Overcoming Market Obstacles to New Antibiotics	克服新型抗生素的市场障碍


LONDON – From the strict perspective of some investors, astute financial management by a company to bolster its share price is a good thing.	伦敦——如果严格地从某些投资人的角度来看，企业依靠精明的财务管理支撑股价是件好事。


By this narrow logic, when it comes to the pharmaceutical industry, we should be unconcerned if drug firms’ share prices are boosted not by new discoveries, but by financial maneuvers, such as share buybacks or tax inversion.	按照这种狭隘的逻辑，在涉及医药行业时，我们不必担心推动制药企业股价的不是新发现，而是股票回购或税收倒置等金融策略。


But the pharmaceutical industry is not an industry like any other.	但制药业不同于其他任何产业。


It is intrinsically bound up with the public good, having historically provided the medical innovation that is essential to society’s ability to fight disease.	它本质上与公共利益息息相关，历史上曾经的医疗创新赋予了人类社会战胜疾病的能力。


Furthermore, while patients are the consumers, the actual buyers are often governments.	此外，虽然患者是消费者，但实际的买家往往是政府。


Even in the United States, public purchasers account for at least 40% of the prescription drug market.	即便在美国，公共采购也在处方药市场中也占到至少40%的份额。


Governments also bankroll much of the research underlying the industry’s profits.	产生行业利润的大部分研究同样由政府提供资助。


The US government is the world’s largest funder of medical research and development; globally, taxpayers finance a third of spending on health research.	美国政府是全球最大的医疗研发出资人； 而在全球范围内，纳税人则承担了1/3的医疗研发开支。


So it should come as no surprise when policymakers insist that the industry’s efforts at innovation be channeled into areas that provide the most benefit to taxpayers and patients, rather than those – like financial maneuvers – that might be most profitable for the industry in the short term.	因此，决策者坚持将行业创新工作引导到对纳税人和患者最为有利的领域一点不值得大惊小怪，它们不应像金融策略那样在短期内让行业有利可图。


The pharmaceutical industry is at its best when private profitability and social good coincide, as it does when useful new drugs attract large market shares.	医药行业往往在私人利润和社会利益不谋而合时处于最佳状态，有效的新药吸引大量市场份额就是这方面的例子。


But, unfortunately, that is not always the case – and the results can be tragic.	但不幸的是，事实并非总是如此——而且可能因此带来悲剧性的后果。


In the field of antibiotics development, in particular, the divergence between profit-seeking behavior and the public good is taking the world to the brink of crisis.	特别是在抗生素的研发领域，营利行为与公共利益之间的差异正导致世界一步步走向危机。


When antibiotics first entered into common use in the 1940s, previously dangerous conditions, such as pneumonia or infected cuts, became benign conditions that could be treated easily.	当20世纪40年代抗生素最早进入普遍应用的时候，之前非常危险的状况，比如肺炎和伤口感染，成了可以轻松化解的良性问题。


Antibiotics underpin modern medicine; without them, surgery or chemotherapy become much riskier.	抗生素是现代医学的基础； 没有它们将大大增加手术或化疗的危险性。


But antibiotics lose their effectiveness over time.	但随着时间的推移，抗生素逐渐失去了效力。


And whereas previous generations of scientists quickly found new substitutes, today, in many cases, doctors are down to their last line of defense.	虽然老一代科学家曾迅速发现新的替代品种，但今天，在许多情况下，医生们都被迫退守最后一道防线。


For a range of infections – including strains of pneumonia, E. coli, and gonorrhea – there are no replacements in reserve.	对包括肺炎、大肠杆菌和淋病菌株在内的等一系列感染而言，储备库里已经没有任何替代品。


One would think this would cause drug companies and their investors to compete to develop new antibiotics.	人们可能认为制药企业及其投资人在这种情况下会竞相研发新抗生素。


But much of the pharmaceutical industry has abandoned this pursuit.	但绝大多数制药企业已经放弃了这项��作。


Developing new antibiotics is difficult and expensive – and, crucially, far less profitable than investments in other important fields, such as cancer and diabetes.	新抗生素的研发难度大且投入昂贵——而且关键是与癌症和糖尿病等其他重要投资领域相比带来的利润没那么多。


Part of the problem is these drugs’ unique importance.	部分问题在于这些药物独一无二的重要性。


Companies are not always able to recoup their investments by setting a high price on patented antibiotics.	企业并不总能通过为专利抗生素设定高价来回收他们的投资。


When a new antibiotic is discovered, public health authorities rightly want to keep it in reserve, insisting that it be used only when all other options have failed.	新抗生素被发现后，公共卫生当局理所当然地想用它来补充储备，坚持认为只有当其他备选药品都不起作用的情况下才能启用新抗生素。


As a result, a new antibiotic may not become widely used until after its patent has expired and its inventors are forced to compete with generic manufacturers.	结果导致新抗生素在专利失效前可能无法得到广泛应用，而专利失效后发明企业则被迫面对仿制企业的竞争。


In January, the pharmaceutical industry took a big step toward solving this problem when more than 100 companies and trade associations from more than 20 countries signed a declaration calling on governments to adopt a new model of antibiotic development.	今年1月，制药行业为解决这一问题迈出了重要的一步，来自20多个国家的100多家企业和行业协会联合签署了一项呼吁政府采用抗生素研发新模式的声明。


As part of this new model, the signatories committed themselves to provide access to new drugs for all those who need them, increase investment in R&D that meets global public health needs, and help slow the development of drug resistance in humans and animals.	作为新模式的组成部分，缔约方承诺将新药提供给有需求的所有人，加大研发投资以满足全球公共卫生需要，并协助延缓人类和动物抗药性的形成。


Governments should encourage and enable the industry to meet these objectives.	政府应鼓励和帮助制药行业实现这些目标。


One way would to be adopt a proposal I made last year and introduce rewards of $1 billion or more to those who develop the most-needed types of antibiotics.	一种方式是采纳我去年提出的一项建议，为研发迫切需要类型抗生素的企业提供10亿美元或者更高的奖金。


Such an approach would balance commercial returns with affordability, global access, and conservation, while saving governments money in the long run.	这种方式可以平衡商业回报和购买力、确保新药进入全球市场和药物储备，同时从长远看还能为政府节省资金。


Using this approach to restock the antibiotics pipeline would cost roughly $25 billion over ten years.	用这种方法补充抗生素储备将在10年内消耗约250亿美元的开支。


Shared among G-20 governments, this is very little money, and would be a remarkably good investment – especially given that antibiotic resistance currently costs the US health-care system alone about $20 billion per year.	如果由20国集团共同承担，这笔钱数量很小，而且会是一项相当不错的投资——尤其考虑到当前仅抗生素耐药性一项就耗费美国医疗系统每年200亿美元的开支。


Governments could introduce incentives for antibiotics R&D, paid for with their existing funding streams or new funding streams that are innovative and self-sustaining.	政府可以用创新并能自我维系的现有资金或新增资金设立抗生素研发奖励基金。


One option would be a small access-to-market fee that could be collected by pharmaceutical regulators in large markets.	方案之一是大型市场的药品监管部门可以收取小额的市场准入费用。


This system recognizes that antibiotics are a shared and exhaustible resource on which the viability of a range of other pharmaceutical products and medical devices – from chemotherapy to joint replacements – depends.	该体系认可抗生素是一种人类共享并且可以耗竭的资源，也是从化疗到关节置换等其他一系列医药产品和医疗设备赖以存在的基础。


It is comparable to approaches in sectors such as energy, water, or fisheries, where regulatory tools are used to ensure that shared resources and infrastructure are managed and replenished in the interests of both consumers and the producers whose businesses rely on them.	抗生素与能源、水资源或渔业等行业状况具有可比性，这些行业都在利用监管工具来确保商业利益有赖于此的消费者和生产者能够管理和补充共同的资源和基础设施。


The necessary $2.5 billion per year would amount to just 0.25% of global pharmaceutical sales – hardly a strain on an industry that is, by and large, in sound financial health.	这项政策所需的每年25亿美元仅占全球药品销售的0. 25%——这对财务状况大体健康的医药行业来说基本构不成负担。


And the scheme would be particularly attractive if it could be implemented on a pay-or-play basis, whereby companies could choose whether to invest in R&D or to contribute to a fund rewarding those whose efforts result in the desired drugs.	而且如果能以付费研发二选一的方式来落实这项方案或许更具吸引力，这样企业就可以选择是投资研发还是交费鼓励那些研发出有效药品的企业。


It is time to turn ideas into effective action and solve the problem of drug resistance.	现在是时候将想法付诸行动并以此解决耐药性问题。


To do that, companies and governments must recognize that antibiotics are not a commodity like any other.	为了实现这一目标，企业和政府必须认识到抗生素不同于其他任何商品。


Markets and School Quality	市场与学校质量


SANTIAGO – Around the world, private schools are booming, especially in developing countries.	圣地亚哥—放眼世界，私立学校正在兴盛，特别是在发展中国家。


The Economist reports that in 2010, there were an estimated one million private schools in the developing world, and the figure has since risen quickly.	《经济学人》报道，2010年发展中世界大约有一百万所私立学校，并且这一数字增长很快。


From Latin America to Africa and South Asia, private schools have been moving into communities – mostly poor – where the state has been slow to provide services.	从拉丁美洲到非洲和南亚，私立学校正在进入国家提供服务进度缓慢的社区——大部分是贫穷社区。


This trend has proven controversial.	这一趋势引起了争议。


The marriage of education and markets attracts three main criticisms.	教育和市场的联姻遭致三条主要批评。


The first focuses on distributive justice: if everything – including education – is for sale, those who have more money will buy more of it.	第一条关注分配公平：如果一切——包括教育——都可以买卖，那么有更多的钱就能得到更多。


Inequality in knowledge (and therefore income) in one generation will be transmitted to the next, perhaps in amplified form.	一代人的知识（进而收入）不平等将传递给下一代，程度也许还会放大。


This is an important concern, especially given the increasingly skewed income distribution in developed countries.	这是一个重要的问题，特别是考虑到发达国家收入分配越来越不平均的情况。


But economists have long understood that the distribution of wealth, as John Stuart Mill put it in his Principles of Political Economy, is “a matter of human institution solely.”	但经济学家早就明白，财富分配，如约翰·穆勒在其《政治经济学原理》中所说，“完全是人类制度问题”。


In other words, market-based production is one thing; distribution is quite another, and it can be influenced by policy.	换句话说，基于市场的生产是一回事，分配是截然不同的另一回事，并且可以被政策影响。


Vouchers are one example.	教育券就是一个例子。


Pupils receiving a voucher, such as those used in Sweden or Chile, can obtain as much education as the voucher – not their family’s income – will allow.	像瑞典和智利等国家，获得教育券的学生可以获得教育券——而非家庭收入——中所包含的教育服务量。 对于这一安排存在相当合理的批评；


There are valid criticisms of such schemes, including, as in Chile, that the vouchers may be too small to purchase a quality education; but, at least in principle, vouchers and other forms of financial aid can make a private education, if desired, accessible to all.	比如在智利，教育券面额太小，不足以购买到高质量教育； 但是，至少从理论上，教育券和其他形式的财务援助能够可以让所有渴望得到私立教育的人都能得到。


A second criticism is that education markets perform poorly.	第二条批评是教育市场表现拙劣。


We know from research in the economics of imperfect information that markets run into trouble when what is bought and sold cannot be observed or measured.	从不完美信息经济学的研究中我们知道，当买卖对象无法观察或测量时，市场就会陷入麻烦。


Education would seem to be rife with such problems.	教育似乎就饱受这种问题的困扰。


Pupils, especially young ones, cannot observe a teacher’s pedagogical effort.	学生，特别是年轻学生，无法观察教师的教学投入程度。


Parents, especially if short of education themselves, cannot easily evaluate the quality of their children’s schooling.	家长，特别是教育程度不高的家政，无法轻松地评估孩子所受教育的质量。


So for-profit schools may deliver low teacher effort and insufficient quality.	因此，盈利性学校可能教学投入程度不足、质量不高。


Much research has gone into measuring how serious these problems are in practice, and therefore whether private schools perform better or worse than public schools.	许多研究对这些问题在实际中有多严重进行了衡量，从而评估私立学校与公立学校的优劣。


There are abundant examples, in rich and poor countries alike, of fly-by-night for-profit schools that dupe parents and neglect students (Donald Trump’s sham Trump University being a case in point).	发达和贫穷国家都有大量例子，不负责任的盈利性学校糊弄家长、忽视学生（唐纳德·特朗普的伪善的特朗普大学就是其中之一）。


But such research is inconclusive for several reasons, not least that public schools face incentive problems of their own, leading to low effort, absenteeism, and frequent strikes.	但出于一些原因，这些研究无法得出确定的结论，如公立学校也面临激励问题，导致投入程度不够、旷课和频繁的罢工。


Moreover, it is difficult to separate statistically the educational value added by the school from the characteristics of the families whose children attend.	此外，在统计上将来自学校和来自学生家庭出身的教育增加值进行分离十分困难。


If motivated families choose private schools, for example, their kids will perform better, but not for any reason having to do with private schooling.	比如，目标明确的家庭选择私立学校的话，他们的孩子表现会更好，但这绝不是必须上私立学校的依据。


The third criticism is that education can be degraded by being sold and bought.	第三条批评是教育可能因为被买卖而堕落。


Harvard’s Michael Sandel has argued that there should be limits to markets, and that there are things that money cannot (or should not) be allowed to buy.	哈佛大学的迈克尔·桑德尔（Michael Sandel）指出，市场应该有界限，有一些东西不能（也不应该）允许拿钱去买。


We all intuitively know, for example, that hiring someone to act like a friend is not the same as having a friend.	比如，直觉上我们都知道，雇一个人假扮朋友和真正拥有一位朋友是不同的。


Because of the inherent dignity of human beings, modern societies do not allow people to sell themselves, or their children, into slavery.	由于人类与生俱来的尊严感，现代社会不允许人们出卖自己或子女为奴。


And democracies do not allow citizens to sell their votes, because that would debase elections.	民主国家也不允许公民出卖选票，因为这将破坏选举。


Is education in the same category?	教育也属此类吗？


Professors (I have long been one) would like to think that we do our job because of our love of learning and teaching, and that our effort and dedication is not something money can easily buy.	教授（我很久之前便已经成为教授）愿意这样想：我们做这行是因为我们热爱学习和教学，并且我们的努力和奉献不是钱可以轻易买到的。


Critics claim that the commodification of education somehow degrades it.	批评者宣称教育商品化在一定程度上让教育堕落了。


Parents in poor countries, who have been flocking to private schools, may beg to differ.	涌向私立学校的贫穷国家的家长也许无法苟同。


In Chile today, 53% of all children attend voucher-financed private schools (many of them until recently run for profit), despite the top-up fees they often charge.	在智利，如今53%的学生在受教育券资助的学校上学（其中许多直到最近才开始转为非盈利性学校），尽管常常还需要缴纳额外的学费。


Parents are willing to make the extra effort simply because the local public schools are not good enough.	家长愿意花更多的投入，因为本地公立学校不够好。


Nor is it obvious that education is so different from health care, another essential service where issues of dignity and respect loom large.	教育和医疗——另外一种尊严和尊重问题至关重要的基本服务——之间也没有太大的区别。


Private (sometimes for-profit) clinics are common worldwide, yet do not confront the opposition that for-profit schools elicit.	私立（有时具有盈利性）诊所在全世界随处可见，但它们不必面对盈利性学校所遭致的反对。


Conditional cash transfers are also widely accepted in poor countries, and de facto they involve paying mothers to do such things as send their children to school or take them to clinics to be vaccinated.	有条件的现金转移支付在贫穷国家也被广泛接受，并且事实上也包括送孩子上学或上诊所接种等活动。


A more damning charge is that market incentives change behavior in socially damaging ways.	更加要命的指责是市场激励改变行为，导致它们有害于社会。


Sandel mentions the much-cited study of Israeli daycare centers where parents, once they faced fines for late pickups, began showing up even later to fetch their kids.	桑德尔提到了被广泛引用的对以色列日托中心的研究，家长一旦面临接孩子迟到罚款，就会干脆更晚去接孩子。


The apparent explanation is that parents treated the fines as fees, and did not feel guilty about paying them.	显而易见的解释是家长将罚款��为费用，付了费用以后便不在感到愧疚。


But market incentives may also have the opposite effect, improving motivation or other valuable traits.	但市场激励也可能相反，改善动机或其他可贵特质。


A 2012 paper examined what happens when students are allowed to choose (presumably better) schools after winning a lottery.	一份2012年的论文考察了当允许学生在赢得彩票后选择（理应是更好的）学校时会发生什么。


It finds that truancy rates go down as soon as students learn about the lottery outcome; and once they move to the new school, their test scores rise significantly.	研究发现，学生了解到彩票结果后，旷课率立刻下降； 而一旦他们转到新学校，考试成绩也显著上升。


Contrary to what zealots in either camp claim, neither public nor private schools perform better than the alternative at all times.	与两个阵营的狂热分子的主张相反，公立学校并不总是比私立学校表现好，反之亦然。


So it makes sense to consider how to combine the virtues of both systems, instead of simply choosing between them.	因此，应该考虑如何结合两者的优点，而不是简单地二选一。


In the area of college education, a recent paper by Harvard’s David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz concludes that in the US “for-profits appear to be at their best with well-defined programs of short duration that prepare students for a specific occupation.”	在大学教育领域，哈佛大学的大卫·德明（David Deming）、克劳迪娅·戈尔丁（Claudia Goldin）和劳伦斯·卡茨（Lawrence Katz）的最新论文认为，在美国，“盈利学校最擅长的是专为学生获得某个具体职位而精心设计的短期课程”。


In other areas, traditional not-for-profit colleges perform better, with higher completion rates and superior labor-market outcomes.	在其他领域，传统非盈利大学表现更好，毕业率更高，就业情况也更好。


Finally, despite legitimate concerns about “teaching to the test,” there is evidence that properly designed teacher evaluations can improve incentives and performance in public and private schools alike.	最后，尽管对“应试教育”的担心不无道理，但有证据表明设计合理的教师评估体系可以改善公立和私利学校的激励和表现。


More broadly, recent research makes clear that many factors affecting education outcomes have nothing to do with whether schools are public or private.	更广泛地看，最新研究清楚地表明，许多影响教育结果的因素与学校是公立还是私立无关。


A recent World Bank report calls on countries to leave behind the “great schooling wars” and adopt a “pragmatic approach” to education reform.	世界银行的一份最新报告呼吁各国抛弃“学校大战”，采取“务实方针”进行教育改革。


That seems like an approach worth trying.	这似乎是值得尝试的方法。


When Financial Markets Misread Politics	当金融市场对政治产生误读


CAMBRIDGE – When Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) defied pundits and pollsters by regaining a parliamentary majority in the country’s general election on November 1, financial markets cheered.	坎布里奇——当土耳其正义与发展党（AKP）11月1日在大选中重获议会多数推翻了专家和民意调查机构的预测，金融市场欢呼雀跃。


The next day, the Istanbul stock exchange rose by more than 5%, and the Turkish lira rallied.	第二天，伊斯坦布尔证交所指数涨幅超过5%，土耳其里拉也有所升值。


Never mind that one would be hard pressed to find anyone in business or financial circles these days with a nice thing to say about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or the AKP that he led before ascending to the presidency in 2014.	别说如今在金融圈要找说雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安或他在2014年当选总统前领导的土耳其正义与发展党（AKP）好话的人很难。


And make no mistake: Though Turkey’s president is supposed to be above party politics, Erdoğan remains very much at the helm.	而且不要搞错：虽然土耳其总统本该超脱于党派政治之上，但正义与发展党的事务仍然完全由埃尔多安掌握。


Indeed, it was Erdoğan’s divide-and-rule strategy – fueling religious populism and nationalist sentiment, and inflaming ethnic tension with the Kurds – that carried the AKP to victory.	其实是埃尔多安的分而治之策略——即推动宗教民粹主义和民族主义情绪，并煽动与库尔德人的民族紧张——让正义与发展党取得了胜利。 可以说，这是唯一可能有效的策略。


Arguably, it was the only strategy that could work.	毕竟，埃尔多安政权对媒体的攻击已经疏远了自由主义者；


After all, his regime has alienated liberals with its attacks on the media; business leaders with its expropriation of companies affiliated with his erstwhile allies in the so-called Gülen movement; and the West with its confrontational language and inconsistent stance on the Islamic State.	在所谓葛兰运动中没收昔日盟友所属的企业又疏远了商界领军人物； 其对抗性语言和对待伊斯兰国的多变立场又得罪了西方盟国。


And yet financial markets, evidently placing a premium on stability, hailed the outcome.	但金融市场为选举结果欢呼显然有稳定溢价的考虑。


A majority AKP government, investors apparently believed, would be much better than the likely alternative: a period of political uncertainty, followed by a weak and indecisive coalition or minority administration.	投资人显然认为，正义与发展党占多数的政府应该比可能的替代选择要好得多：在一段时间的政治动荡之后，民众迎来软弱而优柔寡断的少数派政府联盟。


But, in this case, there was not much wisdom in crowds.	但这一次，真理并没有掌握在多数人手中。


It is true that the AKP had a few good years after first coming to power in late 2002.	正义与发展党2002年末首次执政后的确有一段黄金时期。


But the party’s room for mischief was constrained by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund abroad and secularists at home.	但国外的欧盟和国际货币基金组织与国内的世俗主义者共同对它起到了遏制作用。


Once those limits were removed, Erdoğan’s governments embraced economic populism and authoritarian politics.	一旦去除了这些限制，埃尔多安政府就开始实施经济民粹主义和专制政策。


Investors’ apparent optimism following the AKP’s victory recalls Einstein’s definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different outcome.	正义与发展党当选后投资者显而易见的乐观情绪让人想起了爱因斯坦对精神错乱的定义：一遍又一遍做同样的事，但却期待不同的结果。


Turkey certainly isn’t the only case where financial markets have misread a country’s politics.	土耳其肯定不是金融市场误读国家政治的唯一案例。


Consider Brazil, whose currency, the real, has been hammered since mid-2014 – much worse than most other emerging-market currencies – largely because of a major corruption scandal unfolding there.	比方说巴西，其货币雷亚尔从2014年年中开始就一直遭受重创——雷亚尔所受的打击比其他多数 新兴市场货币更为严重——究其原因主要是那里发生的一次重大腐败丑闻。


Prosecutors have revealed a wide-ranging kickback scheme centered on the state-owned oil company Petrobras and involving executives, parliamentarians, and government officials.	检察官已经揭露了以国有石油公司巴西石油为核心的涉及面极广的回扣计划，高管、国会议员和政府官员全都参与其中。


So it may seem natural that financial markets have been spooked.	因此金融市场自然被吓得不轻。


Yet the most important outcome of the scandal has been to highlight the remarkable strength, not weakness, of Brazil’s legal and democratic institutions.	但丑闻最重要的结果却是彰显了巴西法律和民主制度的非凡实力而非弱点。


The prosecutor and judge on the case have been allowed to do their job, despite the natural impulse of President Dilma Rousseff’s government to quash the investigation.	此案的检察官和法官都被允许完成他们的工作，尽管迪尔玛·罗塞夫总统政府无法避免拥有推翻调查的冲动。


And, from all appearances, the probe has been following proper judicial procedures and has not been used to advance the opposition’s political agenda.	而且，从表面上看，调查一直遵循着恰当的司法程序，并没有被反对派用来推动自己的政治议程。


Beyond the judiciary, a slew of institutions, including the federal police and the finance ministry, have taken part and worked in synch.	除司法机关外，一系列机构，包括联邦警察和财政部，也都同步参与了调查。


Leading businessmen and politicians have been jailed, among them the former treasurer of the ruling Workers’ Party.	颇具影响力的商界和政界人士被关进监狱，其中也包括工党政府的前任财长。


Financial markets are supposed to be forward-looking, and many economists believe that they allocate resources in a way that reflects all available information.	金融市场应该具有前瞻性，而且许多经济学家认为其分配资源的方式反映了所有的信息汇总。


But an accurate comparison of Brazil’s experience with that of other emerging-market economies, where corruption is no less a problem, would, if anything, lead to an upgrade of Brazil’s standing among investors.	但准确地对比巴西与其他新兴市场经济体（它们的腐败不逊于巴西）的经验应该会导致巴西在投资者心目中的地位提升。


Going back to Turkey, leaked recordings of telephone conversations have directly implicated Erdoğan and his family, along with several government ministers, in a hugely lucrative corruption ring involving trade with Iran and construction deals.	再回到土耳其，外界掌握的电话交谈录音直接牵涉到埃尔多安及其家人。 同时受牵连的还有几位政府部长，他们都卷入了与伊朗贸易和建筑交易相关的利润丰厚的腐败丑闻。


It is an open secret that government procurement is being used to enrich politicians and their business cronies.	��府采购被用来填满政治家及其商界亲信的口袋已经是公开的秘密。


From all indications, corruption reaches higher and is more widespread than in Brazil.	从种种迹象看，腐败涉及的级别比巴西更高，涉及面也比巴西更广。


But today it is the police officers who led the corruption probe against Erdoğan who are in jail.	但今天被关进监狱的却是领导对埃尔多安调查的警方官员。


Some of the media outlets that supported the probe have been closed down and taken over by the government.	支持调查的有些媒体被关闭，有些则被政府接管。


The AKP argues that the police officers are adherents of the Gülen movement and that the investigation was politically motivated, aiming to unseat Erdoğan.	正义与发展党认为警方官员是葛兰运动的追随者，且调查出于政治动机，目的是推翻埃尔多安。


Both claims are most likely true.	这两种说法很可能都有真实的成分。


But neither justifies the blatant lawlessness with which the AKP government has clamped down on the corruption allegations.	但它们却都无法解释正义与发展党政府镇压腐败指控明目张胆的无法无天。


The upshot is that Turkey’s institutions, unlike Brazil’s, are being captured and corrupted to an extent that will hamper economic growth and development for years to come.	结果是土耳其机构和巴西不同，其腐败和受控制的程度将阻碍今后几年的经济的增长与发展。


Nor is Turkey the only country where large-scale corruption is left unchecked.	土耳其不是对大规模腐败听之任之的唯一国家。


In Malaysia, Prime Minister Najib Razak has been at the center of a major political scandal since nearly $700 million in unaccounted funds was found in his bank accounts.	马来西亚首相纳吉布·拉扎克自从其银行账户发现近7亿美元的不明资金后就一直处在大规模政治丑闻的中心。


Billions of dollars are said to be missing from the government investment fund 1MDB, which Najib controlled.	据称有数十亿美元从由纳吉布控制的政府投资基金1MDB中不翼而飞。


Najib has promised a full reckoning, but he has sacked Malaysia’s attorney general, who was investigating 1MDB.	纳吉布已承诺开展全面清算，但却解雇了马来西亚总检察长，后者正在对1MDB展开调查。


In Latin America, Argentina and Mexico both rank among the bottom half of countries in controlling corruption and maintaining transparency – much lower than Brazil.	在拉丁美洲，阿根廷和墨西哥两国都在控制腐败和保持透明度的国家名单中排名垫底—— 它们的排名比巴西要低得多。


The dramatic abduction and gruesome killing in 2014 of 43 students north of Mexico City is only the latest example of collusion among the country’s criminal gangs, police, and politicians.	2014年43名学生在墨西哥城以北遭到戏剧性地绑架和残忍杀害仅仅是该国犯罪团伙、警察和政客勾结的最新例子。


We know from painful experience that financial markets’ short-term focus and herd behavior often lead them to neglect significant economic fundamentals.	我们从痛苦的经验中得知金融市场对短期的关注和从众行为往往会导致他们忽略重大的经济基本面。


We should not be surprised that the same characteristics can distort markets’ judgment of countries’ governance and political prospects.	同样的特点能够扭曲对国家治理和政治前途的市场判断也并不值得大惊小怪。


The Global Economy’s New Abnormal	全球经济的新反常态


NEW YORK – Since the beginning of the year, the world economy has faced a new bout of severe financial market volatility, marked by sharply falling prices for equities and other risky assets.	纽约—今年以来，全球经济面临了一系列新的严重金融市场波动，表现为股票和其他风险资产价格剧烈下跌。 多重因素在起作用：担心中国经济硬着陆；


A variety of factors are at work: concerns about a hard landing for the Chinese economy; worries that growth in the United States is faltering at a time when the Fed has begun raising interest rates; fears of escalating Saudi-Iranian conflict; and signs – most notably plummeting oil and commodity prices – of severe weakness in global demand.	担心沙特-伊朗冲突升级； 全球需求表现出严重疲软信号——最显著的表现便是石油和大宗商品价格暴跌。


And there’s more.	还有其他因素。


The fall in oil prices – together with market illiquidity, the rise in the leverage of US energy firms and that of energy firms and fragile sovereigns in oil-exporting economies – is stoking fears of serious credit events (defaults) and systemic crisis in credit markets.	石油价格的下跌——以及市场流动性紧缺、美国能源公司以及石油出口经济体能源企业杠杆率上升、石油出口经济体脆弱的主权等——正在引起人们对严重信用事件（违约）和信用市场系统性危机的担忧。


And then there are the seemingly never-ending worries about Europe, with a British exit (Brexit) from the European Union becoming more likely, while populist parties of the right and the left gain ground across the continent.	此外还有没完没了的欧洲隐忧，英国退出欧盟可能性越来越大，而右翼和左翼民粹主义政党正在整个欧洲得势。


These risks are being magnified by some grim medium-term trends implying pervasive mediocre growth.	一些糟糕的中期因素预示着平庸的增长前景，这进一步放大了这些风险。


Indeed, the world economy in 2016 will continue to be characterized by a New Abnormal in terms of output, economic policies, inflation, and the behavior of key asset prices and financial markets.	事实上，从产出、经济政策、通货膨胀和重要资产价格和金融市场的行为看，2016年将又是一个新反常态（New Abnormal）之年。


So what, exactly, is it that makes today’s global economy abnormal?	那么，让当今全球经济反常的原因究竟何在？


First, potential growth in developed and emerging countries has fallen because of the burden of high private and public debts, rapid aging (which implies higher savings and lower investment), and a variety of uncertainties holding back capital spending.	首先，发达和新兴国家的潜在增长因为私人和公共债务高企、人口迅速老化（这意味着更高的储蓄和更低的投资），以及各种让人们收紧资本支出的不确定性而下降。


Moreover, many technological innovations have not translated into higher productivity growth, the pace of structural reforms remains slow, and protracted cyclical stagnation has eroded the skills base and that of physical capital.	此外，许多技术创新没有转化为更高的生产率增长，结构改革速度仍然缓慢，漫长的周期性停滞侵蚀着实体资本的技能基础。


Second, actual growth has been anemic and below its potential trend, owing to the painful process of deleveraging underway, first in the US, then in Europe, and now in highly leveraged emerging markets.	其次，实际增长保持萎靡并低于潜在趋势，原因在于痛苦的去杠杆化过程还在继续——先是美国，然后是欧洲，现在是高杠杆新兴市场。


Third, economic policies – especially monetary policies – have become increasingly unconventional.	第三，经济政策——特别是货币政策——越来越“不走寻常路”。


Indeed, the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy has become increasingly blurred.	事实上，货币和财政政策的分野变得越来越模糊。


Ten years ago, who had heard of terms such as ZIRP (zero-interest-rate policy), QE (quantitative easing), CE (credit easing), FG (forward guidance), NDR (negative deposit rates), or UFXInt (unsterilized FX intervention)?	十年前，根本没人听说过ZIRP（零利率政策）、QE（量化宽松）、CE（信用宽松）、FG（前瞻指引）、NDR（负存款利率）和UFXInt（无冲销外汇干预）等词汇。


No one, because they didn’t exist.	没有人，因为它们根本不存在。


But now these unconventional monetary-policy tools are the norm in most advanced economies – and even in some emerging-market ones.	但如今，这些非常规货币政策工具已经成为最发达经济体的常态——甚至一些新兴市场经济体也是如此。


And recent actions and signals from the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan reinforce the view that more unconventional policies are to come.	欧洲央行和日本银行最近的行动和信号则加强了还有更多非常规政策将会实施的感觉。


Some alleged that these unconventional monetary policies – and the accompanying ballooning of central banks’ balance sheets – were a form of debasement of fiat currencies.	有人指责这些非常规货币政策——以及随之而来的央行资产负债表膨胀——是法币贬值的一种形式。


The result, they argued, would be runaway inflation (if not hyperinflation), a sharp rise in long-term interest rates, a collapse in the value of the US dollar, a spike in the price of gold and other commodities, and the replacement of debased fiat currencies with cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin.	他们认为，其结果是通胀失控（甚至恶性通胀）、长期利率急升、美元价值崩溃、黄金和其他大宗商品暴涨，以及贬值的法币被比特币等加密货币取代。


Instead – and this is the fourth aberration – inflation is still too low and falling in advanced economies, despite central banks’ unconventional policies and surging balance sheets.	相反——这也是第四个反常现象——尽管央行采取了非常规政策，其资产负债表也飞速膨胀，但通货膨胀在发达经济体依然过低并且继续下降。 央行的挑战是提高通货膨胀甚至避免全面通缩。


The challenge for central banks is to try to boost inflation, if not avoid outright deflation.	与此同时，���期利率近几年来一直在下降； 美元在升值；


At the same time, long-term interest rates have continued to come down in recent years; the value of the dollar has surged; gold and commodity prices have fallen sharply; and bitcoin was the worst performing currency of 2014-2015.	黄金和大宗商品价格暴跌； 比特币也沦为2014—2015年表现最差货币。


The reason ultra-low inflation remains a problem is that the traditional causal link between the money supply and prices has been broken.	极低利率仍然是个问题的原因在于货币供给和价格之间的传统因果关系已经破裂。


One reason for this is that banks are hoarding the additional money supply in the form of excess reserves, rather than lending it (in economic terms, the velocity of money has collapsed).	之所以如此，一个原因是银行以超额准备金的形式囤积新增货币供给，而不是发放贷款（用经济学术语讲，货币流通速度崩溃）。


Moreover, unemployment rates remain high, giving workers little bargaining power.	此外，失业率仍然很高，工人根本没有讨价还价能力。


And a large amount of slack remains in many countries’ product markets, with large output gaps and low pricing power for firms (an excess-capacity problem exacerbated by Chinese overinvestment).	许多国家的产品市场仍然存在大量滞销、巨大的产出缺口和企业定价能力低下（被中国过度投资放大的产能过剩问题）。


And now, following a massive decline in housing prices in countries that experienced a boom and bust, oil, energy and other commodity prices have collapsed.	如今，继经历了枯荣循环的国家的房价大面积下跌之后，石油、能源和大宗商品价格也出现了崩盘。


Call this the fifth anomaly – the result of China’s slowdown, the surge in supplies of energy and industrial metals (following successful exploration and overinvestment in new capacity), and the strong dollar, which weakens commodity prices.	这可以称之为第五大反常态——其原因是中国减速、能源和工业金属供给激增（因为成功的勘探工作和新产能过度投资）以及强势美元（削弱了大宗商品价格）。


The recent market turmoil has started the deflation of the global asset bubble wrought by QE, though the expansion of unconventional monetary policies may feed it for a while longer.	最近的市场动荡开始乐QE带来的全球资产泡沫的通缩，尽管非常规货币政策的扩张可能将继续助长泡沫。


The real economy in most advanced and emerging economies is seriously ill, and yet, until recently, financial markets soared to greater highs, supported by central banks’ additional easing.	大部分发达和新兴经济体的实体经济问题严重，但是，直到目前，金融市场仍然在央行加码宽松的情况下频创高峰。


The question is how long Wall Street and Main Street can diverge.	问题在于华尔街和主街（Main Street）的分歧可以维持多久。


In fact, this divergence is one aspect of the final abnormality.	事实上，这一分歧是最后一个反常态的一个方面。


The other is that financial markets haven’t reacted very much, at least so far, to growing geopolitical risks either, including those stemming from the Middle East, Europe’s identity crisis, rising tensions in Asia, and the lingering risks of a more aggressive Russia.	另一个方面是金融市场（至少到目前为止）对地缘政治风险升高的反应也并不强烈，包括中东地缘政治风险、欧洲身份危机、亚洲紧张态势升级以及更具侵略性的俄罗斯带来的风险。


Again, how long can this state of affairs – in which markets not only ignore the real economy, but also discount political risk – be sustained?	这样的状态——市场不但忽视实体经济，也轻视政治风险——会维持多久？


Welcome to the New Abnormal for growth, inflation, monetary policies, and asset prices, and make yourself at home.	欢迎来到增长、通胀、货币政策和资产价格的新反常态，请尽情享受吧。


It looks like we’ll be here for a while.	看起来这一状态会维持一段时间。


The Anti-Globalization Brexplosion	反全球化“英国退出”大爆发


SEOUL – Populism, nationalism, and xenophobia all contributed to the victory of the “Leave” campaign in the United Kingdom’s recent referendum on membership in the European Union.	首尔—民粹主义、民族主义和仇外都为“脱欧”阵营在英国最近的欧盟成员资格公投中获胜贡献了力量。


But these forces float on the surface of a larger sea change: a fundamental shift worldwide in the relationship between the state and the market.	但这些力量只是更大的变局的表象：全世界范围内国家和市场关系的根本性变化。


Since the birth of modern capitalism, these two frameworks of human activity have generally been at odds.	自现代资本主义诞生以来，这两种人类活动的框架总体而言一直保持着独立。


While the market tends to expand geographically as its participants pursue economic benefits, the state seeks to keep orderly everybody and everything within the territory it controls.	市场参与者追求经济利益，市场也随之在地理上不断扩大，而国家寻求人人遵守秩序和控制领土内的一切。


A merchant may recognize market opportunities in a foreign country, but he will run into the state – most immediately, that country’s immigration authorities – if he pursues them.	一个商人可能察觉到外国的市场机会，但要追求这些机会，他会去找国家——最先找的是移民当局。


How to reconcile the tension between the market and the state is the central concern of political economy today, just as it was for Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, Friedrich List and Karl Marx in the nineteenth century, and John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich von Hayek in their long debate on the topic through the middle decades of the twentieth century.	如何协调市场与国家之间的紧张是当今政治经济学的一个核心问题，一如十八世纪的亚当·斯密、十九世纪的弗雷德里希·李斯特（Friedrich List）和卡尔·马克思以及在整个二十世纪中叶就此问题进行长期论战的约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯和弗雷德里希·冯·哈耶克。


Let’s consider two hypothetical extremes in the state-market relationship.	让我们构想国家-市场关系的两种极端情况。


The first is a seamless global market in which individuals can maximize their material benefits without any state intervention.	第一种是一个无缝的全球市场，个体可以尽情最大化物质利益而不会受到任何国家干预。


The problem with this scenario is that you may live in a country that is vulnerable to all the negative consequences of no-holds-barred globalization, such as currency devaluation, labor exploitation, the flouting of intellectual property laws, and so forth.	这一情景的问题是你所生活的国家可能极易受到畅通无阻的全球化所造成的一切消极后果的影响，比如货币贬值、劳动剥削、践踏知识产权法等。


The other extreme is a world comprising entirely isolated autarchic states, where individuals are protected from external economic forces and the state has full autonomy over domestic affairs.	另一个极端是世界由完全孤立的独裁国家组成，个体不必受到外部经济力量影响，国家对内政拥有完全的自决权。


In this scenario, you will have to forgo all the well-known economic benefits of the global division of labor.	在这一情形中，你必须放弃全球劳动分工所带来的众所周知的经济收益。


Between these two extremes lies most of the world as it is, characterized by regional integration projects like the EU or the North American Free Trade Agreement.	世界绝大部分地区都位于这两种极端之间，其特征是存在欧盟和北美自由贸易协定等区域一体化工程。


We can identify important swings during the history of capitalism over the last two centuries, either toward the market or the state.	过去两个世纪中，我们可以看到资本主义出现了重大波动，摆向市场和摆向国家的情况都有。


For example, the repeal of the Corn Laws in the UK in 1846 favored a free market in international trade and accelerated globalization until the outbreak of World War I.	比如，1846年英国废除谷物法有利于国际贸易中的自由市场，也加速了第一次世界大战爆发前的全球化进程。


After WWI, the pendulum swung back toward the state.	一战结束后，钟摆又摆回了国家的方向。


Financial capital in the West was weakened politically, and a mobilized working class took the opportunity to demand jobs and social-welfare programs that ran counter to the logic and rules of a globalized market.	西方金融中心在政治上被削弱，动员起来的工人阶级抓住机会要求获得工作岗位和与全球化市场逻辑和规则相悖的社会福利计划。


In the run-up to World War II, beggar-thy-neighbor policies and rampant protectionism ensued – with Britain leaving the gold standard in 1931 in response to a run on the pound.	在第二次世界大战前，以邻为壑政策和保护主义泛滥并存——1931年英国为了应对英镑挤兑而脱离金本位。


The Economist declared that Monday, September 21, “the definite end of an epoch in the world’s financial and economic development.”	《经济学人》杂志宣布9月21日星期一这一天是 “世界金融和经济发展一个时代结束的日子。


After the passage of Brexit, the same journal warned, “Britain is sailing into a storm with no one at the wheel.”	”英国退出公投通过后，《经济学人》警告“英国驶入风暴，船上无人掌舵。 ”


The 1944 Bretton Woods conference marked another swing back toward the market, but this time allowed for some degree of national autonomy.	1944年的布雷顿森林会议标志着钟摆再次摆向市场，但这一次仍保留了一些国家自主权。


Until the late 1960s, a harmonious balance of international openness and national autonomy allowed for widespread prosperity.	直到20世纪60年代末，国际开放与国家自主权之间的和谐平衡保证了普遍的繁荣。


Turbulence returned in the 1970s, however, as the slow growth and high prices of “stagflation” and a global energy crisis pushed the pendulum back toward fully liberalized markets – a shift from the Keynesian to the Hayekian world, helped along by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the United States.	但是，随着“滞涨”的低增长和高物价以及全球能源危机将钟摆推向了完全自由化的市场——在英国的撒切尔夫人和美国的罗纳德·里根的推波助澜下从凯恩斯的世界摆向哈耶克的世界，波动在20世纪70年代卷土重来。


This brings us to the present.	然后我们迎来了现状。


The economic crisis of 2008, and the global economy’s failure to recover from it fully, put an end to the project begun by Thatcher and Reagan.	2008年经济危机以及全球经济无法从中完全恢复的局面宣告了始于撒切尔夫人和里根的工程的结束。


As in the post-WWI period, workers came to see themselves as left behind by globalization, with political leaders favoring financiers and big business at their expense.	与一战后的时期一样，工人看到他们自己被全球化所抛下，政治领导人牺牲他们的利益满足养肥了金融家和大企业。


In the case of Brexit, the “Leave” camp voted for more national autonomy, even though it will have a clear material cost.	在英国退出公投中，“脱欧”阵营把票投给了更多国家自主权，尽管这显然必须付出物质代价。


An American version of Brexit may not be far behind if the next US president scraps the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal with 11 Pacific Rim countries, signed in February of this year.	如果下一任美国总统废除今年2月与11个环太平洋国家签署的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），那么美国版英国退出也为时不远了。


At a time when global trade negotiations are almost dead, the TPP should seem like a reasonable approach to boosting multilateral trade.	如今，全球贸易谈判已经几乎死去，TPP看似刺激多边贸易的合理方法。


And yet both presumptive US presidential candidates say they oppose it, promising what would be tantamount to an “Amexit” from the global trading system.	但两位推定美国总统候选人均表示反对TPP，许下了等同于全球贸易体系“美国推出”的承诺。


We are at an interregnum.	我们正处于一个空白期。


Social and political discontent will continue to bubble up around the world until we return the state-market relationship to a healthy equilibrium.	社会和政治不满将继续在全球发酵，直到我们让国家-市场关系恢复健康的平衡。


The problem is that no one knows how best to do this.	问题在于没人知道如何最好地实现这一点。


Some propose re-harmonizing international markets with national autonomy, as occurred under Bretton Woods.	一些人提出重新如布雷顿森林体系那样协调国际市场和国家自主权。


But the post-war international economic order was built for the pre-globalization age, and we cannot put the genie back in the bottle, even if it were possible to do so.	但战后国际经济秩序建立于前全球化时期，我们无法让精灵回到瓶子中去，即使有这样的可能。


Brexit marks the beginning of the end of the latest era of globalization.	英国退出标志着最新的全球化时代结束的开始。


What comes next is anyone’s guess, but we can be certain that it won’t be the final destination.	下一步会怎样还只能猜测，但可以肯定这不会是重终点。


Another Way to Make Finance Safer	让金融更安全的另一种方法


CAMBRIDGE – Since the financial crisis erupted in 2008, policymakers have sought to make the world’s banks safer, mainly via detailed instructions: use more capital, avoid specified risky activities, provide more transparency, and punish reckless behavior.	美国剑桥—自2008年金融危机爆发以来，决策者想方设法要让全世界的银行变得更安全，他们主要是通过具体的措施：使用更多的资本、避免具体的冒险行为、提供更多的透明度，以及惩罚鲁莽行为。


But this approach to financial regulation, while laudable, requires officials to make, or shape, banks’ most important strategic decisions: capital levels, liability structure, and the scope of their business activities.	但这一金融监管的方法尽管值得赞赏，却需要让官员来决定或影响银行最重要的战略决策：资本水平、负债结构以及业务活动范围。


And, while regulators often target bank executives’ incentives, they often leave intact the organization’s incentives to take risks – but then command them, via regulation, not to take those risks.	此外，监管者的目标常常是银行高管的激励，却常常对组织的冒险激励视而不见，反而是在事后通过监管要求它们不要冒这些险。


This command-and-control approach has shortcomings: regulators may mistake which activities to regulate and how; banks resist; and bankers and their advisers – some of the smartest businesspeople around – innovate to free themselves from many of the imposed constraints.	这一要求-控制方法有其缺陷：监管者可能弄错应该监管什么行为、怎样监管； 银行对监管采取抵制态度；


High-quality economic talent could be better used elsewhere.	银行家和他们的顾问——其中不乏最聪明的商人——通过创新规避许多施加给他们的约束。 高质量经济人才可以在其他领域得到更好的使用。


Worse, many command-and-control efforts have become too complex to implement well.	更糟糕的是，许多要求-控制措施太复杂，无法很好地实施。


In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act’s famous “Volcker rule,” which seeks to limit banks’ proprietary trading, has swollen to hundreds of pages, and its introduction has been repeatedly delayed.	在美国，多德-弗兰克法案（Dodd-Frank Act）的著名的“沃克尔规则”（Volcker rule）试图限制银行的自营交易，这一规则条文厚达数百页，其实施也被一推再推。


There is a simpler, mostly untried approach to financial regulation.	有一种更简单、而且几乎没有尝试过的金融监管方法。


Instead of relying primarily on command-and-control rules, regulators should focus on what motivates the organization as a whole and align those incentives with financial safety.	监管者不应该主要依赖要求-控制规则，而应该专注于组织作为一个整体的动机，将激励与金融安全协调起来。


Doing so could both change banks for the better and increase the effectiveness of ongoing command-and-control regulation.	这样做既可以让银行变得更好，也可以增进实施中的要求-控制监管的效果。


The recent massive fine of $13 billion imposed by the US government on JPMorgan Chase fits this mode of financial regulation.	最近，美国政府对摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）课以130亿美元巨额罚款，这一做法就符合这一金融监管模式。


But, because such fines are erratic and difficult for banks and banking executives to predict, their impact on long-term organizational incentives is unclear.	但是，由于这类罚款具有不确定性，银行和银行高管很难预测它的发生，因此它对长期组织激励的影响尚不清楚。


The best opportunity to align overall organizational incentives is to be found in tax rules.	协调整体组织激励的最好机会存在于税收规则中。


Yet reforms in this area are not only untried; they are not even under discussion.	但这方面的改革尚未尝试，甚至连讨论都没有。


That needs to change.	这需要改变。


Like other corporations, financial institutions are taxed on their income, with expenses – including the firm’s financing costs, like interest payments to its creditors – deducted from revenues.	与其他公司一样，金融机构也要缴纳所得税，其中费用（包括企业的融资成本，如对债权人的利息支付）可以从收入中扣除。


Interest on debt lightens the tax burden and increases profits; returns to equity do not.	债务利息减轻了税收负担，增加了利润； 股东回报则否。


As a result, safe equity becomes more expensive than riskier debt financing.	结果，安全的股本变得比高风险的债务融资更加昂贵。


In the mainstream understanding of finance, a firm’s debt level is primarily a trade-off between the benefits of the tax deduction for interest paid and the increased probability of bankruptcy or operational degradation.	在主流金融理论中，企业的债务水平首先是一种权衡——一边是利息支付的税收扣减的好处，另一边是破产和经营不善概率的增加。


So taxing banks on their debt, not their equity, would fundamentally alter organizational incentives.	因此对银行的债务而不是股本课税将从根本上改变组织激励。


Two basic options are available.	有两个基本选择。


The most straightforward is to eliminate the deductibility of interest from a bank’s tax bill.	最直接的选择是取消银行利息支付的税收扣减性质。


The bank, its shareholders, directors, and executives would no longer have tax reasons to prefer debt over equity, because the bank’s total pre-interest-expense income would be taxed (at a lower rate than the tax on profit), without benefiting from deducting interest expenses on its debt.	银行、其股东、董事和高管将不再会因为税收原因偏好债务而不是股本，因为银行的息费前利润全部要被课税（税率比利润税低），不再能得到先扣减债务利息费用的优惠。


However, this tax structure’s impact would vary over time, as interest rates rise and fall.	但是，这一税收结构的影响会因为时间而随利率波动而改变。


With today’s interest rates at historical lows, the impact of adjusting the deduction for interest on debt would be small.	如今，利率处于历史低位，调整债务利息扣减的影响很小。


When interest rates return to more normal levels, the impact would be greater.	当利息回归正常水平时，这一影响会增加。


Alternatively, the authorities could levy an excise tax on bank debt in exchange for repealing the corporate tax.	或者当局可以对银行债务课以特种消费税，作为交换，同时取消公司税。


The tax should be calibrated so that banks would pay the same amount, on average, before and after the change.	税收应该这样校准：变化前后银行总体来说纳税额不变。


The tax rate would be low.	税率将会较低。


A bank financed with 8% equity should be indifferent to paying an excise tax of 0.5% of its debt or paying today’s corporate tax.	股本融资比率在8%的银行应该对缴纳0. 5%的债务特种消费税和缴纳现在的公司税无差异。


But, though the total tax paid would be the same, the incentives for the bank, its board, and its executives to make the bank and the financial system safer would be strengthened.	但是，尽管总缴税额不变，银行、其董事会和高管让金融系统变得更安全的激励会增强。


The tax would make debt more expensive, because it would be taxed, while making equity cheaper, because profits would not be taxed.	税收将让债务变得更贵，因为债务将被课税，同时股本会变得更便宜，因为利润不会被课税。


Banks would want to use more safe equity and less risky debt.	银行将希望使用更多的安全的股本和更少的危险的债务。


Tax reform would not solve everything needed to ensure systemic financial safety.	税收改革不能解决确保系统性金融安全的一切问题。


Bank debt receives other subsidies, such as from the implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee.	银行债务还能获得其他补贴，比如“太大而不能倒”的隐性担保。


Nor would the size of the tax be tied to the damage that major bank failures do to the rest of the economy.	税收的规模也与大银行倒闭对经济所造成的伤害无关。


And there would be implementation and avoidance issues, as is true of all taxes.	还有实施和规避问题，这是一切税收都免不了的。


Nevertheless, the tax would better align financial firms’ incentives with the goal of minimizing the risk of systemic crises.	尽管如此，税收能更好地协调金融企业的激励与系统性危机风险最小化目标。


Moreover, because the shift to taxing debt instead of equity would reduce the corporate tax for financial firms, policymakers could hope that it would not generate the resistance that the post-crisis command-and-control rules have.	此外，转向对债务而不是股本课税将降低金融企业的公司税，因此决策者可以期待这不会引起危机前要求-控制规则所引起的抵制。


Regulatory styles have diminishing returns.	监管风格的回报的递减的。


Much of what can destroy a bank is not headstrong recklessness, but ordinary day-to-day failures.	摧毁一家银行的的因素很大程度上不在于顽固的鲁莽，而在于寻常的日常失策。


Command-and-control regulation, which can generate more pushback by its targets as the regulatory commands get stronger, is by now well developed for banks and finance.	随着监管要求的增加，要求-控制型监管受其目标的反弹也更大。 如今，针对银行和金融的要求-控制型监管已经发展得颇为完善了。


Addressing banks’ and financial firms’ organizational incentives should play a more prominent role in the financial-policy mix than it does today.	纠正银行和金融企业的组织激励应该在金融政策组合中扮演更主要的角色。


Empowering Financial Bankruptcy	授权金融破产


CAMBRIDGE – Four of the world’s most important financial regulators – the Bank of England, Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority – recently asked the world’s derivatives industry to change the way it does business.	美国剑桥—世界上最重要的四个金融监管机构——英格兰银行、德国联邦金融监督局（BaFin）、美国联邦存款保险公司和瑞士金融市场监督局——最近要求世界衍生品行业改变业务模式。


The question now is whether the regulators can make that happen with a request, as opposed to something more substantial.	现在的问题监管者是否可以凭借这一要求让这一幕发生——在一些更重要的问题上，答案是否定的。


That will not be easy.	这绝不容易。


The regulators’ tersely worded letter to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) asked it to renounce a core component of the industry’s multi-decade effort to exempt itself from financial debtors’ bankruptcy – an exemption that worsens not only the debtor’s stability, but also that of the global economy.	这些监管机构给国际互换和衍生品协会（ISDA）发去了一封言简意赅的函件，要求它放弃该行业几十年来让自己免于金融债务人破产的影响做法——这一特权不但让恶化了债务人的稳定性，也拖累了全球经济。


Many observers believe that these exemptions hit the world’s financial system especially hard when Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008.	许多观察者认为，2008年雷曼兄弟倒闭时，这一特权给世界金融系统造成了特别严重的冲击。


Other creditors typically cannot do that; in a US bankruptcy, for example, they must first wait for a court to decide whether the debtor company can be restructured. Only then can they collect their debts.	监管机构关注的是衍生品合约的一个重要特征——允许衍生品行业断然关闭与陷入金融困境的实体的交易。


Regulators around the world have worked hard to make the financial system safer.	全世界机关机构一直在努力让金融系统变得更安全。


With the recent missive to the derivatives industry, they are now starting to deal with bankruptcy – and well they should.	这封最近的致衍生品行业的公函表明，它们现在开始解决破产问题了——早就应该如此了。


Until now, bankruptcy has played a second-tier role in reform efforts, even though bankruptcy law does for industrial firms much of what regulators want for financial firms.	到目前为止，破产在改革中扮演的一直是二等角色，尽管破产法对产业公司做了监管者希望它对金融公司做的事情。


By restructuring a failed industrial firm’s debts, saving its profitable businesses, and selling its loss-making ones, bankruptcy can minimize a failed firm’s knock-on costs for its creditors and the economy as a whole.	破产可以通过重组倒闭产业公司债务、挽救其可盈利业务、出售其亏损业务将倒闭公司给其债权人和整体经济所造成的间接成本最小化。


But, though US bankruptcy law usually does a good job of restructuring industrial firms, it cannot restructure financial firms, because bankruptcy’s basic rules – which allow the court to consolidate the firm’s assets, redeploy them, and sell the rest – do not apply to most financial contracts, like derivatives.	但是，尽管美国破产法在重组产业公司方面通常做的十分出色，却无法重组金融公司，因为破产的基本规则——允许法庭整合公司资产、予以重新部署并出售其余部分——并不适用于大部分金融合约，比如衍生品合约。


So, bankruptcy is both part of the problem and part of the hoped-for solution – if it can be fixed and made to work for financial firms.	因此，破产既是问题的一部分，也是希望的解决方案的一部分——如果它能够得到修订从而适用于金融公司的话。


Consider the collapse of Lehman Brothers.	以雷曼兄弟的倒闭为例。


When then-US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson decided not to bail out Lehman, the firm filed for bankruptcy and quickly sold off its brokerage operations.	时任美国财政部张亨利·鲍尔森（Henry Paulson）决定不拯救雷曼，因此该公司陷入破产并很快地甩卖了它的经纪部门。


But, ominously, it could not sell its large portfolio of derivatives contracts – deals based on movements of interest and currency rates.	但不幸的是它无法出售其规模巨大的衍生品合约（基于利率和汇率波动的交易）组合。


By most accounts, Lehman’s derivatives portfolio was a winner when it went bankrupt, but bankruptcy exemptions for derivatives allowed Lehman’s counterparties to close out their positions rapidly, in ways that were costly for Lehman, chaotic for financial markets, and damaging to the real economy.	从很多方面看，雷曼的衍生品组合在它破产时是盈利的，但衍生品的破产豁免让雷曼的交易对手迅速了结了它们的头寸，所使用的方式令雷曼损失惨重，令金融市场陷入混乱，也令实体经济受到伤害。


The derivatives market is exempt from rules that stop creditors from grabbing collateral and terminating their contracts when the debtor files for bankruptcy.	衍生品市场不适用禁止债权人在债务人申请破产时抢夺抵押品并中止合约的规则。


They are also exempt from rules that impede better-informed creditors from seizing assets and running off just before a bankruptcy, even if their positions are needed, say, to sell a portfolio intact to another business, and even if the fleeing creditor would eventually be paid in full, with interest.	衍生品也不适用禁止信息占优的债权人在破产前夕不顾它们的处境需要（比如）出售完好无损的组合给另一个企业，或者债权人原本可以连本带利获得十足偿付的情况而攫取资产逃之夭夭的规则。


Regulators’ push for sounder finance has so far focused on requiring more capital, creating safer products, and establishing more resilient business structures.	监管机构急切地要让金融变得更可靠，到目前为止，这方面的努力主要集中在提高资本要求、创造更安全的产品和建立恢复力更强的业务结构上。


These are indeed the right priorities.	这些都是正确的优先目标。


But the US Congress and regulators have said all along that bankruptcy is the preferred way to restructure failed financial firms.	但美国国会和监管机构都言之凿凿地说破产是重组倒闭金融公司的优先方式。


If a judicial bankruptcy process could work, the thinking goes, it would minimize the likelihood of taxpayer-financed bailouts and disruption of financial markets and the real economy.	理论上，如果法定破产程序能够起效，就能让纳税人买单的救援和对金融市场和实体经济的破坏最小化。


The problem is that bankruptcy today is no more capable of restructuring a failed financial firm than it was in 2009; a failed Lehman in 2014 would be no less disruptive to the world economy.	问题在于今天的破产不再像2009年那样有能力处理倒闭金融公司的重组； 若雷曼在2014年倒闭，其对世界经济的破坏力不会比当年小。


US regulators, for example, cannot first try bankruptcy before deploying their expanded powers under the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation; if they did, the bankrupt firm’s counterparties in the derivatives and repo markets would close out their contracts and dump their collateral as soon as they could.	比如，美国监管机构首先无法在根据2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革立法扩大权力之前尝试破产； 如果它们尝试了破产，破产公司的衍生品和回购市场对手方将了结它们的合约，尽快甩卖它们的抵押品。


Once that happened – probably within hours of the bankruptcy filing – the firm would be beyond repair.	如果发生了这一幕——可能会在破产申请递交几小时内发生——雷曼公司就会变得不可挽救。


Regulators could not go back and fix it with their new Dodd-Frank powers, because the firm would already be ripped asunder.	监管机构无法回头凭借新多德-弗兰克权力拯救它，因为该公司已经支离破碎了。


So, as it stands now, regulators need to preempt bankruptcy, not rely on it, because as soon as any failed financial firm files for bankruptcy, it has signed its own death warrant.	因此，和现在一样，监管机构需要先发制人地实施破产而不是依赖它，因为只要倒闭金融公司递交破产申请，就相当于签署了死亡保证书。


The regulators’ letter to the ISDA asked the derivatives industry to rewrite its standard contracts, so that a bankrupt firm’s portfolio is not ripped apart as soon as it files.	监管机构给ISDA的致函要求衍生品行业重写标准合约，以便破产公司的组合不会在递交破产申请后立刻被了结。


This is a big step in the right direction.	这是迈向正确方向的一大步。


But, as regulators reflect further, they will recognize that they cannot rely on the derivatives industry to revise its contracts any more than industrial bankruptcy relies on creditors’ contracts to stop failed firms from being ripped apart.	但是，只要监管机构进一步深思就会发现，它们无法像产业破产依赖债权人的合约阻止倒闭公司四分五裂那样指望衍生品行业修订其合约。


Many simply will not use the contract terms.	许多金融公司根本不会用到合约条款。


Perhaps regulators will find that they must require that the regulated have the desired contract provisions.	或许监管机构会发现它们必须要求被监管机构提供想要的合约条款。


That solution will be incomplete, however, because not all derivatives traders are regulated financial institutions, and because many creditors would find ways to circumvent the contract and the requirement.	但这一解决方案是不完全的，因为并非所有衍生品交易方都是被监管金融机构，并且许多债权人可以找到绕过合约和要求的办法。


If the coverage is not complete, one can expect the regulated to complain that they have been placed at a competitive disadvantage.	如果要求覆盖范围不完全，就可以预言被监管机构抱怨它们被置于竞争劣势。


Regulators may well need to turn to bankruptcy laws to fix the problem.	监管机构可能确实需要破产法来纠正问题。


The regulators’ call to the ISDA for voluntary action will not amount to much if it is just a request to the derivatives industry to act against its own financial interests.	监管机构要求ISDA采取自愿行动不会起到很大的效果，如果它要求衍生品行业不顾及自身金融利益的话。


But it does start the regulators down the road to more serious reform.	但这确实意味着监管机构开始迈出严肃改革的第一步。


Bonded Bankers	用债券束缚银行家


CAMBRIDGE – Since the global financial crisis, regulators have worked hard to make the world’s big banks safer.	美国剑桥—自全球金融危机以来，监管者努力地试图让全球大银行变得更加安全。


The fundamental problem is well known: major banks have significant incentives to take on excessive risk.	基本问题早已众所周知：大银行有巨大的激励过度冒险。


If their risky bets pay off, their stockholders benefit considerably, as do the banks’ CEOs and senior managers, who are heavily compensated in bank stock.	如果它们的高风险赌注赢了，股东就能获得极大的好处，被授予大笔银行股票的银行CEO和高管也能从中获利。


If they do not pay off and the bank fails, the government will probably pick up the tab.	如果赌注输了、银行倒闭，还有可能得到政府的买单。


This confluence of economic incentives to take on risk makes bank managers poor guardians of financial safety.	冒险的经济激励让银行管理者不再是金融安全的守护者。


They surely do not want their bank to fail; but, if the potential upside is large enough, it is a risk they may find worth taking.	他们当然不希望自己的银行倒闭； 但是，如果潜在好处足够大，他们或许会认为风险值得担。


Several solutions to this problem have been proposed, and some – such as increased capital requirements and restrictions on risky investments – are headed toward implementation.	人们已经提出了一些解决这一问题的办法，其中不少——如增加资本要求、限制高风险投资等——已经进入实施阶段。


More recently, two other important solutions have emerged.	近来涌现出两个重要的其他解决方案。


Under the first, more developed proposal, banks would undertake large obligations via long-term bonds, which would be paid only if their operations are sound.	第一个方案比较成熟，在这个方案下，银行将大量发行长期债券，只有在经营情况良好时，这些债券才会被偿付。


In effect, the long-term bondholders would guarantee the rest of a bank’s debts, including the riskiest ones.	事实上，长期债权人将为银行的其他债务做出担保，包括风险最高的债务。


If the bank faltered, the guaranteeing bondholders would stabilize the most troubled elements of the firm.	如果银行遭遇不测，担保债权人将保持银行最麻烦的要素的稳定。


The bondholders – not the bank’s core operations – would take the hit.	债权人——而非银行的核心经营层——将遭遇打击。


Proponents hope that this would soften the systemic cost of bank failure.	支持者希望这能软化银行倒闭的系统成本。


They also hope that the guarantees would motivate the bondholders to monitor banks’ activities and pressure bank managers to limit their risky operations.	他们还希望担保能刺激债权人监督银行行为、对银行管理者施压，限制他们的高峰限行为。


The second solution that is gaining ground is to revise bankers’ compensation.	第二个日益获得关注的办法是修正银行的薪酬。


Senior bank managers would be paid not in cash or equity, but in the bank’s long-term bonds, thereby giving them a larger financial stake in the bank’s long-term stability, instead of its long-term stock price.	高级银行管理人员不再获得现金或股票，而是获得银行长期债券，从而让他们的利益与银行的长期稳定性而非长期股价表现关系更加密切。


If the bank failed, it would be unable to repay the bonds, and the managers owning bonds would be that much poorer.	如果银行倒闭，将无法偿付债券，拥有债券的管理者也会遭遇巨大损失。


Bank regulators in the US and elsewhere are now seriously considering such changes, but they have yet to determine how comprehensive the compensation makeover should be.	美国和其他地区的银行监管者目前正在认真考虑这些变革，但仍未想出这一薪酬方案大变脸的全部细节。


In general, though, a substantial share of senior bankers’ pay would be deferred for several years.	但是，总体而言，银行高管的大部分薪酬将延后数年支付。


If the bank did not survive that long, the managers would lose that money.	如果银行在此期间倒闭，管理者就得不到这笔钱。


This could be achieved by unfunded pension obligations, which do not require that banks set aside the money in advance.	这可以通过无拨付退休金机制实现，该机制不要求银行事先准备好资金。


Banks overseen by managers who had larger unfunded pensions weathered the financial crisis better than their counterparts, presumably because they had a stronger incentive to keep them safe.	由无拨付退休金数额较大的管理者经营的银行在金融危机中的表现比同业更好，这应该是因为他们有更大的激励保证银行安全。


A more aggressive approach would compensate bankers with the same bonds that guarantee their institutions’ short-term, volatile, and risky debts.	更激进的办法是用担保本机构的高波动、高风险短期债务的债券作为银行家薪酬。


As a result, bank managers would have a personal financial stake in ensuring that the risky obligations do not blow up, as they did during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.	这样一来，确保高风险债务不出篓子（2007—2008年金融危机的原因就在于此）就和银行管理者的个人财务利益绑在了一起。


If the obligations deteriorated and the bank failed, the managers would be left unpaid.	如果债务问题恶化，银行倒闭，管理者将无法获得偿付。


Because the obligations would be guaranteeing the rest of the bank’s operations, the managers would, it is hoped, be especially vigilant in ensuring that basic operations were safe.	由于债务将担保银行的其余业务，人们希望管理者将因此获得很大的动力确保基本业务的安全。


By tying senior managers’ pay to the bank’s stability, the financial sector, advocates argue, would be forced to police itself.	支持者指出，通过将过关薪酬与银行稳定性挂钩，金融部门将被迫自我监管。


This incentive-based regulation could bolster economic stability more effectively than expecting regulators to keep pace with banks’ risky activities.	这一基于激励的监管能够比指望监管者跟上银行高风险行为更有效地保证经济稳定。


The proposal is not perfect – not least because bank managers’ compensation would still be tied to profits.	该方案并不完美——不仅是因为银行管理者薪酬仍然与利润挂钩。


If a banker is told that he or she will be compensated entirely in bonds this year, with the bank’s annual profits determining the number of bonds to be received, the banker would obviously want to boost this year’s profits – even if it required taking bigger risks.	如果银行家被告知，他今年的薪酬将直接用债券方式支付，债券数量由银行年利润决定，那么他显然会希望做大今年的利润——即使这要求银行冒更大的风险。


After the banker receives his or her first bond payment, the incentives become more complex.	在银行家获得第一笔债券薪酬支付后，激励就变得更加复杂了。


The banker wants last year’s bonds to be paid (creating an incentive to safeguard stability) but wants a high payment this year (creating an incentive to maximize profit, which usually entails risk-taking).	银行家希望去年的债券得到偿付（产生捍卫稳定的激励），但又希望今年获得高薪（产生利润最大化的激励，而利润最大化常常包含着冒险）。


Moreover, bankers could find ways to sell the long-term bonds.	此外，银行家无法出售长期债券。


While regulators can require that the bonds remain unpaid by the bank, and even that bankers prove that they have not sold them, senior bankers are adept at finding loopholes.	即使监管者可以要求银行不偿付债券，甚至银行家也可以证明他们并没有出售债券，而事实上高级银行家向来是寻找漏洞的高手。


They could, for example, retain ownership of the bonds, but sell off their economic interest.	比如，他们可以保持债券的所有权，但出售它们的经济利息。


Bank executives who hold large numbers of these bonds would have an incentive to lobby to dilute the bonds’ guarantee.	持有大量这类债券的银行高管将有激励游说稀释债券的担保力。


If the bank’s financial condition deteriorated, their bond holdings might motivate them to conceal that and hope for a turnaround before their bonds were wiped out.	如果银行财务状况恶化，他们所持有的债券会促使他们隐瞒状况，寄希望于在债券变得一文不名前出现转机。


All of this highlights the imperative that regulators develop a shrewd and comprehensive strategy for supervising such a compensation system.	所有这些都凸显出监管者应尽快研究巧妙、全面的策略监督这一薪酬制度。


Otherwise, it would lose its effectiveness.	否则，它有可能丧失有效性。


Compensating bankers with bonds helps to promote safety, but it does not let the regulators off the hook.	以债券为银行机付酬有助于促进安全，但并不让监管者高枕无忧。


Despite these challenges, a new, bond-based compensation strategy could enhance bank stability considerably.	尽管存在这些挑战，基于债券的新薪酬策略仍有助于大幅提高银行稳定性。


Though there is no silver bullet for bank regulation, implementing such a system with care and vigilance would be an important step in the right direction.	银行监管问题没有万灵丹，但小心警惕地实施这一制度将是朝正确方向的重要一步。


JPMorgan Inside the Whale	鲸中的JP摩根


CAMBRIDGE – It has been a bad few weeks for JPMorgan Chase (JPM), the multinational financial-services firm that by some measures is America’s biggest bank.	美国剑桥—对于从某些角度堪为美国最大银行的跨国金融服务企业摩根大通公司（JPM）来说，最近几周日子可谓难过。


Two of its traders were indicted, and the bank agreed to a billion-dollar fine for failing to report the extent of its “London Whale” losses fast enough and accurately enough.	它家两名交易员遭到了起诉，此外它还同意缴纳十亿美元罚款，原因是其报告“伦敦鲸”损失不够迅速，也不够准确。


Now it faces even bigger fines – perhaps exceeding $10 billion – for mortgage activities, mostly by two of the financial firms, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, that it bought up during the financial crisis.	如今，JPM因为它在金融危机期间买下的两家企业——贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）和华盛顿互助银行（Washington Mutual）的按揭行为而面临更大规模的罚款，也许将超过100亿美元。


The conventional wisdom is that the United States government would not have gone after JPM had these setbacks and errors become salient during the financial crisis.	传统智慧认为，既然这些篓子和错误爆发于金融危机期间，美国政府就不应该盯着JPM不放。


The London Whale trades, for example, were from early 2012; had they occurred in 2008, when the financial system was fragile, JPM, it is said, would have gotten a legal pass.	比如，如果实际发生在2012年初的伦敦鲸交易发生在2008年金融系统孱弱不堪时，JPM就会被网开一面。


This view seems well founded, because the government was then propping up the big banks in a concerted effort to overcome the financial crisis.	这一观点似乎颇有道理，因为随后政府集中对大银行予以了扶持以克服金融危机。


Weakening the big banks further seemed likely to deepen and prolong the crisis.	进一步削弱大银行可能会加深和延长危机。


So JPM, according to this view, has been unlucky: too many of its legal problems postdate the financial crisis or came to light well after it erupted.	因此，从这个角度出发，JPM相当的不幸：太多的法律问题发生在金融危机之后，或者在金融危机之后才被曝光。


That, however, is not the only way to view JPM’s – and the economy’s – luck.	但是，关于JPM（以及整个经济）的运气问题，这并不是唯一的看待方式。


If the $6 billion London Whale losses had occurred in 2008 instead of 2012, then, yes, the government would not have piled on with fines and criminal indictments.	如果60亿美元的伦敦鲸损失发生在2008年而不是2012年，那么政府确实不会采取罚款和刑事指控措施。


But what would JPM’s trading partners have done in 2008, when the economy was in turmoil, if the losses hit then?	但在2008年经济陷入动荡时，遭遇损失打击的JPM的交易对手会怎样做？


The financial marketplace was quite wary and tense in 2008, owing to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the government bailout of mega-insurer American International Group (AIG).	2008年，金融市场充满了忧虑和紧张，这是拜雷曼兄弟公司的倒闭和政府对保险巨头美国国际集团（AIG）的援助所赐。


With major financial institutions’ exposure to the previously over-priced mortgage market unclear, financial transactions froze up.	金融机构在此前定价过高的按揭市场中风险敞口有多大谁也说不清，因此金融交易处于冻结状态。


Those who dealt with Citibank, for example, worried about its exposures and losses. Were they under control, or were they just the tip of an iceberg?	比如，与花旗银行交易的各方对其敞口和损失忧心忡忡——是一切尽在掌握，还是只是冰山一角？


If Citi was facing bigger losses than those already known, could it make good on new obligations to trading partners and lenders?	如果花旗面临的损失比已知更加巨大，它还能兑付对交易对手和贷款人的新债务吗？


Better to avoid Citi, some financial players thought.	最好还是离花旗远一些，一些金融机构会这样想。


JPM’s London Whale trades – bets on the future state of the American economy that JPM could not reverse without big losses – were of a type that the bank could readily have made in 2008.	JPM的伦敦鲸交易——下注于美国经济的未来状况，JPM不得不以巨大损失的代价关闭它——就属于JMP在2008年可能陷入的情形。


The losses, initially put at $2 billion, soon tripled.	其损失——一开始只有20亿美元——很快就翻了三倍。


So imagine that JPM had made these kinds of bets during the financial crisis in 2008, realized that they were mistakes, and found that it could not reverse them easily.	因此，可以想象JMP如果在2008年金融危机期间做出这类交易、发现它们出了错并且很难关闭会是怎样。


JPM then announces a $2 billion loss, and CEO Jamie Dimon calls the problem “a tempest in a teapot” (as he did in 2012).	事后JMP将宣布损失为20亿美元，CEO戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）称问题不过是“煮沸的茶壶顶了盖”（一如他在2012年做的那样）。


But the announcement of a $2 billion loss in that setting of economic turmoil would have made JPM’s counterparties jittery.	但在2008年经济动荡的环境中宣布20亿美元损失将让JPM的交易对手大惊失色。


Was it just $2 billion?	什么叫只有20亿美元？


Was this a big problem in an otherwise sound institution, or was there an iceberg beneath the surface.	这仅仅是可靠机构的一个大问题吗？ 还是下面藏着一个巨大的冰山？


After all, AIG was an AAA-rated firm that turned out in late 2008 to have assumed more risk than it could handle.	毕竟，AIG本是一家AAA级企业，在2008年末还不是积累了它根本无法处理的风险。


How can we be sure, market players might have asked, that JPM is not in the same boat?	市场参与者会问，凭什么可以笃定JPM不是一丘之貉？


Now consider how destabilizing it would have been had the same escalating series of announcements that JPM issued in the wake of the London Whale trades come during the financial crisis: It’s not $2 billion, but $4 billion; no, it’s not just $4 billion, but $6 billion.	现在可以想象一下，在金融危机期间JPM是怎样一步步宣布伦敦鲸交易损失升级的：不是20亿美元，而是40亿美元； 不，不止40亿，是60亿美元。


Sorry.	抱歉。


Had that happened, Dimon would have needed to withdraw his comment that the problem was just a tempest in a teapot, and doubts would have arisen, in the midst of the crisis, about just how good JPM’s well-regarded risk-management practices really were.	如果发生这一幕，戴蒙就得收回问题不过是沸腾的茶壶顶了盖的评论，而在危机期间将有谣言四起，人们纷纷质疑JPM大名在外的风险管理其实是一团糟。


In that setting, what JPM called its “fortress” balance sheet would suddenly have looked highly vulnerable, and the bank could have found itself under far more damaging attack than it has in the last year.	如此，JPM自称“坚不可摧”的资产负债表将在一夜之间变得不堪一击，JPM也将陷于猛烈的打击中，远甚于去年。


But the attack would have come from investors, not regulators.	但打击将来自投资者而不是监管者。


And once some traders refuse to deal with a bank, the damage can become self-perpetuating, as losses mount and other traders follow suit.	而一旦有交易员拒绝与某银行打交道，那么随着损失的增加和其他交易员的效仿，所造成的伤害将会自我持续。


Worse, the economy might have suffered further.	更糟糕的是，经济也可能进一步遭遇打击。


During the crisis, financiers rightly pointed out that JPM and several other major firms were islands of stability in the financial storm.	在危机期间，金融家正确地指出，JPM和其他一些大银行是金融风暴中的稳定之岛。


But had the London Whale losses occurred then, JPM would not have been on the list of sound financial institutions, undermining confidence further and potentially making the crisis that much worse.	但如果接着发生伦敦鲸损失，JPM就将被可靠金融机构名单除名，进一步打击信心，并有可能让危机严重恶化。


Indeed, JPM runs one of the two major private operations for settling major trades of government debt.	事实上，JPM经营着两家最大的政府债务交易结算单位之一。


If a shadow falling over JPM from its trading desk had extended to its capacity to settle government debt properly, the economic fallout could have been severe.	如果JPM交易部门阴云笼罩并扩大到影响其正常结算政府债务的程度，带来的经济辐射伤害将是巨大的。


Napoleon is reputed to have said that he wanted lucky generals.	拿破仑有个著名的论断——他中意幸运的将军。


No matter how good a leader is, success is not assured and pure chance plays a larger role than many care to admit.	不管一个领袖多么优秀，成功都不是板上钉钉，纯粹的运气所起的作用比许多人愿意承认的大得多。


No matter how well managed JPM was, both it and the US economy are lucky that what has befallen it in the last year did not happen – as it well could have – in 2008.	不管JPM管理多么出众，去年发生在它头上的事情没有在2008年发生——可能性很大——对于它和美国经济来说都是幸事。


Privacy Since Snowden	斯诺登事件之后的隐私


LONDON – A year has passed since the American former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden began revealing the massive scope of Internet surveillance by the US National Security Agency.	伦敦——现在离美国前情报承包商爱德华·斯诺登披露美国家安全局大规模网络监视行动已经整整一年了。


His disclosures have elicited public outrage and sharp rebukes from close US allies like Germany, upending rosy assumptions about how free and secure the Internet and telecommunications networks really are.	他所披露的行为引发了公众愤怒和德国等亲密盟友的强烈指责，颠覆了现实生活中互联网和电信网络多么自由安全的美好假设。


Singlehandedly, Snowden has changed how people regard their phones, tablets, and laptops, and sparked a public debate about the protection of personal data.	斯诺登靠一己之力改变了人们对手机、平板和笔记本电脑的认识，引发公众辩论个人信息保护。


What his revelations have not done is bring about significant reforms.	但泄密事件并没有带来真正的改革。


To be sure, US President Barack Obama, spurred by an alliance between civil-society organizations and the technology industry, has taken some action.	可以肯定，美国总统奥巴马在民间社团和科技产业的联手带动下已经采取了某些举措。


In a January speech, and an accompanying presidential policy directive, Obama ordered American spies to recognize that “all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”	在1月讲话及随后颁布的总统施政令中，奥巴马命令美国间谍认可“无论国籍或可能居住在哪里，所有人都应该享有尊严和尊重，同时每个人在对其个人信息进行处理时都享有合法的隐私权。 ”


Some specific advances, unprecedented in the shadowy world of intelligence agencies, have accompanied this rhetorical commitment to privacy.	上述隐私保护要求带来了情报机构阴暗世界里某些前所未有的进步。


When technology companies sued the government to release details about intelligence requests, the Obama administration compromised, supporting a settlement that allows for more detailed reporting.	奥巴马政府在科技公司状告政府披露情报要求细节时做出了妥协，通过和解方案允许透露进一步的报告。


Under this agreement, companies have the option of publishing figures on data requests by intelligence agencies in ranges of 250 or 1,000, depending on the degree of disaggregation of the types of orders.	照此协议，企业有权公开情报机构索取资料的次数（250到1，000次），具体情况取决于命令类型的解聚程度。


Though this represents a step forward, it is far from adequate, with gaping loopholes that prohibit reporting on some of the most notorious NSA programs, such as the dragnet collection of phone records under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.	但仅有这样的进步还远远不够。 信息披露依然存在着很大漏洞，比如禁止报告某些最臭名昭著的国家安全局项目，包括依据美国爱国者法案第215条规定大规模搜集电话记录。


Moreover, Obama has demurred on the most significant recommendations of the independent review group that he appointed.	此外，奥巴马对其本人任命的独立审查小组最重要的某些建议提出了异议。


And the “USA FREEDOM Act,” which was meant to stop the mass collection of Americans’ phone records, is being diluted by a set of amendments that would enable the government to continue collecting metadata on millions of individuals, without their consent.	而本来以阻止大规模美国电话记录搜集为目的的“美国自由法案”遭遇到一系列修正案的稀释，使得政府得以继续在未征得同意的情况下对成百上千万人开展元数据搜集工作。


This metadata – covering whom we talk to, when, and for how long – can reveal as much about our private lives as the content itself.	这些元数据包括我们和谁交谈、交谈的时间和长度——由此泄露的个人隐私与内容本身一样多。


Worse, relative to the rest of the world, the US has taken the strongest action since the Snowden revelations began.	更糟的是，相比其他国家而言，斯诺登泄密事件后美国采取了最有力的行动。


Of course, Snowden exposed more about the US government’s surveillance activities than any other country.	当然，斯诺登披露美国政府的监控行为比其他国家更多。


But the documents also included egregious examples of overreach by the Government Communications Headquarters, the United Kingdom’s signals intelligence agency, and information about intelligence sharing in the so-called “Five Eyes” network of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.	但泄密文件还包括政府通信总局、英国信号情报机构过度干预的惊人例子，以及美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰所谓“五眼”网络的情报共享内容。


The agreements that govern the pooling and exchange of intelligence among these governments remain closely guarded secrets.	规范政府间情报汇集和交换的协议仍被列为机密内容。


In the UK, public and parliamentary debate on surveillance practices has been minimal, at best.	英国公众议会对监视行为的辩论充其量只能用微乎其微来形容。


And not only does Canadian law prohibit companies from reporting virtually any information about government requests for data; Prime Minister Stephen Harper has nominated a lawyer who spent his career advising intelligence agencies to serve as an official privacy commissioner, raising the ire of activists.	而且不仅加拿大法律禁止公司报告有关政府信息要求的几乎任何信息； 哈珀总理提名一位终生为情报机构提供咨询的律师担任官方隐私专员之举点燃了活动人士的怒火。


Some countries have even intensified their surveillance activities.	有些国家甚至增强了监控活动。


Immediately following the Snowden revelations, the French government snuck into a military appropriations bill the authority to increase government surveillance of the Internet dramatically, including for “commercial” reasons.	就在斯诺登泄密事件后，法国政府悄然通过了军事拨款法，大幅增加了政府因“商业”等原因实施网络监控的权利。


The European Parliament’s criticism of the mass surveillance practiced by the UK, Sweden, France, and Germany (and potentially soon by the Netherlands) seems not to carry much weight for national governments.	欧洲议会对英国、瑞典、法国和德国（可能很快就会包括荷兰）实施公众监控行为的批评似乎并没影响到国家政府。


With the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta this month, Snowden’s revelations have also fueled a new movement to create country-specific Internet “bills of rights” establishing the principles of privacy, free speech, and responsible anonymity.	随着本月大宪章800周年纪念日的到来，斯诺登泄密事件也推动了确立隐私、言论自由和负责任匿名等原则的新一轮互联网“权利法案” 起草运动。


In a stirring speech at the United Nations last September, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff placed her country at the forefront of this movement by promoting Brazil’s historic Marco Civil bill.	去年九月在联合国一次令人不安的讲话中，巴西总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫带领她的国家站在了此次运动的前沿，推动了巴西历史性马可孛民事法案的通过。


But the proposed bill included the requirement that Internet companies keep their servers in Brazil – purportedly to protect information from American intelligence agencies’ prying eyes – while easing access to these data for Brazil’s own law-enforcement and security agencies.	但拟议中的法案包括要求互联网企业把服务器设在巴西——据称是为保护信息免受美国情报部门的窥探——同时降低巴西本国执法及安全机构对上述信息的访问难度。


Fortunately, Brazil’s legislators kept these provisions out of the final Marco Civil, which was adopted in April.	幸运的是，巴西立法机构并未允许将上述规定纳入四月通过的马可孛民事法案最后版本之中。


Alas, other governments are threatening to impose similar forced data-localization requirements.	可悲的是，其他国家政府正威胁实行类似的强制数据本地化政策。


Such rules run not only contrary to the fundamental principles of an open and interconnected Internet infrastructure; they also create new privacy risks.	这样的规则不仅违反了开放互联网络设施的基本原则； 还导致新的隐私风险应运而生。


And they do nothing to solve the basic problem of restricting government access to personal data held by private companies.	他们在限制政府获取由私营企业所掌握的个人信息方面什么也不做。


How companies worldwide respond to Snowden’s revelations will have a profound impact on their users’ rights.	世界各国企业对斯诺登泄密事件做何反应将对其用户权利产生深远的影响。


So far, some have taken the right approach, pressing for greater transparency, while strengthening encryption on their networks to keep intelligence agencies out.	迄今为止，有些企业采取了正确对策，他们要求增加透明度，同时强化网络加密能力防止情报机构侵入。


Companies throughout the information and communication technology sector have started to make transparency reports an industry standard.	信息通讯技术业所有企业已开始将透明度报告纳入行业标准范畴。


But more telecommunications companies and hardware manufacturers should join Internet companies and privacy rights advocates to build a broad reform coalition.	但更多电信和硬件制造企业应当与互联网企业及隐私维权人士携手，建立具有广泛基础的改革联盟。


A year ago, Snowden alerted the world to governments’ egregious violation of people’s privacy.	一年前，斯诺登警告世界政府如何严重破坏个人隐私。


It is up to the technology industry, civil-society organizations, and the general public to keep governments honest in pursuing much-needed reforms.	技术行业、民间团体和广大民众必须联起手来，让政府切实推行迫切需要的改革。


Only then can the Internet provide the boon to freedom that it has long promised.	只有这样，互联网才能像承诺的那样带来自由。


A Dream for the Digital Age	数字时代之梦


PRINCETON – Fifty years ago, Martin Luther King dreamed of an America that would one day deliver on its promise of equality for all of its citizens, black as well as white.	普林斯顿—五十年前，马丁·路德·金提出了一个美国梦，有一天，美国所有公民，不论黑人白人，都能得到平等。


Today, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has a dream, too: he wants to provide Internet access to the world’s five billion people who do not now have it.	如今，Facebook创始人马克·扎克伯格也有一个梦：他想向世界五十亿不能上网的人提供互联网接入。


Zuckerberg’s vision may sound like a self-interested push to gain more Facebook users.	扎克伯格的愿景听起来像是让Facebook拥有更多用户的自利举动。


But the world currently faces a growing technological divide, with implications for equality, liberty, and the right to pursue happiness that are no less momentous than the racial divide against which King preached.	但当今世界面临着越来越大的技术差异，这一差异对平等、自由和追求幸福的权利所形成的影响不亚于金所针对的种族差异。


Around the world, more than two billion people live in the Digital Age.	放眼全球，二十多亿人生活在数字时代。


They can access a vast universe of information, communicate at little or no cost with their friends and family, and connect with others with whom they can cooperate in new ways.	他们可以接入广袤无垠的信息世界，以极低甚至零成本与朋友和家人通信，与其他他们需要合作的人联系。


The other five billion are still stuck in the Paper Age in which my generation grew up.	其他五十亿人仍生活在我们这一代人生长其中的纸时代。


In those days, if you wanted to know something but did not own an expensive encyclopedia (or your encyclopedia was no longer sufficiently up-to-date to tell you what you wanted to know), you had to go to a library and spend hours searching for what you needed.	在纸时代，如果你想要了解些什么但又没有昂贵的百科全书（或者你的百科全书已经过时，无法告诉你你想知道的东西），你就必须跑到图书馆，花数小时时间寻找你需要的东西。


To contact friends or colleagues overseas, you had to write them a letter and wait at least two weeks for a reply.	为了联系海外的朋友和同事，你必须给他们写信，然后至少等待两周时间才能收到回信。


International phone calls were prohibitively expensive, and the idea of actually seeing someone while you talked to them was the stuff of science fiction.	越洋电话贵得惊人，而面对面谈话更是科幻小说里才有的内容。


Internet.org, a global partnership launched by Zuckerberg last month, plans to bring the two-thirds of the world’s population without Internet access into the Digital Age.	Internet. org——扎克伯格上个月推出的全球合作计划——志在让无法获得互联网接入的三分之二世界人口进入数字时代。


The partnership consists of seven major information-technology companies, as well as non-profit organizations and local communities.	这一合作计划包括了七大信息技术公司以及非营利组织和地方社区。


Knowing that you cannot ask people to choose between buying food and buying data, the partnership will seek new, less expensive means of connecting computers, more data-efficient software, and new business models. 	该计划知道，你不能要求人们在买食品还是数据之间做出选择，因此它将寻找更新、更廉价的电脑连接方式、数据效率更高的软件和全新的商业模式。


Microsoft founder Bill Gates has suggested that Internet access is not a high priority for the poorest countries.	微软公司创始人比尔·盖茨认为，互联网接入并不是最穷国家的当务之急。


It is more important, he says, to tackle problems like diarrhea and malaria.	他说，更重要的是克服腹泻和疟疾等问题。


I have nothing but praise for Gates’s efforts to reduce the death toll from these diseases, which primarily affect the world’s poorest people.	对于盖茨在降低这些疾病死亡人数方面所做的努力（受益者主要是最穷人群），我由衷地赞美。


Yet his position seems curiously lacking in big-picture awareness of how the Internet could transform the lives of the very poor.	但令人难解的是，他的立场缺少大局观，没有认清互联网如何能够改变极贫困人群的生活。


For example, if farmers could use it to get more accurate predictions of favorable conditions for planting, or to obtain higher prices for their harvest, they would be better able to afford sanitation, so that their children do not get diarrhea, and bed nets to protect themselves and their families against malaria.	比如，如果农民可以使用互联网获得种植有利条件的更准确的预报，或者让自己的收成获得更高的价格，那么他们将能负担得起更好的卫生条件，他们的孩子们也就不会得腹泻，他们也就能获得蚊帐保护自己和家庭免遭疟疾之苦。


A friend working to provide family-planning advice to poor Kenyans recently told me that so many women were coming to the clinic that she could not spend more than five minutes with each.	一位致力于向贫困肯尼亚家庭提供计划生育建议的朋友最近告诉我，前来寻求帮助的妇女太多，她在每个人身上花的时间还不到五分钟。


These women have only one source of advice, and one opportunity to get it, but if they had access to the Internet, the information could be there for them whenever they wanted it.	这些妇女只有一个建议来源，也只有一次机会���但如果她们能接入互联网，那么她们岁时都能得到想得到的信息。


Moreover, online consultations would be possible, sparing women the need to travel to clinics.	此外，在线咨询也将成为可能，从而让这些妇女不必长途奔波前往诊所。


Internet access would also bypass the problem of illiteracy, building on the oral traditions that are strong in many rural cultures and enabling communities to create self-help groups and share their problems with peers in other villages.	互联网接入还能克服文盲问题，采用许多农村地区根深蒂固的口头方式，让社区建立自助组织，并与其他村庄分享他们的问题。


What is true for family planning is true for a very wide range of topics, especially those that are difficult to speak about, like homosexuality and domestic violence.	计划生育方面的经验可以推广到大量主题，特别是那些难以启齿的主题，比如同性恋和家庭暴力。


The Internet is helping people to understand that they are not alone, and that they can learn from others’ experience.	互联网帮助人们知道他们并不孤独，他们可以从他人身上学习经验。


Enlarging our vision still more, it is not absurd to hope that putting the world’s poor online would result in connections between them and more affluent people, leading to more assistance.	继续放宽我们的视线就会觉得，希望全世界穷人接入互联网能让他们与丰裕人群取得联系、获得更多援助的观点也并不可笑。


Research shows that people are more likely to donate to a charity helping the hungry if they are given a photo and told the name and age of a girl like those the charity is aiding.	研究表明，在看到照片或被告知慈善对象的姓名和年龄的情况下，人们为减少饥饿的慈善事业慷慨解囊的可能性就会增加。


If a mere photo and a few identifying details can do that, what might Skyping with the person do?	既然一张照片和些许身份信息就能做到，为何让人们取得联系做不到？


Providing universal Internet access is a project on a scale similar to sequencing the human genome, and, like the human-genome project, it will raise new risks and sensitive ethical issues.	提供普遍的互联网接入是一项规模堪与人类基因组测序相媲美的工程； 此外，与人类基因组工程类似，它将带来新的风险和伦理问题。


Online scammers will have access to a new and perhaps more gullible audience.	在线骗子因此能够解除到新的、更轻信的人群。


Breaches of copyright will become even more widespread than they are today (although they will cost the copyright owners very little, because the poor would be very unlikely to be able to buy books or other copyrighted material).	版权侵犯也将远比今天普遍（但这给版权所有者带来的代价很小，因为穷人原本就不太可能买得起书本和其他有版权材料）。


Moreover, the distinctiveness of local cultures may be eroded, which has both a good and a bad side, for such cultures can restrict freedom and deny equality of opportunity.	此外，地方文化的区别可能会缩小，这是一柄双刃剑，因为这些文化本身可能是限制自由、拒绝承认机会平等的。


On the whole, though, it is reasonable to expect that giving poor people access to knowledge and the possibility of connecting with people anywhere in the world will be socially transforming in a very positive way.	尽管如此，从整体看，有理由期待让穷人获得知识和与世界各地人们取得联系的可能性将以十分积极的形式推动社会变迁。


Marriage Counseling for the G-20 and the IMF	给G20和IMF做个婚姻咨询


BERKELEY – The relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the G-20 is symbiotic but conflicted.	伯克利——国际货币基金（IMF）和二十国集团（G20）的关系是既相互依存又冲突不断。


Like a long-married couple who habitually bicker and fight, the two can’t seem to live together – but they can’t live apart, either.	就像一对经常掐架的夫妻，看似没法儿再过，却谁也离不开谁。


The question of what to do about this relationship is coming to a head in advance of the November G-20 summit chaired by South Korea.	今年11月，韩国将主持G20峰会，在此峰会前夕，这对“夫妻”的关系问题推到了风口浪尖。


Since the 1997-1998 crisis, Asian governments have sought to keep their distance from the Fund.	自从1997~1998年危机以来，亚洲各国政府大多对IMF敬而远之。


It is admirable, therefore, that South Korea’s government has taken the lead in discussions about reforming the IMF’s mandate.	因此，韩国政府能够率先探讨IMF宗旨改革的话题，其胆识颇为可敬。


It has contributed significantly to international thinking on the design of new lending facilities.	这种探讨，将大大启发国际社会去思考，如何设计新的国际贷款机制。


The IMF’s crisis-prevention efforts begin with its country surveillance, as provided for by Article IV of its Articles of Agreement.	IMF的危机预防机制，第一个环节是国情监测，其依据是IMF协定第四条款。


The problem with these exercises is that they are regularly relegated to the “duly noted” bin: governments receive them, file them away, and go back to doing what they were doing before.	在实践中却存在一个问题，条约中的要求往往被贴上“充分注意”的标签束之高阁：各国政府接受归接受，传达归传达，回头还是依然故我。


A further problem is that these exercises rarely address the implications of national policies for third countries and the international system.	还有一个更深的问题。 有关条款基本上忽略了国内政策对其他国家乃至国际体系的影响。


Article IV surveillance of the United States during the sub-prime mortgage boom said little about the dangers posed by such lending for international financial markets.	根据第四条款对美国次贷泡沫期的监测很少提到，此类放贷行为可能会给国际金融市场造成什么样的风险。


Article IV reviews of China have similarly said little about the implications of the country’s policies for global imbalances.	关于中国的第四条款监测报告同样也很少提到该国货币政策对全球收支失衡的影响。


To close these gaps, the IMF is now experimenting with “spillover reports” that focus on cross-country impacts.	为了填补这一空白，IMF最近尝试发布了一些所谓“外溢报告”，重点关注跨国效应。


But so long as big countries, which are the main source of spillovers, show little inclination to act on the Fund’s recommendations, it is not clear that this analytical step forward will be a practical step forward as well.	然而，如果作为溢出效应主要源头的各大国不合作，很难说这种分析工作上的进步能否真正促成实践上的改善。


Article IV also gives the IMF a mandate to oversee the “effective operation” of the international monetary system.	第四条款还责成IMF去监督国际货币体系的“有效运作”。


It is past time for the Fund to put some flesh on these constitutional bones.	IMF要让这付条约骨架长出些许血肉来，现在可是最后的机会。


Staff and management should be tasked with producing a biannual report on the international monetary system. This report would evaluate the sustainability of current-account balances and exchange rates, and the adequacy or excessiveness of members’ foreign-exchange reserves.	应当要求IMF的工作人员和管理层每两年编制一个国际货币体系报告，以评估经常账户收支和汇率的可持续性，以及成员国外汇储备的充盈和过剩程度。


It would recommend policies for eliminating imbalances and describe what kind of exchange-rate and reserve changes must accompany any adjustments.	该报该还应就消除收支失衡作出政策建议，规定就何种汇率和储备变化应当出台那些调整政策。


It would probably be too politically sensitive for the Fund to announce by exactly how much different currencies were overvalued and undervalued, and to declare some as seriously misaligned.	由IMF公布哪些货币被高估，哪些被低估，哪些被严重错配，这在政治上恐怕过于敏感。


Instead, it could settle for offering a range of assessments.	不过，它可以规定一个评估区间。


If this proved successful, it could then move toward publishing more forceful, umpire-like decisions.	如果这一步行得通，它就可以进一步出台更为有力的裁决。


In order to better carry out the other half of its dual mandate, the IMF has signaled that it will ask for a further increase in its resources, to $1 trillion, up from the $750 billion agreed at the London G-20 meeting in April 2009.	为了更好地贯彻IMF双重宗旨的另外一半，IMF已经释出信号，表明它将增募资金，从2009年4月伦敦G20会议上通过的7500亿美元增加到1万亿美元。


In the spring of 2010, the IMF committed upwards of $300 billion to Southern Europe alone.	2010年春季，光是为了帮助南欧，IMF就许诺了3000亿美元。


Clearly, more firepower is called for.	显然，它需要更多的弹药。


But, in addition to more resources, the IMF needs a more effective way of deploying them.	但是，除了增加资源之外，IMF还需要提高资源的使用效率。


Here, with input from South Korea, it is developing plans for a Precautionary Credit Line (PCL).	在韩国的大力支持下，它正准备推出一个紧急授信额度（PCL）计划。


This would generalize and extend its Flexible Credit Line (FCL), under which countries with impeccable credentials are prequalified for automatic access to IMF credit without having to accept onerous conditions.	这是对其现有的所谓灵活授信额度（FCL）的一种拓展和延伸。 通过这种工具，拥有优质信用记录的国家能自动获得信贷资源，而无需接受种种麻烦的条件。


Unfortunately, only three countries – Mexico, Colombia, and Poland – have signed up for an FCL.	不幸的是，迄今只有墨西哥、哥伦比亚和波兰三个国家成功申请过FCL。


Others hesitate, either because they worry about not qualifying or because they remain concerned about the stigma of association with the Fund.	其他国家逡巡不前，要么是担心不够资格，要么是仍旧对跟IMF的不愉快合作经历耿耿于怀。


Augmenting an FCL for countries with impeccably strong policies with a PCL for countries with reasonably strong policies might break this deadlock.	把FCL的“拥有优质信用记录”这个门槛放低到PCL的“拥有良好信用记录”，将有助于打开这个死结。


Countries qualifying for a PCL would have to meet some, but relatively minimal and unobtrusive, conditions.	申请PCL的国家需要符合较少也较温和的条件。


They might have to pay somewhat higher interest rates to address concerns about moral hazard.	比如支付略高一些的利息以避免道德风险。


The stigma problem could then be addressed if the IMF was authorized to pre-qualify unilaterally a swath of countries for one facility or the other.	创伤���忆的问题也有可能得到解决，只要授权IMF单方面指定一些国家，向其开放这种创新的融资渠道即可。


One problem with the FCL is what might happen if the IMF disqualifies a previously prequalified country.	FCL的一个潜在问题是，如果IMF取消了一些获得预授权国家的资格，那又该怎么办？


Investors could take this as an indication that policies had deteriorated significantly and rush for the exits.	投资者可能会将此视作有关国家政策剧烈恶化的一个信号，乃至蜂拥出逃。


This danger would be attenuated if pre-qualification was not a yes-or-no decision: if there were a range of facilities for which countries could be pre-qualified, they could be moved between them as circumstances changed.	可以通过设计一种与授权机制来减少这种危险，不要简单地同意或拒绝，而是提供多种工具供有关国家选择，让它们可以在情况有所变化时在不同品种之间做出调整。


But it is not clear that this would be enough to remove the danger that an IMF decision, taken in response to deteriorating country policies, could precipitate a crisis.	然而，这是否就足以消除由IMF的某个决定（例如对某国恶化的政策作出回应）引发一场危机的风险呢？


As always, the devil is in the details.	答案并不明显。 魔鬼在细节中。


It is to be hoped that we will learn the details before the G-20 meets in Seoul in November.	真希望在11月的首尔G20会议前，看见一个详细的方案。


Saving Retirement	拯救退休


CAMBRIDGE – Public pension programs around the world are in financial trouble.	美国剑桥—全球公共退休金计划都陷入了麻烦之中。


Because of continuing increases in life expectancy, the number of eligible retirees is rising more rapidly than the tax revenue available to finance benefits.	由于寿命预期不断增加，在世退休者增加的速度要快于可以为退休金提供资金来源的税收收入。


In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office projects the relative cost of the Social Security program’s old-age pension benefits to rise by more than a quarter over the next 25 years, from 4.9% of GDP today to 6.2% in 2038.	在美国，国会预算办公室预测社会保障计划的老龄退休福利的相对成本将在未来25年中增加四分之一以上，到2038年，其占GDP比重将从今天的4. 9%上升为6.


Because the taxes that are earmarked to support Social Security do not automatically rise faster than GDP, either the growth rate of benefits must be reduced or tax rates must be increased.	2%。 被用于支持社会保障的税收并不能自动地以比GDP更快的速度增长，因此，要么必须让退休福利增长降下来，要么必须让税率升上去。


One reason for the rapid rise in benefits stems from how they are adjusted for inflation.	退休福利快速增长的一个原因来自其根据通胀调节的办法。


Under current US law, retirees’ benefits are automatically adjusted to account for increases in the traditional consumer price index (CPI).	在现行美国法律下，退休者的退休金自动根据传统消费物价指数（CPI）的增长而调整。


But experts have long understood that the CPI overstates the true increase in the cost of living, and that the resulting over-indexing of benefits should be fixed.	但专家们早已知道CPI会高估生活成本的真实增长，由此产生的退休金的过度指数化应该予以纠正。


Part of the problem is that the CPI does not reflect how consumers change the composition of their purchases over time as relative prices change.	部分问题在于CPI并不反映消费者如何随相对价格的变化而改变他们的采购篮子。


President Barack Obama’s administration initially followed expert advice and suggested that the traditional CPI be replaced by a more accurate measure known as the chain-weighted CPI.	奥巴马政府最初采取了专家的建议，提出用更准确的所谓链式加权CPI代替传统CPI。


Although this would reduce the annual rate of increase in benefits by only about 0.25%, outlays for Social Security and other inflation-indexed programs over the next ten years would be more than $200 billion lower.	尽管这只能让每年的退休福利增速下降大约0. 25%，但社会保障和其他通胀指数型计划在未来十年里可以省下2,000多亿美元。


Applying the chain-weighted CPI to tax-bracket adjustments would raise more than $100 billion over the same period.	将链式CPI应用于税级调整能够在同一时期提高1,000亿美元收入。


But there is another, more fundamental reason why the traditional CPI overstates the true rise in the cost of living: It does not accurately reflect the introduction of new goods and services or improvements in the quality of existing goods and services.	但对于传统CPI为何会高估生活成本，还有另一个更加基本的原因：它并不准确反映新商品和服务的引入或已有商品和服务的改善。


So it is unfortunate that Obama recently withdrew his proposal to change the traditional index, preferring the political gesture of “protecting Social Security benefits” to the more responsible policy of correcting the way that benefits and taxes reflect rising prices.	因此，奥巴马最近撤消了改变传统指数的方案，在摆出“保护社会保障福利”的政治姿态和采取更负责任的政策纠正福利和税收反映价格上涨方式之间选择了前者，这真是一个不幸。


But the more important reform for stabilizing the financing of Social Security pension benefits is to adjust the benefits for the rise in life expectancy.	但对稳定社会保障退休福利资金来源来说，更重要的改革是根据预期寿命的增加调整退休福利。


When the US created its Social Security program in the 1930’s, the legislation specified that benefits would be paid to retirees at age 65.	当美国在20世纪30年代创立其社会保障计划时，立法部门具体规定了退休福利从退休者65岁时开始支付。


Life expectancy at age 65 rose after that by about one year per decade.	此后，65岁年龄段人群的预期寿命每隔十年就会增加一岁。


Today, life expectancy at age 65 is about six years higher than it was in 1940.	如今，65岁人群的预期寿命比1940年时长了六年。


The increase in the number of retirement years put Social Security in financial trouble.	退休岁月的增长让社会保障计划陷入了财务困境。


The US Congress responded in 1983 by gradually raising the age for full benefits from 65 to 67.	1983年，国会开始对此做出反应，逐渐将全额退休福利领取年龄从65岁提高到了67岁。


Individuals who want to retire as early as 62 can still do so with an actuarially fair reduction in their benefits.	个人想在62随时就退休也可以，但要根据公平的精算结果扣减退休福利。


Alternatively, they can work longer and receive higher benefits.	相应地，他们���可以选择多工作几年并获得更高的退休福利。


Of course, the decision to increase the age for full benefits was never going to be politically popular.	当然，增加全额退休福利领取年龄的决定从来没有获得过政治支持。


Congress was therefore careful to delay the start of the gradual adjustment, applying it only to those below the age of 45 at the time of the legislation, with the higher retirement age to be fully phased in only in 2027.	因此，国会将何时开始逐渐调整这一年龄一推再推，立法成立时，这项调整只适用于当时45岁以下的人群，提高退休年龄政策完全实施要等到2027年。


As a result, the public was generally unaware during the decade after the 1983 legislation that the age for full benefits would eventually rise.	因此，在1983年全额退休福利年龄终将提高的立法通过后的十年中，公众基本上对此毫无感觉。


When pollsters asked voters whether they would favor an increase in the Social Security retirement age to improve the program’s financial stability, the response was overwhelmingly negative.	当调查者询问选民是否支持提高社会保障退休年龄以改善该计划的财务稳定性时，得到的几乎是清一色的否定回答。


But here is the politically important fact: At no time did any member of Congress propose that the legislation be changed to delay or eliminate the rise in the eligibility age for full benefits.	但这里有一个具有政治意义的重要现实：没有一位国会议员曾经提出该立法应该做出改变以推迟或取消提高领取全额退休福利的资格年龄。


Congress acted responsibly to slow the growth of benefits, even though reversing the increase in the eligibility age would have been politically popular.	国会负责地降低了退休福利的增长，尽管改变增加资格年龄的做法能够获得更多的政治支持。


Since the 1983 legislation was enacted, life expectancy at age 67 has increased by another three years, bringing it to 85.	自1983年立法实施以来，67岁人群寿命预期又增加了三岁，达到了85岁。


There is every reason to expect life expectancy to continue to rise in the future at the rate of one year per decade.	有理由相信预期寿命将在未来继续以每十年一岁的速度增加。


The obvious solution to the current and future Social Security financing problem is to reprise the 1983 legislation by gradually raising the age for full benefits from 67 to 70, with appropriate actuarial adjustments for earlier and later retirements.	对于当前和未来的社会保障资金问题，一个显而易见的解决方案是效仿1983年立法，逐渐将全额退休福利领取年龄从67岁提高到70岁，并对提早和推迟退休做出精算调整。


Because life expectancy at age 67 is roughly 18 years, this would be equivalent to reducing average lifetime benefits by one-sixth (the present value of the benefit reduction is actually higher, given that the reduction comes at the start of the retirement period).	由于67岁人群寿命预期为18年，这相当于将平均终身退休福利减少六分之一（退休福利削减额的现值实际上要更高一些，因为削减从退休起点开始的）。


It would be even better to avoid future political posturing by enacting legislation now that automatically raises the eligibility age for full benefits in such a way that average life expectancy at that threshold is kept constant, at 15 years.	更好的避免未来摆弄政治姿态的做法是现在就实施立法，自动提高全额退休福利的资格年龄，让平均退休期长度稳定在15年左右。


Some experts object on principle to an increase in the eligibility age for full benefits, because some low-income groups do not experience the same one-year-per-decade rise in life expectancy.	一些专家在原则上反对提高全额退休福利资格年龄，因为一些低收入群体的寿命预期增长达不到十年一岁。


A simple solution to that problem would be to relate the age at which full benefits are paid to each individual’s average lifetime earnings.	对这一问题的一个简单解决办法是将全额退休福利领取年龄和个人的平均终身收入挂钩。


A more fundamental reform would be to shift from a pure pay-as-you-go system to a mixed system that combines the current benefits with investment-based personal retirement accounts.	更加根本的改革应该是把完全的现收现付制度转变为与基于投资的个人退休账户的当前利益相结合混合制度。


Such investment-based annuities would be a natural supplement to the lower pay-as-you-go benefits that would result from raising the eligibility age for full benefits.	这些基于投资的年份将作为对现收现付福利缩水（因全额退休福利资格年龄的提高导致）的自然补充。


Obviously, retirees deserve advance notice before benefits are reduced.	显然，退休者应该在退休福利被缩减前未雨绸缪。


That is why it is important for the US – and for many countries around the world – to act now to make the changes needed to stabilize future pension finances.	正因如此，现在就开始做出变化从而实现未来退休金稳定对美国——以及世界各地的其他许多国家——来说至关重要。


A Healthy Path to Chinese Consumption Growth	中国消费增长的健康路径


CAMBRIDGE – China’s economic policymakers want to shift the country’s production away from exports and heavy industry, and to increase the share of consumption in GDP.	美国剑桥—中国决策者希望将中国的生产远离出口和重工业依赖，增加消费占GDP的比重。


A relatively simple institutional change to encourage health-care insurance could do much to promote the latter goal.	相对简单的鼓励医疗保险的制度性变化能极大促进后一个目标。


A higher level of consumer spending would raise the average Chinese family’s standard of living, a primary component of what China’s leaders now call the “Chinese Dream.”	更高的消费支出水平将提高普通中国家庭的生活水平，这是中国领导人所谓的“中国梦”的首要要素。


Faster growth in consumer spending would also reverse the recent slowdown in GDP growth, providing the extra demand needed to create employment for the millions of Chinese who are leaving agriculture and the millions more who are graduating from the country’s universities.	消费支出的更快增长还能逆转最近的GDP增长减速之势，提供为数百万农村地区中国人和数百万中国大学毕业生创造就业岗位所需要的需求。


Consumer spending in China now accounts for just 36% of GDP, about half the consumption share of GDP in the United States and Western Europe.	如今，消费支出只占中国GDP的36%，大约为美国和西欧比例的一半。


This remarkably low level reflects both the small share of household income in total GDP and the high rate of household saving.	这一明显偏低的水平反映了家庭收入占GDP总量比重较小以及家庭储蓄率较高。


Chinese officials hope that higher household incomes will boost consumer spending, as the tightening labor market causes wages to rise and as urbanization shifts workers from low-productivity farm work to higher-wage employment in the cities.	中国官员希望，随着劳动力市场趋近推高工资以及城市化让工人从低生产率的农活转向更高收入的城市就业，因此提高的家庭收入能够提振消费支出。


Reducing the share of income that Chinese households save could also raise consumer spending faster and more easily.	降低中国家庭储蓄占收入之比也能更快、更容易地提高消费支出。


The high rate of household saving in China reflects many factors, including the risk of job loss and the lack of a reliable government pension program.	中国家庭高储蓄率反映出几大因素，包括失业风险和可靠的政府养老金不足等。


But the main reason why Chinese households save so much of their relatively low salaries is to ensure that they have the funds to meet high medical costs if a family member requires surgery or other inpatient care.	但中国家庭将相对较低的储蓄中的如此高的部分储蓄起来的主要原因是确保在家庭成员需要动手术或其他住院治疗时有足够的钱支付高额医药费。


People save so much because insurance is so inadequate.	人们储蓄这么多是因为保险不足。


The government’s universal health-care insurance is very rudimentary, and private health insurance is not widely available.	政府的全民医疗保险非常初级，私人健康保险普及率也比较低。


So households accumulate large amounts of cash as a hedge against the possibility that those funds will be needed some day for hospital care.	因此家庭只能存储大量现金用于，以防有朝一日需要在医疗上花费重金。