NEW DELHI – For years, China has sought to encircle South Asia with a “string of pearls": a network of ports connecting its eastern coast to the Middle East that would boost its strategic clout and maritime access.	新德里—多年来，中国一直在寻求用“珍珠链”包围南亚。 所谓“珍珠链”是指连接中国东部沿海到中东的港口网络，这条链能增强其战略实力和海上航线。


Not surprisingly, India and others have regarded this process with serious concern.	毫不奇怪，印度和其他国家将此视为严重威胁。


Now, however, China is attempting to disguise its strategy, claiming that it wants to create a twenty-first-century maritime Silk Road to improve trade and cultural exchange.	但是，如今，中国试图掩饰这一战略，声称其意欲建设二十一世纪海上丝绸之路以促进贸易和文化交流。


But friendly rhetoric can scarcely allay concern in Asia and beyond that China's strategic goal is to dominate the region.	但友好的说辞难以平息亚洲和其他地区的担忧：中国的战略目标是主宰这一地区。


That concern is well founded.	这一担忧理由充分。


Simply put, the Silk Road initiative is designed to make China the hub of a new order in Asia and the Indian Ocean region.	简言之，丝绸之路计划就是为了中国成为亚洲和印度洋地区新秩序的枢纽。


Indeed, by working to establish its dominance along major trade arteries, while instigating territorial and maritime disputes with several neighbors, China is attempting to redraw Asia's geopolitical map.	事实上，中国在努力使自己成为贸易大动脉的主宰者，同时煽动与不少邻国的领土和领海纠纷，以此改变亚洲的地缘政治版图。


The strategic dimension of the maritime Silk Road is underscored by the fact that the People's Liberation Army has led the debate on the subject.	海上丝绸之路有其战略图谋，这是基于一个事实：解放军主导着这一主题的讨论。


The PLA National Defense University's Major General Ji Mingkui argues that the initiative can help China to craft a “new image" and “win influence," especially as the US “pivot" to Asia “loses momentum."	中国国防大学少将纪明葵指出，这一计划有助于中国构建“新形象”、“赢得影响力”，特别是在美国的亚洲“支点”“失去动力”时。


Yet PLA experts remain eager to disavow the Silk Road initiative's link with the “string of pearls."	但解放军专家仍忙不迭否认丝绸之路计划与“珍珠链”有关。


Instead, they compare it to the fifteenth-century expeditions of Zheng He, a Chinese eunuch admiral who led a fleet of treasure ships to Africa.	相反，他们将其与十五世纪的郑和下西洋相提并论。 郑和的宝船队伍一直航行至非洲。


According to Central Military Commission member Sun Sijing, Zheng used the ancient Silk Road without seizing “one inch of land" or seeking “maritime hegemony" (though history attests to his use of military force – for example, executing local rulers – to control maritime chokepoints).	根据中央军委委员孙思敬的说法，郑和在古丝绸之路的航行中没有侵占“一寸土地”，也没有寻求“海洋霸权”（但历史证明他使用军事力量——比如处决地方统治者——控制海路要塞）。


In reality, little distinguishes the maritime Silk Road from the “string of pearls."	在现实中，海上丝绸之路和“珍珠链”基本没有区别。


Though China is employing ostensibly peaceful tactics to advance the initiative, its primary goal is not mutually beneficial cooperation; it is strategic supremacy.	尽管表面上中国采取了和平战术推进该计划，但其主要目标并非多赢合作； 而是战略主宰。


Indeed, the Silk Road is integral to President Xi Jinping's “China dream" ambitions, which entail restoring China's past glory and status.	事实上，丝绸之路是中国国家主席习近平的“中国之路”野心的一部分。 中国梦就是要重塑中国过去的光荣和地位。


China, especially under Xi, has often used aid, investment, and other economic leverage to compel its neighbors to deepen their economic dependence on – and expand their security cooperation with – the People's Republic.	中国，特别是习近平治下的中国，常常使用援助、投资或其他经济杠杆迫使邻国加深对中国的经济依赖——并扩大与中国的安全合作。


Xi's use of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund and the new China-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to develop the maritime Silk Road reflects this approach.	习近平投入400亿美元建立丝绸之路基金并出资成立新的亚洲基础设施投资银行以发展海上丝绸之路，反映的就是这一方针。


Already, China is constructing ports, railroads, highways, and pipelines in the region's littoral states, not only to facilitate mineral-resource imports and exports of Chinese manufactured goods, but also to advance its strategic military goals.	中国已经在地区内的沿海国家建设了港口、铁路、高速公路和管道，这不仅是为了便利矿产资源进口和中国制造品出口，也是为���推进其战略军事目标。


For example, China concluded a multi-billion dollar deal with Pakistan to develop the port at Gwadar, owing to its strategic location at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, which more than offsets the port's limited commercial potential.	比如，中国与巴基斯坦完成了数十亿美元的交易，在瓜达尔开发港口，原因就在于这里霍尔木兹海峡口的战略区位，这足以抵消该港口商业潜力有限的弊端。


Twice last autumn, Chinese attack submarines docked at Sri Lanka's newly opened, $500 million container terminal at Colombo Harbor – built and majority-owned by Chinese state companies.	去年秋天，中国攻击型潜艇两次停驻斯里兰卡科伦坡港新开的价值5亿美元的集装箱码头——该码头由中国国有公司建设并拥有多数股权。


China has now embarked on a $1.4-billion project to build a sprawling complex roughly the size of Monaco on reclaimed land in Colombo – a “port city" that will become a major stop on China's nautical “road."	如今，中国在科伦坡进行一项14亿美元的工程，填海造出一片相当于摩纳哥大小的土地建造综合体——这个“港口城市”将成为中国海上“之路”的主要停靠站。


Zhou Bo, an honorary fellow with the PLA Academy of Military Science, admits that China's mega-projects “will fundamentally change the political and economic landscape of the Indian Ocean," while presenting China as a “strong yet benign" power.	解放军军事科学院荣誉研究员周波承认，中国的巨型工程“将从根本上改变印度洋的政治和经济格局”，同时将中国描述为“强大而温和”的力量。


This is important, because the new Asian order will be determined less by developments in East Asia, where Japan is determined to block China's rise, than by events in the Indian Ocean, where China is chipping away at India's longstanding dominance.	这一点很重要，因为新亚洲秩序与其说将由东亚发展趋势决定，不如说将由印度洋所发生的事件决定。 在东亚，日本必然会阻挠中国的崛起，而在印度洋，中国正在挑战目前的印度主导地位。


India is certainly suspicious of China's behavior.	印度当然怀疑中国的行为。


But China is treading carefully enough that it can continue to advance its goals, without spooking its intended quarry.	但中国小心翼翼，以使其能够继续推进其目标而不打草惊蛇。


The American academic John Garver depicted it best using a Chinese fable: “A frog in a pot of lukewarm water feels quite comfortable and safe.	美国学者约翰·贾沃尔（John Garver）用中国寓言很好地描述了这一局面：“青蛙在温吞水中感觉舒适又安全。


He does not notice as the water temperature slowly rises until, at last, the frog dies and is thoroughly cooked."	他没有注意到水温正在缓慢上升，直到被杀死并彻底煮熟。 ”


Seen in this light, it is not surprising that China has invited India to join the maritime Silk Road initiative.	照此看，中国邀请印度参与其海上丝绸之路也就不足为奇了。


The aim is not only to help calm a suspicious neighbor, but also to slow the development of India's strategic ties with the US and Japan.	中国的目标不仅是安抚狐疑的邻国，还包括减缓印度与美国和日本的战略关系。


China's plans for the Silk Road combine economic, diplomatic, energy, and security objectives in an effort to create an expansive network of linked facilities to boost trade, aid strategic penetration, and permit an increasingly potent and active submarine force to play an expanded role.	中国的丝绸之路计划综合了经济、外交、能源和安全目标，其手段是打造庞大的连接设施网络促进贸易、协助战略渗透、使其日益强大和活跃的潜艇部队起到更大作用。


In the process, China aims to fashion an Asian order based not on a balance of power with the US, but on its own hegemony.	在此过程中，中国意在改变亚洲秩序，使之不再基于与美国的实力平衡，而是基于其自身的霸权。


Only a concert of democracies can block this strategy.	民主国家只有齐心协力才能阻挡这一战略。


China’s Silk Road Revival	中国的丝绸之路复兴


NEW DELHI – The phrase “Silk Road” evokes a romantic image – half history, half myth – of tented camel caravans winding their way across the trackless deserts and mountains of Central Asia.	新德里—“丝绸之路”给人们以浪漫印象——一半是历史，一半是传说——商人带着驼队和帐篷走在中亚无路可循的沙漠和丘陵中。


But the Silk Road is not just part of a fabled past; it is an important feature of China’s current foreign policy.	但丝绸之路并不只是虚构的过去的一部分； 它也是中国最新外交政策的重要特征。


The historical Silk Road comprised an overland and a maritime route, both of which facilitated the transfer to Europe of South and East Asian goods and ideas, from Chinese tea to inventions like paper, gunpowder, and the compass, as well as cultural products like Buddhist scripture and Indian music.	历史上的丝绸之路由一条陆路和一条海路组成，这两条路促进了商品和思想传向欧洲和东南亚，有中国茶叶，有纸、火药和指南针这样的发明，也有佛经和印度音乐这样的文化产品。


Likewise, the Silk Road – primarily the overland route, which also passed through the Arab world to Europe – gave China access to Indian astronomy, plants, and herbal medicines, while introducing it to the Buddhist and Islamic faiths.	类似地，丝绸之路——主要是指途径阿拉伯世界抵达欧洲的陆路通道——让中国接触到印度的天文学、植物和草药，也接触到了佛教和伊斯兰教信仰。


Thanks to Chinese Admiral Zheng He, who steered his naval fleet across the Indian Ocean seven times in the early fifteenth century, the Chinese wok became the favorite cooking vessel of women in the southwestern Indian state of Kerala.	十五世纪初，七下印度洋的郑和让中国产品成为印度西南部喀拉拉邦妇女们最喜爱的炊具。


Chinese fishing nets still dot the waters off Kochi.	中国渔网至今仍在科钦（Kochi）水域中使用。


In 1411, Zheng erected a stone tablet – translated into Chinese, Persian, and Tamil – near the Sri Lankan coastal town of Galle, with an inscription appealing to the Hindu gods to bless his efforts to build a peaceful world based on trade and commerce.	1411年，在斯里兰卡海岸附近的加勒（Galle）竖起一块石碑，石碑上用汉字、波斯文和泰米尔文镌刻着祈祷印度诸神保佑他建立基于贸易和商业的和平世界的铭文。


Six hundred years later, Chinese President Xi Jinping is espousing a similar goal – only he is appealing to political leaders throughout Europe and Asia to advance his cause.	六百年后，中国国家主席习近平也在追求类似的目标——只不过他寻求欧洲和亚洲的政治领袖配合他的目标。


In September of last year, in a speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, Xi announced the so-called “Silk Road Economic Belt,” a new foreign-policy initiative aimed at boosting international cooperation and joint development throughout Eurasia.	去年9月，在哈萨克斯坦巴扎尔巴耶夫大学（Nazarbayev University）的演讲中，习近平提出了所谓的“丝绸之路经济带”，这是一项旨在增进欧亚地区国际合作和联合开发的新外交政策。


To guide the effort, Xi identified five specific goals: strengthening economic collaboration, improving road connectivity, promoting trade and investment, facilitating currency conversion, and bolstering people-to-people exchanges.	习近平提出了五个具体目标：加强经济合作，改善陆路连接，促进贸易和投资，促进货币兑换，加强人际交流。


The following month, the other shoe dropped.	一个月后，另一只鞋也落了地。


Xi, addressing Indonesia’s Parliament, called for the re-establishment of the old sea networks to create a twenty-first century “maritime Silk Road” to foster international connectivity, scientific and environmental research, and fishery activities.	习近平在印尼议会演讲时号召重新建立昔日的海洋网络，形成二十一世纪的“海洋丝绸之路”促进国际联系、科学和环境研究以及渔业活动。


Chinese Premier Li Keqiang subsequently reiterated that goal at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, and again at the East Asia Summit last year.	随后，中国国务院总理李克强在亚太经济合作峰会上重申了这一目标，然后又在去年的东亚峰会上再次重申。


Since then, the establishment of a modern overland and maritime Silk Road has become official Chinese policy, endorsed by the Communist Party and the National People’s Congress.	自此以后，建立现代陆路和海路丝绸之路就成为中国的官方政策，受到中共和全国人大的支持。


Xi has emphasized that the goal of the Silk Road economic initiative is to revive ancient ties of friendship in the contemporary globalized world.	习近平强调，丝绸之路经济计划的目标重振当代全球化世界的古老联系和友谊。


But he undoubtedly has a domestic motive as well, rooted in the growing prosperity gap between eastern and western China.	但毫无疑问，他也有其国内动机，即日益拉大的东西部经济差距。


The concentration of economic activity in the cities and special economic zones of the east has generated energy-supply and environmental constraints and bottlenecks that are hampering China’s ability to achieve the sustainable, inclusive growth that it needs to attain high-income status.	经济活动集中在东部城市和特别经济区造成了能源供给和环境约束和瓶颈，妨碍了中国追求不如高收入行列所必须的可持续、包容性增长的能力。


The government hopes that the Silk Road initiative will make China’s west and southwest regions the engines of the next phase of the country’s development.	中国政府希望丝绸之路计划可以使西部和西南地区成为中国下一阶段的发展引擎。


Nonetheless, the initiative’s international dimension remains the most relevant – and complex.	尽管如此，该计划的国际部分仍然更加重要，也更加复杂。


Chinese diplomats have pointed to a constellation of mechanisms and platforms built or strengthened in recent years that could help maximize its impact. These include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; the Chinese-built Yuxinou Railway from Chongqing to Germany (and onward to north European ports); and the new and incipient energy corridors between China and Central Asia, as well as Myanmar.	中国外交官指出，近几年来所建立或强化的众多制度和平台有助于将实现该计划影响最大化，如上海合作组织、孟加拉国-中国-印度-缅甸走廊、中国-巴基斯坦经济走廊、中国建设的渝新欧铁路（从重庆到德国，可进一步延伸到北欧海港）、中国和中亚以及缅甸之间方兴未艾的新能源走廊等。


Moreover, China has established the New Development Bank with its fellow BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – institutions that will undoubtedly benefit from China’s enormous investible surplus.	此外，中国与其他金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和南非）成立了新开发银行，还建立了亚洲基础设施投资银行——毫无疑问，这些机构将从中国巨大的投资盈余中获益。


Given China’s prominent role in both, they could easily be used to provide financing for Silk Road-related programs.	中国在这两大机构中都起着主导作用，因此可以轻松地利用它们为丝绸之路相关项目融资。


But, though China may not struggle to finance its Silk Road ambitions, it is likely to face political resistance – especially with regard to the maritime route.	但是，尽管中国或许并不难于为丝绸之路野心融资，但可能面临政治阻力——特别是在海上丝绸之路上。


At a time when China’s assertive stance in the South and East China Seas is provoking anxiety among its neighbors – including Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore – the Silk Road initiative has aroused significant geopolitical apprehension.	中国在东南沿海的进攻姿态正在引起邻国的焦虑——包括日本、越南、菲律宾和新加坡——因此丝绸之路计划将带来巨大的地缘政治恐慌。


In fact, these fears have a strong historical basis.	事实上，这些恐慌有其深刻的历史根源。


Zheng’s expeditions involved the use of military force in present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and India to install friendly rulers and control strategic chokepoints across the Indian Ocean.	郑和在下西洋的过程中在今天的印尼、马来西亚、私利兰克和印度使用暴力扶持友好统治者、控制印度洋沿岸战略要塞。


He intervened in the dynastic politics of Sri Lanka and Indonesia, abducting and executing local rulers.	他干预斯里兰卡和印尼的王朝政治，诱捕并处死地方统治者。


He even seized the relic of the tooth of Buddha, a symbol of Sri Lankan political sovereignty.	他甚至抢夺象征斯里兰卡政治主权的佛陀牙齿舍利。


The countries along Zheng’s route therefore recall his adventures not just as initiatives to promote trade and establish commercial links, but also as direct military intervention in their affairs, under the pretext of ushering in a harmonious world order under China’s emperor.	因此，在郑和下西洋沿途国家看来，他的旅程并不只是为了促进贸易和建立商业联系，也是为了直接军事干预它们的事务，所谓引入在中华帝国统治下的和谐世界秩序只是借口。


Reminding them of this painful past may not be entirely in China’s interest.	唤醒对这一痛苦过去的回忆并不完全符合中国的利益。


This is not to say that the modern Silk Road would benefit only China.	这并不是说现代丝绸之路将只有利于中国。


On the contrary, its overland and maritime routes could attract considerable investment to participating countries – especially from China, as it seeks new avenues for deploying its vast reserves.	相反，其陆路和海路铜带可能吸引大量投资进入沿途国家——特别是来自中国的投资，中国正在寻找新途径部署其为数巨大的储备。


But the modern Silk Road’s establishment will also mark a step toward reinvigorating the ancient Chinese concept of tianxia, in which the Chinese emperor was considered the divinely appointed ruler of the entire known world.	但现代丝绸之路的建设也标志着古代中国“天下”观的复兴。 在“天下”观念中，中国皇帝是天指定的全部已知世界的统治者。


Many Asians still remember Japanese efforts before and during World War II to create a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” – a self-sufficient bloc of countries, under Japan’s leadership – through conquest.	许多亚洲人仍记得日本在二战前和二战期间试图通过征服建立“大东亚共荣圈”，即日本统治下的自给自足的国家圈。


Might China be on a similar – albeit less openly aggressive – path?	也许中国也有类似的想法——只不过没有那么公然罢了？


Development Finance with Chinese Characteristics?	具有中国特色的发展金融学？


GENEVA – After a late flurry of additions to the founding membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, attention now turns to setting the China-led AIIB’s rules and regulations.	发自日内瓦——在亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）再次添加了一批姗姗来迟的创始成员国后，如今焦点开始转向以中国为导向的亚投行规则和规定的设置。


But important questions remain – most important, whether the AIIB is a potential rival or a welcome complement to existing multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank.	但最重要的问题依然存在，就是亚投行对现有的多边金融机构，比如世界银行，究竟是潜在的竞争对手还是喜闻乐见的补充。


Since China and 20 mostly Asian countries signed the AIIB’s initial memorandum of understanding last October, 36 other countries – including Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom – have joined as founding members.	自从去年10月中国和20个主要亚洲国家签署了亚投行最初的谅解备忘录后，其他36个国家，包括澳大利亚、巴西、埃及、芬兰、法国、德国、印尼、伊朗、以色列、意大利、挪威、俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯、南非、韩国、瑞典、瑞士，土耳其和英国——均以创始成员国的身份加入其中。


According to China’s finance ministry, the AIIB’s founding members are to complete negotiations on the Articles of Agreement before July, with operations to begin by the end of the year.	根据中国财政部公布的资料消息，亚投行的创始成员计划在7月前完成谈判协议条款，并于今年底开始实施。


China will serve as the standing chairman of the negotiators’ meetings, which will be co-chaired by the member country hosting the talks.	中国将成为谈判会议的常务主席，与轮值主席的其他成员国联席主持会谈。


The fourth chief negotiators’ meeting was completed in Beijing in late April, and the fifth will take place in Singapore in late May.	4月底，第四届首席谈判代表会议在北京结束，第五届会议将于5月底在新加坡举行。


The Chinese economist Jin Liqun has been selected to lead the AIIB’s Multilateral Interim Secretariat, charged with overseeing the bank’s establishment.	中国经济学家金立群被推选带领亚投行多边临时秘书处，负责监督亚洲投资银行的建立。


While GDP will be the basic criterion for share allocation among the founding members, the finance ministry suggested in October that China does not necessarily need the 50% stake that its GDP would imply.	虽然创始成员之间将以GDP为基本标准配置股份，但财政部于10月时表示，中国不一定需要依据其GDP占比而获得50%的股份。


Moreover, although the AIIB will be based in Beijing, the ministry has said that regional offices and senior management appointments will be subject to further consultation and negotiation.	此外，尽管亚投行总部设在北京，但外交部表示，区域办事处和高级管理人员的任命可以通过进一步磋商和谈判决定。


Like the $50 billion New Development Bank announced by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) last summer, the AIIB has faced considerable scrutiny, with some Western leaders questioning its governance, transparency, and motives.	就像金砖国家(巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非)去年夏天宣布建立500亿美元规模的新开发银行一样，亚投行也面临着相当严厉的审视，例如一些西方领导人质疑其治理、透明度和动机。


Indeed, many in the West have portrayed their establishment as part of an effort to displace existing multilateral lenders.	事实上，许多西方人会认为它的建立会在一定程度上取代现有的多边贷款机构。


But the new development banks seem less interested in supplanting current institutions than in improving upon them – an objective shared by those institutions themselves.	但是相比取代当前机构，新开发银行似乎对改进这些机构更感兴趣——这也是两者的共同目标。


As Deputy Finance Minister Shi Yaobin pointed out recently, by recognizing the need to reform their governance, existing multilateral lenders have shown that there are, in fact, no “best practices” – only “better practices.”	正如中国财政部副部长史耀斌最近指出，通过识别改革治理的需求，现有多边贷款机构表明，事实上没有“最佳实践”，只有“更好的实践”。


There is no reason improvements cannot originate elsewhere.	同时也没理由不让其他机构来推动改革


In fact, given its experimental approach to development, China is well-suited – and, as some top officials have hinted, more than willing – to contribute to this process.	事实上，鉴于其实验方法的发展，一些高级官员已经暗示。 中国不仅适合，而且愿意多为这个过程做出贡献。


If China can help find a way to balance the need for high standards and safeguards in project lending with the imperative of rapid loan dispersion, global economic governance would benefit significantly.	如果中国能够帮助找到一种方法，来对高贷款审核标准和无可避免的快速分散贷款项目进行平衡，全球经济治理就将极大受益。


In pioneering a more pragmatic approach to development finance, China’s institutional model could be the $40 billion Silk Road Fund that President Xi Jinping announced last November.	为了开创一种更务实的方法来发展金融，中国的制度模式可能是习近平主席于去年11月宣布的400亿美元丝路基金。


The SRF and the AIIB will serve as the key financial instruments of China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy, centered on the creation of two modern-day Silk Roads – the (overland) “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road” – stretching across Asia toward Europe.	丝路基金和亚投行将作为中国 “一带一路”战略主要的金融工具，以创建两个现代丝绸之路——（陆上）经济带“丝绸之路”和“21世纪海上丝绸之路”——横跨亚洲至欧洲。


The initiative will aim to promote economic cooperation and integration in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly by providing financing for infrastructure like roads, railways, airports, seaports, and power plants.	主要通过为基础设施如公路、铁路、机场、港口和发电厂提供融资，致力于促进亚太地区经济合作和一体化。


Yet the SRF has received scant attention from Western media.	然而，丝路基金从西方媒体得到的关注非常少。


This is unfortunate, because what little is known about it suggests that it could play an important role in transforming development finance.	这是不幸的，因为它将可能在发展金融变革中发挥重要的作用，而我们却对它知之甚少。


According to Chinese media, the SRF will be capitalized by four state agencies.	据中国媒体报道，丝路基金将由四大国家机构控制。


The State Administration of Foreign Exchange will hold a 65% stake; the China Investment Corporation (CIC, the country’s sovereign-wealth fund) and the China Export-Import Bank (China Exim) will each have a 15% stake; and the China Development Bank (CDB) will hold the remaining 5%.	国家外汇管理局将持有65%的股份，中国投资公司（CIC，中国主权财富基金）和中国进出口银行将分别有15%的股份； 中国国家开发银行（国开行）将持有剩余5%的股份。


The Fund was officially registered in December 2014, and held its first Board of Directors meeting the following month.	该基金于2014年12月正式注册，并于次月举行了第一次董事会会议。


In a sense, the SRF can be considered China’s latest sovereign-wealth-fund initiative, and some media have even referred to it as the “second CIC.”	从某种意义上说，丝路基金可以被认为是中国最新的主权财富基金项目公司，一些媒体甚至称其为“第二个中投”。


But, whereas the CIC is under the managerial control of the finance ministry, the SRF’s operations appear to reflect the influence of the People’s Bank of China.	但是，中投是受财政部管理控制的，而丝路基金的运营似乎反映了中国人民银行的影响。


In a recent interview, the PBOC’s governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, suggested that the SRF would concentrate more on “cooperation projects,” particularly direct equity investment, before hinting at the Fund’s “just right” financing features.	在最近的一次采访中，中国央行行长周小川建议丝路基金在其“常规”的融资功能之外，更应致力于“合作项目”，尤其是直接股权投资。


For example, Zhou indicated that the SRF will adopt at least a 15-year time horizon for investments, rather than the 7-10-year horizon adopted by many private equity firms, to account for the slower return on infrastructure investment in developing countries.	例如，周小川表示丝路基金将采取至少15年时间的投资项目，而不是大多数私募股权公司采取的7-10年，因为发展中国家的基础设施投资回报率相对较慢。


Moreover, the SRF could act as a catalyst for other state financial institutions to contribute to a selected project’s equity and debt financing.	此外，丝路基金应该作为其他国家金融机构所选项目进行股权和债务融资的催化剂。


The Fund and other private and public investors – would first make joint equity investments in the project.	国际货币基金组织和其他私人、公共投资者——将首先合资投资项目。


China Exim and the CDB could subsequently disburse loans for debt financing, with the CIC providing further equity financing.	中国进出口银行和国开行可能随后为债务融资支付贷款，中投公司提供进一步的股权融资。


When the AIIB is up and running, it, too, could support this process, by arranging debt financing alongside SRF’s initial equity investment.	亚投行启动并运行时，它也可以通过债务融资与最初的股权投资支持这一过程。


Of course, there is still much to digest in these new financing initiatives.	当然，这些新融资计划还有很多东西要消化研究。


But one can see the emerging contours of a South-South development-finance landscape – one with the potential to transform multilateral lending more broadly.	但是你可以看到新兴南-南发展金融格局的轮廓——也是有潜力去更广泛实现多边贷款的转型。


China’s Industrial Nightmare	中国的工业噩梦


The Western media have a habit of going on feeding frenzies.	西方媒体总是喜欢追逐猎奇新闻。


Ironically, when it comes to China, the latest frenzy concerns food itself.	具有讽刺意味的是，在中国，最近的疯狂事件关注的是食品本身。


The execution this week of the former head of China’s State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), Zhen Xiaoyu, who accepted almost $1 million in bribes, shows that the frenzy has now seeped into China as well.	本周，中国前食品药品监督管理局局长郑筱萸被执行死刑。 他受贿近百万美元，显示出这种疯狂也已经渗透进了中国。


First came a spate of stories about pet food laced with melamine (a coal derivative), cough medicine and toothpaste adulterated with diethylene glycol (a sweet-tasting industrial chemical used in anti-freeze and brake fluid), toy trains decorated with lead-based paints, bacteria-infected antibiotics, exploding cell phone batteries, and defective car tires.	首先是大量关于宠物食品被掺入密胺（一种煤的衍生物）、咳嗽药和牙膏里面含有二甘醇（一种味甜的工业化学品，用于防冻液和刹车油）、玩具火车表面涂有含铅漆、被细菌感染的抗生素、爆炸的手机电池以及有缺陷的汽车轮胎。


Now, attention has now turned to food.	现在，人们的注意转到了食品上。


The world press is filled with stories about honey laced with industrial sweeteners, canned goods contaminated by bacteria and excessive amounts of additives, rice wine braced with industrial alcohol, and farm-raised fish, eel, and shrimp fed large doses of antibiotics and then washed down with formaldehyde to lower bacterial counts.	世界上的各大媒体现在都充塞着有关蜂蜜里掺有工业甜味剂、罐头食品被细菌感染以及含有过量的添加剂、米酒里掺进了工业酒精、还有养殖的鱼、鳗鱼和虾被喂食了大量的抗生素，然后用甲醛进行冲洗以降低细菌的数量的报道。


In response, China’s government acted almost instantly.	作为回应，中国政府几乎立刻采取了行动。


The General Administration of Quality and Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine conducted a survey and reported that nearly one-fifth of all products made in China for domestic use did not measure up to safety and quality standards.	国家质量监督检验检疫总局进行了一次检查，得到的结果是在中国生产的用于国内市场的所有产品中大约有五分之一达不到安全和质量标准。


At the same time, regulators increased inspections, closed down some 180 food manufacturers and now post the names of violators on their Web site.	与此同时，监管人员加强了检查，关闭了大约180家食品生产厂家，并且把违法者的名字张贴在他们的网站上。


Moreover, not only was Zhen Xiaouyu executed, but Cao Wenzhuang, who was in charge of drug registration at the SFDA, was sentenced to death for accepting roughly $300,000 in bribes from drug manufacturers.	此外，不仅仅是郑筱萸一个人被处决了，药品注册司原司长曹文庄因为从药品生产厂家那儿收受了大约30万美元的贿赂也被判处了死刑。


Both verdicts were doubtless calculated, as a famous Chinese proverb puts it, to “kill some chickens in order to scare the monkeys.”	这两次判决无疑都是经过精心考虑的，就像一句著名的中国谚语所说的，这是在“杀鸡给猴看”。


But why does this surprise us?	但是为什么这让我们感到惊讶呢？


After all, “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” has been a chaotic free-for-all for some time.	不管怎样，“中国特色的资本主义”变成肆无忌惮已经有一段时间了。


Roughly 75% of China’s food is now produced by small, private, and un-licensed operations that are difficult to regulate.	目前中国大约有75%的食品是由私人的无证的小作坊生产的，这些小作坊很难进行监管。


With little knowledge of China’s tectonic changes, foreigners have been investing, buying, trading, and extravagantly praising its amazing, but hell-bent, “economic boom.”	因为对中国结构的变化了解甚少，外国人一直在对中国进行投资、购买中国的产品以及与中国进行贸易，并且大加赞赏它令人惊异、但却高速前进的“经济增长”。


Fear of “China bashing” has made it difficult for so-called “friends of China” to discuss its darker side openly.	因为害怕受到“中国的抨击”，使所谓的“中国的朋友”很难公开谈论它的黑暗面。


The Chinese people themselves, however, have been far from unaware that the purity of their food, medicine, water, and air is in doubt.	而中国人自己其实完全清楚他们的食品、药品、水和空气的纯净很令人生疑。


The xiadao xiaoxi (back alley news) has long been replete with rumors of things going awry.	小道消息一直以来就充塞着关于许多东西出了错的传闻。


One small-time operation ground up sheet-rock and put it in gel-caps to sell as medicine.	一个小作坊把石膏灰胶纸板碾碎，然后将其灌进胶囊里充当药来卖。


A peasant village raided a hospital dumpster to reclaim discarded surgical equipment, wash it in a nearby canal, re-package it in sealed plastic saying “sterilized,” and sell it back to the hospital at cut-rate prices.	一位村民到医院的垃圾袋里收集被丢弃的手术设备，在临近的一条运河里冲洗一下，然后将其重新包装进一个密封的塑料袋里说它“已经消过毒了”，然后将它们以一个较低的价格卖回给医院。


It has not helped, of course, that the Communist Party loathes a free press and a robust civil society, both of which are essential information feedback loops in ensuring any country’s well-being.	当然，这并没有使共产党不那么讨厌自由的媒体和欣欣向荣的文明社会，正是它们可以提供重要的信息反馈以确保任何国家的福址。


Nor has it helped that China’s regulatory agencies lag far behind the growth of its economy.	它也没有帮助改变中国的监管机构的发展远远落后于它经济的发展。


For example, the Beijing office of China’s State Environmental Protection Administration has less than 300 employees, whereas the United States Environmental Protection Administration has over 17,000.	比如，中国的国家环保总局在北京只有不到300位职员，而美国的国家环保局却有超过17000名职员。


China’s mad rush toward fuqiang (wealth and power) has given it little chance to develop all the compensatory institutions that any truly developed, not to say enlightened, society needs to achieve equilibrium and social health.	中国向富强的狂奔使它很难有机会来发展所有的补偿机构，而这是任何真正发达更别提是开明的社会为实现平等和社会的健康所必需要做到的。


But in today’s globalized world, where national boundaries have morphed into synapses for myriad kinds of uncontrollable interactions, each country’s problems have become everyone’s problem.	但是在今天全球化的世界，国家的边界因为无数无法控制的相互影响而变成了突触。 一个国家的问题会变成所有国家的问题。


So, before we in the West becomes too censorious of China’s quality control problems, we should remember our complicity in making China the world’s industrial park and global dumping ground for many toxic industries.	所以，在我们西方人对中国的质量控制问题严厉批评之前，我们应该想到正是我们合谋让中国成为世界的工业园和许多有毒产业的全球倾卸场。


While we may lament the loss of manufacturing jobs through “outsourcing,” we certainly do not lament exporting massive amounts of pollution to China.	我们也许会悲叹通过“外包”而失去的制造业岗位，但是我们肯定不会为我们出口到中国的巨量污染物感到悲叹。


China may come to rue the wanton eagerness with which it has embraced industrialization.	中国也许已经开始懊悔它拥抱工业化时不合理的急切。


Already, the Chinese are beginning to awaken from the infatuation with development that besieged them as they began to emerge from the commodity-starved Cultural Revolution.	中国人已经开始从他们刚刚从商品严重匮乏的文化大革命中挣脱出来时对发展的迷恋中醒悟过来。


In a world of scarcity, more always seemed better.	当时在一个匮乏的世界，多总是意味着更好。


But now, just as the West began to understand decades ago that the natural environment has limits, China is showing the first signs of entering a post-industrial phase.	但是现在，正像西方人在几十年前开始认识到自然环境是有极限的那样，中国也开始显示出进入后工业社会的初步迹象。


So, rather than simply shutting our doors to Chinese products, we might contemplate helping China by opening the doors of our regulatory agencies to Chinese regulators.	因为，我们不应该简单地把中国的产品拒之门外，而是应该考虑通过向中国的监管者打开我们的监管机构之门来帮助中国。


To do so would actually help ourselves.	这样做肯定也能够帮助我们自己。


For, even with “strategic competitors” like China, we now live in a global commons in which we share air, water, manufactured goods, and even food.	因为，即便是面对像中国这样的“战略竞争者”，我们还是应该想到我们共有一个地球，我们分享着空气、水、工业品甚至是食品。


China’s Landing – Soft not Hard	中国经济不会硬着陆


NEW HAVEN – China’s economy is slowing.	发自纽黑文——中国的经济增长正在放缓。


This is no surprise for an export-led economy dependent on faltering global demand.	这对一个依靠出口带动又遭遇全球需求萎缩的经济体来说毫不稀奇。


But China’s looming slowdown is likely to be both manageable and welcome. Fears of a hard landing are overblown.	但中国即将面对的经济放缓其实是可控并恰逢其时的，因此那些“硬着陆”的恐惧也是过分夸张了。


To be sure, the economic data have softened.	毫无疑问，各项经济数据都有所走低。


Purchasing managers’ indices are now threatening the “50” threshold, which has long been associated with the break-even point between expansion and contraction.	采购经理人指数目前已经临近“50”大关，而这个点数一直以来都是体现生产扩张与收缩的分界点。


Similar downtrends are evident in a broad array of leading indicators, ranging from consumer expectations, money supply, and the stock market, to steel production, industrial product sales, and newly started construction.	而其他一系列重要指数——从消费者预期，货币供应，股市到钢铁产量，工业产品销售以及新开工项目数量——也出现了类似的下行趋势，


But this is not 2008.	但这可不是2008年。


Back then, global commerce was collapsing, presaging a 10.7% drop in the volume of world trade in 2009 – the sharpest annual contraction since the 1930s.	当时全球商业都陷入崩溃，世界贸易总额很可能比2009年下跌10. 7%——堪称自1930年代以来最严重的紧缩。


In response, China’s export performance swung from 26% annual growth in July 2008 to a 27% contraction by February 2009.	结果中国的出口从2008年7月的26%年增长率急转直下，到2009年2月出现了27%的下滑。


Sequential GDP growth slowed to a low single-digit pace – a virtual standstill by Chinese standards.	在此影响下GDP增长率也只剩一位数且数字较小——以中国标准来说就算是停止增长了。


And more than 20 million migrant workers reportedly lost their jobs in export-led Guangdong province.	同时在出口经济占主导的广东省有超过2000万农民工失业。


By late 2008, China was in the throes of the functional equivalent of a full-blown recession.	到了2008年年末，中国几乎已经濒临全面衰退的边缘。


Thanks to a massive fiscal stimulus, China veered away from the abyss in early 2009.	但中国借助庞大的财政刺激措施于2009年年初摆脱了这一困境。


But it paid a price for this bank-funded investment boom.	但同样也为银行资助下的投资热潮付出了代价。


Local governments’ indebtedness soared, and fixed investment surged toward an unprecedented 50% of GDP.	各地方政府负债急升，而固定资产投资占GDP的比率也史无前例地逼近50%。


Fears surfaced of another banking crisis, the imminent collapse of a monstrous property bubble, and runaway inflation.	人们害怕出现另一场银行危机，担心庞大资产泡沫即将破灭以及无法遏制的通胀。


Add a wrenching European crisis to the equation, and a replay of 2008 no longer seemed far-fetched.	一场深重的欧洲危机又令情况雪上加霜，以致2008年的一切似乎将重演了。


While there is a kernel of truth to each of these China-specific concerns, they do not by themselves imply a hard landing.	这些中国特有的问题都有其事实依据，但它们本身却并不意味着硬着陆的出现。


Nonperforming loans will undoubtedly increase in response to the banking sector’s exposure to some $1.7 trillion of local-government debt, much of which was incurred during the stimulus of 2008-2009.	虽然地方政府目前债务总额约为近1. 7万亿，其中大部分都是在2008~2009年间欠下的，而银行部门与这些债务之间的关联无疑会使不良贷款数额上升。


But the feared deterioration in loan quality is exaggerated.	但对贷款质量恶化的恐惧就有点夸张了。


The reason: With rural-urban migration projected to exceed 310 million people over the next 20 years, there is reason to believe that much of the apparent overhang of housing supply will be steadily absorbed.	笔者的判断理由是随着未来20年内有3. 1亿农村居民进入城市，大部分的过剩房屋供应量都将被消化。


Like Shanghai Pudong in the late 1990’s, today’s Chinese “ghost cities” are likely to be teaming urban centers in the not-so-distant future.	以1990年代末的上海浦东为例，今日中国的那些“鬼城”在不远的未来都将成为城市中心。


Meanwhile, deposit-rich Chinese banks have ample liquidity to absorb potential losses; the system-wide loan-to-deposit ratio is only about 65% – well below earlier pre-crisis levels that were typically closer to 120%, according to a recent analysis by the Xerion team of Perella Weinberg Partners.	与此同时，占有大笔存款的银行拥有足够的流动性去吸收潜在损失； 整个银行系统的存贷比只有大概65%——根据Perella Weinberg Partners投资银行下属Xerion研究组的成果，过往危机爆发前这个比率都会上升到近120%的水平。


Nor is the Chinese property market about to implode.	中国房地产市场也不会走向崩溃。


Yes, a building boom and speculative excesses have occurred.	没错，房地产建设热以及过度投机的情况都发生了。


But a year and a half ago, the government moved aggressively to dampen multiple property purchases – raising down payments to 50% for second homes and to 100% for third homes.	但一年半前政府着手重拳压打击购买多套住宅的行为——购买者必须为第二和第三套住房分别预先支付50%和100%的房款。


While that halted much speculative activity, house prices have remained at elevated levels – underscoring lingering affordability issues for China’s emerging middle class.	但此举虽然遏制了许多投机行为，房价却依然维持在高位——提示中国不断壮大的中产阶级依然难以承担房价。


Notwithstanding that problem, major imbalances in Chinese property markets should prove to be the exception over the next two decades.  While there could be supply-demand mismatches in any given year, with an average of roughly 15 million citizens a year slated to move from the countryside to newly urbanized areas, demand should rise to meet supply.  Meanwhile, there are encouraging signs that property inflation is now cooling: For 46 of 70 major Chinese cities, property prices either declined or stayed flat in August 2011 compared with 31 cities that reported similar conditions in July.	虽然存在这个问题，但中国房地产市场最主要的不平衡应该在于对未来20年的预期。 每年都可能出现供需不平衡，但预计年均1500万的农村新进城人口将会把需求推高到供应的水平。


Inflation is always a serious risk in China – especially with headline increases in the country’s Consumer Price Index surging through the 6% threshold this summer.	此外通胀也一直都是中国面临的严重风险——尤其是在报章头条充斥着消费者物价指数（CPI）今夏突破6%关口的消息之时。


The government has responded forcefully on four fronts.	而政府也在四个方面做出了强有力的回应。


First, food inflation, which accounts for about half the recent run-up in overall prices, has been addressed by administrative measures aimed at cutting fertilizer costs and removing bottlenecks to increased supplies of pork, cooking oil, and vegetables.	首先，针对占最近总体价格上涨因素近一半的食品通胀，政府已经颁布旨在削减燃料费用并消除猪肉，食用油和蔬菜供应瓶颈的行政措施来应对。


Second, in an effort to curtail excess bank lending, reserve ratios were increased nine times in the past 11 months.	其二，为了遏制银行过量贷款，存款准备金率已经在过去11个月内9次上调。


Third, the rate of currency appreciation has edged up.	第三，人民币升值速度有所加快。


Finally – and perhaps most importantly – the People’s Bank of China has raised its benchmark policy rate five times since October 2010.	最后——或许也是最重要的一点——中国人民银行自2010年10月以来已经5次上调基准政策利率。 目前的一年期贷款利率为6.


At 6.5%, the one-year lending rate is now 0.3% above August’s headline inflation rate.	5%，比8月报章报导的通胀率还要高0. 3%。


If food inflation recedes further, and the headline inflation rate starts to converge on the 3% core (non-food) rate, the result will be the equivalent of "passive monetary tightening" in real (inflation-adjusted) terms – precisely what the inflation-prone Chinese economy needs.	如果食品通胀进一步降低，而公开报导的通胀率逐渐向3%的核心（非食品）通胀率靠拢，结果就等于是不变价（扣除物价因素）的“消极货币紧缩”——而这正是容易发生通胀的中国经济所急需的


All of this underscores a potential silver lining.	上面这一切都意味着存在一线希望。


An increasingly unbalanced Chinese economy cannot afford persistent 10% GDP growth.	一个日渐不平衡的中国经济无法长期维持10%的增长率。


Provided that there is no recurrence of the severe external demand shock of 2008 – a likely outcome unless Europe implodes – there is good reason to hope for a soft landing to around 8% GDP growth.	除非欧洲崩盘，否则2008年爆发的严重外部需求震荡已不会重现，那么就有理由相信中国会实现一个GDP增长约为8%的软着陆。


A downshift to this more sustainable pace would provide welcome relief for an economy long plagued by excess resource consumption, labor-market bottlenecks, excess liquidity, a large buildup of foreign-exchange reserves, and mounting inflationary pressures.	一个迈向更加可持续发展道路的降速现象对于中国这个长期被过度资源消耗、劳动力市场瓶颈、过量流动性，巨额外汇储备和通胀压力所困扰的经济体来说堪称幸事


For China, there is a deeper meaning to recent global developments.  A second major warning shot in three years has been fired at this export-led economy.  First, the United States, and now Europe – China's two largest export markets are in serious trouble and can no longer be counted on as reliable, sustainable sources of external demand.	这个出口导向的经济体已经接收到了3年以来第二严重的警告。 两大出口目的地——首先是美国，如今是欧洲——都陷入了严重问题，无法继续成为可靠以及可持续的外部需求来源。


As a result, there are now major questions about the sustenance of China's long powerful export-led growth model.	于是人们也开始质疑中国的强大出口导向增长模式究竟该如何维持下去。


Accordingly, China has no choice but to move quickly to implement the pro-consumption initiatives of its recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan. Strategic transition is what modern China is all about.	对此中国别无选择，只能尽快实施其“十二五”计划中的促进消费措施。


That’s what happened 30 years ago, when economic reform began.  And it needs to happen again today.  For China, a soft landing will provide a window of opportunity to press ahead with the formidable task of increasingly urgent economic rebalancing.	事实上战略转型贯穿了整个现代中国，30年前经济改革开始时就发生过一次，而今也必须再次实现这一点。 对中国来说，软着陆将提供一个机会之窗，使其得以推进艰巨而又日渐紧迫的经济再平衡进程。


China’s Lessons for the World Bank	世界银行从中国吸取的经验


The China Daily recently ran a front-page story recounting how Paul Wolfowitz used threats and vulgarities to pressure senior World Bank staff.	《中国日报》日前在头版刊登了一则新闻，文章讲述了沃尔福威茨运用威胁性和下流的语言向世界银行的高级官员施压。


The newspaper noted that Wolfowitz sounded like a character out of the mafia television show The Sopranos .	这篇文章称沃尔福威茨好像是黑帮电视剧《黑道家族》（ The Sopranos） 里走出来的人物。


At the same time, while the Wolfowitz scandal unfolded, China was playing host to the Africa Development Bank (ADB), which held its Board meeting in Shanghai.	正当沃尔福威茨的丑闻被曝光的时候，中国已经承办了非洲开发银行的会议，其董事会在上海召开。


This is a vivid metaphor for today’s world: while the World Bank is caught up in corruption and controversy, China skillfully raises its geopolitical profile in the developing world.	这是对当今世界的生动比喻：当世界银行陷入腐败和矛盾之中时，中国很有技巧地在第三世界中提升着自己地理政治方面的形象。


China’s rising power is, of course, based heavily on its remarkable economic success.	中国的日益强大当然是建筑在令人惊叹的经济成功之上。


The ADB meeting took place in the Pudong District, Shanghai’s most remarkable development site.	非洲开发银行会议在浦东举行，这是上海发展最快的地区。


From largely unused land a generation ago, Pudong has become a booming center of skyscrapers, luxury hotels, parks, industry, and vast stretches of apartment buildings.	浦东从几十年前一大片荒芜的土地，发展成为摩天大楼、豪华酒店、公园、工业、公寓楼林立的中心地区。


Shanghai’s overall economy is currently growing at around 13% per year, thus doubling in size every five or six years.	上海的经济每年大致呈13%增长，每5、6年便可以翻一番。


Everywhere there are startups, innovations, and young entrepreneurs hungry for profits.	上海到处都是新的开始，创新以及充满野心的年轻企业家。


I had the chance to participate in high-level meetings between Chinese and African officials at the ADB meetings.	我有机会参加了非洲开发银行会议中，中国与非洲官员之间的高级会谈。


The advice that the African leaders received from their Chinese counterparts was sound, and much more practical than they typically get from the World Bank.	非洲领导人从中国领导人那里得到了合理的建议，比起他们从世界银行得到的要实际得多。


Chinese officials stressed the crucial role of public investments, especially in agriculture and infrastructure, to lay the basis for private-sector-led growth.	中国官员们强调了公共投资的重要性，特别是对于农业和基础设施的投资，以为私有经济带动的经济增长打好基础。


In a hungry and poor rural economy, as China was in the 1970’s and as most of Africa is today, a key starting point is to raise farm productivity.	对于饥渴而贫困的农村经济，比如中国20世纪70年代以及现在非洲的大部分地区，一个主要的出发点是提高农业生产力。


Peasant farmers need the benefits of fertilizer, irrigation, and high-yield seeds, all of which were a core part of China’s economic takeoff.	农民们需要的是化肥、灌溉、高产种子带来的好处，所有这些都是中国经济腾飞的核心组成部分。


Two other critical investments are also needed: roads and electricity, without which there cannot be a modern economy.	还有两项特别重要的投资：道路和电力，没有这两项就没有现代经济。


Farmers might be able to increase their output, but it won’t be able to reach the cities, and the cities won’t be able to provide the countryside with inputs.	农民也许能够提高产量，但他们无法接触到城市，而城市也无法向乡村投资。


The officials stressed how the government has taken pains to ensure that the power grid and transportation network reaches every village in China.	中国官员们强调政府如何努力确保电力和交通网络可以到达中国的每个乡村。


Of course, the African leaders were most appreciative of the next message: China is prepared to help Africa in substantial ways in agriculture, roads, power, health, and education. And the African leaders already know that this is not an empty boast.	当然，非洲领导人最欣赏的还是下面这个信息：中国将在农业、道路、供电、卫生和教育等方面向非洲提供大量援助。


All over Africa, China is financing and constructing basic infrastructure.	而且非洲领导人业已知道这并非空头支票。


During the meeting, the Chinese leaders emphasized their readiness to support agricultural research as well.	在会谈中，中国领导人强调了他们同时乐于对农业研究提供资助。


They described new high-yield rice varieties, which they are prepared to share with their African counterparts.	他们还描述了新的高产水稻，他们准备与非洲领导人分享。


All of this illustrates what is wrong with the World Bank, even aside from Wolfowitz’s failed leadership.	所有这些都表现了世界银行的错误之处，即便不去考虑沃尔福威茨的失职领导。


Unlike the Chinese, the Bank has too often forgotten the most basic lessons of development, preferring to lecture the poor and force them to privatize basic infrastructure, rather than to help the poor to invest in infrastructure and other crucial sectors.	和中国不同，世界银行经常忘记发展的最基本的经验，他们喜欢教育贫困国家，并强迫他们将基础设施私有化，而不是帮助这些贫困国家对基础设施以及其他关键领域进行投资。


The Bank’s failures began in the early 1980’s, when, under the ideological sway of President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it tried to get Africa and other poor regions to cut back or close down government investments and services.	世界银行的失败是从20世纪80年代早期开始的，当时在里根总统以及撒切尔首相的意识形态理念的影响下，世界银行竭力劝说非洲及其他贫困地区减少或者关闭政府投资或者政府提供的各种服务。


For 25 years, the Bank tried to get governments out of agriculture, leaving impoverished peasants to fend for themselves.	25年来，世界银行竭力使政府与农业分离，让这些贫困的农民自给自足。


The result has been a disaster in Africa, with farm productivity stagnant for decades.	其结果是引发了非洲的灾难，使得其农业生产力几十年持续走低。


The Bank also pushed for privatization of national health systems, water utilities, and road and power networks, and grossly underfinanced these critical sectors.	世界银行同时也推动国家卫生体制、水力、道路、电力网络的私有化，使这些重要部门得不到足够的经济支持。


This extreme free-market ideology, also called “structural adjustment,” went against the practical lessons of development successes in China and the rest of Asia.	这种极端的自由市场理念，也称为结构调整，与���国及亚洲其他地区经济的成功发展是相背离的。


Practical development strategy recognizes that public investments – in agriculture, health, education, and infrastructure – are necessary complements to private investments.	实际的发展战略认可公共投资¾对农业、卫生、教育及基础设施的投资¾这些都是私有投资必要的补充。


The World Bank has instead wrongly seen such vital public investments as an enemy of private-sector development.	而世界银行则错误得将这些关键的公共投资看作是私有经济发展的敌人。


Whenever the Bank’s extreme free-market ideology failed, it has blamed the poor for corruption, mismanagement, or lack of initiative.	当世界银行极端的自由市场理念失败时，它会指责贫困国家的腐败、管理不善，缺乏动力。


This was Wolfowitz’s approach, too.	沃尔福威茨也是如此。


Instead of focusing the Bank’s attention on helping the poorest countries to improve their infrastructure, he launched a crusade against corruption.	沃尔福威茨并不强调世界银行帮助贫困国家提高基础设施，而是向腐败宣战。


Ironically, of course, his stance became untenable when his own misdeeds came to light.	具有讽刺意味的是，当他自己的不良行为曝光后，他的立场则变得站不住脚。


The Bank can regain its relevance only if it becomes practical once again, by returning its focus to financing public investments in priority sectors, just as the Chinese leadership is prepared to do.	世界银行只有再次变得实际起来，将其重点转向帮助重点部门的公共投资，才能够发挥作用，正如中国领导人所愿意做的那样。


The good news is that African governments are getting the message on how to spur economic growth, and are also getting crucial help from China and other partners that are less wedded to extreme free-market ideology than the World Bank.	好消息是，非洲政府得到了如何刺激经济增长的信息，也正在得到中国以及其他不如世界银行般热衷于极端自由市场理念的经济伙伴的重要帮助。


Many African governments at the Shanghai meeting declared their intention to act boldly, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural modernization, public health, and education.	许多非洲政府首脑在上海宣布，他们将对基础设施、农业现代化、公共卫生以及教育进行大胆的投资。


The Wolfowitz debacle should be a wake-up call to the World Bank: it must no longer be controlled by ideology.	沃尔福威茨的倒台应该是给世界银行一个叫醒电话：世界银行不应该再被意识形态所控制。


If that happens, the Bank can still do justice to the bold vision of a world of shared prosperity that prompted its creation after World War II.	如果这样做了，那么世界银行仍然可以在这个二战后促成了其存在的共享繁荣的世界里发挥自己的作用。


China’s Losing Battle Against Corruption	中国腐败战斗的失败


China’s rulers rarely wash their dirty linen in public.	中国领导人们极少会在公众面前披露内部丑闻。


So the arrest of Politburo member and Shanghai Communist Party boss Chen Liangyu on corruption charges has sent shock waves across the country.	因此政协委员及上海市委书记陈良宇因腐败罪名被捕入狱在全国引起了震惊。


Some speculate that the arrest is really part of a power struggle, with President Hu Jingtao demonstrating his authority against a local power broker who had thwarted national policy.	有人猜测逮捕陈其实是权力斗争的一部分，胡锦涛是在对挑战国家政策的地方政权显示威力。


Whatever the truth behind Chen’s fall, and despite the widening corruption probe of other senior government officials, data and evidence recently released by the government and multilateral institutions suggest that the authorities are fighting a rearguard battle against a rising tide of graft.	无论陈下台的真正原因是什么，尽管对其他政府高官腐败问题的调查在不断加强，政府和多国机构最新公布的数据和证据显示，中国政府正在与呈上升势头的行贿受贿问题进行艰苦战斗。


Consider the grim statistics recently released by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP).	我们看看最高人民检察院最近公布的并不乐观的数据。


More than 42,000 government officials on average were investigated for corruption every year from 2002 to 2005, with more than 30,000 per year facing criminal charges.	自2002至2005年，每年平均有超过4万2千名政府官员接受腐败问题的调查，每年有3万多人面临指控。


These startling figures do not include economic crimes outside the public sector.	这一惊人数字还不包括政府部门外的经济犯罪。


For example, in 2005 alone, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) unearthed irregularities involving misused funds of RMB767.1 billion ($93.7 billion).	比如，单2005年，中国银监会公布了挪用公款7671亿人民币（937亿美元）等非法行为。


The CBRC uncovered 1,272 criminal cases and disciplined 6,826 bank employees (including 325 senior managers).	中国银监会披露1272起刑事案件并对6826名银行员工（包括325名高层经理）进行了处罚。


According to Ye Feng, a SPP Director-General, “[a]lmost every type of financial institution has seen the emergence of criminal cases involving the solicitation of bribes in return for loans.”	最高人民检察院局长叶峰说，“几乎每个类型的金融机构都有牵扯到用贷款行贿的案件。 ”


Despite the government’s intermittent anti-corruption campaigns, progress has been slow.	尽管政府不断进行反腐运动，但进展缓慢。


On the contrary, as Ye has candidly acknowledged, the number of corruption cases “has continued to rise.”	相反，正如叶所承认的，腐败案件的数量“呈不断上升的趋势”。


Indeed, international measures of graft show that the authorities may be reaching a stalemate or even retreating in the fight.	根据国际通行的行贿受贿标准，中国政府的反腐运动也许陷入了僵局甚至将会失败。


Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the most widely-used benchmark to gauge businessmen’s and experts’ beliefs about the extent of corruption in various countries, ranked China 78th out of 158 countries in 2005 – not much improvement from 2000.	透明国际清廉指数，这一最广泛运用的反映企业家以专家对各国腐败程度的标准，在2005年将中国列为158个国家中的78位——这个数字自2000年后未有多少改善。


Indeed, among the World Bank’s six “Governance Indicators,” China’s scores on the “Control of Corruption” index have actually slipped in recent years, from -0.20 in 1998 to -0.40 in 2002 and -0.69 in 2005.	在世界银行的六大管理指标中，中国“控制腐败”的指数在近年呈下滑趋势，从1998年的-0. 20跌到2002年-0.


In 2005, the World Bank ranked China 142nd out of 204 countries on the “Control of Corruption” index.	69。 2005年，世界银行在“控制腐败”指数上将中国列为204个国家的142位。


While the economic toll of graft cannot be precisely quantified, indirect evidence suggests that the costs are significant.	尽管经济上的行贿受贿统计不能准确计算，间接证据显示其代价是巨大的。


Multinational executives frequently cite China as their favorite investment destination, but many of them also complain about rampant graft.	跨国公司的总裁们经常称中国是他们中意的投资目的地，但他们中的很多人也对腐败现象猖獗表示了不满。


According to the World Bank’s “Investment Climate Surveys”, 27% of nearly 4,000 firms doing business in China in 2002-03 described corruption as a “major constraint” on their commercial operations, while 55% reported that they had paid bribes to government bureaucrats and/or local business partners to get things done.	根据世界银行“投资环境调查”，2002－2003年，近4000家在中国开设业务的公司里有27%将腐败列为其商业运作的“主要障碍”。 而其中55%称他们向政府官员和/或当地贸易伙伴行贿以便实现自己的商业目的。


Likewise, Hu Angang, an economics professor at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, has estimated that corruption in 1999-2001 alone caused economic losses worth RMB1,293 billion ($156 billion), or 13.2% of GDP.	同样，清华大学经济学教授胡安纲（音译）估算1999－2001年，由于腐败导致12930亿人民币（1560亿美元）的经济损失，占GDP的13. 2%。


Not surprisingly, the financial services sector suffered the most from corruption, losing RMB547 billion (6.25% of GDP).	不奇怪，金融服务部门是受到腐败损失最严重的，达5470亿人民币（占GDP 6. 25%）。


Fraudulent public expenditure cost 2.4% of GDP, siphoning off privatization proceeds amounted to almost 2.1% of GDP, and smuggling caused losses of more than 1.1% of GDP.	诈骗公共开支造成的损失占GDP的2. 4%，私自挪用公款的损失达到2.


The Chinese government has neither censored nor refuted Hu’s dreadful findings.	1%。 中国政府并没有限制或反驳胡提出的这些数据。


The biggest obstacle to fighting graft is the weakness of the judiciary, especially at sub-national levels.	打击行贿受贿的最大障碍是司法软弱，特别是国家级以下的司法体系。


Since most government corruption occurs at the county, township and village levels, it usually involves abuses of power by local officials.	由于大多数政府级腐败发生在县和乡镇一级，多伴有地方政府滥用职权的现象。 但是因为这些小官有着几乎绝对的权力，他们同时也控制着投诉的渠道。


However, since these petty bureaucrats’ power is almost absolute, they also control the channels for addressing grievances.	在世界银行六大管理指标中，中国在“法制力度”上近几年也呈下滑趋势，从1998年的-0.


Indeed, among the World Bank’s six “Governance Indicators,” China’s score on the “Rule of Law” index has also slid in recent years, from -0.28 in 1998 to -0.47 in 2005, when China ranked 124th out of 208 countries in this category.	28降至2005年的-0. 47，在这一类中的208个国家中列第124位。


With little recourse to legal means, an increasing number of frustrated victims of graft resort to extra-legal measures such as strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins in order to gain media and public attention.	由于缺乏司法手段，越来越多的行贿受贿的受害者寻求法律外的手段，如罢工、游行、静坐以得到媒体和公众的关注。


Some even carry their fights to the provincial and central authorities, stoking a sharp rise in the incidents of “public order disturbances” nation-wide.	有些人甚至向省级及中央政府发难，致使全国范围内“扰乱公共秩序”案件严重上升。


Whereas the Ministry of Public Security reported only 8,700 such disturbances in 1993, by 2005 the number had jumped ten-fold, to 87,000.	公安部报道，1993年类似案件有8700起，2005年上涨9倍，达到87000起。


Needless to say, government mishandling of such disturbances, or a decision to repress them with force, would only fuel further social discontent.	勿庸置疑，如果政府对这些事件处理不当或决定用武力镇压，只会引起更大的社会不满。


In fact, the government’s success in clamping down on corruption, especially at sub-national levels, will be a litmus test of its legitimacy.	事实上，政府打击腐败的成功，特别是国家级以下的腐败，是对其的试金石。


To fail would risk igniting a severe political backlash, including a spontaneous escalation of anti-regime activities.	如果不成功，则有引发严重政治反响包括升级为反政府行为的危险。


China’s Macro Disconnect	中国的宏观分化


NEW HAVEN – Structural change and rebalancing are formidable undertakings for any economy.	纽黑文—结构变化和再平衡对于任何经济体来说都是一项令人望而生畏的事业。


China has been focused on these objectives for five years – seeking to transform a powerful yet unbalanced growth model based largely on exports and investment into one driven increasingly by its consumers.	中国专注于这些目标已有五年——试图将强大但失衡的、主要基于出口和投资的模式转变为日益由其消费者驱动的模式。


Success is essential if China is to avoid the dreaded “middle-income trap” – the economic slowdown that most fast-growing developing economies experience when they reach income thresholds comparable to that of China today.	如果中国想要避免可怕的“中等收入陷阱”——大部分高速增长发展中经济体在收入达到与今天的中国相当的阈值水平时都曾经历过这一陷阱——就必须取得成功。


The results have been mixed.	结果有好有坏。


China has been highly successful in its initial efforts to shift the industrial structure of its economy from manufacturing to services, which have long been viewed as the foundation of modern consumer societies.	中国一开始的努力——将经济结构从制造业转向长期被视为现代消费社会基础的服务业十分成功。


But it has made far less progress in boosting private consumption.	但在刺激私人消费方面进步十分缓慢。


China now has no choice but to address this disconnect head on.	如今，中国别无选择，必须纠正这一分化。


The performance of China’s services sector has been especially impressive in recent years, with its share of GDP increasing from 44% in 2010 to 51.6% in the first three quarters of 2015, according to official statistics.	中国服务业表现在近几年中令人印象深刻，据官方数据，其占GDP之比从2010年的44%提高到2015年前三季度的51. 6%。


That is nearly double the four-percentage-point increase that was initially envisioned in the 12th Five-Year Plan, which is about to come to an end.	其比重增长比即将结束的十二五规划一开始所构想的四个百分点高出近一倍。


The gains have been particularly strong in the distribution sectors – wholesale and retail trade – as well as in finance and real estate.	分销业——批发和零售贸易——的进步尤其巨大，金融业和房地产业也不遑多让。


And China’s shift to services has only just begun.	而中国转向服务业的趋势才刚刚开始。


It should broaden into IT services, healthcare, domestic transportation, and hospitality and leisure, as the sector as a whole climbs toward a 60-65% share of GDP over the next decade.	这一趋势应该扩大到IT服务、医疗、国内交通、酒店和休闲等行业，未来十年服务业总体占GDP之比应增加到60—65%。


By contrast, consumer-led growth has been much slower to materialize.	相反，消费拉动型增长的实现要缓慢得多。


After bottoming out at 36% of GDP in 2010, private consumption’s share of GDP inched up to 38% in 2014 – a two-percentage-point increase that is only about one-fourth the magnitude of the services-led shift in the economy’s structure.	私人消费占GDP之比的低点见于在2010年的36%，到2014年，这一比重上升到38%——只提高了两个百分点，只有服务业在经济结构中比重提高幅度的四分之一。


With its prowess in central planning, China has always been adept at engineering shifts in its industrial structure – as the move toward services-led growth attests.	中国的中央计划十分了得，长于促进产业结构内部的变化——向服务拉动型增长的转型就是明证。


But China apparently is far less proficient in replicating the DNA of a modern consumer culture – specifically, in altering the behavioral norms of its people.	但中国显然并不那么善于复制现代消费文化的DNA——具体而言，即改变中国人民的行为范式。


The disconnect between surging services and lagging growth in private consumption has been accompanied by a steady rise in China’s urban saving rate to 30% in 2014 (versus 24% a decade earlier).	伴随服务业的狂飙突进和私人消费增长滞后之间的分化出现的是中国城市储蓄率稳步上升至2014年的30%（十年前为24%）。


This has occurred despite a significant increase in the personal income share of the Chinese economy, driven by services-led employment growth and the income leverage of urbanization.	这一增幅发生在个人收入占中国经济比重大幅增加的背景下。 服务业拉动的就业增长以及城市化的收入杠杆效应使得个人收入占中国经济比重大增。


Chinese families have been reluctant to convert much of this newfound income into discretionary spending.	中国家庭不愿意将新增收入的大头用于自由支配支出。


China’s high and rising urban saving rate in a climate of vigorous per capita income growth reflects a persistent preference for precautionary saving over discretionary consumption.	在人均收入强劲增长的情况下，中国城市储蓄率依旧高企并在不断升高，这反映出中国人的预防性储蓄偏好持续高于自由支配消费。


Unfortunately, this is a rational response to the uncertain future faced by the majority of Chinese families, underscored by the lack of a reliable social safety net.	不幸的是，这是对中国大部分家庭所面临的不确定的未来的理性反应，其背后是缺乏可靠的社会安全网。


Moreover, anxiety over inadequate provisions for retirement and health care is set to intensify as a rapidly aging population now enters the most vulnerable phase of its life cycle.	此外，随着迅速老龄化的人口现在进入到生命周期中最脆弱的阶段，对退休金和医疗保险不足的焦虑将加剧。


The good news is that the 13th Five-Year Plan (covering the 2016-2020 period), which is to be enacted in March 2016, appears likely to address these concerns explicitly.	好消息是，将于2016年3月出台的十三五规划（2016—2020年）可能会直接解决这些顾虑。


Early indications from the Fifth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in late October, suggest that the next plan will focus on the missing piece of consumer-led rebalancing: a strong social safety net.	10月底举行的中共十八大五中全会所释放的初步信号表明，下一个五年规划将重点关注消费拉动型再平衡中失落的环节：强大的社会安全网。


A proposed consolidation of rural and urban plans for pensions and critical health care is particularly important in this regard, as is the authorities’ commitment to allowing workers to transfer their hukou (residency permits) – and the associated social welfare benefits – wherever they move.	在这方面，整合农村和城市退休金和大病医疗的方案尤其重要，另一个要点是当局承诺允许工人将户口——以及相关社会福利——迁往居住地。 对中国2.


For China’s 270 million migrant workers, benefit portability could be decisive in shifting the balance from fear and precautionary saving to security and discretionary spending.	7亿农民工来说，获得社会福利的可能性对于将平衡从担忧和预防性储蓄转向安全和自由支配支出具有决定性作用。


Equally significant was the Fifth Plenum’s emphasis on using state capital to fund a more robust safety net through an increase in taxes on state-owned enterprises that was proposed a couple of years ago.	同样重要的是五中全会强调动用国有资本通过几年前便已提出的提高国企税收的方案为更强大的安全网注资。


But the biggest breakthrough in reshaping societal norms was in family-planning policy – replacing the one-child limit that had been in force since 1980 with a two-child limit beginning in 2017.	但改变社会范式的最重大的突破是计划生育政策——从2017年开始，二胎政策将取代1980年以来的一胎政策。


Aimed at addressing China’s serious aging problem, the eventual consequences of this long-overdue shift cannot be minimized.	这一拖延已久的措施的目的是解决中国严重的人口老龄化问题，其最终结果绝对不容小觑。


As the family unit, central to China’s Confucian heritage, changes, so will the country’s social and economic character.	家庭单位是中国儒家传统的核心，它的变化将带来中国社会和经济性质的变化。


Over the past 35 years, China’s powerful growth model has yielded extraordinary progress in terms of economic growth and development.	在过去35年终，中国强大的增长模式在经济增长和发展方面取得了杰出的进步。


But speedy implementation of the shift from production to consumption will be vital if the country is to remain on course and avoid the middle-income trap.	但如果中国想要保持这一势头，避免中等收入陷阱，迅速实施从生产向消费的转变至关重要。


That will require resolving the disconnect between the structural shift to services and the behavioral norms that will ultimately shape the spending habits of its people.	这需要解决转向服务业的结构变化与将最终决定人民支出习惯的行为范式之间的分化问题。


And that means overcoming the understandable caution of Chinese households in the face of an uncertain future.	而这意味着克服中国家庭在面临不确定的未来时难免会有的谨慎。


Converting fear into confidence is a daunting task for any society.	让担忧转变为信心对任何社会来说都是艰巨的任务。


China is no exception.	中国也不例外。


The focus on resolving China’s macroeconomic disconnect, reflected at the Fifth Plenum and a likely precursor of what to expect in the upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan, is thus very encouraging.	因此，五中全会表明中国开始将重点放在解决宏观经济分化，这是个非常令人鼓舞的信号。


China’s Made-in-America Success Story	中国成功，美国制造


NEW DELHI – America’s strategy in Asia for more than a century has sought a stable balance of power to prevent the rise of any hegemon.	新德里—一个多世纪以来，美国的亚洲战略一直是寻求稳定的势力均衡，防止出现霸权。


Yet the United States, according to its official National Security Strategy, is also committed to accommodating “the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual interests.”	但根据其官方《国家安全战略》的说法，美国也在寻求适应“和平而繁荣的中国的崛起，与我们合作处理共同挑战和共同利益。


So America’s Asia policy has in some ways been at war with itself.	”因此从某种程度上说，美国的亚洲战略本身就有矛盾。


In fact, the US has played a key role in China’s rise.	事实上，美国在中国崛起过程中起到了关键作用。


For example, rather than sustain trade sanctions against China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the US decided instead to integrate the country into global institutions.	比如，在1989年天安门事件后，美国并没有对中国采取贸易制裁，反而决定帮助中国融入全球机构中去。


But US foreign policy had been notable for a China-friendly approach long before that.	但美国外交政策的中国友好方针在此前很久就已经颇为醒目了。


In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt, who hosted the peace conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, after the Russo-Japanese War, argued for the return of Manchuria to Manchu-ruled China and for a balance of power in East Asia.	1905年日俄战争后，西奥多·罗斯福总统在新罕布什尔州朴茨茅斯举行了和平会议，他提出把满洲归还给满族统治下的中国，并寻求在东亚建立势力平衡。


The war ended up making the US an active participant in China’s affairs.	日俄战争让美国成了中国事务的活跃参与者。


After the Communists seized power in China in 1949, the US openly viewed Chinese Communism as benign, and thus distinct from Soviet Communism.	1949年中共建政后，美国公开对中共示好，并将其与苏共区别对待。


And it was after the Communists crushed the pro-democracy movement in 1989 that the US helped to turn China into an export juggernaut that has accumulated massive trade surpluses and become the principal source of capital flows to the US.	1989年中共镇压民主运动后，美国又帮助中国成为世界出口冠军，中国因此积累了巨额贸易盈余，也成为美国资本流入的主要来源。


America’s policy toward Communist China has traversed three stages.	美国对共产主义中国的政策经历了三个阶段。


In the first phase, America courted Mao Zedong’s regime, despite the Korean War, China's annexation of Tibet, and domestic witch hunts, such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign.	在第一个阶段中，美国向毛泽东政权大献殷情，尽管在此期间，经历了朝鲜战争、中国西藏解放以及毛在国内大行政治迫害，比如在许多西方观察家看来意在引蛇出洞的百花齐放运动。


Courtship gave way to estrangement during the second phase, as US policy for much of the 1960’s sought to isolate China.	继大献殷情之后出现的是第二阶段的疏远期，在20世纪60年代的绝大部分时间里，美国的政策是孤立中国。


The third phase began immediately after the 1969 Sino-Soviet military clashes, with the US actively seeking to exploit the rift in the Communist world by aligning China with its anti-Soviet strategy.	1969年中苏军事冲突爆发后，美国对华政策立刻进入了第三阶段，美国积极寻求利用共产主义世界内部裂痕，拉拢中国进入其反苏战略中。


Although China clearly instigated the bloody border clashes, America sided with Mao’s regime.	尽管这场流血边境冲突显然是由中国挑起的，但美国还是站在了毛泽东政权一边。


That helped to lay the groundwork for the China “opening” of 1970-1971, engineered by US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who until then had no knowledge of the country.	这打下了中国1970—71年“开放”的基础，美国方面的领导者是国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格，当时他对中国还一无所知。


Since then, the US has pursued a conscious policy of aiding China’s rise.	自此以后，美国一直在有意识地采取帮助中国崛起的政策。


Indeed, President Jimmy Carter sent a memo to various US government departments instructing them to help in China’s rise – an approach that remains in effect today, even as America seeks to hedge against the risk that Chinese power gives rise to arrogance.	事实上，卡特总统曾给美国政府各部发过一份备忘录，要求它们帮助中国崛起——这一方针至今仍在执行，尽管美国也在寻找打消中国的傲慢随实力增长而增长的风险。


Indeed, even China’s firing of missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1996 did not change US policy.	事实上，即使是1996年中国向台湾海峡发射导弹也没有改变美国的政策。


If anything, the US has been gradually loosening its close links with Taiwan, with no US cabinet member visiting the island since those missile maneuvers.	可以这样说，美国一直在逐渐脱离与台湾的密切关系，自中国发射导弹后，再也没有一位美国政要访问过台湾。


Seen in this light, China’s spectacular economic success – including the world’s largest trade surplus and foreign-currency reserves – owes much to US policy from the 1970’s on.	如此看来，中国令人瞩目的经济成功——包括世界最大规模的贸易盈余和外汇储备——的军功章有美国20世纪70年代以来对华政策的一半。


Without the significant expansion in US-Chinese trade and financial relations, China’s growth would have been much slower and more difficult to sustain.	没有美中贸易和金融关系的大扩展，中国的增长就会缓慢得多，也难以维持。


Allies of convenience during the second half of the Cold War, the US and China emerged from it as partners tied by interdependence.	在冷战后半阶段，美国和中国因互相方便而结成盟友，两国也因为这一通过相互依赖性联系在一起的伙伴关系而崛起。


America depends on China’s trade surplus and savings to finance its outsize budget deficits, while China relies on its huge exports to the US to sustain its economic growth and finance its military modernization.	美国依靠中国的贸易盈余和储蓄为其巨大的预算赤字融资，而中国依赖其对美国的巨额出口维持经济增长和为军事现代化融资。


By plowing more than two-thirds of its mammoth foreign-currency reserves into US dollar-denominated assets, China has gained significant political leverage.	中国的巨额外汇储备中有三分之二是美元计价资产，中国也因此获得了巨大的政治杠杆。


China is thus very different from previous US adversaries.	因此，中国与美国从前的对手大不相同。


America’s interests are now so closely intertwined with China that a policy to isolate or confront it is not feasible.	如今，美国利益与中国紧密相连，孤立和对抗中国的政策根本不具有可行性。


Even on the issue of democracy, the US prefers to lecture other dictatorships rather than the world’s largest autocracy.	即使是在民主问题上，美国也更喜欢对其他独裁者指手画脚，而对世界最大专制政府视而不见。


Yet it is also true that the US is uneasy about China’s not-too-hidden aim to dominate Asia – an objective that runs counter to US security and commercial interests and to the larger goal of securing a balance in power in Asia.	不过，美国显然也对中国不再掩饰的主导亚洲的雄心颇为担心，这一目标有损于美国的安全和商业利益，也不利于美国确保亚洲势力均衡的更大目标。


To avert Chinese dominance, the US has already started to build countervailing influences and partnerships, without making any attempt to contain China.	为了阻止中国的主导力，美国已开始构建对抗性作用力和伙伴关系，但并没有尝试遏制中国。


For the US, China’s growing power actually helps to validate its forward military deployments in Asia, maintain existing allies in the region, and win new strategic partners.	对美国来说，中国实力的增长实际上有助于证明其在亚洲增兵、维持该地区已有盟友关系以及争取新战略伙伴的必要性。


Indeed, an increasingly assertive China has proven a diplomatic boon for the US in strengthening and expanding its Asian security relationships.	事实上，日益专横的中国给美国带来了不少外交好处：增强和扩展了其亚洲安全关系。


The lesson is clear: The muscle-flexing rise of a world power can strengthen the strategic relevance and role of a power in relative decline.	其中的教训是很明白的：世界一极的耀武扬威式的崛起可以强化相对衰落大国的战略相关性和作用。 大约在十年前，美国开始感到自己正在被亚洲边缘化，其原因是多样的，中国的“魅力攻势”也是其中之一。


Barely a decade ago, the US was beginning to feel marginalized in Asia, owing to several developments, including China’s “charm offensive.”	但如今美国显然已经回到了中心舞台。 韩国加强了与美国的军事同盟关系；


But now America has returned firmly to center stage.	日本不再试图劝说美国将海军基地迁离冲绳； 新加坡同意美国战舰在新加坡停留；


South Korea has beefed up its military alliance with the US; Japan has backed away from an effort to persuade the US to move its Marine base out of Okinawa; Singapore has allowed the US Navy to station ships; Australia is hosting US Marine and other deployments; and India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others, have drawn closer to the US as well.	澳大利亚是美国海军和其他部队的驻地； 印度、越南、印尼和菲律宾等国也在与美国拉近关系。


But no one should have any illusions about US policy.	但别对美国的政策产生幻想。


Despite America’s “pivot” to Asia, it intends to stick to its two-pronged approach: seek to maintain a balance of power with the help of strategic allies and partners, while continuing to accommodate a rising China.	尽管美国“优先”考虑亚洲，但实行的仍是两手准备：在战略盟友和伙伴的帮助下维持势力均衡； 同时继续适应中国崛起。


China’s Misrule of Law	中国法而不制


PHILADELPHIA – A last-minute deal between the United States and China may afford human-rights lawyer and activist Chen Guangcheng the opportunity to enroll in law school in New York. But, even if a way out of the diplomatic debacle is at hand, much about the case remains troubling.	费城——美国和中国最终达成的交易可能会使人权律师和活动家陈光诚有机会进入纽约法学院。


In particular, despite more than three decades of legal reform in China, Chen had precious little recourse to fight harassment and house arrest at the hands of the Chinese authorities.	但是，即使找到了此次外交惨败的出路，该案件仍有许多麻烦，特别是在中国当局手中，陈光诚几乎没有珍贵的追索权来对抗骚扰和软禁，虽然中国的法律改革已经进行了三十多年。


Indeed, 23 years after dissident Fang Lizhi took refuge in the US embassy following the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, Chen’s only option was to take the same last-gasp leap into the arms of American diplomats.	事实上，23年前在天安门广场镇压后，持不同政见的方励芝跑去美国大使馆避难，23年后，陈光诚的唯一选择也是最终投入美国外交的怀抱。


Chen’s case reveals weaknesses in China’s legal system, and it should spark a push to build stronger ties between China’s human-rights activists and the broader legal profession.	陈光诚的案件揭露出中国法律体系的弱点，应该可以推动中国人权活动家和更广泛的法律界人士建立更牢固的关系。


Chen rose to prominence as a self-educated legal activist after he challenged harsh enforcement of the government’s family-planning policies.	作为一个自学成才的法律活动家，陈光诚质疑政府推行的计划生育政策执法苛刻，随后名声大噪。


His approach reflected a larger trend of rights-based resistance in China that began in that late 1990’s; Chen was part of a coterie of lawyers and activists, some well-known and many others not, who wanted to see the government behave according to its own rules.	上世纪90年代后期，中国出现了以权利为基础的抵制活动，而他的做法正反映出这种较大的趋势； 很多律师和活动家——有些知名度很高，许多其他人则鲜为人知——想看到政府根据自己制定的规则办事，陈光诚是他们中的一员。


This activism was interpreted as a sign of an emerging rule-of-law culture in China.	这种行动主义被理解成一种中国新兴法制文化的标志。


But Chen’s career as a legal activist met an abrupt end with a conviction for disturbing public order, and most experts inside and outside of China considered his ensuing confinement to be unlawful.	但是作为一位法律活动家，陈光诚的职业生涯却因扰乱公共秩序的控告而突然宣告结束，中国内外的大多数专家认为他随后被禁闭是不合法令的。


Chen’s case, like so many others in China, reminds us how incomplete Chinese legal reform has been.	陈光诚的案子与中国很多其他人的情况如出一辙，这告诉我们中国的法制改革还非常不健全。


Despite the many laws enacted, lawyers trained, courtrooms built, and millions of technical-assistance dollars spent, China’s legal institutions remain weak, especially when the cases brought before them have – or acquire – political implications.	尽管中国制定了许多法律，培养了很多律师，建造了许多审判室，给予了数百万美元的技术援助，但是中国的法律制度仍然很薄弱，尤其是当摆在其面前的案件会产生政治影响的时候。


Legal activism in China is not unprecedented.	中国的法制行动主义并非没有先例。


In 1923, more than 100 Chinese judges, prosecutors, and clerks resigned en masse to protest trumped-up corruption charges against the then-finance minister.	1923年，中国的100多名法官，检察官和书记员集体辞职，抗议时任财政部长莫须有的贪污罪名。


Their primary concern was the government’s interference in the legal process in its pursuit of the case.	在其审理案件的法律过程中，他们最担心的是政府的干预。


“We have labored diligently and carefully.…[to see] that a strong foundation of our judicial system should be laid,” they wrote in their resignation letter.	 “我们辛勤努力，兢兢业业，是为了看到我们的司法制度奠定坚实的基础”，他们在辞职信中写道。


As a result of the government’s threat to the independence of the judiciary, they concluded, “the bone and sinew of the results of our long and hard labors thus become as running water.”	由于政府给司法独立带来威胁，他们得出结论，“我们长期辛勤劳动的结果全都付之东流了”。


Lawyers argue unpopular positions.	律师站在不受欢迎的立场上。


They challenge the establishment.	他们挑战建立的法制体系。


Chen has paid a terrible price for living up to the ideals of the profession.	陈光诚为了实现行业理想而付出了惨痛的代价。


At a time when the legal academy and the profession are under attack in the US, Chen’s case is a reminder of what strong lawyers and legal institutions provide to a society.	当法学院和法律行业遭到美国攻击的时候，陈光诚的案件让我们深刻反思强大的律师和法律机构应该向社会提供什么。


Last June, we led a delegation of nine US law school deans to a two-day summit with ten peers from China’s top law schools, which culminated in a joint statement declaring that both sides recognize and support the rule of law, and agree on the importance of promoting the integrity of the legal profession.	去年六月，我们带领一支由9所美国法学校的院长组成的代表团与来自中国顶级法学院的同行们参加了为期两天的研讨会，会议最终发布联合声明，双方承认并支持法治，同意完善法律界的重要性。


The Chen case provides another reminder that the integrity of the profession is under pressure.	陈光诚的案子再次提醒我们法律界的完整性面临着巨大的压力。


Activist lawyers in China pursue their cases with little explicit support from the legal academy or the profession.	中国的维权律师们在接手处理案件时，很少从法学院或法律界获得明确支持。


They are not able to speak at law schools, much less teach or recruit students to work for them.	他们不能在法学院发表演说，更不能招收学生为他们工作。


Many Chinese lawyers and legal academics wish that the rule of law in China were more robust, and a few of them, such as Jiang Ping, have warned about backsliding.	许多的中国律师和法律学者希望中国的法治更加健全，他们中有些人（如江平）警告中国法制的倒退。


But, in cases like that of Chen, even sympathetic legal colleagues are often afraid to speak out, much less take action.	但是，在诸如陈光诚这样的案例中，即使有同情心的法律人士往往也不敢站出来说话，更不要说采取行动了。


China’s top law deans and professors now have a chance to turn rhetoric into reality.	中国顶级法学院的院长和教授现在有机会将说辞变成现实。


Law schools should be a place where students and professors can engage with the full range of Chinese law and legal activity.	法学院应该是学生和教授可以从事全方位中国法律和法律活动的地方。


That means studying how Chinese law is developing and being deployed in the protection of rights, and creating opportunities to interact with those who are at the forefront of these movements in all areas of law.	这意味着学习中国法律是如何发展，如何用于保护公民的权利，并创造机会与那些在所有法律领域的前沿工作的人士交流。


Not long after Chen left the US embassy for Beijing’s Chaoyang hospital, China’s government issued its usual denunciation of US interference in its internal affairs.	陈光诚离开美国大使馆，前往北京朝阳医院后没多久，中国政府发布了其一贯谴责美国干涉其内政的公告。


But China’s leaders should expect nothing else so long as they maintain a system where lawyers face persecution when they advocate for the weakest groups in its society.	但是中国领导人应该别无他求，因为他们所维持的法律体系使那些为社会中最弱势的群体维权的律师面对迫害。


Chen had to turn to American diplomats to be his advocates, but it would augur better for China’s future if the country’s legal profession came together to urge the authorities to uphold the rule of law in even the most sensitive cases.	陈光诚不得不求助美国外交官成为他的支持者，但是如果中国的法律界人士能团结起来，督请当局即使在最敏感的案件上也能坚持法治，那么中国的未来将会更好。


That would help to ensure that three decades of legal reform is more bone and sinew than running water.	这将有助于确保这三十年的法律改革有骨有筋，而不是付之东流。


China’s Monetary Sterilization	中国的货币冲销措施


BEIJING – Not long after the United States Federal Reserve Board announced its second round of “quantitative easing” (known as QE2), the People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank, announced two increases of 0.5 percentage points in the required reserve ratio (RRR) of bank deposits.	发自北京——就在美联储宣布实施第二轮“量化宽松”政策之后，中国人民银行（下称“人行”）旋即连续两次上调存款类金融机构人民币存款准备金率0. 5个百分点。


The RRR now stands at 18.5%, a historic high, even in global terms.	目前该比率为18. 5%，不但创下了建国以来的新高，在世界范围内也是罕见的。


While the Fed is planning to pump more money into the US economy, the PBC is trying to reduce the amount of money in circulation in China.	当美联储计划向美国经济注入更多货币的时候，人行反而在努力减少国内的货币流通数量。


Money used by commercial banks to satisfy the RRR, which is held in accounts at the PBC, can no longer be extended as loans.	那些被商业银行挪作存款准备金的货币将被锁定在人行的账户中，从而无法形成贷款。


As a result, more money than ever is now frozen or inactive in China.	结果大量货币被冻结，而且金额空前庞大。


It is understandable that the Fed wants to boost demand as long as the US economy remains depressed.	美联储希望刺激需求来使美国经济走出衰退的做法是可以理解的。


But why has the PBC tightened monetary policy so much?	但人行却为何要如此收紧货币政策？


The Chinese economy is not over-heating.	中国经济并未过热，增长率依然居高不下，每年都能达到近10%。


Growth is still high, at about 10% per year, but has started to moderate.	虽然当前的通货膨胀是一个值得关注的问题——居民消费价格指数（CPI）年比从9月的3.


And, while inflation is a concern – having risen to 4.4% year on year in October, from 3.6% in September – this cannot explain why the PBC raised the RRR three times earlier this year, when inflation was lower.	6%升高到10月的4. 4%——但也无法解释人行为何在今年早些时候三次上调准备金率，因为当时的通货膨胀率依然维持在较低的水平。


Instead, the PBC’s policy is preemptive: sterilize over-liquidity and get the money supply under control in order to prevent inflation or over-heating.	事实上，人行的政策是预防性的：消灭过多的流动性并使货币供应得到控制，以防止通货膨胀或者经济过热。


At the beginning of the year, the RRR increases could be regarded as part of efforts to correct the over-supply of money that arose from the anti-crisis stimulus package.	在今年年初的时候，提高存款准备金可能是想纠正由经济刺激计划所导致的货币过度供应问题。


But the most recent RRR increases serve mainly to sterilize the “passive money supply” caused by the increase in foreign-exchange reserves.	而最近这两次则主要是为了冲销由不断增加的外汇储备所导致的“被动货币供应”。


Indeed, in September alone, China’s foreign-currency reserves increased by almost $100 billion compared to August.	单是在今年9月，中国的外汇储备就比8月增加了近1000亿美元。


With the global economy recovering, China’s trade surplus began to grow.	随着全球经济的复苏，中国的贸易盈余开始增长。


Moreover, capital inflows increased significantly, owing to real investment opportunities in the high-growth economy and the expectation of renminbi revaluation.	此外由于高增长中不断涌现的投资机会以及人民币升值的预期，国外资本流入也大幅增加。


But rapid growth in foreign-exchange reserves means an increase in the domestic money supply, because the PBC issues RMB6.64 (down 3% since June) for every dollar it receives.	但外汇储备的高增长意味着国内货币供应量的增加，因为人行每储备1美元都要相应发行6. 64元人民币（该比率自6月以来已经下降了3%）。


That means that money supply increase by nearly RMB700 billion in September.	这意味着单单是9月内人民币供应量就增加了7000多亿元。


The two 50-basis-point RRR increases just locked up the same amount of liquidity.	而两次提升存款准备金率50个基点的措施恰好就锁住了相等金额的流动性。


A country with current-account and capital-account surpluses and increasing foreign-exchange reserves normally sees an excessive money supply and high inflation.	当一个国家拥有经常账户和资本账户盈余，外汇储备也不断增加的时候，过量货币供应和高通货膨胀率的情况就会出现。


But, while excessive money supply is a reality for China – the PBC now holds more than $2.6 trillion in foreign reserves – inflation has been quite moderate so far, thanks to the sterilization policy.	但虽然中国确实存在过量货币供应——中国人民银行拥有超过2. 6万亿美元外汇储备——通货膨胀率却相当温和，这都是冲销措施的功劳。


The RRR is only one example of a textbook sterilization instrument.	存款准备金比率只不过是经典的冲销手段之一。


Another is to sell off government bonds held by the central bank in order to take money out of circulation – again, just the opposite of what the Fed is now doing.	另外一个则是通过销售中央银行所持有的政府债券，并以此回收流通领域中的货币——而中国当前的做法也跟美联储背道而驰。


Because China’s government does not owe much debt to the public, the PBC sold out its holdings of government bonds in 2005. So it had to create something else to sell.	因为中国政府并没有多少公众债务，人行早在2005年时已经将手中的债券售罄，因此它还得创设其他的一些金融产品来出售。


It created so-called “Central Bank Bills,” which commercial banks are supposed to buy voluntarily.	人行创设了所谓的“中央银行票据（央票）”，由各商业银行自愿购买。


When they do, the money they pay is also locked up in the PBC’s accounts.	当银行买入这些央票之时，他们所支付的货币也被锁定在人行的账户内。


To date, up to 5-6% of total liquidity has been returned to the central bank in this way.	迄今为止，大约有5%~6%的货币都通过这种方式回流到了中央银行。


Furthermore, the PBC uses unconventional instruments from time to time, such as “credit ceilings” or “credit quotas” imposed on commercial banks.	此外人行还不时采用一些非常规手段，比如向商业银行施加“信贷最高额”或是“信贷配额”。


This may result in “extra reserves,” which commercial banks cannot use to extend their credit lines.	这也能取得“额外储备”的效果，因为商业银行无法发放超过限额的汇款。


Credit quotas imposed early this year have left Chinese commercial banks with 2-3% of extra reserves.	今年早些时候实施的信贷限额使商业银行额外产生了2%~3%的储备。


Adding up the impact of the PBC’s sterilization efforts, roughly one-quarter of China’s total monetary base is illiquid.	所有这些消毒措施加起来，大约1/4的中国货币基数都处于非流动状态。


Thus, although China’s total money supply seems excessive, with the M2-to-GDP ratio now at about 190%, the real monetary base is actually much smaller than it appears.	即便中国的货币总供应量看似超额（M2-GDP比率目前达到了190%），真正的货币基数却比看上去要小。


As a result, China’s inflation, as well as asset prices, remain under control.	因此中国的通货膨胀以及资产价格也都维持在可控的范围内。


For how long will this sterilization continue, and how far will it go?	那么这一冲销措施将持续多久，并执行到何种程度？


At what point will higher RRR levels cause Chinese commercial banks to begin running losses?	如果存款准备金比率继续上调，中国的商业银行又将在哪一个点位上开始亏损？


There may be room for further sterilization.	或许该措施在未来还有一定的实施空间。


First, unlike in some other countries, Chinese commercial banks are paid reasonable interest rates on required reserves, except for the “extra reserves” that they hold. So they do not lose much, if anything, from the PBC’s sterilization policies.	首先，不像其他某些国家，中国的商业银行也从强制性的央行储备中获得了合理的利息（除了其自身持有的“额外储备”外），因此人行的冲销政策对各银行造成的损失不会太大。


Second, China’s central bank still controls interest rates by enforcing a roughly three-percentage-point spread between deposit rates and lending rates.	其二，中国中央银行规定的存款和贷款利率依然相差3个点左右。


As a result, Chinese commercial banks can operate longer with a higher RRR than their counterparts elsewhere.	因此即便存款准备金率比其他国家更高，但中国商业银行还是可以维持的更久。


One key issue facing China is how to reduce the current- and capital-account surpluses in order to reduce foreign-exchange holdings.	而当前中国所面对的关键问题则是如何减少经常和资本账户盈余以减少外汇储备。


Yes, further revaluation of the exchange rate is needed, but this can play only a secondary role.	进一步的汇率重估很有必要，但这种方法还是次要的。


The most important task for China is to reduce the saving rate, which equaled 52% of GDP in 2009.	更重要的任务是降低储蓄率（相当于2009年GDP的52%）。


A number of fiscal, social-security, and tax reforms should be a priority for this purpose.	要实现这一点，就必须实施一系列财政，社会保障和税务方面的改革措施。


But it seems that both revaluation and reform will take time.	但似乎汇率重估和改革都将稳步推行。


Meanwhile, the causes of global imbalance on the US side also seem unlikely to disappear any time soon. And now, with the Fed’s QE2 on the table, conditions may worsen before they improve.	与此同时，由美国引发的全球不平等状况在短期之内也无法消失，甚至会在美联储第二轮“量化宽松”政策后继续恶化。


The PBC may have to continue its sterilization for some time in the foreseeable future.	因此人行也必然会在可见的将来继续推行冲销措施。


China’s New Economic Model	中国新的经济模式


China’s success since it began its transition to a market economy has been based on adaptable strategies and policies: as each set of problems are solved, new problems arise, for which new policies and strategies must be devised.	向市场经济转型以来，中国的成功建立在适应性战略和政策基础之上。 在各个问题得到解决之际，新的问题涌现，为此必须设计出新的政策和战略。


This process includes social innovation .	这一进程包括社会创新。


China recognized that it could not simply transfer economic institutions that had worked in other countries; at the least, what succeeded elsewhere had to be adapted to the unique problems confronting China.	中国认识到它根本无法照搬在其他国家奏效的经济制度； 至少，在他处成功的东西不得不适应到中国独有的问题。


Today, China is discussing a “new economic model.”	今天，中国正在讨论一个“新的经济模式”。


Of course, the old economic model has been a resounding success, producing almost 10% annual growth for 30 years and lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty.	当然，旧的经济模式取得了巨大的成功，在过去30年中年均增长率为10%，数以亿计的中国人摆脱了贫困。


The changes are apparent not only in the statistics, but even more so in the faces of the people that one sees around the country.	这些变化不仅在统计数据上是明显的，而且即使在全国各地人们的脸上也更为如此。


I recently visited a remote Dong village in the mountains of Quizho, one of China’s poorest provinces, miles away from the nearest paved road; yet it had electricity, and with electricity had come not just television, but the internet.	我最近访问了中国最为贫困省份之一的贵州省的偏僻村落东村。 这个村子距离最近的马路也有好几英里，但是它通了电，不仅有电视，还有互联网。


While some rising incomes came from remittances from family members who had migrated to coastal cities, the farmers, too, were better off, with new crops and better seeds: the government was selling, on credit, high-grade seeds with a guaranteed rate of germination.	不仅移居到沿海城市的家里人汇款让他们的收入提高，而且农民自己也日子好过了。 他们有了新的庄稼和更好的种子。


China knows that it must change if it is to have sustainable growth.	中国知道，要想持续增长，它就必须改变。


At every level, there is a consciousness of environmental limits and the realization that the resource-intensive consumption patterns now accepted in the United States would be a disaster for China – and for the world.	在每个层面上，大家都知道环境的限制，并且认识到现在美国接受的资源密集型的消费对于中国和世界来说将会是一场灾难。


As an increasing share of China’s population moves to cities, those cities will have to be made livable, which will require careful planning, including public transportation systems and parks.	中国越来越多的人口移居到城市，就必须让这些城市宜居。 这就要求认真的规划，包括公交系统和公园。


Equally interesting, China is attempting to move away from the export-led growth strategy that it and other East Asian countries have pursued.	同样令人感兴趣的是中国正在试图摆脱它和其他亚洲国家一直所实行的出口带动型增长战略。


That strategy supported technology transfer, helping to close the knowledge gap and rapidly improving the quality of manufactured goods.	这一战略支持了技术转移，帮助弥补知识差距并且快速提高了制成品的质量。


Export-led growth meant that China could produce without worrying about developing the domestic market.	出口带动型增长意味着中国可以在不必担心国内市场的情况下发展经济。


But a global backlash has already developed.	但是全球性的反弹已经发生。


Even countries seemingly committed to competitive markets don’t like being beaten at their own game, and often trump up charges of “unfair competition.”	甚至是看起来致力于竞争性市场的国家也不喜欢在制造业上被击垮，而且时常大为发起“不公平竞争”的指控。


More importantly, even if markets are not fully saturated in many areas, it will be hard to maintain double-digit growth rates for exports.	更加重要的是，即使各国市场在许多方面都并不完全饱和，维持两位数的出口增长是困难的。


So something has to change.	因此就必须予以改变。


China has been engaged in what might be called “vendor finance,” providing the money that helps finance the huge US fiscal and trade deficits, allowing Americans to buy more goods than they sell.	中国一直在搞所谓的“卖方融资”，也就是提供资金资助美国的财政和贸易赤字，让美国人进口更多的产品，其数量大于其出口。


But this is a peculiar arrangement: a relatively poor country is helping to finance America’s War on Iraq, as well as a massive tax cut for the richest people in the world’s richest country, while huge needs at home imply ample room for expansion of both consumption and investment.	但是这却是一项离奇的安排，那就是说，一个相对贫穷的国家在帮助资助美国的伊拉克战争，以及给世界上最富有的国家中最富有的人减税。 与此同时，中国国内巨大的需求表明在消费和投资上还有巨大的扩张空间。


In fact, to meet the challenge of restructuring China’s economy away from exports and resource-intensive goods, China must stimulate consumption.	实际上，中国为了迎接重组经济、从出口和资源密集型产品中转移开来的挑战，就必须刺激消费。


While the rest of the world struggles to raise savings, China, with a savings rate in excess of 40%, struggles to get its people to consume more.	中国的储蓄率超过40%，当世界各地努力提高储蓄之时，中国却在尽力让人们更多地消费。


Providing better social services (public health care, education, and nation-wide retirement programs) would reduce the need for “precautionary” savings.	提供更好的社会服务(公共医疗、教育以及全民退休养老规划)将会减少“预防性”储蓄的需要。


More access to finance for small and medium sized businesses would help, too.	给中小企业更多的融资机会也将会有所帮助。


And “green taxes” – such as on carbon emissions – would shift consumption patterns while discouraging energy-intensive exports.	而对类似对二氧化碳排放征收的“绿色税收“将会改变消费模式，与此同时还可以抑制能源密集型的出口。


As China moves away from export-led growth, it will have to look for new sources of dynamism in its growing entrepreneurial ranks, which requires a commitment to creating an independent innovation system.	在中国从出口带动型增长中转移之际，它就得要在其不断增长的企业界中寻找新的能动资源，这就要求致力于建立一个独立的创新体系。


China has long invested heavily in higher education and technology; now it is striving to create world-class institutions.	中国多年来一直在高等教育和科技上投入巨资，现在，它正在努力建立世界水平的院所。


But if China wants a dynamic innovation system, it should resist pressure by Western governments to adopt the kind of unbalanced intellectual property laws that are being demanded.	但是，如果中国想要一个充满活力的创新体系，它就应该抵制西方国家要求采纳不平衡的知识产权法规的压力。 相反，中国应该实施一种“平衡的”知识产权制度。


Instead, it should pursue a “balanced” intellectual property regime: because knowledge itself is the most important input in the production of knowledge, a badly designed intellectual property regime can stifle innovation – as has been the case in America in some areas.	由于知识本身是知识生产中最为重要的投入，规划不良的知识产权制度会阻碍创新。 美国在某些领域中就是这样。


Western technological innovation has focused too little on reducing the adverse environmental impact of growth, and too much on saving labor – something that China has in abundance.	西方的技术创新对减少经济增长的环境影响关注得太少，而对节省劳力关���太多，中国又劳力充足。


So it makes sense for China to focus its scientific prowess on new technologies that use fewer resources.	所以，中国将其科技力量集中到使用较少资源的新技术上来是有道理的。


But it is important to have an innovation system (including an intellectual property regime) that ensures that advances in knowledge are widely used.	但是，建立一个确保知识进步得到广泛应用的创新体系(包括知识产权体系)是重要的。 这就会要求创新型的措施。


That may require innovative approaches, quite different from intellectual property regimes based on privatization and monopolization of knowledge, with the high prices and restricted benefits that follow.	这些措施与建立在私有化和知识垄断基础之上的知识产权体系大为不同，与这一体制随之而来的是奇高的价格和利益受到限制。


Too many people think of economics as a zero-sum game, and that China’s success is coming at the expense of the rest of the world.	太多的人认为经济学是一种零和游戏，中国的成功是以世界其他地方为代价的。


Yes, China’s rapid growth poses challenges to the West.	是的，中国快速的经济增长对西方构成挑战。


Competition will force some to work harder, to become more efficient, or to accept lower profits.	竞争将会迫使某些人更为努力工作，更为具有效率，要么接受更低的利润。


But economics is really a positive-sum game.	但是经济学的确是一个正和游戏。


An increasingly prosperous China has not only expanded imports from other countries, but is also providing goods that have kept prices lower in the West, despite sharply higher oil prices in recent years.	不断繁荣的中国不仅增加了从其他国家的进口，而且，尽管近年来石油价格大幅度上升，它还提供了保持西方低物价的产品。


This downward pressure on prices has allowed Western central banks to follow expansionary monetary policies, underpinning higher employment and growth.	这一压低价格的压力让西方的中央银行实施扩张性的货币政策，巩固了高就业率和经济增长。


We should all hope that China’s new economic model succeeds.	我们都应当期盼中国新的经济模式取得成功。


If it does, all of us will have much to gain.	果真这样，我们大家都会大有收益。


China’s New Latin Beat	中国的新拉丁政策


China’s President Hu Jintao has just returned home from his first trip to Latin America, where he sought new long-term sources of supplies for his country’s booming economy.	中国国家主席胡锦涛刚刚结束他的首次拉美之行回到中国，为中国高速发展的经济寻找新的长期能源供应国。


These new ties offer Latin America and the Caribbean both a new market and an example of how a dynamic economy can reduce poverty.	这一新型合作关系将为拉美国家和加勒比海地区开拓一个新市场，同时也给他们带来一个范例，如何依靠发展经济减少贫穷。


But Latin America should also be on its guard. While China may be a ravenous importer of Latin American commodities, it is also a formidable competitor.	但是拉美国家也不能掉以轻心，要知道，虽然中国对拉美出口商品需求巨大，但其本身也是个可怕的竞争对手。


Both the public and private sector throughout the region should take immediate measures to face up to this new competition and to work toward cooperative projects with the Chinese.	因此，拉美的公有和私有制企业都应该立刻根据这一新型竞争关系采取相关措施，以应对与中国企业的合作性项目。


Ordinary people in Latin America are only now recognizing China’s importance as a global economic player.	在拉美，人们仅仅刚开始意识到中国作为世界经济强国的重要性。


Indeed, until recently, most people took little notice of China.	事实上，大部分人最近才开始对中国有所了解。


But China’s soaring growth, seen in contrast with stagnation in Latin America’s economies, has awakened governments and businessmen across the region.	但是，与拉美地区停滞不前的经济相比，中国经济的飞速发展引起了当地政府和企业的极大关注。


Comparisons between China’s economy and that of Latin America are stunning.	中国与拉美地区的经济发展情况相差悬殊。


The World Bank estimates that dire poverty in China, calculated as individual income of $1 per day, has been reduced from about 500 million people at the start of the 1980’s to less than 90 million in 2000.	据世界银行估计，中国在上世纪80年代初有约5亿人口极度贫困，日均收入只有1美元，但在2000年这个人数已经减少到九千万。


Meanwhile, poverty rates in South America have remained relatively constant.	相比之下，南美的贫困率却一直居高不下。


Economic growth rates reveal the same gap.	南美的经济增长率也反映了这一差距。


From 1978 to 2003, annual real GDP growth in China averaged 8.1% while growth in Mexico – the fastest in Latin America, barely reached 1% a year.	从1978年到2003年，中国GDP保持着年8. 1%的增长率，而墨西哥却只有1%还不到，它还是拉美经济发展最快一个国家。


Although growing, China’s trade with Latin America and the Caribbean remains small, representing less than 2% of both exports and imports in 2002. The nature of that trading relationship differs substantially from country to country.	尽管中国贸易增长迅速，但它与拉美和加勒比海地区的贸易量却一直增长缓慢，2002年进出口量分别只比前一年高出了2个百分点不到，且不同国家的贸易模式彼此差别很大。


Brazil and Argentina have, for example, significantly increased agricultural exports to China, while Central America and Mexico have seen their imports from China increase dramatically.	以巴西和阿根廷为例，两国分别已加大对中国的农产品出口，而中美洲和墨西哥则大幅提升了对中国产品的进口量。


This is important because it illustrates the dissimilar regional impact that trade with China has on Latin America and the Carribean, owing to the export of South America’s basic goods, coupled with the growth of Chinese imports into Mexico.	这一点相当重要，因为其揭示了由于地域差异所造成的拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区在对华贸易上的差异。 南美洲基本物资的出口和中国对于墨西哥出口的持续增长是造成这一现象的原因。


In the 10 years between 1993 and 2003, China’s and Hong Kong’s exports to Mexico rose from 1.12% of total Mexican imports to 5.8%.	在1993年2003年十年期间，中国及香港地区对墨西哥的出口额从占墨西哥贸易总额的1. 12%上升到5.


Since 2003, China has become Mexico’s most important trading partner after the United States. Indeed, Mexico’s trade deficit with China reached $9 billion in 2003.	自2003年起，墨西哥对中国的贸易逆差达到九十亿，中国已经成为了墨西哥的第二大贸易伙伴，排名仅列美国之后。


In the second quarter of 2004, Chinese exports to Mexico grew by 67%, while Mexico’s exports to China fell by 1.3 %.	2004年第二季度，中国对墨西哥出口量增长67%，而墨西哥对中国出口却下降了1. 3%。


These changes have also had a severe impact on Mexico’s trade with the US.	这些变化对墨西哥的对美贸易也产生了严重影响。


Although Latin American and Chinese exports to the US have both grown significantly since 1990, China replaced Mexico in 2003 as the second-leading exporter to the US in value terms after Canada.	尽管拉美和中国对美国的出口额自1990年起增幅显著，但在2003年，中国的贸易额上赶上墨西哥，并取代它成为美国之后加拿大的第二大贸易伙伴。


Mexico’s competition in the US market from China has increased particularly in light manufacturing – mostly clothing and electronics.	在美国市场，墨西哥产品正日益受到来自中国的挑战，特别是服装和电子产品为主的轻工业。


In Central America and Mexico clothing production is vitally important – generating 400,000 and 600,000 jobs, respectively – and represents the heart of Central America’s maquiladoras (free trade zones), which account for more than 70% of regional exports to the US.	服装产业在中美洲和墨西哥极其重要，每年可分别为两国提供400,000和600,000个就业机会，它同时也是中美洲的maquiladors产业(自由贸易区)的中心所在，占当地对美出口额的70%以上。


Losing this sector of the economy to the hyper-competitive Chinese will be a hard hit, as textile exports are often the first step on the development ladder.	若是他们在与中国的激烈竞争中输掉了这块巨大的经济市场蛋糕，那将是一个致命的打击，因为纺织品出口通常来说是发展贸易过程中的第一步。


With respect to other goods, including computers, Chinese-made products are set to replace Mexican output in overwhelming numbers.	至于包括计算机在内的其他的商品，中国产品正以压倒性的数量取代墨西哥产品。


Mexico’s so-called “Silicon Valley South” companies in Guadalajara have, by their own estimates, already lost more than $500 million worth of projects and approximately 20,000 jobs to Asia, especially to China, and this trend will continue in the short term.	据墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉“南硅谷”的几家公司们自己估计，亚洲国家，尤其是中国，已让他们至今损失了价值5亿美元的项目和大约20,000个工作。 并且，这个趋势在短期内还将持续。


If Latin America fails to deal with its new competitor, the peoples of the region will lose jobs and opportunities to develop as they should.	如果拉丁美洲不能有效应对它的竞争者，当地的人们就会失去工作，失去他们原本应有的发展机会。


But there are lessons to be learned and advantages to be gained from China if Latin American governments and businesses are willing to think creatively.	但若拉美政府和企业想要有所创新，他们倒是该好好向中国借鉴经验，吸取教训。


China’s Next Transformation	中国的下一次转型


HONG KONG – During three decades of favorable global economic conditions, China created an integrated global production system unprecedented in scale and complexity.	香港—三十年来，在有利的全球经济环境中，中国创造了规模和复杂程度前所未有的一体化全球制造体系。


But now its policymakers must deal with the triple challenges of the unfolding European debt crisis, slow recovery in the United States, and a secular growth slowdown in China’s economy.	但是，如今，中国决策者必须应对欧债危机深化、美国复苏缓慢以及中国经济增长显著放缓的三重挑战。


All three challenges are interconnected, and mistakes by any of the parties could plunge the global economy into another recession.	这三重挑战是相互关联的，不论在哪个方面出了错，都会将全球经济拖入新的衰退。


To assess the risks and options for China and the world, one must understand China’s “Made in the World” production system, which rests on four distinct but mutually dependent pillars.	为了很好地评估中国和世界所面临的风险和抉择，我们必须理解中国的“世界制造”生产体系，该体系建立在四个大不相同但互相依赖的支柱上。


The first of these pillars, the China-based “world factory,” was largely created by foreign multinational corporations and their associated suppliers and subcontractors, with labor-intensive processing and assembly carried out by small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) that have direct access to global markets through a complex web of contracts.	第一大支柱是设在中国的“世界工厂”，它们大多由外国跨国公司及其相关供应商和转包商开设，通过复杂契约关系网直接面向全球市场的中小企业承担了劳动密集型处理和组装业务。


Starting modestly in coastal areas and special economic zones, the “world factory” supply chain has spread throughout China, producing everything from stuffed animals to iPads.	“世界工厂”供应链起步很低，一开始均位于沿海地区和经济特区，如今已遍布中国，生产从动物填充标本到iPad的一切东西。


The “world factory” could not have been built without the second pillar: the “China infrastructure network,” installed and operated mostly by vertically integrated state-owned enterprises in logistics, energy, roads, telecoms, shipping, and ports.	如果没有第二大支柱，“世界工厂”就只能是海市蜃楼。 这第二大支柱便是“���国基础设施网”，大部分由物流、能源、公路、通讯、航运和港口等行业的垂直整合型国有企业建设和经营。


This pillar relies heavily on planning, large-scale fixed investment, and administrative controls, and its quality, scale, and relative efficiency were strategic to Chinese competitiveness and productivity.	这一支柱严重依赖规划、大规模固定投资和行政控制，其质量、规模和相对效率对于中国的竞争力和生产率具有战略意义。


The third pillar is the “Chinese financial supply chain,” which provided the financing needed to construct and maintain the infrastructure network.	第三大支柱是“中国的金融供应链”，它为建设和维系基础设施网提供所需要的融资。


This supply chain is characterized by the dominance of the state-owned banks, high domestic savings, relatively under-developed financial markets, and a closed capital account.	该供应链有几个显著特征：国有银行主导、高国内储蓄、相对欠发达的金融市场以及封闭的资本账户。


The final pillar is the “government services supply chain,” by which central and local officials affect every link of production, logistics, and financial networks through regulations, taxes, or permits.	最后一大支柱是“政府服务供应链”，中央和地方官员通过它利用监管、税收和许可影响生产、物流和金融网络。


Most foreign observers miss the scale and depth of institutional and process innovation in this supply chain, which has managed (mostly) to protect property rights, reduce transaction costs, and minimize risks by aligning government services with market interests.	大部分外国观察家都忽略了该供应链的制度和过程创新的广度和深度，其（主要）作用是保护产权、降低交易成本以及通过将政府服务与市场利益相协调实现风险最小化。


For example, Chinese local governments became highly adept at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) by providing attractive infrastructure and supporting services that facilitate the expansion of global production chains.	比如，中国地方政府对于通过提供颇具诱惑力的基础设施和有利于全球生产链扩张的支持性服务吸引外国直接投资（FDI）驾轻就熟。


With the onset of the current global crisis, and given dramatic changes in social media, demographics, urbanization, and resource constraints, all four pillars are now under stress.	由于全球危机的爆发，以及社会媒体、人口、城市化和环境约束的重大变迁，这四大支柱如今都承受着压力。


Production chains are facing labor shortages, wage increases, and threats of relocation to lower-cost countries.	生产链面临着劳动力短缺、工资增长和迁往成本更低国家的威胁。


Meanwhile, global investors are questioning local governments’ solvency.	与此同时，全球投资者也在要求地方政府证明其具有偿债能力。


Chinese experts are now debating a key governance question: which top-level architecture would enable the country to adopt the reforms needed to meet global and domestic pressures?	如今，中国专家对一个关键性治理问题展开着争论：哪种上层建筑能够让中国接受应对全球和国内压力所必须的改革？


Investors are concerned about Chinese equities’ erratic performance, regulatory risks, and policy surprises, as well as the uncertainties stemming from greater volatility in asset prices, including property prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate.	投资者担心中国股市的波动、监管风险、政策惊奇以及资产价格（包括房价、利率和汇率）波动性增加所带来的不确定性。


What makes the Chinese economy more difficult to read is the increasingly complex interaction of all four of its production system’s components, with each other and the rest of the world.	让中国经济更加难以理解的是其生产体系的四大成分之间及其与世界其他地区之间日渐复杂的互动关系。


First, favorable conditions for the growth of the “world factory” have begun to dissipate.	首先，有利于“世界工厂”成长的条件已经开始消失。


Production costs – in terms of labor, resources, regulation, and infrastructure – have been rising domestically, while consumption bubbles in the West have burst.	国内生产成本——劳动力、资源、监管和基础设施等方面——一直在增长，同时西方消费泡沫也在破灭。


Second, the early success of “China infrastructure” was built on cheap land, capital, and labor.	其次，“中国基础设施”的早期成功之基础是廉价的土地、资本和劳动力。


But, despite modern infrastructure, logistical costs within China are 18% of production costs, compared with 10% in the US, owing to various internal inefficiencies.	但是，尽管基础设施已经实现了现代化，中国国内物流成本仍占生产成本的18%，而美国只占10%，这是由多种多样的内部低效率导致的。


Third, the success of China’s financial system was built on state-owned banks’ financing of large infrastructure projects and foreign financing of export production through FDI and trade.	第三，中国金融体系的成功基础是国有银行为大型基础设施项目的融资以及外国通过FDI和贸易对出口生产提供的融资。


The financial system has yet to address adequately the challenges of financial inclusivity, particularly funding of SMEs and rural areas, and exposure to excess capacity in selected industries.	金融体系还无法胜任应对包容性金融的挑战，特别是中小企业融资和农村金融问题突出，在某些指定行业存在产能过剩风险。