The policy would become one of defense (deploying additional anti-missile systems) and deterrence, with North Korea understanding that any use or spread of nuclear weapons would lead to the end of the regime and possibly nuclear retaliation.	对朝政策变为防御（部署更多反导系统）和威慑，让朝鲜知道一旦使用或传播核武器就将导致政权的末日乃至核报复。


Cyber weapons might also be employed to obstruct and impede the progress of North Korea’s program.	也可以运用网络武器阻挠或破坏朝鲜核计划的进展。


The second option would be a conventional military attack, targeting North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities.	其二是常规军事打击，目标为朝鲜核与导弹能力。


The danger is that such a strike might not achieve all of its objectives and trigger either a conventional military attack on South Korea (where nearly 30,000 US troops are based) or even a nuclear attack from the North.	危险在于这样的打击可能无法全部命中目标，结果是引发朝鲜对韩常规军事打击（目前有30,000美军驻扎在韩国）甚至核打击。


Needless to say, Japan and South Korea would have to be prepared to support any US military response before it could be undertaken.	不消说，日本和韩国必须在军事行动开始之前做好支持美国一切军事反应的准备。


The third option would be to launch such a conventional military attack only if intelligence showed North Korea was putting its missiles on alert and readying them for imminent use.	其三是只在情报表明朝鲜已进入导弹警戒状态、准备立即使用时发动这一常规军事打击。


This would be a classic pre-emptive strike.	这是经典的先发制人打击。


The danger here is that the intelligence might not be sufficiently clear – or come early enough.	危险在于情报可能不够明确——或不够及时。


All of which brings us back to that possible day in 2020.	所有这些让我们回到2020年的那个可能的日子。


If much is unknown, what seems all but certain is that whoever wins November’s US presidential election will confront a fateful decision regarding North Korea sometime during her or his term.	如果说还有许多事情仍不确定的话，那么有一件事已经确定，那就是，不论谁赢得11月的美国总统选举，在他或她的任期内都将面临命运攸关的朝鲜政策决定。


A Korean Helsinki Process?	朝鲜赫尔辛基进程？


SEOUL – Last month, North and South Korea narrowly avoided a catastrophic military confrontation.	首尔—上个月，朝鲜和韩国勉强避免了灾难性军事冲突。


After 40 hours of strenuous negotiations, the South agreed to stop loudspeaker broadcasts into the demilitarized zone between the two countries, in exchange for the North expressing “regret” for the South Korean soldiers killed by a landmine blast in the DMZ three weeks earlier.	在经过40小时的紧张谈判后，韩国同意停止在两国之间的非军事区进行广播喊话，作为交换，朝鲜对三周前韩国士兵因在非军事区踩雷丧生表示“遗憾”。


While the crisis featured North Korea’s familiar belligerence and aggressive rhetoric, there were also some interesting new twists.	在这场危机中，朝鲜的反应依然是为人所熟知的好斗和咄咄逼人，但也体现出一些颇为有趣的新动向。


Understanding these developments could help to generate enough momentum to initiate, after more than seven years of confrontation, genuine inter-Korean cooperation and help guide the peninsula toward a more peaceful and secure future.	理解这些新发展趋势有助于获得足够动力在七年多的冲突后启动真正的朝韩合作、帮助引导朝鲜半岛走向更和平、更安全的未来。


The first new development is the South Korean leadership’s much firmer response to provocations from the North.	第一个发展趋势是韩国领导层对来自朝鲜的挑衅反应更加坚决了。


In 2010, the South Korean public was sharply critical of the military’s failure to retaliate immediately following the North’s sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean warship carrying more than 100 personnel, and its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island later that year.	2010年，韩国民众尖锐地批评了韩军没有在朝鲜击沉韩国军舰天安号（船上有100多名船员）和前一年朝鲜炮击延坪岛后立即反击。


After the recent landmine blasts, by contrast, President Park Geun-hye would not back down from her demands that the North, which denied planting the mines, apologize.	相反，在最近的地雷爆炸事件发生后，韩国总统朴槿惠毫不退缩地要求否认埋设地雷的朝鲜道歉。


Her approval ratings soared to 50%, from around 34% the previous month.	她的支持率立刻从前一个月的34%左右上升到50%。


This shift, while popular in South Korea, carries serious risks for the peninsula.	这一转变深受韩国欢迎，但给朝鲜半岛带来了严重的风险。


If an unyielding South becomes engaged in another military game of chicken with the often-audacious and always-erratic North, the results could be catastrophic.	如果不服软的韩国参与到与常常鲁莽冒险并且永远无法捉摸的朝鲜之间的“胆小鬼”军事博弈中，结果可能是灾难性的。


In this sense, an institutional framework for permanent inter-Korean peace is more urgent than ever.	从这个角度讲，我们比以往任何时候都更加急切地需要永久性朝韩和平制度性框架。


The second development relates to China, which remained silent throughout the latest crisis – a significant departure from its stance in 2010, when it actively sided with North Korea on the international diplomatic stage.	第二个发展趋势与中国有关。 在最近的危机中，中国一直保持沉默，这与其在2010年的立场截然不同。


Of course, it is impossible to know whether China’s response this time marks a genuine strategic withdrawal from its role as the North’s only ally and key economic benefactor.	2010年中国在国际外交舞台上积极地维护朝鲜。 当然，我们不可能知道中国在此次危机中的反应是否标志着它果真从朝鲜唯一的盟友和关键经济“金主”的角色中战略性退出。


China’s leaders may simply have decided that a tactical disciplining of the North’s leadership was in order.	中国领导人也许认为朝鲜领导层的战术性规训（tactical disciplining）并未失控。


But, at a time when China’s relationship with South Korea is deepening, the silence has been deafening.	但是，当中国与韩国关系正在深化的时候，如此沉默可谓振聋发聩。


If China really is distancing itself from North Korea, Kim Jong-un’s regime will be almost entirely isolated internationally.	如果中国真的是与朝鲜保持距离，那么金正恩政权将几乎完全与国际社会隔绝。


Will Kim respond to that isolation recklessly, by continuing to antagonize the South, or pragmatically, by becoming more flexible?	金正恩会因为这一隔绝采取鲁莽行动（比如继续与韩国敌对）还是识时务地变得更加灵活？


That is not an easy question to answer.	这不是一个简单的问题。


It should be clear to Kim by now that his parade of provocations is not benefiting his country.	如今，金正恩应该已经清楚，他的挑衅策略无益于他的国家。


His bellicose behavior in 2013, for example, worsened his relationships with China, South Korea, and the United States simultaneously; and in the recent crisis, all he earned was a halt to mocking loudspeaker broadcasts.	比如，他在2013年的好战行为同时恶化了他与中国、韩国和美国的关系； 而在最近的危机中，他所获得的只不过是韩国暂停了嘲弄性的广播喊话。


But Kim is not exactly known for his pragmatism or diplomacy.	但金正恩所缺乏的正是务实主义或外交手段。


Kim’s intentions may become clearer next month, when the North is expected to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party by conducting a nuclear test and launching a new intercontinental missile.	金正恩的意图可能在下个月表现得更加清楚，届时朝鲜将用核试验和发射洲际导弹庆祝执政的朝鲜劳动党成立70周年。


But China, South Korea, and the US – whose policies toward North Korea are now more closely aligned than ever – should not simply wait to see what happens.	但中国、韩国和美国——如今三国对朝政策前所未有地统一——不应该坐视情况发展。


They should initiate a dialogue with the North and take steps to dissuade Kim from continuing on his path of antagonism.	它们应该组织与朝鲜的对话，并采取措施说服金正恩不要在对抗的道路上越走越远。


The third new development on the peninsula is a growing awareness among North Koreans of their country’s dire situation.	朝鲜半岛的第三个新发展趋势是朝鲜人民越来越清醒地认识到祖国的悲惨状况。


At this point, the shift is most apparent among North Korean soldiers in the DMZ, for whom the South’s recent broadcasts were highly demoralizing.	目前，最明显的变化出现在非军事区的朝鲜士兵身上，对他们来说，韩国最近的广播喊话让人十分沮丧。


Today’s young soldiers represent the so-called Jangmadang (“black market”) generation that came of age under the marketization process that followed the massive famine in the mid-1990s.	今天的年轻士兵代表着所谓的“黑市”（Jangmadang）一代，他们是在20世纪90年代中期大饥荒之后的市场化过程中长大成人的。


Exposed to South Korean movies, music, and other products, they recognize the yawning gap between their government’s propaganda and the country’s grim reality.	他们看过韩国电影、听过韩国音乐，用过其他韩国产品，他们知道政府宣传与国家惨淡现实之间存在着巨大的差异。


The South’s loudspeaker broadcasts drove the point home.	韩国广播喊话击中了他们的痛处。


As the marketization process continues, soon it won’t be just the soldiers who see through the regime’s propaganda.	随着市场化进程的继续，过不了多久，看穿当局宣传伎俩的便不会仅仅局限于士兵了。


The time for bottom-up change in the North may not be far off.	朝鲜发生自上而下变革也许已为时不远。


This opens up a new policy option for the West: impelling North Korea to dial back its foreign and security policy by deepening its economic and social engagement with the rest of the world.	这给西方带来了新的政策选择：迫使朝鲜改变其外交和安全政策，深化与��界其他地区的经济和社会参与。


The benefits for the North would drastically change the regime’s strategic calculus, particularly concerning nuclear weapons.	这样给朝鲜带来的好处将极大地改变朝鲜政权的战略考量，特别是核武器问题。


International linkages – or, rather, sanctions that blocked the benefits of such linkages – were vital to Libya’s decision to denuclearize and Iran’s willingness to reach an agreement with world powers regarding its nuclear program.	国际联系——或者不如说阻止获得国际联系所带来的好处的制裁——在利比亚决定放弃核武器以及伊朗愿意与西方列强达成核计划协议方面起到了关键作用。


Sanctions have been less effective in North Korea, largely because the population did not know what it was missing.	制裁对朝鲜一直收效甚微，很大程度上是因为朝鲜人不知道朝鲜正在失去什么。


Similarly, growing connections between groups within the Soviet bloc and the West played a major role in bringing about the 1975 Helsinki Accords.	类似地，苏联阵营内部各集团与西方联系的增加在促成1975年赫尔辛基协议（Helsinki Accords）上起到了主要作用。


The accords represented an effort to improve East-West relations during the Cold War, and included an emphasis on human rights.	赫尔辛基协议代表着冷战期间改善东西方关系的努力，并包括了强调人权的内容。


Most important, they achieved the kind of sustained engagement that is badly needed on the Korean Peninsula today.	最重要的是，赫尔辛基协议实现了今天的朝鲜半岛急需的持续交流（sustained engagement）。


The aftermath of the August crisis may be the moment to think seriously about how to balance continued sanctions on North Korea with deeper economic and social ties.	8月危机也许是认真思考如何通过加深经济和社会联系平衡继续对朝制裁的良机。


Without such an approach, North and South Korea could, before long, be locked in another military standoff.	如果没有这一方针，朝鲜和韩国也许过不了多久就会陷入新一轮军事僵局。


The next one may not end so well as the last.	新的军事僵局也许不再会像旧军事僵局那样容易解决。


Managing North Korea’s Collapse	管理朝鲜的崩溃


LOS ANGELES – In the last few months, North Korea has again displayed remarkable temerity.	洛杉矶—在过去几个月中，朝鲜再次表现出极大的鲁莽。


First, the regime threatened to conduct more nuclear tests if the United Nations does not withdraw its recommendation to prosecute the country’s leaders for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court.	首先，朝鲜政府威胁如果联合国不撤销其关于在国际刑事法院起诉朝鲜领导人反人类罪的建议，朝鲜就要进行更多的核试验。


Moreover, US officials claim that the regime mounted a clandestine cyber attack on Sony Pictures, allegedly over objections to “The Interview,” a slapstick movie premised on an assassination attempt against North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un.	此外，美国官员声称朝鲜政府对索尼影业公司（Sony Pictures）发动了秘密网络袭击，相信目的是为了反对一部低俗喜剧《采访》（The Interview）。 该片以刺杀朝鲜领导人金正恩的故事为基础。


Then, in yet another melodramatic twist, Kim offered in his New Year’s address to resume talks with South Korea.	接着，金正恩又故作姿态，在其新年讲话中表示要重启与韩国的对话。


The Kim regime’s actions obviously merit consideration.	金氏政权的行为显然值得深思。


But they should not divert attention from the real risks on the Korean Peninsula: Kim’s uncertain grip on power and the dangers that could be unleashed should his regime fall apart.	但不应该因为它们而将注意力从朝鲜半岛的真正风险上移开：金正恩权力不稳以及在金氏政权倒台时出现的危险。


Indeed, none of the region’s key strategic players – China, the United States, and South Korea – seem to be adequately prepared for such a scenario.	事实上，该地区的重要战略行动方——中国、美国和韩国似乎都没有为这一情形做好准备。


That needs to change.	这需要改变。


Crucially, the long-standing presumption that the US should take the lead in responding to what happens in North Korea also needs to be reconsidered.	关键是，美国应该领导对朝鲜局势变化的应对方案这一长期存在的假定也需要重新考虑。


The North’s behavior almost certainly reflects mounting turmoil among the elite.	朝鲜的行为几乎肯定反映的是精英阶层不断增加的动荡。


For more than a year, the regime has been carrying out a purge of high-level officials, beginning with the execution of Kim’s uncle, Jang Song Taek, in 2013.	一年多来，朝鲜政权一直在清洗高层官员，首先是2013年被清洗的金正恩的姑父张成泽。


Subsequent executions of Jang’s entourage and advisers, the recall of Jang’s associates from posts abroad, and the attempted kidnapping in France of the son of one of his assistants attest to the level of alarm in Kim’s inner circle.	随后，张成泽的亲信和幕僚被处决，其相关人员从国外被召回，其一位助手的儿子在法国险遭绑架，所有这些都证明，金氏王朝内部圈子已是警钟大作。


The elevation of Kim’s inexperienced 27-year-old sister, Kim Yo-jong, to a senior post, is another indication of growing anxiety.	金正恩提拔其毫无经验的27岁妹妹金与正为高级官员，这是形势剑拔弩张的又一信号。


The potential for instability has not gone unnoticed in China.	潜在的不稳定没有逃过中国的眼睛。


An article published late last year in the official media by a prominent retired People’s Liberation Army general describes the North Korean regime as terminal.	去年年底，中国官方媒体发表解放军退休高级将领的文章，将朝鲜政权形容为“晚期”。


The article’s appearance is a clear sign that China’s leaders are debating how deeply they can afford to be drawn in if the regime collapses.	这篇文章的出现时一个清晰的信号，表明中国领导人正在讨论，如果金氏政权倒台，他们可以进行多少程度的干涉。


A similar discussion needs to take place in the US.	美国也需要进行类似的讨论。


There is no question about what America’s responsibility would be if the Kim regime’s downfall led to all-out war.	毫无疑问，如果金氏政权倒台并导致全方位战争，美国将肩负责任。


The security agreement between the US and South Korea mandates a military response.	美韩安全协定规定美国美国需做出军事反应。


What is less clear is the role that the US should play in the event of a peaceful collapse.	不明确的是，如果和平崩溃，美国应该扮演怎样的角色。


America’s contingency planning is classified.	美国的意外事件计划时保密的。


But publicly available evidence suggests that US forces and resources are expected to play the primary role.	但公开证据表明美国的部队和资源可以起主导作用。


In 2013, a former principal deputy director of national intelligence wrote that America’s interests could require major use of US armed forces.	2013年，一位前国家情报首席副官写道，美国的利益可以要求美国大规模使用武装部队。


Last year, the Rand Corporation estimated that as many as 270,000 troops would be needed just to secure the North’s nuclear weapons.	去年，兰德公司（Rand Corporation）估计，光是保护朝鲜的核武器就需要270,000军队。


In light of the costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US should give careful thought to its plans – and consider limiting its involvement as much as possible.	考虑到干预伊拉克和阿富汗所带来的沉重代价，美国应该谨慎考虑其计划——并考虑尽可能限制干预规模。


Sixty years after the end of the Korean War, South Korea is well equipped to take the lead in the event of a North Korean collapse.	朝鲜战争已经结束六十年，韩国已有充分的能力在朝鲜崩溃时起到领导作用。


With a trillion-dollar economy, world-class technology, a 500,000-strong military, and a vibrant, well-educated society, the country is capable of planning, manning, and paying for the aftermath of a peaceful end to the Kim regime.	韩国拥有万亿美元规模的经济、世界级的技术、500,000大军和充满活力、教育程度优良的社会，它有能力计划、操作和提供资金以实现金氏王朝的和平下台。


In order to do so, however, South Korea will need to invest in its capabilities to stabilize North Korea and manage its transition.	但是，要实现这一目标，韩国需要投资于稳定朝鲜、管理朝鲜转型的能力。


Recent plans for major cuts in the South Korean military, along with a lack of public discussion about the country’s role in the wake of Kim’s fall, suggest that much work remains to be done.	最近的大幅裁军计划以及关于金正恩倒台时扮演何种角色这一问题上鲜有公共讨论表明，韩国还有很多工作要做。


If South Korea takes the lead, the US will be able to concentrate on its top priority: North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.	如果韩国承担领导作用，美国就能专注于其最高优先任务：朝鲜核武库。


Whether the Kim regime collapses with a bang or a whimper, the country’s nuclear weapons will present both an immediate danger and a future proliferation threat.	不管金氏王朝以动乱还是以和平形式结束，朝鲜的核武器都将是迫在眉睫的危险和未来核扩散的威胁。


Ensuring that these weapons are not used, moved, or exported is a task that will require the capabilities of the US armed forces.	保证这些核武器不被使用、移动或出口是一项非依靠美国军事实力不能完成的任务。


Communication with China will be essential.	与中国的交流将是至关重要的。


If North Korea collapses, the Chinese may well send troops.	如果朝鲜崩溃，中国很有可能会出兵。


As US and South Korean forces would most likely be operating on the same territory, they will need to avoid misperceptions or mistakes that could cause unintended clashes.	美国和韩国部队极有可能在同一区域执行任务，它们需要避免误会或可能导致意料外冲突的错误。


China’s military relations with its North Korean counterparts also could play a stabilizing role, particularly if the Kim dynasty’s demise unleashes internal strife.	中国和朝鲜军队的关系也可以起到稳定作用，特别是如果金氏王朝的倒台缓和内部争端的话。


Given the instability in North Korea, each country should define its role now.	考虑到朝鲜的不稳定局势，所有国家现在都应该开始谋划自己的角色。


Careful consideration, not events in Pyongyang, should drive their discussions, and the understandings and policies they produce.	讨论、理解以及由理解产生的政策应该受谨慎的思考而不是平壤发生了什么推动。


North Korea Makes History	北朝鲜制造了历史


Historical turning points are normally easier to identify in retrospect.	在回顾中历史转折点一般能很容易地被识别出来。


But it will not require years to determine whether North Korea’s test of a nuclear explosive device qualifies as one. It does.	但是北朝鲜进行核爆炸装置试验的问题上并不需要你花很多年才使你发现它将成为一个历史转折点。


The question is whether it proves to be a turn for the better or for the worse.	问题只是它将会朝着好的方向发展还是坏的方向发展。


Some argue that little has changed as a result of the test.	有些人争辩说就试验的结果而言没有发生多大的变化。


The world assumed for years that North Korea possesses enough nuclear material to make a half-dozen or more basic nuclear bombs.	世界上多年来一直猜测北朝鲜拥有足够制造六枚甚至更多基本的核弹的核材料。


The test made explicit what was implicit.	这次试验证实了大家的猜测。


But what was assumed is now known.	问题已经明朗了。


So much has changed.	发生了如此多的变化。


North Korea has challenged the world; the question is how the world responds.	北朝鲜向世界发出了挑战； 现在的问题是世界将作出怎样的回应。


The stakes could hardly be higher.	赌注不能再高了。


North Korea’s leaders have a history of aggressiveness, a demonstrated contempt for their people, and a record of selling just about anything (from drugs and counterfeit dollars to missile parts) to earn hard currency.	北朝鲜的领导人一直都极具挑衅性，无视它的人民的利益，并且会贩卖任何能获得硬通货的物品，从毒品，假钞到导弹零件。


The danger is that they might be tempted to use a nuclear weapon, act irresponsibly in the belief that such weapons shield them, or sell one to terrorists.	危险在于他们可能因为相信这样的武器会保护他们而贸然使用核武器，或者把它卖给恐怖主义者。


A second danger concerns the regional consequences of North Korea’s test.	另一个危险在于北朝鲜的核试验所带来的地区影响。


Northeast Asia is a dynamic arena, home to many of the world’s powers, including China, Russia, Japan, the two Koreas, and in many ways the United States.	东北亚是一个充满活力的舞台，那里聚集了世界上好几个强有力的国家，包括中国、俄罗斯、日本，南北朝鲜，并且在许多方面还有美国。


This dynamism could lead to instability, owing to multiple sources of mistrust and the lack of strong regional institutions to help manage rivalries.	这种活力会因为出于多种因素的相互间的不信任以及缺乏强有力的地区组织来帮助抑制竞争行为而带来不稳定的因素。


Global consequences exist as well.	另外还存在全球范围上的影响。


North Korea is now the ninth state with nuclear weapons, joining the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Israel, India, and Pakistan.	北朝鲜现在成了第九个拥有核武器的国家，在它前面是联合国安理会的五个常任理事国、以色列、印度和巴基斯坦。


The danger is that we may fast be approaching a tipping point.	我们面临的危险在于我们可能很快就接近一个倾覆点。


How the world responds to North Korea is likely to affect the calculations of other would-be nuclear powers, including Iran.	世界对北朝鲜作出的回应很有可能会影响到其他一些将会拥有核武器的国家的决策，包括伊朗。


Maintaining peace in a world in which literally dozens of fingers are on nuclear triggers will be far more difficult—and the consequences of failure far more destructive.	当世界上有许多国家都能按动核按钮时要维护和平会变得尤其困难——而一旦失败所带来的后果将是毁灭性的。


Initial reactions to North Korea’s nuclear test were uniformly critical, culminating (thus far) in UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which condemns the test, demands that North Korea resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and imposes a range of military, political, and economic sanctions.	对于北朝鲜核试验一开始的反应是一致的谴责，最终（到目前为止）出台了联合国安理会第1718号决议。 该决议谴责了这次核试验，要求北朝鲜恢复与国际原子能机构的全面合作，并且将对它实行军事、政治和经济上的制裁。


Nevertheless, North Korea’s leaders are clearly betting that they can get away with what they have done, and that the world will get used to their nuclear weapons program, much as it did with Israel, India, and Pakistan.	然而，北朝鲜的领导人显然认定他们不会受到任何惩罚，并且世界将慢慢地习惯于他们的核计划，就像对以色列、印度和巴基斯坦那样。


They may be right.	也许他们是对的。


Both South Korea and China are reluctant to support robust sanctions.	韩国和中国都不太支持实行强有力的制裁。


South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” is best understood as “unconditional engagement.”	韩国的“阳光政策”最好被理解为“无条件的承诺”。


Not surprisingly, this “all carrot, no stick” approach has failed to affect North Korean behavior.	毫不令人奇怪，这种“只有胡萝卜，没有大棒”的做法丝毫不能影响北朝鲜的行为。


China, for its part, has made clear that it does not intend to inspect cargo moving in and out of North Korea across their long common border to ensure it does not contain items prohibited by Resolution 1718.	而中国则明确表明它不会对北朝鲜从它们漫长的共同边界线里进出的货物实行检查以确保这些货物不含有1718号决议所禁止的项目。


While China opposes North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is even more opposed to policies that could threaten the North’s stability and lead to massive refugee crossings into China or to a unified Korea with its capital in Seoul.	中国反对北朝鲜寻求拥有核武器，但是它更加反对的是可能会威胁北朝鲜的稳定从而引发大批难民越境进入中国或者带来一个首都位于首尔的统一的韩国的政策。


So the challenge remains to devise a response that will gain widespread international backing and influence North Korean behavior and capabilities.	所以我们面临的挑战在于如何作出一个会得到广泛国际支持以及能影响北朝鲜的行为和核能力的回应。


One option is a “preventive” military strike.	一种选择是进行“预防性”的军事打击。


The problem is that it would almost surely trigger a massive, costly war, and it would not necessarily succeed in destroying all of North Korea’s hidden capabilities.	但是问题在于它几乎肯定会引发一场大规模的、耗资巨大的战争，并且也不太可能会成功地销毁掉北朝鲜所有隐藏的核能力。


Moreover, both China and South Korea strongly oppose such a scenario, while the United States is poorly positioned to implement it, given its involvement in Iraq.	此外，中国和韩国坚决反对这样一种方案，而美国因为身陷伊拉克而很难抽身去进行这样的行动。


A second option is living with a nuclear North Korea.	第二种选择是任由北朝鲜去拥有核武器。


The danger is less that North Korea might use nuclear weapons (although it might) than that it might sell them.	其危险在于北朝鲜也许不太可能会使用核武器���尽管它有可能会使用），但它却很有可能把它卖给别国。


President Bush’s warning that “the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action,” is meant to deter this outcome.	布什总统关于“如果北朝鲜把核武器或者核材料转给别的国家或非国家实体将被视为对美国的一个严重威胁，并且北朝鲜将对这种行为所带来的后果负全部责任”的警告是想吓阻这种事情的发生。


The problem, of course, is that deterrence sometimes fails.	当然问题是这种吓阻有时起不到作用。


The third option is diplomacy.	第三种选择是外交。


North Korea would be expected to give up its nuclear weapons and place its nuclear material under international safeguards in exchange for formal security assurances, energy resources, and a range of political and economic benefits.	北朝鲜将被期待放弃它的核武器并且把它的核材料置于国际的监管下以换取正式的安全保证、能源和一些政治以及经济上的利益。


Such efforts should be renewed as soon as possible; the US should agree to bilateral as well as six-party talks with the North, possibly in exchange for a moratorium on nuclear tests.	这种努力应该尽快得到恢复； 美国应该同意与北朝鲜进行六方会谈的同时也进行双边会谈，也许可以以此来换取中止核试验。


It will take a blend of the three options – the threat of military force, the reality of economic sanctions, and the resumption of diplomacy —to deal with North Korea’s challenge.	面对北朝鲜的挑战这三种选择——威胁动武、实行经济制裁以及恢复外加努力都不能放弃。


This will not be easy, but it is worth pursuing, because the alternative—a desperate, hostile, nuclear-armed, and isolated North Korea—should alarm everyone.	那并不容易，但值得为此付出努力，否则的话一个铤而走险、充满敌意、掌握着核武器以及被孤立的北朝鲜将会危害所有人。


No Appeasement for North Korea	绝不向朝鲜妥协


WASHINGTON, DC – Earlier this month, North Korea carried out its fifth nuclear test – its second this year.	华盛顿——本月初，朝鲜进行了第五次核试验——也是今年的第二次核试验。


Judging by the tremor detected, it was the North’s most powerful nuclear device ever.	从检测到的震动看，这是朝鲜有史以来威力最大的核装置。


The question now is how the international community should respond.	现在的问题是国际社会应当如何面对。


That question has become all the more acute because, though North Korean reports are not exactly reliable, the propaganda that accompanied the latest test hinted that the North was testing a weapon design, not just an explosive device.	这个问题已经变得更为严重，因为尽管朝鲜国内的报道并不完全可靠，但伴随最新核试的宣传暗示朝鲜是在测试一种武器设计，而不仅是一枚爆炸装置。


And, as South Korean officials have suggested, it may not be the last test of this year.	而且，韩国官员提出这或许并不是本年度的最后一次测试。


In other words, North Korea may begin to stockpile weapons of mass destruction.	换句话说，朝鲜可能会开始囤积大规模杀伤性武器。


Not only have the North’s recent nuclear tests been more powerful than those of previous years; they have also been conducted alongside an equally robust series of tests of ballistic missiles, including submarine launches and multi-stage rocket launches, with much more powerful engines.	不仅朝鲜近期的核试验与前些年相比威力更大； 核试验的同时威力同样巨大的弹道导弹试验也在进行当中，包括潜艇发射和配备有大功率发动机的多级火箭发射。


This means that North Korea may be close to perfecting a delivery system for whatever weapons it is developing.	这意味着朝鲜可能已接近完善所研发武器的运载系统。


No one can say for sure whether a deliverable weapon will come from North Korea in the next two years, four years, or later.	没人能够肯定在未来两年、四年或更长时间内可发射武器能否在朝鲜研制成功。


But there is little doubt that the North Koreans are not just seeking attention; they are seeking a powerful bomb and the means to use it.	毫无疑问的是朝鲜所寻求的不仅是关注； 他们正在全力研制一枚威力巨大的炸弹及其使用方法。


As expected, the international community has unvaryingly condemned the tests.	不出所料，国际社会毫无例外地对核试进行了谴责。


But not everyone agrees on what else to do.	但不是每个人都同意接下来该怎么做。


Some observers, including New York Times contributor Joel S. Wit and former intelligence officer Scott Ritter, declare that now would be an appropriate time to initiate talks with the North Koreans.	某些观察家，包括《纽约时报》撰稿人乔尔·S·维特和前情报官员斯科特·里特在内，宣布现在与朝鲜展开会谈的时机已经成熟。


The logic behind such suggestions seems to come down to, “What have we got to lose?”	这种建议背后的逻辑似乎可以归结为，“我们有什么可以失去的？


The answer is simple: plenty.	”答案很简单：我们可以失去的东西实在太多。


Such talks – “dialogue” as the Chinese often call it – would most likely bring with it a general acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state.	这样的会谈——中国人往往称之为“对话”——很可能带来普遍接受朝鲜为有核国家的后果。


Moreover, the North would be unlikely to engage in any such talks, much less impose a moratorium on weapons tests, unless some of their longstanding demands – such as the suspension of joint military exercises by the United States and South Korea – were met.	此外，朝鲜不太可能参与这样的会谈，更不可能强制停止核武器试验，除非朝鲜提出的某些长期要求——如停止进行美韩联合军演——得到满足。


This Realpolitik approach, some seem to believe, will somehow diminish whatever power the North Koreans wield, essentially disarming them.	有人似乎相信，这种现实政治的做法将在某种程度上削弱朝鲜掌握的权力，并最终让他们放下武器。


But the truth is that the North has done nothing to earn such appeasement.	但实际情况是朝鲜没有做出任何事情值得我们给予这样的姑息。


And, in fact, if the international community were to make any such conciliatory gestures, the result would be a bolder North Korea.	事实上，如果国际社会要做出任何这样的和解姿态，结果必然是让朝鲜胆气更足。


But there is a good reason why the international community – and the United States, in particular – has refused to agree to North Korea’s terms, particularly the suspension of US-South Korea military exercises.	但国际社会——尤其是美国——有充分的理由拒绝同意朝鲜方面的条款，特别是停止美韩军事演习。


Joint military exercises are an essential part of any alliance.	联合军演是任何联盟的重要组成部分。


If two countries agree to mutual defense, they need to ensure that their cooperation is practiced and perfected.	如果两国一致同意共同防务，就需要确保实际演练并完善他们的合作。


That is precisely why North Korea, which knows a thing or two about the need for tests and exercises, has made the issue a top propaganda priority.	正因为如此，对测试和演练略知一二的朝鲜为此问题发动了最高级别的宣传攻势。


Instead of giving into such demands, the US has long held that it will engage in talks with North Korea only if they are based on previous agreements, including the September 2005 joint statement, which obliged the North to abandon all nuclear programs.	美国并未向这样的要求屈服，而是一直坚持在此前协议的基础上与朝鲜谈判，包括2005年9月签署的联合声明。 该声明强制朝鲜放弃所有核计划。


This is a sensible position.	这种立场十分明智。


After all, launching new talks that ignored past obligations would cast doubt on the viability of any new accord.	毕竟，置过去的义务于不顾而展开新的谈判或许会为任何新协议的可行性带来怀疑。


To be sure, pursuant to a February 2007 agreement, North Korea did take concrete steps to disable its nuclear facilities, including demolition of the cooling tower at its main atomic reactor in the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in June 2008.	可以肯定，根据2007年2月的协议，朝鲜确实采取了拆除核装置的具体步骤，包括在2008年6月将其在宁边原子能研究中心主要核反应堆的冷却塔拆除。


Such measures were supposed to brake the country’s nuclear momentum, by ensuring that restarting the program would be costly – perhaps even prohibitively so.	这样的措施本意是通过确保重启核计划代价昂贵——甚至昂贵到令人望而却步，从而阻止该国的核研发势头。


But, by restarting its nuclear program without rebuilding the cooling tower, North Korea has avoided many of those costs.	但通过在不重建冷却塔的情况下重启核计划，朝鲜避免了很多相关费用。


Kim Jong-un’s regime – which has as little regard for the environment as it does for international rules and norms – simply called for the steaming water used to cool the reactor to be dumped into a nearby river.	金正恩政权——对环境像对国际标准和规则一样不屑一顾——干脆将用来冷却反应堆的热气腾腾的沸水排放到临近的河中。


Against this background, the argument for talks is weak.	在这样的背景下，谈判的基础非常薄弱。


After all, negotiations are simply a means to an end, and if that end is unclear or unlikely, it makes little sense to engage in them.	毕竟，谈判只是达到目的的一种手段，而如果那个目的不明确或不可能，那么开始谈判就没有太多意义。


Instead, the international community should reject North Korea’s demands outright, ending the regime’s fantasy that the world will simply accept it as a nuclear-weapons state.	相反，国际社会应毫不犹豫地拒绝朝鲜的要求，从而结束金正恩政权希望世界接受其核武器国地位的幻想。


Fortunately, the international community’s response to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions generally aligns with this imperative.	幸运的是，国际社会对朝鲜核野心的对策大都符合上述必要的举措。


What is needed is more cooperation with China on sanctions enforcement, as well as deep and quiet talks with the Chinese that aim to address any strategic mistrust over the eventual political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula.	我们有必要与中国合作执行制裁行动，同时与中国私下展开深入的对话，以解决就朝鲜半岛最终政治安排问题的任何战略不信任。


The US should also continue to strengthen its security relations with Japan and South Korea, including by developing and deploying antiballistic missile systems.	美国也应继续加强与日本和韩国的安全关系，包括研制和部署反弹道导弹系统。


Direct measures like those that were allegedly used to hamper Iran’s nuclear program should be explored and accelerated.	应当对据称曾阻止伊朗核计划的直接措施加以探讨和运用。


None of this is to say that engaging North Korea is not an option.	这并不是说接触朝鲜不是一种选择。


On the contrary, previous agreements should remain on the table.	恰恰相反，此前的协议仍应严格遵守。


The September 2005 deal addressed North Korea’s key national interests: it gained assurances of peace and diplomatic recognition, in exchange for the dismantling of its nuclear program.	2005年9月的协议顾及了朝鲜关键的国家利益：这个国家获得了和平及外交承认的保证，以换取该国取消其核计划。


If the Kim regime really wants an opportunity to join the international community, it has everything it needs, written, agreed, and ready to be implemented.	如果金政权确实希望有机会加入国际社会，它所需要的一切就摆在面前，白纸黑字、双方同意，而且随时可以执行。


If, however, it wants to continue its march toward nuclearization, it should know, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it will remain a pariah.	但如果它宁愿继续其核长征，那么它应当毫无疑问地明白自己仍将是国际社会的弃儿。


Its status as a nuclear-weapons state will never be accepted.	它作为核武器国的地位永远不会被接受。


North Korea’s Choice	北朝鲜的选择


NEW YORK – When the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world.	纽约——当大韩民国在1948年刚刚成立的时候，它还是世界上最穷的国家之一。


GDP per capita was US$67 in 1953, immediately following the Korean War, and rose to only US$79 in 1960.	朝鲜战争结束后的1953年人均国内生产总值只有67美元，1960年也只上升到79美元。


At that time, North Korea’s economy was much stronger than that of the South.	当时，北朝鲜的经济状况明显强于韩国。


Natural resources were abundant in the North, and even electricity was supplied from North to South.	北方拥有丰富的自然资源，就连电力也是从北方输送到南方。


Most industry was located in the North, whereas the South was mainly agricultural.	北方拥有绝大部分工业，而南方则主要靠农业为生。


Today, the South’s GDP is 40 times larger than that of the North.	而今天，南方的国内生产总值却比北方高40倍。


Comparing the two Korean economies is virtually meaningless.	把两个朝鲜的经济放在一起比较几乎已经毫无意义。


Such disparities do not arise from different historical experiences, because Koreans have shared a history for thousands of years as one nation.	这样的差距并非来自不同的历史经历，因为两个朝鲜几千年来一直是同一个国家。


The gap, instead, reflects recent historical choices.	恰恰相反，这种差距反应了不久前的历史选择。


By persistently adhering to a planned economy and obsolete ideology, North Korea is trapped in a vicious cycle, suffering from unstable food supplies and low, or sometimes negative, economic growth.	由于死死抱住计划经济和过时的意识形态不放，北朝鲜陷入了恶性循环，不断受到粮食供应不稳定和经济增长低迷、有时甚至是负增长的困扰。


Nonetheless, North Korea has shown little interest in reform.	尽管如此，北朝鲜却对改革鲜有兴趣。


Instead, it has developed a nuclear weapons program that threatens stability in the region and places a heavy burden on its economy.	相反却建立了一项威胁地区稳定的核武器计划，加重了自己的经济负担。


South Korea, which is enjoying unprecedented prosperity, is becoming increasingly uncomfortable with North Koreans’ economic despair.	享受着前所未有繁荣的南朝鲜越来越无法坐视北朝鲜绝望的经济状况。


Probably no two neighboring countries have such a huge economic gap, let alone countries that share the same ethnic and historical background.	也许没有哪两个邻国的经济差距如此之大，更不用说这两个国家的民族和历史背景如此相似。


The danger is that such a discrepancy can become a source of instability and conflict.	危险在于这样一种差距可能成为动荡和冲突的根源。


To overcome its economic deficiencies and attain social stability, the North has no choice but to abandon its nuclear weapons program and move toward reform and greater openness.	为了克服经济短缺、实现社会稳定，北朝鲜没有其它选择，只能放弃核武器计划，实行改革开放。


South Korea is trying to persuade the North to make this strategic decision.	韩国正努力说服北朝鲜做出这样的战略抉择。


We are more than willing to help the North achieve economic growth, which is almost always the source of peace and security.	我们非常愿意帮助北朝鲜实现几乎总能带来和平与安全的经济增长。


As such, North Korea’s economic recovery is vital for an enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.	同样，北朝鲜的经济复苏对实现朝鲜半岛持久和平至关重要。


So, in accordance with the Six-Party Talks (North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan) my government wants to create a Korean Economic Community in collaboration with the North.	因此，按照六方会谈（南北朝鲜、美国、俄国、中国和日本）的精神，我的政府希望和北朝鲜合作建立朝鲜经济共同体。


In cooperation with the international community, we will help North Korea raise its annual per capita income to US$3,000.	在国际社会的配合下，我们将帮助北朝鲜把人均年收入提升到3，000美元。


To this end, we will carry out joint projects in five key areas: education, finance, industrial infrastructure, quality of life, and economic development.	为实现这一目标，我们将在教育、金融、工业基础设施、生活质量和经济发展等5个关键领域实施合作项目。


But an institutional mechanism is needed to implement this initiative, such as an inter-Korean consultative body.	但上述方案的实施需要像两朝磋商机制这样的制度建设。


Of course, mere economic assistance or investment is not sufficient for a country to bail itself out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment and poverty.	当然，单纯的经济援助或投资并不足以把一个国家从贫穷和发展落后的恶性循环中解放出来。


A national economy can take off only when the necessary infrastructure, an adequate level of competition, and reasonable government policies are in place.	只有必要的基础设施、足够的竞争和合理的政策都万事俱备，这个国家的经济才能开始腾飞。


We know how difficult it is to achieve such conditions, because we had to do it ourselves.	我们知道要实现上述条件是多么困难，因为这曾是我们自己走过的道路。


Our vision for an inter-Korean economic community is based on sharing our experiences with the North.	我们建立朝鲜经济共同体的目标是要与北朝鲜分享我们的经验。


True, inter-Korean relations have already expanded. But this expansion has not brought fundamental change to the two Koreas’ relationship.	没错，朝鲜经济共同体确实已经有所发展，但是这种发展并没有给两朝关系带来根本性的变化。


An incident at Mt. Geumgang last July demonstrated the relationship’s vulnerable nature.	去年7月发生的金刚山事件显示出两国关系的脆弱本质。


A middle-aged South Korean female tourist was shot to death while walking on the beach, having inadvertently crossed over the boundary of the tourist zone.	一名中年韩国女游客在沙滩上漫步时被枪击身亡，因为她一不小心越过了旅游区。


No North-South dialogue has emerged to investigate the incident, or to prevent a recurrence.	还没有任何南北对话来调查这一事件，也没有对话机制来防止它再次发生。


Under these circumstances, there are greater calls in South Korea for a new approach towards the North.	在这样的情况下，韩国有更多人呼吁对北朝鲜采取新的方式。


We now believe that inter-Korean relations should conform to principles and standards that any member of the international community should respect.	我们现在相信两朝关系应符合国际社会任何成员应当尊重的原则和标准。


Another key consideration is to consolidate a sustainable peace structure on the Korean Peninsula.	巩固朝鲜半岛可以持续的和平结构是另一个关键考虑。


This cannot merely be a state of affairs like the current one, in which hostilities are absent. It refers to an enduring peace, which is not easily affected by incidents or accidents and is able to prevent politico-military crises such as that caused by the North’s nuclear program.	这绝不仅仅是像目前这样一种不再敌对的形势，它指的是不易受到事件或事故影响的持久的和平状态，可以防止北朝鲜核计划所造成的政治军事危机。


The only way to realize such a peace is by completing North Korea’s denuclearization and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.	实现这种和平的唯一方式是完善北朝鲜的无核化，并在朝鲜半岛建立起和平机制。


As of today, the Six-Party Talks is the principal framework to open up the future of the North.	到今天为止，六方会谈仍然是开创北朝鲜未来的主要框架。


If the North abandons its nuclear weapons program, many benefits can be gained.	如果北朝鲜放弃核武器计划，就能获得许多收益。


Relations between the North and its neighbors can improve, along with a greater probability of forming a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.	北朝鲜及其邻国的关系将得到改善，也更有可能形成东北亚和平与安全机制。


Fortunately, America’s removal of North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism has re-started the denuclearization process.	幸运的是，美国将北朝鲜从恐怖主义赞助国的名单上去掉已经重新启动了无核化进程。


But the North’s prior threat to resume work at the facilities suggests that this process may be fitful.	但北朝鲜之前威胁要恢复核设施建设的威胁表明这一进程可能会时断时续。


Moreover, since South Korea’s new government took office earlier this year little progress has been made in relations between the two Koreas.	此外，自从韩国新政府在年初执政以后，两朝关系就没有取得过什么进展。


But our vision will eventually open up ways to solve North Korea’s problems, not only bringing a better future for the North, but also making the Korean Peninsula a gateway for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.	但我们的远见终将开启北朝鲜问题的解决方式。 这不仅能为北朝鲜带去更好的未来，还能令朝鲜半岛成为东北亚和平与繁荣的门户。


Leaders in the North may mistakenly believe that they can circumvent or outmaneuver the South – the so-called strategy of driving a wedge between the Republic of Korea and the US.	北朝鲜领导人也许会错误地相信自己能超过或者压制南朝鲜——这就是所谓在大韩民国和美国之间挑起不和的策略。


But in the end, South Korea is the neighbor whom the North can truly trust and rely on the most.	但到最后，韩国却是北方可以真正信任和倚重的邻居。


The North should realize this and make a wise choice.	北朝鲜应该认识到这一点，并做出明智的选择。


North Korea’s Powerful Weakness	朝鲜的强大弱点


CAMBRIDGE – When US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for their “shirt-sleeves summit” in California last month, North Korea was a major topic of conversation.	美国剑桥—美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席习近平上个月在加州举行了“习奥会”，在他们的会谈中，朝鲜是一个重要话题。


The subject was not new, but the tone was.	这一话题并不新鲜，但习奥的话语很新鲜。


More than two decades ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency caught North Korea violating its safeguards agreement and reprocessing plutonium.	二十多年前，国际原子能机构（IAEA）抓了朝鲜违反安全保障协定、再加工钚元素的现行。


After the North renounced the subsequent Agreed Framework, negotiated by President Bill Clinton’s administration, in 2003, it expelled IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has since detonated three nuclear devices and conducted a variety of missile tests.	在2003年宣布退出随后由克林顿政府谈定的协议框架后，朝鲜驱逐了IAEA调查员，退出了和不扩散条约，并进行了三次核爆和多次导弹试验。


During those two decades, American and Chinese officials frequently discussed North Korea’s behavior, both privately and in public meetings.	在这二十年中，美国和中国官员在公私场合频繁讨论朝鲜的行为。


The Chinese consistently said that they did not want North Korea to develop nuclear weapons, but claimed that they had limited influence over the regime, despite being its major supplier of food and fuel.	中国一直说，它不希望朝鲜发展核武器，但又称对朝鲜政权影响力有限，尽管它是朝鲜食品和燃料的主要供应者。


The result was a somewhat scripted exchange in which China and the US would accomplish little more than professing denuclearization as a shared goal.	结果中美照本宣科地声称去核化是两国的共同目标，除此之外再无建树。


China was sincere in expressing its desire for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, but the nuclear issue was not its primary concern.	中国表达对无核朝鲜半岛的愿望是真心实意的，但核问题并不是它首要关注的问题。


It also sought to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and the resulting potential for chaos on its border – not only flows of refugees, but also the possibility that South Korean or US troops could move into the North.	它还寻求防止朝鲜政权倒台并因此引起中朝边境混乱——不但事关难民，还事关韩国和美国军队进入朝鲜的可能。


Torn between its two objectives, China placed a higher priority on preserving the Kim family dynasty.	在这两个目标间疲于奔命的中国极为重视说服金氏王朝。


That choice gave rise to a seeming paradox: North Korea gained surprisingly powerful influence over China.	这一选择滋生了一个似是而非的悖论——朝鲜赢得了对中国的异常强大影响力。


North Korea has what I call “the power of weakness.”	朝鲜具有我所谓的“弱实力”。


In certain bargaining situations, weakness and the threat of collapse can be a source of power.	在特定的讨价还价情景中，弱和崩溃危险可以成为实力之源。


To take a well-known example, if you owe a bank $1,000, the bank has power over you; but if you owe the bank $1 billion, you may have considerable bargaining power over the bank.	举一个众所周知的例子，如果你欠银行1000美元，那么你要看银行脸色； 但如果你欠银行10亿美元，你就拥有了凌驾于银行之上的强大的讨价还价能力。


China is, in this sense, North Korea’s over-exposed banker.	从这个角度讲，中国就是在朝鲜身上风险暴露过大的银行家。


As a result, China has tried to persuade North Korea to follow its market-oriented example.	结果，中国试图说服朝鲜效仿其市场经济榜样。


But, with the Kim regime terrified that economic liberalization would eventually provoke demands for greater political freedom, China’s influence over the regime is limited.	但是，金氏政权害怕经济自由化最终会激发增加政治自由的要求，因此中国对金氏政权的影响力十分有限。


As a Chinese official once told me in an unguarded moment, “North Korea has hijacked our foreign policy.”	一位中国官员曾经漏嘴告诉我，“朝鲜绑架了我们的对外政策。 ”


North Korea has amplified its power by playing its weak hand audaciously.	朝鲜肆无忌惮地大打“弱”牌，扩充其实力。


The North’s leaders know that superior South Korean and US military forces would win a full-scale military conflict.	朝鲜领导人知道，如果爆发全面军事冲突，韩国和美国超强的军事实力将取得胜利。


And yet, with 15,000 artillery tubes in the Demilitarized Zone, just 30 miles (48 kilometers) north of Seoul, the South Korean capital, they also know that they could wreak havoc on South Korea’s economy, whereas the North has relatively less to lose.	但是，在韩国首尔以北区区48公里的非军事地带，朝鲜部署了15000多门火箭炮，朝鲜知道，它可以给韩国带来严重的经济麻烦，而在这方面，朝鲜相对来说没什么可输的。


North Korea has long been adept at flaunting its willingness to take risks, provoking a crisis in 2010 by sinking a South Korean naval vessel and shelling a South Korean island.	很久以来，朝鲜一直熟于展现其冒险的意愿，2010年，朝鲜击沉一艘韩国军舰并炮击韩国岛屿，引发了一场危机。


This spring, it conducted a nuclear test and a series of missile tests, accompanied by a stream of bellicose rhetoric.	今年春天，它又进行了一次核试验和数次导弹试验，并数次发表战争宣言。


Now it appears that China is beginning to lose patience.	现在，中国似乎开始失去了耐心。


It has less confidence in the North’s inexperienced new ruler, Kim Jong-un, than it had in his father, Kim Jong-il.	中国人对缺少经验的朝鲜新领袖金正恩的信心不像对其父金正日那样厚。


Chinese leaders are also beginning to recognize the risks that North Korea is imposing on China.	中国领导人还开始认识到朝鲜对中��构成的威胁。


With more nuclear tests, a demand for nuclear weapons could grow in South Korea and Japan.	更多的核试验导致韩国和日本的核武器需求增加。


Moreover, if this spring’s sharp rhetoric from the Kim regime is followed by provocations against South Korea like those that occurred in 2010, South Korea could respond forcefully, and China might be drawn in.	此外，如果朝鲜政权在今春的激烈言辞后继之以类似于2010年的针对韩国的挑衅的话，韩国可能会强烈反弹，中国也可能深陷其中。


The signs of a change are intriguing.	改变的信号破耐人寻味。


Following the “frank” discussion of North Korea by Xi and Obama, Xi hosted a summit with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, without first meeting with its official North Korean ally.	习近平和奥巴马就朝鲜进行了“直率的”讨论，接着又在未和其正式盟友朝鲜会晤的情况下与韩国总统朴槿惠进行了峰会。


Instead, two senior North Korean officials subsequently visited Beijing and were scolded for the North’s behavior.	相反，此后两名朝鲜官员访问北京，并因为朝鲜的行为而受到了批评。


By contrast, Xi and Park issued a joint statement proclaiming the importance of faithfully implementing United Nations Security Council resolutions that call for sanctions against North Korea, as well as a multilateral agreement in 2005 that obliges the North to exchange its nuclear-weapons programs for economic and diplomatic benefits.	与此形成对比的是，习近平和朴槿惠发表了联合声明，宣称如实贯彻联合国安理会要求制裁朝鲜的解决方案和2005年规定朝鲜用核武器计划换取经济和外交好处的多边协定是十分重要的。


Both leaders urged a resumption of the six-party talks on denuclearization, which have been suspended since 2009.	中韩领导人敦促重启2009年中止的六方去核会谈。


What comes next is uncertain.	下一步会发生什么还不确定。


North Korea has tempered its rhetoric and behavior, but the Kim regime has given no indication that it is willing to give up the nuclear-weapons program that it regards as vital to its security and prestige.	韩国的语气和行为有所缓和，但金氏政权并没有表现出愿意放弃其视为安全和地位关键保障的核武器的意愿。


In the long run, economic and social change may help to resolve the situation.	从长期看，经济和社会变化可能有助于改变这一局面。


China’s dilemma remains that if it pushes too fast for reform, the Kim regime may collapse.	中国的困境依然是，如果它推动朝鲜改革过急，金氏政权可能崩溃。


Faced with that prospect, the US and South Korea could take steps to reassure China that they would not exploit such a situation by moving their troops to China’s border.	面临如此前景，美国和韩国可能采取步骤向中国保证它们不会利用此局面向中国边境派遣军队。


In the past, when the US has suggested quiet talks to discuss contingency planning in the case of regime collapse, China has been wary of offending and weakening North Korea.	在过去，当美国建议就政权崩溃问题的或有计划进行秘密谈判时，中国总是担心侵犯或削弱朝鲜。


But finding a formula to talk about such contingencies may be the next step for China as it seeks to overcome its quandary.	但中国要想走出困境，下一步或许应该是找出讨论这一或有情景的模式。


North Korea’s Missile Tantrum	朝鲜的导弹怒火


SEOUL – Once again, tension is rising across Asia over North Korea’s missile program.	首尔－朝鲜的导弹计划再次使亚洲的紧张情绪升温。


Unlike its previous “surprise” missile launches, North Korea’s government this time notified international agencies in advance that it will launch a “satellite” sometime between April 4 and 8.	和以前“出人意料”地发射导弹不同，这次朝鲜政府提前通知各国际机构，它将在四月四日到四月八日的某一天中发射一颗“卫星”。


The question for the world now is not whether the North Korean regime will launch its missile, but what happens afterward.	对国际社会而言，现在的问题不是朝鲜当局是否会发射导弹的问题，而是朝鲜发射导弹后会发生什么的问题。


The United States, Japan, and South Korea have already publicly condemned the launch as a “provocative act” and a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted in October 2006, five days after North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test.	美国、日本和韩国都已经公开宣称朝鲜发射导弹的行为是“挑衅行为”，并谴责朝鲜违反了联合国安理会第1718号决议——这个决议是朝鲜2006年10月份进行核武器实验五天后，由联合国安理会通过的。


But, instead of hot rhetoric, what is needed now is a cool-headed assessment of the military implications of the missile launch.	但是，对于朝鲜发射导弹的问题，现在需要的不是激烈的言辞，而是对朝鲜发射导弹军事意义的冷静评估。


If Japan, the US, and others attempt to intercept or counter the missile, military tension – even possible combat – is likely to ensue.	如果日本、美国和其他国家试图拦截或者回击朝鲜发射的导弹，那么，军事紧张局势——甚至是可能的对抗——就非常可能会接踵而来。


How to prevent unnecessary military measures and countermeasures is the most immediate concern for the region’s governments.	对该地区的各国政府来说，怎样防止不必要的军事措施以及对抗措施，是最紧迫的考虑。


Above all, the ongoing six-party talks (China, the US, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea) that have sought to bring North Korea’s nuclear program to an end must not become a casualty of the missile launch.	现在最重要的问题是，为努力结束朝鲜核计划而持续进行的六方会谈（六方会谈由中国、美国、日本、俄罗斯、韩国和朝鲜六方组成），不能成为朝鲜发射导弹的牺牲品。


In dealing with North Korea, two fundamental issues must be addressed.	在应对朝鲜问题上，我们必须注意两个基本问题。


First, although governments are justified in criticizing North Korea for its foolhardy, counterproductive, and self-destructive behavior over many years, including numerous inhuman acts perpetrated against its own people and others, North Korea is not solely to blame for its “missile tantrum.”	首先，虽然各国政府有权批评朝鲜多年来的莽撞、适得其反以及自毁性的行为——包括许多朝鲜侵害其自己的人民和他人的不人道行为，但是，朝鲜不应该是唯一一个为其“导弹怒火”承担责任的国家。


Indeed, the Bush administration’s unilateral behavior, including the dismantling of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea, the hyping of an enriched uranium deal, and the infamous “axis of evil” speech, have all increased the paranoia of an already paranoid regime.	事实上，布什政府的单边行为——包括其背弃在1994年和朝鲜达成的《日内瓦共识框架协议》，大肆宣传朝鲜的铀浓缩交易以及发表声名狼藉的“邪恶轴心”演讲——都强化了朝鲜已经很偏执的政府的偏执倾向。


So former President Bush’s foreign policy toward North Korea, especially during his first term in office, must take a fair share of responsibility for the present mess.	所以，美国前总统布什的对朝外交政策，特别是在其第一届任期内的对朝外交政策，必须为当前的混乱局面承担一定的责任。


More fundamentally, no one should think that North Korea’s totalitarian communist system can be changed overnight.	更根本的是，各国都不应该认为朝鲜的极权共产主义体制能够在一夜之间发生改变。


No one inside or outside can remove its anachronistic dynastic-communist regime, and no outsider can hope to modify quickly the policy behavior of its fossilized military, party, and administrative bureaucrats.	不论是在朝鲜国内还是国外，都没有人能够清除这个错置的王朝式共产主义政权，外人也不能期望很快改变朝鲜陈腐的军事、政党和政府官僚的政策行为。


These are the cold realities of North Korea today.	这就是朝鲜现在的冰冷的现实。


But cold realities do not necessarily have to turn into hot combat.	但是，冰冷的现实不一定要变成激烈的对抗。


Indeed, the idea of warfare on the Korean peninsula should be unthinkable, given the grotesque levels of deaths that it would likely cause.	事实上，鉴于朝鲜半岛战争可能引起可怕的人员伤亡，在朝鲜半岛发动战争的观点是不可想象的。


Even to contemplate such a possibility is proof of diplomatic failure, not a triumph of real leadership.	即使只是考虑朝鲜半岛战争的可能性，也是外交失败的证据，而不是真正的领导力的胜利。


A leadership mismatch has, moreover, been a central obstacle in resolving the problem of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and the ultimate question of achieving a unified Korea.	而且，领导错配已经成为解决朝鲜大规模杀伤性武器的主要障碍，也是实现朝鲜半岛统一的根本问题。


Since the emergence of two separate regimes and systems on the Korean Peninsula in 1948, South Korea and the US (its only defense ally) have dealt with only two “supreme leaders,” Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.	自从1948年在朝鲜半岛出现两个独立的政权和政治制度以来，韩国和美国（韩国唯一的防卫同盟国）只应对过两位朝鲜“最高领导人”——金日成和金正日。


During the same period, there have been 10 South Korean presidents and 11 US presidents.	然而在此期间，在韩国换了10位总统，在美国换了11位总统。


For the past 10 years, three South Korean presidents and three US presidents have been attempting to deal with the same “perpetual” leader – Kim Jong-il.	在过去十年里，三位韩国总统和三位美国总统都试图对付同一位“永远”的领导人——金正日。


From Kim’s perspective, encountering such leadership changes and subsequent policy clashes are both bewildering and difficult to assimilate.	在金正日看来，应对韩国和美国的领导人变化以及随之而来的政策冲突，让人既无所适从，又很难加以领会。


Just on the South Korean side, he has had to cope with Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun’s on again, off again diplomacy, and current President Lee Myung-bak’s confrontational stance.	仅仅在韩国方面，金正日就不得不应对金大中接触朝鲜的“阳光政策”，卢武铉多变的外交政策以及现任总统李明博的对抗立场。


From the US, he has confronted engagement on the part of Bill Clinton, unilateral confrontation from George W. Bush, and the nascent “principled engagement” of Barack Obama.	在美国方面，金正日经历了比尔·克林顿的接触政策，乔��·沃克·布什的单边主义政策以及巴拉克·奥巴马新提出的“有原则的接触”政策。


This form of leadership mismatch has also disturbed relations between South Korea and the US.	这种形式的领导错配也扰乱了韩国与美国的关系。


The discrepancy between the two-term, four-year US presidency and one-term, five-year South Korean presidency has sometimes been problematic, and the respective policies toward North Korea of US and South Korean administrations have often collided.	在美国的总统最多连任两届、每届任期四年和韩国的总统只能任职一届、每届任期五年之间存在的差异，有时也会产生问题，而且，美国政府和韩国政府的朝鲜政策还经常发生冲突。


When they do, both sides must spend an enormous amount of time and effort in reaching a consensus on North Korea, which leaves the isolated North breeding all sorts of conspiracy theories.	在美国和韩国的朝鲜政策发生冲突的时候，美韩双方必须花费大量的时间和精力努力在朝鲜问题上达成共识，而这让孤立的朝鲜政权形成美韩在进行各种各样的阴谋的理论。


The Korean question is even more intractable and perplexing if the leadership changes of other concerned parties in the region such as China, Japan, and Russia are factored into the political equation.	如果将该地区其他有关国家的领导人的变化——例如，中国、日本和俄罗斯的领导人变化——纳入政治平衡的考虑之内，那么，朝鲜问题就变得更加复杂而棘手了。


The long-term result of all this is oscillation between dialogue and deadlock, which has led to periods of uncertain engagement or heated confrontation.	以上问题引起的长期结果是，朝鲜问题在对话和僵持之间摇摆，这导致朝鲜问题各方在一段时间里进行不稳定的接触，在另一段时间里进行激烈的对抗。


To break this sterile cycle, what is needed now is not more hot rhetoric about North Korea’s missiles, but a commitment to steady, patient diplomacy that transcends changes in the political cycle.	为了打破这种没有结果的怪圈，各国现在要做的不是对朝鲜发射导弹发表更激烈的言论，而是致力于形成一个超越政治周期中的变化的稳定的、耐心的外交政策。


There is no quick fix in disentangling the Korean knot. Only persistence and commitment will do.	在解开朝鲜问题的死结上没有捷径，只有坚持和稳定的外交政策承诺才能实现朝鲜问题的解决。


The Dear Sister Disappears	敬爱的大姐的消失


TOKYO – The Korean peninsula is stirring.	东京—朝鲜半岛一片乱象。


In December, South Koreans will go to the polls to choose President Lee Myung-bak’s successor in what is currently a three-way contest.	12月，韩国将举行大选，选出李明博的继任者，目前有三人竞争这一宝座。


Meanwhile, China is seeking to seize opportunistically on the recent flare-up of a territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan to court the government in Seoul.	与此同时，中国寻求抓住最近的韩日领土争端的机会想韩国政府示好。


But, perhaps most important, one of the pillars of the North Korean dictatorship may now be cracking – at a time when the country must once again cope with a severe, man-made food shortage.	但是，也许重要的还要数朝鲜独裁统治的支柱之一目前已经开始崩塌——而与此同时，该国极有可能将再次面临人为的严重食物短缺。


On September 25, the South Korean media reported rumors that Kim Kyong-hui, the sister of the late “Dear Leader,” Kim Jong-il – and the aunt of North Korea’s twenty-something leader Kim Jong-un – was seriously ill.	9月25日，韩国媒体报道了已故“敬爱领袖”金正日之妹、朝鲜不到三十的领袖金正恩之姑金敬姬病重的传闻。


The reports have not been confirmed, but her name was missing from the list of attendees at a recent Supreme People’s Assembly.	这些消息并未得到证实，但金敬姬的名字 已经不见于最高人民会议的代表名单中。


In secretive North Korea, that seems to be a clear sign that something is afoot.	在神秘的朝鲜，这似乎是不对劲的型号。


Singapore and China have been mentioned in Asian intelligence circles as possible treatment locations for Kim Kyong-hui.	据亚洲情报圈的消息，金敬姬可能在新加坡或中国治病。


After the death of her brother, Kim Jong-il, last year, Kim Kyong-hui was often seen accompanying her nephew on his inspection tours around the country.	其兄金正日去年逝世后，金敬姬经常陪伴侄子左右时差全国。


Her sudden disappearance has sparked much speculation about the fragility of the “Young General’s” regime; despite her notorious drinking habits, she was widely seen as the power behind Kim Jong-un’s throne.	她的突然消失引起了大量的猜测，“小将军”政权或已岌岌可危； 尽管她酗酒的恶习早已人尽皆知，但她仍被广泛视为金正恩背后的权力靠山。


The truth about her disappearance will, undoubtedly, remain murky for some time.	显然，关于她消失的真相在相当一段时间内都无法水落石出。


Kim Jong-il was said to have died suddenly of a heart attack, though he had been dying of cancer for some time – a subterfuge aimed at concealing Kim Kyong-hui’s de facto leadership during her brother’s cancer treatments.	金正日据闻死于心脏病突发，但此前已因癌症生命垂尾——这无非是个花招，意在隐瞒兄长癌症病重期间金敬姬实质掌权的真相。


Moreover, before he died, Kim Jong-il made a supreme effort to prepare the ground for his sister to continue as the key decision-maker, even under Kim Jong-un.	此外，在金正恩死亡之前，他做了相当多的安排，为其妹在金正恩上台后继续担任关键决策者铺平道路。


He removed leaders who could potentially oppose her, including such senior figures as Lee Yong-chul and Lee Je-gang.	他清洗了可能威胁她的领导人，包括李勇哲和李继刚等要员。


Protecting the Kim dynasty’s rule has become the regime’s alpha and omega.	保护金氏王朝已成为朝鲜政权的唯一任务。


For Kim Kyong-hui, this has meant overseeing proposals from the Korean Workers’ Party, the military, and the government.	对金敬姬来说，这意味着监督朝鲜劳动党、军队和政府的各项议案。


It has meant revising, supplementing, and ratifying other policies, as well as setting the KWP’s general direction.	这意味着修订、补充和批准其他政策，以及制定朝鲜劳动党的大方向。


Once policies are set, her task is to monitor and oversee their execution.	一旦政策定下，她的任务就变为监督和监视政策的执行。


In other words, in North Korea, many of the most routine decisions taken by states elsewhere cannot be left to just anyone – particularly not to those outside the Kim bloodline.	换句话说，在朝鲜，许多在别的国家最普通的国是，在朝鲜都不容他人染指，特别是身上没有金饰血统的人染指。


Any decision that could affect the regime’s survival is taken within the dynasty; and, ultimately, in terms of legitimacy, background, experience, and competence, Kyong-hui is viewed as the only suitable decision-maker in the Kim clan.	任何可能影响政权存亡的决定都由金氏王朝内部决定，从正统性、背景、经验和能力来说，金敬姬才是金氏家族最合适的决策者。


It is a dizzying life of highly centralized command and control.	高度中央集权和控制的生活令人眩目。


To succeed, three lines of power emanate from Kim Kyong-hui – to the Party, the military, and the central government, with each line branching into the smallest corners of North Korean life.	为了获得成功，金敬姬必须依靠三条权力线——党、军队和中央政府，每一条线都深入到朝鲜人民日常生活的最细微之处。


Yet Kim Kyong-hui’s ruling style is quite different from that of her late brother.	但金敬姬的统治风格与其兄迥然不同。


Kim Jong-il preferred military rule, and pushed the army to the forefront.	金正日更喜欢军政，大搞先军政治。


Kim Kyong-hui has returned to the methods of her father, the dynasty’s founder, Kim Il-sung, who viewed party control as the most convenient and reliable means of exercising power.	金敬姬则回归了其父、金氏王朝创始人金日成的路子，认为对党的控制才是最传统、最可靠的权力行使之道。


Particularly for a North Korean woman, party control is a far wieldier tool to elicit the type of absolute loyalty that the Kims need.	特别是，对于一位朝鲜妇女来说，控制党显然是更适合的工具，能够侦测出金氏王朝所需要的绝对忠诚出自哪里。


Kim Jong-un has done some things that were previously unseen in North Korea – frankly admitting the failure of a missile test, for example, and cavorting with Disney’s Mickey Mouse, a symbol of enemy American culture, while building amusement parks of his own.	金正恩正在做一些朝鲜前所未见的事情——比如坦率承认导弹试射失败、与迪士尼米老鼠（敌对的美国文化的象征）联欢、同时建设自己的游乐园等。


But no one should mistake this for a Pyongyang Spring.	但不要把这当成平壤之春的迹象。


Indeed, the regime’s efforts to hide, yet again, a severe food shortage demonstrate that its core values have not changed in the least.	事实上，金氏政权再一次试图掩盖严重食物短缺表明至少七核心价值并没有改变。


Maintaining this policy stasis is the great challenge facing Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyong-hui.	保持这一政策静态是金正恩和金敬姬所面临的重大挑战。


For, although government is now clearly centered on the party, the regime could yet unravel, and perhaps collapse, if the food shortage is not resolved and other power structures decide to step into the breach.	这是因为，尽管政府显然仍旧集权于党，但政权仍可能解体甚至崩溃，如果食物短缺问题解决不好且其他权力结构决定与金家决裂的话。


Given this risk, Kyong-hui’s poor health is a significant hindrance.	在面临如此风险的情况下，金敬姬糟糕的身体状况是一个重大隐患。


Will she run out of time, or will the food shortage be resolved first?	是她先撒手人寰，还是食品短缺先得到解决？


For now, the fate of the Korean peninsula hinges on the health of one woman.	目前，朝鲜半岛的命运纠结于这位女人的健康之上。


The Battle for Santa Claus’s Home	围绕圣诞老人家园的战争


STOCKHOLM – A couple of years ago, a Canadian minister proudly declared that Santa Claus was a citizen of Canada.	斯托克霍姆—几个世纪前，一位加拿大部长自豪地宣布圣诞老人是加拿大公民。


After all, his home and toy factory are at the North Pole, which, according to the minister’s interpretation, belongs to Canada.	毕竟，他的家和玩具工厂都在北极，而按照这位部长的解释，它们都属于加拿大。


Though Santa Claus has not commented on the matter, it is now clear that he could choose several passports when he travels the world on December 24th.	尽管圣诞老人从未对此作出评论，但如今，当他在2014年12月24日那天穿梭于全世界时，他显然可以选择多种护照。


In 2007, a privately funded mini-submarine planted a Russian flag directly beneath his alleged home.	2007年，一艘私人出资的迷你潜艇将俄罗斯国旗插在了他据称的家乡的正下方。


And two weeks ago, Denmark, which has sovereignty over Greenland, staked its own territorial claim, also covering the North Pole.	两周前，拥有格陵兰岛主权的丹麦也发表了它的领土主张——同样包括了北极。


By filing its claim with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Denmark has joined our era’s “great game”: the contest for economic control over a large part of the Arctic.	丹麦向联合国大陆架边界委员会（United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf）递交了它的主张，加入了现时代的“大博弈”：争夺北极圈大部的经济控制权。


And Denmark’s claim is massive.	丹麦的主张非同小可。


Not only does it seek sovereignty over everything between Greenland and the North Pole; it is also extending its claim to nearly 900,000 square kilometers, all the way to the existing limits of the Russian economic zone on the other side of the Pole – an area 20 times Denmark’s size.	它不但寻求从格陵兰岛北极之间的一切东西的主权； 还将它的主张延伸了近900,000平方公里，进入了位于北极另一面的俄罗斯经济区的现有边界——面积相当于丹麦的20倍。


How to assess countries’ claims to Arctic territory hinges on the status of the Lomonosov Ridge, a vast formation that rises from the sea floor and stretches 1,800 kilometers from Greenland to the East Siberian continental shelf.	如何评估各国对北极圈的主权主张取决于罗蒙诺索夫海岭（Lomonosov Ridge）的地位。 罗蒙诺索夫海岭矗立于海底，延绵1,800公里，从格林兰一直延伸到东西伯利亚大陆架。


Everyone agrees that it is a ridge.	所有人都同意它是一个海岭。


The key question is whether it is an extension of the Greenland shelf or an extension of the East Siberia shelf.	关键问题是它是格陵兰大陆架延伸还是东西伯利亚大陆架的延伸。


Denmark, together with the government of Greenland, now claims that it is the former, giving it the right to extend its economic zone across a huge area at the top of the world.	丹麦联合格林兰政府，罗蒙诺索夫海岭是格陵兰大陆架的延伸，因此它拥有将经济区扩充至整个世界之巅广大区域的权利。


Though nothing is yet known about the claim that Russia says it will present in the spring, there is no doubt that it will argue the opposite.	俄罗斯表示它将在春天给出它的领土主张，目前它会怎么说还不得而知，但毫无疑问肯定会持相反意见。


And what about the Canadians and their claim?	那么加拿大人和加拿大的主张又如何呢？


That remains to be seen, but there have been reports that Prime Minister Stephen Harper is dissatisfied that Canadian scientists are not being sufficiently aggressive in pressing the country’s case.	仍有待观察，但有报道说加拿大总理哈珀对于加拿大科学家不够积极地为祖国说话十分不满。


Nonetheless, for all the hype about a “race for the Arctic,” and despite the rather icy atmosphere among the claimants, there is little reason to fear conflict.	尽管如此，对于最近大热的“北极圈竞赛”，虽然各主张方之间的氛围冷到了极点，但并不必担心马上会产生冲突。


Under the terms of the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, all of the countries bordering the Arctic Ocean agree to resolve their claims peacefully and based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.	根据2008年伊卢利萨特宣言（Ilulissat Declaration），所有北冰洋周边国家同意基于联合国海洋法公约和平调解各自的主张。


According to settled procedure, a UN commission will first judge whether the claims have merit.	根据既定程序，首先应由一个联合国委员会主张是否有利。


If they are overlapping, which is highly probable, bilateral negotiations will be held.	如果各国主张领土出现重叠——可能性很大——就要进行双边谈判。


Such talks, to put it mildly, could take time.	平心而论，这些谈判可能旷日持久。


Norway and Russia negotiated over a far smaller territorial delimitation for four decades.	挪威和俄罗斯就一个小得多的领土分歧都讨论了四十年之久。


Both Denmark and Russia have been devoting significant resources to exploring the Lomonosov Ridge.	丹麦和俄罗斯都花了巨大的资源勘探罗蒙诺索夫海岭。


Denmark has hired Swedish icebreakers for repeated expeditions, and Russia has been deploying special submarines to obtain samples from the ridge and the ocean floor.	丹麦雇佣瑞典破冰船多次出征，而俄罗斯也部署了特别潜艇获取海岭和海底样本。


The Arctic region has always been strategically vital for Russia, accounting for roughly 85% of Russia’s natural-gas production, which is based primarily in Western Siberia.	对俄罗斯来说，北极地区永远是至关重要的战略要地，贡献了俄罗斯天然气产量（主要基于西西伯利亚）的约85%。


The Kremlin has activated a new military command for the Arctic, and is busy reopening air bases and radar stations along its Arctic shoreline.	克里姆林宫组建了新的北极司令部，并在重启北极沿岸的空军基地和雷达站。


But it is a very long way from these new Russian bases to virtually everywhere.	但这些新俄罗斯基地要达到星罗棋布的程度还需要很长时间。


And, in addition to the vast distances, there is the harsh climate.	此外，除了距离遥远，气候也十分恶劣。


A Canadian military commander, asked what he would do if foreign soldiers attacked his country’s Far North, calmly replied that he would dispatch an expedition to rescue them.	一位加拿大军官被问及如果加拿大远北（Far North）地区遭到外国军队打击时会怎么做，他镇定地回答说，他会派一支远征队去救他们。


Though Russia had hoped for a rapid increase in shipping along the Northern Sea Route, commercial traffic this year fell by 77%.	尽��俄罗斯希望快速增加北海航道（Northern Sea Route）沿线的船只数量，但今年商业交通流仍下降了77%。


Of course, the stakes are too high for Canada, Denmark, and Russia to allow the region’s remoteness and its hostile environment to influence how resolutely they press their claims.	当然，对加拿大、丹麦和俄罗斯来说，因为北极地区的偏远性和恶劣的环境影响主权主张的决心都是不可接受的。


Boundaries like these are fixed once and forever, and no one knows what discoveries, technologies, and opportunities the future might bring.	类似的边界确定是一劳永逸的事情，而谁也不知道未来会有什么发现、技术和机会。


But for the time being, neither Santa Claus, nor anyone else, has reason to be worried.	但在目前，圣诞老人和其他所有人都不必担心。


The nature of the Lomonosov Ridge will be debated for years to come, while his thoughts – and ours – are likely to be focused on more immediate issues.	罗蒙诺索夫海岭的性质还将有多年的争论，而他——以及我们——的思维也许更专注于更紧迫的问题。


Good People, Bad Judgments	善良的人，糟糕的判断


NEW YORK – Vidkun Quisling, Norway’s wartime fascist leader whose name has become synonymous with collaboration with evil, lived with his wife in a rather grandiose villa outside of Oslo.	纽约——挪威的战时法西斯领袖维德孔·吉斯林的名字已成为与邪恶狼狈为奸的代名词，奥斯陆郊外一栋宏伟的别墅曾是他和他妻子的住所。


That villa is now the Norwegian Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, a fine transformation of a tainted place.	这栋别墅现在已被改建为挪威大屠杀及宗教少数族裔研究中心，可谓是对这栋曾被玷污建筑不错的改造。


Earlier this year, I visited the center for a fascinating exhibition on the first independent Norwegian constitution promulgated in 1814.	今年初，我去那里参观了关于1814年首部独立挪威宪法的很有意思的展览。


It was a remarkably enlightened and progressive document, composed by learned scholars, steeped in history, law, and philosophy.	这是一部极其开明进步的文献，由精通历史、法律和哲学的渊博学者负责起草。


Some were experts on the Greek classics, others on ancient Hebrew; all were keen readers of Kant and Voltaire.	其中有些人是希腊典籍专家，还有人非常了解古代希伯来； 所有人都熟读康德和伏尔泰。


There is, however, one extraordinary clause: Article II proclaims freedom of religion in the Lutheran state, with the caveat that “Jews shall still be banned from entering the Realm.”	但这部宪法有一项特别条款：第二条宣布路德州宗教自由，但告诫“犹太人仍不得进入这一区域。


This was peculiar, even at the time.	”这条规定实属罕见，即使在当时也同样如此。


Napoleon, defeated in that same year, had secured civil rights for Jews in the countries he had conquered.	同年被打败的拿破仑已经在被征服国为犹太人争取到公民权利。


And just before the clause entered Norwegian law, the King of Denmark had granted citizenship to Jews in his realm.	而就在这项规定载入挪威法律之前，丹麦国王已经在王国内部授予犹太人公民身份。


What is most interesting about Norway’s 1814 constitution is not that it contains this clause, but why.	挪威1814年宪法的有趣之处不是它包含上述规定，而是其中的理由。


The stated motives of the intellectuals who created it were not racist; they did not assume Jews to be biologically inferior.	制定宪法的知识分子其公开动机并非种族主义； 他们并不认为犹太人是劣等种族。


Rather, the question was argued in terms of culture and faith, with Jewish beliefs and customs deemed incompatible with modern, enlightened Western values.	相反，他们的理由在文化和信仰领域，犹太人的习俗和信仰被认定与现代、开明的西方价值观不符。


One of the writers of the constitution, Frederik Motzfeldt, argued that Jews would never assimilate themselves with the people of any country.	宪法的起草者之一弗雷德里克·莫兹菲特认为犹太人永远不会与任何国家的民众融合。


Another asserted that Judaism encourages its followers to deceive Christians and other Gentiles.	另一位起草者则断言犹太教鼓励其追随者欺骗基督教信众和其他异教徒。


Jews, it was believed, would always form a “state within a state.”	有人认为犹太人永远会组成“国中之国”。


The constitution’s writers were undoubtedly aware that Jews had long been persecuted in other countries, but they concluded that it was not Norway’s problem.	宪法起草者们无疑知道犹太人曾在其他国家遭受长期迫害，但他们认定这不是挪威的问题。


For Norway, it was best not to let them become citizens at all.	对挪威来讲，最好根本不让犹太人拿到公民资格。


Experts in Hebrew culture explained that Judaism and Norway’s constitution were irreconcilable.	希伯来文化专家的解释是犹太教和挪威的宪法不可调和。


Mosaic law was, so the experts said, the only constitution recognized by Jews, and so it should be feared, in the way modern critics of Islam fear Sharia law.	专家称摩西律法是犹太人承认的唯一宪法，由此造成的恐惧就像伊斯兰教的现代批评者惧怕伊斯兰教法一样。


So the main issue was religion, not race – though the two could easily be confused.	因此，主要问题是宗教而非种族，虽然这两个问题很容易混淆。


As Håkon Harket, the greatest Norwegian scholar on the subject of the anti-Jewish clause, explains: “Even those who fought for civil rights for the Jews held often an ambition to liberate Jews from Judaism.”	就像鼓吹反犹条款最主要的挪威学者哈克特所说的那样：“即使那些犹太公民权的推动者也往往希望将犹太人从犹太教的控制下解放出来。 ”


The parallels with current notions about Muslims and Islam hardly need to be pointed out.	对穆斯林和伊斯兰当前看法的相似之处无需赘述。


Now, too, the Enlightenment is often invoked as shorthand for the Western values that are supposedly in danger of “Islamization.”	现在也是一样，启蒙运动往往被引为西方价值观面临所谓“伊斯兰化”威胁的代名词。


Now, too, people warn of Muslim tricksters, states within states, the impossibility of assimilation, and the necessity for staunch secularists to free the benighted Muslims from their faith.	人们现在也同样警示穆斯林骗子、国中之国、不可能被同化以及需要坚定的世俗主义者将穆斯林从他们愚昧的信仰中解放出来。 。


To be sure, in 1814, there was no Jewish equivalent of the violent Jihadism that poisons relations with Muslims in the West today.	可以肯定，1814年没有哪种犹太运动能与今天毒化穆斯林和西方关系的暴力圣战主义相媲美。


Nonetheless, there are lessons to be learned from the Norwegian constitution’s misguided anti-Jewish clause, which, it should be noted, was repealed just a few decades later.	不过，我们也可以从���威宪法误导性的反犹条款中吸取教训，必须强调一点，那就是上述条款仅仅实行了几十年即被废止。


Bad judgment can arise even from decent motives, and knowledge (of Islam or of Judaism) is no prophylactic against stupid ideas.	即便令人尊敬的动机也可以造成错误的判断，而（对伊斯兰教或犹太教的）知识无法防止愚蠢理念的产生。


The most important lesson, however, is that it is always foolish – and, indeed, dangerous – to judge people by what we think they believe.	但最重要的教训是靠我们印象中人们的信仰来对其进行评判始终十分愚蠢——而且实际上也非常危险。


To assume that all Muslims think alike because of their religious background, that they have “a mind” rather than individual thoughts, is as big a mistake as to assume to know the minds of Jews, Christians, or anyone else.	假设所有穆斯林因其宗教背景而想法趋同、即认定他们仅有“集体意志”而没有个人想法和假装了解犹太人、基督徒或其他任何人的思想一样愚蠢。


And to claim that something as diverse, and sometimes vague, as a religious faith can be pinned to a fixed ideological position, because of certain ancient texts, is utterly misleading.	而且声称像宗教信仰这样多种多样、甚至有时还含混不清的事物可以因为某一部古代典籍而造成固定的意识形态立场是一种彻头彻尾的误导。


There are populist demagogues in the West who would ban the Koran and prohibit Muslims from immigrating to their countries.	西方某些民粹主义煽动者想禁止古兰经及穆斯林从他们的国家移民。


They have a following, which might be growing, fueled by the widespread anxiety about terrorism spilling over from the Middle East.	这些人各有自己的追随者，恐怖主义从中东蔓延的普遍焦虑可能导致其追随群体增加。


But they are not yet in the majority, and the belief that the West is in imminent danger of being “Arabized” or “Islamized” is not quite yet mainstream.	但他们还没有占据多数，而认为西方可能即将面临“阿拉伯化”或“伊斯兰化”危险的想法还远远没有成为主流。


Yet even mainstream politicians, sometimes for the best of reasons, are in danger of making the same kinds of mistakes as the members of the 1814 Norwegian Constituent Assembly.	但即便是主流政客，有时就算理由极其充分，也可能犯下像1814挪威制宪会议成员同样的错误。


British Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, is aiming to crack down on Islamist extremism by banning the expression of ideas that the government deems to be promoting or glorifying it.	比方说英国首相戴维·卡梅伦以通过禁止政府认为要宣传或赞美伊斯兰极端主义的想法的表达来镇压伊斯兰极端主义。


People who “reject our values” will be prosecuted, he has declared, “whether they are violent in their means or not.”	他当众宣布“拒绝我们价值观”的将遭到起诉，“无论他们是否使用了暴力手段”。


Cameron is not a known racist, or a bigot.	卡梅隆并非众所周知的种族主义者或偏执狂。


He is attempting to tackle a real problem: the promotion of violent extremist ideologies.	他正试图解决一个真正的问题：即遏制暴力极端主义意识形态的传播。


But, while people should certainly be punished for acts of violence, going after people purely for what they think – or, worse, what we think they think – has the air of a witch-hunt.	但尽管人们理应当为暴力行动而受到惩罚，但仅仅因为思想——更有甚者，我们所认为的他们的思想——而迫害某些特定群体颇有些政治迫害的味道。


Cameron is right: “key values” like “democracy and tolerance” are fine things, and they ought to be defended.	卡梅伦说得没错：像“民主和宽容”这样的“重要价值观”是美好的事物，必须尽一切力量来捍卫它。


But it is hard to see how banning ideas, or penalizing those who do nothing more than express them, is the best way to do so.	但真的很难证明禁止思想、或惩罚仅仅表达思想的人是这样做的最好方法。


No Safe Havens for Dirty Money	让黑钱无处藏身


PARIS – In difficult economic times like these, one principle should be given the same prominence as the headline-grabbing issues of high deficits and austerity packages. That principle can be captured in just a few words: “Everyone must play by the rules.”	发自巴黎——在如今这种艰难时世，有一条原则必须和那些占据媒体头条的高赤字和缩减计划摆在同等重要的位置，而这条原则可以浓缩成一句话：“每个人都必须遵守规则。


The global financial crisis has served to show that there is little tolerance nowadays for people who cheat.	全球金融危机已经证明了人们是无法容忍那些欺诈者的。


And, since the onset of the crisis, the G-20 countries – with France (and the United States) as driving forces – have been pressing for better regulation, governance, and accountability.	而自从危机爆发之后， G20成员国在法国（以及美国）的推动下开始呼吁更完善的管制，政府治理以及问责机制。


No safe havens for tax evasion. No safe havens for money laundering and terrorism financing, and no safe havens for “cozy financial regulation.”	消灭那些纵容逃税，洗钱以及资助恐怖主义的“避难天堂”，同时还要消灭那些推行所谓“宽松金融管制”的地区。


These principles are clearly what people in the developed world want to see enforced.	这些原则恰恰是发达国家民众所愿意看到的。


In tough times such as these, money matters.	须知在当今的困境之下，资金就是最要紧的东西。


For the developing world, however, there is another dimension to the phrase “play by the rules.”	对于发达国家来说，“遵守规则”还有着另外一层意义。


People there want to see an end to the safe havens that allow corrupt officials to steal public money and stash it abroad.	民众希望那些帮助腐败官员在海外隐匿赃款的“天堂”早日消失。


So we would add: no safe havens for proceeds from corruption.	因此我们还可以加上一条：消灭那些窝藏腐败收入的“避难天堂”。


On the tax side, there has clearly been progress.	在税务方面，我们已经取得了明显的进步。


France imposed on its banks strong transparency and reporting requirements for banking activities in tax havens, in addition to the international standard for information exchange.	除了实施跨国信息互通之外，法国还要求国内银行增加透明度，并报告那些涉及到“避税天堂”的银行运作。


Others have demonstrated leadership in pursuing companies that pay kickbacks and bribes to foreign officials.	其他国家则带头追查那些向外国官员提供回扣和贿赂的企业。


But recovering the billions of dollars stolen by corrupt leaders and officials in the developing world has so far proved to be a lengthy process.	但追回由发展中国家的腐败领导人和官员收受的数十亿美元将注定是一个相当漫长的过程。


The World Bank Group, together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is working on the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative to go after corrupt gains and help spur action to return looted assets to their legitimate owners: the people in the affected developing country.	而世界银行集团正与联合国毒品和犯罪问题办事处联手制订一项名为“追讨被盗资产”的行动，一方面追查腐败所得，另一方面也协助将被窃资产归还给其合法拥有者——那些受害的发展中国家人民


France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland all support this urgent agenda, and agree that impunity for this type of global crime can no longer be tolerated.	法国、英国、澳大利亚、瑞典，挪威和瑞士都对这一紧急议程表示了支持，并一致认为不能再纵容这种国际犯罪行为逍遥法外。


Abuse of public authority for private gain is not acceptable.	滥用公共权威来谋取私利不可饶恕的罪行。


These issues of tax havens, looted funds, bribery, and corruption are at the nexus of the urgent need to foster openness and transparency in financial transactions, and to ensure accountability at the global level. Now is the time to build momentum and deliver lasting results.	这些与避税天堂、腐败小金库，贿赂和腐败行为有关的事务是与在金融交易方面的公开透明程度，以及全球层面上��问责制度相关联的，如今也是时候将加大力度并传递长期效应了。


Corruption – under any form or circumstance – is a cancer that cripples developed and developing economies alike. It undermines economic growth.	腐败——不管以何种形式或在任何场合——无论对发达和发展中经济体来说都堪称是危害巨大的癌症，不但损害经济发展，而且是一种对发展中国家危害尤其巨大的罪行。


By conservative estimates, every year around $20 billion to $40 billion is stolen from developing countries through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and corrupt practices.	据保守估计，每年全球发展中国家都因为贿赂，挪用公款和腐败行为而损失200至400亿美元。 因此而损失的机会成本也极为巨大。


The lost opportunities are enormous.	须知在发展中国家，200亿美元可以铺设4.


In the developing world, $20 billion could finance 48,000 kilometers of two-lane paved roads, or provide treatment for 120 million people with HIV/AIDS for a full year.	8万公里的两车道公路，或者为1. 2亿艾滋病患者提供全年的治疗费用。


Success is possible.	但成功也不是遥不可及的。


Switzerland repatriated $684 million of former President Ferdinand Marcos’ money to the Philippines and $700million of General Sani Abacha’s funds to Nigeria, and, with other nations, returned to Peru more than $180 million stolen by former government official Vladimiro Montesinos.	比如瑞士就分别退回了菲律宾前总统费迪南德·马科斯的6. 84亿美元赃款，将尼日利亚前领导人萨尼·阿巴查的7亿美元归还该国，还联同其他国家将智利前高官拉迪米罗·蒙特西诺斯的1.


So, as world leaders convene at the G-20 and other forums in the coming weeks to discuss the economic crisis, stimulus plans, financial regulation, and development, the fight against corruption should remain a full part of the multilateral agenda.	因此，随着世界领导人在未来几个月齐聚G20峰会以及各大论坛讨论经济危机，刺激计划，金融监管以及发展议题，与腐败的斗争应该贯穿整个多边议程。


But not all G-20 countries have yet ratified UNCAC – the United Nations Convention against Corruption – which provides a framework for countries to develop their own laws to stamp out the use of safe havens for criminals stealing from the developing world.	但并非所有的G20国家都批准了《联合国反腐败公约》——该公约为各国提供了一个框架，帮助制订相关法律来消灭那些从发展中国家抽逃资金的安全避难所。


The G-20 has called for more forceful action against corruption.	G20集团呼吁对腐败采取更为有力的行动。


We must now go further.	现在我们必须更进一步。


Countries that have not signed the convention should quickly do so.	那些尚未批准反腐败公约的国家应该尽快行动。


Those countries that have signed and ratified UNCAC now need to implement it.	而那些签订并批准了公约的国家则应该尽快将其付诸实施。


Financial institutions should also not do business with non-cooperative jurisdictions – areas that don’t comply with the rules.	各金融机构也应该停止与不合作的地区（也就是不遵守规则的地区）做生意。


Civil society should agitate for action and accountability.	市民社会应该鼓励采取行动并落实责任。


Fighting corruption is vital, not simply because it is the right thing to do, but because failing to do so affects us all.	与腐败斗争之所以必不可少，不但是由于这样做是对的，而是因为如果失败的话，我们每个人都像深受其害。


We now live in a different world where developing countries are a fundamental source of growth, as well as being importers of capital goods and services from developed countries.	我们现在生活在一个完全不同的世界里，在这个世界里发展中国家才是发展的根本源头，同时也是发达国家产品和服务的进口国。


When corruption hurts partners with that level of clout, it hurts you, too.	当腐败借助其势力伤害着这些生意伙伴的时候，别不记得，它同时也在伤害你自己。


No Shareholders’ Spring	子虚乌有的股东之春


CHICAGO – The ongoing global economic crisis is not only causing incumbent governments to lose elections; it is also shaking corporate boards.	芝加哥—发酵中的全球经济危机不但让在任政府输掉了大选，也让公司董事会如坐针毡。


When stock prices and profits seemed to defy gravity, shareholders’ meetings resembled American political conventions: a show to promote a company’s image, rather than a forum to debate contentious issues.	当股价和利润似乎要摆脱地球引力的时候，股东大会便呈现出美国政治传统的特征，成为一场公司形象秀，而不是讨论争议问题的论坛。


This year’s round of annual general meetings has been different.	今年的公司年会则有所不同。


Frustrated by low returns, investors are much feistier.	由于对低回报不满，投资者也比以前难对付多了。


At Credit Suisse and Barclays, for example, more than a quarter of shareholders rejected the pay package proposed by management.	比如，在瑞士信贷（Credit Suisse）和巴克莱（Barclays），超过四分之一的股东拒绝了管理层提出的薪资计划。


At Citigroup, a majority of shareholders rejected managers’ pay at Citigroup – the first S&P 500 company at which that happened.	在花旗集团（Citigroup）则成为标准普尔500指数成分股中第一家多数股东拒绝了管理层薪资计划的公司。


Shareholder activists can also claim other (at least partial) victories at Yahoo!, where a shareholder activist forced the newly appointed CEO to resign for falsifying his educational credentials.	在雅虎（Yahoo！ ），股东积极主义者迫使其新任命的首席执行官因文凭造假而辞职。


But many commentators’ hyperbolic depiction of a “shareholders’ spring,” with its resonance of ousted Arab dictators, is inappropriate for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that the Arab Spring actually toppled regimes.	但很多评论者将这夸张地称为“股东之春”，与阿拉伯世界独裁者的倒闭相提并论。 从多个角度看，这样的比喻都是不正确的，比如，阿拉伯之春是连同制度一并推翻的。


At the moment, the current shareholders’ revolt is failing to achieve any significant result.	而到目前为止，此次股东造反还没有取得任何重大成果。


For starters, the votes on company managers’ pay are non-binding.	首先，股东的反对公司管理层薪资计划并不具有约束性。


To be sure, compensation committees and boards tend to follow shareholders’ wishes, even if they are not legally obliged to do so.	诚然，薪资委员会和董事会总是会按照股东意愿行事，即使并没有法律上的义务这样做。


But they do so mostly out of embarrassment and a sense of guilt, and the changes can be entirely cosmetic.	但在大多数情况下，他们这样做时会感到很尴尬，甚至有一种罪恶感，而薪资计划的修改也许仅仅是动些皮毛而已。


For example, after receiving only 43% of shareholders’ support, Bruce Gans, an independent director of Hospitality Properties Trust, resigned.	比如，Hospitality Properties Trust公司的独立董事甘斯（Bruce Gans）由于只获得了43%的股东的支持而选择辞职。


The company then quickly invited him to rejoin the board, filling the vacancy created by his own departure!	随后，该公司很快将他延入了董事会，填补由他本人离职留下的空缺！


When describing shareholders’ struggle to make board members accountable, the right analogy is not the Arab Spring, but the protests at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square two decades ago.	在描述股东为问责董事会成员而进行的斗争时，正确的类比并不是阿拉伯之春，而是二十多年前的天安门事件。


In 1989, the Chinese Government sent troops to repress the country’s pro-democracy movement.	1989年，中国政府动用军队镇压了该国的民主运动。


In a similar vein, the Business Roundtable, composed of CEOs of major US corporations, has deployed brigades of lawyers to squelch shareholders’ aspirations.	与此一脉相承的是，由美国大公司首席执行官组成的商业圆桌会议（Business Roundtable）派出律师大军镇压着股东的请愿。


One of the (few) positive achievements of America’s Dodd-Frank legislation, enacted to address the causes of the financial crisis of 2008, is – or should have been – the requirement that the US Securities and Exchange Commission repeal the current rules that prevent institutional investors from appointing their own representatives to corporate boards.	美国多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）法案的（少数几个）积极成果之一是——其实早就应该这么做了——要求美国证券和交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission，SEC）撤销禁止机构投资者在公司董事会自身安插代表的规定，这是为了修正导致2008年危机的弊端。


In fact, the requirement was very timid, posing so many restrictions in terms of quantity and length of ownership as to leave the bar to institutional investors effectively in place.	事实上，这一要求是非常谨小慎微的，对所有权的数量和时限施加了诸多限制，机构投资者想要在董事会形成气候十分困难。


Still, it was too much for the Business Roundtable, which sued the SEC to stop it.	而商业圆桌会议的权力太大，他们提起诉讼，要求SEC停止这样做。


Argued by Eugene Scalia, the son of US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the case against the SEC was won in the US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit, on a technicality – the SEC’s failure to conduct a cost-benefit analysis ahead of time.	美国最高法院法官安东宁·斯卡利亚（Antonin Scalia）之子尤金·斯卡利亚（Eugene Scalia）说，这项针对SEC的诉讼已经在技术上赢得了美国华盛顿特区巡回法院上诉庭的胜诉——SEC没有事先做好成本-效益分析。


This small victory turned into a major defeat for shareholders when the SEC, rather than performing such an analysis and re-proposing the rule, chose to stall.	SEC并没有提供成本-效益分析并重新实施该规则，而是选择拖延，这就让股东所取得的小胜利变成了大溃败。


At a conference last December, I asked SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro when her agency was planning to reintroduce the rule.	在去年12月的一次会议中，我询问SEC主席夏皮罗（Mary Schapiro），她的手下准备何时重新实施该规则。


I even offered to do the cost-benefit analysis for free.	我甚至表示可以免费帮他们做成本-效益分析。


But she confessed that the SEC had many other items on its agenda, and had placed the issue on the back burner – a polite way to say that the SEC, like the heroic students in Tiananmen Square, had surrendered under irresistible pressure.	但她表示SEC有很多事情要做，此事得先等一等——这无异于委婉地表示SEC像当年在天安门广场上请愿的学生那样，已经屈服于不可抵挡的压力了。


The violent repression in Tiananmen Square set back China’s move toward democracy by at least 20 years.	暴力镇压天安门广场让中国的民主运动至少倒退了20年。


Let’s hope that Business Roundtable et al. v. SEC does not mean the same thing for shareholder democracy.	但愿商业圆桌会议派和SEC的斗争不会给股东民主带来同样的后果。


This is not a shareholders’ spring: it is the winter of their discontent.	这不是股东之春，而是股东失望之冬。


No Time for a Trade War	不能再打贸易战了


But 17 of the G-20’s members introduced protectionist measures just months after the first summit in November 2008. The “Buy American” provision in the United States’ stimulus bill got the most attention.	纽约——


Continuing economic weakness in the advanced economies risks a new round of protectionism.	当年大萧条开始的时候，许多人担心保护主义会抬起它丑恶的头颅。 的确，20国集团（G20）领导人承诺，他们已经从大萧条中吸收教训。


In America, for example, more than one in six workers who would like a full-time job can’t find one.	但是20国集团中有17个国家，在2008年12月举行的首次峰会后的数月就采取了保护主义措施。 美国刺激法案中的“购买美国货”条款最受关注。


These were among the risks associated with America’s insufficient stimulus, which was designed to placate members of Congress as much as it was to revive the economy.	发达经济体持续低迷的经济状态有引发新一轮保护主义的危险。


With soaring deficits, a second stimulus appears unlikely, and, with monetary policy at its limits and inflation hawks being barely kept at bay, there is little hope of help from that department, either. So protectionism is taking pride of place.	例如在美国，6个工人中，至少有一个找不到全职工作。


The US Treasury has been charged by Congress to assess whether China is a “currency manipulator.” Although President Obama has now delayed for some months when Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner must issue his report, the very concept of “currency manipulation” itself is flawed: all governments take actions that directly or indirectly affect the exchange rate.	这些危险都与美国刺激力度的不足有关，这些刺激政策既是为了恢复经济，也着眼于安抚国会议员。


Reckless budget deficits can lead to a weak currency; so can low interest rates. Until the recent crisis in Greece, the US benefited from a weak dollar/euro exchange rate.	随着赤字的飞涨，第二轮的刺激政策似乎不可能，并且随着货币政策发挥到极限，通胀鹰派继续大行其道，国会也几乎不可能给予帮助。


Should Europeans have accused the US of “manipulating” the exchange rate to expand exports at its expense?	因此，保护主义正在抬头。


Although US politicians focus on the bilateral trade deficit with China – which is persistently large – what matters is the multilateral balance.	美国国会授权财政部评估中国是否为“货币操纵国”。 虽然奥巴马总统要求财长蒂莫西•盖特纳把报告的发布时间推迟数月，然而这个“货币操纵”概念本身就是有缺陷的。


When demands for China to adjust its exchange rate began during George W. Bush’s administration, its multilateral trade surplus was small.	所有的政府都采取会间接或直接影响汇率的行动。 无节制的财政赤字会导致货币的疲软，低利率也会如此。


More recently, however, China has been running a large multilateral surplus as well.	在最近的希腊危机发生前，美国得利于低的美元/欧元汇率。 那么欧洲人是否应该指控通过美国“操纵”汇率，加大出口，进而损害他们利益呢？


Saudi Arabia also has a bilateral and multilateral surplus: Americans want its oil, and Saudis want fewer US products.	尽管美国政客着眼于对中国的双边贸易逆差——逆差额一直都很大——真正重要的却是多边平衡。


Even in absolute value, Saudi Arabia’s multilateral merchandise surplus of $212 billion in 2008 dwarfs China’s $175 billion surplus; as a percentage of GDP, Saudi Arabia’s current-account surplus, at 11.5% of GDP, is more than twice that of China.	在布什当政时，外界开始要求中国调整汇率，那时中国的多边贸易顺差还很小。


Saudi Arabia’s surplus would be far higher were it not for US armaments exports.	然而近年来，中国一直拥有大额的多边贸易顺差。


In a global economy with deficient aggregate demand, current-account surpluses are a problem.	同样，沙特也有着双边和多边的贸易顺差：美国想要它的石油，而沙特人不怎么想要美国货。


But China’s current-account surplus is actually less than the combined figure for Japan and Germany; as a percentage of GDP, it is 5%, compared to Germany’s 5.2%.	即使从绝对价值来看，2008年沙特的多��贸易顺差额为2 120亿美元，使得中国1 750亿美元的顺差额相形见绌。 而从国民生产总值（GDP）的比例上看，沙特阿拉伯的经常账户盈余为国民生产总值的11.


Many factors other than exchange rates affect a country’s trade balance.  A key determinant is national savings.	但事实上，中国的经常账户盈余小于日本和德国叠加的数字； 从比例上看，中国的经常账户盈余占国民生产总值的5%，而德国的比例是5.


America’s multilateral trade deficit will not be significantly narrowed until America saves significantly more; while the Great Recession induced higher household savings (which were near zero), this has been more than offset by the increased government deficits.	如果美国人不大幅增加储蓄的话，美国的多边贸易逆差将不能大幅减少； 尽管大萧条使居民储蓄有所增加（在那之前，居民储蓄率接近零），但是它被膨胀的政府赤字轻易抵消了。


Adjustment in the exchange rate is likely simply to shift to where America buys its textiles and apparel – from Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, rather than China.	汇率的调整可能仅仅会改变美国购买纺织品和服装的地点——由中国转向孟加拉国或是斯里兰卡。


Meanwhile, an increase in the exchange rate is likely to contribute to inequality in China, as its poor farmers face increasing competition from America’s highly subsidized farms.	与此同时，汇率的上调可能会加重中国的贫富差距，因为贫穷的农民将面临来自美国大力补贴的农场主的激烈竞争。


This is the real trade distortion in the global economy – one in which millions of poor people in developing countries are hurt as America helps some of the world’s richest farmers.	这才是全球经济中真正的贸易扭曲——在这贸易扭曲中，由于美国帮助世界上一些最富裕的农民，致使发展中国家中数以百万计的穷人受到冲击。


During the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the renminbi’s stability played an important role in stabilizing the region.	在1997-1998的亚洲金融危机中，人民币的稳定对该地区的稳定中发挥了重要的作用。


So, too, the renminbi’s stability has helped the region maintain strong growth, from which the world as a whole benefits.	因此同样地，人民币的稳定帮助着这一地区保持强劲的增长，而整个世界也因此受益。


Some argue that China needs to adjust its exchange rate to prevent inflation or bubbles.	一些人声称中国需要调整汇率，以防止通货膨胀或泡沫。


Inflation remains contained, but, more to the point, China’s government has an arsenal of other weapons (from taxes on capital inflows and capital-gains taxes to a variety of monetary instruments) at its disposal.	中国的通胀继续受到抑制，但是更重要的是，中国政府还有其他的可用手段（从资本流入税到资本增值税，再到一系列的货币工具）


But exchange rates do affect the pattern of growth, and it is in China’s own interest to restructure and move away from high dependence on export-led growth.	但是汇率确实会影响经济的增长方式。 脱离对出口引导的增长形式的高度依赖，重组增长结构，是符合中国自身利益的。


China recognizes that its currency needs to appreciate over the long run, and politicizing the speed at which it does so has been counterproductive.	中国认识到它的货币在长期中需要升值，而把货币升值的速度政治化是有害无益的。


(Since it began revaluing its exchange rate in July 2005, the adjustment has been half or more of what most experts think is required.)	（自从2005年7月，中国开始上调汇率以来，大多数专家认为，调整的额度要么是需要值的一半，要么超出。


Moreover, starting a bilateral confrontation is unwise.	）此外，进行双边对抗是不明智的。


Since China’s multilateral surplus is the economic issue and many countries are concerned about it, the US should seek a multilateral, rules-based solution.	既然中国的多边贸易顺差是一个经济问题，许多国家也对此表示担忧，那么美国应该寻求一个多边的，有规则可依的方案。


Imposing unilateral duties after unilaterally labeling China a “currency manipulator” would undermine the multilateral system, with little payoff.	如果在单边地把中国列为“货币操纵国”后又强制实行单边税收，不仅多边机制受到损害，美国也无利可图。


China might respond by imposing duties on those American products effectively directly or indirectly subsidized by America’s massive bailouts of its banks and car companies.	作为回应，中国可能会对那些间接或直接地在美国大规模援救银行业和汽车行业的政策中受到补助的产品强制征税。


No one wins from a trade war.	贸易战中没有赢家。


So America should be wary of igniting one in the midst of an uncertain global recovery – as popular as it might be with politicians whose constituents are justly concerned about high unemployment, and as easy as it is to look for blame elsewhere.	因此美国应该保持谨慎，不要在全球复苏还不确定的情况下又发动贸易战——尽管政客们可能欢迎贸易战，原因有二：其一，他们的选民担心高失业率，这一担忧合情合理； 其二，寻找造成高失业率的替罪羊对政客们来说也很简单。


Unfortunately, this global crisis was made in America, and America must look inward, not only to revive its economy, but also to prevent a recurrence.	不幸的是，这次的全球危机源于美国，美国必须从自身出发，不仅要恢复自身经济，还要防止危机再次发生。


No Time for Complacency	尚不是自满之时


LONDON – After years of rapid growth, the countries of Eastern Europe have been especially hard hit by the world financial crisis.	发自伦敦——在数年的迅速增长之后，东欧国家在最近的国际金融危机中遭受了尤其严重的挫折。


Some required billions of dollars of international support.	其中一些国家需要几十亿美元国际支援来渡过难关。


Even those countries that were better prepared were made painfully aware of the after-effects of crisis: export markets collapsed, commodity prices fell, and credit markets seized up.	而即便是那些相对准备较充分的国家都痛苦地感受到了一连串后危机效应：出口市场严重萎缩，商品价格下滑，以及信贷市场失灵。


In many countries, economic output sank dramatically, more so than in Europe’s west.	许多东欧国家都出现的经济大幅下滑现象甚至比起西欧更为严重。


This decline seems to have stopped, and the most recent data indicate that the bottom may have been reached.	但在目前来说下滑的趋势似乎已经停止，而最新的数据更显示经济可能已经触底。


Yet it is premature to declare the crisis over, because much of the impact and many of the consequences of the crisis have yet to be felt.	但在此时宣布危机结束依然为时尚早，因为危机的许多影响及其诸多后续效应依然未被人们所感知。


We must reckon with a huge increase in bankruptcies – as well as with impaired credit markets and high unemployment.	我们必须考虑到企业破产的大幅度增加，而受损的信用市场和高失业率也同样不容乐观。


This, in turn, will place a burden on national budgets and banking systems – and will challenge politicians across the region.	上述现象将反过来对国家预算和银行体系造成负担——这将考验本地区政治家的应对能力。


A number of countries have already been forced into drastic budget cuts, which have had a knock-on effect on standards of living.	很多国家已经被迫大幅度削减预算开支，并随之对民众生活水平造成了冲击。


One must add structural problems to this mix – problems that have not been dealt with since the crisis erupted.	而我们必须在这个复杂的问题中增加结构性问题这一项——这些问题自危机爆发以来都没能得到处理。


For Eastern Europe, this boils down to four major areas: (1) an overdependence on natural resources; (2) export imbalances, in terms of product mix and foreign markets; (3) small, inadequate capital markets; and (4) inefficient production and use of energy.	对于东欧来说结构性问题主要体现在四个方面：首先，对自然资源的过度依赖； 其次，在商品结构以及国外市场方面的出口不平衡；


But the past 12 months have also underscored Eastern Europe’s strengths.	但在过去12个月所经历的一切也同样表明了东欧的实力。


Twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the countries of the east are more integrated into international markets than ever before. This brought strong growth rates in good times.	在冷战“铁幕”倒塌后的20年以来，东欧国家比以往更多地整合到国际市场中，并且在经济景气时期为东欧带来了强劲的经济增长。


In times of crisis it had a negative impact – although integration has prevented currency collapse or the write-off of national debt, occurrences that we have witnessed during previous crises in emerging markets.	但当经济危机来临之时，对国际市场的整合却为东欧带来了负面效应——尽管这种整合阻止了货币体系崩溃或者拖赖国际债务这些以往经济危机中经常在新兴市场发生的事件。


The IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as the European Central Bank and the European Commission, have worked together to stabilize the situation.	国际货币基金组织和世界银行，连同欧洲投资银行、欧洲复兴开发银行、欧洲中央银行和欧盟委员会等其他国际金融机构一道，共同合作以稳定东欧的形势。


The G20 has led the way on the international level.	此外G20峰会也在国际层面内起到了引导作用。


Cooperation and coordination of this kind and at this level were unattainable during earlier financial crises.	而此类性质和层面的合作与协商在以往的经济危机中是难以实现的。


Another difference with past financial downturns in emerging markets is that investments in the EBRD region – Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, Turkey, and the former Soviet Union – have turned out to be long term, rather than short-term or speculative.	新兴市场与先前金融衰退时期的另一点不同则体现在对欧洲复兴开发银行运作的地区——即东欧，东南欧，土耳其与前苏联国家——的投资已经转变为长期投资，而非往日的短期投资或投机行为 。


Western entrepreneurs and investors have increasingly come to view Europe’s east as a part of a (now broader) domestic market and have behaved with a longer-term view.	西欧企业家和投资者越来越把东欧视为欧盟内部市场的一部分，而这部分市场如今正变得更加广阔。


This has brought the region much needed stability.	此外，企业家和投资者已经开始以更长远的目光对待自己的投资行为，这就为本地区带来了非常必要的金融和投资市场稳定。


A healthy banking and financial sector is crucial for stability.	健康的银行业和金融业对于保持市场的稳定至关重要。


International cooperation has succeeded in preventing banks headquartered in Western Europe, with extensive branch networks in the Eastern Europe, from pulling out.	而国际合作已经成功挽救总部设立于西欧、分支机构遍布东欧的多家银行免于倒闭。


Yet serious problems remain. An unwillingness to lend and expensive loans in foreign currencies are a real burden to eastern balance sheets.	但仍然存在许多严重的问题：低下的贷款意愿以及昂贵的外币贷款对于东欧国家的收支平衡来说是一个真正的负担。


That is why it has become so difficult for small and medium-sized companies to get new loans or to refinance existing loans.	这也解释了为什么中小型企业申请新贷款和在现有贷款基础上重新融资是如此困难。


The EBRD has experienced the change in market conditions first-hand.	欧洲复兴开发银行在第一线经历了市场条件的变化。


We have implemented an anti-crisis program that has concentrated on the financial sector, the real economy, and especially important infrastructure investments, particularly in the crucial area of energy efficiency.	而我们已经开始实施抗击危机计划并把焦点放在金融行业、实体经济、尤其是在那些和能源利用率有关的关键领域的重要基础建设投资上。


Demand for our loans and project finance is higher than ever: in the first nine months of 2009, we have invested more than €6 billion, twice as much as we did in the same period a year ago.	所以，一般性贷款和项目贷款的需求比以往任何时候都高：2009年头9个月，我们已经投资超过60亿欧元，这个数目是去年同期投资的两倍之多。


Yet the EBRD does more than make much-needed loans. Our investments are aimed at the development and support of market economies across the region.	然而除了申请紧需的贷款之外，欧洲复兴开发银行还做出了更多的努力，我们的投资旨在区域发展以及对市场经济的支持。


We work with the private sector and not in competition with it.	我们同私营行业是合作的关系，而非与之竞争。


We mobilize private financing for public goods, such as infrastructure.	我们动员私人资金投入到基础设施建设这类的公共事业当中。


Our investments are aimed at overcoming structural problems that have plagued the region.	我们的投资目的在于克服一直困扰东欧经济的结构性问题。


This crisis has shown that the need for adequately capitalized public institutions is enormous.	这次经济危机显示出东欧极为需要那些有充足资金支持的公营部门。


This will remain the case for the foreseeable future.	这种情况在可预见的未来都会存在。


For years to come, the private banking sector will be preoccupied with the consequences of the financial crisis.	未来数年内，私营银行业都会一直被金融危机的后续效应所困扰。


As a result, investors value a strong public partner now more than ever before.	因此投资者比以往都更加珍视一个强有力的公营部门合作伙伴。


The current economic situation has pushed the EBRD to its limits.	当今的经济形势已经使欧洲复兴开发银行达到了自身的极限。


It is for this reason that I have suggested a capital increase to the shareholders of the bank – to €30 billion from the current €20 billion.	也正由于这个原因，我已经建议银行的股东增加资金，从现有的200亿欧元增加到300亿。


This would mean that the EBRD could invest up to €10 billion annually over the next five years, enabling us to continue to fulfill our role, providing vital backing and financial support to Eastern Europe and the private sector.	这就意味着欧洲复兴开发银行在未来5年内将能够每年平均投资100亿欧元来保证能够继续完成我们的目标，为东欧和私营行业提供必不可少的帮助和资金支持。


Such investment is more necessary than ever, even at a time of gradual economic recovery.	这样的投资是有史以来最为必要的，即使我们正处于经济缓慢恢复的时期。


No Time to Slacken	时不我待


PITTSBURGH – Almost six months ago, at a moment of great alarm about the global financial and economic crisis, G-20 leaders met for a historic summit in London.	发自匹兹堡——大约半年以前，就在全球经济与金融危机的警钟震荡世人之时，G20组织众领导人齐聚伦敦举行了一次历史性的首脑峰会。


Their collective commitments to stimulate, regulate and restructure global economic activity helped to calm nerves around the world.	他们共同承诺刺激，规管和重整全球经济活动，令世人紧张的神经得以平复下来。


Many of the problems that spurred the London summit remain real.	然而时至今日，促成伦敦峰会的众多难题依然没能得到解决。


Anxiety levels may have come down, in board rooms and stock markets, but the daily drama for survival continues.  Indeed, for many people it has deepened, in the villages and streets of the world’s least-developed countries – particularly in Africa.	在公司董事会和证券市场里的焦虑情绪或许已得到缓和，但为了生活而苦苦挣扎的悲剧却仍然每天上演。 实际上，对于大多数生活在世界上最不发达国家的乡村和街道上的人们而言，悲剧正在加深——而非洲尤甚。


The United Nations and the World Bank predict that the direct and indirect effects of the economic meltdown will be felt in the developing world for a long time to come.	据联合国和世界银行预测，经济萎缩对发展中国家所造成的直接和间接影响将在很长一段时间内都无法消散。


Jobs have gone, incomes have been lost and opportunities foregone.	工作丢了，薪水没了，发展机遇也化为泡影。


Tens of millions of people have been added to the hundreds of millions already below the poverty line, reversing progress toward attaining the world’s Millennium Development Goals.	如今又有数千万人加入了原先数亿人的行列，生活在贫困线以下，这个状况显然同达成世界千年发展目标的进程背道而驰。


The London G-20 meeting recognized that the world’s poorest countries and people should not be penalized by a crisis for which they were not responsible.	参与伦敦G20峰会的领导人们达成共识，世界上最为贫困的国家与人民不应当为这场不由他们负责的危机埋单。


With this in mind, the G-20 leaders set out an ambitious agenda for an inclusive and wide-ranging response.	为了达成这个目的，G20的领导人设立了具有宏大抱负的议程，来对问题制定具有包容性和范围广泛的应对措施。


If the Pittsburgh summit is not to be an anticlimactic end to the G-20’s ascendancy as a forum for decisive action, the momentum generated must be maintained. Four issues provide the opportunity to do so.	而如果匹兹堡峰会不想堕落成为G20这个全球支配性决策论坛的失败终点的话，就必须做到下面四点：


First, G-20 leaders need to follow through with the commitments they’ve made to a Global Plan for Recovery and Reform.	首先，G20领导人需要坚守他们在全球复原和改革计划中所做出的承诺。


Having recognized its “collective responsibility to mitigate the social impact of the crisis and minimize long-lasting damage to global potential,” the group now needs to review how much support has reached or become accessible to developing countries.	在意识到其“有集体责任来减轻危机带来的社会影响，并将长期持续的全球潜在发展能力的危害降到最低”之后，G20现在需要的是重新审视究竟对发展中国家的支持能在多大程度上实现，或更可能成为现实。


There are some encouraging signs.	而令人庆幸的是，一些鼓舞人心的兆头已经出现。


For example, in July, the International Monetary Fund commendably announced a substantial increase in concessional lending to least-developed countries.	比如在7月份国际货币基金组织就适时宣布，将大幅度提高对最不发达国家的减让性贷款额度。


Several of them, including Ethiopia, Malawi and South Africa, have already been allocated Special Drawing Rights to help them cope with the economic crisis.	其中几个这类国家，包括埃塞俄比亚，马拉维和南非都已经被分配了特别提款权，以帮助他们成功应对经济危机。


But some vulnerable countries are still struggling to finance countercyclical investment and expanded social protection services.	然而一些脆弱的国家却依然在极力争取抗循环性投资以及扩大社会保护服务的资金。


It raises questions about the stringencies of the World Bank’s eligibility criteria and allocation models which can prevent support of the most needy.	因此有人开始质疑世界银行的资格审查标准和分配模式的公信力，因为这些标准把那些最需要帮助的国家都拒之门外了。