In fact, diarrhea and pneumonia top the charts as the biggest threats to child survival – as they have for the more than 30 years that we have been tracking them.	事实上，腹泻和肺炎在儿童生存最大威胁排行榜上位居前茅——在我们追踪观察的30多年来是如此。


According to the recently published 2016 Pneumonia and Diarrhea Progress Report, the two diseases caused 1.4 million child deaths last year, and one-quarter of all deaths of children under the age of five.	据最新发布的《2016年肺炎和腹泻进展报告》（2016 Pneumonia and Diarrhea Progress Report），这两种疾病去年导致140万儿童死亡，以及四分之一的五岁以下儿童死亡案例。


They exact their highest toll in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.	其中南非和撒哈拉以南非洲情况最为严重。


Tackling the two biggest killers of children worldwide may seem daunting, but we have all the knowledge we need to mount an effective response.	跟踪全世界前两大儿童杀手似乎是一个艰巨的任务，但我们已经具备采取有效应对措施的所有知识。 事实上，我们知道应该针对哪些病毒、细菌和寄生虫；


Indeed, we know which viruses, bacteria, and parasites we need to target; which interventions are likely to work; and which countries need them the most.	知道哪些干预措施可能有效； 知道哪些国家最需要它们。


Just 15 countries account for 72% of childhood deaths from pneumonia and diarrhea.	15个国家占了肺炎和腹泻致死儿童数量的72%。


These are the countries on which the Pneumonia and Diarrhea Progress Report focuses.	它们是《肺炎和腹泻进展报告》关注的对象。


Its analysis of national efforts shows that, while most countries have made improvements over the last year, improvement in some of the largest countries has been minimal, and a few countries have not made any progress at all.	报告对国家措施的分析表明，尽管大部分国家在去年有所进步，但一些最大的国家改善很小，一些国家甚至完全没有进步。


Most deaths happen in the first two years of a child’s life.	大部分死亡病例出现在两岁以前。


To change this, governments need to step up their efforts to prevent pneumonia and diarrhea, including by ensuring that parents have access to the information they need to protect their children.	要改变这一状况，政府需要采取措施预防肺炎和腹泻，包括通过确保家长能获得保护孩子所需要的信息。


Here, it is critical that ordinary citizens stand up and hold their governments accountable.	在这方面，普通公民站出来问责政府至关重要。


The good news is that there are three relatively simple interventions that could make a big difference.	好消息是有三种相对简单的干预方法能够带来巨大的不同。


The first is breastfeeding.	首先是母乳喂养。


An age-old, no-cost intervention, breastfeeding exclusively for the first six months of a baby’s life is one of the easiest ways to prevent both diarrhea and pneumonia.	作为古老的无成本干预手段，新生儿前六个月纯母乳喂养是预防腹泻和肺炎最简单的方式。


Breast milk has all the nutrients babies need to grow, as well as antibodies that boost their immune systems, thereby protecting against illness and helping to accelerate recovery.	母乳具备婴儿生长所需的全部营养，还能提供刺激婴儿免疫系统的抗体，从而预防疾病、加快恢复。


The Progress Report estimates that about half of all diarrhea episodes, and about a third of respiratory infections, could be averted by breastfeeding.	《进展报告》估算，大约一半的腹泻病例以及三分之一的呼吸系统感染可以通过母乳喂养避免。


Yet rates of exclusive breastfeeding during a child’s first six months remain low.	但新生儿前六个月纯母乳喂养率仍然很低。


In ten of the 15 countries evaluated in the Progress Report, fewer than half of mothers exclusively breastfeed their children.	在《进展报告》所评估的15个国家中，有10个国家只有不到一半的母亲纯母乳喂养孩子。


To increase breastfeeding rates, governments need to ensure that mothers receive the guidance and help they need.	要提高母乳喂养率，政府需要确保母亲获得所需的指导和帮助。 这意味着培训卫生工作者；


That means training health workers; establishing community-level support networks, such as mother-to-mother groups; investing in behavioral-change campaigns; and creating a culture in which breastfeeding is welcome and encouraged.	建立社区级支持网络（如母亲互助团体）； 投资于移风易俗运动；


The second critical intervention is improved water, sanitation, and hygiene in homes and communities.	第二项关键性干预是改善社区和家中的水、环境卫生和卫生情况。


Globally, according to UNICEF, around 2.4 billion people still do not have access to modern sanitation, and 663 million do not have access to safe water sources.	据联合国儿童基金会，全球有大约24亿人仍无法获得现代环境卫生设施，6. 63亿人无法获得安全水资源。


Many kids still lack clean drinking water, access to basic toilets, and good hygiene practices.	许多儿童仍然缺乏清洁的饮用水，无法获得基本厕所设施、养成良好的卫生习惯。


Poor water quality and lack of reliable sanitation systems to treat human waste play a big role in spreading diseases.	糟糕的水质以及缺乏可靠的环境卫生系统处理人类垃圾是疾病传播的重要原因。


UNICEF reports that something as simple as hand washing with soap can cut rates of diarrhea and respiratory infections by more than 40% and 25%, respectively.	联合国儿童基金会报告，只要采取用肥皂洗手等简单的措施，就能让腹泻和呼吸系统感染发病率分别降低40%和25%。


By investing not only in systems to provide clean drinking water and sanitation, but also in educational programs that encourage better hygiene practices and toilet use, governments can break a vicious cycle of diarrhea and malnutrition that causes irreversible physical and cognitive damage.	政府不但要投资于提供清洁饮用水和环境卫生的系统，也要投资于鼓励更好的卫生习惯和使用厕所的教育计划，如此就能打破导致不可逆转的身体和认知损害的腹泻和营养不良的恶性循环。


The children they help are more likely to be able to attend school, and grow into healthy, educated adults.	获得帮助的儿童更有可能进入学校、成长为受过教育的健康成年人。


The third key intervention is vaccination.	第三项关键干预是免疫。


Vaccines represent the most cost-effective intervention for preventing childhood illness, and they already exist for most common bacterial causes of pneumonia (pneumococcus and Hib) and for the leading causes of diarrhea (rotavirus).	疫苗是性价比最高的预防儿童疾病的干预手段，最常见的细菌性肺炎（肺炎双球菌和乙型流感嗜血杆菌）以及腹泻（轮状病毒）疫苗早已面世。


Yet half of the world’s children live in areas where the pneumococcal vaccine is not available through a national immunization program, and only 15% of the children in the world’s poorest countries have access to the rotavirus vaccine.	但全世界一半儿童生活在国家免疫计划不提供肺炎双球菌疫苗的地区，而在全球最贫困国家，只有15%的儿童能接种轮状病毒疫苗。


By making vaccines available through national immunization programs, governments can protect all children from the diseases that are most likely to harm or kill them.	政府要通过国家免疫计划推广疫苗，这样就可以保护所有儿童免受最有可能伤害或杀害他们的疾病的影响。


Efforts to ensure that families take advantage of vaccination services, including by educating parents about their value, will also be needed.	确保家庭能得到接种服务的措施——包括通过教育家长疫苗的重要性——也是必不可少的。


Pneumonia and diarrhea should not still be taking children’s lives.	肺炎和腹泻本不应该还能夺走儿童的生命。


No single intervention will be enough.	采取单一干预是不够的。


But the accelerated and coordinated implementation of the three interventions described here could go a long way toward preventing pneumonia and diarrhea, especially for the most vulnerable children, enabling them to lead healthy, productive lives.	加快和综合实施本文所述的三种干预手段能够极大地改善肺炎和腹泻的预防情况，特别是对最脆弱儿童而言，让他们能够过上健康的、富有创造力的生活。


In the Footsteps of Gandhi, Mandela, and Havel	追随着甘地，曼德拉和哈维尔的脚步


LONDON – Liu Xiaobo, the imprisoned Chinese writer and human-rights campaigner, will receive the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10.	发自伦敦——刘晓波这位目前仍在狱中的中国作家和人权活动家将于12月10日获颁诺贝尔和平奖。


For the first time in history, however, neither the laureate nor any member of his immediate family will be present in Oslo to accept the award.	而与此同时，这也是该奖百年来第一次出现获奖者及其家属都无法出席奥斯陆颁奖仪式的状况。


China’s government has blocked Liu’s wife, the acclaimed photographer Liu Xia, from participating by keeping her under virtual house arrest in Beijing.	中国政府将刘晓波的妻子，著名摄影师刘霞软禁在北京家中，禁止她前去领奖。


It has browbeaten other countries into boycotting the award ceremony.	此外还威逼其他国家与其联合抵制整个仪式。


Not surprisingly, Vladimir Putin’s Russia was among the first to kowtow to China’s Diktat. More ominously, it looked for a while like the Norwegian Nobel committee itself might bow to Beijing, too.	不出意外，以普京治下的俄罗斯为首的几个国家当即屈服于北京当局的淫威之下。


But in the end it decided to go ahead with the award. That is only fitting: an award for moral courage ought not to be compromised by those offering it.	但更令人忧心的是，曾经有段时期连挪威诺贝尔奖评选委员会都似乎要向北京低头，但委员们最终决定坚持原决议——这才是唯一的正道，因为一个褒扬道德勇气的奖项是不能被其颁发者所妥协和出卖的。


When Liu learned that he had been awarded this year‘s Nobel Peace Prize, his first reaction was telling: “This prize is given to the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre.”	当刘晓波得知自己被授予本年度的诺贝尔奖时，他的第一个反应就是一句话：“这个奖是奖给天安门亡灵的。 ”


That simple phrase neatly encapsulates Liu’s peaceful 20-year-resistance to China’s government, which began with a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square.	这句简短的发言精妙地概括了刘晓波对中国政府持续20年的和平抗争，而这一切都是从天安门绝食行动开始的。


Over the next two decades, he was imprisoned several times, and held under house arrest when not in prison.	在过去这20年中，他数次被投入监狱，就算出了狱也会遭到软禁。


Despite this ongoing persecution, Liu continued to write and petition the government on behalf of the people of China.	但尽管遭到不断的迫害，刘晓波依然坚持写作并代表中国人民向政府请愿。


Like the greatest non-violent freedom fighters of modern times – Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, and Václav Havel – he sacrificed his own freedom to highlight his people’s lack of it.	正如近代最伟大的非暴力自由斗士——圣雄甘地、马丁·路德·金，纳尔逊·曼德拉和瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔——他牺牲了自己的自由，却揭露了人民缺乏自由的现实。


Today, many individuals and countries are demonstrating their support for the Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s decision to award the prize to Liu.	如今，许多个人和国家都对诺贝尔和平奖评选委员会颁奖给刘晓波的决定表示支持。


Indeed, Havel and a previous laureate, Desmond Tutu, were consistent advocates of awarding the prize to him.	事实上，哈维尔本人以及另外一位得奖者德斯蒙德·图图都一直呼吁将这个奖颁给刘晓波。


But, in addition to supporting Liu’s achievements by making certain that they are represented at the ceremony in Oslo, world leaders need to come to grips with the Chinese government’s reaction.	但除了派代表出席奥斯陆颁奖仪式以示对刘晓波成就的支持之外，全世界的领袖们还要应对中国政府的反应。


Although much of the world recognizes that it is in economic competition with China, it often fails to see that it is also in moral competition with China.	虽然大多数国家都知道自己与中国是经济上的对手，但却很少意识到本国与中国在道德上也存在着竞争关系。


The Communist Party of China used to rule a destitute power. But, having become much richer over the past three decades, China is now proposing to the world its own model of development – and, indeed, of civilization.	中国共产党治下的中国曾是一个赤贫的巨人，但在三十年的不断富裕之后，中国如今正向全世界推销自己的发展——以及文明——模式。


This model, which some have dubbed “The Beijing Consensus” is explicit: there are no moral standards, only material ones.	这个人称“北京共识”的模式非常简单明了：没有道德标准，只谈物质水平。


Human rights and freedom can be made to disappear not only from Web sites, but also from reality.	人权和自由不但要在网络上销声匿迹，还要被消灭于现实之中。


Though now better off than they have ever been in material terms, the Chinese people under the current regime are denied any real opportunity to retain and refine their own dignity beyond the quest for wealth and luxury goods.	虽然在物质上空前富足，但当今的中国人民却被剥夺了除致富和奢侈品以外任何保持和追求自身尊严的机会。


Liu’s prize is a rebuke to the regime, because it rejects the dogma that nothing but the pursuit of economic interest matters.	刘晓波得奖的事实就对这个政权的控诉，因为它拒绝接受这个经济利益压倒一切的教条。


China’s rulers know that in a system in which justice is absent, Liu’s efforts to speak to a higher moral calling requires only moral courage to be followed.	中国的统治者知道在一个正义缺失的系统中，人们只需要有足够的道德勇气就能追随刘晓波对一个更高道德的呼唤。


The regime has tried to separate politics and economics, but Liu has shown that this is impossible.	当局试图将政治与经济分割开来，但刘晓波证明了这是不可能做到的。


Any Chinese can become another Liu Xiaobo if they choose to see through the lies of the regime’s “Materialism/Leninism.”	任何看透了该政权那套“唯物主义/列宁主义”的中国人都可以成为另一个刘晓波。


But even here there is a paradox for the regime.	但即便目前这套做法也会让当局陷入困境。


For inevitably, the ordinary men and women who have built modern China will demand to live in a freedom commensurate to their material achievements.	因为任何为建设现代化出了力的普通中国人都无可避免地要求一个与物质文明相称的自由。


So a civilized China is emerging, just as a civilized Eastern Europe once emerged, from the hearts and minds of prisoners of conscience, of people like Liu Xiaobo.	因此正如���年的东欧一样，一个文明的中国正从刘晓波这些政治犯的思维理想中逐渐浮现起来。


Havel, who has inspired Liu as he has so many others who aspire to freedom, wrote a public letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao after Liu’s latest imprisonment.	而哈维尔这位激励了刘晓波以及其他自由斗士的人，则在刘晓波最近一次入狱后写了一封致中国国家主席胡锦涛的公开信。


In it, he said: “Mr. Liu's trial was the result of a political order for which you carry ultimate political responsibility.”	在信中他写道：“对刘晓波的审判将导致一个你最终担负政治责任的结果。 ”


Just as Czechoslovakia’s communist government once imprisoned Havel for daring to dream of a civil society and a true constitution of liberty for his country, China’s government has imprisoned Liu for attempting something similar, with his Charter 08 appeal, modeled on Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77.	正如前捷克斯洛伐克的共产党政府曾因哈维尔胆敢追求一个公民社会以及真正自由的制度而将他投入监狱那样，中国政府也以类似的原因逮捕了刘晓波，而他发起的《零八宪章》正像是前捷克斯洛伐克《七七宪章》的翻版。


Havel eventually saw his ideas triumph in the Velvet Revolution of 1989.	哈维尔最终亲眼看到自己的理念在1989年的“天鹅绒革命”中夺得胜利。


Liu Xiaobo is demonstrating anew the unstoppable power of the powerless.	而刘晓波也再一次宣示了那些被剥夺权力者所拥有的无法阻挡的权力。


Awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize lifts the hopes of all of us who dream of a truly free and civilized China.	向他颁授诺贝尔奖鼓舞了我们这些梦想着一个真正自由文明的中国的人。


And we might also dream that next December, the Nobel committee will at long last recognize Havel for an award whose meaning he truly personifies.	而我们也希望在明年11月，诺奖委员会能最终向哈维尔颁发这个奖，好令他的高贵品质也得到褒扬。


A Very Tolerant Christmas	一个非常宽容的圣诞节


LONDON – Christmas is coming – and has been, it seems, since mid-autumn.	伦敦—圣诞节临近——似乎从中秋就开始了。


And just in case there was any sign of flagging, we now have Black Friday, an export from the United States, when we are all encouraged to drink deep of the modern Christmas spirit and shop until we drop.	也许是衰落的标志，我们现在也有了黑色星期五，这是美国的舶来品，我们被鼓动本着现代圣诞精神大肆欢饮，“买买买”直到手软。


In my old-fashioned way, I rather disapprove of celebrating “God rest you merry merchants” day.	按照我的老派作风，我对庆祝“上帝祝你商诞快乐”的日子十分失望。


Since when were we happy for Christmas to dawn in early November?	我们从什么时候开始从11月初就开始庆祝圣诞了？


Festivals should happen only when they turn up on the calendar.	节日应该在它到达的那一天才发生。


When I was a boy, Christmas arrived on its eve, December 24.	我小时候，圣诞节在它的前夜也就是12月24日才来临。


We went to mass at midnight.	我们去做午夜弥撒。


Afterward, my dad carried me home.	然后，父亲带我回家。


We woke up the following morning to open presents and prepare for our turkey lunch.	第二天早上，我们醒来打开礼物，准备火鸡午餐。


The day after Christmas was a public holiday with cold turkey and ham to sustain us.	圣诞节后的一天是公共假期，我们吃冷火鸡和火腿。


Then it was back to work on December 27.	然后，12月27日，大家回到工作岗位。


That was that. Christmas was over, until December 24 the following year.	这样，圣诞节就过完了，然后等待明年的12月24日。


These days, whether you are Christian or not, the feast to mark the birth of Jesus Christ has turned into a winter bacchanal and a huge retailing orgy.	这些年，不管你是不是基督徒，这个纪念耶稣基督诞生的日子已经成为冬日饮酒节和巨大的零售狂欢。


Of course, there was always a commercial side to Christmas, if only for breeders of poultry and makers of greeting cards.	当然，圣诞节永远有其商业因素，不过以前只限于家禽养殖户和贺卡生产商。


But in most countries today, even those with few Christian citizens, the festival offers the chance for a holiday and a binge.	但在今天的大部分国家里，哪怕是那些几乎无人信仰基督教的国家，这个节日也成为放假和狂欢的借口。


Sometimes, the symbols of the event become very confused.	有时候，圣诞节的象征变得让人困惑。


It is reported that one Tokyo department store marked the time of year for shoppers by hanging a huge crucified Father Christmas in its entrance hall.	据报道，一家东京百货商场在它的大堂放置了一尊巨大的钉在十字架上的圣诞老人，向购物者宣布圣诞来了。


Apocryphal or not, the story gives us some idea of the cultural confusion that this midwinter religious feast can cause.	这个消息未必是真，但它让我们有所了解这一仲冬时节的宗教节日可能引起怎样的文化混乱。


It is all a long way from the stable in Bethlehem that we read about in the New Testament – a location now ringed by Israel Defense Forces barbed wire.	这里我们在《新约》中所读到的伯利恒的马厩相隔十万八千里——如今，这座马厩被以色列国防军的铁丝网重重围住。


Of course, there are places where any sign of celebrating Christmas would trigger immediate persecution.	当然，有一些地方，任何庆祝圣诞节的迹象都会立刻遭致迫害。


In any part of Mesopotamia presently controlled by the Islamic State (ISIS), practicing Christians would lose their heads.	在目前由伊斯兰国控制的美索不达米亚地区，身为基督徒可能会让你掉了脑袋。


At its worst, intolerance is literally murderous.	这是最糟糕的情况——伐异和杀戮划上了等号。


But there are other forms of intolerance, infinitely less horrifying than that of jihadist bigots, that kill no one but demean us all.	但伐异还有其他形式，比偏执的圣战要温和许多。 这样的伐异不会杀害任何人，但贬损我们所有人。


Think of all those who don’t like to write or say “Happy Christmas,” lest they offend those who are not Christians.	想象一下，有些人不喜欢写下或说出“圣诞快乐”，唯恐冒犯非基督徒。


This self-censorship is rather insulting to Jews, Hindus, and Muslims.	这一自我审查对于犹太人、印度教徒和穆斯林来说是一种耻辱。


What cause for offense should they have when Christians celebrate their December feast?	当基督徒庆祝他们的12月节日时，他们会感到怎样的冒犯？


Does the celebration of Diwali, Eid, or Passover offend Christians?	庆祝排灯节或逾越节会冒犯基督徒吗？


It certainly should not, although we can recall terrible periods of Christian intolerance and bigotry.	显然不会，尽管我们记得基督教也有可怕的伐异和偏执时期。


In Britain, we recently experienced an example of alleged political correctness that went well beyond such questions.	在英国，最近我们看到了一个所谓的政治正确的例子，这个例子远远超出了这些问题的范畴。


The Church of England filmed various Christian groups saying the Lord’s Prayer, one of the foundations of Christian worship.	英国圣公会制作了一部拍摄各种基督教团体念诵主祷文（Lord’s Prayer，基督教崇拜的基础之一）画面的影片。


The film was to be shown among the advertisements in cinemas.	该片计划在电影院广告时段播放。


But the cinema proprietors banned the film on the grounds that it might give offense.	但电影院业主拒绝播放该片，因为它可能引起冒犯。


Even well-known atheists criticized this mindless act of censorship.	就连著名的无神论者也批评了这一无脑的审查行为。


Intolerance grows, and not just in societies run by jihadists and religious fanatics.	伐异愈演愈烈，并且并不仅限于圣战者和宗教狂热分子统治的社会。


Across university campuses, particularly in the US but also in Britain, students claim the right to deny others free speech or to rewrite history that offends them – a complete denial of what universities should be all about.	在大学校园——特别是美国，英国也有——学生们主张否认其他人的言论自由的权利和重写冒犯他们的历史的权利——这完全与大学应有的价值观背道而驰。


Censorship and assertions of sensitivity eviscerate scholarship and, with it, the very idea of a university where pluralism defines the meeting of minds.	审查和敏感性主张（assertions of sensitivity）“阉割”了学术，也阉割了大学的意义——多元化带来思想的碰撞。


Disagreement is the heart of educated debate.	分歧是受过教育的辩论的核心。


Destroy that and you destroy the hallmarks of liberal order.	毁灭了分歧，你也毁灭了自由秩序的标志。


As the great political philosopher Karl Popper argued, the only thing that we should not tolerate in an open society is intolerance.	伟大的政治哲学家卡尔·波普尔（Karl Popper）曾说，在开放社会中，我们唯一不能宽容就是伐异。


The most extreme example of such intolerance today – which much of the world is now fighting – is the religious totalitarianism of ISIS.	当今最极端的伐异例子——世界大部分国家正在打击这种伐异——便是伊斯兰国的宗教极权主义。


The extent to which this extremism is a product of Saudi Arabia’s energetic promotion of its Wahhabi ideology is for Muslims to debate themselves.	这一极端主义的兴盛多大程度上是沙特阿拉伯不遗余力地推行其瓦哈比派意识形态的结果留给穆斯林本身去争论。


But it is increasingly difficult for the outside world to overlook the impact of the Kingdom’s main export, alongside oil.	但外部世界越来越难以忽视沙特的这一与石油等量齐观的主要输出品的影响。


The best present we could give to the world this Christmas (regardless of whether we celebrate it religiously or not), would be to dedicate ourselves to championing tolerance everywhere.	在这个圣诞节（不管我们是否在宗教意义上庆祝它），我们能够给世界的最好的礼物是献身于让全世界实现宽容的事业。


This will require us to address the inverted narratives of victimhood, which are often recruited to justify intolerance.	这需要我们设法扭转受害者叙事的角度——这种叙事常常被用来论证伐异。


The suffering from past wrongs does not justify current and future cruelty.	过去的错误所带来的苦难并不能证明当下和未来残忍的正确性。


This Christmas, the open society is endangered not only from without, by the likes of ISIS, but also by (admittedly far smaller) threats at home – a gloomy reflection, I admit, as we prepare in churches and in high streets to enjoy another year’s winter party.	这个圣诞节，开放社会不但收到外来威胁（比如伊斯兰国），也受到内部威胁（诚然，要比外部威胁小得多）——我承认，当我们在教堂和大街上准备享受又一次冬季派对时，这是令人悲观的沉思。


So, in the spirit of tolerance: Happy Christmas, whether you are Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, atheist, agnostic, consumerist, or Christian.	因此，以宽容的名义：圣诞快乐，不管你是犹太人、穆斯林、印度教徒、锡克教徒、无神论者、不可知论者、消费主义者还是基督徒。


As the Irish comedian Dave Allen used to say, “May your God go with you.”	正如爱尔兰喜剧演员戴夫·艾伦（Dave Allen）所言，“愿你的上帝与你同在。 ”


Into Syria without Arms	不带武器开进叙利亚


NEW YORK – Much of the debate over what to do in the Middle East tends to pit realists against idealists.	发自纽约——大多数关于在中东地区如何作为的辩论都倾向于变成现实主义者与理想主义者之争。


Bahrain is a classic case, as is Saudi Arabia and, for that matter, Egypt: calls for the United States and other countries with interests and influence in the region to stand up for democracy and human rights run up against concerns that national-security interests will suffer if pro-Western authoritarian regimes are ousted.	巴林就是个经典例子，正如沙特以及——在这一点上说——埃及那样：一方面呼吁美国和其他该区域有利益关系和影响力的国家为民主人权挺身而出，另一方面则担心如果这些亲西方政权倒台可能会影响国家安全利益。


European and US policymakers often attempt to square the circle with a compromise policy that is inconsistent and satisfies no one.	欧洲和美国的政策制定者们经常妄想能够推行一种折衷的政策，但这类政策往往难以持续且两头不讨好。


Syria offers a stark contrast to this pattern in the sense that strategic and humanitarian interests are aligned.	而相对于上述模式，叙利亚则提供一个明白无误的例子证明战略和人道是可以是一致的。


Many governments have a strategic desire to oust a regime that is closely allied with Iran and Hezbollah.	多国政府都有推翻这个政权的战略意愿，因为后者与伊朗和真主党关系非常紧密。


And there is a humanitarian desire to get rid of a regime that has killed as many as 15,000 – if not more – of its own people.	而在人道方面的意愿则是驱逐一个已经杀害了近1. 5万名（保守估计）本国民众的政权。


But an armed intervention would be a large undertaking, one requiring not just considerable air power (given Syria’s extensive air-defense network) but also ground forces, given the existence of at least two capable divisions that remain loyal to President Bashar al-Assad.	但武装干涉将会是一场宏大的任务，不仅需要相当数量的空中力量来对付叙利亚的大型防空网络，此外由于目前至少还有两个师以上的叙军忠于总统阿萨德，所以还需要投入一定规模的地面部队。


The sectarian nature of Syrian society all but guarantees that the presence of troops from other countries would be both prolonged and difficult.	而叙利亚社会中派系对立的本质将保证任何他国部队的出现都将是旷日持久且困难重重的。


One alternative to direct military intervention is to provide arms and other forms of support to the opposition.	直接武装干涉之外的另一个选项就是向反对派提供武器以及其他形式的支持。


This is being done.	这一点已经做到了。


The case for helping people defend themselves is obvious.	帮助人们进行自卫的实施情况也有目共睹。


But arming the opposition is not without its drawbacks. It risks fueling a civil war and encouraging regime loyalists to dig in.	但武装反对派力量的做法不是没有缺陷的，因为这可能会激起一场内战并迫使忠于政权者铤而走险。


In addition, arms provided to fight the regime will be used by factions to fight one another if and when the regime is removed, thereby making the aftermath in Syria that much more violent.	此外那些用来与现政权斗争的武器可能会在政权倒台后沦为派系交战的工具，这将使叙利亚的后续状况变得更加血腥。


But intervention need not be defined as either armed intervention or intervention with arms.	但其实干涉行为并不能仅仅被定义为武装干涉或是利用武器来进行干涉。


There is much more that the world can and should be doing to bring about the removal of the Assad regime.	全球各界其实可以且应当去实施更多的手段来驱逐阿萨德政权。


For starters, economic sanctions can be increased.	首先，应逐步加大经济制裁的力度。


The rule of thumb should be that Syria will be the target of sanctions no less stringent than those being applied to Iran.	要点在于叙利亚所受的制裁程度不应低于伊朗。


Syria’s energy and banking sectors should be fully covered.	叙利亚的能源和银行部门必须被一网打尽。


The elites in Syria who still support the regime ought to pay an additional price.	那些依旧支持政权的叙利亚精英们应该付出额外的代价。


Cutting off air travel to and from Syria would increase dissatisfaction among those who regularly visit London, Paris, and other Western capitals.	切断进出叙利亚的飞行航线将会使这些经常往来于伦敦，巴黎以及其他欧洲首都的人日渐感到不自在。


Likewise, those Arab governments unhappy with the state of affairs in Syria can do more to bring about change.	同样，那些对叙利亚现状不满的阿拉伯国家政府可以做更多的事来促成变革。


They could suspend all ties with Syria, and they should scale back commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia, the regime’s most important external backer, until the Kremlin alters its policy.	它们可以暂停与叙利亚的一切联系，并应当弱化与俄罗斯的商业和外交关系——后者是该政权最大的外部支持者——直到克里姆林宫改变其政策。


Moreover, the diplomatic mission led by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan under UN auspices needs to be fundamentally recast.	此外，由前联合国秘书长安南率领并由联合国支持的外交使团必须彻底重组。


The time to try to broker a compromise, with Assad’s regime agreeing to reforms that would satisfy the opposition, is long gone (if it ever existed).	该使团希望能在阿萨德政权与反对派之间斡旋，令前者同意推行让后者满意的改革措施，但这样的时机（如果曾经存在过的话）其实早就一去不返了。


The purpose of diplomacy now should be to bring about an exit for Assad and his inner circle, and to establish a process for moving to a new, more representative political order based on the rule of law.	如今这些外交行动的目的应当是为阿萨德及其亲信提供一条退路，并建立一个向新的，更具代表性，以法治为基础的政治秩序迈进的进程。


We are already beginning to see some of those closest to Assad desert what they rightly view as a sinking ship.	我们已经开始看见一些阿萨德身边的人纷纷脱身逃离。


One way to accelerate this trend is to threaten war-crimes indictments by a certain date, say, August 15, for any senior official who remains a part of the government and is associated with its campaign against the Syrian people.	而加速这个趋势的一个方法就是威胁那些高级官员：如果他们在某个日期（比如8月15日）后依然留在政府并继续与叙利亚人民对立的话就将被以战争罪起诉。


Naming these individuals would concentrate minds in Damascus.	而点出这些人的名字也将使大马士革当局内部人心惶惶。


Defections will also increase if the Syrian opposition demonstrates that the alternative to the Assad regime is one that is truly open and inclusive.	如果叙利亚反对派能证明阿萨德政权的替代政府确实会是公开且包容的话，那么叛逃现象将继续增加。


The minority Alawites fear that they will suffer the fate of the minority Sunnis in post-Saddam Iraq. The only way to reassure them (and to encourage them to defect) is with an opposition that becomes truly national and articulates principles that appeal to all Syrians.	人口占少数的穆斯林阿拉维派信徒害怕自己将遭受萨达姆倒台后伊拉克逊尼派教徒的境况，而令他们重树信心（并鼓励其弃暗投明）的唯一方法就是要让反对派确实由来自全国的民众组成并对所有叙利亚人一视同仁。


Western governments need to work much more closely with the divided and relatively inexperienced opposition if this imperative is to be met.	如果要符合这一重要条件的话，西方各国政府就必须与这个内部存在分歧且相对缺乏经验的反对派展开紧密合作。


In short, the crisis in Syria warrants outside intervention, but mostly with tools other than arms.	简而言之，对叙利亚危机进行外部干涉是合情合理的，但绝大部分都需要通过武器之外的工具来实施。


What is needed is an approach that hastens the demise of the Assad regime and increases the odds that what comes after will not be an orgy of vengeance, violence, and chaos.	我们真正需要的是一个可以加速阿萨德政权灭亡并减少前者倒台后发生一场复仇，暴力以及混乱狂欢的可能性。


The human and strategic stakes call for no less.	因为人道和战略上的利害关系都是不能打一点折扣的。


Investing in a Closed-Border World	在一个闭关锁国的世界中投资


CAMBRIDGE – Investors, like astronomers or anthropologists, rely on intellectual models to make sense of a complicated universe, guide immediate choices, and set priorities for further inquiry. But, every so often, a freak occurrence forces a reappraisal of what we think we know.	发自剑桥——投资者就跟天文学家或人类学家一样，依靠智力模型来理解这个复杂的宇宙，指导快速决策，并确定下一步优先进行何种研究。


It could be a strange fossil. Or it could be a political upheaval, like the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom or the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States.	但经常发生的状况是，总会有某些异常状况迫使我们重新评估那些自以为了如指掌的事物：这可能是一个黑洞，也可能是一块奇怪的化石，又或者是一场政治动荡，比如英国脱欧公投或唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统。


As a tumultuous year comes to a close, giddy global markets continue to set new records.	虽然这个动荡的一年行将结束，但令人眼花缭乱的全球市场却依然在刷新纪录。


But investors should not become distracted.	然而投资者们不该因此而分心。


In 2017, they will need to reappraise how the global economy works, and recalibrate accordingly their assessment of every stock or bond on sale, because even if some market fundamentals remain the same, many others have clearly changed.	在2017年，他们需要重新评估全球经济的运作模式，并以此重新校准其对每只在售股票或债券的评估，因为即使某些市场基本面保持不变，许多其他因素也会有所改变。


For at least two decades, most investors accepted the consensus among economists and political scientists that the world was getting smaller and more integrated.	二十多年来，大多数投资者接受了经济学家和政治科学家的共识，认定世界正在变得更小也更一体化。


With the rise of China and India, one-third of the world’s population suddenly became workers and consumers in the global economy.	随着中国和印度的崛起，世界人口的三分之一突然成为全球经济中的工人和消费者。


And new technologies offered cheap communications, advanced robotics, and increasingly powerful data analysis, which enabled companies to slim down their inventories and integrate supply chains.	新技术提供了廉价的通信，先进的机器人和日益强大的数据分析，使公司能够精简库存并整合供应链。


Meanwhile, political leaders gradually developed regulatory and trade regimes that eliminated tariffs, simplified border crossings, and opened exciting new markets.	与此同时，政治家们逐渐完善了监管和贸易制度，消除了关税，简化了通关程序，并开拓出令人振奋的新市场。


Good companies tried to take advantage of new opportunities, and investors looked for the firms that showed the most promise.	优秀的企业希望利用这些新机遇，而投资者们也在寻找最有前景的公司。


According to the World Trade Organization, merchandise and commercial-services exports have quadrupled since 1995.	根据世界贸易组织的统计，商品和商业服务出口自1995年以来增长了四倍。


Given this track record, when trade performance declined after the 2008 financial crisis, most policymakers assumed that new trade agreements would, again, boost growth.	有鉴及此，即便2008年金融危机后贸易额有所下降，大多数决策者依然认定新的贸易协定将再次促进增长。


US President Barack Obama’s administration, for its part, envisioned a vast free-trade area encompassing both Asia and Europe.	美国奥巴马政府设想了一个涵盖亚洲和欧洲的大型自贸区。


The two grand agreements that it pursued – the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – would have put the US at the center of an integrated market comprising two-thirds of the global economy.	它所推动的两项大型协议——包含12国的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协议》以及《跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协议》——将使美国成为涵盖全球经济总量三分之二的整合性市场的核心。


But that hope has faded now that populist movements across the West, tapping into public discontent about the dawning world order, have succeeded at the polls.	但目前这种希望已经破灭，因为当前席卷西方的民粹主义运动正利用公众对新生世界秩序的不满在选举中攻城拔寨。


Since the radical anti-establishment Syriza’s election in Greece almost two years ago, voters seem to have taken to the idea of national governments standing up to supranational and multilateral organizations such the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund.	自从两年前激进反体制的激进左翼联盟（Syriza）在希腊大选夺魁以来，选民似乎已经接受了本国政府挺身而出与欧盟委员会和国际货币基金组织这类超国家及多边组织对抗的理念。


Likewise, many observers have interpreted the Brexit referendum as a bid to reassert control over national borders.	同样，许多观察家将英国脱欧公投解释为一种重夺国界控制权的举动。


And while historians will still be debating what led to Trump’s victory long after he has left office, it is already apparent that many of his supporters similarly want America to bolt its door, restock its pantry, and rely more on itself than on foreign friends.	虽然历史学家们可能会在特朗普卸任总统后的相当一段时间内仍然探究令他胜选的原因，但很显然他的许多支持者们同样希望美国栓紧国门，充实储备，更多地依靠自身而非国外友人。


Taken together, these political outcomes – and the anti-establishment forces on the march ahead of next year’s French and German elections – will halt further global economic and political integration, at least in the near term.	总而言之，这些政治结果——以及面对明年法国和德国选举一路高歌猛进的反体制势力——将至少在短期内阻碍全球经济和政治一体化。


For now, countries will avoid grand trade deals and make only half-hearted efforts to align their regulations.	因此各国将避免签署重大贸易协定，只会付出一半的努力来协调各自的法规。


Companies operating internationally will soon face higher costs, as it becomes harder to move goods across state borders and employ foreign workers; their investors, meanwhile, can expect lower returns.	国际化运营的公司很快���面临更高的成本，因为跨国运输货物和雇用外国工人将变得更加困难； 而这些企业的投资者同时也只能调低回报预期。


Even a mild trade tussle between the US and Mexico, for example, could be extremely costly for car manufacturers, given that some components currently cross the US border as many as eight times during the production process.	比如说，即使是美国和墨西哥之间轻微的贸易摩擦也会为汽车制造商带来极为高昂的成本，因为某些组件在整个生产过程中会穿越两国边界多达八次。


And if Boeing were not already reining in its Dreamliner model’s vast global supply chain, it would now be scrambling to do so even faster.	如果波音公司还没完全把波音787客机散布全球的庞大供应链收回来，那么现在就得赶快做到这一点。


If voters want to limit the cross-border movement of goods, services, and people, companies will have to adopt a new model that builds in more redundancy within borders; and investors will need to look for firms that can profit with minimal border crossings, or that can still generate a profit despite increased protectionist friction.	如果选民想限制货物，服务和人口的跨界流动，企业就必须采用一种在本国境内建立更多冗余产能的新模式； 投资者则需要寻找那些能够尽可能减少过境次数并获利，或者即使保护主义摩擦增加仍能产生利润的企业。


At the margin, the market will put a premium on companies that can quibble with governments and navigate contradictory regulations, rather than those that can boost productivity and open new markets.	在这种情况演变到极致的时候，市场将给予那些善于与政府周旋并在相互矛盾的法规之间游刃有余的企业更高的溢价，而不是青睐那些可以提高生产力和开拓新市场的公司。


At the same time, the new model that emerges will still have to account for major forces that sustained the old model, especially the forces of globalization and technological innovation that voter resistance will not stop.	与此同时，当前涌现的新模式仍然必须考虑到支撑旧模式的主要力量，尤其是选民将继续抵制的全球化和技术创新的力量。


In today’s global economy, the next substantial productivity boost will come from companies analyzing customer and production-line data on a large scale.	在当今的全球经济中，下一个巨大的生产力提升将来自那些能对客户和生产线数据进行大规模分析的企业。


Companies that do this well will be able to design better products, at lower costs; but they will achieve significant gains only if they can compare data across borders and jurisdictions.	做得好的公司将能够以更低的成本设计更好的产品； 但只有当它们能够跨越国界和行政区来比较数据时才能取得显着的效果。


Meanwhile, the immutable logic of the Internet, productivity-enhancing robotics, and the division of labor that Adam Smith first described will force governments to cooperate.	同时，互联网，高生产力机器人以及由亚当·斯密首先描述的分工的逻辑将依旧不可违背，并迫使各国政府展开合作。


Savvy investors will look for companies that can withstand the current populist revolt against globalization and take advantage of incipient economic and technological trends.	精明的投资者会去寻找能够经受住当前民粹主义对全球化的抵制并利用新兴经济和技术趋势的公司。


Theirs will be a more complicated analysis for more complicated times.	而他们的做法则是在更复杂的时点进行更复杂的分析。


Like a good astronomer or anthropologist, however, successful investors will find reliable patterns in a sea of crosscutting evidence.	但正如一个优秀天文学家或人类学家那样，成功的投资者会最终在一大堆相互穿插的证据中找出一套可靠的模式。


Inviting the Avoidable	美国财政，引火烧身


Maybe it is excessive skittishness, or perhaps it is the result of global financial volatility in recent years – crises in Mexico in 1994-5, East Asia in 1997-98, Russia in 1998, and then in Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina – but we economists are more concerned about monetary affairs and possible future disasters than we have been in many decades.	也许是因为过于变化无常，抑或是近几年全球金融市场的风云变幻—1994-95年在墨西哥，1997-98年在东亚，1998年在俄罗斯及之后在巴西、土耳其和阿根廷发生的金融危机—我们这些经济学家变得比过去几十年更关注货币关系和未来可能发生的灾难。


This month, the Switzerland-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was the latest to worry aloud about the financial risks that the world seems to be building into its future.	本月，总部设在瑞士的国际清算银行(BIS)对世界未来的金融风险表示了强烈的担忧。


“[A]ll the countries hit by financial crisis... experience[d] a very sharp slowdown,” the BIS says of the recent past.	“所有受到金融危机影响的国家都经历了经济增长速度骤减”，BIS在提到前面的金融危机时如是说。


It then cites “global current account imbalances,” particularly “the US external deficit,” describing it as “unprecedented for a reserve currency country to have a current account deficit of such magnitude.”	它接着又引述了“全球经常账户的不平衡”，特别是“美国的对外赤字”，并将其描述为“一个发行硬通货的国家遇到如此严重的经常账户赤字问题是前所未有的。


In short, the world has become “increasingly prone to financial turbulence.”	”简言之，世界已经变得“越来越容易受到金融动荡的影响。 ”


The BIS hints at the possibility of a financial crisis that, with the US at its center, would dwarf by at least an order of magnitude all crises that have occurred since 1933.	BIS暗示说一次以美国为中心的金融危机可能会使1933年以来的历次危机都小巫见大巫。


Yet, in response to this risk, the BIS issues the standard textbook recommendations.	但为了应对这种风险，BIS以标准教科书的形式颁布了一系列的建议。


Countries whose policies and economies are out of balance should change their policies, thereby restoring balance: “deficit countries should reduce the rate of growth of domestic spending below that of domestic production.	经济和政策存在不平衡现象的国家应该改变政策，由此回归平衡：“赤字国家应该将国内支出的增长率降到低于国内生产的增长率。


Allowing their currencies to depreciate in real terms would make their products more competitive, and also provide an incentive for production to shift out of non-tradables into tradables.”	允许它们的货币实际地贬值可以使它们的产品更具竞争力，还能激励生产从非贸易型向贸易型转变。 ”


This is economists’ polite code for the message that the US must gradually cut its budget deficit, while other countries – like China and Japan – must gradually let the value of the dollar fall and that of their own currencies rise.	这是经济学家们以客气的方式传达这样一个信息，即美国必须逐渐削减其预算赤字，而其他国家—例如中国和日本—必须逐渐让美元贬值，并让本国货币升值。


So the BIS proposes nothing new or particularly attention-grabbing.	因此，BIS的提议并无新意，或者说并不特别引人注目。


But if we turn to America’s government, we see an enormous pretense that the current budget deficit is not a problem.	但反观美国政府，我们发现其态度在很大程度上是粉饰太平，认为目前的赤字不是问题。


As Stan Collender, a noted observer of the US federal budget, has commented, “No one with federal budget responsibilities actually seems to be interested in the budget.”	正如Stan Collender，一位知名的美国联邦预算观察家所评论的那样：“任何一个对联邦预算负有责任的人都似乎对预算本身缺乏真正的兴趣。


This is not “because the budget committees are too busy....[T]he House and Senate...are not doing much of anything...[because] they don't want to.”	”这不是“因为预算委员会应顾不暇……（而是）参众两院……漠然置之……（因为）他们不想采取行动。


Within the Bush administration, Director of the Office of Management and Budget Josh Bolten “has been virtually invisible,” while “the president and vice president...avoid talking publicly about the budget.”	”在布什政府内部，管理和预算办公室主任Josh Bolten“简直成了隐身人”，而“总统和副总统……避免在公众场合谈及预算问题。 ”


Let us be clear on this point: it is not that politicians who wish to take the lead on fiscal consolidation are failing to gain traction; it is that there are no politicians – at least none with any agenda-setting influence – who are even trying to steer the US towards adopting a more responsible fiscal policy.	我们要明确一点：并不是想要牵头进行财政整合的政治领袖没有获得牵引力，而是根本没有能对议程设定产生影响的政治领袖在努力促使美国采用更负责任的财政政策。


This is a grotesque failure of leadership.	这种领导力的失败是荒唐的。


Governments that pursue policies – whether US fiscal laxity or China’s exchange-rate peg – that create unsustainable imbalances do so for what they regard as important political reasons.	政府追求某种造成不可持续的收支不平衡的财政政策—不论是美国的财政宽松还是中国的联系汇率—都是出于他们认为重要的政治原因。


Appeals to them to change their policies, and thus contribute to the common global good of financial stability, are fruitless unless others are seen to change their policies, act responsibly, and so contribute to the common good as well.	要想说服他们改变政策，从而为全球的金融稳定做出贡献是徒劳的。 除非他们看到其他的政府也在改变政策，以负责的行动对全球金融稳定作贡献。


International policy coordination requires a leader, a first mover.	国际政策的协调需要一个领导，一个身先士卒者。


But, while the US, as the world’s largest economy, is best suited for this role, it has so far failed to play its part.	然而，尽管美国作为世界最大的经济体，是这一角色的最佳人选，但它却未能肩负起这一责任。


Treasury Secretary John Snow has spent almost no public time on the budget, but a lot of public time on China.	财政部长约翰•斯诺在预算问题上几乎没有花费什么公众时间，但在中国问题上却毫不吝惜。


Republican political operatives care far less about national savings than they do about manufacturing-sector job losses.	共和党的政治人物们对国家财政储备的关注远不如对制造业失业情况的关注。


“So what else is new?” you may ask – and with good reason.	“还有什么我们不知道的吗？


The list of issues on which the Bush administration has failed to lead is a long one, and failure to take steps to diminish the risks of future financial catastrophe cannot rank very high.	”你可能会问—你有足够的理由。 布什政府领导失职的问题清单太长了，未能采取有效措施降低未来金融灾难的风险这一失职的排名不会太靠前。


The entire Bush administration has been a succession of leadership failures, so why harp on its poor financial management?	既然整个布什政府就是一个领导力失败的连续体，所以有什么必要对其蹩脚的财政管理喋喋不休呢？


Form a purely practical point of view, one reason is that ensuring global financial stability is an issue on which real progress can be made relatively easily.	从纯粹实用的观点来看，有一个理由是在确保全球金融稳定方面取得进展相对容易。


The Bush administration may not care that deficit reduction is the right policy for America, but it might care far more if the issue were framed as a prerequisite for policy changes abroad that diminish pressure from imports on domestic manufacturing employment.	布什政府可能不屑于削减赤字是美国应该实行的政策的观点，但如果把这一问题作为他国改变政策并由此减小进口对美国国内制造业就业的压力的前提条件，那么布什政府就会对其关注得多。


Iran: Another Problem from Hell	伊朗：来自地狱的又一团火焰


WASHINGTON, DC – Throughout 2010, the pattern for negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program held to form.	华盛顿——2010年，伊朗核计划的谈判模式始终无法摆脱流于形式之嫌。


With just about every diplomatic effort failing to yield results, international efforts have increasingly given way to discussions about sanctions – and what mix of them would be needed to bring Iran to heel.	在几乎所有努力折戟沉沙之后，国际外交已经越来越多地被有关制裁的探讨所取代——人们热衷于讨论如何运用制裁和谈判两种方式来迫使伊朗就范。


In 2011, a renewed focus on comprehensive economic sanctions could turn out to be the bad idea whose time has arrived.	2011年，世界将再次关注全面经济制裁，这个糟糕的办法再度引起世人关注的时刻可能就在眼前。


Sanctions, of course, have a dismal historical record in achieving their aims.	当然从历史上看，通过制裁达到目标的记录似乎并不乐观。


Indeed, they have often been more useful in proving the law of unintended consequences.	事实上，制裁一直能很好地证明非预期后果法则。


So it might be useful to step back and take one more look at our disagreeable negotiating partner – Iran – to see what should, and should not, be emphasized diplomatically.	因此我们或许可以退后一步，再次审视伊朗这个令人不快的谈判伙伴，以便确定哪些问题可以被列为外交重点。


There is nothing easy about negotiating with Iran.	与伊朗谈判当然绝非易事。


It is one of the oldest states in the broader Middle East, with a deep culture.	伊朗是中东地区历史最悠久的国家之一，具有深厚的文化底蕴。


Despite its leaders’ grim public image, Iran has a sense of humanism, as any Kurd who fled from Saddam Hussein’s chemical-warfare attacks along the Iranian border can attest.	虽然领导人留给公众的印像是残忍冷酷，但伊朗具有悠久的人道主义传统，曾沿伊朗边境线躲避萨达姆·侯赛因化学进攻的库尔德人可以证明这一点。


Bending, much less breaking, will not come naturally to such a prideful country.	卑躬屈膝，更不用说彻底崩溃，在这样一个高傲的国家身上很难出现。


Iran also doesn’t “play well with others.”	指望伊朗能与他人和睦相处同样很难。


Most Americans remember it as the country that abducted US diplomats soon after its Islamic revolution in 1979, holding them for no apparent purpose for 444 days.	多数美国人都记得伊朗在1979年伊斯兰革命后迅速绑架了美国外交官，并出于显而易见的目的将他们关押了444天。


No American diplomat has been stationed in Tehran since.	自那之后，美国外交官就再也没有进驻过德黑兰。


American attitudes toward Iran are probably far more conditioned by that episode than people realize.	此事对美国态度的影响远远超乎人们的预料之外。


Iran is also internally divided.	伊朗的国内意见同样并不统一。


Its mullahs bicker constantly, seeming to reflect the country’s broader cleavages.	伊朗各派宗教领袖经常斗嘴，似乎是这个国家存在裂痕的最好体现。


Iran’s civilian authorities apparently have limited control over the military and the dreaded security services, which seem to answer to no one but themselves.	伊朗的平民当局似乎无法控制军队和可怕的安全部队，后者似乎除自己之外并不听命于任何人。


Iran’s Islamic Revolution, moreover, has run into a familiar contradiction: it cannot further its aims without accepting Westernization and modernization.	此外，伊朗的伊斯兰革命再次遇到了似曾相识的矛盾： 它无法在避开西方化和现代化的同时实现自身的目标。


Iran’s youthful population – a product of the massive post-revolution baby boom – is increasingly frustrated and depressed; not surprisingly, young Iranians are having fewer children than ever.	年轻一代的伊朗人是后革命时期大规模婴儿潮的产物，他们正感到越来越沮丧，越来越没有信心，还有一点不出人们所料，那就是年轻的伊朗人生育子女的数量少于以往任何时候。


As the June 2009 election protests showed, Iran’s urban youth desperately want to end the country’s isolation, but they have increasingly found that the only way out of isolation is to study or work abroad – and never return.	正如2009年6月的选举抗议活动所表明的那样，伊朗的城市青年不顾一切地想要结束国家的孤立状况，但他们越来越清楚地意识到，结束孤立的唯一方法就是出国学习和工作——而且永远不要回来。


Iran does not live in a great neighborhood, either.	伊朗的邻国状况同样不容乐观。


Turkey can be a good neighbor, but otherwise Iran is bordered by inhospitable states to the east and the north.	土耳其本来可以成为不错的邻居，但除此之外伊朗东侧和北侧的邻国并不殷勤友好。


And, while its western neighbor Iraq is a fellow Shia-majority state, Iraq’s Arab Shia make no secret of their distaste for the Persians and their claim to Shia prominence.	而尽管西侧的伊拉克与伊朗一样由什叶派占主导地位，但伊拉克的阿拉伯什叶派却毫不掩饰对波斯人及其什叶派地位主张的厌恶和反感。


While most of the world may have missed it, there is an ongoing competition between Iraq’s Najaf and Iran’s Qom over which city is holier.	虽然多数国家没有意识到这一点，但伊拉克纳杰夫和伊朗库姆的圣城地位之争一直没有间断。


Iran has virtually no friends among the Sunni Arab states.	伊朗在逊尼派阿拉伯国家中几乎没有朋友。


As the world recently learned from the WikiLeaks release of US diplomatic cables, Sunni Arab leaders are no more tolerant of an Iranian nuclear bomb than is the US or its allies.	正如不久前美国外交电报维基解密告诉世人的那样，逊尼派阿拉伯领导人并不比美国或其盟友更能容忍伊朗的核弹计划。


The Sunni reaction to Iran may reflect deep-seated suspicions about the Shia (witness the cold shoulder given by most Sunnis to Shia rule in Iraq).	逊尼派对伊朗的态度可能反映出对什叶派根深蒂固的怀疑（只要看看伊拉克多数逊尼派对什叶派统治的冷淡态度就不言自明了）。


Iran’s only friends, it seems, are those – like the Chinese – who are more interested in its natural resources than its people.	伊朗唯一的朋友似乎以中国人为首，但伊朗的自然资源，而不是伊朗人，是他们所关注的目标。


While sanctions may deepen Iran’s predicament, they are unlikely to break the diplomatic impasse on nuclear weapons.	虽然制裁可能加重伊朗所面临的困境，但核武器领域的外交僵局不大可能就此被打破。


But, given the Iranian government’s increasingly unhelpful reactions to diplomatic overtures, there is unlikely to be any interest in toning down sanctions.	但由于伊朗政府对外交努力采取越来越不配合的态度，因此经济制裁在一段时期内也很难有所缓和。


Indeed, just the opposite response is likely – efforts to tighten sanctions still further.	事实上，采取相反措施的可能性更大——制裁很可能因此得到进一步强化。


Yet, just as the US adopted a “bomb and talk” approach with the Serbs during the dénouement of the Bosnian war, America must be willing to “sanction and talk” when it comes to Iran, thereby creating greater space for an eventual diplomatic strategy.	但正如美国在波斯尼亚战争临近结束时采取“先轰炸后和谈”的策略一样，美国也必须愿意在伊朗问题上“先制裁后谈判”，从而为争取最终外交解决创造更多的空间。


First, the US should consider establishing diplomatic relations with Iran and putting diplomats on the ground.	首先，美国应考虑与伊朗建立外交关系并派遣外交官进驻。


This would not be an easy process, and could well meet considerable Iranian resistance.	上述过程可能非常困难，也可能遭遇伊朗方面的强烈抵制。


But the Iranians have diplomatic relations with other members of its main interlocutor in talks on its nuclear program, the sanctions-minded P-5+1 Group (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US), and restoring Iran-US diplomatic ties would shorten lines of communications and close the 444-day chapter of 1979-1981.	但伊朗同参与核谈判但支持制裁的其他P-5+1国家（中国、法国、德国、俄国、英国和美国）已经建立外交关系，而恢复美伊外交关系将缩短沟通路线，真正结束1979－1981年的444天事件。


Second, even if a stronger bilateral mechanism is forged, it should not be allowed to displace the P-5 approach.	其次，即便形成了强有力的双边机制，也不能取代P-5集团在谈判中的位置。


The ability of this group to work together is critical to resolving this and future crises.	化解当前和未来的危机需要依赖这些国家强大的合作能力。


Third, the US should continue its efforts to encourage action by Iran’s neighbors.	第三，美国应当继续努力，鼓励伊朗的邻国采取措施。


While Turkey’s lurch into the fray in 2010 may have been unwelcome, its interest in calming a situation involving an immediate neighbor is understandable.	虽然2010年土耳��的不请自来令人难以接受，可它急于平复邻国局势的心情却不难理解。


More problematically, the Sunni Arab states should also give more serious thought to addressing the situation, and should seek to reconcile their private and public postures.	更大的问题是，逊尼派阿拉伯国家也应该认真考虑如何化解危机，并努力统一自身在私下和面对公众时的姿态。


Iran, after all, is not building an Islamic bomb.	毕竟伊朗制造的不是伊斯兰核弹。


It is building an Iranian bomb, or, worse yet, a Shia bomb that Arab leaders must be more resolute in trying to stop.	而是伊朗核弹，甚至是更糟糕的什叶核弹，因此阿拉伯领导人必须态度坚决地予以阻止。


Private expressions of deep concern do not compensate for public nonchalance (or changing the topic to Israel), and are hardly a basis for a successful policy toward a country whose nuclear ambitions could have a catastrophic impact on the region.	私下表达的深切忧虑无法弥补公开场合的漠不关心（或将话题引向以色列），在对待一个核理想可能会给整个地区造成灾难性后果的国家时，成功的政策绝对不能是这样。


Finally, the Chinese and the Russians have been brought along principally by the US to a more robust policy, yet they remain reluctant.	最后，中国和俄国是迫于美国压力才采取强硬政策，但这并不是他们的本意。


They need to convey through their own bilateral approaches to Iran a sense of urgency – and perhaps even express a little anger – at Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate seriously.	他们需要通过双边外交渠道表达对伊朗不愿认真谈判的急迫态度（甚至可以是一点点愤怒）。


Sanctions should be a tool of diplomacy, not the other way around.	经济制裁应当作为一种外交工具，而不是反过来。


Even as we look to tighten sanctions on Iran in 2011, we must strengthen our efforts to establish a strong political and diplomatic track.	即使预期将在2011年加强对伊朗的制裁，建设政治和外交渠道的努力也必须强化。


Iran at History’s Fork in the Road	站在历史十字路口的伊朗


NEW YORK – History rarely unfolds smoothly or evenly. Instead, it tends to be punctuated by major developments – battles, assassinations, breakthroughs – that have consequences that are felt for years.	发自纽约 —— 历史的画卷很少会平静而顺利地铺展开来，相反，历史总会被某些重大事件所打断 —— 比如战争，暗杀以及开创性的发现 —— 而这些事件的后续影响，也将持续经年。


Thirty-one years after the revolution that ousted the Shah and brought Islamic rule to Iran, we are at one of those turning points.	在伊朗推翻巴列维王朝并建立伊斯兰教法统治整整 31 年后，我们也同样迎来了一个历史的转折点。


To be sure, we do not know the degree, direction, or pace of change.	无可否认，我们对这场变革的剧烈程度，发展方向以及进展速度都心里没底。


What we do know, however, is that what happens in Iran will materially affect not just that country but the entire Middle East and beyond.	但我们所知道的，则是当前在伊朗所发生的事件不仅将影响这个国家，更将波及到整个中东以及更广大的地域。


One future for Iran would be mostly an extension of what already exists, i.e., an Iran run by conservative clerics and an aggressive Revolutionary Guard, with the latter increasingly enjoying the upper hand.	对于伊朗来说，未来的其中一种走向就是继续延续现状，比如一个由保守派宗教学者和激进的伊斯兰革命卫队所把持，且后者权重不断增加的伊朗。


The Iranian regime would continue to brutally repress its domestic opponents, meddle in Iraq and Afghanistan, arm and fund Hezbollah and Hamas, and, most important, develop the ability to construct one or more nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.	伊朗政权将继续残酷镇压国内反对派，染指伊拉克和阿富汗事务，武装并资助黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯，而更要紧的，则是制造一枚或多枚核武器并发展出相应的核武运载能力。


The emergence of such a future would present the world with a stark choice: either acquiesce to an Iran that possesses or could quickly assemble a nuclear device, or launch a preventive military attack designed to destroy much of the Iranian nuclear program.	这一逐渐浮现的前景将令世人面临一道无法回避的选择题：要么默认一个已经拥有或即将组装核武设施的伊朗存在，要么发动一场预防性的军事打击，让伊朗的核计划灰飞烟灭。


Iran’s emergence as a nuclear-weapons state would almost certainly tempt several of the main Sunni Muslim countries (Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all come to mind) to embark on a crash program to acquire or develop nuclear arms of their own.	倘若伊朗作为核武国家的崛起的话，无疑会使周边几个主要的逊尼派穆斯林国家（比如土耳其，埃及和沙特阿拉伯）大受刺激，并加紧获取或者发展本国的核武计划。


A Middle East comprising several nuclear weapons states is a recipe for catastrophe.	显而易见，一个几大核武国家并存的中东地区将是无数灾难的源泉。


An armed attack by the United States, Israel, or both on Iran’s nuclear facilities is another possibility.	相反另外一个可能选项则是由美国，以色列或两国联手对伊朗核设施发动袭击。


One downside of such a prospect that Iran would likely retaliate against US interests and personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, using Hamas and Hezbollah, against Israel and others.	但这一选项的弊端则是伊朗很可能出手对伊拉克和阿富汗地区的美国利益和人员进行报复，并利用哈马斯和真主党来对付以色列及其他国家。


Iran could also interfere with oil traffic, leading to a spike in prices and delivering a further blow to American and global economic recovery.	伊朗还可以切断石油运输线路，迫使油价飙升，进而沉重打击美国以及全球的经济复苏进程。


Moreover, while a preventive strike would delay Iran’s nuclear efforts, it would not stop the regime from rebuilding, and it might also create conditions that cause problems for the regime’s domestic opponents.	此外，虽然一场预防性的袭击拖延了伊朗在核武方面的进度，但却难以阻止伊朗政府重建这些设施，并势必为该国国内的反对派带来麻烦。


But, despite these potential drawbacks, an armed attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will and should remain a distinct possibility given the enormous strategic costs of a nuclear-armed Iran.	然而即便存在这些潜在的不利条件，考虑到各国可能为一个核武伊朗所付出的巨大战略代价，一场针对伊朗核设施的袭击也存在极大的可能性。


It is in part to avoid the difficult choice of either living with a nuclear-armed Iran or attacking it that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany have pursued negotiations to limit Iran’s nuclear program and place it under international supervision.	而为了防止这个要么与核武伊朗并存，要么袭击伊朗这样的艰难选择最终摆在面前，联合国安理会五大常任理事国和德国都已经寻求展开谈判，试图限制伊朗核计划并将其置于国际监察之下。


Russia and China, which claim to oppose the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, are now being pressed to support new, tough sanctions to increase the odds it does not happen.	而声明反对伊朗核武化的俄罗斯和中国也正受到各方压力，迫使其支持新一轮的严厉制裁。


But if history is a guide, even strong sanctions may not be enough to persuade Iran’s rulers to negotiate constructively and accept meaningful constraints on their nuclear activities.	但回顾过去，即便是严厉的制裁都未必能令伊朗统治者展开建设性的谈判���并使其在核活动方面接受有现实意义的规则限制。


These considerations raise the prospect of trying to bring about an alternative future: an Iran with a political leadership that is more moderate at home and abroad, and that forgoes developing a nuclear weapon or anything close to it.	至此，上述这些考量都引出了一种具有可替代性的未来前景：能否催生一个拥有对内对外都更加温和的领导层的伊朗，一个放弃发展一切与核武有关事务的国家。


In addition to providing a better life for Iran’s 70 million people, political change there would weaken both Hamas and Hezbollah, thereby strengthening the relative position of moderates in the West Bank and Gaza and much improving the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.	除了能改善伊朗的 7000 万人民的生活之外，这场政治变革将削弱哈马斯和真主党，并增强约旦河西岸和加沙地区的温和派力量，随之改善以色列和巴勒斯坦人之间的和平前景。


A more moderate Iran would also cause Turkey to reconsider its recent shift away from the West and lead Syria to rethink its foreign-policy orientation, which would create a real opportunity for an Israeli peace deal with Damascus.	一个更温和的伊朗将令土耳其重新考虑自己最近疏离西方的举动，并引得叙利亚重新思考自身的外交政策目标，为以色列和大马士革当局之间达成和平协议创造一个真正的好机会。


Iraq’s prospects for emerging as a successful country at peace with itself and its neighbors also would be much improved.	而这也将充实伊拉克崛起成一个内部和谐，对外和平的好国家的前景。


It is rare in history that such widely different but plausible paths stem from a common point.	虽然，在历史上很少有一个节点能催生出如此富有差异化而且看似合理的发展路径。


It is not difficult, however, to determine which one is preferable.	然而也不难去判断，究竟上面哪一条路径更可取。


This is why additional measures are called for to improve the prospects for political change that brings about an Iranian government prepared to live in peace with its own people and its neighbors.	而这也是为什么我们呼吁实施一些额外手段去加强伊朗政治变革的前景，催生一个准备与人民和邻国和平共处的伊朗政府。


Such measures include assisting the Green Movement so that it can maintain access to the Internet, introducing additional sanctions aimed at the Revolutionary Guard, and publicly supporting the political and legal rights of the Iranian people.	这些手段包括协助伊朗民众的“绿色运动”，让这场运动更多地在网上曝光，增加对伊斯兰革命卫队的额外制裁，并对伊朗人民的政治和法律权利予以公开支持。


Some governments and individuals are likely to resist these suggestions, believing that such intervention constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into Iran’s sovereignty.	某些政府和个人将很可能会反对这些建议，因为他们相信这类行为是无端干涉伊朗主权的行径。


But in today’s global world, what happens in Iran is more than Iran’s affair.	但在当今这个全球化的世界上，伊朗的问题影响的早已不仅仅是伊朗本身。


Iran’s government has a right to nuclear power to generate electricity, but not to a nuclear weapon.	伊朗政府拥有发展核能发电的权利，而核武器则不行。


It also has obligations to its neighbors, to the world community (not to support terrorism, for example), and to its citizens.	与此同时伊朗也对其人民，邻国以及国际社会承担着义务（比如不去支持恐怖主义）。


The world should not sit idly by as Iran’s regime fails to meet these obligations.	全世界不应该冷眼旁观，眼睁睁地看着伊朗不去履行这些义务。


Iran Confronts Reality	伊朗直面现实


MADRID – Who has not seen what looks like water on a highway on a hot summer’s day?	马德里—你见过酷暑时节高速公路上的水吗？


Or a three-dimensional image that was actually a picture on a flat surface?	你见过实际上是画在一张纸上的三维图画吗？


The nature of illusion is that we mistake what we perceive for reality.	幻觉的本质就是我们把我们所感觉到的东西误认为了事实。


That is true whether an illusion is cognitive or political.	不管是认知幻觉还是政治幻觉都是如此。


Depending on how a particular event develops, it can lead us to formulate erroneous interpretations of what is actually happening.	一起特定事件的特定发展轨迹可能会导致我们对实际正在发生什么形成误判。


Such perceptions are often mediated by ideas and previous experiences.	这种感觉通常会以观念和从前的经验为媒介。


And, as Robert Jervis argued in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, published during the Cold War, the illusions that we create have an enormous influence on decision-making – even becoming a fundamental cause of conflict.	此外，正如罗伯特·杰维斯（Robert Jervis）在冷战时期出版的著作《国际政治中的感知和错误感知》（Perception and Misperception in International Politics）中所指出的，我们所形成的幻觉能够对决策形成重大影响力——即使它演变为冲突的基本原因。


To a certain extent, this is what has happened with analysis of the recent 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held at the end of August in Tehran – the first time Iran has hosted the meeting.	从某种程度上讲，这就是在对8月底在德黑兰举行的第十六届不结盟运动（NAM）峰会的分析身上所发生的事情。


The summit took place against a background of scant progress in negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program and growing pressure from Israel for the international community to establish a “trigger” – a line that the Islamic Republic must not cross.	这是伊朗第一次主持不结盟运动峰会。 此次峰会举行的背景是伊朗核计划谈判进展缓慢、以色列向国际社会不断施压，要求设置一条伊朗不可跨越的“触发”线。


Moreover, regional tensions heightened the perception of the NAM summit’s importance and that of its host.	此外，地区紧张局势增加了人们关于不结盟运动峰会及其主办国的重要性的感知。


In the Middle East, only Iran and Hezbollah support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in a civil war that is nearing the point of no return and destabilizing Lebanon and Jordan.	在中东，只有伊朗和黎巴嫩真主党支持叙利亚总统巴沙尔的政权，而叙利亚内战已处于不可挽回的边缘，黎巴嫩和约旦也极有可能因此受到动摇。


The NAM played an important role during the Cold War.	不结盟运动在冷战期间起到过重要作用。


Its vision was shaped by the recent independence struggles of many of its member countries, and its agenda promoted national sovereignty, non-interference, a rebalancing of North-South relations, and support for national liberation movements.	其愿景的形成受最近其众多成员国独立斗争的影响，其日程旨在增强国家主权、不干涉、南北关系再平衡以及支持民族解放运动。


But the reality that united NAM in the past has changed.	但过去让不结盟运动团结起来的现实已经改变了。


The Cold War’s bipolar governance structures and a subsequent period of American unilateralism – to which the non-aligned states attempted to act as a counterbalance – have given way to a much more complex and interdependent multi-polar world.	冷战的两极主宰结构及其后的美国单极时代（即没有结盟国家试图制衡美国）已经让位给了更加复杂、更加相互依赖的多极世界。


While the United States and Europe are still struggling to overcome a serious economic crisis, many NAM members, such as India, Chile, and Singapore, have maintained relative strong growth and form a part of new global governance structures, such as the G-20.	美国和欧洲仍在严重的经济危机中挣扎，而印度、智利、新加坡等许多不结盟运动国家保持着相对强劲的增长���并跻身G20等新的全球治理结构的一部分。


Likewise, many of the problems that we now face – whether climate change, financial crisis, development challenges, terrorism, or nuclear proliferation – reflect growing global interdependence.	类似地，许多我们如今所面临的问题——不管是气候变化、金融危机、发展挑战、恐怖主义还是核浓缩——反映了日渐增加的全球相互依赖程度。


Managing them effectively obliges us to rethink the concept of sovereignty.	有效治理这些问题要求我们重新思考主权的概念。


These changes have transformed not only the traditional structures of power, but also the leitmotif of NAM and the fate of its members.	这些挑战不但改变了传统实力结构，也改变了不结盟运动的主旨及其成员国的命运。


Globalization has fueled ever-widening disparities among its members – just compare Colombia with Afghanistan, or Chile with Sudan – that make it difficult to transform sheer numbers into coherent influence.	全球化让不结盟运动成员国之间的差异越来越大——比较一下哥伦比亚和阿富汗或者智利和苏丹便可一窥端倪——这使得将成员数字转化为显而易见的影响力变得十分困难。


The impact of the Tehran summit, and whom it may have benefited, is not entirely clear.	德黑兰峰会的影响，以及谁会从中获益并非显而易见。


Iran certainly regarded the meeting as a propaganda opportunity, promising wide media coverage at a time when it was in the eye of a diplomatic hurricane.	伊朗显然将这次峰会视为一次宣传机会，允许媒体对此进行广泛报道——要知道，当时伊朗正处在外交风暴的中心。


But the participants’ inability to reach a common position on their hosts’ nuclear program or the violence in Syria – two of the fundamental questions that confronted the summit – obviously undermined Iran’s effort to demonstrate that, despite facing severe economic and diplomatic sanctions, it remains an effective international player.	但参与国没能在关于东道国的核计划或叙利亚暴力问题——此次峰会所面临的两大根本性问题——上达成共同立场显然破坏了伊朗证明其在面临严厉经济和外交制裁的情况下仍能保持国际影响力的算盘。


Indeed, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon criticized Iran for not assuring the world that it is not seeking nuclear arms at a time when the International Atomic Energy Agency has published a new report suggesting that it is.	事实上，联合国秘书长潘基文批评伊朗没有在国际原子能机构的新报告认为它寻求持有核武器时保证事实并非如此。


And, in a speech of great depth, Mohamed Morsi, the first Egyptian president to visit Iran since the Islamic Republic’s birth in 1979, firmly rejected the Syrian regime, as he did in a subsequent appearance before the Arab League as well.	此外，1979年伊朗伊斯兰共和国成立以来第一位到访的埃及总统穆尔西在其颇具深度的演讲中明确地否定了叙利亚政权，随后又在阿盟面前再次确认了这一点。


Moreover, Morsi urged Iran to join Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – all Sunni-majority countries – in pressing for political transition in Syria (a role that the Syrian opposition rejected before Iran could even say no).	穆尔西敦促伊朗加入到埃及、土耳其和沙特——均是逊尼派占多数的国家——的行列中，敦促叙利亚实现政治转型（对于这一角色，叙利亚反对派在伊朗说不之前便予以了否定）。


In other words, reality betrayed the perception that Iran sought to create in hosting the NAM summit.	换句话说，事实背离了伊朗试图通过主办不结盟运动峰会所欲造成的感觉。


Instead, Morsi’s speech provided the occasion’s most memorable moment.	相反，穆尔西的演讲成了此次峰会最值得铭记的时刻。


And Iran’s nuclear quest remains a reality that must not be ignored during the next key three years, when the Islamic Republic will lead NAM while itself remaining one of the most serious problems on the international agenda.	伊朗的核要求仍是关键的未来三年中不可忽视的现实，在此期间，伊朗将继续领导不结盟运动，而其自身也将仍然是国际日程中最为棘手的问题。


An Iran Deal Ten Years Late	迟到十年的伊核协议


ROME – The only thing to lament about the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members – China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States – plus Germany) in Vienna this month is that it was not signed and sealed a decade ago.	罗马—对于本月在维也纳达成的伊朗和P5+1（联合国安理会五大常任理事国——中国、英国、法国、俄罗斯和美国加上德国）的协议，唯一的遗憾之处是它没有在十年前就签字画押。


In the years that it has taken for diplomatic sanity to prevail, the Middle East has endured myriad avoidable tensions and lost opportunities for security cooperation.	外交尝试用了多年的时间才获得胜利，在此期间，中东经历了各种各样本可避免的对峙，丧失了许多安全合作机会。


From 2003 to 2006, Iran made clear to anyone willing to listen that it would agree to all the key elements of the recent deal, including measures to block uranium and plutonium pathways to a bomb and obtrusive monitoring mechanisms to ensure ample advance notice of a likely breakout.	从2003年到2006年，伊朗向任何愿意倾听的人表明态度：它将同意现在的协议的所有关键内容，包括阻止其获得制造核弹所需的铀和钚的措施以及确保能充分提前预警可能的违反情况的严格的检查机制。


All it needed in return – beyond, of course, the lifting of sanctions as implementation proceeded – was formal recognition of its “right to enrich” uranium.	它所需要的全部回报——当然除了作为前提条件的取消制裁之外——是正式承认其铀“浓缩权利”。


In discussions with the European Union in 2003-2004, Iran voluntarily froze its then-minimal enrichment program, pending negotiation of a full accord.	在2003—2004年间的对欧谈判中，伊朗自愿冻结了当时规模甚小的核浓缩项目，期待谈形成一个完整的协议。


Iran also declared its willingness to apply the “additional protocol,” allowing for much more far-reaching and stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency than is called for under standard arrangements.	伊朗还宣布它愿意接受“附加协议”，接受比标准情况下深入得多、严格得多的国际原子能机构监督。


Those commitments ended in 2005, owing to the continued insistence by the EU, backed by the US, that Iran abandon uranium enrichment entirely.	这些承诺结束于2005年，原因是欧盟在美国的支持下坚持要求伊朗完全放弃铀浓缩。


This stance disregarded the “inalienable right,” clearly acknowledged in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (as much as one might wish otherwise, in an ideal world), of NPT parties to engage in all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle as part of a peaceful nuclear energy program.	这一立场无视核不扩散条约所明确承认的“不可剥夺的权利”（在理想世界中你也只能期待这么多了）。 核不扩散条约规定，签署国可以进行各阶段核燃料循环，只要出于和平核能用途目的。


If, at that time, the West had been prepared to settle for effectively containing Iran’s nuclear program, rather than destroying every last sensitive component of it, a deal would have been possible.	如果当时西方就准备满足于事实遏制伊朗的核计划，而不是毁掉其核计划中所有的敏感成分，那么当时就有可能达成协议。


And, indeed, in early 2006, the International Crisis Group published a comprehensive “delayed limited enrichment” proposal that included all of the key features of the deal that has now been signed in Vienna.	而事实上，在2006年初，国际危机集团（International Crisis Group）提出了一份全面的“推迟有限核浓缩活动”方案，该方案包括了如今在维也纳签署的协议的所有关键内容。


I am confident, on the basis of many hours of productive dialogue with senior Iranian officials in Tehran, New York, and elsewhere, that this proposal could have broken the deadlock.	从德黑兰、纽约和其他地方与伊朗高级官员的无数小时的建设性对话出发，我对于该方案能够打破僵局非常有信心。


It had all the right elements of an effective compromise.	它具备了有效妥协的所有正确要素。


But with the US not talking to Iran at any level, and the EU talking but not listening, the effort went nowhere.	但美国拒绝与伊朗展开任何层面的对话，而欧盟只说不听，因此我们的努力付诸东流。


The Iranians were never going to accept what they perceived as second-class status under the NPT.	伊朗人永远不会接受他们所认为的核不扩散条约下的二等地位。


It was only when US President Barack Obama’s administration acknowledged that, and commenced direct back-channel talks in 2011, that progress became possible.	直到美国总统奥巴马政府意识到这一点，并在2011年开始非正式渠道的直接对话，这一方案才获得了取得进展的可能。


The key was the recognition that Iran’s sense of honor had to be accommodated.	关键在于承认伊朗的荣誉感必须得到顾及。


Critics of the Vienna deal in the US Congress, Israel, and the Arab world tend to assume that Iran has no honor.	美国国会、以色列和阿拉伯世界的维也纳协议批评者总是认为伊朗没有荣誉可言。


They believe that Iran has always been hell-bent on building nuclear weapons, and that its leaders signed the deal, which imposes limits on the country’s nuclear program for 15 years, only to relieve the enormous sanctions pressure now crushing its economy.	他们认为伊朗永远在偏执地试图制造核武器，其领导人之所以签署这个对伊朗今后15年的核计划添加约束的协议，只是为了缓解让伊朗经济透不过气来的各项制裁。


Iran is biding its time, the critics charge, and will inevitably attempt to break out again.	批评者指出，伊朗是在隐忍，它必将再次撕毁协议。


While no one should be under any illusion that Iran has been a model international citizen, or is likely to become one any time soon, this perception of the country’s nuclear ambitions involves a fundamental misreading of the dynamics in play.	没人会认为伊朗是模范国际公民，或者很快会成为模范世界公民，但对伊朗核野心的这一看法构成了对形势的一个根本性误解。


My judgment, based on more dialogue with senior Iranian officials than most of the critics have conducted, is that Iran – whatever engineering research it may have carried out in the past, and whatever fuel-making and missile-delivery capabilities it may have developed more recently – has never been close to deciding actually to build nuclear weapons.	以我比大部分批评者多得多的与伊朗高官的对话经验看，伊朗——不管它在过去进行了多少工程研究，不管最近它已经发展出多少燃料制造和导弹发射能力——从未接近于真的决定制造核武器。


Iran has always been keenly aware of the multiple risks involved in crossing that red line.	伊朗一直对跨越红线所暗含的风险十分警觉。


It knows that it would face attack by a much more heavily armed Israel, whether supported by the US or not; that Sunni powers in the region could move quickly to counter a “Shia bomb” with their own nuclear weapons; and that additional crushing international sanctions could be imposed.	它知道，它将受到武装远比自己强的以色列的攻击（不管有没有美国支持）； 它知道，地区中的逊尼派力量可以很快行动起来用它们自身的核武器制造一颗“什叶炸弹”；


And there is another factor that should not be instantly dismissed, as it usually is by cynical critics: Iranian leaders’ repeated strong rejection of weapons of mass destruction on religious grounds.	它知道，它可能面临更加严厉的国际制裁。 还有一个不应该轻易忽视的因素——犬儒主义批评家经常忽视它：伊朗领导人出于宗教立场一再拒绝大规模杀伤性武器。


The question, then, is why has Iran walked the precipice for so long by building a visible breakout capability bound to spook the West, Israel, and its Arab neighbors?	于是，问题在于伊朗为何要在如此长的时间里铤而走险，摆出一副显而易见的突破驾驶，惊动西方、以色列和阿拉伯邻国？


The answer, I believe, is overwhelmingly national pride – its peoples’ desire to demonstrate that Iran is a power to be reckoned with, a country that has impressive technical prowess, and that there are limits to its willingness to suffer international humiliation.	我认为，答案在于无法抵抗的国家骄傲——伊朗人民渴望证明伊朗是一个不可小觑的力量，是一个拥有惊人技术实力的国家���并且伊朗承受国际羞辱的忍耐力是有限度的。


Iranians vividly remember the overthrow, orchestrated by the CIA and British intelligence, of the elected government of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953.	伊朗人还深刻地记得美国中央情报局和英国情报部门1953年颠覆民选的摩萨德（Mohammad Mosaddegh）政府。


They remember the West’s prolonged support for the hated Shah, and for Iraq in its brutal war with Iran in the 1980s, even after Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein employed chemical weapons.	他们还记得西方长期支持他们所讨厌的国王沙哈（Shah）； 记得西方支持20世纪80年代悍然向伊朗宣战的伊拉克（即使是在萨达姆·侯赛因使用化学武器后）。


And they remember when US President George W. Bush labeled their country part of an “axis of evil,” despite its cooperation with the US in Afghanistan.	他们也记得美国总统小布什将伊朗贴上“邪恶轴心”的标签，即使其在阿富汗问题上与美国合作。


It is understandable that many will not readily be persuaded of Iranian sincerity, not least because the national negotiating style – among moderates and hardliners alike – tends to be anything but frank and direct, with private reason often accompanied by public thunder that makes it hard to assess real intent.	不难理解，许多人不会相信伊朗的诚意，因为伊朗的谈判风格——不管是温和派还是强硬派——绝对算不上坦诚直接，私人原因和公共理由交织在一起，让人为无法判断真实意图。


But the Vienna agreement deserves wide support, and not just because the alternatives – continuation of acute regional tension at best, and catastrophic military conflict at worst – are so unappealing.	但维也纳协议理应获得广泛支持，因为其他办法——最好情况是继续尖锐地区对立，最坏情况是军事冲突——更加糟糕。


In fact, there is every reason to believe that the agreement captures and reflects the real interests not just of Iran, but also of the international community.	事实上，有很强的理由可以相信该协议抓住并反映了伊朗以及国际社会的真实利益。


It keeps intact a global non-proliferation regime that has been showing signs of falling apart, and gives new hope for wider regional security cooperation.	它保护了已经颓势尽显的全球核不扩散机制的完整性，也带来了更广泛的地区安全合作希望。


Intelligent diplomacy beats brute force every time.	明智外交永远胜过蛮力。


Saying No to the Warmongers	对战争贩子说不


NEW YORK – The accord struck in Vienna to rein in Iran’s nuclear activities has warmongers fulminating.	纽约—维也纳所达成的限制伊朗核活动的协议引起了战争贩子的谩骂。


Citizens worldwide should support US President Barack Obama’s brave effort to outmaneuver them, taking heart from the fact that the signatories include not just the United States, but all five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.	全世界公民都应该支持美国总统奥巴马计胜战争贩子的勇敢行为，认识到签署国不仅仅是美国，而是所有联合国安理会五大常任理事国再加上德国，这会让我们信心大振。


Many of the warmongers are to be found in Obama’s own government agencies.	许多战争贩子就存在于奥巴马自己的政府机构中。


Most Americans struggle to recognize or understand their country’s permanent security state, in which elected politicians seem to run the show, but the CIA and the Pentagon often take the lead – a state that inherently gravitates toward military, rather than diplomatic, solutions to foreign-policy challenges.	大部分美国人很难认识或理解美国的永久安全状态——看似是当选政客在主持，实则中央情报局（CIA）和五角大楼才是领衔主演——这个国家天生倾向于用军事而非外交方案解决对外政策挑战。


Since 1947, when the CIA was established, the US has had a continuous semi-covert, semi-overt policy of overthrowing foreign governments.	自1947年CIA成立以来，美国一直有一套半隐蔽半公开的颠覆外国政府政策。


In fact, the CIA was designed to avoid genuine democratic oversight and provide presidents with “plausible deniability.”	事实上，CIA就是为了避免真正的民主监督、为总统提供“合理否认”（plausible deniability）的。


It has gone on to topple dozens of governments, in all regions of the world, with no accountability there or at home.	CIA在全球各个地区推翻了数十家政府，在当地和国内从未受到问责。


I recently examined one period of CIA activity in my book To Move the World: JFK’s Quest for Peace.	我在我的近著《推动世界：肯尼迪对和平的追求》（To Move the World: JFK’s Quest for Peace）中考察了一段时期的CIA活动。


Soon after Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961, he was “informed” by the CIA of its plot to overthrow Fidel Castro.	1961年，肯尼迪成为总统后不久，他被CIA“告知”关于推翻卡斯特罗的计划。


Kennedy felt stuck: Should he sanction the planned CIA invasion of Cuba or veto it?	肯尼迪大吃一惊：他应该批准CIA入侵古巴还是否决它？


New to the gruesome game, Kennedy tried to have it both ways, by letting it proceed, but without US air cover.	作为这一可怕的游戏的新手，肯尼迪试图做两手准备，让CIA去干，但不提供空中掩护。


The CIA-led invasion, executed by a motley group of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, was a military failure and a foreign-policy disaster, one that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year.	CIA领导的入侵行动由一帮古巴流亡者组成的乌合之众在猪湾（Bay of Pigs）实施，是一场军事失败和对外政策灾难，导致了第二年的古巴导弹危机。


During the missile crisis, most senior security officials advising the president wanted to launch military action against Soviet forces, a course that could well have ended in nuclear annihilation.	在导弹危机期间，总统的最高安全官员想发动针对苏联力量的军事行动，这极有可能演变为核灭绝。


Kennedy overruled the warmongers, and prevailed in the crisis through diplomacy.	肯尼迪驳斥了战争贩子的计划，通过外交解决了这场危机。


By 1963, Kennedy no longer trusted the advice of the military and the CIA.	到1963年，肯尼迪已不再信任军方和CIA的建议。


Indeed, he regarded many of his putative advisers as a threat to world peace.	事实上，他认为他的许多所谓顾问是世界和平的威胁。


That year, he used diplomacy relentlessly and skillfully to achieve a breakthrough nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union, the Limited Test Ban Treaty.	这一年，他不懈地巧妙使用外交手段与苏联达成了突破性核协议——部分禁止核试验条约。


The American people strongly – and rightly – supported Kennedy over the warmongers.	美国人民强烈——也正确地——支持肯尼迪对战争贩子的态度。


But three months after the treaty was signed, JFK was assassinated.	但条约签署后三个月，肯尼迪就遇刺身亡。


Viewed through the lens of history, the main job of US presidents is to be mature and wise enough to stand up to the permanent war machine.	从历史角度看，美国总统的主要职责是足够成熟和睿智，与永久性战争机器对抗。 肯尼迪坚持了；


Kennedy tried; his successor, Lyndon Johnson, did not, and the debacle of Vietnam ensued.	但他的继任者约翰逊没有坚持，随之而来便是越南的灾难。


Jimmy Carter tried; Reagan did not (his CIA helped to unleash death and mayhem in Central America throughout the 1980s).	卡特坚持了； 里根没有（他的CIA是整个20世纪80年代中美洲死亡和混乱事件的幕后推手）。


Clinton mostly tried (except in the Balkans); George W. Bush did not, and generated new wars and turmoil.	克林顿在大部分时间里坚持了（除了在巴尔干问题上）； 小布什没有，并带来了新的战争和混乱。


On the whole, Obama has tried to restrain the warmongers, yet he has given in to them frequently – not only by relying on weaponized drones, but also by waging covert wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.	总��而言，奥巴马试图约束战争贩子，但常常屈服——不仅仅是武器化的无人机，也包括在叙利亚、利比亚、也门和其他地区发动隐蔽战争。


Nor did he truly end the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; he replaced troops on the ground with US drones, air strikes, and “private” contractors.	他也没有真正结束美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的战争； 他用美国无人机、空袭和“私人”承包商取代了地面部队。


Iran is surely his finest moment, a historic milestone that demands full-throated approval.	伊朗显然是他做得最正确的事情，这是一个应该获得如潮赞誉的历史里程碑。


The political difficulty of making peace with Iran is similar to that of JFK’s peacemaking with the Soviet Union in 1963.	与伊朗缔结和平的政治困难与肯尼迪1963年与苏联和解不相上下。


Americans have been suspicious of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis, in which Iranian students held 52 Americans at the US embassy for 444 days.	自1979年伊斯兰革命及随后的人质危机（伊朗学生在伊朗大使馆劫持52名美国人达444天之久）以来，美国人对伊朗一直心存怀疑 。


But their suspicion also reflects jingoistic manipulation and a lack of perspective on US-Iran relations.	但他们的怀疑也反映出强硬外交的操纵和缺少对美伊关系的理解。


Few Americans know that the CIA overthrew a democratic Iranian government in 1953.	很少有美国人知道，CIA在1953年推翻了民主的伊朗政府。


Iranians had had the temerity to elect a progressive, secular prime minister who believed that the country’s oil belonged to its people, not to the United Kingdom or the US.	伊朗人冒失地选择了一位进步的世俗总理，他认为伊朗的石油属于伊朗人民而不是英国或美国。


And few Americans recall that after the coup, the CIA installed a brutal police state under the Shah.	也很少有美国人记得，政变发生后，CIA在伊朗国王背后扶植了一个残暴的警察国家。


Likewise, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the US armed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to go to war with Iran, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Iranian deaths in the 1980s.	类似地，1979年伊朗革命后，美国武装了萨达姆·侯赛因的伊拉克，让其与伊朗开战，造成20世纪80年代数十万伊朗人死亡。


And US-led international sanctions, imposed from the 1990s onward, have aimed to impoverish, destabilize, and ultimately topple the Islamist regime.	而从20世纪90年代开始实行的美国领衔的国际制裁的目的就是让伊斯兰政权变穷、动摇、最终推翻它。


Today, the warmongers are trying to scuttle the Vienna accord.	如今，战争贩子又试图扼杀维也纳协议。


Saudi Arabia is in a violent struggle with Iran for regional supremacy, with geopolitical competition converging with the Sunni-Shia rivalry.	沙特阿拉伯正在与伊朗暴力争夺地区主宰权，地缘政治竞争最后指向的是逊尼派-什叶派对立。


Israel, the Middle East’s only nuclear power, wants to retain its strategic monopoly.	而中东唯一的核力量以色列希望保持其战略垄断地位。


The US warmongers seem to view any Islamist state as ripe for toppling.	美国战争贩子似乎将一切伊斯兰教国家都视为颠覆对象。


Obama is correct that America’s true interests, and those of the world, are with peace, not continued conflict, with Iran.	奥巴马说，美国乃至全世界的真正利益在于和平而不是继续与伊朗冲突，这是正确的。


The US is not a partisan in the Shia-Sunni struggle; if anything, the US confronts mainly Sunni terrorism, funded from Saudi Arabia, not Shia terrorism backed by Iran.	美国在什叶派-逊尼派斗争中没有立场； 如果有的话，美国主要面临的是沙特阿拉伯提供资金支持的逊尼派恐怖主义，而不是伊朗所支持的什叶派恐怖主义。


Obama is also right that, despite Israel’s arguments, the agreement will reduce the possibility of Iran ever becoming a nuclear state.	奥巴马还说，尽管以色列反对，但协议将降低伊朗成为有核国家的可能性，这也是正确的。


The best way to ensure that outcome is to normalize relations with it, help its economy recover, and support its integration into the international community.	确保这一结果的最佳办法是对伊关系正常化，帮助其经济复苏、支持其融入国际社会。


Iran is a great and ancient culture.	伊朗拥有伟大而古老的文化。


Its opening to the world as a place of business, tourism, the arts, and sports would be a boon to global stability and prosperity.	它作为商业、旅游、艺术和体育之地向世界开放将是全球稳定与繁荣的福音。


The new treaty will verifiably prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon for at least a decade – and keep it bound to nuclear non-proliferation thereafter.	新条约将至少在十年内阻止伊朗发展核武器——并在此后让伊朗受到核不扩散约束。


This is the time to begin a broader US-Iran rapprochement and build a new security regime in the Middle East and the world that leads toward full global nuclear disarmament.	应该开始更广义的美伊重新建交并构建新的中东和世界安全机制、迈向全面的全球核裁军。


To get there requires, above all, replacing war (including the CIA’s secret wars) with commerce and other forms of peaceful exchange.	而要实现这些目标，最重要的是用生意和其他和平交换形式代替战争（包括CIA秘密战争）


Iran’s Economy After the Elections	选举后的伊朗经济


LONDON – Recent gains by pro-government reformist candidates in Iran’s parliamentary elections have given President Hassan Rouhani a welcome midterm boost.	伦敦—在最近的伊朗选举中，亲政府改革派候选人得势，这给了总统鲁哈尼一次理想的中期提振。


But huge economic challenges remain.	但艰巨的经济挑战依旧。


And in the coming months, these challenges are what will determine the battle lines between the president and his hardline adversaries inside and outside the parliament.	在未来几个月中，这些挑战将决定总统及其议会内外强硬派对手的斗争局势。


Elections are normally won and lost along political lines, and Iran’s recent vote is no exception.	选举通常因为政治原因决出胜负，伊朗的最新选举也不例外。


But, on this occasion, there is reason to believe that economic concerns were a major driver of political change, as evidenced by the massive turnout at the electoral booths.	但是，在此次选举中，有理由认为经济问题是政治变化的一大主要推动力，投票箱前人头攒动的景象就是明证。


Ever since July, when Iran signed a landmark nuclear deal with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union, popular expectations for an improvement in the state of the economy have reached a fever pitch.	自7月份伊朗与联合国五大常任理事国以及欧盟签订里程碑式的核协议以来，公众就开始热切期盼经济状况有所改善。


Rouhani is well aware of the importance of economic expectations; indeed, they were what swept him into the presidency in 2013.	鲁哈尼很清楚经济期望的重要性； 事实上，这正是他在2013年问鼎总统宝座的原因。


The recent election campaign once again drew strength from the promise to fix an economy battered by years of tough economic sanctions and domestic mismanagement.	最新的选战再次得益于承诺提振因为多年的严厉制裁和国内管理不善而萧条的经济。


That is why he placed a high priority on reaching a deal with the outside world that would close the nuclear file and pave the road to economic recovery.	因此，他将与外部世界达成协议，用关闭核设施换取经济复苏列为重中之重。


The economy that Rouhani inherited from his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had been distorted by years of generous redistributions of oil revenues to the president’s supporters and then hit with stagflation, as what US Vice President Joe Biden called the “toughest economic sanctions in history” began to take hold.	鲁哈尼从他的前任内贾德手中接过的是一个经济烂摊子，多年来，石油收入被肆意再分配给总统支持者，然后，随着美国副总统拜登所谓的“史上最严厉经济制裁”的开始，伊朗经济陷入滞胀。


In 2013, the year Rouhani assumed office, inflation exceeded 40%, and GDP contracted by 6%.	2013年，即鲁哈尼成为总统的那一年，通货膨胀超过40%，GDP萎缩6%。


Rouhani’s woes were exacerbated by the economic destabilization that followed the introduction of comprehensive financial sanctions that cut Iran off from the international banking system.	伊朗遭受全面金融制裁、无法进入国际银行体系导致了经济动荡，这加剧了鲁哈尼面临的萧条。


Unable to sell oil, and faced with a blockade of the central bank by the United States and the EU, Rouhani faced the momentous challenge of trying to kick-start growth and tame spiraling prices.	鲁哈尼面临的局面是无法再卖出石油，并且伊朗中央银行遭遇美国和欧盟封杀，提振增长和稳定物价上涨成为鲁哈尼面前的巨大挑战。


Rouhani has had some success in lowering inflation, which is now down to 13%.	鲁哈尼在降低通胀方面取得了一些成功，目前的通胀率下降到了13%。


But rekindling growth has proven to be a tougher challenge.	但重振增长的挑战更加艰巨。


With the International Monetary Fund predicting that GDP will either stagnate or contract this year, Iran’s economy might well be set for a double-dip recession.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测伊朗GDP今年将停滞或萎缩，伊朗经济可能发生二次探底。


With sanctions lifted, however, the IMF now expects GDP growth to reach roughly 5% next year – a rate that would make Iran the Middle East’s best-performing economy.	但是，随着制裁的取消，IMF现在预期明年GDP增长大约为5%——这将让伊朗成为中东表现最佳的经济体。


Attaining this level of growth will be essential if jobs are to be created; Iran habitually suffers from a double-digit unemployment rate, with official youth unemployment above 25%.	要想创造就业岗位，如此增长水平至关重要； 伊朗失业率常常达到两位数，官方年轻人失业率更是高达25%以上。


But several obstacles stand in the way.	但是障碍很多。


The first is the collapse in oil prices, which have tumbled by 70% since mid-2014.	首先是石油价格暴跌，自2014年年中以来已经跌去70%。


A similar misfortune occurred in 1999, when President Mohammad Khatami was attempting to carry out his own reformist experiment, and prices fell below $10 per barrel.	1999年也发生过类似的情况，时任伊朗总统哈塔米试图进行改革试验，而石油价格下跌到每桶10美元以下。


Then, as now, the first two years of a reformist administration were thwarted by adverse external developments in the international oil markets.	和现在一样，哈塔米政府两年的改革成绩因为国际石油市场的不利外部影响而功败垂成。


The last crisis was driven by demand-side factors relating to the Asian financial crisis.	上一次危机受到与亚洲金融危机有关的需求面因素驱动。


This time, supply-side factors are creating a global oil glut, with similar results.	这一回是供给面因素造成全球石油过剩，而结果相似。


Failing to understand this, conspiracy theorists can be forgiven for noticing that reform-minded presidencies seem to be negatively correlated with international oil prices.	不理解这一点，就会落入阴谋论者的圈套，认为改革派总统与国际石油价格负相关。


Rouhani’s main challenges, however, are internal.	但是，鲁哈尼的主要挑战在于国内。


They come from Iran’s complex post-revolutionary institutional architecture, which is beset by a labyrinth of decision-making entities interlaced with yet more bodies and agencies created to ensure compliance with Islamic tenets and revolutionary standards.	这些挑战来自伊朗复杂的后革命时代制度结构，决策实体叠床架屋，更有各式各样的机构和部门确保它们符合伊斯兰教义和革命标准。


In recent decades, this system has produced tremendous political fragmentation, if not open factional fighting, at all levels.	最近几十年来，这套制度制造了巨大的政治分裂甚至各层面的公开的派系斗争。


It is in this labyrinth of power that Rouhani is fighting an intense battle with his conservative adversaries – a battle that may be far from over.	在这一错综复杂的权力环境中，鲁哈尼正在与其保守派对手进行恶斗——这场斗争还远未结束。


In fact, Rouhani’s economic remedies – attempting to open the economy to foreign trade and investment flows, and introducing economic reforms to foster the private sector following the lifting of sanctions – are at odds with the vision of Iran’s hardline conservatives.	事实上，鲁哈尼的经济政策——尝试向对外贸易和投资流开放经济，并引入经济改革从而在制裁取消后刺激私人部门——与伊朗强硬保守派的愿景相悖。


For these so-called Principlists – who advocate a “resistance economy,” based on years of austerity marked by self-sufficiency and reliance on domestic resources – Rouhani’s desire to declare Iran “open for business” and to encourage foreigners to take an active role in Iran’s economy raises as much alarm as the nuclear deal.	这些所谓的原教旨主义者（Principlists）鼓吹“抵抗经济”，依靠以自给自足为标志的多年的紧缩。 对他们来说，鲁哈尼渴望伊朗“开放经济”和鼓励外国人在伊朗经济中扮演积极角色，这和核协议一样值得警惕。


The decline of the Principlists’ power bloc in the next parliament is undoubtedly a powerful message from Iran’s youthful electorate.	原教旨主义者在下一届议会中失势对于伊朗的年轻选民来说毫无疑问是一个有力的信号。


This resonates with what former US President Bill Clinton told Charlie Rose in 2005: Iran is the only country with elections “where the liberals, or the progressives, have won two-thirds to 70% of the vote in six elections….There is no other country in the world I can say that about, certainly not my own.”	这与美国前总统克林顿2005年对查理·罗斯（Charlie Rose）说的话异曲同工：伊朗是唯一一个“自由派或进步派在六场选举中赢得三分之二到70%席位”的国家……“我找不出世界上还有其他这样的国家，我国显然不是。 ”


A decade later, Clinton will no doubt find it heartening to see this trend continue.	十年后，克林顿一定会为这一趋势得到了持续而欢欣鼓舞。


But, while the Principlists might be down, they are certainly not out, as the looming battle over the future of the economy attests.	但是，尽管原教旨主义者可能失势，但他们绝未出局，若隐若现的关于伊朗经济未来的激战就是明证。


It is here that Rouhani will face his most difficult challenge.	鲁哈尼的最艰巨的挑战就在于此。


His electoral victory might raise the stakes for him, by increasing pressure to deliver on popular expectations.	他在选举中获胜可能让他的赌注变得更加巨大，因为满足公众期望的压力增加了。


But, as reformists found when they lost to Ahmadinejad in 2005, growth and economic recovery cannot come at the expense of the electorate’s aspirations for greater equality and social justice.	但是，正如哈塔米2005年败给内贾德时所发现的，不能因为增长和经济复苏而牺牲掉选民对更大的平等性和社会正义的渴望。


The Drone in the Desert	沙漠中的无人机


TEL AVIV – A drone recently penetrated Israel’s airspace from the Mediterranean.	特拉维夫—最近一架无人机从地中海进入以色列领空。


It was allowed to fly for about half an hour over southern Israel before being shot down by the Israeli air force over a sparsely populated area.	它在以色列南部上空飞行了月半小时，然后被以色列空军击落在人口稀疏地区。


It is still not known who dispatched the drone and from where, but it is now assumed that it was launched from Lebanon, either by Hezbollah, acting in Iran's service, or by forces of the Iranian regime itself.	这架无人机是谁派来的、从哪里飞来的，这些到目前都不得而知，但据信来自黎巴嫩，不是真主党根据伊朗指示发射，便是伊朗本身派来的。


If that is indeed the case, the episode should not be regarded as yet another incident in a region fraught by conflict and violence.	果真如此的话，此事就不能视作这个冲突和暴力多发地区的又一次事件。


On the contrary, it is a significant window into the arena in which the conflict over the future of Iran's nuclear program is being waged.	相反，这是一次重大事故，表明关于伊朗核计划未来的冲突大幕已经拉开。


Several developments and forces are now shaping this arena.	目前，决定伊朗核问题的是多方发展形势和力量。


One is Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s decision, announced in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly last month, to suspend his threat to launch unilateral military action against Iran's nuclear installations.	其一是以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的决定——上个月，在联合国大会上的演讲中，他宣布收回对伊朗核设施采取单方面军事行动的威胁。


He has said that Israel will give the US and the rest of the international community an opportunity to stop Iran’s progress through other means by the spring or early summer of 2013.	他说，以色列将给美国和国际社会通过其他方式让伊朗在2013年春或初夏中止核计划的机会。


Another development is the US presidential election.	另一大发展形势是美国大选。


Republican challenger Mitt Romney’s success in the first debate improves his chances and the prospect of a new administration settling in before any major decisions are made on the Iranian nuclear issue.	共和党挑战者罗姆尼在第一轮电视辩论中大获全胜，增加了他的当选机会，在就伊朗核问题做出任何重大决定之前，美国可能产生一个新政府。


In Iran, the regime pushes ahead, but is clearly being hurt by an economic crisis (largely a consequence of international sanctions), popular protest, and internal bickering – and has turned bellicose as a result.	在伊朗，现政权仍在继续推进，但显然因经济危机（很大程度上是国际制裁的结果）、群众示威和内部分裂而受到了削弱，并因此变得十分好斗。


After several months of listening to Israeli (and, to some extent, US) war rhetoric, the regime began issuing its own menacing bombast, as a matter of substance and to defend the pride of a regime that views itself as the heir to the glorious imperial tradition of Persia.	在听了以色列（从某种程度上说，还有美国）几个月的战争聒噪后，伊朗政权终于开始抛出自己的战争威胁——既有实质成分，也是一个将自己视为波斯帝国光荣传统继承者的骄傲政权自卫的一种方式。


Various Iranian spokesmen have begun threatening Israel not only with a massive response to any potential attack, but also with a preemptive strike.	多位伊朗发言人开始威胁以色列，说伊朗不但会对潜在攻击予以坚决回击，而且可以先发制人。


Israel would not merely be punished for any attack, they say; it would be annihilated.	以色列不但会因袭击伊朗受到惩罚，而且将被毁灭。


This position was accompanied by Iran’s harder line on military involvement in the Syrian civil war, echoed by its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.	伊朗的这一立场在其对叙利亚内战的强硬干涉及其黎巴嫩真主党代理人的附和中显露无疑。


For some time, under the impact of the Syrian civil war – and still smarting from the 2006 war with Israel – Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, had lowered his profile and moderated his rhetoric.	有一段时间，在叙利亚内战——以及2006年对以色列战争创伤的余痛未消——的影响下，真主党领袖纳斯鲁拉开始低调行事，口风也不再强硬。


No longer.	但这已是过去的事了。


At the same time, the Iranian regime is sending a variety of signals that it wants to renew the nuclear negotiations.	与此同时，伊朗政权给出了众多信号，表明它将重启和谈判。


One example was the announcement that some of its enriched uranium is being diverted to medical research; in other words, uranium enrichment, according to this message, can be slowed down.	一个例子是它宣布将一部分浓缩铀用于医疗研究； 换句话说，铀浓缩行动将放缓。


At this point, however, there are no indications that Iran is interested in more than reducing external pressure and the impact of the sanctions.	不过，在这个节骨眼上，对伊朗来说，最要紧的是减轻外部压力和制裁的影响。


The drone, shot down not far from Israel’s nuclear facility in Dimona, fits with these two efforts.	击落于以色列戴摩纳（Dimona）核设施附近的无人机就符合伊朗的这两大需要。


Iran’s war rhetoric and threat to inflict a deadly blow on Israel is served by dispatching a drone in the general direction of Dimona.	派遣无人机前往戴摩纳大致方向表明了伊朗的战争威胁和给予以色列致命一击的决心。


And, if the idea is to negotiate, the drone’s flight was an excellent prelude to a demand that Iran’s nuclear effort be dealt with as part of a larger effort to ban nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East.	此外，如果伊朗的想法是谈判，那么此次无人机飞行可以作为完美的序幕，让伊朗得以顺势提出将其自身核问题作为范围更广的整个中东地区���核问题的一部分的需求。


There are two other disturbing aspects to the drone affair.	此次无人机事件还有两大令人不安的含义。


First, it is a clear indication that Hezbollah is, indeed, the long arm of the Iranian regime – its base on the Mediterranean and on Israel’s border.	首先，这是一个清晰的信号，表明真主党的确是伊朗政权的爪牙——以地中海为基地、毗邻以色列的爪牙。


The occasional argument that it is a genuine Lebanese political movement, tied to Iran but ultimately Lebanese, is simply wrong.	偶然论——这确实只是黎巴嫩的政治运动，与伊朗有关但最终只属于黎巴嫩——大错特错了。


Second, the drone’s arrival from the Mediterranean underscored the danger that terrorist organizations, supplied with deadly modern equipment, can inflict damage “without a return address.”	其次，来自地中海的无人机凸显出一大威胁——配有现代化致命武器的恐怖组织可以发动“无可溯源”的伤害。


Just a few weeks ago, it was feared that Syria’s crumbling regime might transfer part of its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction to Hezbollah, or that some of that arsenal might fall into jihadis’ hands.	几周前，人们还在担心濒临崩溃的叙利亚政权可能会把大规模杀伤性武库部分转移给真主党，其中一部分可能落到圣战组织手中。


And one of the arguments against Iran’s nuclear program has been that the regime might transfer fissile material to Hezbollah and its ilk to be used in a radioactive “dirty bomb.”	反对伊朗核计划的一个观点是伊朗可能会把导弹材料转移给真主党及类似组织，用于制造放射性“脏弹”。


There are four components to an effective strategy for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program: real negotiations, rather than a leisurely meeting once every few weeks; stiff sanctions on Iran, but without today’s gaping loopholes; a credible threat of military action; and a face-saving exit for the Iranian leadership.	应对伊朗核计划的有效战略包括四个部分：真正的谈判（而不是每隔几周进行一次的休闲会议）、对伊朗施以严厉制裁（而非类似如今的漏洞百出的制裁）、可信的军事行动威胁，以及为伊朗领导层制造体面的台阶。


This is a viable strategy, but it is now clear that only the US can implement it.	这是一个可行的战略，但很显然，现在只有美国能够实施它。


Let us hope that the Americans act in time.	我们只能寄希望于美国及时出手了。


Iran: Last Exit for Diplomacy	伊朗：最后一线外交生机


The Iran crisis is moving fast in an alarming direction.	伊朗危机正朝着令人担忧的方向急剧恶化。


There can no longer be any reasonable doubt that Iran’s ambition is to obtain nuclear weapons capability.	勿庸置疑，伊朗的野心是获得核武器制造能力。


However, at the heart of the issue lies the Iranian regime’s aspiration to become a hegemonic Islamic and regional power and thereby position itself at eye level with the world’s most powerful nations.	然而，问题的核心在于伊朗政权渴望成为伊斯兰世界的霸权力量和地区大国，从而与世界上最强大国家们平起平坐。


It is precisely this ambition that sets Iran apart from North Korea: whereas North Korea seeks nuclear weapons capability in order to entrench its own isolation, Iran is aiming for regional dominance and more.	恰恰是这种野心使得伊朗与北朝鲜截然不同。 北朝鲜寻求核武器制造能力是为了保卫自己的与世隔绝状态，伊朗则是为了获得地区统治优势，并且还有更大的野心。


Iran is betting on revolutionary changes within the power structure of the Middle East to help it achieve its strategic goal.	伊朗将赌注押在了中东的势力结构发生革命性变化从而帮助其实现战略目标。


To this end, it makes use of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also of Lebanon, Syria, its influence in the Gulf region, and, above all, Iraq.	出于这种目的，它不仅利用以色列和巴以冲突，而且利用黎巴嫩、叙利亚及其在海湾地区的影响力，最重要的是利用伊拉克。


This combination of hegemonic aspirations, questioning of the regional status quo, and a nuclear program is extremely dangerous.	霸权野心、对本地区现状的质疑以及核计划，这三者结合起来显得极为危险。


Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb – or even its ability to produce one – would be interpreted by Israel as fundamental threat to its existence, thereby compelling the West, and Europe in particular, to take sides.	如果伊朗获得核弹或者获得了制造核弹的能力，以色列会将其视为生存的致命威胁，从而会要求西方特别是欧洲表明立场。


Europe has not only historical moral obligations to Israel, but also security interests that link it to the strategically vital Eastern Mediterranean.	欧洲不仅历史上就对保护以色列负有道义责任，而且在战略上至关重要的东地中海地区也有安全利益需要捍卫。


Moreover, a nuclear Iran would also be perceived as a threat by its other neighbors, which would likely provoke a regional arms race and further fuel regional volatility.	此外，拥有核能力的伊朗将被其邻国视为一种威胁，这将可能引发地区军备竞赛，加剧该地区的动荡。


In short, nuclear Iran would call Europe’s fundamental security into question.	总之，拥有核武器的伊朗将使得欧洲的基本安全面临挑战。


To believe that Europe could keep out of this conflict is a dangerous illusion.	认为欧洲将在这场冲突中置身事外是一个危险的幻想。


In this crisis, the stakes are high, which is why Germany, the UK, and France began negotiations with Iran two years ago with the goal of persuading Iran to abandon its efforts to close the nuclear fuel cycle.	此次危机的风险极大，这正是德国、英国和法国两年前就开始与伊朗谈判希望说服伊朗放弃完成核燃料循环试验努力的原因所在。


This initiative failed for two reasons.	谈判失败的原因有两方面。


First, the European offer to open up technology and trade, including the peaceful use of nuclear technology, was disproportionate to Iran’s fundamental fear of regime change on the one hand, and its regional hegemonic aspirations and quest for global prestige on the other.	第一，欧洲提出的开放技术和贸易包括和平利用核技术的提议与伊朗担心其政权改变的首要恐惧以及寻求地区霸权和全球影响力的野心不成比例。


Second, the disastrous US-led war in Iraq has led Iran’s leaders to conclude that the leading Western power has been weakened to the point that it is dependent on Iran’s goodwill, and that high oil prices have made the West all the more wary of a serious confrontation.	第二，美国主导的伊拉克战争陷入泥潭使得伊朗的领导人认为美国这个西方的领导力量已经得到削弱，现在其已经取决于伊朗的好意，并且高油价已经使得西方对进行严重对抗更加警惕和谨慎。


The Iranian regime’s analysis might prove a dangerous miscalculation, because it is likely to lead sooner rather than later to a “hot” confrontation that Iran simply cannot win.	伊朗政权的上述分析是一个危险的误算，因为这很可能加快而不是推迟一场“热”武装对抗的爆发，而伊朗根本无法打赢这场战争。


After all, the issue at the heart of this conflict is this: who dominates the Middle East – Iran or the United States?	毕竟，这场冲突的核心问题在于：谁主导中东？ 是伊朗还是美国？


Iran’s leaders underestimate the explosive nature of this issue, and how it is answered, for the US as a global power and thus for its own future.	伊朗领导人低估了这个问题的爆炸性性质，并且对于如何应对美国这个全球力量以及自己国家的未来准备不足。


Nor, however, is the debate about the military option – the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program through US air strikes – conducive to resolving the issue.	然而，军事行动，也就是美国通过空中打击摧毁伊朗的核项目与事无补。


Rather, it rings of a self-fulfilling prophecy.	它只会敲响自我实现的预言。


There is no guarantee that attempts to destroy Iran’s nuclear potential and thus of its capability for a nuclear breakout will succeed.	摧毁伊朗核潜力及其取得核突破能力的行动无法保证一定能够成功。


Moreover, as a victim of foreign aggression, Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions would be fully legitimized.	此外，一旦遭到外国侵略，伊朗的核武野心将完全合法化。


Finally, a military attack on Iran would also mark the beginning of a regional, and possibly global, military and terrorist escalation – a nightmare for all concerned.	最后，对伊朗进行军事打击也将标志着一场地区性并且可能是全球性军事和恐怖活动升级与扩大的开始，这对有关各方来说都不啻是一场可怕的梦魇。


So what should be done?	那么应该怎么做呢？


There remains a serious chance for a diplomatic solution if the US, in cooperation with the Europeans and thus certainly with the support of the Security Council and the non-aligned states of the Group of 77, offers Iran a “Grand Bargain.”	如果美国能够与欧洲国家进行合作，特别是争取安理会和77国集团不结盟国家的支持，向伊朗提供一份“优惠协议”，那么仍然切实存在通过外交解决的机会。


In exchange for long-term suspension of uranium enrichment, Iran and other states would gain access to research and technology within an internationally defined framework and under comprehensive supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.	作为对长期停止铀浓缩试验的补偿，伊朗和其它国家将在国际社会制定的框架结构下在接受国际原子能机构全面监督的条件下，可以获得科研活动以及相关技术。


Full normalization of political and economic relations would follow, including binding security guarantees upon agreement of a regional security design.	接下来将是政治和经济关系的全面正常化，包括根据地区安全计划签订安全保证。


The high price for refusing such a proposal has to be made absolutely clear to the Iranian leadership: should no agreement be reached, the West will do everything within its power to isolate Iran economically, financially, technologically, and diplomatically, with the full support of the international community.	必须让伊朗领导人绝对清楚地意识到拒绝这样一个提议需要付出的高昂代价。 那就是，如果无法达成协议，西方将在自己能力范围之内、在国际社会的全面支持下采取一切措施从经济、金融、技术和外交上孤立伊朗。


Iran’s alternatives should be no less than recognition and security, or total isolation.	伊朗除了接受协议获得安全或完全孤立之外别无选择。


Presenting Iran with these alternatives presupposes that the West does not fear rising oil and gas prices.	向伊朗提供这些选择预示着西方并不担心石油和天然气价格上升。


Indeed, the two other options – Iran’s emergence as a nuclear power or the use of military force to prevent this – would, in addition to all of its horrible consequences, also increase oil and gas prices.	实际上，其它两种选择，也就是伊朗成为一个有核国家或使用武力阻止其核武野心，除了产生各种可怕的后果之外，也都将会导致石油和天然气价格上升。


Everything speaks in favor of playing the economic-financial and technology card vis-à-vis Iran.	一切都表明与伊朗打经��、金融和技术牌更为有利。


Knowledge of the potentially horrible consequences of a military confrontation and of the equally horrific consequences of an Iran in possession of the atomic bomb must force the US to abandon its policy of no direct negotiations and its hope for regime change.	对军事对抗产生的可怕后果和伊朗拥有原子弹产生的同样可怕的后果有了透彻了解之后，美国必须被迫放弃其不直接谈判的政策和政权更迭的希望。


It is not enough for the Europeans to act while the Americans continue to look on as the diplomatic initiatives unfold, partaking in discussion only behind the scenes and ultimately letting the Europeans do what they will.	如果随着外交倡议的进展，美国继续采取旁观态度，只在幕后参与讨论并最终任由欧洲为所欲为的话，那么欧洲没有足够的实力采取进一步的行动。


The Bush administration must lead the Western initiative in harmonized, direct negotiations with Iran, and, if these negotiations succeed, the US must also be willing to agree to appropriate guarantees.	布什政府必须领导西方与伊朗进行协调一致的直接谈判，并且要想使谈判取得成功，美国也必须同意提供适当的保证。


In this confrontation, international credibility and legitimacy will be the deciding factors, and ensuring them will require far-sighted and cool, calculated American leadership.	在这场对抗中，国际可信性和合法性将是决定性因素，确保具备可信性和合法性将需要美国进行富有远见、冷静清醒、恰到好处的领导。


An offer of a “Grand Bargain” would unite the international community and present Iran with a convincing alternative.	提供一份“优惠协议”将把国际社会团结起来，向伊朗提供一个令人信服的选择。


Were Iran to agree to this offer, its suspension of nuclear research in Natanz while negotiations are ongoing would be the litmus test of its sincerity.	如果伊朗同意授受这份协议，那么在谈判进行过程中停止纳坦兹的核研究活动将成为检验其诚意的试金石。


Were Iran to refuse the offer or fail to honor its obligations, it would totally isolate itself internationally and provide emphatic legitimization to further measures.	如果伊朗拒绝这个提议或没有忠于自己的承诺，这将使它国际社会中彻底孤立，并且为采取进一步措施提供了有力的依据。


Neither Russia nor China could avoid showing solidarity within the Security Council.	俄罗斯和中国都得无法避免地同意保持安理会的统一和一致。


But such an initiative can succeed only if the American administration assumes leadership among the Western nations and sits down at the negotiating table with Iran.	但是，这样一个倡议只有美国政府承担领导西方国家的责任并坐下来与伊朗进行谈判才能获得成功。


Even then, the international community would not have long to act.	即使那样，国际社会也没有多少时间可用了。


As all sides must be aware, time is running out for a diplomatic solution.	所有各方都必须意识到，留给外交解决的时间所剩无几了。


After the Iran Deal	协议之后


BERLIN – After 12 years of tedious negotiations, Iran and the “P5+1” countries (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, plus Germany) have reached a comprehensive agreement that will limit Iran’s development of its nuclear capabilities to non-military objectives.	柏林—在经历了12年的冗长谈判后，伊朗和“P5+1”（中国、法国、俄罗斯、美国和英国，再加上德国）终于形成了一个全面协议，该协议将把伊朗的核能力发展限制在非军用目标。