These choices are as false as they are intolerable.	这样的选择不仅虚伪而且不可容忍。


Yet these are the choices offered by our influential doctrinaires.	但这就是有权有势的教条主义者摆在我们面前的选择。


But to see these as Ukraine’s only options is to mistake weariness for wisdom, and to be discouraged rather than to understand.	但把这作为乌克兰唯一的出路是误把厌倦当成了智慧，我们只会失望而不能理解。


For the search for law has an irresistible energy. No human obstruction can long withstand it.	因为对法治的追求有着无法抗拒的力量，任何人为的障碍都无法阻挡它前进的步伐。


Though we may take a step back now and then, as we have recently, only by adhering to this higher law can Ukraine achieve freedom and prosperity for all.	尽管我们有时不得不后退，就像不久前发生的那样，但只有遵守这项更高的法律，乌克兰人民才能迎来自由和繁荣。


Achieve it we will.	我们一定能实现这个目标。


Ukraine’s Watershed Election	乌克兰决定性的选举


Ukraine’s politics are not those of the steppe.	乌克兰的政治并非是大草原的政治。


Our voters cannot stroll in one direction during one poll, and in the opposite direction the next time they vote, without worrying about falling over the edge.	我们的选民不可能在不必担心精神错乱的情况下在某次选举中选择某一个方向，而在下一次选举中选择另一个截然相反的方向。


Ukrainians are people of the watershed: we live on either one side or the other of a great divide.	乌克兰人是位于分水岭的人民，那就是说，我们生活在一个大分水岭的其中一端。


A year ago, Ukrainians dared to risk the unfamiliar territory over the hill, and found democracy and the promise of a more open and honest economy.	一年前，乌克兰人敢于承担山岭另一端并不熟悉的领域的风险，发现了民主以及一个更为开放和诚实的经济体的前途。


But democracy is messy; with some of our Orange Revolution’s promises postponed or disavowed by President Viktor Yushchenko, there is a chance that on March 26, when Ukrainians vote for a new parliament, they may in their disappointment choose to return to the realm of corrupt and autocratic rule.	但是，民主混乱不堪； 由于尤先科总统推迟或者反悔了我们橙色革命中的某些许诺，因此，当3月26日乌克兰举行新的议会选举时，乌克兰人民可能出于失望而选择回到腐败和专制独裁的王国。


The alternatives – for my country, for Russia, and for Europe – are clear.	对于我的祖国、俄罗斯以及欧洲而言，选择是明显的。


Of the three leading electoral coalitions that are challenging each other, the forces that supported the Orange Revolution seek a modern and democratic future for our country.	在三个彼此挑战的主要竞选联盟中，支持橙色革命的力量为我们的国家寻求一个现代和民主化的未来。


The other bloc offers the near-certainty of a return to a surly and squalid isolation  -- perhaps the beginning of the end of our hard-won independence.	其他势力则几乎肯定会把乌克兰带回到阴森而又邋遢的孤立之中。 这也许是我们来之不易的独立结束的开始。


Of course, our Orange forces are not perfect, and Viktor Yanukovych – who again opposes Ukraine’s democrats – is not Stalin reincarnated.	当然，我们橙色革命的力量并非尽善尽美，而且再一次反对乌克兰民主派的亚努科维奇并非是斯大林转世。


But the records of both alternatives suggest that Ukraine under those who backed the Orange Revolution will remain a member of the club of democracies and open economies, whereas under Yanukovich, Ukraine would turn its back on reform, and may re-embrace the grimmest aspects of our Soviet past.	但是，两个选择方向的记录表明，乌克兰由那些支持橙色革命的人领导将会继续是民主国家和公开经济体的俱乐部成员，而如果由亚努科维奇领导，乌克兰则将会走改革的回头路，可能重蹈已逝苏联时代最为残酷方面的覆辙。


Yanukovych’s “Party of the Regions” has been leading in opinion polls for months, and the world should remember that Yushchenko’s ultimate triumph over him in 2004 was by a whisker, not a landslide.	几个月来，亚努科维奇的“地区党”在民意调查中一直领先，而且人们应当记得，2004年尤先科是险胜亚努科维奇，而非大胜。


Moreover, Yushchenko used his year in power mostly to disappoint those whose votes he now needs.	而且，尤先科在位一年来，主要是让那些他目前所需要的选民失望。


The case against a Yanukovych counter-revolution is that it would be just that: a ruthless effort to undo Ukraine’s democratic and legal reforms.	之所以要反对亚努科维奇的反革命在于，结局会是残酷无情地消除乌克兰民主和法制改革。 而且，资助其政党的寡头政客们不会听由他自己来管理国家；


Moreover, he would not be left to himself to govern, but would be a marionette of the oligarchs who bankroll his party, and perhaps of Russia, which yearns – albeit more discretely than a year ago – for his triumph.	这些政客，可能还有俄罗斯将会让他成为他们的牵线木偶。 俄罗斯盼望他能够获胜，尽管这一次要比一年前更为谨慎了。


Yanukovych’s party contains the largest core of unreconstructed apparatchiks of any party.	亚努科维奇的党派包含任何政党所具有的、未经改造的共产党政工干部的最大核心力量。


Many of its candidates seek office not to work for Ukraine’s betterment, but to gain parliamentary immunity from prosecution.	该党的许多候选人之所以追逐公职，并非为了改良乌克兰，而是为了获得议会对其刑事起诉的豁免。


Some say we should not worry, that democracy and the market are now too well established in Ukraine to be replaced; that reform is irreversible; and that the country’s ruling oligarchic clans, like those of Eastern Europe, will in time become law-abiding capitalists.	有人说我们不必担忧，乌克兰的民主和市场经济地位牢固、无法取代； 改革是无法逆转的；


Alas, this view is based more on wishful-thinking than on reality.	而且乌克兰占据统治地位的寡头帮派会像东欧的一样最终变成守法的资本家。 天哪，这一观点大多是一厢情愿，而非建立在现实的基础之上。


A year after the Orange Revolution demonstrated ordinary Ukrainians’ fidelity to liberty, Yanukovych still evinces no faith in democracy, and the “single economic space” with Russia that he backs will strengthen the abusive oligarchic system and rule out liberalization.	橙色革命展示了普通乌克兰人对于自由的忠诚。 在此一年以后，亚努科维奇仍然没有表现出对民主的信仰，而他所支持的与俄罗斯的“单一经济空间”将会加强滥用权势的寡头体系并且排除经济自由化。


Yanukovych’s foreign policy might not be openly subservient to Russia, but it won’t also be a clearly pro-western one either.	亚努科维奇的外交政策可能不会公开地屈从于俄罗斯，但是也不会是明显的亲西方。


A Yanukovych government promises the semi-neutrality of semi-paralysis.	亚努科维奇政府肯定是半瘫痪的半中立。


Many who support Yanukovych do not necessarily wish to go back to the old days but are confused by the buffeting they have received in the past decade.	许多支持亚努科维奇的人并不一定希望回到旧时代，但是，他们却被在过去十年中所受到的连续伤害所迷惑不解。


Yanukovych panders to xenophobes and anti-Semites, and his strongest appeal is to the core of angry diehards who detest the collapse of Soviet power.	亚努科维奇迎合排外和反犹主义，而其最大的号召力则是面向那些憎恨苏联强权解体的顽固不化分子。


He remains unrepentant about the obscene levels of corruption during his tenure as prime minister.	对于在其担任总理期间腐败盛行，他并不忏悔。


I do not claim that the Orange Revolution’s protagonists are paragons, and that the split between Yushchenko and me has not disheartened many of those who stood with us in the streets of Kyiv in the winter of 2004-2005.	我并不是说橙色革命的领导者都是完人，或者尤先科和我本人之间的分裂并没有让许多在2004年年终以及2005年年初冬天在基辅街头支持我们的人心寒。


But no one can question that we brought more honest government, and the beginnings of a more open economy, to Ukraine.	但是，没有人可以质疑，我们为乌克兰带来了更为诚实的政府以及开启了更为开放的经济体。


We began the battle against entrenched corruption, imposed the rule of law on Ukraine’s robber barons, and encouraged the birth of a vital civil society.	我们开始了反对根深蒂固的腐败的斗争，对乌克兰强盗大亨实行了法制，而且催生了充满活力的公民社会。


Most Ukrainians feel more secure because of these changes.	大多数乌克兰人由于这些变化而感到更为安全。


This is why our people should know precisely what they are voting for this Sunday.	这也就是为什么当我们的人民在本星期天投票的时候应当明确知道他们在做些什么。


I have pledged that, under no circumstances will I form a coalition government with Viktor Yanukovych.	我已经承诺，在任何情况下我都不会与亚努科维奇组成联合政府。


President Yushchenko should do the same.	由先科总统也应该这样做。


Only by restoring our partnership can we hope to keep our Orange Revolution’s promises.	我们只有恢复合作伙伴关系才能够希望遵守橙色革命的诺言。


Criminal and civil codes will be enforced; our courts will be allowed to find their feet and their freedom.	我们将实施刑事和民事法典； 我们将给法院自主权和自由。


Above all, the new Rada (parliament) will settle down to the business of enacting laws and monitoring the government, not carving up the budget among corrupt clans.	最为重要的是，新的议会将开始颁布法律以及监督政府，而不是在腐败的帮落��间瓜分预算。


We will fight for essential reforms to bring the country in line with European norms.	我们将努力争取必要的改革以使得国家符合欧洲的标准。


Relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia will be repaired.	我们还将修复与普京领导的俄罗斯之间的关系。


Elections are seldom make-or-break affairs. This one is.	只有在很少的情况下选举才成为决定乾坤的事件。


For the battle for Ukraine’s liberty and independence was not decided last winter.	但是这次选举就是，因为去年冬天，争取乌克兰自由和独立的战斗并没有决出胜负。


A Yanukovych restoration would be a disaster for Ukraine, for Russia, and for Europe, because it would put Ukraine’s independence in question and tempt Russia with dreams of renewed empire.	亚努科维奇的复辟将会是乌克兰、俄罗斯以及欧洲的灾难，因为这将令乌克兰的独立摇摆不定，而且诱使俄罗斯做恢复帝国的美梦。


Only a second victory over Yanukovych can secure a future of freedom and hope for Ukraine’s people.	只有再次战胜亚努科维奇才能够确保乌克兰人民自由和充满希望的未来。


Ukraine: The Next Crisis?	乌克兰：下一场危机？


The Russian invasion of Georgia has sent shock waves throughout the West and the former Soviet space - especially Ukraine.	俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚的入侵在西方和前苏联地区造成了冲击波，尤其是在乌克兰。


Indeed, Ukraine could be the next potential crisis.	其实，乌克兰可能是下一场潜在的危机的发生地。


Georgia's increasingly pro-Western course, including growing ties to NATO, has been a thorn in Moscow's side.	格鲁吉亚不断地向亲西方靠拢，包括和北约不断加强的联系，一直是莫斯科的眼睛中的一粒沙子。


But it did not pose a serious threat to Russian security.	但是，这并不对俄罗斯的安全造成严重的威胁。


Georgia's army is small, ill-equipped and no match for Russia's, as was amply demonstrated this month.	格鲁吉亚的军队规模小，且装备差，和俄罗斯根本不可一比。 这一点，已经在本月显露无遗。


Ukraine's integration into NATO, by contrast, would have far-reaching strategic consequences, ending any residual Russian hopes of forming a ampquot;Slavic Unionampquot; composed of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine - a dream that still beats in the breast of many Russians.	相反，若乌克兰加入北约，将会产生深远的战略影响，这会让俄罗斯人心中那一丝建立一个由俄罗斯、白俄罗斯和乌克兰组成的“斯拉夫联盟”的梦想成为泡影。 现在这个梦想仍然存于俄罗斯人心中。


It would also have important implications for the Russian defense industry, notably air defense and missile production.	这也会对俄罗斯国防工业，尤其是空中国防和导弹生产工业，产生重要的影响。


In short, the real source of Moscow's anxiety and strategic angst is Ukraine's future political and security orientation.	简而言之，莫斯科的担心和战略忧虑，其真正原因是对于乌克兰将来的政治和安全防卫取向的不安。


Georgia has largely been a side show.	格鲁吉亚所发生的一切只是一场小打小闹而已。


Russia has a number of means of pressuring Ukraine short of using military force.	俄罗斯有几种途径以武力向乌克兰施压。


One is energy. Ukraine is heavily dependent on Russian energy, particularly gas.	一是能源问题，乌克兰在能源方面极其依赖俄罗斯，尤其是天然气。


Russia has used the gas issue as a foreign policy instrument.	俄罗斯一直拿天然气作为外交政策的手段。


Ukraine currently pays $179 per 1,000 cubic meters for gas from Russia - more than three times what it paid in 2004 - and there have been reports that Moscow is considering a further doubling of the price.	乌克兰目前以每一千立方米179美元的价格购买俄罗斯的天然气，此价格是它2004年支付价格的三倍多，而且据说莫斯科正考虑把价格再提高一倍。


Russia's long-term strategy is to try to gain control of Ukraine's pipelines by transferring them to a joint venture, as it has done in Belarus, thus enabling it to control both supply and distribution of gas to Ukraine.	俄罗斯长期的战略是企图是控制乌克兰的输气管，通过与它在白俄罗斯的同样的所作所为，把这些输气管变为合作项目，这样它就能同时控制输往乌克兰的天然气的供给和配送。


The Black Sea Fleet is another potential source of tension.	黑海舰队也是另一个紧张局势的潜在的源头。


Under an agreement signed in 1997, Ukraine granted Russia basing rights for the fleet at Sevastopol in Crimea until 2017.	根据1997年签署的协议，乌克兰授权俄罗斯在2017年前可以在克里米亚地区的塞瓦斯托波尔港驻扎舰队。


Ukraine has been pressing Russia to begin discussions on the fleet's withdrawal. But Russia has dragged its feet, suggesting that Moscow may seek to use the presence of the fleet as a means of pressuring Ukraine.	乌克兰一直在敦促俄罗斯开始就舰队撤离一事进行商议，但俄罗斯一直拖拉，这暗示了莫斯科想要利用其舰队在乌克兰的驻扎，作为向乌克兰施压的手段。


Crimea itself represents a third potential flash point.	克里米亚本身也是第三个潜在的不安定地区。


Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where ethnic Russians constitute an overwhelming majority of the population (58 per cent).	克里米亚是乌克兰唯一的俄裔少数民族占人口大多数的地区（58%）。


Khrushchev transferred the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954 as a gift to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine and Russia.	赫鲁晓夫在1954年把这个半岛归并给乌克兰作为纪念乌克兰和俄国合并300年的礼物。


At the time, the gesture was largely symbolic, as Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and few could envisage an independent Ukraine.	那时，这个举措仅仅是象征意义的，因为乌克兰仍然是苏联的一部分，当时很少有人料到将来乌克兰会独立。


Separatist pressures emerged in Crimea immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.	苏联解体后，由克里米亚分裂势力引起的紧张局势马上就出现了。


They subsided after 1995 largely because the Russian separatists were divided, and Moscow, facing separatist pressures in Chechnya, showed little inclination to support them.	这种紧张在1995年后得到了缓解，主要是因为俄裔分裂势力内部出现了分化，而莫斯科当时也面临着车臣出现分裂的紧张局势而顾不上支持他们。


However, separatist pressures, while diminished, continue to exist in Crimea.	但是，克里米亚的分裂活动尽管势头减弱了，其一直还存在。


Given Crimea's historic ties to Russia and its majority ethnic Russian population, many Ukrainian officials fear that Russia could try to foment separatist movements in Crimea as a means of putting pressure on Ukraine to curb its ties to the West.	考虑到克里米亚和俄罗斯历史上的渊源以及占了大多数人口的饿裔少数民族，很多乌克兰官员害怕俄罗斯会通过煽动克里米亚的分裂活动给乌克兰施压，使其不至于和西方走得太近。


Moscow's tactics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provide cause for concern in this regard.	莫斯科在阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的的策略，在这一点上给了人们担心的理由。


Russia encouraged and supported separatist movements in both entities, then used the separatist tensions to justify sending ampquot;Russian peacekeepersampquot; into the regions.	俄罗斯在这两个地区鼓励并支持分裂运动，然后，以分裂引起的紧张局势为由，向这些地区派遣“俄罗斯维和部队”。


Moreover, it granted Russian citizenship to Abkhaz and South Ossetian residents, and then justified its recent invasion of Georgia on the grounds that it had an obligation to protect Russian citizens.	更有甚者，俄罗斯给予阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的居民俄罗斯公民身份，然后以有义务保护俄罗斯公民为幌子，在最近入侵了格鲁吉亚。


Western allies have a strong strategic interest in supporting Ukrainian democracy and Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.	对于支持乌克兰的民主进程和和它加入欧洲-大西洋组织。 西方盟国有其强烈的战略利益。


But this course must be pursued prudently and with great care.	但是在实行过程中，它们必须非常谨慎。


As the Georgian crisis has underscored, there are limits to the ability to influence developments in a region where Russia has strong strategic interests and a preponderance of military power.	格鲁吉亚出现的危机表明，在俄罗斯有重大的战略利益和压倒性军事力量的地区，想要影响该地区的事态进展，我们的能力是有限的。


Thus Europe and the United States need to be very careful about making security commitments they are unwilling or unable to carry out.	因此，欧洲和美国在许下它们不愿意、也没有能力的安全方面的承诺的时候，要非常小心。


This does not mean that Moscow should be given a veto over Ukraine's security orientation or that Ukraine can never become a member of NATO.	这并不是说莫斯科就应该拥有对乌克兰安全防卫取向的否决权，或乌克兰就永远不能成为北约的成员国。


The door for Ukraine to join NATO should remain open.	乌克兰加入北约的大门应该保持敞开。


But with Russia in a defiant mood and refusing to fully withdraw its troops from Georgia, now is not the time to accelerate efforts to bring Ukraine into the Alliance.	但是，在目前俄罗斯虎视眈眈以及拒绝从格鲁吉亚完全撤军的情况下，加速乌克兰加入北约的进程是不合时宜的。


Poking an angry bear is not a wise policy.	挑逗一只发了怒的熊并非上策。


Ask Mikheil Saakashvili.	只要问问米哈伊尔·萨科维利就明白了。


Ukraine’s Vote, Russia’s Fate	乌克兰的投票，俄罗斯的命运


STOCKHOLM – When Ukraine’s voters go to the polls on October 26, not only the fate of their country will be at stake; so will the future of a significant part of Europe.	斯托克霍姆—10月26日，当乌克兰选民开始投票时，他们决定的不仅仅是自己国家的命运； 欧洲大部的未来也在他们手中。


To put it simply: the future of Ukraine will decide the future of Russia, and the future of Russia will have a substantial impact on the future of Europe.	简言之，乌克兰的未来将决定俄罗斯的未来，而俄罗斯的未来将对欧洲未来造成重大影响。


When the Soviet Union collapsed more than two decades ago, and Ukraine opted for independence, many expected the country to do better than Russia in the years to come.	二十多年前苏联解体时，乌克兰选择了独立，当时许多人期望这个国家会在未来多年中比俄罗斯更棒。


But events turned out differently.	但事情的发展与此截然不同。


During the first decade of the new century, Russia benefited from the combined effect of an old hydrocarbon industry that privatization in the 1990s had made more efficient and high oil prices.	在新世纪的第一个十年中，俄罗斯得益于20世纪90年代私有化改革给旧石油工业带来的效率增长以及高油价。


The reversal of sought-after economic diversification, and the reduction of “modernization” to little more than a slogan, caused no immediate concern.	受欢迎的经济多样化势头出现倒退，“现代化”也沦为一句口号，但这些并没有立刻引起关注。


By contrast, Ukraine became the worst managed of all the post-Soviet states, with cronyism and corruption thwarting productive capacity, and causing the country to fall further and further behind other post-communist countries in transition.	相反，乌克兰成为前苏联国家中治理得最差的一个，任人唯亲和腐败阻碍了产能，也导致乌克兰与其他后共产主义转型国家距离越拉越大。


Most notable is the comparison with Poland: at independence, the two countries had roughly the same GDP per capita; today, Poland’s is more than three times higher.	与波兰的对比最引人注目：独立时，两国人均GDP基本持平； 如今，波兰人均GDP比乌克兰高三倍。


The Orange Revolution in 2004 was a failure for most Ukrainians.	对大部分乌克兰人来说，2004年的橙色革命是一场失败。


The hoped-for break with the past did not occur, as political infighting among the country’s new leaders blocked the implementation of any serious reform agenda.	希望中的与昔日的决裂并没有发生，新领导人之间的暗斗使得认真的改革日程根本无从实施。


But 2004 was also a bitter failure for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who tried to bring his favored presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, to power in Kyiv by supporting massive vote manipulation.	但2004年对俄罗斯总统普京来说也是苦涩的失败之年，他试图通过支持大规模操纵投票让他所中意的总统候选人亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）上台。


The failure was a bitter blow to the Kremlin, one that was neither forgiven nor forgotten.	这场失败对不啻对克里姆林宫的重创，后者永远不会忘记，也永远不会原谅。


Then, in 2010, the Orange Revolution’s failure brought Yanukovych to power in a free and fair election, and in 2012 Putin selected himself for a third presidential term in Russia.	接着，2010年，橙色革命的失败让亚努科维奇通过自由公平的选举上了台，而在2012年，普京第三度出任俄罗斯总理。


The creation of a new Eurasia Union was a key part of his platform.	建立新欧亚联盟（Eurasia Union）是普京新平台的关键部分。


In the meantime, Ukraine had been negotiating with the European Union for a free-trade and association agreement since 2007, and these talks were completed in early 2012.	与此同时，乌克兰自2007年以来一直在与欧盟谈判自由贸易和入盟协定，2012年初，谈判完成。


Though entirely compatible with the existing free-trade agreement between Ukraine and Russia, the proposed pact with the EU certainly was not compatible with Putin’s Eurasia project.	尽管其内容与已有的乌俄自由贸易协定完全不冲突，但与欧盟签订契约的计划显然与普京的欧亚联盟工程格格不入。


A little more than a year ago, the Kremlin began its offensive to turn Ukraine away from an EU agreement that was supported even by Yanukovych and his Party of Regions.	一年多后，克里姆林宫开始采取手段让乌克兰脱离亚努科维奇及其地区党（Party of Regions）也支持的欧盟协定。


The rest – Yanukovych’s renunciation of the EU agreement, the popular uprising that ousted him in response, two invasions by Russia, and thousands of people killed in the country’s eastern Donbas region – is history.	后来的事——亚努科维奇反悔欧盟协定、群众因此暴动并推翻亚努科维奇、俄罗斯两次入侵乌克兰、乌克兰东部顿巴斯（Donbas）地区数千人丧生——大家都知道了。


The Kremlin is seeking more than the annexation of Crimea and control over the Donbas rust belt; its aim is to prevent Ukraine from going West, force it to turn East, and quash any risk within Russia’s wider orbit of further revolutions like the one that brought down Yanukovych.	克里姆林宫的算盘不止于吞并克里米亚和控制顿巴斯铁锈地带； 其目的是阻止乌克兰倒向西方，迫使它导向东方，杜绝任何俄罗斯外围内部再次出现类似导致亚努科维奇倒台那样的革命的风险。


Western sanctions against Russia have certainly highlighted the seriousness with which the EU and the United States view Putin’s efforts to challenge and undermine the core principles of European security and international law.	毫无疑问，西方针对俄罗斯的制裁表明了欧盟和美国对普京挑战和破坏欧洲安全和国际法核心原则的做法的严重关注。


But even a weakened Russia will still be a strong power in its immediate neighborhood.	但即便是削弱了的俄罗斯，对其邻国来说仍然无比强大。


At the end of the day, it is only the strength and determination of Ukraine that can block Russia’s revisionist ambitions.	最终，只有乌克兰的强大和决心能阻止俄罗斯的修正主义野心。


But to strengthen a Ukraine plagued by corruption and cronyism, and heavily burdened by Russian aggression and destabilization, is no easy task.	但要强化任人唯亲和腐败横行、不堪俄罗斯入侵和动摇的乌克兰决非易事。


The election on Sunday must give rise to a government that is truly determined to bring radical reform to the country.	周日的选举必须产生一个真正有决心给乌克兰带来彻底改革的政府。


Such a government must be able to count on the strong and determined support of the wider international community.	这个政府必须能够期待广大国际社会的强力而坚定的支持。


A revised and reinforced International Monetary Fund package is imperative if the necessary reforms are to be enacted.	若要实施必要的改革，更改和增强国际货币基金组织（IMF）方案至关重要。


The country’s irrational energy policy, based on immensely wasteful subsidies to consumers, must be fundamentally altered.	乌克兰不理性的能源政策（依靠巨大又浪费的消费者补贴）必须从根本上予以改变。


And the agreement with the EU must be used to drive the reform process forward.	同时必须利用与欧盟的协定推进改革。


If this agenda succeeds, the Kremlin’s revisionist bid will be blocked; as this becomes apparent, there might even be an opening for a new and urgently needed wave of reform in Russia itself.	如果这一日程取得成功，克里姆林宫的修正主义方案就会得到抵制； 日益明确的是，这甚至有可能在俄罗斯打开急需的新改革风潮。


But if reform fails, there is little doubt that the Kremlin will continue its policies until it reaches its aims in Kyiv.	但如果改革失败，毫无疑问克里姆林宫将继续现有政策直至进入基辅。


Putin is in no hurry, but he clearly knows what he wants.	普京并不急躁，但他十分清楚想要什么。


Then, set on a course of continued confrontation with the West, Russia might hunker down into a siege mentality, with the risk that the Kremlin might seek to compensate for economic failure with further revisionist behavior.	因此，若继续与西方进行一系列对峙，俄罗斯将陷入包围心理，克里姆林宫有可能会寻求用进一步的修正主义行为补偿其经济失败。


Anyone familiar with the aggressively nationalist posturing of Russian state-controlled media nowadays knows the danger of this.	任何熟悉俄罗斯国家控制媒如今的激进民族主义立场的人都明白发生这有多危险。


It is in these circumstances that the real danger for Europe could arise.	欧洲的真正风险就存在于这样的环境中。


The ambitions of such a Russia will not stop at the Dnieper River.	如此俄罗斯的野心不会止于第聂伯河。


Revisionism might turn into outright revanchism as the Kremlin seeks to counter-balance internal weakness with demonstrations of external strength.	随着克里姆林宫试图用对外强硬掩盖内部虚弱时，修正主义可能演变为彻底的复仇主义。


By that time, it might be too late to stop a slide toward a wider confrontation.	到那时，阻止冲突扩大可能就太晚了。


That is why the emergence of a strong and democratic Ukraine from decades of failure is needed now.	正因如此，我们需要乌克兰现在从几十年的失败中崛起，成为强大的民主国家。


The election this Sunday is crucial for Ukraine, but it also holds the key to encouraging the transformation of Russia into a true member of the democratic European family.	周日的选举对乌克兰来说至关重要，但它也是鼓励俄罗斯转变为民主欧洲家庭的真正成员的关键。


Encouraging Work	鼓励工作


SANTIAGO – Some policies are economically illiterate, for they cause avoidable inefficiency.	圣地亚哥——有些政策从经济上看并不明智，因为带来本可避免的效率低下。


Others are heartless, for they cause avoidable human suffering.	而有些又冷酷无情，因为造成不必要的人类痛苦。


Few policies manage to be economically illiterate and heartless all at once.	集没有经济意义和冷酷无情于一身的政策却不多。


But Britain’s Conservative government has achieved just that, by cutting tax credits for low-income workers.	但英国保守党政府居然做到了这一点，因为他们削减了低收入工人税收抵免政策。


The system, introduced in 2003 by a Labour government, is modeled after the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit.	2003年工党政府模仿美国劳动所得税扣抵制推出了这套政策。


Both work in practice like a wage subsidy for those with low incomes, cutting poverty – particularly among women with young children – while strengthening incentives to work.	两者都起到了类似低收入者工资补贴式的现实作用——在削减（尤其是需要养活幼童的妇女）贫困的同时鼓励人们去工作。


Success has attracted emulators.	成功引来了效仿者。


Turkey adopted regionally targeted employment subsidies in 2004-2005.	2004-2005年土耳其实行了区域针对性就业补贴政策。


When I was Chile’s finance minister, our center-left government adopted a wage subsidy in 2008, focused on young workers.	我担任智利财政部长时，我们中间偏左的政府也于2008年实行了重点帮助年轻人的工资补贴政策。


South Africa’s government did much the same in 2014.	南非政府2014年也采取了差不多的举措。


Other middle-income countries have discussed adopting similar policies.	其他中等收入国家也已讨论采取类似的政策。


The Tory move in the United Kingdom is based on shortsighted fiscal calculations (appearing to shave additional pounds from the budget deficit) and shortsighted political calculations (displaying “toughness” to right-wing voters who believe that the poor are undeserving).	英国保守党此举是基于短视的财政（貌似是从预算赤字中刮取更多英镑）及政治（向认为穷人不配得到救济的右翼选民表明“强硬态度”）因素。


But the move is also interesting in terms of what it reveals about the coming debate on the role of work (and of labor-market policies) in both advanced and emerging economies.	但此举的有趣之处还在于它在发达和新兴经济体揭示了今后数十年工作（和劳动力市场政策）所扮演的角色。


Two forces are shaping this debate.	两股力量决定了这次辩论的结果。


The first is technological change.	首先是技术变革。


After globalization made it easier to move manufacturing and service jobs from rich to poor countries, growing automation now threatens to move jobs from humans to robots.	在全球化降低了将生产和服务岗位从富国转移到穷国的难度后，不断发展的自动化正威胁将工作从人转到机器人手中。


A recent paper by two Oxford University economists estimates that up to 47% of all jobs in the US are at risk.	两位牛津大学经济学家不久前合写的一篇论文估算美国有高达47%的工作都处在危险之中。


Techno-optimists like venture capitalist Peter Thiel point out that machines consume little (beyond electricity) while allowing us to produce vastly more, so their effects on human welfare must be unambiguously positive.	风险投资家彼得·泰尔这样的技术乐天派指出机器（除电力外）很少消耗却能大幅提高效率，因此其对人类福祉产生的影响无疑将是积极的。


Techno-pessimists like Robert Skidelsky fear that machines will wipe out so many jobs that governments will be forced to provide an income to all citizens.	而罗伯特·斯基德尔斯基那样的技术悲观派却担心机器将消灭太多就业机会，以至于政府将被迫向全民提供收入。


Neither is right.	这两种说法都不准确。


Fears about job losses arising from technological progress are not new.	技术进步并不是第一次带来失业的担忧。


The nineteenth-century Luddites fretted over that.	十九世纪卢德派份子就对此深感忧虑。


Inventions like the steam engine and the power loom destroyed some jobs but eventually created many more.	像蒸汽机和动力织机这样的发明摧毁了一些就业机会，但最终却创造了更多。


But there are caveats.	但也有注意事项。


One is that adjustment is lengthy, because old jobs go quickly but new ones can take a long time to replace them.	其一是调整过程十分漫长，因为老的工作很快就被消灭，而新工作替代旧工作需要的时间却很长。


Public policies are needed both to accelerate the process and to alleviate human suffering.	加速上述进程并减轻人类痛苦的公共政策因此非常必要。


Another caveat is that technological change may worsen the income distribution if the jobs that are destroyed are those filled by unskilled workers.	还有一点需要注意，那就是如果被消灭的是非技术性工作，技术变革可能恶化收入分配状况。


Less demand for their services will cause their relative (and perhaps absolute) wages to drop, causing income inequality to rise.	服务需求下降将导致其相对（或许是绝对）工资下降，并因此造成收入不平等抬头。


Again, activist policy is called for, and here schemes like wage subsidies can play a key role.	这里再次需要实行积极政策，诸如工资补贴等方案可以发挥关键的作用。


Unfortunately, the acrimonious politics surrounding today’s jobs debate makes crafting the right policy response difficult.	遗憾的是，围绕今天就业辩论的刻薄政治态度加大了政策反应的难度。


In rich countries, the stagnation of middle-class wages has caused understandable anxiety.	不难理解富裕国家中产阶级工资停滞造成了民众的焦虑。


Politicians like Hillary Clinton in the United States are promising that they can cajole large corporations into paying higher wages.	希拉里·克林顿这样的美国政客承诺可以说服大企业支付更高的工资。


They have the backing of luminaries like the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman, who, building on the pioneering work of economists David Card and Alan Krueger, argues that raising the minimum wage need not destroy a lot of jobs (as conservative opponents insist) – and may even create some.	他们身后有诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼等杰出人物的支持，克鲁格曼在经济学家大卫·卡特和艾伦·克鲁格开创性工作的基础上，提出提高最低工资并不一定会（像保守反对派所坚持的那样）破坏大量就业机会——甚至可能反而创造出一些。


(Paradoxically, British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne seems to agree with these left-leaning American Democrats: He offered a minimum-wage increase as partial compensation for cutting wage subsidies.)	（矛盾的是，英国财政大臣乔治·奥斯本似乎同意这些美国左翼民主党人的看法：他提高了最低工资，以部分对冲削减工资补贴。 ）


Politics is heating up in middle-income countries as well, and unions are pressing politicians to take action.	中等收入国家政治也呈升温趋势，工会正逼迫政治家采取措施。


Consider Chile, where the current leftist government has sent a bill to Congress that promises to improve income distribution simply by giving unions more power in collective bargaining.	比方说智利，现任左翼政府已经向国会提交了一份法案，承诺通过强化工会集体谈判权来改善收入分配。


The aims are lofty, but the proposed policies alone will not solve the problem.	目标足够高尚，但仅靠拟定政策本身解决不了问题。


Limited minimum-wage increases in a growing economy need not cost jobs; but sizeable increases in a context of slumping growth (the norm nearly everywhere today) surely will.	发展经济体中有限的最低工资增长不一定会影响工作； 但在经济低迷时大幅提高最低工资（这几乎成了今天无所不在���常态）却无疑能够造成影响。


And automation will make it easier to substitute machines for workers, likely undermining the low elasticity of labor demand with respect to the cost of hiring (adjusted to include turnover and training costs) that underlies the Card-Krueger-Krugman view.	而且自动化将降低机器取代人的难度，有可能对支撑卡特-克鲁格-克鲁格曼观点的劳动力需求领域（调整为包含营业额和培训成本的）雇佣成本的低弹性造成破坏。


Similarly, the potential for union-led bargaining to redistribute income presupposes non-competitive corporate practices, which in turn generate abnormal profits that can be bargained away by unions.	同样，工会引导收入再分配谈判的前提是非竞争性企业做法，这反过来又产生出工会可以讨价还价的异常利润。


But globalization and technological progress, by making it easier to match supply and demand, will make such monopolistic behavior harder to maintain in the future.	但全球化和技术进步降低了实现供需匹配的难度，这导致未来难以继续这样的垄断行为。


Moreover, traditional redistribution policies presuppose traditional, contract-bound workers.	此外，以合同为基础的传统劳动者是传统再分配政策的前提条件。


That, too, can no longer be taken for granted.	这一点也不能再以为是理所当然的。


Are Uber drivers Uber employees?	Uber司机算不算Uber员工？


The debate is raging in cities from Paris to San Francisco, and one can be sure that similar controversies will erupt in many more cities and countries – and not just over Uber.	这样的争论席卷从巴黎到旧金山的每一个城市，我们可以肯定类似的争论——而且不仅仅限于Uber——将在更多城市和国家中爆发。


We are accustomed to the idea that owners of capital hire laborers and set the rules.	我们习惯的想法是资本所有者雇佣劳动力并制定规则。


In the future, technology may enable laborers to hire the capital they need and work with an unprecedented degree of autonomy.	未来，技术可以让劳动者雇佣所需资本，并以前所未有的自主权工作。


Distributional struggles will look very different in that kind of world.	彼时世界的分配斗争将发生巨大变化。


Last month, I attended a conference in France entitled “What if work were the key?”	上个月，我在法国参与了一次主题为“如果劳动是重中之重”的会议。


The attendees – France’s best and brightest – resoundingly concluded that work does seem to be the key to enhancing social cohesion, and to more fulfilling lives.	法国最优秀最聪明的与会者响亮地总结道工作貌似确乎是加强社会凝聚力和充实生活的关键要素。


The attendees also agreed that the best way to improve income distribution is to provide work to those who have no job (and therefore no income).	与会者还一致认为，改善收入分配的最佳方法是为没有工作（因此也没有收入）的人提供工作。


One figure mentioned at the conference stuck out: Out of today’s five billion working-age people, only three billion have jobs.	会上提到的一个数字很令人瞩目：即在今天五十亿工作年龄人口中，只有三十亿拥有工作。


Solving that problem will require fresher thinking than experts and politicians have provided so far.	解决这一问题需要专家和政治家拿出更新的思路。


Osborne and the British Tories got it completely wrong.	奥斯本和英国保守党完全搞反了。


Others should ignore their example.	千万不要以他们为榜样。


Is 70 Too Old for the UN?	70岁的联合国太老了吗？


NEW YORK – As world leaders prepare to gather next week at the United Nations in New York to ratify the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and commemorate the UN’s 70th anniversary, for many a fundamental question has become inescapable.	纽约—全球领导人正在准备出席下周在纽约举行的新可持续发展目标（SDG）批准会议并庆祝联合国成立70周年。 对许多领导人来说，一个根本性问题已经无法回避。


In the face of growing global disorder – including turmoil in the Middle East, waves of migrants flooding into Europe, and China’s unilateral moves to enforce its territorial claims – does the UN have a future?	面对日益严峻的全球失序——包括中东动荡、涌入欧洲的难民潮和中国的单方面领土主张——联合国还有未来吗？


Grounds for pessimism are undeniable.	不可否认，悲观派的悲观是有道理的。


Conflicts rage on, seemingly unaffected by upholders of world order.	冲突如火如荼，全球秩序支持者的努力似乎毫无用处。


Despite more than two decades of talk, the Security Council’s permanent membership (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) still reflects the geopolitical realities of 1945, not 2015.	尽管经历了二十多年的谈判，但安理会常任理事国（中法俄英美）反映的仍是1945年而非2015年的地缘政治现实。


Denied accommodation in the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) commensurate with its economic clout, China has established its own alternatives, which other countries have flocked to join.	布雷顿森林机构（世界银行和国际货币基金组织）拒绝了中国获得与其经济实力相称的地位的改革要求，因此中国干脆另立门户，其他国家纷纷加入其中。


The G-20 seems more representative than the Security Council – and more imbued with common purpose.	G-20的代表性似乎好于安理会——也更强调共同目标。


Yet the UN should not be written off.	但联合国不应该被抹杀。


It continues to serve a vital purpose, and its history suggests that it can be revitalized to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.	它仍然致力于一个关键目标，其历史表明它能够实现复兴以满足二十一世纪的需要。


The UN began, in 1945, as a vision shared by the leaders of the victorious Allies, who were determined to ensure that the second half of the twentieth century did not play out like the first half.	联合国成立于1945年，它是战胜的同盟国领导人的共同愿景——确保二十世纪下半叶不会重蹈上半叶的覆辙。


After two world wars, countless civil wars, brutal dictatorships, mass expulsions of populations, and the horrors of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, “never again” was not just a slogan: the alternative was too apocalyptic to contemplate.	在经历了两次世界大战、数不清的内战、残酷独裁、人口大量驱逐以及大屠杀和核爆恐怖后，“再也不要如此”不仅仅是一个口号：重蹈覆辙的后果不堪设想。


To this end, the Allies sought an alternative to the balance-of-power politics that had wreaked such havoc in the preceding five decades.	基于此，同盟国试图找出一个不同于在此前五十年带来如此浩劫的实力平衡政治方案。


Their idea – now called “global governance” – was to create an institutional architecture that could foster international cooperation, elaborate consensual global norms, and establish predictable, universally applicable rules, to the benefit of all.	他们的办法——现在称为“全球治理”——建立一套能够促进国际合作、健全全球共同规范、制定全球适用的可预测的规则，从而造福全人类的制度基础上。


The hope that many placed in the UN Charter was soon dashed by the onset of the Cold War.	许多人寄托在联合国宪章上的希望很快就因为冷战的爆发而破灭。


And yet global statesmen made good use of the new organization as a forum to contain superpower tensions.	但全球政治家很好地利用了这个新组织，作为一个遏制超级大国紧张局面的论坛。


Peacekeeping missions, not even mentioned in the Charter, were devised to contain conflicts around the world, and to prevent them from igniting a superpower conflagration.	人们设计出维和任务（它并没有写入联合国宪章）遏制全球冲突、防止它们演变为超级大国对峙。


Thanks to the UN, World War III never happened.	感谢联合国，第三次世界大战从未发生。


Moreover, the UN’s contribution to peace during the Cold War is not the whole story.	此外，联合国在冷战期间的和平贡献并不是其作用的全部。


Its decolonization efforts freed millions from the yoke of imperialist oppression.	其去殖民地化的努力将数百万人从帝国主义的压迫中解放出来。


Economic and social development rose to the top of its agenda.	经济和社会发展成为其日程的最重要部分。


As global governance has evolved, the UN system has become the port of call for innumerable “problems without passports”: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the degradation of our common environment, epidemics, war crimes, and mass migration.	随着全球治理的演化，联合国系统成为无数“难解之题”的呼吁场所：大规模杀伤性武器的扩散问题、人类共同环境的破坏问题、传染病问题、战争罪问题、大规模移民问题，等等。


Such problems require solutions without passports, because no country or group of countries can solve them alone.	这些问题需要通行解决方案，因为没有哪个国家或一群国家能够单枪匹马解决它们。


With universality comes legitimacy.	普世性带来合法性。


Because all countries are members, the UN enjoys a global standing that gives its decisions and actions a degree of authority that no individual government enjoys beyond its own borders.	由于所有国家都是成员国，因此联合国享有一种全球地位，其决定和行动具有一定程度的权威性，这是任何国家的政府在其国界之外无法做到的。


The binary international order of the Cold War is long gone.	冷战的二元国际秩序早已成为往事。


Instead, the metaphor for today’s globalized world is that of the World Wide Web, in which we increasingly function through multiple networks.	相反，当今全球化世界的隐喻是万维网，在这张网中，我们日益通过多重网络实现日常生活。 有时这些网络会发生重叠，有着共同参与者；


Sometimes those networks overlap, with common participants, and sometimes they are distinct; they all serve our interests in different ways and for different purposes.	有时它们则相去甚远； 但它们已不同方式、不同目的服务于我们的利益。


Many countries once felt insulated – by wealth, strength, or distance – from external dangers.	许多国家曾经绝缘于外部威胁——通过财富、实力和距离等。


But now they realize that local security forces are not enough to protect their citizens, and that the safety of people everywhere depends on internationally coordinated efforts to combat terrorism, pollution, infectious diseases, illegal drugs, and weapons of mass destruction, and to promote human rights, democracy, and development.	但如今它们意识到，本地安全力量不足以保护它们的公民，全球各地人民的安全都取决于国际合作打击恐怖主义、污染、传染病、非法毒品、大规模杀伤性武器和促进人权、民主与发展。


The UN has not fully succeeded in turning recognition into reality.	联合国在将认识转变为现实方面尚未取得完全的成功。


But at its best and its worst, the UN is a mirror of the world.	但无论如何，联合国是世界的镜子。


As the legendary Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld famously put it, “The United Nations was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.”	著名的联合国前秘书长哈马舍尔德（Dag Hammarskjöld）有一句名言：“联合国不是用来让人类上天堂的，而是用来拯救人类不下地狱的。 ”


I believe strongly that the UN needs reform, not because it has failed, but because it has succeeded enough to be worth investing in.	我坚信，联合国需要改革，但这不是因为它的失败，而是因为它取得了足够的成功，所以值得投资。


As the agreement on the SDGs demonstrates, there is much that can be accomplished with the UN as the lynchpin of our system of global governance.	SDG的一致意见表面，作为全球治理体系关键节点的联合国可以取得重大成就。


Moreover, the UN has proved a remarkably adaptable organization; it would not have survived so long if it was not.	此外，联合国还是一个适应性相当强的组织；


While it must be reformed to accommodate today’s world, all that is needed is a smidgen of the statesmanship shown seven decades ago, when world leaders subordinated their immediate short-term interests to a long-term vision of the kind of world they wanted their children to inhabit.	若非如此，它不可能存在这么长时间���它必须作出改革以适应当今世界，但所需要的只是一点点政治家精神，这股精神在七十年前就存在，当时的世界领导人牺牲了眼前的短期利益以换取我们希望子孙后代能够生活在其中的世界的长期愿景。


The UN remains the source of laws and norms that countries negotiate together and agree to uphold as the “rules of the road.”	联合国仍是法律和规范的源泉，各国聚在一起谈判并同意遵守这些法律和规范，使之成为“交通规则”。


And it remains the pre-eminent forum where sovereign states can come together to share burdens, address shared problems, and seize common opportunities.	它也仍然是最重要的论坛，主权国家在这个论坛上分担负担、解决共同问题、抓住共同机会。


In other words, the UN’s foundations, laid down in 1945, remain strong.	换句话说，1945年打下的联合国的基础亦然坚固。


But they must be buttressed if they are to withstand the ongoing shifts in countries’ strategic weight.	想要适应各国战略实力的持续变化，联合国必须得到巩固。


As the UN turns 70, it is time to reaffirm its founders’ guiding vision – a vision born of devastation that remains a source of universal hope for a better world.	联合国已经70岁了，是时候重申其领导人的指导愿景了——一个产生于破坏、至今仍是建设更好的世界的全球希望之源的愿景。


The Unavoidable Costs of Helicopter Money	直升机撒钱的不可避免的成本


MUNICH – The long-running debate about the advisability of so-called helicopter money has changed shape, as new ideas emerge about the form it could take – and questions arise about whether it is already being dropped on some economies.	慕尼黑—随着关于所谓的直升机撒钱的可能形式的新概念的出现，对其是否值得考虑的长期争论形势也发生了变化，并且出现了直升机撒钱是否已在某些经济体落地的疑问。


What hasn’t changed is that embracing helicopter money would be a very bad idea.	没有发生改变的是采取直升机撒钱是一个非常糟糕的主意。


According to the conventional view, helicopter money is newly printed cash that the central bank doles out, without booking corresponding assets or claims on its balance sheet.	根据传统智慧，直升机撒钱即中央银行提供新印现金，而不记录对应的资产或对其资产负债表的索偿权。


It can come in the form of cash transfers to the public or as the monetization of government debt; in both cases, it is a permanent loss for the central bank.	其形式可以是面向公众的现金转移支付或者政府债务货币化； 它们都会导致央行的永久亏损。


In practice, helicopter money can look a lot like quantitative easing – purchases by central banks of government securities on secondary markets to inject liquidity into the banking system.	在实践中，直升机撒钱可以与量化宽松非常相似——央行在二级市场上购买政府债券，以此为银行系统注入流动性。


The helicopter-money version would be the purchase of zero-interest-rate government bonds that will not be repaid, either because they are perpetual bonds or because they are rolled over every time they mature.	这种直升机撒钱的形式是购买不会得到偿付的零息政府债券，要么是因为它们是永续债券，要么是因为它们每次到期都会展期。


That is arguably what the Bank of Japan is now doing.	日本银行正在做的基本上就是这些。


BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda has said that directly underwriting the budget deficit is not an option.	日本银行行长黑田东彦说，直接为预算赤字兜底不是日本银行的行动选项。


Nonetheless, he has initiated a policy of replacing the government bonds on the BOJ’s balance sheet once they mature, while constantly increasing the volume of government debt on the central bank’s books.	但是，他实施了一项在到期时替换日本银行资产负债表上的政府债券，同时不断增加央行账目上的政府债券数量的政策。


This comes after years of declarations by prominent economists, including Berkeley’s Brad DeLong and former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, that helicopter money offers a way to overcome deflation (with which Japan has struggled for decades).	多年前，许多著名经济学家，包括伯克利的布拉德·德隆（Brad DeLong）和美联储前主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke），宣布直升机撒钱是克服通货紧缩的一个办法。 多年后，饱受通缩之苦几十年之久的日本终于这么做了。


The idea is that, by monetizing the fiscal deficit, the central bank helps the government to finance growth-enhancing investments in, say, infrastructure, while providing the liquidity needed to counter deflationary forces.	其背后的思想是，通过将财政赤字货币化，央行帮助政府融资（比如）基础设施方面的增长提振性投资，同时也为抵御通缩提供了所需的流动性。


If it sounds too good to be true, that’s because it is.	这听起来好得不真实，因为确实如此。


As Milton Friedman often said, in economics, there is no such thing as a free lunch.	米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）常说，经济学没有免费的午餐。


In fact, there are major downsides to helicopter money.	事实上，直升机撒钱存在重大弊端。


Most important, by enabling the monetization of unlimited amounts of government debt, the policy would undermine the credibility of the authorities’ targets for price stability and a stable financial system.	最重要的是，该政策通过无限量货币化政府债务，破坏了当局的物价稳定和稳定金融系统的目标的可信度。


This is not a risk, but a certainty, as historical experience with war finance – including, incidentally, in Japan – demonstrates only too clearly.	这不是风险，而是确定性，因为战争金融的历史经验——碰巧的是，其中就包括日本——早已非常清晰地证明了这一点。


In the early 1930s, under Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan implemented money-financed deficit spending, in order to lift the economy out of deflation.	20世纪30年代初，在财务大臣高桥是清的领导下，日本实施了赤字支出的货币融资，以促使经济走出通缩。


But it worked a little too well, generating a powerful wave of inflation.	但效果太好了一点，造成了强大的通胀。


Korekiyo’s subsequent attempts to rein in public deficits by slashing military spending failed.	高桥随后试图通过削减军事支出遏制公共赤字。


The military rebelled, and Korekiyo was assassinated in 1936.	军方采取了下克上，高桥于1936年遭到暗杀。


Germany’s monetary breakdown after World War I also stemmed from the issuance of war bonds to the German public.	一战后德国的货币破产也源自向德国公众发行战争证券。


In the United States, the excessive printing of dollars to finance the Civil War contributed to high inflation.	在美国，为南北战争融资而过度印刷美元也导致了高通胀。


The list goes on.	这一名单还能继续下去。


Some proponents of helicopter money, such as Adair Turner, former head of the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, argue that this danger can be neutralized with clear rules to limit the use of monetary and fiscal stimulus.	一些直升机撒钱的支持者，如英国金融服务局前局长阿代尔·特纳（Adair Turner），指出这一危险可以用清楚的限制货币和财政刺激用途的规则中和。


And, theoretically, they are right.	理论上，他们是对的。


But are such limitations politically realistic?	但这些限制在政治上现实吗？


The truth is that the central bank would struggle to defend its independence once the taboo of monetary financing of government debt was violated.	真相是一旦政府债务货币融资的禁忌被打破，央行将难以捍卫其独立性。


Policymakers would pressure it to continue serving up growth for free, particularly in the run-up to elections.	决策者将向央行施压，要求其继续免费提振增长，特别是在选举期间。


Even if central banks did retain their independence, it is doubtful that they would be able to steer inflation gradually to, say, 2%, and then keep it there.	即使央行确实保住了独立性，它们能否逐渐将通胀导向（比如）2%的水平并保持也值得怀疑。


Dispensing liquidity to spur inflation is much easier than draining it to prevent price growth from spinning out of control.	释放流动性刺激通胀比回收流动性防止物价上涨失控容易得多。


The problem, which Friedman identified in 1969, is that while helicopter money generates more demand in an economy, it does not create more supply.	弗里德曼在1969年时指出，问题在于，尽管直升机撒钱在经济中创造了更多需求，却没有创造更多供给。


So the continued provision of helicopter money after an economy has returned to normal capacity utilization – the point at which demand and supply are in equilibrium – will cause inflation to take off.	因此，在经济回到正常产能利用率——即需求和供给的均衡点——后继续直升机撒钱，就会导致通胀抬头。


Developed economies have not reached that point today, because the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis are still dampening demand.	眼下，发达经济体尚未达到这一均衡点，因为2008年全球金融危机的后果仍然在遏制需求。


But once deleveraging is complete and the credit cycle turns, inflationary pressure is likely to reappear.	但一旦去杠杆化完成，信用周期扭转，通胀压力有可能重现。


And central banks’ efforts to suppress it will carry large costs, in terms of employment and growth, as occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.	而央行遏制通胀的措施将造成巨大的就业和增长成本，20世纪八九十年代即是如此。


But even if supply-side growth were maintained, say, by China, thereby holding down prices of tradable goods, helicopter money would carry major costs, because debt would still be growing faster than nominal GDP.	但即使（比如）中国保持供给侧增长，从而拉低可贸易商品的价格，直升机撒钱仍将带来巨大的成本，因为债务仍然比名义GDP增长更快。


In the long run, that would jeopardize confidence in the central bank, saddled with claims against an over-indebted government, and put the fiat money system at risk.	在长期，这将破坏对身负过度负债政府的索偿权的央行的信心，法币制度也将告急。


Once investors began to move their assets into more stable currencies, the local currency would depreciate and bond prices would collapse.	一旦投资者开始将资产转移到更稳定的货币，本币就将贬值，债券价格崩溃。


All forms of monetary stimulus – from quantitative easing to negative interest rates – carry risks.	所有形式的货币刺激——从量化宽松到负利率——都会带来风险。


But helicopter money is particularly dangerous; indeed, there is no realistic scenario in which such a policy would not go awry.	但直升机撒钱尤其危险； 事实上，这一政策不“走歪”的现实情景从未发生过。


It is time to recognize, once and for all, that governments, not central banks, are responsible for generating long-term employment and growth, by ensuring favorable investment conditions, a high-quality education system, and open, competitive markets.	必须彻底认识到，政府，而不是央行，需要对创造长期就业和增长负责，实现这一目标的方法是确保有利的投资环境、高质量的教育系统和开放竞争的市场。


Monetary policymakers should defend this red line – which means keeping the helicopters on the ground.	货币决策者应该谨守红线——这意味着直升机永远只能停在地上。


What Are We Betting On?	我们在下什么注？


LAGUNA BEACH – When I consider the prospects for the global economy and markets, I am taken aback by the extent to which the world has collectively placed a huge bet on three fundamental outcomes: a shift toward materially higher and more inclusive global growth, the avoidance of policy mistakes, and the prevention of market accidents.	拉古娜海滩—当我思考全球经济和市场前景时，我都会大吃一惊：世界在三大基本结果上下了巨大的集体赌注。 这三个结果是：向实质性更高、更包容的全球增长的转变、避免政策错误以及预防市场事故。


Though all three outcomes are undoubtedly desirable, the unfortunate reality is that they are far from certain – and bets on them without some hedging could prove exceedingly risky for current and future generations.	尽管所有者三个结果毫无疑问都是值得追求的，但不幸的现实是，它们还远远不能称之为确定——下注于它们而不对冲也许会给我们和子孙后代带来巨大的风险。


The first component of the bet – more inclusive global growth – anticipates continued economic recovery in the United States, with a 3% growth rate this year bolstered by robust wage growth.	这一赌注的第一项——更包容的全球增长——认为美国经济将持续复苏，强健的工资增长将让今年的增长率达到3%。


It also assumes China’s annual growth rate will stabilize at 6.5-7%, thereby enabling the risks posed by pockets of excessive leverage in the shadow-banking system to be gradually defused, even as the economy’s growth engines continue to shift from exports and public capital spending toward domestic consumption and private investment.	该赌注还认为中国年增长率将稳定在6. 5—7%，因此影子银行体系杠杆过高的风险将可以逐步消化，即使经济增长引擎继续从出口和公共资本支出转变为国内消费和私人投资。


Another, more uncertain assumption underpinning the bet on more inclusive growth is that the eurozone and Japan will be able to escape the mire of low growth and avoid deflation, which, by impelling households and businesses to postpone purchasing decisions, would undermine already weak economic performance.	下注于更包容的增长的另一个更加不确定的假设是欧元区和日本将能够摆脱低增长、避免通缩。 低增长和通缩迫使家庭和企业推迟购买决定，从而制约已然十分疲软的经济表现。


Finally, the bet assumes that oil-exporting countries like Nigeria, Venezuela, and especially Russia will fend off economic implosion, even as global oil prices plummet.	最后，该赌注认为石油出口国——如尼日利亚、委内瑞拉，特别还有俄罗斯——将成功避免经济崩溃，即使全球油价暴跌。


These are bold assumptions – not least because achieving these outcomes would require considerable economic reinvention, extending far beyond rebalancing aggregate demand and eliminating pockets of excessive indebtedness.	这些都是激进的假设——因为实现这些结果需要巨大的经济再造（economic reinvention），远不止于重新平衡总需求和消灭过度负债。


While the US and China are significantly better placed than others, most of these economies – in particular, the struggling eurozone countries, Japan, and some emerging markets – would have to nurture entirely new growth engines.	美国和中国的境况比其他国家好得多，而这些经济体中的大部分——特别是步履艰难的欧元区国家、日本和一些新兴市场——将不得不寻找全新的经济引擎。


The eurozone would also have to deepen integration.	欧元区还必须深化一体化。


That adds up to a tough reform agenda – made all the more challenging by adjustment fatigue, increasingly fragmented domestic politics, and rising geopolitical tensions.	这就构成了艰难的改革日程——而调整疲劳、日益分裂的国内政治和不断恶化的地缘政治紧张局面让挑战更加艰巨了。


In this context, a determined shift toward markedly higher and more inclusive global growth is far from guaranteed.	在这样的背景下，坚定地朝向显著更高、更包容的全球增长的转变远非板上钉钉之事。


The second component of the collective bet – the avoidance of policy mistakes – is similarly tenuous.	集体赌注的第二项——避免政策错误也相当危险。


The fundamental assumption here is that the untested, unconventional policies adopted by central banks, particularly in advanced countries, to repress financial volatility and maintain economic stability will buy enough time for governments to design and deliver a more suitable and comprehensive policy response.	这里的基本假设是中央银行（特别是发达国家中央银行）能够采取未经检验的非常规政策抑制金融波动、维持经济稳定，从而为政府赢得足够时间设计和实施更合理、更全面的政策反应。


This experimental approach by central banks has involved the conscious decoupling of financial-asset prices from their fundamentals.	央行的实验性方针包括有意识地让金融资产价格与基本面脱钩。


The hope has been that more buoyant market valuations would boost consumption (via the “wealth effect,” whereby asset-owning households feel wealthier and thus more inclined to spend) and investment (via “animal spirits,” which bolster entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest in new plant, equipment, and hiring).	人们希望更高的市场估值能够提振消费（通过“财富效应”，即拥有资产的家庭觉得自己变富从而更倾向于支出）和投资（通过“动物精神”，即刺激企业家投资于新工厂、设备和人手的意愿）。


The problem is that the current economic and policy configuration in the developed world entails an unusual amount of “divergence.”	问题在于当前发达世界的经济和政策配置存在异常巨大的“分化”。


With policy adjustments failing to keep pace with shifts on the ground, an appreciating dollar has assumed the role of shock absorber.	政策调整无法跟上变化，升值的美元因此承担了冲击吸收器的角色。


But history has shown that such sharp currency moves can, by themselves, cause economic and financial instability.	但历史表明，如此剧烈的货币波动本身可能造成经济和金融动荡。


The final element of the world’s collective bet is rooted in the belief that excessive market risk-taking has been tamed.	世界集体赌注的最后一项是认为市场的过度冒险行为可以得到遏制。


But a protracted period of policy-induced volatility repression has convinced investors that, with central banks on their side, they are safe – a belief that has led to considerable risk-positioning in some segments of finance.	但长期的、政策导致的波动性抑制让投资者相信，和央行站在一条战壕里是安全的——这一观点导致金融业的某些细分领域堆积了巨大的风险。


With intermediaries becoming reluctant to take on securities that are undesirable to hold during periods of financial instability, market corrections can compound sudden and dramatic price shifts, disrupting the orderly functioning of financial systems.	随着中介机构越来越不愿持有在金融动荡期不吃香的证券，市场纠正可能导致剧烈的突发性价格变动，干扰金融体系的有序运行。


So far, central banks have been willing and able to ensure that these periods are temporary and reversible.	目前，央行愿意和能够确保这类时期时间短、可逆转。


But their capacity to continue to do so is limited – especially as excessive faith in monetary policy fuels leveraged market positioning.	但它们维持这样做的能力是有限的——特别是在对货币政策的过度信念助长杠杆头寸的情况下。


The fact is that central banks do not have the tools to deliver rapid, sustainable, and inclusive growth on their own.	事实上，央行没有单枪匹马早就快速、可持续并且包容的增长的工具。


The best they can do is extend the bridge; it is up to other economic policymakers to provide an anchoring destination.	它们所能做的充其量只是拓宽桥面； 锚定目标还要依靠其他经济决策者。


A bridge to nowhere can go only so far before it collapses.	“无路之桥”（bridge to nowhere）最后只能倒塌。


The nature of financial risks has morphed and migrated in recent years; problems caused by irresponsible banks and threats to the payment and settlement systems have been supplanted by those caused by risk-taking among non-bank institutions.	近几年来，金融风险的性质发生了改变和迁移； 不负责任的银行所造成的危险以及对支付和结算系统的威胁被非银行机构的冒险行为所取代。


With the regulatory system failing to evolve accordingly, the potential effectiveness of some macro-prudential policies has been undermined.	由于监管系统不能随机应变，一些宏观审慎政策的潜在效果也遭到了破坏。


None of this is to say that the outlook for markets and the global economy is necessarily dire; on the contrary, there are notable upside risks that could translate into considerable and durable gains.	所有这些都不是说市场和全球经济的前景必然渺茫； 相反，有许多积极风险可以转化为巨大而持久的收益。


But understanding the world’s collective bet does underscore the need for more responsive and comprehensive policymaking.	但理解世界的集体赌注确实能够彰显更负责任、更全面的决策的必要性。


Otherwise, economic outcomes will remain, as former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it in 2010, “unusually uncertain.”	否则，经济结果将继续如同前美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在2010年所指出的那样“反常地不确定”。


As in the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis, China may need to rely on the large state balance sheet for loan consolidation, debt write-offs, and bank recapitalization.	就像20世���90年代末亚洲金融危机爆发后，中国可能需要依靠国家大幅扩大资产负债表来实现贷款整合、债务减记和银行资本重组。


The Brexit Muddle	英国退出乱象


LAGUNA BEACH – During a recent visit to the United Kingdom, I was struck by the extent to which the question of whether the country should remain in the European Union is dominating the media, boardroom discussions, and dinner conversations.	拉古娜海滩—在最近的英国之行中，我十分震惊地发现，关于英国是否应该留在欧盟的问题绝对主宰着媒体、董事会讨论和晚餐谈话。


While slogans and sound bites capture most of the attention, deeper issues in play leave the outcome of the June 23 referendum subject to a high degree of uncertainty – so much so that a single event could end up hijacking the decision.	口号和滚动播出的声音吸引着大部分目光，而更深层次的问题让6月23日的全民公决结果仍然高度不确定——也许只需要一个事件就能最终左右结果。


Of course, the most cited arguments on both sides tend to be the most reductive.	当然，双方最常提出的观点总是最简单的。


On one side are those who caution that departure from the EU would cause trade to collapse, discourage investment, push the UK into recession, and trigger the demise of the City of London as a global financial center.	一方担心脱离欧盟将导致贸易崩溃，导致撤资，让英国陷入衰退，并让伦敦金融城失去全球金融中心的地位。


They point to the pound’s recent depreciation as a leading indicator of the financial instability that would accompany a British exit (or “Brexit”).	他们将最近英镑的贬值视为将伴随英国退出发生的金融动荡的先行指标。


On the other side are those who argue that Brexit would unshackle the UK from the grip of EU bureaucracy and stop the flow of British taxpayer funds to other countries.	另一方认为英国退出将让英国从欧盟官僚主义的桎梏中解放出来，不再让英国纳税人的钱流向其他国家。


The pro-Brexit camp also positions itself as fighting to protect Britain from an uncontrollable influx of immigrants, from imported terrorism, and from laws formulated by foreigners who lack sufficient understanding and appreciation of British culture.	支持英国退出阵营还立足于保护英国不受不可控的移民涌入、恐怖主义的输入以及由不能充分理解和尊重英国文化的外国人所制定的法律的影响。


In a noisy and rough campaign – one that has already divided the Conservatives and contributed to the unease within Labour over the party’s leadership – the appeal of such simplistic arguments is obvious.	在这场喧闹而粗暴的竞争中——它已经导致保守党分裂，并且让工党内部对该党的领导地位产生忧虑——如此简单的观点显然极具号召力。


But Brexit is far more complex than the sound bites suggest.	但英国退出的复杂性远比滚动播出的评论声音大得多。


And, in fact, many of the underlying issues that should shape the referendum’s outcome are still subject to a high degree of uncertainty.	事实上，许多可能决定公决结果的基础问题仍然面临高度不确定性。


Not only does that explain the inability of the British intellegentsia to reach consensus about the issue; it also leaves the Brexit question at the mercy of last-minute developments.	这不但解释了英国知识届为何无法就该问题形成一致； 也导致英国退出的问题一直到最后一刻才能见分晓。


At the most fundamental level, Britain’s interest in the EU has centered on its status as a kind of supercharged free-trade area and an enabler of a “common passport” for financial services.	在最根本的层面上，英国在欧盟的利益集中在后者是一个超强自由能贸易区，并能带来金融服务“通用护照”。


But while Britons support the free movement of goods and services, they are not particularly keen on the free movement of labor.	但尽管英国人支持商品和服务的自由流动，他们却并不特别热衷于劳动力的自由流动。


And they have little interest in “ever-closer union,” characterized by comprehensive political and economic integration.	他们也对以全面整治和经济一体化而特征的“更加紧密的联盟”没什么兴趣。


This contrasts sharply with the vision upheld by many other EU members, including core countries like France and Germany, which view the EU’s single market as a stepping stone toward deeper integration, not an end in itself.	这与许多其他成员国持有的观点不同，包括法国和德国，它们将欧盟单一市场视为通向更深层次一体化的垫脚石，而不是终点。


Traumatized by past wars and supportive of regionalization as a way to succeed in a fluid global economy, ever-closer union seems like the key to ensuring continued peace and prosperity.	饱受昔日战争摧残并支持地区化作为在不稳定的全球经济的成功之道，日益紧密的联盟似乎是持续和平与繁荣的关键。


But the situation is far more complicated than just reconciling two clear but competing visions.	但情况远远比仅仅协调两个明确但冲突的观点复杂得多。


Given widespread disagreement – including, as the referendum makes plain, within the UK itself – over what the “right” arrangement should look like, finding a solution that works for everyone seems all but impossible.	由于关于“正确”的安排到底应该怎样的分歧广泛存在——包括全民公决所揭示的英国本身内部的分歧——找出人人都接受的方案几乎是不可能的任务。


While British Prime Minister David Cameron has managed, in tricky negotiations, to secure concessions from his fellow European leaders regarding what would happen if the UK stayed in the EU, nobody really knows what would happen if British citizens vote to leave.	尽管英国首相卡梅伦在艰难的谈判中成功确保了他的欧洲领导同侪就英国留在欧盟后的情况问题作出了妥协，但没人真正知道如果英国公民选择脱离欧盟会发生什么。


Without knowing what specific regional arrangements would follow Brexit, the pro-EU camp cannot make a decisive economic and financial case for remaining.	在不清楚英国退出之后的具体的地区安排的情况下，亲欧盟阵营无法提出留在欧盟的决定性经济和金融依据。


After all, following what admittedly would be a period of dislocation, the UK could end up with some type of association arrangement that preserves some of its current privileges, thereby limiting longer-term disruption.	毕竟，在经过一段名副其实的错位（dislocation）时期后，英国可能最终拿出某种保留一些当前特权的结盟安排，从而限制长期破坏性。


The anti-EU camp is no better off.	反欧盟阵营也好不到哪里去。


It is difficult to prove that membership in the EU – which opponents portray as meddlesome and disruptive – has made Britain materially worse off.	难以证明欧盟成员资格——其反对者称之为碍事和破坏性——让英国实质境况变得更糟了。


And the ever-closer union that Brexit advocates so adamantly oppose is far from a sure thing.	而英国退出强硬反对的日益紧密的联盟也远非板上钉钉。


In fact, the EU has been struggling to tackle collectively the challenges it faces – in particular, the refugee crisis, which has already strained passport-free travel within the Schengen Area (one of the most visible, celebrated, and appreciated achievements of European integration).	事实上，欧��根本难以对其所面临的挑战拿出集体应对措施——特别是难民危机，这场危机已经影响到申根区（欧洲一体化最显眼、最著名、最受赞赏的成就）内部的免护照旅行。


In the face of so much uncertainty, British voters would ultimately have to make their decision on the basis of pragmatic, not strategic, considerations.	在面临如此多不确定性的情况下，英国选民最终将根据务实而非战略考虑作出决定。


And perhaps the most pragmatic choice would be to remain in the EU, at least for now, thereby preserving the option of changing their collective mind later, should new information warrant it.	也许最务实的选择是留在欧盟，至少暂时留下，从而保留日后新的情况有保证时改变集体思维的选择。


Some are inclined to push harder.	一些人倾向于更用力地推动。


They believe that a better version of this de facto “muddled middle” can be achieved through a game of “chicken.”	他们认为，比这一事实上的“混乱的中庸”（muddled middle）更好的状态可以通过“胆小鬼”游戏实现。


The UK votes to leave now, in the hopes that a panicked EU would not only grant further concessions, but also alter its own vision of ever-closer union.	英国现在支持退出，期待恐慌的欧盟不但做出进一步妥协，还将改变其自身更加紧密的联盟的愿景。


With this high-risk strategy, the UK could end up decisively reshaping the EU according to its preferences.	通过这一高风险战略，英国和可能最终得以根据自己的喜好决定性地改变欧盟。


But, given the other challenges currently facing the EU, this is not a likely outcome.	但是，考虑到欧盟当前面临的其他挑战，这一结果可能性很低。


That is why remaining in the EU would be Britain’s best bet.	因此，留在欧盟是英国的最佳赌注。


Such an approach would enable the UK to avoid the near-certainty of short-term disruptions, bank the concessions that Cameron has already secured, and keep their future options open, particularly as the EU itself evolves.	这一方针将让英国得以避免几乎必然会发生的短期破坏，巩固卡梅伦已经获得的妥协，并继续保持未来选择权，特别是在欧盟本身发生变化的话。


But that does not mean it is not a gamble.	但这并不意味着这不是赌博。


After all, pragmatism does not always bring about the desired outcome.	毕竟，务实主义并不总能带来渴望的结果。


Without a solid strategic vision, British citizens could end up ignoring analytical pragmatism, and instead decide how to vote in the referendum in response to a sudden event.	没有可靠的战略愿景，英国公民可能最终忽视分析务实主义（analytical pragmatism），而决定根据突发事件在公决中投票。


Given the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris in November and in Brussels last week, one must not ignore the possibility that the deplorable actions of disruptive non-state actors could become the pivotal factor determining the outcome of a referendum on the historic interactions of nation-states.	考虑到11月巴黎和上周布鲁塞尔的恐怖袭击，我们决不能忽视破坏性的非国家行动方的恶劣行为成为决定民族国家的历史性互动的全民公决结果的主要因素的可能性。


Should this awful possibility materialize, it would be a tragedy in more ways than one.	如果这一可怕可能性实现，那么将是一个全方位悲剧。


Uncertainty Shifts to China	不确定性转向中国


Now that the dollar has dropped 43% from its high against the euro, the process of global financial rebalancing is seriously underway.	既然美元相对欧元已经从高位贬值43%，就说明全球金融再平衡的过程已经开始。


The United States’ trade and current account deficits have begun to shrink relative to American and world GDP.	美国的贸易和经常项赤字相对于美国和全世界的GDP已经开始缩小。


Asian current account surpluses are about to start to shrink as well, especially if growth slows markedly in America in the aftermath of the end of its housing boom.	亚洲的经常项盈余也即将开始萎缩，特别是如果房产泡沫破灭导致美国经济增长明显放缓。


At the moment, Europe is feeling most of the pain, as the euro’s value has risen furthest and fastest against the dollar.	目前，欧洲正感受着欧元相对美元升值创历史新高的切肤之痛。


But Latin America and Asia will start to feel distress as well, as the decade-long US role as the global economy’s importer of last resort comes to an end.	但随着美国长达十年的，作为世界经济中救命稻草式的进口国角色的终结，拉美和亚洲的日子也会开始不好过了。


As long as imbalances of world trade and capital flows unwind slowly and smoothly, the magnitude of any global economic distress should be relatively small.	只要世界贸易和资本流的不平衡缓慢而平滑地蔓延，任何全球性经济恶化的程度也会相对较轻。


Of course, it will not seem small to exporters and their workers who lose their American markets, or to Americans who lose access to cheap capital provided by foreigners.	当然，这在那些失去了美国市场的出口商及其雇员，或是那些失去了获得廉价外国资本的机会的美国人看来倒并不是件小事。


But the next few years are certain to bring up a more threatening and more serious political-economic problem than the unwinding of global imbalances.	但在未来几年里肯定会发生一个比全球不平衡的发展更具威胁性和更为严重的政治经济问题。


Yes, the US might enter a small recession – the odds are roughly 50-50 of that happening.	是的，美国可能会出现一次低强度的经济衰退—发生的几率大约是50%。


Yes, an American recession might spill over to the rest of the world and cause a worldwide recession.	是的，美国的衰退可能会波及到世界其他地方，造成世界性的经济衰退。


And yes, global economic growth over the next five years is unlikely to be as rapid as growth in the last five years.	是的，全球经济在未来五年的增长率可能难以保持在过去五年里的水平。


A formal recession, however, is not an overwhelming probability, and is likely to be small. The prospect of a truly hard landing – that global investors wake up one morning, suddenly recognize the US current account’s cannot be sustained, dump dollars, and bring about a crash of the global economy – is becoming less likely with each passing day.	而出现真正硬着陆的可能性—全球的投资者在某一天早晨突然醒悟，发现美国的经常账目难以为继，抛售美元，从而引发全球经济的崩溃—正随着时间的推移而变得越来越小。


Under two plausible scenarios – both concerning China – the unwinding of global imbalances could cause regional if not global depression.	在两种可能的情况下—都与中国有关—正在发生的全球不平衡会导致地区性（如果不是全球性）的经济衰退。


In the first scenario, China continues to attempt to maintain full employment in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and elsewhere not by stimulating domestic demand but by trying to boost exports further by keeping the renminbi stable against the dollar and falling in value against the euro.	在第一种情况下，中国继续试图通过促进出口而不是刺激内需来维持在上海、广州和其他地区的全民就业。 进一步促进出口的方式是保持人民币兑美元汇率的稳定而对欧元贬值。


The effort to maintain the dollar-renminbi exchange rate at a level approved by China’s State Council has already led to an enormous increase in the Chinese economy’s financial liquidity.	将美元—人民币汇率维持在中国国务院批准的水平上的努力已经导致了中国经济的金融流动性大幅增加。


The consequences of this are now manifested in property and stock market inflation, but not yet in rampant and uncontrolled consumer price inflation – at least for now.	其后果现在已经通过不动产和股票市场的通胀显现出来，不过还未造成普遍的、不可控制的消费品价格通胀—至少目前还没有。


But if China does not accelerate the renminbi’s revaluation, the world might see a large burst of consumer inflation in China in the next two or three years.	但如果中国不加快对人民币的重新估值，那么在未来两三年内就可能会发生严重的消费通胀。


If so, the consequences will be a choice between the destructive runaway inflation familiar from much of post-WWII Latin America and stagflation.	果真如此，其后果将会是在我们所熟知的、二战后肆虐拉美的恶性通胀和经济滞胀之间做出抉择。


The fall-out from this scenario, however, would be largely confined to Asia.	然而，这种情况所产生的后果主要还是局限于亚洲。


The second scenario is more dangerous for the entire world.	第二种情况对于整个世界而言则更加危险。


In this scenario, once again China continues to attempt to maintain full employment by keeping the renminbi undervalued.	在这种情况下，中国继续试图通过维持人民币估值偏低的状态来保持全民就业。


But this time, the Chinese government manages to restrain domestic inflation, so America’s trade deficit with Asia stops falling and starts rising again, as does Europe’s, while Latin America finds itself priced out of its export markets.	但这一次，中国政府成功地控制了国内的通胀，因此美国对亚洲的贸易赤字开始止跌回升，就如同拉美发现出口定价过高以后对欧洲造成的影响。


Five or six years hence, the world economy faces the danger that it faced two years ago, although the fear this time is not of a sudden crash in the dollar’s value, but of a sudden crash in the value of the dollar and the euro against Asian currencies.	未来的五六年，世界经济将面临两年前的那种危险，虽然这一次不是担心美元价值的突然崩溃，而是担心美元和欧元相对于亚洲货币的突然大幅贬值。


Four years ago, I would have said that the principal source of international economic disorder was made in America.	四年以前，我本可以说国际经济混乱的首要源头是美国。


That has passed as a result of the dollar’s decline and the ebbing political strength of right-wing populist factions in the US that seek ever-greater redistribution to the rich fueled by ever-increasing tax cuts and ever-rising long-term deficits.	但这种论断由于美元的贬值和美国国内右翼民粹派系（他们企图通过幅度空前的减税和持续增长的财政赤字，以前所未有的力度向富人重新分配财富）的逐渐失势而失去了依据。


Today, the principal source of international economic disorder is made in China, owing to factions inside its government that hope to avoid a more-rapid appreciation of the renminbi’s value.	今天，国际经济混乱的主要发源地则是中国。 其原因是政府中希望避免人民币尽快升值的那部分势力。


I cannot judge the strength of these factions, or whether they know that the falling US current account deficit and dollar may lessen the urgency of adjustment in the rest of the world, but not in China.	我不能判断这些人的影响力（究竟有多强），也不清楚他们是否知道美国经常项赤字的下降和美元的贬值可以减轻除中国以外的世界其他国家做出调整的紧迫压力。


Richard Nixon’s treasury secretary, John Connally, once told a group of European leaders that while the dollar was America’s currency, its misalignment was Europe’s problem.	尼克松的财政部长，John Connally曾经告诉一群欧洲领导人说，虽然美元是美国的货币，但它的汇率偏离（misalignment）则是欧洲的问题。


Today, the misalignment of the dollar – and the euro – against the renminbi and other Asian currencies is increasingly becoming Asia’s problem.	今天，美元和欧元相对于人民币和其他亚洲货币的汇率偏离则正日益成为亚洲的问题。


The Paris Climate-Change Spectacular	巴黎气候变化大戏


OTTAWA – The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December will feature all the tightly choreographed production values of a Hollywood blockbuster.	渥太华—12月的巴黎联合国气候变化会议将聚齐所有好莱坞大片精心设计的要素。


The cast will be huge: presidents and prime ministers at center stage, supported by thousands of extras, including protesters, riot police, and busloads of media.	“卡司”阵容强大：各国总统和总理当主角，包括示威者、防暴警察和各路媒体在内的“群众演员”当陪衬。


The script may still be under wraps, but the plot has already leaked: This time, in sharp contrast to the failed negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, the planet is going to win.	剧本也许还没有杀青，但剧情已经泄露无疑：这一回与2009年哥本哈根谈判失败的结局不同，地球将获得胜利。


It is a seductive plot, but one that does not quite hold together.	如此戏码颇令人着迷，但还远未敲定。


Goodwill and hard bargaining, the world will be told, paid off.	世界将会知道，良好的初衷和艰难的谈判会取得成效。


Governments have agreed to voluntary reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions that will prevent the planet from heating more than 2° Celsius.	政府已经同意自愿减少温室气体排放，以使地球升温幅度不超过2℃。


Then, in a stunning deus ex machina, it will be revealed that the world’s largest fossil-fuel companies – the so-called supermajors – have agreed to bring net emissions to zero by 2100, by capturing carbon at the source, sucking it out of the atmosphere, and storing it underground.	此外，一个“神转折”将是全球最大化石燃料公司——所谓的石油巨头——已经同意到2100年将净排放减少到零。 这一目标将通过捕捉生产过程中的碳，将它们从大气中分离并埋入地下储存的方式实现。


The planet will have been saved, and the economy will be free to flourish.	地球将得到拯救，经济将重获繁荣。


Cue the music and roll the credits.	音乐响起，大幕落下。


The trouble is that the script is fiction, not documentary.	问题在于这是个虚构剧本，而不是纪录片。


The technology required has yet to be invented, and bringing net emissions to zero simply is not possible.	所需要的技术还没有发明出来，将排放减少到零根本不可能。


And, like a Hollywood production, the Paris conference’s message will have been heavily influenced by those who have the most money.	此外，和好莱坞电影一样，巴黎会议的结果将在很大程度上由最大的金主决定。


The math is not difficult to follow.	算盘打起来很容易。


The world’s energy infrastructure – finely tooled for the use of fossil fuels – is worth $55 trillion.	世界能源基础设施——为化石燃料量身定做——价值55万亿美元。


The paper value of the fossil-fuel reserves – most of them owned by the supermajors – is some $28 trillion.	化石燃料储备的纸面价值——大部分由石油巨头所有——高达28万亿美元。


The fossil-fuel industry’s influence is evident in the fact that governments worldwide are expected to spend some $5.3 trillion this year subsidizing it, including the massive outlays necessary to counteract its adverse health and environmental effects.	化石燃料行业的影响力从一个事实中窥斑见豹：预计全球政府今年将花费5. 3万亿美元补贴该行业，包括大量抵消其负面健康和环境影响的必须措施。


In other words, the governments meeting in Paris spend more subsidizing the causes of climate change than they do on global health care or, for that matter, on climate-change mitigation and adaptation.	换句话说，参加巴黎会议的各国政府对气候变化原因的补贴比对全球医疗以及（从这个角度）遏制和适应气候变化的补贴更多。


But that will not be part of the story in Paris.	但这并不在巴黎的故事中。


There, the global public will be presented with a narrative premised on two unproven forms of “geoengineering,” proponents of which seek to manipulate the planetary system.	在巴黎，全球公众看到的将是基于两个尚未证实的“地质工程”形式的故事，其支持者试图操纵地球系统。


The effort that will receive the greatest amount of attention is bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).	将受到最大关注的是碳捕捉和储存生物工程（BECCS）。


In May, the United States Department of Energy convened a private meeting to discuss this technology, which will be the fig leaf used by the supermajors to protect their assets.	5月，美国能源部召开了一次非公开会议讨论这一将成为石油巨头保护它们的资产的遮羞布的技术。


Deploying BECCS, however, would require the world to maintain an area 1.5 times the size of India, full of fields or forests capable of absorbing vast amounts of carbon dioxide, while still providing enough food for a global population that is expected to exceed nine billion by 2050.	但是，部署BECCS需要世界留出相当于印度面积1. 5倍的土地、足够多的用于吸收大量二氧化碳的原野或森林，同时还要保证能满足全球人口（到2050年预计将超过九十亿）需要的粮食。


By then, the technology’s advocates promise, biological sequestration will be joined by programs that capture emissions as they are released or pull them out of the air to be pumped into deep subterranean shafts – out of sight and out of mind.	BECCS的支持者承诺，到那时，除了生物固碳，还能在碳被排放时捕捉它们或将它们抽离出空气，泵入深层地下竖井——眼不见心不烦。


Fossil-fuel producers promote carbon capture to allow them to keep their mines open and pumps flowing.	化石燃料制造商大力推销碳捕捉技术，以使它们能够继续勘探开采作业。


Unfortunately for the planet, many scientists consider it technically impossible and financially backbreaking – especially if such technology is to be deployed in time to avert chaotic climate change.	对地球来说，不幸的是许多科学家认为这在技术上不可能，在经济上不可行——特别是如果该技术必须及时部署以扭转气候变化趋势的话。


Preventing temperatures from rising out of control will require a second geoengineering fix, known as solar radiation management.	防止温度升高失控需要第二种地质工程，即所谓的太阳辐射管理。


The idea is to mimic the natural cooling action of a volcanic eruption, by using techniques like the deployment of hoses to pump sulfates 30 kilometers into the stratosphere to block sunlight.	其中的思想是模拟火山爆发的自然冷却过程，使用的技术类似于用软管将硫酸盐送上三万米高空的同温层阻挡太阳光。


The United Kingdom’s Royal Society believes that the need for such technology may be unavoidable, and it has been working with counterparts in other countries to explore ways in which its use should be governed.	英国皇家学会认为，对这一技术的需求是不可避免的，并且已开始与其他国家的同道一起探索如何治理该技术的使用。


Earlier this year, the US National Academies of Science gave the technique a tepid endorsement, and the Chinese government announced a major investment in weather modification, which could include solar radiation management.	今年早些时候，美国国家科学院（National Academies of Science）给予该技术以有保留的支持，中国政府宣布将对天气改造投入巨资，其中就有可能包括太阳辐射管理。


Russia is already at work developing the technology.	俄罗斯已经开始致力于该技术的开发。


Unlike carbon capture, obstructing sunlight actually has the potential to lower global temperatures.	与碳捕捉技术不同，阻挡太阳光确实有望降低地球温度。


In theory, the technology is simple, cheap, and capable of being deployed by a single country or a small group of collaborators; no UN consensus is required.	理论上，该技术简单、廉价，一国或少数几个国家联手就有能力部署； 并且不需要联合国的共识。


But solar radiation management does not remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.	但太阳辐射管理无法将温室气体从大气中去除。


It only masks their effects.	它只是抵消了温室气体的影响。


If the hoses shut down, the planet’s temperature will soar.	如果输送硫酸盐的软管关闭，地球温度就会飙升。


The technology could buy time, but it surrenders control of the planetary thermostat to those who hold the hoses.	该技术可以赢得时间，但地球恒定温度的控制权将落入软管所有者之手。


Even the technology’s advocates concede that their computer models predict that it will have a strong negative impact on tropical and subtropical regions.	该技术的支持者也承认，他们的计算机模型预测，这对热带和亚热带会带来严重的负面影响。


Climate change is bad, but geoengineering has the potential to make it worse.	气候变化是一件糟糕的事，但地质工程有可能让它变得更加糟糕。


The story that the Paris conference’s producers will ask viewers to believe relies on technologies that are no more effective than smoke and mirrors.	巴黎会议“制片人”的故事将要求观众相信并不比障眼法更高明的技术。


It is important that we learn to see past them.	我们必须学会看穿它们，这一点很重要。


The curtain will rise on a set of false promises, and it will close with policies that can lead only to mayhem – unless the audience gets into the act.	大幕将在一组假承诺中拉开，在一组可能只会带来重大伤害的政策中落下——除非观众行动起来。


The Copenhagen-Paris Express	哥本哈根 - 巴黎快车


COPENHAGEN – In 2009, when Copenhagen hosted the United Nations Climate Change Conference, I was there as a member of parliament, and I had the feeling that I was witnessing a world-changing event.	哥本哈根——2009年，当联合国气候变化大会在哥本哈根召开时，我还在国会任职，当时我感到自己正在目睹世界的改变。


For years, negotiators had been working toward an ambitious, binding agreement to limit greenhouse-gas emissions, and the world’s attention was directed toward Denmark.	多年来，谈判人员一直为限制温室气体排放努力签订一份雄心勃勃并具有约束力的协议。 当时全世界的目光都聚焦到丹麦。


Unfortunately, the global financial crisis and national special interests colluded to derail a comprehensive deal.	不幸的是，全球金融危机和各国特殊利益共同阻止了签订一份全面协议。


Now, climate negotiators are gathering once again – this time in Paris, where expectations for an agreement are equally high.	现在，气候谈判人士正再次汇聚巴黎，达成气候协议的希望同样迫切。


This time, however, chances are good that a robust deal will be struck.	但这次很可能达成一份牢固的协议。


I will be in attendance, as the Danish minister responsible for climate issues, and I believe that this year’s conference will mark the moment when the world got serious about bringing global warming under control.	我将以丹麦气候大臣的身份与会，并相信这次会议将成为世界开始严肃对待控制全球变暖的标志。


The political environment is very different from that of six years ago.	政治环境和六年前相比已经产生了很大的差异。


When the conference in Copenhagen took place, the world was still reeling from the near-collapse of global finance, prominent politicians were questioning whether human activity was responsible for climate change, and industry groups were campaigning against binding emission cuts.	哥本哈根会议召开时，世界仍未摆脱全球金融几近崩溃的影响，著名政治家还在质疑是否是人类活动导致了气候变化，而商业团体都在拼命反对有约束力的减排。


Today, the global economy is recovering, climate scientists have dismissed the last doubts about the causes of climate change, and the business community has entered the fight on the side of the environment.	如今，全球经济正在复苏，气候学家已经驳斥了有关气候变化原因的最后疑虑，企业界也已经加入了保护环境的行列。


In 2009, green business leaders could be counted on the fingers of one hand.	2009年，绿色企业领袖只用一只手的手指就能数得清楚。


Today, their ranks have grown into an army.	而今天已经扩展到一直强大的军队。


In November, for example, Goldman Sachs announced that it would invest $150 billion in green energy by 2025.	比方说在11月，高盛宣布到2025年将在绿色能源领域投资1，500亿美元。


The dynamics of the negotiations themselves have changed fundamentally.	谈判本身的动力已经从根本上发生了改变。


The goal is no longer to forge an agreement dictating the emission cuts that countries must make; instead, we are developing a framework for reducing emissions that allows governments to decide what their countries can put on the table.	我们的目标不再是强制各国签署减排协议； 恰恰相反，我们正在制定一套减排框架，让政府决定他们能够做出什么样的贡献。


As a result, individual countries are driving the deal forward.	结果是各国政府推动协议向前发展。


They have realized that the consequences of doing nothing will be dire, and that cutting emissions will pay off over the long run.	他们已经意识到无所作为的后果将会非常可怕，从长远来看削减排放将会收到效果。


Signs of progress are everywhere.	进步的迹象随处可见。


Last year, for example, the United States and China entered into a bilateral agreement to fight climate change.	以去年为例，美中两国签署了应对气候变化的双边协议。


The US agreed to reduce its CO2 emissions by 26-28% by 2025, and China committed to reaching peak emissions around 2030 and bringing emissions down thereafter.	美国同意到2025年削减二氧化碳排放26-28%，而中国则承诺在2030年左右达到排放峰值，并在其后逐步实现减排。


This new approach has broadly expanded the scope of the climate negotiations.	这种新方法已大幅度拓展了气候谈判的范围。


The agreement in Paris is set to include more than 180 countries, and cover at least 90% of global CO2 emissions.	巴黎协议确定会涉及180多个国家，并至少涵盖全球二氧化碳排放量的90%。


By comparison, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol covered less than 15% of global emissions.	相比之下，1997年的《京都议定书》只涵盖了不到15%的全球排放量。


To be sure, much more can and needs to be done.	可以肯定，能够和必须做的事还有很多。


Denmark will continue the fight against climate change.	丹麦将继续参与应对气候变化的战争。


Over the next 25 years, global demand for energy will increase by almost a third, primarily in non-OECD countries like China and India, and we must ensure that this demand is met in as sustainable a manner as possible.	今后25年，全球能源需求将增长近三分之一，上述增长主要出现在中国和印度等非经合组织国家，我们必须确保以尽可能可持续的方式满足上述需求。


Organizations such as the International Energy Agency could play an even larger role in helping to drive the clean-energy transition.	国际能源机构等组织可以在推动清洁能源转型中发挥更大的作用。


The international community seems on track to reach the goal agreed to in Copenhagen of mobilizing $100 billion a year in climate financing for developing countries by 2020.	国际社会似乎有望达到哥本哈根会议的议定目标，即到2020年每年为发展中国家筹措1，000亿美元的气候融资。


To accomplish this, we will need to harness the power of the marketplace, leveraging public funds to attract private investment.	要想实现上述目标，我们要充分发挥市场力量，利用公共资金吸引私人投资。


In this, the Danish Climate Investment Fund, through which the government invests, together with large Danish pension funds, in climate projects for the benefit of Danish companies, could serve as an example for others.	在这方面，政府投资的丹麦气候投资基金与大型丹麦养老基金联手，可以在惠及丹麦企业的气候项目上成为别国仿效的典范。


The effort will also involve phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, as well as developing new financial tools to motivate investors to help solve problems on their own, without relying on public funds.	上述努力还包括逐步淘汰化石燃料补贴，以及开发鼓励投资者不依赖公共资金独立解决问题的新型金融工具。


An agreement in Paris would put in place the much-needed global framework the world needs to reduce total greenhouse-gas emissions.	巴黎协议将建立起世界迫切需要的削减温室气体排放总量的全球框架。


And while it would by no means mark the successful conclusion of the fight against climate change, it would provide a strong foundation for the global transition to a green economy.	虽然这并不意味着应对气候变化斗争取得了圆满成功，但将为朝向绿色经济的全球过渡奠定坚实的基础。


Basic Income Revisited	基本收入的回归


LONDON – Britain isn’t the only country holding a referendum this month.	发自伦敦——英国不是唯一一个在本月举行全民公决的国家。


On June 5, Swiss voters overwhelmingly rejected, by 77% to 23%, the proposition that every citizen should be guaranteed an unconditional basic income (UBI).	在6月5日，瑞士选民以77％比23％的压倒性多数否决了向每个公民发放无条件基本收入的提案。


But that lopsided outcome doesn’t mean the issue is going away anytime soon.	虽然这一结果逐渐消失在公众的视野中，却并不意味着问题将很快消失。


Indeed, the idea of a UBI has made recurrent appearances in history – starting with Thomas Paine in the eighteenth century.	事实上，无条件基本收入的理念在历史上已经重复出现过数次——最早始于十八世纪的托马斯·潘恩（Thomas Paine）。


This time, though, it is likely to have greater staying power, as the prospect of sufficient income from jobs grows bleaker for the poor and less educated.	但这一次它很可能存在更强大的后劲，因为穷人和受教育程度较低者通过就业获取足够收入的前景正日益黯淡。


Experiments with unconditional cash transfers have been taking place in poor as well as rich countries.	对此无论是穷国还是富国都实施过无条件现金转移支付的实验。


UBI is a somewhat uneasy mix of two objectives: poverty relief and the rejection of work as the defining purpose of life.	无条件基本收入这个理念在某种意义上是两项目标的艰难组合：扶贫，以及避免让工作成为生命的定义。


The first is political and practical; the second is philosophical or ethical.	前者是政治和实用性的； 后者则是哲学或道德层面的。


The main argument for UBI as poverty relief is, as it has always been, the inability of available paid work to guarantee a secure and decent existence for all.	将无条件基本收入作为扶贫手段的主要论据是有偿工作一直以来都无法保证所有人的安全和体面生存。


In the industrial age, factory work became the only source of income for most people – a source that was interrupted by bouts of unemployment as the industrial machine periodically seized up.	在工业时代，工厂工作成为大多数人的唯一收入来源——但凡工业陷入低潮就会造成大量失业，来源随之中断。


The labor movement responded by demanding “work or maintenance.” Acceptance of maintenance in lieu of work was reflected in the creation of a system of social security: “welfare capitalism.”	劳工运动对此的诉求是“要么工作要么保障”，并因此创立了社会保障体系：“福利资本主义”。


The aim of welfare capitalism was explicitly to provide people an income – typically through pooled compulsory insurance – during enforced interruptions of work.	福利资本主义的目的相当明确：在工作被迫中断时给人们提供一份收入——通常是通过事先汇集资金购买强制保险。


In no sense was income maintenance seen as an alternative to work.	但这种收入保障在任何意义上都不能替代工作。


As the idea of interruption from work was extended to include the disabled and women bringing up children, so entitlements to income maintenance increased beyond the capacity of social insurance, with benefits paid to eligible individuals from general taxation.	随着这种被迫失业的范围扩展到包括残疾人和抚养孩子的妇女，收入保障项目的规模超出了社会保险的承受能力，只能从从一般税收中拨出款来支付给符合条件的个人。


In the 1980s, US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher unwittingly extended the scope of welfare further, as they dismantled institutions and legislation designed to protect wages and jobs.	在1980年代，美国总统里根（Ronald Reagan）和英国首相撒切尔夫人（Margaret Thatcher）都在不知不觉中进一步扩大了福利的范围，因为他们撤除了旨在保护工资和就业机会的机构和立法。


With both left to the market, “in work” benefits, or tax credits, were introduced to enable employed workers to earn a “living wage.”	在将这两项事务留给市场后，政府随后引入了“在职”优待或税收减免政策，使劳动者可以赚取一份“生活工资”。


At the same time, conservative governments, alarmed at the growing cost of social security, started to cut back on welfare entitlements.	与此同时，保守党政府在也意识到社会保障支出日益膨胀，开始削减福利项目。


In this newly precarious environment of work and welfare, UBI is seen as guaranteeing the basic income previously promised by work and welfare, but no longer reliably secured by either. (A leading advocate, Guy Standing of the University of London, has written a book called The Precariat.)	在工作和福利两者都不稳定的新环境下，无条件基本收入被看作是对从前工作和福利承诺给予但却再也无法有效维系的基本收入的保障（一位主要倡议者，英国伦敦大学的盖伊·史丹亭（Guy Standing）为此写了一本书叫《朝不保夕的人（Precariat）》）。


An additional argument, always resonant in this tradition, but particularly so today in poor countries, is UBI’s emancipatory potential for women.	另一个一直存在的额外论据则在当今贫穷国家尤为吃香，认为无条件基本收入有助于妇女解放。


The ethical case for UBI is different.	而无条件基本收入的道德诉求则有所不同。


Its source is the idea, found both in the Bible and in classical economics, that work is a curse (or, as economists put it, a “cost”), undertaken only for the sake of making a living.	它的来源是一种同时存在于圣经和古典经济学的理念，认为工作是一种诅咒（或者如经济学家所说的那样是“成本”），只是为了谋生。


As technological innovation causes per capita income to rise, people will need to work less to satisfy their needs.	由于技术创新令人均收入上升，人们只需要做一点工作就能满足自身的需求。


Both John Stuart Mill and John Maynard Keynes looked forward to a horizon of growing leisure: the reorientation of life away from the merely useful toward the beautiful and the true.	在约翰·斯图亚特·密尔和约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯两人看来人类的生活会越来越悠闲：生命从仅仅“有用”被重新定位到追求美好和真实。


UBI provides a practical path to navigate this transition.	无条件基本收入则提供了迈向这一转型的切实路径。


Most of the hostility to UBI has come when it stated in this second form.	而大多数对无条件基本收入的敌意来自于第二个方面。


A poster put up during the Swiss referendum campaign asked, “What would you do if your income were taken care of?”	在瑞士全民投票期间上贴了一张海报问道：“如果有人把你的收入都打点好了，你会怎么做？


The objection of most UBI opponents is that a majority of people would respond, “Nothing at all.”	”那些无条件基本收入反对者都认定大多数人会回答：“什么都不做”。


But to argue that an income independent of the job market is bound to be demoralizing is as morally obtuse as it is historically inaccurate.	但这种不受就业市场的收入必将令人游手好闲的说法在道德上也是站不住脚的，历史证明了这一点。


If it were true, we would want to abolish all inherited income.	因为如果这种说法是对的，我们就得取消所有继承权。


The nineteenth-century European bourgeoisie was a largely rentier class, and few questioned their work effort.	例如十九世纪欧洲资产阶级是一个食利阶层，但很少有人会质疑他们的工作努力程度。


Virginia Woolf famously wrote that a woman who wanted to write fiction “must have money and a room of her own.”	对此弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫的名言是一个想写小说的女人“必须有钱和一个属于自己的房间。 ”


The explosion of robotics has given the demand for UBI renewed currency.	机器人技术的爆发又给无条件基本收入提供了新的依据。


Credible estimates suggest that it will be technically possible to automate between one-quarter and one-third of all current jobs in the Western world within 20 years.	可靠的估算表明，西方世界在未来20年内将有1/4~1/3工作实现自动化。


At the very least, this will accelerate the trend toward precariousness of jobs and income.	这至少将加速就业岗位和收入的不稳定趋势。


At worst, it will make a sizeable share of the population redundant.	在最坏的情况就会出现相当数量的冗余人口。


A standard objection to UBI as a way to replace earnings from vanishing jobs is that it is unaffordable.	那些反对用无条件基本收入来取代因工作消失而丧失的收入的人认为社会是负担不起的。


This partly depends on what parameters are set: the UBI’s level, which benefits (if any) it replaces, whether only citizens or all residents are eligible, and so on.	但这一定程度上取决于参数如何设置：无条件基本收入应该设在何哪种水平，替代（如果执行的话）哪些收入，是只有公民还是全体居民都有资格获取，等等。


But this is not the main point.	但这不是重点。


The overwhelming evidence is that the lion’s share of productivity gains in the last 30 years has gone to the very rich.	压倒性的证据是在过去30年生产率提高的最大份额都流向了超级富豪的口袋。


And that’s not all: 40% of the gains of quantitative easing in the United Kingdom have gone to the richest 5% of households, not because they were more productive, but because the Bank of England directed its cash toward them.	而这还不是全部：在英国，量化宽松所产生的40％收益都归最富有的那5％家庭所有，这并非因为他们更有效率，而是由于英国央行向他们定向供应现金。


Even a partial reversal of this long regressive trend for wealth and income would fund a modest initial basic income.	即便稍微逆转一下这一漫长的财富和收入和倒退趋势都能为一个温和的初始基本收入计划筹集到资金。


Beyond this, a UBI scheme can be designed to grow in line with the wealth of the economy.	除此之外，一个无条件基本收入方案可以设计成与经济财富同步增长。


Automation is bound to increase profits, because machines that make human labor redundant require no wages and only minimal investment in maintenance.	自动化势必增加利润，因为这些节省了人类劳动的机器不需要工资，只需要最基本的维护费用。


Unless we change our system of income generation, there will be no way to check the concentration of wealth in the hands of the rich and exceptionally entrepreneurial.	除非我们改变我们的收入创造系统，否则就没有办法阻止在财富向富人和企业家手中集中。


A UBI that grows in line with capital productivity would ensure that the benefits of automation go to the many, not just to the few.	一个与资本生产率同步增长的无条件基本收入将确保自动化将惠及大众，而不仅仅是少数人。


The Year of Resilience	恢复力之年


NEW YORK – Ten years ago this month, representatives from 168 United Nations member states met in Kobe, the capital of Japan’s Hyogo Prefecture, to decide how to manage risk better in the wake of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, which claimed more than 227,000 lives.	纽约—十年前的这个月，来自联合国168个成员国的代表齐聚日本兵库县首府神户，讨论在印度洋海啸灾难的背景下如何更好地管理风险。 印度洋海啸夺走了227,000等多人的生命。


Over five days, which included the anniversary of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, they crafted the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), composed of a raft of measures designed to “reduce the losses in lives and social, economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries.”	会议进行了五天，其中也包括了1995年神户地震纪念日，与会者起草了兵库行动框架（Hyogo Framework for Action，HFA），该框架包括了多条旨在“降低生命损失和国家与地区社会、经济和资产损失”的措施。


In two months, UN member states will gather for the third World Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction in another Japanese city synonymous with disaster risk: Sendai – the center of the Tōhoku region, which bore the brunt of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that led to the Fukushima nuclear meltdown.	两个月后，联合国成员国将在另一座可作为灾难风险代名词的日本城市——仙台参加第三次世界灾难风险遏制会议（World Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction）。 仙台是日本东北地方中心城市，即导致福岛核电站事故的2011年地震和海啸的重灾区。


One question will be on everyone’s mind at the meeting: Has the world lived up to the HFA’s ambitious goals?	所有与会者脑海中都会带着这样一个问题：世界实现HFA的宏大目标了吗？


The evidence of the last decade – which has been marked by some of the worst natural disasters on record – is far from favorable.	过去十年的证据相当令人沮丧。 这十年爆发了不少史上最严重灾难。


Port-au-Prince collapsed in an earthquake.	太子港在一场地震中沦为废墟。


Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans.	卡特里娜飓风摧毁了新奥尔良。


Drought killed an unknown number of people in the Horn of Africa.	干旱在非洲之角夺走了无数人的生命。


Floods and earthquakes affected millions in Pakistan and China.	洪水和地震影响了巴基斯坦和中国的数百万人民。


Heat waves and wildfires ravaged countries around the world.	热浪和山火在全世界各国肆虐。


These disasters serve as a stark reminder of the need for instruments like the HFA, especially because the drivers of disaster risk – improper land use, non-existent or poorly implemented building codes, environmental degradation, poverty, climate change, and, most important, weak governance by inappropriate and insufficient institutions – still abound.	这些灾难让我们警醒——我们需要HFA这样的工具，特别是在灾难风险助推因素仍无处不在的时候。 土地的不恰当使用、建筑法规缺失或执行不力、环境破坏、贫困、气候变化，还有最重要的机构治理能力不适和不足，这些因素让灾难风险节节高升。


That is why world leaders need to agree on an updated version of the HFA at the Sendai conference.	因此，世界领导人需要在仙台会议上就修订HFA达成一致。


To be sure, there have been some important, albeit less noticeable, successes over the last ten years.	平心而论，在过去十年中，我们取得了一些重要（尽管不太惹人注意）的成功。


In Asia, where 80% of the world’s disasters are concentrated, the number of people directly affected has dropped, decade-on-decade, by almost one billion, owing to measures like the Indian Ocean tsunami early-warning system.	亚洲集中了80%的世界灾难，但直接受灾难影响的亚洲人口数量在十年间下降了近十亿，原因就在于采取了印度洋海啸预警系统等措施。


Indeed, timely evacuations in the face of accurately forecasted major storm systems have enabled the Philippines and India to save thousands of lives just in the last year.	事实上，在正确预测大风暴的基础上及时疏散让菲律宾和印度在去年挽救了成千上万生命。


And, over the last three years, China has worked hard to keep economic losses within its 1.5%-of-GDP target.	而在过去三年中，中国花大力气将经济损失限制在GDP的1. 5%以内。


Meanwhile, Turkey will have earthquake-proofed every school and hospital in the country by 2017.	与此同时，土耳其将在2017年实现所有学校和医院的抗震改造。


Ethiopia has developed a sophisticated data-management system to help guide its efforts to address not only drought but also other natural hazards.	埃塞俄比亚开发了先进的数据管理系统帮助指导干旱和其他自然风险治理措施。


Both countries – and many others – have incorporated the study of disaster risk into their school curriculum.	土耳其和埃塞俄比亚——以及其他许多国家——都将灾难风险研究纳入了学校课程。


In Latin America, a cost-benefit analysis in Ecuador has concluded that each dollar invested in disaster risk reduction, by eliminating recurring losses from floods and storms, ultimately provides $9.50 in savings.	在拉丁美洲，厄瓜多尔的一项成本效益分析表明，投资于遏制灾难风险的每一美元，通过消除洪水和风暴的再发损失，最终可以为社会节省9.


Similarly, the European Union estimates that €1 ($1.18) spent on flood protection brings €6 in savings.	5美元。 类似地，据欧盟测算，用于洪水保护的每1欧元可以为社会节省6欧元。


In the United Kingdom, for example, investment in flood defenses meant that 800,000 properties were protected during last winter’s storms, significantly reducing the bill for response and recovery.	比如，在英国，防洪投资让800,000座房产在去年冬天的风暴中得到了保护，极大地降低了灾难响应和恢复支出。


But more must be done.	但我们还必须做更多事。


In the last 44 years, disasters caused by weather, climate, and water-related hazards have led to 3.5 million deaths.	在过去44年中，天气、气候和水相关风险导致的灾难夺走了350万人的生命。


Though progress has been made in reducing disaster-related mortality – according to the Center for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters, the number of disaster-related deaths has not increased significantly in the last decade, despite the uptick in disasters – this figure remains far too high.	尽管在降低灾难致命性方面已经取得了一些进展——根据灾难导致流行病研究中心（Center for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters）的数据，灾难呈现升级之势，但灾难相关死亡人数在过去十年中没有增长——但死亡人数仍然太高了。


Moreover, even where people’s lives are saved, their livelihoods are often decimated.	此外，即使人们的性命保住了，但生活往往遭到毁灭性打击。


Since 1960, disasters have cost the world more than $3.5 trillion, with both developed and developing countries paying a huge price in terms of lost productivity and damaged infrastructure.	1960年以来，灾难给全球造成的损失超过3. 5万亿美元，发达国家和发展中国家都付出了沉重的生产率降低和基础设施破坏的损失。


That is why, at the upcoming UN conference in Sendai, world leaders must agree, through a revised HFA, to scale up their efforts to cope with the risks posed by rising sea levels, global warming, rampant urbanization, and rapid population growth.	因此，在即将到来的仙台联合国会议上，世界领导人应该形成一致，通过修订HFA加大措施力度治理因海平面上升、全球变暖、大规模城市化和人口快速增加带来的风险。


Only with strong political commitment at the highest level can real progress toward a safer, more sustainable future be made.	只有来自最高层面的强力政治承诺才能让世界朝更加安全、更加可持续的未来进步。


It should not be difficult to win support for a revised HFA.	赢得对修订HFA的支持应该不是难事。


After all, there is no compelling – or even rational – reason why a finance minister or CEO would choose to pay for recovery but not to invest in prevention.	毕竟，没有迫切——甚至理性——的理由让财政部长或CEO选择为灾后恢复买单而不是投资于灾前预防。


It is time for the world to embed resilience to disasters into the industrialization process and the development of towns and cities, accounting for factors like seismic threats, flood plains, coastal erosion, and environmental degradation.	世界应该讲灾难恢复力建设纳入工业化进程和城镇和城市的开发，在此过程中考虑地震风险、泛洪区、海岸腐蚀和环境破坏因素。


If the UN conference produces the right agreement, resilience can become the hallmark of 2015, setting the tone for agreements later in the year on climate change and sustainable development – both of which hold important implications for disaster risk.	如果联合国会议能形成正确的一致，那么恢复力将成为2015年的标志，为今年晚些时候关于气候变化和可持续发展的协议奠定基调——后两者对灾难风险具有重要影响。


An Unconventional Truth	非常规事实


NEW YORK – Who would have thought that six years after the global financial crisis, most advanced economies would still be swimming in an alphabet soup – ZIRP, QE, CE, FG, NDR, and U-FX Int – of unconventional monetary policies?	纽约—谁会想到，在全球金融危机爆发六年后，大部分发达国家仍然在费常规货币政策的字母汤中游泳——ZIRP、QE、CE、FG、NDR、U-FX Int轮番上阵。


No central bank had considered any of these measures (zero interest rate policy, quantitative easing, credit easing, forward guidance, negative deposit rate, and unlimited foreign exchange intervention, respectively) before 2008.	没有一家央行在2008年前考虑使用这些措施（分别是零利率政策、量化宽松、信用宽松、前瞻指引、负存款利率和无限制外汇干预）。


Today, they have become a staple of policymakers’ toolkits.	如今，它们成了决策者工具箱中的香饽饽。


Indeed, just in the last year and a half, the European Central Bank adopted its own version of FG, then moved to ZIRP, and then embraced CE, before deciding to try NDR.	事实上，就在过去一年半中，欧洲央行采取了它的FG，然后转向ZIRP，然后采取CE，然后决定尝试NDR。


In January, it fully adopted QE.	1月，欧洲央行最终采取了QE。


Indeed, by now the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the ECB, and a variety of smaller advanced economies’ central banks, such as the Swiss National Bank, have all relied on such unconventional policies.	事实上，如今，美联储、英格兰银行、日本银行、欧洲央行和众多小发达经济体的央行（如瑞士国民银行）都实施了非常规政策。


One result of this global monetary-policy activism has been a rebellion among pseudo-economists and market hacks in recent years.	这一全球货币政策积极主义的一个结果是近几年来伪经济学家的骚动和市场动荡。


This assortment of “Austrian” economists, radical monetarists, gold bugs, and Bitcoin fanatics has repeatedly warned that such a massive increase in global liquidity would lead to hyperinflation, the US dollar’s collapse, sky-high gold prices, and the eventual demise of fiat currencies at the hands of digital krypto-currency counterparts.	各色“奥地利学派”经济学家、激进货币主义者、黄金信徒和比特币疯狂粉丝一再警告如此增加全球流动性将导致恶性通胀、美元崩溃、黄金价格暴涨，最终，法币将最终在隐晦的数字货币面前寿终正寝。


None of these dire predictions has been borne out by events.	所有这些悲观预测都没有得到事实印证。


Inflation is low and falling in almost all advanced economies; indeed, all advanced-economy central banks are failing to achieve their mandate – explicit or implicit – of 2% inflation, and some are struggling to avoid deflation.	几乎所有发达经济体的通胀都很低并且还在继续下降； 事实上，所有发达经济体央行都没有实现它们的或直接或间接的使命——2%的通货膨胀率，有一些还在竭力避免通缩。


Moreover, the value of the dollar has been soaring against the yen, euro, and most emerging-market currencies.	此外，美元币值对日元、欧元和大部分新兴市场货币一直在升值。


Gold prices since the fall of 2013 have tumbled from $1,900 per ounce to around $1,200.	黄金价格在2013年秋触及1,900美元/盎司，目前下跌到1,200美元左右。


And Bitcoin was the world’s worst-performing currency in 2014, its value falling by almost 60%.	而比特币则是2014年全世界表现最差的货币，币值跌去了近60%。


To be sure, most of the doomsayers have barely any knowledge of basic economics.	平心而论，大部分末日论者根本没有基本经济学知识。


But that has not stopped their views from informing the public debate.	但这并没有阻止他们的观点进入公共争论。


So it is worth asking why their predictions have been so spectacularly wrong.	因此，有必要研究一下他们的预测为何错得如此离谱。


The root of their error lies in their confusion of cause and effect.	他们的错误根源在于混淆了原因和影响。


The reason why central banks have increasingly embraced unconventional monetary policies is that the post-2008 recovery has been extremely anemic.	央行越来越多地采取非常规货币政策，其原因在于2008年后的复苏一直非常萎靡。


Such policies have been needed to counter the deflationary pressures caused by the need for painful deleveraging in the wake of large buildups of public and private debt.	这些政策是抵抗通缩压力之必须，而通缩压力来自公共恶化私人债务大量累积所造成的痛苦的去杠杆化需要。


In most advanced economies, for example, there is still a very large output gap, with output and demand well below potential; thus, firms have limited pricing power.	比如，大部分发达经济体仍存在巨大的产出缺口，产出和需求仍大大低于潜在水平； 因此，企业的定价能力受到了限制。


There is considerable slack in labor markets as well: Too many unemployed workers are chasing too few available jobs, while trade and globalization, together with labor-saving technological innovations, are increasingly squeezing workers’ jobs and incomes, placing a further drag on demand.	劳动力市场也十分萎靡：太多失业工人追求太少的职位，而贸易和全球化，以及劳动力节约型技术创新，正在日益挤占工人的岗位和收入，进一步拖累需求。


Moreover, there is still slack in real-estate markets where booms went bust (the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Dubai).	此外，房地产市��泡沫破裂的地区仍然萎靡不振（美国、英国、西班牙、爱尔兰和迪拜）。


And bubbles in other markets (for example, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Norway, Australia, New Zealand) pose a new risk, as their collapse would drag down home prices.	其他市场的泡沫（如中国、香港、新加坡、加拿大、瑞士、法国、瑞典、挪威、澳大利亚、新西兰）则构成了风险，它们的崩溃将进一步拉低住房价格。


Commodity markets, too, have become a source of disinflationary pressure.	大宗商品市场也是反通胀压力的源泉之一。


North America’s shale-energy revolution has weakened oil and gas prices, while China’s slowdown has undermined demand for a broad range of commodities, including iron ore, copper, and other industrial metals, all of which are in greater supply after years of high prices stimulated investments in new capacity.	北美的页岩能革命削弱了石油和天然气价格，而中国的减速遏制了多种大宗商品的需求，包括铁矿石、铜和其他工业金属，这些商品此前经历了多年的高价，而高价刺激了新产能投资，因此供给有所增加。


China’s slowdown, coming after years of over-investment in real estate and infrastructure, is also causing a global glut of manufactured and industrial goods.	中国在多年的房地产和基础设施投资过度后出现了减速，这也是全球制造品和工业品供过于求的原因之一。


With domestic demand in these sectors now contracting sharply, the excess capacity in China’s steel and cement sectors – to cite just two examples – is fueling further deflationary pressure in global industrial markets.	这些部门的内需出现了大幅收缩，因此，中国钢铁行业——这只是一个例子——的过剩产能推动者全球工业市场陷入更大的通缩压力。