In this sense, the initiative could function much like America’s post-1945 Marshall Plan, which is universally lauded for its contribution to the reconstruction and economic recovery of war-ravaged Europe.	在这个意义上说，这个倡议可以像美国1945年后的马歇尔计划那样发挥作用，而后者为战后欧洲的重建和经济复苏所作出的贡献得到了全世界的广泛赞誉。


Of course, external funding alone is not sufficient for success.	当然，只靠外部资金并不足以取得成功。


Recipient countries must also undertake key reforms that increase policy transparency and predictability, thereby reducing investment risk.	受援国还必须实施关键性改革以提高政策透明度和可预测性，从而降低投资风险。


Indeed, implementation of complementary reforms will be a key determinant of the economic returns on Belt and Road investments.	实际上，补充性改革的实施将成为左右一带一路投资经济回报的关键因素。


For China, the Belt and Road investments are economically appealing, particularly when private Chinese firms take the lead in carrying them out.	对中国来说，一带一路投资在经济上是有吸引力的，尤其是当中国的私营企业率先实施的时候。


In 2013, when China first proposed the Belt and Road initiative, the country was sitting on $4 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, which were earning a very low dollar return (less than 1% a year).	当中国在2013年首次提出“一带一路”倡议时，该国的外汇储备已达4万亿美元，而这些储蓄的美元回报率却极低，每年不到1％。


In terms of China’s own currency, the returns were negative, given the expected appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar at the time.	再加上当时人民币兑美元的升值预期，如果换成中国本国货币的话收益甚至是负的。


In this sense, Belt and Road investments are not particularly costly for China, particularly when their far-reaching potential benefits are taken into account.	在这个意义上，中国的一带一路投资代价并不是特别昂贵，尤其是考虑到其潜在利益的情况下。


China’s trade-to-GDP ratio exceeds 40% – substantially higher than that of the US – owing partly to underdeveloped infrastructure and inadequate economic diversification among China’s trading partners.	而中国之所以拥有超过40％的贸易额相对GDP比率（远高于美国），部分原因是其贸易伙伴国的基建发展不足和经济多样化不足。


By addressing these weaknesses, China’s Belt and Road investments can lead to a substantial increase in participant countries’ and China’s own trade volumes, benefiting firms and workers substantially.	通过解决这些弱点，中国的一带一路投资可以大大提升本国和参与国贸易量，为企业和劳动者带来相当大的收益。


This is not to suggest that such investments are risk-free for China.	这并不意味着这类投资对中国来说是无风险的。


The economic returns will depend on the quality of firms’ business decisions.	经济回报将取决于企业经营决策的质量。


In particular, because efficiency is not the primary consideration, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) might purse low-return projects. That is why China’s SOE-reform process must be watched carefully.	特别是当效率并非首要考虑因素的情况下，中国的国有企业可能会参与一些低收益项目，而这也是为何要密切留意中国的国有企业改革进程的原因。


Nonetheless, while the Belt and Road initiative is clearly driven partly by strategic objectives, a cost-benefit analysis shows that the economic case is also very strong – so strong, in fact, that one might ask why China didn’t undertake it sooner.	尽管如此，虽然“一带一路”倡议显然是部分是由战略目标所驱动的，但成本效益分析表明其经济意义也极大——大到有人或许会质疑为什么中国不早点执行。


Even the United States and other countries may reap significant economic returns.	即便是美国等国也可能从中获取巨大的经济回报。


A decade after the global financial crisis erupted, recovery remains weak and tentative in much of the world. Bold, large-scale infrastructure investments can provide much-needed short-run stimulus to global aggregate demand.	全球金融危机爆发至今已是十年，全球大部分地区的复苏仍然疲软而短暂，而大规模的基础设施投资可以为全球总需求提供急需的短期刺激。


The US, for one, is likely to see a surge in demand for its own exports, including cars, locomotives, planes, and high-end construction equipment, and financial, accounting, educational, and legal services.	美国可能会看到自身出口的需求激增，包括汽车、牵引机车、飞机，高端建筑设备以及财务、会计，教育和法律服务。


In the longer term, the new infrastructure will ease logistical bottlenecks, reducing the costs of production inputs. The result will be higher productivity and faster global growth.	从长远来看，新的基础设施将减少物流瓶颈，降低生产原材料的成本，最终带来更高的生产力和更快的全球增长。


If Belt and Road projects are held to high environmental and social standards, significant progress can also be made on global challenges such as climate change and inequality.	如果各个一带一路项目能遵循较高的环境和社会标准，同时就可以在气候变化和收入不平等等全球挑战方面取得重大进展。


The more countries choose to participate in these projects, the better the chance of achieving these standards, and the greater the global social returns will be.	越多的国家选择参与这些项目，实现这些标准的机会就越多，全球社会所得到的回报就越多。


In an era when some of the world’s most influential countries are turning inward, talking about erecting trade barriers and constructing border walls, the world needs initiatives focused on building bridges and roads, both literal and figurative – initiatives like the Belt and Road strategy.	在这个某些世界上最具影响力的国家都向内转向，大谈树立贸易壁垒和边界围墙的时代，我们的世界更一些需要专注于建立桥梁和道路的举措——无论是在路桥本身还是其寓意上——而一带一路战略这样的倡议正是如此。


Why China’s Capital-Account Liberalization Has Stalled	中国资产账户自由化为何停止


BEIJING – In early 2012, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) took advantage of what it viewed as a “strategic opportunity” to accelerate capital-account liberalization, which has been underway since 2009.	北京—2012年初，中国人民银行利用其认定的“战略性机会”，加快了始自2009年的资本账户自由化步伐。


The renminbi, it was expected, would be “basically” convertible by the end of 2015, and fully convertible by the end of 2020.	人们预计人民币将在2015年底实现“基本”可兑换，在2020年底实现完全可兑换。


But things haven’t worked out as expected.	但情况并没有像人们预料的那样展开。


Problems began in 2014, when China’s capital account, which had been in surplus since the 1990s, swung into deficit.	问题始于2014年，当时，自20世纪90年代一直处于盈余状态的中国资本账户转为赤字。


By the end of the next year, the deficit had grown so large that China’s overall balance of payments (BOP), too, turned negative, even as China’s current-account surplus remained above $300 billion.	到下一年年底，赤字变得非常巨大，导致中国国际收支余额（BOP）也由正转负，虽然中国经常项目仍保持3,000亿美元以上的盈余。


Last year, China’s capital-account deficit amounted to some $200 billion.	去年，中国资本项目赤字达到了约2,000亿美元。


To protect the renminbi, the PBOC intervened heavily – a process that proved costly.	为了捍卫人民币，中国人民银行进行了大量干预——这个过程让它付出了沉重的代价。


In less than two years, China’s foreign-exchange reserves fell from their peak of $4 trillion in mid-2014 to just below $3 trillion.	在不到两年的时间里，中国外汇储备从2014年年中4万亿美元的峰值下降到了略低于3万亿。


At first, many were indifferent to the losses.	一开始，许多人对损失无动于衷。


Some even argued that there were no losses at all, but rather a positive shift in resource allocation, with official reserves becoming privately held foreign assets.	甚至有人指出，根本就没有损失，只不过是资源配置发生了积极的转变，官方储备变成了私人持有的外汇资产。


After all, they pointed out, as China’s foreign-exchange reserves fell by $1 trillion from the second quarter of 2014 to the end of 2016, holdings of foreign assets by the private sector increased by $900 billion.	他们指出，毕竟，在中国外汇储备从2014年二季度到2016年年底减少了1万亿美元的同时，私人部门持有的外国资产也增加了9,000亿美元。


But this argument failed to recognize that, during the same period, China’s cumulative current-account surplus was $750 billion.	但这一观点没有认识到同一时期中国累计经常项目盈余为7,500亿美元。


By definition, a country’s current-account surplus should be equal to the increase in the country’s net foreign assets.	根据定义，一国的经常项目盈余应该等于该国净外国资产。


So what really happened was that $850 billion of China’s foreign-exchange reserves had gone missing.	因此，真正发生的情况是8,500亿美元的中国外汇储备灰飞烟灭。


And, in fact, this process had begun much earlier.	而事实上，这一过程早就开始了。


From the first quarter of 2011 to the third quarter of 2016, while China’s cumulative current-account surplus was $1.28 trillion, its net foreign assets fell by $12.4 billion.	从2011年一季度到2016年三季度，中国累计经常项目盈余为1. 28万亿美元，而净外国资产下降了124亿美元。


In other words, since 2011, some $1.3 trillion of China’s foreign assets has disappeared.	换句话说，中国外国资产蒸发了大约1. 3万亿美元。


Recognizing this dangerous trend, the PBOC abruptly hit the brakes on capital-account liberalization last year, tightening capital controls to a degree not seen since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.	察觉到这一危险趋势的中国人民银行立刻在去年给资本账户自由化踩了刹车，收紧了资本管制力度，程度之大为20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机以来所未见。


The gap between changes in a country’s current account and its net-foreign-asset position partly reflects “net errors and omissions” in the BOP calculations.	一国经常账户变化与其净外国资产头寸之间的差额部分反映了BOP计算中的“净误差和省略”。


When capital flows out of a country, the transactions are supposed to be reflected in the BOP table.	当资本流出一国时，交易理应体现在BOP表格中。


But in a country like China, where capital flight is illegal and investors attempt to evade capital controls, transactions might not be recorded at all.	但在中国这样的国家，资本外逃是非法行为，而投资者试图规避资本管制，因此交易可能根本不会被记录。


Instead, they show up in net errors and omissions, which in China have turned strongly negative in recent years, owing, in my view, to accelerating capital flight.	相反，它们会体现在净误差和省略项中，最近几年，中国BOP的该项目已经变为巨大的赤字，在我看来，原因就在于资本外逃加速。


Some in China have argued that the negative trend for net errors and omissions is simply the result of statistical mistakes.	一些中国人认为，误差和省略项的负趋势只不过是统计错误的结果。


But when the shortfall amounts to $1.3 trillion, such claims can hardly be taken seriously.	但在缺口高达1. 3万亿美元的情况下，这样的观点根本站不住脚。


Nor can they account for the fact that, over the last six years, China’s net errors and omissions have moved in just one direction, always contributing to the BOP deficit.	也无法解释这个事实：在过去六年中，中国的净误差和省略项一直在同向变动，导致了BOP赤字。


Although China’s net errors and omissions must be linked to capital flight, the figures do not have to line up exactly; net errors and omissions can be either larger or smaller than the actual figure.	尽管中国的净误差和省略项肯定与资本外逃有关，但数字未必需要严丝合缝地对上； 净误差和省略项可以大于也可以小于实际数字。


In China’s case, the latter seems to be true, for a simple reason: capital flight may also be recorded as regular capital outflows that do not affect errors and omissions.	中国的情况可能是小于，原因很简单：资本外逃也可以记录为不影响误差和省略项的普通资本外流。


For example, as they pursue overseas mergers and acquisitions, some Chinese corporations have taken large amounts of capital out of China legally.	比如，在寻求海外并购的过程中，一些中国公司合法地将大量资本输出国外。


But no one knows whether those outflows will translate into net foreign assets owned by Chinese residents.	但没人知道这些外流的资本是否会转化为中国居民所持有的净外国头寸。


That is why, to gauge the scale of capital flight, one must also consider the difference between year-end investment positions, net of “financial transactions” and “other changes in position.”	因此，要确定资本外逃的规模，你还必须考虑年底投资头寸，即“金融交易”和“头寸的其他变化”之差的变动。


Doing so leads to a stark conclusion.	这样的计算让真相大白。


Since 2012, and especially since 2014, China has experienced massive capital flight.	2012年以来，特别是2014年后，中国经历了大规模资本外逃。


If the government had not taken action to slow, if not halt, the process of capital-account liberalization in 2016, the results could have been truly devastating.	如果政府不在2016年采取行动阻止或者延缓资本账户自由化进程，结果将是真正的灾难。


In the past, the key challenge facing China was to stop importing “dark matter”: as one of the world’s largest net creditors, China needed to stop running an investment-income deficit.	在过去，中国面临的关键挑战是停止输入“暗物质”（dark matter）：作为世界最大债权人之一，中国必须阻止投资收益赤字。


Today’s challenge is to avoid “matter annihilation”: China must prevent its net foreign assets from disappearing.	今天的挑战是避免“物质湮灭”（matter annihilation）：中国必须阻止净外国资产消失。


In early 2013, when capital-account liberalization was in full swing, I wrote that, “with China’s financial system too fragile to withstand external shocks, and the global economy mired in turmoil, the PBOC would be unwise to gamble on the ability of rapid capital-account liberalization to generate a healthier and more robust financial system.”	2013年年初，当资本账户自由化开展得如火如荼时，我写道，“中国既然弄体系太脆弱，经不起外部冲击，而全球经济仍陷在一片混乱之中，在这样的情况下，中国人民银行下注于其迅速实现资本账户自由化的能力来建立更健康、更稳健的金融体系是不明智的。


In fact, I continued, “Given China’s extensive reform agenda, further opening of the capital account can wait; and, in view of liberalization’s ambiguous benefits and significant risks, it should.”	”事实上，我继续写道，“考虑到中国的全面改革日程，进一步开放资本账户可以等一等； 而从自由化收益不明但风险巨大的情况看，也应该等一等。


Four years later, this advice is worth reiterating.	”四年后，这一建议仍值得重温。


The Limits of Chinese Soft Power	中国的软实力制约


CAMBRIDGE – China has been making major efforts to increase its ability to influence other countries without force or coercion.	美国剑桥—中国一直在竭力增强其在不使用武力和强制手段的情况下影响其他国家的能力。


In 2007, then-President Hu Jintao told the Communist Party that the country needed to increase its soft power; President Xi Jinping repeated the same message last year.	2007年，时任国家主席胡锦涛告诫中共，中国需要提升软实力； 现任国家主席习近平在去年又重申了这一点。


They know that, for a country like China, whose growing economic and military power risks scaring its neighbors into forming counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy must include efforts to appear less frightening.	他们知道，对于中国这样的国家，经济和军事实力的增长有可能让邻国陷入恐慌，促使它们结成制衡联盟，因此，明智的战略必须包括让中国看起来不那么可怕的措施。


But their soft-power ambitions still face major obstacles.	但中国的软实力野心仍面临着重大障碍。


To be sure, China’s efforts have had some impact.	诚然，中国的努力已经形成了一些影响。


As China enrolls countries as members of its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and doles out billions of dollars of aid during state visits abroad, some observers worry that, when it comes to soft power, China could actually be taking the lead over countries like the United States.	中国广延各国成为其亚洲基础设施投资银行成员国，并在国事访问中给予各国数十亿美元的援助，这让一些观察家担心，在软实力方面，中国实际上可能已经领先美国等其他国家一头。


The American sinologist David Shambaugh, for example, estimates that the country spends roughly $10 billion a year in “external propaganda.”	比如，美国“中国通”沈大伟（David Shambaugh）估算中国每年在“对外宣传”中花费大约100亿美元。


By comparison, the US spent only $666 million on public diplomacy last year.	相反，美国去年公共外交支出仅为6. 66亿美元。


Yet the billions of dollars China is spending on its charm offensive have had only a limited return.	但中国在魅力攻势上所花费的数十亿美元获得的回报极其有限。


Polls in North America, Europe, India, and Japan show that opinions about China’s influence are predominantly negative.	北美、欧洲、印度和日本的民调显示，对中国影响力的观点呈现出显著的负面态度。


The country is viewed more positively in Latin America and Africa, where it has no territorial disputes and human-rights concerns are not always high on the public agenda.	在拉美和非洲，中国的形象更加正面——中国在这些地区没有领土纠纷，人权问题也常常不属于公共日程的重点。


But even in many countries in those regions, Chinese practices like importing labor for infrastructure projects are unpopular.	但即使在这些地区的许多国家，中国的行为——如进口劳动力从事基础设施工程——也不受欢迎。


Combining hard and soft power into a smart strategy, it turns out, is not easy.	看起来，将硬实力和软实力结合形成一个巧妙的战略并非易事。


A country derives its soft power primarily from three resources: its culture (in places that find it appealing), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).	一国软实力主要来自三个方面：文化（哪些地方认为其文化具有吸引力）、政治价值（如果能在国内和国外实现）以及外交政策（如果被视为合理并且具有道德权威性）。


China has emphasized its cultural and economic strengths, but it has paid less attention to the political aspects that can undermine its efforts.	中国强调其文化和经济强势，但不太关注可能破坏其努力的政治角度。


Two major factors limit China’s soft power, as measured by recent international polls.	从最近的国际民调看，两个主要因素制约了中国的软实力。


The first is nationalism.	首先是民族主义。


The Communist Party has based its legitimacy not only on a high rate of economic growth, but also on appeals to nationalism.	中共的合法性基础不但来自高经济增长率，也来自民族主义诉求。


Doing so has reduced the universal appeal of Xi’s “Chinese Dream,” while encouraging policies in the South China Sea and elsewhere that antagonize its neighbors.	这样做降低了习近平“中国梦”的国际吸引力，也助长了引起邻国反抗的南海等地区的政策。


With, for example, China bullying the Philippines over possession of disputed islands in the South China Sea, the Confucius Institute that China established in Manila to teach Chinese culture can win only so much goodwill.	比如，中国与菲律宾的南海岛礁所有权争议中恃强凌弱，这使得中国在马尼拉建立的孔子学院无法赢得美誉。


(China has opened some 500 such institutes in more than 100 countries.)	（中国在100多个国家开设了大约500家孔子学院。


The consequences of the country’s foreign policy can be seen in last year’s anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam following the positioning of a Chinese oil drilling rig in waters claimed by both countries.	）中国外交政策的后果在去年的越南反华骚乱中可见一斑。 这场骚乱因为中国在中越争议水域钻井开采石油引起。


The other limit is China's reluctance to take full advantage of an uncensored civil society.	另一个制约因素是中国不愿充分利用不受审查的公民社会。


As noted by The Economist, the Chinese Communist Party has not bought into the idea that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society.	《经济学人》（Economist）指出，中共对于软实力主要来自个人、私人部门和公民社会的思想不买账。


Instead, it has clung to the view that the government is the main source of soft power, promoting ancient cultural icons that it thinks might have global appeal, often using the tools of propaganda.	相反，中共坚持认为政府是软实力的主要来源，推广其认为具有全球吸引力的古代文化形象——通常是通过宣传工具进行。


In today’s media landscape, information is abundant.	当今媒体业可谓信息泛滥。


What is scarce is attention, which depends on credibility – and government propaganda is rarely credible.	稀缺的关注，关注取决于可信度——而政府宣传很少有可信的。


For all of China’s efforts to position the Xinhua news agency and China Central Television as competitors of CNN and the BBC, the international audience for brittle propaganda is vanishingly small.	中国试图把新华社和中央电视台打造成为CNN和BBC的竞争对手，但不可靠的宣传的国际受众规模非常小。


The US, by contrast, derives much of its soft power not from the government, but from civil society – everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture.	相反，美国的软实力很大程度上并非来自政府，而来自公民社会——从大学和基金会到好莱坞和流行文化的一切。


China does not yet have global cultural industries on the scale of Hollywood or universities capable of rivaling America’s.	中国尚不具备规模堪与好莱坞相比的全球文化产业或实力堪与美国相比的大学。


Even more important, it lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of America’s soft power.	更重要的是，中国缺少美国那样的对软实力做出巨大贡献的大量非政府组织。


In addition to generating good will and promoting the country’s image abroad, non-governmental sources of soft power can sometimes compensate for the government’s unpopular policies – like the US invasion of Iraq – through their critical and uncensored reaction.	除了在海外营造良好声誉、推进国家形象，软实力的非政府来源有时还可以通过其不受审查的批判反应弥补政府不受欢迎的政策——比如美国入侵伊拉克。


China, by contrast, has watched its government policies undermine its soft-power successes.	相反，中国的政府政策在破坏其软实力的成功。


Indeed, the domestic crackdown on human-rights activists undercut the soft-power gains of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.	事实上，在国内镇压人权活动家破坏了2008年北京奥运会带来的软实力进步。


And the benefits of the 2009 Shanghai Expo were rapidly undermined by the jailing of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and the television screens around the world broadcasting scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies.	而2009年上海世博会带来的软实力进步又因为诺贝尔和平奖得主刘小波被捕和奥斯陆颁奖现场空荡荡的座位画面而消失殆尽。


Marketing experts call this “stepping on your own message.”	营销专家称之为“自己打自己的脸”。


China’s aid programs are often successful and constructive.	中国的援助项目常常是成功且建设性的。


Its economy is strong, and its traditional culture is widely admired.	其经济十分强劲，其传统文化广受敬仰。


But if the country is to realize its enormous soft-power potential, it will have to rethink its policies at home and abroad, limiting its claims upon its neighbors and learning to accept criticism in order to unleash the full talents of its civil society.	但如果中国要实现其巨大的软实力潜力，就必须反思其国内外政策，克制其对邻国的主张，学会接受批评以充分释放其公民社会的才能。


As long as China fans the flames of nationalism and holds tight the reins of party control, its soft power will always remain limited.	只要中国继续煽动民族主义、严格实施党控，其软实力永远会受到制约。


The Making of China’s Consumer Society	打造中国的消费者社会


HONG KONG – China’s transformation from a manufacturing-driven and export-led economy to one underpinned by services and domestic consumption is firmly underway.	香港—中国从制造业驱动和出口拉动型经济向以服务和国内消费为基础之经济的转型正在稳步推进。


And that’s good news not just for China, but also for the future of the global economy.	这不仅对于中国是好消息，对全球经济的未来亦然。


The 2016-17 edition of the Blue Book of China’s Commercial Sector by Fung Business Intelligence and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences maps the change.	冯氏集团利丰研究中心和中国社会科学院策划的《中国商业发展报告（2016~2017）》描述了这一变化。


China’s retail markets reached CN¥30 trillion ($4.6 trillion) in 2015, after more than a decade of double-digit growth.	在经历了十多年的两位数增长后，中国零售市场规模在2015年达到了30万亿元。


Household consumption has begun to climb, even as the pace of investment has fallen, and now exceeds 60% of GDP.	在投资速度有所下滑的形势下，家庭消费仍然开始攀升，现已突破GDP的60%。


Though the consumption growth rate has slowed to 10.7%, the Blue Book projects that China’s domestic market may reach CN¥50 trillion by 2020.	尽管零售消费增长率放缓至10. 7%，但《中国商业发展报告》仍然预测中国国内零售市场将在2020年达到50万亿元规模。


A key driver of this transformation has been Internet technology.	这一转型的一个主要推动力是互联网技术。


Building on heavy investments in public infrastructure, such as ports, airports, roads, rail, and telecommunications, the Internet is now expanding rapidly the range of choices available to Chinese consumers, while lowering costs and accelerating delivery.	得益于巨大的公共基础设施投资，如港口、机场、公路、铁路和通讯，互联网正在迅速扩大中国消费者的选择范围，同时也降低了物流及递送的成本并提高了速度。


As a result, China’s online retail sales have surged in recent years, from 6.3% of total retail sales in 2012 to 12.9% by 2015.	结果，中国在线零售销售额近几年来大幅增长，从2012年占总零售额的 6. 3% 增长到2015年的12.


By 2020, 40% of all retail transactions in China may be conducted online.	9% 。 到2020年，中国零售交易中有40%将可能在线上进行。


Online sales via mobile phones have jumped from only 1.5% in 2011 to 55.5% in 2015, and may reach 73.8% by 2018.	移动电话端的在线销售比例从2011的1. 5%增加到2015年的55.


China has now overtaken the United States to build the world’s largest online retail market.	如今，中国已经超过美国，建成了全世界最大的在线零售市场。 其33%左右的增长率也是在线零售市场中最快的。


With a growth rate of some 33%, it is also the fastest-growing such market.	尽管互联网使用大幅增长——上网人数从2008年的2.


And despite growth in Internet use – the number of connected Chinese has risen from 253 million in 2008 to 688 million last year – there is plenty of room for further expansion.	53亿增加到去年的6. 88亿——中国上网人数仍有充足空间继续扩张。


This progress reflects innovations that enable broad-based consumption without the construction and maintenance of expensive brick-and-mortar outlets.	这一进步体现了中国在互联网商业方面的创新，使得中国能够不必建设和维护昂贵的砖块水泥实体店面而实现广泛的消费扩张。


In fact, growth in mobile sales has been driven by lower-income consumers, particularly in rural areas, where more than 81% of Internet use occurs via mobile devices.	事实上，移动销售额的增长由低收入消费者驱动，特别是在农村地区，那里81%的互联网使用量通过移动设备来实现。


One key innovation has been multi-sided platforms like Alibaba, which, by providing access to production, logistics, distribution, and payments, challenge traditional business models – and with considerable success.	一项关键的创新是阿里巴巴等多方平台公司的创立，这些平台公司提供产品、物流、分销和支付接口，对传统商业模式构成了挑战，并取得了巨大的成功。


In the second quarter of 2016, Alibaba announced that its revenue from China’s retail market had increased by 49% year on year; another online platform, Tencent, reported a 52% increase.	2016年二季度，阿里巴巴公告其中国零售市场收入同比增加49%，而另一家在线平台公司腾讯公告收入增加52%。


By connecting small and medium-size enterprises (which account for 80% of employment in China) with the consumer base, such platforms erode some of the competitive advantage of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	这些平台公司将贡献了中国80%就业的中小企业与消费者群体联系在一起，侵蚀了一些大型国有企业的竞争优势。


Indeed, while the returns from China’s Internet retailing revolution have been highly concentrated, for once this concentration has not been in the state sector.	事实上，中国互联网零售革命的回报呈现出高度集中的趋势，但这一次集中的方向不再是国有部门。


In online retailing via mobile devices, Alibaba held an 84.2% share of the market last year, with the next largest online retailer, JD.com, capturing just 5.7%.	在移动设备在线零售领域，去年阿里巴巴占据了84. 2%的市场份额，第二大在线零售商京东只获得了5.


In the business-to-consumer market, Alibaba’s Tmall claimed a 58% market share in the third quarter of 2015, with JD.com taking just 22.9%.	7%的市场。 在企业对消费者（B2C）市场，2015年三季度阿里巴巴天猫市场份额为58%，京东仅占22.


In third-party online payment services, Alipay held 47.5% of the market, while Tenpay captured 20%, and UnionPay, the only service developed by the banking community, had 10.9%.	在第三方在线支付服务方面，支付宝占领了47. 5%的市场，财付通占领了20%，而银行业开发的唯一在线服务系统银联支付只占10.


As a result, SOEs, which have long specialized in single markets or products, have now begun to recognize that they need to re-tool to compete both in China and in global markets.	结果，长期以来专精于单一市场和商品的国有企业现在开始认识到它们需要重整旗鼓参与中国和全球市场竞争。


Given that SOE reform has long been on China’s agenda, this extra impetus may prove beneficial.	国企改革进入了中国的日程，这一额外的刺激是很有裨益的。


But the challenge of determining how to create a level playing field for healthy competition and improve capital allocation in the Internet age remains.	但如何构建公平竞技场以实现互联网时代的健康竞争和改善资本配置仍然是一个挑战。


It is not just China’s large companies that need to rethink their business models.	不仅中国大公司需要反思商业模式，随着中国电子商务平台的日益全球化，它们也可能挑战跨国巨头在国际贸易的主导地位。


As China’s e-commerce platforms become increasingly global, they may erode the dominance of giant multinationals in international trade.	2015年，中国跨境电商总规模估计在5. 2万亿元，或相当于贸易总量的17.


Already in 2015, China’s cross-border e-commerce amounted to an estimated ¥5.2 trillion, or 17.6% of the country’s total trade; it may reach ¥8 trillion, or 23% of total trade, by next year.	6%； 明年可能达到8万亿元，或贸易总量的23%。


All of this growth is great news for China; indeed, at a time of slowing performance in many traditional sectors, online retailing could be an economic lifesaver.	这一增长对中国来说是天大的好消息； 事实上，在许多传统行业表现放缓的情况下，在线零售也许是经济的救命稻草。


But it also represents a major challenge for a government that has long relied on top-down decision-making.	但这对长期依靠自上而下决策的政府来说也构成了一种挑战。


China’s e-commerce revolution enables the country’s consumers to decide where to put their money.	中国电商革命让中国消费者能够决定怎么花钱。


They can choose not only what kinds of goods and services they deem worthwhile, but also where to live and receive an education.	他们不但可以决定哪些商品和服务值得花钱，还可以决定在哪里生活和享受服务。


As a result, they have become a key driver behind the transformation of the housing market, supply chains, finance, and even monetary policy.	结果，他们成为住房市场、供应链、金融甚至货币政策转型背后的关键驱动力。


The task for China’s leaders is to respond more effectively to their citizens’ needs and desires, including by accelerating progress on economic reform.	中国领导人的任务是有效地响应中国公民的需要和渴望，包括通过加快经济改革进程来降低交易成本。


Specifically, they must phase out obsolete supply chains saddled with overcapacity, bad debts, and falling employment, while taxing the winners in the e-commerce game.	具体而言，他们必须逐步淘汰受制于产能过剩、坏账和日益下降的就业的陈旧供应链，同时对电商革命的赢家合理课税。


These imperatives are challenging traditional approaches to monetary, fiscal, industrial, environmental, and social policy, while testing the capacity of the bureaucracy and political system.	这些当务之急对传统货币、财政、产业、环境和社会政策的方针构成了挑战，同时也在考验官僚系统和政治制度的治理能力。


China’s transformation into a consumer society will have profound implications for domestic and global suppliers and distributors of goods and services.	中国向消费者社会的转型将给国内和全球商品和服务供应及分销商带来深远的影响。


At first, it might hurt some of China’s trading partners, particularly the emerging economies that have long depended on Chinese demand for their commodity exports.	首先，它可能影响到中国的一些贸易伙伴，特别是长期依赖中国大宗商品需求的新兴经济体。


The decline in Chinese imports has already contributed to a decline in commodity prices.	中国进口贸易的下跌已经造成大宗商品价格下跌。


Moreover, foreign importers may find that Chinese-manufactured consumer goods now cater more to local tastes and preferences.	此外，外国进口商也许会发现中国制造业的消费品现在更多地关注迎合本地消费者的品味和偏好。


Whatever challenges emerge, the fact is that a prosperous China, underpinned by local consumers, will contribute to – and shape – a prosperous global economy.	不管出现什么挑战，一个以本地消费者为基础的繁荣的中国将影响及塑造一个繁荣的全球经济。


We can thank e-commerce for that.	对此，我们要感谢电子商务。


The Next Battle in China’s War on Corruption	反腐下一程


HONG KONG – Corruption is a cancer to which no society is immune.	香港—腐败是一种癌症，没有哪个社会能够免疫。


It raised the death toll of Iran’s recent earthquake, owing to substandard housing construction ten years ago.	它让伊朗因为十年前建造的劣质住房而导致更多的百姓在最近的地震中死亡。


It has afflicted the United States Navy, which is now investigating more than 60 admirals and hundreds more officers for fraud and bribery.	它冲击到美国海军，有超过60名将领和数百名官兵正在接受有关欺诈和贿赂的调查。


It has brought down countless governments, from Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s administration last year to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government of the Republic of China.	它让许多政府失去了政权，包括去年的巴西总统罗塞夫的政府和蒋介石的国民党政府。


Chinese President Xi Jinping, a keen student of history, is well aware of corruption’s destructive potential – and has confronted the phenomenon head-on.	作为历史的好学生，习近平主席深知腐败的破坏力，并能直面这一弊端。


But, as China’s economy continues to modernize, much work remains to be done.	但是，随着中国经济的不断现代化，还有很多工作要做。


Prior to the economic reforms of the 1980s, corruption in China was relatively petty, as the market’s limited size constrained opportunities for administrative abuse.	在20世纪80年代的经济改革之前，腐败在中国规模相对较小，因为有限的市场规模及相对强势的道德规范限制了滥用行政权力的机会。


But, as the market deepened, inadequate legislation and weak institutional safeguards facilitated increasingly brazen corruption and administrative abuses.	但是，随着市场化的深入，相应的监管公权力也不断扩大，加上立法不完善及制度保障不健全，腐败和行政权力滥用越来越肆无忌惮。


Meanwhile, as income and education levels rose, citizens became less tolerant of such abuses, increasingly demanding transparent and lawful delivery of basic public goods, from infrastructure to environmental protection, as well as a fair distribution of income and opportunities.	与此同时，随着收入和教育水平的提高和公众道德意识的回升，公民不再轻易地容忍权力滥用，越来越要求政府透明、依法地行使公权与提供基本公共品，包括基础设施、环境保护以及收入和机会的公平分配。


Recognizing the potential of corruption to undermine the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China and the authority of the Chinese state, Xi has embarked on an anti-graft campaign that is unprecedented in scale, scope, and depth.	认识到腐败对党和国家合法性和权威的破坏力，习近平展开了规模、范围和深度前所未见的反腐运动。


Over the last five years, that campaign has resulted in the dismissal, sanction, or other punishment of no less than 440 provincial officials, 8,900 at the municipal level, 63,000 at the county level, and 278,000 at the village level.	在过去五年中，这场反腐运动令不下440名省级官员、8,900名市级官员、63,000名县级官员和278,000名村级官员遭到停职、处分和其他惩罚。


Some 58,000 individuals have been referred for further criminal investigation.	大约58,000名个人被刑事调查。 在中共8,900万党员中，1.


All in all, 1.7% of the CPC’s 89 million members – including both “tigers” (Party leaders) and “flies” (petty officials) – have been affected.	7%受到了影响，其中既包括“老虎”（党的高级领导人），也包括“苍蝇”（一般官员）。


But the initiative is far from over.	反腐行动还远未结束。


At the CPC’s 19th National Congress last month, the Party endorsed the creation of a National Supervision Commission to consolidate and modernize the anti-graft agency, so that it will expand beyond Party members to cover all officials exercising public power at all levels.	上个月的中共十九大提出要成立国家监察委员会来巩固反腐成果，及建立现代化反腐机构，其反腐范围将超越党员，覆盖各级别行使公权力的所有官员。


But building robust and lasting anti-graft institutions will not be easy, owing to the enduring ability of corrupt officials to capture such institutions.	但从历史及国际经验来看，构建强健而持续的反腐机制绝非易事，因为腐败官员往往会竭尽全力去影响、甚至操纵这些机构。


Consider the kind of corruption in advanced economies exposed by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, in which vested interests secure the enactment of laws and regulations that entrench their own advantages.	例如，2007—2008年全球金融危机就暴露了发达经济体中的腐败，既得利益集团为了确保他们的利益，乘机巩固了他们在立法和监管方面的影响力。


In the US, the Supreme Court’s infamous Citizens United decision of 2010 actively encourages such outcomes, by allowing corporations and unions to spend unlimited sums anonymously to help secure the election or defeat of individual candidates.	美国最高法院在2010年颁布的臭名昭著的联合公民裁决（Citizens United）就积极地鼓励了这样的结果，允许公司和工会可匿名动用无限量的资金用于竞选，来确保候选人当选或败选。


As a result of the decision, outside spending in the 2016 election cycle reached nearly $1.4 billion in 2016, compared less than $100 million in the 2006 cycle.	这项裁决导致2016年选举周期的预算外支出达到了近14亿美元，而2006年的选举周期的预算外支出只有不到1亿美元，使得美国的民主制度在公平、道德、及合法性方面出现倒退。


So corruption is not just a failure of the state; it is also closely linked to the failure of market, legal, and ideological systems.	因此，腐败不只是政府失灵； 它和市场、法律、道德和意识形态体系的失灵也息息相关。


If the concentrated economic and social power that financial markets and network economies tend to create can be used to capture and control political power, an effective system of checks and balances becomes virtually impossible.	金融市场和网络经济往往会造成经济和社会权力的集中，如果这些集中的权力被用于俘虏和控制政治权力，那么在正常情况下有效的制衡系统也会失灵。


The London School of Economics anthropologist David Graeber frames the problem in terms of how political actors approach bureaucracy.	伦敦经济学院人类学家大卫·格雷伯尔（David Graeber）从政治活动参与者如何与官僚体系互动的角度来分析这个问题。


As Graeber points out, those on the political right condemn excessive bureaucracy.	格雷伯尔指出，右翼政治集团往往喜欢谴责过度的官僚制度和行为。


Yet their solution – to reduce the role of the state and allow market forces to take over – is actually what fuels cumbersome bureaucratic expansion.	但他们的解决方案——减少政府角色，让市场力量来接管官僚——实际上却有可能加剧积重难返的官僚主义扩张。


Graeber sums up this argument in what he calls an “iron law of liberalism”: “any market reform, any government initiative intended to reduce red tape and promote market forces, will have the ultimate effect of increasing the total number of regulations, the total amount of paperwork, and the total number of bureaucrats the government employs.”	格雷伯尔用他所谓的“自由主义的铁律”总结了这一观点：“任何市场化改革，任何旨在减少红头文件、促进市场力量的政府计划，都会导致监管规则总量、红头文件总量和政府雇用的官僚总人数增加的最终效应。


In other words, markets can work efficiently only with the guidance of a competent, honest, and fair state, with effective protections against abuses and graft from both the market actors who offer bribes and the officials who accept them.	” 换句话说，市场能够有效运转的前提是有一个能干、诚实、公平的政府为市场公平运作提出合适的指引，并有效地防止滥用权力及腐败，包括阻止市场人士行贿及官僚受贿。


What does this mean for China?	这对中国有什么启发？


For starters, the country needs to develop modern mechanisms for resolving civil disputes arising from unclear property rights or rules for market transactions.	首先，政府需要制定现代机制来解决因产权或市场交易规则不明晰而产生的民事纠纷。


Here, China can take inspiration from the Western common law system, in which cases are decided on the basis of existing precedents, or from the use of administrative courts to resolve disputes between individuals and the bureaucracy.	在这方面，中国可以从西方普通法体系（循例断案）中汲取有益经验，也可以从行政诉讼法庭解决官民纠纷的做法汲取有益经验。


Hong Kong’ Independent Commission Against Corruption also provides a useful model.	香港廉政公署也提供了有益的榜样。


At the same time, China must reduce the incentive for graft, by raising the pay of public servants at all levels.	与此同时，中国需要减少官员从事腐败活动的吸引力，包括提高各级别公务员的薪酬。


As it stands, officials’ salaries are usually set with reference to the overall level of national income. But the resulting pay is not high enough to mitigate the temptation officials face to use their enormous power to profit in key sectors, such as energy, finance, and real estate.	目前，官员的薪酬常常参考国民收入总水平制定，但这导致有些行业与地区官员的薪酬过低，难以产生抵抗力来拒绝在一些重要的高利润部门（如能源、金融和房地产）以权谋私的诱惑。


Similarly, in advanced economies, officials not only receive much higher pay; they are also often subject to limitations on what they can do, and when, after they leave office.	在发达经济体，官员薪酬要高得多，他们也面临离职后在其监管行业内就业的各种限制。


In China, by contrast, officials can exchange favors while in office for higher-paying jobs or benefits after retirement.	而在中国，一些官员往往为了离职后得到回馈来帮助利益集团获利。


Maintaining accountability and preventing vested interests from capturing institutions – a process that involves entrenching morality within vulnerable bureaucracies – will be no easy feat.	确保政府问责并同时防止既得利益俘虏权力机构并不容易，因为在这个过程中，不仅需要对公权力的制衡及相应的公务员激励机制，还需要建立恰当的道德观来抵消易受诱惑的官僚体系内的负能量，从而培育对腐败的持久抵抗力。


It may well be the toughest challenge Xi faces in realizing what he calls the “China Dream.”	这也许是中国在实现习近平提出的“中国梦”过程中最为艰巨的挑战。


But, for now, China’s anti-corruption agenda seems to be on the right track.	但就目前而言，中国的反腐大致已经进入正确的轨道。


The Great Escape from China	中国大逃亡


CAMBRIDGE – Since 2016 began, the prospect of a major devaluation of China’s renminbi has been hanging over global markets like the Sword of Damocles.	发自剑桥—— 自今年年初以来，人民币大幅贬值的预期已经成为了高悬于全球市场头上的达摩克利斯之剑。


No other source of policy uncertainty has been as destabilizing.	从来没有任何一个政策不确定性的来源能对各方面的稳定造成如此重大的影响。


Few observers doubt that China will have to let the renminbi exchange rate float freely sometime over the next decade. The question is how much drama will take place in the interim, as political and economic imperatives collide.	少数观察家怀疑中国将在未来十年中的某个时间点被迫随人民币汇率自由浮动，问题则是在这一过渡期间会因为政治和经济规则发生冲突而产生多少乱象。


It might seem odd that a country running a $600 billion trade surplus in 2015 should be worried about currency weakness.	一个在 2015 年还拥有6000 亿美元贸易顺差的国家竟然会担心货币走软，这似乎有点奇怪。


But a combination of factors, including slowing economic growth and a gradual relaxation of restrictions on investing abroad, has unleashed a torrent of capital outflows.	但众多因素结合在一起，包括经济增长放缓和逐步放宽对国外投资的限制，已经引发了巨大的资本外流。


Private citizens are now allowed to take up to $50,000 per year out of the country.	按规定每个中国公民每年可以携带 5万美元出国。


If just one of every 20 Chinese citizens exercised this option, China’s foreign-exchange reserves would be wiped out.	如果20个中国人中有一个采取此做法，中国的外汇储备就会灰飞烟灭。


At the same time, China’s cash-rich companies have been employing all sorts of devices to get money out.	同时现金充裕的中国企业公司也开始动用各种手段往外汇钱。


A perfectly legal approach is to lend in renminbi and be repaid in foreign currency.	一个完全合法的做法是对外出借人民币并要求以外币偿还。


A not-so-legal approach is to issue false or inflated trade invoices – essentially a form of money laundering.	不是所以法律方法是开具虚假或夸大贸易发票——基本上是某种形式的洗钱。


For example, a Chinese exporter might report a lower sale price to an American importer than it actually receives, with the difference secretly deposited in dollars into a US bank account (which might in turn be used to purchase a Picasso).	比如一家中国出口可能会报一个比其实际价格更低的销售价格给美国的进口商，并要求对方偷偷把美元差额存入一个美国银行帐户 (而这些钱反过来可能会用于购买毕加索的名画) 。


Now that Chinese firms have bought up so many US and European companies, money laundering can even be done in-house.	如今中国企业收购了大量美国和欧洲的公司，洗钱过程甚至可以在企业内部完成。


The Chinese hardly invented this idea.	而且这种做法根本算不上是中国人的发明。


After World War II, when a ruined Europe was smothered in foreign-exchange controls, illegal capital flows out of the continent often averaged 10% of the value of trade or more.	在二战后，几遭毁灭的欧洲执行了严苛的外汇管制，但平均下来流出的非法资本经常会占到贸易总额的10%或更多。


As one of the world’s largest trading countries, it is virtually impossible for China to keep a tight lid on capital outflows when the incentives to leave become large enough.	作为世界上最大的贸易国之一，当逃离的动机变得足够强大时，中国几乎不可能保持对资本流出的严格限制。


Indeed, despite the giant trade surplus, the People’s Bank of China has been forced to intervene heavily to prop up the exchange rate – so much so that foreign-currency reserves actually fell by $500 billion in 2015.	事实上，尽有着庞大的贸易顺差，中国央行依然被迫大举出手干预以支撑汇率 — — 如此大手笔以至于外币储备实际上在2015 年减少了5000亿美元。


With such leaky capital controls, China’s war chest of $3 trillion won’t be enough to hold down the fort indefinitely.	在这种漏洞百出的资本管制之下，3兆美元的中国货币战争资源不能无限期地守住城池。


In fact, the more people worry that the exchange rate is going down, the more they want to get their money out of the country immediately.	事实上，越多的人担心汇率下跌就越多人想把自己的钱立即弄出这个国家。


That fear, in turn, has been an important factor driving down the Chinese stock market.	这种恐惧反过来也成为了一直推动中国股市下挫的重要因素。


There is a lot of market speculation that the Chinese will undertake a sizable one-time devaluation, say 10%, to weaken the renminbi enough to ease downward pressure on the exchange rate.	还有很多市场判断认为中国将执行大规模的一次性贬值——比如10%——来缓解人民币汇率的下行压力。


But, aside from providing fodder for the likes of Donald Trump, who believes that China is an unfair trader, this would be a very dangerous choice of strategy for a government that financial markets do not really trust.	但是，除了给唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）这类认为中国是不公平交易者的人提供佐证之外，对一个并不能得到金融市场完全信任的政府来说这将是非常危险的策略选项。


The main risk is that a big devaluation would be interpreted as indicating that China’s economic slowdown is far more severe than people think, in which case money would continue to flee.	主要风险是人民币大幅贬值将被理解为中国经济减速比人们所想得更严重，在这种情况下资金只会继续逃离。


There is no easy way to improve communication with markets until China learns how to produce credible economic data.	除非中国何时能学会如何发布真实可靠的经济数据，否则没有什么简单的方法能改善该国与市场的沟通。


It was a huge news story when China’s 2015 GDP growth was reported at 6.9%, just short of the official target of 7%.	当中国 2015 的GDP 增长据报为6. 9%，低于7%的官方目标时引发了外界的极大关注。


This difference ought to be irrelevant, but markets have treated it with the utmost importance, because investors believe that things must be really bad if the government can’t rig the numbers enough to hit its target.	这种差异本应是无关痛痒的。 但市场对其给予了极大重视，因为投资者相信如果连政府不能编造足够的数字以达到其目标，那么情况肯定是非常糟糕的。


A good place for the authorities to start would be to establish a commission of economists to produce a more realistic and believable set of historical GNP figures, paving the way for more believable GNP figures going forward.	当局首先要启动的一个良好开端是成立一个经济学家委员会，核定出一整套更加现实和可信的过往国民生产总值数字，为未来发布更可信的国民生产总值数据铺路。


Instead, the government’s immediate idea for relieving exchange-rate pressure is to peg the renminbi to a basket of 13 currencies, instead of just to the US dollar.	另外政府为缓解紧迫汇率压力的一个替代方案是让人民币和一揽子共13种货币挂钩，而不仅仅针对美元。


This is a good idea in theory; in practice, however, basket pegs tend to have chronic transparency problems.	这是一个理论上的好主意； 然而在实践中挂钩一揽子货币会容易出现长期的透明度问题。


Moreover, a basket peg shares most of the problems of a simple dollar peg.	此外，挂钩一揽子货币跟简单盯住美元所产生的大多数问题都是同样的。


True, the euro and yen have fallen against the dollar over the past couple of years.	实际上，欧元和日元在过去几年间已经相对美元的有所贬值。


If the dollar retreats in 2016, however, the basket peg implies a stronger renminbi-dollar rate, which might be unhelpful.	如果美元在2016年贬值，挂钩一揽子货币就意味着人民币兑美元汇率还要上涨，而这可能不是什么好事。


The government has also indicated that it intends to clamp down more heavily on illegal capital flows; but it will not be easy to put that genie back in the bottle.	中国政府还表示计划更严厉打击非法资本流动； 但把蛇赶回洞里又谈何容易呢？


Life would be a lot easier today if China had moved to a much greater degree of exchange-rate flexibility back when the going was good, as some of us had advised for more than a decade.	如果中国能在年景好的时候更大幅度地提升汇率灵活性的话，当前的情况可能会更加游刃有余，而我们有些人已经为此呼吁了超过十年。


Maybe the authorities will be able to hold on in 2016; but it is more likely that the renminbi will continue its rocky ride – taking global markets along with it.	也许当局将能够在 2016 年控制住局面； 但更有可能的是人民币将继续其震荡之路——也让全球市场随之上下翻飞。


China, the Digital Giant	中国，晋身数字化巨头


SHANGHAI – China has firmly established itself as a global leader in consumer-oriented digital technologies.	上海——中国已经稳固奠定了自身作为消费者导向型数字技术全球领导者的地位。


It is the world’s largest e-commerce market, accounting for more than 40% of global transactions, and ranks among the top three countries for venture capital investment in autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, robotics, drones, and artificial intelligence (AI).	它是全球最大的电子商务市场，占据了全球零售电商40％以上的交易额，在自动驾驶汽车，3D打印，机器人，无人机和人工智能等领域，其风险投资规模位列全球三甲。


One in three of the world’s unicorns (start-ups valued at more than $1 billion) is Chinese, and the country’s cloud providers hold the world record for computing efficiency.	全世界1/3的独角兽企业（估值超过10亿美元的创业公司）都来自中国，同时，中国科技企业的运算效率依然保持着世界纪录。


While China runs a trade deficit in services overall, it has lately been running a trade surplus in digital services of up to $15 billion per year.	虽然中国的总体服务贸易仍呈现逆差，但近年来，在数字服务贸易方面，中国已实现每年150亿美元的顺差。


Powering China’s impressive progress in the digital economy are Internet giants like Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent, which are commercializing their services on a massive scale, and bringing new business models to the world.	推动中国数字经济取得如此瞩目进步的是阿里巴巴、百度和腾讯等互联网巨头，这些巨头正在大规模地将其服务商业化，为全球带来新的商业模式。


Together, these three companies have 500-900 million active monthly users in their respective sectors.	这三家公司在各自领域分别拥有5~9亿月活跃用户。


Their rise has been facilitated by light – or, perhaps more accurate, late – regulation.	而它们的崛起则得益于宽松——或者更准确地说，是略显滞后——的监管。


For example, regulators put a cap on the value of online money transfers a full 11 years after Alipay introduced the service.	比如，监管机构在支付宝推出网上转账服务整整11年后才开始对转账额度进行了限制。


Now, these Internet firms are using their positions to invest in China’s digital ecosystem – and in the emerging cadre of tenacious entrepreneurs that increasingly define it.	如今，这些互联网巨头正利用其强势地位不断投资中国的数字生态系统，以及那些层出不穷的，持续拓展着数字生态系统定义的创业群体。


Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent together fund 30% of China’s top start-ups, such as Didi Chuxing ($50 billion), Meituan-Dianping ($30 billion), and JD.com ($56 billion).	阿里巴巴，百度和腾讯总共投资了30%的本土领先创业公司，例如滴滴出行（500亿美元），美团-点评（300亿美元）和京东（560亿美元）。


With the world’s largest domestic market and plentiful venture capital, China’s old “copy-cat” entrepreneurs have transformed themselves into innovation powerhouses.	凭借全球规模最大的本土市场以及充足的风险投资，中国不少企业已经摆脱了“抄袭效仿者”的帽子，转型成为强大的创新企业。


They fought like gladiators in the world’s most competitive market, learned to develop sophisticated business models (such as Taobao’s freemium model), and built impregnable moats to protect their businesses (for example, Meituan-Dianping created an end-to-end food app, including delivery).	他们在这个全球竞争最激烈的市场上摸爬滚打，学会发展出复杂的商业模式（如淘宝的免费增值模式），并建立了坚固的壁垒以保护自身业务（比如美团-点评就创建了一个终端到终端的餐饮手机app，就连送餐服务也一并涵盖在内了）。


As a result, the valuation of Chinese innovators is many times higher than that of their Western counterparts.	因此，中国创业企业的估值往往会比西方同行高出许多倍。 此外，中国在一些特定领域居于全球领先地位。


Moreover, China leads the world in some sectors, from livestreaming (one example is Musical.ly, a lip-syncing and video-sharing app) to bicycle sharing (Mobike and Ofo exceed 50 million rides per day in China, and are now expanding abroad).	从直播（例如Musical. ly这款唇音同步和视频分享手机app）到共享单车（摩拜和ofo在中国已经拥有每天超过5000万人次的骑乘量，并正在向国外扩张），中国正引领全球趋势。


Most important, China is at the frontier of mobile payments, with more than 600 million Chinese mobile users able to conduct peer-to-peer transactions with nearly no fees.	更值得一提的是，中国处于移动支付的前沿。 可以进行点对点交易的中国手机用户多达6亿人，而且交易过程几乎完全免费。


China’s mobile-payment infrastructure – which already handles far more transactions than the third-party mobile-payment market in the United States – will become a platform for many more innovations.	中国的移动支付基础设施——其处理的交易量远比美国的第三方移动支付要多得多——即将成为更多创新活动的平台。


As Chinese firms become increasingly technically capable, the country’s market advantage is turning into a data advantage – critical to support the development of AI.	随着中国企业的技术能力日益提高，中国的市场优势正在转变为数据优势，这对于人工智能的发展至关重要。 中国企业旷视科技（Face ++）最近完成了4.


The Chinese firm Face++ recently raised $460 million, the largest amount ever for an AI company.	6亿美元的C轮融资，这是截至目前人工智能领域规模最大的一笔融资。


DJI (a $14 billion consumer drone company), iFlyTek (a $14 billion voice recognition company), and Hikvision (a $50 billion video-surveillance company) are the world’s most valuable firms in their respective domains.	科大讯飞（一家市值140亿美元的语音识别技术企业）以及海康威视（市值500亿美元的视频监控企业）也都是在各自领域中全球最有价值的企业。


Another important developing trend in China is “online merging with offline” (OMO) – a trend that, along with AI, Sinovation Ventures is betting on.	在中国市场，另外一个重要的发展趋势则是“线上线下融合（OMO）”——这也是除人工智能之外，创新工场另一个重点投资的方向。


The physical world becomes digitized, with companies detecting a person’s location, movements, and identity, and then transmitting the data so that it can help shape online experiences.	物理世界正在变得数字化，企业可以掌握消费者所处的位置、，移动路径和身份识别，并将这些数据上传，用于塑造在线体验。


For example, OMO stores will be equipped with sensors that can identify customers and discern their likely behavior as seamlessly as e-commerce websites do now.	举个例子，OMO商店将配备可以无缝识别客户身份及潜在消费行为的传感器，就如同目前电子商务网站可以做到的一样。


Similarly, OMO language learning will combine native teachers lecturing remotely, local assistants keeping the atmosphere fun, autonomous software correcting pronunciation, and autonomous hardware grading homework and tests.	同样，OMO语言学习可以将远程授课的国外教师、协助维持课堂气氛的本地助教，纠正发音的自主软件以及批改作业和考试的自主硬件结合在一起。


With China in a position to rebuild its offline infrastructure, it can secure a leading position in OMO.	通过重建其线下基础设施，中国可以确保其在OMO领域的领先地位。


Yet, even as China leads the way in digitizing consumer industries, business adoption of digital technologies has lagged.	但是，即便中国在消费行业数字化方面处于领先地位，数字技术的商业化应用总体仍然有所滞后。


This may be about to change.	不过这一状况正在快速改观。


New McKinsey Global Institute research finds that three digital forces – disintermediation (cutting out the middle man), disaggregation (separating processes into component parts), and dematerialization (shifting from physical to electronic form) – could account for (or create) 10-45% of the industry revenue pool by 2030.	麦肯锡全球研究院的一项新研究发现，三大数字化推动力——去中介化（摒弃中间人），分散化（将庞大的资产分解为多个组成部分）和非物质化（从物理形式转变为虚拟形式）——到2030年，或可转变（与创造）10~45%的行业总收入。


Those actors that successfully capitalize on this shift are likely to be large enough to influence the global digital landscape, inspiring digital entrepreneurs far beyond China’s borders.	那些成功抓住这一商机的企业，很可能将快速发展壮大，其规模将足以大到影响全球数字版图，并激励更多在海外的数字创业者。


Value will shift from slow-moving incumbents to nimble digital attackers, armed with new business models, and from one part of the value chain to another.	价值将从目前那些反应迟缓的企业，转向那些敏捷的、建立在全新商业模式之上的数字挑战者身上； 同时价值将从价值链的一部分转移到另一部分。


Large-scale creative destruction will root out inefficiencies and vault China to a new echelon of global competitiveness.	大规模的创造性颠覆将铲除中国行业效率较低的状况，从而帮助中国经济的全球竞争力跻身新梯队。


China’s government has grand plans for the country’s future as a digital world power.	中国政府对中国作为世界数字化强国的未来有着宏伟的规划。


The State Council-led Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program has resulted in more than 8,000 incubators and accelerators.	在国务院领导的“大众创新、万众创业”号召之下，中国已经新建了8000多个项目孵化器和加速器。


The government’s Guiding Fund program has provided a total of $27.4 billion to venture capital and private equity investors – a passive investment, but with special redemption incentives.	政府的“创业投资引导基金”为风险投资和私募股权投资者提供了总额达274亿美元的资金——这是一项拥有特殊赎回奖励措施的被动性投资。


The authorities are now mobilizing resources to invest $180 billion in building China’s 5G mobile network over the next seven years, and are supporting the development of quantum technology.	目前中国政府鼓励各方资源，计划投入1800亿美元在未来7年内建成本国的5G移动网络，同时支持量子技术的发展。


The State Council has also issued guidelines for developing AI technologies, with the goal of making China a global AI innovation center by 2030.	国务院同时还出台了发展人工智能技术的指导方针，目标是到2030年使中国成为全球人工智能创新中心。


Xiongan, now under construction, may be the first “smart city” designed for autonomous vehicles.	目前正在建设中的雄安地区可能成为第一个专为自主驾驶车辆设计的“智慧城市”。


In Guangdong Province, the government has set an ambitious target of 80% automation by 2020.	而广东省政府则制定了到2020年实现自动化覆盖率达到80%的宏伟目标。


Such aspirations will inevitably disrupt the labor market, beginning with routine white-collar jobs (such as customer service and telemarketing), followed by routine blue-collar jobs (such as assembly line work), and finally affecting some non-routine jobs (such as driving or even radiology).	这样的愿望必然会在劳动力市场激起波澜，首先将影响日常的白领工作（如客户服务和电话营销），其次是是常规的蓝领工作（如流水线作业），最后甚至会影响到一些非常规工作（比如驾驶甚至放射影像诊断）。 最近一项麦肯锡全球研究院研究发现，在一个高速实现自动化的情境下，约有0.


Recent MGI research found that in a rapid-automation scenario, some 82-102 million Chinese workers would need to switch jobs.	82~1. 02亿的中国劳动者需要重新找一份工作。


Retraining the displaced will be a major challenge for China’s government, as will preventing the major digital players from securing innovation-stifling monopolies.	对失业者的再培训，以及防范数字巨头攫取扼杀创新的垄断地位，都将是中国政府面临的重大挑战。


But the government’s readiness to embrace the emerging digital age, pursuing supportive policies and avoiding excessive regulation, has already placed the country at a significant advantage.	但政府鉴定拥抱新兴数字时代、实施扶持性政策以及避免过度监管的意愿，已经使中国在数字化浪潮中占据了明显优势。


China’s Dangerous Digital Agenda	中国的危险数字日程


WASHINGTON, DC/BRUSSELS – When the Chinese e-commerce juggernaut Alibaba listed on the New York Stock Exchange late last year, it became the world's 17th largest publicly traded company overnight, with a market capitalization of $230 billion – larger than Amazon, eBay, or Facebook.	华盛顿/布鲁塞尔—中国电子商务巨头阿里巴巴公司去年底在纽约证券交易所挂牌上市，一夜之间成为世界第17大公开交易公司，市值2,300亿美元——比亚马逊、eBay和Facebook都要大。


Europe, however, seems to have missed the news.	但是，欧洲似乎遗漏了这个消息。


Indeed, instead of responding to China's digital rise, the European Union has remained fixated on the global success of American platforms like Amazon, Facebook, and Google, even threatening punitive actions against them.	事实上，欧盟并没有对中国的数字崛起做出反应，而是心安理得地享受着美国平台的全球成功——如亚马逊、Facebook 和谷歌——甚至威胁要对它们使用惩罚措施。


A couple of months after Alibaba's IPO, the European Parliament passed a  non-binding resolution to prevent online companies like Google from “abusing" their market position.	阿里巴巴IPO后几个月，欧洲议会通过了一项非约束性决议，防止谷歌等在线公司“滥用”市场地位。


The resolution called for “unbundling search engines from other commercial services."	该决议要求“不得将搜索引擎与其他商业服务绑定”。


But there is mounting evidence that the real competitive challenge for Europe will come from the East, especially China, which is taking a protectionist and expansionist approach to securing its future digital dominance.	但大量证据表明，对欧洲来说，真正的竞争挑战将来自东方特别是中国。 中国正在采取保护主义和扩张主义方针确保其未来数字主宰力。


If the European Union and the United States do not collaborate to limit China on this front, they risk leaving the playing field wide open to a regulatory regime based on principles that directly controvert the fundamental values the West's two largest economies share.	如果欧盟和美国不联合起来在这方面限制中国，就有可能让竞技场朝基于直接与西方最大两个经济体所共有的基本价值相冲突的原则的朝监管制度洞开。


There is no doubting China's success in the Internet economy.	毫无疑问，中国在互联网经济中大获成功。


With Alibaba, China has 27 so-called unicorns (companies that are valued at $1 billion following an IPO, sale, or publicly declared round of funding), whereas Europe has only 21.	包括阿里巴巴在内，中国已拥有27家所谓的怪兽公司（在经过IPO、销售或公开宣布的融资轮后市值超过10亿美元），而欧洲只有21家。


China also boasts four of the world's top ten most visited websites.	中国还拥有四家全球访问量前十名的网站。


Baidu, the country's leading search engine, anticipates that half of its revenues will come from outside of China within just six years.	中国最大搜索引擎百度预测，不出六年，其收入的一半将来自中国以外地区。


To be sure, China still lags far behind the US, with its 79 unicorns, in the digital sphere.	平心而论，在数字领域中国仍远远落后于美国，美国拥有79家怪兽公司。


But it poses a greater threat to the sector's openness and competitiveness, as its leaders rely on mercantilism and protectionism to further their high-tech goals.	但它给该行业的开放性和竞争带来了更大的挑战，因为中国领导人依靠重商主义和保护主义来追求高科技目标。


For example, the Chinese State Council's plan to ensure that the country leads the world in semiconductor production by 2030 will involve the provision of at least €20 billion ($22.6 billion) in government subsidies to Chinese-owned firms, as well as discriminatory procurement to shut out their foreign competitors.	比如，中国国务院意欲确保到2030年中国在半导体生产方面领先全球，该计划将向中国所有的企业提供至少200亿欧元政府补贴，并采取歧视性采购挤出外国竞争者。


Similarly, the Chinese government has committed €640 billion annually for five years to just seven “strategic emerging industries," including information and communications technology.	类似地，中国政府承诺在五年内每年投入6,400亿欧元给包括信息和通讯技术在内的七大“战略性新兴产业”。


Moreover, China employs technology standards as a market barrier, while using its anti-monopoly laws to harass US and European companies.	此外，中国利用技术标准作为市场壁垒，同时用反垄断法打击美国和欧洲公司。


Add to that the theft of valuable European and American intellectual property, including through the government-backed hacking of European companies' computers, and the threat that China poses to open competition could not be clearer.	此外中国还窃取欧洲和美国的知识产权，包括通过政府支持的黑客行为入侵欧洲公司计算机。 中国对公开竞争的威胁更是众人皆知。


But the problem is not confined to China's borders.	但问题并不局限于中国。


The “Beijing consensus" – China's statist policy approach, often contrasted with the “Washington consensus" of market-friendly policies broadly favored by Europe and the US – is inspiring a growing number of countries to shower domestic tech champions with privileges and subsidies.	“北京共识”——中国的中央集权政策方针，通常与欧洲和美国所广泛支持的亲市场的“华盛顿共识”针锋相对——正在促使越来越多的国家采取给予本国优秀科技公司特殊地位和补贴的政策。


Perhaps more problematic, Chinese influence is fueling support for Internet balkanization – the splintering of the global Internet into smaller, closed national networks – in a number of countries, including key players like Brazil, Russia, and Turkey, and even has sympathizers in Europe.	也许问题更大的是中国的影响正在刺激许多国家对互联网分割的支持——将全球互联网分割为更小的封闭国家网络，其中包括巴西、俄罗斯和土耳其等重要国家，甚至在欧洲也有同情者。


Such data localization may sound harmless, especially when it is presented as a legitimate response to revelations of far-reaching surveillance by the likes of the US National Security Agency.	这一数据地方化看上去人畜无害，特别是在美国国家安全局大肆监控等丑闻曝光后作为合理应对措施出现的情况下。


And, in promising a “secure" national cloud, this is precisely what policymakers are attempting to do.	此外，这也是决策者正在尝试的事情——承诺“安全”的国家云。


But those are weak grounds for undermining one of today's greatest innovations and most effective economic-growth engines, especially given that hacking can, and does, occur from anywhere.	但这些都不能作为破坏当代最伟大创新和最有效经济增长引擎的借口，特别是考虑到黑客行为可能并且确实在世界各地都有发生。


Indeed, the gravest cyber crimes originate from precisely those countries, including China and Russia, that are leading the balkanization movement.	事实上，最恶劣的网络犯罪正是来自这些在分割运动中一马当先的国家，包括中国和俄罗斯。


The surest way to accelerate China's digital rise is a transatlantic falling out over relatively small issues.	大西洋两岸斤斤计较于相对较小的问题，这最有利于加速中国的数字崛起。


Whether it is data or copyright, the Internet of Things, or privacy, the EU and the US must agree on a common path – based on shared values like democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of speech.	不管是数据、版权、物联网还是隐私，欧盟和美国都必须采取共同方法——基于民主、法治和言论自由等共同价值。


Otherwise, China will soon be dictating the terms of trade of the world's fastest-growing economic sector.	否则，中国很快就会在这一世界增长最快的经济部门赢得贸易优势。


If open and pluralistic societies do not stand up for an open Internet and market-based trade, who will?	如果开放多元社会不站出来捍卫开放互联网和基于市场的贸易，还有谁会站出来？


The Challenges Confronting China’s Digital Economy	中国数字经济的机遇与挑战


HONG KONG – China’s digital economy is a force to be reckoned with.	香港—中国数字经济的崛起势如破竹：中国占全球电子商务的比重已经高达42%；


The country now accounts for 42% of global e-commerce, boasts one-third of the world’s most successful tech startups, and conducts 11 times more mobile payments than the United States per year.	全世界最成功的科技初创企业有三分之一在中国； 中国每年的移动支付总额更是美国的11倍；


But there are major challenges ahead.	但未来发展面临巨大挑战。


To be sure, China is on track for continued progress, thanks to its rich ecosystem of innovators, a tech-friendly attitude among regulators and government, and its massive consumer market.	中国数字经济的迅猛发展要归功于其丰富多样的创新创业生态系统、监管者和政府对技术发展的友好态度、以及巨大的消费市场。


China’s 731 million Internet users outnumber those in the European Union and the US combined.	中国有7. 31亿互联网用户，比欧盟和美国的总和还要多。


These factors underpin projections of rapid growth in China’s FinTech market.	这些因素为中国金融技术（FinTech）市场的高增长预期奠定了基础。 高盛公司预测，2016—2020年间，与消费有关的第三方支付量将从1.


From 2016 to 2020, Goldman Sachs expects consumption-related third-party payment value to grow from $1.9 trillion to $4.6 trillion, with lending by non-traditional players soaring from $156 billion to $764 billion and new online-oriented asset management increasing from $8.3 trillion to $11.9 trillion.	非传统贷款人贷款将从1,560亿美元增加到7,640亿美元； 新的在线导向的资产管理规模将从8.


Moreover, China is accelerating investment in artificial intelligence.	中国也正在加快人工智能（AI）方面的投资。


In its report Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China, McKinsey estimates that AI technology in China could add 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points to China’s annual GDP growth, depending on the speed of adoption.	根据麦肯锡公司（McKinsey）的报告《人工智能：对中国的影响》（Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China）测算，取决于采用AI的速度，AI技术将为中国GDP增长带来0. 8—1.


Early this month, Google AI China was launched in Beijing by the company’s Chinese-born chief scientist for cloud computing, Fei-Fei Li.	4个百分点的增量。 本月早些时候，谷歌AI中国在北京成立，由在中国出生的谷歌云计算首席科学家李飞飞主持。


Yet China still has a long way to go.	但中国仍有很长的路要走。


As another recent McKinsey study, Digital China: Powering the Economy to Global Competitiveness, points out, the US remains 4.9 times more digitized than China.	麦肯锡公司的最新研究《数字中国：赋予经济全球竞争力》（Digital China: Powering the Economy to Global Competitiveness）指出，美国数字化程度仍比中国高4.


And, within China, there are large variations in various sectors’ level of digitization.	9倍，而且，在中国内部，不同行业的数字化水平和参差不齐。


China will confront serious risks as it closes these gaps.	在追赶及缩短差距的过程中，中国将面临严峻挑战。


As McKinsey notes, digitization promises to shift and create value equivalent to anywhere from 10% to 45% of total industry revenues in four key sectors (consumer and retail, automotive and mobility, health care, and freight and logistics) by 2030.	麦肯锡公司指出，到2030年，数字化有望改变四个关键行业（消费和零售、汽车和交通、医疗、及物流）并创造相当于全行业10%-45%的收入。


This implies significant disruptions to value chains and uncertainty about jobs, consumption, and the socio-political context.	这将对现有的价值链体系造成巨大冲击，提升就业、消费和社会政治环境的不确定性。


If China is to ensure the continued development of its digital economy, while containing the risks associated with disruption, its leaders will need to implement smart regulations.	为了确保数字经济的持续健康发展，应对突破性技术进步所带来的产业与社会风险，中国需要实施明智的监管机制。


And that will require careful consideration of the factors that have contributed to – and impeded – its progress so far.	而这就需要审慎考察推动及制约技术进步的各种因素。


As recently as a decade ago, few expected China’s remarkable digital breakthrough.	十年前，几乎没人预测到中国会发生如此引人注目的数字经济突破。


In fact, both of the country’s key Internet pioneers, Jack Ma of Alibaba and Pony Ma of Tencent, experienced early failures.	事实上，中国的两位互联网先锋， 阿里巴巴的马云和腾讯的马化腾，创业之初都经历过失败。


But thanks to the Chinese leadership’s willingness to experiment, allowing access to foreign capital and technology, these pioneers were able to pursue initial public offerings elsewhere – Tencent in Hong Kong and Alibaba in New York.	受益于中国对外开放及鼓励试验与创新的政策，这两家公司才能获得外国资本和技术，并在海外进行首次公开募股（IPO）——腾讯在香港上市，阿里巴巴在纽约上市。


As they took advantage of emerging digital technology – not to mention China’s high-quality public infrastructure – to leverage and build services, these pioneers spearheaded rapid progress in China’s digital economy.	他们利用新数字技术以及中国高质量的电讯及物流公共基础设施来撬动和构建以互联网为基础的数字服务业，成为中国数字经济崛起的先锋。


Alibaba’s e-commerce platform expanded market access and reduced transaction costs, crowding out traditional middleman who undermined productivity.	阿里巴巴的电子商务平台降低了交易成本、开拓了新市场、挤出了制约生产率提升的传统中介。


Tencent’s WeChat reduced the costs of communication, interaction, coordination, and socialization among individuals, stimulating innovation across industries.	腾讯的微信降低了个体之间通讯、交流、协作和社会活动的成本，刺激了跨行业创新。


Both broke down barriers among manufacturing, distribution, media, and finance, thereby achieving scale, expanding scope, and increasing speed.	两家公司的创新成功推翻了制造、分销、媒体和金融之间的壁垒，帮助中国经济在规模、范围、与速度维度同步提升。


These achievements – which produced major productivity, income, and wealth gains – are a testament to private-sector ingenuity.	中国迅速崛起的新经济 带来了巨大的生产率、收入和财富提升，是民营企业活力与市场创造力的写照。


But they were facilitated by the state, which pursued a policy of flexible non-enforcement of functional rules and regulations that enabled not only the expansion of private markets in China, but also the integration of those markets into the global economy.	但各级政府也为市场创新提供了便利，明智地选择了在市场发展的初期对新生事物采取网开一面的灵活政策，监管措施不但允许民企及市场不断扩张，还让这些市场成功融入全球经济。


Yet market-based innovations are intrinsically unpredictable, and expectations regarding innovations often overshoot.	但基于市场的创新具有内在不可预测性，而与创新有关的预期常常会过度高估或低估现实可能。


In the case of China’s digital economy, imperfect and lagging regulations and enforcement exacerbated the effects of imbalances in the business environment, which enabled the emergence of severe vulnerabilities, from financial and debt risk to pollution and inequality.	对于中国的数字经济，监管和执法的滞后和漏洞加剧了营商环境的失衡，导致金融和债务风险、污染和收入不平均等社会问题。


Under China’s current system, it is up to the government to deal with these problems.	在中国现行体制下，需要政府来解决这些社会问题。


And, over the last five years, it has attempted to do just that, often using old, imperfect, but already-available administrative tools.	在过去五年中，政府也确实在尝试解决这些问题，但通常会使用传统、非系统性、及现成的行政管理工具。


Over the last year alone, China’s authorities have steadily tightened regulations governing the crypto-currency Bitcoin, B2C financing platforms, shadow banking, cross-border capital flows, and debt and securities markets.	在过去一年，中国有关当局逐步收紧了对加密数字货币（比特币）、互联网融资平台、影子银行、跨境资本流动、地方债务及证券市场的监管。


But such changes do not address the underlying weaknesses that allow risk to proliferate.	但这些应急措施在短期有其必要，却无法根除导致风险与不确定性的一些更基本的制度因素，即如何处理创新过程中的失败、损失、及监管漏洞等灰犀牛问题。


For that, China must build more effective institutions to deal with business failures, absorb losses, and manage risks and uncertainty.	因此，中国需要构建更有效的制度与机制来应对企业破产、吸收损失、及管理风险和不确定性。


In particular, China needs improved bankruptcy procedures, multilevel capital markets, an effective social-security system, reliable public housing, and a progressive tax regime that aims to reduce inequality.	特别是，中国需要健全的破产流程、有活力的多层次资本市场、有效的社会安全体系、可靠的公共住房体系、以及一个旨在降低收入与财富不平等的累进税制。


At the same time, to counter market abuses, China should introduce more robust competition laws, anti-corruption mechanisms, and stronger environmental regulations.	与此同时，为了遏制一些市场不平衡，中国需要引入更强的竞争法、反腐败机制以及环境监管。


The digital economy is naturally pro-market, pro-productivity, and pro-globalization.	数字经济天然有利于市场、有利于提高生产率、有利于全球化。


Yet, without effective management, it can generate significant economic imbalances that foster political and social instability.	但如果没有有效的监管，数字经济可能导致严重的经济失衡，甚至影响到社会稳定。


This is all the more true at a time of large-scale disruptions, owing to rapid technological progress, demographic shifts, and climate change.	在新经济对传统经济具有大规模冲击力的时代，在突破性技术进步、人口老化和气候变化等因素相互作用的环境下，这一点尤其重要。


The only way to harness the digital economy’s potential while avoiding downside risks is to build fair and inclusive social institutions that protect property rights and ensure efficient markets.	为了实现数字经济的潜力，并避免其可能的弊端，中国需要构建公正包容的社会制度来保护产权及确保有效的市场。


In other words, it all comes down to delineating clearly, appropriately, and effectively the roles of the state and the market.	换句话说，一切都取决于清楚、合理、有效地界定政府与市场的角色。


Deciphering China’s Economic Resilience	解构中国的经济恢复力


NEW HAVEN – Once again, the Chinese economy has defied the hand wringing of the nattering nabobs of negativism.	纽黑文—中国经济再一次否定了消极论者的聒噪。 在经历了连续六年的减速后，真实GDP增长在2017年呈现出上扬之势。


After decelerating for six consecutive years, real GDP growth appears to be inching up in 2017.	据最新报道，中国GDP第二季度年化增长率为6. 9%，高于2016年的6.


The 6.9% annualized increase just reported for the second quarter exceeds the 6.7% rise in 2016 and is well above the consensus of international forecasters who, just a few months ago, expected growth to be closer to 6.5% this year, and to slow further, to 6%, in 2018.	7%，也远高于国际预测者的共识。 几个月前，他们认为中国增长今年将接近6.


I have long argued that the fixation on headline GDP overlooks deeper issues shaping the China growth debate.	我一直指出，过度关注标题GDP导致人们忽略了中国增长讨论中的更深层次的问题。


That is because the Chinese economy is in the midst of an extraordinary structural transformation – with a manufacturing-led producer model giving way to an increasingly powerful services-led consumer model.	这是因为，中国经济正处在一个波澜壮阔的结构转变过程中——制造业领衔的生产国模式将让位给日益强大的服务业推动的消费国模式。


To the extent that this implies a shift in the mix of GDP away from exceptionally rapid gains in investment and exports, toward relatively slower-growing internal private consumption, a slowdown in overall GDP growth is both inevitable and desirable.	这意味着GDP的组成将从投资和出口的超快速增长，转变为增长相对缓慢的内部私人消费，因此，总体GDP增长将是不可避免的，也是应有之义。


Perceptions of China’s vulnerability need to be considered in this context.	对于中国疲软的观点，应该放到这一环境中去考察。


This debate has a long history.	这一争论由来已久。


I first caught a whiff of it back in the late 1990s, during the Asian financial crisis.	我第一次看到它可以追溯到20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机期间。


From Thailand and Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan, China was widely thought to be next.	危机从泰国和印尼，蔓延到韩国和台湾，人们普遍认为中国将是下一个。


An October 1998 cover story in The Economist, vividly illustrated by a Chinese junk getting sucked into a powerful whirlpool, said it all.	1998年10月，《经济学人》（The Economist）刊登了生动的封面配图，中国废墟被一个强大的漩涡吞没。 这说明了一切。


Yet nothing could have been further from the truth.	然而这一预言大错特错。


When the dust settled on the virulent pan-regional contagion, the Chinese economy had barely skipped a beat.	中国硬是成为东南亚覆巢之下的完卵。 真实GDP增长在1998—1999年期间暂时性地下降到7.


Real GDP growth slowed temporarily, to 7.7% in 1998-1999, before reaccelerating to 10.3% in the subsequent decade.	7%，但在随后的十年中又再次升高到10. 3%。


China’s resilience during the Great Financial Crisis was equally telling.	中国在金融大危机期间所表现出来的恢复力同样很能说明问题。


In the midst of the worst global contraction since the 1930s, the Chinese economy still expanded at a 9.4% average annual rate in 2008-2009.	在这场20世纪30年代以来最糟糕的全球衰退中，2008—2009年中国经济仍然能够以平均每年9. 4%的速度扩张。


While down from the blistering, unsustainable 12.7% pace recorded during the three years prior to the crisis, this represented only a modest shortfall from the 30-year post-1980 trend of 10%.	7%的增长率低了不少，但和1980年以来的30年趋势10%相比只是略微下降。 事实上，若非中国在最近的衰退中表现出卓越的恢复力，世界GDP在2009年就不会只收缩0.


Indeed, were it not for China’s resilience in the depths of the recent crisis, world GDP would not have contracted by 0.1% in 2009, but would have plunged by 1.3% – the sharpest decline in global activity of the post-World War II era.	1%，而将下降1. 3%——第二次世界大战结束以来最严重的全球经济活动萎缩。


The latest bout of pessimism over the Chinese economy has focused on the twin headwinds of deleveraging and a related tightening of the property market – in essence, a Japanese-like stagnation.	针对中国经济的最大悲观论关注两大问题，即去杠杆和与之相关的房地产市场紧缩——本质上，就是日本式停滞。


Once more, the Western lens is out of focus.	但在这里，西方的视角再次对错了焦。


Like Japan, China is a high-saving economy that owes its mounting debt largely to itself.	和日本一样，中国是一个高储蓄经济体，其高企的债务基本都是内债。


Yet, if anything, China has more of a cushion than Japan to avoid sustainability problems.	并且，中国还有一个日本所不具有的缓冲可以用来避免可持续性问题。


According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s national savings is likely to hit 45% of GDP in 2017, well above Japan’s 28% saving rate.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF）数据，2017年中国国民储蓄可能高达GDP的45%，远高于28%的日本储蓄率。


Just as Japan, with its gross government debt at 239% of GDP, has been able to sidestep a sovereign debt crisis, China, with its far larger saving cushion and much smaller sovereign debt burden (49% of GDP), is in much better shape to avoid such an implosion.	日本的总政府债务高达GDP的239%，仍然能够避免主权债务危机。 类似地，中国拥有更大的储蓄缓冲和更小的主权债务负担（GDP的49%），其避免内部崩溃的形势远远优于日本。


To be sure, there can be no mistaking China’s mounting corporate debt problem – with nonfinancial debt-to-GDP ratios hitting an estimated 157% of GDP in late 2016 (versus 102% in late 2008).	平心而论，中国确实存在企业债务迅速积累的问题——据估算，非金融债务-GDP之比在2016年年底高达GDP的157%（2008年年底为102%）。


This makes the imperatives of state-owned enterprise reform, where the bulk of rising indebtedness has been concentrated, all the more essential in the years ahead.	这意味着必须将实施国有企业改革列为未来几年的重中之重。 国有企业是中国企业债务增量的大头。


Moreover, there is always good reason to worry about the Chinese property market.	此外，对于中国的房地产市场，始终存在令人担忧的理由。


After all, a rising middle class needs affordable housing.	毕竟，崛起的中产阶级需要平价住房。


With the urban share of China’s population rising from less than 20% in 1980 to more than 56% in 2016 – and most likely headed to 70% by 2030 – this is no trivial consideration.	随着中国城镇人口比例从1980年的20%增长到2016年的56%——到2030年极有可能达到70%——这绝不是一件小事。


But this means that Chinese property markets – unlike those of other fully urbanized major economies – enjoy ample support from the demand side, with the urban population likely to remain on a 1-2% annualized growth trajectory over the next 10-15 years.	但这意味着中国房地产市场——和充分城市化的主要经济体不同——拥有来自需求端的充分支持，在未来10—15年中，城镇人口有望保持1—2%的年化增长率。


With Chinese home prices up nearly 50% since 2005 – nearly five times the global norm (according to the Bank for International Settlements and IMF global housing watch) – affordability is obviously a legitimate concern.	2005年以来，中国住房价格上涨了近50%——是全球正常水平的近五倍（据国际清算银行和IMF全球住房观察数据）——平价性显然是一个合理的关注点。


The challenge for China is to manage prudently the growth in housing supply needed to satisfy the demand requirements of urbanization, without fostering excessive speculation and dangerous asset bubbles.	中国面临的挑战是审慎地管理住房供给的增长，从而既满足城镇化需求的需要，又不产生过度投机和危险的资产泡沫。


Meanwhile the Chinese economy is also drawing support from strong sources of cyclical resilience in early 2017.	与此同时，2017年上半年中国经济还获得了周期性恢复力的强大支撑。 6月份，中国出口同比增长11.


The 11.3% year-on-year gain in exports recorded in June stands in sharp contrast with earlier years, which were adversely affected by a weaker post-crisis global recovery.	3%，与此前几年饱受危机后全球恢复萎靡的不利影响的局面形成了鲜明的对比。 类似地，2017年上半年，经通胀调整的零售额实现了10%的年化增长——比6.


Similarly, 10% annualized gains in inflation-adjusted retail sales through mid-2017 – about 45% faster than the 6.9% pace of overall GDP growth – reflect impressive growth in household incomes and the increasingly powerful (and possibly under-reported) impetus of e-commerce.	9%的总体GDP增长速度快了大约4. 5%——这反映了家庭收入的迅速增长和电子商务推动力的日益强大（并且可能被低估）。


Pessimists have long viewed the Chinese economy as they view their own economies – repeating a classic mistake that Yale historian Jonathan Spence’s seminal assessment warned of many years ago.	长期以来，悲观论者总是把中国经济与本国经济作比较——重复着耶鲁大学历史学家史景迁（Jonathan Spence）的著名观点在多年前就发出警告的典型错误。


The asset bubbles that broke Japan and the United States are widely presumed to pose the same threat in China.	人们普遍认为，重创日本和美国的资产泡沫也会给中国带来同样的威胁。


Likewise, China’s recent binge of debt-intensive economic growth is expected to have the same consequences as such episodes elsewhere.	类似地，中国最近的债务密集性经济增长狂欢也被认为是在重蹈其他国家的覆辙。


Forecasters find it difficult to resist superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China.	预测家总是难以抗拒把受大危机重创过的发达经济体的经验生搬硬套到中国头上的诱惑。


That has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today.	在过去，这种方法一直是错误的； 今天，它将再次证明是错误的。


Should China Be Ejected from the SDR?	中国应当被移除出特别提款权体系吗?


SANTA BARBARA – Last week, the Chinese government tightened its grip on the renminbi’s exchange rate. China has now effectively reneged on a promise it made 18 months ago, when it lobbied its way into the basket of currencies that determines the value of the International Monetary Fund’s synthetic reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR).	发自圣塔巴巴拉——在上周收紧了对人民币汇率的管制后，中国实际上已经违背了18个月前游说国际货币基金组织，将人民币列入到决定基金组织创设的综合储备资产“特别提款权”价值的一篮子货币时所许下的承诺。


China’s latest move will hardly strengthen confidence in its currency.	这一最新举措不会有助于外界加强对人民币的信心。


As some of us warned at the time, the renminbi’s admission to the SDR basket was a highly political decision that could have adverse long-term consequences.	正如包括笔者在内的一些学者在人民币被纳入特别提款权货币时警告的那样，这是一项高度政治性的决定，并可能会导致不利的长期后果。


The basket had previously comprised the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen – all world-class currencies that meet the IMF’s two criteria for admission: they are issued by the world’s leading exporters, and they are “freely usable,” meaning that they are widely exchanged worldwide.	这个篮子原本只包含美元，欧元，英镑和日圆，而这些货币都是符合国际货币基金组织两个准入标准的世界级货币：它们都由位居世界前列的出口国发行，而且是“可以自由使用的”——也就是说可以在全世界各处进行兑换。


By contrast, the renminbi met only the first criterion when it was included in the SDR.	相比之下，人民币在被纳入特别提款权货币时只符合了第一个标准。


Although China was already the world’s largest exporting country, its financial markets were primitive, and its currency plainly fell far short of being freely usable.	虽然中国已经是世界上最大的出口国，但其金融市场却相当原始，其货币远未实现自由使用。


In 2015, the renminbi ranked seventh in global central-bank reserves, eighth in international bond issuance, and 11th in global currency trading; and it remained non-convertible for most capital-account transactions.	2015年人民币在全球央行储备中排名第七，在国际债券发行中排第八，位居全球货币交易量的第十一； 而在大多数资本账户交易它依然是不可兑换的。


Still, the renminbi was admitted.	不过，人民币依然被纳入了一篮子货币。


China had made it abundantly clear that it would not be happy with a negative decision, and no one wanted to poke the dragon.	因为中国已经非常清楚地表示不愿意收到一个否定的结果，也没有人想跟这条大龙过不去。


But rather than upholding its usual standards, the IMF and its principal members settled for China’s vague promise to make the renminbi more usable sometime in the future.	然而国际货币基金组织及其主要成员却未能遵照通常的标准来执行，而是采信了中国将在未来某个时候实现人民币自由兑换的模糊承诺。


Historically, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) had fixed the renminbi’s exchange rate on a daily basis, without regard to underlying market sentiment; and it had allowed for the renminbi to trade only within very narrow limits.	历史上，中国人民银行每天都会在毫不顾及市场情绪的情况下制定一个人民币汇率； 只允许人民币在极窄的限定范围内进行交易。


But even before the IMF decided to include the renminbi in the SDR, the Chinese government announced that it was loosening its control over the currency.	而即使是在货币基金组织决定将人民币纳入特别提款权之前，中国政府也已经宣布将放宽对人民币的管制。


The PBOC declared that market signals would henceforth be factored into its daily exchange-rate fixing. And it promised gradual liberalization of China’s capital controls, which would boost the renminbi’s attractiveness to investors.	中国人民银行宣布会在制定日常汇率时考虑市场的信号，并承诺将逐步放宽资本管制，令人民币对投资者的吸引力有所提升。


And yet the Chinese authorities’ latest move indicates that they have no intention of playing by the rules.	但中国当局的最新举动却显示出其无意按规矩办事。


Instead of further loosening its grip on the exchange rate, the PBOC is reasserting control and reducing the role of market sentiment in its decision-making.	中国人民银行不再放松对汇率的管制，而是再度抓紧并减少市场情绪在决策中的作用。


The proof is in the pudding: the renminbi is clearly less freely usable than it was 18 months ago.	让我们用事实说话：人民币当前的自由使用状况明显要低于比18个月前。


Since mid-2016, China has been imposing strict new capital controls to prevent the renminbi from pouring out of the country and being converted into dollars.	自2016年年中以来，中国一直在严格执行新的资本管制措施以防止人民币流出国外被换成美元。


China has also placed new limits on Chinese corporations’ foreign direct investments, and it is scrutinizing other cross-border transactions.	中国也对本国企业的外商直接投资提出了新的限制，并对其他跨境交易进行仔细审查。


It is not difficult to understand why China has reneged on its promises.	中国违背其承诺的原因其实不难理解。


Over the past two years, newly affluent Chinese citizens have been seeking ways to move their wealth abroad.	近两年来，新近富裕起来的中国公民一直在寻求将财富转移到海外的途径。


This has increased downward pressure on the renminbi, and has forced the PBOC to spend more than $1 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves to prop up the exchange rate. And yet that still wasn’t enough to prevent Moody’s Investors Service from downgrading China’s credit rating earlier this month, leaving policymakers on the defensive.	这导致人民币贬值压力上升，迫使中国人民银行花费超过1万亿美元的外汇储备来支撑汇率，然而这仍不足以制止投资评级机构穆迪在本月初调低中国的信贷评级，使决策者们疲于招架。


Of course, China’s current problems may amount to a brief detour on the long road to greater openness. But they may not.	当然，中国目前的问题可能只是迈向更大规模开放的漫长道路上的一段弯路，但也可能并非如此。


If the Chinese government is serious about opening its capital market, it will have to implement reforms that go straight to the heart of the Chinese Communist Party’s model of political and economic management.	如果中国政府确实有诚意开放资本市场，就要推行直接影响到中国共产党政治和经济管理核心模式的改革。


An efficient, open financial sector could seriously erode the CCP’s authority, not least because financial repression is a key component in China’s machinery of political autocracy.	高效，开放的金融部门可能严重削弱中共的权威，而金融压制尤其是中国政治专制机制的重要组成部分。


At best, China’s government acted prematurely when it insisted that the renminbi be included in the SDR.	从最乐观的角度看，中国政府坚持将人民币纳入特别提款权也是个不成熟的行为。


At worst, it set an unfortunate precedent that could encourage other big emerging economies, such as India or Russia, to demand the same treatment for their currencies, regardless of whether they meet the IMF’s criteria.	最糟糕的是，此举开创了一个不幸的先例，会鼓励印度或俄罗斯等其他大型新兴经济体罔顾国际货币基金组织的标准，要求对其货币制定相同的待遇。


Indeed, if China can get into such a prestigious, exclusive club despite its arbitrary policy behavior, then why can’t they?	事实上，如果中国在政策上恣意妄为却照样可以加入这样一个意义重大的独家俱乐部，那么其它国家为什么就不行？


Never mind that the IMF’s authority would be severely compromised.	更别提国际货币基金组织权威所受到的严重损害了。


Looking to the future, there is only one solution.	展望未来，只有一个解决方案。


The renminbi should be removed from the SDR, unless China can make credible commitments to pursue serious and permanent financial liberalization.	人民币应该被移出特别提款权，除非该国作出可靠的承诺，推动认真，永久的金融自由化。


The criterion that a constitutive currency should be freely usable is a guarantee of stability for the global monetary system. That guarantee is only as credible as the criterion itself.	特别提款权构成货币的自由使用标准是全球货币体系稳定的保证，而只有标准本身可信的情况下这种保证才能成立。


China, the Innovation Dragon	中国，创新之龙


WASHINGTON, DC – China has achieved much since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping initiated the transition to a market economy.	华盛顿—自1978年以来，中国成就斐然。 邓小平开启了市场经济改革。


In terms of headline economic progress, the pace of China’s transformation over the past 40 years is unprecedented.	以总体经济进步衡量，过去四十年来中国转型的速度可谓前所未有。


The country’s GDP grew by nearly 10% per year on average, while reshaping global trade patterns and becoming the second-largest economy in the world.	中国GDP平均每年增长近10%，并改变了全球贸易模式，成为世界第二大经济体。


This success lifted 800 million people out of poverty, and the mortality rate of children under five years old was halved between 2006 and 2015.	这一成功让八亿人摆脱了贫困，五岁以下儿童夭折率在2006—2015年间下降了一半。


The question now is whether China, well positioned to become the world’s innovation leader, will realize that opportunity in 2018 or soon after.	现在的问题是，大有希望成为世界创新领导者的中国，是否能在2018年随后的一段时间实现这一机会。


China’s transformation has been underpinned by an unprecedented manufacturing boom.	中国转型的基础，是前所未有的制造业繁荣。


In 2016, China shipped more than $2 trillion worth of goods around the world, 13% of total global exports.	2016年，中国向全世界输出了2万亿多美元的产品，占全球总出口量的13%。


It has also pursued economic modernization through massive infrastructure investment, including bridges, airports, roads, energy, and telecoms.	中国通过大规模基础设施投资实现经济现代化，包括桥梁、机场、公路、能源和电信等。


In less than a decade, China built the world’s largest bullet train system, surpassing 22,000 kilometers (13,670 miles) in July 2017.	在不到十年的时间里，中国就建成了全世界最大的高速铁路系统，2017年7月里程突破22,000公里。


Annual consumption is expected to rise by nearly $2 trillion by 2021, equivalent to adding another consumer market the size of Germany to the global economy.	年消费量预计在2021年将接近2万亿美元，相当于给全球经济新增一个德国规模的消费市场。


Earlier this month, Apple CEO Tim Cook declared that, “China stopped being a low-labor-cost country many years ago, and that is not the reason to come to China.”	本月早些时候，苹果公司CEO库克（Tim Cook）说“中国已不再是多年前哪个低劳动力成本的国家，劳动力成本低廉也不再是来华的原因。


The country’s manufacturing strengths now lie in its advanced production know-how and strong supply-chain networks.	”如今，这个国家的制造业优势在于对先进生产的知识和强大的供应链网络。


Understandably, China’s leadership wants to increase productivity and continue to move further up the value chain.	不难理解，中国领导层希望提高生产率、进一步上价值链上游攀升。


Building on its 13th Five Year Plan (in May 2016), the authorities established objectives for China to become an “innovative nation” by 2020, an “international innovation leader” by 2030, and a “world powerhouse of scientific and technological innovation” by 2050.	基于十三五规划（2016年5月），当局为中国制定的目标是到2020年成为“创新国家”，到2030年成为“国际创新领导者”，到2050年成为“世界科技创新强国”。


It also committed to increasing its expenditure on research and development to 2.5% of GDP and almost doubling the number of patents filed per 10,000 people by 2020.	当局还承诺到2020年要提高研发支出至GDP的2. 5%，每10,000人申请专利量要接近翻番。


To enable this innovation, municipal governments are building technology hubs, hoping to attract talent.	为让创新成为可能，市级政府正在打造技术枢纽以期吸引人才。


The city of Guangzhou is encouraging researchers, entrepreneurs, and corporations to base themselves there.	广州鼓励研究人员、企业家和企业在那里建立大本营。


General Electric recently committed to build its first Asian biopharmaceutical project in an $800 million bio-campus.	通用电气最近承诺在8亿美元规模的生物科技园建立其首个亚洲生物制药项目。


The southern city of Shenzhen is already known as the “Silicon Valley of Hardware,” and the greater Shenzhen-Hong Kong area is ranked second in terms of global inventive clusters (measured by patents).	位于广州以南的深圳以“硬件硅谷”文明，而深港大区被评为全球第二大密集城市群（以专利衡量）。


Business in China often operates at a speed and nimbleness unlike anywhere else in the world.	在中国，做生意的速度和技巧与世界其他国家都不一样。


China is fully embracing digital models, not just digitizing old models.	中国全方位接受了数字模式，而不只是对旧模式进行数字化改造。


Its lack of legacy systems has already enabled it to leapfrog the West in areas such as digital payments, the sharing economy (dockless bicycles are sweeping the world), and e-commerce.	中国没有历史包袱，这使它能够在数字支付、共享经济（共享单车正在横扫全世界）和电子商务方面可以“弯道超车”西方。


Total spending on R&D in China (as a percentage of GDP) more than doubled from 0.9% in 2000 to 2.1% in 2016.	中国研发总支出（占GDP百分比）从2000年的0. 9%提高到2016年的2.


To date, the increase has mostly been focused on applied research and commercial development, with only 5% dedicated to basic science.	1%。 到目前为止，这一增量大部分集中在应用研究和商业开发，只有5%投入了基础科学。


Nevertheless, China ranked 22nd in the 2017 Global Innovation Index (a survey of 127 countries and economies based on 81 indicators) ahead of Spain, Italy, and Australia.	尽管如此，中国仍在2017年全球创新指数（基于81项指标对127个国家和经济体进行的调查）中位列第22名，高于西班牙、意大利和澳大利亚。


China’s share of high-impact academic publications (the top 0.1% of papers in Scopus, which rates by citations) has grown, from less than 1% in 1997 to about 20% in 2016.	中国占高影响力学术出版（引用率排在斯高帕斯（Scopus）数据库中前0. 1%的文章）的比例也从1997年的不到1%增加到2016年的约20%。


The sheer volume of university graduates (6.2 million in 2012, six times the 2001 total) combined with an internationally trained, highly skilled diaspora whose members return home in large numbers – there are 800,000 Chinese students in tertiary education abroad – is likely to produce enough talent to achieve the desired effect.	巨大的大学毕业生数量（2012年达到620万，是2001年的六倍），加上大量回国的具备国际背景的高水平侨民（中国有800,000大学生在海外留学），有望带来足够多数量的人才实现中国想要的结果。


American workers are still considerably more productive than their Chinese counterparts.	美国工人的生产率仍然比中国工人高得多。


On average, each Chinese worker generates only about 19% of the amount of GDP that an American worker does.	平均而言，每名中国工人所生产的GDP，只有美国工人的19%左右。


But this lead is being eroded.	但这一领先地位正在被追上。


Other factors in America’s favor include 30 of the top 100 universities in the world, a risk-taking, entrepreneurial culture, and its companies’ heavy exposure to market forces.	美国的其他优势是它拥有全球100所顶尖高校中的30所，拥有一个勇于冒险的企业家文化，并且美国公司要时刻面对严酷的市场竞争。


Traditionally, this has driven US firms to compete aggressively, often relying on innovation.	传统上，这促使美国企业采用进攻性竞争策略，通常需要要创新。


But American industry is not as dynamic as it once was.	但美国工业已经不如昔日那样有活力。


Between 1997 and 2012, two-thirds of America’s industries experienced an increase in market concentration, and a record 74% of employees are working at these aging (16 years or older) incumbents.	1997—2012年间，三分之二的美国行业经历了市场集中度升高，创纪录的74%的员工在历史悠久（16年或以上）的老牌企业工作。


US President Donald Trump’s administration seems to have completely misunderstood what is needed.	美国总统特朗普的政府似乎完全误解了需要什么。


Trump favors a more protectionist future, which would take the pressure off US companies to be globally competitive or truly innovative.	特朗普想要更加保护主义的未来，这将降低美国公司的全球竞争和真正创新的压力。


American universities are being undermined by changes in the tax code and impending spending cuts – part of what appears to be a broader war on science.	美国大学正在被税制和严厉的支出削减所制约——其中一些措施可视为反科学战争。


And immigration – an essential source of talent and ideas – looks likely to be restricted.	而移民——人才和思想的重要来源——也有可能受到限制。


Given its own policies, and those of the US, China is on track to become the world’s innovation leader.	从其自身以及美国的政策看，中国正走在成为世界创新领导者的路上。


By the end of 2018, it will be more apparent just how quickly and easily this latest chapter in the Chinese success story will be written.	到2018年年底，我们将更加清楚地看到中国的成功故事的新篇章将以多么迅速和轻松的方式写就。


Calling the Chinese Bully’s Bluff	识破中国的虚张声势


NEW DELHI – The more power China has accumulated, the more it has attempted to achieve its foreign-policy objectives with bluff, bluster, and bullying.	新德里—中国实力积累越来越大，它也越来越喜欢用诈唬、恫吓和胁迫来实现自己的外交政策目标。


But, as its Himalayan border standoff with India’s military continues, the limits of this approach are becoming increasingly apparent.	但是，随着中印喜马拉雅山区军事对峙的发展，这一方针的局限性也变得越来越明显。


The current standoff began in mid-June, when Bhutan, a close ally of India, discovered the People’s Liberation Army trying to extend a road through Doklam, a high-altitude plateau in the Himalayas that belongs to Bhutan, but is claimed by China.	当前的僵持始于6月中旬，当时，印度的紧密盟友不丹发现解放军正在扩建一条通过洞朗的公路。 洞朗是喜马拉雅山区的一片高原，属于不丹领土，但中国对其有领土主张。


India, which guarantees tiny Bhutan’s security, quickly sent troops and equipment to halt the construction, asserting that the road – which would overlook the point where Tibet, Bhutan, and the Indian state of Sikkim meet – threatened its own security.	印度为微型国家不丹提供安全保障，立刻派遣军队和设备阻止中方建设，认为这条公路——它可以俯视西藏、不丹和印度锡金邦的交界点——威胁到其自身安全。


Since then, China’s leaders have been warning India almost daily to back down or face military reprisals.	此后，中国领导人几乎每天都要警告印度退回去，否则将面临军事报复。


China’s defense ministry has threatened to teach India a “bitter lesson,” vowing that any conflict would inflict “greater losses” than the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when China invaded India during a Himalayan border dispute and inflicted major damage within a few weeks.	中国国防部威胁要给印度一个“惨痛的教训”，信誓旦旦地表示任何冲突都将会导致比1962年中印战争“更大的损失”。 当时，中国在一次喜马拉雅山区边境纠纷中入侵了印度，在几周时间里造成了严重破坏。


Likewise, China’s foreign ministry has unleashed a torrent of vitriol intended to intimidate India into submission.	类似地，中国外交部也极尽嘲讽之能事，试图通过恐吓迫使印度就范。


Despite all of this, India’s government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has kept its cool, refusing to respond to any Chinese threat, much less withdraw its forces.	尽管如此，在印度政府在莫迪总理的领导下，一直保持冷静，拒绝回应中国的任何威胁，更不用说撤军了。


As China’s warmongering has continued, its true colors have become increasingly vivid.	随着中国备战行为的深入，其真面目也变得越来越清晰。


It is now clear that China is attempting to use psychological warfare (“psywar”) to advance its strategic objectives – to “win without fighting,” as the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu recommended.	现在，很显然中国正在尝试用心理战推进其战略目标——即孙子所谓的“不战而屈人之兵”。


China has waged its psywar against India largely through disinformation campaigns and media manipulation, aimed at presenting India – a raucous democracy with poor public diplomacy – as the aggressor and China as the aggrieved party.	中国对印度发起的心理战主要是通过散布错误信息和操纵媒体，其目标是将印度——一个公共外交能力孱弱的喧闹的民主国家——描述为侵略者，而中国则是被侵略的一方。


Chinese state media have been engaged in eager India-bashing for weeks.	中国国家媒体几周来一直在猛烈地抨击印度。


China has also employed “lawfare,” selectively invoking a colonial-era accord, while ignoring its own violations – cited by Bhutan and India – of more recent bilateral agreements.	中国还动用了“法律武器”，有选择性地援引殖民地时代的协定，而忽视其自身违反时间上更近的双边协定的行为——不丹和印度都指出过。


For the first few days of the standoff, China’s psywar blitz helped it dominate the narrative.	在僵持一开始的几天中，中国的心理闪击战让它赢得了话语权。


But, as China’s claims and tactics have come under growing scrutiny, its approach has faced diminishing returns.	但是，随着中国的主张和策略受到日益严格的审视，其方针的回报也越来越差。


In fact, from a domestic perspective, China’s attempts to portray itself as the victim – claiming that Indian troops had illegally entered Chinese territory, where they remain – has been distinctly damaging, provoking a nationalist backlash over the failure to evict the intruders.	事实上，从国内角度讲，中国将自己描述为受害者——宣称印军非法进入中国领土并滞留——有很大的弊端，这会导致抨击没能驱逐入侵者的民族主义声浪。


As a result, President Xi Jinping’s image as a commanding leader, along with the presumption of China’s regional dominance, is coming under strain, just months before the critical 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).	因此，习近平作为统帅的形象，以及中国成为地区主导力量的假定，都将承受压力，而重要的中共十九大即将在几个月后召开。


And it is difficult to see how Xi could turn the situation around.	很难看出习近平如何扭转局面。


Despite China’s overall military superiority, it is scarcely in a position to defeat India decisively in a Himalayan war, given India’s fortified defenses along the border.	尽管中国总体军力占优，但在喜马拉雅山区作战其很难决定性地击败印度，因为印度已经加强了边境防线。


Even localized hostilities at the tri-border area would be beyond China’s capacity to dominate, because the Indian army controls higher terrain and has greater troop density.	即使是三国交界地区的局部对峙，中国也没有能力主导，因为印军控居高临下，军队密度也更大。


If such military clashes left China with so much as a bloodied nose, as happened in the same area in 1967, it could spell serious trouble for Xi at the upcoming National Congress.	如果这些军事冲突让中国碰了个鼻青脸肿，就像1967年在同一地区所发生的那样，那么习近平在即将召开的十九大上将遇到很大的麻烦。


But, even without actual conflict, China stands to lose.	但即便没有实际冲突，中国也必然是输家。


Its confrontational approach could drive India, Asia’s most important geopolitical “swing state,” firmly into the camp of the United States, China’s main global rival.	其对抗方针可能促使亚洲最重要的地缘政治“摇摆国”印度坚定导向中国的主要全球对手——美国的阵营。


It could also undermine its own commercial interests in the world’s fastest-growing major economy, which sits astride China’s energy-import lifeline.	对抗方针也有损于其自身在作为世界增长最快的主要经济体、又位居中国能源进口生命线的必经之路的印度的商业利益。


Already, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj has tacitly warned of economic sanctions if China, which is running an annual trade surplus of nearly $60 billion with India, continues to disturb border peace.	目前，印度外交部长苏什马·斯瓦拉伊（Sushma Swaraj）默默地 警告，如果中国——目前其对印度贸易有每年600亿美元的盈余——继续干扰边境和平，将对其采取经济制裁。


More broadly, as China has declared unconditional Indian troop withdrawal to be a “prerequisite” for ending the standoff, India, facing recurrent Chinese incursions over the last decade, has insisted that border peace is a “prerequisite” for developing bilateral ties.	更广泛地说，在中国已经宣布印度的无条件撤军是结束僵持的“先决条件”的同时，在过去的十年中面临着中国的反复入侵的印度坚持边境和平是发展双边关系的“先决条件”。


Against this background, the smartest move for Xi would be to attempt to secure India’s help in finding a face-saving compromise to end the crisis.	在这样的背景下，习近平的最明智的举动是确保印度帮助其找到能够挽回颜面的妥协办法，结束这场危机。


The longer the standoff lasts, the more likely it is to sully Xi’s carefully cultivated image as a powerful leader, and that of China as Asia’s hegemon, which would undermine popular support for the regime at home and severely weaken China’s influence over its neighbors.	僵持持续得越久，习近平费尽心机打造的强力领导人的形象就越有可能遭到破坏，中国的亚洲霸主形象也是如此，这将损害中共政权在国内的支持度，严重削弱中国对邻国的影响力。


Already, the standoff is offering important lessons to other Asian countries seeking to cope with China’s bullying.	目前，僵持已经给了其他需要面对中国恫吓的亚洲国家重要的教训。


For example, China recently threatened to launch military action against Vietnam’s outposts in the disputed Spratly Islands, forcing the Vietnamese government to stop drilling for gas at the edge of China’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.	比如，中国最近威胁要对越南在争议的南沙群岛哨所采取军事行动，强迫越南政府停止在南海中国专属经济区边缘钻探天然气。


China does not yet appear ready to change its approach.	中国尚未表现出转变方针的迹象。


Some experts even predict that it will soon move forward with a “small-scale military operation” to expel the Indian troops currently in its claimed territory.	一些专家甚至预测中国很快会采取“小规模军事行动”驱逐目前位于其助长领土内的印军。


But such an attack is unlikely to do China any good, much less change the territorial status quo in the tri-border area.	但这种攻击行为对中国毫无益处，更不会改变三国交界处的领土现状。


It certainly won’t make it possible for China to resume work on the road it wanted to build.	这也显然无法让中国恢复其铺路作业。


That dream most likely died when India called the Chinese bully’s bluff.	当印度不吃中国的虚张声势时，梦就要醒了。


Trumpism Down Under	“南方”的特朗普主义


SYDNEY – Thirty years ago, a colleague of mine in the British government who had ministerial responsibilities in Africa and Asia hung the world map in his office upside down.	悉尼—三十年前，我的一位担任负责非洲和亚洲的事务的英国政府阁臣同事，在办公室里挂着一幅倒置的世界地图。


Placing what was then called the Third World at the top, he claimed, improved his understanding of those countries’ problems and perspectives.	他将当时所谓的第三世界放在最上面，说这样做能增进他对这些国家的问题和前景的理解。


But, for the British, the real “down under” – the country you would reach if you turned the world on its head – is Australia.	但对英国来说，真正的“南方”——那个你绕过半个地球才能到达的国家——是澳大利亚。


Schoolchildren used to be taught that, if you dug a straight tunnel through the planet, Australia is where you would end up.	学生们常常会学到，如果你往地下打一个垂直的隧洞，最后就能从澳大利亚钻出来。


Their seasons were the opposite of ours, as were the days – a point that was driven home when, in the early morning hours, we listened to cricket commentaries from Brisbane or Adelaide.	他们的季节和我们的相反，日子也是——最好的例子就是，一大早我们能听到来自布里斯班或阿德莱德的板球评论。


While Britain slept, the Aussies played in the sunshine.	当英国人沉睡时，澳大利亚人在阳光下游戏。


Australia is a beautiful and prosperous country, with a grand landscape and fine cities, most notably Sydney and Melbourne.	澳大利亚是一个美丽繁荣的国度，有着宏伟的景观和漂亮的城市，最著名的是悉尼和墨尔本。


It is a rumbustious democracy with a profound appreciation of the rule of law, a free and open society that has provided a haven for immigrants and refugees from all over the world.	他是一个喧闹的民主国家，十分尊重法治，社会自由而开放，为来自全世界的移民和难民提供避风港。


While its past treatment of its indigenous population has undoubtedly been problematic, it has had the courage and maturity to acknowledge unpleasant truths.	当然，它对待土著居民的方式毫无疑问很有问题，但它有勇气和成熟的风度承认这些令人不快的事实。


Yet this admirable country now faces an existential challenge.	但这个令人敬仰的国家现在面临着生存威胁。


As Australia’s relationship with the United States comes under increasing strain, its political dynamics are becoming increasingly complex and perilous.	澳大利亚和美国的关系日益紧张，而其政治动态也变得越来越复杂和危险。


For decades, Australia has had a close partnership with the US, not least in security terms.	几十年来，澳大利亚一直与美国保持密切的关系，包括在安全方面。


But, in his year since taking office, President Donald Trump has not only challenged ties with many of America’s traditional allies; he has also worked actively to undermine the systems of global and regional cooperation that the US itself spearheaded and underwrote.	但特朗普总统上台一年来，不但挑战了与许多美国传统盟友之间的关系； 还积极地破坏了由美国本身带头主导和鼎力维持的全球和地区合作体系。


He has reversed his predecessors’ hard-won progress in building relationships and striking mutually beneficial deals, including the Iran nuclear agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, and the Paris climate agreement.	他撤销前几任总统好不容易在构建关系和达成互惠协议方面所取得的进步，比如伊朗核协议、跨太平洋合作伙伴关系和巴黎气候协定等。


Contrary to Trump’s claims that his policies will “Make America Great Again,” he is deeply compromising his country’s role in the world.	与特朗普宣称的他的政策将“让美国再次伟大”相反，他让美国在世界上的作用极大地退缩了。


Long-standing allies regret that the US, a country they have long admired, is now being steered by a mendacious, untrustworthy diplomatic arsonist.	长期盟友很遗憾地看到，它们所长期敬仰的美国，被一个不诚实、不可靠的外交“纵火犯”所领导。


This is bad news for Australia, which would clearly like to build a stronger partnership with regional powers that share its democratic values and interests, including India, Japan, and the US.	这对于澳大利亚来说是坏消息，它当然希望与和自己具有共同民主价值观和利益的地区力量构建更加强大的关系，包括印度、日本和美国等。


Such an alliance would not seek to contain China, but to ensure that it does not abuse its power and stoke regional tensions and instability.	这一联盟不是为了遏制中国，而是为了确保中国不会滥用权力和煽动地区紧张和动荡。


Without a reliable regional counterweight, that is exactly what China seems eager to do.	在没有可靠的地区制衡力量的情况下，中国恰恰表现出这一急切意图。


Like Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping has reversed many of his predecessors’ policies, including some of the market-oriented reforms pushed through by Deng Xiaoping.	和特朗普一样，中国国家主席习近平也一反前任的政策，包括邓小平所推行的某些市场经济改革。


Having cultivated a Mao-style cult of personality, Xi proclaims that the time has come to Make China Great Again.	习近平培养了一种毛泽东式的个人崇拜，宣称现在是让中国再次伟大的良机。


So foreign-policy restraint has gone out the window, and Xi has enabled the Communist Party of China to reassert its control over the economy.	因此，外交政策的克制被抛在了一边，而习近平也让中共重新掌控了经济。


Free enterprise is now once again subordinated to the public sector.	自由企业再一次被公共部门所压制。


The “Communist united front” has been let off its leash.	“共产主义统一战线”势不可挡。


Every Communist regime since the Russian Revolution of 1917 has sought to use the “united front” to extend the power of the party, both at home and abroad, in ways that may be subtle or overt, but are invariably underhanded.	自1917年十月革命以来，所有共产主义政权都用“统一战线”来扩大党在国内和国外的权力，形式或隐晦或张扬，但卑劣则一。


Today’s Chinese united front is no exception, and Australia is one of the countries that is being targeted.	今天的中国统一战线也不例外，而澳大利亚就是被它针对的目标之一。


Australia has strong economic ties with China, which buys much of what it mines and grows.	澳大利亚和中国有着紧密的经济联系，后者向前者购买大量矿产和农作物。


For its own part, China has exported money and people to Australia, from the business world to academia.	中国则向澳大利亚输出资金和人，包括商界和学界。


Most Chinese in Australia, some of whom regard their new home as a haven from repression and corruption, have become enthusiastic Australians with a proud Chinese heritage.	大部分在澳华人——其中一些将新家园视为逃离压迫和腐败的避难所——成为有着骄傲中国遗产的铁杆澳大利亚人。


But a few Chinese in Australia have allowed themselves to become foot soldiers of China’s Leninist (not really communist) dictatorship, manipulated by Chinese diplomats and a few businessmen.	但一些在澳华人成为中国的列宁主义（而非真正的共产主义）独裁的排头兵，受中国外交官和一些商人的操纵。


The effects of their activities can be seen in the conduct of foreign policy and in attempts to mobilize votes against the government.	外交政策的制定和反对政府的选票动员中都可以见到他们的活动的影响。