Such patterns cannot produce the sustained high growth that is necessary for reducing poverty and fulfilling basic human aspirations for health, security, and the chance to contribute productively and creatively to society.	这些模式无法产生持续的高增长，而持续高增长是减少贫困、满足健康、安全和为社会做出生产和创造贡献的基本志向的必备条件。


They underutilize and misuse valuable human resources; and they often give rise to political or social turmoil, often marked by ideological or ethnic polarization, which then leads either to wide policy swings or to policy paralysis.	非包容性增长模式无法充分利用或错误地使用宝贵的人力资源； 也常常导致政治和社会动荡（以意识形态或种族极化为显著特征），随之而来的是剧烈的政策波动或政策瘫痪。


Our second broad conclusion was that sustained growth requires a coherent, adaptable strategy that is based on shared values and goals, trust, and some degree of consensus.	我们的第二项统一结论是持续增长需要合乎逻辑、适应力强的战略，它要基于共同的价值观和目标、信任，以及一定程度的共识。


Of course, achieving that is easier said than done.	当然，实现这一点说起来容易做起来难。


Many developing countries have experienced extended periods of slow or no growth.	许多发展中国家经历了漫长的缓慢增长或无增长。


In some cases, a country’s leaders are simply confused, and do not understand what needs to be done.	在一些国家，领导人一筹莫展，也不知道应该做些什么。


In most cases, however, the ingredients of an effective “growth model” are well known, and the problem is a lack of political or social consensus about how to implement it.	但在大部分情况下，有效“增长模式”的要素是众所周知的，问题在于缺少关于如何实施的政治或社会共识。


Achieving a higher growth equilibrium is rarely a gradual or incremental transition.	实现更高的增长均衡并非逐步或渐进的转变。


It requires a discontinuous leap in expectations and policies, and a fundamental shift in the political and social consensus.	它需要预期和政治实现不连续的跳跃（discontinuous leap），需要政治和社会共识发生根本性变迁。


When these shifts occur, leadership plays a crucial role, by providing citizens with an alternative vision, based on common values, that all stakeholders can support.	在发生这些变迁时，领导扮演着关键角色，为公民提供基于共同价值观、所有相关利益方都有可能支持的替代愿景。


Such leadership can come from above, from below, or from a representative group.	这样的领导可以来自上层，来自下层，也可以来自代表组织。


But as the persistence of low-growth equilibria in many countries shows, it often doesn’t come at all.	但许多国家出现长期低增长均衡的现象表明，这样的领导常常根本不存在。


The spillover effects of non-inclusive growth are already evident almost everywhere, to varying degrees, in the form of social polarization, policy gridlock and incoherence, and a generalized loss of public trust.	非包容性增长的溢出效应几乎随处可见，如社会极化、政策僵局和不连贯、普遍的公共信任缺失等，只是程度不同罢了。


In this respect, developing countries’ experience holds potentially important lessons for policymakers and various stakeholders in advanced economies.	从这个角度将，发展中国的经验是发达经济体决策者和各种相关利益方需要汲取的重要教训。


There has been some progress in identifying the factors causing economic inclusiveness to decline in the last three decades.	在辨别让经济不包容在过去三十年中有所减少的因素方面，我们取得了一些进展。


This is important: only by understanding the nature of the challenge can we develop more effective responses to it.	这很重要：只有理解了挑战的性质，我们才能够制定更有效的应对之道。


If we misdiagnose the problem with a flawed or rushed analysis, our response will be ineffective, and probably even counterproductive.	如果我们因为有缺陷或过于匆忙的分析而误诊了问题，应对措施就难以起效，甚至会适得其反。


That said, the analyses conducted so far have not yet generated widespread awareness of the threat that non-inclusive growth poses to productivity and economic performance as conventionally measured.	尽管如此，目前所进行的分析尚未让人们广泛认识到非包容性增长给生产率和经济绩效（用常规手段衡量）所造成的威胁。


The adverse economic effects of non-inclusive growth grow and multiply slowly over time, and will continue to do so in the absence of collective action – usually but not necessarily manifested through government – to shift prevailing distributional patterns.	非包容性增长的消极经济影响随着时间而逐渐增加和放大，如果不拿出集体行动——通常由政府实施，但非必须如此——改变现有分配模式，将会一直如此。


Some would disagree with this proposition, because they believe that the factors behind economic performance and dynamism are independent of distributional patterns.	一些人反对这一看法，因为他们认为，经济绩效和动态背后的因素，独立于分配模式。


But I would remind them of the second lesson from developing countries’ experience: non-inclusive growth patterns undermine trust and eventually governance, in turn undercutting policymakers’ ability to sustain policies and strategies that support high growth.	但我想提醒他们来自发展中国家经验的第二个教训：费包容性增长模式破坏了信任，最终破坏了治理，反过来又削弱了决策者保持支持高增长的政策和战略的能力。


To put it bluntly, insightful analysis has its uses, but change will not happen without a widespread social and political convergence around shared values and objectives – something that is sorely missing in many countries today.	坦率地说，有洞见的分析有其用处，但如果没有围绕共同价值观和目标的广泛的社会和政治一致，就不会有变化发生——而这正是当今许多国家缺少的东西。


People need to trust one another and their leaders, and they need to agree on how to assess and respond to polarizing economic and social trends.	人们需要信任彼此和他们的领袖，需要在关于如何评估和应对极化的经济和社会趋势方面取得一致。


At the same time, continued inaction will fuel alienation, creating a vicious circle of distrust and paralysis that will have to be broken before effective action can occur.	与此同时，持续不作为将恶化疏离，形成不信任和瘫痪的恶性循环，只有打破这一循环，才有采取有效行动的可能。


There are already many important initiatives dedicated to various dimensions of the inclusiveness challenge, which include not just income and wealth inequality, but also automation, artificial intelligence, and the future of work.	对于非包容性挑战的诸多维度，我们已经有了许多专门的应对计划。 这些挑战既包括收入和财富不平等，也包括自动化、人工智能和工作的未来。


Despite their good intentions, it remains to be seen if any of these initiatives will pave the way for effective policy responses.	尽管初衷良好，但这些计划能否为有效的政策应对创造条件，仍然有待观察。


The value of insightful analyses of such complex problems should not be discounted.	对这些复杂问题的有洞见的分析的价值不应该低估。


But we cannot assume that getting the diagnosis right will be sufficient to overcome political gridlock.	但我们不可认为做出正确诊断便足以克服政治僵局。


The other key ingredient is direct engagement.	另一个关键要素是直接参与。


Restoring public trust will require a deep and sustained commitment, and a new consensus that is broad enough to overcome the political and social divides that are now legion across advanced economies.	重塑公共信任需要深度持续的投入，以及足够广泛、能够克服如今在发达经济体普遍存在的政治和社会分裂的新共识。


From this perspective, the proliferation of commissions and other initiatives that are structured around inclusion, which might seem excessive and redundant under less polarized circumstances, is actually very encouraging.	从这个角度看，围绕包容性问题层出不穷地出现的委员会和其他项目确实令人感到鼓舞。 若不是极化程度如此巨大，这些委员会和项目可谓过剩和多余了。


Convening diverse voices from business, industry, labor, government, academia, and civil society – and doing so as frequently as possible – is exactly what is needed right now.	集合来自商界、业界、劳工、政府、学者和公民社会的声音——并且尽可能频繁地集合这些声音——正是我们现在所需要做的事。


The engagement aspect of the inclusive-growth mission may seem a bit nebulous, especially next to concrete analysis.	包容性增长任务的参与层面也许有一些模糊，特别是与具体的分析相比。


Nevertheless, it is crucial.	尽管如此，这是至关重要的。


Bringing together people who disagree or even distrust one another is the first step toward building a foundation for collective action in the future.	将彼此意见不一甚至互不信任的人集合起来，这是迈向构建未来集体行动的基础的第一步。


Big Polluters, Pay Up	掏钱吧，大污染者


JAKARTA – Earlier this year in Myanmar, torrential rain caused mudslides that wiped out hundreds of houses and caused large-scale crop destruction.	雅加达—今年早些时候，缅甸暴雨所造成的泥石流将数百间房屋夷为平地，并大量毁坏农作物。


More than 1.3 million people were affected, and over 100 died.	超过130万人受到影响，100多人死亡。


In Vietnam, the same deluges caused toxic slurry pits from coal mines to overflow and run through villages, and into the World Heritage-listed Ha Long Bay; the death toll was 17.	在越南，类似的洪涝灾害导致有毒泥浆从煤矿中渗出并泛滥，席卷多个村庄，并流入名列世界遗产清单的下龙湾，17人死亡。


As such weather events become increasingly frequent and intense, the need to mitigate and adapt to climate change is becoming more urgent than ever.	类似的天气事件变得日益频繁和剧烈，减轻和适应气候变化的需求比以往任何时候都要紧迫。


And make no mistake: These events are, at least partly, the result of climate change.	不要弄错了：这些事件至少部分是因为气候变化引起的。


As the climate scientist Kevin Trenberth of the US National Center for Atmospheric Research points out, nowadays, “[a]ll weather events are affected by climate change, because the environment in which they occur is warmer and moister than it used to be.”	美国国家大气研究中心的气候学家凯文·特伦贝斯（Kevin Trenberth）指出，如今，“所有气候事件都受气候变化影响，因为它们的发生环境比从前更温暖潮湿了。 ”


International climate negotiators recognize this, to some extent.	从某种程度上说，国际气候谈判员认识到了这一点。


The effects faced by the people of Myanmar and Vietnam are considered unavoidable costs of failing to adapt to climate change, which officials classify as “loss and damage.”	缅甸和越南人民所面临的影响被认为是没能适应气候变化所造成的不可避免的代价，官方将其归为“损失和伤害”。


But such language fails to capture the full scale of the consequences – especially their impact on human lives.	但这样的用词并没有抓住后果的全部含义——特别是它们对人类生活的冲击。


The people who died in Myanmar and Vietnam are not just “unavoidable costs,” and their loved ones cannot simply “adapt” to losing them.	死于缅甸和越南天气事件的人不仅仅是“不可避免的代价”，他们的爱人也不可能只是“适应”失去他们。


This kind of bloodless rhetoric reflects the inadequacy of the responses to climate change that international negotiations have so far produced.	如此冷血的论调反映出迄今为止国际谈判所产生的气候变化应对措施的不足。


In fact, if the industrialized world had done what was needed to stop climate change, as promised a generation ago, Myanmar and Vietnam most likely would have been spared their recent “loss and damage.”	事实上，如果工业化国家兑现一代人以前所做的承诺，做好阻止气候变化所需要事，缅甸和越南极有可能根本不会蒙受最近的“损失和伤害”。


The so-called advanced economies failure to fulfill their commitments means that Myanmar and Vietnam are hardly the most vulnerable developing countries today.	所谓的发达经济体没有兑现承诺，这意味着缅甸和越南绝非如今最脆弱的发展中国家。


The tiny island states of the Pacific, for example, have been unable to erect adequate defenses against the “king tides” that are encroaching on their land and causing the freshwater “lenses” beneath their atolls to become brackish.	比如，太平洋上的蕞尔小国根本无法构建足够的防御抵挡侵犯它们的土地、导致位于环礁之下的淡水“透镜体”盐化。


Their populations – among the world’s poorest people – are paying for climate change with their lives and livelihoods.	这些国家的人口——他们是全世界最贫穷的人——为气候变化付出了生命和生活的代价。


And without the resources to adapt, they will continue to suffer.	他们没有资源可以用来适应，只能继续遭受苦难。


But it gets even more perverse.	但情况还要糟糕。


Those behind the problem – the world’s biggest polluters – continue to reap billions in profits, while receiving huge energy subsidies from governments (projected to reach $5.3 trillion in 2015, or about $10 million per minute).	问题背后的推手——全球最大污染者——继续赚取着数以十亿计的利润，同时还从政府那里获得巨额能源补贴（预计2015年将达到5. 3万亿美元，或大约每分钟1,000万美元）。


So who are these polluters?	那么，这些污染者是谁？


According to a 2013 study by the scientist Rick Heede, nearly two-thirds of carbon dioxide emitted since the 1750s can be traced to just 90 of the largest fossil fuel- and cement-producing entities, most of which still operate.	据科学家里克·希德（Rick Heede）2013年的一项研究，18世纪50年代以来可追踪二氧化碳排放量的近三分之二来自90个最大的化石燃料和水泥生产实体，其中大部分至今仍在营业。 其中五十家为投资者所有公司，包括雪佛龙德士古、埃克森美孚、壳牌、英国石油和博地能源；


Fifty are investor-owned companies, including ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and Peabody Energy; 31 are state-owned companies, such as Saudi Aramco and Norway’s Statoil; and nine are states like Saudi Arabia and China.	31家为国有公司，包括沙特阿美公司和挪威国家石油公司； 另外九家为沙特阿拉伯和中国等国家。


Recognizing the blatant injustice – not to mention the destructiveness – of this state of affairs, a new initiative, launched by the Carbon Levy Project and supported by a growing number of individuals and organizations, has emerged to demand compensation for vulnerable developing countries from the big polluters.	认识到情况如此不公平——更不用说破坏性了——碳税计划（Carbon Levy Project）启动了一个新项目并受到越来越多的个人和组织的支持。 该项目要求大污染者补偿脆弱的发展中国家。


Specifically, the Carbon Levy Project proposes a tax at the point of extraction for fossil fuels.	具体而言，碳税计划建议在化石燃料提取环节征税。


Such a tax is consistent with international law, including the “polluter pays” principle, and would provide a new and predictable source of finance – amounting to billions of dollars – for the communities that need it most, without letting governments off the hook for providing public sources of finance.	这一税收符合国际法，包括“污染者支付”原则，并能提供新的可预测资金源——数额可达数十亿美元——给最需要这笔资金的社区，而各国政府不需要为此提供公共财政资金。


And, by raising the cost of extracting fossil fuels, it would contribute to the eventual phase-out of a sector that has no place in a climate-safe world.	此外，通过提高提取化石燃料的成本，该项目还有助于最终扼杀这个在气候安全的世界中无立足之地的行业。


Fortunately, the world will not have to wait for moral suasion to carry the day.	幸运的是，世界将不必期盼道德说教获得胜利。


Fossil-fuel companies and governments are already facing intensifying legal pressure.	化石燃料公司和政府已经面临着日益紧迫的法律压力。


Typhoon survivors in the Philippines delivered a complaint to the country’s Commission on Human Rights, calling for an investigation into big fossil-fuel companies’ responsibility for causing climate change.	菲律宾的台风幸存者向菲律宾人权委员会投诉，要求调查大型化石燃料公司在导致气候变化中的责任。


The Dutch group Urgenda and nearly 900 co-plaintiffs successfully sued the Dutch government, forcing it to adopt more stringent climate policies.	荷兰Urgenda集团和近900位联合原告成功地起诉荷兰政府，迫使它采取更加严格的气候政策。


A Peruvian farmer now intends to sue the German coal company RWE to cover the costs of protecting his home, which lies in the flood path of a glacial lake.	一位秘鲁农民目前意欲起诉德国煤炭公司RWE偿付保护其位于冰川湖洪水路径上的家的成本。


And the signatories of the Peoples’ Declaration for Climate Justice from Pacific Island countries are committed to bringing a case against big polluters for activities resulting in the destruction of their homes.	而签署了气候公平人民宣言（Peoples’ Declaration for Climate Justice）的太平洋岛国正致力于起诉大污染者的行为导致它们家园被毁。


If no action is taken, such lawsuits will only become more frequent and difficult to defeat.	如果不采取行动，这些诉讼将变得更加频繁、更加难以胜诉。


Big Oil, Big Gas, and Big Coal need to accept responsibility for climate change and start making real contributions to adaptation, or prepare to battle for their own survival – a battle that, in the long term, they simply cannot win.	大石油企业、大天然气企业、大煤炭企业需要接受气候变化责任，开始为适应做出真正的贡献，否则它们就必须准备好为自身的生存而战——一场从长期看它们毫无胜算的战争。


Big Tech Meets Big Government	当大科技遇上大政府


SINGAPORE – Impressive quarterly results from the biggest technology companies show that they are nowhere near saturating their consumer markets, exhausting their innovation cycles, or reaching growth maturation.	发自新加坡——最近几家最大型科技公司都发布了极为亮丽的季度业绩，但这也表明它们距离消费市场饱和，创新周期耗尽，或者达到增长稳定期不远了。


Dig a little deeper, and those reports also illustrate the sector’s substantial and growing systemic importance.	往深一点看，这些报告也体现了该行业重大且日益增加的系统重要性。


Yet, for the tech sector, there is a distinct downside to this development.	但对于科技行业来说，目前这一发展态势存在着一个明显的缺陷。


With increased systemic importance often comes greater scrutiny.	更高的系统重要性往往意味着更严格的审查。


And, indeed, today’s prosperous and innovative tech giants now face the prospect of redoubled efforts to regulate and tax their activities.	事实上，当前这些繁荣创新的科技巨头的各类活动都面临着加倍细致的监管和税收查验。


The longer it takes for these companies to recognize their systemic importance, the greater the likelihood of a more powerful backlash by governments and the public, hurting the companies and undermining their ability to continue producing innovations that genuinely boost consumers’ wellbeing.	这些公司承认其系统重要性所花的时间越长，政府和公众就越有可能产生更强烈的反弹，最终伤害到企业，使它们无力继续去生产那些真正能提高消费者福利的创新。


When the tech sector began its evolution toward systemic importance, it comprised a collection of hungry start-ups possessing breakthrough technologies.	当科技部门开始向系统重要性方向发展时，它涵盖了一批拥有突破性技术且野心勃勃的初创企业。


Beyond disrupting existing economic sectors and activities, these technologies ended up producing new demand for the altogether new goods and services that they enabled.	这些企业手里的技术不仅冲击了现有经济部门及其活动，最终还催生了对全新商品和服务的新需求。


Tech companies’ track record – time and again proving their capacity for exceptional growth – enables them to attract massive investment.	科技企业的过往记录一次又一次地证明了其超常规增长能力，使它们能吸引到大量投资。


They are thus able not only to strengthen their market position in their core activities, but also to develop innovative capabilities in new areas, by taking over smaller competitors, whether actual or prospective.	企业不仅可以以此巩固其核心业务的市场地位，还可以通过收购较小的竞争对手（不管是当前还是未来的）来发展新领域的创新能力。


And some are even able to self-disrupt repeatedly – and thus consistently to remain at the technological frontier.	有些甚至在自身内部反复破旧立新，从而始终保持在科技前沿。


Fueling Big Tech’s remarkable growth further, many of these companies’ services are ostensibly free, facilitating quick adoption by consumers.	另一个助推大科技企业进一步显着增长的因素在于这些公司的许多服务在表面上看都是免费的，从而可以快速在消费者中推广开来。


It helps that these services often can be provided as seamlessly abroad as they are within their country of origin, to the point that the very concept of “abroad” has become rather elastic.	它们经常可以在企业所属国家的国内和国外同样流畅地提供服务，让“国外”这个概念变得相当具有灵活性。


Over time, the major tech companies’ rapid accumulation of market power has led to the rise of oligopolies in some sectors, and monopoly players in a few.	随着时间的推移，各大科技公司得以迅速积聚市场势力，导致了部分行业寡头的崛起，甚至有少数行业被一家公司所垄断。


Their social, economic, and even political influence has soared in some cases.	在某些情况下它们的社会，经济甚至政治影响力都会飙升。


Facebook and Twitter, for example, played a pivotal role in galvanizing protesters during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.	例如脸书和推特就在2011年阿拉伯之春抗议活动期间发挥了举足轻重的作用。


This raises serious risks: as beneficial as Big Tech’s innovations are, they can also serve as important channels for state or non-state actors to bring about their own disruptions.	这也带来了严重的风险：大科技企业的创新虽然有益，但这些创新也可以成为国家或非国家行为者用以执行自身破坏行为的重要渠道。


In the run-up to last year’s presidential election in the United States, some social media platforms inadvertently enabled the spread of disinformation.	在去年美国总统大选前夕一些社交媒体平台就无意中为虚假信息的传播创造了条件。


More menacing, extremists like the Islamic State have relied on social media for recruitment and propaganda purposes.	而更具威胁性的是伊斯兰国等极端主义势力也在利用社交媒体进行招聘和宣传。


It should come as no surprise that Big Tech firms tend to move much faster than governments and regulators.	大型科技企业往往会走在政府和监管机构前面，这不足为奇。


As such, what began as a laissez-faire attitude of benign neglect– largely a result of ignorance and inattention – is evolving into something more forceful.	因此政府一开始的那种放任自流的轻松态度——主要是出于无知和疏忽——正在演变成一些更具强制性的东西。


As tech firms reach systemic importance, attitudes toward them change markedly.	随着科技企业日益占据系统重要性，对它们的态度也发生了显著的变化。


This shift has become increasingly apparent in recent years, as major tech firms have faced intensifying scrutiny of their competitive practices, tax behavior, data uses, and privacy policies.	这种转变在这几年来日益明显，各大科技企业都面临着竞争行为，税收操作，数据使用和隐私政策的严格审查。


Broader questions about their contributions to labor displacement and effects on wage growth have also arisen, even as societies increasingly recognize that technological disruption implies the need for education reform and improvements in skills acquisition and retraining.	虽然社会各界都逐渐认识到科技的破坏性意味着需要推动教育改革并改善技能获取和再培训体系，但也出现了针对职位流失和工资增长影响状况的更广泛质疑。


Yet the tech sector itself still seems to underestimate its growing systemic importance.	然而科技行业本身似乎仍然低估了其日益增加的系统重要性。


As a result, firms can lag in recognizing the need to update their operations, resources, and mindsets to reflect their shift from small disruptor to powerful incumbent.	因此企业可能会疏于认识到需要更新其运营，资源和思维模式以反映自身从小型搅局者到强大在位者的转变。


That means building more comprehensive and integrated business models, informed by experienced talent with expertise in a broader array of areas, in order to move beyond these companies’ laser focus on innovation.	这意味着要建立更加全面和一体化的商业模式，并由具备更广泛领域专业知识的有经验人才来出谋划策，让这些公司的目光可以从对创新的过度关注中扩展开来。


The longer this process takes, the greater the risk that tech firms will lose control of the narrative.	这个过程拖得越长，科技企业对舆论失去控制的风险就越大。


Beyond fueling a rise in outside monitoring, regulation, and supervision, there is the risk of a consumer backlash – or even the further exploitation of innovations by malicious actors.	除了面临外部监督，监管和监督力度的不断加大之外，还可能会遭遇消费者的反感——甚至是恶意行为者进一步滥用其创新的风险。


In an ideal world, major tech companies would recognize and adjust to their changing role in step with external actors, including governments and consumers, thereby striking the right balance between innovation, consumer benefits and protection, and national security.	在一个理想的世界里，大型科技公司会认识和适应其角色转变，与外部行为者（包括政府和消费者）协调一致，从而在创新，消费者得益和保护以及国家安全之间取得平衡。


But this is not an ideal world.	但我们身边的世界可算不上理想。


And, so far, internal and external forces have been out of sync, in terms of perceptions, capabilities, and actions.	而且，迄今为止内在和外在力量在观念，能力和行动方面都不同步。


Add to that conscious and unconscious biases and considerable temptation for political manipulation, and the risks become only more profound.	再加上有意识无意识的偏见和政治操纵行为所涉及的巨大利益，风险只会变得更为严峻。


Big Tech can and should play a larger role in helping the entire economy to evolve in an orderly and mutually beneficial manner.	大科技企业可以也应该在帮助整个经济向着有序互利发展的方面发挥更大的作用。


This will require, first and foremost, that they internalize their own systemic importance, and adjust their perspectives and behaviors accordingly.	这首先要求它们把自己的系统重要性内在化，并相应调整自身的观点和行为。


But it will also demand far better communication, with firms’ objectives and operations becoming much more transparent.	但这也要求实现更良好的沟通，同时将公司的目标和运作变得更加透明。


And, finally, it will call for a commitment to enhanced monitoring both of themselves and of their peers, together with more effective collective action, as appropriate.	最后，这要求企业承诺加强对自身和同行的监督，并酌情采取更有效的集体行动。


If the tech sector fails to make such changes, government oversight and regulation will inevitably intensify.	如果科技界未能做出这样的改变，政府的监控和管制就将不可避免地收紧。


And it is far from certain that the net result will be positive for society, much less for business.	虽然利弊相抵之后的结果对社会来说是正面的，但对企业来说却是未知之数。


Making the Future Work for Us	让未来符合我们的需要


CAMBRIDGE – What does the future of work hold in store, and how should we prepare for it?	剑桥——未来的工作将为我们带来什么，而我们又将如何去迎接它？


The debate so far has focused on developed countries, but it is a question that will affect the entire world.	迄今为止这样的辩论集中在发达国家，但这个问题将会影响到世界各国。


To pessimists, the introduction of these so-called general-purpose technologies – including 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things – threatens the demand for labor; without new forms of social solidarity, such as a universal basic income, the future will be one of widespread destitution.	在悲观主义者看来，包扩3D打印、 人工智能和物联网在内的这些所谓通用技术的引入将会威胁到劳动力需求，如果没有建立起普遍基本收入等保障社会团结的新形式，未来就很难避免陷入到普遍贫困之中。


To optimists, the latest technological developments, like others that have propelled humanity forward, promise to deliver unprecedented levels of prosperity.	而在乐观主义者看来，最新技术发展像其他推动人类不断前进的因素一样，有可能实现前所未有的繁荣。


It is probably impossible at this stage to say which side is right.	现在断言哪一方的观点正确恐怕还为时尚早。


As the physicist Niels Bohr said: “It is very hard to predict, especially the future.”	物理学家尼尔斯·博尔曾经说过，“做预测的难度很大，尤其是预测未来。


For a complex system such as the world economy, understanding the past – for example, the massive decline in manufacturing employment in almost all countries over the past two decades – is already hard enough.	”具体到世界经济这样的复杂系统，了解过去——如过去20年来几乎所有国家制造业就业人数的大幅下滑——本身已经具有很大难度。


What is more easily ascertained are the causal links that might determine the outcome.	可能决定最终结局的因果关系或许才是比较容易确定的因素。


Rapid displacement of massive amounts of human labor is not a new occurrence.	大量人类劳动者快速失业并不是第一次发生。


The early-nineteenth-century Luddites revolted against the mechanical looms that were supplanting artisanal textile production.	19世纪早期勒德分子为反对取代手工纺织生产的机械织机而举行了暴动。


Almost 60 years later, agricultural employment in the US peaked at 53% of total employment.	近60年后，美国的农业就业人数达到了占总就业人数的53%的顶峰。


Today, it is less than 3%.	而今天， 美国的农业就业率已经下降到总就业人数的3%都不到。


In fact, since as recently as 1980, most countries have experienced large declines in agricultural employment.	事实上，自从不久前的20世纪80年代以来，多数国家已经出现了农业就业人数的大幅下降。


In some, like Portugal, Malaysia, Turkey, and Indonesia, the share of agricultural employment declined by more than 20%.	在葡萄牙、马来西亚、土耳其和印度尼西亚等某些国家，农业就业人数占比下降了20%以上。


In others, like Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Philippines, and Sri Lanka, the decline exceeded 10%.	而在其他国家，如希腊、意大利、保加利亚、匈牙利、爱沙尼亚、波兰、马来西亚、菲律宾和斯里兰卡，同样出现了超过10%的农业就业比重下降。


And it’s not just agriculture.	而且问题还不仅限于农业。


According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell in 100 of the 124 countries reporting data since 1990.	世界银行世界发展指标显示，20世纪90年代后124个上报数据的国家中有一百个制造业在国民生产总值中的占比出现了下降。


But if large shifts in the composition of employment have been the norm, what makes today’s technology-driven shifts so scary?	但如果就业构成的大幅变化再寻常不过，那么是什么让人们如此惧怕今天由技术驱动的变化？


Fundamentally, technology is a way to transform “the world as I found it” into “the world as I want it to be” – from pastures to milk, from soybeans to chicken tenders, from silicon to smartphones.	从根本上说，技术是将“我所发现的世界”转化为“我所希望的世界”的一种方法——从牧场到牛奶、从大豆到鸡柳、从硅到智能手机。 而这种转化则有赖于三种形式的知识：工具所嵌入的知识；


And it depends on three forms of knowledge: embedded knowledge in tools; codified knowledge in recipes, manuals, and protocols; and tacit knowledge, or knowhow, in brains.	诀窍、手册和协议所蕴含的知识； 以及隐性知识，或者存在于头脑中的诀窍。


Most of the time, these three forms of knowledge complement one another: like coffee and sugar, the more of one you have, the more of the others you want.	多数时候，这三种形式的知识互为补充：就像咖啡和糖一样，其中一种加得越多，就会提升对另一种的需求量。


But technological progress occasionally substitutes one for another, as with coffee and tea.	但技术进步偶尔会形成替代关系，就像咖啡和茶一样。


Once upon a time, people stuck their hands in the ground to plant the next crop.	曾几何时，人们面朝黄土背朝天的种植下一季作物。


Now seed drills and planters do that much more quickly and effortlessly.	而现在，条播机和播种机能更快速省力地完成这项工作。


Not long ago, airline check-in clerks wrote out boarding passes.	就在不久前，登机牌还是由航空公司的登机人员负责手写。


Now they are delivered to our smartphones.	而现在，登机牌已经被发送到我们的智能手机上。


It is these substitutions – the embodied knowledge of the machine for the knowhow of traditional handiwork – that make us fearful.	正是这些替代效应——也就是替代传统手工技术的机器所蕴含的知识——令我们感到害怕。


But while each new technology displaces one form of knowhow, it creates others.	但每种新技术在取代一种形式技术的同时，也会创造出其他的技术。


The first industrial revolution so reduced the cost of textiles that it led to a boom in demand, production, and employment.	第一次工业革命大幅降低了纺织品的成本，从而创造了需求、生产和就业的极度繁荣。


Likewise, as David Autor of MIT has pointed out, the automatic teller machine (ATM) displaced human bank tellers, but so reduced the cost of branches that their number rose, fueling an increase in employees focused on customer relationship management (for which ATMs are less than ideal).	同样，就像麻省理工学院的大卫·奥特尔所指出的那样，自动提款机（ATM）取代了人类银行柜员，但同时，大幅降低了银行分支机构的成本，导致分支机构数量大幅增加，从而增加了专注客户关系管理（自动柜员机在客户关系管理方面的效果不太理想）的员工人数。


Today, websites have displaced printed materials, giving rise to an industry of web designers.	今天，网站已经取代了印刷材料，而网页设计行业也因此应运而生。


But while it is clear which jobs new technologies displace, it is harder to anticipate how the new possibilities will be exploited.	但尽管新技术取代了哪些岗位相对比较明确，但更难的是预测如何才能利用新的可能性。


Back in 2001, many thought the Internet’s fiber-optic backbone had been overbuilt, given low demand for bandwidth.	早在2001年，因为对带宽的需求很低，许多人都认为互联网的光纤骨干网络已经过度建造。


But then along came iTunes, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and Netflix.	但随后，诞生了 iTunes、 YouTube、 Facebook、 Twitter、 Skype和 Netflix。


Similarly, today we are trying to predict the nature of future work before the jobs of the future have been invented.	同样，今天我们正试图在未来世界被发明之前对未来工作的性质进行预测。


The most important uncertain aspect of the new technologies is their diffusion capacity.	新技术最重要的不确定因素就是它们的扩散能力。


If they do not diffuse worldwide, they will widen the income divide between countries and regions.	如果它们无法做到全球扩散，就会扩大不同国家和地区之间的收入差距。


Landline telephone service and electricity have diffused far less than guns and cellphones.	固定电话服务和电力的传播能力远逊于枪支和手机。


One determinant of a technology’s “diffusability” is its knowhow intensity.	“知识密度”在某种程度上决定了一种技术具有多强的传播能力。


Tools and codes are easy to ship; moving the knowhow needed to use them is a different matter.	工具和编码容易运输； 但传播利用技术所需的知识却完全不同。


Guns require just a little training to operate, whereas an electrical utility requires a large team of people with varied expertise to run the generators, install and service the transmission lines and sub-stations, limit theft, and compel customers to pay their bills on time.	使用枪支只需要一点点训练，而电力公司则需要配备不同专业的大规模人员团队才能运行发电机、安装和维修输电线路及变电站、控制盗窃并确保客户按时支付电费。


Technologies that require more diverse knowhow, reflected in the size and heterogeneity of the team needed to implement them, diffuse much more slowly or not at all.	那些需要更多样化的知识、更大规模和掌握各式技术的人员团队才能落实的技术其传播速度往往会更加缓慢或者根本无法传播开。


A new technology’s diffusion is also affected by its dependence on the previous diffusion of other technologies.	新技术的传播效果往往也取决于其对之前其他技术传播效果有多强的依赖。


Uber depends on the previous diffusion of cell phones, cars, and credit cards.	优步取决于此前手机、汽车和信用卡技术的传播效果。


If implementing a technology requires less knowhow and fewer other technologies, it is likely to diffuse even faster than the technologies it replaces.	如果实施一项不需要太多知识和其他技术就可以传播的技术，那这项技术的传播甚至很有可能比它所要取代的技术还要快。


This is what people call technological leapfrogging.	这就是人类所谓的技术跨越。


As was the case with computer-aided design and manufacturing, it is easier to run a 3-D printer than to master all the steps needed to make the same part the traditional way.	就像计算机辅助设计和制造一样，运行3D打印机比掌握用传统方法生产同类部件所需要的所有步骤要简单得多。


Artificial intelligence may make technology less reliant on knowhow and consequently easier to diffuse.	人工智能可能使技术不那么依赖知识，也因此更加容易传播。


By contrast, the Internet of Things will probably require prior diffusion of many other technologies.	相比之下，物联网可能需要事先传播许多其他技术。


In 66 countries, electricity penetration is less than 60%; in 26 countries, it is less than 30%.	在66个国家，电力普及率不足60%； 而在26个国家，这一比率甚至停留在30%以下。


Finally, diffusion depends on whether countries can afford to purchase the new technology.	最后，技术的传播取决于各国是否有钱购买这项新技术。


And that, in turn, depends on whether it facilitates or complicates their search for goods and services that they can sell internationally.	而这反过来又取决于这项技术是促进它们搜索能在国际上销售的商品和服务还是令这一过程更加复杂。


The globalization of value chains has made it easier for more countries and regions to participate in international trade, because each country needs to assemble less complex teams; but it has been bad for places like Detroit, where fully integrated industries used to cluster.	价值链的全球化使得更多国家和地区更容易参与国际贸易，因为每个国家只需要配备不那么复杂的团队就可以实现这一目标； 但这样的现象对底特律这样的地区却并非利好，因为那里曾经聚集着完全一体化的行业。


In the end, predicting the future is beside the point.	归根结底，预测未来并非这篇文章的本意。


Most countries’ future is more likely to be bright if they focus on ensuring that they can master every new technology and exploit every new opportunity that comes their way.	如果各国能够确保掌握每种新技术并抓住所有新机遇，那么，绝大多数国家就更有可能拥有光明的未来。


Robotization Without Taxation?	无需征税的机器人化?


NEW HAVEN – The idea of a tax on robots was raised last May in a draft report to the European Parliament prepared by MEP Mady Delvaux from the Committee on Legal Affairs.	发自纽黑文——去年五月，由欧洲议会法律事务委员会成员，欧洲议会议员玛蒂·德尔沃（Mady Delvaux）编写的一份欧洲议会报告草案提出了向机器人征税的想法。


Emphasizing how robots could boost inequality, the report proposed that there might be a “need to introduce corporate reporting requirements on the extent and proportion of the contribution of robotics and AI to the economic results of a company for the purpose of taxation and social security contributions.”	报告强调机器人如何促进了不平等现象，并以此提出或许需要“为了税收和社会保障缴款的目的，让企业就机器人和人工智能对自身经济表现的贡献程度和比例进行申报“。


The public reaction to Delvaux’s proposal has been overwhelmingly negative, with the notable exception of Bill Gates, who endorsed it.	除了对此表示赞成的比尔·盖茨之外，公众对德尔沃的提议是一面倒的反对。


But we should not dismiss the idea out of hand.	但我们不应将这个想法置诸脑后。


In just the past year, we have seen the proliferation of devices such as Google Home and Amazon Echo Dot (Alexa), which replace some aspects of household help.	在过去一年中，我们看到了Google Home和Amazon Echo Dot（Alexa）这类某种家务劳动取代型设备的激增。


Likewise, the Delphi and nuTonomy driverless taxi services in Singapore have started to replace taxi drivers.	同样，Delphi和nuTonomy公司在新加坡落地的无人驾驶出租车服务已经开始取代出租车司机的位置。


And Doordash, which uses Starship Technologies miniature self-driving vehicles, is replacing restaurant delivery people.	而使用Starship Technologies微型自动驾驶车辆的Doordash外卖送餐服务公司也在取代送餐小哥。


If these and other labor-displacing innovations succeed, surely calls to tax them will grow more frequent, owing to the human problems that arise when people lose their jobs – often jobs with which they closely identify, and for which they may have spent years preparing.	由于人们在失业时——通常是失去那些他们密切认同，可能花了数年时间来准备的职位——会产生种种个人问题，一旦这些和其他人类劳动替代性创新取得成功的话，要求向其征税的呼声必然会日益频繁。


Optimists point out that there have always been new jobs for people replaced by technology; but, as the robot revolution accelerates, doubts about how well this will work out continue to grow.	乐观主义者指出，被技术所取代的人们总会找到新的工作； 但随着机器人革命的加速，人们日益质疑这种新工作是否存在。


A tax on robots, its advocates hope, might slow down the process, at least temporarily, and provide revenues to finance adjustment, like retraining programs for displaced workers.	对机器人征税的倡导者希望此举能会减缓这个过程，至少暂时性的，并提供收入来资助人们的职业转型，例如对下岗工人进行再培训。


Such programs may be as essential as our work is to healthy human life as we know it.	正如我们所知道的那样，对于一个人的健康人生来说，这类方案可能与我们的工作一样重要。


In his book Rewarding Work, Edmund S. Phelps emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining a “place in society – a calling.”	埃德蒙·S·菲尔普斯（Edmund S. Phelps）在其《有益的工作》一书中强调了维持一种“社会地位——使命”的根本重要性。


When many people are no longer able to find work to support a family, troubling consequences ensue, and, as Phelps stresses, “the functioning of the entire community may be impaired.”	当很多人都没法再找到工作来维持家庭的时候，麻烦的后果就会接踵而来，如同菲尔普斯所强调的那样，“整个社区的运作可能会受到损害”。


In other words, there are externalities to robotization that justify some government intervention.	换句话说，机器人化存在一些外部性，必须通过政府干预来矫正。


Critics of a robot tax have emphasized that the ambiguity of the term “robot” makes defining the tax base difficult.	机器人税的批评者们则强调“机器人”一词的模糊性使得税基难以界定。


The critics also stress the new robotics’ enormous, undeniable benefits to productivity growth.	评论家还强调新机器人对生产率的增长拥有巨大且不可否认的好处。


But let’s not rule out so quickly at least modest robot taxes during the transition to a different world of work. Such a tax should be part of a broader plan to manage the consequences of the robotics revolution.	但在过渡到另一个职业世界的过程中，我们可不能那么快就将机器人税排除在外，而是应该将其归入针对机器人革命所产生后果的更宏大应对方案中。


All taxes, except a “lump-sum tax,” introduce distortions in the economy.	除了“定额税”之外的所有税收都会在经济体中引发扭曲作用。


But no government can impose a lump-sum tax – the same amount for everyone regardless of their income or expenditures – because it would fall heaviest on those with less income, and it would grind the poor, who might be unable to pay it at all.	但没有一个政府可以征收定额税——不管收入或支出如何，都缴一样的税——因为这意味着收入越少税负越大，还可能会压垮那些无力付税的穷人。


So taxes have to be related to some activity indicative of ability to pay taxes, and whatever activity it is will be discouraged as a result.	所以税收必须与一些提示纳税能力的活动相关联，可不管是什么活动，只要关联起来就会被遏制。


Frank Ramsey published a classic paper in 1927 arguing that to minimize taxation-induced distortions, one should tax all activities, and he proposed how to set tax rates.	弗兰克·拉姆齐（Frank Ramsey）在1927年发表了一篇经典论文，指出如果要尽量减少因税收引起的经济扭曲，就该对所有的活动都征税，并提出了一个税率设定方法。


His abstract theory has never been a fully operational principle for actual tax rates, but it provides a powerful argument against presuming that the tax should be zero for all but a few activities, or that all activities should be taxed at the same rate.	虽然他的抽象理论从来没有成为指导制定实际税率的全面可操作原则，但它提供了一个强有力的论据，反驳了那种认为除少数活动之外所有活动的税收都应该为零，或者所有的活动都应以同样税率征税的观点。


Activities that create externalities might have a higher tax rate than Ramsey would have proposed.	创造外部性的活动应该承担的税率可能比拉姆齐所提出的更高。


For example, taxes on alcoholic beverages are widespread. Alcoholism is a major social problem.	例如，酒精饮料税是普遍存在的，因为嗜酒是一个重大的社会问题，会对婚姻，家庭和个人生活都造成破坏。


It destroys marriages, families, and lives. From 1920 to 1933, the United States tried a much harsher market intervention: outright prohibition of alcoholic beverages.	从1920年到1933年，美国试图进行更严格的市场干预：彻底禁止含酒精饮料。


But it turned out to be impossible to eliminate alcohol consumption.	但事实证明是不可能消除酒精消费。


The alcohol tax that accompanied the end of Prohibition was a milder form of discouragement.	而与禁酒令的终结相伴而生的酒精税则是一种温和的遏制形式。


Discussion of a robot tax should consider what alternative we have to deal with rising inequality.	针对机器人税的讨论应该考虑我们在面对不断拉大的不平等状况时究竟有何种替代方案。


It would be natural to consider a more progressive income tax and a “basic income.” But, these measures do not have widespread popular support.	探讨实施更高的所得累进税并界定“基本收入”是自然而然的，但这些措施缺乏广泛的民众支持。


If support is not widespread, the tax, even if imposed, will not last.	而如果一项税收得不到广泛支持，即使实施也难以长久。


When taxes on high incomes are raised, usually in wartime, it turns out to be only temporary.	当针对高收入者的税收（通常在战时）被提高时，也只是暂时的。


Ultimately, it seems natural to most people that taxing successful people to benefit unsuccessful people is demeaning to the latter, and even the recipients of the handout often do not really want it.	最终，大多数人会自然而然地认为对成功人士征税来补助那些平凡的人是在贬低后者，即便是受援助者通常也不希望伸手要钱。


Politicians know that: they usually do not campaign on proposals to confiscate high incomes and pad low incomes.	政治家也明白这一点：他们在竞选时通常不会鼓吹要没收高收入者资产来补贴低收入者。


So, taxes must be reframed to remedy income inequality induced by robotization.	因此，税制必须重组以弥补机器人所引发的收入不平等。


It may be more politically acceptable, and thus sustainable, to tax the robots rather than just the high-income people.	对机器人而不仅仅是高收入人士征税可能在政治上更容易接受，从而也是可持续的。


And while this would not tax individual human success, as income taxes do, it might in fact imply somewhat higher taxes on higher incomes, if high incomes are earned in activities that involve replacing humans with robots.	虽然这不是像所得税一样对个人所取得的成就征税，但实际上这可能意味着对更高收入的更高税收，如果这些高收入是在涉及用机器人取代人类的活动中所取得的话。


A moderate tax on robots, even a temporary tax that merely slows the adoption of disruptive technology, seems a natural component of a policy to address rising inequality.	对机器人的适度税收，即便是仅仅减缓这类破坏性技术推广的临时税，似乎是一项旨在解决日益严重不平等现象的政策的天然组件。


Revenue could be targeted toward wage insurance, to help people replaced by new technology make the transition to a different career.	其收入可以投入工资保险，帮助那些被新技术取代的人们，并使之得过渡到不同的职业。


This would accord with our natural sense of justice, and thus be likely to endure.	这符合我们自然的正义感，因此人们也更能容忍这类税项。


Complacency Will Be Tested in 2018	2018年的自满情绪考验


NEW HAVEN – After years of post-crisis despair, the broad consensus of forecasters is now quite upbeat about prospects for the global economy in 2018.	发自纽黑文——在被后危机绝望情绪折磨了多年之后，预测者们如今似乎对2018年的全球经济前景一致表示乐观。


World GDP growth is viewed as increasingly strong, synchronous, and inflation-free.	世界GDP增长看似日益强劲，同步且不引发通胀。


Exuberant financial markets could hardly ask for more.	一片兴旺的金融市场似乎也无可指摘。


While I have great respect for the forecasting community and the collective wisdom of financial markets, I suspect that today’s consensus of complacency will be seriously tested in 2018.	虽然我一向对预测界人士以及金融市场的集体智慧敬重有加，但我怀疑当前的自满共识将在2018年遭受严峻考验。


The test might come from a shock – especially in view of the rising risk of a hot war (with North Korea) or a trade war (between the US and China) or a collapsing asset bubble (think Bitcoin).	这种考验可能来自某场冲击——尤其是在爆发热战（对朝鲜）或贸易战（美中两国之间）以及资产泡沫破裂（比如比特币）的风险不断上升之时。


But I have a hunch it will turn out to be something far more systemic.	而我的预感是这一考验将演变成某些更为系统性的东西。


The world is set up for the unwinding of three mega-trends: unconventional monetary policy, the real economy’s dependence on assets, and a potentially destabilizing global saving arbitrage.	全世界都致力于摆脱三大趋势：非常规货币政策，实体经济对资产的依赖，以及可能破坏稳定的全球储蓄套利行为。


At risk are the very fundamentals that underpin current optimism. One or more of these pillars of complacency will, I suspect, crumble in 2018.	而岌岌可危的正是当前这种乐观主义的深层次基本面，以致我怀疑支撑这一自满情绪的其中一根或几根支柱会在2018年崩溃。


Unfortunately, the die has long been cast for this moment of reckoning.	不幸的是，这一末日审判已成定局。


Afflicted by a profound sense of amnesia, central banks have repeated the same mistake they made in the pre-crisis froth of 2003-2007 – over staying excessively accommodative monetary policies.	罹患严重失忆症的央行重蹈了它们在2003~07年危机前的覆辙——在过长时期内维持过度宽松的货币政策。


Misguided by inflation targeting in an inflationless world, monetary authorities have deferred policy normalization for far too long.	在一个缺乏通胀的世界里被通胀目标设定政策所误导的货币当局不断推迟回归政策正常化的进程，等醒悟时已为时已晚。


That now appears to be changing, but only grudgingly.	目前形势虽然看似有所改变，但也只是勉强做做样子。


If anything, central bankers are signaling that the coming normalization may even be more glacial than that of the mid-2000s.	就算动手的话，中央银行家们也纷纷表示即将到来的正常化进程甚至可能比2000年代中期更加缓慢。


After all, with inflation still undershooting, goes the argument, what’s the rush?	毕竟在通胀仍然乏力的当下又何必急于实施正常化呢？


Alas, there is an important twist today that wasn’t in play back then –central banks’ swollen balance sheets.	更何况目前还存在着一个当年并未出现的重大扭曲状况——臃肿不堪的央行资产负债表。


From 2008 to 2017, the combined asset holdings of central banks in the major advanced economies (the United States, the eurozone, and Japan) expanded by $8.3 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements.	根据国际清算银行的数据，在2008至2017年间主要发达经济体（美国，欧元区和日本）央行的综合资产持有量合共增加了8. 3万亿美元。


With nominal GDP in these same economies increasing by just $2.1 trillion over the same period, the remaining $6.2 trillion of excess liquidity has distorted asset prices around the world.	1万亿美元，导致多出来那6. 2万亿美元过剩流动性扭曲了世界各地的资产价格。


Therein lies the crux of the problem.	这就是问题的症结所在。


Real economies have been artificially propped up by these distorted asset prices, and glacial normalization will only prolong this dependency.	实体经济是被这些扭曲的资产价格人为支撑起来的，而缓慢的正常化进程只会令这种依赖不断延长。


Yet when central banks’ balance sheets finally start to shrink, asset-dependent economies will once again be in peril.	等到央行终于开始收缩其资产负债表时，那些依赖资产的经济体就将再次陷入危机。


And the risks are likely to be far more serious today than a decade ago, owing not only to the overhang of swollen central bank balance sheets, but also to the overvaluation of assets.	况且当前的风险可能会比十年前要严重得多，这不仅因为央行资产负债表过重，还基于资产的高估。


That is particularly true in the United States.	美国的情况尤其如此。 根据诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特·J·席勒（Robert J.


According to Nobel laureate economist Robert J. Shiller, the cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratio of 31.3 is currently about 15% higher than it was in mid-2007, on the brink of the subprime crisis.	Shiller）的说法，眼下排除周期性因素后的市盈率为31. 3，比位于次贷危机边缘的2007年年中还高出约15％。


In fact, the CAPE ratio has been higher than it is today only twice in its 135-plus year history – in 1929 and in 2000. Those are not comforting precedents.	事实上，在过去135年中只出现过两个该指数高于当前点位的年份——1929和2000年，而这可不是什么让人放心的先例。


As was evident in both 2000 and 2008, it doesn’t take much for overvalued asset markets to fall sharply.	从2000和2008年的历史都告诉我们，被高估的资产市场大幅下滑也就是一瞬间的功夫。


That’s where the third mega-trend could come into play – a wrenching adjustment in the global saving mix.	这也是第三大趋势可能发挥作用的地方——对全球储蓄组合的粗暴调整。


In this case, it’s all about China and the US – the polar extremes of the world’s saving distribution.	这事关这个世界储蓄分配的两极——中国和美国。


China is now in a mode of saving absorption; its domestic saving rate has declined from a peak of 52% in 2010 to 46% in 2016, and appears headed to 42%, or lower, over the next five years.	中国现正处于储蓄吸收模式：其国内储蓄率从2010年52％的高峰下降到了2016年的46％，并可能在未来五年内达到42％甚至更低。


Chinese surplus saving is increasingly being directed inward to support emerging middle-class consumers – making less available to fund needy deficit savers elsewhere in the world.	中国的过剩储蓄越来越多地被导入国内用以支持那些新兴的中产阶级消费者，也使得世界其他地方的赤字储蓄者更加缺乏资金。


By contrast, the US, the world’s neediest deficit country, with a domestic saving rate of just 17%, is opting for a fiscal stimulus.	在另一面，美国这个国内储蓄率仅为17%的世界上最缺资金赤字国正在推行财政刺激措施。


That will push total national saving even lower – notwithstanding the vacuous self-funding assurances of supply-siders.	尽管供应方吹嘘说保证能内部筹措足够资金，这依然会继续拉低整个国家的储蓄水平。


As shock absorbers, overvalued financial markets are likely to be squeezed by the arbitrage between the world’s largest surplus and deficit savers. And asset-dependent real economies won’t be too far behind.	为此作为减震器的被高估金融市场可能会遭受全球最大盈余和赤字储蓄者之间套利行为的挤压，而资产依赖型实体经济的好日子也没多久了。


In this context, it’s important to stress that the world economy may not be nearly as resilient as the consensus seems to believe – raising questions about whether it can withstand the challenges coming in 2018.	在此背景下，有必要强调世界经济可能不会像共识相信的那样强韧——也引出了我们是否有能力抵御2018年挑战的问题。


IMF forecasts are typically a good proxy for the global consensus.	世界货币基金组织的预测通常是一个体现全球共识的良好指标。


The latest IMF projection looks encouraging on the surface – anticipating 3.7% global GDP growth over the 2017-18 period, an acceleration of 0.4 percentage points from the anemic 3.3% pace of the past two years.	其最新预测表面上看似令人满意，预计2017~18年度全球GDP将实现3. 7％的增长，比过去两年3.


However, it is a stretch to call this a vigorous global growth outcome.	然而将其称之为强劲全球增长是比较勉强的。


Not only is it little different from the post-1965 trend of 3.8% growth, but the expected gains over 2017-2018 follow an exceptionally weak recovery in the aftermath of the Great Recession.	这不仅因为其与1965年后的3. 8％增长趋势大同小异，还由于2017~18年的预期增长是在经历了大萧条后异常疲软的复苏之后发生的。


This takes on added significance for a global economy that slowed to just 1.4% average growth in 2008-2009 – an unprecedented shortfall from its longer-term trend.	而2008~09年间低至1. 4％的平均增长率——相对其更长期趋势的历史性下跌——也为当前的增长数字做了极大铺垫。


The absence of a classic vigorous rebound means the global economy never recouped the growth lost in the worst downturn of modern times.	典型性强劲反弹的缺乏意味着全球经济尚未收复在这场当代最恶劣的经济衰退中丢失的增长。


Historically, such V-shaped recoveries have served the useful purpose of absorbing excess slack and providing a cushion to withstand the inevitable shocks that always seem to buffet the global economy.	从历史上看，这种V型复苏的作用在于吸收多余的萧条并提供一个缓冲来抵御总要敲打全球经济的必然冲击。


The absence of such a cushion highlights lingering vulnerability, rather than signaling newfound resilience – not exactly the rosy scenario embraced by today’s smug consensus.	这样一个缓冲物的缺失体现出的可不是新生的强韧恢复力，而是萦绕不去的脆弱性——这跟当前这种高调共识所描述的美好情景可不是同一回事。


A quote often attributed to the Nobel laureate physicist Niels Bohr says it best: “Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future.”	诺贝尔物理学奖得主尼尔斯·玻尔（Niels Bohr）的一句名言很有道理：“预测是件极难的事情，特别是关于未来的话。


The outlook for 2018 is far from certain. But with tectonic shifts looming in the global macroeconomic landscape, this is no time for complacency.	”2018年的前景远未确定，而随着全球宏观经济形势面临巨变，现在也不是自满的时候。


The $200 Trillion Question	一个事关200兆美元的问题


Perhaps the most remarkable trend in global macroeconomics over the past two decades has been the stunning drop in the volatility of economic growth.	过去二十年中全球宏观经济最为显著的趋势可能就是产量增长波动令人惊异的下降。


In the United States, for example, quarterly output volatility has fallen by more than half since the mid-1980’s.	例如，在美国，季度产量波动从八十年代中期以来已经下降了一半还多。


Obviously, moderation in output movements did not occur everywhere simultaneously.	很明显，产量变动的缓和并非在全球各地同时出现。


Volatility in Asia began to fall only after the financial crisis of the late 1990’s.	亚洲经济的波动只是在九十年代末期金融危机以后才开始下降。


In Japan and Latin America, volatility dropped in a meaningful way only in the current decade.	在日本和拉美，只是最近十年波动才有实质性的下降。


But by now, the decline has become nearly universal, with huge implications for global asset markets.	但是到目前 为止，波动下降已经变得全球盖莫如此，对全球资本市场产生了巨大的影响。


Indeed, the main question for 2007 is whether macroeconomic volatility will continue to decline, fueling another spectacular year for markets and housing, or start to rise again, perhaps due to growing geopolitical tensions.	确实，2007年的主要问题就是宏观经济波动是否将会继续下降，进而引发对市场和房地产的又一个投机年份，还是可能出于不断增长的地缘政治中的紧张局势而开始再次上升。


I lean slightly toward the optimistic scenario, but investors and policymakers alike need to understand the ramifications of a return to more normal volatility levels.	我表示谨慎乐观，但是投资者以及决策者需要理解回复到更为正常的波动水平所带来的后果。


Investors, especially, need to recognize that even if broader positive trends in globalization and technological progress continue, a rise in macroeconomic volatility could still produce a massive fall in asset prices.	投资者特别需要认识到，即使更大范围内的全球化和技术进步的积极趋势继续下去，宏观经济波动提高仍然能够导致资本价格的大跌。


Indeed, the massive equity and housing price increases of the past dozen or so years probably owe as much to greater macroeconomic stability as to any other factor.	实际上，过去一二十年资本和地产的大幅升值有赖于更大的宏观经济稳定，同样也有赖于其他因素。


As output and consumption become more stable, investors do not demand as large a risk premium.	产量和消费变得更加稳定之时，投资者就不要求较大的风险保费。


The lower the price of risk, the higher the price of risky assets.	风险的价格越低，高风险资产的价格就越高。


Consider this.	让我们这样来看一看。


If you agree with the many pundits who say stock prices have gone too high, and are much more likely to fall than to rise further, you may be right—but not if macroeconomic risk continues to drain from the system.	如果你同意许多专家所言，即股票价格上涨过高，而且下跌的可能要远远超过进一步上升的可能，你可能是正确的，但是，宏观经济风险继续排出经济系统就不尽然了。


At the end of 2000, at the height of the Internet stock boom and just before the 2001 crash, the economists James Glassman and Kevin Hassett published Dow 36,000 .	2000年底，互联网股票繁荣到达顶峰并且在2001年的崩溃发生之前，经济学家格拉斯曼和哈塞特发表amplt;amplt;道指36000点ampgt;ampgt;一书。


At the time, the Dow Jones industrial average of US stocks was trading at around 11,000, so the book’s premise seemed outrageous.	当时，美国道琼斯工业平均指数大约为11,000点，因此该书的前提看似漫无边际。


Certainly the timing was bad: global stock prices began to collapse a few months later, and it took years for them to fully recover.	当然该书生不逢时，几个月后全球股票价格开始崩溃，历经数年才完全复元。


But Glassman and Hassett did have a point.	但是，格拉斯曼和哈塞特还是不无道理。


Their admittedly crude analysis shows why, if volatility continues to fall in 2007, prices of stocks and other assets can still go a lot higher.	尽管其分析明显粗糙，但还是表明，如果波动在2007年继续下降，股票价格和其他资产的价格为何依然会大幅攀升。


They asked how investors would price stocks if they expected historical average returns to continue, while also deciding that the risk was essentially zero.	他们问到，如果投资者预期历史平均回报率继续、而且确信风险几近为零，他们将如何给股票定价。


That may sound extreme, but some scholars, such as the 2004 Nobel Prize winner Ed Prescott, have shown that, historically, holding a large diversified portfolio of stocks long enough is generally a far better investment than ultra-safe US Treasury bonds.	这听起来有点极端，但是，某些学者，例如2004年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主普雷斯科特证明，从历史来看，持有大范围分散的股票组合足够长的时间，一般而言，其投资要远远胜于超级安全的美国国债。


A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that with the risk premium removed, stocks prices could easily triple from existing levels, with price/dividend ratios soaring to over 200, compared to historical averages of 40 to 50.	一项粗略估计表明，没有了风险保费，股票价格可以轻而易举地从现有水平翻三番，与历史平均40到50相比，股价和红利比率猛涨到200以上。


Of course, there is a big hole in the Dow 36,000 logic.	当然，amplt;amplt;道指36000点ampgt;ampgt;一书存在严重的逻辑漏洞。


Stocks are risky, depressions can happen, and it is dangerous to extrapolate the past to the future.	股票本身存有风险，经济萧条定会发生，而且，以过去推测未来是危险的。


If prices rise simply because investors decide that there is no longer any risk, then prices will collapse all the more precipitously if investors collectively change their minds.	如果价格仅仅是由于投资者确信已经没有了风险而上升，那么，如果投资者一道改变了观点，价格就会更为剧烈地崩溃。


This brings us to the $200 trillion question (roughly the value of global money and asset markets, including housing): What could cause macroeconomic volatility to start rising?	这就带给我们一个价值200兆美元的问题(基本上与全球货币和资本市场、包括房地产市场的价值相等)，那就是，什么东西会导致宏观经济波动开始上升？


Don’t look to central banks; most are likely to manage the near-term risks to inflation and growth reasonably well.	不要考虑各国中央银行，它们大多数都会相对妥善地管理通货膨胀和经济增长的近期风险。


Hedge funds could throw a scare.	对冲基金可能会令人害怕。


The Germans tried to use their leadership in the G8 to achieve greater transparency in hedge funds, but they were beaten back by the US and Great Britain.	德国试图利用其工业八强主席国的身份来实现对冲基金更大的透明度，但是，美国和英国让他们无功而返。


To my mind, though, the greatest risk is geopolitical instability.	在我的头脑中，最大的风险是地缘政治不稳。


By and large, China has been a far more constructive counterpart to the US than the former Soviet Union ever was.	总体而言，中国对于美国而言要比前苏联是一个更为建设性的对手。


But, given huge income disparities. China’s leaders still face enormous challenges in maintaining domestic stability, and continuing quiescence cannot be taken for granted.	但是，鉴于巨大的收入差距，中国的领导人在维持国内稳定上依然面临巨大的挑战，而且，不能想当然地认为稳定会继续下去。


At the same time, there are at least a half-dozen other global hot spots – some might be tempted to include the US Senate – that could trigger a major breakdown in world trade.	与此同时，至少还有六七个全球热点可能引发世界贸易的瘫痪。 某些人还想把美国参议院包括进去。


In short, if the macroeconomic moderation that dominated 2006 continues into 2007, look for further asset price inflation (but don’t hold your breath for the Dow to hit 36,000).	总之，如果主导2006年的宏观经济缓和延续到2007年的话，就要有进一步的资产价格膨胀(但是道琼斯指数达到36000点前不要屏住呼吸)。


But if a major flare-up causes investors to lose confidence in low volatility, the bottom could fall out from under equity and housing prices.	但是，如果一个大规模突发事件引起投资者对低波动失去信心，那么，资本和房地产价格就会大跌。


In that case, do investors and policymakers have a plan B?	在这一情形下，投资者和决策者有没有预案？


India’s Patently Wise Decision	印度的明智专利决策


NEW YORK – The Indian Supreme Court’s refusal to uphold the patent on Gleevec, the blockbuster cancer drug developed by the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis, is good news for many of those in India suffering from cancer.	纽约—印度最高法院拒绝支持瑞士制药巨头诺华公司著名抗癌药物格列卫（Gleevec）专利的决定对广大印度癌症患者来说不啻福音。


If other developing countries follow India’s example, it will be good news elsewhere, too: more money could be devoted to other needs, whether fighting AIDS, providing education, or making investments that enable growth and poverty reduction.	如果其他发展中国家步印度的后尘，也将是其他地区的福音：更多的钱可以用于满足其他需求，比如抗击艾滋病、提供教育或进行提振增长、消灭贫困的投资。


But the Indian decision also means less money for the big multinational pharmaceutical companies.	但印度的决定同样意味着大型跨国制药公司的钱少了。


Not surprisingly, this has led to an overwrought response from them and their lobbyists: the ruling, they allege, destroys the incentive to innovate, and thus will deal a serious blow to public health globally.	毫不奇怪，这引起了制药巨头及其游说集团的强烈反弹：他们指出，该项判决破坏了创新激励，将给全球公共卫生造成严重打击。


These claims are wildly overstated.	他们的说法大大地言过其实了。


In both economic and social-policy terms, the Indian court’s decision makes good sense.	不管从经济还是社会政策角度，印度法院的决定都是正确的。


Moreover, it is only a localized effort at rebalancing a global intellectual-property (IP) regime that is tilted heavily toward pharmaceutical interests at the expense of social welfare.	此外，这只是实现全球知识产权机制再平衡的局部努力。 当前的知识产权机制安排严重倾向于制药公司的利益而不利于社会福利。


Indeed, there is a growing consensus among economists that the current IP regime actually stifles innovation.	事实上，越来越多的经济学家认为现有知识产权机制在扼杀创新。


The impact of strong IP protection on social welfare has long been considered ambiguous.	长期以来，强大的知识产权保护对社会福利的冲击被认为是模糊不清的。


The promise of monopoly rights can spur innovation (though the most important discoveries, like that of DNA, typically occur within universities and government-sponsored research labs, and depend on other incentives).	垄断权利的诱惑可以刺激创新（尽管DNA等最重要发现通常发现于大学和政府资助研究实验室，且其背后的激励有所不同）。


But there often are serious costs as well: higher prices for consumers, the dampening effect on further innovation of reducing access to knowledge, and, in the case of life-saving drugs, death for all who are unable to afford the innovation that could have saved them.	但通常这也会造成巨大的成本：消费者面临的价格升高、接触知识更加困难阻碍后续创新以及（在救命药品方面）无力承担可拯救自己的药物的人的死亡。


The weight given to each of these factors depends on circumstances and priorities, and should vary by country and time.	这些因素各自占据多少权重取决于环境和紧迫程度，随国家和时间的不同而不同。


Advanced industrialized countries in earlier stages of their development benefited from faster economic growth and greater social welfare by explicitly adopting weaker IP protection than is demanded of developing countries today.	发达工业化国家在发展的早期阶段享受了快速经济增长和社会福利提高的好处，一大原因就是知识产权保护较弱，不及现在的发展中国家所面临的要求高。


Even in the United States, there is growing concern that so-called hold-up patents and me-too patents – and the sheer thicket of patents, in which any innovation is likely to become entangled in someone else’s IP claims – are diverting scarce research resources away from their most productive uses.	即使是美国，人们也对所谓的钳制型专利（hold-up patent）和模仿性专利（me-too patent）——以及专利灌木丛（thicket of patents，任何创新都有可能卷入与他人专利的纠纷中）——担忧日增，这可能导致宝贵的研究资源无法用于最具生产率的用途。


India represents only about 1-2% of the global pharmaceutical market.	印度只占全球医药市场的1—2%。


But it has long been a flashpoint in battles over expansion of pharmaceutical companies’ global IP rights, owing to its dynamic generics industry and its willingness to challenge patent provisions both domestically and in foreign jurisdictions.	但长期以来它一直是制药公司全球专利权扩张的主战场，这是因为印度拥有极具活力的仿制药产业，也时刻准备着在国内外挑战专利条款。


The revocation of patent protection for medicines in 1972 greatly expanded access to essential medicines, and led to the growth of a globally competitive domestic industry that is often called the “pharmacy of the developing world.”	1972年撤销医药专利保护极大地扩大了基础药物的普及，也造就了一个全球性竞争性国内行业，通常被人称为“发展中世界药房”。


For example, production of anti-retroviral drugs by Indian generic manufacturers such as Cipla has reduced the cost of life-saving AIDS treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa to just 1% of the cost a decade ago.	比如，印度Cipla等仿制药制造商生产的抗逆转录酶药物使撒哈拉以南非洲治疗艾滋病的救命成本下降至十年前的1%。


Much of this globally valuable capacity was built under a regime of weak – in fact, non-existent – protection for pharmaceutical patents.	这一全球价值连城的生产能力的基础是薄弱的医药专利保护——实际上可以说不存在。


But India is now bound by the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS agreement, and has revised its patent laws accordingly, causing widespread anxiety in the developing world about the implications for global provision of affordable medicines.	但如今，印度必须接受世贸组织TRIPS协定的约束，据此重新修订其专利法，这在发展中世界造成了普遍的焦虑——可负担药物的全球供给告急。


Indeed, the Gleevec decision is still only a small reversal for Western pharmaceuticals.	事实上，格列卫判决只是对西方制药公司的一次小反抗。


Over the last two decades, lobbyists have worked to harmonize and strengthen a far stricter and globally enforceable IP regime.	过去20年来，游说集团一直在致力于协调和强化严格得多的强制性全球专利保护机制。


As a result, there are now numerous overlapping protections for pharmaceutical companies that are very difficult for most developing countries to contest, and that often pit their global obligations against their domestic obligations to protect their citizens’ lives and health.	结果，现在制药公司获得了重重保护，大部分发展中国家根本难以挑战，也经常让它们的全球责任与其保护公民生命和健康的国内责任相冲突。


According to the Indian Supreme Court, the country’s amended patent law still places greater weight on social objectives than in the US and elsewhere: the standards of non-obviousness and novelty required to obtain a patent are stricter (especially as they pertain to medicines), and no “evergreening” of existing patents – or patent protection for incremental follow-up innovations – is allowed.	据印度最高法院，修订后的印度专利法中社会目标所占权重仍高于美国和其他国家：获得专利所要求的非显著性和新颖性标准更加严格（尤其是关于药品的专利），也不会有“长青”专利——即对后续创新的专利保护。


The court thus reaffirmed India’s primary commitment to protecting its citizens’ lives and health.	印度最高法重申了印度的首要承诺——保护公民生命和健康。


The decision also highlighted an important fact: Despite its severe limitations, the TRIPS agreement does have some (rarely used) safeguards that give developing countries a certain degree of flexibility to limit patent protection.	这一决定还凸显出一个重要事实：尽管TRIPS协定存在严重局限，但它确实提供了一些保护（很少被使用），给了发展中国一定程度的限制专利保护的自由。


That is why the pharmaceutical industry, the US, and others have pushed since its inception for a wider and stronger set of standards through add-on agreements.	这就是为何制药行业、美国和其他人在TRIPS出台以来就一直在寻求通过追加协定扩展和强化标准设置。


Such agreements would, for example, limit opposition to patent applications; prohibit national regulatory authorities from approving generic medicines until patents have expired; maintain data exclusivity, thereby delaying the approval of biogeneric drugs; and require new forms of protection, such as anti-counterfeiting measures.	禁止国家监管当局在专利到期前批准仿制药； 保持数据的独家性，从而推迟生物仿制药的批准；


There is a curious incoherence in the argument that the Indian decision undermines property rights.	至于印度的决定破坏了专利权的说法，其中有一个有趣的漏洞。


A critical institutional foundation for well-functioning property rights is an independent judiciary to enforce them.	运转良好的专利权制度的一大关键制度性基础有独立的司法来强化之。


India’s Supreme Court has shown that it is independent, interprets the law faithfully, and does not easily succumb to global corporate interests.	印度最高法院早已证明了其独立性，它忠实地解释法律，从不轻易屈从于全球公司利益。


It is now up to the Indian government to use the TRIPS agreement’s safeguards to ensure that the country’s intellectual-property regime advances both innovation and public health.	如今，决定是否使用TRIPS协定来确保印度知识产权机制促进创新和公共卫生的是印度政府。


Globally, there is growing recognition of the need for a more balanced IP regime.	从全球看，越来越多的人认识到需要更加平衡的知识产权机制。


But the pharmaceutical industry, trying to consolidate its gains, has been pushing instead for an ever stronger and more imbalanced IP regime.	但制药行业为了巩固自己的利益，一直在推行更强势、更不平衡的知识产权机制。


Countries considering agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership or bilateral “partnership” agreements with the US and Europe need to be aware that this is one of the hidden objectives.	考虑和美国和欧洲构建跨太平洋合作伙伴关系协定或双边“合作伙伴”协定的国家必须清楚，这是隐含目标之一。


What are being sold as “free-trade agreements” include IP provisions that could stifle access to affordable medicines, with a potentially significant impact on economic growth and development.	它们兜售的是“自由贸易协定”，其中的知识产权保护条款可能阻挠人民获得负担得起的药品，对经济增长和发展起着潜在重大影响。


The Politics of Anger	愤怒的政治


CAMBRIDGE – Perhaps the only surprising thing about the populist backlash that has overwhelmed the politics of many advanced democracies is that it has taken so long.	坎布里奇——也许淹没许多先进民主国家的政治民粹主义回潮用时如此之久才最令人惊奇。


Even two decades ago, it was easy to predict that mainstream politicians’ unwillingness to offer remedies for the insecurities and inequalities of our hyper-globalized age would create political space for demagogues with easy solutions.	即便在20年前，预测主流政治学家不愿对我们所处超全球化时代不安全感和不平等现实进行补救将创造政治空间，从而使以简单办法蛊惑人心的政客有用武之地也并非难事。


Back then, it was Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan; today it is Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and sundry others.	当时，采取上述方法的是罗斯·佩罗和帕特里克·布坎南； 而今天则是唐纳德·特朗普、马琳·勒庞及其它各色人士。


History never quite repeats itself, but its lessons are important nonetheless.	历史从来不会完全重演，但它的教训仍然再重要不过。


We should recall that the first era of globalization, which reached its peak in the decades before World War I, eventually produced an even more severe political backlash.	我们应当回顾人类首个全球化时代，它曾在一次大战前数十年达到高峰，但最终却造成了甚至更为严重的政治冲击。


The historical evidence has been well summarized by my Harvard colleague Jeffry Frieden.	我在哈佛大学的同事杰弗里·弗里登很好地总结了历史证据。


In the heyday of the gold standard, Frieden argues, mainstream political actors had to downplay social reform and national identity because they gave priority to international economic ties.	弗里登认为在金本位鼎盛时期，主流政界人士不得不因为优先考虑国际经济关系而淡化民族认同感和社会改革措施。


The response took one of two fatal forms in the interwar period: Socialists and communists chose social reform, while fascists chose national assertion.	上述对策在两次世界大战之间表现为两种致命形式：一是社会党及共产党人选择社会改革、二是法西斯份子渲染民族情绪。


Both paths led away from globalization to economic closure (and far worse).	这两种方式都导致远离全球化、实行经济封闭（甚至更为糟糕的政策）。


Today’s backlash most likely will not go quite so far.	今天这次反弹所造成的结果很可能不会如此不可收拾。


As costly as they have been, the dislocations of the great recession and the euro crisis pale in significance compared to those of the Great Depression.	尽管社会付出了沉重的代价，但经济衰退的紊乱和欧元危机与大萧条时期相比还有不少差距。


Advanced democracies have built – and retain (despite recent setbacks) – extensive social safety nets in the form of unemployment insurance, retirement pensions, and family benefits.	先进民主国家已经以失业保险、退休金和家庭福利等形式成功地建立——并（在遭遇困难时）维持了全方位的社会安全体系。


The world economy now has functional international institutions – such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that it lacked prior to the Second World War.	世界经济现在拥有能发挥作用的国际机构——如国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界贸易组织（WTO）——这些机构在二战之前都尚未建立。


Last but not least, extremist political movements such as fascism and communism have been largely discredited.	还有最后但同样重要的一点，那就是法西斯主义和共产主义等极端政治运动已经在很大程度上信誉扫地。


Still, the conflicts between a hyper-globalized economy and social cohesion are real, and mainstream political elites ignore them at their peril.	但超全球化经济和社会凝聚力之间的矛盾切实存在，主流政治精英对此视而不见的确是危险之举。


As I argued in my 1997 book Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, the internationalization of markets for goods, services, and capital drives a wedge between the cosmopolitan, professional, skilled groups that are able to take advantage of it and the rest of society.	就像我在1997年著作 全球化是否已经走得太远？ 中所提出的那样，商品、服务和资本市场的国际化在有能力抓住机遇的全球化、职业化、高技能群体和其余社会群体之间造成了某种分裂。


Two types of political cleavage are exacerbated in the process: an identity cleavage, revolving around nationhood, ethnicity, or religion, and an income cleavage, revolving around social class.	上述进程导致两种类型的政治分裂进一步加剧：那就是围绕国家、民族或宗教因素的分裂、以及社会阶层的收入差距。


Populists derive their appeal from one or the other of these cleavages.	民粹主义份子从这样或那样的分裂中攫取吸引力。


Right-wing populists such as Trump engage in identity politics.	特朗普等右翼民粹人士钟情于身份政治。


Left-wing populists such as Bernie Sanders emphasize the gulf between the rich and the poor.	而伯尼·桑德斯等左翼民粹人士则强调贫富差距。


In both cases, there is a clear “other” toward which anger can be directed.	无论哪种情况，都可以将愤怒明确指向“其他”群体。


You can barely make ends meet?	你只能勉强度日？


It is the Chinese who have been stealing your jobs.	是中国人一直在偷走你的就业机会。


Upset by crime?	对犯罪不满？


It is the Mexicans and other immigrants who bring their gang warfare into the country.	是墨西哥人和其他移民把帮派战争带进这个国家。


Terrorism?	恐怖主义？


Why, Muslims, of course.	那当然是穆斯林的责任。


Political corruption?	政治腐败？


What do you expect when the big banks are bankrolling our political system?	在大银行为政治体制出资的情况下你还有什么选择？


Unlike mainstream political elites, populists can easily point to the culprits responsible for the masses’ ills.	和主流政治精英不同，民粹主义者很容易就能找到大规模弊病的元凶所在。


Of course, establishment politicians are compromised because they have been at the helm all this time.	当然，在任政治家因为长期以来一直掌舵而威望受损。


But they are also immobilized by their central narrative, which smacks of inaction and helplessness.	但其具有无奈和无助意味的核心观点也让他们的主动性日渐丧失。


This narrative puts the blame for stagnant wages and rising inequality on technological forces beyond our control.	这种说法将工资停滞和不平等上升归咎于我们无法控制的技术力量。


It treats globalization and the rules that sustain it as inexorable and inevitable.	在它看来全球化及其相关规则是不可避免的。


The remedy it offers, investment in education and skills, promises few immediate rewards and would bear fruit years from now, at best.	它所提出的教育及技能投资等补救措施不太可能立即产生效果，充其量也将在若干年后才会有所助益。


In reality, today’s world economy is the product of explicit decisions that governments have made in the past.	事实上，各国政府过去明确作出的决策塑造了今天的世界经济。


It was a choice not to stop at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to build the much more ambitious – and intrusive – WTO.	他们选择不止步于关贸总协定（GATT），而是建立更加雄心勃勃——也更具攻击性的世界贸易组织（WTO）。


Similarly, it will be a choice whether to ratify future mega-trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.	同样，人们还要选择是否批准未来跨太平洋伙伴关系和跨大西洋贸易及投资伙伴关系等大型贸易协议。


It was the choice of governments to loosen regulations on finance and aim for full cross-border capital mobility, just as it was a choice to maintain these policies largely intact, despite a massive global financial crisis.	各国政府为实现跨境资本全自由流通选择放松金融管制，就像他们在面对大规模全球金融危机时选择让上述政策基本维持下去。


And, as Anthony Atkinson reminds us in his masterful book on inequality, even technological change is not immune from government agency: There is much that policymakers can do to influence the direction of technological change and ensure that it leads to higher employment and greater equity.	而且，正如安东尼·阿特金森在其论述不平等的权威著作中提醒我们的那样，就连技术变革也不能对政府机构免疫：决策者可以有多种方式影响技术变革的方向，确保它能减少不平等、提升就业率。


The appeal of populists is that they give voice to the anger of the excluded.	民粹主义分子的吸引力在于他们为被社会排斥的人提供了表达愤怒的方式。


They offer a grand narrative as well as concrete, if misleading and often dangerous, solutions.	他们讲述一个伟大的故事，但却提供误导性、并且往往是非常危险的具体措施。


Mainstream politicians will not regain lost ground until they, too, offer serious solutions that provide room for hope.	除非主流政治学家也能拿出充满希望的严肃的解决方式，否则他们不可能夺回失去的影响力。


They should no longer hide behind technology or unstoppable globalization, and they must be willing to be bold and entertain large-scale reforms in the way the domestic and global economy are run.	他们不能继续藏在技术或全球化势不可挡的借口背后，而且他们必须愿意大胆地大规模改革国内和全球经济的运营方式。


If one lesson of history is the danger of globalization running amok, another is the malleability of capitalism.	如果说全球化肆意横行是历史给我们上了一课，那么另一课则是资本主义的可塑性。


It was the New Deal, the welfare state, and controlled globalization (under the Bretton Woods regime) that eventually gave market-oriented societies a new lease on life and produced the post-war boom.	是新政、福利国家和（布雷顿森林体系下）有管制的全球化最终赋予了以市场为导向的社会新生，并创造了战后的繁荣时期。


It was not tinkering and minor modification of existing policies that produced these achievements, but radical institutional engineering.	取得上述成就靠的不是对现有政策的修修补补，而是制度改革的全面落实。


Moderate politicians, take note.	这一点必须引起稳健政界人士的注意。


The Problem With “Illiberal Democracy”	“不自由的民主”的问题


PRINCETON – Poland’s turn toward authoritarian rule has set off alarm bells across the European Union and within NATO.	普林斯顿—波兰转向极权主义统治给整个欧盟和北约内部敲响了警钟。


Since coming to power in October, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party (PiS) has attacked the country’s Constitutional Court, politicized the judiciary and the civil service, and launched an assault on media pluralism.	自10月份掌权以来，雅罗斯瓦夫·卡钦斯基的法律与正义党（PiS）已经攻击了波兰宪法法院，将司法和行政部门政治化，并打击媒体多元主义。


Critics of the PiS government, which is led by Prime Minister Beata Szydło (with Kaczyński, ruling from behind the scenes as he holds no official post), have described its actions as a blitz to install “illiberal democracy,” similar to what Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has done in his country over the past six years.	批评者认为，以总理贝亚塔·希德沃为首的PiS政府（卡钦斯基则是幕后统治者，他不担任任何职位）的行动堪称建立“不自由的民主”的闪电战，与匈牙利总理维克托·欧班过去六年的所作所为差不多。


But to call what is being constructed in Poland illiberal democracy is deeply misleading – and in a way that undermines efforts to rein in would-be autocrats like Kaczyński and Orbán.	但将波兰的形势称为不自由的民主是很大的误导——并且可能制约约束卡钦斯基和欧班等独裁者的措施。


After all, it is not just liberalism that is under attack, but democracy itself.	毕竟，受到攻击的并非自由主义，而是民主本身。


The concept of “illiberal democracy,” attributable to a 1997 essay by the American foreign-policy thinker Fareed Zakaria, was an effort to describe regimes that held elections, but did not observe the rule of law and regularly overrode their political systems’ constitutional checks and balances.	“不自由的民主”这一概念可以追溯到美国外交政策思想家法里德·扎卡里亚（Fareed Zakaria）1977年的一篇文章，扎卡里亚用它来描述举行选举，但不遵守法治并且时常凌驾于政治制度的宪法制衡之上的政权。


It was an idea born of disillusion.	这是一个源于幻灭的概念。


In the heady days after the fall of communism, a kind of democratic ecstasy prevailed (at least in the West).	在共产主义倒台的梦幻岁月中，（至少在西方）出现了民主狂欢。


The “end of history” had been achieved, and elections, representative institutions, and the rule of law would, it seemed, always go neatly together.	“历史的终结”已经实现，选举、代议机构和法治看起来将永远齐头并进。


Soon, however, newly empowered electorates were voting in majorities that used their power to oppress minorities and violate fundamental rights.	但是，很快，新获得权力的选民开始通过多数投票用他们的权力镇压少数派、侵犯基本权利。


The implication was clear: Democracy on its own was not enough.	其影响显而易见：光有民主本身是不够的。


Liberalism – the protection of minorities and individual civil liberties – had to be strengthened.	自由主义——保护少数派和个人公民自由——必须加强。


The word “liberalism,” however, does not mean the same thing to all people.	但是，“自由主义”一词并不是对所有人都有着相同的意义。


In many circles, it came to be used to describe unfettered capitalism and full freedom of choice in personal lifestyles.	在许多人看来，它描述的是不受约束的资本主义和完全自由的个人生活方式选择。


And it was the alternative meanings that initially allowed politicians like Orbán and the Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to make the case for a different form of majoritarian democracy.	而另一种意义在一开始让欧班和土耳其领导人埃尔多安等政客得以鼓吹不同形式的多数民主。


Erdoğan, emphasizing traditional Islamic morality, started to present himself as a “conservative democrat.”	埃尔多安强调传统伊斯兰教道德，开始将自己包装为“保守民主”。


Orbán, in a controversial speech in 2014, declared his desire to create an “illiberal state.”	欧班在2014年所发表的一次颇具争议的演讲中宣布他渴望建立一个“自由国家”。


More recently, during the refugee crisis, Orbán announced the end of the era of what he called “liberal blah blah” and predicted that Europe would come around to his “Christian and national” vision of politics.	最近，在难民危机期间，欧班宣布了他所谓的“自由的种种”时代已经结束，并预言欧洲将向他的“基督和民主”政治愿景靠拢。


To be sure, the phrase “illiberal democracy” is not necessarily a contradiction in terms.	平心而论，“不自由的民主”一词未必是矛盾的。


Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, many European Christian Democrats would have called themselves “illiberal.”	在整个十九世纪和二十世纪，许多欧洲基督教民主党都自称“不自由”。


In fact, they might have been offended if one questioned their staunch anti-liberalism.	事实上，如果有人质疑它们顽固地反自由主义，有可能激起它们的愤怒。


What this did not mean, however, is that they failed to understand and recognize the importance of minority rights in a functioning democracy (after all, minorities can become the majority in the next election).	但是，这并不意味着它们不理解和承认少数派权利在正常运转的民主中的重要性（毕竟，少数派可能在下一次选举中成为多数派）。


Nor did it mean that they believed unelected institutions like constitutional courts were somehow undemocratic.	这也不意味着它们相信非选举机构（如宪法法院）在一定程度上是不民主的。


They associated “liberalism” with individualism, materialism and, very often, atheism; but being anti-liberal did not mean rejecting the importance of rights or independent institutions.	它们将“自由主义”与个人主义、唯物主义，常常还有无神论挂钩； 但反自由并不意味着拒绝权利或独立机构的重要性。


What governments like those in Poland, Hungary, and Turkey are proposing is something very different.	波兰、匈牙利和土耳其等国的政府所宣扬的是完全不同的东西。


It is one thing to criticize materialism, atheism, or even individualism.	它们宣扬的东西批判唯物主义、无神论甚至个人主义。


It is something else altogether to attempt to limit freedom of speech and assembly, media pluralism, or the protection of minorities.	这是完全不同的东西，它试图限制言论和集会自由，限制媒体多元主义，限制保护少数派。


The first is a disagreement about different political philosophies that can justify democracy.	前者是可论证民主的不同政治哲学之间的分歧。


The second is an attack on democracy’s very foundations.	后者是对民主根基的攻击。


An election, after all, can be undemocratic even if the ruling party refrains from stuffing ballot boxes.	毕竟，选举可以是不民主的，即使执政党不越俎代庖填满投票箱。


If opposition parties have been hindered in making their case to the electorate, and journalists do not dare to report on the government’s failures, the ballot boxes have already been stuffed.	如果反对党被妨碍，无法在选民面前亮相； 如果记者不敢报道政府的失败之处，投票箱就已经被先占满了。


It is no accident that many of the democracies that emerged after the fall of communism established constitutional courts to protect rights and preserve pluralism.	共产主义倒台后，新涌现的许多民主国家建立了宪法法院保护权利和多元主义，这不是巧合。


These institutions ultimately secure and sustain democracy.	这些机构最终保护和维系的是民主。


As long as critics keep using the phrase “illiberal democracy” to describe what is happening in countries like Poland, leaders like Kaczyński will simply say, “Exactly!”	只要批评者继续使用“不自由的民主”一词来描述波兰等国家的情况，卡钦斯基等领导人便会用“正是如此！ ”回应。


Far from being received as a criticism, the phrase reinforces such leaders’ image as opponents of liberalism, while allowing them to continue to refer to their actions as “democratic” – which, for all the disappointments over the last quarter-century, is still the most important prerequisite for inclusion in the geopolitical “West.”	这一词汇并不被看作是批评，虽然强化了这些领导人反对自由主义的形象，但他们仍可以将自己的行为称为“民主”——尽管在过去二十五年中有着诸多令人失望之处，但民主仍是进入地缘政治意义上的“西方”的最重要的前提。


Furthermore, the expression “illiberal democracy” confirms the narrative that democracy is the domain of national governments – and that it is the European Union that is pushing undemocratic liberalism.	此外，“不自由的民主”这一表达确认了民主是国家政府层面的事务——而欧盟在推行不民主的自由。


This allows figures like Kaczyński and Orbán to paint the EU as the agent of rampant capitalism and libertine morality.	这让卡钦斯基和欧班之流将欧盟描述为强盗资本主义和道德败坏的代言人。


The fact that Europe’s new authoritarians have come to power through free and fair elections does not lend democratic legitimacy to their efforts to transform entire political systems to their own advantage.	欧洲新极权主义通过自由公平的选举掌权，这一事实并不能让它们拥有肆意改变全套政治制度的合法性。


Instead of describing them as “illiberal” we should be calling them what they really are: “undemocratic.”	我们不应该将它们称为“不自由”，而应该用真正的形容词来描述它们——“不民主”。


Theresa May’s Pyrrhic Victory	特蕾莎·梅的惨胜


LONDON – The British election called by Prime Minister Theresa May for June 8 will transform the outlook for Britain’s politics and its relationship with Europe, but not necessarily in the way that a vastly increased majority for May’s Conservative Party might seem to imply.	伦敦—英国首相特蕾莎·梅要求在6月8日举行大选，这场大选将改变英国政治及其与欧洲的关系的前景，但未必是以多数优势大幅提高的梅所在的保守党想要的方式。


The scorched-earth defeat that Conservative Euroskeptics expect to inflict on Britain’s internationalist and progressive forces was symbolized by the Daily Mail headline on May’s election announcement: “Crush the Saboteurs.”	保守党疑欧派想要给英国国际主义者和进步力量予以毁灭性打击，《每日邮报》（Daily Mail）在梅的选举公告报道中用《粉碎破坏者》（Crush the Saboteurs）这一标题来描述他们的意图。


But June’s resounding victory could ultimately lead to an even more stunning reversal, like Napoleon’s hubristic march on Moscow after he had destroyed all opposition in Western Europe.	但6月份的大获全胜可能最终导致更加波澜壮阔的逆转，就像拿破仑在横扫西欧后踌躇满志地向莫斯科进军的下场一样。


Britain’s pro-European progressive forces could still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat for three related reasons.	英国的亲欧进步力量仍有可能出奇制胜，有三个互相关联的原因。


First, by bringing forward the British election, May has effectively extended the deadline for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union from 2019 until 2022.	第一，梅提前举行大选实际上将把英国退出欧盟的最后期限从2019年延后到2022年。


The early election makes it inevitable that Britain will formally leave the EU in March 2019, because May will no longer face even the theoretical possibility of parliamentary opposition.	提前选举意味着英国必须在2019年3月正式脱离欧盟，因为梅不可能遭到议会反对，连理论上的可能性都没有。


But it also allows Britain to accept a long transition period after the 2019 departure deadline, so that businesses and administrative systems can adjust to whatever terms are agreed by then.	但这也让英国能够接受2019年脱欧最后期限之后的漫长的过渡时期，以便企业和政府系统能够调整适应届时的环境。


British business lobbies, as well as the government officials tasked with implementation, have been pressing for this transition period to be as long as possible.	英国商界游说集团，以及负责实施退欧的政府官员，一直在为这一过渡期争取尽可能长的时间。


The EU, however, has insisted that during the transition period all of the current obligations of EU membership must continue, including budget contributions, free movement of labor, and enforcement of EU legal judgments.	但欧盟坚持要求，转型期间所有当前欧盟成员国都必须继续履行，包括预算分配、劳动力自由迁徙和执行欧盟司法裁决。


Until the election was called, it seemed almost impossible to reconcile the business community’s need for a long transition period with the insistence of Conservative Euroskeptics on a complete and immediate break with the EU.	在梅要求举行大选之前，商界所要求的长期过渡期和保守党疑欧派所要求的立即与欧盟完全脱离之间的矛盾几乎不可调和。


A crushing election victory will give May the necessary authority to negotiate a long transition, despite the objections of anti-EU extremists, and will persuade more moderate Euroskeptics that, with Brexit now guaranteed, the precise timing of various EU obligations is less important.	在选举中大获全胜将使得梅拥有必要的权力要求长期过渡期——尽管这将遭到反欧盟极端分子的反对，同时说服较温和的疑欧派，在英国脱欧公投的保证下，各种欧盟义务的确切时间并不那么重要。


As a result, although Britain will formally cease to be an EU member by March 2019, very little will change in Britain’s economy or way of life by the time of the next general election in 2022.	因此，尽管英国将在2019年3月正式结束欧盟成员的历史，但直到2022年举行下一次大选之前，英国经济和生活方式将不会产生什么变化。


In this sense, May’s decision to call an early election is a setback for extreme Euroskeptics, who might otherwise have forced her to break completely with Europe by March 2019.	从这个角度讲，梅决定提前举行大选是极端疑欧派的一个挫折，否则他们有可能强迫她在2019年3月彻底脱离欧洲。


This relates to a second reason why the imminent triumph for British Euroskeptics may end up a pyrrhic victory.	这就引出了英国疑欧派的即将到来的胜利为何是一场惨胜的第二个原因。


Whereas the early election will delay economic changes, it will greatly accelerate the transformation of British politics.	提前选举将推迟经济变革，但也将大大加速英国政治转型。


Britain’s main opposition Labour Party has been in its death throes since 2015, but could survive in its present zombie condition until a general election was called.	英国的主要反对派工党自2015年以来便处于半死不活的状态，但在决定举行大选之前，它都能这样活着。


Because the next election was expected in 2020, it was possible that some unforeseen development in the three years might allow Labour to revive.	下一场选举将在2020年举行，因此，这三年里可能发生一些未预见到的情况，让工党实现复兴。


By bringing the election forward, May has brought forward Labour’s disintegration as well, and virtually eliminated the possibility of its revival.	提前举行大选的梅也提前了工党的崩溃，几乎肯定排除了其复活的可能。


When the Labour Party collapses after its defeat in June, a realignment of progressive British politics will become almost certain.	当工党在6月的选举中崩溃的时候，几乎肯定会发生英国进步政治的重组。


This realignment, uniting disillusioned Labour politicians and voters with Liberal Democrats, Greens, and perhaps Scottish and Welsh nationalists, is likely to produce an opposition that is much more effective than May currently faces, even if it has fewer parliamentary seats.	这一重组将把幻想破灭的工党政客和选民与自由民主党、绿党，可能还有苏格兰和威尔士民族主义者捆绑在一起，有望形成一股比梅目前需要面对的高效得多的反对派，即使它拥有的议会席位更少。


By the time of the next general election, most likely in 2022, Britain’s internationalist and progressive political forces will have had five years to prepare themselves to oppose May’s conservatism and English nationalism.	到下一次大选时——很有可能在2022年——英国的国际主义和进步政治力量有五年时间准备反对梅的保守主义和英格兰民族主义。


By that time, the Conservatives will have been in power for three parliaments and 12 years.	届时，保守党已经掌权三届议会、12个年头。


That is about how long it has typically taken Britain’s political pendulum to swing between right and left.	这也是英国政治左右摇摆的典型周期长度。


Moreover, owing to the extended transition period for Brexit made possible by the early election, it will only be around 2022 that the full consequences of terminating EU membership come into view, together with the contradictions in the Brexit coalition between libertarian free traders and socially conservative nationalists and protectionists.	此外，由于提前大选可能延长英国脱欧的过渡期，因此，结束欧盟成员资格的全部后果必然要等到2022年左右才能全部显现，脱欧联盟与自由主义自由贸易派与社会保守派民族主义者和保护主义者之间的矛盾也将一起尽显无疑。


Meanwhile, efforts to negotiate free-trade agreements with the US and China will have revealed the weakness of Britain’s bargaining position.	与此同时，与美国和中国的自由贸易协定谈判将暴露出英国处于讨价还价的劣势地位。


As a result, public opinion about the wisdom of Brexit could shift substantially by 2022.	于是，到2022年，公众对英国脱欧是否明智的观点将大大改变。


In any case, the changing relationship with Europe will be the core issue around which Britain’s socially liberal and internationalist political forces can coalesce after their defeat.	无论如何，英欧关系的变化将是一个核心问题，英国社会自由派和国际主义政治力量可能围绕这一问题，在提前举行的选举败北后联合起来。


Suppose that, in the meantime, the EU continues its economic recovery.	假设与此同时，欧盟一直保持经济复苏。


Suppose further that, after the French and German elections this year, a stronger Franco-German partnership drives the eurozone toward the closer political integration that is obviously needed for the single currency to succeed, whereas Denmark, Sweden, and Poland make clear that they have no intention of ever joining the euro.	进一步假设今年法国和德国大选后，得到加强的法德合作推动欧元区进一步走向政治一体化——显然，这是单一货币要取得成功的必要条件； 而丹麦、瑞典和波兰明确表示不准备加入欧元。


By 2022, British voters could well decide that re-joining a twin-track European Union is much more attractive than pleading for a junior partnership with the US, not to mention China.	到2022年，英国选民很可能会认为重新加入双轨欧盟要比乞求成为美国（更不用说中国了）的初级伙伴有吸引力得多。


That is the third reason why Britain’s Conservative Euroskeptics could end up regretting their imminent electoral triumph.	这就是英国保守党疑欧派将最终因为即将到来的选举胜利而后悔的原因。


Whatever happens, the decisive battle in the war for Britain’s long-term future will not be this year’s easy victory for May. It will be the clash, five years from now, between nationalist conservatism and a new outward-looking progressive opposition.	无论如何，这场关于英国长期未来的战争的决定性战役不会是今年梅的轻松大胜，而将是五年后民族主义保守主义和新的外向型进步反对派之间的碰撞。


The Three Trumps	三面特朗普


NEW YORK – Never in recent history has a change of leadership attracted as much attention and speculation as Donald Trump’s rise to the US presidency.	纽约——近代史上，领导人的更迭从未像特朗普当选总统般引起如此多的猜测与关注。


What this change signifies and what it portends requires unraveling three mysteries, because there are three versions of Trump.	解读这一变化意味着什么需要揭开三个奥秘，因为在外界眼中存在三个版本的特朗普。


The first Trump is the friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin.	特朗普其中一面是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京的朋友。


Trump’s enthusiasm for Putin is the most consistent part of his rhetoric.	特朗普对普京的热情在他的言论中从未改变过。


Despite a worldview that regards the United States as a victim of foreign powers – China, Mexico, Iran, the European Union – Trump’s ardor for Putin burns bright.	尽管各国有观点认为，美国是中国、墨西哥、伊朗和欧盟等外国势力的牺牲品——但特朗普对普京的狂热却从未改变过。


Depending on who is opining, Trump is either a naive admirer of strongmen like Putin or a long-time tool of Russian intelligence.	有些观点认为，特郎普或者是普京等强人天真的崇拜者，或者是俄罗斯情报部门的长期工具。


There is almost surely a backstory here, one that could destroy Trump’s administration if some of the lurid rumors are confirmed.	此处几乎肯定存在不可告人的故事，如果某些可怕的传言得到证实就有可能摧毁特朗普内阁。


We now know that some key dates and details in the infamous “dossier” on Trump’s relations with Putin, assembled by a former British intelligence officer, have been verified.	我们现在已知特朗普与普京关系那份臭名昭著 “档案”中某些关键日期和细节已经得到证实，它们是由一位前英国情报官员负责搜集的。


A growing body of circumstantial evidence suggests that Trump has been backed by Russian money for decades.	越来越多的间接证据表明数十年来，特朗普一直得到俄罗斯资本的支持。 俄罗斯寡头可能曾挽救特朗普免于个人破产，据说一名寡头还前往不止一个特朗普竞选站点，可能扮演特朗普和克里姆林宫中间人的角色。


Russian oligarchs may have saved Trump from personal bankruptcy, and one reportedly traveled to a number of Trump’s campaign stops, perhaps acting as a go-between with the Kremlin.	而且特朗普团队的诸多成员——包括其首任竞选经理保罗·马纳福特； 最近被逐出政府的国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林；


And many top members of Trump’s team – including his first campaign manager, Paul Manafort; recently-ousted National Security Adviser Michael Flynn; former ExxonMobil CEO and now Secretary of State Rex Tillerson; and hedge-fund magnate and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross – all have significant business dealings with Russia or Russian oligarchs.	前埃克森美孚首席执行官及现任国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森； 和对冲基金巨头兼商务部长威尔伯·罗斯——无不与俄罗斯或俄罗斯寡头有着重大的业务往来。


The second version of Trump is a greedy businessman.	特朗普的另外一面是一位贪婪的商人。


Trump seems intent on transforming the presidency into another source of personal wealth.	特朗普似乎执意要将总统任期转化为用一种个人敛财工具。


For most people, the presidency would seem to be its own reward, without cashing in (at least not while in office).	对多数人而言，总统职位本身就是奖励，因此无需兑换成现金（至少在就职期间）。


Not for Trump.	而特朗普却不这么看。


Contrary to all previous norms, and in violation of the standards set by the Office of Government Ethics, Trump is keeping his business empire, while family members maneuver to monetize the Trump name in new investments around the world.	他的观点不仅与此前的规则针锋相对，此外还违反了政府道德办公室制定的标准，特朗普保留了他的商业帝国，同时其家庭成员一手操纵力求在世界范围内对特朗普的名字货币化。


The third Trump is a populist and demagogue.	特朗普的第三面是一位民粹主义者和煽动家。


Trump is a non-stop font of lies, who brushes aside the inevitable corrections by the media with the charge of “fake news.”	特朗普是无休无止的谎言来源，他把媒体不可避免的纠正斥之为“假新闻”。


For the first time in modern American history, the president is aggressively demonizing the press.	总统主动妖魔化媒体在美国现代史上尚属首次。


This past week, the White House barred the New York Times, CNN, Politico, and the Los Angeles Times from a news briefing by the press secretary.	过去这一周，白宫禁止纽约时报、CNN、政客和洛杉矶时报参加新闻秘书处的一次发布会。


On some interpretations, Trump’s demagogy is in the service of his chief strategist, Stephen Bannon, who defends a dark vision of a coming war of civilizations.	根据某些解释，特朗普的煽动为其首席战略顾问斯蒂芬·班农服务，班农坚持即将打响的文明之战会出现不那么光明的未来。


By raising fear to the highest possible level, Trump aims to create a violent America-first nationalism.	通过尽可能煽动人们的恐惧，特朗普意在创造某种暴力的“美国第一”的民族主义氛围。


Hermann Göring chillingly explained the formula from his Nuremberg jail cell after World War II: “[T]he people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.	赫尔曼·戈林第二次世界大战后在他纽伦堡的监狱牢房里令人不寒而栗地解释了这一公式：“很容易操纵民众完成领导人的目标。


That is easy.	这样做轻而易举。


All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.	你所要做的就是告诉他们他们正在受到攻击，并谴责和平主义者缺乏爱国主义，从而使国家置身危险之中。


It works the same way in any country.”	这样的方法适用于任何国家。 ”


Another theory is that all three Trumps – friend of Putin, wealth maximizer, and demagogue – are really one: Trump the businessman has long been supported by the Russians, who have used him for years as a front for laundered money.	另外一种理论是特朗普的所有三面——普京的朋友、敛财大师和煽动家——其实可以合而为一——即身为商人的特朗普一直得到俄罗斯人的支持，多年以来，他们打着他的幌子进行洗钱活动。


One might say they won the jackpot, parlaying a small bet – on manipulating the outcome of an election they most likely never expected him to win – into a huge payoff.	有人可能会说他们赢得了大奖，通过操纵一场从未期望特朗普能赢的选举将很小一笔赌注连本带利演变成巨大的回报。


On this interpretation, Trump’s attacks on the press, the intelligence agencies, and the FBI specifically aim to discredit these organizations in advance of further revelations regarding his dealings with Russia.	根据这种解释，特朗普攻击媒体、情报机构和联邦调查局意在提前破坏上述机构的可信度，进而对它们进一步揭露特朗普和俄罗斯的交易内容造成影响。


Those of us who lived through Watergate remember how difficult it was to hold Richard Nixon to account.	经历过水门事件的人都记得让理查德·尼克松承担责任的难度。


Without the revelation of secret White House tapes, Nixon almost surely would have escaped impeachment and served out his term.	如果不公布白宫秘密录音带，尼克松几乎肯定会逃脱弹劾并完成其总统任期。


The same was true with Flynn, who lied time and again to the public, and to Vice President Michael Pence, about his communications with the Russian ambassador before he assumed his post.	弗林的情况也同样如此，他一再对公众和副总统迈克尔·彭斯说谎，不承认他在就职前曾与俄罗斯大使有过交流。


Yet, like Nixon, he was tripped up only because his lies were recorded, in this case by the US intelligence agencies.	但就像尼克松一样，只是因为谎言被录下来才导致他被扳倒，不过这一次扳倒他的是美国情报机构。


When Flynn’s lies were exposed, Trump’s reaction, characteristically, was to attack the leak, not the lies.	当弗林的谎言被拆穿时，特朗普标志性的反应是攻击泄密者，而不是谎言本身。


The main lesson of Washington, and indeed of strongman politics in general, is that lying is the first, not last, resort.	华盛顿的主要教训，其实也是一切强人政治的主要教训是谎言是第一选择，而不是最后选项。


If Congress has enough honest members, a majority, knowing that Republicans will not police Republicans, will demand an independent investigation of Trump’s Russia ties.	如果诚实的国会议员数量足够多，那么绝大多数明知共和党人不会调查共和党人，仍会要求对特朗普的对俄关系展开独立调查。


Republican Senator Rand Paul was explicit on this point, declaring that it “makes no sense” for Republicans to investigate Republicans.	共和党参议员兰德·保罗曾就此明确表态，声明共和党人调查共和党人是 “是没有意义” 的。


Trump seems intent on turning up the pressure on the FBI, the intelligence agencies, the courts, and the media to back off.	特朗普似乎执意要加大对联邦调查局、情报机构、法院和媒体的压力，迫使他们在斗争中退缩。


Demagogues survive because of public support, which they try to maintain through appeals to greed, nationalism, patriotism, racism, and fear.	公众支持是煽动家的生存之道，他们试图通过借助人性的贪婪、民族主义、爱国主义、种族主义和恐惧情绪来来维持自己的支持力度。


They shower their supporters with short-lived cash, in the form of tax cuts and income transfers, paid for by running up the public debt and leaving the bill to future generations.	他们以减税和收入转移等方式向支持者抛洒短期现金，上述资金来源于提高公共负债和账单留给后代子孙来支付。


Trump has so far kept America’s plutocrats happy, through promises of unaffordable tax cuts, while mesmerizing his white working-class followers with executive orders to deport illegal immigrants and bar arrivals from Muslim-majority countries.	特朗普迄今为止让美国富豪非常满意，承诺难以承受的税收减免，同时用驱逐非法移民的行政命令吸引其白人工薪阶层追随者，并禁止以穆斯林为主的国家移民抵达美国。


None of this has made Trump very popular.	所有这一切都没有保证特朗普的受欢迎程度。


His approval ratings are historically low for a new president, around 40%, with roughly 55% of respondents disapproving.	他的支持率就新任总统而言创下历史新低，仅徘徊在40%左右，约有55%的受访者不支持特朗普。


Judicial challenges to executive actions, fights with the media, tensions stemming from rising budget deficits, and new revelations regarding Trump and Russia, will keep the pot boiling – and Trump’s public support could evaporate.	对行政行为的司法挑战、与媒体的斗争、因预算赤字增加而导致的紧张局势以及有关特朗普和俄罗斯全新披露的事实都会维持这种紧张度——并因此造成特朗普的公众支持消失得无影无踪。


In that case, Republican leaders are more likely to turn on Trump.	在这种情况下，共和党领导人更有可能攻击特朗普。


But no one should ever underestimate a demagogue’s willingness to use fear and violence – even war – to maintain power.	但永远不要低估煽动者使用暴力和恐惧——甚至战争——来保护权力的欲望。


And if Putin is indeed his backer and partner, Trump’s temptations will be strong.	如果普京的确是他的支持者和合作者，特朗普将受到强大的诱惑。


Trade Truths for Trumpians and Brexiteers	特朗普主义者和英国脱欧者的贸易现实


LONDON – Here’s a reality check for British and American policymakers, and for the many pundits who frequently comment on world trade without understanding its realities: data on Germany’s total exports and imports in 2016 indicate that its largest trading partner is now China. France and the United States have been pushed into second and third place.	发自伦敦——最近有一个数据，堪称狠狠将了英美政策制定者以及那些经常对世界贸易妄加评论却不了解其现实的专家一军：2016年德国出进口数据显示，其最大的贸易伙伴如今已是中国，而法国和美国则退居第二和第三位。


This news should not come as a surprise.	这个消息完全是意料之内。


I have often mused that, by 2020, German companies (and policymakers) might prefer a monetary union with China to one with France, given that German-Chinese trade would likely continue to grow.	我有时不禁会遐想，说不定到了2020年，因为德中贸易持续增长，德国企业（和政策制定者）可能更喜欢与中国（而不是法国）建立货币联盟。


And so it has, driven primarily by Chinese exports to Germany. But German exports to China have also been increasing.	尽管这股潮流主要是由中国向德国的出口推动的，但德国对中国的出口也在增加。


Notwithstanding a recent slowdown, Germany could soon export more to China than to its crucial neighbor and partner France, and it already exports more to China than it does to Italy.	虽然最近有所放缓，但德国对华出口可能很快超越其比邻而居的合作伙伴法国（意大利已经被超越）。


For German exporters, France and the UK are the only European national markets larger than China.	对德国出口商来说，法国和英国仅剩的两个比中国更大的欧洲国家市场。


Seasoned observers of international trade tend to follow two general rules.	经验老到的国际贸易观察者倾向于遵循两个原则。


First, the level of trade between two countries often decreases as the geographic distance between them increases.	首先，两国之间的贸易额通常会随着两者之间地理距离的增加而减少。


And, second, a country is likely to conduct more trade with big countries that have strong domestic demand, rather than with smaller countries that have weak demand.	第二，国家更愿意与具有强大国内需求的大国，而不是与需求疲软的小国进行贸易。


The latest German trade data confirm both rules, but especially the second one.	最新的德国贸易数据证实了这两个规则，尤其是第二个。


A big but geographically distant country is different not only in size, but also in kind from a smaller one.	一个幅员辽阔但地理距离遥远的国家相对于小国来说不仅在体量上不同，在性质上也是有差异的。


This is too often forgotten in discussions about trade agreements, especially in such charged political atmospheres as currently prevail in the United Kingdom and the US.	人们经常会在对贸易协定的讨论中遗忘这点，特别是在英国和美国当前火花四溅的政治气氛当中。


In the UK, the House of Commons has already adopted a bill to establish a process for withdrawing from the European Union; but the House of Lords is now demanding that the bill be amended to protect EU nationals living in the UK.	在英国，下议院已经通过了一项法案来创建一套脱欧流程； 但上议院现在要求修改该法案以保护生活在英国的欧盟国民。


In my own brief contribution to the marathon House of Lords debate last month, I argued that, even if Brexit is not the UK’s biggest economic-policy challenge today, it will likely exacerbate other problems, including persistently low productivity growth, weak education and skills-training programs, and geographic inequalities.	在上月上议院对这一议题的马拉松式辩论上所做的简短发言中，我认为即使英国退欧不是英国当前最大的经济政策挑战，它也可能加剧其他问题，包括持续的低生产力增长，贫血的教育和技能培训项目，以及国内区域经济的不平等。


Moreover, I warned that the UK will need to adopt a far more focused and ambitious approach to trade, not unlike that of China or India, if it is to fare well after Brexit.	此外，我警告说如果想在脱欧后过上好日子，英国需要采取一种更加聚焦和雄心勃勃的贸易手段，特别要像中国或印度学习。


Sadly, the UK’s post-Brexit trade strategy is being determined by internal politics, such that it is “patriotic” to focus on new trade deals with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and others in the Commonwealth, while ignoring harsh economic realities.	可悲的是，英国的脱欧后贸易战略却由内部政治所决定，专注于与澳大利亚，加拿大，新西兰和其他英联邦成员国的“爱国式”新贸易交易，却忽视了严苛的经济现实。


New Zealand may be a beautiful country, but it does not have an especially large economy, and it is a very long way from the UK.	新西兰或许风景如画，但它缺乏一个特别庞大的经济，而且距离英国极为遥远。


In fact, despite its massive problems, Greece’s economy is still larger than New Zealand’s.	事实上就算是问题丛生的希腊都比新西兰的经济规模要大。


Many UK policymakers – and all members of the “Leave” campaign – are ignoring the likely costs of exiting the EU single market.	许多英国政策制定者——以及“脱欧”运动的所有成员——都忽视了退出欧盟单一市场所可能产生的成本。


But this factor alone demands serious attention, given the single market’s size and close geographic proximity.	但鉴于欧盟单一市场的规模和隔海相望的地理位置，这一因素本身就需要高度关注。


It is very important that the UK maintain strong trade ties with many EU member states after Brexit.	英国必须在脱欧之后继续与许多欧盟成员国保持强有力的贸易关系。


To that end, Britain should be shoring up its exports of services, a sector where it arguably still has a real net natural advantage.	为此英国应该强化其服务业——在该领域英国可以说仍然具备真正天然净优势——的出口。


At the same time, the UK should urgently be trying to take its relationship with China – or what former British Prime Minister David Cameron called the “golden relationship” – to a new level.	与此同时，英国应该马不停蹄地将对华关系——前英国首相戴维·卡梅伦将其称之为“黄金关系”——提升到一个新的水平。


If there is any country with which the UK should want to strike a new trade agreement, surely it is China.	如果英国必须选一个国家签订新贸易协议的话，那个国家必须得是中国。


During my brief spell in the British government, I helped then-Chancellor George Osborne persuade Cameron that we should aspire to make China our third-largest export market within a decade.	在我在英国政府任职的短暂时期，我协助时任财政大臣的乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）说服卡梅伦应该在十年内使中国成为第三大出口市场。


Does the new government still consider this a priority?	但谁知道新政府是否还认为这是一个优先事项呢？


Beyond China, Britain also needs to be far more focused on its trade ties with India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, all of which will have significant influence in the world economy and global trading patterns in the coming decades.	在中国之外，英国还需更加注重与印度，印尼和尼日利亚的贸易关系，所有这些国家都将在未来几十年对世界经济和全球贸易模式产生重大影响。


In the US, President Donald Trump and his economic-policy advisers need to return to reality, especially on trade.	在美国，特朗普总统和他的经济政策顾问需要接点地气，尤其是在贸易方面。


They can start by studying Germany’s trade patterns, especially vis-à-vis China.	他们可以从学习德国（特别是中德贸易）贸易模式开始。


To be sure, China has a large bilateral trade surplus with the US; but it also constitutes an expanding export market for US companies.	可以肯定的是，中国与美国之间存在巨大的双边贸易顺差； 但它也构成了美国企业不断扩大的出口市场。


And if trends from the last 10-15 years continue, China could soon supplant Canada and Mexico as America’s most important export market.	如果过去10~15年的趋势得以持续的话，中国很快将取代加拿大和墨西哥成为美国最重要的出口市场。


As Chinese household income continues to rise, demand for some of America's most competitive goods and services will only increase.	随着中国家庭收入持续增长，对美国一些最具竞争力的商品和服务的需求只会增加。


Trump, rather than spewing nonsense about China manipulating its currency, should be encouraging market forces to rebalance bilateral trade.	特朗普应当动员市场力量重新实现双边贸易平衡，而不是散布一些关于中国操纵货币的废话。


The same can be said for the US’s overall external deficit.	美国总体外部赤字也是同一个逻辑。


Unless the US can boost its savings rate relative to its internal investment needs, it will continue to need foreign capital inflows.	除非美国能够提高本国储蓄率来满足内部投资需求，否则就将继续需要外国资本流入。


And this, in turn, will require it to maintain a trade and current-account imbalance.	而这反过来又要求它去保持贸易和经常账户的不平衡。


Finally, by pushing for a renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Trump is taking a risk similar to that of the Brexiteers.	最后，通过推动《北美自由贸易协定》的重新谈判，特朗普正在冒类似于脱欧者的风险。


Despite China’s recent gains, Canada and Mexico are still close neighbors and crucial trade partners.	尽管中国最近增长迅猛，但加拿大和墨西哥仍然是美国的近邻和关键贸易伙伴。


By potentially disrupting import patterns with all three countries, Trump’s policies are more likely to push up import prices, while jeopardizing US export growth.	通过暗中破坏美加墨三国的进口模式，特朗普的政策更可能会推高进口价格，同时危及美国的出口增长。


The Trans-Pacific Shell Game	跨太平洋把戏


ROME – The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement is being portrayed as a boon for all 12 of the countries involved.	罗马—跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）贸易协定被描述为是对所有12个参与国的恩惠。


But opposition to the agreement may be the only issue that the remaining US presidential candidates can agree on, and Canada’s trade minister has expressed serious reservations about it.	但反对该协定也许是目前剩下的美国总统候选人唯一达成共识的问题，而加拿大贸易部长也对该协定表示严重保留。


Are the TPP’s critics being unreasonable?	TPP的批评者是否毫无道理？


In a word, no.	一言以蔽之，否。