The second level of cyber threat is against chosen individuals.	第二层威胁则针对特定的个体。


The most common type of intrusion is an attempt to hack into e-mail accounts.	试图侵入电子邮件账户是其中最为常见的入侵方式；


The targets also can face Trojan-horse attacks by e-mail intended to breach their computers and allow the infiltrators to corrupt or transfer files remotely.	目标个体也会面对通过邮件实施的木马攻击，这些攻击旨在侵入用户电脑，并允许渗透者对文件进行远程破坏或传送。


To be sure, if a cyber attack is camouflaged, it is not easy to identify the country from which it originated.	当然，如果网络攻击被施以伪装的话，人们就难以辨识出发动攻击的国家了。


Through the use of so-called “false-flag espionage” and other methods, attacks can be routed through the computers of a third country.	通过运用所谓“冒充他人进行的间谍活动”或其他一些方式，网络攻击就可以取道第三国的电脑。


Just as some Chinese pharmaceutical firms exported to Africa spurious medicines with “Made in India” labels – a fact admitted by the Chinese government – some Chinese hackers are known to have routed their cyber intrusion through computers in Russia, Iran, Cuba, and other countries.	正如某些中国制药企业向非洲出口标明“印度生产”的假药一样（这是中国政府承认的事实），人们也知道某些中国黑客经由俄罗斯、伊朗、古巴以及其他国家的计算机实施其网络入侵行动。


But, like their comrades in the pharmaceutical industry, such hackers tend to leave telltale signs.	不过，正如制药行业的同党一样，这类黑客也会留下泄露身份的记号。


Then there are many cases in which the attacks have originated directly from China.	于是，在许多情况下，黑客直接从中国发动袭击。


It seems unlikely that these hackers, especially those engaged in cyber espionage, pilferage, and intimidation, are private individuals with no links to the Chinese government.	这些黑客（尤其是参与网络间谍活动、窃密活动或恐吓行动的黑客），看起来不大可能是一些与中国政府没有关系的独立个人；


It is more likely that they are tied to the People’s Liberation Army.	更有可能的情况是：这些黑客与人民解放军之间有着关联。


In war, this irregular contingent of hackers would become the vanguard behind which the PLA takes on the enemy.	在战争中，这种非正规的黑客分队将成为解放军与敌交战前的先头部队。


Systematic cyber attacks constitute a new frontier of asymmetrical warfare at a time when the world already confronts other unconventional threats, including transnational terrorism.	当世界已在面对着包括跨国恐怖主义在内的、其他非常规威胁之际，系统性网络攻击又构成了非对称战争的一条新战线。


With national security and prosperity now dependent on the safekeeping of cyberspace, cybercrime must be effectively countered as an international priority.	由于国家安全与繁荣如今依赖于网络空间的安全保障，因此对网络犯罪加以有效回击一事，必须成为国际社会的优先关注；


If not, cyberspace will become the new global-commons battlefield.	如若不然，则网络空间将蜕变为新的全球共同战场。


China’s Decrepit Population	中国趋于老化的人口


China’s government finally appears to be acknowledging the urgent challenges presented by the country’s aging population.	中国政府最终似乎认识到了这个国家日趋老化的人口所带的紧迫挑战。


On December 12, it released a cabinet-level White Paper on the problem – the first of its kind – in an effort to grapple with the prospect of rising social-security and healthcare costs, a tightening labor market, and other potential obstacles to continue rapid economic growth.	12月12日，中国政府第一次发表了关于该问题的白皮书，希望尽力克服越来越高的社会保险和医疗费用、日趋严峻的劳动力市场以及其他潜在的障碍以便继续推动其经济的快速增长。


Looking back, it is ironic that the Chinese government’s draconian “one-child” policy, imposed in 1979, was implemented at the same time as the “open door” policy, aimed at capturing labor-intensive foreign manufacturing investment.	回过头来看，中国政府在1979年开始实行的严厉的“独生子女”政策，与旨在吸引劳动密集型的外国制造业投资的“开放”政策在同时实行很具有讽刺意味。


While both policies must be regarded as successes, over the years the family planning program has contributed to an aging population that may diminish China’s attractiveness as a low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing hub.	两项政策应该说都取得了成功，但是多年以后计划生育政策所带来的是越来越老化的人口，这也许会削弱中国作为一个低费用的劳动密集型制造中心的吸引力。


During the nearly three decades since the “one-child” policy was introduced, live births have dropped from 22.5 million per year in the early 1980’s to around 16-17 million by the middle of this decade.	在“独生子女”政策推行的近三十年时间里，每年出生的新生儿从二十世纪八十年代早期的2250万降到了近几年的大约1600-1700万。


Moreover, with the number of elderly growing as a result of rising life expectancy, this low birth rate has pushed the share of those aged 65 and above from 4.9% of the total population to 7.7%.	此外，因为预期寿命的增高带来了老年人口的增加，这种低出生率使得65岁以上的老年人的比率从总人口的4. 9%增加到了7.


According to the United Nations Population Division’s (UNPD) “medium-variant” projections, without reform of the “one-child” policy, the share of China’s population aged 15 and below would decline from 24.8% in 2000 to 15.7% in 2050, while the share of those aged 65 and above would soar from 6.8% to 23.6%.	根据联合国人口部（UNPD）的“中期变化”推测，如果不改革“独生子女”政策，中国15岁以下的人口比率将从2000年的24. 8%降到2050年的15.


With fewer children to replenish the workforce, the working-age cohort of those 15-64 years old would shrink from 68.4% to 60.7%.	由于可以补充进劳动力的孩子的数量越来越少，那些15岁到64岁之间符合劳动年龄的人口的比率将从68. 4%降到60.


The elderly would thus account for a far greater share of China’s population than in other large emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico.	7%。 因此中国老年人口的比率会比其他的一些新兴的大的经济体，比如巴西、印度、印度尼西亚和墨西哥要高得多。


China’s demographic trends hold several adverse implications for its economy.	中国的人口趋势对其经济会带来很多负面的影响。


With a rapidly aging population and a shrinking workforce, tax revenue will contract, while expenditure on pensions and health care will expand, undermining the fiscal position.	因为人口的急剧老化以及劳动力的减少，税收收入将会萎缩，而养老金和医疗费用的增长会严重破坏财政状况。


Various estimates by private-sector economists and World Bank officials suggest that the government’s accumulated “net implicit pension debt” could balloon to 75-110% of GDP.	由私营部门的经济学家和世界银行的官员所作出的种种预测表明政府累积得越来越高的“净隐性养老金债务”可能会膨胀到GDP的75-110%。


Furthermore, the decline in the working-age cohort would squeeze labor supply, fueling wage growth and eroding the country’s economic competitiveness.	此外，符合劳动年龄的人口的下降会压缩劳动力的供给，刺激工资水平的上升，并且侵蚀这个国家的经济竞争力。


Already, in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, where manufacturing activity is the densest, labor shortages have appeared.	在制造业最密集的长江三角洲和珠江三角洲，已经出现了劳动力的短缺。


In 2004, for example, Guangdong Province had to raise the mandatory minimum wage by as much as 20% to attract workers from other regions.	比如，在2004年，广东省不得不强制最低工资提高了20%以便吸引其他地区的工人。


To hire and retain skilled workers, many foreign-invested enterprises routinely pay above the minimum wage.	为了雇用和留住有技术的工人，许多外资企业通常会支付比最低工资高的薪金。


But some foreign manufacturers, seeking to cap rising labor costs, are shifting production from China to cheaper destinations such as Vietnam, where average monthly wages for factory workers is $50-60 – half that of China.	但是一些外国制造商为了控制越来越高的劳动力费用，已经开始把生产从中国转到工资更便宜的地方，比如越南，那里工厂工人的平均月工资是50-60美元，只有中国的一半。


Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam grew by 40% in 2005, led by investors from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.	越南的外国直接投资（FDI）2005年上升了40%，主要的投资者来自日本、韩国和台湾。 中国境内的外国直接投资2006年的头七个月在2005年下降了0.


China’s inward FDI fell 1.2% in the first seven months of 2006, after a 0.5% decline in 2005, while combined investment from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan plummeted 31% in the first half of 2006, compared to the 6.5% decline in 2005.	5%的基础上又下降了1. 2%，而来自日本、韩国和台湾的总体投资在2006年的上半年大幅下降了31%，2005年则下降了6.


These figures are only the early warnings of an emerging trend.	这些数字只是一个日趋明显的趋势的早期警告。


In the long run, as labor shortages become acute, China will need to relinquish some low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing activities, which will translate into decelerating export performance and lower economic growth.	从长远看，随着劳动力的短缺变得越来越严峻，中国需要放弃一些低级的、劳动密集型的制造活动，这会使它的出口减速并且放慢经济增长的速度。


Aside from abandoning the “one-child” policy, China could avoid this outcome by climbing the value chain in manufacturing and services, as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have done.	除放弃“独生子女”政策，中国参照香港、新加坡、韩国和台湾的做法通过攀升制造业和服务业的价值链来防止这一结果。


However, for China to succeed, higher investment in research and development, together with a fundamental overhaul of the educational system, is essential.	然而，中国要想获得成功，还必须加大其在研发上的投资力度，以及对教育体制进行彻底的改革。


According to OECD estimates, China’s current expenditure on R&D amounts to only 1.3% of GDP, compared to 3.2% in Japan and an average of 2.5-2.6% in South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.	根据经合组织的估计，中国目前的研发费用只占其GDP的1. 3%，而日本是3.


Although the government recently announced that it intends to increase R&D spending to 2% of GDP by 2010, this remains below the OECD average of 2.2%.	尽管政府最近宣布它将把研发费用在2010年提高到GDP的2%，但是这依然低于经合组织2. 2%的平均水平。


As for China’s backward educational system, the large number of university graduates is offset by their overall sub-standard quality.	至于中国落后的教育体制，尽管每年的大学毕业生很多，但是因为他们总体上无法达到标准的素质，这一数字没有多大意义。


According to a recent survey by McKinsey & Company, of the more than three million graduates churned out by China’s universities and colleges every year, less than 10% are suitable for employment with international companies, owing to their deficiencies in practical training and poor English.	根据一项最近由麦肯尼什公司所作的调查，在中国的大专院校每年出来的超过300万的大学毕业生中，因为缺少实际锻炼和差劲的英语水平，只有不到10%的人能够在国际公司担任工作。


In view of these systemic weaknesses, China’s ability to overcome its labor deficit by shifting to an innovation- and productivity-driven economy remains dubious.	考虑到这些制度性的弱点，中国是否能通过转向一个以创新和生产效率为推动的经济从而克服其劳动力的短缺依然值得怀疑。


A Chinese Pivot?	中国的核心？


NEW DELHI – Is China, under its new president, Xi Jinping, undertaking its own diplomatic pivot, parallel to the United States’ “pivot to Asia”?	新德里——在新任主席习近平领导下，中国是否正在谋求与美国“亚洲核心”政策相对应的外交核心政策？


Xi’s first significant international initiatives – making Russia his first official visit abroad, followed immediately by his attendance at the BRICS summit in South Africa – suggest that China may be seeking to place its relations with the world’s most powerful emerging countries on a par with its US diplomacy.	习上任后将俄罗斯选为首次正式出访的目的地，之后又即刻赶赴南非出席金砖四国峰会，这些重大的国际举措均表明中国有可能将与世界最大新兴国家的关系提升至与中美关系同等的地位。


Indeed, this possibility is supported by Xi’s recent statement about relations with India, which he termed “one of the most important bilateral relationships” for China.	其实，习最近发表的中印关系声明证实了上述猜测，他称中印关系是中国“最重要的双边关系”之一。


Xi’s early focus on Sino-Indian relations is unusual for a Chinese leader.	习上任伊始对中印关系的关注有别于其他中国领导人。


He enunciated a five-point platform, rather like Jawaharlal Nehru’s “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” implemented in the two countries’ Panchsheel Treaty of 1954.	他提出与贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁的“和平共处五项原则”近似的中印关系五点建议，“和平共处五项原则”首载于1954年的两国《和平共处五项原则条约》。


According to Xi’s platform, pending a final settlement of territorial issues, the two countries should cooperate to maintain peace and tranquility and prevent border disputes from affecting the overall relationship.	习建议在最终解决领土问题之前，中印两国应合作维护和平安定，防止边界争端影响到两国的整体关系。


China and India should maintain close strategic communications in order to keep bilateral relations on the “right track.”	中印两国应保持密切的战略沟通，以确保双边关系“走上正轨”。


Moreover, the two countries should harness each other’s comparative strengths and expand mutually beneficial cooperation in infrastructure, investment, and other areas; strengthen cultural ties to advance an expanding friendship; and enhance their cooperation in multilateral forums to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries in tackling global challenges.	此外，两国应充分利用彼此的比较优势，在基础设施、投资和其他领域扩大互利合作； 两国应巩固文化纽带推进并扩大友谊；


Finally, they should accommodate each other’s core concerns.	增强多边论坛合作，在应对全球挑战中捍卫发展中国家的合法权益。 最后，两国应充分重视对方的核心关切。


While Xi has been preoccupied with his country’s domestic challenges since becoming Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General-Secretary last November, and now as president since March, relations with India can have a direct impact on internal conditions.	虽然去年十一月任中共总书记、今年三月任国家主席以来习近平主要忙于处理国内事务，但中印关系却可以直接影响到中国的国内局势。


For example, China’s desire to prevent drug trafficking in its southern province of Yunnan means that its police and security forces are taking a keen interest in what happens in Myanmar, a country that is also of special interest to India.	比方说，中国的警察及安全部队因希望制止其南部省份云南的贩毒行为而对缅甸局势有着浓厚的兴趣，而印度也同样关注缅甸的局势。


Then, of course, there is Tibet, perhaps China’s greatest domestic security concern, and also a perennial source of tension with India, owing to territorial disputes.	当然还有中国最大的国内安全隐患西藏，一直存在着领土纠纷导致中印间的紧张局势。


China’s recent anger over a visit by the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh, Indian territory claimed by China, suggests just how potent this issue remains.	达赖喇嘛最近对存在争议的阿鲁纳恰尔邦达旺寺的访问引起中国愤怒充分显示了这个问题的严重性。


Hu Shisheng, a leading South Asia strategic analyst at the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, has suggested that such visits do not mean that “India-China relations are [in a state of] disturbance,” though the potential for trouble remains high.	中国现代国际关系研究院首席南亚战略分析师胡仕胜认为此类访问并不意味着“印中关系处于不稳定状态”，但潜在的麻烦的确也不容小觑。


Under Xi, however, China seems to be accentuating the positive.	但在习近平领导下，中国似乎更愿意强调积极因素。


The CCP’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, recently identified the “two areas of interest with India” that matter most.	中共官方报纸《人民时报》最近指出两大最重要的“中印利益领域”。


With the border issue “effectively controlled,” there should be greater focus on “trade and multilateral issues,” where success could bring about a “new” and welcome “chapter” in bilateral ties.	在“有效控制”边界问题的基础上更多地关注“贸易及多边问题”，因为在上述领域取得成功能够翻开两国关系史上更受人欢迎的“新”篇章。


So is “mistrust” between the two powers diminishing?	中印两国间的“不信任”是否在逐步减少？


The People’s Daily seems to consider bilateral relations as normal at this point.	《人民日报》似乎认为现阶段双边关系处于正常状态。


India appears to be equally hopeful.	印度似乎同样充满了希望。


Indeed, a senior Indian official,speaking about tensions in the South China Sea, was recently quoted as saying: “You can’t assume that India-China maritime rivalry is inevitable.”	事实上，一名印度高官不久前在谈及南海紧张局势时说：“我们不能想当然地认为无法避免印中海上争夺。 ”


The “Indo-Pacific is one geopolitical area,” the official reportedly said, “but look at the situation in the Indian Ocean.	“印度－太平洋同属一个地缘政治区域”，这名官员说，“但我们看看印度洋的情况。


The situation near China, whether in the East China Sea, near Japan, or in the West Pacific, is completely different.	南海、日本海或西太平洋等中国近海的局势是完全不同的。


India, China, and the US – everyone needs sea links; everybody’s energy goes through it.”	印、中、美都需要运输能源的海上通道。 ”


A classified report from India’s defense ministry, however, emphasizes the “increasing number of Chinese submarines venturing into the Indian Ocean region, thus posing [risks] to India’s security interests.”	但印度国防部一份机要报告强调“越开越多的中国潜艇进入印度洋水域，并由此对印度的安全利益构成威胁。


The report indicated that at least “22 contacts were recorded with vessels suspected to be Chinese attack submarines patrolling outside Beijing’s territorial waters last year,” and warned that the “implicit focus” of China’s navy appears to be “to control highly sensitive sea lines of communication.”	”报告显示“去年有据可查的与北京领海外巡逻的中国攻击潜艇的遭遇多达22次”，并警告称中国海军的“潜在焦点”似乎是“对高度敏感的海上交通线进行控制。 ”


Xi’s efforts to cement ties with China’s other huge neighbor, Russia, should be seen as complementing his outreach to India.	习在向印度示好的同时也在与中国的另一大型邻国俄罗斯发展关系。


Here, Xi has been aided by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s evident disdain for the US and the West.	习充分利用了俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京对美国和西方的明显轻视。


China shares Russia’s suspicions in this regard; indeed, Xi proclaimed that, in terms of geopolitics, Russia and China “speak a common language.”	在这方面中国也有着同样的疑虑； 事实上，习近平宣布俄中两国在地缘政治领域“拥有众多的共同利益。


There are, of course, perfectly legitimate reasons for close Sino-Russian relations.	当然，有一些密切中俄关系的理由完全合理。


They are partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.	双方均为上海合作组织的合作伙伴。


China is the world’s largest energy consumer, while Russia is the biggest energy provider.	中国是世界最大的能源消费国，而俄罗斯是最大的能源生产国。


And bilateral trade is booming, worth $88 billion per year.	双边贸易蓬勃发展，每年贸易额高达880亿美元之巨。


Xi’s own regional pivot should be viewed as part of his grand vision of a “revitalization of the Chinese nation,” which essentially calls for China to resume the paramount leadership in Asia that it has exercised for much of its history.	习近平自身的区域核心政策应当是“振兴中华民族”宏伟目标的一部分，这本质上要求中国恢复其曾经有过的亚洲领导地位。


His ambitions are vast, yet he, and the Chinese people, appear determined to achieve them.	他的目标十分宏大，但他和中国人民似乎决意要将它变成现实。


That is far more than can be said of India’s rather wooly strategic meanderings.	这与印度朦胧的战略目标不可同日而语。


China’s Evolving Web	演化中的中国合约网络


HONG KONG – In a recent article, the economist Axel Leijonhufvud defines the market system as a web of contracts.	发自香港——经济学家阿克塞尔·莱琼霍夫德（Axel Leijonhufvud）在近期的一篇文章中将市场体系定义为一个合约网络。


Because contracts are linked with each other, one default can trigger an avalanche of broken promises, “[making] it possible to destroy virtually the entire web of formal and informal contracts which the market system requires for its functioning.”	由于合约之间彼此关联，一份合同的违约可能影响一系列承诺的兑现，如雪崩一般不断扩大，进而“破坏市场体系正常运转所需要的整个正式与非正式合约的网络系统”。


The state’s role is to protect, enforce, and regulate these contracts and related property rights, as well as to intervene to prevent systemic failure.	国家的作用正是保护、强制执行并规范这些合约以及相关的财产权利，并适时干预以防系统性失灵。


This web of contracts – often taken for granted in mainstream economics, to the extent that it becomes almost invisible – embodies the formal and informal rules embedded in the market system that shape and constrain individual and social behavior.	主流经济学家往往将合约网络系统视作理所当然的，以至于几乎对其视而不见。 合约网络界定了市场体系内的正式与非正式规则，同时塑造并约束了个人及社会行为。


They form the fabric of all human institutions.	因此，可以说合约网络是构造人类所有制度的基础材料。


Advanced economic systems have very complex webs of contracts, such as financial derivatives.	发达经济体有着非常复杂的合约网络，例如金融衍生产品。


For Europe, Leijonhufvud argues, this implies a three-pronged approach that focuses on “levels of leverage,” “maturity mismatches,” and “the topology of the web,” – that is, “its connectivity and the presence of critical nodes that are ‘too big to fail.’”	莱琼霍夫德指出，应对当前的欧洲危机需要关注三重问题的相互叠加：“杠杆率”、“期限错配”与“网络拓扑”，也就是“其联通性与关键节点的存在导致其“太大而不能倒”。


This is because “[t]he web of contracts has developed serious inconsistencies.”	这是因为“合约网络已经出现了严重失调”。


To insist that all contracts be fulfilled would “cause a collapse of very large portions of the web,” with “serious economic and incalculable social and political consequences.”	坚持履行所有合约，将会“引发绝大部分合约网络的崩溃”以及“严重的经济灾难以及无法估量的社会与政治后果。 ”


By contrast, emerging markets like China have less sophisticated systems and evolve more complex contractual/institutional links over time, particularly through globalized transactions.	相比之下，像中国这样的新兴市场，合约网络尚没有那么成熟。 然而，随着时间推移，尤其是通过参与国际贸易，新兴市场国家也会发展出越来越复杂的合约网络及系统性的关联结构。


Under China’s planned economy, most contracts were between individuals and the state, whereas more sophisticated market contracts have emerged or re-emerged only over the last 30 years.	当中国处于计划经济时代，大部分合约发生在个人与国家层面； 过去三十年间，随着市场化进程，越来越复杂成熟的市场合约出现或再次浮现。


Indeed, the widespread use of market contracts with publicly-owned companies was a recent and important adaptation in the move toward a “socialist market economy.”	事实上， 中国建设“社会主义市场经济”的一个重要的调整与进展就是在公有制企业中广泛使用市场合约。


The web of contracts, however, can also be understood as complex adaptive market systems, which encompass the state and family relations as well.	然而，合约网络也可理解为不断调整适应的复杂市场体系，其中包括国家与家庭层面的各种制度关系。


To understand China’s socialist market economy, it is essential to examine systematically these different forms of contracts and their institutional structures.	要理解中国的社会主义市场经济体制，需要系统研究这些不同形式的合约关系与制度架构。


Family and kinship contracts, which govern marriage, adoption, cohabitation, inheritance, etc., form the basic unit of human society.	家庭及亲属合约规范了婚姻、收养、共同居住、 及继承等行为，构成了人类社会的基本单位。


These contracts are the most ancient and remain the foundation of social relationships in China today.	这些最古老的契约依然是当今中国社会关系的基础。


Corporate contracts place the profit-oriented legal person at the center of the transaction and bind all of its stakeholders.	企业合约将追求利润的法人置于交易的中心，并将所有的利益相关方联系在一起。


Chinese corporate contracts have grown exponentially over the last 30 years, but they have special characteristics that reflect the primary role of Chinese state-owned enterprises.	过去三十年里，中国的企业合约实现了指数式增长。 由于国有企业在中国经济占据了主导地位，这给中国的企业合约带来了一些中国特色。


Market contracts between producers and consumers – and/or among producers in supply chains – link individuals, families, firms, governments, and public organizations through local or global markets.	市场合约是生产者与消费者之间或各种厂商之间的合约，并通过本地或全球市场的供应链体系将个人、家庭、企业、政府与公众团体联系在一起。


Over the last few decades, China has begun to practice modern contract law and joined the World Trade Organization, committing itself to international rules governing trade and investment.	在过去几十年里，中国开始执行现代合同法，加入了世界贸易组织，并承诺遵守国际贸易与投资规则。


Non-governmental and non-profit civil contracts bind people together for communal, religious, social, and political activities.	民间合约 通过非政府或非盈利的机构将人们联系在一起，参与社区、宗教、社会与政治活动。


These contracts are still relatively new and evolving in China.	在中国，这些民间合约关系相对较新，仍处于发展演进的过程中。


Social contracts created by constitutional and administrative laws define the powers and responsibilities of the state and its constituent bodies vis-à-vis individuals and the private sector.	社会合约 通过宪法与行政法规，界定了国家及其相关部门相对于个人与私营部门的权力与义务，包括政府的征税权；


They include the authority to impose taxes and restraints on individuals and private entities through criminal, administrative, and civil law, as well as the state’s obligation to provide public goods and services.	国家通过刑法、行政法以及民法对个人与私营部门施加的约束，及国家为公民提供公共物品和服务的义务。


China has strengthened its unitary state with important institutional innovations that have delivered growth and middle-income prosperity, but it still retains the basic five-level administrative structure – central government on top, with provincial, city, town, and village bodies below – that first emerged two millennia ago.	���国通过一系列重大的制度创新，加强了其传统的中央集权体制创造经济增长及中等收入繁荣的能力。 但是中国仍然保留了源于两千年前的五级行政管理政府架构，从上至下依次是中央、省、市、镇和村。


Deciphering the structure of the web of contracts holds the key to understanding how an economy behaves, including its dynamic non-linear adaptation to internal and external forces.	理解经济行为与表现的关键在于破解合约网络的结构，包括这种网络结构如何面对内外部力量的冲击，及其动态的非线性调整与适应过程。


Following the physicist Fritjof Capra, one should regard living organisms, social systems, and ecosystems as an interconnected and interdependent, complex adaptive system.	按照物理学家菲杰弗·卡帕（Fritjof Capra）的观点，我们应该将生物体、社会制度体系与生态系统看作一个相互关联、相互依赖、不断调整适应的复杂系统。


This means that we should view the economy and society not as rigid hierarchies or mechanical markets, but as networks or webs of life, in which contracts, formal and informal, fulfilled or violated, are the essence of human activity.	这意味着我们不应将经济与社会视为僵化的层级或机械式运作的市场，而应将其视作一个网络体系或生命网络，而存在于其中的合约，不管是正式还是非正式，履行了还是违反了，都是人类活动的根本。


Examining webs of contracts should be similar to a biologist’s examination of cell structure and DNA.	探讨合约网络与生物学家研究细胞结构和DNA相似，都能让我们透过现象看本质。


China has created four functioning global-scale modern supply chains in manufacturing, infrastructure, finance, and government services, thanks to its evolving, expanding, and complex web of contracts.	正是得益于复杂合约网络的不断演进及扩展，中国成功构建了具有全球规模的正常运作的制造业、基础设施、金融与政府服务这四大现代供应链。


But how was China able to build a modern industrial base within a relatively short period of time from its traditional, patrimonial family contracts and archaic constitutional structures?	短时间内，中国如何能够从传统的家族式合约与陈旧的体制架构中脱胎换骨而建立一个现代产业基础？


Through experimentation, adaptation, and evolution – a process that has been described as “crossing the river by feeling the stones” – China has been able to evolve a higher-order, or fifth, supply chain in political decision-making.	运用邓小平所描述的“摸着石头过河”的思路，通过试验、适应与演进，中国正在成功摸索一个更高层次的供应链——政治决策供应链 。


This “top-level governance architecture,” as it is known in China, has been essential for coordinating and orchestrating the different supply chains and the overall web of contracts to achieve the delicate balance among individual, family, corporate, social, and national objectives.	在中国，这第五个供应链的构建被称为“顶层设计”，其作用是协调及安排其他不同的供应链及整个合约网络的运行，以便达到个人、家庭、企业、社会与国家目标之间的微妙平衡。


This top-level governance architecture is analogous to a computer’s operating system, which orchestrates the other software and hardware components to form a holistic unity.	顶层设计类似于计算机操作系统，需要合理安排所有软硬组件，达到系统兼容及完整。 许多现代经济体都已经拥有这种顶层治理结构。


Such a structure exists in many economies, but, in the Chinese context, where the state plays a central role in the economy, it is critical to the system’s effectiveness.	在中国，由于政府在经济中发挥着相当大的核心作用，其顶层治理结构对中国经济体系的成效至关重要。


How it is shaped will depend on how China’s history, culture, institutional context, and evolving web of contracts affect the country’s social fabric.	中国的顶层治理结构未来的发展，将取决于中国的历史、文化、制度以及不断演进的合约网络如何相互作用而影响中国的基本社会结构。


China’s Excess-Capacity Nightmare	中国的产能过剩之痛


SHANGHAI – Back in 1958, the year of China’s ill-fated “Great Leap Forward,” Chairman Mao had big plans for the steel industry.	发自上海 —— 让时光回到 1958 年，那个发动“大跃进”的年月，国家主席毛泽东对中国的钢铁工业寄予了厚望。


While production had been just over five million tons in 1957, he expected the country to catch up with or even surpass the United States by 1962, producing 80-100 million tons per year, and to reach 700 million tons per year by the mid-1970’s, making China the undisputed world leader.	在 1957 年钢产量仅有 500 万吨的情况下，他希望全国钢产量能在 1962 年时赶上甚至超过美国，达到 8000 万到 1 亿吨，并在 1970 年代中期达到 7 亿吨，让中国成为无可争议的世界钢材生产之王。


All this was to be accomplished using small “backyard steel furnaces” operated by ordinary people with no particular technical expertise.	而用来实现这一宏愿的，则是一些连专门钢铁生产技术都不具备的民众建立起来的“土法炼钢炉”。


Today, Mao’s dream of catching up with the rest of the world has been realized, albeit a bit behind schedule, not only in steel making, where annual capacity has reached 660 million tons, but in many other sectors as well.	时至今日，虽然时间有所推迟，但毛泽东赶超世界水平的梦想终于得到了实现，中国的钢铁年产量已经达到 6. 6 亿吨，而其他工业部门也同样如此。


In 2008, China ranked first in steel (about half of world production), cement (also about half), aluminum (about 40%), and glass (31%), to take just a few examples.	到了 2008 年，中国在钢铁，水泥（两者都占全球总产量近半），铝（占全球 40% ）和玻璃（占 31% ）产量方面都位居世界第一。


The country topped the US in auto production in 2009, and remains second only to South Korea in shipbuilding, with 36% of global capacity.	中国的汽车产量在 2009 年超过了美国，而在造船方面仅仅落后于韩国，拿下了全球造船总吨位的 36% 。


For Beijing’s central planners, however, the size of China’s industrial base has become a cause for alarm rather than celebration.	对于北京的决策者来说，中国工业的规模带来却是一座警钟而不是庆功的号角。


In a document approved by the State Council on September 26, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) warned of serious excess capacity in a wide variety of sectors.	在中国国务院 9 月 26 日下达的一份文件中，国家发展和改革委员会（简称发改委）警告在多个行业都出现了严重的产能过剩。


(The State Council, which includes the premier, vice premiers, and heads of ministries and commissions, is China’s highest executive authority.)	（中国国务院，由总理，副总理及各部委负责人组成，是中国政府的最高行政机关）


Based on the NDRC’s figures, 2008 capacity utilization rates were just 76% for steel, 75% for cement, 73% for aluminum, 88% for flat glass, 40% for methanol, and 20% for poly-crystalline silicon (a key raw material for solar cells). The current project pipeline also implies less than 50% utilization for wind-power equipment manufacturers in 2010.	根据发改委公布的数据显示，在 2008 年钢铁行业的产能利用率只有 76% ，水泥 75% ，铝 73% ，平板玻璃 88% ，甲醇 40% ，多晶硅（一种生产太阳能电池板的关键原料）的利用率更只有 20% ，而目前的项目规划则暗示明年中国的风能发电企业将有超过 50% 的产能闲置不用。


Excess capacity has been a priority for the State Council since 2005, when it issued industry-by-industry restrictions on new projects and targets for shutting down inefficient production.	其实国务院自 2005 年以来就把解决产能过剩列为优先处理的问题，在各个行业都出台了一些限制来阻止新项目上马，并关停那些效率低下的生产企业。


Since that time, however, the situation has in many cases only gotten worse.	但从那时起，情况在许多方面不但没有得到好转，反而进一步恶化。


The problem is that much of the so-called “blind” and “redundant” investment that Beijing would like to eliminate has the strong support of local governments, whose primary concern is with generating GDP growth in their jurisdictions, regardless of whether the means of achieving it make any economic sense.	而问题的症结则在许多北京明令禁止的“盲目”和“多余”投资项目背后都有地方政府撑腰。 这些地方政府主要把眼光放在如何拉动当地 GDP 的增长之上，根本不管这些项目在经济上是否具有可行性。


Consider cement production, where, according to the China Cement Association, 38% of capacity consists of “shaft” kilns. These have been obsolete in most of the rest of the world for over a century, and accounted for less than 3% of production even in 1957, when most of China’s cement plants were imports from Eastern Europe.	以水泥生产为例，根据中国水泥行业协会的数据， 38% 的水泥产量都是来自于立窑，而这种技术在世界各地都已经淘汰将近一个世纪了，甚至在 1957 年的中国也只有 3% 的水泥产量来自立窑，因为当时国内的水泥生产设备都是从东欧进口的。


Nowadays, however, shaft kilns are a favorite of local governments because they can be built cheaply and quickly and generate growth and employment.	然而时至今日，立窑技术却得到了地方政府的青睐，因为他们可以花很少的成本尽快上马项目来创造经济增长和就业。


Achieving economies of scale and lessening environmental impacts simply are not priorities.	至于有没有规模经济效益，能不能减少对环境的影响这些问题，根本就不在优先考虑之列。


A similar situation exists in the steel industry, where the central government has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to close small furnaces.	而钢铁工业也存在着同样的状况，中央关停小型炼钢炉的尝试同样也一次又一次碰壁。


In 2006, for example, the NDRC produced a list of plants that were required to cease operations by the end of the following year.	例如国家发改委在 2006 年就拿出了一份要求在 2007 年年末必须关停的钢铁企业名单。


As the deadline approached in December 2007, a correspondent from Mysteel , a leading local source of information on the sector, visited a number of these mills to see first-hand how they were progressing with the government-mandated dismantling of their equipment.	结果到了 2007 年 12 月大限将至之时，在中国钢铁行业信息方面居于领先地位的网站“我的钢铁网”派出一名记者，走访了名单上的各个企业，希望能拿到企业如何遵照中央指令拆除设备的第一手资料。


What he found was a great example of how any such program is likely to work in practice.	但展现在记者面前的却是一个反映这类项目在现实中被如何执行的绝佳例子。


One site was still operating 24 hours a day; in others production had been temporarily halted until the deadline passed.	一间企业依然在 24 小时开工生产； 其他企业则暂时停工，只等限期过后再次恢复生产；


In only a very few cases had any machinery actually been removed.	只有极少的一部分企业真正拆除了设备。


Local officials and managers had a variety of reasons for not complying with the NDRC’s order.   Some expected to expand their plants so that they would no longer be counted as inefficient – a stratagem explicitly prohibited by the regulations.	地方官员和管理者都有很多的理由不去服从发改委的指令。 有些人希望进一步扩充产能，好让自己的企业不再位列“低效率”的名单之内 —— 但这种把戏是明令禁止的。


Where facilities were privately owned, it was felt, perhaps not unreasonably, that removing assets would violate China’s property-rights law.	当这些���备属于私人所有时，有人会（可能不合理地）觉得关停企业违反了保护财产权的相关法律。


One formerly state-run enterprise was being operated under a 2001 lease specifying that no workers could be laid off for the next ten years.	一所原本属于国营的企业继续维持运作的原因则是 2001 年签订租赁协议时规定十年之内不能让任何员工下岗。


And there were also jurisdictions that had canceled the licenses of the operators in question, so that, as one regulator put it, they simply “didn’t exist.”	有些地方部门干脆直接吊销了有问题企业的生产许可证，这样一来，正如一位监管者所言，这些企业就“不存在”了。


China ’s excess-capacity problem reveals a serious defect in its “socialist market economy.”	中国的产能过剩问题折射出了“社会主义市场经济”所产生的严重弊端。


In many industries, neither market forces nor central planning are strong enough to bring about the “creative destruction” of inefficient producers.	在许多行业，无论是市场本身还是中央政府的力量都不足以推动对低效率生产者的“创造性淘汰”。


As a result, the dream of catching up with the developed countries has to a surprising extent been realized much as Mao imagined – by lower-level cadres using small-scale technology.	结果赶超发达国家的梦想就以一种令人大吃一惊的方式，按照毛泽东构想的那样实现了 —— 以低水平官员操纵小规模技术的形式。


If simply leading the world in output is the goal, the Chairman’s vision has been resoundingly vindicated.	如果目标仅仅是实现产量的世界第一的话，那么主席的宏愿也算圆满完成了。


But if product quality, environmental protection, and economic efficiency are important as well, this state of affairs is little short of nightmarish.	但如果产品质量，环保水平和经济效益都同样重要的话，那么中国工业目前的状况，就堪称一场噩梦。


China’s Expanding Core	中国扩大的核心利益


TOKYO – China is now engaged in bitter disputes with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, both located far beyond China’s 200-mile-wide territorial waters in the South China Sea.	东京—目前，中国与菲律宾的黄岩岛之争和与日本的钓鱼岛之争愈演愈烈，这两个岛均位于南海中国200英里领海线之外。


Indeed, so expansive are China’s claims nowadays that many Asians are wondering what will satisfy China’s desire to secure its “core interests.”	事实上，如今，中国的领土主张非常强硬，以至于许多亚洲国家弄不清如何才能满足中国捍卫其“核心利益”的愿望。


Are there no limits, or does today’s China conceive of itself as a restored Middle Kingdom, to whom the entire world must kowtow?	中国的领土欲望就没有一个限度吗？ 还是说，中国认为自己已经重新成为天朝上国，全世界面对它都得卑躬屈膝？


So far, China has formally referred to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang province as “core interests,” a phrase that connotes an assertion of national sovereignty and territorial integrity that will brook no compromise.	到目前为止，正式被中国列入“核心利益”的包括台湾、西藏和新疆。 “核心利益”一词意味着国家主权和领土完整，中国在这方面绝不会让步。


Now China is attempting to apply the same term to the Senkaku Islands in its dispute with Japan, and is perilously close to making the same claim for the entire South China Sea; indeed, some Chinese military officers already have.	如今，中国正意欲把核心利益一词用于与日本的钓鱼岛之争，甚至不顾危险地将它用于对整个南海的主张：事实上，一些军官已经在这么用了。


The Senkaku Islands, located to the west of Okinawa in the East China Sea and currently uninhabited, were incorporated into Japan by the Meiji government in 1895.	钓鱼岛位于东海冲绳以西，目前无人定居，1895年被划入日本明治政府。


At one time, there were regular residents working at a bonito-drying facility.	该岛一度曾有常住民从事鲣鱼干的制作。


In 1969, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) completed a seabed survey of the East China Sea, and reported the possible presence of vast underground mineral resources, including abundant oil and natural gas reserves near the Senkakus.	1969年，联合国亚洲和远东经济委员会完成了一份关于东海海床的调查报告，报告说，东海海底蕴藏着大量资源，其中钓鱼岛附近海域蕴藏着巨量石油和天然气储量。


Two years passed before Taiwan and China claimed sovereignty over the islands, in 1971, but the Japanese government’s stance has always been that Japan’s sovereignty is not in question.	两年后，1971年，中国和台湾宣称对钓鱼岛拥有主权，但日本政府立场从未改变：日本对该岛的主权不容置疑。


In April, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, a famous and articulate patriot, announced that the metropolitan government that he leads plans to acquire four of the Senkaku Islands, which are currently privately owned by Japanese citizens.	4月，敢说敢做的爱国人士、东京都知事石原慎太郎宣布，他所领导的东京政府计划买下目前由日本公民私人拥有的钓鱼岛群岛的四个岛屿。


Donations for the purchase from the people of Japan now exceed ¥700 million ($8.4 million).	日本人民对此项活动的捐款额已经超过了7亿日元。


China reacted to Ishihara’s proposal with its usual sensitivity: it refused to receive the scheduled visit of Ishihara’s son, who is Secretary-General of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, the country’s main opposition party.	中国以其一贯的敏感应对石原慎太郎的主张：拒绝接受石原慎太郎之子、日本主要反对党自民党总干事的访问计划。


Moreover, at a meeting in Beijing earlier this month between Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during a trilateral summit with South Korea, Wen mentioned the independence movement in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Senkaku Islands in the same breath.	此外，在本月早些时候在北京举行的中日韩三国峰会中，日本首相野田佳彦和中国总理温家宝进行了会晤。 温家宝说，新疆维吾尔自治区的独立运动和钓鱼岛事件的性质是一样的。


“It is important to respect China's core interests and issues of major concern,” he emphasized.	“尊重中国的核心利益和重大关切是十分重要的。 ”温家宝强调说。


Until that moment, the Chinese government had never applied the term “core interest” to the Senkaku Islands.	在此之前，中国政府从未将“核心利益”用于钓鱼岛。


Following Wen’s statement, the trilateral summit deteriorated.	随着温家宝的这番话脱口而出，三国峰会也变了质。


While South Korean President Lee Myung-bak held bilateral talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao, talks between Noda and Hu, and a scheduled meeting between Keidanren Chairman Hiromasa Yonekura and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, were also canceled.	韩国总统李明博继续与中国国家主席胡锦涛进行了双边会谈，但野田佳彦和胡锦涛的会晤以及计划中的日本经联团主席米仓弘昌与中国外交部长杨洁篪的会谈被取消了。


The joint declaration issued at the summit was delayed a day, and omitted all references to North Korea – a prime concern of both Japan and South Korea.	三国峰会联合宣言也推迟了一天发布，宣言中没有任何关于朝鲜问题的内容，而这本是日本和韩国最关心的问题。


China’s brusque treatment of Japan’s leaders probably was intended as a rebuke not only over the Senkaku Islands issue, but also for hosting the Fourth General Meeting of the World Uyghur Congress in Tokyo in May.	中国之所以对日本领导人唐突以待，恐怕不仅仅是在钓鱼岛问题上的示威，也是在对5月第四届世界维吾尔大会在东京召开表示不满。


Previously, such meetings had been held in Germany and the United States, and this one, which stressed the importance of protecting human rights and preserving the traditions, culture, and language of the Uyghur people, received no official sanction or endorsement from the Japanese government.	此前，世界维吾尔大会曾在德国和美国举行，而此次在日本召开的第四届大会旨在强调保护人权，捍卫维吾尔族的传统、文化和语言，日本政府对此既不反对，也不赞成。


If gruff diplomacy was the only manifestation of China’s expansive territorial claims, Asian leaders could sleep more peacefully.	如果粗暴外交是中国扩张性领土主张的唯一表现，那么亚洲领导人大可以高枕无忧。


But the fact is that China’s navy is becoming increasingly active in the South China Sea, at the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Shoal in particular, but also around the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam.	但事实表明，中国海军在南海的活动越来越活跃，特别是在钓鱼岛和黄岩岛海域，在越南宣称拥有主权的南沙群岛也是如此。


Given China’s mushrooming military budget and secretiveness, that assertiveness has set off alarm bells among the other countries bordering the South China Sea.	中国的军费节节攀升，军队的神秘性与日俱增，其海军所表现出来的魄力已经对其他南海邻国敲响了警钟。


Moreover, China’s bullying of the Philippines included not only the dispatch of warships to Scarborough Shoals, but also the sudden imposition of import restrictions on Filipino produce.	此外，中国对菲律宾的欺凌不仅包括派遣军舰前往黄岩岛，还对菲律宾产品突然施加了严格的进口限制。


And China’s reactions toward Japan are far more paranoid since a non-LDP government took power.	而自从非自民党入主日本政坛以来，中国的对日行为也变得更加偏执了。


The struggles for power within China’s ruling Communist Party over the purge of Bo Xilai, and the blind activist Chen Guangcheng’s escape from detention during economic talks with the US, have made Chinese leaders’ nationalist assertions even more strident than usual.	薄熙来事件中的中共内斗以及盲人活动家陈光诚在中美经济对话期间逃脱监禁让中国领导人的民族主义取向更加坚定了。


No official wants to appear soft where China’s supposed “core interests” are concerned.	没有哪个官员愿意在事关中国认定的“核心利益”问题上示软。


So far, China has not unleashed the sort of mass demonstrations against Japan and others that it has used in the past to convey its displeasure.	到目前为止，中国还没有使出反日和反其他国家大游行这一以往惯用的表达不满的招数。


But that probably reflects the jittery state of China’s leaders in the wake of the Bo purge: they cannot guarantee that an anti-Japan demonstration would not turn into an anti-government protest.	但这可能反映了中国领导人在薄熙来事件发酵过程中的不安情绪：他们无法保证反日游行不会演变为反政府示威。


China’s real core interests are not in territorial expansion and hegemony over its neighbors, but in upholding the human rights and improving the welfare of its own citizens, which is the world’s core interest in China.	中国真正的核心利益并不在领土扩张和称霸四邻，���在于提升人权和改善中国人民的福利，这也是世界对中国的核心利益。


But until China accepts that its territorial claims in the South China Sea must be discussed multilaterally, so that smaller countries like the Philippines and Vietnam do not feel threatened, China’s ever expanding “core interests” will be the root of instability in East Asia.	但在中国认识到南海领土主张必须放在多边讨论框架内以使菲律宾和越南等小国不至于感到威胁之前，中国不但扩大的“核心利益”将一直是东亚不稳定之源。


China’s Fair-Weather American Friends	中国的美国朋友——不可共患难


MUNICH – Because China has pegged its undervalued currency, the renminbi, to the dollar, every weakening of the dollar in the wake of America’s financial crisis has also meant a weakening of the renminbi vis-à-vis other world currencies.	慕尼黑——由于中国已经将其估值过低的货币人民币与美国挂钩，因此美国金融危机后美元每次贬值都意味着人民币对其他世界货币贬值。


But is China really to blame for the eruption of a global currency war?	但是中国真的是全球货币战争爆发的罪魁祸首吗？


The central banks of South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, Japan, Switzerland, and many other countries are now buying dollars in order to protect their own currencies against revaluation and thus to defend their exports.	韩国、巴西、台湾、日本、瑞士以及其他许多国家的央行正在购买美元来防止它们本国货币的升值，以此来保护他们的出口。 对于欧元汇率超过1.


Europe also became nervous after the euro exchange rate rose to more than $1.40, far beyond the purchasing power parity (PPP) rate of $1.17.	4美元，欧洲也是紧张不已，这远远超出了1. 17美元的购买力平价率。


The United States is now taking drastic steps against China, and is making provisions for a trade war.	如今，美国正在采取严厉措施对付中国，也准备着一场贸易战。


Congress has authorized the President to impose import duties on Chinese products if China remains unwilling to increase the value of its currency substantially against the dollar.	（美国）国会已授权总统，如果中国仍旧不愿大幅提高人民币对美元的价值，那么就对中国商品强加进口税。


But the undervaluation of the renminbi, which is currently 45%, has persisted for many years.	但是人民币的估值过低——目前低了45%——已经存在许多年了。


So why is the US suddenly acting so aggressively?	为什么美国突然 采取富有侵略性的措施呢？


Why didn’t America take action much earlier?	为什么美国早前不采取措施呢？


The reason lies in capital movements.	原因在于资本的流动。


The US accepted the lower valuation of the renminbi as long as China returned the dollars that it earned from bilateral merchandise trade by financing America’s budget deficit.	以前中国用中美商贸中赚得的美元来填补美国的财政赤字，因此美国接受人民币的低估值。


Now that the Chinese prefer to invest that money in raw materials in Africa and elsewhere, they have aroused the full ire of American policymakers.	而今，中国人喜欢把资本投入到非洲和其他地方的原材料上，这让美国决策者愤怒不已。


China’s shift has been dramatic.	中国的投资转变非常剧烈。


In 2008 and 2009, the Chinese purchased US government bonds at a rate of $17 billion a month.	在2008～2009年间，中国以每月170亿美元的速度购买美国政府债券。


But China reversed course in November 2009.	但是在2009年9月，中国改变了投资方向。


During the first seven months of 2010, China not only refrained from buying any more US government paper, but even began to sell its holdings.	在2010年的头7个月，中国不仅不再买入美国政府债券，而且甚至开始出售手中的债券。


Each month, China sold a net sum of about $7 billion in US government bonds.	中国每个月净出售70亿美元的美国政府债券。


That nerves are now on end in America is perfectly understandable.	美国现在神经紧绷也是完全可以理解的。


The City of London has jumped into the breach, increasing its purchases, which in 2008 and 2009 amounted to only about $1 billion monthly, to an average of $28 billion in the first seven months of this year.	伦敦市插入了中国留下的投资缝隙，提高了对美政府债券的购买量。 在2008～2009年期间，伦敦的购买量是每月10亿美元左右，在今年头7个月增至平均每月280亿美元。


Since the United Kingdom itself is a large capital importer, we can assume that the City is not holding the paper itself but merely restructuring it and then selling it to the world under a new name and with the London stamp on it.	由于英国本身是一个资本输入国，因此我们可以猜测，伦敦并不是自己持有这些债券，而是通过简单地重新包装这些债券，然后为这些债券取个印有伦敦盖章的新名字，然后转售到世界其他地方。


Despite its withdrawal from financing the US government, China remains the world’s largest net capital exporter, a position that it has held since 2006.In2007 and 2008, China exported on average about $400 billion of capital annually.	尽管不再为美国政府提供资金，但是中国仍旧是世界上最大的资本净输出国，自2006年以来， 中国一直保持这个地位。 在2007～2008年，中国平均每年输出4 000亿美元的资本。


The US, which at the time needed annual capital imports of $800 billion in order to offset the near total cessation of private savings, received the lion’s share of this capital.	当时，美国每年需要8 000亿美元的资本输入来抵消几乎完全中断的私人储蓄，中国的大部分资本输出流到了美国。


The unwillingness of the Chinese to consume enabled Americans to build new houses for many years on borrowed money and to maintain a level of consumption that the US economy was unable to finance on its own.	中国人的��愿消费使得美国人能在许多年间依靠借来的资金来建造新房，维持一个美国经济无力维系的消费水平。


To be sure, the Chinese always restrained themselves from private real-estate financing in the US.	当然，中国人一般不为美国的私有房地产提供资金。


They bought only government paper and securitized real-estate instruments that were issued by the semi-public bodies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.	他们一般只购买政府债券以及由半国有机构房利美和房地美发行的证券化的房地产工具。


Direct real-estate finance via private channels came mainly from other countries – Germany, for example.	直接的房地产私人资本融资主要来自其他国家，比如德国。


Nevertheless, China helped the US to achieve a higher standard of living by making money available to government authorities that would otherwise have had to come from American taxpayers.	尽管如此，中国人通过为美国政府提供了原本要从美国纳税人中收取的资金，帮助美国达到更高的生活水准。


Given this history, it is a bit shabby to reproach China now for its exchange-rate policy – a policy that enabled the US to live beyond its means for so long.	就这段历史来看，如今指责中国的汇率政策是有点卑鄙的。 中国的汇率政策使美国人能在这么长的时期内享受超出自己收入的生活水平。


Rather than coming at the expense of the US, as is constantly claimed, it was the renminbi’s low valuation that allowed Americans to dream their American dream of universal homeownership.	美国经常称人民币的低估值损害了美国利益，其实正是人民币的低估值让美国人能做全民有房的美国梦。


Imports of inexpensive Chinese products freed up capital and labor in the US for a dramatic expansion of the housing stock – which led to a sharp rise in the American standard of living.	廉价中国产品的进口使美国能腾出资本和人力，来大规模增加房产数量，由此急剧提高了美国人的生活水准。


It is understandable that the Chinese are now reluctant to invest more money in the US.	如今，中国人不愿意继续在美国投资，这是可以理解的。


They tried to enter the US energy market with the purchase of Unocal, but were blocked by politicians.	他们曾尝试购买优尼科，进入美国能源市场，但是美国的政治人士阻止了这一并购举措。


Other direct investments were also stopped by Congress on the pretext of national security.	国会同样还以国家安全为借口，阻止了中国其他的直接投资。


One need only recall the bidding for Emcore or Firstgold.	人们只要回想光纤公司“Emcore”和金矿公司“Firstgold”的竞标案就明白了。


The US wanted the Chinese money, but it was not prepared to offer anything more than structured securities of questionable creditworthiness, as well as government paper that is now clearly exposed to the risk of inflation and devaluation.	美国想要中国人的资金，但是却只愿意提供信誉无保障的结构化证券，以及如今有通胀和贬值危险的政府债券。


It would be a service to world peace if the US stopped making cheap moral accusations against China.	如果美国停止频频对中国做卑鄙的道德指责，那么世界和平将会受益。


The truth is much more subtle than naked political interest.	事实比赤裸裸的政治利益更加微妙。


China’s Financial Fetish	中国的金融拜物


With the drum beating for the development of the costal areas of Tianjin near Beijing, the curtain seems to be rising on yet another “financial center” in China.	随着北京近邻的天津今日打响滨海开发开放的战地口号，中国另一个“金融中心”建设的帷幕似乎就要拉开。


When Shanghai sought a similar role several years ago, bankers and investors around the world wondered whether the aim was really for Shanghai to replace Hong Kong as China’s financial heart.	几年前当上海举起中华牌的时候，全世界的银行家和投资客都在猜测，其用意是否真的就是要让上海取代香港成为中国的金融中心。


In the current pilot project, Tianjin in China’s north and Shanghai in the south are competing against each other, prompting even more second-guessing.	在目前这一试点中，天津与上海形成南北竞争的局面，越发引起人们的猜测。


Once upon a time, no one had any idea about how to create a “financial center.”	以前，没有人知道如何建造“金融中心”。


A financial center was simply a great metropolis where enormous financial dealings took place.	金融中心只不过是一个重要的金融活动集散地。


Cities such as London and New York became known as financial centers only after they had proved themselves in the role.	像纽约和伦敦那样的城市只有证明了自己的作用之后才被称作金融中心。


Policymakers in China seem to be unaware that many major cities have not had the luck to become financial centers.	中国的决策者似乎并不知道，没有幸运地成为金融中心的大都市还有很多很多。


There is no economic or other theory that explains why a city called a “financial center” should be more valuable or lovely than others.	经济学家或者其他理论家并没有一个理论告诉我们，成为金融中心的城市一定比没有成为金融中心的城市更有价值、更可爱。


Why, then, should China make developing global financial centers a vital national goal?	那么，为什么中国要把建设金融中心列为重要的全国性目标呢？


Does China really need its own financial centers of world standing?	中国果真需要自己的世界级的金融中心吗？


Does the world need China to have them?	是否世界需要中国有世界级的金融中心？


Or is such a goal necessary because a financial center can determine the fate of a great metropolis?	或者是一个金融中心可以决定一个大都市的命运，就必须有这样的一个目标呢？


Nothing in the history of finance, the evolution of cities, or modern economics provides a clear answer.	金融的发展史、城市的演变以及现代经济学都不能提供明确的答案。


It is the Chinese who have endowed the term “financial center” with such weight and meaning by trying to dissect the functions of such cities and quantify every detail.	但金融中心这个词变成今天如此的份量和含义，是中国人自己的产物。 我们试图把金融中心的功能拆开来，并且把每一个细节都量化。


As a result, politicians are prepared to pick a city and order it to create the functions of a financial center, as if such a thing can be constructed like a building – a concept that could not be more off the mark.	结果，政客们就选择一个城市并且命令它建造金融中心的功能，好像是这样一个东西可以当作建筑来建设。 这是一个错得没谱的概念。


Indeed, according to modern development models of finance, whether or not a physical center of finance exists is no longer a meaningful issue.	在金融的现代发展模式下，金融有没有中心已经不是什么有意义的问题。


Owing to historical factors and opportunities, financial transactions were concentrated in cities that were traditionally closely linked to the rise of European and American capitalism.	由于历史因素和机遇，传统上金融活动与欧美资本主义的崛起紧密相连，其形成集中在那些城市里。


But what counts nowadays is not where financial transactions physically take place, but rather the growing importance and globalization of finance in the operation of the world economy.	但是现在，金融活动聚集在哪个地方并不重要，重要的是在世界经济运行中，金融越来越重要，越来越全球化了。


Cities do not become financial centers because they are more “excellent” than other cities, or because they have done something that other cities failed to do.	某些城市成为金融中心并不是因为它们比其他城市更为优越，也不是一些地方做了一些别的地方忘记做的事情。


Instead, once financial transactions begin to concentrate in a place, it becomes hard to move them to other places.	而是一旦金融活动聚集在一个地方，就不大容易搬迁到其他地方。


A free-market economy and its legal traditions -- both indispensable to the survival of financial centers – certainly helps them to rise, but that initial rise has always been attributable to historical evolution, not government strategy.	自由的市场经济和法律传统对于金融中心的生存不可或缺，当然帮助它们崛起，但是最初的崛起总是历史演变，而不是政府的战略打造出来的。


In this sense, China’s effort to deliberately create, through government fiat, global financial centers is both exacting and dogmatic.	从这个意义上说，中国刻意通过政府法令建造全球金融中心是苛刻教条的。


There is no doubt that China needs its financial sector to develop soundly in order to ensure sustained economic growth.	毫无疑问，为了中国的经济持续有效地发展下去，需要金融部门的健康发展。


And there is now a common understanding in China that meeting this objective requires that the government safeguard financial liberalization.	在这个问题上，我们有了共识，那就是，实现这一目标要求政府保障金融自由化。


But progress has been slow, because China’s politicians have put nurturing financial centers – which should be the objective of local governments – at the heart of the country’s financial development.	但是这一进程缓慢，因为，中国的政客们把推进金融发展的重心放在打造金融中心这个地方政府的目标上去了。


Indeed, equating financial liberalization with privileges for cities designated as “financial centers” undermines the very goals of liberalization – namely, to reduce government control and to accelerate the development of financial markets.	实际上，将金融自由化与城市被列为“金融中心”的特权等同起来恰好放慢了金融自由化的目标，也就是减少政府控制，加快金融市场的发展。


China’s financial system is failing in that respect, owing to frequent administrative and political intervention.	中国由于金融领域的行政和政治色彩浓厚，中国的金融体系一直落后。


As a result, Shanghai has been restricted from making the best of its financial functions, and Hong Kong, Asia’s acknowledged financial center, from assisting China’s financial modernization.	结果限制了上海发挥其金融功能，而且也限制了香港这一亚洲公认的金融中心帮助中国的金融现代化。


What China needs most is a financial sector capable of harnessing the forces of liberalization and globalization to drive economic growth in the decades ahead.	中国需要的是一个能够利用自由化和全球化的力量在未来几十年中推动经济增长的金融部门。


The time has come to cast off the burden of building financial centers, and focus instead on advancing the modernization of Chinese finance.	现在应当放弃建设金融中心的包袱，集中精力推进中国金融现代化的步伐。


China’s Five-Year Plan and Global Interest Rates	中国的五年计划与全球利率


CAMBRIDGE – China’s new five-year plan will have important implications for the global economy.	发自剑桥——中国的新五年计划将对全球经济产生极其重要的影响。


Its key feature is to shift official policy from maximizing GDP growth toward raising consumption and average workers’ standard of living.	该计划的主要特点就是将原本着眼于GDP增长最大化的官方政策转变为对消费以及劳动者平均生活水平的提高。


Although this change is driven by Chinese domestic considerations, it could have a significant impact on global capital flows and interest rates.	虽然这一变化是由中国国内的一些因素所引发的，但它仍将对全球现金流和利率造成显著影响。


China’s high rate of GDP growth over the past decade has, of course, raised the real incomes of hundreds of millions of Chinese, particularly those living in or near urban areas.	中国在过去几十年内的高GDP增长无疑使数亿中国人的收入得到了提高，而其中受益最大的则是那些居住在城市或是城郊区域的人们。


And the funds that urban workers send to relatives who remain in the agricultural sector have helped to raise their standard of living as well.	而那些城市劳动者向农村老家的汇款同时也有助于提高后者的生活水平。


But real wages and consumption have grown more slowly than China’s total GDP.	但实际工资和消费的增长速度却远远低于中国GDP总额的增长速度。


Much of the income from GDP growth went to large state-owned enterprises, which strengthened their monopoly power.	事实上GDP的增长主要来自于大型国有企业，而这些企业也借此巩固了自身的行业垄断地位。


And a substantial share of China’s output goes abroad, with exports exceeding imports by enough to create a current-account surplus of more than $350 billion over the past year.	此外还有大量的中国产品被输往国外，出口总额大幅超出进口总额，仅仅在去年就创造了3500亿美元的经常账户盈余。


China now plans to raise the relative growth rate of real wages and to encourage increased consumer spending. There will also be more emphasis on expanding service industries and less on manufacturing.	中国如今计划提高实际工资的相对增长率并以此刺激更多的消费支出，同时还强调进一步扩大服务业而非制造业的规模。


State-owned enterprises will be forced to distribute more of their profits.	国有企业将被迫将更多的利润拿出来分享。


The rising value of the renminbi will induce Chinese manufacturers to shift their emphasis from export markets to production for markets at home.	而人民币的升值将导致中国制造商将重心从国际市场转回到国内市场。


And the government will spend more on low-income housing and to expand health-care services.	政府也将在低收入者住房和扩大医疗保障方面投入更多资金。


All of this will mean a reduction in national saving and an increase in spending by households and the Chinese government.	上述这几点都意味着中国的国家储蓄将减少而家庭和政府的支出将增加。


China now has the world’s highest saving rate, probably close to 50% of its GDP, which is important both at home and globally, because it drives the country’s current-account surplus.	中国目前拥有全世界最高的储蓄率，大约相等于GDP的50%，这个数字无论是在国内还是全球范围内都非常重要，也正是它导致了中国的经常账户盈余。


A country that saves more than it invests in equipment and structures (as China does) has the extra output to send abroad as a current-account surplus, while a country that invests more than it saves (as the United States does) must fill the gap by importing more from the rest of the world than it exports.	一个将资金更多地用于储蓄而非投资于设备和基建的国家（像中国这样）将会向国外输出一个额外的产物，那就是经常账户盈余； 而与此对应的则是一个投资高于储蓄的国家（比如美国）会通过从全世界进口多于出口的方式来消化上述盈余。


And a country with a current-account surplus has the funds to lend and invest in the rest of the world, while a country with a current-account deficit must finance its external gap by borrowing from the rest of the world.	一个拥有经常账户盈余的国家可以有钱去贷款或者投资世界其他国家； 而一个经常账户赤字的国家则必须向全球其他国家借钱以弥补其外部逆差。


More precisely, a country’s current-account balance is exactly equal to the difference between its national saving and its investment.	更精确地说，一个国家的经常账户平衡状况就等于其国家储蓄与投资之间的差额。


The future reduction in China’s saving will therefore mean a reduction in China’s current-account surplus – and thus in its ability to lend to the US and other countries.	未来中国储蓄的减少就意味着中国经常账户盈余的减少——以及其向美国以及世界其他国家借款能力减弱。


If the new emphasis on increased consumption shrank China’s saving rate by 5% of its GDP, it would still have the world’s highest saving rate. But a five-percentage-point fall would completely eliminate China’s current-account surplus.	如果对增加消费的新一轮强调能使中国储蓄相对GDP的比率下降5%，那么中国依然会是全球储蓄率最高的国家，但这5%的下降将完全消灭中国的经常账户盈余。


That may not happen, but it certainly could happen by the end of the five-year plan.	这一情景本不该出现，但却完全有可能在本轮5年计划的末期变成现实。


If it does, the impact on the global capital market would be enormous.	如果这一情况真的发生的话，对全球资本市场的影响将十分巨大。


With no current-account surplus, China would no longer be a net purchaser of US government bonds and other foreign securities.	没有了经常账户盈余，中国就不再是美国政府债券以及外国债券的净买家。


Moreover, if the Chinese government and Chinese firms want to continue investing in overseas oil resources and in foreign businesses, China will have to sell dollar bonds or other sovereign debt from its portfolio.	此外，如果中国政府以及中资企业想继续开拓海外石油资源或者进行商业投资的话，就必须出售自己投资组合中的美元债券或其他国家的主权债券。


The net result would be higher interest rates on US and other bonds around the world.	这一新举措的后果则是更高的美国以及世界各国债券利率。


Whether interest rates do rise will also depend on how US saving and investment evolves over the same period. America’s household saving rate has risen since 2007 by about 3% of GDP.	与此同时，利率是否上升还取决于美国的储蓄和投资在同一时期内有何进展。


Corporate saving is also up. But the surge in the government deficit has absorbed all of that extra saving and more.	美国的家庭储蓄相对GDP的比率自2007年以来已经上升了3%，公司储蓄也有所增加，但大量增加的政府赤字却掩盖了上述成果。


Indeed, the only reason that America’s current-account deficit was lower in 2010 than in previous years is that investment in housing and other construction declined sharply.	事实上，2010年美国经常账户赤字比前几年都低的唯一原因就是在住宅和其他建设项目方面的投资大幅下滑。


If Americans’ demand for housing picks up and businesses want to increase their investment, a clash between China’s lower saving rate and a continued high fiscal deficit in the US could drive up global interest rates significantly.	如果美国人对住宅的需求重新上扬而企业又想增加投资的话，那么中国的低储蓄率和美国继续存在的高财政赤字之间将发生冲突，并导致全球利率大幅上升。


China’s Flood Of Protests	中国的抗议浪潮


Protests in China are nothing new.	中国的抗议问题已经是老生常谈了。


By some accounts, Chinese officials currently negotiate upwards of 50,000 “major incidents” annually.	据有些估计，目前中国官员每年处理的“主要事件”就多达50，000起。


Widespread corruption has bred deep discontent: workers protest the Enron-like bilking of their life savings, townspeople fight against illegal land seizures, and villagers battle injustices – small and large – on a daily basis.	四处蔓延的腐败激起了深刻的不满： 工人们抗议安然式诈骗毁掉了自己一生的积蓄，城市居民反对非法侵占土地，而农村人则不得不日日与大大小小的不公平现象抗争。


Typically, these protests are local in nature and generally resolved with a combination of payoffs, arrests, and promises of future improvement.	典型的抗议活动常带有浓厚的地方色彩，而且一般可以通过补偿、拘留和承诺以后改进等方法加以化解。


Occasionally, China’s government takes action against local officials whose crimes are considered egregious.	中国政府也会偶尔采取行动，惩治恶行昭彰的地方官吏。


As long as protests remain local, however, they can be managed as isolated cases that won’t pose a broader challenge or spark a movement toward systemic change.	只要抗议活动是地方性的，就可以作为孤立事件进行处理，而不会构成大范围的挑战或点燃体制骤变的火花。


Yet the government’s days of putting out protests like brush fires may be ending.	但政府像扑灭山林火险那样压制民众抗议的日子已经一去不复返了。


Over the past year and a half, China’s environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) have organized protests that reach across provincial boundaries, engage Chinese from all social strata, garner support from China’s media, and directly address the issue of failed governance on a national scale.	过去一年半以来，中国环境领域的非政府组织（NGOs）组织了跨省抗议活动，赢得了中国社会各阶层的参与及媒体的支持，矛头直指国家政府的腐败无能。


The catalyst for these broad-based protests is the proposed construction of hundreds of dams throughout western China.	这次大规模抗议活动的导火索是在中国西部建设成百上千个水库的提议。


Dam construction in China has never been open to public debate.	中国的水库建设从来就不听取群众意见。


China’s environmental activists, meanwhile, have focused on the “politically safe” issues of protecting biodiversity, recycling, and environmental education.	与此同时，中国的环保行动人士还重点关注保护生物多样性、资源再生和环境教育等方面的政治安全问题。


Now, however, these activists have become more assertive, launching campaigns against a number of proposed dams along the Nu and Jinsha Rivers in Yunnan and the Min River in Sichuan.	可现在这些人变得更加自信，他们对云南境内怒江和金沙江和四川闽江流域的几个水库提出了反对意见。


They still raise traditional issues of biodiversity loss, destruction of sites of natural beauty and cultural importance, and social justice issues surrounding resettlement.	他们还就有损生物多样性、破坏景区的自然景观和文化价值、以及居民重新安置时的不平等现象等传统问题提出了异议。


But now they also challenge the shoddy governance and corruption that allow dam construction to proceed unchecked, without environmental impact assessments, as local officials siphon off resettlement funds and ignore the claims of local villagers.	他们现在又把矛头指向腐败和管理不善，正是这两个原因让水库建设变得毫无节制，也不进行环境影响方面的评估，而与此同时，地方官员把安置款项据为己有，对当地村民的要求完全置之不理。


The political stakes are high, and China’s hydropower interests are strong.	由于能够给政治人物带来巨大的利益，中国兴修水利的热情一直非常高涨。


Environmental activists who are currently battling to halt damming and flooding in the culturally and scenically renowned region of the Tiger Leaping Gorge in Yunnan are battling hydropower kingpin Li Xiaopeng, son of former Premier Li Peng.	目前正在为阻止淹没云南著名的虎跳峡文化风景区修建水库而四面奔走的环保人士，面对的其实是前总理李鹏之子，水利核心人物李小鹏。


Dam protests can often be volatile.	反对兴修水库的抗议活动常常带有很大变数。


In October, tens of thousands of villagers protesting inadequate resettlement compensation held a local official captive for several hours before ten thousand People’s Armed Police officers rescued him.	10月，成千上万名不满安置补偿的村民把一名当地官员扣留了数小时之久，最后直到万名武装警察出动才把他解救出来。


These protests are striking not only for the sensitive nature of the issues they address, but for the broad-based support they have elicited.	这些抗议颇具威力，不仅因为他们针对的问题非常敏感，还因为他们获得了更为广泛的支持。


While spearheaded by Beijing-based NGO’s, the dam protests involve Chinese from all parts of the country, employ all means of communication, and engage the support of central government officials.	尽管是带头的是设在北京的非政府组织，但水库抗议还牵涉到来自各地的中国人，采用了所有的联络手段，还得到了中央政府官员的大力支持。


Beijing-based NGO’s are allying with local Sichuan NGO’s to launch Internet campaigns, distribute petitions, and mobilize villagers.	北京的非政府组织与四川当地的非政府组织通力合作，发动了一场因特网宣传攻势来散布请愿书和动员村民参与。


In one case, environmental activists took villagers from a proposed dam site to another town to see firsthand how poorly others had fared in the dam resettlement process.	其中一次，环保行动份子把村民从拟议中的库址领到另外一个城镇，让他们亲眼目睹了其它人在重新安置过程中的悲惨遭遇。


University students in the regions of the proposed dams have also become engaged through Internet chat groups.	拟建库址当地的大学生也通过网络聊天组的形式参与了进来。


Environmental activists have found allies among officials within China’s State Environmental Protection Administration, Meteorological Administration, and Forestry Bureau.	环保人士的活动得到了中国国家环保总局、国家气象局和林业局不少官员的支持。


The dam projects have also become a focal point for a broader political debate within the Chinese media.	水库项目也成了中国媒体大规模政治辩论中一个非常重要的焦点话题。


Newspapers such as Southern Weekend , China Youth Daily , and even the traditionally conservative China Daily call directly for greater political openness, increased political participation, and for strengthening the rule of law.	《南方周末》、《中国青年报》甚至是传统上非常保守的《中国日报》都直截了当地呼吁扩大政治开放和政治参与，并要求加强法治建设。


Similar environmental protests have evolved into demands for broader political change in other countries.	类似的环保抗议在其它国家也有演变成大规模政治改革要求的先例。


In the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, environmental activism contributed dramatically to regime change.	在前苏联及其附属国中，环保主义也对制度变革起到过引人注目的推动作用。


In countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, environmental protest has helped spur political reform.	在泰国、印尼和菲律宾等国，环保领域的抗议也曾对政治改革有所帮助。


The same may happen in China.	同样的事也有可能发生在中国。


Many of China’s leading environmentalists are former students and intellectual leaders from the Tiananmen protests of 1989 who believe that environmental activism offers an avenue for advancing broader political reform.	中国起领导作用的很多环保主义者都曾是1989年天安门事件中的学生和知识份子领袖，他们都深信：环境行动主义可以为更为广泛的政治改革开辟道路。


Others began apolitically, but have come to believe that there can be no environmental protection without political change.	其他人的出发点与政治无关，但他们相信:如果不进行政治改革，环境保护就永远不可能成功。


This shared commitment to systemic reform is putting China’s government to the test.	这种对体制改革的一致要求使中国政府面临着严峻的考验。


China’s leaders recognize that their policy options are limited: business as usual, repression, or reform.	即便中国领导人也承认：自己的政策选择非常有限： 要么像从前那样压制，要么就开始改革。


Thus far, the government has demonstrated some flexibility while trying to manage this new challenge with traditional means.	迄今为止，政府在用传统手段应对新的挑战方面，已经显示出一定的灵活性。


Premier Wen Jiabao has stayed the construction of a number of dams until environmental and social impact assessments could be undertaken.	温家宝总理已经暂停了几项筑坝工程，等待环境和社会影响方面的评估结果。


Some have been approved while others have not.	有些工程被批准上马，而有些则被撤销。


With hundreds of dams still likely to become targets for protest, pressure will only intensify for a more significant response.	因为还有成百上千座水坝可能引发争议，要求采取进一步措施的压力只会越来越大。


The government could launch a broad crackdown on such protests, although this would risk damaging China’s prestige internationally and provoking larger, more violent protests.	政府有可能对这样的抗议进行镇压，尽管这样做只会损害中国的国际威望，并引发规模更大、更猛烈的抗议行动。


The third option is to use environmental protection to justify moving China ahead with real political reform sooner rather than later.	还有第三种选择，那就是把环境保护作为开展真正政治改革、推动中国向前发展的理由。


While this is currently an unlikely outcome, as the anti-dam protests gather strength, China’s leaders may realize that if they do not move quickly, they risk being swept away.	尽管目前看来这种可能性还不大，但随着反对筑坝工程的力量越来越大，中国的领导人可能会发现：如果他们不能迅速采取行动，就面临着被这股浪潮吞没的危险。


China’s Green Debt	中国的环境欠债


For a decade, the world has wondered when China’s leaders will recognize the staggering environmental crisis confronting their country.	过去十年来，全世界都在想知道中国的领导人何时能够认识到中国所面临的巨大的环境危机。


This year, we got an answer: a new Five-Year Plan that makes environmental protection a priority.	今年，我们有了答案。 新的五年计划把环境保护列为优先问题。


A storm of green propaganda has followed, and the government now talks about using “Green GDP” to measure development.	随后开展了一鼓风的绿色宣传，政府现在谈论用“绿色GDP”来衡量发展。


But will all this talk amount to real progress?	但是，所有的这些高谈阔论能够带来实际的进展吗？


While the central government admits to some of the environmental degradation caused by rapid economic growth, the picture it paints is incomplete.	尽管中央政府承认由于快速经济发展所造成的某些环境破坏，但是，政府还是文过饰非。


Consider “Green GDP.”	看一看“绿色GDP”就可以知道了。


This spring, the State Environmental Protection Administration produced the country’s first official estimate of GDP adjusted downward for environmental losses.	今年春天，国家环保总局发布了中国的第一个正式的由于环境损失造成的向下调整后的GDP估计。


According to these calculations, it would cost $84 billion to clean up the pollution produced in 2004, or 3% of GDP for that year.	根据这些估算，清理在2004年所产生的污染就会需要840亿美元，相当于当年GDP的3%。


But more realistic estimates put environmental damage at 8-13% of China’s GDP growth each year, which means that China has lost almost everything it has gained since the late 1970’s due to pollution.	但是，更为现实的估计认为，环境损失占中国每年GDP增长的8%到13%。 这就意味着，由于污染，中国几乎失去了自七十年代末期以来所得到的一切成就。


China’s environmental problems, complex as the causes may be, can ultimately be attributed to our understanding of Marxism.	中国的环境问题根源复杂，最终可以归结于我们对于马克思主义的理解。


For most of our recent history, we saw in Marxism only a philosophy of class struggle.	在中国最近历史的大部分时期，我们一直把马克思主义看作是阶级斗争哲学。


We believed that economic development would solve all our problems.	我们相信经济发展可以解决所有问题。


In the reform period, this misreading of Marx morphed into an unrestrained pursuit of material gain devoid of morality.	在改革时期，这一对马克思主义的误解转变成对于物质利益无限制的、不计道德的追求。


Traditional Chinese culture, with its emphasis on harmony between human beings and nature, was thrown aside.	传统中国文化强调人与自然的和谐，已经被抛在一边。


As a result, China’s economy is dominated by resource-hungry and inefficient polluters, such as coal and mineral mines, textile and paper mills, iron and steel makers, petrochemical factories, and building material producers.	结果，耗费大量能源以及低效率的污染企业，例如煤炭和矿物开采、纺织厂、造纸厂、钢铁企业、化工厂以及建材企业统治了中国的经济。


Our cities are exploding in size, depleting water resources and creating horrific traffic congestion.	我们的城市规模在爆炸，耗尽了水资源并且造成可怕的交通堵塞。


One-quarter of China’s people drink substandard water; one-third of urbanites breathe badly polluted air.	中国人口的四分之一饮用低于标准的水； 三分之一的城市居民呼吸严重污染的空气。


Moreover, the country recently witnessed a spate of environmental accidents.	而且，中国最近发生了一系列的环境事件。


Indeed, on average, China suffers a major water pollution accident every other day.	实际上，中国平均每两天就会发生一起严重的水污染事件。


Although China has signed the Kyoto Protocol and some 50 other international environmental accords, we do little to honor them.	尽管中国签署了京都议定书以及大约50个其他国际环保协议，我们却基本上没有履行。


If we are not serious about upgrading our industrial structure, we will fail when it comes time to fulfill our commitments to cut emissions.	如果我们对提升我们的产业结构不予以重视，我们就会无法实现我们的减少排放的承诺。


And while the new Five-Year Plan sets fine goals, many provinces have failed even to meet the major environment protection targets of the last Five-Year Plan.	尽管新的五年计划制定了精确的目标，许多省份却还没有实现上一个五年计划的主要环保目标。


True, China has made the kind of economic advances in three decades that required 100 years in Western countries.	的确，中国在过去三十年中实现了西方国家需要100年才能够实现的经济发展。


But China also has suffered a century’s worth of environmental damage in 30 years.	但是，中国在这30年中也承受了一个世纪的环境破坏。


Unfortunately, unlike Western countries, we cannot afford to wait until our per capita annual GDP reaches $10,000 before tackling our environmental problems.	不幸的是，与西方国家不同的是，我们无法等到我们的年人均GDP达到一万美元再解决我们的环境问题。


Our experts predict that the environmental crisis will intensify to a critical stage by the time China’s per capita annual GDP reaches just $3,000.	我们的专家估计，当中国的年人均GDP达到3000美元之时，环境危机将会加剧到一个危险的地步。


Making matters worse, while we discarded the finer elements of our traditional culture, we failed to absorb the better aspects of modern civilization.	更加糟糕的是，尽管我们抛弃了中国传统文化的精华，我们却没有吸收现代文明中好的一面。


The concept of a “social contract” based on rights and obligations – the essential values that constitute the most important precondition for effective environmental protection – goes largely ignored.	建立在权利和义务基础之上的“社会契约”概念是构成有效的环境保护的最为重要的先决条件的基本价值观点却被忽略。


As a result, environmental protection projects often fail to be included in calculating production costs.	结果，在计算生产成本的时候，环保项目经常不能被列入。


Scarcely anyone bothers to consider the environmental costs to – or rights of – the country’s poor and powerless.	很少有人会费神为中国的贫困和没有权势的人考虑环境成本以及他们的权利。


It is imperative that environmental factors figure in China’s macroeconomic planning in a real way.	现在，环境因素急待在中国的宏观经济规划中切实予以重视。


This requires that a more rational strategy be mapped out in the planning of major industrial projects and energy-hungry enterprises.	这就要求在重要产业项目和耗能大户企业的规划中制定出一个更为理性的战略。


Careful studies need to be done to determine available energy, land, mineral, and biological resources before projects proceed.	在项目开工前，应当认真研究，确定现有的能源、土地、矿产以及生物资源。


Land planning must be overhauled, with industrial monopolies broken up and development goals set according to population, resource volume, and the capacity to absorb pollution.	必须改革土地规划，打破工业垄断，发展目标应当根据人口、资源数量以及吸收污染的能力来予以制定。


Finally, China needs a new energy strategy.	最后，中国需要一个新的能源战略。


Industrialized nations have developed and made great use of nuclear, solar, wind, and bio-gas, and other renewable energy resources.	工业化国家发展并大量利用了核能、风力、沼气以及其他可再生资源。


China’s technological capacities in this sector lag behind even other developing nations such as India and Pakistan, and its reliance on coal is one of the greatest threats to the global climate.	中国在这方面的技术甚至落后于印度和巴基斯坦这样的发展中国家，而且，其对煤炭的依赖是对全球气候最大的威胁之一。


For now, there is simply no alternative.	目前，根本就没有替代。


But in the long run, clean energy will be the only way to bring economic growth without doing irreparable environmental damage.	但是，从长远来看，清洁能源是在不造成无可挽回的环境破坏的情况下带来经济增长的唯一的途径。


Government cannot solve these problems on its own.	政府无法自己解决这些问题。


China’s people have the biggest stake in environmental protection, and so must become the driving force.	中国人民在环保问题上最为利益悠关，因此就必须成为推动力量。


Local communities, non-governmental organizations, and businesses all must do their part.	地方社区、非政府组织以及企业界都必须做份内的事情。


They cannot limit themselves simply to “supervision” and appeals to the authorities.	它们不能仅仅把自己局限在“监管”的范围之内并向上级呼吁。


They must expand into other avenues of appeal: public hearings, welfare lawsuits, enhanced media coverage, and other voluntary activities.	它们必须进入其他的领域，包括公开听证、福利诉讼、提高媒体报道以及其他自愿性的活动。


But ultimate power does rest with the government.	但是，最后的权力还是在政府那里。


China’s leaders need to make several concrete moves in order to move beyond rhetoric.	中国的领导人需要采取几项切实的行动，而不仅仅是停留在口头。


They must give real power to environmental officials to implement existing laws and close gaping legal loopholes.	他们必须赋予环保干部以实权来实施现有的法律并堵塞巨大的法律漏洞。


This can only be done by introducing legal mechanisms to reward those who protect the environment, while making polluters pay, and by helping to unify the environmental watchdogs scattered across different sectors.	只有引入奖励保护环境者、惩罚污染者的法律机制以及帮助联合散落在不同地方的环境监督组织才能够做到。


Above all, a system needs to be established to monitor officials’ performance in environmental as well as in economic terms.	最为重要的是，需要建立一个监督干部经济以及环境政绩的体系。


China is dangerously near a crisis point.	中国正在处在一个危险的危机点上。


The country’s enormous environmental debt will have to be paid, one way or another.	国家巨大无比的环境欠帐无论那种形式总归要还的。


China must exercise the foresight needed to begin paying this debt now, when it is manageable, rather than allowing it to accumulate and, ultimately, threaten to bankrupt us all.	中国必须高瞻远瞩，趁还可以控制的时候现在就开始偿还债务，而不是让债台高筑，最终威胁到让大家都破产。


China’s Growing Growth Risks	中国增长风险增加


BEIJING – If everything goes right for China, it will surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy, in current dollar terms (and more quickly in real terms), by 2021.	北京—如果一切顺利，中国将于2021年超越美国成为世界第一大经济体（以当前美元价值衡量，如果用实际值衡量，超越美国将更快）。


Its per capita income will reach that of today’s lower tier of high-income countries.	中国的人均收入将达到低端高收入国家的现有水平。


But, despite its forward momentum, the Chinese economy faces looming risks in the coming decade.	但是，尽管中国经济前进势头迅猛，但在未来十年仍面临着一些不利的风险。


The immediate risk is continuing stagnation, or recession, in Europe.	最紧迫的风险是欧洲的持续停滞甚至衰退。


In the last decade, export growth has accounted for roughly one-third of China’s overall economic growth, and about one-third of Chinese exports went to the European Union.	在过去十年中，出口增长为中国的整体经济增长贡献了大约三分之一，而在中国的出口中，又有三分之一去向了欧盟。


If the situation in Europe continues to deteriorate, China’s growth will be dragged down.	如果欧洲的状况持续不振，中国的增长也将被拉后退。


Over-tightening of domestic macroeconomic policies, especially those aimed at the real-estate market, could heighten the risk of a slowdown, with house prices currently falling across China, owing to stringent government measures.	过紧的宏观经济政策，特别是房地产调控政策，将增加减速风险，目前，在政府严厉措施的作用下，全国房价都呈现出下降态势。


Indeed, the situation is much like that of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.	事实上，中国的情况与1997年亚洲金融危机时颇为相似。


In the several years before that crisis hit, China had been combating inflation, and appeared to be headed for a soft landing.	在危机爆发之前的几年中，中国一直在与通胀作斗争，准备着实现软着陆。


But the combination of crisis and austerity condemned China to several years of deflation and considerably slower growth.	但危机与紧缩政策一起导致中国在数年内出现了通缩和增长大减速。


Today, as China looks to the medium term, the government must face the problems created by its pervasive role in the economy.	如今，放眼中期，中国政府必须面对其过度干预经济所造成的问题。


A new World Bank report singles out lack of reform of state-owned enterprises as the most important impediment to the country’s economic growth.	最新世界银行报告指出，国有企业改革不力是中国经济最主要的障碍。


But that is only a symptom of a deeper problem: the government’s dominant role in economic affairs.	但这本身只是一个症状，更深层次的问题在于政府主导着经济活动。


In addition to controlling 25-30% of GDP directly, the government also takes a lion’s share of financial resources.	中国政府直接控制着GDP的25—30%，此外还掌握着大部分金融资源。


In recent years, more than one-third of total bank lending has gone to infrastructure, most of which has been built by government entities.	近年来，三分之一以上的银行贷款流向了基础设施，而基础设施大部分是由政府实体建设的。


Indeed, recognizing its over-investment in infrastructure, the government recently abandoned several high-speed rail projects that were already under construction.	事实上，政府已认识到了基础设施投资过的问题，目前已中止了几项已经开工的高铁项目。


But government over-investment is also evident in numerous industrial parks and high-tech zones.	但政府投资过度的问题仍然存在，数不尽的工业园和高新开发区就是明证。


China’s investment frenzy reminds many people of Japan in the 1980’s, when high-speed rail links were extended to Japan’s remotest corners.	中国的投资狂热不禁让人想起了20世纪80年代的日本，当时是，高铁延伸到了日本的每个角落，偏远地区也没有落下。


Most rely on government subsidies to this day.	如今，多条线路都必须仰仗政府补贴过活。


And, while the subsidies may improve the quality of life for ordinary people in some respects, they also detract from it by suppressing domestic consumption.	尽管补贴在一定程度上能够改善普通人的生活质量，但这是以压抑国内消费为代价实现的。


Infrastructure investment will inevitably run up against the law of diminishing marginal returns, but consumption growth does not have a limit.	基础设施投资难免要受边际回报递减规律的束缚，但消费增长是没有极限的。


Suppressing consumption thus suffocates future growth, and the share of household consumption in GDP has declined from 67% in the mid-1990’s to below 50% in recent years, with most of the decline reflecting the distortions created by government policies.	因此，压抑消费会拖累未来增长，家庭消费占GDP的比重从20世纪90年代中期的67%下降到了最近几年的不到50%，其中大部分可以用政府政策所导致的扭曲来解释。


China’s government is production-oriented by nature.	中国政府是生产导向的。


The upside is that this has helped to maintain high GDP growth rates.	这样做的好处是有利于维持GDP的高增长率。


But the downside is equally pronounced. One negative consequence is the persistent deepening of income inequality.	但坏处同样明显，其中之一是收入不平等性的持续恶化。


The Gini coefficient of per capita income has surpassed 50 (with 100 representing maximal inequality), putting China in the upper quartile of inequality worldwide.	人均收入基尼系数已经超过了50（100代表最大程度的不平等），这意味着中国已经步入世界上最不平等的四分之一国家行列。


The problem may not be inequality per se, but its consequences, one of which is the bifurcation of human capital.	或许问题并不在于不平等性本身，而在于其后果，比如人力资本的分化。


The return on education is increasing in China, but access to education is becoming increasingly divided socially and geographically.	在中国，教育的回报是上升的，但获得教育的难易程度正在社会和人口结构中呈现两极分化。


While education is improving in urban areas, children in the countryside are facing a decline in educational quality, because better teachers find their way to the cities.	城市的教育状况在改善，但农村的孩子面临着教育质量下降的问题，因为优秀教师都跑到城市里去了。


Moreover, given the income disparities between cities and rural areas, their education is more expensive than it is for urban families.	此外，由于城市和农村收入差距的存在，教育对农村家庭来说显得更加昂贵。


As a result, a majority of rural kids will enter the workforce without a university diploma.	结果，大部分农村孩子开始工作时没有大学文凭。


Among China’s 140 million migrant workers, 80% have only nine years or less of formal education – far short of what high-income countries require.	在中国的1. 4亿农民工中，80%只接受过9年甚至更少的正式教育，远低于高收入国家标准。


Despite officials’ seeming desire to reduce income inequality, China’s government is aggravating it, by – among other things – subsidizing producers, favoring capital-intensive industries, and maintaining a highly inefficient financial sector.	中国官员似乎有意减弱收入不平等的状况，但政府的一系列政策——（包括但不限于）补贴生产商、优待资本密集型产业、维持效率极低的金融部门等——在加剧这一问题。


But there are also promising signs of an economic uptick.	但令人振奋的经济信号还是存在的。


The government has just announced new rules for household registration, known as hukou.	中国政府刚刚宣布了户籍政策新规。


Except in large cities, people can now freely choose their hukou after three years of residency.	除大城市外，你只要在一地居住满三年，就可以自由选择是否将户籍迁入。


This will greatly help migrants by ensuring equal access to education for their children.	这一政策大大有助于农民工，因为它保障了孩子平等接受教育的机会。


To change completely the government’s distorting behavior, however, requires more drastic political changes.	但是，要彻底转变政府的扭曲性行为就必须采取更加迅猛的政治变革。


The hukou reform is a good start, as it will strengthen migrants’ political rights in local communities.	户籍改革是一个良好的开端，它增加了农民工在所在社区的政治权利。


Given their large numbers, their political participation may force local governments to become more responsive to ordinary people’s needs.	中国有着数量庞大的农民工群体，他们参与政治将迫使地方政府更加关心普通人民的需求。


And government responsiveness at lower levels, one may hope, might eventually trickle up to the top.	而我们希望，低级政府对群众要求的相应最终会传递到最高层。


China’s Happy Mask	中国快乐的面具


BEIJING – China’s “face” may be its Achilles’ Heel.	北京--中国的“面子”可能是其致命的东西。


As it basks in its new status as an economic superpower – the dragon that is outpacing Asia’s tigers as well as the donkeys of the West – China is mistakenly downplaying its own serious structural weaknesses.	中国龙正在超越了亚洲的老虎以及西方的驴子。 正当它沉湎于经济超级大国地位之时却错误地忽视其严重的结构性弱点。


The communist leadership finds it hard to mention, let alone emphasize, the country’s problems.	中共领导人认为难以提及中国的问题，更不必说强调这些问题。


Officials’ preoccupation with commanding respect and not losing face leads them to focus almost exclusively on China’s achievements.	各级官员一心想要的就是得到尊重和不丢面子，导致他们几乎只关注中国的成就。


This is a strategy that risks backfiring, because it misunderstands the dynamics of international politics.	这是一个有可能逆火的战略，因为这错误地理解了国际政治的浩荡局势。


Emphasizing China’s meteoric rise means less understanding in the rest of the world of the need to sustain rapid economic development in order to satisfy the expectations of its 1.3 billion inhabitants.	强调中国的大幅崛起意味着世界其他地方对于需要持续快速经济发展、从而满足其13亿人口的期望的理解不足。


The government knows that it has a political tiger by the tail, but refuses to acknowledge it, either inside China or outside.	中国政府知道它面临严重的政治问题，但是在国内外却拒绝承认这一点。


Trade tensions continue to mount.	贸易摩擦继续上升。


The United States is deeply concerned, following the minimal results of its “strategic economic dialogue” with China in May, and Congress is threatening tough protectionist measures.	美国在五月份与中国的“战略经济对话”后收效甚微，对此严重关切。 美国国会正威胁采取严厉的保护主义措施。


The European Union may not be far behind; much will depend on how China presents its case over the coming 18 months as the two sides negotiate a wide-ranging Partnership Cooperation Agreement, which will determine the quality of bilateral relations for the next decade.	很大程度上取决于中国在未来的18个月内双方谈判达成范围广泛的合作夥伴协议时如何解释说明。 这一协议将会决定未来十年中双边关系的质量。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel has just visited Beijing, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy likely to follow soon.	德国总理默克尔刚刚抵达北京，而法国总统萨尔科奇不久也可能造访。


Both are surely aware that China’s surging exports last year helped it surpass the US as Europe’s largest foreign supplier.	两位领导人当然都知道中国去年大幅上升的出口使得其超越美国而成为欧盟最大的外国供应国。


What they won’t see, of course, are the desperately low living standards of China’s teeming millions, especially the rural poor.	当然，他们不会见到中国数以百万计人口生活水平极端地下，特别是农村的贫苦人民。


Yet China is in no mood to plead poverty when dealing with the West.	但是中国在于西方打交道的时候却毫无表明贫苦的心态。


Its aim is to gain as much prestige as possible from the Olympic games in 2008 and the six-month World Expo in Shanghai during the spring and summer of 2010.	它的目的就是从2008年奥运会以及2010年春夏之交的上海世博会中获得尽可能多的声望。


It remains to be seen whether the two events will be capable of swinging world opinion in China’s favor and keeping it there.	这两大活动项目是否能够改变世界的观点获得对其的好感并且加以保持还有待观察。


Indeed, the government’s suspicion of the international media is liable to spark friction when thousands of journalists arrive and inevitably widen their coverage beyond athletics to politics and human rights.	确实，中国政府怀疑国际媒体有可能在几千名记者云集中国之时，不可避免地将其报导范围超出体育而扩大到政治和人权问题。 这就可能引起摩擦。


For the time being, sentiment about China’s future remains relentlessly upbeat.	目前，人们对于中国未来还是保持一贯的乐观高调。


McKinsey consultants have even forecast that the upper middle-class will number 520 million by 2025 – the sort of projection that the communist mandarins welcome as a tribute to their strange hybrid of a market economy and rigid state control.	麦肯锡咨询公司甚至预计，到2025年，中高阶层人口将达到5亿2千万。 中共官员欢迎这种预计，因为这是对于其市场经济和严厉的国家控制的奇怪的组合的肯定。


Yet it is almost certainly the sort of forecast of which they should beware.	但是，这几乎正是他们应当警觉的预计。


The reality of life in today’s China looks very different from the vantage point of a province far from the heady atmosphere of Beijing or Shanghai.	远离北京或者上海等城市省份的当今中国的生活实际与其大不相同。


For example, like much of the country, Gansu Province, at China’s geographical center, is grappling with structural and social problems that range from the daunting to the apparently insuperable.	例如，位于中部的甘肃省与中国其他大多数地方一样正在应付结构性和社会问题，这些问题有的很棘手，有的难以克服。


Average annual output per capita is about $900, and incomes among the peasants who make up most of its rural population of 26 million are less than $250.	人均年产值是大约900美元，构成其人口大多数的2千6百万农民的收入少于250美元。


Gansu’s challenges range from modernizing its heavy industries to resisting desertification and the encroachment of the Gobi desert.	甘肃省的挑战包括将其重工业进行现代化改造，抵御沙化以及戈壁沙漠的侵袭。


While it has been making slow but steady progress, its future is clouded by worsening water shortages; though it straddles the Yellow River, the water table is dwindling fast.	尽管该省一直取得缓慢而稳步的进展，但是其未来还是受困于日益恶化的水源短缺； 尽管黄河横跨该省，但是其地下水正在快速下降。


Back in Beijing, the chief preoccupation is to safeguard 11% GDP growth while assuaging Western governments.	回到北京，那里的主要精力集中在缓和西方政府的同时维持11%的GDP增长。


By the end of this year, China’s exports will be 24% higher than in 2006, at $1.2 trillion, and its trade surplus will have grown by 43%.	到今年年底，中国的出口将会超过2006的24%，达到1. 2兆美元，而其贸易顺差将增长43%。


But trade will probably not be the main worry for China’s international relations.	但是贸易可能并不是中国的国际关系中德主要忧虑点。


Trouble seems more likely to come from growing concern in the West over climate change.	麻烦更有可能来自于西方对气候变化的日益增长的担忧。


Political leaders in EU capitals and the US may be well aware of China’s global economic importance, but the widespread public perception is that its factories are dirty and environmentally harmful.	欧洲各国和美国的政治领导人可能完全知道中国在全球经济中的重要地位，但是，很多人感觉到，中国的工厂肮脏，对于环境造成伤害。


Rows over product safety and intellectual piracy could all too easily fuel calls for tough new trade limits.	对于产品安全以及盗版问题的抗议可能会轻易地激起新的贸易限制的呼吁。


The answer is not for China to step up its public-relations effort.	答案并不是让中国加大其公关努力。


Instead, it should be revealing its weaknesses and vulnerabilities to gain Western understanding.	相反，中国应该揭露其弱点和隐患来获得西方的谅解。


That really would be a cultural revolution.	这的确将会是一场文化革命。


China’s House Divided	中国的内部分歧


DENVER – There has been much talk about America’s decline in recent years, with the corollary that China will take its place.	发自丹佛——最近几年谈论美国衰落的声音越来越多，相应的是中国将取而代之的论调。


But, while the United States does indeed face problems that urgently need to be addressed, if China is to rise further, to say nothing of supplanting the US internationally, it must first put its own house in order.	虽然美国无疑面临着亟待解决的问题，但对于中国来说，如果不能解决好自家的事情，就无法实现进一步崛起，更别提在国际上取代美国了。


Those who argue that America is in decline have a difficult case to make in economic terms.	那些认为美国正在走向衰落的人很难从经济角度解释自己的说法。


For all its recent woes (which many countries would gladly exchange for their own), the US remains a dynamo of industry and innovation, and may be emerging as an energy powerhouse as well.	美国最近的确遇上了困难（对许多国家来说这算不上什么困难），但仍然是工业和革新的火车头，而且很有可能在未来崛起成为一个能源大国。


What threatens America’s global leadership is, rather, some of the most divided and disruptive domestic politics in its history.	真正威胁美国在全球领导地位的，其实是这个国家在国内政治上出现的各种史无前例的分歧和争议。 美国人民一直以来都是勇于实践的人民。


A country whose people have traditionally prided themselves on practicality is experiencing a debilitating bout of excessive theorizing, ideology, and so-called “new ideas,” thereby forestalling the practical ideas that come from constructive interaction with one’s political opponents.	但是在今天，过多的理论和思想，以及所谓的“新思维”正在使这个国家陷入了疲惫虚弱的状态当中。 这种情况遏制了那些本应由与政治对手之间建设性互动而产生的具有实践意义的理念。


The demise of compromise and collegiality in domestic politics has raised new challenges in America’s interaction with others as well.	美国国内政治中那种的妥协和共赢的遗产也对美国与别国的互动提出了新的挑战。


Foreign-policy debate in the US has become a proxy for who is “tougher,” which does not necessarily mean wiser.	美国关于外交政策的辩论现在已经被谁“更强硬”的表态所主导，而“更强硬”却并不一定意味着“更聪明”。


Thus, the American art of diplomatic engagement, the ability to talk with different sides while holding one’s own views to oneself, has been largely replaced by a penchant for loud talk, finger-pointing, self-righteousness, and recrimination.	于是乎，过去美国外交辩论方式中与不同观点交锋同时又能保留自己意见的做法，如今很大程度上已经变成了大声叫喊，互相指责，同时又自以为是，彼此揭短。


Countries used to welcome and look for American engagement. Now some are more likely to fear it, especially if it comes in the form of playing to domestic American constituencies’ appetite for supposed toughness.	很多国家曾经欢迎并寻求美国的参与，现在却敬而远之，尤其是当这种参与是为了迎合美国国内选民胃口而做出强硬姿态的时候。


But, before the US hands over international leadership to the Chinese, it would be instructive to look at China’s own internal political divisions and inability to synchronize its domestic politics with its growing global responsibilities.	但是，当美国将国际社会的领导权交给中国之前，我们应该看到中国不但存在着国内政治分歧，而且也不能使其国内政治与其不断增长的国际责任协调一致。


China’s problems make those afflicting the US polity seem trivial in comparison.	这一点非常有启示意义，在中国的问题面前，那些困扰美国体制的问题都相形见绌。


In recent years, China has been increasingly embroiled in a nineteenth-century-style dispute with several of its Southeast Asian neighbors over conflicting claims to the South China Sea.	近年中国越来越多地卷入到与东南亚邻国之间关于南中国海的，带有某种19世纪色彩的争端之中。


Before one laments Americans’ unwillingness to crack a history book on an international subject, it is enlightening to watch China in action, systematically complicating its vitally important relationships in the region over…what?	在遗憾美国无心介入这一国际事务之前，仔细观察中国的行为是有启发意义的，你会发现它正在一步一步地将本来非常重要的区域关系搞得越来越复杂，而这指的又是哪些方面呢？


China’s so-called “nine dashes” claim, which essentially seeks to turn the entire South China Sea into a southern Chinese lake, represents a legacy of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Republic of China.	中国所谓的“九段线”基本上将整个南中国海变成了南中国的内湖，但这实际上这是民国时期遗留下来的说法。 那蒋介石委员长是在哪儿找到这套说辞的？


And where did the Generalissimo find the inspiration for this claim?	中国声称对于这片水域的所有权已经有了上千年历史。


China argues that the waters have been Chinese for a thousand years, but the likelier inspiration is more recent, reflecting Imperial Japan’s occupation of Taiwan until 1945.	但更可靠的说辞应该来源于不远的一段历史：日本帝国在1945年以前对台湾的占领将南中国海也纳入其中。


Thus, China, whose culture and achievements are the envy of the world, is today in a war of words – and a few naval vessels as well – with almost all of its southern neighbors over a recently inherited claim on an issue that calls for a respectful process of international negotiation.	结果中国这个让全世界都羡慕其文化和发展成就的国家，就不得不为了一个没多长历史的继承权而与几乎所有南部邻国陷入口水战当中——有时候还夹杂着海军舰艇的对峙，而解决问题还是要靠有礼有节的国际谈判。


Various considerations typically underlie policy choices in such situations.	在这种情况之下，对于政策选择显然应该有多重考虑。


But, in the case of China’s ham-handedness in the South China Sea, domestic constituencies decrying “weakness” and demanding toughness from political leaders are a key factor.	但是中国之所以在南中国海问题上进退失当，关键因素是国内民众公开谴责“政府示弱”并要求领导人表现强硬。


Among China’s 500 million Internet users, for example, one senses a palpable rise in nationalist sentiment, reflected in bitter criticism of official “weakness” in defending Chinese interests.	中国现有的5亿网民如今民族主义情绪高涨，都在严厉批评官方在维护中国利益问题面前“太软弱”。


China’s government is extremely sensitive to such attacks.	中国政府对于这种批评极度敏感。


If a Chinese blogger criticizes the government over its crackdown on Falun Gong, or supports Tibet’s opposition, the Internet police rush to the scene of the supposed crime.	如果有哪个中国博客写手批评政府镇压法轮功或表示支持西藏反对派，互联网警察就会立刻赶赴“罪行”现场。


But if the blogosphere emits jingoistic calls for more raw materials, the government salutes and works harder to obtain them.	但是如果网上发出带有侵略性的呼声，要求抢占更多原材料资源，政府就会表示欢迎并更加努力去取悦他们。


Domestic pressures have tied China in knots on other issues as well.	类似的这种国内政治压力使中国政府在别的事情上也会做出类似反应。


Many international observers might forgive China its behavior in the South China Sea, given that many countries, large and small, have maritime disputes with neighbors.	如果考虑到许多别的国家彼此之间也有海洋领域的冲突，许多国际观察家也许会原谅中国在南中国海的所做作为。


But China’s own constituencies, whether netizens or competing official institutions, have contributed to an international record that is earning China derision from small neighbors and great powers alike.	但是中国国内政治，无论是网民或者是相互打架的各种官方机构，现在都已经在世界范围内成为各国——不论弹丸小国还是强权大国——的笑柄。


China’s continued support for a nuclear aspirant like North Korea is a case in point.	中国对一直渴求核武器的朝鲜的支持就是一个例子。


No responsible country in the world today sees any merit to North Korea’s behavior.	世界上没有哪个负责任的大国会认为朝鲜的做法能够产生什么好处。


Yet China’s preoccupation with its internal politics is such that it cannot see the price that it pays for reacting to every North Korean outrage with only vague opprobrium, combined with expressions of hope-over-experience that North Korea will reform.	但是中国过于关注其国内政治，以致每次朝鲜胡作非为时都只会表示暧昧的遗憾之情，并不切实际地表达对朝鲜改革的希望。


For example, the equanimity of its response to North Korea’s military attacks against South Korea in 2010 left South Koreans, who are also China’s neighbors, in despair about bilateral relations.	中国对2010年朝鲜炮击韩国延坪岛事件视若无睹，让许多同为邻居的韩国人对两国关系大感绝望。


The origin of China’s desultory policy lies in its leadership’s failure to shape or sharpen the drift of domestic politics: many Chinese still see plucky little North Korea as a friend and ally.	中国的外交政策之所以散乱无序，其原因在于中国领导层无力影响和塑造其国内政治动向：许多中国人仍旧将负隅顽抗的小国朝鲜当做自己的朋友和盟友。


So China does nothing to signal a more serious way forward, much less earn respect in the broader international community, which is now thoroughly disgusted by North Korea’s behavior.	因此中国无法释放出认真处理朝鲜问题的信号，当然也就不会赢得一个对朝鲜的行为感到越来越厌恶的国际社会的广泛尊重。


The list of untenable policies goes on.	在中国这张不可靠的外交政策清单上不止朝鲜一个国家。


Syria is the latest international problem that China, again constrained by domestic politics, cannot seem to get right.	受到国内政治制约的中国现在有了最新的问题国家叙利亚，而且似乎又没处理好。


No one expects China to line up in perfect formation with the US or the European Union on this and other issues.	没有人指望中国会在叙利亚或者别的问题上紧跟美国或者欧盟。


But its consistent preference for lining up on the other side of the divide – even when doing so runs counter to its own national interests – calls into question whether it has the internal fortitude to be a leader.	可是中国却一直站在对立的一侧，甚至这种做法已经与自身国家利益相违背的时候依然故我。 这实在让人怀疑中国是否在内部有足够的底气去成为一个国际领导者。


None of this is meant to minimize the consequences of political polarization in the US.	当然，上述这一切无法减轻美国政治极端化的所产生的后果。


But, whereas America’s problem in the world today is that domestic pressures sometimes lead to an excess of fortitude, China’s problem is that similarly constraining pressures produce foreign-policy weakness.	但当美国的外交问题是国内政治压力有时会导致过度强硬之时，中国的问题则是类似的压力使其在外交上优柔寡断。


China the Responsible Stakeholder	负责任的相关利益方中国


TOKYO – Come to Asia and you will hear a growing chorus of concern that China is building a sphere of influence in the region.	东京—来到亚洲，你可以发现，越来越多的人担心中国正在该地区营造势力范围。


To promote Chinese foreign investment, there is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which the government is poised to take a 30% share.	为了促进中国的对外投资，亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）应运而生，其中中国政府将占有30%的股权。


And there is China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative to construct a Silk Road Economic Belt extending through Central Asia, and a Maritime Silk Road linking China with Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and ultimately Europe.	还有中国的“一带一路”计划，该计划啊旨在构建一条覆盖中亚的丝绸之路经济带和一条连接中国和东南亚、印度洋、中东最终达到欧洲的海上丝绸之路。


On the financial side, China is promoting wider international use of its currency, the renminbi. And it is increasingly asserting its interests militarily, fortifying the disputed Spratly Islands and constructing runways capable of accommodating fighter jets.	在金融方面，中国正在推广人民币的国际用途。 此外，它还在不断通过军事主张利益，在存在纠纷的南沙群岛构筑工事，建设可供战斗机起降的跑道。


When contemplating these initiatives, it is important to take a nuanced view.	看待这些措施时，很重要的一点是注意其中的细节。


There is no question that China’s new island-based outposts in the South China Sea pose a threat not just to the security of Vietnam, the Philippines and other neighboring countries, but also to their mineral and fishing rights.	毫无疑问，中国在南海的岛基前哨阵地不但给越南、菲律宾和其他邻国的安全造成了威胁，也影响到它们的矿产和渔业权利。


The international community has a shared interest in discouraging such activities.	国际社会有共同利益阻止这样的行为。


But China’s economic initiatives, which promise benefits both at home and for the country’s partners, are a different matter.	但中国的经济措施对于国内和中国的贸易伙伴来说都有利可图，是完全不同的另一个故事。


For China, the AIIB and Silk Road projects offer alternatives to unproductive domestic investment.	对中国来说，亚投行和丝绸之路工程可以替代生产率低下的国内投资。


Laying the foundations for increased trade among China, South Asia, and emerging Central Asia represents a better outlet for the Chinese construction sector than building more ghost towns at home.	为中国、东南亚和崛起的中亚之间的日益兴盛的贸易打基础对于中国的建筑业来说是一条比在国内建设更多鬼城好得多的出路。


Countries in these other regions, for their part, also will benefit from the additional trade.	至于这些地区的其他国家来说，它们也能从增加的贸易中获益。


A Chinese-led infrastructure bank that helps meet their extensive infrastructure needs could integrate these countries more deeply not just with China but also with the rest of the world.	中国领导的基础设施银行有助于满足它们不断增加的基础设施需要，能让这些国家更加深入地与中国乃至全世界结合起来。


The worry is that China, as the AIIB’s largest shareholder and contributor, will dominate the bank and distort its decision-making.	令人担忧之处在于，中国作为亚投行最大的股东和出资者，它将主导该银行，扭曲该银行的决策。


The result, skeptics say, is that AIIB-financed rail and road projects will lead only to China, while recipients grow more dependent – and not just financially – on their powerful funder.	怀疑派说，这将导致亚投行融资的铁路和公路项目全部指向中国，而受资国的增长将更加依赖——不仅是金融上——它们的强大的出资国。


But the fact that more than 50 countries, including advanced economies with democratic values, have joined the AIIB means that it will be possible to monitor its actions.	但事实上，50多个国家，包括持民主价值观的发达经济体在内，都加入了亚投行，这意味着有可能监督亚投行的行为。


China promises that the new bank will be open and transparent.	中国承诺亚投行将是开放透明的。


It should be given the benefit of the doubt, at least until there is evidence to the contrary.	对于这一点，理应“疑罪从无”，除非出现相反的证据。


Similarly, renminbi internationalization should be encouraged rather than resisted.	类似地，人民币国际化应该受到鼓励而不是阻止。


To be sure, wider international use of the renminbi as a vehicle for cross-border trade and investment will heighten other countries’ dependence on renminbi-denominated credit in times of crisis.	诚然，扩大人民币作为跨境贸易和投资载体的国际使用将增加其他国家在危机时期对人民币计价信用的依赖。


Acknowledging this, the People’s Bank of China has negotiated currency swap lines with other central banks and has designated one of the country’s five large state-owned commercial banks as official clearing bank to settle transactions in renminbi in a variety of foreign financial centers.	意识到这一点，中国人民银行与其他央行进行了货币互换谈判，并指定中国五大国有商业银行之一作为官方清算银行为各大外国金融中心提供人民币交易结算服务。


Meanwhile, China has asked the International Monetary Fund to include the renminbi in the basket of currencies comprising Special Drawing Rights, the Fund’s unit of account.	与此同时，中国要求国际货币基金组织（IMF）将人民币纳入其账户单位——特别提款权（SDR）的成分货币篮子中。


That is an outcome that the rest of us should welcome, because it would give China a greater stake in a multilateral institution that oversees the operation of the global monetary system.	对于这一结果，其他国家应该欢迎，因为这将增加中国在这一监督全球货币体系运营的多边机构中的分量。


Renminbi internationalization is also desirable insofar as it gives the world another source of global liquidity besides the dollar.	人民币国际化让世界拥有除美元外的另一个全球流动性源泉，因此值得鼓励。


When things go wrong financially in the United States, as they did in 2008, other countries will be able to tap a backup supply of emergency credit.	当美国金融出问题时——比如2008年——其他国家能够获得备用紧急信用。


Indeed, China has designated clearing banks for, and negotiated swap lines with, countries in not just Asia but in Europe and the Western Hemisphere as well.	事实上，中国已经为多个国家制定了清算银行并进行了货币互换谈判，不仅包括亚洲国家，也包括欧洲和西半球国家。


Rather than attempting to build a monetary bloc in Asia, China appears to be seeking to elevate the renminbi to the status of a true global currency that might one day rival the dollar.	中国并非在亚洲构建一个货币区，而是寻求让人民成为真正的全球货币，有一天能够对抗美元。


Given the advantages of having more than one emergency lender and multiple sources of international liquidity, this can only be a good thing for the rest of the world.	存在不止一个紧急贷款人和多条国际流动性渠道能带来诸多好处，因此这对世界其他国家来说是件不折不扣的好事。


No question, China is feeling its oats and asserting itself more forcefully.	毫无疑问，中国感到了它的重要性，也更加着力地彰显它的地位。


Where China’s actions threaten its neighbors, as with its territorial claims in the South China Sea, they should be strongly sanctioned and resisted.	当中国的行为威胁到其邻国时——比如其南海领土主张——应该强烈地予以制裁和抵制。


But where its policies promise economic benefits for other countries, as in the case of infrastructure finance through the AIIB and the Silk Road initiative, they should be encouraged.	但当它的政策可能在经济上惠及其他国家时——比如通过亚投行和丝绸之路工程提供基础设施融资——也该获得鼓励。


This is equally true of initiatives like renminbi internationalization, which will integrate China more deeply into the global economy, giving it a bigger stake in the stability of the international system.	人民币国际化措施也是如此，它能让中国更加深入地融入全球经济，让它在国际体系的稳定中起更大的作用。


Rather than recoiling in fear, the international community should encourage China’s constructive engagement.	国际社会不必因为害怕而反对，而应该鼓励中国的建设性参与。


The first step toward that goal should be to take a more nuanced view of China’s recent initiatives.	迈向这一目标的第一步应该是仔细审视中国最近的举措。


A Silk Glove for China’s Iron Fist	中国铁拳的丝绸手套