China’s rapid growth has rescued multitudes from abject poverty, and quasi-Corporatist arrangements are clearly better than Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.	中国经济快速增长已经让多数群众摆脱赤贫，证明准社团制较之毛的大跃进和文化革命显然是一种进步。


But that is faint praise.	但这样的颂扬并不牢靠。


Corporatism elsewhere begat vast inequalities, corruption, and dictatorships that eventually proved unsustainable.	其他地方的社团制带来严重的不平等、腐败和独裁统治，而上述制度最终被证明是不可持续的。


The saga of Corporatism cautions economists against dismissing ethical concerns about markets.	社团主义传奇警示经济学家不应无视市场的伦理问题。


But it also warns theologians that economics contains real truths, however unattractive.	但它同时警告神学者无论他们多么不愿接受，经济学依然包含绝对的真理。


Finally, it counsels Chinese technocrats against dogma-driven economic policies.	最后，它告诫中国的专家管理者反对以教条为导向的经济政策。


The Information State	信息国度


MOSCOW – The new American administration of Barack Obama is planning to appoint a chief technology officer, following the lead of most large corporations nowadays.	莫斯科-美国的奥巴马新政府计划像当今大多数的大公司那样任命一位首席技术官。


Should other countries have one, too?	其他国家是否也应该这样做呢？


Rather than slavishly copy the United States, I think most countries should have a chief information officer – someone who thinks about information as an agent of change, not just as an agent of efficiency.	我想，与其盲目地跟从美国的做法，大多数国家更应该任命的是一位首席 信息 官。 这位首席信息官把信息看成是一种变化的媒介，而不仅仅是一种效率的媒介。


The free flow of information constrains official power and gives individuals the power to act for themselves.	信息的自由流动限制了官方的权力并且使个人有能力捍卫自己的利益。


It is the essence of a free market, and it should also be the essence of a free democracy.	这正是自由市场的本质，而它也应该成为自由民主的本质。


People should know what their officials are doing, what their government’s policies cost, who pays for them, and who benefits.	人们应该了解他们的官员在干什么，他们政府的政策成本，谁为这些政策买单，谁又从这些政策中受益。


Of course, such a government CIO couldn’t make all that happen alone.	当然，这样一位政府的首席信息官孤掌难鸣。


But he or she could encourage it – everywhere information is used and everywhere it’s hidden.	但是他或她能够在每一个使用信息以及隐藏信息的地方实现以上的目标。


The CIO wouldn’t have policymaking authority per se , but he or she should sit high in the government – ideally with little bureaucratic encumbrance.	首席信息官本身并不具备制定政策的权力，但是他或她在政府中应该被摆在很高的地位，最好不要面对太多官僚机构的障碍。


The CIO would not have a fiefdom and would not compete for power or turf with other senior officials, but would simply remind the president or other people of the role of information every time it was appropriate.	首席信息官没有自己的领地，也不会去与其他高官争权夺势，而只是在恰当的时候提醒总统或者其他人信息的重要性。


To the extent that more than persuasion is required, that would be up to the president [head of government].	如果出现仅仅依靠劝说还不够的情况，那就需要总统（政府首脑）的决策了。


Indeed, the CIO would illustrate the power of information’s power by using it , rather than legal power, to persuade people to do the right thing.	事实上，首席信息官应该通过运用 信息 而不是法律权力来展现信息的力量，从而劝说人们去做正确的事情。


No governmental “information agency” is needed.	我们并不需要一个政府的“信息机构”。


The CIO would operate more like a “virus,” spreading everywhere, rather than being an additional appendage grafted onto the government.	首席信息官更多地是像四处传播“病毒”那样去运作，而不是被嫁接到政府的又一个附件。


This virus would continuously nudge government agencies to become more effective and accessible, rather than merely more efficient.	这种病毒将持续地推动政府机构变得更高效和可接近，而不仅仅是更有效。


Ideally, it would affect employees and citizens by changing their expectations.	理想的情况下，它应该通过改变政府雇员和市民的期望来影响他们。


It wasn’t laws that created online banking; it was changed expectations and consumer demand.	催生网上银行的并不是法律，而是被改变的期望和消费者的需求。


(Yes, there were a few laws about liability, but they played only an enabling role.)	（当然，我们还是有一些关于可靠性的法律，但它们仅仅是扮演一个授权的角色。 ）


In short, the CIO would not press the government on “tech policy,” such as the rollout of broadband, but would set strategy about how to collect, manage, and disseminate information for public use and analysis.	简而言之，首席信息官不会推动政府制定“科技政策”，比如宽带的推出，而是会制定有关如何收集、管理和传播信息以供公众使用和分析的战略。


The CIO would consult agencies on their public relations – but public relations would be redefined, as in the non-government world, to mean listening as well as talking, and to mean admitting faults as a way to correct them.	首席信息官将会向政府机构提供有关公共关系的咨询意见。 但是在这里公共关系应该重新定义，就像在非政府领域那样，它应该意味着倾听和讨论，意味着承认错误以便改正这些错误。


What the CIO should not do is almost as important.	首席信息官不应该做什么也同等重要。


He or she should not attempt to centralize information, but rather to make it flow more smoothly.	他或她不应该试图将信息集中化，而是应该使它尽可能顺畅地自由流动。


Call it information liquidity, akin to financial liquidity.	我们可以把它称作信息流动性，类似于金融流动性。


What specific goals should the CIO pursue?	那样首席信息官的目标是什么呢？


Openness and transparency do not mean simply making everything available online, but making information easy to get to, compare, and analyze.	开放和透明并不仅仅意味着可以在网上获得一切信息，而是可以便利地获得、比较和分析信息。


This includes everything from actual data to how those data are represented, facilitating comparisons of data across organizations and across time.	这包括从确切的数据到这些数据是如何呈现这些数据，以便对不同机构之间以及不同时期之间的数据进行对比。


The data also need to be easy to manipulate so that third parties - whether commercial data services or journalists – can create compelling and revealing visualizations.	对于数据的操作也应该更便利，以便第三方、无论是商业数据服务机构还是记者都能够把这些数据以有说服力和能说明问题的可视化方式表现出来。


A government CIO also needs to remind us that as wonderful as the Internet is, it is most useful to people who can read and write.	政府的首席信息官需要提醒我们，尽管因特网非常精彩，它还是对于那些会读、会写的人更有用。


The digital divide isn’t much of a divide anymore; it’s the literacy divide that is holding many people back.	数字鸿沟基本上已经不存在了，但是文化上的鸿沟往往会使很多人无法享受因特网的精彩。


The CIO should not be the minister of education, but he or she can provide advice on the use of information technology for everything from curriculum content to the institutional changes that can be wrought by better teacher-parent-student communications concerning homework assignments, grades, and even school-bus schedules and lunch menus.	首席信息官不应该是教育部长，但是他或她可以为信息技术的使用提供建议，从课程内容的设置到老师、家长和学生之间对于家庭作业、得分甚至校车时间的安排和午餐食谱进行全方位的沟通来实现机制改革，一切用到信息技术的地方都可以提供建议。


Just as consumers can rate products, parents and students should be able to rate and provide feedback on the performance of individual teachers.	正像消费者可以对产品进行评分，家长和学生也可以对各个老师的表现进行评分然后提供反馈信息。


The CIO also needs to take a serious look at information security – in conjunction with the CIOs of other countries (since cybercrime knows no borders).	首席信息官还需要认真地考虑信息安全问题，在这一点他或她应该与其他国家的首席信息官进行合作，因为网络犯罪是没有国界的。


A big factor that contributes to the existence of viruses, spam, and the like is their lucrativeness.	病毒、垃圾邮件以及其他类似的事物存在的一个主要原因是它们背后所隐藏的巨大利益。


Unlike the drug trade, legalization would not make much of the problem go away, but the issue is similar, because economics plays a much bigger role than is generally acknowledged.	与毒品交易不同，合法化不会使很多问题迎刃而解���但是它们所面对的情况却是类似的，因为经济都在这里扮演了一个比人们通常认为的更重要的角色。


Two big changes are necessary.	我们必须进行两大变革。


First, sending an e-mail will need to cost more than it does currently.	首先，发送电子邮件的费用应该比当前大大提高。


Second, Internet service providers, which are in the best position to manage the security of individual users’ machines, need to get more involved – again with a system that understands the costs of poor security and charges those costs back to the people responsible.	其次。 在管理各个用户机器的安全上具备得天独厚优势的互联网服务提供商需要更多地参与进来，在这里又一次需要建立机制使人们了解安全性差的代价以及使那些负责者付出代价。


(Just as we require drivers to have insurance, maybe we should require users either to buy security services from their ISP or to post some kind of bond/insurance.)	（就像我们要求驾驶员购买保险，也许我们也应该要求用户从他们的网络服务提供商那儿购买安全服务或者缔结某种保险）。


There are many such examples; all we need is better information to find them and take action, whether inside the government or in the private sector.	我们有许多这样的例子，我们所需要的只是有更好的信息去找到它们并且采取行动，不管是在政府内部还是在私营部门。


A government can do three major things: make (and enforce) laws, spend (or take) money, and inspire people.	政府可以做三件重要的事情：制定（和实施）法律、花钱（或收钱）以及激励民众。


Every country needs a CIO who can inspire its people with the power of information.	每一个国家都需要一个能够运用信息的力量来激励民众的首席信息官。


The Instability of Inequality	应对不平等问题，世界亟需新模式


NEW YORK – This year has witnessed a global wave of social and political turmoil and instability, with masses of people pouring into the real and virtual streets: the Arab Spring; riots in London; Israel’s middle-class protests against high housing prices and an inflationary squeeze on living standards; protesting Chilean students; the destruction in Germany of the expensive cars of “fat cats”; India’s movement against corruption; mounting unhappiness with corruption and inequality in China; and now the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in New York and across the United States.	纽约——今年，社会、政治动荡和不稳定的浪潮席卷全球，群众纷纷走上真实或虚拟的街头：阿拉伯之春、伦敦骚乱、以色列中产阶级的反通胀示威、智利大学生游行、德国“肥佬”豪车被毁风潮、印度反腐风暴、腐败与不平等让中国“不高兴”，如今，“占领华尔街”运动在纽约和全美如火如荼。


While these protests have no unified theme, they express in different ways the serious concerns of the world’s working and middle classes about their prospects in the face of the growing concentration of power among economic, financial, and political elites.	虽然这些抗议行动并无统一纲领，但它们以不同的方式表达出全世界劳动和中产阶级的深切忧虑——眼看权力日益向经济、金融和政治精英集中，他们感到前途茫茫。 直接导火索很明确：发达和新兴经济体失业率高，就业不充分；


The causes of their concern are clear enough: high unemployment and underemployment in advanced and emerging economies; inadequate skills and education for young people and workers to compete in a globalized world; resentment against corruption, including legalized forms like lobbying; and a sharp rise in income and wealth inequality in advanced and fast-growing emerging-market economies.	年轻人的教育和技能不足以应对全球化世界的挑战； 非法或披着合法外衣的腐败（如政治游说）激起反弹；


Of course, the malaise that so many people feel cannot be reduced to one factor.	当然，有无力感的人如此众多，不能归结为单一因素。


For example, the rise in inequality has many causes: the addition of 2.3 billion Chinese and Indians to the global labor force, which is reducing the jobs and wages of unskilled blue-collar and off-shorable white-collar workers in advanced economies; skill-biased technological change; winner-take-all effects; early emergence of income and wealth disparities in rapidly growing, previously low-income economies; and less progressive taxation.	例如，不平等的加剧有多重原因：中国和印度的23亿人加入全球劳动大军，压缩了发达经济体低技能蓝领岗位和可外包白领岗位的数量和薪酬； 技术革新包涵着技能歧视；


The increase in private- and public-sector leverage and the related asset and credit bubbles are partly the result of inequality.	在一定程度上，私人和公共部门杠杆加剧，资产、信贷泡沫生成，也是不平等的结果。


Mediocre income growth for everyone but the rich in the last few decades opened a gap between incomes and spending aspirations.	近几十年来，所有人的收入增长都差强人意，除了富人是仅有的例外，这扩大了收入与消费欲之间的鸿沟。


In Anglo-Saxon countries, the response was to democratize credit – via financial liberalization – thereby fueling a rise in private debt as households borrowed to make up the difference.	英美国家的对策是通过金融自由化实现信用大众化，鼓励家庭量出为入，从而推高了私人债务。


In Europe, the gap was filled by public services – free education, health care, etc. – that were not fully financed by taxes, fueling public deficits and debt.	欧洲则试图靠扩大公共服务，提供免费教育、免费医疗等等，来填补鸿沟，这些开支却超出了财政收入，从而推高了公共赤字和债务。


In both cases, debt levels eventually became unsustainable.	结果，大西洋两岸，高筑的债台终于到了濒临崩盘的一天。


Firms in advanced economies are now cutting jobs, owing to inadequate final demand, which has led to excess capacity, and to uncertainty about future demand.	最终需求不足，导致产能过剩和未来需求的不确定性，于是发达经济体的企业裁员不休。


But cutting jobs weakens final demand further, because it reduces labor income and increases inequality.	但裁员令劳动收入下滑，不平等上升，从而进一步削弱最终需求。


Because a firm’s labor costs are someone else’s labor income and demand, what is individually rational for one firm is destructive in the aggregate.	由于企业的劳动成本就是员工的劳动收入，也就消费者的需求，所以个别公司的行为，分开来看是理性的，合起来就具有破坏性。


The result is that free markets don’t generate enough final demand.	结果，自由市场无法产出足够的最终需求。


In the US, for example, slashing labor costs has sharply reduced the share of labor income in GDP.	比如在美国，企业削减劳动力成本大大压低了劳动收入的GDP占比。


With credit exhausted, the effects on aggregate demand of decades of redistribution of income and wealth – from labor to capital, from wages to profits, from poor to rich, and from households to corporate firms – have become severe, owing to the lower marginal propensity of firms/capital owners/rich households to spend.	几十年来，收入和财富再分配长期失衡——从劳动到资本，从工资到利润，从穷人到富人，从家庭到企业——对总需求的潜在压力不断累积，一旦信用耗尽，压力就陡然上升。 毕竟，企业、资本家和富人的边际支出倾向较低。


The problem is not new.	这是老问题了。


Karl Marx oversold socialism, but he was right in claiming that globalization, unfettered financial capitalism, and redistribution of income and wealth from labor to capital could lead capitalism to self-destruct.	马克思的社会主义虽已市场饱和，但他有一个主张还是对的：全球化、无约束的金融资本主义、收入和财富由劳动向资本转移，会导致资本主义的自我毁灭。


As he argued, unregulated capitalism can lead to regular bouts of over-capacity, under-consumption, and the recurrence of destructive financial crises, fueled by credit bubbles and asset-price booms and busts.	正如他所论证的，无节制的资本主义会定期导致产能过程，消费不足，信贷和资产价格泡沫循环消长，破坏性的金融危机一再爆发。


Even before the Great Depression, Europe’s enlightened “bourgeois” classes recognized that, to avoid revolution, workers’ rights needed to be protected, wage and labor conditions improved, and a welfare state created to redistribute wealth and finance public goods – education, health care, and a social safety net.	即便在大萧条以前，欧洲开明的“布尔乔亚”阶级也承认，为避免革命，劳工权益必须得到保障，工资和劳动条件必须改善，福利国家需要建立，以对财富进行再分配，提供公共品——教育、医疗和社会保障网络。


The push towards a modern welfare state accelerated after the Great Depression, when the state took on the responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization – a role that required the maintenance of a large middle class by widening the provision of public goods through progressive taxation of incomes and wealth and fostering economic opportunity for all.	大萧条加速了现代福利国家的建立，国家接过了稳定宏观经济的责任，这个责任要求它们扩张公共品的供给以支撑庞大中产阶级的存在，为此，国家对收入和财富征收累进税，并设法向所有人提供经济机会。


Thus, the rise of the social-welfare state was a response (often of market-oriented liberal democracies) to the threat of popular revolutions, socialism, and communism as the frequency and severity of economic and financial crises increased.	随着经济金融危机日趋频繁和深重，群众革命、社会主义和共产主义的威胁也日益严峻，于是，作为（市场经济自由民主国家）的一种对策，社会福利国家崛起了。


Three decades of relative social and economic stability then ensued, from the late 1940’s until the mid-1970’s, a period when inequality fell sharply and median incomes grew rapidly.	继之而来的是三十年社会和经济相对稳定的时期，从20世纪40年代到70年代中叶，这个时期同时也是不平等程度大幅下降，收入中等水平迅速提升的时期。


Some of the lessons about the need for prudential regulation of the financial system were lost in the Reagan-Thatcher era, when the appetite for massive deregulation was created in part by the flaws in Europe’s social-welfare model.	金融体系必须得到审慎监管的教训，有好些被里根—撒切尔时代遗忘了，当时，鉴于欧洲社会福利模式存在一些缺陷，产生了放松监管的强烈倾向。


Those flaws were reflected in yawning fiscal deficits, regulatory overkill, and a lack of economic dynamism that led to sclerotic growth then and the eurozone’s sovereign-debt crisis now.	那些缺陷表现为巨大的财政赤字、过度监管、经济缺乏活力，在当年导致增长粘滞，后遗症则是如今欧元区的主权债务危机。


But the laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon model has also now failed miserably.	然而，英美自由放任模式如今也一败涂地。


To stabilize market-oriented economies requires a return to the right balance between markets and provision of public goods.	要稳定市场取向的经济，就必须回归市场和公共品供给之间的恰当平衡。


That means moving away from both the Anglo-Saxon model of unregulated markets and the continental European model of deficit-driven welfare states.	这意味着，既不能搞英美无监管市场模式，也不能搞欧洲大陆的赤字福利国家模式。


Even an alternative “Asian” growth model – if there really is one – has not prevented a rise in inequality in China, India, and elsewhere.	甚至连所谓“亚洲”增长模式——如果真有这种模式的话——也无法阻止中国、印度和其他一些国家不平等加剧。


Any economic model that does not properly address inequality will eventually face a crisis of legitimacy.	凡是不能恰当应对不平等问题的经济模式，最终都会面临合法性危机。


Unless the relative economic roles of the market and the state are rebalanced, the protests of 2011 will become more severe, with social and political instability eventually harming long-term economic growth and welfare.	除非市场和政府的经济角色重新找到平衡，否则2011年的抗议风潮将愈演愈烈，社会、政治不稳定最终将伤害长期经济增长和福利。


The International Atomic Energy Agency at 50	国际原子能机构成立50周年


This summer’s 50th anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) founding offers an opportunity for stocktaking about the world’s most important nuclear watchdog.	今年夏天国际原子能机构成立50周年给人们提供机会来检讨这一世界上最为重要的核子监督组织。


It comes at a time when the Agency has assumed increasing responsibility for nuclear security.	这一时机正是发生在该机构对核子安全承担了越来越大责任的时候。


The recent dispatch of inspectors to verify the shutdown of North Korea’s weapons reactor and the continuing efforts to ferret out Iran’s nuclear intentions are only the most visible signs of its monitoring function.	最近派遣检查员核实北韩关闭武器反应堆以及继续弄清楚伊朗的核子野心仅仅是该机构监督职能的最为明显的例证。


But, while there is much to celebrate, questions remain about whether the IAEA can increase its capacity both to combat proliferation and promote nuclear power plant safety.	但是，尽管人们应当庆贺，但是，该机构是否能够提高其能力打击核子扩散以及促进核子电力工厂的安全依然存有疑问。


History suggests that without greater authority, the Agency will be incapable of dramatically reducing global nuclear risks.	历史表明，如果没有更大的权限，该机构将无法大幅度降低全球核子风险。


The IAEA traces its lineage to the early dark days of the Cold War.	国际原子能机构发端于冷战早期黑暗的日子。


In his December 1953 UN General Assembly “Atoms for Peace” address, US President Dwight Eisenhower sought to relax atomic weapons competition with the Soviet Union by calling for the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank stocked with superpower fissile material. Management would come from a new global nuclear organization.	美国总统艾森豪威尔在1953年12月向联合国大会发表的“原子换和平”的演说中，通过呼吁建立存有超级大国裂变原料的国际核子原料储存机构来寻求缓和与苏联之间的核武器竞赛，可以通过一个新的全球核子组织来进行管理。


Although the fuel bank never emerged, the seed for the organization took root, giving rise to the IAEA in 1957.	尽管原料储存机构没有形成，但是，建立组织的种子却生了根，并在1957年成立了国际原子能机构。


In time, the IAEA became a nuclear brain bank, assisting developing countries with their peaceful nuclear needs.	最终，国际原子能机构成为了一个核子智力仓库，为发展中国家的和平核子需要提供援助。


It educated nuclear operators, generated safety and protection standards, promoted the benefits of the atom for industry, agriculture, and medicine, and much more.	这一机构给核子操作员提供教育，建立安全和保护标准，促进原子对工业、农业、医学以及其他更多领域的利益。


In 1970, boosted by the new Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA acquired expanded authority to safeguard nuclear elements against diversion.	在1970年，受到核不扩散条约的激励，该机构获得新的权限来防止核子原料移作他用。


Today, this responsibility extends to more than 180 countries.	如今，这一职责延伸到180多个国家。


In practice, however, the IAEA has an uneven record in tracking down nuclear cheats.	但是在实践上，该机构在发现核子欺骗上的记录还是喜忧参半。


In 1981, following Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor, IAEA inspector Roger Richter told the US Congress how Saddam had blocked IAEA access to nuclear sites.	1981年，以色列摧毁了伊拉克的奥西拉克核反应堆后，该机构的检查员瑞彻就告诉美国国会萨达姆如何阻拦该机构进入核子设施地点。


After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq once again embarrassed the IAEA, when inspectors uncovered a major covert nuclear weapons program.	1991年的海湾战争以后，当检查员发现了一个大型秘密核武器项目后，伊拉克再一次让该机构难堪。


In 2003, Libya’s renunciation of its secret weapons revealed how another country had hoodwinked the Agency.	2003年，利比亚宣布放弃其秘密武器表明另一个国家是如何欺骗该机构的。


And, only recently, the IAEA discovered that Egypt conducted non-safeguarded nuclear experiments decades ago.	只是在最近，该机构才发现埃及在几十年前就进行了没有进行防护的核子实验。


Despite these errors, in the past few years, the IAEA has demonstrated its worth as an effective nuclear sleuth.	尽管存在这些错误，但是在过去几年中，该机构还是展现出其作为有效核子探警的价值。


In 2002, its inspectors revealed North Korea’s cheating, prompting UN sanctions.	在2002年，其检查员发现北韩欺骗，进而促成联合国的制裁。


(Unfortunately, this did not halt the country’s subsequent withdrawal from the NPT.)	(不幸的是，这并未停止该国随后退出核不扩散条约。 )


The IAEA’s tenacity also has smoked out much of Iran’s nuclear program, albeit only after an Iranian dissident group disclosed the existence of some of the regime’s secret facilities.	该机构坚持不懈，还发现了伊朗的核子项目，尽管这是伊朗的异议团体揭发伊朗政权的某些秘密设施之后才发现的。


In early 2003, its onsite presence in Iraq established that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapons program, contrary to the Bush administration’s representations.	在2003年早些时候，与布什当局的说法相反的是，其在伊拉克的现场检查员确认萨达姆并没有核子武器项目。


And in 2004, the IAEA blew the whistle on South Korea’s non-safeguarded plutonium and enrichment experiments.	在2004年，该机构揭发了南韩没有防护的钸和浓缩试验。


Beyond truth seeking, the IAEA has taken a leadership role in promoting new initiatives to reduce weapons proliferation.	除了追寻事实以外，该机构还在促进减少武器扩散上发挥领导作用。


It has pressed for multinational nuclear fuel facilities that would eliminate the need for national installations that draw proliferation concerns.	它给跨国核子原料工厂施加压力来取消带来扩散担忧的全国性装置。


Director General Mohamed El Baradei has called upon the US to negotiate directly with Iran over its atomic program.	该机构主席巴拉迪呼吁美国与伊朗就其原子项目直接谈判。


He also has attempted to generate momentum for a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone.	它还试图推动中东无核武器区。


Looking forward, the IAEA confronts both internal and external challenges.	展望未来，国际原子能机构面临内部和外部的挑战。


Internally, mandatory retirements will soon cost the Agency 50% of its senior management.	在内部，强制性退休将会损失50%的高级管理人员。


Nor has the Agency’s budget kept pace with its increasing workload.	而该机构的预算也无法适应其不断增加的工作负担。


More significant is the IAEA’s failure to overcome resistance to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements.	更为重要的是，国际原子能机构未能克服阻力达成全面的保障协议。


Some countries oppose the application of NPT safeguards to small quantities of nuclear materials.	某些国家反对对小剂量的核子原料适用核不扩散条约的保障条款。


The unwillingness of more than half the NPT membership to apply the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA new flexibility to uncover clandestine nuclear activity, undermines global security.	该条约的附加议定书给该机构新的灵活性来发现秘密的核子活动，而核不扩散条约一半以上的成员国不愿意适用该附加议定书，这就破坏了全球安全。


The projected rapid growth of nuclear energy will generate yet more challenges.	核能预计将会迅速增长，这将会产生新的挑战。


To date, reactor construction has been concentrated in the industrial world.	到目前为止，反应堆的建造都集中在工业化国家。


In coming years, developing countries with little nuclear experience – Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and others – will attempt to leap onto the atomic bandwagon.	在未来几年中，没有什么核子经验的发展中国家例如印尼、越南、泰国、约旦、土耳其、埃及以及其他国家都将试图发展核能。


Without authority to enforce safe practices, the IAEA cannot better assure nuclear safety in these or other countries.	如果没有强制实行安全措施的权限，国际原子能机构就无法更好地确保在这些国家和其他国家的核子安全。


And without better intelligence and backing from the UN Security Council to impose significant, timely, and certain penalties on nuclear violators, the IAEA will have difficulty in fulfilling its security mandate.	而没有更好的情报和来自联合国安理会的支持来对违反核子体制的国家实施有意义的、及时以及明确的惩罚，国际原子能机构就会在实现其安全授权上遇到困难。


So, although the IAEA will continue to play a vital role, it will be more of a band-aid than a cure for the atomic risks that we will all have to assume.	所以，尽管国际原子能机构将会继续发挥重大作用，但是，对于我们都会承担的原子风险，它将更多地只是治标不治本。


The World in 2030	2030年的世界


CAMBRIDGE – What will the world look like two decades from now?	剑桥——20年后世界将会怎样？


Obviously, nobody knows, but some things are more likely than others.	显然这个问题没有人能回答，但发生某些情况的概率较高。


Companies and governments have to make informed guesses, because some of their investments today will last longer than 20 years.	企业和政府必须根据现有情况作出猜测，因为今天的某些投资将会延续到20年以后。


In December, the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its guess: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.	12月，美国国家情报委员会（NIC）发表了题为《全球趋势2030：另类世界》的预测报告。


The NIC foresees a transformed world, in which “no country – whether the US, China, or any other large country – will be a hegemonic power.”	国家情报委员会预测未来世界将脱胎换骨，“无论美、中还是其他大国，任何国家都不能再成为霸权力量。 ”这是以下四大“趋势”的体现：个人授权和全球中产阶级成长；


This reflects four “megatrends”: individual empowerment and the growth of a global middle class; diffusion of power from states to informal networks and coalitions; demographic changes, owing to urbanization, migration, and aging; and increased demand for food, water, and energy.	城市化、移民和老龄化造成的人口结构变化； 以及日益增长的粮食、水及能源需求。


Each trend is changing the world and “largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of ‘democratization’ at the international and domestic level.”	各项趋势都在改变世界，并“在很大程度上逆转1750年以来西方的历史性崛起，恢复亚洲在全球经济中所占的地位，并在国际和国内迎来‘民主化’的新时代。


The US will remain “first among equals” in hard and soft power, but “the ‘unipolar moment’ is over.”	”美国仍将在硬实力和软实力两方面首当其冲，但是“‘单极时代’已经不复存在。 ”


It is never safe, however, to project the future just by extrapolating current trends.	但凭借当今趋势预测未来从来都谈不上准确。


Surprise is inevitable, so the NIC also identifies what it calls “game-changers,” or outcomes that could drive the major trends off course in surprising ways.	出人意料的情况不可避免，因此国家情报委员会还指出了所谓的“意外因素”，也就是能以出人意料的方式导致主流趋势偏离的结果。


First among such sources of uncertainty is the global economy: will volatility and imbalances lead to collapse, or will greater multipolarity underpin greater resilience?	全球经济是首当其冲的不确定因素：经济波动和失衡能否导致崩溃，多极化能否加强经济的弹性？


Similarly, will governments and institutions be able to adapt fast enough to harness change, or will they be overwhelmed by it?	同样，政府和机构能否迅速适应变化并为我所用，还是会被淹没在应接不暇的变化之中？


Moreover, while interstate conflict has been declining, intrastate conflict driven by youthful populations, identity politics, and scarce resources will continue to plague some regions like the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.	此外，尽管国与国间的冲突日益减少，但青年民众、身份政治和稀缺资源所导致的国内矛盾却将持续困扰中东、南亚和非洲。


And that leads to yet another potentially game-changing issue: whether regional instability remains contained or fuels global insecurity.	这将继而引发有可能改变全局的另一个因素：能否抑制地区动荡，还是为全球局势火上浇油。


Then there is a set of questions concerning the impact of new technologies.	此外还有与新技术影响有关的一系列问题。


Will they exacerbate conflict, or will they be developed and widely accessible in time to solve the problems caused by a growing population, rapid urbanization, and climate change?	它们是会加剧冲突，还是能及时完成研究和推广以解决人口增长、快速城市化和气候变化所导致的问题？


The final game-changing issue is America’s future role.	美国未来扮演的角色是最后一个能改变全局的因素。


In the NIC’s view, the multi-faceted nature of US power suggests that even as China overtakes America economically – perhaps as early as the 2020’s – the US will most likely maintain global leadership alongside other great powers in 2030.	在国家情报委员会看来，美国实力的多面性表明即使中国最早于2020年代在经济上超过美国，也很可能无法撼动2030年美国和其他大国同处全球领导地位。


“The potential for an overstretched US facing increased demands,” the NIC argues, “is greater than the risk of the US being replaced as the world’s preeminent political leader.”	国家情报委员会指出，“美国在日益增长的要求面前过度扩张的潜在风险远大于其世界杰出政治领袖地位旁落的可能性。 ”


Is this good or bad for the world?	这对世界各国来讲是福是祸？


In the NIC’s view, “a collapse or sudden retreat of US power would most likely result in an extended period of global anarchy,” with “no stable international system and no leading power to replace the US.”	在国家情报委员会看来，“美国力量的崩溃或���然撤出极有可能导致全球陷入长时间的无政府状态，”，“美国稳定和领导国际体系的作用无可取代。 ”


The NIC discussed earlier drafts of its report with intellectuals and officials in 20 countries, and reports that none of the world’s emerging powers has a revisionist view of international order along the lines of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union.	国家情报委员会同20个国家的知识分子和官员探讨了这份报告的早期版本，称世界上没有哪个新兴国像纳粹德国、日本帝国或苏联那样修正主义地看待国际秩序。


But these countries’ relations with the US are ambiguous.	但这些国家与美国的关系却非常暧昧。


They benefit from the US-led world order, but are often irritated by American slights and unilateralism.	他们受惠于美国领导的世界秩序，但同时对美国的傲慢无礼和单边主义颇有微词。


One attraction of a multipolar world is less US dominance; but the only thing worse than a US-supported international order would be no order at all.	多极化世界的优点之一是美国的主导地位有所削弱，但唯一逊于美国所主导国际秩序的是根本没有国际秩序。


The question of America’s role in helping to produce a more benign world in 2030 has important implications for President Barack Obama as he approaches his second term.	到2030年美国在创造良性世界中所起的作用对奥巴马总统的第二任任期具有重要的意义。


The world faces a new set of transnational challenges, including climate change, transnational terrorism, cyber insecurity, and pandemics.	世界正面对着气候变化、跨国恐怖主义、网络风险和流行病等一系列新的跨国挑战。


All of these issues require cooperation to resolve.	所有这些问题都需要合作才能解决。


Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy argues that the US must think of power as positive-sum, not just zero-sum.	奥巴马2010年国家安全战略指出美国应当将实力视为正和而非零和。


In other words, there may be times when a more powerful China is good for the US (and for the world).	换句话讲，中国强大有时可能对美国（和世界）都有好处。


For example, the US should be eager to see China increase its ability to control its world-leading greenhouse-gas emissions.	比如，美国应当乐于见到中国对其领先世界的温室气体排放加强控制。


US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has referred to the Obama administration’s foreign policy as being based on “smart power,” which combines hard and soft power resources, and she argues that we should not talk about “multipolarity,” but about “multi-partnerships.”	美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿曾经谈到综合硬实力和软实力的“巧实力”才是奥巴马政府外交政策的基础，并提出我们应当重视“多边伙伴关系”，而不是“多极化”。


Likewise, the NIC report suggests that Americans must learn better how to exercise power with as well as over other states.	同样，国家情报委员会的报告表明美国人必须更好地学会如何针对他国并与他国一道行使权力。


To be sure, on issues arising from interstate military relations, understanding how to form alliances and balance power will remain crucial.	可以肯定，在国与国军事关系所引发的问题上，了解如何结成联盟并平衡力量意义事关重大。


But the best military arrangements will do little to solve many of the world’s new transnational problems, which jeopardize the security of millions of people at least as much as traditional military threats do.	但最精心的军事安排恐怕也对解决世界全新跨国问题无能为力，而这些问题给成百上千万人带来的安全威胁丝毫不亚于传统的军事事务。


Leadership on such issues will require cooperation, institutions, and the creation of public goods from which all can benefit and none can be excluded.	解决这些问题需要合作、体制，还需要能让所有人受益的公共利益得到弘扬。


The NIC report rightly concludes that there is no predetermined answer to what the world will look like in 2030.	国家情报委员会报告就此顺理成章得出结论，2030年的世界局势如何并不存在既定的答案。


Whether the future holds benign or malign scenarios depends in part on the policies that we adopt today.	未来是美好还是黯淡将部分取决于我们今天所实行的政策。


The Internet’s Immune System	互联网免疫系统


NEW YORK – Viruses, phishing, spyware, spam, denial-of-service attacks, botnets… You have probably heard these words, and perhaps even suffered from what they signify, with or without knowing it.	. 你可能听到过这些名词，不管你有没有意识到，你也可能也是它们的受害者。


I’d like to lay out a simple path to addressing (not resolving) these security problems, one that does not require agreement among all governments (or people) on what really constitutes a crime, much less a global police force or unenforceable global treaties.	让我试图提供一个简单的思路来解释（不是解决）这些安全问题，我的方法 不需要政府之间相互签订的协议，更不需要一个全球警察组织或是什么全球联盟机构来解决。


If we can increase security in general, then governments can focus on the real criminals.	你要做的就是增加安全的意识，让政府来对付那些真正的犯罪行为。


A better approach is to view computer security as an issue of public health and economics, in which people can protect themselves but must pay for the costs they impose on others.	我们应当将计算机安全看作类似于公共健康或是社会经济是否健康的一个问题，大家要有自我保护的能力，更要有惩罚加害者的机制。


We need to enable people to defend themselves against others; prevent innocent, well-meaning people from becoming infected and harming others; and reduce the incentives and ability of the ill-intentioned to do harm.	每一个人都需要能自我保护，防止受到的侵害后无意识地又加害了其他的无辜者，同时减少加害者的犯罪几率。


That sounds like a lot of different challenges.	这听起来有一些挑战。


But there are effective approaches to each of them that do not require tracking everyone online, or requiring IDs for every interaction.	不过还是有一些有效的方法，例如无需跟踪上网记录，登录的时候更不需要注册ID等。


Tracking user IDs will not enable us to catch or stop bad guys, and it will render the Internet impossible to use.	跟踪上网纪录不能抓到坏人或是阻止他们的恶行，而只是可能妨碍我们对网络的使用。


We can’t save cyberspace by destroying its openness.	我们不能以牺牲网络的开放性来打击犯罪。


To implement effective security, the entities best equipped to do so, the Internet service providers, must take the lead.	为了有效地保障网络的安全，作为网络服务的门户，网络服务提供商（ISP）应该担负起主要的责任。


They are technically savvy organizations with the ability (more or less) to protect users and detect abusers; they have a direct (though impersonal) relationship with their users; and they compete for users’ business, so that, unlike governments, they will suffer if they perform badly.	作为一个技术性很强的机构，他们有能力来保护我们，打击网络犯罪。 他们和最终用户有着直接的联系，给用户提供商业的服务，所以，不像政府，他们如果做的不好的话，自身也会大大地受到影响。


The ISPs (rather than governments) should provide basic security – anti-virus, anti-phishing, anti-spam, and the like – as a regular feature of consumer Internet services.	ISP比起政府来说，应该提供简单的安全防范——杀毒软件，反钓鱼软件，防范垃圾邮件等等——这些都是一些基本的网络用户所需要的服务，实施起来也不会很困难。


This is not hard to do.	当然，杀毒软件的公司也能提供安全网络服务。


A number of anti-virus companies compete to offer consumer security services; each ISP could select one, or offer its customers a choice of three, for example.  The trick is to get consumers to use these tools – which will require an awareness campaign along the lines of public health messages.  The result should be something closer to widespread hand-washing than to a system of acute-care hospitals.	ISP可以选择他们其中的一家，或者是几家的组合。 ISP可以教会用户使用这些工具——对公众进行网络安全知识的普及宣传，这更象是要求公众勤洗手这些简单的健康知识。


As for spam, ISPs (including mail service providers) could limit their users to, say, 100 e-mails a day; for more, you have to pay or at least post a security bond, or pass some good behavior test.	对于垃圾邮件，ISP（包括邮件服务提供商）应该对用户发送邮件的数量有所限制，比方说，一天最多100封邮件。 如果超过100封，你就要付费或通过安全测试证明是无害的。


At the same time, all ISPs should implement an e-mail ID system (there are two good standards, called Domain Keys and SPF). This is not to track everyone’s mail, but to prevent bad guys from spoofing good guys.	同时，ISP们应该实施一种EMAIL ID系统（目前有两个好的方法：Domain Keys和SPF），这倒不是追踪用户的邮件，而是为了防范坏人作恶。


ISPs would throttle traffic from ISPs that did not join the security collective, and pretty soon their customers would complain, forcing them either to join or find themselves relegated to the underworld, from which it would be hard to launch attacks because no one would accept their traffic.	ISP们限制那些没有加入网络安全防范的ISP的流量，这样的话，没有安全防范的ISP用户就会抱怨网速变慢，而要求他们的ISP加入网络安全防范，非法用户就不能通过这些没有安全防范的ISP来攻击其他ISP。


And, because ISPs answer to other ISPs, not governments, dissidents and whistleblowers could maintain their anonymity.	由于这是ISP行业内部的处理，不是由政府来主导的，所以相互之间可以保持举报者的匿名性。


As for anti-phishing and malware downloads, there are a number of services that track “bad” sites and warn users off. Users can still go where they want, but at least there are signposts warning that they are entering a dangerous neighborhood.	至于反钓鱼软件和木马软件，有好几种方法来追踪和屏蔽“非法网站”，用户可以自由的浏览网站，当他们进入一些危险网站的时候，会收到一些安全提示信息。


Google does this in its search results, working with StopBadware.org (I am an advisory board member), and both Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer offer similar protections.  In all cases, adventurous users or professionals can overcome the paternalism, but only by paying what amounts to liability insurance, for the risks they impose on the system.	其他的一些网络游览器例如，Mozilla 火狐狸和微软的IE也有类似的保护措施。 对于那些专业用户或是测试软件的用户来说，他们可以有所突破，不受到以上的限制，前提是支付费用，以作出对系统安全的保证。


The point is to create economic incentives to reduce cybercrime. Real criminals won’t be deterred, but such a system would prevent the rest of us from being pulled along or becoming victims.	此项措施的目的利用经济手段来���少网络犯罪，当然，真正的罪犯不会被阻止。


With fewer victims, crime will pay less.	但这样的系统可以减少我们受害的可能，从而达到防范的目的。


There are several reasons why this has not yet happened.	为什么我们还没有实施以上的措施呢？ 有几个原因。


The first is inertia, combined with (or disguised as) idealism – the mistaken idea that the Internet should be free not just for speech, but also from payment.  Yet it costs something to maintain an infrastructure that keeps people safe.	首先是惰性，也可能是理想主义情怀——例如认为网络不仅应该自由浏览，而且应该完全免费。 为了人们安全的使用网络，一些必要的费用支出也是应该的。


Indeed, cost – both to users and to ISPs – is the second obstacle.	实际上，对用户和ISP来说，费用的支出也是第二个障碍。


The challenge is to acknowledge the costs (as we are now doing with pollution) and assign them to people who can – and can be compelled to – pay for them.	我们应该对费用支出表示认可（就象我们针对环境污染那样），并将相关的费用分摊到具体的用户。


After all, we accept the costs of police forces and health care, including not just hospitals, but also clean water, safe food, etc.	毕竟，我们可以接受警察队伍和公共安全健康和的费用支出，这当然不仅仅是医院，而且包括干净的用水，安全食物等等。


So how do we make this happen?	那我们应该怎么做呢？


ISPs need to pass these costs on to their customers.	ISP应该将费用分摊到用户的头上。


But they won’t, because they compete mostly on price. So customers need to demand security as part of their service, while ISPs need to shun ISPs that don’t comply.	但目前，ISP由相互之间的价格战，也许不这么做，所以说用户应该对ISP提出这样的要求，ISP也应该有行业的规范，对那些没有安全设施的ISP作出限制。


To help things along, someone should file a lawsuit – not too many! – against ISPs who tolerate misbehavior.  The targets should be ISPs that willfully serve criminal customers, refusing to deal with complaints to the point that ignorance is no longer a legitimate excuse.	进一步来说，当ISP容忍一些非法网络行为的时候，应该有人对他们提出法律诉讼。 现在这样的诉讼不是太多，而是还不够。


But ISPs’ costs also include warning people away from bad sites, which requires a due-process system to notify owners of compromised websites – so that they can fix them or realize that they have been exposed.	但ISP的费用应该包括警告用户浏览不良网站的措施，就是有一个提示网站主人系统受到侵害的提示——这样他们就可以知道自己正在受到侵害并解决问题。


Such a system is relatively expensive to manage, but it is cheaper than the costs of not having it.	建立这样的系统的成本应该不便宜，但如果没有的话，后期所付出的费用应该更高。


These changes would not create some digital nervous system with a centralized brain that could solve all problems.	以上这样的改变不可能解决所有的问题，不是象一个数字化的中枢神经大脑，更象一个免疫系统，让它无处不在。


Instead, they would result in something like an immune system of competing ISPs and evolving security services, local and omnipresent.  That would vastly improve the overall computer-security situation: Ordinary people would feel secure and law enforcement and security specialists could focus on the biggest threats.	这也会大大地改善目前的网络环境：让普通人有安全感和法律的保障。 安全专家可以将精力放在对付那些对网络安全更大的威胁上面。


The Intervention Dilemma	干涉行动的困境


CAMBRIDGE – When should states intervene militarily to stop atrocities in other countries?	发自剑桥——国家应当在何时采取军事干涉行动以制止在其他国家境内发生的暴行？


The question is an old and well-traveled one.	这是一个古老且通行于世界的问题。


Indeed, it is now visiting Syria.	而如今它降临到了叙利亚头上。


In 1904, US President Theodore Roosevelt argued that, “there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror” that we should intervene by force of arms.	在1904年，美国总统西奥多·罗斯福（Theodore Roosevelt）就指出：“有一些偶尔发生的罪行，其波及范围极广且极端恐怖”以致我们必须动用武力干涉。


A century earlier, in 1821, as Europeans and Americans debated whether to intervene in Greece’s struggle for independence, President John Quincy Adams warned his fellow Americans about “going abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”	就在一个世纪前的1821年，当时欧美双方正在就是否干涉希腊独立运动进行辩论，美国总统约翰·昆西·亚当斯（John Quincy Adams）就警告自己的同胞不要去“远赴国外消灭恶人”。


More recently, after a genocide that cost nearly 800,000 lives in Rwanda in 1994, and the slaughter of Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995, many people vowed that such atrocities should never again be allowed to occur.	更近的例子则有1994年导致80万人死亡的卢旺达大屠杀，以及1995年斯雷布雷尼察地区数千名波斯尼亚男性遭屠杀的事件，当时许多人都发誓不会再让这类惨剧重演。


When Slobodan Milošević engaged in large-scale ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution recognizing the humanitarian catastrophe, but could not agree on a second resolution to intervene, given the threat of a Russian veto.	但当原南斯拉夫联盟共和国（南联盟）前总统斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇（Slobodan Milošević）于1999年在科索沃地区发动大规模种族清洗时，联合国安理会通过了一项决议，将这起事件认定为人道主义灾难，但却由于俄罗斯的否决票而无法在第二项干涉行动决议上达成共识。


Instead, NATO countries bombed Serbia in an effort that many observers regarded as legitimate but not legal.	结果北约国家轰炸南联盟的行为被许多观察家认为是“有合法性但却不合法”。


In the aftermath, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan created an international commission to recommend ways that humanitarian intervention could be reconciled with Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, which upholds member states’ domestic jurisdiction.	作为对事件的反思，时任联合国秘书长的科菲·安南创立了一个国际委员会，专门提出符合联合国宪章第二条第七款的人道主义干涉建议，同时维持成员国对本国的管辖权。


The commission concluded that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, and should be helped to do so by peaceful means, but that if a state disregarded that responsibility by attacking its own citizens, the international community could consider armed intervention.	该委员会认为各国都负有保护其公民的责任，其他各国也应当利用和平方式协助实现这一目的，但如果某国无视这一责任并屠杀本国公民，国际社会就应当考虑武装干涉。


The idea of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) was adopted unanimously at the UN’s World Summit in 2005, but subsequent events showed that not all member states interpreted the resolution the same way.	所谓“保护责任（responsibility to protect）”的理念在联合国世界峰会上一致通过，但后续发生的事件却表明各国对此的理解大不相同。


Russia has consistently argued that only Security Council resolutions, not General Assembly resolutions, are binding international law.	比如俄罗斯就一直坚称只有安理会决议——而非联合国大会决议——才具备国际法效力。


Meanwhile, Russia has vetoed a Security Council resolution on Syria, and, somewhat ironically, Annan has been called back and enlisted in a so-far futile effort to stop the carnage there.	与此同时该国还对安理会叙利亚决议投了反对票，而有点讽刺的是，安南还被请了回来，并参与了一个旨在制止大屠杀但目前却依然未能收获任何实质性成果的行动。


Until last year, many observers regarded R2P as at best a pious hope or a noble failure.	直到去年，许多观察家都仅仅将这种保护责任视为一个无法实现的希望或者是一场华丽的失败。


But in 2011, as Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi prepared to exterminate his opponents in Benghazi, the Security Council invoked R2P as the basis for a resolution authorizing NATO to use armed force in Libya.	但在2011年，当时利比亚前总统卡扎菲上校正准备把他在班加西的反对者们斩尽杀绝，联合国安理会则在保护责任的基础上通过了一项决议，授权北约对该国使用武力。


In the United States, President Barack Obama was careful to wait for resolutions by the Arab League and the Security Council, thereby avoiding the costs to American soft power that George W. Bush’s administration suffered when it intervened in Iraq in 2003.	在美国，总统奥巴马小心翼翼地等待阿拉伯联盟和安理会的决议出台，因此也避免损害美国的软实力——小布什政府2003年干���伊拉克的行为已经将其削弱了好些。


But Russia, China, and other countries felt that NATO exploited the resolution to engineer regime change, rather merely protecting citizens in Libya.	但俄罗斯，中国和其他国家则认为北约不仅是为了保护利比亚人民，而是想借该决议推动政权更替。


In fact, R2P is more about struggles over political legitimacy and soft power than it is about hard international law.	事实上，相对于对国际法的强制执行，保护责任更多涉及的是在政治合法性和软实力上的斗争。


Some Western lawyers argue that it entails the responsibility to combat genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes under the various conventions of international humanitarian law.	一些西方律师认为它赋予了在各个国际人道主义公约框架下对抗种族灭绝，反人类罪和战争罪行的责任。


But Russia, China, and others are reluctant to provide a legal or political basis for actions such as what occurred in Libya.	但俄罗斯，中国以及其他国家则不情愿去提供一个法律或者政治基础来应对在利比亚发生的事件。


There are other reasons why R2P has not been a success in the Syrian case.	而保护责任之所以无法在叙利亚实行还有其他的原因。


Drawn from traditional “just war” theory, R2P rests not only on right intentions, but also on the existence of a reasonable prospect of success.	源自于传统的“正义战争”理论，保护责任不仅构建于一个良好的意愿，还需要一个合理的成功预期。


Many observers highlight the important physical and military differences between Libya and Syria that would make Syrian no-fly zones or no-drive zones problematic.	许多观察家强调利比亚和叙利亚两国在实力和军力上的差异将使叙利亚禁飞区和车辆禁行区的设立困难重重。


Some Syrians who oppose President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, pointing to Baghdad in 2005, argue that the one thing worse than a cruel dictator is a sectarian civil war.	而那些反对总统阿萨德的叙利亚人也担心2005年在巴格达发生的情况会在自己身上重演，因为一场派系内战往往比一个独裁者更加可怕。


Such factors are symptomatic of larger problems with humanitarian interventions.	这些因素正是人道主义干涉某些更大问题的征兆。


For starters, motives are often mixed (Roosevelt, after all, was referring to Cuba).	一开始，各种动机往往是混乱地捆绑在一起（比如当年罗斯福的目标其实是古巴）。


Moreover, we live in a world of diverse cultures, and we know very little about social engineering and how to build nations.	此外，我们生活在一个多文化的世界上，而且对如何推动社会进程以及如何建立国家所知甚少。


When we cannot be sure how to improve the world, prudence becomes an important virtue, and hubristic visions can pose a grave danger.	当我们无法确定如何改善这个世界的时候，谨慎就成为了一种重要的美德，傲慢自大则会引发巨大的风险。


Foreign policy, like medicine, must be guided by the principle, “First, do no harm.”	跟吃药一样，外交政策必须在一定原则的指导下进行——“首先，不能伤害病人。 ”


Prudence does not mean that nothing can be done in Syria.	但谨慎并不意味着在叙利亚问题上无动于衷。


Other governments can continue to try to convince Russia that its interests are better served by getting rid of the current regime than by permitting the continued radicalization of his opponents.	各国政府可以持续尝试说服俄罗斯，使其相信推翻当前政权要比让阿萨德的支持者逐渐陷入极端更有助于实现其利益。


Tougher sanctions can continue to delegitimize the regime, and Turkey might be persuaded to take stronger steps against its neighbor.	更强力的制裁则可以继续令这个政权丧失合法性，还可以说服土耳其对这个邻国采取更强硬手段。


Moreover, prudence does not mean that humanitarian interventions will always fail.	此外，谨慎并不意味着人道主义干涉经常会遭到失败。


In some cases, even if motives are mixed, the prospects of success are reasonable, and the misery of a population can be relieved at modest expense.	在一些事件中，即便存在各种动机，取得成功的预期却是有望实现的。


Military interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor, and Bosnia did not solve all problems, but they did improve the lives of the people there.	对塞拉利昂、利比亚、东帝汶和波斯尼亚的军事干涉并未一次解决所有问题，但却改善了该地人民的生活。


Other interventions – for example, in Somalia – did not.	其他干涉——比如在索马里——却没有取得这样的效果。


Recent large-scale interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, though not primarily humanitarian, have eroded public support for military action.	最近对伊拉克和阿富汗的大规模干涉，虽然主要不是基于人道主义原因，却削弱了公众对军事行动的支持。


But we should recall Mark Twain’s story about his cat. After sitting on a hot stove, it would never sit on a hot stove again, but neither would it sit on a cold one.	为此我们应该牢记马克·吐温对自家猫的记述：在不小心坐在了热炉子上之后，它永远不会干同样的事，但同时也对一个冷的炉子敬而远之。


Interventions will continue to occur, though they are now more likely to be shorter, involve smaller-scale forces, and rely on technologies that permit action at greater distance.	虽然逐渐变得时间更短，牵涉部队更少并依赖那些在远距离展开行动的技术，但干涉行动依然会继续存在。


In an age of cyber warfare and drones, the end of R2P or humanitarian intervention is hardly foretold.	在这个网络战和骚扰战的时代，保护责任或者人道主义干涉可不会那么容易走向终结。


The Intervention Syndrome	干预综合症


Kosovo is often held up as a test case for the concept of “humanitarian” intervention.	科索沃常被冠以“人道主义”干预概念的试验。


But as Iraq spirals into chaos, diplomats and leaders everywhere are again asking themselves if it is ever appropriate for alliances of nations or the international community as a whole to intervene when a sovereign country appears unable or unwilling to defend its citizens from genocide, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.	但是，随着伊拉克陷入混乱，世界各国的外交官和领导人开始再一次诘问自己：当一个主权国家看似无力或不愿保护其公民免受种族灭绝、战争罪或是种族清洗之时，各国联盟或国际社会作为整体予以干预是否恰当。


At the center of this debate is the so-called doctrine of the “responsibility to protect.”	这一辩论的核心是所谓的“保护责任”主义。


As the United Nations-appointed Ombudsperson in Kosovo for the past five years, I have had the unique opportunity to observe the aftereffects of that doctrine following NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999.	过去五年来，作为联合国任命的科索沃巡视员，我有得天独厚的机会观察到1999年北约在前南斯拉夫干预后这一主义的后果。


Kosovo has subsequently become an international experiment in society building, led by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).	科索沃随之成为由联合国驻科索沃临时行政当局特派团领导的社会建设的国际试验场。


Experiment is the right word here.	试验一词恰如其分。


Indeed, Kosovo has become a Petri dish for international intervention.	事实上，科索沃已成为国际干预试验的皮氏培养皿。


Having lived and worked long enough in Kosovo to see the outcome so far, I contend that such experiments require further research.	我在科索沃生活工作已久，足以目睹迄今为止的效果。 我承认，这样的试验需要进一步研究。


Clearly, the need for international intervention in crises is often time-specific and a fairly swift response is frequently required.	显而易见，国际危机干预的需要通常时间确定，而且要求足够迅速的反应。


However, apart from military factors, where such intervention is being considered, it is of vital importance to focus international policy discussion on the rapid deployment of a linked civilian and security presence.	但是，在筹划此类干预之时，除军事因素之外，还应当集中精力进行有关快速部署关联的民事以及安全存在的国际政策讨论。 这一点十分重要。


This is especially true where human suffering is caused by communal conflict, as was the case in Kosovo.	如果人民的灾难如科索沃一般是由种族冲突引发，这一点尤为如此。


An immediate deployment of an adequate civilian and security presence during the months immediately after the end of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign might well have provided suitable protective mechanisms against the backlash that allowed victims to become victimizers.	如果1999年北约轰炸战役后的几个月内立即部署足够的民事和安全存在，就很有可能提供适当的机制，防止让受害者变成施害者的强烈反应。


NATO peacekeeping troops were not directed to stop the abductions, disappearances, retaliation killings, and massive property destruction by groups of ethnic Albanians, which led to a vast reverse ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian (mainly Serb) population.	北约维和部队并未授权制止阿尔巴尼亚族团体进行的绑架、失踪、报复仇杀以及大规模破坏财产，从而导致了对非阿尔巴尼亚族（主要为塞尔维亚族）人口以牙还牙的大规模种族清洗。


As a result of this neglect, a noxious social and political residue pervades today’s Kosovo.	由于这一疏忽，如今，有害的社会和政治残渣充斥着科索沃。


Instead of cooling communal conflict, interethnic hatred remains as heated as ever.	种族冲突没有降低，而种族仇恨依旧强烈。


In addition to the lack of an adequate civilian and security presence to reassure every community of its safety, the overall lack of legal mechanisms to deliver swift justice for crimes committed during and after the intervention created additional tension.	除了缺乏足够的民事和安全存在以确保每个社区安全外，还总体缺乏法律机制，对在干预期间和之后犯下的罪刑予以迅速惩处，造成进一步的紧张。


So pervasive is this tension, in fact, that any chance of even beginning the much-needed reconciliation process must now be pushed far into the future.	事实上，紧张局势弥漫，以致任何亟待进行的和解进程的机会都十分渺茫。


Similarly, in Kosovo the international community has devoted little time to helping former combatants contemplate their collective responsibility for atrocities, no matter how direct or indirect their personal involvement.	类似地，科索沃的国际社会并未投入足够时间帮助前战斗人员反省其残暴行为的集体责任，而无论是否直接或间接个人卷入。


Without such an effort, attempting to improve the situation is like building a house on a sand dune.	缺此，改善局势的努力犹如建造空中阁楼。


This lack of foresight about and planning for the aftermath of armed intervention is not only dangerous to the people who have ostensibly been “saved”; it is counterproductive.	缺乏对武装干预后局面的远见以及计划对于那些表面上被“解救”的人们而言不仅危险，而且具有反作用。


Unless a humanitarian intervention is structured in such a way that it guarantees basic security, the underlying antagonisms that inspired the intervention in the first place will merely be reinforced, not diminished.	除非人道主义干预建构得保障基本安全，否则，最初引起干预的根本性敌意将会被增强，而非削弱。


So, six years after NATO’s intervention, Kosovo seems as far from stability and social peace as ever.	正是如此，科索沃的稳定和社会和平在北约干预六年之后看起来依旧遥不可及。


Despite the frequent assurances of UN authorities that Kosovo is on a path toward reconciliation and true home rule, NATO officials indicate that there are plans to maintain a long-term military presence in the province in order to “guarantee that the political process will be concluded successfully.”	尽管联合国经常保证说科索沃正在通往和解和真正的自治道路上，北约官员指出，计划在这一省份维持长久的军事存在以便“保证政治进程善始善终”。


This brings me to another key point: a workable exit strategy is just as important to the success of any future humanitarian intervention as the entry strategy.	这使得我联想到另外一个关键点，即，对于任何未来的人道主义干预而言，一个可操作的退出战略与进入战略同等重要。


If an international intervention is to have any credible chance of success, clear criteria for what constitutes “success” are needed from the start.	为使得国际干预有望成功，从一开始就需要有关“成功”的标准。


Only such clarity can allow for a proper end to international actors’ engagement.	只有清晰的标准才能让国际势力的卷入善始善终。


In Kosovo, such clarity is and has been absent; as a result, NATO and the UN have no clear idea about when and how both should leave.	在科索沃没有这样的清晰标准。 所以，北约和联合国对于何时以及如何撤离均不知所措。


Someone once rightly said that it is easy to bomb, but much harder to build; it is relatively easy to defeat a regime militarily, but it is far more difficult to create a solid, sustainable, civil society in its place.	有人曾说，轰炸易，重建难。 此言不假。


The UN General Assembly should keep this in mind as it starts to codify the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect.”	从军事上击败一个政权相对容易，而在其基础上建立稳固、可持续的公众社会则极为困难。 联合国大会在开始编撰“保护责任”主义之时，应当谨记。


The Iowa Caucuses and the Atlantic Alliance	爱荷华州党团会议和大西洋联盟


What do the victories of two relatively inexperienced outsiders, Barak Obama and Mike Huckabee, in the Iowa Caucuses mean for American foreign policy in general and the Atlantic Alliance in particular?  It is too soon to predict, on the basis of a plurality of votes cast by a sliver of eligible voters in a small state, who will eventually prevail in the nomination process.  But it is not too soon to ask if the Bush Administration’s unfathomably cavalier and gratuitously alienating attitude toward America’s European allies will change substantially on January 20, 2009.	在爱荷华州党团会议中两位相对并不老练的局外人奥巴马和赫卡比获得胜利，这对于美国的总体外交政策、特别是大西洋联盟意味着什么呢？ 根据一个小州有权投票的一少部分选民的多数来预测谁最终在提名中脱颖而出为时尚早。


Commentators seem to agree that the voters who chose Obama and Huckabee felt that they were rejecting the status quo.  To put the missteps of the past behind them, they apparently voted for the candidates about whom they knew the least.  But exactly what status quo did they imagine they were rejecting?  Upon inspection, the “politics as usual” that they apparently sought to rebuff looks nebulous.  Obama has repeatedly linked Hillary Clinton, whose political team is personally and ideologically committed to wresting power from the current incumbents, to the thinking dominant in Washington from 2001 to 2007.  Even more oddly, the genial and erratic Huckabee says that the Mormon former governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, represents the powers that be.	奥巴马不断把希拉里·克林顿与在2001年到2007年主导华盛顿的思维联系起来。 更为不同寻常的是，和蔼可亲而又怪异的赫卡比说，属于摩门教派的马塞诸塞州前州长罗尼代表了权势。


To focus the discussion, we can ask the following question: Did the status quo rejected by the Obama’s and Huckabee’s voters include the deterioration of American-European relations under the Presidency of George W. Bush?  After all, the current Administration’s denigration of “old Europe” was not just a rhetorical aside, but a centerpiece of its reckless approach to foreign affairs.  That is why any serious break with the disastrous Bush legacy should start with rethinking and rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance.  That a renewed Atlanticism would be a priority for either Obama or Huckabee is extremely doubtful, however.	为了把讨论集中于一定范围之内，我们可以问下面的问题：奥巴马和赫卡比的选民们所拒绝的现状是否包括布什总体任期内美欧关系的恶化呢？ 毕竟，美国当前政府蔑称“老欧洲”并非只是口头而已，而是其对待外交事务鲁莽方针的中心部分。


Relations between the US and Europe have gone virtually unmentioned in the dozens of Presidential debates held over the past six months.  This is not surprising.  Candidates have no incentive to focus attention on a subject, such as the strained Atlantic Alliance, that seldom if ever enters the consciousness of the average voter.  Obama’s failure to convene a single policy meeting of the Senate European sub-committee which he chairs (a committee that oversees, among other things, US relations with NATO and the EU) has had absolutely zero resonance among the electorate at large.  When the topic arises, the Republican candidates, for their part, seem less blandly indifferent than overtly hostile to Europe.  Their anti-European animus, while crudely uninformed, reflects, among other factors, the scorn for secularism typical of Southern white evangelicals and the perverse notion promulgated by some distinguished Republican defense intellectuals that Europe today can contribute little or nothing to American security.	对于像大西洋联盟这样很少进入普通选民意识的问题侯选人并没有动力来予以关注。 奥巴马主持参议员欧洲分委会(这一分委会的职责之一就是监督美国与北约和欧盟的关系)，但是他没有召开一次该分委会的政策会议。


Why does Europe matter to the United States?  Five reasons stand out.	为什么欧洲对于美国而言是重要的呢？ 主要有五个原因。


First, Europe is as much a frontline region in the war on terror as it was during the Cold War.  As last year’s aborted attack on ten airliners heading to the US from London revealed, the likelihood of a terrorist attack on American citizens emanating from a European country remains high.  America may not need the French military, but it certainly needs the French intelligence services.	正如去年挫败的攻击从伦敦飞往美国的十架班机事件所揭示的那样，从欧洲国家对美国公民发动恐怖攻击的可能性依旧很高。 美国可能不需要法国的军队，但是它肯定需要法国的情报机构。


Second, Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to US security.	第二，仅仅是欧洲人的语言技能以及文化知识就确保他们可以为美国的安全做出无以替代的贡献。


The spread of English as the world’s language has had a paradoxical effect on American national security, making the United States transparent to people around the world, while making the rest of the world increasingly opaque to Americans.	英语作为世界语言的传播对于美国国家安全产生了矛盾的影响，让美国在全世界的人民面前透明而让世界其他地方越发对美国人难以琢磨。


Europeans can supply this defect.	欧洲人可以弥补这一缺陷。


Third, the narcissism of small differences and Bush’s war aside, Americans and Europeans share a common way of life and cultural commitment to tolerant individualism that is not found with the same intensity, concentration, and unchallenged dominance in most of the rest of the world.  Europeans and Americans also face many of the same foreign policy challenges.  These include not just terrorism, but also politically destabilizing immigration pressures caused by the wealth gap between North and South, the job-destroying expansion of low-wage labor in China, Putin’s unpredictable petro-politics, nuclear proliferation involving politically unstable countries, contagious disease, global warming, and so forth.  It would be culturally suicidal for “the West” not to work together to devise ways to manage these immensely difficult problems.	第三，除了微小差异的自恋以及布什的伊拉克战争之外，美国人和欧洲人具有共同的生活方式，并且在文化上承诺宽容个人主义。 世界上绝大多数其他地方都没有这一同样的程度以及难以动摇的主导地位。


Fourth, NATO can not only bring important military capabilities to the table, reducing the drain on American forces in a turbulent world; it also offers a much more plausible vehicle for serious foreign-policy multilateralism than either the EU or the UN.	第四，北约不仅可以带来重要的军事实力，减低在动荡不安的世界中美国军队的压力，而且，其与欧盟或者联合国相比更加可以为严肃的外交政策多边主义提供远远更为可行的工具。


Fifth, and perhaps most important, elementary human psychology teaches that individuals who shun contact with others have a weak grasp of reality.	第五，而且是最为重要的是，人类基本心理告诉我们，回避与他人接触的人对现实掌握不力。


Individuals who are never criticized by companions whom they trust, and with whom they share a basic value orientation, have a hard time remaining mentally balanced.	从来不受信任以及具有共同价值取向的同伴批评的人难以保持心理上的平衡。


The same is true of nations.	这对于国家而言也是如此。


What makes allies indispensable to an effective national-security policy is the ability of like-minded nations to provide the reality checks without which a fallible superpower is, as we have regretfully seen, unable to keep its balance on swiftly evolving and treacherous international terrain.	盟国对于有效的国家安全政策不可或缺的地方在于志同道合的各国有能力直言不讳。 正如我们所遗憾地看到的那样，没有这一点，容易犯错的超级大国就无法在迅速演变以及充满危险的国际地带上保持其平衡。


Because 60% of Huckabee’s Iowa vote came from evangelicals, it still seems probable that the Republican nominee will end up being Mitt Romney, John McCain or Rudi Giuliani.	由于赫卡比的爱荷华州选票的60%来自于福音教派，最终共和党提名的人可能是罗尼、麦凯恩或者朱利亚尼。


All of them are strong supporters of Bush’s bellicose foreign policy, and all would campaign on the premise that “fear” has a greater emotional hold on the American electorate than “hope.”  They may well be right.	他们都是布什好战外交政策的强烈支持者，而且他们都将会在“害怕”比“希望”在美国选民中占据更大的感情地位这一前提上竞选。 他们可能对的。


Obama is an obviously gifted politician who, if elected President, would probably break, or attempt to break, from some frustratingly inflexible American policies, especially concerning Israel.  But other candidates, notably Hillary Clinton, would be more likely to conduct an intensely Atlanticist foreign policy, placing emphasis on rebuilding America’s alliance with those extraordinarily prosperous countries best positioned to help the US face the daunting challenges to global stability that lie ahead.	如果当选总统，他将会可能脱离或者试图脱离某些令人沮丧的僵硬的美国政策，特别是对以色列的政策。 但是其他侯选人，特别是希拉里·克林顿将会更有可能实行积极的大西洋外交政策，把重点放在重新建立美国与那些极为繁荣的国家的联盟上。


The Iranian Nuclear Threat Goes Global	伊朗的核计划威胁全球


TEL AVIV – The current drive to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal reflects two important, and interrelated, changes. From Israel’s perspective, these changes are to be welcomed, though its government must remain cautious about the country’s own role.	特拉维夫——


The first change is the escalation of efforts by the United States and its Western allies to abort the Iranian regime’s nuclear quest.	目前防止伊朗研发核武器的动力反映出了两个至关重要又相互联系的变化。


This was instigated in part by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s finding in November 2011 that Iran is indeed developing a nuclear weapon, and that it is getting perilously close to crossing the “red line” – the point beyond which its progress could no longer be stopped. Moreover, the US and its allies understand that failure to take serious action might prompt Israel to launch its own unilateral military offensive.	从以色列的角度来说，这些变化是值得欢迎的，尽管其政府仍需谨慎对待本国所扮演的角色。


The second change is the perception that Iran’s nuclear capacity would threaten not only Israel.	第一个变化是，美国及其西方的盟友都加大努力让伊朗政府放弃核计划了。


In a speech to the Union for Reform Judaism in December, US President Barack Obama stated that “another threat to the security of Israel, the US, and the world is Iran’s nuclear program.”	这样做的部分原因是，国际原子能机构于2011年11月公布，伊朗确实在研发核武器，即将越过“红线”——越过这条红线将无法阻挡其进程。


But, by this February, Obama was saying of Iran that “my number-one priority continues to be the security of the US, but also the security of Israel, and we continue to work in lockstep as we proceed to try to solve this…”	此外，美国及其盟友明白，不采取严厉措施将导致以色列采取单边的军事行动。


That choice of words was no accident; rather, it was a sign that the US is changing tack when it comes to Iran.	第二个变化是伊朗的核能力不止威胁以色列的概念。


For more than a decade, the question “Whose issue is it?” has been part of the policy debate about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Israel’s former prime minister, Ariel Sharon, used to caution his colleagues against “rushing to the head of the line” on Iran.	去年12月份，美国总统贝拉克•奥巴马在向革新犹太教联会发表演讲时称，“对以色列、美国和世界的另一项威胁是伊朗的核计划。


He argued that if Israel were to take the lead in sounding the alarm on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the issue would be perceived as yet another “Israeli problem.”	”但是，今年2月份奥巴马提到伊朗时说“我的首要任务仍然是美国和以色列的安全，在解决这个问题的过程中，我们将继续保持一致的步调……”


Indeed, Israel’s critics were already arguing that this was another case of the tail wagging the dog – that Israel and its American lobby were trying to push the US into serving Israel’s interests rather than its own.	选用这样的措辞并非偶然，而是表明美国在伊朗问题上正在改变方针。 10多年来，“伊朗核问题是谁的问题？


The most egregious examples of this view were statements made by the political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.	”这个问题一直是有关伊朗核野心政策辩论的一部分。 以色列前总理阿里埃勒•沙龙过去常常要求其同僚谨记在伊朗问题上切勿“当出头鸟”。


In a paper published prior to the release of their much-debated book The Israel Lobby, they argued:	他称，如果以色列在伊朗核野心上率先敲响警钟，这个问题又将被认为是“以色列问题”。


“… Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not pose an existential threat to the US.	实际上，已有以色列的批评人士称，这又是摇尾乞怜的表现——以色列及其美国的游说团正试图迫使美国为以色列的利益而非自身的利益服务。


If Washington could live with a nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear China, and even a nuclear North Korea, then it can live with a nuclear Iran.	政治学家约翰•米尔斯海默和斯蒂芬•沃特的声明就是这种观点最突出的例子。 在其颇富争议的著作《以色列的游说》发行之前的一篇论文中，他们表示：“……伊朗的核野心并没有给美国构成现成的威胁。


And that is why the [Israel] Lobby must keep constant pressure on US politicians to confront Tehran.”	如果华盛顿能与拥核的苏联、中国甚至朝鲜共存，那么也能于拥核的伊朗共存。 这就是（以色列）游说团必须不断向美国政客施压对抗伊朗的原因。


Israel’s current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been less worried than Sharon was about Israel’s perceived role.	与沙龙相比，以色列现任总理本雅明•内塔尼亚胡对以色列应发挥的作用担心较少。


He is too busy being directly engaged in the attempt to eliminate the deadly threat that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to the Jewish state.	拥核的伊朗将给犹太国家构成致命的威胁，他正在直接参与试图消除这种威胁的努力中，无暇分身。


Prior to the 2009 election that brought him to power, Netanyahu campaigned on the Iranian danger, and his government made the issue its cardinal concern.	2009年让他登上总理宝座的选举之前，内塔尼亚胡竞选的时候提出了伊朗的危险性，其政府还将这个问题当作主要的忧虑。


Together with his defense minister, Ehud Barak, Netanyahu succeeded in persuading Obama and the rest of the world that Israel was preparing a military attack as a last resort, should the US and its allies fail to stop the Iranian program in time.	内塔尼亚胡和其国防部长埃胡德•巴拉克一道已经成功地让奥巴马以及世界其他国家相信，如果美国及其盟友不及时阻止伊朗的核进程，以色列最终将采取军事行动。


That policy has been effective, but it has also drawn attention to Israel’s influence on the Iran question.	这个政策一直以来都行之有效，但是也引起了人们对以色列对伊朗问题影响的关注。


Curiously, this has not been held against Israel, at least not so far, partly because Obama and other leaders now regard Iran as a more serious threat, and therefore feel the need to take appropriate action.	奇怪的是，这并没有给以色列带来什么不利，至少到目前为止是如此，部分原因是现在奥巴马以及其他领导人把伊朗当作了更加严重的威胁，因此觉得需要采取适当的行动。


The international community must underscore that its members are acting in the service of their national interests, and not simply for Israel’s sake.	国际社会必须强调，其成员国正在采取的行动符合各国的利益，而不仅仅只是符合以色列的利益。


But their willingness to engage could wane, particularly if sanctions exact a high financial price or military action causes a large number of casualties.	但是如果制裁要付出高昂的金融代价或者军事行动会造成重大伤亡，他们参与的意愿就会降低。


Israel would therefore be wise to remember Sharon’s cautionary words, and reinforce its pressure on the US administration with a broader diplomatic campaign.	因此以色列铭记沙龙谨慎的话，利用更加广泛的外交活动给美国政府施压，这将是明智之举。


Like it or not, Israel must urge the world to remember that Iran is everyone’s problem.	不管喜欢与否，以色列都必须敦促世界记住，伊朗是每个国家的问题。


The Iraqi Public Speaks	伊拉克公众说话了


Most of what we think about Iraq is shaped by the daily violence that plagues the country.	我们对伊拉克的印象大多来源于这个国家每天所遭受的暴力行动。


Intelligence and military analysts debate how much of the violence is due to the presence of foreigners, though it is widely conceded that most of the attacks can be attributed to what American officials call “former regime elements,” with the Iraqi Sunni community the main pillar of the resistance.	尽管大部分人都认同多数袭击应当归因于美国官方所谓的“残余政权因素”—— 伊拉克最大的反对派逊尼派，情报和军事分析家还是就暴力行动在多大程度与外国人的存在有关进行了辩论。


Having dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and despite numbering less than a quarter of the overall population, Sunnis, it is said, are fighting to prevent their communal interests from being overwhelmed by the majority Shi’ites and the Kurds, a distinct ethnic group concentrated in the north.	虽然伊拉克萨达姆·侯赛因政权时期的统治派逊尼派只占不到四分之一的伊拉克人口，却正为保证他们的党派利益不被占人口多数的什叶派和集中在北部的族群—库尔德人夺走而斗争。


Late last year, I was an organizer of a major national survey of Iraqi public opinion that demonstrated the complexity of the country’s communal relations.	去年年末，我组织了一场重要的伊拉克民意调查，伊拉克公众的观点证明了该国错综复杂的党派关系。


To be sure, Iraqis of different ethnic or religious backgrounds are divided over many issues, but they also embrace a common national identity, as well as a desire for democracy.	当然，不同民族或宗教背景的伊拉克人在很多问题上存在分歧，但是他们都信奉相同的民族认同并都期望一个民主体制。


To begin, we asked Iraqis to reflect on the fall of Saddam: Was Iraq better off without him?	首先，我们要求伊拉克人回顾萨达姆政权的崩溃：没有了他，伊拉克人是不是过得更好了？


Among Sunnis, only 23% thought so.	只有23%的逊尼派人这样认为。


Among Shi’ites, however, 87% saw a better Iraq without Saddam.	而却有87%的什叶派看到了一个没有萨达姆之后更好的伊拉克。


Kurds exceeded this number, with 95% claiming an improvement.	库尔德人超过了这个数字，有95%认同这一改变。


At the same time, overwhelming majorities of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites – more than eight out of ten – preferred to be seen as Iraqis first, believing that “Iraq will be a better society if people treat one another as Iraqis.”	与此同时，在库尔德人、逊尼派和什叶派中，超过百分之八十的压倒性多数更愿意首先被看作是伊拉克人，相信“如果人们把彼此看作伊拉克人，伊拉克会变为一个更好的社会”。


Strong majorities also endorsed the idea of a democratic system for Iraq.	绝大多数人也认同在伊拉克采用民主体系的观点。


Important divergences re-emerge on social questions.	重大分歧再次出现在社会问题上。


Kurds have a much more egalitarian view of gender relations than either Sunnis or Shi’ites.	无论比起逊尼派还是什叶派，库尔德人对两性关系的看法都更为平等。


Asked if university education was more important for boys than girls, 78% of Kurds disagreed.	当被问到大学教育是否对男孩比对女孩更重要时，78%的库尔德人持反对意见。


Among Shi’ites, the number disagreeing was 50%.	什叶派中，反对的人占50%。


Among Sunnis, the number fell below a majority: only 44% believed in the equal importance of higher education for girls and boys.	而在逊尼派中，这个数字毫无优势可言：只有44%认同高等教育对女孩和男孩一样重要。


Similarly, 78% of Kurds rejected polygamy, compared to just 49% of both Shi’ites and Sunnis.	相同地，78%的库尔德人反对一夫多妻制，与什叶派和逊尼派中49%的反对人数形成对比。


While these findings demonstrate the shadings of opinion across Iraq’s dominant communities, they do not explain attitudes that may be behind the continuing violence that disfigures Iraqi life.	尽管这些结果表明了伊拉克统治政党的观点各有侧重不同，但是它们不能解释那些可能隐藏在破环伊拉克人生活的持续暴力行动背后的看法。


The most radical differences in opinion can be found in communal perceptions of control of the future – the possibility of building a better life in post-Saddam Iraq – and security.	最根本的观点分歧可能是在各党派对控制未来的理解上——在后萨达姆时代创建更美好的生活以及更安全的社会的可能性。


We asked respondents to indicate how much control they had over their lives and how optimistic they were about the future, using a scale on which ten indicated a highly optimistic sense of control and one a deep level of powerlessness and pessimism.	我们使用十道能够显示出人们对生活控制到底呈高度乐观还是深度无助和悲观的测试题，要求回答者简单地说明他们可以在多大程度上控制他们的生活以及他们对未来有多乐观。


Kurds had the highest perception of control and optimism, with 19% indicating the highest level of control over their lives and 17% the greatest degree of hope in the future.	库尔德人对生活控制能力最强，最为乐观，有19%显示了对生活控制能力最高的水平，17%对将来的希望程度最高。


The comparable figures for Shi’ites were 10 and 14%, respectively, but were just 4% and 5%, respectively, for Sunnis.	相比之下，什叶派的比例分别为10%和14%，而逊尼派只有4%和5%。


The results for extreme pessimism were skewed in the opposite direction: 14% of Sunnis thought things were as bad as could be, while only 2% of Kurds and 3% of Shi’ites shared this opinion.	而极端悲观的情绪在相反的测试题中反映：14%的逊尼派认为事情遭透了，而只有2%的库尔德人和3%的什叶派这么认为。


The effects of localized violence were also made clear in the survey: 17% of Kurds, 41% of Shi’ites, and 77% of Sunnis felt that life in Iraq is unpredictable and dangerous, a clear demonstration of the effects of the ongoing resistance that is centered in the Sunni Triangle.	此次调查中清晰地显现了本地化暴力行动的影响：17%的库尔德人，41%的什叶派以及77%的逊尼派认为伊拉克的未来难以预测且充满艰险，这清楚表明了集中在逊尼派三角洲持续不断的抵抗运动所造成的影响。


This disparity in attitudes toward the future could determine what eventually happens in Iraq.	对未来态度上的分歧将最终决定伊拉克的形势。


Widespread political violence in both Iran and Latin America in the 1960’s and 1970’s demonstrated a connection between popular feelings of powerlessness and the growth of urban guerilla movements.	上世纪60年代和70年代发生在伊朗和拉丁美洲的大范围政治暴动表明了普遍的无助感与乡间游击队运动加强之间的联系。


Leaders of these groups often defended terrorism by insisting that violence was the only means of bringing hope to demoralized people.	这些团队领导人通常坚持，暴力行动是给 士气低下的人们带来希望的唯一方式，并以此为恐怖主义辩护。


This argument, long discredited, resonates in the actions of the Iraqi insurgents and their fanatical allies.	尽管长期遭受质疑，这一观点却在伊拉克起义士兵和他们的狂热的同盟军中得到了响应。


This is not to say that an insecure and demoralized community supports violence.	这并不是说一个不安全且士气低落的党派就会支持暴力活动。


By its immobilization, however, such a community may simply be too passive to oppose the violent men acting in its name.	然而由于组织瘫痪，这样一个党派也许很容易过于积极地反对以它的名义行动的暴力者。


If Iraqi Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers chose to stop their own violence, it was not simply because of the superior firepower of the coalition forces. It was because Shi’ite religious leadership felt empowered, optimistic, and secure enough to press the Sadrists to end their revolt.	如果伊拉克的什叶派领导人克塔达·萨德尔（Muqtada al-Sadr）和他的追随者们选择停止他们的暴力活动，这不仅仅是因为联军的强势火力，而是因为什叶派的宗教领导感到被授予了足够的权利、在一个足够安全的环境下，有足够的信心去迫使萨达主义者们结束他们的反抗运动。


If the Sunni leadership were to feel that it has a stake in the outcome of political events now unfolding, it would also be able to stop the insurgency.	如果逊尼派领导感到现在正在展开的政治活动有利可图的话，它也可能会停止叛乱活动。


That’s why the political talks – open and clandestine – now reported to be underway are vital.	那正是政治谈话至关重要的原因，无论公开还是秘密的。


They offer the possibility for the Sunni community to participate in the new system.	它们为逊尼派提供了参加新体系的可能性。


The American-led coalition can help by taking more steps that would reinforce a message of hope and optimism for the exhausted and demoralized Sunnis of Iraq.	通过采取更多的措施，美国领导的联军能为精疲力竭、士气低落的伊拉克逊尼派带来更多的希望之光和乐观精神。


Military action by itself may simply make matters worse.	单单靠军事行动只会使事情变得更糟。


The Iraq War Ten Years Later	十年后的伊拉克战争


CAMBRIDGE – This month marks the tenth anniversary of the controversial American-led invasion of Iraq.	剑桥——这个月即将迎来颇受争议的美国入侵伊拉克十周年纪念日。


What has that decision wrought over the last decade?	这项决策十年来产生了哪些影响？


More important, was the decision to invade rightly made?	更重要的是，入侵是否有正当的理由？


On the positive side, analysts point to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the creation of an elected government, and an economy growing at nearly 9% per year, with oil exports surpassing their pre-war level.	分析师指出伊拉克战争的积极效果是推翻萨达姆·侯赛因、建立民选政府、实现近9%的年度经济增长以及超过战前的石油出口。


Some, such as Nadim Shehadi of Chatham House, go further, arguing that, while “the US certainly bit off more than it could chew in Iraq,” America’s intervention “may have shaken the region out of [a] stagnation that has dominated the lives of at least two generations.”	查塔姆研究所的纳迪姆·什哈蒂等人甚至认为虽然“美国肯定消化不了伊拉克行动，”但美国的干预“或许已经帮助该地区摆脱了困扰至少两代人的经济停滞。 ”


Skeptics reply that it would be wrong to link the Iraq War to the “Arab Spring,” because events in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 had their own origins, while President George W. Bush’s actions and rhetoric discredited, rather than advanced, the cause of democracy in the region.	怀疑者反驳说伊拉克战争和“阿拉伯之春”两者间没有必然的联系，因为2011年的突尼斯和埃及事件自有其缘由，而乔治·W·布什总统的言论和行动不仅没有推进，反而破坏了该地区的民主声誉。


Removing Saddam was important, but Iraq is now a violent place governed by a sectarian group, with one corruption index ranking it 169th out of 174 countries.	推翻萨达姆的确是重要结果，但伊拉克现已成为宗派团体治下的暴力之地，其腐败指数在194个国家中排名第169。


Whatever the benefits of the war, skeptics argue, they are too meager to justify the costs: more than 150,000 Iraqis and 4,488 American service members killed, and an estimated cost of nearly $1 trillion (not including long-term health and disability costs for some 32,000 wounded US soldiers.)	怀疑者认为战争的好处根本无法补偿所付出的代价：150,000名伊拉克人和4,488名美军士兵因此丧生，并造成超过1万亿美元的经济损失（这当中还不包括约32,000名美军伤残士兵的长期医疗和残疾支出。 ）


Perhaps this balance sheet will look different a decade from now, but at this point most Americans have concluded that the skeptics are right, and that thinking has influenced current US foreign policy.	这份资产负债表十年后给人的感觉也许会有所变化，但此时此刻，多数美国人认为怀疑者所言有理，并进而影响到美国当前的外交政策。


In the next decade, it is very unlikely that the US will try another prolonged occupation and transformation of another country.	未来十年美国不太可能再次试图长期占领并改造另一个国家。


As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it shortly before stepping down, any adviser recommending such action “should have his head examined.”	前国防部长罗伯特·盖茨离职前言简意赅地指出，提议采取此类行动的顾问“应该检查脑子有没有毛病。 ”


Some call this isolationism, but it might better be called prudence or pragmatism.	有人把这称为孤立主义，但我认为审慎和务实恐怕更加贴切。


After all, President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused in 1954 to send US troops to save the French at Dien Bien Phu because he feared that they would be “swallowed up by the divisions” in Vietnam.	毕竟，德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔总统1954年曾拒绝派美军到奠边府救援法军，因为他担心美军会被“越南部队吞噬”。


And Ike was hardly an isolationist.	艾克绝不是孤立主义者。


While a decade may be too soon to render a definitive verdict on the long-term consequences of the Iraq War, it is not too soon to judge the process by which the Bush administration made its decisions.	虽然十年时间对伊拉克战争的长期后果妄下断语还为时过早，但已经足够评判布什政府所做的决策。


Bush and his officials used three main arguments to justify invading Iraq.	布什及其幕僚主要有三项理由为入侵伊拉克辩护。


The first tied Saddam to Al Qaeda.	首先是萨达姆和“基地”组织有联系。


Public-opinion polls show that many Americans accepted the administration’s word on the connection, but the evidence has not sustained it.	民意测验显示不少美国人认可政府的这种说法，但却拿不出任何证据。


Indeed, the evidence that was presented publicly was thin and exaggerated.	事实上，公之于众的证据既夸张又薄弱。


The second argument was that replacing Saddam with a democratic regime was a way to transform Middle East politics.	第二项理由是用民主政权取代萨达姆可以改革中东政治。


A number of neoconservative members of the administration had urged regime change in Iraq well before taking office, but were unable to turn it into policy during the first eight months of the administration.	政府中某些新保守党成员早在任职以前就已经鼓吹伊拉克政权更迭，但在��政府就职的前八个月都未能推出相关的政策。


After September 11, 2001, they quickly moved their policy through the window of opportunity that the terrorist attacks had opened.	2001年9月11日后，他们抓住恐怖袭击的机会迅速通过了这项政策。


Bush spoke often of regime change and a “freedom agenda,” with supporters citing the role of American military occupation in the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II.	布什常常提起政权更迭和“自由计划”，支持者甚至举出二战后美军占领实现德日民主化的例子。


But the Bush administration was careless in its use of historical analogies and reckless in its inadequate preparation for an effective occupation.	但布什政府随意运用历史比喻，对如何有效占领缺乏充分的准备。


The third argument focused on preventing Saddam from possessing weapons of mass destruction.	第三项理由是防止萨达姆拥有大规模杀伤性武器。


Most countries agreed that Saddam had defied United Nations Security Council resolutions for a dozen years.	多数国家认为萨达姆十几年来一直违反联合国安理会决议。


Moreover, Resolution 1441 unanimously put the burden of proof on Saddam.	此外，第1441号决议一致通过由萨达姆承担全部举证责任。


While Bush was later faulted when inspectors failed to find WMDs, the view that Saddam possessed them was widely shared by other countries.	虽然检查人员找不到大规模杀伤性武器后曾有人要求布什承担责任，但很多国家普遍认为萨达姆拥有大规模杀伤性武器。


Prudence might have bought more time for the inspectors, but Bush was not alone in this mistake.	谨慎或许能为核查人员争取更多时间，但犯错的的确不只布什一个。


Bush has said that history will redeem him, and compares himself to President Harry S. Truman, who left office with low poll ratings because of the Korean War, yet is well regarded today.	布什曾说历史将还他以清白，还自比因朝鲜战争导致离任时支持率偏低、但如今却备受尊敬的杜鲁门总统。


Will history really be so kind to Bush?	历史是否真的会对布什如此宽容？


Truman biographer David McCullough warns that about 50 years must pass before historians can really appraise a presidency.	杜鲁门传记作家戴维·麦卡洛警告历史学家，需要50年时间才能真正评价一个总统。


But one decade after Truman left office, the Marshall Plan and the NATO alliance were already seen as solid accomplishments.	但杜鲁门离职十年后，马歇尔计划和北约联盟已经被视为不可撼动的成就。


Bush lacks comparable successes to compensate for his mismanagement of Iraq.	布什并没有类似的成功可以弥补他在伊拉克的失误。


History tends to be unkind to the unlucky, but historians also judge leaders in terms of the causes of their luck.	历史往往对不幸者缺乏仁慈，但历史学家也会就运气的原因对领袖人物进行评判。


Good coaches analyze their game and their opponent’s game, so that they can capitalize on errors and benefit from “good luck.”	好教练分析本方和对手的比赛，以便利用对手的错误收获“好运气”。


By contrast, reckless reality-testing and unnecessary risk-taking are often part of “bad luck.”	相比之下，鲁莽地考验现实及不必要地冒险往往是“坏运气”的部分理由。


Future historians are likely to fault Bush for these shortcomings.	未来的历史学家很可能因此追究布什的责任。


Even if fortuitous events lead to a better Middle East in another ten years, future historians will criticize the way Bush made his decisions and distributed the risks and costs of his actions.	即使偶然事件在十年后造就一个更好的中东，未来的历史学家也会批评布什的决策和成本风险分配方式。


It is one thing to guide people up a mountain; it is another to lead them to the edge of a cliff.	带领人们登山和把人们引向悬崖完全是两回事。


The Irish Think Again About the Lisbon Treaty	爱尔兰再度考虑《里斯本条约》


MAYNOOTH, IRELAND – For months, the European Union has been battered by economic storms that now seriously threaten a protracted Europe-wide recession.	爱尔兰梅努斯—好几个月以来，欧洲联盟都遭受着经济风暴的打击，这一场风暴现在正使得欧洲可能会面临长时间遍布全洲的严重衰退。


But, although banking and finance have taken center stage, the EU’s constitutional problem refuses to go away.	但是，尽管银行和金融业成了关注的中心，欧盟的宪法问题也依然拒绝忽视，尚未解决。


The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in June plunged the EU into a renewed period of uncertainty about the Union’s future.	爱尔兰在6月的时候否决了《里斯本条约》，这使欧盟的前途再度变得扑朔迷离。


Now, in the run-up to the European Council summit on 11-12 December, expectations are growing that Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen will provide a clear roadmap for an Irish solution to the EU’s constitutional dilemma.	现在，面对即将于12月11-12日召开的欧洲议会高峰会议，一种期望情绪正在滋长，那就是爱尔兰总理布莱恩·科恩将就爱尔兰解决欧盟宪法进退两难的困境提供一份清楚的计划表。


Pragmatists acknowledge that the ratification crisis set in train by the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty has grown into a wider European problem.	实用主义者承认因为爱尔兰拒签《里斯本条约》而引发的批准危机已经变成了涉及欧洲更大范围内的问题。


The Irish “No” emboldened Euro-skeptics in other member states, not least the irascible Czech president, Václav Klaus, who has signaled that he may refuse to sign the Lisbon Treaty until Ireland’s ratification is secured.	爱尔兰说“不”给欧洲其他成员国内的欧盟怀疑论者壮了胆，尤其是容易发火的捷克总统瓦茨拉夫·克劳斯。 他已经发出风说，在确定爱尔兰批准《里斯本条约》之前，自己可能会拒绝签署这一条约。


With the Czech Republic set to assume the presidency of the EU on January 1, 2009, there is a distinct fear that Klaus will use his position as Czech head of state to try to sabotage efforts to rescue the Lisbon Treaty.	由于捷克共和国预计将在2009年1月1日成为欧盟的轮值主席国，人们显然担心克劳斯可能会利用自己捷克国家首脑的身份，试图破坏那些确保《里斯本条约》生效的努力。


These concerns remain acute, even in the aftermath of the decision by the Czech Constitutional Court on November 26 that the Lisbon Treaty is compatible with the Czech constitution and can be ratified in the normal way by the Czech Parliament.	即使是捷克宪法法院11月26日作出的决定也依然未能缓和人们的这种担心。 该决定的内容是：《里斯本条约》可以和捷克宪法相提并论，能够通过正常的途径由捷克议会来批准通过。


But the current constellation of Czech political forces is finely balanced between pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty forces.	但在捷克当前的政治力量对比中，支持条约派和反对条约派势均力敌。


So the inter-linkage between the ratification crises in Ireland and the Czech Republic is now explicit and threatens to spill over into the wider EU arena in 2009.	因此，爱尔兰和捷克共和国在《条约》批准危机里的连锁反应已经很明显了，并且这有可能会在2009年渗透到欧洲的更大范围。


In contrast to the Czech Republic, there is clear agreement among political actors in Ireland about the need to ratify the Lisbon Treaty.	和捷克共和国不同的是，爱尔兰的政治家们显然都同意必须批准《里斯本条约》。


The Irish problem remains how to convince popular opinion to accept a Treaty that was decisively rejected by 53.4% to 46.6% in the June 12 poll.	爱尔兰的问题依然是如何说服民意来接受这一条约。 在6月12日的公投中，该条约因为53.


The core elements of the Irish plan to “rescue” Lisbon have now emerged, and it is clear that a second referendum is central to this effort.	6%赞成而被明确否决。 现在，爱尔兰为确保通过《里斯本条约》提出了核心计划，而第二轮公民复决显然就是本轮努力的要点。


One reason Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty lay in concerns that Ireland’s voice and representation within EU institutions would be eroded, in particular through the periodic loss of Irish representation on the European Commission.	爱尔兰投票者反对 《里斯本条约》的原因之一是担心爱尔兰在欧盟机构内部的声音和代表权将会被削弱，尤其是爱尔兰将在欧洲委员会里慢慢地丧失它的代表权。


As a first step toward convening a second poll, Cowen has sought EU-wide agreement that, rather than reducing the size of the Commission, the provision of the Lisbon Treaty that allows for a “one member state, one commissioner” rule will be enacted, allowing Ireland to retain a permanent place.	为了举行第二轮公民投票，科恩走出的第一步是：不是把范围缩小到欧洲委员会，而是寻求整个欧盟的支持，在《里斯本条约》中将颁布这样一条规定：允许“一个成员国，一个委员”，从而使得爱尔兰可以永远占据一席之地。


Although this concession is not yet a done deal, there is increasing acknowledgment that it would give Dublin considerable breathing space to conduct a more effective second referendum campaign.	虽然这种让步尚未全部达成，越来越多的人承认它将赋予都柏林巨大的喘息机会，从而举行一次更有效的二次复决。


The second part of the plan is for the EU to provide the Irish with a series of clarifications on other key issues. These include Ireland’s exclusive right to decide policy on issues such as abortion and corporation tax as well as participation in European security and defense operations.	计划的第二部分是让欧盟向爱尔兰人澄清一系列其他关键的问题，包括指明爱尔兰特有的权力，例如决定堕胎和公司税收，参加欧盟安全和防御行动等事务的权力。


The model for this approach is Denmark’s attainment of legal opt-outs in defined areas.	这种方式效仿了丹麦有权在指定领域从法律上退出的模式。


Political declarations on the issues outlined would be registered as international treaties at the United Nations to provide binding legal force. The Lisbon Treaty would remain unchanged.	就这些事宜作出的政治宣言将在联合国作为国际条约记录在册，以便提供法律上的约束力，但是《里斯本条约》不会发生变动。


The paradox of the Irish position is that opinion polls continue to demonstrate strong popular attachment to the EU.	爱尔兰立场的自相矛盾之处在于，该国的民意调查继续显示出民众广泛对欧盟怀有强烈的感情。


A total of 82% of Irish people surveyed earlier this year believed Ireland had benefited from EU membership, the highest score in Europe, where the average was 54%.	受调查的爱尔兰人中总共有82%相信爱尔兰已经因为是欧盟成员国而收获良多。 这是欧洲各国中的最高比例，平均值是54%。


The most recent opinion poll on attitudes about the Lisbon Treaty also demonstrates a “bounce” in favor of the Yes side.	最新一轮针对《里斯本条约》的民意调查也显示对条约的支持态度有所反弹。


But the problem for Cowen (and for the EU) is that this level of support does not seem to translate to the ballot box: the Irish rejected EU treaties on two of the last three occasions when they were asked to vote.	但是科恩（以及欧盟）面对的问题是：这种程度的支持似乎并不会转化成投票箱里的赞成票。 在过去三次针对欧盟��约的投票中，爱尔兰人两次都投的死反对票。


The gap between the Yes and No sides remains within the margin of error and could easily reverse itself, as it did in the weeks leading up to the June referendum.	支持派和反对派在人数上相差无几，并且很有可能会发生逆转，就像在六月那次公民复决的几周之前发生过的那样。


One positive development for Cowen is that a second referendum would most likely bring back into play the significant economic dimension of Ireland’s EU membership.	对于科恩来说，一个积极的进展就是第二轮公民复决很有可能将会唤起人们记住爱尔兰加入欧盟以来在经济领域获得的好处。


Ireland has been a major beneficiary of EU subvention since joining in 1973, and, in 2007, it was still receiving a net total of €500 million from the EU budget.	自从1973年加入欧盟以来，爱尔兰一直是欧盟援助的主要受益方。 2007年，它仍然从欧盟财政预算中净得五亿欧元。


Reminding voters of the potentially catastrophic cost of being excluded, not just from core parts of the Single Market, but from the vital decision-making structures in the Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank, reinforces what is at stake in a second referendum campaign.	通过提醒选民被排除在外的灾难性代价，（这种退出不仅是从欧洲单一市场的中心部分退出，而且是从部长会议和欧洲中央银行中的重要决策机构里退出，）科恩能够支持在第二轮公民复决公决中面临风险的因素。


The extraordinary implosion of global financial markets may also work to the advantage of the Yes side in a second referendum, because Ireland’s economic future cannot be contemplated seriously outside of EU structures.	全球金融市场的剧烈震荡可能也会在第二轮公民复决里对支持条约方有利，因为在仔细考虑爱尔兰的经济前景时，人们不可能脱离欧盟的架构。 。


Indeed Irish ministers argue that Ireland would have gone the way of Iceland in recent months were it not for EU membership and the protections afforded by euro-zone membership.	实际上，爱尔兰的部长们论证说，如果不是国家加入了欧盟，并且享受了欧元区成员国的特享保护，爱尔兰可能已经走上了冰岛的道路。


The Irrepressible 1930’s	1930年代即将重演


LONDON – The just concluded G-20 meeting in Seoul broke up without agreement on either currencies or trade.	发自伦敦——刚刚闭幕的首尔G20峰会并未在货币或贸易方面达成任何协议。


China and the United States accused each other of deliberately manipulating their currencies to get a trade advantage.	中美两国互相指责对方蓄意操纵货币以夺取贸易优势。


The Doha Round of global trade talks remain stalled.	世贸多哈回合谈判依旧停滞不前。


And, amid talk of the “risks” of new currency and trade wars, such wars have already begun.	事实上，当人们还在大谈新一轮货币贸易战争的“风险”之时，各国之间早已战火纷飞了。


Thus, despite global leaders’ vows to the contrary, it seems that the dreadful protectionist precedent of the 1930’s is about to be revived.	于是乎，尽管各国领袖都呼吁抵制贸易保护主义，但1930年代的恐怖景象却正在一步步逼近。


That decade’s trade war was started by the US with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930.	当时的贸易战是由美国于1930年颁布的《斯姆特－霍利关稅法案》（Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act)首先挑起的。


The British retaliated with the Import Duties Act of 1932, followed by Imperial Preference.	而英国则用1932年的《进口税法案》（Import Duties Act）予以回击。


Soon, the world economy was a thicket of trade barriers.	没过多久，贸易壁垒就遍布全世界了。


Britain fired the first shot in the 1930’s currency war, leaving the gold standard in September 1931.	在货币战争方面，英国于1931年打响了第一枪：放弃金本位制度。


The US retaliated by leaving the gold standard in April 1933.	作为报复，美国也于1933年4月采取了同样措施。


The pound fell against the dollar, then the dollar against the pound.	先是英镑兑美元大幅贬值，然后美元迎头赶上，发起了对英镑的新一轮贬值潮。


While the two main currencies of the day were slugging it out, France headed a European “gold bloc” of countries whose currencies became increasingly overvalued against both, until the bloc collapsed in 1936.	而在当时的两大主要货币斗个你死我活之时，以法国为首的“金本位国家集团”发行的货币相对美元/英镑的价值持续高估，直到集团于1936年分裂后才告一段落。


A world economic conference, convened in London in 1933 to end the currency war, adjourned without reaching any decision.	为了终结这场货币战争，各国于1933年在伦敦开会谈判，最终却不欢而散。


Substitute China for Britain and today’s eurozone for the gold bloc and the trend of events today has the same ominous feel.	倘若我们把当年的英国换成今天的中国，将欧元区比作金本位国家集团，再考虑到最近各项事务的发展走向，是不是会有一丝不祥的预感？


The US Federal Reserve now proposes to stimulate the American economy by printing more money – a second round of (quantitative easing, or QE2), to the tune of $600 billion.	美联储目前正试图用大印钞票的方式来刺激国内经济——这是第二轮的量化宽松措施，计划发钞量高达6000亿美元。


Almost no one remembers that President Franklin Roosevelt tried the same thing in 1933.	有谁记得当年富兰克林·罗斯福在1933年时也用过这一招呢？


Prices had started falling in September of that year, following a brief commodity boom.	在短暂的商品繁荣之后，物价在那一年的9月开始下跌。


George F. Warren, a professor of farm management at Cornell University, told FDR that the way to raise prices was by reducing the gold value of the dollar.	康奈尔大学农场管理学教授乔治·F·沃伦向罗斯福建议说，如果想把价格提上去，就得把美元的货币含金量降下来。


Under the gold standard, the dollar was convertible into gold at a fixed price of $20.67 an ounce.	金本位制度规定20. 67美元可兑换1盎司黄金。


To stabilize the price level, the economist Irving Fisher had produced a plan for a “compensated dollar,” which would vary the dollar’s gold value to offset rising or falling prices, in effect allowing the Fed to issue more or fewer dollars as dictated by business conditions.	为了稳定这个价格水平，经济学家欧文·费舍尔设计了一个“美元补偿”方案，使美元可以不断调整其含金量以抵消价格升跌所造成的影响，并允许美联储依据市场情况决定发钞量的大小。


In response to deflationary pressure, Fisher’s plan would have enabled banks to draw down their reserves and thus, supposedly, increase their lending (or create deposits).	为了应对通缩压力，费舍尔的方案令银行可以减少自身储备并随之（据推测）增加借贷（或创造存款）。


The extra spending would cause prices to rise, which would stimulate business activity.	这种超额消费将导致价格上升，并刺激经济活动。


Fisher provided a new rationale for an old practice of debasing the coinage called seignorage.	而费舍尔也为过去那种封建君主降低货币成色（所谓铸币税）的老把戏提供了一个新逻辑。


The variant proposed by Warren, and followed by FDR in 1933, was to raise the price at which the government bought gold from the mint.	而1933年沃伦给罗斯福的建议则是上述方案的变种，做法是提高政府向铸币厂购买黄金的价格。


Since a higher price meant that each dollar cost less in terms of gold, the result would be the same as in the Fisher plan.	理由是更高的价格意味着降低每一个美元的含金量，最终的结果是与费舍尔方案殊途同归。


Domestic prices would rise, helping farmers, and the external value of the dollar would fall, helping exporters.	国内物价上升，帮助了农场主，国际美元价值下跌，扶持了出口商。


Starting on 25 October 1933, Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau, his acting Secretary of the Treasury, and Jesse Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, met every morning in Roosevelt’s bedroom to set the price of gold.	从1933年10月25日开始，亨利·摩根索（美国财政部代理部长），杰西·琼斯（复兴银行公司主席）都会一早来到罗斯福的卧室，和总统共商黄金价格。 而他们的某些决策方式则近乎荒谬：比如说某天决定将买价提高0.


One day, they increased it by $0.21, since 21 seemed like a lucky number.	21美元，理由是“21”似乎是个幸运号码。


At first, they bought only newly minted gold in the US.	起初他们只购买美国铸币厂新铸的黄金。


Later they bought up gold supplies from abroad.	后来就开始向海外收购黄金了。


The gold-buying policy raised the official gold price from $20.67 an ounce in October 1933 to $35.00 an ounce in January 1934, when the experiment was discontinued.	这项黄金购买政策将官方黄金价格从1933年的20. 67美元一盎司提高到1934年1月的35美元（实验随后终止了）。


By then, several hundred million dollars had been pumped into the banking system.	在此期间，注入银行系统的美元数量已达数亿之巨。


The results were disappointing, however.	而最终结果却让人失望不已。


Buying foreign gold did succeed in driving down the dollar’s value in terms of gold.	购买国外黄金成功降低了以黄金为参照的美元价值。


But domestic prices continued falling throughout the three months of the gold-buying spree.	但在大肆收购黄金的三个月之间，国内物价却持续走低。


The Fed’s more orthodox efforts at quantitative easing produced equally discouraging results.	另一方面，美联储更加循规蹈矩的量化宽松政策也收获了同样沮丧的结��。


In John Kenneth Galbraith’s summary: “Either from a shortage of borrowers, an unwillingness to lend, or an overriding desire to be liquid – undoubtedly it was some of all three – the banks accumulated reserves in excess of requirements.	正如经济学家约翰·肯尼思·盖尔布莱夫总结的那样：“借贷人不足，贷款意愿低下，以及那种不顾一切增加流动性的渴望——这三种情况果然都出现了——各银行都积累了大大超过需求量的储备。 美联储各会员银行超出货币需求量的总储备额在1932年时为2.


Reserves of member banks at Fed were $256 million more than required in 1932; $528 million in 1933, $1.6 billion in 1934, $2.6 billion in 1936.”	56亿美元，1933年为5. 28亿美元，1934年上升到16亿美元，最后在1936年堆积到26亿。


What was wrong with the Fed’s policy was the so-called quantity theory of money on which it was based.	而美联储政策失误的根源正是那个所谓的量化理论。 该理论认为价格是由货币供应量以及售出的商品和服务总量所决定的。


This theory held that prices depend on the supply of money relative to the quantity of goods and services being sold.	但货币也包括了银行存款，但存款是被商业信心所左右的。 这正应了凯恩斯那句名言：“你不能推一条绳子”（You can't push on a string）。


But money includes bank deposits, which depend on business confidence.	（这是个比喻说法，货币政策就可认为是栓在经济上的绳子，对一根绳子，你不能推，而是只能拉。


As the saying went, “You can’t push on a string.”	货币政策对通货膨胀有效（即拉住绳子以免跑得太快），对紧缩就效用不大了。 ）


Keynes wrote at the time: “Some people seem to infer…that output and income can be raised by increasing the quantity of money.	凯恩斯当时写到：“有些人似乎推断……可以用增加货币量的方式来提高产出和收入。


But this is like trying to get fat by buying a larger belt.	但这就跟买条更松的皮牌来实现增肥的目的一样。


In the United States today, the belt is plenty big enough for the belly….It is [not] the quantity of money, [but] the volume of expenditure which is the operative factor.”	在当今的美国，这条皮带对肚皮来说已经足够松了……但决定因素并不是货币的数量，而是支出的数额。 ”


Now the US, relying on the same flawed theory, is doing it again.	如今的美国使用的也是同一条错误理论。


Not surprisingly, China accuses it of deliberately aiming to depreciate the dollar.	这也难怪中国不断指责美方蓄意压低美元汇率了。


But the resulting increase in US exports at the expense of Chinese, Japanese, and European producers is precisely the purpose.	而美国的目的恰恰也是挤压中国，日本和欧洲的制造商，增加本国出口。


The euro will become progressively overvalued, just as the gold bloc was in the 1930’s.	欧元将向过高估值持续迈进，正如1930年代的金本位国家集团那样。


Since the eurozone is committed to austerity, its only recourse is protectionism.	由于欧元区奉行紧缩政策，因此它唯一的资源就是保护主义。


Meanwhile, China’s policy of slowly letting the renminbi rise against the dollar might well go into reverse, provoking US protectionism.	与此同时，中国令人民币兑美元缓步升值的政策将收到反效果，最终进一步刺激了美国的贸易保护主义。


The failure of the G-20’s Seoul meeting to make any progress towards agreement on exchange rates or future reserve arrangements opens the door to a re-run of the 1930’s.	而首尔G20峰会无法在汇率或未来储备上达成协议的事实则打开了重蹈1930年代景象的潘多拉魔盒。


Let’s hope that wisdom prevails before the rise of another Hitler.	对此我们只能期望有智慧之光闪现，否则等待我们的，将是下一个希特勒的崛起。


The Islamic Democratic Paradox	伊斯兰民主的悖论


The rage across the Arab world over the publication in Denmark (months ago) of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed, together with the victory of Hamas in Palestine and the increasing radicalization of Iran’s politics, has made “political Islam” a fundamental question of international diplomacy.	几个月前，丹麦报章发表描绘穆斯林先觉默罕默德的卡通画招致阿拉伯世界的愤怒，加上哈马斯在巴勒斯坦选举中获胜以及伊朗政治中不断提高的激进主义，使得“政治伊斯兰”成为国际外交的一个基本问题。


But a one-size-fits-all response won’t work.	但是，一体适用的回应是不会奏效的。


Indeed, we need to abandon the idea that there is a holistic or global Islamist movement.	实际上，我们需要摈弃这样一种观念，也就是说存在一个全盘性的或者全球性的伊斯兰运动。


Political Islam of all colors has emerged as the main alternative to secular Arab nationalist regimes whose legitimacy, based on the struggle for national liberation, has evaporated due to their inability to resolve economic and social problems, establish the rule of law, and guarantee fundamental freedoms.	不同颜色的政治伊斯兰涌现成为世俗阿拉伯民族主义政权的主要替代者。 这些政权的合法性建立在民族解放斗争的基础之上。


In Palestine, for example, the Islamists triumphed over Fatah because of years of bad governance under the harsh conditions spawned by Israeli occupation.	由于无法解决经济和社会问题、建立法制并且保证基本自由，其合法性已经消失殆尽。 例如在巴勒斯坦，以色列的占领导致环境艰难，法塔赫多年来治理混乱不堪，因此伊斯兰主义者在选举中战胜了法塔赫。


Successive European and American governments share an atavistic fear of the “Islamic alternative” to Arab secular nationalists like Fatah, and so have defended the status quo.	欧洲国家以及美国的历届政府对取代类似法塔赫那样的阿拉伯世俗民族主义者的“伊斯兰替代品”怀有隔代遗传的恐惧，因此维护现状。


But repression of all Arab opposition movements by the region’s monarchs and secular dictators meant that “protection of the Mosque” became the only umbrella under which to engage politically.	但是，该地区的君主以及世俗独裁者们压制所有的阿拉伯反对派，这意味着“保卫清真寺”成为政治参与的唯一框架。


Now political Islam can no longer be contained, because democracy cannot be built by driving underground parties that have a strong social base, as was tragically demonstrated in Algeria 15 years ago.	正如15年前阿尔及利亚所悲剧性地表明的那样，无法通过驱除具有强大社会基础的地下党派而建立民主，因此，政治伊斯兰现今无法再被抑制。


The only alternative to authoritarianism is to craft a transition that allows Islamists to participate in public life and encourages them to accept unequivocally the rules of the democratic game.	独裁主义的唯一替代品就是建立过渡期，允许伊斯兰主义者参与公共生活，并且鼓励他们明确接受民主游戏的规则。


There are already many examples of more or less conservative Islamist parties that are willing to play along.	已经有许多例子表明保守程度不同的伊斯兰党派愿意合作。


It is no accident that there are Islamists in the legislatures of all the countries undergoing some form of political reform, including Lebanon, where Hezbollah is part of a freely elected government, as well as Jordan and Morocco.	黎巴嫩真主党进入经过自由选举产生的政府，该国以及所有同样正在经历某种形式政治改革的国家如约旦和摩洛哥的议会中都有伊斯兰主义者，这也就不是偶然的了。


In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a strong force in parliament despite the limits imposed on the participation of Islamist groups in last year’s elections.	在埃及，尽管在去年的选举中限制了伊斯兰团体的参与，但是，穆斯林兄弟会已经成为议会中的强大势力。


In Iraq, free elections have revealed the enormous influence of Islamist currents.	在伊拉克，自由选举揭示了伊斯兰运动的巨大影响力。


In Turkey, the transition to democracy led the Islamist Justice and Development Party to power.	在土耳其，民主过渡导致伊斯兰正义和发展党上台。


That government has undertaken various important democratic reforms and initiated accession negotiations with the EU.	该政府业已进行了重要的民主改革并且同欧盟开展了入盟谈判。


These Islamist parties have nothing to do with Al Qaeda, even though some of the most conservative among them have adopted somewhat similar ideological positions.	尽管某些最为保守的政党采取了某些与基地组织类似的意识形态立场，但是它们与基地组织并无牵连。


The risk of political transitions that may lead to the victory of Islamist parties is a democratic paradox that Europe and the US must accept if they are to devise inclusive reform policies – in other words, policies that are the polar opposite of the type of democratic imposition practiced in occupied Iraq.	如果欧洲和美国想要设计出包含各方在内的改革政策，也就是与在被占领的伊拉克强加民主所截然相反的政策，它们就必须接受政治转型可能导致伊斯兰党派获胜风险这一民主悖论。


Indeed, one of the less fortunate consequences of the intervention in Iraq was to reinforce the notion of a “clash of civilizations” between the West from Islam, which in turn serves to create a climate favorable to Islamist movements.	的确，干预伊拉克导致的更为不幸的后果之一就是强化西方与伊斯兰之间“文明的冲突”的观念，而这一冲突反过来又会创造一种有利于伊斯兰运动的气候。


After all, political reform movements in the Muslim world emerged long before the US-led “war on terror,” and reformists were not waiting for the EU to become stronger to press for change.	毕竟，伊斯兰世界的政治改革早在美国领导的“反恐战争”之前就已经显现，而且改革分子并没有等待欧盟来变得强大以推进变革。


These movements were not created in the US or Europe after September 11, 2001, and they will not wait for or depend on the US or the EU to act.	这些运动并不是2001年9月11日以后在美国或者欧洲产生的，而且他们不会等候、依赖美国或者欧盟来采取行动。


Nevertheless, the success of Muslim moderates may well depend on how the EU and the US respond to pressure for reform and how they decide to encourage change.	但是，穆斯林温和派的成功则将取决于欧盟和美国如何应对要求改革的压力以及它们决定如何鼓励变革。


It is now necessary to show that democracy is the best path for Palestinians to attain their national goals.	现在有必要表明，民主是巴勒斯坦人获得其民族目标的最佳途径。


This depends largely on the new Hamas government and its transformation into a democratic force that respects the rule of law, democracy, and international legality.	这大部分取决于新的哈马斯政府及其向尊重法治、民主以及国际合法性的民主力量的转型。


But it also depends on Israel and the international community, which must do all they can to ensure a future Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.	但是，这还取决于以色列以及国际社会。 它们必须竭尽全力来确保一个未来的、以耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国。


Supporting Palestinian democratization does not mean that the international community should not demand that Hamas abandon terror for once and for all, demilitarize, respect the Palestinian constitution, and accept the existence of the state of Israel.	支持巴勒斯坦民主化并不意味着国际社会不应当要求哈马斯彻底摒弃恐怖主义、非军事化、尊重巴勒斯坦宪法以及接受以色列国家的存在。


But it also does not mean supporting sanctions that would hurt the Palestinian people after they have expressed their will democratically.	但是，这也并不意味着在巴勒斯坦人民以民主的方式表达意愿后支持可能损害他们的制裁。