The EU already accounts for almost 20% of US imports, and the US for 11% of EU imports.	而且欧盟占了美国进口量的20%，美国则占欧盟进口量的11%。


And, given similar per capita income levels and cultural orientations, overlaps in production and consumption are considerable.	而且考虑到相似的人均收入水平和文化取向，它们在生产与消费上的重叠部分都是相当大的。


Having said this, there would be immediate upside potential, owing to better resource allocation, more harmonized investment regimes, stronger standards, and the elimination of outdated non-tariff and regulatory barriers.	话虽如此，由于更好的资源分配、更和谐的投资管理体制、更严格的标准以及旧有非关税和监管障碍的取消，自由贸易区还是会出现即时的上升空间。


Aerospace, auto manufacturing, biotechnology, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals are among the sectors that stand to gain.	航空航天、汽车制造、生物技术，化妆品和医药都是一定会受益的行��。


There is also the potential for reforming inefficient approaches to food and agriculture, particularly in Europe.	对食品和农业的低效率生产方式也存在有改良的余地——尤其对欧洲来说。


The second reason for waning attention to the proposed partnership speaks to a broader issue: A seemingly endless stream of short-term political dramas has made it extremely difficult for both Europe and the US to focus for long on any secular and structural initiative.	而人们不再关注与欧洲建立伙伴关系的第二个原因则涉及到一个更宏观的问题：看似无穷无尽的一系列短期戏剧化政治变动使得欧洲和美国都很难长时间关注任何长期结构性改革方案。


In Europe, broad-based discussion was undermined by the outcome of the Italian election – just the latest sign of how frustrated citizens in a growing number of countries are rejecting conventional political parties and the political status quo.	在欧洲，意大利的选举结果破坏了那些全局性的讨论——这只是越来越多国家的受挫公民们开始对传统的政党和政治现状说不的最新表现而已。


With that, it becomes more difficult to pursue longer-term policy objectives, which merely adds further uncertainty about the precise path of European economic and financial integration.	在这种情况下，要追求长期的政策目标变得更加困难，而这又进一步增添了欧洲经济与金融一体化进程的不确定性。


In the US, the disruption took the form of yet another fiscal mini-drama.	而在美国，这种破坏效应正在以另一种财政闹剧的形式出现。


With a dysfunctional Congress again letting down the American people, the country is now on the receiving end of a budgetary sequester – another self-manufactured headwind to economic growth, job creation, and progress on reducing income and wealth inequalities.	由于机能失调的国会又一次让美国人民失望，如今美国又将要承受一场预算困局——又是一场自作自受的，遏制经济增长和创造就业机会、无助于改善收入减少和财富不平等的不利因素。


Put the two together and you get a barrier to EU-US trade negotiations – one that renders ambitious (though not entirely unrealistic) the two-year timeline that has been set for completing the deal.	把这两种情况放在一起考虑，你就会发现欧盟与美国的贸易谈判会的阻碍在哪里—— 它放弃了原本雄心勃勃（尽管并非完全不切实际）用来实现这一大计的两年时间表。


The third reason concerns the poor state of global policy dialogue, notwithstanding all the happy talk about global challenges and shared responsibilities.	第三个原因涉及到全球政策对话的糟糕状态——尽管依然存在关于应对全球挑战和分担责任的积极对话。


Last month’s G-20 meeting ended up as yet another expensive summit lacking sufficient content and follow through.	上个月的20国集团会议又是一场缺少足够内容和后续跟进的昂贵峰会。


Rather than catalyzing constructive policy coordination, it has inadvertently encouraged complacency.	与其说促进了建设性的政策协调，还不如说它在无意中助长了自满情绪。


All three reasons are highly regrettable.	这三个原因都让人深感惋惜。


They underscore the West’s seeming inability to break out of a short-term mindset in order to respond to the risks and opportunities related to historic national and global re-alignments.	它们都集中体现出西方在应对与历史性的国家及全球重新联盟所涉及风险和机遇时无力打破短期心态的现实。


The real promise of freer transatlantic trade consists in its potential to transform global trade, production networks, and multilateral organizations to the benefit of all.	跨大西洋自由贸易区的真正前景在于它可能变革全球贸易、生产网络和多边组织来为所有人造福。


At the most general level, it would act to rationalize the current system of four poorly functioning blocs – centered on China, Europe, the US, and the rest – to three, and eventually (and perhaps quite quickly) to two better-functioning blocs that would have little choice but to work well together: one dominated by China, and the other by the EU/US.	从最普遍的层面来说，它会使当前这个由四个运作欠佳的集团（分别以中国、欧洲、美国和其他地区为核心）组成的体系合理化——各集团——变成三个，并最终（也许会很快）转化为两个运行得比较好的集团，这两个集团别无选择，只能选择一起同意合作：一个由中国主导，另一个由欧美主导。


Such a global structure has the potential to encourage better medium-term alignments to reduce trade barriers, set proper standards, and enhance mutually beneficial cooperation.	这样的全球结构有可能催生更好的中期联盟来减少贸易壁垒，设定适当的标准并加强互利合作。


It would facilitate coordination on stronger global rules and principles, including those pertaining to intellectual-property rights and trade in services.	它将促进基于更强大全球规则和原则之上的协调，包括在知识产权和贸易服务等方面。


And it would force multilateral organizations to reform if they wish to retain even the limited relevance that they have now.	它会迫使多边组织改革——如果这些机构还想保留当前拥有的有限智职能作用的话。


The proposal for freer transatlantic trade is potentially transformational.	这个建设跨大西洋自由贸易区的提议意味着巨大的潜在转型。


It comes at a time when the West is increasingly being dragged down by short-term disruptions and continued policy inertia.	它出现在西方不断被短期破坏因素和持续政策惯性所拖累的时候。


Yet the implementation prospects are far from promising.	然而实现前景并不乐观。


The proposal has the capacity to act as a catalyst for adapting policy approaches to current realities; but it is subject to the dulling forces of twentieth-century mindsets and institutions that are too slow to adapt to twenty-first-century challenges and opportunities.	这提议有能力促进用政策方法来解决目前的现实问题； 但它受制于二十世纪迟钝的思维模式和那些不能适应21世纪挑战与机遇的机构。


Occupy the Classroom?	占领教室？


CAMBRIDGE – Early last month, a group of students staged a walkout in Harvard’s popular introductory economics course, Economics 10, taught by my colleague Greg Mankiw.	美国剑桥——上个月月初，一群学生在由我同事曼昆（Greg Mankiw）开设的哈佛经济学入门课程（Economics 10）上掀起了一场罢课运动。


Their complaint: the course propagates conservative ideology in the guise of economic science and helps perpetuate social inequality.	他们指责该课程披着经济科学的外衣散播保守意识形态，从而加剧了社会不平等性的固化。


The students were part of a growing chorus of protest against modern economics as it is taught in the world’s leading academic institutions.	这群学生是日渐兴起的反对当前领先学术机构所授的现代经济学的群体的一部分。


Economics has always had its critics, of course, but the financial crisis and its aftermath have given them fresh ammunition, seeming to validate long-standing charges against the profession’s unrealistic assumptions, reification of markets, and disregard for social concerns.	当然，对于经济学，批评之声从未停息，但金融危机及其余波给批评之声带来了新鲜元素，似乎又激活了长期存在的对该学科的指责——不现实的假设、具体化的市场以及对社会问题的欠考虑。


Mankiw, for his part, found the protesting students “poorly informed.”	至于曼昆，他发现反对他的学生是“信息劣势”的。


Economics does not have an ideology, he retorted.	他反驳说，经济学并不存在意识形态。


Quoting John Maynard Keynes, he pointed out that economics is a method that helps people to think straight and reach the correct answers, with no foreordained policy conclusions.	他引用凯恩斯的话，指出经济学是一种方法，能够帮助人们在不先入为主的情况下直接地思考并探寻正确答案。


Indeed, though you may be excused for skepticism if you have not immersed yourself in years of advanced study in economics, coursework in a typical economics doctoral program produces a bewildering variety of policy prescriptions depending on the specific context.	事实上，如果你没有花上数年时间深入研究高级经济学，那么你对经济学产生怀疑是可以理解的，不过，典型的经济学博士课程中存在的取决于具体环境的政策药方确实太多。


Some of the frameworks economists use to analyze the world favor free markets, while others don’t.	在经济学家用来分析世界的框架中，有的赞成自由市场，有的不赞成。


In fact, much economic research is devoted to understanding how government intervention can improve economic performance.	事实上，许多经济学研究致力于理解政府干预如何能够改善经济绩效。


And non-economic motives and socially cooperative behavior are increasingly part of what economists study.	非经济动机和社会合作行为正日渐成为经济学家的研究对象。


As the late great international economist Carlos Diaz-Alejandro once put it, “by now any bright graduate student, by choosing his assumptions….carefully, can produce a consistent model yielding just about any policy recommendation he favored at the start.”	已故的伟大国际经济学家迪亚兹-亚历杭德罗（Carlos Diaz-Alejandro）曾经指出，“到现在为止，聪明的研究生通过仔细……选择他的假设，便可以做出一个政策建议与其一开始所想要的相符的模型。


And that was in the 1970’s!	”他说这番话是在20世纪70年代！


An apprentice economist no longer needs to be particularly bright to produce unorthodox policy conclusions.	现在，就算是初出茅庐的经济学家，也不需要多高的智商就能做出另类的政策结论来。


Nevertheless, economists get stuck with the charge of being narrowly ideological, because they are their own worst enemy when it comes to applying their theories to the real world.	尽管如此，经济学家仍陷入了意识形态狭隘的指责之中，这是因为在将理论应用到真实世界中时，他们本身是自己最大的敌人。


Instead of communicating the full panoply of perspectives that their discipline offers, they display excessive confidence in particular remedies – often those that best accord with their own personal ideologies.	他们不会充分考虑经济学所提供的所有观点，而是对某些特定方案过度自信——通常是与他们自己的意识形态相符的那些。


Consider the global financial crisis.	就拿全球金融危机来说吧。


Macroeconomics and finance did not lack the tools needed to understand how the crisis arose and unfolded.	宏观经济学和金融学并不缺乏理解危机如何产生和发展所需的工具。


Indeed, the academic literature was chock-full of models of financial bubbles, asymmetric information, incentive distortions, self-fulfilling crises, and systemic risk.	事实上，关于金融泡沫、不对称信息、激励扭曲、自我实现的危机以及系统风险的模型汗牛充栋。


But, in the years leading up to the crisis, many economists downplayed these models’ lessons in favor of models of efficient and self-correcting markets, which, in policy terms, resulted in inadequate governmental oversight over financial markets.	但是，在危机到来前的几年中，许多经济学家低估了这些模型，为的是赞成有效和自我纠正的市场模型，其政策结果就是政府对金融市场的监管不足。


In my book The Globalization Paradox, I contemplate the following thought experiment.	在我的《全球化悖论》（The Globalization Paradox）一书中，我设想了如下思想实验。


Let a journalist call an economics professor for his view on whether free trade with country X or Y is a good idea.	一位记者让一位经济学教授说说关于与国家X或Y进行自由贸易是否是个好主意的观点。


We can be fairly certain that the economist, like the vast majority of the profession, will be enthusiastic in his support of free trade.	我们可以相当确定地说，这位经济学家与他的绝大多数同侪一样，会热烈支持自由贸易。


Now let the reporter go undercover as a student in the professor’s advanced graduate seminar on international trade theory. Let him pose the same question: Is free trade good?	现在，让我们假设这位记者假扮学生参加该教授主持的国际贸易理论高级研究生讨论班，在班上提出同样的问题：自由贸易好不好？


I doubt that the answer will come as quickly and be as succinct this time around.	我认为，这一回记者得不到言简意赅的答案。


In fact, the professor is likely to be stymied by the question.	事实上，教授可能会被这个问题搞懵。


“What do you mean by ‘good?’” he will ask.	“你的‘好’是什么意思？


“And good for whom?” 	”他会这样问，“对谁好？ ”


The professor would then launch into a long and tortured exegesis that will ultimately culminate in a heavily hedged statement: “So if the long list of conditions I have just described are satisfied, and assuming we can tax the beneficiaries to compensate the losers, freer trade has the potential to increase everyone’s well-being.”	接着，这位教授会给出一大串冗长解释，最后形成一段模棱两可的结论：“那么，如果我刚才所说的一大串条件满足，并假设我们可以对受益者征税补偿受害者，那么更自由的贸易可以具有增进所有人福利的潜力。


If he were in an expansive mood, the professor might add that the effect of free trade on an economy’s growth rate is not clear, either, and depends on an altogether different set of requirements.	”如果这位教授研究甚广，他可能还会加上几句：自由贸易对一国经济的增长率的影响是不确定的，取决于不同的前提条件。


A direct, unqualified assertion about the benefits of free trade has now been transformed into a statement adorned by all kinds of ifs and buts.	现在，直接的、不合格的关于自由贸易的好处的评估变成了充斥着“如果”和“但是”的结论。


Oddly, the knowledge that the professor willingly imparts with great pride to his advanced students is deemed to be inappropriate (or dangerous) for the general public. 	奇怪的是，教授踌躇满志地准备讲授给他的高级学生的知识对于普通大众来说是不合适（也是危险）的。


Economics instruction at the undergraduate level suffers from the same problem.	本科生水平的经济学教学也受到了相同问题的困扰。


In our zeal to display the profession’s crown jewels in untarnished form – market efficiency, the invisible hand, comparative advantage – we skip over the real-world complications and nuances, well recognized as they are in the discipline.	我们热切地希望展示经济学皇冠上尚未失去光泽的宝石——市���有效性、看不见的手、比较优势——与此同时，我们忽略了真实世界的复杂和微妙之处，而这些东西是公认的经济学内容。


It is as if introductory physics courses assumed a world without gravity, because everything becomes so much simpler that way.	这就好比是物理学概论假设世界万物极其简单以至于没有重力。


Applied appropriately and with a healthy dose of common sense, economics would have prepared us for the financial crisis and pointed us in the right direction to fix what caused it.	如果能够结合必要的常识合理地应用，经济学可以让我们对金融危机未雨绸缪，并向我们指出修正危机祸根的正确方向。


But the economics we need is of the “seminar room” variety, not the “rule-of-thumb” kind.	但是，我们需要的经济学是“讨论班”式的，不是“经验法则”式的。


It is an economics that recognizes its limitations and knows that the right message depends on the context.	这是一种明白自身局限并承认正确做法取决于具体环境的经济学。


Downplaying the diversity of intellectual frameworks within their own discipline does not make economists better analysts of the real world.	淡化我们这一学科内部的知识框架的多样性并不能让经济学家更好地分析真实世界。


Nor does it make them more popular.	让这一学科更加流行亦然。


Occupy the Government	占领政府


NEW YORK – Too much of the talk nowadays about how social media has affected politics focuses on awareness: People adopt social media, discover they are not alone, start to protest, and eventually their “Facebook revolution” overwhelms those in power.	发自纽约——当今那些社交媒体如何影响政治的话题大多都把焦点放在认知方面：人们应用社交媒体，寻找志同道合者，发动抗议，最后用一场“Facebook革命”推翻当权者。


But, even if such a revolution succeeds, that is only the beginning.	但即便革命成功，一切也只能算是刚刚开始。


What happens next?	那么接着将发生什么呢？


As an angel investor in start-up companies and a sometime philanthropist, I have the luxury of traveling the world and talking with articulate people who give me an unofficial, clear-eyed view of how most countries actually work.	作为一名天使投资者以及业余慈善家，我有幸能够环游世界，并因此从一些头脑清晰辩才无碍的人口中得知一些关于大多数国家究竟如何运行的非官方观点。


It is a depressing picture.	结论让人颇为失望。


I have been to roughly 70 countries, and have discovered roughly 70 different ways to run things badly.	我大概去过70多个国家，也因此听说了70多种把事情搞砸的方式。


Many of these countries have elections; but, as has been said of Russia, while the candidates may surprise, the outcome is predictable.	许多国家都有选举； 但以俄罗斯为例，虽然有时候会冒出些意料之外的候选人，但最终结果却是可预测的。


Often a single individual or a small group has almost absolute power.	一般是某个人或者小团体拥有绝对权力。


Seemingly independent businesses are mostly beholden to government supporters, who typically take a cut of the proceeds.	看似独立的企业大多由政府支持者把持，这些人再从企业身上捞取好处。


Even in real democracies, where people vote freely, things are going badly, as in Greece.	即便在希腊这些人们可以自由投票的真正民主国家，事态也在逐步恶化。


Elsewhere, as in Egypt, democratization incites further protests, or even violence.	而在埃及等地，民主化反而激发了进一步抗议甚至暴力行动。


Yes, things seem to be improving in Burma, and Zimbabwe appears quiet; but Hungary – and, more recently, South Africa – has enacted laws to suppress information that might prove damaging not to government in general, but to those in power.	虽然缅甸情况转好，津巴布韦也看似平静； 但匈牙利以及最近的南非都颁布了一些法案，压制那些并非批评政府本身，只是可能对掌权者不利的信息。


Riots and protests are erupting around the world.	骚乱和示威正在全球蔓延。


In the United States and elsewhere, elected governments used to take care of the people, but now, like companies colluding against their customers to keep out disruptive newcomers, they have become a separate interest group.	在美国以及其他地方，民选政府通常都会照顾好自己的人民，但如今，就跟那些背着顾客密谋打压“不守规矩”新竞争者的企业一样，政府自己都变成了一个独立的利益集团。


Political parties exchange benefits and ignore those who elected them.	政党之间进行利益交换并把那些选举它们的人晾在了一边。


The power to tax, for example, is often used more to employ civil servants or workers in favored companies than to provide services the people want.	比如说征税权经常被用来雇佣更多为企业利益服务的公务员或者工人，而不是提供民众急需的服务。


Lacking competition, inefficient bureaucracies focus more on maintaining jobs than on serving putative customers.	缺乏竞争，效率低下的官僚机构更多地把注意力放在保住自己的位子而不是服务“顾客”。


One part of the problem is how money stacks the deck, not just for dictatorships that wield de facto control over the economy, but also in democratic countries, where business is free to use its resources to “influence” government.	问题的其中一部分就是金钱如何占据了上风，不仅仅是独裁国家政权在事实上控制了整个国家经济，民主国家中的企业也在任意使用自己的资源去“影响”政府。


Political parties claim to embody ideas and worldviews, but in many ways they are simply self-perpetuating money machines.	政党都宣称自己的是某些理念和世界观的承载者，但在许多方面看来它们不过是些自我固化的赚钱机器而已。


Recent rebellions worldwide show that some citizens recognize that they are being offered false choices, often no more meaningful than the choice between brands of toothpaste.	最近全球爆发的反抗说明一些公民已经意识到：（政界）赋予他们的（候选人）选择都是谬误的，甚至跟选择牙刷品牌一样毫无意义。


Social networking has given them new tools of protest to topple governments, but what is also needed are new ways to make government operate effectively and accountably.	社交网络成为了他们抗议并推翻政府的新工具，但同时我们也需要能让政府更有效也更负责任运行的新路径。


I don't know what should be done, but I am supporting one effort, called Americans Elect, to push for radical change in the US. Perhaps it can be a model elsewhere.	我不知道为此应该做些什么，但我正在支持一个叫做“让美国人来选”的运动，该运动致力于在美国推动彻底的变革，而或许这能成为其他地方的一个样板。


The group’s first task is simply to win the right to put a candidate on the ballot in all 50 US states to run against the conventional slate of one Democrat and one Republican.	该团体的第一个目标就是赢得在美国全部五十个州推举一名总统候选人的权利，以打破各州以往只有一个民主党人和一个共和党人决胜的常规。


That has not been easy, and the fight continues state by state.	这决非易事，而且要一个州一个州地进行争取。


Rules and regulations in most states protect the two parties that have held sway in US politics for more than a century.	大多数州的法律条令都偏袒民主共和这两个支配美国政治超过一世纪的政党。


It turns out that most state bureaucracies, theoretically accountable to the public, in fact are accountable to the parties, and do everything they can to keep Americans Elect from claiming its right to a spot on the ballot next fall.	目前看来那些理论上应该对公众负责的官僚机构事实上却在看政党的脸色行事，并想尽一切办法阻止“让美国人来选”运动行使在明年秋天推举一个总统候选人的权利。


Many commentators claim that Americans Elect will simply take votes from the incumbents but have no lasting impact.	许多评论员认为“让美国人来选”运动只能从当前的竞选者手中夺走一些票数，毫无长期影响可言。


But I am hoping that widespread frustration will leverage the group’s ability to to encourage a genuine shift towards a new approach.	但我却希望这种广泛的负面言论能使该组织的能力得到升华，从而促成一个实现新路径的真正转变。


Americans Elect will use a long series of competitions and online and offline convocations to select a candidate who will be beholden to millions of people at large, rather than to a smaller group of big donors whose interests the candidate must serve.	 “让美国人来选”将实施一长串的竞争和线上线下的集会，最终选举出一个能为数百万人负责，而不仅仅仅服务于一小撮大赞助者的候选人。 其计划也相当周详：最初的资助者都是以借款而非赞助的形式；


Its plan is cunning: the original funders are being asked for loans, not donations; that way, they will have no further claim on Americans Elect after they are repaid. (Obviously, they will be a natural source of money for the next round, so the group has to become self-sustaining on the basis of small donations, or it will become beholden as well.)	那么在还款之后他们也无法对“让美国人来选”运动有进一步要求（很显然，这些借款者自然也又会成为下一轮竞选活动的资金来源，但这意味着组织将会被借款者所把持，因此组织必须实施借助小额捐助来进行自我维持的策略）。


That money is supposed to go toward reaching a broad public who will respond via the Internet, making small donations and joining in a national effort to suggest and choose a third candidate for president.	计划中这些资金将来自于广大公众，他们将通过互联网作出回应，提供小额捐款并参与到一个全国性行动中来，共同倡议和选择一个第三方总统人选。


This candidate will not try to divide and polarize the country, but rather will unite it around common-sense approaches to fiscal policy, education, health care, and other long-term issues.	这个候选人不会想去分化这个国家或者拉帮结派，而是用针对财政政策、教育，医疗以及其他长期性事务的常识性方案来团结民众。


In the end, people do not want to be sold the same old toothpaste when what they really need is serious dental work.	毕竟人们真正需要的不是那些老牌子的牙膏，而是严肃的牙科治疗。


Americans Elect is not the only organization with this vision, but it is the only one with the necessary scale.	 “让美国人来选”并不是唯一拥有这一愿景的组织，但它却是唯一拥有所需规模的。


I recently saw a presentation by a company called 5ivePoints, which helps people running campaigns, often volunteers, reach out to their Facebook, Twitter, Google+, and other friends.	我最近观看了一个名为“5ivePoints”的公司的介绍会，该公司致力于帮助那些正在进行选举行动的人（通常是没什么财源背景的志愿者）通过Facebook，推特，Google+以及其他朋友扩大影响。


Of course, 5ivePoints will be going after the established parties as customers, but my hope is that groups like Americans Elect, and eventually protesters in other countries, will start to use it (or something similar).	虽然5ivePoints会将业已建立的政党作为客户，但我希望像“让美国人来选”这样的团体，最终还有其他国家的抗议者也能开始使用这个工具（或者类似的模式）。


If the point is to replace our current governments with more accountable models, we need to use new online tools not only to throw out the old, but also to bring in the new.	如果重点是要用一个更可靠的模式取代现有政府的话，那我们所需的新网络工具不仅要破旧，还必须立新。


Occupy the Mortgage Lenders	占领抵押贷款商


WASHINGTON, DC – Participants in the Occupy Wall Street movement are right to argue that the big banks have never properly been investigated for the mortgage origination, aggregation, and securitization behavior that was central to the financial crisis – and to the loss of more than eight million jobs.	华盛顿——“占领华尔街”运动的参与者们没有说错——大银行的抵押贷款发起、集中和证券化行为是造成金融危机以及800万人失业的罪魁祸首，但他们从未得到应有的调查。


But, thanks to the efforts of New York’s attorney general, Eric Schneiderman, and others, serious discussion has started in the United States about an out-of court mortgage settlement between state attorney generals and prominent financial-sector firms.	但是，在纽约总检察长史树德（Eric Schneiderman）等人的努力下，美国已经掀起了一场关于总检察长与主要金融公司庭外和解的认真大讨论。


Talks among state officials, the Obama administration, and the banks are currently focused on reported abuses in servicing mortgages, foreclosing on homes, and evicting their residents.	眼下，州官员、奥巴马政府和银行之间谈论的焦点是被曝光的抵押贷款偿付、收回抵押贷款偿还权以及驱逐屋主的问题。


But leading banks are also accused of illegal behavior – inducing people to borrow, for example, by deceiving them about the interest rate that would actually be paid, while misrepresenting the resulting mortgage-backed securities to investors.	但主要银行被指还犯有违法行为，如有意欺骗借款人让他们误解自己实际应付的利率，同时向投资者虚假宣传据此产生的抵押贷款支持证券，从而诱导人们前来贷款。


If these charges are true, the bank executives involved may fear that civil lawsuits would uncover evidence that could be used in criminal prosecutions.	如果这些指控是真的，那么涉案银行高管就得担心民事律师发现足以将他们送上刑事庭的证据了。


In that case, their interest would naturally lie in seeking – as they now are – to keep that evidence from ever seeing the inside of a courtroom.	于是，符合他们利益的做法自然是让证据永远不要进入法庭——也就是他们现在在做的事。


The scale and structure of any out-of-court mortgage settlement should address the damage inflicted by the alleged pattern of behavior.	任何抵押贷款庭外和解的规模和结构都应该修复被控行为模式所造成的伤害。


Many Americans now have too much debt.	如今，许多美国人背上了太多的债务。


About 10 million mortgages are estimated to be “underwater” (the house is worth less than the loan).	大约1 000万笔抵押贷款被认为处于“资不抵债”状态（即房屋价值低于贷款数额）。


And, in key markets around the US, four years into the housing slump, home prices continue to fall.	此外，在房地产陷入萧条四年后，美国主要市场房价仍然在下跌。


If these were commercial loans, creditors would consider restructuring them – extending the payment schedule and typically writing down principal.	如果这些贷款都是商业贷款，那么债权人可以考虑对其进行重组——即延长偿还期，通常还包括减记本金。


But, in America’s home mortgage market, this is much less common.	但是，在美国住房抵押贷款市场，这么做并不普遍。


Banks want neither millions of negotiations nor, most importantly, the need to face the losses implied on their loan portfolio.	银行肯定不愿意进行数百万次重组谈判，而且更重要的是，它们不愿意直面其贷款组合所隐含的损失。


As a result, households want to spend less and pay down their debts.	结果，家庭只能削减支出、偿还债务。


To some extent, this is the natural aftermath of any credit boom.	从某种程度上讲，这是信贷繁荣的自然后果。


And household deleveraging in the US will take a long time.	美国家庭的去杠杆化过程将持续很长一段时间。


Policymakers can respond in three ways.	决策者有三条应对方案。


First, they could do nothing – apparently the preference of the Republican congressional leadership, which recently wrote to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to demand that he not try to stimulate the economy further.	首先，他们可以静观其变——这也是共和党国会领袖的优先选项，最近他们写信要求美联储主席伯南克不要再进一步采取经济刺激措施了。


Second, they could continue to rely on conventional monetary and fiscal policy to pull the economy out of the doldrums.	其次，他们可以继续依赖传统货币和财政政策将经济拖出不景气。


This is the approach still preferred by the Obama administration, despite its poor performance.	这是奥巴马政府的优先选项，尽管效果甚微。


Third, we could adopt an alternative approach that directly reduces the value of underwater mortgages.	第三，他们可以采取直接减记资不抵债抵押贷款价值的替代方案。


At this point, any improvement in consumer balance sheets would directly stimulate the economy and create jobs.	这样一来，消费者的资产负债表就能得到改善，从而直接刺激经济、创造就业岗位。


Start with the proposal made by Martin Feldstein, who recommends a trade: the government should reduce the value of mortgages when they are sufficiently underwater, with the government and the banks splitting the losses; in exchange, the borrower must agree that the new loan becomes “full recourse.”	让我们从马丁·菲尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）的方案开始。 他建议做一笔买卖：政府减记深度资不抵债抵押贷款的价值，损失由政府和银行分担；


That means that lenders could pursue borrowers’ other assets – not just the house – in case of default.	作为交换，借款人必须同意新贷款具有“完全追索权”。 这意味着贷款人可以在借款人违约时收走后者的其他资产，而不仅仅是房子。


The key to this proposal is that banks must agree; it is a voluntary debt restructuring, compelled by no legal authority.	菲尔德斯坦方案的关键是银行必须同意； 这是一种自愿而不是法律强制的债务重组。


In principle, banks should be attracted to the proposal, because restructured loans are less likely to default.	从原理上看，该方案对银行是有吸引力的，因为重组后的贷款违约可能性更小了。


In practice, the banks have consistently dragged their feet on mortgage restructuring – and are laying off staff, rather than hiring people who could help them deal with an initiative of the required scale.	但在实践中，银行在抵押贷款重组业务上踯躇不前，不但没有雇佣发起所需规模所需要的人手，反而还在裁员。


Feldstein calculates that the one-time cost of principal reduction would be around $350 billion.	据菲尔德斯坦测算，本金削减的一次性成本大约在3 500亿美元。


Of course, in our current fiscal environment, it will be hard to find additional resources from the budget.	当然，给定当前的财政环境，要从预算中抠出更多的资源是很难的。


But $350 billion is roughly what the financial sector as a whole earned in an average quarter during the credit boom – and profit levels in recent quarters have reached or exceeded those levels.	但3 500亿美元大约只是整个金融部门在信贷繁荣期一个季度的利润，而在最近几个季度中，该部门总利润已经回到甚至超过了繁荣期水平。


So, if the entire write-down cost were covered by banks, most of them would lose the equivalent of no more than one year’s profits – spread over several years.	因此，如果全部减记成本都由银行承担，大多数银行充其量也就是损失了不到一年的利润——这样利润此前可是维持了好几年呢。


Those boom-time profits were in any case overstated, because they were not adjusted for risk.	这些繁荣期利润毫无疑问被夸大了，因为它们未经风险调整。


And when the downside risks materialized, the losses were largely socialized – the primary reason why US public debt has soared in recent years.	而当下行风险显露时，损失大多被社会化了，这也是美国公共债务在近几年出现飙升的主要原因。


Asking shareholders and management to pay a relatively small amount is entirely fair and appropriate under these circumstances.	在如今的环境下，让股东和管理层来承担相对较小的数目完全是公平合理的。


Some in the financial sector would, of course, threaten dire consequences.	当然，某些金融部门人士会威胁说，这将产生灾难性后果。


In fact, bank stock prices might drop, and it is entirely possible that compensation and bonuses would be curtailed, at least in the short term.	事实上，银行股可能下跌，薪酬和奖金也完全可能被削减，至少在短期是如此。


On the other hand, a large-scale settlement that legitimately and finally removed the threat of future legal action would lift an enormous cloud that hangs over some of the largest lenders, including Bank of America, and creates significant risks for the rest of the financial system.	另一方面，合法地消除未来诉讼威胁的大规模和解将在大型贷款人（包括美国银行）头顶上制造出一片阴云，并给金融体系的其他部分造成巨大风险。


If the banks were ever really held accountable for the social costs of their behavior, the bill would far exceed $300-400 billion.	如果银行真的为其行为担负社会成本，那么账单将远远超过3 000—4 000亿美元。


Realistically assessed, the full downside legal risks to financial institutions are in excess of $1 trillion – particularly if it can be demonstrated that the “mortgage-backed securities” sold to investors were not backed by mortgages at all, because the proper legal paperwork was never done.	现实地估算，金融机构的不利法律风险总量超过了1万亿美元——特别是若能证明卖给投资者的“抵押贷款支持证券”背后并没有抵押贷款在支持（因为从来不曾有过适用的法律文档）的话。


Any settlement should also include the banks’ explicit agreement that they will support modifying America’s bankruptcy law to enable inclusion of mortgages in the usual court-run processes.	和解还必须包括银行对支持改进美国破产法以便将抵押贷款纳入常规法庭程序的明确同意。


If the Occupy Wall Street movement tells us anything, it is that the last thing the US economy needs is more households overwhelmed by debt.	如果“占领华尔街”运动告诉了我们什么，那就是，美国经济最需要解决的问题就是被债务压得喘不过气的家庭。


One Earth, One Ocean	同一个地球、同一片海洋


NEW YORK – The ocean and the atmosphere are linked in ways that are only just beginning to be fully understood.	纽约——人们刚刚开始完全理解海洋和大气之间的关系。


Like siblings, the sky above us and the waters around us share many characteristics – most notably these days a need to be protected.	就像兄弟姊妹一样，我们头顶的天空和周围的海域拥有许多共同的特点——当前最显而易见的是需要得到我们的保护。


We are siblings working on a shared agenda to defend both – an agenda that will define the future for many millions of brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, friends, and neighbors, as well as life-forms on the land and in the seas, now and for generations to come.	我们是执行天空及海洋保护计划的姊妹兄弟——上述计划将决定现在和未来几代人时间里数百万兄弟、姐妹、父亲、母亲、朋友、邻居以及各式各样陆地及海洋生命的未来。


Fortunately, governments around the world are beginning to understand the challenge, and are expected to deliver – or at least make progress toward – two important agreements this year: a new global treaty to protect marine life in international waters, and a climate-change accord to safeguard the atmosphere.	幸运的是，各国政府开始意识到所面临的挑战，并有望在年内签署两项重要协议——或至少在这方面取得进步。 其中一份是保护国际水域海洋生物的全新全球公约，而另一份则是保护大气的气候变化协议。


Together with a suite of Sustainable Development Goals, these agreements will serve as crucial road signs indicating the path to be followed by the world’s national economies over the next 15 years and beyond.	上述协议将与全套可持续发展目标一起作为关键路标，指引未来15年及其后世界各国经济的前进道路。


The planned accords come amid extraordinary efforts by countries, cities, companies, and citizens to protect the climate and the ocean.	拟签署的协议诞生于国家、城市、企业和民众为保护气候及海洋付出非凡努力之际。


Investments in renewable energy are running at well over $250 billion a year, and many countries are spending as much on green forms of energy production as they do on fossil fuels.	可再生能源年度投资大大超过2500亿美元，很多国家对绿色能源生产的投入可以和化石燃料投入相媲美。


Our native Costa Rica, for example, now gets 80% of its energy from renewable sources.	比方说我的祖国哥斯达黎加，目前可再生能源占比80%。


In China, renewables are expanding rapidly, and coal consumption fell by 2.9% year on year in 2014.	中国的可再生能源正在迅速扩大，煤炭消费量较之2014年同比下降2. 9%。


Meanwhile, offshore, the need for more marine reserves and sustainable fishing is being recognized and, in some cases, met, with technological breakthroughs strengthening officials’ ability to monitor and track illegal catches.	此外，人们已经意识到在近海增设海洋保护区和实行可持续捕捞的必要性，并且在某些情况下，利用能强化官方监视及跟踪非法捕捞能力的技术进步来达到这一目的。


Scientists studying climate change have shown how the problem can be tackled by adopting a clear path with progressive milestones.	研究气候变化的科学家已经找到了问题的处理方法，即选择一条明确的道路，并在不同阶段设立里程碑。


We must bring global emissions to a peak in the next decade, drive them down rapidly thereafter, and establish a balance between emissions and the planet’s natural absorptive capacity by the second half of the century.	今后十年我们必须让全球排放量达到峰值，之后快速加以削减，并在本世纪下半叶建立起排放和地球自然吸收能力之间的平衡。


The ocean has historically played an important role in achieving that balance.	海洋有史以来一直在上述平衡中起到重要作用。


As a natural carbon sink, it absorbs approximately 25% of all the carbon dioxide emitted by human activity annually.	作为天然碳汇，它能吸收每年人类活动所排二氧化碳的约25%。


But we are overtaxing its absorptive capacity.	但我们正在过度利用海洋的吸纳能力。


The carbon dissolved in the ocean has altered its chemistry, driving up acidity by 30% since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.	海洋中溶解的碳已经改变其化学成分，自工业革命以来已导致酸度上升30%。


The rate of change is, to the best of our knowledge, many times faster than at any time in the last 65 million years, and possibly the last 300 million years.	就我们所知，变化速度比过去6，500万年中的任何时候都快，并且很有可能超过过去3亿年的速度。


If CO2 emissions are not brought under control, the rate of acidification will continue to accelerate – with deadly effects on the ocean’s inhabitants.	如果二氧化碳排放仍未得到控制，将进一步加快海水的酸化速度——这对海洋生物造成的影响是致命的。


As CO2 from the atmosphere is churned into the world’s waters, it reduces the availability of carbonate ions needed by many marine animals and plants to build their shells and skeletons.	随着空气中的二氧化碳进入到全球水域，众多海洋动植物赖以形成其壳体和骨骼的碳酸离子浓度将大幅降低。


If CO2 levels continue to rise at their current rates, scientists estimate that around 10% of the Arctic Ocean will be corrosive enough to dissolve the shells of sea creatures by 2018.	如果二氧化碳浓度继续以目前的速度上升，科学家预计到2018年约10%北冰洋水域的腐蚀性将足以溶解海洋生物的壳体。


Many other oceanic bodies face a similar future.	其他很多海洋生物未来也非常相似。


International agreements succeed best when the political, economic, and social trends of the time align, as they have now, to give rise to a new vision of the future and a new relationship between humanity and the planet we share.	国际协议成功的最佳条件是当政治、经济和社会发展趋势像现在这样形成合力，从而催生出人类和我们所共享的这个星球间未来和新关系的崭新视野。


Realizing this vision will involve multiple generations.	实现这一目标需要几代人的共同努力。


Both the ocean and the climate are in need of global, credible, measurable, actionable plans to provide for their protection.	无论海洋还是气候都需要全球性、可靠、可度量、可操作的计划来为其提供保护。


Our scattered, fully protected marine reserves must be expanded from the 1% of the ocean they currently protect to form a truly global network.	我们零散的海洋保护区必须从目前仅占海洋面积的1%发展为真正的全球性网络。


Last month, 13 Caribbean heads of state and government called for an effective global agreement, citing current and emerging impacts.	上个月，来自13个加勒比国家及政府的首脑呼吁签署列举现有及新兴影响的有效的全球协议。


It is an alarming list: “more frequent extreme events, more intense and changing rainfall patterns, more ocean acidification and ocean warming, coral bleaching, rising sea levels, coastal erosion, salinization of aquifers, the greatly accelerated emergence of new communicable diseases, reduced agricultural productivity, and a disruption of fishing traditions.”	这份清单十分令人恐惧：包括“更频繁的极端事件、更强降雨及降雨模式改变、更严重的海洋酸化及海洋变暖、珊瑚白化、海平面上升、海岸侵蚀、地下水盐碱化、新型传染性疾病加速出现、农业生产力降低以及对渔业传统的破坏”。


Such threats are proof of the urgent need to expand the international rules providing for the conservation and sustainable management of the climate and marine life.	上述威胁证明有必要对提供气候、海洋生物保护及可持续管理的国际规则进行拓展。


The climate-change agreement expected to be reached in Paris in December will not solve the problem at the stroke of a pen, just as no agreement to protect marine life will, on its own, lead to a healthier ocean.	就像没有哪份海洋生物保护协议能凭一己之力使海洋更加健康一样，预计12月将在巴黎达成的气候变化协议也不可能大笔一挥就解决问题。


But it is essential that we establish the policy pathways needed to ensure that all countries play their part in protecting the planet, while assisting the vulnerable to adapt to the effects of environmental degradation already underway.	但重要的是我们要建立固定的政策通道，以确保所有国家为保护地球出力，并帮助弱势群体对已经开始显现的环境恶化影响进行调适。


Britain’s Gas Chance	英国的天然气选择


PRAGUE – In late June, the British Geological Survey announced the world’s largest shale-gas field.	布拉格—去年6月，英国地质调查局公布了世界最大的页岩气田。


The Bowland Shale, which lies beneath Lancashire and Yorkshire, contains 50% more gas than the combined reserves of two of the largest fields in the United States, the Barnett Shale and the Marcellus Shale.	位于兰开夏郡和约克郡地下鲍兰德页岩（Bowland Shale），其页岩气蕴藏量比美国最大的两块气田——巴涅特页岩（Barnett Shale）和马塞勒斯页岩（Marcellus Shale）加起来还要多50%。


The United Kingdom has been reluctant to join the hydraulic-fracturing (or fracking) revolution.	英国一直拒绝加入液压致裂法革命。


Yet tapping the Bowland Shale could reignite the UK economy and deliver huge cuts in CO2 emissions.	但开采鲍兰德页岩能让英国经济再次启动，并大幅削减二氧化碳排放。


At the same time, the UK Parliament has approved stringent new measures to reduce carbon emissions by 2020, with the biggest CO2 cuts by far to come from an increase of more than 800% in offshore wind power over the next seven years.	与此同时，英国国会批准了严格的新措施，以便在2020年前减少碳排放，目前，最大的二氧化碳削减项来自未来七年将离岸风能电力增加800%以上的计划。


But offshore wind power is so expensive that it will receive at least three times the traded cost of regular electricity in subsidies – more than even solar power, which was never at an advantage in the UK.	但离岸风电价格昂贵，以至于其补贴至少是常规电力交易成本的三倍，甚至比太阳能电力还高，而后者在英国从未获得优势。


For minimal CO2 reduction, the UK economy will pay dearly.	对于最小二氧化碳减排目标，英国将付出沉重代价。


This is just one example of current climate policy’s utter remove from reality – and not just in the UK.	这只是当前气候政策严重偏离现实的一个例子——英国绝不是个例。


We are focusing on insignificant – but very costly – green policies that make us feel good, while ignoring or actively discouraging policies that would dramatically reduce emissions and make economic sense.	我们专注于无甚大用——但成本高昂——的绿色政策，这让我们感到好受，但忽略了甚至积极地抑制着能大量减排、经济上也划算的政策。


Consider the three standard arguments for a green economy: climate change, energy security, and jobs.	就拿关于绿色经济的三个基本论点来说吧。 它们是气候变化、能源安全和就业。


As it turns out, fracking does better on all three.	就这三方面而言，液压致裂都拥有优势。


Assuming complete success for the UK’s scheme, offshore wind power could produce more than 10% of the country’s electricity in 2020 and reduce its CO2 emissions by up to 22Mt, or 5%, per year.	如果英国的安排获得十足的成功，那么离岸风能可以在2020年产出该国电力总量的10%，降低二氧化碳排放量22百万吨或5%。


But the cost would also be phenomenal.	但成本也颇为壮观。


The UK would pay at least $8 billion annually in subsidies to support this inherently inefficient technology.	英国每年至少得付出80亿美元用于补贴这一效率先天不足的技术。


Compare this to the opportunity of the Bowland Shale.	再来看鲍兰德页岩的机会。


If, by 2020, the UK could exploit its reserves there at just one-third the intensity of the exploitation of the Barnett and Marcellus Shales today, the outcome would be phenomenal.	如果到2020年英国对鲍兰德页岩储气量的开采强度达到巴涅特页岩和马塞勒斯页岩现有水平的三分之一，结果就会大不相同。


Natural gas is much more environmentally friendly than coal, which continues to be the mainstay of electricity production around the world and in the UK.	天然气对环境的友好远胜于煤炭，而就全世界和英国来看，煤电仍是电力的主要形式。


Gas emits less than half the CO2 per kWh produced, and it emits much lower amounts of other pollutants like NOx, SO2, black carbon, CO, mercury, and particulates.	每千瓦时电力二氧化碳排放量，天然气只有煤炭的二分之一弱，而氮氧化物、二氧化硫、炭黑、一氧化碳、汞和微粒粉尘的排放量，天然气更是少得多。


If the UK sold its shale gas both domestically and abroad to replace coal, it could reduce local air pollution significantly and reduce global carbon emissions by 170Mt, or more than a third of UK carbon emissions.	如果英国向国内外出售页岩气以取代煤炭，将极大地降低当地空气污染程度，并减少全球碳排放量170百万吨，即英国碳排放量的三分之一强。


At the same time, instead of costing $8 billion per year, shale-gas production would add about $10 billion per year to the UK economy.	与此同时，页岩气生产不会产生每年80亿美元的成本，反而能给英国经济带来100亿美元的增加值。


Likewise, it is often argued that the green economy will increase energy security, as green resources will leave countries less dependent on fossil-fuel imports.	类似地，一个经常提及的观点是绿色经济会提升能源安全，因为绿色能源能使一国不再依赖化石燃料进口。


But even much higher supplies of wind power would improve security only marginally, because the UK would still have to import just as much oil (wind replaces mostly coal, rarely oil) and much of its gas, leaving it dependent on Russia.	但即便风能再多，也只能在边际上改善能源安全，因为英国仍必须进口与从前同样多的石油（风能取代的大多是煤炭，很少能取代石油）和天然气，即仍必须依赖俄罗斯。


For countries closer to Russia’s sphere of influence, like Poland and Ukraine, this dependence becomes palpable.	对于更接近俄罗斯影响圈的国家，比如波兰和乌克兰，这一依赖就更加���显了。


And yet the UK could improve its energy security dramatically, because it has enough gas reserves to cover roughly the entirety of its gas consumption for a half-century or more.	但英国可以极大地改善其能源安全，因为它所拥有的天然气储备足以覆盖半个多世纪的天然气消费总量。


Moreover, increased UK production would lower world prices, making countries with fewer or no shale-gas resources safer.	此外，英国产量的增加能拉低国际价格，让页岩气资源较贫乏的国家也更加安全。


And, of course, any country that is $10 billion richer, rather than $8 billion poorer, will have a better chance to handle future problems.	当然，任何每年能增加100亿美元而不是减少80亿美元财富的国家，其处理未来问题的境况都会得到改善。


Finally, green-economy advocates promise a surfeit of green jobs.	最后，绿色经济支持者承诺了过多的绿色就业岗位。


But economic research convincingly shows that while subsidies can buy extra jobs, they eventually have to be financed with increased taxes, costing an equal number of jobs elsewhere.	但经济研究令人信服地证明，尽管补贴可以买来就业增加，但最终需要用增税来筹资，造成其他部门同样数量的岗位缩减。


In comparison, shale gas in the US has created an estimated 600,000 jobs that are generating about $100 billion in added GDP and almost $20 billion in public revenue.	比较而言，页岩气在美国创造了约60万个就业岗位、增加了1000亿美元的GDP和近200亿美元的公共收入。


Current global climate policy is unsustainable; the UK’s commitment to boosting offshore wind power is only the latest example.	当前的全球气候政策市不可持续的，英国关于提振离岸风能的承诺只是最新的例子。


Distressed economies cannot afford to pay more than $350 to avoid each ton of CO2, which could be cut on the European market for about 50 times less.	萧条的经济负担不起为了少排放一吨二氧化碳而付出350美元代价，而在欧洲市场上，同样的减排，成本可以低50倍左右。


Shale gas could cut the cost of reducing CO2 seven times more while actually helping Europe’s ailing economy.	页岩气可以让减少二氧化碳排放的成本再降低七倍，同时还能实际帮助欧洲步履蹒跚的经济


Though it is not the ultimate solution, shale gas is greener.	尽管页岩气并非终极解决方案，但它更加绿色。


With good regulation, during the coming decade it can do the most good worldwide in terms of cutting CO2 emissions and improving living conditions.	在良好的监管下，未来十年页岩气可以在减少二氧化碳排放和改善生活条件方面为全世界做出最大的贡献。


Mindless subsidies that we cannot afford will not create a green economy; what will is investment in research and development to bring down costs, so that green energy eventually can outcompete gas.	无法承担的不明智的补贴不可能带来绿色经济； 能带来绿色经济的是为降低成本而投入的研发投资，以使绿色能源最终能够胜过天然气。


Off With Their Heads.	砍下他们的头


WASHINGTON, DC – At last the Obama administration seems to be contemplating a decisive move against America’s banking elite. Following the recent electoral setback in Massachusetts the proposals laid down by former Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker, to reduce the market power of the banks, are being dusted off.	华盛顿特区 ——


Until now it has been a very different story – essentially a victory for the big bankers since spring 2009, when some of the healthier ones were allowed to start paying back any funds they had drawn from the US treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.	最终，经过一番深思熟虑，奥巴马当局好像对美国银行权贵们下手了。


That, in turn, allowed them to escape even the very weak special conditions that had been laid down by the government relating to bonuses and remuneration.	在经过近期在马萨诸塞州选举中的失败之后，由前美联储主席保罗 · 沃尔克起草的一份减少银行权限的报告，开始被重新重视起来。


At the critical moment of crisis and rescue – from September 2008 to early 2009 – the Bush and Obama administrations blinked.	到目前为止，事态的发展开始转变 —— 起初，银行大佬们获得了自 2009 年春天以来的胜利。


There was no serious thought of deposing the bankers, who had helped to cause the crisis, or of breaking up their banks.	一些情况转好的银行开始返回由财政部发放的不良资产救助款。 一旦还款，他们就可以摆脱政府制定的特别条款的束缚：限制奖金和薪酬的发放。


Ordinarily, if an industry plunges into crisis, you expect a serious shake-up. Even if there was some bad luck mixed in with manifest incompetence, the presumption generally is: if your company requires a government rescue, top management needs to be replaced.	在危机发生和救助的关键时期 ——2008 年 9 月到 2009 年初之间 —— 布什和奥巴马当局正在交接政权。


The US treasury has for many years consistently advocated such principles – both directly and through its influence with the IMF – when other countries have got into trouble.	在罢免银行高管和拆分银行方面，他们都还顾不上认真考虑。


But in the case of the US banking industry, nothing, at least until now, has happened at all. Most of the pre-crisis executives in big banks have remained in place, and very little has changed in terms of risk-control practices, or remuneration.	通常情况下，当一个行业陷入危机之时，不管是运气不佳或是经营不善，重组问题就不可避免。


Why was the administration so conservative?	重组的前提是：想要得到政府的救助，公司高管必须下台。


Fear of a complete collapse of the banking system must have played some role – along with an unhealthy degree of intermingling between the political and financial elite, which meant that there was real affection for firms such as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup at the top of government.	过去，当一些国家的财政出现问题时，美国财政部多年以来就是一直奉行该项原则 —— 直接或是通过影响 IMF 来实行重组。


In any case, the window of opportunity appeared to have been missed.	但是在处理美国银行业上，至少到现在，还没有任何形式的处罚措施。


As the measures taken to stabilize the economy began to work, the banks started to make money again.	绝大多数的银行高管依旧没有替换，在风险控制和薪酬架构问题上，依旧没有什么改变。


And, given the departure of some competitors – such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers – the larger market share for those that remained meant higher profits.	为什么当局如此保守？ 害怕银行业的整体崩盘可能是部分原因 —— 当然也包括政客和金融权贵之间某种不正常的关系，也就是对高盛和花旗高管们那种真心的偏爱。


The administration did launch a modest regulatory-reform initiative in summer 2009, proposing new consumer protections and some measures to strengthen financial stability, but the measures were fought every inch of the way. And early in 2010 a new bank tax was proposed that aimed to raise about $90 billion over a decade or so – but that would have represented only about 1% of banks’ profits.	当稳定经济的措施开始发挥效力之时，银行开始盈利。 由于一些竞争者的退出 —— 这包括贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟 —— 更多的市场占有率就意味着更高的利润。


It is no surprise that the banks have tried to resist reform. The existing business model allows them to take the upside when they win, and hand over the downside to taxpayers when they lose.	政府确实在 2009 年夏天实施了一些微弱的监管改革，提出了对消费者的保护和一些加强金融稳定的措施，但就这也遭到了银行业的顽强反击。


This encourages excessive risk and threatens repeated cycles of boom-bust-bailout. Indeed, Andrew Haldane, head of financial stability at the Bank of England, calls this our “doom loop.”	2010 年初生效的银行税将在未来 10 年向银行征收 900 亿美元 —— 但这仅占银行利润的 1% 。


Back-to-back international financial crises are rare, but the continued presence of such perverse incentives always leads to trouble – more than 50 years of IMF experience is clear on this point.&	大型银行自然想要维持现有的商业模式 —— 盈利时将收益纳入囊中，一旦亏损，则由纳税人买单。 这样他们可以过度冒险，从而引发一系列的泡沫破碎和政府救助轮回。


But, finally, after Massachusetts, it looks as if something important is happening.	全球性的金融危机很少会接连而至，但在这种巨额利润的刺激之下，银行业会一再铤而走险 ——IMF 五十多年的历程非常清楚地表明了这点。


The reforms proposed by Volcker would impose restrictions on banks similar to those contained in the Glass-Steagall Act, the depression-era legislation that separated commercial banking and investment banking.	但是，最终，在马萨诸塞州选举之后，一些重要的改变出现了。 由沃尔克提出的改革方案将给银行增加新的限制措施，类似于大萧条时期的格拉斯 - 斯蒂格尔法案，将商业银行和投行区分开来。


The dilution of Glass-Steagall, and its ultimate repeal in 1999, allowed banks to engage in so-called “proprietary trading” – enabling them to use depositors’ savings to trade for their own account, mainly in risky mortgage-backed securities.	1999 年，格拉斯 - 斯蒂格尔法案被修改，允许银行从事所谓的“自营账户交易” —— 使用储户的资金来进行交易，主要是被用在颇具风险的按揭证券化产品上。


But the Obama administration must go further than prohibiting proprietary trading by commercial banks and do two further things.	不过，奥巴马政府不仅应该禁止商业银行的“自营账户交易”，而且还应该做好两件事情。


First, capital requirements should be tripled – not just in the US, but across the G-20 – so that banks hold at least 20-25% of assets in core capital.	第一，资本准备金应该翻两倍 —— 不仅针对美国，而且是 20 国集团的银行 —— 迫使银行至少持有 20-25% 的核心资产。


That way, shareholders rather than regulators would play the leading role in making banks behave sensibly.	这样一来，股东们就会代替监管机构来主导银行的理性操作。


Second, if banks are “too big to fail,” they must be shrunk, so that taxpayers do not need to bail them out every time a crisis erupts.	第二，如果银行“大到不能破产”，那就必须缩小规模，纳税人没有义务在每次危机爆发时救助它们。


In the US context, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1994, which set a size cap so that no bank can have more than 10% of retail deposits, needs to be amended.	在美国， 1994 年的尼格尔－里尔跨州银行和分支机构效率法需要修改，该法案规定，没有银行可以拥有超过 10% 的储户。


We need to update and enforce this sensible general notion and set a limit on how big any bank can become relative to the overall economy.	我们需要应该明确银行的规模大到什么地步就必须限制。


Obama is right to get tough with the six largest US banks – including JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Bank of America – which now have total assets worth more than 60% of GDP.	奥巴马对六大银行 —— 包括摩根大通，高盛，花旗和美国银行在内 —— 强硬起来是对的。 它们的总资产加起来超过 GDP 的 60% 。


This is an unprecedented degree of financial concentration.	这是现代美国史无前例的金融垄断。


As Teddy Roosevelt pointed out more than 100 years ago, concentrated economic power tends to take over political power, which runs counter to the democratic tradition.	早在 100 多年前，西奥多 • 罗斯福就指出，垄断金融寡头的最大问题就是它们对政治的影响力，这和民主的本质是相违背的。


We have now learned that it also runs counter to sound economic policy.	如今我们还知道，这还会阻碍成熟经济政策的顺利实施。


Oil Currency Hypocrisy	对石油货币的伪善


CAMBRIDGE – Does it make sense for United States Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to be touring the Middle East supporting the region’s hard dollar exchange-rate pegs, while the Bush administration simultaneously blasts Asian countries for not letting their currencies appreciate faster against the dollar?	剑桥－在布什政府抨击亚洲国家不让其货币对美元更快升值的同时，美国财政部长汉克·鲍尔森访问中东支持该地区牢固的盯住美元汇率制度有意义吗？


Unfortunately, this blatant inconsistency stems from the US’s continuing economic and financial vulnerability rather than reflecting any compelling economic logic.	不幸的是，这个明显的矛盾源自美国持续脆弱的经济和财政状况而不是要反映任何强行性的经济逻辑。


Instead of promoting dollar pegs, as Paulson is, the US should be supporting the International Monetary Fund’s behind-the-scenes efforts to promote de-linking of oil currencies and the dollar.	美国应该支持国际货币基金组织推进石油货币和美元脱钩的幕后努力，而不应该像鲍尔森那样推进这些货币盯住美元。


Perhaps the Bush administration worries that if oil countries abandoned the dollar standard, today’s dollar weakness would turn into a rout.	或许布什政府担心如果石油国家抛弃美元标准，美元现在的弱势可能会转变成崩溃。


But the US should be far more worried about promoting faster adjustment of its still-gaping trade deficit, which in many ways lies at the root of the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis.	但是，美国应该更加担心推进加快调整仍在扩大的贸易逆差的措施，这在许多方面是最近的次级抵押贷款危机爆发的根源。


The administration’s multi-pronged effort to postpone pain to US consumers, including super easy monetary and fiscal policy, only risks a greater crisis in the not-too-distant future.	布什政府多管齐下延缓美国消费者痛苦的努力，包括超级简单的货币和财政政策，只会导致在不远的将来产生更大的危机的风险。


It is not at all hard to imagine the whole strategy boomeranging in early 2009, soon after the next US president takes office.	不难想象，在2009初期，在下一任美国总统就职后不久，整个策略就会自食其果。


Of course, a strengthening of the oil currencies (including not only the Gulf States, but also other Middle East countries and Russia) would not turn around the US trade balance overnight.	当然，加强石油货币（不仅包括海湾地区国家，而且也包括其他中东国家和俄罗斯）不会使美国的贸易收支一夜逆转。


But oil countries do account for a large share of the world’s trade surpluses, and a weaker dollar would help promote US exports to some degree, even in the short run.	但是石油国家确实占世界贸易顺差相当大的份额，并且即使在短期内，弱势美元都可以在一定程度上帮助促进美国的出口。


More importantly, it is imperative for US policies to be consistent across regions.	更重要的是，美国在不同地区的政策必须保持一致。


How can the US Treasury, on the one hand, periodically flirt with labeling China a “currency manipulator” and, on the other hand, condone a similar strategy in oil-exporting countries?	一方面，美国财政部不时轻率地给中国贴上“操纵货币”的标签，另一方面，默许石油出口国家同样的策略，美国财政部怎么能这样做呢？


Of course, one can imagine other reasons for US supplication to the oil states.	当然，人们可以设想美国请求石油国家这样做的其他原因。


Perhaps the administration worries that it cannot simultaneously beg for lower dollar oil prices and help promote a weaker dollar.	或许布什政府担心它不能在请求以美元计算的低油价的同时帮助推进美元弱势。


But, contrary to popular opinion, the two actually have little to do with each other.	但是，和流行的观点不同，其实这两者关系不大。


Oil prices are set in a world market, and depend mainly on the quantities demanded and supplied by different regions, not the currency of payment.	石油价格是置于世界市场的，并且主要依靠不同地区的需求和供应的数量而不是支付货币确定。


It is not at all clear that the dollar price of oil would evolve any differently if the euro, rather than the dollar, were the reference currency.	如果不是用美元而是用欧元作为参考货币，还不是很清楚石油的美元价格可能演化的与现在有何不同。


Secretary Paulson has emphasized that the US is “open for business” from sovereign wealth funds.	鲍尔森部长强调美国对主权财富基金进行“商业开放”。


One can hope that his confidence is justified.	人们可以期望他的信心是正当合理的。


There is no cause for the US to place any significant new restrictions on sovereign investments in the US beyond those that it already has on trade.	美国没有理由对在美国的主权投资施加超过其在贸易上已有的重大的新限制。


Besides, the US needs these investments to help re-capitalize its badly weakened financial system.	除此之外，美国需要这些投资来给它虚弱不堪的金融系统重新注入资本。


However, even if we can agree on keeping the US open to sovereign wealth fund investments, that is no reason for promoting exchange-rate policies that exacerbate the very trade imbalances that are driving the whole sovereign wealth fund phenomenon in the first place.	但是，即使我们在美国对主权财富基金投资开放上取得一致，这也并不能成为推进加剧贸易失衡的汇率政策的理由，而贸易失衡又首先驱动了整个主权财富基金现象。


Then again, perhaps the Bush administration is worried that if the oil currencies strengthen too much against the dollar, it will start becoming too expensive for the US to scale up its military operations in the Middle East.	再一次的，或许布什政府担心如果石油货币对美元过于强势，相应提高美国在中东的军事行动就开始变得太昂贵了。


This, too, is wrong-headed.	这也是固执错误的。


If a cheaper dollar leads to an invasion of US exports to the Middle East and rising living standards in the region, all parties will be far better served.	如果便宜的美元导致美国出口大量进入中东地区并提高了当地的生活水平，所有相关各方都能获得更多的好处。


What about the interests of the oil countries themselves?	石油国家自己的利益怎么样呢？


Are they right to fear potentially catastrophic results from abandoning the dollar?	他们害怕抛弃美元后的潜在灾难性后果正确吗？


As with China, these concerns are overblown.	和中国一样，这些担心都是夸大了的。


Even with the prevalence of dollar indexation across the region, exchange-rate appreciation would still help promote cheaper imports and higher living standards.	即使该地区美元指数化盛行，汇率升值依然可以帮助促使进口货物变得更便宜以及生活水平提高。


Moreover, as public confidence in the de-linked oil currencies increases over time, dollar indexation of private contracts will diminish, and currency movements will have a greater impact on overall prices.	而且，随着时间的推移，公众对脱钩后的石油货币信心增加，私人合同的美元指数化就会减少，并且货币活动将会对所有价格产生更大的影响。


More immediately, inflation across the oil states is soaring today, with CPI inflation in the Middle East averaging more than 6% after years of relative stability.	更直接的是，现在石油国家的通货膨胀严重，在相对稳定若干年后，中东国家的CPI平均暴涨超过了6%。


If this inflation is allowed to continue and deepen, it is likely to have effects easily as pernicious as the exchange-rate appreciation the region’s leaders are striving so hard to avoid.	如果允许这样的通货膨胀继续并加深的话，可能很容易产生与该地区领导人努力避免的汇率升值一样的有害后果。


Perhaps the most important positive effect of exchange-rate appreciation would be to help promote the development of domestically-oriented industries such as health care, education, and banking, thereby alleviating some of the region’s mass underemployment.	或许汇率升值最重要的积极结果是帮助促进内部导向型的产业的发展，如医疗，教育和银行业，并因此缓解该地区大量失业的状况。


To be sure, there are important differences between the oil exporters and the Asian economies.	可以肯定，石油出口国和亚洲经济体之间有重要的区别。


With world energy prices at record highs, it makes sense for oil economies to run surpluses, thereby saving for when oil supplies eventually peter out.	在世界能源价格处于历史高位的时候，石油经济体取得顺差从而为石油供应最终枯竭后进行储备是有意义的。


But flexible exchange rates are still the right way for the region to develop a more balanced economic and financial base.	但是灵活的汇率依然是该地区发展更平衡的经济和金融基础的正确选择。


As for the US, it makes little sense to support dollar currency pegs in any large emerging market, at least until its trade balance normalizes.  This is no time for oil currency hypocrisy.	对美国来说，至少在它的贸易结余正常化之前，支持任何大的新兴市场货币盯住美元意义不大。 现在不是对石油货币采取伪善态度的时候。


Oil in the Gulf, Then and Now	海湾石油的今与昔


VIENNA – On April 20, an explosion on Deepwater Horizon, a British Petroleum (BP)- operated oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, led to the most publicized oil spill in decades.	维也纳——4月20日，英国石油公司所属墨西哥湾钻井平台“深水地平线”的爆炸引发了数十年来最广为人知的一次石油泄漏事故。


Another blowout in the same waters 31 years ago, farther south on the Mexican side of the Gulf, turned into the largest peacetime oil spill ever.	31年前在墨西哥湾更南端水域发生的另外一起井喷事故演变成了和平时期规模最大的一次石油泄漏。


The platform where that accident happened, called Ixtoc 1, was operated by Pemex, the state-owned Mexican oil company.	发生事故的钻井平台“伊克斯托克I号”归属墨西哥国有石油企业墨西哥石油公司所有。


The two accidents and the spills they caused have a number of similar features, although marine oil spills in general have profoundly changed in character in the three decades between the two events.	虽然这两次事故相距的三十年间海上石油泄漏的一般特点发生了重大变化，但这两次事故及其引发的泄漏却有若干特点是极其相似的。


Oil tankers used to be responsible for the bulk of oil that was spilled.	油轮曾经是造成大部分原油泄漏的罪魁祸首。


Tank-washing gave rise to a huge number of small spills, and tanker accidents such as those involving the Torrey Canyon, Exxon Valdez, Metula, and St. Peter resulted in huge, concentrated spills.	油仓清洗引发了数量庞大的小规模泄漏事件，而诸如托利峡谷号、埃克森·瓦尔德斯号和圣彼得堡号等油轮事故则导致了大规模集中的原油泄漏。


Blowouts were not infrequent, but most occurred on land or in shallow water, and most could be stopped relatively easily.	井喷事故也屡见不鲜，但绝大多数都发生在陆地或浅水区域，可以比较容易地加以遏制。


The ban on tank-washing, technical features such as double hulls and sectioning of tanks, introduction of one-way sea lanes and, most important, the use of Global Positioning Systems, have greatly reduced the amount of oil entering the sea from tankers.	禁止清洗油仓的禁令、诸如双层船壳及油仓分区等技术特征、海上单向航道的设开辟、以及意义最为重大的全球定位系统的启用，所有这些措施大大减少了海洋原油泄漏事故。


Meanwhile, the technology used at drilling and production platforms has developed tremendously, but the challenges regarding depth, weather, and sediment structure have grown even more, as easy-to-exploit oil fields have been exhausted.	与此同时，钻井和开采平台的技术发展也日新月异，但随着便于开采的油井已经被开采完毕，人们所面临的深度、气候和沉积物构造等方面的难题也更加棘手。


Blowouts have become the most troublesome type of oil spills, and in deep water they tend to continue for a considerable time because of the difficulties faced in containing them.	井喷已经成为最难处理的漏油事故，在深水区发生的井喷因为处理困难，可能持续的时间很长。


After the explosions at Deepwater Horizon and Ixtoc, oil and gas under high pressure entered the water at the seabed.	在“深水地平线”和“伊克斯托克I号”发生爆炸后，油气在高压作用下从海底涌入水中。


This resulted in a three-phase emulsion of oil, gas, and water that also contained sand and dirt particles.	这导致油、气及混有沙土微粒海水的三重乳化现象。


The properties of this oil emulsion differ from normal crude oil.	这种乳化油的性质与普通原油不同。


Some part of it will float on the surface, but parts may also form plumes at different depths in the water mass.	其中某些部分会浮在海面，但某些部分也可能在水体的不同深度形成羽状结构。


Standard aerial or satellite imaging techniques to measure the quantity of oil spilled do not work well.	测量漏油数量的一般空中或卫星成像技术效果均不太显著。


In the Ixtoc case, using such methods, Pemex (wanting to keep the loss figure low) estimated the spill to amount to a little under a half-million tons.	在“伊克斯托克”泄漏事件中，墨西哥石油公司采用上述方法（目的是尽可能压低损失数据）估算泄漏总量不足50万吨。


A United Nations expert group that I led put the figure significantly higher.	我所率领的联合国专家小组估算的数据比这高得多。


Similarly, whereas BP has been using a release figure of 800 tons per day From Deepwater Horizon, estimates by independent experts are many times higher.	与此相似，英国石油公司公布的“深水地平线”泄漏数据为每天800吨，而独立专家小组所做的估算比这高出很多倍。


Pemex tried to put a device called a “sombrero” over the Ixtoc leak to collect the oil at the ocean floor, but the plan failed because the structure could not be kept in place.	墨西哥石油公司曾经尝试把一种名叫“墨西哥宽边帽”的仪器放在“伊克斯托克”油井旁边收集海底的原油，但因为无法对仪器进行固定，所以计划最终没有成功。


Formation of methane hydrate was noted, but was not decisive.	当时据报形成了甲烷水合物，但没有发挥决定性的效果。


In the case of Deepwater Horizon, a huge dome could be put in place, despite the greater depth, thanks to deployment of modern unmanned underwater vehicles, robots, and positioning tools, but the formation of methane hydrates clogged the device and rendered it useless.	而在“深水地平线”事故中，由于运用了现代无人水下器械、机器人和定位设备，所以尽管漏点更深，人们仍然将一个巨大的穹顶放置到位。 但甲烷水合物的形成堵塞了相关设备，让它成了无用的摆设。


In both cases, efforts were made to burn off the oil from the ocean’s surface.	在这两次泄漏事故中，人们都试图烧掉漂浮在海面的原油。


But, as the 1967 Torrey Canyon experience showed – the stranded tanker was bombed with napalm – oil on water doesn’t burn well, and the emulsified oil called “chocolate mousse” hardly burned at all.	但1967年托利峡谷号的前车之鉴表明——人们用凝固汽油弹炸毁了那艘搁浅的油轮——浮在水面的原油很难燃烧充分，而被称为“巧克力慕斯”的乳化油则根本无法燃烧。


Whether or not to “disperse” oil has been a key strategic question since combating spills began in earnest in the 1960’s.	20世纪60年代与原油泄漏的斗争正式开始以来，是否“驱散”原油已经称为一项战略性的决策。


The answer depends on whether the priority for protection is birds and beaches, or other forms of marine life such as fish, shrimps, and mollusks.	答案取决于保护的重点是鸟类以及海滩，还是鱼、虾和软体动物等其他形式的海洋生物。 如果首要保护鸟类和海滩，可以选择驱散原油；


If it’s birds and beaches, disperse; if it’s fisheries, don’t.	如果首要保护鱼类，则不要进行这项操作。


The decision has an obvious public-relations dimension.	这项决策显然会造成公共关系方面的影响。


Oil-contaminated birds and beaches make appalling pictures, whereas dead fish and shrimp larvae go unnoticed by cameras.	受原油污染的鸟类和海滩从照片上看触目惊心，而死亡的鱼虾幼体则不容易被注意到。


The damage caused by the Ixtoc spill was huge.	“伊克斯托克”泄漏事故造成的损失非常大。


Beaches, mostly in Mexico but to some extent also in the United States, were hit, and birds succumbed in large numbers, despite the dispersion efforts.	绝大多数墨西哥和一些美国海滩遭到了破坏，尽管对泄漏原油进行了驱散，但仍然导致大量的鸟类死亡。


Because of the dispersion, shrimp, squid, and some fish populations suffered, with fisheries hit even harder.	驱散原油殃及了虾、乌贼和某些鱼类种群，渔业生产遭受的打击也非常严重。


Where the concentrations of un-weathered oil components are highest, water-breathing organisms die.	在未风化原油集中的海域，依靠在水中呼吸的有机体大量死亡。


In a much larger area, they become tainted and rendered useless as food products.	在更为广阔的海域，它们遭到污染，无法再作为食品食用。


In an even larger area – and for a much longer time – consumers reject the products.	在更为广阔的领域——而且在更长时间内——消费者都拒绝购买类似产品。


After Ixtoc, the blow to the Mexican fisheries became a blessing in disguise.	在“伊克斯托克”事故后，墨西哥渔业遭受的打击却使人们因祸得福。


The dramatic reduction in fishing pressure allowed the devastated populations to recover, and five years later one had to look carefully to spot either remaining oil or damaged populations.	捕捞压力的大幅减轻给了遭受毁灭性打击的鱼类种群以喘息之机，事故发生5年后，人们必需仔细观察才能发现残留的原油和对鱼群的影响。


The high temperatures of the Gulf of Mexico helped, as recovery proceeds much faster in warm waters than in cold.	墨西哥湾的高温发挥了积极作用，因为温暖水域的生态恢复比寒冷水域快得多。


It took nine months to cap the Ixtoc well.	封闭“伊克斯托克”油井共耗时九个月。


Drilling a release well finally did the job of stopping the flow of oil.	导流井的钻探成功最终阻止了原油的泄漏。


Deepwater Horizon is still spewing oil into the Gulf of Mexico, even though BP has succeeded in inserting a smaller pipe into the main leakage to suck off part of the flow.	尽管英国石油公司成功地将一小截油管插入主渗漏口并吸走了部分渗漏的原油，但“深水地平线”油井仍然不停地向墨西哥湾喷涌原油。


It is far too early to assess the ecological damage and economic losses to fisheries and tourism from the Deepwater Horizon spill.	评估“深水地平线”漏油事故所造成的生态破坏给渔业和旅游业造成的经济损失仍然为时过早。


It is a safe bet that shrimp and squid populations will suffer, as they did in the Ixtoc case, but so is a close-to-complete recovery within a limited number of years.	但几乎可以肯定虾类和乌贼种群将像“伊克斯托克”油井事故中那样受到打击，但只需几年时间这种影响即可恢复如初。


Cheap Oil’s Silver Lining for the Gulf	低油价给波斯湾带来的福音


BEIRUT – In June 2014, a barrel of Brent crude – the main benchmark of the international oil market – sold for $115.	贝鲁特—2014年6月，一桶布伦特原油——国际石油市场的主要基准——卖115美元。


Today, less than two years later, the price is $45 – or even less.	如今，不到两年后，其价格是45美元——甚至更低。


Not surprisingly, that collapse has been a massive shock to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil sheikhdoms, which rely on oil for some 85% of their revenues.	毫不奇怪，如此暴跌对沙特阿拉伯和波斯湾产油国造成了沉重打击，它们85%的收入要依靠石油。


And what they need to realize is that, unlike past price declines, this one will not be transitory.	它们需要意识到，和过去的价格下跌不同，这次下跌不是暂时性的。


This “new normal” for oil reflects new realities: China’s economic growth – and so its demand for oil – is bound to be lower; the world’s energy efficiency will increase, not least because of commitments made in December at the Paris conference on climate change; and disruptive innovation is making shale oil and gas, along with renewable energy sources, far more competitive.	这一石油“新常态”反映了新现实：中国经济增长——及其石油需求——必然将下降； 因为12月的气候变化巴黎大会的承诺，世界能源效率将提高；


With the return of Iran, Libya, and Iraq as major oil exporters, low oil prices must surely be both inevitable and enduring.	而破坏性创新正在大大提高页岩油气和可再生能源资源的竞争力。 随着伊朗、利比亚、伊拉克重新成为主要石油出口国，低油价显然是不可避免并将长期持续的。


Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states should not let this crisis go to waste.	沙特阿拉伯和其他波斯湾国家不应该浪费这次危机。


They now have a perfect opportunity finally to undertake comprehensive economic reforms.	它们现在拥有一次最终实施全面经济改革的完美机会。


Their aim should be a new development model that frees them from dependence on hydrocarbons.	它们的目标应该放在新的发展模式上，从对碳氢化合物的依赖中解脱出来。


The fiscal buffers from past oil revenues can provide the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with short-term relief.	过去石油收入所带来的财政缓冲可以为海湾合作委员会（GCC）六国提供短期缓解。


But they must use that window to launch the structural reforms needed to achieve sustainable economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and the sound and equitable exploitation of their oil and gas reserves.	但它们必须利用这一窗口启动实现可持续经济增长、宏观经济稳定以及可靠合理地利用石油天然气收入所需要的结构改革。


That means economic diversification, which can be achieved only by reducing the size of government and removing the obstacles that stymie the private sector.	这意味着经济多元化，而经济多元化只能通过减小政府规模、消除阻碍私人部门的障碍实现。


A radical reform of the Kafala system, which monitors and regulates migrant labor, would remove a major barrier to labor mobility.	Kafala���度监控和监管移民劳动力，必须予以彻底改革，从而消除劳动力流动的一大主要障碍。


But governments must also introduce the legal and regulatory frameworks needed for privatization and public-private partnerships (PPPs).	但政府还必须引入私有化和公私合作（PPP）所需要的法律和监管框架。


Sadly, only Kuwait and Dubai have so far moved to allow PPPs, while only Saudi Arabia intends to privatize airports (Jeddah and Dammam).	悲哀的是，目前只有科威特和迪拜开始允许PPP，而只有沙特阿拉伯想要私有化机场（Jeddah和Dammam）。


Privatization and PPPs in infrastructure, energy, health, education, transport, and logistics could attract massive domestic and foreign investment.	基础设施、能源、医疗、教育、交通和物流方面的私有化和PPP可以吸引大量国内外投资。


So, too, would legislation to allow full ownership of enterprises by foreigners and the proper protection of their property rights – which would have the added benefit of encouraging expatriates to save and invest locally.	允许外国人拥有企业全部产权以及合理保护他们的财产权利的立法亦然——这还会带来额外的好处，即鼓励侨民在本地储蓄和投资。


Dubai’s free-trade zones are a testament to the success that comes with liberalization and the removal of barriers to foreign ownership and management.	迪拜的自由贸易区证明了自由化和消除外国所有权和管理权障碍能够取得成功。


Fiscal reform must also be a high priority.	财政改革也必须作为重中之重。


Wasteful government expenditures and subsidies account for some 8% of non-oil GDP (5% of total GDP) in the GCC states.	浪费性政府支出和补贴占了GCC国家非石油GDP的8%（总GDP的5%）左右。


Energy subsidies – so ingrained in the GCC economies – distort consumption and production patterns; defeat government attempts at economic diversification; and increase vulnerability to volatile international energy prices.	能源补贴——在GCC经济体中根深蒂固——扭曲了消费和生产模式； 有害于政府在经济多样化方面的尝试；


Eliminating the subsidies would not only stimulate investment in energy efficiency and solar power, but would also generate substantial environmental and public-health benefits.	并增加了面对波动的国际能源价格的脆弱性。 取消补贴不但能够刺激能源效率和太阳能方面的投资，还能带来巨大的环境和公共健康好处。


Similarly, if the region’s governments were to introduce efficient, equitable pricing of public services and utilities – including water, electricity, and transport – they would create fiscal room to promote job creation with schemes linking education and employment.	类似地，如果该地区政府想要引入高效、平等的公共服务和公用设施定价——包括水、电和交通等——它们将创造财政空间，拿出将教育和就业挂钩的机制刺激就业创造。


Instead of government spending crowding out the private sector, there could be development spending to “crowd in” the private sector.	政府支出不会挤出私人部门，相反，可能出现“挤进”私人部门的发展支出。


The other imperative is to diversify government revenue.	另一项当务之急是政府收入多样化。


The prevailing tax regime across the Gulf is not fit for purpose, has limited ability to influence private-sector behavior, and rules out counter-cyclical fiscal policy.	目前波斯湾普遍的税收制度都与目标不符，对私人部门行为的影响力有限，并且反周期财政政策无从着手。


From 2012 to 2014, the GCC’s non-oil tax revenues averaged only about 1.6% of GDP.	从2012年到2014年，GCC非石油税收收入平均只有GDP的1. 6%。


As a first step, the GCC states are moving toward new tax regimes in early 2018, including a value-added tax, a corporation tax, property taxes, and taxes on fuel, tobacco, and alcohol.	作为第一步，GCC国家正在着手从2018年初实施新税制，包括增值税、公司税、房产税以及能源、烟草和酒税。


At 5%, the VAT could raise a modest 1.5-2% of GDP in revenue.	如果增值税税率为5%，将带来GDP的1. 5—2%的温和收入。


But why not go further?	但为何不更进一步？


A $0.52 carbon tax per liter could raise over $50 billion annually for Saudi Arabia, substantially reducing this year’s projected budget deficit of $90 billion.	每升0. 52美元的碳排税将给沙特阿拉伯带来每年500亿美元的收入，大幅降低今年900亿美元的预计预算赤字。


As a third step, the GCC countries should issue debt and sukuk (Sharia-compliant bonds) to finance budget deficits as well as development projects and infrastructure investment.	第三步，GCC国家应该发行债务和sukuk（符合伊斯兰教法的债券）为预算赤字以及发展项目和基础设施投资融资。


The GCC countries have low levels of government debt and can run moderate budget deficits without jeopardizing fiscal sustainability.	GCC国家政府债务水平低，能够背负温和的预算赤字而不影响财政可持续性。


But developing their financial markets would allow the private sector to tap the GCC’s plentiful financial resources invested outside the Gulf.	但发展自身金融市场将让私人部门利用GCC投资于波斯湾之外的大量金融资源。


Finally, the GCC needs to favor greater exchange-rate flexibility and monetary independence.	最后，GCC需要支持加强汇率弹性和货币独立性。


Traditionally, its governments have pursued expansionary policies during economic booms and tightened their belts in downturns.	传统上，其政府在经济繁荣期追求扩张性政策，在衰退期收紧裤腰带。


Pegging their currencies to the US dollar has aggravated this pro-cyclical pattern.	将货币盯住美元放大了这一顺周期模式。


While the peg gives GCC currencies credibility, it has prevented real depreciation and fails to reflect the deep structural changes in GCC members’ economic and financial links over the past three decades – particularly the shift away from the United States and Europe and toward China and Asia.	盯住美元给了GCC货币信誉，但也阻止了GCC货币真实贬值，从而无法体现过去三十年来GCC成员国经济和金融联系的深刻结构性变化——特别是脱离美国和欧洲、倒向中国和亚洲的趋势。


Instead, the GCC countries should peg their currencies to a basket comprising the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the renminbi.	相反，GCC国家应该将货币盯住由美元、欧元、日元和人民币所组成的货币篮子。


If the basket also included oil, GCC currencies could depreciate in line with a falling price – and rise if and when it recovers.	如果将石油也纳入这个篮子，那么GCC货币可以随着石油价格下跌而贬值——而在石油价格复苏时升值。


The bottom line is that economic diversification – so long preached rather than implemented – is now a necessity for the Gulf’s oil states.	底线是经济多元化——宣传了很久，但从未实施——目前已成为波斯湾石油国家的需要。


As the cliché has it, necessity is the mother of invention.	老话说，需要是发明之母。


The GCC should embrace it.	GCC应该领会它。


Cheap Oil for Change	低油价的契机


WASHINGTON, DC – The recent decline in oil prices is likely to have a major, largely positive impact on the global economy – even greater than most observers seem to recognize.	发自华盛顿特区——最近的油价下跌很可能会为全球经济带来重大且在很大程度上正面的影响——甚至要比绝大多数观察家们所意识到的更为深远。


Indeed, if governments take advantage of lower oil prices today to implement critical energy-policy reforms, the benefits may improve structural features of their economies tomorrow.	事实上，如果各国政府能利用当今的低油价去推行极为关键的能源政策改革，所收到的好处或将改善这些国家经济在未来的结构性特征。


A key reason why the price decline’s impact has so far been underestimated is that nobody knows how long it will last.	而油价下跌的影响至今仍被低估的一个主要原因就是没人知道这一状况究竟将持续多久。


And, indeed, past price movements provide little guidance in this regard.	与此同时，过去的油价变动事实上在这方面也只有极小的借鉴意义。


When prices plunged in 2008, they shot back up almost faster than experts could say “new normal”; after the 1986-1987 drop, prices remained low for a decade and a half.	当油价在2008年下跌时，随后的反弹是如此迅猛，以致专家们都还没来得及做出“新常态”的判断； 而在1986~1987年间的下跌之后，油价却维持了15年的低价运行。


This time, the price trajectory is likely to be determined by a new player in the energy game: shale oil.	如今，油价的运行轨道很可能由能源博弈的一个新参与者所决定——页岩油。


The marginal cost of shale-oil production (the expense of continuing to pump an existing well) varies from $55 to $70 per barrel.	页岩油生产的边际成本（也就是持续从一个已有油井采油的费用）在55到70美元一桶之间。


Add a $5 profit margin, and the oil-supply curve now has a long, near-horizontal segment in the range of about $60-75 per barrel.	再加上5美元的利润，石油供应曲线如今在60至75美元每桶的范围内拥有一个长且近乎平行的区段。


Regardless of demand, this will be the natural nesting range for the price of oil – call it the “shale shelf” – and will likely remain in place for a protracted period.	在不考虑需求的情况下。 这一区间将成为油价的一个天然底部区间——可以将其称之为“页岩底部”——并很可能维持相当长的一段时间。


This provides some insight into OPEC’s decision last November not to curtail supply.	这可以让我们理解石油输出国组织为何在去年决定不再削减产量。


Saudi Arabia correctly reasoned that cutting output would not boost prices, but simply concede space for new players to step in and grab market share.	沙特阿拉伯明智地推算出削产无法推高价格，只能为新参与者拉开进入空间并将市场份额拱手相让。


Of course, this pattern could be disrupted, if, say, a war or major conflict in an oil-exporting region constrained supply enough to cause prices to spike beyond the shale shelf.	当然，如果因为某个石油产区爆发了战争或严重冲突，导致供应大幅下降到足以令价格远超页岩底部的话，这一模式��会被打破。


But, in the absence of a major unexpected shock, oil companies will remain under pressure to continue selling oil, even at low prices, as they struggle to service the large debts they incurred on investments when oil prices were high.	但在缺乏一场重大意外冲击的情况下，石油企业将继续被迫低价卖油油，因为它们得努力偿还高油价时进行投资所欠下的债务。


This pressure is precisely what drove oil prices so low in December and January.	而这一压力也正是在最近的12月和1月导致油价走低的原因。


Given this, it is reasonable to expect the oil supply to remain plentiful, and prices to remain moderate, through 2016 – a trend that will boost global growth by an estimated 0.5 percentage points over this period.	基于这一情况，预计石油供应将在2016年间保持充足，而价格也将维持保持平稳——而这一趋势预计会将该时期的全球增长推高0. 5%。


The impact will be especially large for countries like India and Indonesia, where the bill for oil imports amounts to as much as 7.5% of GDP.	同时这对印度和印尼这类国家的影响将尤为重大，因为这些国家的石油进口上的钱占到了GDP的7. 5%。


In fact, India’s current account, which has been in deficit for years, is likely to record a surplus this year.	事实上，印度的经常账户在维持了多年的赤字之后。 有望在今年实现顺差。


This creates a unique opportunity for energy-policy reform.	同时这也为能源政策改革创造了一个独特的契机。


In far too many countries, fuel is heavily subsidized, straining government budgets and encouraging wasteful consumption.	在许多国家中，对燃料价格的高额补贴导致政府预算吃紧，同时还并助长了浪费性的消费。


Low oil prices offer an ideal opening to reduce subsidies, thereby releasing funds that governments can spend on basic services and social-welfare programs that advance poverty reduction.	低油价也提供了一个减少补贴的理想契机，令到政府可以将这些资金用在基础服务以及协助脱贫的社会福利项目之上。


But advising countries simply to lower subsidies is often meaningless.	但简单建议各国去降低补贴往往是无意义的。


In countries where the government dictates gas prices – like India and Indonesia did until recently (and, to some extent, continue to do) – lower market prices would reduce the subsidy automatically.	在那些政府操控油价的国家——像印度和印尼两国直到最近所做的那样（以及在某种程度上将继续实施的）。 更低的市场价格将自动使补助额得以减轻。


That is why holding down subsidies is inadequate for such countries.	这也是为何降低补助不适用于这些国家的原因。


The goal should be to shift from a fixed-price system, with occasional government-decreed adjustments, to a market-based price regime, in which the government makes a credible pledge not to limit prices, with the exception of pre-defined extreme circumstances.	而最终的目标，应该是从一个油价固定并偶尔由政府下令调整的体系转换成一个以市场为基础的，政府承诺只要不出现预先设定的极端情况就不去限制价格的体系。


While such a move would have a negligible effect on prices now, it would provide countries with a huge advantage during future oil-price fluctuations, because consumers and retail suppliers would no longer be cut off from price signals.	虽然这一举动可能只会对当前的油价产生极为微小的影响。 却将为各国在未来油价波动中带来巨大的好处，因为消费者和零售商供应商将不再与价格信号绝缘。


Amid all of this good news, two serious concerns stand out.	虽然有着如此多的好处，但同时也凸显出两大严峻问题。


In the short run, declining oil prices create grave challenges for those who, having invested in expanding production when prices were high, now face large costs and failing businesses.	在短期内，下跌的油价会为那些在高油价时期投资扩产的企业带来重大的挑战。 它们当前面临的是高额成本及经营危机。


More problematic, lower oil prices encourage excessive consumption – the long-term environmental impact of which will be compounded by the weakening incentive to invest in alternative energy sources.	而令问题更严重的是。 低油价鼓励了过度的消费——一方面导致长期的环境影响，另一方面也会弱化投资替代能源的激励因素。


Policymakers must recognize these risks, and implement policies to mitigate them.	政策制定者们必须认识到这些风险并实施政策对其进行缓冲。


Specifically, governments should divert the money they save on oil and subsidies to targeted programs aimed at helping people escape poverty, and they should incorporate into their tax regimes incentives for innovation and investment in clean energy.	尤其是各国政府应当把补贴中省下来的钱转而支持旨在帮助人们摆脱贫困的项目中。 同时也将这些举措与税务激励政策相结合，鼓励在清洁能源方面的创新和投资。


With the correct approach, today’s oil-price volatility could turn out to be a critical turning point on the path toward a more sustainable future, characterized by shared prosperity and genuine progress on poverty reduction.	通过正确的手段。 当今的弱势油价将成为迈向更可持续发展未来道路的一个转折点，并呈现出分享繁荣及切实推进脱贫的特点。


The direction to take is clear.	这就是我们眼中的方向，明确无疑。


Oil Dictator Dominos	石油独裁者的多米诺骨牌


LONDON – Price movements as large and rapid as those that have upended oil markets since June 2014 are sure to cause pain to some and benefit others.	发自伦敦——自2014年6月起这种彻底颠覆了原油市场的大起大落走势肯定会导致有家欢喜有家愁。


Though the pain tends to capture the most attention, the benefit is just as important – if not more so.	虽然受害者往往会赢得最多关注，但受益者也同样重要——而且理应得到更多关注。


The 70% drop in the price of a barrel of crude represents a colossal transfer of $3 trillion in annual income from oil producers to oil consumers.	原油价格每桶下跌了70%意味着有3兆美元的巨额年度收入从石油生产商那转移到了消费者的口袋里。


As a result, while sliding equity markets and a further decline in oil (and other commodity) prices have sparked much talk of another global recession, dire predictions are likely to prove overly gloomy and misdirected.	于是乎，虽然股票市场暴跌和石油 (及其他大宗商品) 价格的进一步下跌引发了众多关于另一场全球经济衰退会否爆发的讨论，但这些可怕的预言有可能最终会被证明是过于悲观且误导性的。


To be sure, the dramatic drop in the price of oil will produce winners and losers. But the biggest dangers will be political, not economic.	油价的急剧下跌当然会产生赢家和输家，但最大的输赢将是政治上的，而非经济方面。


The shift in fortunes can perhaps best be seen on the boarding passes of International Monetary Fund officials.	财富的转移也许可以在国际货币基金组织官员的登机牌上找到一点端倪。


Rather than going to Athens, they are now heading for Baku.	他们没有飞去雅典，而是前往阿塞拜疆首都巴库。


Indeed, Central Asia’s oil-producing dictatorships, including Azerbaijan, have been among the countries hardest hit by the drop in prices – especially because, as ex-Soviet states, they remain heavily dependent on trade with Russia, another oil producer.	事实上，中亚地区的石油独裁政权，包括阿塞拜疆在内，是受到油价下跌冲击最大的群体——尤其是因为身为前苏联加盟共和国，他们的贸易仍然严重依赖俄罗斯，而后者也是个产油国。


The biggest beneficiaries of the price slump will be the highly indebted, oil-importing countries of the eurozone: Greece, Italy, and Spain (Germany, too, is likely to benefit).	而油价暴跌的最大受益者则是欧元区的高负债石油进口国: 希腊，意大利和西班牙 (德国也可能受益)。


Their export markets in emerging economies will suffer, damping hopes of a trade-led recovery, but that negative effect stands to be more than offset by the windfall from a big drop in energy costs.	虽然这些国家对新兴经济体的出口贸易也受到了影响，令其以贸易带动经济复苏的希望变得渺茫，但那种负面效应会被因能源成本大幅下降而节省的大笔财富所抵消。


Growth in the eurozone will be based on the resulting increase in domestic demand, rather than exports.	欧元区的增长将基于国内需求，而非出口的增加。


The United States and the United Kingdom are simultaneously energy producers and importers, so the impact on their economics is likely to be more complicated.	美国和英国同时身兼能源生产商和进口商，所以对两国经济的影响是可能要更复杂。


In 2013 and 2014, energy firms dominated business investment, and cutbacks in the sector will translate into lost jobs and dropping demand for the manufacturers and service companies supplying the industry.	在2013年和2014年，能源企业占了企业投资的主导地位，而该部门的削弱将转而导致相关就业岗位流失以及行业背后的制造商和服务企业需求下降。


On the other hand, consumer spending in both countries stands to rise.	另一方面，两国的消费者支出势必上升。


While US consumers have so far saved a large proportion of the windfall they have received through cheaper gasoline prices, the gains for households are starting to translate into higher levels of spending.	尽管目前为止美国消费者把大部分从便宜汽油上省下来的钱存进了银行，但家庭的收益也开始转化为更高水平的开支。


Economists are likely to spend months puzzling over why the effect of low oil prices has proved slow to emerge in the consumption statistics.	经济学家们很可能要花费数月来苦思为何低油价的影响没法迅速在消费统计上反映出来。


But, ultimately, emerge they will, as they have every time such a large fall has occurred.	但最终如每次发生了如此大规模下跌后那样，这些数字会有所表现。


The more important question is one for political scientists: Which governments will collapse this year, and with what consequences?	不过更重要的问题得由政治科学家来解答：哪些国家的政府会在这一年崩溃，后果是什么？


It is no coincidence that the last emerging-markets crisis, in 1997-1998, was also associated with a dramatic fall in oil prices.	这可不是巧合，因为上次1997~1998年间新兴市场危机也与石油价格的大幅下降有关联。


In that case, the two biggest victims were a dictator in Indonesia and a fragile democrat in Russia.	当时其中两个最大的受害者是印尼的独裁者和俄罗斯的脆弱民主制度。


In May 1998, nine months after the beginning of East Asia’s financial crisis, Indonesian President Suharto resigned after 31 years in office.	1998年5月，在东亚金融危机爆发9个月后，印尼总统苏哈托辞职，结束了31年的执政。


A few months later, Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt as its currency collapsed.	几个月后，俄罗斯宣布主权债务由于货币汇率崩溃而违约。


On December 31, 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned, leaving the country in the hands of his recently appointed prime minister, Vladimir Putin.	在1999年12月31日，总统鲍里斯·叶利钦辞职，把国家交到了被他最近任命为总理的普京手里。


In attempting to predict which governments might face a similar fate this time, the basic criteria – in addition to the oil slump’s financial impact – are resilience and flexibility.	如果要预测哪个国家的政府可能会面临同样命运，基本条件——加上石油暴跌对财政影响——就是弹性和灵活性。


Does a regime have the financial reserves with which to cushion the shock and buy time to adjust?	一个政权是否拥有足够的财政储备来减轻冲击并换取调整时间？


Does a country have a robust banking system?	这个国家是否拥有稳健的银行体系？


Can its political system contain growing popular frustration or channel it through existing institutions?	其政治系统可以容纳日渐增长的沮丧情绪或通过现有体制进行疏导吗？


Oil-dependent regimes that fail to meet these criteria are in trouble.	结论是，未能满足上述这些条件并依赖石油的政权将处于困境。


This analytical framework yields surprising insights.	这一分析框架产生了令人大吃一惊的见解。


As much as pundits like to predict the collapse of the Saudi Arabian monarchy, they are likely to be disappointed once again.	虽然很多专家预测说沙特阿拉伯君主制行将崩溃，但他们很可能会再次失望了。


The country is the world’s lowest-cost oil producer; and, though its political rigidity is beyond question, it is showing economic flexibility by cutting its budget and introducing wide-ranging reforms.	首先该国是世界上成本最低的石油生产商； 与此同时，���然其政治上的僵硬固化程度毋庸置疑，但它也通过削减预算并引入大范围改革来展现了自身的经济灵活性。


Russia, however, for all its bluster, may prove less fortunate.	而牛皮哄哄的俄罗斯则没那么幸运。


Its political robustness is not matched by financial and economic resilience.	其政治上的强势没有金融和经济上的灵活性相匹配。


Putin will try to mask the pain, but at some point it is likely to become debilitating.	普京将试图掩盖伤口，但在某种情况下该国可能会逐渐衰竭。


The potential victims are many, with worrying implications for geopolitical stability worldwide.	潜在的受害者还有很多，对全球地缘政治稳定的影响也令人忧虑。


Venezuela has been in financial crisis since long before the oil crunch, and Nigeria is looking a lot like Russia in 1998 – a fragile democracy facing a currency crisis.	委内瑞拉在油价崩溃以前就一直处于金融危机之中，而尼日利亚则很像1998年的俄罗斯——面临货币危机的脆弱民主政体。


As to who might become the next Suharto in the coming months, my best guess is one or more of the Central Asian oil autocrats in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.	至于谁可能在未来几个月中成为下一个苏哈托，我认为最可能是一个或几个中亚地区的石油独裁政权——阿塞拜疆、 哈萨克斯坦和土库曼斯坦。


In any case, this year promises to be interesting – and harrowing, if you happen to be a dictator clinging to power in an oil-exporting country.	无论如何，今年都会是有趣的一年——不过如果你碰巧一位石油输出国家的独裁者，那就相当惨淡了。


A New Ceiling for Oil Prices	油价的新顶部


LONDON – If one number determines the fate of the world economy, it is the price of a barrel of oil.	伦敦—如果说有一个数字能左右世界经济的命运，那就是每桶石油的价格。


Every global recession since 1970 has been preceded by at least a doubling of the oil price, and every time the oil price has fallen by half and stayed down for six months or so, a major acceleration of global growth has followed.	自20世纪70年代以来，每一次全球衰退前都会出现一次油价至少翻番，并且每一次油价都会腰斩并在低位徘徊六个月左右，然后是全球增长的大提速。


Having fallen from $100 to $50, the oil price is now hovering at exactly this critical level.	如今，油价从100美元跌至50美元，已徘徊在这一临界水平左右。


So should we expect $50 to be the floor or the ceiling of the new trading range for oil?	那么，50美元的价格将成为油价新波动区间的底部还是顶部？


Most analysts still see $50 as a floor – or even a springboard, because positioning in the futures market suggests expectations of a fairly quick rebound to $70 or $80.	大部分分析师仍认为50美元是底部——甚至是“钻石底”，因为期货市场的状况表明人们预期油价会快速反弹至70或80美元。


But economics and history suggest that today’s price should be viewed as a probable ceiling for a much lower trading range, which may stretch all the way down toward $20.	但经济学和历史学告诉我们，今天的价格或许应该被视为更低的交易区间的顶部，油价可能一路探底，向20美元靠拢。


To see why, first consider the ideological irony at the heart of today’s energy economics.	究其原因，首先来考察一下当今能源经济学的核心思想矛盾。


The oil market has always been marked by a struggle between monopoly and competition.	石油市场永远在垄断和竞争之间摇摆。


But what most Western commentators refuse to acknowledge is that the champion of competition nowadays is Saudi Arabia, while the freedom-loving oilmen of Texas are praying for OPEC to reassert its monopoly power.	但大部分西方评论者拒绝承认的是，如今最支持竞争的沙特阿拉伯，而热爱自由的德克萨斯州石油商却在日夜期盼欧佩克举起垄断大旗。


Now let’s turn to history – specifically, the history of inflation-adjusted oil prices since 1974, when OPEC first emerged.	现在，让我们把目光转向历史——具体而言，转向1974年欧佩克刚刚成立以来的经通胀调整的油价史。


That history reveals two distinct pricing regimes.	这段历史揭示出两个不同的定价机制。


From 1974 to 1985, the US benchmark oil price fluctuated between $50 and $120 in today’s money.	从1974年至1985年，美国基准油价在50至120美元（以今天的价格衡量）之间波动。


From 1986 to 2004, it ranged from $20 to $50 (apart from two brief aberrations after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the 1998 Russian devaluation).	从1986年到2004年，油价在20至50美元之间波动（1990年伊拉克入侵科威特和1998年俄罗斯违约期间有过短暂的偏离）。


Finally, from 2005 until 2014, oil again traded in the 1974-1985 range of roughly $50 to $120, apart from two very brief spikes during the 2008-09 financial crisis.	最后，从2005年到2014年，油价再次回到1974—1985年的价格区间，即50至120美���内波动，只是在2008—2009金融危机期间有过两次短暂的暴跌。


In other words, the trading range of the past ten years was similar to that of OPEC’s first decade, whereas the 19 years from 1986 to 2004 represented a totally different regime.	换句话说，过去十年的油价交易区间与欧佩克的第一个十年相近，而1986—2004年这19年则体现出完全不同的机制。


It seems plausible that the difference between these two regimes can be explained by the breakdown of OPEC power in 1985, owing to North Sea and Alaskan oil development, causing a shift from monopolistic to competitive pricing.	看起来这两大机制之间的区别可以用1985年欧佩克实力崩溃来解释。 欧佩克实力崩溃是因为北海和阿拉斯加开始开发石油，使得定价从垄断向竞争转变。


This period ended in 2005, when surging Chinese demand temporarily created a global oil shortage, allowing OPEC’s price “discipline” to be restored.	这段时期结束于2005年中国需求的激增造成全球石油的暂时性短缺，也使欧佩克的价格“纪律”得以重塑。


This record points to $50 as a possible demarcation line between the monopolistic and competitive regimes.	这一历史记录表明，50美元也许是垄断和竞争机制的分界线。


And the economics of competitive markets versus monopoly pricing suggests why $50 will be a ceiling, not a floor.	而竞争市场和垄断定价的经济学说明了为何50美元是顶而不是底。


In a competitive market, prices should equal marginal costs.	在竞争市场中，价格应该等于边际成本。


Simply put, the price will reflect the costs that an efficient supplier must recoup in producing the last barrel of oil required to meet global demand.	简言之，价格将反映有效供给者在生产最后一桶石油以满足全球需求时所需要覆盖的成本。


In a monopoly price regime, by contrast, the monopolist can choose a price well above marginal costs and then restrict production to ensure that supply does not exceed demand (which it otherwise would because of the artificially high price).	相反，在垄断价格机制中，垄断者可以选择大大高于边际成本的价格，然后限制产量以确保供给不超过需求（否则在人为高价下产量会超过需求）。


Until last summer, oil operated under a monopoly price regime, because Saudi Arabia became a “swing producer,” restricting supply whenever it exceeded demand.	直到去年夏天前，石油市场一直在垄断价格机制下运行，因为沙特阿拉伯成为“摇摆生产者”，每逢供给超过需求时就限制供给。


But this regime created powerful incentives for other oil producers, especially in the US and Canada, to expand output sharply.	但这一机制为其他石油生产国制造了强大的大幅增加产能的激励，特别是美国和加拿大。


Despite facing much higher production costs, North American producers of shale oil and gas could make big profits, thanks to the Saudi price guarantee.	尽管面临更高的生产成本，但拜沙特的价格保证所赐，北美页岩油气生产商仍可以获得巨额利润。


The Saudis, however, could maintain high prices only by reducing their own output to make room in the global market for ever-increasing US production.	但是，沙特欲维持高油价，只有减少其自身的产出，从而在全球市场中腾出空间消化不断增加的美国产量。


By last autumn, Saudi leaders apparently decided that this was a losing strategy – and they were right.	去年秋天，沙特领导人显然认为这是个输家战略——正是如此。


Its logical conclusion would have been America’s emergence as the world’s top oil producer, while Saudi Arabia faded into insignificance, not only as an oil exporter but also perhaps as a country that the US felt obliged to defend.	其逻辑结论将是美国崛起为世界第一大石油生产国，而沙特阿拉伯将变得无关紧要——不仅作为石油出口国是如此，作为美国必须捍卫的国家恐怕也是如此。


The Middle East’s oil potentates are now determined to reverse this loss of status, as their recent behavior in OPEC makes clear.	中东的石油君主们决心要扭转地位下降之势，他们最近在欧佩克的一举一动就是明证。


But the only way for OPEC to restore, or even preserve, its market share is by pushing prices down to the point that US producers drastically reduce their output to balance global supply and demand.	但欧佩克夺回——甚至捍卫——市场份额的唯一办法是将价格压低至美国生产商大幅削减产出以平衡全球供求的水平。


In short, the Saudis must stop being a “swing producer” and instead force US frackers into this role.	简言之，沙特必须停止充当“摇摆生产者”，而是迫使美国液压致裂法炼油商来充当这一角色。


Any economics textbook would recommend exactly this outcome.	任何经济学教科书都会推断这一结果。


Shale oil is expensive to extract and should therefore remain in the ground until all of the world’s low-cost conventional oilfields are pumping at maximum output.	页岩油勘探提炼高昂，因此应该把它们留在地下直到全球所有低成本常规油田都达到最大产出。


Moreover, shale production can be cheaply turned on and off.	此外，页岩油生产可以低成本地开启和关闭。


Competitive market conditions would therefore dictate that Saudi Arabia and other low-cost producers always operate at full capacity, while US frackers would experience the boom-bust cycles typical of commodity markets, shutting down when global demand is weak or new low-cost supplies come onstream from Iraq, Libya, Iran, or Russia, and ramping up production only during global booms when oil demand is at a peak.	因此，竞争性市场条件决定了沙特阿拉伯和其他低成本生产国将总是保持产能全开，而美国液压致裂法炼油商将经历大宗商品市场的典型枯荣循环，在全球需求萎靡时或来自伊拉克、利比亚、伊朗和俄罗斯的新低成本供给涌出时关门，只能在全球石油需求位于顶峰的全球繁荣期开门营业。


Under this competitive logic, the marginal cost of US shale oil would become a ceiling for global oil prices, whereas the costs of relatively remote and marginal conventional oilfields in OPEC and Russia would set a floor.	根据这一竞争逻辑，美国页岩油的边际成本将成为全球油价的顶部，而欧佩克和俄罗斯相对偏远和边缘的常规油田的成本将决定底部。


As it happens, estimates of shale-oil production costs are mostly around $50, while marginal conventional oilfields generally break even at around $20.	目前的情况，估计页岩油生产成本大多在50美元左右，而边缘常规油田总体盈亏平衡点在20美元左右。


Thus, the trading range in the brave new world of competitive oil should be roughly $20 to $50.	因此，新的竞争性石油价格交易区间大致应该在20至50美元。


The Geopolitical Impact of Cheap Oil	廉价石油的地缘政治影响


CAMBRIDGE – The price of oil has fallen more than 25% in the past five months, to less than $80 a barrel.	美国剑桥—在过去五个月中，石油价格下跌超过25%至80美元/桶以下。


If the price remains at this level, it will have important implications – some good, some bad – for many countries around the world.	如果价格维持在该水平，将对全球许多国家产生重要影响——有好也有坏。


If it falls further, as seems likely, the geopolitical consequences on some oil-producing countries could be dramatic.	如果油价继续下跌（看起来很有可能），将给某些产油国带来巨大的地缘政治后果。


The price of oil at any time depends on market participants’ expectations about future supply and demand.	无论何时，石油价格取决于市场参与者对未来供求的预期。


The role of expectations makes the oil market very different from most others.	预期的作用使石油市场与其他市场十分不同。


In the market for fresh vegetables, for example, prices must balance the supply and demand for the current harvest.	比如，在新鲜蔬菜市场，价格必须平衡当季收成供求平衡。


By contrast, oil producers and others in the industry can keep supply off the market if they think that its price will rise later, or they can put extra supply on the market if they think the price will fall.	相反，石油生产商和其他行业参与者可以保持低供给，只要它们认为价格会在日后上升； 也可以超额供给市场，只要它们觉得价格会在日后下跌。


Oil companies around the world keep supply off the market by reducing the amount of oil that they take out of the ground.	全球石油公司通过降低它们从地下采掘的石油量保持低供给。


Oil producers can also restrict supply by holding oil inventory in tankers at sea or in other storage facilities.	石油生产商还可以通过持有海上油轮或储油设施中的石油存货限制供给。


Conversely, producers can put more oil on the market by increasing production or by running down their inventories.	反之，石油生产商可以通过增加产量或削减存货增加市场上的石油。


The market expectations reflected in today’s price reflect lower future demand and increased future supply.	今天的价格所反映的市场预期表明未来需求较低而未来供给较高。


Lower demand reflects both the current weakness of economic activity, particularly in Europe and China, and, more important, the longer-term changes in technology, which will increase cars’ fuel efficiency and induce the use of solar power and other non-oil energy sources.	低需求反映了当前经济活动的疲软局面（特别是欧洲和中国），更重要的是，它还反映了技术的长期变化——汽车燃油效率将有所提高、太阳能和其他非石油能源资源日益重要等。


The increase in the future potential supply of oil reflects new output produced by fracking, the development of Canada’s tar sands, and Mexico’s recent decision to allow foreign oil companies to develop the country’s energy sources.	未来潜在石油供给的增加反映了液压致裂法所带来的新产出、加拿大沥青砂开采和墨西哥最近决定允许外国石油公司开采本国能源资源等。


These changes in demand and supply suggest that the future price of oil will be lower than industry participants expected until just a few months ago.	这些需求与供给上的变化表明未来油价将比行业参与者几个月前所预期的更低。


Some of the recent changes in expected future demand and supply could have been anticipated earlier.	预期未来需求与供给的当前变化中有一些可以提前预测到。


But there is no way to know when attitudes and expectations will change.	但无从获知态度和预期何时会发生变化。


The historic volatility of oil prices reflects these psychological shifts as well as changes in objective reality.	石油价格的历史波动既反映了客观现实的变化，也反映了这些心理变化。


Today’s oil price is also linked to anticipated future interest rates.	今天的石油价格还与预期到的未来利率挂钩。


More specifically, oil producers have an investment choice: They can increase production now, selling the additional oil at today’s price and investing the proceeds at the existing long-term interest rate, or they can leave the oil in the ground as an investment.	更具体地说，石油生产商面临投资选择：它们可以现在提高产量，以今天的价格出售增加的石油并将获得的资金按现有长期利率投资； 它们也可以让石油留在地下作为一种投资。


A low rate of interest encourages producers to leave oil in the ground.	低利率鼓励石油生产商把石油留在地下。


When the current abnormally low interest rates on long-term bonds rise over the next few years, it will become more attractive for producers to increase the supply of oil and invest the resulting income at the higher rate.	如果当前长期债券的反常低利率在未来几年中升高，石油生产商就有动力增加石油供给，将所获得的收入按更高的利率投资。


Unless expectations about the fundamentals of future supply and demand change, the rise in the interest rate will cause oil prices to fall further.	除非关于未来供给和需求的基本面的预期发生改变，否则利率的升高将导致油价进一步下跌。


The low price of oil is good news for the United States economy, because it implies higher real incomes for American consumers.	低油价对于美国经济来说是一件好事，因为这意味着美国消费者真实收入增加。


Within the US, the lower price is transferring real income from oil producers to households, which raises short-term demand because households spend a higher proportion of their incomes than oil firms do.	在美国，低油价将真实收入从石油生产商转移到家庭手中，这会提高短期需求，因为家庭将收入用于支出的比例高于石油企业。


For the same reason, the lower price also gives a boost to aggregate demand in Europe, Asia, and other oil-importing regions.	同理，油价下跌也有利于提振欧洲、亚洲和其他石油进口地区的总需求。


The big losers from falling oil prices include several countries that are not friends of the US and its allies, such as Venezuela, Iran, and Russia.	油价下跌的大输家包括一些与美国及其盟友关系不太好的国家，如委内瑞拉、伊朗核俄罗斯。


These countries are heavily dependent on their oil revenue to support their governments’ spending – especially massive transfer programs.	这些国家严重依赖石油收入支持政府支出——特别是大规模转移支付项目。


Even at $75 or $80 a barrel, these governments will have a difficult time financing the populist programs that they need to maintain public support.	即使以75—80美元/桶的价格算，这些政府也将难以为维持公共支持所需要的民粹主义计划融资。


Although Saudi Arabia and several of the Gulf states are also major oil exporters, they differ from other producers in two important ways.	尽管沙特阿拉伯和一些海湾国家也是主要石油出口国，但它们与其他产油国不同。


First, their cost of extracting oil is extremely low, which means that they will be able to produce profitably at the current price – or even at a much lower price.	原因有二。 首先，它们开采石油的成本极低，这意味着按照当前甚至更低的价格，它们生产石油仍可盈利。


Second, their enormous financial reserves allow them to finance their domestic and international activities for an extended period of time, as they seek to transform their economies to reduce their dependence on oil revenue.	其次，它们拥有巨大的金融储备，这意味着它们能够在相当长的时间内为其国内和国际活动提供融资，同时寻求转变经济、减少对石油收入的依赖。


A further decline in the price of oil could have major geopolitical repercussions.	石油价格的进一步下跌可能造成重大地缘政治反响。


A price of $60 a barrel would create severe problems for Russia in particular.	如果油价跌至60美元/桶，俄罗斯将面临特别严重的问题。


President Vladimir Putin would no longer be able to maintain the transfer programs that currently sustain his popular support.	俄总统普京将不再能够继续实施目前维持着其公共支持率的转移支付项目。


There would be similar consequences in Iran and Venezuela.	伊朗和委内瑞拉也面临类似的后果。


It is not clear whether these countries’ current regimes could survive a substantial and sustained future decline in oil prices.	这些国家的政权是否能在未来石油价格持续大跌的情况下继续存在很不好说。


By contrast, it is obvious that oil-importing countries would benefit greatly – as they already are.	相反，显然石油进口国将大大受益——就像目前那样。


Oil Prices and Global Growth	石油价格和全球增长


CAMBRIDGE – One of the biggest economic surprises of 2015 is that the stunning drop in global oil prices did not deliver a bigger boost to global growth.	坎布里奇—2015年最大的经济意外是全球石油价格暴跌并没有带来更大的全球增长提振。


Despite the collapse in prices, from over $115 per barrel in June 2014 to $45 at the end of November 2015, most macroeconomic models suggest that the impact on global growth has been less than expected – perhaps 0.5% of global GDP.	尽管油价从2014年6月的每桶115美元下跌到2015年11月底的45美元，但大部分宏观经济模型都表明，其对全球增长的影响要小于预期——只有全球GDP的0. 5%。


The good news is that this welcome but modest effect on growth probably will not die out in 2016.	好消息是这一积极但微不足道的增长效应在2016年仍将存在。


The bad news is that low prices will place even greater strains on the main oil-exporting countries.	坏消息是低油价将给主要石油出口国带来更大的压力。


The recent decline in oil prices is on par with the supply-driven drop in 1985-1986, when OPEC members (read: Saudi Arabia) decided to reverse supply cuts to regain market share.	石油价格近期下跌与1985-1986年增长驱动的下跌如出一辙，当时，欧（沙）佩（特）克（阿）成（拉）员（伯）决定取消减产以重新赢得市场份额。


It is also comparable to the demand-driven collapse in 2008-2009, following the global financial crisis.	它也可以与2008-2009年全球金融危机后的需求驱动的暴跌相比。


To the extent that demand factors drive an oil-price drop, one would not expect a major positive impact; the oil price is more of an automatic stabilizer than an exogenous force driving the global economy.	对于需求因素引起的油价下跌，我们不可能预期会带来重大积极影响； 石油价格与其说是驱动全球经济的外生力量，不如说是一个自动稳定器。


Supply shocks, on the other hand, ought to have a significant positive impact.	另一方面，供给冲击应该产生重大积极影响。


Although parsing the 2014-2015 oil-price shock is not as straightforward as in the two previous episodes, the driving forces seem to be roughly evenly split between demand and supply factors.	尽管剖析2014—2015年油价冲击不像前两次那么直观，但驱动因素似乎是需求和供给五五开。


Certainly, a slowing China that is rebalancing toward domestic consumption has put a damper on all global commodity prices, with metal indices also falling sharply in 2015.	显然，中国因为转向国内消费的再平衡而减速给一切全球大宗商品价格踩了刹车，2015年金属指数也剧烈下跌。


(Gold prices, for example, at $1,050 per ounce at the end of November, are far off their peak of nearly $1,890 in September 2011, and copper prices have fallen almost as much since 2011.)	（比如，11月底黄金价格为每盎司1,050美元，远低于2011年9月近1,890美元的峰值，铜价较2011年也下跌了相近幅度。 ）


New sources of oil supply, however, have been at least as important.	但是，石油供给新来源也起着至少同样重要的作用。


Thanks to the shale-energy revolution, American oil production has risen from five million barrels per day in 2008 to 9.3 million barrels in 2015, a supply boom that has so far persisted, despite the price collapse.	拜页岩能源革命所赐，美国石油产量从2008年的每日五百万桶上升到2015年的930万桶，尽管价格暴跌，但这一产量增长仍得到了保持。


Anticipation of post-sanctions Iranian oil production has also affected markets.	解除制裁后的伊朗石油产量预期也影响了市场。


A decline in oil prices is to some extent a zero-sum game, with producers losing and consumers gaining.	从某种程度上讲，石油价格下跌是一个零和博弈，生产者损失而消费者获益。