Germany, Europe’s largest economy, is playing a strange, sometimes bizarre, role in the crisis.	德国作为欧洲最大的经济体，正在危机中扮演着一个古怪，甚至有时显得离奇的角色。


At no point since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 has the country been so strong.	自从德意志联邦共和国1949年建立以来这个国家从未变得如此强大。


It has become the EU’s leading power; but it is neither willing nor able to lead.	它已经成为了欧盟的领头羊，但却既不愿意也没有能力去领导这个集体。


Precisely for this reason, many of the changes in Europe have occurred despite German opposition.	正因为这个原因，欧洲的许多改变都在不顾德国反对的情况下发生了。


In the end, the German government has had to resort to the art of the political U-turn, with the result that Germany, though economically strong, has grown institutionally weaker – a dynamic exemplified by its reduced influence in the ECB’s Governing Council.	最后，德国政府只能求助于政治180度转向的手腕，结果就是德国虽然在经济上强大，却在制度上逐渐弱化——该国在欧洲央行管理委员会中影响力逐渐减弱的状况正好反映出这一变动。


The old Bundesbank was laid to rest on September 6, when the ECB adopted its “outright monetary transactions” program – unlimited purchases of distressed eurozone countries’ government bonds – over the objections of a lone dissenter: Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann.	旧的德意志银行已经在9月6日归于沉寂，因为尽管德意志银行主席延斯·魏德曼（Jens Weidmann）一力反对，欧洲央行依然采取了其“完全货币交易”计划——可以无限制地购买欧元区危机国的政府债券。


And the undertaker was not ECB President Mario Draghi; it was German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	而埋葬旧德意志银行的不是欧洲央行主席马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi），而是德国总理安吉拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel）。


The Bundesbank did not fall victim to a sinister southern European conspiracy; rather, it rendered itself irrelevant.	德意志银行并不是一场南欧危险合谋的受害者； 相反是它自己落在了潮流后面。


Had it gotten its way, the eurozone would no longer exist.	如果它得势的话，欧元区将不复存在。


Placing ideology above pragmatism is a formula for failure in any crisis.	将理想放在实用主义之上在任何危机中都必输无疑。


Currently, the eurozone is on the threshold of a banking union, with a fiscal union to follow.	目前来说，欧元区正处在形成一个银行联盟的门槛上，随后则会是一个财政联盟。


But, even with only a banking union, the pressure toward political union will grow.	但即便只成立一个银行联盟，向一个政治联盟推进的压力也将不断增大，


With 27 members (28 with the approaching addition of Croatia), EU treaty amendments will be impossible, not only because the United Kingdom continues to resist further European integration, but also because popular referenda would be required in many member states.	由于拥有27个成员国（克罗地亚加入后将达到28个），欧盟条约的修改将变得不可能，不仅因为英国继续反对进一步的欧洲一体化，但也由于许多成员国都必须就修订发起公民投票。


These plebiscites would become a reckoning for national governments on their crisis policies, which no sound-minded government will want.	这些表决将成为对各国政府危机政策的审判，没有政府会头脑发热到想要去做这一点。


This means that intergovernmental agreements will be needed for some time to come, and that the eurozone will develop in the direction of inter-governmental federalism.	这意味着到了某些时候就需要达成一些政府间协议，而欧元区将朝着跨政府联邦制度的方向发展。


This promises to be exciting, as it will offer completely unexpected possibilities for political integration.	这肯定是令人兴奋的，因为它将带来一些完全意料之外的政治一体化可能性。


In the end, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has prevailed, because the eurozone today is led by a de facto economic government that comprises member countries’ heads of state and government (and their finance ministers).	最后，法国前总统尼古拉·萨科齐（Nicolas Sarkozy）将得势，因为当今的欧元区是由一个由成员国政府首脑（极其财政部长）组成的事实上的经济政府所领导。


European federalists should welcome this, because the more these heads of state and government turn into a government of the eurozone as a whole, the faster their current dual role as the EU’s executive and legislative branch will become obsolete.	欧洲联邦主义者会欢迎这一点，因为随着越来越多政府首脑转变成为一个欧元区整体的政府，它们当前这种既是欧盟执行者又是立法者的双重角色就越快被废弃。


The European Parliament will not be able to fill the emerging vacuum, as it lacks fiscal sovereignty, which still lies with national parliaments and will remain there indefinitely.	欧洲议会将无法填补这个不断扩大的真空地带，因为它缺乏财政方面的主权——这一权利将依然无限期地握在各国立法机关手里。


Only national parliaments can fill the vacuum, and they need a common platform within the eurozone – a kind of “Euro Chamber” – through which they can control European economic governance.	只有各国议会能填补这一真空，而它们需要一个在欧元区内的共同平台——某种“欧元议院”——以此它们可以控制欧洲的经济治理。


Federalists in the European Parliament, and in Brussels generally, should not feel threatened.	欧洲议会以及布鲁塞尔的联邦主义者不应感到被威胁。


On the contrary, they should recognize and use this unique opportunity.	相反，他们应当意识到并利用这个独一无二的机会。


National MPs and MEPs should come together quickly and clarify their relationship.	各国议员和欧洲议会议员应当迅速集合起来并理清互相之间的关系。


In the medium term, a European Parliament with two chambers could emerge.	在中期内，一个拥有两个议院的欧洲议会将浮现。


This crisis offers a tremendous opportunity for Europe.	这个危机为欧洲带来了一个巨大的机会。


It has defined the agenda for years to come: banking union, fiscal union, and political union.	它定义了未来几年的议程：银行联盟，财政联盟，政治联盟。


What remains missing is an economic-growth strategy for the crisis countries; but, given mounting unrest in southern Europe, such a strategy is inevitable.	而缺失的则是一个针对危机国家制定的经济增长战略； 但考虑到南欧地区不断动荡的局势，这样一个战略的出台是无可避免的。


Europeans have reason to be optimistic if they recognize the opportunity that their crisis has created – and act boldly and decisively to seize it.	如果能认识到危机所创造的机会，欧洲人就有理由去保持乐观——并大胆而果断地抓住这个机会。


Stability and Prosperity in Monetary Union	货币联盟的稳定与繁荣


FRANKFURT – There is a common misconception that the euro area is a monetary union without a political union.	法兰克福—有一个普遍的错误概念——欧元区是一个没有财政联盟的货币联盟。


But this reflects a deep misunderstanding of what monetary union means.	但这反映的是对货币联盟含义的深刻误解。


Monetary union is possible only because of the substantial integration already achieved among European Union countries – and sharing a single currency deepens that integration.	货币联盟之所以成为你可能，唯一的原因是欧盟国家间已经实现了深度一体化——而共用一种货币深化了这个一体化。


If European monetary union has proved more resilient than many thought, it is only because those who doubted it misjudged this political dimension.	如果欧洲货币联盟比许多人想的更有韧性，其唯一原因是质疑它的人误判了它的政治面。


They underestimated the ties among its members, how much they had collectively invested, and their willingness to come together to solve common problems when it mattered most.	他们低估了欧元区成员国之间的联系、它们集体投资的规模、以及它们联手解决告急的共同问题的意愿。


Yet it is also clear that our monetary union is still incomplete.	但同样明显的是，我们的货币联盟仍不完善。


This was the diagnosis offered two years ago by the so-called “Four Presidents” (the European council president in close collaboration with the presidents of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Eurogroup).	两年前，所谓的“四主席”（欧盟理事会主席与欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和欧元集团主席的密切合作）做出了这一诊断。


And, though important progress has been made in some areas, unfinished business remains in others.	此外，尽管在某些领域取得了重要进展，但其他方面的工作仍有待完成。


But what does it mean to “complete” a monetary union?	但“完善”货币联盟意味着什么？


Most important, it means having conditions in place that make countries more stable and prosperous than they would be if they were not members.	最重要的是，它意味着创造一系列条件，使各国加入其中能获得更大的稳定与繁荣。


They have to be better off inside than they would be outside.	加入其中比位于其外更好。


In other political unions, cohesion is maintained through a strong common identity, but often also through permanent fiscal transfers between richer and poorer regions that even out incomes ex post.	在其他政治联盟，凝聚力通过强大的共同身份维持，但往往也通过富裕地区和贫穷地区持久的财政转移从而在事后实现收入平均来维持。


In the euro area, such one-way transfers between countries are not foreseen (transfers do exist as part of the EU’s cohesion policy, but are limited in size and are primarily designed to support the “catching-up” process in lower income countries or regions).	在欧元区，这一国家间的单向转移在可预见的未来不会存在（欧盟团结政策中确实有关于转移支付的内容，但规模有限制，并主要是为了支持低收入国家或地区的“赶超”过程）。


This means that we need a different approach to ensure that each country is permanently better off inside the euro area.	这意味着我们需要另辟蹊径确保每个国家都会因为加入欧元区而持续变得更好。


This implies two main things.	这主要意味着两点。


First, we have to create the conditions for all countries to thrive independently.	首先，我们必须为所有国家创造独立繁荣的条件。


All members need to be able to exploit comparative advantages within the Single Market, attract capital, and generate jobs.	所有成员国都需要能够利用单一市场中的比较优势、吸引资本、创造就业岗位。


And they need to have enough flexibility to respond quickly to short-term shocks.	它们还需要足够的灵活性以快速应对短期冲击。


This comes down to structural reforms that spur competition, reduce unnecessary red tape, and make labor markets more adaptable.	这就需要采取结构改革刺激竞争、减少不必要的繁文缛节、增强劳动力市场的适应力。


Until now, whether or not to carry out such reforms has largely been a national prerogative.	到目前为止，是否实施这类改革基本上仍是国家权力。


But in a union such as ours they are a clear common interest.	但在像我们这样的联盟中，这显然也是共同利益。


Euro area countries depend on one another for growth.	欧元区国家需要相互依赖实现增长。


And, more fundamentally, if a lack of structural reforms leads to permanent divergence within the monetary union, this raises the specter of exit – from which all members ultimately suffer.	更基本的是，如果结构改革不足导致货币联盟内部的持久分化，将制造退出幽灵——所有成员国最终都会因为这一幽灵蒙受损失。


In the euro area, stability and prosperity anywhere depend on countries thriving everywhere.	在欧元区，各地的稳定与繁荣取决于各国共同繁荣。


So there is a strong case for sharing more sovereignty in this area – for building a genuine economic union.	因此，有很强大的理由在欧元区内共享更多的主权——这样才能构建真正的经济联盟。


This means more than beefing up existing procedures.	这不仅意味着加强现有程序。


It means governing together: shifting from coordination to common decision-making, and from rules to institutions.	这意味着共同治理：从合作转变为共同决策，从规则转变为机构。


The second implication of the absence of fiscal transfers is that countries need to invest more in other mechanisms to share the cost of shocks.	财政转移缺位的第二个影响是各国需要更多地投资于其他机制以共担冲击成本。


Even with more flexible economies, internal adjustment will always be slower than it would be if countries had their own exchange rate.	即使是较灵活的经济体，内部调整也永远慢于拥有本国汇率时的情形。


Risk-sharing is thus essential to prevent recessions from leaving permanent scars and reinforcing economic divergence.	因此，风险共担是防止衰退留下永久疤痕、刺激经济分化的关键。


A key part of the solution is to improve private risk-sharing by deepening financial integration.	解决方案的一个关键是通过金融一体化改善私人风险共担。


Indeed, the less public risk-sharing we want, the more private risk-sharing we need.	事实上，我们越是不希望公共风险共担，就越需要私人风险共担。


A banking union for the euro area should be catalytic in encouraging deeper integration of the banking sector.	欧元区银行联盟应该成为鼓励深化银行部门一体化的催化剂。


But risk-sharing is also about deepening capital markets, especially for equity, which is why we also need to advance quickly with a capital markets union.	但风险共担也事关资本市场深化，特别是股市，因此，我们还需要快速推进资本市场联盟。


Still, we have to acknowledge the vital role of fiscal policies in a monetary union.	但是，我们仍必须承认财政政策在货币联盟中的关键作用。


A single monetary policy focused on price stability in the euro area cannot react to shocks that affect only one country or region.	专注于欧元区价格稳定的简单货币联盟无法应对只影响一个国家或地区的冲击。


So, to avoid prolonged local slumps, it is critical that national fiscal policies can perform their stabilization role.	因此，为了避免长期地方崩溃，国家财政政策可以起到稳定作用至关重要。


To allow national fiscal stabilizers to work, governments must be able to borrow at an affordable cost in times of economic stress.	要让国家财政稳定器起作用，政府必须能够在经济受压时以低廉的成本借贷。


A strong fiscal framework is indispensable to achieve this, and protects countries from contagion.	强大的财政框架对于实现这一目标、阻止国家间传染来说是不可或缺的。


But the crisis experience suggests that, in times of extreme market tensions, even a sound initial fiscal position may not offer absolute protection from spillovers.	但危机经验表明，在极端市场紧张时期，即使是坚挺的初始财政状况也无法给溢出效应提供绝对保护。


This is a further reason why we need economic union: markets would be less likely to react negatively to temporarily higher deficits if they were more confident in future growth prospects.	因此，我们更加需要经济联盟：如果提高国家的未来增长前景的信心，它们采取消极措施应对暂时性赤字升高的可能性就越小。


By committing governments to structural reforms, economic union provides the credibility that countries can indeed grow out of debt.	通过让政府致力于结构改革，经济联盟可以提供让各国真正摆脱债务的信誉。


Ultimately, economic convergence among countries cannot be only an entry criterion for monetary union, or a condition that is met some of the time.	说到底，国家间经济趋同不能只依靠设立货币联盟的门槛标准，或设立有时需要满足的条件。


It has to be a condition that is fulfilled all of the time.	国家间经济趋同需要一个随时随地都要满足的条件。


And for this reason, to complete monetary union we will ultimately have to deepen our political union further: to lay down its rights and obligations in a renewed institutional order.	出于这一原因，要完善货币联盟，我们最终必须深化我们的政治联盟：在新的机构秩序中明确权利和义务。


Europe’s Shadow Budget	欧洲的影子预算


MUNICH – More details about the European Commission’s €315 billion ($390 billion) investment plan for 2015-2017 have finally come to light.	慕尼黑——有关2015-2017年欧盟委员会3150亿欧元（合3900亿美元）投资计划的更多细节终于水落石出。


The program, announced by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in November, amounts to a massive shadow budget, twice as large as the European Union’s annual official budget, that will finance public investment projects and ultimately help governments circumvent debt limits established in the Stability and Growth Pact.	由欧盟委员会主席让 - 克洛德·容克于11月宣布的这项计划实际相当于规模庞大的影子预算，将为公共投资项目提供两倍于欧盟年度官方预算的巨额支持并最终协助政府避开稳定与增长公约规定的债务限制。


The borrowing will be arranged through the new European Fund for Strategic Investment, operating under the umbrella of the European Investment Bank.	该借款安排将假手新的欧洲战略投资基金，在欧洲投资银行的保护伞下进行运作。


The EFSI will be equipped with €5 billion in start-up capital, produced through the revaluation of existing EIB assets, and will be backed by €16 billion in guarantees from the European Commission.	该投资基金将拨备50亿欧元的启动资金，其中部分来自以欧盟委员会160亿欧元担保为后盾对欧洲投资银行现有资产进行重估。


The fund is expected to leverage this to acquire roughly €63 billion in loans, with private investors subsequently contributing some €5 for every euro lent – bringing total investment to the €315 billion target.	该基金预计将以此撬动约630亿欧元的信贷资产，每借出一块欧元预计将使私人投资者取得5欧元左右的产出——由此计算总投资将接近3150万欧元的目标。


Though EU countries will not contribute any actual funds, they will provide implicit and explicit guarantees for the private investors, in an arrangement that looks suspiciously like the joint liability embodied by Eurobonds.	虽然欧盟国家不会提供任何实际资金，但他们会为私人投资者提供隐性及显性担保，这与欧元债券所隐含的连带责任颇有相似之处。


Faced with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s categorical rejection of Eurobonds, the EU engaged a horde of financial specialists to find a creative way to circumvent it.	德国总理安格拉·默克尔断然拒绝欧元债券提议后，欧盟组织了大批金融专家寻找创造性的规避方式。


They came up with the EFSI.	欧洲战略投资基金就是他们煞费苦心想出的方式。


Though the fund will not be operational until mid-2015, EU member countries have already proposed projects for the European Commission’s consideration.	虽然基金到2015年年中之前都无法实际运行，但欧盟成员国已经上报了多个项目提请欧洲委员会审议。


By early December, all 28 EU governments had submitted applications – and they are still coming.	截止十二月初，全部28个欧盟成员国政府均已提交了申请——而且申请项目仍在不断增加。


An assessment of the application documents conducted by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, of which I am President, found that the nearly 2,000 potential projects would cost a total of €1.3 trillion, with about €500 billion spent before the end of 2017.	我所领导的 伊佛经济研究所在对申请文件进行评估时发现，近2，000个潜在项目将总共耗资1. 3万亿欧元，其中2017年年底前需要投入的部分约为5，000亿。


Some 53% of those costs correspond to public projects; 15% to public-private partnerships (PPPs); 21% to private projects; and just over 10% to projects that could not be classified.	21%投向私人项目； 仅有略多于10%的项目无法进行归类。


The public projects will presumably involve EFSI financing, with governments assuming the interest payments and amortization.	公共项目想必会涉及欧洲战略投资基金，由政府承担利息支付和分期摊销。


The PPPs will entail mixed financing, with private entities taking on a share of the risk and the return.	公私合作将带来混合融资，由私营实体在承担部分风险的同时获得部分收益。


The private projects will include the provision of infrastructure, the cost of which is to be repaid through tolls or user fees collected by a private operator.	私人项目将包括提供基础设施，通过私人运营商收取过路费或使用费来偿还债务。


Unlike some other critics, I do not expect the program to fail to bolster demand in the European economy.	我不像其他某些批评者那样认为该计划无法支撑欧洲经济体的需求。


After all, the €315 billion that is expected to be distributed over three years amounts to 2.3% of the EU’s annual GDP.	毕竟，计划于3年内投资完成的这3，150亿欧元占欧盟年GDP2. 3%的份额。


Such a sizeable level of investment is bound to have an impact.	如此庞大的投资势必会产生影响。


But the program remains legally dubious, as it creates a massive shadow budget financed by borrowing that will operate parallel to the EU and national budgets, thereby placing a substantial risk-sharing burden on taxpayers.	但上述计划在法律上仍然非常可疑，因为它凭空创造了与欧盟和国家预算平行运作的巨额影子预算，从而将巨大的风险负担强加在纳税人头上。


Because every country, regardless of its creditworthiness, can borrow at the same interest rate, projects will be undertaken in countries that recently have burned such huge amounts of capital that they can no longer tap financial markets for funding.	因为国家无论其资信状况都可以以相同的利率借用资金，且很多项目申请国因为不久前刚刚烧光巨额资金而无法再次从金融市场获得融资。


Just like the many other “protective” measures taken during the crisis, this distortion of market processes will help to cement the sub-optimal allocation of European investment capital, hampering economic growth for years to come.	就像危机期间采取的许多其他“保护”措施一样，这种对市场过程的扭曲将有助于巩固欧洲投资资本的次优配置，并对未来几年的经济增长构成阻碍作用。


Making matters worse, only a fraction of the new borrowing enabled by the mutualization of liability will be factored into national budgets.	雪上加霜的是，这种债务共同化带来的新增借款仅有一小部分将被纳入国家预算之中。


This will render meaningless EU-wide debt-management agreements, including the Stability and Growth Pact, which limits the overall deficit to 3% of GDP, and the 2012 “fiscal compact,” which stipulates that countries whose debt-to-GDP ratios exceed the 60% limit should reduce them by one-twentieth annually until they are in compliance.	这会导致欧盟范围内债务管理协议形同虚设，包括将总体赤字限制在GDP3％的稳定与增长公约，以及2012年 “财政契约”，该契约规定债务占GDP比率超过60%的国家在完全符合契约规定前必须每年削减二十分之一的债务。


In recent years, banks have been berated for using shadow budgets, in the form of special-purpose vehicles and conduits, to take on excessive risk.	近年来，银行一直因通过特殊用途工具和管道、利用影子预算过度承担风险而饱受指责。


It is worrisome, to say the least, that the EU is now resorting to similar tricks.	欧盟现在也在采用类似的措施，这即便从最保守的意义上讲也非常令人担任。


Ecb Is Now Europe’s Anchor	欧洲央行：如今的欧洲后盾


The European Central Bank is making its reputation at this time of turmoil and crisis.	欧洲中央银行（ECB）扬名之时指日可待。


Barely a month after the rejection of the European Union Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the EU Summit in Brussels ended in a surprisingly acrimonious orgy of national egoisms and no deal. Then the terrorists struck in London.	就在欧盟宪法在法国和荷兰遭到拒绝一个月后，最近在布鲁塞尔召开的欧盟峰会又在一场国家利己主义的激烈争辩中收场，而欧盟预算事项却毫无进展。


With all this trouble, the ECB is showing itself to be an “anchor of stability” by steadfastly sticking to its mandate of insuring price stability.	当欧盟陷入政治混乱的时候，ECB必须成为稳定的后盾。


Europe suffers from a profound crisis of confidence.	欧洲正在遭受一场旷日持久并且已经对欧洲的经济复苏形成障碍的信任危机。


Its economy, for example, cannot recover properly because consumers, lacking confidence in the ability of their political leaders to solve the economy’s manifold economic problems (budget deficits, pensions, etc.), are saving for a rainy day they feel is just around the corner—and businessmen are reluctant to invest, because they don’t trust government to make the necessary economic reforms.	由于对他们政治领导人解决多方面问题的能力缺乏信心，公民们正在未雨绸缪地为这场他们相信很快会来到的危机做准备，与此同时，商人们不愿投资，因为他们不相信政府将会采取任何必要的经济改革。


The public’s lack of confidence in the EU’s political leadership is totally justified.	正如不光彩的布鲁塞尔峰会所清楚表现出的那样，这种对欧盟政治领导层的信任的缺乏是完全有道理的。


Instead of actually doing something constructive about Europe’s essential problem --reforming expensive welfare states to ensure global competitiveness--Europe’s political leaders are hiding behind straw man arguments about “ultra liberal Anglo Saxon models,” and pressuring the ECB to lower interest rates as if European economic weakness were Frankfurt’s fault.	欧洲的政治领导人并没有真正地为解决欧洲基本问题做一些有建设性的事情——改革高额福利国家以保证他们能适应全球化的竞争，相反他们却用有关“极端自由的盎格鲁-萨克逊典范”、英国的预算返款以及高利率的论调作幌子，好像经济衰退是欧洲中央银行的过错一样。


Europe’s finance ministers portray the ECB as closed to dialogue.	为了破坏ECB的独立性，欧洲的财政部长们正在寻求在银行的决定权上拥有更大的发言权。


When testifying before the EU Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Luxembourg prime minister and Euro-group chairman Jean-Claude Juncker said there should be “open and frank” talks between the euro-group ministers and the ECB—and French finance minister Dominique de Villepin said the same thing.	卢森堡首相兼欧元集团主席让·克洛德·容克在欧盟议会的经济及货币事务委员会召开前表示，欧元区的财长们应该在对ECB表达他们的观点时态度更强硬。 他呼吁欧元集团的部长们和ECB之间应当展开“开放坦率的”谈话。


According to a knowledgeable ECB source, however, Europe’s finance ministers regularly meet in secret with the ECB leadership for a mutual and frank exchange of views on monetary policy and other issues.	谁需要这样的谈话？


The dialogue already exists though the public does not know it. Such disingenuousness does little to boost confidence in Europe’s political leadership.	所有欧元区的财长们一致所要讨论的就是降低利率，而这将无助于欧洲经济的复苏。


The ECB has done all it can for growth by giving Europe a prolonged period of monetary stability at record low interest rates.	通过将利率维持在历史最低纪录，ECB已经使欧洲在很长一段时间保持了货币稳定。


Does anyone really believe consumers are holding back on spending —and businessmen postponing their investments—in anticipation of that next drop in interest rates?	有谁真的相信在预料到利率下调后，消费者们会对开销支出缩手缩脚——商人们会延缓他们的投资呢？


To paraphrase Keynes, you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink.	正如凯恩斯（Keynes）说的那样，师傅引进门，修行在个人。


“The last thing Europe needs now is an interest rate cut,” says one influential member of the ECB Governing Council in a candid assessment of the current situation.  Capitulating to outside political pressure is no one’s definition of an “anchor of stability.”	“欧洲现在最不需要的就是降低利率，”一位颇具影响力的ECB监管理事会成员在一次对现行状况的公正评估中说道。 屈服于外界的政治压力并不是“稳定后盾”的含义。


The euro would collapse, and the ECB finished as a creditable central bank.	欧元会崩溃，并且ECB将作为一家信誉良好的中央银行关门。


Moreover, ECB chief economist Otmar Issing predicts long- term interest rates would go up—not down—as inflationary expectations increased.	此外，ECB的首席经济学家Otmar Issing预测，随着通货膨胀的可能性增加，长期利率将走高，而非下降。


So cutting interest rates would not only be stupid—it would be crazy.	因此，降级利率的做法不仅是愚蠢的，更是疯狂的。


But the ECB is not going to cut rates even though, for public relations reasons of keeping the political wolves at bay, it deceptively hints it might.	但是ECB不会削减利率，即使这暗示着它可能就是为了阻止政治狼群。


Don’t be fooled by such feints. The ECB is holding fast and, in doing so, demonstrates to Europe’s peoples that there is at least one EU institution they can trust.	ECB坚持着自己的立场，通过这样做它向欧洲公民表明他们至少还有一个欧盟机构可以信任。


This is vital.	这点至关重要。


History shows political turmoil often leads to inflation, which only fuels further turmoil.	历史已经告诉我们政治动乱通常导致的就是通货膨胀，而通货膨胀只会引发更多的骚动。


Europeans can bet their last euro the ECB will not let the fledgling common currency be ravaged by inflation because their political leaders, having failed to do their jobs, now fear they might lose them.	欧洲人可以用他们的最后一块欧元打赌ECB不会让刚刚起步的共同货币被通货膨胀所破坏，因为他们工作不合格的领导人现在害怕他们会失去民众。


Indeed, the courage currently demonstrated by the ECB in sticking to its guns should serve as a model for Europe’s future politicians.	事实上，ECB在坚持自己的主张中所表现出来的勇气应该成为欧洲未来的政治家门的榜样。


Once they realize they can’t bully the ECB into unwanted and self-destructive interest rate cuts, EU leaders actually might summon up the will to lead—which is, after all, what they have been elected to do.	一旦他们意识到他们不能威吓ECB进行不必要的自我消亡式的利率降低，欧盟领导人也许能鼓起领导的勇气——这毕竟是他们被选举出来所要完成的任务。


The ECB Goes Rogue	走上邪路的欧洲央行


TILBURG – The European Central Bank has done it again.	发自蒂尔堡——欧洲中央银行又故伎重施了。


At its recent meeting in Frankfurt, the ECB Governing Council decided to increase bond purchases further, from €60 billion ($67 billion) to €80 billion per month, with corporate bonds now also eligible for purchase.	在其最近在法兰克福举行的会议上，欧洲央行理事会决定进一步增加债券采购规模，将额度由每月600 亿欧元（折合670 亿美元）提升到800 亿欧元，而且还可以购买公司债券。


The deposit rate, too, was reduced once again, and now stands at -0.4%.	存款利率也再次降低，目前为-0. 4%。


This is far from a neutral policy – and it takes the ECB far beyond its mandate of preserving monetary stability.	这是可远远算不上是一个中性的政策——也令欧洲央行大幅逾越了其维持货币稳定的职权范围。


The motivation behind the recent policy moves is clear: ECB President Mario Draghi is committed to curbing deflation, a serious threat to economic growth.	最近这一系列政策举措背后的动机相当明确 ︰ 欧洲央行主席马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）致力于抑制严重威胁经济增长的通货紧缩状况。


After all, in a deflationary environment, it is more difficult to repay debt, so companies will tend to postpone investment.	因为在通货紧缩的环境中偿付债务愈发艰难，所以企业会倾向于推迟投资。


Recent Eurostat figures, which show that the annual consumer-price index fell by 0.2% last month, heighten concerns.	最近欧盟统计局的数据显示，上个月的年度消费者价格指数下降了 0. 2%，引发外界高度关注。


But while what is happening is technically deflation – that is, sustained price-level decreases that may be reflected in employment or other contracts – it is not structural deflation.	但虽然当前情况属于技术性通货紧缩——也就是，持续的价格水平下降，并可能在就业或其他合同上体现出来——但并非结构性通缩。


Instead, it largely reflects low oil prices, which have fallen by more than 70% since June 2014.	相反，它很大程度上反映了自2014 年6月以来下跌了 70%以上的低油价影响。


In fact, if we discard energy and food prices, the eurozone is in a situation of structural low inflation.	事实上，如果剔除能源和食品价格，欧元区现正处于结构性低通胀的状况。


That, together with the oil price, should actually benefit the economy, as it gives a boost to consumption and investment.	这与石油价格相结合应该在实际上有益于经济，因为它大幅推动了消费和投资。


So why has the ECB’s massive quantitative easing (QE) program, which has put plenty of money into circulation, failed to stimulate demand for goods and services?	所以为何欧洲央行推行的大规模量化宽松计划——将足量资金投入流通——未能刺激对商品和服务的需求？


One problem is that banks are reluctant to pass the negative deposit rate through to the savings rate, for fear of losing depositors.	一个问题是银行不愿将负存款利率转化为储蓄利率，因为担心会流失储户。


They are thus forced to increase further their margins on mortgages and loans to small and medium-size enterprises.	因此，他们被迫进一步增加其向中小型企业抵押贷款和借款的利润率。


As a result, contrary to the goal of QE, they are extending less credit to households and companies.	因此与量化宽松政策的目标背道而驰的是，银行给家庭和企业的贷款反而减少了。


Meanwhile, banks, households, and small and medium-size enterprises are still excessively leveraged, and need time to pay down their debts.	与此同时，银行、 家庭和中小型企业仍在高杠杆经营，并需要一段时间来偿还其债务。


While this might seem to suggest that the ECB’s focus on boosting inflation is the right one, the reality is that a straightforward expansion of the bond-purchase program ignores the underlying structural issues afflicting the eurozone’s weaker economies.	虽然这似乎暗示欧洲央行将重点放在提振通胀是正确的，但事实上债券购买计划的简单扩张忽略了困扰欧元区内部各弱势经济体的基础结构问题。


Worse, by enabling those economies to borrow cheaply, QE permits them to avoid implementing difficult structural reforms.	更糟糕的是，通过允许这些经济体进行低息贷款，量化宽松政策令它们避免了实施艰难的结构性改革。


Draghi and the doves on the ECB Governing Council – namely, the presidents of southern European countries’ central banks – seem to think that they can get a car moving simply by giving it more gas, even if its clutch is broken.	德拉吉和欧洲央行理事会内的鸽派——即欧洲南部各国央行的行长们——似乎认为，他们只需给一辆车加油就能让它跑起来，即便其离合器早已失灵。


The hawks in the ECB Governing Council, such as Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann and De Nederlandsche Bank President Klaas Knot, see the folly in this approach, but they are in the minority.	而在理事会中的鹰派如德意志银行总裁简斯·魏德曼(Jens Weidmann)以及荷兰中央银行行长克拉斯·克努特(Klaas Knot)看到了这个方法的愚蠢之处，无奈他们只是少数派。


QE was effective in spurring economic growth in the United States, because it functioned via the capital market.	量化宽松政策之所以能有效刺激美国的经济增长，是因为它通过资本市场进行运作。


But, in Europe, where there is no unified capital market to allow portfolios to rebalance, the policy works through the bank lending channel, so it inflates – and distorts – the prices of bonds and stocks.	而欧洲缺乏允许资本账户实现重新平衡的统一资本市场，其政策通过银行贷款渠道生效，所以它膨胀——并扭曲了——债券和股票的价格。


More problematic, the ECB policy results in a substantial redistribution of wealth from savers (including retirees) in the stronger northern eurozone countries – namely, Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands – to the debtors in the southern eurozone countries, including France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.	更成问题的是，欧洲央行政策导致大量财富从经济更强势的北方欧元区国家——德国、 芬兰和荷兰——的储户 （包括退休人员） 转移到包括法国、 希腊、 意大利、 葡萄牙和西班牙在内的南部欧元区国家债务人身上。


Such transfers were never supposed to be a feature of the Economic and Monetary Union, and it is clearly not within the ECB’s mandate to force fundamental changes to the EMU system – especially if those changes favor one group of countries.	这种转移支付从就不是这一经济和货币联盟的特点，欧洲央行显然也不具备强制推动该联盟根本性变革的职权——尤其是在这些变化只有利于一个国家集团的情况下。


The problems with the ECB’s current policy approach are serious.	欧洲央行现行政策方针的问题极为严重的。


Yet the ECB seems committed to it – not least, it seems, because QE’s beneficiaries outnumber those who are footing the bill.	然而欧洲央行似乎致力于此——尤其是因为量化宽松政策的受益者似乎要多于那些为之付账的人。


The longer the ECB keeps up this bizarre and irresponsible policy, the greater the chances that, when the car finally does get going, it will careen out of control.	欧洲央行保持这怪异和不负责任政策的时间越长，车毁人亡的可能性就更大。


Is the ECB Doing Enough?	欧洲央行尽职了吗？


FRANKFURT – Konrad Adenauer, Germany’s first chancellor after World War II, famously said: “Why should I care about the things I said yesterday?”	发自法兰克福——二战后德国首任总理康拉德·阿登纳（Konrad Adenauer）曾说过一句名言：“为什么我要为昨天说过的话负责？


What he meant was that events can sometimes unfold at a speed that outpaces our ability to understand them.	”意思是事情发展的速度往往会超出我们的理解能力。


So, as 2014 winds down, it is worth asking ourselves, with the benefit of hindsight: Have we at the European Central Bank reacted swiftly enough to maintain price stability in the face of threats, as our mandate requires?	因此随着2014年即将落下帷幕，也值得让我们去扪心自问，以事后检讨的方式来反思：“在面对众多威胁之时，我们这些欧洲中央银行的管理者们是否能像我们所被授予的任命那样，采取了足够迅速的行动去维持价格稳定？


I think the answer is yes.	”而答案在我看来，是肯定的。


We noticed that our monetary policy was no longer having the effect on private borrowing costs to which we were accustomed.	我们注意到我们的货币政策对对私人借贷的影响已经不再像过去那样有效。


It was obvious that the lending channels in the banking system had become dysfunctional; excessively restrictive borrowing conditions were suppressing demand.	很显然银行系统内部的各条贷款渠道已经变得紊乱； 过度严苛的贷款条件正在压抑需求。


In response, the ECB did precisely what any central bank would have done: we acted to restore the relationship between our monetary policy and the cost of borrowing, aiming to bring down the average rate that households and firms have to pay.	对此欧洲央行做出了跟其他任何央行一样的回应：我们重新梳理了自身货币政策和借贷成本之间的关系，务求将家庭和企业所承担的平均贷款利率压下来。


In June, we introduced a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (known as TLTROs) to provide funding for banks at very low fixed rates for a period of up to four years.	在六月的时候，我们采取了一系列定向长期再融资操作（简称TLTROs），为各银行提供最长达4年的固定利率超低息融资。


The TLTROs were designed to maximize the chances that banks would pass on the funding relief to borrowers.	这是为了让银行可以随之纾缓贷款者所承担的压力。


Our programs to purchase asset-backed securities and covered bonds were tailored to help lubricate further the transmission of lower funding costs from banks to customers.	而另一个收购有资产担保股票/债券的项目则是为了进一步促进更低利率融资从银行到消费者的转移而专门设计。


Together, these measures offer a powerful response that addresses the root causes of impaired bank lending, thereby facilitating new credit flows to the real economy.	上述手段结合在一起，为解决银行贷款错位问题的根源因素做出了有力的回应，并因此令新的信贷流更快地流向实体经济。


And tentative evidence suggests that they are delivering some initial tangible benefits to the euro area’s economy.	同时有初步证据表明这些措施都为欧元区经济带来一些前期实质性利好。


At the same time, inflation has continued trending down.	与此同时通胀也持续走低。


In November, annual inflation in the euro area fell to a cyclical low of 0.3%, largely owing to the sharp fall in oil prices since the end of the summer.	在11月，由于原油价格自夏季末期一路暴跌，欧元区年度通胀率下跌到了周期性低点0. 3%。


But falling core inflation (which excludes volatile energy and food prices) also points to weak aggregate demand.	但核心通胀（排除较多变动的能源和食品价格）的下降也意味着总需求疲软。


And, indeed, the ECB’s latest staff projections entail a notable downgrading of the macroeconomic outlook.	事实上欧洲央行最新发布的一份机构预测中也大幅调低了对宏观经济发展的预测。


Falling oil prices and the prospect of a prolonged period of low inflation also seem to have affected inflation expectations.	油价下跌和低通胀期延长的展望似乎也影响到了通胀预期。


Given the potency of the recent oil-price shock, the risk is that inflation may temporarily slip into negative territory in the coming months.	考虑到最近油价动荡的影响，风险在于通胀可能会在未来几个月临时滑入负值区间。


Normally, any central bank would welcome a positive supply shock.	一般来说，央行会欢迎一个正面的供应井喷。


After all, lower oil prices boost real incomes and may lead to higher output in the future.	毕竟低油价会推高实际收入并可能推动未来产量提升。


But we may not be able to celebrate. After all, because well-anchored inflation expectations are indispensable for medium-term price stability, monetary policy must respond to a risk of de-anchoring.	但这还不是庆祝的时候，毕竟要实现中期价格稳定就得有稳定挂钩的通胀预期，而货币政策正是要应对这种脱钩风险。


That is why the ECB Governing Council has reiterated its unanimous commitment to use additional unconventional instruments within its mandate should it become necessary to address a prolonged period of low inflation, or should the monetary stimulus fall short of our intention to move our balance sheet toward its size in early 2012.	这也是为何欧洲央行管理委员会反复重申，一致承诺要在自身委任权限内动用额外的非常规工具来在必要时应对低通胀期延长，或是货币刺激手段无法完成令我们（欧洲）的资产负债表向2012年初规模靠拢的情况。


This would imply altering the scope, pace and composition of our measures early next year, and staff from the ECB and national central banks have stepped up technical preparations for further measures, if needed, with a view to implementing them in a timely manner.	这或许意味着把我们明年年初手段的范围，路径和构成进行转换，而欧洲央行和各国央行的人对此也已经升级了技术准备，因此一旦有需要，进一步的措施就能及时实施。


If we were to judge that the economy is in need of further stimulus, one option could be to extend the ECB’s outright asset purchases to other asset classes.	如果我们觉得经济需要进一步刺激，其中一个选项会是将欧洲央行的直接资产采购扩大到其他资产门类。


But it is important to remember that asset purchases are not an end in themselves.	但一定要记住资产采购本身并不是目的。


They are an instrument, not a target, of monetary policy.	它们是货币政策的一项工具，而非目标。


An important criterion for the choice of additional measures should be the extent of their influence over broad financing conditions in the private economy.	一个选择额外措施的重要条件应该是它们对私营经济宏观融资条件的影响力。


For example, purchases of bonds issued by euro-area non-financial corporations (NFCs) would probably have some direct pass-through effect on firms’ financing costs.	比如说，购买由欧元区非金融机构发行的债券或许会对企业的融资成本产生某种直接的传递效应。


But, compared to other asset classes, the market for NFC bonds is relatively thin.	但相比于其他资产门类，这类债券的市场还相对薄弱。


It would be a different matter if we were to decide to buy bonds issued by euro-area sovereigns – the only market where size would generally not be an issue.	如果买的是欧元区国家发行的主权债券——唯一一个规模不是问题的市场，那就是另一回事了。


Interventions in this market would likely entail a stronger signal that the ECB is committed to maintaining an accommodative monetary policy for an extended period of time.	对这一市场的介入或会发出一个强烈信号：欧洲央行会把宽松型的货币政策继续维持一段时间。


The effectiveness of interventions in the sovereign-bond market – that is, their ability to lower the borrowing costs of households and firms further – will also rest on the state of the banking sector.	而干涉手段对主权债券市场的效力——也就是它们进一步降低家庭和企业借贷成本的能力——也取决于银行部门所处的状态。


Higher capital ratios, lower exposure to bad loans, and more transparent balance sheets increase the chances that the ECB’s quantitative impulses will be transmitted to the wider economy.	更高的资本储备金率，更低的坏账风险，更透明的资产负债表将增加欧洲央行量化刺激手段传导到更广大经济范围的机会。


That is why the completion of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets and the start of Europe-wide banking supervision will help revitalize sluggish lending in the euro area.	这也是为何欧洲央行对各银行资产负债表的综合评估和全欧银行监督计划的启动能有助于活化欧元区的不良贷款。


In particular, increased clarity and transparency about banks’ balance sheets, together with a better-capitalized banking sector, will create a more supportive lending environment.	尤其是银行资产负债表的不断明晰和透明，加上资本更充足的银行部门，将创造一个更有益处的贷款环境。


But a decision to purchase sovereign bonds would also need to build on and factor in the institutional specificities of the euro area, including the limits set by the EU Treaty.	但一个购买主权债券的决定也必须构建和融合于欧元区的制度特殊性，包括《欧盟条约》设下的限定条件。


We take these limits very seriously.	我们也极为严肃认真地对待这些限制。


The year ahead will be challenging and rife with uncertainty.	未来的一年将充满着挑战和不确定性。


But if the past holds any lesson, it is that, if our ability to fulfill our mandate is at risk, we will not hesitate to act.	但如果说往事能给我们任何教益的话，那就是如果我们完成自身被委任使命的能力变得岌岌可危，那么我们就会毫不犹豫地行动。 ·


The New Philosophers	新哲学家


PRINCETON – At the recent meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Australia, US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew noted “philosophical differences with some of our friends in Europe,” before urging Europeans to do more to boost their anemic growth rate.	普林斯顿—在最近的澳大利亚二十国集团财长会议上，美国财政部长杰克·卢指出“与我们的一些欧洲朋友之间存在哲学差异，”接着敦促欧洲花更大力气提振其长期萎靡不振的增长率。


The terminology is striking, and underscores the difficulty of Europe’s search for a way out of its current malaise.	如此用词令人震惊，也凸显出欧洲探寻走出经济萎靡之路的艰难。


Canada’s finance minister, Joe Oliver, joined the call for fiscal expansion in Europe – a position for which there seems to be some support within the European Central Bank.	加拿大财政部长乔·奥利佛（Joe Oliver）也加入了要求欧洲财政扩张的行列——欧洲央行内部似乎也有一些人支持这一立场。


Indeed, ECB President Mario Draghi has advocated higher spending by more fiscally strong countries like Germany.	事实上，欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉支持依靠德国等财政较坚挺的国家提高支出。


And ECB Executive Board member Benoit Coeure, together with his former colleague Jörg Asmussen, currently Germany’s deputy labor minister, recently suggested that Germany should “use its available room for maneuver to promote investments and reduce the tax burden of workers.”	欧洲央行执行委员会委员贝努特·寇尔（Benoit Coeure）及其前同事、现德国劳动部副部长耶格·阿斯缪森（Jörg Asmussen）最近指出，德国应该“利用其现有空间采取措施促进投资、降低工人的税收负担。 ”


In fact, most of the world believes that Germany should adopt a more expansive fiscal policy.	事实上，世界上大部分人认为德国应该采取更为扩张的财政政策。


According to this view, austerity is counter-productive, because it induces slowdowns and recessions that make long-term fiscal consolidation more difficult.	根据这一观点，紧缩是反生产的，因为它带来了让长期财政整合更加困难的减速和衰退。


But Germans – as well as some other Northern Europeans, and perhaps some Chinese economists – remain reticent.	但德国人——以及一些其他北欧国家的人，可能还有一些中国经济学家——仍有所保留。


They believe that responding to calls for stimulus would simply lead to more such calls, creating a log-rolling, pork-barrel dynamic in which any hope for fiscal consolidation is ruled out.	他们认为响应刺激要求只能导致更多的刺激要求，形成一个彼此强化的分肥动态，一切财政整合观点都会被排除在外。


The stimulus-versus-austerity debate is an old one.	刺激与紧缩之争由来已久。


In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States regularly called on Germany and Japan to act as locomotives for the global economy.	20世纪七八十年代，美国时不时要求德国和日本要充当全球经济的火车头。


But, until recently, the divergences were viewed in terms of interests, not “philosophies.”	但是，直到最近，这一分歧都是从利益而非“哲学”角度出发的。


Americans wanted additional demand for their goods and higher prices, while the Germans and Japanese defended their export industries.	美国人希望为其商品创造更高需求和更高价格； 而德国人和日本人想捍卫出口行业。


The problem today, as Lew’s recent statement highlighted, stems from deeply entrenched differences between the opposing sides’ belief systems, with ideological questions about fairness and responsibility trumping pragmatic discussion of the best way forward for everyone.	正如卢的最近讲话所表明的，今天的问题来自对立双方信念体系的根深蒂固的分歧，关于公平和责任的意识形态问题压倒了关于什么是对所有人最好的前进道路的务实讨论。


As the historian Robert Kagan argued in 2002, Americans and Europeans do not only have different worldviews; they occupy entirely different worlds.	历史学家罗伯特·卡甘（Robert Kagan）在2002年指出，美国人和欧洲人不但世界观不同； 所处的世界也完全不一样。


Philosophical differences are extremely difficult to reconcile.	哲学差异极难调和。


Just as Platonists and Aristotelians struggled against one another for millennia, Kantians and utilitarians have been at one another’s throats for centuries.	柏拉图学派和亚里士多德学派斗争了上千年，康德学派和功利主义学派也针锋相对了几百年。


Such deep theoretical conflicts have real-world consequences, as they impede constructive debate and cooperative action in crisis situations.	如此深刻的理论冲突会产生现实世界后果，它们阻碍危机局面下的建设性争论和合作行动。


Fundamental ideological divisions over the 2003 Iraq war have strained global politics for more than a decade.	对2003年伊拉克战争的根本性意识形态分歧影响了十多年来的全球政治。


Modern political processes and structures are simply not well suited for conducting – much less settling – philosophical disputes.	现代政治进程和结构十分不利于协调——更不用说和解了——哲学争议。


Democratic institutions are designed for making deals between competing interests, with parliaments specializing in finding the right combination of concessions to enable agreement on a generally accepted solution.	民主制度的产生就是为了让竞争的各利益方达成交易，议会就是专门用来寻找正确的让步组合以便在总体可接受的方案上形成一致。


Likewise, international forums like the G-20 exist precisely to persuade a large number of vastly different countries to set aside philosophical questions for the sake of their shared economic, political, or security interests.	类似地，二十国集团等国际论坛之所以存在，也正是为了说服大量截然不同的国家为了共同的经济、政治或安全利益而将哲学问题抛在一边。


Philosophies do not just give a little here and there, blurring over the difficult bits in the hope that everything will work out in the end.	哲学并不只是在这里或那里稍稍退让几步，对难点进行模糊化处理以使最后一切都能通过。


Imagine asking a Kantian to add just a bit of utilitarian calculation to the categorical imperative.	你可以想象一下要求康德学派给绝对命令（categorical imperative）添加一点功利主义。


Of course, resolving a philosophical debate is not impossible.	当然，解决哲学争论也不是不可能的。


It was standard pre-modern practice to overcome such differences with a formal disputation.	通过正式辩论克服这些困难是前现代的标准做法。


In the early sixteenth century, the German princes attempted to settle the philosophical challenge presented by Protestant reformers by engaging Martin Luther to debate a prominent orthodox Catholic theologian, Johannes Eck.	在十六世纪初，德国贵族试图解决新教改革家带来的哲学挑战，他们的办法是把马丁·路德请进争论，与最著名的正统天主教神学家约翰·艾克（Johannes Eck）辩论。


There are not that many modern varieties of this sort of practice, but the 1944 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods comes close.	这种办法在现代难以看到踪迹，但1944年联合国布雷顿森林货币和金融会议庶几接近于此。


By systemically engaging with the economic issues involved in building a viable international system, experts created a new global economic and political order.	通过系统性地引入与建立可行国际体系相关的经济问题，专家们创立��一个新的全球经济和政治秩序。


In a sense, central banks have begun to resemble medieval philosophical faculties, with discussions addressing the issues underlying policy decisions, rather than just the policies themselves.	从某种程度上讲，中央银行已开始模仿中世纪哲学学派，用讨论而不仅是政策本身解决作为政策决定基础的问题。


In the ECB, for example, a debate is underway to determine under which conditions deviation from fiscal orthodoxy might be stabilizing in the long term.	比如，欧洲央行正在展开争论以决定在何种条件下偏离财政正统或许有利于长期稳定。


How that debate is resolved could lead to a new kind of international cooperation.	这一争论如何收场可能会决定一种新型的国际合作。


At a time when political processes are stalled on both sides of the Atlantic, the US Federal Reserve and the ECB have been engaging in a series of policy innovations, feeling their way toward a solution that could promote and sustain economic recovery.	如今，大西洋两岸的政策进程都陷入了停滞，美联储和欧洲央行已经实施了一系列政策创新，寻找可以促进和保持经济复苏的办法。


On this basis, the ECB is recasting itself as the incubator of a new intellectual and philosophical synthesis.	在此基础上，欧洲央行正在重塑自己的身份，试图成为新思想和哲学综合的催化器。


But central banks’ new role as supreme arbiters of policy truth is fraught with hazard.	但中央银行的最高政策真理仲裁者的新角色充满了风险。


Given that the solutions that emerge from their disputations and analyses will be the product of technocratic – not democratic – processes, they are likely to trigger populist backlashes.	由于从它们的纠纷和分析中产生的解决方案是技术官僚——而非民主——进程的产物，因此可能引起民粹主义者的抵制。


Moreover, the policy approaches that central banks produce may be too complex and interlinked to function efficiently.	此外，中央银行所产生的政策方针可能太过复杂，彼此联系太深，无法有效运行。


In particular, the attempt to make expansionary policies conditional on the implementation of a host of microeconomic reforms is problematic.	特别是，让扩张性政策取决于一系列微观经济改革的实施的做法颇有问题。


If only some parts of a complex package linking fiscal leeway with structural reform are realized, the outcome is likely to disappoint – or even prove counterproductive.	要是将财政退路和结构性改革的复杂关系中只实现了一部分，其结果可能令人失望——甚至令生产倒退。


When it does, the old philosophical divisions are likely to resurface.	到那时，旧哲学争论可能会卷土重来。


The ECB’s Faulty Weapon	欧洲央行的错误武器


BRUSSELS – With inflation in the eurozone stubbornly remaining on a downward trajectory, pressure on the European Central Bank to do “something” to prevent outright deflation is growing.	布鲁塞尔— 欧元区通货膨胀难以摆脱下降之势，这给欧洲央行造成了极大的压力，它必须得做“一些事”防止日益严重的通缩。


This “something” is usually understood to be massive asset purchases, or quantitative easing (QE).	“这些事”常常被理解为大规模资产购买，或曰量化宽松（QE）。


But would QE actually do the trick?	但QE真能成功吗？


The discussion has so far followed easily predictable national patterns: Creditor countries do not object to deflation, because it increases the real value of their investment, whereas debtor countries’ repayment burdens would grow heavier.	不难预测，这一讨论目前又陷入了国家模式：债权国不反对通缩，因为这增加了它们的投资的价值； 而债务国的偿债负担会日益沉重。


In a closed economy, to every credit there must a corresponding debt.	在封闭经济中，每一笔债权都必须存在相应的债务。


But consider individual countries: some run a large foreign debt, while others maintain a large creditor position.	但考虑个体国家：一些国家存在巨大的外债，而另一些维持着巨大的债权。


The United States and Germany are at opposite extremes of the creditor-debtor scale.	美国和德国是债权-债务对立的两大极端。


The US, benefiting from the “exorbitant privilege” of issuing debt denominated in its own currency, has run current-account deficits for more than 30 years.	美国受益于用本国货币发行债务的“过度特权”，30多年来维持着巨大的经常项目赤字。


The total foreign debt of US residents (most of which is in US dollars) is above $7 trillion.	美国居民的总外债（大部分用美元计价）超过7万亿美元。


This implies that any reduction in US interest rates would benefit the country as whole, relative to creditor countries, like Germany, where interest income would fall.	这意味着美国的每一次降息都会让整个国家相对于债权国（如德国，其利息收入会随之下降）获益。


Within the eurozone, where until recently external accounts were nearly balanced, a similar creditor/debtor spectrum has emerged, with Germany and the Netherlands at one end, and much of the eurozone south at the other.	在欧元区内部，直到最近其外部账户都保持接近平衡的状态，最近则出现了类似的债权国/债务国问题，德国和荷兰处于一端，大部分欧元区南部国家处于另一端。


This partly explains both the hostile stance toward QE adopted in the German financial press and the over-indebted periphery countries’ increasingly desperate calls for more action by the ECB.	这部分解释了德国财经媒体对QE的敌对立场，而过度负债的外围国声嘶力竭地呼吁欧洲央行采取更多行动。


In the eurozone, however, QE is a questionable response to such calls.	但是，在欧元区，用QE响应这一呼吁大有问题。


QE is a special instrument used when a central bank’s short- and medium-term policy rates are already at zero and it wants to lower long-term interest rates.	QE是一种特殊工具，在央行短期和中期政策利率已经接近于零并且希望降低长期利率时使用。


This implies that QE can be effective only in economies in which changes in long-term (market) interest rates play an important role in the private sector.	这意味着QE只有在长期（市场）利率变化对私人部门影响的重大的经济中才有效。


But this is not the case in Europe, where most investment is financed via bank loans that typically do not have long-term maturities – often less than five years – because banks themselves have little secure long-term financing.	但欧洲并非如此。 在欧洲，大部分投资通过银行贷款融资，这些贷款通常期限并不长——往往小于五年——因为银行本身没有多少可靠的长期资金源。


Moreover, the interests rates charged on these loans are not linked to market rates, but rather to the bank’s refinancing cost, which is already close to zero.	此外，这些贷款的利率并不与市场利率挂钩，而是与银行的再融资成本（已经接近于零）挂钩。


In the eurozone, lower long-term rates for government bonds are thus unlikely to improve the corporate sector’s financing conditions and boost investment demand.	因此，在欧元区，更低的政府债券长期利率无法改善公私部门的融资条件并提振投资需求。


By contrast, in the US, a much larger proportion of investment is financed by issuing bonds, which can have a longer maturity than bank loans.	相反，在美国，用发行债券给投资融资的比例要高得多，而债券的期限比银行贷款更长。


Moreover, these bonds are priced as spreads on the government-bond yield curve, implying that QE will have an immediate impact on enterprises’ financing costs.	此外，这些债券都用与政府债券收益率曲线的利差定价，这意味着QE对公司融资成本具有立竿见影的效果。


For households, the main impact of lower interest rates is felt through mortgages.	对家庭而言，降低利率的主要影响通过按揭被感受到。


But most of southern Europe relies mainly on floating rates.	但南欧大部主要依靠浮动利率。


This implies that QE would not reach, say, Spanish households, whose mortgages are indexed to short-term rates, which are already close to zero.	这意味着QE不会触及（比如）西班牙家庭，因为他们的按揭与已接近于零的短期利率挂钩。


In the US, households have a prepayment option on their mortgages should interest rates fall.	在美国，当利率下降时，家庭可以有还款选择。


Moreover, mortgages are usually securitized. This implies that a fall in the rate at which bundles of mortgages can be sold on the market can have a strong impact on household spending, because lower long-term rates typically lead to waves of mortgage refinancing, leaving households with lower monthly payments – and thus higher disposable income.	此外，按揭往往都被证券化，这意味着按揭包（bundles of mortgages）可在市场上售出的利率的下降对家庭支出具有重大影响，因为下降的长期利率常常会造成按揭再融资波动，降低家庭月供，从而提高可支配收��。


When the central bank buys large amounts of bonds, all asset prices, including housing, tend to increase.	当中央银行大量购买债券时，所有资产（包括房产）价格都倾向于上涨。


Here, too, the US, where higher house prices stimulate consumption, is a misleading example for Europe.	在这方面，高房价刺激消费的美国同样对欧洲起着误导作用。


Owner occupancy rates are high in the US, and the financial system allows households to extract the equity in their homes relatively cheaply, either by second liens or by refinancing the entire mortgage.	在美国，屋主自住率很高，金融体系让家庭可以相对廉价地获得自家房子的权益，可以通过第二留置权（second liens），也可以通过再融资全部按揭。


This is not possible in most of Europe, and especially not in Germany, where loan-to-value limits remain conservative, refinancing is costly, and most banks would frown on any attempt to cash in on “home equity” to finance a vacation or a new car.	这在大部分欧洲国家都不可行，特别是在德国。 德国的贷款/房价比限制相当保守，再融资成本很高，并且大部分银行会拒绝任何试图通过将“房屋权益”套现筹钱度假或买新车的行为。


Moreover, higher house prices and rents distribute income from poorer households (which typically rent) to richer households (which own the houses).	此外，较高的房价和房租使收入从贫穷家庭（往往租房）向富有家庭（拥有自己的房子）转移。


But the poor have a much higher propensity to spend than the rich.	但穷人的消费倾向比富人高得多。


A housing boom in a nation of renters might actually lead to lower aggregate consumption.	租户之国的房地产繁荣实际上可能带来总需求下降。


Differences in financial structure thus matter profoundly in the effort to prevent deflation.	因此，金融结构的差异严重影响着防止通缩措施的效果。


Though QE might work in a debtor economy with a flexible financial system like the US, it could backfire in a creditor economy with a conservative financial system.	尽管QE在美国这样的金融体系灵活的债务国很有效果，但在金融体系饱受的债权经济体很有可能适得其反。


This, rather than the fear that the ECB might end up buying the bonds of untrustworthy governments, is the real argument against QE in the eurozone.	这，而不是担心欧洲央行最终购买的是信誉低下的政府的债券，才是反对欧元区实施QE的真正原因。


Putting Deflation First	把通缩放在首位


CAMBRIDGE – The European Central Bank is moving, hesitantly but ineluctably, toward quantitative easing.	剑桥—欧洲央行正在朝量化宽松行动，虽然动作踯躅，但方向确定。


The threat of deflation – and the ineffectiveness of its previous measures – leaves it no choice.	通缩威胁——以及此前措施的无效——让欧洲央行别无选择。


The question is whether the ECB will be able to move quickly enough.	问题时欧洲央行的动作是否足够快。


The ECB has already attempted to ease credit conditions by purchasing high-quality asset-backed securities.	欧洲央行已经开始尝试通过购买高品质资产支持证券放松信用条件。


It has bought securities backed by cash flows from private-sector mortgages, so-called covered bonds, and it has floated the idea of buying corporate bonds and multilateral securities issued by the European Investment Bank.	它购买以私人部门按揭贷款现金流为支持的证券——所谓的有担保债券，还提出了购买公司债券和欧洲投资银行发行的多边证券的想法。


But it is clear that this will not be enough.	但显然这是不够的。


Supplies of private-sector securities are limited, reflecting the dominance of bank lending in Europe and depressed sentiment in securitization markets.	私人部门证券供给有限，反映出欧洲银行贷款的指导地位以及证券化市场的沮丧情绪。


Augmenting the supply of such securities will take time, which is not something European policymakers possess.	扩大这类证券的供给需要时间，而时间正是欧洲决策者所缺少的。


For all these reasons, purchasing private-sector securities alone will not enable the ECB to achieve its stated goal of expanding its balance sheet by €1 trillion ($1.2 trillion).	出于这些理由，光是购买私人部门证券无法让欧洲央行实现其所宣称的将资产负债表扩大1万亿欧元的目标。


Unable to vanquish the specter of deflation, ECB President Mario Draghi will need to continue working to build a consensus – even better, unanimity – within the bank’s governing board for purchases of government bonds.	无法克服通缩幽灵，欧洲央行行长德拉吉就需要继续致力于构建欧洲央行董事会的共识——全体一致的共识更好——以购买政府债券。


But Draghi and his colleagues will proceed in small steps, given fears in Germany that quantitative easing is just another name for runaway inflation.	但德拉吉和他的同事们只能小步前进，因为德国担心量化宽松只不过是剧烈通胀的代名词。


Initially, the ECB will buy a small volume of government bonds; when this fails to produce economic Armageddon, it will begin to scale up its purchases.	一开始，欧洲央行将购买小量政府债券； 若无法造成经济大决战，就将扩大购买量。


We can expect to see the first of these baby steps in January.	预计我们将在1月看到第一批小动作。


The problem is that this kind of incrementalism will not work.	问题在于这一渐进主义不会奏效。


When the problem is deflation, quantitative easing will help only by transforming expectations.	问题是通缩，量化宽松只有通过改变预期才能起作用。


When deflationary expectations are entrenched, as they are in Europe today, consumers and investors delay spending on the ground that prices and costs will be lower tomorrow.	当通缩预期根深蒂固时——目前的欧洲就是如此——消费者和投资者就会推迟支出，以期明天的价格和成本会更低。


Those expectations become self-fulfilling, because less spending means even less inflation and, in the worst case, falling prices.	这一预期会自我实现，因为支出减少意味着更少的通胀——甚至价格下跌。


Deflationary expectations can be transformed into inflationary expectations – thereby encouraging more spending – only by policies that induce shock and awe.	通缩预期可以转变为通胀预期——从而鼓励增加支出。 这只有通过制造震惊和畏惧的政策才能实现。


Dramatic measures are needed to convince households and firms that the future will be different from the past.	需要大手笔措施让家庭和企业相信未来会不同于今日。


The central bank needs to convince them that it will do “whatever it takes,” as Draghi put it in July 2012, to jolt the economy out of its deflationary lethargy.	欧洲央行需要让他们相信，如德拉吉在2012年7月所言，它会“竭尽全力”把经济带出通缩陷阱。


That is what the Bank of Japan, under Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, is attempting to do.	日本银行正在行长黑田东彦的带领下朝这个方向努力。


But the ECB seems temperamentally incapable of adopting the same approach, given fear and loathing in northern Europe of radical monetary action.	但欧洲央行暂时还无法采取相同的方针，因为北欧担心和厌恶激进的货币政策。


Opponents of quantitative easing worry that it augurs inflation – a peculiar position, given the European economy’s current slack.	量化宽松的反对者担心它带来通胀——这个立场有些奇怪，因为当前的欧洲经济颇为松弛。


They worry that securities purchases will sow the seeds of another financial bubble and bust.	他们担心购买证券会埋下新一轮金融泡沫和破裂的种子。


This too, is a peculiar fear, given that financial markets are now subject to much more stringent regulation.	这一担忧也有些奇怪，因为金融市场目前面临着严格得多的监管。


The most influential objection to quantitative easing is that it will relieve the pressure on European governments to reform.	对量化宽松最有影响力的反对是这会放松欧洲政府的改革压力。


According to this moral-hazard argument, the authorities will push ahead with painful labor- and product-market reforms and pursue the fiscal consolidation needed to gain the confidence of investors only if they remain under the gun.	根据这一道德风险观点，只有在仍需面对枪口时，当局才会推动痛苦的劳动力和产品市场改革并追求必要的财政整合以争取投资者的信心。


If the ECB purchases their bonds, governments will be able to ignore market pressure.	如果欧洲央行购买它们的债券，各国政府就可以无视市场压力。


In fact, those who advance this view – which is the most powerful obstacle to radical ECB action – have their analysis upside down.	事实上，持这一观点的人——他们是欧洲央行采取激进行动的最强大的障碍——采用了自上而下的分析。


Under current conditions, with the inflation rate dangerously close to zero, governments are reluctant to do anything that increases the risk of deflation.	在当前条件下，通胀率接近于零，这一情况十分危险，政府不愿采取任何可能增加通缩风险的动作。


And structural reform and fiscal consolidation are both deflationary in the short run.	而从短期看，结构改革和财政整合都有通缩作用。


Fiscal consolidation means less public spending.	财政整合意味着减少公共支出。


And less spending means less upward pressure on prices – which is the last thing Europe needs in a deflationary environment.	而减少支出意味着减小价格上涨压力——在通缩环境下，欧洲最不愿看到的就是这一情况。


Structural reform that increases the flexibility of labor and product markets is deflationary as well.	增加劳动力和产品市场灵活性的结构改革也有通缩作用。


Enhancing wage flexibility in an environment in which unemployment exceeds 11% will allow firms to cut wages, and lower labor costs will permit them to cut prices in an effort to gain market share.	在失业率超过11%的情况下强工资灵活性将使企业削减工资，而更低的劳动力成本令他们可以通过降低价格争夺市场份额。


Deregulation that intensifies product-market competition will similarly lead to lower prices (that being what competition does).	加剧产品市场竞争的去监管化也会类似地导致价格下降（竞争的结果）。


In other circumstances, these would be positive outcomes.	在其他环境中，这些可能是积极的结果。


Indeed, Europe does stand to reap significant benefits from fiscal consolidation and structural reform – but in the long run, not in the short run, when the problem is deflation.	事实上，欧洲确实可以从财政整合和机构改革中获益良多——但是在长期，而不是在面临内通缩问题的短期。


And European governments know it.	欧洲政府也知道这一点。


It follows that the best thing the ECB could do to encourage fiscal consolidation and structural reform is to banish the specter of deflation.	据此，欧洲央行能够鼓励财政整合和结构改革的最佳办法是驱逐通缩幽灵。


Only full-bore quantitative easing can do that.	只有全面量化宽松可以做到。


Those who object that such audacity would discourage fiscal consolidation and structural reform should consider what deflation would do.	那些表示反对、认为如此大胆的行为会阻挠财政整合和结构改革的人应该思考一下通缩会带来什么。


The Lemmings of QE	QE者，负鼠也


NEW HAVEN – Predictably, the European Central Bank has joined the world’s other major monetary authorities in the greatest experiment in the history of central banking.	纽黑文—欧洲央行可预见地加入了世界其他货币当局行列，开始了史上最大央行业务实验。


By now, the pattern is all too familiar.	到目前为止，一切都是那么熟悉。


First, central banks take the conventional policy rate down to the dreaded “zero bound.”	首先，央行将常规政策利率下降到可怕的“零下限”。


Facing continued economic weakness, but having run out of conventional tools, they then embrace the unconventional approach of quantitative easing (QE).	但经济继续萎靡，而常规工具已经用尽，于是央行采取了非常规方法——量化宽松（QE）。


The theory behind this strategy is simple: Unable to cut the price of credit further, central banks shift their focus to expanding its quantity.	这一战略背后的理论很简单：央行无法让信用的价格进一步降低，转向了扩张信用的数量。


The implicit argument is that this move from price to quantity adjustments is the functional equivalent of additional monetary-policy easing.	隐含观点是这一从价格到数量调整的变化在作用上等同于增加货币政策宽松。


Thus, even at the zero bound of nominal interest rates, it is argued, central banks still have weapons in their arsenal.	因此，即使名义利率处于零下限，央行手里仍有武器。


But are those weapons up to the task?	但这些武器可适用于它的任务吗？


For the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), both of which are facing formidable downside risks to their economies and aggregate price levels, this is hardly an idle question.	对欧洲央行和日本银行来说，它们都面临可怕的经济和总物价水平的下行风险，这绝不是一个可以等闲视之的问题。


For the United States, where the ultimate consequences of QE remain to be seen, the answer is just as consequential.	对美国来说，它的量化宽松最终后果还有待观察，答案也仍然有待揭露。


QE’s impact hinges on the “three Ts” of monetary policy: transmission (the channels by which monetary policy affects the real economy); traction (the responsiveness of economies to policy actions); and time consistency (the unwavering credibility of the authorities’ promise to reach specified targets like full employment and price stability).	量化宽松的影响取决于货币政策的“3T”：传递（transmission，货币政策影响实体经济的渠道）； 牵引（traction，经济对货币政策的反应）和时间一致性（time consistency，当局实现充分就业和物价稳定等具体承诺目标的坚定信心）。


Notwithstanding financial markets’ celebration of QE, not to mention the US Federal Reserve’s hearty self-congratulation, an analysis based on the three Ts should give the ECB pause.	尽管金融市场欢呼量化宽松的到来，更不用说美联储的踌躇满志，但基于3T的分析表明欧洲央行应该三思而后行。


In terms of transmission, the Fed has focused on the so-called wealth effect.	从传递角度看，美联储的重点在所谓的财富效应。


First, the balance-sheet expansion of some $3.6 trillion since late 2008 – which far exceeded the $2.5 trillion in nominal GDP growth over the QE period – boosted asset markets.	首先，自2008年底以来，美联储资产负债表扩张了3. 6万亿美元——远远高于量化宽松期间名义GDP的增长规模2.


It was assumed that the improvement in investors’ portfolio performance – reflected in a more than threefold rise in the S&P 500 from its crisis-induced low in March 2009 – would spur a burst of spending by increasingly wealthy consumers.	5万亿美元——这提振了资产市场。 人们认为投资者投资组合表现的改善——标准普尔500指数从其2009年危机导致的底部反弹了三倍多——将让消费者财富增加，从而刺激支出。


The BOJ has used a similar justification for its own policy of quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE).	日本银行也用类似的理由论证其量化和定性宽松（QQE）政策。


The ECB, however, will have a harder time making the case for wealth effects, largely because equity ownership by individuals (either direct or through their pension accounts) is far lower in Europe than in the US or Japan.	但是，欧洲央行要形成财富效应更加困难，这主要是因为欧洲个人持有股票（不管是直接持有还是通过养老金账户持有）规模远小于美国和日本。


For Europe, monetary policy seems more likely to be transmitted through banks, as well as through the currency channel, as a weaker euro – it has fallen some 15% against the dollar over the last year – boosts exports.	对欧洲来说，货币政策更可能通过银行传递，而随着欧元贬值提振出口——欧元兑美元汇率去年下跌了15%——则货币也是一个传递渠道。


The real sticking point for QE relates to traction.	量化宽松的真正症结在于牵引。


The US, where consumption accounts for the bulk of the shortfall in the post-crisis recovery, is a case in point.	在美国，消费是危机后复苏疲软的主要原因，这正说明了牵引因素的重要性。


In an environment of excess debt and inadequate savings, wealth effects have done very little to ameliorate the balance-sheet recession that clobbered US households when the property and credit bubbles burst.	在债务过多和储蓄不足的环境下，财富效应对于改善资产负债表衰退作用甚微。 当房产和信用泡沫破裂时，资产负债表衰退令美国家庭遭受重创。


Indeed, annualized real consumption growth has averaged just 1.3% since early 2008.	事实上，2008年初以来年化平均真实消费增长率只有1. 3%。


With the current recovery in real GDP on a trajectory of 2.3% annual growth – two percentage points below the norm of past cycles – it is tough to justify the widespread praise of QE.	当前，真实GDP复苏每年大约在2. 3%——比过去周期的正常水平低两个百分点——很难认为对量化宽松的普遍赞扬理所应当。


Japan’s massive QQE campaign has faced similar traction problems.	日本的大规模量化和定性宽松也面临着类似的牵引问题。


After expanding its balance sheet to nearly 60% of GDP – double the size of the Fed’s – the BOJ is finding that its campaign to end deflation is increasingly ineffective.	日本银行将其资产负债表规模扩大至GDP的近60%——比美联储还要高一倍——但它发现，其结束通缩的努力正在日益失效。


Japan has lapsed back into recession, and the BOJ has just cut the inflation target for this year from 1.7% to 1%.	日本再次陷入了衰退，而日本银行也刚刚将今年通胀目标从1. 7%调低到1%。


Finally, QE also disappoints in terms of time consistency.	最后，量化宽松的时间一致性也令人失望。


The Fed has long qualified its post-QE normalization strategy with a host of data-dependent conditions pertaining to the state of the economy and/or inflation risks.	美联储一直用一套描述经济和/或通胀风险状态的基于数据的条件论证其后量化宽松时期的正常化战略。


Moreover, it is now relying on ambiguous adjectives to provide guidance to financial markets, having recently shifted from stating that it would maintain low rates for a “considerable” time to pledging to be “patient" in determining when to raise rates.	此外，目前美联储依靠模棱两可的形容词为金融市场提供指引，最近将表述从保持“相当长”时间的低利率变为承诺“耐心”地决定何时提高利率。


But it is the Swiss National Bank, which printed money to prevent excessive appreciation after pegging its currency to the euro in 2011, that has thrust the sharpest dagger into QE’s heart.	但瑞士国民银行才是刺入量化宽松心脏的最锋利的利刃。 自2011年瑞郎盯住欧元以来，瑞士国民银行通过印钱防止瑞郎过度升值。


By unexpectedly abandoning the euro peg on January 15 – just a month after reiterating a commitment to it – the once-disciplined SNB has run roughshod over the credibility requirements of time consistency.	1月15日，瑞士国民银行出人意料地宣布放弃盯住欧元——一个月前它还在重申盯住欧元的承诺——曾经严守纪律的瑞士国民银行已经顾不上时间一致性的信誉要求了。


With the SNB’s assets amounting to nearly 90% of Switzerland’s GDP, the reversal raises serious questions about both the limits and repercussions of open-ended QE.	瑞士国民银行的资产接近瑞士GDP的90%，它的“反水”给无期限的量化宽松的界限和作用造成了严重问题。


And it serves as a chilling reminder of the fundamental fragility of promises like that of ECB President Mario Draghi to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro.	并且这是一次无情的提醒，让人们留心欧洲央行行长德拉吉“不惜一切代价”拯救欧元之类的承诺。


In the QE era, monetary policy has lost any semblance of discipline and coherence.	在量化宽松时期，货币政策撕去了纪律和连贯性的伪装。


As Draghi attempts to deliver on his nearly two-and-a-half-year-old commitment, the limits of his promise – like comparable assurances by the Fed and the BOJ – could become glaringly apparent.	随着德拉吉尝试兑现他在近两年半前许下的承诺，该承诺的界限——如美联储和日本银行的可以比较的保证——可以变得更加明确。


Like lemmings at the cliff’s edge, central banks seem steeped in denial of the risks they face.	中央银行就像是悬崖边的负鼠，完全无视它们面临的风险。


The ECB and Its Critics	欧洲央行和它的批评者


PARIS – In Northern Europe, especially Germany, the European Central Bank’s decision to embark on quantitative easing (QE) has triggered an avalanche of indictments.	巴黎—在北欧，特别是德国，欧洲央行决定采取量化宽松引起了舆论大哗。


Many are unfounded or even baseless.	许多指责毫无根据甚至是无稽之谈。


Some are confusing.	一些人则弄混了情况。


Others give greater weight to speculative dangers than to actual ones.	也有人过于重视猜测的危险而忽视了实际危险。


And few point to real problems, while ignoring potential solutions.	几乎没有人谈论实际问题，也忽视了潜在解决方案。


Judging by the criticism, one might consider zero inflation a blessing.	从批评看，你也许会认为零通胀是一种幸福。


But if that were true, central banks around the world would have set it as a target long ago.	但若果真如此的话，全世界的央行早就将零利率作为它们的目标了。


Instead, all of them define price stability as low, stable, but positive inflation.	相反，所有央行都将物价稳定定义为较低、稳定但为正的通胀。


That is because zero inflation has three overwhelmingly negative consequences.	这是因为零通胀存在三个巨大的消极作用。


First, it erodes the effectiveness of standard monetary policy (because if interest rates went much below zero, depositors would withdraw cash from banks and put it in safes).	首先，它破坏标准货币政策的效果（因为如果利率远低于零，存款人就会将现金从银行中抽出放入保险箱）。


Second, it makes relative wages (of, say, manufacturing versus services employees) more rigid, because wage contracts are generally set in euro terms.	其次，它让相对工资（比如制造业相对服务业的工资）更加刚性，因为工资合同常常根据欧元确定。


And, third, it increases the burden of past debts and makes exiting from a private or public debt crisis even more painful.	第三，它增加了过去的债务的负担，让解决公私债务危机的过程变得更加痛苦。


But, say the critics, there is no reason to worry, because the eurozone’s near-zero inflation is merely the result of the sharp drop in oil prices.	但是，批评者说，没有理由需要担心，因为欧元区的近零通胀只不过是因为石油价格的暴跌。


Unfortunately, there is indeed plenty of reason to worry.	不幸的是，确实存在许多理由需要担心。


Consumer price inflation in the eurozone has been below target for 22 consecutive months – long before the price of oil started collapsing.	欧元区消费物价通胀已经连续22个月低于目标值——远远先于油价开始崩溃。 廉价石油是增长的助推剂；


Cheaper oil is a boon for growth; but it also lowers long-term inflation expectations, which are the true target of monetary policy.	但它也降低了长期通胀预期，而长期通胀预期才是货币政策的真正目标。


Then there is the critics’ claim that below-target inflation is needed to restore competitiveness.	批评者还说，低于目标的通胀是重塑竞争力的必要条件。


This is just confusing.	这纯属混淆视听。


It is true that rebalancing competitiveness within the eurozone has not yet been completed, and that some countries thus need to record below-average inflation to cut above-average costs.	诚然，实现欧元区内部竞争力的再平衡还远未完成，一些国家因此需要低于平均值的通胀以降低高于平均值的成本。


But this is not true of the eurozone as a whole.	但对欧元区整体来说，这一点并不成立。


Eurozone-wide competitiveness depends on product quality and the euro exchange rate, which is flexible.	泛欧元区竞争力取决于产品质量和欧元汇率，这两者都是灵活变化的。


Inflation is irrelevant in this respect.	从这个角度讲，通胀是一个无关因素。


Nonetheless, the ECB’s critics fear the sorcerer’s apprentice: monetary initiatives like QE will ultimately cause runaway inflation.	尽管如此，欧洲央行批评者担心魔法师的学徒（sorcerer’s apprentice）：量化宽松这样的货币动作最终会导致通胀失控。


This reasoning is strange, at best.	这其中的逻辑可谓怪异。


If the critics’ point is that central banks make mistakes, it seems worth pointing out that the mistake made in the eurozone was to let inflation reach excessively low levels.	如果批评者的要点是央行犯了错，那么应该指出欧元区的错误是让通胀过低才对。


Now the ECB is reacting with force, but, as Japanese policymakers have found, exiting from deflation is far from easy.	如今，欧洲央行正在奋起反击，但如日本决策者所看到的，摆脱通胀绝非易事。


ECB President Mario Draghi may fail to bring inflation back to 2%.	欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）也许无法让通胀回升到2%。


Or he may overshoot.	或者他可能用力过猛。


Nobody knows.	没人知道。


But it is odd to claim that a speculative danger should prevent the ECB from fighting one that is all too real.	但更大的概率是猜测的威胁将阻止欧洲央行与实实在在的危险搏斗。


Then comes the claim that QE is illegal.	接下来看看量化宽松不合法的说法。


But the ECB’s primary responsibility is to achieve and maintain price stability.	但欧洲央行的主要责任是实现并维持物价稳定。


When conventional interest-rate policy becomes impotent, its duty is to rely on other instruments.	当常规利率政策不再有效时，它就有义务祭出其他工具。


The purchase of government bonds is explicitly authorized by the EU Treaty.	购买政府债券是欧盟条约明文允许的。


This is not to say that QE has no downside.	这并不是说量化宽松没有弊端。


It probably will create asset-price bubbles.	它可能造成资产价格泡沫。


Ultra-low interest rates lift asset prices in two ways: they increase the present value of the future income stream of a stock or a fixed-income bond; and they make credit and property purchases more affordable.	极低利率通过两��方式推高资产价格：它们增加股票或固定收入债券的未来收入流的现值； 它们让获得信用和购买房产变得更加容易负担。


So asset-price inflation is likely, and policymakers will have to contain it through regulatory tools, such as credit limits.	因此，资产价格通胀有可能发生，决策者必须通过监管工具（如信用上限）遏制这一风险。


Moreover, QE probably will increase inequality.	此外，量化宽松可能加剧不平等。


The rise in the price of stocks, bonds, and land will increase their owners’ wealth.	股票、债券和土地价格的上涨将增加拥有者的财富。


Obviously, those without property will not benefit.	显然，无房户就无从从中获利。


But the ECB’s monetary initiative will also help reignite growth and create jobs, thereby benefiting the poor.	但欧洲央行的货币动作也有助于助推增长、创造就业，从而让穷人获益。


It is governments’ task to address the rise in inequality resulting from QE, and they have an instrument for that: taxation.	解决因量化宽松导致的不平等是政府的任务，而它们也拥有完成这一任务的工具：税收。


When the United States Federal Reserve embarked on QE, it was accused of exporting its problems, because aggressive monetary easing inevitably weakens the currency. The same charge is now being leveled against the ECB. But this is misleading.	美联储采取量化宽松时，有人指责它在输出问题，因为激进的货币宽松难免会令货币贬值。 如今，同样的指责对准了欧洲央行。


Ultimately, the US recovery helped its trade partners more than it hurt them.	但这是错误的。 最终，美国的复苏给其贸易伙伴带来的好处超过了弊端。


In today’s world of global monetary interdependence, the rule of the game is that every currency union should pursue its own price stability.	在全球货币互相依存的当今世界，游戏规则是每一个货币联盟都必须追求其自身的物价稳定。


The ECB has not departed from this standard.	欧洲央行也不例外。


Another major concern in Germany is that QE could be a backdoor means of creating Eurobonds.	德国的另一个主要担忧是量化宽松可能成为创立欧元债券的后门。


But a Eurobond is a pact among issuers offering each other mutual guarantees.	但欧元债券是发行人之间彼此互相提供担保的契约。


The ECB, however, is not an issuer; it is an independent agency, and the decision to buy is its own.	而欧洲央行并非发行人； 它是一个独立机构，购买决策由其自主做出。


Furthermore, 80% of the risk will be borne by national central banks individually.	此外，80%的风险将由国家央行分别承担。


Northern European opposition to Eurobonds reflects moral-hazard concerns that monetary activism will discourage structural reforms.	北欧对欧元债券的反对体现了对货币积极主义可能阻挠结构改革的道德风险担忧。


But, in the current context of protracted stagnation, the TINA (there is no alternative) argument for reform is losing strength by the day.	但是，在当前长期停滞的背景下，TINA（没有替代方案）的改革观点正在日益式微。


Absent a visible payoff, reform fatigue is setting in.	在看不见回报的情况下，改革疲劳正在日益出现。


The new policy mix should combine macro-level support and micro-level change.	新政策组合应该兼顾宏观层面的支持和微观层面的变革。


The argument that QE will destroy fiscal discipline cannot be rejected out of hand, because both its proponents and its adversaries seem to agree that its days are over.	认为量化宽松将破坏财政纪律的观点无法彻底排除，因为其支持者和反对者都同意财政纪律的时代已经过去了。


But, though it is true that ECB bond purchases will shelter governments from market pressure, such pressure was already fairly ineffective.	但是，尽管欧洲央行的债券购买计划确实能缓和政府的市场压力，但这一压力已经没有什么效果。


It is governments’ job to uphold their end of the bargain and ensure that they do not shirk their responsibilities.	保守信用和保证不推脱责任是政府的指责。


This is what the EU’s “fiscal compact” is for.	这也是欧盟“财政契约”的目的。


Finally, German critics complain that the ECB’s monetary policy is not geared to German economic conditions.	最后，德国批评者抱怨欧洲央行的货币政策不与德国的经济状况相契合。


This is both true and unavoidable.	确实如此，但这是不可避免的。


The ECB is responsible for the eurozone as a whole.	欧洲央行要对欧元区整体负责。


Its monetary policy cannot be perfectly suited to all members’ needs all of the time.	其货币政策不可能随时完美契合所有成员国的需要。


For the euro’s first ten years, the ECB’s policy was too lax for Spain; now it is too lax for Germany.	对欧元的第一个十年来说，欧洲央行的政策对西班牙太宽松了； 如今则是对德国太宽松了。


The ECB should not be blamed for doing its job.	不应该因此指责欧洲央行。


The ECB’s New Macroeconomic Realism	欧洲央行的新宏观经济现实主义


NEW YORK – The European Central Bank has finally launched a policy of quantitative easing (QE).	纽约—欧洲央行终于启动了量化宽松（QE）政策。


The key question at this stage is whether Germany will give the ECB the freedom of maneuver needed to carry out this monetary expansion with sufficient boldness.	现阶段的关键问题是德国是否会给予欧洲央行所需要的方便，使其以足够的力度实施货币扩张。


Though QE cannot produce long-term growth, it can do much to end the ongoing recession that has gripped the eurozone since 2008.	尽管 QE不能带来长期增长，但它大大有利于结束自2008年以来让欧元区饱受折磨的衰退。


The record-high stock-market levels in Europe this week, in anticipation of QE, not only indicate growing confidence, but are also a direct channel by which monetary easing can boost both investment and consumption.	本周，在QE预期下，欧洲股市创出历史新高，这不但表明市场信心增加，也是货币宽松提振投资和消费的直接渠道。


But some observers, such as Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman and former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, continue to doubt whether QE can really be effective.	但一些观察家，如诺贝尔奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）和前美国财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯（Larry Summers），依然质疑QE是否真的有用。


As Krugman recently put it, a “deflationary vortex” is dragging down much of the world economy, with falling prices causing an inescapable downward spiral in demand.	克鲁格曼最近表示，一个“通缩漩涡”正在拖累世界经济大部，下跌的物价导致了无法摆脱的需求下降螺旋。


The World Bank and International Monetary Fund seem to agree, as both recently lowered their growth forecasts a few notches.	世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）似乎也同意这一点，两家机构最近又都再度调低了增长预期。


Pessimists argue that the world economy suffers from an insurmountable shortage of aggregate demand, leading to a new “secular stagnation.”	悲观派指出，世界经济受制于难以克服的总需求不足，导致新的“长期停滞”。


Monetary policy is seen to be relatively ineffective, owing to the notorious zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates.	货币政策被视为相对无效，因为名义利率存在著名的零下限（zero lower bound）。


With policy interest rates near zero, the argument goes, central banks are more or less helpless to escape the deflationary vortex, and economies become stuck in the infamous liquidity trap.	这一观点指出，在政策利率接近于零的情况下，央行对于通胀漩涡或多或少会产生无力感，经济也会陷入著名的流动性陷阱。


In this scenario, the demand insufficiency feeds on itself, pushing down prices, raising real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates, and lowering demand further.	在这一情形中，需求无法有效地自我强化，于是拉低物价、提高实际（经通胀调整的）利率，并进一步抑制需求。


This perspective has been prominent among Keynesian economists in the United States and the United Kingdom since 2008.	自2008年以来，这一观点在美国和英国的凯恩斯主义经济学家中占据了主流。


Krugman argues that Japan was only the first of the major economies to succumb to chronic deflation, back in the 1990s, and has now been followed by the European Union, China, and most recently Switzerland, with its soaring franc and falling prices.	克鲁格曼认为日本曾经是唯一陷入慢性通胀的主要经济体——从20世纪90年代便已如此，而如今欧盟、中国以及最近的瑞士（从高企的瑞郎和下跌的物价看）纷纷步了日本后尘。


The US, in this view, remains near the vortex as well, prompting the Keynesians’ repeated calls for more fiscal stimulus, which, unlike monetary policy, is seen by the pessimists to be especially efficacious at the ZLB.	从这一观点看，美国也仍处于这一漩涡附近，因此急需凯恩斯主义者一再呼吁的财政刺激。 财政刺激与货币政策不同，悲观派认为它在零利率下限特别有效。


In my view, the pessimists have exaggerated the risks of deflation, which is why their recent forecasts have missed the mark.	在我看来，悲观派夸大了通缩风险，这也是他们最近预测失准的原因。


Most notably, they failed to predict the rebound in both the US and the UK, with growth rising and unemployment falling even as deficits were cut.	最令人瞩目的是，他们没能预测到美国和英国的反弹。 美国和英国出现了增长加速和失业下降，即使它们削减了赤字。


Without a proper diagnosis of the 2008 crisis, an effective cure cannot be prescribed.	要不是准确地诊断了2008年危机，是无法开出有效的药方的。


The pessimists believe that there has been a large decline in the will to invest, something like the loss of “animal spirits” described by Keynes.	悲观派认为投资意愿出现了大幅下降，凯恩斯所谓的“动物精神”损失惨重。


Even with very low interest rates, according to this view, investment demand will remain low, and therefore aggregate demand will remain insufficient.	根据这一观点，即使利率极低，投资需求也将保持低水平，因此总需求也会依然不足。


Deflation will make matters worse, leaving only large fiscal deficits able to close the demand gap.	通缩将进一步恶化形势，只有大规模财政赤字才能填补需求缺口。


But the causes of 2008’s deep downturn were more specific, and the solutions must be more targeted.	但2008年深度衰退的原因要更加具体，解决办法也必须更有目标性。


A large housing bubble preceded the 2008 crisis in the hardest-hit countries (the US, the UK, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy).	2008年危机前，受影响最大国家出现了大规模房地产泡沫（美国、英国、爱尔兰、西班牙、葡萄牙和意大利）。


As Friedrich Hayek warned back in the 1930s, the consequences of such a process of misplaced investment take time to resolve, owing to the subsequent oversupply of specific capital (in this case, of the housing stock).	哈耶克在20实际30年代就警告说，这一投资不当过程的后果需要时间才能消化，因为随后会发生具体资本(在这个案例中是房地产存量)会出现过度供给。


Yet far more devastating than the housing bubble was the financial panic that gripped capital markets worldwide after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.	但比房地产泡沫破坏力更大的是雷曼兄弟倒闭后发生的席卷全球资本市场的金融恐慌。


The decision by the US Federal Reserve and the US Treasury to teach the markets a lesson by allowing Lehman to fail was a disastrously bad call.	美联储和美国财政部决定给市场一个教训，放任雷曼兄弟倒闭，这是特别糟糕的信号。


The panic was sharp and severe, requiring central banks to play their fundamental role as lenders of last resort.	恐慌剧烈而严重，央行不得不行使其最后贷款人的基本作用。


As poorly as the Fed performed in the years preceding the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, it performed splendidly well afterward, by flooding the markets with liquidity to break the panic.	美联储在雷曼兄弟倒闭的前几年中表现拙劣，而在此之后表现特别出色，向市场注入大量流动性遏制了恐慌。


So, too, did the Bank of England, though it was a bit slower to react.	英格兰银行亦然，尽管其反应速度稍慢一些。


The Bank of Japan and the ECB were, characteristically, the slowest to react, keeping their policy rates higher for longer, and not undertaking QE and other extraordinary liquidity measures until late in the day.	按惯例，日本银行和欧洲央行反应最慢，在更长的时间里保持了更高的政策利率，没有采取QE和其他扩大流动性的措施，直到现在才幡然悔悟。


Indeed, it required new leaders in both institutions – Haruhiko Kuroda at the BOJ and Mario Draghi at the ECB – finally to set monetary policy right.	事实上，这要求两家机构的新领导人——日本银行的黑田东彦和欧洲央行的马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)——最终开始指定正确的货币政策。


The good news is that, even near the ZLB, monetary policy works.	好消息是，即使在零利率下限，货币政策仍然有效。


QE raises equity prices; lowers long-term interest rates; causes currencies to depreciate; and eases credit crunches, even when interest rates are near zero.	QE提高了股价，降低了长期利率，让货币发生贬值，也舒缓了信贷动荡，即使利率已经接近于零。


The ECB and the BOJ did not suffer from a lack of reflationary tools; they suffered from a lack of suitable action.	欧洲央行和日本银行没有因为再通胀工具不足而受损，它们因为没有采取足够的合适行动而受损。


The efficacy of monetary policy is good news, because fiscal stimulus is a weak instrument for short-term demand management.	货币政策起效是一个好消息，因为财政刺激对短期需求管理而言不是一个强力工具。


Ironically, in an influential 1998 paper, Krugman explained why.	讽刺的是，在著名的1998 年的文章中，克鲁格曼解释过个中缘由。


He argued at that time, and rightly in my view, that short-term tax reductions and transfers would be partly saved, not spent, and that public debt would multiply and create a long-term shadow over the fiscal balance and the economy.	当时他指出——也正如我意——短期减税和转移支付会部分地储蓄起来而不是花掉，而公共债务会成倍增长，给财政平衡和经济带来长期影响。


Even if interest rates are currently low, he noted, they will rise, thereby increasing the debt-service burden on the newly accumulated debt.	即使目前利率处于低位，他说，它们也终会上升，从而增加新增债务的偿付负担。


With all major central banks pursuing expansionary monetary policies, oil prices falling sharply, and the ongoing revolution in information technology spurring investment opportunities, the prospects for economic growth in 2015 and beyond are better than they look to the pessimists.	在所有主要央行纷纷追求扩张性货币政策的情况下，石油价格迅速下跌，而信息技术的持续进步刺激了投资机会，因此2015年及以后的经济增长前景要好于悲观者的意见。


There are rising profits, reasonable investment prospects for businesses, a large backlog on infrastructure spending almost everywhere in Europe and the US, and the opportunity to finance capital-goods exports to low-income regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, and to meet the worldwide need for investment in a new, low-carbon energy system. 	上升的利润，合理的企业投资前景，欧洲和美国几乎所有国家都存在的基础设施支出的巨大不足，向撒哈拉以南非洲等低收入地区出口资本品的融资机会和满足全球投资低碳新能源体系需要的机会，这些都是乐观的理由。


If there is a shortfall of private investment, the problem is not really a lack of good projects; it is the lack of policy clarity and complementary long-term public investment.	如果私人投资存在短缺，问题不在于真的缺少好项目； 而在于缺少政策明确性和互补性长期公共投资。


European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s plan to finance long-term investments in Europe by leveraging relatively small amounts of public funds to unlock large flows of private capital is therefore an important step in the right direction.	因此，欧盟委员会主席让-克劳德·容克计划以相对较小数量的公共资金解放大规模私人资本流，以此为欧洲长期投资提供资金，这是迈向正确方向的重要一步。


Obviously, we should not underestimate the capacity of policymakers to make a bad situation worse (for example, by pressing Greek debt service beyond the limits of social tolerance).	显然，我们不应该低估政决策者让不利局面更加恶化的能力（比如增加希腊偿债压力导致社会无法容忍）。


But we should recognize that the main threats to growth this year, such as the unresolved Greek debt crisis, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and turmoil in the Middle East, are more geopolitical than macroeconomic in nature.	但我们应该认识到，今年的主要增长威胁，比如未解决的希腊债务危机、俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突和中东动荡等，在性质上更加偏向地缘政治问题而不是宏观经济问题。


In 2015, wise diplomacy and wise monetary policy can create a path to prosperity.	2015年，明智的外交和明智的货币政策可以带来繁荣之路。


Broad recovery is within reach if we manage both ingredients well.	广泛的复苏就在伸手可及的地方，只要我们能够很好地结合这两大因素。


The Drag on E-Cigarettes	电子烟草的拖累


RENNES – Michael Russell and Murray Jarvik, two pioneers of smoking-cessation research in the 1970s, would probably have welcomed the development of the electronic cigarette or “personal nicotine vaporizer” (PNV).	雷恩—20世纪70年代戒烟研究先驱迈克尔·罗素（Michael Russell）和穆雷·哈维克（Murray Jarvik）也许会欢迎电子香烟或“个人尼古丁蒸馏器”（personal nicotine vaporizer，PNV）的开发。


Beyond serving as a temporary aid for people attempting to quit smoking cigarettes, such new nicotine-delivery systems could act as long-term alternatives to tobacco – making it possible to eliminate tobacco consumption almost entirely.	这一新型尼古丁提供系统除了可以作为戒烟者的临时辅助手段，也可以成为烟草的长期替代品——让几乎完全消灭烟草消费成为可能。


We have long known that people smoke for the nicotine, but die from the smoke.	我们早就知道，人们为尼古丁而吸烟，但死于烟雾。


Indeed, the vast majority of cigarette-related diseases and deaths arise from the inhalation of tar particles and toxic gases, including carbon monoxide.	事实上，绝大部分烟草相关疾病和死亡是因为吸入了焦油颗粒和包括一氧化碳在内的有毒气体。


Though nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) has helped many smokers quit, the cigarette habit remains pervasive in many countries.	尽管尼古丁替代疗法（NRT）帮助许多烟民戒了烟，但吸烟的习惯仍在众多国家无处不在。


The use of nicotine in non-combustible forms like smokeless tobacco, or PNV, would enable millions of current smokers to reduce considerably the harm that their nicotine consumption is doing to their health.	以不可燃形式使用尼古丁——如无烟烟草或PNV——可以让数百万烟民大幅减少尼古丁消费现在给他们的健康带来的伤害。


In Sweden, the widespread use of snus – a smokeless tobacco product with a lower concentration of carcinogenic nitrosamines – has contributed to a dramatic decline in the incidence of lung cancer, to the world’s lowest levels.	在瑞典，鼻烟（snus，一种无烟烟草产品，具有较低的致癌亚硝胺浓度）的广泛使用大幅降低了肺癌数量，目前瑞典的肺癌人数为世界最低之一。


The benefits of phasing out tobacco consumption could not be more compelling.	消灭烟草消费的好处可谓无穷。


That is why PNVs should be actively promoted as an alternative to tobacco products, aided by endorsements from health authorities, tax advantages, and support from the anti-smoking movement.	正因如此，PNV应该积极推广以作为烟草产品的替代物，卫生当局、税收体系和反吸烟运动应该予以支持。


But, so far, none of this has occurred, largely because nicotine is viewed as a highly addictive and toxic substance, with even smokers hesitating to try NRT or PNV for this reason.	但是，目前所有这些都没有发生，这大部分是因为尼古丁被认为是一种高致瘾性有毒物质，因此，即使是烟民，在尝试NRT或PNV时也会犹豫不决。


In fact, nicotine has been the primary target of anti-tobacco campaigns for more than three decades.	事实上，尼古丁成为反烟草运动的主要目标已有三十多年。


But nicotine is only partly responsible for tobacco dependence.	但尼古丁只是烟草依赖的原因之一。


Other substances from tobacco smoke – such as monoamine oxidase inhibitors, which have antidepressant effects –reinforce tobacco dependence, but are absent from vaporized nicotine.	其他烟草烟雾中的物质——比如具有抗抑郁效果的单胺氧化酶抑制物——会加强烟草依赖，但它们在蒸馏尼古丁中是不存在的。


That may be why PNV user surveys suggest that nicotine is less addictive in its vaporized form.	这也许就是PNV使用者调查表明蒸馏形式尼古丁致瘾性较低的原因。


In reality, nicotine is a relatively safe drug at dosages that a smoker or “vaper” inhales, with similar effects to caffeine.	在现实中，按烟民或“蒸民”的吸入量计算，尼古丁是一种相对安全的毒品，其效果与咖啡因差不多。


Moreover, smokers and PNV users control very precisely, on a puff-by-puff basis, the dose of nicotine they consume, virtually eliminating the risk of overdose.	此外，烟民和PNV使用者一口一口地吞云吐雾，可以非常精确地控制他们所消费的尼古丁剂量，几乎完全杜绝了过量吸入风险。


In fact, a lethal dose of nicotine is a lot higher than the 30-60 milligrams that many scientific papers claim.	事实上，致命尼古丁剂量远远高于许多科学论文所宣称的30—60毫克。


After reviewing case reports of nicotine intoxications and suicide attempts, the pharmacologist Bernd Mayer found that the lethal dose of nicotine in humans must be somewhere between 500-1000 mg of absorbed – not just ingested – nicotine.	在审读了尼古丁中毒和尝试自杀的案例报告后，药物学家本恩德·梅耶（Bernd Mayer）发现人类尼古丁致死剂量必须要达到500—1000毫克吸收——不仅是摄入——尼古丁。


Given that one of the first symptoms of intoxication is vomiting, and that 70% of the remaining nicotine in the digestive tract is metabolized by the liver before it reaches other organs, absorbing that much nicotine is not easy.	中毒的首批症状之一是呕吐，并且消化道中70%的剩余尼古丁在到达其他器官之前已在肝脏中被新陈代谢，因此吸收那么多尼古丁并不是件容易事。


With minimal health risks compared to tobacco smoking, PNVs face only one real barrier to use: smokers’ willingness to switch.	与吸烟相比，PNV的健康风险极小，其使用的真正障碍只有一个：烟民是否愿意改变。


But, even on this front, the devices have had considerable success, with PNV use increasing exponentially in the last few years.	但是，即使在这个方面，PNV也取得了显著的成功，在过去几年中，PNV的使用呈现出指数增长之势。


Though, in an ideal world, people would simply be able to quit using nicotine altogether, experience suggests that many smokers cannot – or do not want to – give it up, and will continue to smoke if there is no safe and acceptable alternative.	在理想状态中，人们能够连同尼古丁一并戒除，但经验表明许多烟民无法——或不愿——放弃尼古丁，如果找不到安全且可接受的替代方案，他们会继续吸烟。


If smokers are willing to accept PNVs as a viable option, high-risk tobacco use could become a thing of the past.	如果烟民愿意接受PNV作为可行选择，高风险烟草使用就将是明日黄花。


So far, converted smokers have taken the lead in promoting the shift to PNVs, sharing their experiences online, in Internet forums and on Facebook and Twitter.	目前，转变的烟民成为提倡转向PNV的领导力量，他们在互联网论坛和Facebook和Twitter上分享经验。


They are spreading the news that, for the first time in history, people can quit smoking without giving up the pleasure they derive from nicotine.	他们在历史上第一次散播人们可以戒除吸烟又不失去尼古丁带来的乐趣的消息。


Meanwhile, health authorities and governments have adopted a fear-based approach, scrambling to regulate – or even ban – PNVs.	与此同时，卫生当局和政府采取了基于恐惧（fear-based）方针，忙不迭地监管——乃至禁止——PNV。


The European Union’s Tobacco Products Directive and the United Kingdom’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency plan to introduce strict regulations of PNV sales and use, based on drug legislation, even though the devices are neither tobacco nor medical products.	欧盟的烟草产品指令（Tobacco Products Directive）和英国的药品和健康产品监管局（Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency）计划对PNV的销售和使用采取基于药品立法的严格将官，尽管这一产品既非烟草，也不是医疗产品。


Even the World Health Organization has released a report expressing serious concern about the marketing and use of electronic nicotine-delivery systems.	沈志弈世界卫生组织也发布报告，表示严重关注电子尼古丁提供系统的营销和使用。


Such opposition is not based on scientific evidence.	这些反对措施不是基于科学证据。


Indeed, an increasing number of scientific publications show that PNV use is much safer than smoking tobacco.	事实上，越来越多的科学文献证明使用PNV比吸烟安全得多。


“If wisely regulated, electronic cigarettes have the potential to make cigarettes obsolete and save millions of lives worldwide,” we wrote. Excessive regulation, by contrast, “will contribute to maintaining the existing levels of smoking-related disease, death, and health-care costs.”	1月，一群科学家（包括我）致信欧盟委员会，恳请实施基于证据的适度监管，以使PNV用户了解这种产品和适合他们的剂量。


Russell once declared, “It is nicotine that people cannot easily do without, not tobacco.”	罗素曾说，“是尼古丁令人难以摆脱，而不是烟草。


He was right.	”他是对的。


And it is tobacco smoke, not nicotine, that kills.	另一方面，是烟草烟雾而不是尼古丁致人死亡。


That makes PNVs the ideal solution.	这意味着PNV是理想的解决方案。


It is time for health authorities to get on board.	卫生当局应该认真考虑。


Triangulating Brexit	脱欧三角恋


BRUSSELS – More than 100 days after the United Kingdom voted narrowly to leave the European Union, it remains far from clear what arrangement will regulate cross-Channel trade after Brexit.	发自布鲁塞尔——距离英国民众以微弱多数决定脱欧至今已经过去100多天，但各方却远未确定应该以何种安排去规管跨英吉利海峡的贸易。


Political discussions tend to revolve around three key issues: immigration controls, access to the single market, and passporting rights for financial services.	在这方面的政治讨论往往围绕着三个关键问题：移民管控，进入单一市场的渠道以及金融服务的准入权。


Which balance should European leaders strike?	那么欧洲领导人究竟该如何拿捏三者之间的平衡呢？


Many in Britain know exactly what they want: to impose controls on the movement of workers from the rest of the EU, thereby protecting the domestic labor market, but without losing access to the single market or passporting rights, which allow British firms to sell their financial services on the continent.	许多英国人的诉求相当明确：一方面对欧盟其他地区的劳动者流入实行管制，从而保护国内劳动力市场，一方面不丢失进入单一市场的渠道或准入权，允许英国企业向欧洲出售其金融服务。


That was, after all, the kind of deal many leaders of the “Leave” campaign promised before the June referendum.	归根结底，这就那些“脱欧”运动领导人在6月公投前承诺要实现的方案。


But the Brexiteers’ promise remains wishful thinking.	但这些脱欧者的承诺仍然是一厢情愿的想法。


As German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has pointed out, access to the single market is inextricably linked to the free movement of people.	正如德国财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）所指出的那样，进入单一市场的渠道与人员的自由流动是密不可分的。


Indeed, he has even offered to send Boris Johnson, the UK’s foreign secretary, a copy of the Treaty of Lisbon, where that link is established.	事实上，他甚至向英国外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）发送了一份《里斯本条约》的副本，好让后者明白上述两个事项之间的明确关联。


This may sound legalistic, and it certainly reflects political motivations.	这听起来好像是在死抠法律条文，当然也反映了某些政治动机。


But basic economic principles imply that free movement is, indeed, at least as important as free trade.	但基本经济原则告诉我们：无论怎么说，人员的自由流动确实与自由贸易一样重要。


Trade usually benefits both sides.	贸易通常会使双方得利。


It is thus clear that it is in the common interest of the UK and the EU to minimize the losses from the introduction of new barriers through Brexit.	很显然，最符合英国和欧盟双方共同利益的事情就是尽量减少因脱欧构筑的新壁垒所造成的损失。


From the point of view of European welfare, it is the size of the trade barriers that matters, not which side is a net exporter or importer.	从欧洲整体福利的角度来看，关键点是贸易壁垒的规模，而非哪一边是净出口或进口。


Low barriers typically have low costs, unless very large volumes of trade are affected.	除非有非常大量的贸易受到影响，否则低壁垒通常意味着低成本。


But as barriers become higher, the negative impact on welfare grows disproportionately.	但随着壁垒不断加大，就会对整体福利构成不成比例的负面影响。


The good news for the UK is that it probably wouldn’t face substantially higher trade barriers even if it did leave the single market.	但对英国的好处在于即便脱离单一市场，它也很可能不会遭遇持续提升的贸易壁垒。


After all, the EU has, in general, a liberal trade regime, with low external tariffs.	因为欧盟毕竟总体上是一个外部关税较低的自由贸易体制。


That is why so many studies do not consider the economic benefits of tariff-free transatlantic trade as the primary reason for pursuing it.	这也是为何大多数研究都不会将无关税跨大西洋贸易的经济效益作为协议重点的主要原因。


Even if the UK faced some additional barriers – such as new customs requirements and certificates of origin – their impact would most likely be relatively small.	即使英国会面对一些额外的障碍——例如新的海关要求和原产地证明——其影响很可能相对较小。


The case of Switzerland – which is even more integrated into EU production chains than the UK – shows that efficient customs administrations on both sides are enough to keep such barriers to a minimum.	瑞士的情况（该国与欧盟产业链的融合比英国更深）表明，高效的双边海关管理机构足以将这些障碍降至最低。


In any case, exports of goods to the EU generate only about 6% of the UK’s GDP.	毕竟向欧盟的商品出口额只占英国GDP的6％左右。


Yet another reason why the introduction of some low trade barriers is unlikely to produce large losses is that the differences in the cost of producing goods in one market or the other are small.	而引入一些低贸易壁垒不大可能造成巨大损失的另一个原因是，在一个市场或另一个市场之间生产商品的成本差异很小。


Producing a car in Britain, for example, costs about the same as producing one in Germany.	比如在英国生产汽车的成本就与在德国生产汽车的成本大致相同。


Barriers to the free movement of labor are a different story.	而限制劳动者自由迁移的壁垒就不一样了。


Productivity and income per worker in the UK remains significantly higher than in, say, Poland.	英国工人的人均生产力和收入都显著高于波兰。


A worker would get about €25 ($27.70) for an hour of work in the UK, but only €8.50 in Poland.	一个工人在英国工作一个小时会得到25英磅（折和 27. 7美元），而在波兰只有8.


In other words, not allowing a Polish worker to work in the UK would imply large economic costs for Europe.	5磅。 换句话说不允许波兰工人在英国工作意味着巨大的欧洲经济成本。


Moreover, if British Prime Minister Theresa May follows through on her stated goal of reducing annual net immigration to less than 100,000, the UK would have to implement drastic – potentially costly – measures to close off the UK labor market.	此外，如果英国首相特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）维持其原定每年净移民减少到10万以下的目标，英国将不得不采取大规模——也可能耗资巨大——的措施去关闭英国劳动力市场。


This means that the barriers that EU negotiators are in a position to impose – which largely affect trade in goods – are likely to have a much smaller impact than the UK-imposed barriers, such as quotas on EU workers.	这意味着，欧盟谈判者可以施加的障碍（这些障碍主要影响货物贸易）可能比英国施加的障碍（例如欧盟工人配额）产生的影响小得多。


But there is one more issue that negotiators must consider: financial services.	但这些谈判者们还必须考虑一点：金融服务业。


While overall trade in services is unlikely to suffer enormously from Brexit – the internal market for services never worked all that well, anyway – finance constitutes a special case, largely because of the passporting arrangements for banks.	虽然总体服务贸易不太可能因脱欧而遭受巨大损失——反正国内服务市场的运作从来就比较低效——但金融是一个特殊的情况，这在很大程度上来自于银行的准入安排。


Economists are often ambivalent about the benefits of financial integration, not least because large flows of bank credit can have a serious impact on macroeconomic stability.	经济学家对金融一体化的好处常常持矛盾态度，尤其是因为大规模银行信贷流动可能对宏观经济稳定产生严重影响。


Whereas securitization, for example, can help to reduce risk and increase the availability of credit for risky borrowers under the right framework, the 2008 global financial crisis starkly demonstrated that it can imply huge costs if it goes too far.	比如说证券化可以帮助在适当的框架下降低风险并增加风险借款人的可动用信贷额，但2008年全球金融危机明显表明，如果过度使用这一手段就可能意味着巨大的成本。


But steps can be taken to maximize the benefits of cross-Channel provision of financial services after Brexit.	但在脱欧之后英国还是可以采取相关措施来最大化跨海峡金融服务的益处。


The key is to base decisions not on sustaining the City of London’s role as Europe’s financial hub, but on ensuring that the services provided strengthen Europe’s capital markets.	关键在于未来的决策不能只是为了维持伦敦金融城作为欧洲金融中心的角色，而是确保英国提供的服务能有助于加强欧洲的资本市场。


That would require an emphasis on equity over debt instruments, and on market-based financing over bank credit.	这将需要强调债务工具之间的公平使用，以及以市场为导向的银行信贷融资。


From an economic standpoint, the priorities that should guide Brexit negotiations are clear.	从经济角度来看，指导脱欧谈判的优先事项是相当明确的。


Negotiators must focus on minimizing new barriers to the free movement of labor; indeed, this should be an even higher priority than maintaining the free movement of goods.	谈判者必须注重最大限度地减少对劳动力自由流动的新障碍； 事实上这应该是比维持货物自由流动更优先的事项。


And British financial services should be welcomed in the EU, but only if they help it to move away from its bank-centric system and complete the capital market union.	英国的金融服务应该得到欧盟的接受，但前提是它们要能帮助欧洲摆脱以银行为中心的体系并完成资本市场联盟的构建。


But politics continues to distort discussions, driving leaders to draw red lines on free movement and adopt mercantilist stances on financial services.	但政治却依然在扭曲对这些问题的合理讨论，撩拨领导人在人员自由流动方面寸步不让，并在金融服务方面采取重商主义立场。


It will take some statesmanship on both sides to shift attention to the common good.	那么双方可都需要拿出一些政治气概才能把注意力转移到共同利益之上。


The Business Case for Europe’s Refugees	欧洲难民的商业意义


LONDON – In the face of the largest influx of refugees into Europe in decades, the responses and policy proposals from the European Union and its member governments have varied enormously, and the debate has become deeply politicized.	伦敦——面对数十年来涌入欧洲最大规模的难民潮，欧盟及其成员国政府的对策和政策建议都各不相同，讨论也极度政治化。


International organizations and non-governmental agencies such as the UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee, and religious leaders such as Pope Francis and the Archbishop of Canterbury, have weighed in as well.	联合国难民署和 国际救援委员会等国际组织和非政府机构，以及教皇弗朗西斯和坎特伯雷大主教等宗教界领袖也参与进来。


But one group’s voice has been conspicuous by its absence: business.	但有一个团体寂然无声非常引人注目：那就是商界。


While governments, charities, and donor organizations actively discuss how to share responsibility for refugees on all steps of their journey – from camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to transit to settlement – European business has been strangely silent.	当各国政府、慈善机构和捐助机构积极讨论如何分担难民之旅的责任时——从约旦、黎巴嫩和土耳其的难民营到抵达安置点的交通状况——欧洲商界却出奇地安静。


But, at a time when business is more powerful than ever, with multinational corporations stretching around the world, the private sector must work with governments and NGOs to help address the short-term and long-term challenges posed by the massive refugee inflows.	但在跨国公司在世界各地扩张、商界势力比以往任何时候都更强大的时代，私营部门必须与政府和非政府组织合作，以协助解决大规模难民流入带来的短期和长期挑战。


Indeed, industry leaders in all sectors owe it to themselves to be involved from the start.	事实上，所有行业领导者为自身利益考虑也应该从一开始就积极参与。


Only by turning the challenges into opportunities can social, political, and economic risks be mitigated.	只有转危为机才能化解社会、政治和经济风险。


There has been one notable exception to the pattern of private-sector silence.	私人部门沉默模式有一个明显的例外。


Just as German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been at the political forefront of the migration crisis, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) has been at the business forefront.	一如德国总理安吉拉·默克尔一直站在移民危机的政治前沿，德国工业联合会（BDI）也一直站在商界的前沿。


The BDI has spoken clearly and decisively about the benefits of refugees for business and has proposed changes to Germany’s labor laws and regulations, including fast-tracking the newcomers’ right to work.	德国工业联合会明确坚定地阐述了难民对于商界的好处，并对德国的劳动法规，包括快速完成新移民工作权的审批提出了修改建议。


In order to make business engagement and investment sustainable, the BDI has also sought assurances that migrants who find employment will not be deported.	为保障企业参与和投资的可持续性，德国工业联合会还要求确保已经就业的移民不被驱逐。


Now it is time to hear from other countries’ business associations.	现在是时候听取其他国家商业协会的意见。


How do the Confederation of British Industry or France’s MEDEF intend to respond?	英国工业联合会和法国雇主联盟打算怎样回应？


And what of individual multinational corporations?	跨国企业又可能有何动作？


What legislative changes do they think they will need to aid governments and the EU in addressing the refugee crisis and ensuring long-term stability in Europe?	他们认为需要哪些立法改变才能辅助政府和欧盟解决难民危机和确保欧洲的长期稳定？


The challenge, everyone agrees, is not confined to managing the huge inflows and processing asylum applications.	所有人都同意挑战不仅限于管理庞大的移民潮和处理庇护申请。


In the coming months and years, destination countries must lay the foundations for integrating refugees into their workforces.	未来的数月乃至数年，目的地国必须为难民融入本国劳动力奠定基础。


To wait too long is to miss an important opportunity to be involved in developing a strategy that works for businesses, governments, and societies alike.	等待太久有可能错过参与制定对企业、政府和社会有利战略的重要机会。


Becoming involved early in the process of assessment, education, and integration planning would allow the private sector to help shape policy from the outset, rather than complaining about the government’s failures after the fact.	及早参与评估、教育和整合规划将使私营部门从一开始就协助制定政策，从不是在事后抱怨政府失职。


Business leaders can help identify the skills and abilities that would most benefit their sectors, establish guidance and training programs, and offer apprenticeships.	企业领导人可以协助确定最能惠及本行业的技术和能力，创建指导和培训计划并提供实习机会。


The benefits are clear.	这样做的好处显而易见。