The International Monetary Fund could provide these funds, as it did previously, with the EU promising to match the IMF’s contribution.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）可以像往常那样提供这笔资金，并由欧盟承诺匹配IMF的贡献。


Actual expenditures would remain under the IMF’s control and subject to the implementation of far-reaching structural reforms.	实际支出仍有IMF控制，并根据意义深远的结构性改革的实施情况进行。


In Ukraine, there is one more factor working in the EU’s favor: the country’s new leadership is determined to correct previous governments’ corruption, mismanagement, and abuses.	在乌克兰，还有一个因素有利于欧盟：该国新领导层决心纠正前任政府的腐败、管理不善和滥用职权。


Indeed, it has already created a detailed strategy to cut household gas consumption by more than half, with the goal of dispersing the corrupt gas monopoly of Naftogaz and ending Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia.	事实上，它已经制定了一个详细战略将家庭天然气消费降低一大半，计划拆分腐败的天然气垄断商国家天然气公司并摆脱对俄罗斯的能源依赖。


The “new Ukraine” is resolutely pro-European, and ready to defend Europe by defending itself.	“新乌克兰”将坚决站在欧洲一方，并准备通过自卫保卫欧洲。


But its enemies – not only Putin’s Russia, but also its own bureaucracy and financial oligarchy – are formidable, and it cannot defeat them alone.	但它的敌人——不仅有普京的俄罗斯，还包括其自身的官僚和金融寡头——十分强大，它无法自力更生战胜它们。


Supporting the new Ukraine in 2015 and beyond is the most cost-effective investment the EU could make.	在2015年及其后支持新乌克兰是欧盟所能做的最有性价比的投资。


It could even help the EU recapture the spirit of unity and shared prosperity that led to its creation.	这甚至能够帮助欧盟重新获得让欧盟得以诞生的统一精神和共同繁荣。


In short, by saving Ukraine, the EU could also save itself.	简言之，通过拯救乌克兰，欧盟也可以拯救自己。


The Price of European Indifference	欧洲不作为的代价


BAGHDAD – Europe’s migration debate has taken a disturbing turn.	巴格达—欧洲的移民争论正在发生令人不安的转折。


It began with the creation of the catch-all concept (a legal freak) of a “migrant,” which obscures the difference, central to the law, between economic and political migration, between people escaping poverty and those driven from their homes by war.	它开始于一刀切的“移民”概念（一种法律异形）的建立，这一概念模糊了作为法律核心的区别，即经济和政治移民的区别，或者逃离贫困的人和因为战争而被迫离开家园的人的区别。


Unlike economic migrants, those fleeing oppression, terror, and massacre have an inalienable right to asylum, which entails an unconditional obligation by the international community to provide shelter.	与经济移民不同，逃离压迫、恐怖和大屠杀的人有不可侵犯的避难权，这意味着国际社会有无条件为他们提供收容所的义务。


Even when the distinction is acknowledged, it is often as part of another sleight of hand, an attempt to convince credulous minds that the men, women, and children who paid thousands of dollars to travel on one of the rickety boats washing up on the islands of Lampedusa or Kos are economic migrants.	即使承认了这一区别，也常常沦为另一套花招的一部分，即试图让轻信之士相信，花数千美元登上破船颠簸前往蓝佩杜萨群岛（Lampedusa）或科斯岛（Kos）男性、女性和儿童都是经济移民。


The reality, however, is that 80% of these people are refugees, attempting to escape despotism, terror, and religious extremism in countries like Syria, Eritrea, and Afghanistan.	然而，现实是，这些人中有80%是难民，他们是为了逃脱叙利亚、厄立特里亚和阿富汗等国家的独裁、恐怖和宗教极端主义。


That is why international law requires that the cases of asylum-seekers are examined not in bulk, but one by one.	因此，国际法要求寻求庇护者必须逐一审查而非集体审查。


And even when that is accepted, when the sheer number of people clamoring to get to Europe’s shores makes it all but impossible to deny the barbarity driving them to flee, a third smokescreen goes up.	而即使这一点被接受，当大量人群蜂拥来到欧洲海岸，不容你否认促使他们逃离的粗暴行为时，也会产生第三种烟幕。


Some, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, claim that the conflicts generating these refugees rage only in Arab countries that are being bombed by the West.	一些人，包括俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫在内，宣称产生了这些难民的冲突全部都在受西方轰炸的阿拉伯国家。


Here again, the figures do not lie.	在这方面，数据依然不会撒谎。


The top source of refugees is Syria, where the international community has refused to conduct the kinds of military operations required by the “responsibility to protect” – even though international law demands intervention when a mad despot, having killed 240,000 of his people, undertakes to empty his country.	难民的最大来源地是叙利亚，国际社会拒绝组织“保护责任”所要求的军事行动——即使国际法要求当疯狂的独裁者杀戮了240,000本国人民、几乎掏空全国时必须采取行动。


The West also is not bombing Eritrea, another major source of refugees.	西方也没有轰炸难民的另一个主要来源地——厄立特里亚。


Yet another damaging myth, perpetuated by shocking images of refugees swarming through border fences or attempting to climb onto trains in Calais, is that “Fortress Europe” is under assault by waves of barbarians.	但另一个有害的传说是“欧洲堡垒”正在遭受一波又一波野蛮人的冲击。 这一传说通过令人震惊的影像传播——大量难民蜂拥通过边境隔离带，或者试图攀上加莱（Calais）的火车——它存在两个层面的错误。


First, Europe is far from being the migrants’ primary destination.	首先，欧洲绝非移民的主要目的地。


Nearly two million refugees from Syria alone have headed to Turkey, and one million have fled to Lebanon, whose population amounts to just 3.5 million.	来自叙利亚一地的近两百万难民进入了土耳其，一百万逃往黎巴嫩——后者本身的人口只有350万。


Jordan, with a population of 6.5 million, has taken in nearly 700,000.	人口650万的约旦接受了近700,000人。


Meanwhile, Europe, in a display of united selfishness, has scuttled a plan to relocate a mere 40,000 asylum-seekers from their cities of refuge in Italy and Greece.	与此同时，欧洲表现出团结的自私，扼杀了一个在意大利和希腊为区区40,000寻求庇护者提供收容的计划。


Second, the minority who do choose Germany, France, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, or Hungary are not enemies who have come to destroy us or even to sponge off of European taxpayers.	其次，确实选择了德国、法国、斯堪的纳维亚英国或匈牙利为目的地的少数人也不是为了摧毁我们，甚至不是为了寄食于欧洲纳税人。


They are applicants for freedom, lovers of our promised land, our social model, and our values.	他们自由的追求者，热爱我们这片乐土，我们的社会模式，和我们的价值。


They are people who cry out “Europe!	他们高喊“欧洲！ 欧洲！


Europe!” the way millions of Europeans, arriving a century ago on Ellis Island, learned to sing “America the Beautiful.”	”，就好像一个世纪前登上埃利斯岛（Ellis Island）、学会高唱“美丽美国”的数百万欧洲人。


Then there is the ugly rumor that this imaginary assault has been clandestinely orchestrated by the strategists of a “great replacement,” with foreigners supplanting native Europeans, or, worse, by agents of an international jihad, in which today’s migrants are tomorrow’s terrorists on bullet trains.	还有一个恶劣的谣言：这一想象中的攻击是“大替代”（great replacement）战略家秘密策划的，目的是用外国人取代土著欧洲人，或更恶劣地，用国际圣战代理人取代欧洲土著人，今天的移民将是明天子弹头列车上的恐怖分子。


It should go without saying that this is nonsense.	毫无疑问，这纯属无稽之谈。


Taken together, these distortions and delusions have had serious consequences.	这些扭曲和幻想已经形成了严重后果。


For starters, the Mediterranean Sea has been all but abandoned to human smugglers.	首先，地中海已经成为蛇头的乐园。


The Mare Nostrum is gradually becoming the kind of vast and watery mass grave described by a faraway poet.	“我们的海”正在逐渐变成远古诗歌中的一望无际的水葬墓场。


Some 2,350 people have drowned already this year.	今年便已有大约2,350人葬身地中海。


But, for most Europeans, these people are little more than statistics, just as the women and men who have survived the journey remain unidentified and indistinguishable, a threatening anonymous mass.	但是，对大部分欧洲人来说，这些人只不过是统计数字，正如那些在旅途中活下来的男女仍然没有身份，无法辨别，成为危险的匿名群众。


Our society of the spectacle, normally so quick to manufacture an instant celebrity to serve as the “face” of the crisis du jour (anything from swine flu to a truckers’ strike), has not taken an interest in the fate of a single one of the “migrants.”	我们的外表社会（society of spectacle）常常很快就能为当下危机（不管是猪流感还是卡车司机罢工）制造一张“脸”，却没有兴趣关心“移民”中的一员的命运。


These individuals – whose course to Europe resembles that of the Phoenician Princess Europa, who arrived from Tyre on Zeus’s back several millennia ago – are being wholly rejected; indeed, walls are being constructed to keep them out.	这些个体——他们来到欧洲的旅程就像几千年前来自宙斯背上的泰尔（Tyre）的腓尼基公主欧罗巴（Phoenician Princess Europa）——被全部拒之门外； 事实上，欧洲正在建设将他们隔离在外的藩篱。


The result is another group of people being denied basic rights.	结果是有一群人无法得到基本权利。


Such people, as Hannah Arendt once observed, will ultimately come to see in the commission of a crime their only path into the world of law and of those who enjoy the rights the law confers.	这些人——正如汉娜·阿伦特（Hannah Arendt）曾经观察到的——最终将把犯罪作为他们进入法律世界、融入那些享有法律授予的权利的人的唯一途径。


Europe, harassed by its xenophobes and consumed by self-doubt, has turned its back on its values.	受仇外情绪困扰、充满自我怀疑的欧洲已经背离了它的价值。


Indeed, it has forgotten what it is.	事实上，它已经忘了它是什么。


The bell tolls not only for the migrants, but also for a Europe whose humanistic patrimony is crumbling before our very eyes.	丧钟不仅为移民而鸣，也为人文遗产在我们眼前崩塌的欧洲而鸣。


Europe’s Jihadi Generation	欧洲的圣战一代


MADRID ‒ He came from Algeria seeking a better life, anticipating an escape from poverty, oppression, and hopelessness.	马德里——他来自阿尔及利亚，想要过上更好的生活，憧憬着从贫困、压迫和绝望中摆脱。


In Paris, he found a low-skill job and had children and grandchildren.	他在巴黎找到了一份技术要求不高的工作，之后生育子孙。


As French citizens, they had the right to an education and health care.	身为法国公民，他们拥有接受教育和医疗的权利。


But they grew up in the ghettos that ring France’s major cities, surrounded by families like theirs, literally on the margins of society.	但却在环绕法国各大城市的贫民窟中长大，可以说身处社会边缘，周围都是和他们境况类似的家庭。


Unable to integrate fully, they had few opportunities for economic advancement.	因为始终无法完全融入，他们鲜有机会取得经济上的成功。


Paradise was never gained.	他们从未得到想象中的天堂。


This story has been repeated millions of times in the countries of Western Europe, with immigrants and their families ending up poor and excluded.	同样的故事在西欧国家已经重复了数百万次，那里的移民及家庭过着被排斥的贫困生活。


In the worst-case scenario, they are recruited by extremist groups that seem to offer what they are missing: a sense of belonging, identity, and purpose.	最坏情况下，他们被看似为其提供所缺元素的极端组织招募，因为极端组织为他们提供了无法获得的归属感、认同感和目的感。


After a lifetime of marginalization, participation in a larger cause can seem worth the lies, self-destruction, and even death that inclusion demands.	在终其一生无法融入主流社会后，参与更宏伟的事业似乎值得付出谎言、自我毁灭乃至死亡的代价。


In the wake of the attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the thwarting of another attack in Belgium, Europe needs to take a good look at itself.	在挫败针对巴黎讽刺杂志查理周刊和比利时的另一次恐怖袭击后，欧洲需要认真地审视自身。


It must recognize that second- and third-generation immigrants are susceptible to the blandishments of terrorist organizations because European citizenship has not translated into social and economic inclusion.	我们必须认识到第二和第三代移民很容易受到恐怖组织花言巧语的蛊惑，因为成为欧洲公民并没有为他们带来社会和经济领域的包容。


If anything, growing inequality – exacerbated by years of crisis – is making the problem worse.	如果一定要说有什么，那么因多年危机而不断加剧的不平等正在使问题变得更加糟糕。


People need hope.	所有人都需要希望。


They need to believe in a vision, a project that promises a better future for them and their communities.	他们需要相信某种愿景，相信承诺为他们及所在群体缔造更美好未来的计划。


European countries once offered that sense of hope.	欧洲国家曾给过人这样的希望。


But the crisis, and the official response to it, has replaced hope with frustration and disillusionment.	但危机及其后采取的官方对策让这种希望变成了沮丧和失望。


This has created fertile ground for anti-immigrant populists and Islamist terrorists alike.	这为反移民的民粹主义者和伊斯兰恐怖分子创造了肥沃的土壤。


More than 1,200 French citizens are estimated to have joined the jihadi cause in Syria, along with 600 from the United Kingdom, 550 from Germany, and 400 from Belgium.	估计已有超过1200名法国公民加入了叙利亚圣战组织，600名英国人、550名德国人和400名比利时人也是一样。


Other European countries, including Spain, are experiencing a similar phenomenon.	其他欧洲国家，包括西班牙，同样出现了类似的现象。


And some European citizens, like the Charlie Hebdo assassins, have acted at home.	某些欧洲公民，比方说袭击查理周刊的刺客，已经在国内采取了行动。


While intelligence services and police forces must be engaged to prevent attacks, devising an effective strategy to counteract extremist movements requires, first and foremost, understanding what drives them.	虽然情报部门和警察部队必须出力防止袭击，但制定有效策略对抗极端主义首先要理解背后的驱动力量。


Western countries must go beyond defending freedom of speech and improving police coordination to develop lasting solutions that address adherents’ economic and social marginalization, while avoiding cultural confrontation and reliance on repression alone.	西方国家必须在捍卫言论自由及加强警方协调以外制定长期方案化解恐怖追随者的经济和社会边缘化，同时避免文化冲突和单纯依靠镇压。


More fundamentally, such solutions require abandoning the false dichotomy of liberty and security.	更根本的是，上述方案必须放弃将自由和安全一分为二的错误观点。


If security concerns trump basic rights and freedoms, fanaticism will have scored a victory; and the same thing will happen if expressions of Islamophobia and xenophobia increase.	如果安全问题压制了基本权利和自由，那么宗教狂热就已经打了胜仗； 如果伊斯兰恐惧症和仇外心理的表达不断蔓延，带来的结果也将一模一样。


A week after the Paris attacks, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated the sentiment expressed by former President Christian Wulff in 2010: standing beside Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Merkel declared that Islam is as much a part of Germany as Judaism and Christianity.	巴黎袭击发生一个星期后，德国总理默克尔重申了2010年前总统克里斯蒂安·武尔夫所表达的立场：默克尔与土耳其总理达武特奥卢并肩站在一起，宣布伊斯兰教和犹太教、基督教同样是德国社会的组成部分。


This statement represents the right way forward.	这一声明代表了正确的前进方向。


Muslim immigrants, whether first-, second-, or third-generation, must be able to integrate fully into European society, gaining the same opportunities as Europe’s other residents and citizens.	穆斯林移民，无论是第一，第二还是第三代，都必须能完全融入欧洲社会，享有欧洲其他居民和公民得到的同样机会。


That principle should be applied at the global level as well, through the establishment of an inclusive framework that fosters development – and encourages the rejection of fanaticism – in the Islamic world.	通过建立一套促进发展的包容性框架并鼓励伊斯兰世界拒绝狂热情绪，这项原则也应当适用于世界各国。


The aggressive fundamentalism and infighting that held down Christian societies for centuries has been relegated to the past, and that is where it must remain.	数百年来压制基督教社会的激进原教旨主义和内讧已经过去，我们绝不能允许它再度复活。


A religion is not only a belief system; it is also an institution, a language, and even a kind of market actor, competing for supporters.	宗教不仅是一种信仰体系； 也是一种制度、一种语言，甚至是一种市场主体，竭尽全力争夺支持者。


Radical terrorist groups attempt to consolidate their distorted version of “true” Islam as the only institution, imposing their language to win the entire Muslim market.	激进恐怖组织试图巩固其歪曲版本“真正”伊斯兰教独一无二的地位，强制推行他们的语言去赢得整个穆斯林市场


Today, groups like the Islamic State and Nigeria’s Boko Haram have joined Al Qaeda in a struggle to attract Muslims from all over the world, thereby securing their leadership in global jihad.	如今，像伊斯兰国和尼日利亚博科圣地这样的组织已经加入了基地组织的队伍，诱惑世界各地的穆斯林民众，从而确保对全球圣战运动的领导。


These groups take advantage of unruly environments and weak or collapsing institutions to gain a territorial foothold.	这些组织利用无法无天的环境、脆弱或濒临崩溃的制度来争取在区域内实现立足。


Indeed, it was the failed transitions in Syria, Libya, and Yemen after the Arab Spring revolts that fueled the Islamic State’s emergence.	事实上，伊斯兰国的崛起要归结于叙利亚、利比亚、也门阿拉伯之春起义后转型失败的推动。


Millions of young people, though disillusioned by decades of social paralysis, unemployment, and brutal dictatorships, had dared to expect better.	数以百万计的年轻人，虽然对数十年社会瘫痪、失业和残酷独裁政权倍感失望，但却敢于怀揣更美好的梦想。


Though Tunisians have made progress, the other affected populations, like many Muslim immigrants in Europe, have had their hopes shattered.	虽然突尼斯已经取得进展，但其他受影响的群体，比如欧洲许多穆斯林移民，却怀揣着已经破灭的梦想。


Jihad, like any other reductionist political program, is capable of seducing a wide variety of people.	圣战像其他简化的政治纲领一样，能对各种各样的人产生诱惑。


The attribute they almost always share is a sense of futility or a lack of purpose.	他们的共同点是无助感和漫无目标。


The West must recognize that, as Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, conflict in the Arab world cannot be resolved through foreign military intervention.	西方人必须认识到，就像阿富汗和伊拉克事态已经证明的那样，外国军事干预无法解决阿拉伯世界的冲突。


The only way to restore order and spur progress in the region is by empowering moderate Muslims, so that they can triumph over the forces of radicalism and violence.	恢复地区秩序和推动进步的唯一途径是授权温和的穆斯林民众，使他们能战胜激进主义和暴力力量。


The West’s role is to identify them and offer them acceptance and support.	西方要做的是找到并接受他们，并为他们提供帮助。


This lesson should be applied both abroad and at home.	这一教训理应在国内国外全部适用。


Europe’s Clash of Generations	欧洲的代际冲突


LONDON – As Europe’s financial crisis goes from acute to chronic, the dispute over who will bear the costs of resolving it is fueling the emergence of a new generation of political movements.	伦敦—随着欧洲金融危机由急性转为慢性，关于谁来承担解决危机的成本的争论正在让新一代政治运动浮出水面。


In the so-called periphery, political upstarts promise citizens an alternative to austerity.	在所谓的外围，政治新贵向人民承诺采取紧缩的替代方案。


In the eurozone’s “core” countries, they purport to protect taxpayers from relentless demands for debtor-country relief.	在欧元区的“核心”国家，他们宣称要保护纳税人免受拯救债务国的无理要求的折磨。


How Europe’s leaders respond to these new political challengers will determine whether the monetary union stabilizes or fractures.	欧洲领导人如何应对这些新的政治挑战将决定货币联盟是走向稳定还是分裂。


Europe’s political elite have, for the most part, been strongly integrationist.	在过去的大部分时间里，欧洲政治精英极力主张融合。


Given that they are largely of the post-World War II generation, they are acutely aware of the benefits of a peaceful Europe.	他们大多是二战后一代，十分清楚和平的欧洲的好处。


In the 1990’s, differing visions of European integration led to a problematic compromise.	20世纪90年代，关于欧洲一体化的不同愿景催生了有问题的妥协。


In order to secure France’s backing for German reunification, Germany agreed to create a monetary union – but not a fiscal union.	为了确保法国支持德国的重新统一，德国同意建立货币联盟——而不是财政联盟。


Now, Europe is suffering the consequences of that Faustian bargain.	如今，欧洲正在经受这一浮士德式讨价还价的后果。


At the same time, Europe’s leaders are under pressure from a new generation of voters, who grew up in the shadow of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.	与此同时，欧洲领导人面临新一代选民的压力，他们成长于柏林墙倒塌的影响下。


The lifting of the Iron Curtain gave the West access to a vast supply of cheap labor in Eastern Europe.	铁幕的升起让西方得到了来自东欧的充足的廉价劳动力供应。


China’s subsequent emergence expanded that supply further, culminating with China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001.	随后，中国的崛起让廉价劳动力供应进一步扩大了，并在2001年中国加入世贸组织时达到高峰。


As a result, many of Europe’s economies began to fall behind.	结果，许多欧洲经济体开始落后。


European leaders hoped that a monetary union would help Europe’s less competitive economies catch up to the richer countries of the north.	欧洲领导人希望货币联盟能帮助欧洲缺少竞争力的经济体赶超北欧的富裕国家。


And, during its first decade, the euro ostensibly delivered.	在第一个十年里，欧元表面上达到了这一目的。


Just as cheap mortgage financing papered over the cracks of growing income inequality in the United States, cheap capital from the north accelerated Europe’s apparent economic convergence.	正如廉价按揭融资糊住了美国不断增长的收入不平等裂缝，来自北欧的廉价资本加速了欧洲表面上的经济趋同。


The post-Wall generation seemed to have all the luck – at least for a while.	柏林墙后一代似乎获得了命运的垂青——至少是暂时性地。


But income inequality was worsening steadily in all member countries, with more highly educated citizens benefiting from the booming services industry, while the less educated suffered as manufacturing moved to cheaper locations.	但收入不平等在所有成员国都在稳步恶化，教育层次高的公民受益于服务业繁荣，而教育层次低的公民遭难于制造业向低成本地区的转移。


Then, the global financial crisis struck, income inequality rose sharply, and the post-Wall generation in southern Europe suffered the largest drop in living standards since WWII.	接着，全球金融危机爆发，收入不平等大幅上升，南欧的柏林墙后一代遭遇了二战后最严重的生活水平下降。


Unlike the US, which was founded on a political cause – opposition to British colonialism – that forged a common national identity, countries joining the European Union sought simply to avoid further warfare on the continent.	与美国不同——美国建立在反对英国殖民主义的政治目标基础上，这铸造了共同的国民身份——加入欧盟的诸国只是为了寻求进一步躲避大陆战乱。


While laudable, this cause was inadequate to foster a shared European identity.	这当然值得赞赏，但如此目标不足以铸造共同的欧洲身份。


On the contrary, it allowed national identity to flourish.	相反，它让民族身份坐大了。


The post-Wall generation, whose members are less than 40 years old and thus far removed from WWII, has little appreciation for this cause.	柏林墙后一代——他们年龄不到40，没有经历过二战——对这一目标毫无共鸣。


For them, debtor and creditor countries’ increasingly divergent economic objectives are much more meaningful.	对他们来说，债务国和债权国日渐分歧的经济目标才更有意义得多。


Citizens of debtor economies, who grew up complacent about economic convergence, have lost their savings and, in many cases, have run out of hope.	债务国公民——他们成长于对经济趋同的得意中——失去了储蓄，很多人还失去了希望。


Meanwhile, citizens of creditor countries are focused on protecting the gains made before the crisis; after all, it was their savings that financed their neighbors’ reckless spending.	与此同时，债权国公民着眼于保护他们在危机前所赚得的好处； 毕竟，是他们的储蓄替邻国不知节制的花钱提供了融资。


Throughout the eurozone, rising income inequality has created an underclass that is increasingly suspicious of the monetary union.	在整个欧元区，上升的收入不平等已经造成了一个下等阶级，他们越来越质疑货币联盟。


As the post-war generation ages – with most of its members now at least 60 years old and its leaders either in senior leadership positions or acting as senior statesmen – the remaining support for integration is waning.	随着战后一代老去——他们大部分人至少已经60岁，其领袖要么身居高位，要么是资深政客——对一体化的支持正在消失。


Many post-Wall voters stand on the margins of established parties or are forming parties of their own, while a more pragmatic group is being pulled between the old order and new movements.	许多柏林墙后一代选民或者是老牌政党的边缘人，或者在建立他们自己的新政党，与此同时，更务实的群体被旧秩序和新运动争相争取。


The muddled, reactive response to the euro crisis reflects the compromises that traditional political parties have made in order to remain in power as generational differences have become increasingly extreme.	对欧元危机的模糊而被动的反应反映了一种妥协，传统政党为了在代际差异日益极端时保有权力而做出了这一妥协。


Political revolutions rarely arise out of brief periods of acute crisis.	政治革命很少会产生于为时短暂的急性危机。


Rather, they follow one or more generations of chronic decline, when fear of economic loss gives way to targeted anger, and charismatic voices surface to orchestrate the response.	它们往往产生于一代甚至几代人的缓慢衰落之后，那时，经济损失产生了愤怒目标、美妙承诺开始出现并编织应对措施。


This pattern has recurred throughout history, from the French Revolution all the way to the fall of the Berlin Wall.	这一模式在历史上屡试不爽，从法国大革命到柏林墙倒塌无一不是如此。


Although markets may have been cowed into submission for now, the cracks in the eurozone’s political foundations are beginning to show.	尽管市场现在已经被迫从命，但欧元区政治基础的裂缝正在开始显露。


For now, the post-Wall generation lacks a clear focus for its anger.	现在，柏林墙后一代缺少明确的愤怒对象。


New populist parties in Italy, Greece, and Germany reflect the direction in which politics is moving, not the final destination.	意大利、希腊和德国的新民粹主义政党反映了政治的发展方向，而不是终点。


Their ability to win support from both the left and the right suggests a shared aspiration to rebuild the protective national barriers that the post-War generation demolished.	他们能赢得左右两派的能力表明，重建战后一代所拆掉的保护性国家壁垒已是共识。


Against this background, most European leaders are afraid that their electorates will reject anything that seems to imply more integration.	针对这一背景，大部分欧洲领导人担心他们的选民会拒绝任何暗示进一步一体化的方案。


It is a classic prisoner’s dilemma: all countries are better off if they contribute to a common cause, but the pressure of national elections impedes politicians’ ability to champion that cause.	这是个典型的囚徒困境：如果所有国家都为共同目标努力，则所有国家都会受益，但国家选举的压力阻碍了政客推行这一目标的能力。


The ultimate test of leadership will be a commitment to EU treaty reform, with all the thorny negotiations and referenda that this entails.	对领导人的终极考验将是欧盟条约改革承诺及其所包含的一切棘手谈判和公投。


The post-war generation’s political leaders must respond promptly and effectively to the challenge posed by emerging political movements while they are still immature.	战后一代的政治领袖必须在新崛起的政治运动尚处于萌芽之势时对它们构成的挑战做出迅速而有效的反应。


If they wait too long, the old walls will be restored and the euro’s guardians will be left out in the cold.	如果等得太久，就墙会重新竖起，欧元卫士将万劫不复。


European Politics With an Islamic Face?	伊斯兰面目的欧洲政治？


LONDON – Donald Trump’s call to bar Muslims from the United States provoked the following exchange with two young friends of mine: “If the choice was between Muslim immigration and preserving liberal moral values,” I asked, “which would you choose?”	伦敦—唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）扬言要禁止穆斯林进入美国，这引起了我的两位青年朋友的对话：“如果要在穆斯林移民和捍卫自由道德观之间作虎选择，”我问，“你会选哪个？


They both denied the question’s premise.	”他们均否认了问题的前提。


The immigrants themselves, they suggested, might have reactionary moral codes, but their children, growing up in today’s Britain, America, or Continental Europe, would be quite different.	移民本身，他们认为，也许存在反动道德，但他们的孩子们生长在今天的英国、美国或欧洲大陆，会与父辈大不相同。


But is that true?	但果真如此吗？


My question focused not on Islamist terrorism – the ostensible ground of Trump’s outburst – but on the threat posed by large-scale Muslim immigration to the code of morals that my young friends, like most educated Europeans, now accept without question.	我的问题的重点不是伊斯兰恐怖主义，即特朗普爆发的表面目标，而是大规模穆斯林移民给我的青年朋友（以及大部分受过教育的欧洲人）视为理所当然的道德观所造成的威胁。


Terrorism aside, wouldn’t they worry if Islam came to have a growing influence on British law and politics?	暂且把恐怖主义放在一边，如果伊斯兰教日益对英国法律和政治形成越来越大的影响，他们难道不会担忧吗？


This is not just a hypothetical possibility.	这可不是假设的可能性。


The Muslim population in Europe was 44.1 million in 2010, or 6% of the total.	2010年欧洲穆斯林人口，为4,410万，或总人口的6%。


There were 2.7 million Muslims in the United Kingdom in 2011 (4.8% of the population), up from 1.6 million in 2001.	2011年英国穆斯林人口为270万（总人口的4. 8%），而2001年只有160万。


Given recent immigration trends and, more important, Muslims’ above-average fertility rate (three children per family versus the British average of 1.8), the Muslim share of the UK population is bound to grow for decades to come.	从当前移民趋势以及更重要的穆斯林高于平均值的生育率（每户人家有三个孩子，英国平均水平为1. 8个），穆斯林占英国人口比重在未来几十年中必然会不断增加。


Much of Europe is on the same demographic trajectory.	大量欧洲地区都面临着同样的人口趋势。


Of course, demographics is not an exact science: Much depends on assumptions about age profiles, standards of living, inequality, and so on, and sooner or later the Muslim fertility rate will converge with the national average.	当然，人口学不属于精确科学：很大程度上要取决于关于年龄结构、生活水平、不平等性等因素的假设，而穆斯林生育率迟早会向全国平均水平靠拢。


But by then the Muslim population will have expanded rapidly – to 10-20% of the total in the UK.	但那时穆斯林人口已有快速增长——可能占英国总人口的10—20%。


The interesting question concerns the consequences of this.	这一变化有什么后果是一个有趣的问题。


Liberals have not worried about ethnic demographics, because they assume that individuals eventually identify with the host society’s norms.	自由派不担心民族人口，因为他们认为个体最终会认同东道国社会的规范。


The standard argument is that immigrants enrich the host, while leaving any incompatible characteristics at home.	通常的观点是移民能充实东道国社会，他们与东道国社会不相容的特征都会留在母国。


In particular, their political behavior will fall into line with that of the general population.	特别是，他们的政治行为将与大多数人一致。


If this is right, the sociopolitical impact of a change in the ethnic composition of a population is neutral, or even beneficial.	果真如此的话，人口民族构成的社会政治影响应该是中立甚至积极的。


Immigrants from Algeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Turkey will, in the course of a generation or two, become European in outlook and politics.	来自阿尔及利亚、孟加拉国、巴基斯坦或土耳其的移民将在一两代人的时间里实现人生观和政治观的欧洲化。


Their religion will become for them a private matter, as it now is for most Europeans, and they will become integrated in all important respects.	他们的宗教信仰将只是隐私问题，就像如今的大部分欧洲人那样，他们将在所有重要方面实现融合。


But that historical pattern, in my view, depended crucially on the small size of the immigrant population and its cultural closeness to the home population.	但在我看来，这一历史模式有一个关键前提，即移民规模小，并且在文化上与母国人口切断联系。


(Even so, the process of assimilation was far from frictionless.)	（即使如此，同化的过程也绝非一帆风顺。


Historical experience offers little guide to the social and political consequences of the much greater numbers and more pronounced cultural differences at stake in the postwar migrations to Europe, especially from the Muslim world.	）历史经验没有告诉我们，数量上大得多的移民会带来怎样的社会和政治后果，也没有告诉我们，战后来到欧洲的移民（特别是穆斯林移民）的更加显著的文化差异会带来怎样的社会和政治后果。


The incompatibilities are much greater.	他们的不相容性要大得多。


The nub of the problem is that contemporary European civilization is secular, whereas Muslim civilization is religious.	问题的核心是当代欧洲文明是世俗文明，而穆斯林文明是宗教文明。


In Europe, religion has lost its authority over law, legislation, education, morals, and business life.	在欧洲，宗教已经失去了凌驾于法律、立法、教育、道德和商业之上的权威。


The Islamic world has undergone no comparable process.	伊斯兰世界则尚未经历类似的过程。


There is no systematic separation of faith and state; the family, not the individual, remains the basic social unit.	在伊斯兰世界，信仰和国家之间没有系统区分； 家庭而非个人仍然是基本社会单元。


The essential elements of modern European political life – individual rights and duties, and the accountability of government to the governed – are lacking, particularly in the Arab Middle East.	现代欧洲政治生活的基本要素——个人权利和责任，以及人民对政府的问责权——在伊斯兰世界特别是阿拉伯中东是不存在的。


Despite efforts at secularization, the gap between Muslim and Western outlooks has, if anything, grown in recent years, as religion has regained ascendancy in most Muslim countries.	尽管存在一些世俗化努力，但穆斯林和西方世界观之间的距离在近几年越拉越大，在大部分穆斯林国家，宗教重新取得了支配地位。


Sharia religious law – extreme versions of which hold that conduct decriminalized in the West, such as adultery and homosexuality, is punishable by death – influences their legal codes.	伊斯兰教法——其中最极端者坚持认定在西方早已不是犯罪的行为——比如通奸和同性恋——应该处以死刑——影响着地方规范。


Moreover, in many countries, large majorities of Muslims say Sharia should be the official law.	此外，在许多国家，绝大多数穆斯林认为伊斯兰教法应该成为官方法律。


In Europe, Islam is the fastest-growing religion, and Sharia has penetrated European legal systems.	在欧洲，伊斯兰教是一个发展势头迅猛的宗教，而伊斯兰教法也渗透到了欧洲法律体系中。


In the UK, a hundred Sharia courts adjudicate on divorce and other family cases, prompting Home Secretary Theresa May to promise a review of Sharia courts “to determine whether they are consistent with British values.”	在英国，有一百家伊斯兰法庭裁决着离婚和其他家庭案件，促使内政大臣特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）承诺要审查伊斯兰法庭“已决定它们是否与英国价值观一致”。


Secularization is not inevitable.	世俗化不是不可避免的。


As the political philosopher Larry Siedentop has argued, “secularization is Christianity’s gift to the world.”	政治哲学家拉里·西登托普（Larry Siedentop）曾说，“世俗化是基督教给世界的礼物。


According to Siedentop, features specific to Christianity led to liberal individualism, and they are absent from the other great world religions.	”在西登托普看来，基督教所特有的特征带来了自由个人主义，这是世界其他大宗教所没有的。


The great gift of secularism, in turn, has been tolerance.	反过来，世俗化带来的大礼物是宽容。


Despite horrific twentieth-century backsliding in Europe, secularism has served to blunt the edge of bigotry, because secular reasoning, unlike divine revelation, is never conclusive.	尽管二十世纪的欧洲发生了可怕的倒退，但世俗化仍有助于钝化偏执，因为世俗理性不同于神启，不具有一锤定音的效力。


Economists regard migration as a movement of individuals in search of a better life and call for more immigration to offset population aging, or to provide workers to do the “dirty jobs.”	经济学家将移民视为个体追寻更好的生活的运动，支持用更多的移民来抵消人口老化或提供干“脏活”的工人。


But such evocations of “economic man” miss a key dimension of migration: People carry their culture with them across political frontiers.	但这一对“经济人”的召唤没有考虑到移民的一个关键特征：人们在穿越政治边境时也带来了他们的文化。


We should not assume that economic success automatically leads to cultural convergence.	我们不能认为经济成功会自动带来文化趋同。


This brings us back to Trump.	这让我们回到了特朗普。


Whatever happens in the US, Muslim immigration into Europe will continue and even expand in the next few years.	不管美国发生了什么，未来几年进入欧洲的穆斯林移民仍将继续并有可能增加。


The Syrian catastrophe alone ensures this.	光是叙利亚灾难就足以形成这一结果。


Everything that dialogue and education can do to close the gap between immigrant and host communities should be done.	对话和教育能够弥合移民和东道国社会之间的差异，应该不遗余力地去做。


But it may not be possible to prevent a return to religious politics – and the conflict which religious bigotry brings.	但有可能无法阻止宗教政治的回归——以及宗教偏执所带来的冲突。


If we are to avoid sleepwalking into a highly troublesome future, we must recognize that failed integration, not terrorism, is the main danger we face.	如果我们想要避免梦游着进入无比动荡的未来的情况，就必须认识到，融合失败，而不是恐怖主义，才是我们所面临的主要危险。


Europe’s Lapse of Reason	欠缺理性的欧洲


NEW YORK – At long last, the United States is showing signs of recovery from the crisis that erupted at the end of President George W. Bush’s administration, when the near-implosion of its financial system sent shock waves around the world.	纽约—终于，美国显现出从小布什执政末期爆发的危机中复苏的信号，这场几乎让美国金融系统崩溃的危机波及了全世界。 但现在的复苏并不坚挺；


But it is not a strong recovery; at best, the gap between where the economy would have been and where it is today is not widening.	充其量只是经济理应取得的成就和经济今天所处的位置之间的差距没有扩大。


If it is closing, it is doing so very slowly; the damage wrought by the crisis appears to be long term.	如果这一差距正在缩小，那么速度也十分缓慢； 危机所造成的伤害似乎是长期的。


Then again, it could be worse.	其实事情可能更加糟糕。


Across the Atlantic, there are few signs of even a modest US-style recovery: The gap between where Europe is and where it would have been in the absence of the crisis continues to grow.	放眼大西洋两岸，你甚至连平庸的美国式复苏也难以找到：欧洲经济目前所处的位置与其在不发生危机情况下所应该取得的成就之间的差距在继续扩大。


In most European Union countries, per capita GDP is less than it was before the crisis.	在大部分欧盟国家，人均GDP还不如危机前。


A lost half-decade is quickly turning into a whole one.	失去的五年很快就会变成失去的十年。


Behind the cold statistics, lives are being ruined, dreams are being dashed, and families are falling apart (or not being formed) as stagnation – depression in some places – runs on year after year.	在冰冷的数据背后，生活每况愈下，梦想遭遇打击，家庭因为年复一年的经济停滞——有的地方则是经济萧条——而被迫拆散（或无法组建）。


The EU has highly talented, highly educated people.	欧盟拥有才华横溢、受过良好教育的人民。


Its member countries have strong legal frameworks and well-functioning societies.	欧盟成员国拥有强大的法律框架和运转良好的社会。


Before the crisis, most even had well-functioning economies.	危机前，大部分欧盟成员国的经济也在良好地运转。


In some places, productivity per hour – or the rate of its growth – was among the highest in the world.	在一些地方，小时生产率——或其增长率——位列世界最高行列。


But Europe is not a victim.	但欧洲并不是受害者。


Yes, America mismanaged its economy; but, no, the US did not somehow manage to impose the brunt of the global fallout on Europe.	诚然，美国经济治理有问题； 但是，美国并没有设法让危机的全球震波涌向欧洲，没有。


The EU’s malaise is self-inflicted, owing to an unprecedented succession of bad economic decisions, beginning with the creation of the euro.	欧盟的问题是自己造成的，来自前所未有的持续经济决策失当，而首先就是欧元的创立。


Though intended to unite Europe, in the end the euro has divided it; and, in the absence of the political will to create the institutions that would enable a single currency to work, the damage is not being undone.	尽管创立欧元的初衷是统一欧洲，但最终欧元却在分裂欧洲； 而在缺乏建立单一货币运转所需要的机构的意愿的情况下，欧元所造成的伤害也无从消除。


The current mess stems partly from adherence to a long-discredited belief in well-functioning markets without imperfections of information and competition.	从某种程度上讲，当前的乱象来自欧洲对一个早已破产的信念的坚持——市场能够在信息和竞争不完美的情况下完美运转。


Hubris has also played a role.	自大也起到了一些作用。


How else to explain the fact that, year after year, European officials’ forecasts of their policies’ consequences have been consistently wrong?	若非如此，如何解释这样的事实——年复一���，欧洲官员对其政策后果的预测无不以错误告终？


These forecasts have been wrong not because EU countries failed to implement the prescribed policies, but because the models upon which those policies relied were so badly flawed.	这些预测错误的原因不在于欧盟国家没有实施规定的政策，而是在于作为这些政策基础的模型缺陷太大。


In Greece, for example, measures intended to lower the debt burden have in fact left the country more burdened than it was in 2010: the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased, owing to the bruising impact of fiscal austerity on output.	比如，在希腊，旨在降低债务负担的措施实际上导致了该国背上了比2010年还要沉重的债务负担：债务-GDP比率因为财政紧缩对产出所造成的消极影响而增加。


At least the International Monetary Fund has owned up to these intellectual and policy failures.	至少国际货币基金组织（IMF）承认了这些理论和政策失误。


Europe’s leaders remain convinced that structural reform must be their top priority.	欧洲领导人依然认为，必须以结构改革为重中之重。


But the problems they point to were apparent in the years before the crisis, and they were not stopping growth then.	但他们所指向的问题在危机前多年就已经显露无疑，并且此后从未停止扩大。


What Europe needs more than structural reform within member countries is reform of the structure of the eurozone itself, and a reversal of austerity policies, which have failed time and again to reignite economic growth.	与成员国国内的结构改革相比，欧洲更加需要欧元区本身的结构改革以及扭转紧缩政策——紧缩政策在提振经济增长方面一而再、再而三地失败。


Those who thought that the euro could not survive have been repeatedly proven wrong.	认为欧元无法生存下去的观点被一再证明是错误的。


But the critics have been right about one thing: unless the structure of the eurozone is reformed, and austerity reversed, Europe will not recover.	但是批评者有一点是正确的：除非改革欧元区的结构并扭转紧缩政策，否则欧洲不会复苏。


The drama in Europe is far from over.	欧洲的闹剧远未结束。


One of the EU’s strengths is the vitality of its democracies.	欧盟的一大优势是其生机勃勃的民主。


But the euro took away from citizens – especially in the crisis countries – any say over their economic destiny.	但欧元让欧洲人民——特别是危机国的国民——无法决定他们的经济命运。


Repeatedly, voters have thrown out incumbents, dissatisfied with the direction of the economy – only to have the new government continue on the same course dictated from Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin.	选民们反复选出新内阁，他们对经济的方向十分不满——而新政府总是继续听命于布鲁塞尔、法兰克福和柏林所规定的方向。


But for how long can this continue?	但是，这一切可以持续多久？


And how will voters react?	选民又将如何反应？


Throughout Europe, we have seen the alarming growth of extreme nationalist parties, running counter to the Enlightenment values that have made Europe so successful.	放眼欧洲，我们已经令人警觉地看到，极端民族主义政党正在崛起，站到了让欧洲取得如此大成功的启蒙价值的对立面。


In some places, large separatist movements are rising.	在一些地区，大规模分裂主义运动正在兴起。


Now Greece is posing yet another test for Europe.	如今，希腊正在给欧洲又一考验。


The decline in the Greek economy since the start of the crisis is in many ways worse than that which confronted America during the Great Depression of the 1930s.	2010年以来，希腊GDP的下降程度远比美国在20世纪30年代大萧条期间更严重。


Youth unemployment is over 50%.	年轻人失业率高达50%以上。


Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’s government has failed, and now, owing to the parliament’s inability to choose a new Greek president, an early general election will be held on January 25.	总理萨马拉斯政府已经倒闭，如今，由于议会无法选出新的希腊总统，可能将于1月25日举行提前大选。


The left opposition Syriza party, which is committed to renegotiating the terms of Greece’s EU bailout, is ahead in opinion polls.	反对党左翼同盟（Syriza party）在民意调查中领先。 该党承诺重新谈判希腊的欧元援助条款。


If Syriza wins but does not take power, a principal reason will be fear of how the EU will respond.	如果该党获胜但无法获得权力，那么一个主要原因将是恐惧欧盟的应对方式。


Fear is not the noblest of emotions, and it will not give rise to the kind of national consensus that Greece needs in order to move forward.	恐惧不是好情绪，也无法产生希腊向前进步所需要的国民统一意志。


The issue is not Greece.	问题不在希腊。


It is Europe.	在欧洲。


If Europe does not change its ways – if it does not reform the eurozone and repeal austerity – a popular backlash will become inevitable. Greece may stay the course this time.	如果欧洲不改变它的道路——如果它不改革欧元区并撤销紧缩——就难免会遭遇群众抵制。


But this economic madness cannot continue forever. Democracy will not permit it.	今天，希腊也许能抵挡住此次冲击。


But how much more pain will Europe have to endure before reason is restored?	但在恢复理性之前，欧洲还要承受多少痛苦？


E Pluribus Europe?	欧洲合众为一？


BRUSSELS – The European Union’s economic crises of the last half-decade have fueled the emergence of a deep divide between the northern creditor countries and the southern debtors.	布鲁塞尔—过去五年的欧盟经济危机导致北部债权国和南部债务国裂痕日深。


Now Europe’s migrant crisis is creating an east-west divide between the countries that are welcoming toward the ongoing influx of refugees, and those who want to do little, or nothing, to help.	如今，欧洲移民危机则正在制造东西分裂，一边欢迎持续流入的难民，另一边什么忙都不想帮。


Add to that growing political divisions within member countries, and one must ask: Is the EU coming unglued?	除此之外还有成员国内部日益增加的政治分歧。 你一定会问：欧盟快要崩溃了吗？


The creditor/debtor split was thrown into sharp relief this summer, during the negotiations over Greece’s third bailout agreement.	今年夏天，在希腊第三轮援助协议谈判期间，债权国/债务国分裂大为缓和。


Germany, the leading proponent of austerity and the most influential creditor, was accused of insufficient flexibility and solidarity; Greece, for its part, was lambasted for failing to implement the reforms that it promised the first two times it was bailed out.	紧缩派领导者、影响力最大的债权国德国被控灵活性和团结精神不足； 希腊则被猛烈批评没能实施在前两次援助中承诺实施的改革。


(It was France, neither entirely “north” nor entirely “south,” that ended up playing a vital role in facilitating the deal.)	（是既不完全“北”也不完全“南”的法国最终成为促成协议的“关键先生”。 ）


Germany is now trying to lead the way in the migrant crisis as well, but this time by its generosity.	如今，德国在移民危机中也试图充当领头羊，但这一回凭借的是慷慨。


Chancellor Angela Merkel has pledged to take in more than 800,000 refugees just this year.	总理默克尔承诺，仅在今年德国就准备接收800,000以上的难民。


Welcoming crowds have lined streets and filled train stations in German cities, offering drinks, food, and clothing to the exhausted refugees, many of whom have walked hundreds of miles and risked their lives to get to safety.	欢迎群众纷纷走上德国各大城市街头和火车站，为精疲力竭的难民提供饮水、食品和衣物。 许多难民走了数百英里、冒着生命危险，终于来到了安全的地方。


Whereas Merkel declared forcefully that Islam was also a religion of Germany, some in Eastern Europe have declared that they will welcome only a small number of refugees – and only if they are Christian.	默克尔有力地宣布伊斯兰教也是德国的宗教，但一些东欧人宣称他们只欢迎少数难民——并且必须是基督教徒。


Such bigotry plays directly into the hands of Islamist extremists worldwide.	如此顽固的态度正中全球伊斯兰极端分子下怀。


The refugee crisis is all the more challenging in view of EU member countries’ internal political fragmentation.	从欧盟成员国内部的政治分裂问题看，难民危机极具挑战性。


While those on the left support cautious acceptance of refugees, the further one moves to the right, the more negative the attitude becomes.	左翼支持谨慎接受难民，而越是右倾的人，对待难民的态度就越强硬。


Even the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party to Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, has proved a reluctant partner in this area.	就连默克尔所在的基督教民主联盟（Christian Democratic Union）的姊妹政党、巴伐利亚基督社会联盟（Christian Social Union）在难民问题上也是态度冷淡。


Yet another divide lies between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU.	但还有另一个分裂，存在于英国和欧盟剩余部分之间。


Given the UK’s role, alongside France, as the key force in European defense and a significant authority in world affairs, particularly with regard to climate- and development-related issues, the prospect of a genuine split should be a source of serious concern for the EU.	英国与法国一起构成了欧洲防务的主力和全球事务重要权威（特别是气候和发展相关问题），因此这一分裂趋势理应成为欧盟严重关注的问题。


These divisions have created deep doubts about the dream of ever-closer union in Europe, underpinned by a shared system of governance that allows for more effective decision-making.	这些分裂给以促进更有效决策的共同治理体系为基础的日益紧密的欧洲联盟这一梦想蒙上了阴沉的疑云。


Likewise, they are not conducive to implementation of the reforms that are needed to spur economic growth.	类似地，这些分裂也不利于刺激经济增长所需要的改革的实施。


Yet it is still too early to write off progress toward increased European integration.	但抹杀欧洲进一步一体化的进展还为时过早。


In fact, when it comes to EU cohesion, more cleavages are probably better than a single divide.	事实上，在欧盟凝聚力这一问题上，多重分裂可能好于一重分裂。


When economic considerations alone were dominating the debate, austerity-obsessed northern Europe, oblivious to any Keynesian considerations, and struggling southern Europe, desperately in need of fiscal room to make demand-boosting, job-creating structural reforms politically feasible, were at loggerheads.	当经济问题独大、主宰争论时，北欧的顽固紧缩派无视任何凯恩斯主义考虑，而努力挣扎的南欧急切地需要财政空间来让刺激需求、创造就业岗位的结构性改革具有政治可行性。 北欧和南欧就这样陷入了拉锯。


The situation became so heated that some respected observers even proposed creating a “northern euro” for the region around Germany, and a “southern euro” in the Mediterranean (where France would fit was unclear).	争论如此激烈，以至于一些德高望重的观察者甚至提出为德国及其周边地区创造“北欧元”，为地中海地区创造“南欧元”（法国应该归属哪个地区尚无定论）。


In such a eurozone, the European Central Bank would have to split, and the northern euro would appreciate.	在这样一个欧元区中，欧洲央行也必须分裂，北欧元将会升值。


Exchange-rate uncertainty would reappear, not only between the two euros, but also, before long, within the “northern” and “southern” zones, owing to the collapse of confidence in the very idea of a currency union.	汇率不确定性将重新出现，不仅存在于两种欧元之间，不久也将存在于“北”和“南”区域之间，因为人们对货币联盟这一思想的信心已经崩塌。


Within the northern bloc, Germany would play an even more outsize role than it does now, a situation that would likely generate new tensions.	在北欧元区，德国将扮演比现在还要重要的角色，这一局面可能制造新的紧张。


Similarly, a clear division between a refugee-friendly west and a closed east would effectively end the Schengen Agreement, because the political disagreement would harden into a physical barrier blocking the free movement of people within the EU.	类似地，对难民友好的西部和封闭的东部之间明确分裂将在事实上终结申根协定，因为政治分歧将深化为实体屏障，阻碍人们在欧盟内部的自由迁徙。


Such a split would be as damaging to Europe’s cohesion as a divided eurozone.	这一分裂对欧洲凝聚力的伤害不亚于分裂的欧元区。


But what if countries that are on opposite sides of one cleavage are on the same side of another?	但在一个分裂中对立的国家，在另一个分裂中站在同一边，事情会怎么样？


Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden may agree on the immigration issue, while Greece, France, Italy, and Portugal agree on eurozone macroeconomic policies.	德国、意大利、西班牙和瑞典在移民问题上一致，而希腊、法国、意大利和葡萄牙在欧元区宏观经济政策上站在同一阵营。


France, Poland, and the UK may be willing to spend more on defense, while Germany remains more pacifist.	法国、波��和英国可能愿意将更多支出用在防务上，而德国仍然是和平主义者。


And Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the UK may be at the forefront of the fight against climate change.	而德国、斯堪的纳维亚国家和英国又都是治理气候变化的先锋。


Moreover, the Europe-wide political “families” of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and so on could be allies on some policies and opponents on others, transcending national or regional borders, and moving toward pan-European politics, with the European Parliament increasing its democratic debate and oversight functions.	此外，基督教民主党（Christian Democrats）、社会民主党（Social Democrats）等泛欧洲政治“家族”也可能在某些政策上互为盟友，而在另一些政策上争锋相对，超越国家和地区边界，触及泛欧洲政治，而欧洲议会的民主争论和监督功能日益增加。


A Europe where countries do not fit neatly into one category or another, and where flexible coalitions emerge on various issues, probably has a greater chance of progressing than one divided simply between north and south or east and west.	一个各国无法明确归类为这一类或那一类的欧洲，一个在各种问题上组成灵活的统一战线的欧洲也许是比仅仅南北分裂或东西分裂的欧洲更好的进步机会。


Of course, there remains the challenge of strengthening institutions so that they can manage this diversity and reconcile it with political effectiveness.	当然，强化欧盟机构、使其能够管理这一多样性并拿出政治效率协调这一多样性仍是一项挑战。


Here, greater scope for weighted and double-majority voting is crucial.	在这方面，扩大加权和双倍多数投票范围至关重要。


But, for truly democratic societies, the challenge of reconciling divergent interests never goes away.	但是，对真正的民主社会来说，协调多样化利益的挑战永远不会消失。


Europe’s Barbarians Inside the Gate	欧洲大门里的野蛮人


BERLIN – I am on a two-week European tour at a time that could make one either very pessimistic or constructively optimistic about Europe’s prospects.	柏林—我正在欧洲作为期两周的旅行，眼下，我对欧洲的前景既不特别悲观，也不建设性地乐观。


First the bad news: Paris is somber, if not depressed, after the appalling terrorist attacks earlier this month.	首先是坏消息：在经历了本月早些时候骇人听闻的恐怖袭击后，巴黎显得十分低落，甚至可以说是抑郁。


France’s economic growth remains anemic, the unemployed and many Muslims are disaffected, and Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Front is likely to do well in the upcoming regional elections.	法国经济增长依然萎靡，失业者和许多穆斯林心怀怨念，马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）的极右翼政党国民阵线有望在即将举行的地区选举中表现出色。


In Brussels, which was semi-deserted and in lockdown, owing to the risk of terrorist attacks, the European Union institutions have yet to devise a unified strategy to manage the influx of migrants and refugees, much less address the instability and violence in the EU’s immediate neighborhood.	布鲁塞尔因为恐怖袭击风险已经沦为半座死城，管制严格。 但欧盟机构仍没有制定出统一的战略管理移民和难民的涌入，更不用说解决欧盟近邻的动荡和暴力了。


Outside the eurozone, in London, there is concern about negative financial and economic spillover effects from the monetary union.	在欧元区之外，伦敦担心来自货币联盟的消极金融和经济溢出效应。


And the migration crisis and recent terrorist attacks mean that a referendum on continued EU membership – likely to be held next year – could lead the United Kingdom to withdraw.	移民危机和最近的恐怖袭击意味着关于是否保留欧盟成员资格的全民公决——有望在明年举行——可能导致英国退出欧盟。


This would probably be followed by the breakup of the UK itself, as “Brexit” would lead the Scots to declare independence.	接下来，英国本身也有可能分裂，“英国退出”可能导致苏格兰人宣布独立。


In Berlin, meanwhile, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership is coming under growing pressure.	与此同时，在柏林，德国首相默克尔的领导地位受到日益严重的压力。


Her decision to keep Greece in the eurozone, her courageous but unpopular choice to allow in a million refugees, the Volkswagen scandal, and flagging economic growth (owing to the slowdown of China and emerging markets) have exposed her to criticism even from her own party.	她决定让希腊留在欧元区，勇敢但不受欢迎地选择了允许一百万难民进入德国，再加上大众公司丑闻和经济增长减速（拜中国和新兴市场减速所赐），就连她本身的政党内也出现了批评她的声音。


Frankfurt is a divided city, policy-wise: the Bundesbank opposes quantitative easing and negative policy rates, while the European Central Bank is ready to do more.	法兰克福是一座分裂的决策之城：德国央行反对量化宽松和负利率，而欧洲央行准备加码这些政策。


But Germany’s thrifty savers – households, banks, and insurance companies – are furious about ECB policies that tax them (and others in the eurozone core) to subsidize the eurozone periphery’s alleged reckless spenders and debtors.	但节俭的德国储户——家庭、银行和保险公司——对欧洲央行从他们（以及其他欧元区核心国）身上征税补贴欧元区外围饱受诘难的不知节制的花钱大户和借款人十分愤怒。


In this environment, the full economic, banking, fiscal, and political union that a stable monetary union eventually requires is not viable: The eurozone core opposes more risk sharing, solidarity, and faster integration.	在这样的环境下，根本无法形成一个稳定的货币联盟最终必须具备的完整的经济、银行、财政和货币联盟：欧元区核心国反对进一步风险共担、凝聚和加快一体化。


And populist parties of the right and left – anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migrant, anti-trade, and anti-market – are becoming stronger throughout Europe.	左翼和右翼民粹主义政党——它们反欧盟、反欧元、反移民、反贸易、反市场——正在全欧洲风生水起。


But of all the problems Europe faces, it is the migration crisis that could become existential.	但在欧洲所面临的所有问题中，只有移民危机可能演变为生存危机。


In the Middle East, North Africa, and the region stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, there are about 20 million displaced people; civil wars, widespread violence, and failed states are becoming the norm.	在中东、北非以及从萨赫勒到非洲之角的广袤地区，大约存在2,000万流民； 内战、无处不在的暴力以及国家失败已经成为常态。


If Europe has trouble absorbing a million refugees, how will it eventually handle 20 million?	如果欧洲无法吸收一百万难民，还如何最终解决2,000万？


Unless Europe can defend its external borders, the Schengen agreement will collapse and internal borders will return, ending freedom of movement – a key principle of European integration – within most of the EU.	除非欧洲能够防卫其对外边界，否则申根协定将崩溃，其内部边界将重新出现，欧盟内部大部分地区自由迁徙——欧洲一体化的核心原则——将是明日黄花。


But the solution proposed by some – close the gates to refugees – would merely worsen the problem, by destabilizing countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, which have already absorbed millions.	但一些人所反对的解决方案——关闭难民进入欧洲的大门——只会让问题更加恶化，动摇土耳其、黎巴嫩和约旦等已经吸收了数百万难民的国家。


And paying off Turkey and others to keep the refugees would be both costly and unsustainable.	而补偿土耳其和其他国家继续收留难民代价巨大并且不可持续。


And the problems of the greater Middle East (including Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Africa cannot be resolved by military and diplomatic means alone.	而大中东（包括阿富汗和巴基斯坦）和非洲的问题无法光靠军事和外交手段解决。


The economic factors driving these (and other) conflicts will worsen: global climate change is accelerating desertification and depleting water resources, with disastrous effects on agriculture and other economic activity that then trigger violence across ethnic, religious, social, and other cleavages.	这些（和其他）冲突背后的经济因素将恶化：全球气候变化正在加速沙漠化和水资源的耗竭，对农业和其他经���活动带来灾难，引发种族、宗教、社会和其他形式的暴力。


Nothing short of a massive, Marshall Plan-style outlay of financial resources, especially to rebuild the Middle East, will ensure long-term stability.	至少必须有规模相当于马歇尔计划的金融资源援助——特别是以重建中东为目标的援助——才能确保长期稳定。


Will Europe be able and willing to pay its share of it?	欧洲能够并且愿意承担它应该承担的部分吗？


If economic solutions aren’t found, eventually these regions’ conflicts will destabilize Europe, as millions more desperate, hopeless people eventually become radicalized and blame the West for their misery.	如果找不到经济解决方案，那么这些地区的冲突最终将动摇欧洲，数百万绝望无助的人最终将走向极端，指责西方必须为他们的苦难负责。


Even with an unlikely wall around Europe, many would find a way in – and some would terrorize Europe for decades to come.	即使建立一道环绕欧洲的墙——根本不可能——许多人仍会设法进入欧洲，其中一些人将在未来几十年中在欧洲从事恐怖活动。


That’s why some commentators, inflaming the tensions, speak of barbarians at the gates and compare Europe’s situation to the beginning of the end of the Roman Empire.	因此，一些评论家煽动紧张，大谈“门口的野蛮人”，并将欧洲的现状与罗马帝国衰亡开始时相比较。


But Europe is not doomed to collapse.	但欧洲绝非注定会崩溃。


The crises that it now confronts could lead to greater solidarity, more risk sharing, and further institutional integration.	它目前所面临的冲突可能带来更大的凝聚力、更多的风险共担和进一步机构一体化。


Germany could absorb more refugees (though not at the rate of a million per year).	德国可能吸收更多的难民（尽管达不到每年一百万的速度）。


France and Germany could provide and pay for military intervention against the Islamic State.	法国和德国可能提供和出资针对伊斯兰国的军事干预。


All of Europe and the rest of the world – the US, the rich Gulf States – could provide massive amounts of money for refugee support and eventually funds to rebuild failed states and provide economic opportunity to hundreds of millions of Muslims and Africans.	整个欧洲以及世界其他地区——美国、波斯湾富裕国家——可能提供大量资金用于支持难民并最终出资筹建失败国家，为数以亿计的穆斯林和非洲人民提供经济机会。


This would be expensive fiscally for Europe and the world – and current fiscal targets would have to be bent appropriately in the eurozone and globally.	这对欧洲和世界来说是一个沉重的财政负担——当前欧元区和全球财政目标必须做出适当调整。


But the alternative is global chaos, if not, as Pope Francis has warned, the beginning of World War III.	但另一边是全球混乱，乃至教皇方济各所警告的第三次世界大战的爆发。


And there is light at the end of the tunnel for the eurozone.	欧元区的黑暗中也有一丝曙光。


A cyclical recovery is underway, supported by monetary easing for years to come and increasingly flexible fiscal rules.	受未来多年货币宽松和日益灵活的财政规则支持，周期性复苏已经开始。


More risk sharing will start in the banking sector (with EU-wide deposit insurance up next), and eventually more ambitious proposals for a fiscal union will be adopted.	银行部门将开始更多的风险共担（下一步是泛欧盟存款保险机制），最终，宏大的财政联盟方案会被采纳。


Structural reforms – however slowly – will continue and gradually increase potential and actual growth.	结构性改革——不管多么缓慢——将继续逐渐提振潜在和实际增长。


The pattern in Europe has been that crises lead – however slowly – to more integration and risk sharing.	欧洲的模式一直是危机带来——不管多么缓慢——更多的一体化和风险共担。


Today, with risks to the survival of both the eurozone (starting with Greece) and the EU itself (starting with Brexit), it will take enlightened European leaders to sustain the trend toward deeper unification.	如今，欧元区（从希腊开始）和欧盟本身（从英国退出开始）都面临着生存威胁，开明欧洲领导人必须站出来维持朝向加深统一的趋势。


In a world of existing and rising great powers (the US, China, and India) and weaker revisionist powers (such as Russia and Iran), a divided Europe is a geopolitical dwarf.	当今世界，既有老牌和新兴力量（美国、中国和印度），也有衰落的修正主义力量（如俄罗斯和伊朗），一个分裂的欧洲将沦为地缘政治侏儒。


Fortunately, enlightened leaders in Berlin – and there are more than a few of them, despite perceptions to the contrary – know that Germany’s future depends on a strong and more integrated Europe.	幸运的是，柏林的开明领导人——其实为数绝不少，尽管人们的感觉与此相反——明白德国的未来系于更加强大、更加一体化的欧洲。


They, together with wiser European leaders elsewhere, understand that this will require the appropriate forms of solidarity, including a unified foreign policy that can address the problems in Europe’s neighborhood.	他们，以及欧洲各地的明智领导人都知道，这需要合适的凝聚力形式，包括能够解决欧洲周边问题的统一的外交政策。


But solidarity begins at home.	但凝聚力从自身内部开始。


And that means beating back the populists and nationalist barbarians within by supporting aggregate demand and pro-growth reforms that ensure a more resilient recovery of jobs and incomes.	而这意味着支持总需求和促增长改革以确保就业和收入复苏更加坚挺，从而消灭大门里的民粹主义和民族主义野蛮人。


Europe’s Leadership Crisis	欧洲的领导危机


BRUSSELS – The European Union’s list of crises keeps growing.	布鲁塞尔—欧盟的危机名单还在加长。


But, beyond the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” vote to leave the bloc, Poland’s constitutional-court imbroglio, Russian expansionism, migrants and refugees, and resurgent nationalism, the greatest threat to the EU comes from within: a crisis of political leadership is paralyzing its institutions.	但是，除了英国“退欧”公投、波兰宪法法院乱象、俄罗斯扩张主义、移民和难民问题以及民族主义复兴，欧盟最大的威胁来自内部：政治领导层正在让欧盟机构陷入瘫痪。


As if to prove the point, EU member states’ leaders (with the exception of UK Prime Minister Theresa May) met recently in Bratislava, Slovakia, in an attempt to demonstrate solidarity, and to kick-start the post-Brexit reform process.	好像是为了证明这一点似的，欧盟成员国领导人（英国首相梅除外）最近齐聚斯洛伐克布拉迪斯拉发试图证明欧洲的团结，并启动英国退出后的改革进程。


The attendees made some progress toward creating a European Defense Union, which should be welcomed, and toward admitting that the EU’s current organizational framework is unsustainable; but there was scant talk of meaningful institutional or economic reform.	与会者在构建欧洲防御联盟方面取得了一些进展——这令人欣喜，并且朝着承认欧盟当前组织框架不可持续迈进了一步； 但对有意义的机构和经济改革几乎只字未提。


Meanwhile, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s refusal, at the close of the summit, to appear onstage with French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel all but confirmed fears that rudderless leadership is fueling institutional dysfunction.	与此同时，意大利总理伦齐在峰会闭幕时拒绝与法国总统奥朗德和德国首相默克尔同台，这确认了人们对领导层失去方向正在加剧机构功能失调的担忧。


A summit that was supposed to be a display of unity revealed only further division.	本应为团结正名的峰会反而揭露了更深层的分歧。


EU leaders must take responsibility for this latest failure.	欧盟领导人必须为最近的失败负责。


For starters, they must stop issuing empty declarations.	首先，他们必须停止许诺空头支票。


The EU’s institutional impotence is apparent, especially to its enemies.	欧盟机构能力欠缺是显而易见的，特别是在面临其敌人时。


So now it faces a stark choice: a leap forward toward unification or inevitable disintegration.	因此现在欧盟面临严峻选择：向统一跃进，或陷入不可避免的解体。


Few Europeans want to make that choice.	新欧洲人想做出选择。


Many politicians are afraid of paying a high domestic political price for pursuing an agenda of EU reform.	许多政客担心推动欧盟改革议程会导致他们付出高昂的国内政治代价。


They argue that pushing for further integration in the current political climate is reckless, and that the EU should focus on doing less, better.	他们指出，在当前政治环境下追求进一步一体化是鲁莽的，欧盟应该专注于少做、做好。


But that is a false trade-off.	但这是错误的权衡。


The EU could build a more integrated economic-governance model to increase investment and create jobs, while at the same time streamlining its operations to address common complaints about red tape and dysfunction.	欧盟可以构建一个更加一体化的经济治理模式以增加投资、创造就业，与此同时理顺它的操作流程以解决对繁文缛节和机能失调的抱怨。


Few European leaders seem to understand that the real risk to the EU – and to their own political futures – is the status quo.	极少有欧洲领导人理解欧盟——及其自身的政治未来——的真正风险是现状。


And with populist movements across Europe pummeling traditional parties in the polls, the window for delivering real change is quickly closing.	放眼欧洲，民粹主义运动正在投票箱中横扫传统政党，带来真正变化的窗口正在快速关闭。


It does not have to be this way.	这并不是宿命。


Too many leaders are paying lip service to domestic nationalists and populists, mistakenly thinking that this will preserve their domestic poll ratings, when they should be showing genuine leadership and fighting for the common good.	太多领导人对国内民族主义者和民粹主义者只是动动嘴皮子，错误地认为这样就能捍卫他们的国内支持率，而他们实际上应该表现出真正的领导力以及为人民利益而斗争。


Upcoming national elections in France and Germany will be bellwethers for the future of European leadership.	即将到来的法国和德国大选将是欧洲领导层未来的风向标。


In recent German state elections, Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and its government partner, the Social Democratic Party, experienced notable losses, which could mean that Germany’s grand coalition is at risk ahead of next year’s election.	在最新的德国地方选举中，默克尔的基督教民主联盟及其执政伙伴社会民主党遭遇惨败，这可能意味着德国执政联盟明年大选告急。


Meanwhile, support for the far-rightAlternative for Germany (AfD) continues to grow.	与此同时，对极右翼的德国另类党（AfD）的支持率持续攀升。


Merkel has two choices: She can move to the right, as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has done in his latest bid for the French presidency, or she can fight to hold the center by addressing the AfD’s simplistic arguments head on.	默克尔有两个选择：她可以右倾，如法国前总统萨科齐为法国总统大选所做的最后一搏那样； 她也可以硬碰AfD的简单化立场，坚持中间道路。


The choice is clear: Merkel should stand and fight, while also advancing an alternative vision for modernizing the EU.	选择是显而易见的：默克尔应该坚持战斗，同时拿出欧盟现代化的替代愿景。


Defeating populism will require leaders to acknowledge the people left behind as a result of globalization, but also to dispel the myth that there is a quick fix, or that globalization can simply be reversed.	打败民粹主义需要领导人承认因全球化而落后的人群，同时也需要打破存在速效药或全球化可以迅速逆转的神话。


Contrary to populist arguments, protectionism will not reduce youth unemployment or income inequality.	与民粹主义观点相反，保护主义无法降低年轻人失业率或收入不平等。


If EU countries reject trade deals currently under discussion, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the EU’s share of world trade will decrease, and the European economy will suffer for it.	如果欧盟国家拒绝目前正在讨论中的贸易协定，包括跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系以及全面经济和贸易协定，那么欧盟占世界贸易的比重将继续下降，欧洲经济也将因此蒙受损失。


Likewise, if the eurozone fails to integrate further by strengthening its economic-governance structures, Europe’s ongoing financial crisis will only continue, impeding social mobility and undermining social justice.	类似地，如果欧元区无法通过强化其经济治理结构实现进一步融合，那么欧洲的金融危机还将继续，破坏社会流动性和社会正义。


It is time for EU leaders to make these arguments more effectively.	欧盟领导人应该更高效地提出这些观点。


Across the West, the 2008 financial crisis triggered a political fight that is still in progress.	放眼西方，2008年金融危机所引发的政治斗争仍然没有结束。


It has changed from a battle for accountability and reform to a clash between visions of open and closed societies, between a global consensus and policies still operating at the national, local, or even tribal level.	它已经从问责和改革战争演变为开放和封闭社会愿景之间的冲突、全球共识与仍在国家、地方甚至部落层次运行的政策之间的冲突。


If the EU is going to quell the revolt against globalization, free trade, and open societies, it will need more leaders and fewer managers.	如果欧盟平复对全球化、自由贸易和开放社会的反动，就需要更多的领导人、更少的管理者。


European leaders, frankly, should know better than to blame EU institutions, hypothetical trade deals, and refugees for their own failures to tackle unemployment and reduce inequality.	坦率地说，欧洲领导人应该不至于愚蠢到通过指责欧盟机构、假定的贸易协定和难民为他们自身在解决失业和降低不平等性方面的失败开脱。


The EU’s current crisis-management playbook is running out of pages.	欧盟的当前危机管理策略已经穷途末路。


We in Europe can either put our heads in the sand while the European project slowly dies, or we can use this crisis to start a new project of renewal and reform.	我们欧洲人可以当鸵鸟，放任欧洲工程缓缓死去，也可以利用这次机会开启新的复兴和改革工程。


Here, too, the right choice is clear: EU leaders should offer Europeans a new social contract, based on the understanding that people’s legitimate fears about globalization should be met with a collective, progressive European response.	在这里，正确的选择同样显而易见：欧洲领导人应该为欧洲人民提供新的社会契约，它基于这样的认识：人民对全球化的合理担忧应该用进步的欧洲集体应对措施来解决。


The EU has been a major force behind globalization, and only the EU has the power to help manage the consequences.	欧洲曾经是全球化的主要推动力，也只有欧盟有力量改变结果。


European leaders must explain to their voters why nationalism cannot.	欧洲领导人必须向选民解释民族主义为什么行不通。


Democracy or Bust in Europe	欧洲究竟是民主还是崩溃？


BERLIN – “Europe will be democratized or it will disintegrate!”	柏林——“欧洲将实现民主或土崩瓦解！


That maxim is more than a catchphrase from the manifesto of the Democracy in Europe Movement – DiEM25, the group I just helped to launch in Berlin.	”这句格言不仅是我刚在柏林创立的欧洲民主运动——DiEM25宣言中多次出现的流行语。


It is a simple, if under-acknowledged fact.	这是一个很多人还没有意识到的简单事实。


Europe’s current disintegration is all too real.	欧洲目前的解体太过真实。


New divisions are appearing seemingly everywhere one looks: along borders, within our societies and economies, and in the minds of Europe’s citizens.	放眼望去新的隔阂似乎无所不在：沿着边境线的两侧、存在于经济社会内部和隐藏在欧洲民众的心里。


Europe’s loss of integrity became painfully evident in the latest turn in the refugee crisis.	难民危机的最新转折显示出欧洲统一性的丧失。


European leaders called upon Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to open his country’s borders to refugees from the war-torn Syrian city of Aleppo; in the same breath, they chastised Greece for letting the same refugees into “European” territory, and even threatened to erect fences along Greece’s borders with the rest of Europe.	欧洲领导人呼吁土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安面向饱受战争蹂躏的叙利亚城市阿勒颇难民开放其边界； 同时，他们却严厉批评希腊让同样的难民涌入“欧洲”领土，甚至威胁要在希腊和欧洲其他国家的边境上设立围栏。


Similar disintegration can be seen in the realm of finance.	金融领域同样可以看出类似的解体。


If an American citizen won some lottery jackpot, she would not care whether her prize dollars were deposited in a bank domiciled in Nevada or New York.	如果是美国公民赢得了彩票头奖，她不会在意自己的奖金是存入内华达州还是纽约州的银行。


This is not so in the eurozone.	但在欧元区却并非如此。


The same sum of euros has very different “expected” value in a Portuguese, Italian, Greek, Dutch, or German bank account, because banks in the weaker member states are reliant on bailouts from fiscally stressed governments.	同样数额的欧元在葡萄牙、意大利、希腊、荷兰或德国的银行账户里有着截然不同的“预期”价值，因为较弱的成员国银行需要依赖本已财政困难的政府提供救助。


That is a sure sign of the single currency’s disintegration.	这一迹象明确显示出单一货币的解体。


Meanwhile, political rifts are dividing and multiplying in the European Union’s heartland.	此外，欧盟中心地带的政治裂痕正在产生并迅速繁殖。


The United Kingdom is torn on whether to exit or not – a reflection of its political establishment’s own chronic unwillingness both to defend the EU and to confront its authoritarianism.	英国纠结于是否退出欧盟——这反映其政治体制本身一直不愿捍卫欧盟和直面其独裁主义。


The result is an electorate prone to blaming the EU for everything that goes wrong, but with no interest either in campaigning for more European democracy or in leaving the EU’s single market.	结果是只要出错选民就指责欧盟，但却对加强欧洲民主或离开欧盟单一市场不感兴趣。


More ominously, the Franco-German axis powering European integration has fractured.	更为严重的是，为欧洲一体化提供动力的法德联盟已经破裂。


Emmanuel Macron, France’s Economy Minister, could not have put it more chillingly when he said that the two countries are edging toward a modern version of the Catholic-versus-Protestant Thirty Years’ War.	没有什么比法国经济部长马克隆所谓两国正在走向现代版天主教新教三十年战争的说法更令人寒心了。


Meanwhile, southern countries languish in a state of permanent recession that they blame on Europe’s north.	此外南部国家因为陷入永久衰退状态而指责欧洲北部。


And, as if this were not enough, another menacing fault line has appeared along the former Iron Curtain, with governments of formerly communist countries openly defying the spirit of solidarity that used to characterize (at least in theory) the European project.	而且，似乎这还不够，沿着之前的铁幕再次出现了另一条断裂线，前共产主义国家政府公开反对曾象征（至少在理论上）欧洲计划的团结精神。


Why is Europe disintegrating?	欧洲为什么正在解体？


And what can be done about it?	我们应该采取什么措施？


The answer lies in the EU’s origins.	应当从欧洲的起源中寻找答案。


The EU began life as a cartel of heavy industries determined to manipulate prices and redistribute monopoly profits through a bureaucracy located in Brussels.	欧盟的生命起始于决意通过设在布鲁塞尔的官僚机构操纵价格并实现利润再分配的重工业卡特尔。


To fix prices across European borders, there was a need to fix exchange rates as well.	要想确定欧洲各国的价格，就有必要先确定汇率。


During the Bretton Woods era, the Unites States provided this “service.”	而在布雷顿森林体系时代，由美国负责提供这种“服务”。


But as soon as the US ditched Bretton Woods in the summer of 1971, the Brussels-based cartel’s administrators began to design a European fixed exchange-rate system.	但随着美国于1971年夏天放弃布雷顿森林体系，位于布鲁塞尔的卡特尔管理员们开始设计一套欧洲的固定汇率体系。


After a series of (often spectacular) failures, the euro was born to superglue exchange rates together.	在一系列（往往令人叹为观止的）失败后，作为强力汇率粘合剂的欧元终于问世。


As with all cartel managers, the EU technocrats treated genuine pan-European democracy as a threat.	但像所有卡特尔管理者一样，欧盟技术官僚将真正的泛欧洲民主视为一种威胁。


Patiently, methodically, a process of de-politicizing decision-making was put in place.	他们有条不紊地耐心推进非政治化的决策体系。


National politicians were rewarded handsomely for their acquiescence, while anyone opposed to the cartel’s technocratic approach was labeled “un-European” and treated as an outsider.	国家政客因为保持沉默而收到丰厚的回报，而反对卡特尔技术官僚做法的任何人都被贴上“反欧洲”标签，并且遭受到局外人的待遇。


Thus, although European countries remained democratic, the EU institutions, where sovereignty over crucial decisions was transferred, have remained democracy-free.	因此，尽管欧洲国家仍实行民主制度，但拿到关键决策主权的欧盟机构却一直保持其不民主的本质。


As Margaret Thatcher explained during her last Parliamentary appearance as British Prime Minister, who controls money and interest rates controls the politics of Europe.	正如玛格丽特·撒切尔在其英国首相任内最后一次议会会议上所指出的那样，谁控制了货币和利率政策，谁就能控制欧洲政治。


Handing Europe’s money and politics to a cartel administration did not only spell the end of European democracy; it has also fueled a vicious cycle of authoritarianism and poor economic results.	将欧洲货币和政治交给一家卡特尔政府不仅标志着欧洲民主的结束； 还催生了独裁主义和糟糕经济表现的恶性循环。


The more Europe’s establishment chokes off democracy, the less legitimate its political authority becomes.	欧洲机构越压制民主，其政治当局就越缺乏合法性。


That leads European leaders to double down on authoritarianism in order to stick to their failed policies when recessionary economic forces strengthen.	这导致欧洲领导人加倍奉行独裁主义，以便顶着越来越强的经济衰退压力继续执行其失败政策。


This is why Europe is the world’s only economy that has failed to recover since 2008.	这也解释了为什么欧洲2008年后会成为世界唯一一个没有复苏的经济体。


It is through this vicious cycle that Europe’s crisis is turning its peoples inward and against one another other, amplifying latent jingoism and xenophobia.	欧洲危机正是通过这样的恶性循环使得民众日趋内向并相互敌视，放大了潜在的侵略主义和排外主义。


Indeed, it is what has rendered Europe incapable of absorbing external shocks – like last summer’s refugee influx.	事实上，正是这种循环导致欧洲无法化解像去年夏天难民流入那样的外部冲击。


What we should do now is what democrats should have done in 1930 to prevent a catastrophe that is now becoming imaginable once again.	我们现在必须完成民主人士本该在1930年完成的任务，才有可能防止再次遭受灾难袭击。


We should establish a pan-European coalition of radical, social, green, and liberal democrats to put the “demos” back into democracy, countering an EU establishment that sees people power as a threat to its authority.	我们应当反对将人民力量视为对其权威威胁的欧盟机构，建立由激进、社会、绿色和自由派民主人士共同组成的泛欧洲联盟，让“民众”再次回到民主制度中去。


This is what DiEM25 is about and why it is necessary.	这就是DiEM25的宗旨，而且也解释了为什么必须成立这一组织。


Are we utopian?	我们是乌托邦？


Maybe.	也许。


But it is more realistic than the EU establishment’s attempt to hang on to our disintegrating, anti-democratic, cartel-like union.	但这比欧盟机构抓住业已四分五裂、反民主、类卡特尔式的联盟更为现实。


If our project is utopian, it is also the only alternative to a dystopia in the making.	如果我们的计划是乌托邦，它也是防止陷入“反乌托邦”状态的唯一机会。


The real danger is not that we shall aim too high and miss.	真正的危险并非我们好高骛远、无法达成目的。


The real danger is that Europeans train their eyes on the abyss and end up there.	真正的危险是欧洲人眼睛盯住深渊，并最终掉下去。


Can the EU Survive Populism?	欧盟能从民粹主义的虎口中逃生吗?


BRUSSELS – Another year, another threat to the European Union’s survival.	发自布鲁塞尔——新的一年，对欧盟的生存来说又是个新威胁。


The good news is that the greatest disruption of 2016, Britain’s vote to exit the EU, appears manageable.	好消息是，2016年最大的事件——英国公投脱欧——似乎还是可控的。


The bad news is that both France and Italy face the prospect of a populist political takeover this year. Either outcome could well spell the end of the EU.	坏消息是，法国和意大利今年都面临着民粹主义政治夺权的前景，而任何一场夺权都可能会导致欧盟的终结。


The EU has lately become a prime target for populists.	欧盟近来成为了民粹主义者的主要目标。


The phenomenon first took hold in Greece, when the left-wing Syriza party came to power in January 2015.	这种现象首先在希腊冒头，以激进左翼联盟党（Syriza）在2015年1月上台为标志。


But Syriza was not trying to pull Greece out of the EU; rather, it wanted a better deal with the country’s creditors, who had imposed devastating austerity measures on Greek citizens.	但该党并不想让希腊脱离欧盟； 相反，它希望与希腊的债权人——这些国家和机构迫使希腊公民承受了严厉的紧缩措施——达成更好的交易。


Syriza’s approach largely reflected the will of the people.	激进左翼联盟党的做法在很大程度上反映了人民的意志。


In a June 2015 referendum, voters overwhelmingly rejected a deal proposed by Greece’s creditors that would have meant even more austerity.	在2015年6月的公投中，选民近乎一面倒地否绝了希腊债权人提出的一项将进一步加剧紧缩的交易。


Yet the government’s acceptance of a largely unchanged deal just a few days later received broad support.	然而政府在仅仅几天后接受的一项变化不大的交易却获得了广泛的支持。


Greek voters understood that better terms were not worth losing eurozone membership.	在希腊选民看来，就算条件再好，也不值得为此放弃欧元区成员国资格。


To be sure, not everyone considered EU membership to be worth the sacrifice.	可以肯定的是，并不是每个人都认为值得为欧盟成员国资格作出如此牺牲。


But there was an air of practicality in popular criticism of the EU, which largely focused on what the EU did, especially in the economic sphere.	但在民众对欧盟的批评中有一种实用主义倾向，主要集中在欧盟做了什么，尤其是在经济领域。


That is why such criticism has been loudest in the countries that were hit the hardest by the euro crisis, or that faced austerity, or, more recently, that felt left behind by trade agreements.	这就是为何这些批评在那些受欧元危机影响最严重，或面临紧缩政策，或感觉被贸易协议抛弃的国家中声浪最大的原因。


That is no longer the case.	但如今情况发生了改变。


Right-wing populism has gained traction in strong economies (Austria) and in countries where the benefits of EU membership are palpable (Hungary and Poland).	右翼民粹主义在某些强大经济体（如奥地利）和通过欧盟成员国资格获益甚多的国家（如匈牙利和波兰）都获得了动力。 比如法国从来没有遭遇过任何欧盟强加的紧缩政策；


In France, there was never any EU-imposed austerity; even European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker admitted that the EU’s budget rules cannot actually be imposed on France, “because it is France.”	甚至欧盟委员会主席让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）都承认，法国实际上不受欧盟的预算规则控制——“因为法国就是老大啊。 ”


Now, populists are focused not on what the EU does, but what it represents.	但如今民粹主义者关注的不是欧盟的所作所为，而是它所代表的东西。


Instead of asking whether the EU is making people richer or poorer, populists are focused on a more fundamental and powerful question: “Who are we?”	民粹主义者不去质问欧盟究竟是让人们变得更富有还是更贫穷，却关注一个更根本和强有力的问题：“我们是谁？


At a time of large-scale immigration, this shift is not surprising.	这一转变在这个大规模移民迁徙的时代并不奇怪。


Societies that have long defined themselves according to shared background and culture now must struggle with the implications of multiculturalism.	那些一直以来都根据共同的背景和文化来长定义自身的社会现在必须与多元文化主义的影响做斗争。


That is why most observers of populist parties, especially of right-wing parties, have focused on attitudes toward foreigners and minorities.	这就是为何大多数关注民粹主义政党的（特别是右翼政党）的观察者都关注其对外国人和少数派群体的态度。


With the shift toward identity politics – a terrain that is not particularly amenable to compromise – has come a shift in attitudes toward democratic institutions.	随着这种向身份政治——这是一个不是特别容易实现妥协的领域——的转变，人们对民主体制的态度也发生了转变。


Populist leaders operate on the assumption that the will of the “people” – as defined by the populist – should not be institutionally constrained. This controverts the fundamental premise of liberal democracy: that the power of the majority must be limited, not least to protect minorities, electoral and otherwise.	民粹主义者领导人假设“民众”（如民粹主义者所定义）的意志不应受到体制的限制并以此为行动准则，这就与自由民主制度的基本前提起了冲突：后者认为多数人的权力必须受到限制，特别是保护少数派群体，选举权和其他权利。


Limits on the power of the majority of the moment are typically achieved through what Americans call “checks and balances,” which include, for example, an independent judiciary and super-majority requirements to alter fundamental elements of the political system.	大多数时候对权力的限制通常是通过美国人所称的“制衡”来实现的，例如包括独立的司法机构以及需要实现超级多数才能改变的政治制度基本要素。


And such limits usually work, at least for the most part.	这种限制至少在大部分情况下是行得通的。


In the United Kingdom, for example, three High Court judges ruled that only Parliament – not the government – can trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the formal process for leaving the EU.	例如在英国，三名高等法院法官裁决只有议会——而非政府——才能触发《里斯本条约》第50条的程序正式脱离欧盟。


But populist politicians chafe under such constraints.	但是民粹主义政治家则在这种限制下躁动不已。


Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has not only openly stated his preference for an “illiberal” democracy; he has worked to dismantle checks on his government’s power.	匈牙利总理维克多·奥尔班（Viktor Orbán）不仅公开宣称自己倾向于实现“非自由”民主制度； 还努力破除对他政府权力的制衡。


The same goes for Poland’s populist government, whose de facto leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, doesn’t even hold a formal position in the administration.	波兰的民粹主义政府也是如此，其实际领导人雅罗斯瓦夫·卡辛斯基（Jarosław Kaczyński）甚至没有在政府中担任任何正式职位。


Given their contempt for independent institutions, it is not hard to see why populists oppose the EU, which is, in a sense, the quintessential liberal democracy: governed by impersonal rules, rather than by the majority of the moment, with most decisions requiring either a super-majority or unanimity.	鉴于上述人士对独立机构的藐视，也就不难看出为何民粹主义者会反对欧盟，因为欧盟在某种意义上就是一种典型的自由民主体制：由非人格的规则来管辖，而不是依赖某一个时刻的大多数，而大多数决策都要求实现超级多数或完全一致同意。


For populists, the EU represents significant added constraints that are even harder to push past than domestic checks.	对于民粹主义者来说，欧盟代表了极大的附加约束，甚至比国内制衡更难超越。


That makes it a problem.	这也使欧盟成为了他们的眼中钉。


In another sense, however, the EU suffers from insufficient democracy: as populist leaders routinely point out, its leaders in Brussels are unelected. (Populists use similar arguments to deny the legitimacy of, say, national courts.)	然而在另一个意义上，欧盟也存在着民主不足的问题：正如民粹主义者领导人经常指出的那样，欧盟在布鲁塞尔总部的领导人并非通过选举产生（他们也使用类似的论据来否定国家法院这类机构的合法性）。


The reality, of course, is that democratically elected governments and parliaments install EU leaders and bureaucrats (and independent judges) precisely to place limits on the majority of the moment and future governments.	当然，现实是民主选举的政府和议会之所以设置欧盟领导人和官僚（以及独立法官），正是为了限制某一时刻的大多数以及未来的政府。


But populists reframe their followers’ understanding of this system, by declaring that such officials are part of the “elite,” selected by their fellow elites to frustrate the will of the people.	但民粹主义者则宣称这些官员不过是“精英”小圈子推举出来镇压人民意志的人且本身就是精英集团的一分子，以图重塑他们的追随者们对这一制度的理解。


There is little that mainstream politicians, much less EU officials, can do to counter this narrative.	主流政治家对这种叙述无从下手，而欧盟官员更是束手无策。


Some national politicians succumb to popular pressure, adopting the rhetoric – and even the program – of their populist adversaries.	一些国家政治家屈服于民众的压力，采纳了其民粹主义对手的说辞——甚至是议案。


But the EU can do no such thing, without effectively hastening its own demise.	但欧盟不能做出这样的事情，因为这将切切实实地加速自身的灭亡。


When the problem was what the EU did, there was a possible solution: the EU could change tack on economic issues.	而当问题在于欧盟做过了什么的时候，就可能会有一个解决方案：欧盟可以在经济问题上改变方针。


And, indeed, the Commission has de facto abandoned austerity.	欧盟委员会实际上已经放弃了紧缩方案。


Likewise, the EU’s new trade deal with Canada, signed in October, was concluded only after working out elaborate compromises.	同样，欧盟与加拿大的新贸易协议也是在达成了详尽复杂的妥协后才于去年十月签署的。


But the EU cannot change what it represents.	但欧盟不能改变其代表性。


It cannot accept, much less advance, the notion that checks and balances are obstacles to progress, or that foreigners threaten the European way of life.	它不能接受，更不可能推动所谓“制衡是进步的障碍”或“外国人威胁了欧洲的生活方式”这样的观点。


It cannot offer the kinds of radical, impossible, or illiberal solutions that populists use to win support.	它不能提出民粹主义者借以赢取支持的那种激进，不可行或不自由的解决方案。


The EU must remain a bulwark of liberal democracy, with all of its unsexy yet necessary rules and procedures.	欧盟必须继续成为自由民主制度的堡垒，维持所有的枯燥但必要的规则和程序。


In the current environment, this lumbering embodiment of a multi-level democracy and open economy cannot compete with populists’ lofty promises.	在目前的环境下，实施多层次民主和开放经济的笨拙实体确实无法与民粹主义者的高调承诺竞争。


When populists fail to deliver, however, it is back to the EU that the public will run.	然而当民粹主义者不能兑现其承诺时，民众将回归欧盟。


One only hopes that there will still be an EU waiting for them.	唯望那时还有欧盟存在就是了。


A Europe of Citizens	公民组成的欧洲


MADRID – Last month was another cruel one for Europe, culminating in the horrific terrorist attacks in Brussels on March 22.	马德里——上个月对欧洲来讲又是残酷之月，在3月22日对布鲁塞尔的恐怖袭击事件中达到高潮。


The aftermath has seen a new round of soul searching, with Europeans mulling over the European Union’s institutional failures and sheer incompetence, not to mention the existential challenge it currently faces.	结果引发了欧洲人新一轮自我反省，他们认真思索欧盟的制度缺陷和能力不足，更不用说它目前正在面临的生存挑战。


Such considerations seem to arise frequently these days, as Europe encounters a seemingly endless series of emergencies, from the Greek crisis to the influx of refugees.	随着欧洲遭遇从希腊危机到难民涌入等看似无穷无尽的一系列突发事件，今天这样的思考似乎成了家常便饭。


Yet complacency remains the order of the day, with EU leaders adopting to a crisis-response mentality that privileges reaction over action and perpetuates the cycle of destabilization.	但自满仍然是现在的常态，欧盟领导人应对危机的心态是被动多于主动，因此无法打破动荡循环。


The fact that crises have become the EU’s new normal has reinforced the notion, already ubiquitous among Europhiles and Eurocrats, that we will simply continue to muddle through.	危机已成为欧盟新常态的现实强化了这一其实已经在亲欧人士和欧盟官员当中无所不在的观念。 这种观念认为我们只能继续蒙混过关。


This approach is both misguided and dangerous.	这样的方法既错误又非常危险。


As it stands, European unity is disintegrating rapidly.	现实情况是欧洲一体化正在迅速瓦解。


The just-concluded referendum in the Netherlands, in which Dutch voters overwhelmingly rejected an association agreement between the EU and Ukraine, is merely the latest example.	在荷兰刚刚结束的全民公决中，荷兰选民以压倒多数否决了乌克兰加入欧盟的协议仅仅是最新的例证。


If the EU is to survive this slow-motion train wreck, let alone thrive in the long run, bold action – not just valiant rhetoric – is urgently needed.	如果欧盟想要从这次慢动作版的火车失事中逃生，更不用说在未来实现繁荣兴旺，那么迫切需要的不仅是豪言壮语，还有大胆的行动。


It is time to decide whether the EU is a truly transnational undertaking or merely a vessel for inter-governmental arrangements.	现在必须决定欧盟是真正的跨国机构还仅仅是政府间安排的承载者。


If it is the latter, we should call a spade a spade.	如果只是后者，我们必须实话实说。


But, in that case, we should understand that we – both the EU and individual countries – are effectively resigning ourselves to increasing irrelevance.	但如果出现那种情况，我们必须明白我们——包括欧盟及各成员国在内——实际接受了自己越来越无关紧要的现实。


Paying little more than lip service to a common approach in critical areas leaves problems unaddressed and opportunities unexplored.	面对关键领域的共同问题口惠而实不至导致问题无法得到解决，机遇也无法真正实现。


Simply put, with an “every man for himself” approach, everyone will sink.	简言之，在“人人为己”的原则指导下，我们将会一起完蛋。


A transnational undertaking is the superior option.	建立跨国机构是更好的方案。


But it is also the more difficult one, because it demands deep and fundamental changes in how the question of European integration is approached.	但这样做难度更大，因为需要深入根本地改革实现欧洲一体化的方式。


The original sin of the European project is that, Brussels notwithstanding, there is no European constituency.	欧盟计划的原罪是尽管存在布鲁塞尔，但却没有欧洲选民。


Events, policies, and challenges are all viewed through a national lens.	事件、政策和问题全都通过国家的视角观看。


The refugee crisis has brought this into sharp relief; but every stress on the European system brings to the fore nationalist perspectives.	难民危机让这个问题变得非常明显； 但欧洲体系所承受的一切压力最终都导致民族主义观点。


And why shouldn’t this be the case?	这种情况为什么不应该出现？


After all, political accountability – not to mention tax money – flows from citizens to the national capitals.	毕竟，政治责任——更不用说税金——在公民和国家首都间流动。


But the split between the EU and national governments is a false one.	但割裂欧盟和国家政府是错误的做法。


Subsidiarity, properly applied and understood as decision-making power at the appropriate level of government, is and must remain a guiding principle of European action.	正确执行并理解称之为各级政府决策权的辅助性原则一直且今后必须仍然指导欧洲的行动。


There are, however, times when collective action is needed.	但有时需要集体采取行动。


For such action to be effective, the EU level cannot be a place for scapegoating and bloviating.	这样的行动要想实现高效，欧盟层面就不能仅仅用来充当替罪羊或夸夸其谈。


National political figures cannot continue to claim that Brussels or the European Commission is the source of all their problems, and pursue self-centered and shortsighted measures that ultimately exacerbate crises.	国家政要不能继续宣称布鲁塞尔或欧盟委员会是所有问题的根源，同时实行以自我为中心的短视政策并最终导致危机进一步加剧。


Nor can EU officials continue to shrug their shoulders and blame national politicians for failing to implement proposed EU-wide measures.	欧盟官员也不能继续耸耸肩膀并指责国内政要未能实施拟议中的欧盟举措。


Instead, the EU needs real authority to execute policy.	相反，欧盟需要真正的权威来执行政策。


One Brussels insider recently noted to me that the EU, propelled by its crises, is already entering a new phase of empowerment, where it, not its member states, has real implementing authority.	一位布鲁塞尔知情人士最近对我指出欧盟在危机的推动下已经进入了新的授权阶段，也就是说由欧盟而非其成员国掌握真正的执行权。


And, indeed, there are assorted examples of the EU assuming something of an executive position; notably, the EU is expected to play a leading role in implementing its recent deal with Turkey to resolve the refugee crisis.	事实上，有各种各样的实例显示某种程度的执行权由欧盟掌握； 值得注意的是，人们希望欧盟在执行最近与土耳其签署的难民危机协议中能够发挥领导作用。


But a genuine and legitimate shift to an effective EU executive requires a stronger connection between the people and those acting on their behalf.	但欧盟执行权真实合法的转移需要加强民众及其代表之间的联系。


In other words, we must create a transnational constituency.	换句话说，我们必须建设一个跨国选区。


This is not a new idea.	这早已不是新的想法。


There has long been support for the idea of European citizenry, and the EU treaties include provisions that could serve as stepping stones to this end.	长期以来一直存在对欧洲公民构想的支持，欧盟条约也已经包含可以为此奠定基础的条款。


But limited progress on this front reflects popular sentiment.	但这方面的有限进展反映了民众的情绪。


In the five years since Eurobarometer began asking survey participants whether they feel like citizens of the EU, the number responding positively has increased by only 2% (from 62% in 2010 to 64% in 2015).	在调查机构“欧洲晴雨表”开始对欧盟公民民意测验的5年内，积极响应者的比例只增长了2%（从2010年的62%增长到2015年的64%）。


Deepening the political links among Europeans requires institutional reform based on collective action, awareness, and ownership.	加深欧洲民众的政治联系需要基于集体行动、意识及所有权的制度改革。


The seeds of such an endeavor – from replacing the elegant but bloodless Spitzenkandidaten system with direct EU-wide elections for European Commission President to considering a limited but direct EU tax to establish a clear line of accountability – are already available.	上述努力的种子——从以直选欧盟委员会主席取代优雅但却毫无血性的种子候选人制度到思考某种有限但直接的欧盟税以划定明确的责任限度——已经存在。


Such efforts would certainly face serious political headwinds; the current system is, after all, quite comfortable for many.	这项工作肯定会遭遇严重的政治阻力； 毕竟，目前的体系对很多人而言非常方便。


But the process of unraveling is already underway.	但解构的过程已经开始。


Only a conscious European citizenry can weaken the centrifugal forces that emerge in every crisis, because only such a citizenry can ensure accountability at the EU level, compel officials to formulate and execute effective policy, and thereby break the cycle of blame that has become entrenched in European decision-making.	只有拥有自觉意识的欧洲公民能够削弱每次危机中出现的离心力，因为只有这样的公民能够确保在欧盟层面建立问责制度，迫使官员制定并执行有效的政策，从而打破欧盟决策层面根深蒂固的相互指责的恶性循环。


Creating this awareness would be a long-term process, but it is essential.	建立这种意识将是一种长期的过程，但所起的作用却非常关键。


At a time of such difficult challenges, strengthening transnationalism might seem extreme and unachievable.	在如此困难的情况下，加强跨国主义可能看似极端和难以实现。


But unless we recognize the real reasons that we continue to be battered by crises, we will be doomed to continue muddling through until there is no EU left.	但除非我们认识到连续遭遇危机重创的真正原因，我们将注定继续得过且过，直到欧盟不复存在。


Betting on Ukraine	押注乌克兰


KYIV – A year ago, young Ukrainians were risking their lives on Kyiv’s Independence Square to defend an agreement that would bring their country closer to the European Union.	基辅—一年前，乌克兰青年冒着生命危险走上基辅独立广场，捍卫让他们的祖国与欧盟走得更近的协议。


That uprising ended a corrupt regime and brought to power – after a free and fair election – what appears to be Ukraine’s most reform-minded government ever.	这场起义结束了一个腐败的政权，把权力——在自由公正的选举之后——交给了乌克兰有史以来最有改革思维的政府。


One might have expected the heroic commitment of Ukrainians to Europe’s democratic ideals to trigger a rush of Western support for the country in its battle against Russian aggression and economic instability.	你也许认为乌克兰人对欧洲式民主理想的英勇决心会给他们带来大量西方支持，帮助他们抵抗俄罗斯的入侵和经济动荡。


But that has not been the case.	但并非如此。


Indeed, though the last EU leadership summit of 2014 brought the courageous decision to “stay the course” on Russian sanctions, it produced little movement on aid to Ukraine.	事实上，尽管上一次2014年欧盟领导人峰会做出了“坚持”对俄罗斯实施制裁的勇敢决定，但并没有采取行动援助乌克兰。


Donald Tusk, the former Polish prime minister who was chairing his first summit as President of the European Council, supports additional financing for Ukraine.	当时，第一次以欧盟理事会主席身份主持峰会的前波兰总理塔斯克（Donald Tusk）支持增加对乌克兰的融资支持。


But, as the Financial Times reports, several EU countries’ willingness to come up with the money remains “lukewarm at best.”	但是，据《金融时报》（ Financial Times）报道，一些欧盟国家对于出资仍“相当冷淡”。


When confronted with a debt crisis in the eurozone, European leaders repeatedly kicked the can down the road.	在面临欧元区债务危机时，欧洲领导人一再采取权宜之计。


The result was an unnecessarily deep and protracted recession.	结果是造成了不必要的长期深度衰退。


Now, they are about to make the same mistake in Ukraine, with even more devastating potential consequences.	如今，他们在乌克兰又要重蹈覆辙，而潜在后果可能更加严重。


Ukraine is facing a steady drain on bank deposits, large fiscal and current-account deficits, and sizeable external debt payments in the next few years.	乌克兰的银行存款正在稳步告竭，财政和经常项目赤字巨大，未来几年还要偿还大量外债。


With its international reserves dwindling, the country cannot finance these gaps with its own dollar resources.	随着国际储备的减少，乌克兰无法用其自身的美元资源填补资金缺口。


The International Monetary Fund has estimated that Ukraine will need $15 billion in outside help in 2015, in addition to the $17 billion bailout that it received last year.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）估计2015年乌克兰将需要150亿美元外援，而在去年乌克兰已经获得了170亿美元援助金。


The funding gap extends into 2016 and beyond.	融资缺口将在2016年及其后继续存在。


Stabilizing Ukraine’s economy will, of course, require deep domestic reforms.	当然，稳定乌克兰经济需要深刻的国内改革。


The government will have to cut energy subsidies to reduce the yawning deficit of Naftogaz, the state-owned oil and gas company.	乌克兰政府必须削减能源补贴以减少国有石油天然气公司乌克兰石油公司（Naftogaz）的巨大赤字。


At the same time, the central bank must continue to clean up and close insolvent banks and ensure the recapitalization of viable financial institutions.	与此同时，乌克兰央行必须继续清理和关闭破产银行并确保可靠金融机构的资本重组。


And, with Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index ranking Ukraine 142nd out of 175 countries, drastic measures to improve and professionalize governance are imperative.	此外，在透明国际（Transparency International）的腐败感指数上，乌克兰位于175个国家的第142位，采取果断措施改善治理、实现治理专业化也是当务之急。


But these reforms can succeed only in an environment of financial stability.	但这些改革只有在金融稳定的条件下才能成功。


With the fiscal deficit being financed through money creation, inflation is high and the hryvnia, Ukraine’s currency, has depreciated (though nowhere near as much as the Russian ruble).	乌克兰财政赤字需要通过货币创造融资，通货膨胀高企、其货币格里夫纳大幅贬值（尽管跌幅比俄罗斯卢布小得多）。


An external aid package that is large enough to restore confidence and assuage financing doubts is a precondition for successful structural reform.	大到足以重振信心、打消融资疑虑的外部援助计划是成功的结构改革的先决条件。


The other prerequisite is political legitimacy.	另一个先决条件是政治合法性。


After all, reform demands tremendous sacrifices from citizens.	毕竟，改革需要公民做出巨大牺牲。


Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, citizens readily accepted such sacrifices, because generous financial assistance from the West and the prospect of EU membership lent credibility to the promise of democracy and future prosperity.	在中欧和东欧的其他地区，公民已经接受了这一牺牲，因为来自西方的慷慨金融援助和欧盟成员地位前景给了民主和未来繁荣的承诺以信誉。


Ukrainians must perceive that the pain of adjustment is being shared fairly, which means that the country’s oligarchs must become subject, at long last, to the rule of law.	乌克兰人必须觉得调整的痛苦被公平地分担，而这意味着至少该国的寡头最终需要接受法律的约束。


But, given that a free, stable, and prosperous Ukraine is very much in Europe’s strategic interest, the EU’s member governments should also share the burden of financing reform.	但是，由于自由、稳定、繁荣的乌克兰十分符合欧洲的战略利益，因此欧盟成员国政府也应该分担金融改革的负担。


The funding that Ukraine will need to stabilize its economy over the next four years looks paltry when compared to the more than $300 billion, from different sources, devoted to bailing out Greece – a country where there is far less at stake strategically.	乌克兰在未来四年中稳定经济所需要的资金与用于援助希腊（高达3,000亿美元以上，来自不同来源）的资金相比只是九牛一毛，而希腊的战略意义远远及不上乌克兰。


During previous financial crises, from Mexico in 1994 to southern Europe recently, the international community has proved that it can be very creative when it comes to finding mechanisms to channel emergency funds.	在此前的金融危机期间，不论是1994年的墨西哥还是最近的欧洲，国际社会都证明它在寻找紧急资金渠道机制方面具有巨大的创新力。


This suggests that the problem today is not insufficient money or institutional constraints, but a lack of political will.	这表明，今天的问题不在于资金不足或制度约束，而在于缺少政治意愿。


Skeptics in the EU and the German government acknowledge the urgency of Ukraine’s plight; but they fear that the money will go to waste in the absence of comprehensive reforms.	欧盟和德国政府中的怀疑派承认乌克兰困境的紧迫性，但他们担心，如果没有全面改革，援助资金会打水漂。


Cynics privately add that hyperinflation may not be such a bad thing after all, because it would force local politicians to reform.	犬儒主义者还夹带私货，指出恶性通胀也许并不那么糟糕，因为它将迫使地方政客实施改革。


But that ignores history: Ukraine suffered hyperinflation in the 1990s, only to elect governments headed by President Leonid Kuchma, whose misrule incited the Orange Revolution in 2004, and President Viktor Yanukovych, who was overthrown in February 2014.	但这是对历史的无视：20世纪90年代乌克兰层经历过恶性通胀，结果是以总统库奇马（Leonid Kuchma）和亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）为首的政府的当选。 库奇马的暴政导致了2004年的橙色革命，亚努科维奇则在2014年2月被推翻。


Clearly, such complacent views are both wrongheaded and terribly dangerous.	显然，这些自以为是的观点可谓执迷不悟，并且具有可怕的危险性。


The success of reform efforts can never be assured in advance.	改革措施的成功永远无法事先保证。


But one factor that can guarantee failure – and lead to political and economic dislocation – is financial instability.	但金融动荡倒是可以保证改革的失败——以及政治和经济混乱。


The current government in Ukraine has an unprecedented electoral mandate for change.	本届乌克兰政府拥有前所未有的变革的选举授权。


It has also drawn into public service some of the country’s best and brightest (including from the Ukrainian diaspora) to fight a war and stave off an economic meltdown simultaneously.	乌克兰政府也将该国的一些最好最聪明的人才（包括乌克兰犹太人）纳入了公职部门以实现打仗和避开经济崩溃两不误。


One hesitates to consider what might happen if they fail.	人们总是不愿考虑失败时会发生什么。


Plan B in Ukraine is surely not more reform, but less of it – and probably the kind of reckless economic populism that Latin America has witnessed in recent years, from Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela to Néstor and Cristina Kirchner’s neo-Peronist Argentina.	乌克兰的B计划显然不是更多改革，而是更少改革——甚至可能是近几年来拉丁美洲所出现的鲁莽的经济民粹主义，比如查韦斯的委内瑞拉和基什内尔夫妇（Néstor and Cristina Kirchner）的新庇隆主义阿根廷。


That possibility alone should be sufficient to spur the IMF, the United States, and, above all, the EU to act.	光是这一点也许就足以让IMF、美国以及（最重要的）欧盟采取行动。


In the grey and depressing days of the Soviet Union, an independent and democratic Ukraine seemed unimaginable.	在苏联日薄西山时，独立民主的乌克兰似乎是不可想象的。


Yet it happened.	但它发生了。


Today, economic and political reform seems similarly daunting; but it remains just as attainable.	如今，经济和政治改革也似乎毫无生气； 但改革仍然是可能发生的。


For Western governments, coming to the aid of Ukraine is a gamble, but one that is surely worth taking.	对西方政府来说，援助乌克兰是一场赌博，但显然是值得冒险的赌博。


Europe as a Task	欧洲任务


For me as Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Europe has a meaning that goes far beyond geography.	对于现任捷克共和国总理的我来说，欧洲的意义远远超过其地理范畴。


It is a synonym for a new beginning, new hope, the rule of the "better me" that exists in all of us.	它是新开端、新希望和在我们每个人身上都存在着的"更好的自我"的同义词。


It's an expression of prosperity, progress, and justice.	它表达了繁荣、进步和公正。


Perhaps these words sound exaggerated to cynical ears.	对于愤世嫉俗的人，这些话听起来或许有些夸张。


But they clearly express the changes that Europe has witnessed over the past half-century, changes for the good that all Czechs now want to secure for themselves, having been denied the fruits of European peace and prosperity for so long.	但它们清楚地表达了欧洲在过去的50多年里所见证的变化。 在长期不被允许分享欧洲和平与繁荣的成果之后，捷克人现在要为自己争取这种美好的变化。


Throughout its history, Europe saw countless bloody conflicts; peoples and states clashed, with the Czech lands often the bloody crossroads of these battles.	在历史上，欧洲发生过无数血腥的战争； 当民族之间和国家之间发生冲突的时候，捷克往往成为这些血腥战役的十字路口。


The disasters of two world wars, and the half-century of Cold War, pushed Europe to embrace cooperation and integration in order to avoid another suicidal battle.	两次世界大战和半个世纪的冷战所造成的灾难促使欧洲接受合作与一体化从而避免另一场自杀性战争的发生。


Those far-sighted Europeans who set Europe on its road to peace through unification deserve our heartfelt appreciation.	那些通过统一将欧洲引领到和平之路上来的具有远见卓识的欧洲人值得我们由衷的敬仰。


Simply put, the idea of European integration transformed our continent.	简单地说，欧洲一体化的理念改变了欧洲大陆。


The open economic space and the principle of solidarity helped ensure that economically less developed countries that joined the European Economic Community and, later, the European Union, progressed at an astonishing pace, enhancing the living standards of their peoples.	开放的经济空间和团结的原则确保了那些加入欧共体，而后再加入欧盟的经济较不发达的欧洲国家飞速发展，不断提高其人民的生活水平。


Nowadays, indeed, instead of deepening disparities in standards of living in Europe, which was the historic norm, differences are actually blurring as the quality of life everywhere in Europe rises.	确实，在现今的欧洲，随着各国人民生活质量的全面提高，生活水平的差距日渐缩小。 不断扩大的生活水平差距作为曾经一度的历史模式已不复存在。


Yet this prosperous and peaceful Europe is not idyllic; sometimes Europe is not at all an easy place for its citizens to live, as the tumultuous Balkan Wars and painful postcommunist transitions of the past decade demonstrated.	然而这个繁荣与和平的欧洲并不是田园牧歌； 正如过去十年里狂乱的巴尔干战争和痛苦的后共产主义转型所昭示的，欧洲有时也不是个能让人安居乐业的地方。


But even in hard times, every European knows deep down that European integration has delivered peace with clear prospects for broadening Europe's zone of peace and stability.	但就是在艰难时世下，每个欧洲人的内心都明了：欧洲一体化以其不断扩大欧洲和平与稳定的区域的清晰前景已经为我们带来了和平。


On the other hand, to secure that promise of peace and stability, Europeans must recognize that the Union is not and cannot be perceived as a work set in stone.	然而，要兑现和平与稳定的承诺，欧洲人必须意识到欧盟并不是也不能被当作是一纸空文。


The half-century of peace that integration has delivered involved constant changes.	由一体化带来的半个世纪的和平也在不断演进着。


Today, we must also continue forming and correcting the EU to maximize its ability to reflect the needs of its inhabitants in an ever-changing world.	今天，我们必须继续塑造和修正欧盟以使其能够最大限度的反映其居民在不断变化的世界形势下的需求。


These changes, however, must always be undertaken in the light of core European virtues.	但是这些变革必须和欧洲的核心价值观一致。


Foremost among these, perhaps, is the Union's open character.	在这个价值体系中最重要的大约就是欧盟开放性的特点。


The European Union is neither closed nor static; it is a living organism.	欧盟既不是封闭的也不是静态的； 它是一个充满生命力的有机体。


The European Union, as I grasp it, is primarily a process, leading from worse to better; a process with only one end - the continuous development of European prosperity and peace.	按照我的理解，欧盟首先是一个不断向上的进程； 这个进程的唯一目标就是-持续发展欧洲的繁荣与和平。


Indeed, it is vital to understand that Europe's integration process is not mechanical but organic.	确实，明白欧洲一体化进程不是机械的而是有机的这一点至关重要。


It is not a machine that goes on of its own accord, but is instead something that must be lived and worked for by Europeans.	它不是一台自行其是的机器，而是一个所有欧洲人都必须为之生活和工作的理念。


For no one should be mistaken: there are alternatives to European integration - all of them bad, unwanted, and dangerous.	因为所有人都应该明白：欧洲一体化的方式还有其它的选择-但都是糟糕的、不受欢迎的和危险的。


Unless all Europeans remain devoted to integration and the creation of an open Europe, the Continent's dark past may once again become its future.	除非所有的欧洲人都致力于一体化和塑造一个开放的欧洲的进程，否则这片大陆黑暗的过去就会在未来重演。


There are a number of qualities that must be understood if integration is to continue to build an ever more open Europe.	如果一体化要继续建设一个更加开放的欧洲，那么有些品质是我们必须了解的。


Voluntary self-restraint, a voluntary sharing of our own rights and privileges with a wider collective, is paramount here.	最重要的一种品质就是主动的自我约束-一种自发与更广泛的集体分享权利和待遇的品质。


While states once enforced their rights at the expense of others, they now transfer their rights in favor of others.	一些国家曾经以牺牲他国的权利为代价来贯彻自己的权利，而它们现在却以有利于他国的方式转让自己的权利。


The heart of this miracle is that it benefits all - Europe's citizens, its states, the whole continent, and the world.	这种奇迹发生的动因是它让所有人获益-欧洲的公民、国家、整个欧洲大陆以至全世界。


For states to voluntarily limit themselves is unique in human history.	国家主动限制自身的行为在人类历史上是绝无仅有的。


Europe's states have been able to achieve this discipline primarily because they are democracies.	欧洲国家能够实现这种约束首先因为它们都是民主国家。


Europe's peoples have sanctioned limiting their own governments powers so as to achieve peace across Europe.	欧洲的人民同意限制政府的权力以使全欧洲的和平得以实现。


There would be no Union and no integration, were it not built on the principles of democracy.	如果没有民主的原则作为基础，就不会有欧盟，更不会有欧洲的一体化。


This is why, having regained their democratic regimes, Central and Eastern European countries unequivocally voted to join the continent's integration process.	这就是为什么中欧和东欧的国家在重建民主政体之后都不约而同地选择加入洲大陆一体化的进程。


This is why these countries associate the future of their democracies with ever-closer and more integrated cooperation with other European states.	这也就是为什么这些国家将它们民主的未来和与其他欧洲国家更紧密的合作联系起来。


Of course, democracy does not automatically mean integration.	诚然，民主并不自动地意味着一体化。


But without democracy, no genuine, fair, and universally beneficial integration would be possible.	但没有民主也就不可能有真正的、公平的和让所有人获益的一体化进程。


The people of the Czech Republic, like most Europeans, wish to jointly build an irreversible system of mutual relationships among states, regions, municipalities, and their inhabitants.	捷克共和国的人民和大多数欧洲人一样，希望在欧洲的国家、地区、城市及其居民之间共同建立一种不可撤销的相互关系。


Their desire is to eliminate violence and, at the same time, generate stable conditions for economic and social progress for everyone in Europe.	他们的愿望是清除暴力同时为所有欧洲人创造一个适于经济和社会发展的稳定环境。


The end of history may not be at hand in Europe, but the end of Europe's dark history is clearly in sight - so long as Europeans continue on the path of integration.	欧洲的历史将会如何发展也许现在还不明了，但欧洲黑暗历史的终点却近在眼前-只要欧洲人继续在一体化的道路上前行。


Europe’s Brexit Hangover	欧洲的英国脱欧宿醉


NEW YORK – The market reaction to the Brexit shock has been mild compared to two other recent episodes of global financial volatility: the summer of 2015 (following fears of a Chinese hard landing) and the first two months of this year (following renewed worries about China, along with other global tail risks).	纽约—市场对英国脱欧冲击的反应和其他两次最近的全球金融动荡——2015年夏天（担心中国硬着陆）和今年前两个月（中国担忧卷土重来，以及其他全球尾部风险）——相比显得相当温和。


The shock was regional rather than global, with the market impact concentrated in the United Kingdom and Europe; and the volatility lasted only about a week, compared to the previous two severe risk-off episodes, which lasted about two months and led to a sharp correction in US and global equity prices.	这场冲击只是地区性而非全球性，市场影响集中在英国和欧洲； 而波动仅仅维持了一周，前两次严重的避险潮持续了大约两个月并导致美国和全球股市剧烈修正。


Why such a mild, temporary shock?	为什么此次冲击如此温和和短暂？