America, and the world, will be paying to repair it for decades to come.	美国以及全世界都会在未来几十年中付出代价来修复这些破坏。


Obama’s Year of Iran	奥巴马的伊朗年


PRINCETON – As US President Barack Obama begins his second term, he will have to devote much of his attention to figuring out how to get America’s domestic finances in order.	普林斯顿——随着美国总统奥巴马第二任期的开始，他不得不耗费大量精力整顿国内财政政策。


But foreign-policy issues loom large as well, and, notwithstanding the ongoing conflict in Syria and the possible spread of war across Africa’s Sahel region, the consensus in Washington is that 2013 will be the “year of decision” on Iran.	但外交问题同样十分突出，尽管叙利亚冲突持续不断且战火有可能蔓延至非洲萨赫勒地区，华盛顿的共识是2013年将是伊朗问题的“决策之年”。


Obama began his first administration with an offer to engage with the Islamic Republic; as he memorably put it in his first inaugural address in 2009, “We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”	奥巴马开启首任任期时就曾承诺要与伊朗伊斯兰共和国保持接触； 这一点在2009年他首次令人难忘的就职演说中就曾有记录，“如果你们愿意松开双拳，我们就将伸出援手。


He repeated that commitment, although much more obliquely, in his second inaugural address: “We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully – not because we are naive about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.”	”他转弯抹角地在第二次就职演说时重申了这项承诺：“我们将显示出和平解决与他国分歧的勇气——这并非因为我们天真到无视所面临的风险，而是因为接触可以更持久地消除怀疑和恐惧。 ”


As the American scholar and activist Hussein Ibish recently argued, Obama has appointed a cabinet designed to give him maximum room to negotiate a deal with Iran.	正如美国学者兼社会活动家侯赛因·伊比什近来所说，奥巴马任命的内阁让他有最大空间通过谈判与伊朗达成交易。


In particular, naming military veterans as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense will provide him with valuable domestic political cover for an agreement that would inevitably require lifting sanctions on Iran and almost certainly recognizing its right to enrich uranium at a low level of concentration.	特别是任命退伍军人担任国务卿和国防部长将为达成协议提供宝贵的国内政治掩护，因为协议签署将不可避免地需要解除对伊朗的制裁，并几乎肯定要承认伊朗提取低纯度浓缩铀的权利。


That should signal to Iran’s rulers not only that the US is serious about a deal, but also that whatever the US offers is likely to be the best deal that they can get.	这不仅将向伊朗统治者表明美国对协议的态度非常严肃，而且要让他们明白，美国所提出的将是他们可以期望得到的最好的交易。


The Obama administration has assembled an extraordinary coalition of countries to impose economic sanctions that are having a demonstrable effect on the price and availability of goods in Iran and on the ability of even powerful institutions, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to do business.	奥巴马政府已组建特别国家联盟实施经济制裁，并已对伊朗国内的商品价格和供应情况产生显著影响，就连革命卫队等强权机构在生意往来中也无法摆脱这种影响。


But coalitions do not hold together forever, and the pain of sanctions often cuts both ways, affecting buyers as well as sellers.	但联盟不可能永远稳固，制裁之痛往往具有两面性，在影响买方的同时也影响卖方。


Countries like South Korea and Japan, for example, have curtailed their imports of Iranian oil only reluctantly; countries like China and Russia rarely play straight on sanctions in the first place.	比方说，韩日等国仅仅是勉强压缩从伊朗的原油进口，而中俄等国则从一开始就极少对制裁投赞成票。


Moreover, Obama can threaten that “all options are on the table” only so many times without losing credibility with the Iranians and other countries in the Middle East.	此外，奥巴马威胁“所有选择都已摆在桌面上”的次数不能多到在伊朗和其他中东国家民众面前丧失信誉。


As Brookings Institution foreign-policy expert Suzanne Maloney points out, countries in the region and beyond are already dismayed at the lack of US leadership concerning Syria.	布鲁金斯学会外交政策专家苏珊·马洛尼指出，中东及其他地区国家已经对美国在叙利亚问题上鲜有作为而感到沮丧。


If the US gives negotiations one more serious try (a credible offer and a genuine willingness to engage), gets rebuffed, and then does nothing, it will effectively declare itself a paper tiger.	如果美国再次试图展开正式谈判（本着真诚接触的意愿提出可信的建议），却在再次遭到拒绝后什么也不做，则必将切实暴露其纸老虎的真实面目。


At that point, the sanctions coalition will most likely disintegrate amid a much broader loss of confidence in US leadership.	如果出现这种情况，制裁联盟最有可能因全面丧失对美国领导力的信心而土崩瓦解。


The US has thus painted itself into a corner.	美国就这样把自己逼进了死胡同。


Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently argued strongly against military action, proposing, instead, a strategy that would continue sanctions and extend deterrence.	美国前国家安全顾问兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基不久前提出坚决反对军事行动，并提出战略要继续制裁并扩大威慑。


Like US policy toward the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, “An Iranian military threat aimed at Israel or any other US friend in the Middle East would be treated as if directed at the United States itself and would precipitate a commensurate US response.”	像冷战时期美国对苏联集团的政策一样，“伊朗对以色列或中东任何美国盟国的军事威胁将被视为对美国的直接挑衅，并将导致美国采取相应的对策。 ”


I can certainly see the wisdom in Brzezinski’s approach.	我真正理解布热津斯基做法的智慧之处。


But Obama has marched the US and its allies too far down the current path.	但奥巴马率领着美国及其盟国在这条路上走过了头。


Moreover, and crucially, Brzezinski forgets that Obama’s determination to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon does not stem only from his concern for Israel’s security or the stability of the wider Middle East.	此外，关键问题是，布热津斯基忘了奥巴马不仅因为关注以色列安全抑或整个中东地区稳定而决意阻止伊朗获取核武器。


Obama has repeatedly committed himself to the goal of turning the world in the direction of “global zero” – a world without nuclear weapons.	奥巴马已反复承诺要实现“全球零核化”目标——即消除全世界所有核武器。


He believes (as do former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn) that unless the world finds a way to live without nuclear weapons, we will find ourselves in an international system in which 30-50 states possess them, raising the danger of accidental or deliberate launch to an unacceptably high level.	他坚信（前国务卿亨利·基辛格和乔治·舒尔茨，前国防部长威廉·佩里和前参议员萨姆·纳恩也秉承同样的信念）除非世界找到一种无核化方法，否则国际体系中将有30－50个国家持有核武器，进而导致意外或蓄意发射的危险性提高到无法接受的程度。


Convincing great powers to eliminate their nuclear arsenals might seem as politically fanciful as pushing gun-control legislation through the US Congress, but on that issue, too, Obama has made clear that he is willing to try.	说服大国销毁核武器或许看上去就像让美国国会通过枪支管制法一样在政治上想入非非，但在这个问题上，奥巴马已经明确表示自己愿意尝试。


However logical or attractive a containment policy might be, and however disastrous the consequences of bombing are likely to be, Obama’s commitment to realizing global denuclearization as part of his legacy implies that he will not allow another country to acquire a nuclear weapon on his watch, as his predecessors allowed India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan to do.	无论遏制政策多么严谨而富于诱惑，奥巴马任内实现全球无核化的承诺意味着他不会像前任纵容印度、以色列、朝鲜和巴基斯坦那样任由另一个国家获取核武器。


Thus, the stakes for both the US and Iran are very high.	因此，美国和伊朗双方都押上了极高的赌注。


Other countries would do well not to underestimate Obama’s resolve; governments that have relations with Iran should emphasize that the time to make a deal is now.	其他国家最好不要低估奥巴马的决心； 与伊朗有关系的政府应当强调达成交易的时机已经成熟。


And countries like Turkey and Brazil (and perhaps India and Egypt) could play a useful role by devising face-saving ways for the Iranians to meet the international community’s demands, together with longer-term alternatives for fuel enrichment that would be consistent with reducing the global nuclear threat.	土耳其和巴西等国政府（也许还有印度和埃及）可以通过为伊朗设计出在满足国际社会要求的同时能够保全颜面的方式来发挥有益的作用，此外还需制定长期燃料浓缩替代方案，从而减轻全球核威胁。


America’s allies, in turn, must be prepared to close ranks with it on both the outlines of a deal and the willingness to strike militarily.	反过来，美国的盟国必须在制定交易内容和进行军事打击时与美国保持一致。


The art of statecraft is not to choose between war and diplomacy as if they were mutually exclusive alternatives, but to understand how they fit together.	治国的艺术不是要像两者相互排斥般在战争和外交之间做出选择，而是必须理解这两种方案怎样相互结合。


In the case of Syria, the West has repeatedly called for diplomacy while ruling out any military action, with predictably bad results.	具体到叙利亚问题，西方国家曾多次在排除军事行动可能性的前提下呼吁外交解决，这样做显然不会取得太好的结果。


The US will not make that mistake with Iran.	美国不会在伊朗问题再次犯错。


America the Hypocritical	伪善的美国


In commemorating the 230th anniversary of America’s independence last July, President George W. Bush noted that the patriots of the Revolutionary War believed that all men are created equal, and with inalienable rights.	在去年7月庆祝美国独立230周年时，布什总统强调“美国革命战争”的爱国者们坚信人生来平等，拥有不可剥夺的权利。


Because of these ideals, he proclaimed, the United States “remains a beacon of hope for all who dream of liberty and a shining example to the world of what a free people can achieve.”	他宣称，因为这些理想，美国“仍然是所有梦想自由的人们的希望灯塔，也为全世界树立了一个自由民族能够实现的成就的楷模。 ”


But, at the same time, his administration was holding approximately 400 prisoners at the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.	但与此同时，他的政府却在位于古巴关塔纳摩湾的美国海军基地羁押了约400名囚犯。


Some of them have now been there for more than five years. None of them has ever been put on trial.	他们中间有的人已经被关押了5年多，其中没有一个人受到过审判。


Last month, a highly reputable source confirmed that the Guantánamo prisoners are suffering from more than indefinite detention.	上个月，来源高度可靠的消息证实关塔纳摩的囚犯们所遭受的还不仅仅是无限期的关押。


The US Federal Bureau of Investigation released documents showing that an FBI agent witnessed “on several occasions” detainees who were “chained hand and foot in [a] fetal position to [the] floor,” without a chair, or food or water.	美国联邦调查局（FBI）所发布的文件显示，一名FBI特工“好几次”目睹被关押者“以婴儿的姿势被手脚同铐在地上”，没有椅子、食物或水。


In these conditions, “most urinated or defecated on [them]selves.”	在这种情况下，“大多数人都大小便在自己身上。


They were left there for 18 or 24 hours, or more.	”他们在这样的情况下会待上18或24小时，或更长的时间。


On one of these occasions, the agent reported, “the air conditioning was turned up so low that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold.”	这位特工报告说，某一次，“空调的温度被调得如此之低，以至于赤脚的被囚者冷得发抖。


On another occasion the room was unventilated, the temperature over 100 degrees Fahrenheit, and the detainee was almost unconscious on the floor with a pile of hair next to him – “he had apparently been pulling it out throughout the night.”	”另有一次，囚室没有通风，室温高达100华氏度，被囚者躺在地上几乎失去知觉，旁边还有一堆头发—“很明显，他整夜都在抓扯着自己的头发。 ”


Another FBI agent was laughingly told by a civilian contractor, “[Y]ou have to see this.”	另一位FBI特工被一位民间承包人开玩笑似地告知“必须得去见识一下。


He was then taken to an interrogation room where he saw a longhaired man with a full beard who was gagged with duct tape that “covered much of his head.”	”于是他被带到一间审讯室，看见一个长头发满脸胡子的男子被“裹满大半个头部”的管道包裹带搞得快要窒息。


When the agent asked how the tape would be removed, he was not given any answer.	当这名特工询问怎样取下封带时却没有得到答案。


Other FBI agents reported seeing prisoners left in shackles for 12 hours or more, again in cold conditions, being subjected to strobe lights and loud rap music for many hours, or being forced to wrap themselves in an Israeli flag.	其他FBI特工报告说看到囚犯被戴上镣铐在低气温的情况下待上12个小时或更长的时间，同时还被用闪光灯照射和高音量的说唱乐轰炸长达数小时，或者被强迫用以色列国旗包裹自己的身体。


The FBI report noted these incidents with the comment: “doesn’t seem excessive given Department of Defense policy.”	而FBI报告对这些事件的注释性评论认为“就国防部目前的政策而言（这些事件）似乎并不出格。 ”


Several of the detainees told the FBI agents that they had no connection with terrorism and had no idea why they had been abducted and taken to Guantánamo.	几位被羁押者告诉FBI特工说他们与恐怖主义并无关系，不知道为什么会被绑架并带到关塔纳摩。


Many prisoners were not captured fighting in Afghanistan.	许多囚犯并不是在阿富汗战争中被俘的。


Some were picked up in Bosnia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mauritania, and Pakistan.	有的人在波斯尼亚、印度尼西亚、泰国、毛里塔尼亚和巴基斯坦被抓捕。


The Bush administration says that the detainees are “enemy combatants” in the global war against terror – a war that is being waged around the world, and that could last for decades.	布什政府说这些被关押者是全球反恐战争中的“敌方战斗分子”—那是一场在全世界范围内发动，可能持续数十年的战争。 关塔纳摩特别行动的指挥官，海军少将小Harry B.


The commander of the Guantánamo task force, Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., recently defended harsh treatment of his prisoners, claiming, “They’re all terrorists; they’re all enemy combatants.”	Harris最近为残酷对待囚犯的行为辩护说：“他们都是恐怖分子； 他们都是敌方的战斗分子。


But the CIA has made mistakes before.	但美国中央情报局（CIA）曾经犯过错误。


For example, Murat Kurnaz, a German-born Turkish man, was held in Guantánamo for four years before being released last August.	例如，Murat Kurnaz，一位出生在德国的土耳其人，就在被关押在关塔纳摩长达4年后于去年8月获释。


The case of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, appears to be another of these errors.	另一位黎巴嫩裔的德国人Khaled el-Masri的案子似乎也是同样错误的结果。


Seized by the CIA in Macedonia, he was taken to Afghanistan and interrogated for five months before being released without charge.	被中情局在马其顿抓获以后，他被带到阿富汗，并在遭受了长达5个月的审讯之后被无罪开释。


A German court has now issued arrest warrants for those involved in his abduction.	德国的一家法院已经对参与这起绑架的人员发出了逮捕令。


If there are any human rights at all, the right not to be locked up indefinitely without trial is surely one of them.	如果根本上还有人权的话，那么不被未经审讯无限期关押的权利肯定是其中一条。


The US Constitution’s Bill of Rights puts considerable emphasis on that right, specifying in the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal prosecutions, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury” and “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”	《美国宪法》的《人权法案》再三强调了这一项权利，在《第六修正案》中特别指出在所有刑事起诉中，“被告享有在迅速和公开的情况下被一个公正的陪审团审判的权利”并“有权被告知指控的内容和原由； 有权面对控方证人。


None of the Guantánamo inmates has been granted these rights.	”而却没有一个关塔纳摩的囚犯被给予了这样的权利。


So it has never been proved, by the standards laid down in the US Constitution that any of them really are terrorists.	所以，他们是恐怖分子的论断从未得到过由美国《宪法》所设立的标准的证实。


But the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the Guantánamo prisoners, because they are not US citizens and are in a facility that, technically, is not part of US territory, although it is under the full control of the US government.	但《第六修正案》却��不适用于关塔纳摩的囚犯，因为他们不是美国公民，并且被关押在从技术上讲并非位于美国领土的设施里，虽然这一设施完全在美国政府的控制之下。


Whatever US courts say about it, abducting people all over the world, locking them up for years without establishing that they are guilty of anything, and subjecting them to harsh and abusive treatment is a flagrant violation of international law.	不论美国法庭如何解释，从全世界各地绑架人口，将他们在未被治罪的情况下关押数年，并以残酷和侮辱的方式对待他们就是对国际法的公然践踏。


By any standard of justice, it is also just plain wrong.	以任何的司法标准来看这都是错误的。


Tom Paine, the great American revolutionary and author of The Rights of Man, wrote: “He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach himself.”	汤姆•佩恩，这位伟大的美国革命者和《人类的权利》一书的作者写道：“想确保自身自由的人甚至必须保卫他的敌人也不受压迫； 因为如果他违反了这项义务，就建立了一个会使他自己承受同样后果的先例。


If America would only follow that advice, it might really be a beacon of hope and a shining example.	”要是美国听进了这一忠告，那么它还真的有可能成为一座希望的灯塔和一个耀眼的楷模。


But as long as it continues to hold and abuse prisoners without giving them a fair trial, America’s professed ideals will continue to sound to the rest of the world like the deepest hypocrisy.	但只要它仍然不进行公正的审判，继续扣押和虐待囚犯，那么它所鼓吹的理想会继续在全世界其他人的耳朵里听来如同极度的伪善。


The State of the United States	美国的状态


NEW YORK – The US presidential election is still more than half a year away, and it is impossible to know with any certainty who will be nominated to represent the major parties, much less who will be the 45th occupant of the White House.	纽约—美国总统竞选尚未过半，还不可能笃定知道哪位能获得两大党的提名，更不用说谁能成为白宫第45位主人了。


But it is not too soon to assess the mood of the country's more than 320 million inhabitants and what it will mean for the man or woman who ultimately prevails in what must seem to most people around the world to be an endless political soap opera.	但评估这个拥有3. 2亿居民的国家的情绪，以及这对于这场全世界大部分人眼里没完没了的政治肥皂剧的最终获胜者的意义已经不早了。


The dominant mood in the United States today is one of considerable anxiety, if not outright anger.	今天，美国的主流情绪是非常焦虑的，甚至可以说是出离愤怒。


The Washington Post recently published a four-part series of articles revealing popular fury aimed at Wall Street, Muslims, trade deals, Washington, police shootings, President Barack Obama, Republicans, immigrants, and other targets.	《华盛顿邮报》最近发表了一篇由四部分组成的系列文章，揭示了针对华尔街、穆斯林、贸易协议、华盛顿、警察枪击、奥巴马总统、共和党、移民和其他目标的群众愤怒。


One of the worst descriptions to be applied to a person nowadays is “professional politician.”	如今，对一个人最糟糕的描述是“职业政客”。


The beneficiaries of this state of mind are anti-establishment candidates who espouse policies in opposition to free trade and immigration reform and who call for a radical overhaul of current tax and spending policies.	这一思维状态的受益者是反建制候选人，他们力挺反对自由贸易和移民改革，要求彻底改变当前税收和支出政策。


The details of what they advocate may well differ, but their platforms share a promise of radical departure from the status quo.	他们所鼓吹的具体细节可能大不相同，但他们的平台都承诺彻底远离现状。


The basis of this mood is hardly self-evident, as the country is better off economically than it was a half-dozen years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 economic crisis.	这一情绪背后的基础并不显而易见，因为美国经济比五六年前2007—2008年经济危机刚刚过去时情况要好。


Over nine million jobs have been created since then, interest rates are low (making loans for homes and cars more affordable), and the fall in the price of gasoline is the equivalent of a $700 tax cut for the average American family.	在此期间，九百万以上工作岗位被创造出来，利率很低（让住房和汽车贷款变得很便宜），而汽油价格的下跌相当于给每户美国家庭减税700美元。


Moreover, the stock market has risen some 200% since its low of seven years ago, and millions of people who were without health insurance are now covered.	此外，股市自七年前低点上涨200%，以前没有医疗保险的数百万人现在得到了保险覆盖。


Yet this good economic news is offset in many cases by weak growth in household incomes, which have stagnated in real (inflation-adjusted) terms for some 15 years.	但这一经济好消息被家庭收入增长萎靡所抵消，美国真实（经通胀调整的）家庭收入已有15年不见增加。


The percentage of Americans working full time has still not reached the level it was at seven years ago.	拥有全职工作的美国人百分比仍没有达到七年前的水平。


And many fear that their jobs will disappear because of foreign competition, new technologies, or outsourcing.	更有许多人担心会因为外国竞争、新技术或外包丢掉饭碗。


A large number of Americans are living longer, but are anxious, as they have failed to set aside the funds needed to ensure that their retirement will allow them to live comfortably into old age.	大量美国人寿命变得更长，但他们很焦虑，因为没有存够钱以保证退休后能安享晚年。


Some are paying health-insurance premiums that they previously had avoided because of mandates in the reform enacted under Obama.	由于奥巴马所实施的改革要求，一些人需要支付此前免于支付的健康保险费。


There is also the issue of inequality.	还有不平等性问题。


This causes real anger, but the problem is not so much inequality (which, though worse, is nothing inherently new) as it is the decline in opportunity.	这导致真正的愤怒，但这一问题并不在于不平等（不平等尽管糟糕，但绝非新鲜事），而在于机会的减少。


The American Dream is giving way to class consciousness – a profound change for a country founded on the ideal that anyone can improve his or her lot through hard work.	美国梦正在让位给阶级意识——对于这个建立在人人都能通过努力工作改善生活的理想的国家来说，这是个影响深远的变化。


But the reasons for anxiety and anger transcend economic realities and worries.	但焦虑和愤怒的原因不仅限于经济现实和忧虑。


There is also physical insecurity, whether because of crime or the fear of terrorism.	还有生体不安全感，不管是因为犯罪还是因为害怕恐怖主义。


In many communities, there is concern, too, about where the culture and the society are heading.	在许多社区，还存在文化和社会何去何从的担忧。


Modern media tend to make things worse.	现代媒体总是让事情变得更糟。


Ours is an age of “narrowcasting,” not broadcasting.	我们的时代是一个“窄播”（narrowcasting）时代，而不是“广播”（broadcasting）时代。


People increasingly tune in to cable channels or websites that reinforce their views and ideologies.	人们越来越只愿意看加强自身观点和意识形态的有线电视频道和网站。


Little of this is reassuring.	所有这些都不让人放心。


The national mood transcends the election campaign and will pose a real challenge to the new president and Congress.	国家情绪超越选战，将给新总统和国会带来真正的挑战。


The divisions within and between the Democratic and Republican parties will make compromise and the formation of coalitions that are essential for governing all but impossible.	民主党和共和党内部和彼此之间的分歧将形成妥协和联盟，这是治理不可能的关键。


Concerns over retirement and health-care affordability will make it that much more difficult to reform entitlements, even though their expansion will drive up the national debt to record levels.	关于退休和医疗平价问题的担忧将极大地增加改革权益的难度，即使这些权益的扩大将让国民债务提高到创纪录的水平。


Free trade is blamed for job losses and is losing support, even though it has also been a source of new jobs and greater consumer choice – and has strengthened America’s strategic position around the world.	自由贸易被指为就业损失的原因，正在失去支持，即使它也是新就业和更多消费者选择的来运——也增强了美国在全世界的战略地位。


Immigration, long part of the country’s heritage and a source of valuable talent, is now the object of so much controversy that prospects for reform are dim.	移民一直是美国特色的一部分，也是出色人才来源，现在也受到许多争议，改革前景黯淡。


The mood of the US may also intensify officials’ domestic focus.	美国的情绪还可能加强官员的国内关注度。


Already turned off by foreign involvement in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, which cost much more than they achieved, many Americans are skeptical of what the US can accomplish abroad.	伊拉克和阿富汗干涉的代价远远高于所得，许多美国人对此后的外交参与感到失望，对于美国可以在海外取得怎样的成果感到怀疑。


They are frustrated with allies seen as not carrying their fair share of common burdens, and they are increasingly convinced that the government needs to focus less on the world and more on fixing what is wrong with the US.	他们对盟友没有承担公平比例的共同负担感到沮丧，越来越相信美国政府应该减少注重世界，更多解决美国的问题。


Some in other countries will no doubt read all of this with satisfaction; but, overall, it is bad news for much of the world.	显然，一些其他国家的人对于这一点非常满意； 但是，总体而言，这对于世界大部是一个坏消息。


An America that is distracted and divided is less likely to be willing and able to take the lead in promoting stability in the Middle East, Europe, or Asia, or in meeting global challenges.	注意力涣散的分裂的美国更加不可能愿意和能够在推进中东、欧洲或亚洲的稳定或者应对全球挑战方面起到领导作用。


And, without US leadership, these challenges are likely to go unmet, turning into problems or, worse, crises.	而没有美国的领导，这些挑战可能无法解决，成为问题，或者更糟糕地，成为危机。


America Wakes Up to Climate Change	美国醒悟在气候变化之际


After years of debate in the United States, and opposition to action by the Bush administration, America is finally waking up to the reality of global climate change.	经过多年的争论和布什政府反对采取任何行动的态度影响，美国终于开始对全球气候变化的现实有所醒悟。


Leadership is still not coming from the president, but the private sector has begun to act.	但这一过程中的主导作用并非来自总统，而是来自私有部门的行动。


Leaders of major US companies have decided that global man-made climate change is real, must be controlled, and that business must play a constructive part in the process.	美国主要公司的领导人们都认为全球人为的气候变化是不争的事实，必须加以控制，而商界在这一过程中必须发挥建设性的作用。


Thus, even as the Bush administration and some scientific contrarians pretend that there is no problem, US corporate leaders are seeking practical solutions.	因此，即便是布什政府和一些与科学证明背道而驰的人仍在粉饰太平，美国的公司领导人们还是在寻求着切实的解决方案。


The basic situation has been clear for years.	多年以来，基本的情况已经非常明了。


Global use of fossil fuels is contributing to a sharp rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide, which is causing the Earth to warm.	化石燃料的全球性使用正导致大气中二氧化碳含量的急剧升高，而这又使地球变暖。


Rainfall patterns are changing.	降水模式也正发生着改变。


Deserts and dry regions are becoming drier.	沙漠和干燥地区变得更为干旱。


Extreme weather events such as hurricanes and typhoons are likely to increase.	飓风和台风一类的极端天气现象发生的频率也在增加。


Flooding in Europe is likely to intensify, a process that may already have begun.	欧洲的水灾可能会变得更为严重，而这样的过程可能已经发生了。


Sea levels are rising, and could climb sharply if global warming leads to a destabilization of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.	海平面正在上升，如果格林兰和南极洲的冰盖在全球变暖的作用下变得不稳定，那么这种上升的趋势还会进一步加剧。


In short, the scientific evidence is strong and growing that the planet is at grave risk, with many ill effects already being felt and more to come.	简言之，有越来越多的科学证据正强烈地显示我们这个星球已处于危险之中。 许多不良作用已经显现，而这些还只是冰山一角。


The proper responses are also increasingly understood.	正确的应对方式也正为越来越多的人理解。


We must move to a sustainable energy system, one that does not mean a huge increase of carbon in the atmosphere.	我们必须转向一种可持续的能量系统，一种不会让大气中的碳含量急剧增加的系统。


This will require a shift to renewable energy sources such as solar power, and perhaps nuclear power, as well as new technologies to capture carbon dioxide at power plants and then to dispose of the carbon dioxide in safe underground deposits.	这将会要求我们转向使用太阳能及核能在内的可再生能源，并采用能将发电厂排放的二氧化碳收集起来并集中进行安全地下处置的新技术。


Society will have to pay a price for these investments in new energy technologies, but the benefits will be vastly greater than the price.	社会必须为采用这些新能源技术付出必要的成本，但我们从中的获益会远大于我们的付出。


The US is the world’s major emitter of carbon dioxide from energy use, but it has done the least among all major economies to confront the global challenge.	美国是世界上通过能源使用排放二氧化碳的主要国家。 但在主要国家中，它为应对全球气候挑战所采取的行动却是最少的。


The Bush administration claims that more research is needed before any action is taken.	布什政府声称在采取任何行动之前还需要进行更多的研究。


Yet real action in the US is starting, thanks to leadership in other parts of the world, and thanks to the enlightened understanding of some major American businesses.	可喜的是，由于其他国家领导层的影响和主要美国公司的幡然醒悟，美国已经开始采取切实的行动了。


First, the rest of the world ratified the Kyoto Protocol to control emissions of carbon dioxide.	首先，世界的其他国家都批准了《京都议定书》以控制二氧化碳的排放。


At the beginning of this year, Europe introduced a new Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme that uses market-based incentives to control carbon emissions.	今年年初，欧洲引入了新的“温室气体排放权交易制度”，用市场激励机制来控制碳的排放。


American companies operating in Europe are part of that system for their European-based emissions, so that US companies are being pulled into climate control even if their own government avoids the issue.	在欧洲营运的美国公司由于其在欧洲的排放也成为该体系的一部分。 因此即便在本国政府回避这一问题的情况下，美国公司还是被纳入了气候控制的体系当中。


Second, major US investors, such as pension fund managers, are realizing that US companies that fail to control their emissions may be vulnerable to financial losses in the future.	再者，美国主要的投资人，如养老基金经理们正意识到不能控制排放的公司可能在未来遭遇经济损失。


They know that, sooner or later, the US will have to join the rest of the world in controlling climate change.	他们明白美国迟早要加入全球控制气候变化的进程当中。


At that point, power companies that use antiquated technologies that emit massive amounts of greenhouse gases may face serious financial losses.	到那时，使用过时技术的电力公司会因排放大量的温室气体而面临严重的财务损失。


So investors are telling companies to report their carbon emissions today in order to assess future liabilities.	所以投资者们正让当今的公司报告碳排放量以便评估未来的责任。


Similarly, many company bosses know that pretending that climate problems do not exist is bad for shareholders, because reality will one day strike.	同样，许多公司的老板都明白佯装气候问题不存在的做法有损股东利益，因为真相总有大白的一天。


They know that investing today in clean technologies can give them a long-term competitive advantage.	他们知道今天在清洁（能源）技术上的投资能增加公司的长期竞争力。


As a result, many companies are taking steps now to limit their emissions to avoid future financial liabilities and a lack of investor confidence.	其结果是许多公司都开始采取措施限制排放以避免在未来承担不必要的经济责任并以此保持投资者的信心。


The most dramatic breakthrough of this kind occurred when General Electric, one of the world’s most important, innovative, and respected companies, announced that it was going “green” with a major new corporate focus on environmentally sound technologies and a commitment to limit its own greenhouse gas emissions.	当全球最重要、最富创新精神和最受人尊敬的公司之一—通用电气公司宣布将通过实施采用有利于环境的技术的新主张和承诺限制其自身的温室气体排放，而成为一家“绿色”公司时，就引发了这一领域的最重大突破。


With GE’s leadership, which it termed “ecomagination” (combining ecology with imagination), many US businesses are sure to follow.	在通用电气公司自称为“生态想象力”（将生态与想象力结合）的领导力指引下，许多美国公司都会从善如流。


It is too early to count on success in engaging the US on climate change.	要说已成功地让美国介入了应对气候变化的阵营还为时尚早。


The Bush administration continues to delay and to avoid sound science.	布什政府仍继续拖延并回避有效的科学论证。


Yet it is reasonably clear that a tipping point has been reached.	然而，比较明了的是现在的形势已经到了一个转折点。


Reality is catching up with the US, as it already has elsewhere in the world.	正如在其他国家已经发生的情况一样，现实正在逼近美国。


As US citizens and businesses continue to suffer the results of climate change – heat waves, droughts, hurricanes, and floods – more and more Americans, including an increasing number of business leaders, will press America’s political leaders for real action.	随着美国民众和公司继续遭受气候变化的不良影响—热浪、干旱、飓风和洪水—越来越多的美国人，包括越来越多的商业领袖都会敦促美国的政治领导层采取切实的举措。


The solutions will not be easy, and the effort must last over many decades in all parts of the world.	解决之道不会是一蹴而就的，这样的努力必须在全世界范围内持续数十年。


But the effort needs to start now.	但我们必须现在就开始行动。


As with Europe’s new carbon trading, all producers and consumers around the globe will need to face market incentives to adopt technologies and consumption patterns that slow (and eventually stop) the increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.	如同欧洲的新排放交易制度一样，全球的生产者和消费者都需要面对市场激励机制采用减缓（并最终停止）增加大气中温室气体的技术和消费模式。


We will all need to pay a “market price” when we contribute to global climate change, so that we give true economic incentives to sustainable energy systems and new public investments – for example, mass transit – that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby head off future climatic disasters.	当我们对全球气候变化负有责任时，我们都应该为一定的“市场价格”埋单。 这样我们才能真正地从经济上激励可持续的能源体系和新的公共投资—例如大运量公交系统—从而减少温室气体的排放，进而防止未来的气候灾难。


The Right Weights for Mortgage Risks	按揭风险的正确权重


ABU DHABI – Ever since hunter-gatherers started to build their own dwellings some 14,000 years ago, homeownership has been a mark of high social and economic status.	阿布扎比—自从14,000年前采集狩猎部落开始建设栖身之所以来，房屋拥有权就成为社会和经济地位崇高的标志。


Today, the United States has built a mammoth financial bureaucracy to promote homeownership, and economists, bankers, politicians, and of course homeowners themselves keenly follow house-price indicators.	如今美国建立了巨大的金融机构系统以促进房屋拥有，经济学家、银行家、政客，当然还有屋主本身，都热切地追踪者房价指标。


But, as we have recently witnessed, unless mortgage risks are properly calculated, the dream of homeownership can all too easily become an economic nightmare.	但是，正如我们最近所看到的，除非按揭风险得到正确计算，否则拥有房子之梦很容易演变为经济噩梦。


Mortgage debt has become households’ biggest liability throughout the developed world.	按揭债务已成为整个发达世界最大的家庭负债项。


In the decade preceding the financial crisis, US mortgage debt increased almost threefold, while the real economy grew by only one-third.	在金融危机之前的十年中，美国按揭债务几乎增加了三倍，而实体经济仅仅增长三分之一。


At its 2007 peak, US mortgage debt stood at $10.6 trillion – more than double the combined GDP of China and India.	在2007年高峰期，美国按揭债务高达10. 6万亿美元——比中国和印度GDP加起来还要多一倍有余。


The six major banking crises in the advanced economies since the mid-1970s were all associated with a housing bust.	自20世纪70年代中期以来，发达经济体共爆发过六次大型银行危机，它们全部与房地产泡沫破裂有关。


A real-estate price crash has also been a key cause of emerging-market crises, such as the 1997-98 Asian collapse.	房地产价格崩溃也是新兴市场危机的主要原因，1997—98年亚洲崩盘就是如此。


Research shows that lost output during recessions accompanied by a housing bust is double or triple what it might otherwise have been had real-estate prices held up.	研究表明，与房地产泡沫破裂有关的危机的产出损失比房地产价格保持坚挺的情况要大一到两倍。


Moreover, housing busts tend to prolong recessions by almost three years.	此外，房地产泡沫破裂会让衰退期延长近三年。


Given the enormous social and economic costs when high levels of mortgage debt meet a crash in house prices, one would expect regulators to be fully engaged on the issue.	当按揭债务高水平遇上房价崩盘时，就会引起巨大的社会和经济成本，因此，监管者理应对这一问题全力以赴、密切关注。


Unfortunately, they are not.	不幸的是，并非如此。


Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the primary global benchmark for bank regulations, proposed reforms after the 2008 crisis that are aimed at strengthening the financial system, mortgage regulations have changed little.	尽管2008年危机后全球银行监管的主要基准——巴塞尔银行监督委员会（Basel Committee on Banking Supervision）建议实施旨在强化金融系统的改革，但按揭监管变化甚微。


The key to mortgage regulation is the concept of “risk weight,” a measure that increases with the probability that a borrower will default.	按揭监管的关键是“风险权重”的概念。 这一指标随借款人违约概率的增加而增加。


For example, a loan to AAA-rated Microsoft has a 0% risk weight, meaning that it is virtually risk-free.	比如，贷给AAA级的微软公司的贷款，风险权重为0%，这意味着它可视为无风险。


A loan to the Indian government will have a risk weight of 50%, and one to a riskier Argentina will be weighted at 150%.	贷给印度政府的贷款，风险权重为50%，风险更高的阿根廷贷款，风险权重将是150%。


When it comes to mortgages, the standard risk weight is 35% (down from 50% a decade ago).	至于按揭贷款，标准风险权重是35%（十年前是50%）。


But banks can use internal mathematical models to calculate their own risk weights.	但银行可以用内部数学模型计算它们自身的风险权重。


This is akin to marking one’s own exam paper; unsurprisingly, banks’ risk scores are usually on the safe side.	这就好比是自己给自己的考卷打分； 好不奇怪，银行的风险评分往往落在安全区间。


Consider, for example, a $200,000 bank loan to buy a $235,000 home.	比如，考虑一笔200,000美元的贷款，用途为购买一套235,000美元的房子。


If the bank attaches a 10% risk weight to the loan, the risk-weighted equivalent is $20,000.	如果银行赋予这笔贷款10%的风险权重，则其风险加权等价值为20,000美元。


If the amount of bank capital needed to protect that risk-weighted equivalent is 10%, then the bank requires just $2,000 of its own capital to fund the mortgage, $198,000 of which the bank itself borrows.	如果保护这一风险加权等价值所需要的银行资本比重为10%，则银行只需要拿出2,000美元的资本就可以发起这笔贷款，其余198,000美元都是银行借来的。


All it takes to wipe out the bank’s own money is a 16% drop in the house’s price (from $235,000 to below $198,000).	让银行自己的钱损失殆尽需要房价下跌16%（从235,000美元跌到198,000美元之下）。


US house prices – as measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index – fell by more than 30% from June 2006 to March 2009, while European countries, including Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, experienced similar or greater declines.	用S&P/Case-Shiller全国住房价格指数衡量，2006年6月—2009年3月美国房价下跌了30%多，而欧洲国家（包括西班牙、爱尔兰和英国）也经历了类似或更大的跌幅。


The problem is that banks continue to offer big mortgages while having little of their own “skin in the game.”	问题在于，自己基本没有“牵涉其中”的银行继续放出大量按揭贷款。


The IMF estimates that the average mortgage risk weight in Europe and Asia was 14% and 15%, respectively, with some banks using a risk weight as low as 6%.	IMF估计，欧洲和亚洲的平均按揭风险权重分别为14%和15%，一些银行使用的风险权重低至6%。


Recently, some regulators have become suspicious of banks’ do-it-yourself risk weights.	最近，一些监管者开始质疑银行自说自话的风险权重。


In 2012, the UK authorities asked banks to apply a temporary minimum 15% risk weight to their mortgage portfolios, though that guidance expired in July.	2012年，英国当局要求银行按揭组合采取15%的临时性风险权重下限，但该指引7月份就失效了。


The Swedish regulator has recommended that mortgage lenders raise their risk-weight floor from 15% to 25%.	瑞典监管者建议按揭贷款人将风险权重下限从15%提高到25%。


Although welcome, these steps may still be too little; more important, they lack flexibility.	尽管这些措施值得欢迎，但步子仍然迈得太小； 更重要的是，它们缺少灵活性。


A better option would be to implement time-varying, pro-cyclical floors, forcing banks to hold more capital during housing booms.	更好的办法是实施随时间变化的顺周期下限，强迫银行在房地产繁荣期持有更多资本。


And, whereas a single, fixed floor might push banks toward riskier loans that offer higher returns for the same amount of capital, a dynamic system would allow lower floors for the lowest-risk mortgages and require higher floors for riskier loans.	此外，一刀切的固定下限可能促使银行将同等资本用于风险更大、回报也更大的贷款； 而动态系统允许降低风险最低的按揭贷款的下限，而对风险较大的贷款要求较高的下限。


Moreover, while risk weight is an important macro-prudential lever, it must be used in conjunction with regulators’ other tools.	此外，尽管风险权重是一个重��的宏观审慎杠杆，但必须与监管者的其他工具配合使用。


These include mortgage eligibility criteria, such as loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios, and dynamic provisioning (that is increasing banks’ mandatory loan-loss reserves during housing booms).	这些用具包括按揭合格标准（如贷款/房屋价值比和贷款/收入比）和动态拔备（即在房地产繁荣期提高银行的法定贷款损失准备金）。


It is important to calibrate the impact of risk weights on housing-market cycles relative to other measures, not least because excessive and overlapping intervention could itself fuel dangerous cycles.	根据房地产市场周期调整风险权重相对于其他指标的影响十分重要，因为过度和重复干预本身也可能导致恶性循环。


The reliance of modern banking regulation on risk weighting is nowhere more important than in the mortgage market.	现代银行监管依赖于风险权重，最能表现这一点的莫过于按揭市场。


If regulators get it wrong, the entire edifice could collapse – yet again.	如果监管者措施失当，整个金融系统都要崩溃——再一次崩溃。


The views expressed in this column are the author’s own, and do not represent those of the National Bank of Abu Dhabi.	本专栏仅代表作者个人观点，不代表阿布扎比国民银行观点。


Hardening Brazil’s Soft Power	硬化巴西的软实力


BRASILIA – It is, perhaps, a truism for Brazil’s citizens that their country is and always will be a peaceful one.	巴西利亚——或许对巴西民众来讲，国家永远和平是一个不言而喻的问题。


After all, Brazil has lived with its ten neighbors without conflict for almost 150 years, having settled its borders through negotiation.	毕竟在谈判解决边境争端后，巴西与十个邻国间已近150年没有爆发任何冲突。


It last went to war in 1942, after direct aggression by Nazi U-boats in the South Atlantic.	1942年纳粹U型潜艇明目张胆入侵南大西洋是巴西最后一次打仗。


It has forsworn nuclear weapons, having signed a comprehensive nuclear-safeguards agreement with Argentina and the International Atomic Energy Agency.	巴西已和阿根廷及国际原子能机构签署了《全面核保障协定》，誓言放弃核武器。


Through the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), Brazil is helping to integrate the region politically, economically, socially, and culturally.	巴西正通过南方共同市场（Mercosur）和南美国家联盟（UNASUR）为地区的政治、经济、社会和文化融合贡献自己的力量。


But is soft power enough for one of the world’s major emerging countries?	但向巴西这样的世界主要新兴国家单纯依靠软实力能否行得通？


To be sure, Brazil’s peaceful foreign policy has served it well.	可以肯定，巴西的和平外交政策效果良好。


Brazil has used its stature to advance peace and cooperation in South America and beyond.	巴西充分利用其自身地位推进南美及其他地区的和平合作。


Its constructive stance derives from a worldview that accords pride of place to the values of democracy, social justice, economic development, and environmental protection.	巴西将国家自豪感与民主制度、社会正义、经济发展和环境保护相融合的世界观造就了如此建设性的态度。


Brazil’s unique approach to promoting these ideals is an important source of its soft power, reflected in the broad international support that placed Brazilians atop international institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Trade Organization.	巴西软实力的重要来源是其弘扬理想的独特方式，具体表现在巴西所获的支持超过了粮农组织和世贸组织。


Yet no country can rely on soft power alone to defend its interests.	但没有哪个国家可以单靠软实力来捍卫自己的利益。


Indeed, in an unpredictable world, where old threats are compounded by new challenges, policymakers cannot disregard hard power.	事实上，在一个旧威胁未去新挑战又来的不可预知的世界，决策者绝不能忽视建设硬实力。


By deterring threats to national sovereignty, military power supports peace; and, in Brazil’s case, it underpins our country’s constructive role in the pursuit of global stability.	军队通过遏制对国家主权的威胁来保障和平。 以巴西为例，支撑其在全球稳定中发挥建设性作用的还是硬实力。


That role is more necessary than ever.	上述作用比以往任何时候都更有必要。


Over the past two decades, unilateral actions in disregard of the UN Security Council’s primary responsibility in matters of war and peace have led to greater uncertainty and instability.	过去的二十年来，单方面行动破坏了联合国安理会在国际战争与和平领域的权威，导致动荡和不确定性加剧。


Likewise, little progress toward nuclear disarmament has been made, in disregard of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	《不扩散核武器条约》并未引起重视，核裁军领域同样进展甚微。


Brazil’s abundance of energy, food, water, and biodiversity increases its stake in a security environment characterized by rising competition for access to, or control of, natural resources.	巴西丰富的能源、食物、水资源和生物多样性使其在对自然资源争夺日趋白热化的安全环境中愈加举足轻重。


In order to meet the challenges of this complex reality, Brazil’s peaceful foreign policy must be supported by a robust defense policy.	为应对复杂现实的挑战，巴西和平外交政策的背后必须有强大的国防政策支撑。


Brazil’s National Defense Strategy, updated in 2012, states that the modernization of the Armed Forces is intrinsically linked to national development.	2012年更新的巴西国防战略 明确指出武装部队现代化与国家的发展具有内在的相关性。


Thus, it emphasizes the need to strengthen the domestic defense industry.	报告因此强调要加强国内国防工业。


In accordance with the Strategy, Brazil is enhancing its conventional deterrence capabilities, including by building a nuclear-propelled submarine as part of a naval program commensurate with its responsibilities in the South Atlantic.	巴西正按照该战略要求加强自身的常规威慑能力，包括建造核潜艇，以使这部分海军计划与巴西在南大西洋的责任相称。


Brazil coordinates closely on defense matters with its neighbors, both bilaterally and through Unasur’s South American Defense Council, which aims to promote confidence-building, transparency, a joint regional defense industry, and, most important, a common defense identity.	巴西通过双边及南美国家联盟南美防务委员会在国防领域与邻国展开密切合作，该委员会的宗旨是促进信任、透明度、联合区域国防工业以及最重要的——构建共同的国防身份。


One potential mechanism for advancing these objectives is a South American Defense College, now under consideration.	筹划中的南美国防学院是推进上述目标的一个潜在机制。


South America is becoming a region where war is unthinkable – what the political scientist Karl Deutsch once called a “security community.”	战争在南美地区越来越不可想象——这就是政治学家卡尔·多伊奇所谓的“安全社区”。


Having visited every South American country in my tenure as Defense Minister, I am convinced that, the most effective deterrent on the continent is cooperation.	任职国防部长期间访问南美各国令我坚信合作是该地区最有效的威慑手段。


At the same time, Brazil is pursuing increased bilateral defense cooperation with African partners.	同时，巴西正在寻求与非洲伙伴加强双边防务合作。


With our neighbors on both shores of the South Atlantic, Brazil is working closely to strengthen the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), which aims to keep the ocean free from rivalries foreign to it and from nuclear weapons.	巴西正与遍布南大西洋两岸的邻国密切合作为保护海洋避免对抗及核武器而加强南大西洋和平合作区（ZPCSA）的建设。


Brazil is also reaching out to other emerging countries, such as its fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa).	巴西也正争取其他新兴国家，比方说金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）其他国家和IBSA对话论坛（印度、巴西和南非）成员国的合作。


For example, Brazil conducts IBSAMAR, a regular trilateral naval exercise, with South Africa and India.	举例来讲，巴西与南非和印度定期举行IBSAMAR三边海军演习。


More broadly, we are exploring ways to cooperate in the joint development of defense technologies.	更广义地讲，我们正在就国防科技研究的合作方式进行探索。


Through such endeavors, Brazil hopes to contribute to a more balanced international order, one less subject to hegemonies of any kind, without losing sight of the importance of mutually beneficial partnerships with developed countries.	巴西希望能够通过上述努力在重视与发达国家互利伙伴关系重要性的基础上，为建设免受霸权干扰的平衡国际秩序贡献自己的力量。


Even as Brazil hardens its soft power, it remains deeply committed to the path of dialogue, conflict prevention, and the negotiated settlement of disputes.	即使在巴西硬化软实力的过程中，它仍然坚定致力于通过对话预防冲突和谈判解决争端的道路。


The presence of Brazilian peacekeepers in countries like Haiti and Lebanon underscores Brazil’s contribution to maintaining peace and security worldwide.	巴西向海地和黎巴嫩等国派驻维和部队凸显了巴西为维护世界和平及安全所做的努力。


In the twenty-first century, a truly stable global order will depend on a legitimate and effective UN Security Council, one that reflects the plurality of the emerging multipolar world.	巴西还坚信二十一世纪真正稳定的全球秩序将取决于能否建设反应多元化新兴多极世界的合法有效的联合国安理会。


China Grows Down	减速增长再创改革红利


HONG KONG – For more than three decades, China’s GDP has grown by an average of more than 10% annually.	香港——三十多年来，中国以超过10%的GDP增长率快速发展。


But former Premier Wen Jiabao rightly described this impressive growth performance as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable,” highlighting the many economic, social, and environmental costs and challenges that have accompanied it.	然而，在这令人赞叹的经济增长成绩背后，随之而来的是诸多经济、社会、环境成本和挑战，正如前总理温家宝准确的描述——“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、不可持续”。


Now China must choose between the export-based, investment-driven growth model of the past and a new, more viable economic order.	现在，中国必须做出选择：以出口投资为驱动的旧的经济增长模式，还是可持续的经济增长新秩序。


Cheap credit and perverse incentives – such as promotions for officials who contribute most to GDP growth – have led to massive but redundant investment, which, in turn, has contributed to excess capacity in manufacturing and infrastructure.	廉价信贷和错误的激励机制（例如提拔对GDP增长贡献最大的官员等）引发大规模的重复投资，进而导致制造业和基础设施行业的产能过剩。


This model is not only inefficient; channeling government resources to support investment also undermines China’s social development.	这种模式不仅效率低下，还引导政府资源流向阻碍中国社会发展的无效投资。


Given this, China’s leaders have decided to stop using GDP growth as the primary criterion for evaluating officials’ performance.	有鉴于此，中国领导人已决定停止将GDP增长作为评价官员政绩的主要标准。


Indeed, the 12th Five-Year Plan, which extends until 2015, aims to shift China’s economy to a new, more sustainable growth model based on quality and innovation, and accepts that annual GDP growth will likely fall to 7% during the transition.	实际上，将于2015年结束的“十二五”规划旨在实现中国经济向以质量和创新为基础的可持续的新增长模式转型，并接受在转型期间GDP增长率降至7%的可能性。


Most discussion of growth models nowadays is based on work by the Nobel laureate Robert Solow.	时下大多关于增长模式的讨论都基于诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特·索洛的理论。


For Solow, GDP growth is determined by the factor inputs of land, labor, and capital, together with the economy’s total factor productivity (TFP, or the change in output not accounted for by changes in the volume of inputs, but by factors like technological innovation and institutional reform).	在索洛看来，GDP增长率由土地、劳动力、资本等投入要素和全要素生产率共同决定。 全要素生产率（TFP）指不是因为投入量的变化、而是由于技术创新和制度改革所导致的产出变化。


Since 1978, China, by implementing major reforms, has achieved three periods of high TFP growth, each lasting 5-7 years.	1978年以来，通过推进重大改革，中国已经实现了三阶段的全要素生产率高速增长期（每阶段5-7年）。


First, in the early 1980’s, following the introduction of the rural household-responsibility system, which boosted agricultural productivity and released a large amount of unskilled labor to work in the higher-productivity urban and industrial sectors, annual TFP growth accelerated to 3-4%.	第一阶段是在20世纪80年代初引入农村家庭联产承包责任制，成功促进了农业生产率的提高，并将大批非技术工人释放到生产率较高的城市和工业部门工作， 全要素生产率年增长率也因此增至3-4%。


The second such period followed Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, during which he emphasized the need to shift to a market-based – albeit state-controlled – system by opening China’s economy to foreign direct investment and establishing special economic zones to help develop export-oriented industries.	第二个快速增长期出现在1992年邓小平南巡讲话后，他在讲话中强调中国经济需要向外商直接投资开放，并设立经济特区发展出口导向型产业，实现向以市场为基础的国家控制体制的过渡。


This time, TFP growth soared to 5-6%, partly owing to the “catching up” process facilitated by China’s adoption of foreign technology and know-how.	这一次，部分因为中国引进国外先进技术及成功实现专业知识的“追赶”，全要素生产率一举飙升至5-6%。


Finally, after major reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the tax system, China acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2001. With the country fully integrated into global supply chains, TFP growth hit 4%, where it remained until 2007.	最后，在对国有企业和税收制度进行重大改革后，中国于2001年加入了世贸组织，促使中国彻底融入全球供应链，全要素生产率增速达到4%，并且一直延续到2007年。


Since then, however, the TFP growth rate has fallen by almost half.	但是从那以后，全要素生产率增长速度已经下降了近一半左右。


Indeed, China’s economy has experienced a significant – and ongoing – growth slowdown in the wake of the global economic crisis that erupted five years ago.	事实上，自五年前全球经济危机爆发以来，中国经济增长就已经持续显著放缓。


By 2012, human capital’s contribution to China’s GDP growth fell almost to zero, with fixed-capital accumulation accounting for roughly 60% of total growth.	截至2012年，人力资本对中国GDP的贡献降至几乎为零，而固定资本积累则占增长总额的约60%。


Large-scale, debt-funded capital investments have raised the country’s credit/GDP ratio to nearly 200%, increasing the financial system’s vulnerability – a development reflected in the recent spike in interbank interest rates.	大规模债务融资将中国信贷占GDP的比率提高到近200%，凸显出金融系统的脆弱性——不久前的银行同业拆借利率飙升就反映了这一点。


In order to achieve more balanced and sustainable GDP growth, China’s leaders must implement a set of deep, comprehensive, and long-lasting institutional reforms aimed at boosting TFP.	为了实现平衡、可持续的GDP增长，中国领导人必须全面落实旨在提高全要素生产率的深入长效制度改革措施。


In particular, the reforms should be designed to facilitate China’s transition from its traditional supply-based growth model, which assumes that building hard infrastructure leads automatically to demand growth.	改革应着力促进中国经济增长模式转型。 以发展基础设施建设而达到扩大需求的传统供应型增长模式，显然已不适应当前的经济形势。


In fact, GDP growth may be slowing precisely because existing investment in manufacturing and infrastructure, undertaken largely by local governments and SOEs, does not match the pattern of domestic demand.	事实上，GDP增长放缓或许恰恰因为当前基本由地方政府和国有企业主导的制造业和基础设施投资并不符合国内实际需求。


As a result, China now faces the problem of short-term excess capacity.	中国也因此面临短期产能过剩的问题。


Improving the quality of GDP growth will depend on Chinese leaders’ willingness to enact market-oriented reforms.	能否改善GDP增长质量取决于中国领导人是否愿意制定以市场为导向的改革措施。


Rather than directly driving investment, the state must emphasize its regulatory and enforcement functions, including setting and overseeing standards, building an effective property-rights infrastructure, and managing macroeconomic conditions.	政府必须强调自身的监管和执法职能，包括制定及监督标准，建立有效的产权基础设施及管理宏观经济环境，而不是直接拉动投资。


At the same time, the state must improve the quality and delivery of education, health care, and security, while minimizing corruption and administrative abuses.	与此同时，政府应提高教育、医疗及社保的质量，并尽可能抑制腐败和行政权力滥用。


In short, China must shift its focus from meeting GDP growth targets to creating an environment that fosters innovation and competition, thereby enabling market forces to set prices and allocate resources more effectively.	总之，中国必须将重点从实现GDP增长目标转向营造促进创新与竞争的环境，从而允许市场制定价格并提高资源分配效率。


The state would thus become an intermediary agent, facilitating the development of a sustainable economic order in which less is more – that is, a system in which less intervention creates more opportunities for creativity.	政府进而转变为促进可持续经济秩序发展的中介力量， 以更少的干预换取更多的创新机会。


SOEs undoubtedly played an important role in China’s previous growth model, delivering the infrastructure and services that were deemed necessary for the global manufacturing supply chain to function.	毋庸置疑，国有企业在中国过去的增长模式中发挥了重要作用， 提供了全球制造业供应链运转不可或缺的基础设施和服务。


But access to cheap credit from state-controlled banks creates an incentive for SOEs to generate surplus capacity, which increases systemic risk in the economy.	但国有银行的廉价信贷却激励国有企业积累过剩产能，导致经济系统性风险增加。


To correct China’s excess-capacity problem would require the relevant enterprises, whether SOEs or private firms, to exit the market.	要想纠正中国的产能过剩问题，就必须让相关低效企业退出市场，不论是国有企业还是民营企业。


Unless China’s leaders implement major structural reforms aimed at establishing a market-based growth model, they will be unable to avoid the “middle-income trap” that has prevented so many developing economies from attaining advanced-country status.	中国领导人需要推行重大结构性改革来建立以市场为基础的经济增长模式，好让中国避开“中等收入陷阱”——正是这一陷阱导致许多发展中经济体无法进入发达国家行列。


The deceleration in GDP growth that such reforms would cause would be more than offset by increased market dynamism and overall economic stability.	中国需要用上述结构性改革带来的改革红利，包括市场活力和整体经济稳定性增长，来抵消GDP增速放缓的改革成本。


A Murder in Moscow	莫斯科的谋杀


It is time to end the fiction that Vladimir Putin’s “dictatorship of law” has made postcommunist Russia any less lawless.	现在是结束那种所谓普京的“独裁法治”让后共产主义的俄罗斯变得没有那么不守法律的谎言的时候了。


The murder of Anna Politkovskaya, one of Russia’s bravest and best journalists, a woman who dared to expose the brutal murders committed by Russian troops in Chechnya, is final proof that President Putin has delivered nothing more than a run of the mill dictatorship with the usual contempt for law.	波利特科夫卡娅是俄罗斯最勇敢和最好的记者之一，一个敢于揭露俄罗斯军队在车臣进行残暴杀戮的女人被谋杀，是对普京总统除了以对法律惯有的蔑视而推行的、平庸的独裁统治的新证明。


This recognition is a timely one for the world to make, particularly Europe.	世界尤其是欧洲应该及时认清这一事实。


Germany’s Foreign Ministry is preparing a policy on Russian/German relations that will enshrine indifference to Putin’s lawlessness as being in the national interest of the most powerful member of the European Union.	德国外交部正在拟定的一项针对德俄关系的政策将会把对普京的违反法律视而不见作为这个最大欧盟成员国的国家利益。


But indifference becomes appeasement when it encourages Putin to pursue his lawless ways in the international arena, as in his current campaign to strangle Georgia’s economy.	但是漠视从而导致鼓励普京在国际舞台上推行他违法的方式就变成了姑息迁就，就像他正在推行的试图扼杀格鲁吉亚经济的运动。


The killing of Politkovskaya has incited an eerie sense of déjà vu : just as in the KGB’s heyday, people simply disappear in Putin’s Russia.	对波利特科夫卡娅的谋杀让人产生了一种不安的似曾相识的感觉：这就像是那个克格勃猖獗的年代，在普京统治下的俄罗斯，人们不知不觉地消失了。


Politkovskaya’s is the third politically tinged killing in three weeks.	波利特科夫卡娅是三周以来第三起与政治有牵连的被谋杀者。


Enver Ziganshin, the chief engineer of BP Russia, was shot to death in Irkutsk on September 30.	俄罗斯英国石油公司总工程师吉甘辛9月30日被人在伊尔库次克枪杀。


Andrei Kozlov, the deputy governor of Russia’s central bank who was leading a campaign against financial fraud, was assassinated on September 14.	正在领导一场针对金融诈骗的运动的俄罗斯中央银行副总裁科兹洛夫9月14日被人刺杀。


The fact that Russia’s Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, took over the investigation into Politkovskaya’s killing, as he did with the murder of Kozlov, doesn’t inspire hope, as such senior level involvement would in any real democracy.	俄罗斯总检查长切卡将军主持对于波利特科夫卡娅谋杀案的调查工作，就像他在科兹洛夫谋杀案中所做的那样，并不能让人们像在真正的民主国家中那样对于这种有高层参与的行为会产生希望。


In fact, the involvement of the highest level of Russia’s government is almost a guarantee that the killers will never be found.	事实上，俄罗斯政府最高层的参与几乎使人们可以肯定凶手永远不会被找到。


Politkovskaya’s murder is a particularly grim augury when you consider that she was a powerful critic of Russia’s President.	如果你认识到波利特科夫卡娅是俄罗斯总统的一个强有力的批评者的话,那么她的谋杀就显得尤其是一个可怕的征兆。


In her articles for one of the few remaining independent papers in Moscow,	在她在莫斯科仅存的几家为数不多的独立报纸之一新报上所发表的文章，以及她的著作《普京的俄罗斯：民主正在消失的生活》和《一场肮脏的战争：一个在车臣的俄罗斯记者》中，波利特科夫卡娅描述了在普京总统的统治下鲜明的特征，那就是自由丧失。 就像前媒体大亨别列佐夫斯基和古辛基被驱逐和石油巨头科多尔科夫斯基被监禁中所表明的，等待普京敌人的是三种结果：放逐、监禁或者是坟墓。


I am not accusing Putin’s government of the contract killing of Politkovskaya.	我并不是指责普京政府协约谋杀了波利特科夫卡娅。


After all, as a campaigning investigative journalist she made many people angry besides Putin, not least of which is the current Chechen Prime Minister, Ramzan Kadyrov, whom she accused of a policy of kidnapping for ransom.	不管怎样，作为一个好斗的新闻调查记者，除了普京之外她还有很多敌人，其中就包括车臣现总理卡德罗夫，她指责他推行的是绑架以换取赎金的策略。


But even if Vladimir Putin’s associates had nothing to do with Politkovskaya being gunned down in an elevator of her apartment building in the center of Moscow, his contempt for law created the climate in which the murder was carried out.	但是就算普京的同党与波利特科夫卡娅 被人在她位于莫斯科市中心的公寓楼的电梯里枪杀事件不相干，他对法律的蔑视也制造了使这场谋杀得以进行的气候。


Like the murder of Archbishop Thomas Beckett in his Canterbury Cathedral many centuries ago, the crime was committed in the clear belief that it would please the king.	就像许多世纪以前大主教贝科特被人在坎特伯雷教堂里杀害一样，是因为凶手相信这将会取悦国王。


Given what Politkovskaya represented—the responsibility of a democratic press to question the Kremlin and its policies—the government should have made certain that nothing bad happened to her.	考虑到波利特科夫卡娅所代表东西，也就是民主的新闻质疑克里姆林宫及其政策的职责，政府本该确保在她不会遭遇不测。


Putin’s Russia has already lost 12 leading journalists to murder in the past six years.	普京的俄罗斯在过去六年中已经失去了12位著名的记者。


None of those crimes has been solved, which would not be the case if Putin’s “dictatorship of law” was anything more than a PR strategy.	这些案件都没有被侦破，如果普京的“独裁法治”比公关策略稍好一点的话就不会这样。


The six year period since Vladimir Putin arrived in the Kremlin has been a time of deeply conflicting signals.	普京入主克里姆林宫的六年充满了相互矛盾的信号。


On one hand, the world sees a young, educated leader pledging to modernize Russia, particularly in terms of bringing its law enforcement and judicial practices into line with international norms.	一方面，世界看到了一位年轻、受过良好教育的领导人誓言要使俄罗斯走向现代化，尤其是在法制的实施和司法程序上要向国际标准看齐。


On the other, the president watches in silence while his ex-colleagues in Russia's FSB security service (the former KGB) provide no security to those murdered, and launch a series of notorious espionage cases against journalists, scientists, and environmental activists.	另一方面，当他在俄罗斯国家安全局（前身是克格勃）的前同事们没有为那些被谋杀的人提供安全，并且对记者、科学家和环保主义者发起一系列臭名昭著的间谍案时却袖手旁观。


These “neo-spies” include journalist Gregory Pasko, arms control expert Igor Sutyagin, diplomat Valentin Moiseyev, physicist Valentin Danilov, and others.	这些“新型间谍”包括记者帕斯克，武器控制专家苏特亚琴，外交官莫伊塞叶夫，物理学家达尼洛夫等等。


The supposedly civilizing influence of being a Western partner — chairing a G-8 summit in Saint Petersburg for example — seems to have been lost on Putin’s Kremlin cabal.	预想中作为一个西方伙伴所能带来的文明的影响力，比如在圣彼得堡主持八国峰会，似乎在普京的克里姆林宫阴谋集团中消失了。


Once again exposure to Western values has delivered another Potemkin Village; Russia presents a façade of laws and democratic institutions, but behind that cardboard surface the same arbitrary brutes rule.	暴露在西方的价值观面前的是又一个华而不实的例子。 在俄罗斯法律和民主制度的表面��隐藏的同样专横的暴君统治。


The danger for the world is that Putin’s lawlessness is being exported.	世界所面临的危险是普京的违法行为正在向外输出。


Across Russia’s near abroad, a form of criminalized diplomacy is taking root.	在俄罗斯的周边国家，一种犯罪的外交政策正在形成势力。


Look at Putin’s attempt to rig Ukraine’s previous presidential election, and the on again off again criminal charges brought against the opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko.	看看普京企图操纵乌克兰上一次总统选举的行为，对于反对党领导人季莫申科一再的犯罪指控。


Look at the rogue breakaway regions in Moldova and Georgia that exist only because of the Kremlin’s backing.	看看摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚那些闹着要分裂的无赖地区，它们之所以存在正是有了克里姆林宫的支持。


Look at how the Kremlin seeks to blackmail its neighbors by threatening their energy supplies.	看看克里姆林宫是怎样凭借威胁停止对它们的能源供应来讹诈邻邦的。


Every policeman knows that when you ignore criminal behavior, criminals grow bolder.	每一个警察都知道当你无视犯罪行为时，罪犯们就会变得更加猖獗。


It is past time for the world to recognize Vladimir Putin for what he is: a man who is taking Russia back into the shadows.	世界早就应该认识到普京是怎样一个人了：他正把俄罗斯重新带回黑暗中。


So the world must now ponder that old Latin maxim qui tacet consentere videtur – silence means consent – and ask itself if it is wise to quietly consent to Putin’s construction of a lawless energy superpower.	所以世界现在应该好好思考一下那句古拉丁格言“沉默意味着容忍”，并且想一下默认普京建立一个不守法律的能源超级大国是否是明智之举。


An Accidental Cure for Iraq	意外的伊拉克药方


Doctors use the word “crisis” to describe the point at which a patient either starts to recover or dies.	医生经常用“危象”一词来描述某一时段，在这一时段中，病人要么开始康复，要么死亡。


President George W. Bush’s Iraqi patient now seems to have reached that point.	布什总统的伊拉克病人现在看起来已经达到了这一点。


Most commentators appear to think that Bush’s latest prescription – a surge of 20,000 additional troops to suppress the militias in Baghdad – will, at best, merely postpone the inevitable death of his dream of a democratic Iraq.	大多数评论家似乎认为，布什的最新药方，也就是大幅增兵20000人来镇压巴格达的民兵将最多只是推迟建立民主的伊拉克的梦想不可避免的灭亡。


Yet as “Battle of Baghdad” begins, factors beyond Bush’s control and not of his making (at least not intentionally) may just save Iraq from its doom.	但是，超出布什控制范围、并且不是他所为(至少不是有意的)的因素也许就会从末日中挽救伊拉克。


One key factor is that, for the first time since the United States and Britain invaded Iraq, Arab Sunni leaders are backing a US military plan for that country.	其中一个关键因素是，自从美国和英国入侵伊拉克以来，阿拉伯逊尼派领导人第一次支持美国在伊拉克的军事计划。


These Sunni leaders live in abject fear of the geopolitical earthquake that any disintegration of political authority in Baghdad would bring, believing that all-out civil war would invariably follow – a war that would not respect international borders.	这些逊尼派领导人生活在悲惨的恐惧之中，担心巴格达政权的解体所会带来的地缘政治地震。 他们相信，那将会不可避免地引发全面内战，而这一内战将不会尊重国际边界线。


Of course, America has been encouraging Sunni leaders in this belief.	当然，美国一直在鼓励逊尼派领导人相信这一观点。


Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent tour of Middle East capitals helped spread the word to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states that any US failure and sudden withdrawal would be certain to destabilize them.	国务卿莱斯最近访问中东各国首都，向埃及、约旦、沙特以及海湾国家传话说，美国一旦失败并且匆忙撤兵肯定将会破坏它们国家的稳定。


Given the fragile grip that these leaders have over their societies, America’s warnings have been taken to heart.	鉴于这些领导人对其社会控制微弱，美国的警告得到了重视。


But the truly curious factor that might bring success to Bush is that those who have opposed or resented America’s presence in Iraq, such as the Iranian-backed Shi’a parties now also appear to want Bush’s new strategy to succeed.	但是真正可能给布什带来成功的奇怪因素是，那些先前反对或者仇恨美国在伊拉克存在的势力，例如由伊朗支持的什叶派派别现在似乎想要布什的新战略成功。


They are for it because they believe it will defang Moqtada al-Sadr, the rogue Shi’a cleric whose power has mushroomed over the past three years – to the point that he now dominates much of Baghdad and holds the allegiance of countless angry young Shi’a men.	它们支持这一新战略是因为它将剪除什叶派流氓教士阿萨德的羽翼。 该人的势力在过去三年中膨胀到可以掌控巴格达大部分地区并且拥有无以计数的、愤怒的什叶派年轻人的效忠。


Of course, attacking Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in the name of fighting militia death squads has the potential to draw American military forces into a level of urban warfare unseen since the Falluja assaults of 2004 and 2005.	当然，以同死亡行刑队作战的名义袭击阿萨德的救世主军有可能将美国的军事力量拖入城市巷战之中，其规模是自2004年和2005年法鲁贾战役以来最大的。


Al-Sadr is seen as the protector of the Shi’a of Iraq and has are an estimated 60,000 fighters in his militia.	阿萨德被认为是伊拉克什叶派的保护人，其民兵拥有大约60000名战士。


But he is deeply mistrusted by other Shi’a leaders, who fear that they may one day have to take him on by themselves.	但是，其他什叶派领导人对其深切怀疑，他们害怕总有一天他们自己要对付此人。


Better to let the Americans do it, though of course these Shi’a leaders prefer a slow strangulation of al-Sadr to a direct and bloody assault.	还是让美国人来干掉他，当然，这些什叶派领导人更喜欢慢慢勒死阿萨德，而不是刺刀见红。


But make no mistake: how al-Sadr is handled is the big test of Bush’s new strategy.	但是不要搞错，那就是，如果处理阿萨德是对布什新战略的考验。


Should the US choose to face al-Sadr and his forces head on, they risk alienating Iraq’s largest sectarian community, the Shi’a, adding fuel to the anti-occupation resistance and thus probably dooming Bush to failure.	如果美国选择与阿萨德及其势力正面交火，那么，他们就冒着与伊拉克最大的教派社区，即什叶派分道扬镳的风险，从而给反占领抵抗火上加油，也有可能让布什彻底失败。


Iran and Syria, which have played a spoiler role in Iraq up to now, may also now be anxious to find a way to pull the country back from the brink.	伊朗和叙利亚目前为止在伊拉克扮演了捣蛋的角色，现在它们也可能急于找到途径把这个国家从悬崖边上来回来。


Bush still refuses to talk to either of them, and has lately been having US troops arrest Iranian agents in Iraq.	布什依旧拒绝与它们中的任何一方谈判，最近他还下令美国军队逮捕在伊拉克的伊朗间谍。


Yet Iran may already see itself as victorious, with the current Iraqi government friendlier than any the Iranians have ever known.	但是，鉴于目前的伊拉克政府比伊朗所知道的以往的任何前任政府都要友善，因此伊朗可能已经认为自己获胜了。


So maintaining that government in office has now become a strategic priority for Iran, particularly as it is now clear that any US hopes of using Iraq as a permanent military base are dead.	所以，维持该政府执政是伊朗的一个战略重点，特别是现在已经清除，美国的任何把伊拉克作为永久军事基地的希望已经破灭。


The “surge” also opens, perhaps for the first time, a serious possibility of pouring water on the insurgent fires in Anbar province, the heartland of the Sunni insurgency.	美国的大幅增兵还有可能第一次确实扑灭安巴尔省，即逊尼派叛乱的中心地带的叛乱之火。


The US has achieved relative successes in the province through alliances with Sunni tribes.	美国通过与逊尼派部落结盟已经在该省取得了相对的成功。


The hope is that such realistic and pragmatic accommodations will be extended to Iraqis who are fighting under the banner of a nationalist and anti-occupation agenda.	美国所希望的是，这种现实主义的安抚可以延伸到那些在民族主义和反对占领的旗帜下作战的伊拉克人。


So some of the stars have come into alignment for Bush.	所以，布什可能已经有了某些好运。


But to keep them there in the long term, the Iraqi government will need to amend the constitution in a way that appeases the Sunni community.	但是，要长久保持这些运气，伊拉克政府就需要修改宪法来安抚逊尼派社区。


Reassuring Iraq’s Sunnis that they have a place in the new Iraq will also reassure neighboring Sunni governments, which have mostly turned a blind eye to the support for the insurgency that has come from their lands.	向逊尼派保证说他们将会在新的伊拉克占有一席之地也会让邻近的逊尼派各国政府放心。 这些政府大多数都对从它们境内出发的叛乱支持视而不见。


Of course, should the US see failure ahead, it could seek to broaden the war beyond Iraq’s borders by attacking Iran, a policy reminiscent of “Operation Sideshow,” when US failure in Vietnam in the late 1960’s enticed President Nixon into attacking Cambodia and Laos.	当然，如果美国预见到了失败，它就可能寻求把战争扩大到伊拉克境外来攻击伊朗。 这一政策让人回想起所谓的“余兴行动”，即六十年代末期美国在越南失利，引发尼克松总统下令攻击柬埔寨和老挝。


But Iran has resources that Cambodia and Laos could never muster; indeed, its ability to retaliate could set the entire region ablaze.	但是，伊朗却拥有柬埔寨和老挝所从来没有掌握的资源； 实际上，其报复的能力可以让整个地区陷于火海之中。


Whereas America’s war in Indochina was a tragic mistake, the cost of a wider war precipitated by the crisis in Iraq would be incomparably greater – for both the patient and the doctor.	美国在印度支那的战争是一个悲剧性的灾难，由伊拉克危机所促发的更大范围的战争的代价对于病人和医生而言都将会更为巨大，无可比拟。


An Agenda for Growth in Europe	有关欧洲增长的议程


A recent OECD study reminds us, once again, that per capita income levels are roughly 30% lower in the euro area, as well as in the three largest Continental countries – France, Germany, and Italy – that dominate its performance, than in the United States.	经合组织最近的一项研究提醒我们，欧元区以及统领欧元区经济表现的欧洲大陆最大的三个国家法国、德国和意大利的人均收入水平低于美国大约30％。


That gap is likely to widen as Europe’s demographic profile darkens, and if productivity continues to grow more slowly than elsewhere in the industrial economies.	随着欧洲人口构成恶化，而且如果生产效率与工业化经济体的其他地方相比继续更为缓慢地增长，这一差距有可能扩大。


Why have the large European economies failed to catch up with US income levels?	欧洲经济大国为何没有赶上美国的收入水平？


The bulk of the shortfall is due to less intensive use of labor: employment rates for women and for the oldest and youngest age groups are lower in the euro area than in the US, working hours are far fewer, and, least significantly, unemployment rates are higher.	差距主要是由于劳动力使用不够密集。 欧元区妇女、最大以及最年轻年龄组的就业率要低于美国，工作时间更少，而且更为重要的是，失业率更高。


Some take consolation from this, viewing it as positive that Europeans prefer leisure to work.	有些人从中得到慰藉，认为欧洲人相比工作更喜欢休闲是积极的。


But low levels of labor utilization are largely due to heavier income taxes and social security contributions, as well as high social benefit levels introduced at a time when the labor force was growing rapidly and the need to replace involuntary with voluntary unemployment seemed more urgent than today.	但是，更低水平的劳动力使用主要是由于更高的税负以及缴纳更多的社会保险金，也是由于很高的社会福利水平。 这种高社会福利水平是在劳动力增长迅速、用主动失业替换被动失业的需求比当今更为迫切的时期建立的。


These measures will need to be revisited both to increase the supply of labor and to make public finances more sustainable.	应当重新审视这些措施来提高劳动力的供应以及让公共财政更为可以持久。


This process is already underway, particularly in Italy and France, through cuts in social security contributions for lower-paid workers, tighter conditions for drawing unemployment benefits, and tax credits for “the working poor.”	这一进程已经开始，特别是在意大利和法国。 这一进程通过为低工资工人降低社会保险金、更为严格的提取失业福利条件以及为“工薪穷人”提供税收抵免实现。


Since the mid-1990’s, the relative decline in employment in these countries has, indeed, been slightly reversed.	从二十世纪九十年代以来，这些国家的相对就业率下降确实有所扭转。


But factors beyond taxes and benefits also contribute to low employment rates in all the three major euro-zone economies: high minimum wages and some features of employment protection legislation slow down the flow of workers through the job market.	但是，税收以及福利以外的原因也造成欧元区经济体的三大国的低就业率，也就是较高的最低工资以及就业保护法律的某些特征减缓了工人通过就业市场的流动。


Although a long agenda of reforms is beginning to be tackled, first in Germany and, more recently and cautiously, in France, the results are slow in coming and public understanding of the need for change remains limited.	尽管首先在德国、最近更为谨慎地在法国正在开始处理一长串改革议程，但是成效迟缓，公众对有必要改革的理解也有限。


Much can be learned from each country’s experience and from that of smaller EU member states, but labor market reforms inevitably have a strong national flavor.	可以从每个国家的经历以及欧盟小国中得出经验，但是，劳动力市场的改革不可避免地更有国家特色。


Employment objectives have been formulated for all EU member states since 1997 in the so-called European Employment Strategy (EES), now part of the “Lisbon Agenda,” the set of goals established to boost EU productivity.	1997年制定“里斯本议程”中的欧洲就业战略以来，已经为欧盟的所有国家确定了就业目标。 “里斯本议程”为提高欧洲的生产效率确立了一整套目标。


But, with the policy instruments for achieving these goals largely national and the arguments for applying them simultaneously in several member states weak, the EES has created unrealistic public expectations and triggered only limited action by governments.	但是，由于实现这些目标的政策手段主要集中在各国，而且在数个成员国同时实施这些政策手段的主张微弱，欧洲就业战略已经造成了不切实际的期望。 而各国政府的行动有限。


Nor is the employment gap with the US the only problem for Europe.	与美国之间的就业差距并非欧洲的唯一问题。 每工作小时产量的增长率是人均收入增长的主要因素。


Beginning in the mid-1990’s, the rate of growth in output per hour worked – a key factor behind the rise in per capita income – slowed in most European countries while it rose in the US, reversing a decades-long pattern.	从九十年代中期开始，这一增长率在欧洲大多数国家都有所减缓，而美国则上升，从而逆转了长达十年的模式。 2000年至2004年之间，美国的每小时劳动生产率每年增长2.


Between 2000 and 2004, hourly labor productivity rose more than twice as fast in the US than in the large euro zone economies – 2.8% per year versus little more than 1%.	8％，欧元区经济体略高于1％。 美国的速度要比欧元区快大于两倍。


So why have the Europeans been unable to sustain improvements in both foundations of growth – employment and productivity – at the same time?	那么，为何欧洲无法同时在增长的两大基础、也就是就业和生产效率上维持增长呢？


This proved possible not only in the US, but also in other advanced economies outside Europe – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – and, unsurprisingly, in the new EU member states.	这一点不仅在美国是可能的，而且在欧洲以外的其他发达经济体，例如澳大利亚、加拿大、新西兰以及令人惊讶的欧盟新成员国中都是可能的。


The explanation is not capital spending, which is normally linked to productivity growth.	花费的资本通常与生产效率挂钩，但是并不能以此来解释。


There have been no major differences between the US and the large euro zone economies here.	这样就只能用全要素生产率来解释了。


This leaves the “explanation” to what economists call Total Factor Productivity (TFP), a mix of several important elements, including innovation activity, a well-functioning financial system ready and willing to take risks, and organizational flexibility that facilitates rapid diffusion of new technologies.	所谓全要素生产率，就是几项重要因素的综合，包括创新活动、运转良好的金融体系准备而且愿意承担风险，以及促进新技术快速传播的组织灵活性。


The main lapse in TFP growth in Europe over the past decade has been in services (excluding information and communications technologies).	欧洲过去十年中全要素生产率增长主要落后于服务业（不包括信息以及通讯技术）。


So deregulation and integration of services will be essential if the Euro area’s TFP is to improve, as more than two-thirds of total income in most EU economies is generated in this sector.	所以，欧元区的全要素生产率如果想要改善，解除服务领域管制并且加以联合将是至关重要的，这是因为大多数欧盟国家经济体总收入的三分之二是在这一领域创造的。


While product markets have held center stage in the creation of the single European market, services continue to be fragmented by national regulatory, anti-competitive practices.	尽管产品市场在建立欧洲单一市场中占据中心地位，但是服务业继续由于各国的管制以及反竞争的做法而条块分割。


Much of the explanation lies in the very heterogeneity of services and the greater difficulties that mutual recognition, or the “country-of-origin principle” – essential in the integration of product markets – implies for services.	主要解释在于服务业的多样性，以及相互承认、或者叫做“原产国原则”对服务业的影响，而“原产国原则”在产品市场的联合中至关重要。


Unfortunately, reform was derailed in 2005.	不幸的是，2005年改革受阻。


During the referendum campaign in France preceding the vote on the draft EU Constitutional Treaty, the proposed directive was vilified as undermining the rights of labor, symbolized by that dreaded bogeyman, the “Polish plumber.”	法国欧盟宪法草案全民公决前的运动中，欧盟建议的有关服务业的指令被诬蔑为破坏劳动者权利，而这一指控通过“波兰管道工”吓人的形象体现出来。


These attacks overlooked the fact that the directive makes employment conditions of workers from other EU-member states subject in most respects to host-country rules.	这些攻击忽视了这一事实，也就是这一欧盟指令在大多数情况下将从欧盟其他成员国来的工人的就业条件遵从于东道国的规则。


A revised version of the directive that reduces its sectoral scope and makes a number of compromises with the country-of-origin principle is now before the European Parliament.	现在，这一指令的修正版现在提交给了欧洲议会。 这一版本减少了行业范围并在原产国原则上进行了几项妥协。


Even this limited version would constitute progress; most of the gains arise from removing the red tape that complicates cross-border establishment of small and medium-size service enterprises and limits competition in broad sectors of the economy.	但是即使是这一个有限的版本取得进展，大多数进展还是来自于取消造成跨国界建立中小服务企业困难以及在经济中的广泛领域限制竞争的繁文缛节。


It is a sad reflection on the state of the EU that it seems unable to agree on the one clear productivity-advancing piece of legislation when improving productivity is held out as a shared goal.	尽管改善生产率被称为欧盟的共同目标，但是，它仍旧无法在一项明显提高生产率的法律上达成一致。 这难免不是欧盟处境的悲惨之处。


The failure to mobilize consumer interests in favor of European integration is particularly disappointing for the new member states, which had expected to reap some of the benefits.	欧盟新成员国打算从动员消费者对欧洲联合的兴趣来获得利益。 但是，无法做到这一点对于他们来说特别令人失望。


An Alliance of Civilizations?	文明联盟


MADRID – The first International Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, conceived as an antidote to the idea that the world is doomed to a “clash of civilizations,” recently met in Madrid and revealed that there is more than a grain of truth in Robert Kagan’s idea that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus.	马德里-被认为针对社会注定要产生“文明冲突”的观念的解毒药的首个文明联盟国际论坛最近在马德里召开，揭示出罗伯特·卡根关于美国人来自火星，而欧洲人来自金星的说法其实是很有道理的。


Ever since September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a crusade against the forces of evil in the Muslim world.	自从2001年9月11日以后，美国就一直在针对穆斯林社会的邪恶势力进行一场十字军运动。


By contrast, the March 11, 2004, terrorist attack on Spain, which left 200 dead, triggered an “anti-crusade” that seeks to disarm extremism by building bridges of understanding and reconciliation with Islam.	与之相比，2004年3月11日发生在西班牙造成200人死亡的恐怖袭击引发了尝试通过与伊斯兰建立理解和和解来消除极端主义思想的“反十字军运动”。


Co-sponsored by Spain and Turkey, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative is not devoid of political calculation.	由西班牙和土耳其共同发起的文明联盟倡议并非完全没有政治上的考虑。


To the Spaniards, it helps to justify their abrupt withdrawal from Iraq in 2004; for the Turks, it is yet another vehicle in their struggle, as the vital bridge between Islam and the West, for admission into the European Union.	对于西班牙人来说，它能够帮助表明他们在2004年突然从伊拉克撤军的合理性； 而对土耳其人来说，这是他们作为伊斯兰和西方之间的重要桥梁寻求加入欧盟的另一个手段。


A loose and somewhat confused project, the Alliance of Civilizations aims to heal the wounds of conflict between Islam and the West through education, viable integration policies, and a better-informed dialogue with the media.	作为一项松散并且有些模糊的计划，文明联盟旨在通过教育、可行的融合政策以及与媒体更好的对话来治愈伊斯兰与西方之间的冲突所留下的创伤。


But it suffers from the major global players’ profound skepticism, with the US, Russia, and, for that matter, the EU shown no real enthusiasm for it.	但是它却面临着主要大国极大的怀疑态度，美国、俄罗斯以及在这方面欧盟都很不热心。


However vague, the alliance of civilizations idea certainly cannot do more harm than war against Islamic extremism.	尽管很模糊，但是文明联盟的想法绝对不可能比与伊斯兰极端主义的战争造成更大的危害。


After all, none of the Muslim world’s problems and conflicts with the West are susceptible to a military solution.	不管怎样，任何穆斯林社会的问题以及它与西方社会的冲突都还没有大到需要用武力来解决的程度。


Moreover, the Alliance is not an entirely incoherent proposal if the objective is that the West disengage from the politics of hubris and establish a genuine sphere of cooperation with the Muslim world in economics, culture, and science.	此外，如果它的目标是让西方摆脱政治上的傲慢并且与穆斯林社会建立在经济、文化和科学上真正的合作，那么这个联盟就不能被说成完全是一个没有内聚力的提议。


Of course, the idea is held back by the inner workings of both parts of the proposed alliance.	当然，这种思想受到了提议成立联盟的双方内部力量的阻碍。


Many in the West question whether Islam is compatible with human rights and Western concepts of liberty.	许多西方人质疑伊斯兰是否能包容人权和西方的自由观念。


Many Muslims who have been fighting for years for  their countries’ modernization have so far failed to find a lucid response to the progressive wave of radical Islam.	而许多为他们国家的现代化奋斗了多年的穆斯林迄今并没有能对极端伊斯兰主义高涨的浪潮给出清晰的回答。


To claim that Islam is incompatible with human rights is to consider it a civilization too hidebound to change.	认为伊斯兰无法包容人权等同于认为这是一种十分古板而不会作出改变的文明。


This is a historic fallacy.	这是一个历史性的谬论。


Nor is the claim that Islam is intrinsically inimical to innovation viable, because Muslim civilization has contributed mightily to science and art throughout history.	而那种认为伊斯兰在本质上反对可行的创新的看法同样也是错误的，因为穆斯林文明在历史上为科学和文化作出了巨大的贡献。


Today, Western universities are replete with distinguished Arab scholars in almost every field – the result of a brain drain that itself reflects the Islamic world’s centuries of decline.	今天，在西方国家的大学里随处可见几乎所有领域的杰出的阿拉伯学者，这种人才外流的结果本身反映了伊斯兰社会数个世纪以来的衰微。


In 2005, the 17 countries of the Arab world together produced 13,444 scientific publications, fewer than the 15,455 achieved by Harvard University alone.	2005年，17个阿拉伯国家总共出版了13444部科学著作，比哈佛大学一家出版的15455部还少。


Enemies of reason, however, are also to be found in the West.	但是，理智的敌人同样也存在于西方社会。


We live in an age in which many people are disillusioned with secular politics, and are turning to religion instead, not only throughout the Muslim world, but in the core of Western civilization, Christian Europe and Evangelist America.	我们生活在一个许多人对世俗政治不再抱幻想而转向宗教的时代，这不仅存在于穆斯林社会，而是同样存在于西方文明的中心，也就是信仰基督教的欧洲和信仰福音的美国。


Nor is the Jewish state of Israel, where Messianic fanatics and religious nationalists have embraced a political theology that questions the very legitimacy of the democratic institutions, immune from this phenomenon.	在信仰犹太教的以色列也并非与这种现象绝缘，在那里信仰弥赛亚的狂热分子和宗教民族主义者笃信一种质疑民主制度的合法性的政治神学。


The current crisis of Islam might not be congenital, but Islam’s predicament is acute.	伊斯兰社会目前的危机也许并不是先天性的，但是伊斯兰社会确实面临着巨大的困境。


The question is this: are Muslims ready to accept that Khomeini’s dictum that “Islam is politics or it is nothing” is wrong, that Islam is a religion and not a form of government, and that, as in the Christian world, there is a sphere for Caesar and a sphere for God?	问题是：穆斯林准备好接受霍梅尼关于“伊斯兰就是政治，非此莫属”的格言是错误的，伊斯兰是一种宗教而不是政府的形式，就像在基督教社会，凯撒和上帝能够共存一样。


Those in the Muslim world who want to embrace reform must be driven by the conviction that theocracy has never served as a vehicle for human progress.	那些在穆斯林社会想要进行变革的人必须认识到神权统治从来都不是人类前进的载体。


Of course, the Alliance of Civilizations should not attempt to bridge differences by defending moral relativism.	当然，文明联盟不应该试图通过为道德相对主义作辩护来消除观念上的不同。


If it is driven by a Western guilt complex that assumes that the solution simply lies in greater empathy for the Muslim predicament, then the skeptics are bound to be vindicated.	如果它是受认为解决的办法就在于对穆斯林社会所面临的困境表现出更大的同情的那种西方负罪情结的驱动，那么人们真的应该对此持怀疑态度。


For the Alliance of Civilizations to have any chance of success, the emphasis must be on reciprocity.	如果文明联盟想要取得成功，它关注的焦点必须是互惠。


Tolerance and religious freedom must be mutual.	包容和宗教自由必须是相互的。


Islam’s part in the deal must include a guarantee of human rights and civil liberties, improvement in women’s status, and realistic policies to stem the Islamic world’s demographic explosion.	从伊斯兰这一面来说它应该保证人权和���民自由、提高妇女地位以及采取现实的政策制止伊斯兰社会的人口爆炸问题。


Some, as usual, will claim that the Arab-Israeli conflict lies at the root of the problems that exist between Islam and the West, and that resolving the Palestinians’ plight will contribute immensely to smoother relations.	有些人像往常一样阿拉伯与以色列之间的冲突是伊斯兰与西方社会之间矛盾的根源，而解决了巴勒斯坦的困难就能够大大地促进双方更加和睦的关系。


But Arabs and Muslims must stop deluding themselves that the Israel-Palestine dispute is what is holding them back.	但是阿拉伯人和穆斯林不能再自欺欺人地认为以色列与巴勒斯坦之间的冲突是阻碍他们前进的根本原因。


Ending the American occupation in Iraq and imposing an Arab-Israeli peace would help, but they are no panacea.	结束美国在伊拉克的占领以及推动阿拉伯与以色列之间的和平会对此有所帮助，但是它们并不是灵丹妙药。


The fight to eradicate misery, illiteracy, and corruption, and Islam’s embrace of science, do not depend on the results of the Middle East peace process.	消除贫困、文盲和腐败现象的斗争以及伊斯兰社会对科学的推崇并不依赖于中东和平进程的结果。


An Alliance of Equals	平等的联盟


PARIS – During NATO’s recent 60th anniversary ceremony in Strasbourg, the Alliance welcomed two new members, Albania and Croatia, bringing its total membership to 28.	巴黎——正值北约在斯特拉斯堡庆祝其成立60周年之际，又迎来了新的两个成员国：阿尔巴尼亚和克罗地亚。


This expansion is a good thing, for history has tormented these two countries.	至此，北约的成员国增加到28个。 此次北约扩张是一件好的事情。


Being welcomed within the great international family of the West will reassure them, stabilize them, and contribute to their political, cultural, and economic development.	从历史来看，这两个国家饱受磨难。 加入西方大家庭的怀抱之后，对这两个 国家的政治经济和文化的稳定平和发展都有好处。


But the good news was limited, because NATO addressed only a routine agenda.	但现在看来好处也是有限的。 北约只是在走一个常规的流程。


No core problem was really tackled.	并没有什么实质性的改变。


The controversy that arose in France over the country’s return to NATO’s unified military command makes this abundantly clear.	随着法国有争议地重新回到北约的军事体系之下，问题就显得更为清楚。


Was France losing its autonomy, perhaps even its sovereignty?	法国是否失去了自治的权利？ 甚至说是丧失了主权？


Was it capitulating to American hegemony?	还是向是美国霸权缴械投降？


These are real questions, yet at the NATO summit people spoke of them more in terms of symbols than as realities.	，在此次的北约峰会上，这些真正的问题并没有解决，大家的讨论象征的意义大于实际的解决。


But what is the reality here?	这么说的现实究竟是什么呢？


NATO is a military alliance composed of 28 countries.	北约是由28个国家组成的军事联盟。


One of them, the United States, has a military budget that is more than three times that of all the other members combined.	作为成员国之一的美国，它每年军费预算比其他所有的成员国加起来三倍还多。


Hence, the US runs most NATO civilian and military commands with the consent of the others.	所以说，美国实际上执行了北约大部分军事和民用的命令。


Of course, there is a collective consultation and deliberative process that enables any member to be heard.	当然，从程序上来说，北约的决议都是经过成员国知晓并讨论后作出的。


But in reality a member’s actual power is what affects common decisions.	但实际上美国是对所有的决定有着特殊的影响力。


This structure harks back to the conditions of NATO’s birth, when it was forged to thwart the Soviet threat to Western civilization.	这样的组成结构当然有其历史的背景，北约是作为抵抗前苏联对西方文明的入侵而建立的。


At the time, no one ever doubted that American power – already endowed with nuclear weapons – was the only counterpart.	当时，没有人质疑作为西方核大国的美国应该是苏联的唯一对手。


For this reason, the US came to preside over the alliance.	也正因为此，美国掌控着整个联盟。


During the 41 years of the Cold War, 14 of NATO’s 16 members strictly obeyed and complied with American decisions and policies.	在成立之后41年的冷战时期，当时16个成员国中的14个都严格执行着美国的政策和命令。


French President Charles de Gaulle was the only one to question whether an American president would actually ever be ready to launch a nuclear attack on the USSR in order to protect one or several Alliance members if vital US interests were not directly at stake.	唯一例外的是法国总统戴高乐，他质询如果没有涉及到美国本国的利益情况下，其他成员国受到苏联的攻击，美国是否会对苏联进行核打击。


Based on that doubt, France – a nuclear power since 1960 – withdrew in 1966 from the Alliance’s permanent centralized military command in order to assert its own deterrent capability.	正基于此疑问，为了维护自身的主权安全，法国在1966年退出了北约的军事体系（法国1960年成为有核国家）。


This decision was mainly grounded on the American doctrine, adopted in 1962, of “flexible response,” which said to the Soviets: “As long as you do not use nuclear weapons, we will not use them, either.”	此项决定是在美国1962推出所谓“灵活应对”的法令后而做出的。 灵活应对的含义是“只要苏联不对美国实施核打击，美国也不会使用核武器。


This very doctrine left Europe exposed.	”这样来看的话，欧洲的安全利益就被出卖了。


Indeed, while it is a much disputed question, de Gaulle was probably right about America’s lack of commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe.	虽然戴高乐此项的决定值得推敲，但在美国并没有对欧洲进行核保护的大背景下，这个决定也许是正确的。


Both Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara left office admitting that de Gaulle had been correct.	亨利·基辛格和罗伯特·麦克纳马拉在卸任后都坦承说戴高乐是对的。


Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s insights left a legacy that still causes some mistrust and dissent within NATO.	不过怎么说，法国的退出导致了北约内部的一些不信任感。


France was right on this key strategic point, but it was never able to explain its position to its allies.	法国在战略上是对的，但对北约来说并不是一件好的事情


This inability to discuss, clearly and forthrightly, this strategic doctrine continues to hamper the Alliance.	有关法国退出北约而产生的不稳定问题，已经有过广泛而深入的讨论。


At the Strasbourg summit, confidence in the future could have been strengthened if a couple of troubling issues had been discussed.	战略上的条例仍然阻碍着北约的发展。 在此次斯特拉斯堡会议上，如果讨论有关北约未来的一些问题，北约的前途才有希望。


Instead, once again, there was an extended focus on the past.	但事实却是，会议上更多的是对过去问题的纠缠。


The key questions are whether NATO’s doctrine of common defense is currently directed at one country in particular, and whether nuclear force remains the Alliance’s major defensive tool.	问题的核心是北约的共同防御的法令是否还应该由一个国家说了算，核武器是否还是北约重要的防范手段。


In the current global situation, no predictable conflict will require the use of a nuclear weapon.	从目前的现实来看，核武器在未来的冲突中不可能使用。


At the moment, there is no global threat and the Alliance only intervenes in regional conflicts, so why not have NATO admit this?	目前世界性的威胁不复存在，地区的冲突才是问题的核心，北约为什么不能正视这个现实呢？


But the most important matter that went unmentioned in Strasbourg is the relationship with Russia.	在此次会议上，最重要的问题并没有被讨论，那就是北约和俄罗斯的关系问题。


NATO was founded to confront the threat that the USSR represented 60 years ago.	北约是60年前为了抵抗苏联而成立的。


But the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s “anti-NATO” alliance of socialist countries, was dissolved in 1991; communism imploded the same year, with Russia caught ever since in a struggle to build a market economy and define a new global position for itself.	作为苏联对抗北约的社会主义军事联盟“华沙条约组织”早在1991年就已经解散。 以此同时，共产政权也土崩瓦解，俄罗斯开始拥抱市场经济，并开始重新寻找自己的定位。


At a time when Russia was taking a more pacific course, NATO – unlike the Warsaw Pact – was not dismantled.	随着俄罗斯和平的对外战略，北约并没有象华约那样解散。


On the contrary, the Allies chose to maintain the pact and to extend it to numerous Russian neighbors.	相反的，北约反而向俄罗斯的邻国进行扩张。


NATO’s members essentially said: “We Western nations do not trust you. Even if you become a democracy, we will always be suspicious.”	北约成员国的基本理念是：“我们西方社会并不信任你，即使你成为一个民主国家，我们还是保持一贯的怀疑。


George Kennan, one of the greatest American diplomats of the post-war years, once wrote that the Western world was committing its biggest mistake in 50 years time by expanding NATO after Soviet communism collapsed.	作为二战后最伟大的美国外交官之一的乔治·凯南曾经写道,西方社会在50年来犯得最大的一个错误就是，在前苏联共产政权倒台之后，北约还继续东扩。


The resulting humiliation and blatant mistrust that Russia’s elite has felt ever since has led them to their current policy of rearmament.	结果就是俄罗斯精英阶层深受打击和感到羞辱，从而走向目前继续扩充军备的政策。


The only way to resolve this problem is for NATO to assert its pacific intentions before the world.	如果要想解决这个问题，北约应该在全世界面前作出和平的姿态。


The most convincing way to do that is to moderate America’s excessive taste for power, which it demonstrated in Iraq.	如果要有所表示的话，美国应该抑制自己过分的权力，美国在伊拉克问题上的处理就是过分的表现例子。


NATO needs to shift its focus from organizing and administering a unified military command to building real confidence that every member’s voice will be heard.	美国应该抛弃过去那种军事上的独裁，转向应对各个成员国的表示个体的尊重。


To that end, all members must stand on an equal footing.	最终来说，所有的成员国都应该平等地被对待。


France’s decision to return to full and equal Alliance membership was a good one, and France must now work from within to advance the principles in which it believes.	法国重新返回北约就是一个好的信号，法国还应该一直为自己一贯坚守的原则而努力。


Avoiding a New American Recession	避免美国新衰退


CAMBRIDGE – The United States may be headed for a recession in 2013.	美国剑桥—美国可能在2013年步入衰退。


Even if the country avoids going over the “fiscal cliff,” a poorly designed political compromise that cuts the deficit too quickly could push an already weak economy into recession.	即使可以避免坠下“财政悬崖”，过快削减赤字的拙劣政治妥协也可能将已然相当疲软的经济拖入衰退。


But a gradual phase-in of an overall cap on tax deductions and exclusions (so-called tax expenditures), combined with reform of entitlement spending, could achieve the long-run fiscal consolidation that America needs without risking a new recession.	但逐渐实施的税收减免总额上限（所谓的税收支出）可以和福利支出改革一起构成美国所需要的能够避免再次衰退的财政整合方案。


The US economy has been limping along with a growth rate of less than 2% during the past year, with similarly dim prospects in 2013, even without the shock of the fiscal cliff.  That is much too weak a pace of expansion to tolerate the fiscal cliff’s increase in tax rates and spending cuts, which would reduce demand by a total of $600 billion – about 4% of GDP – next year, and by larger sums in subsequent years.	去年，美国经济以低于2%的增速蹒跚前行，2013年的前景也一样暗淡，即便没有财政悬崖冲击也是如此。 这样的扩张速度太慢，不能抵消财政悬崖所带来的税率提高和支出削减，后两者将让明年总需求下降6 000亿美元（约为GDP的4%），后年更甚。


President Barack Obama’s proposed alternative to the fiscal cliff would substantially increase tax rates and limit tax deductions for the top 2% of earners, who now pay more than 45% of total federal personal-income taxes.	奥巴马总统的财政悬崖替代方案将大幅提高薪酬最高的2%人群的税率，限制他们的税收减免优惠，如今，该群体贡献了联邦个人所得税总量的45%以上。


His budget would also increase taxes on corporations, and would end the current payroll-tax “holiday,” imposing an additional 2% tax on all wage earners.	他的预算还将增加公司税，结束当前的工资税“豁免期”，这意味着对所有工薪族增加2%的税收。


Together, these changes could lower total demand by nearly 2% of GDP.	这些变化加起来将拉低相当于约GDP的2%的总需求。


And the higher marginal tax rates would reduce incentives to work and to invest, further impeding economic activity.	更高的边际税率将遏制工作和投资的激励，进一步拖累经济活动。


All of that could be fateful for an economy that is still struggling to sustain a growth rate of less than 2%.	这对于一个仍在挣扎着维持不到2%的增长率的经济来说是致命的。


The Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve predict that going over the fiscal cliff would cause a recession in 2013, with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke recently saying that the Fed would be unable to offset the adverse effect on the economy.	国会预算办公室和美联储预计跌下财政悬崖将在2013年导致衰退，美联储伯南克最近宣称，美联储无法冲销经济所受到的消极效应。


He could have said the same thing about the fiscal drag that would be created by Obama’s budget proposal.	对于奥巴马的预算方案所造成的财政拖累，伯南克也许也会这样说。


Although Congressional Republicans rightly object to raising tax rates, they appear willing to raise revenue through tax reform if that is part of a deal that also includes reductions in the long-run cost of the major entitlement programs, Medicare and Social Security.	尽管国会中的共和党正确地对提高税率表示反对，但他们似乎愿意通过税收改革提高收入，如果这是包括了削减主要福利项目——联邦医保和社会保障的长期成本的方案的一部分的话。


Although some Republicans would like to see revenue increased only by stimulating faster economic growth, that cannot be achieved without the reductions in marginal tax rates and improvements in corporate taxation that the Democrats are unlikely to accept.	尽管一些共和党只愿意看到由刺激经济更快增长带来的收入增加，但这一目标无法达到，如果边际税率不降而民主党不可能接受的公司税改革不实施的话。


Raising revenue through tax reform will have to mean reducing the special deductions and exclusions that now lower tax receipts.	通过税收改革增加收入将意味着减少特别税收减免项目，目前，这些项目一致了税收收入。


The potential recession risk of a budget deal can be avoided by phasing in the base-broadening that is used to raise revenue.	预算方案的潜在衰退风险可以通过逐步采取扩大税基增加收入的办法避免。


A desirable way to broaden the tax base would be to put an overall cap on the amount of tax reduction that each taxpayer can achieve through deductions and exclusions.	扩大税基的合理方法可以是对每位纳税人可以通过税收减免优惠获得的减税总额加以限制。


Such an overall cap would allow each taxpayer to retain all of his existing deductions and exclusions but would limit the amount by which he could reduce his tax liability in this way.	总额限制允许每位纳税人继续获得所有已有的税收减免优惠，但限制了他可以通过这一方法削减的税收负担规模。


An overall cap would also cause many individuals who now itemize deductions to shift to the standard deduction – implying significant simplification in record-keeping and thus an improvement in incentives.	总额限制也将促使大量目前采用逐条列举扣的个人转向标准扣除——这意味着极大地简化税收登记，从而是激励方面的改善。


A cap on the tax reductions derived from tax expenditures that is equal to 2% of each individual’s adjusted gross income would raise more than $200 billion in 2013 if applied to all of the current deductions and to the exclusions for municipal-bond interest and employer-paid health insurance.	为源自税收支出（相当于每位个人经调整的毛收入的2%）的税收削减施加上限将在2013年筹集2 000亿美元，如果被应用于当前所有针对市政债券利息和雇主支付健康保险等税收减免项目的话。


Even if the full deduction for charitable gifts is preserved and only high-value health insurance is regarded as a tax expenditure, the extra revenue in 2013 would be about $150 billion.	即使针对慈善的减税优惠被我安全保留，只将高价值健康保险视为税收支出，2013年的额外收入仍将达到1 500亿美元。


Over a decade, that implies nearly $2 trillion in additional revenue without any increase in tax rates from today’s levels.	十年后，该方案意味着不在当前基础提高税率的情况下增加2万亿美元的收入。


Extra revenue of $150 billion in 2013 would be 1% of GDP, and could be too much for the economy to swallow, particularly if combined with reductions in government spending and a rise in the payroll tax.	2013年的1 500亿美元额外收入将相当于GDP的1%，美国经济还吞不下如此巨额的数量，特别是如果还要加上政府支出削减和工资税增加的话。


But the same basic framework could be used by starting with a higher cap and gradually reducing it over several years.	但相同的基本框架可以通过设置更高的起始限制并在多年内逐渐调低实现。


A 5% cap on the tax-expenditure benefits would raise only $75 billion in 2013, about 0.5% of GDP; but the cap could be reduced from 5% to 2% over the next few years, raising substantially more revenue when the economy is stronger.	5%的收入支出收益限制将在2013年形成750亿美元的额外收入，约相当于GDP的1%； 但该限制可以在未来几年里降至2%，在经济更加坚挺时形成多得多的收入。


Slowing the growth of government spending for Medicare and Social Security is necessary to prevent a long-term explosion of the national debt or dramatic increases in personal tax rates.	减缓政府在联邦医保和社会保障方面的支出是避免国民债务长期爆发和大规模个人税率提高之所必须。


Those changes should also be phased in gradually to protect beneficiaries and avoid an economic downturn.	这些变革也应该逐渐地实施，以保护受益者、避免经济衰退。


America’s national debt has more than doubled in the past five years, and is set to rise to more than 100% of GDP over the next decade unless changes in spending and taxes are implemented.	美国的国民债务水平在过去五年里翻了一倍，除非支出和税收的变革得到实施，否则必将在未来十年中突破GDP的100%。


A well-designed combination of caps to limit tax expenditures and a gradual slowing of growth in outlays for entitlement programs could reverse the rise in the debt and strengthen the US economy.	精心设计的税收支出上限和福利项目支出增长逐渐放缓的组合可以扭转债务上升的趋势，强化美国经济。


America’s current budget negotiations should focus on achieving a credible long-term decline in the national debt, while protecting economic expansion in the near term.	美国的当前预算谈判应该集中于达成可信的国民债务长期削减方案，同时保护短期经济扩张势头。


An Arab “Third Way”	阿拉伯的“第三条路”


AMMAN – Throughout the post-colonial period, Arab countries have consistently failed to produce an efficient – let alone democratic – system of government.	安曼—在整个后殖民地时期，阿拉伯国家一直没能建立起有效的——更不用说民主的——政府制度。


Now, after a half-century of competition between military or royal dictatorships and militant Islamist regimes, many Arabs are again seeking a “third way” – a path toward a credible form of representative democracy.	如今在经历了半个世纪的军事或皇室独裁与军事伊斯兰教政权的竞争后，许多阿拉伯人开始再次寻找“第三条路”——通向可信的代议制民主的道路。


But will their efforts prove as futile now as they have in the past?	但是，他们今天的努力回合过去一样以失败收场吗？


The Middle East – named for its geographic position between Europe and East Asia – was under Ottoman rule for 400 years before the Allied powers, after defeating the Ottomans in World War I, partitioned the region into distinct political units that, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, fell within spheres of influence carved out by the United Kingdom and France.	中东——这个名字来源于它夹在欧洲和东亚中间的地理位置——曾归属奥斯曼土耳其帝国统治400年，随后，奥斯曼帝国在一战中被协约国打败，中东也根据赛克斯-皮科协定（Sykes-Picot Agreement）分裂为不同的政治单元，归属英国或法国的势力范围。


But, in response to these new divisions, an Arab awakening – shaped by pan-Arabism and support for Palestine – was occurring.	但是，随着新分裂局面出现的是阿拉伯的觉醒——源自对巴勒斯坦的泛阿拉伯支持。


Charismatic young military rulers-turned-dictators like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Syria’s Hafez al-Assad used these popular causes to win public support.	天赋异禀的年轻军事执政者——比如埃及的纳赛尔、伊拉克的萨达姆·侯赛因、利比亚的卡扎菲、也门的萨利赫和叙利亚的哈菲兹·阿萨德——利用这一民意赢得公众支持，由执政者转身成为独裁者。


But their failure to deliver better lives to their citizens, together with the discrediting of left-wing ideologies following the Soviet Union’s collapse, fueled the rise of a rival movement: political Islam.	但他们没能给人民带来更好的生活，加上左翼思想因为苏联解体而失去信誉，于是产生了敌对运动——政治伊斯兰教。


The Muslim Brotherhood – established in the Egyptian town of Ismailia in 1928 and political Islam’s oldest, best organized, and most widespread proponent – was (and is) despised by both secular Arabs and Arab monarchies.	1928年成立于埃及小城伊斯梅里亚的穆斯林兄弟会是伊斯兰教最老牌、组织最好、影响最广的政治伊斯兰教支持者，它曾（现在仍然如此）受到世俗阿拉伯人和阿拉伯君主的蔑视。


Indeed, secular dictators have worked to suppress the Brothers at every turn – often violently, as when Assad ruthlessly crushed a Brotherhood-led uprising in Hama in 1982.	事实上，世俗独裁者在每一个转折点上都对穆兄会实施了镇压——通常是暴力镇压，如1982年阿萨德残忍地粉碎了穆兄会领导的哈马（Hama）起义。


Forced to operate clandestinely, the Brotherhood built its support base with a social agenda that targeted the needs of the poor, while consistently reinforcing its Islamic ties, even using the compulsory zakat (annual financial contribution to religious causes) to build up its social network.	被迫转入地下的穆兄会通过定位于穷人需求的社会日程赢得了支持，同时它也在不断加强其伊斯兰教关系，不惜通过强制性的“天课”（每年向宗教事务的财务捐赠）建立起社会网络。


The Brothers, with the help of a conservative society and the mosques, were prepared to seize power whenever the opportunity arose.	穆兄会在保守社会和清真寺的帮助下做好了一有机会就夺取权力的准备。


Another Islamist movement, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, almost had such an opportunity in 1991, when it won the first round of a general election.	另一个伊斯兰教运动——阿尔及利亚的伊斯兰拯救阵线在1991年几乎迎来了这样一次机会。 它赢得了第一轮大选。


But the military prevented its victory by canceling the second round, triggering a brutal eight-year civil war in which an estimated 200,000 people died.	但军队取消了第二轮大选，从而阻止了它获得胜利，并引发了一场为时八年的内战，约20万人因此丧生。


Palestine’s Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, succeeded at the ballot box in 2006, but has since failed to deliver credible governance.	巴勒斯坦的哈马斯也属于穆兄会的分支，它成功地在2006年选战中胜出，但此后并未交出令人信服的治理成绩。


Then the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, creating new opportunities for political renewal.	接着便是2011年阿拉伯之春的爆发，这创造了政治革新的新机会。


Within months, Islamist parties shaped by the Brotherhood’s ideology had replaced secular dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, and seemed poised to take over Yemen and Syria, largely because they were the only well-organized political movements on the scene.	在几个月内，以穆兄会思想武装起来的伊斯兰政党就颠覆了突尼斯和埃及的世俗独裁者，并骎骎然大有接管也门和叙利亚之势，这主要是因为它们是革命中唯一的组织良好的政治运动。


Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood gained control of Egypt, the largest and most influential of the Arab Spring countries.	此外，穆斯林兄弟会还赢得了阿拉伯之春中最大、最有影响力的国家——埃及的控制权。


But their exclusive, rigid ideology was poorly suited to governing such a large and diverse country.	但它们排他性的僵化意识形态并不适合治理如此庞大而多样化的国家。


As a result, after only a year in power, the military – backed by the same secular, liberal young people who had opposed it in 2011 – drove President Mohamed Morsi out of power.	结果，在掌权仅仅一年后，军队旧推翻了总统穆尔西，而支持军队的正是在2011年揭竿而起的世俗自由主义年轻人。


Unable to mount a political alternative, however, the protesters’ rejection of the Islamist government served only to put the army back in charge.	但是，由于无法给出政治替代方案，示威者的拒绝伊斯兰政府最终导致军队重新回到了权力中心。


Some argue that the absence of a secular liberal option in Arab politics stems from fear of political Islam.	有人指出，阿拉伯政治之所以缺乏世俗自由主义的选择，是因为害怕政治伊斯兰教。


For decades, Western powers backed military regimes in the Arab world, willingly ignoring their systematic repression of democratic movements and rights, in order to ensure that Islamists did not gain power.	几十年来，西方列强一直支持着阿拉伯世界的军事统治，有意忽略它们对民主运动和权利的系统性镇压，以确保伊斯兰教不会赢得权力。


Now that both the military- and Islamist-led systems have been discredited, an ideological vacuum has appeared in Arab politics.	如今，军队领导和伊斯兰教领导的制度都已经信誉扫地，阿拉伯政坛出现了意思形态真空。


But Arabs today – most of whom are under the age of 30 – are less interested in an overarching political ideology than they are in an efficient representative government that implements sound policies aimed at creating jobs and bolstering economic growth.	但今天的阿拉伯人——大部分不到三十岁——对占支配地位的政治意思形态不感兴趣，他们更愿意接受能实施旨在创造就业、提振经济增长的可靠政策的高效代议制政府。


In short, they want a government that is focused on improving citizens’ lives.	简言之，他们希望政府专注于改善人民的生活。


In fact, the absence of a specific ideology was essential to the Arab Spring’s initial success in Egypt and Tunisia, for it allowed a large number of young activists to forge loose alliances.	事实上，具体意识形态的缺失乃是起初阿拉伯之春在埃及和突尼斯取得成功的根本原因，因为它使大量年轻活跃分子能够结成松散的同盟。


But mass movements can take a country only so far; establishing a credible representative government requires political parties organized around clearly defined principles.	但群众运动充其量也只能将一国推动到这一步，建立可信的代议制政府要求围绕明确指导原则组织起来的政党。


While the Muslim Brotherhood has such an organizing principle, its internal rigidity – at least with Morsi at its helm – made it unfit to govern.	穆斯林兄弟会具备这一组织原则，但其内在顽固性——至少从其舵手穆尔西身上看来——决定了它不适合执政。


Meanwhile, infighting among Egypt’s liberals prevented them from establishing a disciplined, reliable alternative to the Brotherhood based on principles like diversity, plurality, respect for women, and freedom of expression.	与此同时，埃及自由派之间的内斗也决定了他们无法形成建立在多样性、多数支持、尊重女性和言论自由等原则基础上的有纪律的、可靠的穆兄会替代品。


So when the Islamist government’s credibility collapsed, the military was Egypt’s only remaining option.	因此，当伊斯兰政府信誉扫地时，军队成了埃及唯一的选择。


In order to make progress, the youth-led movements that drove the Arab Spring must translate their shared principles into effective political structures, and choose leaders who are capable of placing the search for consensus ahead of personal ambition.	为了取得进展，推动了阿拉伯之春的年轻人领导的运动必须让他们的共同原则转化为有效的政治结构，并选出有能力将寻找共识置于个人野心之前的领导人。


If they succeed, the Arab world may finally have an alternative to rule by generals or mullahs.	如果他们获得了成功，那么阿拉伯世界或许最终能够找出将军或毛拉统治的替代方案。


Even if they fail to gain power, the emergence of such an alternative would surely influence the Arab world’s agenda for years to come.	即使他们没能赢得权力，如此替代方案的出现也必将影响阿拉伯世界未来多年的日程。


An American Oil Spill	一场有美国特色的石油泄漏


SINGAPORE – When accidents happen, there is always enough blame to go around, and with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, no one has been spared – with the exception of one of the main culprits, the American public.	发自新加坡——每当事故发生之时，总会有一大堆指责满天飞，而当墨西哥湾深海地平线号钻井平台发生漏油事故之后，自然也没人能置身事外——除了其中一个首犯，那就是美国公众。