Not surprisingly, the economy deteriorated.	经济状况恶化并不令人意外。


Frustrated by the long-ruling LDP’s poor political and economic management, voters opted last year for change at the top.	对自民党长期以来糟糕的政治经济管理倍感失望的日本选民去年选择更换高层政治领袖。


But the pattern of economic mismanagement, far from being reversed, has only become worse.	但经济管理不善的模式不但未能扭转，反而进一步加剧。


Huge spending increases were directed at farmers and households.	农业和家庭部门得到了庞大的增量开支。


As a result, the share of tax revenue to total spending this fiscal year slipped below 50%, something unseen in Japan’s entire post-war history.	结果，本财政年度税收与总开支的比例滑落至50%以下，这在日本整个战后历史上是破天荒第一次。


Despite the parlous fiscal position, for now the market for Japanese government bonds (JGBs) remains stable.	尽管财政状况十分危险，但到目前为止日本国债市场仍然保持稳定。


But this is because government bonds are purchased mostly by domestic organizations and households.	但这是因为日本国债多数被国内机构和家庭购买。


In another words, the government’s negative saving is financed by the private sector’s positive savings.	换言之，私有部门的储蓄盈余弥补了政府的储蓄赤字。


But that private-sector safety net of savings is fraying.	但私有部门的储蓄安全体系也正在濒临解体。


Japanese households hold savings of about ¥1.1 trillion in net monetary assets.	日本的家庭储蓄总额折合货币净资产约合1. 1万亿。


In about three years, however, the amount of JGBs will exceed the total assets of Japanese households.	但在约三年时间内，日本国债总额就会超过日本家庭的资产总额。


Government debt will no longer be backed up by taxpayers’ assets.	纳税人的资产将无法支持政府负债。


Confidence in the JGB market will likely decline.	对日本国债市场的信心将可能降低。


Moreover, as Japan’s society ages, the household savings rate will decrease dramatically.	此外，随着日本社会老龄化，家庭存款率也将大幅降低。


This will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the domestic private sector to finance the budget deficit indefinitely.	就算还能勉强维持，国内私有部门也越来越难以无限支撑预算赤字。


And new demands for fiscal expenditures are expected to grow as the country ages.	日本的老龄化也会创造新的财政开支需求。


In about five years, all baby boomers will be over 65, but pressure on government expenditures for pensions and health care is expected to start sooner, around 2013.	短短5年内，婴儿潮时期所有的日本国民年龄将超过65岁，但退休金和医疗等政府开支压力的释放将会提早到2013年左右。


Japan’s new government, led by Prime Minister Naoto Kan, started discussing a consumption-tax hike to offset the growth in spending.	菅直人首相领导的日本新政府已开始探讨上调消费税来平衡政府开支。


But a consumption-tax hike is no panacea, particularly given the government’s lack of a growth strategy.	但特别是在政府缺乏发展战略的情况下，上调消费税并非是一剂万能灵药。


Although a tax increase will undoubtedly be needed, it is the wrong priority at the moment – and could prove counter-productive if it causes the economy to decline dramatically.	虽然肯定要增加税收，但目前这么做却不是时机——这项政策的副作用甚至可能导致经济大幅滑坡。


Indeed, Koizumi’s government demonstrated the best way to tackle fiscal consolidation.	事实上，小泉政府已经展示了进行财务整顿的最佳方式。


Koizumi decided that a primary budget balance should be restored in 10 years.	小泉决定基本预算平衡应当在10年内得到恢复。


And he came close to being successful, as the primary deficit of ¥28 trillion in 2002 was reduced to just ¥6 trillion in 2007.	他也几乎获得了成功，因为基本预算赤字已经从2002年的280万亿日元下降到2007年的60万亿。


Had this effort been continued for two more years, a primary surplus could have been realized.	如果这项政策再持续两年，就可以实现基本预算盈余。


Without a strategy for growth, which includes efforts to reduce government expenditures and a policy to stop deflation, Japan’s economy will remain in the doldrums.	没有正确的发展战略，包括缩减政府开支和制止通缩的政策，日本的经济发展仍将陷于停滞。


But Kan still seems unwilling to focus on growth.	但菅直人似乎仍不愿将发展作为第一要务。


Instead, like so many other leaders before him, he proclaims his desire to find a “third way.”	相反，他像前任很多领导人一样，声称要找到“第三条路”。


But, as history has shown, no third way exists.	但正如历史已经证明的那样，所谓第三条路根本就不存在。


Kan continues to believe that a large government, with growing social-welfare expenditures, is the way to get the economy moving.	菅直人仍然认为社会福利开支不断增加的大政府能够推动经济。


This should not be surprising.	这并不令人意外。


He used to be involved in civic movements and groups – like environmental organizations – that take little heed of the need for economic growth.	因为他曾经参加过环保团体等公民运动和公民组织，此类组织和机构很少注意到经济发展的重要意义。


Increasing the tax burden seems almost a natural part of such a mindset, as does ignorance of the need for increased economic competition.	增加税负和忽视经济竞争几乎是自然而然的思维模式。


Without that, and a renewed focus on growth, Japan will continue to climb down the global ladder of success.	没有正确发展策略的引导，日本经济的世界排名难以改变下滑的颓势。


Indeed, any Japanese who thinks that complacency is an option should look to Argentina.	事实上，选择自鸣得意的日本人应当看看阿根廷经济。


A hundred years ago, Argentina was arguably the world’s second wealthiest economy.	一百年前，阿根廷几乎是世界第二大富裕经济体。


Now, thanks to bad policies, and even worse politicians, it ranks among the world’s also-rans.	而现在由于糟糕的政策和比政策还糟的政客，这个国家已经沦落到失败者的行列。


Japan’s Economic Quandary	日本的经济窘境


CAMBRIDGE – The Japanese economy is a paradoxical mixture of prosperity and failure.	发自剑桥——日本经济一个是繁荣与失败的矛盾混合体。


And, in a significant way, its prosperity makes its failures difficult to address.	而且在很大程度上，正是它的繁荣使得其失败变成了一个棘手的难题。


Japan’s affluence is palpable to anyone who visits Tokyo.	对于那些造访东京的人来说，日本的富裕是显而易见的。


The standard of living is high, with per capita income in 2015 (in terms of purchasing power parity) amounting to $38,000, close to the $41,000 average in France and Britain.	生活水平相当高，2015年的人均收入（按购买力平价计算）达3. 8万美元，接近英法两国4.


The unemployment rate, at 3.3%, is substantially lower than the US rate of 5% and the eurozone rate of about 10%.	失业率为3. 3％，大大低于美国的5％和欧元区的10％。


But Japan’s economy has now slipped into deflation, with consumer prices lower in March than a year ago, while real GDP is declining.	但日本的经济却已陷入通缩，三月份的消费者价格指数比去年同期更低，而实际GDP则一路下行。


Despite near-zero borrowing costs, the fiscal deficit is running at nearly 7% of GDP, and government debt exceeds 230% of GDP.	虽然借贷成本已经接近零，但财政赤字却相当于当前GDP的7％，政府负债额则超过GDP的230％。


The population and the labor force are shrinking, implying even higher debt ratios in the future.	人口和劳动力双双萎缩，意味着未来的负债率还将走高。


When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in December 2012, he announced a strategy – comprising three “arrows” – to overcome the economy’s combination of slow growth and low inflation: very easy monetary policy, a short-term fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms to labor and product markets.	安倍晋三于2012年12月就任日本首相后随即宣布了一项“三支箭”战略以克服本国经济低增长低通货膨胀并存的状况：高度宽松的货币政策，短期财政刺激和针对劳动力和商品市场的结构性改革。


But the government’s economic policies (so-called Abenomics) have not fixed Japan’s problems and are unlikely to do so in the future.	但政府的经济政策（所谓安倍经济学）目前并未解决日本的问题，也不太可能在未来凑效。


After Abe appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as the new head of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and charged him with getting the inflation rate to 2%, Kuroda loosened monetary policy immediately and dramatically, by slashing interest rates and launching large-scale purchases of long-term government bonds.	安倍晋三任命黑田东彦执掌日本央行并要求他实现通胀率2％的目标，黑田随即大肆实施宽松货币政策，大幅削减利率并开始大规模购买长期政府债券。


This caused a sharp fall in the value of the yen and sent the interest rate on ten-year bonds toward zero.	这导致日元大幅下跌并使得10年期债券利率趋向于零。


The more competitive exchange rate raised the profits of Japanese exporters, but not their output, while the weaker yen also raised import prices, reducing the real incomes of most Japanese households.	更具竞争力的汇率增加了日本出口商的利润，却没有增加它们的产出，而日元贬值也导致进口价格上升，降低了大多数日本家庭的实际收入。


In January, the BOJ went further and introduced negative deposit rates on commercial banks’ mandatory reserves, which markets interpreted as a confusing act of desperation.	今年一月份日本央行更进一步，将商业银行在央行的强制性储备利率降为负值，这被市场解读为绝望中的胡乱挣扎。


That had the adverse effect of weakening household and business demand.	此举产生了削弱家庭和商业需求的不利影响。


And, despite the BOJ’s easing, global financial conditions soon caused a rise in the value of the yen, which rose nearly 10% relative to the dollar.	而尽管日本央行实施宽松政策，全球金融状况很快引发日元升值，相对美元上涨了近10％。


This week, the BOJ surprised markets by making no policy change at its meeting, contrary to the widespread expectation of a significant further easing of monetary conditions.	本周，日本央行在其会议后并未宣布任何政策变化，违背了货币状况进一步大幅宽松政策的普遍预期，令外界大感意外。


Markets reacted sharply, with the yen strengthening by 2% against the dollar and the Japanese stock market falling 3%.	市场对此反应强烈，日圆对美元当即升值了2％，日本股市则下跌3％。


Abe began his fiscal policy with a substantial spending program, focused primarily on repairing and replacing infrastructure affected by the 2011 earthquake.	安倍通过大规模开支计划来作为自身货币政策的开局，主要集中于维修和更换受2011年东日本地震影响的基础设施。


But he also raised the value-added tax (VAT) from 5% to 8% to address the enormous deficit and growing national debt.	但他同时也将增值税从5%上调至8％，以弥补庞大的财政赤字和不断增长的国家债务。


The result was an economic downturn, with two quarters of declining GDP.	其后果是经济陷入衰退，国内生产总值连续两季度下跌。


The level of real GDP now is no higher than it was in 2008.	目前的实际GDP甚至低于2008年的水平。


The third arrow of Abenomics – structural policies aimed at boosting potential growth – has barely been launched.	安倍经济学的第三支箭——旨在提高潜在增长的结构性政策——至今都尚未发出。


The good news is that there has been some increase in female labor-force participation and in the number of tourists visiting Japan.	好消息是女性劳动力参与率有所上升，访日游客数量也有所增加。


And a variety of reforms are intended to overhaul the highly protected agricultural sector, though substantial change depends on ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (and even then the changes would be phased in only over several decades).	同时计划启动一系列针对高度贸易保护下的农业部门的改革，但实质性的变化将依赖于跨太平洋伙伴关系贸易协定的签订（即使如此，这些变化的逐步展开也还需要几十年）。


Japan’s declining population and shrinking labor force is a major long-term challenge – reflected in Abe’s call for more women to work outside the home.	日本的人口下降和劳动力队伍萎缩是一个重大长期性挑战——这在安倍要求更多妇女外出工作的呼吁中可见一斑。


Although a system of temporary permits allows foreign workers to be employed in Japan for up to three years, the country will not seek to ameliorate adverse demographic trends by opening itself to permanent immigration.	虽然临时许可证制度允许外国劳工在日本工作三年，但该国也并未试图开放永久移民来缓解不利的人口构成趋势。


Reluctance to expand the number of foreign workers and to change work customs to encourage more married women to join the labor force may reflect the relative affluence that Japan currently enjoys.	既不愿扩大外国工人数量，也羞于改变工作习惯来鼓励更多已婚妇女加入劳动大军的状况可能源自于了日本目前享有相对富裕。


The Japanese public may prefer to maintain its current lifestyle and cultural homogeneity, even though doing so is preventing more rapid economic growth.	日本民众可能更倾向于保持目前的生活方式和文化同质性，尽管这样做实际上阻碍了经济的更快增长。


Japan’s biggest immediate problem, however, is the budget deficit and government debt.	而日本当前迫在眉睫的最大问题则是财政赤字和政府债务。


If the BOJ succeeds in achieving a 2% inflation rate, the deficit will rise rapidly, as the interest rate on government debt would increase from the current zero level.	假设日本央行成功实现2％的通胀率，赤字必将暴增，因为政府债券也将脱离当前的零利率水平。


Failure to implement the spending cuts and revenue increases needed to reduce the budget deficit would undermine confidence in the economy’s prospects and increase speculation that the government would eventually resort to some form of debt repudiation.	一旦未能落实削减预算赤字所需的政府开支削减和收入增加，那么必将削弱外界对经济前景的信心，令人怀疑政府是否会最终诉诸某种形式的赖账手段。


Abe thus faces a dilemma in deciding whether to raise the VAT further, from 8% to 10%, as planned.	因此安倍面临着是否要将增值税从8％进一步提到计划中10％的两难决定。


Doing so is undoubtedly hard at a time when GDP has declined and CPI inflation has turned negative.	在GDP下降和CPI通胀率沦为负数的时候实施这一切无疑非常困难；


And yet failure to raise the VAT or to cut government spending means continued large deficits and soaring government debt.	但如果没法提高增值税或削减政府开支，就只能继续面对巨额赤字和不断飙升的政府负债。


Abe has said he would offset the immediate contractionary effect of the VAT hike with a short-term fiscal stimulus in the form of higher government spending.	安倍表示，他将采取增加政府支出的短期财政刺激手段来抵消增值税上调的直接收缩效应。


That might allow the necessary permanent reduction of the deficit without causing a repeat of the economic downturn that accompanied the last VAT increase.	这可能会在实现必要的赤字永久性削减的同时避免重蹈上次调高增值税率后经济衰退的覆辙。


Another strategy that might help sustain aggregate demand would be to phase in the VAT increase at an annual rate of 1% for three or four years.	另一种可能有助于维持总需求的策略是在未来三年或四年的以1%的年增长率逐步提高增值税。


This would give consumers an incentive to increase spending, especially on large ticket items, before each increment raises prices.	这将鼓励消费者在每次上调前增加支出——尤其是在大件商品采购方面。


There is no way to avoid shrinking the budget deficit without jeopardizing debt sustainability – and probably sooner rather than later.	没有什么手段可以在不危及债务可持续性的情况下缩小预算赤字——也许宜早不宜迟。


If Abe can get public finances under control, Japan will be in a much stronger position to face its other economic challenges.	如果安倍能成功控制住公共财政，那么日本就将处于一个更有利的地位去应对其他经济挑战。


Japan’s Constitutional Albatross	日本的宪法负担


TOKYO – The approach of the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II has sparked much discussion – and lamentation – of East Asia’s resurgent historical feuds.	东京—随着日本在二战中战败七十周年纪念日的临近，对东亚复燃的历史争执的讨论和嗟叹也纷纷登场。


But recent tensions in the region may partly reflect a lack of progress in another, overlooked area: Japanese constitutional reform.	但最近的地区紧张局势部分反映了另一个被忽略领域缺乏进展：日本的宪法改革。


Indeed, despite the powerlessness so vividly highlighted by the Islamic State’s beheading of two Japanese hostages, Japan has not adopted even one amendment to the “peace constitution” that the occupying American forces imposed on it in 1947.	事实上，尽管伊斯兰国斩首两名日本人质如此生动地展现了日本的无力，但日本仍没有对1947年占日美军所制定的“和平宪法”做出哪怕一项修订。


At first glance, this may not be altogether surprising.	乍一看，这也许并不那么令人惊讶。


After all, the constitution served an important purpose: by guaranteeing that Japan would not pose a military threat in the future, it enabled the country finally to escape foreign occupation and pursue rebuilding and democratization.	毕竟，这部宪法有其重要目的：保证日本不会在未来成为军事威胁。 这部宪法让日本最终摆脱外国占领并开始追求重建和民主化。


But consider this: Germany adopted an Allied-approved constitution under similar circumstances in 1949, to which it has since made dozens of amendments.	但想一想：1949年，德国在相似的环境中接受了盟军批准的宪法，时至今日已经做出数十项修改。


Moreover, whereas Germany’s constitution, or Basic Law, authorized the use of military force in self-defense or as part of a collective security agreement, Japan’s constitution stipulated full and permanent relinquishment of “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”	此外，尽管德国宪法，或者基本法，授权德国出于自卫目的或作为集体安全协议的一部分使用军事力量，但日本宪法规定彻底而永久地放弃“威胁或使用武力作为解决国际纠纷的方式”。


Japan is the only country in the world bound by such restrictions – imposed not just to prevent a militarist revival, but also to punish Japan for its wartime government’s policies – and continued adherence to them is unrealistic.	日本是世界上唯一一个受到如此限制的国家——之所以如此，不但是要防止军国主义复燃，也是要惩罚日本战时政府的政策——继续遵守这样的限制是不现实的。


That is why Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made constitutional reform a high priority.	因此，日本首相安倍晋三将宪法改革作为高度重点。


Having cemented his authority in December’s snap general election, in which his Liberal Democratic Party won a decisive victory, Abe is determined to pursue his goal of building a stronger, more competitive Japan – one that can hold its own against an increasingly muscular China.	在12月的临时大选中，他所在的自民党赢得决定性胜利，他也巩固了自己的权力，在此基础上，他决心追求其建设更强大、更有竞争力的日本的目标——一个能对抗日益强大的中国的日本。


Abe’s effort to “normalize” Japan’s strategic posture began with a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution, according to which the country would henceforth be allowed to engage in “collective self-defense.”	安倍试图“正常化”日本的战略姿态始于对宪法第9条的重新解释。 根据重新解释，日本此后将被允许参与“集体自卫”。


Japan’s government approved the change last summer, and the United States backed the move as well.	日本政府在去年夏天批准了这一变化，美国也支持这一行动。


With the Islamic State’s attempts to leverage the lives of two Japanese hostages, legislation to implement the reinterpretation is set to be submitted to the Diet.	伊斯兰国试图利用两名日本人的生命做文章，在此背景下，实施该重新解释的立法将呈递国会讨论。


Yet the reinterpretation has faced some resistance at home and abroad.	但这一重新解释受到了一些国内外的反对。


Chinese critics, in particular, have expressed concern that Japanese militarism could reemerge, though they neglect to mention that it is China’s military buildup that prompted Japan’s government to reassess its national defense policy.	特别是中国批评者表示担心日本军国主义可能死灰复燃，尽管他们完全不提是中国的军队建设促使日本政府重新评估其国家安全政策。


In fact, the reinterpretation amounts to little more than a tweak: Japanese forces can now shield an American warship defending Japan, but they remain prohibited from initiating offensive attacks or participating in multilateral military operations.	事实上，这一重新解释只不过是顺水推舟：目前日本自卫队可以护卫保卫日本的美国军舰，但仍禁止发动进攻或参与多边军事行动。


Given that the United Nations charter recognizes individual and collective self-defense as an “inherent right” of sovereign countries, the change should be uncontroversial.	联合国宪章承认个体和集体自卫为主权国家���“固有权利”，因此这一重新解释并非反常规。


But significant obstacles continue to block wider constitutional reform.	但更广泛的宪法改革仍然阻力重重。


Amendments require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the Diet, and a majority in a popular referendum, making Japan’s constitution one of the world’s most difficult to revise.	修宪需要在国会两院都获得三分之二以上多数，还需要在公投中获得多数，这使得日本宪法是全世界最难修订的宪法之一。


To facilitate his ambitions, Abe hopes to scale down the requirement to simple majorities in both chambers or eliminate the need for a public referendum.	为了推进自己的雄心，安倍希望将国会两院的多数条件降低为简单多数或取消公投多数的条件。


Given popular resistance to change, Abe’s task will not be easy.	由于对宪法改革的大量阻力，安倍的任务绝不容易。


Whereas citizens of most democracies regard their constitutions as works in progress – India, for example, has amended its constitution 99 times since 1950 – the Japanese largely treat their constitution as sacrosanct.	尽管大部分民主国家的公民都把宪法视为不断改进的基本法——比如，自1950年以来印度已经99修改了宪法——但日本人大多将宪法视为神圣不可侵犯。


As a result, rather than ensuring that their constitution reflects social, technological, economic, and even ideological developments, they zealously uphold its precise provisions, like religious fundamentalists defending the literal truth of scripture.	结果，日本人并不去确保宪法反映社会、技术、经济甚至意识形态发展，而是激烈地捍卫其具体条款，就像原教旨主义者捍卫经文的字面意义一样。


Moreover, pacifism is deeply ingrained in the Japanese psyche, even among young people, largely owing to the painful legacy of Japan’s prewar militarism.	此外，和平主义深深地扎根于日本人的心理，即使是年轻人也是如此，这主要是因为日本战前军国主义留下的回忆太过痛苦。


Indeed, a poll conducted by the World Values Survey last year revealed that only 15.3% of Japanese – compared with 74.2% of Chinese and 57.7% of Americans – would be prepared to defend their country, the lowest rate in the world.	事实上，去年的世界价值调查（World Values Survey）发现，只有15. 3%的日本人——中国有74.


Just 9.5% of Japanese under the age of 30 said that they would be willing to fight.	2%，美国有57. 7%——准备捍卫国家，这一比例为世界最低。


Given such opposition, an actual revision of Article 9, rather than just a reinterpretation, does not seem feasible, especially while the avowedly pacifist Komeito party remains part of the ruling coalition.	考虑到如此大的反对，宪法第9条的实际修改而不只是重新解释看起来并不可行，特别是在明确以和平主义为旗帜的公明党仍身处执政联盟中的情况下。


Even if Abe manages to relax the amendment requirements – no easy feat, given the likelihood that a popular referendum would reveal weak public support – he will probably have to leave the change to his successor.	即使安倍设法放松了修宪条件——这绝非易事，因为全民公投可能暴露出安倍公众支持率十分难看——他也有可能将修宪留给继任者去完成。


But one factor could bolster Abe’s cause considerably.	但有一个因素可能大大有利于安倍的算盘。


Explicit US support for Japanese constitutional reform might not only blunt Chinese criticism, but could also reassure many Japanese that updating Article 9 would not amount to rejecting the postwar order that the Americans helped to establish in Japan.	美国明确表示支持日本修宪也许不仅能抵御中国的批评，还可以让许多日本人放心修改第9条不会影响美国在日本建立的战后秩序。


Such a move would also serve US security interests.	这一动作也符合美国的利益。


A more confident and secure Japan would be better able to block China from gaining ascendancy in the western Pacific, thereby advancing the central US policy objective of ensuring a stable balance of power in Asia.	更有信心、更可靠的日本将更有能力抵制中国在西太平洋获得支配地位，从而有利于美国的核心政策目标——确保亚洲稳定的实力平衡。


No other country in the region could act as a credible counterweight to China.	在该地区，没有其他国家能像日本那样成为可靠的制衡中国的力量。


Today’s Japan – a liberal democracy that has not fired a single shot against an outside party in nearly seven decades, and that has made major contributions to global development during this period – is very different from the Japan of 1947.	当代日本——近七十年来从未对外放过一枪、为全球发展做出重大贡献的自由的民主国家——与1947年的日本截然不同。


Its constitution should reflect that.	它的宪法应该体现这一点。


Japan’s Vote for Bold Reform	日本选择果断改革


TOKYO – With the powerful mandate of the Japanese people, demonstrated by their overwhelming vote of support in our country’s December 14 election, my government’s ability to act decisively has been strengthened immeasurably.	东京—日本人民在12月14日的投票中一边倒地支持我的政府，他们的强大的授权极大地加强了我们采取果断行动的能力。


Indeed, we now not only have the authority to act, but a clear and definitive message from the electorate that we must do so.	事实上，我们现在不仅有了行动的权力，也准确无误地感到了选民要求我们必须这样做。


In particular, we now have a mandate to launch what has become known around the world as the “third arrow” of so-called Abenomics: structural reform.	特别是，我们现在有了启动早已为全世界所周知的所谓安倍经济学的“第三支箭”——结构改革的权力。


And it is structural reform that will unleash the competitiveness, and long-pent-up dynamism, of Japan’s firms and people.	而只有结构改革可以释放日本企业和人民的竞争力和压抑已久的活力。


By calling in November for a snap general election, my aim was to consolidate the government’s political capital – not in order to hoard it, but to spend it on the reforms that were first promised two years ago.	我在11月突然宣布大选，目的是巩固政府的政治资本——不是为了囤积，而是为了将它用于两年前就许下的改革承诺。


Now, with our renewed mandate, that is what we will do.	如今，我们有了更新的权力，这也是我们将要做的。


First, we intend to subject Japan’s tax regime to a fundamental review.	首先，我们将从根本上重新审视日本的税收制度。


This entails not only an increase in the consumption-tax rate, the second round of which we have postponed, but also making the necessary adjustments so that our tax system no longer impairs investment incentives.	这不仅包括增加新消费税率（目前我们暂停了消费税率的第二轮提升），也包括做出必要的调整以使我们的税收制度不再阻碍投资激励。


Some of the agro-business organizations – the epitome of vested interests – must change, and we will push them to do so.	一些农业企业组织——它们是既得利益的缩影——必须有所改变，我们将促使它们改变。


Second, we must adapt Japan’s labor regulations to the norms of modern life almost everywhere, which means allowing every individual to strike a beneficial balance between life and work.	其次，我们必须让日本的劳动力监管规则适应几乎全球皆然的现代生活范式——这意味着让所有个体都获得生活和工作的有益平衡。


We Japanese will always work hard – I have no doubt about that.	日本人民永远会努力工作——对此我毫不怀疑。


But we also need to enable and encourage more Japanese women to participate in the workforce, whether at the beginning of their careers, or after choosing to have and raise children.	但我们也需要鼓励更多日本女性参与到劳动力大军，不管是在职业生涯开始阶段，还是在选择生养孩子之后。


Moreover, it is not just bold domestic reforms that must be embraced.	此外，我们必须采取的措施不仅局限于果断的国内改革。


Japan also needs to change how its economy interacts with the world.	日本还需要改变与世界的经济互动。


Consider the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Japan-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement.	以跨太平洋伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP）和日本-欧盟经济伙伴协定（Japan-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement）为例。


Completion of both trade and investment deals are among the most urgent tasks we face, because Japan’s economy needs powerful external catalysts to spur change in how we compete at home and for export markets.	完成这两个贸易和投资协议是我们最紧要的任务之一，因为日本经济需要强大的外部催化剂刺激我们改变在国内和出口市场上的竞争方式。


Japan has no alternative other than to do everything necessary and feasible to enhance its labor productivity.	日本别无选择，只有竭尽一切必要和可行的手段提高劳动生产率。


We now have the Japanese public’s support to make all of these changes happen.	如今，我们有了日本人民的支持启动激活所有这些变化。


That support is based on explicit statements of the government’s intentions.	这一支持的基础是政府明确表达它的意图。


For example, it is now well understood – and approved – by voters that, come April 2017, my government will raise the consumption tax.	比如，如今选民能够很好地理解——并批准——我的政府在2017年4月提高消费税。


Until then, we will no longer be bogged down in debating the merits of this decision.	至此，我们不会再为这一决定的利弊争个不可开交。


But we also know that the political space that we have secured is too precious to be squandered.	但我们也知道，我们所确保的政治空间十分宝贵，不能白白浪费。


We must use it single-mindedly to implement reforms that enhance Japan’s long-term growth potential.	我们必须坚定不移地实施强化日本长期增长潜力的改革。


Our country’s global standing depends on it.	我国的全球地位取决于此。


Over the last two years, I have traveled 354,200 miles, visited a total of 62 countries, and conducted 246 one-on-one meetings with heads of state and other national leaders.	在过去两年中，我行程354,200英里，拜访了总共62个国家，与国家元首和其他国家领导人做了246次一对一会晤。


These experiences have convinced me that there is an enormous amount of trust in the world about the path that postwar Japan has taken.	这些经验让我相信，世界人民对于战后日本所采取的道路有着巨大的信任。


In particular, there is no doubt about the norms and principles that our people and our government have long upheld, such as popular sovereignty, respect for human rights, and peace – all pillars of the Japanese constitution.	特别是，日本人民和日本政府长期坚持的范式和原则——主权民有、尊重人权和和平等，它们都是日本宪法的基石——是无可质疑的。


Japan has also gained international credibility for the fact that, for seven decades, its diplomacy has not once sought to coerce or intimidate any other country with threats of military force.	其实年来，日本外交从未通过武力威胁强制或威吓任何一个国家，这一事实也为日本赢得了国际信誉。


Most significant, global trust in Japan reflects the modesty and decorum that countless Japanese have exemplified as they worked to make our economy one of the world’s three largest.	最重要的是，对日本的全球信任也是对无数日本人在努力让日本经济成为世界第三强过程中所表现出来的谦逊和礼貌的体现。


The faith that the world has placed in Japan and its people has been Japanese diplomacy’s most valuable asset.	世界对日本和日本人民充满了信任，这是日本外交最宝贵的资产。


Our mandate from the Japanese people is to ensure that this tradition continues, undiminished, into the future.	日本人民给予我们的使命是确保这一传统在未来无损地延续下去。


That is the oath I will be making as I assume leadership of Japan for the coming electoral term.	这就睡我在新的选举周期所要做的誓言。


For me and my government, the main task ahead – working even harder to restore Japan’s economy – is inseparable from safeguarding our country’s position in the global vanguard of peace, progress, and prosperity.	对我和我的政府来说，眼前的主要任务——更加努力地复兴日本经济——与捍卫日本在全球和���、进步与繁荣事业中的先锋地位是不可分割的。


Japan’s Beheaded Illusions	日本的斩首幻觉


TOKYO – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was on a six-day tour of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine, when the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) posted a video online threatening to murder two Japanese hostages, Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto, if his government did not pay $200 million within 72 hours.	东京—当伊斯兰国在发布网上视频，威胁如果日本政府不在72小时内支付2亿美元赎金就杀掉两名日本人质汤川遥菜和后藤建二时，日本首相安倍晋三正在为期六天的埃及、约旦、黎巴嫩、以色列和巴勒斯坦的访问之旅中。


Abe had no good options.	安倍没有什么好选择。


Indeed, when it comes to protecting its citizens overseas, Japan never does.	事实上，在保护海外公民的事情上，日本从未有所作为。


When Abe failed to bow to its demands, ISIL released a second video claiming that Yukawa, who was seized last August in Syria while reportedly preparing to establish a Japan-based private security company, had been beheaded.	安倍没有向伊斯兰国的要求屈服，而伊斯兰国的随后又放出了第二份视频，称汤川已被斩首。 汤川于去年8月被伊斯兰国抓住，据报道，当时他在叙利亚准备成立一个设在日本的私人保安公司。


Goto, a journalist who traveled to Syria last October to try to secure Yukawa’s release, will supposedly be spared if Japan secures Jordan’s release of a convicted terrorist.	后藤是一名记者，去年10月前往叙利亚试图确保汤川的释放，据称如果日本能确保约旦释放一名被定罪的恐怖分子，他将重获自由。


In fact, Goto’s wife had received an email demanding a ransom of ¥2 billion ($17 million) in December.	事实上，后藤之妻在12月时曾经收到过一份电邮，要求她支付20亿日元赎金。


But it seems that Abe’s Middle East tour presented a greater opportunity for ISIL to make the most of its Japanese hostages.	但似乎安倍的中东之行给了伊斯兰国更好的机会利用其手中的日本人质。


ISIL’s ransom demand was not just a bid for cash; it sent a powerful message.	伊斯兰国的赎金并非只是现金要求； 它还传递了有力的信号。


Just three days before the demand was made, Abe pledged to provide $200 million in non-military humanitarian aid to frontline countries in the fight against ISIL, including Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, all of which have taken in large numbers of refugees.	在伊斯兰国的提出要求前三天，安倍承诺提供2亿美元非军事人道主义援助给位于与伊斯兰国的斗争的第一线的国家，包括约旦、叙利亚、伊拉克和黎巴嫩，这些国家都存在为数巨大的难民。


ISIL explicitly directed the video to both Japan’s government and its citizens, evidently hoping that the largely pacifist Japanese would press their leaders to back down.	伊斯兰国公然将视频释放给日本政府和日本人民看，显然是希望总体持和平主义的日本人会迫使其领导人就范。


And, to some extent, their expectation was met; some opposition members of Japan’s Diet tweeted that Abe should cancel the promised aid.	此外，从某种程度上说，他们的期望得到了满足； 日本国会的一些反对党成员发tweet说安倍应该取消承诺的援助。


Needless to say, Abe’s government ignored their advice.	不消说，安倍政府没有理睬他们的建议。


When the ransom demand did not work, ISIL shifted its approach, but not its goal.	当赎金要求起不到作用时，伊斯兰国转变了方针，但目标未变。


The prisoner whose release it has demanded in exchange for Goto is Sajida al-Rishawi, who faces the death penalty in Jordan for her role in hotel bombings in Amman in 2005.	其作为后藤的交换条件要求释放的囚犯是雷莎维（Sajida al-Rishawi），她因为2005年安曼饭店爆炸事件而在约旦面临死刑。


The group seems to believe that forcing Japan and Jordan to negotiate such a trade could undermine the countries’ longstanding relationship.	伊斯兰国似乎认为迫使日本和约旦谈判这一交易可以削弱两国的长期关系。


ISIL probably knows that Japan has historically placed the safety of its own citizens above all other considerations – even if it meant bowing to terrorists’ demands.	伊斯兰国也许知道，历史上日本将本国公民的安全置于高于一切的地位——即使这意味着向恐怖分子低头。


When the Japanese Red Army hijacked a Japan Airlines flight to Dhaka Airport in Bangladesh in 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda not only paid the $6 million ransom; he also resorted to the “extralegal measure” of handing over imprisoned members of the faction.	1977年，日本赤军（Japanese Red Army）在孟加拉国达卡机场劫持了一家日本航空（Japan Airlines）航班，首相福田赳夫不但支付了600万美元赎金，还采取“法外措施”移交了该组织被关押的成员。


“The weight of a human life,” he declared, “is heavier than the earth itself.”	“人命的分量”福田赳夫说，“比地球还重。 ”


This response stands in stark contrast to Israel’s behavior a year earlier, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Air France flight with 256 passengers.	这一反应与一年前的以色列形成了鲜明对比。 解放巴勒斯坦人民阵线（Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine，PFLP）劫持了一架有256名乘客的法国航空（Air France）航班。


Instead of giving the group what they wanted – the release of 53 militants imprisoned in Israel and four other countries – the Israeli Army launched Operation Thunderbolt, rescuing the hostages at Uganda’s Entebbe Airport.	以色列军方没有满足该组织的要求——释放53名关押在以色列和其他四国的军人——而是发动了霹雳行动（Operation Thunderbolt），在乌干达恩德培（Entebbe）机场解救了人质。


Only three hostages and one Israeli commando – Yonatan Netanyahu, the elder brother of current Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – were killed in the operation.	只有三名人质和一名以色列指挥官——现任以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡之兄约坦纳·内塔尼亚胡（Yonatan Netanyahu）——在行动中被杀。


But Fukuda’s response was not entirely a matter of choice.	但福田的反应并非只关于选择。


Under Japan’s constitution, neither the country’s self-defense forces nor the police would have had legal grounds to travel overseas to rescue endangered Japanese citizens.	根据日本宪法，不论是日本自卫队还是警察部队，都没有依法前往国外解救身处危险的日本公民的权利。


In any case, neither force would have had the training necessary to pull off something like Operation Thunderbolt.	无论如何，自卫队和警察都没有接受过发动霹雳行动这样的任务所需要的训练。


The Dhaka episode was hardly the first time that threats against Japanese citizens had exposed this shortcoming.	达卡事件不是第一次针对日本公民的威胁暴露出这一缺陷。


Seven years earlier, a forerunner to the Japanese Red Army hijacked another Japan Airlines flight – the “Yodogo” – and demanded to be taken to North Korea.	七年前，日本赤军的一位先驱劫持了另一架日本航空航班——“淀”号，要求前往朝鲜。


The Japanese authorities got lucky: When the pilot landed first in South Korea, the hijackers released their 129 hostages in exchange for permission to continue to Pyongyang, where they gained asylum.	日本当局运气不错：当飞行员第一次在韩国降落时，劫匪释放了129名人质以换取继续飞往平壤的许可。 他们在平壤获得了避难身份。


Two years later, three members of the Japanese Red Army, recruited by the PFLP, attacked Tel Aviv’s Lod Airport, killing 26 people and injuring 80 others.	两年后，九名受PFLP招募的日本赤军成员袭击了特拉维夫罗德机场（Lod Airport），杀害26人并致80人受伤。


And, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the wives of the Yodogo hijackers went to Europe, where they are suspected of abducting young Japanese students and taking them to North Korea.	20世纪70年代末、80年代初，淀号劫匪的妻子前往欧洲，被怀疑在那里诱拐年轻日本学生并带往朝鲜。


As ISIL’s actions demonstrate, Japanese are still at risk – and their government still lacks adequate tools to protect them.	伊斯兰国的行为表明，日本人仍面临风险——而他们的政府仍缺少充分的工具保护他们。


Fortunately, Abe – whose efforts to rescue Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea fueled his political rise – seems to recognize the need for change.	幸运的是，安倍——他因为解救被朝鲜诱拐的日本公民的努力而获得了政治提升——认为这一点需要改变。


Since World War II, military considerations have barely factored into Japanese policy, and official development assistance, which began as war reparations, has placed international imperatives above domestic concerns.	自二战以来，军事考虑极少被纳入日本的政策，官方发展援助——一开始是战备——也将国际任务置于国内考虑之上。


But, after playing benefactor to the world for 60 years, Japan’s diplomatic and crisis-management capabilities have been severely weakened.	但是，在为世界做了60年的贡献者后，日本的外交和危机管理能力也遭到了严重削弱。


It is unacceptable for a government to be unable to protect its own citizens.	政府无法保护本国人民是难以接受的。


That is why Abe is determined to amend, or at least reinterpret, Japan’s constitution to allow for the kinds of defense maneuvers that other countries, from Israel to India, employ when their people are threatened.	因此，安倍决心更改——或至少重新解释——日本宪法，以允许采取从以色列到印度诸国在人民受到威胁时所采取的防卫行动。


As US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once put it, a constitution is not a suicide pact.	美国最高法院法官杰克逊（Robert Jackson）曾说，宪法绝不是自杀契约。


Thomas Piketty’s Japanese Tour	托马斯·皮凯蒂的日本之旅


TOKYO – Six months after Thomas Piketty's book Capital in the Twenty-First Century generated so much buzz in the United States and Europe, it has become a bestseller in Japan.	东京—托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）的书《二十一世纪资本论》（Capital in the Twenty-First Century）出版半年来，在美国和欧洲引起了极大的反响，如今，它在日本也成了畅销书。


But vast differences between Japan and its developed counterparts in the West, mean that, like so many other Western exports, Piketty's argument has taken on unique characteristics.	但日本和西方发达国家之间的巨大差异意味着，与许多其他欧洲舶来品（export）一样，皮凯蒂的观点颇有些独特的特征。


Piketty's main assertion is that the leading driver of increased inequality in the developed world is the accumulation of wealth by those who are already wealthy, driven by a rate of return on capital that consistently exceeds the rate of GDP growth.	皮凯蒂的主要主张是，发达国家不平等性加剧的主要原因是“先富”群体的财富积累。 他们的财富积累来自持续超出GDP增长率的资本回报率。


Japan, however, has lower levels of inequality than almost every other developed country.	但是，日本的不平等程度要低于几乎其他所有发达国家。


Indeed, though it has long been an industrial powerhouse, Japan is frequently called the world's most successful communist country.	事实上，尽管日本早已成为工业强国，但常常被称为世界上最成功的共产主义国家。


Japan has a high income-tax rate for the rich (45%), and the inheritance tax rate recently was raised to 55%.	日本对富人征收高额所得税（45%），遗产税率最近也被提高到55%。


This makes it difficult to accumulate capital over generations – a trend that Piketty cites as a significant driver of inequality.	这意味着难以在代际之间积累资本——这一趋势正是皮凯蒂所认为的不平等性的重要来源。


As a result, Japan's richest families typically lose their wealth within three generations.	因此，日本最富裕家庭往往富不过三代。


This is driving a growing number of wealthy Japanese to move to Singapore or Australia, where inheritance taxes are lower.	这驱使越来越多的日本富人迁往遗产税更低的新加坡和澳大利亚。


The familiarity of Japan, it seems, is no longer sufficient to compel the wealthy to endure the high taxes imposed upon them.	似乎熟悉的故土也不足以让日本富豪忍受施加在他们头上的沉重税负了。


In this context, it is not surprising that Japan's “super-rich" remain a lot less wealthy than their counterparts in other countries.	在这样的背景下，毫不奇怪日本“巨富”比其他国家的富豪穷得多。


In the US, for example, the average income of the top one percent of households was $1,264,065 in 2012, according to the investment firm Sadoff Investment Research.	比如，根据萨多夫投资研究公司的数据，2012年美国最顶尖1%家庭的平均收入是1,264,065美元。


In Japan, the top 1% of households earned about $240,000, on average (at 2012 exchange rates).	在日本，最顶尖1%家庭的收入平均为240,000美元（按2012年汇率计算）。


Yet Japanese remain sensitive to inequality, driving even the richest to avoid ostentatious displays of wealth.	但日本人对不平等性仍然相当敏感，即使是最富有的群体也唯恐露富。


One simply does not see the profusion of mansions, yachts, and private jets typical of, say, Beverly Hills and Palm Beach.	在比弗利山和棕榈湾司空见惯的豪宅、游艇和私人飞机在日本很难见到。


For example, Haruka Nishimatsu, former President and CEO of Japan Airlines, attracted international attention a few years ago for his modest lifestyle.	比如，几年前，前日本航空社长兼CEO西松遥因其现代生活方式而引起了国际关注。


He relied on public transportation and ate lunch with employees in the company's cafeteria.	他乘坐公共交通工具出行，在公司食堂和员工一起吃午饭。


By contrast, in China, the heads of national companies are well known for maintaining grandiose lifestyles.	相反，中国的国有企业老总们以生活浮夸著称。


We Japanese have a deeply ingrained stoicism, reflecting the Confucian notion that people do not lament poverty when others lament it equally.	我们日本人有着根深蒂固的清心寡欲传统，这体现出不患寡而患不均的儒家思想。


This willingness to accept a situation, however bad, as long as it affects everyone equally is what enabled Japan to endure two decades of deflation, without a public outcry over the authorities' repeated failure to redress it.	只要人人影响平等，甘愿接受现状的心态让日本安然度过了二十年的通缩，民众并没有因为当局始终无法解决通缩问题而怨声载道。


This national characteristic is not limited to individuals.	这一国民特性不仅仅体现在个人身上。


The government, the central bank, the media, and companies wasted far too much time simply enduring deflation – time that they should have spent working actively to address it.	日本政府、中央银行、媒体和公司浪费了太多时间忍受通缩——它们本应该把这些时间用在积极地解决通缩上的。


Japan finally has a government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, that is committed to ending deflation and reinvigorating economic growth, using a combination of expansionary monetary policy, active fiscal policy, and deregulation.	终于，日本出现了安倍晋三首相领导的、决心结束通缩、重振经济增长的政府。 安倍政府计划用扩张性货币政策、积极的财政政策和去监管化的组合实现这一目标。


Now in its third year, so-called “Abenomics" is showing some positive results.	如今，所谓的“安倍经济学”进入了第三年，正在带来一些积极结果。


Share prices have risen by 220% since Abe came to power in December 2012.	自2012年12月安倍上台以来，股价上涨220%。


And corporate performance has improved – primarily in the export industries, which have benefited from a depreciated yen – with many companies posting their highest profits on record.	公司表现也有所改善——特别是受益于日元贬值的出口部门——许多公司都报告了创纪录的盈利水平。


But Abenomics has yet to benefit everyone.	但安倍经济学尚未惠及每一个人。


In fact, there is a sense that Abe's policies are contributing to rising inequality.	事实上，有一种感觉认为安倍的政策导致不平等性加剧。


That is why Piketty's book appeals to so many Japanese.	这也是皮凯蒂的书吸引了如此多日本人的原因。


For example, though the recent reduction in the corporate-tax rate was necessary to encourage economic growth and attract investment, it seems to many Japanese to be a questionable move at a time when the consumption-tax rate has been increased and measures to address deflation are pushing up prices.	比如，尽管最近的降低公司税的政策对于鼓励经济增长、吸引投资十分必要，但对许多日本人来说，在消费税已经提高、治理通缩的措施正在推高物价的时候，采取这样的动作大有问题。


To address this problem, the companies that enjoy tax cuts should increase their employees' wages to keep pace with rising prices, instead of waiting for market forces to drive them up.	要解决这一问题，享受减税的公司应该提高员工工资以赶上物价上涨，而不是坐等市场力量驱使工资上涨。


Herein lies the unique twist that Piketty's theory takes on in Japan: the disparity is not so much between the super-rich and everyone else, but between large corporations, which can retain earnings and accumulate capital, and the individuals who are being squeezed in the process.	皮凯蒂的理论在日本所遇到的独特矛盾就在这里：富豪阶层和其他阶层的差距没有那么大，但大公司（可以留存利润和积累资本）和个人（在此过程中惨遭挤压）之间的差距很大。


Japanese Lessons for China’s Currency	Japanese Lessons for China’s Currency


SHANGHAI – The question of how much China’s currency should appreciate to rebalance its trade has become a global hot-button issue.	上海-中国的货币应该升值多少才能重新平衡贸易的问题已经成为全球热议的一个话题。


But the answers have been all over the map, with some finding that the yuan is not undervalued at all, while others argue that it should appreciate against the dollar by more than 30%.	但是对此的回答已经都摆到台面上来了。 有人认为人民币的价值根本没有被低估，而另外一些人则认为它应该对美元升值超过30%。


Clearly, there must be major differences in the macroeconomic models used to produce such a wide range of estimates.	他们的预测如此不同显然是因为他们所使用的宏观经济模型存在巨大差异。


But the one thing about which everyone seems to agree is the theoretically and empirically unjustified assumption that an equilibrium exchange rate actually exists.	但是他们似乎都有一个共同点，就是在理论上和凭借经验主义不恰当地假设确实存在一个平衡的汇率。


The theoretical problem is simple: a country’s trade balance depends on a lot more than the value of its currency in the foreign exchange markets.	理论上的问题很简单：对一个国家的贸易平衡产生影响的因素远远不止它的货币在外汇市场上的价值。


Interest rates, employment, aggregate demand, and technological and institutional innovation all play a role.	利率、就业率、总需求以及技术和制度的革新都是影响贸易平衡的因素。


As the economist Joan Robinson pointed out in 1947, just about any exchange rate will be the equilibrium value for some combination of these other variables. The equilibrium exchange rate, she famously argued, is a chimera.	正如经济学家琼·罗宾逊夫人在1947年所指出的，几乎所有汇率都是这些其他变量的某种混合体的平衡价值。 她的一个有名的观点就是，所谓平衡的汇率完全是一个妄想。


Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence that trade imbalances can be resolved through exchange rate changes alone is unconvincing.	经验主义的证据认为贸易的不平衡只须通过改变汇率就可以得到解决也毫不奇怪地无法令人信服。


In the case of China, the most useful precedent is probably that of Japan in the period from the end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate regime in August, 1971, to the collapse of its “bubble economy” in 1990.	在中国的问题上，最有用的先例也许是从1971年8月布列敦固定汇率机制的终结到1990年“泡沫经济”的破灭这段时间里的日本。


During that period, the yen’s value more than doubled against the dollar, rising from its original fixed rate of 360 to 144 at the end of 1989.	在那段时间里，日元对美元升值了一倍多，从最初360日元兑1美元的固定汇率暴涨到1989年底的144日元兑1美元。


Yet, even as Japan’s exports became much more expensive in dollar terms and its imports much cheaper in yen, its trade surplus rose from $6 billion in 1971 to $80 billion in 1989.	然而，即便日本出口的产品按美元计算变得越来越贵而它的进口产品按日元变得越来越便宜，它的贸易顺差还是从1971年60亿美元一路飙升到1989年的800亿美元。


For two decades, expectations that an appreciating yen would restore external balance were repeatedly disappointed.	在这20年时间里，对于日元升值将会恢复对外贸易平衡的预期一次又一次地破灭了。


At the time of the December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement, 308 yen to the dollar was supposed to do the trick.	在1971年12月达成“史密斯协定”时，308日元兑1美元被认为就可以产生预期的效果了。


Fourteen years later, during the Plaza Accord negotiations, the Japanese argued for an eventual level of 200-210, while some US Treasury officials thought the final target should be as high as 165-170.	14年后，在“广场协议”的谈判期间，日本人争辩说最终的水平应该在200-210日元兑1美元左右，而美国财政部的官员则认为最终的目标应该高达165-170日元兑1美元。


At the end of the 1980’s, some analysts thought rates as high as 120 might finally produce the long-sought equilibrium.	八十年代末，一些分析师认为汇率达到120日元兑1美元可能会最终带来人们期待已久的平衡。


Yet, as Japan entered the “lost decade” of the 1990’s, its exports continued to grow faster than its imports.	然而，当日本进入“失去的十年”的九十年代，它的出口增速依然超过它的进口增速。


Japan’s trade surplus peaked only in 1994, at $144 billion, just a few months before the yen’s April 1995 all-time high of 79.75.	日本的贸易顺差在1994年达到最高峰的1440亿美元，几个月后，日元兑美元的汇率也在1995年4月达到历史最高值，79. 75日元兑1美元。


In retrospect, it is easy to see why none of these supposed equilibrium exchange rates delivered external balance.	现在回想起来，我们很容易理解为什么所有这些假设的平衡汇率都没有带来对外贸易的平衡。


As the yen appreciated, Japan responded not by exporting less but by improving productivity and quality control through plant and equipment investment and innovations in factory management, making possible rapid growth in exports of high-value-added products.	面对日元的升值，日本作出的回应并不是减少出口，而是通过工厂和设备投资以及工厂管理的革新来提高生产力以及加强质量控制，使得高附加值产品的出口快速增长。


Exchange-rate equilibrium calculations from the 1970’s and 1980’s, which could only have been based on the export sector’s contemporary structure, naturally would have little relevance subsequently.	对从二十世纪七十年代到八十年代的汇率平衡的计算只能基于出口产业当时的结构来进行，自然对以后的状况在很大程度上就缺少了关联性。


The same is true of calculations at the beginning of the 1990’s, which would have forecast Japanese import growth based on extrapolations from the high GDP growth rates of the previous 40 years rather than on the decade of stagnation that ensued.	同样的情况也出现在对二十世纪九十年代初期汇率平衡的计算上，它根据前面40年很高的GDP增长率而不是后面即将出现的十年的停滞期来预测日本的出口增长。


In China, changes in the export sector’s structure similar to those observed in Japan are now taking place.	中国也正在发生与当时的日本类似的出口产业结构的转变。


These changes are likely to make today’s attempts to find an equilibrium yuan-dollar exchange rate seem just as chimerical in hindsight as previous calculations of the yen-dollar equilibrium rate.	这些转变可能使今天人们寻求平衡的人民币兑美元汇率的努力在事后看起来也许像以前对人民币兑美元平衡汇率的计算一样完全是一种妄想。


For the 30 years since the beginning of China’s economic reforms, Chinese industry has achieved impressive efficiency gains by adopting new technologies and realizing economies of scale, leading to a huge expansion in locally made products suitable for export.	自从中国开始经济改革的30年来，中国的工业已经通过吸收新技术和实现规模经济而大大提高了效率，从而使越来越多国产的产品适合用来出口。


While an appreciating currency might eventually drive labor-intensive manufacturers out of business, if Japan’s economic history is any guide, they are likely to be replaced by producers of things like ships, machine tools, semiconductors, and doubtless new products yet to be invented.	尽管货币的升值可能最终将劳动密集型的制造商挤出市场，如果我们可以将日本的经济发展史作为参考的话，它们很可能会被船舶、机械工具、半导体以及无疑今后将被发明的产品的制造商所取代。


The equilibrium yuan-dollar rate is a chimera not because China’s trade could never be balanced, but because the exchange rate alone does not determine equilibrium.	我们说找到平衡的人民币兑美元汇率是一种妄想并非是因��中国的贸易就永远无法取得平衡了，而是因为单单依靠汇率无法决定平衡的问题。


The structure of the entire economy matters, too.	整个经济的结构也是重要的因素。


As this is constantly evolving in unpredictable ways, there is no reason to expect that the assumptions underlying any particular macroeconomic model will ever remain valid long enough for its steady-state solution to be achieved in practice.	而它是不断地以无法预测的方式演变的，我们没有理由认为根据任何宏观经济模型进行的预测会在它的稳定状态解决方案在实践中得到实现时依然保持有效。


Abenomics for Asia	亚洲的安倍经济学


TOKYO – Once again, Japan is Asia’s odd country out.	东京—日本再一次成了亚洲的另类国家。


For two decades, as one Asian economy after another boomed, Japan’s economy remained virtually stagnant.	过去二十年中，亚洲国家一个又一个迎来了繁荣，但日本经济始终陷于事实停滞之中。


Now, with GDP growth in Asia’s two giants, China and India, slowing precipitously – a decline that appears to be contributing to diminishing economic performance in much of the rest of Asia – Japan is recording its strongest growth since its 1980’s boom.	如今，在亚洲两大巨头中国和印度GDP增速显著放缓、并导致亚洲其他许多国家经济表现低迷的情况下，日本却迎来了自1980年代繁荣以来最强劲的经济增长。


But, just as Japan’s post-war economic model became the template for the Asian economic miracles of recent decades, the reforms currently being implemented by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (“Abenomics”) may offer Asian economies a path back to strong growth.	但是，正如日本战后经济模式成为近几十年来亚洲经济奇迹的样板后，首相安倍晋三正在实施的改革（“安倍经济学”）或许能给亚洲经济体带来一条重回强劲增长之路。


If the fallout from China’s slowdown is not to hit the entire region and jeopardize the economic integration that has already taken place, Asia’s governments – beginning with China – will need to embrace similar reforms.	如果不想让中国减速的影响波及整个地区、破坏已经开始的经济一体化进程，那么亚洲各国政府——从中国开始——也需要采取类似的改革。


How did Asia’s boom fade so quickly?	亚洲的繁荣为何消失的如此之快？


Economics is supposedly a cold-blooded subject.	经济学被认为是一门冷血的学科。


Yet successful economies are prone to one of the most dangerous emotions of all: self-satisfaction, that excessive pride that Confucius condemned, which makes governments wary of reforming what has been a winning model, even when stresses begin to appear.	但成功的经济容易受到最危险的心理之一的影响：自满，儒家所谓满招损是也。 这种心态让政府害怕改革成功的模式，即使压力已经开始显现。


Japan has paid a high price for this attitude.	日本为这一心理付出过沉重代价。


Even after its property bubble burst 24 years ago, the authorities continued to believe that the country’s growth model needed no adjustment.	24年前，即使其房地产泡沫已经破裂，当局仍认为日本增长模式不需要调整。


The result was two lost decades of deflation and introspection before Japan finally embraced the reforms needed to kick-start a new, more open – and hence more vibrant – economic model.	结果是失去的二十年、通缩和反省，此后，日本才终于采取了开启新的、更开放的、因而也更有活力的经济模式所必须的改革。


China and India, it seems, have also succumbed to economic hubris.	中国和印度似乎也陷入了经济自大之中。


Three decades of success in China, and a decade in which India supposedly overcame the old, slow, “Hindu rate of growth,” are ending with both economies slowing precipitously.	中国的成功的三十年，以及印度被认为克服了昔日缓慢的“印度增长率”的十年正在走向终点——经济增长显著放缓。


And both are slowing for the same reason: stalled reform, which is a direct result of governments being so satisfied with today’s conditions that they fail to address tomorrow’s rising dangers.	两国放缓的原因是一样的：改革停滞不前，而这又是政府自满于今天的条件，以至于没有去解决逐渐显现的明天的危险的结果。


China’s government continues to turn a blind eye toward banks that lend to the politically well connected, or that tolerate companies – mostly state-owned – with poor financial discipline.	中国政府仍对向银行的某些行为睁一只眼闭一只眼，包括向政治关系户贷款和容忍借款公司——主要是国企——不遵守财务纪律。


Indeed, total public- and private-sector debt in China is now around 200% of GDP, up by more than one-third in five years.	事实上，中国的公私部门债务总量已达到了GDP的200%左右，而五年前只有三分之一。


Reckless lending is undermining efficient allocation of capital and preventing China from drawing a line under the investment- and export-led growth model of the past three decades and basing future growth more on domestic consumption.	鲁莽放贷破坏了资本的有效配置，也阻碍了中国摆脱过去三十年的投资和出口拉动增长模式、迈向内需拉动的未来增长模式。


Likewise, India’s government, having embraced economic liberalization, has essentially pulled back from it in recent years.	类似地，实施经济自由化的印度政府在最近几年事实上有所倒退。


Plans to allow foreign investment in retailing and other key economic sectors have been put on hold.	允许外资投资零售业和其他重要经济部门的计划被搁置。


In critical industries – mobile communications and mining are perhaps the two most important examples – privatization has been corrupted by cronyism.	在关键产业——最重要的要数移动通信业和矿业——私有化时常受到裙带主义的腐蚀。


Moreover, India remains an inward-looking economy that attracts relatively little foreign investment and plays a much smaller role in world trade than it should.	此外，印度仍是一个内向的经济，吸引的外国投资相对较少，在世界贸易中所起的作用也与其地位不符。


Notwithstanding its renowned software industry, India plays little part in the production chains that underpin Asia’s regional trade patterns.	虽然其软件产业举世闻名，但印度在作为亚洲地区贸易模式基础的生产链上作用甚微。


The result – as visible as it was predictable – has been a sharp slowdown in economic growth.	其结果——不难预料——是经济增长的大幅放缓。


To be fair, there is a growing recognition in some countries of the need for change.	实事求是地说，一些国家越来越认识到需要改变。


The need to restore economic dynamism was the focus of South Korea’s presidential election in 2012, which brought the country’s first-ever female president, Park Geun-hye, to power.	在你2012年韩国总统大选中，重塑经济活力的需要成了竞选的焦点，也是该国首任女总统朴槿惠当选的关键。


Today, the country is gripped by an important debate about how to reform the chaebol, the mammoth industrial conglomerates that did so much to lift the country out of poverty and into the front ranks of the world’s economies.	如今，困扰韩国的一个问题是关于如何改革财阀的重要争论。 财阀是巨型产业集团，曾是韩国走出贫困、名列世界经济前茅的中坚力量。


Park’s status as the daughter of former President Park Chung-hee, who put the chaebol at the center of South Korea’s economy, could give her the credibility needed to recast their economic role.	朴槿惠的父亲、前总统朴正熙使财阀成为韩国经济的核心，这给了朴槿惠必要的信誉来改变财阀的经济作用。


Elsewhere in Asia, including in China, the debate is only beginning.	在亚洲其他地区，包括中国，争论才刚刚开始。


But progress on reform, particularly in finance, must come quickly, because in most countries – India is the main exception – the demographic window of a growing working-age population is closing, if not already shut.	但改革方面的进展，特别是金融改革，必须加快，因为在大部分国家——印度是显著例外——工作年龄人口增长期即使没有结束，也正在接近尾声。


It is not necessarily bad for Asia’s traditionally high savings rates to fall; after all, consumption typically rises with an aging population.	亚洲传统的高储蓄率下降未必是件坏事； 毕竟，消费通常会随人口老化而增长。


But savings will need to be allocated far more efficiently than in the past.	但储蓄需要得到比从前更有效地配置。


Japan’s lost decades provide a grim lesson of the economic cost of neglecting such reform.	日本失去的二十年为忽略这类改革的经济成本提供了惨痛教训。


Moreover, borrowing in US dollars to finance current investment spending – as many emerging economies have done in recent years, as the US Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing flooded emerging markets with cheap funds – is no substitute.	此外，借入美元为当前投资支��融资——在美联储用量化宽松向新兴市场注入大量廉价资金的背景下，许多新兴经济体最近今年中都这么做了——并不是替代方案。


Indonesia, Thailand, and others are now finding it difficult to service these loans as their exchange rates fall against the dollar in the wake of the Fed’s plans to “taper” its policy.	如今，随着美联储计划“逐渐退出”量化宽松，印尼、泰国和其他国家货币对美元汇率的再次下降， 偿付美元贷款变得十分困难。


Indeed, the debt build-up is so large that markets now fear a repeat of Asia’s financial crisis.	事实上，这些国家的美元债务数量之大已使市场担心亚洲金融危机会重演。


The Japanese precedent matters all the more, given that, 16 years after the Asian financial crisis nearly wiped out decades of hard-earned growth, Asia’s banks and capital markets remain inefficient.	16年前，亚洲金融危机曾经将几十年辛苦建立的增长摧毁殆尽，16年后，亚洲的银行和资本市场仍然效率低下，这让日本的先例变得愈加意义重大了。


Asia’s economies need deep, well-regulated capital markets, so that savings can be allocated to where they yield the highest returns.	亚洲经济体需要深化的、监管良好的资本市场，以使储蓄可以配置在能产生最高回报的地方。


Instead, today’s poorly regulated financial sectors – China is the biggest culprit – misprice capital.	相反，如今监管不力的金融部门——尤以中国为甚——导致了资本定价错误。


Moreover, banks are too dominant: Asia (including Japan) accounts for more than half of the world’s population but barely a quarter of global capital-market capitalization.	此外，银行主导力太大：亚洲（包括日本）拥有世界人口的一大半，但资本市场市值只占全球的四分之一。


Sixteen years ago, the Asian financial crisis erupted, following the Thai government’s decision to float the baht in the face of speculative attacks.	十六年前，在投机冲击面前，泰国政府决定泰铢自由浮动，亚洲金融危机就此爆发。


The response of governments to that crisis has shaped much of the region’s economic policymaking ever since.	各国政府对这场危机的应对措施在很大程度上决定了此后亚洲地区的经济决策。


If Asia is to avoid another crisis on a similar scale, or lost decades of growth, its governments will need to embrace the type of all-encompassing reforms that Japan is undertaking.	如果亚洲想避免类似程度的危机再次发生，或避免几十年的无增长时期，那么其政府就需要实施像日本正在做的全面改革。


Abenomics, it seems, is for everyone.	照此看，安倍经济学人人应该效而仿之。


Keynes Reborn	凯恩斯重生


TOKYO – In the fourth century, Japan’s emperor looked out from a small mountain near his palace and noticed that something was missing: smoke rising from people’s kitchens.	东京—公元四世纪，日本天皇从皇宫附近的一座小山丘上远眺，注意到少了点什么：寻常人家升起的炊烟。


While there were some faint trails here and there, it was clear that people were facing such harsh economic conditions that they could barely purchase any food to cook.	尽管在一些地方还有一些淡淡的烟迹，但显然人民正面临着严酷的经济环境，几乎找不到任何用来做饭的东西。


Appalled at the circumstances of the Japanese people, who were largely peasants, the emperor decided to suspend taxation.	天皇被日本人民（大部分是农民）的悲惨遭遇所震惊，决定黜免税赋。


Three years later, the palace gates were in disrepair and the stars shone through leaks in the roof.	三年后，宫门年久失修，星光可以透过屋顶的漏洞照射到室内。


But a glimpse from the same mountain revealed steady plumes of smoke rising from the peasants’ huts.	但站在同一座山丘上远眺，可以看到农居中升起的炊烟不绝如缕。


The tax moratorium had worked.	免赋起了作用。


The people were so grateful to the emperor – who became known as Nintoku (Emperor with Virtue and Benevolence) – that they volunteered to repair his palace.	人民对天皇感恩戴德——他被称为“仁德”天皇——自愿为天皇修缮皇宫。


Almost two millennia later, the Japanese people are, again, under economic pressure.	近两千年过去了，如今日本人民再一次面临经济压力。


A steep hike in the consumption tax in 2014, together with another hike expected in the near future, has undermined household spending.	2014年消费税剧增，预计不久还将再一次上调，这打压了家庭消费。


As in the Nintoku story, it is the wealth of the people – not that of the government – that dictates consumption.	和仁德天皇的故事中一样，决定消费的是人民——而不是政府——的财富。


Of course, the wealth of the government does play a role in economic performance.	当然，政府的财富对经济表现也确实起着作用。


But excessive concern about government’s solvency can cause the private sector to be reluctant to spend.	但过于担心政府的偿债能力可能导致私人部门不愿花钱。


That is what has happened in Japan.	这就是日本所发生的事情。


Excessive government debt can be highly damaging.	政府负债过高可能带来严重后果。


In inflationary periods, high outstanding government liabilities impair fiscal policy, because higher taxes are needed to finance the same level of real government spending.	在通胀时期，政府未偿还债务高企会影响到财政政策，因为需要加税才能维持同样水平真实政府支出。


Making matters worse, governments can be tempted to inflate their debts away – a power that has been abused since the age of monarchs, resulting in a uniform inflation tax on asset holders.	更糟糕的是，政府可能想通过通胀减少债务——在君主制时代，这一伎俩经常被滥用，形成对资产持有者的一刀切的通货膨胀税。


But large public debts are not always bad for an economy, just as efforts to rein them in are not always beneficial.	但庞大的公共债务对于经济并非总是坏事，限制债务的措施也并非总是好事。


The focus on a balanced budget in the United States, for example, has led some elements of the Republican Party to block normal functions of state and even federal authorities, supposedly in the name of fiscal discipline.	比如，美国对平衡预算的关注导致共和党的某些人打着财政纪律的名义阻挠州乃至联邦机构正常运转。


Likewise, the eurozone’s recovery from the 2008 financial crisis has been held back by strict fiscal rules that limit member countries’ fiscal deficits to 3% of GDP.	类似地，欧元区在2008年金融危机后的恢复也受到严格财政规则的掣肘，这些规则规定成员国财政赤字水平不能超过GDP的3%。


To understand the relationship between public debt and economic performance, we should look to the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), a macroeconomic doctrine that has lately been receiving considerable attention.	要理解公共债务和经济表现之间的关系，应该着眼于物价水平的财政理论（FTPL），这是最近才引起广泛关注的宏观经济学思想。


In August, at the annual conference of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Princeton’s Christopher Sims provided a lucid explanation of the theory.	在8月份的怀俄明州杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）央行行长年会上，普林斯顿大学的克里斯托弗·西姆斯（Christopher Sims）清晰地解释了这一轮。


As Sims explained, contrary to popular belief, aggregate demand and the price level (inflation) are not dictated only – or even primarily – by monetary policy.	西姆斯解释说，与流行的信念相反，总需求和物价水平（通货膨胀）不是完全由——甚至不是主要由——货币政策决定。


Instead, they are determined by the country’s net wealth and the liabilities of the central bank and the government.	相反，它们由一国的净财富以及央行和政府的负债决定。


When government deficits are lower, investing in government debt becomes more attractive.	当政府赤字较低时，投资于政府经济债务就变得较有吸引力。


As the private sector purchases more of that debt, demand for goods and services falls, creating deflationary pressure.	随着私人部门购买更多的政府债务，商品和服务的需求就会下降，形成通缩压力。


If the central bank attempts to spur inflation by expanding its own balance sheet through monetary expansion and by lowering interest rates, it will cause the budget deficit to fall further, reinforcing the cycle.	如果央行尝试用扩表（通过货币扩张）和降低利率来刺激通胀，就会导致预算赤字进一步降低，从而强化这一循环。


In such a context, Sims argued, monetary policy alone would not be adequate to raise inflation; fiscal policy that increases the budget deficit would also be necessary.	再这样的环境下，西姆斯指出，光靠货币政策不足以提高通货膨胀； 增加预算赤字的财政政策也必不可少。


The FTPL provides a clear diagnosis of the Japanese economy’s problems – and points to solutions.	FTPL为日本的经济问题提供了清晰的诊断——和解决要点。


When Abenomics was introduced in 2012, a massive injection of liquidity by the Bank of Japan was supposed to offset deflation.	2012年安倍经济学开始实施时，日本银行注入大量流行性以抵消通缩。


But, as both traditional Keynesians and FTPL followers would note, quantitative easing – which amounts to an exchange of money for its close substitutes (zero-interest bonds) – becomes less effective in stimulating demand over time.	但是，如传统凯恩斯主义者和FTPL派所指出的，量化宽松——即用货币交换近似货币的替代品（零息债券）——对需求的刺激作用随时间降低。


Add to that Japan’s fiscal tightening – and, especially, its consumption-tax hike – and it is no surprise that demand has remained repressed.	此外，日本还采取了财政紧缩——特别是提高消费税的政策——毫不奇怪需求仍然饱受压制。


More recently, Japan’s negative-interest-rate policy worked rather well to push down market interest rates.	随后，日本的负利率政策相当出色地压低了市场利率。


But the policy also impaired the private sector’s balance sheet, because it functioned as a tax on financial institutions.	但它也损害了私人部门的资产负债表，因为它相当于对金融机构征税。


As a result, it has failed to provide the intended boost.	结果，它没能带来预想中的提振效果。


During periods of recession or stagnation, additional interest payments by banks would burden the economy, whereas public debt may enable the economy to reach full employment.	在衰退或停滞期，银行利息支付的增加会成为经济的负担，而公共债务可以让经济实现充分就业。


(Neo-Ricardians would argue that public debt in the hands of people is worthless, because consumers internalize their children’s future tax payments by holding debt certificates.	（新李嘉图学派会说，人民手里的公共债务毫无价值可言，因为消费者通过持有债务凭证将子女的未来税收支出内部化了。


But, as David Ricardo himself recognized, people are rarely that smart.)	但是，如李嘉图本人所认识到的，人民很少这么聪明。 ）


John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,which argued for active fiscal policies, was published in 1936.	提出要实施积极财政政策的约翰·凯恩斯的《就业、利息与货币通论》出版于1936年。


Forty years later, a counterrevolution took hold, reflecting sharp criticism of fiscal activism.	四十年后，一场反向革命成为主流，尖锐地批评财政积极主义。


After another 40 years, Keynes’ key idea is back, in the form of the FTPL.	又过了40年，凯恩斯的主要思想以FTPL的形式卷土重来。


This may be old wine in a new bottle, but old wine often rewards those who are willing to taste it.	这也许是新瓶装旧酒，但如果你愿意尝试的话，陈酿常常是非常可人的。


Shinzo Abe’s Pivot To Asia	安倍晋三的亚洲支点


LONDON – Over the past year, relations among East Asia’s three most successful economies – Japan, South Korea, and China – have been slowly but steadily improving.	伦敦——过去一年中，东亚三大最成功经济体——日本、韩国和中国——之间的关系一直在缓慢而稳步地攀升。


This is notable, because their ties with one another have never been easy or smooth.	这一点应该引起注意，因为上述三国间的彼此关系从未呈现过顺利和轻松。


The history of the twentieth century and their longer-term rivalries have seen to that.	二十世纪和它们长期对抗的历史造就了现在这种状况。


This August, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gives a major speech to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, he has a chance either to accelerate the rapprochement or bring it to a halt.	今年八月，日本首相安倍晋三在二战结束70周年纪念仪式上的致辞要么将加速和解、要么将结束和解进程。


Given his rightist pedigree and revisionist views about Japan’s wartime history, the region is bracing itself for a new bout of diplomatic turbulence surrounding his address.	鉴于他的右翼血统和对日本侵略史的修正主义看法，该地区恐怕要准备面对由他讲话引发的新一轮外交动荡。


Abe should remember that it is within his power to bring about a different outcome.	安倍应该记住他能够带来截然不同的结果。


And, though not delivering a speech at all might have been the most prudent course, he can still use the occasion to reinforce an image of his country as a positive force in Asia.	而且，虽然根本不发表讲话可能是最明智的对策，他仍然可以利用这个机会巩固日本作为亚洲积极力量的国家形象。


He should take pains to present Japan as a strong country that looks forward rather than backward, and that wants to contribute to economic development, peace, and security around the world – and especially within Asia.	他应当煞费苦心地向世界证明日本是一个展望未来、而非纠结过去的大国，他应当让人们看到日本希望促进世界和平、安全与经济发展——尤其是在亚洲内部。


During the 1960s and 1970s, after Japan’s economy had recovered, the country dealt with its wartime history in large part by becoming a generous donor of overseas aid throughout Asia, including China.	20世纪六七十年代日本经济恢复后，该国主要通过遍布亚洲、包括中国在内的慷慨的海外援助实现对其侵略史的救赎。


Abe should place this type of generosity of spirit and action at the center of his speech.	安倍应当把这种慷慨的精神和行动作为他讲话的核心内容。


The power of generosity can be disarming.	慷慨的力量可以熄灭怒火。


In 2007, I visited the “Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression,” an institution whose name reflects the sentiment expressed by the bulk of its exhibits.	2007年，我参观了“中国人民抗日战争纪念馆”，这个纪念馆大部分展品所表达的情绪都体现在它的名称当中。


So it was a pleasant surprise to see that the last exhibit on display was a wall of items acknowledging Japan’s aid and investment in China in recent decades.	因此我抑制不住惊喜地看到最后一件展品是承认日本近几十年来对华援助和投资的展览墙。


Last month, Abe showed that he may be thinking along these lines when he announced a Japanese plan to invest $110 billion in infrastructure projects in Asia over the next five years.	上个月，安倍在宣布一项未来五年对亚洲基础设施1，100亿美元的投资计划时显示他可能接受了上述思路。


The trouble was in the timing.	问题在于宣布的时间点。


Both the United States and Japan have made the mistake of refusing to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and criticizing the more than 50 countries – including the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – that have done so.	无论美国还是日本都犯下了拒绝加入以中国为首的亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）的错误，更有甚者，它们还批评包括英国、德国、法国在内的五十多个国家选择加入。


That stance has left both countries isolated and looking somewhat churlish.	这一立场已经使上述两国陷入孤立并显得缺乏教养。


For Japan, it has had the additional effect of making its investment announcement look like a tit-for-tat response to the AIIB, even to the extent of topping the bank’s initial capitalization of $100 billion.	对日本而言，这还使上述投资公告看起来像是针锋相对回击亚投行的对策，甚至不惜到超过该行1，000亿美元初始投资的程度。


Abe would do even more damage to the region’s perception of Japan were he to use his speech to try to mollify right-wing supporters.	安倍将进一步损害日本的地区形象，如果试图利用讲话来安抚右翼支持者。


Chinese and Koreans, in particular, will be incensed should he avoid overt apologies for Japan’s behavior during World War II or question criticism of its conduct at the time, such as the Imperial Japanese Army’s sexual enslavement of Korean “comfort women.”	如果他回避就日本二战期间所作所为公开道歉或质疑对日本当时罪行——如日本皇军性奴役韩国“慰安妇”——的批评，那么尤其会激怒中韩两国。


Instead, Abe should take a leaf from his speech to the US Congress in April.	相反，安倍应该从他四月对美国国会的讲话中撷取部分内容。


There, he described a “deep repentance in his heart” when he visited a memorial to American soldiers who died in World War II, to whom he offered his “eternal condolences.”	他在参观二战死难美国老兵纪念馆时表达了“发自内心的深深忏悔”和对死难者的永恒悼念。


Concerning Japan’s actions in Asia, however, Abe pledged only “to uphold the views expressed by the previous prime ministers in this regard,” without repeating their actual apologies.	但在日本亚洲侵略问题上，安倍只承诺“继续坚持前任首相在这方面表达的观点”，而拒绝重复他们实际的道歉内容。


In August, Abe should reiterate – and go beyond – his predecessors’ statements.	今年八月，安倍应该重申——并且超越——前任首相的声明。


Words similar to those he used to address the subject of America’s war dead would demonstrate that Japan does not intend to rewrite history, and that Abe feels repentant toward not only its US ally, but also its neighbors in Asia.	类似在美国战争死难者问题上做用的措辞能够表明日本并不打算改写历史，而且安倍不仅在美国盟友、而且也在亚洲邻国面前表示悔过。


Abe would then have an opportunity to pivot from the past to the future by declaring Japan’s intention to be generous and constructive.	安倍随后将有机会通过宣布日本慷慨且富于建设性的意愿而从过去转向未来。


He could talk about the sort of Asia he would like to help build and describe the kind of regional institutions that he believes are necessary.	他可以谈谈自己希望建立的亚洲秩序，并描述他认为必要的地区机构。


One dramatic way to seize the initiative would be to build on Japan’s existing initiatives in post-conflict peace-building with a proposal for an inclusive plan for Asia’s defense and security.	一个抢占先机的戏剧性方法是利用日本战后建立的现有和平计划，就亚洲防务和安全问题提出一项包容性计划提案。


Such a scheme would include joint military exercises and information-sharing arrangements not just with South Korea and the US, but also with China, India, the Southeast Asian countries.	这样的方案不仅包括与韩美两国、也包括与中国、印度和东南亚国家的联合军演和信息共享安排。


Such a proposal might turn out to be too bold to realize; it would, after all, come up against Asia’s very real divisions.	这样的计划可能终因过于大胆而无法实现； 毕竟它需要克服亚洲现实存在的分歧。


But as a gesture for peace and a better future, it certainly would allow Japan to claim the moral high ground.	但作为对和平及美好未来的姿态，它无疑将使日本占据道德制高点。


And that is where the country should aim to be.	而这恰恰应该是日本的目标。


Economic Policy Turned Inside Out	由内转外的经济政策


NEW HAVEN – The world economy is in the grips of a dangerous delusion.	纽黑文—世界经济陷入了危险的错觉。


As the great boom that began in the 1990s gave way to an even greater bust, policymakers resorted to the timeworn tricks of financial engineering in an effort to recapture the magic.	20世纪90年代开始的大繁荣已经转变为规模更大的萧条，决策者求助过时的金融工程，妄图重获魔法。


In doing so, they turned an unbalanced global economy into the Petri dish of the greatest experiment in the modern history of economic policy.	这使得失衡的全球经济成了现代经济政策史上国模最大实验的“培养皿”。


They were convinced that it was a controlled experiment.	决策者认为，这是一个受控实验。


Nothing could be further from the truth.	大错特错。


The rise and fall of post-World War II Japan heralded what was to come.	二战后日本的兴衰预示会发生什么。


The growth miracle of an ascendant Japanese economy was premised on an unsustainable suppression of the yen.	欣欣向荣的日本经济增长奇迹有一个前提，即不可持续地抑制日元。


When Europe and the United States challenged this mercantilist approach with the 1985 Plaza Accord, the Bank of Japan countered with aggressive monetary easing that fueled massive asset and credit bubbles.	1985年，欧洲和美国以广场协议挑战这一重商主义方针，日本银行的回应是激进的货币宽松，这引起了巨大的资产和信用泡沫。


The rest is history.	后来的事历史书上都有。


The bubbles burst, quickly bringing down Japan’s unbalanced economy.	泡沫破裂，立刻拖累了失衡的日本经济。


With productivity having deteriorated considerably – a symptom that had been obscured by the bubbles – Japan was unable to engineer a meaningful recovery.	生产率严重恶化——此前这一症候被泡沫掩盖——因此日本无法实现有意义的复苏。


In fact, it still struggles with imbalances today, owing to its inability or unwillingness to embrace badly needed structural reforms – the so-called “third arrow” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic recovery strategy, known as “Abenomics.”	事实上，日本至今仍在与失衡作斗争，因为它无法或不愿采取急需的结构改革——即首相安倍晋三的被称为“A安倍经济学”的经济复苏战略的所谓的“第三支箭”。


Despite the abject failure of Japan’s approach, the rest of the world remains committed to using monetary policy to cure structural ailments.	尽管日本的方针是一场彻头彻尾的失败，但世界其他国家仍铁心要用货币政策解决结构性问题。


The die was cast in the form of a seminal 2002 paper by US Federal Reserve staff economists, which became the blueprint for America’s macroeconomic stabilization policy under Fed Chairs Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke.	美联储专职经济学家的一份2002年的讨论论文奠定了这一方针的基础，该论文也成为美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）和本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）治下美国宏观经济稳定政策的蓝图。


The paper’s central premise was that Japan’s monetary and fiscal authorities had erred mainly by acting too timidly.	该论文的核心假设是日本经济和财政当局的主要错误是动作太胆小。


Bubbles and structural imbalances were not seen as the problem.	泡沫和结构性失衡没有被视为问题。


Instead, the paper’s authors argued that Japan’s “lost decades” of anemic growth and deflation could have been avoided had policymakers shifted to stimulus more quickly and with far greater force.	相反，论文作者认为，如果决策者更迅速、更强力地采取刺激手段，日本增长缓慢、通货紧缩的“失去的十年”或许可以避免。


If only it were that simple.	要是如此简单就好了。


In fact, the focus on speed and force – the essence of what US economic policymakers now call the “big bazooka” – has prompted an insidious mutation of the Japanese disease.	事实上，关注速度和力度——美国决策者现在所谓的“巨型火箭炮”的关键——促使“日本病”发生了恶性突变。


The liquidity injections of quantitative easing (QE) have shifted monetary-policy transmission channels away from interest rates to asset and currency markets.	量化宽松所注入的流动性将货币政策传导渠道从利率转变为货币市场。


That is considered necessary, of course, because central banks have already pushed benchmark policy rates to the once-dreaded “zero bound.”	当然，这被认为是必要的，因为中央银行已经将基准政策利率降到了曾经令人生畏的“零区间”。


But fear not, claim advocates of unconventional monetary policy.	但是不要慌张，非常规货币政策鼓吹者宣称。


What central banks cannot achieve with traditional tools can now be accomplished through the circuitous channels of wealth effects in asset markets or with the competitive edge gained from currency depreciation.	央行无法用常规工具实现的目标现在可以通过资产市场财富效应的迂回渠道或来自货币贬值的竞争优势实现。


This is where delusion arises.	错觉就产生在这里。


Not only have wealth and currency effects failed to spur meaningful recovery in post-crisis economies; they have also spawned new destabilizing imbalances that threaten to keep the global economy trapped in a continuous series of crises.	财富和货币效应飞弹没有刺激后危机经济体有意义的复苏； 反而酝酿了新的破坏稳定的失衡，这些失衡有可能让全球经济陷入一连串危机。


Consider the US – the poster child of the new prescription for recovery.	以美国为例。 美国是新复苏方针的榜样。


Although the Fed expanded its balance sheet from less than $1 trillion in late 2008 to $4.5 trillion by the fall of 2014, nominal GDP increased by only $2.7 trillion.	尽管美联储将其资产负债表规模从2008年底的不足1万亿美元扩大到2014年秋的4. 5万亿美元，但名义GDP只增加了2.


The remaining $900 billion spilled over into financial markets, helping to spur a trebling of the US equity market.	7万亿美元。 其余9,000亿美元溢出到了金融市场中，刺激美国股市大涨两倍。


Meanwhile, the real economy eked out a decidedly subpar recovery, with real GDP growth holding to a 2.3% trajectory – fully two percentage points below the 4.3% norm of past cycles.	与此同时，实体经济举步维艰，复苏十分萎靡不振，实际GDP增长保持在2. 3%左右——比过去经济周期的正常水平4.


Indeed, notwithstanding the Fed’s massive liquidity injection, the American consumer – who suffered the most during the wrenching balance-sheet recession of 2008-2009 – has not recovered.	事实上，尽管美联储注入了巨量流动性，美国消费者——他们是2008—2009年剧烈的资产负债表衰退的最大受害者——并没有恢复元气。


Real personal consumption expenditures have grown at just 1.4% annually over the last seven years.	过去七年实际个人消费支出每年只增加1. 4%。


Unsurprisingly, the wealth effects of monetary easing worked largely for the wealthy, among whom the bulk of equity holdings are concentrated.	毫不奇怪，货币宽松的财富效应大部分产生在富人身上，他们是股票资产的主要持有者。


For the beleaguered middle class, the benefits were negligible.	至于困难重重的中产阶级，得到的好处可以忽略不计。


“It might have been worse,” is the common retort of the counter-factualists.	“本来可能更糟糕的，”反事实主义者常用这句话来反驳。


But is that really true?	但果真如此吗？


After all, as Joseph Schumpeter famously observed, market-based systems have long had an uncanny knack for self-healing.	毕竟，正如约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）的著名论断，市场制度早就有一种神秘的自我修复功能。


But this was all but disallowed in the post-crisis era by US government bailouts and the Fed’s manipulation of asset prices.	但在后危机时代，美国政府的援助和美联储对资产价格的操纵让这一功能无从发挥��


America’s subpar performance has not stopped others from emulating its policies.	美国的萎靡表现并没有阻止其他国家的效仿。


On the contrary, Europe has now rushed to initiate QE.	相反，如今欧洲也加入了QE行列。


Even Japan, the genesis of this tale, has embraced a new and intensive form of QE, reflecting its apparent desire to learn the “lessons” of its own mistakes, as interpreted by the US.	甚至这一方针的始作俑者日本，也采取了新的密集型QE，这表明日本显然渴望从“学习”经过美国解释的自己的错误。


But, beyond the impact that this approach is having on individual economies are broader systemic risks that arise from surging equities and weaker currencies.	但是，除了这一方针给个体经济体带来的影响，还有股市飙升和货币贬值造成的系统性风险。


As the baton of excessive liquidity injections is passed from one central bank to another, the dangers of global asset bubbles and competitive currency devaluations intensify.	过度流动性注入的接力棒在央行之间不断传递，全球资产泡沫和竞争性货币贬值的危险与日俱增。


In the meantime, politicians are lulled into a false sense of complacency that undermines their incentive to confront the structural challenges they face.	与此同时，政客陷入了错误的自负，这破坏了他们直面眼前的结构性挑战的激励。


What will it take to break this daisy chain?	如何打破打破这一链条？


As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stressed in a recent interview, the answer is a commitment to structural reform – a strategic focus of China’s that, he noted, is not shared by others.	中国总理李克强在最近的访谈中强调，答案在于结构改革决心——他指出，这也是中国独有的战略重点。


For all the handwringing over China’s so-called slowdown, it seems as if its leaders may have a more realistic and constructive assessment of the macroeconomic policy challenge than their counterparts in the more advanced economies.	中国所谓的减速已经引起了一片哀嚎，但中国领导人也许有着比发达经济体领导人更加现实和建设性的宏观经济政策评估。


Policy debates in the US and elsewhere have been turned inside out since the crisis – with potentially devastating consequences.	自危机以来，美国和其他地区的政策争论经历了由内而外的转变——这可能带来灾难性后果。


Relying on financial engineering, while avoiding the heavy lifting of structural change, is not a recipe for healthy recovery.	依靠金融工程尽管可以避免结构变革的重担，但它绝非健康复苏的秘诀。


On the contrary, it promises more asset bubbles, financial crises, and Japanese-style secular stagnation.	相反，这样会带来更多资产泡沫、金融危机和日本式的长期停滞。


Japan Stands Up	日本站起来


TOKYO – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has decided to extend the Diet’s current session for 95 days, until September 27 – making for the longest continuous session in the Japanese parliament’s postwar history.	东京——日本首相安倍晋三已决定延长现任国会任期95天至9月27日——这是战后历史上日本国会最长的连续任期。


The reason is clear: Abe is determined to pass a set of national security bills allowing a reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution that enables the country to play a greater role not only in enhancing its own security, but also in advancing world peace.	原因非常明确：安倍决心通过一套允许日本重新解释宪法的国家安全法案，在加强自身安全的同时推动世界和平。


Abe’s actions in the Diet come on the heels of his performance at the recent G-7 summit in Germany, where he broke with Japanese tradition.	安倍在开完近期德国举行的七国集团首脑会议后在国内议会采取了行动，他在首脑会议上与日本的传统公开决裂。


For the previous 39 years, Japanese representatives to the G-7 had focused on the economic discussions at such meetings, content to remain largely silent as the industrialized world’s other leaders surveyed the planet’s political hot spots and recommended action or, more often, inaction.	过去三十九年，日本代表甘愿在在七国集团首脑会议上重点探讨经济问题，而在其他工业化国家领导人讨论世界政治热点、行动方案或静观其变的时候保持沉默。


But the summit showed that Japan no longer intends to stand on the diplomatic sidelines.	但本届峰会表明日本不愿在外交问题上继续站在场边。


On the two foreign-policy issues that dominated the agenda, Abe was a forceful participant, advocating a muscular response to Russia’s encroachment on Ukraine’s sovereignty – indeed, Abe visited Kyiv before the summit – and supporting efforts to roll back the Islamic State.	安倍对主导峰会议程的两大外交问题都进行了积极参与，鼓吹应强硬回击俄罗斯侵犯乌克兰主权——事实上，安倍在峰会前刚刚访问过基辅——并支持打击伊斯兰国。


Abe’s interventions at the G-7, and his determination to create a legal framework for a more proactive security strategy, are proof that Japan, at long last, is constructing a foreign policy – a Weltpolitik – that reflects not only the global weight of its economy, but also the impact of faraway events on its national security.	安倍在七国首脑会议上的发言，以及他为更积极主动的安全战略缔造法律框架的决心都表明日本在经过长时间的犹豫和等待后，终于决定构建不仅反映其经济全球地位，而且体现遥远事件对国家安全影响的外交——世界政策。


This foreign-policy assertiveness is as revolutionary for Japan’s diplomacy as “Abenomics” has been for its economic policy.	这种外交政策上的自信之于日本外交就像“安倍经济学”之于其经济政策那样颇具革命色彩。


It marks a stark contrast with the seven decades following Japan’s defeat in 1945 in the Pacific War, when successive governments mostly outsourced foreign policy to the United States.	这与1945年日本太平洋战争战败七十年来，历届政府大多将外交政策外包给美国形成了鲜明的对比。


Until the 1980s, this made sense.	20世纪80年代前，这种选择自有其道理。


By concentrating on reconstructing the country after the devastation of war, our leaders brought about an economic miracle.	通过专注经受战争破坏后的国家重建，我们的领导人成功创造了经济奇迹。


Japan became the world’s second-ranking industrial power, and almost all Japanese enjoyed lifestyles and levels of social security that their parents could never have imagined.	日本成为世界排名第二的工业强国，而且几乎所有日本国民都享受到超出其父辈想象的社会保障水平和生活方式。


Of course, there were jolts along the way.	当然，这当中并非没有挫折。


In fact, the two greatest were administered by the US.	事实上，两次重大挫折都来源于美国。


First came Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to meet Mao Zedong to prepare President Richard Nixon’s visit to China; then came the so-called Nixon Shock – the decision just a short time later to end the US dollar’s direct convertibility to gold (a pillar of the post-war international monetary system created at Bretton Woods in 1944).	先是亨利·基辛格秘密受命会见毛泽东为尼克松总统访华做准备； 之后就是所谓的尼克松冲击波——其后不久又决定宣布美元与黄金的直接兑换（1944年在布雷顿森林创建的战后国际货币体系的支柱）脱钩。


The opening to China and the Nixon Shock confirmed the position of those in Japan who knew that the country could not remain on permanent sabbatical from its foreign-policy role and responsibilities.	对华开放和尼克松冲击波证实了部分日本人的看法，即日本不能永远不承担外交政策职责。


Because successive Japanese governments badly underestimated its consequences, the rise of China has been the third and final shock to Japan’s policy of neo-isolationism.	因为历届日本政府严重低估其后果，中国崛起第三次也是最后一次冲击了日本的新孤立主义政策。


Over much of the past three decades, Japanese firms and official agencies have happily invested hundreds of billions of dollars in China, hoping to bind the two economies together in a way that would end the lingering bitterness from World War II.	在过去三十年的大部分时间里，日本企业和官方机构兴高采烈地向中国投入了数千亿美元，希望能让两国经济紧密联系在一起，从而结束二战挥之不去的苦涩。


Instead, as the friction of recent years has amply attested, China continues to nurture the bitterness of its people, and those of other Asian countries, toward Japan.	相反，近年来的摩擦已充分证明中国继续滋长民众的仇日情绪，同样的情况也出现在其他亚洲国家。


Its hope is to rule out any Japanese role in resolving regional security issues, and to diminish the potency of the US-Japan alliance.	中国想阻止日本在解决地区安全问题中发挥任何作用，并同时削弱美日同盟。


But it is not only China that has reawakened Japan’s foreign-policy ambitions.	但唤醒日本外交政策野心的并不仅仅是中国。


Russia was a concern for Japan even before President Vladimir Putin unleashed his armed forces on Ukraine.	甚至在普京总统兴军入侵乌克兰之前，俄罗斯问题就一直令日本担忧。


The Kremlin has maintained Russia’s illegal occupation of Japanese islands – our “Northern Territories” – seized by Stalin after Japan’s surrender in the Pacific War.	克里姆林宫一直非法占领日本列岛——我们的“北方领土”——日本在太平洋战场投降后上述岛屿就落入了斯大林手中。


In the decades since, both the Soviet government and the Russian government of President Boris Yeltsin periodically engaged in diplomatic efforts to end their country’s estrangement from Japan.	之后的几十年，无论苏联政府还是叶利钦总统领导的俄罗斯政府都不时进行外交努力，以结束自己国家与日本的隔阂。


But under Putin, Russia no longer makes even a pretense of talking.	但在普京领导下，俄罗斯已经撕下了和谈的伪装。


Indeed, for the first time since the islands’ seizure, Russian leaders have actually visited them, reinforcing Russia’s spurious sovereignty claim.	事实上，占领列岛后俄罗斯领导人首次实际登岛，强化了俄罗斯虚伪的主权要求。


Given Chinese and Russian actions, it should surprise no one that Japan has fundamentally rethought its diplomatic posture.	鉴于中国和俄罗斯的行动，日本从根本上重新思考其外交政策应该并不令人感到惊讶。


And now the world is witnessing the results, not only in Abe’s reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution to allow for greater military support of the country’s allies, but also in the reinvigorated mutual-defense pact that Abe and President Barack Obama signed in Washington, DC, in late April.	现在世界所看到的正是这样的结果。 不仅安倍重新解释日本宪法为盟友提供更多军事支持，而且四月下旬安倍和美国总统奥巴马在华盛顿特区签署的在共同防卫条约也被重新激活。


At the same time, Japan is moving out of America’s diplomatic shadow.	与此同时，日本正在从美国的外交阴影中摆脱。


A strategic partnership with India has been gaining strength since Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office last year, and Abe has been deepening Japan’s strategic ties around Southeast Asia, particularly with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, which are confronting China’s hegemonic ambitions in the South China Sea.	在总理纳伦德拉·莫迪去年上任后，与印度战略伙伴关系已经逐步增强，而且安倍已经在深入推进日本与东南亚的战略伙伴关系，尤其是像菲律宾和越南这样在南中国海面临中国霸权野心的国家。


Japan’s engagement with the world’s most vexing problems goes beyond Asia.	日本与世界最棘手的难题的接触不仅局限在亚洲。


The country was the first of the world’s leading economies to provide financial assistance to Ukraine after Putin’s placeman, President Viktor Yanukovych, was ousted last year.	该国是去年普京的傀儡亚努科维奇总统被驱逐后世界主要经济体中率先为乌克兰提供财政援助的国家。


And it is beefing up its relations with emerging giants like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey.	而且日本与巴西、墨西哥、尼日利亚和土耳其等新兴大国的关系也正在不断巩固。


These initiatives reflect Japan’s recognition that the global framework that has kept the peace, and created opportunities for prosperity, for ever more countries – including China – is under threat.	上述举措反映日本���识到为越来越多国家——包括中国在内——维持和平并创造繁荣机会的全球框架正在受到威胁。


Japan and likeminded countries must actively defend it.	日本与志同道合的国家必须积极捍卫它。


The positions that Abe staked out in Germany represent an important step in that direction.	安倍在德国的立场标志日本朝这个方向迈出了重要的一步。


The Surrender of Japan’s Peace Constitution	日本和平宪法的投降


WASHINGTON, DC – In February, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on the National Diet to amend Article 9 of the country’s constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling disputes.	华盛顿——今年2月，日本首相安倍晋三呼吁国会修改该国放弃以战争为解决争端手段的宪法第九条。


Drafted by the United States after World War II, the constitution contains “some parts [that] do not fit into the current period,” Abe said.	安倍表示，上述由美国在二战后起草的宪法包含“某些部分不适合当前时期的需要。


He is particularly concerned with the constitutional provision that prohibits Japan from maintaining “land, sea, and air forces,” arguing that it seems to be in direct contradiction with the existence of the country’s Self-Defense Forces.	”他尤其对禁止日本保有“陆、海及空军力量”的宪法规定表示忧虑，认为它似乎与该国的自卫队存在直接相抵触。


At a glance, Abe’s proposal seems deeply unpopular.	乍看上去，安倍的提案似乎是很不受欢迎的。


According to one poll, some 50.3% of the Japanese public objects to amending Article 9.	根据一项民调显示，约有50. 3%的日本公众反对修改宪法第九条。


Only 37.5% of those polled favor such action.	仅有37. 5%的被调查者赞成这项行动。


The good news for Abe, however, is that opposition to his efforts, though broad, does not seem to run deep.	但对安倍来讲好消息是尽管对他努力的反对非常广泛，但却似乎并不深入。


Voters, it seems, are less concerned about the direction Abe is taking the country than they are about his decision to make the issue a top priority.	选民们似乎并不太关心安倍晋三正引领国家走向何处，而对他将该问题作为重中之重的决策表示担忧。


Revising the constitution would provide stronger legal grounding for Abe’s controversial defense measures.	修改宪法将为安倍备受争议的防御措施提供更加有力的法律基础。


Introduced last year, the new legislative provisions lift restrictions on deploying Japanese forces overseas and expand the definition of self-defense to include aiding an ally.	去年推出的新的立法规定解除了对日本海外派兵的限制，并将自卫的定义拓展至包括协助盟友。


These, too, are unpopular – at least superficially.	上述措施同样不受欢迎——至少从表面上看是这样。


Some 51% of Japanese voters disapprove of the measures, compared to 30% who support them.	约51%的日本选民不赞成这项举措，而支持者仅有30%左右。


And yet only 38% say they would like to see Abe reverse course and repeal the legislation.	不过，仅有38%的人表示他们希望看到安倍改弦更张并废除这项立法。


To be sure, many in Japan are concerned about the implications of Abe’s agenda, feeling that it runs counter to the country’s national security and proper international stance.	可以肯定，日本许多人都在关注安倍议程的影响，认为这违背了国家安全和恰当的国际立场。


They worry that Abe’s defense moves will make it more likely that Japan will be dragged into war, putting an end to its post-war pacifism.	他们担心安倍的防御举措更有可能将日本拖入战争，结束其战后奉行的和平主义原则。


Another avenue of criticism regards worries that Japan’s new defense doctrine will worsen its relationships with its neighbors.	另一方面的批评担心日本新防卫原则将导致与邻国关系进一步恶化。


Several countries have indeed already expressed concerns.	的确已经有几个国家表达了关切的立场。


China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei, stated that Japan’s new approach was “out of step with the trend of the times featuring peace, development, and cooperation.”	中国外交部发言人洪磊表示日本新政策“不符合当前时代和平、发展及合作的潮流。


His counterpart at South Korea’s foreign ministry commented that his country would “never tolerate” Japan’s exercise of the right to collective self-defense on the Korean peninsula “without the [Republic of Korea’s] request or consent.”	”他在韩国外交部的同行评论道韩国将“绝不容忍”日本在“未经大韩民国”要求或者同意的情况下在朝鲜半岛行使集体自卫权。


And North Korean state media reported that Abe’s reforms were intended to “pave the way for invading other countries.”	而朝鲜官方媒体则报道安倍的改革旨在“为侵略其他国家铺平道路。 ”


Not all of the opposition to Abe’s agenda, however, stems from substantive objections.	但安倍议程所遭遇的反对并非都是实质性的。


In some cases, concern focuses on the legitimacy of the process that produced the laws.	在某些情况下，制定法律进程的合法性才是人们最主要的关注。


According to one poll, 67% of respondents disapprove of how the ruling coalition pushed the legislation through the Diet.	民调显示67%的被调查者反对执政联盟迫使国会通过立法。


There is a widespread feeling in Japan that Abe’s cabinet “did not make a sufficient effort” to explain the legislation to the public.	日本国内普遍的感觉是安倍内阁“并没有做出足够的努力”面向公众开展立法的解释工作。


By ignoring criticism from the majority of voters, Abe’s government allegedly discredited Japan’s democratic system.	由于无视广大选民的批评，安倍政府涉嫌抹黑日本的民主制度。


Similarly, some 51% of respondents disapproved of the laws on constitutional grounds, believing them to be in violation of Article 9 of the constitution, the provision that Abe would like to alter.	同样，约51%的受访者因为宪法的原因而反对这项法律，认为它违反了安倍试图修改的宪法第九条。


These voters are less likely to support scrapping the bills; indeed, some of them may be mollified if Abe is successful in amending the constitution.	上述选民不太可能支持放弃提案，其中某些人的态度可能因为安倍成功修宪而有所缓和。


There is also a simple, practical answer that explains why opponents of the laws may not be in favor of efforts to repeal them.	还有一种简单、实际的答案能够解释为什么反对者可能并不赞成废除这项法律。


Many in Japan would like to avoid a divisive debate that could distract the government’s attention from other priorities.	许多日本人希望避免可能产生分歧的争论，从而避免将政府精力从其他优先任务上分散掉。


Japan’s economy shrunk more than expected in the final quarter of 2015, and its stock market has been in turmoil since the beginning of this year.	2015年最后一个季度日本的经济萎缩高于预期，而从今年年初以来其股市一直不断震荡。


No matter how unenthusiastic the Japanese might be about Abe’s security bills and his attempts to change the constitution, they would prefer that the issue be relegated to a back burner.	无论日本人对安倍法案以及修宪企图如何不热心，他们更希望能够将这个问题退居到次要的位置。


That way, the government can focus on what voters really care about: turning the economy around and saving the country’s social security programs.	这样，政府就可以专注解决选民真正关心的问题：即扭��经济颓势并挽救国家的社会保障计划。


A Japanese Ponzi Scheme?	日本庞氏骗局？


TOKYO – In the early years of the twentieth century, Charles Ponzi, an Italian migrant to North America, had a seemingly brilliant moneymaking idea.	东京—二十世纪初，从意大利移民北美的查尔斯·庞齐（Charles Ponzi）想出了一个看似绝妙的赚钱主意。


He would offer huge returns on worthless investments, thereby convincing a growing number of people to give him their money, which was used, in lieu of profit, to pay off earlier investors.	他为毫无价值的投资提供巨大回报，从而说服越来越多的人把钱给他，这些钱被用作利润支付给先前的投资者。


Ponzi’s eponymous scheme was essentially a way to enable businesses to rack up debt forever.	这个以庞齐的姓氏命名的骗局在本质上是一种让企业永久积累债务的方法。


But, of course, it was ultimately just a scam – and, indeed, it landed Ponzi in prison.	但是，当然，它终究只是个骗局——而事实上，庞齐也因此入狱。


A century later, pyramid schemes like Ponzi’s are still regarded as fraud, at least when they are pursued by private businesses.	一个世纪后，类似于庞齐骗局的金字塔骗局仍被视为欺诈，至少在私人企业这样做时如此。


Yet few seem to recognize the role such schemes play in the public sector.	但似乎极少有人认识到这类骗局在公共部门中的作用。


In fact, governments in many countries, including the United States and Japan, survive on what are essentially Ponzi schemes.	事实上，许多国家的政府，包括美国和日本，都依靠实质庞齐骗局生存。


Of course, there are crucial differences.	当然，其中有一些关键区别。


A traditional private-sector Ponzi scheme, despite its potential short-run returns, always breaks down for a simple reason: the number of potential investors is finite.	传统私人庞氏骗局尽管能支付短期回报，但永远会因为 一个简单的原因而败露：潜在投资者数量是有限的。


But in a government-run Ponzi scheme, the investor is the taxpayer.	但在政府庞氏骗局中投资者是纳税人。


And a stable government, with all the coercive means at its disposal, can reasonably expect to continue collecting taxes, which it can use to repay its earlier debts, for generations to come.	而一个稳定的政府，能够根据自己的意愿实施强制措施，想必可以一直征税，将税收收入用于偿还早前的债务，这一过程可以维持多代人。


But the fact that a public-sector Ponzi scheme can be sustained for a longer time does not make it foolproof.	但公共部门庞氏骗局能够维持很长时间，这一事实并不意味着它万无一失。


Excessive public debt weighs down an economy, leaving it vulnerable to shocks.	过多的公共债务会压垮经济，让经济无法承受冲击。


Given this, many analysts have called for aligning the rules for public debt more closely with those governing the private sector.	考虑到这一点，许多分析师呼吁让公共债务规则与私人部门规则更加一致。


Yet it is important to take a nuanced approach.	但采取细致的方法十分重要。


That is not what has happened in the US, where Republican Party leaders decided that curtailing debt accumulation was the top priority.	美国就不是这样。 共和党领导人认为，遏制债务积累是重中之重。


By blocking the passage of budgets, Republican lawmakers caused brief shutdowns of the federal government – an approach that succeeded only in spooking markets.	共和党立法者阻挠预算的通过，导致联邦政府短暂关门——这样的方法只能让市场有如惊弓之鸟。


If anything, the party’s embrace of such a radical stance contributed to the emergence of Donald Trump – the erratic and recalcitrant “billionaire” who claims that he can convince creditors to accept haircuts on America’s debt – as a contender for the US presidency.	共和党如此激进的立场也促使了唐纳德·特朗普的横空出世——这位反复无常、桀骜不驯的“亿万富翁”宣称他可以说服债权人接受美国债务“剃头”（haircut）——成为美国总统候选人。


Just as a fast-moving cyclist cannot simply stop pedaling, governments cannot suddenly halt all borrowing.	正如高速行进的自行车手不能猛然停止踏动踏板，政府也无法猛然停止一切借贷。


To remain upright and in control, they must eliminate their deficits gradually.	要保持坚挺和控制局面，政府必须逐渐消除赤字。


That is a lesson that Japan has taken to heart.	这是日本铭记在心的教训。


With net debt of around 130% of GDP – much higher than in other advanced economies – the country is currently forced to allocate a large share of government expenditure toward servicing its liabilities.	日本净债务相当于GDP的130%左右——比任何其他发达经济体都要高得多——目前被迫将很大一部分政府支出用于维持负债。


While very low (sometimes even negative) interest rates helped to limit that share to 22% of the total budget during the last fiscal year, a rate increase would force taxpayers to pay a lot for fewer benefits.	尽管极低（有时甚至为负）的利率帮助日本在上一财年将这一比例限制在总预算的22%，但利率的提高将迫使纳税人用高得多的支出换取更少的福利。


Clearly, Japan has an incentive to reduce its debt burden.	显然，日本有激励降低债务负担。


But the Japanese economy is currently being buffeted by strong headwinds.	但日本经济目前正遭遇巨大的阻力。


China’s economic fragility, together with the threat of a British exit from the European Union, is generating significant uncertainty globally.	中国经济的脆弱性，以及英国退出欧盟所带来的威胁，正在给全球带来巨大的不确定性。


Moreover, while the decline in the price of crude oil is, in itself, beneficial for Japan, a major net importer, its negative impact on other major economies is spilling over onto Japanese exporters.	此外，尽管原油价格下跌本身有利于作为主要净进口国主义的日本，但其对其他主要经济体的消极效应正在溢出影响日本出口商。


Then there is the US Federal Reserve’s hesitation to reverse its monetary policy fully, which has hurt prospects for a more competitive exchange rate and growth in Japan’s equity market.	还有，美联储在完全扭转其货币政策方面犹豫不前，妨碍了更有竞争力的汇率和日本股市的增长。


Against this background, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was recently faced with a key decision: whether to follow through with a planned consumption-tax hike, from 8% to 10%.	在这样的背景下，日本首相安倍晋三最近面临一个关键决定：是否完成计划中的将消费税从8%提高到10%的政策。


Though the hike would have ostensibly served the objective of balancing Japan’s budget, it also would have undermined consumption, which has yet to recover from the last tax hike, from 5% to 8%, implemented in 2014.	尽管从表面上看，加税有利于平衡日本预算的目标，但也会遏制消费。 目前消费还没有从2014年实施的上一次加税（从5%加到8%）中恢复。


Abe decided to keep pedaling: he postponed the hike for two and a half years.	安倍决定继续踏动踏板：他将加税延迟两年半。


Since launching his economic revitalization strategy – so-called “Abenomics” – in 2011, Abe has presided over a roughly ¥12 trillion ($115 billion) increase in government revenues.	自2011年实施其经济复兴战略——所谓的“安倍经济学”以来，安倍让政府收入提高了12万亿日元左右。


The labor market is now in its best shape in many years, with an unemployment rate of just over 3% and a high vacancy-to-applicant ratio.	劳动力市场目前处于多年来的最佳状态，失业率略高于3%，职位-申请比也相当高。


Only the consumption component of GDP is weak.	唯独GDP中的消费部分萎靡不振。


Abe knew better than to allow the pressure to reduce debt to drive him to risk the gains of Abenomics.	安倍知道最好不要让降低债务的压力促使他拿安倍经济学的成就冒险。


The announcement of Abe’s decision to postpone the tax hike did not, as some feared, cause the market rates of Japanese government bonds to rise substantially – an indication that investors do not view the bonds as increasingly risky.	安倍宣布推迟加税的决定并没有如一些人所担心的那样导致政府债券市场利率飙升——这表明投资者认为这些债券风险并未增加。


It seems that, like Abe, markets recognized the need to balance the imperatives of debt reduction and economic growth.	似乎市场与安倍一样认识到平衡降低债务和经济增长的需要。


Japan’s Fiscal Crisis Comes of Age	源于老龄化的日本财政危机


TOKYO – Has Japan’s political paralysis finally lifted?	东京——日本的政治瘫痪是否已经结束？


The recent agreement, after a long debate, between the government and leading opposition parties to double the consumption tax – from 5% to 8% in 2014, and then to 10% in 2015 – suggests that it has.	政府经过长时间辩论与主要反对党达成了到2014年实现消费税从5%到8%翻番，而后到2015年再增长到10%的最新协议，这项协议表明日本的政治瘫痪已经结束。


But there is a real risk that the government will mistake this measure for the end of the reform process.	但真正的危险在于政府会把这项举措视为改革进程的结束。


In fact, it is – or should be – only the beginning.	其实，这项措施应当——或者仅仅标志着改革进程的起步。


By virtually any measure, official Japanese debt is the highest in the world.	无论从哪个角度衡量，日本的官方债务都居于世界之首。


The total outstanding volume of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) is an almost unfathomable $9 trillion, only just below the $10.5 trillion in outstanding debt for the full 17-country eurozone, which has more than triple the population.	日本政府债（JGBs）总欠债额近乎达到不可思议的9万亿美元，仅略低于欧元区17国欠债总额的10. 5万亿美元，而后者的人口数量达到前者的三倍。


So grim has Japan’s fiscal position become that bond issuance has exceeded tax revenue since 2009.	日本的财政状况非常严峻，以致于从2009年起发债额就已经超过了税收。


Taxes cover less than half of government spending.	源于税收的开支还不到政府开支的一半。


And last year’s earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster only made a grim fiscal picture worse by requiring huge new spending on reconstruction.	而去年爆发的地震、海啸及核灾难需要巨大的重建开支，这无疑进一步恶化了本已严峻的财政状况。


Japan issued a record ¥55.8 trillion ($693.5 billion), or 12% of nominal GDP, in government bonds during the last fiscal year.	日本上一财年度发行的政府债券占名义GDP的12%，达到创纪录的55. 8万亿日元（合6935亿美元）。


Of course, Japan’s fiscal problems have been mounting for decades.	当然，日本的财政问题近几十年来一直没有解决。


Annual tax revenue has fallen 30% since the country’s property bubble burst in 1989, owing to slow growth and deflation, with tax cuts implemented as stimulus measures during the 1990’s recession playing a subsidiary role.	经济增长缓慢和通货紧缩导致1989年地产泡沫破裂后年度税收收入下降30%，20世纪90年代经济衰退期间所采取的减税刺激政策同样影响了税收收入。


The only reason that Japan has been able to sustain its fiscal position is that 93% of its debt is domestically held (with the Bank of Japan now buying close to one-third of the JGBs issued each year).	日本能保持其财政状况的唯一原因是其93%的债务都是国内发行的（日本央行现在买入的日本政府债份额近乎年发行量的三分之一之多）。


Indeed, in contrast to the foreign capital flight that has so damaged Europe, willing foreign buyers of JGBs are currently plentiful, pushing interest rates to their lowest levels ever.	其实，相比于对欧洲造成重大破坏的国外资本出逃，目前丝毫不乏自愿掏钱的日债买主，从而推动利率达到历史最低水平。


Moreover, Japan’s private sector – its households and companies – sits atop a mountain of savings, which is mostly used to purchase JGBs.	此外，日本的家庭和企业等私有部门握有大量的储蓄，这些储蓄主要用于购买日债。


Because the government can still borrow mainly from the Japanese people, its balance sheet remains stable.	因为政府仍然可以向日本民众借钱，因此基本保持了资产负债表的稳定。


But, given Japan’s aging population, how long can that continue?	但鉴于日本人口迅速老化，这种情况还能持续多久？


Most leading Japanese economists believe that the situation cannot be sustained, given that the large number of households formed by pensioners is increasingly drawing down savings.	多数知名日本经济学家认为这种状况不可能继续下去，因为退休人员家庭与日俱增导致储蓄日渐减少。


The share of those aged 65 or over has nearly doubled over the past two decades, to 23%, compared to 13% for the United States and 16% for Europe.	65岁或以上人口占比20年来近乎翻番到23%，而美国的这一比例为13%，欧洲则为16%。


If this trend continues, as seems likely, the captured market that JGBs have had for decades will begin to shrink dangerously.	如果这种趋势不出所料地继续下去，日债已经占领数十年的市场将开始以危险的方式萎缩。


At that point, foreign purchasers are unlikely to pick up the slack.	真到那时，国外买家不太可能出来收拾残局。


In reaching the agreement to raise the consumption tax, the opposition Liberal Democratic Party insisted that the main squeeze on the budget deficit – the amount spent on social-security benefits for Japan’s retirees – begin to be addressed.	在同意提高消费税的时候，反对派的自由民主党坚持要着手解决造成预算赤字的罪魁祸首——日本退休人员的社会保障和福利开支。


But the agreement actually does nothing to fix that problem.	但这份协议实际无助于解决这一问题。


The large number of elderly and retired people means that spending on health care and social security now consumes 29.2% of the budget, a one-third increase since 2000.	大量老人和退休人员意味着医疗保健和社会保障开支现在占到总体预算的29. 2%，比2000年增长了三分之一。


To meet these demands, Japan’s government has been slashing spending on education and research, the two areas in which the country’s post-war economic rise was forged.	为了满足这些要求，日本政府已经缩减了教育和研究开支，而这两项恰恰是战后日本经济快速崛起的基础。


And the old jibe that Japan cannot resist building bridges to nowhere if the government is paying rings less true nowadays.	过去曾有人开玩笑说如果日本政府出钱，不管桥通向哪里人们都会修，但如今这种状况早已时过境迁了。


Public works and pork-barrel spending fell to 5.1% of the budget this year, from 13% in 2000.	公共工程和政治拨款开支占比从2000年的13%骤降至今年的5. 1%。


Of course, the tax system will also need to be addressed.	当然，税制问题也需要解决。


Just as Japan’s deficit is monumental by any measure, Japanese income earners are clearly under-taxed.	正像日本的赤字无论从哪个角度衡量都非常可观一样，日本对纳税者的征税比例显然也非常不足。


Even after the proposed doubling of the consumption tax, the rate will remain half the 20% (or more) that almost all European countries levy.	即使在建议消费税翻番之后，日本的税率仍然只有欧洲几乎所有国家所征20%（或更高比例）的一半左右。


Overall tax revenue is roughly 27% of GDP, putting Japan in 28th place among the 35 OECD countries.	税收总收入约占GDP的27%，在35个经合组织国家中仅仅排名第28。