Britain can and should champion an agenda that confronts questions of energy efficiency (through an energy and environmental union), fair taxation (through a plan for dealing with tax havens), and security (through heightened cross-border intelligence gathering and policing against terrorism and illegal immigration).	英国应当并且可以提出一份议程，（通过能源和环境联盟）解决能源效率、（通过制定处理避税天堂计划）公平税负并（通过强化跨境情报收集和打击恐怖主义及非法移民的政策制定）来保障区域安全。


The British blueprint for a reformed Europe should be bold and far-sighted, recognizing the social dimension to the single market and deepening pan-European collaboration in scientific research.	英国绘制的欧洲改革蓝图应当敢作敢为、高瞻远瞩，充分认识到单一市场在社会层面的特点并深化科研领域的泛欧合作。


By embracing the reality that we can achieve more through cooperation than isolation, such a blueprint could become the agenda for the UK Presidency of the EU in 2017 and usher in an era of greater cross-border engagement.	如果拥抱现实我们可以通过合作获得比孤立更多的好处，这样一份蓝图完全可以成为2017年英国担任欧盟轮值主席国时的指导纲领，从而迎来加强跨境合作的新时代。


We could also use this moment of leadership to advocate for a more cooperative approach to international development and conflict resolution, including a modern European-led Marshall Plan for North Africa and the Middle East.	我们还可以利用上述领导机会来倡导国际发展和冲突解决的深化合作机制，包括由现代欧洲领导北非和中东马歇尔计划的推行。


Britain has an opportunity to be at the forefront of shaping the next stage of Europe’s development.	英国有机会在欧洲发展的下一阶段发挥前沿作用。


For the last, post-imperial half-century, Britain has struggled to find a role that suits our sense of destiny.	在后帝国时期的过去半个世纪，英国一直在试图寻找符合我们使命感的角色。


Through active engagement with Europe, we can show that we are more than one half of a special relationship with America, more than one twenty-eighth of the NATO alliance, and much more than just one member of an ever-growing EU.	通过对欧洲问题的积极参与，我们可以向外界表明英国不仅是英美特殊关系中的一方、不仅是北约联盟的二十八分之一、更远远不仅是不断发展的欧盟当中的一个成员国。


On June 23, we should demonstrate that Britain’s future lies in leading Europe, not in leaving it.	6月23日，我们应当证明英国的未来在于引领、而非脱离欧洲。


Britain by Itself	英国靠自身的力量


LONDON – The United Kingdom’s general election is a little more than a month away, but already the campaign seems to have been with us forever, rolling implacably forward, but with little evidence of any genuine excitement – or even significant movement in the polls.	伦敦——离英国大选还有一个多月，竞选活动却似乎早已开始了很长时间，虽然缺少真正的兴奋点——就连民调都没有什么大的动作。


Support for the two main contenders – the Labour Party and the ruling Conservative Party – seems stuck in the low-to-mid 30s.	工党及执政保守党这两大主要对手的支持者似乎徘徊在30多个百分点。


The Conservatives hope that the government’s record on the economy will convince undecided voters to break in their favor late in the campaign.	保守党希望政府卓越的经济成绩能说服犹豫不决的选民在选举活动的后半程倒向本方。


Maybe they are right; they deserve to be.	他们或许有理由这样想；


In the meantime, Labour seems to be hoping for who-knows-what to turn the tide, while keeping their collective fingers crossed that they will not be eviscerated in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party is threatening to sweep the board.	他们也配得上这样的待遇。 但与此同时，工党似乎指望鬼才知道是什么的因素协助其力挽狂澜，并祈祷自己不要在民族党扬言要大获全胜的苏格兰元气大伤。


One surprise is the election campaign’s insularity.	出人意料的是竞选活动的狭隘。


A dark cloud, in the form of a possible referendum on whether the UK will remain in the European Union hangs over the outcome, but no one talks about it much.	虽然人们都小心翼翼地三缄其口，但决定英国是否留在欧盟的全民公决的阴云自始至终从未散去。


Prime Minister David Cameron has said that a referendum is needed in order to prevent the country from sleepwalking toward an accidental and disastrous EU exit.	戴维·卡梅伦曾表示为防止英国浑浑噩噩地因为意外而灾难性地退出欧盟就必须进行公投。


And so it must come as a surprise to some of Britain’s EU partners that none of the country’s politicians seems to be making any effort to wake a somnambulant public.	因此英国某些欧盟伙伴无疑对英国政客未采取任何措施唤醒正在梦游的民众而感到意外。


More broadly, while much of the world seems to be going to hell in a handbasket, there has been little talk about Britain’s international role and responsibilities.	从更广义的角度讲，虽然世界多数国家似乎正手挽手坠向地狱，但英国国际责任问题所引发的讨论却少之又少。


The UK was once famous for punching above its weight in global affairs, but perhaps the country no longer really matters much – if only because it does not want to matter.	曾几何时英国曾在国际事务中发挥过与自身实力不相称的影响力，但今天或许仅仅因为英国已失去影响世界的意愿，导致该国的地位或许已不那么重要。


The closest anyone has come to putting some international fizz into the campaign was when US President Barack Obama fired a couple of warning shots across the UK’s bow.	首次将国际意愿注入英国竞选的是美国总统奥巴马对英国发出的警告。


The Obama administration seems bent on proving that the so-called “special relationship” goes beyond raucous backslapping.	奥巴马政府似乎执意要证明所谓的“特殊关系”不仅仅停留在热闹地表示友好。


The first salvo – a warning that Britain should not be overly accommodating toward China – followed the UK’s decision to join China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	就在英国决定加入由中国成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行之后，美国发起了英国不宜过于包容中国的第一轮警告。


But the problem is far broader than the AIIB.	但问题远非亚洲基础设施投资银行所能限量。


In any case, it is doubtful that anyone in London will take much notice.	无论如何，伦敦都不一定会听从美国的警告。


These days, policy on China is driven entirely by the Treasury, which subscribes to the view that one can do business with the Chinese only from a position of servility.	如今的对华政策完全受财政部驱动，而财政部认为对华贸易的基础只有对中国言听计从。


The second barrage was over a more serious matter, regarding defense spending.	第二波攻势牵涉到国防开支问题，上述问题显然更加严重。


The criticism was directed at all European members of NATO, but it was clear that the US government believes that Britain bears a special responsibility to maintain its military commitments.	北约所有欧洲成员国都是批评的对象，但有一点非常明确，即美国政府认为英国在兑现其军事承诺方面负有特殊的责任。


The UK has a long track record of scolding its European NATO partners for not spending the 2% of GDP that each has pledged to dedicate to defense; now it appears that Britain itself risks falling short.	英国长期以来一直在指责其欧洲北约伙伴国未能兑现将各自GDP的2%用于国防开支的承诺； 但现在看来英国自己的承诺也很有可能落空。


There is an economic argument against assigning a fixed percentage of national wealth to a given departmental budget.	从经济方面反对将国家财富的固定百分比分配给特定的部门预算有着充分的理由。


The British economy is now growing fast by current European standards, so 2% of GDP is becoming a larger sum.	英国经济按照目前的欧盟标准正实现快速增长，因此GDP的2%意味着更大的金额。


(The same is true of the UK’s similar commitment to the United Nations to spend 0.7% of its GDP on international development assistance.)	（英国像联合国承诺将其GDP的0. 7%用于国际发展援助也是同样的状况。


Government officials presumably recognize the embarrassment that would be caused were Britain to fall short of the 2% target, so they seem to be looking for programs that can be squeezed into the Defense Department’s budget to pad spending.	政府官员想必已经意识到英国达不到2%的目标所能带来的尴尬，因此他们在四处寻找能塞进国防部预算、以抬高开支的计划。


This is exactly the sort of behavior the UK has criticized in others: lumping all sorts of pension payments and intelligence commitments into their calculations of defense spending.	英国过去恰恰常批评别国的类似行为：将各式养老金支付和情报经费纳入到国防开支计划。


There is a very real risk in all of this.	上述做法中有着非常现实的危险因素。


The fact that neither of the major parties is prepared to make the case for increasing defense spending sends the wrong sort of message to Russian President Vladimir Putin.	主要国家谁也不愿增加国防开支的事实向俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京发出了错误的信号。


The proper response to Russian adventurism in Ukraine should not only be to work with the rest of the EU to help the government in Kyiv steady its economy; it should also include ramping up defense spending and convincing NATO members to do the same.	对俄国乌克兰冒险的恰当回应不仅要联合其他欧盟国家协助基辅政府稳定经济； 此外还应包括扩大国防开支并说服北约成员国也这样做。


It is unfortunate that some of the most important issues facing the UK are being ignored in the country’s current election campaign.	不幸的是英国面临的某些最重要问题却在该国目前的竞选活动中遭到忽视。


Whatever the outcome when voters head to the polls on May 7, the next government will have to deal with reality.	无论5月7日选民投票的结果如何，下一届政府将不得不面对现实。


The country’s defense posture and Russia’s threat to European security are sure to be near the top of the next prime minister’s agenda.	英国的防御态势和俄国对欧洲安全的威胁无疑将高居下一届首相议程的榜首。


Ukraine’s Debt Dilemma	乌克兰债务难题


CAMBRIDGE – Insecurity is haunting Ukraine – and not just geopolitical insecurity, but economic insecurity as well.	美国剑桥—不安全性正在困扰乌克兰——不光是地缘政治不安全性，还有经济不安全性。


Output is in freefall.	产出崩盘。


The country’s external deficit is exploding, and borrowing costs have spiked precisely as financing has become imperative.	外债暴增，随着融资问题的日益紧迫，借贷成本也开始飙涨。


The International Monetary Fund has recognized the danger, approving a $17 billion loan in April to stabilize the economy and avert default.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）认识到这一危险，在4月批准了170亿美元贷款以稳定乌克兰经济、避免违约。


But the Fund was overly optimistic about Ukraine’s prospects and its ability to fill the financing gap.	但IMF对乌克兰前景和填补融资空缺的能力太乐观了。


It is now clear that $17 billion will not be enough.	如今，170亿美元显然是不够的。


The IMF had hoped that tensions with Russia would ease, allowing other lenders to step up.	IMF希望与俄罗斯的紧张局面可以缓解，以使其他贷款人跟进。


Instead, continuing conflict has complicated risk assessments and curtailed Kyiv’s access to external finance, raising the likelihood of a disruptive debt default.	相反，持续冲突让风险评估更加复杂化了，也堵塞了基辅获得外部融资的途径，提高了灾难性债务违约的可能性。


Under normal circumstances, there would be little cause for worry.	在正常情况下，乌克兰没有什么可以担心的。


As late as last year, the government’s debt was less than 40% of GDP.	直到去年，政府债务还不到GDP的40%。


Still, for understandable reasons, few investors are keen to lend Ukraine more money.	但是，出于不难理解的原因，恐怕很少会有投资者热切地希望借给乌克兰更多钱。


These short-term liquidity problems will test the country’s ability to meet its debt obligations.	这些短期流动性问题将考验乌克兰履行债务义务的能力。


This is not only unfortunate; it also was avoidable.	这不仅是件不幸事； 它原本是可以避免的。


Indeed, Ukraine’s struggles highlight the need for an agreed framework to resolve sovereign-debt difficulties and govern IMF lending.	事实上，乌克兰的困境凸显出我们需要有一个一致框架解决主权债务难题和管理IMF借贷。


Under the IMF’s current lending framework, if it is “highly probable” that a borrower’s debt is sustainable, the Fund will extend a conditional loan, even for large amounts, to tide it over.	根据IMF的现行借贷框架，如果借款人债务可持续的“概率很高”，则IMF将扩展有条件贷款期限，即使这笔贷款数量很大。


But if a country fails the solvency test, it must impose a sufficiently deep haircut on its bondholders to bring it to the “high probability” standard needed to qualify for IMF assistance.	但如果一国不能通过偿债能力测试，IMF就会对其债券持有人施加足够规模的“剃头”（haircut），以使其符合“高概率”标准从而能够得到IMF的援助。


In such circumstances, restructuring is desirable, because it prevents the money injected by the IMF from simply going to pay off a country’s creditors, which in Ukraine’s case includes Russia.	在这样的环境下，重组是值得追求的选择，因为这能够防止IMF所注入的资金全都被用于偿付债权人——在乌克兰的例子中还包括俄罗斯。


And, because the IMF is virtually always paid back, restructuring avoids putting domestic taxpayers on the hook for a creditor bailout.	此外，由于IMF几乎总能获得偿付，重组可以避免让本国纳税人出钱援助债权人。


But, though this approach works in some circumstances, it is poorly suited for cases of genuine uncertainty like Ukraine.	但是，尽管这一方法在一些环境中起到了作用，但对于乌克兰这样的名符其实的不安全环境，它并不适用。


Who, after all, can say whether Ukraine’s debt is sustainable?	毕竟，谁能说乌克兰债务是否可持续？


The answer today could change tomorrow.	今天的答案放到明天就不一定正确了。


To address cases like this, IMF staff has suggested “re-profiling” rather than restructuring the debt.	为了解决这一问题，IMF建议“重新规划”（re-profiling）债务而不是重组债务。


Re-profiling means lengthening the maturity of bonds while preserving principal and, generally, the coupons.	重新规划意味着延长债券期限，同时保证本金，一般而言息票也能保证。


The country then implements a reform program while receiving financial assistance from the Fund.	然后，债务国实施改革计划，同时获得IMF的金融援助。


This approach would give the country more time to pay without forcing it into default.	这一方法能让债务国获得更多时间偿付债务而不必迫使它违约。


The government would have an opportunity to restore economic growth and get its debt obligations under control. The heavy social and financial costs of an expensive bailout or a disruptive restructuring could thereby be avoided.	政府也有机会重塑经济增长并让债务义务保持可控��昂贵援助或破坏性重组的高昂社会和金融成本也因此能够避免。


Re-profiling would not be straightforward.	重新规划并不容易。


To avoid exciting the markets, it would have to be voluntary.	为了避免刺激市场，它必须是自愿的。


Persuading the bondholders to agree would be challenging – even more so in light of recent court decisions in the United States that strengthen the hand of holdout investors.	说服债券持有人同意是一个挑战——特别是考虑到美国法院的最近裁定加强了顽固抵制投资者的立场。


But there is no superior alternative.	但除此之外找不到更好的办法了。


Ukraine would be an ideal candidate for re-profiling.	乌克兰是重新规划的理想候选。


Given uncertainty about the country’s near-term prospects, both a mega-bailout and a full-fledged debt restructuring would be overkill.	该国短期前景非常不确定，大规模援助和完全的债务重组都会造成过重的代价。


An extension of maturities on its debt repayments is precisely what it needs to weather the storm.	延长其债务支付期限才是抵御风暴的最佳手段。


But, in order to proceed in this way, the IMF must address a second flaw in its current approach: the so-called “systemic exemption” introduced in 2010.	但是，为了能够这样做，IMF必须解决其当前方法的第二个漏洞：2010年引入的所谓“系统性豁免”。


That exemption was created for Greece, because there was no “high probability” that Greek sovereign debt was sustainable, and the IMF’s European members worried that a Greek restructuring would spread financial contagion to other eurozone countries.	系统性豁免为希腊而设，因为不存在“高概率”认为希腊主权债务可持续，而IMF的欧洲成员国担心希腊重组将导致金融传染病蔓延到其他欧元区国家。


In response to their pressure, the Fund gave itself the right to lend to a country whose debt is of questionable sustainability whenever default supposedly threatens the international system.	出于它们的压力，IMF自己给自己授权，在违约有可能威胁到国际系统时向可持续性颇可质疑的国家发放贷款。


Yet, rather than resolving the crisis, the systemic exemption only prolonged it.	但是，系统性豁免并没有解决危机，反而延长了危机。


Greece’s debt started out unsustainable, and it remained unsustainable.	希腊债务一开始不可持续，现在仍然不可持续。


The massive IMF-European Union bailout did nothing to catalyze private capital inflows.	大规模IMF-欧盟援助没有刺激到任何私人资本流入。


When the inevitable restructuring finally came in 2012, it was, in the IMF’s words, “too little, too late.”	当不可避免的重组最终在2012年到来时，用IMF的话说，已经“太少、太迟了。 ”


Unfortunately, the same danger arises in the context of re-profiling.	不幸的是，重新规划也面临这样的危险。


Investors may worry that if one country re-profiles, other countries in its position will re-profile as well.	投资者可能担心，如果一国实施了重新规划，其他处境相似的国家也会依样画葫芦。


Governments will hesitate to recommend re-profiling for fear, justified or not, of destabilizing the international system, and will encourage the IMF to lend large amounts instead.	政府将因为担忧动摇国际系统（不管这种担忧是否合理）而不愿意建议继续拧重新规划，反过来鼓励IMF发放大规模贷款。


IMF staff have recommended scrapping the systemic exemption.	IMF已经建议缩减系统性豁免。


But important shareholders, not just crisis-hit eurozone countries, but also the United States, are reluctant to go along.	但重要相关利益方——不仅包括受危机影响的欧元区国家，还有美国——不愿意这样做。


The Fund needs to act quickly to remove the systemic exemption and create room for the smart use of sovereign-debt re-profiling.	IMF需要快速行动起来取消系统性豁免，为明智地使用主权债务重新规划创造空间。


Countries like Ukraine depend on it.	乌克兰等国家需要依赖重新规划。


Europe’s War in Ukraine	欧洲的乌克兰战争


BERLIN – War is ravaging Europe’s east.	柏林—战争正在蹂躏欧洲东部。


Ukraine is a victim of Russian military aggression, and, like it or not, its fate will essentially determine that of Europe’s, because the current crisis will define the rules and principles that Europeans live by in the twenty-first century.	乌克兰是俄罗斯军事侵略的受害者，不管你喜不喜欢，它的命运将决定欧洲的命运，因为当前危机将确定欧洲在二十一世纪赖以生存的规则和原则。


Will Europe be governed by the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and the inviolability of national borders? Or will sheer might and the willingness to use force triumph?	欧洲将根据自由、民主、法治精神和国界的不可侵犯性的原则来治理，还是黩武和使用武力在最后胜出？


Will “managed” democracy and spheres of influence trump the right of countries, large or small, to determine their own future?	“有管理的”民主和影响力范围会压倒国家（不论大国还是小国）决定自己未来的权利吗？


With the Cold War’s end and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity quickly became a cornerstone of the European order.	随着冷战的结束和苏联的解体，乌克兰的独立和领土完整很快就成为欧洲秩序的一大基石。


This strategic fact is more evident now than ever before.	如今，这一战略实施比以前更加明确。


Simply put, today’s democratic Ukraine is fighting for Europe’s future.	简言之，今天的民主乌克兰在为欧洲的未来而战斗。


Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to restore an international order based on exclusive spheres of influence controlled by major powers – the system that prevailed in Europe’s war-torn eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.	俄罗斯总统普京想重建基于专属主要力量的势力范围的国际秩序——十八和十九世纪的战乱欧洲实行的就是这一体系。


A European Ukraine and the European Union stand in the way of this goal.	欧洲的乌克兰和欧盟是横亘在俄罗斯面前的障碍。


That is why current Russian policy seeks to destabilize Ukraine permanently, especially militarily and financially.	因此，目前俄罗斯寻求永久动摇乌克兰，特别是从军事上和金融上动摇乌克兰。


In its own interest, Europe must not allow this policy to prevail.	出于自身利益，欧洲决不能允许这一政策得逞。


Despite the war in eastern Ukraine, the country has managed to take important steps toward democracy since the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych last February.	尽管乌克兰东部战火纷飞，但自去年2月推翻总统亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）以来，乌克兰仍成功地朝民主迈出了重要步骤。


Indeed, since the “Euromaidan” uprising began in Kyiv in November 2013, a new Ukraine has emerged.	事实上，2013年基辅爆发“欧洲广场”（Euromaidan）骚乱后，新的乌克兰诞生了。


Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections have brought to power leaders who, by implementing radical reforms, are determined to realize voters’ demands for a modern economy and an end to corruption.	自由公平的总统和议会选举把权力交给了决心通过实施彻底改革实现选民对现代经济和结束腐败的渴求的领导人。


Nonetheless, the goal of domestic political stabilization is far from reached.	尽管如此，国内政治稳定的目标远未实现。


Apart from tensions within the Ukrainian government, the main reason is the country’s dire financial situation.	除了乌克兰政府内部的紧张，主要原因还在于该国糟糕的金融状况。


The United States, the European Commission, and the EU’s main member states all agree, at least in principle, that Ukraine needs quick and substantial financial help in order to be able to resist Russian aggression.	美国、欧盟委员会和欧盟主要成员国都同意，至少在原则上，乌克兰急切地需要大量金融援助才能够抵抗俄罗斯的入侵。


Likewise, they agree to support the deep social and economic reforms that Ukraine must carry out.	类似地，它们同意支持乌克兰必须实施的深刻社会和经济改革。


So far, no package has been put together, which is deeply troublesome, because the IMF is authorized to release the money it pledged only if Ukraine’s financial stability is guaranteed for at least 12 months. The country is facing a severe shortage of money, which could lead to a serious financial crisis, in addition to the ongoing and dramatic military crisis.	目前还没有实施任���措施组合，这是个棘手问题，因为根据IMF所获得的授权，只有在乌克兰至少能保证12个月的金融稳定的情况下才能提供承诺的资金。


The EU’s difficulty in devising a concrete financial commitment stems from its dearth of financial means.	欧盟之所以难以做出实质性金融承诺，是因为它自身金融状况也不佳。


A major weakness of EU foreign policy is its lack of versatile instruments for allocating financial aid to neighboring countries.	欧盟外交政策的一大弱点是它缺少综合工具用于向邻国配置金融援助。


It would be absurd if Ukraine were to slide into a financial crisis because the EU could not agree on how to raise the funds to prevent it.	如果乌克兰由于欧盟无法就如何筹集资金阻止其崩溃而崩溃，那将是滑天下之大稽。


The way to avoid that outcome is to adjust one of the EU’s two instruments for non-eurozone members to meet Ukraine’s needs: The Macro-Financial Assistance scheme, a versatile instrument that can combine loans and direct subsidies; or the balance-of-payments assistance facility, which could complement an IMF program to EU countries.	避免这一结果的办法是调整欧盟的两大面向非欧元区成员的工具以满足乌克兰的需要：宏观金融荣援助（Macro-Financial Assistance）机制（结合了贷款和直接补贴的综合工具）； 或收支平衡援助便利（可以对欧盟国偶家实施IMF计划）。


Both instruments could be subject to conditions designed to ensure that the funds do not sustain rampant corruption, but flow instead to where they are needed most.	两大工具都可以具备一些约束条件，以确保资金不会用来维持横行的腐败，而是流向最需要资金的地方。


Moreover, the commitments should be made in the context of a donor agreement that bars the aid from being used to make direct payments to Russia.	此外，承诺必须在资助协议的基础上作出，用这些协议防止援助用于直接向俄罗斯支付。


Today, it is more important to give adequate financial support to Ukraine than to impose new sanctions on Russia.	如今，给予乌克兰足够的金融支持比向俄罗斯施加新制裁措施更加重要。


That is why Russia may also be interested in a donor conference and fresh money from Europe for Ukraine.	因此，俄罗斯也许也对援助会议和欧洲给乌克兰的新鲜资金感兴趣。


Indeed, economic sanctions not only exacerbate the crisis in Russia; they also negatively affect other European countries.	事实上，经济制裁不仅加剧了俄罗斯的危机； 它也消极地影响了其他欧洲国家。


By contrast, financial aid to Ukraine would clearly signal that the EU will not tolerate the country’s destabilization, while providing economic stimulus in Ukraine and the entire region.	相反，对乌金融援助将是一个明确的信号，表明欧盟不会容忍乌克兰被动摇，同时也能给乌克兰和整个地区带来经济刺激。


Equally important, if the West’s response to Russian aggression toward Ukraine is effectively limited to economic sanctions, Putin will more easily be able to blame the West and its alleged hostility toward Russia for the collapse in ordinary Russians’ living standards, thus enabling him to double down on aggressive nationalism.	同样重要的是，如果西方对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的反应有效限制在经济制裁范围内，普京可以轻松地指责西方及其所谓的对俄敌意导致了普通俄罗斯人生活水平的下降，从而大大扩大他的侵略性民族主义赌注。


Today, the only thing needed to convert EU funds into financial aid for Ukraine is political will.	如今，将欧盟资金转化为对乌金融援助唯一需要的是政治意愿。


The most immediate step should be an initiative by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to get the funds flowing with a minimum of bureaucratic delay.	最紧迫的步骤应该是由欧盟委员会主席容克解决官僚主义拖延，让资金在最短时间内流向乌克兰。


Even if doing so takes some time, initiating the process would send a powerful political signal of the EU’s determination to support Ukraine.	即使这样做需要一些时间，启动这一程序也可以传递一个有力的政治信号，表明欧盟决心支持乌克兰。


The announcement alone would help Ukraine in its acute financial plight.	光是宣布这一程序也可以助深陷金融困境的乌克兰一臂之力。


Many of Europe’s leaders will meet this week at the Munich Security Conference.	众多欧洲领导人将在本周的慕尼黑安全会议上会面。


They should seize this opportunity to urge Juncker to start the proceedings needed to repurpose one of the EU’s two available funds.	他们应该抓住这次机会，敦促容克启动改变欧盟两大现成资金源目标的程序。


A financial crisis, in addition to the military and political crisis, would be devastating for Ukraine, and there is no good reason why it cannot be avoided.	金融危机再加上军事和政治危机将是乌克兰的灾难，没有理由认为不能避免这一灾难。


Keeping Europe’s Eastern Promise	兑现欧洲对东欧的承诺


KYIV – For many years, the European Union’s eastward expansion seemed unstoppable.	基辅——多年以来，欧盟东扩的步伐似乎势不可挡。


But with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin appears to have succeeded in ordering a halt to Europe’s efforts to extend democracy, the rule of law, and open markets throughout the continent.	但随着俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，俄罗斯总统普京下令阻止在欧洲全境扩大民主、法治和开放市场的努力似乎已经成功了。


The EU must not kowtow to his demands.	欧盟绝不能屈服于他的要求。


Ukraine’s fate has become Europe’s fate.	乌克兰命运已成为欧洲命运的缩影。


Indeed, Putin not only wants to stop European political, civic, and social norms from taking root within Ukraine; he wants to roll them back in the Baltics, the Balkans, and anywhere else in Europe made politically brittle by economic crisis and/or demagogic populism.	事实上，普京不但要阻止欧洲政治、公民和社会规范在乌克兰扎根； 他还想逆转因经济危机和/或蛊惑人心的民粹主义政策导致政局脆弱的波罗的海、巴尔干半岛和欧洲其他国家的民主化风潮。


The EU Eastern Partnership summit in Riga can and must demonstrate Europe’s determination to defend its unity, security, and values in the face of Russian aggression.	在里加举行的东欧伙伴关系峰会可以而且必须证明欧洲有决心在俄罗斯侵略面前捍卫自身的统一、安全和价值观。


And it must do so in concrete ways, not simply with quickly forgotten official communiqués for which the Kremlin and its Ukrainian separatist proxies have only contempt.	而且欧洲不能只是简单地发表几份被克里姆林宫及其乌克兰代理分裂势力所蔑视的很快会被遗忘的官方公报，而是必须出台具体的措施。


Of paramount importance is to make the new policy a true partnership among peoples.	最重要的是使新政策在各国民众间结成真正的伙伴关系。


The citizens of the partner countries must become the real beneficiaries if this partnership is to become more than the inert agreement that it has been.	如果此次合作想摆脱一直以来沦为无效协议的命运，就必须让协议伙伴国的民众真正受益。


Generous EU commitments on mobility, aid to SMEs and entrepreneurs, and a vast increase in educational opportunities are among the key ingredients that could make such a partnership politically popular for a vast majority.	欧盟在人口流动性方面的慷慨承诺、对中小企业和企业家的援助以及教育机会的大幅增加是能让多数民众在政治上欢迎上述伙伴关系的关键因素。


Ukraine should be the centerpiece of any effort to revive the Eastern Partnership as a way to attract the support of Europeans who remain outside the EU.	乌克兰应当成为相关工作的核心，以此来重振东欧伙伴关系并吸引仍在欧盟外的欧洲人的支持。


Yes, the news from my country remains bad.	但从我祖国传来的都是不利的消息。


Thousands of our citizens are dead.	成千上万的民众死于战火。


Hundreds of thousands are now refugees in their own homeland.	数十万人在自己的国土上沦为难民。


The Minsk II cease-fire agreement has failed to restrain Russian/separatist forces.	明斯克II停火协议未能遏制俄罗斯/分裂主义势力。


Although Ukraine’s economy is no longer in free-fall, as it was last winter, GDP has declined by a quarter since Russian troops first invaded in February 2014.	尽管乌克兰经济不再像去年冬天那样自由落体。 国内生产总值自2014年2月俄罗斯军队最初入侵以来已经下降了四分之一。


Official unemployment now stands at over 10%, compared to 7.3% before Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea.	俄罗斯占领吞并克里米亚之后，官方失业率已经从之前的7. 3%上升到现在的超过10%。


Our national debt is mounting by the day to levels that inspired The Economist to suggest that we may become the “Greece of the east.”	乌克兰国家债务逐日上涨，以至于《经济学家》杂志认为我们有可能沦为“东方的希腊”。


Moreover, much of our economy remains in separatist hands, and they, no surprise, are running the stolen assets into the ground.	此外，绝大部分经济仍掌握在分离主义份子手里，而他们正不出所料地毁掉这些偷来的财富。


In the face of such calamitous conditions, Ukraine’s government is a bit like the proverbial Dutch boy who put his finger in a dike to stop the sea from leaking through.	在如此巨大的灾难面前，乌克兰政府有点像故事中的荷兰男孩想用手指堵住漏水的海堤。


Despite herculean efforts, more leaks continue to appear.	尽管像赫拉克勒斯那样拼尽全力，但漏水的地方依然越来越多。


The simple truth that Europe must grasp is that we Ukrainians simply do not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks, and thus rebuild our economy, on our own.	欧洲必须明白一个最简单的道理，那就是乌克兰根本无法靠手指堵住漏洞，并依靠自己的力量重建国内经济。


Despite the depth of Ukraine’s plight, Europe cannot avoid taking up the challenge that Putin has set before it.	尽管乌克兰已深陷困境，欧洲依然要不可避免地解决普京设定的难题。


After all, if Putin succeeds in turning Ukraine into a failed state with a frozen conflict embedded within it, he will seek the same outcome all along the EU’s borders, from Estonia to Greece.	毕竟，如果普京成功地将乌克兰变成陷入长期冲突的失败国家，他会在从爱沙尼亚到希腊的整个欧盟边境试图达到同样的目的。


Fortunately, the EU has a real partner in Ukraine, whose people’s devotion to Europe has been tested by snipers in the streets of Kyiv and now by the Russian army.	幸运的是，欧盟在乌克兰有真正的伙伴，乌克兰民众对欧洲的热爱经受住了基辅街头狙击手和现在俄罗斯军队的考验。


Their courage, and their newfound political activism, has stiffened the government’s backbone in implementing needed reforms and made it impossible for any political actor in Ukraine to buck the pro-EU consensus.	他们的勇气和新生的政治积极性已经让政府挺直腰杆推行改革并让国内政治势力不可能反对亲欧共识。


The EU can stiffen it even more by demanding much greater clarity in the fight against corruption.	欧盟可以通过要求增加反腐透明度来进一步巩固这一趋势。


Yet, given the war in the eastern Donbas region, the shattering of so much of our economy, and the precarious nature of our government’s finances, the International Monetary Fund and others are clearly asking too much of Ukrainians.	但鉴于顿巴斯东部战争、如此大规模的经济破坏和政府财政的岌岌可危，国际货币基金组织和其他人所提的要求乌克兰民众显然无法满足。


The idea that Ukraine can embrace the economic “shock therapy” that Poland pursued a quarter-century ago is the type of cookie-cutter policymaking that resulted in the 2008 global financial crisis.	恰恰是认为乌克兰可以像二十五年前的波兰那样接受经济“休克疗法”这类的决策导致了2008年的全球经济危机。


That is why the Eastern Partnership, if it is to be renewed, must embrace bold new initiatives for Ukraine, and not try to reheat old policies designed for very different circumstances.	这就是为什么延续东欧伙伴关系必须大胆在乌克兰问题上采用全新举措，而不是抱定针对不同情况设计的原有政策旧事重提。


A recent report from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies provides some guidance concerning what the EU should now try to do for Ukraine.	维也纳国际经济研究所最近发布的报告就欧盟现在该为乌克兰做些什么提供了某些指导性建议。


For starters, the EU should help us create a more stable exchange-rate regime to overcome the currency volatility that has wracked our economy since Russia’s invasion.	首先，欧盟要帮我们建立一套更加稳定的汇率制度，以化解从俄罗斯入侵以来破坏我们经济的货币波动问题。


And, although fiscal consolidation is necessary, given the state of our economy, Ukraine’s most vulnerable people are now enduring a hand-to-mouth existence.	同时，尽管有必要进行财政整顿，但鉴于���前经济状况，乌克兰最弱势民众现在正忍受着无隔夜粮的困难冲击。


They have nothing more to sacrifice.	他们已无法牺牲更多的东西。


On the contrary, they need relief, and Europe should insist that its programs, and those of the IMF, take their needs into account.	相反，他们需要救济，而欧洲应坚持欧盟和国际货币基金组织项目将他们的需求纳入考虑。


Perhaps most important for the long term, the EU must honor its commitment to the deep free-trade and association agreement that Ukraine’s previous government refused to sign in late 2013.	或许长期来看最重要的是，欧盟必须兑现承诺，深入推行乌克兰前政府曾经拒绝签署的自由贸易及联盟协议。


After all, it was to secure that agreement that young Ukrainians braved former President Viktor Yanukovych’s snipers, and are now braving the might of the Russian army.	毕竟，正是为了保证这份协议的签署年轻的乌克兰人挺身而出对抗乌克兰前总统亚努科维奇的狙击手，并且现在仍在对抗俄罗斯军队势力。


To follow through would do more to anchor Ukrainians’ confidence in their European future, and to convince the Kremlin that it cannot succeed in rolling back European values, than anything else the EU might do.	贯彻这项协议会比推行其他举措更能安定乌克兰民众对其欧洲未来的信心，并说服克里姆林宫它无法成功击溃欧洲的价值体系。


One clear way that Europe can demonstrate that its association agreement with Ukraine remains alive is to encourage investment in my country.	欧洲能清楚表明上述联合协议依然有效的方式是积极鼓励对乌克兰投资。


Since Russia’s invasion, FDI into Ukraine has collapsed, which is precisely what Putin wants.	俄国入侵后，乌克兰外资流入几乎陷于崩溃，而这恰恰符合普京的预期。


The EU can demonstrate its commitment to Ukraine’s economic renewal by having the European Investment Bank invest in a showcase infrastructure project, say improved rail links to the EU.	欧盟可以通过让欧洲投资银行投资示范性基建项目（如升级到欧盟的轨道线路）来表明其仍致力于重建乌克兰经济。


The EU faces a stark choice: a renewed Eastern Partnership or a renewed division of Europe.	欧盟面临的选择非常严峻：延续东欧伙伴关系或重新任由欧洲陷入分裂。


The decisions that it makes, beginning at the Riga summit, will determine Europe’s fate for decades to come.	从里加峰会开始，欧盟做出的决策将决定欧洲未来数十年的命运。


Last Chance for Ukraine and Europe	乌克兰和欧洲的最后机会


LONDON – The European Union stands at a crossroads.	伦敦—欧盟站在了十字路口。


The shape it takes five years from now will be decided in the coming 3-5 months.	其今后五年的格局将在未来3—5个月内决定。


Year after year, the EU has successfully muddled through its difficulties.	年复一年，欧盟一直在困难之中得过且过。


But now it has to deal with two sources of existential crisis: Greece and Ukraine.	但如今，它必须面对两大生存危机源头：希腊和乌克兰。


That may prove too much.	这也许太困难了。


Greece’s long-festering crisis has been mishandled by all parties from the outset.	希腊的长期烂摊子危机从一开始就被各方错误地引导。


Emotions now are running so high that muddling through is the only constructive alternative.	如今，汹涌的群情意味着只有得过且过一种替代方案。


But Ukraine is different.	但乌克兰就不同了。


It is a black-and-white case.	这是一个黑白分明的问题。


Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the aggressor, and Ukraine, in defending itself, is defending the values and principles on which the EU was built.	普京的俄罗斯是侵略者，而自卫的乌克兰所捍卫的是作为欧盟基础的价值和原则。


Yet Europe treats Ukraine like another Greece.	但欧洲把乌克兰当成了另一个希腊。


That is the wrong approach, and it is producing the wrong results.	这是错误的方针，并且正在制造错误的结果。


Putin is gaining ground in Ukraine, and Europe is so preoccupied with Greece that it hardly pays any attention.	普京正在乌克兰节节推进，欧洲则在希腊泥足深陷，几乎顾不上乌克兰。


Putin’s preferred outcome in Ukraine is to engineer a financial and political collapse that destabilizes the country, and for which he can disclaim responsibility, rather than a military victory that leaves him in possession of – and responsible for – part of Ukraine.	普京更希望乌克兰出现的结果是金融和政治崩溃进而动摇这个国家，并且他可以否认责任； 而非通过军事胜利拥有部分乌克兰领土，并为此承担责任。


He has shown this by twice converting a military victory into a ceasefire.	他曾经两次把军事胜利变成停火，充分证明了这一点。


The deterioration in Ukraine’s position between the two ceasefire agreements – Minsk I, negotiated last September, and Minsk II, completed in February – shows the extent of Putin’s success.	乌克兰在两大停火协议——去年9月谈判的明斯克I协议和2月达成的明斯克II协议——之间的局势的恶化便是普京成功的写照。


But that success is temporary, and Ukraine is too valuable an ally for the EU to abandon.	但这一成功是暂时的，乌克兰这个盟友对欧盟太重要，后者不可能放弃前者。


There is something fundamentally wrong with EU policy.	欧盟的政策中有根本性错误。


How else could Putin’s Russia have outmaneuvered Ukraine’s allies, which used to lead the free world?	否则普京的俄罗斯如何能够智胜曾经领导自由世界的乌克兰的盟国？


The trouble is that Europe has been drip-feeding Ukraine, just as it has Greece.	麻烦在于欧洲一直在“鼻饲”乌克兰，就像对希腊那样。


As a result, Ukraine barely survives, while Putin has the first-mover advantage.	结果，乌克兰奄奄一息，而普京获得了先发制人优势。


He can choose between hybrid war and hybrid peace, and Ukraine and its allies are struggling to respond.	他可以选择混合战争或混合和平，而乌克兰及其盟国则不得不疲于应付。


The deterioration of Ukraine’s situation is accelerating.	乌克兰局势的恶化正在加速。


The financial collapse of which I had been warning for months occurred in February, when the hryvnia’s value plummeted 50% in a few days, and the National Bank of Ukraine had to inject large amounts of money to rescue the banking system.	几个月来我一直在警告的金融崩溃在2月份爆发了，乌克兰格里夫尼亚在几天内贬值50%，乌克兰国民银行不得不注入大量资金拯救银行系统。


The climax was reached on February 25, when the central bank introduced import controls and raised interest rates to 30%.	2月25日，金融崩溃达到高潮，央行实施了进口管制并将利率提高到30%。


Since then, President Petro Poroshenko’s jawboning has brought the exchange rate back close to the level on which Ukraine’s 2015 budget was based.	此后，总统波罗申科的大声疾呼让格里夫尼亚汇率回到接近2015年乌克兰预算所需要的水平。


But the improvement is extremely precarious.	但局面的改善相当不稳固。


This temporary collapse has shaken public confidence and endangered the balance sheets of Ukrainian banks and companies that have hard-currency debts.	这一暂时崩溃震慑了公共信心，也威胁到存在硬货币债务的乌克兰银行和公司的资产负债表。


It has also undermined the calculations on which Ukraine’s programs with the International Monetary Fund are based.	它还破坏了国际货币基金组织（IMF）乌克兰项目的算盘。


The IMF’s Extended Fund Facility became insufficient even before it was approved.	IMF的中期贷款便利（Extended Fund Facility）在获得批准之前便已不再足够。


But EU member states, facing their own fiscal constraints, have shown no willingness to consider additional bilateral aid.	但欧盟成员国面临着自身的财政约束，没有表现出任何考虑增加双边援助的意愿。


So Ukraine continues to teeter on the edge of the abyss.	因此乌克兰始终徘徊在悬崖边缘。


At the same time, a radical reform program within Ukraine is gaining momentum, and slowly becoming visible to both the Ukrainian public and the European authorities.	与此同时，乌克兰国内的彻底改革正在赢得动力，并逐渐为乌克兰民众和欧洲当局所见。


There is a stark contrast between the deteriorating external situation and the continuing progress in internal reforms.	外部局势的恶化和内部改革的持续进展之间形成了鲜明对比。


This gives the situation in Kyiv an air of unreality.	这给基辅的局势带来了一种不现实感。


One plausible scenario is that Putin achieves his optimal objective and Ukraine’s resistance crumbles.	一个看似可能的情形是普京实现其最优目标，而乌克兰的抵抗以失败告终。


Europe would be flooded with refugees – two million seems to be a realistic estimate.	欧洲将迎来大量难民——两百万应该不为过。


Many people expect that this would mark the beginning of Cold War II.	许多人认为这将标志第二次冷战的开始。


The likelier outcome is that a victorious Putin would have many friends in Europe, and that the sanctions on Russia would be allowed to lapse.	更有可能的结果是胜利的普京在欧洲赢得众多朋友，而对俄制裁将停止。


That is the worst possible outcome for Europe, which would become even more divided, turning into a battleground for influence between Putin’s Russia and the United States.	对欧洲来说，这是最糟糕的可能结果，欧洲将因此变得更���分裂，成为普京的俄罗斯和美国之间的影响力战场。


The EU would cease to be a functioning political force in the world (especially if Greece also left the eurozone).	欧盟将不再是世界舞台上起作用的政治力量（特别是如果希腊也离开欧元区的话）。


A more likely scenario is that Europe muddles through by drip-feeding Ukraine.	更有可能的情形是欧洲通过“鼻饲”乌克兰得过且过。


Ukraine does not collapse, but the oligarchs reassert themselves and the new Ukraine begins to resemble the old Ukraine.	乌克兰不会崩溃，政治寡头会卷土重来你，新乌克兰与老乌克兰毫无区别。


Putin would find this almost as satisfactory as a complete collapse.	对普京来说，这一结果与完全崩溃一样令人满意。


But his victory would be less secure, as it would lead to a second Cold War that Russia would lose, just as the Soviet Union lost the first.	但他的胜利将不再那么笃定，并且这将导致俄罗斯会输的第二次冷战，就像苏联输掉第一次冷战那样。


Putin’s Russia needs oil at $100 a barrel and will start running out of currency reserves in 2-3 years.	普京的俄罗斯需要油价保持100美元／桶，其货币储备将在２—３年内开始告罄。


The latest chapter in what I call the “Tragedy of the European Union” is that the EU will lose the new Ukraine.	我所谓的“欧盟的悲剧”的终章是欧盟输掉新乌克兰。


The principles that Ukraine is defending – the very principles on which the EU is based – will be abandoned, and the EU will have to spend a lot more money on defending itself than it would need to spend helping the new Ukraine succeed.	乌克兰所捍卫的原则——即作为欧盟基础的原则——将会被抛弃，欧盟将不得不投入比帮助新乌克兰获得成功更多的钱捍卫它自己。


There is also a more hopeful scenario.	也有一个更让人感到有希望的情形。


The new Ukraine is still alive and determined to defend itself.	新乌克兰仍能活下去并决心捍卫自己。


Though Ukraine, on its own, is no match for Russia’s military might, its allies could decide to do “whatever it takes” to help, short of becoming involved in a direct military confrontation with Russia or violating the Minsk agreement.	尽管乌克兰自身的军事实力无法与俄罗斯相比，但其盟友会决定“不惜一切代价”帮助它，只要不卷入与俄罗斯的直接军事冲突或违反明斯克协议。


Doing so would not only help Ukraine; it would also help the EU to recapture the values and principles that it seems to have lost.	这样做不但有助于乌克兰，也有助于欧盟重新获得看似已经失去的价值和原则。


Needless to say, this is the scenario I advocate.	不消说，这就是我所支持的情形。


The Right Intervention in Ukraine	对乌克兰的正确干预


STOCKHOLM – The ongoing Greek drama may have transfixed Europe and the world, but the great crisis in Europe’s east has not gone away.	斯德哥尔摩——正在上演的希腊大戏可能已经震惊了世界和欧洲，但欧洲东部危机并没有就此消失掉。


Ukraine remains under partial occupation by Russian-backed separatists, with intermittent fighting still taking place, despite the Minsk II ceasefire agreement.	尽管签署了明斯克 II停火协议，乌克兰依然被俄国支持的分离主义分子所部分占领， 间歇性的战斗仍在进行中。


The on-and-off fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas region since the Minsk deal was signed in February has made one thing clear.	明斯克协议2月签署后乌克兰顿巴斯地区断断续续的战斗至少说明一点。


If Russia is serious about seeking a solution to the conflict, it should be prepared to endorse the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission and force.	如果俄当局真想寻找冲突的解决办法，它应该批准国际维和部队和行动的部署。


Such a mission could begin the process of rehabilitating the region, allow those displaced by the violence to return, and facilitate the reintegration of the Donbas into Ukraine with appropriate safeguards and devolved powers.	上述行动或许可以开始修复地区创伤，让因暴力而流离失所的难民重返家园，并在有措施保障和权力移交的情况下促进顿巴斯与乌克兰重新融合。


A useful model for this approach is at hand.	这种方法的有效模式就近在眼前。


Two decades ago, the international community was entering the final phase of efforts to secure peace in Bosnia.	二十年前，国际社会进入到努力争取波斯尼亚和平的最后阶段。


But there were also lingering conflicts in Croatia, notably in the Eastern Slavonia region, adjacent to Serbia.	但克罗地亚冲突依然挥之不去，特别是在东部的斯拉沃尼亚地区，紧邻塞尔维亚。


Croatian military offensives, first in early May 1995, and a second in early August, had taken back three of four United Nations-protected sectors from separatist Serb control.	1995年5月和8月初相继爆发的克罗地亚攻势从塞族分裂势力的控制下收复了四块中的三块联合国保护领土。


But the most important area, Sector East in Eastern Slavonia, remained under firm Serb control.	但重要性首屈一指的东斯拉沃尼亚地区依然在塞族控制之下。


And, much like Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Ukraine issue today, Serbia’s then-president, Slobodan Milošević, insisted that the issue could be resolved only by direct talks between the Serb separatists and the Croat government in Zagreb.	而且，就像今天乌克兰问题上的俄总统弗拉基米尔·普京一样，塞尔维亚时任总统斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇坚持该问题只能由塞尔维亚分离主义分子和萨格勒布的克罗地亚政府双方直接谈判解决。


The reality, of course, was that the Serb separatists were entirely dependent on the political, military, and economic support of Milošević’s Serbia.	现实状况当然是塞尔维亚分离主义分子在政治、军事和经济上都完全依赖米洛舍维奇领导的塞尔维亚政府。


And, in the end, Milošević agreed to the deployment of a UN mission and force, which was tasked with ensuring the region’s demilitarization and return to Croat sovereignty, after implementing the necessary safeguards for the Serbs living there.	而且米洛舍维奇最终同意部署负责确保地区非军事化和恢复克罗地亚主权的联合国行动部队，前提是为生活在那里的塞族人提供必要的保护措施。


Today, the UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium) mission is virtually forgotten – not because it failed, but because it succeeded.	今天，UNTAES（联合国东斯拉沃尼亚、巴拉尼亚和西锡尔米乌姆过渡政府）行动几乎被人们遗忘——这不是因为那次行动的失败，而恰恰是因为那次行动的成功。


To be sure, not every issue in Eastern Slavonia was sorted out then or in the years since; but there is no longer a conflict, and Croatia and Serbia now enjoy constructive bilateral relations.	可以肯定，东斯拉沃尼亚当时或之后数年并非所有问题都得到了解决； 但那里冲突已经停止，克罗地亚和塞尔维亚现在拥有建设性的双边关系。


This could be a model for the separatist-controlled areas of Donbas if the political will is there to make such an arrangement work.	如果存在切实解决问题的政治意愿，顿巴斯分离分子控制区域可以效仿这一模式。


But is the Kremlin serious about recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty in the Donbas and resuming normal relations with the West?	但克里姆林宫是否真的承认乌克兰对顿巴斯地区拥有主权并愿意与西方恢复正常关系？


At the moment, I strongly doubt it.	至少到目前为止我强烈怀疑。


It is worth bearing in mind that Russia has driven every step toward escalation in this conflict – including the establishment of the separatist enclaves.	我们应该记住是俄罗斯一直在推动包括建立分离主义分子飞地在内的冲突升级。


Indeed, the Kremlin appears to be waiting for Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government to fail and the West to split on the issue and stop taking an interest in its resolution.	事实上，克里姆林宫似乎一直在等待乌总统波罗申科政府失败和西方发生分歧并对冲突的解决失去兴趣。


At that point, perhaps, Putin will be ready to move against Ukraine to secure his own desired long-term outcome.	真到那时，普京将准备对乌克兰采取行动，以实现他所希望的长期目的。


But if Ukraine’s government and the West remain united, the Kremlin might see that its enclaves in Donbas represent a threat mainly to Russia itself.	但如果乌克兰政府和西方保持团结，克里姆林宫可能会看到它在顿巴斯的飞地主要对俄国自身构成威胁。


After all, the grim reality is that the separatist enclaves are in economic free-fall, with their societies becoming increasingly criminalized.	毕竟，严酷的现实是分离主义分子飞地在经济上近乎自由落体，而且还有越来越难以解决的社会犯罪问题。


Donbas risks becoming a tar baby for which no one wants to take responsibility.	顿巴斯可能令各路势力避之惟恐不及。


As this becomes apparent, Russia’s leaders could start to envisage a UNTAES-type solution for the region.	如果出现这种状况，俄国领导人可能效仿UNTAES解决地区问题。


Absent any other arrangement, the Kremlin will have to do just that.	如果没有其他安排，克里姆林也只能这样做。


Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine – if you break it, you own it – applies to Putin’s intervention in Ukraine as much as to George W. Bush’s misadventure in Iraq.	美国前国务卿鲍威尔的信条——自己的烂摊子自己收拾——既适用于小布什在伊拉克的失败，也适用于普京对乌克兰的干预。


There certainly are very difficult issues that must be sorted out before a peacekeeping mission could go into Donbas, notably the composition and formal mandate of whatever force is deployed.	必须在维和部队开进顿巴斯前解决部队组成和正式任命等艰难问题。


But, again, if the will is there, these questions should not be intractable.	不过同样，如果确有意愿，上述问题应该总能解决。


Such a mission could then ensure the real implementation of the political provisions of the Minsk II agreement.	这样的任务应该可以确保明斯克II协议政治规定的真正落实。


Genuinely free and fair local elections, with the participation of all displaced people and refugees, will never be possible without a substantial international presence.	吸纳流离失所者和难民参与的真正自由公正的地方选举，如果没有大规模国际势力的介入永远不可能成为现实。


Today, this idea is sure to be dead on arrival. So was UNTAES in the early discussions on Eastern Slavonia.	今天，就像东斯拉沃尼亚早期讨论UNTAES时一样，这样的理念注定要胎死腹中。


The Milošević regime then sounded exactly like the Kremlin now.	当时米洛舍维奇政权的口吻和现在的克里姆林宫如出一辙。


But tomorrow really is another day, and it is certainly not too early to start exploring options that promise not just to manage the conflict, but to resolve it.	但明天是崭新的一天。 现在是时候开始解决、而非仅仅是管理冲突。


Such an intervention might work – but only if and when both sides genuinely want a solution.	这样的干预措施可能产生效果——但前提是双方真心实意想办法解决。


We are not there yet.	现在时机还不成熟。


But if both Ukraine and the West stand firm and act to block further Russian efforts at destabilization, that day might come.	但如果乌克兰和欧洲坚持立场、积极行动阻止俄罗斯的破坏努力，那一天终将到来。


We should be ready.	我们应该做好准备。


Ukraine Loses Its Way	走向歧途的乌克兰


PRAGUE – Since the election of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, Ukraine has experienced a significant and alarming deterioration in its democratic framework.	布拉格——自从亚努科维奇赢得2010年总统大选后，乌克兰民主框架经历了一次具有警示意义的巨大动荡。


Fundamental tenets of a democratic society, such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press are increasingly coming under pressure.	民主社会的基本原则——比如言论自由、集会自由和新闻自由——都被压制了。


And the prosecution of opposition members, which has now culminated in the arrest and detention of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko – during an ongoing trial that most of the West has deemed political – seems to confirm that the rule of law is being brushed aside.	而对反对派的指控——如今已发展到拘禁前总理季莫申科的新高度了，在大多数西方人看来，这场没完没了的审判根本就是政治迫害——表明，法治精神正在被抛弃。


Given Ukraine’s strategic importance, the country’s fate has become an urgent matter of concern not only for Europe, but for the entire international community.	乌克兰具有战略重要性，该国的命运不仅是欧洲，更是整个国际社会的当务之急。


Among the most worrying factors underlying Ukraine’s anti-democratic turn are the following:	在乌克兰的反民主逆流中，最可担忧的是以下几点：


Consolidation of power.	权力集中。


After Viktor Yanukovych’s election last year, the Constitutional Court rescinded constitutional changes made in 2004 as part of the settlement that brought about a peaceful end to the Orange Revolution.	亚努科维奇去年当选总统后，宪法法院废除了2004年的修宪内容，这部分内容原本是为了和平解决橙色革命而加上去的。


By doing so, a consensus was reversed that aimed to reduce the presidency’s powers and move toward a more parliamentary system.	这样一来，削减总统力量、让乌克兰向议会制靠拢的一致意见就被逆转了。


Instead, Ukraine’s president is now increasingly consolidating his total control over the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.	而与此相对应的是，乌克兰总统正在进一步集中他对执法、立法和司法的大一统掌控。


Endemic corruption.	腐败横行。


Corruption is widely believed to be endemic in the country’s police, secret service, administration, government, and Prosecutor’s Office.	人们广泛认为，乌克兰警察、特务机关、行政部门、政府和检查系统普遍存在腐败现象。


On Transparency International´s Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Ukraine scored 2.4 on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).	在透明国际的《2010全球清廉指数》中，乌克兰得分为2. 4（打分范围为0—10，0表示高度腐败，10表示高度清廉）。


Efforts to combat corruption are at best half-hearted and are not bringing any apparent results.	反腐措施最多称得上差强人意，而且没有产生任何明显效果。


Corruption cripples the country´s institutions and the government´s inaction on this problem is also having an economic impact.	腐败已经严重侵蚀了该国的各种机构，且政府在腐败问题上的不作为已经造成了经济后果。


Increased Security Service (SBU) activity.	安全部门（SBU）活动频繁。


Evidence of increased SBU activity with political motives was presented in various human rights groups´ reports.	众多人权团体的报告表明，带政治目的的SBU活动有所增加。


Individuals, NGOs, and journalists have been either overtly threatened or placed under surveillance.	个人、非政府组织（NGO）和记者存在被公开威胁或被监视的情况。


For example, in July 2010, Nico Lange, the head of the Ukrainian office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, was detained at the Kyiv airport after publishing a critical report on the process of Ukrainian regional elections (the incident was subsequently presented as a “misunderstanding”).	比如，2010年7月，阿登纳基金会（Konrad Adenauer Foundation）乌克兰办事处主任尼科·兰格（Nico Lange）在基辅机场被捕，因为他将一份关于乌克兰地方选举的关键性报告曝了光（这件事后来被宣称是场“误会”）。


In September, SBU searched the offices of organizations funded by philanthropist George Soros; in October 2010, the offices of the Vinnitsa Human Rights Group were also searched by police without a court order.	9月，SBU搜查了由慈善家乔治·索罗斯提供资金的组织的办公室； 2010年10月，文尼察人权团体（Vinnitsa Human Rights Group）办公室也在没有法院搜查令的情况下受到了警察的搜查。


Harassment of opposition parties and independent media.	对反对党及独立媒体的骚扰。


Theongoing criminal proceedings against opposition politicians, including Tymoshenko, together with the impact of changes in the electoral law to favor the president and his supporters, are weakening opposition forces.	对反对派政治家（包括季莫申科）的没完没了的刑事指控和修改选举法以利于总统及其支持者所造成的影响正在削弱反对力量。


Harassment of the independent media ranges from administrative obstruction to much worse.	对独立媒体的干扰有多种方式，行政干预算是最轻的。


The disappearance of Vasyl Klymentyev, the editor-in-chief of Novyi Styl, a newspaper which focuses heavily on corruption in the Kharkiv region, has never been fully investigated.	专注于卡尔科夫（Kharkiv）地区腐败报道的《Novyi Styl》报总编克莱门蒂夫（Vasyl Klymentyev）失踪案至今未获得彻底调查。


Most television channels are in the hands of four groups, most of which have close links to the ruling Party of Regions.	大多数电视频道被四大集团所拥有，控制人大多与执政党乌克兰地方党（Party of Regions）关系密切。


Valery Khoroshkovsky’s continued ownership of Inter Media Group, in addition to his roles as head of the country’s security service and as a Council Member of the National Bank of Ukraine, is an obvious conflict of interest.	克罗什科夫斯基（Valery Khoroshkovsky）长期拥有国际传媒集团（Inter Media Group），而他的本职工作乃是乌克兰安全部门首脑兼乌克兰国民银行（National Bank of Ukraine）委员会成员，这显然属于利益冲突范畴。


Overall, there is clear evidence of a decline in media pluralism since President Yanukovych came to power.	总而言之，自从亚努科维奇问鼎总统宝座后，乌克兰媒体多样性退化是不争的事实。


A weak civil society.	孱弱的公民社会。


While observers believe that further harassment of NGOs is constrained by the administration’s wariness of international reaction, particularly from the EU, the operating environment for civil-society organizations remains extremely difficult, and they have no opportunities for genuine inclusion in policymaking.	尽管观察家们认为，乌克兰对进一步骚扰NGO会有所顾忌，因为政府还得顾及国际反应，特别是欧盟的态度，但公民社会阻止的运作环境仍然十分困难，而且没有任何参与决策的机会。


Ukraine has reached a crossroads.	乌克兰已经走到了十字路口。


One signpost points towards democracy; the other towards autocracy.	一块路标指向民主，另一块则指向专制。


The former path leads to membership in the European Union; the latter would take Ukraine to a darker and more dangerous destination.	前一条路通向欧盟成员国资格，后一条路将把乌克兰带向黑暗和厄运。


Millions of Ukraine’s citizens favor EU membership, but their enthusiasm is tempered by the absence of a clear EU policy towards Ukraine.	上千万乌克兰人民更愿意走向欧盟成员国，但欧盟并没有清晰的乌克兰政策，这让乌克兰人民很受伤。


Meanwhile, the administration of President Yanukovych proclaims its willingness to join the EU, but has failed to introduce the changes needed to meet the qualifying criteria.	与此同时，亚努科维奇总统也宣称愿意加入欧盟，但他却没有引入符合入盟标准的变革。


As a result, Ukraine is unlikely to be invited to start membership negotiations anytime soon.	因此，在短期内，乌克兰都不可能得到启动入盟谈判的邀请。


It is in the EU’s vital interest to strive for a far more active policy towards Ukraine than it has so far.	对欧盟来说，采取尽力争取乌克兰的政策具有极其重要的意义。


The current Polish EU presidency should hark back to the origins of Poland’s thriving democracy, and recall the essential support that it received from the West a generation ago.	现任欧盟主席国波兰应该想一想自己蒸蒸日上的民主形势来自何处，回忆一下老一辈波兰人如何获得了必不可少的西方支持。


A similar effort is needed for Ukraine today, and that effort should not be set aside for reasons of political expedience, or, for that matter, pursued for reasons of simple economic self-interest.	如今，乌克兰也需要类似的支持，这些支持不应该以政治代价昂贵为理由而被置之一旁，也不应该仅仅因为具有巨大的经济利益而得到实施。


We urge the EU and its member states to insist that the rule of law is respected.	我们敦促欧盟及其成员国坚持法治精神必须得到尊重的原则。


At the very least, the EU should demand that Tymoshenko and the other opposition leaders are set free on bail so that they can more vigorously defend themselves in court.	欧盟至少应该要求让季莫申科和其他反对派领导人获得保释，以便他们能够在法庭上更有力地为自己辩护。


A Way Out for Ukraine and Russia	乌克兰和俄罗斯的出路


LONDON – The leaders of Russia and Ukraine will meet in Astana, Kazakstan, on January 15 to discuss, once again, an end to the fighting that has roiled eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region since last spring.	伦敦—1月15日，俄罗斯和乌克兰领导人将在哈萨克斯坦阿斯塔纳再次会晤讨论结束去年春天开始的东乌克兰顿巴斯地区的战事。


Hopes for a viable agreement are not high.	人们对于形成可行协议不抱多大希望。


One reason why the crisis in Ukraine has proved so difficult to overcome is that its roots stretch far outside the country’s borders.	乌克兰危机之所以如此难以克服，一个原因是其根源远远超过了乌克兰边界。


Finding a genuine solution will require the resolution of a dispute between Russia and the West that dates back to the 1990s, before Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power.	找到真正的解决办法需要解决俄罗斯与西方之间可追溯到20世纪90年代、俄罗斯总统普京掌权之前的纠纷。


At its heart, the conflict in Ukraine is about a disagreement over NATO’s expansion into what Russia regards as its “near abroad.”	乌克兰冲突的核心是对北约向俄罗斯认为属于其“近邻”地区的扩张的不满。


Fortunately, a solution is possible – but it will require a reworking of Europe’s security architecture.	幸运的是，形成解决办法是可能的，但需要改造欧洲安全结构。


Both sides are deeply committed to their positions.	双方都坚持自己的立场。


In November, Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, told the BBC that Russia required a “100% guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO.”	11月，普京发言人佩斯科夫（Dmitry Peskov）告诉BBC，俄罗斯要求“100%保证乌克兰不会加入北约”。


That is a promise that Western countries will be unable to provide.	这是西方国家无法提供的承诺。


For them, what is at stake is the principle that sovereign countries have the right to chart their own course, rather than be entangled in a larger power’s sphere of influence.	对它们来说，此事关乎主权国家有权决定自己的事，不被迫卷入更大力量的势力范围的原则。


Indeed, it was this principle that, once invoked to justify NATO enlargement in the 1990s, put the two sides on a collision course.	事实上，正是这一原则，从20世纪90年代被用来作为北约扩张的基础开始，让双方产生了冲突。


With Russia’s neighbors free to join the alliance, the natural result could only be a new dividing line, one pressing up against the Russian Federation’s western and southern borders.	俄罗斯邻国可以自由加入北约，这一状况的唯一自然结果只能是带来一条压迫俄罗斯联邦西面和南面边境的新的分割线。


This outcome was foreseen by the veteran American diplomat George F. Kennan.	这一结果被老道的美国外交家凯南（George F.


In an interview he gave to the New York Times in May 1998, he predicted that NATO enlargement would lead to a new Cold War.	Kennan）所预见。 在1998年5月接受《纽约时报》采访时，凯南预测北约扩张将导致新冷战。


Now that Kennan’s prediction has all but come to pass, the parties to the conflict would be wise to take a lesson from the diplomatic efforts that helped bring the original Cold War to an end – in particular, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).	如今，凯南的预测已经成为现实，冲突各方的明智做法是汲取让最初的冷战结束的外交努力的经验——特别是1990年欧洲常规武装力量条约（Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ，CFE）。


NATO enlargement may have rendered the treaty’s detailed provisions obsolete, but its underlying approach – a transparent inspections regime that enforces limitations on the overall quantity and, crucially, the regional concentrations of ground forces – remains applicable today.	北约扩张让这一条约的具体条款成为废纸，但其基本方针——控制总量并且（关键性地）实现地区地面力量的集中的透明的检查机制——在今天仍然适用。


For the West, a revamped CFE Treaty would help mitigate worries about military threats in the area that Russia has traditionally considered its sphere of influence.	对西方来说，修订CFE条约有助于减轻关于俄罗斯所认定的传统势力范围地区的军事威胁的担忧。


Violations of the treaty would be easily detectable and allow time for the West to deploy countermeasures.	违反条约的行为很容易得知，西方也有时间部署对策。


In addition, there would be no formal prohibition of NATO membership for Ukraine – or for any other country in the Russian periphery.	此外，不应该正式禁止乌克兰或任何其他俄罗斯外围国家加入北约。


For Russia, a new treaty would allow it to live with the hitherto nightmare scenario of Ukrainian accession to NATO; as long as the pact remained in force, Ukraine’s membership would have no military consequences.	对俄罗斯来说，新条约让它可以从容接受迄今为止的噩梦情景——乌克兰加入北约； 只要条约保持效力，乌克兰加入北约就不会导致任何军事后果。


NATO, at least in the Russian hinterland, would become first and foremost a political organization.	至少在俄罗斯后院，北约将首先是一个政治组织。


Above all, a new treaty would allow both Russia and the West to secure their interests in a balanced and binding agreement.	最重要的是，新条约能让俄罗斯和西方都确保在有约束力的平衡协议中的利益。


For Russia, this would mean a significant improvement on what it has been offered since the end of the Cold War.	对俄罗斯来说，这意味着其自冷战结束以来所获条件的重大改善。


Though invitations by the West to join organizations such as the NATO-Russia Council or the G-8 may have been symbolically important and thus politically valuable, these venues provide only forums for discussion; they do not produce binding agreements.	西方邀请俄罗斯参加北约-俄罗斯委员会和G-8等组织，这些举动都具有象征重要性及由此带来的政治价值，但它们只不过提供了讨论的场合，并没有产生约束性协议。


A new treaty would do more than anything else to bring peace to Ukraine.	新条约将给乌克兰带来比其他任何方案都要多的好处。


It would eliminate the primary motive behind Russia’s support for separatism in the country’s southeast: ensuring that Ukraine remains ineligible for NATO membership.	它将消除俄罗斯支持乌克兰东南部分裂主义的主要动机：保证乌克兰不合格北约成员国的状态。


The dispute over the fate of Crimea would continue; but an agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the issue could be made a precondition of the treaty’s entry into full effect.	在克里米亚命运问题上的纠纷将继续存在； 但乌克兰和俄罗斯在该问题上的协议可以成为该条约完全生效的前提条件。


There are two other obvious objections to this proposal.	这一方案还存在其他两个显而易见的阻力。


The first is that Putin would reject a treaty with NATO.	首先是普京将拒绝与北���缔结条约。


That should not stop the West from making the offer.	这不应该阻止西方抛出橄榄枝。


With the Russian economy in serious trouble, Putin may be looking for a way out of his corner.	俄罗斯经济陷入了严重困境，普京也许正在寻找改变之路。


The second objection is that the West would be best served by simply standing back and watching while sanctions and plunging oil prices bring down Russia’s economy – and ultimately Putin himself.	第二个阻力是，对西方来说，最有利的做法是袖手旁观，同时利用制裁和节节下跌的油价拖垮俄罗斯经济，最终打败普京本人。


But this would be an irresponsibly dangerous and ultimately counterproductive strategy.	但这样做不负责任并且十分危险，说到底是一个适得其反的战略。


After all, economic and political breakdown in Russia would have profound adverse consequences well beyond Russia’s borders – particularly for Ukraine.	毕竟，俄罗斯经济和政治崩溃将带来远不止于俄罗斯国界的严重负面后果——特别是对乌克兰而言。


Why Ukraine Needs Weapons	为何乌克兰需要武器


MUNICH – It has become something of a mantra among diplomats and other foreign-policy analysts that there is no military solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.	慕尼黑—俄罗斯和乌克兰冲突不存在军事解决方案，这已经成了外交官和外交政策分析师中间的一个魔咒。


The only viable path to peace and stability, observers almost unanimously proclaim, is a diplomatic one.	观察者几乎异口同声地表示，唯一可行的和平与稳定之道是外交。


But, despite the recent ceasefire agreement announced in Minsk, ongoing violence – reflected in the violent expulsion of Ukrainian forces from the town of Debaltseve – strongly suggests that it is time to consider what is needed to block any Kremlin-imposed military solution.	但是，尽管最近在明斯克达成了停火协议，但持续暴力——杰巴利采韦（Debaltseve）的乌克兰军队被暴力驱逐就是明证——仍然强烈地表明有必要考虑阻止克里姆林宫所实施的一切军事解决方案。


Three influential American think tanks have already done so, and arrived at the conclusion that the United States should begin supplying Ukraine not only with more non-lethal aid – such as drones, armored Humvees, and medical equipment – but also with “lethal defensive military assistance," in the form of light anti-armor missiles.	三个颇有影响力的美国智库已经开始行动起来，并且形成了一个结论：美国不但应该向乌克兰输送非致命援助——如无人机、装甲悍马和医疗设备——也应该开始提供“致命防御性军事援助”，如轻型反装甲导弹。


European governments, however, remain unwilling to reconsider their position on supplying defensive equipment to Ukraine, and have instead reiterated that a diplomatic solution is the only option.	但是，欧洲政府仍不愿重新考虑其关于向乌克兰提供防御设备的立场，而是不断重申外交途径是唯一选择。


Of course, from Ukraine's perspective, a one-on-one military confrontation with Russia is not a viable option.	当然，从乌克兰的角度讲，与俄罗斯的一对一冲突绝非可行选择。


Last year, when separatist forces in the Donbas region appeared to be crumbling under the weight of Ukraine's counter-offensive, it seemed possible that Ukraine would be able to reassert its sovereignty over the area.	去年，当顿巴斯分裂势力在乌克兰的反击下几近崩溃，乌克兰眼看着就要收复该地区的主权。


But the Kremlin quickly deployed battalion-size tactical groups from the Russian army to support the rebels.	但克里姆林宫迅速从俄军中抽调营级战术性部队部署至顿巴斯。


Ukraine's relatively weak forces did not stand a chance.	相对较弱的乌军毫无还手之力。


The move exemplifies Russia's commitment to do whatever it takes to prevent a military defeat of the separatist entities that it has incited and forged into fighting units – a determination that has endured, even as the conflict has placed considerable strain on its armed forces.	这一举动表明俄罗斯决心不惜一切代价防止其煽动并组建为战斗单位的分裂势力在军事上被打败——这一决心是长久的，即使冲突给其武装力量造成了相当大的压力。


Given this, the prospects for Ukraine to reassert control over the Donbas region militarily are so slim that even trying to do so would be foolish.	基于此，乌克兰通过军事手段夺回顿巴斯地区控制权的希望非常渺茫，做出这样的尝试也是愚蠢的。


If one considers the strategic ambitions of the separatists and their Russian patrons, Ukraine's prospects are even bleaker.	如果考虑分裂分子及其俄罗斯庇护者的战略野心，乌克兰的前景就更加黯淡了。


Beyond supplying the separatist groups with heavy and advanced weapons, and deploying special units and forces to support them, Russia now appears to be sending in “volunteers" to train a separatist army that could ultimately go on the offensive.	俄罗斯不但向分裂组织提供重武器和先进武器，还部署特种部队支持他们，而如今，俄罗斯似乎还在派遣“志愿者”前去训练分裂势力部队，使其立刻可以继续战斗。


Such an army, separatist leaders hope, will enable them – at the very least – to secure control over the Donbas region.	分裂主义领导者希望，这样一支军队可以让他们至少能够确保控制顿巴斯地区。


They would then be positioned to secure a “Novorossiya" statelet extending along the entire Black Sea coast, up to and including Odessa.	接着，他们将试图确保一个覆盖整个黑海沿岸直至包含敖德萨的“新俄罗斯”小国。


And, in all likelihood, some would even dream of an eventual march into Kyiv.	此外，一些人甚至梦想最终进军基辅。


To prevent this scenario from unfolding, a robust political dialogue with the Kremlin is clearly vital, as are continued economic sanctions to make clear that Russia will pay a rising price for ongoing aggression.	为了阻止这一情形发生，与克里姆林宫的稳健政治对话显然是不可或缺的，继续实施经济制裁以表明俄罗斯将为入侵行为付出越来越大的代价亦然。


But trusting solely in a diplomatic dialogue and sanctions to bring about a lasting peace may be excessively optimistic.	但相信只靠外交对话和制裁就能带来持续和平也许过于乐观了。


A more comprehensive approach would focus on strengthening Ukraine in every respect.	更全面的方针应着重于强化乌克兰的每一个方面。


To this end, political and diplomatic support is essential.	在这个问题上，政治和外交支持必不可少。


But perhaps even more important is backing for reforms aimed at eliminating corruption and promoting growth.	但也许更重要的是支持旨在清除腐败和刺激增长的改革。


The recent agreement with the International Monetary Fund is of immediate importance in this respect, and the agreement with the European Union on a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area is crucial to the country's long-term transformation.	在这方面，与国际货币基金组织的最新协议具有紧迫的重要性，而与欧盟的深入和全面自由贸易区（Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area）协议对于乌克兰的长期转型至关重要。


But if separatist groups, with support from Russia, believe that they can control Donbas and the Black Sea coast, efforts to rebuild Ukraine's society and economy will amount to little.	但如果分裂组织在俄罗斯的支持下认为他们可以控制顿巴斯和黑海沿岸，重塑乌克兰社会和经济的努力就会毫无意义。


That is why Ukraine's external partners must also help to strengthen the country's defensive capabilities.	因此，乌克兰的外部伙伴还必须帮助强化乌克兰的防御力量。


In such a charged situation, there will always be hotheads, eager to pursue military options.	在如此紧张���局面下，总会有鲁莽之士急切地追求军事方案。


But the greater concern is the behavior of pragmatists, who identify weaknesses that can be exploited.	但更加应该关注的务实主义者的行为，他们寻找可加利用的弱点。


If the Russian-backed separatists view Ukraine's defensive capacity as a serious weakness, there will be little to compel them not to push forward in pursuit of their ambitions.	如果俄罗斯支持的分裂分子认为乌克兰的防御力量是一个严重弱点，就很难阻止他们追求野心。


A political or diplomatic solution would be next to impossible.	政治或外交解决方案将几乎毫无用处。


Security experts should identify which actions powers like the US and Europe could take to improve Ukraine's defensive capabilities.	安全专家应该厘清美国和欧洲的给力量应该采取哪些行动改善乌克兰的防御力量。


The requests for non-lethal equipment made by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the recent Munich Security Conference could provide some guidance.	乌克兰总统波罗申科在最近的慕尼黑安全会议（Munich Security Conference）所要求的非致命装备可以提供些许指引。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel and others are clearly right when they say that there is no purely military solution to the conflict in Ukraine.	德国总理默克尔和其他人说，乌克兰冲突没有纯军事解决方案，这显然是正确的。


But a year of talks and failed agreements has demonstrated that there is no purely diplomatic solution either.	但为期一年的谈判和失败的协议已经表明，也没有纯粹的外交解决方案。


Only by eliminating – or at least seriously diminishing – the potential for the separatists and their Russian backers to continue their military campaign can Ukraine and its partners hope for a lasting political solution.	只有通过消灭——或至少严重削弱——分裂分子及其俄罗斯支持者继续军事行动的潜力，乌克兰及其伙伴才能看到可持续的政治方案的希望。


Ukraine\u0027s Borgia Campaign	乌克兰总统竞选


With its accusations about poisonings and conspiracies, Ukraine's presidential election campaign is a spectacle only the Borgias could love.	由于有人阴谋策划了对领导人食物投毒，乌克兰总统竞选已经成了只有黑手党家族能欣赏的一场闹剧。


Ten days ago, Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate for president (who is leading in the polls), disappeared from the campaign trail. He re-surfaced in Vienna recovering from what at first was thought to be food poisoning.	十天前，在民意测验中处于领先地位的反对党候选人维克多·尤什申科竟然在总统竞选活动中消失，之后他在维也纳重新露面，对外宣传先前失踪是因为食物中毒，而现已治愈。


But it is now widely alleged in Ukraine that Yushchenko's food may have been laced with the deadly drug ricin, once a favorite of KGB assassins, who used it in the murder of Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident, in London in 1978.	但是现在乌克兰国内广为流传的一种说法是尤什申科吃的食品中可能加有致命的蓖麻蛋白，这种药品曾经是克格勃刺客最喜欢的暗杀工具，他们在1978年用它在伦敦暗杀了保加利亚流亡领导人乔治·马可夫。


In most countries, such charges would seem like paranoid delusions.	在大多数国家，这种指控可能看上去象天方夜谭，但在乌克兰，却不是空穴来风。


Not in Ukraine, where the current prime minister, and Mr Yushchenko's leading rival for president, Viktor Yanukovych, has been twice convicted for violent crimes.	现任总理、尤什申科竞选总统的最主要的对手，维克多·亚努克维奇，曾两次被法院宣判从事参与暴力犯罪。


Yushchenko has now resumed campaigning, his face partially paralyzed when he spoke to a huge rally of supporters in Kiev last week.	事后尤什申科重新投入了总统竞选中，但上周当他在基辅一个由支持者组成的集会上发言时，他的脸部分瘫痪了。


His opponents cavalierly dismiss the affair, with the deputy head of President Leonid Kuchma's administration suggesting that Yushchenko should hire a food taster.	他的对手傲慢地解散了集会，总统兰奥尼德·库马的政府代表也暗示尤什申科应该雇佣一个帮他试吃食品的人。


The matter is now the subject of a criminal investigation.	这一事件现在已经立案调查。


Suspicions of foul play deepened when the opposition's second-leading figure, Yuliya Tymoshenko, a former deputy prime minister, was summoned by a Moscow prosecutor to answer questions related to charges that years ago she bribed a Russian military officer to benefit the gas firm she headed.	反对党的二号人物，保加利亚前副总理尤利娅·提莫申科被莫斯科检察官传唤，让她回答一些关于几年前她对一名俄罗斯军官进行贿赂，使自己主持的燃气公司从中获利的问题，这么一来无疑加深了人们对总统竞选的违规性的猜疑。


Indeed, Russia's military prosecutor has now issued an international arrest warrant for her, even though the officer she is accused of bribing was acquitted in a trial in Moscow last year of the very charges that prosecutors now want to question her about.	事实上，俄罗斯军事检察官已经对她发出了一张国际逮捕证，然而受牵连的那名军官去年在莫斯科的一次审讯之后被宣告无罪释放。 当时法庭指控他的正是如今要审问尤利娅那些问题。


Coming on the heels of Yushchenko's alleged poisoning, the timing of the move against Tymoshenko appears to be anything but coincidental.	在尤什申科宣称食物中毒后接踵而来的提莫申科事件可以说绝对不是一个巧合。


Indeed, the case was reopened while Yushchenko was hospitalized - thus threatening to decapitate the opposition with barely a month to go before the presidential election on October 31.	事实上，此事事被旧事重提正是在尤什申科住院期间，力图通过这种方式在十月三十一号举行的总统竞选前一个月将反对党的势力彻底斩除。


Such strong-arm tactics are all the more distressing because according to the most recent opinion polls Ukraine's opposition has a real chance of winning.	这些强制的策略令人担忧，因为按照最新一次乌克兰的民意调查，反对党在选举中胜出的可能性很大。


Against all odds, Ukraine's opposition groups have helped forge a civil society and healthy political parties far beyond anything seen in President Vladimir Putin's Russia.	乌克兰反对派团体致力于建立一个同普京总统领导之下的俄国截然不同的市民社会以及健康的政党，为此可谓历经万难。


Indeed, Russia's president is rallying behind Yanukovych, who has open backing from Russia's ambassador in Kiev, former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.	俄罗斯总统站在维克多·亚努克维奇这一边，因为他得到了俄国驻基辅大使、前总理维克多·谢赫诺密丁的公开支持。


Yanukovych represents the Donetsk clan, one of several geographically defined oligarchic groups that compete to dominate Ukrainian business and politics.	亚努克维奇代表的是顿涅茨克派别，是几个地理上被定义为主张寡头政治的团体之一，这些团体争相控制乌克兰的商业和政治。


He has little sway over either the Kiev clan, led by Viktor Medvedchuk, Kuchma's chief of staff, or the Dnipropetrovsk clan of Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma's sonâinâlaw.	他在由库马总统的总参谋长维克多·麦德伍申科领导的基辅派和由库马的女婿领导的宁普洛帕乔斯科派之间摇摆不定。


But both oligarchs prefer Yanukovych to Yushchenko, who has vowed to "end corruption" and send "bandits" to jail.	但两大寡头政治派别都倾向于亚努克维奇，因为尤什申科宣誓要"终结腐败"并将"强盗们"绳之以法。


Yushchenko's promises resonate across Ukraine.	尤什申科的承诺传遍了乌克兰举国上下。


Even though the oligarchs control all but one of the main television stations, he remains popular.	尽管寡头政治的执政者们控制了除了一家以外的几乎所有的主要电视台，他还是受到了公众的欢迎。


Under President Kuchma, the economy has recently started to boom - thanks partly to Yushchenko's brief, reformist premiership four years ago - but the oligarchs' grip has grown tighter.	库马总统领导下的经济最近开始有了起色，这应该部分归功于尤什申科四年前竞选总理时的纲领。


In June, a consortium led by Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov, a Donetsk magnate, bought a stateâowned steelworks in an auction allegedly rigged to specifically exclude foreign bidders offering two or three times as much.	今年六月，一个由平强克和顿涅茨克富豪瑞耐特·阿克莫托夫领导的集团通过拍卖买下了一个国家钢铁厂，这次拍卖据称被非法操纵，因为它明确规定国外投标人只能出二到三次价。


The move was probably more than just another property grab; it also suggests an effort to forge an interâclan alliance for the post-Kuchma period.	这一行动可能不止是一次财产的掠夺； 它还意味着为后库马时代党派之间强强联手作准备的一次努力。


Such an alliance would make Yushchenko's rule, if he wins, more difficult - and he knows it.	如果尤什申科在竞选中胜出，这种联合将使得他的统治更为艰难。


So he is cagey about plans to confront the oligarchs.	他本人也很清楚这一点，因此他不得不精心策划应对寡头政治团伙的方案。


"I don't exclude investigations of the clans behind Medvedchuk or Yanukovych, but the rest of business wants clear rules," he says.	"我不反对对麦德伍申科或是亚努克维奇身后的党派进行调查，这一行需要清晰的法规。 "他说道。


By leaving Pinchuk off this list, Yushchenko may be hinting that he wants a truce with Ukraine's most powerful magnate should he become president.	他没有提到平强克的名字，也许通过这种方式暗示如果他成为总统的话，他还是希望同乌克兰最有势力的大富豪和平共处。


Europe, America, and the wider world must not stand idle if Ukraine's rulers and oligarchs try to steal this election by any means at their disposal.	如果乌克兰的统治者和寡头政治团伙试图通过任何方式操纵这次总统竞选的话，欧洲、美国以及国际社会绝对不会在一旁观望。


Pressure must be brought to bear on Kuchma to ensure that the vote in October is transparently free and fair.	必须向库马总统施加压力以保证十月份的投票将以一种透明以及公正的方式进行。


Otherwise, Kiev might witness the type of protests - and the risk of civil war - that brought down Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000 and Eduard Schevardnadze's government in Georgia last year.	否则，基辅也许会出现一些示威抗议活动，甚至有发生内战的危险，2000年发生在塞尔维亚的内战就推倒了斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇，去年格鲁吉亚的厄杜德·舍瓦得纳兹的政府也被同样的方式推翻。


Applying pressure won't be easy.	然而施加压力并不是一件容易的事。


For years, President Kuchma has been in the West's doghouse, but Europe and the United States stepped gingerly, wary of pushing him into Russia's waiting embrace.	库马总统从西方世界失宠已经很久了，但欧洲和美国走得小心翼翼，生怕将他推到俄国的怀抱中去。


Moreover, Kuchma's decision to send Ukrainian troops to Iraq divided the Western alliance, as he came into America's good graces.	此外，库马将乌克兰军队派遣到伊拉克的决定分裂了西方的联盟，因为他欣然站在美国这一边。


Perhaps unwisely, Yushchenko publicly called for troop withdrawal from Iraq after casualties were sustained.	在伊伤亡人数持续上升之后，尤什申科公然呼吁从伊撤军，这也许是一种不识时务之举。


But President Bush cannot promote democracy in Iraq by cynically sacrificing it in Ukraine.	但如果美国总统布什对乌克兰的民主状况冷眼旁观的话，他也无法推进伊拉克的民主进程。


Europe and the US must address the corruption allegedly surrounding the Kuchma government and its efforts to maintain power by manipulating the choice of his successor.	欧洲和美国必须谴责库马政府的腐败状况以及他通过操纵竞选控制他的继任者以继续掌权的企图。


All efforts to subvert the electoral process should be met with clear warnings that current and future aid, as well as trade privileges such as accelerated WTO accession, will be in jeopardy.	国际社会应该通过停止援助以及终止贸易特权等方式来敦促乌克兰进行公正的选举。


Most ordinary Ukrainians desperately want to be part of Europe. These aspirations can be used to encourage Kiev to turn toward the West and democracy.	大多数乌克兰人拼命想成为欧洲的一部分，这种渴望可以鼓励基辅来到西方民主社会中来。


But it must be made clear that regardless of Ukraine's geopolitical importance, the West will not shy away from confronting it when democracy and fundamental human rights are threatened.	但必须澄清的是撇开乌克兰地理上、政治上的重要性不谈，当民主和基本人权受到威胁的时候，西方社会是绝对不会袖手旁观的。


Ukraine’s Dollar Addiction	乌克兰迷恋美元


KYIV – Inflation in Ukraine is skyrocketing.	    基辅--乌克兰的通货膨胀正在窜升。


By March, it reached 26% per year and continues to rise.	三月的时候，通货膨胀达到26%并且继续上升。


Although prices are increasing around the world, Ukraine’s inflation is extreme, twice as much as in neighboring Russia.	尽管世界各地的物价都在上升，乌克兰的通胀确实极端的，相当于邻国俄国的两倍。


Amazingly, instead of dampening inflation, Ukraine’s central bank is stoking it.	令人惊讶的是，乌克兰中央银行不仅不抵销通货膨胀，反而在火上加油。


Ukraine’s prices started spiraling out of control around the time when Yuliya Tymoshenko returned as prime minister last December.	    当季莫申科在去年十二月重新返回担任总理的时候，乌克兰的物价开始失去控制攀升。


Malicious observers suggest that she is to blame for pursuing populist social expenditures.	恶意的观察家们说季莫申科追求民粹主义的社会开支，应当对此负责。


But this is false.	但是这并非如此。


Her government actually  tightened the budget just before New Year.	她的政府实际上在新年的时候紧缩了预算。


Indeed, Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk reports that the state recorded a budget surplus of 0.6% of GDP during the first quarter of 2008.	实际上，乌克兰财政部长平泽尼克报告说，在2008年的第一季度乌克兰实现预算盈余达到GDP的0. 06%。


This is not surprising, because state revenues expand with rising prices, while expenditures are largely fixed.	    这并不令人惊讶，因为国家财政收入与物价一起上升，而开支则大体上固定。


But Tymoshenko’s government has, in reality, done a solid fiscal job.	但是季莫申科政府实际上在财政问题上步伐稳健。


State finances are generally in good shape, with public debt at just 11% of GDP.	国家财政基本上良好，公共债务仅仅是GDP的11%。


According to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), international reserves have grown steadily and now stand at $33 billion.	乌克兰国家银行报告说，该国的国际储备稳步上升，现在是330亿美元。


The real cause of Ukraine’s inflation is that its currency, the hryvnia, remains pegged to the US dollar.	    乌克兰通货膨胀的实际原因是它的货币格里夫纳与美元挂钩。


When the dollar falls in value, as it has, Ukraine’s very open economy imports inflation.	当美元正如实际那样贬值的时候，乌克兰非常开放的经济也就进口了通货膨胀。


In the last year, the dollar’s value dropped by 12% against the euro, which is a more important currency than the dollar in Ukraine’s foreign trade.	去年，美元与欧元相比贬值12%，而欧元是在乌克兰外贸中更为重要的货币。


The International Monetary Fund has persistently warned Ukraine that its dollar peg could cause a financial crisis because of over- or undervaluation, and for years has called on Ukraine to free its exchange rate.	    国际货币基金组织一贯警告乌克兰说，由于过高或者过低估价，其货币与美元挂钩有可能造成金融危机。 该组织多年来一直呼吁乌克兰放开汇率。


But the NBU refused to do so – making Ukraine the last country in Central and Eastern Europe to tie its currency to the dollar.	但是乌克兰国家银行拒绝从命，从而使得乌克兰成为中东欧最后一个把货币与美元挂钩的国家。


Ukraine’s powerful industrialists praised the NBU’s low exchange-rate policy, believing it makes the country more competitive.	    乌克兰势力强大的企业家们赞扬国家银行低汇率政策。 他们相信这让乌克兰更加具有竞争力。


They ignore the fact that the NBU can control only the nominal appreciation of the hryvnia.	他们忽略这一事实，也就是国家银行只能控制格里夫纳名义上的升值。


But costs are determined by the real revaluation, which is the sum of exchange-rate changes and inflation.	但是实际货币价值、也就是汇率和通货膨胀的总和决定了成本。


The dollar peg has also forced the NBU to pursue a loose monetary policy.	    与美元挂钩还迫使国家银行采用宽松的货币政策。


Ukraine’s current refinance rate is 16% a year, 10% less than inflation, which means that Ukraine has a negative real interest rate of 10% a year.	乌克兰再供款的利率是16%，低于通货膨胀10%，这就意味者乌克兰的年度利率是负10%。


As a result, Ukraine’s money supply, M3, exploded by no less than 52% in the last year, which points to inflation hitting 30% soon.	结果，乌克兰的货币供应M3在去年爆炸式上升52%，也就意味着通货膨胀马上达到30%。


The NBU’s leadership understands that it must act to contain inflation, but its insistence on the dollar peg ties their hands, because it prevents them from raising interest rates sufficiently.	    乌克兰国家银行的领导层理解，该行必须采取行动来遏制通货膨胀，但是其坚持与美元挂钩限制了他们的行动，因为这不让他们有效地提高利率。


Instead, they have reverted to strict reserve requirements, effectively rationing credit and thereby causing a domestic credit squeeze in the midst of the current international financial crisis, which is likely to force some medium-sized banks into bankruptcy because of liquidity problems.	相反，他们回到了严格的储备要求，实际上实行信贷配给，从而在当前国际金融危机当口造成国内信贷紧缩。 这就有可能迫使某些中等规模的银行由于流动资金问题而破产。


Rationing is always worse than a market.	配给制度总是不如市场高明。


Why does the NBU persist with this harmful policy?	    为什么乌克兰国家银行要坚持这一有害的政策呢？


Incompetence is one reason, but politics is probably the decisive cause.	不称职是一个原因，但是政治可能是决定性的原因。


The NBU is subordinate to President Viktor Yushchenko, who, despite naming Tymoshenko as prime minister, seems more interested in harming her politically than in capping inflation.	乌克兰国家银行听命于尤先科总统。 他尽管任命季莫申科担任总理，但是看起来更为想要在政治上破坏季莫申科，而非抑制通货膨胀。


The flaws in the NBU’s policy are so obvious it will be forced to free the exchange rate, but it might act too late.	    乌克兰国家银行政策的缺陷极为明显，它被迫实行自由汇率，但是它采取行动可能为时已晚。


Even now, in the midst of an inflationary crisis, the NBU wants to move in small steps, evidently failing to grasp the severity of the crisis.	即使是现在处于通货膨胀危机的当口，乌克兰国家银行还是想要亦步亦趋，很明显没有完全理解危机的严重性。


The NBU needs to announce that it no longer has an exchange-rate target and that it will stop intervening by ending its purchases of dollars on the currency market.	乌克兰国家银行需要宣布它废弃汇率目标，而且它将会通过停止在货币市场上购买美元来停止干预。


If the NBU lets the exchange rate float, Ukrainians are likely to exchange billions of dollars into hryvnia, driving up the hryvnia exchange rate.	    如果乌克兰国家银行实行浮动汇率，乌克兰人将会有可能把几十亿美元兑换成格里夫纳，抬高该货币的汇率。


That would contain Ukraine’s inflation, as the NBU could restrict the money supply through high interest rates rather than rationing.	这将会抑制乌克兰的通货膨胀，因为国家银行可以通过高利率而非信贷配给来限制货币供应。


Time is short.	    时间短暂。


The great economist Rudi Dornbusch used to say that a financial crisis usually starts much later than anyone expects, but then develops faster than anyone can imagine.	伟大的经济学家多恩布什曾经说过，金融危机发生通常要比人们预计的要晚很多，但是随后发展起来要比人们想像的要快很多。


Ukraine is on the financial precipice.	乌克兰正处于金融危机的悬崖。


Yushchenko and the NBU can still act, but if they do not do so immediately, a costly and unnecessary financial crisis might ensue.	    尤先科和乌克兰国家银行还是可以采取行动，但是如果他们不马上采取行动，一场代价巨大而且不必要的金融危机就会到来。


As prime minister, Yushchenko saved his country from financial default in early 2000.	尤先科作为总理在2000年早期让乌克兰免于一场金融无力偿还危机。


Ukraine’s well-being must not be sacrificed to his political ambitions.	不能为了他的政治野心而牺牲乌克兰的福祉。


Ukraine’s Orange Christmas	乌克兰的橙色圣诞


That Ukrainians will vote for their freedom this Christmas season is a coincidence of true perfection.	在圣诞之际，乌克兰将再次为自由进行投票，这真是一个完美的巧合。


For our movement is a triumph, not of mobs but of joyous crowds; of protests, not of looting; of clear purpose, not confusion.	因为我们所取得的进展是欢欣人群的胜利而非暴民的成功，是抗议运动而非抢劫掠夺，我们的目标明确而不含糊。


As a result, something new will color the habits of those who govern Ukraine from now on: respect for individuals, which is the ultimate check on the abuse of power.	其结果就是，从现在开始乌克兰的执政者们将带上一种新气象，即对个人的尊重，从而在根本上控制滥用职权。


Nothing can ever diminish what was at stake – and the victory that has been won – on the streets of Kyiv.	在基辅的大街上，没有什么能减少极具风险的事情——也不能否认已经获得的胜利。


Ukraine’s people have renewed their self-respect through courage and resolution.	乌克兰人民用勇气和决心恢复了他们的自尊。


They have reason to be proud.	他们完全有理由为此而感到骄傲。


Self-confidence among the governed and caution among the rulers: these are the psychological springs of democracy and true freedom, and they can never again be diverted in our homeland.	民众们充满自信，执政者们小心谨慎：民主制度和真正的自由终于迎来了精神上的春天，它们再也不会在我们的故乡上消失了。


Nobody ever doubted that Ukraine had changed vastly in its twelve years of independence.	没有人会质疑乌克兰在取得独立的十二年间发生的巨大变化。


Yet, caught in the sights of a gun barrel, nobody – not even the brave men and women who camped in their hundreds of thousands in the snow before Ukraine’s parliament – knew with certainty whether those changes had wrenched Ukrainians from the grip of fear and apathy.	但是，看见荷枪实弹后，没有人——甚至是成千上万勇敢地冒雪站在乌克兰议会前的男男女女们——都不敢肯定这些变化是否能将乌克兰从恐惧和消沉中解脱出来。


The success of their defiance shows the power of the idea that bewilders outgoing President Leonid Kuchma and his acolytes: that democracy means taking responsibility for one’s fate into one’s own hands.	他们认为，民主就是为掌握自己的命运而负起责任，而抗议活动的胜利证明了这一观点力量之强大，令即将下台的总统列昴尼德·库奇马和他的党羽为此大伤脑筋。


The regime clearly expected the crowds that protested the fraudulent election of November 21 to scatter in apathy.	很明显，当权政权希望那些集会抗议11月21日舞弊选举的民众最终在心灰意冷中自动解散。


They did not.	但结果事与愿违。


This left the regime to choose between using force to quell the growing resistance or cutting its losses.	政府不得不在两难之间做出抉择：是使用武力镇压不断上扬的抵抗情绪，还是降低他们的损失。


By refusing to leave the streets and squares of Kyiv, Ukraine’s mass volunteer army of democrats forced our country’s gray old men of the past to retreat into the past.	乌克兰聚集的民主主义者组成的志愿军拒绝离开基辅街道和广场，迫使我国昔日头发灰白的老人再次使出旧招。


This is a breakthrough that will endure.	经过愤世嫉俗的七十多年，乃至几个世纪，这一突破才到来，并且将持续下去。


For 70 cynical years, and for centuries before that, everything done in the name of Ukrainians was done without our consent.	而在此之前，所有以乌克兰人民名义所做的事其实都没有征得他们的同意。


Corrupt regimes, through intimidation and bribery, insisted on the loyalty of the bureaucracy, police, and armed services.	腐败政权通过恫吓威胁以及行贿手段，墨守官僚主义、坚持警察部队和武装力量统治。


Newspapers and broadcasts were packed with lies.	报纸和广播谎言铺天盖地。


The Kuchma regime’s vast wealth, stolen from ordinary Ukrainians, suggested that the reign of thuggery and deceit could go on forever.	库奇马政权从乌克兰人民手中盗取了巨额财富，暗示着这种残暴欺骗的统治将永无尽头。


But Ukrainians have now given their seal of approval to democracy and an open society.	但是现在乌克兰人已同意进行民主主义改革和社会开放。


From now on, the force of ideas, not the force of arms, will win the day.	从现在开始，思想的力量将战胜武装力量赢得胜利。


For once, Karl Marx, the mischievous cause of so much of Ukraine’s misery, got something right: “the point,” he said about the world, “is to change it.”	卡尔·马克思，这位造成乌克兰人民不幸境遇的始作俑者，说对了一点：关键是改变世界。


Of course, our movement was created out of opposition: opposition to corruption, opposition to surrendering our national independence, opposition to the rule of the bully.	当然，我们所取得的进展源于各种反对运动：反对腐败，反对放弃我们的国家独立、反对威吓手段。


The joy of opposition is its simplicity; Ukrainians understood what we opposed and stood side by side with us.	反对的乐趣就在于其本身的简单性； 乌克兰人民了解我们的反对立场，并和我们并肩作战。


Now we must lead a nation in which – thanks to the cynical ploys and hate-filled rhetoric of a discredited regime – some sections seem to be set against the democracy we seek to build.	由于这个不讲信誉的政权使用犬儒主义政策和暗藏恶意的花言巧语，使得现在我们必须领导的这个国家中的一些法令与我们所寻求建立的民主制度背道而驰。


But no section of Ukraine is our enemy and none will be treated that way. For we need no reminding of what must be Ukraine’s priority.	但是没有任何一个乌克兰选区是我们的敌人，也没有人应以敌对态度对待，因为我们很清楚乌克兰的优势所在。


We have shouted it from every platform in the country: end corruption and abuse of power for personal and partisan gain.	我们从全国各个角落发出我们的呐喊：结束一切中饱私囊和党派争利的腐败行为和滥用职权。


It is a message carved on our hearts.	这是发自我们内心的声音。


Thus, our first task is legal and judicial reform, and here we are given hope by the courage of Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which in overturning the stolen election of November 21 upheld the law and the liberties of Ukrainians against a regime determined to sweep them away.	因此，我们的首要任务是进行法律和司法改革。 乌克兰最高法院推翻了11月21日舞弊选举结果，高院的勇气给了我们莫大的希望，也维护了法律公正和乌克兰人民的自由，尽管当权政府下定决心将这些一扫而光。


So we will resist the temptation of revenge and retribution. That way lays demoralization and new divisions.	因此我们放弃了报仇雪耻和所要赔偿的诱惑，因为那样将会导致我们的消沉和新的分歧。


Ruling in the national interest, rather than for the benefit of favored sections or clans, we will apply the law equally to our supporters and our opponents.	在治理国家上，国家利益将远远大于那些优待选区或家族的利益。 无论是我们的支持者还是敌人，在法律上都将得到一视同仁的对待。


We will be guided, and bound, by the rule of law – and the spirit of ordered liberty that animates it.	我们将受到法律的引导和约束——而有序井然的自由精神将会使推动法律蓬勃生机。


Of course, immense difficulties remain.	诚然，困难依旧重重。


The first is repairing our country’s unity.	首先要做的就是修复我国的完整统一。


Yes, Ukraine has Ukrainian speakers and it has Russian speakers; yes, it has Orthodox and Catholics.	的确，乌克兰国内有说乌语者，也有说俄语者，是的，有东正教也有天主教。


But those divisions were manipulated with the same sort of cynicism that Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman used to pit Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian against each other in the former Yugoslavia.	但是这些分化过去被犬儒主义方式操纵着。 斯洛布登‧米洛赛维齐和弗拉特科·杜子曼都在昔日的南斯拉夫国用同样的方法以使塞尔维亚、克罗地亚和波斯尼亚反目成仇。


Ukrainians recoil, in anger and horror, at the very idea of dividing the nation.	一想起国家分裂，乌克兰人总会在愤怒和恐惧中畏缩。


Our nation’s unity is not artificial. We are united as a people and in our shared history of suffering.	我们是作为一支民族被统一起来的，彼此分担着一段受尽苦难的历史。


Having laid the foundations of genuine democracy, our house will not be divided by anyone.	这样的统一真实可靠。 当真正的民主主义在我们国家扎根之后，我们就再也不会被分割。


In renewing our liberties, we will renew our unity. We will renew Ukraine.	在重得我们的自由中，我们将恢复我们的统一，我们将使乌克兰焕然一新。


Ukraine’s Own Goal	乌克兰自身的目标


KYIV – Politics and sports are often an incendiary mix, as the controversy now swirling around the Euro 2012 football championship, to be co-hosted by Ukraine and Poland, demonstrates.	发自基辅——政治和体育经常会成为某种煽动性的混合物，正如当前围绕着2012年欧洲国家杯——该项赛事由乌克兰和波兰合办——的论战所体现的那样。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, and other European Union leaders have said that they will boycott matches held in Ukraine, owing to the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and other opposition figures.	德国总理默克尔，欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐还有另外一些欧盟领袖都声称会抵制在乌克兰境内举办的部分赛事，因为该国囚禁了其前总理尤利娅·季莫申科以及其他一些反对派。


Why, two decades after communism ended and Ukraine gained its independence, does the country remain mired in economic torpor and an authoritarian politics that has aroused such ire in Europe?	从乌克兰终结共产主义并赢得独立迄今已有20多年了，为何这个国家依然深陷经济泥潭，并依然运行着一套在欧洲激起众怒的专制政治？


When a country like Ukraine develops slowly and remains poor, it is not because of natural disaster or resource constraints. Bad policies pursued by bad governments are to blame.	当一个像乌克兰这样的国家发展缓慢且贫穷不堪的时候，我们无法将其归结为天灾或者资源限制，而是要把矛头指向一个坏政府所执行的坏政策上。


Contrary to what many Western economists think, the worst economic breakdowns are not the result of free markets gone haywire, but of excessive concentration of political power.	与许多西方经济学家的想法相反的是，最恶劣的经济崩溃并非源自于自由市场的紊乱，而是来自于政治权力的过度集中。


To insure against the worst human and economic catastrophes, limits to political power must be introduced and a system of checks and balances maintained.	为确保那些最险恶的人道和经济灾难免于发生，就必须对政治权力加以限制并维持权力之间的互相制衡。


Witness the divergence in long-run economic growth between the Euro 2012 co-hosts.	对此我们可以用2012年欧洲国家杯两个主办国在长期经济发展上的差异作为见证。


Poland’s GDP has almost doubled over the last 20 years, while Ukraine is still barely maintaining the output level recorded during the last year of socialism.	波兰的GDP在过去20年间几乎翻了一倍，而乌克兰的产出却依然维持在社会主义制度倒台那一年的水平。


Generally speaking, Central and Eastern European countries have performed better economically than the ex-Soviet countries (with the exception of the Baltic states).	总体来说，中东欧国家在经济上的表现都比前苏联加盟共和国要好（波罗的海各国除外）。


Economic growth is a matter not just of quality of life, but of quantity as well.	经济增长并不仅仅关系到生活的品质，也与生命的数量有关。


Child mortality rates have declined in all Central European countries over the past 20 years, especially in Poland, where the rate fell from 17 per 10,000 live births to seven.	所有中欧国家的儿童死亡率在过去20年都有所下降，尤其是波兰——从万分之17降到了万份7。


In the Czech Republic and Slovenia, life expectancy has increased from 71 to 77, similar to other Central European countries.	在捷克和斯洛文尼亚，人们的期望寿命从71岁增加到了77岁，其他中欧国家也实现了类似的成就。


In Ukraine, by contrast, under-five child mortality rates have fallen only slightly, from 25 per 10,000 live births to 24, while life expectancy has declined from 70 years to 68.	相比之下在乌克兰，5岁以下儿童死亡率仅有轻微下降，从万分之25变成了24，而预期寿命则从70岁下降到了68岁。


The same stagnation applies to Russia.	俄罗斯的状况也与此类似。


The post-communist record shows that the countries that reformed most successfully are also the most democratic – indeed, as democratic as any in the West.	共产主义倒台后的纪录显示那些改革最成功的国家同时也是最民主的国家——事实上跟任何西方国家同样民主。


The worst economic outcomes in the region are found in countries that have diverged from democracy.	而最糟糕的经济数据则来自于那些与民主分道扬镳的国家。


Democracy is not a panacea, but non-democratic regimes usually pursue worse economic polices than democratic governments do.	民主并不是什么万灵丹，但不民主的政权通常会采取一些比民主政府更糟糕的经济政策。


The former engage in predatory and unpredictable regulation, which produces a bad business environment.	前者一味巧取豪夺，规则反复无常，最终造成了一个恶劣的营商环境。


Another danger is heavy taxation.	另一大危险则是重税。


Official taxes are high when spending is high.	政府大量支出时通常伴随着高昂的官方税率。


When spending is high, it is usually social spending that is badly targeted, which means that only a small share of poor people really benefit.	而在这些支出中用于社会方面的支出往往不得要领，只能让少部分的穷人受益。


Moreover, corruption payments should be added to official taxation.	此外，与贪污腐败有关的款项也应当被计入税收之中。


It may turn out that most businesses are hit by heavy taxation of both varieties – so heavy that the economy cannot grow, as appears to be the case in Ukraine.	而大多数企业都会受到这两类重税的冲击——这些税项是如此沉重以致连经济都无法增长，一如眼下的乌克兰。


Furthermore, uneven protection of property rights – crony capitalism – means that a small number of businessmen are politically favored.	此外，在财产所有权保护上的不平等——比如说权贵资本主义——意味着有一小部分的企业会得到特殊照顾。


They may pay lower taxes, or their competitors may be subject to raids by the authorities.	他们能享受低税率，或者他们的竞争对手会遭到当局的突击搜查。


Because the state uses its apparatus to deter competition – both informally, through arbitrary enforcement of property rights, and formally, through trade restrictions – crony capitalism is not only unjust, but also inefficient.	由于国家利用其下属机构来遏制竞争——无论是非正式地利用针对财产所有权的执法，或是正式利用种种贸易管制政策——权贵资本主义不仅不公平，而且也缺乏效率。


Individual businessmen may succeed, but the economy will not.	某些生意人或许能获得成功，但整体经济却乏善可陈。


Without competition, capitalism works only a little better than socialism did.	没有了竞争，资本主义跟社会主义没什么大区别。


A key ingredient of Poland’s success in the last 20 years was a clear separation, from the very beginning of the post-communist transition, between politics and business.	波兰在过去20年之所以能取得成功，一个关键因素就是在后共产主义转型初始就在政治和商业间实现了明确的区分。


There were uniform rules and equal protection for everyone.	规则一视同仁，每个人都能得到平等的保护。


Poland introduced massive competition by dismantling monopolies and opening its economy to the world.	通过废除垄断和向全世界开放市场，波兰引入了大量的竞争。


Moreover, Poland avoided extreme booms and the deep recessions that follow.	此外，波兰避免了经济的过度膨胀以及随后产生的大幅衰退。


Most booms are produced by bad monetary and fiscal policies.	大多数这类膨胀都来自于错误的货币和财政政策。


This is true of the recent boom-bust sequence in Spain, Ireland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, and the Baltics, among others.	西班牙、爱尔兰、美国、英国，保加利亚和波罗的海各国最近出现的泡沫膨胀-爆发连锁反应都说明了这一点。


In Ukraine, too, a huge boom in 2004-2007 was followed by a contraction amounting to almost 15% GDP in 2009 – a direct result of domestic policies.	乌克兰也一样，2004~2007年间的大泡沫之后就是2009年相当于GDP总额15%的收缩——也是其国内政策所导致的直接后果。


Ukraine’s record over the past 20 years demonstrates that it is not enough to abolish socialism.	乌克兰在过去20年间的纪录说明仅仅抛弃社会主义是不够的。


The real challenge is to build free-market, rule-based capitalism.	真正的挑战在于建立自由市场以及以规则为基础的资本主义。


And, to do that, an energetic civil society must demand an end to crony capitalism.	为了实现这一点，一个充满活力的公民社会必须迫使权贵资本主义走向终结。


Ukraine’s citizens can become more like their Central European neighbors, or they can allow the economy’s many distortions from past bad policies to persist, in which case they will fall further behind.	而乌克兰的公民们要么进一步他们的中欧邻居看齐，要么就容忍过往错误政策所带来的经济紊乱持续下���——这也将令他们更加被人远远抛在后面。


Ukraine’s Struggle for Law	乌克兰的法制斗争


One year after our Orange Revolution, many Ukrainians see its ideals as betrayed.	“橙色革命”一年后，很多乌克兰人都认为自己的理想被出卖了。


Belief in a government answerable to the people and in a transparent market purged of insider dealing no longer guides government policy.	政府对人民负责和清除市场内鬼的信念不再是政府政策的准绳。


Instead, the ideals for which we struggled appear as slogans invoked by those who want to protect their vested interests.	相反，他们为之奋斗的理想更像是被保护既得利益者们利用的口号。


Cynics explain this by saying that our AOrange” ideals were never anything but the rationalizations of one set of oligarchs struggling to overthrow another.	愤世嫉俗者说我们的“橙色”理想从一开始就不过是一个寡头集团用来推翻另一个寡头集团的合理借口。


Once masters of the situation, it is said, the zeal of those who promised reform mutated into a zeal to preserve their private wealth and that of their friends.	他们说这些人一旦大权在握，他们承诺改革的热情就转向了保护自己和朋友的私有财产。


How did Ukraine reach this state of cynicism?	乌克兰怎么陷入了这样尴尬的境地？


A year ago, everyone gathered in the streets of Kyiv knew what we were standing up against: a corrupt government that sought to command life and labor, and to dispose of state property, at its will.	一年前，聚集到基辅街道上的每个人都清楚任意操纵生活和劳动、任意处置国家财产的腐败政府才是我们的反对目标。


In so far as formal legal rights existed, no court could be relied upon to enforce those rights when our rulers saw their interests as challenged.	只要正式的法律权利存在，就不可能在统治者认为权利受到挑战的时候，指望法院来行使这些权利。


In evicting that regime, we believed that this form of absolutism was ended.	专制政府下台的时候，我们相信如彼那般的专制形式已经寿终正寝。


Instead, those who benefited from the regime=s corruptions insisted that their rights to the property they had stolen were inviolate.	恰恰相反，专制政权腐败的既得利益者坚持认为他们盗窃得来的财产神圣不可侵犯。


These crony capitalists argue that, if they are left alone to develop their assets, they will make the country prosperous.	这些任人唯亲的资本家说，如果让他们自由经营自己的财产，他们就能使国家繁荣富强。


Tamper with property, no matter how ill-gotten, and no investor will have confidence, they claim.	而如果侵犯了这些财产，不管它们是如何得之不义，都会使投资者失去信心。


That is the oldest excuse to justify wrongdoing: the end justifies the means.	那是为错误行为狡辩的老套借口：用目的来验证手段。


But power - be it political or economic - without legitimate origins is arbitrary.	但没有合法来源的政治和经济权利都属于独裁。


An economy that appears arbitrary and illegitimate in the eyes of the majority of people may, for a time, run on the false confidence of easy profits.	被多数人认为独裁和违法的经济也许会在短期内由于暴利而得到虚假的信任。


Corruption, however, is inevitable because the rule of law, which is the market=s ultimate guarantor, depends on the consent of all its participants and their belief in its core fairness.	但从长远来看，腐败却不可避免，因为作为市场终极保证的法治取决于所有参与者的认可和对核心公平的信任。


A radical lawlessness was at the heart of Ukraine’s privatization process.	乌克兰私有化进程的核心是极端激进的无法无天。


So we must not be tricked by the fact that those who gained economic power by looting state assets now employ lawyers, invoke free market nostrums, and claim to follow the letter of the law.	因此我们不该被这样的事实所迷惑，那就是那些靠掠夺国家财产的爆发者现在却在聘请律师、摆出自由市场原则、并自称遵守法律的规定。


For there is such a thing as a lawless legality.	这个世界上有些东西貌似合法，实则无法无天。


It is found when governments deny that in making or interpreting laws they are bound by the spirit of law.	政府否认在制定和解释法律的时候，也应该遵守法律的精神，就是看似合法、实则非法思潮的具体体现。


In this respect, the oligarchs and their political placemen who insist that their right to stolen property is sacred make the same crude claim as the regime that we overthrew: that they have an indefeasible right to the exercise of power.	在这个方面，坚持盗窃财产神圣不可侵犯的寡头及其政治傀儡与我们推翻的政府说法惊人的一致：那就是他们行使权力的权利神圣不可侵犯。


They reject the principle that there is a law which is superior to presidents, magnates, majorities, or mobs.	他们拒绝承认法律的权力凌驾于总统、富豪、大众或暴民之上。


If their claim is upheld, then the cynics are right: our revolution was merely about whether one class or another, one person or another, would obtain the power to work his or her will.	如果他们的说法得到确认，那么愤世嫉俗者们终于不幸言中：我们的革命不过是决定这个或那个阶级、这个或那个人，能够大权在握，来贯彻自身的意志。


Endorsing the claim to arbitrary power is the cardinal heresy of those who say we should certify property stolen from the state as rightfully owned.	认可独裁权力是那些声称应该证明从国家盗窃的财产为个人合法所有的人所提出的主要邪说。


I call this a heresy because it rejects the supremacy of equality under law and proclaims the supremacy of particular men. This is alien to any and all concepts of liberty.	我把它称为异端邪说，是因为这种说法拒绝承认合法的平等至高无上，却极力渲染个人的霸权。


It is the legalism of the barbarian, and the nihilist philosophy everyone in reaction against the coming of political and economic liberty to Ukraine.	这不符合自由的一切理念，它是野蛮人的法律，是反对乌克兰政治经济自由的反动者借助的虚无主义哲学。


Legal primitives are not alone in embracing this stance.	法律不健全并非持有上述立场的全部原因。


Many economists also believe that ownership of stolen goods must be recognized.	很多经济学家也相信：必须认可盗窃物品的所有权。


They liken the transition from communism to the state of nature described by John Locke. So they imagine the property rights acquired through cronyism, nepotism, and backroom dealing as somehow emerging from a Lockean realm of freedom.	他们把从共产主义的过渡比作约翰·洛克所说的自然状态，于是就认定通过任用亲信、裙带关系和私下交易所获得的财产是来自洛克哲学的自由王国。


When my government questioned this assumption, they cried out that this was interference by the state with legitimate property rights.	当我的政府对此提出质疑时，他们声称这是政府对合法财产权利的粗暴践踏。


Another group also succumbed to this delusion.	另外一群人也被错觉所蒙蔽。


Some who a year ago displayed great public spirit came to feel, when in government, that they could not vindicate the supremacy of law without curtailing economic growth.	有些一年前表现出可贵公众精神的人开始感到一旦进入政府，他们就无法在经济停滞的状态下维护法律的尊严，因为最不朽的原则也经不起政府的打磨。


Because the grind of government can obscure enduring principle, people inspired by the best motives now find themselves on the same side as their criminal adversaries.	曾经为美好动机所鼓舞的人们现在发现自己站到了罪恶的对手一边。


They have, I believe, lost their way and taken a path that can only lead back to the supremacy of arbitrary power.	在我看来，他们已经失去了方向，走上了承认独裁权力至高无上的老路。


Indeed, the denial that men may be arbitrary is the higher law by which we must govern.	实际上，防止独裁是我们必须遵守的最高法律。


Without this conviction the letter of the law is nothing but a mask for bureaucratic caprice and authoritarian will.	如果没有这样的信念，法律条文就不过是反复无常和独裁意志的面具。


For when people do not believe that their government adheres to this higher spirit of law, no constitution is worth the paper it is written on; no business transaction is safe.	因为如果人们不再相信自己的政府遵守这样高尚的法律精神，那么任何宪法都不过是废纸一张，而任何商业交易也无法保证安全。


For maintaining a constitutional order and viable free market requires an intuitive dislike of arbitrariness, a sensitivity to its manifestations, and spontaneous resistance.	因为维护宪法秩序和有活力的自由市场需要对独裁的本能排斥。 我们要敏感地辨认出独裁的表象，并自觉地加以抵制。


This was why my government sought to recover stolen state property.	这就是我的政府力求恢复被窃国有财产的原因。


By doing so, and then auctioning that property in a transparent manner, Ukrainians saw that arbitrary action could be redressed, that the rule of law applied to the powerful as well as the weak.	通过收回被窃财产，而后以透明的方式公开拍卖，乌克兰人将会看到：独裁行动可以得到矫正，法治不仅适用于弱者，也同样适用于强者。


Indeed, this did happen with the one property recovery that my government was able to secure, the giant Kryvorizhstal steel works that our former president’s son-in-law gained through a rigged sale at a bargain price.	实际上，我的政府的确收回了一笔财产，那就是前总统的女婿通过虚假拍卖以低价取得的Kyrvorizhstal钢铁厂。


On its re-auction, Ukraine received more than five times the amount that had been paid through that insider deal.	重新拍卖时，乌克兰收到的钱数超过了那次虚假交易的5倍。


Ukraine must continue in this way if our people are to trust the law and their institutions.	乌克兰必须坚持下去，法律和制度才能获得人民的信任。


The lesson in the open Kryvorizhstal auction is clear: if a president may not act willfully, arbitrarily, by personal prerogative, then no one may. Ministers may not.	Kyrvorizhstal公开拍卖的教训显而易见：如果总统都不能借助手中的特权胡作非为、独断专行，那就没有人能够这么做。


Parliament may not. Majorities may not.	部长们不可以，议会也不能。


Individuals may not. Crowds may not.	���众不行，个人不行，群体更不行。


Only by adhering to this higher law will Ukraine develop the consciousness of law that true liberty demands.	只有遵守这项更高的法律，乌克兰才能形成真正自由所需的法律意识。


By identifying the law with their vested rights, the oligarchs who have (for now!) derailed the ideals of the Orange Revolution sought to shield their own interests from challenge.	通过用法律来保护自己的既得利益，背叛了“橙色革命”理想的政治寡头们力求保护自己的利益不受挑战。


But because men pervert a truth there is no reason to abandon it.	但我们没有理由因为人为的曲解而放弃真理。


If, as we were taught by Marx, belief in a higher law is a mixture of sentimentality, superstition, and unconscious rationalizations, then the predations that incited the Orange Revolution are in reality the only possible conditions in which we can live.	如果正像马克思所说的那样，相信更高的法律是感情、迷信和下意识推理相结合的产物，那么曾引发“橙色革命”的掠夺实际上是我们生存唯一可能的条件。


We must give up the hope of liberty within an ordered society and market and resign ourselves to that interminable war of all against all of which Hobbes spoke.	我们必须放弃在秩序社会和市场中对自由的渴望，投身到霍布斯所说的一切反对一切的那场无休止的战争。


Indeed, the policies now being offered seem hostile to the ideals of our Orange Revolution.	实际上，现行政策似乎与“橙色革命”的理想背道而驰。


We are asked to choose between social solidarity and economic growth.	政府要我们在社会团结和经济增长之间做出选择。


To escape from want we are told we must embrace illegality.	为了躲避欲望我们不得不容忍违法行为。


To promote the truth, we are told that old crimes - even the beheading of a journalist and the poisoning of our president - must not be closely examined.	为了坚持真理，我们被告知旧有的罪恶¾甚至是把记者斩首和毒杀总统这样的滔天罪行¾都绝对不能深究。