队、解除武装并使从前的战士重新融入社会，以及进行社会服务和基础设施的重建和恢复。


To meet these goals, the objective of peace should prevail over that of development if the two come into conflict.	要实现这些远景，在和平与发展目标产生矛盾的情况下，前者就应重于后者。


Often, optimal economic policies and best practices are not attainable – or even desirable.	通常，最优的经济政策和最佳的实现方式是不具操作性—甚至是不合时宜的。


This also means that peace-related programs should get priority in budget allocations.	这也意味着与和平相关的项目应该在预算分配上优先。


Of course, the legitimacy of the government or other policymaking body will determine what is possible in economic policymaking.	当然，政府的合法性或其他政策制定机构会决定具体的经济政策。


A weak interim national government – or a United Nations or foreign occupying administration – should not attempt to implement policies such as privatizing national resources when doing so might incite political resistance.	一个软弱的过渡时期政府—或外来占领方的权力机构—不应该试图实施诸如国家资源私有化这样的政策，尤其在这样做可能引发政治对抗的情况下。


Indeed, early privatization is likely to be destructive in its own terms, because property rights will remain in question for some time.	的确，过早的私有化本身很可能具有破坏性，因为产权在一段时间内仍会是个问题。


Thus, a new yardstick is needed to measure success.	因此，我们就需要一种新的准绳来衡量成功。


Projects must be judged by whether they contribute to peace and reconciliation, rather than on purely economic grounds.	判定相关项目的成功与否必须看它们是否为和平与和解做出贡献，而不仅仅是在经济层面上考量。


Effective demobilization and reconciliation in El Salvador, for example, ensured the consolidation of peace after that country’s brutal civil war of the 1980’s.	例如，萨尔瓦多卓有成效的遣散军队与和解确保了该国在经历了1980年代惨烈的内战之后，和平得以巩固。


Elsewhere, however, disregarding the primacy of politics in a transition to peace has had tragic consequences.	但在世界的其他地方，不顾向和平过渡进程中政治的重要性已经造成了悲剧性的后果。


The failure to demobilize and reconcile factions in Lebanon, where Hezbollah remained armed despite its transformation into a political party, meant that belligerency was always bubbling below the surface.	黎巴嫩未能有效实现遣散武装及派系和解（尽管真主党已经转型为一个政治党派，但却仍保留着武装）意味着在和平的表征之下，交战状态依然存在。


Likewise, the collapse of peace processes in Angola and Haiti and the various setbacks in Cambodia and Nicaragua during the 1990’s reflect a failure to demobilize and integrate.	同样，安哥拉和海地和平进程的崩溃以及柬埔寨和尼加拉瓜在1990年代的种种挫折都反映了他们在遣散军队和政治统一上的失败。


On the surface, the UN seems ideally placed to lead reconstruction efforts because, unlike development institutions like the World Bank, it can integrate the political and economic objectives that are equal parts of a transition to peace.	表面上看，联合国似乎是领导重建的理想机构，因为和世界银行等发展机构不同，它能够整合政治和经济目标—这两个向和平过渡过程的对等部分。


Yet, time and again, the UN has shown itself to be incompetent in this role.	然而，联合国却屡次证明自己担负不起这样的责任。


In Kosovo, for example, the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into a civilian peace force has caused great insecurity over the years, which the UN administration might ultimately regret if the resolution of the province’s final status does not lead to independence.	例如，在科索沃，科索沃解放军在向一支和平武装转变的若干年里就造成了极大的不安全因素。 如果关于该省最后地位的决议没有使其独立，那么联合国可能最终会为这一项目感到后悔。


Treating the transition to peace as “development as usual” has, moreover, led to new violence in East Timor, a country that the UN once trumpeted as a success story.	另外，把向和平过渡当作“常规发展”对待的做法在东帝汶也造成了新的暴力情况。 而联合国还曾一度将该国鼓吹为成功的实例。


The commercial exploitation of rich oil and gas reserves in the Timor Gap could have facilitated reconstruction and created jobs for the 30% of the labor force that is unemployed.	对“帝汶海”(Timor Gap) 丰富油气资源的商业开采本可以有力地推动该国的重建，并为30%的失业劳力大军创造工作机会。


Instead, with the strong approval of the IMF, East Timor created a Norwegian-style “petroleum fund” to save the money for a rainy day.	然而在国际货币基金组织的大力鼓动下，东帝汶却创建了一支挪威式的，未雨绸缪的“石油基金”。


But in East Timor, that rainy day is now.	但对它来说，现在就正是风雨无常的时期。


Iraq provides numerous examples of the dangers created by misplaced priorities.	伊拉克在不分主次所造成的危险方面的例子更是不胜枚举。


Early efforts to privatize Iraq’s oil industry proved disastrous, confirming for many Iraqis that the occupying Americans were determined to “steal” the country’s wealth and thus fanning the flames of violent resistance.	过早地对伊拉克石油工业实行私有化被证明是灾难性的。 此举令许多伊拉克人确信美国占领者肯定是要“偷窃”他们国家的宝藏，从而为暴力对抗火上浇油。


Indeed, privatization was all the more bizarre as a policy choice because it was doomed in advance: investors clearly would not be attracted to buy assets where property rights might change once a legitimate Iraqi government took over – a huge impediment to investment in Kosovo as well.	的确，私有化实在是一种奇怪的政策选择，因为它是注定行不通的：在合法的伊拉克政府接管政权之后，产权可能发生变��的情况下，投资者明显对购买相关资产不感兴趣。 这也是科索沃面临的投资困境。


But the United States has not learned its lesson.	但美国却并未吸取教训。


On the verge of civil war, Iraq just announced a restructuring of its foreign debt.	在内战爆发的边缘，伊拉克刚宣布对其外债实施重组。


Rather than improving services and living conditions in areas where it could have helped consolidate peace, the government, at America’s behest, will allocate hundreds of millions of dollars to pay investment banks, accounting firms, and legal advisors who assist with that refinancing.	伊拉克现政府非但没有在本可能有助于巩固和平的地区改善服务并提高人民的生活水平，反而在美国的授意下，将成百上千万的美元支付给参与这项重组计划的投资银行、会计事务所和法律顾问。


Any transition to peace may well prove ephemeral unless policymakers make political reconciliation and integration – not optimal economic policies – the bedrock priority.	除非政策制定者们着力实行政治和解与统一—而不是最优的经济政策—这一重中之重，否则任何向和平过渡的进程都会夭折。


Despite its failures, the UN is probably still the best-placed organization to oversee such efforts.	尽管屡战屡败，但联合国很可能还是监督这些进程的首选机构。


But the complexity of the tasks that post-conflict countries face underscores the urgent challenge of providing the UN with the capacity to meet them.	但战后各国所面临的任务的复杂性更凸显出了赋予联合国担当重任的能力这一急迫挑战。


The Russian Revival	俄国的复兴


Russia’s national revival and new assertiveness under President Vladimir Putin is not really home made but reflects highly auspicious international conditions.	在弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)总统的领导下，俄国的国家复兴和全新自信并不是俄国闭门造车的产物，而是真实地反应了俄国所处的顺利的国际环境。


Oil and gas prices are sky high, the United States is overwhelmed by serious problems in Iraq and the Middle East, and the West is divided about how it should deal with Russia.	石油和天然气价格令人望而却步，美国深陷在伊拉克和中东问题中无法自拔，而西方世界在如何对待俄国的问题上态度也相去甚远。


Putin’s administration has been keen to take advantage of this favorable environment.	普京政府非常愿意利用如此有利的环境。


Yet, although some of the Kremlin’s moves seem clear and reasonable, others can scarcely be described as rational or forward-looking.	尽管克里姆林的某些举措似乎明确而合理，但另外一些做法却难以得到合乎情理、高瞻远瞩的赞誉。


For example, Russia’s desire to take ownership stakes in Europe’s gas distribution markets makes perfect sense and is fully legitimate given Russia’s energy assets and pipeline capacity.	举例来讲，如果考虑到其所拥有的能源资产和管线容量，俄国在欧洲天然气输送市场谋求所有权股份的愿望合情合理、无可厚非。


Likewise, Russia’s effort to expand its influence in the energy-rich countries of Central Asia is aimed at consolidating Russia’s stature as a major energy supplier.	与此相似，俄国在能源丰富的中亚各国扩大影响的目的是巩固自身主要能源供应国的地位。


Asserting itself as a major power outside the Western realm, Russia has boosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China and most Central Asian countries.	俄国向世界宣称自己是独立于西方王国之外的主要力量，并推动建立了拥有中国和多数中亚国家参与的上海合作组织。


Indeed, Russia is increasingly attaching ever greater significance to its relations with China, something of a strategic shift in foreign policy, even if it is not yet clear how close Russia wants to be get to China.	事实上，俄国对俄中关系给予了前所未有的重视，这代表着其外交政策的一次战略性革命，尽管目前还不清楚俄国究竟希望俄中关系发展到何种地步。


But bullying Georgia and Moldova, demonstrating support for Hamas, or indulging North Korea do not seem to be guided by any strategic sense of Russia’s far-reaching interests.	但欺凌格鲁吉亚、摩尔多瓦，支持哈马斯或纵容北朝鲜似乎并不是出于俄国长远利益和战略需要的指引。


They seem guided by pure and simple spite.	导致上述行为的更像是简单、纯粹的不怀好意。


Russia’s heavy-handed pressure on Georgia and its support of secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two unrecognized republics within Georgia, inflames passions and risks destabilizing the already tense Northern Caucasus.	俄国对格鲁吉亚的高压和对格鲁吉亚国内两个未获承认的共和国¾南奥塞梯（South Ossetia）及阿布哈西亚分离主义运动的支持进一步点燃了狂热情绪，很可能破坏本已岌岌可危的北高加索地区的稳定。


Should instability ignite into open warfare, Russia will find it impossible to avoid the consequences.	如果不稳定因素最终引燃了战火，俄国会发现自己很难逃避战争带来的后果。


Of course, Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili may at times be thoughtless and arrogant. But if Russia’s policy toward him lets events in Georgia get out of control, Russia will be held accountable.	当然，格鲁吉亚总统米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利(Mikhail Saakashvili)有时可能确实显得轻率自私、傲慢自大，但如果俄国惩罚他的政策最终导致格鲁吉亚局势失控，那么俄国必须为此付出代价。


Because Russia claims the status of a world power, it is expected to show restraint and responsibility.	既然宣称自己是世界强国，俄国就理应能够表现出克制，并勇于承担责任。


But the urge to project strength for the mere sake of doing so now seems overwhelming for the Kremlin.	但今天的克里姆林似乎无法克制为显示力量而显示力量的强烈愿望。


This urge stems from a desire to make up for the years of Russia’s humiliation after the USSR collapsed, years when the West contemptuously disregarded Russia’s views and interests.	这种强烈的冲动源自于苏联解体后俄国所受到的屈辱，那时西方世界轻蔑地忽略俄国的见解和利益，而现在的俄国想为这段屈辱的经历寻求补偿。


This lingering resentment may explain Putin’s somewhat uncivil behavior and dubious jokes when dealing with his Western counterparts.	这种残留的怨恨可以解释普京在接触西方同僚时有些粗野的举止和令人生疑的玩笑。


It may also have been behind Russia’s irrational decision to renege on its promise to give Poland the files that document the massacre of thousands of Polish officers on Stalin’s orders in the forest at Katyn at the outbreak of WWII.	这或许还可以解释俄国为什么不理智地撕毁约定，拒绝履行将记录二战爆发时斯大林军官在卡廷（Katyn）森林屠杀成千上万名波兰军官的文件资料移交给波兰的承诺。


What possible benefits can Russia gain by breaking this pledge?	俄国破坏这样的承诺能得到什么好处呢？


The motive seems to be brutally simple: “Precisely because you want it, we won’t deliver.	他们的动机简单得近乎残酷：“恰恰因为你们想要，所以我们不给。


We can do what we like because we’re strong again.”	因为我们再次强大，所以我们可以为所欲为。 ”


But this renewed vigor is too fresh for Russia to feel truly confident.	但这种新生的力量还太过稚嫩，很难赋予俄国以真正的自信。


Putin’s irresistible urge to remind everyone that Russia has recovered its strength suggests underlying insecurity.	普京迫不及待地向所有人宣告俄国已经恢复强大的无法压抑的欲望恰恰表明了他内心深处安全感的缺乏。


In an episode recently reported by The New York Times , at one of Putin’s informal meetings with Bush, Putin showed the US president his Labrador and said, “Bigger, tougher, stronger, faster, meaner than Barney” (Bush’s dog).	《纽约时报》不久前报导了一则趣事，一次普京同布什非正式会晤期间，普京向美国总统展示了自己的拉布拉多爱犬，并说“它比巴尼（布什的猎犬）更硕大、凶猛、强健、迅捷，富于攻击性”。


Though Putin barely implied that the dog’s superiority indicates Russia’s domination over the US, his remark appears to be in line with his general message: don’t you ever dare to doubt our high status.	尽管普京并未明言猎犬的优劣代表了俄美两国的实力，但上述评论却与他所传递的总体信息如出一辙：永远也不要胆敢质疑我们的力量。


Russia is by no means seeking to isolate itself.	俄国根本不希望自我孤立。


Russia needs America and the West in order to realize its ambitious initiative to establish international centers of uranium enrichment, and it needs Western markets, which are the largest consumers of Russia’s gas and oil.	俄国需要美国和西方的协助，才能实现建立国际铀浓缩中心的宏伟理想。 俄国也离不开消费俄天然气和石油资源的西方市场。


Moreover, it is in the West where the rich and powerful Russian elite likes to travel, go shopping, and send their kids to school.	不仅如此，富有和掌握权力的俄国精英们希望到西方游览、购物，并让自己的子女到西方留学。


But Russia’s muscle-flexing behavior leaves Western leaders perplexed and wary, which seems a dubious way for the Kremlin to secure Russia’s new stature.	但俄国炫耀武力的举动使西方领导人小心翼翼、不知所措，克里姆林似乎用这种可疑的方式来建立俄国的全新地位。


Contentious foreign policy makes contacts uneasy and agreements difficult to reach.	对抗性的外交政策加大了接触的难度，也使协议很难达成。


It damages the trust needed for stronger trade relations.	它破坏了加强贸易关系所必须的信任。


As Russia’s conflict with Ukraine in early January over gas prices demonstrated, when Russia plays rough, the West grows apprehensive and suspicious rather than more amenable.	正如1月上旬俄乌天然气价格之争所表明的那样，当俄国态度蛮横时，西方世界变得忧心忡忡、疑惑不解，却并没有顺从俄国的意愿。


What will happen should crude strength and hard language prove inadequate to the task of insuring Russian national interests?	如果事实证明粗暴的武力和强硬的言语无法承担起确保俄国利益的重任，我们该怎么办？


No one can say, but Russia’s history in this regard is not a source of hope.	没有人知道确切的答案，但俄国以前的历史显然无法被看成希望的源泉。


The Russians are Coming – With Cash	俄国人带着现金来了


MOSCOW – Russia’s government is sitting on a giant pile of cash that it plans to invest in foreign assets.	莫斯科－俄罗斯政府现在坐在一堆非常庞大的现金上，这堆现金是它计划用来投资外国资产的。


The glimpse of its economic muscle was revealed this week when the Prime Minister of Iceland announced that Russia may come with about $5 billion to save its troubled economy.	当本周冰岛总理宣布，俄罗斯可能带来大约50亿美元拯救其饱受困扰的经济的时候，世界对俄罗斯经济实力的兴趣显示出来了。


Who could have thought that, given the chaotic Russia of the 1990’s, only ten years later it would be in the position to bail out a developed country?	鉴于俄罗斯在20世纪90年代的混乱状况，谁能想到仅仅在十年之后，它就会置身于挽救一个发达国家的地位上？


Even more surprising is the fact that the helping hand for Iceland comes at a time when the domestic stock market is in a free fall and trading on the Moscow stock exchange is routinely halted.	更令人惊奇的事实是，对冰岛的援助之手出现在俄罗斯国内的股票市场处于自由下落，莫斯科证券交易被经常性地停止的时候。


The Kremlin thinks that now is the time to buy assets cheaply, using the current financial crisis to emerge as a powerful global economic player.	克里姆林宫认为，现在是低价购买资产，并利用当前的金融危机使俄罗斯以一个强大的全球经济参与者的姿态出现的时候。


As Prime Minister Vladimir Putin remarked at a recent meeting with the CEO of state-owned bank VTB, “Perhaps we should buy something [abroad]?	像弗拉基米尔·普京在最近和国有俄罗斯外贸银行（VTB）的首席执行官的会议中谈及的那样，“或许我们应该〔在国外〕买一些东西？


Something that is up for grabs?”	那些待价而沽的东西？


According to Arkady Dvorkovich, an economic aide to President Dmitry Medvedev, the government will support – both diplomatically and financially – the expansion of Russian companies abroad.	”按照俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫的经济助理德沃尔科维奇（Arkady Dvorkovich）的说法，政府会——既从外交上又从财政上——支持俄罗斯公司在国外的扩张。


Following the Russian-Georgian war, the West is scared that Russia’s government will use its cash not just for economic purposes, but as an aggressive foreign policy tool.	在俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚之间的战争爆发后，西方担心俄罗斯政府不仅仅是为了经济目的使用其资金，而且会将这些钱作为具有侵略性的对外政策的工具。


Should the West really consider blocking Russian investments abroad as a way to influence Russia?	西方真地应该考虑将阻止俄罗斯在国外的投资作为影响俄罗斯的途径吗？


Trying to erect an Iron Curtain around Russian funds and businesses will prove counterproductive.	试图在俄罗斯资金和商业周围树立起一个铁幕，将会被证明是达不到预期目标的。


Indeed, a large-scale “invasion” of Russian business would be a positive development, because it would foster economic interdependence.	事实上，俄罗斯商业大规模的“入侵”是一个积极的趋势，因为这会促进经济的相互依赖。


This is true even if the economic expansion is led by state-owned companies and by Russian sovereign wealth funds.	即使这样的经济扩张是由国有公司以及俄罗斯主权财富基金领导的，这一点也是正确的。


By investing in American and European assets, Russia’s government and business elites are buying a stake in the global economy.	通过投资美国和欧洲的资产，俄罗斯政府和商业精英在逐步融入全球经济。


This should bring better mutual understanding and a more rational and accountable foreign policy.	这应该会带来更多的相互理解以及更理性和负责任的对外政策。


Paradoxically, despite recent hits to the Russian stock market, Russia remains awash with cash.	荒谬的是，尽管最近俄罗斯股票市场遭受了严重的打击，俄罗斯仍然现金充裕。


Russia’s government just rolled out a $130 billion bailout plan for the country’s banking system; as a percentage of GDP this would be equivalent to about $1.3 trillion in the US – almost double the Paulson plan.	俄罗斯政府刚刚推出了一个对其国内银行系统高达1300亿美元的援救计划； 如果按照GDP的百分比计算，这相当于美国的1.


Yet, even this package has not significantly eaten into Russia’s sovereign wealth funds and its world’s third largest currency reserves.	3万亿——几乎是鲍尔森计划的两倍。 然而，即使是这样庞大的计划，也没有严重消耗俄罗斯主权财富基金及其世界第三大的货币储备基金。


The government’s Reserve Fund, created to cushion the economy from a fall in oil prices, stands at $140 billion, and the National Welfare Fund, intended mainly to solve the coming pension crisis, holds another $30 billion.	为了缓冲因为石油价格回落而对经济造成的影响，俄罗斯设立了政府储备基金，该基金拥有1400亿美元资金； 主要是为了解决将来的养老金危机的国民福利基金，拥有300亿美元的资金。


The NWF, though not yet officially a “sovereign wealth fund,” is already among the 10 largest such funds, rivaling the Brunei Investment Agency.	国家福利基金（NWF）虽然还不是一个正式的“主权财富基金”，但是已经位居类似基金的前十位，和文莱投资局（Brunei Investment Agency）媲美。


A combined Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund (excluding the half-trillion dollars in foreign-exchange reserves) would rival Singapore’s Temasek Holdings (currently sixth in the world) and lag just behind the China Investment Corporation.	组合的俄罗斯主权财富基金（不包括0. 5万亿外汇储备）可以和新加坡的淡马锡控股（当前在全球排名第六）媲美，位居中国投资公司之后。


By design, these funds are intended to be invested outside Russia.	从目的上讲，俄罗斯主权财富基金是为了在俄罗斯之外进行投资。


As today’s financial crisis has made many Western assets cheap, they are now within reach of Russia’s government and leading Russian companies.	因为现在的金融危机已经使许多西方资产变得很便宜，它们现在处在俄罗斯政府和主要俄罗斯公司伸手可及的范围之内。


Russian private and state-owned companies have already invested abroad extensively, often buying stakes in large foreign companies.	俄罗斯私营和国有公司在国外已经进行了广泛的投资，这些投资通常是购买外国大公司的股份。


Overall, the top 25 Russian companies hold $59 billion in foreign assets and are the third largest investors in emerging economies, following Hong Kong and Brazil.	总体上看，俄罗斯排名前25位的公司拥有590亿美元的外国资产，俄罗斯是新兴经济体中第三大的投资者，位居香港和巴西之后。


Even though the financial crisis has wiped out Russian stock market, some of the best-run companies are hit less badly than their Western counterparts and will therefore be shopping in the global market next year.	即使金融危机已经摧毁了俄罗斯的股票市场，一些经营管理非常好的俄罗斯公司与它们的西方竞争对手比起来，遭受的冲击要小得多，所以，它们会在明年在全球市场上购买资产。


Russian corporations’ foreign investments have already generated a heated debate in both the United States and Europe – even when investment was done by a private company.	俄罗斯公司的海外投资已经在美国和欧洲引起了激烈的争论——即使投资是由私营公司进行的。


The largest controversy surrounded a merger that Russian steel giant SeverStal sought with Luxemburg-based Arcelor.	最大的争议出现在俄罗斯钢铁巨人北方钢铁公司（SeverStal）试图对位于卢森堡的安赛乐（Arcelor）的收购过程中。


SeverStal was rejected in favor of Mittal Steel, with some commentators claiming that the decision was taken on political grounds.	最终，北方钢铁公司（SeverStal）被拒绝了，选择了米塔尔钢铁公司（Mittal Steel），有些评论员认为这个决定是出于政治目的。


But no investment by a private Russian company has, so far, been vetoed by Western governments.	但是，迄今为止，由俄罗斯私营公司进行的投资还没有被西方政府否决过。


Yet hostility towards investment by Russia’s government (and government companies) has been almost universal until recently.	然而，直到最近，西方对俄罗斯政府（以及政府所有的公司）的投资的敌意，还几乎是普遍存在的。


US and European policymakers do not trust that foreign governments (and their sovereign wealth funds) invest solely on business grounds.	美国和欧洲的政策制定者不相信外国政府（以及它们的主权财富基金）仅仅是为了商业目的进行投资。


But the financial crisis is making the West happy to find “friends with cash.”	但是，金融危机使西方乐于找到“拥有现金的朋友”。


During his visit to Russia in June, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson emphasized that the US is interested in welcoming Russian investment, including investment by Russia’s sovereign wealth funds.	在其六月份对俄罗斯的访问中，美国财政部长亨利·鲍尔森强调，美国对包括俄罗斯主权财富基金在内的俄罗斯投资感兴趣。


But Russia’s government still needs to set up a transparent and accountable structure to manage its sovereign wealth.	然而，俄罗斯政府仍然需要设立一个透明而且负责任的组织来管理其主权财富基金。


Doing so will also help to convince other countries that the government’s agenda is economic, not political.	这样做也会有利于说服其他国家，俄罗斯政府的目的是经济，不是政治。


Russian authorities may be advancing that goal by taking initial steps toward improving corporate governance in state-owned companies.	俄罗斯的政府机构可以通过开始采取措施改进国有公司的公司治理，来推进这一目标。


In an unprecedented move, the government replaced a large number of bureaucrats on the boards of these companies with independent directors (including a couple of foreigners).	在一个前所未有的行动中，俄罗斯政府用独立董事（包括一些外国人）取代了许多国有公司董事会中的官僚。


While it is unlikely that Russian sovereign wealth funds and state-owned companies will change overnight, they will certainly become more transparent and efficient in the near future.	虽然俄罗斯的主权财富基金和国有公司不大可能在一夜之间发生改变，但是，在不远的将来，它们一定会变得更加透明而高效。


The key benefit of Russian foreign investment is not economic, but that it helps Russia become a global citizen.	俄罗斯外国投资的主要益处不是经济上的，而是在于促使俄罗斯成为一个世界公民。


Consider Russia’s elites, who buy houses in London, ski in the Alps, and educate their children in Switzerland.  They have too much to lose from a worsening political climate between Russia and the West.	想想那些在伦敦买房，在阿尔卑斯山滑雪，将孩子送到瑞士读书的俄罗斯精英。 他们会因为俄罗斯和西方不断恶化的政治环境失去很多东西。


It is time to make Russia’s big business – and its government – stakeholders in the world economy.	现在是使俄罗斯的大公司——以及其政府——成为与世界经济利益相关的参与者的时候了。


Managing Syria’s Meltdown	应对叙利亚的崩溃


DENVER – As Russian and American diplomats prepare for a Syrian peace conference, the Middle East is experiencing convulsions not seen since the Arab Spring two years ago.	丹佛——在俄美外交官准备叙利亚和平会议的同时，继两年前阿拉伯之春后从未有过的动乱正在中东地区上演。


Syria, which at first seemed to be just another instance of internal change, has spawned a civil war that has spread beyond the country’s borders, affecting all of its neighbors.	起初看似不过又一场国内变革的叙利亚危机已经演化为一场扩散到边境以外的内战，进而影响到所有邻国的安全。


In historical terms, the Syrian crisis, not the Arab Spring, will most likely be regarded as the Middle East’s seminal event in this decade – and the crucible of the region’s future.	从历史角度看，叙利亚危机而非阿拉伯之春最有可能成为近十年中东的开创性事件和今后的严峻考验。


The dimensions of the crisis demand focus, wisdom, and leadership from all parties, especially the United States.	处理如此规模的危机需要各方，尤其是美国的关注、智慧和领导艺术。


Managing the historical forces that are being released requires going far beyond the desultory US debate about what kind of assistance to give to which participants in the conflict.	控制危机所释放的历史能量需要的远远不只美国断断续续争论为哪方提供何种援助那样简单。


Gone is the simplistic view of a conflict pitting aspiring democrats against a grouchy dictator – the familiar (though not entirely accurate) narrative of the Arab Spring.	认为对抗双方是理想远大的民主派和牢骚满腹的独裁者这种对阿拉伯之春运动熟悉（但并不完全准确）而简单的理解早已不复存在。


Would-be democrats, freedom fighters, jihadists, Sunni extremists, and Al Qaeda elements – all supported by Sunni Arab countries and groups, now man one side of the battle lines.	逊尼派阿拉伯国家和团体支持下的自诩民主派、自由战士、圣战者、逊尼派极端分子和“基地”组织人员现在处于战线的一端。


Against them are arrayed President Bashar al-Assad and his cronies, Shia militant groups fighting to protect their lifelines to Iran, religious minorities concerned about life after Assad, and, most ominously, Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.	总统巴沙尔·阿萨德及其亲信，为保护通往伊朗的生命线而战斗的什叶派武装团体、对后阿萨德时期生活忧心忡忡的宗教少数派人士，以及最难对付的伊朗及其在黎巴嫩的代理真主党则处在战线的另一端。


With the stakes so high, the Russian-US initiative to organize a peace conference has not only been welcomed, but is seen as an indispensable initiative that must be planned with excruciating care.	因为利害攸关，俄美组织和平会议的计划不仅颇受欢迎，而且被视为不可或缺的行动而受到慎重对待。


We are likely to hear of delay after delay in the coming days, as various sides try to choose their representatives.	因为各方都力争选定代表，和平会议的日程可能一推再推。


But patience is essential, because, once the conference begins, it must end in success.	但我们必须保持耐心，因为会议一旦开始除成功外就没有别的选择。


There will be no medals for effort.	没有结果的努力不会有任何用处。


The public debate in America about whether and how to arm or equip the Syrian opposition is an interesting sideshow. But it has nothing to do with the significance and complexity of the tectonic historical forces now grinding their way forward, straining – and beginning to tear asunder – the region’s political landscape.	美国是否及怎样武装叙利亚反对派的公共辩论就好比一出有趣的余兴节目，但它与扭曲并撕裂地区政治局势的势不可挡的结构性历史力量的意义及复杂性无关。


Similarly, America’s great suspicion concerning Iran’s role in this regional crisis should not be used to try to limit its participation at the conference.	同样，我们不应利用美国对伊朗在地区危机中所起作用的高度怀疑限制其参与和平会议。


Iran may be part of the problem, but, whether we like it or not, it may also be part of the solution.	伊朗也许是问题的原因，但无论我们是否愿意，它同样可以解决问题。


Indeed, out of crisis can come opportunity: an Iranian role in resolving the Syrian conflict could bring a measure of cooperation that ultimately leads to progress in the moribund talks on Iran’s nuclear program.	事实上，危机可以转化为机遇：伊朗在解决叙利亚冲突中发挥作用可以促成合作，最终推动停滞不前的伊朗核计划谈判取得进展。


To solve a problem, make it bigger, as Dwight D. Eisenhower once put it.	艾森豪威尔曾经说过，在最终解决之前先要把问题变大。


But we also need to understand that Iran’s nuclear aspirations do not exist in a vacuum.	但我们也要明白伊朗的核野心并不是无缘无故。


They are part and parcel of a broader agenda, some elements of which are visible in the ongoing Syrian crisis.	它们是总体计划的组成部分，透过持续发酵的叙利亚危机也可以观察到其中的某些元素。


The crisis has indeed spread to all of Syria’s neighbors – including, most recently, Turkey, which has witnessed the export of suicide bombings to what had been the peaceful city of Reyhanli.	这场危机最近已蔓延到叙利亚的邻国，比如土耳其就目睹原本和平的雷伊汉勒市爆发自杀式炸弹袭击。


US President Barack Obama was wise to have invited Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a NATO ally, to Washington for talks on Syria and the impending peace conference.	美国总统奥巴马邀请北约盟友兼土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安赴华盛顿参与叙利亚问题谈判和即将开始的和平会议确属明智之举。


Perhaps no country outside of Syria has shown greater concern about the crisis.	叙利亚以外最关注这一问题的莫过于土耳其。


But it is Iraq (another country about which the US needs to show the utmost concern) that now faces the gravest spillover effects.	但目前受连累最深的莫过于伊拉克（除叙利亚之外伊拉克同样需要美国的重点关注）。


Some pretend that the rise in violence there – to levels not seen since 2008 – has nothing to do with Syria.	某些人佯装伊拉克暴力达到2008年以来的高峰与叙利亚无关。


They lay all the blame for Iraq’s problems at the door of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a tough-minded Shia politician who has led the venerable Dawa Party to the head of a broad Shia coalition that helped him win a second term in December 2010.	他们将伊拉克所有问题一股脑推到带领受人尊敬的达瓦党登上大什叶派联盟宝座的意志坚定的什叶派政治家、总理努里·马利基身上，马利基也凭借这次成功于2010年12月再次登上了总理宝座。


The Shia are the majority in Iraq, and the Sunnis need to become reconciled with that fact.	什叶派是伊拉克的多数派，逊尼派需要接受这样的现实。


There is certainly good reason to be concerned about Maliki’s temperament, his small group of advisers, his tendency to exercise personal control in the use of state power, and his reputation, partly merited, of making empty promises.	关注马利基的个性无疑理由充分：他的小规模顾问团体、他在行使国家权力时的个人控制倾向、他因为无法兑现承诺而受损的个人名誉。


But Sunni extremists have launched some 50 suicide attacks in the last month, killing 500 mostly Shia civilians.	但逊尼派极端分子仅上个月就实施了约50起自杀式袭击，多达500名平民（其中多数为什叶派）因此而丧生。


In one instance, they killed 30 people and seized the Justice Ministry in downtown Baghdad, and have attacked Kurdish interests in Kirkuk and Mosul for good measure.	仅其中一次袭击就杀害30人并占领了巴格达市中心的司法部，此外基尔库克和摩苏尔的库尔德人利益也受到了打击。


In other words, this is hardly a moment when any leader anywhere would be in a position to offer more concessions to the opposition.	换言之，在这样的时刻不会有任何地方的任何领导人对反对党做出更多让步。


Today, Sunnis in Iraq’s Anbar province, inspired by their brethren in neighboring Syria, are organizing “tribal armies” to do battle with the Iraq national army – a challenge to central authority that no leader could ignore.	今天，在邻国叙利亚兄弟们的激励下，伊拉克安巴尔省的逊尼民众正组建“部落军”与伊拉克政府军交战，没有任何领导人会对这样的挑战视若无睹。


The fate of the entire region may well depend on the outcome of the upcoming conference.	即将开始的会议结果可能决定整个地区的命运。


For the US, in particular, this is a moment when many interests are simultaneously engaged.	尤其对美国而言，众多利益问题必须在此刻同时解决。


One hopes that it, too, will be properly prepared.	希望美国做好准备迎接这一挑战。


The Science of Acupuncture	针灸疗法


Like many other traditional Chinese medicines, acupuncture has for many centuries been viewed suspiciously in the West.	像其他许多中医医术一样，数个世纪以来西方人一直对针灸抱有一种怀疑的观点。


It seems to work, but how?	它看上去能起作用，但是是怎样起作用的呢？


Is a scientific answer possible?	能给出一个科学的解释吗？


Most Chinese doctors and patients have, for example, long regarded acupuncture as an effective treatment for stroke, using it to improve motor, speech, and other functions that have been destroyed.	比如说，绝大多数中国的医生和病人一直都把针灸当作治疗中风的一种有效手段，用它来改善被遭到破坏的肌肉、语言和其他功能。


One survey showed that 66% of Chinese doctors use acupuncture routinely to treat the effects of stroke, with 63% of the doctors surveyed believing it to be effective.	一项调查显示66%的中国医生通常使用针灸来治疗中风所产生的病症，而63%受调查的医生认为它很有效。


Some 36% of Chinese doctors think the effectiveness of acupuncture remains uncertain, perhaps because the scientific basis for it remains so new.	大约36%的中国医生认为针灸的作用机制还不太为人所知的原因可能在于其科学依据依然属于一种全新的概念。


Recently, however, systematic scientific studies of acupuncture’s effects in such treatment has begun.	不过，最近已经开始了对于针灸在这种治疗方面的效果系统的科学研究。


Almost all trials on acupuncture as a treatment for stroke conducted within China have been positive.	几乎所有在中国进行的对于针灸作为治疗中风的手段的试验结果都是肯定的。


But another recent study done in the UK showed that research conducted in several countries was uniformly favorable to acupuncture as a treatment for the damage caused by stroke.	但是最近在英国所做的另一项研究显示在几个国家所进行的关于针灸作为一种治疗由中风引起的破坏的手段的研究都同样显示它是很有效的。


Indeed, all the trials performed before June 1995 in China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were deemed positive by the British researchers.	事实上， 英国的研究者们认为1995年前在中国、日本、香港和台湾所进行的所有试验其结果都是肯定的。


The Cochrane Collaboration, an international non-profit organization providing healthcare information, conducted a systematic review of the benefits of acupuncture, including 14 trials, of which 10 were conducted in China, involving 1,208 patients.	Cochrance合作组织，一个提供健康护理信息的国际非赢利性组织，对针灸的功用进行了一次系统的评估。 这项评估包括了14项试验，其中10项试验在中国进行，涵盖了1208位病人。


Acupuncture started within 30 days of stroke onset, with control groups receiving a placebo – sham acupuncture – or no treatment.	在中风发作后30天内开始进行针灸，受控人群接受一种安慰性的——伪针灸——或者说不接受任何治疗。


Compared to patients who received sham acupuncture or no treatment, far fewer of those who received acupuncture died or became invalid within three months.	与接受伪针灸或者不接受任何治疗的人群相比，接受了针灸治疗的人群中只有极少数在三个月后死亡或者残废了。


After three months or more of treatment, the numbers rose even more significantly in favor of those treated by acupuncture.	在经过三个月乃至更长时间的治疗后，那些接受了针灸治疗的人群受益的程度变得更加明显。


Oddly, when comparing acupuncture with sham acupuncture, the statistical difference concerning death or the need for institutional care was small.	说来奇怪，当把针灸与伪针灸做对比时，在关于死亡或者需要进行规定的护理方面的统计数字的差别却很小。


Indeed, another analysis, including 14 randomized trials with 1,213 patients six months after a stroke, compared the effects of conventional stroke rehabilitation with and without acupuncture as a supplement.	事实上，另一项对于1213名病人在中风后六个月所作的14项随机调查的统计，对有否运用针灸作为一种针对传统中风康复护理的补充治疗手段的效果进行了对比。


Acupuncture was found to have no additional effect on motor recovery, but a small positive effect on disability, which may be due to a true placebo effect, or to the varied quality of the trials.	针灸被发现对于肌肉恢复没有任何的附加作用，但是对于残疾却有一点点积极的作用，这也许得归功于一种真正的安慰性效果，或者试验不同的质量。


Indeed, the efficacy of acupuncture without stroke rehabilitation remains uncertain, mainly because of the poor quality of such studies—a problem that has affected most of trials undertaken so far.	事实上，没有中风康复的针灸效果至今仍不确定的主要原因在于这些研究差强人意的质量——这是至今所进行的绝大多数试验所存在的主要问题。


For example, many trials did not describe their method of measuring statistical relevance, and only called themselves “randomized controlled trials.”	比如说，许多试验并不描述它们进行有关统计衡量的标准，而只是自称为“随机进行的受控试验”。


Only four trials, with 373 patients, could provide data on death or dependency (becoming dependent on others for activities of daily living).	只有四项针对373位病人的试验能够提供死亡或者需要他人来护理（需要依靠其他人帮助来进行日常的活动）的数据。


And only three trials—all conducted in Europe—used sham acupuncture as a control, whereas no acupuncture trials controlled with placebos or sham acupuncture have been reported in China, owing to high cultural barriers.	只有三项试验——全都在欧洲进行——把伪针灸作为了一种控制手段，由于面临很大的文化障碍，没有报道称在中国进行过安慰性的或伪针灸的针灸试验。


Part of the problem in China is choosing the patients to be studied.	在中国面临的部分问题是选择作为研究对象的病人。


After all, patients come to hospitals that practice traditional Chinese medicine because they already believe in acupuncture and are likely to be using it to treat another illness.	不管怎样，病人到开办中医治疗的医院里来是因为他们已经信任针灸并且愿意用它来治疗其他疾病。


Getting such patients to accept being put into a control group where no acupuncture is applied is almost impossible.	要把这些人放到一个受控群体里来进行不使用针灸的试验几乎是不可能的。


This difficulty makes random studies of the effects of acupuncture treatment on stroke patients particularly difficult in a traditional Chinese medicine hospital.	这种困难使得要在一家中医院开展一项对于针灸治疗对中风病人的效果的随机研究变得尤其困难。


More fundamentally, however, Chinese doctors who use traditional medicine argue that outcome measures of acupuncture as a treatment for stroke should be different from conventional measures used in Western trials, because the theory of acupuncture is different.	不过，最主要的是在于使用中医疗法的中国医生争辩说对于针灸作为中风的一种治疗手段效果的衡量应该与西方进行的试验所运用的传统的衡量办法不同，因为它们的治疗理论不一样。


But no one has yet specified what the appropriate outcome measures for acupuncture should be.	但是还没有人能够说出对于针灸合适的效果衡量到底应该是怎样的。


A recent study conducted in China, including 862 patients who were between the second and tenth day after onset of acute stroke, is the largest truly randomized trial using death or dependency as the primary outcome.	最近一项在中国针对862名处于第二次严重的中风发作后十天内的病人所进行的研究是真正把死亡或依赖他人护理作为主要结果的最大规模的随机试验。


The patients were randomly allocated to an acupuncture group receiving acupuncture treatment plus routine treatment or a control group receiving routine treatment alone.	病人被随机抽取到接受针灸治疗外加寻常治疗的针灸人群或者只接受寻常治疗的受控人群中。


The results will be reported after analysis of the trial data and could prove useful for therapy of stroke patients.	结果将在对试验的数据进行统计后公布，它将会对中风病人的治疗手段产生很好的作用。


At present, however, there is insufficient evidence for routine use of acupuncture in stroke.	尽管如此，目前还没有针灸对于中风治疗效果的足够证据。


More high-quality trials are needed.	还需要进行高质量的试验。


We do know that acupuncture is a safe, inexpensive, widely accepted, and potentially effective therapy.	我们确实知道针灸是一种安全、廉价、被公众所接受并且很有可能是有效的治疗手段。


Particularly at a time when standard rehabilitation is not available for most Chinese stroke patients, few will wait to try acupuncture until its role is confirmed or refuted by reliable evidence.	尤其是当大多数中国的中风病患者还无法接受到标准的康复治疗的时候，恐怕没有多少人会等到针灸的作用被可信的证据证实或否定的时候再去尝试它。


The Scientific Road to Copenhagen	通往哥本哈根的科学之路


BERLIN – On June 10, 1859, six months before Charles Darwin published his  Origin of Species , the physicist John Tyndall demonstrated a remarkable series of experiments at the Royal Institution in London.	柏林——1859年6月10日，在查尔斯·达尔文的著作《物种起源》问世6个月前，物理学家约翰·廷德尔在伦敦皇家学会进行了一系列不同寻常的实验演示。


The meeting was chaired by Prince Albert.	演示会由阿尔贝亲王亲自主持。


But neither he, nor Tyndall, nor anyone in their distinguished audience could possibly have anticipated the extent to which the experiments’ results would preoccupy the world 150 years later.	即便如此，无论是阿尔贝亲王、廷德尔还是台下那些受人景仰的听众都不可能预料到150年后这次实验的结果将在多大程度上主宰世界。


This month, thousands of people from all over the world, including many heads of state, will gather in Copenhagen to try to forge an agreement to drastically cut atmospheric emissions of an invisible, odorless gas: carbon dioxide.  Despite efforts by some leading countries to lower expectations ahead of the conference about what can and will be achieved, the meeting is still being called the most important conference since World War II.  And at the conference’s heart are the results of Tyndall’s experiments.	这个月，来自世界各地的数千人，包括众多国家首脑将汇集哥本哈根，力求达成大幅削减二氧化碳这种无色无味气体大气排放的相关协议。 尽管某些大国在会议召开前试图降低人们对于成果的期望值，但这次会议仍然被誉为二战结束后最重要的会议。


But the story starts even before Tyndall, with the French genius Joseph Fourier.	但廷德尔并非始作俑者，真正的始作俑者是法国天才约瑟夫·傅立叶。


An orphan who was educated by monks, Fourier was a professor at the age of 18, and became Napoleon’s governor in Egypt before returning to a career in science.	出身孤儿的傅立叶在修道士的教育下长大，18岁就当上教授，在回国开始科研生涯前曾担任拿破仑的埃及总督。


In 1824, Fourier discovered why our planet’s climate is so warm – tens of degrees warmer than a simple calculation of its energy balance would suggest.	1824年，傅立叶发现了我们星球的气候为何如此温暖——比简单计算能量平衡所得出的结果要高出好几十度。


The sun brings heat, and earth radiates heat back into space – but the numbers did not balance.	太阳光带来热能，而地球则将热能反射回太空——但能量得失的数据并不平衡。


Fourier realized that gases in our atmosphere trap heat.	傅立叶意识到大气中的某种气体能够捕获热能。


He called his discovery  l’effet de serre – the greenhouse effect.	他把自己的发现称为 l’effet de serre ，也就是温室效应。


It was Tyndall who then put Fourier’s ideas to the test in his laboratory.	廷德尔随即在实验室里测试了傅立叶提出的理论。


He proved that some gases absorb radiant heat (today we would say long-wave radiation).	他证明热能辐射（即今天我们所谓的长波辐射）被某些气体所吸收。


One of these gases was CO2.	二氧化碳就可以起到这种作用。


In 1859, Tyndall described the greenhouse effect in beautifully concise words: “The atmosphere admits of the entrance of solar heat, but checks its exit; and the result is a tendency to accumulate heat at the surface of the planet.”	1859年，廷德尔用优美凝练的语言对温室效应进行了描述：“大气吸收了入射的太阳热量，但却阻止了这些热量的散失，其结果造成了热量在地表的逐渐聚积。 ”


Then, in 1897, Svante Arrhenius, who earned a Nobel Prize for chemistry six years later, calculated how much global warming a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere would cause.	接着在1897年，斯凡特·阿列纽斯计算出大气中二氧化碳含量翻倍能在多大程度上导致变暖结果。 六年以后，阿列纽斯赢得了诺贝尔化学奖。


His answer was 4-6 degrees Celsius (a little more than the 2-4 degrees that modern studies consistently find).	他所得出的结果是4－6摄氏度（他的结果比现代研究一致发现的2－4摄氏度略高）。


Arrhenius was not in the least troubled by the prospect of global warming.	阿列纽斯根本不担心全球变暖的问题。