But, more interestingly, the nuclear boom is not global: Brazil is at the forefront in Latin America, while the fastest development is occurring in Asia, mostly in China and India.	但是更加有趣的是，核能的繁荣并不是全球化的：巴西是拉丁美洲发展的先锋，然而发展速度最快的国家在亚洲，主要是中国和印度。


If we compare this geographical distribution with a global snapshot of nuclear sites prior to the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown in the United States in 1979, a striking correlation emerges between countries’ nuclear-energy policy and their geopolitical standing and economic vigor.	在1979年美国三里岛核危机爆发之前，如果我们把全球核反应堆的地点和这种发展国家的地理位置相比较，就会出现一个非常惊人的联系。 国家和核能政策和这些国家的地缘政治地位以及经济的活力有着密切的联系。


Whereas the appetite for reactors in the 1970’s reflected the international heft of the Soviet Union, and principally that of the geopolitical West – Japan, the US, and Europe – today the center of gravity has shifted irrevocably to the East, where nuclear energy has become a “gateway to a prosperous future,” in the telling words of a November 2011 commentary in The Hindu.	然而，20世纪70年代对核反应堆的兴趣反映了当时苏联的国际地位，主要也反映了地缘政治学上所说的西方---日本，美国以及欧洲的国际影响力。 但是，如今这种中心力量已经无法避免地转向到了东方。


Indeed, US President Barack Obama, evidently agreeing with that view, has boldly bet that loan guarantees and research into creating small modular reactors will reconfirm America’s global position at the forefront of civilian nuclear technology and its relevance in the new global order.	”事实上，美国总统奥巴马公开同意这个观点。 他大胆地猜想，在建立小型模块化反应堆方面的贷款保证和研究可以再次巩固美国在民用核技术方面的全球领先地位以及其在新的全球秩序方面的影响力。


Energy is, of course, the bloodline of any society, reflected in the correlation between energy demand and income.	当然，能源是任何一个社会的生命线。 这一点可以在能源的需求和供应上反映出来。


In this respect, nuclear energy’s advantages, particularly its reliability and predictable costs, stand out.	在这一方面，核能，尤其是其可依赖性和可预测花费方面显得尤为突出。


The International Energy Agency’s 2010 World Energy Outlook foresees a rise in global energy demand of 40% by 2030 – an unforgiving reality that is most tangibly felt in developing countries, particularly in Asia.	国际能源机构2010发表的世界能源展望预测到2030年时，全球能源的需要会上涨40%。 这是发展中国家，尤其是亚洲国家不可避免感受到的事实。


So expansion of nuclear energy is, and will continue to be, a fact.	所以核能的扩张现在会，将来还会持续进行下去。


To act responsibly, Europeans should be working to enhance international security standards for nuclear power, not opting out of the game.	想要做出负责任的行动，欧洲人应该致力于提到核能的国际安全标准，而并不是选择放弃使用核能。


The real lesson of Fukushima is that state controls are necessary but not sufficient to ensure nuclear safety.	福岛事件的真正教训告诉我们，国家监管在确保核能安全方面很有必要，但仍然不够。


Unfortunately, a proposal last year at the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at launching an effective international control system on safety and security of nuclear power worldwide blatantly failed with the acquiescence of the European Union.	不幸的是，去年国际原子能结构提出的旨在在世界范围内建立一个保证核能安全的国际监管系统的议案由于欧盟的态度而遭到重创。


Worse still, with European backing, the IAEA’s budget, already a paltry €300 million, has been cut by almost 10%.	更糟糕的是，由于欧盟的缘故，国际原子能机构的预算已从原本就少得可怜的3亿欧元削减了10%。


In this context, an initiative to mandate random IAEA inspections of 10% of the world’s operating reactors within three years was watered down, again with the EU’s active support, on the grounds that responsibility for security and inspections should rest primarily with member states.	在这种环境下，国际原子能机构原本出台的在未来三年内视察10%的全世界正在运行的核反应堆的草案就不得不被搁浅。


Only a slim provision that made joint inspections with the IAEA voluntary made it into the final agreement.	再者，由于欧盟积极的干预，与国际原子能机构自愿进行联合检查这一微小的决定被列入了最终决议，欧盟的理由是安全和视察的责任应该主要归于成员国。


As for the EU itself, the debate and final formulation of the March 2011 “voluntary” stress tests, accurately called “stormy” by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, revealed a bewildering array of deficiencies and weaknesses.	对于欧盟本身来讲，关于2011年3月份所提出的“自愿”原则的争论和最终决定都经历了巨大的压力，用波兰总理图斯克的话来讲经历了“狂风暴雨”。 这揭露出了一系列的弱点和不足。


Perhaps the most striking contradiction in Europe’s nuclear discourse is the discrepancy between the seeming effort to boost economic growth and employment, and the flippancy of member states in abandoning the nuclear industry, which depends on the design, engineering, and command-and-control skills that underlie Europe’s comparative advantage in the industry.	也许，欧洲对于核能讨论的最大矛盾在于他们看似努力在推动经济增长和就业问题和成员过放弃核工业是的轻浮态度间所存在的差距。 核能工业依靠设计、工程和指挥控制的技术。


One heartening exception is a recent agreement between the United Kingdom and France to forge a manufacturing alliance between Rolls Royce and Areva in nuclear technology.	最近英国和法国就劳斯莱斯公司和阿海珐集团在核能技术方买组成制造联盟的一项决议是一个鼓舞人心的例外。


But they should not be alone. Is it reasonable that Europe’s countries give up a niche of prosperity on ideological grounds that are irrelevant from a global perspective?	欧洲国家放弃繁荣的发展方式，依仗追求理论化的观点，并且这些观点脱离了国际视角，这样做对欧洲而言真的是理智的吗？


The rise of nuclear power in Europe paralleled its post-war economic prowess.	欧洲核能的发展和战后经济卓越表现是密不可分的。


It coincided with the peak of the West’s belief in its soaring economic strength and perpetual global ascendancy.	核能的发展和欧洲相信其腾飞的经济力量以及永远的够级主导地位是相一致的。


Today, with Europe increasingly seen as the sick man of the world’s economy, even the whole continent’s renunciation of nuclear energy would have little to no reverberation on the world stage.	现在，由于欧洲越来越被人们看作是国际经济中的一个“病人”，即使整个欧洲大陆都在谴责核能的使用，在全世界的舞台上也不会有太大的反响。


Dictating the direction of the policy discourse is no longer Europe’s role.	规定政策的制定方向已经不是欧洲的能力范围了。


Behaving responsibly is.	尽职尽责地行动才是欧洲应该做的。


Private Wealth and European Solidarity	私人财富与欧洲团结


COLOGNE – A little-discussed but crucial factor in the debate over wealth transfers from Europe’s more economically sound north to its troubled south is the relationship between public debt, GDP, and private wealth (households’ financial and non-financial assets, minus their financial liabilities) – in particular, the ratio of private wealth to GDP in the eurozone countries.	科隆—在关于从北欧经济坚挺国到南欧经济疲软国的财富转移的争论中，有一个关键因素很少得到讨论，这就是公债、GP和私人财富（家庭金融和非金融资产减去金融债务）之间的关系，特别是欧元区国家私人财富相对GDP只比。


While the European Central Bank’s bond-purchasing scheme has calmed financial markets to a considerable extent, some European economies – including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal – are still at risk, because they are not growing fast enough to narrow their deficits and stem the growth of their national debts.	欧洲央行的债券购买机制极大地稳定了金融市场，但一些欧洲经济体——包括意大利、西班牙、希腊和葡萄牙——仍处于危急之中，因为它们的增长速度不足以减少赤字、阻止国民债务增加。


The grim irony here is that the ratio of private wealth to GDP in some of the countries that are in need of support from the ECB and northern eurozone members is equal to or higher than that in more solvent countries.	这里有一个残酷的讽刺：一些需要欧洲央行和欧元区北欧成员国支持的国家的私人财富对GDP的比率与更坚挺的国家一样高甚至更高。


Consider Italy, which has the highest ratio of private wealth to public debt of any G-7 country, and is some 30% to 40% higher than in Germany.	就拿意大利来说，其私人财富对GDP的比率比任何G7国家都高，比德国高出30%—40%。


Likewise, Italy and France share a private wealth/GDP ratio of five to one, while Spain’s – at least before the crisis hit the country in full – was six to one.	类似地，意大利和法国的私人财富/GDP比率大约为五比一，而西班牙——至少在危机全面爆发之前——高达六比一。


By contrast, the ratio in Germany, Europe’s largest creditor, is only 3.5 to one.	相反，欧洲最大债权国德国的这一比例只有3. 5比1。


This discrepancy is at the heart of the question with which European policymakers are now grappling: Should taxpayers in debtor countries expect “solidarity” – or, more bluntly, money – from taxpayers in creditor countries?	这一差异是目前欧洲决策者正在试图抓住的问题的核心。 债务国纳税人应该期待债权国纳税人的“团结”——或者说得更直白一点，债权国纳税人的钱吗？


Why should taxpayers in creditor countries have to take responsibility for financing the euro crisis, especially given that high private wealth/GDP ratios may result from low tax revenues over time, while lower ratios may reflect higher tax revenues?	债权国纳税人的钱为什么非得用来担起为欧元危机融资的责任，特别是在高私人财富/GDP的原因可能正是长期以来的低税，而低私人财富/GDP则是高税的反映的情况下？


Before seeking or accepting help from the rest of Europe, countries should employ all available domestic resources.	在寻求或接受欧洲其他国家帮助之前，各国应该尝试各种国内资源。


Debtor governments should call upon their own taxpayers to fund some of the national debt in order to avoid higher interest rates in credit markets.	债务国政府应该要求本国纳税人为某些国民债务买单，以避免信用市场利率升高。


They could, for example, offer an incentive in the form of a 3-4% interest rate on bonds, and even make them tax-free eventually.	比如，它们可以为债券提供3—4%的利率激励，甚至给他们完全免税的待遇。


This would allow Italy, Spain, and even Greece to finance their national debts at a more reasonable, sustainable cost.	这将使意大利、西班牙甚至希腊以合理而可持续的水平为其国民债务融资。


Citizens’ voluntary financing of their countries’ national debt would be the most effective means of reducing strain on Europe’s financial resources, while simultaneously serving as a powerful symbol of solidarity.	公民自愿为祖国国民债务融资将是减弱欧洲财政资源约束的最有效办法，同时也将是团结的有力刺激因素。


By contrast, turning creditor-country citizens’ tax payments into forced subsidies of other countries’ debts would undermine European cohesion.	相反，要求拿债权国公民的税款来强制补贴他国债务只能破坏欧洲的凝聚力。


Nordic countries, for example, cannot be expected to fund other countries’ debts in the long term – especially if those countries have not made full use of their own resources.	比如，北欧国家不可能愿意长期为他国债务提供融资，特别是在这些国家并没有充分调动自身资源的情况下。


In fact, while concerns over the eurozone’s survival tend to focus on its indebted members, Europe’s monetary union is at risk of losing one of the few members that still enjoys a triple-A credit rating: Finland.	事实上，尽管关于欧元区生存的担忧总是集中在债务国，但欧洲货币联盟的风险是失去仅有的几个仍保有3A新用评级的成员国之一：芬兰。


Given Finland’s difficult domestic political situation, its citizens may look to Denmark and Sweden – which boast rapid growth and low national debt, and do not pay into the European Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism – and decide that eurozone membership costs too much and is no longer worthwhile.	由于国内政局陷入了困境，芬兰人民可能会向丹麦和瑞典看齐——这两个国家均保持着高增长和低国民债务，且不用为欧洲金融稳定机制和欧洲稳定机制出资——认为欧元区成员国地位成本太高，不值得留在其中。


Italy and Spain have enough resources to rescue themselves, and to secure the time needed to restructure their economies.	意大利和西班牙有足够的资源自我拯救以及赢得重组其经济的时间。


Indeed, even after taking on the entire national debt, their private wealth/GDP ratios would still be higher than they are in some northern European countries.	事实上，即使在承担所有国民债务之后，它们的私人财富/GDP比率仍将高于某些北欧国家。


Escaping the euro crisis is less a matter of economics than of political will.	走出欧元危机更多地是政治意愿问题，而不是经济问题。


By calling upon citizens to finance their own countries’ national debts, southern Europe’s leaders can fix their own economies and strengthen the European principles of solidarity and subsidiarity.	通过号召公民为祖国国民债务融资，南欧领导人可以修补自身经济，还能强化欧洲的团结互助原则。


Furnace Cities	火炉之城


COPENHAGEN -- It’s possible to see, right now, what global warming will eventually do to the planet.	哥本哈根——现在应该可以看到全球变暖最终将会给这个星球带来怎样的后果了。


To peek into the future, all we have to do is go to Beijing, Athens, Tokyo, or, in fact, just about any city on Earth.	要想知道未来会是怎样一种景象，我们只须到北京、雅典、东京，或者，事实上，地球上几乎任何一个城市去看一看就明白了。


Most of the world’s urban areas have already experienced far more dramatic temperature hikes over the past few decades than the 2.6°C increase expected from global warming over the next hundred years.	世界上绝大多数的城区在过去几十年间都经历了远比因为全球变暖而导致未来百年间气温预计将提高2. 6℃的幅度高出很多的气温的上升。


It’s simple enough to understand.	这一点很容易理解。


On a hot day in New York, locals sprawl out on the grass fields of Central Park, not on asphalt parking lots or concrete sidewalks.	在纽约的一个大热天里，当地人躺在中央公园的绿地上，而不是沥青地面的停车场或混凝土路面的人行道上。


Bricks, concrete, and asphalt – the building blocks from which cities are made – absorb much more heat from the sun than vegetation does in the countryside.	砖头、混凝土和沥青这些建造城市的材料比农村的植被从太阳那儿吸收了更多的热量。


Across an entire city, there’s much more tarmac than there is grass.	在整座城市里，沥青路面比绿地多得多。


So the air above the city heats up.	所以城市上空的气体就变热了。


This effect, called an “urban heat island,” was discovered in London in the early 1800’s.	这种被称为“城市热岛”的效应是在十九世纪初在伦敦被人们发现的。


Today, the fastest-growing cities are in Asia.	今天，人口增长最快的城市都在亚洲。


Beijing is roughly 10°C hotter than the nearby countryside in the daytime and 5.5°C warmer at night.	北京与其邻近的农村相比，白天的温度大概要高出10℃，而夜间的温度大概要高5. 5℃。


There are even more dramatic increases in Tokyo.	而东京的温度甚至还要更高。 八月份，那里的温度比周围的农村高出12.


In August, temperatures there climbed 12.5oC above the surrounding countryside, reaching 40oC – a scorching heat that affected not only the downtown area, but also covered some 8,000 square kilometers.	5℃，达到了40℃。 这种灼热的温度不仅影响了闹市区，还覆盖了大约8000平方公里的范围。


Looking at a fast-growing city like Houston, Texas, we can see the real effect of the urban heat island.	看看人口快速增长的城市，像德克萨斯州的休斯顿，我们会看到城市热岛效应的真正影响。


Over the last 12 years, Houston grew by 20%, or 300,000 inhabitants.	在过去12年间，休斯顿的人口增长了20%，或者说30万居民。 在这段时间内，夜间温度上升了大约0.


During that time, the night time temperature increased about 0.8°C. Over a hundred-year period, that would translate to a whopping 7°C increase.	8℃。 照此推算，经过100年，温度就会惊人地上升7℃。


But, while celebrity activists warn about the impending doom posed by climate change, a more realistic view is offered by these cities’ ability to cope.	但是，当一些著名的活动家警告气候变化即将带来的灾难时，我们看到的更真实的情景是这些城市应对这些变化的能力。


Despite dramatic increases over the past 50 or 100 years, these cities have not come tumbling down.	尽管过去50或100年间气温的剧烈上升，这些城市并没有摇摇欲坠。


Even as temperatures have risen, heat-related deaths have decreased, owing to improved health care, access to medical facilities, and air-conditioning.	即便气温上升了，但是因为健康护理水平的提高、医疗设施的便利以及空调而使因为天气热而死亡的人数反而下降了。


We have far more money and much greater technological ability to adapt than our forebears ever did.	我们拥有更多的钱和更高的技术能力，因而使我们的适应能力远比我们的祖辈要高。


Of course, cities also will be hit by temperature increases from CO2, in addition to further warming from urban heat islands.	当然，城市还因为二氧化碳含量的上升而导致气温的升高，从而进一步加剧了因为城市热岛效应而带来的气候变暖。


But we have an opportunity to act.	但是我们有机会采取行动。


Unlike our forebears, who did very little or nothing about urban heat islands, we are in a good position to tackle many of their effects.	与我们对于城市热岛效应所做甚少或者无所作为的祖辈不同，我们有很好的办法应对它所带来的许多影响。


While celebrity activists focus entirely on cutting CO2, we could do much more – and at much lower cost – if we addressed urban heat islands.	当著名的活动家把注意力全部放在削减二氧化碳含量的问题上时，其实我们能够做到的要多得多并且是以低得多的成本，如果我们着手解决城市热岛问题的话。


Simple solutions can make a vast difference to temperatures.	简单的解决方案能够给温度带来巨大的差异。


Cities are hotter than the land around them because they are drier.	城市比它们周围的地方热的原因在于它们更干燥。


They lack moist green spaces and have drainage systems that efficiently remove water.	它们缺少潮湿的绿地，并且排水系统会大量地排出水分。


In London, the air around the River Thames is cooler than it is a few blocks away in built-up areas.	在伦敦，泰晤士河周围的空气比几个街区外的建成区要凉快得多。


If we plant trees and build water features, we won’t just beautify our surroundings, but we’ll also cool things down – by upwards of 8°C, according to climate models.	如果我们种更多的树和建造更多的水景，那我们就不仅仅能美化我们的环境，并且还可以降低温度。 根据气候模型，最高可降低8℃。


Moreover, although it may seem almost comically straightforward, one of the best temperature-reducing approaches is very simple: paint things white.	此外，尽管这看上去几乎有点令人发笑地直截了当，但是有一个降低温度的方法非常简单：把物体涂成白颜色。


Cities have a lot of black asphalt and dark, heat-absorbing structures.	城市里有大量黑色的沥青和黑色的、吸热的结构。


By increasing reflection and shade, a great deal of heat build-up can be avoided.	通过增加反射和遮光物，大量聚集起来的热量是可以避免的。


Paint most of a city and you could lower the temperature by 10°C.	把城市的大多数地方涂成白色，我们可以把温度降低10℃。


These options are simple, obvious, and cost-effective.	这些选择简单、明显并且很划算。


Consider Los Angeles.	以洛杉矶为例。


Re-roofing most of the city’s five million homes in lighter colors, painting a quarter of the roads and planting 11 million trees would have a one-time cost of about $1 billion.	把这个城市的五百万所房屋的大部分屋顶重新涂成更浅的颜色，把四分之一的路面涂成白颜色以及种1100万棵树，将一次性花费大约10亿美元。


Each year after that, this would lower air conditioning costs by about $170 million and provide $360 million in smog-reduction benefits.	此后的每一年，它可以减少大约1700万美元的空调费用，并且在降低烟雾方面带来3600万美元的利益。


And it would lower LA temperatures by about 3°C – or about the temperature increase envisioned for the rest of this century.	并且它可以使洛杉矶的温度大约降低3℃，或者是预计其在本世纪内大约会上升的温度。


Compare that to the $180 billion cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, which will have virtually no effect.	让我们把这笔费用与实施《东京议定书》将要耗费的1800亿美元作一下比较，何况实施《东京议定书》实际上并不会起到什么作用。


At the moment, we don’t hear much about the smartest choices when it comes to addressing global warming.	当前，在谈到解决全球变暖的问题时我们并没有听到太多最最聪明的选择。


That needs to change.	这种状况必须要有改变。


We do get to choose which future we want.	我们必须选择哪一种未来是我们所想要的。


The Negative Rates Club	负利率俱乐部


BRUSSELS – For the better part of a decade, central banks have been making only limited headway in curbing powerful global deflationary forces.	布鲁塞尔—在最近十年的大部分时间里，中央银行在遏制强大的全球通缩力量方面只取得了有限的进展。


Since 2008, the US Federal Reserve has maintained zero interest rates, while pursuing multiple waves of unprecedented balance-sheet expansion through large-scale bond purchases.	2008年以来，美联储将利率维持在零水平，同时还通过大规模债券购买操作进行了多次前所未有的资产负债表扩张。


The Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank have followed suit, each with its own version of so-called “quantitative easing” (QE).	英格兰银行、日本银行和欧洲央行也纷纷步美联储后尘，都实施了各自版本的所谓“量化宽松”（QE）。


Yet inflation has not picked up appreciably anywhere.	但通货膨胀在任何地方都没获得合理的提升。


Despite their shared struggles with deflationary pressures, these countries’ monetary policies – and economic performance – are now diverging.	尽管这些国家都在与通缩压力作斗争，但它们的货币政策——以及经济表现——正在分化。


Whereas the United States and the United Kingdom are now growing strongly enough to exit their expansionary policies and raise interest rates, the eurozone and Japan are doubling down on QE, pushing policy long-term interest rates further into negative territory.	美国和英国现在的增长足够强势，已经可以退出扩张性政策并提高利率，而欧元区和日本正在加码QE，将政策长期利率进一步推向负区间。


What explains this difference?	这一区别的原因何在？


The short answer is debt.	简短地回答是债务。


The US and the UK have been running current-account deficits for decades, and are thus debtors, while the eurozone and Japan have been running external surpluses, making them creditors.	几十年来，美国和英国一直有经常项目赤字，因此是债务国，而欧元区和日本一直有外部盈余，因此是债权国。


Because negative rates benefit debtors and harm creditors, introducing them after the global economic crisis spurred a recovery in the US and the UK, but had little effect in the eurozone and Japan.	负利率有利于债务国而不利于债权国，因此全球经济危机之后所引入的负利率刺激了美国和英国的复苏，但对于欧元区和日本基本上没有什么效果。


This is not an isolated phenomenon.	这不是一个孤立的现象。


By now, most of the world’s creditor countries – those with large and persistent current-account surpluses, such as Denmark and Switzerland – have negative interest rates, not only for long-term governments bonds and other “riskless” debt, but also for medium-term maturities.	到目前为止，全世界大部分债权国——有持续大量经常项目盈余的国家，比如丹麦和瑞士——都存在负利率，不仅长期政府债券和其他“无风险”债务如此，中等期限债券也是如此。


And it is doing little good.	这绝非好事。


Despite the weak impact of low interest rates, central banks in these economies remain committed to them.	尽管低利率收效甚微，但这些经济体的央行仍然坚持这一政策。


If it is suggested that QE or lower interest rates are unlikely to benefit their economies much, they shift the focus of the discussion, railing against the notion that raising interest rates would stimulate the economy – an ostensibly airtight argument.	如果你提出QE或降低利率不可能给经济带来收益，他们就会顾左右而言他，反驳提升利率能刺激经济的概念——从表面上看这无懈可击。


Only it is actually far from airtight.	但实际上这漏洞百出。


Basic economics courses cover the curious case of the “backward-bending supply curve of savings”: In some circumstances, lower interest rates can lead to higher savings.	基础经济学课程都有提到“向后弯曲的储蓄供给曲线”这一奇特现象：在一定的环境中，降低利率导致储蓄增加。


Because lower rates reduce savers’ income, they spend less, especially if they have a savings target for their retirement.	因为利率下降减少了储蓄者的收入，他们会减少支出，特别是如果他们具有为退休而储蓄的目标的话。


None of this discredits the general rule – which forms the basis of modern monetary policymaking – that a lower interest rate tends to stimulate consumption and other expenditure.	所有这些都不是在否定一般规则——它构成了现代货币决策的基础——降低利率能够刺激消费和其他支出。


The impact simply varies according to the economy’s debt position.	只不过影响因为经济体的债务状况的不同而不同。


In a closed economy, there is a debtor for every creditor, so whatever creditors lose from ultra-low interest rates, debtors should gain.	在封闭经济中，每个债权人都有一个债务人，因此，不管债权人因为极低利率损失什么，债务人都应该获益。


But in an economy with a large net-foreign-asset position, there are naturally more creditors than debtors.	但在一个存在大量净外国资产头寸的经济中，债权人自然会比债务人多。


For a country with large foreign debts, the opposite is true.	对于一个存在大量外国债务的国家来说，情况正好相反。


The effectiveness of monetary policy at the lower bound should thus be different in creditor and debtor economies.	因此，利率下限货币政策的效果在债权和债务经济体中是不同的。


Until recently, this condition did not matter, because foreign-asset positions were usually small (as a percentage of GDP).	直到最近，这一条件并不重要，因为外国资产头寸常常较小（以GDP的百分比衡量）。


Today, however, these positions in the major industrial economies are large and increasingly divergent, partly owing to the buildup of leverage that led to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.	但是，如今，主要工业化经济体的外国资产头寸很大并且日益多样化，部分是因为导致2007—2008年全球金融危机的杠杆化。


And, in fact, at the international level, leverage is continuing to grow.	事实上，在国家层面，杠杆仍在继续增加。


Though current-account imbalances have generally fallen since the financial crisis began, they have not reversed.	尽管经常项目失衡总体而言从金融危机开始后有所减轻，但并未逆转。


This implies that the surplus countries continue to strengthen their creditor positions, diverging from the deficit economies.	这意味着盈余国家继续强化它们的债权人地位，与赤字经济体产生分化。


Commodity exporters like Russia and Saudi Arabia, which ran large current-account surpluses when oil prices were high, are the main exception to this pattern of diverging foreign-asset positions.	一些大宗商品出口国，比如俄罗斯和沙特阿拉伯，在石油价格高企时存在大量经常项目盈余，它们成为外国资产头寸分化的主要例外。


With the precipitous decline in world oil prices since June 2014, their fortunes have reversed.	2014年6月以来，世界油价发生暴跌，这些国家的财富趋势逆转。


Their export earnings have plummeted – falling by half in many cases – forcing them to run deficits and draw on the large sovereign-wealth funds they accumulated during the global commodity boom.	它们的出口收益剧烈减少——很多国家跌去一半——���迫使它们产生赤字，依靠在全球大宗商品繁荣时期积累的庞大的主权财富基金。


A radical reduction in expenditure has now become unavoidable.	如今，大幅降低支出已经不可避免。


The industrialized economies face very different challenges.	工业化经济体面临完全不同的挑战。


Their problem – in a sense, a luxury problem – is to ensure that their consumers spend the windfall from lower import prices.	它们的问题——从某种程度上说，是一个奢侈的问题——是确保消费者将得自进口价格下降的意外之财花掉。


But in the creditor countries, negative rates do not seem to advance this goal; indeed, some external surpluses are even increasing.	但在债权国，负利率似乎并没有推进这一目标； 事实上，一些外部盈余甚至还在增加。


This divergence is also playing out within the eurozone.	这一分化在欧元区内部也存在。


Though it is a creditor economy overall, it comprises debtor countries as well.	尽管作为一个整体，欧元区是债权经济体，但其中也有债务国。


The debtor economies, such as Spain and Portugal, now run small current-account surpluses, and are gradually reducing their debt.	债务经济体，比如西班牙和葡萄牙，现在都有销量经常项目盈余，并在逐步降低债务。


But the traditional creditors have seen their current-account surpluses grow so much that the debtor/creditor asymmetry continues to increase.	但传统债务国的经常项目盈余太高，以至于债务国/债权国不对称性继续增加。


Most notably, since the start of the financial crisis, Germany's current-account surplus has increased to nearly 8% of GDP, meaning that the country has accumulated more surpluses in that period than in its entire previous history.	最值得关注的是，自金融危机爆发以来，德国经常项目盈余增加到GDP的近8%，这意味着德国在此期间所积累的盈余超过了此前的历史总和。


On current trends, the German creditor position might rise from 60% of GDP to 100% of GDP.	按照当前趋势，德国债权头寸可能从GDP的60%增加到100%。


Central bankers are supposed to be patient.	央行行长应该是耐心的。


Indeed, economists supported the global movement toward central-bank independence precisely because it seemed that central bankers would be less inclined to try to stimulate the economy for short-term gain.	事实上，经济学家之所以支持央行独立的全球潮流，正是因为央行行长较少渴望刺激短期经济增长。


But central bankers seem to have become impatient, fretting about low inflation, even though the output gap is slowly closing and full employment has been reached in the US and Japan.	但央行行长们似乎耐心并不好，为低通胀大伤脑筋，尽管产出缺口正在慢慢填补，美国和日本还实现了充分就业。


Creditor countries’ central bankers must stop trying to manipulate their economies with more potentially counterproductive monetary easing.	债务国央行行长必须停止用更多可能不利于生产的货币宽松操纵经济。


Instead, they should allow the recovery to run its course, even if that happens slowly, and wait for the base effect of lower oil prices to disappear.	相反，他们应该允许复苏自己发展，即使它十分缓慢，并等待油价下跌的基数效应消失。


ECB President Mario Draghi recently admitted that, in today’s global context, the current monetary-policy approach might not be effective.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉最近承认，在今天的全球环境下，当前货币政策方针也许并不有效。


But promising more of the same is not the answer.	但承诺更多老方一帖不是解决之道。


Preventing the Next Eurozone Crisis Starts Now	从现在开始防止下一场欧元区危机


PARIS – European leaders have devoted scant attention to the future of the eurozone since July 2012, when Mario Draghi, the European Central Bank’s president, famously committed to do “whatever it takes” to save the common currency.	巴黎—自2012年7月欧洲央行行长德拉吉发出著名的声音，承诺“不惜一切代价”拯救共同货币以来，欧洲领导人便不再关注欧元区的未来。


For more than four years, they have essentially subcontracted the eurozone’s stability and integrity to the central bankers.	四年多来，他们事实上已将欧元区的稳定和完整转包给了央行行长。


But, while the ECB has performed the job skillfully, this quiet, convenient arrangement is coming to an end, because no central bank can solve political or constitutional conundrums.	但是，尽管欧洲央行表现出了极强的工作能力，其悄然进行的便利安排已经行将结束，因为任何央行都无法解决政治或宪法难题。


Europe’s heads of state and government would be wise to start over and consider options for the eurozone’s future, rather than letting circumstances decide for them.	欧洲各国首脑和政府明智的话应该开始考虑欧元区的未来选择，而不是让环境来替他们做决定。


So far, Europe’s leaders have had little appetite for such a discussion.	目前，欧洲领导人对讨论这一问题毫无兴趣。


In June 2015, they only paid lip service to a report on the euro’s future by the presidents of the various European institutions.	2015年6月，他们只是由各大欧洲机构首脑动动嘴皮子就欧元的未来作了一番报告。


A few weeks later, the issue briefly returned to the agenda when eurozone leaders spent a long late-July night arguing about whether to kick out Greece; but their stated intention to follow up and address underlying problems was short-lived.	几周后，这一问题短暂地回到了议程中——欧元区领导人在7月末花了长长一个晚上讨论是否要将希腊踢出欧元区； 但他们只是短暂地公开表示要跟进并解决基本问题。


Finally, plans to respond to the Brexit shock by strengthening the eurozone were quickly ditched, owing to fear that reform would prove too divisive.	最后，通过强化欧元区来应对英国退欧冲击的响应计划很快也被放弃，因为他们担心改革具有太多的分歧性。


The issue, however, has not gone away.	但是，问题从未消失。


Although the monetary anesthetics administered by the ECB have reduced market tensions, nervousness has reemerged in the run-up to the Italian constitutional referendum on December 4.	尽管欧洲央行的货币麻药缓和了市场的紧张，但随着12月4日意大利修宪公投的临近，紧张情绪再次高涨起来。


By end-November spreads between Italian and German ten-year bunds reached 200 basis points, a level not seen since 2014.	截至11月底，意大利和德国十年期国债利差达到了200个基点，为2014年以来的最高水平。


The worrying state of several Italian banks is one reason for the mounting concern.	多家意大利银行状况令人担忧，这也是人们日益担忧的原因之一。


Brexit, and the election of a US president who advocates Americanism instead of globalism and dismisses the EU, adds the risk that voters, rather than markets, will call into question European monetary integration.	英国退欧、美国选出了一位宣扬美国主义而非全球主义并且鼓吹欧盟解体的总统，增加了选民（而非市场）质疑欧洲货币一体化的风险。


Anti-euro political parties are on the rise in all major eurozone countries except Spain.	反欧元政党在所有欧元区主要国家纷纷崛起，只有西班牙是例外。


In Italy, they may well command a majority.	在意大利，它们很有可能能够赢得多数。


On the economic front, the eurozone has much unfinished business.	在经济方面，欧元区有很多任务有待完成。


The banking union, launched in June 2012 to sever the interdependence of banks and states, has made good progress but is not yet complete.	2012年6月为了便利银行和国家相互依存而启动的银行联盟取得了很大的进展，但尚未完成。


Competitiveness gaps between eurozone members have diminished, and external imbalances within it have abated, but largely thanks to the compression of domestic demand in Southern Europe; saving flows from North to South have not resumed.	欧元区成员国之间的竞争力差距有所缩小，欧元区内部外部失衡有所减轻，但主要原因是南欧内需受到抑制； 从北向南流动的储蓄流没有恢复。


Unemployment gaps remain wide.	失业差距仍然巨大。


The eurozone still lacks a common fiscal mechanism as well, and Germany has flatly rejected the European Commission’s recent attempt to promote a “positive stance” in countries with room to boost spending.	欧元区也仍然缺少共同财政机制，德国断然拒绝了欧盟委员会敦促存在刺激支出空间的国家上采取“积极立场”的最新尝试。


Of course, when the next recession hits, fiscal stability is likely to be in dangerously short supply.	当然，如果新的衰退袭来，财政稳定也可能严重紧缺。


Finally, the governance of the eurozone remains excessively cumbersome and technocratic.	最后，欧元区的治理仍然过于繁复和技术官僚化。


Most ministers, not to mention legislators, appear to have become lost in a procedural morass.	大部分部长——更不用说立法者了——似乎已经迷失在程序的陷阱中。


This unsatisfactory equilibrium may or may not last, depending on political or financial risks – or, most likely, the interaction between them.	这一无法令人满意的均衡可能会持续，也可能不会持续，取决于政治或金融风险——或者更有可能地，取决于两者的互动。


So the question now is how to hold a fruitful discussion to map out possible responses.	因此，现在的问题是如何进行卓有成效的讨论制定可能的应对方案。


The obstacles are twofold: First, there is no longer any momentum toward “more Europe”; on the contrary, a combination of skepticism about Europe and reluctance concerning potential transfers constitutes a major stumbling block.	障碍是双方面的：首先，“更加欧洲”的动力已经不复存在； 相反，质疑欧洲和排斥考虑政治转移问题的合力构成了一大拦路石。


And, second, views about the nature and root causes of the euro crisis differ across countries.	其次，关于欧元危机的性质和根源的看法，各国不尽相同。


Given the dearth of political capital to spend on European responses, and disagreement on what the problem is and how to solve it, governments’ excess of caution is hardly surprising.	没有多少政治资本可用于欧洲响应机制，而关于问题所在和解决之道又存在分歧，因此政府谨小慎微不足为奇。


Both obstacles can be overcome.	这两个障碍都可以克服。


For starters, discussion of the eurozone’s future should not be framed as necessarily leading to further integration.	首先，关于欧元区未来的决定并不一定要带来进一步一体化。


The goal should be to make the eurozone work, which may imply giving more powers to the center in some fields, but also less in others.	目标应该是让欧元区运转正常，这意味着在某些领域增加权力的集中，在另一些领域则减少集中。


Fiscal responsibility, for example, should not be reduced to centralized enforcement of a common regime.	比如，财政责任不应该退化为集中执行共同机制。


It is possible to design a policy framework that embodies a more decentralized approach, empowering national institutions to monitor budgetary behavior and overall fiscal sustainability.	设计这样一个政策框架是可能的：它采用更加分散化的方针，授予国家机构监督预算行为和总体财政可持续性的权力。


In fact, some steps in this direction have already been taken.	事实上，已经采取了一些这一方向上的步骤。


Going further would imply making governments individually responsible for their misconduct – in other words, making partial debt restructuring possible within the eurozone.	更进一步意味着让各国政府为各自的不当行为负责——换句话说，就是在欧元区内实行局部债务重组。


Such an approach would raise significant difficulties, if only because transiting to such a regime would be a hazardous journey; but options of this sort should be part of the discussion.	这一方针将带来巨大的困难，因为转向这样一套机制的过程充满了风险； 但诸如此类的选项应该成为讨论的一部分。


To overcome the second obstacle, the discussion should not start by addressing the legacy problems.	要克服第二个障碍，讨论不应该从解决遗留问题开始。


Distributing a burden between creditors and debtors is inevitably acrimonious, because it is a purely zero-sum game.	在债权国和债务国之间分配负担难免会引起激烈的争议，因为这是一个纯粹的零和博弈。


The history of international financial relations demonstrates that such discussions are inevitably delayed and necessarily adversarial when they take place.	国际金融关系史证明，这样的讨论不可避免地需要耗费很长时间，实施之后也一定会引起对立。


So the issue should not be addressed first.	因此，一开始不要去解决这个问题。


The seemingly realistic option of starting with immediate problems before addressing longer-term issues is only superficially attractive.	看似现实的选择是在解决长期问题之前先从解决眼前的问题开始，但这一选择只是表面上具有吸引力。


In reality, discussions should start with the features of the permanent regime to be established in the longer run.	在现实中，讨论应该从长期来看应该建立具备什么特征的永久性机制开始。


Participants should explore logically coherent options until they determine if they can agree on a blueprint.	参与者应该探索逻辑相洽的选项，直到他们确认是否能够形成一致草案。


It is only when agreement on a blueprint for the future has been reached that the path toward realizing it should be discussed.	只有关于未来的一致草案形成，实现之路才有讨论的意义。


There are no quick fixes to the eurozone’s problems.	欧元区问题没有速效药。


But one thing is clear: the lack of genuine discussion on possible futures is a serious cause for concern.	但有一件事是明确的：缺乏关于可能的未来的真正的讨论是一个严重的忧虑原因。


Silence is not always golden; for the sake of Europe’s future, the hush surrounding the common currency should be broken as soon as possible.	沉默未必是金； 对欧洲的未来命运而言，环绕在共同货币周围的寂静必须尽快打破。


The G20 Embraces Green Finance	G20采纳绿色金融


BEIJING – The G20’s finance ministers and central-bank governors have begun to undertake a stunning shift in mindset.	北京—G20财政和央行行长已经开始大幅转换思维。


They have become increasingly convinced that “green finance” – financing environmentally sustainable growth – should be at the center of economic-development strategies.	他们越来越信奉“绿色金融”——环境可持续怎张融资——应该成为经济发展战略的核心。


Such an idea, until recently confined to a fringe of academics and policymakers, is potentially one of the most important new “truths” of the twenty-first century.	此前这一思想只存在于少数学者和决策者心中，它有可能是二十一世纪最重要的新“真理”。


The conventional economic-development model viewed environmental protection as a “luxury good” that societies could afford only after they became rich.	传统经济发展模型将环境保护视为“奢侈品”，只有在社会致富以后才有可能实现。


Such thinking explains why the dramatic growth in global income, 80-fold in real terms during the last century, has been accompanied by a decline, according to the United Nations Environment Programme, in natural capital in 127 of 140 countries.	这一思维解释了，为何全球收入的大幅增长——以实际值衡量，在过去一个世纪中增长80倍——带来的是140个国家中有127国自然资本的下降（据联合国环境规划署）。


But natural capital is not just an abstract concept; it supports lives, livelihoods, and societal wellbeing.	但自然资本不仅仅是一个抽象的概念； 它支持生命、生计和社会福利。


The environmental destruction that our activities are wreaking – greenhouse-gas emissions add energy to the Earth system at a rate equivalent to the detonation of four nuclear bombs every second – has concrete consequences, which are already being borne by millions of people.	我们的活动所造成的环境破坏——温室气体排放个地球系统增加的能量相当于每秒钟引爆四颗核弹——带来的后果是实实在在的，数百万人已经感受到了这一后果。


Since 2008, an average of 26.4 million people have been displaced from their homes by natural disasters each year – equivalent to almost one person every second.	2008年以来，平均每年有2,640万人因为自然灾害而流离失所——几乎相当于每秒钟一人。


One-third of the world’s arable land is now jeopardized by land degradation, which causes economic losses of $6.3-10.6 trillion per year.	如今，三分之一的全球适耕土地受到土壤退化困扰，每年导致6. 3—10.


And 21 of the world’s 37 largest aquifers have passed their sustainability tipping point.	6万亿美元的经济损失。 全世界37个最大的含水层中有21个已经越过了可持续性触发点。


The downsides of the conventional approach to economic development, which favors income and employment over environmental protection, are particularly apparent in China.	传荣经济发展方针认为收入和就业比环境更重要，其缺点在中国尤其触目惊心。


By some measures – in particular, per capita income and GDP growth – China’s development process has been an extraordinary success.	以某些标准衡量——特别是人均收入和GDP增长——中国的发展过程可谓巨大的成功。


But it has also brought lethal levels of air pollution and extensive contamination and depletion of land and water.	但这也带来了致命水平的空气污染以及土地和水的大规模毒化和枯竭。


The good news is that Chinese leaders now seem to recognize that they must safeguard the environment before China achieves high-income status.	好消息是如今中国领导人似乎认识到他们必须在中国跨进高收入行列之前就开始保护环境。


Indeed, they have moved to the forefront of the green-finance movement.	事实上，他们已经站在了绿色金融运动前列。


To be sure, the challenge facing China is monumental.	诚然，中国面临着艰巨的挑战。


Success will require an estimated $600 billion in investment each year, in areas including environmental remediation and protection, renewable energies and energy efficiency, and sustainable transportation systems.	成功需要每年投入6,000亿美元，涉及到的领域包括环境修复和保护、可再生能源和能源效率，以及可持续交通系统。


Given that less than 15% of that finance will come from public sources, China will also have to retool its financial system to support private investment.	只有不到15%的这类融资来自公共部门，中国需要重整其金融体系以支持私人投资。


But China is already taking concrete steps in the right direction.	但中国已经朝着正确的方向迈出了坚实的步骤。


On August 30, President Xi Jinping presided over a decision by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms to transform China’s financial system to facilitate green investment.	8月30日，国家主席习近平主持了中央全面深化改革领导小组的决定——改革中国金融体系，便利绿色投资。


The so-called “guidelines for establishing a green finance system” adopted at the meeting represent the world’s first attempt at an integrated policy package to promote an ambitious shift toward a green economy.	会议所确定的“构建绿色金融体系的指导意见”是全世界首个推进宏大绿色经济转型计划的综合政策方案。


According to the guidelines, China will have to develop a wide range of new financial instruments, including green credit, green development funds, green bonds, green equity index products, green insurance, and carbon finance.	根据该指导意见，中国必须开发各种新金融工具，包括绿色信用、绿色发展基金、绿色债券、绿色股票指数产品、绿色保险以及碳金融。


It must also introduce a host of specific policies, regulations, and incentives, including innovative use of the central bank’s relending operations, interest subsidies, and guarantees.	中国还提出了一系列具体政策、监管措施和激励，包括对央行再贷款操作的创新性使用、利息补贴以及担保。


And it must establish a national-level Green Development Fund, much like the United Kingdom’s Green Investment Bank.	此外，中国还必须成立一个国家级的绿色发展基金，类似于英国的绿色投资银行。


How this process unfolds in China will hold important lessons for others seeking to build more sustainable economies.	这一过程在中国如何展开将给其他寻求构建更加可持续的经济的国家提供重要教训。


But some governments are not hesitating to make their own way.	但一些政府正毫不犹豫地走自己的道路。


From the City of London’s Green Finance Initiative to Indonesia’s Sustainable Finance Roadmap, innovative policy packages are emerging at an accelerating pace.	从伦敦金融城的绿色金融计划（Green Finance Initiative）到印度尼西亚的可持续金融路线图（Sustainable Finance Roadmap），创新政策方案出现的速度越来越快。


Moreover, many of the world’s stock exchanges have committed to requiring listed companies to report on their sustainable development risks.	此外，全世界许多证券交易所承诺要求挂牌公司报告各自的可持续发展风险。


And a coalition of banking regulators has emerged to explore how to advance green credit.	一个银行监管者联盟已经成立，探索如何推动绿色信用。


Details vary by country, but the goal is a common one: to align capital markets with the financing needs of an inclusive, sustainable economy.	各国的具体情况各不相同，但目标是一致的：让资本市场与包容的、可持续的经济的融资需求相一致。


The G20’s agenda, which aims to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced economic growth, should now be updated to reflect this shared goal, with green finance becoming a key component of the G20’s business.	旨在推动强劲、可持续和平衡的经济增长的G20议程也应该进行更新以体现这一共同目标，让绿色金融成为G20的一项关键工作。


This week’s summit in China is the ideal place to start.	本周的中国峰会是一个理想的起点。


The Age of Megaprojects	巨型工程时代


WASHINGTON, DC – We seem to be entering a new age of megaprojects, as countries, in particular those of the G-20, mobilize the private sector to invest heavily in multi-million (if not multi-billion or multi-trillion) dollar infrastructure initiatives, such as pipelines, dams, water and electricity systems, and road networks.	华盛顿—我们似乎正在进入一个巨型工程新时代，各国，特别是G-20国家，动员私人部门大量投资数百万美元（乃至数十亿、数万亿美元）的基础设施项目，包括输油管道、大坝、水利电力系统和道路网络等。


Already, spending on megaprojects amounts to some $6-9 trillion a year, roughly 8% of global GDP, making this the “biggest investment boom in human history.”	目前巨型工程支出每年已高达6—9万亿美元，约占全球GDP的8%，这意味着这是“人类历史上规模最大的投资繁荣”。


And geopolitics, the pursuit of economic growth, the quest for new markets, and the search for natural resources is driving even more funding into large-scale infrastructure projects.	而地缘政治、对经济增长的追求、对新市场的渴望以及对自然资源的搜寻正在驱使跟多的资金进入大规模基础设施工程。


On the cusp of this potentially unprecedented explosion in such projects, world leaders and lenders appear relatively oblivious to the costly lessons of the past.	在前所未有的工程扩张潮中，世界领导人和贷款人似乎忘记了过去的代价沉重的教训。


To be sure, investments in infrastructure can serve real needs, helping meet an expected surge in the demand for food, water, and energy.	诚然，基础设施投资可以服务于真实需要，有助于满足粮食、水和能源需求的预期剧增。


But, unless the explosion in megaprojects is carefully redirected and managed, the effort is likely to be counterproductive and unsustainable.	但是，除非巨型工程的兴起得到小心引导和管理，否则它们有可能适得其反并且不可持续。


Without democratic controls, investors may privatize gains and socialize losses, while locking in carbon-intensive and other environmentally and socially damaging approaches.	如果没有民主控制，投资者将把收益私人化而损失社会化，采取碳密集和其他对环境和社会有害的方针。


To begin with, there is the issue of cost effectiveness.	首先是成本效率问题。


Rather than adopting a “small is beautiful” or a “bigger is better” philosophy, countries must build “appropriate scale” infrastructure suited to its purposes.	各国不应该持“小即是美”或“越大越好”观念，而应该建设与目的相匹配的“适当规模”的基础设施。


Bent Flyvbjerg, a professor at the University of Oxford specialized in program management and planning, studied 70 years of data to conclude that there is an “iron law of megaprojects”: they are almost invariably “over budget, over time, over and over again.”	专场项目管理和规划的牛津大学教授本特·弗吕贝格（Bent Flyvbjerg）研究了70年的数据，最后得出了一个“巨型工程铁律”：它们几乎不可避免地将“超支、超时，反复超值超时。


They are also, he adds, subject to the “survival of the unfittest,” with the worst projects getting built, instead of the best.	”他还说，它们还受制于“非适者生存”，建成的往往是最坏而不是最好的工程。


This risk is augmented by the fact that these megaprojects are driven largely by geopolitics – not careful economics.	这一风险因为以下事实而更大：这些巨型工程大多受地缘政治而不是仔细的经济分析驱使。


From 2000 to 2014, as global GDP more than doubled to $75 trillion, the G-7 countries’ share of the world economy dropped from 65% to 45%.	2000—2014年，全球GDP增长了一倍多，达到75万亿美元，而G-7国家占世界经济的比重从65%下降到45%。


As the international arena adjusts to this rebalancing, the United States has begun to worry that its hegemony will be challenged by new players and institutions, such as the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	国际竞争也随着这一再平衡而出现调整，美国开始担忧其霸权遭到新选手和机构的挑战，如中国领导的亚洲基础设施投资银行。


In reaction, the Western-led institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, are aggressively expanding their infrastructure investment operations, and are openly calling for a paradigm shift.	世界银行和亚洲开发银行等西方领导的机构的回应是积极扩大基础设施投资业务和公开呼吁范式转变。


The G-20, too, is accelerating the launch of megaprojects, in the hope of boosting global growth rates by at least 2% by 2018.	G-20也在加速启动巨型工程，以期在2018年至少提振2%的全球增长率。


The OECD estimates that an additional $70 trillion in infrastructure will be needed by 2030 – an average expenditure of a little more than $4.5 trillion per year.	经合组织估算，到2030年将需要增加70万亿基础设施投资——每年平均支出略高于4. 5万亿美元。


By comparison, it would take an estimated $2-3 trillion per year to meet the Sustainable Development Goals.	比较而言，满足可持续发展目标每年预计需要2—3万亿美元。


Clearly, with megaprojects, the potential for waste, corruption, and the buildup of unsustainable public debts is high.	显然，巨型工程极有可能带来浪费、腐败和不可持续的公共债务。


The second issue that must be considered is planetary boundaries.	第二个必须考虑的问题是地球的极限。


In a March 2015 letter to the G-20, a group of scientists, environmentalists, and opinion leaders warned that ramping up investment in megaprojects risks irreversible and catastrophic damage to the environment.	2015年3月，一些科学家、环保主义者和意见领袖集体致信G-20，警告称加码巨型工程投资有可能给环境造成不可逆转的灾难性伤害。


“Each year, we are already consuming about one-and-a-half planets’ worth of resources,” the authors explained.	“我们每年所消耗的资源总量已经达到了地球能力的1.


“Infrastructure choices need to be made to alleviate rather than exacerbate this situation.”	5倍，”信中说，“基础设施选择应该减缓而不是加剧这一状况。 ”


Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change cautions that “infrastructure developments and long-lived products that lock societies into greenhouse-gas-intensive emissions pathways may be difficult or very costly to change.”	类似地，气候变化政府间委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）警告说，“让社会陷入温室气体密集排放模式的基础设施开发和长期产品很难改变或改变成本极高。


And, indeed, the G-20 has put in place few social, environmental, or climate-related criteria for the “wish list” of mega-projects that each member country will submit to its summit in Turkey in November.	”事实上，G-20也没有对各成员国在其11月土耳其峰会上递交的巨型工程“愿望清单”做出社会、环境或气候相关标准的规定。


The third potential problem with megaprojects is their reliance on public-private partnerships.	巨型工程的第三个潜在问题是它们依靠公私合作。


As part of the renewed focus on large-scale investments, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilateral lenders have launched an effort to reengineer development finance by, among other things, creating new asset classes of social and economic infrastructure to attract private investment.	在人们开始重新关注大规模投资的背景下，世界银行、国际货币基金组织和其他多边贷款机构试图重新设计发展金融，其手段包括（但不限于）建立新的社会和经济基础设施资产类别以吸引私人投资。


“We need to tap into the trillions of dollars held by institutional investors… and direct those assets into projects,” said World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim.	“我们需要获得机构投资者手中的数万亿美元……将这些资产导向各类工程，”世界银行行长金墉说。


By using public money to offset risk, the institutions hope to attract long-term institutional investors – including mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and sovereign-wealth funds – who together control an estimated $93 trillion in assets.	这些机构希望用公共资金抵消风险，以此吸引长期机构投资者——包括对冲基金、保险公司、退休基金和主权财富基金，它们总共控制着约93万亿美元的资产。


Their hope is that tapping this huge pool of capital will enable them to scale-up infrastructure and transform development finance in ways that would have been previously unimaginable.	它们希望，利用这一巨大的资本池能实现基础设施规模扩张、实现此前不可想象的发展金融方式转变。


The trouble is that public-private partnerships are required to provide a competitive return on investment.	麻烦在于，实现有竞争力的投资回报需要公私合作。


As result, according to researchers at the London School of Economics, they “are not regarded as an appropriate instrument for [information technology] projects, or where social concerns place a constraint on the user charges that might make a project interesting for the private sector.”	结果，根据伦敦经济学院研究者的研究，它们“不是适合于[信息技术]工程的工具，也不适用于社会关注约束私人部门利益之所在的使用费的领域。


Private investors seek to sustain the rate of return on their investments through guaranteed revenue streams and by ensuring that laws and regulations (including environmental and social requirements) do not cut into their profits.	”私人投资者寻求的是通过有保证的收入流和确保法律和监管（包括环境和社会要求）不影响利润维持投资回报率。


The risk is that the quest for profit will undermine the public good.	风险在于追求利润将破坏公共利益。


Finally, the rules governing long-term investment do not effectively incorporate long-term environmental and social related risks, as emphasized by trade unions and the United Nations Environment Program.	最后，治理长期投资的规则没有有效地考虑将环境和社会风险，这也是工会和联合国环境署所强调的。


Pooling infrastructure investments in portfolios or turning development sectors into asset classes could privatize gains and socialize losses on a massive scale.	将基础设施投资集合成投资组合或将开发部门列为资产类别可以大规模地将收益私人化、损失社会化。


This dynamic can increase levels of inequality and undermine democracy, owing to the lack of leverage that governments – much less citizens – may have over institutional investors.	这一动态可能会加剧不平等性、破坏民主，因为政府——更不用说公民了——缺少制约机构投资者的手段。


In general, trade rules and agreements compound these problems by putting the interests of investors over those of ordinary citizens.	总体而言，贸易规则和协定将投资者的利益置于普通公民之前，这进一步复杂化了这些问题。


Left unexamined, the push toward megaprojects risks – in the words of the authors of the letter to the G-20 – “doubling down on a dangerous vision.” It is critical that we ensure that any transformation of development finance be crafted in a way that upholds human rights and protects the earth.	推进巨型工程的做法没有接受过考验，有可能——用致信G-20的作者的话说——“对危险的愿景加倍下注，”我们必须确保任何发展金融方式的转变都必须严守人权和保护地球这一前提，这一点至关重要。


The Global Economy’s Stealth Resilience	全球经济的隐秘恢复力


OXFORD – Last week, Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, warned that if countries do not act together, the global economy could be derailed.	牛津—上周，国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁拉加德警告说，如果各国不能合作行动，全球经济可能脱轨。


Likewise, the OECD has warned that countries must move “urgently” and “collectively” to boost global growth prospects.	类似地，经合组织警告说，各国必须“迅速”且“集体”地行动起来以提振全球增长前景。


Yet the G-20 finance ministers and central-bank governors to whom these entreaties were directed failed to agree any such action at their recent meeting in Shanghai.	但作为吁求对象的G-20财政部长和央行行长们并没能在上海的最新会议上达成任何行动协议。


To be sure, the communiqué released after the meeting includes a pledge to use “all policy tools – monetary, fiscal, and structural – individually and collectively” to “foster confidence and preserve and strengthen the recovery.”	诚然，上海会议之后发布的公报中包括了承诺“分别和集体使用所有政策工具——不管是货币工具、财政工具还是结构性工具”以“提振信心和保持复苏势头”。


But the communiqué also reflects distinct divisions – particularly with regard to the role of monetary and fiscal policy in stimulating growth – among the finance ministers and central bankers who agreed on its text.	但公报也体现出一致同意这一协议的财政部长和央行行长们之间存在深刻的分歧——特别是在货币和财政政策在刺激增长中的作用方面。


On monetary policy, the communiqué offers the empty statement that the G-20 would “continue to support economic activity and ensure price stability, consistent with central banks’ mandates.”	在货币政策方面，公报只有空洞的陈述：G-20将“继续支持经济活动和确保物价稳定，与央行使命保持一致。


That avoided the central question: Should central banks be attempting to stimulate growth through “unconventional” monetary policies?	”这回避了核心问题：央行应该尝试通过“非常规”货币政策刺激增长吗？


The Bank for International Settlements thinks not, arguing in its 2015 annual report that “monetary policy has been overburdened” in an attempt to reinvigorate growth, a reality that is reflected in “the persistence of ultra-low interest rates.”	国际清算银行（BIS）认为答案是否定的，在其2015年年报中指出在重振增长方面“货币政策承担了太多”，这一现实体现在“极低利率的持久性”中。


The result is a vicious cycle of too much debt, too little growth, and too-low interest rates that, to quote the BIS’s Claudio Borio, “beget lower rates.”	结果是过多债务、过少增长和过低利率的恶性循环，用BIS的克劳迪奥·波里奥（Claudio Borio）的话说，这“导致更低的利率”。


This sobering analysis has not stopped the Bank of Japan or the European Central Bank from further monetary easing.	这一冷静的分析并没有停止日本银行和欧洲央行进一步宽松的脚步。


Nor did it deter People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan from expressing a willingness to shoulder more of the growth-stimulating burden in Shanghai.	中国人民银行行长周小川也没有因此在上海选择不表达承担更多增长刺激负担的重任。


But not everyone is ignoring the writing on the wall.	但并非所有人都对不祥之兆视而不见。


Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan has called on the IMF to examine the effects of unconventional monetary policy not just on the countries that implement them, but also on the rest of the world.	印度储备银行行长拉詹（Raghuram Rajan）呼吁IMF不但要考察非常规货币政策在实施国的效应，也要考察它们对世界其他国家的效应。


Likewise, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has pointed out that countries using negative interest rates (including, most recently, Japan) are, by forcing currency devaluation, exporting weak demand – ultimately a zero-sum game.	类似地，英格兰银行行长卡尼（Mark Carney）指出使用负利率的国家（包括最近的日本）通过迫使货币贬值出口疲软的需求——说到底这是一场零和游戏。


When it comes to fiscal policy, agreement is similarly lacking.	在财政政策方面也是如此。


The IMF is urging surplus countries like Germany to pursue more stimulus.	IMF敦促德国等盈余国采取更多刺激。


The OECD, too, has called upon its wealthier members to take advantage of their current ability to borrow for long periods at very low interest rates to increase growth-enhancing investment in infrastructure.	经合组织也呼吁其较富裕的成员国利用目前可以以非常低的利率借到长期贷款的机会增加刺激增长的基础设施投资。


These calls provoked a sharp rebuttal from German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who condemned the “debt-financed growth model.”	这些要求激起了德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）的强烈反弹，他大声指责“债务融资增长模式”。


The result of this conflict was a vague declaration by the G-20 that it would use “fiscal-policy flexibly to strengthen growth, job creation, and confidence, while enhancing resilience and ensuring debt as a share of GDP is on a sustainable path.”	这一冲突的结果是G-20只是含糊地宣布将使用“财政政策灵活性提振增长、就业创造和信心，同时增加恢复力和确保债务占GDP之比保持可持续趋势。 ”


In light of the statements by the IMF and the OECD, this distinct failure to agree on monetary and fiscal policy seems highly dangerous.	从IMF和经合组织的陈述看，这一货币和财政政策的深刻分析是非常危险的。


But both institutions may be overstating the problem.	但两家机构都高估了问题。


In fact, despite widespread uncertainty – volatile capital flows, plummeting commodity prices, escalating geopolitical tensions, the shock of a potential British exit from the European Union, and a massive refugee crisis – the stalling of global cooperation may be less risky today than it was even a decade ago.	事实上，尽管存在普遍的不确定性——高波动的资本流、大宗商品价格下跌、地缘政治紧张局势升级、英国退出欧盟的潜在冲击以及大规模难民危机——但全球合作的停滞在今天的危险不如（哪怕）十年前。


The key factor in this context has been widespread recognition of the risks inherent in economic globalization, and concerted efforts to build up the needed resilience on a national, bilateral, or regional basis.	这一局面下的关键因素是人们普遍认识到经济全球化所包含的风险，并采取一致行动构建国家、双边和地区层面所需要的恢复力。


Consider finance.	以金融为例。


Twenty years ago, a catastrophic financial crisis began in Thailand and quickly spread across East Asia.	二十年前，始于泰国的灾难性金融危机迅速蔓延整个东亚。


Since then, those economies, and others in the emerging world, have self-insured against crisis by building up huge stockpiles of foreign-exchange reserves.	此后，这些经济体，以及其他新兴经济体，通过囤积巨大的外汇储备存量进行自我危机防护。


Partly as a result of this, the volume of reserves has risen from some 5% of world GDP in 1995 to around 15% today.	部分出于这一原因，储备量从1995年相当于世界GDP的5%左右上升到今天的15%左右。


Emerging economies are also holding less sovereign debt, and they have created bilateral and regional currency-swap arrangements.	新兴经济体的主权债务也有所减少，并且创造出双边和地区货币互换安排。


In addition, more than 40 countries have deployed macroprudential measures since the 2008 global financial crisis.	此外，自2008年全球金融危机以来，40多个国家实施了宏观审慎措施。


Countries also benefit from greater access to more diversified sources of finance.	各国也因为能够获得更加多元的融资源而获益。


Some emerging and developing countries now access global bond markets individually.	一些新兴和发展中国家现在可以自力更生进入全球债券市场。


And the role of regional development banks – including the African, Asian, and Inter-American Development Banks, as well as the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank – has grown.	而地区开发银行——包括非洲、亚洲和泛美开发银行以及新成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行和新开发银行——纷纷成长起来。


The final manifestation of this new pattern of cooperation – which might be called “distributed governance” – appears in trade.	这一新合作模式的最后一个写照——也许可以称之为“分布式治理”——在于贸易。


While the Doha Round of negotiations has staggered and fallen, liberalization is proceeding apace, owing to the proliferation of bilateral, regional, and super-regional deals.	尽管多哈回合谈判已经停滞和失败，但由于双边、地区和超地区协议的蓬勃出现，自由化进展迅速。


These new governance arrangements have important resilience-enhancing effects; but they may not offer a more efficient alternative to multilateralism, and they do not eliminate the need for traditional multilateral institutions.	这些新治理安排具有重要的增强恢复力的效果； 但是它们也许无法提供多边主义的更高效的替代方案，并且它们也确实没有消除传统多边机构的必要性。


On the contrary, bodies like the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization should be responsible for analyzing and transmitting vital information to the array of institutions that are filling their traditional role.	相反，IMF、世界银行和世贸组织等机构应该负责分析信息并把它们传递给正在扮演它们的传统角色的机构。


For example, the IMF should respond to Rajan’s request to track and analyze the effects of unconventional monetary policies.	比如，IMF应该响应拉詹跟踪和分析非常规货币政策的效果的要求。


Likewise, it could strengthen its analysis of the impact of capital controls on the countries implementing them, and on other countries.	类似地，IMF可以加强对资本管制对实施国和其他国家的影响的分析。


It could also resume preparing models of how sovereign-debt restructuring could be better supported – whether at the national level, through GDP-linked or contingent convertible bonds, or at the regional or global level.	IMF还可以继续准备关于如何更好地支持主权债务重组的模型——不管是在国家层面(通过GDP挂钩债券或或有可转换债券)还是在地区和全球层面。


At their Shanghai meeting, G-20 policymakers vowed to adopt a range of policy tools to boost global growth and avoid currency wars.	在上海会议上，G-20决策者承诺要采取一系列政策工具提振全球增长和避免货币战争。


They did not deliver on that promise.	他们没有兑现这一承诺。


But their failure may have reinforced the shift to a new phase of distributed global economic governance.	但他们的失败也许加强了向分布式全球经济治理的新阶段的转变。


A Plutocrats Summit?	富豪峰会？


BRISBANE – At an official dinner in Washington, DC, ahead of November’s G-20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia-born media mogul Rupert Murdoch lectured ministers on the dangers of socialism and big government.	布里斯班—在11月布里斯班二十国集团峰会前的一次华盛顿正式晚宴上，出生于澳大利亚的传媒大亨鲁珀特·默多克（Rupert Murdoch）向各位部长级人物宣讲了社会主义和大政府的危害。


A fervent opponent of Australia’s carbon price, and a battle-hardened opponent of US President Barack Obama, Murdoch lauded the virtues of austerity and minimal regulation, and railed against the corrosive effects of social safety nets.	默多克向来是澳大利亚碳定价的反对者，也是顽固的美国总统奥巴马的反对者，他大声赞美紧缩和最小监管的好处，抨击社会安全网的消极作用。


The ministers were in Washington to attend the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, where they attempted to thrash out differences and establish common ground before the upcoming summit.	各位部长是来华盛顿参加国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行年会的，会上他们将尝试克服差异、为即将到来的峰会建立共同基础。


The tone set by Murdoch, however, suggests that a consensus on sustainable, inclusive growth will be hard to achieve.	但是，默多克的言论表明，很难形成关于可持续包容性增长的共识。


Murdoch’s comments are in keeping with views expressed by his friend, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, and Abbott’s current administration.	默多克的评论与他的朋友、澳大利亚总理阿伯特及其现任政府所表达观点一致。


In January, for example, Abbott informed a startled Davos conference that the global financial crisis was caused not by unregulated global markets, but rather by too much governance.	比如，1月份阿伯特在达沃斯的会议上令人震惊地宣称全球金融危机不是因为不受监管的全球市场导致的，而是因为治理过度导致的。


This was certainly news to the finance ministers who had spent the past few years struggling with the toxic fallout from financial-sector excess.	对于过去几年一直为金融部门过度收拾残局的各位财政部长来说，这真是前所未闻。


Viewed in the context of such comments, one can better understand Australia’s refusal to put issues of climate change and inclusive prosperity on the Brisbane agenda.	从这些评论中我们可以更好地理解澳大利亚为何拒绝将气候变化和包容性繁荣列入布里斯班峰会日程。


Of course, stimulating global growth is a big enough challenge in itself, even without considering inclusiveness or environmental sustainability.	比如，刺激全球增长本身已是一个足够艰巨的挑战，即使不考虑包容性或环境可持续性也是如此。


The IMF’s gloomy growth forecasts attest to that.	IMF的悲观增长预测证明了这一点。


And many policymakers view Australia’s G-20 chairmanship as an opportunity to re-energize and refine the group’s mission to boost global growth, create jobs, and raise living standards.	许多决策者认为，澳大利亚担任二十国集团主席国是一次重振和精炼该集团刺激全球增长、创造就业岗位和提高生活水平的使命的机会。


G-20 finance ministers have already decided on a 2% target for annual growth through 2018, and are sifting through more than 900 proposals for structural reforms in order to achieve this.	二十国集团财政部长已将2018年年度增长目标定在2%，并且正在筛选900余份结构性改革方案以实现这一目标。


What reforms G-20 members propose in Brisbane, and how serious they will be about implementing them, remains to be seen.	二十国集团在布里斯班提出怎样的额改革，以及会以怎样的严肃态度对待这些改革的实施仍有待观察。


The bigger challenge, though, is hitting those growth targets in a sustainable and inclusive way.	但是，更大的挑战是以可持续和包容的方式实现这些增长目标。


If structural reforms are not done right, the Brisbane Summit will come to be regarded as a failure.	如果结构性改革实施不当，布里斯班峰会就将是一场失败。


Structural reforms, in which certain interests are sacrificed for the greater good, will always be controversial and difficult to execute.	结构性改革需要牺牲一定利益以换取更大的好处，因此永远会引起争议，难于执行。


But when such reforms involve sacrifices by ordinary citizens and benefit society’s most privileged groups, political gridlock and instability invariably follow.	但当改革牵涉到牺牲普通公民、令社会最有特权群体受益时，就必然会引起政治僵局和动荡。


Over the past two years, academics, regulators, economists, and financial institutions have all linked the secular stagnation in demand with greater income inequality.	在过去两年中，学者、监管者、经济学家和金融机构都认为需求的长期停滞是拜收入不平等增加所赐。


It is ironic that, at a time when many in the developing world are entering, or aspire to enter, the emerging middle class, wealth in much of the developed world is becoming more concentrated at the top.	讽刺的是，在大量发展中世界公民正在步入或准备步入新兴中产阶级的同时，许多发达国家的财富日益向顶层集中。


Indeed, inequality of outcomes both in emerging and advanced economies has increased within and across generations.	事实上，新兴和发达经济体的结果不平等性在同代人和代际之间都有所加剧。


Australia’s refusal to discuss inclusive growth in Brisbane may please plutocrats like Murdoch, but talk of unregulated markets, lower taxes, and the removal of social safety nets strongly indicates that the summit will offer no substantive policies aimed at reducing inequality.	澳大利亚拒绝在布里斯班讨论包容性增长也许能取悦默多克这样的富豪，但大谈无监管的市场、降低税收和取消社会安全网强烈表明，此次峰会不会产生旨在真正降低不平等性的政策。


With just days to go until the Brisbane meeting, the G-20 is ignoring the main long-term threats to the global economy.	距离布里斯班峰会开幕只有几天时间了，二十国集团仍然无视全球经济的主要长期威胁。


As the Bank of England’s Governor Mark Carney (who I assume also heard Murdoch’s lecture) remarked earlier this year, “[U]nchecked market fundamentalism can devour the social capital essential for the long-term dynamism of capitalism itself.”	正如英格兰银行马克·卡尼（Mark Carney，我猜他也听了默多克的演讲）在今年早些时候所言，“（未经）深思熟虑的市场原教旨主义可能毁灭对资本主义本身的长期活力至关重要的社会资本。


IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde recently put it more starkly, noting that the world’s 85 richest people control more wealth than the world’s 3.5 billion poorest people, and that this degree of inequality is casting a dark shadow over the global economy.	”IMF总裁克里斯汀·拉加德（Christine Lagarde）最近更加尖锐地指出，如今全世界最富有的85人所控制的财富超过了35亿最贫穷人口，并且这一不平等程度正在严重印象全球经济。


Inequality is not a fringe issue.	不平等性不是一个次要问题。


Combating its rise is essential to achieving sustainable economic growth and political stability.	遏制不平等性上升对于实现可持续经济增长和政治稳定至关重要。


The G-20’s real power is to highlight such challenges and generate informed debate on the issues as a prelude to action.	二十国集团的真正力量是强调这些挑战，就这些问题进行信息顺畅的争论以作为行动的前奏。


The question now is which leader in Brisbane, if any, will grab the global megaphone and speak out.	现在的问题是，哪位领导人能在布里斯班面向全世界说出这一点。


Realizing the Potential of China’s G20 Presidency	中国作为G20轮值主席国的潜力


NEW YORK – In the run-up to this September’s G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, there has been much talk about strengthening global macroeconomic cooperation and reforming the international monetary system.	发自纽约——距离今年九月在中国杭州举办的G20峰会尚余两月，各界对加强全球宏观经济合作以及改革国际货币体系的讨论已是汗牛充栋。


While this is far from the first time these topics have come up – in 2011, for example, France pushed for monetary reform, but was waylaid by the eurozone crisis – the time may be ripe for genuine progress.	虽然这早已不是第一次把这些主题提出来谈了——比如2011年时法国就曾力推货币改革，无奈却被欧元区危机中途打断——但这次时机已经成熟，是时候实现一些真正的进展了。


Today’s global economy is plagued by uncertainty.	当今的全球经济正遭受不确定性的困扰。


Inconsistent data have lately raised questions about the strength of the United States’ economy.	新近出台的一系列互相矛盾的数据令外界不禁质疑美国经济实力。


When it comes to Japan, the data are even more erratic. The European Union faces not only a still-weak recovery, but also the possibility of losing the United Kingdom as a member.	日本的数据更是忽上忽下，而欧盟不仅面临着复苏乏力的问题，还很可能会失去英国这个成员国。


The emerging world, meanwhile, is experiencing a sharp economic slowdown.	与此同时，新兴市场国家正经历着急剧经济放缓。


China, in particular, poses a significant risk, with many fearing that its downturn will be more severe than initially anticipated.	其中以中国暴露的风险最为显著，令许多人担心经济的衰退情况可能会超过最初预期。


This has spurred many to move their capital out of the country, generating strong downward pressure on the renminbi.	这导致许多人将资本抽离中国，对人民币造成了较大的下行压力。


This highlights another source of uncertainty today: exchange rates.	这突出了当前不确定性的另一个来源：汇率。


From the euro’s decline in 2014-2015 to the US dollar’s decline after the Federal Reserve signaled a postponement of its rate increases to the British pound’s recent drop, spurred by uncertainty surrounding the recent referendum on EU membership, major currencies have been all over the map in recent years.	从2014~15年的欧元下行，到美联储暗示推迟加息后的美元下跌，再到近期在脱欧公投不确定性刺激下的英镑跌势，各主要货币近几年都是一团乱麻。


Some have even mooted suspicions of competitive devaluation.	有些货币的走势甚至令人怀疑它们是否在进行竞争性贬值。


At a time when a policy change in one country reverberates throughout the global economy, stronger cooperation could be vital to enhancing overall stability.	当某几个国家的政策足以撼动整个全球经济之时，更强大的合作对于整体的稳定性来说就变得至关重要。


And, indeed, to some extent, world leaders have already recognized this imperative.	在某种程度上世界各国领导人其实都已经认识到：这一点是势在必行的。


Since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, many initiatives aimed at boosting macroeconomic cooperation have been undertaken.	自2008年爆发全球金融危机后，各方都推出了许多旨在提升宏观经济合作的举措。


For example, the G20 launched the Mutual Assessment Process, whereby member countries are evaluated on the basis of agreed indicators.	例如G20集团就发起了相互评估进程项目（Mutual Assessment Process），设立一个得到各成员国同意的指标，并在此基础上进行互相评估。


The International Monetary Fund’s surveillance of macroeconomic policies has also been enhanced, with the implementation of a new set of multilateral surveillance tools that focus on major economies.	通过建立一套聚焦于主要经济体的新多边监督工具，国际货币基金组织对宏观经济政策的监督能力也得到了增强。


These reforms, it has been said, make for the most elaborate system of multilateral macroeconomic cooperation in history.	而上述改革堪称有史以来最为复杂的多边宏观经济合作系统。


And yet the G20 still finds it extremely difficult to fulfill its objective, agreed in 2009, to “act together to generate strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth.”	但即便如此，G20集团依然难以兑现其在2009年订立的“共同行动起来催生强劲，可持续和平衡的全球增长”的目标。


Among the most notable obstacles has been the inability to compel some surplus economies to pursue growth-stimulating policies, which would compensate for the recessionary effects of adjustment in the deficit countries.	其中最显着的障碍是无法迫使一些顺差经济体去追求刺激增长型政策，也因此无法弥补逆差国家因调整而遭受的经济衰退影响。


This failure is perhaps most pronounced within the eurozone, where Germany and the Netherlands have failed to reduce their surpluses, even as the deficit economies have undergone massive adjustments.	此障碍在欧元区最为显著，即便赤字经济体已经进行了大规模的调整，但德国和荷兰都未能削减其顺差。


As a result, the eurozone has gone from having an overall deficit in 2008 to being a major surplus region – a shock that has subtracted about 1% from global demand.	这样一来，欧元区已经从2008年的总体逆差区域成为一个主要的顺差区域，而这一冲击则令全球需求减少了1％。


Macroeconomic cooperation clearly must be made more effective.	对此显然必须推动更加有效的宏观经济合作。


But, as recent exchange-rate volatility has shown, even that will not be enough to stabilize the global economy. Monetary reform is also needed.	但正如最近的汇率波动所体现的那样，即便如此也不足以稳定全球经济，依然亟需实施货币改革来进行补足。


Such reform must include a reconsideration of the US dollar’s outsize role in shaping the international monetary system.	这种改革必须包括重塑美元对国际货币体系的过分影响。


In an increasingly multipolar world, would it not be more appropriate to build a multicurrency system and make greater use of the only global currency that has ever been created: the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)?	在一个日益多极化的世界上，建立一个多货币体系，并更好地利用我们创建的唯一全球性货币——国际货币基金组织的特别提款权，岂不是更好？


Establishing the SDR as the leading global reserve currency would have far-reaching benefits.	将特别提款权作为全球储备的主导货币将带来长远的好处。


It would allow all countries – not just major economic powers – to enjoy “seigniorage,” or the profits brought by money creation.	它将使所有国家——不仅是那些主要经济大国——都享有“铸币税”或通过生产货币所带来的利润。


Moreover, as the IMF economist Jacques Polak suggested long ago, the IMF could finance its programs by creating SDRs, eliminating the cumbersome negotiations required to secure credits or raise member quotas.	此外正如国际货币基金组织经济学家雅克·波拉克（Jacques Polak）很久以前建议的那样，该组织可以通过创建特别提款权来资助自身的项目，避免那些确保信贷或提高成员配额所需的繁琐谈判。


And SDRs could support development; for example, they could be allocated in a larger proportion to developing countries, which have greater demand for foreign-exchange reserves.	同时特别提款权还可以被用来支持发展； 例如可以更大比例地分配给对外汇储备的需求较大的发展中国家。


China’s G20 leadership could be the impetus the group needs to initiate this shift.	中国的G20组织轮值主席国角色可以成为启动这一转变所需的动力。


Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China, was among the first to question the dollar’s role, some seven years ago, and China has been working steadily to internationalize the renminbi.	中国人民银行行长周小川自己就是七年前质疑美元地位的第一批人之一，同时中国也不断致力于人民币国际化。


That effort reached a milestone in 2015, when the IMF Board agreed to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that determines the SDR’s value.	这一努力在2015年实现了一个里程碑——国际货币基金组织董事会同意将人民币添加到决定特别提款权价值的一篮子货币当中。


Beyond the push to use SDRs more actively in IMF programs, governments could issue SDR-denominated bonds.	除了推动在国际货币基金组织的项目中更积极地使用特别提款权之外，政府还可以发行以特别提款权计价的债券。


Moreover, private banks could increase their use of this monetary unit, just as some European banks used the so-called European Currency Unit, helping to pave the way for the euro.	此外私人银行也可以增加对这一货币单位的使用，就像当年一些欧洲银行使用所谓欧洲货币单位来为欧元铺平道路那样。


The G20’s China summit represents an important opportunity to improve macroeconomic cooperation and launch major reforms of the global monetary system.	G20集团中国峰会上代表着一个改善宏观经济合作、启动全球货币体系重大改革的重要契机。


For the sake of balanced growth in developed and developing countries alike, it must not be squandered.	为了实现发达国家和发展中国家的平衡增长，这个机会可不能被轻易浪费。


Inclusive Growth and Global Justice	包容性增长和全球正义


ANKARA – As France and the world mourn the terrorist slaughter of innocents in Paris, the leaders of the G-20 are meeting in Antalya, Turkey.	安卡拉—在法国和全世界为巴黎恐怖袭击的无辜遇难者哀悼的同时，G-20领导人将齐聚土耳其安塔利亚。


Terror will now vault to the top of the long list of pressing issues that will be discussed.	他们将讨论多个紧迫问题，而现在，恐怖主义将是其中最重要的一个。


The G-20, whose members account for about 85% of the world economy, has an important responsibility to respond to challenges that affect the lives and prosperity of millions of people around the world.	G-20成员国占了世界经济的85%，它们肩负着应对这些影像这全世界数百万人生活与繁荣的挑战的责任。


It cannot risk falling into complacency and inaction, whether regarding terrorism or the fragile state of the world’s economy.	G-20决不能因为自满和不作为而遭致风险，不管是在恐怖主义问题上，还是在脆弱的世界经济现状问题上都是如此。


Since Turkey assumed the presidency of the G-20 in December 2014, our approach toward ensuring inclusive and robust growth through collective action has enjoyed the support of the organization’s members.	2014年12月，土耳其成为G-20主席国，自此以来，我们通过集体行动确保包容性强健增长的方针受到了G-20组织各成员国的支持。 这一方针建立在三个基石之上：果断实施过去的承诺；


This effort has been built on three pillars: decisive implementation of past commitments, boosting investments as a powerful driver of the global economy, and promotion of inclusiveness so that the benefits of growth are shared by all.	刺激投资作为全球经济的强大引擎； 以及促进包容性从而让增长的好处为全体世界人民所分享。


When it comes to implementation, great strides have been made.	在实施方面，已经取得了很大的进步。


By promoting sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies and implementing solid, structural reforms, we have made significant progress toward our objective of expanding the G-20’s collective GDP by 2.1% by 2018.	我们推进了可靠的宏观经济和财政政策，实施了扎实的结构性改革，向我们的目标——到2018年实现G-20总GDP增长2. 1%迈出了一大步。


The global financial system is now more resilient than it has ever been.	全球既然弄体系比以往恢复力更强了。


Financial capacities are being rebuilt, and new growth targets are being met.	金融能力正在得到重建，新增长目标正在实现。


But there remains much more to be done.	但仍有许多事情要做。


G-20 members should expedite efforts to deliver on their commitments to boost productivity and eliminate structural bottlenecks to investment, competition, trade, and jobs.	G-20成员国应该加快兑现承诺，以刺激生产率，打破投资、竞争、贸易和就业的结构性瓶颈。


We must also cement the fundamental reforms to the global financial system that the G-20 has delivered over the past seven years.	我们还必须加强G-20在过去七年所做出的全球金融体系基本改革。


Our focus on investment – a key driver of growth, jobs, and development – is also beginning to pay off.	我们对投资的关注——投资是增长、就业和发展的重要推动力——也初见成效。


There is a huge investment gap in the global economy, both in advanced and developing countries.	全球经济存在巨大的投资缺口，不管是发达国家和发展中国家都是如此。


That is why we need developed-country strategies that bring together concrete policy actions and commitments to improve the investment ecosystem, support small and-medium-size enterprises, and promote the construction of efficient, high-quality infrastructure.	因此，我们需要发达国家采取将具体政策行动和承诺结合起来的战略，以改善投资生态，支持中小企业，促进高效高质基础设施的建设。


If the G-20 members fully implement their commitments under these strategies, their collective GDP is expected to increase by another 1%.	如果G-20成员国根据这些战略充分兑现它们的承诺，预计它们的总GDP可以再增加1%。


Economic growth must be strong and sustainable; but, above all, it must be inclusive.	经济增长必须强劲并可持续； 但是，最重要的，它必须是包容性的。


Inequality is rising in many G-20 countries; in some cases, it has reached historic highs.	多个G-20国家的不平等性正在增加； 一些国家的不平等性处于历史最高水平。


This is a dangerous development, one that can retard growth, threaten the cohesion of societies, and jeopardize people’s wellbeing.	这是一个危险的发展趋势，可能阻碍增长、威胁社会凝聚力，破坏人民福祉。


It is imperative that the G-20 tackle inequality head on and demonstrate its determination to ensure that all of its member countries’ citizens enjoy the fruits of economic growth.	G-20急需将解决不平等性作为头等大事，并证明其有决心确保所有成员国公民都能享受到经济增长的果实。


Reducing unemployment is central to the fight against inequality.	降低失业是遏制不平等的核心。


There are about 100 million jobless people in the G-20, and another 200 million young people who are neither working nor studying.	G-20有大约1亿失业人口，另有2亿年轻人既不工作，也没有在学习。


Significantly reducing youth unemployment is one of the G-20’s most important commitments.	大幅降低年轻人失业是G-20最重要的承诺之一。


Inclusiveness cannot stop at the borders of the G-20.	包容性不能止步于G-20边界。


We must work to ensure that the benefits of growth and prosperity are shared by people all over the world.	我们必须努力确保增长与繁荣的好处被世界全体人民所分享。


In Antalya, we will discuss how we can align our efforts with the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and increase our engagement with low-income, developing countries.	在安塔利亚，我们将讨论如何将我们的努力与2030年可持续发展日程相协调，以及如何增加我们与低收入发展中国家的合作。


As politics and economics are increasingly intertwined, the G-20 must also work together to confront our era’s geopolitical challenges.	政治和经济的联系日益紧密，因此G-20还必须共同面对现时代的地缘政治挑战。


This year is an important one in the fight against climate change.	今年是遏制气候变化的关键之年。


We must send a strong political message from Antalya in support of a successful outcome at the United Nations Climate Change Conference that takes place in Paris from November 30 to December 11.	我们必须在安塔利亚发出强烈的政治信号，支持11月30日—12月11日巴黎联合国气候变化会议形成成功的结果。


Meanwhile, the terror attacks in Paris have brutally reminded us, once again, that global challenges – such as terrorism, the war in Syria, and the refugee crisis – require truly global responses.	与此同时，巴黎恐怖袭击再一次残忍地提醒我们，全球性挑战——如恐怖主义、叙利亚战争和难民危机——需要全球性应对。


The G-20 is an ideal forum in which to address them.	G-20是解决这些危机的理想论坛。


The Syrian civil war – now well into its fourth year – must be brought to an end, and a fair and sustainable political transition must be ensured.	叙利亚内战——目前已经进入第四年——必须结束，同时必须保证一个公平的、可持续的政治过渡。


The conflict and the brutal state terrorism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is not only the cause of terrible suffering in Syria and the death of more than 360,000 people; it is also the root of the refugee crisis and the emergence of Daesh – a threat to all countries.	这场冲突以及总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的残忍国家控不住不但导致叙利亚惨遭蹂躏，360,000多人死亡； 也成为难民危机和达伊莎（Daesh）崛起的根源。


Turkey is a member of the coalition against Daesh, and we are seeking to degrade and destroy this terrorist menace in our country and beyond our borders.	达伊莎是对所有国家的威胁。 土耳其是打击达伊莎联盟的一份子，我们正在试图打击和摧毁在我国内外的该恐怖集团。


At the same time, we must not allow ourselves to forget the plight of those fleeing the brutality of the Assad regime and Daesh.	与此同时，我们决不能允许我们忘记逃离巴沙尔政权和达伊莎血腥统治的人的苦难。


The international community that shuddered at the photograph of Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian toddler who was found dead on a Turkish beach, must be made to remember that many more like him are dying every day in the cold waters of the Mediterranean and the Aegean.	国际社会因为死于土耳其海滩三岁叙利亚男孩艾伦·库尔迪（Alan Kurdi）的照片而震惊，但国际社会必须记住，每天都有许多像库尔迪这样的人死于地中海和爱琴海冰冷的海水中。


Turkey is currently hosting some 2.2 million Syrian refugees, and we have spent more than $8 billion over the last three years caring for them.	目前，土耳其接收了220万叙利亚难民，在过去三年，我们花了80多亿美元用于照顾他们。


The international community must agree on a mechanism that ensures that the burden is fairly shared.	国际社会必须形成一个共同机制确保公平分担这一负担。


Finally, it is important to note that Turkey continues to confront the threat of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an organization listed as a terrorist group by both the United States and the European Union.	最后，必须注意到土耳其仍在面临库尔德工人党（PKK）的威胁。 PKK被美国和欧盟列为恐怖组织。


Turkey has implemented a large number of reforms and made major investments to the benefit of our Kurdish citizens.	土耳其实施了大量改革，进行了大量投资改善我国库尔德公民的福利。


And yet the PKK has refused to disarm, instead amassing weapons and attacking civilian and security targets across the country. As we continue to fight the scourge of terrorism in our country, we call on all countries not only to mourn the dead in Paris, but to reject terrorism in all of its forms.	但PKK仍拒绝解除武装，反而在囤积武器，袭击土耳其全国的平民和安全目标。 我们将继续与土耳其国内的恐怖主义祸害作斗争，与此同时，我们呼吁所有国家不但要为巴黎死难者致哀，更要拒绝任何形式的恐怖主义。


The G-20 Summit in Antalya will address these and other major issues confronting the world.	安塔利亚G-20峰会将解决这些和其他世界面临的主要问题。


Whether the subject is economics, finance, climate change, or politics, the guiding principle must be equality and justice for all.	不管主题是经济、金融、气候变化还是政治，指导原则都必须是全人类的平等和正义。


A Debt Agenda for the G7	G7债务日程建议


CAMBRIDGE – On May 26-27, the heads of the Group of Seven leading industrial countries will gather in Japan to discuss common security and economic problems.	坎布里奇—5月26—27日，领先工业国七国集团首脑将在日本开会讨论共同安全和经济问题。


A major common problem that deserves their attention is the unsustainable increase in the major developed countries’ national debt.	一个值得各国首脑关注的主要共同问题是主要发达国家国民债务不可持续地升高。


Failure to address the explosion of government borrowing will have adverse effects on the global economy and on debt-burdened countries themselves.	无法遏制政府借贷的爆发之势将给全球经济以及债务国本身带来消极影响。


The problem is bad and getting worse almost everywhere.	各国问题都很严重，并且还在恶化。


In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the federal government debt doubled over the past decade, from 36% of GDP to 74% of GDP.	在美国，国会预算办公室（CBO）估算联邦政府债务在过去十年翻了一番，从占GDP的36%增加到74%。


It also predicts that, under favorable economic assumptions and with no new programs to increase spending or reduce revenue, the debt ratio ten years from now will be 86% of GDP.	CBO还预测，在有利的经济假设并且没有新的增支减收项目的情况下，十年后这一债务比例将为GDP的86%。


Even more worrying, the annual deficit ratio will double in the next decade to 4.9% of GDP, putting the debt on track to exceed 100% of GDP.	更令人担心的是，年赤字率将在未来十年翻一番，达到GDP的4. 9%，债务总量直奔GDP的100%以上而去。


The situation in Japan is worse, with gross debt at more than 200% of GDP.	日本的情况更加糟糕，总债务已经超过GDP的200%。


Japan’s current annual deficit of 6% of GDP implies that the debt ratio will continue to rise rapidly unless action is taken.	日本当前年预算为GDP的6%，这意味着债务比将继续快速增长，除非采取行动。


Conditions differ among the eurozone countries.	欧元区各国情况不尽相同。


But three of the European Union’s four largest economies – France, Italy, and the United Kingdom – all have large debts and annual deficits that point to even higher debt ratios in the future.	但欧盟四大经济体之三——法国、意大利和英国——债务和年赤字都非常庞大，将让未来债务比进一步上升。


A rising level of national debt absorbs funds that would otherwise be available to finance productivity-enhancing business investment.	国民债务水平的上升将吞噬本可以用来为增进生产率的商业投资的资金。


Businesses now fear that the increasing deficits will lead to higher taxes, further discouraging investment.	现在，企业担心赤字的升高将导致更高的税收，进一步阻碍投资。


That is a worrying prospect for everyone.	这是令所有人都感到担忧的前景。


When interest rates rise, as surely they must, the cost of servicing the debt will require higher taxes, hurting economic incentives and weakening economic activity.	当利率升高时（必然会如此），维持债务的成本就会要求提高税收，从而伤及经济激励，阻碍经济活动。


And the persistence of large deficits reduces the room that governments have to increase spending when there is an economic downturn or a threat to national security.	而赤字长期巨大会缩小政府在经济衰退或国家安全受到威胁时增加支出的空间。


Reducing deficits is obviously a task for those responsible for tax revenue and public spending: governments and legislatures.	降低赤字显然是负责税收收入和公共支出的人——政府和立法机构的任务。


But central banks also play a role, affecting the problem in two ways.	但央行也可以起作用，从两方面影响这个问题。


Low-interest-rate policies in advanced countries are depressing the current size of budget deficits, but at the cost of reducing pressure on political leaders to address future deficits and encouraging voters to favor more spending programs and larger tax cuts.	发达国家的低利率政策正在抑制预算赤字的当前规模，但代价是政治领导人解决未来赤字的压力降低了，并且刺激了选民支持更多支出项目和更大手笔的减税。


Central banks can help by announcing clearly that interest rates will rise substantially in the future, making it more expensive for governments to borrow and to roll over existing debt.	央行可以通过明确宣布利率将在未来大幅升高、从而增加政府借贷和展期现有债务的成本而起到帮助作用。


Reducing annual deficits requires either increased tax revenue or decreased outlays.	降低年赤字要么靠增加税收收入，要么靠降低支出。


Raising marginal tax rates is both politically unpopular and economically damaging.	提高边际税率在政治上不讨好，在经济上也有害处。


In the US, there is scope to raise revenue without increasing tax rates, by limiting so-called tax expenditures – the forms of spending that are built into the tax rules rather than appropriated annually by Congress.	在美国，存在不提高税率而增加收入的空间，即限制所谓的税收开支（tax expenditures）——写入税收规则而不由国会每年划拨的支出形式。


For example, an American who buys an electric car receives a $7,000 tax reduction.	比如，购买电动汽车的美国人可以享受7,000美元的减税。


Larger tax expenditures in the US include the deduction for mortgage interest and the exclusion from taxable income of employer-paid health-insurance premiums.	更大项的美国税收开支包括按揭利息抵扣和应税收入的雇主支付健康保险费扣除等。


Although eliminating any of these major tax expenditures might be politically impossible, limiting the amount by which a taxpayer could reduce his or her tax liability by using these provisions could raise substantial revenue.	尽管消除这些大项税收开支的任何一项在政治上都几乎不可能，但通过这些条款限制纳税人能够减除的应税数额可以大幅提高收入。


So I do my best to persuade my Republican friends in Congress that reducing the revenue loss from tax expenditures is really a way to cut government spending even though the deficit reduction appears on the revenue side of the budget.	因此我竭尽全力说服我在国会的共和党朋友，减少来自税收开支的收入损失着实是降低政府支出的好办法，尽管这一赤字减少体现在预算的收入端。


The good news is that a relatively small reduction in annual deficits can put an economy on a path to a much lower debt-to-GDP ratio.	好消息是只要每年降低相对较小规模的年预算，就可以让经济的债务-GDP比大幅降低，让赤字从预计的占GDP的4.


For the US, cutting the deficit from the projected 4.9% of GDP to 3% of GDP would cause the debt ratio to drop toward 60%.	9%下降到3%可以让债务比向60%靠拢。


The same is true elsewhere.	其他国家亦然。


The long-run debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to the ratio of the annual budget deficit to the annual rate of growth of nominal GDP.	长期债务-GDP比等于年预算赤字与年名义GDP增长率之比。


With 4% nominal GDP growth, a budget deficit of 2% would bring the long-term debt ratio down to 50%.	如果名义GDP增长率为4%，那么2%的预算赤字将让长期债务比下降到50%。


That should be the goal for which all of the G7 countries aim.	这应该成为G7所有国家的目标。


The G-7’s Sustainability Mission	G-7的可持续性使命


FRANKFURT – In six months, representatives from countries around the world will gather in Paris in an effort to reach a global accord to fight climate change.	法兰克福—六个月后，世界各国代表将齐聚巴黎，为达成对抗气候变化的全球协定努力。


When the G-7’s leaders meet next week in Germany, they should use the occasion to take the first steps toward avoiding the most dangerous consequences of global warming.	下周，G-7领导人将在德国召开会议，他们应该抓住这次机会迈出避免全球变暖的最危险后果的第一步。


With the world’s safety and prosperity at stake, the question is not whether or when to begin the transition to a low-carbon economy, but how to manage the effort.	这一问题事关世界安全与繁荣，它不是是否或何时开始向低碳经济转型的问题，而是如何实现转型的问题。


In 2014, investments in clean energy reached a new high of $310 billion, after two years of decline.	2014年，清洁能源投资在经历了两年的降低后创出了3,100亿美元的新高。


That is good news, but it is still far short of the $1.1 trillion per year that the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates is needed in the low-carbon energy sector.	这是个好消息，但距离国际原子能机构（IEA）所估算的低碳能源业所需要的每年1. 1万亿美元投资还相去甚远。


In the meantime, some $950 billion was invested in oil, gas, and coal in 2013 – a figure that has doubled in real terms since 2000.	与此同时，2013年石油、天然气和煤炭投资高达9,500亿美元——就实际值而言较2000年翻了一番。


The value of an investment is based largely on the perception of how risky it is.	投资的价值主要取决于人们认为它有多大的风险。


Investment will not shift decisively toward greener sources of energy unless and until portfolio managers begin to account for the risks of dangerous climate change.	除非投资组合经理开始算计危险的气候变化的风险，否则投资就无法决定性地向更加绿色的能源资源倾斜。


Investors also need to consider “carbon bubbles,” the overvaluation of fossil-fuel companies based on the assumption that they will be able to continue burning the world’s reserves until depletion.	投资者还需要考虑“碳泡沫”，即基于化石燃料公司能够一直将全球储量燃烧殆尽的假设给予这些公司过高的估值。


Until recently, traditional forms of energy production have had the advantage of being based on established and mature industries.	直到最近，传统方式的能源生产一直更加有利于以成熟的老牌产业为基础。


But the tides are shifting.	但潮流正在发生改变。


Sovereign wealth funds and institutional and private investors are increasingly recognizing that climate change will undermine their returns, and that governments eventually will begin to address the problem.	主权财富基金以及机构和私人投资者日益认识到气候变化将制约他们的回报，政府最终将开始纠正这一问题。


Likewise, the Bank of England is undertaking important work on the risk that assets like coal or oil reserves could be “stranded” by policy changes intended to limit dangerous climate change.	类似地，英格兰银行正在进行重要的风险评估工作，研究煤炭或石油储量等资产有多大风险被旨在限制危险的气候变化的政策变革“搁置”。


And the G-20 finance ministers recently requested that the Financial Stability Board undertake a broad assessment of climate-related risks and opportunities.	G-20财政部长最近要求金融稳定委员会（Financial Stability Board）对气候相关风险和机会进行广泛评估。


The G-7 countries should clearly signal that they are serious about the low-carbon transition, and the most effective way to do that would be to support a global goal of cutting net greenhouse-gas emissions to zero by 2050.	G-7国家应该释放明确信号表明它们将严肃对待低碳转型，而这样做最有效的办法是支持到2050年将温室气体净排放量削减到零的全球目标。


In addition, governments and regulators can take concrete steps to stimulate private-sector investment in cleaner forms of energy.	此外，政府和监管者可以采取务实举措刺激私人部门投资于更加清洁的能源形式。


For starters, governments should take the equivalent of the Hippocratic oath and pledge to do no active harm to the planet.	首先，政府应该立下类似于希波克拉底誓言的承诺，不再“积极”伤害地球。


The New Climate Economy Report, released by the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, on which I serve, underlines the importance of phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies and questions the wisdom of allowing export credit agencies to finance coal projects.	全球经济和气候委员会（Global Commission on the Economy and Climate，我是委员之一）所发布的新气候经济报告（The New Climate Economy Report）强调取消化石燃料补贴的重要性，并质疑出口信用机构为煤炭项目提供融资的做法。


Governments must set themselves a firm four-year deadline to end fossil-fuel subsidies and redirect funding to areas like green infrastructure projects and development assistance.	政府必须给自己设定明确的四年时限结束化石燃料补贴，将资金配置给绿色基础设施项目和发展援助等领域。


Second, governments must lead by example.	其次，政府必须树立榜样。


High-level meetings in Addis Ababa and Paris later this year offer the opportunity to create synergies between the fight against climate change and financing for development and infrastructure.	今年晚些时候在亚的斯亚贝巴和巴黎的高规格会议提供了让对抗气候变化和为发展和基础设施提供融资两个方面形成协同效应的机会。


Governments should also encourage public pension funds to invest responsibly, especially when it comes to the climate.	政府还应该鼓励公共退休基金进行负责任的投资，特别是在气候问题上。


More, too, could be done to support the market for green bonds, including by issuing green government bonds.	此外，还应该更多地支持绿色债券市场，包括通过发行绿色政府债券。


Third, governments must create policy frameworks that foster low-carbon investments.	第三，政府必须建立促进低碳投资的政策框架。


Putting a price on carbon is critical.	给碳定价至关重要。


The slow but steady progress that countries are making toward this goal is encouraging.	各国在这方面的进步虽然缓慢，但十分稳健，这令人鼓舞。


In the meantime, governments should use a shadow carbon price and carbon discount rate in their decision-making processes.	与此同时，政府应该在决策过程中使用影子碳定价和碳贴现率。


In addition, governments and regulators should adopt policies ensuring sustainable financial-sector practices, including annual reporting by companies and investors on environmental, social, and governance issues and due diligence and risk models regarding environmental hazards.	此外，政府和监管者应该采取政策确保可持续财务实践，包括公司和投资者发布关于环境、社会和治理问题的年报以及考虑环境风险的尽职调查和风险模型。


Consideration of the possibility of stranded assets must be systematically expanded.	对搁置资产可能性的考虑必须系统性��予以扩大。


Finally, policymakers should foster partnerships and new instruments that nudge the economy toward low-carbon alternatives.	最后，决策者应该开展合作、促进新工具的开发以推动经济向低碳转型。


Development banks, for example, can help leverage private-sector investment.	比如，开发银行有助于撬动私人部门投资。


And new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are in a position to make sustainability a core mandate.	亚洲基础设施投资银行等新机构应该将可持续性作为核心使命。


Managing the transition from an economy based on fossil fuels to one based on low-carbon alternatives will not be easy.	管理从基于化石燃料的经济向基于低碳能源的经济的转型绝非易事。


But that is why it is essential to begin today.	但正因如此，才应该从现在做起。


It is time for the G-7 to recognize its responsibility and lead the world toward a sustainable future.	G-7必须认识到它的责任，领导世界走向可持续的未来。


G-8 Summit and Climate Change	八国集团峰会和气候变化


Two years ago, the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland promised to advance a clean development agenda and mobilize financial support for greener growth in the key emerging market economies.	两年前，苏格兰格伦伊格尔斯八国集团峰会保证推动清洁发展议程并且为主要新兴市场经济体更为环保的发展调动财政支持。


This year’s meeting, in Heiligendamm, Germany, must deliver on that promise.	今年在德国Heligendamm举办的峰会必须兑现这一诺言。


Since Gleneagles, a critical mass of public support to act decisively on climate change has developed.	从格伦伊格尔斯峰会以来，对气候变化采取坚决措施的公众支持大为提高。


Some say a tipping point has occurred.	有些人说形势已经越过了一个界限。


The science and the economics of climate change has come closer as a result of the overwhelming scientific evidence in the studies of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Sir Nicholas Stern’s Report for the UK government on the costs of action and inaction.	随着政府间气候变化委员会的研究报告以及斯塔恩爵士为英国政府所作的采取行动或者无所作为的成本的报告出台，有关气候变化的科学理论和经济学更加靠近了。


Around the world expert officials, the business community, concerned citizens, and responsive governments are coming together to find common solutions to a global problem that may be the single most important issue we face as a global community.	全世界的专家官员、工商界、对此关心的公民以及采取对应措施的各国政府正在联合起来寻找这一全球性问题的共同解决办法。 这一问题可能是我们作为全球社区所面临的最为重要的问题。


In Heiligendamm, the G-8 leaders, together with representatives of major emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, China, India, and South Africa, who have a critical stake in energy consumption to continue to generate economic growth), will discuss a comprehensive approach encompassing a set of energy options, from energy efficiency and renewable energy, to clean coal, carbon capture and storage, and carbon sequestration.	在德国Heligendamm会议上，八国集团领导人以及主要新兴经济体的代表们（巴西、墨西哥、中国、印度以及南非，它们在继续经济增长的能源消耗上利益攸关）将会讨论包括一整套能源选择的全面措施。 这包括能源效益和可再生能源、清洁煤炭、回收和储存二氧化碳以及二氧化碳隔离。


They also have a chance to advance the use of market mechanisms to do two things: mitigate climate change, and, at the same time, create incentives for expanded use of clean energy.	他们还有机会促进使用市场机制来做到两件事情，也就是减轻气候变化，与此同时为扩大使用清洁能源创造激励手段。


An important way to achieve both objectives is by expanding carbon markets.	实现这两大目标的一个重要方式就是扩大二氧化碳交易市场。


Carbon finance is an effective vehicle for channeling funds for climate-friendly investments, including to the developing world.	二氧化碳金融是将资金导向气候友好的投资的有效手段，这包括向发展中国家提供资金。


Last year alone the size of the world carbon market tripled to over $30 billion, of which about 20 percent went to projects in the developing world.	仅仅去年一年，全世界的二氧化碳交易市场的规模就扩大了三倍，超过300亿美元，这其中的20％用于发展中国家的项目。


By one estimate, with a long term, predictable, and equitable post-2012 global regulatory framework for curbing greenhouse gas emissions (when the Kyoto protocol expires), carbon markets could develop exponentially and deliver financial flows to developing countries of anywhere between $20 and $120 billion dollars/year.	根据某一项估计，根据长期可以预计并且公平的后2012年全球限制温室气体排放管理框架（届时京都议定书将过期），二氧化碳市场有可能大幅增加，并且向发展中国家提供每年200亿到300亿美元的资金。


The funds are sorely needed.	现在急需资金。


The World Bank calculations show that developing countries need an annual investment of about $165 billion through 2030 just to supply electricity to their people.	世界银行估算，发展中国家在2030年以前需要每年投资1650亿美元才能够向其人口提供电力。


Of this sum, only about half is readily identifiable.	在这个数目中，只有大约一半的资金得到了落实。


On top of this $80 billion gap, developing countries will need another $30 billion per year to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector alone and get on a low-carbon development path, and $10-40 billion dollars more per year to adapt to the already inevitable impact of climate change .	除了这800亿美元的缺口之外，发展中国家另外每年需要300亿美元来从电力部门减少温室气体排放以及走向低二氧化碳排放的发展道路。 此外，还需要每年100亿到400亿美元的资金来适应气候变化带来的已经不可避免的影响。


A G8 commitment to the global carbon market will foster long-term financing beyond 2012.	八国集团对全球二氧化碳市场作出承诺将会为2012年以后培育长期的融资。


Such carbon finance can also tackle deforestation, which represents about 20% of the global CO2 emissions causing climate change.	这种二氧化碳金融也将会处理森林流失问题，而森林流失占全球导致气候变化的二氧化碳排放的20％。


A forest carbon facility can reward forest conservation as a means of protecting the climate while also preserving ecosystems and generating income for poor communities in developing countries.	森林二氧化碳措施可以奖励森林保护作为保护气候同时维持生态系统并且在发展中国家的贫穷社区创造收入的手段。


The World Bank is keen to work with partners to experiment with such a facility for avoided deforestation.	世界银行愿意同合作伙伴合作来试验这种措施来避免森林流失。


An expanded carbon market can help pay for a transformation to a low carbon economy, but it won’t be enough.	二氧化碳交易市场大幅度扩大可以为向低二氧化碳排放的经济转型提供资金，但是这还不够。


Like other new markets, it will take time to mature and reach out to places with weaker market institutions.	像其他新市场一样，这一市场也需要时间才能够成熟并扩展到市场机制薄弱的地方。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that rich countries need to take the lead because only then will the less developed economies follow, and she is right.	德国总理默克尔说过，富国应该以身作则，因为只有在那时发展中国家才会效仿。


The United Kingdom recently announced a new £800 million Environmental Transformation Fund International Window.	她说得有道理。 英国最近宣布价值8亿英镑的环境转型基金国际窗口。


Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said his country is ready to look into the possibility of creating a new financial mechanism, with substantial funds for the relatively long- term, to help developing countries halt global warming. These are the types of climate change leadership that the world needs.	日本首相安倍说日本准备研究建立新的金融机制的可能性，给相对长期的项目大量资金来帮助发展中国家阻止全球变暖。 这些就是世界所需要的气候变化领导作用。


Mobilizing large scale financing for clean investments today and over the next 5-10 years is critical because this is when developing countries will essentially “lock-in” carbon emissions for the next 50 years.	为今天以及未来50年的清洁投资调动大量资金是极为重要的，因为这段期间发展中国家将基本上“锁定”未来50年的二氧化碳排放。


If we can help them get on a low carbon path, we will have taken a giant step forward in preserving and protecting our planet while enabling them to reduce poverty and offer their citizens a better future.	如果我们能够帮助它们走到低二氧化碳排放的道路上来，那么，我们就会在维护和保护地球、与此同时让这些国家减少贫困并且给这些国家的人民一个更好的将来的方向上迈出一大步。


The meeting in Heiligendamm can advance the commitments made at Gleneagles two years ago and bring the world closer to a more sustainable future.	本次Heligendamm八国集团峰会可以促进两年前在格伦伊格尔斯做出的承诺，并且将世界带近到一个更为可持续发展的未来。


Gambler’s Ruin	赌徒的毁灭


San Francisco – From Adam Smith (1776) until 1950 or so, capital was considered by economists to be absolutely essential for economic growth.	旧金山－从亚当·史密斯（1776)开始直到1950左右，资本被经济学家认为是经济增长的绝对关键。


You also needed a few good basic institutions. “Security of property and tolerable administration of justice,” as Smith put it.	除此之外，还需要一些良好的基本制度，如史密斯提出的“财产安全和对公正的适当管理”。


If these fundamental institutions were right, then landlords, merchants, and manufacturers would invest and improve.	如果这些基本制度是公正的，那么地主，商人和企业主就会进行投资和改进工作。


In investing and improving, they would add to the capital stock: “In all countries where there is a tolerable security [of property], every man of common understanding will endeavor to employ whatever [capital] stock he can command, in procuring either present enjoyment or future profit... A man must be perfectly crazy, who, where there is a tolerable security, does not employ all the stock which he commands, whether it be his own, or borrowed of other people...”	在投资和改进的过程中，他们会扩大资本：“在所有有适当的〔财产〕安全的国家，每一个具有一般常识的人都会努力使用他可以支配的任何〔资本〕资金来获取当前的享受或者是将来的利润···一个人如果在有适当的财产安全的情况下不使用他可以支配的资金，不管资金是他自己的还是从别人那里借来的，他肯定是非常懒惰的···”


A larger capital stock would mean thicker markets, a finer division of labor, and a more productive economy.	更大的资本将意味着更雄厚的市场，更细致的劳动分工和更多产的经济。


A highly productive society based on a sophisticated division of labor was how you secured “the wealth of nations.”	一个建立在复杂的劳动分工基础上的非常多产的社会，就是取得 “国家财富”的方法。


Reverse the process, however, and you get the poverty of nations, which Smith believed he saw in the Asia of his time.	但是，将这个过程反过来，国家就会变得贫困，史密斯认为他在同时代的亚洲看到了这一点。


For Smith and his successors over the first 175 years, any episode of sustained economic growth overwhelmingly required investment capital.	对史密斯和其后超过175年内的继承者来说， 任何经济的可持续增长绝对需要投资资本。


We economists were by and large capital boosters, and our magic formula for economic development was saving, investment, thrift, and wealth accumulation.	我们经济学家基本上是资本的拥护者，我们发展经济的魔力公式是储蓄，投资，节俭和财富积累。


The last and fullest expression of this line of thought comes at the end of the 1950’s with W.W. Rostow’s book The Stages of Economic Growth .	对这一思想最后和最全面的表述是在上个世纪五十年代末期华尔特·罗斯托的著作《经济增长的阶段》中。


Then Robert Solow and Moses Abramovitz challenged this near-consensus.	后来，罗伯特·索洛和莫希斯·阿布拉莫维兹挑战了这个几乎没人提出异议的观点。


They calculated that 75% to 80% of economic growth did not come from increasing the capital-output ratio – at least not if the private marginal product of capital was taken as an indicator of the social marginal product.	他们计算出75%到80%的经济增长不是来自资本产出率的增加－至少在企业的资本边际产量被当作社会边际产量的一个指标的时候不是如此。


Instead, the keys to growth and development appeared to lie beyond an increase in capital intensity as measured by capital-output ratios: skills, education, technology broadly understood, and improvements in organizational management.	相反，增长和发展的关键似乎是增加以资本产出率衡量的资本集约度之外的因素：技能，教育，对技术的广泛理解和组织管理的改进。


Yet capital continued to be seen as necessary, if not sufficient.	然而资本仍然被认为即使不是发展的决定性因素，依然非常关键。


In the framework developed by the development economist Dani Rodrik, a shortage of capital can be a binding “growth constraint”: the place where “the biggest bang for the [policy] reform buck can be obtained.”	在由发展经济学家丹尼·罗德瑞克研究的框架中，在“可能进行突破性的〔政策〕改革”的地方，缺乏资本可以成为一个有效的“增长制约”。


And even when other factors constrain growth more, they cannot be changed without changing the shape and form of the economy’s capital stock.	并且即使在其他因素更制约增长的时候，在没有改变该经济体的资本形态的情况下，这些其他因素也不能得到改变。


Indeed, high investment serves as a sign that other binding constraints to growth are absent, implying prosperity and that things are going right.	确实，高投资率可以作为没有其他有效制约增长因素的标志，暗示着繁荣和一切正常。


The problem is that for poor economies, raising the capital needed to relax binding growth constraints is difficult.	问题是，对于贫穷的经济体，筹集用于缓解有效增长制约的资本很困难。


That’s why the world took the neo-liberal bet in the 1990’s: international capital mobility would come to the rescue by relaxing capital constraints where they were binding, and by reducing the scope for corruption and rent-seeking, which was often a more significant binding growth constraint.	这就是为什么世界同意在上世纪九十年代的新自由主义上打赌：国际资本流动可以通过在资本制约有效的地方缓解它和降低腐败和权力寻租的范围－这通常是一个更重要的有效增长制约，来帮助经济发展。


The hope was that, like the pre-1913 era of British overseas investment, which financed a huge amount of industrialization in the resource-rich, temperate periphery of the world economy, net capital outflows from the industrial core would finance much late twentieth and twenty-first century industrialization.	人们希望如同1913年以前的英国海外投资一样——这些英国投资在世界经济外围的资源丰富，气候温和地区扶持起了大量的工业，从核心工业国家的净资本流出可以为二十世纪和二十一世纪才工业化的地区提供资金。


But we all know the outcome: while international capital flows soared, the large net flow of capital from rich to poor countries simply never materialized.	但是我们都知道结果：在国际资本流动剧增的同时，从富裕国家向贫穷国家的大量净资本流动从来没有实现过。


In fact, the principal outcome was an enormous flow of capital from the periphery to the rich core.	事实上，主要的结果是大量的资本从外围地区流入到富裕的核心地区。