The government must not overestimate how much revenue can be gained by the consumption-tax increase, and thus how much of the budget hole can be closed.	政府不应高估提高消费税所能带来的税收数量，也不要错误地估计能够弥补的税收漏洞。


Moreover, it has so far shrugged off any concern that the tax increase might have a chilling effect on consumption, and thus on economic growth.	此外，政府迄今为止并没有考虑增加税收可能为消费、甚至经济带来的冷却作用。


Hiromichi Shirakawa, the chief economist at Credit Suisse AG in Tokyo, suggests that the revenue increase from the consumption-tax hike will soon begin to evaporate – and disappear completely in 5-7 years.	瑞士信贷公司东京首席经济学家白川浩道表示消费税上调带来的收入增长将会很快的蒸发——并在5-7年内消失殆尽。


If he is right, the increase will turn out to be little more than a finger in the dyke of Japan’s budget problems.	如果他不幸言中，那么此次增加消费税将无异于用手指去堵日本预算问题的堤坝。


Despite its two decades of economic malaise, Japan remains the world’s third-largest economy, and will grow by about 2% this year and 1.5% in 2013.	虽然20年来经济一直萎靡不振，但日本仍然是世界第三大经济体，今年将会增长2%左右，2013年将会增长1. 5%。


Given the economic doldrums in which the world finds itself, that may not seem so bad.	鉴于全球目前低迷的经济状况，日本的现状似乎并没有那么糟糕。


But, if Japan is ever to address its fiscal dilemma effectively, it will need to sustain faster growth than that.	可如果日本想有效解决其财政困境，就必须维持比上述更快的增长幅度。


Such growth presupposes a credible strategy to pare the deficit, which means a plan that recognizes the reality of the growing cohort of pensioners.	上述增长的前提是制定削减赤字的可靠策略，也就是说一项直面退休人员越来越多的现实的计划。


Japanese authorities will also need to launch bold liberalizing reforms to unshackle the many areas of the economy that are shielded from competition.	日本当局还需要进行大胆的自由化改革，以释放屏蔽竞争的众多的经济领域。


These reforms must aim to boost greater workforce participation by women; induce corporations to invest more at home; and increase competition in cosseted sectors of the economy.	这些改革必须着眼于让女性加入职业队伍，促使企业加大国内投资，以及增加娇生惯养的经济部门的竞争能力。


If any country has the political tools to undertake a program of comprehensive reform, it is Japan.	如果说哪个国家拥有执行全面改革计划的政治工具，这个国家非日本莫属。


The unity with which the Japanese population met last year’s disaster demonstrated once again that, when called upon, the national spirit can work miracles.	日本民众面对去年灾难时所表现出来的团结一致再次证明：在真正需要时，民族精神能够创造奇迹。


And Japan’s “greatest generation” – the men and women who rebuilt a war-shattered country into an economic powerhouse – should not be deemed unwilling to sacrifice for the greater good.	而且我们不该想当然地认为，把战后破碎的国家重建为一个经济强国的日本“最伟大的一代”男性与女性不愿为大义而做出牺牲。


After all, they saved their country once; they are more than capable of doing it again.	毕竟，他们曾经拯救了自己的国家，他们完全有能力再次这么做。


Japan’s Kamikaze Isolation	日本的自杀式隔绝


It almost seems as if Japan is bent on self-isolation in Asia.	日本似乎决意要在亚洲实行自我封闭。


After a few months during which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ostensibly sought to improve his country’s relations with China, his fifth visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine has again raised tempers.	日本首相小泉纯一郎改善对华关系的表面文章做了不过几个月，他对备受争议的靖国神社的第五次参拜就再次点燃了怒火。


China and South Korea both cancelled meetings of their foreign ministers with their Japanese counterpart.	中国和韩国取消了各自外长与日本外相的会晤。


Once again, Japan has missed a chance to rebuild trust in a part of the world where, in the absence of cooperative international institutions, trust is all there is.	于是，在亚洲这个没有合作性国际组织、而仅靠信任来维系相互关系的世界，日本再一次丧失了重新建立信任的良机。


Why does Japan still not understand that the way it treats its history echoes across every part of Asia that Japan’s military occupied in the first part of the 20th century?	日本为什么还不明白，它对待历史的态度会在二战时被日军占领过的所有亚洲国家引起强烈的反响？


Japanese reactions reveal an extraordinary degree of stubborn self-righteousness.	日本的所作所为所显示的是固执得异乎寻常的自以为是。


As Japan’s government never ceases to point out, the Yasukuni shrine, built in 1869, venerates the 2.5 million Japanese who have died for their country, not just the 14 judged as war criminals after WWII.	正如日本政府一直指出的那样，1869年修建的靖国神社供奉着250万为国捐躯的日本烈士，而不仅仅是那14名二战期间受到审判的日本战犯。


But, while many Japanese feel (with some justification) that South Korea and, in particular, China, exploit the Yasukuni issue to reduce Japan’s influence in the region and to pander to their publics’ strong nationalism, they are missing the point.	但小泉政府指责（其说法似乎也不无道理）韩国，特别是中国政府利用靖国神社事件来削弱日本的地区影响，煽动公众强烈的民族主义情绪的说法却显然并未切中要害。


Indeed, domestic politicking seems to be at least as important to Japan’s leaders as to South Koreas’s or China’s.	事实上，与韩国或者中国相比，国内政治对日本领袖来讲似乎更为重要。


Koizumi’s visit to the shrine, officially presented as that of a private citizen, was intended to impress the Japanese public, regardless of its effects abroad.	小泉靖国神社之行的公开说法是私人参拜，目的是讨好日本公众，而不顾国外会产生怎样的反响。


But the country now is isolated, which affects the whole fabric of stability in the region.	但日本现在在亚洲陷入了彻底孤立的地位，这甚至影响到该地区稳定的整体构架。


Japan’s diplomatic isolation strengthens those in the Chinese leadership who have long sought to marginalize what is economically and militarily still Asia’s most powerful nation, while sucking other states in the region deeper into China’s shadow.	日本在外交上的孤立客观上帮助了中国领导人，他们很久以来就力求使仍然是亚洲经济和军事最强国的日本边缘化，而把该地区其它国家进一步聚拢到中国的旗下。


Japan’s isolation also increases its dependency on its only ally, the United States, and undermines the fragile chance of developing a framework in Asia to address future regional crises in a spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation and rivalry.	日本的孤立也使其更加依赖盟友美国，使原本并不乐观的努力前途更加渺茫：这种努力就是建立亚洲框架，本着合作而非对抗敌视的原则来处理未来的地区危机。


Because Japan’s isolation is a matter not only for the Japanese, it must be a matter for Western policy.	日本的孤立不仅是他们的本国事务，更应该是西方政策关注的目标。


The record, however, is not impressive.	但迄今为止，这方面的进展并不令人满意。


The US administration, fashionably worried over China’s growing regional influence, seems quite happy with a closely-tied Japan that could help balance China.	美国政府和其它国家一样担心中国的地区影响日益膨胀，因此他们似乎对有一个联系密切的日本来帮助平衡中国的影响感到十分的满意。


But this is obviously a shortsighted approach, for a Japan that is tied exclusively to America will lose, not gain, against China in the region, thus making the balancing act even harder.	但这显而易见是一种短视的政策，因为一个只知听命于美国的日本在地区的影响会日益缩小，而不是日益扩大，而这会导致平衡的努力难上加难。


The Europeans have no Japan policy at all, not even a shortsighted one.	而欧洲人则根本就没有对日政策，甚至连只顾眼前的政策也没有。


Fixated on the promise of an ever growing Chinese market, they give little thought to the stability of the region.	他们把注意力集中在日益扩大的中国市场，而地区稳定问题则根本不在他们的考虑之列。


They seem to think of the powers in the region as unconnected islands, and of their own behavior towards one as devoid of political consequence for the others.	在欧洲人看来，亚太地区国家似乎都是些毫不相关的孤岛，而他们自己的行为也根本没有什么切实的政治意义。


When the European Union last year considered lifting its symbolic arms embargo against China, none of the governments driving the proposal bothered to consider that this, too, would be symbolic, sending a message all over Asia that Europe was putting its political weight behind Chinese regional policies.	欧盟去年审议撤销已经只有象征意义的对华武器禁运时，推动这项提案的那些政府根本就没有考虑到这一举措本身的象征意义，撤销武器禁运等于向亚洲各国宣布欧洲支持中国推行的地区政策。


Japanese demands to reconsider fell on deaf ears, and the initiative was put on ice only when US congressmen threatened economic repercussions and China increased pressure on Taiwan.	日本要求重新审议的呼吁根本没有人理睬，而只有当美国议员威胁要实行经济制裁和中国加大对台压力的时候，这项动议才暂时地被搁置起来。


Instead of exploiting Japan as a regional aircraft carrier, as the US tries to do, or neglecting her politically, as Europeans do, both need to work out a new, strategic approach – if possible, jointly.	除了像美国那样把日本当作亚太地区的航空母舰，或者像欧洲那样彻底忽视她的政治存在，欧美各国都需要制定出新的、战略性的对策¾可能的话应该共同付出努力。


The aim must be to prevent a clash of nationalisms and encourage a cooperative framework in which the region’s major countries interact and develop respect for each other’s interests.	我们的目标是防止民族主义冲突，推动建立合作性的框架，使得该地区的重要国家能够相互牵制，相互尊重对方的基本利益。


Such a framework can emerge in Asia only with Japan’s active involvement, not on the basis of her isolation.	只有日本积极参与，而不是身处孤立，这样的框架才有可能在亚洲成为现实。


Of course, Japan must lead the way.	当然，日本必须起到应有的示范作用。


Japan’s leaders must recognize that the mindlessness with which they still treat the sensitivities of societies that suffered from Japanese imperialism in the twentieth century is as morally deaf as it is strategically damaging.	日本领导人必须意识到他们对待亚洲各国敏感问题的愚蠢态度不仅在道义上完全错误，在战略上也万分有害，因为这些亚洲国家在20世纪都曾受到过日本帝国主义的迫害。


But this process of realization is more likely to succeed if Japan does not feel it stands with its back against a wall.	但只有不让日本感觉走投无路，它才有可能完成这样的认识过程。


Friends from abroad, therefore, can assist this process by ensuring that Japan does not to feel alone.	因此，外国朋友可以在上述过程中起到辅助的作用，我们可以确保日本不会感到孤立无援。


Far from endorsing Japanese lack of sensitivity, active Western political engagement – for its own credibility in Asia – must convey that Japan’s future depends on gaining the trust of the region.	但西方积极的政治介入绝不等于纵容日本对别国的情感置之不理，即便是为了提升日本自身在亚洲的形象也必须让他们明白：日本的未来取决于他们能否在亚太地区赢得信任。


That is not too much to ask.	这样的要求并不过分。


After all, Japan was a political ally throughout the half-century of the Cold War.	毕竟，日本在冷战中的半个世纪都曾经是我们的政治盟友。


In a part of the world where democracy is gradually advancing, Japan can point to firm democratic traditions and institutions.	在民主日益发展的这个世界，日本有坚定的民主传统和制度可以依靠。


Its economic clout remains formidable, and its commercial and cultural ties to the West are broad and varied.	日本仍然掌握着强大的经济权力，它与西方的商业和文化联系也涵盖广泛，而且复杂多样。


Japan may have shied away for decades from sharing the task of maintaining international order, but a new awareness of international responsibility is steadily emerging.	过去几十年来日本也许无需承担维护国际秩序的义务，但日本人正在越来越清醒地意识到自己也需要承担相应的国际责任。


For those who want a stable Asia, the interest in establishing close links with Japan should be obvious.	对于希望亚洲稳定的人来讲，与日本建立密切合作的好处应该显而易见。


This should not come at the expense of similar links with others, such as China and India, but these ties must not be acquired at the price of isolating Japan.	对日合作不应损害与其它国家，比如与中国和印度的类似关系，但与其它国家的关系也不应以孤立日本为代价来加以维持。


Japan\u0027s Leadership Muddle	松村昌弘


OSAKA – Having seen a new prime minister every year for five consecutive years, Japan has just narrowly avoided having its third in 2010.	近五年来日本首相年年易主，2010年选举总算没有重蹈覆辙。 首相菅直人击败小泽一郎，当选执政党日本民主党（DPJ)主席。


Prime Minister Naoto Kan has been elected President of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), surviving a challenge from Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ’s most potent behind-the-scenes power broker. Had Nan lost to Ozawa, he would have lost the premiership to him as well.	倘若菅直人在党内选举中输给了小泽这位民主党内最具影响的权力掮客，那他的首相职位也将不保。


With DPJ lawmakers almost equally split, Kan’s victory is being attributed to the support of general and associate party members.	双方在民主党内部的势力难分高下，菅的胜选归功于军方和兄弟党的支持。


Their vote was more in line with recent public-opinion polls, which showed popular support running at seven-to-two in favor of Kan over Ozawa.	同样，近期的民意调查也显示出七分之九的民众对菅表示支持。


Only three months ago, Kan was chosen as the DPJ’s top leader to restore its public image, which had been severely tarnished by political-financing scandals involving his predecessor as prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, and a separate scandal involving Ozawa.	菅开始以民主党领袖身份出现不过是三个月前的事，当时前任首相鸠山由纪夫的政治献金事件和另一桩涉及小泽的丑闻使该党声誉大为受损。


Hatoyama’s mismanagement of Japan’s relations with the United States, centered on the relocation of a Marine base in Okinawa, had also dented the DPJ’s standing.	鸠山首相对日美关系的不当处理——以冲绳岛海军基地迁移问题为焦点——也对民主党造成不利影响。


From the moment the DPJ took power in 2009, Kan was tacitly slated to be Hatoyama’s successor, given that he was concurrently Hatoyama’s deputy prime minister and treasury minister.	早在2009年民主党上台之际，菅就被内定为鸠山的继任者，身兼副首相和财务大臣。


In these posts, Kan avoided involvement with the two issues that wrecked Hatoyama’s premiership: the controversial base relocation issue, and debates over budget cuts.	在其职位上，菅避免了卷入两桩事务：美军基地迁移问题和预算削减讨论，而正是这两个议题迫使鸠山下台。


Consequently, he was aloof from the DPJ’s feud with Japan’s powerful bureaucratic mandarins, who are desperately trying to safeguard the longstanding bureaucratic/cabinet system in which the once-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) passed mandarin-drafted, cabinet-sponsored bills and budgets, almost continuously, for five decades.	菅也因此免于得罪民主党的宿敌——强势的日本大官僚，他们正试图维持的官僚/内阁体系曾在过去的半个世纪中帮助由官僚起草的法案和预算案得到自民党内阁通过。


Surprisingly, Kan, who entered politics to dismantle the old system, now has switched to the mandarins’ side.	令人称奇的是，当初为了改革旧体制而投身政界的菅直人现在却投靠了大官僚。


The DPJ suffered a bitter defeat in this summer’s upper-house election, after Kan abruptly proposed a significant increase in the highly unpopular consumption tax.	今年夏天，菅不顾民众抗议，提议大幅提高消费税，民主党由此在随后的上议院选举中惨败。


That increase would enable Treasury mandarins to maintain their latitude in setting fiscal policy, while making it unnecessary to streamline special-account budget financing for gargantuan public corporations, into which retiring bureaucrats parachute for lucrative jobs.	这一增税计划会使财政官员能够制定较为宽松的政策，而不必清查为大型公共事业团体提供资助的秘密账户，在那些事业单位中领取巨额薪金的退休官员也就不必担心收入受到威胁。


Moreover, Kan’s approach to the base relocation issue revived the old LDP plan, which the DPJ had previously denounced.	此外，菅处理美军基地迁移问题的方法也跟自民党的原有计划相似，民主党早先曾反对那一计划。


Kan’s retreat means that the mandarins continue to hold the reins of foreign and defense policy.	菅的让步表明，日本外交和防务政策仍受官僚集团控制。


Even if Kan had failed to win the upper-house election, the mandarins would have faced a weakened DPJ.	官僚们打的算盘是：即使菅直人没能在其支持下赢得上议院选举，民主党自身也会受损。


Either way, they won.	因此，无论菅胜选与否，都于官僚有利。


Small wonder, then, that Hatoyama advocated replacing Kan with Ozawa, even though Hatoyama insisted that Ozawa resign when he was forced from the premiership three months ago.	由此就不难理解为什么鸠山想让小泽一郎替代菅直人——尽管三个月前下台时鸠山曾要求小泽辞职。


Both are openly opposed not only to the tax increase, but also to the continuing presence of the US Marine base on Okinawa.	鸠山和小泽都公开反对增税法案以及美国海军在冲绳的持续驻扎。


While committed to the bilateral US-Japan alliance, Ozawa has said that Japan’s security requires the continued presence only of the US Seventh Fleet, not of US ground troops.	小泽支持美日双边同盟，但认为日本仅需要美军继续留驻第七舰队，而非地面部队。


Evidently, he is trying to redefine the relationship, probably with a view to enhancing Japan’s freedom of maneuver in foreign and security policy.	他似乎倾向于重新定义美日关系以扩大日本在外交和防务领域的回旋余地。


Despite his confusing signals, Ozawa’s stance is neither pro-China nor anti-American, given that he most recently emphasized Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku islands as an integral part of its territory – a position that China strongly disputes.	小泽虽然表现出可能转变政策的态度，但他的立场绝非亲中或是反美，这从最近他不顾中国强烈抗议而强调日本对尖阁列岛拥有主权一事上可以看出。


Logically, Ozawa’s approach involves a significant military buildup, but he remains silent about how to maintain effective deterrence once the US Marines leave Okinawa.	相应地，小泽的政策还包括大幅增强军事力量，但是，他尚未说明日本该如何在美军离开冲绳后维持有效防务力量。


Kan’s status quo approach to alliance management won’t hold up long, because Hatoyama’s bungling has inflated Okinawans’ expectations about evicting the Marines.	在军事联盟方面，菅直人倡导的“维持现状”政策难以长久。 由于鸠山之前的处理不当，冲绳居民驱逐美军的情绪高涨。


The current governor will likely block any construction to relocate a base on the island, exercising a de facto veto, particularly with the gubernatorial election due in late November.	特别是在十一月下旬的县级选举到来之前，现任县长可能会以实际行动反对菅的政策，阻挠任何在该岛上重新建造基地的活动。


Only by equivocating about the relocation plan could Kan appease both the governor and US President Barack Obama, who is scheduled to meet Kan in Tokyo the same month.	菅直人只有不对迁移计划表态才可能让县长和奥巴马总统都不发作，后者计划在十一月到访东京同菅会谈。


Japan and America can now agree only on what will not be implemented.	目前，日美两国只能就放弃执行哪些项目达成一致。


The DPJ is caught between a rock and a hard place, and Kan’s premiership will surely reach a stalemate.	现在民主党进退两难，菅的首相职位也前途未卜。


Because the DPJ has neither an upper-house majority nor the two-thirds lower-house majority needed to override upper-house votes, his government will be unable to pass budget and/or appropriation bills by the end of the current fiscal year, March 31, 2011.	民主党既没有占到上议院的多数席位，也没能在下议院中占得三分之二多数（因而无法推翻上议院决议），菅直人政府将无法在2011年3月31日本财政年度结束前通过预算案和支出案中的一个或全部。


Ozawa, had he become prime minister, would inevitably have been subjected to not only similar obstruction in Diet sessions but also to interrogation about his financing scandal, while fearing prosecution.	如果小泽一郎当选首相，他不仅要应对议会的阻力，而且要面临关于自己献金丑闻的调查甚至审判。


An Ozawa government might be stable only if he could form a grand coalition.	只有组织起广泛的联合政府，他才能避免其内阁垮台。


Yet, given strong public sentiment against Ozawa, that is impossible.	然而，考虑到民众对小泽的反感情绪，这种可能不会实现。


Meanwhile, Ozawa’s electoral challenge has left the DPJ more divided than ever.	另一方面，小泽一郎参选使得民主党分裂倾向高于以往。


In order to ride out the hung Diet, Kan will have to reconstruct party unity by replacing at least the incumbent anti-Ozawa party chief or Chief Cabinet Secretary, and, possibly, by appointing a pro-Ozawa Justice Minister – i.e., someone who can block Ozawa’s prosecution in the financing scandal.	为赢得议会多数，菅直人必须实现党内团结。 为此他需要至少撤掉反对小泽的现任政党领袖或是内阁官房长官，而且可能需要任命一位有利于小泽的司法部长以阻止小泽因丑闻受审。


Appeasing Ozawa, however, is contrary to public sentiment and detrimental to the DPJ’s hopes of regaining popular support.	但是，向小泽示好会招致民众不满，不利于民主党重新赢得民心。


For the moment, Japan’s political situation is stable, but that will last for the next six months, at most.	短期看来，日本的政治局势���算稳定，但是最多不出六个月，形势就会变化。


The time is fast approaching when the public becomes entirely disillusioned with both the LDP and the DPJ, which comprise a two-party system in name only, in which legislators shift allegiance for reasons centered on attachment to or enmity against the LDP.	用不了多久，民众就会对自民党和民主党都彻底失望，发现在名义上的两党制之下，议员们只是因其对自民党的亲近或疏远而改变立场。


Without a grand reorganization of the major political parties along ideological lines, Japan’s domestic and foreign policies – including relations with the US – will remain a muddle.	如果不出现有着坚定思想路线的政党，日本的国内外政策——包括其对美关系——将难逃乱局。


Can Japan Reboot?	日本能够重启吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent policy decisions – to increase monetary stimulus dramatically, to postpone a consumption-tax increase, and to call a snap election in mid-December – have returned his country to the forefront of an intense policy debate.	美国剑桥—日本首相安倍晋三的最近的政策决定——大幅加码货币刺激、暂停消费税提高、决定在12月中旬举行大选——让日本又回到了激烈政策争论的前沿。


The problem is simple: How can aging advanced economies revive growth after a financial crisis?	问题很简单：老龄化发达经济体如何在金融危机后恢复增长？


The solution is not.	答案可不简单。


It is now clear that the first round of Abe’s reforms – known as “Abenomics” – has failed to generate sustained inflation.	如今，很显然安倍的第一轮改革——被称为“安倍经济学”——没能带来持续通胀。


Hopes for continued recovery have now given way to two consecutive quarters of negative growth.	如今，对持续复苏的希望已经因为连续两季度的负增长而烟消云散。


The question is whether Abenomics 2.0 will put Japan’s economy back on the path to renewed prosperity.	问题在于安倍经济学2. 0是否能让日本经济回到重新繁荣之路。


My own view is that the “three arrows” of Abenomics 1.0 basically had it right: “whatever it takes” monetary policy to restore inflation, supportive fiscal policy, and structural reforms to boost long-run growth.	我本人的观点是安倍经济学1. 0中的“三支箭”基本上都是有的放矢：重塑通胀的“竭尽全力”、支持性财政政策和提振长期增长的结构性改革。


But, though the central bank, under Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, has been delivering on its side of the bargain, the other two “arrows” of Abenomics have fallen far short.	但是，尽管日本央行在黑田东彦的领导下完成了自己的使命，但安倍经济学的其他两支“箭”远远落后了。


There has been no significant progress on supply-side reforms, especially on the core issue of how to expand the labor force.	供给端改革一直没有重大进展，特别是在如何扩大劳动力这一核心问题上。


With an aging and shrinking population, Japan’s government must find ways to encourage more women to work, entice older Japanese to remain in the labor force, and develop more family-friendly labor policies.	在老龄化且不断减少的人口条件下，日本政府必须找到办法鼓励更多妇女去工作，引导日本老人留在工作岗位，并发展更有利于家庭的劳动力政策。


Above all, Japan needs to create a more welcoming environment for immigrant workers.	最重要的是，日本需要创造更加欢迎移民工人的环境。


There has been some movement on immigration.	在移民方面已经有了一些动作。


Panicked by deadlines for the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, the government managed to clear the import of foreign construction workers (though the decision had to make its way through a half-dozen ministries).	受2020年东京夏季奥运会期限的刺激，政府已明确要进口外国建筑工人（尽管该决定需要闯过通过六个部门）。


But overall progress has been slow.	但总体进展仍然很慢。


Japan desperately needs more nurses and hospice workers to care for its aging population, but bureaucratic and political resistance to immigration is deeply entrenched.	日本急需更多护士和护工照看老龄化的人口，但对移民的官僚和政治抵制根深蒂固。


When I first started asking my Japanese academic friends about Abe’s supply-side reforms, they said, “Don’t worry, they’re coming.”	我第一次向我的日本学术界朋友询问安倍供给端改革方面的问题时，他们说：“不要担心，会来的。


Then, after a while, they would say, “Don’t worry, they’re coming – but slowly.”	”接着，过了一段时间，他们又说：“不要担心，会来的，就是慢点。


Recently, the mantra has changed to, “Don’t worry, we still think they’re coming.”	”最近，口头禅变成了“不要担心，我们仍然认为会来的。


One can only hope so.	”人们只剩下了希望。


Without structural reforms, especially of the labor market, Abenomics cannot succeed in the long run.	没有结构性改革，特别是劳动力市场改革，安倍就无法取得长期成功。


The timing of the April 2014 consumption-tax hike (from 5% to 8%) was also unfortunate.	2014年4月消费税提高（从5%提高到8%）的时机也很不幸。


It would not have been easy for Abe to postpone the move, given that it had been locked in place by broad-based political agreement before he took office.	安倍要暂停这一措也不会容易，因为在他成为首相前，这就已经是广泛的政治共识。


But the government could have engaged in more aggressive fiscal stimulus to counteract the hike’s short-term effects.	但政府本可以实施更果断的财政刺激抵销增税的短期效应。


Instead, two successive quarters of negative growth have had a dispiriting psychological impact.	相反，连续两个季度的负增长已经产生了令人丧气的心理影响。


True, the slump is partly an illusion: the earlier boom was fueled by Japanese households’ effort to beat the tax by front-loading purchases of consumer durables – a nuance that seems to have been lost in the public debate.	诚然，从某种程度上说，这一下降时一种幻觉：早前的繁荣是受日本家庭试图通过提前消费耐久品以规避增税的行为推动的���—这一细节似乎被公共争论所遗忘。


But the big picture remains: Abenomics so far has failed to turn around a deflationary mindset.	但大图景仍然不变：到目前为止，安倍并没有扭转通缩思维。


Mind you, Japan’s outsize government debt and undersize pension assets are a huge problem, and only the most reckless and crude Keynesian would advise the authorities to ignore it.	别忘了，日本的大规模政府债务和规模不足的退休金资产是一个巨大的问题，只有最鲁莽、最粗放的凯恩斯主义者才会建议当局忽视这一问题。


For the moment, the risks are notional, with interest rates on ten-year government debt below 0.5%.	此时此刻，风险还只是概念上的，十年期政府债务利率尚不足0. 5%。


But saying that Japan’s debt is irrelevant is like saying that a highly leveraged hedge fund is completely safe; the risks may be remote, but they are not trivial.	但要说日本债务无关紧要就好比是认为高杠杆对冲基金完全安全一样； 风险也许还十分遥远，但绝不是可以忽略不计。


Think about what would happen if the Bank of Japan actually managed to convince the public that inflation will average 2% on a sustained basis.	想一想，如果日本银行真的让公众认为通胀将持续处于平均2%的水平，十年期利率还会是0.


Would ten-year interest rates still be 0.5%?	5%吗？


What if other factors – say, a sharp decline in emerging-market growth – led to a sharp rise in global real interest rates, or a rise in risk premia on Japanese debt?	如果其他因素——比如新兴市场增长暴跌——导致全球真实利率飙升，或日本债务风险溢价增加会如何？


In principle, Japan could weather such shocks without high inflation or other extreme measures, but it is folly to deny the country’s vulnerability.	理论上，日本可以再没有高通胀或其他极端手段的情况下抵御这一冲击，但否认日本的弱点也是荒谬的。


A hedge fund can simply go out of business; that is not an option for a great nation.	对冲基金可以破产了事，但大国不能如此。


Fiscal sustainability requires an eventual rise in the consumption tax, and of course Japan should not wait until international investors start doubting its willpower.	财政可持续性要求消费税的最终增加，当然日本不应该等到国际投资者怀疑其意志力时才这样做。


The problem is in the timing and tactics.	问题在于时机和策略。


Postponing the second consumption-tax increase seems like a good compromise between pushing Abenomics to escape velocity and maintaining long-run credibility.	暂停第二次消费税增加似乎是将安倍经济学推向逃逸速度和维持长期信誉之间的合理妥协。


But this brings us back to Japan’s deeper problems.	但这又把我们引回了日本更深层次的问题。


Demand policies alone will not alone prevent two more lost decades, much less guarantee two golden ones.	光靠需求政策无法防止又一个失去的二十年，更不能保证带来一个黄金二十年。


Demographic decline was a key factor in setting off Japan’s 1992 financial crisis and the long malaise that followed.	人口减少是导致1992年日本金融危机及其后长期问题的关键因素。


Japan is still a rich country, but its ranking in terms of real per capita income has now slipped below that of many other advanced economies – including the United Kingdom, by some measures – and far below that of the United States.	日本仍然是一个富裕国家，但其真实人均收入已落后于其他许多发达国家——在一些指标上包括英国，更是远远落后于美国。


Japan’s experience holds important lessons for Europe, the main one being that stimulus policies, though necessary in the short run to support demand, cannot address long-term structural deficiencies.	日本的经验给欧洲带来了重要教训，其中最主要的一个是，刺激政策尽管对于短期支持需求必不可少，但无法解决长期结构性缺陷。 如果安倍经济学2.


If Abenomics 2.0 fails to embrace deep structural reform, it will fare no better than the original.	0不能采取深刻的结构性改革，也不会起到比1. 0好的效果。


Four More Years for Abe	安倍的又一个四年


TOKYO – In the December snap election initiated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior coalition partner, the Komeito Party, won 326 of the Diet’s 475 seats, retaining their constitutional majority in the lower house of parliament.	东京—在日本首相安倍晋三发起的12月提前大选中，自民党及其次要伙伴公明党赢得国会475个议席中的326席，继续保有众议院宪定多数。


It was an extraordinary achievement – one that Japan has not witnessed in decades.	这是一个了不起的成就——几十年来的第一次。


Japan’s opposition parties offered no convincing alternative to the Abe government’s policies.	日本的反对党拿不出令人信服的方案取代安倍政府的政策。


The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which led the government less than three years ago, was unable even to field enough candidates to contest every seat.	不到三年前执政的民主党甚至无法推选足够的候选人竞争所有议席。


Its road back to political relevance appears long and bleak.	它想要重新获得政治影响力可谓任重道远。


Of course, under the single-seat constituency system, minor parties in Japan are at a distinct disadvantage.	当然，在单席位选区制度下，日本的少数党处于绝对劣势。


Indeed, a landslide victory on the scale of Abe’s may very well lead to some of them completely disappearing from political life.	事实上，安倍的压倒性生理极有可能导致其中一些反对党政治生命的完全终结。


The only opposition party that made significant gains in the recent vote was the Japanese Communist Party, which nearly tripled its seat total, from eight to 21.	在最近的选举中获得重大胜利的唯一一个反对党是日本共产党，其议席总数增加了近两倍，从八席增至21席。


The JCP has recently sought to position itself as a “reliable opposition” to the LDP – though it has never proved particularly “reliable,” at least not in promoting realistic policies.	日本共产党最近将自己定位于自民党的“可靠反对党”——尽管它从未证明自己特别“可靠”，至少在推进现实政策方面是如此。


Given this, the JCP’s gains were probably fueled more by disgruntled voters’ desire to signal their frustration to Abe.	基于此，日本共产党的胜利可能更多地要归因于不满的选民渴望表达他们对安倍的沮丧之情。


In fact, in those districts where the election pitted JCP and LDP candidates against each other, many citizens did not take the trouble to vote.	事实上，在日本共产党和自民党针锋相对的选区，许多公民干脆不去投票。


This contributed to record-low voter turnout of 52% – the one real blemish on the LDP’s victory.	这导致了创纪录的低投票率（52%），成为自民党胜利中的一个名副其实的瑕疵。


The main actor in the election was undoubtedly Abe himself, whose bold macroeconomic strategy, so-called “Abenomics,” has attracted considerable attention since its initiation two years ago.	此次选举的主角毫无疑问是安倍本人，他的激进宏观经济战略——即所谓的“安倍经济学”——自两年前启动以来吸引了大量关注。


But three other actors also played important roles in securing Abe’s victory.	但其他三个角色也对确保安倍的胜利起到了重要作用。


The first was Saudi Arabia.	首先是沙特阿拉伯。


At an OPEC meeting in the run-up to the election, the group’s dominant producer, Saudi Arabia, shelved plans to restrict oil production to counteract the rapid decline in world prices, allowing them to continue to fall.	在选举之前的欧佩克会议上，欧佩克主要生产国沙特阿拉伯拒绝采取限制石油产量以阻止全球油价快速下跌的计划，放任油价继续下滑。


This has brought considerable benefits to the oil-importing advanced economies – including Japan.	这给石油进口发达经济体带来了巨大的好处——包括日本。


Had the Saudis decided to reduce output, Japan would have suffered the double blow of increased oil prices and a sudden sharp depreciation of the yen.	要是沙特决定减产，日本将受到油价上涨和日元突发急剧贬值的双重打击。


That would have exposed Abe’s government to widespread criticism, particularly in automotive industry hubs.	这将让安倍政府饱受批评，特别是汽车行业的批评。


The second important actor in Abe’s campaign was China.	安倍选战的第二个重要角色是中国。


The appearance of more than 200 ships harvesting precious red coral around Japan’s Ogasawara islands in November opened the eyes of many Japanese to the risks of China’s growing power.	11月，200多艘船只出现在日本小笠原群岛收割珍贵的红珊瑚，这让许多日本人认识到中国力量崛起的风险。


Such skepticism about China’s peaceful intentions has intensified criticism of the DPJ for what many consider an excessively soft approach to managing relations with the People’s Republic.	这一对中国和平意图的怀疑加剧了对民主党的批评——许多人认为民主党在对华关系方针过于软弱。


The third important actor was Japan’s labor unions.	第三个重要角色是日本的工会。


The current problem facing Abenomics, as it aims to save Japan’s economy from deflation, is that wage hikes have not kept pace with the April 2014 consumption-tax increase (from 5% to 8%) or the rise in import prices associated with a weaker yen.	如今，安倍经济学想要让日本经济摆脱通缩，其目前所面临的问题是工资增长赶不上2014年4月的消费税提升（从5%增至8%）或日元贬值所导致的进口品价格上涨。


Organized labor’s representatives in wage negotiations, which are conducted every spring, usually come from unions that support the DPJ.	工资谈判（每年春天进行）中的劳工组织代表常常来自支持民主党的工会。


But Abe himself has supplanted the unions in demanding big pay rises from companies, helping him to attract significantly more votes from union members in this election than in 2011.	但安倍本人代替工会要求公司大幅涨薪，这帮助他吸引了比2011年选举中多得多的工会成员选票。


These three players’ interventions have helped Abe secure four more years in power.	这三个角色的介入帮助安倍确保了四年的执政时间。


After decades of rotating leadership, with eight prime ministers in just ten years, Japan finally has a stable government.	在经历了几十年的轮流坐庄、十年换了八任首相后，日本终于迎来了稳定的政府。


Though Japan’s parliamentary system distinguishes it from its neighbors, this aligns more closely with norms in the region, where presidential executives serve for six years in Russia and five years in South Korea and China.	尽管日本的议会制度与邻国不同，但本届议会将更接近于地区管理——俄罗斯总统任期为六年，韩国和中国都是五年。


(North Korea’s leader, of course, has no fixed term in office.)	（当然，朝鲜领导人没有固定的任期。 ）


Abe now has more political capital – and thus more freedom to maneuver – than perhaps any Japanese leader since the end of the Pacific War.	如今，安倍拥有了巨大的政治资本——因此也有了更大的腾挪空间——也许比太平洋战争结束后的任何其他首相都要大。


He must use it to follow through on the promise of Abenomics, finally enacting the structural reforms that Japan needs to reinvigorate its economy.	他必须利用这一资本兑现安倍经济学的承诺，最终启动日本经济复兴所需要的结构改革。


With such a powerful mandate, there can be no excuses.	安倍拥有如此强大的权力，他没有任何借口。


Japan’s New Model Political Leadership	日本的新领导模式


AMSTERDAM – Amid the horrifying news from Japan, the establishment of new standards of political leadership there is easy to miss – in part because the Japanese media follow old habits of automatically criticizing how officials are dealing with the calamity, and many foreign reporters who lack perspective simply copy that critical tone.	发自阿姆斯特丹——在日本传来的众多骇人听闻的新闻中，新政治领导标准建立的消息往往会被忽略——这在某种程度上是因为日本媒体还是一如既往地批评官员在灾难面前应对不力，而许多缺乏主见的外国记者则简单照搬了这种批评式口吻。


But, compared to the aftermath of the catastrophic Kobe earthquake of 1995, when the authorities appeared to wash their hands of the victims’ miseries, the difference could hardly be greater.	但相对于1995年神户大地震后当局那种对灾民的苦难袖手旁观的态度，这次政府的行动已经极大改善了。


This time, Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) government is making an all-out effort, with unprecedented intensive involvement of his cabinet and newly formed specialized task forces.	在这次地震中，日本首相菅直人的民主党政府全力以赴投入救灾，其中包括内阁对整个事件前所未有的高度参与以及新成立的特别任务部队。


The prime minister himself is regularly televised with relevant officials wearing the work fatigues common among Japanese engineers.	首相本人经常偕同相关官员一起身着普通日本工程人员的工作服出现在电视上。


In 1995, Kobe citizens extricated from the rubble were looked after if they belonged to corporations or religious groups.	而在1995年，那些从残桓断壁下生还的神户人只能依靠所属的企业或者宗教组织提供救助。


Those who did not were expected to fend mostly for themselves.	而不属于这类团体的人则只能自力更生。


This reflected a ‘feudal’ like corporatist approach, in which the direct relationship between the citizen and the state played no role.	这一状况反映的是一种“封建式”的社团主义行为模式，而市民与国家之间的直接关系则根本没有发挥作用。


This widely condemned governmental neglect of the Kobe earthquake victims was among the major sources of public indignation that helped popularize the reform movement from which Kan emerged.	而民众对政府忽视神户灾民的普遍愤怒则进一步助长了改革运动的声势，最终造就了菅直人的崛起。


Unfortunately, today’s Japanese media are overlooking that historical context.	不幸的是，当今的日本媒体却忽视了这一历史背景。


For example, the newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun recently lamented the shortcomings of the Kan government’s response, emphasizing the poor lines of command running from the cabinet to officials carrying out rescue and supply operations.	比如说《日本经济新闻》最近就不断批评菅直人政府救灾反应的不足之处，重点着墨于内阁和负责营救和供应行动的官员之间的指挥不通畅。


But it failed to point out that the feebleness of such coordination, linked to an absence of cabinet-centered policymaking, was precisely the main weakness of Japan’s political system that the founders of the DPJ set out to overcome.	但该报却没有指出这种协作之所以扭曲，恰恰是因为日本缺乏以内阁为中心的政策制定体制，而这也正是民主党领导人致力于克服的日本政治系统重大弱点。


When the DPJ came to power in September 2009 it ended half-a-century of de facto one-party rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).	当民主党2009年9月上台时它实际上结束了日本自民党长达半个世纪的实际统治。


But even more significantly, its intentions addressed a cardinal question for Japan: who should rule, bureaucratic mandarins or elected officials?	但更重要的是，该党的意图回答了日本政治的一个根本问题：日本究竟应该由谁统治，是行政官僚？ 还是民选领导人？


The LDP, formed in 1955, had not done much actual ruling after helping to coordinate postwar reconstruction, which extended without debate into an unofficial but very real national policy of, in principle, unlimited expansion of industrial capacity.	日本自民党自1955年创立以来除了协助战后重建外实际上没有实施多少实际统治。 随后这种重建政策被大家心照不宣地演变成为一个非正式但却实实在在的日本国家政策，那就是追求工业生产能力的无限扩张。


Other possible priorities hardly ever entered political discussions.	其他潜在首要政策几乎都无法被纳入政治辩论中。


The need for a political steering wheel in the hands of elected politicians was highlighted in 1993, when two major political figures bolted from the LDP with their followers.	而日本对一位可以执掌政治方向盘的民选官员的需求也在1993年逐渐凸现，当时两位重要政治人物都脱离自民党另立门户。


By doing so, they catalyzed the reformist political movement that resulted in the DPJ, the first credible opposition party that – unlike the Socialists who engaged in mere ritualistic opposition – was prepared to win elections and actually govern rather than merely maintain the façade of government that had become the norm under the LDP.	他们通过此举催化了改革派政治运动，为日本民主党这个第一次出现的真实反对党——不像社会党那样只是装模作样地反对一下——铺平了赢得选举和实际执政的道路，而不是仅仅是维持一个徒有其表的政府——这在自民党统治下已经成为常态了。


Lowering the prestige of the government right now is the fact that Kan has not shown any talent for turning himself into a TV personality who can project a grand image of leadership.	目前拉低政府声望的因素则是菅直人并未显露出任何成为电视名人的天赋，也无法因此树立一个领导者的宏观形象。


But his government is dealing without question as best it can in the face of four simultaneous crises, its efforts encumbered by huge logistical problems that no post-World-War-II Japanese government has ever faced before.	但他的政府无疑正在全力应对4场同时发生的危机，而该政府的努力却被二战以后任何日本政府都不曾遭遇的重大信息沟通难题所拖累。


The efforts of Kan’s government are obviously hampered by a rigid and much fragmented bureaucratic infrastructure.	菅直人政府的努力显然遭到了一个死板僵化且条块分割的官僚架构的阻碍。


The DPJ has had scant time to make up for what the LDP has long neglected. Its seventeen months in power before the current catastrophe have been a saga of struggle with career officials in many parts of the bureaucracy, including the judiciary, fighting for the survival of the world they have always known.	而民主党根本没有足够的时间去修补自民党留下的缺陷，该党在本次地震之前的17个月执政都是在与各大政府机构的职业官僚们反复拉锯中度过的——其中包括司法部门——是在为这个国家的存亡而奋斗。


Other countries could learn much from the DPJ’s attempt to alter a status quo of political arrangements that has had half a century to form and consolidate.	对此其他国家都可以从民主党尝试改变一个形成并巩固了长达半个世纪的政治制度现状的努力中学到一些东西。


But it was the United States that first undermined the DPJ administration, by testing the new government’s loyalty with an unfeasible plan – originally the brainchild of the George W. Bush-era US defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld – to build a new base for the US Marines stationed on Okinawa.	但首先向民主党政府发难的却是美国人，后者利用一个无法实施的计划——原本是小布什时期美国国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德的主意，试图在日本冲绳岛建立一个新的美国海军基地——来测试新自民党政府的忠诚度。


The first DPJ prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, miscalculated in believing that a face-to-face meeting with the new American president to discuss long-term matters affecting East Asia could settle the issue. He was steadily rebuffed by the American government.	首任民主党首相鸠山由纪夫错误地以为与美国新总统关于东亚长期事务的面对面商谈可以解决这一问题，��最终遭到了美国政府的粗暴拒绝。


As Hatoyama could not keep his promise to safeguard the interests of the Okinawan people, he followed up with a customary resignation.	由于鸠山无法兑现维护冲绳人利益的承诺，只能引咎辞职。


Japan’s main newspapers have mostly backed the status quo as well.	日本各大主要报章也大多赞成维持现状。


Indeed, they now appear to have forgotten their role in hampering the DPJ’s effort to create an effective political coordinating body for the country.	事实上他们如今似乎已经忘记了自己在阻挠民主党建立有效国家政治协作体制方面所扮演的角色。


A half-century of reporting on internal LDP rivalries unrelated to actual policy has turned Japan’s reporters into the world’s greatest connoisseurs of political factionalism. It has also left them almost incapable of recognizing actual policy initiatives when they see them.	持续半个世纪的对自民党内斗的报道（却不牵涉任何实际政策）已经令日本媒体成为了政治派系斗争的优秀鉴赏家，也使他们几乎失去了识别任何实际政治首创性措施的能力。


The rest of the world, however, has marveled at the admirable, dignified manner in which ordinary Japanese are dealing with terrible adversity.	然而世界其他国家则惊叹于普通日本人在面对大灾难时的优秀高贵品质。


I am repeatedly asked why there is no looting or signs of explosive anger.	人们总是问我为何当地没有发生抢劫或者任何暴动迹象。


The term “stoicism” appears over and over in media coverage of Japan’s calamity.	而“隐忍”这个词则在报道日本灾难的媒体封面上反复出现。


But, in my half-century of close acquaintance with Japanese life, I have never thought of the Japanese as stoic.	但在我长达半个世纪的对日本生活的近距离观察中，我从来没有将日本人视为“隐忍”的人。


Rather, the Japanese behave as they do because they are decent people.	而日本人之所以有这样的举动是因为他们都是正派的人。


Being considerate, they do not burden each other by building themselves up as heroes in their own personal tragedies.	善解人意的他们不愿意用在自己的个人苦难中将自己树立为英雄的方式来给其他人添麻烦。


They certainly deserve the better government that the DPJ is trying to give them.	而他们也当之无愧地应该得到一个更好的好政府——这也是民主党努力希望带给他们的。


Japan’s Nuclear Morality Tale	日本的核寓言


NEW DELHI – The troubles of the Fukushima nuclear-power plant – and other reactors – in northeast Japan have dealt a severe blow to the global nuclear industry, a powerful cartel of less than a dozen major state-owned or state-guided firms that have been trumpeting a nuclear-power renaissance.	发自新德里——位于日本东北部的福岛核电站（及其它反应堆）所碰到的麻烦对全球核工业来说如同当头一棒，一时间这个圈子很小（成员仅限于几个国营或国家管制的大企业）但却势力甚大的垄断行业集团收起了以往那套鼓吹核能复兴的说辞，变得噤若寒蝉了。


But the risks that seaside reactors like Fukushima face from natural disasters are well known. Indeed, they became evident six years ago, when the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 inundated India’s second-largest nuclear complex, shutting down the Madras power station.	人们对于福岛这类沿海反应堆的潜在自然危害早已不陌生，就在6年前的2004年11月，印度第二大核电集群就遭到了印度洋海啸的直接冲击，直接导致马德拉斯核电站被迫关闭。


Many nuclear-power plants are located along coastlines, because they are highly water-intensive.	而由于运作中需要消耗大量的水，许多核电站都选址在海边。


Yet natural disasters like storms, hurricanes, and tsunamis are becoming more common, owing to climate change, which will also cause a rise in ocean levels, making seaside reactors even more vulnerable.	但与此同时风暴，台风和海啸这类自然灾害却在全球气候变化的作用下日渐频繁，气候变化同时还导致海平面上升，使这些沿海反应堆更加暴露于危险之中。


For example, many nuclear-power plants located along the British coast are just a few meters above sea level.	英国许多沿海核电站的选址位置仅仅高于海平面几米。


In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused significant damage at the Turkey Point nuclear-power plant on Biscayne Bay, Florida, but, fortunately, not to any critical systems.	而在1992年，台风安德鲁对位于美国佛罗里达州比斯坎湾的土尔其角核电站造成了重大破坏，所幸各关键设施都安然无恙。


All energy generators, including coal- and gas-fired plants, make major demands on water resources. But nuclear power requires even more.	所有能源发电装置，包括煤和燃气发电机组都是用水大户，但核电站的需求尤其巨大。


Light-water reactors (LWRs) like those at Fukushima, which use water as a primary coolant, produce most of the world’s nuclear power. The huge quantities of local water that LWRs consume for their operations become hot-water outflows, which are pumped back into rivers, lakes, and oceans.	像福岛这样使用水作冷却剂的轻水式反应堆又占了全球核年发电量的大部分，而它们消耗的大量当地水资源最终会变成热水并再度被排放回河流，湖泊和海洋。


Because reactors located inland put serious strain on local freshwater resources – including greater damage to plant life and fish – water-stressed countries that are not landlocked try to find suitable seashore sites.	由于位处内陆的核电站会对所在地的淡水资源造成极大压力，其中包括对植物和鱼类资源的极大破坏——那些临海的缺水国家纷纷尝试寻找合适的海岸区域。


But, whether located inland or on a coast, nuclear power is vulnerable to the likely effects of climate change.	但无论是位于内陆还是海边，核电站都容易受到气候变化因素的影响。


As global warming brings about a rise in average temperatures and ocean levels, inland reactors will increasingly contribute to, and be affected by, water shortages.	随着全球变暖导致平均气温和海平面双双升高，位处内陆的核反应堆将越来越成为水资源短缺的元凶（或成为缺水的影响）。


During the record-breaking 2003 heat wave in France, operations at 17 commercial nuclear reactors had to be scaled back or stopped because of rapidly rising temperatures in rivers and lake.	比如在法国破纪录的2003年酷热期间，有17座商业核反应堆因河流和湖泊温度迅速上升而被迫降低发电功率或者停止运作。


Spain’s reactor at Santa María de Garoña was shut for a week in July 2006 after high temperatures were recorded in the Ebro River.	而当2006年7月西班牙埃布罗河的水温升到极高水平时，位于该河沿岸的Santa María de Garoña核电站反应堆也被迫关停了1个星期。


Paradoxically, then, the very conditions that made it impossible for the nuclear industry to deliver full power in Europe in 2003 and 2006 created peak demand for electricity, owing to the increased use of air conditioning.	矛盾的是，使得欧洲核电站无法全力发电的2003年和2006年酷热却同时引发了用电高峰，因为人人都开动了空调。


Indeed, during the 2003 heat wave, Électricité de France, which operates 58 reactors – the majority on ecologically sensitive rivers like the Loire – was compelled to buy power from neighboring countries on the European spot market.	事实上，在2003年热浪期间，拥有58座核反应堆——其中大部分位于卢瓦尔河这样的生态敏感流域——的法国电力集团只能被迫通过欧洲现货市场从邻国购买电力。


The state-owned EDF, which normally exports power, ended up paying 10 times the price of domestic power, incurring a financial cost of €300 million.	这间以往都以电力出口商面目出现的国营企业最后只能以超出本国电价10倍的价钱购买电力，并为此支付了合共3亿欧元。


Similarly, although the 2006 European heat wave was less intense, water and heat problems forced Germany, Spain, and France to take some nuclear power plants offline and reduce operations at others.	同样，虽然2006年的欧洲酷热状况有所减轻，水和气温问题依然迫使德国，西班牙和法国关停部分核电站并减少其他核电站的发电功率。


Highlighting the vulnerability of nuclear power to environmental change or extreme-weather patterns, in 2006 plant operators in Western Europe also secured exemptions from regulations that would have prevented them from discharging overheated water into natural ecosystems, affecting fisheries.	虽然核电站在环境变化以及极端天气情况下是如此脆弱，但2006年各大西欧核电企业依然成功逃脱了禁���其直接向自然界排放高温水（并以此影响鱼类生态）的监管措施。


France likes to showcase its nuclear power industry, which supplies 78% of the country’s electricity. But such is the nuclear industry’s water intensity that EDF withdraws up to 19 billion cubic meters of water per year from rivers and lakes, or roughly half of France’s total freshwater consumption.	法国人总喜欢炫耀其提供了全国78%能源需求的核电工业，但对此付出的代价是法国电力集团下属核电站每年从河流湖泊中抽取190亿立方水，几乎占到了法国全国淡水消耗量的一半。


Freshwater scarcity is a growing international challenge, and the vast majority of countries are in no position to approve of such highly water-intensive inland-based energy systems.	淡水资源枯竭是一个日趋严峻的全球挑战，大多数国家都没理由去批准如此高耗水的内陆能源系统。


Nuclear plants located by the sea do not face similar problems in hot conditions, because ocean waters do not heat up anywhere near as rapidly as rivers or lakes.	而由于海洋的升温要比河流和湖泊缓慢得多，沿海的核电站并不会遇到类似的酷热问题。


And, because they rely on seawater, they cause no freshwater scarcity.	与此同时，由于他们使用的是海水，自然也不会造成淡水资源短缺。


But, as Japan’s reactors have shown, coastal nuclear-power plants confront more serious dangers.	但正如日本核反应堆所暴露的那样，这些沿海核电站其实面临着更严重的危险。


When the Indian Ocean tsunami struck, the Madras reactor’s core could be kept in safe shutdown condition because the electrical systems had been ingeniously installed on higher ground than the plant itself.	当年印度洋海啸来袭时，马德拉斯反应堆的核心之所以能够被安全关闭，就是因为相关电力控制系统被明智地安放在了比电站更高的地方。


And, unlike Fukushima, which bore a direct impact, Madras was far away from the epicenter of the earthquake that unleashed the tsunami.	同时福岛核电站遭受了地震的直接影响，而马德拉斯核电站的位置则远离引发海啸的地震中心。


The central dilemma of nuclear power in an increasingly water-stressed world is that it is a water guzzler, yet vulnerable to water.	在这个水资源日渐匮乏的世界上，核能身上的核心困境莫过于它既是水资源的极大消耗者，都是水文灾难的脆弱受害者。


And, decades after Lewis L. Strauss, the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Agency, claimed that nuclear power would become “too cheap to meter,” the nuclear industry everywhere still subsists on munificent government subsidies.	就在美国原子能机构委员会前主席刘易斯·L·斯特劳斯宣称核能将“便宜得不值一提”的数十年后，全球的核电工业依然要靠政府的大笔补贴才能生存。


While the appeal of nuclear power has declined considerably in the West, it has grown among the so-called “nuclear newcomers,” which brings with it new challenges, including concerns about proliferation of nuclear weapons.	而当西方对核能的认可度大幅减少之时，核能却在那些所谓“核能新玩家”中走红，并为其带来了新的挑战，包括对这些国家将核燃料浓缩制成核武器的担忧。


Moreover, with nearly two-fifths of the world’s population living within 100 kilometers of a coastline, finding suitable seaside sites for initiation or expansion of a nuclear-power program is no longer easy.	此外，全世界有2/5的人口都居住在离海岸线100公里以内的区域，因此寻找合适的海岸来建设或者扩大核项目都变得越来越难。


Fukushima is likely to stunt the appeal of nuclear power in a way similar to the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania in 1979, not to mention the far more severe meltdown of the Chernobyl reactor in 1986.	在降低人们对核电的认可度方面，福岛事件的作用类似于1979年美国三里岛核电站事故，更不用提1986年的切尔诺贝利核电站爆炸事故了。


If the fallout from those incidents is a reliable guide, however, nuclear power’s advocates will eventually be back.	但如果这些事故所造成的影响成为一个可靠指导的话，核能的鼓吹者最终还会卷土重来。


America’s Bickering Asian Allies	争吵不休的美国亚洲盟友


ATLANTA – American diplomats like to portray their country’s allies in glowing terms.	亚特兰大—美国外交官喜欢用闪光的词汇描述美国的盟友。


So the world should take note when they do not – such as when US Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, at a recent conference in Washington, DC, on Asian security, publicly scolded South Korea for its seemingly endless vilification of Japan.	因此，当他们不这么做的时候，世界就要注意了——比如，美国副国务卿谢尔曼（Wendy Sherman）在最近的华盛顿亚洲安全会议公开斥责韩国没完没了地中伤日本。


According to Sherman, South Korea’s stance – reflected in its demand that Japan apologize, once again, for forcing Korean women to provide sexual services to the Imperial Army during World War II – has produced “paralysis, not progress.”	根据谢尔曼的说法，韩国的立场——再次要求日本就二战期间强迫韩国妇女充当慰安妇道歉——制造了“僵局而非进步”。


But Sherman’s criticism could also be leveled against Japan.	但谢尔曼的批评也可以是针对日本的。


Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has rarely missed an opportunity to provoke Japan’s Korean critics, whether by visiting Tokyo’s Yasukuni shrine, where the “souls” of 14 Class A war criminals are interred, or embracing revisionist critiques of previous official apologies for Japanese aggression.	日本首相安倍晋三从不错过挑衅日本的韩国批评者的机会——要么拜访供奉14名甲级战犯“灵位”的东京靖国神社，要么对此前日本对侵略行为做出的官方道歉进行修正主义批评。


Instead of working together to help their American ally confront the challenges posed by a rising China and the North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea and Japan have allowed their rancor to stymie effective action.	韩国和日本没有联合起来协助它们的美国盟友面对中国崛起的挑战和朝鲜核威胁，而是让彼此的历史恩怨阻碍有效行动。


This seemingly endless tension has been frustrating – and worrying – American leaders for years, especially as it has undermined the United States’ strategic “pivot” toward Asia.	多年来，这一看似没完没了的紧张态势令美国领导人感到沮丧，也感到担心，特别是这破坏了美国的亚洲战略“支点”。


Since President Barack Obama announced the pivot five years ago, the US has been attempting to bolster its forces and alliances in Asia, thereby reinforcing its strategic role in a region that China is increasingly attempting to dominate.	自美国总统奥巴马五年前宣布采取亚洲支点战略以来，美国一直在试图加强亚洲的力量和盟友，从而增强其在中国日益希望主导的地区的战略角色。


But the relentless sniping by its two most important Asian allies has blocked the kind of concrete cooperation needed to help it achieve its main goals, including ensuring a durable, long-term military presence in the region.	但最重要的两个亚洲盟友之间的肆无忌惮的中伤阻碍了实现美国的主要目标——包括确保其在该地区持久的长期军事存在——所必须的实质合作。


Intelligence sharing is a case in point.	情报共享是要点之一。


In December, US officials, seeking to better their understanding of North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs – and enable commanders to react swiftly if potential threats materialize – announced a new information-sharing agreement with South Korea and Japan.	12月，美国官员为了更好地了解朝鲜导弹和核计划——以使其指挥官能在潜在威胁具体化时采取快速行动——而宣布了与韩国和日本的新情报共享协议。


But the deal could be a script for a situation comedy: Japan and South Korea refuse to provide intelligence data to each other, leaving the US to play the middleman.	但这一协议可能只是一场情景喜剧：日本和韩国拒绝彼此提供情报数据，必须由美国充当中间人。


The US has accentuated the positive, calling the agreement an important step forward.	美国强调该协议的积极面，称之为重要进步。


But, though it does represent progress from 2012, when popular opposition in South Korea to the idea of military cooperation with Japan caused a similar agreement to collapse, the latest effort is inefficient, at best.	但是，尽管该协议确实代表了2012年以来的进步——2012年韩国群众反对与日本进行军事合作的主意，导致类似协议崩溃——但充其量只能说是不完全的。


China has been eager to capitalize on the animosity between Japan and South Korea to undermine America’s security interests in Asia.	中国渴望利用日本和韩国之间的嫌隙破坏美国在亚洲的安全利益。


During a visit to South Korea last July, President Xi Jinping highlighted not only the two countries’ deepening economic relationship, but also their shared views regarding Japan’s wartime past.	去年7月访韩期间，中国国家主席习近平不但强调两国深刻的经济关系，还强调了两国对日本侵略史的共同观点。


Other Chinese officials have picked up the theme, dropping hints that China’s 70th anniversary celebration of the end of World War II could exclude Japan – unless, that is, Japan is more contrite about its historic transgressions.	其他中国官员也在此问题上大做文章，暗示中国纪念二战结束70周年的仪式将排除日本——除非日本就其历史罪行做出忏悔。


It is time for the US to tell its Asian allies to get over it.	美国应该要求它的亚洲盟友赶紧翻篇。


As the underwriter of both Japan’s and South Korea’s national defense, the US simply cannot allow their historical animosities to impede action to address urgent threats in this critical region.	美国是日本和韩国国防的保护人，决不能允许历史恩怨阻碍解决这一关键地区紧迫威胁的行动。


The timing could not be better, as rising security fears are altering public perceptions.	现在，安全担忧正在扭转公共观点，翻篇可谓正逢其时。


Recent opinion polls suggest that at least half of all South Koreans are worried enough about regional tensions to support closer military ties with Japan.	最新民调现实至少一半韩国人因为担心地区紧张而支持加强与日本的军事关系。


And, indeed, the security risks facing Asia are only growing – exemplified in China’s move from military expansion to blatant assertiveness.	此外，事实上亚洲所面临的安全风险在不断增加——中国从军事扩张转变为公然嚣张就是明证。


Most notably, in the South and East China Seas, China has been staking its claim to disputed island territories, deploying advanced military hardware, and aggressively patrolling an expanded security zone.	最令人关注的是，在南海和东海，中国宣称拥有争议岛屿领土主权，部署先进军备，并在扩大安全区内进行侵略性巡逻。


Meanwhile, leaks from Chinese think tanks have suggested that if the North Korean regime collapses, China could well send troops to preserve the country’s stability.	与此同时，来自中国智库的风声表明，如果朝鲜政权倒台，中国可能会出兵维持朝鲜稳定。


Asia’s new security landscape places a premium on seamless cooperation among US allies – a prospect that the sustained bickering between South Korea and Japan calls into question.	亚洲的新安全格局意味着美国盟友之间消除嫌隙裨益良多——而韩国和日本的持续争吵让这一前景难以实现。


It could even be said that their longstanding dispute makes America’s Asian alliance system worth less than the sum of its parts.	甚至可以说，它们的长期纷争导致美国的亚洲联盟体系整体步入部分之和。


Repairing relations between South Korean and Japan could not be more urgent.	修复韩国和日本的关系是最迫切的要务。


Even with good will on both sides, it will take time to build a strong defense partnership.	哪怕双方都怀着良好意愿，也需要相当的时间构建强大的防务合作关系。


Effective military cooperation requires personal ties that take years to build, and, aside from some joint naval and air exercises, the two countries have little experience working together.	有效军事合作需要多年时间才能建立的个人关系，并且，除了举行一些联合海上和空中军演，两国再无多少合作经验。


Boosting technical interoperability also will take considerable time, though both countries maintain sophisticated defense forces with great potential to be linked together.	增强技术互通性也需要大量时间，尽管两国都拥有成熟的国防力量，联系起来的潜力也十分巨大。


Effective cooperation will also require a broader scope for joint action – an imperative that is not reflected in the recent intelligence-sharing agreement.	有效合作还需要更广泛的联合行动——最新的情报共享协议并没有体现这一当务之急。


The risks to stability in Northeast Asia extend well beyond North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, and a joint intelligence agenda should address them.	东北亚的稳定风险绝不仅限于朝鲜核武器和导弹计划，联合情报计划应该解决这一问题。


How will the allies respond to the threat of a conventional military attack by – or instability in – North Korea?	盟国如何应对朝鲜发生常规军事打击或动荡的情况？


What if the North Korean regime collapses, and China does intervene militarily?	朝鲜政权倒台、中国果真实施军事干预又怎样应对？


After spending the last six decades defending South Korea and Japan, the US has every reason – and plenty of leverage – to demand that its two long-time allies enhance their military cooperation.	过去六十年中，美国一直在保护韩国和日本，它由充分的理由——和手段——要求这两个差昂起盟友加强彼此的军事合作。


Simply focusing on the positive – America’s classic approach to alliance diplomacy – is no longer enough.	简单地聚焦于积极面——美国的经典联盟外交方针——已不在足够。


Whatever their historical disagreements, South Korea and Japan both face serious risks in their immediate neighborhood.	不管历史上有什么恩怨，韩国和日本都面临着来自邻国的严重威胁。


It is up to the US to ensure that they work together to protect themselves – and ensure long-term stability throughout Asia.	美国需要确保它们合作保护自己——并确保整个亚洲的长期稳定。


Japan’s Recovery Bonds	日本的重建情谊


TOKYO – The tsunami raced through the town at eight meters per second, the speed of a gold-medal sprinter.	东京——海啸以每秒8米的速度冲入城镇，这一速度与金牌短跑选手的奔跑速度大体相当。


The wave’s height reached 15 meters, towering above even the highest pole-vault bars.	海浪高达15米，比撑杆跳所允许的最大高度还要高。


Ships were heaved onto hills, and cars floated like boats.	船只被冲上山坡，汽车则像船一样漂在水面上。


After the wave passed, a chaotic mountain of debris was all that was left of Kamaishi, Japan’s oldest steel-manufacturing town, in Iwate prefecture.	潮涌过后，日本历史最悠久的钢铁制造重镇岩手县釜石市变成了杂乱的瓦砾场。


It looked like the aftermath of the firebombing of Tokyo, or like Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the atomic bombs fell.	场面就像东京刚刚遭受到燃烧弹袭击，或者像原子弹刚刚在广岛和长崎爆炸。


Similar scenes can be found throughout the Tōhoku region, along Japan’s northeastern Sanriku Coast.	沿着日本东北的三陆海岸，整个东北地区都处在类似的状况。


For example, in the quiet rural city of Rikuzentakata, with a population of 23,000, it is believed that 5,000 of its 8,000 households disappeared in the disaster.	比如在拥有23，000人口的静谧的农村小镇陆前高田市，据信有5，000到8，000个家庭在这场灾难中失踪。


The only buildings that remain standing are the town hall and one supermarket.	市政厅和一家超市是唯一屹立不倒的建筑物。


Sendai airport, near the coast in Miyagi Prefecture, now looks more like a seaport.	靠近宫城县海岸的仙台机场现在更像是一座海港。


The enormous earthquake that hit the Tōhoku region on March 11, with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale and its epicenter off the coast of Sanriku, was the largest in Japan’s recorded history.	震中在三陆沿海的里氏9. 0级大地震3月11日袭击日本东北地区，是日本有史以来最强的地震。


The number of victims and the extent of the damage remains unknown, but the human loss is expected to exceed 23,000, and economic damage is estimated to be around ¥25 trillion.	具体遇难人数和损失状况仍然不得而知，但估计人员损失超过23，000人，经济损失在25万亿左右。


Tsunami is originally a Japanese word.	海啸最初是个日文单词。


Patrick Lafcadio Hearn (known as Koizumi Yakumo after his naturalization as a Japanese citizen), an Englishman born on the Greek island of Lefkada, first introduced it in his novel A Living God.	出生在希腊莱夫卡斯岛的英国人帕特里克·拉夫卡迪奥·赫恩（加入日本国籍后更名为小泉八云），首次在其小说《活着的神》中提到了海啸。


Hearn’s depiction of the Meiji-Sanriku earthquake, which in 1896 took 22,000 lives in the same region as the recent quake, was later included in elementary school textbooks under the title of “The Burning of the Rice Field.”	赫恩笔下1896年的明治三陆地震夺去了同一震区22，000条生命，之后被编入小学课本，命名为“稻丛之火”。


In Hearn’s novel, Gohē, a village headman who lives atop a hill in his village, notices an approaching tsunami wave when he sees seawater being drawn out rapidly from the shore.	在赫恩的小说中，一位住在山顶名叫Gohē的村长看到海啸巨浪迅速靠近，海水被从海岸线快速抽走。


In order to warn his fellow villagers, who are busy with festival preparations, Gohē uses a torch to set fire to his recently cut sheaves of rice.	为了警告忙于准备过节的的乡亲们，村长用火炬点燃了刚刚割下的稻草。


The villagers who gather on the hill to put out the fire soon see below them the tsunami wreaking havoc on their town.	围拢到山上救火的村民很快发现了脚下肆虐的海啸。


Gohē’s quick leadership and sacrifice saved all of the villagers.	Gohē迅速的带头和牺牲成功地挽救村民的生命。


This story has influenced Japan ever since.	这个故事自此之后就对日本产生影响。


Indeed, when Japan provided relief to the countries hit by the Sumatra earthquake in 2004, which claimed 250,000 lives, it was keenest to promote an early warning system for tsunamis.	事实上，日本参与夺去250，000条生命的2004年苏门答腊地震救援时，它最急于要做的就是建立海啸早期预警系统。


But Japan’s long history of earthquakes and tsunamis – and now advanced forecasting technology – had made people complacent.	但日本漫长的地震海啸史和目前领先的预报技术令人有些沾沾自喜。


Moreover, no one imagined that such a huge tsunami would ever hit Japan.	此外，任何人都没有想到这样一场大规模海啸会发生在日本。


The most unforeseen event occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.	最出人意料的变故发生在福岛第一核电站。


The facility’s robust design is similar to that of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, the world’s largest, in Niigata, which was unscathed by the Chūetsu offshore earthquake (measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale) in July 2007.	这座核电站的设计和位于新泻的世界最大核电站柏崎刈羽同样坚固，而后者经受住了2007年7月中越近海地震（里氏6. 8级）的考验。


Fukushima Daiichi withstood the earthquake, but no one considered the possibility of ten-meter-high tsunami waves hitting a nuclear plant.	福岛第一核电站经受住了地震的袭击，但没有人想到10米高的海啸大浪会袭击核电站。


Now we know that the unthinkable is possible.	现在我们知道不可思议的事情可能会发生。


As a result, the Fukushima Daiichi plant’s problems have brought the worldwide rush toward nuclear-power generation to a screeching halt.	结果是福岛第一核电站事故令全球核电热嘎然而止。


There are currently 443 nuclear power plants worldwide – a number that was set to double in the next 15 years.	目前全球共有443座核电站，这一数字在今后15年内将会翻番。


China alone had been planning to add 50 new power plants to the 27 plants it already has.	仅中国就计划在现有27座核电站的基础上新建50座核电站。


It is Japan’s responsibility, particularly of political leaders like me, to ensure that our experiences are reflected in the creation of safe building codes and standards for such plants worldwide.	日本，特别是像我这样的日本政治领袖，有责任保证我们的教训在全球核电站的安全建设规则和标准中有所体现。


As for Japan, once the initial economic panic subsides, bipartisan agreement will be necessary to design and approve a budget aimed at bringing about the quickest possible recovery.	具体到日本，最初的经济恐慌一旦退去，两党必须齐心协力，设计并批准实现最快重建的财政预算案。


Furthermore, Japan must find a way to compensate for the ten-million-kilowatt shortfall that the loss of the Fukushima plant implies.	此外，日本必须想法设法弥补福岛电站事故造成的千万千瓦用电缺口。


Indeed, Japan must now reevaluate its entire national energy strategy, including a review of the different usage levels in eastern and western Japan.	事实上，日本必须立即评估其总体能源策略，包括审核其东部和西部地区不同的利用水平。


And, because the affected regions were already suffering from depopulation and rapid aging – problems typical of much of today’s Japan – recovery will require a new rural-development program that moves the country away from its Tokyo-centric economic model.	而且，由于受影响地区已经像当今日本多数地区一样出现人口减少和快速老龄化，重建需要实施新的乡村发展规划，对以东京为核心的经济模式逐步加以改变。


But, in working towards recovery, Japan has a great advantage.	但是，在恢复重建过程中，日本具备极大的优势。


The key word for recovery in Japanese is kizuna (bonds).	kizuna（情谊）是日语中恢复的关键词。


Even when faced by the vast confusion created by disaster on the scale of the recent earthquake and tsunami, Japanese relied on kizuna to help and reassure each other.	即使面对由刚刚发生的地震和海啸灾难所带来的巨大混乱，日本人依靠情谊来互相帮助，互相安慰。


When implementing forced blackouts in the region, for example, there were few major traffic accidents, even though traffic lights had stopped working.	比如在灾区实行强制停电的过程中即使交通信号灯停止工作，重大的交通事故也很少出现。


I hope that one day, after the story of Japan’s recent calamity has been written, kizuna will become even more widely known than “tsunami.”	我希望有一天在日本这场灾难载入史册之后，人们对情谊的理解会比“海啸”更加普遍。


Japan’s Resilience Lessons	日本恢复力的启示


NEW YORK – Buried in the coverage of last year’s Great East Japan Earthquake is a success story of which the world should not lose sight, because it tells us much about how we manage risk in the twenty-first century.	纽约--去年东日本大地震的新闻报道取得了世界各国都无法忽视的成功，因为这些报道告诉了我们人类是如何处理二十一世纪所面临的危机。


It is the story of how the Japanese people, through centuries of memory and shared experience, have built up their resilience to natural disasters.	这些感人的故事阐述了日本人民如何运用上百年积累的经验和传统来树立本民族抵抗自然灾害的能力。


Indeed, as the sea reared up to ravage the country’s coast on March 11, 2011, more than 90% of the population in the affected areas had already fled to safety.	事实上，2011年3月11日那天，当汹涌海水的海水猛烈敲击日本的海岸线时，超过90%的受灾地区人口已经逃离到了安全区域。


That safety was further endangered by the meltdown of nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, a catastrophe with which Japan is still coping.	但人们的安全由于福岛第一核电站核反应堆融毁事故进一步陷入危险。 目前日本仍在持续应对这一灾难。


Nevertheless, the country can take heart that so many of its people, children in particular, are alive today because of early-warning systems, safety drills, and a strong emphasis on disaster-risk reduction in the school curriculum.	然而，日本可以鼓起勇气，重整旗鼓。 由于日本的早期预警系统、学校的安全演练课程，以及对降低灾难危险系数的高度重视，使得许多人民，尤其是孩子得以幸存。


The world has been paying greater attention to reducing loss of life from disasters.	全世界各国目前都更加关注如何降低灾难中的人口死亡数量。


And yet, while mortality risk relative to population size is falling, the lives of more than 200 million people continue to be disrupted each year by disasters.	然而，尽管就人口规模相比，死亡危险系数正在不断下降，但每年仍然有超过2亿的人口持续收到灾难的困扰。


Moreover, economic costs are soaring, with insured losses reaching a record-high $380 billion last year.	再者，经济开销一直不断攀升，去年保险损失数额达到了历史性的3800亿美元。


Over the last 40 years, the world’s population has almost doubled, to seven billion, but global exposure to tropical cyclones has almost tripled.	在过去的四十年里，世界人口将近翻了一番，达到了70亿。 但全球受到热带风暴影响的人口数量却上涨了2倍。


More than 100 million people experience floods each year, and roughly 370 million live in earthquake-prone cities.	超过1000万的人口每年遭到洪水的侵袭。 大约3.


Given the rapid pace of urbanization, and the technology base that a well-resourced city requires, the risk of “synchronous failure” is growing constantly, as the Great East Japan Earthquake demonstrated.	由于城市化进程的步伐迅猛，打造一个资源城市就需要技术来支撑，因此“同步失败”的风险就会持续增加。 东日本大地震就是一个例子。


The earthquake disrupted critical sections of Japan’s electricity grid, including the power supply needed to cool the spent fuel at Fukushima, while the tsunami disabled back-up generators at the plant, resulting in the worst nuclear disaster since the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine in 1986.	由于海啸破坏了工厂的备用发电机，降低福岛核废料温度的能源就需要由主要电网区域来提供，但地震破坏了日本电网的主要区域，因此造成了自1986年乌克兰切尔诺贝利核泄漏事故以来最大的核灾难。


The broader lesson should be clear: when a natural hazard wreaks havoc on a power grid, there is a high potential for cascading impacts on dependent systems, such as banking and finance, government services, transport and communications, and drinking water.	更广的教训变得越发明显：一旦自然灾害破坏了电网，就非常有可能对依靠电力的系统产生巨大的冲击。 例如，这些系统包括银行和金融业、政府服务、交通和通信以及饮用水资源。


Moreover, as new drivers of risk emerge and interact, longstanding assumptions about disasters are being called into question.	再者，随着新的危险隐患的出现和演变，对于灾难的长期假设就会成为问题焦点。


In 2010, western Russia experienced July temperatures almost 8°C above the long-term average, which, combined with lack of rainfall, led to wildfires across 800,000 hectares of parched fields, forests, and peat lands.	在2010年，俄罗斯西部七月份经历了比长期平均温度高8度的天气，并且干旱少雨。 这引发了一场涉及面积800，000公顷的野火，烧毁了耕地、森林以及泥炭地。


Moscow and its surroundings, with a population of more than 15 million inhabitants, were covered by smoke for many weeks.	莫斯科以及其周围地区拥有超过1500万的居民人口，但被浓烟覆盖数周。


People with cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, the elderly, and the very young were particularly affected.	这尤其对患心血管疾病和呼吸系统疾病的病人、老人以及年龄很小的儿童产生了严重的影响。


During and after the wildfires, Russia’s mortality rate rose 18%.	在野火蔓延和被扑灭后的一段时间里，俄罗斯的死亡率上涨了18%。


Floods in Thailand last year threw 700,000 people out of work and had knock-on economic effects around the world.	泰国去年的洪灾使700，000的人口失去了工作，对全世界各地的经济都产生了影响。


The Economist reports that American bank JP Morgan has estimated that the disaster set back global industrial production by a surprisingly large 2.5%.	根据《经济学人》的报道，美国银行摩根大通估计这场灾难使全球工业生产量降低了2. 5%。


Economic exposure to floods is increasing faster than per capita GDP in all regions.	这一数字之大，令人咋舌。 由于洪灾所带来的经济损失，其增长速度比各个地区的人均GDP增长速度都要快。


Human happiness and economic well-being are also being affected by climate change, which may be contributing to what could turn out to be a third consecutive year of drought in sub-Saharan Africa – and this amid growing food-security concerns in a world with one billion underfed people.	这种气候变化可能是撒哈拉以南连续三年遭旱灾侵袭的罪魁祸首。 这场旱灾使10亿没有粮食挨饿人口的食品安全问题变得更加紧迫。


Much of the world was shaken from its lethargy on disaster preparedness by the Asian tsunami in December 2004.	由于2004年12月份亚洲发生的海啸，全世界大多数国家都已经从睡梦中醒来，开始着手应对灾难的准备。


The following month, 168 countries adopted an international blueprint for disaster-risk reduction at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, hosted by the city of Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture, the scene in 1995 of one of Japan’s worst earthquakes, with more than 5,000 lives lost.	在随后的一个月，168个国家采取了世界减灾大会上所提出的国际减灾蓝本。 这一大会在神户市兵库县举办，而1995年这里发生了日本最严重的地震，夺走了5000多人的性命。


The resultingamp Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015amp was a watershed moment in establishing disaster-risk reduction and climate-change adaptation as hallmarks of good governance.	兵库2005年-2015年行动框架的结果是一个分水岭，它建立了减灾和应对环境变化措施，将其作为国家良好治理的准则。


Most of the countries that stand to benefit from the Hyogo Framework do not have Japan’s long historical experience of battling natural hazards.	大多数从兵库行动框架中受益的国家并不像日本那样有着丰富的抵抗自然灾害的经验。


The Framework can help them to understand their exposure and vulnerability in today’s hazardous world, and to set priorities for action in developing a culture of prevention.	行动框架可以帮助他们理解在当今这个充满危险的世界中，他们自身的弱点和发生灾难的可能性，从而促使他们在建立一种预防机制，把其放在首要位置上。


That is why, as the Hyogo Framework comes to an end, it is important to start thinking now about its replacement, which will guide us through the thicket of risks emerging in the urbanized, interdependent world of the twenty-first century.	这就是为什么随着兵库行动框架趋近于尾声，现在开始考虑一种新的替代措施显得尤为重要。 新的替代方式会使我们走出二十一世纪城市化、全球化，各国相互依赖所带来的重重困难。


The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction has already started to talk with governments, local government partners, and a broad spectrum of civil-society organizations to prepare a new framework in time for the next World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2015, which, not surprisingly, will again be hosted by Japan.	联合国办事处为减少灾害风险已经开始和各国政府、地区城府同盟，以及一系列的民间机构组织开展洽谈，旨在为2015年举办的下一届世界减灾大会��备一个新的行动框架。 大会毫无疑问仍会在日本召开。


The outcome will certainly reflect what was learned from last year’s earthquake and tsunami, and seek to encourage deeper political and economic commitment to disaster-risk reduction and resilience worldwide.	结果肯定会展示从去年地震和海啸中所学到的教训，并试图鼓励全世界各国致力于降低灾难风险，提高恢复力，进一步深化政治合作和经济投入。


Japan’s Road to Harmonious Decline	日本的和谐衰落之路


PARIS – Forget what you have heard about the hard-working Japanese salaryman: since the early 1990’s, the Japanese have drastically slackened their work habits.	巴黎——忘掉你所听说过的工作勤勉的日本工薪族：从20世纪初开始，日本人的工作习惯已经彻底松懈。


Indeed, Tokyo University economist Fumio Hayashi has demonstrated that the main reason behind Japan’s 20 years of stagnation has been the decrease in the quantity of work performed by the Japanese.	实际上，东京大学经济学家林文夫已经证实，主要是日本人工作量的下降导致了20年的经济停滞。


The government itself has led the way here, starting with its decision to close public administration buildings on Saturdays.	政府在这方面做出了表率，它率先决定公共管理机构在每周六关门。


Japan’s banks followed suit.	日本的银行紧随其后。


From 1988 to 1993, the legal work week fell 10%, from 44 hours to 40.	1988到1993年间，法定的每周工作时数缩短了10%，从44小时缩短至40小时。


This, as much as anything, helped to bring Japan’s long-running post-WWII economic “miracle” to its knees.	在这一改变和其他多种因素的综合作用下，终于致使日本长期持续的二战后经济“奇迹”后劲不足。


In the service sector, the decline is even worse than in manufacturing, because services are heavily regulated and partially closed to foreign competition.	服务业的衰落尤甚于制造业，因为服务业管制严重，其中部分领域国外竞争无法进入。


In the retail sector, which employs a huge number of Japan’s unskilled workers – the so-called “mom and pop” shops – Japanese productivity is now 25% lower than in Western Europe.	而在雇佣日本大量非技术工人的零售业——也就是所谓的“夫妻零售店”——日本人的生产率现在比西欧低25%。


Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (in power between 2000 and 2004) and his chief economic adviser and minister of finance, Heizo Takenaka, understood all too well that Japan was losing ground in terms of productivity.	前首相小泉纯一郎（于2000至2004年间执政）和他的首席经济顾问兼财政大臣竹中平藏对日本在生产率方面节节败退的情况十分清楚。


They sought to counter the trend toward less work through privatization and deregulation.	他们试图通过私有化和放松管制等措施来遏制工作时间缩短的势头。


Japan’s powerful bureaucrats, nostalgic for the 1960’s model of development, whereby government and its business cronies nurtured the Japanese miracle, strongly opposed this bold, free-market solution.	日本大权在握的官僚却对由政府及其商业密友创造日本奇迹的20世纪60年代发展模式仍然念念不忘，这种胆大妄为的自由市场解决之道遭致他们强烈的反对。


But their model is obsolete, because Japan now competes directly with many other Asian and non-Asian countries, where work habits are of the type that used to prevail among the Japanese.	但他们所推崇的模式已经过时，因为日本现在直接面临其他许多亚洲和亚洲以外国家的竞争，这些国家的工作习惯和日本曾经的工作习惯非常相似。


Moreover, public opinion never supported Koizumi’s policy, which was alleged then, as it is now, to be a source of inequality.	此外，公众舆论从未支持过小泉的政策，无论当时还是现在，他的政策都被指为制造不平等。


But that is a canard: real-estate speculation, not privatization, has been the real source of undeserved wealth in Japan.	但这不过是谣言而已：日本不义之财的真正来源是房地产投机，而不是私有化。


Nonetheless, the newly victorious Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has been able to make the accusation stick to free-market policies.	虽然如此，新获胜的日本民主党成功地将这种指责与自由市场政策联系在一起。


The recent electoral triumph of Yukio Hatoyama’s untested DPJ thus confirmed the popular wish not to follow America’s free-market model.	不久前鸠山由纪夫治下未经考验的日本民主党在选举中获胜证明了公众不愿追随美国的自由市场模式。


Hatoyama makes no economic sense in declaring that growth is important but that happiness comes first.	鸠山声明经济发展虽然重要但幸福更重要没有任何实际意义。


Nevertheless, this sentiment does reflect the mood of many Japanese.	但这种观点的确反应了许多日本人的情绪。


Assuming that Hayashi and Takenaka are right about the causes of Japan’s stagnation, one must ask whether today’s Japanese are willing to work more in order to catch up with the United States and to lead Asia development?	假设林文夫和竹中平藏总结的有关日本经济发展停滞的原因正确无误，我们必须要问，今天的日本人是否愿意为赶上美国并领导亚洲发展而加大工作量？


Stagnation is a tacit collective choice made by a country’s majority.	经济发展停滞是多数日本人无声的集体意愿。


Have the Japanese people opted for it?	这是不是日本人自己做出的选择？


Nearly half of the Japanese population is either retired or near retirement age, and they worked very hard to achieve a high level of comfort.	将近半数的日本人已经退休或者即将退休，他们曾经为舒适生活付出了艰苦的努力。


Thanks to them, despite the blighted economy of the “lost decade,” Japanese income is still higher than it is in Europe.	多亏了他们，虽然在“迷失的十年”中日本经济状况一直低迷，但日本人的收入仍然高于欧洲。


Moreover, unemployment is low compared to the Western world, because the unproductive distribution sector absorbs young people who cannot find better jobs.	此外，失业状况也不像西方世界那般严重，因为非生产性的分销行业吸收了找不到更好工作的年轻劳动力。


Stagnating Japan has thus remained a peaceful and rather conservative society.	停滞的日本因此得以保持一种和平而保守的社会氛围。


By contrast, a higher growth rate would require fewer golf breaks for salarymen and significant immigration in a nation that is unaccustomed to foreign intrusion and different cultural habits.	相反，加快经济发展速度需要工薪族减少打高尔夫球的时间，而且会使这个不适应国外入侵和别样文化习惯的国家被迫面对大量移民。


Are the Japanese really ready to accept such a cure?	这样的解决方法日本人是不是真的准备接受？


Most Japanese, mostly among the old generation, are satisfied with the kind of society they have built.	绝大多数日本人，尤其是老一代日本人，对自己建设的这个社会感到满意。


They perceive Americans and Europeans as being obsessed with money and material ambition, and they seem ready to accept some stagnation as the price of remaining truly Japanese.	他们认为美国人和欧洲人被金钱和物欲所困，他们似乎愿意接受某种程度的停滞，以换取能够保持日本人的本色。


Hatoyama understands this, which is why he won the recent election.	鸠山由纪夫清楚这种心态，他也因此获得了选举的胜利。


Hatoyama’s talk about a “new age,” which sounds strange from a Western perspective, is in harmony with the Japanese way: this is a country where thousands of cult leaders offer myriad paths to Happiness, in particular a glib mishmash of New Age and Zen Buddhism.	鸠山所谈论的“新时代”虽然从西方人的角度看有些古怪，但却非常符合所谓的日本方式：在这个国家里，成千上万名邪教领袖为人们指出了无数条通往幸福的道路，特别引人注目的是“新时代”和“禅宗”荒诞的大杂烩。


How long can Japan sustain this period of harmonious stagnation?	这种和谐的经济停滞究竟能在日本维持多久？


Japan’s high-tech industries remain competitive, and the country is still the world’s second largest exporter.	日本的高科技行业依然有竞争力，而且日本仍然是世界第二大出口国。


It retains a highly innovative economy, which registers more new patents each year than all European countries combined – second only to the US and eons ahead of China and India.	它仍然拥有高度创新的经济，每年注册的新专利数超过所有欧洲国家的总和——日本在这方面仅次于美国，比中国和印度领先好几个世纪。


Japan’s 150 million people still produce far more than 2.5 billion Chinese and Indians.	日本的1亿5千万人口所创造的产值仍然大大超过中国和印度的25亿人口。


In ten years or so, however, Japan could lose its status vis-à-vis the rest of Asia.	但今后十年左右，日本可能会丧失相对于其他亚洲国家的优势。


Stagnation is already having a big impact on Japan’s young, for whom it is becoming hard to find a job, let alone life-long employment in a leading global company.	经济停滞已经对日本的年轻人造成了很大影响，令他们很难找到工作，更不要说在全球领先的企业谋到一份终身职位。


Teenagers know that they will have fewer opportunities than their parents had.	青少年知道他们不会拥有父辈那样的机会。


How they will pay for their parent’s pensions and health care is unknown.	他们如何能够承担父辈的养老金和医疗费用也是一个未知的话题。


Most troubling is the absence of open debate about these matters.	最令人不安的是没有人公开讨论上述问题。


Japan is a hush-hush society, where everyone is supposed to guess what is going on, and the media are careful not to provoke social division.	日本是习惯遮遮掩掩的社会，每个成员都必须猜测到底发生了什么，媒体也小心翼翼地避免引发社会成员的对立。


Hard questions are not to be asked, and straightforward answers are considered too rude and crude to be given.	困难的问题根本不允许提及，而直截了当的回答则被认为太过鲁莽和粗俗。


Foreigners are welcome to make comments, but their advice will usually be ignored.	日本人欢迎外国人做出评论，但对外国人的建议一般都会一笑了之。


It may seem to most Japanese that their continuing economic power affords them the luxury of indulging such ingrained habits.	多数日本人似乎认为长期的经济繁荣使他们有权放纵这种根深蒂固的习气。


Perhaps they should bear in mind Ernest Hemingway’s description of how a man goes broke: “slowly, then all at once.”	或许他们应该记取欧内斯特·海明威有关男人怎样破产的描述：“开始时非常缓慢，但到后来只是一眨眼的工夫。 ”


Japan’s Rubble Economy	日本的废墟经济


TOKYO – On March 11, a year will have passed since Japan was struck by the triple tragedy of an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident.	东京—3月11日是日本遭受地震、海啸和核事故三重打击的一周年纪念日。


According to figures announced by the country’s National Police Agency, the Great East Japan Earthquake left behind 15,848 dead and 3,305 missing – the largest loss of life due to natural disaster in Japan since World War II.	根据日本警察厅公布的数据，这场东日本大地震造成15 848人死亡、3 305人失踪，是日本自二战以来生命损失最严重的自然灾难。


Searches for the missing – mainly at sea – are still continuing.	失踪者搜寻工作——主要是海上搜寻——仍在进行中。


The number of buildings affected by the earthquake or the tsunami include 128,582 completely destroyed, 243,914 partly destroyed, 281 completely or partly burned, 33,056 flooded (including 17,806 above the ground floor, and 674,641 with other types of damage.	再来看看此次地震和海啸中建筑的受损情况：128 582栋建筑完全被毁，243 914栋部分被毁，281栋完全或部分被烧毁，33 056栋被淹（包括17 806栋超过一层的建筑），674 641栋遭受了其他形式的损坏。


Approximately 320,000 people lost their homes, of which more than 90% continue to live in temporary housing.	大约320 000人无家可归，其中90%以上至今仍住在临时住所。


Where to rebuild their homes remains undecided.	他们的家园在何处重建仍然没有定论。


The Great Hanshin Earthquake that struck western Japan in 1995 took 6,343 lives, in part because the city’s mazelike streets prevented access by emergency workers.	1995年发生的阪神大地震夺走了6 343人的生命，其中部分原因在于神户街道错综复杂，导致紧急救援人员无法快速抵达现场。


In the aftermath, the city was reborn in a dramatically different and safer form.	地震发生后，重生的神户面貌发生了重大变化，比以前更加安全了。


Despite numerous difficulties, recovery from that earthquake was faster than expected: there was no tsunami to complicate matters, and rebuilding efforts could be focused on buildings that had collapsed in the earthquake.	尽管困难重重，但震后恢复仍然比预料中快得多：没有让情况雪上加霜的海啸，因此重建工作可以专注于在地震中被毁的建筑物。


Moreover, the government provided strong leadership and official agencies responded rapidly, ensuring, among other things, a rapid cleanup of the rubble.	此外，政府领导得力，官僚机构反应迅速，确保了废墟的快速清理（当然还有其他工作）。


Indeed, aside from fiscal issues, disposal of rubble is the greatest obstacle preventing reconstruction after natural disasters everywhere.	事实上，除了财政问题，废墟处理可以说是自然灾害灾后重建工作的最大障碍。


The rubble produced in the Great Hanshin Earthquake was equivalent to the amount that Japan normally processes in roughly eight years.	阪神大地震所造成的废墟量相当于正常情况下日本8年的废墟处理量。


Difficulties like damaged waste-disposal facilities were overcome by local governments’ cooperation and burden-sharing.	地方政府之间的精诚合作和同甘共苦克服了垃圾处理设施被毁等困难。


And, fortunately, plans to build Kobe Airport on an artificial island near the coast ensured demand for landfill.	此外，幸运的是，在近海人工岛上建造神户空港的计划也保证了废墟需求。


In Japan, waste disposal relies mainly on incineration, but use of landfill off the coast made it possible to process the waste more quickly.	在日本，垃圾处理的主要方式是焚烧，但用废墟在近海填海造地加快了垃圾处理进程。


Even so, disposal of the waste took approximately three years, at a cost to the central government of ¥324.8 billion.	尽管如此，垃圾处理仍然花了3年时间才告成，而日本中央政府为此付出了3 248亿日元。


Compared to the Great Hanshin Earthquake, reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake is moving at a snail’s pace.	与阪神大地震相比，东日本大地震的灾后重建工作可谓慢如蜗牛。


Rubble is equivalent to 11 years of waste in Iwate prefecture, and 19 years of waste in Miyagi prefecture – enormous volumes that exceed these regions’ disposal capacity.	此次地震的废墟量相当于岩手县11年的垃圾总量，或宫城县19年的垃圾总量——数量之巨远远超过了这些地区的处理能力。


The cost of waste disposal, estimated at ¥776.7 billion, will be more than double the disposal cost following the Great Hanshin Earthquake.	垃圾处理成本估计将达7 767亿日元，比阪神大地震高出一倍有余。


Unlike the relatively rapid cleanup after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, only 5% of the total amount of rubble created by last year’s disaster has been processed so far.	与阪神大地震后的相对快速的清理工作不同，截至目前，去年大地震的废墟只清理了总量的5%。


Temporary sites for rubble in affected areas are being piled with the remnants of building materials and domestic appliances and furnishings, creating little mountains here and there, as rules on recycling instituted since 1995 require sorting waste by material.	在灾区临时废墟站里，残余建筑材料、家用电器和家具堆积如山，这是因为1995年开始实施的循环利用法要求对垃圾进行分类。


Moreover, there are no plans to build an artificial island to use up the rubble, as was done with Kobe airport.	此外，现在也没有像神户空港这样的能利用废墟建设人工岛的计划。


Owing to the tsunami, some of the refuse will ride the waves of the Pacific, reaching Hawaii and the West coast of the United States in a year or so.	拜海啸所赐，部分废料进入了太平洋，一年后出现在了夏威夷和美国西海岸。


But the damage caused by the tsunami also caused significant delays in reconstruction.	但海啸还极大地延缓了重建工作。


Local governments worry about how far from the coast new residential areas should be built, amplifying concerns about the future for people who are being forced to live with strangers in temporary housing in an unfamiliar area.	当地政府对新居民区该建在离海岸多远的地方心存顾虑，这也加重了那些被迫与陌生人一起住在陌生地区的临时住所的灾民的担心。


But the main reason for reconstruction delays is concern about radiation from the destroyed Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.	但重建工作进展缓慢的主要原因是担心被毁的福岛第一核电站的辐射。


Fear of radioactive contamination has stoked strong opposition from residents in areas that would need to accept rubble – even when the rubble is from areas nowhere near Fukushima.	担心放射性污染导致必须接受废墟地区居民的强烈反对，即使废墟来自原理福岛的地区。


In addition, although incineration greatly decreases the volume of waste, the concentration of radioactive cesium has been increasing over the past year, making it difficult to find suitable final disposal sites.	此外，尽管焚烧工作极大地减少了垃圾量，但在过去一年中，浓缩放射性铯元素仍然大量增加了，这使得寻找合适最终处理站的工作难上加难。


The heads of local governments in various regions are attempting to convince residents not to fear radiation and to allow for dispersal of rubble.	各地地方政府正在试图说服居民不要害怕辐射，从而为废墟寻找出路。


But the unseen enemy has aroused concerns – particularly among mothers of young children – that are more a matter of psychology than of science.	但这个看不见的敌人已经造成了担心——特别是孩子尚幼的母亲的担心。 这种担心与其说是出于科学，不如说是出于心理。


As the world’s only victim of a nuclear attack, Japan’s allergy to radiation is stronger than anywhere else.	作为全世界仅有的一次核打击的受害者，日本人对辐射的厌恶比其他任何国家都要大得多。


Nevertheless, with the exception of the special circumstances caused by the Fukushima catastrophe, Japan is hardly the only country with a mess to clean up before it can reconstruct.	尽管如此，除了因福岛核电站被毁所造成的特殊环境外，日本绝不是因废墟清理不力耽误重建的国家。


Thailand, which earlier this year suffered prolonged flooding, is also facing the need to dispose of rubble as it works to rebuild.	今年早些时候遭遇长时间洪灾的太过也面临着重建之前的废墟处理工作。


Measures to prevent flooding and steps to repair damaged areas of Bangkok cannot even begin until the rubble is cleared.	在废墟被清理掉之前，防洪和修复曼谷受灾区的措施根本无法施行。


Haiti and New Zealand have also encountered similar problems.	海底和新西兰也面临过同样的问题。


Reconstruction constitutes a special kind of public-works project.	重建构成了公共工程项目的一大特殊种类。


The disposal of rubble, given its labor-intensive character, has a particularly marked effect on job creation, at least in the short term.	处理废墟是一项劳动密集型工作，具有显著的增进就业作用，至少在短期是如此。


One might call this “rubble economics.”	有人将其称为“废墟经济学”。


It is the inevitable formula for recovery – one shovel load at a time.	一砖一瓦地堆砌，这就是重建的不二法门。


Japan’s Treacherous Bureaucrats	两面三刀的日本官僚


Much has been made of the massive defeat Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party suffered in the recent election to Japan’s Upper House.	安倍晋三首相领导的自民党在不久前日本上议院的选举中大败，舆论哗然。


But, as the smoke dissipates from that vote, it has become clear that the real victor is neither the leading opposition Democratic Party (DPJ) nor the electorate. Instead, it is Japan’s bureaucrats who are celebrating.	但是，随着选举之战的硝烟散去，真正的赢家显露出来，既不是最大的反对党日本民主党（DPJ），也不是选民，而是日本的官僚在举杯庆祝。


The aim of these entrenched mandarins is to block Abe’s plans for extensive civil-service reforms intended to inhibit them from parachuting into lucrative post-retirement jobs in the public corporations and private firms that they once regulated.	这些官僚的势力根深蒂固，他们的目的是阻挠安倍大规模的公务员制度改革计划，因为这些计划旨在限制他们退休后下海到自己曾经管辖过的公有或私有公司担任油水丰厚的职位。


They also want to stop Abe from dismantling and privatizing one of their central fiefdoms, the Social Security Agency.	他们还想阻止安倍解散和私有化他们的核心“封地”——社会保障局。


In this struggle, the mandarins are aligning themselves with the DPJ, at least to the general public’s eye, because it has proposed merging the Social Security Agency with the National Tax Agency, a move that would ensure government jobs for the former’s employees.	在这场斗争中，官僚们选择与DPJ结盟（至少在公众的眼里），因为该党提议将社会保障局与国家税务局合并。 这样的提议可以保住以前的雇员在政府内的工作。


The LDP’s declining vote is attributable largely to Abe’s mishandling of pension fund issues, particularly his late admission of knowledge last December about 50 million “lost” pension files.	自民党的选票缩减在很大程度上可以归咎于安倍对养老金基金问题的处理欠妥，特别是他在去年12月不够及时地承认知道5000万养老金文件“失踪”的事情。


This followed other minor scandals concerning the misuse of political funds, which had led to two resignations and the suicide of one of Abe’s cabinet ministers.	此前还有一些较小的有关滥用政治资金的丑闻，导致安倍内阁部长中两人辞职，一人自杀。


But a close look reveals the hands of the mandarins behind these debacles.	不过仔细观察，可以发现这些事件背后有官僚的黑手。


Abe and his ministers were simply not provided with critical facts by the bureaucrats who are supposed to serve them.	安倍和他的部长们只是没有从本应为他们服务的官僚那里得到关键性的真实材料而已。


Indeed, a DPJ member of the Diet was able to pose pointed questions to Abe and his ministers because he had obtained detailed information from an unidentified Social Security Agency official.	毫无疑问，议会上的DPJ党员之所以能够向安倍及其部长们提出尖锐的问题，是因为他从不明身份的社会保障局官员那里得到了详细的材料。


This constant stream of leaks from the bureaucrats has seriously shaken popular confidence in the Abe administration as well as the ruling LDP.	官僚们不断泄漏的资料严重地动摇了公众对安倍政府和自民党统治的信心。


The mandarins are now counting on an Upper House controlled by the DPJ to wreck Abe’s civil-service reforms.	现在，官僚们都等着DPJ控制的上议院破坏安倍的公务员制度改革。


Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi handpicked Abe as his successor to continue his administration’s central policies: divorcing the LDP from pork-barrel politics and consolidating the huge non-performing loans in the private sector that resulted from the collapse of Japan’s property market bubble in the early 1990’s.	前首相小泉纯一郎亲手挑选了安倍作为他的继任者，继续推行其政府的核心政策：让自民党摆脱分肥政治，整顿上世纪90年代日本房地产市场泡沫破灭造成的私有部门大量的不良贷款。


By revitalizing and modernizing Japan’s financial system, and by getting politicians out of the game, Koizumi intended to reinvigorate the Japanese economy.	小泉意图通过重振和改革日本的金融制度，将政客从游戏中驱逐出去，从而使日本经济复兴。


Koizumi had real successes in these reform efforts, which significantly transformed a malfunctioning Japanese state that was in the grip of pork-barrel LDP politicians, bureaucrats, and big business elites.	小泉在这些改革中取得了实质性的成功，使得被假公济私的自民党政客、官僚和商业巨头把持的、运转不灵的日本政府发生了重大转变。


Koizumi had relied on the bureaucrats to implement his reforms, but he did so at the price of postponing an overhaul of the civil service, which became a poisoned chalice that he passed on to Abe.	小泉依靠官僚实施改革，代价是不得不推迟公务员制度的全面革新，结果这在安倍接手后就成了毒瘤。


Moreover, Abe’s lack of Koizumi’s star quality and outsider charisma has made him rely more heavily than his predecessor on the LDP’s existing leadership.	此外，安倍不具备小泉那样的明星气质和外在魅力，因此比他的前任更加依赖自民党现有的领导人。


These leaders are less concerned with the reform agenda than with promoting patriotism among Japanese youth, upgrading the Defense Agency to a ministry, and enacting a law to permit a referendum to revise the pacifist constitution.	与改革计划相比，这些领导人更关心如何在日本青年中宣传爱国主义、如何将国防机构升级为国防部、以及如何制定法律允许公民投票修改和平主义宪法。


These are all important matters, but they are not among the electorate’s priorities.	这些都是重要的事情，但却不是选民最关心的。


Koizumi’s approach was to defy the LDP’s leaders by appealing over their heads directly to the electorate.	小泉走的是违逆自民党领导人的路，绕过他们直接投合选民的心意。


He successfully portrayed himself as a rebel resisting the LDP’s old guard, actually purging some of them, in defense of ordinary Japanese.	他成功地将自己塑造成一个反叛者，为了日本的普通百姓而违抗自民党的保守势力，甚至真的清理了其中一些人。


But Koizumi’s reforms seemed to abandon not only rent-seekers, but also the disadvantaged who had relied on the state’s protectionist measures.	但是，小泉的改革似乎不但抛弃了寻租者，同时也抛弃了依赖国家保护措施的弱势群体。


Abe is now confronting the legacy of this strategy: domestic polarization between highly educated and unskilled labor, between competitive and declining sectors, and between urban and rural areas.	安倍现在就面临着这种策略的遗害：国内受过高等教育者和低技能劳动力之间、有竞争力的部门和夕阳部门之间、以及城市和农村地区之间的两极分化。


And, to protect their jobs, Japan’s bureaucrats are now aligning their interests with those who see themselves as having lost out in the Koizumi years.	现在，为了保住工作，日本的官僚将自己的利益与那些认为自己在小泉执政期间失败的人联系在一起。


The DPJ, now temporarily aligned with low-profile bureaucrats behind the scene, can now either obstruct any bill in the Upper House that is sponsored by Abe’s administration, thereby cornering him into dissolving the Lower House, or they can engage in meticulous deliberations in the Diet in the hope of demonstrating to the electorate their fitness to govern.	现在，暂时与幕后的低调官僚结盟的日本民主党可以在上议院阻挠安倍政府提倡的任何法案，从而逼得安倍解散下议院，也可以在议会中表现得十分谨慎，以便向选民证明他们才适合管理国家。


The DPJ’s leader, Ichiro Ozawa, seems to be opting for the obstructionist approach favored by the bureaucrats, which will seek to bring not only a populist reversal of Koizumi’s economic and political reforms, but the shelving of Abe’s civil-service reforms as well.	民主党领袖小泽一郎似乎会选择官僚们钟意的阻挠手段，不但打算通过民粹主义方式颠覆小泉的政治经济改革，还要搁置安倍的公务员制度改革。


Japan will now likely face a hung Diet for a year or two.	日本议会可能在一两年内面临各党势均力敌的情况，但是最终必须决定到底让自民党还是日本民主党执掌。


But, in the end, it will have to decide if it wants to be governed by the LDP, which at least offers the possibility of addressing Japan’s problems, or a DPJ in complete thrall to the bureaucracy and the past.	前者至少还有解决日本各种问题的可能，后者则完全是官僚主义和昔日的奴隶。


Until Koizumi, the electorate was never faced with such clear-cut choices, and his administration taught the Japanese to like them.	在小泉之前，选民还从未遇到过如此黑白分明的选择。 小泉的政府让日本人学会喜欢他们。


In the meantime, Japan will drift, unable to take any significant foreign policy decision at a time when Asia’s security landscape is changing rapidly.	与此同时，在亚洲安全环境飞速变化的这样一个时刻，日本只能随波逐流，不能决定任何重要的外交政策。


Japan’s Unfinished Reformation	功败垂成的日本改革


TOKYO – Revolutions, it is often claimed, do not happen when people are desperate. They occur in times of rising expectations.	发自东京——据说革命这类事件一般不会在人们感到绝望时爆发，而是发生在人们充满期望之时。


Perhaps this is why they so often end in disappointment.	这大概也是他们常常在革命后感到失望的原因。


Expectations, usually set too high to begin with, fail to be met, resulting in anger, disillusion, and often in acts of terrifying violence.	这种期望通常都会有一个很高的起点，但却无法兑现，接着导致愤怒，幻灭，还常常伴随着骇人听闻的暴力行为。


Japan’s change of government in 2009 – when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) broke the almost uninterrupted monopoly on power held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955 – was not a revolution.	在2009年发生在日本的政权更替——自民党自1955年以来几乎从未间断的政权垄断终于被民主党一手终结——并不是一场革命。


But, rather like the election of the first black president of the United States, it was fizzing with popular expectations, promising a fundamental shift from the past.	但就像美国选出了第一位黑人总统那样，这场更替承载着大众的殷切期望，并承诺要与过去来一个彻底的了断。


This was even truer of Japan than the US.	日本人的变革似乎比美国人更具有实质性。


The DPJ not only put many new faces into power, it was going to change the nature of Japanese politics.	民主党不但将许多新面孔推向政坛，还想要改变日本政治的本质。


At last, Japan would become a fully functioning democracy, and not a de facto one-party state run by bureaucrats.	最终日本的民主制度将充分运转起来，不再是像以前那样虽号称民主，实际上却是一个在官僚手中运转着的一党专政国家。


To judge from the Japanese press, as well as the DPJ’s plunging poll ratings, disillusion has already set in.	但从当前日本媒体的反应以及民主党支持率的大幅下滑来看，民众的期望已经开始破灭了。


The permanent bureaucracy proved resistant, and DPJ politicians, unused to power, made mistakes.	日本的官僚机构依旧顽冥不化，而缺少执政经验的民主党政治家则失误连连。


One of the worst was Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s announcement in June of a consumption-tax hike just before the Upper House elections, which the DPJ went on to lose badly.	其中最严重的要数首相菅直人在上议院选举之前对提高消费税问题所发表的讲话，这直接导致了民主党的惨败。


The other disappointment has been the government’s failure to get the US to move its Marine airbase out of Okinawa.	另一个令民众大失所望的则是新政府无法迫使美国空军基地撤出冲绳。


This promise by the DPJ was meant to be part of Japan’s new assertiveness, a first step away from being a mere “aircraft carrier” for the US, as a former LDP prime minister once described his country.	民主党的这项承诺本应是日本新独立自主战略的一部分，只要踏出了第一步，日本就不会再像某位自民党前首相所说的那样，仅仅是美国的一艘“航空母舰”。


If Japan’s status quo is to change, the country’s oddly skewed relationship with the US is one key factor.	而如果要改变日本现状的话，该国与美国之间那种不对等的关系将是一个关键因素。


Too much dependence on American power has warped the development of Japanese democracy in ways that are not always sufficiently recognized by the US.	对美国权力的过度依赖已经扭曲了日本的民主制度，甚至到了连美国都难以完全认可这种制度的程度了。


Japan’s one-party state, under the conservative LDP, was a product of World War II and the Cold War.	日本这种自民党一党专政的状况其实是二战和冷战的产物。


Like Italy, the old Axis partner during the war, Japan became a front-line state in the battle against Communist powers.	作为像意大利那样的前轴心国，日本沦为了美国与共产主义斗争的马前卒。


And, as in Italy, a right-wing party, backed by the US, dominated politics for decades in order to crush any chance for the left to take power.	而就像意大利一样，美国支持日本的右翼党派长期主导国内政治，以便扼杀任何左派卷土重来的机会。


Even former Japanese war criminals, one of whom became prime minister in the late 1950’s, became subservient allies of the US in the wars (hot and cold) against Communism.	在这一策略下，即便是某位曾与1950年代后期初任日本首相的前战犯，都可以摇身一变成为美国的小盟友，共同携手对抗共产主义（无论是在冷战还是热战方面）。


In fact, Japanese dependence on the US was even greater than that of Italy and other European powers.	事实上相对于意大利以及其他欧洲国家来说，日本对美国的依赖程度简直有过之而无不及。


West European armies were embedded in NATO.	西欧的武装力量都被纳入了北约体系。


Japan, whose armed forces were entirely blamed for driving the country into the catastrophic Pacific War, was not even supposed to have an army or navy after the war.	而由于日军被认为是将日本拖入太平洋战争的罪魁祸首，所以日本在战后本来连军队不能拥有。


During their occupation of Japan in the 1940’s, Americans wrote a new pacifist constitution, which made the use of Japanese military force abroad unconstitutional.	但在1940年代占领日本期间，美国人制定了一套和平宪法，禁止日本在海外用兵。


In matters of war and peace, Japan abdicated its sovereignty.	无论是在战时还是和平时期，日本都放弃了自己在这方面的主权。


Most Japanese were happy to be pacifists and concentrate on making money.	大多数日本人都爱好和平，并把心思放在如何赚钱上面。


Japanese governments could devote their energy to building up the country’s industrial wealth, while the US took care of security, and by extension much of Japan’s foreign policy.	在美国接管了国防事务（并延伸到大部分外交政策）之后，日本政府得以全心全意发展工业。


It was an arrangement that suited everyone: the Japanese became rich, the Americans had a compliant anti-communist vassal state, and other Asians, even Communist China, preferred Pax Americana to a revival of Japanese military clout.	这是一个对大家都有好处的计划：日本人赚到了钱，美国人得到了一个千依百顺的反共附属国，而亚洲其他国家，比便是身处共产主义阵营的中国，宁肯接受美国治下的和平，也不愿看到日本军队势力死灰复燃。


But there was a steep political price to pay.	但这也意味着一个极端高昂的政治成本。


A democracy that is over-dependent on an outside power, and monopolized by one party whose main role is to broker deals between big business and the bureaucracy, will become stunted and corrupt.	如果这个民主制度过度依靠外界势力，又执掌在一个将撮合大资本和官僚阶层作为其安身立命之本的政党手中，那么这个制度必将发育不良，并走向腐朽。


Italy, under the Christian Democrats, had the same problem.	天主教民主党治下的意大利也遇到了同样的问题。


But the end of the Cold War in Europe changed the political status quo – with mixed results, to be sure.	但冷战在欧洲地区的终结改变了当时的政治现状——毫无疑问也引发了各类后果。


Old parties lost power, which was a good thing.	比如旧的政党纷纷失势，这是好事。


The vacuum was filled in Italy by the rise of Silvio Berlusconi, which may have been less of a good thing.	而贝鲁斯科尼���崛起则填补了政治真空，但这可算不上是好事。


In East Asia, by contrast, the Cold War is not yet entirely over. North Korea still causes trouble, and China is nominally a Communist state.	相反在东亚地区，冷战还没有全面结束，朝鲜依然在制造麻烦，而中国在名义上依然是个共产主义国家。


But it is a very different world from the one left in ruins in 1945.	但相对于1945年那个满目疮痍的世界来说，当今世界已经大有不同了。


For one thing, China has become a great power, and Japan, like other Asian countries, must adapt to new circumstances.	中国已经成长为一支巨大的力量，而日本必须和其他亚洲国家一道适应这一新状况。


But, while it is the only Asian democracy able to balance the power of China, the system established after WWII is not best suited to this task.	但作为唯一能够抗衡中国的亚洲民主政体，日本这套在二战后建立的体系已经无法胜任这个任务了。


This was recognized by the DPJ, which would like Japan to play a more independent role, as a more equal ally, rather than a mere protectorate, of the US, and thus be a more assertive political player in Asia.	日本民主党意识到了这一点，并希望日本能够扮演一个更加独立的角色，不仅仅是美国的受保护国，而是一个平等盟友，并因此在亚洲政治舞台上拥有更多自主权。


Hence, the first symbolic step was to get the US to move its marines from Okinawa, an island that has carried the burden of a US military presence for much too long.	而第一个象征性步骤就是要让美国将其海军基地撤出冲绳——这是一个长期承担着美国军事存在的压力，并已经不堪重负的地区。


The US did not see things that way.	不过美国人可不买账。


The DPJ threatened to change comfortable old arrangements, whereby the US could more or less tell the Japanese what to do.	于是民主党威胁要修改那些对美国有利的旧协议，不让其再对日本人指手画脚。


As a result, the US showed little patience with Japan on the question of Okinawa, and has barely concealed its contempt for the DPJ government, feeding popular disappointment with its performance so far.	结果在冲绳问题上美国也没给日本人面子，甚至毫不掩饰其对民主党政府的蔑视。 以至于民众对民主党大失所望。


The US seems to prefer an obedient one-party state to a difficult, faltering, but more democratic partner in Asia.	相比于一个更难相处，更犹豫不决，但也更民主的亚洲盟友，美国似乎更乐于看到一个俯首帖耳的一党专政国家。


The Obama administration, struggling to fulfill its own promises of change, should be more understanding of its Japanese counterpart.	而正苦于兑现自身承诺的奥巴马政府应该对他们的日本同行给予更多的理解。


If the US is as serious about promoting freedom abroad as it claims, it should not be hindering one of its closest ally’s efforts to strengthen its democracy.	如果美国真如其所宣称的一样执着于推广民主的话，就不应在日本这个最亲密盟友的民主完善之路上拦路抢劫。


Japan’s War Guilt Revisited	日本人又产生了对于战争的自责


“It is our obligation as Japan’s most influential newspaper to tell our readers who was responsible for starting the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War.”	渡部恒雄是日本同时也是世界上发行量最大的报纸《读卖新闻》的总编。


So writes Tsuneo Watanabe, Editor-in-Chief of Japan’s (and the world’s) most widely circulated newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun , in the introduction to the book From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Ha rbor: Who Was Responsible .	他在介绍新作《从卢沟桥到珍珠港：谁应该对此负责》时这样写道：“作为日本最有影响力的报纸我们有责任告诉我们的读者谁应该为挑起中日战争和太平洋战争负责。 ”


Watanabe, who is now in his eighties and served in the Imperial Japanese Army during WWII, was bothered by the way unfinished business concerning the war continued to hinder Japan’s progress.	已经年过八十的渡部二战期间曾在日本皇军中服役，他对于日本至今仍在为有关这场战争悬而未决的问题依然阻碍着日本的发展感到很担忧。


As a remedy, he set up a War Responsibility Re-Examination Committee at his newspaper to undertake a 14-month investigation into the causes of Japan’s Pacific War.	作为补救，他在他的报社里成立了一个战争责任重新审视委员会，该委员会对于日本太平洋战争的起因进行了为期14个月的调查。


Watanabe tells us that the Committee concluded that, “not only high-ranking government leaders, general, and admirals should shoulder the blame.” According to the Committee, “field officers were often more influential than even the Emperor, war ministers, and chiefs-of-staffs in making decisions to go to and escalate the wars, and were responsible for many atrocities.”	渡部告诉我们委员会的结论是：“不仅政府部门的高级领导人、陆军上将和海军总司令应该承担责任，而且战场指挥官通常甚至比天皇、战争大臣和总参谋长在挑起并且使战争逐步升级的决策中更有影响力，并且应该对种种的暴行负责。


It has never been easy for a nation to face up honestly to the bitter fact of having committed war crimes, genocide, unjustified foreign aggression, or having mistreated and killed its own people.	要让一个国家诚实地面对曾经制造了战争罪行、种族屠杀、无端入侵其他国家，或者曾经虐待和杀害它自己的国民的痛苦事实并不是一件很容易的事情。


Japan is no exception.	日本也不例外。


Although there have been numerous initiatives to investigate its war guilt, especially its occupation of China, there has not yet been an official effort comparable to what the Germans undertook to take collective responsibility for their war crimes.	尽管有无数的倡议要审视它的战争罪行，尤其是它对中国的占领，但是迄今为止官方并没有作出这样的举动，而德国人则对他们的战争罪行承担了集体责任。


While Yomiuri’s unique public effort is not a government initiative, it comes as close as Japan will probably ever get to conducting an acceptable “official” inquiry and offering an adequate apology.	尽管《读卖新闻》独特的公众努力并不是出于政府的倡议，但是可以把它看作是日本所可能进行的一次可以接受的“官方”调查并且作出了适当的道歉。


Its style is almost scientific – factual, staccato-like, and unemotional – and it goes a long way toward meeting China’s demand for a convincing investigation and act of contrition that might allow the bitter and still poisonous past to be overcome.	其风格几乎是科学性质的，即实际的态度、前后不连贯并且不带有情感，它与中国所要求的进行一次令人信服的调查，并且有悔悟的举动从而也许能忘却这段苦痛和依然残害着人们心灵的过去已经作出了很大进展。


Watanabe laments the fact that after Japanese war criminals were tried by the Tokyo Tribunal of 1951, “No efforts were made in the name of Japan or the Japanese people to look into where responsibility for the war rested.”	渡部感到痛心，那就是在1951年东京特别法庭审判了日本的战争罪犯之后，“没有人以日本或日本民众的名义对调查谁应该对这场负责”。


As a result, “there can be no genuinely honest and friendly dialogue with those countries that suffered considerable damage and casualties in the wars with Japan.”	其结果是，“我们与那些在与日本的战争中遭受巨大损失和人员伤亡的国家无法进行真诚和友好的对话。