Most counted on the party’s media monopoly to carry their message, such as it was: “Vote Lezek, a good communist.”	多数人指望党对媒体的垄断来宣传他们的思想，比如：“请给优秀共产党员莱斯泽克投票。 ”


To their credit, the regime accepted its inevitable loss with remarkable grace.	共产党政权以非凡的风度接受了不可避免的失败，这一点非常值得赞扬。


At three p.m. on the day after the vote, Jaruzelski summoned top party officials.	投票结束后当天下午3点，雅鲁泽尔斯基召集了党内高层会议。


“Our defeat is total,” he told them.	“我们遭到了完败，”他说。


“A political solution will have to be found.”	“必须找到政治解决的办法。


By that, he meant no violence and no doctoring the ballot count.	”他这么说不是要使用暴力，也不是要窜改计票结果。


The communists would have to live with the result.	接受现实是共产党人唯一的选择。


Twenty years later, I remain mystified.	20年后的今天，我仍然感到迷惑。


Those of us covering Eastern Europe knew that Solidarity would win.	我们这些报导东欧问题的记者知道团结工会必将获胜。


We knew, too, that its peaceful victory would be a lesson for the rest of the bloc.	我们也知道这次和平的胜利将为集团内部其他国家所仿效。


For anti-communists everywhere, the Polish election was extraordinarily encouraging.	对于各地反共势力来说，波兰的选举结果尤其令人鼓舞。


Thanks to Poland, what only days before had seemed impossible was, suddenly, possible.	多亏有了波兰的榜样，仅仅在几天前似乎还不可能的事突然之间变得可能了。


There were other signs.	此外还有其他的迹象。


In May, Hungarian reformers began tearing down the fence along their border with Austria – a hole in the Iron Curtain.	五月，匈牙利改革者开始拆掉奥匈边境上的围墙——铁幕终于被挖开了一个洞。


In Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of a “Common European House” and repudiated the interventionist Brezhnev Doctrine.	在莫斯科，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫提出建立共同的欧洲议会，不承认干涉主义者勃列日涅夫的教条。


Yet when the Wall tumbled down, experts and world leaders alike were unanimous.	但当柏林墙倒塌的时候，专家和世界领袖们却异口同声。


“We never saw it coming,” they confessed.	他们承认“我们从来没有想到”。


The Cold War had lasted so long that change seemed unimaginable until freedom burst forth.	冷战持续的时间如此之长，以致于在自由真正破茧而出前变革似乎超出人们的想象。


Bringing It All Back Home	卷起铺盖回家


PARIS – Global policymakers regularly congratulate themselves on having avoided the policy errors of the 1930’s during the financial crisis that began in 2008.	巴黎—2008年爆发金融危机后，每隔一段时间，全球决策者就会拍手相庆，认为避免了20世纪30年代的政策失误。


Led by US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke, an economic historian of the Great Depression, they remembered the ideas of John Maynard Keynes and loosened monetary and fiscal policy to avoid the worst.	在大萧条经济史专家、美联储主席伯南克的领导下，他们牢记凯恩斯思想，放松货币和财政政策以避免最坏情形发生。


We are still coping with the budgetary consequences, especially in Europe, but it is true that the world did not end in 2008.	我们至今仍在收拾预算烂摊子，特别是在欧洲。 但是，2008年确实没有成为世界末日。


Monetary tightening was not the only major policy error of the 1930’s; so was a retreat into protectionism, symbolized by the Smoot-Hawley tariff increases at the beginning of that decade.	货币紧缩并非20世纪30年代唯一的重大政策失误； 除此之外还有保护主义复燃——以30年代伊始实行的斯穆特-霍利（Smoot-Hawley）关税法案为典型代表。


Historians continue to debate the centrality of the Smoot-Hawley law itself, but the subsequent tariff war certainly damaged trade and economic growth, making a bad situation worse.	经济史家仍然在为斯穆特-霍利法案本身的集中性争辩不休，但随之而来的关税战破坏了贸易和经济增长，让形势雪上加霜。


Today’s statesmen like to say that they have avoided the protectionist error as well, but is that true?	如今，政客们还喜欢说，他们避免了保护主义错误，但果真是这样吗？


Certainly I do not expect a tariff war to break out in the near term, but there are dangerous indicators of trade trouble ahead.	毫无疑问，我认为短期内绝不会发生关税战，但放眼未来，可以看到不少危险的贸易信号。


The Doha round of global free-trade talks has been abandoned, and the World Trade Organization is now languishing by the lake in Geneva, uncertain of its future.	全球自由贸易谈判多哈回合已经告废，世界贸易组织现在还在寄希望于日内瓦会议，但心怀惴惴焉。


Perhaps Doha was unlikely to achieve much in the current circumstances, but the absence of any continuing dialogue on world trade – at worst, a useful safety valve – adds a new level of risk.	也许多哈回合照目前的形势看不可能获得什么成果，但如果没有后续世界贸易对话跟上——至少也得有个可用的安全阀——则将出现新的风险。


While people are talking, they are less likely to act precipitately.	人们口头上还在谈判，但要指望能有多大实际动作已经不太现实。


In the financial arena, there are many signs of a revival of nationalistic approaches to regulation and currency policy.	在金融方面，越来越多的迹象表明，各国各自为政实施监管和货币政策的时代要卷土重来了。


The crisis challenged the Washington Consensus, which assumed that the world was moving gradually towards free movement of capital and market-determined exchange rates.	危机挑战了华盛顿共识——世界正在逐步走向资本自由流动和市场决定的汇率。


Several countries – including Brazil, South Korea, and Turkey – have now imposed capital controls of various kinds.	不少国家——包括巴西、韩国和土耳其——已经实施了多种资本管制。


Even the International Monetary Fund, long the embodiment of the Washington Consensus, has acknowledged that “capital controls are a legitimate part of the toolkit to manage capital flows in certain circumstances.”	就连华盛顿共识的长期实践者IMF也承认，“在某些情况下，资本管制是合理的资本流管理工具之一”。


American Congressmen view the Chinese as archetypal currency manipulators, but the Swiss have introduced a firm cap on the franc’s appreciation.	美国国会认定中国是货币操纵国的典型例子，但瑞士也对瑞郎的波动上限有着严格控制。


These early signs of deglobalization of financial markets have their parallels in commercial banking, with some of the biggest global institutions retrenching rapidly.	金融市场的这些反全球化早期迹象也可以在商业银行中找到，这群全球最大的金融机构中已有一些开始迅速收缩。


Citibank and HSBC had gone further than most in developing a global footprint; indeed, one can hardly get on a plane nowadays without being reminded that the latter is “the world’s local bank.”	花旗银行和汇丰银行一直是全球化急先锋； 事实上，如今，只要你坐飞机，就一定会看到后者“全世界的本地银行”的广告语。


But both are closing down in many countries.	但这两家银行正在关掉多个国家的业务。


Likewise, many other European banks are cutting back their overseas business sharply.	与此类似，许多其他欧洲银行也在大力削减海外业务。


The impact is particularly vivid in trade finance, where European banks have been major participants in Asia.	贸易金融首当其冲——在这方面，欧洲银行一直是亚洲业务的主要参与者。


Now they are in rapid retreat from that market, creating a worrying gap that Asian banks are seeking to fill.	如今它们正在快速从亚洲市场撤出，导致亚洲银行疲于奔命，寻找填补它们留下的要命空白的办法。


There is more to come.	到这里还不算完。


As they struggle to raise new capital, European banks and insurers are likely to be forced to sell overseas assets.	急于筹集新资本的欧洲银行和保险公司可能将被迫出售海外资产。


If this were simply a sign of a new, tighter focus on viable long-term strategies, it might be regarded it as a benign development.	如果这仅仅表明欧洲银行转向更专注的可靠长期战略的新动向，那么倒是可以被视为良性发展。


But there are indications that the process is being driven by regulatory change, and in some cases by regulatory protectionism.	但有迹象表明，之所以如此是受监管变化推动，其中不乏监管保护主义。


Banks are overseen by a “home” regulator in their country of incorporation, and by a series of “host” regulators where they operate.	银行要受到注册地“母国”监管者的监督，也要受到一系列业务所在地“东道国”监管者的监督。


“Home” regulators and lenders of last resort are increasingly worried about their potential exposure to losses in banks’ overseas operations.	“母国”监管者和最后贷款人越来越担心它们海外业务的潜在风险损失敞口。


As Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, acutely observed, “banks are global in life, but national in death.”	英格兰银行行长默文·金犀利地指出，“银行生在全球，死在祖国。


In other words, home authorities are left to pick up the tab when things go wrong.	”换句话说，一旦出了篓子，还要靠母国当局去收拾残局。


Host regulators are increasingly nervous about banks that operate in their jurisdictions through branches of their corporate parent, without local capital or a local board of directors.	东道国监管者则对那些通过母公司分支在其辖区内开展业务，但没有本地资本或本地董事会的银行越来越忌惮。


So they are insisting on subsidiarization.	因此它们坚持要求子公司化。


From the banks’ perspective, that means that capital is trapped in subsidiaries, and cannot be optimally used across its network.	从银行的角度来说，这意味着资本会被困在子公司，而无法在整个网络实现最优配置。


So banks may prefer to pull out instead.	因此银行可能宁可选择退出。


A particular version of this phenomenon is at work in the European Union.	欧盟就在上演��个桥段。


In the single financial market, banks are allowed to take deposits anywhere, without local approval, if they are authorized to do so in one European country.	作为单一市场，银行可以随处吸收存款而不需要获得地方批准，只要它们获得了其中一个欧洲国家的授权。


Yet when the Icelandic banks failed, the British and Dutch authorities had to bail out local depositors.	但在冰岛银行纷纷倒闭后，英国和荷兰当局不得不出手拯救本地存款人。


Now regulators are discouraging such cross-border business, leading to a process with the ugly new name of “de-euroization.”	如今，监管者已开始抑制此类跨国业务，这导致了一个难听的新名词——“去欧元化”。


We can only hope that it does not catch on.	我们只能寄希望于这不会成为一种时尚。


Regulators, recognizing the risks of allowing financial deglobalization to accelerate, have been seeking better means of handling the failure of huge global banks.	监管者已经意识到金融反全球化之势加速的风险，开始寻找更好的应对全球银行巨头倒闭的良策。


If banks can be wound up easily when things go wrong, with losses equitably distributed, regulators can more easily allow them to continue to operate globally and efficiently.	如果银行在出问题时可以轻松解决，损失可以公平地分担，那么监管者可以更爽快地允许它们继续在全球开展高效经营。


So a major effort to construct a cross-border resolution framework is under way.	因此，建立跨国解决方案框架的重大努力正在进行中。


But it is uphill work, and Daniel Tarullo, a governor of the Federal Reserve, has acknowledged that “a clean and comprehensive solution is not in sight.”	但这项工作相当繁重，美联储官员塔鲁罗（Daniel Tarullo）承认，“清晰完整的解决方案还没有成型。 ”


Does all of this amount to a serious threat to the benefits of globalization?	所有这些都会成为全球化好处的严重威胁吗？


The cautious answer would be that it is too early to say.	谨慎的回答是现在还不好说。


Perhaps we are just seeing the beginnings of a changing of the guard, and that HSBC and Citibank will be replaced as global players by China’s ICBC, Brazil’s Itau Unibanco, or Russia’s Sberbank.	也许我们所看到的仅仅是卫兵交接仪式，花旗银行和汇丰银行的全球地位由中国工商银行、巴西伊塔乌联合银行（Itau Unibanco）、俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行（Sberbank）取而代之。


But it may be that we are seeing a revival of a less benign Keynesian doctrine: “ideas, knowledge, science....should of their nature be international.	但也许我们正在目睹激进凯恩斯主义卷土重来：“思想、知识、科学……理应天然是国际的。


But let goods be homespun wherever it is reasonably and conveniently possible and, above all, let finance be national.”	但商品应该本地的，存在于合理和便利的地方，而金融，那应该是国家的。 ”


Bringing the UK to Europe’s Core	将英国带到欧洲的核心之中


BRUSSELS – The European Union’s core countries these days, besides the original six founders, are the 15 member states that make up the European Monetary Union.	布鲁塞尔—目前欧盟的核心国家，除最初的6个创始国外，是组成欧洲货币联盟的15个国家。


They have converging economies and coordinated monetary and fiscal policies.	这些国家具有趋同的经济体系和共同的货币及财政政策。


The big outsider is the United Kingdom.	最大的外围国家是英国。


British EMU membership remains very desirable.	仍然有许多人希望英国加入欧洲经济货币联盟。


If the EU is to progress beyond the limits of a common economic and monetary policy and develop a defense and security policy along with a common foreign policy, the UK must be on board.	如果欧盟想要突破共同的经济和货币政策的界限，在发展安全防卫政策的同时发展共同的外交政策，英国必须参与。


Exchange-rate fluctuations between sterling and the euro disturb market forces among member states, and at times even have a negative impact in London.	英镑和欧元之间的汇率波动扰乱了欧盟成员国之间的市场力量，有时候甚至在伦敦造成了负面冲击。


In the long run, the UK risks serious isolation if the euro zone starts to exert even greater power.	从长期来看，如果欧元区开始施加更大的影响力，英国就冒着严重的被孤立的风险。


But other European countries must also understand British arguments in favor of the UK maintaining its own currency, given London’s importance as an international financial center as well as its privileged relations with more than 50 Commonwealth countries.	但是，鉴于伦敦作为国际金融中心的重要地位以及英国和50多个英联邦国家的特殊关系，其它欧洲国家也应该理解英国要求其拥有自己的货币的观点。


The euro zone should therefore offer the UK an honorable compromise in which Britain would be allowed to become a full member of the EMU and take a seat in all of its institutions like the European Central Bank and the ministerial Eurogroup, while also being able to keep the pound in its relations with third countries.	因此，欧元区应该为英国提供一个体面的折衷方案，允许英国成为欧洲经济货币联盟的完全成员，加入其所有的机构——例如欧洲中央银行以及部长级的欧元集团，同时在英国和第三国家关系中可以继续使用英镑。


The euro would, however, have to be accepted as legal tender in the UK, alongside the pound, and in the commonwealth countries, and this would demand close cooperation between the Bank of England and the ECB.	但是，欧元应该和英镑一起被作为英国以及英联邦国家的法定货币，这需要英格兰银行和欧洲中央银行间的紧密合作。


Such a compromise would increase the EMU’s weight both inside and outside Europe.	这样的折衷方案可以增加欧洲经济货币联盟在欧洲以及欧洲以外地区的影响力。


A Europe built around such a core corresponds to what I call a “Saturn model,” with a huge planet in the middle, surrounded by rings, converging sooner or later in the center.	建立在这样一个核心周围的欧洲符合我所说的“土星模式”，在这个模式中，在中间是一个巨大的行星，周围被环形环绕着，它们迟早会合而为一。


The outer circles are the transition countries, while the rings around the center would be EU countries that still refuse to join the EMU, or do not yet fulfill all the conditions, like Romania and Bulgaria, or eventually the western Balkan countries and Turkey.	在模式的外围的是过渡时期的国家，与此同时，围绕在中心周围的环形是仍然拒绝加入欧洲经济货币联盟的欧盟国家，或者是像罗马尼亚和保加利亚这样尚未满足所有条件的国家，或者是最终的西巴尔干半岛国家和土耳其。


The Saturn model puts the present fierce debate on enlargement and the borders of Europe into a totally different context, because the core countries would no longer find themselves being asked to accept a Europe divided into different classes of member states.	土星模式将当前关于欧盟扩大和欧洲边界的激烈争论置于一个完全不同的背景，因为核心国家将发现它们不再被要求接受一个被分裂成为不同类别的成员国的欧洲。


The positioning of EU countries on the rings around the core would be transitory, with the aim being to facilitate overall convergence.	处于围绕着核心国家周围的环形上的欧盟国家是暂时的，其目的是推进完全的融合。


Given the impact of globalization and the direct challenge to the EU implied by competition from countries like China and India, the European economy needs to become more innovative.	鉴于全球化以及诸如中国和印度这样的国家潜在的竞争导致的直接的挑战，欧洲经济需要变得更有创新精神。


Economic and social reform policies throughout Europe would be strengthened if the EU authorities were able to coordinate them, and EU enlargement, together with the further development of its internal market of almost half a billion consumers, could powerfully stimulate economic activity.	如果欧盟官方能够协调遍及欧洲的经济和社会改革政策，这些政策会变得更有力，并且，欧盟的扩大以及几乎拥有5亿消费者的内部市场的进一步发展，可以强有力地刺激经济行为。


The accession of Spain and Portugal was a vivid example of that in the 1980’s, and it is an argument that should be considered with respect to such a populous country as Turkey.	20世纪80年代西班牙和葡萄牙的加入就是一个生动的例子，它也是对土耳其这样一个人口众多的国家加入欧盟这个问题应该考虑观点。


Europe has been unifying gradually for 50 years now, and we can reasonably look forward to further inter-continental cooperation and integration, not least because of scientific and technological developments.	现在，欧洲逐渐一体化已经50年了，我们有理由期望进一步的洲际合作和一体化，尤其是因为科学和技术发展的影响。


At the same time, we can expect a growing Atlantic community as successive rounds of trade liberalization make it easier to develop a free-trade area between the EU and the United States.	同时，我们可以期待一个成长中的大西洋共同体，因为后续的贸易自由化谈判使在欧盟和美国之间发展一个自由贸易区更加容易。


Europe’s own experience has taught us that a customs union must be the first step, and that sooner or later the more intense economic cooperation that a customs union imposes will compel its members to establish an economic community that has all the characteristics of a unified internal market.	欧洲自己的经验告诉我们，关税联盟必须是发展自由贸易区的第一步，然后，关税联盟带来的更紧密的经济合作迟早会迫使其成员建立具有统一的内部市场一切特征的经济共同体。


But, of course, this can only function smoothly if exchange-rate fluctuations between its members’ currencies have been eliminated.	但是，当然，这只有在其成员国之间的汇率波动被消除以后才能顺利运行。


Although an Atlantic Monetary Union (between the US and the EU) is a long-term prospect, it should be considered as a grand design for the future.	虽然大西洋货币联盟（美国和欧盟之间的联盟）是一个长期以来的期望，然而，它仅可以作为一个未来的宏大蓝图来考虑。


Europe’s leaders and their voting publics now have a choice between the Europe of the past and of the future.	现在，欧洲的领导人和他们的选民可以在过去的欧洲和未来的欧洲之间进行选择。


The Europe of the past began with the Schuman Plan, which sowed the seeds of today’s EU, and concluded when the Cold War ended.	过去的欧洲以舒曼计划开始，它为现在的欧盟播下了种子，并在冷战结束的时候结束。


It was an era of integration based on the heroic drive to reconcile post-war Germany and France and establish a  Pax Europea , as well as the threatened expansion of the Soviet Union.	这是一个建立在推进战后的德国和法国和解，建立一个和平的欧洲以及苏联扩张的威胁上的一体化时代。


But after the implosion of communism, the situation in Europe was more or less reversed: the defensive demarcation of borders has been replaced by the removal of frontiers across the Continent.	但是，在共产主义垮台之后，欧洲的情形多多少少发生了一些逆转：对边界的防卫划分被在整个大陆消除国境所取代。


However, while General de Gaulle once spoke of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, defining Europe in purely geographical terms omits other criteria – including the European social model and the scale of values on which it is based – of what it means to “belong” to Europe.	但是，虽然戴高乐将军曾经提到将欧洲从大西洋扩大到乌拉尔，然而，仅仅用地理概念定义欧洲漏掉了“属于”欧洲的含义的其它标准——包括欧洲的社会模式以及其建立的价值标准。


Instead, the vocation of Europe in the course of the twenty-first century should be to become the lever of step-by-step inter-continental convergence and unification.	相反，在21世纪，欧洲的使命应该是成为逐步的洲际融合和统一的杠杆。


Europe must be reinvented for this purpose, and broadening the EMU’s reach is the right place to start.	为此目的，欧洲必须进行彻底改造，而扩大欧洲经济货币联盟的范围是一个正确的开端。


No Pain, No Gain for Britain?	英国：没有痛苦就没有收获？


LONDON – The economic historian Niall Ferguson reminds me of the late Oxford historian A.J.P. Taylor.	伦敦—经济史学家尼尔·弗格森（Niall Ferguson）让我想起已故的牛津历史学家泰勒（A. J.


Though Taylor maintained that he tried to tell the truth in his historical writing, he was quite ready to spin the facts for a good cause.	Taylor）。 尽管泰勒在其历史写作中坚持试图述说真相，但他随时准备出于好意采取春秋笔法。


Ferguson, too, is a wonderful historian – but equally ready to spin when he shifts into political gear.	弗格森也是了不起的历史学家——但在进入政治领域时有些狂妄。


Ferguson’s cause is American neo-conservatism, coupled with a relentless aversion to Keynes and Keynesians.	弗格森笃信美国新保守主义，同时他顽固地排斥凯恩斯和凯恩斯主义。


His latest defense of fiscal austerity came immediately after the United Kingdom’s recent election, when he wrote in the Financial Times that, “Labour should blame Keynes for their defeat.”	最近，英国大选刚刚落下帷幕，他又开始为财政紧缩辩护，在为《金融时报》撰写的文章中，他说，“工党应该把失败归咎于凯恩斯。 ”


Ferguson’s argument amounts to that of a brutal disciplinarian who claims vindication for his methods by pointing out that the victim is still alive.	弗格森的观点就像是残酷不仁的严格执行者，认为受害者还活着就说明他的方法是可行的。


In pleading on behalf of British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, he points out that the UK economy grew by 2.6% last year (the “best performing of the G-7 economies”), but ignores the damage that Osborne inflicted on the economy en route to this recovery.	他为英国财政大臣乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）辩护，说英国经济去年增长了2. 6%（是“G-7经济体中表现组好的”），但对奥斯本给经济复苏过程中造成的伤害只字不提。


There is now much agreement about this damage.	如今，对于这一伤害已经达成了相当大的共识。


The Office of Budget Responsibility, the independent agency set up by Osborne to assess the government’s macroeconomic performance, has just concluded that austerity reduced GDP growth by 2% from 2010 to 2012, bringing the cumulative cost of austerity since 2010 to 5% of GDP.	由奥斯本设立、评估政府宏观经济表现的独立机构预算责任办公室（Office of Budget Responsibility）刚刚估算，从2010年到2012年，紧缩导致GDP增长下降2%，2010年以来的累计损失相当于GDP的5%。


Simon Wren-Lewis of Oxford University estimates that the damage might be as high as 15% of GDP.	牛津大学的西蒙·任-刘易斯（Simon Wren-Lewis）估算该损失可能高达GDP的15%。


In a recent poll of British economists by the Centre for Macroeconomics, two-thirds agreed that austerity had harmed the UK economy.	在宏观经济学中心（Centre for Macroeconomics）的最新英国经济学家意见调查中，三分之二的受访者同意紧缩伤害了英国经济。


Moreover, Britain is not alone.	而且英国不是“一个人”在战斗。


In its October 2012 World Economic Outlook, the IMF admitted that, “fiscal multipliers were underestimated across the world.”	在2012年10月的《世界经济展望》（World Economic Outlook）中，IMF承认“财政乘数被全世界所低估。


In plain English: the forecasters underestimated the extent of spare capacity and hence the scope for fiscal expansion to raise output.	”用大白话说就是：预测者低估了闲置产能的程度，因此也低估了财政扩张可能带来的产出增长。


Was it an honest mistake?	这是无心之失吗？


Or was it because the forecasters were in thrall to economic models that implied that economies were at full employment, in which case the only result of fiscal expansion would be inflation?	或者，这是因为预测者被暗示经济处于充分就业状态、财政扩张的唯一结果只能是通货膨胀的经济模型所迷惑了吗？


They now know better, and Ferguson should now know better as well.	现在，他们已经有了更好的了解，弗格森现在也应该有了更好的了解。


A depressing aspect of Ferguson’s interpretation is his failure to acknowledge the impact of the Great Recession on government performance and business expectations.	弗格森的狂妄有一个令人沮丧的方面，那就是他根本没有意识到大萧条对政府表现和商业预期的影响。 因此，他将2014年2.


Thus, he compares 2.6% growth in 2014 with the 4.3% contraction in 2009, which he describes as “the last full year of Labour government” – as though Labour policy produced the collapse in growth.	3%的衰退相比较。 他称2009年时“工党政府的最后一个整年”——好像工党的政策导致了增长崩溃似的。


Similarly, “At no point after May 2010 did [confidence] sink back to where it had been throughout the last two years of Gordon Brown’s catastrophic premiership” – as though the Brown government’s performance caused business confidence to collapse.	类似地，“自2010年5月以后，[信心]从未跌回戈登·布朗灾难般的首相生涯的最后两年的低位”——好像是布朗政府的表现导致商业信心崩溃似的。


The claim that “Keynes is to blame” for Labour’s election defeat is peculiarly odd.	把工党选举失利“归咎凯恩斯”的说法尤其怪异。


After all, the one thing Labour’s leadership tried hardest to do in the campaign was to distance the party from any “taint” of Keynesianism.	毕竟，工党领导层在选战中用力最多之处乃是将工党与一切凯恩斯主义“毒药”划清界限。


Perhaps Ferguson meant that it was Labour’s past association with Keynes that had damned them – “their disastrous stewardship before and during the financial crisis,” as he puts it.	也许弗格森的意思是工党与凯恩斯结盟的过去让他们付出了代价——用他的话说，就是“他们在金融危机之前和之中的灾难性治国之道。 ”


In fact, Labour’s most recent governments were determinedly non-Keynesian; monetary policy was geared to hitting a 2% inflation target, and fiscal policy aimed at balancing the budget over the business cycle: standard macro-economic fare before the recession struck.	事实上，工党最新几届政府绝非凯恩斯主义者； 货币政策的目标一��是2%的通胀，财政政策的目标一直是平衡整个商业周期的预算——在衰退开始前，这是标准的宏观经济方针。


The most damning charge against their stewardship is that they embraced the idea that financial markets are optimally self-regulating – a view that Keynes rejected.	对他们的治国之道的最严厉的指责是他们认为金融市场最好自我监管——而这正是凯恩斯反对的。


Keynes was not to blame for Labour’s defeat; in large part, Scotland was.	凯恩斯不是工党失败的原因； 从很大程度上说，苏格兰才是。


The Scottish National Party’s crushing victory left Labour with only one seat in the country.	苏格兰民族党（Scottish National Party）的大获全胜导致工党在该地区只获得一席。


There are no doubt many reasons for the SNP’s overwhelming triumph, but support for austerity is not one of them.	毫无疑问，苏格兰民族党之所以大获全胜，原因有很多，但支持紧缩绝不在此列。


(The Conservatives did as badly as Labour.)	（保守党和工党做的一样糟糕。 ）


Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister of Scotland and leader of the SNP, attacked the “cozy consensus” around fiscal consolidation in Westminster.	苏格兰第一大臣、苏格兰民族党领袖尼古拉·斯特金（Nicola Sturgeon）抨击威斯敏斯特围绕财政整合计划的“愉快共识”。


The deficit, she rightly said, was “a symptom of economic difficulties, not just the cause of them.”	她正确地指出，赤字是“经济困难的表征，而不仅是经济困难的原因。


The SNP manifesto promised “at least an additional £140 billion ($220 billion) across the UK to invest in skills and infrastructure.”	”苏格兰民族党的竞选口号承诺“至少在全英国增加1,400亿英镑投资于技能和基础设施。 ”


This is what leaders of the Labour party like Alistair Darling, Gordon Brown’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, are now saying. But they seem to have had no influence on the two architects of Labour’s election strategy, Ed Miliband and Ed Balls, both now removed from front-line politics.	因此，如果苏格兰民族党依靠“凯恩斯主义”财政扩张计划取得如此出色的成绩，那么，认为工党若更有力地为其自身执政记录辩护、更积极地攻讦奥斯本的财政政策就会收到更好的效果岂非有理？


What the Conservatives did succeed in doing, and doing brilliantly, was to persuade English people that they were only “cleaning up Labour’s mess,” and that, but for austerity, Britain would have “gone the way of Greece” – exactly Ferguson’s view.	保守党的成功做成并且做得相当聪明的是说服英格兰人民他们只是在“收拾工党的烂摊子”，并且，要不是紧缩，英国将“是另一个希腊”——而这正是弗格森的观点。


One might conclude that all of this is history: the voters have spoken.	你也许会认为，所有这些都是历史：选民已经发话。


But it would be a mistake to accept the Conservative narrative as the last word.	但接受保守党的说辞为定音是一个错误。


It is basically a tissue of propaganda, with little support in theory and destructive effects in practice.	从根本上，这是宣传手段，没有什么支持，倒是有破坏性的实践效果。


This might not matter so much had there been a change of government.	如果换了一个政府，这也许不重要。


But Osborne is back as Chancellor, promising even tougher cuts over the next five years.	但奥斯本又回到了财政大臣的位子上，承诺在未来五年采取更严格的削减开支。


And fiscal austerity is still the reigning doctrine in the eurozone, thanks to Germany.	而拜德国所赐，财政紧缩也依然是欧元区主宰观念。


So the damage is set to continue.	因此，伤害还会继续。


In the absence of a compelling counter-narrative, we may be fated to find out just how much pain the victims can withstand.	如果没有令人信服的反驳，我们也许不得不目睹受害者到底能承受多少痛苦。


The Eclipse of British Reason	站不住脚的英国理由


BERLIN – When placed under too much strain, chains tend to break at the weakest link.	柏林— 当拉力过大时，链条会从最薄弱的一环断起。


Figuratively speaking, the same applies to the European Union.	这形象地说明了欧盟的状况。


So the entire world quite naturally assumed that any process of EU disintegration would start primarily in the crisis-ridden European south (Greece, first and foremost).	因此，全世界都会非常自然地认为，如果欧盟开始分裂，最初一定从危机深重的南欧（其中又以希腊首当其冲）开始。


But, as British Prime Minister David Cameron has now demonstrated, the European chain is most likely to break not at its weakest link, but at its most irrational.	但是，正如英国首相卡梅伦最近所指出的，欧洲之链的断环极有可能不出现在最弱的一环，而出现在最不理智的一环。


The United Kingdom – the homeland of pragmatism and realism, a country of unflappable principles and unmatched adaptability that stoically gave up its empire after successfully defending Europe’s freedom against Nazi Germany – has now lost its way.	英国——实用主义和现实主义的发轫地，一个有着惊人镇定和适应性的国家，一个在成功对抗纳粹德国、捍卫欧洲自由之后放弃帝国地位的国家——如今正在迷失方向。


More precisely, it has been led astray by the Conservative Party’s ideological fantasy that certain EU powers can and should be returned to British sovereignty.	更准确滴说，它是被保守党意识形态幻象——欧盟权力可以也应该回归英国主权——带错了路。


The UK’s national interests have not changed, and no fundamental shifts within the EU have worked against those interests.	英国的国家利益并未改变，欧盟的根本性变化也并不对英国国家利益构成威胁。


What has changed is Britain’s domestic politics: a prime minister too weak to control his roughly 100 anti-European backbenchers (call them the “High Tea Party”) in the House of Commons, and a Conservative establishment wary of the UK Independence Party’s rise, which could cost the Tories enough votes on the right to give Labour an electoral advantage.	改变的是英国的国内政治：首相太弱，镇不住下议院约100人的反欧洲议员（称之为“茶话会”（High Tea Party）），而保守党政府还担心英国独立党的崛起，这会导致保守党失去右翼选票，让工党在大选中占先。


Cameron claims that he does not want the UK to leave the EU.	卡梅伦说，他不愿看到英国离开欧盟。


But his strategy – “renegotiation” of EU membership, followed by a British referendum on the new agreement – is the product of two illusions: first, that he can ensure a positive outcome, and, second, that the EU is able and willing to give him the concessions that he wants.	但他的战略——“重议”欧盟成员国资格，然后就新协议举行英国全民公投——是两大幻觉的产物。 其一是他可以确保产生积极结果，其二是欧盟可以也愿意给出他想要的让步。


In fact, there is good reason to believe that such a course would take on a dynamic of its own, possibly leading to an unintended British exit from the EU.	事实上，有充分的理由认为，整个过程会按自己的逻辑发展，可能出现意料之外的英国退出欧盟的结果。


That would be a severe setback for the EU; for the British, blundering through history, it would be a veritable disaster.	这将是欧盟的一次严重退步； 对英国来说，历史表明这一结果将是名副其实的灾难。


While Britain surely would survive outside the EU, the quality of its existence is another matter.	毫无疑问，脱离欧盟的英国也能生存，但生存质量如何就难说了。


By exiting the EU, the UK would severely damage its economic interests, losing both the single market and London’s role as a financial center.	退出欧盟会严重损害英国的经济利益，既失去了单一市场，也丢掉了伦敦的金融中心地位。


An exit would also harm Britain’s geopolitical interests, both in Europe (where, ironically, it favors EU enlargement) and, worldwide, in its global standing and special relationship with the United States (which has made clear its preference for a European UK).	退出欧盟也会危害英国的地缘政治利益，不仅包括其在欧洲的利益（讽刺的是，这方面它倒是支持欧盟扩张的），也包括其在全世界的利益，其在全球事务中的地位以及其与美国的特殊关系（美国明确表示更希望看到欧洲英国）。


Unfortunately, Cameron’s track record in European politics does not inspire confidence in his ability to manage a different outcome.	不幸的是，卡梅伦的欧洲政治表现记录实在无法激起人们对他获得不同结果的信心。


When, in 2009, he ordered the Conservative MEPs to withdraw from the European People’s Party, the Europe-wide grouping of center-right political forces, he merely deprived the Tories – now consigned to sit with the sectarians and obscurantists – of any influence in the European Parliament.	2009年，他下令保守党MEP退出欧洲人民党（European People’s Party，泛欧洲的中右翼政治势力集团），此举剥夺了保守党在欧洲议会的一切影响力，而保守党现在已与派系主义者和反启蒙主义者处在同一阵营中。


By weakening the UK’s position within the EU, he ended up strengthening the Euro-skeptics within his party.	他削弱了英国在欧盟的地位，最终加重了党内对欧元的疑虑


But, while Cameron should know from grim experience what is looming, it seems that he has abandoned rational considerations.	但是，尽管卡梅伦应该知道惨痛的教训，却仍抛弃了理智的思路。


Indeed, the belief that the EU would renegotiate Britain’s membership terms – which assumes, further, that Germany would not object – borders on magical thinking.	事实上，认为欧盟会重议英国的成员资格条件——这意味着德国不会反对——简直是白日做梦。


Such a precedent would be applicable to the other member states, which would mean the end of the EU.	如此先河将被其他成员国所援引，从而意味着欧盟的末日。


With all due respect to the UK, dismantling the EU as the price of its continued membership is an absurd idea.	尽管英国德高望重，但为了继续其成员资格而解散欧盟实在太过荒谬。


Cameron should recognize that his strategy cannot be allowed (even if he fears that a few cosmetic corrections to the treaty won’t help him at home).	卡梅伦应该认识到，他的战略是不可能实现的（即使他担心对条约修饰性的修改无助于他在国内的处境）。


In the meantime, the Tories risk losing their way on a crucial issue – reform of the relationship between the eurozone and non-euro EU members – if they try to use it as leverage to renegotiate the various European treaties.	与此同时，如果保守党想将此作为重议众多欧洲条约的第一步，那么他们将有可能失去解决一个关键问题——改革欧元区和非欧元区欧盟成员国关系——的机会。


Britain knows that the euro’s survival requires much closer political integration, and also that London’s role as a financial center – as important for the UK as the nuclear industry is for France and the auto industry is for Germany – would be greatly damaged if the euro should fail.	英国知道，欧元的生存需要更紧密的政治一体化，也知道作为金融中心的伦敦之于英国就像核工业之于法国、汽车工业之于德国，若是欧元崩溃，将受到严重损害。


Although no one should expect the British to join the euro any time soon, political leadership within the EU requires the acumen to take account of the central interests of one’s own country and those of the other member states without indulging in threats.	尽管没人会期待英国在不久的将来加入欧元区，但欧盟内部的政治领导力需要明智地考量一国本身的核心利益和其他成员国的核心利益，不能把目光集中在威胁上。


This, however, requires an adequate understanding of those interests and a willingness to cooperate on the basis of mutual trust, which should be a given within the European family.	但是，这又要求充分理解这些利益，并愿意在互惠基础上合作，而这在欧洲大家庭中应是理所当然之事。


Speeches, particularly when delivered by leaders of great nations, can be useful, irrelevant, or dangerous.	说辞，特别是来自大国领导人的说辞，可能有用，可能不切题，也可能有害。


Cameron’s long-planned speech on Europe was postponed time and again.	卡梅伦酝酿已久的关于欧洲的讲话被一再打断。


Perhaps he should have taken that as a sign that he should rethink his position.	也许他应该将这作为反思其立场的信号。


He still can, before it is too late.	他还可以这样做，再不做就晚了。


The best starting point would be a re-reading of Winston Churchill’s famous speech in Zurich in 1946.	最佳起点是重读一下丘吉尔1946年在苏黎世的著名演讲。


“We must build a kind of United States of Europe,” urged Britain’s greatest twentieth-century statesman.	“我们必须建设一个欧罗巴合众国，”英国20世纪最伟大首相如是说。


That remains our task – and Britain’s – to this day.	如今，这仍然是我们——也是英国——的任务。


Brittle Britain	脆弱的英国


LONDON – Which European country faces the greatest risk of political instability and financial turmoil in the year ahead?	伦敦—在未来一年中，哪个欧洲国家面临最大的政治动荡和金融混乱风险？


With less than a week to go before the British general election on May 7, the answer is both obvious and surprising.	在5月7日英国大选还有不到一周之际，答案既明显又令人震惊。


Once a haven of political and economic stability amid the turmoil of the euro crisis, the United Kingdom is about to become the European Union’s most politically unpredictable member.	作为曾经欧元危机中的政治和经济稳定的避风港，英国即将成为欧盟政治局面最难预测的成员国。


Indeed, continuity is the one election outcome that can almost certainly be excluded.	事实上，连续性几乎可以确定从选举结果中排除。


Unless opinion polls are inaccurate to a degree unprecedented in British history, the two parties comprising the government coalition, Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, have almost no chance of winning a combined parliamentary majority.	除非民调结果出现英国历史上最大程度的不准确性，否则组成执政联盟的两党——首相卡梅伦的保守党和自由民主党——几乎不可能赢得联合议会多数席位。


One possibility – with a probability slightly above 50% according to the polls – is that Britain, the birthplace of Thatcherism and the EU’s standard-bearer of neoliberal economics, will soon have a Labour-led government committed to the biggest tax-raising program since the 1970s.	一个可能性——根据民调结果，这一可能性略高于50%——是英国，撒切尔主义的诞生地和欧盟新自由主义经济学的旗帜，很快就会出现一个决心实施自20世纪70年代以来最大增税计划的工党政府。


Moreover, because of the peculiarities of the British electoral system and the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, a Labour government’s survival would depend on the support of parties with even more radical economic agendas and dedicated to dismantling the UK.	此外，拜英国选举制度的特殊性和苏格兰和威尔士民族主义的兴起所赐，工党政府能否生存下去取决于经济日程更加激进、以分裂英国为目标的政党的支持。


Another scenario – almost as probable as a Labour-led coalition – is a weak and unstable Conservative government.	另一个情景——与工党领导的执政联盟情形可能性几乎相当——是弱势且不稳定的保守党政府。


To judge by the opinion polls, Cameron’s best hope is to win more parliamentary seats than Labour and try to form a minority government, which could survive as long as the other parties failed to unite against it.	从民调结果看，卡梅伦的最大希望是赢得比工党更多的议会席位，然后试图组建少数派政府，主要其他政党不联合起来反对，就能继续执政。


This might be possible, because the Liberal Democrats and Scottish Nationalist Party may see benefits in allowing a weak Conservative government to remain in power, at least for a while.	这也许是可能的，因为自由民主党和苏格兰民族党（Scottish Nationalist Party）也许认为允许弱势的保守党政府上台有利可图，至少暂时如此。


But a minority Conservative government would create additional uncertainties and risks.	但少数派保守党政府会带来更多不确定性和风险。


Cameron would be more vulnerable than any leader in postwar British history to blackmail by his own party’s dissidents and extremists, who see it as their historic mission to pull Britain out of the EU.	卡梅伦将比其他所有战后英国领导人都更容易受到本党异见派和极端分子的要挟，后两者把让英国退出欧盟视为自己的历史使命。


And a minority government would be unable to pass any controversial legislation that the Scottish Nationalists opposed.	而少数派政府也将无法通过任何苏格兰民族党反对的争议立法。


Moreover, Britain’s political institutions might be unable to cope.	此外，英国政治制度也将无以为继。


The UK’s unwritten constitution is based entirely on tradition and precedent.	英国的不成文宪法完全基于传统和先例。


That arrangement has always presupposed strong governments with clear mandates.	这一安排永远需要以拥有明确权力的强势政府为前提。


The constitution is so poorly adapted to coalitions and minority governments that some legal scholars question whether the Queen should address Parliament on behalf of “her” new government if there is a risk that it will be toppled within a few weeks or months.	宪法极不适应联合政府和少数派政府，一些法律学者甚至质疑，如果政府不出几周或几个月就会被推翻，那么女王是否应该宣布议会代表“她的”新政府？


And yet, although the electoral arithmetic makes a stable centrist government – one that could maintain Britain’s current policies on taxes, economic management, and Europe – almost impossible to imagine, continuity is the outcome that most international business leaders and politicians seem to expect.	此外，尽管选举算术意味着稳定的中间道路政府——能够保持英国当前的税收、经济管理和欧洲政策的政府——几乎不可能出现，但连续性仍是大部分国际商界领袖和政客所期待的结果。


The clearest evidence of this can be seen in financial markets.	关于这一点，最明显的证据要数金融市场。


Although the pound has declined by about 10% from its peak of $1.70 last September, sterling weakness has simply reflected the dollar’s strength.	尽管英镑汇率自去年9月的合1. 70美元贬值了大约10%，但这完全是美元强势的结果。


In the same period, sterling has risen almost 10% against the euro, while British share prices have hit all-time highs and government bonds have generated better returns in Britain than in the United States, Germany, or Japan.	与此同时，英镑对欧元升值了近10%，而英国股价正处于历史最高水平，英国政府债券的回报也高于美国、德国和日本。


What accounts for this apparent indifference – also evident among European politicians – to the looming political risks in Britain?	什么造成了这一对即将到来的英国政府风险的漠视——在欧洲政客之间显然也是如此？


Many international observers believe that politics simply no longer matters much in Britain, because the economy is fundamentally sound and growing at a fairly healthy pace.	许多国际观察家认为政治早已不在英国占据重要地位，因为经济基本面良好，增长率相当健康。


But this is a dangerously complacent argument.	但这是一种非常危险的自满观点。


Yes, Britain recorded the fastest economic growth among the major OECD countries in 2014 and has an unemployment rate of only half the EU average.	是的，2014年英国经济增长为主要经合组织国家中最快的，失业率也只有欧盟平均水平的一半。


But these favorable indicators obscure a source of enormous risk: one of the world’s largest external deficits, financed last year by foreign-capital inflows totaling $160 billion.	但这些有利指标掩盖了一个巨大的风险源：世界首屈一指的外部赤字，去年这一赤字通过总额高达1,600亿美元的外部资本流入填补。


The current-account gap, at 5.5% of GDP, is by far the highest among the major OECD countries and is at a level long associated – both in the UK and elsewhere – with the onset of financial crises.	经常项目缺口相当于GDP的5. 5%，目前为主要经合组织国家最高，这一水平也是金融危机爆发以来长期存在的水平——英国和其他国家都是如此。


As long as Britain was a haven of political stability and tax policies favorable to foreign investors, it had no problem attracting capital inflows.	只要英国身为政治稳定的安全港并且税收政策有利于外国投资者，就不会出现吸引资本流入的问题。


But the impending shifts in Britain’s politics and its EU relations are bound to draw attention to the economy’s extreme dependence on foreign finance.	但英国政坛及其与欧盟关系即将发生的改变必然会引起人们关注英国经济对外部融资的极端依赖。


A Labour government, wielding tax proposals specifically designed to hit private foreign investors, would certainly discourage inflows.	工党政府有一套专门用来对付私人外国投资者的税收计划，该计划必定会影响资本流入。


But international investors might be equally put off by a weak Conservative government dominated by the party’s Europhobe wing.	但国际投资者也许同样会因为“恐欧派”把持的弱势保守党政府而感到沮丧。


In either case, GDP growth is likely to slow as business confidence, consumption, and house prices suffer – either from new taxes under Labour or from uncertainties about EU membership under the Conservatives.	无论如何，GDP增长都会随商业信心、消费和房价的不振——或者因为工党的新税收政策，或者因为保守党带来的欧盟成员资格不确定性——而减速。


Another reason why international observers may be ignoring such obvious risks is that they have been preoccupied with more dramatic events in Greece and Ukraine.	另一个国际观察家忽视如此明显的风险的原因是他们的目光完全集中在希腊和乌克兰你的大事件上。


Politicians, financial analysts, and political commentators have limited time and attention.	政客、金融分析家和政治评论家的时间和注意力都是有限的。


They tend to focus on whatever seems to be the biggest and most urgent story, and British politics has not been it.	他们倾向于关注最大最紧迫的问题，而英国政治不在此列。


Then again, many apparently sophisticated analysts may simply be in a state of psychological denial.	而许多显然是非常老练的分析家可能再次完全陷入了一种心理否认的状态。


Surveys of business and financial opinion in Britain show clear majorities in these groups expecting a sudden swing toward the Conservatives in the closing days of the election campaign, resulting in a stable coalition government and continuity in economic and political conditions.	英国商业和金融观点调查表明，这类群体中的绝对多数期望选战的最后几日会出现有利于保守党的突然转变，形成一个稳定的执政联盟和实现经济和政治环境的连续性。


Such a last-minute shift in voting intentions is possible, but the time for it is running out.	发生最后一分钟选举倾向改变时可能的，但时间正在耗尽。


In fact, British public opinion has remained uncannily stable, not only during the official election campaign, but throughout the past 12 months.	事实上，英国公众观点一直惊人地稳定，不仅在官方选战期间是如此，在整个过去12个月里一直是如此。


There are simply no rational grounds for expecting either the Conservatives or Labour to achieve the decisive victory needed to form a stable government.	预期保守党或工党取得组建稳定政府所需要的决定性胜利绝非理性预期。


The upcoming election will therefore mark the beginning, not the end, of a period of uncertainty for British politics, economics, and finance.	因此，即将到来的选举将标志着英国政治、经济和金融不确定性时代的开始，而不是结束。


No amount of lingering faith in stability will change that.	即使再大的稳定信念也无法改变这一点。


Britain’s Failed Human Rights Revolution	英国人权革命的失败


LONDON – The budget-cutting austerity program of Britain’s new coalition government has been claiming all the headlines, but David Cameron’s cabinet is breaking with its Labour predecessor in another key area as well: human rights.	发自伦敦——英国新联合政府的预算紧缩计划无疑占据了各大媒体的头条，但大卫·卡梅隆内阁同时也与前任工党政府在另一个关键领域彻底决裂——那就是人权。


Indeed, the human-rights experiment that Tony Blair’s Labour government brought to Britain has failed.	事实上，由东尼·布莱尔的工党政府带给英国的人权试验已经彻底宣告破产了。


Faulted by some for its inability to prevent “illiberal” anti-terrorism measures, the Human Rights Act is criticized by just as many others for hampering counter-terrorism policy.	英国的人权法案如今是两面不讨好：一方面有人指责其无力制止“粗暴”的反恐监察措施，另一方面又被人批评其阻碍了反恐政策的顺利实施。


Indeed, many people mock the very notion of human rights, which is seen as leading to “loony” concessions that favor criminals and terrorists.	实际上有许多人都对人权的终极理念嗤之以鼻，认为这只会导致对罪犯和恐怖分子的“愚蠢”妥协。


Overall, the reaction of both press and public is one of disillusion and/or cynicism.	总的来说，媒体和公众的反应总是介乎于理想幻灭以及冷嘲热讽之间。


Britain famously has no written constitution, or, until recently, anything resembling a modern Bill of Rights. Instead, we have Magna Carta and cricket.	英国这个国家以没有成文宪法闻名，或者说，直到最近都没有形成一份类似现代《权利法案》的文件，不过我们有1215年《自由大宪章》和板球。


The concept of universal human rights is literally foreign – enshrined in the broad-brush principles of the European Convention on Human Rights, whose court sits in Strasbourg.	普世人权的概念其实是个舶来品——它存在于《欧洲人权公约》那些笼统的原则当中，而人权法庭则远在法国斯特拉斯堡。


Until recently, anyone who wished to bring a human-rights case against the British government had to go to France.	因此任何想以人权理由控告英国政府的人都得跑到法国才能立案。


Times changed when Tony Blair came to power in 1997.	不过在布莱尔1997年上台之后，事情开始有了转机。


With fanfare and idealism – reflected in the slogan “Rights Brought Home” – the Human Rights Act came into effect in 2000.	在“权利终于回家了（意指回到了发源地）”这一浮夸和理想主义口号的映衬下，英国《人权法案》终于在2000年得以颁布实施。


But the high-minded liberalism of the then-elite had a practical point as well: should the government have any soiled linen, it should be laundered in British courts rather than be aired before a panel of international judges.	但这些充满道德感的自由主义精英也有自己的小算盘：倘若英国政府违反了法案的话，那就得由英国自己的法庭来审判，不用飘洋过海去劳烦那些国际法官了。


Yet the Act is unloved by the British public, which never engaged with the process.	但这个法案在英国却不得人心，也从未付诸法律实践。


As Tony Blair’s wife, Cherie Booth, herself a human rights lawyer, lamented, “the majority of people feel that human rights are not relevant to their lives.”	正如布莱尔的夫人切丽·布斯（她本身就是位人权律师）哀叹道：“大部分公众认为人权法案与自己的生活毫不相关。 ”


There is a lesson here: if it’s not broken, don’t fix it. Put another way, actions speak louder than words.	这个例子告诫我们：不要画蛇添足，或者说，事实胜于雄辩。


When compared with human-rights abuses that truly affect humanity, the complaints dealt with by the British courts are small beer.	与那些真正有损人道的侵犯人权行为相比，英国法院所受理的那些人权投诉简直不值一提。


Which child goes to what school or what public housing is offered to which asylum seeker will be of concern to many people (and views will differ). But using the broad brush of “human rights” to resolve such issues trivializes the concept.	哪个孩子应该上哪所学校，或者应该给政治避难者安排何种住宿这类的问题都会引发许多人的关注（而且观点往往会分化），但用“人权”这个粗略的概念来解决这些问题其实是贬低了这个概念。


It also inhibits proper debate.	而这同时也阻碍了真正严肃的讨论。


After all, what responsible public body wants to be accused of violating human rights?	最后，估计也没有哪个公共机构愿意因侵犯人权而遭到起诉。


Indeed, the threat of human-rights litigation has made providers of public services overly cautious and defensive.	事实上，人权诉讼的威胁令到那些提供公共服务的机构变得过于谨慎和保守。


This has led the popular press to howl that we now live in a costly, bureaucratic, and inefficient “human rights culture” – a charge with profound political resonance.	这使得公众媒体痛批我们正生活在一个耗资巨大，官僚习气深重，而且低效率的“人权文化”当中——这可算是一个引发深层次政治回响的指控。


Before he became Prime Minister, Cameron called for the Human Rights Act to be replaced with something more “British.”	而在问鼎首相之前，卡梅隆就呼吁用某种更“英国”方式的来取代《人权法案》。


Paradoxically, some deem human rights to be wholly inefficacious where their recognition is most required. Many MPs who backed the incorporation of the European human-rights convention into British law came to view formal recognition of human rights as a grave inconvenience when faced with Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism.	但荒谬的是，在人权最需要得到承认的时候，有些人却认为人权是一个毫无用处的东西，许多英国议员支持将欧洲人权法案编入英国法律，但他们同时也发现：如果给人权以正式承认的话，就会在对抗基地组织这类恐怖主义行为方面遭到极大不便。


In short, having brought rights home, the Blair government ended up trying to hide them under the sofa.	简而言之，在“权力终于回家”之后，布莱尔政府却最终想把它塞到沙发底下藏起来。


This conundrum is symbolized by the debate over detaining terrorism suspects without charge or trial.	而这一谜局在一场辩论上得到了最终体现——关于在没有起诉或审判的情况下关押恐怖主义嫌疑犯。


Initially, Blair attempted to force through detention without charge for up to 90 days. Parliament settled on 28 days – still the longest such period in the Western world.	原本布莱尔打算将拘留期设定为90天，最终议会将其定在28天——但这依然是西方世界中最长的拘留期。


So much, then, for Article 6 of the European Convention, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right “to be informed promptly” of the nature of the accusation against him.	但《欧洲人权公约》第6条规定：每个受到犯罪指控的人都有权“被立刻告知”自己的罪名。


So much, also, for Magna Carta, which provides that “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned…but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”	而《大宪章》里也列明“任何自由人，如未经他人之依法裁判，或经国法判决，皆不得被逮捕，监禁……”


Blair’s behavior is not unique.	不过布莱尔的所作所为可不是一个特例。


The fact is that any piece of legislation purporting to embody human rights is entirely vulnerable to a political system in which parliament is supreme.	事实上，任何试图实现人权的立法手段在一个议会高于一切的政治系统中都是不堪一击的。


The Human Rights Act must inevitably yield to subsequent legislation.	《人权法案》必然要臣服于随后颁布的法律法规。


All legislation is passed by a simple majority.	这些法律法规可都是获得了议会简单多数通过的。


And judges cannot strike down legislation.	而法官是无法与这些条文抗衡的。


The result?	结果是什么？


Rights brought home one day; detention for a month without charge the next.	权力只回了一天家； 不过嫌疑人可要在大牢里蹲上1个月，却不知道自己犯了什么罪。


Indeed, even when the cause of human rights is being advanced, the Human Rights Act is now overlooked.	事实上，即便人权的原则得到了推进，《人权法案》如今却遭到了忽视。


In May, in his first major policy speech, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg announced the sweeping away of the “Big Brother” state that Blair had constructed: no more ID cards or national identity register, new restrictions on the storage of DNA, tighter regulation of the closed-circuit television surveillance that had made the British the most monitored people on earth, and so on.	在副首相尼克·克列格5月发表的第一次重要政策演说中，他声明要推翻布莱尔所建成的“老大哥”国家（意指国家监控公民一切行为）：不再有身份证或者人口登记，对DNA信息的存储设立新限制，收紧对闭路电视监控的规管（此网络已经令英国人成为全球受监控程度最严重的人民）等等。


All this and not one mention of “human rights” – an absence that reflects the political sensitivity of human rights in Britain today, and that tacitly acknowledges that when the stakes are high, the Human Rights Act cannot be relied upon.	他说了那么多，却一句都没提到“人权”——这既反映出人权在当今英国的敏感性，同时也在默默地承认：在这种关键时刻，《人权法案》可是靠不住的。


Where, then, does that leave the Cameron government’s supposed extirpation of Big Brother?	那么卡梅隆政府究竟将如何根除“老大哥”？


One way forward would be to go further than Blair by ring-fencing certain principles and creating some form of constitutional court to defend them.	一种方法就是比布莱尔更进一步，把某些原则特别提出来，并设立宪法法庭以维护之。


But the cost of such rigid rules may be high, and their effectiveness, as witnessed by the vagaries of the United States’ record on human rights, is less fool-proof than is sometimes imagined.	但这种死板管制的成本可能会很高，而其效力，以美国飘忽不定的人权记录来看，有时比空想更靠不住。


So, perhaps in a mature democracy, human rights should be dignified by actions rather than words.	因此，或许在一个成熟的民主体制内，与其虚张声势，不如采取实际行动去尊重人权；


Instead of introducing more legislation that is tainted both in the popular imagination and in its utility, Britain could, after all, trust its constitution to act as and when required to safeguard liberty and fair play.	与其引入更多法律，既在民众中留下坏印象，又不堪大用，不如在需要维护自由和公平竞争时相信自己的宪政体制。


For good or ill, democratic sentiment will win out, and Britain’s human-rights record, while imperfect, remains strong.	不管怎么样，民主的观点最终会胜利，而英国的人权记录，虽然算不上完美，却依然可圈可点。


Britain’s Path of Denial	英国的否定之路


SANTIAGO – Visit London nowadays and you will notice something strange going on: the worse the British economy tanks, the more fervently Prime Minister David Cameron’s ministers and Tory economists insist that draconian spending cuts are good for economic growth.	圣地亚哥——如今，如果你去伦敦旅行，会发现一些奇怪的景象：英国经济越萎靡，卡梅伦政府的各位部长和保守党经济学家就越频繁地宣称严厉的支出削减政策对经济增长有利。


Some observers see this as an act of faith (presumably in the virtues of the unfettered market).	一些观察家将其视为一种信念（大概是对不受束缚的自由市场的优点的信仰）。


Others, such as the economist Paul Krugman, see it as an act of bad faith: the Tories just want smaller government, regardless of the consequences for growth.	其他人，比如保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman），则认为这是一种欺瞒：保守党一心想要小政府，为此不惜牺牲经济增长。


The question remains whether there is a non-faith-based argument for cutting back spending to stimulate an economy.	问题在于，削减支出以刺激经济到底是不是一种无信念基础的观点。


The answer is yes.	答案是肯定的。


In fact, there are two.	事实上，这一观点存在两种类型。


Academic research has shown them at work in the past – for example, in Ireland and Denmark during the 1980’s.	学术研究表明，它们在过去挺有效，比如20世纪80年代的爱尔兰和丹麦。


Unfortunately for the Tories, neither case for stimulative spending cuts fits Britain’s predicament today.	对保守党来说，不幸的是这两次刺激性支出削减都不适用英国窘迫的现状。


One argument emphasizes the links between fiscal and monetary policy.	一种观点强调财政和货币政策之间的联系。


In a country with large fiscal deficits, the central bank may have to keep interest rates high to control inflation.	如果一国有着巨大的财政赤字，那么其中央银行可能不得不维持高利率以控制通胀。


In this scenario, budget cuts create room for interest rates to fall.	在这种情形下，预算削减将创造降息空间。


If the country has a floating exchange-rate regime, the currency depreciates, too.	如果该国汇率是浮动的，那么货币也会贬值。


Both of these changes are good for demand and growth.	这些变化均有利于需求和增长。


If their combined impact more than outweighs the initial contractionary effect of expenditure cuts, then the economy may well pick up after a round of fiscal tightening.	如果综合作用压倒了一开始削减支出的紧缩效应，则经济就能在一轮财政紧缩后大为改善。


But little effort is needed to see that this not the British story today.	但在如今的英国，很难看到这种效应。


The Bank of England’s policy interest rate has remained just above zero for more than two and a half years.	英格兰银行将利率维持在零区间已经超过两年半了。


Regardless of the government’s fiscal-policy stance, this interest rate cannot move below zero.	不管政府的财政政策立场如何，利率都不可能降到零以下。


The second case for expansionary fiscal contraction is subtler.	另一种扩张性财政收缩则更为隐蔽。


In an economy in which public debt is growing quickly, the longer fiscal adjustment is put off, the larger and costlier it will have to be.	在一个公共债务快速增长的经济中，财政调整被推得越迟，所需的调整规模就会变得越大，成本也会变得越高。


Households and companies understand this and cease to consume or invest in anticipation of the painful spending cuts and tax hikes to come.	家庭和公司都明白这一点，并预期未来会出现痛苦的支出削减和税收增加，因而停止消费和投资。


So, the argument goes, a courageous Tory government that cuts spending today spares citizens that future pain.	因此，该观点推断，保守党政府在今天大力削减开支将有助于英国人民免于在明天遭受痛苦。


Then, feeling richer and brimming with optimism, the private sector goes on a spending spree and the economy booms.	开支削减后，私人部门会感到手里的钱更多了，对前景也更乐观了，于是便会继续大手花钱，经济也将繁荣起来。


Put differently: without the budget cuts, Britain would have been Spain – or perhaps even Portugal or Greece.	换句话说，如果没有预算削减，英国大概已经和西班牙成为难兄难弟了——甚至可能成为另一个葡萄牙或希腊。


With the budget cuts in place and the markets reassured, Britain no longer risks resembling an unruly Mediterranean country.	实施了预算削减并得到了市场的保证，英国将不会有步放任的地中海国家后尘的危险。


Thus, Britons will soon start spending again and economic growth will ensue.	因此，英国的支出很快就会复苏，经济增长也会再次启动。


So far, so good – except that this story, too, does not apply to Britain.	听起来很美妙，但这并不是如今英国的现实。


There is no sign of a crisis narrowly averted.	我们看不到危机已经擦边而过的迹象。


Ten-year yields on British government bonds were at historic lows long before Cameron took office.	英国国债的十年期收益率从卡梅伦上台之前很久便下跌到了历史低点。


If a crisis was imminent, the markets clearly took no notice.	如果危机即将袭来，那么市场显然对此全无防范。


And if the coalition government’s budget cuts had improved expectations about future output, that greater confidence would have shown up in higher equity prices – but there is no evidence of this, either.	而如果联合政府的预算削减已然提高了对未来产出的预期，那么信心的提升应该显示为股价攀升——这显然也得不到事实的印证。


In short, private demand in Britain is flatlining rather than surging.	简言之，英国的私人需求依然波澜不惊，并未出现大涨。


Add to the mix the collapse in public-sector demand that comes from deep budget cuts, and you have all the ingredients necessary for prolonged stagnation.	再加上因预算削减导致的公共部门需求大跌，英国已经具备了进入长期停滞的所有必要条件。


And stagnation, if not worse, is precisely what recent British economic reports are showing.	而停滞（如果不是倒退的话）正是近期英国经济报告所显示的信息。


The longer this goes on, the more serious the problem will become.	照现在的形势发展得越久，问题就会变得更严重。


The long-term unemployed will drop out of the labor market.	长期失业人士会被挤出劳动力市场。


Firms that invest little will become uncompetitive.	长期不进行新投资活动的企业将丧失竞争力。


In the jargon of economists, low demand will engender low supply, making a non-inflationary recovery even more difficult to achieve.	用经济学家的话说，低需求会导致低供给，致使无通胀复苏难上加难。


What is to be done in Britain?	英国将如何应对？


With the eurozone tumbling from crisis to crisis, salvation will not come from abroad.	欧元区在没完没了的危机中苦苦挣扎，因此英国不用指望外部援手。


At home, all that is left is unconventional monetary policy.	而在国内，唯一可以采取的措施是非常规货币政策。


The Bank of England recently injected an additional £75 billion into the economy via so-called quantitative easing.	英格兰银行最近再度通过所谓的量化宽松向经济注入750亿英镑。


Now, that is real cash, not just an act of faith.	这一回撒下去的可是真金白银，而不是信念了。


Britain Votes and Reality Waits	大选在前，现实在后


LONDON – I don’t mean to sound as though I am bragging, but the last time the Conservative Party won an election in Britain was 1992, when John Major was Prime Minister. The chairman of the party at the time, running the winning campaign, was me.	发自伦敦——我可不是在这里自吹自擂，不过上一次保守党赢得英国大选还是1992年，当时的首相是约翰·梅杰，而时任党主席而又成功操办了那场大选的，正是鄙人。


We won the election, but I lost my own race for a parliamentary seat and was sent off to Hong Kong as the colony’s last British governor.	我们赢得了大选，但我本人却在竞选议会席位时落败，并被派到香港担任这个殖民地的末代总督。


So I wasn’t around when the Conservative Party, losing the will to govern, tore itself apart in the mid-1990’s over Britain’s role in Europe.	因此当保守党彻底丧失了执政意志，随之在1990年代中期因英国在欧洲所扮演的角色这一问题而分裂的时候，我是不在场的。


As Winston Churchill said, the problem with committing political suicide is that you live to regret it.	一切正如温斯顿·丘吉尔所言：“政治自杀是一个足以令人后悔一辈子的问题。 ”


Despite piloting the economy through a post-recession recovery, Major lost to Tony Blair in 1997, ending 18 years of Conservative government and bringing a 13-year Labour run, which will probably end when Britain votes for a new government on May 6.	虽然梅杰成功地带领英国经济实现了后衰退时代的复苏，但他却在1997年输给了东尼·布莱尔，断送了保守党18年执政并迎来了工党的13年统治，而这13年的执政似乎也将在5月6日英国人投下一票后宣告落幕。


Blair took over a strong economic legacy, and, to be scrupulously fair, he didn’t wreck it.	布莱尔继承了强劲的经济发展势头，而且平心而论也没有毁掉它。


He and his finance minister, Gordon Brown, stuck to their predecessors’ public-spending plans, for example.	他本人及其财政大臣戈登·布朗一直坚持奉行前任的公共支出计划。


In Labour’s first nine years of governing, public expenditure as a proportion of GDP was lower than in the comparable Conservative period.	在工党执政的最初九年间，财政支出占GDP的比例甚至比保守党开始执政的那几年还要低。


Then we fell into the usual British trap.	但随后我们却一如既往地陷入了英国式困境当中。


Brown, who became prime minister in 2007, let spending and borrowing rip, so that when the global crash hit Britain was already suffering from a structural fiscal deficit and a credit bubble.	布朗在2007年任首相之后大肆花费举债，以致在金融危机冲击英伦三岛之前整个国家就已经陷入了结构性财政赤字以及信贷泡沫之中。


The country was worse prepared for disaster than most others.	英国对危机的准备工作也做得比大多数其他国家要差。


As a result, whoever wins the election will have an awful job cutting the country’s budget deficit – 12% of GDP – and setting the economy back on the road to sustainable recovery.	因此本次大选的赢家就必须得承担一个异常棘手的工作，那就是削减预算赤字——占到GDP的12%——并将经济带回到可持续复苏的轨道上去。


The Conservatives should triumph under a young leader, David Cameron, who has hauled them back onto the middle ground of politics where elections are usually won.	保守党人很可能在大卫·卡梅隆这个年轻领袖的领导下夺得胜利，因为卡梅隆令全党的政治立场重新回归到了中间路线，而走这个路线的政党常常能赢得竞选胜利。 而布郎率领的工党则不受欢迎，因为经济深陷泥沼且人们普遍认为该党已经黔驴技穷了。


Labour, under Brown, is unpopular, with the economy in deep trouble and a general sense that the party has run out of ideas.  The Liberal Democrats under Nick Clegg have surged remarkably, and may even push ahead of Labour in the popular vote.  But the structure of the British election is such that a victory for them is almost a statistical impossibility.	而尼克·克列格率领的自由民主党则声势浩大，甚至有可能在投票中压倒工党。 然而英国的选举体制却注定了他们的大选获胜几率几乎只有统计学上的可能性。


Indeed, the opinion polls remain tight.	事实上，民意调查的数据依然胶着。


Much will depend on the outcome of TV debates between the leaders, which are being held for the first time in a British election campaign, and which have thus far contributed mightily to the Liberal Democrat surge.	结果在很大程度上将由各党领袖电视辩论的胜负来决定，而类似的辩论在英国大选中还是头一次，并将对自由民主党的竞选活动产生极大支持。


Each leader has been carefully groomed to avoid the sort of gaffes that could cost his party the election, and thus far, not one has shot himself in the foot.	每一位领袖都在精心准备，生怕辩论场上的任何洋相令自己的党派丢掉大选，而是至今日，还没有谁干出些搬石头砸自己脚的蠢事。


If Clegg’s job is almost impossible, Cameron’s job is also much harder than it should be because the British electoral system is tilted heavily against the Conservatives.	如果说克列格的获胜几乎不可能的话，那么卡梅隆要付出的努力也比常规多得多，这是因为英国的选举系统是向工党严重倾斜的。


The more Labour-oriented parts of the United Kingdom – Wales, Scotland, and urban England – are over-represented.	那些由工党所主导的地区——威尔士，苏格兰和英格兰农村地区——所选出的代表数量可是超出正常比例的。


Electorates in constituencies where Labour is usually dominant are smaller, and district boundaries take insufficient account of population shifts.	工党区的人口数量通常较少，而选区划分又没有充分考虑到人口流动的因素。


Thus, more votes are needed to elect a Conservative than a Labour MP.	因此如果一名保守党议员要获胜的话就得比工党议员赢得更多的选票。


In the last election, Labour got 3% more of the popular vote than the Conservatives, but gained 150 more seats.	在上届选举中，工党的总票数只比保守党多3%，却多得了150个以上的席位。


The situation is a bit fairer today, but Cameron still has a steep hill to climb if he is to win.	虽然如今的状况已经比从前公平许多，但卡梅隆却依然要克服极大的困难才能赢的胜利。


I think he will do so – not least because the most potent electoral argument today is “time for change.”	我想他会成功的——这不仅是因为当今最有影响力的竞选口号就是“变革”。


Voters tend to get rid of governments once the incumbents have lost their most precious attribute: the benefit of the doubt.	二是一旦选民们发现那些政府负责人失去了他们最宝贵的品质：疑罪从无（意指在不确定伊拉克是否有策划发动“9·11”的情况下发动战争）之时，就会倾向于推翻政府。


Labour seems to be in that situation today.	而工党目前似乎正处于如斯境况当中。


But, whatever the outcome, a new government will face a daunting challenge – challenges that will be even more daunting in the case of a “hung parliament,” which will require either a coalition government or minority government to be formed after the vote.	但无论结果如何，新政府都将面对一项令人畏惧的挑战——比一个“无多数派议会”所造成的混乱更令人裹足不前的挑战，这就是选举后可能需要组建一个联合政府或者少数派政府。


It is not just that tough measures will be required to rein in public spending for years to come. More worrying is that many voters seem to be in denial about that fact.	不仅需要政府用强力手段去控制未来几年的公共支出，而更令人担忧的则是许多选民似乎都倾向于否定这个现实。


They are likely to find that economic reality, once all the electioneering is over, is a very cold shower indeed.	人们可能会发现一旦所有选举活动结束之后，真实的经济状况对他们的冲击就如同一盆冷水从头浇到腿。


As a tribal Conservative, albeit it with pretty moderate tendencies and a deep suspicion of ideology, I naturally want Cameron to win.	尽管我本人有着相当的温和派倾向以及有点理想化，但作为一个老派保守党人，我自然是希望卡梅隆能赢。


He is clever, decent, and strong. I think he will make a good prime minister.	他这个人头脑聪明，举止得体，而且身体强健。


But I don’t envy him the job.	我想他会是一个好首相，但我并不妒忌他。


It will require leadership skills of a high order to persuade voters that in order to prevent national decline we must curb our appetite for more and more public spending.	因为要说服选民去接受为了防止国家衰退必须遏制住花费更越来越多公共支出的观点是需要非常高超的领导技巧的。


The old laws of household economics still apply.  You can’t spend more than you earn – even in the so-called new economy of the twenty-first century.	那些持家过日子的老法则依旧适用，那就是你的支出不能超过收入——即便是在所谓的21世纪新经济当中。


I suspect that other countries will have to learn that lesson as well.	我猜其他国家也必须得补上这一课。


In Europe, it is not just Greece that is in a mess.	在欧洲，经济一团糟的可不仅仅是希腊。


The public finances of Spain and Portugal are somewhat sounder, but those countries face huge problems in increasing their competitiveness within the eurozone.	西班牙和葡萄牙的公共财政状况相对还好一点，但这些国家也面对着如何在提升自身在欧元区内竞争力的严峻问题。


In Spain, for example, wages have risen too fast, and productivity has lagged.	比如在西班牙，工资一再飙升，生产力却停滞不前。


We should be on the lookout for political fireworks over the next few years in many European countries as people are forced to confront some uncomfortable verities.	我们应当警惕那些在未来几年内可能在欧洲各国发生的政治危机，而人们则将被迫承受许多不如意的事实。


It won’t only be in Britain that politics, from time to time, becomes a bit too exciting.	须知有机会发生政治险情的地方，可不仅仅只有英国。


Deserting the Battle for Britain	英国之战的逃兵


SAINT PIERRE D’ENTREMONT, FRANCE – In the sad state of affairs following the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, former “Remainers” – those who wished to stay in the EU – seem to have given up altogether on fighting for the future of their country.	圣皮埃尔昂特雷蒙，法国—在英国脱欧投票之后的悲哀状态中，前“留欧派”似乎已经完全放弃了为国家未来而斗争。


Worse still, many seem to have accepted the fundamental premise of the anti-EU “Leave” campaign: that there are too many Europeans in Britain.	更糟糕的是，许多人似乎接受了反欧盟“脱欧”阵营的基本前提：英国有太多的欧洲人。


This has changed the terms of the debate for the worse, and has led to hopelessly wishful thinking: Perhaps the UK won’t actually lose much market access if it imposes immigration restrictions on EU nationals.	这让争论朝着恶化的方向发展，并导致了绝望的一厢情愿：也许，如果英国对欧盟公民实施移民前置，其实也不会失去多少市场准入。


Perhaps the EU itself will abandon free labor mobility in an attempt to appease the UK.	也许欧盟本身也将放弃劳动力自由流动，以此安抚英国。


Perhaps the EU will make special exceptions to protect the British university sector, or treat the UK like Liechtenstein, a microstate with access to the single market.	也许欧盟会采取特例以保护英国大学，或给予英国与列支敦士登一样的待遇。 作为微型国家，列支敦士登可以进入欧盟单一市场。


In fact, with Remainers accepting the argument that Britain should keep Europeans out, the UK – or at least England and Wales, if pro-EU Scotland and Northern Ireland leave – is headed for a “hard” Brexit, not just from the Union, but from Europe’s single market.	事实上，留欧派接受了英国应该将欧洲人挡在国门之外的观点，这让英国——或至少是英格兰和爱尔兰，如果亲欧盟的苏格兰和爱尔兰脱离英国的话——迈向了“硬”脱欧，不仅仅脱离欧盟，也脱离欧洲单一市场。


If this happens, it will cost the country dearly.	果真如此的话，英国将付出巨大代价。


The full extent of the fallout is unknown, but we can expect it to be painful for many people and damaging to many institutions.	余波到底有多广尚未可知，但可以预期许多人将感到十分痛苦，许多机构也将遭受重创。


Is there any merit to the claim that the UK has become flooded with newcomers from other EU member states?	来自其他欧盟成员国的新来者已在英国泛滥成灾，这种说法难道一无是处吗？


The following chart shows the percentage of EU immigrants in each EU country.	下图描述了欧盟移民占各欧盟国家的百分比。


The UK is at the upper end of the distribution, but it is on par with many other EU members, and it is far from having the most EU immigrants per capita.	英国处于分布的顶端，但与其他许多欧盟成员国等量齐观，人均欧盟移民数更是远远没有达到最多。


In fact, the share of EU immigrants in the total population is twice as high in Ireland.	事实上，爱尔兰欧盟移民占总人口比例比英国高出一倍。


As British policymakers navigate the post-Brexit landscape, they should consider the Irish example, given the similarities between the two countries.	英国决策者在处理英国脱欧后局面时，应该参考爱尔兰的例子，因为两国情况相似。


Ireland and the UK both have housing shortages, especially around metropolitan centers such as Dublin and London.	爱尔兰和英国都存在住房短缺，特别是在都柏林和伦敦等大都会中心周边。


And they both have public services that leave something to be desired – in fact, Ireland’s are much worse than Britain’s.	它们的公共服务都不尽如人意——事实上，爱尔兰比英国还要差得多。


While the Irish are not British, they are closer culturally than other Europeans.	尽管爱尔兰人并不是英国人，但他们在文化上比其他欧洲人更加接近。


As we saw in 2008, when Irish referendum voters refused to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, there is a potential anti-immigrant voting bloc in the poorer parts of Dublin.	2008年，爱尔兰公投拒绝里斯本条约草案，都柏林的贫困地区成为强大的反移民票仓。


These are the same kind of voters who turned out for the UK’s Brexit referendum – poorer people who have not felt the gains from globalization.	英国脱欧公投中也有类似的群体——感受不到来自全球化的好处的穷人。


The question, then, is why the Irish haven’t developed UK levels of animosity toward EU immigrants, especially given the appalling way in which the country was treated by European institutions in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.	于是问题就在于为何爱尔兰没有没有发展出向英国那么高涨的对欧盟移民的敌意，特别是考虑到2008年金融危机后欧洲机构令人发指的对待爱尔兰的方式。


Surely, the British media bear considerable responsibility for the difference.	诚然，英国媒体要为其中的区别负有相当大的责任。


Ireland has nothing like the mendacious, jingoistic gutter press that thrives in the UK.	爱尔兰没有遍布于英国的撒谎成性的狭隘沙文主义三流小报。


Much of the blame, however, lies with British political leaders.	但是，很大的责任在于英国政治领导人。


One the one hand, there are those who have made careers out of attacking the EU, often on entirely specious grounds.	一方面，有些人靠攻击欧盟生存，他们的立论点往往似是而非。


On the other, there are lukewarm Remainers, such as former Prime Minister David Cameron, who never made a strong case for continued membership in the EU.	另一方面，有些留欧派不够热情，如前首相卡梅伦，他们从未强烈支持保留欧盟成员资格。


Now, even committed Remainers are failing to make the case for continued two-way labor mobility between the UK and the EU, and for membership in the European Economic Area (EEA).	如今，即便是铁杆留欧派也没有提出保留英国和欧盟之间的双向劳动力流动以及加入欧洲经济区（EEA）。


Ireland hasn’t had this problem.	爱尔兰没有这个问题。


Notably, Sinn Féin, Ireland’s nationalist party and the former political arm of the Irish Republican Army, has not indulged in the kind of xenophobic rhetoric used by the UK Independence Party.	令人关注的是，爱尔兰民族主义政党、前爱尔兰共和军的政治力量新芬党也没有沉溺于英国独立党所采用的仇外论调。


In fact, to its immense credit, Sinn Féin has gone out of its way to adopt a progressive stance on the issue of immigration from the EU and elsewhere.	事实上，新芬党有了很大的改观，在来自欧盟和其他地区移民的问题上采纳了进步立场。


Many commentators have correctly pointed to the economic effects of globalization to explain anti-immigrant sentiment.	许多评论者正确地指出，全球化的经济影响能解释反移民情绪。


The fact that globalization produces both winners and losers certainly explains much of the anti-globalization backlash now apparent in the UK and elsewhere.	全球化创造了赢家和输家这一事实显然解释了目前在英国和其他国家显而易见的反全球化抵制。


But other things matter, too, such as cultural chauvinism.	但其他东西也很重要，比如文化沙文主义。


Put plainly, English animosity toward the presence of fellow Europeans has a lot to do with some of the worst aspects of English society.	简单说，英国对其欧洲同胞的存在的敌意与英国社会中最阴暗的一些方面有着很大关联。


Addressing shortfalls in public services can help to mitigate economic concerns about immigration, and about globalization more generally.	解决公共服务短缺问题有助于减轻关于移民——以及更一般地，关于全球化——的经济顾虑。


Just as important, former Remainers must continue to explain to the English why the free exchange of goods, services, and people with Europe is good for Britain.	同样重要的是，前留欧派必须继续向英国人解释为何与欧洲进行商品、服务和人的自由交换有利于英国。


The UK voted to leave the EU, but Brexit comes in two flavors: membership in the EEA, with access to Europe’s single market and free movement of people, or an exit from the single market, followed by unpredictable trade negotiations.	英国投票脱离了欧盟，但脱欧可以有两种版本：获得EEA成员资格，以进入欧洲单一市场和保持人员自由流动； 或退出单一市场，然后进行难以预料的贸易谈判。


There is still a huge amount to play for: we don’t know which of these two outcomes English voters would choose.	还有巨大的周旋余地：我们不知道英国选民会选择两种结果的哪一种。


Unfortunately, it looks as though the UK is now headed for the second option – a “hard” Brexit – by default.	不幸的是，看起来英国正在默认迈向第二个选择——“硬”脱欧。


For Remainers not to make the case for EEA membership, when they had previously been in favor of remaining in the EU, is an astonishing abdication of responsibility.	对于留欧派来说，在他们先前支持留在欧盟的时候没有提出争取EEA成员资格的理由是令人震惊的不负责任的行为。


A British Bridge for a Divided Europe	连接分裂欧洲的英国之桥


LONDON – The European Union has never been very popular in Britain.	伦敦—欧盟在英国向来不是很受欢迎。


It joined late, and its voters will be asked on June 23 whether they want to leave early.	英国加入欧盟很晚，其选民将在6月23日决定是否想要早早离开。


The referendum’s outcome will not be legally binding on the government; but it is inconceivable that Britain will stay if the public’s verdict is to quit.	此次全民公决的结果对政府不具有法律约束力； 但很难想象在公众决定要退出的情况下英国仍然留在欧盟。


Over the years, the focus of the British debate about Europe has shifted.	多年来，英国关于欧洲的争论焦点几经变迁。


In the 1960s and 1970s, the question was whether Britain could afford not to join what was then the European Economic Community.	20世纪60年代和70年代，问题是英国是否可以不加入当时的欧洲经济共同体。


The fear was that the United Kingdom would be shut out of the world’s fastest-growing market, and that its partnership with the United States would be at risk as well: The Western alliance would consist of two pillars, and Europe, not a shrunken Britain, would be one of them.	担心之处是英国会被排除在全世界增长最快的市场之外，并且其与美国的关系也将受到威胁：西方世界将由两大支柱构成，而欧洲，而不是衰败的英国将是其中之一。


Today, it is the enfeeblement, not power, of Europe, that drives the UK debate.	如今，英国争论背后的推动因素是欧洲的衰落而非其力量。


The British perceive themselves as doing rather well, whereas Europe is doing badly.	英国认为自己表现出色，而欧洲表现糟糕。


Indeed, ever since the 2008 crash, the EU has been identified with failure.	事实上，自2008年大崩盘以来，欧盟一直是失败者。


Outside Britain and Germany, there has been almost no economic growth.	除了英国和德国，几乎看不到经济增长。


It cannot defend its frontiers against terrorists (“Europe is not safe,” proclaims Donald Trump).	欧洲无法捍卫边界不被恐怖分子突破（“欧洲不安全”，唐纳德·特朗普如是说）。


Its institutions lack legitimacy.	欧洲机构缺乏合法性。


Made up of 28 quasi-sovereign members, it cannot act, but only issue intentions to act.	欧盟由28个准主权成员构成，它无法行动，只能发布行动意图。


No wonder there is a move afoot to reclaim national sovereignty, where some decision-making power still resides.	毫不奇怪收回仍有一些决策权力的国家主权的运动正在酝酿中。


The EU’s fate has become hopelessly entangled with that of its most vulnerable feature: the 19-member eurozone, the single-currency heartland of economic stagnation.	欧盟的命运绝望地与其最脆弱的一环联结在一起：包括19个成员国的欧元区，亦即经济停滞的单一货币核心区。


To officials in Brussels, the eurozone is the EU.	对布鲁塞尔的官员来说，欧元区就是欧盟。


Only Britain and Denmark have been allowed to opt out.	只有英国和丹麦被允许选择置身其外。


The other members, including Sweden, are expected to join when they meet the criteria.	其他成员国，包括瑞典在内，预计都将在符合标准时加入欧元区。


The eurozone was to be the engine of political union.	欧元区本应成为政治联盟的引擎。


But the engine has stalled.	但这个引擎熄火了。


To be sure, the 2008 crisis started with the banking collapse in the US.	诚然，2008年危机肇始于美国银行业大崩盘。


But most of the rest of the world has recovered, whereas most of Europe has not.	但世界其他地区大部分都已经复苏，而欧洲大部没有。


To assess why, a recent symposium on the subject at Nuffield College, Oxford, focused on the lack of a sovereign authority able to protect the European economy as a whole from contagious crises starting elsewhere.	为了评估原因，最近牛津大学纳菲尔德学院组织了一次研讨班，讨论的焦点是缺少一个主权实体有能力保护作为一个整体的欧洲经济免受肇始于其他地区的危机的影响。 缺少主权的方面包括一个响应非对称冲击的财政转移支付体系；


The missing bits of sovereignty include a fiscal transfer system to respond to asymmetric shocks; a risk-free asset (eurobonds) in which to park redundant money; a single system for supervising banks and capital markets; a central bank able to act as lender of last resort; and the ability to organize an EU-wide stabilization/recovery program.	一套监督银行和资本市场的单一体系； 一个能够作为最后贷款人的中央银行，以及组织泛欧盟稳定/复苏计划的能力。


The eurozone has weakened the nation-states comprising it, without creating a supranational state to replace the powers its members have lost.	欧元区削弱了加入其中的国家（nation-states），而没有建立一个超国家（supranational state）取代其成员国所失去的权力。


Legitimacy thus still resides at a level of political authority that has lost those attributes of sovereignty (such as the ability to alter exchange rates) from which legitimacy derives.	因此，合法性仍停留在已经失去了作为合法性来源的主权特征（比如改变汇率的能力）的政治层面上。


Meanwhile, promises of action continue to flow.	与此同时，行动承诺仍然层出不穷。


The so-called Five Presidents’ Report calls for “completing Europe’s economic and monetary union” as a prelude to “political union.”	所谓的五主席报告（Five Presidents’ Report）呼吁“完善欧洲的经济和货币联盟”，作为“政治联盟”的前奏。


But is that the right sequence?	但这样的顺序正确吗？


Historically, political union precedes economic and monetary union.	从历史看，政治联盟先于经济和欧比联盟。


As Otmar Issing, a former ECB chief economist, never tires of pointing out, without a sovereign, the process of transferring competences – including monetary policy – to ever higher levels will create a huge legitimacy deficit.	欧洲央行前首席经济学家奥特马尔·伊辛格（Otmar Issing）一贯指出，在没有主权的情况下，向更高层面转移职能——包括货币政策——的过程将造成巨大的合法性赤字。


The EU has tried to achieve political union incrementally, because it was impossible to start with it.	欧盟试��逐步实现政治联盟，因为不可能将政治联盟作为起点。


Indeed, barely hidden in the “European project” was the expectation that successive crises would push political integration forward.	事实上，“欧洲工程”从未掩盖连续不断的危机将推动政治一体化前进的预期。


This was certainly Jean Monnet’s hope.	这显然是让·莫奈的希望。


The alternative – that the crises would have the opposite effect, leading to the breakup of the economic and monetary union – was never seriously confronted.	反之——危机将产生相反的效应，导致经济和货币联盟崩溃——从未被认真面对。


Few people in the UK would welcome a rapid move toward a political union, assuming this means filling in the gaps in sovereignty that have crippled the eurozone.	在英国，很少有人会欢迎迅速走向政治联盟，英国人认为这意味着填补导致欧元区步履蹒跚的主权缺口。


Indeed, in the deal that Prime Minister David Cameron negotiated with European heads of government as a condition of remaining in the EU, Britain is specifically exempted from commitment to “ever closer political union.”	事实上，在英国首相卡梅伦与欧洲政府首脑所达成的作为英国留在欧盟的条件的协议中，英国获得了不必遵守“更加紧密的联盟”的承诺的特别豁免。


Yet, without a political union, it is hard to see how the eurozone can be made to work.	但是，没有政治联盟，欧元区很难起作用。


The eurozone is therefore likely to break up into more compatible parts, after further failed efforts to muddle through.	因此，在经历更多失败的权宜之计后，欧元区可能分裂为多个更加兼容的部分。


One can imagine a northern single-currency area, with enough sovereignty (provided by Germany or, more plausibly, by Germany and France acting together) to make it work, linked by free trade to a southern area that is not subject to the northern bloc’s monetary and fiscal rules.	我们可以想象一个北方单一货币区，它拥有足够的主权（由德国提供，或者更合理地，由德国和法国联合提供）起作用，以及一个不必受北方区货币和财政规则约束的南方区，两者之间通过自由贸易联系。


Specifically, members of the southern bloc would have fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates with one another and with the northern union.	具体而言，南方区成员国彼此之间和与北方联盟之间将拥有固定但可调的汇率。


The southern bloc, however, would lack a member with the weight and prestige to counterbalance Germany.	但是，南方区缺少一个拥有可制衡德国的分量和地位的成员国。


That member could only be Britain.	这一成员国只能是英国。


And this is the main argument against pulling out of the EU: By staying in, Britain would be able to ensure that, if and when the eurozone’s breakup comes, the process is not too messy, and will at any rate preserve something of the spirit of the EU’s founders.	而这正是反对脱离欧盟的主要理由：留在欧盟的英国将能够保证如果欧元区崩溃，崩溃过程不会过于混乱，多少能保留一些欧盟创建者的精神。


Britain has much to fear from an acrimonious divorce, as it will inevitably be swept into its turbulent wake.	猛然分手对英国弊端众多，将不可避免地被卷入乱流。


It has always been part of Britain’s role to act as a bridge between different worlds. It can play this role in the two Europes of the future, but only by not cutting itself off from the one Europe that currently exists.	作为连接不同世界的桥梁向来是英国的作用之一对于未来的两个欧洲，英国也可以起到这一作用，但首先决不能自绝于目前存在的欧洲。


Britain’s Silent Election	英国的寂静选举


LONDON – Other people’s elections are usually baffling and boring, which is certainly true of the United Kingdom’s coming vote on May 7; indeed, many Britons share the sentiment.	发自伦敦——世界各国的选举通常都是迷乱且沉闷的，而英国即将在五月七号举行的大选也是如此； 许多英国人无疑也深有同感。


The longest election campaign in UK history has been strikingly short of focus.	令人震惊的莫过于这场在英国史上选前造势期最为漫长的选举竟然不存在任何焦点议题。


Nonetheless, the campaign contains three important pointers for other Western democracies.	但即便如此，这场选举依然为其他西方民主国家带来了三点重要的教益。


The first pointer is that Bill Clinton’s famous campaign slogan from 1992 – “It’s the economy, stupid” – is itself stupid, or at least insufficient.	第一点教益是比尔·克林顿（Bill Clinton）在1992年提出的著名竞选口号——“笨蛋，经济才是关键！ ”——本身就非常愚蠢，或者说至少是不充分的。


If it was the economy that would decide Britain’s election, Prime Minister David Cameron would be leading a much more confident campaign.	如果决定英国选举的是经济的话，现任首相戴维·卡梅伦（David Cameron）早就该胜券在握了。


For the past 18 months or so, the UK has had Europe’s fastest-growing economy, and at times has even outpaced the United States.	在过去约18个月以来，英国的经济增速位列欧洲第一，甚至不时超越美国。


The unemployment rate, now 5.6%, has fallen to less than half that of the eurozone.	目前5. 6%的失业率也不及欧元区的一半。


But favorable economic indicators have made little difference to the standing of Cameron’s Conservatives in opinion polls, and have done nothing to save their coalition partner, the centrist Liberal Democrats, from a severe slump.	但即便这些经济数据如此亮丽，却无法在民调中为卡梅伦的保守党政府争取到什么优势，也无力将其执政联盟搭档——中间派的自由民主党——从民望大跌中拯救出来。


Too many voters, it seems, still do not feel better off, and for good reason: average incomes have barely begun to rise, following seven painful years.	许多选民似乎并未感觉到自身境遇有所改善，而这种感觉也是有道理的：在历经七年的痛苦煎熬之后，人均收入依然没有抬头迹象。


So the right slogan in this campaign might be, “It’s the living standards, stupid.”	因此正确的选举口号应该是：“笨蛋，生活水平才是关键。


Or, more accurately (though more cumbersomely): “It’s the perception of future living standards, stupid, and the perception of fairness surrounding those prospects.”	”或者更准确地说（虽然更拗口）：“笨蛋，对未来生活水平的预期，以及围绕实现这一预期的公平感才是关键”。


Either way, the point is straightforward: statistical recovery is not enough.	无论哪种说法，重点都很明确：光靠统计数据来证明复苏，是不够的。


This seems to be why, although it has only a small lead of 2-4 percentage points in the polls, the center-left Labour Party has had the best of the campaign.	这似乎也是为何中左翼的工党似乎更占优势的原因，虽然在当前民调中他们仅仅领先2~4个百分点。


Labour’s leader, Ed Miliband, was widely derided last year as weak, unconvincing, and unlikeable; but, perhaps benefiting from low expectations, he has looked steadily more credible and statesmanlike as the campaign has gone on.	工党领导人埃德·米利班德（Ed Miliband）在去年看来还是个优柔寡断,不招人喜欢的家伙； 但或许得益于原本不高的预期，他的形象也随着竞选的不断推进而日渐变得更可信也更具政治家风范了。


The second pointer is that foreign affairs, though rarely a major factor in any country’s national elections, can contribute to a general sense of unease about political leadership.	第二个教益则是外交事务——虽然在任何国家的大选中都不太起主导作用——可以强化人们对政治领导人的总体不信任感。


It had been widely assumed that the UK’s continued membership in the European Union would be a leading campaign issue, given the rise of the UK Independence Party and Cameron’s pledge that, if re-elected, he would hold a referendum on the question by 2017.	外界原本认为由于英国独立党的崛起以及卡梅伦承诺如果连任将在2017举行公投，英国会否留在欧盟将成为本次大选的核心议题。


Indeed, Cameron’s promise is arguably the most consequential issue at stake in the British election: if he remains Prime Minister, there will be a referendum; if Miliband takes over, there will not be.	事实上，卡梅伦的承诺应当是本次大选中最具连锁反应的重大议题：如果他连任，则公投可期； 如果米利班德当选，则一切照旧。


Britain’s strategic future rests on this choice.	英国的战略性未来将由此定夺。


Yet there has been near-silence on this choice.	但围绕这一选择的讨论却近乎无声无息。


Both UKIP and its charismatic leader, Nigel Farage, have slipped in opinion polls and have struggled to get attention.	无论是独立党还是其魅力领袖奈吉尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）都在民调中走弱，只能不断作秀吸引眼球。


More important, Cameron has said almost nothing about either Europe or immigration; and, though Miliband’s clearly stated pro-EU stance has endeared his candidacy to many business leaders, he, too, has played down the issue.	更重要的是，卡梅伦在欧洲和移民方面几乎没有发表过任何言论； 而虽然米利班德的亲欧盟立场让他赢得了许多商界领袖的亲睐，他本人却也在刻意弱化这一议题。


Perhaps this reflects my own bias, but I suspect that this evasiveness on the part of Britain’s main political parties has weakened support for them, by diminishing their status as valid representatives of the country.	或许这体现了我的个人偏好，但我怀疑英国主要政党在该议题上的躲躲闪闪实际上削弱了人们对它们的支持，因为这让它们作为英国真正代表的想象大打折扣。


Voters may not list Europe or foreign affairs among the main issues that concern them.	选民们或许不会将欧洲或者外交事务列为关注重点。


But the daily news about migrants dying in the Mediterranean, the war in Ukraine, Greece’s possible default, the turmoil in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Gaza, Iran’s nuclear program, and more heighten voters’ awareness that their country needs to be defended robustly, by a government with a coherent foreign policy.	但媒体每天连篇累牍地报道偷渡者死在地中海上，乌克兰战争，希腊的潜在违约，叙利亚、伊拉克、也门，利比亚和加沙地区的乱局以及伊朗核项目都在不断提高选民的意识，认为自己的国家应当由一个拥有长期一致性外交政策的政府来奋力守护。


And yet Britain’s defense forces are weaker than at any time since the 1930s.	无奈英国的防卫力量已经弱化到了1930年代以来的最低点。


The general perception is that Britain’s voice in international affairs is less influential than at any time since then, too.	人们也普遍认为英国在国际事务上的影响力也同步下降。


Whatever voters think Britain’s foreign and defense policy should be, they believe their country should have one.	但无论选民们对英国的外交和国防政策有什么样的看法，他们都认为自己的国家无论如何都必须得拟定一个。


The final pointer of the UK election may partly reflect the vacuum in national leadership that such silence epitomizes.	这场选举的最后一项教益这些寂静的缩影或许在某种���度上反映了国家领导力的真空.


Whatever the result of the election, the most striking phenomenon will be the rise of regionalism, most notably a surge in support for the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP).	无论选举结果如何,其中最引人注目的现象就是地区主义的崛起,其中最明显的就是支持独立的苏格兰国家党的支持率大增。


No one can predict whether the SNP might end up in the paradoxical position of joining a coalition with Labour to govern a country that it was campaigning to leave in last September’s independence referendum.	没人可以预期苏格兰国家党是否会最终荒诞地加入工党执政联盟，去治理一个它在去年9月的公投中奋力要求脱离的国家。


But the SNP’s likely electoral gain is too large to be explained by secessionist sentiment alone.	但该党在选举后可能获得的优势可不能仅仅以分离主义情绪来解释。


The party appears to be attracting many people who voted against independence but who want more regional autonomy and a stronger voice for Scotland in the Westminster Parliament.	这个党派显然吸引了一些不愿独立但希望为苏格兰争取更多自治权以及在威斯敏斯特议会更大发言权的选民。


The absence of a broader “feel good” factor from economic recovery, resentment of economic inequality, mistrust of national political leaders, and greater faith in localism: these are the main features of Britain’s election campaign.	在经济复苏中更宽泛的“改善体验”因素缺位，对经济不平等状况的不满，对国际政治领导人的不信任，以及人们对地方主义的更广泛接纳：这些才是英国大选竞选的主要特征。


Whether or not they make Miliband the next prime minister (in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, or both), they are likely to characterize elections elsewhere as well in the years ahead.	无论他们是否选米利班德做下任首相（与自由民主党和/或苏格兰国家党组成执政联盟），他们都将在未来几年间为世界其他地方的选举定下基调。


The Bookies and the British Election	博彩公司和英国选举


LONDON – I used to be considered a pretty good forecaster of British and other countries’ elections.	伦敦—我曾经被视为英国和其他国家选举的神准预测家。


I was, after all, once a party chairman.	毕竟，我曾经当过党主席。


I can now confess my method.	现在，我可以坦白我的方法了。


It was not based on any novel political insight.	我的预测基础不是新颖的政治洞见。


I did not have a magic algorithm relating economic factors to voting intentions – though I do think that there is some correlation between net disposable income and how people normally vote.	我不会那些与选举倾向有关的经济因素的魔法算术——尽管你我也确实认为净可支配收入和人们通常的选举倾向有一定相关性。


But my own technique, which I still use, has proved more reliable than even poring over the political entrails in every constituency.	但我自己的仍在用的技术，甚至要比仔细算计每一个选区的政治详情还要可靠。


What I do is not very sophisticated: I watch the bookmakers’ odds.	我的做法并不十分复杂：我观察博彩公司的赔率。


Doing so proved invaluable as recently as the Scottish independence referendum last September.	这种做法在去年9月的苏格兰独立公投中被证明效果显著。


Two days before the count, bookmakers were paying out to gamblers who had bet that Scotland would vote “No” to independence.	计票前两天，博彩公司开始支付下注苏格兰对公投说“不”的赌徒。


Guess which way Scotland actually voted.	猜一下苏格兰实际上会做出何种投票选择。


My method is based largely on the observation that you rarely hear of a poor bookie.	我的方法的基础是一项观察，即你很少听说有穷光蛋博彩公司。


So I apply the American writer Damon Runyon’s famous adage: “The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but that’s the way to bet.”	因此我运用了美国作家达蒙·朗恩（Damon Runyon）的名言：“比赛的关键并不总是快，战斗的关键也并不总是强，但我们得这样赌。 ”


The problem now is that the British general election in May is too close to call.	现在的问题是，5月的英国大选实在太势均力敌了。


So the bookmakers have 2:5 odds on no party gaining an outright majority, and 10:11 on either Labour or the Conservatives winning the largest number of seats.	因此博彩公司开除了2赔5的无政党可或绝对多数的赔率，而工党和保守党赢得最大数量席位的赔率也都只有10赔11。


So I cannot predict the outcome, and neither can the masters of the universe in the City of London, who always become jittery in the face of political uncertainty.	因此我无法预测结果，伦敦金融城的宇宙主宰者亦然，他们总是对政治不确定性神经过敏。


What I can do is try to explain why that uncertainty exists.	我可以做的是解释为何存在这一不确定性。


First, as in many other democracies, support for the United Kingdom’s two main political parties is declining.	首先，与许多其他民主国家一样，英国两大政党的支持度正在下降。


When I first became interested in politics, nearly 50 years ago, Labour and the Conservatives attracted some 90% of the popular vote.	我第一次对政治感兴趣时，也就是在近50年前，工党和保守党吸引了90%左右的公众支持。


In May, their combined share will be about 65% to 70%.	而在5月，它们两党相加大概能达到65%到70%。


There are several reasons for this.	之所以如此，有几个原因。


One is the decline of the traditional working class and the growth of a more affluent middle class, underpinned by changes in occupation and housing.	一是传统工人阶级的衰落和更丰裕的中产阶级的成长，这一趋势的基础是居住和拥有住房状况的变化。


Trade-union membership and public-sector employment have fallen.	工会成员和公共部门就业下降。


The number of people joining political parties has dropped sharply as ideological identification with either the left or the right has waned.	参加政党的人数随着非左即右的意识形态二分的消退而迅速下降。


Add to this the rise of populist and nationalist parties in Britain, partly a consequence of the political and economic alienation that have resulted from globalization and economic troubles, and Labour and the Conservatives are fighting over dwindling support.	除此之外则是民粹主义和民族主义在英国的兴起，这部分是拜政治和经济疏离所致，而政治和经济疏离的原因则是全球化和经济困境，工党和保守党为了不断下降的支持度而斗个不停。


The latest polls indicate 34% support for Labour, and 32% for the Conservatives.	最新民调显示34%的选民支持工党，32%支持保守党。


Labour’s popularity has been trending down from the high 30s over the last couple of years; the Conservatives have remained stuck at around 30%.	工党的支持率几年前还接近40%； 而保守党则一直徘徊在30%左右。


Several factors make predicting the outcome even more problematic.	一些因素让预测结果变得难上加难。


For starters, the electoral system is tipped sharply in Labour’s favor.	首先，选举制度的设计极有利于工党。


It takes more votes to elect a Conservative than a Labour MP, owing to the over-representation of urban Britain and some majority-Labour parts of the country.	保守党成为议员所需要比工党赢得更多选票，因为城市英国居民拥有过多的代表权，而工党在不少英国选区占据多数优势。


As a result, psephologists calculate that the Conservatives have to win at least 4% more of the popular vote than Labour in order to win more seats.	结果，选举专家测算，保守党必须至少赢得比工党高4%的支持才能拿下更多席位。


Second, the anti-immigration, anti-European UK Independence Party (UKIP) takes more votes – perhaps as much as 50% – from the Conservatives than it does from the Labour party.	其次，反移民、反欧洲的英国独立党（UK Independence Party）从保守党中夺走的选票比从工党夺走的多得多——也许多50%。


It looks as though UKIP’s support may have peaked, and that some of the air is escaping from the party’s tires.	看起来，英国独立党的支持也许已经见顶，并且已经表露出疲态。


But no one really knows how much damage UKIP will do to the Conservatives’ chances.	但没人真的知道英国独立党对保守党的胜算会造成多大影响。


Third, on the other side of the fence, the Scottish National Party appears to be attracting a large number of former Labour supporters.	第三，在藩篱的另一边，苏格兰民族党（Scottish National Party）似乎正在吸引大量前工党支持者。


Many working-class voters in western Scotland used to vote for the SNP in Scottish Parliament elections, but would drift back to Labour in UK general elections.	许多苏格兰西部的工人阶级选民曾经在苏格兰议会选举中支持苏格兰民族党，但在英国的大选中，他们将转而支持工党。


But some believe that this pattern has been disrupted, owing to a sense that Labour has taken its traditional supporters for granted.	但一些人认为这一模式已经被打破，因为有一种感觉认为工党将其传统支持者视为理所当然。


Ed Miliband, the Labour leader, seems to be just as unpopular in Scotland as his Conservative counterpart, Prime Minister David Cameron.	工党领袖米利班德（Ed Miliband）在苏格兰的不受欢迎程度与其对手、首相卡梅伦不相上下。


Leadership is an area where the Conservatives are already ahead in opinion polls.	在领导力方面，保守党已经在民调中领先。


They have a substantial lead on economic issues as well, as the news continues to support the party’s contention that the recovery in growth and employment, along with low inflation, are now benefiting the entire country.	他们在经济问题上也有明显的领先优势，而新闻媒体一直在支持该党关于增长与就业复苏以及低通胀正在让整个经济获益的主张。


Conservatives will hammer away on the economy, as they did in 1992, the last time that they won an election outright.	保守党将与他们上一次在选举中大获全胜的1992年一样苦心钻研经济问题。


Labour, for its part, will seek to focus voters’ attention on issues that are thought to be toxic for the government, like the National Health Service.	至于工党，他们将把重点放在选民对不利于政府的问题上的注意力。


With the campaign already underway, no one should expect the main protagonists to depart significantly in the weeks ahead from the themes that they have already espoused.	选战已经开始，没人会认为主力宣传机器会未来几周偏离既定主题。


What happens if the outcome matches the bookies’ predictions?	结果与博彩公司的预测不谋而合会如何？


There will presumably be months of attempts to build coalitions out of improbable alliances; then maybe there will be another election (assuming Parliament can change the law mandating its five-year term).	可能会有几个月的时间可以努力结成不可能的同盟； 接着也许是又一场选举（假设议会改变五年一选的法律规定的话）。


I hope it does not come to that, and that when the battle smoke clears, Cameron will be left – as he deserves to be – the only man standing.	我希望不会走到这一步，还希望当硝烟散尽时，卡梅伦将是唯一还站着的人——他配得上胜利。


But before I place that bet, I will consider what the bookies have to say.	但在我下注前，我会考虑博彩公司怎么说。


Lies, Damn Lies, and the British Election	谎言、该死的谎言和英国选举


LONDON – Democratic elections cannot be described as competitions aimed at revealing which candidates tell the unvarnished truth.	伦敦——揭示哪些候选人能不加修饰地说出真相并不是民主选举竞赛的目的。


Most politicians try to avoid telling outright lies; they bob and weave like prizefighters when faced with questions that might ensnare them in outright mendacity.	多数政治家尽量避免直接撒谎； 他们像职业拳手那样躲闪可能让自己陷入到说谎境地的问题。


But they invariably exaggerate what they have to offer, as well as the perils that would result should their opponents win.	但他们却不约而同地夸大自己的好处以及竞争对手获胜的危险。


It is understandable that politicians should talk up their own vision of the future and talk down what others have to say.	我们可以理解政治家渲染自己的未来目标，而对别人的目标进行淡化处理。


All of this is most credible if it does not go too far, and if it bears some resemblance to what the same politicians have achieved when they have been in power.	但做得不太过火才相对可信，并且此人在过去掌权时也应该取得过某些相似的业绩。


Voters normally spot political Pinocchios and the lengthening of politicians’ noses a mile off.	选民们往往在一英里外就能辩认出政界匹诺曹和说谎者的长鼻子。


But they also do not expect their elected representatives to be saints.	但他们也并不用圣人的标准来要求自己的当选代表。


They are prepared to give some the benefit of the doubt (by far the most important attribute any political leader can possess).	他们愿意在一定程度上适用无罪推定（目前为止这是政界领袖能够拥有的最重要的品质）。


My guess is that on polling day, Prime Minister David Cameron will emerge holding this asset.	我猜想在投票当天，戴维·卡梅伦首相在露面时会表现出这种特点。


Voters also have a gut instinct – usually, though not always, correct – that parties of the traditional left will tax and spend more, and that those of the right will do the opposite.	选民们通常也相信直觉——虽然直觉并不总正确——即传统左翼党派往往会多征税多开支，而右翼党派则恰恰相反。


The way voters respond reflects the way they perceive recent history and what they want for themselves and their families in the future.	选民们对此的反应体现出他们对近期局势的看法，以及他们希望自己和家人拥有什么样的未来。


I subscribe to the view that they normally get these judgments right.	我认同选民们往往能够做出正确的判断。


This year, however, the British electorate must navigate more than the ordinary amount of election-time dissimulation.	但今年，英国选民必须忍受异乎寻常的选举隐瞒。


As voters head to the polls on May 7, their would-be elected officials are asking them to believe three great falsehoods, each of which is dangerous in its own way.	在选民5月7日走进投票站时，待选官员要求他们相信危险的三大谎言。


The first two falsehoods – deceptions as large as I can remember witnessing during an election campaign – are being peddled by the country’s two most successful populist parties: the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP).	英国最成功的两大民粹主义政党——英国独立党（UKIP）和苏格兰民族党（SNP）正在兜售上面提到的前两大谎言，这也是我本人在竞选活动中所目睹过的最大欺骗。


UKIP’s rapid rise has been built on the promise of a return to a British past that never was: mostly white, God-fearing, law-abiding, culturally insular, and narrowly focused on its own national interests.	英国独立党的快速崛起基于英国回到从未有过的过去的诺言：以白人为主、敬畏上帝、遵纪守法、在文化上孤芳自赏并一味追求狭隘的国家利益。


It is a vision that appeals mainly to those who are suspicious of modernity and hostile toward globalization.	上述目标吸引的主要是怀疑现代化、敌视全球化的民众。


The danger is that UKIP’s two primary policy prescriptions – an end to immigration and withdrawal from the European Union – are incompatible with economic prosperity.	英国独立党两大主要政策处方——即结束移民和退出欧盟——其风险在于不符合经济繁荣的要求。


In order for Britain to continue to thrive outside the EU, it would have to open its economy even further, not only to worldwide trade and investment, but also to increased immigration flows.	为让英国在欧盟以外继续壮大发展，有必要对全球贸易投资和不断增长的移民进一步开放经济。


Following UKIP’s suggestion to close the country off from the world would result only in greater poverty – above all for British workers.	英国独立党面向世界封闭英国的建议只会导致更严重的贫困——尤其是对英国工人而言。


The SNP, too, has built its campaign around a core of dishonesty that, unfortunately, explains a good part of its success.	苏格兰民族党的竞选也围绕不诚实的核心，不幸的是，这种不诚实恰恰在很大程度上是其成功的源泉。


In addition to appealing to an unpleasant undercurrent of Scottish Anglophobia, the SNP promises its electorate the prospect of policies that are far to the left of anything that Labour’s prime ministerial candidate, Ed Miliband, could possibly deliver.	除迎合苏格兰仇英的社会暗流外，苏格兰民族党承诺其选民实行远比工党首相候选人埃德·米利班德所能提供的更偏左翼的极端政策。


To make matters worse, the increase in welfare spending that the SNP is promising Scotland’s voters would have to be paid for primarily by taxpayers in England.	更糟的是，苏格兰民族党向苏格兰选民承诺的增加福利开支必将主要来自英国纳税人的腰包。


Regardless of which party – Labour or Conservative – wins the largest number of seats in Parliament, its constituents would of course include many English voters, who would never agree to the SNP’s policy priorities.	无论工党还是保守党哪一方赢得最多数量的议会席位，其构成必然会包括众多永远不可能同意其政策重点的英国选民。


As far as falsehoods go, this is a dangerous one; it once again threatens the constitutional integrity of Britain, just eight months after Scotland voted to stay part of the United Kingdom by a margin of 10%.	这是一个危险的谎言； 在苏格兰仅以10%的优势投票留在英国短短八个月后，它再次对英国的宪法完整性构成威胁。


But it is the last deception that is the most widespread – and probably the most dangerous of all.	但最后一个谎言流传最为普遍——危险系数可能也最高。


National politicians’ campaign rhetoric embodies the delusional belief that the UK can exercise the same degree of control over global events that might have been possible 50 years ago.	国家政客的竞选演说体现出一种妄念，即英国能够以50年前相同的力度控制全球。 无论如何，这样的可能性几乎为零。


For better or worse, that simply is not true.	英国不再拥有曾经有过的影响力；


The UK no longer wields the international influence it once did; indeed, Britons hardly seem to be bothered by their country’s downgraded importance – or even very much aware of the implications.	事实上，英国人似乎并未受到国家重要性下降的困扰——甚或不太清楚这当中的涵义。


National sovereignty is becoming an ever more elusive concept.	国家主权的概念越来越难以捉摸。


Britain’s economic prospects increasingly depend on events beyond its shores, whether just across the English Channel or in China or California.	英国的经济前景越来越依赖于海外发生的事件，无论是刚刚跨过英吉利海峡，还是在中国或者加州。


Environmental hazards blow in on the wind.	危害环境的物质随风而至。


Swelling migration pressures threaten to overwhelm any pretense at border controls.	不断加大的移民压力随时可能压倒任何边境管制的假象。


Security concerns increasingly implicate foreign and domestic policies simultaneously.	安全问题越来越多地同时牵扯到外交和国内政策。


A recent political cartoon showed British bombers taking off on a mission, with one pilot saying to the others, “It seems a long way to go to bomb a few young men from South London.”	最近的政治漫画画着英国轰炸机起飞执行任务，一名飞行员对旁边的人说，“轰炸伦敦南部的几个年轻人似乎有很长的路要走。 ”


Addressing the challenges that we Britons face will first require acknowledging our limited control over their root causes.	解决英国人所面临的挑战首先要承认我们无法全面控制造成问题的根源。


The country is in desperate need of leadership with the courage to be candid with voters, by explaining to them clearly and soberly that the UK can no longer solve its problems alone.	国家迫切需要有独立见解的政治家，有勇气对选民坦率而清楚地说明英国独自解决问题的日子已经一去不返。


In an increasingly dangerous, ever-more interconnected world, Britain cannot afford to make its most important collective decisions based on delusions.	在越来越危险、联系越来越紧密的世界里，英国不能任由其最重要的集体决策基于妄想或谎言。


The British electorate would be better served if their politicians had the courage to serve up some uncomfortable truths – or at least not to deal in dangerous deceit.	英国政治家披露令人不快的真相将令选民受益——至少他们应该做到停止兜售危险的欺骗。


Britain in Search of a Country	英国寻求国家定位


LONDON – The Brexit vote has smashed much of the infrastructure of Britain’s economic and political relations with Europe and the world.	伦敦——英国脱欧投票已经粉碎了英国与欧洲和世界经济政治联系的多数基础设施。


Those who campaigned for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, largely on the basis of lies and delusion, have no idea what to do next.	那些基本基于谎言和欺骗的英国脱欧派根本不知道下一步该何去何从。


They are destroyers, not creators.	他们是毁灭者、而非建设者。


But now that we Brits have broken all the crockery in the shop, we have to piece together our national interest from the shards.	但现在我们英国人已经打碎了店里所有的瓷器，只能将国家利益从碎片中拼凑出来。


All of us, led by a new and clever prime minister, Theresa May (who campaigned to stay in Europe), must do all we can to save our country from isolation and decline.	在聪明的新任首相特雷莎·梅（梅是留欧支持者）的领导下，我们所有人必须竭尽全力将我们的国家从孤立和衰退的边缘挽救回来。


May has moved quickly to put in place a team to manage Britain’s divorce from the EU.	梅已经迅速行动组建了英国脱欧的管理团队。


It includes Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, who will need no reminder of the old adage that diplomats are supposed to go abroad to lie for their country.	团队由鲍里斯·约翰逊任外交大臣，他非常清楚外交官的使命是要到国外去为本国说谎这一古老的箴言。


His challenge will not only be his cavalier attitude to the truth, but also his record of insulting many of those – including US President Barack Obama and his possible successor, Hillary Clinton – with whom he will need to do business.	他所面临的挑战不仅是无视真相，而且还有曾经侮辱过很多现在需要打交道的人（包括美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马及其可能的继任者希拉里·克林顿）。


But more important than the team is the nature of the game they have to play.	但比团队更重要的是这场博弈的属性。


“Brexit means Brexit,” May has said.	梅曾表示过，“脱欧就是脱欧”。


But what does that mean for our trade relations and our immigration policy?	但这对我们的贸易关系和移民政策有何意义？


Are we committed to seeking access to Europe’s single market on something like our current terms?	我们是否力争以与现在相差不多的条件加入欧盟单一市场？


Will we be able to secure “passporting” rights for our banks and financial services, so that they can stay in Britain while operating in the rest of Europe?	我们能否为银行和金融服务取得“护照”，让它们既能留在英国又能在欧洲其他国家开展业务？


How can we secure any of these objectives without, like Norway or Switzerland, accepting the single market’s rules?	我们怎样才能不像挪威和瑞典一样，在接受单一市场规则的情况下实现这样的目标。


A key issue in answering these questions will be what we can negotiate concerning the free movement of labor.	回答这些问题的关键在于我们能谈成什么样的劳动力自由流动结果？


At the moment, our attitude to trade and migration seems to be encapsulated in one simple but contradictory slogan: “Open for business, but closed for foreigners.”	目前，我们对贸易和移民的态度似乎可以用“欢迎商业、但不欢迎外国人”这句简单而矛盾的口号来概述。


I hope – and suspect – that some flexibility will be possible in this area.	我希望——同时怀疑——在这方面能有一定的灵活性。


Brexit not only diminishes Britain; to a lesser extent, it also diminishes the EU.	英国退欧不仅削弱了英国； 在某种程度上，欧盟也同样遭到了削弱。


Other European countries should want to make Britain’s exit as easy and friendly as possible.	其他欧洲国家肯定希望让英国的退欧过程尽可能轻松友好。


Yet, over the next year or so, several of our former colleagues may recognize that they, too, want some form of emergency brake on migration flows from one EU country to another.	但到明年前后，我们之前几个伙伴国有可能意识到他们也希望对欧盟国家间流动的移民潮踩下紧急刹车。


When this happens, it should be possible to offer Britain a better deal, without destroying the integrity of the EU’s treaties and policies.	如果真是这样，英国就应当能在不损害欧盟条约和政策完整性的前提下谈成更好的结果。


This would not pander to the sort of racism that was a shameful feature of some of the “Leave” campaigning in Britain – and which has left a harmful residue of hostility to foreigners of every hue.	这绝不是迎合某些“脱欧”份子那种可耻的种族主义——他们为形形色色的外国人留下了有害的敌意。


Reported instances of hate crime have risen sharply.	公开报道的仇恨犯罪案例已经大幅度上升。


Now, “Leave” campaigners of course deny that this has anything to do with them.	现在，“脱欧”宣传者当然否认他们与这种状况有任何关系。


Some even argue that they never called for limiting immigration, just for “taking control” of our own borders.	有人甚至辩称从未呼吁过限制移民人数，他们的本意只是要夺回对本国边境的“控制权”。