Digital connections promote productivity growth; indeed, they can help developing economies move to the productivity frontier by exposing their business sectors to ideas, research, technologies, and best management and operational practices, and by building new channels to serve large global markets.	数字联系促进生产率增长； 事实上，它们可以帮助发展中经济体通过让商业部门接受思想、研究、技术和最佳管理和运营实践，以及构建服务于全球大市场的新渠道站到生产率前沿。


But the Internet cannot deliver such improvements in efficiency and transparency unless countries build the digital infrastructure needed to connect the world’s huge offline population.	但除非各国构建好连接庞大的世界离线人口所需要的数字基础设施，否则互联网无法带来这些效率和透明度改善。


The number of Internet users worldwide now exceeds 3.2 billion, but at the end of 2015, 57% of the world’s population, or four billion people, remained offline, and many who are online use only basic cell phones.	全世界互联网用户数量现已突破32亿，但在2015年底，57%的世界人口，或四十亿人，仍没有接入互联网，而许多互联网用户只使用基本的手机。


In many developing countries, connectivity is too slow, unreliable, or expensive to allow entrepreneurs and individuals to take full advantage of the new global business and educational opportunities.	在许多发展中国家，连通性太低，太不可靠，太昂贵，以至于企业家和个人无法充分抓住新的全球商业和教育机会。


Education systems will also need to keep up with demand for language fluency and digital skills.	教育系统也需要跟上语言和数字技能的新要求。


While 40% of the world’s population are connected to the Internet, 20% are still unable to read and write.	40%的世界人口已经接入互联网，但20%仍然不具有读写能力。


According to another recent MGI study, there are also large gender gaps in access to digital technologies around the world, and this lack of access impedes women’s economic and social empowerment.	据另一份MGI最新研究，在全球数字技术普及方面也存在巨大的性别差距，而无法接入互联网阻碍了女性的经济和社会赋权。


Lagging countries that fail to promote gender equality, invest in education, and adopt broader governance and regulatory reforms risk falling even further behind in reaping the significant benefits of globalization.	没能促进性别平等、投资于教育以及采取更广泛的治理和监管的落后国家有可能在获取全球化的巨大收益方面进一步落后。


Twenty-first-century globalization, driven by digitization and rapid changes in competitive advantage, can disrupt local industries, companies, and communities and cause job loss, even as it spurs greater productivity, boosts overall employment, and generates economy-wide gains.	二十一世纪的全球化受数字化和比较优势的快速变化的驱动，它可能破坏地方产业、公司和社区，导致工作岗位损失，即使它能够刺激更高的生产率、提振总体就业、给整个经济带来收益。


Governments must consider these trade-offs carefully, and develop ways to support those who are harmed by global flows, giving them paths to new roles and livelihoods. To date, few governments have done so.	政府必须谨慎考虑这些权衡，制定支持因为全球流动而受害的群体的方法，给他们指明扮演新角色、过上新生活的道路。


Ironically, the political backlash against globalization is gaining momentum in many places even as digitization increases the opportunities and economic benefits that globalization has to offer.	讽刺的是，尽管数字化增加了全球化苏能提供的机会和经济收益，但反对全球化的政治阻力正在许多地方日渐得势。


Dignity or Decline?	维护尊严，还是走向没落？


TOKYO – Kokka no Hinkaku, The Dignity of a State, is the title of a recent book by the Japanese mathematician Masahiko Fujiwara that has sold three million copies.	发自东京——既是数学家，同时也是著名作家的藤原正彦写了本名为《国家の品格》（国家的尊严）的书，并一举创下了300万册的销售记录。


Talk about the book in Japan is so fervid that the term “dignity” (hinkaku) has become a buzzword.	而日本人对此书的讨论是如此热烈，以至于“品格”一词都摇身一变成了流行语。


That Japan’s dignity is now a central issue should surprise no one.	事实上，日本这种把国家尊严上升为中心议题的现象并不令人吃惊。


For this is a moment when Japan must chart its course – either decline or dignity – as a “state” (kokka) in relation to its giant neighbor, China.	因为此时正是日本必须规划其未来之路的时刻——作为中国这个巨大国家的邻邦，要么走下坡路，要么努力维持自身的尊严。


The issue of relations with China crystallized in September, when the Japanese Coast Guard arrested the captain of a Chinese trawler after his ship hit two Japanese patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands, which are part of Japan and within its territorial waters.	而日本的对中关系问题也在9月被激化，当时一位中国船长驾驶渔船与两艘日本巡逻船在尖阁诸岛（即钓鱼岛）附近洋面发生碰撞，该岛属于日本领海范围以内的领土，因此日本海岸警卫队逮捕了该名船长。


Tension between Japan and China – which claims the islands – immediately soared.	事件发生之后，日本与同样宣称对该岛拥有主权的中国之间的紧张局势当即升温。


For many years, Japanese governments have taken a “let-sleeping-dogs-lie” approach to territorial disputes over the islands, ignoring repeated provocations by China (and Taiwan).	许多年来，日本政府在岛屿领土争端上一直都采取“维持现状，不惹麻烦”的策略，沉默应对中国（和台湾）的一次次挑衅。


But that ended with the election of September 2009, which ushered in the pro-China administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.	但在亲中的鸠山由纪夫政府于2009年9月大选上台之后，形势就发生了变化。


Hatoyama was naïve enough to declare publicly his intention of turning the East China Sea into a Chinese-led “Sea of Fraternity.”	鸠山在政治上非常幼稚，甚至公开宣称要把东海变成中国主导下的“兄弟之海”。


He also earned the distrust of the United States, Japan’s most important ally, by advocating the relocation outside Japan of a US air base on Okinawa.	他同时还主张让美国空军基地撤出冲绳，直接得罪了美国人这个日本最大的盟友。


Diplomatic realism was not restored after Hatoyama’s fall from power earlier this year. Instead, his successor, Naoto Kan, continues to believe that Japan can somehow opt out of history and a turbulent region.	这一切导致鸠山最终于今年早些时候下台，但外交现实主义却未能回归日本政坛，恰恰相反，鸠山的继任者菅直人依然相信日本能够脱离过去的历史和所处地域行事。


Speaking at the United Nations plenary meeting this September, Kan said that his government seeks to achieve a “society in which human suffering is reduced a minimum.”	在今年9月联合国大会上的发言中，菅直人宣称他的政府正寻求实现一个“尽可能减少民众苦难的社会”。


National security is treated as a low-grade issue.	而国防问题则被晾在了一边。


Meanwhile, China is following its own definition of “dignity,” which looks to almost everyone in Asia – other than Kan’s government – as a right to dominate.	与此同时，中国也在实践着自己的“尊严”之路——这在亚洲其他国家（朝鲜除外）看来就是某种统治权。


Indeed, China no longer even tries to hide its desire for hegemony in the Pacific.	事实上中国已经撕下了面具，彻底暴露出其称霸太平洋的野心了。


China appears to have seen the standoff over the Senkaku Islands as a test of wills – a test Kan’s government failed abysmally.	中国似乎要把尖阁诸岛问题上的对峙视为对日方决心的考验——虽然当年朝鲜在这方面一败涂地。


In retaliation for Japan’s refusal to release the trawler captain, China hinted that it might recall its ambassador from Tokyo, suspended bilateral ministerial-level exchanges, and canceled a tour to Japan for about 10,000 Chinese.	为了报复日方拒绝释放船长的举措，中国暗示其将召回驻日大使，停止双边部长级交流，并取消1万名中国游客的赴日行程。


More ominously, the Chinese arrested four employees of Fujita, a Japanese construction company, on suspicion of espionage.	更过分的是，中国以涉嫌间谍活动的理由逮捕了日本藤田公司的四名日本雇员。


The four were in China for a project commissioned by the Japanese government to dispose of chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese military after World War II.	但这四人实际上是受日本政府委派，来华处理二战日军遗弃化学武器的。


Chinese officials also suggested the possibility of banning exports to Japan of rare-earth elements – raw materials crucial for many Japanese manufacturing processes – and appear to have done so informally.	中国官员还声称可能停止对日稀土出口——这是许多日本企业生产所必须的关键原材料——也最终实施了非正式的稀土禁运。


Inexperienced and diplomatically inept, Kan’s administration buckled, releasing the trawler captain early. His government then sought to pin the blame on the local prosecutor who had formally arrested the captain.	外交经验和手腕都乏善可陈的菅直人政府选择了屈服，并在前一段时间释放了中方船长，政府甚至还试图让正式逮捕该名船长的地方检查厅来背这个黑锅。


This display of weak-kneed diplomacy appalled many Japanese, and popular support for Kan’s administration has plummeted.	这种软弱的外交态度使日本民众大为震惊，菅直人政府的民意支持率也因此一落千丈。


The de facto export ban on rare-earth elements – often referred to as “industrial vitamins” – struck a terrible blow to Japanese companies, which rely on China for 97% of their supply.	而中方对稀土元素——人称“工业的维生素”——的实质性禁止出口对日本企业造成了严重冲击，因为这些公司97%的稀土原料都来自中国。


Among a variety of rare-earth elements, neodymium and dysprosium are widely used as a magnetic material for motors in environmentally friendly vehicles and home appliances, while erbium is used as a dopant in optical fibers and cerium as an abrasive for polishing liquid crystal display (LCD) glass.	在诸多稀土元素中，钕和镝都被广泛运用于环保汽车和家电领域，是制造马达的磁性材料，铒是生产光纤的掺杂物，而铈则是液晶显示器玻璃的抛光粉原料。


The “rare-earth threat” is not confined to Japan, as China accounts for over 90% of the world’s production, roughly 120,000 tons.	这种“稀土恐吓”的作用范围可不仅限于日本，因为中国的稀土开采量占全世界90%以上，大约12万吨。


But this shouldn’t be a threat at all, because the world has ample reserves of these elements.	但这本来不算什么威胁，因为全世界拥有足够的稀土储量。


Indeed, rare-earth elements are “rare” only in the sense that they are distributed in small quantities and must be extracted from ores, a time-consuming process.	事实上，稀土元素的“稀”只是由于它们分布量少，且必须经过漫长的过程才能从矿石中分离出来。


Rare-earth mines are found throughout the world.	稀土矿遍布全世界。


China dominates the global market simply because it has fairly abundant rare-earth ores close to the surface.	中国对全球市场的垄断仅仅是因为其拥有大量靠近地表的稀土矿藏而已。


Of course, China also has abundant cheap labor to process ore.	当然，中国还拥有大量的廉价劳动力去处理矿石。


Rare-earth ores in southern China – all except for those in Inner Mongolia – contain radioactive substances that pose significant threats to human health and the environment.	中国南部地区的稀土矿（内蒙古地区除外）含有对人体和环境有害的放射性物质。


Other countries might worry about the health risk to workers in rare-earth processing, but that does not appear to be true of China.	其他国家或许会担心稀土处理过程中的工人健康问题，但对中国来说，这根本不是个问题。


In the face of aggressive price cutting by Chinese rare-earth producers, many mines in the US and elsewhere in the world were shut down over the years.	面对中���稀土生产商的杀伤性低价策略，美国及世界其他国家的稀土矿纷纷关闭。


Even before the trawler incident, China was trying to regulate rare-earths, defining them as a strategic resource.	即便是在中日争端之前，中国已经开始限制稀土出口，并将其定义为一项重要战略资源。


Chinese officials say that concern over the overexploitation and illicit export of rare earths prompted them to regulate the industry more closely.	中国官员声称对稀土过度开采和非法出口的关注引发了对该行业监管力度的加强。


But this regulation, when combined with China’s aggressive pricing, suggests a desire to assert monopoly control, and the de facto ban of rare-earth exports to Japan looks like an effort to test the benefits of this looming monopoly.	但这种管制与杀伤性低价策略相结合则暴露出了中国垄断稀土的企图，而对日本的实质性稀土禁运则似乎是对这种垄断迷梦的一次利益测试。


China’s move, however, put the rest of the world on alert.	然而中国这番举动也令世界各国纷纷提高了警惕。


Many countries are now planning to develop their own or alternative sources of rare-earth elements, and to accelerate efforts to develop technologies that are free of them.	许多国家正开始计划开发国内稀土资源或寻找相关替代资源，并进一步加快科技研究，摆脱稀土依赖。


But China has another motive for tightening the noose on rare-earth exports: it wants to force high-tech firms to operate in China, so that local companies can absorb their technologies.	此外，中国限制稀土出口的背后有着另一个动机：它想迫使全球高科技企业都转移到中国生产，以便让本土企业吸收前者的技术。


A senior official of a Chinese company has said that, even though rare-earth exports have been restricted, Japanese companies can secure their supply by launching operations in China.	正如一名中方高级官员所说，即便稀土出口受限，日本企业也能通过在华设厂的方式保证生产。


If there is a response to such blackmail that could preserve Japan’s dignity, the Kan government is unlikely to find it.	怪只怪菅直人政府无能，面对着中国的百般敲诈勒索，却找不到一个能维护日本国家尊严的方式。


Belindia Has Spoken	“比利印度”论


SANTIAGO – Forty years ago, the Brazilian economist Edmar Bacha named his country Belindia: a combination of prosperous and modern Belgium and poor and backward India.	圣地亚哥—四十年前，巴西经济学家埃德马尔·巴查（Edmar Bacha）将他的祖国称为“比利印度”：繁荣而现代的比利时和贫穷而落后的印度的合体。


In last Sunday’s presidential election, according to many observers, the Indian part of Brazil voted for the incumbent, President Dilma Rousseff, and the Belgian part voted for the social democrat Aécio Neves.	很多观察者看来，在上周日的总统选举中，巴西的印度部分支持现任总统迪尔马·罗塞夫，而比利时部分支持社会民主党人艾西奥·尼维斯（Aécio Neves）。


India is larger, so Rousseff won.	印度比比利时大，所以罗塞夫赢了。


This is fast becoming the standard account of Brazil’s election, the most acrimonious and hotly contested in recent memory.	这正在迅速成为巴西选举的标准解说词。 这次选举是近期最针锋相对、竞争最激烈的一次。


And it is easy to see why.	不难看出为何如此。


In Brazil’s underdeveloped Nordeste, Dilma (in Brazil, politicians, like footballers, go by their first name) swept the vote.	在巴西欠发达的东北部，迪尔马（在巴西，政客和足球明星一样，用首名称呼自己）取得压倒性胜利。


In the relatively rich South, which accounts for 70% of Brazil’s economic output, Aécio won handily.	在相对富裕的南部（占巴西经济产出的70%），艾西奥大获全胜。


Similar divisions appear when voters are classified according to dependence on government handouts (high in the Northeast) or years of schooling (high in the South).	如果把选民根据倚赖政府救济（在东北部比例很高）还是倚赖教育（在南部比例较高）分类，也会出现类似的结果。


Yet there is more to this election than this broad-brush picture suggests.	但除了这一总体图景之外，此次选举还有诸多细节值得关注。


In 1974, when Bacha coined his term, it went without saying that the prosperous and modern Brazil was just a tiny sliver of the total.	1974年，当巴查发明“比利印度”一词时，毫无疑问繁荣而现代的巴西只占总体的极少部分。


In 2014, Neves, the candidate of “Belgian” Brazil, won more than 48% of the vote.	2014年，“比利时”巴西候选人尼维斯赢得了超过48%的选票。


That reveals how much the country has changed in the last four decades, and how large and influential its middle class has become.	这凸显出巴西在过去四十年中的变化，以及中产阶级的壮大和影响力的日增。


It was precisely that middle class, fed up with allegations of corruption and a sluggish economy, that turned against the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) and voted for change.	正是这批对腐败和经济停滞不满的中产阶级开始反对执政的劳工党（Workers’ Party），把票投给了变化。


But it is also striking that despite the weak economy – growth will barely average 1.5% during Rousseff’s first term, and the economy is now in a technical recession, having contracted in two consecutive quarters – Dilma and the PT managed to retain the support of Brazil’s tens of millions of poor and excluded citizens.	但同样令人惊讶的是，尽管经济萎靡——在罗塞夫的第一个任期中，平均经济增长率只有1. 5%，目前更是陷入了技术性衰退，已连续两个季度出现收缩——迪尔马和劳工党仍拥有巴西数千万穷人和被排除的公民的支持。


This is partly because the recession has not made a big dent in employment, which means that many households have yet to feel the impact.	这部分是因为衰退并没有给就业带来很大影响，而这意味着许多家庭尚未感受到冲击。


Dilma was also helped by the commodity super-cycle, which filled Brazil’s coffers and made it possible to run ambitious cash-transfer programs that helped pull countless families out of poverty.	迪尔马还获得了商品超级周期的支持，商品超级周期让巴西资金充裕，因此能够实施大手笔现金转移支付几乎，将无数家庭带出了贫困。


These policies were actually launched by former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Neves’s Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), but are associated in the popular imagination with Dilma’s political mentor and predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, also of the PT.	这些政策实际上是尼维斯所在的巴西社会民主党（Party of Brazilian Social Democracy）前总统卡多佐（Fernando Henrique Cardoso）启动的，但在群众的印象中，这是迪尔马的政治导师兼前任、同样来自劳工党的卢拉（Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva）的功劳。


By claiming (with no evidence) that Aécio would cut these popular programs, Dilma dealt the PSDB a sharp electoral blow.	迪尔马声称艾西奥会削减这些广受支持的计划（但她并无证据），成功地重创了社会民主党。


Using commodity revenues to obtain political support is not a strategy unique to Brazil.	利用商品收入赢取政治支持并非巴西所独有的战略。


In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, populists have tried the same trick.	在阿根廷、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔和委内瑞拉，民粹主义者都使用同样的伎俩。


So have the vastly different governments of the conservative Sebastián Piñera and the socialist Michelle Bachelet in Chile.	而与它们截然不同的智利保守党人皮涅拉（Sebastián Piñera）和社会党人巴切莱特（Michelle Bachelet）也是如此。


And the similarities do not end there.	这个相似的名单还可以拉得更长。


Now that the commodity boom is ending, all of these countries face the challenge of building a new economic engine to sustain growth and create jobs.	如今，商品繁荣正在终结，所有这些国家都面临寻找新经济引擎维持增长和创造就业的挑战。


Without the commodity windfall, they must develop new sectors that can produce new goods and services, requiring new sets of skills and new types of infrastructure.	没有了商品带来的巨额财富，它们必须发展能生产新商品和服务的新产业，而这需要新技能和新的基础设施类型。


This is a tall order, especially for Brazil.	这是难以完成的任务，特别是在巴西。


The structural deficiencies of its economy have long been understood, but little has been done to correct them.	巴西经济的结构缺陷早已众所周知，但并未采取多少纠正这些缺陷的措施。


Brazil has South America’s biggest government (with a tax take exceeding one-third of GDP), yet the authorities save and invest too little, which creates both micro- and macroeconomic problems.	巴西拥有南美最大的政府（税收占GDP的比例超过三分之一），但巴西当局储蓄和投资太少，导致了微观和宏观经济问题。


On the micro side, too little public investment means poor infrastructure and high export costs.	在微观层面，公共投资过少意味着基础设施破旧不堪、出口成本高企。


Brazil has none of neighboring Argentina’s hefty export taxes, but its heavy transport costs have the same effect.	邻国阿根廷所实施的高昂出口税巴西一项都没有实施，但沉重的交易成本起到了一样的效果。


Education, too, receives little public funding, especially at the pre-school and primary levels.	教育也没有得到多少公共资金支持，特别是学前教育和小学教育。


Like Chile, Brazil has sharply increased school enrollment but has yet to provide high-quality learning opportunities to disadvantaged children.	与智利相同，巴西大幅提高了学校入学率，但并未为后进儿童提供高质量的学习机会。


In the OECD’s international PISA rankings of educational achievement, Brazil places near the bottom, below Mexico and Chile.	在经合组织国际PISA排名（衡量教育成就），巴西几乎垫底，名次低于墨西哥和智利。


On the macro side, too little public savings means insufficient savings at the national level.	在宏观层面，公共储蓄不足意味着国民储��不足。


When international funds are available, this produces short-lived booms and large current-account deficits, financed by heavy external borrowing.	当巴西可以获得国际资金时，这催生了短期的繁荣和大规模经常项目赤字（通过大量对外借款融资）。


When international liquidity dries up, as it often does for Brazil and Latin America, weak domestic investment and sluggish growth follow.	当国际流动性枯竭时——巴西和拉丁美洲经常遭遇这种情况——就会出现国内投资疲软和经济增长停滞。


Neves had a plan to address these shortcomings.	尼维斯提出了纠正这些缺陷的计划。


Dilma does not.	迪尔马没有。


Her election-night speech was full of calls for unity and dialogue, and included a pledge to “take urgent action” to resume growth.	她的选举前夜演讲充斥着对团结和对话的呼吁，应承诺“采取紧急措施”重塑增长。


But, like her campaign, the speech was short on specifics.	但是，和她的选战战略一样，她的演讲缺少具体内容。


On industrial policy, the PT has the right intuition but the wrong tools.	在产业政策方面，劳工党直觉正确，但手段错误。


Partnering with leading domestic sectors to promote innovation is one thing; doing so through price controls (as with fuels), indiscriminate subsidies, and protectionism is another.	和国内主导行业合作推进创新是一回事； 通过价格控制（如能源）、歧视性补贴和保护主义这样做是另一回事。


In recent years, Brazil has taken the latter route.	近几年来，巴西采取的是后一种方式。


Rousseff has little time to waste.	罗塞夫没有多少时间可以浪费了。


She will govern a country with substantial public debt (60% of GDP), a volatile currency, and high inflation.	她面临的是一个公共债务负担沉重（占GDP的60%）、货币波动剧烈、通货膨胀高企的巴西。


Nervous financial markets will keep the government on a tight leash.	紧张的金融市场将继续掣肘巴西政府。


Neves and his PSDB have come out of this election considerably strengthened, but they also will face difficult challenges in the coming years.	尼维斯和他的社会民主党通过这次选举而壮大了不少，但他们也将在未来几年中面临艰巨挑战。


The social democrats will have a larger delegation in Congress (including Neves himself in the Senate) and will govern some of Brazil’s larger states, including São Paulo, home to 43 million people and one-third of the country’s GDP.	社会民主党在国会中的占比增加了（包括在参议院的尼维斯本人）并将在不少巴西大州执政，包括拥有4,300万人口、占巴西GDP三分之一的圣保罗州。


But to reach the Planalto Presidential Palace after the 2018 election, the PSDB will have to convince poor Brazilians – those living in Bacha’s India – that it works on their behalf, and that the policies it advocates benefit them the most.	但要想在2018年问鼎总统宝座，社会民主党必须让巴西穷人——即巴查的印度部分——相信社会民主党是代表他们的政党，其所支持的政策将让他们获益最多。


Then, and only then, will Brazil’s longstanding divisions begin to heal.	如此，也只有如此，巴西长期存在的分裂局面才会开始得到纠正。


When they do, the country will get the modern and effective social-democratic government that it deserves.	到那时，巴西将水到渠成地出现现代、高效的社会民主党政府。


Diplomacy’s Darkest Hours	外交最黯淡的时刻


MADRID – Diplomacy is not having its finest hour nowadays.	马德里——如今，外交并没有经历辉煌时刻。


Quite the contrary: resistance to diplomatic solutions is a common thread in most of today’s major conflicts.	恰恰相反：当今大多数冲突都抵制外交途径解决。


Afghanistan will continue to bleed until the allies finally recognize that only by engaging the Taliban do they stand a chance of ending the war.	阿富汗会继续淌血，直到北约联军最终认识到只有通过与塔利班谈判才能有可能结束战争。


But the West will also have to recognize that conflicts with a potent cultural and religious component are simply not susceptible to a military solution – a realization that points toward ending the ostracism of political Islam – Hamas and Hezbollah, for example.	但是西方同样需要认识到，军事手段很难结束那些包含强烈文化和宗教因素的冲突，比如结束对伊斯兰政治势力的放逐——哈马斯、黎巴嫩真主党等。


Meanwhile, Iran’s unstoppable rush to develop nuclear weapons could prove to be a monument to the international community’s failure to stem the atomic tide in the region.	此外，伊朗核武发展的势不可挡证明了国际社会没能抑制这一地区的核武潮流。


The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be the diplomatic charade that it has been for many years now.	巴以冲突继续披上外交谈判的伪装，数十年来都是如此。


And nothing has attenuated the tensions between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon.	以色列与叙利亚、黎巴嫩之间的紧张局势也没有得到缓解。


History teaches that diplomacy all too frequently produces results only when backed by overwhelming power.	历史告诉我们，外交通常只有在强权的支持下才能带来结果。 这就是美国前总统、诺贝尔和平奖获得者西奥多·罗斯福的存在主义世界观。


Such was the existentialist worldview of US President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Theodore Roosevelt, a major advocate of American expansionism: “A just war is, in the long run, far better for a man’s soul than the most prosperous peace.”	他曾说：“从长期起来看，正义的战争比最富庶的和平年代更能让人的灵魂受益。 ”一个世纪后，现任美国总统奥巴马在中东身陷两场无望获胜的战争。


A century later, another American president, Barack Obama, immersed in two hopeless wars in the Middle East, received his Nobel Peace Prize with an apology for “just wars.”	他也获得了诺贝尔和平奖。 在获奖发言中，他为“正义的战争”带来的伤害道歉。


Indeed, the list of Nobel Peace Prize laureates is not lacking in men – Roosevelt, George Marshall, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, and Henry Kissinger – who either ended up recognizing the limits of military power or were simply following Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means.	事实上 ，有许多诺贝尔和平奖的获得者——罗斯福、乔治·马歇尔、梅纳赫姆·贝京、萨达特、伊扎·拉宾、阿拉法特以及基辛格，他们要么在最后认识到军事力量的局限性，要么相信克劳塞维茨的理论：战争是政治的延续，只是方式不同。


Conflicts start to be ripe for diplomatic solutions only when the parties get trapped in an unbearably painful mutual deadlock.	只有当各方陷于十分痛苦的僵局时，用外交途径来解决冲突的时机才成熟。


Without such a deadlock, neither United Nations resolutions, nor premature peace initiatives can cut short the dynamic of war.	如果没有这种僵局，联合国决议和过早的和平倡议都不能中止战争态势。


It is only then that formulas for power-sharing – such as those in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Guatemala, or Iraq – emerge as a realistic alternative.	只有在出现僵局的时候，权力共享的方案——如在北爱尔兰、黎巴嫩、危地马拉、伊拉克等——才会变成现实可行的选择。


It was NATO’s robust military intervention, not European diplomacy, that created the conditions for the end of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.	是北约强势的军事干预为终止前南斯拉夫的大屠杀和种族清洗创造了条件，而不是欧洲的外交途径。


Martti Ahtisaari fully deserved his Nobel Peace Prize for articulating a diplomatic solution to Kosovo’s drive for independence.	马尔蒂·阿赫蒂萨里完全有资格获得诺贝尔和平奖，因为他为科索沃的独立提供了提供了外交解决方案。


But this could not be achieved before Serbia was militarily humbled.	但是如果要不是塞尔维亚的军事力量受到了削弱，科索沃的独立也不会实现。


However encouraging, Czechoslovakia’s peaceful “velvet divorce” into two states has not been the norm in Europe or elsewhere.	尽管捷克斯洛伐克通过“天鹅绒分离”和平地分为两个国家，这十分鼓舞人心，但是无论在欧洲还是其他地方，这种现象都不是常态。


If it were not for the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel and Egypt would never have reached a peace settlement.	要不是1973年的赎罪日战争（第四次中东战争——译者注），以色列和埃及永远都不会达成和平协议。


And it was the first Gulf War and Palestinian Intifadah that created the conditions for the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the subsequent Oslo Accords.	而正是第一次海湾战争和以占区巴勒斯坦人的暴动为1991年的马德里和会以及随后奥斯陆协议创造了条件。


After Rabin’s assassination, the notion has been gaining ground that any Israeli-Palestinian accord would be the “peace of the exhausted,” not Rabin’s “peace of the brave.”	在拉宾被暗杀后，人们越来越相信巴以和平协议将会是“精疲力尽之人的和平”，而不是拉宾说的“勇敢者的和平”。


But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is nonetheless sui generis: either the parties’ six-decade mutual deadlock is not unbearable enough, or they prefer to pay the price of conflict rather than compromise their national ethos.	尽管如此，巴以冲突具有特殊性：要么是60年的僵局对双方来说还没到难以承受的地步，要么双方宁愿为冲突付出代价，也不愿违背各自的民族精神。


Such is now the loss of hope in a negotiated solution that those who advocate an internationally imposed solution seem to be gaining ground.	正是因为双方会谈解决问题的希望渺茫，所以人们要求国际社会为双方提供强制解决方案的呼声越来越响。


Internal conflicts that end not with mutual deadlock but with an overwhelming victory by one of the parties hardly ever produce diplomatic solutions.	如果一场内部冲突不是因为双方的僵局而结���，而是因为一方取得了压倒性的胜利，那么这场内部冲突很少需要外交解决方案。


Long years of mediation and endless peace proposals in the Sri Lanka conflict failed to end the war and the devastation of entire Tamil communities.	在斯里兰卡的内战中，持续多年的斡旋和和平提议没能结束战争，也没能结束对泰米尔族的摧毁。


“Peace” came about only with the total and unconditional defeat of the Tamil Tiger rebels.	只有在政府军彻底打败“泰米尔猛虎”组织的叛乱分子时，“和平”才得以实现。


Likewise, the failure of Chechnya, Biafra, Tibet, or the Kurdish areas of the Middle East to reach independent statehood is attributable entirely to their military impotence.	同样，车臣、比夫拉、西藏以及中东的库尔德人地区没能获得独立完全是因为它们的军事力量薄弱。


By contrast, Eritrea, East Timor, and parts of the former Yugoslavia achieved independence by exhausting their occupiers and/or their internal rivals.	相反，厄立特里亚、东帝汶、前南斯拉夫的地区能获得独立是因为它们耗尽了占领者或者国内敌对势力的力量。


There are few cases where diplomacy actually succeeded in preventing war.	在少数的一些例子中，外交确实能阻止战争。


Almost invariably, the greatest diplomatic successes have followed, rather than preceded, bloodshed.	而最伟大的外交成功总是在流血事件之后发生的，而不是在此之前。


In 1919, John Maynard Keynes told the statesmen of post-World War I Europe to abandon their vindictive patriotism for the sake of building a future of peace based on European integration.	1919年，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯建议一战后欧洲的政治家们摒弃复仇式的爱国主义，通过欧洲一体化来缔造将来的和平环境。


Alas, it took another world war to convince European leaders of the validity of Keynes’s approach.	不幸的是，在另一次世界大战之后，欧洲的领导人们才相信凯恩斯的建议的合理性。


The European Union – an empire built through diplomacy and consensus – emerged out of the ashes.	于是欧盟——一个完全通过外交和共识建立的帝国——在废墟中耸现。


One should, however, resist falling back on fatalism.	然而，我们不能因此转而相信宿命论。


Colombia’s new president, Juan Manuel Santos, showed genuine courage in cutting short a march to war with Venezuela and calming down the entire Bolivarian axis (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) by reviving the region’s diplomatic channels.	哥伦比亚的新总统胡安·曼努埃尔·桑托斯停止了与委内瑞拉的战争势头，通过恢复地区外交渠道安抚了整个“玻利瓦尔轴心”（委内瑞拉、厄瓜多尔以及玻利维亚），以此表现出了真正的气概。


His was a truly revolutionary shift from the politics of saber-rattling to the hard work of establishing regional peace.	他是真正革命性转折人物，把充斥着战争叫嚣的政治转化为实现地区和平的努力奋斗。


To be sure, much hope still lies in popular diplomacy, in civil society mobilizing for peace.	当然，在倡导和平的民权社会中，公众外交还是能带来许多希望的。


Frequently, governments need to be coaxed into accepting the inevitability of compromise, thanks to pressure from below.	政府经常需要公众外交的劝诱来接受妥协。


Civil society’s support for bridging the psychological gap between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland helped pave the way to peace.	民权社会对弥合北爱尔兰天主教徒和新教教徒心理鸿沟的支持为和平创造了条件。


And Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, after 18 years of useless military occupation, largely reflected the immense impact of the “Four Mothers’ Movement” on Israel’s government.	而以色列在18年徒劳的军事占领后于2000年3月从黎巴嫩撤军，这在很大程度上反映了“四母亲运动”对以色列政府的巨大影响。


But popular diplomacy alone never forces political leaders to end wars and make peace.	但是仅靠公众外交从未成功迫使政治领导人结束战争，谋求和平。


Official diplomacy begins where the battlefield ends.	战场的战斗结束后，正式的外交于是就开始清理战斗未解决的问题。


Unfortunately, in today’s most consequential militarized conflicts, that boundary is still nowhere in sight.	不幸的是，在如今最有破坏性的军事化冲突中，外交与战争的界限令人难以捉摸。


Disarming the Middle East	中东裁军


TEL AVIV – Israel’s desperate plea that the world act to curtail what its intelligence service describes as Iran’s “gallop toward a nuclear bomb” has not gotten the positive response that Israel expected.	特拉维夫－以色列拼命呼吁国际社会行动起来，以遏制其情报机构描述的伊朗“核弹大跃进”的请求，没有得到它期望的正面反应。


With the United Nations sanctions regime now having proven to be utterly ineffective, and with international diplomacy apparently futile in preventing the Iranians from mastering the technology for enriching uranium, Israel is being boxed into a corner.	随着联合国的制裁机制现在已经被证明完全无效，以及国际外交在阻止伊朗掌握铀浓缩技术上的显然不起作用，以色列被逼进了一个角落里。


What was supposed to be a major international effort at mediation is deteriorating into an apocalyptic Israeli-Iranian showdown.	应该是一个重大的国际调停努力事件，现在正在沦为一场预示灾难的以色列－伊朗大摊牌。


This is an intriguing anomaly, for, notwithstanding Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s vile anti-Semitic rhetoric, the implications of Iran’s emerging power extend far beyond the Jewish state.	这是一个令人感兴趣的异常现象，这是因为，尽管有伊朗总统默罕默德·艾哈迈德内贾德无耻的反犹言论，伊朗显现的军事实力的意义远远超过了以色列这个犹太国家的范围。


Indeed, it affects the entire Arab world, particularly the vulnerable Gulf countries, and even Afghanistan and Pakistan.	事实上，它影响了整个阿拉伯世界——特别是脆弱的海湾国家，甚至影响到了阿富汗和巴基斯坦。


The United States, as a major Middle East power, and Europe also have an interest in stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation that now threatens the Middle East. For a nuclear Iran would open the gates to an uncontrolled rush for the bomb across the region.	对于欧洲和作为在中东有重要影响力的美国来说 ，阻止现在威胁中东的核扩散趋势，也符合它们的利益，因为一个拥有核武器的伊朗会为该地区不受控制的核武器竞赛打开大门。


The international system’s failure to address effectively the nuclear issue in the Middle East stems mostly from the Russia-US divide, to which wrongheaded American strategy has contributed mightily.	国际制度没能有效地解决中东核问题的主要原因是俄罗斯－美国的分歧，而刚愎自用的美国策略是造成这一分歧的主要原因。


Russia cannot want a nuclear Iran.	俄罗斯不可能希望伊朗拥有核武器。


But in its quest for leverage against what it perceives as hostile American policies, and as way to bargain for a more acceptable security framework with the West, the Russians refuse to join America’s leadership in international efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions.	但是，在俄罗斯探求对抗其认为充满敌意的美国政策的手段，以及与西方讨价还价更有利的安全框架的途径的时候，它拒绝加入由美国领导的遏制伊朗核野心的国际行动。


Russia holds the key not only to Iran’s diplomatic isolation, but also – through the weapons transfers that it has already pledged to Iran – to the Iranian government’s capacity to protect its nuclear installations.	俄罗斯不仅是对伊朗的外交孤立政策奏效的关键，而且——通过其已经对伊朗作出的出售武器的保证——也是伊朗政府保护其核设施能力的关键。


In October 2007, Vladimir Putin became the first Russian leader since Leonid Brezhnev to visit Iran, bringing along five leaders of the Caspian Sea states.	在2007年10月，弗拉基米尔·普京成为自勃列日涅夫后访问伊朗的第一位俄罗斯领导人，并使五位里海沿岸国家领导人会晤。


Since then, Putin has sought to expose the bankruptcy of America’s policy of isolating Iran.	从那以后，普京已经开始暴露美国孤立伊朗政策的破产。


Russia probably can tame the Iranian regime, but it will do so only in exchange for America’s respect for its interests in the former Soviet Republics, and possibly also a revision of post-Cold War strategic agreements.	俄罗斯可能能遏制伊朗政权，但是，它只有在换得美国对其在前苏联加盟共和国的利益的尊重，以及在可能的情况下对冷战后的战略协定进行修改的情况下，才会这样做。


But, even if abandoned by the Russians, it is highly unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions unless its regional concerns are addressed.	但是，即使伊朗被俄罗斯抛弃，它也不大可能放弃其核野心，除非其区域安全担忧得到解决。


Iran’s nuclear drive reflects a broad national consensus, the result of a deep-seated sense of vulnerability and betrayal.	伊朗追求拥有核武器的动力反映了一个广泛的国民共识，该共识是根深蒂固的易于受到攻击和遭到背叛的结果。


The Iranians remember how the international community remained indifferent when Saddam Hussein attacked with chemical weapons in the 1980’s.	伊朗人记得，当萨达姆·侯赛因在20世纪80年代使用化学武器袭击伊朗的时候，国际社会是怎样的冷漠。


Nor is the presence of America’s formidable might in today’s Iraq comforting to them.	而且，美国现在在伊拉克可怕的权力存在也让他们感到不舒服。


Iran believes that it is the victim of an international double standard – acceptance of Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear status, not to mention Israel’s – which only fuels its sense of discrimination and its resolve to pursue its ambitions.	伊朗认为它是国际双重标准的受害者——国际社会接受了巴基斯坦和印度的核地位，更不要提以色列了——而这只会增强其受到歧视的感觉以及继续其野心的决心。


By exposing the inadequacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran, a signatory, has signaled to Israel that the regional order can no longer be based on Israel’s nuclear monopoly as a non-NPT member.	通过暴露《不扩散核武器条约》的不足，作为该条约签字国的伊朗已经向以色列发出这样的信号：区域秩序再也不能建立在作为非《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国的以色列的核垄断的基础上了。


Hence, the solution lies not only in forcing NPT members like Iran and Syria to comply with their commitments, but in creating a broader regional security and cooperation architecture in the Middle East.	因此，核问题的解决方法不仅在于迫使像伊朗和叙利亚这样的《不扩散核武器条约》的缔约国遵守它们的承诺，而且在于在中东建立一个更广泛的区域安全和合作体制。


But it is highly unlikely that the Arabs will agree to such a system so long as Israel refuses to address her own nuclear capabilities.	但是，只要以色列拒绝讨论其自身的核能力问题，阿拉伯人不大可能同意这样的体制。


Any regional security architecture will have to be premised on the Middle East becoming a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.	任何区域安全体制都将不得不以中东成为一个没有大规模毁灭性武器——包括核武器，化学和生物武器——的区域为前提。


The Middle East retains the infamous distinction of being the only region in the world to have used such weapons since the end of World War II.	中东取得了自二战结束后，世界上唯一一个使用过这样的武器的区域的臭名昭著名声。


Indeed, Arab states have both developed and used chemical and biological weapons – not against Israel, so far, but against others in the region.	确实，阿拉伯国家都既开发又使用过化学和生物武器——到目前为止还不是用它们来攻击以色列，而是攻击该地区的其他人。


Iraq used them against Iran, Egypt in its war in Yemen of the 1970’s, and Iraq against its own Kurds.	伊拉克使用这类武器来攻击伊朗，埃及在20世纪70年代的也门战争中使用过它们，伊拉克用它们来攻击其本国的库尔德人。


In 1993, Israel signed the international treaty banning chemical weapons, but did not ratify it because of the Arab states’ refusal to follow suit as long as Israel maintained its nuclear advantage.	在1993年，以色列签署了禁止化学武器的国际条约���但是没有批准这个条约，因为只要以色列保持其核优势，阿拉伯国家就拒绝批准该条约。


The international community must recognize that the Middle East security equation is not a simple linear one involving Israel versus the Arab world.	国际社会必须认识到中东安全等式不是一个简单的包含以色列对阿拉伯世界的线性等式。


The proliferation of nuclear weapons in a region that has seen fit to use weapons of mass destruction before threatens everyone.	在一个以前已经认为使用大规模毁灭性武器恰当的区域，核武器的扩散会对每一个人造成威胁。


So a concerted effort is needed by outside powers such as the US and Russia, not to act as spoilers of each other’s policies in the region, but to create a WMD-free zone.	所以，核问题的解决，需要诸如美国和俄罗斯这样的外部强国在该地区不要成为对方政策的破坏者，而要共同努力建立一个没有大规模毁灭性武器的地区。


Such a regional system cannot be built in a political vacuum.	这样的区域体制不能建立在政治真空上。


A major effort to assist in the solution of the region’s major political disputes is a vital prerequisite.	帮助该地区主要政治争端找到解决办法的重大努力，是一个至关重要的先决条件。


The nuclear clock is ticking.	解决核武器问题的时间很紧迫。


Dispersing the Terrorist Storm	驱散恐怖阴云


WARSAW – On September 11, 2001 at three p.m., Warsaw time, I was talking on the telephone with Poland’s Consul General in New York.	发自华沙——当时是华沙时间2001年9月11日下午3点，我正在跟波兰驻纽约总领事通电话。


She informed me that two planes had hit the World Trade Center.	她告诉我说纽约世界贸易中心遭到了两架飞机的撞击。


That moment, I realized, was more than just a plane crash.	在那一刻，我意识到这可不仅仅是一场普通的空难。


The United States, the world, indeed our very lives, were about to change fundamentally.	美国，世界，乃至我们所有人的生活，都被彻底地改变了。


Ten years later, it is clear that the fanatics behind those attacks miscalculated in two central respects. They regarded Western democracies as weak – unwilling or unable to respond to their evil extremism.	回顾十年前，很显然当年发动袭击的伊斯兰狂热分子在两大重要方面打错了算盘：首先他们以为西方民主国家非常软弱——因此不愿也无法追究其极端主义暴行。


And they expected Muslim communities and countries around the world to rise up and mobilize behind their millenarian worldview.	他们梦想全世界穆斯林社区及国家会在袭击后实现总动员，在千年轮回之后重建一个安拉的国度。


But, far from being uncertain or indecisive, the democratic world responded with unrelenting determination to terrorist outrages of all shapes and sizes.	但民主世界对此却毫不犹豫，迅速对各类大小恐怖行为作出了一连串反应。


Across Europe and in America, new arrangements have been set up to pool information about possible terrorist attacks and take the speedy (and sometimes robust) action needed to prevent or disrupt them. Where possible, we work closely with India, Russia, Pakistan, the Gulf states, and other key international partners.	欧美各地纷纷建立了相关机制以共享潜在恐怖袭击信息，并采取迅速（有时甚至有点粗暴）的行动来防止或是扑灭这些威胁，同时还尽可能地与印度、俄罗斯、巴基斯坦，海湾国家以及其他重要国际伙伴展开密切合作。


The institutions and policies established by the European Union are a vivid example of the unobtrusive benefits of modern cross-border integration.	而欧盟为此建立的一系列机构和政策则生动体现出当代跨国整合政策所带来的实际益处。


EU member states share highly sensitive intelligence and police information as never before, thereby increasing public security while upholding world-class legal and democratic standards.	欧盟各国对高敏感度情报以及治安信息的交流程度堪称前所未有，并因此在确保高度法制和民主的同时提升了公共安全。


These operational measures have been complemented by carefully calibrated policies that aim to acknowledge social diversity but reduce the political space available for intolerance and bigotry.	这些行动方案也都经过了细心调整，既尊重社会的多样性，又减少了狭隘偏激思想的政治空间。


Success does not come easy.	但成功无法一蹴而就。


Most of Al Qaeda’s leaders are dead, but our democracies rightly experience impassioned debates about means and ends, and about the balance between individual freedom and state authority.	虽然大部分基地组织领导人都已丧命，但我们的民主体制无疑也经历了关于手段与结果孰轻孰重，个人自由与国家权威之间如何平衡的激辩。


In the current difficult global economic climate, public concerns about immigration and access to jobs inevitably grow more acute, increasing the risk that rival forms of lumpen populism and associated tensions will emerge.	在当前的全球经济困境下公众对移民和就业的关注难免过于急迫，以致失业民粹主义及其相关矛盾所引发的风险都会上升。


Above all, the West’s effective crackdown on domestic extremism has tended to drive would-be terrorists – now often based in remote parts of the world, where they hope to operate with impunity – to higher levels of technical sophistication.	最重要的是，西方对其境内极端主义的有效压制迫使那些潜在的恐怖分子——大多数躲在全球偏远地区，希望因此逍遥法外——使用更高级别的技术（来逃脱搜捕）。


As a result, painful policy dilemmas arise, and they can divide even the closest allies.	但这又催生了痛苦的政策困境，使得最亲密的反恐盟友都会心生嫌隙。


How best to respond if some states cannot or will not take the necessary steps to thwart terrorist planning on their territory?	试问如果某些国家无法/不愿采取必要措施阻止其境内的恐怖行动策划，应该如何应对？


How to deal with evidence of terrorist planning gleaned from states suspected of practicing torture?	如果某些国家可能采取刑讯逼供，又该如何处理因此取得的恐怖行动情报？


The sheer nihilistic irrationality of terrorism strains and tests our own beliefs like nothing else can.	恐怖主义的极端无政府主义狂热正不断绷紧和考验着我们自身的信念。


Yet the terrorist blows inflicted on New York, London, and Madrid over the past decade have not shaken Western democracies.	但过去十年在纽约，伦敦和马德里发生的恐怖袭击并未动摇西方民主制度。


Our societies are more resilient, open, and diverse than ever.	而我们的社会也比以前变得更加坚韧，开放和多样化。


That said, we are not doomed to succeed.	没错，我们可能不一定会获得最后的胜利。


Even well-intentioned social policies can have unwelcome consequences.	因为即便满怀善意的社会政策都可能带来意料之外的后果。


Above all, we should be grateful to the police forces and intelligence agencies whose unflagging hard work and dedication far away from the public eye help keep us safe.	但无论如何，我们都要感谢警方和情报部门，正是他们的默默不懈努力保证了公众的安全。


The 9/11 terrorists’ second blunder was to believe that their terrorist attacks would inspire irresistible surge in anti-Western Islamist extremism.	而9·11恐怖分子的第二个错误则是自以为能激发反西方伊斯兰极端主义的汹涌浪潮。


In some parts of the world, radicalization of this sort did take place.	当然在世界的某些地方这种极端化过程也确实发生了。


Yet, since 9/11, most victims of Islamist-inspired terrorist extremism – often in the vile form of suicide attacks – have been Muslims, in Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Terrorist groups have to resort to organized crime to fund themselves.	然而9·11事件后大多数伊斯兰恐怖极端主义的受害者——往往遭到自杀式的卑劣袭击——都是伊拉克，巴基斯坦或者其他国家的穆斯林。


In short, far from leading some sort of worldwide Islamist revolution, the violent fanaticism of Al Qaeda and other organizations now resembles a repulsive, but manageable, form of ideological toxic waste.	简而言之，基地组织及其同党的暴力狂热非但未能带领起一场全球伊斯兰革命，却成为了一个令人厌恶（却可以被制服）的意识形态毒药。


And the focus this year has shifted decisively away from it. Millions of people in North Africa and the Middle East have started to demand a normal society with basic democratic rights and, above all, the rule of law.	更何况今年的焦点也无法逆转地从他们身上转向了别处：北非和中东的数百万民众开始争取一个具备基本民主权利和法治的正常社会。


They welcome measured and respectful US, European, and wider support.	他们也欢迎美国，欧洲以及全球慎重而又无损当地人尊严的援助。


Faced with this unexpected challenge, some desperate rulers, above all now in Syria, have been using repressive, even terrorist methods against their open people.	面对这些意想不到的挑战，某些穷途末路的统治者——比如叙利亚总统阿萨德——用镇压甚至恐怖主义的手段来镇压开明的人民。


European pressure on President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is intensifying.	而欧洲对阿萨德政权的压力也正不断加大。


In Libya, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s appalling tyranny has collapsed; the EU will be generous in helping the Libyan people start to build a modern pluralist society.	在利比亚，卡扎菲骇人听闻的暴政已经崩溃； 欧盟也非常乐意帮助利比亚人民建立一个多党制民主国家。


Poland’s initiative to create a European Endowment for Democracy could play a leading role here, and with Europe’s own unfinished business of democratization in Belarus and elsewhere, like backsliding Ukraine.	波兰关于创设一个欧洲民主基金的倡议将能在该国扮演核心角色，同时也有助于完成欧洲自身内部的民主化进程，比如在白俄罗斯或是正处于民主倒退过程中的乌克兰。


Few people decide to commit terrorist outrages. Of those who do, a minute fraction actually tries to carry them out, and only a tiny number of those succeed.	有一些人决定要实施恐怖活动，其中只有极少数人能真正实施，而最后只有一小撮人能成功。


But the main lesson of 9/11 is that in any free society a tiny number of people can exploit their freedom and do vast damage, especially when the underlying motivation is incoherent.	但9·11带给我们最重要的教训莫过于在任何自由社会中都会有一些人会滥用自己的自由并造成极大破坏，尤其是在这些行为背后的动机都自相矛盾之时。


This is exemplified in very different ways by the murderous killing spree in Norway in July, and now by WikiLeaks’ disgraceful release of huge numbers of unredacted diplomatic cables.	这一方面体现在今年7月挪威的大屠杀事件上，同时也在维基解密组织未经编辑而泄露大批外交电文的可耻行为中暴露无遗。


The terrorism threat ten years from now probably will be even more diverse and unpredictable.	9·11事件至今已历十年，恐怖主义威胁或许也因此变得更加多样化和不可预测。


In Europe various homegrown “single issue” extremist groups need close monitoring.	在欧洲大量本地化的“单一议题”极端组织需要密切监控。


In each case, we see obsessive people arrogating to themselves the right to decide others’ fate, and using modern technology for their harmful purposes.	在每一个案例中，我们都能看到那些偏执者赋予自身决定他人命运的权力，并使用现代科技来为自己的邪恶目的服务。


By its very nature, this sort of disaggregated but highly focused threat is almost impossible to identify and intercept in advance.	从本质上看，这种形式分散却焦点高度集中的威胁几乎无法被事先辨认和破除。


Of course, the democratic world cannot build a bomb-proof house. But we can minimize risk by remaining vigilant and upholding at all times the values on which our societies are based.	很显然民主世界不可能用防弹钢板把自己包裹起来，但只要随时保持警惕并尽力维护作为自身社会基础的价值观，我们就能尽量缩小这些风险。


Managing the Age of Disruption	管理被破坏的年代


NEW YORK – Bold predictions based on intuition are rarely a good idea.	纽约——仅凭直觉就大胆预测很少会是好主意。


Margaret Thatcher, as Education Secretary in 1973, famously asserted that the United Kingdom would not have a woman prime minister in her lifetime.	1973年撒切尔夫人任教育大臣时，曾众所周知地断言英国在她有生之年不可能选出一位女首相。


IBM’s president, Thomas J. Watson, declared in 1943 that there was “a world market for perhaps five computers.”	IBM总裁托马斯·J·沃森曾在1943年宣称“世界市场可能需要五台电脑。


And, when movies with sound made their debut in 1927, Warner Brothers’ Harry Warner asked, “Who the hell wants to hear actors talk?”	”而当有声电影于1927年首次亮相时，华纳兄弟影业的哈利·华纳质问，“究竟谁想听演员讲话？ ”


At a time when four powerful forces are disrupting the global economy, upending most of our assumptions, such pronouncements on the future, shaped by intuitions based on the past, are even more likely to be wrong.	值此四大力量破坏全球经济、颠覆我们绝大多数假设时，像这样从过去经历中总结出来的直觉其错误的可能性甚至更大。


Each of these four “great disruptions” is transformational on its own, and all are amplifying the effects of the others, producing fundamental and unpredictable changes on a scale the world has never seen – and that will prove our intuitions wrong.	所谓四大“破坏力”本身都是转型性力量，它们无时无刻不在放大着各自的效果，为世界带来前所未有且不可预知的根本性变化——这些变化会证明我们的直觉错误。


The first great disruption is the shift of economic activity to emerging-market cities.	最重要的破坏性力是经济活动转移到新兴市场城市。


As recently as 2000, 95% of the Fortune Global 500 was headquartered in developed economies.	就在2000年， 95％的全球财富500强企业总部还设在发达国家。


By 2025, nearly half of the Fortune Global 500 companies will be based in emerging economies, with China home to more of them than the United States or Europe.	而截止到2025年，近半数全球财富500强企业的总部将设在新兴经济体，其中设在中国的总部数量将超过美国和欧洲。


Cities are at the vanguard of this shift.	城市是上述转变的急先锋。


Nearly half of global GDP growth from 2010 to 2025 will come from 440 emerging-market cities, many of which Western executives may not even know exist.	2010到2025年近半数的全球GDP增长将来自440个新兴市场城市，其中不少西方高管甚至可能都从未听说。


They are places like Tianjin, a city southeast of Beijing with a GDP that is practically on par with Stockholm’s today – and could equal all of Sweden’s by 2025.	比方说位于北京东南的城市天津，其当前GDP几乎堪与斯德哥尔摩相媲美——而到2025年甚至可能相当于整个瑞典的规模。


The second great disruption is the acceleration of technological change.	第二大破坏力是不断加速的技术变革。


While technology has always been transformative, its impact is now ubiquitous, with digital and mobile technologies being adopted at an unprecedented rate.	尽管技术一直是变革的推动力，但现在随着数字和移动技术前所未有的普及，技术的影响力简直是无处不在的。


It took more than 50 years after the telephone was invented for half of American homes to have one, but only 20 years for cellphones to spread from less than 3% of the world’s population to more than two-thirds.	电话发明后用了50多年时间才在半数美国家庭中普及，而手机普及率从世界人口不到3%猛增至超过三分之二仅用20年就完成了。


Facebook had six million users in 2006; today, it has 1.4 billion.	2006年Facebook还只有600万用户； 但今天已经达到14亿之多。


The mobile Internet offers the promise of economic progress for billions of emerging-economy citizens at a speed that would otherwise be unimaginable.	移动互联网以难以想象的速度为数十亿新兴经济体民众带来经济增长的曙光。


And it gives entrepreneurial upstarts a greater chance of competing with established firms.	它使得创业新贵有机会与老牌企业竞争。


But technological change also carries risks, especially for workers who lose their jobs to automation or lack the skills to work in higher-tech fields.	但技术变革也带来了风险，尤其是对那些因自动化失业或没有掌握先进技术的工人来讲。


The third disruption is demographic.	人口是第三大破坏力量。


For the first time in centuries, our population could plateau in most of the world.	世界多数地区的人口增长将在几个世纪以来首次达到平衡。


Indeed, population aging, which has been evident in the developed world for some time, is now spreading to China and soon will reach Latin America.	事实上，人口老龄化趋势在发达国家已经非常明显，现在已经蔓延到中国，并将很快波及拉丁美洲。


Thirty years ago, only a few countries, home to a small share of the global population, had fertility rates substantially below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.	三十年前，仅有占全球很小部分人口的少数几个国家其生育率远低于每名妇女2. 1个孩子的替代率。


In 2013, about 60% of the world’s population lived in countries with sub-replacement fertility rates.	而2013年，约60%的世界人口已居住在生育率低于替代率的国家。


As the elderly increasingly outnumber working-age people, pressure is building on the labor force, and tax revenues, needed to service government debt and fund public services and pension systems, are diminishing.	由于老年人相对劳动年龄人口的数量越来越多，因此对劳动人口造成的压力也越大越大，偿还政府债务、资助公共服务及养老体系所需的税收收入不断萎缩。


The final disruption is the world’s increasing interconnectedness, with goods, capital, people, and information flowing ever more easily across borders.	最后的破坏力是当今世界越来越密切的联系，货物、资本、人员和信息的跨界流动比过去容易得多。


Not long ago, international links existed primarily among major trading hubs in Europe and North America; now, the web is intricate and sprawling.	就在不久前，国际联系还主要体现在欧洲和北美的大型贸易枢纽； 而现在，复杂而又庞大的网络覆盖了一切。


Capital flows among emerging economies have doubled in just ten years, and more than one billion people crossed borders in 2009, over five times the figure in 1980.	新兴经济体间的资本流动在短短十年间增加了一倍，2009年有超过10亿人跨越国界，是1980年跨境人数的五倍。


The resulting challenges – a host of new and unexpected competitors, volatility stemming from faraway places, and the disappearance of local jobs – are already overwhelming workers and companies.	由此带来的挑战——一系列意想不到的新增对手、来自远方的波动性及本地就业机会的消失——已经让工人和企业措手不及。


Of course, this interconnectedness also offers important opportunities; but an implicit bias toward the familiar is impeding the ability of workers, firms, and even governments to take full advantage of them.	当然，这样的联系也能带来重要的机遇； 但人们内心所隐藏的对于熟悉的偏爱会妨碍工人、企业甚至政府利用这样的机遇。


This is especially true for companies.	对企业而言尤其如此。


According to McKinsey research, from 1990 to 2005, US companies almost always allocated resources on the basis of past, rather than future, opportunities.	麦肯锡研究显示从1990年到2005年，美国企业几乎总是根据过往业绩来分配资源，而不是未来的机遇。


Firms that succumb to such inertia will probably sink, rather than swim, in the new global economy.	屈从于上述惯性的企业或许会在新全球经济中垮台，而不是发展壮大。


Some firms, however, will adapt, taking advantage of unprecedented opportunities to remain agile.	但有些企业会适应环境，利用前所未有的机遇来保持自身的敏捷。


Instead of, say, building a new headquarters, renting a storefront, or purchasing a restaurant – traditional requirements that demanded large amounts of up-front capital – they can open a satellite sales office, create an online store, or launch a food truck.	它们会放弃建设新总部、租用新店面或购买新餐厅等需要投入大量前期资本的传统需求，转而开设卫星销售点、设立网上商店或启用流动食品车。


Flexibility and responsiveness will enable such firms to thrive.	灵活性和响应能力将使这些公司能够茁壮成长。


The pace and scale of the current economic transformation is undoubtedly daunting.	当前经济转型的速度和规模无疑令人胆怯。


But there is plenty of reason for optimism.	但仍有很多保持乐观的理由。


Inequality may be on the rise within countries, but it has dropped dramatically among them.	国内不平等可能表现出上升趋势，但国与国之间的不平等已经大幅下降。


Nearly a billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty from 1990 to 2010; another three billion will join the global middle class in the next two decades.	从1990到2010年有将近10亿人摆脱赤贫； 未来二十年另外三十亿人将进入全球中场阶级。


In 1930, at the height of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes declared that the standard of living in “progressive economies” would increase 4-8 times over the subsequent 100 years.	1930年，在大萧条最恐怖时期，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯称“渐进经济体”的生活水平将在今后一百年提升4-8倍。


His prediction, which was regarded as hopelessly Pollyannaish at the time, has turned out to be correct, with the improvement likely to be at the top of his projected range.	事实已经证明了他在当时被指“极度乐观”的预测正确，且实际改善幅度很可能达到他预测范围的上限。


Keynes, unlike many of his contemporaries, recognized the forces at work in the economy, adjusted his thinking, and, crucially, was not afraid to be optimistic.	有别于同代人的是，凯恩斯认清了起作用的经济力量，及时调整自己的思维，并且最关键的是，不惧怕抱有乐观的态度。


We must do the same.	我们也必须这样。


Divest in a Better Future	远离化石燃料，迎接美好未来


SEATTLE – Sometimes the best measure of a movement’s momentum is the reaction of its critics.	西雅图—有时，衡量一场运动有多少动力的最佳办法是看批评者的反应。


When, in early October, the Australian National University (ANU) announced that it would sell its shares in seven fossil-fuel and mining companies, it triggered a chorus of criticism from the country’s conservative politicians.	10月初，当澳大利亚国立大学(ANU)宣布将出售七家化石燃料和矿业公司股票时，澳大利亚保守政客异口同声地对ANU进行了猛烈抨击。


These nominal champions of the free market were quick to tell the university what it should do with its money.	表面上看，这些自由市场赢家马上行动起来告诉ANU应该如何花钱。


The Treasurer of Australia, Joe Hockey, disparaged the ANU’s decision as being “removed from reality.”	澳大利亚财政部长乔·霍吉（Joe Hockey）批评ANU的决定是“违背现实”。


Others chimed in, calling it “a disgrace,” “very strange,” and “narrow-minded and irresponsible.”	其他人也纷纷加入其中，称之为“丢人”、“非常奇怪”、“心胸狭隘、不负责任”。


Never mind that the sums involved were relatively small – making up less than 2% of the university’s estimated $1 billion portfolio.	事实上这一决定所涉资金相对很小——只相当于ANU大约10亿美元投资组合的不到2%——但丝毫没有妨碍批评者的热情。


As the drive to divest from fossil fuels picks up speed, such panicky responses are becoming increasingly common.	随着远离化石燃料的呼声日涨，如此恐慌的反应也变得越来越平常。


The outrage of Australia’s conservatives reminds me of the reaction I received when I testified before the US Congress in 2013 that we should “keep our coal in the ground where it belongs.”	澳大利亚反对派之怒让我想起了2013年我在美国国会前参与听证、表示我们应该“让我们的煤炭留在地下原来的位置”时所收获的反应。


David McKinley, a Republican congressman from West Virginia, in the heart of America’s coal country, replied that my words “sent a shiver up [his] spine,” then changed the subject to the crime rate in Seattle, where I was Mayor.	来自美国煤炭业中心西弗吉尼亚州共和党议员大卫·麦金利（David McKinley）说我的证词“让他打了一个寒颤”，接着把话题引向了我担任市长的西雅图市的犯罪率。


Even ExxonMobil appears shaken.	就连埃克森美孚公司看起来也受了惊。


The company recently published a long, defensive blog post responding to what it described as a “full-throated endorsement” of fossil-fuel divestment by Mary Robinson, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s special envoy for climate change.	该公司最近发布了一篇长篇辩护博文，作为对其所谓联合国秘书长潘基文的气候变化特使玛丽·罗宾逊（Mary Robinson）“声嘶力竭地鼓吹”远离化石燃料的反应。


The fossil-fuel industry clearly sees the divestment movement as the political threat that it is.	化石燃料行业显然将远离化石燃料运动视为潜在威胁。


When enough people say no to investing in fossil-fuel production, the next step has to be keeping coal, oil, and gas in the ground.	当足够的人对化石燃料生产投资说“不“时，下一步就必然是让煤炭、石油和天然气留在地下。


That is a necessary step if we are to head off the most dangerous consequences of climate change.	如果我们想阻止气候变化的最危险后果，这是不可缺少的步骤。


To prevent world temperatures from rising above the 2º Celsius threshold that climate scientists believe represents a tipping point beyond which the worst effects could no longer be mitigated, we will need to leave approximately 80% of known fossil-fuel reserves untapped.	为了防止世界气温上升幅度超过2℃的阈值，我们必须让大约80%的已知化石燃料储备保持原状。 气候学家认为，如果升温幅度超过2℃，就将无法减轻气候变化的最恶劣影响。


Oil and coal companies and their political allies warn us of fiscal catastrophe if we do that – as if heat waves, droughts, storms, and rising seas did not bring their own fiscal and social catastrophes.	石油和煤炭公司及其政治盟友警告我们，如果我们这样做，财政就会崩溃——好像热浪、干旱、风暴和海平面上升不会让它们的财政和社会崩溃似的。 作为西雅图市市长，我支持建设能源高效型建筑；


As Mayor of Seattle, I supported the creation of energy-efficient buildings, the development of solar, wind, and hydroelectric power, and a shift toward walking, biking, and public transit as alternatives to driving – strategies that can help to build a more resilient economy and provide viable alternatives to fossil fuels.	开发太阳能、风能和水电； 多采用步行、骑车和公共交通代替驾车出行——这些策略有助于构建恢复力更强的经济、提供化石燃料的替代方案。


But they cannot prevent the worst of global warming, particularly if they result in coal and oil simply being sold elsewhere.	但它们无法防止最糟糕的全球变暖，特别是如果煤炭和石油公司只是换一个地方出售产品的话。


As imperfect as our governance systems are, at some point the public and its leaders may demand that we confront the truth about global warming.	我们的治理体系并不完善，同样，总有一天公众和公众领袖会要求我们直面关于气候变暖的真相。


At that point, they will put in place the regulatory or legal controls needed to reduce fossil-fuel use dramatically.	那时，我们将实施大幅减少化石燃料使用所必要的监管和法律控制手段。


If you are a prudent and cautious investor, contemplate that possibility for a moment.	如���你是审慎、小心的投资者，就应该深刻思考迎来这一时刻的可能性。


Stock values in the fossil-fuel industry – which are based on the assumption that companies will be able to extract and burn all known reserves – will plummet.	化石燃料行业的股票价值将崩溃——它们的估值基础是公司能够开采和燃烧所有已知储备这一假设。


Investing in these companies, it turns out, is extraordinarily risky.	投资于这些公司风险极大。


As anyone who receives investment statements knows, “past performance is no guarantee of future performance.”	所有读过投资学的人都知道，“过去的表现并不能保证未来表现”。


That reality implies another compelling case for divestment.	这一现实构成了另一个远离化石燃料的理由。


To be sure, some will claim that the world will never change and that we will continue to depend on fossil fuels forever.	诚然，会有人说世界永远不会变，我们将永远依赖化石燃料。


But one has only to look to Seattle, where gay couples marry in City Hall and marijuana is sold in licensed retail outlets, to see the human capacity to reexamine deeply held assumptions.	但你只要看看西雅图，同性恋夫妻在市政厅结婚，大麻在持牌零售商店销售，这些都表明该人类有能力反思根深蒂固的假设。


The prudent investor, and the wise business leader, will look where the economy is headed, not where it has been.	审慎的投资者和明智的商业领袖会着眼于经济的未来方向而不是昨天的位置。


The ANU’s decision looks like a sage one to anyone not in thrall to oil and gas companies, and it will only look wiser with the passing of time.	ANU的决定在任何一个非石油和天然气公司代言人的人眼里都是英明的，而若以未来的眼光看，这一决定更是明智无比。


Good on them.	他们做了一件好事。


When I put Seattle on the path to divestment in 2013, my decision was well received by the young people who will have to live with the consequences of global warming, as well as the general public.	2013年，当我决定让西雅图远离化石燃料时，我的决定受到了必须面对全球变暖后果的年轻人的热烈响应，普通大众也很支持。


As the political pressure mounts, the university’s administrators need only listen to the students.	尽管政治压力的增加，但ANU管理层只需要聆听学生的声音。


We need more courage like that shown by the ANU.	我们需要更多ANU所表现出来的勇气。


Its leaders bucked the power of coal and oil interests, which wield enormous power in Australia.	ANU领导人打败了在澳大利亚炙手可热的煤炭和石油利益集团。


If they can do it to popular acclaim, others can, too.	如果我们大家都为此喝彩，其他人也能这样做。


Divided We Fall	离则死，合则生


LONDON – Politics trumped sensible economics in the United States this summer, when Congress and President Barack Obama could not agree on taxes, entitlements, deficits, or an investment stimulus.	发自伦敦——今夏美国国内的政治需要压倒了经济理性，国会与总统奥巴马在税收、授权，赤字以及刺激方案上争持不下。


Europe’s leaders were also paralyzed – ruling out defaults and devaluations, as well as deficits and stimulus.	欧洲各国领导人也左右为难：一方面排除了违约和贬值的可能性，另外一方面又不愿推行赤字和刺激计划。


And, having run negative real interest rates, printed money, plowed in liquidity, and subsidized commercial banks, central bankers everywhere – most recently US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke – appear to have concluded that they, too, have reached the limit of what they can do.	而通过实施实质负利率，印钞，注入流动性并补贴各商业银行，世界各地的中央银行管理者们（最近是美联储主席伯南克）似乎都认定自己已经尽力了。


As a result, few people today doubt that the world is drifting, rudderless and leaderless, towards a second downturn.	于是，只有很少一部分人怀疑世界正在失控状态下滑向第二次探底。


The pre-summer debate about whether we faced a “new normal” of slower growth has been resolved: nothing now looks normal.	夏天来临之前那场关于我们是否面对一个低增长“新常态”的问题已经不复存在，因为已经没有任何东西能维持常态了。


Muddling through has failed.	希望再挺一挺来蒙混过关的策略已经失效。


Unable to conclude a global trade deal, climate-change agreement, growth pact, or changes in the financial regime, the world is likely to descend into a new protectionism of competitive devaluation, currency wars, trade restrictions, and capital controls.	由于无法在全球贸易协定，气候变化条约，增长协议或者经济体制改革等方面达成一致，世界很可能会陷入一个争相贬值、货币战争，贸易限制以及资本管制的新保护主义格局之中。


But this is not a time for defeatism.	但现在还没到承认失败的时候。


Countries claiming to have reached the limit of what they can do really mean that they have reached the limit of what they can do on their own.	那些声称已经用尽一切手段的国家其实只是穷尽了本国能使用的路数。


The way forward to sustained growth and employment is not through a flurry of one-off national initiatives, but rather through global policy coordination.	而实现持续增长和就业的策略并不能依靠某个国家的一次性计划，而是要通过全球政策协调来达成。


That was the goal back in April 2009, when the G-20 set itself three critical tasks.	这其实是2009年4月所订立的目标，当时G20集团给自己定下了三大关键任务。


The first, preventing a global depression, was achieved.	首先要防止全球衰退，这一点已经实现了。


The other two – a growth pact, underpinned by a reformed global financial system – should now be the main items on the G-20’s agenda when it meets.	而另外两个——改革全球金融系统，并因此制定一个增长协议——应当成为G20下次会议的主要议程。


In 2010, the International Monetary Fund estimated that a coordinated approach to macroeconomic, trade, and structural policies could achieve 5.5% higher global GDP, create 25-50 million additional jobs, and lift 90 million people out of poverty.	2010年时国际货币基金组织预测一个涵盖宏观经济，贸易和政策体制的协调策略将使全球GDP实现5. 5%的额外增长，并因此创造2500~5000万个就业岗位并使9000万人脱离贫困。


But a global growth pact looks even more indispensable today, given the world economy’s structural problems and huge imbalances between production and consumption.	但考虑到世界经济当前面临的结构问题以及生产消费之间的巨大缺口，一个全球增长协议如今显得更加必不可少。


It may seem strange to describe the greatest financial crisis since the 1930’s as a symptom of a bigger problem.	有人说1930年那场史上最严酷经济危机其实是另一更严峻问题的先兆，这一看法或许看上比较奇怪。


But, when historians look back on the wave of globalization after 1990 – which has brought two billion new producers into the world economy – they will find a turning point around 2010. For the first time in 150 years, the West (America and the European Union) was out-manufactured, out-produced, out-exported, out-traded, and out-invested by the rest of the world.	然而当历史学家回顾1990年后那场将20亿新生产者卷入世界经济的全球化浪潮时，他们会发现在2010年左���其实出现了一个转折点：150年来西方（美国以及欧盟）第一次在制造、生产、出口，贸易和投资方面被世界其他地区全面超越。


Indeed, by the early to mid-2020’s, the Asian consumer market will be twice the size of the US market.	事实上，亚洲消费市场的规模将在2020年中前期达到美国市场规模的两倍。


Today, however, the West and Asia remain mutually dependent.	然而今天西方和亚洲市场依然相互依存。


Two-thirds of Asia’s exports still end up in the West, and south-south trade accounts for just 20% of global turnover.	亚洲出口额中的2/3销往西方，而发展中国家间贸易仅占全球贸易总额的20%。


Put another way, ten years ago the US engine could drive the world economy, and ten years from now the emerging-market countries stand to take over that role, particularly given the rising purchasing power of their middle classes.	换句话说，10年前美国引擎足以驱动全球经济，而未来10年内随着新兴市场国家中产阶层消费力的不断增强，它们将最终占据这一角色。


But, for now, America and Europe cannot expand their consumer spending without increasing exports, while China and the emerging markets cannot easily expand their production or consumption without the guarantee of strong Western markets.	但目前为止欧美都无法在不增加进口的情况下增加消费，而中国以及其他新兴市场也不能在缺乏西方强劲市场的情况下扩展其生产或消费。


So, first, we must restore the broad vision of global cooperation contained in the G-20 growth pact (which has since been downgraded to what the IMF now calls “an in-depth analysis of…those countries identified as having large imbalances”).	因此，我们首先必须重新恢复G20增长协议（该协议如今已降格为国际货币基金组织所谓“一项针对那些财政失衡国家的深入分析报告”）所包含的全球合作大视野。 同时还需要一个更广泛也更深入的议程：中国应当同意提升家庭支出和消费品进口；


But a broader and deeper agenda is needed: China should agree to raise household spending and consumer imports; India should open its markets so that its poor can benefit from low-cost imports; and Europe and America must boost competitiveness in order to increase their exports.	印度应当开放市场以使贫苦民众受惠于廉价进口商品； 欧美则应当提升竞争力以增加出口。


The G-20 was also adamant in 2009 that future stability required a new global financial regime.	G20集团在2009年时也曾强调未来的稳定需要一个新的全球金融体制来维持。


David Miles of the Bank of England predicts three more financial crises in the coming two decades.	英格兰银行的大卫·迈尔斯预测在未来20年内还将再发生3次经济危机。


And, if the BoE’s Andrew Haldane is right that rising pressures in Asia threaten future turmoil, the West will regret its failure to entrench global capital-adequacy and liquidity standards and a more transparent early-warning system.	而如果他的同事安德鲁·霍尔丹关于亚洲承受压力增大将导致混乱的论断是对的话，西方必将对自己未能认真确立全球资本充足率和流动性标准以及一个更精确的早期预警系统而懊悔不已。


The problem is already evident.	这一问题其实早已露出端倪。


Europe’s banking-sector liabilities are nearly five times higher than in the US, at 345% of GDP.	欧洲的银行部门债务额是美国的5倍，相当于GDP的345%。


Germany’s banks are leveraged at 32 times their assets.	德国银行的资产杠杆比率高达32。


So, not only is bank recapitalization essential for financial stability, but so is a reformed euro, built on fiscal and monetary coordination and an enhanced role for the European Central Bank in supporting individual governments (not individual banks) as lender of last resort.	因此金融稳定不仅需要银行进行财务重组，还需要一个重整的欧元，该货币一方面构建在财政和货币政策协调之上，另一方面则奠基于一个更有作为，足以在最后时刻贷款给单一国家政府（而非单一银行）的欧洲中央银行。


The G-20 will not achieve growth and stability without a renewed focus on long-term debt reduction.	如果不能将注意力重新聚焦放在长期债务消减之上，G20集团国的增长和稳定就是空谈。


But there is also a short-term imperative to avoid a cycle of decline.	但同时也存在着避免陷入下滑周期的短期紧迫要求。


So we should draw on Robert Skidelsky’s national investment bank proposals to equip our infrastructure – not least our environment – for future challenges and to stimulate growth and job creation.	因此我们应当采纳罗伯特·斯基德尔斯基的国家投资银行提议来改善自身基础设施（而不仅仅是环境）来应对未来的挑战并刺激增长和就业。


One model is the European Investment Bank, which, with €50 billion of capital, has been able to invest €400 billion.	其中一个榜样就是拥有500亿欧元资本并有能力进行4000亿欧元投资的欧洲开发银行。


But there is perhaps a deal to be done with the Chinese on investing their reserves and with Western multinationals on the tax treatment of repatriated profits.	但或许可以和中国谈谈如何利用其外汇储备进行投资，并和西方跨国公司商讨回流利润的税务问题。


Finally, as the Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence has shown, growth is now a necessary but insufficient condition for job creation.	最后，正如诺贝尔奖经济学奖得主迈克尔·斯宾塞所展示的那样，增长如今已经成为创造就业的一个必要但不充分条件。


Today’s epidemic of youth unemployment, in particular, requires new approaches – a development bank, for example, to help employ the bulging youth population in the Middle East and North Africa, and training and apprenticeship programs elsewhere.	青年失业的流行病尤其需要新的手段来应对——比如设立一个开发银行来帮助中东和北非地区不断膨胀的青年人口实现就业，并在其他地区推行职业培训和学徒项目。


The G-20’s growth compact must be a jobs compact, too.	而G20集团的增长协议也必须成为一项就业增长协议。


The G-20, which represents 80% of world output, came into its own in 2009 as the only multilateral body able to coordinate global economic policy.	代表着全球80%生产额的G20集团在2009年成为了唯一能够协调全球经济政策的多国实体。


Unfortunately, its member states soon abandoned that goal and defaulted to national solutions.	但不幸的是，其成员国迅速抛弃了这个目标并着手寻求单一国家解决方案。


Predictably, going it alone has proven futile in ensuring economic recovery. The G-20’s time has come again.	然而可以预见的是，单打独斗已经无法确保经济复苏，良机也因此再度降临到了G20会议身上。


The sooner French President Nicolas Sarkozy calls the G-20 together to act, the better.	而法国总统萨科齐越快召集G20成员国共同行动，效果就越好。


Déjà-vu in the Middle East	中东似曾相识


BERLIN -- Does history repeat itself, after all?	柏林--历史是否重演？


Recent developments in the Middle East suggest that the answer is “yes,” because the situation at the end of President George W. Bush’s tenure increasingly resembles that of Bill Clinton’s final year in the presidency.	中东最近的局势发展表明的确如此，因为布什总统任期尾端的形势越发与克林顿总统任期最后一年的相像。


Both presidents, at the end of their respective terms, sought to resolve one of the world’s most dangerous conflicts, while facing the threat that time was running out on them.	两位总统在任期的最后都寻求解决世界上最为危险的冲突，而面临着时间迅速流逝的威胁。


One could despair: the Bush administration has obviously wasted almost seven years during which it could have pursued a solution.	人们或许会绝望。 布什政府明显浪费了大部分七年时间，原本可以在这段时间里寻求解决途径。


We are now back to the starting point: the Camp David and Taba talks – flippantly abandoned in January 2001 – are to be taken up again.	我们现在又回到了出发点，也就是2001年1月轻率放弃的戴维营和塔巴会谈将会重新开始。


Still, as the wise saying goes, better late than never!	然而，正如智者所言，迟到总比没有好！


The Middle East conference to be held in Annapolis, Maryland should be a forum for final status negotiations between the parties, dealing above all with the establishment of a Palestinian state and its borders (those of June 1967, with some negotiated exchanges of territory), its capital (Jerusalem), Israeli settlements, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees.	将在马里兰州安娜波利斯举行的中东问题会议应该是各方之间最终地位谈判的论坛，首先处理巴勒斯坦建国问题及其边界(1967年的边界，其中一部分谈判交换领土)、首都(耶路撒冷)、以色列定居点以及巴勒斯坦难民返回家园的权利。


It should also address questions of security, the termination of the decades-long state of war, and recognition of Israel by the Arab states.	这一会议还应该处理安全问题、结束长达几十年的战争状态以及阿拉伯国家承认以色列的问题。


Indeed, it is high time for progress on a two-state solution, because the Palestinians are increasingly losing hope of ever having a state of their own.	确实，现在应该在两国方案上取得进展了，因为巴勒斯坦人越发失去早晚拥有自己的国家的希望。


Without it, the Middle East conflict will remain at a stalemate and violence will only intensify.	没有这一进展，中东冲突将会继续处于僵局，而暴力只会加剧。


Acceptable compromises on all of these questions have been negotiated repeatedly by the parties and stowed away for many years.	多年来，各方不断就所有这些问题进行谈判以求可以接受的妥协，但是都无果而终。


The only missing ingredient is the political will and strength to enter into a peace agreement.	唯一缺乏的就是达成和平协议的政治意愿及力量。


But this very political strength is precisely what both the Israeli and Palestinian governments lack.	但是，以色列和巴勒斯坦政府缺乏的就是这一政治力量。


Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are very weak domestically, and, given the compromises needed on both sides, they will be risking a lot.	以色列总理奥尔穆特和巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯在国内都处于劣势，而且鉴于双方都要做出的妥协，他们冒着很大的风险。


The same is true of President Bush.	这对于布什总统也一样。


Indeed, the US government does not even stand whole-heartedly behind its own initiative.	确实，美国政府甚至并不全心全意支持自身的建议。


Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wants the conference to happen and has done much to push it ahead.	莱斯国务卿想要召开这一会议而且费尽周折来加以推动。


But how much risk is Bush – without whom a real breakthrough will be impossible – prepared to accept?	但是，没有布什的支持真正的突破就不可能。 他愿意接受多少风险呢？


Fortunately, existing taboos about what is acceptable in the final status talks have fallen – on both sides.	所幸的是，现有的最终地位谈判上可以接受的禁区已经解除，双方都是如此。


The parallel weakness of Olmert and Abbas has produced a parallel interest in a peace settlement.	奥尔穆特和阿巴斯两人共同的弱点产生了对和平协议的共同的兴趣。


Indeed, both men hope for political survival through a peace agreement: Olmert by means of new elections and Abbas by a referendum through which he can regain ascendancy over Hamas.	实际上，两人都希望通过和平协议来达到在政治上生存下去的目的。 奥尔穆特通过新的选举，而阿巴斯通过可以取得对哈马斯优势的全民公决来达到目的。


So will a failed “Peace of the Strong“ be followed by a successful “Peace of the Weak”?	所以，“强人之间的和平”失败后，是否“弱者之间的和平”可以成功呢？


As the domestic situations in Israel and Palestine have changed, so, too, has the regional political environment changed in a positive direction, because most Arab states today are more afraid of Iran’s regional domination than they are of Israel.	以色列和巴勒斯坦国内局势发生了改变，而地区政治环境也朝着积极的方向发生了改变，因为今天的大多数阿拉伯国家更为担心伊朗的地区控制，而非以色列。


This development offers an unprecedented opportunity.	这一局势发展提供了一个前所未有的机遇。


There are obvious pitfalls, to be sure.	毫无疑问，这里还是有显而易见的苦难。


Olmert’s room for maneuver within his party, and particularly within his coalition, is very small.	奥尔穆特在其党内、特别是其联合政府内的移动空间非常小。


Can he make sufficient concessions on borders and Jerusalem?	他能否在边界和耶路撒冷问题上做出足够的让步？


Similar doubts apply to Abbas.	阿巴斯同样也存有疑虑。


Can he deliver the security guarantees that Olmert needs, especially given the Palestinians’ fear that, in the end, they will give too much, without getting back concessions on what they see as their fundamental demands?	特别是在巴勒斯坦人担心他们最终放弃过多而没有在他们认为是其根本要求上得到的让步的情况下，他能否实现奥尔穆特寻求的安全保证？


Moreover, the critical hurdle will not be the negotiations, but rather implementation of whatever agreement may emerge – and its political cost will be very high.	而且，关键的障碍不是谈判，而是落实无论达成的何种协议，而其政治代价将会很高。


The Palestinians are already in the midst of a civil war.	巴勒斯坦人已经身处内战。


The compromises necessary for peace are likely to lead to a stark political confrontation in Israel as well.	和平所需要的妥协可能同样会导致以色列内部的强烈的政治对抗。


Obviously, Olmert is thinking of fusing an agreement on the final status with the Road Map mechanism.	很明显，奥尔穆特在考虑将最终地位协议和路线图机制相结合。


Such an agreement should be implemented gradually, and progress should depend on the parties’ fulfillment of their obligations each step of the way.	这一协议应当逐步实施，而其进展应当取决于各方在各个步骤上落实义务的情况。


Yet a mechanism of this kind can only work if a third party (the US, the “US plus,” or the Middle East Quartet) is available to monitor the agreement.	但是，此类机制只有在第三方(美国，“美国加”或者中东四方)可以监督协议的情况下才会奏效。


Otherwise, disputes about fulfillment of this or that provision will lead the entire process back into the familiar quicksand of Middle East futility.	否则，有关落实这条或者那条条款的争议将会导致整个进程回到人们所熟悉的中东无果而终的流沙之中。


So, from a realistic point of view, a positive outcome for the Annapolis talks seems almost impossible.	所以，从现实的观点来看，安娜波利斯会谈取得积极的成果几乎不可能。


Why should this conflict, which has proven to be unsolvable in the past, be suddenly solved (or brought closer to a solution) by three actors – Bush, Olmert, and Abbas – who are all in a state of profound domestic weakness?	这���冲突在过去无法解决，目前三个关键人物即布什、奥尔穆特和阿巴斯都在国内处于困境。 为什么这一冲突可以由这三个人突然解决(或者取得进展) 呢？


Karl Marx wrote that history always repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.	卡尔·马克思说过，历史总是重演，先是悲剧，然后是闹剧。


One might fear that Camp David proves to be the tragedy and Annapolis the farce.	人们可能担心戴维营是悲剧，而安娜波利斯是闹剧。


But, then, this is the Middle East, where earlier breakthroughs grew out of defeat, not victory.	但是，这是中东，过去的突破都是来自于失败而非胜利。


So one should never give up hope, even when hope seems impossible to sustain.	所以人们不应该放弃希望，即使希望看来难以维系。


Do Antioxidant Supplements Work?	补充抗氧化剂真的有效吗？


NIS, Serbia – The influence of diet on health has been known since the Ancient Greeks.	塞尔维亚尼什——远在古希腊的时候人们就了解了饮食对于健康的影响。


Our bodies simply cannot synthesize many essential compounds, so our health partly depends on what we eat and drink.	我们的身体无法合成一些重要的合成物，所以我们的健康部分依赖于我们所吃和喝的东西。


Antioxidants, which are believed to help protect us against both cancer and heart disease, are one such element that must import into our bodies.	被认为能帮助保护我们不致患上癌症和心脏病的抗氧化剂正是这样一种必须输入我们体内的元素。


Studies have shown that there is a significant positive association between a higher intake of fruits and vegetables and reduced risk of chronic disease.	研究表明水果和蔬菜摄入越多与降低患慢性病的危险之间存在着非常明显的正比关系。


Fruits and vegetables are sources of numerous micronutrients, and some, including b-carotene (a precursor of vitamin A), vitamin C, vitamin E, and selenium, have potential as antioxidants.	水果和蔬菜含有丰富的微量营养素，其中的一些，包括β胡萝卜素（维生素A的前身）、维生素C、维生素E和硒，都有可能成为抗氧化剂。


But what specifically makes fruits and vegetables so beneficial is not clear.	但是到底是什么使水果和蔬菜对我们身体如此有益至今尚不清楚。


The main role of antioxidants is to prevent oxidative damage to cellular components, so it has been proposed that dietary antioxidants decrease such damage and with it the risk of disease.	抗氧化剂的主要作用是防止对细胞组分的氧化损伤，所以人们认为包含在膳食中的抗氧化剂能够减少这类损伤以及患病的危险。


This has stimulated interest in the possible preventive potential of antioxidant supplements.	这也使人们对于补充抗氧化剂可能会有的预防潜力产生了浓厚的兴趣。


Indeed, consumption of antioxidant supplements in developed countries has become widespread.	事实上，食用补充抗氧化剂在发达国家已经非常普遍。


More than one-third of adults in developed countries now ingest antioxidant pills, which is much easier than eating fruits and vegetables.	现在在发达国家中有超过三分之一的成年人服用抗氧化药片，这比吃水果和蔬菜要简单多了。


But will the benefits be the same?	但是它对我们人体同样有益吗？


As with any therapeutic intervention, the most convincing and direct proof of the preventive efficacy of antioxidant supplements requires randomized, controlled clinical trials.	在任何干预研究中，对于补充抗氧化剂的防治效果最有说服力和最直接的证据需要尽心随机和受控的临床试验。


Such trials eliminate the problems of participants’ dietary record and controls the effects of both known and unknown confounding factors.	这种试验会排除参与者饮食记录上的问题，并且控制所有已知和未知的复杂因素的影响。


So far, many studies have been conducted to verify the supposed beneficial effects of antioxidant supplements.	迄今为止，进行了许多以验证人们所猜想的补充抗氧化剂的有益作用。


But, while the results of epidemiological studies have been almost uniformly positive, the results of clinical trials have remained largely inconclusive.	但是，尽管许多流行病研究的结果几乎都肯定了它的作用，临床试验的结果在很大程度上却并没有定论。


Some clinical trials were terminated prematurely because harmful effects of antioxidant supplements were observed.	一些临床试验因为发现了补充抗氧化剂的有害作用而提前结束了。


Indeed, the overwhelming evidence currently calls into question the preventive effect of antioxidant pills.	事实上，现在有压倒性的证据可以使我们对抗氧化药片的防治效果产生疑问。


On the contrary, they may be harmful, leading to an increased risk of mortality in people consuming them.	恰恰相反，它们也许是有害的，服用这些药片的人死亡的风险加大了。


There are several possible explanations for the negative effect of antioxidant supplements.	对于补充抗氧化剂的负面作用有一些可能的解释。


First, the “free radicals” that anti-oxidants act against perform a dual biological function.	首先，抗氧化剂所要对抗的“自由基”有两面的生理功能。


Free radicals are produced continuously in all cells as part of their normal functioning.	作为它们正常功能的一部分，自由基在所有细胞中持续不停地被产生。


In moderate concentrations, they are essential mediators of reactions by which our bodies eliminate unwanted cells.	在正常的浓度下，它们是我们机体消灭不想要的细胞的反应的一种重要的介质。


By eliminating free radicals from our body, we interfere with important defensive mechanisms for eliminating damaged cells, including cancerous cells.	在消灭我们身体中的自由基时，我们也就干预了消灭受损细胞，包括癌细胞的重要防御机制。


So antioxidant substances can also harm people.	所以抗氧化物质同样也会对人产生伤害。


Whereas our diets typically contain safe levels, highly concentrated antioxidant supplements can be hazardous.	而如果我们的膳食中通常包含安全水平、高浓度的补充抗氧化剂就会很危险。


In fact, the amounts of antioxidants that lend protection are not known and probably differ among individuals.	事实上，到底多大量的抗氧化剂可以对人体带来保护目前并不清楚，并且也许因人而异。


People exposed to increased oxidative stress may have elevated antioxidant requirements.	受到更多氧化应激的人对于抗氧化剂的要求也许会更高。


Moreover, antioxidant supplements in pills are synthetic and biochemically unbalanced compared to their naturally occurring counterparts.	此外，药片中的补充抗氧化剂是合成的，与自然产生的抗氧化剂相比在生物化学上是不平衡的。


Nor are they subjected to the same rigorous toxicity studies as other pharmaceutical agents.	它们也没有像其他药剂那样经过严格的毒理研究。


Indeed, we still lack substantial information on how our bodies metabolize them and how they interact with one another.	事实上，我们对于我们的身体是怎样对它们进行新陈代谢的以及它们之间是怎样相互作用的缺乏实质性的知识。


As a result, it is still unclear whether dosage, duration of use, or parallel intake of other agents determine differences in their effect.	其结果是，我们至今尚不清楚它的服用剂量、服用期限以及同时服用其他药物是否会影响它的作用。


It also is unclear whether oxidative stress is a primary cause or a secondary phenomenon of chronic diseases, as well as of the aging process.	我们同样不清楚氧化应激是慢性病以及老化过程的首要起因还是一个次要现象。


In most human disease, oxidative stress is merely a symptom.	在大多数的人体疾病中，氧化应激仅仅是一种症状。


So the link between oxidative stress and disease should not be overemphasized.	所以氧化应激与疾病之间的联系不应被过分强调。


There are still many gaps in our knowledge of the mechanisms of action of antioxidant supplements.	我们对于抗氧化剂的作用机制还知之甚少。


Basic issues concerning the efficacy and safety of consuming relatively high doses of antioxidant supplements need to be resolved.	服用相对高量的补充抗氧化剂的效果和安全性这样的基本问题尚需得到解决。


Results of ongoing clinical trials and further studies are required to improve our knowledge.	我们需要进行持续的临床试验和进一步的研究来提高我们的认识。


In the meantime, we know that antioxidants can cause unwanted health consequences.	与此同时，我们知道抗氧化剂可能会给我们的健康带来我们不想要的后果。


So the optimal source for antioxidants is diet, not supplements.	所以抗氧化剂的最佳来源应该是膳食，而不是营养补给物。


In short, we should stop taking pills and eat more fruits and vegetables.	总而言之，我们应该停止服药片，而去吃更多的水果和蔬菜。


Could Hensarling’s Dodd-Frank “Off-Ramp” Work?	亨萨林的多德-弗兰克法案“匝道”能奏效吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Jeb Hensarling, the Republican chair of the Financial Services Committee in the US House of Representatives, delivered a wide-ranging speech last month at the Economic Club of New York, proposing to overhaul US financial regulation.	发自剑桥——上个月，美国众议院金融服务委员会的共和党人主席杰布·亨萨林（Jeb Hensarling）在纽约经济俱乐部发表了一次内容广泛的演讲，提议彻底改革美国金融监管制度。 关于金融危机的责任，亨萨林一面指责监管机构，一面为华尔街开脱；


Hensarling blamed regulators and excused Wall Street for the financial crisis; condemned government-funded bank bailouts; characterized the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation as a power grab; and called for increased congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve.	谴责政府资助下的银行救助行动； 还将2010年的多德 - 弗兰克金融改革立法视为夺权之举；


Most of Hensarling’s proposals – even backed, as they now are, by a partisan-sounding document from the House Banking committee and a favorable Wall Street Journal review – are political nonstarters. (They would have to get 60 Senate votes and a presidential signature to pass.)	大多数亨萨林的提议——即便如今得到了一份党派意味浓厚的众议院银行委员会文件和一篇有偏向性的华尔街日报评论文章支持——在政治上都是毫无意义的（这些提案都必须得到参议院60票赞成以及总统签字方能通过），同时也已经被民主党尖锐批评为过于冒险和偏袒银行——大多数提议确实如此。


They have already been sharply criticized by Democrats as being too risky and pro-bank – which they largely are. That said, one of Hensarling’s ideas is well worth exploring: an “off-ramp,” as he put it, from Dodd-Frank regulation for banks that willingly increase their available capital.	即便如此，亨萨林的其中一项理念是非常值得探讨的：那些愿意增加自身可用资本金的银行是否可以摆脱多德-弗兰克法案的监管，照他的话说，与其大家都挤在一条路上，为何不能安排一条“匝道”让一些人能选择另一条路线？


Let’s go back to basics for a moment. The government guarantees bank deposits because a banking failure could hurt the entire economy.	让我们先回到一些基本问题上：政府之所以会为银行存款做担保，是因为银行破产可能会损害整个经济。


This creates moral hazard, as banks, looking for big shareholder gains, become lax in managing what effectively becomes the public’s money.	这引发了道德风险，因为银行为了增加大股东的收益，会疏于管理那些实际上属于公众的资金。


They feel comfortable taking big risks, because if they lose, they just turn the bank over to the government to pay off depositors and other creditors.	它们毫不介意去冒巨大的风险，反正出事了只要把银行交回给政府来去偿还储户和其他债权人就行了。


And if they win, they and their shareholders keep the bonanza.	反之一旦博赢，银行及其股东们就赚大了。


Regulators use two key measures to mitigate such risk-taking: they require banks to hold more capital and to keep investments, loans, and operations safer (and potentially less profitable) than the banks want them to be.	监管机构使用两个关键措施来遏制这种冒险行为：它们要求银行持有更多资本，并保证投资，贷款和操作比银行计划中更为安全（也意味着潜在利润减少）。


Because these two central regulatory methods achieve the same end, they can theoretically be substituted for one another – regulators can set banks’ capital requirement very high, or they can set the riskiness of banks’ activities very low.	因为这两大核心监管手段都指向同样的目的，所以理论上是可以互相替换的——监管机构可以将银行的资本要求设置到极高水平，也可以将银行活动的风险程度压得极低。


In practice, because regulators cannot do either perfectly, they do some of each.	在实践中，由于监管机构都无法做到完美，所以它们选择在两方面都做一些规定。


Hensarling’s off-ramp proposal builds on that tradeoff, giving banks more leeway to decide whether they want less risk or more capital.	亨萨林的“匝道”提议就构建于这一权衡之上，给银行更多的回旋余地以决定自身是否想少风险或更多的资本。


Baseline regulation would be the typical mixture of the two, but individual banks could opt for substantially higher capital requirements in exchange for permission to engage in riskier investments and operations.	基础的监管将会是两个手段的典型混合物，但个别银行可能会选择更高的基本要求以换取参与高风险投资和运营的许可。


In other words, they could reduce the constraints of one regulatory measure in exchange for tightening those of the other.	换句话说，它们可以通过提高一种调控手段的约束来换取另一种调控手段的松绑。


This is conceptually sound.	这在概念上是合理的。


But there are problems with Hensarling’s proposal as he has articulated it. And they are not small.	但亨萨林对其提议的阐述中存在一些问题，而且问题还不小。


First, the ratio of capital that Hensarling would require of banks that take an off-ramp is far too low, at 10% of total assets.	第一，亨萨林提案将对那些“匝道”选项银行的资本比例要求太低，只相当于总资产的10％。


That is higher than current levels, but not high enough to ensure bank safety.	这虽然高于当前的水平，但并未高到足以保证银行的安全性。


The Financial Stability Board and the International Monetary Fund each found that many banks threatened during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 would have needed double today’s levels of capital to survive intact.	金融稳定委员会和国际货币基金组织都各自意识到，许多遭到2007~2008年金融危机威胁的银行都需要比当前水平多一倍的资本金才能全身而退。


Were the Hensarling proposal to be implemented, those levels would have to be even higher, owing to the reduction in risk regulation.	而如果要推行亨萨林提案的话，由于对风险的规管有所降低，这一资本金水平必须更高。


Only if capital were increased substantially – to “shock and awe” levels – would the banks and their executives conclude, without regulatory instruction, that it is not in their or their stockholders’ interest to take on much risk.	只有当资本金比率被大幅提高——达到“震慑”的水平——那些银行高管才会意识到在放宽监管指令的情况下，承担过度风险是不符合银行自身或其股东利益的。


A second problem with Hensarling’s proposal is that banks are likely to reject it as long as corporate tax policy remains unchanged.	亨萨林提案的第二个问题是，只要企业所得税政策不变，银行都会拒绝这一做法。


As I have argued in previous commentaries, and in a recent academic paper written with Michael Troege, requiring banks to have more capital raises their tax bill, because it reduces the level of tax-deductible debt and increases that of taxable equity.	正如我在从前的评论文章以及近期与迈克尔·托奇（Michael Troege）合作发表的学术论文中所指出的那样，要求银行保留更多的资本金会导致它们的收税金额上升，因为它降低了可以用来抵税的债务水平，增加了应纳税的股权。


If the tax code is not reformed, few banks will find the tradeoff attractive, because a higher tax bill will cancel out returns from taking Hensarling’s offer.	如果税法不改革，很少有银行会觉得权衡政策有吸引力，因为较高的税收将抵消采取采纳亨萨林提案的回报。


The third problem is one of logistics: Hensarling’s plan would hardwire into legislation the parameters for banks to take a regulatory off-ramp, thus tying regulators’ hands.	第三个问题是个逻辑问题：亨萨林方案将硬性规定那些选择走监管“匝道”的银行应该达到哪些标准参数并将其写入法律，从而束缚了监管机构的手脚。


Once a bank had the 10% capital, it could neither be stopped from key mergers nor be determined to be systemically important and risky.	一旦银行达到了10％的资本金，监管机构既无法阻止其实施关键性兼并行动，也不能将其定义为具备系统重要性和风险的机构。


Because financial circumstances change quickly, regulators, who can adapt to new conditions faster than Congress can, should have discretion to set capital-requirement and loan-risk tradeoff benchmarks.	由于金融环境变化极快，那些比国会更能适应新环境的监管者应拥有自由裁量权去设定资本金要求和贷款风险的权衡标准。


Under Hensarling’s plan, they would not.	但在亨萨林方案中，它们无法这样做。


More insidious, by repealing much of the Dodd-Frank risk regulation, the Hensarling proposal would virtually eliminate banks’ incentive to choose the off-ramp.	更凶险的是，在废除大部分的多德 - 弗兰克法案风险监管之后，亨萨林方案将几乎完全消除了银行选择“匝道”的激励因素。


There wouldn’t be enough regulation for them to feel the need to escape.	不会有足够的监管措施让他们觉得有必要选择另一条道路。


Banks could thus have their cake and eat it.	于是乎银行可以鱼和熊掌兼得。


Despite all of this, regulators should thank Hensarling for pushing forward the concept of a flexible tradeoff framework.	尽管存在上述问题，但监管机构应该感谢亨萨林提出了一个灵活框架权衡的概念。


While the details of his particular proposal are problematic, to say the least, the concept has real potential.	虽然这一提案的具体细节有待商榷，但至少这一概念具有真正的潜力。


The result could be a more dynamic financial system – and also a safer one.	可能可能催生一个更具活力——也更安全的——金融体系。


Do Economic Sanctions Work?	经济制裁能管用吗？


CAMBRIDGE – With Western economic sanctions against Russia, Iran, and Cuba in the news, it is a good time to take stock of the debate on just how well such measures work.	美国剑桥—新闻频频报道西方对俄罗斯、伊朗和古巴实施经济制裁，这是个盘点这些措施效果如何的良机。


The short answer is that economic sanctions usually have only modest effects, even if they can be an essential means of demonstrating moral resolve.	简单的回答是经济制裁通常只有十分有限的效果，即便它们可能是表现道德决心的重要方法。


If economic sanctions are to play an increasingly important role in twenty-first-century statecraft, it might be worth reflecting on how they have worked in the past.	如果经济制裁要在二十一世纪扮演重要的治国角色，我们就必须认真想一想它们在过去表现如何。


As Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott note in their classic book on the topic, the history of economic sanctions goes back at least to 432 BC, when the Greek statesman and general Pericles issued the so-called “Megarian decree” in response to the abduction of three Aspasian women.	加里·哈夫鲍尔（Gary Hufbauer）和杰弗里·肖特（Jeffrey Schott）在他们关于这一话题的经典著作中指出，经济制裁至少可以追溯到公元前432年希腊政治家和军事家伯里克利颁布了所谓的“迈加拉法令”（Megarian decree）以处理三名阿斯帕齐娅妇女被绑架事件。


In modern times, the United States has employed economic sanctions in pursuit of diverse goals, from the Carter administration’s efforts in the 1970s to promote human rights, to attempts to impede nuclear proliferation in the 1980s.	在现代，美国利用经济制裁追求各种目标，比如20世纪79年代卡特政府用它来推进人权、20世纪80年代用它来阻止核扩散等。


During the Cold War, the US also employed economic sanctions to destabilize unfriendly governments, especially in Latin America, though they do not appear to have played more than a minor role, even where regime change eventually occurred.	在冷战时期，美国也利用经济制裁动摇不友善国家，特别是拉丁美洲国家，尽管制裁效果往往并不怎么样，即使在政权最终发生更迭的国家也是如此。


Economic sanctions on Serbia in the early 1990s did not deter the invasion of Bosnia.	20世纪90年代初对塞尔维亚的经济制裁并未威慑其对波斯尼亚的入侵。


Certainly, the US government’s symbolic punishment of chess legend Bobby Fischer (for playing a match in Belgrade that violated sanctions) provided no relief for the besieged city of Sarajevo.	显然，美国政府对国际象棋传奇鲍比·费舍尔（Bobby Fischer）的象征性惩罚（因为它在贝尔格莱德参加比赛，违反了制裁规定）并没有给被包围的萨拉热窝带来多少喘息。


The old Soviet Union played the sanctions game as well – for example, against China, Albania, and Yugoslavia.	旧苏联也玩制裁游戏——比如针对中国、阿尔巴尼亚和南斯拉夫。


It, too, did not have much success, except perhaps in the case of Finland, which ultimately bent its policies to gain relief from sanctions imposed in 1958.	苏联的制裁也没有多少成功，不过也许芬兰是个例外，它最终做了政策屈服，以换取苏联放松1958年实施的制裁。


Most modern cases of sanctions pit a large country against a small country, though there are a few cases involving countries of equal size, such as the long quarrel, from the 1950s to the 1980s, between the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar.	大部分现代制裁往往是大国和小国的对立，但也有一些例子发生在对等国家之间，比如20世纪50年代至80年代英国和西班牙因为直布罗陀的反目。


As Hufbauer and Schott, among others, have illustrated, the effects of sanctions are often fairly disappointing – so much so that many scholars have concluded that such measures often are imposed so that governments can appear to domestic audiences to be “doing something.”	哈夫鲍尔和肖特以及其他人指出，制裁的效果往往十分令人失望——许多学者甚至推论说，实施制裁的原因常常是政府为了向国内群众表明它“正在做些什么”。


Certainly, severe US sanctions on Cuba failed to bring the Castro regime to heel; indeed, President Barack Obama’s move to reestablish full diplomatic relations may have more effect.	显然，美国队古巴的严厉制裁并没有导致卡斯特罗政权倒闭； 事实上，奥巴马总统转而与古巴重建完全外交关系倒有可能效果更好。


But sometimes sanctions do work.	但有时制裁确实管用。


The strong international consensus to impose sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s eventually helped bring an end to apartheid.	20世纪80年代所形成的对南非实施制裁的强大国际共识最终帮助结束了种族隔离。


Likewise, sanctions have helped bring Iran to the bargaining table, though it is not clear how long its government will be willing to defer its nuclear ambitions.	类似地，制裁还让伊朗重回谈判桌，尽管伊朗政府愿意将其核野心延缓多久还不得而知。


And the Russian economy today is in big trouble, though this might be described as a lucky punch, with the real damage being done by an epic collapse in global oil prices.	而如今，俄罗斯经济也陷入��巨大的麻烦——虽然这也许只是天上掉下来的馅饼，真正的伤害是全球油价大崩盘带来的。


Some in Russia, where the price collapse has hit government revenues hard, claim that the US and Saudi Arabia are conspiring to bring Russia to its knees.	油价崩盘极大地打击了俄罗斯政府收入，一些俄罗斯人声称是美国和沙特合谋要让俄罗斯就范。


But that gives US strategists far too much credit.	但这实在是太抬举美国战略家了。


A more likely culprit for the steep price decline is a combination of the shale-energy revolution in the US and the sharp slowdown in Chinese growth.	油价暴跌更有可能的元凶是美国页岩能革命和中国增长急剧放缓的共同作用。


China’s slowdown has helped precipitate a broad-based fall in commodity prices that is having a devastating effect on countries like Argentina and Brazil, with which the US authorities presumably have little quarrel.	中国的放缓可以解释大宗商品价格的普遍下跌，阿根廷和巴西等与美国当局没什么矛盾的国家也遭受了打击。


One of the major reasons economic sanctions have fallen short in the past is that not all countries have complied.	过去经济制裁收效甚微的一个主要原因是并非所有国家都遵守制裁规则。


Indeed, significant differences of domestic opinion in the imposing country often undermine sanctions as well.	事实上，实施国国内观点的巨大差异也常常破坏制裁。


Moreover, countries imposing sanctions must be prepared to address their own vulnerabilities.	此外，制裁实施国不许准备好解决其自身的弱点。


North Korea is perhaps the most noxious regime in the world today, and one can only hope that its cruel government collapses sometime soon.	朝鲜也许是当今世界最邪恶的政权，我们都希望其野蛮的政府早日倒台。


The Kim regime has clung to power despite being subject to severe economic sanctions, perhaps because China, fearing a united Korea on its border, has not yet been willing to withdraw its support.	金氏政权经历严厉经济制裁而屹立不倒，也许是因为中国害怕国界另一边出现一个统一的朝鲜而不愿撤回对朝支持。


Yet it is easy to forget that there are different viewpoints in international relations, even in the most extreme situations.	但是我们很容易忘记国际关系中存在不同观点，即使是在最极端的情形也是如此。


Though North Korea’s alleged attack on Sony Pictures’ computers has been rightly condemned, it must be admitted that from the perspective of the North Korean elite, their country simply applied economic retaliation much like anyone else does.	尽管朝鲜被控入侵索尼影业公司电脑并受到指责（理应如此），但必须承认，从朝鲜精英的角度讲，他们的国家只是在以与其他任何人一样的方式运用经济关系。


Sony Pictures had produced a satire poking fun at North Korea’s leader, the “Young General” Kim Jong-un.	索尼影业拿朝鲜领袖、“小将军”金正恩开涮。


This was an intolerable affront, to which the elite responded with economic sabotage rather than military action.	这是令人无法容忍的冒犯，朝鲜精英的反应是经济破坏而非军事行动。


Let us also not forget that Russia, too, has deployed cyber attacks in the service of foreign-policy goals.	我们也不要忘了，俄罗斯也使用网络袭击为其外交政策服务。


Indeed, Russia has far more formidable hackers than North Korea (though much of the top talent currently is employed in mafia rings, rather than in strategic operations).	事实上，俄罗斯黑客比朝鲜厉害多了（尽管许多顶尖人才都加入了黑帮而不再战略部门供职）。


In a world where nuclear proliferation has rendered global conventional war unthinkable, economic sanctions and sabotage are likely to play a large role in twenty-first-century geopolitics.	当今世界，核扩散以使全球性常规战争不再具有现实可能性，经济制裁和经济破坏也许将在二十一世纪地缘政治中扮演重要角色。


Rather than preventing conflict, Pericles’s sanctions in ancient Greece ultimately helped to trigger the Peloponnesian War.	古希腊伯里克利的制裁并没有阻止冲突，反而最终引发了伯罗奔尼撒战争。


One can only hope that in this century, wiser heads will prevail, and that economic sanctions lead to bargaining, not violence.	我们只能希望，在二十一世纪，更聪明的头脑可以胜出，经济制裁将带来谈判而非暴力。


Does Austerity Promote Economic Growth?	紧缩能推动经济增长吗？


NEW HAVEN – In his classic Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits(1724), Bernard Mandeville, the Dutch-born British philosopher and satirist, described – in verse – a prosperous society (of bees) that suddenly chose to make a virtue of austerity, dropping all excess expenditure and extravagant consumption. What then happened?	发自纽黑文——荷兰出生的英国哲学家兼讽刺作家伯纳德·曼德维尔在其1724年出版的经典名著《蜜蜂的寓言：私人的恶德，公众的利益》中用一首长诗来描述一个原本繁荣，却突然选择以节俭为美，放弃一切额外支出和奢侈消费的（蜜蜂）社会，诗文如下：


The Price of Land and Houses falls;	地价房价骤跌；


Mirac’lous Palaces, whose Walls,	那些为享乐而建的，壮丽宫殿，


Like those of Thebes, were rais’d by Play	那些底比斯式的，雕梁斗拱，


Are to be let; . . . .	都要转手； ……


The building Trade is quite destroy’d	建筑行业尽毁


Artificers are not employ’d; . . .	营造者们也失了业； ……


Those, that remain’d, grown temp’rate strive	那些幸存者们，变得克己而勤奋


Not how to spend, but how to live . . .	不为消费，只为生存……


That sounds a lot like what many advanced countries have been going through, after financial-crisis-induced austerity plans were launched, doesn’t it? Is Mandeville a genuine prophet for our times?	在金融危机的影响下许多发达国家都启动了紧缩政策，而这首诗的内容听上去也与它们的近况极为相似——莫非曼德维尔才是预言我们这个时代的真正先知？


Fable of the Bees developed a wide following, and generated substantial controversy, which continues to this day.	《蜜蜂的寓言》从出版至今依然拥有一大批追随者并引发了大量的争论。


The austerity plans being adopted by governments in much of Europe and elsewhere around the world, and the curtailment of consumption expenditure by individuals as well, threaten to produce a global recession.	而欧洲大部分国家以及其他地区国家的政府所采用的紧缩政策以及个人消费支出的缩减，都可能导致一场全球性衰退。


But how do we know if Mandeville is right about austerity?	但我们怎么知道曼德维尔对于紧缩的判断是对的？


His research method – a long poem about his theory – is hardly convincing to modern ears.	他的研究方法——一首阐述自身理论的长诗——往往难以令当今的人们信服。


Harvard economist Alberto Alesina recently summarized evidence concerning whether government deficit reduction – that is, expenditure cuts and/or tax increases – always induces such negative effects: “The answer to this question is a loud no.”	哈佛大学经济学家阿尔伯托·阿里辛纳（Alberto Alesina）最近总结了一些关于政府赤字缩减政策——即支出缩减和/或加税——会否导致这类负面效应的证据：“对这个问题的答案是一个大大的‘不’字。


Sometimes, even often, economies prosper nicely after the government’s deficit is sharply reduced.	”有时（甚至是经常性的），经济会在政府大幅减少赤字后蓬勃发展；


Sometimes, just maybe, the austerity program boosts confidence in such a way as to ignite a recovery.	有时（但只在有可能的情况下），紧缩政策能以上述手段提振信心并激发复苏。


We have to examine the issue with some care, understanding that the issue that Mandeville raised is really a statistical one: the outcome of government deficit reduction is never entirely predictable, so we can ask only how likely such a plan is to succeed in restoring economic prosperity.	我们必须谨慎地研究这个问题，并意识到曼德维尔所提到的状况实际上是一个统计学上的现象：你永远无法全面预测政府紧缩政策的结果，因此我们只能询问这么一个计划成功推动经济复苏的可能性究竟有多大。


And the biggest problem here is accounting for possible reverse causality.	而其中最重要的问题则是解释可能存在的逆向因果关系。


For example, if evidence of future economic strength makes a government worry about economic overheating and inflation, it might try to cool domestic demand by raising taxes and lowering government spending.	比如说，如果某些与未来经济相关的证据使某国政府担心可能出现经济过热和通胀，它可能会尝试通过加税和降低政府支出来为国内需求降温。


If the government is only partly successful in preventing economic overheating, it might nonetheless appear to casual observers that austerity actually strengthened the economy.	即便这些防止过热措施只取得了部分成功，但在普通旁观者眼里，这些紧缩政策似乎��经实质上增强了经济。


Likewise, the government’s deficit might fall not because of austerity, but because the stock market’s anticipation of economic growth fuels higher revenues from capital-gains tax.	同样，政府的赤字不仅会因紧缩而下降，也可能是因为股票市场对经济增长的预期带来了更多资本利得税收入。


Once again, we would see what might appear, from looking at the government deficit, to be an austerity-to-prosperity scenario.	这一次我们可能也会从政府赤字的角度，认为是紧缩实现了繁荣。


Jaime Guajardo, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori of the International Monetary Fund recently studied austerity plans implemented by governments in 17 countries in the last 30 years. But their approach differed from that of previous researchers.	而国际货币基金组织的贾米·瓜加尔多（Jaime Guajardo），丹尼尔·利（Daniel Leigh）和安德烈·佩斯卡托利（Andrea Pescatori）最近研究了过去30年内17国政府所采取的紧缩政策。


They focused on the government’s intent, and looked at what officials actually said, not just at the pattern of public debt.	他们把焦点放在政府的动机之上，并研究政府官员们的言论，而不仅仅是公共债务的模式。


They read budget speeches, reviewed stability programs, and even watched news interviews with government figures.	他们研读预算报告，检讨金融稳定政策，甚至观看那些政府高官的新闻采访。


They identified as austerity plans only those cases in which governments imposed tax hikes or spending cuts because they viewed it as a prudent policy with potential long-term benefits, not because they were responding to the short-term economic outlook and sought to reduce the risk of overheating.	在他们的定义中，紧缩政策是那些政府将加税或者削减支出视为一个将产生潜在长期收益的明智政策，而不是对短期经济预测的回应或者尝试减少经济过热的风险。


Their analysis found a clear tendency for austerity programs to reduce consumption expenditure and weaken the economy.	他们的研究发现紧缩政策具有减少消费支出并削弱经济的明显趋势。


That conclusion, if valid, stands as a stern warning to policymakers today.	这个结论如果是正确的话，那么政策制定者们就要小心了。


But critics, such as Valerie Ramey of the University of California at San Diego, think that Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori have not completely proven their case.	但包括加州大学圣地亚哥分校经济学教授维拉莉尔·拉梅（Valerie Ramey）在内的批评者则认为上述论证并不完整。


It is possible, Ramey argues, that their results could reflect a different sort of reverse causality if governments are more likely to respond to high public-debt levels with austerity programs when they have reason to believe that economic conditions could make the debt burden especially worrisome.	拉梅认为上述研究结果可能只是反映了一个不同形式的逆向因果关系，因为政府之所以更可能用紧缩政策来应对高公共负债水平，就是因为它有理由相信经济状况将令债务负担特别令人忧虑。


That may seem unlikely – one would think that a bad economic outlook would incline governments to postpone, rather than accelerate, austerity measures.	但这看上去似乎不太可能——有人会认为一个悲观的经济预测将促使政府推迟（而不是加速）紧缩措施。


And, in response to her comments, the authors did try to account for the severity of the government’s debt problem as perceived by the markets at the time that the plans were implemented, finding very similar results.	同时为了回应她的评论，三位作者也确实尝试对紧缩计划推出时市场对政府债务问题严重性的预期进行了评估，并发现了类似的结果。


But Ramey could be right.	当然拉梅也可能是对的。


One would then find that government spending cuts or tax hikes tend to be followed by bad economic times, even if the causality runs the other way.	但即便顺推这一因果关系，人们可能也会发现政府支出削减或者加税之后会经历一段不景气时期。


Ultimately, the problem of judging austerity programs is that economists cannot run fully controlled experiments.	最终，评判紧缩政策的问题在于经济学家无法运行一个完全受控实验。


When researchers tested Prozac on depressed patients, they divided their subjects randomly into control and experimental groups, and conducted many trials.	比如研究者们测试百忧解（一种抗抑郁药物）的时候，他们可以把被试者随机分为控制组和实验组并反复测试。


We cannot do that with national debt.	而在国家债务问题上显然是无法做到这一点的。


So do we have to conclude that historical analysis teaches us no useful lessons?	因此我们是否就可以认为那些历史分析并无教益？


Do we have to return to the abstract reasoning of Mandeville and some of his successors, including John Maynard Keynes, who thought that there were reasons to expect that austerity would produce depressions?	我们是否应该回到曼德维尔及其某些继承者（包括凯恩斯）的抽象推理方式，认为有理由去预期紧缩政策将导致衰退？


There is no abstract theory that can predict how people will react to an austerity program.	没有抽象理论能预测人们究竟将如何对一项紧缩政策做出反应。


We have no alternative but to look at the historical evidence.	我们没有选择，只能回顾那些历史证据。


And the evidence of Guajardo and his co-authors does show that deliberate government decisions to adopt austerity programs have tended to be followed by hard times.	而贾米·瓜加尔多及其同僚所发现的证据也确实显示政府深思熟虑后出台的紧缩政策后面往往会伴随一段不景气时期。


Policymakers cannot afford to wait decades for economists to figure out a definitive answer, which may never be found at all.	政策制定者们不可能有几十年去等待经济学家们找出一个确定的答案——而这个答案甚至永远都无法得出。


But, judging by the evidence that we have, austerity programs in Europe and elsewhere appear likely to yield disappointing results.	但根据我们目前的证据来判断的话，欧洲以及其他地区的紧缩政策似乎将带来令人失望的结果。


Does Capitalism Cause Poverty?	资本主义导致贫困？


CAMBRIDGE – Capitalism gets blamed for many things nowadays: poverty, inequality, unemployment, even global warming.	美国剑桥—如今，资本主义被人认为是诸多问题的罪魁：贫困、不平等、失业，甚至全球变暖。