Over the past 40 years, expert committees convened by the World Health Organization have agreed that sexual health includes physical, emotional, mental, and social well-being in relation to sexuality, and is underpinned by respect for human rights and individual autonomy.	在过去40年中，世界卫生组织召集的专家委员会一致认为，性健康包括与性有关的生理、情感、精神和社会福利，其基础是对人权和个人自主权的尊重。


But WHO has never proposed such a definition to its governing body, the World Health Assembly, presumably because some of its member states would reject the definition and the accompanying obligations to promote it domestically.	但世卫组织从未在其治理机构世界卫生大会（World Health Assembly）上提出这一建议，之所以如此，是因为部分成员国将拒绝该定义，也拒绝在国内推广该定义所伴生的义务。


Now, however, the world has an opportunity to move from criminalization to consent.	但是，如今，世界有机会从入刑（criminalization）转向同意（consent）。


With the debate on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals starting at last month’s UN General Assembly, an oblique reference to “ensuring access to services” can be fully explored.	上个月的联合国大会启动了2015年后可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals）的讨论，可以充分利用其中的“确保获得服务”分议题。


This would normally include sexual and reproductive health-care services such as family planning and treatment of sexually transmitted infections.	这通常包括了性和生殖健康服务（如计划生育和性传播传染病的治疗等）。


Access to services, though important, is not synonymous with a view of sexuality founded on human rights and individual autonomy.	获得服务尽管重要，但并非以人权和个人自主权为基础的性观念的同义词。


Indeed, rights are mentioned only in relation to reproduction, and concern only girls and women.	事实上，权利只在与生殖的关系中被提及，并且只关注女孩和妇女。


However, if consent becomes central to the issue of sexual health, all adults will have the right to make autonomous decisions about their sexuality.	但是，如果同意成为性卫生问题的核心，那么所有成年人都有权自主决定自己的性。


These sexual rights would include the right to choose one’s sexual partners; decide whether, when, and whom to marry; decline sexual advances; and even buy sex from another consenting adult.	这些性权利应该包括选择性伙伴的权利、决定是否、何时和与谁结婚的权利、减少性骚扰的权利，甚至向另一位同意的成年人购买性活动的权利。


With rights come the responsibility to protect children who cannot legally consent; to ensure that sexual partners are not coerced; and to promote a safe and satisfying sex life for all.	和权利一同到来的则是保护不能合法地同意的儿童的责任、确保性伙伴不受强迫的责任； 以及促进所有人获得安全满意的性生活的责任。


It is these rights and responsibilities that Canada and other countries should be enshrining in their laws.	这些权利和责任才是加拿大和其他国家应该写入法律中的内容。


That would be a sexual service that no one should oppose.	这将是人人都不会反对的性服务。


Legitimacy and Elections	合法性与选举


So Ukraine now has a legitimate government. Or does it?	那么，乌克兰现在拥有了一个合法政府，还是没有呢？


Viktor Yushchenko has been elected with 52% of the popular vote. His opponent received 44%.	维克托·尤先科赢得52％的多数选票当选，他的对手赢得44%。


Observers confirm that infringements of the electoral rules were but minor. Yet questions remain.	观察员确认选举中的违规因素并没有起到关键性作用，但很多疑问尚存。


The defeated candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, contests the result. The country is deeply divided.	落败的候选人维克托·亚努科维奇置疑选举结果，整个国家已成明显的分裂态势。


Will the miners of Donetsk start the next revolution, this time in red against the orange of the protests staged by Yushchenko’s supporters against the original election with its clearly illegitimate result?	顿涅茨克的矿工这回会身着红色衣服，掀起又 一次革命，来和尤先科的支持者旨在抗议初次选举明显不合法的选举结果而上演的“橙色革命”唱对台戏吗？


Will there be a secession movement in eastern Ukraine?	在乌克兰东部会发生“脱离”运动吗？


Legitimacy is a delicate, yet utterly important feature of stable democratic politics. It is also complicated.	合法性是稳定的民主政治很微妙而且绝对重要的一个特征，同时它也很复杂。


Was George W. Bush the legitimately elected President of the United States in his first term, having gained office only after America’s Supreme Court ordered an end to the Florida recount and with Bush having secured only a minority of the votes nationwide?	就在美国最高法院宣布结束佛州重新计票工作，布什只保住了全国的少数选票便就职的情况下，第一任期的乔治·W·布什能说是合法当选的美国总统吗？


Are the presidents of some former Soviet republics who seem to command 90% of the popular vote legitimately elected?	一些似乎博得了90％多数票的前苏维埃共和国的总统们都是合法当选的吗？


Will the planned elections in Iraq be regarded as legitimate internally as well as externally?	正在运筹之中的伊拉克大选在内部和外部程序上都将具有合法性吗？


It is vital to remember that elections alone do not guarantee legitimacy, even if they are seen to be free and fair.	重要的是记住即使选举被认为是自由、公正的，其本身也并不能保证合法性。


Americans find it hard to understand this, as do others in the lucky democracies of the Anglo-Saxon world.	美国人认为这很难理解，幸运地生活在盎格鲁－撒克逊民主政治中的英国人也对此深感疑惑。


For them, legitimacy simply means that voting and counting votes happens according to undisputed rules.	对于他们来说，合法性仅仅意味着按照无可置辩的选举规则进行投票和计票那么简单。


What is legal, they think, is also legitimate.	他们认为，法定的就是合法的。


For many others in the world, however, at least two other questions remain.	然而，对于世界上其他国家来说，至少还有另外两个问题需要考虑。


First, turnout is crucial: who has voted and who has not.	首先，参投人数至关重要：谁投了谁没投要搞清楚；


The second question is whether there remains any systematic, potentially violent opposition to the outcome.	其次，针对选举结果，是否存在有计划的，可能很激烈的反对。


The point about George W. Bush’s first term was that despite grumblings and continued vocal opposition, the result of the election of 2000 was generally accepted.	很说明问题的是：尽管针对乔治·W·布什的第一任期，曾有过忿忿不平和持续的强烈反对，2000年的选举结果还是被普遍认同的。


Or consider Tony Blair’s “landslide victory” in 2001, when Labour won 40% of the vote with turnout of 60%.	或者让我们来思考一下2001年，工党在60％的参投票数中赢得40％的选票后，托尼·布莱尔获得的“压倒性胜利”。


In effect, 25% of the total electorate gave him nearly two-thirds of the seats in the House of Commons.	实际上，合法选民（即有资格参加选举的所有选民）中的25%就为他赢得了下院将近三分之二的席位。


Did anyone doubt the legitimacy of the result?	曾有人置疑过这一选举结果的合法性吗？


Not in Britain, nor among Britain’s partners.	大不列颠没有置疑，她的伙伴国们也没有置疑。


But there are not many countries where that would be true.	但并不是许多国家都是如此。


Most others would – at the very least – demand a coalition government to reflect the existing diversity of views.	大多数其它国家，至少要求成立联合政府来倾听现存的多方面呼声。


Legitimacy by election is particularly problematic in countries with what might be called “endemic minorities.”	选举的合法性在存在“地方性少数民族”的国家尤其成问题。


In Canada, for example, it would be risky to overlook the special interests of Quebec.	比如在加拿大，忽略魁北克省的特别利益将会是冒险的事情；


In Ukraine, the divergent interests of the country’s west and east have to be recognized if legitimacy is to be established.	在乌克兰，若要确立合法性，就应该认识到国家东西部的利益存在分歧；


In Iraq, a technical majority in a wholly legal election is almost meaningless if the position of Sunni Muslims and Kurds is not explicitly recognized.	在伊拉克，如果逊尼派穆斯林和库尔德人的态度主张没有得到认可，即使完全依法定程序进行而产生的技术性的多数票也几乎没有任何意义。


The occupation powers are therefore right to be worried about an election in which massive abstention among Sunnis results in a large Shiite majority.	因此对于一次因逊尼派大规模弃权而导致的什叶派占多数票的选举结果，控制权究竟归属哪一方仍然是悬而未决的。


So legitimacy is more than legality. It rests on what the people concerned believe to be real.	合法性不仅仅是符合法定程序那么简单，它还取决于相关人员认可什么是真实有效的。


At the very least, there has to be an absence of violent opposition, including the threat of secession.	至少，不允许存在激烈的反对，包括“脱离联邦”之类的威胁。


In Western countries, notably in the US, people tend to assume too much when it comes to bringing democracy – meaning elections in the first instance – to others.	在西方国家，特别是美国，当民主产生的时刻（对其他人来说这首先意味着“选举”）到来时，往往过份的想当然。


In particular, we assume an essentially homogenous electorate, so that even a low turnout does not involve any disadvantage for particular ethnic or cultural groups.	尤其是，我们单纯的认为所有合法选民都是同一利益的代表，以致低投票率也没有让我们怀疑过特殊种族和特殊文化群体是否因此处于劣势；


We also assume an automatic acceptance of rules that in fact took a long time to become embedded even in the US.	我们还把经过漫长年月在美国这样的国家也根深蒂固下来的规则不假思索的加以接受。


Without legitimacy, there can be no stability in any political system, and without elections – that is, an explicit expression of popular consent to the holders of power – there can be no legitimacy.	没有合法性，任何一种政治体系都谈不上稳定； 没有选举――这个明确接受执政者的多数人的意愿表示，也不可能有合法性这一说法。


But while free elections are a necessary condition of legitimacy, they are far from being sufficient to assure it.	虽然自由选举是合法性的基本条件，其本身还不能充分确保合法性。


Constitutional arrangements must guarantee all entrenched groups a place in the countries’ political institutions.	宪法性的筹备工作必须保证所有选举人群在国家政治体制中拥有一席之位。


It is equally imperative to establish the rule of law, exercised by an independent and respected judiciary.	此外，由一个独立的、被尊重的司法机构确立的法律规则同样是必须的。


We should remember this as we pursue the elusive objective of democracy in Iraq, so that we are not surprised if the upcoming election fails to generate a legitimate government.	我们在追求难以实现的伊拉克民主目标的过程中要牢记这一点。 那么，即将到来的大选一旦没能产生合法政府，我们就不会感到奇怪了。


Egypt’s Revolutionary Reset	埃及革命从头开始


CAIRO – Whether or not Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was pushed aside by a military coup may be debatable, but it is undeniable that the June 30 protest that triggered his ouster was the largest mass movement in Egypt’s history. It was also glaring testimony to the failure of the first phase of Egypt’s revolution.	开罗—埃及历史上首个民主选出的总统穆尔西是否是军事政变赶下台的，这或许可以争论，但不可否认的是，导致穆尔西下台的6月30日示威乃是埃及历史上最大规模的群众运动，也是埃及革命第一阶段以失败告终的难以辩驳的证据。


Politicians, generals, and jurists could not rise above myopic concerns to build the bedrock for a new republic.	政客、将军和法官不可能克服短视，为新共和国打下基础。


The forcible removal of an elected president should have been avoided – the liberal opposition could have eased popular anger by demanding that the government make some concessions until legislative elections, which had been set for later this year.	强行撸下当选总统应该避免——自由主义反对派本可以要求政府做出让步直到合法选举（定于今年晚些时候开始），从而缓和公众愤怒。


With a good showing, they could have then compelled Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood to accept the necessary compromises.	表现好的话，他们本可以接着迫使穆尔西的穆斯林兄弟会接受必要的妥协。


The most dangerous consequences of Morsi’s overthrow became apparent on July 8, when security forces in Cairo opened fire on some of the tens of thousands of his supporters who had turned out to call for his reinstatement, killing more than 50 people.	穆尔西下台的最危险后果在7月8日显露无疑。 那一天，开罗安全部队朝走上街头要求穆尔西复职的成千上万支持者开了火，五十多人被杀。


Egyptians now fear an outcome like that in Algeria in 1992, when the military scrapped elections and sparked a bloody civil war, or in Pakistan in 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf led a widely celebrated – and soon regretted – coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.	如今，埃及人担心1992年阿尔及利亚或1999年巴基斯坦的局面重演——1992年，阿尔及利亚军队宣布选举无效并掀起血腥内战； 而在1999年，穆沙拉夫将军领导了一场大受欢迎但马上成为遗憾的政变推翻了总理谢里夫。


Egypt is at its most volatile since former President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in early 2011.	埃及正处在2011年初前总统穆巴拉克下台以来最动荡的时刻。


But past mistakes have also taught Egyptians important lessons about what a successful transition demands.	但过去的错误也让埃及人吸取了重要的教训，了解了成功转型到底需要什么。


The first transition did not manage to gather broad popular legitimacy.	第一次转型没有获得广泛的群众合法性。


Instead of uniting the various political forces around an accepted set of democratic institutions, the constitutional process ended up polarizing society along identity lines, owing in large part to a faulty sequence: unlike Tunisia, a president with full powers was elected before a new constitution was produced.	制宪过程并未让各股政治势力团结在被共同接受的民主制度安排周围，而是最终让社会走向了极端，不同身份的人各自为政。 其原因很大程度上在于程序错误：与突尼斯不同，埃及在新宪法尚未产生前先选出了全面掌权的总统。


As a result, Morsi’s incentives were to consolidate power rather than produce an inclusive constitution; put to a referendum, the draft backed by the Brotherhood was approved by 64% of voters, but with a turnout of just 33%.	结果是，穆尔西的激励变成了巩固权力，而不是起草包容性宪法； 在全民公投中，穆斯林兄弟会支持的宪法草案获得了64%的选民支持，但投票比例只有33%。


Opposition forces were also to blame; they refused to cooperate with the Brotherhood, betting that political isolation and a failing economy would end up weakening their opponents.	反对派也有责任； 他们拒绝与穆兄会合作，寄希望于政治孤立和经济失败终会削弱它们的对手。


The second revolution highlighted the unwillingness of a large part of Egypt’s diverse population to accept this non-inclusive process.	第二次革命凸显出，在埃及多元化的人口中，有很大一部分不愿意接受这一非包容性过程。


Those who took to the streets to demand a replay – largely secular, liberal, educated Egyptians – were driven not just by political and economic grievances, but also, like restive middle classes elsewhere, by aspirations for freedom and inclusiveness.	走上街头要求重修宪法的大多是受过教育的世俗自由主义埃及人，他们的动机不仅有政治和经济不平，也包括对自由和包容的诉求（这一点与其他地方的桀骜不驯的中产阶级别无二致）。


Against this background, future progress depends on three major factors.	在这样的背景下，未来进步取决于三大因素。


First, Egypt needs a broadly agreed constitution and political road map.	首先，埃及需要被广泛接受的宪法和政治路线图。


The new transition process must emphasize consensus, with “no victor, no vanquished” serving as a guiding principle.	新转型过程必须强调共识，可以将“无征服，亦无被征服”作为指导原则。


The revision of the constitution must include public debate, and the resulting text must gain the support of a supermajority in a popular referendum.	宪法的修订必须包括公共争论，由此产生的宪法文本必须在全民公投中得到绝对多数支持。


Ensuring that Islamic groups are included in the political process is a prerequisite for progress.	确保伊斯兰团体也被纳入政治进程是进步的前提。


Egypt’s Islamists traded violent militancy for moderation and participation when they started to compete in parliamentary elections under Mubarak.	在穆巴拉克时期开始进入议会竞争时，埃及穆斯林用暴力斗争交换温和和参与。


The recent events threaten this historic transformation.	最近的事件威胁着这一历史转变。


Unless Islamists are brought permanently into the political fold, political Islam will return in more violent forms in the future.	除非穆斯林被永久纳入政治领域，否则政治伊斯兰将在未来以更暴力的形式回归��


Second, the country’s new leaders will have to initiate unpopular measures aimed at revitalizing the ailing economy.	其次，埃及新领导人将必须采取不受欢迎的旨在重振萎靡经济的措施。


This will require explaining to the population the real economic challenges facing the country.	这要求向公众解释埃及所面临的真正的经济挑战。


The new government needs to convince the middle class to accept a cutback in energy subsidies, which now consume 30% of public expenditures, and ensure better regulation of competition and democratization of credit.	新政府需要说服中产阶级接受目前占公共开支30%的能源补贴的削减，并确保更好的竞争监管和信用民主化。


It needs to protect the poor and provide them with security and broader access to state services, and to convince them that reforms will work to their advantage.	新政府需要保护穷人，向穷人提供保障和更广的国家服务，并让他们相信改革会让他们过得更好。


Finally, the “street” will have to keep pressure on politicians to ensure that the transition delivers a political settlement with which the main parties can live.	最后，“街头”必须保持向政客施压，以确保转型能带来主要政党能够存在的政治和解。


The street has now become much more strategic.	如今，街头具有更加重要的战略意义。


Tamarod, the grassroots movement that led the recent protests by collecting millions of signatures on a petition demanding an early presidential election, has forced the fragmented liberal parties to become more disciplined.	 “反抗”（Tamarod，通过征集数百万人签名请愿要求提前进行总统选举而引发最近的示威草根运动）迫使四分五裂的自由主义政党变得更具纪律性。


While Morsi’s supporters have also shown resilience, increased support for other religious parties reflects dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood’s performance even among Islamists.	尽管穆尔西的支持者也表现出了韧性，但对其他宗教政党支持的日益增加反映出即使是穆斯林也对穆兄会的表现不太满意。


Success requires dialogue and compromise.	成功需要对话和妥协。


The sequence in the road map announced by interim President Adli Mansour is a good starting point – first a constitution, then a parliament, and finally a president.	过渡总统曼苏尔（Adli Mansour）所公布的路线图顺序是一个很好的起点——首先是宪法，然后是议会，最后是总统。


Interim Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi, a highly regarded economist and experienced manager and diplomat, is both a respected liberal and a scion of the scholars of the Al-Azhar Mosque, the highest authority in Sunni Islam.	过渡总理、著名经济学家、经验丰富的管理者和外交家贝巴拉维（Hazem El-Beblawi）既是受人尊敬的自由主义者，也是逊尼派伊斯兰教最高当局艾兹哈尔清真寺（Al-Azhar Mosque）学人子弟。


He is ideally positioned to lead a technocratic cabinet of last resort.	他是领导最后技术官僚内阁的理想人选。


Both Mansour and Beblawi can rise above short-term temptations, because they will not contest the upcoming elections.	曼苏尔和贝巴拉维可以克服短期诱惑，因为他们不参与即将到来的选战。


Meanwhile, the military should be chastened by its recent blunders and choose to keep a low profile.	与此同时，军队应该因其最近的错误而受罚，保持低调。


Egypt’s democratic transition can still succeed.	埃及的民主转型仍然可能成功。


But progress toward inclusive, durable institutions will require Egyptians to take heed of the main mistakes of the past two and a half years.	但迈向包容、持久制度的进步要求埃及人汲取过去两年半中所犯下的主要错误的教训。


Complacency in a Leaderless World	在群龙无首的世界里自鸣得意


DAVOS – The World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos has lost some of its pre-crisis panache.	发自达沃斯——在达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛年度会议失去了危机前的派头。


After all, before the meltdown in 2008, the captains of finance and industry could trumpet the virtues of globalization, technology, and financial liberalization, which supposedly heralded a new era of relentless growth.	毕竟2008年的危机灾难之前，那些金融和工业巨头们可以吹嘘全球化、科技发展和金融自由化的优点——这本该预示着一个增长持续不断的新时代。


The benefits would be shared by all, if only they would do “the right thing.”	只要他们能“为所应为”，那么所有人都能共享到这其中的利益。


Those days are gone.	那些好日子已经一去不返了。


But Davos remains a good place to get a sense of the global zeitgeist.	但达沃斯依然是一个能让人感受到全球时代精神的好地方。


It goes without saying that developing and emerging-market countries no longer look at the advanced countries as they once did.	发展中国家和新兴市场国家已经不再像以前那样看待发达国家，这是不言而喻的事实。


But a remark by one mining company executive from a developing country caught the spirit of change.	但某个来自发展中国家的矿业公司高管的评论抓住了这一变化的精神内涵。


In response to one development expert’s heartfelt despair that unfair trade treaties and unfulfilled promises of aid have cost the developed countries their moral authority, he retorted: “The West never had any moral authority.”	在 某发展研究专家对不公平贸易条约和未兑现援助承诺损害了发达国家的道德权威表示发自内心的绝望之时，该高管回应道：“西方国家从来就不存在任何道德权威。


Colonialism, slavery, the splintering of Africa into small countries, and a long history of resource exploitation may be matters of the distant past to the perpetrators, but not so to those who suffered as a result.	” 对那些行凶者来说，殖民主义、奴隶制、将非洲分割为众多小国以及资源掠夺的漫长历史也许已是遥远的过去，但对那些因此受到伤害的人来说却并非如此。


If there is a single topic that concerned the assembled leaders the most, it is economic inequality.	如果说与会领导人有什么最关心的话题，那就是经济不平等。


The shift in the debate from just a year ago seems dramatic: no one even mentions the notion of trickle-down economics anymore, and few are willing to argue that there is a close congruence between social contributions and private rewards.	讨论内容与去年大不相同，中间的转换似乎颇具戏剧性：没有人会再提到滴入式经济的概念（指一个体制中给予上层人的利益会传递给较低阶层的人），也很少人愿意声言社会贡献与私人报酬之间存在密切的一致性。


While the realization that America is not the land of opportunity that it has long claimed to be is as disconcerting to others as it is to Americans, inequality of opportunity at the global scale is even greater.	尽管意识到美国并不是它一直宣称那样充满机会的事实令世界其他国家的人和美国人一样感到窘迫不安，但全球层面上的机会不平等更严重。


One cannot really claim that the world is “flat” when a typical African receives investment in his or her human capital of a few hundred dollars, while rich Americans get a gift from their parents and society in excess of a half-million dollars.	当非洲人均只能获得几百美元的人力资本投入，而富有的美国人则从其父母和社会得到超过50万美元的人力资本投资之时，我们再也无法声称世界是“平的”。


A high point of the meeting was the speech by Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, who stressed the marked change in her institution, at least at the top: deep concern about women’s rights; renewed emphasis on the link between inequality and instability; and recognition that collective bargaining and minimum wages could play an important role in reducing inequality.	这次会议的亮点是国际货币基金组织常务董事克里斯汀·拉加德（Christine Lagarde）的发言，她强调了其机构的显著变化，至少在机构首脑层是如此：他们深切关注妇女权利； 重新强调不平等和不稳定之间的联系；


If only the IMF programs in Greece and elsewhere fully reflected these sentiments!	并认识到集体谈判和最低工资在减少不平等上能起到重要作用。 你说要是在希腊和世界其他地方实施的国际货币基金组织项目能充分体现这些观点那该多好！


The Associated Press organized a sobering session on technology and unemployment: Can countries (particularly in the developed world) create new jobs – especially good jobs – in the face of modern technology that has replaced workers with robots and other machines in any task that can be routinized?	美联社组织了一次有关技术和失业问题的会议环节，非常发人深省：现代科技在可以流程化工作中使用机器人和其他机器来取代工人，面对这样的现实，全球各国（尤其是发达国家）还能够创造新的——尤其是好的——工作吗？


Overall, the private sector in Europe and America has been unable to create many good jobs since the beginning of the current century.	总体来说，自这个世纪初以来，美国和欧洲的私人企业已经无法创造多少好的工作了。


Even in China and other parts of the world with growing manufacturing sectors, productivity improvements – often related to job-killing automated processes – account for most of the growth in output.	即使是中国和其他制造业增长的地方，生产力的提高——通常与扼杀就业的自动化过程有关——是产出增长的主要动力。


Those suffering the most are the young, whose life prospects will be badly hurt by the extended periods of unemployment that they face today.	受影响最大的是年轻一代，他们的生活前景将会受到当前面对长期失业现实的严重打击。


But most of those in Davos put aside these problems to celebrate the euro’s survival.	但达沃斯的大部分人把这些问题摆在了一边，都在庆祝欧元的幸存。


The dominant note was one of complacency – or even optimism.	占主导地位的态度是自满——甚至是乐观主义。


The “Draghi put” – the notion that the European Central Bank, with its deep pockets, would and could do whatever necessary to save the euro and each of the crisis countries – seemed to have worked, at least for a while.	“德拉吉说”——即财力雄厚的欧洲央行将会尽一切努力挽救欧元和每一个危机国家——似乎真地起了作用，至少在一段时间内是如此。


The temporary calm provided some support for those who claimed that what was required, above all, was a restoration of confidence.	目前的平静支撑了那些声称首先需要恢复信心的人。


The hope was that Draghi’s promises would be a costless way of providing that confidence, because they would never have to be fulfilled.	人们希望德拉吉的承诺会是一种带来信心而又无须付出代价的方式，因为这些承诺根本不需要实现。


Critics repeatedly pointed out that the fundamental contradictions had not been resolved, and that if the euro was to survive in the long run, there would have to be a fiscal and banking union, which would require morepolitical unification than most Europeans are willing to accept.	批评家们再三指出基本矛盾并没有得到解决，如果欧元要在长期内生存下来，就得有一个财政和银行联盟，这就需要构建更多超出大部分欧洲人意愿的政治联合。


But much of what was said in and around the meetings reflected a deep lack of solidarity.	无奈在会议内外所讨论的一切都反映出欧洲其实深刻地缺乏团结。


One very senior government official of a northern European country did not even put down his fork when interrupted by an earnest dinner companion who pointed out that many Spaniards now eat out of garbage cans.	当被一起用餐的同伴发言打断其晚餐的时候，来自某北欧国家的一位高级政府官员甚至没有放下他的叉子，这位同伴指出现在很多西班牙人正在从垃圾桶里寻食。


They should have reformed earlier, he replied, as he continued to eat his steak.	对此这位官员答曰，这些人早该改革，接着又继续大嚼他的牛排。


IMF growth forecasts released during the Davos meeting highlight the extent to which the world has become decoupled: GDP growth in the advanced industrial countries is expected to be 1.4% this year, while developing countries continue to grow at a robust 5.5% annual rate.	在这次达沃斯会议上发布的国际货币基金组织增长预测点明了世界分化的程度：今年先进工业国的GDP增长预计为1. 4%，而发展中国家则继续保持着5.


While Western leaders talked about a new emphasis on growth and employment, they offered no concrete policies backing these aspirations.	当西方国家领导人谈论重新重视增长和就业之时，他们并未提出明确支持这些意愿的政策。


In Europe, there was continued emphasis on austerity, with self-congratulations on the progress made so far, and a reaffirmation of resolve to continue along a course that has now plunged Europe as a whole into recession – and the United Kingdom into a triple-dip downturn.	欧洲国家仍然强调紧缩政策，对其目前取得的成就沾沾自喜，并重申决定继续沿着当前的进程走，然而这条路已经让整个欧洲陷入衰退——并让英国陷入三重衰退。


Perhaps the most optimistic note came from the emerging markets: while the risk of globalization was that it implied a new interdependence, so that flawed economic policies in the US and Europe could torpedo developing countries’ economies, the more successful emerging markets have managed globalization well enough to sustain growth in the face of failures in the West.	也许最乐观的态度来自新兴市场：由于全球化的风险在于它意味着一种新的相互依存关系，正是如此美国及欧洲有缺陷的经济政策才会破坏发展中国家的经济，比较成功的新兴市场国家已经能很好地应对全球化，足以在西方国家政策失败的情况下维持增长。


With the US politically paralyzed by the Republicans’ infantile political tantrums, and Europe focused on ensuring the survival of the ill-conceived euro project, the lack of global leadership was a major complaint at Davos.	由于美国共和党人幼稚的政治固执导致该国政治瘫痪，而欧洲则着眼于确保设计拙劣的欧元计划能够幸存，因而达沃斯会议上最主要的抱怨就是全球领袖的缺失。


In the last 25 years, we have moved from a world dominated by two superpowers to one dominated by one, and now to a leaderless, multi-polar world.	在过去的25年中，我们从一个由两个超级大国主导的世界走到一个没有领袖的多极世界。


While we may talk about the G-7, or G-8, or G-20, the more apt description is G-0.	我们也许会谈及G7、G8或G20，但比较合适的说法是G0。


We will have to learn how to live, and thrive, in this new world.	我们将需要学习如何在这个新的世界生存和实现繁荣。


The Detroit Syndrome	底特律综合症


SINGAPORE – When the city of Detroit filed for bankruptcy last week, it became the largest such filing in United States history.	发自新加坡——上星期底特律市政府提交的破产申请堪称美国有史以来最庞大的一起破产事件。


Detroit’s population has dropped from 1.8 million in 1950, when it was America’s fifth-largest city, to less than 700,000 today.	这座城市的人口在1950年时位居全美第五，约为180万人，而如今则锐减成不到70万。


Its industrial base lies shattered.	整座城市的工业基础也早已分崩离析。


And yet we live in a world where cities have never had it so good.	但我们依然生活在一个最美好的城市时代。


More than half of the world’s population is urban, for the first time in history, and urban hubs generate an estimated 80% of global GDP.	有史以来第一次有超过一半的全球人口居住在城市，而这次城市汇聚之处则创造了全世界超过80%的GDP。


These proportions will rise even higher as emerging-market countries urbanize rapidly.	随着新兴市场国家的快速城市化，这一数字将继续攀升。


So, what can the world learn from Detroit’s plight?	那么，我们又能在底特律的困境中得到些什么教训呢？


As recently as the 1990’s, many experts were suggesting that technology would make cities irrelevant.	在1990年代时，许多专家建议说科学技术将淘汰城市。


It was believed that the Internet and mobile communications, then infant technologies, would make it unnecessary for people to live in crowded and expensive urban hubs.	他们相信当时尚处萌芽状态的互联网和移动通讯会使得人们不再需要住在拥挤而高生活成本的城市地区。


Instead, cities like New York and London have experienced sharp increases in population since 1990, after decades of decline.	但事实上在经历了数十年的人口流出之后，像纽约和伦敦这样的城市自1990年以来都出现了人口暴涨。


One factor that has helped cities is the nature of twenty-first century life.	对此其中一个对城市有帮助的因素就是21世纪生活的特质。


Previously, life in developed countries was based on daily routines: people went to work in offices and factories, returned home to eat dinner with their families, watched their favorite television programs, went to sleep, and repeated the cycle when they awoke.	在此之前，发达国家人们的生活都是基于一些每日常规活动：在写字楼或者工厂上班，回家与家人吃饭，观看喜欢的电视节目，上床睡觉，然后第二天醒来把上述活动又重复一遍。


Such regular cycles no longer apply to most peoples’ lives.	如今对许多人来说，这种有规律的生活已经不复存在了。


In the course of a work day, people mix and match many activities – they may work at a desk, but they may also meet a friend for lunch, go to the gym, do chores, travel on business, shop online, and so on.	在每一个工作日，人们可以把许多不同的活动混在一起来做——或许伏案工作，也可能与好友午餐，健身，干些零散事情，出差公干，上网购物……不一而足。


Similarly, time at home is no longer clearly demarcated, with people working online or participating in conference calls even as they manage their family life.	同样，在家中的时间也不再是一成不变，大家甚至可以在投身家庭生活的同时在线工作或者参加网络会议。


We have discovered that this multi-tasking life is best done in cities, which concentrate a multiplicity of hard amenities – airports, shops, schools, parks, and sports facilities – as well as soft amenities like clubs, bars, and restaurants.	我们发现在城市里最适宜过这种多任务生活，因为城市集中了多种多样的硬件设施——机场，商店，学校，公园和体育设施——以及夜店，酒吧和餐厅等软件设施。


Another factor is that cities have increased in importance as hubs for innovation and creativity.	另一个因素则是城市作为创新和创造性工作汇聚之处的重要性。


Until the nineteenth century, innovation was carried out mostly by generalists and tinkerers, which meant that the accumulation of new knowledge was slow, but that its diffusion across different fields was rapid.	19世纪时的创新主要都是由博学家和工匠来完成，这意味着新知识的积累极为缓慢，但同时不同领域之间的渗透也极为迅速。


In the twentieth century, knowledge creation became the job of specialists, which accelerated knowledge creation but retarded inter-disciplinary application.	到了20世纪，知识的创造成为了专业人士的工作，虽然积累速度大为加快，却阻碍了多领域应用。


But recent studies have shown that this source of innovation is rapidly decelerating (the productivity of an American research worker may now be less than 15% of a similar researcher in 1950).	但最近的一项研究却表明这种创新源头正在不断减速（一个美国研究者的生产力如今不足1950年时的15%）。


Instead, innovation is increasingly based on mixing and matching knowledge from different specializations.	相反，创新正逐渐构建于将不同专家的知识进行融合。


Certain cities are ideally suited for this, because they concentrate different kinds of human capital and encourage random interactions between people with different knowledge and skills.	有些城市特别适合这类活动，因为它们汇聚了多种多样的人力资本并鼓励这些拥有不同知识技能的人随意进行互动。


The problem with this post-industrial urban model is that it strongly favors generalist cities that can cluster different kinds of soft and hard amenities and human capital.	但这个后工业时代城市模式的问题在于它强烈偏向于那些能把各种各样软硬件和人力资本的“博学家”型城市。


Indeed, the growth dynamic can be so strong for some successful cities that they can hollow out smaller rivals (for example, London vis-à-vis the cities of northern England).	事实上，那些成功城市的���长动力是如此强大，甚至能把一些较小的竞争对手城市掏空（比如伦敦与英格兰北部各城市之间就是如此）。


Some specialist cities could also do well in this world.	某些专业性城市可以在这个世界上取得成功。


But, as Detroit, with its long dependence on the automotive industry, demonstrates, cities that are dependent on a single industry or on a temporary location advantage may fare extremely poorly.	但类似底特律这种长期依赖于汽车工业的城市所显示的那样，那些只有单一工业或只有临时地理优势的城市可能下场堪忧。


All of this has important implications for emerging economies.	上述现象对新兴国家都有教益。


As it transformed itself into the “factory of the world,” the share of China’s urban population jumped from 26.4% in 1990 to around 53% today.	以中国为例，随着其转型为“世界工厂”，国内城市人口占总人口的比例从1990年的26.


The big, cosmopolitan cities of Beijing and Shanghai have grown dramatically, but the bulk of the urban migration has been to cookie-cutter small and medium-size industrial towns that have mushroomed over the last decade.	4%一路上升到如今的约53%。 但大部分移民人口都进入了过去十年内如雨后春笋般涌现的中小型城市。


By clustering industrial infrastructure and using the hukou system of city-specific residency permits, the authorities have been able to control the process surprisingly well.	通过聚集工业基础设施并利用户口制度来管制城市居留行为，中国当局可以很好地控制这一进程。


This process of urban growth, however, is about to unravel.	但这一城市增长进程即将走向瓦解。


As China shifts its economic model away from heavy infrastructure investment and bulk manufacturing, many of these small industrial cities will lose their core industry.	随着中国将自身经济模式由大幅基础建设投资和大型制造业转向其他方面，许多小型工业城市开始失去其核心产业。


This will happen at a time when the country’s skewed demographics causes the workforce to shrink and the flow of migration from rural areas to cities to slow (the rural population now disproportionately comprises the elderly).	等到该国扭曲的人口结构开始导致劳动人口减少且农村向城市的人口流动减缓之时，这种状况就将不断涌现（城市人口中老年人的比重也不成比例地高）。


Meanwhile, the post-industrial attractions of cities like Shanghai and Beijing will attract the more talented and better-educated children of today’s industrial workers.	与此同时，那些后工业时代的宠儿，比如上海和北京，将吸引更多更聪明且教育程度更高的产业工人后代前来。


Unlike rural migrants heading for industrial jobs, it will be much more difficult to guide educated and creative professionals using the hukou system.	跟农村移民不同，这些创造性专业人士更加难以用户口制度来管理。


The boom in the successful cities, therefore, will hollow out human capital from less attractive industrial hubs, which will then fall into a vicious cycle of decay and falling productivity.	因此这些成功城市的兴起将挖空那些弱势工业城市的人力资本，而后者将随之陷入衰败和生产力下降的死循环之中。


Stories like Detroit’s have played out several times in developed countries during the last half-century.	在过去50年中，底特律这类城市的故事已经不止一次上演。


And, as the fate of Mexico’s northern towns suggests, emerging economies are not immune from this process.	而墨西哥北部城市的现状也显示，新兴经济体也无法置身事外。


That is why China needs to prepare for this moment.	这也是中国为何要做好准备的原因。


Rather than building ever more cookie-cutter industrial towns, China needs to refit and upgrade its existing cities.	与其建立更多小型工业城市。 中国应当对其现有城市进行重整和升级。


As its population begins to shrink, it may even be worthwhile to shut down unviable cities and consolidate.	随着该国人口开始下降，减少那些生存能力低下城市并进行合并的需要也更加紧迫。


Detroit’s fate should serve as a warning, not only for China, but for the next generation of urbanizing countries (for example, India) as well.	底特律的命运应当成为一记警钟，不仅仅是对中国，也是对印度这类下一轮城市化国家。


Following from Above	从上面跟随


PARIS – France’s military intervention in Mali is proceeding apace, with the recent fall of Timbuktu representing a significant milestone in the effort to rout the Islamist rebels who took control of the north of the country.	巴黎—法国对马里的军事干预进展迅速，最近，廷巴克图的攻克算得上击溃控制马里北部的伊斯兰叛军的里程碑。


More broadly, the intervention’s apparent success underscores three key points.	从更大的层面上讲，法国军事干预的显而易见的成功凸显了三大要点。


First, it confirms that France retains the ability to act as Europe’s prime mover.	首先，它确认了法国仍有作为欧洲原动力的能力。


France has a large and rapidly deployable military force, as it demonstrated in Libya in 2011.	法国拥有大规模可快速部署的军事力量，这已在2011年的利比亚展示过了。


Furthermore, this military capability is tied to a worldview, rather than just to the defense of economic interests.	此外，其军力与其世界观相联系，而不仅仅为了捍卫其经济利益。


In Mali, France is not seeking to lay claim to resources, export democracy, or extend a Françafrique in which it no longer believes.	在马里，法国并没有要求资源、出口民主或是扩张它已不再信任的“法语区”。


More prosaically, France seeks to stabilize a country that is subject to violent forces that are not always led by Malians, and that are likely to disrupt the whole sub-region while threatening Europe.	法国寻求的是让一个有可能被并不一定由马里人领导的暴力势力主宰的实现稳定，而这可能影响整个撒哈拉以南非洲，并威胁欧洲。


Second, the intervention once again highlights the strategic insignificance of the European Union, which is promoting a “comprehensive strategy” for Mali and the whole region in order to avoid the crucial question: Under what conditions will Europe use force?	其次，此次干预再一次凸显欧盟的战略无价值，这促使马里和整个地区倒向“综合战略”以避免一个关键性问题：欧洲在什么情况下才会使用武力？


The final point concerns the nature of American involvement in the conflict.	最后一点与美国牵涉冲突中的性质有关。


The United States remains France’s most valuable strategic ally in this endeavor, but the terms have changed.	在此次行动中，美国仍是法国最宝贵的战略盟友，但平衡有所改变。


Indeed, after a decade of fruitless (to say the least) military interventions, tightening budget constraints have led President Barack Obama’s administration to sacrifice some ground forces in order to keep intact its substantial air and naval capabilities, the purpose being, apparently, to contain China.	事实上，在（至少）十年的军事干预后，预算约束的收紧迫使总统奥巴马政府不得不牺牲一些地面军队，以保证其空军和海军实力的完整，其目的显然在于遏制中国。


Obama’s recalibration has accentuated the realist turn in American foreign policy, according to which the US is now willing to intervene only when its immediate interests are at stake.	奥巴马的变策加强了美国外交政策的现实主义转向，据此，目前美国只有在感觉其利益直接受到威胁的情况下才会愿意干预。


In other cases, America’s allies will have to demonstrate their commitment in order to receive conditional backing.	若非如此，美国的盟友就必须自力更生以争取有条件支持。


This new approach was applied to Libya, where it was characterized as “leading from behind.”	利比亚就是如此，美国扮演的角色是“幕后领导”。


But this concept is inapt, because it implies that, ultimately, the US was the leader.	但这一概念是不恰当的，因为这意味着说到底美国仍是领导者。


Clearly, it was not.	显然，事实并非如此。


Absent the initial push from France and Great Britain, the US would most likely have remained passive, which was what the State and Defense Departments advised.	若不是法国和英国在一开始的行动，美国极有可能会保持消极观望，这也正是其国务院和国防部所建议的。


(The State Department even went so far as to warn France and Great Britain not to vote for United Nations Resolution 1973, which authorized intervention.)	（美国国务院甚至警告法国和英国不要投票赞成授权干预的联合国1973号提案。 ）


Obama ultimately overturned his bureaucrats’ position, proposing a strong military intervention, without ground troops, for a very limited period.	最终，奥巴马扭转了其手下官僚的立场，实施了为时极短的不派遣地面部队的强力军事干预。


In the end, the US delivered 75% of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 75% of air-to-air refueling, and 90% of the targeting intelligence – an indisputably significant contribution.	最终，美国提供了75%的情报、监视和侦察（ISR），75%的空中加油和90%的定点情报——毫无疑问贡献卓著。


Yet Libya marked the beginning of a concept – applicable to Mali today – that might be termed “following from above.”	但利比亚标志着一个新概念的开端，这一新概念正适用于如今的马里，可以称之为“从上面跟随”（following from above）。


In other words, the US is conveying to its allies that it will no longer intervene in low-priority areas unless its allies commit first, just like an investor waiting for the promoter to make a down payment.	换句话说，美国向其盟友传递的信息是，它不会在干预非当务之急的地区，除非其盟友率先行动，这就好比是投资者等待推销者付首付。


As in Libya, France had to take the initiative in Mali.	一如在利比亚那样，法国必须在马里打头阵。


And, as in Libya, American support was crucial in the four areas where France and other European countries fall short: aerial reconnaissance, targeting, air transportation, and air-to-air refueling.	一如在利比亚，美国的支持在法国和其他欧洲国家有所欠缺的四大领域是非常关键的：空中侦察、定位、空中运输和空中加油。


Unlike in Libya, though, in Mali the US took an unprecedented step in the history of transatlantic relations by considering making France pay to lease troop transport aircraft.	与在利比亚不同，在马里，美国开始考虑让法国掏钱租用军用运输机，这是在跨大西洋关系中前所未有的举动。


Although this proposal ultimately was discarded, it reveals both the erosion of US support and America’s determination to signal its non-assistance to Europeans who are in harm’s way.	尽管这一方案最终被否决，但它表明，美国支持程度在下降，并且决定表示它不会再为危险中的欧洲人提供帮助。


Moreover, there are real disagreements within the US bureaucracy when it comes to assessing the threat that Al Qaeda in Mali poses for US interests.	此外，在评估马里基地组织对美国利益的威胁的问题上，美国官场内部确实存在分歧。


Following from above thus has operational and symbolic significance.	因此，从上面跟随具有操作性和象征性的重要意义。


Operationally, it is limited to ISR and does not involve ground troops.	从操作层面看，它局限于ISR而不包括地面部队。


Symbolically, it means backing initial and significant efforts undertaken by others.	从象征意义看，它意味着支持其他人的一马当先和艰苦努力。


For Europe, this situation is worrying on two counts.	对欧洲来说，这是个值得担忧的情况。


First, it illustrates the stop-and-go dynamic undergirding American politics, which can swing – within just five years – from a disturbing expansionism to an equally worrying withdrawal from the world.	原因有二。 首先，这表明走一步看一步正在成为美国政治的主流，短短五年间，美国从令人担忧的扩张主义倒向了同��令人担忧的全球大撤退。


A jihadist Mali admittedly does not directly threaten the US, or at least less so than it does Europe.	诚然，圣战主义的马里不会直接威胁到美国，至少不会像威胁欧洲那样威胁美国。


But does it make sense to stick to such a simple analysis after what occurred on September 11, 2001?	但有了2001年9月11日的教训，这样的简单分析真的明智吗？


Second, Europe persists in ignoring the need to determine under what conditions it can and should use force, not for peacekeeping but to fight potentially hostile forces.	其次，欧洲仍然忽视了它需要决定在什么样的条件下可以和应该使用武力对付潜在敌对势力而不是维持和平。


The aversion to war is one of the most serious risks that Europe currently faces.	对战争的厌恶是目前欧洲所面临的最严峻的风险。


For the French, the US position will force a reevaluation of the importance of Africa in France’s global strategy, given that the government’s 2008 white paper on defense clearly minimized the continent’s importance, most likely to justify a reduction in French ground forces.	对法国来说，美国的立场将迫使其重新评估非洲在其全球战略中的重要性，法国政府的2008年国防白皮书明确地将非洲的重要性列为最小，或许这主要是为了证明削减地面部队的重要性。


Moreover, it will encourage France to broach the subject of military force with its European allies.	此外，这还会鼓励法国与其欧洲盟友一起确定其军事行动的目标。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel is known to criticize France for being less than enthusiastic about European political union.	德国总理默克尔对法国做出过著名的批评，她说法国对欧洲政治联盟不够热情。


The question is how to build Europe with states that bury their heads in the sand at the mention of the use of force, while cynically admitting that France is defending all of Europe in Mali.	问题在于如何与一提到使用武力就把头埋在沙子中、同时又不愿大方承认法国在马里捍卫了整个欧洲的的诸国一起建设欧洲。


France must now insist on addressing the question of the use of force as a pre-condition to any negotiations on Europe’s political integration.	如今，法国必须坚持将解决武力使用问题作为欧洲政治一体化谈判的先决条件。


By showing Europe that it is following its actions from above, the US will once again force Europeans to awaken from their political torpor and strategic mediocrity.	美国的从上面跟随姿态告诉欧洲，它将再次迫使欧洲从政治迟缓和战略平庸中惊醒。


The question remains whether Europeans will be willing to do so.	问题依然是欧洲是否愿意这样做。


Lessons from the Black Tsunami	黑色海啸留下的教训


The world has been horrified at America’s response to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans.	美国对卡特里娜飓风的反应和这场飓风给新奥尔良造成的损失令世界震惊。


Four years after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and with billions of dollars allegedly spent on “preparedness” for another emergency, America has shown the world that it was not prepared – even for an event that came with ample warning.	在2001年9月的恐怖袭击发生4年后，美国声称已经花费了成百上千亿美元做好了再一次应急的准备，但这场灾难向世界表明：美国根本没有真的准备好¾这个国家甚至无力应对一场事先已经发出了足够预警的灾难。


The difference between the Tsunami in Asia last December and what is coming to be called the Black Tsunami in America – because it brought so much devastation to the poor, mostly black, people of Louisiana – is striking.	发生在去年12月的亚洲海啸与这场被人们称为“美国黑色海啸”的灾难有着显著的区别，因为后者给路易斯安娜州的穷人、特别是黑色人种带来了更多的灾难。


The Asian disaster showed the ability of those affected to overcome long-standing rifts, as Aceh rebels put down their arms in common cause with the rest of Indonesia.	随着亚齐武装为了全印尼的共同事业主动放下武器，亚洲那场灾难向世人展示了受灾者有能力弥合久已存在的裂痕。


By contrast, the disaster in New Orleans – and elsewhere along America’s Gulf Coast – exposed and aggravated such rifts.	恰恰相反，同样的裂痕却在新奥尔良和美国墨西哥湾沿岸其它地区发生的这场灾难中日益严重，暴露无遗。


The Bush administration’s response to the hurricane confirmed the suspicion among blacks that, while they might send their boys to fight America’s wars, they had not only been left behind in America’s prosperity, but that there was neither understanding nor concern when they needed it most.	布什政府对飓风事件的反应证实了黑人心目中的猜测：那就是尽管他们会让自己的子女去为美国打仗，但他们不仅被美国的繁荣远远抛在了脑后，就连最最需要的时刻也得不到理解和关怀。


An evacuation was ordered, but no means to do so were provided for the poor.	政府发出了撤离的命令，却没有为穷人提供任何用于撤离的工具。


When help came, it was, as one New York Times columnist noted, like the Titanic: the rich and powerful got out first.	即便救援最终来到，也与《纽约时报》专栏作家笔下的泰坦尼克式援助完全吻合：那就是有钱有权者最先获救。


I was in Thailand right after the Tsunami, and I saw that country’s impressive response.	海啸发生后我就在泰国，亲眼目睹了那个国家令人印象深刻的举措。


The Thais flew consular and embassy officials to the affected areas, aware of the sense of helplessness among those stranded far from home.	泰国人组织外国使领馆的官员飞赴灾区，体验远离家园的被困者所感受到的无助。


America kept foreign officials from coming to the aid of their nationals in New Orleans – embarrassed, perhaps, at what they would see.	而美国却阻止外国官员向新奥尔良地区的同胞提供援助¾也许让外国人看到灾区的状况会使他们感到无地自容。


Even the richest country in the world has limited resources.	即便是世界上最富裕的国家资源也同样有限。


If it gives tax cuts to the rich, it will have less to spend on repairing levees; if it deploys the National Guard and reserves to fight a hopeless war in Iraq, there will be fewer resources at home to cope with a domestic crisis.	如果允许富人少纳税，国家修筑堤坝的资金就必然减少。 如果动用国民警卫队和物资储备在伊拉克打一场毫无希望的战争，就必然占用处理国内危机时所能动用的资源。


Choices must be made, and choices matter.	必须要做出选择，而且选择事关重大。


Shortsighted politicians like Bush often skimp on long-term investments in favor of short-term advantage.	布什之流的短视政客常常以克扣长期投资来牟取短期的利益。


He recently signed a lavish infrastructure bill that included, among other payoffs to political supporters, an infamous bridge to nowhere in Alaska.	不久前他刚刚批准投入巨资兴建基础设施，其中包括一座臭名昭著的通往阿拉斯加偏远地区的大桥，作为对其政治支持者们的一项回报。


Money that could have been used to save thousands of lives was spent to win votes.	本可以挽救成千上万条性命的钱财却被用来赢得选票。


Seldom do the “chickens come home to roost” as quickly as they have in recent years – an ill-conceived war, attempted on the cheap, has not brought peace to the Middle East.	恶有恶报这句话很少像近年来这样迅速地得到应验¾一次想占便宜的错误战争未能给中东地区带来和平。


Now America has had to pay the price for ignoring loud warnings about the weakened levees of New Orleans.	现在美国必须为忽视新奥尔良大堤不再稳固的大声警告付出代价。


Clearly, nothing could have spared New Orleans completely from Katrina’s impact, but the devastation could certainly have been lessened.	显而易见，没有任何措施能保护新奥尔良彻底免受卡特里娜飓风的影响，但飓风所造成的破坏却肯定能够得以减轻。


Markets, for all their virtues, often do not work well in a crisis.	尽管有着各种各样的优势，但市场调解常常在危机中失去作用。


Indeed, the market mechanism is often revolting to behold in emergencies.	实际上，市场机制在危急关头根本无法适用。


The market did not respond to the need for evacuation by sending in huge convoys of buses to get people out; in some places, it did respond by tripling hotel prices in neighboring areas, which, while reflecting the marked change in supply and demand, is reviled as price gouging.	市场没有派出大批车队帮助灾民撤离，在有些地方，市场确实做出了反应，使临近地区旅馆的价格提高了三倍，虽然这种做法的确反应了供给和需求的明显变化，但却被视为价格欺诈而遭人所不齿。


Such behavior is so odious because it brings little allocative benefit – no significant increase in supply in the short run – and carries a huge distributive cost, as those with resources take advantage of those without.	这种行为令人憎恶，因为它对资源分配本身没有任何好处，供给不会在短时间内得到大幅度提高，它还伴随着巨大的分配成本，因为掌握资源的人利用手中的资源对缺乏资源者进行掠夺。


The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has emphasized that most famines are associated not with a shortage of food, but the failure to get food to the people who need it, largely because they lack purchasing power.	诺贝尔经济学奖获得者阿玛蒂亚·森强调：大多数饥荒发生时粮食都并非真的紧缺，而是未能把粮食运到需要的人们手中，这在很大程度上是因为他们缺乏购买力。


America, the richest country in the world, clearly had the resources to evacuate New Orleans.	美国，这个世界上最富裕的国家，显然拥有帮助新奥尔良人撤离所需要的资源。


Bush simply forgot the poor – the tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands, who simply did not have the resources to pay for their own evacuation.	只是布什忘记了穷人的存在¾那些数��万计、甚至十万计的贫困人口，根本承担不起撤离所需要的费用。


When you’re poor, you don’t have a credit card, and most of the stranded were especially strapped for funds because it was the end of the month.	不仅贫困，没有信用卡，被飓风所困的绝大多数人还由于临近月底而身无分文。


But even if they had had the money, it is not obvious that markets would have responded quickly enough to provide the needed supply; in times of crisis, they often simply don’t.	但即便他们有撤离所需的费用，市场似乎也不太可能迅速做出反应，供给所需要的资源。


That’s one of the reasons why the military does not use a price system to allocate resources.	在危机时刻，市场常常失去作用，这也是军队不用价格体系分配资源的原因之一。


Last January, after the tsunami, in response to widespread calls for an early warning system, I observed that the world had been given an early warning on global warming.	去年1月的海啸过后，作为对引起人们广泛关注的早期预警系统的回应，我看到全世界人们都听到了全球变暖的警报。


The rest of the world has begun to take heed, but Bush, having ignored warnings about Al Qaeda’s plans prior to September 11, 2001, and having not only ignored the warnings about New Orleans levees, but actually gutted funding to shore them, has not led America to do likewise.	其它国家已经给予了充分的关注，但布什在2001年9月11日之前忽略了有关基地组织计划的警报以后，不仅再次忽略了新奥尔良大坝告急的警报，甚至还侵吞了修建大坝的资金，从而再一次让美国陷入了困境。


Scientists increasingly believe that global warming will be accompanied by larger climatic disturbances.	科学家们越来越相信全球变暖会带来明显的气候改变。


Recent evidence is at least consistent with that hypothesis.	近来的证据至少证实了这样的假设。


Perhaps Bush had hoped that the consequences of global warming would be felt long after he left office – and would be felt more by poor, low-lying, tropical countries like Bangladesh than by a rich country astride the temperate zones.	也许布什认为全球变暖的后果在他离职很多年后才会得以显现，而且只会影响到孟加拉这样贫困、没有地位的热带国家，而不是跨越若干气温带的富裕的美国。


Yet there is perhaps a silver lining in the clouds over New Orleans.	但在笼罩新奥尔良的阴云中也许还有一线希望。


Perhaps America, and especially Bush, will be persuaded to join the rest of the world in the fight against poverty and to protect our planet’s environment.	也许美国，特别是布什，会最终被说服同其它国家一道与贫困作战，保护我们这个星球的环境。


In facing and planning for disasters, whether natural or man-made, we must do more than hope and pray for the best.	面对着突如其来的天灾与人祸，除了期待和祈祷我们还必须做些什么。


Lessons from the Kaczyńskis\u0027 Poland	卡钦斯基治国的教训


The defeat of the Kaczyński twins’ Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland brought sighs of relief across Europe.	卡钦斯基孪生兄弟法律与正义党在波兰选举中败落让整个欧洲喘了一口气。


But, as Donald Tusk’s new government assumes office it is important to learn the lessons that their defeat holds for all of us.	但是，正当塔斯克的新政府就职的时候，吸取其失败的教训对于我们大家而言都是重要的。


Many governments waste good economic times by postponing the reforms needed to build a prosperous future.	许多政府通过推迟建立繁荣未来所需要的改革而错失良好的经济时机。


The PiS-led government, elected in 2005, inherited a fast-growing economy, but did nothing to strengthen that legacy.	法律与正义党所领导的政府于2005年当选，接收了高速增长的经济，但是却在巩固这一成就上无所作为。


Instead, privatization was blocked, while fiscal reforms and deregulation remained paper proposals.	相反，私有化受到阻挠，而财政改革和削减管制的建议则停留在纸面上。


Indeed, the Kaczyński government embarked on a program of anti-reform.	实际上，卡钦斯基政府实行了反改革的措施。


The separation of powers (an independent judiciary and central bank) was undermined in favor of a “strong” state.	分权(独立司法机关和中央银行)受到破坏，反而向所谓“强势”国家倾斜。


The PiS captured the public media, the general prosecutor’s office was politicized, and, with the use of the media, was turned into a tool of party propaganda aimed at showing that Poland was ruled by malicious hidden forces, known as the układ , which cheated Poles and kept them poor.	法律与正义党控制了公共媒体，总检察长办公室被政治化，而且，利用媒体将其转变成为政党宣称的工具，其目的在于表明波兰是被叫做“尤达卡”的隐藏的恶意势力统治。 这一势力欺骗了波兰人并让他们处于贫穷。


Anyone who disagreed with this diagnosis or criticized the PiS’s methods, particularly those used by its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, was promptly classified as belonging to the układ .	任何不同意这一观点或者批评法律与正义党、尤其是其领导人卡钦斯基的手腕的人被迅即划归为“尤达卡”。


No one was spared.	没人可以幸免。


Indeed, Lech Wałęsa and Władysław Bartoszewski, the Polish Mandela, were ruthlessly attacked.	实际上，瓦文萨和被称为波兰的曼德拉的巴尔托舍夫斯基受到无情的攻击。


Contrary to popular cliché, PiS’s victory in 2005 did not result from “reform fatigue,” since there were not many reforms implemented in 2000-2005 (except for an ambitious but partially blocked attempt at fiscal consolidation).	与大众所说的相反的是，法律与正义党2005年的胜利并非来源于“改革疲劳”，因为在2000年到2005年期间，除了一次对财政合并雄心勃勃而又中途而废的企图之外，并没有实行多少改革。


This explanation seems dubious elsewhere, too.	这一解释在其他地方看起来也是不明确的。


In Slovakia, the reformist leader Mikuláš Dzurinda won the 1998 elections after having implemented a tough stabilization program, and he could have continued to govern after the 2006 elections if not for disagreements in his coalition.	在斯洛伐克，改革派领导人祖林达在实行强制稳定项目后赢得1998年大选，而且，如果不是在其执政联合内部的分歧，他还可以继续在2006年以后执政。


In the Czech Republic, a reformist government was elected in 2006, and in Hungary, political divisions rather than reform fatigue dominates electoral campaigns.	在捷克共和国，改革派政府在2006年当选。 在匈牙利，政治分歧而不是改革疲劳控制了竞选。


Of course, it is not easy for reformers to win elections.	当然，改革者赢得选举并非易事。


On the contrary, reforms usually are undertaken only when the signs of an impending crisis are so strong that it is increasingly difficult to ignore them, or after the crisis has already “educated” voters.	相反，往往只有当现有危机迹象极为强烈，以至越发无法忽视它们之计，或者危机已经“教育”了选民之后才推行改革。


(However, if the crisis follows reforms, populist politicians may win by blaming the reforms, instead of their incomplete nature, as in Argentina.)	(但是，如果危机跟随改革，民粹派政坛人物们或许会像阿根廷那样，以指责改革而赢得选举，而不是其不完整的性质。 )


Reformers can win elections if they are better at public communication than the populists.	如果改革派们比民粹派更加善于沟通，他们就可以赢得选举。


Bad policies are, more often than not, easier to sell than good ones.	糟糕的政策往往比好的政策更容易有市场。


In Poland in 2005, the issue was mainly corruption.	2005年波兰的主要议题是腐败。


The PiS jumped on the anticorruption bandwagon and strengthened its appeal by linking the fight against corruption to the vision of hidden forces supposedly perverting Polish society and democracy.	法律与正义党借题发挥，并且通过将反腐败与被指称破坏波兰社会和民主的隐藏势力联系起来而巩固了其号召力。


If not for that, the results of the 2005 elections would most likely have been quite different.	如果不是因为这个，2005年选举的结果几乎肯定会大不一样。


To criticize anticorruption campaigns is risky, because words can be twisted to imply indifference.	批评反腐败的竞选是有风险的，因为话语可以被扭曲为表示无动于衷。


Therefore, let me first present my anticorruption credentials: as Deputy Prime Minister in 1999 I was the first Polish politician to ask the World Bank to prepare a report on corruption in Poland and ways to eradicate it.	因此，让我首先介绍本人的反腐败资历。 1999年，作为副总理，我是第一个要求世界银行准备一份有关波兰腐败问题以及如何消除腐败的报告的政坛人物。


In my public life, I emphasized eliminating discretionary regulations – the main source of both inefficiency and corruption.	在我的公众生活中，我强调消除随意规章，这是低效率和腐败的主要来源。


But we should not be blind to what can happen when political demagogues hijack the anticorruption card.	但是我们并应当对于当煽动者们劫持了反腐败这张牌的时候所发生的事情视而不见。


Interestingly, all the available measures of actual corruption were already declining before the Kaczyński twins were elected.	令人感到兴趣的是，在卡钦斯基兄弟当选之前，实际腐败的所有现有指标都已经在下降。


For example, the index of the frequency of paying bribes, calculated by the World Bank and EBRD, was 2.7 in 1999 and 2.03 in 2005 (the value of 1 is the minimum).	例如，根据世界银行和EBRD的计算，支付贿赂频率的指数在1999年是2. 7，在2005年是2.


The corruption tax (the percentage of sales paid in bribes) declined from 1.22% in 2002 to 0.7% in 2005.	03(数值1是最低值)。 腐败税(也就是销售额中支付的贿赂比例) 从2002年的1.


Poland now has a huge gap between the levels of perceived and actual corruption.	目前，波兰的想像中的腐败和实际腐败有巨大差距。


On perception, it fares much worse than Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Greece, while it fares better – or at least not worse – on indicators of actual corruption.	在想像中，腐败形式要比斯洛文尼亚、捷克共和国、匈牙利和希腊糟糕很多。 而在实际腐败指标上，它好很多，至少不会更差。


For example, the percentage of respondents admitting to paying bribes in 2006 was 5% in Poland and 17% in the Czech Republic and Greece.	例如，承认在2006年行贿的受调查者的比例在波兰是5%，在捷克和希腊是17%。 2005年的行贿频率指标在波兰是2.


The index of the frequency of paying bribes in 2005 was 2.03 in Poland, 2.22 in Slovakia, 2.09 in the Czech Republic, and 2.37 in Greece.	03，在斯洛伐克是2. 22，在捷克是2.


The corruption tax in 2005 was 0.7% in Poland, 0.93% in Slovakia, and 0.63% in Hungary.	2005年的腐败税在波兰是0. 7%，在斯洛伐克是0.


Of course, Poles should not settle for today’s levels of corruption.	当然，波兰人不应当满足于当前的腐败水平。


Instead, the battle with corruption should aim at removing its root causes: the scope of the discretionary public sector and the suppression of market forces.	相反，反腐斗争应当致力于消除其根本原因，也就是可以随意裁量的公共部门范围以及压制市场力量。


This is the only path that promises both less corruption and more economic growth.	这是唯一可以保证减少���败以及更多经济增长的途径。


Combating corruption through increased punitive action, while leaving intact a bloated and discretionary public sector, will only paralyze public officials, delay important decisions, and play into the hands of cynical demagogues and political fanatics.	通过提高惩罚性措施反腐败而对臃肿和随意裁量的公共部门置之不理只会让官员瘫痪，推迟重要的决定，并且正中那些玩世不恭的煽动者和政治狂热派的下怀。


Lessons From the North	北欧国家经验谈


Fewer debates over economics would be needed if the world spent more time examining what actually works and what does not.	如果全世界多花些时间来调查什么实际有用什么没用的话，经济争论就会越来越少。


Almost everywhere, debate has raged about how to combine market forces and social security.	几乎各地都在对如何将市场力量与社会安全结合起来进行激烈争论。


The left calls for an expansion of social protection; the right says that doing so would undermine economic growth and widen fiscal deficits.	左派要求加强社会保护，右派却认为，这样会破坏经济发展，增大财政赤字。


But the debate can be moved forward by examining the successful economies of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.	但是，在研究丹麦、芬兰、冰岛、荷兰、挪威和瑞典的经济成功后，讨论可能会进一步深入。


While no regional experience is directly transferable, the Nordic countries have successfully combined social welfare with high income levels, solid economic growth, and macroeconomic stability.	虽然区域经验不能直接转让，但北欧国家确已成功地将高收入水平的社会福利、稳固的经济增长和宏观经济稳定结合起来。


They have also achieved high standards of governance.	它们还实现了高标准的管理。


To be sure, there are also differences among the Nordic states, with social welfare spending the highest in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, and a bit lower in Finland and Iceland.	诚然，北欧国家之间也存在差别，丹麦、荷兰、挪威和瑞典消费水平较高，而芬兰和冰岛相对较低。


Nevertheless, whereas the taxes at the national level in the United States are equal to around 20% of GNP, in the Nordic countries the ratio is more than 30%.	然而，美国国家税收大约占国民生产总值的20%， 北欧国家的这一比率却超过了30%。


High taxation supports comprehensive national health care, education, pensions, and other social services, resulting in low levels of poverty and a relatively narrow income gap between the richest and poorest households.	高税收能够为全面国家保健、教育、养老金和其他社会服务提供支助，导致贫穷水平较低以及最富裕家庭和最贫穷家庭之间收入差距相对较小。


In the US, the poorest 20% of households receive just 5% of total income, putting their income at around one-fourth of the national average.	在美国，20%最贫穷家庭只领取总收入的5%，其收入占国家平均收入的四分之一。


In the Nordic countries, by contrast, the poorest 20% of households receive nearly 10% of total income, putting them at roughly one-half of the national average.	相反，北欧国家20%最贫穷家庭的收入约占总收入的10%，大约为全国平均收入水平的一半。


American conservatives argue that a large public sector is subject to inefficiency and mismanagement, corruption, and bureaucratic abuse, while the taxation needed to support it blunts economic efficiency.	美国保守党认为，大型公共部门效率低下、管理不善、腐败成风、官僚主义严重，而支持该部门所必需的税务却降低了经济效益。


But each of these propositions is refuted by the Nordic experience.	但是，诸如此类的每种说法均遭到北欧经验的驳斥。


Consider the claims of inefficiency and waste.	想想效率低下与浪费的诉求吧。


As a result of government-funded national health insurance, the Nordic countries have a higher life expectancy and a lower infant mortality rate than the US.	由于政府提供国家健康保险资金，与美国相比，北欧国家人民寿命更长，婴儿死亡率更低。


Life expectancy is close to 80 years in the Nordic countries, compared to 78 years in the US, where the government does not guarantee national health insurance and millions of families are too poor to pay for it on their own.	北欧国家人的寿命接近80岁，而美国人为78岁。 美国政府不保证实施全国健康保险，数百万家庭过于贫穷，自己无法投保。


Ironically, the heavy reliance on the private sector in the US system is so inefficient that Americans pay a larger share of GNP for health (14%) than do the Nordic countries (11%), but get less.	具有讽刺意味的是，美国制度过分依赖私营部门，显示出效率低下，美国较之于北欧国家（11%）向保健投入了较大比率的国民生产总值（14%），但所获更少。


Similarly, although social welfare spending is lower in the US than in the Nordic countries, its budget deficit as a share of national income is much larger.	同样，尽管美国社会福利开支比北欧国家更低，其占国民收入一定份额的预算赤字却大得多。


The US spends less in the public sector, but it taxes even less than it spends.	美国在公共部门花费更少，但其税收甚至比花费还要低。


Nor has high taxation in the Nordic countries impeded economic performance.	北欧国家的高税收却没有阻碍经济绩效。


Rather than relying mainly on income taxation, as in the US, the Nordic countries rely on value-added taxation, which provides a relatively high amount of revenue with relatively low rates of evasion and few distortions to the economy.	北欧国家并非以所得税为主，比如美国， 而是以增值税为主，增值税的收入金额相对较高，逃税比率相对较低，对经济的失真反映较少。


The Nordic experience also belies conservatives’ claim that a large social welfare state weakens incentives to work and save.	保守党认为，大型社会福利国家减弱了工作和储蓄的激励机制，北欧经验证明这是站不住脚的。


National saving in the Nordic countries averages more than 20% of national income, compared to around 10% in the US.	北欧国家的国民储蓄平均为国民收入的20%以上，而美国大约为10%。


Moreover, economic growth in the Nordic countries has been similar to that in the US in recent years. Income levels are higher on average in the US, but mainly because the Nordic countries work fewer hours per week.	另外，近年来北欧经济增长与美国类似，而收入水平比美国平均水平更高，主要原因在于，北欧国家每周工作时间更少。


In any case, all of the Nordic countries have very high incomes, and Norway’s per capita income actually exceeds the US.	在任何情况下，所有北欧国家收入水平较高，挪威人均收入实际超过美国。


Several factors appear to explain the Nordic countries’ economic success.	若干因素似乎可以解释北欧国家经济成功的原因。


Taxation is broad-based and relatively non-distorting, while open international trade, market forces, and private ownership of industry are relied on to maintain incentives.	北欧国家税收基础广阔，相对无偷税漏税现象。 开办国际贸易、市场力量和产业私有化均有赖于保持激励机制。


The Nordic countries are not “socialist” economies, based on state ownership and planning, but “social welfare” economies, based on private ownership and markets, with public provision of social protection.	北欧国家并非国家所有和计划的“社会主义”经济， 而是私人所有和市场化的“社会福利”经济，有着社会保护的规定。


Importantly, they invest heavily in higher education and in science and technology, so they remain at the cutting edge of high-technology industries.	重要的是，它们在高等教育和科技方面进行大量投资，因此，它们一直处于高科技产业的最前沿。


Half a century ago, the free-market economist Friedrich von Hayek argued that a large public sector would threaten democracy itself, putting European countries on a “road to serfdom.”	半个世纪以前，自由市场经济学家弗·冯·哈耶克（Friedrich von Hayek）提出，大型公共部门将威胁民主本身，将欧洲国家置于“受奴役的地位”。


Yet the Nordic states have thrived, not suffered, from a large social welfare state, with much less public-sector corruption and far higher levels of voter participation than in the US.	然而，北欧国家却因大型社会福利国家而繁荣起来，并非为此受难，与美国相比，公共部门腐败少得多，而选举人参与水平却高得多。


According to Transparency International, the Nordic countries have the world’s least corrupt political systems (with Iceland and Finland ranking as the least corrupt), while the US, with its big money politics, is fairly far down on the list.	据透明国际组织称，北欧国家是全球最不具有腐败政治制度的国家（冰岛和芬兰位居首位），而美国因其大钱政治相对排名靠后。


But how replicable are the Nordic successes?	可是，北欧的成功有多少是可以效仿的呢？


These countries have small populations, easy access to international trade, natural resources, and peaceful neighbors.	这些国家人口较少，容易开展国际贸易，获得自然资源，与邻国和平共处。


Most notably, they are ethnically homogeneous, so that social divisions are more amenable to compromise.	最值得注意的是，它们民族比较单一，社会分工比较容易服从和协调。


However, this means that the challenge of maintaining a strong social welfare state in ethnically and racially diverse societies such as the US is not economic, but one of promoting respect and inclusiveness.	这意味着要在美国这类民族和种族多元化社会维持强大的社会福利国家的挑战并不现实，但可以促进相互尊重和包容。


Lessons from the Tsunami	海啸的教训


There are many lessons that emerge from the tsunami that brought such devastation and loss of life to Asia.	从给亚洲带来如此破坏和生命损失的海啸中，我们可以汲取很多教训。


It demonstrated the power of globalization, as television brought vivid pictures of the destruction to homes around the world.	它向我们展示了全球化的威力，因为全世界有千家万户通过电视看到了这次灾害的生动画面。


Indeed, it is at times like this that the world truly does seem like a global village.	实际上，就是在这种时刻，世界才真正像个地球村。


Of course, it seemed to take somewhat longer for news of the extent of the disaster to reach the Crawford, Texas, ranch of President Bush.	当然，有关灾害破坏程度的新闻传到布什总统在德克萨斯州克劳福德的农场，所用的时间似乎长了一点。


But, in the end, he decided to interrupt his vacation and offer amounts of aid that were successively revised upwards, in a global competition which promised to benefit those who were desperate for help.	可最后，他还是决定取消休假，并在这场为绝望人民提供帮助的国际竞争中，不断提高对灾区的援助金额。


America’s aid still appeared niggardly when compared with the amounts offered by countries with a fraction of America’s economic wealth.	但如果与很多物质财富远不及美国的国家比起来，美国的援助显得十分吝啬。


Lightly populated Australia offered more than twice America’s assistance, Japan promised almost 50% more, and Europe pledged more than five times as much.	人口稀少的澳大利亚捐助额是美国的两倍，日本比美国高出50%，而欧洲承诺的金额也达到了美国的5倍。


This led many observers to reflect on the fact that the world’s richest country was in general the most miserly in foreign assistance – all the more so in comparison to the amount it spends on war and defense.	这使很多观察家认为世界最富有的国家在对外援助方面一般也最吝啬啬比起花在战争和国防上面的经费就更是如此。


The disaster was international, so it was appropriate that the United Nations take the lead in coordinating the relief effort.	这场灾害是国际性的，因此由联合国牵头协调救灾行动再恰当不过。


Unfortunately, in an effort that was widely seen as another attempt to undermine multilateralism, the US tried to lead a “core group” driving the assistance program, ignoring ongoing efforts within the region and at the UN.	令人遗憾的是，在普遍被看成是破坏多边主义的又一次图谋中，美国试图置地区和联合国的持续努力于不顾，领导所谓的“核心小组”来推动援助计划向前发展。


Whatever America’s motive, it later wisely decided to join the UN effort.	不管美国是出于怎样的动机，它后来还是明智地选择加入联合国的计划。


The Bush administration’s face-saving rhetoric that it had rushed to push together the core group in the absence of other efforts was quietly let to pass.	布什政府称自己是在其它行动尚未开始的情况下试图成立核心小组，这种保全脸面的托词被人们平静地接受了。


The response of some countries within the region was truly impressive, showing how far they had come in establishing efficient and effective governments.	该地区一些国家的反应的确感人至深，说明他们在建立高效政府方面付出了多大的努力。


Myriad details were addressed: Thailand flew ambassadors to the affected part of the country to help attend to the needs of their citizens, helped those who lost their money and passports return home, provided health care for the injured, set up systems to identify bodies, and dealt with the difficulties posed by shortages of body bags and the lack of cold storage facilities.	泰国让各国使节乘飞机来到受灾现场，协助满足灾区人民的需要； 帮那些丢失钱款和护照的人回国，为受伤人员提供医疗救助，设立遗体辨认的机制，应对由于尸袋和冷冻设备短缺所带来的困难。


Countries, like Thailand, that felt that they could handle the finances on their own asked that assistance be directed to others.	像泰国这样觉得能解决经济问题的国家要求把援助分配给其它国家。


They did ask one thing: a reduction of tariff barriers and greater access to markets abroad.	他们的确提出了一个要求：减免关税和放松国外市场的准入限制。


They didn’t want a handout, only a chance to earn income.	他们要的不是援助，而是增加收入的机会。


The response, at least at the time of this column’s writing, has mostly been deafening silence.	但至少在我写这篇文章之前，各国的回应仍是一片沉默。


On the other hand, the G-7 made a truly important contribution in offering debt relief.	另一方面，西方七国在提供救灾援助方面做出了不少贡献。


This is especially important for Indonesia, which must service a debt of $132 billion (of which $70 billion is owed to public creditors or guaranteed by government agencies).	这对印度尼西亚尤为重要，因为它要偿还1320亿美元的债务（其中700亿美元的债主是公众债券人或有政府机构的担保）。


Even without the tsunami, this debt burden would have been an enormous hindrance to the country’s development as it finally recovers from the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis.	即便没有这次海啸，这样的债务负担也足以影响该国的发展，影响它从1997年金融危机当中的恢复。


Indeed, there is a compelling case to be made for Indonesian debt relief in any case, given that much of the debt was incurred in loans to the corrupt Suharto government.	实际上，无论如何印尼债务负担的减免都需要尽早提上议程，因为这么多债务都是腐败的苏哈托政府欠下的。


Lenders knew, or should have known, that not all of the money was going to help Indonesian development.	债主们清楚，或是应该清楚并不是所有的钱都会用于印尼的发展。


Moreover, some of the debt was incurred as part of the 1997-1998 crisis, which was aggravated and deepened by IMF-imposed policies.	另外，有些债务是在1997－1998年危机中欠下的，而国际货币基金组织的政策又加重了这样的债务负担。


No one pretends that we can prevent or alter the forces of nature. Rather, we have to learn to cope with them.	没有人装作能够阻止或改变自然力量的发展，相反，我们必须学会如何去应对。


There are now calls for improved tsunami early warning systems.	人们呼吁改善海啸的早期预警系统。


But in one area, global warming, we have already received an early warning.	但在全球变暖这个领域，我们已经收到了早期的警报。


Most countries have recognized this, coming together in Rio and Kyoto to do something about it—not enough, but the Kyoto protocol was intended only as a start.	多数国家都表示了认可，并在里约和京都共同做出了努力力虽然还远远不够，但京都议定书不过是个开始。


Sadly, global warming will likely destroy some of the same countries ravaged by the tsunami. Low lying islands like the Maldives will become submerged.	令人难过的是，全球变暖还会使这次海啸受灾国中的一部分遭到损害，像马尔代夫这样地势低洼的岛国将会被淹没。


We are, however, still not a global village.	但我们还远未成为一个地球村。


After first disputing that there was scientific evidence of the problem, the largest polluter in the world, the US, is now simply refusing to do anything about it (other than preaching voluntary restraint—of which there is little evidence, at least in America).	在首先提出全球变暖问��缺乏科学依据后，全球最大的污染国美国就是不愿采取任何措施（除了鼓吹自愿限制制没有证据表明自愿限制是否可行，至少在美国的确如此）。


The international community has yet to figure out what to do with an aberrant member who fails to live up to its responsibilities as a global citizen.	对付这样未能承担起地球公民义务的不正常的成员，国际社会还没有拿出可行的办法。


Optimists say that technology will solve the problem.	乐观人士认为技术能解决问题。


Realists observe that in the long race between the environment and technology, it appears that technology has so far been losing.	但现实主义者看到在环境和技术的漫长较量中，到目前为止技术都没有胜算。


Nature, as we have learned from the tsunami, has its own timetable.	这次海啸告诉我们，大自然有它自身的时间表。


Unless we learn how to respect it, we will all miss the boat.	除非我们知道如何加以尊重，否则就会错过那条救命的方舟。


Two Policy Prescriptions for the Global Crisis	解决全球危机的两种政策方案


WASHINGTON, DC – One thing that experts know, and that non-experts do not, is that they know less than non-experts think they do.	发自华盛顿特区——只有专家们才知道自己所知的比外行人认为的要少。


This much was evident at the just-completed Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group – three intense days of talks that brought together finance ministers, central bankers, and other policymakers.	这在刚刚闭幕的国际货币基金组织和世界银行集团春季会议中表现得尤为明显——各国财政部长、中央银行家和其他政策制定者们都被议程密集的三天会谈聚到了一起。


Our economic expertise is limited in fundamental ways.	我们的经济专业知识在基础方法上是很局限的。


Consider monetary and fiscal policies. Despite decades of careful data collection and mathematical and statistical research, on many large questions we have little more than rules of thumb.	以货币和财政政策为例，尽管几十年来我们都小心收集数据并进行数学和统计学研究，在很多大问题上我们也只不过是比一般经验知道得多一点而已。


For example, we know that we should lower interest rates and inject liquidity to fight stagnation, and that we should raise policy rates and banks’ cash-reserve ratios to stifle inflation.	比如，我们知道为了对抗经济停滞应该降低利率并注入流动性，而且应该提高政策利率和银行存款准备金率以抑制通胀。


Sometimes we rely on our judgment in combining interest-rate action with open-market operations.	有时候我们依赖自身的判断来结合利率行动与公开市场操作。


But the fact remains that our understanding of these policies’ mechanics is rudimentary.	但事实上我们对这些政策机制的了解还是很粗浅的。


These rules of thumb work (at least tolerably so) as a result of evolution.	作为进化的结果，这些经验法则还算有效（至少还在容忍范围之内）。


Over time, the wrong moves are penalized, and their users either learn by watching others or disappear.	随着时间的推移，错误的行动被惩罚，其使用者要么通过观察别人来学习、要么被淘汰。


We get our monetary and fiscal policies right the same way that birds build their nests right.	我们像鸟儿合理筑巢一样习得合理的货币和财政政策。


As with all behaviors shaped by evolution, when the environment changes, there is a risk that existing adaptations become dysfunctional.	而跟所有的进化行为一样，一旦环境发生变化，现有的适应特性有可能会功能失调。


This has been the fate of some of our standard macroeconomic policies.	这已经成为了我们一些标准宏观经济政策的命运。


The formation of the eurozone and a half-century of relentless globalization have altered the global economic landscape, rendering once-proven policies ineffective.	欧元区的构建和半个世纪以来无情的全球化已经改变了全球经济格局，使那些曾经有用的政策当场失效。


When Sweden’s Riksbank was founded in 1668, followed by the Bank of England in 1694, the motivation was that a single economy should have a single central bank.	在1668年瑞典创立中央银行之后，英格兰央行也在1694年成立，其动机是单一经济体应该拥有一个中央银行。


Over the next three centuries, as the benefits of instituting a monopoly over money creation became more widely recognized, a slew of central banks were established, one for each politically bounded economy.	在接下来的三个世纪，随着垄断货币创造的好处得到广泛认可，大量的央行被建立起来，每个央行都对应着一个拥有政治界限的经济体。


What was not anticipated was that globalization would erode these boundaries.	但人们没有预料到的是全球化侵蚀了这些边界。


As a result, we have returned to a past from which we tried to escape – a single economy, in this case the world, with multiple money-creating authorities.	结果，我们又回到了当初极力摆脱的境地——单一的经济体（即全球经济体），却有着许多个可以印钞的当局。


This is clearly maladaptive, and it explains why the massive injections of liquidity by advanced-country central banks are failing to jump-start economies and create more jobs.	这显然是不适应环境的，它也解释了为何发达国家注入大规模的流动性却不能推动经济也不能创造更多的就业。


After all, in a globalized economy, much of this liquidity spills across political boundaries, giving rise to inflationary pressures in distant lands and precipitating the risk of currency wars, while unemployment at home remains dangerously high, threatening to erode workers’ skills.	毕竟，在全球化经济下，这些现金的大部分都跨过政治边界流到了别的地区，这又引起了遥远地方出现通货膨胀压力并使世界陷入货币战争的风险，而国内的失业率仍然处于高危水平，可能导致工人丧失技能。


The long-run damage could be devastating.	这种长期的破坏可以是毁灭性的。


What was evident at the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings was that virtually all policymakers are distressed and no one has a complete answer.	出席世界银行及国际货币基金组织的春季会议的���乎所有政策制定者似乎都愁眉不展，并且没有一个人能拿出妥善的解决方案。


Neither do I. But here are two simple ideas that could help to mitigate the crisis.	我也没有。 但我有两个简单的建议能缓解这一危机。


First, in the absence of a single global central-banking authority, a modicum of monetary-policy coordination among major economies is required.	首先，在缺乏全球统一央行的情况下，我们需要经济大国之间进行某些货币政策协调。


We need a group of the major economies – call it “G Major” – that announces monetary policies in a coordinated fashion.	我们需要一组经济大国——可以称之为“G国”——来发布协调一致的货币政策。


To see why, consider the case of Japan.	为了说明原因，我们来看看日本的情况。


Japanese policymakers have good reason to try to promote some inflation and even correct some of the yen’s secular appreciation over the last six or seven years.	日本的政策制定者有充分的理由促进一定程度的通货膨胀甚至纠正一下日元在过去六七年间的长期升值。


But, in today’s unilateral world, other central banks would soon respond by injecting liquidity, prompting the Bank of Japan to act again.	然而在当今这个各人自扫门前雪的世界，其他国家的央行很快会作出向市场注入流动性的反应，这促使日本央行再次行动。


These actions are usually justified as policies for boosting domestic demand, but they end up fueling a surrogate, low-grade currency war.	这些行动通常被粉饰为提振国内需求的政策，但它们最终会助长一场替代性的，低级的货币战。


If, however, the G Major economies issued quarterly announcements of significant upcoming policy changes – for example, a small round of quantitative easing by country X, a larger liquidity injection by countries Y and Z, and so on – markets would be reassured that a currency war was not being fought.	然而，如果这些G国主要经济体在季度报告上宣布即将来临的重大政策变化——比如，X国的小轮量化宽松政策，Y国和Z国大规模的现金注入等等——这会对市场起到安抚作用，让人们知道不会出现货币战。


Exchange-rate movements would be minimal and only as intended, and volatility would be contained, because tit-for-tat injections would no longer occur and speculation would wane.	这样的话，汇率变动就会很小，而且只要在需要的时候才会有变动； 汇率波动性会被遏制，这是因为不会再发生针锋相对的注入；


Moreover, liquidity injections would be likely to have a greater impact on demand, because synchronization would reduce leakage across national boundaries.	投机行为也会减弱。 此外，流动性注入很有可能对需求产生更大的影响，因为同步性将会减少在跨国性的资金流出。


The second recommendation pertains to the mechanics of liquidity injection, much of which takes place nowadays – in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere – through asset purchases.	第二个建议适用于流动性注入的机制，这些都通过资产收购发生——在欧洲、日本和其它地方。


The US Federal Reserve, for example, is currently purchasing assets (many of them mortgage-backed) worth $85 billion each month.	比如美联储目前每个月都在收购价值850亿美元的资产（其中大多数是债券）。


Liquidity injections and low interest rates have a microeconomic effect that has received little attention: they lower the cost of capital vis-à-vis the cost of labor, which causes a relative decline in demand for labor.	流动性注入和低利率都会产生一定的微观经济效应，但这一效应未能得到多少关注：它们降低了资本相对于劳力的成本，也就相应降低了对劳力需求。


This is very likely exacerbating the unemployment problem; it certainly is not mitigating it.	这很有可能会加剧失业问题； 它肯定不会缓和这个问题。


One solution is to channel part of the liquidity injections toward countering this factor-cost asymmetry.	其中一个解决方案是利用部分注入的资金来解决这个成本产出不对称的问题。


Thus, for every $100 of new liquidity, we could use $60 to purchase assets and the remainder to give firms a marginal job-creation subsidy, which could be especially effective in economies with flexible labor markets that enable short-term hiring.	因此，对每100美元的注入资金，我们可以用60美元来购买资产而剩下40美元的用来补贴公司创造工作——这对那些拥有允许短期雇佣的灵活劳动力市场的经济特别有效。


Even if the employment subsidy were offered only for, say, one year, firms would be tempted to use more labor during this time.	即使就业津贴只提供一年，公司也会忍不住在这一时期多雇一些人。


And, because the current bout of high unemployment is self-reinforcing, once the equilibrium is broken for a while, the economy could move to a higher-employment equilibrium permanently, without the need for any further government support.	而且因为目前爆发的高失业率是自我强化的，一但均衡被打破一段时间，经济就有可能长期步入一个就业水平更高的均衡状态，而且无需政府提供进一步的支持。


This prescription has one problem.	这种方案存在一个问题。


Asset purchases have no balance-sheet effect, because assets replace money.	资产收购并在资产负债表上并没有影响，因为资产取代了钱。


Subsidizing labor, by contrast, is a pure injection of liquidity.	相反，补贴劳力是纯粹的流动性注入。


However, for precisely that reason, an employment subsidy is likely to be more effective in boosting demand, which implies that a smaller injection of this kind is likely to boost demand as much as a larger asset purchase would.	然而，正是因为如此，就业补贴很有可能在提高需求方面更为有效，这意味着这类规模较小的注入带动的需求很可能和大规模资产收购所带动的需求一样多。


Among the few certainties in crafting economic policy is the need to adapt to external change.	在制定经济政策过程中为数不多的确定性选项中就包括有适应外部变化的需求。


Our challenge is like that of Industrial Revolution-era moths, which adapted to their new soot-laden environment by becoming darker (and thus better able to hide from predators).	我们的挑战就像工业大革命时的飞蛾——它们通过变得更黑（从而能更好地躲避天敌）来适应新的烟尘环境。


In a globalized economy, national policymakers should not be left circling light bulbs.	而在全球化经济下，各国的政策制定者也不能只围着灯光打转。


The Lessons of America’s Election	美国大选的教训


STANFORD – Donald Trump’s surprise election as the 45th president of the United States has spawned a cottage industry of election post-mortems and predictions, in America and abroad.	发自斯坦福——唐纳德·特朗普竞逐美国第45任总统的意外胜选令美国国内和国外都涌现出一批专门进行选举后分析和预测的家庭小作坊。


Some correlate Trump’s victory with a broader trend toward populism in the West, and, in particular, in Europe, exemplified in the United Kingdom’s vote in June to leave the European Union.	有人把特朗普的胜利与西方迈向民粹主义的宏观趋势联系起来，而该现象在欧洲则尤其以英国在6月份公投脱欧为标志。


Others focus on Trump’s appeal as an outsider, capable of disrupting the political system in a way that his opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – a consummate insider – never could.	另一些人则关注特朗普作为一个局外人的魅力，竟能够以一种其对手——近乎无懈可击的圈内人前国务卿希拉里——永远不可能做到的方式来搅乱整个政治体系。


There may be something to these explanations, particularly the latter. But there is more to the story.	这些解释（特别是后者）可能有点道理，但这其中还蕴藏着更多的深意。


In the months preceding the election, the mainstream media, pundits, and pollsters kept repeating that Trump had an extremely narrow path to victory.	在选举前的几个月里，主流媒体，专家和民众都一再认定特朗普的取胜之路极为狭窄。


What they failed to recognize was the extent of economic anxiety felt by working-class families in key states, owing to the dislocations caused by technology and globalization.	他们低估了那些位于关键州的工人阶级家庭因技术和全球化造成的错位而产生的经济焦虑程度。


But, as I highlighted two months before the election, those frustrations were far-reaching, as was the sense of being ignored and left behind – and it was Trump who finally made that group feel seen.	但是，正如我在选举前两个月特别指出的那样，那些焦虑感的影响是深远的，而那种被忽视和抛离的感觉也是如此——而只有特朗普最终使这个团体找到了存在感。


That is why I recognized the possibility of a Trump upset, despite Clinton’s significant lead in the polls (five points, just before the election).	这也是尽管希拉里民调一路领先（在选举开始前还领先5个点），但笔者却意识到特朗普可能成功搅局的原因。


And an upset is what happened.	这一搅局最终成为了现实。


Trump narrowly won states that Republicans had not won in decades (Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania), and won big in usually closely contested Ohio.	特朗普以微弱优势拿下几个了共和党几十年来都没赢过的州（威斯康星州，密歇根州和宾夕法尼亚州），并在两党得票一直相近的俄亥俄州取得了大胜。


In fact, Republicans secured a broad victory.	共和党人在事实上夺取了大面积的胜利。


The party retained control of the Senate, even though more than twice as many Republican seats were up for reelection than Democratic seats, and it lost just a handful of House seats, far fewer than the 20 predicted.	一方面，虽然面临重选的共和党参议院席位要比民主党席位多出一倍多，但前者依然手握参议院的控制权，另一方面，共和党只丢失了少数众议院席位，远远低于原本20个的预期。


Moreover, the Republicans now control 33 governorships, compared to 16 for the Democrats, and have expanded their already-large majorities in state legislatures.	此外共和党目前控制了33个州，而民主党只有16个，并扩大了各州议会中本已占大多数的席位。


Now, talk has turned from the impending implosion of the Republican Party to the repudiation, disarray, and bleak future prospects of the Democrats.	如今人们议论的热点也已从共和党面临的内部分裂转到了民主党的否定，混乱和黯淡前景。


Since the election, Trump has moved quickly to assert himself.	自选举以来，特朗普迅速行动起来去树立自身的权威。


Republicans, even those who opposed Trump during the campaign, have coalesced behind him.	所有共和党人，甚至那些在竞选期间反对过他的人，都已聚集在他身后。


Meanwhile, the Democrats in government – most notably President Barack Obama – have largely echoed Clinton’s gracious concession-speech injunction that Trump should be given an opportunity to lead.	与此同时，当政的民主党人——其中最明显的莫过于总统奥巴马——却在一致响应希拉里貌似宽宏大量的败选号召，认为无论如何都该给特朗普一个领导国家的机会。


The US election’s unexpected outcome holds four key lessons, applicable to all advanced democracies.	美国大选所得到的这一意外结果留下了四个关键的教训，适用于所有发达民主国家。


First, growth beats redistribution.	首先，增长要比再分配更重要。


Clinton’s barely discussed economic plan was to expand Obama’s left-leaning agenda, so that it looked more like the socialism of her opponent in the Democratic primary, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders.	希拉里甚少提及的经济计划其实是奥巴马左倾议程的扩大化，因此看起来也更像她的民主党初选对手，佛蒙特州参议员伯尼·桑德斯所提倡的社会主义。


Higher taxes for the wealthy, together with more “free” (taxpayer-paid) services, was, she argued, the best route to combating inequality.	在她看来，对富人征收更高的税加上更为“免费”（却由纳税人支付）的服务，就是打击不平等的最佳途径。


Trump, by contrast, hammered home messages about jobs and incomes.	相比之下，特朗普着力于传达关于工作和收入的居家生活信息。


Though the media almost exclusively covered his most hyperbolic and controversial statements, it was largely his economic message that won him support.	虽然媒体几乎都是在报道他极为夸张且富争议性的言论，但是他的支持率在很大程度上都是靠其经济信息赢回来的。


People want hope for a better future – and that comes from rising incomes, not from an extra government-issued slice of the pie.	人们希望重拾对一个更美好未来的向往——而这来自收入的增加，而不是政府另外画出的一块饼。


The second lesson concerns the risk of dismissing, let alone condescending to, voters.	第二个教训则与对选民的漠视(更别提屈从)有关。


From the start, Clinton was not broadly liked.	从一开始希拉里就不大受欢迎。


Revelations during the campaign – for example, that, in a 2015 speech, she had said that “deep-seated cultural codes, religious beliefs, and structural biases have to be changed” to secure women’s reproductive and other rights – reinforced fears that she would push too progressive a social agenda.	大选期间被挖出来的旧事——例如在2015年的一次演讲中，她提到“必须改变那些深层次的文化符号，宗教信仰和结构性倾斜”以确保妇女的生育及其他权利——令人们更为担心她当选后会过度推进这一社��议程。


Recognizing these shortcomings, Clinton tried to win the election by making Trump unacceptable.	认识到这些缺点之后，希拉里试图通过令特朗普变得让人无法接受来取胜。


But her remarks that half of Trump’s supporters belonged to a “basket of deplorables” – that they were racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – reinforced the impression that she and her party looked down on Trump voters as morally contemptible and even stupid.	但她却评论说特朗普的支持者多半数属于“一个糟糕可悲的群体”——种族主义者，男性至上主义者，仇视同性恋者，仇外分子和伊斯兰恐惧症患者——进而强化了一种印象：她和她的党派看不起特朗普支持者,觉得这些人在道德有问题乃至愚不可及。


Such statements could well have pushed some undecided voters to decide against Clinton.	但很可能正是这类言论令一些原本左右摇摆的选民转而反对希拉里。


The third lesson is that a society’s capacity to absorb rapid change is limited.	第三个教训是社会适应快速变革的能力其实是有限的。


When technological progress and globalization, not to mention social and cultural change, outpace people’s ability to adapt, they become too jarring, disruptive, and overwhelming.	当技术进步和全球化，更不要说社会和文化变革，超过了人们的适应能力，他们就会变得焦躁且具备破坏性和压倒性。


Many voters – not just in America – also fret over terrorism and immigration, especially in combination with these rapid changes.	许多选民——不仅仅是在美国——也对恐怖主义和移民感到恐惧，尤其是与这类快速变革结合在一起的时候。


Add to that concerns about America’s growing opioid epidemic and a tedious and intolerant form of political correctness, and, for many, change did not look like progress.	除此之外还有美国日益严重的依赖性以及令人乏味且无法容忍的政治正确形式，对许多人来说，变革看起来跟进步无关。


If democratic political systems do not find ways to ease transitions, provide shock absorbers, and accept heterodox attitudes and values without condemnation, voters will push back.	如果民主政治制度没有找到办法去舒缓这种过渡，提供减震机制，接受非正统的态度和价值观而不加以谴责，选民就会发生倒退。


The final lesson relates to the danger of the ideological echo chamber.	最后的一个教训则与在意识形态上闭目塞听的危机有关。


The repeated claim by shocked Clinton voters that no one they knew voted for Trump reveals the extent to which too many people – Republicans as well as Democrats – live in social, economic, informational, cultural, and communication bubbles.	震惊的克林顿选民一再声称自己连一个投票给特朗普的人都不认识，这表明有极大数量的人——无论是共和党人和民主党人——都生活在社会，经济，信息，文化和沟通交流的封闭空间中。


Declining trust in national media, combined with a proliferation of Internet communication, has created a world where the news people read is often created with the goal of “going viral,” not informing the public; the result can barely be called news at all.	对国家媒体的信任下降加上互联网交流的激增创造了一个世界：在这里人们读到的新闻往往以“病毒式传播”为目标，而不是为了（将实情）告知公众； 由此做出来的东西几乎无法被称为新闻。


Moreover, the information people see is often filtered, so that they are exposed only to ideas that reflect or reinforce their own.	此外人们看到的信息经常会被过滤，所以他们接受到的信息只不过是反映或强化了自己原本的想法。


(The corollary with this online world is that, as Trump and Clinton discovered, we are all just one hack away from YouTube or WikiLeaks, cable news or talk radio, fame or infamy.)	（正如特朗普和希拉里所发现的那样，这个在线世界的必然结果是我们距离YouTube或维基解密，有线新闻或电台访谈，盛名在外或臭名昭著，都只不过是取决于黑客的一个点击而已。 ）


These developments undermine people’s capacity to engage in informed, rational discussions, let alone debates, with those who have different perspectives, values, or economic interests.	这些变革破坏了人们参与知情理性讨论的能力，更遑论说与那些持有不同观点，价值观或经济利益的人进行辩论的能力。


Even universities, which are supposed to foster knowledge-sharing and spirited debate, are now suppressing it, for example by spinelessly rescinding speaking invitations to almost anyone that some group or another considers objectionable.	即使是本应促进知识共享和激烈辩论的大学现在也正抑制这一点，例如只要某些团体表示反感，大学就会立刻唯唯诺诺地取消某个人的演讲邀请。


When we fail to engage in such debates – when people choose “safe spaces” over tough discussions – we lose our best chance of building consensus on how to solve at least some of our societies’ pressing problems.	当我们无法参与这类辩论的时候——当人们放弃艰难的讨论而选择“安全地带”时——我们就失去了就如何解决我们社会的一些紧迫问题而达成共识的最佳机会。


A Better Way to Fight Climate Change	对抗气候变化的更好方法


NEW YORK – Of all major world regions, Europe has worked the hardest to implement policies aimed at countering human-caused climate change.	纽约——在世界所有主要地区中，欧洲为贯彻应对人为气候变化的政策付出了最艰苦的努力。


Yet the cornerstone of Europe’s approach – a continent-wide emissions trading system for the greenhouse gases that cause climate change – is in trouble.	但欧洲对策的基础，也就是欧洲大陆实行的导致气候变化温室气体的排放交易制度已经陷入困局。


That experience suggests a better strategy for both Europe and the rest of the world.	这告诉我们欧洲和世界各国都必须找到一条更好的出路。


The basic story of human-caused climate change is becoming clearer to the global public.	人为气候变化的原理对全球公众而言已经不再陌生。


Several gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, warm the planet as their concentrations in the atmosphere increase.	大气中二氧化碳、甲烷和一氧化二氮等几种气体的浓度上升导致地球升温。


As the world economy grows, so do emissions of these gases, accelerating the pace of human-caused climate change.	温室气体排放随世界经济发展而增长，由此导致人为气候变化的步伐加速向前迈进。


The main greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide.	二氧化碳是主要的温室气体。


Most CO2 emissions result from the burning of fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – for energy, global consumption of which is rising as the world economy grows.	全球能源消耗随世界经济增长而上升，燃烧煤、石油和天然气等化石能源排出绝大部分的二氧化碳。


As a result, we are on a path to very dangerous levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.	因此，长此以往大气中的二氧化碳将达到危险含量。


Twenty years ago, the world agreed to reduce sharply emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, but little progress has been made.	20年前，世界各国就已同意大幅减少二氧化碳和其他温室气体排放，但迄今为止仍然收效甚微。


Instead, the rapid growth of the emerging economies, especially coal-burning China, has caused global CO2 emissions to soar.	相反，新兴经济，尤其是中国燃煤量的快速增长已经导致全球二氧化碳排放快速增长。


Dangerous changes in climate have already begun.	危险的气候变化已经开始显露迹象。


If the world continues on its current trajectory, global temperatures will eventually rise by several degrees centigrade, causing higher sea levels, mega-storms, severe heat waves, massive crop failures, extreme droughts, heavy flooding, and a sharp loss of biodiversity.	如果世界继续沿着目前的轨道前行，全球气温终将上升几摄氏度，进而导致海平面升高、特大风暴、严重热浪，大规模农作物歉收、极端干旱、严重洪涝和生物多样性骤降。


Yet changing the world’s energy system is a daunting challenge, because fossil fuels are so deeply embedded in the workings of the global economy.	但改变世界能源体系是一项艰巨的挑战，因为化石燃料已深深植根于全球的经济运作。


Oil provides the main fuel for transportation worldwide.	石油是全球运输的主要燃料。


Coal and gas are burned in huge and growing amounts to produce electricity and to provide energy for industry.	煤和天然气燃烧量巨大并且不���增加，转化成电力为工业生产提供能量。


How, then, can we sustain worldwide economic progress while cutting back sharply on carbon emissions?	既然如此，我们如何在大幅削减碳排放的同时保持世界经济增长？


There are essentially two solutions, but neither has been deployed on a large scale.	解决办法基本可以分为两种，但这两种都没有被大规模采纳。


The first is to shift massively from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, especially wind power and solar power.	首先是从化石燃料大规模过渡到可再生能源，特别是风能和太阳能。


Some countries will also continue to use nuclear power.	有些国家还将继续使用核电。


(Hydroelectric power generation emits no CO2, but there are only a few remaining places in the world where it can be expanded without major environmental or social costs.)	（水力发电无二氧化碳排放，但也只适合在世界少数地区推广，而不会付出高昂的环境或社会代价）。


The second solution is to capture CO2 emissions for storage underground.	第二种解决方法是捕获排放的二氧化碳并储存在地下。


But this technology, called carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), is not yet proven on a large scale.	但这种被称为碳捕获封存（CCS）的技术目前尚未经过大规模验证。


One approach is to capture the CO2 at the power plant as the coal or gas is burned.	一种办法是在发电厂燃煤或燃气时捕获二氧化碳。


Another is to capture it directly from the air using specially designed chemical processes.	另一种方法是利用专门设计的化学程序直接从空气中捕获。


Either way, CCS will require significant investment in further research and development before it becomes a viable technology.	但无论采用哪种方法，碳捕获封存都还需要大规模投资展开进一步研发，才能逐步完善和成熟。


The big problem is time.	时间是最大的拦路虎。


If we had a century to change the world’s energy system, we could feel reasonably secure.	如果我们有一个世纪来改革世界能源系统，我们或许有理由感到安全。


Yet we must complete most of the transformation to low-carbon energy by mid-century.	但我们必须在本世纪中叶完成向低碳能源转型的绝大部分任务。


This is extraordinarily difficult given the long transition period needed to overhaul the world’s energy infrastructure, including not only power plants, transmission lines, and transport systems, but also homes and commercial buildings.	鉴于检修电厂、输电线、运输系统等世界能源基础设施及住宅和商业建筑需要较长的过渡期，因此完成这项任务确实困难重重。


Few economic regions have made much progress in this transformation.	几乎没有哪个经济区在此次转型中取得了显著的进展。


In fact, the United States is now investing heavily in natural gas without recognizing or caring that its shale-gas boom, based on new hydraulic-fracturing technology, is likely to make matters worse.	事实上，美国现在对天然气大量投资，却不承认也不在乎即将开始的基于全新水力压裂技术的页岩气大发展可能会使情况进一步恶化。


Even if the US economy shifts from coal to natural gas, America’s coal will probably be exported for use elsewhere in the world.	即使美国经济从煤炭转向天然气，美国的煤炭也可能出口到世界其他地方。


In any event, natural gas, though somewhat less carbon-intensive than coal, is a fossil fuel; burning it will cause unacceptable climate damage.	无论如何，尽管与燃煤相比碳排量较小，但天然气仍然是一种化石燃料； 其燃烧对气候造成的破坏仍然不可接受。


Only Europe has tried to make a serious shift away from carbon emissions, creating a system that requires each industrial emitter to obtain a permit for each ton of CO2 emissions.	只有欧洲认真尝试减少碳排放，并建立起要求工业排放企业取得吨二氧化碳排放许可证的全套管理制度。


Because these permits trade at a market price, companies have an incentive to reduce their emissions, thereby requiring them to buy fewer permits or enabling them to sell excess permits for a profit.	因为允许许可证上市交易，企业才有动力降低排放，并借此减少许可证购买量或将多余份额卖出获利。


The problem is that the permits’ market price has plummeted in the midst of Europe’s economic slowdown.	问题是欧洲经济增长放缓导致许可证价格一落千丈。


Permits that used to sell for more than $30 per ton before the crisis now trade for under $10.	危机前每吨价格高于30美元的许可证现在已经跌倒10美元以下。


At this low price, companies have little incentive to cut back on their CO2 emissions – and little faith that a market-based incentive will return.	如此低价很难激励企业减少二氧化碳排放，并且市场化激励机制重新发挥作用的希望也非常渺茫。


As a result, much of European industry continues on a business-as-usual energy path, even as Europe tries to lead the world in this transformation.	因此，即使欧洲力求在全球能源转型中发挥领导作用，但大部分欧洲企业却依然我行我素。


But there is a much better strategy than tradable permits.	但还有比许可证交易更好的方法。


Each region of the world should introduce a tax on CO2 emissions that starts low today and increases gradually and predictably in the future.	世界各地均应征收二氧化碳排放税，开始时税率较低，今后肯定会逐步升高。


Part of the tax revenue should be channeled into subsidies for new low-carbon energy sources like wind and solar, and to cover the costs of developing CCS.	部分税收收入理应为风能和太阳能等低碳新能源提供补助，并用于支付碳捕获封存的成本费用。


These subsidies could start fairly high and decline gradually over time, as the tax on CO2 emissions rises and the costs of new energy technologies fall with more experience and innovation.	低碳补助开始可能很高但随时间推移逐步下降，因为在二氧化碳排放税增加的同时，新能源技术成本会随着经验和创新而不断下降。


With a long-term and predictable carbon tax and subsidy system, the world would move systematically toward low-carbon energy, greater energy efficiency, and CCS.	伴随长期可预测的碳税和补贴制度，世界将向低碳能源、提高能源效率和碳捕获封存全面迈进。


Time is short.	时间非常紧迫。


The need for all major world regions to adopt practical and far-sighted energy policies is more urgent than ever.	世界主要地区实行有远见、切实可行能源政策的需求比以往任何时候都更加迫切。


Aleppo’s Sobering Lessons	阿勒颇的警钟


NEW YORK – The fall of Aleppo to forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is neither the end of the beginning nor the beginning of the end of Syria’s five-and-a-half-year-old civil war – a war that is also a proxy, regional, and to some extent global conflict.	发自纽约——对于已持续五年半的叙利亚内战来说，第二大城市阿勒颇落入忠于总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的武装力量之手既不意味着局势已经完全拉开帷幕，也不意味着战争即将终结。 这场战争是一场代理人式的，区域性，甚至在一定程度上全球性的冲突。


The next major battle will be fought in Idlib province; the only question is when.	下一场重大战役预计将在伊德利卜省展开； 唯一的问题仅仅是何时开打而已。


And even after that, the war will continue to fester in various parts of what will remain a divided country.	即使在那以后，战争还将在这个分裂国家的各个地区延续下去。


Even so, now is a good time to take stock and focus on what has been learned, if only to learn from it.	即使如此，哪怕仅仅是想从中学点什么的话，如今也是个好时机去审视和聚焦于从中得到的教训。


Little in history is inevitable, and the outcome in Syria is the result of what governments, groups, and individuals chose to do – and what they chose not to do.	历史上很少事件是不可避免的，而叙利亚当前的局势也是政府，团体和个人选择做什么——以及选择不去做什么——所共同作用的结果。


Indeed, not acting in Syria has proved to be as consequential as acting.	事实证明就算对叙利亚袖手旁观，也会跟介入干涉一样产生某些后果。


At no point was this clearer than when the United States did not fulfill its threat to make Assad’s government pay for its use of chemical weapons.	而当前比任何时候都更明确的一点，就是美国并未兑现其使阿萨德政府为使用化学武器付出代价的威胁。


That proved to be a missed opportunity not only to alter the momentum of the conflict, but also to underscore the principle that any government that uses weapons of mass destruction will regret it.	这个不仅错失了改变冲突势头的机会，也违背了任何使用大规模杀伤性武器的政府都要后悔的原则。


Enforcement, after all, is essential to the effectiveness of future deterrence.	毕竟执法能力才是未来威慑有效性的关键。


Deriving additional lessons requires going back to 2011, when peaceful anti-government protesters were met with deadly force, leading US President Barack Obama and others to demand that Assad step down.	吸取额外的教训则需要回溯到2011年，当时和平反政府示威者遭遇血腥镇压，导致美国总统奥巴马和其他人要求阿萨德下台。


Here, too, no action or resources backed the strong rhetoric.	无奈措辞虽然强硬,但拿出的实际行动或资源却不相匹配。


The emergence of such a wide gap between means and ends almost always dooms a policy to failure.	手段和目的之间的巨大差距总是一个政策注定走向败局的原因。


This is especially so when the goal is regime change, and when the incumbent regime represents a substantial minority of a divided population.	当目标是实现政权更迭，而现政权只代表各个分割族群中的相对少数时，情况尤其如此。


These circumstances tend to give rise to winner-take-all – and loser-lose-all – struggles.	这些情况往往导致赢家通吃（而败者输精光）的斗争。


Not surprisingly, those with the most to lose tend to conduct the fight with enormous tenacity.	不出意外，那些最可能失去一切的人必定会以巨大的韧性死战到底。


Scholars of international relations often write about the perceived limits to the utility of military force.	国际关系学者经常会指出军事力量的效用是有限的。


But Syria shows that military force can be decisive – especially when applied in massive doses, with little concern for the number of civilians killed or displaced.	但叙利亚的例子表明，军事力量可以是决定性的 - 特别是在大规模使用，毫不顾忌平民伤亡或流离失所之时。


Russia, Iran, and Assad’s government all demonstrated what large-scale and often indiscriminate use of military force could accomplish.	俄罗斯，伊朗和阿萨德政府都表明了大规模且往往不加区别地使用军事力量可以达到何种效果。


Another casualty of the Syria conflict is the term “international community.”	而叙利亚冲突的另一个受害者则是“国际社会”一词。


In fact, there is little in the way of a global community of thought or action.	事实上关于一个全球社会的思想或行动都乏善可陈。


And, with more than 500,000 dead and another ten million displaced in Syria, the much-vaunted doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) has been exposed as well.	而且50多万人丧生1000万人流离失所的叙利亚也暴露了人们大肆吹捧的“保护责任”（responsibility to protect）原则的缺陷。


Adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 (partly in response to Rwanda’s genocide a decade earlier), R2P was premised on the notion that governments are obliged to protect their citizens from physical harm.	2005年联合国大会一致通过的保护责任原则（在某种程度上为了应对10年前卢旺达的种族灭绝行动）的前提是政府有义务保护本国公民免受人身伤害。


When they are unable or unwilling to do so, according to R2P, other governments are obliged to intervene to protect those being subjected to harm.	根据该原则，当它们不能或不愿这样做时其他政府就有义务进行干预以保护那些受害者。


If any government failed to meet the R2P norm, it was Syria’s.	如果一个政府不能满足保护责任的规范，那就会沦为叙利亚。


But the international intervention that came about was not designed to protect innocent lives or to weaken the government’s hold on power; instead, it was designed to ensure that the government prevailed. And it succeeded.	但是因此而来的国际干预并不是为了保护无辜的生命或削弱政府对权力的掌控;相反，它的目的是确保政府重夺优势——也成功实现了这一点。


The international community did only somewhat better when it came to responding to the massive refugee crisis caused by the war.	国际社会只有在应对战争造成的大规模难民危机方面做得还好一点。


The fact that many countries have been unwilling to open their borders to meaningful numbers of asylum-seekers highlights the reality that the best refugee policy is one that prevents innocent men, women, and children from becoming refugees in the first place.	但许多国家不愿意向合理数量的寻求庇护者开放其边界的做法凸显了一个现实：即便最好的难民政策也无法第一时间阻止无辜的民众沦为难民。


Diplomatic efforts failed to achieve much in the way of saving Aleppo or its inhabitants, and they are no more likely to bring an end to the war.	外交努力未能在挽救阿勒颇或其居民方面取得什么成就，也不再可能结束战争。


However talented and committed diplomats may be, diplomacy tends to reflect, not create, realities on the ground.	无论那些外交官员是如何坚定而有才干，外交都倾向于反映而非创造当地的现实情况。


Future diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the fighting or a particular political outcome will succeed only to the extent that the military balance and trends allow.	今后为了结束战斗或某一特定政治结果而进行的外交努力也只有在军事力量实现均衡和趋势允许的情况下才能取得成功。


Looking ahead, Assad’s government will remain in place and in control of much, but not all, of the country.	展望未来，阿萨德政府将继续存在并控制该国多数（但不是全部）地区。


Various Sunni terrorist groups, less radical Sunni rebels, proxy forces such as Hezbollah, the Turkish army, Syrian Kurdish forces, and others will compete for control of particular regions.	各种逊尼派恐怖主义团体，不那么激进的逊尼派反抗军，真主党者这类代理人武装，土耳其军队，叙利亚库尔德人武装以及其它势力将争夺特定地区的控制权。


Outsiders, such as the US, would be well advised to accept this reality for the immediate future and focus their energies on stabilizing areas liberated from the Islamic State, protecting civilian populations, developing political and military ties with non-terrorist Sunni groups, and forging local cease-fires to prevent further Aleppos.	而美国这类局外人应接受这一短期现实，并集中力量稳定从伊斯兰国魔掌下解放出来的地区，保护平民，与非恐怖组织逊尼派团体发展政治和军事关系，推动地方停火以防止出现更多的阿勒颇。


The goal of bringing about a transition to a different and more broad-based government should be maintained. But that is a long-term proposition.	向一个管治方式且具备更广泛群众基础的政府过渡的目标应该持续维持，但这会是一个长期的主张。


The lesson of the last five and a half years must be taken to heart: those who engage Syria with limited will and limited means must set limited goals if they are to accomplish even a limited amount of good.	我们必须牢记过去五年半的教训：那些以有限的意志和有限的手段介入叙利亚局势的人们必须制定有限的目标，这样才能做到有限的好事。


Lessons of the Lebanon War	黎巴嫩战争的教训


Wars are won not only on battlefields, but also in people’s minds.	战争不仅仅是在战场上决出胜负，而且是在人们的心目之中。


So, while Hezbollah has not decisively won its current war with Israel, by maintaining its ability to fight in the face of the might of the Israeli army, it has captured the imagination of Arabs, restoring lost pride in the same way as the Egyptian Army’s crossing of the Suez Canal in the war of 1973 did.	所以，尽管真主党没有在与以色列目前的战争中赢得决定性胜利，但是，通过在以色列军队的强势面前维持其战斗能力，它却赢得了阿拉伯人的想象，象埃及军队在1973年战争中横跨苏伊士运河那样恢复了丢失的自豪感。


Restored pride was central to Anwar Sadat’s eventual decision to go to Jerusalem and regain the entire Sinai Peninsula for Egypt.	恢复自豪是萨达特最终决定挺进耶路撒冷并且为埃及重新掌握整个西奈半岛的中心目的。


Although ordinary Lebanese have paid a huge human, economic, and infrastructural price, Hezbollah has made it clear to the Israelis that they can no longer take their military predominance for granted.	尽管普通的黎巴嫩人民付出了巨大的人员、经济以及基础设施的代价，但是真主党向以色列表明，他们不能再把他们的军事霸主地位看作是理所当然的事情了。


The limits of military power have been exposed.	军事力量的局限得到了暴露。