A West African country with newly discovered oil reserves needs to finance exploration, drilling, and pipeline construction, which means that it needs to hedge at a time horizon of 10-20 years, not 90 days.	发现了新石油储量的西非国家需要为开采、钻进和管道建设融资，这意味着它的对冲期长达10—20年，而不是区区90天。


Another disadvantage of derivatives is that they require a high degree of sophistication –both technical and political.	衍生品的另一大劣势是其操作需要高超的技术和政治技巧。


In the event of an increase in a commodity’s price, a finance minister who has done a perfect job of hedging export-price risk on the futures market will suddenly find himself accused of having gambled away the national patrimony.	如果商品价格上涨，在利用期货市场进行出口价格对冲方面做得很好的财政部长会猛然发现自己正在受千夫所指，说他败光了国家财产。


This principal-agent problem is much diminished in the case of commodity bonds.	这一委托-代理问题可以通过商品债券得到彻底解决。


If the international financial wizards can get together and act on this idea now, commodity exporters might be able to avoid calamity the next time the world price of their product takes a plunge.	如果国际金融天才们能够团结起来马上将这一思想付诸实践，商品出口国就能在其商品的全球价格出现又一次崩盘时免于陷入灾难。


The World Bank should take up the cause.	世界银行应该承担起责任来。


Barroso Overboard?	抛弃巴罗索吗？


BRUSSELS – It is time for José Manuel Barroso to start selling himself.	布鲁塞尔--现在巴罗索应该推销自己了。


His chances of being re-appointed as President of the European Commission depend on the case he makes.	他能否再度被任命为欧盟委员会主席取决于他所提供的理由。


Until the global financial crisis broke, Barroso looked fairly certain to get a second five-year term.	在全球金融危机爆发以前，巴罗索看起来很有可能得到第二个五年任期。


Now, it is becoming increasingly hard to find diplomats or policymakers who support him.	现在越发难以找到支持他的外交官或者决策者了。


French President Nicolas Sarkozy is said to have been disappointed by Barroso’s performance during last autumn's financial meltdown, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel also seems to have fallen silent on the matter of his future.	法国总统萨尔科奇据说对巴罗索在去年秋天金融系统崩溃中的表现感到失望，而德国总理默克尔也对他的前途开始沉默了。


No one doubts that Barroso is in an awkward position.	没有人怀疑巴罗索处在一个尴尬的境地。


The European Commission has few powers of its own with which to confront the recession as it spreads throughout the European Union; most powers belong to the European Central Bank.	欧盟委员会自己没有什么权力在衰退席卷欧盟的时候进行应对，大多数权力属于欧洲中央银行。


But the Commission does have a voice with which to rally people, and it is for their silence that Barroso and his fellow commissioners are being rebuked.	但是委员会确实可以发出声音来团结民众，而正式由于它默不作声才使得巴罗索及其委员们受到批评。


The perceived lack of leadership from the Commission at this time of deepening economic gloom is just the tip of the iceberg.	在这一不断深化的经济不景气背景下，欧盟委员会被人视为缺乏领导能力仅仅是冰山的一角。


The events of recent months have crystallized more deep-seated concerns.	最近几个月来的事件表明了更多深刻的担忧。


When Barroso, the former Portuguese prime minister, was awarded the EU post by his fellow heads of government, he appeared to be a dynamic new broom who would sweep away the cobwebs left by his predecessor, Italy’s Romano Prodi.	当葡萄牙前总理巴罗索被各国首脑推举为主席的时候，他好像是一个充满动力的扫把，要清除他的前任、意大利普罗迪遗留下来的烂摊子。


But, with the passage of time, the Barroso-led Commission has also come under fire for being unadventurous and lacklustre.	但是随着时间的推移，巴罗索领导的欧盟委员会由于缺乏勇气和魄力而受到指责。


Even before the clouds of recession began to gather, Euroskepticism was on the rise, with the Commission blamed, rightly or wrongly, for the EU’s failure “to reach out to the citizen.”	即使在衰退的阴云开始聚集之前，欧洲怀疑派就在上升，而欧盟委员会被人指责未能贴近群众。


The job of Commission President is arguably among the most difficult in the world.	欧盟委员会主席是世界上最难当的。


The institution has been in near-imperceptible decline for almost 20 years, thanks to the rise of the European Parliament and the way EU member governments have whittled away its authority while consolidating their own powers as the EU’s true legislators.	由于欧洲议会地位的上升以及欧盟各国政府在巩固自身作为欧盟实际立法者权力并且削弱委员会势力，欧盟委员会几乎以难以察觉地衰落已经将近二十年了。


Yet the head of the Commission is called upon to be the dynamic public face of Europe.	然而委员会主席却被要求成为欧洲积极有力的公共形象。


The Commission’s own internal culture of cautiousness and red tape is a constraint that nobody in Brussels much likes to talk about.	委员会自身谨小慎微和官僚的内部文化也是一种限制，布鲁塞尔没有人愿意多谈。


It is not a structure that is conducive to political coups de theâtre , and most of the Commission’s work is the relentless grind of EU regulation and re-regulation.	这一结构并不有利于政治成就，而且委员会的大多数工作就是没完没了的制定欧盟法规以及重新制定法规。


But the bottom line is that at a time when everyone is asking, “What is Europe doing?”, the Commission’s responses have seemed inadequate.	但是基本问题就是，当每个人都在问“欧洲在忙些什么”的时候，委员会的反应似乎不够。


For reasons that are now obscure, there is an unwritten rule that Commission presidents must be drawn from the ranks of past or current prime ministers.	由于并不明显的原因，委员会主席必须从现任或者前任总理之中产生，这已经成为不定之规。


This has in large part accounted for Barroso’s high hopes of getting a second term.	这也是巴罗索很有希望获得第二个任期的原因。


There was, it appeared, no other credible candidate to challenge him.	好像没有其他可靠的候选人对他提出挑战。


For his part, Barroso is widely seen as having avoided controversy throughout 2008 in order not to risk offending any governments that might have been inclined to block his reappointment.	在巴罗索自己这方面，他好像在2008年避免了争议，从而不冒犯任何一个国家政府以便不阻挠他的连任。


That seeming passivity is now his greatest problem.	这一看似不思进取现在成了他最大的问题。


France’s presidency of the EU during the second half of 2008 showed that dynamic leadership is a quality widely appreciated by the European public.	2008年法国担任欧盟的轮值主席表明，充满动力的领导是欧洲公众所广泛欣赏的素质。


With his sense of showmanship, Sarkozy almost effortlessly eclipsed Barroso when handling the Russia-Georgia crisis in August, followed by the EU’s responses to the autumn crisis of cascading bank collapses.	萨尔科奇具有作秀意识，在八月份处理俄国和格鲁吉亚危机以及欧盟应付随后在秋天银行接二连三的倒闭危机中几乎毫不费力地压过了巴罗索。


The Commission was left on the sidelines.	欧盟委员会靠边站了。


What is to be done?	需要做什么工作呢？


France’s successful presidency has intensified doubts about the effectiveness of the Commission and its president, so much so that even in Paris concerns are being voiced that the Brussels executive must somehow be strengthened if it is not to become a mere secretariat.	法国成功地担任欧盟主席国加剧了对欧盟委员会及其主席有效性的怀疑，以至于甚至在巴黎人们表达出担忧，也就是布鲁塞尔的这一行政机关必须予以加强，否则将会沦为一个秘书处而已。


EU governments have wanted a pliable Commission, but now the cost could be the death of the “community method” that protects the EU against national frictions.	欧盟各国政府一直想要一个圆滑的委员会，但是现在的代价就是保护欧盟不受民族摩擦的“共同体方式”的灭亡。


Barroso needs to respond to all these doubts.	巴罗索需要对这些怀疑做出反应。


If he is to reassure EU national leaders that they should re-appoint him, then he needs to signal that his second term can hold out fresh promise.	如果他要向欧盟各国领导人保证他们应该重新任命他的话，那么他就需要表明他的第二个任期会给人以新的希望。


He is good at giving upbeat speeches, but this will not be enough.	他善于做出激动人心的演说，但是这还不够。


Some sort of plan is needed.	还需要有某种计划。


When he arrived in Brussels in 2004, Barroso was repeatedly asked whether he had a “big idea” for Europe’s future.	当巴罗索在2004年上任的时候，人们一再询问他是否对欧洲未来有雄伟规划。


Back then, he did not need one to be appointed.	那时候，他不需要有人感到失望。


This time, he must produce one if he is to save his skin.	这一次，如果他还想要保住职位的话���他就要讲出来。


Restructuring Debt Restructuring	重组债务重组


BERKELEY – Sometimes the worst intentions yield the best results.	伯克利—有时，坏心也能办成好事。


So it is, unexpectedly, with Argentine debt.	阿根廷债务问题就出人意料地产生了这样的结果。


The story begins with Argentina’s financial crisis in 2001-2002.	故事从2001—2002年阿根廷金融危机开始。


There is no question that the crisis left the country unable to service its debts.	毫无疑问，这场危机导致阿根廷无力偿还债务。


But Argentina made no friends by waiting four years to negotiate with its creditors and then offering settlement terms that were stingy by the standards of previous debt restructurings.	但阿根廷花了四年时间与债权人谈判，并提出了比不上此前债务重组标准的和解条件，结果以失败告终。


Still, the terms were acceptable to the vast majority of the country’s creditors, who exchanged their old claims for new ones worth 30 cents on the dollar.	不过，对于绝大部分阿根廷债券人来说，条件是可以接受的，他们可以打三折后将旧债券换成新债券。


All, that is, except for a few holdouts who bought up the remaining bonds on the cheap and went to court, specifically to the US District Court of the Southern District of New York, asking to be paid in full.	所有债权人都接受了这一条件，除了一小撮顽固派——他们廉价收购剩余债券，然后诉诸法庭要求足额偿付，美国纽约南区地方法院受理了此案。


This quixotic strategy met with unexpected success when Federal Judge Thomas Griesa ruled in the holdouts’ favor.	这一异想天开的战略取得了出人意料的成功，联邦法官托马斯·葛里萨（Thomas Griesa）做出了有利于顽固派的裁决。


Griesa idiosyncratically reinterpreted the pari passu, or equal treatment, clause in the debt contracts to mean that “vulture” funds refusing to participate in the earlier debt exchange should receive not 30 but 100 cents on the dollar.	葛里萨对债务合同中的“平等对待”条款做出了独特的解释，认为这意味着拒绝参与早先的债务转换的“兀鹫”基金不应该获得三折偿付，而应该获得足额偿付。


Griesa’s ruling threatened to hold the Bank of New York Mellon, the Argentine government’s agent, in contempt if it paid other bondholders without also paying the vultures.	葛里萨的裁决意味着，如果阿根廷政府代理人纽约梅隆银行（Bank of New York Mellon）偿还其他债券持有者而不偿还兀鹫基金，就要承担藐视法庭的责任。


Effectively barred from servicing its debt on the renegotiated terms, Argentina had little choice but to default again.	事实上，阿根廷已被禁止按谈成条件偿付债务，除了再次违约之外基本别无选择。


This was not an episode from which anyone emerged smelling like a rose.	这绝不是皆大欢喜的结局。


Argentina’s hardball tactics and erratic policies did not endear it to investors.	阿根廷的强硬策略和摇摆政策使它在投资者中间相当不受欢迎。


The vultures showed no scruples in profiting at the expense of Argentine taxpayers.	兀鹫投资者对于牺牲阿根廷纳税人为自己谋取利润的做法毫无愧色。


They are now deploying the same strategy against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the world’s poorest countries.	如今他们正在对世界上最贫穷的国家之一——刚果民主共和国故技重施。


Griesa, for his part, showed no compunction about upending a financial order in which market-based exchanges of old bonds for new ones are used to restructure the debts of countries unable to pay.	至于葛里萨，他对于颠覆金融秩序也没有感到丝毫愧疚。 在旧金融秩序中，基于市场的旧债券换新债券常被用于重组无力偿债的国家的债务。


By making it impossible for sovereigns to restructure, he effectively rendered them unable to borrow in the United States.	葛里萨让主权债务人无从进行重组，事实上也断绝了它们在美国融资的门路。


Ignoring previous precedent and all economic common sense, he threw international financial markets into turmoil.	他无视先例和一切经济常识，让国际金融市场陷入了混乱。


This prompted various suggestions for reforming sovereign-debt markets.	这促使产生了大量改革主权债务市场的建议。


Resuscitating ideas advanced in the wake of Argentina’s earlier default, some experts proposed creating an international bankruptcy court in the IMF.	一些专家重新提出了上一次阿根廷为月时所出现的观点，建议在IMF成立国际破产法庭。


Others suggested that Argentina might issue bonds under European – or even domestic – law.	也有人建议阿根廷根据欧洲法律（甚至本国法律）发行债券。


But experience has shown that bondholders are not inclined to subordinate their claims to some untested international bankruptcy court.	但是，经验表明，债券持有人不会把他们所拥有的债券的命运交给未经检验的国际破产法庭。


The only thing they would like less are obligations whose terms were enforced by courts as easy to manipulate as Argentina’s.	要说还有什么让他们更加讨厌的话，那么只有法庭可以像操纵阿根廷债务一样容易地强制执行的债务了。


As for borrowing in European currencies, Griesa was quick to declare that his rulings would cover such bonds as well.	至于以欧洲货币借钱，葛里萨迅速宣布他的裁决亦可覆盖这类债券。


Fortunately, there is a simple solution to these problems.	幸运的是，对于这些问题有一个简单的解决办法。


Investors could agree to insert language into bond contracts that leaves no room for vulture funds.	投资者可以形成协议，在债权合同中加入兀鹫基金难以钻空子的条款。


First, they could clarify the pari passu clause, specifying that it guaranteed comparable treatment for existing bondholders, not for existing bondholders and earlier bondholders whose claims were already extinguished.	首先，他们可以阐明平等对待条款，规定其用来保证现有债券持有人之间的可比对待，而不适用于现有债券持有人和债权已经消灭了的前债券持有人之间。


Second, issuers could add “aggregation clauses” specifying that an agreement supported by a qualified majority of a country’s bondholders, say, two-thirds, would bind one and all.	其次，发���人可以增加“总数条款”，规定有足够多数的某国债券持有人（比如三分之二）支持，就可以形成可约束所有债券持有人的协议。


There was already movement after Argentina’s earlier default to add “collective-action clauses” that allowed the holders of an individual bond issue to take a binding vote to accept a restructuring offer.	在阿根廷上一次违约后，已经有人行动起来增加“集体行动条款”——允许某次债券发行的持有人发起具法律约束力的投票以接受重组计划。


But this still allowed the vultures to block the process by buying up a third of a particular bond issue.	但兀鹫基金仍可以通过买入某次债券发行的三分之一存量阻止集体行动程序。


By contrast, purchasing a third of a country’s entire debt stock, as required for a blocking position when all bondholders vote together, is an altogether more costly proposition.	相反，买入一国总债务存量的三分之一——如果所有债券持有人一起投票，就必须如此才能获得否决权——的难度要大得多。


In 2003, in an article in the American Economic Review, Ashoka Mody and I made the case for these provisions.	2003年，阿肖卡·莫迪（Ashoka Mody）和我在《美国经济评论》（American Economic Review）发表了一篇文章，论证了这些办法。


They are basically what the International Capital Market Association of leading investors and issuers has now agreed to implement, subject to some additional details that need not be examined here.	这也是由主要投资者和发行人组成的国际资本市场协会（International Capital Market Association）所同意采取的基本方针，还有一些细节在这里不必讨论。


Why didn’t it happen sooner?	为什么这来的这么晚？


The answer is that getting investors to agree is like herding cats.	答案是让投资者形成一致就像是把猫聚集成群。


In this case, it required strong behind-the-scenes leadership from the US Treasury.	这需要美国财政部在背后的强力领导。


The agreement is not perfect, and problems remain. Because new contractual provisions are not easily retrofitted into old bonds, it will take years before the clauses are included in the entire stock of debt.	这一协议并不完美，问题依然存在，因为新合同条款并不容易适用于旧债券，因此要花多年时间才能让所有债券存量都受这些条款约束。


Establishing an international bankruptcy court would be a far more efficient solution, but that doesn’t make it feasible.	建立国际破产法听是更有效的方案，但不可行。


Investors were wise to acknowledge that, in international capital markets, the perfect is the enemy of the good.	投资者很聪明，他们知道在国际资本市场，完美是优秀的敌人。


The Renminbi’s Grand Tour	人民币的壮游


REYKJAVIK – European and Chinese officials have made two notable announcements in recent weeks.	雷克雅未克—近几周来，欧洲和中国官员宣布了两件要事。


On June 18, China’s second largest financial institution, China Construction Bank, was designated as the official renminbi clearing bank for London.	6月18日，中国第二大金融机构——中国建设银行被指定为伦敦官方人民币清算行。


The next day, the Frankfurt branch of the Bank of China, the country’s largest commercial bank, received the same designation for the eurozone.	第二天，中国最大商业银行——中国银行【原文如此】法兰克福银行被指定为欧元区官方人民币清算行。


Both announcements were greeted with great acclaim.	这两件事均引起赞声一片。


British Chancellor George Osborne hailed the creation of a London clearing bank as “hugely important” for the financial future of the City.	英国财政大臣奥斯本（George Osborne）赞美成立伦敦清算行对伦敦金融城的未来“极其重要”。


Joachim Nagel of the German Bundesbank lauded the Bank of China announcement as a “milestone on the road toward creating a renminbi trading center in Frankfurt.”	德国央行的纳高（Joachim Nagel）赞美中国银行受到指定是“通往建立法兰克福人民币交易中心之路上的里程碑”。


We should expect these kinds of enthusiastic pronouncements from European officials, who are desperate for good news, whatever its source.	我们不难预料欧洲官员对这两件事的热情洋溢，他们急切地需要好消息，不管来自哪里。


But should the rest of us care?	但我们其他人关心这些事吗？


After all, banks, firms, and even individuals already can buy renminbi for their pounds and euros.	毕竟，银行、企业甚至个人早已能够用人民币兑换他们的英镑和欧元。


A range of financial institutions, both locally and in Hong Kong, have long stood ready to provide this service.	一些金融机构（包括地方金融机构和香港金融机构）早已准备好提供这一服务。


The only difference is that the two big Chinese banks, when doing business in London and Frankfurt, will be permitted to purchase renminbi in China itself when their foreign customers demand it.	唯一的区别是两家中国大银行在伦敦和法兰克福开展业务时将被允许在外国客户有需求时从中国本国购买人民币。


The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) will give them a quota for this purpose.	中国人民银行将授予它们这一操作的配额。


Other banks, when seeking to provide renminbi to their clients, are limited to bidding for the fixed supplies that circulate offshore.	其他银行在向客户提供人民币时只能通过离岸流通的固定供给。


This raises their costs and limits demand for their services.	这增加了它们的成本，也限制了它们的服务的需求。


Thus, by permitting two clearing banks to access renminbi onshore, Chinese officials are effectively subsidizing their London and Frankfurt operations and encouraging direct sterling and euro trades.	因此，通过允许两家清算行获得在岸人民币，中国官员实际上在补贴其伦敦和法兰克福的机构，以及鼓励直接英镑和欧元交易。


But London and Frankfurt would be reckless to bank on rapid growth in their renminbi transactions.	但伦敦和法兰克福如果寄希望于人民币交易的迅速增长，那将是有失偏颇的。


In its most recent survey of foreign-exchange markets, in April 2013, the Bank for International Settlements found that renminbi-dollar trades averaged $113 billion a day, whereas direct renminbi-euro trades totaled a mere $1 billion, while direct renminbi-sterling trades amounted to even less.	国际清算银行2013年4月的最新外汇市场调查发现，人民币-美元贸易平均交易量为每天1,130亿美元，而直接人民币-欧元交易量总共只有10亿美元，直接人民币-英镑交易量则更加稀少。


In practice, when Europeans want China’s currency, they use their euros and pounds to buy dollars, and then use those dollars to buy renminbi.	在实践中，当欧洲人想要中国货币时，他们会用欧元和英镑买入美元，然后再用美元买入人民币。


This reflects the fact that the market in dollar-denominated assets is exceptionally deep and liquid, which limits transaction costs.	这反映出一个事实，即美元计价资产市场具有相当的深度和流动性，从而能够限制交易成本。


In other words, European practice reflects the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” as the only true global currency, freely accepted by currency traders and investors in China and around the world.	换句话说，欧洲人的实践行为反映出美元作为唯一真正全球货币、被中国和全世界货币交易这和投资者无条件接受的“过度特权”。


Chinese officials presumably believe that this situation will change over time.	中国官员想必认为这一局面会随时间而改变。


Once banks offer new assets denominated in renminbi, more customers will be drawn into the market, thereby adding liquidity and reducing transaction costs for purchases of renminbi in European currencies.	一旦银行提供以人民币计价的新资产，就会有更多客户被吸引到市场中，从而增加流动性，降低用欧洲货币买入人民币的交易成本。


The dollar’s asymmetric role will be superseded.	美元拥有超然的不对称地位。


At that point, the renminbi, the euro, and sterling will all play consequential international roles.	在这一点上，人民币、欧元和英镑都只不过扮演着间接的国际��色。


Thus, the decision to designate renminbi clearing banks in London and Frankfurt is, in effect, one more step by China to foster the emergence of an international monetary system with several global currencies, not just one.	因此，指定伦敦和法兰克福人民币清算行的决定实际上只不过是中国促进建立由多种而非一种全球货币组成的国际货币体系的又一步骤。


It is a step toward creating a better match between our multipolar global economy and its monetary and financial system – and thus a step toward ending the world economy’s dependence on the dollar, which European and Chinese policymakers have complained about since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008.	这是通往更好地匹配我们的多极全球经济及其货币和金融体系的一步——从而也使通往结束世界经济依赖美元的一步。 欧洲和中国决策者自2008年全球金融危机爆发以来一直在抱怨美元依赖。


But it is only a step.	但这只是一步。


Deep and liquid markets are not built in a day.	深化而流动的市场不是一天建成的。


In June 2013, when the PBOC unexpectedly tightened monetary policy, domestic interbank interest rates shot up to 25%.	2013年6月，当中国人民银行出人意外地收紧货币政策时，国内银行间利率飙升至 25%。


Thus, even a quota that permits an offshore clearing bank to tap funding in China does not guarantee that it can obtain that funding at a reasonable price.	因此，即使配额允许离岸清算银行从中国国内获得资金，也不能保证能够以合适价格得到资金。


Moreover, if China develops financial problems, capital outflows may accelerate.	此外，如果中国产生金融问题，资本外流就可能加速。


The Chinese authorities may then be forced to tighten the quotas made available to the clearing banks.	中国当局可能被迫收紧清算行所能获得的配额。


Market liquidity would be a casualty.	市场流动性也会受到拖累。


One can also question how much appetite European investors will display for renminbi-denominated financial assets.	你还可能质疑欧洲投资者会对人民币计价金融资产表现出多大的胃口。


In the past, demand for such assets has been fed by the expectation that the renminbi will continue to appreciate.	在过去，对这类资产的需求一直由人民币继续升值的预期推动。


If Chinese growth slows, such expectations might well dissolve.	如果中国增长减速，这一预期就可能消失。


There is no doubt that, with time, the renminbi will acquire a more consequential international role.	毫无疑问，假以时日，人民币将起到更重要的国际作用。


Twenty-first-century financial technology will facilitate direct trading in a variety of different currencies, eliminating the need and custom of routing virtually all international transactions through the dollar.	二十一世纪金融技术将有利于多种不同货币的直接交易，消除几乎所有国际交易都通过美元进行的需要和习惯。


Ultimately this will spell the end of America’s “exorbitant privilege.”	这最终将终结美国的“过度特权”。


Just not yet.	但不是现在。


And not anytime soon.	也不会是近期。


Leaners of Last Resort	最后学习者


OSLO – With Jeremy Stein’s return to his academic post at Harvard at the end of May, the US Federal Reserve Board lost its leading proponent of the view that monetary policy should be used to lean against financial excesses.	奥斯陆—随着5月底杰里米·斯特恩（Jeremy Stein）回哈佛任教，美联储理事会也失去了支持货币政策应该遏制金融过度（financial excess）的观点的领军人物。


Stein’s view, expressed in a speech earlier this spring, is that central banks should be less aggressive in their pursuit of full employment in an environment of heightened financial risk.	斯特恩的观点在今年春天早些时候的一次演讲中表露无遗，即在金融风险高企的环境中，央行不应该太积极地追求充分就业目标。


His position is a refutation of former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s doctrine that the central bank should not adjust policy in response to financial-sector excesses, but instead should concentrate on reacting to any problems that subsequently arise.	他的立场与前美联储主席格林斯潘的教条针锋相对。 格林斯潘认为中央银行不应该因为金融部门出现过剩而调整政策，而应该集中于对随后产生的任何问题做出反应。


The question is whether Stein’s new view is justified.	问题在于斯特恩的新观点是否能够得到论证。


In principle, the answer is straightforward.	理论上，答案是直观的。


If a central bank has two policy targets, then it needs two instruments: monetary policy to influence aggregate demand, and regulatory policy to limit financial risks.	如果中央银行有两个政策目标，那么就需要两种工具：货币政策影响总需求； 监管政策限制金融风险。


In practice, however, the answer is more complicated, because the question has several components.	但是，在实践中，答案更加复杂，因为这个问题有多重成分。


What should monetary policymakers do when regulators are prone to falling down on the job?	当监管者不作为时，货币决策这应该怎么办？


In particular, should they raise interest rates?	特别是，他们应该提高利率吗？


To what indicators should they look when determining whether regulators have failed to do their part?	在决定监管者是否不作为时，他们应该盯住什么指标？


And is monetary policy a sufficiently subtle instrument to address the resulting risks?	还有，在解决由此产生的风险时，货币政策是否是足够灵活的工具？


In the wake of the global credit crisis, the answer to the first question is not in doubt.	全球信用危机爆发时，第一个问题的答案毋庸置疑。


There is a clear victor in the “lean versus clean” debate.	“抑制与救济”（lean versus clean）之争的胜者是显而易见的。


Central banks cannot concentrate only on cleaning up after crises; the costs of financial instability are too high.	央行不可能只关注危机后的救济工作； 金融动荡的代价太高昂了。


Rather, as recent events have amply shown, the monetary authority must lean against excesses as they develop.	相反，最近的事件充分表明，货币当局必须在过度发展过程中抑制它。


That leaves the question of how to detect the existence of excesses, and the question of what, exactly, to do about them.	这就引出了一个问题：如何确定过度的程度以及如何对策。


Stein proposes focusing on risk premiums in the bond market.	斯特恩提出应该专注于债券市场的风险溢价。


When yields on risky bonds decline toward those on safe assets, it is fair to conclude, he argues, that someone is taking on excessive risk.	当高风险债券收益率向安全资产下跌靠拢时，他指出，就可以认为有人在过度冒险。


The problem, then, is how to determine exactly when risk premiums are too low.	于是，问题就变味如何确定风险溢价太低。


Some suggest focusing on rapid increases in the volume of bank and nonbank lending to the non-financial private sector as an indicator that lending is growing riskier.	有人建议专注于流向非金融私人部门的银行和非银行的贷款量，将此作为贷款风险增加的指标。


Others recommend monitoring the leverage ratio, particularly the ratio of capital to assets in the banking system, on the grounds that banks are the weak link in the financial chain.	也有人建议监测杠杆率，特别是银行系统的资本-资产比率，因为银行是整个金融链的薄弱环节。


These suggestions are all indicative of central bankers’ instinctual desire to reduce complex decision-making to simple rules.	这些建议都表明央行有将复杂的决策简化为简单规则的内在倾向。


But the disagreement among experts shows that the search for simple rules is futile.	但专家之间的分歧表明追寻简单规则是无用功。


Here as elsewhere, central bankers have no alternative but to consider the broader context and rely on their judgment.	世界各地的央行行长们别无选择，只能参考大背景并依赖他们的判断。


Finally, there is the question of whether monetary policy is the right instrument to use in response to the risks arising from financial instability and, if so, how aggressively to use it.	最后一个问题是是货币政策是否是应对源自金融动荡的风险的正确工具，若是，又应该在什么程度上使用。


Inevitably, the answers are colored by the United States’ experience in 1929, when the Fed tightened policy in response to what it perceived as excesses on Wall Street, only to plunge the economy into the Great Depression.	答案不可避免地受到美国在1929年的经验的影响。 当时，美联储认为华尔街存在过度问题，因此收紧了货币政策，结果导致经济陷入大萧条。


In fact, exactly the same debate raged then.	事实上，同样的争论在当时也曾经闹得不可开交。


On one side were Fed governors who argued that the only effective way to rein in financial excesses was to raise interest rates.	争论的一方是美联储理事，他们认为唯一有效的治理金融过度之法是提高利率。


On the other side were officials, like George Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who worried about the impact on the broader economy and preferred to use other instruments to address financial imbalances.	另一方是美联储官员，如纽约联储银行的乔治·哈里森（George Harrison），他们担心整体经济受到影响，更偏向于使用其他工具解决金融失衡。


Harrison’s alternative was “direct pressure” – that is, using the Fed’s regulatory powers and moral suasion to persuade member banks to curtail their lending to the stock market.	哈里森提出的方案是“直接压��”（direct pressure）——即利用美联储的监管权力和道德劝告说服成员银行减少向股市的贷款。


Of the two views, Harrison’s was the more sophisticated.	在两种观点中，哈里森的观点更加成熟。


The problem was that the Fed’s macro-prudential instruments were undeveloped.	问题在于美联储的宏观审慎工具尚不完善。


No sooner did the Federal Reserve System’s member banks limit their provision of credit to purchasers of securities than non-member banks, insurance companies, and trust companies ramped up their lending, allowing the stock market to race ahead.	美联储成员银行一限制它们对证券买家的信用供给，非成员银行、保险公司和信托公司就会开足马力填补空白，让股市继续节节攀升。


In the wake of this failed experiment, even Harrison was forced to acknowledge that reining in the market required policymakers to make lending more expensive for the financial sector as a whole.	在这场失败的实验中，即使哈里森也被迫承认驯服市场需要决策者提高整个金融部门的贷款利率。


The Fed then raised its policy rates in the summer of 1929 – and the rest, as they say, is history.	接着，美联储在1929年夏天提高了其政策利率，随后的故事大家都知道了。


The implication is clear: Central banks should focus on developing more effective macro-prudential instruments.	其中的含义是明确的：央行应该专注于开发更有效的宏观审慎工具。


They should widen the regulatory perimeter – that is, they should work to bring nonbank financial institutions under their regulatory umbrella.	它们应该扩大监管视野——即应该让非银行金融部门也归入它们的监管范围。


They should use the resulting instruments and powers preemptively.	它们应该先发制人地使用由此产生的工具和权力。


And they should adjust monetary policy to address potential financial risks as a last resort, not as their first line of defense.	它们还应该将调整货币政策以纠正潜在金融风险作为最后手段，而不是第一道防线。


Banking on the BRICS	依赖金砖五国


BERKELEY – For the leaders of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the announcement in July of their agreement to establish a “New Development Bank” (NDB) and a “Contingent Reserve Arrangement” (CRA) was a public-relations coup.	伯克利——对金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）领导人而言，7月份创立“全新开发银行”（NDB）和“应急储备安排”（CRA）的公告不啻于一场公关政变。


The opportunity for a triumphal group photo was especially welcome for Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, in light of her country’s ignominious World Cup defeat and slack economy, and for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, given the international reaction against his government’s support of the rebels in Ukraine.	巴西总统迪尔玛•罗塞夫因巴西在世界杯上不光彩的失败和国内经济低迷而特别欢迎这样有凯旋意味的合影机会，鉴于俄政府支持乌克兰叛军所引发的国际反应，俄罗斯总统普京也特别需要这样的事件。


The agreement was also an opportunity for the five countries to reiterate their dissatisfaction with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the role of the dollar in the global monetary system.	这份协议也给了金砖五国重申不满世界银行、国际货币基金组织和美元在全球货币体系中所扮演角色的机会。


The BRICS possess just 11% of the votes in the IMF, despite accounting for more than 20% of global economic activity.	金砖国家仅握有国际货币基金11%的投票权，却占据全球经济活动的20%以上。


The US Congress refuses to ratify the agreement reached in 2010 to correct this skewed state of affairs.	美国会拒绝批准2010年达成的协议，纠正这种失衡的状态。


And the United States has displayed no willingness to renounce its anachronistic privilege of nominating the World Bank’s president.	同时美国也不愿放弃任命世行总裁的过时权限。


Meanwhile, the share of the dollar in global foreign-exchange reserves remains more than 60%, while 85% of global foreign-exchange transactions involve dollars.	此外，美元在全球外汇储备中所占的份额仍然超过60%。 而超过85%的全球外汇交易都要用到美元。


Given the reluctance of underrepresented countries to sign up for the IMF’s precautionary credit lines, central banks desperate for dollars can obtain them only from the Federal Reserve.	鉴于代表名额不足的国家不愿签署IMF的预防性信贷额度，央行急需美元时只能从美联储申请贷款。


The Fed was reasonably forthcoming in providing dollar swaps in the last crisis in 2008; but there is no guarantee that it will behave similarly in the future.	美联储在2008年危机中对提供美元互换基本持合作态度； 但未来是否仍会如此谁也不知道。


Thus, the BRICS’ dissatisfaction with the status quo is understandable.	因此，金砖四国对现状不满是可以理解的。


The question is whether their NDB and CRA will make a difference.	问题在于他们的“全新开发银行”（NDB）和“应急储备安排”（CRA）是否能改变现状。


The logic for the NDB is compelling.	“全新开发银行”具有令人信服的逻辑。


The BRICS, and developing countries generally, have immense infrastructure needs.	金砖国家和一般发展中国家都有巨大的基础设施需求。


China may not have an infrastructure deficit, but it has something else: large construction companies that welcome the opportunity to undertake additional projects abroad.	中国可能没有基础设施欠账，但却有大型建筑企业急于到国外承接更多的项目。


Hence the incentives of the NDB’s prospective creditors and borrowers are happily aligned.	于是“全新开发银行”的潜在债权人和借款人愉快地实现了合作。


Moreover, there already is a proliferation of regional development banks, from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank to the more modestly capitalized African Development Bank.	此外，从美洲开发银行到亚洲开发银行再到资本更小的非洲开发银行，区域性开发银行已经遍地都是。


These institutions cooperate with the World Bank.	上述机构与世界银行合作。


Their existence creates no major problems for the Bretton Woods institutions.	它们的存在对布雷顿森林并不构成重大威胁。


There is no reason why the NDB should create problems, either.	“全新开发银行”也没有构成威胁的理由。


With initial capital of just $100 billion, it is too small to make a major contribution to global infrastructure needs.	仅仅1000亿美元的初始资金根本不足以满足全球基础设施所需。


But inadequate capitalization can be corrected over time.	但时间或许可以逐渐改变资本金的不足。


The CRA – intended to lessen the BRICS’ dependence on the Fed and the dollar – is another story.	旨在削减金砖国家对美联储和美元依赖的“应急储备安排”则完全是另一回事。


The five participants agreed to earmark $100 billion of their foreign-exchange reserves for swap lines on which all members are entitled to draw.	与会五国同意拨付1000亿美元的外汇储备，所有相关国家均有权提取由此构成的互换额度。


But here the interests of prospective borrowers and lenders are not obviously compatible.	但这里未来借款人和贷款人的利益并不明显契合。


The next BRICS country experiencing a crisis will want to draw on the CRA.	下一个陷入危机的金砖国家需要提取“应急储��安排”。


But the other members will hesitate to lend more than token amounts, especially if there are repayment doubts.	但尤其当无法确定借款方能否还款的情况下，其他成员国可能只愿借出象征性的数目。


In contrast to development finance, the incentives of potential lenders and borrowers are not aligned.	相对于开发融资，潜在贷款人和借款人的激励机制并不一致。


Permitting the lenders to impose policy conditions on borrowers, and to monitor their compliance, can redress this problem.	允许贷款人对借款人提出政策条件并督促其遵照实行可以解决上述问题。


But imposing conditionality on sovereign states is a delicate matter – especially when the countries involved are as large, proud, and diverse as the BRICS.	但对主权国家提条件非常棘手——尤其当所涉国家像金砖成员国那样广阔、多样并引以为豪。


It is difficult to imagine Brazil, for example, accepting policy conditions laid down by China.	比方说，很难想象巴西会接受中国提出的政策条件。


Other attempts to establish networks of swap lines and credits, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, which was negotiated in the wake of the Asian crisis, have been bedeviled by the same problem.	同样的问题困扰着其他建立换汇和信贷额度的努力，比方说亚洲危机爆发后提出的清迈倡议。


The Chiang Mai network is even larger than the CRA.	清迈倡议涉及的国家甚至比“应急储备安排”更广。


But, given the divergent interests of lenders and borrowers, it has never been used – not even in 2008, at the height of the global financial crisis.	但由于贷款人和借款人的利益分歧，清迈倡议从未付诸实施——就连2008年全球金融危机达到顶峰时都从未实施过。


The architects of the Chiang Mai Initiative attempted to finesse the problem by requiring countries that draw more than 30% of their swaps to negotiate a program with the IMF.	清迈倡议的设计者解决问题的方法是要求提取超过30%互换额度的国家与国际货币基金组织谈判一项计划。


Ironically, the “Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement” contains exactly the same provision.	讽刺的是，“金砖应急储备安排创立协议”也提出了一模一样的要求。


So much, then, for the CRA as an alternative to the IMF.	因此，“应急储备安排”不可能取代IMF。


And, if inclusion of that provision was not revealing enough, then there is the fact that the BRICS’ commitments to the CRA are expressed in US dollars.	而且如果上述条款还不够发人深省，金砖国家对“应急储备安排”的缴款居然是以美元为单位的。


The NDB makes sense for the BRICS, and it has a future.	“全新开发银行”对金砖国家具有实际意义。


But the CRA is empty symbolism, and that is how it will be remembered.	但“应急储备安排”却只有象征意义，这一点肯定会被历史记住。


A Requiem for Global Imbalances	全球失衡安魂曲


BERKELEY – The start of 2014 marks ten years since we began fretting about global imbalances, and specifically about the chronic trade and current-account imbalances of the United States and China.	伯克利—2014年是我们开始担心全球失衡问题，特别是美国和中国之间长期存在的贸易和经常项目失衡的第十个年头。


A decade later, we can happily declare that the era of global imbalances is over.	十年后，我们可以愉快地宣布，全球失衡结束了。


So now is the time to draw the right lessons from that period.	因此，现在应该从这段时间吸取正确的教训。


America’s current-account deficit, which was an alarming 5.8% of GDP as recently as 2006, has now shrunk to just 2.7% of GDP – a level that the US can easily finance from its royalty income and returns on prior foreign investments without incurring additional foreign debt.	2006年，美国经常项目赤字达到了令人警惕的GDP的5. 8%，如今这一数字下降至GDP的2.


Even more impressive, China’s current-account surplus, which reached an extraordinary 10% of GDP in 2007, is now barely 2.5% of national income.	7%——美国可以轻松地用版税收入和先期对外投资回报来弥补这一赤字，而不会增加新的外债。


There are still a few countries with worrisomely large surpluses and deficits.	仍有一些国家存在令人担忧的巨大盈余或赤字。


Germany and Turkey stand out.	尤其是德国和土耳其。


But Germany’s 6%-of-GDP surplus is mainly a problem for Europe, while Turkey’s 7.4% deficit is mainly a problem for Turkey.	但德国相当于GDP的6%的盈余大体上是一个欧洲问题，而土耳其相当于GDP的7. 4%的赤字大体上是土耳其的问题。


In other words, theirs are not global problems.	换句话说，它们都不是全球问题。


Back in 2004, there were two schools of thought on global imbalances.	2004年，关于全球失衡存在两大思维派别。


The Dr. Pangloss school dismissed them as benign – a mere reflection of emerging economies’ demand for dollar reserves, which only the US could provide, and American consumers’ insatiable appetite for cheap merchandise imports.	乐观派认为失衡无关紧要——无非反映了新兴经济体需要美国才能提供的美元储备，而美国消费者对廉价进口商品也有着无穷尽的胃口。


Trading safe assets for cheap merchandise was the best of all worlds.	用安全资产换取廉价商品对全世界都有利。


It was a happy equilibrium that could last indefinitely.	这是一个可以永远持续下去的愉快的均衡。


By contrast, adherents of the Dr. Doom school warned that global imbalances were an accident waiting to happen.	相反，悲观派警告说，全球失衡是一场随时都有可能发生的事故。


At some point, emerging-market demand for US assets would be sated.	在某个时点，新兴市场对美国资产的需求会得到满足。


Worse, emerging markets would conclude that US assets were no longer safe.	更糟糕的是，新兴市场将认为美国资产不再安全。


Financing for America’s current-account deficit would dry up.	为美国经常项目赤字融资将成为明日黄花。


The dollar would crash.	美元将崩溃。


Financial institutions would be caught wrong-footed, and a crisis would result.	金融机构将措手不及，危机将爆发。


We now know that both views were wrong.	现在我们知道，两种观点都是错误的。


Global imbalances did not continue indefinitely.	全球失衡并没有无限持续下去。


As China satisfied its demand for safe assets, it turned to riskier foreign investments.	中国的安全资产需求得到了满足，便转向了风险更高的对外投资。


It began rebalancing its economy from saving to consumption and from exports to domestic demand.	它已开始实现经济从储蓄转向消费、从出口转向内需的再平衡。


The US, meanwhile, acknowledged the dangers of excessive debt and leverage.	与此同时，美国也认识到了过度负债和杠杆的危害。


It began taking steps to reduce its indebtedness and increase its savings.	它开始减少负债、增加储蓄。


To accommodate this change in spending patterns, the dollar weakened, enabling the US to export more.	为了适应支出模式的变化，美元开始贬值，这增加了美国的出口。


The renminbi, meanwhile, strengthened, reflecting Chinese residents’ increased desire to consume.	与此同时，人民币开始升值，反映出中国居民不断高涨的消费渴望。


There was a crisis, to be sure, but it was not a crisis of global imbalances.	危机确实发生了，但并不是全球失衡危机。


Although the US had plenty of financial problems, financing its external deficit was not one of them.	美国金融问题重重，但为外债融资已不再是其中之一。


On the contrary, the dollar was one of the few clear beneficiaries of the crisis, as foreign investors, desperate for liquidity, piled into US Treasury bonds.	相反，美元成为极少数显而易见的危机受益者之一，因为急切地渴望流动性的外国投资者纷纷涌向美国国债。


The principal culprits in the crisis were, rather, lax supervision and regulation of US financial institutions and markets, which allowed unsound practices and financial excesses to build up.	危机的罪魁是美国金融机构和市场监督和监���太松，这导致了太多的鲁莽行为和过度融资。 中国并没有导致金融危机；


China did not cause the financial crisis; America did (with help from other advanced economies).	美国导致了金融危机（其他发达经济体则是帮凶）。


This is not to deny the enabling role of international capital flows.	这并不是要否认国际资本流的推波助澜作用。


But the flows that mattered were not the net flows of capital from the rest of the world that financed America’s current-account deficit.	但重要的资本流不是来自世界其余部分、为美国经常项目赤字提供了融资的净资本流；


Rather, they were the gross flows of finance from the US to Europe that allowed European banks to leverage their balance sheets, and the large, matching flows of money from European banks into toxic US subprime-linked securities.	而是美国流向欧洲、让欧洲银行提高资产负债表杠杆的毛金融流以及与之对应的从欧洲银行流向与有毒美国按揭相关证券的资金流。


Both critics and defenders of global imbalances almost entirely overlooked these gross flows in both directions across the North Atlantic.	全球失衡的批评者和辩护者都几乎完全忽略了北大西洋的这两股相向而动的毛资本流。


The next time that global imbalances develop, analysts will – we must hope – know to look beneath their surface.	下一次全球失衡卷土重来时，分析者将直到（但愿如此）要透过表面看到本质。


But will there be a next time?	但还会有下一次吗？


A couple of years ago, forecasters were confident that global imbalances would reemerge once the crisis passed.	几年前，预测家信誓旦旦地表示全球失衡将在危机过去之后重现。


That now seems unlikely: Neither the US nor China is going back to its pre-crisis growth rate or spending pattern.	现在看来这基本上不可能：中国和美国都没有回归危机前的增长率或支出模式。


Nor are earlier trade balances about to reemerge.	此前的贸易平衡也不太可能重现。


America’s trade position will be strengthened by the shale-gas revolution, which promises energy self-sufficiency, and by increases in productivity that auger further re-shoring of manufacturing production.	美国的贸易地位将因为带来能源自给的页岩气革命和刺激制造业生产回流的生产率提高而增强。


Emerging markets, for their part, have learned that export surpluses are no guarantee of rapid growth.	至于新兴市场，它们已经知道出口盈余并非快速增长的保证。


Nor do large international reserves guarantee financial stability.	巨量国际储备也不能保证金融稳定。


There are better ways to enhance stability, from strengthening prudential supervision to taxing and controlling destabilizing capital flows and letting the exchange rate adjust.	有更好的办法可以增强稳定，如加强审慎监管、控制破坏性资本流并对之课税、采取浮动调节等。


All of this suggests that the accumulation of foreign reserves by emerging and developing countries – another phenomenon over which much ink has been spilled – may be about to peak.	所有这些表明，新兴和发展中国家囤积外汇储备——这又是一个被说烂了的现象——可能已经达到了顶峰。


Then it will be just another problem laid to rest.	这将是下一个成为历史的问题。


Chinese Industrialization and its Discontents	中国的工业化和它的不满


TOKYO – As the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convenes in Beijing, China stands at a crossroads.	东京—随着中共十八大三中全会的召开，中国站在了十字路口。


Its recent growth record is stupendous; no country in history can match it.	它的最新增长记录是惊人的，历史上没有哪个国家可以与之媲美。


But China’s economic imbalances are also stupendous.	但中国经济失衡同样惊人。


The country has sustained its output growth by investing fully one-half of GDP, though no country can productively invest more than a third of national income for an extended period.	中国的产出增长是用投资整整一半的GDP来维持的，尽管没有哪个国家可以在相当长的时间里将国民收入的三分之一以上用于投资还能保证生产率。


Household consumption accounts for only one-third of GDP, compared to two-thirds in a normal economy.	家庭消费只有GDP的三分之一，而一般经济要占到三分之二。


Associated with this low level of consumption is widening inequality – between the countryside and the cities, and between the political elites and the masses.	与如此低水平的消费相伴而生的是日益恶化的不平等性——既存在于城乡之间，也存在于政治精英和普罗大众之间。


University graduates with rising aspirations cannot find the office jobs that they seek and will not accept the factory jobs that they are offered.	心高气傲的大学毕业生无法找到中意的白领工作，又不愿意接受录用他们的蓝领职位。


Social unrest, whether expressed in blogs or spontaneous demonstrations, is mounting.	社会动荡——不论是在博客上表达不满还是大规模示威——愈演愈烈。


China’s leaders understand all of this.	中国领导人对此心知肚明。


They acknowledge the need to rebalance the economy from investment to consumption, and they recognize that this means developing the service sector, where good white-collar jobs will be found.	他们成人需要实现经济从投资到消费的再平衡，也认识到这意味着发展可以提供白领岗位的服务部门。


They also appreciate the need to build a social safety net and strengthen rural property rights.	他们还明白需要建立社会安全网、强化农村产权。


But Chinese officials worry that the shift from investment to consumption, and from manufacturing to services, will mean slower growth.	但中国官员担心从投资到消费以及从制造到服务的转型意味着增长减速。


Less investment will mean less capital deepening.	投资减少将意味着更少的资本深化。


Expanding the service sector, where productivity is low, will hold back aggregate output.	扩张生产率尚低的服务部门会拖累总产出。


And if growth decelerates further – the annual rate has already dropped from 10% to 7.5% – social unrest may increase.	而如果增长进一步减速——年增长率已从10%降至7. 5%——社会动荡可能还会加剧。


Knowing this, Chinese leaders may hesitate to move ahead with needed reforms, causing imbalances to continue to rise.	了解了这一点，中国领导人可能会踯躅于推行必要的改革，导致失衡继续发展。


But this cannot go on indefinitely.	但这不可能永远持续下去。


At some point, the ticking time bomb will explode, and the growth rate will crash.	定时炸弹迟早要爆炸，增长率将会崩溃。


So where should Chinese leaders look for help in meeting these challenges?	那么，中国领导人应该着眼于何处应对这些挑战？


It may seem improbable, but they can find guidance from the United Kingdom.	看似不可能的是，他们可以从英国找到指南。


Just as Chinese industrialization is unprecedented – no developing country has grown by more than 10% per year without interruption for two full decades – Britain’s industrialization 200 years ago was similarly unparalleled.	正如中国的工业化是前所未有的——没有哪个发展中国家可以在整整二十年的时间里不间断地保持每年10%以上的增长，200年前英国的工业化也是前无古人。


Britain was, of course, the homeland of the Industrial Revolution.	当然，英国是工业革命的故乡。


Its economic growth was faster than that of any economy in human history up to that time.	其经济增长比当时人类有史以来任何一个经济体都要快。


But Britain’s rapid growth created severe problems.	但英国的快速增长造成了严重的问题。


There was growing inequality, or so it appears from recent scholarly contributions to the so-called “standard-of-living debate.”	不平等性日益加剧，直至最近还有所谓的“生活水平争论”的学术问题。


There was the alienation of smallholders’ property, in what was known as the “enclosure movement.”	家庭产权保护极为不力，发生了所谓的“圈地运动”。


And there were complaints about urban pollution and inhumane factory conditions in what William Blake called Britain’s “dark Satanic mills.”	此外还有关于城市污染和不人道的工厂环境的抱怨，威廉·布莱克（William Blake）称之为“黑暗作坊”。


Inevitably, there were eruptions of social unrest.	不可避免地，英国爆发了社会动荡。


Recall the Luddites, who responded to the early nineteenth-century mechanization of the textile industry by smashing the new technology, and the Swing Riots, in which workers destroyed threshing machines.	比如应十九世纪初纺织业机械化而起、摧毁新技术的卢德派和工人摧毁打谷机的施荣暴动（Swing Riots）。


British politicians responded by reforming the social safety net.	英国政治家的应对措施是改革社会安全网。


In 1834, the New Poor Law established national standards for social benefits.	1834年，《新济贫法》（New Poor Law）规定了社会福利的国家标准。


In the face of considerable controversy, assistance continued to be provided without requiring the poor to enter oppressive workhouses.	尽管争议重重，但穷人仍可以获得补助而不必进入压抑的救济所。


Outdoor relief, as the alternative was known, was expanded as the most cost-effective way to address the poverty problem.	另一个方案，即所谓的户外救济（outdoor relief）也获得了扩大，成为解决贫困问题的成本最低的方法。


Second, political reform gave voice to the rising middle classes.	其次，政治改革让崛起的中产阶级得以发声。


The 1832 Reform Act gave the vote to individuals with at least £10 of property – not an inconsequential sum, to be sure, but low enough to enfranchise the middle class.	1832年《改革法案》（Reform Act）授予财产不少于10英镑的个人投票权——平心而论标准不低，但已足以让中产阶级获得选举权。


The act also created a system of special courts to adjudicate disputes over voter registration.	该法案还建立了特别法庭制度仲裁关于选民注册的纠纷。


Moreover, along with political reform came policy changes aimed at rebalancing the economy.	此外，随政治改革到来的还有旨在再平衡经济的政策变化。


Abolition in 1846 of the Corn Laws, which had propped up the declining agricultural sector, facilitated structural shifts, first toward manufacturing and then toward services, notably financial services.	1846年，《谷物法》（Corn Laws）被废，这拯救了衰落的农业部门，促进了结构转变，先是转向了制造业，后来又转向服务业（特别是金��业）。


Finally, British politicians did not seek to maintain at any cost their country’s position as the world’s fastest-growing economy.	最后，英国政治家并没有寻求维持该国世界增长最快经济体的地位。


Admittedly, they faced criticism when the United States, Germany, and other countries overtook Britain in the late nineteenth century.	诚然，当美国、德国和其他国家在十九世纪末超过英国时，他们受到了批评。


But, by not standing in the way of the economy’s natural evolution from agriculture to industry and then to services, they enabled the United Kingdom to enjoy a full century of sustained economic growth.	但是，他们并没有试图抵挡经济从农业进步到工业再进步到服务业的自然演化，而是成功地让英国获得了整整一百年的持续经济增长。


China may regard the nineteenth-century experience of a windswept island off the northwest coast of Europe as an odd source of inspiration.	中国可能认为这个偏居欧洲大陆西北一隅的岛国在十九世纪的经验作为他山之石难以接受。


But if Chinese leaders meeting at their party plenum accomplish half as much as their nineteenth-century English predecessors, they will have done very well indeed.	但如果中国领导人可以在三中全会上取得十九世纪英国先行者一半的成果，便已着实不错了。


Minimum Wage or Living Income?	最低工资还是过活所得？


LONDON – Most rich countries now have millions of “working poor” – people whose jobs do not pay enough to keep them above the poverty line, and whose wages therefore have to be subsidized by the state.	伦敦—如今，大部分富裕国家都存在几百万“工作的穷人”——工作收入无法让他们生活在贫困线以上，因此必须领国家补贴的人。


These subsidies take the form of tax credits.	这些补贴以税收优惠的形式发放。


The idea is a very old one.	这一思想由来已久。


England implemented its “Speenhamland” system – a form of outdoor relief intended to offset rising bread prices – during the Napoleonic Wars.	英国在拿破仑战争期间就实行了“斯宾汉兰”（Speenhamland）制度，这是一种户外救济（outdoor relief），旨在抵消面包涨价的影响。


In 1795, the authorities of Speenhamland, a village in Berkshire, authorized a means-tested sliding scale of wage supplements.	1795年，斯宾汉兰（位于伯克夏的一个村庄）当局批准了一项根据资产状况调查发放的按比例工资补贴方案。


The supplements that families received varied with the number of children and the price of bread.	家庭所获补贴额根据孩子数量和面包价格的不同而不同。


But the scheme was criticized for allowing employers to pay below-subsistence wages, because the taxpayer would make up the difference.	但该机制受到了批评，被认为这让雇主支付低于生存水平线的工资，因为纳税人会补偿差额。


In 1834, the Speenhamland system was replaced by the New Poor Law, which confined relief to workhouses, under conditions sufficiently odious to force people back into the labor market.	1834年，斯宾汉兰制度被新济贫法（New Poor Law）取代，新济贫法规定救济只限于救济院，并且需要满足非常苛刻的条件以迫使人们回到劳动力市场。


Then, in the twentieth century, the Speenhamland principle was revived – and by none other than the free-market liberal Milton Friedman.	接着，在二十世纪，斯宾汉兰原则复兴——推动者不是别人，正是自由市场自由派米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）。


In 1962, Friedman proposed a “negative income tax,” whereby people earning below a certain threshold would receive supplemental income from the government, rather than paying taxes to it.	1962年，弗里德曼提出实施一种“负所得税”，收入低于一定阈值的人从政府获得补偿性收入而无需为缴纳所得税。


The idea was to get people off the dole and back to work.	他的思想是让人们不再去领救济而是回去工作。


It was implemented as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and the Working Families Tax Credit in the United Kingdom.	该思想在美国和英国分别以“劳动所得税抵扣”（Earned Income Tax Credit）和“工作家庭税收减免”（Working Families Tax Credit）的形式实施。


At the same time, there have been efforts to raise the level of earned income by setting minimum-wage legislation.	与此同时，人们还采取措施通过设立最低工资法提高劳动所得。


But the minimum wage has never reached the floor set for a “living income” and has not, therefore, appreciably reduced the bill for wage subsidies.	但最低工资从未达到“过活所得”下限，因此也从未很好地降低工资补贴规模。


In 2008, about 5.5 million working families in the UK received tax credits, including working and child credits, housing benefits, and local tax benefits.	2008年，大约550万英国工作家庭获得税收减免，包括工作和儿童减免、住房补贴和地税补贴。


Austerity policies have reduced this number to 4.3 million.	紧缩政策将这一人群的数量减少到430万。


Given that there were 11.4 million working households in the UK in 2012, this means that an astonishing 38% did not receive a “living wage.”	2012年英国工作家庭数为1,140万户，因此这意味着有令人吃惊的38%的家庭无法获得“过活工资”。


Or, to put it another way: the market-clearing wage was unable to provide a living income for 38% of working families.	或者，换句话说，市场出清工资水平无法为38%的工作家庭提供过活所得。


These are the “working poor.”	他们是“工作的穷人”。


In his July 8 budget announcement, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne proposed to cut £12 billion ($18.6 billion) from the welfare bill over the next four years as part of his deficit-cutting plan.	在7月8日的预算公告中，英国财政大臣奥斯本（George Osborne）提出要在未来四年削减120英镑福利支出，作为其削减赤字计划的一部分。


Of this, £9 billion will come from cutting the tax subsidies for working families.	其中90亿英镑将来自工作家庭税收补贴削减。


To offset this cut, Osborne proposed to raise the minimum wage from £6.50 per hour to £9 per hour over the same period.	为了抵消这一削减的影响，奥斯本计划将同期最低工资从时薪6. 50英镑提高到9英镑。


The increase will fall on employers, not the public purse, and so the reduction in credits and benefits is a net gain for Her Majesty’s Treasury.	这一提薪的成本将由雇主而非公家承担，因此税收减免和福利的净削减等于是国库的净增��。


An analysis by the Institute for Fiscal Studies has concluded that while the Treasury will save £12 billion, the gross increase in pay from the higher minimum wage amounts to only £4 billion.	财政研究中心（Institute for Fiscal Studies，IFS）的分析认为，国库将节约120亿英镑，而提高最低工资所导致的薪酬总增量仅为40亿英镑。


As Paul Johnson, head of the IFS, put it: “There is simply not enough money going into the new minimum wage to anywhere near compensate in cash terms people on tax credits.”	IFS主管保罗·约翰逊（Paul Johnson）说：“投入新最低工资的钱远远无法达到能够用现金补偿人们税收减免损失的程度。 ”


But even if the minimum wage were raised sufficiently to offset the withdrawal of tax credits, transferring more of the cost of labor from taxpayers to employers would be the wrong strategy.	但即使最低工资提高到足以抵消取消税收减免的影响的程度，将更多的劳动力成本从纳税人头上转嫁到雇主头上也是错误的战略。


The reason is that for many – perhaps most – people, work will be a declining source of income.	原因在于，对许多人——也许是大部分人来说，工作是一个日薄西山的收入源。


After all, one prediction on which we can confidently rely is that automation will make increasingly large inroads into the world of human work.	毕竟，一个关于我们放心依赖什么的预言说，自动化将进军越来越多的人类工作领域。


Up to 50% of existing jobs may be at risk in the next 20 years.	最高有50%的现有工作可能在未来20年内告急。


It is at least an open question whether enough new jobs can be found to replace them, or, indeed, whether it is desirable to continue producing more and more products simply to provide human employment at ever shrinking wages.	能否找到足够多的新岗位替代他们，或者，仅仅为了向人类提供工资越来越少的就业机会而继续生产越来越多的产品是否值得追求，这个问题还不好说。


As robots increasingly replace human labor, humans will need incomes to replace wages from work. Whereas tax credits point in the direction of replacement incomes, raising the minimum wage points in the opposite direction, by making income more dependent on jobs.	随着机器人日益取代人类劳动，人类需要取代劳动所得的收入源。


In fact, focusing on the minimum wage would almost certainly speed up the automation process. Previous evidence that minimum-wage legislation does not reduce the demand for labor might not stand up against the rapidly falling cost of automating the production of goods and services.	税收减免指向替代性所得，而提高最低工资的指向与此正好相反，让所得更加依赖于工作。


In short, if Osborne is serious about his pledge to provide a “living income” for all, he should be moving toward the idea of a “basic” or “citizen’s” income, independent of the job market.	简言之，如果奥斯本认真对待其为所有人提供“过活所得”的承诺，他就应该致力于推广独立于就业市场的“基本”或“公民”所得。


A simple way forward would be to provide all citizens an unconditional tax credit, which could be built up gradually as the rewards from work fall.	一个简单的方法是向所有公民提供无条件税收减免，该政策可以随着工作收入的逐渐下降而建立起来。


Both free-market and socialist thinkers have long advocated implementing a basic-income scheme.	长期以来，自由市场和社会主义思想家都在鼓吹实施基本所得机制。


But the idea has always fallen foul of two objections: societies are too poor to afford it, and it would be a disincentive to work.	但该思想永远面临着两个局限：社会太穷，负担不起这样的机制； 并且这样的机制会鼓励人不去工作。


The first objection is surely no longer true of the advanced economies, while the second is irrelevant, given that the goal is not to strengthen the incentive to work, but to enable people to live without work.	第一个局限显然已经不适用于发达经济体，而第二个局限无关紧要，因为目标不是激励人们去工作，而是让人们可以脱离工作生活。


An unconditional basic income would make part-time work a possibility for many who now have to work full-time at non-living wages.	无条件基本所得能够让兼职工作成为许多目前必须在无法过活的工资水平上从事全职工作的人的一种可能。


And all workers would begin to gain the freedom to make the same choices regarding how much to work, and under what conditions, that owners of substantial capital now have.	而所有工人都可以开始获得做出关于工作多少、在什么环境下工作的选择的自由。 这一自由如今为大量资本所有者所独有。


Bear Hunting in Romania	在罗马尼亚猎熊


NEW YORK – Nicolae Ceausescu liked to hunt bear.	纽约 —— 尼古拉·齐奥塞斯库酷爱猎熊。


With his retinue, he would retreat to a lodge in Transylvania and sally forth, locked and loaded.	他常常和随行人员一道躲进特兰西瓦尼亚的小木屋，从那里全副武装出发去猎熊。


He was accustomed to good fortune, for his huntsmen took precautions.	因为事先采取了周密的防范措施，他已经习惯了好运随身。


They would chain some poor beast to a tree, drug it to keep it still, and conceal themselves around the blind from which the Great Man would shoot.	工作人员会把一头可怜的动物绑在树上，事先麻醉以防止它乱动，然后自己躲进射击死角，静候着伟人开枪猎熊。


One day, they did their job haphazardly.	有一天，他们在执行任务时出现了险情。


Ceausescu took aim, then fell backward when the bear, inadequately sedated, reared on its hind legs as if to attack.	齐奥塞斯库举枪瞄准，但没有完全麻醉的熊后腿立起像要发动进攻，齐奥塞斯库仰面朝天跌倒在地。


His shot flew into the treetops, even as three bullets entered the bear’s heart from the snipers who guaranteed the dictator’s marksmanship.	他猎枪里的子弹飞上了树梢，与此同时却有三颗子弹射入了黑熊的心脏，开枪的是保护独裁者安全的狙击手。


This day, I was told by a forester who claimed to have witnessed the incident, Ceausescu did not acknowledge the applause of his retainers.	今天，我从一位声称目睹了事件全过程的护林人口中了解了事情的真相，齐奥塞斯库并没有对随行人员的精彩表现予以嘉奖。


This could be the story of the Romanian revolution, 20 years ago.	这个故事与 20 年前的罗马尼亚革命非常相像。


The bear is the country’s enslaved people.	黑熊代表了这个国家被奴役的民众。


They rise up from slumber.	他们从沉睡中醒来。


The emperor, alarmed, fires wildly and misses his mark.	大吃一惊的君主疯狂射击，却没有打中目标。


The sharpshooters hidden in the forest take aim and fire, only this time their target is not the bear, but Ceausescu himself.	隐藏在森林里的神枪手瞄准开枪，只是这一次他们的目标不是黑熊，而是齐奥塞斯库本人。


Just as the glory of the French Revolution ended in the Terror, so Eastern Europe’s miracle year of 1989 ended in blood.	与法国大革命以恐怖告终如出一辙的是， 1989 年这个神奇的东欧年份也以血腥收场。


Elsewhere, communist regimes seemed almost to run from power.	在其他国家，共产党政府几乎都是仓惶出逃。


The people who deposed them celebrated largely painless victories.	将他们赶下台的民众为庆祝这几乎兵不血刃得来的胜利而载歌载舞。


Not so in Romania.	但在罗马尼亚却不是这样。


There, the country’s communist masters ordered the security forces to fire on the people.	这个国家的共产党领导人命令安全部队对民众开枪。


They obeyed.	军队服从了他们的命令。


A civil war was fought, albeit briefly.	罗马尼亚陷入了短暂的内战。


Revolution transmuted into a crypto-coup d’état.	革命演变为一次秘密的军事政变。


It began in mid-December in the gritty industrial town of Timisoara, close to the Hungarian border.	政变始于 12 月中旬 蒂米什瓦拉这个 靠近匈牙利边境的工业重镇 。


When Ceausescu ordered the military to stage a show of force against those who dared oppose him, commanders took him literally: they put on a parade, complete with marching band.	当齐奥塞斯库命令军队向敢于反抗者展示力量时，指挥官们按照字面意思执行了指令：他们组织了一次检阅，让军队在军乐团的鼓点中行进。


Farce quickly turned to tragedy in the face of the dictator’s rage.	在独裁者的怒火面前闹剧迅速演变成为一场悲剧。


“I meant tanks, you fool,” he said, in effect, to Gen. Iulian Vlad, threatening to put him in front of a firing squad if he did not comply.	“我指的是坦克，你们这帮笨蛋，”他对 尤利安·弗拉德将军说，甚至威胁如果敢于违抗命令就将其就地正法。


That night, roughly a hundred Romanian citizens died in the streets, and hundreds more were wounded.	那一晚，大概 100 多名罗马尼亚公民死在了街上，此外还有数百人受伤。


The rest is well-known history.	接下来就是那段尽人皆知的历史。


On the morning of December 21, Ceausescu stepped onto the balcony of the Central Committee in the heart of Bucharest to address the people – cadres of state workers assembled, as was customary, to cheer on cue.	12 月 21 日清晨 ，齐奥塞斯库站在布加勒斯特市中心中央委员会的阳台上发表群众讲话 —— 罗马尼亚工人骨干按照惯例集中起来，在接到信号时欢呼鼓掌。


But something went wrong.	但这一次计划并未执行得天衣无缝。


From the rear of the huge crowd came shouts: “Ti-mi-soara!	从人群的后方传来呐喊：“ 蒂米什瓦拉！


Ti-mi-soara!”	蒂米什瓦拉！


Then came the fateful call, shouted by perhaps one or two people but soon picked up by others: “Down with Ceausescu!”	”接着传来了致命的呐喊，开始时可能只有一两个人，但很快其他人就开始加入喊话：“打倒齐奥塞斯库！ ”


Never had Ceausescu heard anything like it.	齐奥塞斯库从未听到过类似的口号。


His face sagged.	他的脸越拉越长。


Flustered, he stopped speaking, waved his arms in timid bewilderment, the weak and ineffectual gestures of an imposter.	他在慌乱中停止了讲话，胆怯而迷惑不解地挥舞着臂膀，这是江湖骗子虚弱而徒劳的姿态。


This moment of truth lasted only a few seconds, but it was enough.	真相大爆发的时刻只持续了几秒钟，但已经足够了。


He stood revealed.	他毫无掩饰地站在当场。


Everyone on the square and everyone watching on national TV saw clearly.	亲临广场和收看电视转播的每一个人都看得清清楚楚。


The emperor had no clothes.	皇帝被剥光了新装。


Ceausescu and his wife, the infamous Elena, fled from the roof of the Central Committee aboard a white helicopter as crowds stormed the building. Fighting erupted between the army, siding with the people, and elements of the secret police loyal to Ceausescu.	第二天，反抗运动蔓延到所有的重要城市。


Snipers shot from the rooftops, and tanks blasted away in what today is Revolution Square, setting the national library ablaze. After a three-day chase, on Christmas Day, the dictator and his wife were captured, tried, and summarily executed by a kangaroo “people’s court.”	齐奥塞斯库和他的夫人，臭名昭著的


Revolutions are probably never as they seem, but Romania’s was especially ambiguous.	革命或许从来就不是看起来的样子，但罗马尼亚这场革命尤其模糊。


For, at the moment of Ceausescu’s speech, it became in effect two revolutions – one that played out publicly in the streets, and the other a deep and behind-the-scenes struggle for power among elites.	因为从齐奥塞斯库讲话那一刻起，革命就分成了两条支线 —— 一条在街道上公开上演，另一条则是精英人士为争权夺利上演的一场不为人知的深层次战斗。


I sensed this arriving in Bucharest on December 26.	12 月 26 日 革命已经蔓延到布加勒斯特。


Visiting the television station, seized by a new provisional government called the National Salvation Front, I found an odd mélange of revolutionary leaders.	在走访被名为救国阵线的临时政府所占领的电视台时，我发现革命领袖的身份令人奇怪的鱼龙混杂。


I could understand the poets, students, dissidents, and allegedly disaffected government officials.	我能理解他们中有诗人、学生、持不同政见者和所谓不满的政府官员。


But Gen. Stefan Gruse, the army chief of staff who commanded the troops in Timisoara?	但怎么会有在 蒂米什瓦拉指挥军队的陆军参谋长斯特凡·格鲁泽？


The newly appointed president, Ion Iliescu, who was Ceausescu’s former chief propagandist?	新任命的总统伊利埃斯库 居然曾经负责齐奥塞斯库的宣传工作？


Perhaps the most incongruous presence was Gen. Victor Stanculescu, a favorite of the Ceausescu’s who only days before had reportedly organized their evacuation from the rooftop of the Central Committee.	也许最不协调的是将军 维克托·斯滕库列斯库，他是齐奥塞斯库最宠信的人物，就在几天前，他还被报导组织了从中央委员会楼顶的撤退活动。


Other reports credited him with subsequently organizing both their trial and a firing squad – even before the legal proceedings began.	其他报导称他其后组织了齐奥塞斯库夫妇的审判并安排了行刑小组 —— 当时法律程序甚至还没有正式启动。


The “trial” itself lasted less than an hour.	“审判”本身持续时间不到 1 个小时。


Scarcely seven minutes after the sentence was read out, had the executioners done their work.	在宣读判决仅仅 7 分钟后，行刑者就枪决了齐奥塞斯库夫妇。


The event was videotaped, to be aired to an astonished nation the next day, but in the rush the cameraman’s power cable was yanked from the wall as the convicted couple was dragged out to an open-air courtyard.	有人对这次审判过程进行了录像，第二天在惊得目瞪口呆的公众面前播出，但在一片混乱中摄影师的电线被从墙上拉下，当时宣判完毕的齐奥塞斯库夫妇正被拖到室外的空场上。


By the time he caught up, soldiers were already shooting.	等到摄影师赶上的时候，士兵们已经在开枪。


Nicolae Ceausescu lay on his back, in the overcoat and suit in which he had fled, his blue-grey eyes staring vacantly at the sky.	尼古拉·齐奥塞斯库仰面朝天躺在地上，身上穿着逃跑时穿的外衣和套装。 他的蓝眼睛毫无神采地盯着天空。


Elena had fainted and was shot where she lay.	埃列娜已经昏死过去，就在昏倒的地方被行刑者开枪处决。


Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Exchange Rates?	以邻为壑外汇政策？


GENEVA – When the Swiss National Bank (SNB) recently brought its interest rate down to 0.25%, it announced that it would engage in “quantitative easing,” following in the footsteps of the United States Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.	日内瓦报道－当瑞士国家银行（简称“瑞行”）最近将利率下调到0. 25%，该行宣布其将实行“定额放松”政策，实则是在紧跟美联储与英格兰银行所实行的措施。


More surprising was the simultaneous announcement that it was intervening on the foreign-exchange market with the aim of reversing the appreciation of the franc.	更让人吃惊的是，瑞行同时宣布其将干涉外汇市场，旨在逆转瑞士法郎的升值问题。


Will this be the first salvo in a war of competitive devaluations?	在目前这场货币竞相贬值的战争中，瑞行的措施能成为发起攻势的先行者吗？


Interest rates are traditionally low in Switzerland.	一贯以来，瑞士的利率就不高。


Like most other central banks confronted with the recession, the SNB has reduced its policy interest rate all the way to the zero lower bound.	如同其它在经济萧条中抗争的国家中央银行，瑞行将其政策性的利率一路降到零利率下限。


Once there, traditional monetary policy becomes impotent, as the interest-rate tool is no longer usable.	一旦出现这种情况，惯常实行的货币政策就无法抵抗危机，因为利率工具不再发挥其作用。


This is why central banks are now searching for new instruments.	这也是为什么各国的中央银行现在都在想方设法采取新的方法。


Quantitative easing represents one such attempt.	“定额放松”就代表这样一种尝试。


It remains to be seen whether it can effectively restore some monetary-policy influence.	但该措施能够有效地恢复某些货币政策的影响力，还需继续观察。


However, an important issue is rarely mentioned: in small, open economies – a description that applies to almost every country except the US – the main channel of monetary policy is the exchange rate.	然而，一个重要的问题却很少被提到：在小而开放的经济体（这种描述适合于几乎任何国家，除了美国）中，货币政策的主要渠道是汇率。


This channel is ignored for one good reason: exchange-rate policies are fundamentally of the beggar-thy-neighbor variety.	这种渠道被忽略，其中有个很好的理由，即从根本上讲，汇率政策实际上就是“以邻为壑”政策。


Unconventional policies that aim at weakening the exchange rate are technically possible even at zero interest rates, and they are quite likely to be effective at the level of individual countries.	从专业上来讲，旨在弱化汇率的各项非传统政策是又可能达到零利率的，并且在单个（非联盟）国家更能发挥其作用。


Boosting competitiveness through exchange-rate depreciation may not succeed in raising exports in a situation where world trade is rapidly contracting, but it can cushion the blow by switching demand toward domestically produced goods and services.	通过汇率贬值来加强货币竞争在世界贸易快速萎缩的情况下也许无法提升出口额，但这种措施能通过将需求转化到对本国产品与服务上，从而减少经济打击的力度。


The risk is that those countries that suffer from the switch retaliate and depreciate their own currencies.	这其中的风险是，在转化过程中蒙受损失的那些国家最终还是要以货币贬值为代价。


That could easily trigger a return to the much-feared competitive depreciations that contributed to the Great Depression.	这样就会容易引发一场由货币竞相贬值而向大萧条时代的回归，这是最让人担惊受怕的。


The first casualty would be whatever small scope remains for international policy coordination.	这样将引发一些损失。


The second would be the world international monetary system.	首先是那些需要进行国际政策协作的小范围的国家，其次则是世界货币体系。


In fact, one key reason for the creation of the International Monetary Fund was to monitor exchange-rate developments with the explicit aim of preventing beggar-thy-neighbor policies.	事实上，成立国际货币基金组织的主要一个原因是其能够监控汇率的发展情势，也就是要阻止任何国家实行“以邻为壑”政策。


This is why the Swiss move comes as a surprise.	这也是瑞士给人带来吃惊的原因。


It is true that the franc has appreciated in real terms by 8% since the crisis started in August 2007.	自从2007年8月经济危机爆发之时起，瑞士法郎就实际上升了8%。


This is commonly attributed to the currency reputation as a safe haven during troubled times.	这一般归因于瑞士法郎的名声，即在困难时期能成为安全的避风港。


What this really means is that the appreciation is neither a consequence of monetary policy nor the other usual factors.	然而其真正的意义是，货币的升值不是货币政策的结果，也不是其它通常因素的结果。


In any case, while the Swiss authorities’ discomfort with the situation is understandable, their decision is disquieting.	无论如何，尽管瑞士当局在当前情况下感到不适能被人理解，但其决定仍令人担忧。


The Swiss franc is not the only currency that has appreciated in recent months.	最近几个月以来，瑞士法郎并不是唯一升值的货币。


Other small economies have undergone even sharper real appreciations.	其它的小经济体也经历了急剧的货币升值。


For example, Poland and the Czech Republic have seen their currencies go up by close to 30% and 15%, respectively.	比如说，波兰与捷克共和国各自的货币就几乎升值了30%与15%。


Major countries also have undergone currency appreciations – 30% for Japan and 15% for China.	主要的一些国家同样经历了货币升值：日本的货币升值约30%，中国的货币升值约15%。


These countries, too, are facing a recession, and, while the interest rate has not yet reached its zero bound everywhere, incentives to depreciate might grow in the near future.	这些国家也都面临经济萧条，而当其利率还未达到零下限时，这些国家在不久的将来可能出炉货币贬值的刺激政策。


In fact, the incentives are already there.	事实上，刺激政策已经开始执行。


Some fairly large countries – Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, to name a few – have already undergone some very large depreciations.	一些相当大的国家（韩国、瑞典与英国，举行而言）已经经历了非常大幅的货币贬值。


In fact, Poland’s currency recently started to depreciate.	实际上，波兰的货币最近也开始贬值。


None of these countries’ central banks has indicated that it was involved in depreciating its currency.	这些国家的中央银行都未曾表示要对其货币实行贬值。


Of course, statements and intentions may not be identical.	当然，陈述与动机也许无法相关联。


It may be that the SNB merely acknowledges what other central banks do not.	可能瑞行只是承认了其它中央银行没有承认的事实。


In doing so, however, the SNB is violating a taboo: “Thou shall not engage in competitive depreciations.”	然而，在这样做的时候，瑞行违反了一种忌讳：“你不该参与竞相贬值活动”。


Alternatively, it may be that the SNB mostly wishes to talk the franc down to break the safe-haven effect.	或者，瑞行可能主要希望能让瑞士法郎稍作贬值来打破安全避风港效应。


Having promptly achieved depreciation, it may have succeeded.	快速地获得货币贬值，它也许能达到这个目的。


In that case, the franc will not move much more, in any direction, and there will be no need for further interventions.	在这种情况下，瑞士法郎贬值与升值都不会很大，这样就无需瑞行对汇率进行干涉。


Nevertheless, the limited reaction to the SNB move is somewhat surprising.	然而，对于瑞行的措施受限的反应还是让人有些吃惊的。


The move came one week after the IMF concluded its annual Article IV visit to Switzerland, and the report has yet to be released; it could make for unusually interesting reading.	瑞行的措施是在国际货币基金组织决定其对瑞士进行视察的年度第四项条款之后出台的，而这个报告还没有公开发行； 该文件读起来会非同寻常的有趣。


Other central banks have not expressed any view, which may suggest that they do not intend to retaliate, at least at this stage.	其它国家的中央银行没有发表任何观点，这也许表明他们至少在现阶段不打算对货币采取回弹政策。


They may have been reassured by the SNB’s official statement that the appreciation represented “an inappropriate tightening of monetary conditions,” and that the policy move merely aims “to prevent any further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro.”	瑞行的官方报告指出，货币升值代表了“对货币情形不加适宜地加紧控制”，而且国家政策的实施只是为了能“阻止瑞士法郎针对欧元再次升值”——这样也许让其它央行再次放心瑞行的政策。


It may also be that notice has been taken of the precedent, and that those authorities that intend to use it to justify future moves are loathe to criticize it.	也许是因为瑞行注意到了先前危机的危害，而且那些打算使用这些信息对未来行动进行支持的当局不愿对此提出评论意见。


In that case, the generalized silence could indicate that all other central banks entertain the possibility of using that option, which would be most worrisome.	在这种情况下，各国齐心一致的沉默说明，所有其它央行更愿意采用这种最令人不安的选择。


Smokeless China	无烟中国


BEIJING – In a few weeks, Beijing will implement a city-wide ban on smoking in all indoor public spaces, such as restaurants and offices, as well as on tobacco advertising outdoors, on public transportation, and in most forms of media.	北京——短短几周内，北京将在餐馆及办公室等全市所有室内公共场所实行禁烟措施。 户外、公交及多种媒体形式的烟草广告也将被同时禁止。


If the initiative, agreed late last year by the municipal people’s congress, is successful, China may impose a similar ban nationwide.	如果去年底市人大批准的举措成功实施，中国有可能在全国范围内强制实行类似的禁烟措施。


A significant decline in smoking would undoubtedly bring enormous public-health benefits to China.	吸烟人数显著下降无疑会给中国带来不可估量的公共健康利益。


But is it feasible?	但问题是这样做是否现实？


With an estimated 300 million smokers, China represents one-third of the world’s total and accounts for an average of roughly 2,700 tobacco-related deaths per day.	拥有约3亿烟民的中国占世界烟民总数的三分之一，平均每天约有2，700人因为吸烟引发的疾病致死。


The costs of treating smoking-related diseases, not to mention the associated productivity losses, are considerable.	治疗与吸烟有关疾病的费用，更不要说相关的生产力损失是非常惊人的。


But China has so far struggled to reduce smoking or enforce bans effectively.	但中国迄今为止在减少吸烟或有效执行禁令方面的进展并不顺利。


Indeed, despite ratifying the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention to Tobacco Control in 2005, China failed to fulfill its commitment to ban indoor smoking by 2011.	事实上，尽管在2005年批准了世卫组织的烟草控制框架公约，中国未能兑现其到2011年禁止室内吸烟的承诺。


Moreover, tobacco output increased 32%.	不仅如此，烟草产量还增加了32%。


Bans have since been implemented in 14 Chinese cities, including Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou.	其后禁令在上海、杭州和广州等 14个中国城市得以实施。


But they have done little to reduce smoking, owing not only to weak enforcement, but also to the prevailing view, held by 75% of Chinese adults, that smoking does not cause serious harm.	但因为执行不力和75%的中国成年人认为吸烟不会造成严重危害，导致禁烟并未取得显著的效果。


(Only about 16% of Chinese smokers report an intention to quit.)	（据报有意戒烟的中国烟民仅占16%。


Against this background, the Beijing municipal authorities’ plan to fine smokers up to CN¥200 ($32) for lighting up in public places appears unpromising at best.	）在这样的背景下，北京市政当局对公共场所吸烟高达200人民币（相当于32美元）的罚款计划似乎充其量也没有太大意义。


The obvious question is why China’s government, which is not known to be shy about imposing paternalistic policies in other areas, does not simply ban cigarette production and use altogether.	最明显的问题是为什么在其他领域不吝推行家长式政策的中国政府不干脆禁止烟草的生产和使用。


After all, other countries and localities, from Scandinavia to New York City, have made smoking prohibitively expensive and illegal in most public places.	毕竟，从斯堪的纳维亚到纽约的其他国家和地区已经在多数公共场所开辟了吸烟违法且付出昂贵代价的先例。


The reason why China has not taken this path lies in the jobs and revenue that the industry provides.	中国没有采取上述措施的原因在于烟草行业所能提供的就业机会和收入。


The state-owned China National Tobacco Corporation sells almost all of the cigarettes consumed in the country; indeed, it is the world’s largest cigarette manufacturer, supplying 2.5 trillion annually, which in turn generates CN¥816 billion (7-10% of GDP) in revenue.	国内消费的几乎所有香烟均由国有的中国烟草总公司负责销售； 事实上，该公司是全世界最大的卷烟制造企业，年供应量高达2，5000亿，实现人民币8，160亿元（占国内生产总值7-10%）的销售收入。


Indeed, tobacco receipts finance as much as half of some provincial governments’ budgets.	事实上，烟草带来的财政收入相当于某些省级政府财政预算的半数 。


Even in an authoritarian country like China, the loss of so much income, not to mention the ire of 300 million addicts, would make prohibition a huge challenge.	即使在中国这样的专制国家，如此巨额的收入损失、更不用说3亿烟民对禁烟的不满会给禁烟工作带来巨大的难度。


But there is an alternative that could help appease angry citizens and mitigate the revenue loss from an outright ban on smoking: electronic cigarettes.	但电子烟替代法有助于缓解彻底禁烟所带来的收入损失和平息民众愤怒。


Given that e-cigarettes merely heat a nicotine solution to produce an inhalable vapor, they release none of the carcinogenic tar of cigarette smoke, making them the ideal nicotine-delivery system for smokers seeking – or being forced – to reduce or halt their tobacco intake.	鉴于电子烟只是加热尼古丁溶液产生可吸入蒸汽，不释放吸烟所产生的致癌焦油物质，���得其成为吸烟或被迫减少或停止烟草摄入者理想的尼古丁输送系统。


Aside from being far less damaging than cigarettes, e-cigarettes are a homegrown product, invented in China in 2003.	电子烟不仅危害远小于香烟，而且于2003年由中国自主发明并自产自销。


But, despite considerable progress in China’s e-cigarette industry – in 2013, Shenzhen province housed 900 manufacturers of the devices, up 200% from 2012, and accounted for over 95% of global e-cigarette production – traditional cigarettes still dominate the Chinese market.	但尽管中国电子烟行业取得了长足的进步——2013年，深圳市拥有900家电子烟制造企业，比2012年增长200%，占到全球电子烟生产超过95%的份额——传统的香烟制品依然垄断着中国市场。


As Yanzhong Huang of the Council on Foreign Relations recently pointed out, “If only 1% of China’s smoking population turned to e-cigarettes, it would mean a market of about 3.5 million e-cigarette users.”	就像外交关系委员会委员黄严忠最近指出的那样，“只有有1％的中国吸烟人口转向电子烟，就意味着约350万用户的庞大电子香烟市场。


The China National Tobacco Corporation could become the world’s largest e-cigarette maker.	中国烟草总公司可能成为世界上最大的电子烟制造商。


One reason China has not managed to tap the e-cigarette industry’s enormous potential is a lack of adequate regulation.	中国未能成功挖掘电子烟行业巨大潜力的原因之一是监管的缺乏。


Low entry barriers enable intense competition that diminishes producers’ profit margins, and shoddy products are rife, owing to low manufacturing standards.	进入门槛低导致的激烈竞争严重侵蚀了生产者的利润，较低的生产标准导致伪劣产品四处开花。


If e-cigarettes are to replace traditional cigarettes and offset lost tobacco revenues, the government must regulate the industry more carefully to ensure safety and quality.	要想让电子烟代替传统香烟弥补失去的烟草收入，政府必须更认真地规范行业以确保安全和质量。


But such efforts will mean little without a shift in people’s attitudes.	但民众观念如果未能转变上述努力的意义就不大。


Here, the ban on smoking in public places or during official activities imposed in 2013 on Chinese Communist Party and government officials could be helpful.	这里，2013年实行的党和政府官员公共场合或公务活动吸烟禁令可能会有所帮助。


As Huang explains, if more officials turn to e-cigarettes, ordinary people might be inspired to follow suit.	黄严忠解释说，如果更多官员转向电子烟，普通民众可能会受到启发纷纷效仿。


Already, it seems that the directors of the China National Tobacco Corporation have complied with a government-mandated ban on cigarette smoking.	到目前为止，似乎中国烟草总公司的董事们遵守了政府强制实施的禁烟规定。


Whether they have become e-cigarette “vapers” is not known.	他们是否已经成为电子烟“拥趸”还有待考证。


A smoke-free China – one that benefits from rising productivity and massive health-care savings – may seem like a pipe dream.	受益于生产率提高和巨额医疗费用节约的无烟中国可能看起来像一个白日梦。


But a country-wide ban on smoking, with a reliable e-cigarette industry providing an alternative (both to smokers and to budgets), offers an intriguing way to turn the dream into reality.	但全国禁烟加之可靠的电子烟行业（为烟民和财政）提供替代方案指明了把梦想变为现实的有吸引力的道路。


Beijing Versus the Billionaire	北京对决亿万富翁


BANGKOK – China’s government and Hong Kong’s wealthiest man, the much-admired Li Ka-shing, have been waging an acidic spat – one that increasingly looks like a bitter divorce being played out in tabloid newspapers.	曼谷——中国政府和香港第一大富豪、备受推崇的李嘉诚正在进行一场激烈的争吵——而且在小报上越来越像一次激烈的离婚。


Indeed, Chinese media have lately been directing a relentless stream of vitriol at Li.	事实上，中国媒体近来一直在尖刻地评论李嘉诚。


His “crime”?	他犯了什么“罪”？


Buying low in Europe and selling high in China – that is, acting like an investor.	像投资者那样在欧洲低价买入在中国高价卖出。


The trigger for this wave of scorn was Li’s sell-off of some of his prime Shanghai properties, after relocating his corporate registry from Hong Kong to the Cayman Islands.	引发这波轻蔑谴责的是李抛售在上海的某些高端物业，还把公司注册地从香港转到开曼群岛。


This is a completely mundane and rational business decision, aimed at minimizing tax obligations.	这完全是普通而理性的商业决策，目的是最大限度地减轻税收负担。


Indeed, some 70% of all Hong Kong-listed companies have a Caribbean registry, and even a number of major mainland companies, including the Internet giant Alibaba, are registered in offshore tax havens.	事实上，约70%的香港上市公司都在加勒比地区进行过注册，就连包括互联网巨头阿里巴巴在内的一些大型内地企业也在海外避税天堂注册以求避税。


But, in the Chinese media’s puerile narrative, the move exposes Li as “ungrateful” and “unpatriotic.”	但在中国媒体幼稚的文章中，此举暴露了李的“不爱国”和“忘恩负义”。


He is “abandoning” China – which, it is claimed, enabled him to rise from extreme poverty to become one of the world’s wealthiest men – when the country needs him most.	当中国最需要他的时候，他却抛弃了这个使他从极端贫困成长为世界首富的国度。


This absurd account neglects the fact that Li was already one of the world’s wealthiest people before he ever invested in China.	这种荒谬的说法忽略了一个事实，即李嘉诚在投资中国前就已经栖身世界首富之列。


Perhaps more important, it fails to recognize that Li’s Chinese land holdings still amount to more than 20 million square meters (215 million square feet) – nearly a quarter of the size of Manhattan – and that the number of retail outlets he owns in China has increased by 70% in two years.	或许更重要的是，它未能意识到李在中国的土地储备仍然高达2，000万平方米（2. 15亿平方英尺）——几乎是曼哈顿面积的四分之一——而且他在中国拥有的零售渠道数量在两年内增长了70%。


But the facts are irrelevant.	但事实无关紧要。


This is a matter of politics.	这是个政治问题。


As China attempts to tighten its grip on Hong Kong, Li is showing independence, and China’s new rulers – who, true to their communist roots, believe firmly in top-down control – do not like it one bit.	随着中国意图加强对香港控制和李日益表现出我行我素，中国相信自上而下控制且忠实于共产主义根源的执政者一点也不喜欢他的所作所为。


The ongoing squabble represents a significant shift in Li’s relationship with China’s government.	此次争吵反映出李和中国政府关系的重大转变。


A former adviser to Deng Xiaoping and confidante of former President Jiang Zemin (whose political influence is now waning), Li was among the first to invest in China after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.	曾任邓小平顾问和前主席江泽民（其政治影响力正不断减弱）密友的李嘉诚，曾是1989年天安门广场屠杀事件后首批在中国的投资者。


He long touted the motto, “I don’t do anything against China’s interest, and I don’t say anything that may hurt China’s reputation.”	他的座右铭是，“我不做任何违背中国利益的事，不说任何有损中国声誉的话。 ”


That changed in 2012, when Leung Chun-ying was appointed as Hong Kong’s chief executive.	2012年梁振英被任命为香港行政长官时这一切都发生了改变。


China’s first choice for the position, Henry Tang, was forced to withdraw because of private indiscretions and a disgraceful bid to have his wife take the fall for a zoning violation.	中国任命担任特首职务的首选唐英年因为私行不检和让妻子为划区违规担责的丑闻而被迫退出竞争。


Leung became China’s man in Hong Kong, responsible for doing the Chinese government’s bidding – including taking an uncompromising position against pro-democracy protests by students and intellectuals.	梁振英成了中国在香港的代表，负责执行中国政府政策——包括对学生和知识分子的民主抗议活动采取强硬措施。


Indeed, even as China’s agenda in Hong Kong has become increasingly tough – and thus unpopular locally – Leung has proved himself to be absolutely loyal to China’s rulers.	事实上，即便中国在香港的政策变得日益强硬——因此在当地不受欢迎——梁依然证明自己绝对忠诚于中国执政者。


Li, however, stood by Tang.	而李则加入了唐英年的阵营。


More problematic, he has occasionally dissented publicly from Leung’s various misguided policies.	更有问题的是，他偶尔会对梁各项错误政策公开表示反对。


As any student of the People’s Republic knows, expressions of political disagreement, however mild, can be lethal.	中华人民共和国的学生都知道，表达政治不同意见无论多么温和都可以致命。


There is no “agree to disagree” in China; once the leader has spoken, there is only “obey.”	在中国没有“同意保留意见”的余地，一旦领导人下达命令，唯一的选择就只有“执行”。


In Li’s case, the stakes are particularly high.	李所涉及的利益尤其巨大。


Unlike most of Hong Kong’s tycoons, who are considered excessively focused on political expedience, Li is viewed as a person of strong conscience and thus worthy of considerable respect.	和多数只关注政治权宜之计的香港大亨不同，李被视为有良心的人，值得尊敬。


He even enjoys the affectionate nickname “Superman.”	别人甚至给他起了绰号叫“超人”。


But now, China’s rulers, through Leung, are pushing potentially disastrous policies aimed, in Chinese Communist Party parlance, at “de-colonizing” Hong Kong.	但现在中国执政者正通过梁振英推行可能是灾难性的政策，按照中国共产党的说法是启动香港的“去殖民化”进程。


For example, officials recently declared that judicial independence and the separation of powers are “colonial” legacies that should be discarded, with China’s government and Hong Kong’s chief executive, not the local courts, calling all the shots.	比如官方最近宣布司法独立和分权是应该抛弃的“殖民地”产物，并由中国政府和香港首席执行官、而非地方法院来做出决定。


In this moment of transition, dissent from someone of Li’s standing could have precisely the kind of destabilizing impact that China’s leaders fear.	在这样的过渡时期，像李这种人的不同意见会带来中国领导人担心的不稳定。


So Li has to be “de-deified.”	因此必须对李实施“去神化论”。


China’s attacks have pushed Li, after almost three weeks of stony silence, to do something he had never done before: strike back.	中国的攻击迫使李在近三周的沉寂之后，开始做他从未做过的事情：反击。


Not only did he point out that all of the accusations about his intentions to abandon China were false; he openly accused China of using tactics from the Cultural Revolution that left him “trembling with fear” and sent “shivers down the spine.”	他不仅指出所有关于他抛弃中国的指责错误，还公开指责中国利用文化大革命留下的对策让他“恐惧”得不寒而栗。


Li concluded his statement with the message, delivered via three lines by two canonical Chinese poets from the ancient Tang and Song dynasties, that his home was where he felt safe.	李用中国古代唐宋两位诗人的三句诗来结束自己的声明，称家让他感到安全。


The subtext to any literate Chinese was clear: “China may be my ancestral country, but I am a free man, free to choose my home.”	其中的潜台词十分明确：“中国可能是我的祖国，但我是自由人，我有权选择把家安在哪里。 ”


Li, an avid reader of world history and literature, has apparently not taken to heart the lesson that so many Chinese have learned, through great personal tragedies, since 1949.	李是世界历史和文学的狂热爱好者，但显然未能吸取1949年后很多中国人通过巨大的个人悲剧所得到的教训。


The core values of China’s government are not informed by the humane civility of Tang or Song poets, but by the twisted dialectics of Marxism-Leninism and the amoral militaristic tradition of a party that still cherishes its often brutish and violent habits of governance.	中国政府的核心价值不是来自唐宋诗人的人道文明，而是来自扭曲的马克思列宁主义辩证法和依然珍视自身粗野暴力执政习惯的违反道德的军国主义传统党派。


As China’s leaders continue to push for more control over Hong Kong, spinal shivers are likely to become an increasingly common feature of life there.	随着中国领导人继续加强对香港的控制，不寒而栗有可能日益成为那里生活的常态。


Ben Bernanke’s Dream World	伯南克的天上人间


BERKELEY – US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke is not regarded as an oracle in the way that his predecessor, Alan Greenspan, was before the financial crisis.	伯克利——美联储董事会主席本·伯南克并没像他的前任艾伦·格林斯潘在金融危机前那样被人们称为圣人。


But financial markets were glued to the speech he gave in Jackson Hole, Wyoming on August 26.  What they heard was a bit of a muddle.	但8月26日，他在怀俄明州杰克森霍尔的讲话让市场十分纠结。 市场听到的是混乱的信号。


First of all, Bernanke did not propose any further easing of monetary policy to support the stalled recovery – or, rather, the non-recovery.	首先，伯南克并未表示会实施任何进一步的宽松货币政策来支持停滞不前的复苏（或者还不如说是复而不苏）。


Second, he assured his listeners that “we expect a moderate recovery to continue and indeed to strengthen.”	其次，他向听众保证“我们预期温和复苏会持续，事实上，复苏会有所增强。


This is because “[h]ouseholds also have made some progress in repairing their balance sheets – saving more, borrowing less, and reducing their burdens of interest payments and debt.”	”这是“因为家庭在修复资产负债表上面也取得了一些进展，他们储蓄增加了，贷款减少了，利息和债务负担也在减少。


Moreover, falling commodity prices will also “help increase household purchasing power.”	”此外，商品价格下跌也会“有助于增加家庭购买力。 ”


Finally, Bernanke claimed that “the growth fundamentals of the United States do not appear to have been permanently altered by the shocks of the past four years.”	最后，伯南克宣称“过去四年来的冲击并未永久性改变美国经济增长基本面。 ”


Frankly, I do not understand how Bernanke can say any of these things right now.	坦白说，我不明白伯南克为何能在现在说出这样的话。


If he and the rest of the Federal Open Market Committee thought that the projected growth of nominal spending in the US was on an appropriate recovery path two months ago, they cannot believe that today.	如果两个月前他和美联储公开市场委员会的其他成员认为美国名义支出预期增长率处在不错的复苏势头中，那么如今他们已不再持有这一观点。


Two months of bad economic news, coupled with asset markets’ severe revaluations of the future – which also cause slower future growth, as falling asset prices lead firms to scale back investment – mean that a policy that was appropriate just 60 days ago is much too austere today.	两个月以来，经济坏消息频频，资产市场对未来的估值大幅下挫（这还会造成未来增长减缓，因为资产价格的下跌将导致企业收缩投资规模），这意味着60天前还非常合适的政策如今已苍白无力。


But let me focus on Bernanke’s fourth statement.	但让我把关注点集中在伯南克的第四个观点上。


Even if we project a relatively rapid economic recovery, by the time this lesser depression is over, the US will have experienced an investment shortfall of at least $4 trillion.	即使如今这次小萧条已经结束，预计将出现相对迅速的经济复苏，美国也将经历一次至少4万亿美元的投资不足。


Until that investment shortfall is made up, the missing capital will serve to depress the level of real GDP in the US by two full percentage points.	除非该投资不足被弥补，否则资本缺失将把美国真实GDP增长率压低整整2个百分点。


America’s growth trajectory will be 2% below what it would have been had the financial crisis been successfully finessed and the lesser depression avoided.	美国的增长潜力将比金融危机被成功消除、小型萧条被成功避免的情形低2%。


There is more: state and local budget-cutting has slowed America’s pace of investment in human capital and infrastructure, adding a third percentage point to the downward shift in the country’s long-term growth trajectory.	这还不算完：州和地方预算削减已经拖累了美国人力资本和基础设施投资速度，这将使美国长期增长趋势再缩水1个百分点。


After the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the vast wave of investment in industrial capacity during World War II made up the shortfall of the lost decade.	20世纪30年代大萧条结束后，二战期间工业产能投资潮弥补了失去的十年留下的空缺。


As a result, the Depression did not cast a shadow on future growth – or, rather, the shadow was overwhelmed by the blinding floodlights of five years of mobilization for total war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.	因此大萧条并未给未来增长留下阴影，或者说，大萧条的阴影被为对抗纳粹德国和日本帝国的总体战而动员起来的5年现代化所发出的强光一扫而空。


There is no analogous set of floodlights being deployed to erase the shadow that is currently being cast by the lesser depression.	如今，小萧条也留下了阴影，但我们却找不到类似的强光。


On the contrary, the shadow is lengthening with each passing day, owing to the absence of effective policies to get the flow of economy-wide nominal spending back on its previous track.	相反，由于缺少有效政策来让整个经济的名义支出流重回往日轨道，每过去一天，这一阴影就延长几分。


Moreover, there is an additional source of drag.	此外，还存在进一步拖后腿的因素。


A powerful factor that diminished perceived risk and encouraged investment and enterprise in the post-WWII era was the so-called “Roosevelt put.”	在后二战时代，有一个强力因素减少了风险感知并鼓励了投资和创业，那就是所谓的“罗斯福看跌期权”。


Industrial-country governments all around the world now took fighting depression to be their first and highest economic priority, so that savers and businesses had no reason to worry that the hard times that followed 1873, 1884, or 1929 would return.	如今，全世界工业国政府都将对抗萧条作为其首要和最高的经济政策考虑目标，因此储蓄者和企业不必担心1873、1884和1929年之后的艰难时世会重现。


That is no longer true.	这一点已不再成立。


The world in the future will be a riskier place than we thought it was – not because government will no longer offer guarantees that it should never have offered in the first place, but rather because the real risk that one’s customers might vanish in a prolonged depression is back.	未来世界的风险将比我们所认为的更高，这并不是因为政府将不再给出一开始就不应该给出的担保，而是因为长期萧条使得客户流失的真实风险卷土重来。


I do not know by how much this extra risk will impede the growth of the US and global economies.	我不知道这一额外风险会对美国和全球经济增长造成怎样的阻碍作用。


A back-of-the-envelope estimate suggests that a five-year lesser depression every 50 years that pushes the economy an extra 10% below its potential would reduce average investment returns and retard private investment by enough to shave two-tenths of a percentage point from economic growth every year.	无需复杂计算就能看出，50年一遇的5年小萧条将会导致经济���力降低10%，这将抑制平均投资回报和私人投资，使每年的经济增长率下降0. 2个百分点。


As a result, America would not just end this episode 3% poorer than it might have been; the gap would grow – to 7% by 2035 and 11% by 2055.	因此，美国的经济将不会仅仅下降3%，空缺会持续增长，到2035年增长到7%，到2055年增长到11%。


This is the shape of things to come if steps are not taken now to recover rapidly from this lesser depression, and then to implement policies to boost private capital, infrastructure, and education investment back up to trend.	这就是我们将要面对的未来，如果现在不采取措施以使经济从小萧条中快速复苏、然后继之以实施刺激私人资本、基础设施和教育投资重回趋势水平的政策的话。


Perhaps that would be enough to reassure everyone that policymakers’ current acquiescence in a prolonged slump was a horrible mistake that will not be repeated.	或许这已足够使所有人认识到，政客们当前对长期衰退的默认态度是个危险的错误，决不能让他们一错再错。


The New Loose Nukes	新的核危险


LOS ANGELES – Nobody would dispute the danger inherent in possessing nuclear assets.	洛杉矶——没有人会否认掌握核资产本身是件危险的事。


But that danger becomes far more acute in a combat zone, where nuclear materials and weapons are at risk of theft, and reactors can become bombing targets.	但这种危险在战区进一步加剧，核材料和武器面临被盗的危险，而反应堆则有可能成为轰炸的目标。


These risks – most apparent in today’s chaos-ridden Middle East – raise troubling questions about the security of nuclear assets in volatile countries everywhere.	这些危险因素（在今天陷入混乱的中东地区多数都非常明显）导致全球动荡国家的核资产安全问题变得令人担忧。


Two recent events demonstrate what is at stake.	最近发生的两起事件显示了其中的利害关系。


On July 9, the militant group now known as the Islamic State captured 40 kilograms (88 pounds) of uranium compounds at Mosul University in Iraq.	7月9日，被外界称之为“伊斯兰国家”的武装组织在伊拉克摩苏尔大学得到了40千克（合88磅）铀化合物。


The captured uranium was not weapons-grade; international inspectors removed all sensitive material from Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War (which is why it was absent when the United States invaded in 2003).	他们手中的铀并非武器级材料； 国际核查人员在1991年海湾战争后将所有敏感材料运出了伊拉克（2003年美国入侵时也因此没有找到任何敏感材料）。


But what international response, if any, would have been initiated if the cache had been highly enriched?	但如果敏感材料库存丰富，国际社会又该作何反应呢？


On the same day, Hamas launched three powerful Iranian-designed rockets from Gaza at Israel’s Dimona reactor.	就在同一天，哈马斯瞄准以色列迪莫纳反应堆从加沙发射了三枚威力强大的伊朗制火箭。


Luckily, two missed the target, and Israel managed to intercept the third.	幸运的是，其中两枚未能击中目标，而第三枚则被以色列成功拦截。


But the episode represented a serious escalation of hostilities and served as an important reminder of the vulnerability of nuclear reactors in warzones.	但此次事件显示敌对行动严重升级，提醒人们战区核反应堆有多么脆弱。


In fact, Hamas made similar attempts to attack the Dimona complex in 2012, as did Iraq in 1991, with the aim of releasing the site’s contents to inflict radiological damage on Israel’s population.	其实，哈马斯早在2012年就曾对迪莫纳反应堆发动过类似的袭击，1991年伊拉克也进行过同样的努力，目的是释放该反应堆内容物，从而对以色列民众造成辐射。


(The perpetrators appeared clueless to the fact that certain weather conditions would have concentrated the radioactive debris in the Palestinian-majority West Bank.)	（肇事者似乎完全不清楚特定天气条件会使放射性碎片集中在以巴勒斯坦人为主的约旦河西岸地区。 ）


Of course, it is possible that these events are an aberration.	当然，上述事件也有可能只是意外。


After all, the only conflict so far in which authorities have lost control of sensitive nuclear materials was the Georgia-Abkhazia War in the 1990s, when unknown forces seized a small amount of highly enriched uranium from a research institute.	毕竟，到目前为止当局对敏感核材料失控的唯一例子是20世纪90年代的格鲁吉亚 - 阿布哈兹战争，当时一股不明身份的部队冲进一家研究所抢走了少量高浓缩铀。


Likewise, though there have been numerous attacks on nuclear reactors under construction, the sole threat to an operating plant in a combat zone outside of Israel occurred at the start of the fighting in ex-Yugoslavia, when Serbian nationalists considered attacking Slovenia’s Krško power plant and sent warplanes over the site.	同样，虽然对在建核反应堆已经发生过多次袭击，但对以色列之外战区业已投入使用的核反应堆的唯一一次袭击发生在前南斯拉夫战争刚刚开始时。 当时塞尔维亚民族主义份子曾考虑派战机轰炸斯洛文尼亚克尔什科电厂。


The plant’s operators temporarily halted electricity generation to curb the risk of a radiation release, but nothing came of the threat.	电厂运营方暂停发电以遏制核泄漏风险，但那次威胁最后无疾而终。


Indeed, whenever nuclear assets have been least secure – during the Soviet Union’s collapse, China’s Cultural Revolution, and the Algiers putsch (when a group of mutinous retired generals set their sights on a nuclear device that France was testing in the Algerian desert) – they have not been compromised.	事实上，每当核资产最为危险的时刻——比方说苏联解体、中国文革和阿尔及尔政变（当时一群叛乱退役将领曾将目光投向法国正在阿尔及利亚沙漠测试的核设施）——最后这些设施都并未遭到攻陷。


Even in Ukraine today, despite the escalating civil conflict, the country’s 15 nuclear power plants have remained untouched (though even with new defensive measures taken by Ukrainian officials, this could easily change).	即使在今天的乌克兰，尽管国内冲突不断升级，但该国的15座核电站却并未遭到威胁（虽然乌克兰官员已经采取了新的防御措施，但这种情况随时有可能改变）。


It is impossible to know whether this benign pattern will hold.	我们不可能知道这样的良性模式能否继续下去。


But recent developments in the Middle East suggest that there are grounds for concern in other volatile countries, namely Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran.	但中东近期的事态发展表明人们有理由担心巴基斯坦、北朝鲜和伊朗等其他动荡国家的核设施。


Pakistan has a large nuclear weapons program and faces an expansive jihadi insurgency, which previously attacked military bases suspected of housing nuclear assets.	巴基斯坦大范围圣战叛乱威胁该国大规模核武器计划，圣战份子之前曾袭击过涉嫌保管核资产的军事基地。


Though Pakistan has not experienced a nuclear breach, and the government insists that safeguards remain robust, the country’s increasingly frequent and severe bouts of instability raise serious questions about the future.	虽然巴基斯坦迄今为止尚未出现过核泄漏，且政府坚持采取严密的保护措施，但国内日益频繁而严重的动荡局面使未来面临着严重的问题。


While North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller, persistent doubts about the regime’s sustainability make it a matter of grave concern.	虽然北朝鲜核武库规模很小，但对政权可持续性的疑虑却引发了人们强烈的忧虑。


In the event of the regime’s collapse – a distinct possibility – it would be difficult to prevent the diversion of its assets, or even the use of its weapons.	如果北朝鲜政权崩溃——这种可能性并不小——人们很难阻止转移核资产，甚至使用核武器。


For its part, Iran seems relatively stable, at least compared to its neighbors.	就其本身而言，伊朗似乎相对稳定，至少与邻国相比暂时如此。


But it faces an uncertain political future.	但伊朗国内政治确定性很低。


If a power struggle emerges, the large Bushehr reactor could be used as a bargaining chip.	如果权力斗争浮出水面，那么大型的布什尔反应堆可能被作为讨价还价的筹码。


To mitigate such risks, the international community could maintain its traditional policy of sitting tight and hoping that governments retain control of their nuclear infrastructure.	为了减轻上述风险，国际社会可以保持其传统的观望政策，寄希望于各国政府保持对核设施的控制。


But the United States, for one, is no longer satisfied with this approach.	但比如美国就不再满足于这样的政策。


According to media reports, it has devised a strategy for deploying Special Forces to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in the event that its authorities lose control.	据媒体报道，美国已经制定策略部署特种部队，在巴基斯坦政府失控的情况下销毁巴基斯坦的核武器。


And some government-connected think tanks have explored the possibility of deploying US combat forces to address nuclear risks in North Korea if the regime crumbles.	同时某些有政府关系的智库已经在研究一旦朝鲜政权崩溃部署美国作战部队应对核危险问题。


Such plans, however, are by no means foolproof – not least owing to the difficulties of finding concealed nuclear assets and safeguarding reactors.	但这样的计划绝非万无一失——这不仅因为很难发现隐蔽的核资产，而且还因为很难对反应堆采取保护措施。


Moreover, the American public’s willingness to become enmeshed in yet another risky military venture, when boosting homeland security could suffice, is dubious, at best.	此外，即便根据最乐观的估计，美国公众是否愿意在加强国内安全或许就能解决问题的情况下卷入另一次军事冒险也很值得怀疑。


Instead of waiting for a major development to force hurried action, the world’s major powers should engage in a full-throated debate to determine the best approach to address nuclear risks in volatile countries, seeking ways to cooperate whenever necessary.	与其坐等重大的事态变化逼迫我们匆忙采取行动，世界大国应当展开大规模讨论，确定应对动荡国家核危险的最佳方式，并在必要时进行合作。


After all, even rival powers like China and the US or India and Pakistan share an interest in preventing the world’s most dangerous weapons from falling under the control of its most fanatical minds.	归根结底，即使像中美或印度巴基斯坦那样的对手也在上述领域拥有共同利益，阻止全世界最危险的武器落入狂热份子之手对所有人都有益。


Iran’s Nuclear Quandary	伊朗的核困境


LOS ANGELES – When the United States and its allies resume talks over Iran’s nuclear program on November 7-8, the vexing task of crafting Iran’s recent proposal into an enduring agreement will begin in earnest.	洛杉矶—11月7日和8日，美国及其盟友重新开启了关于伊朗核计划的对话，认真地开始完成将伊朗最新的提议落实为永久性协议的艰巨任务。


There are many obstacles to an agreement, but among the least examined is the legacy of nuclear-disarmament efforts involving Libya and North Korea.	通往协议之路障碍甚多，但被人们研究最少的是利比亚和朝鲜去核努力的后果。


Both cases raise issues that neither Iran nor the US wants to see repeated – but that both will have difficulty avoiding.	这两个国家所出现的问题是伊朗和美国都不愿意重复的，但要避免也绝非易事。


For the US, North Korea illustrates how a poor but ambitious country developed the bomb by gaming talks and gaining time.	对美国来说，朝鲜显示了一个野心勃勃的穷国是如何通过玩弄对话把戏、争取时间开发核弹的。


For Iran, Muammar el-Qaddafi’s 2003 relinquishment of Libya’s weapons of mass destruction demonstrates how a regime, still considered a bête noire by the international community even after normalization of diplomatic relations, arguably forfeited its survival in 2011 by forgoing the chance to build a nuclear deterrent.	对伊朗来说，2003年卡扎菲交出利比亚大规模杀伤性武器表明，一个政权在外交关系正常化后仍然会被国际社会视为不受欢迎者，卡扎菲之所以在2011年被推翻，很大程度上是因为他放弃了建立核威慑的机会。


Digging further into each case illuminates the challenges faced by Iran and its international interlocutors.	深入挖掘这两个例子就可以发现伊朗及其国际对话者所面临的的挑战。


What makes the North Korea precedent particularly troubling is how much Iran has mimicked the regime in Pyongyang.	让朝鲜先例变得特别棘手的是伊朗在多大程度上模仿着平壤政权。


This naturally prompts questions about whether Iran is using the current round of negotiations as a façade for an ongoing effort to develop nuclear weapons.	这自然而然的衍生出一个问题：伊朗是否在利用当前谈判回合为掩护继续开发核武器。


Consider parallels ten years apart.	想想再十年前的先例。


In June 1993, following talks with the US and a threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct limited “safeguards activities.”	1993年6月，在与美国对华和威胁退出核不扩散条约（NPT）后，朝鲜允许国际原子能机构（IAEA）进行有限度的“保障活动”。


Then, in October 1994, the US and North Korea entered into the Agreed Framework to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program.	接着，在1994年10月，美国和朝鲜进入冻结朝鲜核计划的协议框架。


Similarly, in December 2003, after hiding construction of the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility and other plants from the IAEA, Iran agreed to sign – but not ratify – the so-called Additional Protocol, allowing broader application of IAEA safeguards.	类似地，2003年12月，在对IAEA隐藏了纳坦兹铀浓缩设施和其他核项目后，伊朗同意签署——但并未批准——所谓的附加协议，允许更广范围的IAEA监督保障。


Then, in November 2004, in negotiations with European representatives, Iran agreed to suspend nuclear enrichment.	接着，在2004年11月与欧洲代表的谈判中，伊朗同意暂停核浓缩。


Neither agreement lasted long.	这两个协定均没有维持太长时间。


In March 1996, the IAEA reported that North Korea was not complying with efforts to verify plutonium held at the Yongbyon nuclear facility.	1996年3月，IAEA报告说朝鲜并未遵守规定配合对宁边核设施钚元素的检查。


On October 9, 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear weapon, and the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 calling on the country to abandon its program and re-join international denuclearization talks.	2006年10月9日，朝鲜引爆了第一个核武器，联合国安理会通过1718号决议要求朝鲜放弃核计划并重新加入去核化谈判。


Since then, North Korea has responded to incremental tightening of international sanctions with two more nuclear tests, the latest this year under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un.	自此以后，朝鲜对日渐紧迫的国际制裁的应对措施是两次新的核试验，其中最后一次是在新领袖金正恩的领导下在今年进行的。


Likewise, in January 2006, following the collapse of negotiations with European emissaries, Iran broke the IAEA seals on the Natanz facility’s equipment and storage areas.	类似地，2006年1月，在与欧洲使节谈判破裂后，伊朗撕毁了IAEA对纳坦兹核设施设备和储存区的封条。


The following month, the IAEA reported the Islamic Republic to the Security Council for its failure to be forthright about its nuclear program.	2月，IAEA向安理会报告伊朗没有坦白其核计划。


Since then, Iran has responded to incremental tightening of international sanctions by building more centrifuges.	自此以后，伊朗对日渐紧迫的国际制裁的应对措施是建设更多的离心机。


The question now is whether the North Korea-Iran parallel stops with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani.	现在的问题是朝鲜-伊朗的亦步亦趋模式是否会在伊朗新总统鲁哈尼手中结束。


The Libyan legacy confronts Iran with its own conundrum.	利比亚先例也是伊朗所面临的难题。


Like Iran, Qaddafi’s Libya suffered economic and political isolation for many years during which it attempted to advance a WMD program.	与伊朗一样，在试图开��大规模杀伤性武器期间，卡扎菲的利比亚经受了多年的经济和政治孤立。


By the late 1990’s, however, it had had enough.	20世纪90年代末，利比亚已经支撑不住了。


British and American negotiators secretly met with Libyan counterparts to resolve the case of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and other terrorism issues.	英国和美国谈判员秘密会晤了利比亚人员，商讨如何解决1988年泛美航空103航班在苏格兰洛克比上空的爆炸事件以及其他恐怖主义事件。


In the quid pro quo that followed, Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his nascent nuclear program in exchange for an end to pariah status.	在随后达成的让步条件中，卡扎菲同意取消其尚在雏形中的核计划以换取不再受到歧视待遇。


This was coupled with a critical demand: no deal without America’s commitment to eschew regime change.	除此之外还有一个关键性要求：美国必须承诺不寻求推翻卡扎菲政权。


On December 19, 2003, Libya formally renounced all WMD efforts.	2003年12月9日，利比亚正式宣布放弃所有大规模杀伤性武器。


Eight years later, pinned down by a US Predator drone and French airstrikes, Qaddafi met his demise.	八年后，在美国掠食者无人机和法国空军的打击下，卡扎菲倒台。


Without a nuclear deterrent, his regime was helpless when the US reneged on the deal – a lesson that has not been lost on North Korea.	由于没有核威慑力，他的政权对美国撕毁协议毫无办法——朝鲜没有重蹈这一覆辙。


Given this history, Iran has a strong incentive to retain at least a nuclear-breakout option (which would mean completing all but the final steps to weaponization).	考虑到这段历史，伊朗有强大的激励至少保留核突围的选择权（这意味着完成所有除武器化之外的步骤）。