In exchange for its cooperation, Iran will eventually be relieved of the punishing sanctions that the United Nations, the European Union, and the US have imposed upon it for years.	作为合作的交换，伊朗最终将免于联合国、欧盟和美国所施加多年的惩罚性制裁。


This is a huge diplomatic success.	这是一个巨大的外交成功。


Of course, the negotiations have attracted plenty of critics, including in the US Congress and Iran’s parliament, as well as in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even France.	当然，谈判也招致了大量批评，包括美国国会和伊朗议会以及沙特阿拉伯、以色列甚至法国的批评。


But the agreement’s potential benefits cannot be denied.	但该协议的潜在好处不容否认。


For starters, the deal proves that world leaders – despite being divided on a multitude of issues, such as the conflict in Ukraine and territorial disputes in the South China Sea – can still come together to resolve a shared problem.	首先，该协议证明世界领导人——尽管在众多问题上仍有分歧，如乌克兰冲突和中国南海领土纠纷——仍能够合作解决共同问题。


It will also make nuclear proliferation in the Middle East less likely, while strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.	它也意味着中东核扩散可能性的下降，同时也增强了去阿牛核不扩散机制。


And it will allow for the normalization of Iran’s relations with the West.	此外，它还能让伊朗与西方关系正常化。


Of course, Iran’s neighbors have legitimate concerns about the impact the deal will have on the regional balance of power.	当然，伊朗的邻国也有合理担忧：该协议会对地区实力平衡造成什么影响？


As sanctions are lifted, Iran will become stronger, challenging the influence of the Gulf States.	随着制裁的取消，伊朗将变得更加强大，挑战海湾国家的影响力。


Anticipating this, these states have already sought reassurances from the US, while following a more hard-nosed policy in Yemen or Syria, where they consider themselves to be containing Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.	看到这一点的海湾国家已经开始寻求美国的保证，并且在也门和叙利亚采取了更加强硬的立场——它们认为这是在遏制伊朗的霸权野心。


Ultimately, however, the impact of the nuclear agreement will depend on political dynamics in Iran.	但是，说到底，核协议的影响取决于伊朗的政治动态。


Many – indeed, probably a majority – in the Iranian establishment support the resolution of the nuclear confrontation, and agree that Iran does not need to be perpetually at odds with the rest of the world.	许多——事实上，也许是大多数人——伊朗政权内部人士支持这一核冲突解决方案，也同意伊朗没有必要永远与世界其他国家作对。


But some still view the dispute as a key component of the country’s revolutionary identity.	但一些人仍将该争议视为伊朗革命身份的关键要素。


This post-agreement dynamic thus could play out in two ways.	因此，这一协议后动态具有两面性。


In the first scenario, events unfold according to the hopes of the P5+1 and the Iranian negotiators, with the agreement amplifying the voices of those in Iran who advocate regional and international accommodation.	在第一个情景中，事件根据P5+1和伊朗谈判者的希望展开，协议增强了支持地区和国际协调的伊朗人的声音。


In this case, Iran reaches out to Saudi Arabia with a convincing indication that it does not intend to bolster its influence at the expense of the Saudis or their allies.	如此的话，伊朗就会令人信服地向沙特阿拉伯表明它无意牺牲沙特及其盟友增强自己的影响力。


This allows Saudi Arabia to join Iran in using its influence in Syria to bring about a ceasefire agreement between regime forces and rebels, paving the way for the formation of a credible transition government capable of pushing back the Islamic State.	这意味着沙特可以联合伊朗利用其在叙利亚的影响力调停政府军与叛军之间的停火协议，为组成有能力制约伊斯兰国的可信过渡政府铺平道路。


Likewise, Saudi Arabia and Iran bring an end to the fighting in Yemen by backing a power-sharing agreement there.	类似地，沙特和伊朗还可以通过支持权力分享协议停止也门的战事。


Meanwhile, relief from sanctions, together with the gradual return of international companies, kick-starts Iran’s ailing economy.	与此同时，取消制裁以及跨国公司的逐渐回归能刺激伊朗沉疴遍地的经济。


Increased openness toward Europe and, more cautiously, the US encourages reform-minded members of Iran’s middle class to seek their future inside the country, rather than emigrating.	增加向西方以及（更加谨慎地）向美国的开放将鼓励有改革思维的伊朗中产阶级在国内寻求未来而不是移民。


Finally, under this scenario, President Hassan Rouhani’s strong international standing helps him to overcome conservative resistance to pursue much-needed domestic reforms.	最后，在这一情景中，总统鲁哈尼的强硬国际立场有助于他克服保守派对追求急需的国内改革的抵制。


On this basis, Rouhani’s coalition of reformists and pragmatists easily wins a majority when Iran’s next parliament is elected in 2016, with Rouhani himself re-elected in 2017.	在这个基础上，鲁哈尼与改革派和进步派的联盟将在2016年举行的伊朗下一次大选中轻松获胜，而鲁哈尼本人也将在2017年连任总统。


The second scenario is far less benign.	第二种情景远不那么乐观。


In this case, it soon becomes clear that domestic support for the nuclear agreement was broad but thin.	在这一情景中，很快就会暴露出伊朗国内对核协议的支持是广而薄的。


Whereas Rouhani’s reformist camp wants to improve Iran’s foreign relations, the conservative and nationalist forces surrounding Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei view the agreement as a necessary tool to eliminate economic sanctions and strengthen Iran’s conventional military capabilities.	鲁哈尼的改革派阵营希望改善伊朗的对外关系，而围绕在最高领袖哈梅内伊周围的保守派和民族主义力量将协议视为取消经济制裁、增强伊朗传统军事实力的必须工具。


The hardline clerics then undermine whatever confidence Rouhani is building with Iran’s neighbors by declaring repeatedly that the agreement represents an implicit acknowledgement of Iran’s might by the world’s major powers.	于是，强硬派将把鲁哈尼通过反复重申协该协议代表世界主要大国对伊朗实力的间接承认而让伊朗邻国产生的信心破坏殆尽。


This stance vindicates the skeptics, spurring Saudi Arabia to continue its efforts to build a “Sunni coalition” to contain Iranian influence and uphold the fight against what it views as Iranian proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen.	这一立场将证明怀疑派是正确的，刺激沙特阿拉伯继续致力于构建一个“逊尼派联盟”以遏制伊朗的影响力、坚持与其视为伊朗在叙利亚和也门等国家的代理人的战争。


Furthermore, with regional tensions high, the economic impact of the removal of sanctions turns out to be negligible, while conservatives gain ground in resisting reform.	此外，在地区局势十分紧张的情况下，取消制裁的经济影响可以忽略不计，而保守派将赢得阻止改革的借口。


Rouhani and his allies are unable to offer ordinary Iranians economic hope – a failure that causes them to lose both the legislative and presidential elections.	鲁哈尼及其盟友将无法给普通伊朗人民带来经济希望——这一失败将导致他们是去合法性和总统选举。


Paradoxically, in the pessimistic scenario, Iran’s new government, controlled by conservatives and hardliners, actually fits into the region better than the current one.	矛盾的是，在悲观情景中，将由保守派和强硬派控制的伊朗新政府实际上比当前政府更加适合该地区。


After all, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and many other Arab states are also ruled by authoritarian hardliners with little interest in de-escalating regional conflicts.	毕竟，沙特阿拉伯、埃及和其他许多阿拉伯国家也由极权主义强硬派统治，对安抚地区冲突毫无兴趣。


This would make the resurgence of reform-oriented leadership in Iran extremely difficult.	这将导致改革思维领导层在伊朗的复兴变得十分困难。


Of course, the most likely scenario is a combination of both dynamics.	当然，最有可能的情景是两者的组合。


But, given that it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that developments hew more closely to the reform-oriented path, it should be clear to all that the diplomatic work with regard to Iran is far from complete.	但是，确保事态发展更加倾向于改革导向路径符合所有人的利益，因此我们都必须清楚，伊朗问题上的外交使命还远远没有完成。


The Case for Peace With Iran	伊朗和平问题


NEW YORK – The nuclear framework agreement between Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) plus Germany is an important achievement in global diplomacy.	纽约—伊朗和联合国安理会五大常任理事国（美国、英国、法国、中国、俄罗斯）加德国之间的核问题框架协议是全球外交的一次重要成就。


The deal announced earlier this month represents the triumph of rational hope over irrational fear, and it deserves to be implemented.	本月早些时候的协议是理性希望对非理性恐惧的胜利，理应得到实施。


But now the race is on against hardliners in the US, Iran, Israel, and elsewhere, who want to kill the deal before the deadline for a final agreement in June.	但如今需要与美国、伊朗、以色列和其他国家的强硬牌子角力，他们妄图在6月协议最后期限之前扼杀协议。


The framework agreement benefits all parties.	该框架协议能让所有方都受益。


Iran scales back its nuclear activities, especially the enrichment of uranium fuel, in exchange for an end to economic sanctions.	伊朗减少其核活动，特别是铀燃料浓缩活动，以换取取消经济制裁。


Its government is kept further away from developing a nuclear bomb – which it denies pursuing – and gains room for economic recovery and normalization of relations with the major powers.	伊朗政府将更加远离开发核弹——它也一直否认这一点——并赢得经济复苏和与主要大国关系正常化的机会。


It is a smart, pragmatic, and balanced approach, subject to monitoring and verification.	这是一个明智、务实且平衡的方针，需要监督和论证。


It does not require that the US and Iranian governments suddenly trust each other; but it does offer an opportunity to build confidence, even as it allows for specific steps that are in each side’s interests.	它不要求美国和伊朗政府突然变得互相信任； 但它却是提供了构建信心的机会，尽管它允许符合双方各自利益的具体措施。


Crucially, it is part of international law, within the framework of the UN Security Council.	关键是，它是国际法的一部分，处于联合国安理会框架内。


By propounding the idea that the other side can never be trusted, the hardliners are advancing a self-fulfilling theory of politics and human nature that makes war far more likely.	强硬派持有的观点是对方永远不可信任，以此鼓吹极大提高战争可能性的关于政治和人性的自我实现的理论。


These purveyors of fear deserve to be kept on the sidelines.	这些恐惧鼓吹者应该排除在问题之外。


It is time to make peace.	现在应该做的是缔结和平。


The great divide between the West and Iran today, it should be noted, is largely the result of malign Western behavior toward Iran (Persia until 1935) in the past.	如今，应该注意的是，西方与伊朗的巨大分歧大体上是过去西方针对伊朗（1935年前为波斯）的中伤行为的结果。


From the start of the twentieth century, the British Empire manipulated Persia in order to control its vast oil reserves.	20世纪初，英帝国就开始操纵波斯以控制其巨大的石油储量。


After World War II, that job fell increasingly to the US.	二战后，这一工作日益由美国承担。


Indeed, from coup to dictatorship to war to sanctions, the US has racked up more than 60 continuous years of trying to impose its will on Iran.	事实上，从政变到独裁再到战争和制裁，美国在60多年的时间里不断地把自己的意愿强加给伊朗。


The CIA and Britain’s MI6 jointly toppled Mohammad Mossadegh’s democratically elected government in 1953, in order to block Mossadegh’s attempts to nationalize Iran’s oil reserves.	1953年，中央情报局和英国军情六处联合颠覆了民选的摩萨德（Mohammad Mossadegh）政府，以阻止摩萨德将伊朗石油储量国有化的政策。


The US then installed the brutal dictatorship of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, which ruled the country until the Islamic Revolution of 1979.	接着，美国扶持了巴列维（Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi）的残酷独裁统治，直到1979年伊斯兰革命将其推翻。


Following the revolution, the US helped to arm Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, in which an estimated one million Iranians died.	革命后，美国在20世纪80年代的两伊战争中为伊拉克提供武器装备，这场战争导致大约一百万伊朗人死亡。


Since 1987, the US has imposed economic sanctions against Iran on a variety of premises, including claims of Iranian terrorism and the alleged nuclear threat.	1987年以来，美国以各种借口实施经济制裁，包括宣称伊朗阻止恐怖活动和指责其构成核威胁。


And the US has worked hard to internationalize these sanctions, leading the push for UN measures, which have been in place since 2006.	美国还竭力将制裁措施国际化，一马当先推动联合国动作，并在2006年开始执行。


The US hardliners have their own long list of grievances, starting with the 1979 seizure of America’s embassy in Tehran, in which 66 US diplomats and citizens were held for 444 days.	美国强硬派有着自身长长的仇恨清单，首先就是1979年包围美国驻德黑兰大使馆事件。 在该事件中，66名美国外交官和公民被劫持444天。


Then there is Iran’s involvement in Islamist insurgencies, and its support for anti-Israel political movements and groups deemed to be terrorist.	然后是伊朗介入伊斯兰起义以及支持被归为恐怖分子的反以色列政治运动和集团。


Still, the British and American abuses vis-à-vis Persia and Iran started earlier, lasted longer, and imposed far higher costs than Iran’s actions vis-à-vis the US and UK.	但是，英国和美国对波斯和伊朗的伤害行为比伊朗对美国和英国的行为开始得更早，持续得更长，造成的伤害也大得多。


Moreover, much of what the US categorizes as Iranian “terror” is a product of the region’s sectarian struggles between Shia, backed by Iran, and Sunnis, backed by Saudi Arabia.	此外，许多被美国归为伊朗“恐怖主义”的东西其实是该地区伊朗支持的什叶派和沙特阿拉伯支持的逊尼派之间的宗派斗争。


“Terror” is a term that obscures rather than clarifies these long-standing clashes and rivalries.	“恐怖主义”这个词让这些长期存在的冲突和对立变得更加模糊而不是更加清晰。


That is why Iran, called a “terrorist state” by US hardliners, is now America’s de facto ally in the fight against Sunni jihadists in Iraq and Syria.	正因如此，被美国强硬派称为“恐怖国家”的伊朗，现在实际上是美国对伊拉克和叙利亚逊尼派圣战组织的斗争的盟友。


Iran’s confrontation with the UK and the US is part of the much broader saga of the West’s use of its military and economic dominance to project its power and political will over much of the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.	伊朗与英国和美国的冲突是一个含义更加广泛的局面的一部分，即19和20世纪期间西方利用其军事和经济主导力将其实力和政治意愿凌驾于世界大部之上。


Today’s low- and middle-income countries are only now entering a period of true sovereignty.	如今的中低收入国家大多直到最近才进入真正的主权时代。


The proposed agreement with Iran will not overcome a century of distrust and manipulation, but it can begin to create a new path toward peace and mutual respect.	与伊朗的协议草案不可能克服一个世纪的不信任和操纵，但它可以开启创造迈向和平和互相尊重的新道路的机会。


Mutual benefit will be achieved by honest appraisals of mutual interests, and step-by-step progress backed by verification, not by hardliners on both sides claiming that the other side is pure evil and insisting on complete triumph.	共同利益将通过诚实评估共同利益以及以论证为基础的逐步进展实现，而不可能通过双方强硬派指责对方是纯粹的恶魔、坚持要获得彻底胜利实现。


The success of US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in reaching the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, at the height of the Cold War, provides an instructive lesson.	1963年冷战最高峰时，美国总统肯尼迪和苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫成功地达成了有限禁止核试验条约（1979 seizure of America’s embassy in Tehran，LTBT），这给了我们一个很有裨益的例子。


At the time, hardliners on both sides denounced the LTBT as a weakening of national defense in the face of an implacable enemy.	当时，双方的强硬派将LTBT贬低为面对不可调和的敌人的国防软弱。


In fact, both sides fully honored the treaty, and it led to the landmark 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	事实上，双方都充分尊重了该条约，并在此基础上在1968年达成了里程碑式的核不扩散条约（Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty）。


JFK’s words a half-century ago apply to the Iran agreement today.	肯尼迪在半个世纪前的话适用于今天的伊朗协议。


The LTBT, said Kennedy in 1963, “is not a victory for one side – it is a victory for mankind.”	1963年，肯尼迪这样评价LTBT：“这不是一方的胜利——而是全人类的胜利。


This treaty, he said, “will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war.	”这一条约，他说，“不会解决所有冲突，也不会让共产主义者停止野心，也不会消除战争威胁。


It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others.	它不会减少我们对军备、盟友或对外援助计划的需要。


But it is an important first step – a step towards peace – a step towards reason – a step away from war.”	但它是重要的第一步——迈向和平的第一步，迈向理性的第一步，远离战争的第一步。 ”


Grand Bargaining with Iran	与伊朗的隆重谈判


STOCKHOLM – Slowly but surely, Iran’s talks with the international community about its nuclear program are approaching the make-or-break point.	斯德哥尔摩——伊朗就核计划与国际社会展开的谈判正缓慢而坚定地走向决定成败的时刻。


But, more important, the outcome could mark a turning point for the wider – and increasingly volatile – Middle East.	但更加重要的是，谈判结果可能标志着日益动荡的整个中东地区迎来转折。


The rapprochement between Iran and its negotiating partners on the core nuclear issue is obvious.	伊朗与谈判伙伴间在核心核问题上的和解显而易见。


No one at this point seriously believes that Iran is maintaining an active program to develop nuclear weapons, though not long ago it was almost conventional wisdom that the country was close to having them.	现在已经没有人真的相信伊朗仍保留有发展核武器的积极计划，尽管不久前人们还普遍认为伊朗已非常接近拥有核武器。


Now the focus is on ensuring that Iran would need a year or so to assemble a nuclear device if it ever decided to do so.	现在的重点是确保伊朗需要一年左右的时间才能成功组装起核武器。


But the concept of “breakout time” is dubious.	但“突破时间”的概念令人怀疑。


If trust were to collapse, and the Iranian regime decided to abrogate all of the relevant international agreements, it is highly likely that it would get its weapon, even if the country itself was bombed repeatedly.	如果信任崩溃且伊朗政府决定废除所有相关国际协议，那么即使伊朗遭到反复轰炸，这个国家仍极有可能最终研制出核武器。


The strategic emphasis on “breakout time” is thus misplaced.	因此对“突破时间”的战略性强调并不合理。


The key to progress is to help turn Iran from a cause into a country, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger.	取得进展的关键， 按照亨利·基辛格的话讲，是协助伊朗从事业回归到国家本质。


Iran needs to focus on developing all of its human and material resources to become part of a region moving from confrontation to cooperation.	伊朗亟需集中精力开发人力物力资源，与中东地区一道从对抗转向合作。


The deal on the core nuclear issues is central to this approach, but so is a credible process for developing the trade and investment links that will facilitate Iran’s move from isolation to integration.	就伊朗核心核问题达成一致是上述方法的核心，但通过可靠途径发展贸易和投资关系也同样重要，从而协助伊朗从孤立转向融合。


As the talks enter the final phase, the issue of sanctions is likely to be at the forefront.	随着会谈进入到最后阶段，制裁很可能成为最重要的议题。


This is because the Joint Plan of Action to which the parties agreed in November 2013, while addressing virtually all of the West’s immediate nuclear concerns, does not map out the necessary pathway to Iran’s normalization.	因为各方于2013年11月达成的联合行动计划虽然解决了西方国家近乎所有的核疑虑，但却没有指明伊朗实现正常化的必要途径。


Just as conservative forces in Iran can be expected to try to stop an agreement, forces thriving on confrontation in the United States and elsewhere will do the same.	就像伊朗保守势力竭力阻止协议达成一样，美国和其他国家的对抗势力也会付出同样的努力。


Iran’s hardliners play up doubts that the West will ever agree to lift the sanctions, while their Western counterparts will do whatever they can to support that presumption.	伊朗的强硬派大肆鼓吹西方永远不会解除制裁，而西方强硬势力则会不惜一切代价支持这种假设。


A spiral of mutually destructive diplomacy might result.	由此带来的结果或许是共同毁灭。


Here, the European Union should clearly signal its readiness to take the lead in easing and lifting restrictions on Iran, though this obviously must be done in close coordination with Europe’s partners.	在这个问题上，虽然显然还需要伙伴的合作，但欧盟应明确表示愿意带头缓和及解除对伊朗的限制。


The EU oil sanctions, for example, could be suspended almost immediately if an agreement were reached.	比方说如果协议达成，欧盟石油制裁几乎立即就可以停止实施。


An agreement should also be followed by sustained political engagement on other mutually important issues.	协议达成后还要就双方关心的其他问题进行持续的政治接触。


Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq are obviously urgent.	阿富汗和伊拉克的事态发展显然是当务之急。


And, based on close consultation with both Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, it may yet be possible to move toward more cooperative arrangements in that strategically vital region.	而且，在与沙特及其他海湾国家密切磋商的基础上，还有可能在上述具有重要战略意义的地区开展更为密切的合作。


That will require putting the issue of Syria squarely on the table.	这需要公开商讨叙利亚问题。


Four years after the outbreak of the country’s civil war, and despite the horrific humanitarian consequences of the fighting, international diplomacy to stop the violence has achieved nothing.	叙利亚内战爆发已届四年，虽然战争带来了可怕的人道主义后果，但制止暴力的国际外交活动却没有取得任何进步。


The United Nations Security Council has been split and ineffective, and even Russia seems to be gradually losing the leverage it once had in Damascus.	联合国安理会一直保持分裂低效，就连俄罗斯似乎也正逐渐失去其在大马士革曾经有过的影响力。


Iran, the US, and the EU all share an interest in stopping a war that is causing the Syrian state to collapse – with all of the consequences seen in Iraq since 2003 – and strengthening the forces of Sunni jihadism across the region.	亲眼目睹了2003年伊拉克战争所带来的后果，制止导致叙利亚走向崩溃的战争并加强该地区逊尼派圣战主义的力量符合伊朗、美国和欧盟各方的利益。


Whether this is enough common ground for a constructive dialogue with Iran on ending Syria’s civil war remains to be seen, but it is an option that must be pursued.	上述共同点是否足以与伊朗就结束叙利亚内战展开建设性对话尚有待观察，但这一方案必须得到重视。


The talks now reaching their endgame in Lausanne are confined to the nuclear issue; but beyond the agreement loom larger possibilities and risks.	现已进入最后阶段的洛桑会谈仅限于商讨伊朗核问题； 但协议之外还有更大的风险和机遇。


A breakthrough might compel a phase of intense diplomacy, giving Iran a pathway to diplomatic normalization and opening the door for grand bargains that could begin to restore order and stability to the rest of the region.	一旦突破可能会开启频繁的外交努力，为伊朗铺就外交正常化道路并致使地区其余国家开始恢复稳定与秩序。


A breakdown, by contrast, though unlikely to lead immediately to war, could easily foment developments that lead in that direction, and the region as a whole could be pulled even deeper into the current vortex of chaos and violence.	相比之下，谈判破裂虽然不太可能立即引发战争，但很容易助长朝那个方向发展的态势，此外还会导致地区更深地陷入当前的混乱和暴力。


With the core nuclear issue more or less settled, it is now imperative to resolve sanctions and normalization issues and grasp the opportunity for regional grand bargains that might then become possible.	一待核心核问题或多或少地得以解决，现在必须要解决制裁和标准化问题，把握住届时或许会成为可能的正式谈判机遇。


The nuclear deal must mark the beginning of the international community’s efforts to engage Iran in addressing the Middle East’s toughest challenges.	核协议必须标志着国际社会接触伊朗、解决中东最棘手问题的开始。


A Belated Victory for Non-Proliferation	核不扩散迟到的胜利


LONDON – Let us give praise where it is richly deserved.	伦敦—对于值得赞扬的，我们应该毫不吝啬。


Despite all the criticism they faced, US President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State, John Kerry, stuck doggedly to the task of negotiating a deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program.	尽管面临诸多批评，但美国总统奥巴马和他的国务卿克里顽强坚守，与伊朗谈成了限制其核计划的谈判。


Together with representatives of the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, and Germany, they have now succeeded.	与来自英国、俄罗斯、中国、法国和德国的代表一起，他们现在取得了成功。


The main terms of this historic agreement, concluded in the teeth of opposition from Israel, Iran’s regional competitors (particularly Saudi Arabia), and the political right in the United States, seek to rein in Iran’s nuclear activities so that civil capacity cannot be swiftly weaponized.	这一在以色列、伊朗的地区竞争对手（特别是沙特阿拉伯）以及美国政治右派的反对下取得成功的历史性协议的主要内容是遏制伊朗的核活动，使其局限于民用而无法迅速武器化。


In exchange for inspection and monitoring of nuclear sites, the international economic sanctions imposed years ago on Iran will be lifted.	作为让核设施接受检查和监督的交换条件，近几年来对伊朗施加的国际经济制裁将会取消。


This is a significant moment in the nuclear age.	这是核时代的重大时刻。


Since 1945, the terrifying destructive force of nuclear weapons has encouraged political leaders to search for ways to control them.	自1945年以来，核武器的可怕破坏力令政治领导人们寻求各种方法控制它们。


Not long after the destruction of Hiroshima, President Harry S. Truman, together with the Canadian and UK prime ministers, proposed the first non-proliferation plan; all nuclear weapons would be eliminated, and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes would be shared and overseen by a United Nations agency.	广岛被摧毁后不久，美国总统杜鲁门与加拿大总理和英国首相一起提出了首个核不扩散计划； 所有核武器都应该销毁，出于和平目的的核技术应该共享并接受联合国机构的监督。


Truman’s initiative subsequently went further, covering most of the non-proliferation issues that we still discuss today.	杜鲁门的初始计划后来有所扩大，涵盖了大部分我们至今仍在讨论的核不扩散问题。


But the proposals ran into outright opposition from Joseph Stalin, who would accept no limit to the Soviet Union’s ability to develop its own nuclear weapons.	但该计划遭到了斯大林的强烈反对，他绝不接受任何妨碍苏联发展自身核武器的方案。


So the nuclear arms race began, and in 1960 President John F. Kennedy warned that there would be 15, 20, or 25 nuclear states by the mid-1960s.	于是，核军备竞赛开始了。 1960年，美国总统肯尼迪警告说，到20世纪60年代中期将由15、20乃至25个有核国家。


“I ask you,” he said in 1963, “to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world.”	“我要你们停下来想一想，” 他在1963年说，“这么多人手里都有核武器，大大小小的国家都有核武器，不论稳定还是动荡，不论负责还是不负责，不论位于世界哪个角落，意味着什么？ ”


Two developments averted the nightmare of reckless nuclear proliferation.	两件事驱散了无限制核扩散的噩梦。


First, several countries capable of developing nuclear weapons concluded – in some cases, even after launching programs – that to do so would not increase their security.	首先，一些有能力发展核武器的国家认为——一些国家甚至是在启动核计划后这样认为——这不会增加安全。


To their credit, South Africa and a number of Latin American countries took this route.	南非和许多拉丁美洲国家走了这条道路，这值得赞赏。


Second, self-denial was greatly reinforced by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiated after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).	其次，1962年古巴导弹危机后谈成、由国际原子能机构负责监管的核不扩散条约大大强化了核克己。


Since entering into force in 1968, the NPT has been central to holding the line on the spread of nuclear weapons.	自1968年生效以来，核不扩散条约一直是勒紧核武器传播限制的关键。


Nowadays, apart from the original nuclear powers – the US, the UK, France, and Russia – the only other countries with these weapons are China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.	如今，除了最初的四个有核国家——美国、英国、法国和俄罗斯外，只有中国、以色列、印度、巴基斯坦和朝鲜拥有核武器。


The Iran negotiations were vital to ensuring the integrity of the system.	伊朗谈判对于保证这一体系的完整性至关重要。


The danger, of course, was that Iran would move from developing civil nuclear power to making its own weapons.	当然，危险在于伊朗可能会将发展民用核能转变为制造核武器。


This would inevitably have caused other countries in the region, probably beginning with Saudi Arabia, to go the same way.	这难免会导致该地区其他国家——极有可能从沙特阿拉伯开始——效而仿之。


There is an important lesson to be learned from more than a decade of negotiation with Iran.	在于伊朗的十多年的额谈判中，有一个重要教训需要汲取。


Iran’s current president, Hassan Rouhani, was his country’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.	伊朗现任总统鲁哈尼是2003—2005年伊朗首席核谈判代表。


Iran’s president at this time was the scholarly moderate Mohammed Khatami, with whom I at one time attempted to negotiate a trade and cooperation agreement on behalf of the European Union.	当时的伊朗总统是温和的学院派哈塔米（Mohammed Khatami），我也曾经代表欧盟与他谈判国贸易与合作协议。


Progress was stopped by disagreement over nuclear matters.	当时的谈判因为核问题方面的分歧而无法继续。


Khatami’s attempts to open a dialogue with the West fell on stony ground in President George W. Bush’s Washington, and eventually he was replaced by the populist hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.	哈塔米与西方展开对话的尝试被美国总统小布什冷眼以对，而他最终也被民粹主义强硬派内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadinejad）取代。


But in Rouhani’s discussions on proliferation back then, Iran had offered the three EU countries with which it had begun negotiations a reasonable compromise: Iran would maintain a civil but not a military nuclear capacity.	但在当时鲁哈尼主持的核扩散问题讨论中，伊朗在谈判伊始便向三个欧盟国家提出了合理的妥协：伊朗将保留民用但非军用的核能力。


This would have capped the number of centrifuges at a low level, kept enrichment below the possibility of weaponization, and converted enriched uranium into benign forms of nuclear fuel.	该条件将把离心机数量限制在较低水平，核浓缩能力将不足以实现武器化，浓缩铀也将替换为用作核燃料的较低浓度的形式。


The British representative to the IAEA at this time, Ambassador Peter Jenkins, has said publicly that the negotiators from the EU were impressed by the Iranian offer.	时任英国驻国际原子能机构代表詹金斯大使（Ambassador Peter Jenkins）公开说，欧盟谈判代表对伊朗开出的条件很动心。


But the Bush administration pressured the UK government to veto a deal along these lines, arguing that more concessions could be extracted from the Iranians if they were squeezed harder and threatened with tougher sanctions and even a military response.	但小布什政府向英国政府施压拒绝根据这些条件达成协议。 美国政府指出，如果向伊朗施加更大压力并且威胁加紧制裁甚至采取军事手段，可以迫使伊朗人做出更大让步。


We know how the Bush strategy turned out.	我们都知道小布什的这一战略的结果。


The talks collapsed: no compromise, no agreement.	谈判崩溃：没有妥协，没有协议。


Today, a deal has been concluded; but it is less good than the deal that could have been reached a decade ago – a point worth keeping in mind as the likes of former Vice Present Dick Cheney and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu start hollering from the sidelines.	如今，终于到达成了一份协议； 但这份协议还不如十年前就可��达成的协议——这一点值得牢记特别是在如今美国前副总统切尼和以色列总理尼塔尼亚胡之流又开始旁敲侧击地大喊大叫的时候。


As it is, not only will an agreement add cement to the NPT; it could also open the way to the sort of understanding with Iran that is essential to any broad diplomatic moves to control and halt the violence sweeping across western Asia.	与伊朗的协议不但可以巩固核不扩散条约，还可以开辟一条谅解伊朗之路，这是任何控制和阻止暴力席卷西亚的广义外交行动的关键。


The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal	伊朗核协议的未来


NEW YORK – “There’s many a slip twixt the cup and the lip,” goes the old English proverb.	纽约—“从杯子到嘴唇还有很大的距离，”英国旧谚有云。


Something seemingly resolved and certain in fact is neither.	似乎已经解决的事情和笃定的事实之间亦是如此。


If no such expression exists in Farsi, I predict one soon will.	如果波斯语中没有类似的表达，那么我预测很快就会出现。


The reason, of course, is the “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” the framework just adopted by Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members – China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States – plus Germany).	原因当然是“关于伊朗核计划的全面协议条件”（Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program），即刚刚由伊朗和P5+1（中国、英国、法国、俄罗斯和美国等联合国五大常任理事国加上德国）达成的框架。


The agreement constitutes an important political and diplomatic milestone, and it contains more detail and is broader in scope than many anticipated.	该协议构成了重要的政治和外交里程碑，其所包含的细节和范围比许多人所预测的更多更广。


But, for all that, the text leaves unanswered at least as many questions as it resolves.	但尽管如此，该协议没有回答的问题至少与它所解决的问题一样多。


In reality – and as the coming weeks, months, and years will demonstrate – major issues have yet to be settled.	在现实中——未来几周、几个月和几年将会证明——主要问题仍没有解决。


It is closer to the truth to say the real debate about the Iran nuclear accord is just beginning.	更接近事实的说法是关于伊朗核协议的真正争论才刚刚开始。


The framework places significant limits on Iran’s nuclear program, including the number and type of centrifuges, the sort of reactors, and the amount and quality of enriched uranium that the country may possess.	该框架给伊朗核计划制定了重大限制，包括离心机的数量和类型、反应堆的种类、伊朗可以拥有的浓缩铀的数量和质量等。


Standards are set for the inspections needed to provide confidence that Iran is fulfilling its obligations. And provision is made for easing economic sanctions once Iran has verifiably met its commitments.	该框架制定了怎样的调查标准才能让人们对伊朗履行义务有信心，还提出伊朗只要证明履行了承诺就可以放松经济制裁。


The bottom line is that the agreement will provide an estimated one-year warning from the moment that Iran might decide to build one or more nuclear weapons to the point at which it could achieve that goal.	根本点是该协议确定了一个大约为期一年的警告期——从伊朗可能决定制造一项或多项核武器开始到它可以达到这一目标为止。


This assessment assumes that the monitoring called for in the accord will detect any Iranian non-compliance early enough to enable a coordinated international response, particularly the reintroduction of sanctions, before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons.	这一估算结果假设该协议所要求的监控很早就能察觉伊朗违规的情况，从而能够实施国际联合反应，特别是在伊朗能获得核武器之前重启制裁。


There are no less than five reasons not to assume the deal will enter into force or have the desired impact.	有不下五个理由认为该协议未必能得到执行或达到预期效果。


The first involves the next 90 days.	其一是未来90天。


What was announced was an interim framework; a formal, comprehensive accord is supposed to be completed by the end of June.	公布的协议只是一个过渡性框架； 正式的全面协议应该在6月底达成。


In the meantime, there could easily be changes of heart and mind as those who negotiated the interim deal return home and face criticism from their governments and publics over its terms.	与此同时，过渡协议的谈判者回国后，在面临本国政府和公众关于协议条款的批评时，心理和观念可能发生变化。


Already, significant differences are emerging in how the US and Iranian sides are representing what was negotiated.	目前，在美国和伊朗方面如何表达谈判内容的问题上已开始出现重大分歧。


A second concern stems from the specific issues that remain to be resolved.	第二个原因来自悬而未决的具体问题。


The most difficult might be the timing of when various economic sanctions are to be removed – the issue of greatest concern to Iran.	最困难的问题要数各种经济制裁何时取消——这也是伊朗最关注的问题。


But these same sanctions are also the source of the greatest leverage over Iranian behavior, which means that many in the US and Europe will want them to remain in place until Iran has fully met its critical obligations.	但这些制裁正是约束伊朗行为的最大武器，这意味着许多美国和欧洲人希望保持这些制裁措施直到伊朗充分履行关键义务。


A third source of doubt is whether the various parties will approve any long-term pact.	第三个质疑原因是各方能否批准任何长期契约。


The two main uncertainties involve Iran and the US.	两大不确定性来自伊朗和美国。


So-called hardliners in Iran will undoubtedly object to an agreement with the “Great Satan” that places limits on their country’s nuclear ambitions.	伊朗所谓的强硬派显然将反对与“大恶魔”��Great Satan）签订的、给伊朗核野心加上枷锁的协议。


But there is also a widespread desire among Iranians to get out from under economic sanctions, and Iran will approve a pact if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei favors it, which he presumably does.	但也有大量伊朗人渴望结束经济制裁，如果最高领袖哈梅内伊表示支持（预计他会这样做）伊朗就可能批准契约。


The uncertainties are greater in the US.	美国的不确定性更大。


President Barack Obama must contend with a far more complex political environment, beginning with the US Congress.	总统奥巴马必须应付远为更复杂的政治环境，首先就是美国国会。


There is widespread and understandable concern about leaving Iran with any nuclear capabilities, about the adequacy of provisions for monitoring and inspection, and about what will happen in ten or 15 or 25 years when various limits on Iran expire.	不难理解，大量美国人担心伊朗保留任何核实力，担心监控和调查条款是否足够，担心10年、15年或20年后各种对伊限制到期失效后会发生什么。


Persuading Congress to approve the final pact and/or lift sanctions is anything but assured.	说服国会批准最终契约并/或取消制裁绝非易事。


This question of gaining political approval is closely tied to a fourth area of concern: how any final agreement is implemented.	这个赢得政治支持的问题与第四个原因有密切关系：最终协议（不管是什么协议）如何实施。


The history of arms control suggests there will be occasions when Iran, which has a record of withholding relevant information from UN weapons inspectors, is suspected of not living up to the letter, much less the spirit, of what was negotiated.	军备控制的历史表明，有向联合国武器检查官隐瞒相关信息前科的伊朗将多次被怀疑不遵守谈成的协议条款，更不用说协议精神了。


Agreement is needed on the process for judging Iranian behavior and for determining appropriate responses.	协议需要在判断伊朗行为、确定合适应对方针的过程达成一致。


The fifth concern stems not so much from the accord as from everything else about Iran’s foreign and defense policies.	第五个原因与协议的关系较小，而与伊朗其他外交和国防政策关系较大。


The agreement is only about Iran’s nuclear activities.	该协议只是关于伊朗核行为的协议。


It says nothing about Iran’s missile programs or support for terrorists and proxies, much less about what it is doing in Syria or Iraq or Yemen or anywhere else in the turbulent Middle East, or about human rights at home.	它并不牵涉到任何伊朗导弹计划或支持恐怖分子以及代理人的内容，更不用说伊朗在叙利亚、伊拉克、也门或动荡的中东的其他地区的所作所为以及伊朗国内的人权状况了。


Iran is a would-be imperial power that seeks regional primacy.	伊朗是一个追求地区霸权的帝国主义国家。


Even a nuclear agreement that is signed and implemented will not affect this reality and might even make it worse, as Iran could well emerge with its reputation enhanced and a long-term option to build nuclear weapons intact.	即使签订了核协议并得到了实施，也不能影响这一现实，反而有可能让形势变得更加糟糕，因为伊朗可能会获得更好的名声，并且其建造核武器的长期选择并未受到影响。


Obama is right: A nuclear agreement of the sort outlined is preferable to Iran possessing nuclear weapons or going to war to prevent that outcome.	奥巴马是对的：现在所提出的核协议比让伊朗拥有核武器或通过战争阻止这一结果好。


But any agreement must also generate widespread confidence in the US and the region that it will place a meaningful ceiling on Iran’s nuclear program, and that any cheating will be discovered early and dealt with firmly.	但不论任何协议，还必须让美国和中东地区产生普遍的信心，相信协议能够给伊朗核计划带来有意义的限度，任何舞弊行为都能及早发现并果断处理。


This will not be easy; indeed, it is no exaggeration to predict that the effort to generate such confidence may well prove as demanding as the negotiations themselves.	这绝非易事； 事实上，毫不夸张地预测，产生这些信心的措施的必要性一点都亚于谈判本身。


Where Obama Went Wrong on Iran	奥巴马在伊朗问题上错在哪里


JERUSALEM – The pros and cons of the accord with Iran over its nuclear program will be debated extensively over the next two months, in the run-up to a vote on the deal by the US Congress.	耶路撒冷——在伊朗核问题协议即将交由美国会表决的未来两个月里，人们将广泛探讨这份协议的利弊。


But the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will be judged by its implementation, which will take years.	但对所谓联合综合行动计划的评判将取决于实际执行状况，而这可能会历时数年之久。


Nonetheless, two things are already clear.	尽管如此，有两个问题已经非常明确。


First, the JCPOA’s weakest provisions – both cumbersome and open to competing interpretations – are those covering compliance and verification.	联合综合行动计划既麻烦又容易引发歧义的弱势条款涉及遵守及核查问题。


So some skepticism about implementation is in order.	因此，不难理解有人对协议的执行抱有疑虑。


Second, and more immediately, the very achievement of an agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) has already begun to affect the regional balance of power.	其次，而且更为直接的是，伊朗和联合国安理会五个常任理事国及德国（P5+1）协议的达成已经开始影响其地区实力。


Indeed, it is legitimate to ask whether Western (and especially US) negotiators were aware of the geopolitical implications of the deal.	事实上，质疑西方（尤其是美国）谈判人员是否意识到协议的地缘政治影响合情合理。


Even at this early stage, it is apparent that the agreement has empowered Iran regionally.	即使仍处于早期阶段，很明显协议已经增强了伊朗的地区实力。


Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite regime lavished praise on the agreement, rightly recognizing that enhanced international legitimacy and financial resources will enable Shia Iran to provide greater backing.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的阿拉维派少数民族政权毫不吝惜地对协议表示赞美，因为他们意识到国际合法性和财政状况改善将使什叶派伊朗为其提供更有力的支持。


Assad’s other major regional ally, Lebanon’s Hezbollah (which the US classifies as a terrorist organization) also supports the deal.	阿萨德的另一个主要地区盟友黎巴嫩真主党（该党被美国划定为恐怖组织）也支持这一协议。


Vladimir Putin’s Russia is also happy to have received US assistance, however indirectly, in strengthening Assad’s hold on power.	普京领导的俄罗斯也兴高采烈地接受了美国（无论多么间接）的援助，以帮助阿萨德更好的掌控权力。


Understandably, Iran’s empowerment has made America’s closest allies in the region extremely uncomfortable.	伊朗权力的巩固令美国最亲密的地区盟友坐立不安，这一点其实不难理解。


In their different ways, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and some of the smaller, more vulnerable Gulf states have let their unease be known.	以色列、沙特和某些实力较弱的海湾小国都以不同的方式表达了不安情绪。


Turkey – an uncertain US ally nowadays, yet still a NATO member – may be too preoccupied with domestic political turmoil to respond in detail.	目前已不确定是否是美国盟友，但依然是北约成员国的土耳其或许太过关注国内政治动荡而无暇顾及到对策的细节。


But President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan certainly is skeptical of an agreement that Obama describes in almost messianic terms.	但雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安总统肯定对奥巴马以救世主般口吻描述的这份协议表示怀疑。


The Egyptian leadership, also fighting internal challenges, is similarly unhappy with the JCPOA.	同样受困于内部问题的埃及领导人也对联合综合行动计划表露了不满情绪。


And, whether Israel benefits or loses, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is sure to come out ahead.	而且，无论以色列的损益状况，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡注定会从中受益。


A crafty fear monger, he will be able to present the agreement as further proof of Israel’s isolation and abandonment by the world, enabling him to leverage public anxiety into enhanced political support for his government.	作为一名狡猾的恐惧贩子，他必定能将协议作为世界孤立和遗弃以色列的进一步证据，从而充分利用公众焦虑强化对其政府的政治支持。


Netanyahu may even succeed in bringing Yitzhak Herzog’s Zionist Union into his government, thereby shoring up his shaky coalition.	内塔尼亚胡甚至可能将伊扎克·赫尔佐格的犹太复国主义联盟融入其政府，从而为摇摇欲坠的执政联盟争取支持。


His comparison of the Iranian threat to the Holocaust may be absurd and obscene, but it is politically effective.	他将伊朗威胁与大屠杀相比的卑劣手法或许荒唐可憎，却能够收到不错的政治效果。


Nothing helps the Israeli right more than heightening the electorate’s sense of being under siege.	最能帮助以色列右翼的莫过于强化选民的被围攻意识。


Obama’s defense of the JCPOA may be helping Netanyahu in this regard, thanks to some historical claims that may be even more dubious than his arguments regarding Iran’s nuclear policies.	因为有些历史要求甚至比伊朗核政策提法更令人怀疑，奥巴马对联合综合行动计划的辩护可能会对内塔尼亚胡有所助益。


In some of his statements, and in his recent interview with Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, Obama compared the deal with Iran to Richard Nixon’s opening to China in 1972.	在作某些声明和最近接受纽约时报托马斯·弗里德曼采访时，奥巴马将伊朗协议与1972年理查德·尼克松向中国开放相比。


This is a savvy and enticing claim. But it is also a misleading one.	这样的说法精明、有诱惑力，但却很容易造成误解。


Nixon’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, was pursuing a brilliant strategy to weaken Communism by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split.	尼克松的国务卿基辛格当时在寻找一种利用中苏分歧削弱共产主义的战略。


Emulating the French statesman Cardinal Richelieu, Kissinger helped the weaker power against the stronger one.	借鉴法国政治家红衣主教黎塞留的经验，基辛格协助弱者对抗强者。


No such overarching strategy underlies Obama’s policy, even if it may be justified on the more limited grounds of nuclear non-proliferation.	奥巴马的政策不具备这样的战略基础，即使就核不扩散的有限理由而言确有其合理性。


In this interview with Friedman, Obama also maintained that one should try to understand Iranian history and culture.	在与弗里德曼的访谈中，奥巴马还提出应���努力了解伊朗的历史和文化。


This sounds unexceptional, even innocuous, until one realizes what Obama means.	这听上去平淡无奇、无伤大雅，直到人们真正理解奥巴马的含义。


“The fact is that we had some involvement in overthrowing a democratically elected regime in Iran,” he says, referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh’s government.	“事实是我们曾参与在伊朗推翻民选政府，”他说，意指推翻总理穆罕默德·摩萨台政府的1953年政变。


Moreover, the US “had in the past supported Saddam Hussein when he used chemical weapons against Iran.”	此外，美国“过去曾支持萨达姆·侯赛因对伊朗使用化学武器。 ”


Therefore, according to Obama, the Iranians have “their own security concerns and their own narratives.”	因此，奥巴马认为，伊朗人拥有“自身的安全担忧及表达方式。


This is an extraordinarily ahistorical claim.	”这种说法完全不顾史实。


Similarly, one could claim that Germany had its own “security concerns and narratives” during the 1938 Munich crisis.	同样，人们也可以说德国在1938年慕尼黑危机中有其自身的“安全顾虑及表达方式”。


Is Obama suggesting that the US should have supported Mosaddegh in the midst of the Cold War, or tilted toward Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s?	奥巴马是否暗示美国应该在冷战中支持摩萨台，或者在20世纪80年代的两伊战争中对伊朗表示支持？


All of this may say something essential about Obama’s approach to the nuclear deal with Iran.	所有这些都能从某个重要角度反映奥巴马与伊朗签署的核协议。


Above all, while his negotiators’ unremitting focus on the issues before them – centrifuges, enrichment levels, the fate of spent fuel, and so on – undoubtedly permitted the deal to be done, the “success” of this approach has left the future of the region blurrier than ever.	毕竟，尽管谈判代表对离心机、铀浓缩水平、乏燃料命运等眼前事务的不懈关注最终使们得以签署这份协议，但这种策略的“成功”却进一步模糊了地区未来。


Diplomacy’s Long-Distance Race	外交的长途竞赛


MADRID ‒ The successful outcome of the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program provides a splendid validation for those who put their faith in diplomacy.	马德里—伊朗核计划谈判的成功结果给了相信外交的人一个强有力的明证。


The agreement – concluded after more than a decade of talks – highlights the value of persistence in addressing impasses that seem insurmountable, and provides hope for the many other initiatives that will be needed to bring lasting peace to the Middle East.	伊核协议——在经历了十年多的谈判后终于完成——凸显出在解决看似无法克服的僵局时坚持的重要性，并给维持中东和平所需要的其他许多计划带来了希望。


The European Union, which initiated the talks, should be proud of its effort.	谈判的发起人欧盟应该为它的努力而骄傲。


And the United States’ role was remarkable, from Secretary of State John Kerry’s incessant work, even on crutches, to end the 35-year standoff between his country and Iran, to President Barack Obama’s critical push to complete the negotiations.	美国的角色也令人瞩目，国务卿克里为了结束美国与伊朗之间35年来的对峙付出了大量工作，即使拄着拐杖也“不下火线”； 总统奥巴马也对完成谈判起到了关键的推动作用。


Likewise, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani should be commended for his determination to complete the undertaking he began more than a decade ago, when he served as Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.	类似地，伊朗总统鲁哈尼也应该收到赞誉，十多年前，当他还是伊朗最高国家安全委员会秘书时，他就决心完成核谈判。


Rouhani and I met in 2003, sitting across from each other at the first nuclear talks, when our negotiating team was made up of only Europeans.	2003年，鲁哈尼和我就有过照面——在第一次核谈判中，当时我们的谈判团队清一色都是欧洲人。


Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election as President of Iran in 2005 derailed those talks and ultimately led to the imposition of sanctions.	2005年内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadinejad）当选伊朗总统，谈判随之崩溃，并最终导致伊朗受到制裁。


But I had seen how determined Rouhani was to reach an agreement.	但我已经看到坚定的鲁哈尼是如何寻求达成协议的。


And, indeed, when Rouhani succeeded Ahmadinejad in 2013, a door opened.	事实上，当2013年鲁哈尼继任内贾德成为伊朗总统时，谈判成功的大门就打开了。


Rouhani invited me to his inauguration in August 2013.	2013年8月，鲁哈尼邀请我参加他的就职典礼。


During that visit, I was able to attend meetings with him and other top Iranian leaders, including Mohammad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and, later, its chief negotiator in the negotiations in Vienna.	在这次访问中，我得以出席与他和其他伊朗高层领导人的会晤，包括伊朗外交部长、后来在维也纳谈判中担任伊朗首席谈判员的扎里夫（Mohammad Zarif）。


I quickly saw that with these men at Iran’s helm, an agreement would be possible.	我很快意识到，有这些人担任伊朗领导人，协议将成为可能。


The agreement – known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – limits Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful purposes in exchange for lifting all international sanctions on the country.	这份被称为联合综合行动计划（JCPOA）的协议将伊朗核计划限制在和平用途，作为交换，将取消所有针对伊朗的国际制裁。


For the next 15 years, Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium to more than 3.67% (to build a nuclear bomb requires uranium enriched to at least 85%).	在未来15年，伊朗将不允许进行浓度超过3. 67%的核浓缩活动（要制造核弹，核浓缩至少要达到85%）。


Enrichment will be permitted only at the nuclear facility at Natanz – not at the subterranean Fordow installation.	核浓缩活动只能在纳坦兹（Natanz）进行，而不能在位于地下的福尔多（Fordow）核装置进行。


And Iran will have to keep its stock of 3.67%-enriched uranium to below 300 kilograms.	伊朗还必须将浓度为3. 67%的铀保有量保持在300千克以下。


Moreover, the JCPOA will oblige Iran to reduce its number of centrifuges, which are used in the enrichment process, progressively for the next ten years.	此外，JCPOA还要求伊朗在未来十年中逐渐加码减少用于核浓缩的离心机数量。


Likewise, the heavy-water reactor at Arak will have to be redesigned to produce only radioisotopes for medicinal and industrial purposes, or for research into other peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the spent fuel it produces shipped out of the country.	类似地，阿拉克（Arak）的重水反应堆也将被重新设计，只能制造用于医疗和工业目的的放射性同位素或其他核能的和平用途研究，其所产生的乏燃料将被运往国外。


Most important, Iran has committed itself to apply the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, providing the organization with round-the-clock access to all components of its nuclear program for 15 years.	更重要的是，伊朗承诺遵守国际原子能机构附加协议，未来15年终，国际原子能机构可以随时随地获得其核计划的所有要素信息。


The IAEA will also monitor the production of centrifuges for 20 years.	国际原子能机构还将在未来20年内监督其离心机产量。


The agreement was made possible by the fact that Iran’s interlocutors – the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the EU (E3/EU+3) – were able to maintain a common position during a process that played out for more than ten years.	该协议因为一个事实而成为可能：伊朗的对话者——联合国安理会五大常任理事国、德国和欧盟（E3/EU+3）——能够在为期十多年的整个过程中保持共同立场。


This was true even during the negotiating push, when a debate over the sanctions against Iran’s trade in conventional arms and ballistic missiles threatened to open a breach between the partners.	虽然在谈判期间，对于制裁伊朗常规武器和弹道导弹贸易的争论大有在各伙伴国之间制造裂痕的趋势，但最终共同立场还是得到了保持。


While Russia and China asserted that signing an agreement would render any kind of sanction legally unjustifiable, the US sought to allay the fears of Iran’s neighbors as much as possible.	俄罗斯和中国认为签署协议将意味着任何形式的制裁都不合法，而美国试图尽量减轻伊朗邻国的担忧。


The consensus among the negotiating partners – one of the few points of agreement regarding the Middle East among the Security Council’s permanent membership – was crucial in convincing Iran to take the negotiations seriously.	谈判伙伴之间的共识——安理会常任理事国之间关于中东少数形成一致的地方之一——对于伊朗认真对待谈判至关重要。


And, at a time of persistent tension between Russia and the US and Europe, which has resulted in chronic political gridlock in the Security Council, the parties’ ability to remain united justifies greater optimism about the future.	而俄罗斯与美国和欧洲之间一直存在紧张，并在安理会造成了长期政治僵局，因此，各方能够保持一致让我们对外来抱有更大的乐观。


Indeed, it is worth considering whether cooperation between the permanent members of the Security Council and the EU might be useful for moving forward on other matters.	事实上，值得思索安理会“五常”和欧盟之间的合作是否有益于推动其他问题。


The West and Russia share an interest in stability in the Middle East, as does China, which is particularly concerned with the security of its energy supplies.	西方和俄罗斯在中东稳定方面有着共同利益，中国亦然，它特别关心能源供给的安全。


What is most needed – and most difficult to achieve – is a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.	最需要——也最难实现————的是伊朗和沙特阿拉伯重新建交。


Many of the conflicts in the Middle East have their roots in the tension between Sunni and Shia Islam.	中东的许多冲突都植根于逊尼派和什叶派伊斯兰教的紧张。


Cooperation between Sunnis and Shias will be vital to defeat the extremism of the Islamic State, as well as to bridge gaps between combatants in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.	逊尼派和什叶派的合作将是打击伊斯兰国极端主义、为叙利亚、伊拉克、也门和黎巴嫩战事弥合分歧的关键。


Iran must demonstrate that it is a responsible player in the region – not simply a backer of Shia power.	伊朗必须证明它是地区内负责任的行动方——而不仅仅是什叶派力量的支持者。


The reestablishment of ties between the US and Iran will, no doubt, have repercussions in Israel and Palestine.	美国和伊朗重建关系毫无疑问将影响到以色列和巴勒斯坦。


Although the agreement with Iran objectively makes Israel safer, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu considers it a historic error.	尽管与伊朗的协议客观上加强了以色列的安全，但以色列总理内塔尼亚胡仍认为这是一个历史性错误。


To assuage its traditional ally’s sense of abandonment, the US, may – mistakenly – withhold support for the initiatives recognizing the State of Palestine in the coming months.	为了安抚传统盟友的被抛弃感，在未来几个月中，美国可能会（错误地）收回对承认巴勒斯坦国的方案的支持。


But it is essential that the EU, which finances and maintains Palestine’s provisional institutions, not relent in its determination to make them permanent.	但至关重要的是为巴勒斯坦临时机构提供资金和支持的欧盟让其永久化的决心不动摇。


The historic agreement with Iran is just one of many that will be required to bring peace and stability to the Middle East.	与伊朗的历史性协议只是实现中东和平与稳定所需要的诸多协议中的一个。


The first hurdle has been overcome.	第一个障碍已经被克服。


We must now run the rest of the race.	现在，我们需要完成剩下的征程。


Living With the Iran Nuclear Deal	与希腊和协议共存


NEW YORK – It is probable that after 60 days of intense debate in Washington, DC, and conceivably Tehran, the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” signed on July 14 by Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany (the P5+1), will enter into force.	纽约—有可能，在华盛顿——德黑兰应该也是如此——进行了60天的激烈争论后，7月14日签订的、伊朗与联合国安理会五大常任理事国加德国（P5+1）之间的《全面联合行动计划》（Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action，JCPOA）即将生效。


But no one should confuse this outcome with a solution to the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions or its contributions to the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East.	但不能把这一结果与解决伊朗核野心或其在中东持续冲突中所起的作用相混淆。


On the contrary, depending on how it is implemented and enforced, the agreement could make matters worse.	相反，取决于实施和执行情况，该协议可能让局面更加恶化。


This is not to suggest the JCPOA makes no contribution.	这并不是说JCPOA一无是处。


It places a ceiling for the next decade on the quantity and quality of centrifuges Iran is allowed to operate and allows the country to possess only a small amount of low-enriched uranium for the next 15 years.	它给出了未来十年伊朗可以操作的离心机的数量和质量，在未来15年中，伊朗只能进行极少数低浓缩铀处理。


The agreement also establishes, in US President Barack Obama’s words, a “where necessary, when necessary” inspections mechanism that has the potential to verify whether Iran is meeting these and other commitments.	用美国总统奥巴马的话说，该协议还建立了“必要的时间和地点”的检查机制，该机制或许能够证明伊朗是否兑现其各项承诺。


The net result is that the accord should lengthen the period it would take Iran to produce one or more nuclear weapons from several months to as much as a year, making it more likely that such an effort would be discovered in time.	净结果是，该协议应该能够将伊朗制造一件或多件核武器的时间从几个月延长到一年，增加了这一行为被发现的可能。


The prospect that the JCPOA could keep Iran without nuclear weapons for 15 years is its main attraction.	JCPOA可以在15年内让伊朗无法拥有核武器，这是其最吸引人的地方。


Sanctions alone could not have accomplished this, and using military force would have entailed considerable risk with uncertain results.	光靠制裁无法实现这一点，而动用武力会带来风险极高的不确定性结果。


On the other hand (there always is another hand in diplomacy), the agreement permits Iran to keep far more nuclear-related capacity than it would need if it were interested only in civil research and in demonstrating a symbolic ability to enrich uranium.	另一方面（在外交领域，永远有另一方面），该协议允许伊朗保有大量核相关能力，程度远超民用研究和象征性地证明拥有核浓缩能力的需要。


The agreement also provides Iran with extensive relief from economic sanctions, which will fuel the regime’s ability to support dangerous proxies throughout the Middle East, back a sectarian government in Baghdad, and prop up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	该协议还大大缓解了伊朗的经济制裁压力，这将增强伊朗政权支持其整个中东地区危险的代理人、扶持宗派性巴格达政府以及为叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权撑腰的能力。


Moreover, the accord does not rule out all nuclear-related research and does not constrain work on missiles.	此外，该协议并未否定所有与核相关的研究，也没有限制导弹方面的工作。


Sales of ballistic missiles and missile parts to Iran are banned for no more than eight years.	对伊弹道导弹和导弹部件销售禁令不超过八年。


Sales of conventional arms to Iran are prohibited for no more than five years.	对伊常规武器销售禁令不超过五年。


There is also the danger that Iran will fail to comply with parts of the agreement and undertake prohibited work.	另一个危险是伊朗可能不会遵守协议的某些部分，从事被禁的活动。


Given Iran’s record, this has understandably been the focus of much concern and criticism regarding the pact.	从伊朗的历史记录看，不难理解这一点已成为对该协议的批评的核心。


What matters is that non-compliance be met with renewed sanctions and, if needed, military force.	重要的是不遵守协议就必须重新开始制裁，必要时还要采取军事行动。


A bigger problem has received much less attention: the risk of what will happen if Iran does comply with the agreement.	有一个更大的问题，所受到的关注要小得多：如果伊朗确实遵守了协议会发生什么。


Even without violating the accord, Iran can position itself to break out of nuclear constraints when the agreement’s critical provisions expire.	即使不违反协议，伊朗也可以在协议的关键条款过期后打破核约束。


At that point, there will be little to hold it back except the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a voluntary agreement that does not include penalties for non-compliance.	到那时，除了核不扩散条约以外就再也没有可以凭借的约束，而核不扩散条约是一个自愿协议，没有规定对不遵守的情况施加怎样的惩罚。


It is important that the United States (ideally, joined by other countries) let Iran know that any action to put itself in a position to field nuclear weapons after 15 years, though not explicitly precluded by the accord, will not be tolerated.	很重要的一点是美国（最好与其他国家联手）让伊朗明白，任何表明它意欲在15年后染指核武器的举动——尽管没有在协议中明文禁止——都将是不可容忍的。


Harsh sanctions should be reintroduced at the first sign that Iran is preparing a post-JCPOA breakout; this, too, is not precluded by the accord.	只要伊朗表现出准备在JCPOA到期后取得突破的信号，就应该对其实施严厉制裁； 这一点也没有被协议排除。


Iran should likewise be informed that the US and its allies would undertake a preventive military strike if it appeared to be attempting to present the world with a fait accompli.	类似地，还应该让伊朗知道，如果它表现出试图炮制既成事实，美国及其盟友将对其采取先发制人的军事打击。


The world erred in allowing North Korea to pass the nuclear-weapons threshold; it should not make the same mistake again.	世界曾经错误地让朝鲜迈过了和武器门槛； 绝不容重蹈覆辙。


In the meantime, a major effort must be launched to assuage the concerns of Iran’s neighbors, several of which will be tempted to hedge their bets against Iran’s potential breakout in 15 years by pursuing nuclear programs of their own.	与此同时，应该采取重大措施平息伊朗邻国的忧虑。 其中一些国家有可能追求自身的核武器计划，以此防范伊朗在15年后可能取得的突破。


The Middle East is already nightmarish enough without the added risks posed by a number of would-be nuclear powers.	中东的局面已经足够混乱，无法在承受有可能冒出多个潜在核力量的局面。


Obama’s claim that the agreement has “stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region” is premature, at best.	奥巴马宣称该协议“阻止了核武器在该地区的传播”是不成熟的。


It will also be essential to rebuild strategic trust between the US and Israel; indeed, this will need to be a high priority for Obama’s successor.	美国和以色列之间重建战略信任也很重要； 事实上，这应该成为奥巴马继任者的当务之急。


And the US should push back as warranted against Iran’s foreign policy or treatment of its own people.	美国应该遏制伊朗外交政策和对待其自身人民的方式。


None of this rules out selective cooperation with Iran, be it in Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq, if interests overlap.	所有这些都不排除在利益重叠的情况下选择性地与伊朗合作，不管是在阿富汗、叙利亚还是伊拉克。


But here, too, realism should prevail.	但在这方面，也应该持有现实主义。


The notion that the nuclear agreement will lead Iran to moderate its radicalism and rein in its strategic ambitions should not be anyone’s baseline scenario.	核协议将让伊朗缓和其激进主义、驯服其战略野心，这样的概念决不能作为基准情景。


In fact, the emergence of an ever more capable Iran, not a transformed one, is likely to be one of the main challenges confronting the Middle East, if not the world, in the coming years.	事实上，一个实力更强而不是有所转变的伊朗的崛起有可能将成为未来几年中东乃至全世界所面临的主要挑战。


Iran in the Middle	中间的伊朗


PARIS – International negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have been taking place, in one form or another, for more than a decade.	巴黎—关于伊朗核计划的全球谈判已经以各种方式进行了十年有余。


So it is not surprising that the deadline for a final deal has been extended once again.	因此，毫不奇怪最后协议期限被一拖再拖。


Iran and its interlocutors – the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) – now have until the end of June to reach an accord.	现在，伊朗及其谈判对手——五大联合国常任理事国加上德国（P5+1）——将于6月底达成协议。


It is a dispiriting development, and it would be easy to say that the process seems doomed to fail.	这真是令人沮丧的发展趋势，很有可能，该进程注定要失败。


But there is reason for hope.	但也有理由保持希望。


In the ongoing round of negotiations, the two key players, Iran and the United States, have seemed willing – if not desperate – to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.	在当前正在进行的谈判中，两大关键行动方——伊朗核美国似乎愿意——甚至可望——让谈判有一个成功的结果。


Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and US President Barack Obama would both benefit from a deal.	伊朗总统鲁哈尼和美国总统奥巴马都能从协议中获益。


The sanctions imposed on Iran are starting to weigh heavily on its economy, and a settlement to the dispute is a prerequisite for any effort by the two countries to cooperate on a peace deal in Syria or to address the threat posed by the Islamic State.	加给伊朗的制裁正在开始对其经济形成重大影响，而和解争议是两国在叙利亚和平协议或解决伊斯兰国威胁等问题上合作的前提。


Iran is just emerging from a three-year internal political struggle.	伊朗刚刚从为期三年的国内政治斗争中走出。


The military and hardline mullahs, who believe that Iran should produce a nuclear weapon, faced off against the bulk of the business community and reformist mullahs, led by Rouhani and former President Mohammad Khatami, who believe that it should not.	军方和强硬派毛拉认为伊朗应该制造核武器，他们面对大部分商界人士和改革派毛拉的反对，后一阵营以鲁哈尼和前总统哈塔米（Mohammad Khatami）为首，他们认为伊朗不应该制造核武器。


The outcome was uncertain – until Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated a fatwa banning nuclear weapons.	结果曾经十分不确定——直到最高领袖哈梅内伊重申了禁止核武器的宗教裁决。


For as long as the issue remained unsettled, the Iranian delegation to the talks could not agree on the desired outcome.	只要这一问题悬而未决，伊朗谈判代表团就不可能同意令人满意的结果。


This was evident in cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency was granted access to suspected facilities during the negotiations, only to have local commanders turn away its inspectors when they arrived.	一个显著的例子是国际原子能机构在谈判期间被授权进入可疑设施，而当检查者到达时，遭到了地方军官的横眉冷对、礼送出境。


(To be sure, the US delegation has also appeared inconsistent at times, often including officials vehemently hostile to Iran, along with disciplined diplomats seeking an agreement at Obama’s request.)	（平心而论，美国代表团有时也有自相矛盾之处，常常是官员对伊朗包含敌意，而训练有素的外交官则根据奥巴马的要求寻求达成协议。 ）


There is also another, more fundamental, reason for hope.	还有一个更加基本的希望理由。


The Middle East is undergoing a tectonic shift – the Shia awakening.	中东正在经历结构变化——什叶派正在觉醒。


As with the slow, sure movement of the earth’s plates, this deep, broad, underlying transformation is manifesting itself in local, destructive eruptions.	正如地球板块缓慢而稳定的移动，这一深刻、广泛、根本的变化正在以局部的破坏性爆发的形式表现出来。


When America’s misguided war in Iraq deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003, it upset a delicate balance.	2003年，美国打了一场被误导的伊拉克战争，推翻了萨达姆，也打破了微妙的平衡。


Saddam was venal and cruel, but his regime was predominantly secular.	萨达姆是腐败而残忍的，但他的政权具有显著的世俗特征。


Far from harboring weapons of mass destruction, he was focused on maintaining his grip on power.	他绝没有囤积大规模杀伤性武器，而是专注于对权力的掌控。


Having learned his lesson during Iraq’s brutal and costly war with Iran in the 1980s, Saddam was careful not to disturb the region’s geopolitical equilibrium.	萨达姆汲取了20世纪80年代伊拉克与伊朗的野蛮又代价高昂的战争的教训，小心翼翼地不去干扰地区地缘政治均衡。


For more than a thousand years, the Islamic world has been riven by the Sunni-Shia conflict.	一千多年来，伊斯兰世界一直被逊尼派-什叶派割裂。


Until the US-led invasion, Iran, alongside Syria’s Alawite regime, was the only country where Shia controlled the state.	直到美国入侵前，伊朗以及叙利亚的阿拉维派政权是仅有的两个什叶派掌权的国家。


Some 70% of the Arab world’s population is Sunni, and the Shia are a minority in every Arab country – except Iraq and Bahrain.	70%左右的阿拉伯人口是逊尼派，什叶派在所有阿拉伯国家都是少数群体——除了伊拉克和巴林。


The fall of Saddam allowed Iraq’s Shia majority to take power through elections.	萨达姆的倒台让伊拉克的什叶派多数通过选举掌握了权力。


But it also triggered civil war and regional turmoil (including ongoing Shia protests in Bahrain).	但这也引发了内战和地区动荡（包括目前巴林的什叶派示威）。


In Syria, the situation is almost a mirror image.	叙利亚的情况完全是这一局面的镜像。


The country is a mosaic of Druze, Kurds, Christians, a few Jews, many Shia, and a Sunni majority.	叙利亚是一个多成分国家，包括德鲁兹派、库尔德人、基督徒、少数犹太人、大量什叶派以及逊尼派多数。


Like Saddam, President Bashar al-Assad heads a secular regime that rules through brutal repression.	和萨达姆一样，总统巴沙尔·阿萨德领导着一个世俗政权，通过残酷镇压统治国家。


The determination in the West to depose him in the name of human rights and democracy was perceived by the Sunni majority as an opportunity to overthrow their oppressor.	西方决心以人权和民主的旗号推翻他在逊尼派多数看来乃是推翻压迫者的一次机会。


Unfortunately, Syria’s moderate Sunnis came under attack from two sides: Assad’s government and extremist adherents of Wahhabism, Islam’s most intolerant school of thought.	不幸的是，叙利亚的温和逊尼派腹背受敌：巴沙尔政府和极端的瓦哈比派（伊斯兰教中最偏狭的思想流派）。


The result is the emergence of the Islamic State, carrying with it the threat of extermination of the country’s minorities, including Christians and Alawites.	结果是伊斯兰国的崛起，以及随之而来的叙利亚少数派（包括基督徒和阿拉维派）的灭种危机。


The upheaval in these two neighboring countries has reshaped regional geopolitics.	这两个邻国的剧变改变了地区地缘政治。


Along with Iran, Russia, which seeks to undermine American and British influence in the Middle East, supports the Shia awakening, whereas Sunni-dominated Turkey, the region’s strongest military power and a NATO member, has done little to hide its sympathy for the Islamic State.	与伊朗一样，寻求削弱美国和英国在中东影响力的俄罗斯支持什叶派的觉醒，而逊尼派主宰的土耳其——该地区最强大的军事势力兼北约成员国——毫不掩饰对伊斯兰国的同情。


Recently, for example, Turkey’s government forbid the country’s Kurds from supporting their ethnic kin in Iraq and Syria, whom the Islamic State has targeted for annihilation.	比如，最近土耳其政府禁止该国的库尔德人支持他们沦为伊斯���国灭绝对象的伊拉克和叙利亚同胞。


Assad’s brutal regime and Iran have become key players in the fight against the Islamic State.	巴沙尔的野蛮政权和伊朗成了打击伊斯兰国的重要行动方。


Unblocking the nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran is thus crucial; by unfreezing the regional status quo, a final deal could lead to a change of alliances, with far-reaching consequences.	重启P5+1与伊朗的核谈判因此变得至关重要； 若能达成最终协议，可能通过解冻地区现状带来结盟机会，影响深远。


Indeed, perhaps the most compelling reason to hope that the negotiators will move quickly toward an agreement is their governments’ fear of the alternatives.	事实上，也许认为谈判很快就能形成协议的最有力的希望理由就在于各方政府都害怕其他局面。


Iran: One Year Later	Iran: One Year Later


WASHINGTON, DC – This month marks the one-year anniversary of the contested re-election of hard-line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which spurred the country’s largest popular uprisings since the 1979 Islamic revolution.	发自华盛顿特区——到本月为止，距离伊朗强硬派总统艾哈迈迪内贾德充满争议的连任已经过去整整一年了，而此人亲手镇压的则是自1979年伊斯兰革命以来最大规模的群众起义运动。


While the regime gradually succeeded in violently quelling the momentum of the opposition Green Movement, the country’s deep internal rifts – both among political elites as well as between government and society – are far from being reconciled.	尽管当局逐步用武力遏制住了反对派“绿色运动”的势头，但伊朗国内的深层次矛盾还远未弥合——这既包括了政治精英之间的分歧，也包含了政府与社会之间的分裂。


Among the numerous post-election casualties was the notion of Iran as an “Islamic Republic.”	在选举后所发生的一切留下了许多伤痕，而其中之一就是伊朗作为“伊斯兰共和国”的理念。


As the late Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri put it, the regime’s brutality towards its own people has rendered it “neither Islamic nor a Republic.”	正如已故大阿亚图拉阿里·蒙塔泽里所说，这个政权对其民众的残暴行径已经使之陷入了“既违反了伊斯兰教义，也不像个共和国”的境地。


Another casualty was the legitimacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For two decades, Khamenei deceptively cultivated an image of an impartial and magnanimous guide, but his defiant public support for Ahmadinejad exposed him as a petty, partisan autocrat.	而另一个受损的则是阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊作为最高领袖的合法性。 哈梅内伊用了20年时间把自己装扮成一个公正而仁慈的领袖，但他对内贾德的公然支持却暴露出此人只不过是一个卑鄙的派系独裁者。


Among the unprecedented slogans of last summer’s street protests were thunderous chants of “Khamenei is a murderer, his leadership is void!”	去年夏天的街头抗议中涌现了许多闻所未闻的口号，其中就包括了人们狂风暴雨般的呼声：“哈梅内伊是个凶手，他的统治是非法的! ”


Under Khamenei’s leadership, an unholy trinity of nouveau-riche Revolutionary Guardsmen, hard-line clergymen, and indoctrinated Basij militiamen increasingly wield power.	在哈梅内伊的领导下，权力暴发户式的革命卫队，强硬派神职人员以及盲从的巴斯基民兵组织三者所形成的邪恶联盟逐渐把持了国家权力。


Despite his religious pretensions as a spiritual guide, Khamenei’s future rests largely in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. While opposition to his rule among top clerics in Qom worries Khamenei, opposition within the Revolutionary Guard could be fatal for him.	虽然自称精神领袖，但哈梅内伊的未来在很大程度上都依附于革命卫队，尽管圣城库姆的高级神职人员对其统治的反抗令他感到忧心，但来自革命卫队内部的反对声音才是这位最高精神领袖的致命伤。


Despite the government’s crisis of legitimacy and endemic mismanagement, the Green Movement – nominally led by opposition presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi – faces major obstacles.	而尽管伊朗政府面临着合法性危机及其特有的管理不善问题，但绿色革命运动（表面上是由反对派总统候选人米尔·侯赛因·穆萨维和迈赫迪·卡鲁比所领导的）也面临着一连串重大障碍。


Their brain trust is either in prison, under virtual house arrest, or unable to communicate freely. They lack organization and strategy.	他们的智囊团成员要么就被关进大牢，变相软禁，要么被禁止自由交流，同时还缺乏有效的组织和行动战略。


As protests began last year, the grass-roots nature of the Green Movement was initially thought to be advantageous, given that it could not be easily decapitated.	在去年的抗议中，绿色运动表现出来的草根本质最初被认为是一个优势，因为人们认为这类运动是很难被轻易扼杀的。


“Thirty years ago people were sheep and Khomeini was their shepherd,” a prominent Iranian democratic activist told me.	“三十年前，伊朗人民好比是羊群，而哈梅内伊就是他们的牧羊人，”一位著名伊朗民主运动分子对我说。


“Today we don’t have a shepherd, but the people are no longer sheep.”	“但今天，再也没什么牧羊人，我们也不再是一群羊了。 ”


Despite their strength in numbers however, Mousavi and Karroubi’s excessive reliance on street protests is misguided.	但是人多势众的穆萨维和卡鲁比却犯了一个错误，他们过度依赖的街头抗议模式受到了错误的引导。


While their courageous supporters espouse tolerance and practice non-violence, they are overwhelmed by armed government forces who are willing to kill and die to retain power.	他们那些勇敢的支持者们节制忍让，奉行非暴力抵抗，却没有意识到当局为了维护权力是不惜动用武力来血腥镇压的。


If the Green Movement is to mount a serious challenge to the government it must incorporate support from bazaar merchants, workers in major industries, transportation unions, and government workers. Sustained strikes by these groups would bring the country’s economy to a halt.	而如果绿色运动要对当局形成真正挑战的话，它就必须赢得小商人，关键工业部门的工人，运输工会以及政府职员的支持，因为这些团体的持续抵抗将会导致国内经济的停滞。


This is a tall order, however, given that Iran’s labor groups, while deeply discontented, are just as amorphous as the Green Movement itself.	但这只是个奢望，伊朗的劳工团体虽然对政府不满，但也和绿色运动一样缺乏有效的组织。


What’s more, Mousavi and Karroubi, perhaps chastened in part by the unfulfilled promises and excesses of the Islamic Revolution – are seemingly in no hurry to see abrupt change.	此外，或许在某种程度上在从前伊斯兰革命中夸下的海口以及过激行为中得到了教训，穆萨维和卡鲁比似乎并不急于让国家发生某种剧变。


Instead, they have pursued a gradualist approach that aims to co-opt and recruit disaffected members of the traditional classes, including clergy and Revolutionary Guardsmen, to the Green Movement.	相反，他们采用了一种渐进式的办法，希望能找到诸如神职人员以及革命卫队这些既得利益阶层中的反叛者，并将其拉拢和招募到绿色运动当中去。


The Green Movement’s deliberate approach is complicated by the sense of urgency that the United States, Europe, and especially Israel, feel about the Iranian government’s nuclear ambitions.	然而这一深思熟虑的方案却因为美国，欧洲，特别是以色列对伊朗的核野心所产生的紧迫感而变得复杂化了。


While the role that outside powers like the US can play in affecting political reform in Iran is limited, the Obama administration faces two fundamental challenges in its Iran policy.	虽然像美国这样的国外势力对伊朗国内政治改革的影响十分有限，但是在制定对伊政策这个问题上，奥巴马政府仍然面临着两个根本挑战：


First, how do you reach an accommodation with a regime that seemingly needs you as an adversary?	首先，如果有一个政权将反美作为自己立国之本的话，你又如何能与之达成和解呢？


While a large majority of Iranians want to make amends with the US, for Iran’s hardliners, enmity toward the US has become a central part of the Islamic Republic’s identity.	尽管大部分伊朗民众愿意与美国修好，但对于伊朗国内的强硬派来说，对美国的仇恨已经成为了伊斯兰共和国定义的一个重要组成部分。


“If pro-American tendencies come to power in Iran, we have to say goodbye to everything,” conceded Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the powerful Guardian Council.	正如影响力巨大的宪法监护委员会主席阿亚图拉艾哈迈德·詹纳提所说：“如果亲美势力在伊朗国内当权，那我们就一无所有了。


“After all, anti-Americanism is among the main features of our Islamic state.”	毕竟反美主义是我们这个伊斯兰国家的最重要特征之一。 ”


The second challenge for the US is to champion human rights and democracy in Iran without compromising the independence of opposition forces.	其二，如何在支持伊朗人权和民主的同时却不会影响到反对派的独立性。


Given the diversity of the Green Movement, there is no clear consensus as to which US policies are most constructive.	由于绿色运动内部的多元化成分和分歧，在究竟哪一条美国对伊政策才最有效这个问题上还未达成一致的共识。


There is a seemingly universal belief that America should absolutely refrain from military action, condemn the Islamic Republic’s human rights abuses, and express moral solidarity with the Iranian people.	不过，有一点似乎是被公认的，那就是美国首先应避免军事干涉伊朗，其次要谴责伊斯兰共和国侵犯人权的行为，并在道义上与伊朗人民站在同一阵线上。


There is little agreement, however, when it comes to more contentious questions, such as the potential efficacy of targeted sanctions.	但是在诸如有针对性的制裁的潜在影响等一系列更具争议性的问题上，我们还缺乏应有的共识。


Iran’s first post-revolution prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, reportedly once said that the real leader of the 1979 revolution was not Ayatollah Khomeini but rather the Shah, who united diverse groups of people against him.	据闻伊斯兰革命后的第一任总理迈赫迪·巴扎尔甘曾说，1979年革命的真正领袖并不是霍梅尼，而是当时的国王，因为正是他迫使各种群体最终联合起来一致反对他。


Today, a somewhat similar dynamic exists: the two individuals arguably most responsible for the opposition’s resilience are not Mousavi and Karroubi, but Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.	而今类似的情况又重现了：最能激发反对派力量的人并不是穆萨维和卡鲁比，而是内贾德和哈梅内伊。


Governmental brutality and intimidation can withstand the march of history for years, but not indefinitely.	政府的镇压与恐吓虽然能够暂时延缓历史的脚步，但终将为潮流的车轮所碾碎。


Whatever becomes of the Green Movement in the short term, millions of courageous Iranian protestors made clear to the world last summer that their country’s centennial quest for a democracy is an idea whose time has come.	不管短期内绿色运动如何发展，成千上万的勇敢的伊朗人民已经在去年夏天向全世界证明，他们国家已经走过了近百年的追求民主之路，而今真正的时机，已经近在眼前了。


Iran on the Warpath	迈向战争的伊朗


BERLIN – While Europe remains preoccupied with its own slow-motion crisis, and other global powers continue to be mesmerized by the bizarre spectacle of European officials’ myriad efforts to rescue the euro (and thus the global financial system), clouds of war are massing over Iran once more.	发自柏林——当欧洲依然在自身缓慢发酵的危机中挣扎，而其他世界大国正持续关注欧洲官员们是如何使用无数种荒诞愚蠢的手段去拯救欧元（以及整个全球金融系统）的时候，战争的阴云却再一次笼罩了伊朗。


For years, Iran has been pursuing both a nuclear program and the development of long-range missiles, which points to only one conclusion: the country’s leaders are intent on building nuclear weapons, or at least on reaching the technological threshold beyond which only a single political decision is required to achieve that end.	这些年来伊朗一直在同时发展核项目以及远程导弹技术，而这只可能指向一个结论：这个国家的领导人蓄意研发核武器，或至少试图跨越该技术的门槛，到时只需一声令下，就能立刻造出核武器。


The latter course would arguably keep Iran within the scope of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it is a signatory.	对于作为《核不扩散条约》签署国的伊朗来说，第二个进程从逻辑上讲是不违规的。


But there can be no reasonable doubt about the Iranian leadership’s intentions.	但对伊朗领导人真实意愿的质疑却是无可辩驳的。


Otherwise, Iran’s nuclear and missile programs would be a pointless waste of money.	因为如果不发展核武器的话，伊朗的导弹以及核项目就等于浪费金钱。


After all, Iran does not need uranium-enrichment technology. The country has only one civilian nuclear reactor, with fuel rods supplied by Russia, and the Iranian technology now being developed cannot be used in it.	毕竟伊朗不需要铀浓缩技术：这个国家只有一个民用核反应堆，作为燃料的铀棒可以由俄罗斯提供，而伊朗目前正在发展的相关技术也无法应用在这个反应堆上。


But uranium enrichment makes a lot of sense if you want a nuclear weapon; indeed, for that purpose, enrichment is indispensable.	但如果要制造核武器的话，那么进行铀浓缩就合情合理了； 事实上，浓缩是实现这一目标的必经之路。


Moreover, Iran is building a heavy-water reactor, supposedly for research purposes, but which is also needed to build a plutonium bomb.	此外伊朗正在建设一个重水反应堆，虽说是为了科学研究，但也是制造原子弹所需的设备。


Iran has, in violation of the NPT, hidden substantial parts of this program.	伊朗隐瞒该项目大部分内容的行为已经违反了《核不扩散条约》。


The country has also spent millions of dollars on illegal purchases of enrichment technology and nuclear-weapon designs from the Pakistani nuclear scientist and black marketeer A.Q. Khan, the “Father of the Pakistani bomb.”	该国同时还斥资数百万美元从身兼核科学家和黑市商人双重身份的“巴基斯坦核弹之父” 阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗那里购买浓缩技术和核弹设计图纸。


Iran tried to conceal these transactions for years, until its cover was blown when Libya began to cooperate with the West and exposed the Khan network.	数年来伊朗一直试图掩盖这一交易，但随着利比亚与西方展开合作并揭发了巴基斯坦人的交易网络，一切都大白于天下。


An Iran armed with nuclear weapons (or one political decision away from possessing them) would drastically alter the Middle East’s strategic balance.	一个拥有（或者只需一个政治决定就能造出）核武器的伊朗将急剧改变中东地区的战略平衡态势。


At best, a nuclear-arms race would threaten to consume this already-unstable region, which would endanger the NPT, with far-reaching global consequences.	最好的结果是一场核武竞赛将威胁并拖垮这个本已动荡不安的地区，同时影响到《核不扩散条约》的效力并产生无法预知的全球性后果。


At worst, nuclear weapons would serve Iran’s “revolutionary” foreign policy in the region, which the country’s leaders have pursued since the birth of the Islamic Republic in 1979.	最坏的结果则是核武将为伊朗自1979年建立伊斯兰共和国以来一直追求的“革命”外交政策助加一把力。


The combination of an anti-status quo foreign policy and nuclear weapons and missiles is a nightmare not only for Israel, which at least has second-strike capabilities, but also for Iran’s non-nuclear Arab neighbors and Turkey.	这个反现状外交政策以及核武器/导弹的结合体不仅将成为以色列的噩梦（该国至少还有二次打击能力），连那些没有核武器的阿拉伯邻国以及土耳其都岌岌可危。


Indeed, the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, feel more existentially threatened by Iran than Israel does.	事实上，包括沙特阿拉伯在内的海湾国家感觉来自伊朗的现实威胁比以色列更多。


Europe’s security profile, too, would change dramatically if Iran were to possess nuclear warheads and long-range missiles.	如果伊朗拥有核弹头以及长程导弹的话，欧洲的防务状况也将发生巨变。


All attempts at negotiations have led nowhere, with Iran continuing to enrich uranium and improve its nuclear technology.	一直以来所有谈判努力都宣告无效，伊朗照样进行铀浓缩并改进自身核技术。


Sanctions, while useful, work only in the very long term, and a change in the balance of power within the country is not foreseeable in the short term.	制裁虽然有效，但却只能造成长期影响，而短期内这个国家的权力制衡状态似乎没什么改变的迹象。


So it is only a matter of time – and not much time – until Iran’s neighbors and the international community will confront a fateful choice: either accept Iran as a nuclear power, or decide that the mere prospect, as it becomes more realistic, is leading to war.	因此这只是个时间问题（也不剩多少时间）：伊朗的邻国以及国际社会都将最终面对一个命运的抉择——要么承认伊朗作为核势力的存在，要么选择一个发生概率最小但也越来越现实的选项：战争。


President Barack Obama has already made clear that the United States will not accept Iran as a nuclear power under any circumstances.	美国总统奥巴马已经明确指出联合国在任何情况下都不会承认伊朗作为核势力存在。


The same is true of Israel and Iran’s Arab neighbors in the Gulf.	而以色列和海湾地区的阿拉伯邻国也持有同样立场。


The next year promises to be critical.	而明年则显得相当关键。


The Israeli government recently suggested that Iran would reach the nuclear threshold within nine months, and Iran could become a major issue in the long run-up to the US presidential election in November 2012.	以色列政府最近提示说伊朗可能在九个月内达到核门槛，而伊朗问题也会成为现在到2012年12月美国总统大选之间这段长时期的热门话题。


And it is difficult to imagine that Israel’s current government will stand by idly while Iran becomes a nuclear power (or a nuclear quasi-power).	同时也很难想象以色列现任政府会对伊朗逐渐成长为核势力（或者准核势力）的状况无动于衷。


On the other hand, talk of military intervention – which, under the circumstances, would largely boil down to air strikes – is cheap.	在另一方面，关于军事介入的讨论——在目前情况下很可能会归结为空中打击——收效甚微。


There are grave doubts about whether the Iranian nuclear program could be eliminated from the air.	各方都严重怀疑靠空中打击是否能完全毁灭伊朗核项目。


In fact, with large parts of the world most likely condemning any attack, military intervention could clear the diplomatic path to an Iranian bomb.	事实上由于世界上大部分国家都会谴责任何形式的打击，军事介入反而会为伊朗拥有核弹扫清外交障碍。


It is better not to dwell on what the Middle East might look like after this kind of confrontation.	我们无法想象经历这么一场冲突之后的中东地区将是何种景象。


Iranian opposition forces would likely be the first victim of Western military action, and, elsewhere in the region, the Arab Spring would likely be submerged under a massive anti-Western wave of solidarity with Iran.	伊朗反对派势力将首先成为西方军事行动的受害者，而在该地区的其��地方，“阿拉伯之春”也将被大规模声援伊朗的反西方浪潮所淹没。


The region would be pushed back into violence and terror, instead of continuing its transformation from the bottom up.	原本正在由下至上持续转型的中东将重新回复到暴力与恐怖状态中。


The effects on the global economy would be no less significant, to say nothing of the humanitarian consequences.	这对世界经济的影响必然不小，更别提由此而生的人道主义灾难了。


A last-ditch diplomatic solution appears unlikely, given that the nuclear question plays a decisive role in the Iranian regime’s factional struggles, in which anyone favoring compromise can be considered the loser.	由于核问题在伊朗国内派系斗争中扮演着重要角色，任何持妥协立场的派系都会被认定是失败者，因此在希望在最后一刻达成外交解决方案也是不太可能的。


Moreover, Iran’s leaders seem to assume that the country is too big and too strong to be subdued by sanctions or air strikes.	此外伊朗领导人似乎也确信自己的国家足够强大，根本不会在制裁或者空中打击面前屈服。


Historically, the road to disaster has usually been paved with good intentions and grave errors of judgment.	从历史上看，通往灾难之路通常都是由良好的意愿以及严重错误的判断所铺就的。


That could happen again in 2012, when miscalculations on all sides could clear the path to war or a nuclear Iran – or, quite realistically, to both. Further escalation in the Middle East will culminate in these wretched alternatives sooner rather than later, unless a diplomatic solution is found (or unless diplomacy can at least buy time).	而除非能找到外交解决方案（或者至少能利用外交手段拖延一点时间），这一切都可能在2012年重演，因为各方的错误判断都可能为战争或者一个核武伊朗（也更可能两者并存）铺平道路。


Unfortunately, that may be unlikely in the year ahead.	但不幸的是，这个外交解决方案不太可能在来年产生。


In the absence of any viable route to US diplomatic engagement with Iran, the burden of organizing, convening, and conducting such highly sensitive negotiations falls on Europe.	由于美国未能与伊朗建立任何可见的外交路径，组织，召集和执行这种高度敏感谈判的任务就落到了欧洲身上。


And European leaders, as Iran knows very well, have other things on their minds.	而欧洲领导人自顾不暇的状况，恰恰符合伊朗的心意。


Iran’s Syrian Power Grab and Saudi Arabia	伊朗在叙利亚的攫权和沙特阿拉伯


RIYADH – Inviting Iran to the next round of talks on the Syria crisis in Vienna, Austria – an invitation that was reiterated last week – has far-reaching implications.	利雅得—邀请伊朗参加在维也纳举行的叙利亚危机下一轮谈判——这一邀请在上周被重申——将产生深远影响。


In fact, Iran’s current government is attempting to overthrow a balance of power that has endured for some 1,400 years – and Saudi Arabia, as the cradle of the Muslim world, will not allow it.	事实上，伊朗现任政府正在试图颠覆维系了大约1,400年的实力平衡——而穆斯林世界的发祥地沙特阿拉伯不会允许这一情况发生。


The divide between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Middle East’s most prominent Shia and Sunni powers, respectively, has deep roots.	伊朗和沙特阿拉伯分别是中东地区最主要的什叶派和逊尼派力量，它们之间的分歧有着深刻的根源。


If we are to understand what is really happening in the Middle East today – not just in Syria – one must consider the origins of the Sunni-Shia schism, the Arab-Persian divide, and past struggles over the governance of Islam.	如果我们想要理解当今中东——而不仅仅是叙利亚——真正在发生什么，就必须考虑逊尼派-什叶派对立、阿拉伯半岛分裂以及过去围绕伊斯兰教统治权的斗争的源头。


Islam was divided between Sunni and Shia after the prophet Muhammad died and a new successor had to be chosen.	伊斯兰教在其创始人、先知穆罕默德死后因为继承人选问题而分裂为逊尼派和什叶派。


Most of his followers, who became known as Sunni Muslims, felt that the faithful should base their decision on ability, and supported the Muslim elders’ choice of Muhammad’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr.	穆罕穆德的大部分追随者，即日后的逊尼派穆斯林，觉得信徒的决定应该以能力为基础，支持长老们所选择的穆罕默德的岳父阿布巴克尔。


But a small dissident group, who would eventually become known as Shia Muslims, were adamant that the new caliph should be a blood relative of the prophet, and thus decided that Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib (the fourth caliph, according to Sunnis) was his rightful successor.	但少数异见者，即后来的什叶派穆斯林，坚决主张新哈里发必须是先知的血亲，因此认为穆罕默德的女婿兼堂弟阿里（按照逊尼派的说法，他是第四任哈里发）才是正确的继承人。


Today, 90% of all Muslims are Sunni, and 10% are Shia.	如今，90%的穆斯林为逊尼派，10%为什叶派。


While this disagreement was playing out, so was the Muslim conquest of Persia, which began just a year after the prophet’s death in 632.	在这一分歧愈演愈烈的同时，穆斯林从先知逝世（632年）的第二年开始征服了波斯。


The Persian Sassanid Empire, exhausted financially and militarily from decades of warfare with the Byzantine Empire, endured a decisive defeat in the Battle of Qadisiyyah in 636.	在与拜占庭帝国的长达数十年的战争中，波斯萨珊王朝耗尽了财力军力，终于在636年的嘎底西叶战役中惨败。


The next year, the Persian emperor, Yazdegerd III, fled to the border province of Khorasan and the Arabization of Persia began, with Persians taking Arab names and converting to Islam.	第二年，波斯皇帝伊嗣俟逃往边境的呼罗珊省，波斯开始阿拉伯化，波斯人开始起阿拉伯名字，改宗伊斯兰教。


By 651, almost all major urban centers in Persia were under Arab control, adding momentum to the process.	651年，波斯几乎所有大城市都被阿拉伯所控制，更加速了这一进程。


The mass conversion to Islam among Persians was the first step toward the establishment of the first caliphate, a political-religious state comprising all Muslim lands.	波斯人大规模改宗伊斯兰教是第一哈里发帝国建立的第一步。 第一哈里发帝国是一个包括所有穆斯林领土的政教合一国家。


At various times in history, caliphates have extended into Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe.	哈里发帝国在历史上多次入侵亚洲、非洲和欧洲各部。


The effort by various forces seeking to control or restore the caliphate is a recurrent theme throughout Islam’s history.	在伊斯兰教历史上，各种力量一直在试图控制或重建哈里发帝国。


The so-called Islamic State is only the latest example of this.	所谓的伊斯兰国只不过是最新的例子。


Until the year 1500, almost all Persians were Sunni Muslims.	直到1500年，几乎所有波斯人都是逊尼派穆斯林。


Then, Shah Ismail – the first Shah and the founder of the Safavid Dynasty – began a brutal policy of forcing Persian Muslims to become Shia, in order to distinguish his iteration of Persia’s empire from the more powerful Constantinople-based and fervently Sunni Ottoman caliphate.	接着，伊斯迈尔沙阿（Shah Ismail）——第一任沙阿兼萨非王朝创始人——开始了迫使波斯穆斯林改宗什叶派的残酷政策，以使他这一脉的波斯帝国与实力更强的、以君士坦丁堡为首都的、往往信奉逊尼派的奥斯曼哈里发帝国区别开来。


This history clearly informs Iran’s actions today.	这段历史可以澄清伊朗今天的行为。


As Shia Muslims, Iranians are a minority within the Muslim community, a reality that has caused them to feel persecuted.	作为什叶派穆斯林，伊朗人在穆斯林世界中是少数派，这一现实让他们有一种遭到迫害的感觉。


Rather than accept their minority status, various Iranian governments have attempted to establish their country’s hegemony in the Arab world.	各届伊朗政府拒不接受伊朗身为少数派的地位，而是试图称霸阿拉伯世界。


Of course, Iran not only represents only a tiny minority of Muslims; Iranians are not Arabs.	当然，伊朗所代表的不仅仅是一小撮少数派穆斯林； 伊朗人不是阿拉伯人。


It is thus unfathomable that they would dictate to Arab countries in any capacity.	因此，很难理解他们有能力肆意使唤阿拉伯国家。


But this has not stopped Iran’s government from attempting to commandeer the main levers of Islam, both politically and theologically.	但这并没有停止伊朗政府试图把持伊斯兰教权柄的努力，不管是在政治上还是在技术上。


Using Arab countries’ Shia communities, it is trying to wield control over them, with the ultimate objective of taking over Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, over which the Saudi monarch exercises authority as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.	伊朗利用阿拉伯国家的什叶派群体，试图控制他们，进而达到控制伊斯兰教两大圣城——麦加和麦地那的终极目标。 目前，这两座圣城由沙特君主以两座大清真寺守护者的身份统治。


As the Sunni world’s most influential country, Saudi Arabia knows that it must do what it takes to limit Iran.	作为逊尼派影响力最大的国家，沙特阿拉伯知道，它必须竭尽全力阻止伊朗。


In 2011, a Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council coalition had to neutralize an Iran-sponsored Shia insurgency in Bahrain.	2011年，沙特领导的海湾合作委员会联盟必须遏制伊朗所支持的巴林什叶派叛乱。


This year in Yemen (a predominantly Sunni country), a Saudi-led coalition is fighting the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels, whom Iran armed in order to take over the country and gain a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula.	同一年，在也门（逊尼派占多数的国家），沙特领导的联军与栽德派什叶派胡塞叛军作战。 伊朗为了控制也门、获得在阿拉伯半岛的立足点而为胡塞叛军提供武装。


In Syria – a Sunni-majority country where, incidentally, a Sunni Muslim caliphate, the Umayyads, once prospered – Iran is spending billions of dollars to prop up President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, dominated by members of a minority Shia sect, the Alawites (historically known as Nusayris).	在叙利亚——这是一个逊尼派占少数的国家，碰巧也是逊尼派穆斯林哈里发帝国倭马亚王朝的龙兴之地——伊朗投入数十亿美元支持总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权。 巴沙尔政权由什叶派中的少数派阿拉维派（历史上称为奴萨里派）主导。


Actions by Assad’s supporters have so far caused more than 270,000 deaths, displaced over seven million people internally, forced nearly four million people to flee, and left close to 12 million in need of desperate assistance.	巴沙尔支持者的行为目前已造成270,000多人死亡，超过700万人成为国内流民，迫使近四百万人逃离，更有近1,200万人急需援助。


They have enabled – indeed, fueled – the rise of the Islamic State, and with it a growing threat to the global order, as the successive terrorist attacks in Sharm el-Sheikh, Beirut, and Paris tragically have shown.	他们让伊斯兰国得以兴盛——甚至助了伊斯兰国一臂之力——并给全球秩序造成日益严重的威胁，在沙姆沙伊赫、贝鲁特和巴黎接连发生的恐怖袭击悲剧地证明了这一点。


Given this, Saudi Arabia’s leadership – regardless of what temporary results are achieved through the Vienna talks – will continue to work hard to ensure that Assad is removed from power and that the mayhem is finally brought to an end.	沙特阿拉伯领导层——不顾维也纳谈判目前所达成的暂时性结果——将继续致力于确保巴沙尔下台、结束叙利亚乱象。


The terrorism, proxy wars, arms shipments, nuclear ambitions, and grandiose delusions emerging from Iran are part of an age-old struggle with which the Saudis have had enough.	源自伊朗的恐怖主义、代理战争、军火运输、核野心和浮夸幻想只是沙特人民已经受够了的由来已久的斗争的一部分。


That is why King Salman is overseeing the greatest military acquisition and expansion program in Saudi Arabia’s history.	因此，沙特国王萨勒曼正在主持沙特阿拉伯历史上最大规模的军事兼并和扩张。


And Saudi Arabia will not stop until Iran – and its Shia proxies – abandons its revolutionary fantasies and begins working to bring peace and stability to the Middle East and the wider Arab world.	沙特阿拉伯不会停下脚步，除非伊朗——及其什叶派代理人——放弃其革命幻想，开始致力于将和平与稳定带给中东和更广阔的阿拉伯世界。


The Middle East’s Cold War	中东的冷战


PRINCETON – The breach in diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a dangerous watershed in an already unstable, war-torn region.	普林斯顿——伊朗与沙特间外交关系破裂是已经饱受战争蹂躏的动荡的中东地区一道危险的分水岭。


The trigger was the execution by Saudi Arabia of Nimr al-Nimr, a firebrand Shia sheikh who had called for the end of the country’s monarchy.	事件的导火索是沙特处死煽动叛乱的什叶派教士尼米尔·尼米尔，此人曾公开呼吁沙特的君主制度应当终结。


But the rupture has its roots in a strategic rivalry that stretches across the Middle East.	但遍及整个中东地区的战略对抗才是两国关系破裂的根源。


The tensions between the two countries go back many decades, but they became especially acute after Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979.	两国关系紧张由来已久，但1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命后矛盾变得更加尖锐。


The revolution’s leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, did not hide his contempt for the Saudi royal family; he quickly positioned Iran as a champion of “the oppressed” against “the forces of arrogance” – the United States and its local allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.	革命领袖霍梅尼毫不掩饰他对沙特王室的蔑视； 他迅速将伊朗定义为代表“被压迫者”反抗包括美国及其地区盟友沙特和以色列在内的“傲慢势力”。


But while the rivalry has sectarian and ideological components, it is, above all, a pragmatic dispute over regional interests.	尽管不能排除教派和意识形态成分，但最主要的还是争夺地区的实际利益。


Because Iran views the political order in the Arab world as serving its enemies’ interests, it has continuously sought to upend it, promoting terrorist groups and deploying proxies in order to establish and expand its influence in the region.	因为伊朗认定阿拉伯世界政治秩序是在为敌人的利益服务，因此它不断尝试颠覆这一秩序，为建立和扩大其地区影响而发展恐怖组织并部署代理势力。


The non-state actors Iran has supported include rioting pilgrims in Mecca, suicide bombers in Lebanon, and Hezbollah militants, who have launched attacks on Israel and, more recently, battled Saudi-backed rebel groups in Syria.	伊朗支持过麦加的暴乱朝圣者、黎巴嫩自杀式炸弹袭击者和真主党游击队，后者不久前袭击过以色列，并曾在最近与沙特支持的叙利亚叛乱团体作战。


Until the turn of the century, Saudi Arabia’s response was tepid; it sought to establish its Islamic legitimacy through strict enforcement of the religion’s dictates at home and support for Muslim liberation causes abroad, most notably in Afghanistan and Bosnia.	直到世纪之交，沙特的反应一直不温不火； 它试图通过在国内严格执行教规、在国外支持穆斯林解放运动来确立自身（尤其是）在阿富汗和波斯尼亚的合法地位。


But in recent decades, the cold war between the two regional powers has heated up.	但几十年来，这两个地区大国之间的冷战愈演愈烈。


After the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to the formation of a Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, Saudi Arabia’s rulers watched in alarm as Iran extended its influence across the Middle East.	在2003年入侵伊拉克导致巴格达组成由什叶派领导的政府后，伊朗影响力遍及整个中东引起了沙特统治者的高度警惕。


In 2006, Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill in Lebanon.	2006年，真主党与以色列的战斗陷入了僵局。


Then, in 2014, Shia Houthi rebels – another Iranian proxy group – conquered the capital of Yemen.	其后，在2014年，什叶派胡塞反政府武装——也是伊朗的另一个代理团体—— 征服了也门的首都。


In the royal palaces in Riyadh, the prospect of Iranian-backed uprisings in Bahrain – or in Saudi Arabia itself – began to look alarmingly plausible.	在利雅得皇宫，伊朗支持巴林——或沙特国内——发动起义的可能性越来越不可忽视。


Things came to a head in 2015, when the US and the other five permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany) reached a nuclear accord with Iran, agreeing to lift economic sanctions while allowing the country to maintain its regional influence.	2015年局势发展到高潮，美国及联合国安理会（外加德国）等五大常任理事国与伊朗达成核协议，同意在解除经济制裁的同时允许该国保持其地区影响力。


With Iranian allies or proxies operating in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s leaders have felt increasingly surrounded.	随着伊朗盟国或代理在叙利亚、伊拉克、黎巴嫩和也门的日渐活跃，沙特领导人越来越感到被周边的伊朗势力所包围。


Since Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s accession to the throne in January 2015, the kingdom’s principal strategic aim has been to roll back Iran’s influence – with or without US help.	2015年1月萨勒曼·本·阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹登基后，王国的主要战略目标就是要遏制伊朗的影响力——无论有没有美国的支持。


The rivalry’s principal battlegrounds are Syria and Yemen.	叙利亚和也门是对抗的主阵地。


In Syria, Saudi Arabia has dedicated itself to the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad, a key Iranian ally, and has worked to unite the woefully disorganized opposition groups.	在叙利亚，沙特致力于推翻伊朗的重要盟友总统巴沙尔·阿萨德，并竭尽全力团结乱成一团的反对派团体。


Iran, for its part, continues to back Assad, with the help of Russia.	而伊朗则在俄国的协助下继续为阿萨德提供支持。


The war has turned into a quagmire.	战争已经陷入僵局。


With no side able to gain the upper hand, the violence is likely to continue.	由于没有哪一方能够占据上风，暴力很可能仍将持续下去。


A recent US-led effort to broker a peace deal in Lebanon, carried out in the hope that this could lead to a breakthrough in Syria, fell victim to the distrust between the two countries.	最近一次以美国为首试图就叙利亚问题取得突破并在黎巴嫩达成和平协定的努力因为两国间的互不信任而功亏一篑。


The proposed power-sharing agreement would have replaced Assad with one of his allies and installed a long-time Saudi client as Prime Minister.	拟议中的权力分享协议本打算用阿萨德的盟友来取代阿萨德，并让沙特的一名长期委托人担任总理一职。


But while the Saudis appeared willing to accept the deal, Iran rejected it after Hezbollah balked at both candidates.	尽管沙特似乎愿意接受协议，但伊朗却在真主党拒绝两位候任人选后拒绝了这项提议。


In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies launched a military campaign in March 2015 that quickly ground down into another stalemate.	在也门，沙特及其逊尼派盟友于2015年3月发起一场军事行动，之后很快再次陷入胶着状态。


Pro-Iranian Houthi fighters and forces loyal to former President Ali Saleh have fought off a force of southern Yemenis backed by Saudi and Emirati air power and special forces.	亲伊朗的胡塞战士和忠于前总统阿里·萨利赫的军队已经击退了沙特支持的南也门军以及阿联酋空军和特种部队。


Negotiations to resolve the conflict have collapsed.	谈判解决冲突的前景已经崩溃。


In the absence of a full-scale invasion – which is not likely, given the potential for large-scale casualties – the war will almost certainly drag on.	在不进行全面入侵的情况下——鉴于有可能造成大规模伤亡全面入侵的可能性不大——这场战争几乎肯定会继续下去。


Saudi Arabia’s execution of al-Nimr was part of a broader crackdown on domestic opposition; the sheikh was one of 47 people executed on charges of terrorism, all but four of them Sunni militants accused of supporting Al Qaeda.	沙特处决尼米尔是大面积镇压国内反对派行动的组成部分； 这位教士是因恐怖指控被处决的47个人之一，其中除四人外均为被控支持基地组织的逊尼派武装分子。


The reaction of Iran and its supporters – with violent anti-Saudi protests not only in Tehran, where the kingdom’s embassy was sacked, but also in Iraq and Bahrain – merely revealed the full depth of the underlying bilateral enmity.	伊朗及其支持者所做出的反应——不仅德黑兰、而且伊拉克和巴林均爆发了针对沙特的暴力抗议活动并洗劫了该国使馆——不过是向外界展示了两国的仇恨有多深。


In the short term, Iran’s response has benefited Saudi Arabia’s rulers, rallying Sunnis both within the kingdom and abroad and silencing their jihadi opponents.	短期看，伊朗的反应有利于沙特统治者，可以团结国内外逊尼派力量并压制其圣战反对派的呼声。


But without some external intervention to bring the two countries to the bargaining table, their rivalry will derail efforts to stabilize the Middle East and could lead to spillover and escalation, making a bad regional environment much worse.	但如果没有外部干预让两国重新开始谈判，他们的敌对行动将破坏中东的稳定努力，并可能导致溢出和升级效应，从而使本已糟糕的地区环境更加不可收拾。


God and Woman in Iran	伊朗的神和女人


PRINCETON – My grandmother was one of the first women to study mathematics and physics at the University of Vienna.	普林斯顿—我的祖母是维也纳大学第一批学习数学和物理学的女学生之一。


When she graduated, in 1905, the university nominated her for its highest distinction, an award marked by the presentation of a ring engraved with the initials of the emperor.	1905年她毕业时，维也纳大学授予她最高荣誉——刻有帝国首字母缩写的戒指。


But no woman had previously been nominated for such an honor, and Emperor Franz Joseph refused to bestow the award upon one.	但在此之前，从未有女生获得过如此殊荣，约瑟夫皇帝从未破过例。


More than a century later, one might have thought that by now we would have overcome the belief that women are not suited to the highest levels of education, in any area of study.	一百多年过去了，你可能会认为，我们早已克服了女人不适合某个研究领域的最高等教育的陈腐观念。


So it is disturbing news that more than 30 Iranian universities have banned women from more than 70 courses, ranging from engineering, nuclear physics, and computer science to English literature, archaeology, and business.	因此，30所伊朗大学禁止女学生选修70多门课程——包括工程学、核物理学、计算机科学、英语言文学、考古学、商学等——的消息不可谓不令人不安。


According to Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian lawyer, human-rights activist, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, the restrictions are part of a government policy to limit women’s opportunities outside the home.	在伊朗律师、人权活动家、诺贝尔和平奖获得者伊巴迪（Shirin Ebadi）看来，这项限制是伊朗政府制约女性走出家门机会的政策的一部分。


The bans are especially ironic, given that, according to UNESCO, Iran has the highest rate of female to male undergraduates in the world.	让禁课令显得尤为可笑的是，联合国教科文组织的数据显示，伊朗本科学生的女生：男生比例为全世界最高。


Last year, women made up 60% of all students passing university exams, and women have done well in traditionally male-dominated disciplines like engineering.	去年，在所有通过大学入学考试的学生中，女生占了60%，在传统上男生占绝大多数的专业（如工科），女生的表现也极为出色。


It may well be female students’ very success – and the role of educated women in opposing Iran’s theocracy – that led the government to seek to reverse the trend.	也许正是女生所获得的成功——以及受教育女性在反对伊朗神权体制中所起到的作用——让政府寻求扭转这一趋势。


Now, women like Noushin, a student from Esfahan who told the BBC that she wanted to be a mechanical engineer, are unable to achieve their ambitions, despite getting high scores on their entrance exams.	如今，向诺欣（Noushin）——她是一位伊斯法罕女生，她告诉BBC，自己的梦想是成为一名机械工程师——这样的女生根本无从实现自己的雄心壮志，尽管她们在入学考试中获得了高分。


Some claim that the ideal of sexual equality represents a particular cultural viewpoint, and that we Westerners should not seek to impose our values on other cultures.	一些人说，性别平等的理想体现了一种特别的文化观，我们西方人不应该把自己的价值观强加给其他文化。


It is true that Islamic texts assert in various ways the superiority of men to women.	诚然，伊斯兰教条中存在众多男性主宰女性的教义。


But the same can be said of Jewish and Christian texts; and the right to education, without discrimination, is guaranteed in several international declarations and covenants, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which almost all countries, including Iran, have agreed.	但犹太教和基督教教条中也存在这些教义，且不少被包括伊朗在内的几乎所有国家所首肯的国际宣言和条约，如《世界人权宣言》，都要求保证男性和女性拥有无差别的受教育权。


Discrimination against women is part of a broader pattern of official bias in Iran, especially against those who are neither Muslim nor members of one of the three minority religions – Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity – recognized in the Iranian Constitution.	歧视女性只是伊朗社会正式偏见的一部分，特别是针对伊朗宪法认定的既非穆斯林、又非三大少数教派（拜火教、犹太教和基督教）信徒的女性的歧视。


To enroll in a university, for example, one must declare oneself to be a believer in one of the four recognized religions.	比如，要想上大学，你就必须信仰宪法承认的四大教派之一。


Atheists, agnostics, or members of Iran’s Bahai community are not accepted.	无神论者、不可知论者或巴哈教徒在伊朗是无权上大学的。


Imagine how we would react if someone tried to excuse racial discrimination by arguing that it is wrong to impose one’s culture on others.	试想一下，如果某人试图以不能用一种文化凌驾于其他文化之上之名行种族歧视之实，我们应该如何应对。


It was, after all, for many years the “culture” of some parts of the United States that people of African descent should sit at the back of the bus and go to separate schools, hospitals, and universities.	毕竟，在美国，多年来都有一种“文化”，认为非洲裔应该坐在公交车的后部、上隔离学校、医院和大学。


It was the “culture” of apartheid South Africa that blacks should live apart from whites and have separate, and inferior, educational opportunities.	种族隔离的南非也有一种“文化”，认为黑人应该和白人分开生活，黑人应该接受分离的等而下之的教育机会。


Or, to put it more accurately, it was the culture of the whites who held power in these places at that time.	直白地说，这些都是当时掌握权力的白人的文化。


The same is true in Iran.	伊朗也是如此。


The country’s rulers are all male and Muslim.	这个国家的统治者是男性和穆斯林。


Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s call in 2009 for the “Islamization” of universities led to courses being changed and the replacement of some academic staff by more conservative figures.	最高领袖哈梅内伊在2009年呼吁大学“伊斯兰化”，导致大学课程有所修改，一些学者也被更保守的人物代替了。


Two months ago, Khamenei said that Iranians should return to traditional values and have more children – which would have obvious implications for the role of women, quite apart from the environmental impact.	两个月前，哈梅内伊说伊朗人民应该回归价值，生更多的孩子——这显然会对女性的角色形成重大影响，更不用说环境影响了。


The international sanctions against Iran that are currently in place seek to prevent the regime from building nuclear weapons, not to persuade it to end discrimination against women or on religious grounds.	目前，针对伊朗的国际制裁的目的是防止伊朗政权制造出核武器，而不是为了说服其放弃性别和宗教歧视。


There are no widespread boycotts of Iran’s universities, or of its other products, as there were against apartheid South Africa.	对伊朗的大学和其他产品并不存在如同当年的种族隔离的南非那样的普遍的抵制。


It seems that we still take sexual and religious discrimination less seriously than we take racial and ethnic discrimination.	看起来，我们对性别和宗教歧视的重视程度仍比不上种族和血统歧视。


Perhaps we are more ready to accept that the biological differences between men and women are relevant to the roles they play in society.	也许我们更愿意接受男性和女性的生理差别决定了相应的社会角色的观点。


There are such differences, and they are not purely physical.	男女确实存在差别，而且不完全是生理上的差别。


So we should not leap to the conclusion that if most engineers are men, there must be discrimination against women.	因此，我们不能一下子就得出这样的结论，认为既然大部分工程师是男的，就一定存在对女性的歧视。


It may be that more men than women want to be engineers.	这有可能是因为想当工程师的男性比女性更多造成的。


That, however, is a completely different question from whether women who do want to become engineers and are qualified to study engineering should be denied the opportunity to achieve their ambition.	但这与剥夺有志成为工程师也通过了工程师入学考试的女生实现愿望的机会绝不是同一个问题。


By explicitly preventing women from enrolling in courses open to men, Iran has taken a step that is as indefensible as racial discrimination, and that should be condemned just as forcefully.	命令禁止女生选修向男生开房的课程，伊朗的这一举措和种族歧视一样站不住脚，应该被千夫所指。


Iran’s Electoral Strategy	伊朗的大选战略


WASHINGTON, DC – Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have again hit a wall, but the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appears unconcerned.	华盛顿—伊朗和谈判再次陷入了瓶颈，但伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊似乎并不担心。


Indeed, Khamenei seems convinced that neither the United States nor Israel will attack its nuclear facilities – at least not before the US presidential election in November. 	事实上，哈梅内伊似乎已经认定美国和以色列都不会袭击伊朗的核设施，至少在11月美国大选前是如此。


Ironically, while Khamenei is no fan of democracy, he relies on the fact that his principal enemies are bound by democratic constraints.	讽刺的是，尽管哈梅内伊并不是民主派，但他却利用了其主要敌人被民主缚住了手脚的事实。


Khamenei controls Iran’s nuclear program and its foreign policy, but the US and Israel must work to reach consensus not only within their respective political systems, but also with each other.	哈梅内伊控制着伊朗的核计划和外交政策，但美国和以色列不但要在各自的政治制度内部形成一致，还必须在彼此之间消除分歧。


Iran’s leaders, who closely follow Israeli political debates, believe that Israel would not launch an assault on their nuclear facilities without America’s full cooperation, because unilateral action would jeopardize Israel’s relations with its most important strategic ally.	密切关注以色列政坛争论的伊朗领导人认为以色列不可能在没有美国全面合作的情况下袭击伊朗核设施，因为单边行动会影响以色列与其最重要战略盟友之间的关系。


Given that an Israeli offensive would need to be coordinated with the US, while an American assault would not require Israeli military support, Iran would consider both to be American attacks.	以色列的进攻必须有美国的合作，而美国的进攻并不需要以色列的军事支持，因此不管是以色列还是美国发动袭击，伊朗都会认为是美国干的。


But Iran’s leaders remain skeptical of either scenario, despite America’s official position that “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.	但伊朗领导人对其他可能仍持怀疑态度，尽管美国的官方立场是将“动用台面上的一切选择”来防止伊朗发展核武器。


So far, they simply do not feel enough pressure to consider a compromise.	目前，美国显然已不满足于向伊朗施压促成妥协。


In fact, Iran’s leaders continue to deride Israel from afar, calling the country an “insult to humanity,” or a “tumor” in the region that must be eradicated.	事实上，伊朗领导人依然在隔岸嘲弄以色列，说这个国家是“人类的耻辱”，是该地区的“肿瘤”，必须予以切除。


Meanwhile, Iran’s citizens – including clergy in the holy city of Qom, near the Fordow nuclear facility – are deeply concerned about the consequences of an attack.	与此同时，伊朗人民——包括位于富尔道（Fordow）核设施附近的圣城库姆（Qom）的神职人员——十分担心袭击的后果。


Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, a former attorney general and a religious authority (marja’), has asked the government to refrain from provoking Israel.	前司法部长、宗教人士marja’ 塞内（Ayatollah Yousef Sanei）要求政府保持克制，不要挑衅以色列。


Indeed, critics of the government believe that its incendiary rhetoric might lead to a devastating war.	事实上，政府批评者认为，伊朗政府大逞口舌之利可能引起毁灭性战争。


But, from the perspective of Iran’s leadership, the taunting has tactical value to the extent that it reinforces the view among the Israeli public that Iran is a dangerous enemy, willing to retaliate fiercely.	但是，从伊朗领导层的角度看，嘲弄具有战术价值，能够在以色列公众中增强伊朗是个危险敌人的印象，从而想要以牙还牙。