Housing prices shot up, real-estate developers borrowed recklessly, and local governments became heavily indebted.	房价一飞冲天，房地产开发商大肆借贷，地方政府也背上了沉重的负债。


As a result, broad money (M2) increased rapidly, and now stands at more than two times China’s GDP – one of the highest levels in the world.	结果，广义货币（M2）迅速增加，现已超过中国GDP的两倍多，也是世界最高水平之一。


This flood of money rang alarm bells for Li and President Xi Jinping when they took office in early 2013.	这笔钱也给2013年初接班的李克强和国家主席习近平敲响了警钟。


The government has since reined in money-supply growth and started to impose limits on local governments’ borrowing.	此后，中国政府遏制了货币供应增长，开始实施地方政府贷款上限。


Monetary expansion has decelerated.	货币扩张有所减速。


The budget law has been revised to allow local governments to issue government bonds, and their borrowing from commercial banks is being closely monitored.	预算法也进行了修订，允许地方政府发行政府债券，而它们从央行的贷款被严密监控。


These policies have raised capital costs, with monetary tightening, in particular, taking a large toll on local governments and real estate developers.	这些政策提高了资本成本，特别是，在货币紧缩的情况下，地方政府和房地产开发商成熟了很大压力。


Because slower growth forces them to borrow new money to pay their maturing debts, interest rates are bid up, and businesses in the real economy are crowded out, creating a further drag on growth.	由于增长放缓迫使它们不得不借新债还旧债，利率也随之水涨船高，挤出了实体经济中的企业，进一步拖累了增长。


Meanwhile, producer prices have been falling, while consumer prices are flat.	与此同时，生产者物价指数节节下降，而消费者物价指数保持平稳。


So, like much of the rest of the world, China is facing the risk of deflation.	因此，与世界其他部分一样，中国也面临着通缩风险。


Indeed, global deflationary pressure would have emerged much sooner had China not launched its two-year stimulus plan in 2008, which boosted investment demand and thus delayed the fall in world commodity prices.	事实上，要不是中国从2008年开始实施了两年的刺激计划，提振了投资需求从而延缓了世界大宗商品价格的下跌之势，全球通缩压力的影响将出现得更早。


Now that the fall has arrived, domestic deflation has become a real threat, particularly given slower domestic fiscal expansion.	如今，大宗商品价格下跌已经来临，国内通缩也成为实实在在的威胁，特别是考虑到国内财政扩张减速的情况。


That is why China’s government would do well to recall the Asian financial crisis of 1997.	因此，中国政府应该回忆一下1997年亚洲金融危机。


In response to Deng Xiaoping’s famous tour to the south, which provided a needed boost to the reform process, investment increased rapidly in the first half of the 1990s.	邓小平南巡后，改革进程得到了必要的提振，20实际90年代上半叶，投资快速增加。


As a result, China’s annual inflation rate soared to an all-time high of 24% in 1994.	结果，1994年中国年通货膨胀率飙升至创纪录的24%。


The government’s subsequent measures to curb inflation might have engineered a soft landing; but the financial crisis hit China severely, leading to six years of deflation.	政府在此后所采取的遏制通胀政策也许成功地实现了软着陆，但金融危机严重冲击了中国，导致了六年的通缩。


The main lesson of the Asian financial crisis – or, for that matter, of any financial crisis – is that deflation is the ultimate threat to recovery.	亚洲金融危机——从这个意义上说，是任何金融危机——的主要教训是，通缩是复苏的终极威胁。


Because the 1997 crisis was confined to East Asia, China was able to escape deflation after it joined the World Trade Organization.	由于1997年危机局限于东亚地区，中国得以在加入世贸组织后摆脱了通缩。


But today is different.	但今时不同往日。


The entire world is in the grip of deflationary forces.	如今全世界都被通缩所困扰。


If China enters the vortex, its trade partners will not be able to pull it out this time.	如果中国也沦陷，这一回其贸易伙伴将无法成为救星。


So the key question for China’s government is whether the country can do so on its own.	因此，中国政府的关键问题是中国能否自救。


The proactive fiscal policy that Li pledged at Davos will help, but monetary policy also needs to change.	李克强在达沃斯所承诺的积极财政政策有所助益，但货币政策也需要改变。


The conundrum facing China’s authorities is that monetary expansion would merely fuel a run-up in asset prices, rather than resulting in higher credit flows to the real economy.	中国当局面临的难题是货币扩张的唯一效果是助长了资产价格攀升，而不是实体经济信用流入的增加。


The blockages used to be local governments and zombie real-estate developers.	最大的妨碍曾经是地方政府和僵尸开发商。


But that is likely to change this year.	但今年可能会有所不同。


Borrowing by local governments will be strictly monitored, and their new debt financing will come mainly from government bonds.	地方政府贷款将得到严密监控，它们的新增债务融资将主要来自政府债券。


And, though most observers believe that China’s first-tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) will still struggle in 2015 to digest the huge housing stock they built up in recent years, some second- and third-tier cities have already reached the bottom, and have started to recover.	而尽管大部分观察者认为中国一线城市（北上广深）在2015年将继续疲于消化近几年中所建立的巨大住房库存，但一些二线和三线城市已经触底并开始回暖。


China is the largest trading country in the world, prompting calls for Chinese leaders to assume greater responsibility for the overall health of the global economy.	中国是世界上最大的贸易国，这使很多人要求中国领导人承担更多的全球经济总体健康责任。


China’s post-crisis stimulus package demonstrated the authorities’ willingness to do so.	中国的危机后刺激计划表明中国当局愿意承担这一责任。


Likewise, the government’s anti-deflation effort will help not only China, but the rest of the world as well.	类似地，中国政府的反通缩措施将不但有助于中国，也将有助于世界其他地区。


A Window on China’s New Normal	管窥中国新常态


CAMBRIDGE – Every year at this time, China’s government organizes a major conference – sponsored by the Development Research Center, the official think tank of the State Council – that brings together senior Chinese officials, CEOs from major Chinese and Western firms, and a small group of international officials and academics.	美国剑桥—每年的这个时候，中国政府都会组织一次盛会。 这一盛会由中国国务院发展研究中心主办，汇集中国高级官员、中国和西方企业CEO以及一小部分国际官员和学者。


The China Development Forum (CDF) occurs just after the annual National People’s Congress.	发展中国论坛在一年一度的全国人大会议后不久举行。


At the forum, speakers, including the finance minister and the head of the central bank, summarize the Chinese leadership’s current thinking.	在这一论坛上，演讲者——包括财政部长和央行首脑——会总结中国领导层的最新思维。


Officials then listen to comments and suggestions from Western business and academic participants, including a question and answer session with Premier Li Keqiang.	接着，官员们听取来自西方商界和学界与会者的评论和建议，李克强总理也会参与提问环节。


Although I have been attending the CDF’s meetings for more than a decade, I found this year’s conference substantially different from any in the past.	十多年来，我一直出席发展中国论坛会议，但我发现今年的会议与以往大不相同。


The key difference was the official Chinese recognition that annual real GDP growth has declined permanently from the past three decades’ average rate of nearly 10%.	关键区别在于中国官方承认了年实际GDP增长永久性地从过去三十年来近10%的平均水平有所下降。


The official estimate is that real GDP grew 7.4% in 2014, and that the rate will probably slow further, to 7%, this year.	2014年官方估算实际GDP增长为7. 4%，今年可能还会进一步降低到7%。


The Development Research Center presented detailed estimates showing that the growth rate will continue to decline, reaching about 6% by the end of the decade.	发展研究中心所展示的详细估算表明增长率将继续下降，到这个十年的末尾达到6%左右。


Virtually every Chinese official referred to this slowdown as their country’s “new normal.”	几乎每一位中国官员都把这一减速成为中国的“新常态”。


They all seemed reconciled to slower growth, which was initially surprising, because officials previously argued that China needed rapid growth to maintain employment and avoid political unrest.	他们似乎都已经适应了增长放缓——尽管一开始有些惊讶，因为官员此前指出中国需要高速增长维持就业、避免政治动荡。


They now appear to understand that the declining growth rate will not lead to unemployment, because the slowdown reflects China’s structural shift from export-oriented heavy industrial production to increased production of consumer services, which require more employment to create the same amount of value.	如今他们似乎理解了增长率下降不会导致失业，因为放缓反映出中国从出口导向型重工业生产日益向贸易服务生产的转型，制造同样的价值量，后者需要的就业更多。


Stronger growth nevertheless remains necessary, because China is still a relatively low-income country with substantial poverty.	但中国仍需要更强的增长，因为它仍是相对低收入国家，并且存在大量贫困。


Although China’s total real GDP is second only to that of the United States (and might be larger when measured in terms of purchasing power), its per capita income is only about $7,000, or roughly 15% of the US level.	尽管中国总实际GDP已是世界第二，仅次于美国（若以购买力衡量，或许比美国还要大），但其人均收入仍只有7,000美元左右，只有美国的15%。


And consumption remains low – only about 50% of GDP when government spending is included, and just 35% when limited to household consumer spending.	消费仍然很低——包括政府支出只占GDP的50%左右，只算家庭消费则只占35%。


So China has a long way to go to reach its leaders’ goal of achieving a “modern prosperous society.”	因此中国还需要大量努力才能达到其领导人实现“繁荣的现代社会”的目标。


The Chinese see that the “new normal” requires a shift in their growth strategy from factor-driven growth to innovation-driven growth.	中国人看到，“新常态”需要他们将增长战略从因素驱动增长转向创新驱动增长。


But it is not clear how that increase in innovation will be achieved.	但尚不清楚的是如何实现创新的增加。


While officials stress reliance on the market, China does not have the venture capital and “angel financing” that facilitates innovation in the US.	官员强调对要依赖市场，但中国没有像美国那样的促进创新的风险资本和“天使融资”。


The authorities may hope that their plan to insure bank deposits will shift deposits from the three largest banks to many smaller banks around the country, facilitating local startups’ access to financing.	当局也许希望它们的银行存款保险计划能让存款从三家最大银行流向全国众多小银行，解决地方创业企业的融资难问题。


Many other economic problems loom.	其他许多经济问题也摆在面前。


Officials acknowledged at the CDF that the biggest risks lie in the financial sector, particularly owing to local governments�� very large liabilities.	官员在发展中国论坛承认，最大的风险在金融部门，特别是地方政府的巨额负债。


In the past, the government dealt with the problems that these liabilities caused for the banking system by injecting funds into the banks.	在过去，政府通过向银行注资解决这些负债给银行系统造成的问题。


Environmental problems are another powerful drag on China’s current standard of living.	环境问题是另一个严重拖累中国当前生活水平的问题。


But they also represent a potential way to increase GDP should overall demand decline significantly.	但在总需求大幅减少时，环境同时也是增加GDP的潜在方法。


China acknowledges that high levels of air and water pollution create discomfort and harm the public’s health.	中国认识到，严重的空气和水污染制造了巨大的不安和公共卫生伤害。


Government spending on remedying environmental damage could absorb substantial funds if demand-side weakness exacerbates the expected supply-side slowdown.	如果需求端疲软加剧预期中的供给端放缓问题，政府的环境破坏治理支出可以吸收大量资金。


Moreover, the very weak performance of state-owned enterprises, which continue to play a large role in heavy industry and in some service sectors, represents a powerful brake on growth.	此外，国有企业——它们在重工业和一些服务业中仍扮演着主要角色——的拙劣表现也是增长的一大障碍。


Although official policy aims to reduce these firms’ role so that “the market can play the decisive role in resource allocation,” shrinking these firms has proved to be difficult, owing to their strong political backing within the Chinese Communist Party.	尽管官方政策要降低这些企业的重要性，以便“市场在资源配置中起决定性作用”，但缩减这些企业十分困难，因为它们在中共内部拥有强大的政治背景。


At the same time, China maintains restrictions on direct investment by foreigners, limiting both the kinds of firms and the share of joint ventures that they can own.	与此同时，中国仍对外国直接投资保持限制，企业种类和合资入股规模都有限制。


The official policy is to reduce the barriers to foreign corporate investment, especially in high tech and the service sector.	官方政策要降低外国公司投资的壁垒，特别是高科技和服务行业。


There were, of course, a number of subjects that remained just below the surface and were not discussed at this year’s CDF.	当然，许多主题仍没有摆上台面，也没有在今年的发展中国论坛上讨论。


There was no indication of a slowdown in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, though some private conversations suggested that the campaign has resulted in decision-making delays that are hurting productivity and growth.	中国国家主席习近平的反腐运动没有减弱迹象，尽管私下里的一些对话认为反腐运动已经造成了决策延迟，对生产率和增长造成了副作用。


There was also no discussion of Chinese cyber theft of Western technology.	中国对西方技术的网络盗窃也没有讨论。


When that subject was raised in 2014, Li denied that the Chinese do such a thing, but noted that Chinese firms are hacked by domestic sources.	2014年，当这一问题被提出时，李克强否认中国有此行为，但指出中国企业被来自国内的黑客侵入。


And, with the CDF’s emphasis on cooperation, there was no discussion of possible military action by the Chinese to stake their disputed territorial claims in the East and South China Seas.	此外，发展中国论坛的主题是合作，因此也不会讨论中国在东海和南海争议领土上的可能的军事行动。


Meetings like the CDF provide a useful window into a country whose importance for the global economy will continue to grow.	发展中国论坛这样的会议提供了一个有用的窗口，让我们得以一窥这个全球经济重要性还将日益增加的国家。


The current slowdown to a new normal makes such windows even more important.	当下的向新常态减速让这样的窗口变得更加重要了。


China’s Growth Secret	中国增长的秘密


SHANGHAI – Many people are profoundly pessimistic about the Chinese economy’s growth prospects, owing to the emergence of massive debt, excessive investment, overcapacity, and so-called “ghost cities” since the 2008 global financial crisis.	上海—许多人对中国经济的增长前景感到十分悲观，因为大规模债务、过度投资、产能过剩以及2008年全球金融危机以来的所谓“鬼城”逐渐出现。


But these problems are not new.	但这些问题都不是新问题。


They have, in various forms, affected China’s economy since 1978, and were evident in East Asia’s other high-performing economies – Taiwan, South Korea, and even Japan – during their periods of rapid growth.	自1978年以来，它们就以各种方式影响着中国经济，东亚的其他高增长经济体——台湾、韩国甚至日本——在快速增长时期也无不遇到过这些问题。


Nonetheless, in the 35 years since Deng Xiaoping initiated his program of “reform and opening up,” China has recorded 9.7% average annual growth.	尽管如此，自邓小平启动他的“改革开放”政策以来，中国平均年增长率高达9. 7%。


And it took only 40 years for South Korea and Taiwan to complete their transitions from low- to high-income status.	而韩国和台湾都只花了40年时间完成了从低收入到高收入的转型。


How did these economies manage to grow so fast for so long and overcome the serious problems that they faced along the way?	这些经济提是如何成功地以如此快速增长如此长时间，并克服期间所面临的严重问题的？


The answer is simple: resilience.	答案很简单：恢复力（resilience）。


Economic development is a convoluted process, full of challenges and risks, successes and failures, external shocks and internal volatility.	经济发展是一个坎坷的过程，充满了挑战和风险、成功和失败、外部冲击和内部动荡。


And adverse effects – such as a rising debt-to-GDP ratio and excess capacity – are inevitable.	副作用——如债务-GDP比率上升和产能过剩——也是难以避免的。


If a country fails to respond adequately to new challenges as they arise, economic growth and development stall.	如果一国不能在新挑战出现时予以充分应对，经济增长和发展就会停滞下来。


Many countries in Latin America and South Asia, for example, have become mired in the so-called “middle-income trap,” because they failed to adjust their growth models in a timely manner.	比如，许多拉美和南亚国家就陷入了所谓的“中等收入陷阱”，因为它们没能及时调整经济增长模式。


East Asia’s economies, by contrast, consistently adjusted their growth strategies and engaged in continuous institutional reform.	相反，东亚经济体不断地调整增长战略、持续地进行制度改革。


The aim was not to tackle the problems they faced directly, but to induce new, more efficient activities that would help to turn debt into assets and maximize use of the economy’s capacity.	其目的不在于解决直接面临的问题，而在于引导新的效率更高的活动以助债务转化为资产并最大限度地利用经济的产能。


In this sense, East Asia’s economies have embraced the process of “creative destruction” described by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, whereby the economic structure is continually revolutionized from within.	从这个角度讲，东亚经济体发生的是奥地利经济学家熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）所描述的“创造性破坏”，经济结构从内部不断革命。


Moreover, by implementing incremental reforms that facilitate – and even encourage – the replacement of old, inefficient sources of growth with new, more dynamic ones, they have expedited this process.	此外，它们还通过实施有利于——甚至鼓励——用更有活力的新增长源取代效率低下的就增长源的增量改革加快这一过程。


For example, China’s productivity-enhancing agricultural reforms in the 1980s were spurred partly by growth in the non-agricultural sector, a result of policies aimed at stimulating township and village enterprises.	比如，中国在20世纪80年代所实施的提高生产率的农业改革从某种程度上说是受到非农业部门增长的刺激，是旨在鼓励乡镇企业的政策的结果。


Similarly, in the 1990s, China addressed the buildup of bad debt and unfinished construction projects – the result of state-owned enterprises’ chronic loss-making and excessive property investment, respectively – by implementing institutional reforms that stimulated growth in more dynamic sectors, thereby offsetting the SOEs’ declining return on capital.	类似地，20世纪90年代，中国通过实施刺激更有活力的部门的制度改革解决了坏账累积和烂尾楼工程问题（分别由国有企业长期亏损和房地产投资过度导致），从而抵消了国有企业资本回报率的下降。


Resilience has thus characterized the interaction between the government and markets since the introduction of Deng’s reforms.	因此，自邓小平实施改革以来，恢复力已成为政府和市场互动的特征。


Indeed, according to the late economist Gustav Ranis, the interactive dynamic of policy and market institutions was the key to the success of the East Asian economies.	事实上，按照已故经济学家古斯塔夫·拉尼斯（Gustav Ranis）的说法，政策和市场制度的互动动态（interactive dynamic）是东亚经济体成功的关键。


For example, fiscal decentralization in China, spurred by local institutions’ demands for increased autonomy, has helped to fuel regional competition and sustain an increasingly market-oriented economic environment.	比如，由地方机构要求增加自治权所推动的中国的财政分散化帮助刺激了地区竞争、维持了日益市场化的经济环境。


This interactive dynamic is also reflected in the formation of industrial policies.	这一互动动态也反映在产业政策的形成中。


In China, though clusters of vibrant smaller manufacturers are flourishing, policymakers have done relatively little to promote industrial development and upgrading.	在中国，尽管生机勃勃的小制造商集群不断繁荣，但决策者采取促进产业发展和升级的措施的情况相对较少。


This leaves it up to market institutions to guide the process, ensuring that they play a key role in the expanding industrial sectors.	于是市场机构指导了这一过程，确保它们在不断扩大的产业部门中扮演关键角色。


Another source of resilience in East Asia are local governments.	东亚的另一个恢复力来源是地方政府。


For starters, they are responsible for public capital expenditure, driving the improvement in China’s physical infrastructure and yielding reasonable returns for private investors.	首先，它们负责公共资本支出，推动了中国实体基础设施的改善，并给私人投资者带来合理回报。


This advances the objective of helping local businesses, particularly innovative small and medium-size firms, to grow and thrive.	这推进了帮助地方企业特别是创新型中小企业成长和繁荣的目标。


To this end, local governments are also helping entrepreneurs gain access to global production chains.	在这方面，地方政府还帮助企业得以进入全球供给链。


The Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces have been particularly successful in this effort – and, unsurprisingly, rank among China’s most robust regional economies.	浙江省和广东省做得尤其成功——毫不奇怪，这两个省也拥有中国最强健的地区经济。


Finally, local governments have demonstrated a willingness to support institutional innovation.	最后，地方政府表现出愿意支持制度创新。


This allows for the flexibility needed to address structural challenges at the local level, thereby preventing them from blocking growth.	这能带来解决地方层面结构挑战所需要的灵活性，从而防止它们阻碍增长。


After three years of slowing growth and rising debt, China once again finds itself at a crossroads.	在经历了三年的增长放缓和债务增加后，中国再一次站在了十字路口。


Fortunately, it seems to be choosing the path of flexibility and adjustment, as it pursues an ambitious reform plan that, it is hoped, will enable it to edge closer to – and eventually cross – the high-income threshold.	幸运的是，它似乎正在选择灵活和调整之路，追求一个宏大的改革计划，我们希望这能让中国更加接近——并最终迈过——高收入门槛。


China’s Trial-and-Error Economy	中国的试错经济


HONG KONG – Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s work plan for 2015, revealed at this month’s National People’s Congress, highlighted the country’s shift to a “new normal” of 7% economic growth.	香港—在本月的全国人大上，中国总理李克强的2015年工作规划强调中国进入了经济增长率为7%的“新常态”。


The shift to slower growth poses serious challenges, but it also creates an important opportunity for China to ensure its long-term economic development.	这一增长放缓的转变在短期是一个严峻的挑战，但也为中国确保长期经济发展创造了重要的机会。


China’s leaders recognize this opportunity, and are taking action to support the shift to more sustainable growth models.	中国领导人不仅认识到这一机会，而且也正在采取行动引导中国经济转向更加可持续的增长模式。 财政部将中央政府预算赤字占GDP之比从2014年的1.


The finance ministry has raised the central-government budget deficit from 1.8% of GDP in 2014 to as much as 2.7% in 2015, and will allow highly leveraged local governments to swap CN¥1 trillion ($161.1 billion) of debt maturing this year for bonds with lower interest rates.	8%提高到2015年的2. 7%，并允许高负债的地方政府将1万亿人民币的今年到期债务置换为利率更低的长期债券。


Likewise, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has provided monetary support, gradually lowering interest rates and reserve requirements.	中国人民银行也提供了一些货币政策支持，逐渐降低利率和准备金率。


Because wages are still rising, the inflation target for 2015 has been set at 3% – higher than the actual 2014 inflation of 2%, even though producer-price inflation has been negative for 36 months.	由于工资仍在上升，2015年的通胀目标定在3%——高于2014年2%的实际水平，尽管生产者价格指数负增长已有36个月。


The PBOC also has projected a stable exchange-rate environment for this year – despite the steep depreciation of the Japanese yen, the euro, and emerging-economy currencies against the dollar – thereby promoting global stability.	尽管日元、欧元和新兴经济体货币兑美元出现了大幅贬值，人民银行认为今年人民币对美元的汇率环境将保持稳定，并会稳步实现资本帐项下的人民币可兑换，这将促进全球金融稳定。


These policies reflect a remarkable determination to continue on the path of structural reform, despite strong headwinds from the deteriorating external environment and domestic structural adjustments.	这些政策反映出中国领导人有很大的决心完成结构改革及市场开放，尽管外部环境恶化和国内结构调整面临严重阻碍。


In short, China’s government seems to have a clear long-term vision.	简言之，中国政府似乎具有明确、乐观的长期愿景及信心。


But not everyone is optimistic about China’s trajectory.	但并非所有人都对中国的前景感到乐观。


Veteran China watcher David Shambaugh recently went so far as to warn that the challenges facing the political system, led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), may be severely compromising the government’s ability to implement the package of ambitious economic reforms that it unveiled in 2013.	老牌中国观察家沈大伟（David Shambough）最近警告说，以中共为领导的中国政治制度所面临的挑战可能将严重制约政府实施2013年所提出的宏大经济改革的能力。


And yet the claim that China’s economic and political development is in jeopardy seems to ignore the country’s adaptive learning process, which shapes every economic, diplomatic, military, and social policy.	但认为中国经济和政治发展岌岌可危的观点往往忽视了中国改革的“适应性学习过程”这一重要特征——这一过程烙印于每一项经济、外交、军事和社会政策上。


This process – characterized by experimentation, assessment, and adjustment – emerged from the CCP’s military experience of the 1930s, was applied by Deng Xiaoping to his reform program in the 1980s, and has been refined by subsequent Chinese leaders.	这一过程的特征包括实验、评估、调整、再实验这样的互动循环，它起源于中共在20世纪30年代的内战经验，邓小平在20世纪80年代的改革中所使用的就是这一适应性学习过程，并由后来的中国领导人不断提炼完善。


Because no economy had ever experienced such rapid growth on such a large scale, the only way to manage China’s development was, as Deng put it, to “cross the river by feeling the stones.”	历史上从未有哪个经济体经历过如此大规模、如此快速的增长，因此，用邓小平的话说，管理中国发展的唯一办法是“摸着石头过河”。


China’s adaptive policymaking approach has produced both spectacular failures, with entire markets being shut down, and remarkable successes, yielding models that could be applied across the country.	中国的“适应性学习过程”决策方法既需要面对惨痛的失败——如个别市场被完全关闭，也可能有令人瞩目的成功——如产生了可供其它地区借鉴的改革经验及市场模式，包括当年的包产到户、出口导向的制造业发展、成功的基础设施建设等等。


Some experiments have had less clear results, making, say, a positive contribution to GDP growth, but also contributing to problems like excess industrial capacity, pollution, corruption, and the creation of ghost towns.	并不是所有的实验都是成功的，许多实验虽然有利于GDP增长，但也同时导致了产能过剩、污染、腐败和“鬼城”等问题。


In a context of experimentation, such unintended consequences are understandable.	既然是实验，产生这些意料外后果是可以理解的。


The mere fact that they have emerged in no way suggests that China is headed for disaster; that would be the case only if these problems were allowed to persist.	这些问题的出现是改革过程的一部分，并不能单凭实验后出现的问题就得出结论中国将迈向灾难； 只有在这些问题成为持久性问题时中国才有可能面临困境。


Preventing such an outcome requires that efforts to adjust to China’s “new normal” go beyond policies intended to sustain economic growth.	避免这些困境需要中国制定适应“新常态”的措施时超越仅仅维持经济增长的狭隘政策范围。


Reforms must aim to bolster inclusivity, advance environmental sustainability, promote innovation, and boost competitiveness. And this is precisely the four-pronged approach that China’s leaders seem to be taking.	改革必须将目标放在更全面的培养包容性、推进环境可持续性、激发创新和促进竞争力上，而 这正是中国领导人正在采取的步骤。


Indeed, from slashing coal consumption to address air pollution to plans for integrating information technologies with modern manufacturing, the government has shown time and again that it recognizes its reform imperatives.	事实上，从降低煤炭使用以解决空气污染，到将信息技术与现代制造业整合的计划，中国政府一再表明它明白改革的必要性。


And, by remaining dogged in its efforts to root out official graft, it has demonstrated its will to do what is needed to ensure that China succeeds.	此外，中国政府不懈地根除官员贪污，也表明它愿意采取必要措施确保中国改革的成功。


This is not to say that it is all smooth sailing ahead.	这并不是说前途一帆风顺。


The Chinese bureaucracy must adapt radically to cope with the risks – and take advantage of the benefits – of technology and globalization, with the biggest challenge being the shift to a knowledge-based, environmentally conscious, inclusive, and stable industrial base.	中国的官僚体系必须做出重大调整才能处理技术革命和全球化的风险， 并利用其中的好处，其中最大的挑战是朝基于��识的、有环境意识的、包容而稳定的新经济的转型。


And China’s government must take steps to enable market forces to play a greater role in directing economic activity, including by reducing licensing and regulatory requirements in the private sector.	中国政府必须采取措施让市场力量在引导经济活动中扮演更重要的角色，包括降低民营企业的审批门槛和它们面临的监管负担。


Market forces will also benefit from the growth in households’ spending power.	市场力量也将从家庭购买力的增长中获益。


Indeed, continued real-wage growth is forcing inefficient industries that relied solely on cheap labor out of the market, while bolstering the competitiveness of producers that appeal to the evolving tastes of China’s increasingly potent consumers.	事实上，持续实际工资增长正在迫使单纯依靠廉价劳动力的低效率行业退出市场，同时也增强了可以满足购买力日益增长、口味不断变化的中国消费者的厂商的竞争力。


To support this process, China is now implementing deposit insurance, for example.	为了支持这一结构调整过程，中国如今正在建立像存款保险这样的稳定市场制度。


At the same time, China is reforming its inefficient approval-based system of initial public offerings to one based on registrations.	与此同时，中国也正在改革其低效率的证券首次发行（IPO）体制，从审批制改成注册制。


A more active and efficient IPO market will allow companies to meet their financing needs without bank intermediation – a step that is vital to helping firms eliminate their debt overhangs.	更活跃及高效的IPO市场将让公司不只是靠银行中介来满足融资需要，而可以利用股权市场来帮助企业解决积累的债务及降低杠杆率，这对企业未来的创新及风险管理至关重要。


In fact, reducing the role of banks is essential to balancing China’s economy.	事实上，降低银行在各种融资渠道中的比重对于平衡中国经济来说是不可或缺的。


Despite the recent rebound, China’s stock-market capitalization amounts to only 40% of GDP, while banking assets total 266% of GDP.	尽管股市最近大幅上扬，但市值仍只有GDP的40%左右，而银行资产总量高达GDP的266%。


Meanwhile, only 10% of total social funding comes from the equity market.	与此同时，只有10%的社会融资总额来自股市。


But there is one important component missing from the government’s reform agenda for 2015: improved bankruptcy procedures for failed borrowers.	但是，在政府的2015年改革日程中还缺失了一个重要元素：改善用于处理资不抵债借款人的破产程序。


Unless failed borrowers and projects exit the system quickly and smoothly, the market will be saddled with bad debt and incomplete projects, undermining its performance.	除非破产人和失败的项目可以迅速而平稳地退出系统，否则市场将饱受坏账和烂尾工程的纠缠，耗费宝贵的信贷资源，拖累收入、增长及就业表现。


China has repeatedly proved its durability and adaptability.	中国改革的历史一再证明其越来越市场化的经济体的耐久力和适应力。


Now, it must do so yet again, by ensuring that its “new normal” is as stable, sustainable, and inclusive as possible.	如今，它必须再次证明这一点，靠的就是通过改革与开放来确保其“新常态”发展具有可持续、包容、创新及稳定的特征。


This entails strengthening China’s institutional foundations and establishing clear, transparent rules, in order to encourage experimentation and innovation, ensure the smooth exit of failed projects, and manage the fallout of errors.	这需要强化中国的制度基础、建立明确透明的规则，从而鼓励大胆实验和创新，确保烂尾工程的平稳退出，并有稳健常规化的机制收拾不成功实验的残局。


Failure may be the mother of success – but only if one makes the effort to learn from it.	失败是成功之母——但只有在你汲取失败教训时是如此。


Fortunately, China’s leaders seem intent on doing just that.	幸运的是，中国领导人似乎正准备这样做。


China on the Move	中国在行动


BEIJING – The debate is over.	北京——辩论阶段已经过去。


After six years of weighing the options, China is now firmly committed to implementing a new growth strategy.	经过六年的反复权衡，中国现在坚定地贯彻全新发展战略。


At least, that’s the verdict I gleaned from the just-completed annual China Development Forum, long China’s most important dialogue with the outside world.	至少这是我通过刚结束的中国年度发展论坛，也是中国与外界最重要的对话渠道了解到的结论。


There were no surprises in the basic thrust of the strategy – a structural shift in China’s investment- and export-led growth model toward a more balanced consumer-based and services-led economy.	上述战略的基本主旨不出所料，中国改变投资结构，从出口主导的经济增长模式向着更平衡的消费和服务经济转型。


The transformation reflects both necessity and design.	这样的转型既是主动为之但亦属绝对必要。


It is necessary because persistently weak global growth is unlikely to provide the solid external demand for Chinese exports that it once did.	说它必要是因为持续疲弱的全球增长不太可能像以往那样为中国出口提供强劲的外部需求。


But it is also essential, because China’s new leadership seems determined to come to grips with a vast array of internal imbalances that threaten the environment, promote destabilizing income inequality, and exacerbate regional disparities.	同时也因为中国新领导层似乎决意解决威胁环境、造成收入不平等并拉大地区差距的各种国内不平衡。


The strategic shift is also a deliberate effort by Chinese policymakers to avoid the dreaded “middle-income trap” – a mid-stage slowdown that has ensnared most emerging economies when per capita income nears the $17,000 threshold (in constant international prices).	战略转型也是中国决策者为避开“中等收入陷阱”的深思熟虑之举——“中等收入陷阱”是指多数经济体在人均收入接近17，000美元大关（国际不变价格）时的中期增长放缓。


Developing economies that maintain their old growth models for too long fall into it, and China probably will hit the threshold in 3-5 years.	长时间保持原有增长模式的发展中经济体可能会落入陷阱，而中国或许会在3－5年内进入上述阶段。


Three insights from this year’s China Development Forum deepened my confidence that a major structural transformation is now at hand that will enable China to avoid the middle-income trap.	今年中国发展论坛有三项观点增强了我的信心，让我坚信中国避开中等收入陷阱的大规模结构转型正在展开。


First, a well-articulated urbanization strategy has emerged as a key pillar of consumer-led rebalancing.	首先，已经出台以消费再平衡为重要支柱的明确的城市化战略。


This was emphasized by China’s new senior leaders – Executive Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli and Premier Li Keqiang – in the Forum’s opening and closing remarks, and considerable detail was provided in many of the working sessions.	这一点在中国新一代领导层——常务副总理张高丽和总理李克强的论坛开闭幕讲话中都有所强调，此外论坛期间的工作会议还提供了相当多的详细资料。


Urbanization is a building block for consumption, because it provides powerful leverage to Chinese households’ purchasing power.	城市化是消费的基石，可以强力撬动中国家庭的购买力指标。


Urban workers’ per capita income is more than three times higher than that of their counterparts in the countryside.	城镇职工的人均收入高出农村人口三倍以上。


The urban share of the Chinese population reached 52.6% in 2012 – up nearly three-fold from 18% in 1980, and is expected to rise toward 70% by 2030.	2012年中国城镇人口占比52. 6%，较1980年的18%增长近3倍，且预计到2030年将占比近70%。


If ongoing urbanization can be coupled with job creation – a distinct possibility in light of China’s emphasis on developing its embryonic labor-intensive services sector – the outlook for household-income growth is quite encouraging.	如果持续城镇化能在重点发展尚处在萌芽状态的劳动密集型服务业的同时不断创造就业机会，那么家庭收入增长的前景是令人鼓舞的。


The pace of urbanization should dispel Western doubts stemming from concerns over so-called ghost cities and chronic over-investment.	城市化步伐应当打消西方关于所谓鬼城和长期过度投资的疑虑。


According to research by McKinsey & Company, with the annual influx of new urban residents totaling 15-20 million, China will need more than 220 large cities (at least one million people) by 2030, up from 125 in 2010.	据麦肯锡公司研究报告的统计结果，每年新涌入的城镇居民高达1，500－2，000万，这意味着到2030年中国大城市（人口至少在百万以上）需要从2010年的125座增加到2030年的220座以上。


Moreover, because urbanization is a capital-intensive endeavor and China’s capital stock per worker – a key driver of productivity growth – is still only 13% of the levels in the United States and Japan, China has good reason to remain a high-investment economy for years to come.	此外，因为城市化需要海量资金且中国的单位人工股本（推动生产率增长的关键要素）还仅有美国和日本的13%，因此中国有充分理由在今后若干年内保持投资的高速增长。


What is new today is the focus on urbanization’s negative externalities – especially the thorny issues of land confiscation and environmental degradation.	当前的新课题主要是城市化的外部效应，特别是土地征用和环境退化等棘手问题。


A well-developed “eco-city” framework was presented at this year’s Forum to counter both concerns, and features incentives promoting a new urbanization model that stresses compact land usage, mixed modes of local transportation, lighter building materials, and non-carbon energy sources.	今年的发展论坛提出了解决这两项问题的“生态城市”框架，主要关注集约型土地应用、地方交通混合模式、轻型建筑材料及非碳能源等推动新型城市化模型的激励机制。


The second insight from the 2013 China Development Forum is the new government’s focus on strengthening the social safety net as a pillar of a modern consumer society.	2013年中国发展论坛的第二项观点是新政府重点强化社会安全网作为现代消费社会的支柱。


In particular, owing to the hukou (China’s antiquated household registration system), access to public services and benefits is not portable.	特别是户口（中国陈旧的户籍制度）导致公共服务和福利均不能异地享受。


As a result, migrant workers – an underclass numbering roughly 160 million – remain shut out of government-supported health care, education, and social security.	由此导致约1亿6千万名底层农民工无法享受由政府提供的医疗、教育和社会保障。


Holes in the social safety net have led to high and rising levels of precautionary saving – driving a wedge between increases in labor income and any impetus to discretionary purchasing power.	社会安全网络漏洞导致高额且不断增加的预防性储蓄——进而妨碍劳动收入增加对可支配购买力形成推动。


Significantly, there were strong hints from senior Chinese leaders at the Forum that hukou reform is now under active consideration.	重要的是，中国高层领导人在论坛上释放出积极审议户口改革的强烈信号。


While that would be welcome, such efforts need to be accompanied by an expansion of benefits.	尽管上述表态广受欢迎，但仍需要扩大福利范围来加以配合。


China’s retirement system has only about $430 billion of assets under management (national and local government social security and private-sector pensions).	中国的养老金系统仅仅管理着约4，300亿美元的资产（国家及地方政府社会保障和私营部门养老金）。


I pressed newly appointed Finance Minister Lou Jiwei on this point, suggesting that China deploy some of its excess foreign-exchange reserves to fund such an effort – the same tactic used to provide a $200 billion start-up injection for the China Investment Corporation, the sovereign wealth fund that he ran for the previous five and a half years.	我就此问题追问过新任财政部长楼继伟，建��中国拿出部分外汇储备余额来资助这项事业——中国曾用同样的办法为中投公司提供了2，000亿美元的启动资金，而楼继伟过去五年半中一直是上述主权财富基金的管理者。


Unfortunately, he did not favor this suggestion.	遗憾的是，他对这项提议并不赞成。


The final – and possibly most important – insight that I took away from the Forum concerned the quality of China’s new leaders.	我从论坛上得到的最终——也或许是最重要的观点涉及到中国的新任领导人。


From President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang on down, China’s new leadership team is quite sophisticated in terms of analytics, risk assessment, scenario modeling, and devising innovative solutions to tough problems.	从主席习近平和总理李克强开始，中国的全新领导集体十分擅长分析、风险评估、情景预设和为解决棘手问题制定创新方案。


Moreover, under the organizational umbrella of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – the latter-day version of the old central planning apparatus – China has marshaled considerable resources into the formulation of a comprehensive and well-thought-out economic strategy.	此外，在原有中央计划机构当前翻版国家发展和改革委员会（NDRC）的机构框架下，中国已经聚拢了大量资源制定深思熟虑的全方位经济对策。


But, in the end, it takes more than strong policy and analytical skills to deal with tough economic challenges.	但归根结底，单凭强势政策和分析能力来应对严峻的经济挑战还远远不够。


We have seen unfortunate examples of that repeatedly in the West in recent years, and there are no guarantees that China’s newly installed leaders will avoid comparable pitfalls.	近年来我们看到这样不幸的例子在西方一再上演，而中国的新任领导人也不一定能避免类似的错误。


Vision and strategy are vital for realizing the “China Dream,” as the country’s new leaders are now calling it.	目标和战略对实现中国新任领导人所谓的“中国梦”至关重要。


But it will take courage and sheer determination to tackle what is perhaps the biggest obstacle of all – resistance from deeply entrenched local and provincial power blocs.	但勇气和坚定的决心在对抗来自根深蒂固的地方及省级权力集团的最强力障碍时也同样必不可少。


On this critical front, strong words must be accompanied by bold action.	在这个关键领域，掷地有声的话语必须伴随着大胆的行动。


Letting China’s Bubble Burst	让中国的泡沫破灭


NEW YORK – The problems with China’s economic-growth pattern have become well known in recent years, with the Chinese stock-market’s recent free-fall bringing them into sharper focus.	发自纽约——中国经济增长模式所产生的问题在近期广受关注，而中国股市最近的直线下跌使它们成为了更为尖锐的焦点问题。


But discussions of the Chinese economy’s imbalances and vulnerabilities tend to neglect some of the more positive elements of its structural evolution, particularly the government’s track record of prompt corrective intervention, and the substantial state balance sheet that can be deployed, if necessary.	但对中国经济失衡和脆弱性的讨论往往忽视结构性变革中一些更为积极的元素，尤其是政府过往那些迅速纠偏行动，以及在必要时可以动用的大量国家资产。


In this regard, however, the stock-market bubble that developed in the first half of the year should be viewed as an exception.	然而，从这个角度看，今年上半年爆发的股票市场泡沫应被视为一个例外。


Not only did Chinese regulators enable the bubble’s growth by allowing retail investors – many of them newcomers to the market – to engage in margin trading (using borrowed money); the policy response to the market correction that began in late June has also been highly problematic.	不仅因为中国监管机构允许散户投资者——其中很大一部分都是第一次炒股——（用借来的钱）从事融资融券交易促使泡沫增长； 而且6月下旬开始的响应市场回调的政策也存在极大问题。


Given past experiences with such bubbles, these policy mistakes are puzzling.	鉴于过去对这些泡沫的经验，这些政策的错误是令人费解的。


I was in Beijing in the fall of 2007, when the Shanghai Composite Index skyrocketed to almost 6,000 (the recent peak was just over 5,000), owing partly to the participation of relatively inexperienced retail investors.	2007年秋我在北京，当时上证指数飙升至近6000点（最近这波的高点是5000多点），部分原因是相对缺乏经验的散户投资者的大量参与。


At the time, I thought that the greatest policy concern would be the burgeoning current-account surplus of over 10% of GDP, which would create friction with China’s trading partners.	当时，我认为最大的政策关注点应该是规模超过GDP10%且不断增长的经常账户盈余，这将使得中国与贸易伙伴产生摩擦。


But the country’s leaders were far more concerned about the social consequences of the stock-market correction that soon followed.	但该国领导人更关心的是股市回调后的迅速产生社会后果。


Although social unrest did not emerge, a prolonged period of moribund equity prices did, even as the economy continued to grow rapidly.	虽然社会动荡并没有出现，但即使经济持续快速增长，股票价格依然长期停滞不前。


In 2008, it was a combination of exploding asset prices and excessive household-sector leverage that fueled the global financial crisis.	2008年，在资产价格暴涨和家庭部门过度杠杆的双重作用下，全球金融危机爆发。


When such a debt-fueled bubble bursts, its effects are transmitted directly to the real economy via household-sector balance sheets, with the reduction in consumption contributing to a decline in employment and private investment.	当这类债务驱动型泡沫破灭，通过家庭部门的资产负债表直接影响到实体经济，伴随着消费减少，就业和私人投资的下降。


It is much harder to find circuit breakers for this dynamic than for, say, that caused by balance-sheet distress in the financial sector.	而相对于金融部门的资产负债表引发的连锁危机，打破这个动态循环更为困难。


Yet the Chinese authorities seem not to have learned the lessons of either episode.	然而，中国当局似乎没有从这两个事件中吸取教训。


Not only did they fail to mitigate the risks, underscored in the 2007 collapse, that new retail investors introduce into the market; they actually exacerbated them, by allowing, and even encouraging, those investors to accumulate leverage through margin buying.	他们不仅没有减轻风险，如2007年的危机所警示的，控制新的散户投资者进入市场； 而且他们实际上加剧了风险，通过允许甚至鼓励这些投资者通过保证金交易来累积杠杆。


Making matters worse, when the current stock-market correction began in early June, Chinese regulators relaxed margin-buying restrictions, while encouraging state-owned enterprises and asset managers to purchase more stocks.	更糟糕的是，当股市于六月上旬开始回调，中国监管机构放宽了限购的限制，同时鼓励国有企业和资产管理者购买更多股票。


The authorities, it seems, were more interested in propping up the market than allowing for a controlled price correction.	似乎在当局看来支撑市场比受控制的价格修正更感兴趣。


To be sure, China’s stock-market bubble did not emerge until recently.	可以肯定的是，中国股市的泡沫不是直到最近才出现的。


Last October, when the Shanghai Composite Index was in the 2,500 range, many analysts considered equity prices undervalued.	去年十月，当上证指数处于2500区间时，许多分析师认为股票价格被低估。


Given relatively strong economic growth, rising prices seemed justified until about March, when the market, driven by mostly thinly traded small- and mid-cap stocks, shot to over 5,000, placing the economy at risk. (And, in fact, many still claimed that the rally was not unsustainable, as the stock market was trading at a forward price-to-earnings ratio of about 15, consistent with its ten-year average, in mid-April.)	鉴于经济增长相对强劲，股价的上涨似乎是合理的，直到大约3月份市场主要受交易清淡的中小型股票驱动，突击超越5000点，将得经济处于危险的位置（同时，事实上，许多人仍然声称上涨不是不可持续的，因为在4月中旬股市交易的远期价格市盈率约为15，跟过往十年的平均值一致。


But it was a bubble – and a highly leveraged one at that.	但这是一个泡沫，一个高度杠杆化的泡沫。


While periodic bubbles may be unavoidable, and no bubble is without consequences, a highly leveraged bubble tends to cause far more damage, owing to its impact on the real economy and the duration of the deleveraging process.	周期性泡沫也许是不可避免的，但所有泡沫都会带来后果，高杠杆泡沫往往造成更大的破坏，因为其对实体经济的极大影响和持续漫长的去杠杆化过程。


This is reflected in the persistently sluggish recovery in the advanced economies today.	这体现在当今发达经济体的持续缓慢复苏中。


Even the United States, which has fared better than most since the crisis, has recorded GDP growth of little more than 10% since the start of 2008; over the same period, China’s economy grew by about 66%.	即便是美国这个自危机爆发以来比大多地区都发展得好的地方，自2008年开始记录的GDP增长很少超过10 %； 而在同一时期，中国的经济增长达到66%。


Of course, with China’s household sector holding a relatively small share of equities compared to real estate, the current stock-market slump is unlikely to derail the economy.	当���，由于中国家庭部门持有股票的份额相对房产来说比较小，目前股市的暴跌不太可能导致经济脱轨。


Nonetheless, as in 2007, the prospect that lost savings will trigger social unrest cannot be dismissed, especially at a time when tools like social media enable citizens easily to share information, air grievances, and mobilize protest.	然而，正如2007年那样，不能排除因失去储蓄而引发社会动荡的预期，尤其是这个时代有着像社交媒体这样的工具可以供百姓容易地共享信息、怨气、并动员起来进行抗议。


As previous crises have shown, and as the current downturn in China has highlighted, steps must be taken to mitigate market risks.	正如以往的危机所示，中国经济的低迷已经显现，必须采取措施来缓和市场风险。


Specifically, China needs prudential regulation that limits the use of leverage for asset purchases.	具体而言，中国需要谨慎的法规来限制资产购买的杠杆。


Here, the country already has an advantage: relatively high levels of equity and low mortgage-to-value ratios typically characterize real-estate purchases by China’s household sector.	在这里，该国已经拥有了一个优势：相对高水平的资产净值和抵押贷款/房产价值的低比率是中国家庭部门购买房地产的典型特征。


Moreover, once a market correction begins, the authorities should allow it to run its course, rather than prop up prices with additional leverage – an approach that only prolongs the correction.	此外，一旦市场回调开始，当局应该允许市场自主运行，而不是用附加的杠杆来支撑价格，因为这是只是一种拖延回调的方法。


If Chinese regulators allow the market to correct, sophisticated institutional investors with a long-term value orientation will ultimately step in, enhancing the market’s stability.	如果中国监管机构允许市场正确运行，具有长期价值取向的成熟机构投资者将最终介入，提高市场的稳定性。


In the interim, the use of public balance sheets to purchase enough equity to prevent the market from over-correcting may be justified.	在此期间，使用公共资产购买足够的权益，以防止市场矫枉过正可能是合理的。


As China’s markets expand – the capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets is on the order of $11 trillion – they are increasingly outstripping policymakers’ capacity to manage prices and valuations.	随着中国市场的扩大——上海和深圳股市的市值是11万亿美元——它们越来越超出政策制定者管理价格和估值的能力。


The only practical way forward is for the Chinese authorities to focus on regulatory and institutional development, while following through on their commitment to allow markets to play the decisive role in allocating resources.	唯一切实可行的办法是，中国政府要把重点放在监管和机构发展上，同时承诺让市场在资源配置中发挥决定性作用。


The Untapped Potential of Sino-European Investment	中欧投资潜力无穷


BEIJING – Global economic growth, says the International Monetary Fund, has been “too slow for too long.”	北京—国际货币基金组织（IMF）说，全球经济“在太长的时间里增长太慢”。


A major reason has been sharply decelerating growth in global trade, which the World Trade Organization expects to grow by 1.7% this year – far below the 6.7% average in the decade preceding the 2008 crisis.	一个主要原因是全球贸易增长猛烈下降，世贸组织预计今年增长率只有1. 7%，远远低于2008年危机前十年的平均值6.


With trade alone no longer capable of underpinning global cooperation, it is time to add more investment linkages to the mix.	7%。 光靠贸易已无法支持全球合作，因此必须辅之以更多投资联系。


As it stands, there is no real global-level investment framework.	目前，真正的全球水平投资框架尚不存在。


But the G20 recently approved the world’s first programmatic document on multilateral investment, entitled the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking.	但G20最近批准了世界上首个多边贸易纲领性文件，即《G20全球投资决策指导原则》。


The general framework it provides could be particularly valuable for China and the European Union, as they attempt to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).	该文件所提供的一般框架对正在进行双边投资条约谈判的中国和欧盟来说尤其重要。


So far, there have been several rounds of BIT talks, focusing on increased investment protection and market access.	目前，双边投资条约谈判已经进行了数论，焦点集中在增加投资保护和市场进入。


Many more rounds are on the way, as some significant issues – including guarantees of regulatory transparency and the creation of an effective dispute-settlement mechanism – have yet to be fully agreed.	更多轮次正在进行中，一些问题——包括监管透明度保证以及成立有效的纠纷解决机制——仍未得到充分解决。


The Sino-European BIT is to be based on 26 existing BITs involving China and 28 individual EU members – treaties that are far from consistent, in terms of requirements for and restrictions on market access.	中欧双边投资条约将以涉及中国和28个欧盟成员国的现有双边投资条约为基础——这些条约可谓众说纷纭，市场准入条件和限制不尽相同。


This lack of uniformity is a major motivation for China to negotiate a single treaty: it wants to ensure that its enterprises have equal market access in all EU member countries and avoid the costs and complications associated with adhering to different regimes.	缺乏统一性是中国谈判单一条约的主要动机之一：中国想要确保中资企业在所有欧盟成员国获得平等市场准入权，避免因需要遵守不同制度而产生的成本和复杂性。


Gaining access to the advanced technologies and management expertise of European firms is another major enticement.	获得欧洲企业的先进技术和管理技能也是一大主要诱惑。


The EU, for its part, hopes that money flowing in from China will help to boost its struggling economy and pave the way for increased trade.	至于欧盟，它希望来自中国的资金能够刺激步履维艰的经济并为提高贸易打好基础。


Among its main demands is that access to China’s market be governed by a negative list (a list of exceptions to what would otherwise be open market access), rather than by a lengthy government-approval process.	其主要诉求之一是中国采取负面清单（清单之外即开放市场准入）的方式管理市场准入，而不是通过冗长的政府批准流程。


Here, China has already taken some steps forward.	在这方面，中国已经采取了一些步骤。


Last December, the State Council decided to introduce a negative list for market access that applies to all investment activities in China, by both domestic and foreign investors.	去年12月，国务院决定对一切在华投资活动（不论来自国内还是国外投资者）采取负面清单市场准入制度。


A pilot version of this list has proved itself in Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, Fujian, and other free-trade trial areas.	上海、广东、天津、福建和其他自由贸易试验区获批负面清单试点。


Beyond addressing institutional issues, however, China and the EU need to dismantle cultural and conceptual barriers to investment.	但是，除了解决制度问题，中国和欧盟还需要克服投资和文化和概念壁垒。


Both sides must work to increase mutual understanding and trust through various negotiation mechanisms and to encourage “track II diplomacy” (interactions among smaller non-state actors).	双方都必须致力于通过各种谈判机制增加互相理解与信任，鼓励“第二轨道外交”（规模较小的非国家行为人之间的互动）。


To this end, the European Commission seems prepared to establish a transparent “investment project portal” – open to the European public, as well as to Chinese and other third-party investors – to facilitate the sharing of information, knowledge, and resources for European investments.	在这方面，欧盟委员会已准备实施透明的“投资项目门户”——向欧洲公众以及中国和其他第三方投资者开放——以便利关于欧洲投资的信息、知识和资源的共享。


For both sides, there is plenty of work ahead to conclude a BIT.	对双方来说，完成双边投资条约仍然前路漫漫。


But that is no reason to delay the expansion of investment cooperation.	但这绝不是推迟投资合作的借口。


In parallel with their BIT negotiations, China and the EU should be pursuing three main goals.	在进行双边投资条约谈判的过程中，中国和欧盟必须追求三个主要目标。


First, China and the EU must follow through on their 2015 agreement that key strategic initiatives for each economy should be better integrated.	首先，中国和欧盟必须贯彻2015年的协定——双方经济中的重要战略计划应该更好地融合。


On China’s side, these include the “one belt, one road” initiative, which focuses on strategic investment, and its structural reform plans, which focus on making the economy more market-oriented and bolstering innovation.	在中国方面，这包括“一带一路”计划及其结构性改革计划。 一带一路着重于战略性投资，结构性改革着重于让经济进一步市场化以及鼓励创新。


On Europe’s side, such initiatives include the Europe 2020 economic growth strategy and the European Commission’s Investment Plan for Europe, commonly known as the Juncker Plan, both of which aim to help Europe build a more innovative, sustainable, inclusive, and dynamic economy.	在欧洲方面，这包括欧洲2020经济增长战略和欧盟委员会的欧洲投资计划（Investment Plan for Europe，即人们常说的容克计划），以帮助欧洲建立更具创新性、可持续性、包容性和活力的经济。


In addition, the “16+1 cooperation” between China and Central and Eastern European countries should become more transparent and integrated with wider Sino-European cooperation.	此外，中国与中东欧国家的“16+1合作”应该更加透明，并融入广义中欧合作。


A second main objective for China and Europe should be to contribute to protecting and developing global value chains, which foster trade and investment through economic integration.	中国和欧洲的第二个主要目标应该放在保护和发展全球价值链上，全球价值链通过经济一体化促进贸易和投资。


The emergence of these value chains has transformed global trade from a zero-sum game to a foundation for mutually beneficial collaboration.	这些价值链的出现将全球贸易从零和博弈变为互惠合作的基础。


Yet some political forces in Europe (as well as the United States) are now speaking out against international economic integration, proposing a return to the protectionism of the past.	但欧洲（以及美国）的一些政治势力正在反对国际经济合作，要求回归昔日的保护主义。


As soon as one country blocks another country’s goods or services from entering its market, global value chains will be disrupted, producing spillover effects that hurt everyone – including the country that erected the barriers.	如果一国阻止另一国的商品或服务进入本国市场，全球价值链将受到干扰，产生一损俱损的溢出效应——树立壁垒的国家亦不能幸免。


Given this, European and Chinese leaders must make the case for continued liberalization of trade and investment, despite the political challenges that may arise, particularly in Europe.	考虑到这一点，欧洲和中国领导人必须坚持贸易和投资自由化，尽管这可能带来一些政治挑战，特别是在欧洲。


This is especially important with regard to the services sector.	对于服务业，这一点尤其重要。


Europe and China need to open up their services markets to two-way trade, including by dismantling remaining barriers to trade in information technology and promoting technology transfer.	欧洲和中国需要向双边贸易开放服务市场，包括取消信息技术方面的现存壁垒、促进技术转移。


The third key objective that the EU and China should be pursuing on the way to a BIT is the development of new mechanisms to finance investment.	欧盟和中国在通往双边投资条约的道路上必须追求的第三个目标是制定新的投资融资机制。


Such efforts have been pursued by each separately: China led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, while the EU has the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (which forms a pillar of the Juncker Plan).	这些政策双方各自都在实施：中国领衔成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行，而欧盟由欧洲童子银行和欧洲战略投资基金（容克计划的一大支柱）。


China and the EU should use such platforms to promote integration and cooperation in investment financing.	中国和欧盟应该利用这些平台促进投资融资方面的融合与合作。


As it stands, there is far less direct investment between China and the EU than there is between China and its other large trading partners, including the US and Brazil.	目前，中国与欧盟之间的直接投资远少于中国与其他主要贸易伙伴（包括美国和巴西）之间。


With trade growth slowing, both sides should seek to tap their huge potential for mutual investment as quickly as possible.	随着贸易增长的放缓，中欧双方都应该寻求尽快释放互相投资的巨大潜力。


China’s Economy at the Fifth Plenum	五中全会之际的中国经济


HONG KONG – The Chinese government’s intervention in the stock market and devaluation of the renminbi this summer provided a loud reminder that economic developments in China affect everyone.	香港—今年夏天中国的股市及人民币改革及触发的市场波动与政府干预清楚地显示中国今日的经济发展影响着世界每一个地区、企业及个人。


Now, China is set to take some more world-shaping decisions at this month’s Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee.	即将在本月召开的中共十八届五中全会将做出更多的影响世界的决策。


Two years ago, at the Third Plenum, China’s leaders committed to pursue far-reaching reforms, declaring that markets must “play a decisive role in allocating resources.”	在两年前的三中全会上，中国领导人承诺要追求更深刻的改革，宣布市场必须“在资源配置中起到决定性作用”。


While the state sector would continue to play the leading role in the provision of public goods and services, policymakers would “unwaveringly encourage, support, and guide the development of the non-public sector, and stimulate its dynamism and creativity.”	国有经济将继续在提供公共基础设施和公共服务等方面起到领导作用，但决策者将“毫不动摇地鼓励、支持、引导民营经济的发展，激发民营经济的活力和创造力。 ”


Last year, the Fourth Plenum focused on leveling the economic playing field – in terms of rights, opportunities, and regulations – by strengthening the rule of law and improving the accountability, transparency, and legitimacy of government decision-making.	去年的四中全会把重点放在了保证经济发展中的平等竞争上——包括权利、机会和监管等方面的平等，通过强化法治、增进问责、加强透明度和政府决策的合法性来实现这一点。


Specific reforms included establishing circuit courts to reduce local governments’ control over the legal system, and a larger role for the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to ensure official compliance with China’s constitution.	具体的改革包括成立巡回法庭以减少地方政府对司法系统的控制，以及加强全国人大常委会在确保政府行政机构遵守宪法方面的作用。


This year, the Party must agree on the direction of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, which is to be launched in 2016 and is supposed to enable the country to graduate from middle-income status by 2020.	今年的五中全会必须为中国第十三个五年规划确定方向。 十三五规划将从2016年开始，目标是让中国在2020年进入及跨越中等收入地位。


The question is how to balance the need for continued growth with the imperative for reforms that disrupt traditional pro-growth incentives.	问题在于如何平衡增长与改革，为了达到可持续增长就必须改革，而改革却需要打破一些传统促增长的旧激励机制 ，并在短期影响增长。


China certainly faces serious challenges.	毫无疑问，中国面临着严峻挑战。


Economic growth has slowed to below 7%, at a time when the rest of the world is facing the threat of secular stagnation (very low growth and near-zero inflation).	近期的经济增长已放缓至不到7%，与此同时，世界其他国家也正面临着长期停滞（极低的增长和接近于零的通胀）的威胁。 中国的内债越来越多；


Internal debts are rising; the renminbi is facing continued depreciation pressure; and investors are still digesting the implications of the recent stock-market intervention.	人民币也面临持续贬值的压力； 投资者仍在消化最近的股市波动的影响。


Add to that the bureaucracy’s increasing reluctance to take bold action – an unintended consequence of President Xi Jinping’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign – and the scale of the task China is facing becomes clear.	除此之外，官僚体系越来越不愿采取主动大胆的行动——这是习近平主席发起大规模反腐运动后的一个意料之外的结果——中国所面临的任务之艰巨可见一斑。


But there is also some good news.	但也有一些好消息。


On Xi’s recent state visit to the United States, he and US President Barack Obama reaffirmed their countries’ bilateral trade and economic relations.	在习近平主席最近对美国的国事访问中，他与美国总统奥巴马重申了两国的双边贸易与经济的互惠关系。


Moreover, China is moving forward with its “one belt, one road” initiative, aimed at deepening China’s economic ties with countries throughout Central and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and eventually Europe.	此外，中国正在推进其“一带一路”计划，旨在深化中国与整个东亚和东南亚、印度洋、中东乃至欧洲的经济联系。


Such efforts will complement those of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which does not currently include China, in shaping the global trade and investment environment.	这些政策将形成对美国领导的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（目前不包括中国）贸易协定的补充，影响并促进全球贸易和投资环境的改善。


In fact, despite worrying short-term signals, China seems to be in the midst of a major transformation into a “lean, clean, and green” consumption-driven economy.	事实上，尽管有一些令人担忧的短期信号，但中国似乎已经进入了朝向“精干、清洁、及绿色”的消费驱动型经济增长模式的大转型。


Of course, the process will be far from easy, owing not just to the complexity of China’s economy, but also to its globally integrated nature, which makes it vulnerable to external shocks.	当然，这一过程绝不容易，这不仅是因为中国经济本身十分复杂，也是因为中国经济已经深深融入了全球经济，这意味着它很容易受到外部冲击的影响。


But, despite the difficulty of coordinating China’s huge bureaucracy, the government has made considerable headway in addressing four serious challenges: corruption, environmental degradation, excessive local-government debt, and overcapacity.	尽管协调巨大的官僚系统困难重重，政府已经在解决四大严峻挑战——腐败、环境破坏、地方政府过度负债和产能过剩——方面取得了重大进展。


Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has gone as far as taking down a retired member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s most powerful body.	习近平的反腐运动已经“拿下”了中国权力最大的“大老虎”——中共政治局常务委员会的一位退休委员。


Likewise, carbon-dioxide emissions have fallen dramatically since the beginning of this year, and the authorities appear to be well on the way to hitting the carbon-intensity target established in 2010.	类似地，今年以来二氧化碳排放量显著下降，当局达到2010年制定的碳密集度目标似乎指日可待。


Regulatory reforms are beginning to mitigate shadow-banking risks, and even some ghost towns are being revived by market forces.	监管改革正在开始消除影子银行风险，甚至一些“鬼城”也在市场力量的作用下开始复兴。


At the upcoming Fifth Plenum, China’s leaders must build on this progress, agreeing to keep up the reform momentum.	在即将到来的五中全会上，中国领导人必须在这些进步的基础上，形成一致意见，保持改革势头。


To succeed, the government must, as Xi put it, “gnaw even tough bones” – that is, overcome vested interests that are resisting change.	要想成功，政府必须如习近平所说的��样“啃硬骨头”——即克服抵制改革的既得利益集团的阻扰。


At the same time, China’s rulers must recognize that reforms have significant short-term deflationary effects.	与此同时，中国决策层必须认识到，改革具有显著的短期通缩效应。


Officials initially underestimated these effects, resulting in this summer’s unanticipated volatility.	官僚机构在改革初期低估了这一效应，导致今年夏天爆发几个意料之外的市场波动。


If China is to avoid the debt-deflation trap, its leaders must make some adjustments.	如果中国想避免债务-通缩陷阱，其宏观政策必须做出一些调整。


Beyond setting a slightly lower growth target of 6% per year, the authorities must provide more monetary and fiscal support to offset the expected slowdown in investment, consumption, and government expenditures.	除了略微降低每年的增长目标至6%，当局必须提供更多的货币和财政支持以抵消可以预料到的投资、消费和政府支出的放缓。


At the same time, they must deal with the disruptions associated with technological advances.	与此同时，当局还必须应对与技术进步有关的创造性毁灭的市场冲击。


As it stands, China’s inland cities are benefiting considerably from the improvements in market access and distributional efficiency enabled by the rise of e-commerce.	目前，中国内地城市从电子商务崛起所带来的市场进入便利性和分销效率的改善获益。


Moreover, automation is helping to offset the decline in the growth of the labor force (the result of population aging and slowing migration).	此外，生产自动化帮助抵消了劳动力增长放缓（因人口老化和迁移放缓所致）的影响。


By contrast, China’s coastal cities, where manufacturing activities are concentrated, are experiencing creative destruction – a necessary process that nonetheless presents significant short-term challenges.	可是，一些制造业活动集中的沿海城市正在经历创造性破坏发展过程——这是一个必须经历的过程，但会带来巨大的短期挑战。


To cope, the government must create incentives for officials to overcome their risk aversion and become proactive in managing change.	要应对这一情况，政府必须给予地方官员恰当的激励及容错机制，让他们克服担心风险与失败的心理，在创新制度的改革方面更加积极。


Finally, as China’s leaders seem to recognize, an increase in real wages is vital to bolster domestic consumption.	中国领导人似乎已经意识到，实际工资的增长对刺激国内消费至关重要。


Beyond reducing China’s dependence on external demand and helping to propel the country up the value chain, more spending in renminbi would help spur the use of renminbi in trade and investment.	除了降低中国对外需的依存度、帮助中国实现价值链地位的攀升，人民币支出的增加还有助于刺激人民币在国际贸易和投资中的使用。


The International Monetary Fund’s impending decision – which the US has now agreed not to oppose – to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that comprise its reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right, would enhance the currency’s international position further.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）即将决定——美国现已不反对——将人民币加入组成IMF储备资产的特别提款权（SDR）的货币篮子中，这将进一步加强人民币的国际地位。


With the right approach, the 13th Five-Year Plan can bring about significant improvements in the quality of market competition, government accountability, and the provision of public goods and services in China.	如能制定及执行恰当的方针，十三五规划将极大地改进中国的市场竞争质量、政府问责性以及中国公共基础设施和公共服务的供给。


Given China’s global influence, this is good news for everyone.	从中国目前的全球影响力看，这对所有人来说都是个好消息。


China’s Malfunctioning Financial Regulation	中国金融监管的问题


SHANGHAI – The tumult in China’s equity market appears to have come to an end.	上海—中国股市动荡似乎已经进入尾声。


But considerable uncertainty remains, not only about what caused the recent plunge in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, but also about what the episode will mean for China’s financial-reform efforts.	但仍存在巨大的不确定性，不仅是关于最近沪深交易所崩盘的原因的不确定性，还包括关于此次崩盘对中国金融改革意味着什么的不确定性。


China’s stock-market crash has been attributed to a variety of factors.	中国股市暴跌被归因于多重因素。


Official media initially attributed the disaster largely to the “malicious” short-selling of Chinese shares by foreign banks and traders.	一开始，官媒主要将股灾归因于外资银行和交易者“恶意”做空中国股票。


Later, domestic investors were added to the list of suspects, and the Chinese authorities announced a rigorous investigation into the source of short selling.	随后，国内投资者也被列入了嫌疑犯名单，中国当局还宣布将严查卖空源头。


More recently, the discussion has shifted toward a seemingly more credible cause: the proliferation of margin financing since 2010.	最近，套阿伦又转向了似乎更加可信的原因：2010年以来保证金融资的大幅增长。


With retail investors borrowing large amounts to finance share purchases, participation in the stock market surged, effectively turning a sound bull market into a “mad cow.”	散户借入了大量资金用于购买股票，股市参与度大幅提高，这让稳健的牛市演变为“疯牛”。


But while margin financing, enabled by online platforms, amplified the risks of volatility, it alone could not cause such a crash.	通过在线平台进行的保证金融资放大了波动风险，但光此一因素无法引起暴跌。


The real culprit is the government, which first fanned the flames of excessive investment, then suddenly tried to cut off the fire’s oxygen supply.	真正的罪魁是政府，它一开始煽风点火导致过度投资，然后又突然釜底抽薪。


China’s fragmented regulatory system – composed of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) – exacerbated the situation considerably.	中国的监管体系由人民银行、证监会、银监会和保监会组成，它们各自为政，这大大加剧了乱象。


Last December, after two years of a “slow bull” market, People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, announced the arrival of a so-called “reform bull” market that would push the Shanghai Composite Index far above 4,000.	去年12月，在经历了两年“慢牛”后，中共喉舌《人民日报》宣布所谓的“改革牛”市的到来将让上证综指远远超过4,000点。


This convinced practically everyone that a “big bull” market, possibly lasting a decade, had begun and spurred investors to buy stocks at already-high prices.	这几乎让所有人相信，也许将持续十年的“大牛”市已经开始，投资者纷纷购买价格已经相当高的股票。


In other words, the authorities fueled a bubble.	换句话说，当局助长了泡沫。


The CSRC was pursuing an excessively narrow objective, focusing only on getting the bull market going by delivering policies and speeches aimed at boosting investor confidence and spurring participation.	中国证监会的监管目标过于狭窄，只知道用政策和讲话提振投资者信心和刺激市场参与度，以此为耻牛市。


After this crisis, it became clear that this incentive was both toxic and precarious.	危机爆发后，显然这一激励有害又危险。


The CSRC, as China’s capital-market regulator, together with other regulators, neglected to fulfill their proper mission: to create a robust institutional framework capable of sustaining strong investment.	作为中国资本市场监管者的证监会与其他监管机构都忽视了它们应有的责任：建立能够维持强劲投资的强大的制度框架。


Once the market took off, euphoria took over.	当市场开始大涨时，群情激昂。


Even as stock-market indices moved well beyond reasonable bounds, regulators failed to predict the boom’s speed and scale.	哪怕股市指数已经远超合理区间，监管者仍没能预见到繁荣的速度和规模。


Not surprisingly, they lacked any plan for stabilizing the market in its wake.	毫不奇怪，一开始它们没有任何稳定市场的计划。


To be sure, as the A-market headed toward 5,000, regulators finally realized that the risk of a sharp correction was rising, too.	当然，随着A股直奔5,000点而去，监管者最终认识到发生剧烈修正走势的风险也在升高。


But, instead of working incrementally to create strong, targeted regulations, they performed an abrupt about-face, warning investors about risky bubbles and declaring war on margin finance.	但是，它们并没有步步为营、构建强势定向监管措施，而是突然来了一个一百八十度大转变，警告投资者股市存在高风险泡沫并出手打击保证金融资。


With that, the soaring index started to plummet – and the CSRC fell into chaos.	这一做法导致突飞猛进的指数开始暴跌——而证监会也陷入了混乱。


Beyond issuing a flurry of administrative orders, it did little to interact with investors and the market, lacking the means to solicit public opinion and advice.	除了发出一系列行政令，它并未与投资者和市场展开互动，也缺乏征求公共意见和建议的途径。


It was only when the rout was in full swing that the PBOC recognized what was happening – the CSRC had been unable to turn the tide alone – and declared that it would step in to capitalize the market.	直到崩盘已成不可收拾之势，人民银行才认识到正在发生什么——证监会无法独力扭转局面——并宣布将采取措施稳定市场。


The conclusion is clear: the current regulatory system, characterized by a clear and rigid division of responsibility among its constituent bodies, is completely out of sync with China’s rapidly growing, and increasingly integrated, capital markets.	结果很明显：在当前的监管体系中，各机构之间的责任划分清楚而僵化，已经完全与中国快速增长、日益一体化的资本市场脱节。


Yet, according to China’s recently announced draft Internet finance regulations, the country’s “1+3” regulatory model is to be retained.	但是，根据中国最新公布的互联网金融监管草案，其“1+3”监管模式将被保留。


It is time for China’s leaders to recognize that its regulatory framework – and, in particular, its approach to regulating the capital market – is no longer tenable, and to pursue a major regulatory restructuring.	中国领导人应该认识到，其监管框架——特别是其监管资本市场的方法——已不再合适，必须实施重大监管重组措施。


One option that has been proposed would be to create a single super-regulator, like the Financial Supervisory Committee that was established in South Korea after the 1990s Asian financial crisis.	一种已经提出的选择是成立单一的超级监管者，类似于20世纪90年代亚洲金融危机后成立的韩国金融监督委员会。


With or without such a body, improved channels for cooperation among ministries will be vital.	不管是否成立这一机构，改善各部门合作渠道也将至关重要。


Such cooperation is not unprecedented in China.	类似合作在中国并非没有先例。


Indeed, although ministries, seeking to protect their own turf, undoubtedly impede one another on major issues, they have been collaborating wholeheartedly in China’s effort to reshape the world economic order.	事实上，诚然各部门总是试图捍卫自己的地盘，在大问题上毫无疑问存在着互相掣肘，但在中国改写世界经济秩序的努力中，它们一直是精诚合作的。


Former Deputy Finance Minister Jin Liqun, whom the government has nominated to be the first president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, has indicated that the AIIB’s successful launch was driven by such ministerial cooperation.	被中国政府任命为亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）首任行长的前财政部副部长金立群表明，亚投行的成功成立就是由这样的部门间合作推动的。


In order to protect the interests of investors better, China now must find ways to ensure such cooperation among its existing financial regulators, including by revamping the relevant institutions.	为了更好地保护投资者利益，中国必须找到办法确保现有金融监管者之间的此类合作，包括对重要机构进行改造。


As it pursues far-reaching financial-sector reform, now is the time to do so.	中国正在追求深度金融部门改革，目前正逢其时。


The market plunge should provide added impetus.	市场暴跌应该成为抓紧改革的动力。


The fear is that the recent stock-market crash may have spooked the government, causing it to slow the pace of reform, including efforts to open up China’s capital account.	令人担忧之处是最近的股市暴跌可能让政府感到恐慌，导致其放缓改革步伐，包括开放中国资本账户的措施。


Whether reform momentum is maintained will depend largely on whether the government recognizes that the crash was the result of a regulatory failure, or remains adamant that it was the work of some nefarious foreign force, determined to destroy the Chinese economy.	改革势头能否保持下去在很大程度上取决于政府是否认识到股市暴跌是监管失灵的结果，还是仍坚持认为它是别有用心、以破坏中国经济为目的的外部势力的“杰作”。


While the latter scenario is possible, it seems unlikely.	后一种情况也不是没有可能，但可能性很低。


Judging by China’s reform progress in recent years, and the current government’s repeated promises to deepen those efforts, I am confident that the country’s leaders will respond to the recent crash by reaffirming the financial-reform agenda.	从近几年来中国改革的进步，以及本届政府一再承诺深化改革措施看，我有信心中国领导人对此次暴跌的反应将是重申金融改革日程。


Ignoring the lessons of the recent crash would be a serious mistake – one that China’s pragmatic and tenacious authorities will be determined to avoid.	忽视此次暴跌的教训将是一个严重的错误——坚定务实的中国当局将会痛下决心避免重蹈覆辙。


China’s Repressed SMEs	受抑制的中国中小企业


BEIJING – Financial repression – government policies that create an environment of low or negative real interest rates, with the goal of generating cheap financing for public spending – has long been a key feature of Chinese economic policy.	北京—金融抑制——即通过政府政策创造一种低甚至负实际利率环境，以此为公共支出营造廉价融资——是中国经济政策的长期重要特征。


But, with funding costs for businesses trending up, this is finally starting to change.	但是，随着企业融资成本的升高，这一局面终于开始改变了。


Early this year, the State Council, China’s cabinet, made lowering funding costs for businesses, especially small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), a top priority.	今年早些时候，中国国务院把降低企业尤其是中小企业融资成本列为最优先事务。


For its part, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has engaged in cautious monetary loosening, which includes freeing up more funds for lending by banks that allocate a certain proportion of their total loan portfolio to SMEs.	中国人民银行已启动谨慎货币宽松，包括释放更多银行贷款资金，配置一定的总贷款比例给中小企业。


The PBOC, through its “pledged supplementary lending” program, has also started lending directly to banks that have promised to use the funds for social housing construction.	人行还通过其“抵押补充贷款”计划直接向承诺将资金用于社会住房建设的银行贷款。


But, so far, efforts to lower funding costs have had a limited impact.	但是，到目前为止，降低融资成本的措施效果有限。


Indeed, the weighted average interest rate on bank credit to nonfinancial enterprises remains close to 7%, while economic growth has edged down from 7.4% year on year in the last three months to 7.3% in the current quarter.	事实上，银行向非金融企业加权平均利率仍接近7%，而同比经济增长从上季度的7. 4%下降到本季度的7.


The situation may not be dire yet, but it is far from ideal – especially at a time when the Chinese authorities are pursuing structural reform.	情况或许并不悲观，但也远远称不上理想——特别是在中国当局正在追求结构性改革时。


The PBOC now faces a dilemma.	人行目前面临着两难。


If it loosens monetary policy further – by, say, cutting banks’ reserve requirement ratio – the momentum for restructuring could be lost; and there is no guarantee that the additional liquidity would flow into the real sector.	如果继续宽松货币——比如降低银行准备金要求——重组就可能失去动力； 新增流动性也不一定必然会流向实体部门。


But if the PBOC refuses to budge, the combination of high interest rates and slow growth may send the economy into a tailspin.	但如果人行不动摇，高利率和慢增长的合力或将导致经济陷入混乱。


In fact, the PBOC has little choice but to engage in monetary-policy loosening.	事实上，人行几乎别无选择，只能进行货币政策宽松。


But it can avoid the pitfalls of such an approach by placing it within a broader, more comprehensive strategy that accounts for the underlying causes of the increase in funding costs for businesses.	但它可以通过更广、更全面的策略实施宽松，针对企业融资成本上升的根本原因，从而避免货币宽松政策的陷阱。


The first factor driving up funding costs is the outsize profitability of China’s commercial banks – more than 23%, on average, for the top five last year – which account for some 35% of total profits earned by the 500 largest Chinese companies.	推高融资成本的第一个因素是中国商业银行利润率过高——过去五年平均为23%以上——占中国最大五百家公司总利润的35%。


Indeed, the average for banks is nearly four times that for Chinese companies as a whole, for which the average profit is just over 6%.	事实上，银行平均水平是中国全部公司平均水平（大约6%）的近四倍。


Moreover, slowing economic growth, tighter prudential regulation, and increased liability have made banks much more risk-averse, driving them to demand a significantly higher risk premium from borrowers, who must now not only provide collateral, but also find third parties to guarantee the loans.	此外，经济增长减速、审慎监管趋紧和负债升高大大增加了银行的风险厌恶度，促使它们大幅提高借款人风险溢价。 如今借款人不但要提供抵押品，还必须找到第三方为贷款提供担保。


In many cases, banks are requiring a second group of guarantors to guarantee the first group.	在许多情形中，银行还要求第二担保人来为第一担保人提供担保。


This growing aversion to risk makes it particularly difficult for SMEs to borrow from commercial banks, forcing them to turn to the under-regulated shadow banking sector.	风险厌恶度的增加让中小企业非常难以从商业银行借到贷款，迫使它们转向监管松弛的影子银行部门。


Meanwhile, real-estate developers and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), which offer banks a false sense of security and guarantee of profitability, have acquired a major share of financial resources.	与此同时，房地产开发商和地方政府融资平台给银行造成了错误的安全感和利润保证，获得了大部分金融资源。


And financial institutions, especially banks, have been using a substantial portion of their funds for financial arbitrage.	而金融机构，特别是银行，一直在使用大量资金进行金融套利。


By reducing the amount of funding available to regular firms, especially SMEs, such activities drive up the average interest rate on loans.	它们降低普通企业特别是中小企业可以获得的资金量，以此抬高平均贷款利率。


Interest-rate liberalization is exacerbating the situation.	利率自由化加剧了这一状况。


China has already removed all controls on interest rates on loans.	中国已经取消了贷款利率的所有管制。


And, though it continues to guide interest rates on deposits, banks can easily evade these regulations by selling depositors off-balance-sheet wealth-management products, on which returns are not capped.	而尽管存款利率继续接受指引，但银行可以向储户兜售表外理财产品（回报率不封顶）轻易地规避监管。


Increases in the cost of funds’ sources increase the costs of the funds’ uses – that is, credit to enterprises.	资金资源成本增加导致资金使用成本增加，亦即企业信用成本增加。


Finally, Chinese banks’ activities are impeded by outdated and unnecessary regulations, including limits on how much credit they can extend in a year and a 75% cap on the loan-to-deposit ratio.	最后，中资银行的行为饱受过时的不必要监管的制约，包括年度信用总量控制和75%的贷款/存款比上限。


In order to evade such controls, banks are moving a larger share of their lending activities off of their balance sheets.	为了规避这些监管，银行将更多的贷款行为挪到表外。


But such off-balance-sheet loans involve a larger number of intermediaries, increasing transaction costs.	但这些表外贷款涉及到更多数量的中介，增加了交易成本。


In fact, the rising cost of intermediation – largely a result of the distortions in China’s financial system – is among the most important factors driving the rise in borrowing costs for Chinese businesses.	事实上，中介成本的升高——大部分是拜中国金融体系扭曲所赐——是推高中国企业融资成本的最重要因素之一。


That is why further monetary loosening by the PBOC, though necessary to address faltering growth, will not be enough.	正因如此，仅仅依靠人行进一步放松货币政策是不够的——尽管这是提振增长的必须措施。


In order to lower funding costs to a reasonable level, without undermining China’s economic-restructuring effort, monetary policy must be combined with well-designed and concerted financial reform.	要使融资成本下降到合理水平而不破坏中国经济重组大局，货币政策必须与设计良好、协调划一的金融改革相结合。


Only then can Chinese SMEs finally gain access to the funding they need to thrive.	惟其如此，中国中小企业才能获得茁壮成长所需要的资金。


China’s Forex Follies	中国的汇率愚行


BERKELEY – On August 11, China devalued its currency by 2% and modestly reformed its exchange-rate system.	发自伯克利——八月十一日，中国将其人民币汇率下调了2%并稍微改革了其汇率体系。


This was no earth-shattering event, but financial markets responded as if a meteorite had struck them.	这并不算是什么石破天惊的事件，但金融市场的反应却仿佛是被陨石击中了。


The negative reaction is no mystery: China’s devaluation was a textbook example of how not to conduct exchange-rate policy.	这一负面反应也不是什么意外：因为中国的货币贬值措施也堪称是如何拒不实施汇率政策的教科书式案例。


One of the government’s motivations was presumably to give a boost to China’s slowing economy.	该国政府的其中一个动机估计是将推动不断放缓的经济。


Although the service sector, which accounts for the majority of employment, is holding up relatively well, the country’s output of tradable goods, many of which are produced for export, is weakening sharply.	虽然占就业大多数的服务部门情况依然相对不错，但该国可贸易商品的生产——许多供出口——却遭遇大幅下滑。


Chinese exporters are caught between the pincers of weak foreign demand and rapidly rising domestic wages.	中国的出口商如今正困在弱势国外需求和迅速攀升的国内工资水平的夹缝中。


Devaluation is the tried and true remedy for such ills.	对于这些问题，贬值是一个屡试不爽的解决方案。


But a 2% change in currency values is too little to make much of a difference, given that wages in Chinese manufacturing are rising at an annual rate of 10%.	但考虑到中国制造业的工资水平年均10%的增长，仅仅2%的币值变化有点似杯水车薪。


It could be that Chinese policymakers regard the 2% devaluation as a down payment – the first in a succession of downward adjustments.	或许对于中国的政策制定者来说，2%的贬值只是一个开头——后面还跟着一系列的下行调整。


But, in that case, they violated the first rule of exchange-rate management: Don’t cut off a cat’s tail in slices.	但如果这样的话，他们就破坏了汇率管制的第一条法则：切不能一段段地砍猫尾巴（意即措施必须一步到位）。


The rationale for this rule is straightforward: If foreign investors expect that more currency depreciation will follow, they will rush out of Chinese markets to avoid further losses.	这一法则背后的道理相当直白：如果外国投资者预计后面还将出现进一步贬值，他们就将逃离中国市场以避免遭受进一步损失。


Capital outflows will accelerate, financial conditions will tighten, and investment will suffer.	资本外流将加速，金融状况将收紧，而投资也会因此受损。


In fact, this is precisely what China is experiencing.	事实上，这正是中国目前所遭遇的状况。


A single large devaluation that gets the entire adjustment out of the way minimizes this risk.	单次的大幅贬值可以一次性地实现调整目的并尽可能缩小上述风险。


Indeed, if investors expect the sharp improvement in competitiveness to lead to stronger economic performance, the currency will recover some of its lost value.	事实上，如果投资者们预计竞争力的大幅提升将带来更强的经济表现，货币就将重新获得一些失去的价值。


Capital will flow in rather than out.	资本也将流入而非留出。


Spending will rise rather than fall, which is precisely what China needs in the current circumstances.	消费非但不会下降，反而不断上升——这显然也是当前形势下中国急需的东西。


Instead, by resorting to their traditional incremental approach, Chinese policymakers undermined confidence that they know what they are doing.	相反，通过龟缩到自身传统的渐进式手段，中国的政策制定者们令外界失去了信心，觉得这些官员根本不知道自己要干什么。


Because they adjusted the exchange rate without describing their motives, they merely encouraged the belief that China’s economic performance is even worse than official data suggest.	这种不解释自身动机而单纯调整汇率的做法只会让别人认为中国的经济形势肯定要比官方数据显示的更差。


Another interpretation of the August 11 move is that it paved the way for the renminbi’s inclusion in the basket of currencies that comprise the International Monetary Fund’s unit of account, Special Drawing Rights.	另外一种对八月十一日调整的解读则是它为人民币进入国际货币基金组织特别提款权账户的一揽子货币名录铺平了道路。


In order to be included in the SDR basket, a currency must be widely used in international transactions. The renminbi is already widely used to invoice and settle international merchandise trade, notably other countries’ trade with China itself.	被选入特别提款权货币名录的前提就是货币必须被广泛应用于国际交易中，而人民币已经大量应用在国际商品贸易的报价和结算之中，尤其是在中国自身与外国的贸易方面。


But it is less freely traded in global currency markets, ranking only 9th overall, according to the Bank for International Settlements.	但人民币在全球货币市场的交易自由度却不大，在国际清算银行的排名中仅位列第九。


This relatively low standing partly reflects China’s maintenance of controls on capital flows, which make it hard for financial-market participants to get their hands on renminbi.	这个相对较低的地位在某种程度上反应出中国对资本流动的持续管治，使得金融市场参与者们难以插手人民币交易。


But it is also a result of heavy-handed manipulation of the foreign-exchange market by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which makes changes in the price and availability of the renminbi opaque and uncertain.	但这同时也体现出中国人民银行对外汇市场的大力操纵，导致人民币的价格和供应都不透明且充满不确定性。


The August 11 initiative may have been designed to alleviate this concern.	八月十一日调整或许就是设计来缓和这一忧虑。


In addition to devaluing, China announced that the opening “fix” – the price at which trading of the renminbi would commence each day – would be largely based on the previous day’s closing market price.	在实施贬值的同时，当局也宣布以后的开盘“中间价”——人民币每日开始交易的价格——将在很大程度上基于前一日的银行间市场收盘汇率。


Because the PBOC had been setting the opening fix pretty much wherever it wanted, this change could be seen as moving the renminbi toward a more market-determined exchange rate.	由于人民银行过往基本上是随心所欲地设定中间价，这一举措可被视为人民币汇率要更加迈向市场化。


If so, it is at most a very modest move in that direction.	如果这样的话，这几乎是朝着一方向迈进的非常轻微的一步。


The PBOC continues to intervene heavily once the market is open, thereby limiting fluctuations in the dollar-renminbi exchange rate to less than 2% a day.	人行依然在开市后大手干预，力图让美元兑人民币的波动幅度维持在每日2%以内。


In any case, gaining admission to the SDR club is a poor excuse for wrong-footing the markets.	在任何情况下，声称为了获取特别提款权都不是出手扰乱市场的好借口。


Given that the SDR, which the IMF uses to keep track of its own financial transactions, is of little practical importance, the Chinese authorities’ effort to add the renminbi to it amounts to little more than a vanity project.	鉴于这个国际货币基金组织用来跟踪自身金融交易的特别提款权其实并没有什么重要性，中国当局将人民币往里面塞的努力也更多就是摆个花架子而��。


Inclusion would make no difference in terms of progress toward China’s goal of developing its currency into a first-class international and reserve currency widely used by private and official foreign investors.	就算进去了，也对中国让自身货币成为国外私人及官方投资者广泛使用的第一流国际交易和储备货币的目标没什么影响。


If Chinese officials are serious about pursuing this goal, they should stop focusing on the SDR and start developing stable and liquid financial markets that are not subject to official manipulation.	如果中国官员们是真心想实现上述目标，他们就得放弃盲目追求特别提款权，并着手推动一个不受官方操纵的，稳定且流动的金融市场。


Only then will the international community embrace the renminbi as a proper international and reserve currency.	只有这样国际社会才会接纳人民币成为一个合适的国际交易和储备货币。


The events of the last month suggest that China still has a long way to go.	而八月十一日的那一连串举动说明中国人据此还有很长的路要走。


China’s Planning Addiction	中国的规划癖好


TOKYO – In early September, I visited China for the first time in nearly ten years.	东京——9月初，近十年来我首次访问了中国。


With so much time having passed since my last visit, it was easy to see where China has prospered – and where it continues to struggle.	因为上次访问后过了很长时间，中国的繁荣——以及依然存在的问题对我来讲显而易见。


China’s major cities embody the extraordinary success of the development policies that Deng Xiaoping initiated in the 1980s.	中国大城市是20世纪80年代开始的邓小平发展政策获得巨大成功的体现。


They are home to most of the hundreds of millions of Chinese who have been lifted out of extreme poverty in just a few decades.	它们是短短几十年内摆脱极端贫困的多数亿万中国人的家园。


Beijing and Shanghai are almost overwhelming in their scale and energy, lined with shimmering skyscrapers, adorned with bright neon lights, and teeming with increasingly cosmopolitan citizens.	北京和上海的规模和活力几乎势不可挡，到处是闪闪发光的摩天大楼，装饰着闪亮的霓虹灯，日益国际化的民众更是随处可见。


Standing on the streets of one of these vibrant cities, one gains a deeper appreciation of recent data on China’s rising domestic consumption.	站在这些活力城市的街道上，人们可以对中国最近不断攀升的国内消费数据有更深切的体验。


People are using the latest technologies and toting shopping bags bearing the names of international luxury brands.	人们都在应用最新现代技术，提着印有国际奢侈品牌名字的购物袋。


Their rising prosperity is also reflected in the retail sectors of Tokyo and Seoul, where increasingly wealthy Chinese tourists engage in “binge shopping.”	他们不断深入的繁荣还体现在东京和首尔的零售部门，日益富裕的中国游客在那里展开“购物狂欢”。


But the impression I had of a modern, capitalist economy was soon tarnished by an improperly working phone in a first-class Beijing hotel.	但现代资本主义经济的印象很快就被北京一流酒店一台有故障的电话所玷污。


An American friend suspected that it was tapped, probably because of my role as an adviser to the Japanese government.	一位美国朋友怀疑可能因为我日本政府顾问的身份，这台电话被监听了。


Such claims are, of course, difficult to confirm, to say the least.	这种说法当然难以确认，最低限度也可以这样说。


What is not open to dispute is that a week after my trip ended, the number of the credit card that I had used for shopping in Beijing was used to make purchases at a Chinese supermarket in New York City.	毫无疑异的是在我的中国之行结束一周后，我用来在北京购物的信用卡号被人用来在纽约的一家中国超市购物。


While identity theft is by no means exclusively a Chinese problem, such experiences create the impression that technological modernization in China may be outpacing regulation and data-security infrastructure.	虽然身份盗窃绝非仅仅中国才有，但这样的经历给人的印象是中国的技术现代化可能超前于监管和数据安全基础设施。


Then there is the air quality.	再有就是空气质量。


This year, Beijing has experienced repeated bouts of severe air pollution, with two smog “red alerts” having been issued this month.	今年以来，北京反复出现了严重的空气污染，仅本月就已经两次发出雾霾“红色预警” 。


When I visited Beijing in 2005, immediately after the commemorations of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, the sky was clear.	2005年我访问北京是在二战结束60周年纪念活动后，当时的天空非常晴朗。


Of course, air pollution was already a problem for China a decade ago.	当然，10年前中国已经有空气污染问题。


But, before the commemorations, the government had prohibited many cars from driving (based on their license-plate numbers), stopped selected factories from operating, and forced some firms to move out of the city temporarily.	但在纪念活动前，政府已禁止许多机动车上路行驶（按照车牌号码）、阻止特定的工厂开工并迫使某些企业临时搬出市区。


This approach – which could be pursued only within a centrally planned economy like China’s – provided temporary relief.	这样的做法只可能在中国这样实行中央计划的经济体中出现——暂时缓解了空气质量问题。


But ultimately it did little good; in fact, by obscuring the problem, it might have delayed effective action.	但这样做最终好处甚微； 事实上，掩盖问题可能会推迟有效的行动。


This was hardly the first or only time that China has used central planning to implement short-term solutions that fail to bring about – or, in some cases, even impede – long-term progress.	这并非第一次或唯一一次中国利用中央计划贯彻短期方案，上述方案未能带来——在某些情况下甚至阻碍了——长期的进步。


For example, this summer’s stock-market crash was widely viewed as a natural correction, because equity prices – driven largely by government interventions – had risen over the previous year far above what economic fundamentals merited.	比方说今年夏天的股市崩盘被普遍视为一种自然修正，因为股票价格——主要由政府干预驱动——较之去年的上涨幅度远远超过了经济基本面的支撑。


Nonetheless, when prices collapsed, the government moved fast, suspending trading of a substantial number of stocks and pursuing price-keeping operations that resembled those pursued by Japan in the 1990s.	但股价暴跌时，政府迅速行动，暂停了相当数量的股票交易，并采取了类似日本20世纪90年代所采取的价格保护行动。


In this manner, China’s government managed to stop a rout, seemingly reinforcing the Marxist view that economic and financial crises do not occur in controlled economies.	中国政府成功地以这种方式阻止股价崩盘似乎证明了马克思主义的观点，即经济和金融危机不会出现在控制经济当中。


Indeed, China’s leaders seem convinced that price-keeping operations amount to an effective mechanism for manipulating stock prices in whatever way they see fit.	事实上，中国领导人似乎相信价格保护行动是一种以他们认为合适的方式操控股价的有效机制。


As an adviser to the Chinese government said on my recent trip, “movements in the stock-price index are totally unrelated to the real state of the economy.”	中国政府一位顾问在我最近访问时表示，“股价指数的波动与实际的经济状况完全无关。 ”


What Chinese policymakers don’t seem to recognize is that such interventions carry serious long-term costs.	中国决策者似乎没有意识到这样的干预隐含着巨大的长期风险。


Few want to invest in a market where the government can change the rules at any moment.	很少有人愿意在一个政府可以随意修改规则的市场从事投资活动。


China’s recent intervention in the currency market also sent mixed signals.	中国近来的货币市场干预也发出了混杂的信号。


For years, the authorities tended to support the renminbi, as they pursued renminbi internationalization – an effort that culminated in the International Monetary Fund’s recent decision to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that compose its reserve asset, so-called Special Drawing Rights.	多年来，政府在追求人民币国际化期间支持人民币升值——这项工作在国际货币基金组织（IMF）最近决定将人民币纳入构成其储备资产的货币篮子——即所谓特别提款权时达到了高潮。


Not long after the stock-market crash, however, the authorities allowed the currency to depreciate.	股市崩盘后不久，政府允许人民币贬值。


China should continue along this path, pursuing the kind of monetary-policy approach – aimed at securing the right combination of prices and employment – that prevails in free-market economies.	中国应该沿这条路走下去，坚持采用这种为自由市场经济体所普遍采用的旨在确保价格和就业最佳组合的货币政策方法。


Continued currency depreciation would provide a much-needed boost to the slowing economy, just as depreciation of the yen through Abenomics has helped to lift Japan out of a protracted recession.	持续的货币贬值将为经济放缓提供迫切需要的提振，就像安倍经济学利用日元贬值协助日本摆脱了一场旷日持久的经济衰退。


As 2015 closes, China’s leaders find themselves at a crossroads.	随着2015年临近尾声，中国领导人发现自己正处在十字路口。


They must decide whether to continue trying to control the economy or to follow through on their promise to build a genuinely market-oriented system.	他们必须决定是要继续控制经济，还是兑现其承诺，建立真正以市场为导向的体制。


For China’s sake, and that of its neighbors, one hopes they stick to the free-market plan.	为了中国及其邻国的利益，我们希望他们坚持奉行自由市场计划。


The Promise of China’s G-20 Presidency	中国出任G-20主席国的贡献


HONG KONG – In just over a month, China will assume the G-20 presidency.	香港—再过一个月，中国就将成为G-20主席国。


Over the next year – and especially at the organization’s September summit, to be held in Hangzhou – China plans to help lay the groundwork for a world economy that is more “innovative, invigorated, interconnected, and inclusive.”	今后一年——特别是9月在杭州举行的G-20峰会期间——中国准备为建设更加“创新、活力、联动、包容”的世界经济奠定基础。


The question is how.	问题在于如何实现。


One place to look is the current G-20 presidency, held by Turkey, which has emphasized inclusiveness, implementation, and investment for growth.	我们可以首先看看现任G-20主席国土耳其在今年峰会的议题，它强调包容、实施和以增长为目标的投资。


Though securing consensus within the G-20 is notoriously difficult, the Turkish presidency has had three key successes.	尽管在G-20内部确保形成共识向来十分困难，但土耳其在主席国任上仍取得了三项关键成功。


In the last year, Turkey has spearheaded a new accountability framework for efforts to boost growth in the G-20 countries.	去年，土耳其牵头制定了G-20国家提振增长政策的新问责框架。


It has launched a World Small and Medium Enterprise Forum aimed at enhancing the contributions of SMEs to the global economy.	它成立了世界中小企业论坛（World Small and Medium Enterprise Forum），旨在加强中小企业对全球经济的贡献。


And at the recent G-20 summit in Antalya, held just two days after the November 13 terrorist attacks in Paris, a consensus emerged that the fight against the Islamic State is a “major priority.”	而在最近的G-20安塔利亚峰会上（举行于11月13日巴黎恐怖袭击前两天），G-20达成共识，将打击伊斯兰国作为“主要重点”。


In short, the G-20 has gained some momentum, and China can benefit.	简言之，今年G-20峰会获得了一些动力，而中国可以从中获益。


If the current United Nations Climate Change Conference produces a binding global agreement to curb greenhouse-gas emissions, that momentum will become even stronger.	如果最新的联合国气候变化会议产生一个有约束力的全球遏制温室气体排放协定，这一动力将进一步增强。


Given that the G-20 countries represent two-thirds of the world’s population and 85% of its GDP, they would be integral to the implementation of any deal.	目前G-20占据世界人口的三分之二和GDP的85%，任何全球协议的实施都无法脱离G-20。


By providing a framework for these countries to meet regularly to discuss global challenges like climate change, the G-20 – which is, at best, a club of self-selected members – gains legitimacy.	通过为这些国家提供一个框架定期会晤讨论气候变化等全球问题，G-20，作为一个自我选择的成员组成的俱乐部，可以赢得合法性。


All of this bodes well for China’s capacity to help counter the global slowdown in growth, trade, and investment.	所有这些都有利于帮助中国应对全球增长、贸易和投资放缓。


And not a moment too soon: The ongoing slowdown is among the greatest risks the world currently faces, because it could exacerbate desperation and instability in already-fragile countries, while compelling more robust economies to turn inward, rather than address proliferating crises.	时间已经不多了：持续减速是当前世界经济面临的最大风险之一，因为这可能加剧已经十分脆弱的国家的绝望和动荡，同时迫使较为强健的经济体转向自顾而不去解决愈演愈烈的危机。


Fortunately, China has lately been showing its commitment to becoming a more responsible global stakeholder.	幸运的是，中国最近一直在表明其成为更负责任的全球相关利益方的承诺。


Perhaps most notable, it recently led the establishment of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which will serve largely as a vehicle for Chinese foreign investment.	最引人瞩目的也许要数最近在北京成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）。 亚投行将作为中国对外投资的主要载体之一。


Specifically, the AIIB will (among other things) provide funding for China’s ambitious “one belt, one road” policy, which aims to enhance trade linkages throughout Asia, across the Middle East, and into Europe, through massive infrastructure investment.	具体而言，亚投行（以及其它机构）将为中国宏大的“一带一路”政策提供资金。 一带一路旨在以大规模基础设施投资加强整个亚洲通过中东进入欧洲的贸易联系。


The fact that more than 50 countries signed on as founding members, despite opposition from the United States and Japan, indicates that members’ interest in securing resources to meet urgent infrastructure trumps geopolitical competition.	尽管有美国和日本的反对，仍有50多个国家签署成为亚投行创始成员国，这一事实表明，成员国对基础设施的紧迫需求压倒了地缘政治竞争。


The same brand of pragmatism was apparent in China’s response to its exclusion from the recently agreed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, spearheaded by the US and including 12 Pacific Rim countries.	同样的务实主义也体现在中国对于自己被排除在最近达成的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）贸易协定的反应上。 TPP由美国牵头，包括了12个环太平洋国家。


Instead of grandstanding, China has shown its willingness to pursue different types of trade arrangements, as needed.	中国对TPP并没有激烈的反应，而是表态愿意按需追求不同形式的贸易协定。


If China can grasp the opportunity of the G-20 presidency to broker a deal to conclude the World Trade Organization’s long-stalled Doha Development Round, its credentials as a global stakeholder would be enhanced.	如果中国能抓住担任G-20主席国的机会，斡旋完成停滞已久的世贸组织多哈发展回合，其作为全球利益相关方的地位将得到加强。


To be sure, China might ultimately join the TPP, a move that some Chinese believe would, like accession to the WTO, support domestic reform.	诚然，中国最终可能还是会加入TPP，一些中国人相信这如同加入世贸组织一样能够支持国内改革。


But even if China stays out, it seems likely to continue doing its part to enhance trade.	但即使中国不加入TPP，仍可以继续为加强贸易做出贡献。


There is more promising news.	还有更令人振奋的消息。


The Chinese renminbi is poised to join the US dollar, the British pound, the euro, and the Japanese yen in the basket of currencies that determines the value of the International Monetary Fund’s reserve asset, Special Drawing Rights.	人民币即将加入美元、英镑、欧元和日元的行列，成为决定国际货币基金组织（IMF）储备资产价值（SDR特别提款权）的货币篮子成员。


With the renminbi moving one step closer to becoming a reserve currency, China’s capacity to help the world – and especially emerging-market economies – cope with impending market volatility will be greatly enhanced.	人民币距离成为储备货币又近了一步，这意味着中国帮助世界——特别是新兴市场经济体——处理即将到来的市场波动的能力得到了极大的增强。


Building a robust, unified, and fast-growing global economy will be extremely difficult even under the most favorable circumstances.	构建一个强健、统一和快速增长的全球经济是十分困难的，即使是在最有���的环境下。


It will be impossible if large swaths of the world – most notably, the Middle East – remain mired in chaos and violence.	如果世界多国——最引人瞩目的是中东——陷于混乱和暴力难以自拔，这将是一个不可能完成的任务。


Given this, China could, like Turkey, use its G-20 presidency to promote consensus on the need to end the Syrian conflict and to support long-term peace and economic development throughout the Middle East by pursuing strategies that revive trade, investment, and employment.	因此，中国可以像土耳其一样，利用担任G-20主席国的机会促进结束叙利亚冲突。 通过追求振兴贸易、投资和就业的战略来支持整个中东为达到长期和平及经济发展目标形成共识。


In a multipolar world, emphasis on common interests is the key to fostering cooperation and progress.	在多极世界中，强调共同利益是促进合作和进步的关键。


Though the Syrian crisis is undoubtedly highly complex, and the actors involved – such as Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey – have distinct objectives, no one can deny the economic benefits of social and political stability.	尽管叙利亚危机毫无疑问极其复杂，并且牵涉到的行动方——如伊朗、俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其——各有各的目标，但无人可以否认社会和政治稳定带来的经济利益。


Likewise, while the advanced economies may be tempted to pursue austerity, the reality is that stronger growth would benefit everyone, with rising energy and commodity prices lifting the emerging economies out of their current low-growth and debt trap.	类似地，尽管一些发达经济体可能会追求紧缩，但现实是更强的增长有利于所有人。 能源和大宗商品价格上涨能让新兴经济体走出当前的低增长和债务陷阱。


Next year, the G-20 has an important opportunity to show that it can deal effectively with global crises, from the risk of secular stagnation to the scourge of transnational terrorism.	明年，G-20拥有一个重要机会证明其能够有效处理从世界经济长期停滞的风险到跨国恐怖主义祸害的全球危机。


With the right mix of realism and power sharing, China’s G-20 presidency could catalyze important progress – and perhaps even place a firm foundation beneath a new global economic architecture fit for the twenty-first century.	通过正确地结合现实主义和权力共享，中国的G-20主席国任期能够催化全球治理的重要进步——甚至可能为建立一个适合二十一世纪的新全球经济架构打下一个坚实的基础。


China’s G-20 Moment	中国的G-20时刻


BEIJING – The world caught a break in 2009.	北京—2009年，全世界松了口气。


The G-20, an assembly of the world’s largest developed and major emerging economies – which had thus far failed to make a serious mark on the world stage – was meeting in Pittsburgh to formulate a response to the global financial crisis.	由世界最大发达经济体和主要新兴经济体组成的G-20——但目前仍未在世界舞台上留下浓墨重彩——在匹兹堡召开会议，制定应对全球金融危机的措施。


US President Barack Obama, having gotten the message that the G-7 could no longer oversee the global economy on its own, led a summit that made the G-20 the primary body for coordinating global economic policy.	美国总统奥巴马已经知道G-7无法独力管理全球经济，因此，在这次他领衔的峰会上，他让G-20成为协调全球经济政策的主要机构。


It was a highpoint for American leadership.	这是美国领导力的顶点。


Next year, the world’s other economic superpower will assume the presidency of the G-20 and host its annual summit.	明年，另一个世界超级经济强国将成为G-20的主席国并举办G-20年度峰会。


Though China’s leadership will, it is hoped, lack the drama of 2009, President Xi Jinping will undoubtedly make an impression of his own.	尽管人们预计中国的领导不具备2009年这样的戏剧性，但中国国家主席习近平毫无疑问会留下自己的印记。


If he did not miss the opportunity to advance the goal of an Asia-Pacific trade agreement while hosting last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, he certainly will not pass up the chance to ensure that the G-20 agenda serves China’s interests.	如果在去年举办亚太经济合作（Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ）峰会时他抓住机会推进了亚太贸易协定，那么他显然不会放弃确保G-20日程服务中国利益的机会。


Of course, with Turkey’s term at the G-20’s helm having barely begun, Xi probably has not yet settled on specific priorities.	当然，在土耳其主持G-20的时期就要开始的时候，习近平还没有确定具体的优先事项。


But some potential areas of concern are already apparent.	但一些潜在关注领域已经浮现。


Elements of the current G-20 agenda align well with China’s domestic economic concerns, especially with regard to infrastructure.	目前的G-20日程要素与中国国内的经济问题十分契合，特别是基础设施问题。


Last year, G-20 members agreed to pursue a global infrastructure initiative aimed at facilitating investment and boosting financing for infrastructure projects and, crucially, for small and medium-size enterprises.	去年，G-20成员国同意实施旨在促进基础设施项目和（关键性地）中小企业投资、增加资金支持的全球基础设施计划。


Given that SMEs will play a key role in China’s new growth strategy, and already account for some 85% of new jobs in the country, this initiative suits China well.	中小企业将在中国的新增长战略中扮演关键角色，并且它们贡献了中国新增就业岗位的85%，因此这一计划十分契合中国。


With Turkey having zeroed in on SMEs as a key vehicle for fostering more inclusive growth, this year’s summit could already produce progress on this front.	土耳其已经确定要让中小企业成为促进包容性增长的载体，因此今年的峰会可能在这方面取得进展。


But other infrastructure-related opportunities beckon.	但其他与基础设施相关的机会也在闪光。


China has long sought to place Asia on par with North America and Western Europe in terms of connectivity – a project that the Asian Development Bank estimated in 2009 would cost $8 trillion by 2020.	中国一直在寻求让亚洲的连通性达到与北美和西欧旗鼓相当的水平——亚洲开发银行（Asian Development Bank）在2009年时估算，到2020年，这一工程将耗资8万亿美元。


China, the only major Asian emerging economy that is currently meeting the ADB’s spending target, could use its G-20 presidency to persuade its neighbors to increase investment in this area.	作为目前实现亚洲开发银行支出目标的唯一一个亚洲新兴经济体，中国可以利用担任G-20主席国的机会说服邻国增加该地区的投资。


The G-20 may also enable China to advance a key geopolitical objective: the reform of voting rights at the International Monetary Fund.	G-20还有可能让中国得以推进关键地缘政治目标：改革国际货币基金组织（IMF）的投票权。 奥巴马也许是构想G-20领导地位的领导人；


Obama may be the leader who envisaged a premier role for the G-20; but the United States has displayed a distinct aversion to allowing emerging powers to exert the influence over multilateral institutions that their increased economic weight warrants and demands.	但美国显然极不情愿允许新兴力量影响力进入多边机构。 新兴大国不断增长的经济分量让它们提出了新的要求。


Indeed, the US Congress has consistently failed to ratify a package of IMF reforms, agreed in 2010, that would give countries like China greater say in decision-making – a failure that protects Western Europe, whose members benefit most from the status quo.	事实上，美国国会一直没有批准2010年达成一致的IMF改革方案，如若改革实施，则中国等国家将拥有更大的决策影响力。 美国的这一做法保护了西欧——西欧国家是现状的最大受益者。


If China uses its G-20 leadership to push vigorously for change, it would not only improve its own chances of gaining more authority in the IMF; it would also gain favor with other emerging economies, which have been similarly frustrated by US (and European) leaders’ treatment of the issue.	如果中国利用其G-20领导地位大力推进变革，则不但可以增加其自身获得IMF更大话语权的机会； 也可以给其他新兴国家带来好处——它们也对美国（和欧洲）领导人对待这一问题的态度十分不满。


There is also scope for China to assume a leadership role in another domain long dominated by the US and Europe: the global financial system.	中国还有可能收获另一个长期由美国和欧洲主宰的领域的领导地位：全球金融体系。


China, where the US dollar’s predominant role is often criticized for having subjected global finance to unnecessary volatility, could use its G-20 presidency to demand a larger role for what is often considered the world’s only international currency: the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights.	中国常常批评美元的支配地位导致全球金融陷入不必要的波动，它可以利用担任G-20主席国的机会要求增加通常被认为是唯一的国际货币——IMF特别提款权（Special Drawing Rights，SDR）的作用。


In this effort, it would be in China’s interest to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that determine the SDR’s value.	在此过程中，将人民币加入确定SDR价值的货币组合符���中国的利益。


To be sure, the IMF rejected this proposition in 2011, because the renminbi did not yet meet the criteria of a freely convertible currency.	是的，2011年IMF拒绝了这一方案，因为人民币尚不符合可自由兑换货币的标准。


But the IMF also hinted at a willingness to be flexible, conceding that, because the SDR is fundamentally a reserve asset, the currencies that underpin it need only to be available in “sufficiently liquid and deep markets.”	但IMF也暗示可以灵活调整，它让步说，因为SDR从根本上说是一种储备资产，因此其基础货币只需要在“充分流动和深化的市场”中可以获得就行。


And, over the last few years, China’s authorities have gradually loosened their grip on the capital account, allowing the renminbi to become the fifth most popular currency for settling global payments.	此外，在过去几年中，中国当局逐渐放松了对资本账户的管制，这让人民币成为全球第五大结算货币。


With at least 60 central banks now including renminbi among their foreign reserves, next year could present an ideal opportunity for China to advance its long-term goal of reshaping the world monetary system.	目前，至少有60家央行将人民币纳入了外汇储备组合，因此明年对中国来说是一个推进其改革全球货币体系的长期目标的理想机会。


At the same time, China might pursue a shift in the dynamic of international financial regulation.	与此同时，中国可以追求改变国际金融监管动态。