It also makes one wonder whether a creative genius like Fischer, deeply troubled yet supremely functional at the chessboard, would be able to exist in today’s unforgiving online world.	影片也让我们怀疑，一个像费舍尔那样虽然麻烦重重但仍能在棋盘上化腐朽为神奇的充满创造力的天才，是否能够在当今无情的网络世界中生存。


Fischer certainly got attention back then, but information was filtered very differently than it is today.	当时的费舍尔当然引起了人们的关注，但那时的信息过滤机制和今天截然不同。


Journalists used to lead the way, rather than slavishly following the flow of superficial Internet traffic.	当时的记者引领着舆论，而不是像今天那样在肤浅的互联网信息流中随波逐流。


The story of an erratic kid from Brooklyn taking on the Soviet empire in its national sport made good copy for journalists, who understood the significance of the event.	一个漂泊不定的布鲁克林的孩子在堪称苏联国技的项目上扳倒斯帕斯基，对于深谙此事件重要意义的记者来说，这是绝好的素材。


The match garnered front-page headlines in major newspapers around the world on a daily basis for two months, with commentators providing live move-by-move analysis for up to five hours each day.	这个对局在长达两个月的时间里占据着全世界各主要报纸的头版，每一天，都有评论员对对局做出长达五小时的逐步分析。


Back then, there were only a few television channels.	当时，电视频道也寥寥无几。


There were no DVD players or pay-per-view services.	没有DVD播放机，也没有按次计费收看服务。


Still, that was not the only reason people remained glued to their TV sets to watch the match.	但是，这绝非人们执着地守在电视机前观看这场对局的唯一原因。


The surreal environment, the amazing chess turns, and the Cold War backdrop made Fischer one of the most famous people in the world that summer.	超现实主义环境、绝妙的棋路和冷战背景让费舍尔成为那个夏天全世界最出名的人物之一。


I won’t humor myself that it was the chess analysis that drew attention, although I was a commentator for public television on the pivotal 13th game.	我不会自我幽默地说是棋局分析吸引着人们的关注，尽管我是关键的第13局的公共转播评论员。


For the American champion, the match was the consummation of two decades of chasing the title, starting from his days as a child prodigy.	对美国冠军费舍尔来说，这场对局是他从以神童身份出道以来二十年追求头衔生涯的高潮。


After a lifetime of living in relative poverty for a superstar (even though he frequently appeared on the cover of major magazines), Fischer finally found himself playing in a match with a $250,000 purse.	对一个超级巨星来说（他甚至经常出现在主要刊物的封面上），费舍尔的生活可谓穷困潦倒，如今，他终于坐在了价值250,000美元的对局边上。


Of course, it was a pittance compared to the $2.5 million that each fighter was guaranteed in the 1971 Ali-Frazier fight.	当然，这与1971年阿里和弗雷泽（Frazier）拳王争霸战双方都能保证获得的250万美元来说只是九牛一毛。


But Fischer recognized that US culture marginalizes any pursuit that does not produce big money, so he viewed the six-figure cash prize as the ultimate symbol of advancement in his sport.	但费舍尔知道，在美国文化中，一切不产生大钱的运动项目都会被边缘化，因此他将这六位数的现金奖金视为国际象棋运动取得进展的终极标志。


For Russia, the match was not about money; it was about hearts and minds.	对俄罗斯来说，这一对局并非事关金钱，而是事关心与智。


The chess world had long been the perfect battleground on which to prove the superiority of the Communist system.	长期以来，国际象棋是证明共产主义制度优越性的完美战场。


Although most Westerners today pretend that we always knew that Russian-style Communism would fail, it was not so obvious back then.	尽管如今大部分西方人都装作我们早就知道俄式共产主义迟早要失败，但当时绝非如此。


The leading introductory economic textbook of the time, by Nobel laurate Paul Samuelson, was still predicting that Russia might overtake the US as the world’s largest economy.	��时最通用的经济学概论教科书，即诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·萨缪尔逊（Paul Samuelson）的《经济学》，仍预测俄罗斯可能超过美国成为世界最大经济体。


To be fair, Russians valued chess enormously, even if it did not produce a lot of income.	平心而论，俄国人非常看重国际象棋，即使它并不会带来很多收入。


In many ways, chess was Russia’s national sport.	从多种角度看，国际象棋是俄罗斯的国技。


No wonder Fischer’s quixotic pursuit of the championship led American policy mastermind Henry Kissinger to call Fischer and urge him not to back out, as he had threatened to do.	毫不奇怪，费舍尔追求国际象棋世界冠军的堂吉诃德式举动惊动了美国政策智囊亨利·基辛格，基辛格打电话给费舍尔，敦促他不要退出（他曾经威胁要退出）。


Whatever his status in the US, Fischer was certainly the most beloved American in Russia.	不管他在美国的地位如何，费舍尔绝对是最受俄罗斯人爱戴的美国人。


The majesty of his play transcended propaganda in a country where everyday people could appreciate and understand the innate beauty of the game.	普通俄罗斯人都可以欣赏和理解国际象棋的内在之美，而费舍尔的棋艺足以战胜俄国的宣传。


In the run-up to the championship, Fischer trounced two very good opponents with unheard of 6-0 scores, an astonishing result when so many grandmaster games end in draws.	在赢得冠军的征途中，费舍尔以前所未闻的6比0的比分横扫两位强大的对手，这在许多特级大师对局以和局告终的当时令人嗔目结舌。


Russian fans were so excited by Fischer’s unprecedented achievement that they reportedly jammed Moscow telephone exchanges to get information.	俄国棋迷因为费舍尔前所未有的成就而兴奋不已，据说莫斯科电话线路因为他们纷纷打电话了解相关信息而陷入了瘫痪。


After a while, operators would simply pick up the line and say “6-0” and hang up.	电话打进去后好一会儿，你才能听到接线员接起电话，说“6比0”，然后挂掉。


In the end, even Spassky paid the ultimate tribute to Fischer’s genius, clapping along with the audience after Fischer’s inspired sixth-game victory, as portrayed in the movie.	最终，就连斯帕斯基也沦为了费舍尔天赋异禀的最高祭品，在费舍尔以妙到颠毫的手笔赢得第六局的胜利时，他于观众一起为他鼓掌，电影中也描述了这一幕。


The American might have been the ultimate chess genius, but the Russian was the class act.	费舍尔也许是国际象棋的终极天才，而斯帕斯基与他等量齐观。


Director Edward Zwick does not shirk from showing the demons that plagued Fischer.	导演爱德华·齐维克（Edward Zwick）并没有回避折磨费舍尔的恶魔。


He was justly concerned that the Russians would go to great lengths to prevent him from being champion, but ultimately rational concerns tipped into paranoia, and Fischer started to turn on his closest friends and confidants.	他不无道理地担心俄国人会无所不用其极地阻止他赢得冠军，但最终合理的顾虑转变为妄想症，而费舍尔也开始疏远亲朋好友。


He became anti-Semitic, despite being Jewish himself.	他成了反犹人士，尽管他自己正是犹太人。


One suspects that in today’s online world, Fischer’s paranoia and personal flaws would have tripped him up long before he became champion.	你会怀疑，在当今的网络世界，费舍尔的妄想症和人格缺陷在他还远远没有成为世界冠军前就会毁了他。


After Fischer became champion and simply stopped playing competitive chess, his mental illness became much worse.	费舍尔成为冠军后便不再参加象棋比赛，他的精神病迅速恶化。


Though no one can condone Fischer’s virulent rants and dark thoughts in his later years (he died in 2008), it is sad to realize that someone of such towering creativity and genius, who inspired so many people through his chess, might have had his career ended at a much earlier stage today.	尽管我们不能原谅费舍尔晚年的恶毒攻击和黑暗思想（他死于2008年），但意识到创造力和天才如此发达的人，一个通过棋局激励了无数人的人，若放在今天有可能早就结束了他的职业生涯，这着实令人悲伤。


We live in a different world.	我们生活在一个不同的世界。


“Pawn Sacrifice” recalls the world in which Fischer’s feats were possible.	《弃卒》则回忆了一个费舍尔有可能建功立业的世界。


The Boehner Shock	博纳冲击


WASHINGTON, DC – Ever since the financial crisis erupted in 2008, media outlets and specialists alike have devoted much attention to anticipating negative shocks to the global economy.	华盛顿——自2008年金融危机爆发以来，媒体和专家投入了大量精力来预测其对全球经济的负面冲击。


Today the focus is on the state of the Chinese economy, the timing of the US Federal Reserve’s normalization of interest rates, and the various policies under discussion in the United States’ presidential election campaign.	今天的焦点是中国的经济状况、美联储利率正常化的时机和美国总统竞选所讨论的各项政策。


But the most damaging shocks often hide in plain sight – and then hit precisely when and where almost everyone thought stability would prevail.	但最具破坏力的冲击却往往被人忽视——而后却在几乎所有人都认为能够实现稳定的时候准确出击。


One such risk is that political partisanship will cause another disruption to the US federal government’s finances, weakening the American economy and roiling world financial markets.	风险之一是党派之争将再次破坏美国联邦政府财政，削弱美国经济并造成全球金融市场动荡不安。


This warning may seem strange.	上述警告看似有些奇怪。


After all, the last big partisan fight (in 2013) over funding the government and raising the debt limit gained little for the Republicans who instigated it – other than significant damage to their reputation for responsibility.	毕竟，挑起上次政府财政和提高债务限额两党之争（2013年）的共和党除对其自身的责任信誉造成重大损害外，其实从那次混乱中收获甚微。


And the current Republican leadership, eager to strengthen their party’s electoral chances in 2016, very much wants to project an image of sober good sense.	目前的共和党领导层急于加强该党在2016年的选举机会，非常希望以清醒理智的良好形象出现在公众面前。


Yet a major and destabilizing confrontation over public finance now seems unavoidable, particularly following House Speaker John Boehner’s surprise announcement that he will resign his position and his seat in Congress at the end of October.	但公共财政领域的大规模对抗现在看似乎不可避免，尤其是众议院议长约翰·博纳意外宣布他将于10月底辞去议会席位及职务。


To see why, one need look no further than the House Ways and Means Committee, whose current chairman, Paul Ryan, is a leader of the hardline Republican insurgents who had scorned Boehner for being too willing to compromise with President Barack Obama and House Democrats.	理解个中个原因只需看看众议院筹款委员会，该委员会现任主席保罗·瑞安是强硬派共和党反对者，他嘲笑博纳太容易向总统巴拉克·奥巴马及众议院民主党人妥协。


Ryan’s committee plays an important role in setting America’s fiscal agenda, reflecting both the constitutional requirement that revenue bills originate in the House of Representatives and political realities (the House is traditionally less fractious than the Senate).	瑞安的委员会在制定美国财政计划时起着重要的作用，反映了税收法案源起众议院的宪法要求和政治现实（众院传统上不像参院那样摩擦不断）。


Unlike in 2013, the strategy of Ryan and his allies this time around is unlikely to include a threat to default directly on federal government debt.	与2013年不同，瑞安及其盟友此次的策略不太可能包含对联邦政府债务直接的违约威胁。


And Republicans on the committee claim that social security payments will be made on time.	该委员会内部的共和党声称将按时支付社会保障费用。


So what other bills do they plan not to pay as part of a showdown over legislation to keep the government funded?	那么他们计划拒绝支付哪些费用，并以此在政府财政立法问题上摊牌？


In fact, it is difficult to say exactly what the threat is – and that is part of the problem.	事实上，很难说清威胁究竟是什么，这其实恰恰造成了部分问题。


Uncertainty about government contracts and various kinds of payments can have a broad impact on the economy.	政府合同和各项支付的不确定性可以广泛影响到国内经济。


The difficulty of working through the full economic implications is precisely what discourages consumers from making purchases and causes firms to postpone investment.	难以确定全面经济影响恰恰阻碍了消费者进行购物并导致企业推迟投资。


The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a helpful report in July that spelled out some of the consequences of the 2013 confrontation over the debt ceiling – including how it pushed up the government’s borrowing costs and the negative impact this had on the economy.	美国政府问责局（GAO）7月发布了一份有效报告，罗列了2013年债务上限对抗的部分后果——包括其如何推高政府借贷成本及如何负面影响经济。


But the Republican majority in Congress simply ignores this type of sensible analysis.	但国会里的多数共和党根本不注意这种明智的分析。


As a result, a partial government shutdown is entirely possible, with the Republicans imposing a form of prioritization on government payments: some people will be paid what they are owed, and others will not.	如果共和党强制执行某种形式的政府支付排序，完全可能造成政府部分关闭的后果。 有些人将拿到欠款、有些人则不能。


This will fuel uncertainty, sap economic confidence, and almost certainly hurt the Republicans at the polls in 2016.	这将推升不确定性、削弱经济信心、而且几乎肯定会影响2016年共和党总统选举。


So why is it likely to happen?	那么为什么这种情况有可能发生呢？


One reason is to be found in the decentralized nature of American politics, which leaves elected officials relatively unbeholden to party leaders.	原因之一是美国政治的分散性，当选官员相比之下无需对党派领袖负责。


Some Republican supporters and donors have obviously moved to the right in recent decades.	近几十年来某些共和党的支持者和捐赠者已明显向右翼转移。


But, as James Kwak and I explained in our book on US fiscal policy, White House Burning, the time when the Republican right favored responsible budgets and financial stability has long since passed.	但正如詹姆斯·夸克和我在合著的美国财政政策著作《燃烧的白宫》中所诠释的那样，共和党右翼青睐负责任预算和财务稳定的时代早已过去。


Now the right – increasingly catering to a Southern, rural, and white constituency – cares much more about shrinking the federal government, and in recent years has viewed shutting it down or threatening nonpayment of debts as a way to “starve the beast.”	现在的右翼越来越迎合南方农村白人选民——只关心如何削弱联邦政府，且近年来一直将关闭政府或威胁不支付拖欠债务作为“饿死官僚巨兽”的一种方式。


Moreover, the Republicans’ uncompromising stance has been reinforced by the extreme position taken by many within its congressional delegation that Planned Parenthood – a health-care provider that primarily serves women – must be defunded as a condition of any budget deal.	此外，共和党国会代表团不少议员坚持必须将停止资助主要服务于女性的医疗提供商计划生育组织作为达成任何预算协议的先决条件，这也再次凸显了共和党的不妥协立场。


Boehner’s resignation, though viewed by some as clearing the way for a short-term deal to fund the government, merely underscores the limited ability of any “responsible” Republican leader to control the party’s increasingly fundamentalist caucus.	博纳的辞职虽然被某些人视为为达成政府短期结算协议扫清了障碍，但实际只是凸显了任何“负责任”的共和党领导人只能有限度地控制党内越来越强的原教旨主义倾向。


In the US, as elsewhere, debates about fiscal policy should be open, with clear statements of alternative goals and balanced assessments of how best to pay for what government does.	在美国和其他地方，财政政策辩论应做到公开透明，明确替代目标和平衡评估如何以最佳方式支付政府费用。


Unfortunately, a debate and the compromises that follow are not what the Republicans have in mind.	不幸的是，辩论和随之而来的妥协并不符合共和党人的想法。


Boehner’s forced departure makes it likelier than ever that the US – and the world – will soon face the prospect of another self-inflicted economic shock, caused entirely by the Republicans’ scorched-earth budget tactics.	博纳的被迫离开前所未有地增强了这样的可能性——即美国和世界将很快面临另一次自己造成的经济冲击，而这种冲击完全是由共和党的焦土预算战术造成的。


Less than Zero in Japan	日本：比零更低


TOKYO – In a bold attempt to reflate the Japanese economy, the Bank of Japan has now pushed interest rates on deposits into negative territory.	东京—日本银行采取大动作要让日本经济重新实现通货膨胀，如今，它已将存款利率压到了负区间。


Though this policy is not new – it is already being pursued by the European Central Bank, the Bank of Sweden, the Swiss National Bank, and others – it is uncharted ground for the BOJ.	这一政策并不新鲜——欧洲央行、瑞典银行、瑞士国民银行和其他央行都已在实施这一政策——但对日本银行来说，这是个未知领域。


And, unfortunately, markets have not responded as expected.	不幸的是，市场的反应和预期的不一样。


In theory, negative rates, by forcing commercial banks essentially to pay the central bank to be able to park their money, should spur increased lending to companies, which would then spend more, including on hiring more employees.	理论上负利率迫使商业银行实际上需要付钱给中央银行才能把钱存在那里，因此理应刺激面向公司的贷款，公司得到贷款就会增加支出，包括雇用更多员工。


This should spur a stock-market rebound, boost household consumption, weaken the yen’s exchange rate, and halt deflation.	这应该刺激股市反弹，提振家庭消费，遏制日元汇率，并结束通缩。


But theory does not always translate into practice; while the BOJ’s introduction of negative rates almost immediately pushed the interest-rate structure lower, as expected, the policy’s effects on the yen and the stock market have been an unpleasant surprise.	但理论并不总能成为现实； 尽管日本银行引入负利率几乎立刻如预期那样降低了利率结构，但这一政策对日元和股市的影响并不令人愉快。


One reason for this is widespread pessimism about Japan’s economy, reinforced by volatility in China, monetary tightening in the United States, and the collapse in world oil prices.	原因之一是人们普遍对日本经济感到悲观，而这一点因为中国的波动、美国的货币紧缩以及世界石油价格的暴跌更加严重了。


But, as BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda recently reported to the House of Councillors, Japan’s economic fundamentals are generally sound, and pessimistic predictions are greatly exaggerated.	但是，日本银行行长黑田东彦最近向众议院报告说，日本经济基本面总体良好，悲观的预测过于夸张。


In fact, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economy strategy – so-called “Abenomics” – has enabled Japan to stay on a reasonably positive path in highly uncertain times, with the economy showing signs of steady recovery from its decades of stagnation.	事实上，首相安倍晋三的经济战略——所谓的“安倍经济学”成功地让日本在高度不确定时期走在相当积极的路径上，经济表现出从几十年的停滞状态稳步复苏的迹象。


Since Abe took office in 2012, 1.5 million jobs have been created, and the unemployment rate has fallen from 4.6% to 3.3%.	自2012年安倍上台以来，创造了150万个工作岗位，失业率从4. 6%下降到3.


Moreover, tourism has surged, and both company and government revenues have been rising rapidly.	3%。 此外，旅游业增长迅猛，公司和政府收入也快速增加。


Even Japan’s external challenges may not be such bad news.	就连日本的外部挑战也不再那么糟糕。


For starters, Japan, like emerging economies with flexible exchange-rate regimes, may actually benefit from America’s monetary tightening, as an appreciating dollar makes Japanese exports more competitive.	首先，和采取弹性利率机制的新兴经济体一样，日本也可以从美国货币紧缩中获益，因为美元升值让日本出口品更具竞争力。


Similarly, because Japan can meet at most 6% of its own energy needs, cheap oil is a true blessing – one that may well endure for some time to come.	类似地，由于日本最多只能满足6%的自身能源需求，廉价的石油也是天大利好——并且可能维持一段时间。


As for the economic situation in China, there is certainly reason for concern.	至于中国的经济状况，这毫无疑问是一个担忧点。


The problem is that, while the “hardware” of the Chinese economy has advanced substantially since Deng Xiaoping initiated his “reform and opening up” policy almost four decades ago, the “software” of economic policymaking is constrained by excessive state management.	问题在于，尽管自40年前邓小平启动“改革开放”政策以来，中国经济的“硬件”有了大幅提升，但其经济决策的“软件”仍然受到过度的国家管理的掣肘。


As a result, the country is struggling to shift to a more sustainable growth model, underpinned by a thriving services sector and strong domestic consumption.	因此，中国难以转向以繁荣的服务业和强劲的国内消费为基础的更加可持续的增长模式。


Until China reckons with the ruling Communist Party’s stranglehold on key levers of the economy, it will be a source of market uncertainty that reverberates throughout the global economy.	在中国开始反思执政的共产党对经济命脉的控制之前，它都将是回荡在整个全球经济头上的市场不确定性的来源。


But even here Japan’s situation is not as dire as many seem to think, owing to its limited exposure to China; for example, exports to China amount to only 3% of Japan’s GDP.	但即便如此，日本的情况也不像很多人想象的那样糟糕，因为日本对中国的风险暴露有限； 比如，对华出口只占日本GDP的3%。


Given this, there is no reason why the Tokyo stock market should gyrate whenever the Shanghai market shakes.	基于此，没有理由认为东京股市应该跟在上海股市后面亦步亦趋。


The conventional hedge-fund strategy should be going short on Shanghai stocks and long on Tokyo stocks.	传统对冲经济策略应该是做空上海股票，做多东京股票。


And yet, even though Japan’s economic situation is far from dire, introducing negative interest rates has not been treated as what it is: a maneuver to loosen monetary policy.	但是，即使日本经济状况远远算不上悲观，引入负利率的政策也没有得到公正的待遇：放松货币政策的手段。


Instead, the Japanese stock market regarded negative rates as a harbinger of greater financial risk, and speculators have remained bullish on the yen.	相反，日本股市将负利率视为金融风险上升的先兆，而投机者仍然看多日元。


The statistician and economist Yoichi Takahashi tells me that the yen’s 8% appreciation over just ten days in February is abnormal, and probably fueled by speculative attacks.	统计学家兼经济学家高桥洋一（Yoichi Takahashi）对我说，2月份，日元在短短十天内升值8%，这是反常现象，应属投机性袭击。


In his opinion, some interventions in the exchange market by the Ministry of Finance may need to be pursued to contain the extraordinary fluctuations.	在他看来，财务省应该对外汇市场的采取一些干预措遏制过度波动。


From 2003 to 2004, the Japanese treasury purchased a large amount of dollars, thereby easing monetary conditions at a time when the BOJ was reluctant to pursue open market operations.	2003—2004年，日本财务省购买了大量美元，从而在日本银行不愿采取公开市场操作的情况下放松了货币条件。


In recent years, however, the yen’s exchange rate has been determined through monetary policy, not manipulated by intervention.	但是，近几年来，日元汇率由货币政策决定，而不是通过干预操控。


In general, I welcome this new approach, and thus do not recommend major interventions to change the direction of the yen exchange rate.	总体而言，我支持这一新方针，因此不建议用大规模干预改变日元汇率方向。


I do, however, believe that sporadic interventions may be needed to punish speculators who are taking advantage of temporary market psychology to keep the yen far above its market value.	但是，我也确实相信需要采取偶尔为之的干预以惩罚利用暂时性市场心理让日元大大高于市场价值的投机者。


Nigeria’s Poverty-Powered Insurgency	尼日利亚动乱因贫困而起


LAGOS – Nigerian security forces recently razed a northeastern fishing village, leaving almost 200 people dead and destroying some 2,000 homes, in order to root out just a few members of the radical Islamist sect Boko Haram.	拉各斯—最近，尼日利亚安全部队夷平了一座北部渔村，近200人丧命，2000间屋子被毁，而这只是为了根除一小撮伊斯兰极端派系博科圣地（Boko Haram）分子。


The assault reflected the military’s growing frustration with the extremists who have staged scores of attacks in the last four years.	此次袭击凸显出过去四年来军方因为极端主义者的多次袭击而恼羞成怒。


While Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have condemned the army’s heavy-handed approach, this is not the first time that clashes with extremists have caused significant collateral damage – and it almost certainly will not be the last.	尽管尼日利亚总统乔纳森（Goodluck Jonathan）He联合国秘书长潘基文谴责军方的重拳出击方式，但这绝非与极端主义者的对峙造成严重附带伤害——也几乎肯定不会是最后一次。


Boko Haram, whose primary objective is to compel Nigeria to adopt Sharia law, has proved surprisingly resilient since declaring war on the government in 2009, in response to the military’s execution of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf.	博科圣地的主要目标是迫使尼日利亚接受伊斯兰教法，自2009年因军方处决其领袖尤素夫（Mohammed Yusuf）而向政府宣战以来，该组织表现出极强的韧性。


Using hit-and-run guerilla tactics and suicide bombers, Boko Haram has attacked police stations, government buildings, and churches, killing thousands.	博科圣地采用打一枪换一地的游击战术和自杀式人肉炸弹袭击过警局、政府大楼和教堂，造成数千人丧生。


Despite violent clashes with a special military task force in Borno and Yobe, the northern states where the sect is most active, Boko Haram remains robust.	尽管军方特种部队与博科圣地在博尔诺州和约贝州发生过暴力交火，但博科圣地在其活动活跃的北方各州仍然相当强健。


Political sensitivities in the predominantly Muslim north have forced Jonathan, a Christian southerner, to tread lightly in his efforts to contain Boko Haram.	以穆斯林为多数人口的北方的政治敏感型迫使作为南方基督徒的乔纳森不得不小心翼翼地试图遏制博科圣地。


Many northerners resent that the presidency was returned to a southerner after only one term with a northerner in office (an informal agreement mandates that the presidency should alternate between north and south every two terms).	许多北方人怨恨总统宝座在仅仅一个任期之后又回到了南方人手中（一项不成文的约定规定总统应该每隔两届由南方和北方轮流坐庄）。


Northern politicians and emirs (traditional Muslim leaders) have used the ongoing insurgency to damage Jonathan’s credibility, thereby strengthening their campaign to return the presidency to the north.	北方政客和埃米尔（传统穆斯林领袖）利用持续叛乱破坏乔纳森的信誉，从而强化他们让总统宝座回归北方的图谋。


First, they ordered that Jonathan disband the military task force, claiming that it was occupying the north and harassing civilians.	首先，他们要求乔纳森解散军事任务行动部队，宣称它在占领北方、干扰人民。


They then called on Jonathan to extend amnesty to Boko Haram’s members and to initiate a dialogue.	接着，他们要求乔纳森扩大对博科圣地成员的赦免并展开对话。


Jonathan initially refused their requests, stating last month that he could not negotiate with “ghosts.”	乔纳森一开始拒绝了他们的要求，上个月，他表示不能与“鬼”谈判。


But, with the clamor for amnesty reaching a deafening crescendo, Jonathan relented.	但是，随着赦免呼声越来越高，乔纳森屈服了。


Last week, he inaugurated the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, a 26-member committee composed mainly of northern leaders tasked with opening a dialogue with Boko Haram and working out the terms of amnesty and compensation for victims of the insurgency.	上周，他组建了北方对话和和平解决安全挑战总统委员会（Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North），该委员会由26名成员组成，大多为北方领袖。 委员会的任务是与博科圣地组织展开公开对话，并制定赦免条件和叛乱受害者补偿方案。


But, before the government had even announced its decision, Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, rejected the offer.	但是，政府还没有宣布这一决定之，博科圣地领袖谢考（Abubakar Shekau）就拒绝了它。


In an audio recording that he sent to journalists earlier this month, he stated that the organization had done nothing to warrant an amnesty.	在本月早些时候发给记者的电台录音中，他声称博科圣地组织不会为了赦免而做出保证。


According to Shekau, the Nigerian government is the iniquitous party, and Boko Haram will not give up the fight.	据谢考的说法，尼日利亚政府才是邪恶的一方，博科圣地不会放弃斗争。


This defiance reflects Boko Haram’s strong position.	如此蔑视体现了博科圣地的强势地位。


As a recent US State Department report points out, Nigerian citizens’ “grievances regarding poverty, government and security-force corruption, and police impunity and brutality [have] created a fertile ground for recruiting Boko Haram members.”	正如最新的美国国务院报告所指出的，尼日利亚人民“对贫穷、政府和安全部队 腐败以及警察逍遥法外和恣意横行的不满（已经）为博科圣地组织吸收新成员创造了温床。 ”


In recent years, competition from Asia has weakened the north’s once-prosperous textile industry, leaving thousands unemployed; drought has devastated the region’s agriculture; and the service sector has remained underdeveloped.	最近几年来，来自亚洲的竞争削弱了曾经繁荣的北方纺织业，导致成千上万人失业； 干旱摧毁了该地区的农业；


Millions of impoverished, unemployed young people now seek an alternative, which Boko Haram, with its incendiary rhetoric blaming the country’s leaders for the population’s troubles, can provide.	服务部门也得不到发展。 数百万穷困失业年轻人正在寻求另类活路，而这正是猛烈抨击国家领导人乃是全人口麻烦的罪魁的博科圣地可以提供的。


With people flocking to its recruiting centers by the thousands, Boko Haram faces no shortage of willing soldiers to continue its war of attrition against the Nigerian government.	成千上万人涌向博科圣地的募集中心，博科圣地从不缺乏志愿战士来维持其与尼日利亚政府的消耗战。


Recognizing that the most effective approach to thinning Boko Haram’s ranks is to address the north’s deepening economic and social problems, Jonathan has backed an initiative to build new schools in the north that will equip young people with valuable skills.	认识到最有效的削弱博科圣地组织之道乃是解决北方深刻的经济和社会问题，乔纳森已开始支持一项在北方建设新学校的计划。 该计划将为年轻人带去宝贵的技能。


Studies of how to revive the region’s economy have been commissioned.	关于如何振兴地区经济的研究已经展开。


But such efforts will take time to yield results.	但这些努力需要假以时日才能取得成果。


Moreover, the north’s troubles are only part of a wider national story of surging unemployment, restless young people, endemic corruption, and a growing sense of hopelessness.	此外，北方的麻烦只是全国失业飙升、年轻人焦躁不安、腐败横行和无助感与日俱增的一个侧面。


Jonathan appears to be incapable of tackling the official corruption that, as the US report emphasized, pervades all sectors, from the police to the courts.	乔纳森似乎无力处理好官员腐败问题——美国报告强调，腐败在尼日利亚已是无孔不入，从警察到法院皆无法幸免。


In its 14 years in power, the People’s Democratic Party has failed to articulate programs and policies that offer Nigerians a new sense of purpose.	在14年的权力生涯中，人民民主党没能给出能为尼日利亚人民带来新目标的计划和政策。


Most Nigerians expect the general election in 2015 to bring in a new set of self-serving politicians with little interest in improving the situation.	大部分尼日利亚���预计2015年大选所产生的无非是一群新的自利政客，他们对改善现状不会有多大兴趣。


If they are right, Boko Haram will continue to thrive.	如果他们是对的，博科圣地组织将继续繁荣。


Smart Taxation	聪明地征税


ROME – An effective tax policy that ensures adequate domestic revenue is a crucial determinant of a country’s ability to pursue development policies.	罗马—能保证国内收入充足的有效的税收政策是一国追求发展政策能力的关键决定因素。


But tax revenues in most developing countries are low, impeding progress toward more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable economic development that can improve public health and raise standards of living.	但大部分发达国家的税收收入很低，这阻碍了通往更平衡、更包容、更可持续的经济发展之路，而后者又是改善公共卫生、提升生活标准的方法。


Although non-tax revenue may contribute significantly to some countries’ total GDP, the average tax/GDP ratios in low-income and lower-middle-income countries are roughly 15% and 19%, respectively – significantly lower than the OECD average of more than 35%.	尽管非税收入可能占一国GDP总量相当大的比重，但低收入和中低收入国家的平均税收/GDP比率分别在15%和19%左右，显著低于经合组织的平均水平35%。


To finance development projects, poor and lower-middle-income countries must devise and implement tax strategies to increase domestic revenue.	为了给发展项目融资，穷国和中低收入国家必须设计和实施增加国内收入的税收战略。


This entails abandoning the prevailing dogma that taxes should only be increased when absolutely necessary.	这要求抛弃流行的教条——税收只有在绝对必要时才能增加。


This stance assumes that lower tax rates raise the tax/GDP ratio by ensuring better compliance with tax laws, and favors indirect taxation (such as value-added taxes) in order to broaden the tax base to include those with modest incomes.	这一立场假设更低的税率通过确保税法更好的执行而使税收/GDP比率升高，并有利于间接税（如增值税）以扩大税基，将收入不高的人群也纳入税基。


Meanwhile, direct taxation of corporations and individuals has tended to decline – despite the moot claim that lower direct taxation ensures investment and growth.	与此同时，公司和个人直接税总是趋于降低——尽管更低的直接税确保了投资和增长的说法还有待争议。


As a result, the tax/GDP ratio in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America has stagnated or even fallen.	结果，大部分撒哈拉以南非洲和拉丁美洲国家的税收/GDP比率停滞不前甚至出现下降。


In many developing countries, total tax revenue is derived from three main sources: domestic taxes on goods and services (sales and excise taxes), direct taxes (primarily on corporations), and, most important, taxes on foreign trade (import duties).	在许多发展中国家，税收总收入有三个主要来源：对商品和服务收取的国内税（销售税和消费税）、直接税（主要对公司收取）以及最重要的对外贸易税（进口关税）。


But, as trade liberalization has lowered tariffs and duties, the share of trade taxes has declined, while other sources have not compensated for falling trade revenue.	但是，随着贸易自由化降低了关税，贸易税的比重有所降低，���其他收入源又不足以补偿贸易税收入的下降。


By contrast, in high-income countries, income taxes (primarily on individuals) comprise the largest proportion of tax revenue (roughly 36%), while domestic taxes on goods and services and social-security contributions each account for slightly more than one-quarter.	相反，在高收入国家，所得税（主要对个人收取）构成了税收收入的最大头（约占36%），对商品和服务征收的国内税和社会保障费用只占四分之一略多。


Moreover, the share of trade taxes is typically low.	此外，贸易税的比重通常很低。


Of course, developing countries should not simply mimic developed economies’ tax systems.	当然，发展中国家不应该照搬发达国家的税收制度。


After all, no one-size-fits-all approach exists, even among developing countries.	毕竟，放之四海而皆准的方法是不存在的，即使是放之发展中国家而皆准的方法也是不存在的。


And tax policy must evolve with changing economic circumstances.	税收政策必须随经济环境的改变而改变。


Instead, developing-country leaders must draw on the experiences of both developed countries and their peers to design tax policies that meet the basic requirements of operability, buoyancy, and stability.	但在设计满足可操作性、方便性和稳定性等基本要求的税收政策时，发展中国家领导人必须从发达国家和其他发展中国家汲取经验。


This can include broadening the tax base, reducing tax avoidance and evasion, improving tax collection, and developing new, cooperative international taxation strategies.	这也许包括扩大税基、打击偷税漏税、改善征税方式以及开发新的合作性国际税收战略。


In many countries, tax reform has already significantly increased the share of direct taxes in overall revenue.	在许多国家，税收改革使直接税占总收入的比重大幅提高。


Raising tax rates for the wealthiest citizens in developing a more progressive income tax framework would bolster this progress.	提高最富国民的税率以形成更具累进性的所得税框架有助于这一进程。


Governments should also work to improve tax compliance and reduce evasion, which requires limiting tax officials’ discretionary authority.	政府还应该致力于改善税法执行、减少偷漏税，这要求限制收税官的自由裁量权。


Computerizing tax administration, for example, could help to limit corruption by making it more difficult to tamper with records.	比如，税收管理的计算机化能增加篡改记录的难度，从而有助于限制腐败。


In order to increase personal-income taxes’ share of total revenue, developing countries are already improving their tax administrations in innovative ways, particularly to reach hard-to-tax citizens.	为了增加个人所得税在总收入中的比重，发展中国家已在用创新手法改进它们的税收部门，特别是针对难以课税的公民。


More can be done: Every individual who owns a house or a vehicle, is a member of a club, holds a credit card, passport, driver’s license, or other identity card, or subscribes to a telephone service can be required to file a tax return.	它们还能做得更多：每个拥有房子或车子、或身为某俱乐部会员、或持有信用卡、护照、驾照和其他身份证件的个人、或电话安装户都可以要求他们填写报税单。


Moreover, excise taxes are a convenient source of revenue in developing countries, as they are primarily levied on products such as alcohol, tobacco, gas, vehicles, and spare parts, which involve few producers, large sales volumes, relatively inelastic demand, and easy observability.	此外，在发展中国家，消费税是传统税源，因为该税主要针对酒、烟、汽油、汽车和配件征收，这些东西生产厂家少、消费量大、需求弹性低，而且易于观察。


Excise taxes may be levied when goods leave a factory or arrive at a port, simplifying measurement, collection, and monitoring, while ensuring coverage and limiting evasion.	消费税可以在商品出厂或抵港时征收，简化测量、收税和监控，同时确保税收覆盖、限制偷漏税。


But, despite their robust base and low administrative costs, excise taxes currently amount to less than 2% of low-income countries’ GDP, compared to roughly 3% in high-income countries.	但是，尽管该税税基稳固，收税成本低，但在低收入国家中，消费税只占GDP的2%以下，而高收入国家则要占GDP的3%左右。


Developing countries must also aim to offset the consequences of globalization.	发展中国家还必须把抵消全球化后果作为目标。


For example, capital mobility increases opportunities for tax evasion, given that tax authorities’ capacity to monitor their citizens’ overseas incomes is limited, and some governments and financial institutions systematically conceal relevant information.	比如，资本流动性增加了偷漏税的机会，因为税收当局监控公民海外收入的能力有限，而一些政府和金融机构也在系统性地隐瞒相关信息。


If dividends, interest, royalties, and management fees are not taxed in the country in which they are paid, they more easily escape notice in the country of residence.	如果股息、利息、版税和管理费没有在支付发生国被课税，那么在居住国它们很容易就能逃脱关注。


Indeed, some countries – including the United States – impose no taxes on interest from large bank deposits by non-resident aliens.	事实上，一些国家——包括美国——对非居民外国人的大银行存款利息并不课税。


Globalization may also facilitate legal tax avoidance.	全球化还有利于合法避税。


For example, multinational corporations use methods like transfer pricing (book-keeping of goods, services, and resources transferred between a single company’s branches or subsidiaries) to minimize tax liability on their profits from international operations.	比如，跨国公司利用转移定价（对同一公司各分公司或子公司之间的商品、服务和资源转移的簿记）的方式实现国际营业利润税负的最小化。


Corporate taxpayers take advantage of discrepancies in rules and rates, choosing to do business in countries with more favorable – or lax – tax regimes.	公司纳税人利用规则和税率差异，选择在税法最有利（或最宽松）的国家做生意。


Finally, international competition for inward foreign direct investment may lead governments to reduce tax rates and increase concessions for foreign investors.	最后，吸引外国直接投资的国际竞争可能导致政府向外国投资者让步，降低税率。


With evidence of sudden capital outflows in response to certain tax-policy changes, governments are reluctant to raise income-tax rates – which have fallen sharply since the late 1970’s – or to tax dividend and interest income, for fear of capital flight.	有证据表明，某些税收政策改变会引起突发性资本外流，因此政府不愿提高所得税率——自20世纪70年代末以来，所得税率显著下降——也不愿对股息和利息收入征税，以防资本外逃。


But, as direct-tax concessions have little or no effect in diverting international investment, let alone in attracting such flows, they constitute an unnecessary loss of revenue.	但是， 直接税优惠对国际投资多样化影响甚微，更不用说吸引国际投资流了，这纯粹是毫无必要的收入损失。


Beggar-thy-neighbor policies will lead to revenue losses for all developing countries, while undermining the possibility of balanced, inclusive, and sustainable development.	以邻为壑政策会导致所有发展中国家损失收入，同时破坏平衡、包容、可持续发展的可能性。


Developing-country finance ministries and tax authorities must cooperate with one another and with their OECD counterparts to close existing loopholes and establish effective tax policies that support their shared interests.	发展中国家财政部和税收当局必须相互之间并于经合组织国家精诚合作，堵住现存漏洞，建立高效的税收政策以支持共同利益。


With rising public debt worldwide placing fiscal constraints (real and imagined) on global economic recovery, such cooperation is more urgent than ever.	全球性公债增长正在为全球经济复苏制造财政约束（既有真实的，也有想象的），合作的紧迫性前所未有。


Bombs Away	核弹轰炸


LONDON – One of the most dispiriting features of today’s international debates is that the threat to humanity posed by the world’s 23,000 nuclear weapons – and by those who would build more of them, or be only too willing to use them – has been consigned to the margin of politics.	伦敦——将全球23，000枚核武器、核武器生产者及迫不及待想使用核武器的人对全人类造成的威胁漫不经心地推到政治的边缘是当今国际争论最令人沮丧的特点之一。


US President Barack Obama did capture global attention with his Prague speech in 2009, which made a compelling case for a nuclear weapon-free world.	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马2009年的布拉格讲话确实引起了全球的关注，这次讲话令人信服地强调了建设无核武器世界的重要性。


And he did deliver on a major new arms-reduction treaty with Russia, and hosted a summit aimed at reducing the vulnerability of nuclear weapons and materials to theft or diversion.	奥巴马也的确与俄罗斯签订了大规模全新削减武器条约，并且举办了一次应对核武器及材料被盗或偏离危险的首脑峰会。


But nuclear issues still struggle for public resonance and political traction.	但是核问题仍然没能在公众和政界引起足够的重视。


It would take a brave gambler to bet on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the US Senate any time soon.	只有大胆的赌徒才敢于押宝美国参议院将在近期批准《全面核禁试条约》。


The film An Inconvenient Truth won an Academy Award, led to a Nobel Prize for Al Gore, and attracted huge international attention to the disastrous impact of climate change.	《难以忽视的真相》一片获得了奥斯卡金像奖，阿尔·戈尔也因此成为诺贝尔奖得主，气候变化的灾难性后果由此引起了国际社会的广泛关注。


But Countdown to Zero, an equally compelling documentary, made by the same production team and making shockingly clear how close and how often the world has come to nuclear catastrophe, has come and gone almost without trace.	但由同一支制作团队出品的一部同样引人注目的纪录片《倒计时》令人震惊地告诉人们世界多么频繁地被推向核灾难的边缘，但这部影片却未能引起人们足够的重视。


Complacency trumps anxiety almost everywhere.	沾沾自喜压倒忧虑成为当今世界的普遍趋势。


Japan’s Fukushima disaster has generated a massive debate about the safety of nuclear power, but not about nuclear weapons.	日本的福岛灾难引发了一场有关核能安全性的大讨论，其中却没有涉及核武器领域。


Fear of a nuclear holocaust seems to have ended with the Cold War.	冷战的结束似乎消除了人们对核毁灭的恐惧。


Indeed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki seem an eternity ago; new nuclear-weapons states have emerged without the world ending; no terrorist nuclear device has threatened a major city; and possession of nuclear weapons, for the states that have them, seems to be a source of comfort and pride rather than concern or embarrassment.	事实上，广岛和长崎似乎已成为遥远的记忆； 新核武器国家的诞生也没有带来世界末日；


With only a handful of exceptions, the current generation of political leaders shows little interest in disarmament, and not much more in non-proliferation.	恐怖分子掌握的核装备并未威胁世界主要城市； 在有核国家看来，拥有核武器似乎更多地带来安慰和骄傲，而不是尴尬和忧虑。


And their publics are not pressuring them to behave otherwise.	除少数人之外，目前这代政治领导人似乎对核裁军及不扩散事宜提不起多大兴趣。 而他们治下的公众也没有在这方面给他们太多压力。


Few have worked harder to shake the world out of its complacency than four of the hardest-nosed realists ever to hold public office: former US Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former US Senator Sam Nunn.	为让世界认清真相付出最大努力的非美国前国务卿亨利·基辛格和乔治·舒尔茨、美国前国防部长威廉·佩里和美国前参议员山姆·纳恩这四巨头莫属，他们是有史以来曾出任政府要职的最不屈不挠的现实主义者。


In a series of opinion articles over the last five years, they have repeatedly sounded the alarm that the risks of nuclear weapons outweigh any possible usefulness in today’s security environment.	过去五年来在一系列评论文章中，他们反复警告核武器在当今安全环境下的风险超过了任何可能的收益。


Moreover, they have called for a complete rethinking of deterrence strategy, in order to minimize, and ultimately eliminate, reliance on the most indiscriminately destructive weapons ever invented.	此外，他们还呼吁重新思考威慑战略，以便尽可能减少并最终摆脱人类对有史以来最不分青红皂白的破坏性武器的依赖。


Last week in London, the “gang of four” convened a private meeting with leading think-tank researchers and a worldwide cast of some 30 former foreign and defense ministers, generals, and ambassadors who share their concern and commitment.	上周在伦敦，“四巨头”与最有影响力的智库研究员和世界各地有共同担忧和目标的约30位前外交及国防部长、将军和大使召开了一次私人会议。


But our average age was over 65, and the limits of our effectiveness were neatly described by former British Defence Minister Des Browne: “People who used to be something really want to tackle this issue.	但我们的平均年龄超过65岁，前英国国防部长德斯·布朗准确形容了我们影响力的有限性：“曾经掌权的人确实想解决核问题。


The trouble is that those who are something don’t.”	可正在掌权的人却并非如此。 ”


No quick fix will turn all this around.	没有捷径能够扭转目前的颓势。


Getting the kind of messages that emerged from the London meeting embedded in public and political consciousness is going to be slow boring through hard boards.	让伦敦会议信息在公众和政界深入人心注定像在硬板上打孔一样缓慢而又乏味。


But the messages demand attention, and we simply have to keep drilling.	但核问题必须引起关注，我们只能不断钻下去。


The first message is that the threat of a nuclear weapons catastrophe remains alarmingly real.	最重要的信息是核武器威胁令人震惊的切实存在着。


Existing global stockpiles have a destructive capacity equal to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs, and in handling them there is an omnipresent potential for human error, system error, or misjudgment under stress.	现有的全球核库存破坏力相当于150，000颗广岛原子弹，处理过程中很可能出现人为差错、系统故障或者因压力过大造成的误判。


Pakistan versus India is a devastating conflict-in-waiting, and North Korea and Iran remain volatile sources of concern.	巴基斯坦和印度矛盾随时有可能升级为破坏性冲突，而北朝鲜和伊朗的不稳定局势仍然令人关切。


We know that terrorist groups have the capacity to engineer nuclear devices and would explode them anywhere they could; we simply cannot be confident that we can forever deny them access to the fissile material they need to fuel them.	我们知道恐怖组织有能力制造核武器，并成功地在任何地方引爆； 我们只是无法确信能让他们永远得不到为核武器提供燃料的可裂变物质。


The second message is that Cold War nuclear-deterrence doctrine is irrelevant to today’s world.	其次是冷战时期的核威慑论已经无关乎当今世界。


So long as nuclear weapons remain, states can justify maintaining a minimum nuclear-deterrent capability.	只要核武器依然存在，各国就可以名正言顺地保留最基本的核威慑力。


But that can be done without weapons on high alert, and with drastically reduced arsenals in the case of the US and Russia, and, at worst, at current levels for the other nuclear-armed states.	但做到这点不需要让核武器处在高度戒备状态，美俄两国需要大幅降低核武器库存，而其他有核国家充其量可以保持目前的核武器状况。


The third message is that if the existing nuclear powers sincerely want to prevent others from joining their club, they cannot keep justifying the possession of nuclear weapons as a means of protection for themselves or their allies against other weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weapons, or conventional weapons.	另外就是如果现有核国家真心希望阻止别国加入到有核俱乐部，他们就不能继续借口防卫其他大规模杀伤性武器（特别是生物武器或常规武器）为自己和盟国拥有核武器进行辩护。


Indeed, the single most difficult issue inhibiting serious movement toward disarmament – certainly in the case of Pakistan versus India, and Russia and China versus the US – are conventional arms imbalances, and ways of addressing them must rise to the top of the policy agenda.	事实上，巴基斯坦和印度之间、以及俄罗斯和中国与美国之间开展大规模裁军行动的首要抑制因素是常规武器力量的不平衡，而相应的解决办法也必须尽快提上政治议程。


The final message is that neither piecemeal change nor sloganeering will do the job.	最后还要注意零星改革和空喊口号都无助于实现目标。


Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and civil nuclear-energy risk reduction are inextricably connected, and they call for sustained commitment around a comprehensive agenda, and detailed argument.	核裁军、不扩散、反恐和民用核能风险控制之间相互密不可分，需要制定综合议程及详细计划并不断付出努力。


Sound bites and tweets are an unlikely route to nuclear salvation.	时断时续的讲话和议论不太可能实现核救赎的目标。


Kissinger is no idealist icon.	基辛格并不是理想主义偶像。


But he’s always worth listening to, and never more so than with respect to the question that he has been asking for years: When the next nuclear-weapons catastrophe happens, as it surely will, the world will have to respond dramatically.	但他的意见值得我们听取，特别是在他已经强调了多年的问题上：当下一次核武器灾难注定发生时，世界将被迫做出巨大改变。


Why can’t we start right now?	那么改变为什么不能从现在开始呢？


Bombs, Books, and Bucks	炸弹、书本和美元


The $82 billion “emergency supplemental” bill to finance American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan leaves the United States spending more money on military power than is needed on a yearly basis to permit every child in the world to receive, within one decade, both primary and secondary education.	为伊拉克和阿富汗的美军行动所提供的总额价值820亿美元的紧急拨款法案使美国花在军事力量上的钱比每年允许全世界每个孩子在十年内接受小学和中学教育所需的还要多。


Clearly, the question is not whether universal education is affordable, but whether America and the world can afford to neglect the political, economic, social, and health benefits of educating the roughly 380 million children around the globe who currently do not attend school.	显然，问题不在于全球教育是否承担得起，而是美国和全世界是否能够忽略让全球目前约38,000万失学儿童接受教育所带来的政治、经济、社会和健康益处。


Education, no less than military might, is a security imperative, for it helps the world – both individuals and societies – to escape the consequences of widespread poverty, rapid population growth, environmental problems, and social injustices.	教育，和军事力量一样，是一种安全需要，因为它帮助全世界——无论个人还是社会——避免普遍贫困、高速人口增长、环境问题以及社会不公等带来的后果。


Education strengthens social and cultural capital, which contributes to strong and stable polities.	教育加强了社会和文化资本，这有助于保持强大稳定的政体。


It improves human health, increases life expectancy, and lowers fertility rates.	它改善了人类健康，延长了人类寿命并降低生育率。


Aside from these obvious benefits, education is also a widely accepted humanitarian obligation and an internationally mandated human right.	除了这些显而易见的好处之外，教育也是一种广泛认同的慈善义务和一种国际认可的人权。


But this right is unrealized for the 28% of the world’s school-age children who are not enrolled in school.	但是这种权利在占全世界28%的那些失学的学龄儿童身上并没有得到体现。


Most are illiterate and live in absolute poverty.	他们大部分目不识之丁，生活极其贫困。


The majority of these children are female.	这些孩子中大部分是女孩。


Of those who enter primary school in developing countries, more than one in four drops out before attaining literacy.	在那些发展中国家内进入小学学习的孩子中，超过四分之一的孩子在完成扫盲之前就已经辍学。


Moreover, enrollment does not necessarily mean attendance, attendance does not necessarily mean education, and education does not necessarily mean good education.	此外，入学并不一定意味着上学，上学也不肯定意味着教育，教育也不必然意味着高质量的教育。


In 2000, the global community pledged to achieve universal primary education (UPE) by 2015.	2000年，全世界立志要在2015年前在全球普及初等教育（UPE）。


Many poor countries are wildly off track when it comes to meeting this goal.	许多贫困国家在完成这个目标的途中远远地偏离了轨道。


At the current rate of educational expansion, an estimated 118 million children will be absent from primary school in 2015. Nearly twice that number will not attend secondary school.	就目前的教育普及率来看，在2015年将有11,800万儿童无法进入小学，约这个数字两倍的儿童将无法接受中学教育。


The World Bank, UNICEF, and UNESCO have estimated that achieving UPE by 2015 will entail annual expenditures of between $6.5 billion and $35 billion, on top of the approximately $82 billion that developing countries spend each year on primary education.	世界银行、联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）和联合国教科文组织（UNESCO）预计，在2015年前达到UPE的目标所需的花费将比发展中国家每年用于初等教育的约820亿美元高出65亿至350亿美元。


These funds will be needed for schools, teachers, teacher training, materials and equipment, administration, and assessments.	这笔基金将用于学校、教师、教师培训、材料和设备、管理以及评估。


Based on a five-year project that we led at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, we believe that the UPE goal is not ambitious enough: the world should aim for, and can achieve, high-quality, universal	以我们在美国国家艺术和科学院引领的五年计划为基础，我们相信UPE目标还不够雄伟：全世界应该，也能够，像普及全球初等教育一样普及全球中等教育。 发展中国家每年在中等教育上花费约930亿美元。


Creating the necessary space to accommodate universal enrollment will require significant investment.	我们需要大量的投资为普及入学创造一个必要的环境。


These funds would at best ameliorate – not eliminate – prevailing global disparities in educational access and quality.	这些基金将在最大程度上改善——而不是削减——在获得教育途径和教育质量上所普遍存在的全球性差距。


Not included is the cost of other improvements needed to encourage children to attend school, such as meals, tuition subsidies, and more effective, dynamic, and knowledgeable teachers.	这还不包括其他能鼓励儿童上学的改善所需的花费，诸如用餐、学费补贴，以及更有效率、精力更为充沛、更有学识的老师。


Nor does this include the cost of improving national governments’ capacity to collect data and to implement and oversee educational reforms.	这也不包括改善国家政府收集数据和执行并检查教育改革的能力所需的花费。


Though more money is essential, it is not sufficient.	尽管更多的资金至关重要，但这还不够。


In some regions, cultural barriers inhibit schooling of girls and of linguistic, religious, and ethnic minorities.	在某些地区，文化禁忌禁止女孩以及语言、宗教和少数民主接受教育。


The political energy required for expanding and reforming education is difficult to muster in the world’s wealthiest nations.	扩大和改革教育所需的政治力量难以在世界最富裕的国家中集聚起来。


Ensuring high-quality education for all children requires an open discussion of educational goals, an international commitment to improving its effectiveness and economic efficiency, recognition of the need to extend secondary education to all children, and acknowledgment of educational diversity and the need to adapt aid policies to local contexts.	保证所有的孩子能接受高质量的教育需要一场公开讨论，讨论包括教育目标、改进其有效性和经济效率的国际义务、将中等教育向所有儿童普及的必要性以及对教育多样性和改变援助政策以适应当地情况的认识。


None of these tasks is possible without supplementing the funding already provided by developing countries.	如果无法对发展中国家所提供的资金进行补充，这些任务就无法完成。


The world, or even the US by itself, has the ability to provide the additional funds needed.	全世界，或甚至美国一国，都具有提供所需额外资金的能力。


As the G8 leaders gather in Scotland, it is hard to imagine them coming up with a better investment in our common future.	当八国首脑在齐聚于苏格兰时，很难想象他们会对我们共同的未来提出一个更好的投资方案。


How Scary Is the Bond Market?	债券市场有多可怕


NEW HAVEN – The prices of long-term government bonds have been running very high in recent years (that is, their yields have been very low).	纽黑文—近几年来，长期政府债券价格价格十分高（也就是说收益率十分低）。


In the United States, the 30-year Treasury bond yield reached a record low (since the Federal Reserve series began in 1972) of 2.25% on January 30.	在美国，30年国债收益率在1月30日创下了2.


The yield on the United Kingdom's 30-year government bond fell to 2.04% on the same day.	25%的历史低点（自1972年美联储系列债券诞生以来）。


The Japanese 20-year government bond yielded just 0.87% on January 20.	1月20日日本20年政府债券收益率低达0. 87%。


All of these yields have since moved slightly higher, but they remain exceptionally low.	此后，这些收益率均略有回升，但仍然非常低。


It seems puzzling – and unsustainable – that people would tie up their money for 20 or 30 years to earn little or nothing more than these central banks' 2% target rate for annual inflation.	这令人奇怪，也不可持续——人们锁定他们的资金20年或30年，还赚不到利息或赚不到比央行2%的年度通胀目标更高的利息。


So, with the bond market appearing ripe for a dramatic correction, many are wondering whether a crash could drag down markets for other long-term assets, such as housing and equities.	因此，债券市场似乎即将迎来重大调整，许多人认为可能发生市场崩盘，拉低其他长期资产如房地产和股票的价格。


It is a question that I am repeatedly asked at seminars and conferences.	我在各种讨论班和会议上一再提出这一问题。


After all, participants in the housing and equity markets set prices with a view to prices in the bond market, so contagion from one long-term market to another seems like a real possibility.	毕竟，房产和股票市场的参与者参照债券市场价格观点确定价格，因此从一种长期市场到另一种长期市场的传染可能性相当大。


I have been thinking about the bond market for a long time.	我思考债券市场问题已有很长时间。


In fact, the long-term bond market was the subject of my 1972 PhD dissertation and my first-ever academic publication the following year, co-authored with my academic adviser, Franco Modigliani.	事实上，长期债券市场是我1972 年博士论文和第二年首次发表的学术作品（与我的导师弗朗哥·莫迪利亚尼（Franco Modigliani）合作）的主题。


Our work with data for the years 1952-1971 showed that the long-term bond market back then was pretty easy to describe.	我们的工作用1952—1971年的数据证明了当时的长期债券市场情况相当简单。


Long-term interest rates on any given date could be explained quite well as a certain weighted average of the last 18 quarters of inflation and the last 18 quarters of short-term real interest rates.	任意给定日期的长期利率可以用过去18个季度通货膨胀和过去18个季度的短期真实利率的加权平均很好地解释。


When either inflation or short-term real interest rates went up, long-term rates rose.	当通胀或短期真实利率上升时，长期利率也会上升。


When either fell, so did long-term rates.	当两者之一下降时，长期利率也会下降。


We now have more than 40 years of additional data, so I took a look to see if our theory still predicts well.	如今，我们增加了40多年的数据，因此我研究了以下我们的理论是否仍能有很好的预测能力。


It turns out that our estimates then, if applied to subsequent data, predicted long-term rates extremely well for the 20 years after we published; but then, in the mid-1990s, our theory started to overpredict.	情况表明，如果用后来的数据，我们当时的估计在我们的成果发表后20年内都能很好地起作用； 但从20世纪90年代中期开始，我们的理论开始失准。


According to our model, long-term rates in the US should be even lower than they are now, because both inflation and short-term real interest rates are practically zero or negative.	根据我们的模型，美国长期利率应该比现在更低，因为通胀和短期真实利率都达到了近零甚至负水平。


Even taking into account the impact of quantitative easing since 2008, long-term rates are higher than expected.	即使考虑到2008年以来的量化宽松的影响，长期利率仍显著高于预期。


But the explanation that we developed so long ago still fits well enough to encourage the belief that we will not see a crash in the bond market unless central banks tighten monetary policy very sharply (by hiking short-term interest rates) or there is a major spike in inflation.	但我们很久以前所发展的解释仍相当合适，这足以让我们相信我们不会看到债券市场崩溃，只要中央银行不急剧（通过提高短期利率）收���货币政策或通胀不出现大幅上升。


Bond-market crashes have actually been relatively rare and mild.	债券市场崩盘其实相对来说比较罕见和温和。


In the US, the biggest one-year drop in the Global Financial Data extension of Moody's monthly total return index for 30-year corporate bonds (going back to 1857) was 12.5% in the 12 months ending in February 1980.	在美国，穆迪（Moody’s）30年公司债券月度总回报指数（可追溯至1857年）的全球金融数据（Global Financial Data，GFD）扩展的最大啊单年跌幅为12. 5%，发生在1979年3月—1980年2月。


Compare that to the stock market: According to the GFD monthly S&P 500 total return index, an annual loss of 67.8% occurred in the year ending in May 1932, during the Great Depression, and one-year losses have exceeded 12.5% in 23 separate episodes since 1900.	与股市比较：GFD标普500月度总回报指数在1931年4月—1932年3月的一年（大萧条期间）中损失了67. 8%，自1990年以来出现过23次年损失超12.


It is also worth noting what kind of event is needed to produce a 12.5% crash in the long-term bond market.	另一个值得注意之处是什么事件才能导致长期债券市场出现12. 5%的崩盘。


The one-year drop in February 1980 came immediately after Paul Volcker took the helm of the Federal Reserve in 1979.	1980年2月的年度跌幅出现在保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）1979年出任美联储主席后。


A 1979 Gallup Poll had shown that 62% of Americans regarded inflation as the “most important problem facing the nation."	1979年盖洛普调查（Gallup Poll）表明62%的美国人认为通胀时“国家面临的最重要的问题”。


Volcker took radical steps to deal with it, hiking short-term interest rates so high that he created a major recession.	沃尔克采取了激进措施解决这一问题，大幅提高了短期利率以至于制造出异常大衰退。


He also created enemies (and even faced death threats).	他还因此树敌（甚至面临死亡威胁）。


People wondered whether he would get away with it politically, or be impeached.	人们怀疑他的政治生命是否会就此终结，或者遭遇弹劾。


Regarding the stock market and the housing market, there may well be a major downward correction someday.	在股票市场和房产市场，随时可能发生大幅向下调整。


But it probably will have little to do with a bond-market crash.	但这可能与债券市场崩盘没有什么关系。


That was the case with the biggest US stock-market corrections of the last century (after 1907, 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007) and the biggest US housing-market corrections of all time (after 1979, 1989, and 2006).	过去一百年中美国股市的最大调整走势（1970、1929、1973、2000、2007年后）和美国房产市场的所有调整走势（1979、1989、2006年后）都是如此。


It is true that extraordinarily low long-term bond yields put us outside the range of historical experience.	诚然，反常低的债券收益率不符合历史经验。


But so would a scenario in which a sudden bond-market crash drags down prices of stocks and housing.	但债券市场突然崩盘拉低股票和房产价格也不符合历史经验。


When an event has never occurred, it cannot be predicted with any semblance of confidence.	当一个事件从未发生过时，你不可能装出自信的模样预测它发生。


The Great Disconnect	大脱钩


PARIS – Since the second half of 2012, financial markets have recovered strongly worldwide.	巴黎—自2012年下半年以来，全世界金融市场强势复苏。


Indeed, in the United States, the Dow Jones industrial average reached an all-time high in early March, having risen by close to 9% since September.	事实上，在美国，道琼斯工业平均指数在3月初创出史上新高，自去年9月一阿莱上涨近9%。


In Europe, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s “guns of August” turned out to be remarkably effective.	在欧洲，欧洲央行行长德拉吉的“八月火力”（guns of August）也相当强劲。


Draghi reversed the euro’s slide into oblivion by promising potentially unlimited purchases of member governments’ bonds.	德拉吉承诺潜在的无限量购买成员国国债，这扭转了欧元的颓势。


Between September 1 and February 22, the FTSEurofirst index rose by almost 7%.	9月1日至2月22日，FTSEruofirst指数上涨近7%。


In Asia, too, financial markets are up since September, most dramatically in Japan.	亚洲金融市场自去年9月以来也有所上涨，特别是日本。


Even the Italian elections in late February seem not to have upset markets too much (at least so far).	就连2月末的意大利选举也没有给市场带来多大不安（至少到目前为止是如此）。


Although interest-rate spreads for Italian and Spanish ten-year bonds relative to German bonds briefly jumped 30-50 basis points after the results were announced, they then eased to 300-350 basis points, compared to 500-600 basis points before the ECB’s decision to establish its “outright monetary transactions” program.	尽管意大利和西班牙十年期债券相对德国的利差在结果公布后扩大了30—50个基点，但随后减小至300—350个基点，而在欧洲央行的“直接货币交易”计划决定之前，利差高达500—600个基点。


But this financial market buoyancy is at odds with political events and real economic indicators.	但金融市场的欢腾与政治和实体经济指标并不相符。


In the US, economic performance improved only marginally in 2012, with annual GDP rising by 2.3%, up from 1.8% in 2011.	在美国，2012年的经济表现只是略有好转，GDP增长率从2011年的1. 8%增至2.


Unemployment remained high, at 7.8% at the end of 2012, and there has been almost no real wage growth over the last few years.	失业率仍然很高，2012年末水平为7. 8%，且过去数年来真实工资几无增长。


Median household income in the US is still below its 2007 level – indeed, close to its level two decades ago – and roughly 90% of all US income gains in the post-crisis period have accrued to the top 1% of households.	美国的中位家庭收入低于2007年水平——事实上，与20年前的水平差不多——危机前美国收入增长总值的约九成落入了最顶端1%家庭的腰包。


Indicators for the eurozone are even worse.	欧元区的指标更加糟糕。


The economy contracted in 2012, and wages declined, despite increases in Germany and some northern countries.	2012年出现了经济收缩和工资下降，尽管德国和一些北欧国家有所增加。


Reliable statistics are not yet available, but poverty in Europe’s south is increasing for the first time in decades.	可靠的数据仍然无法获得，但南欧的贫困情况出现了几十年来的首次恶化。


On the political front, the US faces a near-complete legislative stalemate, with no sign of a compromise that could lead to the optimal policy mix: short-term support to boost effective demand and long-term structural reforms and fiscal consolidation.	在政治方面，美国面临着几乎全面的立法僵局，看不到形成可能催生最优政策组合（提振有效需求的短期支持和长期结构性改革和财政整固）的信号。


In Europe, Greece has been able – so far – to maintain a parliamentary majority in support of the coalition government, but there, and elsewhere, hyper-populist parties are gaining ground.	在欧洲，希腊到目前为止尚能维持议会多数支持联合政府，但（不仅是希腊）极端民粹主义政党势头渐长。


The Italian election results could be a bellwether for Europe.	意大利选举结果或许是欧洲的先声。


Beppe Grillo’s populist Five Star Movement emerged with 25% of the popular vote – the highest support for any single party.	格里洛（Beppe Grillo）的民粹主义五星运动（Five Star Movement）获得了25%的选票，是支持率最高的政党。


Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, confounding those who had forecast his political demise, re-emerged at the head of a populist-rightist coalition that ended up only 0.3 percentage points away from winning.	前总理贝卢斯科尼令那些预测他已被政治打倒的人大跌眼镜，在民粹主义右翼联盟中独占鳌头，仅仅比获胜所需的支持率低了0. 3%。


In short, we are witnessing a rapid decoupling between financial markets and inclusive social and economic well-being.	简言之，我们正在经历金融市场和包容性社会和经济福利的快速脱钩。


In the US and many other places, corporate profits as a share of national income are at a decades-long high, in part owing to labor-saving technology in a multitude of sectors.	在美国和其他许多国家，公司利润占国民收入的比重处于几十年来的高点，部分是因为在诸多部门采取了节约劳动力的技术。


Moreover, large corporations are able to take full advantage of globalization (for example, by arbitraging tax regimes to minimize their payments).	此外，大公司能够充分利用全球化（比如在税收制度间套利以实现薪酬支付最小化）。


As a result, the income of the global elite is growing both rapidly and independently of what is happening in terms of overall output and employment growth.	结果，全球精英的收入快速增加，并日渐独立于总产出和就业增长。


Demand for luxury goods is booming, alongside weak demand for goods and services consumed by lower-income groups.	奢侈品需求暴涨，而较低收入群体的消费商品和服务需求疲软。


All of this is happening in the midst of extremely expansionary monetary policies and near-zero interest rates, except in the countries facing immediate crisis.	所有这些都发生在极度扩张性的货币政策和近零利率环境中，除了那些直接面临危机的国家。


Structural concentration of incomes at the top is combining with easy money and a chase for yield, driving equity prices upward.	收入向顶端的结构性集中正在与宽松的货币政策和追逐收益率相结合，推高股市。


And yet, despite widespread concern and anxiety about poverty, unemployment, inequality, and extreme concentration of incomes and wealth, no alternative growth model has emerged.	而尽管关于贫困、失业、不平等性和收入和财富的极端集中的担忧和焦虑在不断蔓延，我们却找不到替代增长模式。


The opposition to the dominant mainstream in Europe is split between what is still too often an “old” left that has trouble adjusting to twenty-first-century realities, and populist, anti-foreigner, and sometimes outright fascist parties on the right.	在欧洲，对主流的反对分裂为两个阵营，一是“老式”左派，已脱节于21世纪的现实； 二是右翼民粹主义、排外主义甚至直截了当的法西斯政党。


In the US, the far right shares many of the characteristics of its populist European counterparts.	在美国，极右翼与欧洲民粹主义有着诸多相似之处。


But it is a tribute to the American two-party system’s capacity for political integration that extremist forces remain marginalized, despite the rhetoric of the Tea Party.	但由于美国两党制对政治团结的巨大作用，尽管茶党在大声疾呼，极端势力仍处于边缘地位。


President Barack Obama, in particular, has been able to attract support as a liberal-left idealist and as a centrist-realist at the same time, which enabled him to win re-election in the face of a weak economy and an even weaker labor market.	特别是，总统奥巴马仍有能力以兼为左翼自由主义理想派和中间道路理想主义派的身份赢得支持，这是他能够在经济疲软、劳动力市场更加疲软的情况下赢得连任。


Nonetheless, without deep socio-economic reforms, America’s GDP growth is likely to be slow at best, while its political system seems paralyzed.	尽管如此，除非实行深刻的社会经济改革，否则美国GDP增长将不可能加快，而其政治制度将陷入瘫痪。


Nowhere is there a credible plan to limit the concentration of wealth and power, broaden economic gains through strong real-income growth for the poor, and maintain macroeconomic stability.	没有可信的计划来限制财富和权力的集中、通过穷人真实收入的强劲增长扩大经济收益，并维持宏观经济稳定。


The absence of such a plan in the US (and in Europe) has contributed to the decoupling of financial markets from inclusive economic progress, because it suggests that current trends are politically sustainable.	美国（和欧洲）的缺少这样一个计划是金融市场脱钩于包容性经济进步的一个原因，因为这表明当前趋势在政治上是可持续的。


But, while this disconnect could continue for some time if no alternative program emerges, the huge gap between financial markets’ performance and most people’s well-being is unlikely to persist in the longer term.	但是，尽管在没有替代方案的情况下，这一脱钩可能持续一段时间，但金融市场表现和大部分人的福利之间的巨大差异不可能长期维持。


When asset prices overshoot reality, eventually they have nowhere to go but down.	超越现实的资产价格别无去向，最终只能往下走。


Why Stimulus Has Failed	经济刺激为何失败？


NEW DELHI – Two fundamental beliefs have driven economic policy around the world in recent years.	新德里——两大基本信念驱动着全球各国近些年的经济政策。


The first is that the world suffers from a shortage of aggregate demand relative to supply; the second is that monetary and fiscal stimulus will close the gap.	其一，相对于总供给，全球总需求短缺； 其二，货币和财政刺激将填补此一缺口。


Is it possible that the diagnosis is right, but that the remedy is wrong?	有没有可能是这样：前一条做出的诊断是对的，而后一条开出的药方错了？


That would explain why we have made little headway so far in restoring growth to pre-crisis levels.	这似乎可以解释，为什么我们努力想让经济复苏到危机前的水平，但迄今为止进展不大。


And it would also indicate that we must rethink our remedies.	这也表明，我们需要反思药方是不是有问题。


High levels of involuntary unemployment throughout the advanced economies suggest that demand lags behind potential supply.	非自愿失业水平在发达经济体普遍居高不下，说明需求落后于潜在供给。


While unemployment is significantly higher in sectors that were booming before the crisis, such as construction in the United States, it is more widespread, underpinning the view that greater demand is necessary to restore full employment.	特别高的失业率固然集中在那些危机前的繁荣行业里，如美国的建筑业，但高失业率依然是更多行业的普遍现象，这也支持了必须以扩大需求重振就业的观点。


Policymakers initially resorted to government spending and low interest rates to boost demand.	最初，政策制定者依靠政府支出和低利率来保需求。


As government debt has ballooned and policy interest rates have hit rock bottom, central banks have focused on increasingly innovative policy to boost demand.	等到政府债台高筑、利率低得不能再低，各国央行又全力以赴地创新政策以促进需求。


Yet growth continues to be painfully slow.	但增长依然惨淡。


What if the problem is the assumption that all demand is created equal?	人们假定，创造需求的效果是均等的，但如果这个假定本身错了呢？


We know that pre-crisis demand was boosted by massive amounts of borrowing.	我们知道，危机前的需求是由大规模借贷支撑的。


When borrowing becomes easier, it is not the well-to-do, whose spending is not constrained by their incomes, who increase their consumption; rather, the increase comes from poorer and younger families whose needs and dreams far outpace their incomes.	随着借贷门槛降低，增加消费的并非富人群体，他们的支出本不受收入制约； 增加消费的主要是贫穷和年轻的家庭，他们的梦想超出了他们的收入。


Their needs can be different from those of the rich.	他们的需求与富人不同。


Moreover, the goods that are easiest to buy are those that are easy to post as collateral – houses and cars, rather than perishables.	此外，这部分人群最倾向于购买的是可以充当抵押品的货物——房子、车子，而不是易损耗品。


And rising house prices in some regions make it easier to borrow even more to spend on other daily needs such as diapers and baby food.	而某些地区的房价上涨使得借款人有更多余力购买纸尿裤和婴儿用品等日用品。


The point is that debt-fueled demand emanates from particular households in particular regions for particular goods.	事情的要害在于，举债维持的需求，集中于特定地区的特定人群，针对特定货物。


While it catalyzes a more generalized demand – the elderly plumber who works longer hours in the boom spends more on his stamp collection – it is not unreasonable to believe that much of debt-fueled demand is more focused.	虽然它也会带动其他需求——房地产热使上年纪的管道工业务增加，让他可以花更多的钱去集邮——但说大部分举债维持的需求是较为集中的并无不妥。


So, as lending dries up, borrowing households can no longer spend, and demand for certain goods changes disproportionately, especially in areas that boomed earlier.	所以，一旦贷款枯竭，举债消费的家庭再也无钱开销，对特定货物的需求便以超常的方式崩塌，特别是在早前繁荣的那些地区。


Of course, the effects spread through the economy – as demand for cars falls, demand for steel also falls, and steel workers are laid off.	当然，由此产生的效应渗透了整个经济——汽车需求下滑，带动钢铁需求下滑、钢铁工人下岗。


But unemployment is most pronounced in the construction and automobile sectors, or in regions where house prices rose particularly rapidly.	但失业问题最严重的还是建筑业和汽车制造业，或者是那些原先房价上涨速度太离谱的地方。


It is easy to see why a general stimulus to demand, such as a cut in payroll taxes, may be ineffective in restoring the economy to full employment.	不难理解，对需求的一般刺激，例如减征工资税，在重振就业方面效果不好。


The general stimulus goes to everyone, not just the former borrowers.	一般刺激针对的是所有人，而不是之前的举债人。


And everyone’s spending patterns differ – the older, wealthier household buys jewelry from Tiffany, rather than a car from General Motors.	而人与人的支出模式是不同的——老人、富人会去买蒂梵尼的珠宝，而不是GM的汽车。


And even the former borrowers are unlikely to use their stimulus money to pay for more housing – they have soured on the dreams that housing held out.	而原先的举债人也不太会再用刺激资金去买房——他们的房产梦早已幻灭了。


Indeed, because the pattern of demand that is expressible has shifted with the change in access to borrowing, the pace at which the economy can grow without inflation may also fall.	说真的，由于借贷可能性已发生改变，需求模式也变了，在不引发通胀的情况下经济能够增长的速度也降低了。


With too many construction workers and too few jewelers, greater demand may result in higher jewelry prices rather than more output.	由于建筑工人太多而珠宝买主很少，所以总体需求的增加将主要反映为珠宝价格的上涨而不是国民经济产出的增加。


Put differently, the bust that follows years of a debt-fueled boom leaves behind an economy that supplies too much of the wrong kind of good relative to the changed demand.	换言之，继多年举债维持的繁荣而来的泡沫破灭造成了这样一种经济：同已变化的需求格格不入的那些货物太多了。


Unlike a normal cyclical recession, in which demand falls across the board and recovery requires merely rehiring laid-off workers to resume their old jobs, economic recovery following a lending bust typically requires workers to move across industries and to new locations.	这种衰退不同于普通的周期性衰退，在普通的周期性衰退里，需求下滑是普遍的，而复苏也仅需重新雇佣原先被解雇的工人就可以了。 信贷泡沫破灭后的经济复苏，往往需要依靠劳动力的跨行业转移。


There is thus a subtle but important difference between my debt-driven demand view and the neo-Keynesian explanation that deleveraging (saving by chastened borrowers) or debt overhang (the inability of debt-laden borrowers to spend) is responsible for slow post-crisis growth.	所以，在我的举债驱动型需求观和新凯恩斯主义之间就存在一种微妙然而重要的差别。 新凯恩斯主义认为，去杠杆化过程（吃了苦头的借款人进行存款）或债务后遗症（被债务压得喘不过气来的借款人无力支出）要为危机后低迷的增长率负责。


Both views accept that the central source of weak aggregate demand is the disappearance of demand from former borrowers.	两种观点都承认，总需求疲软的主要原因是原先借款人需求的消失。


But they differ on solutions.	但它们开出的解决方案不同。


The neo-Keynesian economist wants to boost demand generally.	新凯恩斯主义经济学家想要一般地提振需求。


But if we believe that debt-driven demand is different, demand stimulus will at best be a palliative.	但如果我们相信债务驱动型需求有其特殊性，那我们就得承认需求刺激政策最多是治标不治本。


Writing down former borrowers’ debt may be slightly more effective in producing the old pattern of demand, but it will probably not restore it to the pre-crisis level.	为了恢复原有的需求模式，对原借款���的债务进行减记，效果固然比一般性刺激略好，但这种策略也很难让需求恢复到危机前的水平。


In any case, do we really want the former borrowers to borrow themselves into trouble again?	更何况，我们真的想让原先的那些借款人再度陷入泥潭吗？


The only sustainable solution is to allow the supply side to adjust to more normal and sustainable sources of demand – to ease the way for construction workers and autoworkers to retrain for faster-growing industries.	唯一具有可持续性的解决方案是，允许供给端进行调整，以适应更普通更有持续性的需求——对建筑工人和汽车工人进行重新培训，以便利其转向高增长产业。


The worst thing that governments can do is to stand in the way by propping up unviable firms or by sustaining demand in unviable industries through easy credit.	政府所能做的最差的一件事则是，支持末路企业，用廉价信贷维持末路产业的需求，图一时之效，妨碍劳动力转移之路。


Supply-side adjustments take time, and, after five years of recession, economies have made some headway.	供给端调整需要时间，而在持续衰退5年之后，经济稍稍有了些起色。


But continued misdiagnosis will have lasting effects.	但长时间“误诊”的影响还会持续一段时间。


The advanced countries will spend decades working off high public-debt loads, while their central banks will have to unwind bloated balance sheets and back off from promises of support that markets have come to rely on.	发达经济体将付出几十年的时间消化高企的公债负担，而其央行也将不得不放松臃肿的资产负债表，并且放弃支持市场的承诺，令后者无所适从。


Frighteningly, the new Japanese government is still trying to deal with the aftermath of the country’s two-decade-old property bust.	可怕的是，日本新一届政府仍在应对该国持续20年之久的泡沫破灭后遗症。


One can only hope that it will not indulge in more of the kind of spending that already has proven so ineffective – and that has left Japan with the highest debt burden (around 230% of GDP) in the OECD.	我们只能希望，它不要再搞支出扩张了，这条路已经证明是走不通的，而且让日本成了经合组织中债务负担最高的国家（约为GDP的230%）。


Unfortunately, history provides little cause for optimism.	不幸的是，从日本的历史来看，我们没有什么理由对此感到乐观。


The Dirt on Plastic Waste	塑料废物的污点


NEWARK, NJ – Plastics are everywhere.	纽瓦克，新泽西—塑料在生活中随处可见。


Whether used to store leftovers, keep hospital equipment sterile, or insulate a home, plastics are unmatched for their adaptability, durability, and low cost.	不管是被用于盛装废物、保持医院设备无菌状态，还是用于房屋隔热，塑料都以其可塑性、耐久性和低成本拥有无可比拟的优势。


Given their seemingly boundless benefits, it is unsurprising that plastics have replaced traditional materials in many sectors – for example, steel in cars, paper and glass in packaging, and wood in furniture.	塑料的好处无穷尽，因此毫不奇怪，它取代诸多部门的传统材料——比如用于汽车的钢材、用于包装的纸材和玻璃、用于家具的木头等。


As a result, annual plastics consumption worldwide has increased from five million tons in the 1950’s to around 280 million tons today.	结果，全世界塑料的年消费量从20世纪50年代的500万吨增加到今天的2. 8亿吨。


Roughly half of plastic products, such as packaging, are intended for one-time, short-lifespan (less than six months) applications prior to disposal.	大约一半的塑料制品——比如包装盒——是一次性用品，其使用前保质期很短（不到半年）。


Given that most of these items are not biodegradable, and are not recycled, plastics waste is building up – with serious environmental consequences.	这些东西大多不可生物降解，也不可回收，因此塑料废物激增，带来了严重的环境后果。


While governments have begun to implement new (and often quite strict) regulations aimed at managing plastics waste – for example, China banned lightweight plastic shopping bags in 2008 – they are inadequate to address the world’s growing plastics-waste problem.	尽管政府已开始实施新的（通常相当严格）旨在治理塑料废物的监管——比如中国在2008年开始禁止使用轻质塑料购物袋——但并不足以解决越来越严重的塑料废物问题。


Moreover, most plastic products are made from so-called “petroleum-based commodity thermoplastics.”	此外，大部分塑料制品源自所谓的“基于石油的商品热塑性塑料”。


Given that a non-renewable resource forms the basis of many plastic products – most of which will not last long – current plastics usage patterns are not sustainable.	由于许多塑料制品——大部分使用时间很短——来自不可再生资源，当前的塑料使用模式是不可持续的。


Closed-loop recycling, in which plastics waste is used to make another product, thus carries significant environmental benefits, such as reduced energy and oil consumption.	因此，闭环循环——用塑料废物生产其他产品——能带来极大的环境好处，比如减少能源和石油消费。


But the process of separating the petroleum-based recyclable plastics from other kinds of plastics and solid waste is difficult, costly, and labor-intensive, so only a small proportion is recycled.	但分离基于石油的可循环塑料和其他种类的塑料和固体废物十分困难、成本高昂且属于劳动密集型工作，因此只有少部分塑料得到了循环利用。


In 1988, the United States Society of Plastics Industry (SPI) developed a coding system in which each kind of resin is labeled with a number, 1-7, to facilitate sorting.	1988年，美国塑料行业协会（SPI）制定了一套规则，每种树脂都被标以1—7中的一个数字以方便储存。


The system has also been used elsewhere, including in Canada and Switzerland, but has not been adopted worldwide and is still confusing to some consumers.	这一制度也为加拿大和瑞士等其他国家所用，但并未在全世界普及，也容易混淆消费者。


If consumers knew to collect and separate household plastics based on their number, when available, the resulting boost to recycling efforts would demonstrate to government and industry the viability of a more sustainable approach, reduce exposure to rising oil prices, and support growing global demand for plastics.	如果消费者懂得在有条件时按数字收集和分类家庭塑料，那么由此带来的对塑料循环利用的刺激作用将向政府和行业证明存在可持续方法，减轻对石油价格上涨的风险暴露，并支撑日渐增加的全球塑料需求。


There are four categories of plastics recycling: primary recycling, in which the plastic is re-used in the same application; secondary recycling, in which material (mixed or contaminated) is used in less demanding applications; tertiary recycling, in which the plastic is converted into monomers or chemicals; and quaternary recycling, in which only energy is recovered through incineration.	塑料循环利用有四种形式：初级循环，即塑料重新用于相同用途； 二级循环，即（被混合或受污染的）材料用于要求较低的用途；


Each of these methods recovers a different amount of the embodied energy of the plastic item.	三级循环，即用回收塑料提炼单体和化学物质； 四级循环，即焚烧并利用从中产生的能量。


(All of the embodied energy is lost if the plastics are landfilled, a common disposal method worldwide.)	每种方式利用的塑料制品内含能量不同。 （如果塑料被填埋——这是世界普遍采用的处理方式——则其内含能量将完全浪费。


Given the difficulty and expense of separating plastics, the most economically viable option is often secondary recycling of a few commodity thermoplastics – mostly bottles, for which collection infrastructure is already in place.	由于分离塑料费力费钱，因此最划算的办法通常是对少数商品热塑性塑料予以二级循环利用——其中大部分是瓶子，其收集基础设施已经建成。


More economical separation methods are crucial to expanding the scope of plastics recycling, as is the identification of new potential markets for the recyclates.	更经济的分离办法对于扩大塑料循环利用范围来说是至关重要的，同样重要的还有指出回收品的新的潜在市场。


Such developments would encourage industry to re-use or recycle more parts.	这样的发展将鼓励产业界循环和再利用更多的部分。


Although all 40 kinds of plastics used in a North American automobile can be recycled, the need to separate and clean them makes using them more expensive than using virgin plastic resins.	尽管北美汽车业所用的40种塑料都可以循环利用，但分离和清洁塑料的需要导致循环利用的成本比使用全新塑料树脂更高。


This translates into a higher proportion of plastics in the remnants of shredded end-of-life automobiles – a contaminated mixture of plastics and non-plastics that is usually disposed of through some combination of landfilling, incineration, and secondary recycling.	这导致报废汽车中的塑料残余（塑料和非塑料的受污混合物，通常用填埋、焚化和二级循环的混合方法处理）比例较高。


Increasing the proportion of re-used plastics is a crucial step toward more sustainable plastics consumption.	提高再利用塑料是迈向可持续塑料消费的关键一步。


To this end, some automobile manufacturers have adjusted their designs to allow for easy disassembly of parts made of compatible plastics, while governments have set recycling target proportions for end-of-life vehicles.	在这方面，一些汽车制造商已经调整了设计方案，让兼容塑料制成的部件变得容易拆卸，政府也设置了报废汽车循环利用比例目标。


Such efforts should be intensified.	这些措施应该得到强化。


Furthermore, industry should seek new applications for recycled materials, while minimizing the amount of virgin material used.	此外，产业界应该为可循环利用材料寻找新的应用，同时最小化新材料的使用。


And, where possible, manufacturers should “down-gauge” materials (make parts thinner).	在可能的条件下，制造商应该“向下加料”（即把部件做得更薄）。


Government legislation can be enacted to support such measures, as well as to require plastics manufacturers to get involved in the disposal of plastic items – a responsibility long imposed on packaged-goods manufacturers in Europe.	政府立法应该支持这些措施，并要求塑料制造商参与塑料制品的处置——在欧洲，这一责任长期以来被强加给了包装品制造商。


An example of successful waste management is the reprocessing of PET bottles (made of polyethylene terephthalate) into polyester fibers.	成功废物管理的一个例子是将PET瓶子（聚对苯二甲酸乙二醇酯制品）处理成聚酯纤维。


In the last decade, Japan passed several laws obliging both businesses and individuals to separate plastics waste.	过去十年中，日本通过了数项法律，强制企业和个人分离塑料废物。


This, combined with a lack of landfill space and the country’s expanding population, has enhanced plastics recycling efforts.	这与填埋场所的短缺和人口的增加一道，正在加强塑料循环利用措施。


As a result, in 2010, Japan recycled 72% of PET bottles, compared to roughly 30% in the US and 48% in Europe.	结果，到2010年，日本循环利用了72%的PET瓶子，而美国和欧洲分别只有30%和48%。


While incineration and landfilling are still practiced, such high recycling rates underscore the positive impact of targeted policies.	焚化和填埋仍然是处理塑料废物的方式，但高循环率���显了定向政策的积极效果。


Another promising development is bioplastics, which have begun to compete with petroleum-based products in certain short-lifespan applications – such as packaging and agriculture – over the last two decades.	另一个令人振奋的发展是生物塑料。 过去二十年来，在某些短寿命应用领域（如包装和农业），生物塑料已开始与基于石油的产品竞争。


Given that bioplastics are produced from renewable or “bio-based” sources (cellulose, starch, and glucose) – and, in some cases, through microbial fermentation – they have a lower carbon footprint, contribute less to global warming, and biodegrade to small molecules.	生物塑料是用“基于生物”的可再生资源（纤维素、淀粉和葡萄糖）和（在某些情况下）微生物发酵过程制成的，其碳迹更低、对全球变暖影响更小，并能通过生物降解变成小分子。


But bioplastics are not a silver bullet for managing plastics waste.	但生物塑料并不是塑料废物管理的万灵丹。


In fact, they may threaten the secondary recycling of petroleum-based plastics, owing to possible contamination during sorting of mixed streams.	事实上，它可能威胁基于石油的塑料的二级循环，因为在混合使用过程中会出现污染。


And critics have expressed concern about the environmental impact of corn and other crops grown for industrial purposes, such as plastics and ethanol production, not to mention the potential effects on global food prices.	批评者还担心以工业目的（如塑料和乙醇产品）种植的玉米和其他作物会带来环境问题，更不用说对全球粮食价格的潜在影响了。


In a world that is reliant on plastics, more sustainable production, consumption, and disposal of plastic products is crucial.	在这个依赖塑料的世界中，更加可持续的塑料制品生产、消费和处理至关重要。


Civil society, industry, and government must work together to increase the share of recycled plastics, thereby ensuring that plastics’ costs do not outweigh their benefits.	公民社会、产业界和政府必须精诚合作，提高可循环利用塑料的比重，从而确保塑料成本不会超过它的好处。


Can South Korea Make More Babies?	韩国能生更多婴儿吗？


SEOUL – South Korea is facing major demographic challenges.	首尔—韩国正面临严重的人口挑战。


The total fertility rate (the number of children per woman), at 1.24, is one of the lowest in the world, and well below the level – 2.1 children per woman – needed to sustain a population without immigration.	总体生育率（每位妇女生孩子的数量）仅2. 14，位居世界最低行列，也远远低于不需要移民就可以维持人口规模的水平2.


As a result, the population is aging fast, and the government, despite its best efforts, seems to have no answer.	1。 结果，韩国人口迅速老化，而政府尽管使出了浑身解数，却束手无策。


A low birthrate is common in industrialized countries.	低生育率是工业化国家所面临的共同现象。


Before South Korea’s economic boom – a time when having more children was viewed as a source of security in old age – the fertility rate was much higher, averaging more than six until 1960.	韩国经济繁荣之前——从前韩国人认为孩子越多越安全——生育率要高得多，1960年前平均达6以上。


But, as South Korea’s economy advanced, child-rearing costs rose, and female labor-force participation increased, the fertility rate declined dramatically, dropping below two in the 1980s.	但是，随着韩国经济的发展，育儿成本的提高，女性劳动力参与率的上升，生育率显著下降，20世纪80年代降低到2以下。


At first, falling fertility rates were an economic blessing, as households saved more and invested in children’s development.	一开始，生育率下降对经济有利，因为家庭能存更多的钱并投资于孩子的发展。


In 2015, the college enrollment rate for women hit 81%, compared to just 6% in 1980.	2015年，女性大学就读率达到了81%，而1980年只有6%。


But the decline of the prime working-age population has lately been undercutting economic growth, and threatens to place excessive pressure on the public pension system down the road.	但劳动力主力大军的减少最近开始制约经济增长，并有可能让公共退休金系统不堪重负。


South Korea’s government has attempted to address these challenges with a series of measures aimed at boosting fertility rates.	韩国政府进行了一系列措施试图刺激生育率，从而解决这一挑战。


A recent package includes more paternity leave, priority enrollment in public childcare facilities for third children, and subsidies for infertility treatment.	最新方案包括增加产假、第三个孩子优先在公共育儿机构注册、生育医疗补贴等。


But whether these measures will lead to higher fertility rates is dubious, for a simple reason: they fail to tackle sufficiently the high economic hurdles that are causing South Koreans to delay or forego having children.	但这些措施是否能提高生育率颇可怀疑，原因很简单：它们无法充分消除导致韩国人推迟或放弃要孩子的沉重的经济障碍。


One of those hurdles is the cost of education.	这些障碍之一是教育成本。


South Korean parents are willing to invest heavily in giving their few children the best chance of prospering.	韩国家长愿意投入重金为仅有的孩子提供最好的发展机会。


In 2015, they spent almost 7% of their disposable income on private tutoring for their children in primary and secondary education.	2015年，他们花了可支配收入的近7%用于小学和初中家教。


They also pay an absurdly high price for their children’s college education, which no longer guarantees prosperity in life.	他们还花费巨资让孩子上大学，而上大学早已不是出人头地的保证。


In fact, South Korea’s share of private spending for college education is the highest among OECD countries, even ahead of the United States.	事实上，韩国大学教育私人支出为经合组织国家中最高的之一，甚至比美国还高。


That limits how many children parents may feel they can afford to raise.	这让很多孩子的家长不堪重负。


For many young South Koreans, even marriage is economically unfeasible nowadays, owing to factors like high housing costs and youth unemployment, even among university graduates.	对许多韩国年轻人来说，拜住房成本和年轻人失业率等因素所赐，如今连结婚也未必结得起，即使是大学毕业生也是如此。


The number of weddings in South Korea plunged from 435,000 in 1996 to 302,800 in 2015.	韩国新人数量从1996年的435,000人下降到2015年的302,800人。


In a country where only 2% of children are born outside marriage, this trend has a powerful impact on fertility rates.	韩国非婚生比率只有2%，因此这一趋势严重影响了生育率。


Women confront the highest barriers to increased fertility.	女性所面临的的提高生育率壁垒最为严重。


Pervasive gender inequality, together with a lack of affordable, high-quality childcare, causes many South Korean women to withdraw from the labor market after marriage or childbirth.	普遍的性别不平等以及缺少平价品质儿童看护服务让许多韩国女性在婚后或产后退出劳动力大军。


While men work long, inflexible hours, women assume the lion’s share of the responsibility for family care.	男性工作时间漫长又缺乏弹性，女性承担了大部分家政责任。


A 2014 survey indicated that South Korean women spent, on average, three hours and 28 minutes daily on household activities and family care, compared to just 47 minutes for men, who also accounted for only 5.6% of those who took parental leave in 2015.	2014年的调查表明韩国女性平均每天要花3小时28分钟用于家务和家政，而男性仅为47分钟。 2015年男性产假只占总量的5.


Though the new measures aim to boost this share, it will not be enough.	新措施旨在提高这一比例，但还不够。


After all, women are not just struggling to cope with uneven parental leave; many are leaving their jobs altogether after childbirth.	毕竟，女性不但难以安心完整的休产假； 许多人在产后彻底退出了工作。


And many of them do not wish to do so.	许多人并不想这样。


In a recent survey by the Federation of Korean Industries, 38% of the single female respondents said that they do not want children, mostly because they fear that they will struggle to keep up at work or lose their jobs.	韩国工业联合会的一份最新调查显示，38%的单身女性受访者称自己不想要孩子，大部分是因为担心要了孩子就无法胜任工作或失去工作。


Only one-third responded positively to the government’s program for promoting fertility.	只有三分之一的受访者对政府刺激生育率的措施持肯定态度。


South Korea’s government must pursue a more comprehensive policy package aimed at lowering some of the barriers to childbirth.	韩国政府必须采取更加全面的方案，以降低一些育儿壁垒为目标。


Women, in particular, need greater support, in order to eliminate the binary choice between career and family.	特别是女性需要更大的支持，从而让她们不必面临职业和家庭的二选一问题。


The key is to provide more flexible work arrangements, to build a more accepting corporate culture, and to ensure accessible childcare, both public and private.	关键是采取灵活的工作安排、构建更加包容的公司文化，以及确保育儿服务（包括公共和私营服务）的普及。


To this end, allowing the migration of foreign housekeepers and caregivers could be very helpful.	在这方面，引入外国家政人员和儿童看护人员将大有裨益。


South Korea remains conservative about offering permanent residency to foreign nationals.	韩国对于授予外族人永久居留权仍然十分保守。


But the reality is that, in advanced economies where market services for childcare and households are available, highly educated women tend to have more children, especially at older ages.	但现实是，在育儿和家政市场服务普及的发达经济体中，教育程度较高的女性倾向于要更多的孩子，特别是当她们年纪较大时。


Japan, for its part, has managed to boost its ultra-low fertility rate – which bottomed out in 2005 at 1.26 – to 1.46 in 2015, through consistent efforts to reduce childrearing costs and change the corporate culture.	比如，日本成功地将其极低的生育率——2005年达到1. 26的最低值提高到了2015年的1.


To sustain this recovery, it has recently decided to take initiatives to attract more foreign housekeepers.	46，他们的办法是持之以恒地降低育儿成本和改变公司文化。


These changes reflect Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s commitment to prevent the population from falling below 100 million.	为了保持这一复苏势头，日本最近决定采取措施吸引更多外国家政人员。 这些变化体现了日本首相安倍晋三阻止日本人口下降到1亿以下的承诺。


Even where foreign household workers do not raise the fertility rate, they enable more women to continue working after having children.	即使外来家政工作者没有提高生育率，也可以让更多女性在要了孩子后继续工作。


In Singapore, for example, families often hire live-in maids from neighboring countries, including the Philippines and Indonesia, to take care of the housework and childcare.	比如，新加坡家庭常常雇用来自包括菲律宾和印尼等邻国的住家保姆来做家务和看孩子。


Though Singapore’s fertility rate stands at just 1.3 – one of the lowest in the world – this policy enables the country to attract foreign talents to fill the population gap and sustain the economy.	尽管新加坡生育率只有1. 3——为全世界最低之一——但这一政策让新加坡得以吸引外国人才填补人口空白和维持经济。


To some extent, demographic change is inevitable, as is its transformative economic impact.	在某种程度上，人口变化是难免的，其变革性经济影响亦然。


But there are steps that governments can take to shape demographic trends and blunt their negative effects.	但政府可以采取措施影响人口趋势，遏制消极效应。


If South Korea creates an environment in which families can live and work happily, those families will grow larger.	如果韩国营造出家庭能够快乐生活和工作的环境，那么家庭会变得更大。


Privatizing Development Aid	发展援助私人化


LONDON – Much has changed about official development assistance (ODA) over the last 50 years.	伦敦—过去五十年来，官方发展援助（ODA）改变了很多。


Since it originated during the Cold War, when members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee spent roughly $60 billion annually (an amount that the Soviet Union undoubtedly matched), recipient countries have been called “backward,” “developing,” “southern,” and, lately, “emerging.”	ODA起源于冷战，其时经合组织发展援助委员会每年拿出约600亿美元资金（苏联毫无疑问可以与之匹敌），接受国被称为“后进国家”、“发展中国家”、“南方国家”，最近则被称为“新兴国家”。


Indeed, what defines a recipient country has increasingly been called into question in recent years.	事实上，近几年来，如何定义受助国变得越来越值得商榷。


The United Kingdom is debating whether to discontinue aid to India, the third-largest recipient of capital inflows and the home of the UK’s largest manufacturing employer, the Tata Group.	英国在讨论是否停止对印度的援助，后者是当今第三大资本流入国，也是英国最大制造业雇主塔塔集团（Tata Group）的母国。


Likewise, eurozone countries have been looking to long-time aid recipient China, which holds $2.5 trillion of US government debt, to help them overcome their own debt crisis.	类似地，欧元区国家眼巴巴地望着中国帮助它们克服债务危机，而中国是老牌受助国，如今持有2. 5万亿美元美国国债。


Furthermore, development itself has been redefined, with the policy focus shifting to good governance, transparency, accountability, and human rights.	此外，发展本身也被重新定义，政策焦点转移到良好治理、透明度、可问责性和人权上。


As a result, initiatives aimed at improving health, education, and gender equality have replaced large-scale construction projects.	结果，旨在改善卫生、教育和性别平等的计划取代了大规模建设项目。


Now it is time to re-examine the ODA system.	如今，是时候重新审视ODA体系了。


After all, donor countries are mired in debt and stagnation, while some recipient economies are growing 5-7 times faster than they are.	毕竟，援助国受困于债务和停滞，而受助国的增长速度比援助国快7—7倍。


In 1969, Canada’s former prime minister, Lester Pearson, recommended that developed countries should spend 0.7% of their GDP on ODA by 1975, and that they should eventually increase the proportion to 1%.	1969年，加拿大前首相皮尔逊建议，到1975年，发达国家应该将GDP的0. 5%用于ODA，并将这一比例逐渐增加到1%。


Although Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have achieved the 0.7% target, the global average has actually declined, from 0.5% of GDP in 1960 to 0.3% today.	尽管挪威、瑞典、丹麦荷兰和卢森堡已经实现0. 7%的目标，但就全球平均水平而言，这一比例从1960年的0.


The UK has pledged 0.7% of its gross national income, but is debating who will receive it.	英国承诺拿出国民生总收入（GNI）的0. 7%，但在援助谁的问题上争论不休。


America’s annual contribution of $30 billion, the world’s highest in absolute terms, amounts to less than 0.25% of its GNI.	美国每年援助规模为300亿美元，绝对数量为世界之最，但占GNI的比重还不到0. 25%。


But, while international organizations encourage additional ODA spending, donor-country citizens are increasingly resistant.	但是，尽管国际组织鼓励增加ODA支出，援助国国民却越来越抵制。 批评者指出，这笔钱并没有达到真正需要它们的人手中；


Critics argue that the money does not reach those who truly need it; that it creates dependency, and thus harms recipient countries; that it is needed at home; and that it generates income primarily for consultants and source-country vested interests.	国内也需要援助； 援助的主要作用是鼓了顾问和来源国既得利益者的腰包。


To be sure, it is widely agreed that aid for disaster relief and assistance to conflict-affected countries are effective.	平心而论，一个被广泛接受的观点是救灾援助和冲突援助十分有效。


Moreover, almost 10% of total ODA is allotted for humanitarian relief, which should be similarly uncontroversial.	此外，ODA总量中有近10%用于人道主义救济，这也应该是毫无争议的领域。


But the overall impact of ODA remains dubious.	但ODA的总体影响仍然值得质疑。


In a report released last March, the UK’s House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs cited disagreement among experts on the issue, with estimates ranging from a 0.5% boost to annual GDP growth in recipient countries to no effect on growth at all.	在去年3月的一份报告中，英国上议院经济事务委员会援引了专家在这一问题上的分歧——ODA对受助国年GDP增长的提振作用众说纷纭，有人说可达0. 5%，有人说根本毫无作用。


There are several possible explanations for the fact that development aid has not always translated into GDP growth.	有三个原因或能解释发展援助并不总能转变为GDP增长这一事实。


Recipient governments might misuse the aid, preventing it from trickling down to those who would spend or invest it, or the money may be given on the condition that it is spent on goods or services from the donor country.	受助国政府可能滥用援助致使援助无法抵达支出或投资者手中； 援助金可能存在条件，必须花在来自援助国的商品和服务上。


And, even if development aid does spur GDP growth, this does not necessarily lead to better lives for the poorest citizens, especially in the short term.	此外，即使发展援助确实刺激了GDP增长，也不一定会为最贫困人民带来更好的生活，特别是在短期。


While eliminating extreme poverty is undoubtedly an urgent moral imperative, ODA may not be the best way to achieve it.	消灭极端贫困毫无疑问是紧迫的道德驱动力，但ODA或许并非达到此目标的最佳手段。


In fact, there is a strong case for involving the private sector in development assistance.	事实上，有充分的理由应该让私人部门参与发展援助。


Over the last two decades – a period when globalization opened up the world financial system – private capital flows have contributed more to developing economies’ growth than has ODA.	过去二十年来——在此期间，全球化开放了世界金融体系——私人资本流对发展中经济体增长的贡献大于ODA。


Indeed, in 2009, more than $1 trillion in private capital flowed to developing countries – nine times more than total aid.	事实上，2009年，1万多亿美元私人资本流向了发展中国家，比援助总量多九倍。


Moreover, privately funded organizations like Oxfam or Medecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) tend to allocate resources more effectively than governments, delivering genuine gains where they are needed most.	此外，乐施会（Oxfam）和无国界医生（Medecins Sans Frontières）等私人出资组织配置资源的效率高于政府，真正做到了将援助送到最需要的人手里。


Following this model, countries’ aid budgets could be opened up for bids from development NGOs, which would assume responsibility for allocating and delivering the funds as efficiently as possible – and would be required to provide a careful accounting of how they spent the money.	根据这一模式，国家援助预算可以开放接受发展非政府组织的竞标，让后者负责尽可能有效的配置和资金发放——以及要求提供如何花钱的详细核算。


A bolder solution would be direct cash transfers to the poor.	更大胆的计划是直接把现金送到贫困人口手中。


With global aid totaling roughly $130 billon, each of the 1.3 billion people living in extreme poverty (less than $1 per day) worldwide would receive $100 in cash.	全球援助总量大约在1300亿美元，这意味着13亿生活在极端贫困（每天花费少于1美元）的人口每人可以获得100美元现金。


Some countries have already experimented with such programs, and India is preparing to begin providing cash transfers to its 300 million poor citizens.	一些国家一开始实验这一计划，印度正准备向其3亿贫困人口提供现金转移支付。


In other words, a global cash-transfer scheme could be very effective, and would be feasible if donor countries pooled their aid budgets.	换句话说，全球现金转移支付机制可以非常高效，而且可行——如果援助国把援助预算集合起来的话。


The simplest – and most radical – solution would be to stop all official aid payments.	最简单也最彻底的办法是停止所有官方援助支付。


Instead, the money could be returned to donor-country citizens through tax deductions or income transfers, and they could decide how to help those in need.	反之，这笔钱可以通过减税或收入转移支付返还给援助国人民，让他们决定如何帮助需要者。


Given the prevalence of poverty and disease, many of these citizens would be motivated to contribute to global poverty-reduction efforts.	由于贫困和疾病的普遍性，很多人会有动力为全球减贫事业做出贡献。


Allowing citizens to choose how to donate may help to tackle corruption in countries where politicians often misappropriate ODA, while discouraging wasteful or impractical projects.	让人民选择如何援助或有助于解决政客滥用ODA国家的腐败问题，也能防止浪费和不切实际的项目。


In addition, people would be far less likely to complain that their money is being wasted or misused if they chose where it went.	此外，如果由自己决定资金去向，人们将更少抱怨自己的钱被浪费或滥用。


ODA has, at best, a patchy record.	ODA只能说是差强人意。


After 50 years of inefficiency, it is time to try something new.	在经历了50年的低效率后，是时候尝试新变化了。


In the near term, at least, cash transfers seem to be the best option.	至少从短期看，现金转移支付是最佳选择。


Only by allowing each recipient to decide how best to use the money can we ensure that development aid actually enables the world’s poorest citizens to improve their lives.	只有让每一位受助者决定如何最佳地花钱，我们才能确保发展援助真正让全球最贫困人口改善了生活。


The Crisis Europe Needs	欧洲需要的危机


BERKELEY – It’s hard to be optimistic about Europe.	伯克利—对欧洲，你很难抱以乐观。


Last summer, a political cage match between Germany and Greece threatened to tear the European Union apart.	去年夏天，一场德国和希腊之间的牢笼战（cage match）险些让欧盟分崩离析。


In country after country, extremist political parties are gaining ground.	极端主义政党正在一国又一国赢得选民。


And Russian President Vladimir Putin’s incursion into Ukraine, in the EU’s backyard, has turned the common European foreign and security policy into a punch line.	俄罗斯总统普京入侵欧盟后院乌克兰则让欧洲共同外交和安全政策成了一个笑话。


Now comes the refugee crisis.	现在又爆发了难民危机。


The EU’s 28 member states are quibbling over how to distribute 120,000 refugees, when more than three times that number crossed the Mediterranean in the first nine months of 2015 alone.	欧盟28个成员国正在就如何分配120,000难民而争吵不休，而光是在2015年前九个月，就有三倍多于这个数字的难民穿越地中海来到欧洲。


Refugees are coming by land as well as sea.	难民从陆路和海路进入欧洲。


Germany alone expects as many as a million asylum-seekers this year.	光是德国，预计今年就将接受多达一百万寻求庇护者。


It is risible to think that European governments will be able to deport, or “repatriate” in diplomacy-speak, any substantial fraction of these arrivals.	认为欧洲政府仍能驱逐，或用外交辞令说，能“遣返”大部分这些到来者是荒谬的。


Like a rubber ball, they will only come bouncing back.	他们就像是橡皮球，必然会弹回来。


Nor is there agreement on how to handle this flood of humanity.	对于如何处理这股涌入的人流也没有形成一致。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel first declared that her country had a historical obligation to absorb refugees, before backing down in the face of political criticism.	德国总理默克尔先是宣布，她的国家有着吸收难民的历史义务，随后不得不在政治批评面前低头。


Hungary opened its borders, hoping that the human tide would flow onward, but then erected a razor-wire fence when it turned out that there were too few welcoming destinations.	匈牙利开放了边境，希望人流只是过境，但随后建起了铁丝网隔离障，因为情况表明受欢迎的目的地太少了。


The EU’s Eastern European members initially resisted taking their share of the 120,000; but, dependent on fiscal transfers from the EU’s wealthier members, they fell into line after diplomatic arm-twisting similar to that administered to Greece.	欧盟的东欧成员国一开始拒绝分担接受120,000难民的义务，但是，它们需要仰仗欧盟较富裕国家的财政转移支付，因此，在经历了与希腊类似的外交施压后，它们也被迫就范。


Besides raising doubts about European leaders’ competence and solidarity, this crisis jeopardizes the EU’s signal achievement, the single market, which ensures freedom of movement for goods, services, capital, and people.	除了关于欧洲领导人的能力和团结的质疑日益增加之外，这场危机还动摇了欧盟的标志性成就——单一市场。 单一市场保证了商品、服务、资本和人的自由流动。


The Schengen Agreement providing for passport-free transit is what makes freedom of movement for people meaningful.	申根协定规定人可以免签证流动，让人的迁徙自由变得有意义。


But, given the inability of participating states to control their borders with non-EU countries, Germany and other Schengen members have temporarily reinstated controls.	但是，由于参与国无法控制它们与非欧盟国家的边境线，德国和其他申根成员国临时恢复了边境控制。


Indeed, this move could be more than temporary, with influential voices now calling for Schengen’s demise.	事实上，这一动作可能并非临时，如今，要求取消申根协定的声音颇有影响力。


Dismantling Schengen would be a significant economic setback.	废除申根协定将是一次巨大的经济退步。


Allowing trucks and trains to cross the EU’s internal borders without interruption not only facilitates trade; it also encourages the development of regional supply chains and production networks.	让卡车和火车在欧盟内部各国之间畅行无阻不但便利了贸易，也鼓励了地区供应链和生产网络的发展。


Motor vehicle parts can be produced in one member state and assembled in another, after which the final product can be delivered to market.	汽车部件可以在一个成员国生产，在另一个成员国组装，然后将最终产品运往市场。


At a time when Europe is struggling to boost productivity and competitiveness, reinstating border controls would come as a serious blow.	眼下，欧洲正在竭尽全力提振生产率和竞争力，收紧边境控制将是对这些努力的沉重打击。


The irony is that this is precisely the type of crisis that the EU was created to address.	讽刺的是，欧盟正是为了解决这种类型的危机而建立的。


Solving the border-security problem requires European countries to work together.	解决边境安全问题要求欧洲各国齐心协力。


Individual countries like Greece have limited incentive to invest in controls insofar as refugees are only passing through.	目前，希腊等个体国家没什么动力投资于边境控制，因为对它们来说，难民只是过境。


At the same time, unilateral action by countries, like Hungary, that are unprepared to countenance even transiting migrants, merely ends up diverting the flow.	与此同时，匈牙利等国家的单方面行动甚至连过境移民都不准备接受，其结果只是移民改变流动方向。


The EU has an agency called Frontex to coordinate and strengthen national border-control policies.	欧盟有一个叫做边防局（Frontex）的机构，用以协调和强化国家边境控制政策。


But governments have not allowed it to issue directives to national agencies.	但欧洲各国政府尚未允许它对国家机构发布指令。


If the crisis is to be solved, this will have to change.	要想解决这场危机，这一点就必须改变。


The same goes for resettlement.	安置问题也是如此。


Germany and Sweden cannot be expected to be the only destinations for all refugee arrivals.	不能期望德国和瑞典接受所有到达的难民。


Burden sharing is essential if the costs are to be tolerable.	要想让代价可以承受，就必须分担负担。


In principle, the outlines of a deal are not difficult to formulate.	理论上，协议的大纲不难确定。


Germany can provide money and manpower to secure the EU’s external borders.	德国可以提供财力人力捍卫欧盟外部边境。


Its neighbors can then agree to accept more refugees and to offer them real economic opportunity as an incentive to stay.	其邻国应该同意接受更多的难民，并提供真正的经济机会促使他们留下。


Creating institutions to enhance border security and resettle refugees will require Europe to take another step toward deeper political integration, with decisions made at the EU, not the national, level.	建立机构强化边境安全和安置难民需要欧洲朝着深化政治一体化迈出新的步子，决定应该在欧盟而非国家层面做出。


There may be a reluctance to contemplate this, but there is no choice if Europe is to have a hope of solving the problem.	也许有些人不愿意考虑这一点，但如果欧洲想要解决问题，就别无选择。


More razor wire at the border is not an adequate answer.	在边境建立更多铁丝网是不够的。


Europe also needs to address the conditions driving residents of war-torn and poverty-stricken countries to flee.	欧洲还需要改变驱使饱受战争摧残和贫困折磨的国家的居民逃离祖国的环境。


So far, the EU has been singularly ineffectual in deploying aid, diplomacy, and boots on the ground to address conflicts in Africa and the Middle East.	目前，欧盟在通过援助、外交手段和部署地面部队解决非洲和中东冲突等方面几乎毫无建树。


In particular, Germany, the EU’s largest country, has hesitated to contribute forces, funds, and even strategic advice, reflecting its dark military history.	特别是，欧盟最大的国家德国在贡献部队、资金甚至战略建议方面显得颇为犹豫，这反映了其黑暗的军事史。


Merkel, her involvement in negotiations over Ukraine aside, has deferred to the German public’s historically rooted objections to deeper foreign entanglements.	除了参与乌克兰危机谈判外，默克尔顺从了德国民众对陷入对外事务纠缠的根深蒂固的反对。


Such reticence is no longer acceptable.	如此沉默寡言已不合时宜。


One rationale for the European project has always been to allow Germany to project diplomatic and military force in the context of a larger, EU-wide foreign policy.	欧洲工程的一大立足点一直是让德国在更广泛的欧盟外交政策环境下构建外交和军事力量。


That way, both Germans and other Europeans can trust Germany to be a positive force for change.	这样，德国人和其他欧洲人都可以相信德国成为改变局面的积极力量。


If not now, one might ask, then when?	此时不动，更待何时？


Boris Johnson the Counter-Revolutionary	反革命鲍里斯·约翰逊


LONDON – If history repeats itself – first tragedy, then farce – what comes next is Boris Johnson, a shape-shifting politician who embodies the contradictions of our age.	伦敦—如果历史重复自己——先是悲剧，然后是闹剧——那么下一个出场的是鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）。 约翰逊是一位将现时代矛盾表现得淋漓尽致的百变政客。


Johnson is a tribune of the people who grew up with the privileges of the 1%; a child of immigrants who campaigned for closed borders; a Conservative who wants to upend the political order; an erudite man who mocks expertise; and a cosmopolitan who casually calls black people “piccaninnies.”	他是一位嘲笑专家的博学之士； 他是偶尔将黑人称为“黑小孩”的世界大同论者。


Johnson did more than anyone to bury Britain’s European future; but his ultra-flexibility may yet prove to be its salvation.	约翰逊在葬送英国的欧洲未来方面无出其右者； 但他的八面玲珑又可能成为它的救世主。