The Ninth and Tenth Amendments proscribe the use of firearms to compromise other implicit rights as they may become apparent.	第九及第十修正案禁止利用枪支损害今后可能变为显性的其他隐性的公民权。


Today’s most powerful technologies relate to information concerning our thoughts, associations, and bodies.	涉及我们思想、关系和身体的信息已成为今天最强大的技术。


If the framers of the US Constitution were alive today and as well educated as they were then, the Bill of Rights would likely be focused on balancing access to information to ensure that the government remains within bounds.	如果美国的宪法制定者今天还活着并像当时那样受过良好的教育，那么人权法案很可能会集中关注平衡信息获取，以确保政府不��超权限运作。


With this public request from the FBI, the balance between people and policing is being called into question.	联邦调查局这次公开请求令人们开始关注民众和警方之间的平衡。


As the debate unfolds, we need to consider whether it makes sense, legally or as a matter of policy, for everyone – law enforcement, hackers, and terrorists – to be able to possess or access information.	随着辩论的展开，我们需要思考在法律或政策层面，让所有人——包括执法机构、黑客和恐怖分子——都能掌握或获取信息是否讲得通。


The Apple case will affect the balance of informational power, and the scales currently are weighted against the citizen.	苹果的案子将会影响到信息权力平衡，而目前天平倾斜的方向不利于公众。


Resolving the case requires a more considered response from US politicians than hysterical tweeting.	解决这个问题需要的不是歇斯底里的推特，而是美国政界人士更加深思熟虑的回应。


In view of the modern power of information, they must think carefully about the legal ramifications of the FBI’s demand.	鉴于信息在现代社会的力量，我们必须认真思考联邦调查局请求的法律后果。


Realism on North Korea	朝鲜问题上的现实主义


BERLIN – The world’s task in addressing North Korea’s saber rattling is made no easier by the fact that it confronts an impoverished and effectively defeated country.	柏林——尽管朝鲜贫困而一败涂地，但世界并不能因此而更从容地面对它的武力威胁。


On the contrary, it is in such circumstances that calm foresight is most necessary.	相反，恰恰是在这种情况下，我们必须要做到冷静和深谋远虑。


The genius of the Habsburg Empire’s Prince Klemens von Metternich in framing a new international order after the Napoleonic Wars was that he did not push a defeated France into a corner.	哈布斯堡帝国王子克莱门斯·冯·梅特涅在拿破仑战后建立国际新秩序的天才之处在于，他并没有将战败的法国逼入绝境。


Although Metternich sought to deter any possible French resurgence, he restored France’s prewar frontiers.	尽管梅特涅竭力阻止法国复兴，但是他恢复了法国的战前边界。


By contrast, as Henry Kissinger has argued, the victors in World War I could neither deter a defeated Germany nor provide it with incentives to accept the Versailles Treaty.	相反，恰如亨利·基辛格所说，一战的战胜国既未能遏制战败的德国，也未能鼓励它接受《凡尔赛条约》。


Instead, they imposed harsh terms, hoping to weaken Germany permanently.	相反，他们提出了苛刻的条件，希望借此永久削弱德国的实力。


We know how that plan ended.	我们都清楚结局如何。


John F. Kennedy was in the Metternich mold.	约翰·F·肯尼迪是梅特涅的信徒。


During the Cuban missile crisis, he did not try to humiliate or win a total victory over the Soviet Union. Rather, he put himself in Nikita Khrushchev’s shoes and agreed to dismantle, secretly, American missiles in Turkey and Italy in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.	古巴导弹危机时他并未试图侮辱或彻底压制苏联，反而从尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫的角度出发，同意以暗中拆除土耳其和意大利境内的美国导弹来换取苏联将导弹撤离古巴。


Kennedy’s pragmatism prevented World War III.	肯尼迪的务实阻止了第三次世界大战的爆发。


Sadly, North Korea has not received such far-sighted statesmanship.	可悲的是，朝鲜并没有遇见具备如此远见卓识的政治家。


Faced with the North’s dangerous nuclear game, we should ask what would have happened if, over the last 20 some years, the North Korea problem had been approached with the sagacity of Metternich and Kennedy.	在朝鲜危险的核计划面前，我们应当扪心自问，如果过去20年来用梅特涅和肯尼迪的睿智来处理朝鲜问题，现在的情况将会如何？


Of course, North Korea is not early-nineteenth century France or the USSR of 1962.	当然，朝鲜不同于十九世纪初的法国和1962年的苏联。


In the eyes of Western (including Japanese) political leaders, it has never amounted to more than a small, fringe country whose economic failings made it appear to be poised perpetually on the edge of self-destruction.	西方（包括日本）领导人认为朝鲜不过区区弹丸之地，其糟糕的经济状况似乎永远处于自我毁灭的边缘。


For the most part, world leaders preferred not to be bothered with North Korea, and so reacted in an ad hoc way whenever it created a security problem.	多数情况下，世界领导人都不愿认真对待朝鲜问题，因此朝鲜每次制造安全问题他们的对策都是被动地敷衍应对。


But now, following the North’s recent nuclear tests, and given its improving ballistic-missile capabilities, that approach is no longer tenable.	可现在由于朝鲜核试验及弹道导弹能力的提升，我们必须要做出改变。


Perhaps the best chance to address the problem at an earlier stage was immediately after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.	也许1991年苏联解体后是早期解决朝鲜问题的绝佳机会。


Back then, Kim Il-sung – the North’s founder – faced economic collapse, diminution of his conventional military forces, and diplomatic isolation.	当时朝鲜创始人金日成面临经济崩溃、常规军力缩减和外交孤立等问题。


In interviews with Asahi Shimbun and The Washington Times in March and April 1992, Kim clearly expressed a wish to establish diplomatic relations with the US.	在1992年3、4月接受《朝日新闻》和《华盛顿时报》采访时，金明确表示希望与美国建立外交关系。


But US and South Korean leaders were not ready to accommodate Kim’s overture.	但美韩领��人尚未做好准备接受金的提议。


Their received ideas about North Korea prevented them from recognizing a fast-changing political reality.	对朝鲜的陈旧看法导致他们未能认清快速变化的政治现实。


Another opportunity was missed later in the decade.	那十年中还错过了另外一次机会。


If North Korea had reciprocated in a timely manner following US envoy William Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, President Bill Clinton’s policy of engagement with the North might have been upgraded to a push for normalization of diplomatic relations.	如果朝鲜在1999年5月美国特使威廉·佩里访问平壤后及时回访，那么比尔·克林顿总统对朝接触政策可能已经升级为外交关系正常化的努力。


Instead, the North procrastinated, sending Vice Marshall Jo Myong-rok to the US only in October 2000, near the end of Clinton’s presidency.	相反，朝鲜却一拖再拖，直到2000年10月克林顿任期接近尾声时才派次帅赵明禄访美。


A few months later, newly elected President George W. Bush reversed Clinton’s North Korea policy.	几个月后，新当选总统乔治·W·布什推翻了克林顿的朝鲜政策。


I still recall the difficulty that I faced, as South Korea’s foreign minister, in convincing Bush administration policymakers to negotiate with North Korea instead of merely applying pressure and waiting for the North to capitulate.	我还记得担任韩国外长时说服布什政府决策者同朝鲜谈判，而不是一味施压、坐等朝鲜投降的难度。


Back then, North Korea was restarting its Yongbyon nuclear facility and producing plutonium, thus strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis the US.	那时朝鲜重启宁边核设施进行钚生产，借此强化同美国的谈判能力。


Precious time was squandered before North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006.	2006年朝鲜首次核试之前的宝贵时间就这样被白白浪费。


Though Bush shifted his policy toward bilateral negotiations with the North a few months later, the Kim regime had become much more obstinate.	尽管几个月后布什开始接受对朝双边谈判政策，但金氏政权已经变得更加顽固。


Indeed, North Korea’s behavior has since become even more volatile.	事实上，自此之后朝鲜的行为就更加无法预测。


Its sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 were unprecedented, and raised inter-Korean tensions to their highest level in decades.	2010年打沉韩国天安舰及炮击延坪岛等行为史无前例，朝韩之间的紧张局势也因此达到数十年来的顶峰。


Today, following the North’s third nuclear test, we seem to have entered the most precarious stage yet, with the regime declaring that it will never surrender its nuclear option.	如今，第三次核试验后，朝鲜政权对外宣布永远不会放弃核手段，我们似乎也由此进入有史以来最危险的阶段。


So, what should be done?	我们究竟该怎么办？


The first option should be deterrence of further aggression through diplomacy.	首要选择是通过外交手段遏制进一步挑衅。


But achieving diplomatic deterrence will depend on China’s cooperation, and this requires that China’s vital national-security interests be recognized.	但中国的合作是实现外交威慑的必要条件，前提是必须承认中国的关键国家安全利益。


China fears not only the social and economic consequences of a North Korean implosion, but also the strategic consequences of reunification – in particular, that the US military, through its alliance with South Korea, would gain access to territory on its border.	中国所担心的不仅是朝鲜爆炸的社会经济后果，还有朝韩统一的战略后果——尤其是美军藉由美韩联盟控制对中朝边境领土进行控制。


A mere statement by the US that it has no intention to press this military advantage will not assuage China’s fears.	美国仅仅声明无意攫取这种军事优势无法缓解中国的忧虑。


Chinese leaders recall that the US promised Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that German reunification and democratic transition in Eastern Europe would not mean eastward expansion of NATO.	中国领导人清楚地记得美国曾承诺苏联总统米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫德国统一和东欧民主转型并不意味着北约东扩。


So a more concrete undertaking, one that preserves South Korea’s bedrock security concerns, is needed.	因此有必要做出更为具体的承诺，保持韩国最基本的安全关注。


Only after its security is assured will China free itself from complicity in North Korean brinkmanship and be better able to control the North’s behavior. 	只有当自身安全得到保证后中国才有可能摆脱与朝鲜唇亡齿寒的互相依赖，加强对朝鲜行为的控制力度。


But Chinese cooperation, though necessary, will not resolve the North Korea problem on its own.	中国的合作虽然必要，但仅靠它也解决不了朝鲜问题。


A comprehensive approach must recognize the speed of internal change, especially in the minds of ordinary North Koreans.	综合性方案必须意识到朝鲜的内部变化，尤其是普通朝鲜人思想的变化速度。


Simply put, North Koreans are not as isolated as they once were, and have a growing appreciation of their impoverishment, owing primarily to greater trade and closer connections with booming China.	简单而言，朝鲜人已经不再像过去那样与世隔绝，因为与蓬勃发展的中国贸易扩大及联系日趋密切，他们对自身的贫困已经有越来越清醒的认识。


This internal change needs to be encouraged, because it will prove more effective than external pressure in influencing the regime’s behavior.	这样的国内变化必须得到鼓励，因为事实证明它将比外部压力更有效地影响政府行为。


But such encouragement must be undertaken in ways that do not incite the North’s fears of being destroyed by indirect means.  South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s recent proposal to provide humanitarian assistance despite the recent spike in tension, is a start in the right direction.	但鼓励变化时切忌激起以间接手段摧毁朝鲜的恐惧。 韩国总统朴槿惠在近期紧张局势升温的大背景下仍建议提供人道主义援助就是朝着正确方向的正确开始。


The lives of ordinary North Koreans matter as much as the security of North Korea’s neighbors.	普通朝鲜人生活问题的重要性丝毫不亚于朝鲜邻国的安全问题。


A comprehensive approach is required – one that focuses as much on the human dimension as on the security dimension.	国际社会需要制定综合解决方案——方案必须同样关注人文及安全领域。


It remains to be seen whether this approach requires more foresight and courage than today’s political leaders in South Korea, the West, and China can muster.	我们仍需观察上述方案的远见和勇气是否超出当今韩国、西方和中国领导人所具备的能力。


A President in the Dock	被告席上的总统


NEW YORK – In a way, the stir aroused by the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur is a surprise.	纽约—在某种程度上，国际法院(ICC)以在达尔富尔犯下的战争罪和反人类罪起诉苏丹总统巴希尔所造成的哗然令人意外。


After all, the Court has no means of its own to arrest anyone in Sudan, much less a head of state who commands the country’s armed forces.	毕竟，国际法院自身无法在苏丹逮捕任何人，更不用说统领该国军队的国家元首。


Nor is there any prospect that someone else will intervene in Sudan to make an arrest.	第三方介入在苏丹执行逮捕的情况也不可能发生。


While the ICC’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, expresses confidence that Bashir will be brought to justice, it is unclear how this will happen.	尽管ICC的总检察官Luis Moreno-Ocampo表示有信心将巴希尔绳之以法，但究竟如何操作还是个未知数。


But it could.	但可能性还是存在的。


Despite the ICC’s seeming powerlessness, many governments’ leaders are engaged in strenuous efforts to block the indictment.	尽管ICC看似软弱无力，但许多国家的领导人还是不遗余力地阻止起诉。


They do not seem concerned that the charges are unfair; rather, they appear to be demonstrating solidarity with a fellow head of state.	他们似乎并不在乎这些指控是否公正； 而似乎是在显示与一位国家元首同一战壕的团结。


Those denouncing the attempt to put Bashir on trial include the large blocs of countries that are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the African Union, together with such powerful states as China and Russia.	那些谴责让巴希尔受审的企图的国家包括伊斯兰会议组织和非洲联盟阵营的大部分成员国以及中国和俄罗斯这样的强国。


One can only guess whether some of those joining this effort are motivated by concern that they themselves may some day face charges like those leveled at Bashir by the ICC judges.	人们只能猜测有些参与其中的元首是否是出于自身的顾虑，即他们有一天也可能面临ICC的法官们对巴希尔那样的指控。


Though Bashir may be able to avoid arrest simply by limiting his international travel, the commotion provoked by the indictment is not irrational.	虽然巴希尔可能仅仅通过限制他的国际旅行就能避免被捕，但对其起诉所造成的震荡却并非是非理性的。


The charges against him have a powerful stigmatizing effect.	针对他的指控具有很强大的舆论标签作用。


The fact that a panel of judges representing the 108 governments that are parties to the ICC has accused Bashir of principal responsibility for the crimes committed in Darfur during the past six years undermines the legitimacy of his continued rule.	代表ICC成员方108个国家政府的法官团指控巴希尔应对过去6年来在达尔富尔犯下的罪行负首要责任。 这样的指控本身就会损害他继续执政的合法性。


Those crimes have caused more than 300,000 deaths, and have forcibly displaced at least another 2.7 million people.	这些罪行已经造成30万人死亡，并使得270万人流离失所。


Even if Bashir’s fellow heads of state succeed in their effort to persuade the United Nations Security Council to defer prosecution – which is highly unlikely – the charges will continue to hang over Bashir’s head unless and until he stands trial.	即便同情巴希尔的各国首脑们成功劝说联合国安理会延迟对其起诉—可能性极小—这些指控也会继续悬在巴希尔的头上挥之不去，除非（直到）他出庭受审。


In 1999, an international criminal tribunal indicted another sitting head of state, Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.	1999年，一个国际刑事法庭起诉了另一个在位的国家首脑，南斯拉夫联邦共和国的米洛舍维奇。


Though he seemed secure at the time, a year and a half later he was sent to The Hague to stand trial.	虽然他当时似乎高枕无忧，但一年半以后还是被送到海牙受审。


Similarly, in 2003, an international criminal tribunal indicted Liberia’s then president, Charles Taylor.	无独有偶，2003年一个国际刑事法庭起诉了利比里亚当时的总统查尔斯•泰勒。


He had to flee Liberia a few months later and initially received asylum in Nigeria, but is now on trial in The Hague.	他不得不在数月后逃离利比里亚，起初在尼日利亚政治避难，可如今也在海牙受审。


When those indictments were issued, no one could have predicted how events would unfold; in retrospect, it is evident that the indictments’ delegitimizing effects had important consequences.	当那些起诉书发出以后，没人能够预言事态的发展； 回头看来，起诉书的（使）非法化作用产生了重要的后果。


Of course, the ICC’s prosecutor and judges are themselves taking a substantial risk in the indictment of Bashir.	当然，ICC的检察官和法官们在起诉巴希尔时也冒了相当大的风险。


The Court is still in its infancy, and antagonizing the many government leaders expressing solidarity with him could jeopardize its future.	该法院羽翼未丰，惹恼众多与他同一条战线的国家首脑可能会危及其未来的发展。


Yet it should be recognized that the Court’s personnel are carrying out their duties.	然而我们也应该承认国际法院的相关人士也是在履行他们的职责。


The treaty establishing the ICC explicitly states that heads of state do not enjoy immunity.	ICC的创始条约明确规定国家首脑不享有豁免权。


And the Security Council referred the Darfur case to the Court in 2005.	联合国安理会曾在2005年将达尔富尔一案提交ICC。


This was an investigation that had to be conducted, and those found to have the highest level of responsibility for the crimes had to be indicted.	这是一项必须进行的调查，那些被发现对相关罪行负有最高责任的人必须受到起诉。


Many of those now objecting to the prosecution of Bashir participated in the decisions leading to the indictment.	许多现在反对起诉巴希尔的人也参与了导致该项诉讼的决议。


If the ICC’s indictment now causes them discomfort, that is only because they did not anticipate that the Court would carry out the responsibilities that they themselves assigned to it.	如果ICC的起诉现在让他们不快，那只是因为他们没有预料到该法院会行使由他们赋予的职责。


A Primer for Pandemics	流行病初探


A few times each year, the world is reminded that a pandemic threat is immanent.	每年都有几次事件会提醒世界流行病的威胁无处不在。


In 2003, it was SARS.	在2003年，是SARS。


Today, it is a potential avian virus similar to the one that killed 30 million people after 1914.	而现在则是一种潜在的鸟类病毒，其危险性和在1914年致使3千万人丧生的那一种病毒类似。


“Bird flu” has already shown that it can jump from fowl to humans, and now even to cats, which indicates that it might be the next global killer.	事实已经证明“禽流感”可以由鸟类向人类传染，现在连猫类也不能幸免，这预示着它可能成为下一种全球性致命疾病。


But there are many other potential pandemics, and many are not even viruses.	然而，还有许多潜在的流行病，有些甚至都不是由病毒引起的。


Bacteria, prions, parasites, and even environmental factors could suddenly change in a way that slays us.	细菌、prion蛋白、寄生虫甚至环境因素都可能发生致命的突变。


It is widely predicted that when this happens, the economic and human losses will exceed that of any previous war.	科学预测普遍认为如果这样的情况发生，其所造成的经济和人类损失会超过此前任何一场战争。


Indeed, it is humbling to remember that some of history’s most deadly invasions were carried out by single-cell organisms, such as cholera, bubonic plague, and tuberculosis.	的确，令我们羞愧的是，在历史的记忆中，最致命的入侵都是由单细胞有机体引起的。 比如霍乱、腹股沟腺炎和肺结核。


Countries with the resources to do so are making resistance plans against pandemics – limited strategies that would protect their own citizens.	拥有资源支持的国家都制定了对抗这些流行病的方案—可以保护其公民的有限战略。


Most governments are hoping that early detection will make containment possible.	许多政府都希望及早确诊使他们有可能遏制流行病蔓延。


Containment depends heavily on vaccines, but vaccines are only part of the answer.	遏制战略高度依赖疫苗，但疫苗只是答案的一部分。


While they are a good defense against many viruses, each vaccine is highly specific to the threat.	虽然它们对多种病毒都有好的防御作用，但每一种疫苗都有其非常特定的针对性。


Viruses are parasites to cells, and each virus attacks a particular type of cell.	病毒是细胞的寄生物，每一种病毒都攻击一种特定的细胞。


The virus is shaped so that it can drill into a particular feature of that cell and inject parts of itself inside, confusing the cell into making more viruses and destroying itself in the process.	某种病毒的形状使其能够钻入某种细胞特定的部分，并将自身的一部分注入其中，扰乱细胞的功能从而使其制造出更多的病毒，并且在这一过程中自我毁灭。


With their very specific forms, the most effective anti-viral vaccines must be designed for a narrow range of factors.	病毒非常特定的形态，使得最有效的抗病毒疫苗必须针对窄范围的因素而设计。


Sometimes the tailored nature of viruses works in our favor.	有时病毒的特点对我们有利。


For example, they usually find it difficult to jump between species, because they would have to change their structure.	比如，它们要跨越不同物种交叉感染就很困难，因为要那样做它们就必须改变自身的结构。


But if large numbers of a host – say, birds – encounter a great number of people, eventually the virus will find a way to prosper in a new type of cell.	但如果数量众多的宿主—比如鸟类—遭遇了众多的人类，那么病毒最终会找到在新型的细胞中繁殖的方法。


Birds are the greatest concern today only because the spread is easy to see.	鸟类是现在最令我们担心的物种，那只是因为它们的广泛分布是显而易见的。


But AIDS jumped from monkeys and several types of flu jumped from swine.	但艾滋病来自于猴类，而另有几种流感则来自于猪。


Deadly mutations of any kind need to be identified urgently, so that an effective vaccine can be designed before the strain becomes comfortable in the human body.	任何致命的突变都需要被及时发现，以便我们能在病毒完全适应人体之前就能研制出有效的疫苗。


Unfortunately our present methods of detection are not sensitive enough.	不幸的是，我们目前的诊测方法还不够灵敏。


This is even more worrying when you realize that scientists should also be monitoring bacteria, prions, and parasites.	而当你意识到科学家们还应该同时监测细菌、prion蛋白和寄生虫时，就会更加忧心忡忡。


There are more bacteria than any other life form.	细菌的种类比任何生命形式都要多。


Many live harmlessly in our bodies and perform useful functions.	许多细菌无害地存在于我们身体里，并发挥有用的功能。


They evolve and adapt easily, which means that they learn to sidestep our drugs over time.	它们也很容易演化和适应，这就意味着他们能够在足够的时间里学会躲避我们的药物。


Bacteria should be checked for two types of mutation: adaptation by a hostile form that enables it to become super-immune to drugs, or a deadly mutant strain that appears in one of the multitude of “safe” bacteria.	细菌的两种突变需要我们特别注意：以敌对形态发生，使他们具备超强抗药性的适应性突变； 或是在“安全”的细菌群落中的致命性变种。


Prions are a relatively new discovery.	Prion蛋白是相对近期的新发现。


They are made from proteins similar to those that the body uses during healthy operations, which means that they are able to fool the body’s tools into making more prions.	它们是由和健康机体使用的蛋白类似的蛋白质组成，这就意味着它们能够欺骗身体机能来制造更多的同类。


They have only recently been recognized as the cause of several infectious diseases, including mad cow disease and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, which kill by crowding out healthy brain cells.	它们最近才刚被确认为几种传染性疾病的病因。 其中包括疯牛病和克-雅氏病，后者通过排挤健康的脑细胞而致命。


Many nerve, respiratory and muscle diseases might also be caused by prions.	Prion蛋白还可能导致许多神经、呼吸和肌肉系统的疾病。


Finally, parasites, simple animals that infect us, are already classified as pandemics.	最后，寄生虫，感染我们的简单动物，已经被划为流行病。


Malaria afflicts 300 million people and is the world’s biggest killer of children.	疟疾折磨着3亿人，也是全世界最大的儿童杀手。


Many parasites are worms: hookworm (800 million people infected), roundworm (1.5 billion), schistosomes (200 million), and the worm that causes Elephantiasis (150 million).	许多寄生虫是蠕虫：钩虫（8亿人感染），蛔虫（15亿人感染），血吸虫（2亿人感染）还有引起象皮病的蠕虫（1. 5亿人感染）。


There are also antagonists that are currently ignored.	还有目前被我们忽略的敌手。


Environmental chemicals and particulates might warrant their own categories.	环境中的化学元素和微粒可能在致病方面自成一派。


Or consider combinations of problems, such as these chemical infectors mixing with airborne pollens, and apparently pushing up incidences of asthma.	或者想想问题的结合，比如这些化学感染物和在空气中传播的花粉结合，就能使哮喘病例急剧增加。


New fungal infections are even scarier and might be harder to treat.	新的真菌感染更为可怕，且更难治疗。


The bottom line is that we can’t predict where the threat will emerge, so we need a distributed, intelligent detection system.	说到底，我们不能预测威胁会在哪里出现，因此我们需要一种分布式、智能化的侦测系统。


In practical terms, how should it be built?	切实地讲，就是如何建立这样的系统。


“Detectors” would have to be expert enough to know when an ordinary-looking symptom is actually an emergency.	“侦探们”必须是专家，有足够的能力知道一种看似平常的症状在何时会是一种紧急情况。


They would be located everywhere, with an emphasis on vulnerable regions.	他们应该被安排在各处，特别是在高危地区。


Initial warning signs of a pandemic are most likely to appear in the developing world, but detection nodes should be positioned in every country, with the least possible expense.	流行性疾病的初始警报通常会出现在发展中国家，但诊测节点应该以尽可能低的代价在各国建立。


This is not as difficult as it sounds.	这没有听起来那么复杂。


The key is to harness existing infrastructure.	关键是要充分利用现有基础设施。


Medical infrastructure exists everywhere, in some form.	医疗设施在任何地方都以某种形式存在。


It also tends to be the least corrupt of institutions in regions where that is a problem.	即便在腐败问题最严重的地方，它也通常是腐败程度最轻的一个机构。


Medical centers and clinics would be expected to investigate the cause of ailments in a large number of their patients, even in cases where the symptoms seem common.	医疗中心和诊所被冀望能够在数量众多的病人当中调查病因，即便是在症状似乎寻常的情况下。


A small amount of additional scientific expertise and lab equipment would need to be added to a public health system that serves ordinary needs.	在公共医疗体系中只需要增加少量的科技专长和实验室设备就能满足一般的需求。


Enhancing existing resources would be effective for two reasons. First, illness is more likely to be reported in a city hospital than at a specialist institute.	强化现有资源行之有效主要有两个原因：首先，城市医院比专业诊所更可能得到疾病报告。


Second, the investment would boost latent public health in that region.	其次，这笔投资会推动该地区公共医疗潜力。


For poor regions, investment in equipment and training would have to come from wealthier counterparts.	对贫困地区而言，对设备和培训的投入必须得到较富裕地区的支持。


Rich countries could justify the expense in terms of the savings that would result from early detection of a major threat.	富国在这些方面投资的回报体现在及早发现重大威胁所能带来的利益上。


Tropical climates and urban slums are humanity’s front line against pandemics, and they should be equipped properly.	热带和城市贫民区是人类对抗流行病的前沿阵地，所以这些地区必须要有妥善的装备。


Public health is an important asset for any nation.	对于任何一个国家而言，公共医疗都是一笔重要资产。


With so much at stake, it makes sense to place sentinels near every swamp, city, public market, and farmyard on earth.	在如此严峻的形势下，在每一处湿地、每一座城市、每一个公共市场和农场都设立岗哨是明智之举。


A Prisoner’s Christmas	一名囚犯的圣诞节


LUKYANIVSKA PRISON, KYIV – It has been said that there are no atheists in a foxhole.	发自基辅卢科亚尼夫斯卡监狱——人家说在烽火连天的战场上不存在无神论者。


Here, after my show trial and four and a half months in a cell, I have discovered that there are no atheists in prison, either.	而如今，在经历了公审和四个半月囚禁之后，我发现在监狱中也不会有无神论者存在。


When, despite unbearable pain, you are interrogated – including in your cell – for dozens of hours without a break, and an authoritarian regime’s entire system of coercion, including its media, is trying to discredit and destroy you once and for all, prayer becomes the only intimate, trusting, and reassuring conversation that one can have.	当你强忍着巨大的痛楚承受连续数十个小时的审讯（即便在囚室内也不例外），而统治当局的整个强制系统，包括其下属媒体，都试图彻底抹黑和毁掉你的时候，祈祷就成为一个人唯一私密，可信和安心的交流方式。


God, one realizes, is one’s only friend and only available family, because – deprived even of access to a trusted priest – there is no one else in whom to confide one’s worries and hopes.	你会觉得上帝才是你唯一的朋友和家人，因为在连一个可信赖的牧师都被禁止接触的时候，没有人能聆听你的忧虑和希冀。


In this season of love and family, the loneliness of a prison cell is almost unbearable.	在这个洋溢着爱和天伦之乐的季节，身处囚室中的寂寞几乎让人无法忍受。


The gray, dead silence of night (guards peer in voyeuristically through a slot in the door), the sudden, disembodied shrieks of prisoners, shrieks of distress and rage, the distant rattles and clangs of prison bolts: all make sleep impossible, or so restless as to be a torment.	那些黯淡而死寂的夜（看守们还不时会透过铁门上的小孔窥视你），有时囚犯们会突然发出尖啸，似乎要奋力挣脱自己的肉体，再加上那些郁闷而狂躁的狂吼，不知来自何处的窃窃私语和铁门的叮当声——一切都让人难以入眠，或者焦躁不安，形同折磨。


But what is strange is that your senses are not dulled by this dead and dreadful world. On the contrary, they are ignited by it: your mind is set free from mundane concerns to ponder the inestimable and your place within it – a freedom of spirit that is a truly unexpected gift this Christmas season.	但奇怪的是你的感官却并未被这个死寂而绝望的世界消磨殆尽，相反却得到了激发：你的思想从那些日常的念想中解脱了出来，不再局限于思考那些宏大的问题以及自己在问题中所扮演的角色——精神的自由确实是这个圣诞节最意外的礼物。


In the cell’s darkness, I gather strength and hope from the fact that God somehow seems so near to me here.	在囚室的黑暗中，我从上帝可能就在身边的意念中积累力量与希望。


For where else would Christ be but with those who suffer and are persecuted?	救世主会跟那些遭受痛苦和迫害的人同在的。


Indeed, I have recently been reading Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s sublime and challenging Letters from Prison, in which he yearns for a Christ capable of offering mercy to a world, our world, then in the process of being martyred for a single man.	事实上，我最近正在读迪特里希·朋霍费尔令人赞叹且极具挑战性的《狱中书简》一书，他在书中渴望有一个能向世界（我们的世界）施恩的救世主，随后又能为了一个人的福祉而殉道。


Written in a cramped, dank, and putrid cell, where hope was meant to die before the body, Bonhoeffer crafted a book rich in faith, openness, possibility, and, yes, hope – even in humanity’s darkest hour.	在一个希望很可能比肉体更早死亡的，狭窄，阴冷而腐臭的囚室中，朋霍费尔写出了一本充满了信念，开放性思维，可能性，当然还有希望的著作——即便是在那个人类历史上最黑暗的时代。


One particular passage resonates with me as I contemplate Ukraine’s plight. As he awaited his approaching execution by the Nazis, Bonhoeffer wrote that, in prison, “the godlessness of the world is not...concealed but, rather, revealed, and is thus exposed to an unexpected light.”	在我对当前乌克兰的困境陷入沉思时书中的某一段话特别能产生共鸣——在知道自己不久将被纳粹处决的时候，朋霍费尔在狱中写到：“这些（暴行）并未掩盖，而是揭露了……世界对神的不敬畏，并因此产生了一道意料之外的光芒”


So I take some comfort this Christmas in knowing that the godlessness, inhumanity, and criminality of the regime that is now ruling in Kyiv is, at long last, being exposed to the world in a clear light.	因此我在这个圣诞节得到了一丝宽慰，因为我知道当前这个基辅政权的对神的不敬，它们的暴虐和罪恶都被一道真真切切的光芒暴露在世人面前。


Its democratic posturing has been unmasked as cynical political theater, its claim to desire a European future for Ukraine’s people revealed to be a lie, and the rapaciousness of its kleptocrats has been laid bare.	它的民主外衣都被愤世疾俗的政治笑话所剥光，它那些带领国家加入欧盟的承诺沦为空话，而那些损公肥私者的贪婪性也暴露无疑。


The regime’s contempt for the constitution and the rule of law is now undeniable, and that clarity is empowering.	该政权对宪法和法治的蔑视如今已经无法掩盖，而且越发明显。


More importantly, the suffering of Ukraine’s people has also become more widely known, and we are no longer so alone in our plight.	更重要的是，乌克兰人民所遭受的苦难也更加广为人知，而我们也因此不再孤立。


Alleviating it has been embraced as a just cause across Europe and around the world.	欧洲和全世界都将缓解乌克兰的痛苦当成一项正义事业来推动。


The everyday oppression, stifled media, and shakedowns and extortion of businesses for bribes all point to a mafia state on Europe’s border.	在乌克兰国内每天发生的压制人民权利，压制媒体言论，对商界的敲诈勒索都表明在欧洲的边界上存在着一个黑手党国家。


Now our European friends can no longer deny the smug vileness of the regime with which they are forced to deal.	我们的欧洲朋友们虽然被迫要跟这个政权打交道，但如今它们也不再隐瞒该政权那种自以为是的可耻行径。


And I am thankful this Christmas for being able to believe that democratic Europe will not tolerate this state of affairs.	而我也对圣诞节而感到欣慰，因为我可以相信民主欧洲不会再容忍这一事态。


Ukrainians will be strong knowing that they are not alone in their fight.	乌克兰人也会强烈地感知到自己并非在孤军奋战。


I do not pretend to be an expert on religious faith and spiritual values.	我不想把自己伪装成一个宗教信仰和精神价值观方面的专家。


I am only a believer who cannot accept that our existence is the result of some freak cosmic accident.	我只是一个不愿意相信人类的存在只是宇宙中某个偶发意外的信徒。


We are, I believe, part of a mysterious yet integral act, whose source, direction, and purpose, though difficult to grasp at times, does have meaning and purpose – even when one is confined behind prison bars.	我相信，我们是一个神秘而完整的行为的一部分，而我们存在的原因，方向和目的虽然一时难以捉摸，却必定有着某种意义和目的——即便是在高墙之内。


It is only faith in the idea that our lives matter, and that our decisions must be judged by their moral content, that we in Ukraine, and elsewhere, will be able to find our way out of the misery, unhappiness, and despair that has consumed us over the last two years.	我信仰我们的存在是有意义的，而我们所做的决定必须由其道德内容来判定，至此乌克兰人，乃至其他地方的人们才能找到走出过去两年所经历的痛苦，悲伤和绝望之路。


It is within our power to recover or reinvigorate our freedoms and our societies, not by individual efforts, but by joining forces with likeminded people all over the world.	我们有能力去恢复或者重振我们的自由和社会，不是依靠个人的力量，而是通过将全世界志同道合的人们联合起来。


I know that we will manage this.	我知道我们将会做到这一点。


This Christmas, I ask my family and friends everywhere not to worry about me.	这个圣诞节，我告诉我的家人和朋友不要为我担心。


As Anna Akhmatova, the great poetic chronicler of Stalin’s terror, said, “I am alive in this grave.”	正如斯大林恐怖时期的伟大诗人安娜·阿赫马托娃所说：“我在这坟墓中活着。


Indeed, I am more alive, I know, than the men who have imprisoned me here.	”事实上，我知道自己比那些囚禁我的人更加鲜活。


Christmas is meant to mark the possibility of a new beginning for all men and women.	圣诞节意味着一个所有人迎接新开端的可能。 而正如朋霍费尔在书中最后一段断言的那样��“这正是我……生命的开端.


As Bonhoeffer affirmed with his last words: “This is for me...the beginning of life.”	尤利娅·季莫申科，乌克兰政治反对派领袖，曾两度担任乌克兰总理。


A Private Affair?	是个人私事吗？


Can a public figure have a private life?	公众人物可以有私生活吗？


Recent events in three countries have highlighted the importance of this question.	最近发生在三个国家的事件突出了这一问题的重要性。


In the French presidential election, both candidates tried to keep their domestic life separate from their campaign.	在法国总统选举中，两名候选人都试图让他们的家庭事务从他们的竞选中分离开来。


Ségolène Royal is not married to François Hollande, the father of her four children.	奥朗德是罗亚尔的四个孩子的父亲，但是罗亚尔并没有和他结婚。


When asked whether they were a couple, Royal replied, “Our lives belong to us.”	当被问及他们是否是夫妻的时候，罗亚尔回答说：“我们的生活属于我们自己。


Similarly, in response to rumors that President-elect Nicholas Sarkozy’s wife had left him, a spokesman for Sarkozy said, “That’s a private matter.”	”同样地，在应对当选总统萨尔科奇的妻子已经离他而去的传言时，萨尔科奇的一名发言人说：“这是一个私人问题。 ”


The French have a long tradition of respecting the privacy of their politicians’ personal lives, and French public opinion is more broad-minded than in the United States, where an unwed mother of four would have no chance of being nominated for the presidency by a major party.	法国人具有尊重政治人物个人生活隐私的悠久传统，而法国的舆论也要比美国的更为宽宏大量。 在美国，一个没有结婚的四个孩子的母亲是没有机会被提名成为一个主要政党总统候选人的。


Indeed, last month, Randall Tobias, the top foreign aid adviser in the US State Department, resigned after acknowledging that he had used an escort service described as providing “high-end erotic fantasy” – although Tobias said he only had a massage.	实际上在上个月，美国国务院最高外国援助顾问脱拜尔斯在承认他使用了据称是提供“性爱幻想”的陪伴服务后辞职，尽管他说他只是接受了按摩。


In Britain, Lord John Browne, the chief executive who transformed BP from a second-tier European oil company into a global giant, resigned after admitting he had lied in court about the circumstances in which he had met a gay companion (apparently, he met him through a male escort agency).	在英国，英国石油公司的首席执行官布朗爵士将该公司从一个二流的欧洲石油公司转变为一个全球性巨人。 他在承认他在法庭中就有关他如何遇上一位同性恋伴侣（很明显，他通过一个男性陪伴机构遇上他的）的问题上撒谎后辞职。


In resigning, he said that he had always regarded his sexuality as a personal matter, and he was disappointed that a newspaper – The Mail on Sunday – had made it public.	在辞职的时候，他说他一直认为他的性问题是个人事务，而且他对星期天邮报将此事公之于众感到失望。


Candidates for public office, and those holding high administrative or corporate positions, should be judged on their policies and performance, not on private acts that are irrelevant to how well they carry out, or will carry out, their public duties.	人们应该用政策和业绩来评判公职竞选人以及那些占据较高行政或企业职位的人，而不是与他们如何履行公职无关的个人行为。


Sometimes, of course, the two overlap. The Mail on Sunday and its sister paper, The Daily Mail, justified their publication of revelations by Browne’s former companion on the grounds that they include allegations that Browne had allowed him to use corporate resources for the benefit of his own private business.	当然，在某些时候这两者会重叠。 星期天邮报及其姐妹报纸每日邮报把表布朗前伴侣的披露材料，其理由是这些材料包括布朗允许他使用企业资源来为他的私人生意谋取利益。


The company denied that there was any substance to these allegations.	英国石油公司已经否认这些指控有何凭据。


As the administrator of the US Agency for International Development, Tobias implemented the Bush administration’s policy that requires organizations working against HIV/AIDS to condemn prostitution if they are to be eligible for US assistance.	脱拜尔斯作为美国国际发展署署长落实了布什政府的政策，即要求想要获得美国援助的治疗预防艾滋病组织谴责卖淫。


That policy has been criticized for making it more difficult to assist sex workers who are at high risk of contracting and spreading HIV/AIDS.	这一政策使得帮助那些患上和传播艾滋病的性工作者更为困难，因而受到批评。


Arguably, the public has an interest in knowing if those who implement such policies are themselves paying for sexual services.	毫无疑问，知道落实这些政策的人们自己是否买春关系到公众的利益。


Where there is no suggestion that a matter of personal morality has had an impact on the performance of a business executive or government official, we should respect that person’s privacy.	如果无法证明个人道德问题影响到企业执行官或政府官员业绩的时候，我们应当尊重那个人的隐私。


But what about candidates for political leadership?	但是对于政治领导者竞选人又当如何呢？


Since politicians ask us to entrust them with sweeping powers, it can be argued that we should know as much as possible about their morality.	由于政治人物要求我们对他们委以大权，也就可以说，我们应当对他们的道德尽可能地多了解。


For example, we might reasonably ask whether they pay their fair share of taxes, or inquire about their charitable donations.	例如，我们可以合理地问他们是否缴纳他们所应缴纳的税款，或者询问他们的慈善捐款情况。


Such things tell us something about their concern for the public good.	这些事情告诉我们一些有关他们对于公共福址的关切程度。


Similarly, the revelation three years ago that the then-Australian opposition leader and aspiring prime minister, Mark Latham, had assaulted a taxi driver and broken his arm in a dispute about a fare was relevant for those who believe that a nation’s leader should be slow to anger.	同样地，三年前披露说当时的澳大利亚反对党领导人、希冀成为总理的黎敦因为出租车费争执而殴打出租车司机并打断了他的胳膊。 这对于那些相信国家领导人应道缓怒的人来说就是有关系的了。


But does the legitimate interest in knowing more about a politician extend to details about personal relations?	但是，了解政治人物更多情况的合理利益是否延伸到个人关系上呢？


It is hard to draw a line of principle around any area and determine if knowledge of it will provide relevant information about a politician’s moral character.	在任何领域边上划出一条原则线并且确定获知这些情况是否会提供有关这一政治人物的道德本质是很困难的。


The problem is that the media have an interest in publishing information that increases their audience, and personal information, especially of a sexual nature, will often do just that.	问题是，媒体发表可以提高其读者量的信息关系到它们的利益，而私人情况、特别是有关性事的私人情况通常正好可以做到这一点。


Even so, whether people choose to marry or not, whether they are heterosexual or homosexual, even whether they pay to fulfill their erotic fantasies or have fantasies they can fulfill at no cost, tells us little about whether they are good people who can be trusted with high office – unless, of course, they say one thing while doing another.	即使如此，人们是否决定结婚、他们是否是异性恋或是同性恋、甚至他们是否掏钱还是免费满足性幻想并不能告诉我们他们是否是可以委任以高职的好人，当然，除非他们言行不一。


If we can cultivate a wider tolerance of human diversity, politicians, business leaders, and administrators would be less fearful of “exposure,” because they would realize that they have done nothing that they must hide.	如果我们能够培育对人类多样性更大的宽容，那么，政治人物、商界领导人以及行政官员将会不再如此惧怕“曝光”，因为他们将会认识到他们并没有做什么必须隐瞒的事情。


Prostitution is illegal in most of the US, including Washington DC, and this could be one reason why Tobias had to resign.	卖淫在美国大部分地方是违法的，包括华盛顿特区，而这可能就是脱拜尔斯不得不辞职的原因之一。


But when New Jersey Governor John Corzine was involved in a serious road accident last month, it became known that he violated his own state’s law by not wearing his seat belt.	但是，当新泽西州州长科尔金上个月卷入一起严重交通事故的时候，人们得知他没有系安全带，违反了他自己州的法律。


By any sensible measure, Corzine’s violation of the law was more serious than that of Tobias.	根据任何衡量标准，科尔金的违法都要比脱拜尔斯的要更为严重。


Laws requiring the wearing of seatbelts save many lives.	要求系安全带的法律挽救了许多人的性命。


Laws prohibiting prostitution do no evident good at all, and may well do harm.	禁止卖淫的法律更本就没有什么明显的好处，还有可能有坏处。


Yet no one suggested that Corzine should resign because of his foolish and illegal act.	但是没有人表示科尔金由于他的愚蠢和违法行为应当辞职。


In the US, at least, breaching sexual norms still brings with it a moral opprobrium that is unrelated to any real harm it may do.	至少在美国，违背性关系的准则依旧带有与任何实际损害无关的道德骂名。


Bringing Arab Education Online	实现阿拉伯在线教育


DUBAI – Education has long been a challenge in the Arab world, with inadequate access to high-quality schooling contributing to a widening skills gap that is leaving many young people, even graduates, unemployed and hopeless.	迪拜——教育一直以来都是阿拉伯世界的难题，高质量学校教育严重缺乏导致技能差距扩大，致使许多年轻人（甚至包括大学毕业生）因找不到工作而丧失了生活的希望。


In a region plagued by conflict and disorder, addressing these problems will not be easy.	在一个受困于冲突和混乱的地区，解决上述问题绝非易事。


But, with a bold and innovative approach, it can be done.	但如果本着大胆和创新的态度，这样的任务也是可以完成的。


Of course, no single strategy is guaranteed to resolve the Arab world’s educational challenges.	当然，没有哪种策略确保可以解决阿拉伯世界的教育难题。


At the newly created Abdulla Al Ghurair Foundation for Education, which has $1.1 billion and a mandate to broaden opportunities for young Arabs by providing them with scholarships, we have given a lot of thought to the effectiveness – and cost-effectiveness – of the various possible approaches.	最近成立了阿卜杜拉·古赖尔教育基金，该基金拥有11亿美元资本，并承担着为阿拉伯青年提供奖学金而拓展其机会的任务。 我们对各种可能方法的效率——和成本效益——进行过深思熟虑。


And one option stands out: online learning.	结果有一种方案脱颖而出：那就是在线教育。


Already, Arab countries are making rapid progress in expanding Internet connectivity.	阿拉伯国家在扩大互联网接入方面进步迅速。


By 2018, there are expected to be some 226 million Internet users in the Arab world, amounting to more than 55% of the population – almost 7% higher than the global average.	到2018年，阿拉伯世界预计将拥有2. 26亿互联网用户，在总人口中占比超过55%——相比全球均值高出近7%。


But the vast majority of young people use the Internet for social media, rather than for economic or educational purposes.	但绝大多数年轻人将互联网用于社交媒体、而非用于经济或教育目的。


In this sense, they are missing out on a major opportunity, especially given the strides that have been made in improving the effectiveness and appeal of online learning.	从这个意义上讲，他们正在错失一次重大的机遇，尤其考虑到在提高在线教育效率和吸引力方面已经取得了长足的进步就更是如此。


Nowadays, the world’s top universities teach computer science and engineering classes online.	如今，世界一流大学都开设了计算机和工程学领域的在线课程。


And, contrary to popular belief, these are not two-hour-long online lectures with no practical component.	而且，与人们普遍的认知相反，这些课程并不是没有实用价值且长达两小时的在线讲座。


Rather, they comprise short video tutorials, interactive activities to practice concepts in realistic scenarios, and quizzes and peer assessments that provide valuable feedback to students.	相反，它们包含简短的视频教程、在实际场景中练习概念的互动讲解以及为学生提供有价值反馈的测验和同伴评估。


Thanks to this fast-evolving model, online learning is now a better alternative to traditional education than ever.	多亏有了这些快速发展的模型，在线教育现在已经成为比传统教育更好的选择。


This is great news.	这的确是一则振奋人心的消息。


After all, delivering education via Internet technologies resolves some core challenges facing Arab countries’ education systems today.	毕竟，通过网络技术提供教育可以解决当前阿拉伯国家教育体系所面临的某些核心问题。


For starters, there is the sheer number of young people who need affordable access to education.	首先就是需要廉价教育的年轻人纯粹的数量问题。


Once a community has Internet access, as the Arab world increasingly does, scaling up online learning to reach the millions of young people who are currently out of school or do not have access to high-quality institutions can be done at relatively low cost.	一旦社区实现上网（阿拉伯世界在这方面进展越来越迅速），就可以以相对低成本完成拓展在线学习范围，触及成百上千万处于失学状态或无法进入高质量教育机构的年轻人的任务。


The Arab world’s few strong institutions of higher education certainly could not accommodate that many students.	阿拉伯世界仅有的几座高等教育学府肯定无法容纳那么多学生。


And even if they could, they might choose not to.	而且即使有这个能力，它们也很可能拒绝做此选择。


We have seen firsthand how universities in the region and around the world have shut their doors in the faces of refugees from Syria and elsewhere, forcing them to overcome huge bureaucratic and financial hurdles.	我们曾亲眼目睹地区及世界各地大学如何对叙利亚及其他地区难民关上大门，迫使他们不得不克服巨大的官僚主义和财务障碍的事实。


The second challenge is the low quality of education currently being delivered.	第二个问题是目前提供的教育质量极低。


For far too long, the region’s post-secondary institutions have operated without having to prove that the education they provide aligns with global quality standards and expectations.	长久以来，地区高等教育机构不必向外界证明其所提供的教育服务符合国际质量标准和要求。


Through online learning, it would be far easier to measure progress and ensure that students are acquiring knowledge and skills they can actually use.	在线教育将大大降低衡量进展的难度，并确保学生们能够学到实用的知识和技能。


Meanwhile, online learning can facilitate the introduction of new and innovative teaching and learning methods.	不仅如此，在线教育还可以促进创新教育及学习方法的引入。


For example, a reduction in traditional lecturing and rote learning could create space for the kinds of self-paced and personalized learning and assessment tools being used by professors delivering Massive Open Online Courses on EdX and other online educational platforms.	例如，传统授课和死记硬背的减少可以为各类自学及个性化的学习及评估工具创造空间，不少教授现在在大规模开放式在线课程平台及其他在线教育平台上采用这些工具。


Third, the Arab world faces the challenge of delivering continuous learning.	第三，阿拉伯世界面临着提供不间断教育服务的难题。


In order to thrive in today’s fast-changing economic environment, where technology is making many jobs redundant and rewarding greater specialization, workers everywhere must consistently upgrade or expand their skill sets.	要想适应当今快速变化的经济环境（也就是说技术的应用让很多岗位变得多余并且与此同时鼓励更高程度的专业化），世界各地的工人必须持续升级并拓展他们的技能范围。


As it stands, only wealthy young people in the Arab world, without personal commitments such as families and jobs, can pursue continuous learning, in the form of graduate degrees from top universities.	目前的现状是，阿拉伯世界只有来自富裕家庭的年轻人因为无需承担家庭和工作方面的压力而能以获取一流大学研究生学历等方式进行不间断的学习。


Open online courses can level the playing field by offering professionally recognized credentials that boost a person’s career prospects.	开放式在线课程可以提供得到专业人士接受的学历认证，从而通过创造公平的竞争环境提升个人的职业前途。


Taking all of this into consideration, we have created the Al Ghurair Open Learning Scholars Program, aimed at making some of the best education in the world available to Arab youth through online degree programs.	考虑到所有这一切，我们成立了古赖尔开放教学奖学金计划，旨在通过在线学位课程为阿拉伯年轻人提供世界最好的教育。


We are setting the bar high, by establishing our first collaboration with MIT, a leader in open online learning.	我们通过与麻省理工学院合作制定了很高的标准，后者是开放式在线教育领域的领导者。


Together, MIT and the Open Learning Scholars Program will create two new “MicroMasters” programs consisting of five 12-week courses in so-called STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) that are not currently taught in the Arab world.	麻省理工和开放教学奖学金计划一道将创办两项全新的“微硕士”计划，包括阿拉伯世界目前尚未讲授的所谓STEM（科学、技术、工程和数学）学科5项为期12周的课程。


We expect these programs – accessible to young people in Arab countries and beyond – will attract significant interest from students and strong support from employers.	我们期待（对阿拉伯和其他国家青年开放的）上述计划能够显著调动学生的积极性，并能得到来自雇主的强有力的支持。


But, in order to maximize the impact of our investment, perceptions of online learning must change, which will require a joint effort by educational institutions, government, and the private sector.	但为实现投资影响的最大化，我们还必须改变在线教育的观念，而这需要教育机构和私营部门的共同努力。


Indeed, Arab educational institutions must begin to explore the development of high-quality online programs.	的确，阿拉伯教育机构必须开始探索发展高质量在线计划的奥秘。


For their part, governments should reconsider their position on recognizing online learning delivered by credible and internationally accredited institutions.	就其本身而言，政府应当重新思考承认由可靠并经过国际认证的机构提供在线教育的立场。


As for private-sector actors, the key will be to reward employees with degrees and certifications received through online programs.	而就私营主体而言，关键在于对通过在线计划取得学位和证书的员工进行奖励。


In the meantime, the Abdulla Al Ghurair Foundation for Education will embark on a concerted effort to make innovative STEM degrees offered online by the world’s best universities available to Arab youth.	与此同时，阿卜杜拉·古赖尔教育基金将着手开展协调一致地行动，以便为阿拉伯青年提供世界一流大学颁发的创新STEM（科学、技术、工程和数学）学位。


Not to do so would risk allowing the majority of Arab young people to be left behind.	不这样做相当于允许绝大多数阿拉伯青年掉队。


Arab Fathers and Sons	阿拉伯的父与子


The deaths of Yasir Arafat and of Sheikh Zayd, the long-standing ruler of the United Arab Emirates, continues the generational change that began in 1999-2000, when the leaders of Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria died in quick succession.	1999-2000年，约旦、摩洛哥、巴林和叙利亚的领导人在短时间内相继去世，开始了一场世代的交替，而亚瑟·阿拉法特和阿联酋长期以来的领导人谢赫·宰德之死正是这场交替的延续。


Across the Middle East people are younger, and their political leaders older, than the world average.	整个中东的人口比世界平均水平年轻，但他们的政治领导人年龄却高于世界平均水平。


The gradual replacement of one generation of elites by another may be one of the key factors in determining whether or not effective reform takes place in the Arab world.	这种一代精英被下一代逐渐代替的过程可能是判断阿拉伯世界的改革是否有效的关键因素之一。


At present, four political generations co-exist on the region’s socio-political map.	目前，这个地区的社会政治地图上有四代政治领导人共存。


The outgoing leadership generation – that of Arafat, King Hussein or Hafiz al-Assad, King Fahd and President Mubarak – was born before 1935 and has determined events in the Middle East since the 1970’s.	逐渐离任的一代领导人——即阿拉法特、侯赛因国王或哈菲兹·阿萨德、法德国王和穆巴拉克总统一代——出生于1935年以前，从20世纪70年代以来就决定着中东的事务。


These leaders came of age and began their careers during the era of decolonization.	这一代领导人在去殖民化的时期成年，并开始职业生涯。


They were weaned on Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism, and the crucial political event for them was the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.	他们是在加麦尔·阿卜杜勒·纳赛的泛阿拉伯民族主义教育下长大的。 对他们来说，最重要的政治事件是1967年阿以战争中阿拉伯的失利。


Members of this generation sought a strong Arab leadership that would create a balance of power with Israel.	这一代人寻求强有力的、能与以色列达到力量平衡的阿拉伯领袖。


They also believed in – or at least toyed with – forms of socialism and étatism, and did not consider democracy or civil rights to be priorities.	他们还相信——或至少幻想过——各种形式的社会主义和国家社会主义，民主和民权在他们看来并非首要问题。


The next generation was born between 1935 and 1955, and in many respects represents a generation “in between.”	其后一代出生于1935到1955年之间，在很多方面都是“过渡性”的一代。


Most benefited from the economic growth and expanded educational opportunities associated with the oil boom of the 1970’s.	这一代人大多尝到了20世纪70年代石油剧增带来的经济增长和更多教育机会的好处。


At the same time, political participation remained blocked by the previous generation, which never intended to give up power voluntarily.	同时，政坛仍然被上一代人所把持，而上一代人是决不会自愿放下手中的权力的。


Unsurprisingly, many in this generation grew dissatisfied, and not a few began to look for Islamic alternatives to the prevailing political systems.	自然，这代人大多充满不满情绪，许多人开始寻求替代主流政治制度的伊斯兰制度。


Rather than determining events in the coming two or three decades, this generation is likely to be sidelined by the next cohort, born between 1955 and 1975.	然而，这代人不会在接下来的二三十年中决定事务，却极有可能被1955到1975年之间出生的下一代人赶下政治舞台。


This is the generation of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, Jordan’s King Abdullah and Morocco’s King Muhammad VI.	这是叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德、约旦国王阿卜杜拉和摩洛哥国王穆罕默德六世的一代。


Some call this the “generation of sons” – sons of leaders who led their states for decades.	有人把这一代称作“儿子的一代”——那些数十年来领导各自国家的领导人的儿子。


This age cohort was not much influenced by the Arab-Israeli wars or the East-West conflict.	这一代人没有怎么受到阿以战争或中东冲突的影响。


Instead, their political education included the Gulf War of 1991 and the Arab-Israeli peace process of the 1990’s, with its crises and breakdown.	相反，他们的政治教育中有1991年的海湾战争，也有20世纪90年代的阿以和平进程，包括其危机和破裂。


Jailed West Bank Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti is as representative of this group as the leaders of Syria and Jordan.	除叙利亚和约旦的领导人外，入狱的西岸法塔赫领袖马尔万·巴尔古提也是这一代人的代表。


Members of this generation are better acquainted with notions of globalization and economic reform than with socialism and revolution.	相对于社会主义和革命，这代人更熟悉全球化和经济改革的概念。


Except for the Palestinians, they have never known their countries other than as independent and comparatively stable states.	除巴勒斯坦外，他们在各自的国家内一直过着独立和相对稳定的生活。


In the Palestinian territories, the jil al-intifada , the generation of the (first and second) Palestinian uprising, will likely become the founding generation.	在巴勒斯坦范围内， jil al-intifada ，（第一、二次）巴勒斯坦起义的一代，大概会成为奠基的一代。


But it is the fourth group that underscores the relevance of generational issues in the Arab world.	但是阿拉伯世界世代问题的重要性在于第四代人。


Even when combined, the first three generations make up barely one-third of the entire Arab population.	前三代人加起来也不过占整个阿拉伯人口的三分之一。


Almost 60% of all Arabs are younger than 20, with roughly 70% below the age of 30.	近60%的阿拉伯人都不到20岁，30岁以下的约有70%。


This raises a key question: what happens to these Arab “baby boomers” if the generation now coming to power clings to it as tenaciously as the generation of Mubarak, Assad, and Hussein?	这就提出了一个关键性问题：如果目前开始掌权的一代人像穆巴拉克、阿萨德和侯赛因那一代人一样坚持不放手中的权力，这些在“婴儿潮”出生的阿拉伯人会怎样？


The political generation of Bashar al-Assad, King Abdullah, and Gamal Mubarak – son of Egypt’s ailing president – forms a less coherent picture than that of the outgoing leadership.	与逐渐退出的一代领导人相比，巴沙尔·阿萨德、阿卜杜拉国王和加麦尔·穆巴拉克——病痛缠身的埃及总统的儿子——这一代政治人物的形象并没有那么一致。


In that elder generation, many had pursued military careers, and many of their aides and collaborators were engineers and civil servants.	老一代的人许多都从事着军事生涯，他们的很多助手和合作伙伴都是工程师和公仆。


The socio-professional profile of the new elite is broader.	新的精英们的社会职业背景要更广一些。


Economists, bankers, and entrepreneurs as well as of technology or communication experts are common.	经济学家、银行家、企业家以及技术或通讯专家都很常见。


There are also more traditional politicians: personalities who see themselves as representatives of particular social or economic interests, not as apolitical technocrats.	同时也有更加传统的政客：代表特定社会或经济利益的人物，而不是不讲政治的技术统治论者。


This new leadership elite is in many ways more cosmopolitan than its predecessors; their average level of education is higher; a few have foreign degrees.	这个新的精英领导阶层在许多方面都比其前任更加具有全球性； 他们的平均教育水平更高；


Women also play a somewhat greater role.	有些还获得了国外学位。 妇女的作用也多少有所增加。


Developments in Morocco, Bahrain, and Jordan certainly seem to suggest that this changing of the guard can help soften rigid political structures and allow for broader participation.	摩洛哥、巴林和约旦的发展的确似乎暗示着领导层的变更有助于缓和刻板的政治结构，允许更多的人参与。


But generational change need not be accompanied by economic reform and steps towards political liberalization – witness North Korea under Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il.	但是世代的更替不一定伴随着经济改革和政治解放——看看在金日成的儿子金正日的领导下的朝鲜。


Indeed, experience gives little reason to presume that a modern way of speaking, willingness to liberalize the economy, and an urge for technological development automatically translates into a democratic opening.	的确，从经验看来，我们没有理由认为现代化的言谈方式、愿意解放经济的态度、以及敦促科技发展的做法就自动代表了民主化的趋势。


It is more realistic to expect that the new Arab elites will make use of their states’ authoritarian institutions, both to overcome resistance to their economic agendas and to consolidate their newly acquired power.	要看到阿拉伯新的精英们会利用国家的权力机构消除经济议程的阻力，同时巩固其刚获得的权力，这才更实际。


This is anything but a risk-free path.	这绝对不是一条没有风险的道路。


Without a significant increase in opportunities for political participation, including genuinely competitive elections, the chasm between a predominantly young population and a ruling elite with a narrow generational base will widen.	如果不大幅度地增加参政议政的机会，包括真正具有竞争性的选举，那么，主要由年轻人构成的人口和世代基础狭隘的统治精英之间的裂痕就会加深。


Such continuing political inertia leaves an increasingly young Arab population prey to the appeal of extremist ideologies, while driving the best and brightest to seek their fortune elsewhere.	这样持续的政治惰性最终将使越来越年轻化的阿拉伯人受到极端意识形态的吸引，同时驱使最有能力最聪明的人到其他地方寻求发展。


Arab Fathers and Sons	阿拉伯的父亲和儿子们


The problem of succession in the Arab secular republics highlights their predicament in the transition to a post-revolutionary phase, for succession in regimes that fail to build strong institutions always risks triggering a systemic crisis.	阿拉伯世俗共和国的政权交接问题凸显了它们在转向后革命时代时所面临的困境，因为在未能建立强大制度的政体内进行的政权交接总是会引发体系的危机。


While the decision by some in favor of dynastic succession may be lacking in democracy, it is not entirely devoid of merit.	尽管某些倾向在家族内部进行交接的决定也许缺乏民主，但是却并非完全没有优点。


Arguably, it is a choice for economic modernization, for an end to the politics of conflict, and for positive political change further down the road.	值得玩味的是，这样的选择有利于经济现代化、结束政治斗争以及进一步推进政治变革。


Years of Western-backed repressive authoritarianism nipped in the bud any potential growth of a liberal alternative to the incumbent Arab regimes, and turned any abrupt move to free elections into a dangerous exercise in Islamic democracy.	受到西方支持的专制政权多年来把任何可能会取代在位的阿拉伯政权的成长中的自由主义运动都扼杀在襁褓之中，并且任何突然推行的自由选举都演变成伊斯兰民主危险的实施。


A democracy that produces governments led by Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Muslim Brotherhood is inevitably bound to be anti-Western and opposed to an American-inspired “peace process” with Israel.	这样的民主产生了被哈马斯、真主党或穆斯林兄弟会所领导的政府，它们无可避免地会与西方对抗并且反对由美国所倡导的与以色列之间的“和平进程”。


Syria has already sought to assure regime continuity through quasi-monarchic hereditary succession with the move from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar.	叙利亚已经通过类似君主制的世袭继承来寻求确保政权的延续，哈菲兹·阿萨德把政权交给了他的儿子巴沙尔。


There are indications that Egypt might follow suit, with Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal, taking over.	有迹象显示埃及也会步其后尘，穆巴拉克的儿子贾迈尔将会继位。


Likewise, Libya’s Muammar Khaddafi may be succeeded by his son, Seif el Islam.	同样地，利比亚的卡扎菲可能也会让他的儿子赛费尔·伊斯兰接班。


As products of revolutionary military takeovers, these secular nationalist regimes failed to produce genuine popular legitimacy and have had to fall back on the dynastic succession practiced by the regimes they toppled.	作为革命军事政变的产物，这些世俗民族主义政权没能产生大众合法性，而是不得不退回到被他们所推翻的政权所实行的世袭继承中来。


The centrality of hereditary succession in the quest for peace and stability was shown by Hafez al-Assad when he agreed to unprecedented good will gestures aimed at drawing Ehud Barak’s Israeli government into a peace deal.	世袭继承的中心在于寻求和平和稳定，这一点当哈菲兹·阿萨德同意以空前的亲善姿态带动巴拉克政府达成和平协议。


An old and sick man who was to die a few months later, he acted with a sense of urgency to reach a deal that would relieve his inexperienced son of the burden of struggling for the recovery of the Golan Heights.	作为一个几个月后就将辞世的年老体弱的人，他有一种要达成协议的紧迫感，以便让他缺乏经验的儿子不再受到为收回戈兰高地而进行斗争的压力。


Bashar Assad remains essentially loyal to his father’s legacy.	巴沙尔对他父亲的遗产基本保持了忠诚。


Not unlike North Korea’s and Iran’s defiant nuclear policies, Bashar’s membership in the region’s “axis of evil” is a call for dialogue with America, not an invitation to an invasion, and for a settlement with Israel, not a drive to wage war on it.	与朝鲜和伊朗挑衅性的核战略不同，巴沙尔作为地区的“邪恶轴心”呼吁与美国进行对话，而不是使他们作出入侵的决定，以及与以色列达成妥协，而不是挑起与它的战争。


In Egypt, Mubarak turned his back on the lofty rhetoric of Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s revolution and its grand strategic designs. Stability is at the heart of his thinking.	在埃及，穆巴拉克没有听从纳赛尔发起的革命那些玄虚的言论和它伟大的战略设计，他心里考虑的是稳定问题。


Hence, he could not accept America’s awkward pro-democracy agenda. But he was more than willing to occupy center stage in Arab diplomacy’s support of the Annapolis peace conference.	因此，他无法接受美国笨拙的赞成民主的议程，而是更愿意占据阿拉伯外交支持安纳波利斯和平会议的中心舞台。


After all, the passion that the Palestinians’ plight evokes among ordinary Egyptians is a dangerous source of instability.	不管怎样，巴勒斯坦的困境在普通埃及民众中所唤起的同情是引发不稳定的危险根源。


Mubarak’s succession is being conducted in an especially sophisticated manner.	穆巴拉克的接班问题是以一种特别复杂的方式来处理的。


His son’s ascension, unlike that of Bashar on the eve of his father’s death, is anything but settled.	不像巴沙尔在他父亲去世前那样，他的儿子的继位问题还远远没有确定。


But, by being allowed to acquire popular legitimacy and a high degree of acceptance within the political establishment as the driving force behind the ruling party’s preparations for the post-Mubarak era, Gamal is being positioned strategically to compete effectively for the presidency.	但是，执政党为了给后穆巴拉克时代做准备，他们让贾迈尔被允许获得大众合法性以及在政坛得到更高程度的接受，使他被战略性地推到可以有效地竞争总统宝座的位置。


He is widely credited for setting the country’s agenda, and for being the motor behind the liberal economic reforms that since 2004 have meant a qualitative leap in the Egyptian economy.	他得到广泛的信任为这个国家设定议程，并且是2004年以来使埃及经济发生高质量的腾飞的自由经济改革幕后的策划者。


It may be, as President Mubarak’s critics argue, that the faltering progress of democratization reflects the attempt to block all potential challengers to Gamal.	也许像穆巴拉克的批评者所说的那样，这种犹犹豫豫的民主化进程是为了阻止任何可能挑战贾迈尔地位的人。


But, with the decline of secular nationalism and Islamism’s rise, the hidden electoral power of the Muslim Brotherhood poses a mortal threat to the regime and its strategic alliance with the West.	但是，随着世俗民族主义的式微和伊斯兰主义的崛起，穆斯林兄弟会隐藏的选举力量对这个政权以及它与西方的战略联盟都构成了致命的威胁。


As a result, the regime refuses to take any chances.	其结果是，这个政权拒绝冒任何风险。


Nor was Muammar Khaddafi’s decision to stop being an international pariah entirely unrelated to his concern to bequeath to his son a state that lives in peace with the world.	卡扎菲决定不再被国际社会所排斥在外也并非完全与他希望留给他的儿子一个与世界和平相处的国家无关。


His abysmal human rights record remains, but the flamboyant “Guide of the Revolution” ceased flirting with weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism in exchange for the end of sanctions and international rehabilitation.	他恶劣的人权记录并没有消除，但是这位奢华的“革命向导”停止不严肃地对待大规模杀伤性武器和全球恐怖主义问题以换取结束制裁和回到国际大家庭中来。


A sick man whose rule at home is being challenged by Islamist opponents, he decided that international ostracism and domestic troubles is too explosive a combination for his son, a spoiled playboy, to handle.	作为一个在国内的统治受到伊斯兰主义反对派挑战的病人，他认识到被国际社会所放逐加上国内的问题交给他那位被娇纵惯养的花花公子儿子来处理实在是太危险了。


Algeria is an especially difficult case.	阿尔及利亚的问题尤其困难。


The last of the revolutionary generation, President Abdulaziz Buteflika must still conceive a succession that ends his country’s civil war.	作为革命一代最后一位幸存者，布特弗利卡总统必须想办法实现结束他的国家的内战的权力交接。


Fully-fledged democracy might lead to victory for Islamists, as it did in 1991.	尚处于襁褓之中的民主很可能会像1991年那样导致伊斯兰主义者的胜利。


A transition to democracy in the old revolutionary Arab regimes will not correspond to a Western model, nor can it be imposed by American F-16’s.	在过去通过革命产生的阿拉伯政权内部向民主的转化不能参照西方的模式，也不是F-16战斗机所能够强制实行的。


But, as countries like Egypt, Syria, and Lybia might be indicating, hereditary succession is not an inherently reactionary move.	但是，正如埃及、叙利亚和利比亚这些国家所表明的，世袭继承并非是一种内部的反应。


Rather, it means opting for a controlled transition to a post-revolutionary phase in which economic modernization and international integration might usher in greater political change in the future.	相反，它意味着选择向后革命时代有控制的转变，而经济的现代化以及与国际社会的融合也许可以在未来迎来更大的政治变革。


The Silent Arab Majority Must Speak Up	沉默的阿拉伯多数派必须发声


ALGIERS – Since the United Nations Development Program began work on the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) in 2001, the situation in many Arab countries has gone from bad to worse.	阿尔及尔——自从联合国发展计划署2001年开始编制阿拉伯人类发展报告（AHDR）以来，许多阿拉伯国家的状况可谓每况愈下。


In fact, today the region cannot even come together to publish a new report.	事实上，今天该地区合作发布新报告已不太可能了。


This is unfortunate, because finding a new shared vision for Arab people, especially Arab youth, is a prerequisite for ever achieving peace and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa.	这样的情况非常不幸，因为为阿拉伯民众、尤其是阿拉伯年轻人制定新的共同目标是中东和北非实现和平繁荣的先决条件。


The first AHDR, published in 2002, identified three major “development deficits” holding the region back: knowledge, women’s empowerment, and freedom.	第一份阿拉伯人类发展报告发表于2002年，明确了阻碍中东地区的三大“发展赤字”：知识、女性授权和自由。


The report, described as “written by Arabs for Arabs,” had a clear influence on the regional development narrative and the way national elites talked about the problems facing their societies.	这份被誉为“阿拉伯人为阿拉伯人”编写的报告明确影响到地区发展前景及各国精英谈论社会问题的方式。


Around the time of the first AHDR, the Arab world had reasons for optimism.	在首份阿拉伯人类发展报告发布前后，阿拉伯世界有理由对未来保持乐观。


Israel, having withdrawn from Lebanon in 2000, withdrew from Gaza in 2005.	以色列继2000年从黎巴嫩撤军后，2005年再次从加沙撤军。


New Arab leaders – such as Abdullah II in Jordan, Mohammed VI in Morocco, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria – were coming to power and generating hope for change.	新任阿拉伯领导人——如约旦的阿卜杜拉二世、摩洛哥的穆罕默德六世和叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德——都陆续上台，而且带来了变革的希望。


Saudi Arabia announced its first municipal elections in 2003, and held them in 2005.	沙特阿拉伯于2003年宣布举行首次市政选举，并于2005年完成了投票。


Egypt and Iraq also both held (mostly) democratic elections in 2005.	埃及和伊拉克两国都在2005年举行了民主选举。


And Algeria’s attempt to quell longstanding civil strife was largely successful, thanks in part to high oil prices throughout this period.	多亏贯穿该时期始终的高油价，阿尔及利亚平息长期内乱的努力基本取得了成功。


After the Arab Spring, which began in December 2010 and gained momentum through 2011, the UNDP began the 2015 AHDR, which focused specifically on the plight of Arab youth.	2010年12月爆发的阿拉伯之春革命在2011年始终呈燎原之势，在这场革命后，联合国开发计划署开始编制2015年阿拉伯人类发展报告，重点探讨阿拉伯青年的困境。


I was a member of the 2015 AHDR team, along with around 30 intellectuals and activists from the Arab world.	我本人曾是2015年阿拉伯人类发展报告编制小组成员，参与编制工作的还有约30名阿拉伯世界知识分子和活动人士。


The 2015 AHDR shared similar themes with its 2002 precursor, but this time we engaged more directly with influential Arab youth to compile the best data possible, and to put a spotlight on the effects of the wars engulfing the region.	2015年阿拉伯人类发展报告与2002年报告主题十分相似，但这次我们直接接触了有影响力的阿拉伯年轻人，以便获取尽可能详实的数据，并重点关注了吞噬阿拉伯地区的战争的后果。


The 2015 report was finalized in May 2015.	2015年报告于2015年5月编制完成。


But it has lain in the drawers of the UNDP Arab Bureau in New York ever since, probably in no small part due to its harsh judgment of the Arab power elite.	但从那以后它就静静躺在纽约联合国开发计划署阿拉伯发展局的抽屉里，很大部分原因可能是由于对阿拉伯权力精英的严厉批评。


One finding from the 2015 report that I can speak to directly is the emergence in the Arab world of a “silent majority” with a more liberal mindset, especially among the young.	2015年报告中我可以直接提到的一点是阿拉伯世界崛起了思维更自由的“沉默的多数派”，尤其是在年轻人当中。


This promising trend reveals itself in generational comparisons of global opinion polls.	全球民调的代际比较揭示了这一充满希望的趋势。


Arab youth have more access to information from the outside world than ever before, and they are embracing values shared by other young people globally, rather than the values of their parents’ generation.	阿拉伯年轻人从外界获取信息的渠道比以往任何时候都多，而且他们正在接受其他国家年轻人共有的价值观。


Specifically, Arab youth yearn for greater participation in civil society, emancipation from patriarchal hierarchies, and more space for individual creativity.	具体来讲，阿拉伯年轻人向往加入公民社会，从僵化的等级制度中得到解放并拥有更多的个人创造空间。


While education did not emancipate as much as in the rest of the world, owing to the conservative curriculum, youth did.	虽然因课程安排保守教育不像世界其他国家那样解放，但却无法束缚年轻人的思维。


Given these findings, the 2015 report advises national, regional, and international progressive groups to support the forces of emancipation, which hold the key to finding homegrown solutions to the challenges of ensuring better governance, more productive economies, and more resilient societies.	鉴于这样的民调结果，2015年报告建议国家、地区和国际进步团体支持解放力量，而后者是确保找到高效执政、繁荣经济和弹性社会等多重挑战的国内解决方案的关键所在。


The only route to large-scale change in the Arab world is to unleash innovation and creativity – and that demands an unbounded civil society.	阿拉伯世界大规模变革的唯一途径是启动创新和创造力——而这需要无拘无束的民间社会。


Fundamental civil rights must be established, supported by deep changes in the education system, reforms of family law, and a more open space for media and culture.	必须建立起基本的公民权、辅以对教育体系的深刻改革、对家庭法的改革并赋予媒体和文化更多的开放空间。


The 2015 report, which I hope will be published soon, should encourage a reasoned and constructive regional conversation.	我期待不久后即将发布的2015年报告能够鼓励理性和建设性的地区对话。


It begins with this warning: “The youth of the region are becoming continually more disenchanted with the ossified political power structures that marginalize them.	报告开篇就是这样的警示：“导致年轻人边缘化的僵化的政权结构让年轻人的失望越来越深。


Unless governments wake up to this blinding reality, they are going to have to deal with far more than a few extremists.”	除非政府意识到这样的现实，否则他们要面对的远远不止是少数几个极端分子。 ”


The new silent majority is the best defense against the radical and suicidal undercurrents that have filled the political vacuum created by the collapse of the old order.	旧秩序崩塌带来了政治真空，这样的真空被极端自杀性暗流所填补，而面对这样的暗流最坚固的防御力量是新生沉默的多数民众。


Reform-minded Arabs must aim to widen the center, rather than trying to bring together the fringes.	秉承改革思维的阿拉伯人必须着力扩大中间派，而不是试图弥合极端派之间的鸿沟。


And the silent majority needs to break its silence.	沉默的多数派必须打破沉默。


Otherwise, revolts against an unacceptable status quo will continue to be led by extremists, who have only grievances, not aspirations.	否则，对无法接受的现状的反抗将继续由极端分子所主导，这些人只有怨恨，没有志向。


The early 2000s held promise for the Arab world, and in today’s youth we can see it renewed.	21世纪初的阿拉伯世界曾经充满希望，而今天我们看到希望又再次出现在年轻人身上。


Arab civil-society reformers must be encouraged to speak up now, or risk losing that promise for another generation.	阿拉伯民间社会改革者必须出来说话，否则就会冒险让又一代人失去希望。


Economic Growth After the Arab Spring	阿拉伯之春后的经济增长


CAMBRIDGE – Five years after the Arab Spring uprisings began, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia have achieved reasonable levels of political stability.	坎布里奇—阿拉伯之春起义已经五年，埃及、约旦、摩洛哥和突尼斯都实现了相当程度的政治稳定。


Yet economic growth remains tepid, and the International Monetary Fund does not expect the pace of expansion to exceed 1.5% per capita this year.	但经济增长依然不如人意，国际货币基金组织（IMF）的今年预期人均GDP增长也不超过1. 5%。


Given the region’s large catch-up potential and young workforces, one must ask why this is so.	该地区赶超潜力巨大，也有大量年轻劳动力，你一定很奇怪为何会如此。


One obvious explanation is that, despite significant progress in building stable governments, these countries remain subject to political risks that scare private investors.	一个显而易见的解释是，尽管在构建稳定政府方面取得了巨大进展，但这些国家仍然饱受让私人投资者望而却步的政治风险的影响。


But private investment was modest before the uprisings of 2011, when such risks were already high.	但2011年之前这些风险便已经很高，私人投资也相当平庸。


There must be more to the story.	必定还有其他解释。


A look at these countries’ recent economic history offers insight into the problem.	看看这些国家的经济史，我们可以获得关于这个问题的洞见。


Market economies are relatively new to the Middle East and North Africa, having arisen only after the 1980s, when the model of state-directed economic growth collapsed under the weight of its inefficiencies (and resulting debt).	市场经济对中东和北非来说是一件相对较新的事物，直到20实际80年代国家主导的经济增长因为效率低下（以及由此产生的债务）而垮台后才出现。


Unlike Latin America or Eastern Europe, however, Arab countries liberalized their economies without liberalizing their politics.	但是，和拉丁美洲或东欧不同，阿拉伯国家只自由化了经济，而没有自由化政治。


Autocrats, supported by Western powers, remained firmly in place.	在西方力量的支持下，独裁根深蒂固。


As a result, even as the reforms of the 1990s rolled back the state’s economic role – in Egypt, state spending fell from 60% of GDP in 1980 to 30% of GDP in the 1990s – politics continued to shape markets.	因此，即使20实际90年代的改革转变了国家的经济角色——在埃及，国家支出占GDP之比从1980年的60%下降到20世纪90年代的30%——政治仍在左右市场。


With economic privileges doled out in a way that blocked the emergence of independent entrepreneurs that might eventually challenge the autocrats’ control, favored firms were able to acquire virtual monopolies over entire liberalized economic sectors.	经济特权阻挠了最终可能威胁到独裁控制的独立企业家的出现，而有利于能够几乎垄断全部自由化经济部门的企业。


In Egypt, for example, the firms of 32 businessmen closely connected with then-President Hosni Mubarak received in 2010 more than 80% of the credit that went to the formal private sector and earned 60% of the sector’s overall profits, while employing only 11% of the country’s labor force.	比如，在埃及，32 位商人与前总统穆巴拉克关系紧密，2010年，他们获得了流向正式私人部门的总信用的80%以上，赚得60%的部门总利润，但只雇用了希腊劳动力总量的11%。


In Tunisia, former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s cronies received 21% of all private-sector profits in 2010, though their firms employed only 1% of Tunisia’s labor force.	在突尼斯，前总统本·阿里的亲朋好友获得了2010年私人部门总利润的21%，尽管他们的企业只雇用了突尼斯劳动力总量的1%。


Unsurprisingly, this system generated only modest growth.	毫不奇怪，这一制度只能带来平庸的增长。


Political loyalty does not translate into economic efficiency, and autocratic leaders’ loyalists consistently failed to build competitive world-class corporations.	政治忠诚没有转化为经济效率，衷心耿耿于独裁领导人的人没能建立起有竞争力的世界级公司。


With talented potential competitors at such a distinct disadvantage, nobody was motivated to innovate or invest adequately.	有能力的潜在竞争者处于极大的劣势，因此没有人有动力进行足够的创新或投资。


And it was not only traditional rent-filled sectors, such as real estate or natural resources, that failed to reach their growth potential.	而没能实现增长潜力不只限于传统寻租部门，如房地产和自然资源部门。


In tradable sectors, such as manufacturing and utilities, rents were created through non-tariff protection and subsidies, leading to anemic export growth.	在可贸易部门，如制造业和公用事业，租通过非关税保护和补贴制造出来，导致出口增长疲软。


The result was a dearth of jobs in the formal sector, which rarely employed more than 20% of the labor force.	结果是正是部门就业岗位稀缺，雇用人数很少超过劳动力总量的20%。


With the few good jobs reserved for favored groups, a growing pool of educated young workers faced lower-quality jobs in the informal sector.	极少数好工作只为关系集团保留，因此越来越多受过教育的年轻工人只能在非正式部门找到低质量工作。


Add to that poor-quality services, and social mobility ground to a halt.	此外服务质量低下，社会流动也近乎停止。


Intensifying social dissatisfaction was met with rising levels of repression.	日益恶化的社会不满又遇上了逐渐升级的镇压。


As political risks rose, the autocrats’ cronies demanded higher returns.	随着政治风险提高，独裁者的亲信开始要求更高的回报。


Ultimately, the regimes’ inability to control both the street and the private sector culminated in popular protests and political revolutions.	最终，体制无法同时控制街头和私人部门，最终导致群众示威和政治革命。


The governments that emerged from the Arab Spring’s wreckage inherited a broken system of closed deals.	从阿拉伯之春的废墟中崛起的政府继承了一套残破的封闭交易制度。


Inadequate property-rights protection is impeding investment, but moving to fair and well-enforced rules is not a realistic prospect in the current environment, given the petty corruption of an underpaid bureaucracy and the polarized political environment.	不充分的产权保护阻碍着投资，但拜收入过低的官僚的小腐败和极端化的政治环境所赐，走向公平和执行有力的规则在当前环境下亦非现实前景。


These countries could try to replicate Turkey’s economic success in 2000-2010, when a political alliance between the ruling party and a broad group of dynamic small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) contributed to a tripling of exports.	这些国家可以试图复制2000—2010年间土耳其的经济成功，执政党和大量有活力的中小企业结成政治联盟，让出口增长了两倍。


The challenge here would be to find the right investors, who can spur growth and create jobs, not just provide political support.	这里的挑战是找到能够刺激增长和创造就业，而不只是提供政治支持的正确的投资者。


Here, Morocco and Jordan have had some success, with their monarchies proving capable of managing elites who offer both political acquiescence and economic sustenance.	在这方面，摩洛哥和约旦都取得了一些成功，它们的君主表现出管住提供政治默许和经济支持的精英的能力。


But, while these countries’ governments are having some success in broadening their business coalitions, traditional rent-seeking cronies are constraining progress.	但是，这些国家的政府固然在扩大业务联盟方面取得了一些成功，但传统的寻租集团正在遏制进步。


By undermining investment in tradable sectors, appeasing them means hampering export growth considerably.	对他们让步意味着降低可贸易部门的投资，从而大大拖累出口增长。


Tunisia could take a page out of Morocco’s playbook, expanding its export sector by attracting foreign direct investment, while opening up its domestic services sector to local SMEs.	突尼斯与摩洛哥模式不同，它通过吸引外国直接投资扩张出口部门，同时向本国中小企业开放国内服务业。


But it would still have to face the challenge of liberalizing its economy, in the face of rising pressure from labor unions to protect inefficient incumbent firms from increased competition.	但它仍需要面临经济自由化的挑战，工会保护效率低下的老牌企业免受竞争加剧的影响的压力日益增加。


For its part, Egypt is relying on public and private firms close to its army, together with finance from the Gulf Cooperation Council, to support its economy.	至于埃及，它依靠与军方关系密切的私人企业，以及来自海湾合作委员会（GCC）的融资支持经济。


But, given the fall in GCC oil revenues – not to mention disappointment with the arrangement’s inefficiency – this route seems increasingly limited.	但是，由于GCC石油收入下降——更不用说对该安排效率低下的失望了——这条路未必行得通。


In all four countries, employment growth will remain constrained for some time to come.	在所有四个国家中，就业增长在未来一段时间内仍将饱受掣肘。


Improving economic inclusion without threatening political leaders will be no easy feat, as it demands the creation of more inclusive governance arrangements.	在不威胁政治领导人的情况下增进经济包容绝非易事，这需要建立更加包容的治理安排。


For Morocco and Tunisia, the convergence of interests between moderate Islamists and liberals offers a ray of hope.	对摩洛哥和突尼斯来说，温和派伊斯兰教徒和自由派之间的利益趋同提供了一些希望。


But such hope seems to be lacking for the moment in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.	但这一希望目前在埃及和地区内其他国家难觅踪迹。


The Lonely Arab Crowd	孤独的阿拉伯人群


PARIS – In The Hubris of the Zero Point, the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez describes René Descartes’s 1637 declaration “I think, therefore I am” as the moment white Europeans installed themselves above God as the sole arbiters of knowledge and truth.	巴黎—哥伦比亚哲学家圣地亚哥·卡斯特罗-戈麦兹（Santiago Castro-Gomez）在《零点的狂妄》（The Hubris of the Zero Point）中笛卡尔1637年所提出的“我思故我在”的口号描述为欧洲白人让自己凌驾于上帝之上、作为知识和真理的唯一仲裁者的时刻。


With this turning point, they began to think of themselves as observers whose scientific methods, morals, and ethics overrode those of other cultures.	在这个转折点之后，他们开始自视为观察者，他们的科学方法、道德和伦理超然于其他文化之上。


Cultural “zero points” are important because they serve as a dividing line – a clear demarcation of “before” and “after” that holds fundamental implications for the development of private and public life.	文化的“零点”是重要的，因为它们构成了一条分割线——泾渭分明的“之前”和“之后”——给私人和公共生活的发展造成了根本性影响。


So it is instructive to consider the implications of Castro-Gomez’s concept for the Arab world.	因此，考察卡斯特罗-戈麦兹的概念对阿拉伯世界的影响很具有说明性。


Indeed, it could be argued that much of the region’s troubles are attributable to the absence of an indigenous “zero point” onto which a modern culture could be sturdily pinned.	事实上，可以说，该地区的许多麻烦都要归因于缺少本土的“零点”，导致现代文化无法找到稳固的根基。


In The Lonely Crowd, the American sociologist David Riesman identified three broad cultural types: tradition-directed cultures that look to inherited rituals, morals, and values for guidance; inner-directed cultures, in which people behave according to self-nourished values; and other-directed cultures that react predominantly to external norms and peer influences.	美国社会学家大卫·李斯曼（David Riesman）在《孤独的大众》（The Lonely Crowd）中提出了三个广义的文化类型：传统指引型文化从传承的礼仪、道德和价值观中寻求指引； 内心指引型文化让人们根据自我培养的价值观行动；


Riesman’s framework has particular resonance in the Arab world today, where rising literacy rates and rapid advances in communication technology have stirred a maelstrom of competing cultural narratives, with his three types competing to define the region’s future.	他者指引型文化主要靠对外部规范和同侪影响的反应。 李斯曼的框架在当今阿拉伯世界能够找到尤其多的共鸣，在当今阿拉伯世界，日益升高的识字率和通讯技术的迅速进步导致了互相竞争的文化叙事的乱战，这三类文化争相决定该地区的未来。


Ironically, it is the combination of increased literacy and modern technology that is fanning the flames of conflict between the two types of “reformers” – religious revivalists and Western-oriented modernizers.	讽刺的是，正是这一识字率提高和现代技术的组合煽动着两类“改革者”——宗教复兴派和西方导向的现代派之间的冲突之火。


Taking advantage of their ability to mass-produce and instantly disseminate ancient religious texts and Western-originating literature, the two camps battle for the hearts and minds of otherwise traditional societies.	这两大阵营凭借它们大量制作并迅速传播古代宗教典籍和源自西方的文学的能力争夺者原本传统的社会的人心和思维。


According to the Lebanese publisher Samar Abou-Zeid, however, religious books are among the most downloaded works of literature in the Arab world.	但是，据黎巴嫩出版商扎伊德（Samar Abou-Zeid）的说法，宗教书籍是阿拉伯世界下载数量最多的文学作品之一。


The trouble is that most religious texts consumed today in the Arab world address an audience of specialists that no longer exists and – as Riesman warned – they are often misconstrued.	麻烦在于，当今阿拉伯世界所使用的大部分宗教典籍面向的是已经不存在的专家，并且——如李斯曼所警告的——它们常常被曲解。


The people and the times for which these texts were written are completely different from the people reading them today.	这些典籍的作者和成书时间与今天阅读它们的人群截然不同。


Devout Muslims, of course, have their own zero point: the year 610, when the Angel Gabriel revealed the Koran’s first verse to the Prophet Muhammad.	当然，虔诚的穆斯林自有自己的零点：公元610年，即天使加百利向先知穆罕默德传授古兰经第一首诗的时刻。


From then on, many Muslims have regarded themselves as the bearers of a righteous truth and moral vision that takes precedence over all others.	从此，许多穆斯林将自己视为��义真理和道德观的传播者，比其他人更高一等。


This has inevitably put religious revivalists in opposition to the second cultural type vying for preeminence in the Arab world: Western-educated, inner-directed modernists who hold Descartes’s declaration as their reference point.	这难免让宗教复兴派站在了第二种争夺阿拉伯世界主导地位的文化类型——接受西方教育的内心指引型现代派，他们将笛卡尔的口号作为参照点——的对立面。


These Arabs – often the economic elite – read, admire, and consume products of a culture that, despite its proclaimed commitment to “universal values,” continues to be stingily Eurocentric and dominated by Christian intellectual tradition.	这些阿拉伯人——通常是经济精英——所阅读、敬仰和消费的文化尽管宣称致力于“普世价值”，但却是严格的欧洲中心论，由基督教智识传统主导。


As a result, they are increasingly likely to feel like exiles both at home and abroad.	因此，他们在国内外都越来越有众叛亲离之感。


The final, other-directed strand of Arab culture is arguably the most dominant: those whom Riesman would have called the “lonely Arab crowd.”	阿拉伯文化的最后一种类型——他者导向型也许最有主导力：李斯曼称他们是“孤独的阿拉伯人群”。


Free of roots or tradition, they take refuge in superficiality from the conflicts that surround them, seeking fulfillment in consumerism, careers, and lifestyles.	他们不论根基和传统，沉溺于源自身边冲突的表面性，寻求消费主义、职业和生活方式的满足。


Their zero point is the latest fad or fashion.	他们的零点是最新时尚。


This cultural turbulence is due – at least in part – to the absence of a contemporary homegrown intellectual tradition capable of providing Arab societies with an inner compass based on local values and modern perspectives.	这一文化动荡的原因——至少是部分原因——是缺少土身土长的、能给阿拉伯社会带来基于本地价值观和现代观点的内心指引的智识传统。


This cultural vacuum is most evident in the mismatch between the region’s reading habits and the response of its publishing industry.	这一文化真空的最佳写照便是该地区阅读习惯与出版业反应之间的不匹配。


Egyptians, for example, read for an average of 7.5 hours per week, compared to five hours and 42 minutes in the United States.	比如，埃及人平均每周阅读7. 5小时，而美国为五小时42分钟。


And yet in 2012, according to Abou-Zeid, the entire Arab world and its 362 million inhabitants produced just over 15,000 titles, putting it in the same league as Romania (with a population of 21.3 million), Ukraine (45.6 million), or the American publisher Penguin Random House.	但在2012年，据扎伊德的数据，整个阿拉伯世界及其3. 62亿居民只写了15,000部作品，与罗马尼亚（人口2,130万）、乌克兰（4,560万）或美国出版商企鹅兰登书屋差不多。


To maintain a similar proportion to population, the Arab world should be publishing 10-20 times more titles than it does today.	按照人口比例计算，阿拉伯世界出版的作品应该比今天多10—20倍。


The dominance of old religious texts and Western-produced works has left modern Arab readers polarized, without a zero point of their own.	宗教典籍和西方作品的主宰让现代阿拉伯读者走向极端，无法形成他们自己的零点。


It is ironic that increased literacy and adoption of modern technology have contributed not to intellectual growth, but to regional strife.	讽刺的是，识字率的增加和现代技术的蚕蛹并没有带来智识增长，而是带来了地区冲突。


It may be no coincidence that Lebanon, one of the first countries in the region to boost literacy rates, was also the first to tumble into civil war.	黎巴嫩是该地区首先提高识字率的国家之一，也是第一个陷入内战的国家，这也许不是巧合。


Unless Arab and Muslim societies rediscover, revitalize, and in some respects create their homegrown contemporary intellectual tradition, the result will be cultural drift or, far worse, the continuation of bloody civil strife.	除非阿拉伯和穆斯林社会重新发现、重新激活，并在某些方面上创造出土生土长的当代智识传统，否则结果将是文化漂移，或者更糟糕的，是血腥内部冲突继续下去。


Arafat\u0027s Ghost	阿拉法特的鬼魂


History gave Yasir Arafat far more time than most leaders to achieve his mission.	比起其它领导人，历史赋予亚西尔·阿拉法特的时间要多很多。


After all, at the time of his death he had been leader of the Palestinians for 35 years.	毕竟，他死的时候已经当了整整35年的巴勒斯坦领袖。


Yet he left his people in a terrible situation, with no state, in the midst of a losing war, and with a bankrupt economy.	可他却把自己的人民留在了水深火热之中，没有国家、面临一场失败的战争、经济也濒临崩溃的边缘。


Whether his successors can revive and complete the Palestinians' historic mission depends on how they define their goal.	他的继任者能否实现复兴，完成巴勒斯坦的历史重任就取决于他们把什么作为自己的目标。


Looking back at his career, Arafat never really veered from the belief that his life's mission was to destroy Israel by any means necessary and replace it with a Palestinian Arab state.	回顾他的一生，阿拉法特从未真正改变过自己的信仰：那就是把不惜一切手段毁灭以色列，代之以巴勒斯坦阿拉伯国家当作自己的终身目标。


An independent Palestinian state that did not include all of Israel held no appeal to him.	他对没有包括全部以色列领土的独立巴勒斯坦国根本不屑一顾。


He was equally indifferent to his people's material welfare and anything particular about the design of a viable political and economic system.	他也毫不关心人民的疾苦，以及如何建设真正可行的政治和经济体系。


Now, in the post-Arafat era, Palestinians must choose one of several strategies.	如今在后阿拉法特时代，巴勒斯坦人必须从若干策略中做出选择。


Unfortunately, most of the alternatives call for the continued use of violence and terrorism.	不幸的是，绝大多数备选方案都呼吁继续使用暴力和恐怖主义。


The moderate strategy seeks an independent Palestine state as quickly as possible, on the assumption that once there is no more Israeli presence or violence, the Palestinians can concentrate on constructive pursuits, including resettling refugees and improving living standards.	较为缓和的策略把尽快成立巴勒斯坦国作为自己的目标，他们认为一旦消除了以色列的占领或暴力，巴勒斯坦人就可以集中力量进行建设，包括重新安置难民、改善人们的生活水平。


But this is the view of only a small minority of leaders, notably former Prime Minister Abu Mazin and Muhammad Dahlan, who heads his own militia in the Gaza Strip.	但这仅仅是前总理阿巴斯和穆罕默德·达赫兰等少数领导人的观点，他们都在加沙地带拥有自己的武装。


If Arafat had taken this road - accepting Israel's existence, ending terrorism, and confronting Palestinian extremists - the conflict would have ended long ago.	如果阿拉法特选择了另一条路－接受以色列的存在、结束恐怖、反对巴勒斯坦极端份子－那么这场冲突很早以前就已经结束了。


But, with no single all-powerful leader, it will be hard for any successor to force through the difficult decisions required by such an orientation.	可没有唯一的全权领袖，任何继任者想要落实这样的艰难决策都绝非易事。


The	强硬策略是传统的理想化路线，很多从西岸和加沙地带流放归来的法塔赫和巴解组织老兵都支持这样的立场，其中也包括阿拉法特本人。 他们目前的领袖包括巴勒斯坦全国委员会主席萨利姆·扎农和法塔赫精神领袖哈巴什，他们坚持继续与以色列交战直至将其摧毁，而后就能在巴勒斯坦建立起相对稳固的民族主义政权。


The younger generation of indigenous West Bank Palestinians, whose leaders began political activity in the uprising of the late 1970's, embraces a	在20世纪70年代末的起义中开始其政治生涯的新一代西岸巴勒斯坦人的领袖也持好战态度，在他们眼中，强硬派不过是一群疲惫不堪的老顽固，由于腐败而丧失了所有的力量。 和强硬派世俗论者不同，好战份子最著名的领袖是领导法塔赫基层组织坦兹姆的巴库提，他们愿意与伊斯兰教徒进行合作。


The militants argue that a two-stage strategy is needed to defeat Israel.	好战份子宣称：打败以色列要分两步走。


First, long-term continuation of violence will force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.	首先要开展长期持续性的暴力活动，这会迫使以色列从被占领土上撤军。


Then, with Palestinians gaining the upper hand, they can advance to a second stage in which all of Israel is conquered, implying armed struggle - which often takes the form of anti-civilian terrorism - for many more years.	而后，随着巴勒斯坦人占据上风，他们就可以进入第二阶段，也就是用武力征服以色列全境－开展针对平民的恐怖活动－这个过程还会持续很多年。


Finally, there is the	最后，还有哈马斯支持的革命伊斯兰观，也就是继续战斗、继续使用恐怖主义，直到最终战胜以色列和巴勒斯坦民族主义者为止，他们根本不管要付出多长时间和多大代价。 这以后，巴勒斯坦会成为一个纯粹的伊斯兰国家，在这个国度里，温和派会遭到枪决、而旧的民族领袖被迫离职或以腐败罪名入狱。


The problem for Palestinian moderates is clear: any leader willing to agree a peace treaty with Israel would be opposed - passionately and even violently - by roughly 80% of the movement.	巴勒斯坦温和派面临的问题非常清楚：任何愿意与以色列达成和平协议的领袖都会遭到反对－这种反对狂热甚至充满暴力－来自整个运动80%以上的力量。


A key question is whether the Palestinian masses, fed up with their leadership's bickering, corruption, and incompetence, could make their wishes known to find an end to a conflict that has cost them so much.	关键问题是厌烦了领导人无休止的争论、腐败和无能的巴勒斯坦民众是否能够让政府听到自己的愿望，结束这场已经让他们付出了太多代价的冲突。


But none of the main leadership factions are proposing that the masses be consulted very much. Nor did Arafat leave in place any institutional mechanisms for doing so.	但没有一个主要派别提出要多听取广大民众的意见，阿拉法特也没有留下任何类似的机制。


Moreover, the popular appeal of radical religion, ideology, and misinformation should not be underestimated.	此外，我们也不能低估激进宗教、观念和错误信息造成的巨大影响。


Few Palestinians are even aware that four years ago Arafat turned down an independent state equal in size to the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to more than $20 billion in refugee compensation.	4年前，阿拉法特曾拒绝成立一个面积相当于整个西岸和加沙地带的独立的巴勒斯坦国，外加超过200亿美元的难民赔款，可真正了解此事的巴勒斯坦人却寥寥无几。


The main problem left by Arafat is the lack of any leadership at all.	阿拉法特留下的主要问题在于缺乏任何形式的领导。


Rarely in history has a political movement been so deliberately set by its founder on a course toward chaos.	政治运动的创始人故意把自己的组织引向混乱，这种情况在历史上也极为罕见。


Arafat not only left no successor, but no order.	阿拉法特不仅没有留下继承人，也没有留下秩序。


Over the decades, the movement has developed a political culture of indiscipline.	几十年来，巴解组织已经形成了不守纪律的政治文化。


Arafat presided over a sort of anarchy, encouraging rivalries, undermining other potential leaders, and ensuring that all authority (and money) ran through his hands.	阿拉法特管理着一群混乱不堪的竞争对手，这不仅威胁到其它潜在领袖的地位，也确保了一切权力（和资金）都由阿拉法特本人亲自管理。


Only if the post-Arafat movement decides that it really wants a Palestinian state in exchange for ending the conflict with Israel in every respect will there be a real chance of peace.	只有当后阿拉法特时代的领导人下定决心、真心希望在所有领域结束冲突、建立巴勒斯坦国，真正的和平机会才会出现。


Arafat's death may well mark the beginning of that process, but the transition to a new Palestinian leadership could take years, and there is no assurance that it will be a moderate one.	阿拉法特之死也可能预示着这一过程的开始，但向巴勒斯坦新领袖的过渡不仅需要很多年，而且也没什么能够保证这位新领袖一定会是温和派。


Arafat’s Last Hurrrah	阿拉法特最后的欢呼


In his protracted moment of death, Yasir Arafat performed his last act of duty to the Palestinian cause to which he devoted his entire life.	在长时间的死亡过程中，亚西尔·阿拉法特为巴勒斯坦解放事业尽了最后一份力量，这是他终身为之奋斗的事业。


Everything about the man was, indeed, protracted.	实际上，有关阿拉法特的一切都是一场持久战。


He carried out a protracted war of national liberation. He withstood a series of protracted sieges – in Amman (1970), Beirut (1982), and in Ramallah (2002-2004).	他发起了一场旷日持久的国家解放战争，他经受了一系列长时间的围困－1970年的安曼之围、1982年的贝鲁特之围和2002到2004年的拉马拉之围。


Arafat’s leadership was the most protracted among his counterparts in the Arab World, as he outlived three Egyptian Presidents (Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and spanned all of Mubarak’s quarter of a century), five Lebanese Presidents, three Iraqis, five Algerians, three Syrians, three Saudi Monarchs, and two in Morocco, not to mention other world leaders, from Eisenhower to Bush in the US, from de Gaulle to Chirac in France, and from Maó to three successors in China.	和阿拉伯世界的领导人相比，阿拉法特的在位时间也是最长的，因为他的寿命超过了三任埃及总统（纳吉布、纳赛尔、萨达特，其任期还跨越了穆巴拉克执政的四分之一个世纪）、五任黎巴嫩总统、三任伊拉克总统、五任阿尔及利亚总统、三任叙利亚总统、三任沙特国王和两任摩洛哥国王，其它国家的领袖就更难望其项背，从美国的艾森豪维尔到布什、法国的戴高乐到希拉克、从中国的毛泽东到继任的三任领导人。


Probably no other political figure alive today met and endured as many world leaders as Arafat.	今天仍旧在世的政治领袖中，恐怕没有人像阿拉法特这样会见并经历过这么多的世界领袖。


But there is much more to Arafat’s legacy than endurance.	但阿拉法特给我们留下的远远不只是耐力。


It has been correctly said over and again that Arafat was a mixed blessing for his people.	很多人都说阿拉法特对自己的人民来讲是好坏参半的祝福。


Their fate and destiny have been inextricably linked, to the near demise of both at times.	他们的前途和命运紧紧联系在一起，有时两者会同时走到崩溃的边缘。


For several decades after the usurpation of their homeland, Palestinians were reduced to aggregates of refugees, some remaining in the newly-created state of Israel as second-class citizens, with others scattered over the Arab World and far beyond.	家园被强占后几十年过去了，巴勒斯坦人已经沦为了一群无家可归的难民，有些人继续留在新建国的以色列当二等公民，其它人则流落到阿拉伯乃至整个世界。


It was Yasir Arafat, through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) he founded, that gave them a sense of identity as a people.	正是亚西尔·阿拉法特，用他一手创建的巴勒斯坦解放组织（PLO），给了他们做人的最后一点尊严。


Regardless of its effectiveness, the armed struggle waged by the PLO did empower the Palestinians and internalize a sense of collective dignity and self respect within them.	最终效果姑且不论，巴解组织发起的武装斗争确实给了巴勒斯坦人生存的力量，把群体和自我的尊严深深地印在了他们心中。


Their cause could no longer be ignored.	人们再也不能忽视他们的事业。


No other modern issue has appropriated as many UN resolutions or as much international diplomacy.	还没有任何现代事务能引来这么多联合国决议和国际外交的广泛关注。


If politics is defined as the art of compromise, Arafat was a master of it at the Palestinian and Arab levels.	如果政治斗争是一门妥协的艺术，那么阿拉法特是巴勒斯坦和阿拉伯人中当之无愧的大师。


He managed to stay at the helm for over forty years with no serious challengers.	四十年来他大权独揽，没有受到过任何真正严重的挑战。


Internationally, however, he was out of step with the post Cold War era.	在国际上，他却无法跟上冷战后时代的步伐。


Whether or not he was solely to blame, a true opportunity for historical compromise was missed at Camp David in August 2000, and he himself acknowledged it a year later.	不管是不是要由他承担全部责任，但2000年8月错过了戴维营历史和解的真正机会却是无可辩驳的事实，一年后连他自己也承认了这一点。


By that time it was too late, as the leadership in both the US and Israel had changed and there was no interest to engage him.	但那时却为时已晚，因为以色列和美国的领导人都已经更替，他们对团结他已经失去了兴趣。


During the last four years of his life, Arafat’s public space was literally and metaphorically diminishing.	在他生命的最后四年里，阿拉法特的公众空间大幅度缩小，无论从直接还是比喻意义上都不例外。


He was unable to re-engage his Israeli adversaries or control his suicide-bound Palestinian militants.	他无力再团结自己的以色列对手，也无力控制赞成自杀性袭击的巴勒斯坦好战分子。


Nor was he able to contain let alone combat rampant corruption in the Palestinian Authority.	他也无法遏制、更无法战胜巴权力机构内部愈演愈烈的腐败。


Nor was Arafat helped by world events that shifted the spotlight to Bush’s wars on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq.	世界局势也朝着对阿拉法特不利的方向发展，人们把关注的焦点转向了布什在阿富汗和伊拉克发动的反恐战争。


If anything, they had adverse effects for him and his life-long cause.	如果说有影响的话，那么无论对他还是他奋斗一生的事业产生的影响都十分不利。


Like his own body, Arafat’s familiar world was steadily fading away with irreversible loss of control.	阿拉法特熟悉的世界也像他自己的健康状况一样不可控制、也无法挽回的离他而去。


Ironically however, as he was dying, world leaders and the media were rediscovering the importance of Arafat’s leadership if not his persona.	充满讽刺意味的是，在阿拉法特垂死之际，世界领袖和媒体重新发现了他作为领袖和个人的重要性。


The sustained focus of the media on him, to the point of near saturation, focused world attention on the Palestinian Question once again.	媒体给了他长时间、甚至是近乎饱和的关注，巴勒斯坦问题重新成了世界关注的焦点。


Statements by Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Kofi Annan and others on the occasion of Arafat’s death have been forceful in demanding a speedy and long overdue resolution of the conflict.	托尼·布莱尔、雅克·希拉克、柯菲·安南和其它人在阿拉法特死后的讲话都迫切要求尽快结束冲突，这样的解决已经来得太迟了。


It is as if in death, Arafat has given his people a chance to achieve what he could not achieve in life –the dream of an independent democratic Palestinian state.	死去的阿拉法特却好像给了巴勒斯坦的人民在他活着的时候无法获得的机会－那就是对独立、民主的巴勒斯坦国的梦想。


It is Arafat’s last hurrah.	这是阿拉法特生命中最后的欢呼。


Why Are Central Banks on Trial Again?	为何央行又开始做实验了？


LONDON – Central banks have been on a roller-coaster ride in the last decade, from heroes to zeroes and back again.	伦敦—过去十年，央行就像是在坐过山车，从英雄沦为狗熊，又从狗熊重新成为英雄。


Is another downswing in their fortunes and reputations now starting?	如今，它们的运气和名声是否又开始走下坡了？


In 2006, when Alan Greenspan retired after his 18-year reign as Chair of the US Federal Reserve Board, his reputation could hardly have been higher.	2006年，艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）从他干了18年的美联储主席任上退休，其时名誉如日中天。


He had steered the US economy through the dot-com boom and bust, had carefully navigated the potential threat to growth from the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and presided over a period of rapid GDP and productivity growth.	他引导美国经济穿越互联网枯荣循环，谨慎地渡过2001年9月11日恐怖袭击带来的潜在增长威胁，在任期间GDP和生产率增长迅猛。


At his final Board meeting, Timothy Geithner, then-President of the New York Fed, delivered what now seems an embarrassing encomium, saying that Greenspan’s stellar reputation was likely to grow, rather than diminish, in the future.	在他的最后一次美联储理事会会议上，时任纽约联储主席蒂莫西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）对格林斯潘进行了如今看上去颇令人尴尬的高度赞扬，说格林斯潘的名誉在未来还会继续上升而不是下降。


Only three years later, the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman, borrowing from Monty Python’s parrot sketch, was able to say that Greenspan was an ex-maestro whose reputation was now pushing up daisies.	区区三年后，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）借用巨蟒（Monty Python）的鹦鹉素描，说曾经的大师格林斯潘如今已经名誉扫地。


Central banks were widely seen to have been dozing at the switch through the early years of this century.	央行被广泛视为在本世纪最初的几年里玩忽职守。


They allowed global imbalances to build up, looked benignly on a massive credit bubble, ignored flashing danger signs in the mortgage market, and uncritically admired the innovative but toxic products devised by overpaid investment bankers.	它们放任全球失衡日积月累，亲切地看着巨大的信用泡沫产生，忽视按揭市场所闪现的危险信号，不假思索地赞美薪酬过高的投资银行家所创造的创新但有毒的金融产品。


The early reactions by central banks to the deepening crisis were also unsure.	央行对深化的危机的早期反应也是犹犹豫豫。


The Bank of England (BoE) lectured on moral hazard while the banking system imploded around it, and the European Central Bank continued to slay imaginary inflation dragons when almost all economists saw far greater risks in a eurozone meltdown and associated credit crunch.	英格兰银行在银行体系分崩离析之际大谈道德风险，而在几乎所有经济学家都认为欧元区崩溃和相关信用动荡才是更大的风险时，欧洲央行继续与想象中的通胀恶龙搏斗。


Yet, despite these missteps, when governments around the world considered how best to respond to the lessons of the crisis, central banks, once seen as part of the problem, came to be viewed as an essential part of the solution.	但是，尽管出现了这些错误举措，但当全世界政府考虑如何最好地响应危机的教训时，曾经被视为问题的一部分的央行被认为是解决办法的关键部分。


They were given new powers to regulate the financial system, and encouraged to adopt new and highly interventionist policies in an attempt to stave off depression and deflation.	它们获得了新的监管金融体系的权力，并被鼓励采取新的、高度干预的政策来遏制萧条和通缩。


Central banks’ balance sheets have expanded dramatically, and new laws have strengthened their hand enormously.	央行资产负债表急剧扩张，新的法律大大加强了它们的权限。


In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act has taken the Fed into areas of the financial system which it has never regulated, and given it powers to take over and resolve failing banks.	在美国，多德-弗兰克法案让美联储进入它从未涉足的金融体系监管领域，授予它接管和清算倒闭银行的权力。


In the United Kingdom, bank regulation, which had been removed from the BoE in 1997, returned there in 2013, and the BoE also became for the first time the prudential supervisor of insurance companies – a big extension of its role.	在英国，银行监管于1997年从英格兰银行的职能中剥离，2013年又重新加入，此外，英格兰银行还首次成为保险公司的审慎监督者——其作用被大大扩大。


The ECB, meanwhile, is now the direct supervisor of more than 80% of the European Union’s banking sector.	与此同时，欧洲央行现在是80%以上欧盟银行部门的直接监督者。


In the last five years, central banking has become one of the fastest-growing industries in the Western world.	在过去五年中，央行成为西方世界增长最快的行业。


The central banks seem to have turned the tables on their critics, emerging triumphant.	央行似乎扭转了身受口诛笔伐之势，翻身成为大赢家。


Their innovative and sometimes controversial actions have helped the world economy recover.	它们有时带点争议的创新措施帮助世界经济实现复苏。


But there are now signs that this aggrandizement may be having ambiguous consequences.	但是，现在看来，这一权力扩张也许正在产生模棱两可的结果。


Indeed, some central bankers are beginning to worry that their role has expanded too far, putting them at risk of a backlash.	事实上，一些央行开始担心其作用扩张过度，有可能适得其反。


There are two related dangers.	相关危险有二。


The first is encapsulated in the title of Mohamed El-Erian’s latest book: The Only Game in Town.	第一个危险可以用穆罕默德·艾利安（Mohamed El-Erian）的新书标题《唯一的游戏》（The Only Game in Town）来概括。


Central banks have been expected to shoulder the greater part of the burden of post-crisis adjustment.	人们期望央行承担更多危机后调整负担。


Their massive asset purchases are a life-support system for the financial economy.	它们的大规模资产购买操作是金融经济的续命丹。


Yet they cannot, by themselves, resolve the underlying problems of global imbalances and the huge debt overhang.	但它们本身无法解决全球失衡和巨额债务积压等根本问题。


Indeed, they may be preventing the other adjustments, whether fiscal or structural, that are needed to resolve those impediments to economic recovery.	事实上，它们可能正在阻挠解决经济复苏的这些障碍所需要的其他调整，包括财政调整和结构调整。


This is particularly true in Europe.	欧洲尤其如此。


While the ECB keeps the euro afloat by doing “whatever it takes” in ECB President Mario Draghi’s phrase, governments are doing little.	欧洲央行通过行长德拉吉所谓的“不惜一切代价”成功维系了欧元，但政府几乎什么都没有做。


Why take tough decisions if the ECB continues to administer heavier and heavier doses from its monetary drug cabinet?	既然欧洲央行不断从其货币药栈里开出越来越重的剂量，为什么还要去做艰难决定呢？


The second danger is a version of what is sometimes called the “over-mighty citizen” problem.	第二个危险是有时被称为“过于强大的公民”的问题。


Have central banks been given too many powers for their own good?	央行是否被授予过多的权力自说自话？


Quantitative easing is a case in point.	量化宽松就是其中之一。


Because it blurs the line between monetary and fiscal policy – which must surely be the province of elected governments – unease has grown.	它模糊了货币和财政政策之间的界线——财政政策显然是民选政府的管辖范围——因此产生了不安。


We can see signs of this in Germany, where many now question whether the ECB is too powerful, independent, and unaccountable.	我们可以在德国看到这一苗头，如今有很多德国人质疑欧洲央行是否过于强大、独立和不可问责。


Similar criticism motivates those in the US who want to “audit the Fed” – often code for subjecting monetary policy to Congressional oversight.	类似的批评也在驱动希望“审计美联储”的美国人——他们常常要求规定货币政策受国会监督。


There are worries, too, about financial regulation, and especially central banks’ shiny new macroprudential instruments.	还有关于金融监管的担心，特别是央行亮闪闪的新宏观审慎工具。


In his new book The End of Alchemy, former BoE Governor Mervyn King argues that direct intervention in the mortgage market by restraining credit should be subject to political decision.	在新书《炼金术的终结》（The End of Alchemy）中英格兰银行前行长默文·金（Mervyn King）指出，用抑制信用直接干预按揭市场应该接受政治决定的约束。


Others, notably Axel Weber, a former head of the Bundesbank, think it is dangerous for the central bank to supervise banks directly.	也有人，主要是德国联邦银行前行长艾克赛尔·韦伯（Axel Weber），认为央行直接监督银行是危险的。


Things go wrong in financial markets, and the supervisors are blamed.	出问题的是金融市场，受指责的是监督者。


There is a risk of contagion, and a loss of confidence in monetary policy, if the central bank is in the front line.	如果央行被推上第一线，就存在传染风险，以及货币政策信心缺失的风险。


That points to the biggest concern of all.	这就带来了最大的担忧。


Central banks’ monetary-policy independence was a hard-won prize.	央行的货币政策独立性是好不容易才赢得的。


It has brought great benefits to our economies.	这种独立性给我们的经济带来了巨大的好处。


But an institution buying bonds with public money, deciding on the availability of mortgage finance, and winding down banks at great cost to their shareholders demands a different form of political accountability.	但一个用公共资金购买债券、决定按揭融资是否可得、以给股东带来沉重代价的方式关闭银行的机构，需要不同的政治问责形式。


The danger is that hasty post-crisis decisions to load additional functions onto central banks may have unforeseen and unwelcome consequences.	危险在于危机后仓促地决定给央行增加职能可能带来不可预见的不良后果。


In particular, greater political oversight of these functions could affect monetary policy as well.	特别是，加强对这些职能的政治监督可能影响到货币政策。


For this reason, whatever new mechanisms of accountability are put in place will have to be designed with extraordinary care.	出于这一原因，不管采取怎样的新问责机制，都必须特别谨慎地进行设计。


Immunization on the Front Line	免疫最前沿


MAPUTO – Most of the news one hears coming out of Mozambique is bad – poverty, disease, conflict, and floods.	马普托—关于莫桑比克的消息大多不会好——贫困、疾病、冲突，还有洪水。


But there are a lot of good things happening in my country, too.	但我的祖国并不缺乏好事发生。


In the past two decades, Mozambique has become a functioning democracy; grown its agriculture sector; raised literacy rates; increased water supply and electricity in rural areas; and reduced child mortality dramatically, from 219 per 1,000 live births in 1990, two years before the civil war ended, to 135 per 1,000 in 2010.	过去二十年来，莫桑比克已成为运转良好的民主国家，其农业部门有了成长，其识字率有了提高，其农村水电供应有所增加，其儿童死亡率大幅下降。 1990年，即内战结束前的倒数第二年，每1000名初生儿有219名会夭折；


I am particularly proud of the last achievement, because, by working in partnership with my fellow Mozambicans to expand immunization coverage, I believe that I have played a part in bringing it about.	而到了2010年，这一数字下降至135人。 最后一个成就令我感到尤其自豪，因为，我和我的莫桑比克免疫推广工作同事一直在努力，我认为我们对这一成就做出了贡献。


I grew up in Mozambique when the country was still under Portuguese rule, and the inequality in our colonial society shaped my view that all people have a right to health care.	在我长大的年代，莫桑比克仍由葡萄牙人统治，殖民地社会的不平等性使我形成了一种观念，所有人都有权获得健康和医疗。


I remember working at a pediatric ward as a teenager and watching children die from diseases like polio, measles, and tetanus – all easily prevented by vaccines.	我还记得我十来岁的时候在儿科病房工作，常常目睹儿童因小儿麻痹症、麻疹和破伤风丧命，而这些疾病可以简单地通过疫苗预防。


The impact of that experience led me to spend the next 40 years working to ensure that every child in Mozambique, regardless of her ethnicity or where she lives, gets the vaccines that she needs to help her lead a long and healthy life.	这一经历所造成的影响让我在此后40年中致力于确保莫桑比克的每一个孩子，不管他出身何族、身在何处，都能获得他所需要的、能给他带来健康长命的疫苗。


In a few days, I will join 300 global leaders in Abu Dhabi for the world’s first vaccine summit – a gathering dedicated to ensuring that all children everywhere have access to vaccines.	几天后，我将和300名全球领袖一起参加阿布扎比世界首届疫苗峰会——该会议旨在足额包所有地区的所有儿童都能获得疫苗。


People like Bill Gates and Kofi Annan will make the case that immunization programs deserve adequate funding and political support.	比尔·盖茨和科菲·安南的出席表明，免疫计划值得拥有充分的资金和政治支持。


I don’t have an audience like Gates or Annan, but I would like to add my voice to theirs.	我的听众不可能像盖茨和安南那样多，但我也要在他们的基础上补充我自己的看法。