WASHINGTON, DC – Sitting in Paris as the United States’s first ambassador to France, Thomas Jefferson reflected on how the new US government could avoid the errors of European “despots” who kept their people subjugated through war and debt.	华盛顿—美国第一任驻法国大使托马斯·杰斐逊坐在巴黎，沉思美国新政府如何避免欧洲“专制暴君”的覆辙。 专制暴君通过战争和债务让人民屈从。


Writing to James Madison, he observed that the US Constitution had at least checked “the Dog of war,” by transferring “the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”	在给詹姆斯·麦迪逊的信中，他观察道，美国宪法至少通过“将斥责的权力从执政者转交给立法机构，从花钱者转交给付钱者”抑制了“战争之祸”。


At the same time, however, the Constitution designates the executive as the “Commander in Chief,” a power that American presidents have invoked to use military force without Congressional authorization on more than 200 occasions.	但是，与此同时，宪法给予执政者“三军统帅”的地位，美国总统可以行使这一权力在不经国会授权的情况下使用武力，适用这一条款的场合有200多种。


President Barack Obama relied on that power when he told both Congress and the American people that he had the authority to order limited strikes on Syria without going to Congress.	总统奥巴马在告诉国会和美国人民他有越过国会下令对叙利亚实施有限打击之权时所凭据的便是这一权力。


By simultaneously claiming that authority and seeking Congressional authorization to use it, Obama enters a small class of leaders who actively seek to constrain their own power.	奥巴马双管齐下，既宣告这一权力，也寻求国会授权，这使他跻身于少数积极寻求约束自身权力的领导人的行列。


That is because he sees his historical legacy as that of a president who ended wars and made them harder to start, instead reinvesting America’s resources in its own people.	这是因为他的历史使命是成为结束战争、让战争更加难以开启、将美国的资源重新投资于美国人民的总统。


He opposed the Iraq war in 2003 and promised in 2008 that he would end the unlimited “war on terror,” which had become a potential blank check for US presidents to use force anywhere in the world.	2003年时，他反对伊拉克战争； 2008年时，他承诺将结束无限度的“反恐战争”，借着这个名头，美国诸位总统在世界各地挑起战争。


But, beyond the system of political “checks and balances” created by the US Constitution, does it make sense for leaders to take decisions regarding the use of force to the people?	但是，在美国宪法所创造的政治“制衡”制度之外，领袖做出向人民使用武力的决定有何意义？


It certainly makes the leaders’ lives harder.	这显然会使领袖的生涯更加艰难。


British Prime Minister David Cameron came up short when he turned to Parliament to authorize British participation in US strikes against Syria.	英国首相卡梅伦要求议会授权英国加入美国打击叙利亚的行动，结果以失败告终。


French President François Hollande faced intense criticism from right-wing parties in the National Assembly for his agreement to participate in the strikes.	法国总统奥朗德因为同意参与打击而在国民大会中受到了来自右翼政党的严厉抨击。


And Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who volunteered to participate in a military coalition, is facing strong domestic opposition to his Syria policy.	自愿参与军事���盟的土耳其总理埃尔多安的叙利亚政策也受到了强大的国内反对。


There are several arguments for not allowing the people’s representatives to intervene in the complicated foreign-policy dance between force and diplomacy.	对于不让人民的代表参与复杂的武力和外交的对外关系博弈，有若干原因。


For starters, there is the traditional idea that politics end at the water’s edge, where messy domestic disagreements are supposed to give way to the abstraction of one state with a unified national interest.	首先，传统思维认为政治应该在水岸上结束，混乱的国内分歧应该屈从于一个国家、一种国家利益的抽象概念。


A related argument is that domestic political processes can hamstring a government in the great game of poker or chess that international politics is supposed to be.	一个相关观点是，国内政治程序会掣肘政府在国际政治这盘大棋上的动作。


As Obama has just discovered, having a legislature that clearly does not want to go to war weakens the executive’s hand in international negotiations.	正如奥巴马刚刚发现的，立法机关明确不愿走向战争会削弱执政者在国际谈判上的立场。


Timing is another problem.	另一个问题是时机。


Legislative processes are slow and often tortuous, while international diplomacy can change overnight, owing to shifting coalitions, unexpected opportunities, and well-hidden traps.	立法程序很慢，而且往往枝节丛生，而由于联盟的变化、意料之外的机会和隐藏得很深的陷阱，国际外交形式瞬息万变。


Moreover, diplomacy thrives on back-room deals of the kind that US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have just struck over Syria’s chemical weapons.	此外，外交往往充满了幕后交易，如美国国务卿克里和俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫刚刚就叙利亚化学武器达成的协议。


In high-stakes negotiations, the last thing the players need is public debate about the cards that each of them holds.	在髙赌注谈判中，令谈判方最被动的要数关于每人手里捏着什么牌的争论。


A threat to turn from talks to tanks must be credible, which it will not be if an opposing player can simply count votes to see if the necessary legislative majority exists.	让谈话变成坦克的威胁必须是可信的，而如果对手可以轻易地计算选票判断是否能达成必须的立法多数，威胁就无法做到可信。


Still, Jefferson had it right.	不过杰斐逊仍有可取之处。


Though turning to the legislature may prove to be inconvenient, frustrating, and even counter-productive, it is the right thing to do, for three reasons.	尽管转向立法机构可能极不方便、结果令人沮丧甚至事与愿违，但出于三个理由，仍应该这样做。


First, the use of force is costly in terms of lives, money, and leaders’ energy and attention.	首先，使用武力会消耗大量的生命、金钱和领导人的能量和注意力。


The people pay these costs, so their representatives should decide whether to incur them.	人民付出这些成本，因此应该由他们的代表决定是否要付出这些成本。


Second, it is never more important for a democracy to follow its procedures and uphold its principles than in an armed conflict involving non-democracies.	其次，对于一个民主国家来说，在与非民主国家的冲突中，没有什么比遵照程序、坚持原则更重要的了。


The Syrian people, oppressed and brutalized by their own government, should see that the American people have a different relationship with their leaders.	叙利亚人民饱受本国政府的压迫和欺凌，他们应该看看，美国人民和领导人之间的关系大不相同。


Finally, a core component of democracy is a set of rules and procedures designed to require public officials to justify their policies with reasons that can be accepted or countered in public debate.	最后，民主的一个核心要素是有一组规则和程序以要求公共官员论证他们的政策，他们的理由必须被公众所接受，或者在公共争论中被驳倒。


When contemplating foreign military intervention, leaders must explain their actions in ways that make clear how their country’s strategic and moral interests are at stake – for example, how unbridled aggression and hideous suffering can fester and spread.	对于对外军事干预问题，领导人必须解释他们的行动，说清楚为何这关乎国家的战略和道德利益——比如，为何肆无忌惮的侵犯和可怕的苦难会持续和蔓延。


Leaders would prefer to speak in the language of readily calculable interests.	领导人更偏好于为可以计算的利益说话。


Talk of care and moral scruples is uncomfortable and unstable terrain.	谈关注和道德顾虑令他们心里没底，也不稳定。


As the Turkish political analyst Mustafa Akyol has put it, for most of the Turkish population, “care for Syria does not translate into, ‘Let’s go liberate it.’”	土耳其政治分析家阿克约尔（Mustafa Akyol）指出，对许多土耳其人来说，“关注叙利亚并不意味着‘让我们去解放它。


Yet leaders who need their people’s support to address complex, interdependent problems beyond their borders must socialize them into a twenty-first-century world in which caring without acting imperils us all.	’”但需要人民的支持来解决超越国境的复杂且相互联系的问题领导人必须必须把它们纳入二十一世纪思维，即关注而不行动将让我们所有人吃亏。


These arguments do not mean that leaders will not use force from time to time without turning to their people first.	所有这些观点并不意味着领导人永远不会在没有经过人民允许的情况下使用武力。


Obama does have constitutional authority to conduct limited military strikes to deter and degrade Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons.	奥巴马确实拥有宪法赋予的组织有限军事打击以震慑或削弱叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德使用化学武器能力的权力。


All leaders can order their forces into battle in cases of national emergency or self-defense.	所有领导人都可以命令军队开战，如果出现国家紧急情况或是为了自卫的话。


They must preserve their legal and operational ability to act swiftly and decisively when necessary.	他们必须保留在必要时采取快速果断行动的合法的执行力。


But, two centuries after Jefferson, states are no longer merely colored shapes on a map; increasingly, they are transparent and open territories that we view as home to millions of fellow human beings.	但是，在杰斐逊身后两百年，各国早已不再是仅仅是地图上的彩色色块，各国的领土越来越透明和开放，我们把国家视作数百万人类共同的家园。


It is thus ever more important that the people of one country participate in the decision to attack the people of another.	因此，一国中的人民参与决定打击另一国的人民的决策就变得更加重要了。


Investing in Happy Endings	投资美满的结局


LONDON – Public and private investment in the real economy has been under attack since the 2008 financial crisis.	伦敦——针对实体经济的公共及私人投资从2008年金融危机后就备受打击。


In difficult economic times, it may seem logical to cut investments that yield results only in the long term, and thereby conserve money and resources to address short-term problems.	经济困难时期，削减只能收到长期效益的投资、从而节省下资金和资源来解决短期问题看似合情合理。


In fact, cutting investment in our future – be it in people, the planet, political institutions, or business – is deeply irrational.	但事实上，削减对于未来的投资——无论涉及人、地球、政治机构还是企业——都是非常不理性的行为。


It is only through investment in visionary ideas, blue-skies thinking, research and development, and innovation that we can ensure that the future will be better – freer, more peaceful, and more prosperous – than the past.	只有投资于有远见的想法、开创性的思维、研究和创新，才能确保未来更自由、更和平、更繁荣，进而超越过去。


Early-childhood education, preventive medicine, libraries, physical infrastructure, and basic scientific research, for example, all cost money – and studies show that they are worthwhile.	举例来讲，早期儿童教育、预防医学、图书馆、基础设施和基础科学研究都需要资金支持——而且研究显示这些钱花得很值。


But when policymakers need to cut spending, investment in these public goods is often the first thing to go, because voters do not feel the effects in the short term.	但当决策者需要削减开支时，往往会最先牺牲对这些公共产品的投资，因为选民在短期内不会有所察觉。


Most of the pain is deferred, which is precisely why such cuts are politically attractive.	痛苦大多被推迟了，而这恰恰表明这样的削减在政治上颇具吸引力。


But this is low-hanging fruit that societies cannot afford to pick.	但人类社会摘不起这样唾手可得的果实。


We must start investing in people at the earliest possible moment – right from birth.	我们必须尽早对人进行投资——甚至从出生那一刻开始。


Universal access to high-quality nutrition and preventive health care, as well as early-childhood learning programs, are necessary to provide strong foundations upon which countries around the world can ensure their future social advancement and economic growth.	让所有人分享高品质营养、预防保健及儿童早期学习计划能够奠定坚实的基础，确保世界各国都能分享未来的经济增长及社会进步。


Likewise, for children and adults alike, there is real value in, say, public libraries – secular and free gathering spaces that offer universal access to learning and, increasingly, provide a gateway to digital services.	同样，无论对于儿童还是成人，公共图书馆都能带来真正的价值——让所有人拥有世俗和自由的集会空间，在赋予每个人学习机会的同时为他们提供数字化服务。


The same is true of cultural programs and institutions that stimulate growth in the arts and sciences; they, too, are necessary to ensure that citizens can contribute productively to their societies and economies.	推动艺术和科学发展的机构也同样如此； 要想确保民众高效地为经济社会贡献力量这样的机构就不可或缺。


The temptation to cut long-term investment in economic hard times stalks the private sphere as well.	经济困难时期削减长期投资同样会伤及私人领域。


And companies around the world, big and small, have been succumbing to it since the beginning of the global economic downturn.	而世界各地企业无论大小，自全球经济衰退伊始就屈从于这样的诱惑。


As companies are forced to look to their bottom line and become leaner, they cut investment in research and development, employee development and training, infrastructure, and more.	随着企业被迫进行最大限度的精简，他们大幅削减对研发、员工发展培训和基础设施等领域的投资。


Making matters worse, these budget lines are the last to be restored when economic prospects brighten.	更糟的是，即便经济前景看好，也要等到最后才会恢复这些预算领域。


For example, in the face of investor pressure, pharmaceutical companies have cut their research activities dramatically, relying instead on acquisition strategies.	比方说，面对投资者的压力，医药企业纷纷大幅削减研发项目，转而依靠所谓的收购战略。


The aim is to “de-risk” by buying up firms that have already carried out all of the costly blue skies research and have developed proven drugs.	这样做的目的是通过收购已进行过高成本开创性研究且已开发出成熟药品的企业来实现“去风险化”。


Obviously, such strategies will not work in the long term if no one is willing to invest in the earliest stages of research in critical areas like biotechnology, digital technology, renewable energy sources, and the like.	显而易见，如果没人愿意投资生物技术、数字技术，可再生能源等关键领域的早期研究，这样的策略不可能长期持续。


With early-stage investors scarce, governments turning away from blue-sky science, and funders of university-based research increasingly demanding that grantees’ show the “impact” of their work, who will fund risk-taking?	如果早期投资人稀缺、政府抛���开创性科学、大学研究项目的资助者明确要求受助项目证明自己工作的“成绩”，还有谁会资助高风险项目？


If no one does, the well will run dry, and there will be nothing to acquire.	如果没人冒险，井水终将干涸，收购也很难发现标的。


Likewise, instead of investing in new infrastructure, companies patch up the old.	同样，企业不再投资修建新的基础设施，而是对旧的修修补补。


But patching broken things can work for only so long.	但修修补补不可能永远持续下去。


By not committing resources to invest in new, cost-efficient, environmentally-friendly operations, or in developing the skills and knowledge of employees, or in innovation, companies will find that their short-term savings come at the expense of their long-term success.	如果不投入资源为高效环保的新项目提供资助、或者提升员工的技术和知识、或者着力推进创新研究，企业终将发现他们的短期节约最终以牺牲长期成功为代价。


The choices that companies are making not only affect their own operations, but also have profound consequences for their customers, suppliers, and the societies in which they are embedded.	企业所做的选择不仅会影响自身经营，还会对他们的客户、供应商及其所处团体产生深远的影响。


Failure to invest in the future will affect that future for everyone.	未能投资于未来将对所有人的未来造成影响。


Not everything that is worthwhile has an immediate positive effect on financial bottom lines, or can be put neatly in a box.	并非所有有价值的事物都可以轻松打包，或即刻对财务结果产生积极的影响。


If public and private investment decisions are driven only by the easily measured and easily defined, we will miss out on the breakthrough moments that characterize so much of human achievement and advancement.	如果公共和私人投资仅靠能够衡量和界定的因素驱动，我们将会错过标志人类成就及进步的突破时刻。


In both the public and private sectors, we need to commit ourselves to long-term investment, whether in children and education, science and technology, and health and medicine, or in building strong institutions that can serve as the sustainable foundations of peaceful, democratic, and prosperous societies.	我们要着力推进公共及私人领域的长期投资，无论涉及儿童教育、科学技术、医疗药品、抑或能作为和平、民主、繁荣社会基础的建设高效机构等领域。


An investment in our future is never wasted.	对未来的投资永远不会被浪费掉。


Investing in beginnings is the only way we will live to see happy endings.	投资于开始是我们能够得到圆满结果的唯一方式。


Inside the Training Revolution	培训革命的内部


BERKELEY – A highly trained workforce is a public good, crucial not only to the prosperity of workers themselves, but also to the strength of the entire economy.	伯克利—受过高度培训的劳动力是一种公共品，不但对工人自身的兴旺至关重要，对整个经济的强大亦然。


And, as with most public goods, the United States has been underinvesting in it for decades, leaving many American workers without the skills they need to get well-paying jobs.	与大部分公共品一样，几十年来美国在这方面一直投资不足，导致许多美国工人没有获得高薪工作所需要的技能。


Fortunately, there are signs of improvement.	幸运的是，改善信号已显现。


As the American labor market tightens and a growing chorus of companies complains that they cannot find skilled workers, innovative partnerships between governments, employers, and educational institutions are beginning to fill the void.	随着美国劳动力市场状况的收紧和越来越多的公司抱怨找不到高技能工人，政府、雇主和教育机构间的创新合作正在开始填补这一差距。


Governments bear the primary responsibility for funding workforce training.	在培训劳动力方面，政府承担主要责任。


But effective programs require more than just money; they need employers and educators who can identify the necessary skills, create the structures to teach them, and match trained workers with available jobs.	但有效的培训计划所需要的不仅仅是钱； 也需要能识别必要技能、创造教授这些技能的结构、让受过培训的工人与可获得的岗位匹配的雇主和教育者。


To be successful in achieving these goals, training programs must keep pace with rapid changes in technology and the consequent evolution in the labor market.	要想成功实现这些目标，培训计划必须与技术的快速变革及其所带来的劳动力市场演化相适应。


In short, workforce training requires both more investment and more innovation through new kinds of public-private partnerships, degree-granting institutions, and approaches to life-long learning and re-skilling.	简言之，劳动力培训需要更多的投资，也需要通过新型公私合作、学位授予机构和终身学习和再培训实现的更多的创新。


Innovative approaches can pop up almost anywhere, and government has a critical role to play in promoting them: rigorously evaluating programs, scaling up those that work, and withdrawing funding from those that do not.	创新方法可以在任何一个地方出现，而政府在推广方面起着关键作用：严格地评估项目，扩大有效的项目，并把资金从无效项目中抽走。


In the US, community colleges provide the first step toward a good job for millions of Americans.	在美国，社区大学为数百万美国人提供了迈向好工作的第一步。


These institutions are especially important for students from less-advantaged backgrounds and for displaced workers seeking new opportunities.	这些机构对于学习基础较差的学生和转换地方寻找新机会的工人来说尤其重要。


Around the country, community colleges are working with businesses and experimenting with ways to provide practical training for high-demand occupations and to fill specialized needs.	放眼全国，社区大学正在与企业合作，尝试各种方法为高要求岗位提供实践培训，满足专门的需要。


Recognizing their importance, President Barack Obama has proposed making two years of community college tuition-free.	奥巴马总统认识到了社区大学的重要性，提出免收社区大学两年学费。


The proposal would benefit the roughly nine million students attending community college at least half-time, making steady progress, and maintaining passing grades.	这一提案将令大约九百万至少在社区大学学习半天的学生受益，产生稳定的进步并保持通过成绩。


By one careful reckoning, community colleges are an extremely good investment.	仔细思考就能发现，社区大学是一项极好的投资。


For every dollar a student pays or gives up to attend school, his or her future income rises by about $4.80.	一名学生为上学而付出或放弃的每一美元可以在未来为他带来大约4. 8美元的收入提升。


For taxpayers, the lifetime return on investment is better than six to one.	对纳税人来说，这项投资的终身回报超过六笔一。


Community colleges are a classic example of how US states operate as “laboratories of democracy.”	社区大学是一个美国各州作为“民主实验室”的经典例子。


Obama based his proposal in part on the free-tuition programs launched by Tennessee and the city of Chicago.	奥巴马的提案部分是基于田纳西州和芝加哥市所实施的免学费项目。


Drawing on the success of the Tennessee Tech Program, he has also proposed a $200-million federal fund to expand community college programs based on their effectiveness, which is to be measured by employer partnerships, work-based learning opportunities, and student graduation and job placement rates.	他援引田纳西州科技项目（Tennessee Tech Program）成功的例子，又提出成立一个2亿美元的联邦基金用于根据社区大学项目的效果扩大其规模。 效果将通过雇主合作、根据工作的学习机会和学生毕业率和就业率等指标衡量。


Similarly, California, which boasts a long tradition of excellence in public higher education, recently introduced a $50 million fund to foster innovative approaches in the sector, with an emphasis on public-private collaborations that have demonstrated their ability to deliver the skills that employers need.	类似地，以公共高等教育发达著称的加利福尼亚州最近成立了一个5,000万美元的基金用于这方面的创新方法，重点强调已经证明能带来雇主所需要的技能的公私合作项目���


Community colleges are just one part of the rapidly changing training landscape.	社区大学只是快速变化的培训状况的一部分。


The purpose of higher education is evolving.	高等教育的目的在演化。


In addition to traditional tertiary education, training institutions are offering targeted modules, certified by professional industry groups.	除了传统的大学教育，培训机构提供针对性学习模块并获得专业行业团体的认证。


The Obama administration, for example, cooperated with an arm of the National Association of Manufacturers to launch a manufacturing skills certification system based on standards established by industry groups.	比如，奥巴马政府与美国制造商协会（National Association of Manufacturers）的一个附属机构合作成立了一个制造业技能认证系统，其标准由行业集团制定。


That program is now operating at 163 colleges and institutes.	该项目目前在163所大学和研究所实施。


Numerous collaborations among the public sector, non-profit philanthropies, and businesses are offering innovations in worker education.	公共部门、非盈利慈善机构和企业间的各种合作正在提供员工教育创新。


For example, Western Governors University, a nonprofit online institution, offers accredited college-degree programs in teaching, nursing, health-care informatics, and business.	比如，非盈利在线机构西部州长大学（Western Governors University）提供或认可的教师、护士、医学信息和商学大学学位课程。


It gets financial support from more than 20 corporations and philanthropies, including the Gates Foundation, along with $10 million from the US Department of Education.	它从包括盖茨基金会（Gates Foundation）在内的20多家公司和慈善机构获得资金支持，美国教育部也拨款1亿美元。


Advancement is based not on how long students sit in a classroom, but on their competence in the topics they are studying.	完成进度不是根据学生在课堂上坐了多久决定，而是通过他们是否能胜任他们所学习的课题决定。


The cost for six months, regardless of how many courses a person takes, is $2,890 (including books and a mentor) – a bargain, compared to most state universities.	六个月的学习费用——不管你学多少门课——是2,890美元（包括教材费和一名导师的费用），与大部分州立大学比起来十分便宜。


The Nanodegree program at AT&T (where I am a board member) is another example.	AT&T的微学位（Nanodegree）项目（我也是董事会成员）是另一个例子。


The program, a collaboration between AT&T and Udacity, a for-profit provider of online courses, offers courses and mini-degrees in specialized fields such as front-end website development.	该计划是AT&T公司和非盈利在线课程提供商Udacity的合作项目，提供前端网站开发等专业化领域的课程和迷你学位。


The program is a component of AT&T’s in-house training program, but it is open to anyone with a broadband connection.	该项目是AT&T公司的内部培训计划的一部分，但向所有宽带用户开放。


A typical course, the content of which is designed by AT&T and other high-tech companies, costs about $200 a month and takes 6-12 months to complete.	在通常情况下，授课内容由AT&T公司和其他高科技公司设计，费用为每个月200美元，完成课程需要6—12个月。


AT&T offers scholarships through partner non-profit institutions and provides paid internships for up to 100 graduates.	AT&T公司通过合作非盈利机构提供奖学金，并为最多100名毕业生提供带薪实习机会。


LearnUp, a San Francisco startup that has attracted funding from some of the biggest venture capital firms in Silicon Valley, establishes partnerships with employers to offer online training modules that connect job seekers to specific jobs, primarily entry-level positions that do not require college degrees.	旧金山创业公司LearnUp已经吸引了硅谷几家最大风险资本公司的资金。 该公司与雇主合作提供将求职者和具体岗位联系起来的在线培训模块，以不需要大学学历的入门岗位为主。


Employers foot the bill, with the expectation that LearnUp will help them recruit higher-quality applicants.	雇主支付学费，并期望LearnUp帮助它们找到高质量求职者。


And, indeed, once candidates have completed the training, LearnUp helps them to secure interviews with prospective employers, which already includes several large companies.	此外，一旦申请者完成培训，LearnUp也一定将帮助保证他们参与各自雇主的面试，包括一些大公司。


The California community college system is already working with LearnUp to give students access to the skills required to fill available local jobs.	加州社区大学系统已经开始与LearUp合作教授学生获得当地工作岗位所需要的技能。


As these examples illustrate, though workforce training is a public good, no single institution or arm of government has all of the answers concerning how best to provide it.	这些例子表明，尽管劳动力培训是一个公共品，但没有哪个机构或政府分支知道如何最好地提供这一公共品。


Collaboration among government agencies, companies and trade associations, educational institutions, and non-profits can give birth to effective strategies that can be scaled with public funding.	政府机构、公司和行业协会、教育机构以及非营利组织之间的合作能够带来有效的与公共资金相适应的战略。


Only by working together will they be able to identify the best recipes for success.	只有通过合作，它们才能看清成功的最佳秘诀。


Donald Trump and a World of Distrust	唐纳德·特朗普和一个失去信任的世界


WASHINGTON, DC – A crisis of public confidence in civic institutions – including governments, legislatures, courts, and the media – is a central factor in the rise of Donald Trump and figures like him around the world.	华盛顿——公众对公共机构（包括政府、立法机构、法院和媒体的信任危机）是唐纳德·特朗普和世界各地像他这样的人物崛起的核心因素。


And so long as the crisis persists, such leaders will continue to resonate with voters, regardless of electoral outcomes.	只要危机继续下去，这些领导人将继续与选民产生共鸣，无论最终取得什么样的选举结果。


The crisis is not new.	这样的危机已经不是第一次发生了。


A 2007 study, commissioned for a United Nations forum, showed a “pervasive” pattern: over the last four decades, nearly all of the so-called developed, industrialized democracies have been experiencing a decrease in the public trust in government.	某联合国论坛2007年委托开展的研究显示存在一种“非常普遍”的模式：在过去四十年中，几乎所有所谓发达工业化民主国家公众对政府的信任都呈现不断下降之势。


In the 1990s, even countries long known for strong civic trust, such as Sweden and Norway, recorded a decline.	二十世纪九十年代，就连长期以来以公民信任而闻名的国家，如瑞典和挪威，也呈现出民众对政府信任下降的趋势。


In the United States, Gallup’s latest survey of “confidence in institutions” shows double-digit percentage declines in trust since the 1970s (or the earliest available measurement) for 12 of 17 institutions, including banks, Congress, the presidency, schools, the press, and churches; of the remaining institutions, confidence increased modestly for four, and significantly for just one: the military.	美国盖洛普最新“机构信心”调查显示二十世纪七十年代（或有最早可供研究的统计数据）以来十七家机构中的十二家，包括银行、国会、总统、学校、媒体和教堂，信任度均下降了两位数； 在余下的机构中，对四家机构的信任度略有增加，只有一家机构的信任度是显著增加的：那就是军队。


As a social anthropologist who trained in Eastern Europe in the waning years of communism, I observed firsthand what happens to a society devoid of civic trust.	作为共产主义衰退年代曾在东欧受训的社会人类学家，我亲眼目睹了一个失去公民信任的社会会发生什么样的状况。


People viewed formal institutions with profound skepticism and retreated into social silos: informal, close-knit (and closed) circles of friends, family, and allies on which they relied for news, information, and much else.	人们用高度怀疑的目光审视正规机构，并龟缩到社会孤岛之中：联系紧密（而封闭）的非正式家人朋友圈子，以及他们了解新闻、信息和其他很多东西的盟友。


Young people saw little reason to invest in their future, and their elders succumbed to suicide and substance abuse at alarming rates.	年轻人看不到任何理由对未来进行投资，而他们的长辈则以惊人的比例自杀和滥用药物。


There are similarities to some alarming trends in the US, Europe, and elsewhere today.	今天美国、欧洲和其他地方的某些惊人趋势存在不少相似之处。


According to a major study by the economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton last year, the mortality rate for middle-aged, less-educated white men in the US has been surging, in what some observers have called a wave of “despair deaths.”	去年经济学家安妮·凯斯和安格斯·迪顿的一项重要研究显示，美国受教育程度较低的中年白人男性死亡率大幅上升，某些观察家将其称之为“绝望的死亡”浪潮。


At the same time, American millennials (those born between 1982 and 2004) are postponing marriage and home or car purchases, with many telling pollsters that the postponement will be permanent.	与此同时，美国千禧一代（即出生于1982-2004年的一代）不少人都选择推迟结婚、买房或买车，有很多人告诉调查者这种推迟将会是永久性的。


They are residing with their parents at rates not seen since 1940, and many are eking out a living through a patchwork of “gigs” that provide neither benefits nor job security.	他们以二十世纪四十年代以来前所未有的比例和父母住在一起，很多人辛苦地做着既无福利也无保障的东拼西凑的临时性工作。


As a result, a growing cohort of people are identifying as outsiders.	结果是越来越多的群体被认为是外人。


Doors that were once open to them have been shut, and their faith in public institutions to represent their interests has significantly eroded.	曾经对他们开放的大门已经关闭，而他们对代表其利益的公共机构的信心也已大幅削弱。


Many look to anti-establishment movements and figures, such as Trump, for salvation.	很多人把特朗普这样的反体制运动和人物当成拯救者。


This same tendency is apparent in the anti-elite, anti-system rage that has erupted across Europe, reflected in the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum; the right-wing Alternative for Germany Party’s continued rise; far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen’s strong showing in the French presidential campaign; and the Austrian elections this year, where for the first time since World War II no “establishment” candidates made it to the final ballot.	极右翼国家阵线领导人马琳·勒庞在法国总统竞选中表现强势； 而今年的奥地利大选，二战结束后首次没有“体制内”候选人坚持到最后一轮投票。


In the US, as the 2016 presidential campaign got underway, many voters clearly believed – not without reason – that the system was “rigged.”	随着美国2016年总统竞选活动的逐步深入，许多选民确信——系统被人“操纵”，他们这样的想法也并非全无理由。


But democracy and distrust can be a dangerous compound, because people confronting complex political and economic issues do not always direct their anger at the proper target.	但民主体制和信任缺失会成为危险的组合，因为面临复杂政治和经济问题的民众并不总能找到恰当的目标来发泄愤怒。


Profound economic and technological changes in recent decades – together with privatization, deregulation, digitization, and financialization – have further empowered elites and enabled them to hone their use of political influencing via think tanks and philanthropies; shadow lobbying, workarounds that subvert standard processes; the media; campaign finance; and stints in “public service” to advance their interests.	近几十年来深刻的经济和技术变革——加之私有化、放松管制、数字化和金融化——让精英阶层掌握了更多权力，导致其政治影响力通过利用智囊和慈善机构、影子游说、颠覆标准程序的变通办法、媒体、竞选融资和在“公共服务”中推进其利益的紧缩措施进一步增强。


This “new corruption,” though usually technically legal, is virtually nontransparent – and thus highly corrosive of public trust.	这种“新形式腐败”虽然在技术上完全合法，但几乎不具备任何透明度——因此严重损害了公众信任度。


This, along with widening income inequality, helps explain how voters can be swayed by a candidate like Trump, especially when they live, as many increasingly do, in their own information universes.	这种现象在收入不平等持续扩大的助推下可以部分解释像特朗普这样的候选人何以能够打动投票者，尤其当越来越多的投票者生活在他们自己与世隔绝的信息领域之中。


Facebook and Twitter algorithms confirm a group’s biases and screen out contrary viewpoints – and even facts.	Facebook和twitter算法加深团体偏见并过滤掉相反的观点——甚至是事实。


The digital age has created an insularity that, ironically, is not unlike that fostered under communism.	数字时代创造出一片孤岛，讽刺的是，它与共产主义所创造出来的产物并没有什么不同。


The result is frighteningly familiar to anyone who has studied Eastern European history.	对任何研究过东欧历史的学者而言，结果熟悉得令人感到恐怖。


Like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump harnesses futility and anger, exploits nostalgic yearning and nationalism, and finds convenient scapegoats in vulnerable people such as immigrants.	特朗普像俄罗斯总统普京一样利用徒劳和愤怒、怀旧的渴望和民族主义，并在移民等弱势群体中方便地寻找替罪羊。


As in Russia, where gays and other minorities have been officially targeted, America’s disenchanted are being encouraged to harass and demonize already marginalized groups.	就像俄罗斯以同性恋和其他少数族裔为正式目标一样，美国感到梦想幻灭的群体被鼓励对本已边缘化的群体进行妖魔化和骚扰。


Trust is the lifeblood of a thriving society, and much of the West needs an emergency transfusion.	信任是繁荣社会的命脉，而西方多数国家需要紧急的血液输入。


But its political systems will remain on life support until their entrenched elites feel sufficiently vulnerable to stop ignoring the needs of those who have been left behind.	但西方政治制度仍无法摆脱生命支持，直到根深蒂固的精英阶层脆弱到足以停止忽视那些被遗弃者的需求。


Publish or Perish	发表或消亡


OXFORD – A few years ago, two Norwegian researchers presented their version of a scientific-research slippery slope, with honest errors (mistaken observations and analyses) at the top and intentional fraud (plagiarism, falsification, and fabrication) at the bottom.	牛津——几年前，两名挪威科研人员提出了自己心目中的科研滑坡效应，他们把诚实的错误（错误的观察和分析）排在最前面而把故意欺诈（剽窃、篡改和伪造）放在最后。


They placed “publication bias” about halfway down the scale – but it should have been much lower.	他们将“发表偏倚”放在中间偏后的位置——但实际情况应当比这低得多。


Indeed, failure to publish research results is by far the most common and worrying form of scientific and ethical misconduct in health research – and it has had lethal consequences.	其实，未公布研究成果是医疗研究中最常见、也最令人担忧的不当科学及道德行为——而且会造成致命的后果。


Anecdotal evidence of publication bias has existed for a long time.	传说中发表偏倚的证据已经不只存在一天两天了。


But, as requirements for registering clinical trials have become more stringent, its magnitude has become quantifiable: the results of at least half of the clinical trials involving patients and healthy volunteers remain unpublished years after completion.	但随着注册临床试验的要求越来越严格，已经可以量化统计相关影响规模：至少有半数患者和健康志愿者参与的临床试验结果在完成数年后仍被束之高阁。


Studies with “negative” results are particularly unlikely to see the light of day.	结果不那么令人鼓舞的研究尤其难以得见天日。


But neglecting to report research can lead to distorted clinical-practice recommendations, suffering, and death.	但忽视报告研究成果可能导致临床实践建议被扭曲，更有可能带来痛苦和死亡的严重后果。


For example, anti-arrhythmic drugs were prescribed widely – with the United States Food and Drug Administration’s approval – to heart-attack victims for more than a decade, under the assumption that reducing heart-rhythm abnormalities would decrease mortality rates.	比方说美国食品药品管理局批准的抗心律失常药物广泛应用于治疗心脏病患者达10年之久，假设前提是减轻心律异常能够降低死亡率。


But, as the investigative journalist Thomas J. Moore reported in his book Deadly Medicine, at the peak of their use, these drugs were killing more Americans each year than were killed during the entire Vietnam War.	但据调查记者托马斯·摩尔在《致命药物》一书中的报道，在其使用高峰期，每年被这种药物夺去生命的美国人比越南战争中丧生的人还要多。


Following this revelation, a British research team reported a clinical trial that they had carried out more than a decade earlier.	这项研究公布后，一个英国研究小组报告了他们在十多年前进行的一项临床试验。


Their study had found a higher death rate among patients receiving a new anti-arrhythmic drug than among those receiving a placebo.	他们的研究已经发现服用新型抗心律失常药物患者的死亡率比服用安慰剂的对照组患者更高。


They had not published the results, they explained, because the drug’s development had been abandoned for commercial reasons.	他们解释之所以没有公布这项结果，是因为出于商业方面的原因已经放弃了药品的开发。


In retrospect, however, they observed that their results “might have provided early warning of trouble ahead.”	但现在回想起来，他们意识到自己的结果“本来可以就即将发生的问题提供早期的预警信号。 ”


Beyond avoidable suffering and death, failure to report research also slows the pace of scientific discovery.	除本可以避免的痛苦和死亡外，未公开研究成果也延缓了科学发现的步伐。


It is widely acknowledged that the high current level of investment in pharmaceutical research is yielding too few substantive discoveries.	人们普遍承认目前对药物研究投资取得的实质性成果太过微不足道。


At a meeting on “translational research,” a senior member of a contract-research organization – a company that provides outsourced research services to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries – articulated the problem.	在一次名为“翻译研究”的会议上，一家为制药和生物技术产业提供外包研究的合同研究机构高层人员明确指出了这一问题。


“What really frustrates us,” he commented, “is to be commissioned by a pharmaceutical company to design an early-phase trial when we know already that it is going up a blind alley.	他说，“真正让我们灰心丧气的是接到制药公司设计早期试验的委托，而我们已经知道这条路根本走不通。


And the reason we know that is that we’ve been up the blind alley with another company; but that experience remains unreported for commercial reasons.”	我们之所以清楚这一点是因为在接受另一家公司委托时已经走进过死胡同； 但由于商业原因上述结果并未公之于众。


In other words, the drug-discovery process suffers from built-in inefficiency, owing to inadequate reporting.	换句话说，研究成果曝光不足导致药物研发过程具有内生的低效性。


But, while waste may be tolerable, avoidable harm to patients is not.	但即便我们可以容忍浪费，也无法容忍对患者造成本可以避免的危害性。


Drug-trial volunteers should not accept this abuse of their participation in research.	药物试验志愿者不应接受这种对其参与研究成果的滥用。


Failing to publish the results of clinical trials is a betrayal of the implicit trust that they have placed in researchers to use their contribution to increase and improve the stock of scientific knowledge.	不公布临床试验结果违反了他们对研究者隐含的信任，他们本以为研究人员会用他们的贡献来增加并改善科学知识的存量。


Nor should the public accept this squandering of resources.	公众同样不应接受这样的资源浪费。


There is simply no justification for withholding the results of health-research studies.	隐瞒医学研究的结果根本不存在任何理由。


Publication is a moral imperative.	公布结果是道义上必须完成的任务。


Puerto Rico’s Debt Trap	波多黎各的债务陷阱


WASHINGTON, DC – The Caribbean island of Puerto Rico – the largest United States “territory” – is broke, and a human calamity is unfolding there.	华盛顿—加勒比海波多黎各岛——美国最大的“领地”——已经破产，一场人道灾难正在发生。


Unless a constructive course of political action is found in 2016, Puerto Rican migration to the 50 states will rival the scale of the 1930s Dust Bowl exodus from Oklahoma, Arkansas, and other climate-devastated states.	除非20116年做出建设性政治动作，否则波多黎各向50州的移民规模将堪与20世纪30年代阿肯色州俄克拉荷马沙尘碗（Dust Bowl）大逃亡和其他被气候摧毁的州相提并论。


With public debt service (principal plus interest) projected to reach nearly 40% of government revenue in 2016, Puerto Rico needs a new set of economic policies.	2016年波多黎各公共债务维持（本金加利息）成本预计将达到政府收入的近40%，它需要一套新的经济政策。


But austerity will not work; this must be an investment-led recovery, with official measures oriented toward boosting growth by reducing the cost of doing business.	但紧缩不会奏效； 必须来一场投资拉动的复苏，官方措施应以降低营商成本为手段刺激增长。


The question is whether Puerto Rico will have that option.	问题在于波多黎各是否拥有这一选项。


Much of its $73 billion debt has been issued by government corporations.	其730亿美元的债务大多由政府公司发行。


But, though federal law allows such municipal debt to be restructured under Chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code in all 50 states, this does not apply to US territories like Puerto Rico.	但是，尽管联邦法允许50个州的这类市政债务根据破产法第九章进行重组，但这并不适用于波多黎各这样的美国领地。


As a result, a protracted series of confusing legal battles and selective defaults looms.	因此，令人难以厘清的漫长的法律缠斗和有选择的违约在所难免。


The cost of essential infrastructure services – electricity, water, sewers, and transportation – will go up while quality declines.	基本基础设施成本——电力、水、排水和交通——将水涨船高，而质量每况愈下。


One response has been to demand further belt-tightening, for example, in the form of wage reductions and healthcare cuts.	一种应对手段是要求进一步勒紧裤腰带，比如以降工资和削减医保的方式。


But residents of Puerto Rico are also US citizens and they vote with their feet – the population has fallen from 3.9 million to 3.5 million in recent years as talented and energetic people have moved to Florida, Texas, and other parts of the mainland.	但波多黎各居民也是美国公民，他们可以用脚投票——近几年来，随着人才和要人纷纷迁往佛罗里达州、德克萨斯州和美国的其他地区，波多黎各人口已经从390万下降到350万。


The more creditors insist on lower living standards and higher taxes, the more the tax base will simply leave the island – causing bondholders’ losses to rise.	债权人越是坚持要求降低生活水平和提高税收，波多黎各岛的税基就会更快地离开这里——导致债券持有人损失增加。


Disorganized defaults by public corporations will make it hard for any part of the private credit system to function.	公共公司的无序违约将导致私人信用系统的所有部分都无法起作用。


Leading conservatives in the US – including at the Hoover Institution – have long argued in favor of using established bankruptcy procedures when large financial firms fail.	美国保守派领袖——包括胡佛研究所——很早就支持在大型金融企业倒闭时采用现成的破产程序。


The same logic applies here: A judge can remove any doubt that actual insolvency exists, while also ensuring that credit remains available during a restructuring.	同样的逻辑在这里也适用：法官可以消除所有关于实际资不抵债的质疑，同时还能确保重组期间仍能获得信用。


During that process, a judge can rely on precedent and ensure fairness across creditor classes based on the precise terms under which loans were obtained.	在这一过程中，法官可以依照先例，基于获得贷款的确切条款确保不同类别债权人之间的公平。


Although congressional Republicans have so far refused to allow for a judge-supervised bankruptcy process, bipartisan agreement remains possible.	尽管国会中的共和党目前拒绝实施受法官监督的破产程序，但仍有可能达成两党共识。


Democratic Senators Richard Blumenthal, Elizabeth Warren, and Charles E. Schumer have proposed legislation that would introduce a stay on creditor lawsuits until March 31, 2016.	民主党参议员理查德·布鲁门萨尔（Richard Blumenthal）、伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）和查尔斯·舒默（Charles E. Schumer）建议立法规定2016年3月31日之前禁止债权人提起诉讼。


No one, including Republican Senator Chuck Grassley, Chair of the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee, believes that debt restructuring by itself will bring back growth; but extending Chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code to Puerto Rico would help.	没有人相信债务重组本身就能让波多黎各重回增长，包括共和党参议员、权力强大的参议院司法委员会主席查课·格拉斯雷（Chuck Grassley）； 但扩大破产法第九章使其适用于波多黎各将有所助益。


Puerto Rico needs private-sector investment, which requires taking three steps.	波多黎各需要私人投资，而这有需要采取三个步骤。


For starters, bureaucratic hurdles to job creation should be eliminated, including by using state-of-the-art technology to make government more transparent.	首先，应该取消就业创造的官僚障碍，包括采取最新技术让政府更加透明。


Pedro Pierluisi, Puerto Rico’s representative in Congress, has long emphasized this point.	波多黎各众议员佩德罗·皮尔路易斯（Pedro Pierluisi）早就在强调这一点。


Second, the cost of essential inputs for industry needs to fall.	其次，工业基本投入成本需要降下来。


Electricity on the island is significantly more expensive than in Florida, in part because of underinvestment.	岛上的电力要远贵于佛罗里达州，部分原因在于投资不足。


More broadly, there are pressing needs for public investment to improve infrastructure, which implies great opportunities for private-sector participation.	更广义地看，波多黎各迫切需要公共投资以改善基础设施，而基础设施可以为公私合作提供巨大的机会。


But none of this will happen until the debt overhang is removed.	但所有这些都必须在债务积压问题解决的情况下才有可能发生。


Finally, Puerto Rico needs better fiscal management.	最后，波多黎各需要更好的财政管理。


The island’s idiosyncratic tax and expenditure system – and the lack of effective local control over fiscal policy – has become part of the longer-term problem.	该岛的特别税和支出体系——以及缺少对财政政策的有效地方控制——已成为长期问题的一部分。


Puerto Rico should, over time, become more like one of the 50 states in its fiscal relationship with the federal government.	随着时间的推移，波多黎各与联邦政府的财政关系应该向50个州靠拢。


If Congress is willing to commit to that path, a reasonable quid pro quo would be strong fiscal rules – and a powerful monitoring body.	如果国会愿意承诺朝这个方向努力，那么波多黎各应该回报以更强硬的财政规则——以及更有力的监管机构。


With congressional support and pro-growth policies, Puerto Rico can attract talented Americans (and legal immigrants) to move to the island, start companies, and work hard.	有了国会的支持和促增长政策，波多黎各就能够吸引有才华的美国人（和合法移民）来到岛上创办公司，努力工��。


Higher education in Puerto Rico remains strong, but more than 80,000 people leave every year (and only 20,000 move in).	波多黎各高等教育依然强大，但每年有 80,000多人离开（而只有20,000人迁入）。


In part, high levels of net migration reflect Puerto Rico’s badly frayed health-care system.	人口大量流出的原因部分在于波多黎各拙劣的医疗体系。


The federal government provides significantly more support to every state health-care system through Medicare (for pensioners) and Medicaid (for low-income households), despite the fact that Puerto Ricans pay the same federal payroll taxes that fund much of the Medicare program.	联邦政府通过医疗保险（面向退休者）和医疗补助（面向低收入家庭）向各州提供远远高于波多黎各的支持，尽管波多黎各人缴纳相同的联邦工资税，为医疗保险计划做出了巨大贡献。


Likewise, to become eligible for more robust support, including through the earned-income tax credit – a program supported by leading conservatives, such as Speaker of the House of Representatives Paul Ryan – hard-working low-income Puerto Ricans must move to one of the 50 states.	类似地，要符合获得更强支持的条件——包括实现所得税减免，该计划获得了众议院议长保罗·瑞恩（Paul Ryan）等保守派领袖的支持——努力工作的低收入波多黎各人就必须迁往50州之一。


Puerto Rico doesn’t need a bailout.	波多黎各必须要援助。


It needs to reduce the cost of doing business – cut the red tape, encourage investment, and attract people to work (and pay tax in) a beautiful place.	它需要降低营商成本——砍掉红头文件、鼓励投资、吸引人们前来这个美丽的地方工作（和纳税）。


It also needs what has been a constructive part of the American economic model over 200 years – the ability to restructure municipal debt through bankruptcy.	它还需要200多年来美国经济模式的建设性的部分——通过破产重组市政债务的能力。


Purpose beyond Power	权力之外的目标


BUDAPEST – The re-run of the Greek parliamentary election on June 17 is only the latest symptom of the most serious crisis to plague Western democracies and open societies since the 1960’s.	布达佩斯——6月17日的希腊议会重新选举不过是自20世纪60年代以来困扰西方民主和开放社会的严重危机的最新症状而已。


Liberal democracies in the West today are struggling to avoid – and in doing so are exacerbating – a crisis of identity, which puts the existing social contract at risk and threatens their implosion.	今天西方自由民主国家都想拼命避免一场身份危机，但结果却使这场危机愈演愈烈，最终威胁到当前的社会契约，并有可能毁灭现有的社会秩序。


The end of the Cold War bequeathed our leaders with a new set of governance challenges, which promptly grew in magnitude, in large part owing to faster globalization, the consequences of the 1980’s economic liberalization, and the 1990’s revolution in information technology.	冷战结束后留给领导人一套全新的执政挑战，全球化速度加快、20世纪80年代经济自由化后遗症和20世纪90年代信息技术革命导致执政挑战不断加剧。


These challenges, insufficiently addressed, soon led many to question the sustainability of liberal democracy’s appeal at home and its universality abroad, and to probe the alleged merits of the “Chinese model,” best characterized as a form of authoritarian or state capitalism.	由于这些挑战没有得到充分的解决，很快导致很多人开始怀疑自由民主制度在国内的持续性和国外的普遍性，并开始探讨所谓“中国模式”的优势，而“中国模式”往好处说也不过是某种形式的独裁或国家资本主义。


The financial meltdown of 2008, which soon metamorphosed into the deepest Western economic recession since the 1930’s, added fuel to the fire, as policymakers hunkered down in a non-transparent crisis-management mode, condoning massive state intervention in the economy and socialization of private-sector losses on a previously unprecedented scale.	2008年的金融危机很快蜕变为20世纪30年代以来西方最严重的经济衰退，进一步加剧了对西方民主制度的怀疑，因为决策者采用完全不透明的危机管理模式，以前所未有的规模将私有部门应该承担的损失推向社会，纵容对经济实行大规模的国家干预。


The resulting fiscal austerity plunged many below the poverty line and accelerated economic inequality, while many private institutions, having caused the 2008 bust, recovered on the public dime.	由此造成的财政紧缩加剧了经济不平等，导致很多人跌落到贫困线以下，而很多造成2008年萧条的私营机构却利用公共经费迅速恢复了元气。


Adding insult to injury, in Greece and Italy, two of the hardest-hit countries, financial markets effectively deposed elected, if imperfect, governments.	雪上加霜的是在两个受打击最重的国家希腊和意大利，金融市场成功罢免了也许并不完美的民选政府。


The hapless former Greek prime minister, George Papandreou, had to resign last year after daring to suggest a referendum to decide the economic future of his fellow citizens.	倒霉的希腊前总理帕潘德里欧在敢于提出以全民公决的形式决定其同胞的经济未来之后终于在去年被迫辞职。


(Ironically, the upcoming election will de facto serve as the referendum that Papandreou suggested in October 2011.)	（颇具讽刺意味的是，即将进行的选举实际上就是帕潘德里欧在2011年10月所建议的全民公决。 ）


At the root of the European crisis (and its equivalent crisis in the United States) is a shift in the configuration of economic, social, and political power.	经济、社会和政治权力的结构变化是造成欧洲危机（及与之对等的美国危机）的根本原因。


Liberal democracies and open societies have traditionally relied on a fine balance of these three forms of power.	自由民主国家和开放社会传统上一直依赖这三种权力间微妙的平衡关系。


Over the last two decades, our elites have been unable to maintain it, as economic power has long since gone global and dislodged itself from political power, often corrupting democratic politics in the process.	但近20年来我们的精英已经无法维持这样的平衡，因为经济权力早已脱离政治权力实现全球化，而民主政治往往在脱离过程中严重受损。


At the same time, social power, which provides the oxygen for democratic legitimacy, has been marginalized and disillusioned, and is increasingly turning away from the traditional transmission belts of politics.	与此同时，为民主合法性输送氧气的社会权力在遭遇边缘化的同时发生了幻灭，并逐渐从传统的政治传送带上脱离开去。


The result is an erosion of the stature of mainstream political parties and trade unions, and all-time low levels of trust in governments writ large.	结果导致主流政党和工会地位下降，以及对政府政令的信任度跌至历史新低。


Powered by new media, identities are beginning to form around new networks of social interaction that often defy state boundaries and have little connection to liberal democracy’s traditional institutions of governance.	在新媒体的推动下，新的身份正在依托新的社会互动网络逐步形成，新身份往往不受国家边界的束缚，与自由民主国家的传统执政制度也几乎没有任何关系。


The refusal of today’s elites to promote an effective balance of the three powers – to recognize a larger purpose beyond maximizing each individual power – has visibly translated into a waning regard for the public good.	今天的精英们拒绝推进这三种权力的有效平衡显然已经演变为对公众利益的日渐忽视，实现上述平衡需要承认超乎各种权力之外的更广泛的目的。


This has dramatic consequences for liberal democracy and open societies.	这对自由民主和开放社会产生了戏剧性的后果。


With political power diminished (and sometimes usurped) by the transformation of its economic counterpart, and its detachment from its social base rendering it increasingly illegitimate, this is the hour of populists and extremists.	经济权力的转型削弱（有时侵占）了政治权力，而政治权力与社会基础的剥离加大了它的不合法性，现在这个时代属于民粹份子和极端份子。


We now see them feast on enfeebled democracies in many European countries, as fringe movements become serious contenders for power and threaten to wipe out the achievements of more than 60 years of European integration.	现在欧洲许多国家民主的衰落让这些人大行其道，表现为边缘运动日益成为重要的权力争夺者，并威胁要消灭60多年欧洲一体化所取得的成绩。


In the US, the political system has descended into seemingly intractable partisan paralysis, gravely undermining the system of checks and balances and generating a deepening sense of malaise and frustration.	美国的政治制度已沦落为看似无解的党派瘫痪，不仅严重破坏了制衡制度，而且带来更深刻的忧患和挫折意识。


We stand at a critical juncture.	我们正处在一个关键时期。


Recreating democracy and open societies in a global age requires investment in new ideas to rebalance political, economic, and social power at both the national and the global level.	在全球化时代重塑民主和开放社会需要在国家和世界层面对重塑政治、经济和社会权力平衡的新理念进行投资。


Nationally, we need to experiment with new mechanisms for policymaking and implementation, reconnecting democratic institutions to citizens and emerging networks of civil society.	国家范围内，我们需要试验政策制定及执行的新机制，将民主制度重新与公民和新兴民间社会网络联系在一起。


Globally, we must allow political and social power to establish their rightful place next to economic power.	全球范围内，我们则必须允许政治和社会权力在经济权力旁边找到自己应有的位置。


Mere tinkering will not do; we need a transformation of the global institutional architecture.	只是修修补补根本达不到目的，我们需要转变全球体制结构。


Unless we can establish a global socio-political space, we cannot legitimately deliberate over the provision of global public goods, let alone deliver them successfully.	除非能够建立起全球性的社会政治空间，否则就无法正常思考、更不用说成功制定全球公共利益规则。


The push toward such a space needs to be spearheaded by risk takers – social and political entrepreneurs who are unafraid to work across lines traditionally dividing sectors and states, and who help to re-create a global community of purpose beyond power.	朝向上述空间的努力需要由冒险者来领导——这些社会和政治冒险家不畏惧跨越传统上各自为政的国家和领域，协助重建超越权力之外的有目标的全球社会。


The French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre once described the Berlin Wall as a mirror.	法国哲学家萨特曾经形容柏林墙像一面镜子。


In view of the Soviet system, it was indeed easy to overlook our own weakness and fallibilities.	由于苏维埃体系的存在，我们很容易就会忽略自身的弱点和错误。


As the Wall came down, our elites struggled to maintain the fiction of an inherently imminent victory march for liberal democracy worldwide, now laid bare by the economic crisis on both sides of the Atlantic.	在柏林墙倒塌的同时，我们的精英们所竭力维持的自由民主制度在全世界注定胜利的幻象，现在却在大西洋两岸的经济危机面前最重原形毕露。


We have lost two valuable decades to respond adequately to globalization and the crisis of liberal democracy and open societies.	我们已经浪费了两个宝贵的十年，一直未能在全球化及自由民主和开放社会危机面前做好准备。


It is time to begin an honest reflection about power and its purpose in today’s rapidly changing world.	在今天这个瞬息万变的世界里，已经是时候开始诚实思考权力及其目标的问题。


Putin and Medvedev: Teammates or Rivals?	普京和梅德韦捷夫：合作伙伴还是竞争对手？


Vladimir Putin’s decision to serve as prime minister should Dmitri Medvedev become Russia’s next president has made their electoral success in March a virtual certainty.	普京关于如果梅德韦捷夫当选俄罗斯下一任总统他将担任总理的决定使他们在三月份获得大选胜利已经是板上钉钉的事了。


Although the Communist Party’s leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, and the Liberal Democrats’ Vladimir Zhirinovsky are running – in contrast to 2004, when they fielded stand-ins – neither will get more than 15% of the vote.	共产党领导人久加诺夫和自由民主党的日里诺夫斯基还在积极地投入竞选。 与2004年不同，当时他们是让他们的副手参加的竞选，但是他们没有哪个能获得15%以上的选票。


Even assuming that Mikhail Kasyanov, Boris Nemtsov, and Democratic Party leader Andrei Bogdanov somehow collect two million signatures each to get on the ballot, the outcome will be the same.	即便假设卡西亚诺夫、涅姆佐夫和民主党领导人波格达诺夫都能够收集到200万个签名从而能够参加竞选，结果也会是一样。


Indeed, so far, none of them has more than 2% popular support.	事实上，至今他们中间还没有哪个人能获得2%的公众支持。


But, while Medvedev’s victory in the first round of voting appears assured, the important questions will arise after the ballots are counted.	但是，尽管梅德韦捷夫似乎很可能在第一轮投票中就获得胜利，我们应该考虑在投票后可能会出现的那些重要问题。


How will power be distributed between Medvedev and Putin?	梅德韦捷夫和普京之间如何分配权力？


Who will be in charge?	大权掌握在谁的手里？


Will Russia have to rewrite its laws and Constitution to give the prime minister more official power?	俄罗斯将不得不重新修订它的法律和宪法以便给予总理更多的权力吗？


Is Putin risking his political future by accepting a formally secondary role and making himself accountable for all socio-economic policy?	普京会甘愿接受一个形式上的二号人物角色以及必须为所有的社会经济政策负责而拿他的政治未来冒险吗？


Russia’s Constitution does not allow for a “technical presidency.”	俄罗斯的宪法不允许出现一个“技术上的总统”？


The head of state has extensive powers, which alone indicates that Medvedev will be a strong president.	国家元首拥有全面的权力，单单这一点就表明梅德韦捷夫将成为一个强势总统。


Moreover, Medvedev is a strong-willed politician and very experienced administrator.	此外，梅德韦捷夫还是一个有着坚强意志的政治家，并且有着非常丰富的行政管理经验。


But Putin will be a strong prime minister, if only because he’s Putin.	但是普京将成为一个强势总理，只是因为他是普京就能做到这一点。


He is set to remain the most popular person in Russia for a long time to come.	他注定在以后的很长一段时间里都将是俄罗斯最受欢迎的人物。


That implies a system of governance with at least two decision-making centers – perhaps in addition to United Russia, the party of Putin and Medvedev, which won 64% of the vote in the recent parliamentary election up from 37% in 2003.	因此很有可能会出现至少有两个决策中心的治理体系。 也许还应该加上统一俄罗斯党，即普京和梅德韦捷夫所在的政党，它在刚刚举行的议会选举中获得了64%的选票，大大超过了2003年37%的得票率。


All this represents obvious progress from the standpoint of the separation of powers.	站在分权制衡的角度，所有这些显然是取得了明显的进步。


In consenting to become prime minister, Putin is well aware of what to expect.	在同意接任总理职位时，普京显然很清楚等待他的会是什么。


After all, he served as prime minister for several months in 1999.	不管怎样，1999年他曾担任过几个月的总理。


Many commentators underestimate the prime minister’s powers.	许多评论家往往低估了总理的权力。


According to the Constitution, the prime minister is head of the executive branch, and the government is empowered to determine the main direction of domestic and foreign policy.	根据宪法，总理是行政机关的首脑，而政府被授权决定国内和国外政策的主要方向。


Much depends on who is prime minister; heavyweight politicians holding the office can potentially eclipse the president.	关键是要看是谁在担任总理； 如果执掌行政部门的是一位重量级的政治家，那么他就有可能凌驾于总统之上。


Recall Yevgeny Primakov – or Putin at the end of Boris Yeltsin’s last presidential term, when it was obvious to everyone that the prime minister was running the country.	想一想普里马科夫或者叶利钦最后一个总统任期末尾的普京，当时每一个人都很清楚是总理在掌管着这个国家。


The 2008 version of Prime Minister Putin will undoubtedly be stronger than the 1999 version.	2008年版的普京总理毫无疑问会比1999年时的普京总理更强势。


So no changes are required to the laws or the Constitution for him to remain a key political player.	所以法律或者宪法没有必要为了让他继续作为主要的政治人物而进行修改。


But Medvedev – youthful and energetic, with a fresh mandate – will be far stronger than Yeltsin was in 1999.	但是梅德韦捷夫年轻、精力充沛并且刚刚获得了新的授权，肯定比1999年的叶利钦强得多。


A powerful prime minister seems preferable.	一个强势的总理似乎是大家所更愿意看到的。


One of the chief weaknesses in Russia's constitutional design is that power is separated from accountability: the president has the most power, but the government is held accountable for policy results.	俄罗斯宪法设计的一个主要弱点是权力与责任被分割开了：总理掌握了大部分的权力，但是政府却要为政策执行的结果负责。


From this standpoint, the American model, for example, is more successful: the head of state also leads the government.	从这一点上讲，美国的模式更加成功：即国家元首也是政府的领导人。


While not entirely addressing the flaws in the design, the new situation – with the strongest political figure heading the executive branch – will permit more effective performance by the government, which is still battling to recover from Putin’s administrative reforms of 2004.	尽管并没有完全解决这种设计的瑕疵，但是新的状况，也就是由最强势的政治人物领导行政机关将使政府变得更加高效，它现在依然在挣扎着从普京2004年的行政机构改革中恢复过来。


Many commentators have reproached Putin for agreeing to take a job that they say is beneath him – assuming responsibility for road-building, social services, inflation, and many other problems that could undermine his popularity.	许多评论家批评普京同意接受一个他们认为是屈就他的职位—因为这个职位要求他负责修筑道路、社会服务、通货膨胀以及许多其他问题，而可能会削弱他的受欢迎度。


However, he should be thanked rather than reproached.	然而，也许我们更应该感谢他而不是指责他。


But how stable will this new polycentric system of governance be?	但是这种新的多中心治理体系到底有多稳定呢？


How long will Medvedev remain president and Putin prime minister?	梅德韦捷夫将担任多长的总统以及普京会担任多长时间的总理？


What if they quarrel?	如果他们发生争吵怎么办？


Of course, stability requires agreement between the two key actors; and there are sure to be plenty of opponents and allies trying to stir up trouble between them.	当然，稳定需要两个主要人物之间达成协议； 并且肯定会有很多反对派和盟友试图在他们中间制造不和。


But Putin and Medvedev have worked together for more than 17 years with no serious conflicts.	但是普京和梅德韦捷夫已经合作共事了超过17年时间，从来没有发生过任何严重的冲突。


Moreover, Putin has never made a mistake about the loyalty of the people he promotes.	此外，普京在他推举的人的忠诚度上从来没有犯过错误。


In the Yeltsin era, sacked officials often took revenge by publishing their memoirs and “telling all” about their ex-boss.	在叶利钦时代，被解雇的官员常常会通过出版回忆录和把他们以前的上司的事“全抖露出来”来进行报复。


In the Putin era, no one has done so.	在普京时代，还没有人这么做过。


Mikhail Kasyanov, a former prime minister and now an opposition critic, was inherited from Yeltsin.	卡西亚诺夫，前总理和现在的反对派批评家，继承了叶利钦时代的风格。


When Putin made the most important appointment of his life – the choice of his successor – one can be sure that his calculations were thorough.	我们可以肯定，当普京做出他人生中最重要的任命也就是挑选他的继任者经过了周密的考虑。


So Medvedev will become the next president, and will hold that office for at least one full term.	所以梅德韦捷夫将成为下一任总统，并且至少会干完一个任期。


And Putin will remain prime minister throughout that time, with a good chance of becoming president again in 2012 or 2016 – or after any other presidential election over the next two decades.	而普京在此期间会一直担任总理，并且很有可能在2012年或2016年或者在接下来20年的任何其他总统大选后再次担任总统。


Europe Versus Gazprom	欧洲与俄天然气


NEW YORK – For years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has wielded Europe’s dependence on his country’s natural gas as a foreign-policy weapon, without fear of the European Union calling his bluff – until now.	纽约—多年来，俄罗斯普京一直把欧洲对俄罗斯天然气的依赖作为外交政策武器，丝毫不惧怕欧盟的虚张声势——现在情况有所不同了。


With the EU launching an antitrust case against the state-controlled gas conglomerate Gazprom, Europe has sent a clear signal that Putin’s brutishness is no longer as intimidating as it once was.	欧盟对国有天然气集团俄天然气（Gazprom）发起了反垄断调查，这是一个明确的信号，普京的粗暴已不再像过去那样吓唬人了。


The message from the European Commissioner on Competition – that market rules apply to everyone – is one that Putin has dismissed for years.	欧盟竞争委员会所释放的信号——市场规则面前人人平等——多年来一直为普京所不屑。


Reliance on economic and legal means to achieve his political goals has long been a hallmark of his rule.	用经济和法律手段取得政治目的一直是普京统治的标志。


More than a decade ago, the Kremlin expropriated Yukos Oil, which at the time produced 20% of Russia’s output, and jailed its founder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for ten years on trumped-up tax evasion charges after he dared to oppose Putin.	十多年前，克里姆林宫没收尤科斯石油公司（Yukos Oil，当时占俄罗斯产量的20%）并逮捕其创始人霍多尔科夫斯基（Mikhail Khodorkovsky），以伪造的逃税罪名关了他十年（因为他胆敢反对普京）。


All major players in Russia’s energy-centric economy quickly fell into line politically, enabling Putin to use the country’s oil and gas exports as a geopolitical cudgel.	俄罗斯以能源为核心的经济的所有大玩家很快纷纷就范，使普京得以将俄罗斯油气出口当作地缘政治大棒。


EU countries that he could not intimidate militarily, owing to NATO, were wooed with discounts – or punished with price hikes.	囿于北约而无法采取军事恐吓的欧盟国家用折扣来拉拢——或者用涨价来惩罚。


Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán is Putin’s staunchest friend in Europe (though Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras seems to want to change that), while Poland’s leaders have consistently warned that Russia could become a menace to the continent again.	匈牙利总理奥班是普京最“铁杆”的欧洲朋友（尽管希腊总理齐普拉斯有望改变这一点），而波兰领导人一直警告俄罗斯可能再一次成为欧洲大陆的威胁。


As a result, whereas Hungary pays Gazprom $260 per thousand cubic meters of gas, Poland pays $526 – the highest price in the EU.	结果，匈牙利向俄天然气购买天然气每千立方米需要花260美元，而波兰需要花526美元——欧洲最高价格。


The Poles have paid a steep price, but they were right.	波兰人付出了极高的价格，但他们是正确的。


The downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine last July seemed to mark the beginning of the end of Russia’s reputation, such as it is, as a civilized country.	马来西亚航空M17航班去年7月在东乌克兰追回，这也许标志着俄罗斯作为文明国家信誉扫地的开始。


And now there is the hearing, currently underway in London, into the murder of Alexander Litvenenko, a dissident ex-KGB officer.	而最近伦敦进行了持异见的前克格勃官员利特维年科（Alexander Litvenenko） 谋杀案的听证会。


Early in that hearing, the barrister acting for Litvenenko’s family claimed that the evidence in the case led to Putin’s door.	听证开始不久，代表利特维年科家族的律师宣称证据表明此案与普京有关。


Russia’s economy has already been reeling under Western sanctions imposed in response to the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea and continued aggression in eastern Ukraine.	克里姆林宫吞并克里米亚以及继续入侵东乌克兰的举动导致了西方的制裁，而制裁让俄罗斯经济步履蹒跚。


Output is expected to shrink by almost 4% this year, and the country’s credit ratings have been reduced to “junk” or “near junk” status.	今年产出预计将减少近4%，而俄罗斯信用评级也被降至“垃圾”或“准垃圾”级别。


And now the European Commission is taking a page from Putin’s playbook.	而如今，欧盟委员会正在以普京之道还治其身。


By seeking to punish Gazprom for its manipulation of energy prices, it is aiming a dagger at the heart of Putin’s regime.	欧盟委员会试图以操纵能源价格惩罚俄天然气，其目标是直击普京政权的心脏。


Moreover, the EU’s antitrust action seems to be part of a coordinated legal assault.	此外，欧盟反垄断行动似乎是一整套法律打击的一部分。


Last summer, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that Russia must pay $50 billion to Yukos’s shareholders – a judgment expected to be upheld on appeal.	去年夏天按，海牙常设仲裁法庭（Permanent Court of Arbitration）裁决俄罗斯必须向尤科斯股东支付500亿美元——这一判决预计将引起上诉。


In essence, the decision sent the same message as the EU’s anti-trust action against Gazprom: rules apply to everyone, and stolen property must be returned.	本质上说，这一裁决与欧盟而天然气的反垄断行动传递了同样的信息：规则面前人人平等，偷走的东西必��偿还。


Of course, Europe could not easily withstand a 30% cut in natural-gas deliveries if Putin ordered Gazprom to stop doing business there.	当然，如果普京下令而天然气停止欧洲业务，欧洲要想面对天然气输送量下降30%的局面也绝不容易。


But that is unlikely: Natural resources comprise 70% of Russia’s exports, and transfers from Gazprom’s revenues alone account for at least 5% of the national budget.	但这是不可能的：自然资源占俄罗斯出口的70%，而来自而天然气的收入一项就至少占俄罗斯国民预算的5%。


Over the past decade, rising oil and gas prices fueled rapid GDP growth, securing Putin’s popularity and giving him the resources to reconstruct Russia’s military might, now on display in Ukraine.	过去十年中，上涨的石油和天然气价格刺激了GDP的快速增长，确保了普京的支持率，也让他有资源重建俄罗斯军事实力并将其部署到乌克兰。


In other words, Gazprom (and the Russian government) are less capable of withstanding the loss of the European market than vice versa.	换句话说，俄天然气（以及俄罗斯政府）更难以面对失去欧洲市场的局面，而不是相反。


Indeed, given the hard bargains that China has been driving during Putin’s desperate search for alternative buyers, threatening to cut exports to Europe has proven to be an exceedingly unwise tactic.	事实上，在普京急切地寻找其他买家的过程中，中国的讨价还价可谓“狮子大开口”，这表明削减对欧出口绝对是不明智的策略。


A moment of truth is slowly approaching.	真相时刻正在慢慢接近。


Much of the world is working to reduce its dependence on volatile or unsavory energy suppliers by adopting new technologies such as hydraulic fracturing and increasing purchases from places like Australia, Norway, Qatar, and the United States, which has eased restrictions on the export of natural resources.	世界大部正在努力采取液压致裂法等新技术和增加澳大利亚、挪威、卡塔尔和美国（已经放松对出口自然资源的限制）的采购量，以此减少依赖于高波动或令人讨厌的能源供应者。


Whether Putin likes it or not, this trend will force him to become accountable for his actions.	不管普京是否喜欢，这一趋势将迫使他的行为受到更多问责。


The EU may be unable to return Crimea to Ukraine, but its legal actions should put Putin on notice that his strong-arm tactics will not work for much longer.	欧盟也许无法把克里米亚还给乌克兰，但其法律行动应该让普京注意到，他的强硬策略无法再长久有效了。


Putinism in Crisis	危机中的普京主义


MOSCOW – “Owing to the harsh economic situation, it was decided to cut off the light at the end of the tunnel as a temporary measure.”	莫斯科－“由于严峻的经济形势，我国决定采取临时措施切断隧道尽头的电源”。


That is but one of the jokes making the rounds in Russia these days, as the country faces its most severe crisis in a decade.	这是最近在俄罗斯流传的笑话之一。 现在，俄罗斯面临着十年来最严重的危机。


Having been born in the early 1960’s, my generation remembers two crises.	我出生在20世纪60年代初，我那一代人经历了两场危机。


The first, following the collapse of the USSR, was almost cataclysmic – nothing in the shops, the country in bankruptcy, all savings lost.	第一场危机，是苏联倒台后的几乎一贫如洗——商店里什么东西都没有，国家破产了，人们所有的积蓄都没有了。


The other affected everyone but was less severe – Russia’s 1998 default, which saw a fourfold devaluation of the ruble.	另一场危机，影响了所有的人，但是没有前一场那么严重——俄罗斯1998年的经济危机，它见证了卢布四倍的贬值。


Today’s crisis is acute, but there is no sense of an approaching apocalypse.	俄罗斯当前的危机很严重，但是，人们却没有应对措施的任何线索。


Yet the crisis will be severe, not only because prices for the major Russian export commodities – oil, gas, and metal – have plummeted, but also because the government, which believed in its boundless force and wisdom, now seems inadequate to the challenges that Russia faces.	但是，当前危机的严重不仅是因为俄罗斯主要出口商品——石油，天然气以及金属——的价格大幅下跌，而且是因为相信自己具有无穷力量和智慧的政府，现在似乎也无力应对俄罗斯所面临的挑战。


Yes, Russia has enormous gold and currency reserves, but they are being depleted fast.	是的，俄罗斯拥有巨大的黄金和外汇储备，但是，它们正在快速减少。


They will not last for long while being spent – mostly in defense of the ruble – at the current pace.	这些储备如果以当前的速度花费——主要是为了保护卢布，它们很快就会被耗尽。


Most importantly, there is no one in power who can change the country’s economic policies.	更重要的是，在掌权的人中，没有人能够改变俄罗斯的经济政策。 相反，俄罗斯由一个只能同意和附和的“应声虫”统治着：“像你说的那样，总理先生…”；


Instead, Russia is ruled by “yes men” who are only able to agree and echo: “As you say, Mr. Prime Minister…”; “As you wish, Mr. President…” One reason is that the country’s leadership now appears to be digesting the same garbage information it feeds to the public.	“像你希望的那样，总统先生…”。 造成这一局面的一个原因是，俄罗斯的领导层现在似乎正在消化与它提供给公众相同的垃圾信息。


Whole regions – the Urals and Mordovia, for example – are stagnant.	整个整个的地区——例如，乌拉尔和摩尔达维亚（Mordovia）地区——发展都停滞了。


Moscow, which used to rain gold on the economy, is also suffering, because it, too, depends on natural resources, and its biggest taxpayers – Gazprom, Lukoil, Transneft – are now in bad shape.	莫斯科，曾经为国家经济发展提供了大量的资金，现在也遭受了重创，因为它也依赖自然资源，而且它最大的几个纳税人——俄罗斯天然气工业股份有限责任公司（Gazprom），俄罗斯卢克石油公司（Lukoil）以及俄罗斯国家石油运输公司（Transneft）——现在都境况不佳。


Indeed, Moscow’s budget has lost about a quarter of its revenues.	事实上，莫斯科的预算已经失去了四分之一的收入。


But, given the tastes and appetites of Moscow’s mayor, you can assume that he will continue to pour what money remains into the city’s building boom.	但是，鉴于莫斯科市长的品味和爱好，人们可以推测他会继续将剩下的钱投入到该市的建筑热潮中去。


What does not bring in money – roads, schools, hospitals, and kindergartens – will suffer.	那些不能赚钱的地方——道路，学校，医院和幼儿园——会面临困难。


As in the early 1990’s, everyone is again afraid of unemployment.	像20世纪90年代初那样，现在每个人都在担心失业。


But back then, there was almost no unemployment, peaking at 12%, because Russia’s Labor Code makes firing employees hard and very costly.	但是，在那时，因为俄罗斯的劳动法使企业很难解雇员工，并且解雇员工的代价非常高昂，所以几乎没有裁员，失业率到最高峰也只有12%。


Moreover, most Russians do not object strenuously to wage cuts, reductions in working hours, and unpaid leaves.	而且，大多数俄罗斯人并不强烈反对减薪、减少工作时间以及无薪休假。


There is a good reason for this docility.	俄罗斯人的这种顺从有一个很好的解释。


Moving and buying a new apartment in a different place is almost impossible, which makes Russian workers highly immobile.	搬到其他地方并且购买一套新公寓对大多数俄罗斯工人来说几乎是不可能的，这使他们非常缺乏流动性。


In Soviet times, people were proud of the fact that they had only one or two jobs during their lifetime. Those who acted differently were referred to pejoratively as “job-hoppers.”	在苏联时期，人们都为一生只从事一到两份工作而感到自豪，那些从事很多不同工作的人被人轻蔑地称作“跳槽者”。


So, today, people stay near idle factories – kind of employed, but having nothing to do and earning virtually no money.	所以，现在人们待在近乎停顿的工厂里——他们在某种程度上仍然有工作，但是无事可做并且几乎赚不到一分钱。


Occasionally the factory pays them something, but people mainly live off their own vegetable gardens.	工厂偶尔会给他们一些东西，但是，人们主要还是依靠自己的蔬菜园为生。


The outcome is widespread alcoholism, poverty, and lack of prospects.	其结果就是广泛的酗酒，贫困和对未来失去信心。


Yet real signs of crisis are emerging.	然而，危机真正的征兆正在逐步显现。


Electricity consumption fell 6% in November from a year ago, and freight traffic has decreased by 20%.	俄罗斯十一月份的用电量和一年前相比下降了6%，货运量减少了20%。


Even the Ministry of Economics recognizes that Russia has entered a recession that will last at least six months.	连俄罗斯经济部都承认，俄罗斯已经进入了一个至少要持续六个月的衰退期。


The strange thing about today’s crisis is that Russia’s billionaires have been hit harder than others.	当前危机中怪异的事情是，俄罗斯的亿万富翁比其他人遭受了更为严重的打击。


Don’t worry, Russia’s oligarchs are not starving, but the fortunes of many of them have collapsed.	不用担心，俄罗斯的寡头们不会饿死，但是他们中许多人的财富没有了。


In another joke making the rounds in Moscow, a billionaire borrows 300 rubles (just over $10) from another to buy Forbes to check his place in the latest rankings of Russia’s richest people.	在莫斯科流传的另一个笑话中，一个亿万富翁向另一个亿万富翁借300卢布（只有10美元）买《福布斯》，来查看他在俄罗斯最富有人中的最新排名。


Indifferent to the poor, Russia’s government is actively supporting its fallen oligarchs, especially those who are close to the Kremlin.	俄罗斯政府对本国的穷人非常冷漠，但是却积极支持本国陷入困境的寡头们，特别是那些和克里姆林宫关系密切的寡头。


For example, the state has granted a $4.2 billion loan to the aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska (who held first place on the Forbes list before the crisis) to pay off Western creditors.	例如，俄罗斯已经同意向铝业巨头奥列格·德里帕斯卡（Oleg Deripaska）（在危机发生前，他在福布斯财富排名榜上排名第一）提供42亿美元贷款，供其偿还对西方债权人的债务。


While experts are not sure whether Deripaska will repay the loan, the Kremlin and the oligarchs have their own ways of settling debts.	虽然专家们对德里帕斯卡是否会归还贷款存有疑问，但是，克里姆林宫和寡头们却置之不理，随心所欲地清偿债务。


Deripaska, who accompanied President Dmitry Medvedev on his recent trip across Latin America, appealed to Russia’s rulers to study Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” in the 1930’s as a model for economic recovery.	最近随同德米特里·梅德韦杰夫总统访问拉丁美洲的德里帕斯卡，呼吁俄罗斯领导人将富兰克林·罗斯福在20世纪30年代的“新政”作为经济复苏的一种模式加以研究。


Roosevelt’s idea of a treaty between industrialists and the authorities appeals to the Russian oligarch.	罗斯福在产业资本家和政府之间缔结协定的观点是很受俄罗斯寡头们的欢迎的。


Notably, Deripaska has suggested that the government create an “aluminum stabilization fund,” because the industry – his industry – is losing money and global market share.	特别引人注目的是，德里帕斯卡建议政府建立一个“铝业稳定基金”，因为这一行业——他的行业——在亏钱，而且正在失去其在全球市场的份额。


Of course, Vladimir Putin had already put in place a treaty between Russia’s government and the country’s richest men, who agreed not to comment on the actions of the state in exchange for the freedom to earn as much money as possible in any way they wanted.	当然，弗拉基米尔·普京已经使俄罗斯政府和本国最富有的人达成了一个协议，这些人同意不对国家行为��表评论，以换取用他们想要的任何方法赚取尽可能多的钱的自由；


And if a well-placed official wanted to enter into a successful business, refusals were not accepted.	并且，如果一个身居高位的俄罗斯官员想要进入一个成功的行业，对此加以拒绝也是不能接受的。


Fortunately, Russians know how to survive hard times.	幸运的是，俄罗斯人知道怎样度过艰难的时光。


I remember the late 1980’s not only for its hopes for freedom, but also for a total absence of baby food for my newborn daughter.	我对20世纪80年代末仍然记忆犹新，这不仅是因为那时对自由的期待，而且因为对我刚出生的女儿来说，一点儿婴儿食品都没有。


Twenty years have passed. My daughter has grown up.	20年已经过去了，我的女儿已经长大成人。


There is enough baby food in the shops. But now there are no hopes for freedom.	现在，商店里有足够的婴儿食品，但是，却没有了对自由的期待。


Moscow intellectuals debate whether the current economic crisis will bring a new wave of liberalization to Russia.	莫斯科的知识分子对当前的经济危机是否会给俄罗斯带来一场新的自由主义浪潮，有争论。


This is the key question for me.	这对我来说是一个关键问题。


With a feeling of approaching freedom, any economic crisis can be endured more easily.	有了接近自由的感觉，任何经济危机都可以变得更容易度过。


So far, that feeling remains a ghost.	但是，到目前为止，这种感觉仍然看不到踪影。


Vladimir Putin’s Soviet Dream	普京的苏联梦


MADRID – The recent nuclear deal concluded by six major world powers and Iran represented a triumph of multilateralism.	马德里—世界六大主要力量和伊朗最近达成的核协议代表着多边主义的胜利。


If those same powers – the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany – showed the same will to work together to resolve other disputes, the world might enter a new era of cooperation and stability.	如果这六大力量——联合国安理会五大常任理事国和德国——表现出同样强大的合作意愿解决其他纠纷，世界将进入合作与稳定的新时代。


Unfortunately, such a scenario seems farfetched.	不幸的是，这一情景离我们相去甚远。


From China’s activities in the South China Sea to the Islamic State’s continued advance in the Middle East, competition and conflict are threatening long-standing regional orders.	从中国在南海的活动，到伊斯兰国在中东的继续挺进，竞争与冲突正在威胁树立已久的地区秩序。


But perhaps the most critical conflict – the one whose resolution has implications for all the rest – is in Ukraine, a country that has become central to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expansionist ambitions.	但也许最关键的冲突——如何解决这场冲突对全世界都有影响——是乌克兰，目前这个国家已成为俄罗斯总统普京的修正主义野心的核心。


Russia’s unilateral annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine have ruptured its relations with the West, and Putin has intentionally recreated a Cold War atmosphere by touting Russia’s “conservative values” as an ideological counterweight to the American-led liberal world order.	俄罗斯单方面吞并克里米亚和支持东乌克兰分裂分子已经导致其与西方决裂，普京有意地通过将俄罗斯的“保守主义价值”包装为美国领导的自由世界秩序的对立意识形态而营造出一种冷战氛围。


Nonetheless, key issues – the carnage in Syria, the fight against the Islamic State, nuclear non-proliferation, and conflicting interests and competing claims in the Arctic – cannot be resolved without Russia’s involvement.	尽管如此，关键问题——叙利亚大屠杀、与伊斯兰国的战斗、核不扩散和北冰洋的冲突利益和竞争性主张——都需要俄罗斯的参与才能解决。


That is why, as hard as it may be for Western powers, some efforts to appease Russia are unavoidable.	因此，尽管对西方力量来说十分艰难，但必须采取一些措施安抚俄罗斯。


The United States should be less dismissive of Russia’s sensibilities as an important power and a major civilization, and Russia’s legitimate security interests concerning its borders with NATO countries must be addressed, not least to keep Ukraine out of a rival military alliance.	美国应该减少对俄罗斯身为重要力量和主要文明的敏感性的不屑，俄罗斯对其与北约国家边界的合法安全利益的担忧必须解决，比如不容乌克兰加入敌对军事联盟。


The Ukrainian parliament’s endorsement, despite strong international opposition, of autonomy for the pro-Russia separatist regions – a solution initially proposed by Putin – is exactly the kind of concession that is needed to restore peace.	乌克兰议会的在强大的国际反对声中认可亲俄分裂主义地区的自治——这一方案最初由普京提出——正是重塑和平所需要的让步。


Ultimately, however, it is up to Russia to change its ways.	但是，最终，必须由俄罗斯做出改变。


Propaganda-driven nostalgia for the Soviet Union’s Cold War-era “great power” status is obscuring the lessons of that time.	用宣传机器煽动对苏联冷战时期“超级大国”地位的怀念让人们无法看到当时的教训。


The Soviet Union was an unsustainable empire; if it could not survive at a time when isolation and bipolarity were the order of the day, it certainly could not be recreated within today’s interconnected multipolar global system.	苏联是一个不可持续的帝国； 既然它无法在孤立主义和两极政治作为世界秩序的时期存在，那么显然也无法在当今互联多极的全球体系中重建。


Russia already is in no position to confront the West: Its economy is withering, and it lacks solid alliances capable of countering US power.	俄罗斯显然无法面对西方：其经济日渐萧条，并缺少有能力制衡美国力量的可靠盟友。


Putin is hoping that Russia and its BRICS partners (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) will become “the future leaders of the world and the global economy,” as he put it in July, at the conclusion of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits	普京希望俄罗斯及其金砖国家伙伴（巴西、印度、中国和南非）将成为“未来世界和全球经济的领导者”，他在7月金砖国家和上海合作组织峰会时总结说。


But the plain truth is that neither the BRICS nor the SCO is remotely close to being a cohesive bloc capable of insulating Russia from the consequences of its behavior in Ukraine.	但简单的真相是金砖国家和上合组织结构松散，根本不足以成为团结一致的集团使俄罗斯从其对乌克兰的行为中“洗白”。


The differences in values and strategic interests within the groupings are no less acute than the disagreements that their various members have with the West.	这两个组织成员之间的价值和战略利益大相径庭，一点都不亚于它们各自与西方价值和战略利益的不一致。


Russia’s bilateral relationship with China is no different.	俄罗斯与中国的双边关系也是如此。


It is a relationship founded largely on Chinese dependence on Russian energy supplies, mutual support for “spheres of influence” as the conceptual foundation of an alternative world order, and joint naval exercises in the Black Sea.	这一关系主要建立在中国以来俄罗斯能源供给、双方都支持将“影响力范围”作为新的世界秩序的概念基础，以及双方在黑海的联合军演的基础上。


But the two countries have conflicting interests in Central Asia, where China is pursuing major investments to expand its influence in countries that Russia views as its “near abroad.”	但两国在中亚存在利益冲突，中国希望在中亚进行大量投资以扩大其在俄罗斯视为“近邻”的国家的影响力。


When Putin questioned Kazakhstan’s independence last year, China was quick to support the country’s sovereignty.	去年，普京质疑哈萨克斯坦的独立性，中国立刻宣布支持和萨克斯坦主权。


China’s potential encroachment on Russia’s unpopulated Far East borders – which, in China’s view, were stolen, much like Hong Kong and Taiwan, during its “century of humiliation” – is another source of anxiety in the Kremlin.	中国有可能侵犯俄罗斯人口稀少的远东边界——在中国看来，这是在“屈辱的百年”中被沙俄偷走的国土，和香港和台湾一样。 这是克里姆林宫的另一个焦虑点。


More important, China’s economy depends on continued access to Western – and especially US – markets.	更重要的是，中国经济依赖继续进入西方特别是美国市场。


At a time when a slowing economy is creating greater uncertainty for China, it cannot afford to provoke tensions with the US over anything that is not in its direct interests, such as its territorial claims in the South China Sea.	经济减速正在给中国带来更大的不确定性，中国不可能在任何它不存在直接利益（如南海的领土主张）的地方挑起与美国的紧张局面。


Despite Russia’s weak alliances, Putin seems undeterred.	尽管俄��斯没有强大的盟友，但普京并未退缩。


Beyond his boastful talk about Russia’s nuclear arsenal, his government has recently announced a new naval doctrine – one that amounts to an alarming echo of Germany’s naval challenge to Britain prior to World War I. If no diplomatic détente is brokered, Putin may well continue on this path, bringing his country ever closer to a full-blown conflict with NATO.	除了炫耀性地谈论俄罗斯的核武库，他的政府最近还抛出了新的海军思想——让人警惕地想起一战前德国对英国发起的海军挑战。 如果不设法牵线外交调停，普京极有可能沿着这条路继续走下去，把俄罗斯引向与北约的全面冲突。


Even if no such conflict erupts, Putin’s attempts to restore Russian influence across Eurasia (by whatever means necessary, if his actions in Ukraine are any indication) will be highly damaging.	即使这一冲突不爆发，普京重建俄罗斯在欧亚（Eurasia）的影响力的尝试（从其在乌克兰的行为看，可谓无所不用其极）也将具有非常大的破坏力。


It should be no surprise that Kazakhstan and Belarus are as wary of Russian expansionism as Ukraine.	哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯与乌克兰一样担心俄罗斯的扩张主义一点都不令人奇怪。


Putin has discarded former President Dmitri Medvedev’s concept of a “partnership for modernization” with the West.	普京已经抛弃了前总统梅德韦杰夫与西方进行“为了现代化的合作”的概念。


But a Eurasian customs union among post-Soviet and other countries is not the road to modernization for Russia; nor is an effort to make the defense industry the engine of industrialization.	但由前苏联和其他国家组成的欧亚关税联盟绝不是俄罗斯的现代化之路； 其将国防业作为工业化引擎的方针亦然。


That, in a nutshell, was the Soviet model, which failed once and would fail again.	简言之，这些都是苏联模式，曾经失败过，也将再次失败。


If Putin is serious about diversifying and strengthening Russia’s commodities-based economy, thereby improving the lives of his country’s people, he must attract advanced technologies and foreign investment, especially from the West.	如果普京认真地想实现俄罗斯依赖大宗商品的经济的多样化，使它变得更强大，从而改善俄罗斯人民的生活，那么他必须吸引先进技术和外国投资，特别是来自西方的技术和投资。


For that, he must pursue democratic reforms, institutional regeneration, and renewed diplomatic ties with the West.	对于这一点，他又必须追求民主改革、制度重建和改进与西方的外交关系。


Russia is in no position to create an alternative international system; but, if Putin continues to pursue an outdated and antagonistic foreign policy, it can undermine the existing one.	俄罗斯无法打造一个新的国际体系； 但是，如果普京继续追求早已不合时宜的对抗性外交政策，那么可能威胁到现有国际体系。


At a time when the world is facing so many destabilizing challenges, this would not be good for anyone.	世界正在面临诸多不稳定的挑战，这对任何人来说都不是好消息。


The West should seek to mollify Russia on core strategic questions like NATO expansion.	西方应该寻求在北约扩张等关键战略问题上安抚俄罗斯。


But that will not help Putin to overcome the source of Russia’s weakness, which lies in his inability or unwillingness to see the Soviet Union for the failure that it was.	但这无助于普京克服俄罗斯孱弱的根本原因。 俄罗斯的孱弱源于普京不能也不愿如实承认苏联的失败。


Putin is No Ally Against ISIS	普京绝非反对伊斯兰国的盟友


MUNICH – The leaders of the United States and the European Union are making a grievous error in thinking that President Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a potential ally in the fight against the Islamic State.	慕尼黑——美国和欧盟领导人将普京总统的俄罗斯视为反伊斯兰国斗争的潜在盟友是个严重的错误。


The evidence contradicts them.	大量证据与他们的想法相抵触。


Putin’s current aim is to foster the EU’s disintegration, and the best way to do so is to flood the EU with Syrian refugees.	普京当前的目标是促成欧盟解体，而实现目标的最好办法是让叙利亚难民涌入欧盟。


Russian planes have been bombing the civilian population in southern Syria forcing them to flee to Jordan and Lebanon.	俄罗斯飞机对叙利亚南部平民狂轰滥炸迫使他们逃往约旦和黎巴嫩。


There are now 20,000 Syrian refugees camped out in the desert awaiting admission to Jordan.	目前在沙漠中露营等候进入约旦的叙利亚难民有20,000人之多。


A smaller number are waiting to enter Lebanon.	还有少部分人等候进入黎巴嫩。


Both groups are growing.	等候进入上述两国的难民都越来越多。


Russia has also launched a large-scale air attack against civilians in northern Syria.	俄罗斯还大规模空袭叙利亚北部民众。


This was followed by a ground assault by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s army against Aleppo, a city that used to have 2 million inhabitants.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的军队在空袭后地面进攻曾居住着2百万民众的城市阿勒颇。


The barrel bombs caused 70,000 civilians to flee to Turkey; the ground offensive could uproot many more.	桶装炸弹导致70,000人逃往土耳其； 地面进攻可能导致更多人流离失所。


The families on the move may not stop in Turkey.	逃难家庭可能不会在土耳其止步。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel flew to Ankara on February 9 to make last-minute arrangements with the Turkish government to induce the refugees already in Turkey to prolong their stay there.	德国总理默克尔2月9日飞抵安卡拉会同土耳其政府做出最后的安排，促成已经进入土耳其的难民延长在那里的逗留。


She offered to airlift 200,000-300,000 Syrian refugees annually directly to Europe on the condition that Turkey prevent them from going to Greece and will accept them back if they do so.	她提出每年派飞机接200,000-300,000叙利亚难民进入欧洲境内，条件是土耳其阻止他们前往希腊，并在他们返回土耳其的情况下予以接收。


Putin is a gifted tactician, but not a strategic thinker.	普京是个天才的战术家，但却不具备战略天赋。


There is no reason to believe that he intervened in Syria in order to aggravate the European refugee crisis.	没有理由认为加剧欧洲难民危机是他干预叙利亚的目标。


Indeed, his intervention was a strategic blunder, because it embroiled him in a conflict with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that has hurt the interests of both.	事实上，他干预叙利亚是一个战略错误，并因此卷入到与土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安有损双方利益的冲突当中。


But once Putin saw the opportunity to hasten the EU’s disintegration, he seized it.	但一旦普京看到加快欧盟解体的机会，他就绝不会放过。


He has obfuscated his actions by talking of cooperating against a common enemy, ISIS.	他用合作打击共同敌人伊斯兰国的谈话来掩饰自己行动。


He has followed a similar approach in Ukraine, signing the Minsk Agreement but failing to carry out its provisions.	他在乌克兰也采取了类似的策略，即签署明斯克协议却拒绝履行协议规则。


It is hard to understand why the leaders of both the US and the EU take Putin at his word rather than judging him by his behavior.	很难理解美国和欧盟领导人为什么听信普京的花言巧语而不是观察他的做法。


The only explanation I can find is that democratic politicians seek to reassure their publics by painting a more favorable picture than reality justifies.	我能找到的唯一解释是民主政治家试图通过美化现实局面来安抚民众。


The fact is that Putin’s Russia and the EU are engaged in a race against time: The question is which one will collapse first.	事实是普京的俄罗斯和欧盟正在与时间赛跑：问题是先倒下的会是哪一方。


The Putin regime faces bankruptcy in 2017, when a large part of its foreign debt matures, and political turmoil may erupt sooner than that.	普京政权2017年面临破产威胁，届时其大部分外债即将到期，并可能在那之前引发政治动荡。


Putin’s popularity, which remains high, rests on a social compact requiring the government to deliver financial stability and a slowly but steadily rising standard of living.	普京的人气依然旺盛，但前提是政府确保财政稳定、且生活水平缓慢稳步提高。


Western sanctions, coupled with the sharp decline in the price of oil, will force the regime to fail on both counts.	西方制裁加之石油价格的急剧下降，将迫使普京政府无法兑现这两方面的承诺。


Russia’s budget deficit is running at 7% of GDP, and the government will have to cut it to 3% in order to prevent inflation from spiraling out of control.	俄罗斯���算赤字达GDP的7%，且政府要压缩至3%才能防止通胀失控。


Russia’s social security fund is running out of money and has to be merged with the government’s infrastructure fund in order to be replenished.	俄国社保基金的钱已经用光，被迫与政府基础设施基金合并才能得以补充。


These and other developments will have a negative effect on living standards and opinions of the electorate before the parliamentary election in the fall.	上述和其他相关进展将对秋季议会选举前选民的生活水平和见解产生负面影响。


The most effective way that Putin’s regime can avoid collapse is by causing the EU to collapse sooner.	加速欧盟崩溃是普京政权避免崩溃最有效的方法。


An EU that is coming apart at the seams will not be able to maintain the sanctions it imposed on Russia following its incursion into Ukraine.	一个四分五裂的欧盟将无法维持俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后对其进行的制裁行动。


On the contrary, Putin will be able to gain considerable economic benefits from dividing Europe and exploiting the connections with commercial interests and anti-European parties that he has carefully cultivated.	相反，普京将显著受益于欧洲分裂，受益于它自己精心培植的对商业利益及反欧政党层层关系的利用。


As matters stand, the EU is set to disintegrate.	就目前状况而言，欧盟注定难逃分裂的厄运。


Ever since the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent rescue packages for Greece, the EU has learned how to muddle through one crisis after another.	自2008年金融危机和希腊后续救市计划以来，欧盟已经学会如何在此起彼伏的危机中得过且过。


But today it is confronted by five or six crises at the same time, which may prove to be too much.	但今天我们同时面临5-6个危机，这很可能成为压倒骆驼的最后一根稻草。


As Merkel correctly foresaw, the migration crisis has the potential to destroy the EU.	就像默克尔所准确预见到的那样，难民危机有可能摧毁欧盟。


When a state or association of states is in mortal danger, it is better for its leaders to confront harsh reality than to ignore it.	当国家或国家联合体面临致命的威胁，领导人最好能面对残酷的现实而不是逃避它。


The race for survival pits the EU against Putin’s Russia.	这场生存较量让欧盟和普京领导的俄国成为对手。


ISIS poses a threat to both, but it should not be over-estimated.	伊斯兰国对两者皆构成威胁，但不应过高估计它的影响。


Attacks mounted by jihadi terrorists, however terrifying, do not compare with the threat emanating from Russia.	无论由圣战恐怖分子发动的袭击多么可怕，也不能与俄国造成的威胁进行比较。


ISIS (and Al Qaeda before it) has recognized the Achilles’ heel of Western civilization – the fear of death – and learned how to exploit it.	伊斯兰国（及之前的基地组织）已经认识到西方文明的致命弱点（畏惧死亡）并学会如何加以利用。


By arousing latent Islamophobia in the West and inducing both publics and governments to treat Muslims with suspicion, they hope to convince young Muslims that there is no alternative to terrorism.	通过唤起西方潜在的伊斯兰恐惧症并引导政府和民众怀疑穆斯林，他们想要说服穆斯林青年除奉行恐怖主义外没有其他选择。


Once this strategy is understood, there is a simple antidote: Refuse to behave the way your enemies want you to.	一旦我们掌握了这一策略，就会找到简单的解决办法：拒绝落入敌人布下的圈套。


The threat emanating from Putin’s Russia will be difficult to counter.	应对普京俄罗斯造成的威胁难度很大。


Failure to recognize it will make the task even more difficult.	认识不到这样的威胁将进一步加大完成任务的难度。


Putin of all the Russias	全俄罗斯人的普京


VIENNA -- For those who still wondered who Vladimir Putin is, the mystery is over.	维也纳——对那些依然没弄明白普京到底是怎样一个人的人来说，现在终于真相大白了。


His actions this week show that he is Russia’s new autocrat.	他在本周的举动表明他是俄罗斯新的独裁者。


He is a Czar pure and simple.	他在骨子里就是一个真正的沙皇。


The seven years since Putin assumed power in the Kremlin have been a time of conflicting signals.	普京在克里姆林宫掌权的七年时间里曾发出过一些相互矛盾的信号。


On one hand, he appears to be an educated and dynamic leader committed to modernizing Russia.	一方面，他看上去像是一个致力于让俄罗斯走上现代化的受过良好教育、充满活力的领导人。


On the other hand, with the help of the military-industrial KGB complex – the “ siloviki ” – he has systematically weakened or destroyed every check on his personal power, while strengthening the state’s ability to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.	而在另一方面，在军工克格勃联合体“西罗维基”权力集团的帮助下，他有计划地削弱或破坏了对于他的个人权力的每个制衡，同时强化了国家侵犯宪法所规定的公民权利的能力。


This week, Putin told the United Russia party that he will place his name at the top of its ballot for the parliamentary election scheduled for December 2, which could enable him to become Russia’s new prime minister after the presidential election due in March 2008.	本周，普京告诉统一俄罗斯党在定于12月2日进行的议会选举中他将在该党竞选名单中占据首位，这可以使他在2008年3月的总统选举后成为俄罗斯的新总理。


Of course, as he put it, Russia will have to elect as president a “decent, competent, effective, modern person with whom it would be possible to work in tandem.”	当然，像他所说的，俄罗斯必须选举一位“能够与之协同工作的正派、有竞争力、高效、有现代思想的人”担任总统。


But what that really means is that Russia will have to choose a man Putin has hand-picked to do his bidding.	其他这句话的真正含意是说俄罗斯必须选择一个普京亲手挑选的、遵照他的吩咐行事的人。


If this scenario comes true, it will be a sad day for Russia, but not because Putin will be retaining power – something everyone in Russia knew that he would.	如果情况真的是这样，那对于俄罗斯来说将是一个令人伤心的日子，这并不是因为普京将依然掌握权力，俄罗斯的每个人都知道他会这么做。


True, Putin has concentrated in his own hands more decision-making authority than at any time in Russia’s post-Soviet history.	是的，普京掌握在他自己手里的决策权是俄罗斯在苏联垮台后的任何时间都没有过的。


But most Russians think he is a great leader, crediting him with taking the country from the bankruptcy and despair of the Yeltsin era to wealth and prosperity in just seven years.	但是绝大多数俄罗斯人认为他是一个伟大的领导人，认为是他在短短七年时间里把这个国家从叶利钦时代的破产和绝望中拯救出来走向了今天的繁荣富强。


Poll after poll puts his approval ratings at more than 70%.	在每一次的民意测验中他的支持率都高达70%以上。


Putin, quite genuinely, holds contradictory views.	普京非常聪明地持有自相矛盾的观念。


He simultaneously advocates multiparty democracy and centralized power.	他同时提倡多党民主制度和集权统治。


He favors a free economy, but wants the state to control how wealth is allocated and who benefits from it.	他赞同自由经济，却又希望国家怎样分配以及落在哪些人的手里。


Like their president, most Russians see no contradiction between improving their personal lives and the country’s international status since the 1990’s and the erosion of democratic institutions.	像他们的总统一样，大多数俄罗斯人看不出在自从二十世纪九十年代以来提高他们的个人生活水平和这个国家的国家地位与民主制度的被腐蚀之间有什么矛盾之处。 当然，俄罗斯形式上的民主制度依然在那儿；


Of course, Russia’s formal institutions of democracy remain in place; but, in the absence of a free press, an independent judiciary and free elections in the regions – where Kremlin cronies, like Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya, now hold sway – they have been hollowed out.	但是，在没有一个自由的媒体、一个独立的司法系统和地区的自由选举。 在那儿是克里姆林宫的密友，像车臣的卡德罗夫那伙人占据着主导地位的情况下，它已经被抽空了。


Russians would rather have a “father of the nation,” no matter the title – czar, general secretary, president, or prime minister – than follow laws and rules.	俄罗斯人宁愿要一个“国父”，不管他顶着什么头衔，沙皇、总书记、总统或是总理，而不是遵循法律和法规。


Putin’s political genius is to have recognized this.	普京在政治上的聪明就在于认识到了这一点。


Even if Putin has found a way to retain power without amending the constitution – a possibility that was endlessly speculated about by Russia’s dwindling band of democrats – the undemocratic nature of his strategy is glaringly obvious.	即便普京找到一条无需修改宪法就能保留权力的途径。 这种可能性已经被俄罗斯势力越来越小的民主人士做过无限的猜测了，他的策略的非民主性质已经昭然若揭了。


Moving from one high office in the Kremlin to another in the White House (the seat of the Russian Parliament) is merely a technicality.	从克里姆林宫的一个高职换到位于白宫（俄罗斯议会所在地）的另一个高职仅仅是一个技术细节。


Putin will be czar no matter what office is formally his own.	不管他自己形式上的职位是什么，普京毫无疑问将成为一个沙皇。


What will make this work is that, like any good KGB man, Putin is a master of facades.	能够做到这一点是因为普京像所有优秀的克格勃一样是一个做表面文章的高手。


It has been said that presidential democracy only strengthens Russian political culture’s tendency to favor rulers with a “strong hand,” whereas a parliamentary system would allow for a more “horizontal” distribution of power.	人们曾说总统制民主只会强化俄罗斯政治文化中赐予掌权者“铁腕”的倾向，而议会制度将会带来权力更加“水平”的分配。


So any future Prime Minister Putin will be able to say— hey , I rule under the ultra-democratic Italian parliamentary model.	所以当普京未来担任总理时他就可以说，嘿，我是在一个极端民主的意大利议会制模式下执政。


What could be more democratic?	还有比这更民主的体制吗？


But if Putin, who has spent seven years “verticalizing” power in order to restore the stability and pride lost during Yeltsin’s “democratization” of Russia, really wanted to secure the good of his country, he would follow in Yeltsin’s footsteps and exit the scene.	但是如果普京在花了七年时间打造了“垂直”权力体制以恢复在叶利钦式的“民主化”期间俄罗斯所丢失掉的稳定和荣耀后，真的是为他的国家的利益着想的话，就应该仿效叶利钦退出这个舞台。


For the lesson of the years of communist misrule is this: no one man or party can know enough to manage a modern economy.	因为共产党多年的暴政所留下的教训就是：没有哪个人或哪个政党能足够清楚如何管理现代经济。


Only democratic systems and free markets provide the essential signals that a government needs in order to act efficiently.	只有���主体制和自由市场能够向政府提供其进行有效行动所需要的重要信号。


After all, the good of democratic structures is their predictability.	不管怎样，民主结构的一个好处就在于它的可预知性。


Only the Russians, with their devotion to the rule of a strongman, still insist on the importance of the role of personality in history.	只有钟情于强人统治的俄罗斯人依然坚持历史上个人角色的重要性。


By contrast, successful democracies believe that nobody is irreplaceable.	相反，成功的民主体制认为没有哪个人是不可替代的。


After September 11, 2001, many New Yorkers wanted the city’s then Mayor Rudy Giuliani to remain in office.	在2001年的“9. 11”事件后，许多纽约人希望这个城市当时的市长朱利亚尼继续留任。


But democracy required an election, and many now argue that the current mayor, Michael Bloomberg, has performed even better than Giuliani might have done in reviving the city.	但是民主体制规定要进行选举，而许多人现在认为他们现在的市长布隆伯格在复兴这个城市上干得比朱利亚尼可能会做到的更出色。


So, if Putin is concerned about Russia, he should abandon his czarist notions of power and leave high office, if not politics altogether.	所以，如果普京真的关心俄罗斯，他应该抛弃他沙皇式的权力观念并且离开他的职位，如果不是离开政治舞台的话。


Like other democratic leaders, he might consider working in the private-sector, like Gerhard Schröder, or, better yet, write books and help Tsunami victims, like Bill Clinton or become an environmentalist, like Mikhail Gorbachev.	像其他民主领导人一样，他也许可以考虑像施罗德那样到一个私人机构工作，或者最好像克林顿那样著书立说以及帮助海啸受难者或者像戈尔巴乔夫那样成为一个环保主义者。


But this seems to be too much to ask of ex-KGB man Putin, for whom there can be no distinction between losing power and leaving it gracefully.	但是看上去这对普京这样一个前克格勃来说这个要求或许太过分了，对于他们来说失去权力和体面地离开权力舞台没有什么区别。


Putinomics	普京经济学


WASHINGTON, D.C. -- President Vladimir Putin turned Russia’ parliamentary election into a referendum on himself – and won by a landslide.	华盛顿--普京总统把俄国议会选举变成了对自己的全民公决，并且获得大胜。


But, while he refuses to spell out his plans for remaining in power once his second term expires next spring, his economic policy is clear.	但是，尽管他拒绝明确表明在明年春天他的； 第二个任期届满的时候维持权力的安排，他的经济政策却是清晰的。


The strangest thing about the Duma election was that Putin lost his nerve.	有关杜马选举最为奇怪的事情就是普京惊惶失措。


He over-exposed himself in public appearances that were as aggressive as they were vague in substance.	他在公开亮相的场合过度地暴露了自己，其内容实质含糊不清，而表现却非常好斗。


He ran against the West and the “chaos” of the 1990’s, just as he raged against Chechen terrorists in 1999 and against oligarchs in 2003.	他在竞选中反对西方以及九十年代的“混乱”，正如他在1999年镇压车臣恐怖份子以及2003年平定寡头们一样。


The Kremlin abandoned democratic procedures, controlling which parties were allowed to run and their candidates, while Putin’s United Russia monopolized media coverage.	克里姆林宫放弃了民主程序，控制着那些政党可以被允许竞选及其侯选人，而普京的统一俄罗斯垄断了媒体报导。


Opposition activists were blocked from most campaigning, and often arrested, while Kremlin-controlled courts denied their complaints.	反对派活动份子被阻止进行大部分的竞选活动，他们经常被捕，而克里姆林宫控制的法院不受理他们的抗议申请。


People were intimidated into voting for United Russia on a mass scale.	大量的选民被恐吓投票支持统一俄罗斯。


Independent election monitors were barred.	独立选举监督员则被禁止。


As a consequence, the new State Duma has not been elected so much as appointed.	结果，新的国家杜马与其说是选举的，倒不如说是指定的。


It lacks legitimacy and its members are unknown.	它缺乏合法性，而议员们则不为人知。


But Putin’s legitimacy has also been tainted by the pervasive fraud.	但是普京的合法性则由于大规模的欺诈行为而受到玷污。


His only “mass” meeting in Moscow drew no more than 5,000 people.	他唯一的在莫斯科的“群众”集会吸引了不到五千人。


The main questions are how authoritarian he will become, or whether this pathetic campaign will weaken him.	主要问题是他将会在多大程度上极权，或者，这一悲哀的竞选是否会削弱普京。


Putin’s policy is easy to understand if one realizes that he usually does the opposite of what he says.	如果人们认识到他往往说一套做一套的话，那么就不难理解普京的政策了。


In his first term, Putin appeared to be an authoritarian reformer, undertaking substantial market reforms, such as introducing a 13% flat income tax.	在他的第一个任期内，普京似乎是一个极权的改革派。 他进行了实质性的市场改革，例如实行同等13%收入所得税。


But in his second term, Putin was simply authoritarian, undertaking no economic or social reforms worth mentioning.	但是在他的； 第二个任期内，普京只是极权而已，没有进行值得一提的经济或社会改革。


The expropriation of the oil company Yukos, valued at $100 billion, was the signal event, and was followed by rising corruption.	尤科斯石油公司市值一千亿美元，其收归国有成为一个标志事件，其后则腐败丛生。


Putin has established a purely personal dictatorship.	普京建立了完全个人的独裁统治。


He rules through the presidential administration and competing secret police forces without ideology or party.	他通过总统当局以及没有意识形态或者政党的相互竞争的秘密警察进行统治。


United Russia is little more than a bunch of state officials.	统一俄罗斯只不过是一群国家官员而已。


He has sapped most power from other state institutions.	他从其他国家机关中夺取了大部分权力。


Personal authoritarianism rarely survives its founder.	个人独裁统治很少可以在始作俑者身后存活。


Since Putin has created an over-centralized regime that cannot survive without him, he has to stay as president.	由于普京建立了一个没有他就无法存活的极度集权的政权，他不得不继续留任总统。


Law is of minimal relevance, as he can always order the Constitutional Court to approve his third term.	法律根本就无济于事，因为他可以随时命令宪法法院批准他的第三个任期。


Putin’s regime may be described as a group of clans, consisting of state-dominated corporations, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Vneshtorgbank, Rosoboronexport, and the Russian Railways, together with the security agencies.	可以把普京政权描绘为众多宗派的一个集团。 它们包括国家控制公司，例如俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司，俄罗斯石油公司，俄罗斯国防出口公司以及俄罗斯铁路公司，连同各安全机构。


Putin’s KGB cronies, usually from St. Petersburg, control these institutions, and tap them for huge kickbacks.	普京的克格勃把兄弟们大多来自圣彼得堡，控制着这些机构并且从中获取巨额回扣。


At the same time, Putin has made sure that they all hate one another, so that they need him as arbitrator or godfather.	与此同时，普京让他们互相嫉恨，这样他们就需要普京来作为仲裁人和教父。


In a sensational interview before the election in the Russian newspaper Kommersant , one of these previously unknown KGB managers explained how they use state extortion against private enterprises to accomplish their “velvet re-privatization” through state corporate raiding.	大选前，一名以前不为人所知的克格勃官员接受商业日报的采访轰动一时。 他解释了他们如何对私营企业进行国家敲诈来实现他们的“丝绒回复私有化”。


According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the share of GDP originating in the private sector has declined from 70% to 65% under Putin.	根据欧洲复兴开发银行的统计，私人企业对GDP的贡献在普京执政期间从70%降到了65%。


Re-nationalization through extortion is likely to accelerate.	通过国家敲诈来实现回复国有化的行为很可能会加速。


This re-nationalization has not been justified ideologically, but rather cynically: the purpose is simply to generate corrupt revenues for top Kremlin officials.	这种回复国有化在意识形态上从来没有被证明是合理的，这更多的是一种犬儒哲学：其目的就是为了给克里姆林宫的高官创造腐败收入。


Although corruption has been declining in most of the former Soviet Union, it has surged in Russia since 2004, becoming more rationalized and concentrated.	尽管腐败现象在大多数前苏联国家已经在逐步减少，但是在俄罗斯自2004年以来却出现了上升现象，人们对腐败更加习以为常，同时它也更加集中化了。


None of Putin’s KGB kingpins has been arrested or even demoted.	普京的克格勃首要人物中还没有哪个被拘捕甚至解职了。


As re-nationalization gained momentum, the public economic rhetoric changed and become statist.	随着回复国有化势力的得势，在经济上公开论调发生了变化，变得更加强调中央集权了。


Putin now favors protectionism, state intervention, and subsidies.	普京现在偏爱的是保护主义、国家干涉还有补贴政策。


In this climate, no progressive structural reforms are likely.	在这种大环境下是不太可能实施积极的机构改革的。


Until recently, Russia has pursued an admirably conservative macroeconomic policy, running up huge budget and current account surpluses.	直到最近，俄罗斯遵循的一直是令人钦佩的保守宏观经济政策，这是一庞大的预算和经常项目顺差为基础的。


It has paid off its foreign debt and built up foreign currency reserves of $450 billion.	它已经偿还了外债并且建立起了4500亿美元的外汇储备。


Before the Duma election, however, Putin jeopardized this last vestige of responsible economic policy.	不过，在杜马选举前，普京把��后遗留的这个负责任的经济政策也破坏掉了。


Currently, Russia’s greatest economic concern is growing inflationary pressure, driven especially by food prices.	当前，俄罗斯最最关心的经济问题是越来越高的通货膨胀压力，尤其是食品价格的上涨。


Rising food prices are an international phenomenon, and Russia’s inflation is driven by the large current account surpluses and capital inflows.	越来越高的食品价格现在是全世界的普遍现象，而俄罗斯的通货膨胀是庞大的经常项目顺差和资本流入造成的。


But Russia’s government is no longer trying to mitigate these factors, instead pursuing an inflationary policy.	但是俄罗斯政府不再试图缓解这些因素，而是遵循通货膨胀政策。


Monetary policy has been loose for the last year, and before the Duma election the government started pouring huge sums into pensions and other social welfare transfers.	去年的货币政策是很宽松的，而在杜马选举前政府开始向养老金和其他社会福利转移注入巨额资金。


Not surprisingly, inflation has shot up from 7% last spring to 11% currently, and may reach 15% in the spring.	于是毫不惊讶地，通货膨胀率从去年春季的7%暴涨到了现在的11%，并且可能会在明天春季达到15%。


Naturally, monetary and fiscal policy should be tightened, but that is difficult when Putin is trying to placate the population.	自然，货币和财政政策应该被收紧，但是当普京试图安抚民众时这是很难做到的。


He could liberalize the exchange rate and let it float upwards, but he is not even doing that.	他可以放开汇率并且让它一路涨上去，但是他根本没有这样做。


Instead, using an old Soviet tactic, Putin has imposed informal price controls, which cannot hold for long in a privatized economy.	相反，普京运用以前苏联的策略实施了非正式的价格控制，而这在私有化的经济中是难以持续很长时间的。


Russia’s economic growth is still driven by the sound market reforms undertaken in the 1990’s and Putin’s first term, together with high oil and gas prices.	俄罗斯的经济增长依然是由二十世纪九十年代以及普京第一个任期实施的强有力的市场改革以及高昂的石油和天然气价格所驱动的。


But, while growth is not likely to stop any time soon, Russia’s economic success increasingly hinges not only on high but rising oil and gas prices.	但是，尽管这种增长不太可能很快会停滞，俄罗斯的经济成功已经越来越依赖于石油和天然气价格依然保持在高位并且还要继续上涨。


The main question about economic policy in Putin’s third term, then, is how fast it will deteriorate.	因此，普京的第三个任期在经济政策上最主要的问题是它将以多快的速度恶化。


Russia’s Preemptive Counter-Revolution	俄罗斯先发制人的反革命


FLORENCE – In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin returned his country to dictatorship.	佛罗伦萨——2014年，俄罗斯总统普京将他的国家带回到专制体制。


From the Kremlin to Crimea, Russian citizens must now deal with the greed, fear, and mendacity of a dictator who, in the course of a year, eviscerated any final check on his authority.	从克里姆林到克里米亚，俄罗斯民众现在必须面对一个独裁者的贪婪、恐惧和谎言，这位独裁者在2014年摆脱了对其权力最后的限制。


In many respects, Putin’s dictatorship is primitive.	在很多方面，普京的独裁都非常原始。


It is founded on base emotions rather than Soviet-era, ideological motivations.	普京的独裁基础是原始情绪，而不是苏联时代的意识形态动机。


Though Putin has tried to stoke a popular desire for empire with his Crimea annexation and intervention in eastern Ukraine, these actions amount to little more than open theft by masked men in the dead of night; they have little chance of begetting lasting glory.	虽然普京试图借吞并克里米亚和干预东乌克兰激起民众对帝国的渴望，但这些举动实际却比夜深人静时的蒙面盗窃好不到哪去； 这样的行为几乎不可能获得持久的荣誉。


Many of my fellow cultural historians disagree.	与我同行的许多文化历史学家不这么认为。


They insist that Putin’s regime represents a form of continuity with Russia’s cultural traditions.	他们坚持认为普京政权代表俄罗斯文化传统的一种持续形式。