As monks, we believe in alleviating suffering wherever we see it, as part of the vows we have taken.	作为僧侣，我们信奉的是缓解我们在任何地方所看到的苦难，这是我们宣誓的一部分。


We could not ignore our people’s suffering.	我们无法对人民所遭受的苦难视而不见。


We formed the Sangha Coalition when we saw that the country’s monks were united.	我们联合全国的僧侣成立了僧伽同盟。


Those of us who are studying and teaching abroad share this unity, and have rallied to the support of those of us in Burma.	在国外从事学习和教学的僧侣也很支持我们的行动，大家都联合起来支持在缅甸国内的僧侣。


And it is not only the monks who are united.	其实不仅仅是是僧侣们联合起来了。


When we started our peaceful marches for change, students, youth, intellectuals, and ordinary people joined us in the streets, in the rain.	当我们举行和平游行要求变革时，学生、年轻人、知识分子还有普通民众都跟我们一起冒雨走到大街上。


We thought that we could appeal to some, if not all, of the generals – Buddhists themselves – who control our country to join us in trying to right the many ills befalling Burma.	我们认为我们能够呼吁某些，如果不是全部的话，控制我们国家的将军们他们自己也是佛教徒与我们一起努力改变缅甸人民所遭受的许多疾苦。


At first, we tried to show our displeasure with military rule by refusing to receive alms from them.	一开始，我们拒绝接受军人统治集团的施舍以表达我们对他们的不满。


We turned our begging bowls upside down as a gesture of our feelings.	我们把我们的乞讨碗反转过来，以此表达我们的情感。


We have not lost our loving kindness towards ordinary soldiers, nor even towards the leaders who ordered them to brutalize their own people, but we wanted to urge them to change while there was still time.	我们并没有丢失我们对普通士兵的爱，甚至也没有丢失对下令他们残酷地对待他们自己的人民的那些领导的爱，我们只是希望能督促他们在时间还来得及的时候作出改变。


We know that some people in the army and organizations close to the regime have been reluctant to use violence against the monks.	我们知道许多在军队以及与统治集团很接近的组织里的人并不愿意用暴力来对付僧侣。


We want to tell the people who are violent towards their own countrymen to stop and think whether their actions are in accordance with the dharma, whether they are acting for the good of Burma’s people.	我们希望告诉那些残酷对待他们自己的国民的人停下来想一想他们的做法是不是符合佛法的教义，不管他们这样做是不是为了缅甸人民的利益着想。


Some of the soldiers who were ordered to beat us and to stop us from marching actually refused to do so, because they understood the truth of what we were doing.	一些接到命令要殴打我们并且阻止我们游行的士兵最后拒绝按令行动，因为他们理解我们这样做的原因。


We hoped to create a way out for the military leaders, a way to start a real dialogue with the people’s leaders and the leaders of ethnic groups, for the unity of the nation.	我们希望为军方领导人开创一条出路，一条与人民的领导人和族群领导人展开真正的对话以及实现民族团结的路子。


But that hope was short-lived.	但是这种希望很快就破灭了。


The regime is now hunting down those who participated in the demonstrations and committing unspeakable acts of violence.	军人统治集团现在正在到处搜捕参与游行示威的人，并且正在进行着可怕的残忍镇压。


They have attacked monasteries and arrested monks and nuns by force.	他们袭击了寺庙，蛮横地拘捕和尚和尼姑。


Guards are everywhere, on all the streets, around the pagodas and residential areas.	到处都是卫兵，所有的大街上，寺庙的宝塔和居民区的四周，他们无处不在。


Wounded demonstrators are reported to have been buried alive in mass graves, and there are confirmed reports of bodies washing ashore in the waterways near Yangon (Rangoon).	有传言说受伤的示威者被集体活埋，而有人亲眼看见仰光附近水道的岸边漂着许多尸体。


The regime is brutalizing the Burmese people, and lying to the world about its actions.	军人统治集团一面在残酷地对待缅甸的民众，一面却在对世界隐瞒它的暴行。


Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan, a representative of the military, recently told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the marchers in the streets were “bogus monks.”	作为军方代表的觉山准将最近告诉联合国特使甘巴里说大街上的游行者是“冒牌的僧侣”。


But we are genuine, and thousands of us – from Rangoon, Mandalay, Pegu, Arakan, Magwe, and Sagaing – demonstrated for peace.	但事实是我们是真正的僧侣，并且数千名来自仰光、曼德勒、白古、阿拉干、马圭和实皆为了和平而参加游行示威的人都是真正的僧侣。


Some have said that the uprising in Burma is over.	有些人说缅甸的起义结束了。


That is what the junta wants the world to think.	那正是军人集团想让世界产生的想法。


But we believe that the protests represent the beginning of the end of military rule in our country.	但是我们相信抗议活动代表了在我们国家军人统治终结的开始。


The generals who ordered the crackdown are assaulting not only Burma’s people, but also their own hearts, souls, and spiritual beliefs.	那些下令进行镇压的将军们不仅仅是是袭击了缅甸人民，同时了袭击了他们自己的心、灵魂还有精神信仰。


The monks are the preservers of dharma; by attacking them, the generals attack Buddhism itself.	僧侣是佛法的守护者； 袭击他们，将军们就是在袭击佛教本身。


We know that the international community is trying to help us, but we need that help to be more effective.	我们知道国际社会正在努力帮助我们，但是我们需要更有效的帮助。


We thank the many people and organizations abroad who are helping us regain the rights denied to us for more than 40 years.	我们非常感谢许多帮助重新获得我们失去了40多年的权利的人和组���。


But we also appeal to the international community to make its actions practical and effective.	但是我们也要呼吁国际社会采取更实际和有效的行动。


The military government will do anything to remain in power, and their violent acts must be exposed to the world.	军政府为了维护权力会干出任何事，他们的暴行必须让全世界都知道。


They may control the streets and monasteries, but they will never be able to control our hearts and our determination.	他们也许可以控制街道和寺庙，但是他们永远无法控制我们的心和我们的决心。


Cry, the Newborn Baby	新生儿的啼哭


Each year, four million babies die in their first four weeks of life – over 10,000 deaths a day.	每年，4百万婴儿在出生后4周内死亡，也就是每天死亡超过1万人。


Most of these neonatal deaths go unrecorded and remain invisible to all but their families.	大多数新生儿死亡根本不予登记，除了对他们的家庭外，不为人所知。


Virtually all (99%) occur in low- and middle-income countries, but most research and funding focuses on high-tech care for the 1% of deaths occurring in rich countries.	几乎所有的（99％）的死亡发生在中低收入国家，但是，大部分研究和资助却集中于发生在富国的1％的死亡率的高科技护理之上。


The greatest risk of death is at the beginning of life: three-quarters of all neonatal deaths (three million) occur within one week of birth, and at least one million babies die on their first day of life, many at home without any formal healthcare.	死亡的最大危险发生在生命开始阶段：四分之三的新生儿（三百万）在出生后一周内死亡，至少1百万的婴儿在出生后第一天死亡，许多人是死在家里，没有正规的医疗护理。


Moreover, almost 40% of all child deaths occur in the neonatal period, with Africa and South Asia accounting for two-thirds of the total.	而且，几乎40％的儿童死亡发生在新生儿阶段，非洲和南亚占总数的三分之二。


Unfortunately, child survival programs in the developing world have focused primarily on pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, and vaccine-preventable causes of deaths after the first month of life, while safe motherhood programs have focused primarily on the mother.	不幸的是，发展中国家的儿童存活项目大多集中在出生一个月后发生的肺炎、痢疾、疟疾以及可以通过疫苗防治的死亡原因上，而安全母婴项目大多集中于母亲身上。


Prevention of newborn deaths has thus dropped between the cracks of programs focusing on mothers and on older children.	防治新生儿死亡因此就只能位居母亲和稍大一点的儿童之后了。


This represents a tragedy that is as avoidable as it is immense.	这是一个巨大的、可以避免的悲剧。


A recent series on neonatal issues in the British science journal Lancet estimated that between 41% and 72% of neonatal deaths could be prevented if simple interventions were provided effectively where they are needed most.	英国科学杂志柳叶刀最近对新生儿死亡问题的系列文章估计，如果在最需要的地方有效地采取简单的防治措施，就可以防止41％到72％的新生儿死亡。


In other words, up to three million babies needlessly die each year.	换言之，每年有3百万婴儿不必死亡。


Well known, low-cost, and low-tech interventions do not reach those most in need – for example immunization against tetanus, exclusive breastfeeding, simple care for low-weight babies, and antibiotics for infection.	众所周知的、低成本以及低科技含量的防治手段，例如破伤风疫苗、专门母乳、低体重婴儿的简单护理以及防止传染的抗生素等并没有提供给那些最需要得到的孩子。


Such interventions are extremely cost-effective, and packaging these interventions together and linking them with other health programs reduces costs further.	这些防治手段极为低廉有效, 而且，把这些手段组合在一起并把它们同其他保健措施结合起来可以进一步降低成本。


Saving lives requires that mothers and babies in the highest-mortality countries be reached at the time of greatest risk.	挽救性命要求在最大危险之时赶到死亡率最高的国家的母婴。


Currently, only about half of all women worldwide deliver with a skilled attendant present.	目前，全世界大约只有一半的妇女生产时有高技能的助产师在场。


In sub-Saharan Africa, less than 40% of women deliver with skilled care; in South Asia, the figure is less than 30%.	在撒哈拉以南的非洲，不到40％的妇女生产时具有高技能护理； 在南非，这个数字低于30％。


Latin America and Southeast Asia have rapidly increased coverage, but at the current rate of progress in Africa, 50% of women will still deliver without skilled care in the year 2015.	拉丁美洲和南亚已经快速地提供了专业护理，但是，根据目前非洲的进步水平，在2015年的时候仍然有50％的妇女在生产时没有专业护理。


In Ethiopia, a quarter of pregnant women in the highest income group use skilled care at delivery, compared to 1% of the poorest women.	在埃塞俄比亚，最高收入人群中的妇女有四分之一在生产时使用专业护理，而最贫困妇女则只有1％。


Low-income countries have demonstrated that rapid progress is possible.	低收入国家表明，快速改善是可能的。


Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Peru, and Botswana all halved neonatal mortality during the 1990s.	斯里兰卡、印度尼西亚、秘鲁和博茨瓦纳都已经在二十世纪九十年代把新生儿死亡率降低了一半。


These countries’ success has depended on sustained high-level political commitment to providing high-quality maternal and newborn care.	这些国家的成功依赖于在高阶层作出政治承诺，持续提供高质量的母婴和新生儿护理。


In particular, integrated planning is essential.	综合规划十分关键。


In India, newborn health forms part of the national Reproductive and Child Health Program.	在印度，新生儿保健是全国生育和儿童健康计划的组成部分。


In Ethiopia, newborn care is being incorporated into a new community-based healthcare program.	在埃塞俄比亚，新生儿护理被列入新的社区基础上的医疗规划之中。


Of course, there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution.	当然，没有什么“万能的”解决方案。


The numbers and causes of neonatal deaths, the capacity of the health system, and the obstacles faced differ between and within countries, as does support from policymakers and the availability of resources.	新生儿死亡的数量和原因、医疗体系的能力、决策者和资源配置以及国家之间和国家内部不同地区之间面临的阻碍都迥然不同。


The additional cost of maintaining essential newborn health interventions at 90% coverage in the 75 countries with the highest mortality is estimated to be a mere $4.1billion per year.	在75个死亡率最高的国家中维持90％的新生儿保健护理所需要的额外成本每年估计只有41亿美元。


This would supplement current spending of $2 billion, only about 30% of which is for interventions specifically aimed at newborns, while the majority is for interventions that also benefit mothers and older children.	这个数额补充当前的20亿美元花费，而这20亿美元的仅仅30％专门用来新生儿的护理，而其中的大部分还用于母亲和稍微大一点的儿童。


Even with a weak health system, it is possible to achieve measurable mortality reduction.	即使是一个弱小的医疗体系仍然有可能大幅度降低死亡率。


But the world needs to act now to generate the political will and financial resources needed to save the lives of up to three million babies who die each year simply because they are born without the basic care that is their right.	仅仅由于没有原本是他们的基本权利的基本医疗护理，全世界每年有3百万婴儿死亡。 全世界需要现在行动起来，创造挽救这些婴儿的生命所需要的政治意愿和财政资源。


Indeed, to continue to fail the world’s at-risk children is to deliver a verdict of wanton inhumanity against ourselves, for we are a knowing party to an entirely preventable mass destruction of human life.	实际上，继续置处于危险境地的婴儿于不顾是对我们人类自身的荒谬的不人道的行为，因为我们完全知道，新生儿死亡完全是可以防止的大规模的人命毁灭。


Peru’s Self-Sabotage	秘鲁的自甘堕落


SAN MARCOS – You may know Peru as the cradle of Incan civilization.	圣马科斯—你也许知道秘鲁是印加文明发源地。


Or you may have tasted its outstanding cuisine.	你也许尝过美味的秘鲁料理。


But Peru boasts another impressive characteristic: it is among Latin America’s fastest-growing economies, with GDP up by 4.8% year on year in the first quarter of 2014.	但秘鲁人引以为豪的是另一件事：秘鲁是拉丁美洲增长最快的经济体之一，2014年第一季度 GDP同比增长了 4. 8%。


Peru’s long-term prosperity, however, is far from certain.	但是，秘鲁的长期繁荣还面临着诸多不确定。


In fact, Peru’s economic growth – which is based largely on exports of raw materials and hydrocarbons – is already slowing, from annual rates of 5.5-6.9% over the last three years.	事实上，秘鲁的经济增长主要依靠原材料和碳氢化合物出口，已呈现出减速之势，过去三年年增长率高达5. 5—6.


And, though the government recognizes the need for growth-enhancing reform, its approach is all wrong.	9%。 此外，尽管政府认识到需要采取促增长的改革，但实施方针有误。


Specifically, President Ollanta Humala recently won legislative approval of a set of “realistic” procedures to reduce the red tape perceived to be hampering investment in the extractive industries – the very industries on which the economy should become less dependent.	具体而言，总统奥良塔·胡马拉最近获得了立法批准，得以实施一系列“现实”程序削减阻碍采掘炼化行业投资的繁文缛节——而秘鲁经济正需要降低对该行业的依赖。


The new law seriously weakens Peru’s ability to regulate land use, set environmental quality standards, and rein in corporate misconduct through environmental-impact assessments.	新法律严重削弱了秘鲁监管土地使用、规定环境质量标准以及通过环境影响评估制约公司的不当行为的能力。


The Peruvian government now has a serious problem.	秘鲁政府现在面临着严重的问题。


Beyond diminishing Peru’s international credibility as a “climate champion” – an image that some members of the government have been attempting to cultivate – the law jeopardizes Peru’s natural environment and economic-growth prospects.	新法律除了有损于秘鲁“气候冠军”（climate champion）的国际声誉——一些政府官员一直在努力树立这一形象——还破坏了秘鲁的自然环境和经济增长前景。


Peru’s government has not just failed to do what is needed; it has actively worked against its country’s long-term interests.	秘鲁政府不但没有做应做之事； 还在积极地做不符合国家长期利益之事。


At a time when countries should be regulating land use more strictly, Humala’s “reform” eliminates zoning restrictions.	眼下，各国应该更严格地监管土地使用，而胡马拉的“改革”取消了划地限制。


Moreover, under the new law, subnational governments will no longer be able to limit investments on environmental grounds – decisions that were guided by strict technical standards and highly trained experts.	此外，根据新法律，次级政府不再能够以环境原因限制投资——在严格技术标准和高技能专家指导下做出决定。


Instead, a national authority – that is, a political body – will call the shots.	相反，将由国家当局——即政治机构——来做这件事。


All of this makes Peru more vulnerable to corporate misconduct that results in environmental damage.	所有这些都会让秘鲁更容易受到公司行为不当导致的环境破坏的影响。


As if that were not enough, the new law, in a reversal of previous legislation, could lead to reduced sentences for offenders, and even allow them to operate with impunity for three years.	雪上加霜的是，新法律逆转了此前的立法，可能减轻违规者受到的刑罚，甚至可以缓期三年。


This is good news for mining, oil, and gas companies eyeing rich reserves under the Amazon rain forest and the Pacific shelf.	这对于对亚马逊雨林和太平洋大陆架之下丰富储量馋涎欲滴的矿业、石油和天然气公司来说是一个好消息。


But, for indigenous communities, it will open a new chapter of dispossession, poverty, and strife; and, for all Peruvians, it amounts to a massive missed opportunity to put the country on a more sustainable development path.	但是，对本地社区而言，这不啻于开启了新的侵占、贫困和纷争之门； 而对于全体秘鲁人来说，这会导致国家丧失走上更加可持续的发展之路的千载难逢的良机。


The problem is not the government’s efforts to support businesses; measures to bolster business growth and development would be critical to any economic-reform plan.	问题不在于政府支持企业的政策； 提振企业成长和发展的措施对于经济改革计划来说至关重要。


But allowing companies with poor environmental records to operate with impunity is no solution.	但放任环境记录拙劣的公司作业而不予惩罚决非解决办法。


A country where legislation is tailor-made to benefit a few, at the expense of the public interest, cannot achieve long-term inclusive prosperity – and is likely to experience social instability.	一个国家，如其立法康公共利益之慨满足一小撮人的利益，它就无法实现长期包容性繁荣——并且有可能出现社会动荡。


The new law is not the only problematic policy that Peru’s government has pursued.	新法律并非秘鲁政府所追求唯一的有问题政策。


Last month, the Congress also moved to weaken the government’s environmental oversight, claiming that this would add 1.5-3% to the economy’s growth rate.	上个月，秘鲁国会批准削弱了政府的环境监督权，声称这能够将经济增长率提供1. 5—3%。


The government pushed the proposal through in a little more than two weeks, with only token public consultation and no time for reasoned public debate.	政府在略长于两周的时间里就推动了这一立法，只是象征性地征求了公众意见，甚至连合理的公共辩论都没有时间进行。


Given strong opposition from civil-society groups, political parties, the United Nations, and even some business interests, the government’s behavior was both understandable and inexcusable.	公民社会团体、政治党派、联合国甚至一些企业利益集团都强烈反对该立法，因此政府的这一行为是难以理解和宽恕的。


In fact, more than 100 organizations rejected the package before it was approved, while calling for higher environmental standards and stricter enforcement.	事实上，100多家组织在该法律被批准前拒绝了它，呼吁提高环境标准和加强执法力度。


They recognize that what Peru urgently needs is a new, future-oriented economic vision, focused on reducing its reliance on the extractive industries, whose days are numbered.	它们认识到，秘鲁所急需的是以未来为导向的新经济愿景，这一愿景的核心应该是减少经济对已成明日黄花的采掘炼化行业的依赖。


“Green” investment – which, as the World Bank recently proved using robust economic modeling, does not constrain economic growth – is a good place to start.	“绿色”投资——世界银行最近用鲁棒的经济模型证明，绿色投资不会拖累经济增长——才是好的起点。


In September, Humala will go to New York to outline Peru’s “bold and ambitious” actions to head-off the global climate crisis.	9月，胡马拉将前往纽约展示秘鲁为缓解全球气候危机所做的“果断而雄心勃勃的”行动。


In December, Peru will host the next round of UN climate negotiations, with governments from around the world gathering in Lima to pursue a comprehensive agreement that supports a transition from environmentally devastating fossil fuels to low-carbon energy solutions.	12月，秘鲁将主办新一轮联合国气候谈判，全球各国政府将齐聚利马，追求全面协定以支持从破坏性化石燃料向低碳能源解决方案的转型。


Peru’s recent actions have severely undercut its ability to act as a global climate leader, to everyone’s detriment.	秘鲁的近期动作严重影响了其作为全球气候领袖行动的能力，给全世界带来了伤害。


Only with a new strategy based on economic diversification and investment in renewable energy can Peru achieve stable, inclusive, long-term prosperity – and make a real contribution to mitigating climate change.	秘鲁必须采取以经济多样化和可再生能源投资为基础的新战略，惟其如此，秘鲁才能实现稳定、包容的长期繁荣——并真正为遏制气候变化做出贡献。


America Returns to Cuba	美国回到古巴


BEIJING – Barack Obama’s visit to Cuba is the first by a US president since Calvin Coolidge went in 1928.	北京—奥巴马访问古巴是1928年柯立芝以来第一位美国总统访问古巴。


American investors, expat Cubans, tourists, scholars, and scam artists will follow in Obama’s wake.	美国投资者、外籍古巴人、游客、学者和掮客都将追随奥巴马的脚步。


Normalization of the bilateral relationship will pose opportunities and perils for Cuba, and a giant test of maturity for the United States.	美古双边关系正常化将给古巴带来机遇和风险，也给美国带来巨大的成熟度考验。


The Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro 57 years ago was a profound affront to the US psyche.	57年前，菲德尔·卡斯特罗领导的古巴革命是对美国的 一次重大心理打击。


Since the founding of the US, its leaders have staked a claim to American exceptionalism.	自美国建国以来，其领导人一直宣扬美国例外论。


So compelling is the US model, according to its leaders, that every decent country must surely choose to follow America’s lead.	据美国领导人的观点，美国模式令人无法抗拒，每个体面的国家都必须决然跟随美国的领导。


When foreign governments are foolish enough to reject the American way, they should expect retribution for harming US interests (seen to align with universal interests) and thereby threatening US security.	当外国政府太愚蠢以至于拒绝美国道路时，他们应该因为伤害美国的利益（普世利益的代名词）进而威胁美国安全而受到惩罚。


With Havana a mere 90 miles from the Florida Keys, American meddling in Cuba has been incessant.	哈瓦那距离佛罗里达礁岛群只有90英里，美国对古巴的干涉从未停止。


Thomas Jefferson opined in 1820 that the US “ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba.”	1820年，托马斯·杰斐逊指出美国“应该抓住第一次可能的机会获取古巴。


It finally did so in 1898, when the US intervened in a Cuban rebellion against Spain to assert effective US economic and political hegemony over the island.	”1898年，美国终于这么做了——干预古巴反叛西班牙，从而主张美国对古巴岛的经济和政治的事实霸权。


In the fighting that ensued, the US grabbed Guantánamo as a naval base and asserted (in the now infamous Platt Amendment) a future right to intervene in Cuba.	在随后的战斗中，美国夺取了关塔那摩，将之作为海军基地，并主张（根据现在闻名天下的普拉特修正案）拥有干涉古巴的未来权利。


US Marines repeatedly occupied Cuba thereafter, and Americans quickly took ownership of most of Cuba’s lucrative sugar plantations, the economic aim of America’s intervention.	此后美国海军反复占领古巴，美国人迅速攫取了大部分获利丰厚的古巴糖种植园的所有权——这也是美国干涉古巴的经济目的。


General Fulgencio Batista, who was eventually overthrown by Castro, was the last of a long line of repressive rulers installed and maintained in power by the US.	后来被卡斯特罗推翻的巴蒂斯塔将军是美国力量长期扶持和维系的最后一位高压统治者。


The US kept Cuba under its thumb, and, in accordance with US investor interests, the export economy remained little more than sugar and tobacco plantations throughout the first half of the twentieth century.	美国一直控制着古巴，并且根据美国投资者的利益���在二十世纪上半叶，这一出口经济体几乎没有除了糖和烟草种植园之外的产业。


Castro’s revolution to topple Batista aimed to create a modern, diversified economy.	卡斯特罗推翻巴蒂斯塔的革命旨在建立一个多样化的现代经济。


Given the lack of a clear strategy, however, that goal was not to be achieved.	但是，由于缺少明确的战略，这一目标没有达到。


Castro’s agrarian reforms and nationalization, which began in 1959, alarmed US sugar interests and led the US to introduce new trade restrictions.	始于1959年的卡斯特罗的农业改革和国有化威胁到美国糖业的利益，导致美国引入新的贸易限制。


These escalated to cuts in Cuba’s allowable sugar exports to the US and an embargo on US oil and food exports to Cuba.	这些限制升级到削减古巴对美国出口糖的允许量和禁止美国石油和食品出口至古巴。


When Castro turned to the Soviet Union to fill the gap, President Dwight Eisenhower issued a secret order to the CIA to topple the new regime, leading to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, in the first months of John F. Kennedy’s administration.	当卡斯特罗转向苏联填补缺口时，艾森豪威尔总统向中央情报局下达颠覆卡斯特罗新政权的密令，导致了1961年肯尼迪政府上台几个月后灾难般的猪湾入侵事件。


Later, the CIA was given the green light to assassinate Castro.	随后，中央情报局获准刺杀卡斯特罗。


In 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to forestall another US invasion – and teach the US a lesson – by surreptitiously installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, thereby triggering the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation.	1962年，苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫决定先发制人阻止美国再次入侵——也给美国一个教训——秘密地在古巴部署核弹，从而引发1962年古巴导弹危机，世界徘徊在核覆灭的边缘。


Through dazzling restraint by both Kennedy and Khrushchev, and no small measure of good luck, humanity was spared; the Soviet missiles were removed, and the US pledged not to launch another invasion.	由于肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫过人的冷静，再加上一些好运气，人类最终得到了救赎； 苏联撤出了导弹，美国也承诺不会再次发动入侵。


Instead, the US doubled down on the trade embargo, demanded restitution for nationalized properties, and pushed Cuba irrevocably into the Soviet Union’s waiting arms.	相反，美国加紧了贸易禁运，要求古巴提供国有化产权的补偿，这让古巴义无反顾地加入了苏联阵营——正中后者下怀。


Cuba’s sugar monoculture remained in place, though its output now headed to the Soviet Union rather than the US.	古巴仍然保持着只糖业单作，只是其产出现在流向了苏联而不是美国。


The half-century of a Soviet-style economy, exacerbated by the US trade embargo and related policies, took a heavy toll.	半个世纪的苏联式经济，再加上美国贸易禁运和相关政策的影响，给古巴带来了严重伤害。


In purchasing-power terms, Cuba’s per capita income stands at roughly one-fifth of the US level.	以购买力衡量，古巴人均收入大约只有美国的五分之一。


Yet Cuba’s achievements in boosting literacy and public health are substantial.	但古巴在识字率和公共卫生方面的成就是巨大的。


Life expectancy in Cuba equals that of the US, and is much higher than in most of Latin America.	古巴寿命预期与美国相当，远高于大部分拉丁美洲国家。


Cuban doctors have played an important role in disease control in Africa in recent years.	近几年来，古巴医生在非洲疾病控制方面功不可没。


Normalization of diplomatic relations creates two very different scenarios for US-Cuba relations.	美古外交关系正常化为美古关系带来两个截然不同的情景。


In the first, the US reverts to its bad old ways, demanding draconian policy measures by Cuba in exchange for “normal” bilateral economic relations.	第一个情景是美国回到糟糕的老路，要求古巴采取严苛的政策措施换取“正常”的双边经济关系。


Congress might, for example, uncompromisingly demand the restitution of property that was nationalized during the revolution; the unrestricted right of Americans to buy Cuban land and other property; privatization of state-owned enterprises at fire-sale prices; and the end of progressive social policies such as the public health system.	比如，美国国会可能坚决要求在古巴补偿在革命期间被国有化的产业； 取消美国人购买古巴土地和其他产业的权利限制；


It could get ugly.	以跳楼价私有化国有企业； 并结束公共卫生体系等进步的社会政策。


In the second scenario, which would constitute a historic break with precedent, the US would exercise self-restraint.	在第二个情景将创造打破历史的先例，美国进行自我约束。


Congress would restore trade relations with Cuba, without insisting that Cuba remake itself in America’s image or forcing Cuba to revisit the post-revolution nationalizations.	国会重启与古巴的贸易关系，而不坚持古巴根据美国的形象改造自己或强迫古巴重新审视革命后的国有化。


Cuba would not be pressured to abandon state-financed health care or to open the health sector to private American investors.	古巴不会受到放弃公费医疗或向美国私人投资者开放医疗部门的压力。


Cubans look forward to such a mutually respectful relationship, but bristle at the prospect of renewed subservience.	古巴人期待这一相互尊重的关系，但对重新附属于美国的前景感到愤怒。


This is not to say that Cuba should move slowly on its own reforms.	这并不是说古巴应该缓慢执行自身的改革。


Cuba should quickly make its currency convertible for trade, expand property rights, and (with considerable care and transparency) privatize some enterprises.	古巴应该立刻让其货币实现贸易兑换，扩大产权，并（相当谨慎且透明地）私有化一些企业。


Such market-based reforms, combined with robust public investment, could speed economic growth and diversification, while protecting Cuba’s achievements in health, education, and social services.	这些基于市场的改革，再加上强劲的公共投资，能够加速经济增长和多样化，同时保护古巴在卫生、教育和社会服务方面取得的成就。


Cuba can and should aim for Costa Rican-style social democracy, rather than the cruder capitalism of the US.	古巴可以也应该将目标定在哥斯达黎加式的社会民主，而不是更粗放的美国资本主义。


(The first author here believed the same about Poland 25 years ago: It should aim for Scandinavian-style social democracy, rather than the neo-liberalism of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.)	（25年前，本文第一作者认为波兰也是如此：它应该将目标定在斯堪的纳维亚式的社会民主，而不是里根和撒切尔夫人的新自由主义。 ）


The resumption of economic relations between the US and Cuba is therefore a test for both countries.	因此，美古重建关系对两国都是一个考验。


Cuba needs significant reforms to meet its economic potential without jeopardizing its great social achievements.	古巴需要大手笔改革以实现其经济潜力而不破坏其巨大的社会成就。


The US needs to exercise unprecedented and unaccustomed self-control, to allow Cuba the time and freedom of maneuver it needs to forge a modern and diversified economy that is mostly owned and operated by the Cuban people themselves rather than their northern neighbors.	美国需要实施前所未有的、也尚不习惯的自我控制，给古巴时间和自由处置构建现代多样化经济的需要。 这一现代多样化经济主要应该由古巴人民自己拥有和运转，而不是由北方的邻居代劳。


The Narrative Roots of Public Policy	公共政策的叙事根基


BUENOS AIRES – At the recent Summit of the Americas in Panama, Cuban President Raúl Castro chose to break with the agreed protocol.	布宜诺斯艾利斯—在最近的巴拿马美洲峰会（Summit of the Americas）上，古巴总统劳尔·卡斯特罗打破了常规（agreed protocol）。


Instead of speaking for eight minutes, he took six times longer to present a political history of his country that was only loosely based on fact.	他的讲话不是八分钟，而是比这个时间长了五倍，用轻浮松散的事实依据论述了古巴政治史。


Why?	这是为什么？


As a card-carrying member of the economics profession, I have been trained to view the world from the perspective of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, according to whom the purpose of public policy is to create the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.	作为拥有正式与会资格的经济学专家，我所接受的训练让我用英国哲学家边沁（Jeremy Bentham）的观点看待世界。 边沁认为，公共政策的目的是为最广大人民创造最大幸福。


Policies that do not abide by some variant of this utilitarian principle (as proposed by, say, John Rawls or Amartya Sen) are bound to be inefficient or unfair.	政策如果不受一些功利主义原则变量的约束，那么（如约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls）或阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）等人所言）它们就必然是无效或不公正的。


But recent advances in psychology and neuroscience may suggest that if we want to understand social and political behavior, or improve policies, we should be reading Hegel more than Bentham.	但心理学和神经科学的新进展表明，要理解社会和政治行为，或者，要改进政策，我们更应该读一读黑格尔而不是边沁。


That may sound weird, given that Hegel was an Idealist and would never have expected neuroscience – a material reality independent of Geist (usually translated as Mind or Spirit) – to be relevant to his inquiry.	这听起来也许有些奇怪，因为黑格尔是个理想主义者，他永远不会想到神经科学——独立于Geist（通常被译为“思想”或“精神”）的物质实在——会与他的研究扯上关系。


As Antonio Damasio argues in his aptly titled book Self Comes to Mind, the brain creates an autobiographical sense of self.	安东尼奥·达马西奥（Antonio Damasio）在其名称恰如其分的著作《自我成为思想》（Self Comes to Mind）中指出，大脑创造出一种自传式（autobiographical）的自我意识。


It is this created self that perceives, remembers, and aspires, that has telos (or purpose), and on behalf of which decisions are made.	这一被创造出来的自我行使感知、记忆和渴望功能，它拥有telos（或称目的），决策也都是依据它做出的。


It is also the autobiographical self – through the narrative that it creates about itself – that makes life something more than what the American writer, artist, and philosopher Elbert Hubbard once called “one damn thing after another.”	自传式自我——通过它为自己所创造的叙事（narrative）——让生活比美国作家、艺术家兼哲学家阿尔伯特·哈伯特（Elbert Hubbard）所说的“一件鸟事接着又一件鸟事”更有意义。


And our brains are wired to figure out what other selves are thinking and feeling.	我们的大脑被设定了一种功能，即发现其他自我在想什么、感觉怎样。


I believe that this same structure applies to how we understand multi-person groups.	我认为这一结构也适用于我们如何理解由许多人组成的集体。


It is no coincidence, for example, that the law treats corporations as persons.	比如，法律将企业像人一样看待绝非巧合。


We think of the organization in which we work as if it was a person with rights, obligations, values, reputation, and temperament, on whose behalf managers regard themselves as acting.	我们将我们在其中工作的组织视同于一个有权利、义务、价值、声誉和脾气的人，其管理者认为自己代表这个“人”行动。


The same applies to nations and states.	国家（nations and states）也是如此。


Our brains need to create a shared sense of self, an “imagined community,” as the political scientist Benedict Anderson put it, on whose behalf collective decisions are made.	我们的大脑需要创造一种共同的自我意识，一个政治学家本尼迪克特·安德森（Benedict Anderson）所谓的 “想象的共同体”，集体决策的代表对象。


This community is a “person” that has a past and a future that transcend us as individuals.	这一共同体是一个“人”，它具有超越作为个体的我们的过去和未来。


It has a history and a telos.	它拥有一个历史和一个telos。


By contrast, a purely Benthamite view would lead to a view of politics as a set of disparate decisions based on a disembodied utilitarian calculus.	相反，纯粹的边沁主义观点把政治视为一个基于空洞的功利主义算计的不相关的决策的集合。


But this would feel like “one damn thing after another.”	但这让人感觉就像“一件鸟事接着又一件鸟事”。


The set of political decisions made over time must make some sense, and this sense must come from the narrative that is superimposed on historical events.	各个时间的政治决策集合都必须有意义，而这一意义必须来自叠加于历史事件之上的叙事。


The narrative itself is socially constructed and only marginally bound by fact.	叙事本身是社会构建的（socially constructed），只是若即若离地受到事实约束。


For example, according to President Barack Obama’s narrative, the United States has always been about a steady march toward freedom and equality, from the War of Independence to the abolition of slavery and the empowerment of women, minorities, and other previously marginalized groups, such as gays and those with handicaps.	比如，根据美国总统奥巴马的叙事，美国时刻准备着朝自由和平等前进，从独立战争到废除奴隶制和妇女、少数族以即其他边缘群体（如同性恋和残障人士）赋权运动都是如此。


To the extent that this narrative is inaccurate, it is aspirational.	这一叙事从某种程度上说并不正确，但它鼓舞人心。


It is the role of politics to create, sustain, and reshape this shared sense of self, of us (and hence of them).	政治的角色就是创造、维持和改写这一共同自我意识，即“我们”意识（“他们”意识也随之而定）。


It is an illusion, but a socially created illusion.	这是一个幻觉，但它是社会创造的幻觉。


It is how Bavarians and Venetians in the 1860s, for example, became convinced that they were and had always been Germans or Italians.	19世纪60年代，巴伐利亚人和威尼斯人就是这样认为他们是、并且一直以来都是德国人和意大利人。


Likewise, only a new narrative – a new Geist – can persuade the British today that they are really Europeans.	类似地，只有新的叙事——新的Geist——能够让今天的英国人相信他们是名副其实的欧洲人。


Liberals, as the political scientist Drew Westen has explained, often refrain from the narrative of shared identity, perhaps owing to awareness that great crimes are often committed in its name.	自由派，如政治学家德鲁·威斯腾（Drew Westen）所解释的，常常不提共同身份叙事，也许这是因为他们认识到大罪恶常常也是打着这一旗号犯下的。


Hitler redefined the German Volk as the collective victim of an internal enemy that was tainting its blood – a type of narrative that, whether framed in terms of race, religion, or class, underlies genocide wherever it occurs.	希特勒将德语词汇Volk（人民）重新定义为污染民族血液的内部敌人的集体受害者——这就是一种类型的叙事，它可以通过种族、宗教或阶级的幌子构建，成为大屠杀的基础。


But it was also a national “person” that Abraham Lincoln invoked in his Gettysburg Address.	但还有一种国家“人”，由林肯在其葛底斯堡演讲中唤醒。


In just 272 words, Lincoln synthesized America as an ideal based on the proposition that all men are created equal.	在这篇只有272个字的演讲中，林肯将美利坚提炼成一个理想，一个基于人人生而平等命题的理想。


In this narrative, the Civil War was fought to ensure “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”	在这一叙事中，南北战争是为了保证“民有、民治、民享的政府永世长存”。


As the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued in After Virtue, narratives frame individuals’ moral choices.	哲学家阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔（Alasdair MacIntyre）在《追求美德》（After Virtue）中指出，叙事框定了个体的道德选择。


Likewise, narratives frame the choices that governments make.	类似地，叙事也框定了政府决策。


After his brush with Communists in Spain, George Orwell captured the essence of the narrative’s importance in his novel 1984: “Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present, controls the past.”	在与西班牙共产主义者发生摩擦后，乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）在其小说《1984》中抓住了叙事重要性的本质：“控制了过去就控制了未来； 控制了现在就控制了过去。


For example, maintaining open labor markets in the European Union requires people to regard themselves and their new neighbors as European.	比如，保持欧盟内部劳动力市场开放需要人们将自己和新邻居视为欧洲人。


Similarly, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro cannot stop inflation, because the narrative of economic warfare in which he is trapped prevents him from justifying the decisions needed to stabilize prices.	类似地，委内瑞拉总统马杜罗无法阻止通货膨胀，因为他所陷入的经济福利叙事让他无法证明稳定物价所需要的决定的正确性。


Marx’s comparative advantage was to read Hegel and create a narrative in which history is the history of class struggle, with the newly emergent industrial proletariat destined to develop “class consciousness” and overthrow the political and economic order created by the bourgeoisie.	马克思的比较优势是阅读了黑格尔并创造了一套历史是阶级斗争的历史的叙事，新出现的工业无产阶级必定会形成“阶级意识”，推翻由资产阶级建立的政治和经济秩序。


Liberal democracy has been at a disadvantage in the battle for the narrative because it tends to treat the collective self as if it were just a rational median voter in search of a better job.	自由民主在叙事之争中处于劣势，因为它总是将集体自我视为一个寻找更好的工作的理性的普通选民。


But that is inadequate.	但这是不够的。


Policies must fit within the prevailing narrative framework, while the great task of politics is to shape the narrative of tomorrow.	政策必须契合时下的叙事框架，而政治的伟大任务是决定明天的叙事。


No wonder, then, that while Obama used his eight minutes in Panama to delineate concrete policy initiatives that would bring happiness to the greatest number, Castro spent 48 minutes reinventing the past.	因此，毫不奇怪，奥巴马用他的巴拿马八分钟来描绘能给最广大人民带来幸福的务实政策，而卡斯特罗用了48分钟重新阐述了过去。


Cuba’s Back	古巴的回归


MEXICO CITY – After 47 years, the Organization of American States, at its annual General Assembly, has repealed its suspension of Cuba’s membership.	发自墨西哥城-在时隔47年之后，美洲国家组织在其年度大会上废除了驱逐古巴的决议。


The so-called ALBA countries (the Spanish acronym for the so-called Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), which includes Cuba, Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and Ecuador, were able partly to outwit – and partly to “out-blackmail” – Canada, the United States, and the Latin American democracies in getting Cuba rehabilitated.	而这要归功于由古巴、委内瑞拉、洪都拉斯、尼加拉瓜、玻利维亚、多米尼加和厄瓜多尔等国组成的所谓ALBA国家集团（名称取自西班牙语“玻利瓦尔美洲国家替代计划”的首字母缩写），是他们成功地使用了威逼利诱之策，促使加拿大，美国和其它拉美民主国家为古巴恢复了名誉。


The OAS did, however, lay down two conditions.	然而美洲国家组织也为此设下了两大条件：一是古巴必须明确提出恢复成员国地位的申请；


Cuba must explicitly request reinstatement, and a dialogue must be initiated in accordance with the premises of the OAS Charter and other basic OAS documents, and in consonance with the principles on which those documents are based – most importantly, democracy and respect for human rights.	二是必须启动对话谈判，不但要古巴遵守美国国家组织宪章及其他组织文件，同时也要令其服从与这些文件所代表的原则——其中最重要的，就是民主以及对人权的尊重。


Like many diplomatic compromises, the outcome left everyone a bit happy and a bit disappointed.	但正如许多外交上的妥协方案那样，上述结果令所有人都喜忧参半。


Everyone could claim victory, and no one was obliged to acknowledge defeat.	因为在这场斗争中谁都能自称是胜利者，也没有谁要被迫承认失败而丢了面子。


But those compromises are like statistics or skimpy swimsuits: what they show is less important than what they hide.	与此同时这些妥协方案和所有财务报表或者女式泳衣有着同样的特质：那就是它们试图掩盖的部分才是最精彩的地方。


Two fundamental considerations come to mind, and their ramifications in “up-for-grab” countries in Latin America, such as El Salvador, are particularly significant.	而我脑海中则因此浮现出两个基本的思考，而这些思考点在萨尔瓦多这类拉美“中立”国家中催生出的政策副产品则特别值得注意。


The first consideration involves the ALBA countries’ conduct of foreign policy.	第一点思考包含了ALBA国家对其外交政策的操纵手段。


Given that the smaller countries do not act independently of Venezuela, and that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez does not act without Cuba’s guidance on weighty matters such as these, it is now clear that the Cubans and their allies will cut US President Barack Obama no slack on Latin American issues.	考虑到那些拉美小国不可能抛开委内瑞拉行事，而委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯也不可能在这类重要事务上不看古巴的眼色做人，因此很明显，古巴及其盟友们可不会让美国总统奥巴马在拉美事务上有好日子过。


They could have easily let the OAS assembly go by, giving the new American president more time to prepare his Congress and public opinion for a delicate balancing act.	这些国家可以让美洲国家组织大会轻易地通过接纳古巴的决议，并给奥巴马留下更多时间去说服国会和民众，好让美国可以通过一部可以微妙平衡各方面利益的古巴法案。


The key issue here is how to lift the now almost fifty-year old US embargo on trade, investment, and travel to Cuba unilaterally, while portraying it as the result of a negotiation.	而这一法案的关键则在于如何废除美国对古巴施行近50年的贸易、投资和旅游禁令，并使之看上去就像一场艰苦谈判所取得的成果。


The ALBA countries decided they would concede nothing to Obama, and attempt, instead, to back him into a corner: either the US would go along with the new OAS consensus, angering both parts of the Cuban-American lobby and the human rights community by abandoning principles and commitments, or the US would have to act alone (perhaps with Canada by its side), leaving it totally isolated in Latin America – the last thing Obama wants.	但事实上，这些ALBA国家早已下定决心不向奥巴马做出任何让步，并试图把他逼到死胡同里去：要么美国甘愿冒着激怒古巴裔美国人国会游说团和人权团体的政治风险，赞成ALBA所炮制的新美洲国家组织共识，把那些关于民主和人权的原则和承诺弃之不顾； 要么美国人选择特立独行（可能和加拿大一道），将自己彻底孤立于拉丁美洲——这可是奥巴马最不想看见的情况。


The ALBA group pushed hard for a vote, or a compromise on its terms, which it could then flaunt to the world and to domestic public opinion.	但由于ALBA集团不断施压要求就它们的提案进行投票或者获取外交让步，并准备向全世界和国内舆论大肆宣扬它们的战果。


Obama had no choice but to go along.	至此奥巴马已经无从选择，双方只能各走各路。


The second consideration is that this behavior will continue.	第二点思考则是ALBA国家将继续重复这种行为模式。


The reason seems clear enough: Cuba needs international aid desperately, and there are not too many places where it can find it.	原因很简单：古巴极端需要国际援助，而且能捞到援助的地方也不多。


Hopes that Brazil and China would provide cash to Cuba have been dashed by the international financial crisis and geo-politics.	古巴原本希望巴西和中国能给予现金援助，但这却在国际金融危机和地缘政治的双重作用下化为泡影。


And Chávez, despite the recent increase in oil prices, can no longer afford to subsidize Cuba as he did during the boom years.	而尽管最近油价有所回升，委内瑞拉总统查韦斯也不可能再像从前那样资助古巴。


So it seems that the Cubans are hoping to find resources elsewhere, and the only possibility, as remote as it seems, is the Inter-American Development Bank.	因此古巴人只能寄望于从其他地方获取资源，而最有可能贷到款的地方，就是看似遥不可及的泛美开发银行


In principle, IDB membership requires OAS membership, and therein may lie the reason why Cuba insisted so strongly on returning, and why it was ultimately disappointed in not obtaining unconditional re-admission.	然而在原则上，要成为泛美开发银行会员必须首先成为美洲国家组织成员，这就可以解释古巴为什么会如此强烈要求恢复其成员国资格，也为什么在没有获得无条件接纳之时显得如此沮丧。


It will nonetheless attempt to have its allies push for some sort of association with the IDB, while at the same time radicalizing its stance elsewhere, as it is now doing in El Salvador.	但古巴的解决方案则是一面利用其盟友们去和泛美开发银行建立某种联系，一面在其他地方摆出强硬姿态，正如它现在在萨尔瓦多所作的那样。


Indeed, the new Salvadoran president, Mauricio Funes, was elected on the ticket of the FMLN, the party that succeeded the old, hard-left guerrilla group of the 1980’s and 1990’s.	新近上任的萨尔瓦多总统毛里西奥·富内斯是依靠其所属的法拉本多·马蒂民族解放阵线(FMLN)的选票登上总统宝座的，而这个党派则脱胎于1980至1990年代活跃于当地的一支极左翼游击队组织。


He is a moderate, modern leftist who has openly identified himself with Brazilian President Lula and Barack Obama, as opposed to Chávez.	富内斯是个温和左派， 不但把自己和巴西总统卢拉以及美国总统奥巴马相提并论，同时还反对委内瑞拉总统查韦斯。


But his party is as close to Cuba and Venezuela as one can get.	但他所属的党派却与古巴以及委内瑞拉的关系极端密切。


In a showdown over the composition of the cabinet just before his inauguration on June 1, the FMLN old guard won, threatening to take the conflict to the streets.	在富内斯7月1日就职典礼之前的内阁成员人选任命之争中，法拉本多·马蒂民族解放阵线的保守势力不但夺取了主动，甚至威胁要走上街头进行斗争。


The Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans will not cut Funes any slack, either, believing that history is on their side, and that now is the time to force every issue in sight.	而古巴人、尼加拉瓜人和委内瑞拉人同样也不想让富内斯有好日子过，他们坚信历史现在站在自己一方，并且是时候对一切看不顺眼的事情动手了。


They are probably right, up to a certain point, because the second lesson from the OAS assembly concerns the behavior of the Latin American democracies, mainly Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.	在某种意义上说它们可能是对的，因为美洲国家组织大会的第二个值得关注之处则是墨西哥、巴西、智利和哥伦比亚这些拉美民主国家将如何行动。


They tried to accommodate the US (it is rumored that Obama phoned Lula and asked for his help), but were nonetheless unwilling to break with Cuba and Venezuela to side openly with the US.	这些国家虽然努力与美国保持一致（所以美国总统奥巴马致电巴西总统卢拉求援的说法纯属谣言），但又不愿意公开与美国站在同一阵线上，自然也不愿与古巴和委内瑞拉交恶。


They will not do so any time soon, on any issue that may spring up, if it means confrontation with the ALBA countries.	因此这些拉美民主国家不愿在任何可能跟ALBA国家发生冲突的议题上于之对抗。


Fidel Castro knows this, and will take advantage of the democracies’ diluted commitment to human rights and democracy.	而古巴领导人菲德尔·卡斯特罗早就看透了这一点，并利用民主国家在人权和民主事务上说一套做一套的事实大做文章。


In each country where conflict is present or emerging (Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Ecuador) the hard-left will push hard, the democracies will look the other way, and Obama will either give in (as at the OAS) and pay a domestic political price, or step back from Latin America, for fear of appearing isolated.	以至于在每个正在或即将发生冲突的国家（比如玻利维亚、危地马拉、萨尔瓦多、巴拉圭和厄瓜多尔），极左势力都会大肆活动，那些拉美民主国家也只能挣一只眼闭一只眼，而奥巴马要么举手投降（正如在美洲国家组织大会上那样）并在美国国内的抗议声中输掉政治资本，要么就害怕显得孤立而对拉美地区望而却步。


A magnificent opportunity for a new start in US-Latin American relations will have been missed.	事已至此，一个重启美国和拉美关系新篇章的绝佳机会，也将彻底消失。


Cultivating Energy	培植能源


From climate change to volatile oil prices, all signs point to a looming global energy crisis.	从气候变化到阴晴不定的油价，所有的迹象都表明一场全球性的能源危机即将到来。


Confronting the growing challenge means that humanity can no longer afford to ignore the inexhaustible resource found in the organic material that the sun provides each day through photosynthesis.	应对这场迫在眉睫的挑战意味着人类不能再忽视太阳每天通过光合作用在有机物质里为我们提供的取之不尽的能源。


Solar energy enables plants to absorb carbon gas and thereby produce not only oxygen, but also matter that the animal kingdom uses for food – and that our machines can use for energy.	太阳能使植物吸收碳性气体并由此不仅制造氧气，还制造出其它物质—动物王国的食物和我们的机器所消耗的能源。


Since the Neolithic (or late Stone Age) period, humans have been cultivating this “biomass” in order to feed itself.	自从新石器时代以来，人类就开始培育这些“生物质”作为食物。


Yet, even in today’s world, its energy potential is ignored.	然而，即便是在当今世界，它的能源潜力也是被低估了。


Beginning with the industrial revolution, humans sought energy from coal, and later from oil and natural gas, but this leads to the exhaustion of non-renewable resources.	从工业革命开始，人类就从煤炭及其后的石油和天然气中寻找能源，但这导致了不可再生能源的枯竭。


Existing alternatives for diversifying energy production are limited.	能源生产多元化的现有替代方案是有限的。


Nuclear energy presents a number of disadvantages, owing to concerns about safety and disposal of radioactive waste.	由于对其安全性和放射性废料处置的担心，核能也有诸多劣势。


Hydroelectric power is already widely used, while wind and solar energy are structurally sporadic and disparately available.	水电已经得到了广泛应用，但风能和太阳能的利用在结构上呈分散状态，资源的分布也不均衡。


Biomass, on the other hand, has several advantages.	而生物质却有诸多优势。


Supplies of it are large and available throughout the world.	其产量巨大，且在全世界都可以获得。


Moreover, the technology necessary to convert it into energy – including high-yield burning, gas conversion, and liquefaction into synthetic fuel – has long been mastered.	此外，将其转化成能源所必需的技术—包括高产燃烧、气体转化和液化为合成燃料—早已被我们掌握了。


Widely used during World War II, this technology has since advanced considerably.	在第二次世界大战期间就已广泛使用的这一技术，战后又得到了长足发展。


Biomass energy, however, is the victim of unfair competition from fossil fuels.	然而，生物质能源是与化石能源不公平竞争的受害者。


Oil’s price reflects its extraction, refining, and distribution costs, but not that of creating the raw material.	石油的价格反映了其开采、提炼和分配的成本，但却没有反映出原油产生的成本。


Millions of years and 200 tons of plant matter are necessary to produce one liter of oil, whereas just 15 kilograms of plant matter are required to make one liter of synthetic fuel.	200吨的植物物质经过数百万年的变化才能产生一公升石油，而生产一公升的合成燃料却只需要15公斤植物物质。


After the oil glut, with oil below $20 a barrel, interest in developing energy from biomass ebbed, attractive only to “green” militants and those interested in fundamental science.	在石油供应量极大的情况下，由于每桶价格低于20美金，使得人们开发生物能源的兴趣也随之消退。


Yet the potential is immense.	生物能源只对“绿色战士”和致力于基础科学研究的人保持着吸引力。


The planet’s biomass – forests, pastureland, savannas, and crops – make up productive capital that generates a 10% “return” every year.	地球上的生物质—森林、牧场、热带草原和庄稼—形成了年“回报率”10%的生产资本。


Like a battery that runs out and is then recharged by the sun, this supply is renewable indefinitely, as long as it is managed properly.	就像一只能量会耗尽但又会被太阳重新充满的电池，只要我们管理得当，这些生物质的供应是永远可再生的。


The annual return on this capital is currently estimated at 60 billion tons, yet only two billion tons is consumed for food purposes and 10 billion tons for energy.	这些资本每年产生的回报目前估计为600亿吨，而其中只有200亿吨作为食物被消耗，100亿吨被用作能源。


Increasing the responsible use of this energy source would contribute to the fight against climate change by reducing the amount of carbon in the atmosphere and diminishing the amount of fossil fuel required to produce energy.	增加对这一能源的负责任的使用可以为我们应对气候变化做出贡献。 它能减少大气中的碳含量，并遏制化石燃料的使用量。


Moreover, its abundance in southern countries promises to facilitate their economic development.	此外，它在南方国家的丰富产量还有利于这些国家的经济发展。


Considered the “energy of the poor” until today, biomass could become a source of wealth if it is grown and harnessed with the support of the international community.	如果能在国际社会的支持下获得增长和利用，那么直到今天还被认为是“穷人的能源”的生物质完全可以成为财富之源。


Thus, “energy crops” could be developed to produce biofuel.	因此，“能源作物”可以被开发以生产生物燃料。


Residue from forest, agricultural, and agro-industrial activities could be collected and converted.	来自于森林、农业和农产业活动的残渣废料可以被收集起来并进行转化。


For example, the six million tons of waste produced annually by Niger could theoretically be used to meet that country’s entire energy needs.	例如，从理论上讲，非洲国家尼日尔每年产生的600万吨废料可以满足该国全部的能源需求。


However, in many places, energy cropping would certainly compete with food crops.	然而，在许多地方能源作物的种植必然会与粮食作物发生竞争。


Long-term estimates project that over a 50-year time horizon, most of the planet’s arable land would have to be used to feed the world and for forest conservation.	长期的预计认为在50年的时间里，地球上大多数可耕种的土地都必须用来种植粮食并培育森林。


Thus, areas dedicated to energy production, particularly biofuel, may not reach the level that societies would wish.	因此，专门用于能源生产，特别是生物燃料生产的土地面积可能达不到社会的预期。


But, while such competition would reveal new global scarcities, it would also bring higher prices, thereby encouraging producers to increase yields and productivity.	但是，这种竞争在揭示新的全球稀缺资源的同时，也会带来价格的提升，从而鼓励生产者们增加产量并提高产能。


Thus, while cultivating energy would create new constraints, it would also open new possibilities for many economic actors.	因此，尽管培植能源会造成新的制约因素，但它同样也会为许多经济活动的主体开启新的可能性。


The farmer and the forest worker could become more involved in the market, the mine engineer could begin to take an interest in crop fields, the banker in plant shares, etc.	农民和林业工人能够更多地参与市场，采矿工程师可以对作物种植产生兴趣，银行家也会更关注与作物种植相关的股票。


But, in order to prepare for a scaling up of energy cropping, new policies must be implemented, both in northern and southern countries, in terms of agriculture, land and water management, protection of biodiversity, fuel taxes, and information and awareness-raising.	但是，为了扩大能源作物的种植规模，我们必须在南、北方的国家都实施新的农业、土地和水务管理、保护生物多样性、燃料税和信息及公众意识提升的政策。


The ancient Egyptians and the Incas practiced a religion of the Sun, believing it to be at the beginning of all life on Earth.	古印第安人和印加人信奉太阳神，他们相信太阳是地球万物的生命之源。


Science has since proven this to be the case.	科学已经证明了这一信仰的真实性。


Nowadays, when it has become more important than ever that we embrace renewable resources, we should use the Sun to cultivate our energy, just as our ancestors used it to cultivate their food.	现在，当利用可再生能源的重要性前所未有地凸现出来时，我们应该利用太阳来培植我们的能源，就像我们的祖先曾经利用它来种植食物一样。


Curing Hereditary Breast Cancer	治疗遗传性乳腺癌


In developed countries, breast cancer affects about one in ten women, and in many of these countries the disease is on the increase.	十分之一的发达国家女性患有乳腺癌，并且这种疾病在多数这些国家中正呈上升趋势。


But, whatever the reason (or reasons) for the rise in their occurrence, we also know that between 5% and 10% of breast cancers are due to an inherited defect that affects the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes.	但是，无论是哪个（或哪些）原因导致了目前这种趋势，我们都知道5%至10%的乳腺癌患者是由于BRCA1或BRCA2基因感染了遗传性缺陷。


Women carrying a mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene have roughly an 80% risk of developing breast cancer.	携带变异的BRCA1或BRCA2基因的妇女患上乳腺癌的几率约有80%。


A mutation in these genes also leads to an increased risk of developing ovarian tumors.	这些基因内的变异也导致了卵巢肿瘤的发生。


When the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes were discovered more than a decade ago, there were high hopes for novel and targeted therapies.	十多年前当人们发现BRCA1和BRCA2基因的时候，人们曾对新的有针对性治疗方案期望甚高。


Disappointingly, no new treatments have yet arisen.	令人失望的是，至今还没有出现任何新治疗方案。


As a result, many women with a high level of mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes face the tragic choice of having their breasts and ovaries surgically removed to pre-empt cancer.	结果，那些携带高度变异BRCA1 或BRCA2基因的妇女不得不痛苦地选择手术割除她们的胸部和卵巢以抵抗癌症。


Recently, my research group, along with researchers in London, provided some real hope for carriers of mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes.	最近，我的研究小组和伦敦的研究者们一起，为那些变异BRCA1 或 BRCA2基因携带者提供了真正的希望。


Both research teams describe how the use of a chemical inhibitor can kill tumor cells that have either a BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene defect causing hereditary breast cancer.	两个研究团队描述了如何使用一种化学抑制剂消灭那些携带会引起遗传性乳腺癌的BRCA1或者BRCA2基因缺陷的肿瘤细胞。


This new treatment targets only the tumor cells and is unlikely to affect other healthy cells in the body.	这种新治疗手段只以肿瘤细胞为目标，不会影响体内的其他健康细胞。


The discovery could also work to prevent hereditary breast cancer cells from growing into tumors.	该发现也能够防止遗传性乳腺癌转化为肿瘤。


The chemical inhibitors used in this treatment target the enzyme polymerase (PARP1), which is normally involved in the repair of DNA single-strand breaks – a common form of spontaneous DNA lesions.	使用于这种治疗手段的化学抑制剂主要针对聚合酶（PARP1），PARP1通常用于修补DNA的单个碱基断裂——一种常见的自发性DNA损伤。


Chemical inhibition of the PARP1 protein results in reduced occurrence of these single-strand break repairs.	PARP1蛋白质所产生的化学抑制能够减少这些单个碱基断开的发生。


Unrepaired single-strand breaks are not very toxic to cells.	未修复的单个碱基断裂对细胞并无大害。


However, these breaks disrupt and damage the DNA when they are copied as DNA replicates.	然而，当这些断裂的碱基作为DNA副本被复制时就会破坏和损伤DNA。


The damage arising when copying the DNA is repaired with recombination, involving the BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins. But cells with mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes are unable to undergo recombination and are therefore much more sensitive to an increased level of unrepaired single-strand breaks.	复制DNA时候所发生的破坏可以通过与BRCA1和BRCA2蛋白质的再结合得到修复，但是拥有变异BRCA1或BRCA2基因的细胞无法再承受这种重组而因此变得对未修复的单个碱基程度更高的断裂更为敏感。


The normal cells of women carrying the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations can still recombine, because they retain one functional allele—or alternative form—of the gene.	妇女体内携带变异BRCA1或BRCA2的正常细胞仍然可以重组，因为它们还有一个功能正常的等位基因——或者基因的另外一种形式。


Only those cells losing this remaining functional allele of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene will become tumors.	只有在那些细胞中的BRCA1或BRCA2基因失去了其有效等位基因的情况下，细胞才会变成肿瘤。


Thus, only the tumor cells will have a non-functional recombination pathway and rely completely on PARP to repair single-strand breaks before copying the DNA.	因此，只有肿瘤细胞才会有一个功能不正常的重组通道，并完全依赖PARP在复制DNA之前完成修补单个碱基断裂。


In our research, we exploit this requirement to specifically target the BRCA1 or BRCA2-defective cancer cells with inhibitors of PARP.	在我们的研究中，我们探寻了使用PARP抑制剂的必备条件，尤其针对具有BRCA1或BRCA2缺陷的癌细胞。


This treatment is unlikely to cause many side effects; prolonged treatments with PARP inhibitors are well tolerated in mice.	该治疗方法不会引起诸多副作用； 老鼠对PARP抑制剂的长期治疗表现出良好的耐受性。


We have shown that PARP inhibitors are effective at killing BRCA2-defective breast cancer cells, and that the tumors they cause can fully regress and disappear following treatment with a PARP inhibitor.	我们已经展示了PARP抑制剂如何能够有效杀死有BRCA2缺陷的乳腺癌细胞，并且由它们所引发的肿瘤能在使用PARP抑制剂后缩小并彻底消失。


The next step is to investigate how efficient this treatment is in human patients.	下一步要做的就是研究这种治疗法对人类患者究竟有多有效。


We are now initiating clinical trials to determine how efficient these PARP inhibitors are in the treatment of metastasized breast tumors.	我们正准备启动临床实验以测定这些PARP抑制剂在治疗转移性胸壁肿瘤中如何有效。


But caution is in order.	但是我们必须小心谨慎。


BRCA1 and BRCA2-defective tumors are characterized by a high degree of genetic instability.	具有BRCA1和BRCA2 缺陷的肿瘤的特征是高度的遗传不稳定性。


It is possible that highly metastasized breast tumors might have acquired additional genetic changes causing resistance to treatment with PARP inhibitors.	高度转移的胸壁肿瘤可能已经获得能抵抗PARP抑制剂治疗的额外遗传性改变。


Therefore, we suggest that PARP inhibitors might be more useful in the prophylactic treatment of women carrying the gene responsible for this form of inherited breast cancer.	因此，我们建议，PARP抑制剂也许在对携带造成这类遗传性乳腺癌基因的妇女的预防性治疗上更有效用。


The reason is simple: cells that have recently lost the functional BRCA1 or BRCA2 allele and that will later grow into tumors will also be unable to undergo recombination.	原因很简单：刚刚失去正常运作的BRCA1或BRCA2等位基因、并且很快将转变成肿瘤的细胞也是难以经受重组的。


This means that early cancerous cells should be sensitive to PARP inhibitors.	这意味着早期的癌细胞应该对PARP抑制剂较为敏感。


However, unlike fully developed tumors, they are not likely to have acquired many genetic changes and are therefore unlikely to have gained resistance to PARP inhibitors.	然而，与晚期肿瘤不同的是，它们不太可能得到许多遗传性改变，因此也不太可能对PARP抑制剂具备抵抗力。


Treating women carrying BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations with PARP inhibitors to kill cancer cells before they grow into tumors is a new and hopeful concept in cancer prevention.	在癌细胞转变为肿瘤之前，用RARP抑制剂治疗那些携带BRCA1或BRCA2变异体的妇女是防癌方面一个全新的、大有前途的理念。


However, the usefulness of this treatment relies on the fact that PARP1 inhibitors are completely non-toxic to humans.	然而，这种治疗法是否能够被使用还取决于PARP1抑制剂是否对人体完全无害。


It will also take longer to validate a PARP inhibitor for use as a prophylactic treatment, because the treatment cannot be proven effective in a short time.	PARP抑制剂作为预防治疗之用还需要更长的时间的验证，因为治疗手段不会在短期时间内被证明有效。


Thus, while the use of PARP inhibitors to treat established tumors may be feasible within a few years, we could have to wait at least a decade before a prophylactic treatment for inherited breast cancer is widely available.	因此，尽管在这几年之内使用PARP抑制剂来治疗肿瘤也许是切实可行的，但是在遗传性乳腺癌预防性治疗手段的广泛使用之前，我们可能至少得等上十年。


Since early 2014, the renminbi has depreciated by a mere 7.5% against the dollar, compared to the euro’s roughly 25% depreciation in this period, not to mention even faster currency weakening in many emerging markets.	自2014年年初以来，人民币兑美元仅仅贬值了7. 5%，而同期欧元贬值了25%左右��许多新兴市场货币贬值更是要快得多。


How to Fight Currency Manipulation	如何对抗货币操纵


WASHINGTON, DC – Is it appropriate to use trade agreements to discourage countries from using large-scale intervention in the foreign-exchange market to hold down their currencies’ value?	华盛顿—用贸易协议阻止国家利用大规模外汇市场干预拉低其货币价值，这样做合适吗？


That is the question of the day in American economic-policy circles.	这就是当今美国经济政策圈的问题。


In recent years, Japan, South Korea, and China have manipulated their currencies to keep them undervalued.	近几年来，日本、韩国和中国操纵各自货币，使其低估。


This boosted their exports, limited imports, and led to large current-account surpluses.	这刺激了出口、限制了进口，并造成了巨大的经常项目盈余。


But such intervention adversely affects trading partners and is barred under existing international rules.	但如此干预消极地影响了贸易伙伴国，也是现行国际规则所不允许的。


Unfortunately, those rules have proved completely ineffective.	不幸的是，这些规则完全无效。


Now a new opportunity to address the issue has emerged: The Trans-Pacific Partnership – the mega-regional free-trade agreement involving the United States, Japan, and ten other countries in Latin America and Asia.	如今，一个新的解决这一问题的机会出现了：跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）——由美国、日本和其他十个拉美和亚洲国家组成的庞大的地区自由贸易协定。


With the TPP close to being finalized, South Korea and China are watching intently, and other countries may want to join.	随着TPP接近完成，韩国和中国正在密切观察，其他国家也许想要加入。


US President Barack Obama correctly argues that this is an occasion to set the rules for trade and investment in the twenty-first century.	美国总统奥巴马正确地指出，这是一个为二十一世纪制定贸易和投资规则的协定。


Yet the US Treasury Department and the US Trade Representative steadfastly refuse to include any language prohibiting currency manipulation in the TPP, for five main reasons – none of which fits the facts.	但美国财政部和美国贸易代表坚决拒绝将禁止货币操纵纳入TPP中，他们提出了五个主要理由，但没有一个与事实相符。


The first argument is that the International Monetary Fund can deal with instances of currency manipulation.	第一个理由是国际货币基金组织（IMF）可以对付货币操纵。


The IMF does have up-to-date guidelines that define and seek to prevent currency manipulation.	IMF确实有与时俱进的指引，定义并试图防止货币操纵。


These were adopted not only with America’s assent, but at its insistence, at a time (the mid-2000s) when China’s renminbi was greatly undervalued, contributing to the loss of millions of US manufacturing jobs.	这些指引不仅获得了美国的赞同，在（2005年前后）人民币显著低估、导致美国损失数百万制造业岗位时还获得了美国的强调。


Unfortunately, the IMF cannot enforce its guidelines, because currency manipulators are able to stall action.	不幸的是，IMF无法强制执行其指引，因为货币操纵者可以暂停这种行为。


This has been the entrenched and continuing pattern, including when I was the IMF’s chief economist (from early 2007 to August 2008).	这已成为根深蒂固的持续模式，包括在我担任IMF首席经济学家期间（2007年初至2008年8月）。


The second argument made by the US Treasury and the Trade Representative is that no sufficiently precise currency rules can be negotiated.	美国财政部和贸易代表的第二个理由是可谈判的货币规则不够明确。


But there is nothing wrong with the IMF guidelines – both the 2007 and 2012 versions – negotiated by the Treasury itself.	但由美国财政部谈成的IMF的指引毫无问题——2007版和2012版均是如此。


Recognizing this, Congressman Sander Levin – the senior Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over international trade – proposes that a TPP currency chapter be based on the IMF guidelines.	认识到这一点的国会议员、负责管理国际贸易的众议院筹款委员会的资深民主党委员桑德尔·莱文（Sander Levin）提出TPP货币规则应该基于IMF指引。


These guidelines identify when a country, despite running a large current-account surplus, is pursuing long-term, large-scale purchases of foreign assets, thereby blocking exchange-rate appreciation – exactly the problem we want to prevent.	这些指引能够识别什么时候一国尽管存在巨大的经常项目盈余，但仍在追求长期大规模外国资产买入，从而阻止汇率升值——这正是我们想要阻止的问题。


(I have worked with Levin on some of these issues, but here I am speaking only for myself.)	（我在这些问题中的部分问题上与莱文有过合作，但在这里我只是代表自己的观点。 ）


The third argument against putting anti-manipulation provisions in the TPP is that they would imperil America’s ability to implement monetary stimulus.	反对将反操纵条款写入TPP的第三个理由是它们危及美国实施货币刺激的能力。


But this reflects a thorough misunderstanding of the issue.	但这反映出对这一问题的彻底误解。


A well-designed currency chapter in the TPP would not impede US monetary independence.	精心制定的TPP货币条款不会妨碍美国的货币独立性。


Conventional monetary policy operates by altering short-term interest rates, which includes the central bank buying and selling short-term government debt.	传统货币政策通过改变短期利率执行，包括央行买入和卖出短期政府债务。


No intervention in the foreign-exchange market – buying and selling foreign currency – is involved.	外汇市场干预——买入和卖出外国货币——并不包括在其中。


Similarly, the quantitative easing (QE) that has defined many major central banks’ monetary policy in recent years does not involve buying or selling foreign assets.	类似地，近几年来成为众多主要央行货币政策主流的量化宽松（QE）并不包括买入和卖出外国资产。


Under QE, the Federal Reserve buys – and announces that it will buy – assets; the only difference is that these assets are longer-maturity US government debt instruments and mortgage-backed securities of various kinds, all denominated in US dollars.	在QE下，美联储购买——并宣布它将购买——资产； 唯一的区别是这些资产是长期限美国政府债务工具和各种按揭抵押债券，它们均为美元计价。


The fourth argument is that no major country is currently manipulating its exchange rate (the renminbi has appreciated since the mid-2000s), so there is nothing to worry about.	第四个理由是没有哪个主要国家目前正在操纵汇率（2005年以来人民币有所升值），因此没有什么好担心的。


But there is also nothing to stop China or any other country from resuming large-scale currency-market intervention if and when it chooses.	但如果中国或其他任何国家选择大规模干预货币市场，也没有什么可以阻止它们。


And the lack of diplomatic tension around exchange rates today makes this a good moment to raise the topic.	而如今在汇率上不存在外交紧张局面意味着正是提出这个问题的好时机。


The final reason cited in support of excluding a currency chapter from the TPP is that the countries negotiating the deal would never agree.	支持将货币条款排除在TPP之外的最后一个理由是谈判TPP的国家永远不会同意。


But this argument does not hold up when the participating countries are examined one by one.	但如果逐一考察参与国，这一理由就不再成立了。


Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, developed economies with floating exchange rates, do not want to encourage currency manipulation.	加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰是浮动汇率发达经济体，它们不想鼓励货币操纵。


Chile, a middle-income country that has long had sound and responsible macroeconomic policies, does not favor currency manipulation.	智利是宏观政策长期可靠的中等收入国家，不支持货币操纵。


Mexico and Peru have much to fear from other countries becoming currency manipulators again.	墨西哥和秘鲁十分担心其他国家再次变成货币操纵国。


Likewise, Japan, now running its own version of QE, worries about potential currency manipulation by other countries, such as South Korea and China.	类似地，目前正在国内采取QE的日本担心其他国家（如韩国和中国）的潜在货币操纵。


Malaysia and Singapore, having built up a substantial stock of foreign-exchange reserves, should also now be more concerned about currency manipulation by their trading partners.	马来西亚和新加坡建立了巨大的外汇储备存量，现在应该更担心贸易伙伴国的货币操纵。


Vietnam has much more serious TPP issues to resolve, particularly concerning labor rights.	越南有更加重要的TPP问题需要解决，特别是劳动权利等问题。


And Brunei Darussalam, with a population of less than 500,000, is unlikely to object.	而文莱的人口只有区区50万，它不可能提出反对意见。


Currency manipulation is a real problem that causes significant damage.	货币操纵是可以造成的重大伤害的现实问题。


The TPP deal – if it establishes a dispute-resolution mechanism that can quickly dismiss frivolous claims and home in on genuine cases – may offer the best chance to fix it.	TPP协议——如果能建立可以快速解决无理要求、将注意力集中在真正问题上的纠纷解决机制——可以成为解决这一问题的最好机会。


The charge of currency manipulation is nothing but a foil for the US to duck responsibility for fixing America’s saving problem.	货币操纵指控无非是美国逃避解决��内储蓄问题的责任的幌子。


The Myth of Currency Manipulation	货币操纵传说


TOKYO – This month, the Japanese yen’s exchange rate against the US dollar fell below ¥125, a 13-year low, before rebounding to nearly ¥122 following a statement by Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda that he did not expect further depreciation.	东京—本月，日元兑美元汇率跌至125以下，创出13年来新低，随后，日本银行行长黑田东彦表示预计日元不会继续贬值，日元也随之反弹至122附近。


But, as Kuroda later clarified, Japan’s monetary policymakers do not seek to predict, much less control, exchange-rate movements.	但是，黑田随后澄清，日本货币决策者不会预测，更不会控制汇率波动。


Instead, the BOJ’s goal – like that of any effective central bank – is to ensure the right combination of employment and inflation.	相反，日本银行的目标——与任何高效央行一样——是确保合理的就业和通胀组合。


Of course, a country’s monetary policy does affect exchange rates in the short term.	当然，一国货币政策确实会在短期影响汇率。


But it does so only in relation to monetary policy in other relevant countries.	但只有在与其他相关国家的货币政策有关时才会有这一效果。


In the case of Japan today, the exchange rate is being determined less by its own monetary expansion than by America’s move toward monetary tightening, following a period during which massive quantitative easing (QE) by the US Federal Reserve put upward pressure on the yen.	对于今天的日本来说，汇率与其说由本国货币扩张决定，不如说由美国转向货币紧缩决定。 此前，美联储的大规模量化宽松给日元造成了升值压力。


A country can also influence the short-term exchange rate by intervening directly in the foreign-exchange market.	一国也可以通过直接干预外汇市场影响短期汇率。


But such interventions are complicated – not least because they must account for the relationship between the country’s monetary-policy approach and that of other relevant countries.	但这类干预十分复杂——不仅是因为它们必须考虑该国货币政策方针与相关国家货币政策方针之间的关系。


Moreover, if, for example, the United States aims for ¥100 per dollar, while Japan aims for ¥120 per dollar, the result could be not only rising tension between the US and Japan; incompatible exchange-rate targets could also trigger broader market volatility, with spillover effects on other economies.	此外，如果（比如）美国的目标是1美元兑100日元，而日本的目标是120日元，那么结果不但可能包括美国和日本之间出现紧张； 不相容的汇率目标还有可能引发更广的市场波动，波及其他经济体。


Given this, monetary policy remains the most effective driver of exchange-rate movements.	基于此，货币政策仍是最有效的汇率运动驱动因素。


The key to ensuring a satisfactory exchange-rate balance is for countries to pursue policies aimed at ensuring a desirable combination of domestic inflation and employment.	确保有利的汇率平衡的关键是追求旨在确保合意国内通胀和就业组合的政策。


If, for example, meeting domestic inflation and employment targets requires greater monetary expansion – which will place downward pressure on the local currency, bolstering the economy’s international competitiveness – other countries may have to pursue their own monetary expansion to maintain optimal domestic inflation and employment rates.	如果（比如）满足国内通胀和就业目标需要加强货币宽松——这会给本币带来贬值压力，提振经济的国际竞争力——那么其他国家也许也不得不追求货币扩张以维持最优国内通胀和就业率。


That is precisely what happened after the global economic crisis.	这正是全球经济危机后发生的情况。


The US, in an effort to prevent deflation and stem rising unemployment, initiated a massive QE program, with the United Kingdom following suit.	美国为了阻止通缩和失业恶化，推出了大规模量化宽松计划，英国则紧跟着美国的步伐。


At first, the Bank of Japan hesitated to adjust its monetary policy accordingly, allowing the yen to appreciate – a decision that drove the country’s long-stagnant economy into recession.	一开始，日本银行对于据此调整货币政策显得相当犹豫，坐视日元升值——这一决定导致日本长期停滞的经济陷入了衰退。


Fortunately, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power in 2013, he recognized the need for monetary expansion, making it one of the three “arrows” of his strategy – dubbed Abenomics – for economic reform and recovery.	幸运的是，2013年上台的首相安倍晋三认识到货币宽松的必要性，将其作为他的经济改革和复苏战略——即所谓的“安倍经济学”的三支“箭”之一。


Thanks to this change in approach, Japan was able to arrest the yen’s appreciation and move toward stronger growth, without undermining the ability of the US or the UK to advance their own monetary-policy objectives.	这一方针变化让日本得以阻止了日元的升值、迈向更强劲的增长，同时也没有妨碍美国或英国推进自身货币政策目标的能力。


The capacity for such adjustments is the hallmark of the flexible exchange-rate system; indeed, for more than four decades, it has proved time and again to be the key to global macroeconomic stability.	能做出这样的调整是浮动汇率制度的特点； 事实上，四十多年来，这一再证明是全球宏观经济稳定的关键。


As long ago as the period following World War I, countries that adopted an independent monetary policy recovered faster than those that remained locked into the gold standard.	在一战后的岁月中，采取独立货币政策的国家复苏速度要快于仍采取金本位的国家。


Yet some economists and journalists fear that countries, in attempting to gain an advantage in global markets, will engage in competitive devaluations, triggering large-scale inflation in the process.	但一些经济学家和记者担心各国为了获得全球市场优势，会采取竞争性贬值，引发大规模通货膨胀。


Such concerns have even made their way into debates about the mega-regional free-trade agreements – namely, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and the European Union, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership – that are currently being negotiated.	这些担忧甚至进入了大型地区自由贸易协定的讨论中——如目前正在谈判中的美国和欧盟的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系。


Many are now calling for the inclusion of enforceable provisions prohibiting so-called “currency manipulation.”	如今，许多人要求将可执行的禁止所谓“货币操纵”条款纳入协定中。


Including such provisions would be a mistake – not least because exchange-rate issues are intrinsically irrelevant to trade deals.	纳入这些条款将是一个错误——因为汇率问题本质上与贸易协议无关。


In fact, such an approach – which has the potential to derail agreements that would bring considerable benefits to the economies involved – is based on a fallacy.	事实上，这一方针——它有可能导致给相关经济体带来无穷好处的协定流产——建立在一个谬误的基础上。


Unless countries are using direct intervention to pursue contradictory exchange-rate goals, a “currency war” that generates widespread inflation is highly unlikely.	除非各国直接干预追求互相矛盾的汇率目标，否则就不可能爆发能导致普遍通胀的“货币战争”。


If each country tailors its monetary policy to domestic macroeconomic objectives, exchange rates will settle naturally in a state of Pareto (or maximum) efficiency.	如果各国按照本国国内宏观经济目标制定货币政策，汇率将自然形成帕累托（或最大）有效状态。


The economist Jeffrey Frankel has called currency manipulation a chimera, declaring that “linking efforts to prevent currency manipulation to trade agreements has always been a bad idea, and it still is.”	经济学家杰弗里·弗兰克尔（Jeffrey Frankel）将货币操纵称为“喀迈拉”（chimera），认为“将阻止货币操纵的措施与贸易协定挂钩过去一直是、现在也是坏主意。


He is right.	”他是正确的。


Doing so would controvert the most fundamental rule of a flexible exchange-rate regime: that each economy can set – and pursue – its own monetary-policy goals.	这样做违背了浮动汇率机制最根本的规则：每个经济体都可以制定——和追求——自身的货币政策目标。


Lessons from the Fiscal Cliff	财政悬崖的教训


CAMBRIDGE – One of the many things I learned from Milton Friedman is that the true cost of government is its spending, not its taxes.	美国剑桥—我从米尔顿·弗里德曼那里学到了很多东西，其中之一是，政府的真正成本是其支出，而不是其税收。


To put it another way, spending is financed either by current taxes or through borrowing, and borrowing amounts to future taxes, which have almost the same impact on economic performance as current taxes.	换句话说，支出要么用当前税收融资，要么借钱融资，而借来的钱无非是未来的税收，它对经济表现的影响和当前税收无甚区别。


We can apply this reasoning to the United States’ unsustainable fiscal deficit.	我们可以把这一原理用于美国不可持续的财政赤字。


As is well known, closing this deficit requires less spending or more taxes.	众所周知，消除这一赤字要么通过减支，要么通过增税。


The conventional view is that a reasonable, balanced approach entails some of each.	传统观点认为合理、平衡的方法将兼顾两者。


But, as Friedman would have argued, the two methods should be considered polar opposites.	但是，正如弗里德曼所指出的，这两个方法是南辕北辙的。


Less spending means that the government will be smaller.	减支意味着政府变小。


More taxes mean that the government will be larger.	增税意味着政府变大。


Hence, people who favor smaller government (for example, some Republicans) will want the deficit closed entirely by cutting spending, whereas those who favor larger government (for example, President Barack Obama and most Democrats) will want the deficit closed entirely by raising taxes.	因此，偏好小政府者（比如某些共和党）希望完全通过减支来消除赤字； 而偏好大政府者（比如总统奥巴马和大部分民主党）希望完全通过增税来消除赤字。


As the economist Alberto Alesina has found from studies of fiscal stabilization in OECD countries, eliminating fiscal deficits through spending cuts tends to be much better for the economy than eliminating them through tax increases.	经济学家阿尔贝托·阿勒西纳（Alberto Alesina）研究了经合组织国家的财务稳定状况，发现通过减支消除财政赤字比通过增税对经济好得多。


A natural interpretation is that spending adjustments work better because they promise smaller government, thereby favoring economic growth.	一个自然的解释是，支出调整之所以效果更佳，是因为这意味着小政府，从而有利于经济增长。


For a given size of government, the method of raising tax revenue matters.	对于给定的政府规模，征税的方法会产生影响。


For example, we can choose how much to collect via a general income tax, a payroll tax, a consumption tax (such as a sales or value-added tax), and so on.	比如，我们可以选择通过一般所得税、工资税、消费税（比如销售税或增值税）等税种征多少税。


We can also choose how much revenue to raise today, rather than in the future (by varying the fiscal deficit).	我们也可以选择在今天而不是未来（通过改变财政赤字水平）征多少税。


A general principle for an efficient tax system is to collect a given amount of revenue (corresponding in the long run to the government’s spending) in a way that causes as little distortion as possible to the overall economy.	有效税收制度的一个一般原则是以对总体经济扭曲程度尽可能小的方式征收给定数量（对应政府长期支出水平）的税额。


Usually, this principle means that marginal tax rates should be similar at different levels of labor income, for various types of consumption, for outlays today versus tomorrow, and so on.	通常，这一原则意味着不同水平劳动所得、不同类型消费以及不同征收时间（现在或将来）的边际税率应该相似。


From this perspective, a shortcoming of the US individual income-tax system is that marginal tax rates are high at the bottom (because of means testing of welfare programs) and the top (because of the graduated-rate structure).	从这一点出发，美国个人所得税制度的一个缺陷是最底层和最顶层的边际税率太高，前者是因为福利计划，后者是因为累进率结构。


Thus, the government has moved in the wrong direction since 2009, sharply raising marginal tax rates at the bottom (by dramatically increasing transfer programs) and, more recently, at the top (by raising tax rates on the rich).	因此，自2009年政府一直在以错误的方式行事，极大地提高了底层边际税率（通过大幅增加转移支付项目），最近又极大地提高了顶层边际税率（通过提高富人税率）。


One of the most efficient tax-raising methods is the US payroll tax, for which the marginal tax rate is close to the average rate (because deductions are absent and there is little graduation in the rate structure).	最有效的征税方法之一是美国工资税，该税种的边际税率接近于平均税率（因为不存在减税，税率结构的累进性也较低）。


Therefore, cutting the payroll tax rate in 2011-2012 and making the rate schedule more graduated (on the Medicare side) were mistakes from the standpoint of efficient taxation.	因此，从有效征税的角度看，在2011—2012年降低工资税并增加（医保方面的）税率结构的累进性是错误的。


Republicans should consider these ideas when evaluating tax and spending changes in 2013.	共和党应该在评估2013年税收和支出变化时考虑这些观点。


Going over the “fiscal cliff” would have had the attraction of seriously cutting government spending, although the composition of the cuts – nothing from entitlements and too much from defense – was unattractive.	迈向“财政悬崖”本应具有大量削减政府开支的吸引力，尽管如何削减——福利项目一分不减而防务支出削减太多——并不具有吸引力。


The associated revenue increase was, at least, across the board, rather than the unbalanced hike in marginal tax rates at the top that was enacted.	相应的税收收入增加倒至少是全面的，而非仅仅是已经实施的顶层边际税率的不均衡增加。


But the most important part of the deal to avert the fiscal cliff was the restoration of the efficient payroll tax.	但避免财政悬崖妥协的最重要部分是重建有效工资税。


I estimate that the rise by two percentage points in the amount collected from employees corresponds to about $1.4 trillion in revenue over ten years.	我估计，将雇员税负提高2个百分点意味着未来十年增加1. 4万亿美元税收。


This serious revenue boost was not counted in standard reports, because the payroll-tax “holiday” for 2011-2012 had always been treated legally as temporary.	这笔巨大的税收增加并不计入标准报税表，因为2011—2012年收入税“假期”一直被视为是定向、临时的。


It is true that some macroeconomic modelers, including the Congressional Budget Office, forecasted that going over the cliff would have caused a recession.	诚然，包括国会预算办公室在内的一些宏观经济建模者预测迈向财政悬崖可能早已导致了经济衰退。


But those results come from Keynesian models that always predict that GDP expands when the government gets larger.	但这些报告都来自凯恩斯主义模型，而凯恩斯主义模型的预测永远是，随着政府的变大，GDP也会扩张。


Entirely absent from these models are the negative effects of more government and uncertainty about how fiscal problems will be resolved.	完全忽视这些模型是更多政府以及关于财政问题如何解决的不确定性带来的消极影响。


Another recession in the US would not be a great surprise, but it can be attributed to an array of bad government policies and other forces, not to cutting the size of government.	美国陷入另一场衰退不会令人意外，但其原因是坏政府政策和其他因素的合力，而不是削减政府规模。


Indeed, it is nonsense to think that cuts in government spending should be avoided in the “short run” in order to lower the chance of a recession.	事实上，削减政府支出应是“短期”应避免的措施以降低衰退可能性的观点是站不住脚的。


If a smaller government is a good idea in the long run (as I believe it is), it is also a good idea in the short run.	如果说小政府是长期好主意的话（我同意这一观点），那么它在短期也是一个好主意。


Why Give Corporations a Tax Break?	为什么要给公司税收优惠？


BERKELEY – US President Barack Obama has called for additional revenue as part of a balanced plan to reduce future budget deficits.	伯克利—美国总统奥巴马提出将增加收入作为减少未来预算赤字的平衡计划的一部分。


But he is also proposing a significant cut in the corporate tax rate.	但他还建议大幅降低公司税率。


To many, this approach seems inconsistent: Shouldn’t the corporate tax rate be raised, not lowered, so that corporations contribute their “fair share” to deficit reduction?	对很多人来说，这两点是相互矛盾的：难道不是应该提高而不是降低公司税率，从而让公司为赤字削减贡献“公平份额”吗？


The answer is no.	答案是否定的。


After its 1986 tax overhaul, the United States had one of the lowest corporate tax rates among OECD countries.	1986年税法修订后，美国的公司税率为经合组织中最低之一。


Since then, these countries have been slashing their rates in order to attract foreign direct investment and discourage their own companies from shifting operations and profits to low-tax foreign locations.	自此以后，经合组织国家纷纷降低税率以吸引外国直接投资、阻止本国公司将经营和利润移到低税的外国。


In the most recent and audacious move, the British government has embarked on a three-year plan to reduce its corporate tax rate from 28% to 20% – one of the lowest in the OECD – by 2015.	英国政府最近激进地提出了将公司税率从28%降至20%的三年计划计划——到2015年，其公司税率将是经合组织最低。


The US now has the highest corporate tax rate of these countries.	如今，美国是经合组织中公司税率最高的国家。


Even after incorporating various deductions, credits, and other tax-reducing provisions, the effective average and marginal corporate tax rates in the US – what corporations actually pay – are higher than the OECD average.	即使考虑各种扣除、豁免和其他减税条款，有效平均税率和边际税率——即公司实际支付的税率——仍高于经合组织平均值。


Cutting the rate to a more competitive level would encourage more domestic investment by US corporations, and would also make the US more attractive to foreign investors.	将税率削减至更具竞争力水平能刺激美国公司更多地投资国内，还能提高美国对外国投资者的吸引力。


Capital has become increasingly mobile, and differences in national corporate tax rates have a growing influence on where multinational companies locate their operations and report their income.	资本流动性越来越强，国民公司税率的不同越来越影响到跨国公司经营活动和利润报告地的选择。


Higher investment in the US by both domestic and foreign companies would boost economic growth, while the resulting increase in capital – new businesses, factories, equipment, and research –would improve productivity.	国内外公司均增加在美投资能够刺激经济增长，与此同时，由此带来的资本增加——新企业、工厂、设备和研究——能够改善生产率。


That should, in turn, boost real wages over time (although the link between productivity growth and wage growth has weakened during the last two decades).	假以时日，这反过来能够提振真实工资（尽管生产率增长和工资增长的关系在过去二十年中有所减弱）。


The pro-growth rationale for reducing the US corporate tax rate is compelling, and explains why Obama has proposed cutting it from 35% to 28% (roughly the weighted average rate of the other developed countries).	用有利于增长来论证降低美国公司税的必要性十分有力，这也解释了为何奥巴马建议将税率从35%减至28%（大约相当于其他发达国家的加权平均水平）。


But a rate cut would be costly in terms of foregone revenues: each percentage point would reduce corporate-tax revenues by about $100 billion over the next decade.	但税率下降带来的收入损失是巨大的：公司税率每削减一个百分点，未来十年公司税收入就会减少1000亿美元。


Moreover, recent studies indicate that a significant share of the corporate-tax burden falls on capital, so a reduction in corporate taxes would weaken the progressivity of the tax system at a time when income inequality is at an all-time high.	此外，最新研究表明，公司税负担的很大一部分落在了资本头上，因此降低公司税率会减弱税收体系的累进性，而且这正逢收入不平等性高居历史最高水平的时期。


For these reasons, Obama is championing a “revenue-neutral” reform that would leave corporate-tax revenues unchanged, with the proposed rate cut financed by limiting deductions, credits, and loopholes, which would broaden the tax base.	出于这些原因，奥巴马力推“收入中性”改革，即保持公司税收入不变，以限制减税、免税和偷漏税——即扩大税基——来填补为降低税率造成的收入下降。


These features add complexity to the tax code, raise the cost of tax compliance, and reduce corporate-tax revenues.	这些特征会增加税法的复杂性，增加依法纳税成本，减少公司税收入。


They also affect business decisions about what to invest in, how to finance investments, which form of business organization to adopt, and where to produce – reflecting sizeable differences in the effective tax rates behind these choices.	它们还会影响企业投资何处、如何为投资融资、采取何种企业组织形式以及在何处生产的决策——这些决策的背后是有效税率的巨大差异。


As a result, broadening the corporate tax base will not be easy.	结果是扩大公司税基绝非易事。


Within the corporate sector, the three largest domestic tax preferences are the manufacturing production deduction, the credit for research and development, and accelerated depreciation of capital.	在公司部门内部，三大国内税收优惠是制造业生产扣减、研发免税和加速资本折旧。


Manufacturing companies are the major beneficiaries of these preferences, and Obama has proposed strengthening the first two.	制造业公司是这些优惠措施的最大受益者，而奥巴马意在强化前两项。


Instead, he suggests reforming the third by tightening allowances for accelerated depreciation (as several other developed countries have done) in order to offset some of the revenue losses.	他建议改革第三项，办法是通过限制加速折旧（其他一些发达国家已经开始实施这一做法）以抵消部分收入损失。


But reducing the overall corporate rate would increase after-tax returns on past investments, while limiting accelerated depreciation would lower after-tax returns on new investments.	但降低总体公司税率会增加过去投资的税后回报，而限制加速折旧会降低新投资的税后回报。


And even eliminating accelerated depreciation would not broaden the tax base enough to finance a rate cut to 28%.	即使取消加速折旧也不可能让税基扩大到足够的程度补偿税率削减至28%的损失。


Likewise, while limiting the deductibility of net interest for corporations, as many other developed countries have done, would broaden the tax base and discourage excessive reliance on debt financing, it would increase the tax burden on major investments in physical capital, which are often debt-financed.	类似地，尽管限制公司净利息扣除（和其他许多发达国家一样）能够扩大税基、遏制过度依赖债务融资，但也会增加实体资本（通常通过债务融资获得）重大投资的税收负担。


Reducing the tax preferences for non-corporate business entities (such as partnerships) that pass their income through to their owners’ individual returns would also broaden the tax base subject to the corporate-income tax.	减少非公司企业实体（如合伙制企业，这些企业的利��会转换为所有者的个人回报）税收优惠也能扩大公司利润税税基。


Pass-through companies now account for more than 80% of net business income (by far the highest share in the developed countries).	利润转换公司目前产生着八成以上的企业净利润（此比例为发达国家中最高）。


Several of these entities are very large and profitable, and enjoy the same legal benefits as corporations.	这类企业中不乏规模巨大、利润丰厚者，它们享受着与公司同等的法定利益。


Economic logic suggests that businesses of similar size and engaged in similar activities should not pay different tax rates based solely on their organizational form.	经济学逻辑表明，从事类似活动的类似规模的企业仅仅因为组织形式的不同而按不同税率缴税。 。


The fact that a large share of business income is currently taxed as personal income makes it difficult to separate corporate tax reform from personal tax reform, as Obama and members of Congress would prefer to do.	很大一部分企业利润目前按照个人所得征税，这一事实意味着很难将公司税改革和个税改革分开，而奥巴马和国会正是希望这样做。


Moreover, keeping the two areas of reform separate rules out the approach adopted by several other developed countries, which have offset some of the revenue losses from cutting corporate tax rates by increasing taxes on corporate equity income at the personal shareholder level.	此外，将这两大改革领域分离排除了不少其他发达国家所用的办法，即用增加个人股东层面的公司股本收入税来抵消降低公司税率导致的收入损失。


This approach also addresses concerns about the regressive effects of a cut in the corporate rate.	这一办法还能打消关于降低公司税率会导致税收累退的顾虑。


It is both more progressive and more effective: with highly mobile capital, it is far easier to collect taxes from individual citizens and resident shareholders than from multinational companies.	该办法既更加累进，也更加有效：资本是高度流动的，因此从公民个人和股东居民头上征税要比从跨国公司头上征税容易得多。


According to a recent study, restoring tax rates on dividends and capital gains to their pre-1997 levels of 28% could finance a reduction in the US federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 26%.	根据一项最新研究，让红利和资本利得税回到1997年前的水平（28%）能抵消美国联邦公司税率从35%降至26%所导致的收入损失。


This change would both reduce the incentive for corporations to shift investments abroad and increase the progressivity of the US tax system.	这一变化既能打消公司将投资移向海外的激励，也能促进美国税收制度的累进性。


Similarly, a modest carbon tax or value-added tax, with credits or subsidies to offset the regressive effects on low-income households, could generate enough revenue both to pay for a significant reduction in the corporate tax rate and to make a meaningful contribution to deficit reduction.	类似地，温和的碳税或增值税——同时辅以免税和补贴以抵消低收入家庭所承受的累退影响——能产生足够的收入，抵消公司税率大幅降低的影响并为赤字削减做出重大贡献。


There is no inconsistency between a progressive, balanced deficit-reduction plan and lowering the corporate tax rate.	累进、平衡的预算削减计划和降低公司税率之间并不矛盾。


Of all taxes, corporate taxes are the most harmful to economic growth – without which meaningful deficit reduction is far more difficult to achieve.	在各种税种中，公司税对经济增长为害最甚——如果没有它，有意义地降低赤字将会困难得多。


Cyber Insecurity	网络的不安全


CAMBRIDGE – In August 2008, Russian troops moved into Georgia.	剑桥-2008年8月，俄罗斯军队开进了格鲁吉亚。


Observers dispute who fired first, but there was a little noticed dimension of the conflict that will have major repercussions for the future.	观察家们在哪一方先开火的问题上争论不休，但有一个被注意到的此次冲突的方面，将对未来会起重大的影响。


Computer hackers attacked Georgian government Web sites in the weeks preceding the outbreak of armed conflict.	武装冲突爆发前的数周，电脑黑客们就攻击了格鲁吉亚的一些政府网站。


The Russia-Georgia conflict represents the first significant cyber attacks accompanying armed conflict.	俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚之间的冲突是首次伴随着武装冲突的重大网络袭击。


Welcome to the twenty-first century.	欢迎各位来到二十一世纪。


Cyber threats and potential cyber warfare illustrate the increased vulnerabilities and loss of control in modern societies.	网络空间存在的威胁和潜在的网络战争说明了现代社会中不断增加的危险性和失控。


Governments have mainly been concerned about hacker attacks on their own bureaucracy’s information technology infrastructure, but there are social vulnerabilities well beyond government computers.	政府主要担心的是其官僚机构的信息技术基础设施被黑客们攻击，但是，还有远远超出政府电脑设备范围的社会危险性的存在。


In an open letter to the US president in September 2007, American professionals in cyber defense warned that “the critical infrastructure of the United States, including electrical power, finance, telecommunications, health care, transportation, water, defense, and the Internet, is highly vulnerable to cyber attack. Fast and resolute mitigating action is needed to avoid national disaster.”	在美国的网络防卫领域的一些专家于2007年9月给美国总统的一封公开信中警告说， “美国的关键基础设施，包括电力、金融、电信、医疗保健、交通、水利、国防和互联网等，都非常容易受到网络的攻击，因此需要采取快速和果断的预防行动以避免全国性的灾难。


In the murky world of the Internet, attackers are difficult to identify.	”在混沌的互联网空间里，很难确定攻击者到底藏身于何处。


In today’s interconnected world, an unidentified cyber attack on non-governmental infrastructure might be severely damaging.	在当今各领域之间互相关联的世界里，任何身份不明的对非政府基础设施所进行的网络攻击都可能会带来严重的灾害。


For example, some experts believe that a nation’s electric power grid may be particularly susceptible.	例如，一些专家认为国家的电网可能特别容易受到攻击。


The control systems that electric power companies use are thought vulnerable to attack, which could shut down cities and regions for days or weeks.	电力公司使用的控制系统被认为是很脆弱的，一次这样的攻击就可能造成一些城市和地区数天或数周的瘫痪。


Cyber attacks may also interfere with financial markets and cause immense economic loss by closing down commercial Web sites.	网络攻击也可以通过让商业网站瘫痪的途径干扰金融市场并造成巨大的经济损失。


Some scenarios, including an “electronic Pearl Harbor,” sound alarmist, but they illustrate the diffusion of power from central governments to individuals.	某些场景，包括“电子珍珠港” ，似乎是危言耸听，但它们确实是权力从中央政府向个人扩散的真实写照。


In 1941, the powerful Japanese navy used many resources to create damage thousands of miles away.	1941年，强大的日本海军动用了众多资源数造成了数千英里外的灾难性损失。


Today, an individual hacker using malicious software can cause chaos in far-away places at little cost to himself.	如今，一个黑客使用恶意软件就可以造成遥远的地方的混乱，而他又几乎不需任何成本。


Moreover, the information revolution enables individuals to perpetrate sabotage with unprecendented speed and scope.	此外，信息革命使个人能以前所未有的速度和范围从事破坏活动。


The so-called “love bug virus,” launched in the Phillipines in 2000, is estimated to have cost billions of dollars in damage.	所谓的于2000年从菲律宾发出的“爱情虫病毒” ，估计已造成了数十亿美元的损失。


Terrorists, too, can exploit new vulnerabilities in cyberspace to engage in asymmetrical warfare.	恐怖分子也可以钻网上新的安全漏洞的空子来从事不对称的战争。


In 1998, when America complained about seven Moscow Internet addresses involved in the theft of Pentagon and NASA secrets, the Russian government replied that phone numbers from which the attacks originated were inoperative.	1998年，美国抱怨七个莫斯科互联网地址参与了盗窃五角大楼和美国宇航局的机密，而俄罗斯政府答复说，攻击起源地的电话号码是不通的。


The US had no way of knowing whether the Russian government had been involved.	美国当时根本无法判断俄罗斯政府是否参与了那次事件。


More recently, in 2007, China’s government was accused of sponsoring thousands of hacking incidents against German federal government computers and defense and private-sector computer systems in the US.	更近的例子是，2007年中国政府被指控资助了数千桩针对德国联邦政府的电脑以及美国国防部和商业企业的电脑系统的黑客攻击事件。


But it was difficult to prove the source of the attack, and the Pentagon had to shut down some of its computer systems.	但是，要证明攻击的来源却很难，美国国防部以不得不关闭了其一部分电脑系统而告终。


In 2007, when Estonia’s government moved a World War II statue commemorating Soviet war dead, hackers retaliated with a costly denial-of-service attack that closed down Estonia’s access to the internet.	2007年，当爱沙尼亚政府迁移纪念苏联战争期间为国捐躯者们的二战雕像时，黑客们的报复是花费昂贵的拒绝服务攻击，使爱沙尼亚的互联网处于瘫痪。


There was no way to prove whether the Russian government, a spontaneous nationalist response, or both aided this transnational attack.	也无法证明是俄罗斯政府还是自发的民族主义反应，或两者都协助了这次跨国攻击。


In January 2008, President George W. Bush signed two presidential directives that called for establishing a comprehensive cyber-security plan, and his 2009 budget requested $6 billion to develop a system to protect national cyber security.	2008 年1月，美国总统布什签署了两项总统指令，要求建立一个综合性的网络安全计划， 而他的2009年预算要求动用60亿美元的开支来建立一个系统以保护国家网络安全。


President-elect Barack Obama is likely to follow suit.	当选总统奥巴马很可能会效仿此政策。


In his campaign, Obama called for tough new standards for cyber security and physical resilience of critical infrastructure, and promised to appoint a national cyber adviser who will report directly to him and be responsible for developing policy and coordinating federal agency efforts.	在他的竞选中，奥巴马呼吁���定严厉的网络安全新标准和关键基础设施的抗攻击性，并承诺将任命一位国家网络顾问，直接向他汇报并负责制定政策和协调联邦机构的在这方面的努力。


That job will not be easy, because much of the relevant infrastructure is not under direct government control.	这并不是个美差，因为许多相关的基础设施不是由政府直接控制的。 就在最近，美国中情局副局长唐纳德·科尔警告说， “我们政府的计划的信息和价值的重大损失通常不是因为间谍的活动.


Just recently, Donald Kerr, the US deputy director of national intelligence, warned that “major losses of information and value for our government programs typically aren’t from spies....In fact, one of the great concerns I have is that so much of the new capabilities that we’re all going to depend on aren’t any longer developed in government labs under government contract.”	事实上，我非常担心的事情之一是，我们即将依靠的许多新的功能，不再是在由政府签订合同的实验室里研发出来的。 “


Kerr described what he called “supply chain attacks” in which hackers not only steal proprietary information, but go further and insert erroneous data and programs in communications hardware and software – Trojan horses that can be used to bring down systems.	科尔是这样描述他的所谓的“供应链攻击”的：黑客不仅会窃取有专有权的信息，而且更进一步，在通信硬件和软件中插入错误的数据和程序-即可以让系统瘫痪的木马程序。


All governments will find themselves exposed to a new type of threat that will be difficult to counter.	各国政府将发现自己面临一种很难对付的新的威胁。


Governments can hope to deter cyber attacks just as they deter nuclear or other armed attacks.	政府可以寄希望于能像吓退核武器或其他武装袭击那样来吓退网络攻击。


But deterrence requires a credible threat of response against an attacker.	但起到这种作用需要一种对攻击作出反应的并能让人相信的威慑力。


And that becomes much more difficult in a world where governments find it hard to tell where cyber attacks come from, whether from a hostile state or a group of criminals masking as a foreign government.	而做到这一点的难度正变得很大，因为当今世界中，政府发现很难作出判断攻击来自何方，到底是来自敌对国家还是一个伪装成外国政府的犯罪集团。


While an international legal code that defines cyber attacks more clearly, together with cooperation on preventive measures, can help, such arms-control solutions are not likely to be sufficient. Nor will defensive measures like constructing electronic firewalls and creating redundancies in sensitive systems.	虽然能更加明确地定义网络攻击的国际法律系统再加上在预防措施方面的合作，能起到作用，但无论像这样的裁军式的解决方案，还是像建设电子防火墙和在敏感统中建立冗余这样的防御性措施，都不足以解决问题。


Given the enormous uncertainties involved, the new cyber dimensions of security must be high on every government’s agenda.	基于涉及到巨大的不确定性，解决网络安全出现的新问题必须列在每个政府重要的议程上。


Cyber War and Peace	网络战争与和平


CAMBRIDGE – Two years ago, a piece of faulty computer code infected Iran’s nuclear program and destroyed many of the centrifuges used to enrich uranium.	剑桥——两年前，一条有缺陷的计算机代码感染了伊朗核计划，并摧毁了许多用于铀浓缩的离心机。


Some observers declared this apparent sabotage to be the harbinger of a new form of warfare, and United States Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned Americans of the danger of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” attack on the US.	有些观察家称这种明显的蓄意破坏预示着一种新的战争形式，美国国防部长莱昂·帕内塔警告美国人可能会受到“网络珍珠港”袭击。


But what do we really know about cyber conflict?	但我们对网络冲突究竟有多少认识？


The cyber domain of computers and related electronic activities is a complex man-made environment, and human adversaries are purposeful and intelligent.	电脑及相关电子活动的网络域名构成了纯粹人造的复杂环境，上述环境中的人类对手高度智能化而且有针对性。


Mountains and oceans are hard to move, but portions of cyberspace can be turned on and off by throwing a switch.	山脉和海洋很难移动，但网络空间却可以借助开关关上和打开。


It is far cheaper and quicker to move electrons across the globe than to move large ships long distances.	电子的全球移动远比大型船舶的远距离移动更为廉价和快速。


The costs of developing those vessels – multiple carrier task forces and submarine fleets – create enormous barriers to entry, enabling US naval dominance.	多航母特遣部队和潜艇舰队的舰船研发成本创造出巨大的进入壁垒，确保了美国的海上优势。


But the barriers to entry in the cyber domain are so low that non-state actors and small states can play a significant role at low cost.	但网络领域的进入壁垒极其低廉，即使非国家参与者和小国也能以低廉的成本发挥重要的作用。


In my book The Future of Power, I argue that the diffusion of power away from governments is one of this century’s great political shifts. & Cyberspace is a perfect example.	在一本名叫《权力未来》的著作中，我提出政府权力的扩散是本世纪最伟大的政治转折。 网络空间就是一个绝佳的例子。


Large countries like the US, Russia, Britain, France, and China have greater capacity than other states and non-state actors to control the sea, air, or space, but it makes little sense to speak of dominance in cyberspace.	美国、俄罗斯、英国、法国和中国等大国较之其他国家和非国家参与者拥有更强的海洋、天空或太空控制力，但谈论在网络空间占据霸权地位并没有多大意义。


If anything, dependence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic activities creates new vulnerabilities in large states that can be exploited by non-state actors.	如果一定要说有什么影响，那么大国依赖复杂网络系统支持军事和经济活动造成了可以被非国家参与者利用的全新漏洞。


Four decades ago, the US Department of Defense created the Internet; today, by most accounts, the US remains the leading country in terms of its military and societal use.	四十年前，美国国防部创造了互联网，而今天，按照多数人的说法，美国仍然在网络的军事和社会应用方面占据领先地位。


But greater dependence on networked computers and communication leaves the US more vulnerable to attack than many other countries, and cyberspace has become a major source of insecurity, because, at this stage of technological development, offense prevails over defense there.	但对联网计算机和通讯的更多依赖致使美国比其他许多国家更容易受到攻击，且网络空间已成为不安全的主要发源地，因为在目前的技术发展阶段，进攻显然比防守更具优势。


The term “cyber attack”covers a wide variety of actions, ranging from simple probes to defacing Web sites, denial of service, espionage, and destruction.	“网络攻击”一词涵盖的行为多种多样，包括从简单刺探、丑化网站、拒绝提供服务到从事间谍和破坏活动。


Similarly, the term “cyber war” is used loosely to cover a wide range of behaviors, reflecting dictionary definitions of war that range from armed conflict to any hostile contest (for example, “war between the sexes” or “war on drugs”).	同样，“网络战争”一词被用来松散地指代一系列行为，反映出从武装冲突到敌对较量等各式各样的字典涵义（如“两性战争”或“禁毒战争”）。


At the other extreme, some experts use a narrow definition of cyber war: a “bloodless war” among states that consists solely of electronic conflict in cyberspace.	另一种极端情况是，有些专家对网络战争适用狭义定义：即国与国之间一场“不流血的战争”，局限在网络空间的电子冲突。


But this avoids the important interconnections between the physical and virtual layers of cyberspace.	但这回避了网络空间物理和虚拟层面间重要的彼此联系。


As the Stuxnet virus that infected Iran’s nuclear program showed, software attacks can have very real physical effects.	正像感染伊朗核计划的Stuxnet病毒表明的那样，软件攻击也可以产生非常真实的物理效果。


A more useful definition of cyber waris hostile action in cyberspace whose effects amplify or are equivalent to major physical violence.	网络战争更为有用的定义是网络空间中发生的敌对行动，其所产生的影响放大或者等同于严重身体暴力。


In the physical world, governments have a near-monopoly on large-scale use of force, the defender has an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and attacks end because of attrition or exhaustion.	现实世界中，政府近乎垄断了大规模的武力使用，防守方更加熟悉地形，而进攻则可能因为消耗或疲劳而结束。


Both resources and mobility are costly.	资源和流动性都非常昂贵。


In the cyber world, by contrast, actors are diverse (and sometimes anonymous), physical distance is immaterial, and some forms of offense are cheap.	相比之下，网络世界的参与者多种多样（有时还可以匿名参与），实际距离变得无关紧要，而且某些形式的犯罪成本很低。


Because the Internet was designed for ease of use rather than security, attackers currently have the advantage over defenders.	因为互联网设计是为了方便使用、而不是安全，进攻方目前相对于防守方仍占据一定的优势。


Technological evolution, including efforts to “reengineer” some systems for greater security, might eventually change that, but, for now, it remains the case.	技术进步，包括提高系统安全性的某些“再造”工作最终可能会改变这种状况，但至少到目前为止情况依然如此。


The larger party has limited ability to disarm or destroy the enemy, occupy territory, or use counterforce strategies effectively.	规模大的一方解除对方武装或消灭敌人、占据领土或有效使用的反击策略的能力都受到限制。


Cyber war, though only incipient at this stage, is the most dramatic of the potential threats.	网络战争虽然现阶段只是刚刚开始，但却成为最富戏剧性的潜在威胁。


Major states with elaborate technical and human resources could, in principle, create massive disruption and physical destruction through cyber attacks on military and civilian targets.	总的来讲，拥有复杂技术和人力资源的大国可以通过对军事和民用目标发起网络攻击造成大规模中断和实际破坏。


Responses to cyber war include a form of interstate deterrence through denial and entanglement, offensive capabilities, and designs for rapid network and infrastructure recovery if deterrence fails.	网络战争的应对之策包括通过拒绝和纠缠实施某种形式的国际威慑、进攻能力、以及在威慑失效的情况下快速网络和基础设施恢复设计。


At some point, it may be possible to reinforce these steps with certain rudimentary norms and arms control, but the world is at an early stage in this process.	某些时候或许可以通过某些基本规则和军备控制来强化上述步骤，但世界仍处于这一进程的早期阶段。


If one treats so-called “hacktivism” by ideological groups as mostly a disruptive nuisance at this stage, there remain four major categories of cyber threats to national security, each with a different time horizon: cyber war and economic espionage are largely associated with states, and cyber crime and cyber terrorism are mostly associated with non-state actors.	如果您认为现阶段意识形态组织所谓的“黑客行动主义”多半属于破坏性滋扰，依然有四类主要危险因素对国家安全构成威胁。 每种危险因素涉及不同的时间跨度：网络战争和经济谍报活动大多与国家相关，而网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义则大多涉及非国家参与者。


For the US, the highest costs currently stem from espionage and crime, but over the next decade or so, war and terrorism could become greater threats than they are today.	美国目前的最大的损失源于间谍和犯罪活动，但在未来十年左右的时间里，战争和恐怖主义可能造成比今天更大的威胁。


Moreover, as alliances and tactics evolve, the categories may increasingly overlap.	此外，随着联盟和策略的不断发展，威胁种类可能出现越来越多的重叠。


In the view of Admiral Mike McConnell, America’s former director of national intelligence, “Sooner or later, terror groups will achieve cyber-sophistication.	在美国前国家情报总监、海军上将迈克·麦康奈尔看来，“恐怖组织迟早将掌握复杂的网络技术。


It’s like nuclear proliferation, only far easier.”	这有些类似于核扩散，只是比核扩散要容易得多。 ”


The world is only just beginning to see glimpses of cyber war – in the denial-of-service attacks that accompanied the conventional war in Georgia in 2008, or the recent sabotage of Iranian centrifuges.	世界只是刚刚开始看到网络战争的影子——伴随2008年格鲁吉亚常规战争的拒绝服务攻击，或者是近期对伊朗离心机的破坏。


States have the greatest capabilities, but non-state actors are more likely to initiate a catastrophic attack.	国家拥有最强的力量，但非国家参与者更有可能发起灾难性的攻击。


A “cyber 9/11” may be more likely than the often-mentioned “cyber Pearl Harbor.”	“网络911”的可能性要大于经常被提及的“网络珍珠港”。


It is time for states to sit down and discuss how to limit this threat to world peace.	各国现在应该坐下来，讨论如何限制网络战争对世界和平的威胁。


Can Cyber Warfare Be Deterred?	网络战能否被遏制？


CAMBRIDGE – Fear of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” first appeared in the 1990s, and for the past two decades, policymakers have worried that hackers could blow up oil pipelines, contaminate the water supply, open floodgates and send airplanes on collision courses by hacking air traffic control systems.	坎布里奇——对“网络珍珠港”的担忧最早出现在20世纪90年代，过去20年来，决策者一直担心黑客会炸毁油管、污染水源、开启泄洪闸和袭击空中交通控制系统制造撞机事件。


In 2012, then-US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that hackers could “shut down the power grid across large parts of the country.”	2012年，时任美国国防部长帕内塔警告说黑客有能力“关闭美国大部分地区的电网”。


None of these catastrophic scenarios has occurred, but they certainly cannot be ruled out.	这样的灾难性情景暂时尚未发生，但其可能性显然不能排除。


At a more modest level, hackers were able to destroy a blast furnace at a German steel mill last year.	在相对温和的水平上，黑客去年毁坏了一座德国钢厂的高炉。


So the security question is straightforward: Can such destructive actions be deterred?	因此安全问题再简单不过：我们能否遏制这样的破坏行动？


It is sometimes said that deterrence is not an effective strategy in cyberspace, because of the difficulties in attributing the source of an attack and because of the large and diverse number of state and non-state actors involved.	有人说遏制在网络世界并非有效策略，因为难以确定袭击的来源和其中所涉及的大量国家及非国家参与者。


We are often not sure whose assets we can hold at risk and for how long.	我们往往无法确定能用谁的资产冒险以及冒险的时间长度。


Attribution is, indeed, a serious problem.	跟踪调查的问题其实非常严重。 如果没有邮件回复地址我们该怎样报复？


How can you retaliate when there is no return address?	核追踪技术远非完美，但只有九个国家拥有核武器；


Nuclear attribution is not perfect, but there are only nine states with nuclear weapons; the isotopic identifiers of their nuclear materials are relatively well known; and non-state actors face high entry barriers.	其核材料的同位素标识都明确地为外界掌握； 而非国家参与者的进入壁垒很高。


None of this is true in cyberspace where a weapon can consist of a few lines of code that can be invented (or purchased on the so-called dark web) by any number of state or non-state actors.	在任何国家或非国家主体均可创造（或在所谓黑网站上购买）几行代码作为武器的网络世界这一切都不再适用。


A sophisticated attacker can hide the point of origin behind the false flags of several remote servers.	一名有经验的攻击者可以将起始点隐藏在若干远程服务器的虚假标志之后。


While forensics can handle many “hops” among servers, it often takes time.	虽然鉴证人员可以处理众多服务器之间的“跳转”，但这往往是需要时间的。