Nevertheless, given corruption scandals involving prominent government figures that have come to light over the past few years, it is natural to wonder why the stock market has remained so strong.	尽管如此，考虑到涉及政要人士的腐败丑闻在过去几年内被不断曝光，对股市仍然维持强势感到惊讶也就显得再自然不过。


Why haven’t the stories of corruption caused a crisis, as similar scandals did in Korea and Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98?	为什么巴西没有像1997－1998年亚洲金融危机中的韩国和马来西亚那样，由于种种腐败报道而陷入重重危机？


Indeed, while the scandals have shaken the government, Lula was overwhelmingly reelected last year, and investors continue to pour money into the stock market.	实际上，虽然丑闻的确影响到了政府的声誉，但卢拉仍然在去年以骄人的战绩重新当选，投资者也继续把大笔的资金投入股市。


One reason is that the corruption scandals have provided an opportunity for investors to see Brazilian freedom of speech and democracy in action.	理由之一是腐败丑闻为投资者认识巴西实行的言论和民主自由提供了机会。


Newspapers and television commentators have been relentless in reporting the scandals, helping to prove to Brazilians and foreign investors alike that the political system is sufficiently stable to withstand open criticism.	报纸和电视媒体在丑闻报道中毫不留情，从而向巴西民众和国外投资者证明了巴西的政治体制足够稳定，能够经受得起公开责难的考验。


Lula remains popular with Brazilians because his populist rhetoric shows real sympathy with the less affluent, and with foreign investors because he has always tempered his radicalism to accommodate economic reality.	卢拉在巴西国内民众中的热度依然不减，这是因为他的民粹主义言论显示出对欠富裕阶层的真正同情，而成功地控制激进主义势力，使之适应经济的现实发展使得他在外国投资者当中也颇受青睐。


He recently criticized Bolivian President Evo Morales’s threats to seize foreign assets for his failure in this regard: “Radicalism is incompatible with the common sense needed from someone who governs.”	他不久前对玻利维亚总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯（Evo Morale）剥夺国外财产的威胁大加批判，认为“激进主义与执政者所必不可少的常识格格不入。


That combination of philosophical radicalism and economic pragmatism has proven to be a perfect formula for Brazil’s progress.	”这种激进主义哲学和实用主义经济结合在一起，被证明是巴西发展的超完美方程。


Granted, the future is unknown; we have no crystal ball to predict the Bovespa’s likely path.	的确，前途很难预料； 我们没有预测圣保罗证交所指数可能走向的水晶球。


But, for me, the story is far more convincing than the one told during the 1990’s stock-market boom.	但对我来讲，巴西的股市繁荣远比20世纪90年代股市暴涨所讲述的故事更有说服力。


ExxonMobil’s Dangerous Business Strategy	埃克森美孚的危险商业战略


NEW YORK – ExxonMobil’s current business strategy is a danger to its shareholders and the world.	纽约—埃克森美孚的最新商业战略对它的股东和世界来说是一个威胁。


We were reminded of this once again in a report of the National Petroleum Council’s Arctic Committee, chaired by ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson.	埃克森美孚公司CEO雷克斯·蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）担任主席的美国石油委员会（National Petroleum Council） 北极委员会（Arctic Committee）的一份报告确认了这一点。


The report calls on the US government to proceed with Arctic drilling for oil and gas – without mentioning the consequences for climate change.	该报告要求美国政府继续从事北极圈石油和天然气钻井活动，而没有提及这对气候变化的后果。


While other oil companies are starting to speak straightforwardly about climate change, ExxonMobil’s business model continues to deny reality.	其他石油公司正在开始直面气候变化问题，而埃克森美孚的业务模式仍在否认现实。


That approach is not only morally wrong; it is also doomed financially.	这一方针不但在道德上是错误的，在财务上也是灾难。


The year 2014 was the hottest on instrument record, a grim reminder of the planetary stakes of this year’s global climate negotiations, which will culminate in Paris in December.	2014年是有仪器记录以来最热的一年，这残酷地提醒我们，将在12月的巴黎达到顶峰的今年的气候谈判将决定着地球的命运。


The world’s governments have agreed to keep human-induced warming to below 2º Celsius (3.6º Fahrenheit).	世界政府已同意将人为导致气温升高幅度限制在2℃以下。


Yet the current trajectory implies warming far beyond this limit, possibly 4-6º Celsius by the end of this century.	但从目前的情况看，升温幅度要远远超过这个阈值，到本世纪末可能升温4—6℃。


The answer, of course, is to shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy like wind and solar power, and to electric vehicles powered by low-carbon electricity.	当然，解决的办法是从化石燃料转向风能和太阳能灯能源，以及用低碳电力供能的电动汽车。


Many of the world’s biggest oil firms are beginning to acknowledge this truth.	世界诸多大石油企业已开始承认这一事实。


Companies like Total, ENI, Statoil, and Shell are advocating for a carbon price (such as a tax or permit system) to hasten the transition to low-carbon energy and are beginning to prepare internally for it.	道达尔、埃尼、挪威石油公司（Statoil）和壳牌公司支持用碳定价（如征税或许可制度）加快向低碳能源的转型，并正在开始从内部为此做好准备。


Shell has stepped up its investments in carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology, to test whether fossil-fuel use can be made safe by capturing the CO2 that would otherwise go into the atmosphere.	壳牌公司增加了对碳捕捉和储存（CCS）技术的投资，以测试化石燃料的使用是否可以通过捕捉可能排放到大气中的二氧化碳而变得安全。


This is not to say that all is agreed with these companies; they have promised to state their climate positions and policies in advance of this year’s climate summit.	这并不是说所有这些都在这些公司形成了一致； 它们承诺在今年的气候峰会前宣布它们的气候立场和政策。


Yet at least they are talking about climate change and beginning to face up to the new long-term market conditions.	但至少它们在谈论气候变化，并开始面对新的长期市场条件。


ExxonMobil, alas, is different.	埃克森美孚，唉，它与众不同。


The company’s management, blinded by its own vast political power, behaves with a willful disregard for changing global realities.	该公司的管理层被自己强大的政治实力蒙蔽了双眼，一厢情愿地否认变化的全球现实。


It lives in a cocoon of Washington lobbyists and political advisers who have convinced the company’s leaders that because the US Senate is currently in Republican hands, the business risks of climate change have somehow been nullified, and that the world will not change without or despite them.	在华盛顿游说集团和政治顾问的簇拥下，该公司领导人相信，在美国参议院掌控在共和党手中的现状下，气候变化的商业风险或多或少已经消失，有没有气候变化，世界都不会变化。


At the same time, ExxonMobil is not some marginal actor in the planetary drama.	与此同时，埃克森美孚绝非无关紧要的地球行为人。


It is one of the central protagonists.	它是舞台中央的主角之一。


According to a 2013 study, ExxonMobil ranks second among the world’s companies, just behind Chevron, in total contributions of CO2 emissions.	根据2013年的一项研究，埃克森美孚是世界上二氧化碳总排放第二大的公司，仅次于雪弗龙。


Indeed, the study finds that this single company has contributed more than 3% of the world’s total emissions since the start of the fossil-fuel age!	事实上，该研究部发现埃克森美孚一家公司就贡献了化石燃料时代开始以来全球总排放量的3%强！


So what does ExxonMobil say about the new climate realities?	那么，埃克森美孚对这些新的气候现实有何说法？


How does it reconcile its corporate policies with planetary needs?	它如何协调它的公司政策和地球的需要？


Unfortunately, the company basically ducks the issue.	不幸的是，该公司基本上对这一问题采取了回避态度。


When asked by independent analysts such as Carbon Tracker how it plans to square its relentless oil drilling with the planetary limits on fossil-fuel use necessary to stay below the 2º climate-change threshold, it ignores the limits.	碳跟踪系统（Carbon Tracker）等独立分析机构曾问埃克森美孚，其无止尽的钻井活动与守住2℃气候变化阈值所必须的化石燃料使用量限制之间如何协调。 埃克森美孚根本无视这一限制。


It blithely believes that the world’s governments simply will not honor their commitments (or that it can lobby its way out of fulfilling them).	它认定世界各国政府根本无法兑现它们的承诺（或者它可以游说它们不去兑现它们的承诺）。


And so we come to the recent Arctic report.	于是就有了最近的北极报告。


The Department of Energy asked the National Petroleum Council, an industry group, for its advice on Arctic drilling.	能源部向行业组织美国石油协会征询关于北极圈钻井的意见。


What it received from Tillerson’s committee is an exercise in misdirection.	蒂勒森的委员会的回答是赤裸裸的误导。


The development of the Arctic’s oil and gas resources would contribute to warming far above the 2º limit.	北极圈油气资源的开发将让升温幅度远远超过2℃的限制。


The Arctic itself is warming far faster than the planetary average, potentially causing massive, global-scale climate disruptions – which may include the extreme weather patterns recently observed in the US mid-latitudes.	北极本身的变暖速度远快于地球平均水平，可能造成全球范围的严重气候破坏——美国中纬度地区最近所观察到的极端天气也许也是因此导致的。


For these reasons, the best recent science, including an important study published in Nature this year, provides a clear and unequivocal message: Keep the Arctic oil in the ground and beneath the deep seas; there is no safe place in the climate system for it.	出于这些原因，最出色的最新科学，包括今年发表在《自然》杂志上的一项重要研究，提供了明确无误的信息：让北极圈石油留在地下和深海海底； 气候体系中找不到安全的地方容纳它们。


The world has more than enough oil and gas reserves already; we now need to shift to low-carbon energy, stranding much of the proven reserves, rather than developing them and further threatening the planet.	世界现有油气储量早已足够； 我们现在需要的是想低碳能源转变，保留大部分探明储量而不是开发它们并进一步破坏地球。


As the Nature study puts it: “Development of resources in the Arctic and any increase in unconventional oil production are incommensurate with efforts to limit average global warming to 2º C.”	《自然》的研究指出：“北极圈资源的开发和任何非常规石油产量的增加不利于将全球平均升温水平限制在２℃以内的目标。 ”


This would have been a fitting topic for the National Petroleum Council’s Arctic study.	这本应成为美国石油委员会北极报告的合适主题。


But the report never takes up the issue of whether Arctic oil and gas resources are compatible with climate safety.	但石油委员会的北极报告从未提及北极圈石油和天然气资源是否与气候安全相容的问题。


ExxonMobil’s brazenness should be deeply troubling for its shareholders.	埃克森美孚的厚颜无耻可能成为股东的大麻烦。


The company’s management is planning to spend vast sums – perhaps tens of billions of dollars – to develop Arctic oil and gas reserves that cannot safely be used.	该公司管理层计划花巨资——也许达到数百亿美元——开发无法安全使用的北极圈油气储量。


Just as the global shift toward renewable energy has already contributed to a massive drop in oil prices, climate policies that will be adopted in future years will render new Arctic drilling a huge waste of resources.	正如向可再生能源的全球转型大大拉低了石油价格，将在未来几年采取的气候政策将让新北极圈钻井沦为巨大的资源浪费。


Pension funds, universities, insurance pools, and sovereign wealth funds worldwide are grappling with the increasing risks, both moral and financial, of owning shares in oil, gas, and coal companies.	全世界退休基金、大学、保险公司资金池和主权财富基金正在面临持有石油、天然气和煤炭公司股票的日益增加的道德和财务风险。


As Lisa Sachs and I recently explained, responsible investors must urgently query these companies about their business plans to comply with the 2º limit on warming.	丽莎·萨克斯（Lisa Sachs）和我最近指出，负责任的投资者必须尽快询问这些公司有什么计划应对2℃升温限制。


Business plans that include investments in the Arctic, the ultra-deep sea, and the oil sands of Canada have no place in a climate-safe world.	包括在北极圈、极深海域和加拿大油砂上投资的商业计划与气候安全的世界格格不入。


ExxonMobil’s investors must urgently query the company’s management on a business strategy that contradicts global needs and policy agreements.	埃克森美孚的投资者必须尽快就该公司管理层违反全球需要和政策一致的商业战略提出质疑。


If ExxonMobil persists in its dangerous business strategy, the company’s investors should quickly conclude that the time has come to pull up stakes and move on.	如果埃克森美孚坚持其危险的商业战略，该公司投资者应该迅速下决心抛售股份，转投其他公司。


Eyesight for Israel’s Blind	让盲目的以色列重获视野


PARIS – To find a glimmer of hope on the Israel-Palestine question has become difficult, if not impossible.	发自巴黎——如今在以巴问题上即便想找到一丝微漠的希望都非常困难，甚至近乎绝望。


Most Israelis now believe that a peaceful solution will not come in their generation.	大多数以色列人如今都不相信和平决议能在自己这代人实现。


As for the Palestinians, the political stalemate, and ongoing Israeli occupation, has led to radicalization: if they cannot have “something,” they want it all.	而在巴勒斯坦人看来，正是目前的政治僵局以及持续的以色列占领导致了极端主义的产生：如果自己连“一点东西”都得不到，那就干脆豁出去了。


And many believe that whatever their weakness today, time is on the Palestinians’ side.	此外如今许多巴勒斯坦人都相信不管自身有何不足之处，时间都在自己这边。


Even the most moderate Palestinians now reject Israeli leftists’ offers of help in terms of human support against the actions of Israeli settlers or police.	为了反抗以色列定居者或警察的所作所为，即便最温和的巴勒斯坦人都拒绝接受以色列左翼的人道主义援助。


The political dialogue between moderates of both camps is mostly dead, and personal contact has become minimal.	双方阵营温和派之间的政治对话几乎为零，而私人联系也微乎其微。


In the streets of Jerusalem, Israelis and Palestinians give the impression of deliberately trying not to see each other.	在耶路撒冷街头，犹太人和巴勒斯坦人看上去仿佛刻意都装着看不见对方。


Moreover, as Israel increasingly resembles a successful developed country, its Jewish citizens tend to ignore its Arab citizens, just as the rich elsewhere often do not see the poor in their midst.	此外，随着以色列日益发展成为一个成功的发达国家，它的犹太裔公民似乎都倾向于忽视其他阿拉伯裔公民，正如其他地方的富人无视身边的穷人那样。


But, unlike the poor in many emerging and developed countries, who can hope for social mobility, Israeli Arabs are second-class citizens, even if their living standards remain higher than those of most Arabs in the region.	但与那些还有阶级流动希望的新兴和发达国家穷人不同，以色列的阿拉伯裔公民就是二等公民——虽然他们的生活水平比该地区的大多数阿拉伯人都要高。


As we know from Deuteronomy, “Man does not live by bread alone.”	但正如《圣经》申命记所说：“人可不是单靠面包活着的。 ”


This distrustful ignorance of the other can be found everywhere in Israel.	这种互不信任的相互无视现象在以色列国内普遍存在。


Or almost everywhere, for there is a place that escapes this reality: the hospital.	或者说除了医院之外其他地方都无法摆脱这一现实。


Because of an urgent eye problem upon my arrival in Israel in late June, I had to spend seven hours in the ophthalmology department of the Hadassah Hospital in Ein Kerem, which is the main center of treatment, teaching, and research in Jerusalem.	而笔者之所以有此判断是因为到达以色列后突患眼疾，只好在隐加林（Ein Kerem）的哈达萨医院眼科部呆了7个小时——该院是耶路撒冷进行医学治疗，教学和研究的主要机构。


What I saw during those hours were, despite my personal condition, the most comforting and hopeful signs that I have encountered in the entire region in many years.	虽然眼部不适，但笔者在这几个小时中的见闻堪称数年来在该地区能看见的最令人欢欣鼓舞的景象。


Arab citizens of Israel – that is, Palestinian doctors and nurses – were treating Jewish and Arab patients.	以色列的阿拉伯裔公民——也就是巴勒斯坦医护人员——照顾着犹太和阿拉伯裔病人。


Israeli doctors and nurses attended to Arabs’ needs.	以色列医护人员也对阿拉伯人关怀备至。


I even saw some interaction among patients themselves.	我甚至看到一些病人之间的互动交流。


Old Israelis who had clearly come from Eastern Europe before World War II were playing with very young Palestinian children.	那些显然是二战前从东欧移民来的以色列长者与巴勒斯坦幼童玩耍。


There was an atmosphere of reassuring tolerance of the other.	四处都充满着人与人之间的互信和宽容。


In the highly professional, well-organized, and yet very relaxed (if not slightly confused) atmosphere of the hospital, one could glimpse what the future might hold with different political leadership on both sides.	在医院这个高度专业化，组织良好但又非常放松（但也让人略感不真实）的气氛当中，我们可以瞥见双方阵营在不同政治家的领导下会产生一个什么样的未来。


It was as if the ill were behaving in a healthy way, whereas, outside of the hospital, the healthy were behaving pathologically.	情况就像是这里的病人都有着正常人的行为举止，而医院之外的健康人却展现出种种病态。


In the hospital, patients’ only choice was to place themselves in the hands of the other.	在医院里，病人唯一的选择就是把自己托付给别人。


What I encountered that day in Ein Kerem was the best of Israel – and a direct rebuttal to the frequent accusation that Israel is an “apartheid state.”	我在隐加林遇见的是以色列最美的一面——也直接驳斥了那种认定以色列是个“种族隔离国家”的惯常指控。


And it was fitting that this token of a possible future should be found in an ophthalmology department, an enterprise devoted to restoring vision.	而在眼科部这个致力于恢复人们视力——也是眼界——的地方发现某种潜在未来的象征也是非常恰当的。


Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish citizens of Israel interact with each other as equals when they are placed in a situation in which they can and must.	在被放置在一个可以且必须的情境下之时，以色列的阿拉伯裔公民和犹太裔公民是可以进行平等互动的。


Might all Israelis and Palestinians find themselves in such a position one day?	而所有的以色列人和巴勒斯坦人是否有一天也能让自己处于这样的情境中？


I am not naïve.	我并不幼稚。


I understand that what I saw that day (with one eye) in the Hadassah Hospital cannot easily be replicated elsewhere.	我知道自己当天（用一只眼睛）在哈达萨医院所看到的一切不可能被轻易复制到其他地方。


Two days after my hospital experience, a tour of the Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem – surrounded or divided by the security wall – served as a reminder of the region’s harsh and sobering realities.	就在出院两天后，笔者到访了耶路撒冷的巴勒斯坦社区，这个被安全墙重重包围分割的地界不断提醒着人们该区域严酷冷峻的现实。


But the lessons from the Hadassah Hospital remain alive in my heart as much as my head.	但在哈达萨医院的见闻不但留在我的记忆���，也活在了我的心里。


When people have no other choice but to trust each other, they will be able to do so and feel better for it.	当人们别无选择只能信任别人的时候，他们就能做到这一点而且因此感觉更好。


It is a question of balance, competence, and respect.	这是一个与权衡，技能和尊重有关的问题。


Can the reality of the hospital be transferred to the reality outside?	那么医院里的现实是否能被移植到到外面的世界？


Probably not.	这可能无法实现。


But that should not prevent people from reflecting on what a different world could look like one day – or from working to bring about that world now.	但这不能阻止人们去表达出某天将出现一个不一样的世界——或是从今天开始，努力去实现这个世界。


Eyes Wide Shut on Global Warming	对全球气候变暖视而不见


The Kyoto Treaty on controlling climate change was, as Harvard professor Rob Stavins puts it, “too little, too fast.”	哈佛大学教授罗伯·斯塔文曾说，有关控制全球气候变化的京都议定书“太少又太快”。


On one hand, because it covered only those countries projected to emit roughly half of the world’s greenhouse-gas emissions by mid-century, it was not an effective long-run safeguard against the dangers of global warming.	一方面，由于议定书只涉及到本世纪中叶排放全世界温室气体大约一半的国家，因此它并不是针对全球气候变暖危险的长期有效的防备措施。


On the other hand, because it required significant and expensive short-run cuts in emissions by industrial countries, it threatened to impose large immediate costs on the American, European, and Japanese economies.	另一方面，由于它要求工业化国家短期内花费巨资大幅削减排放数量，因此对美国、欧洲以及日本的经济造成巨大损失。


In short, the Kyoto agreement meant lots of short-term pain for little long-run gain.	简而言之，京都议定书意味着为了微小的长期效应而忍受巨大的短期痛苦。


The European Union and American economists in the Clinton administration argued for passage of the Kyoto Treaty only by creating models for something that wasn’t the Kyoto Treaty.	克林顿时期欧盟和美国的经济学家主张在为本不属于京都议定书的东西建立模式的条件下而通过该议定书。


They projected that developing countries would enter the Kyoto framework at some point, and would trade their rights to emit CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the United States and Europe in return for development aid.	他们预计，发展中国家会在某一时候加入议定书框架，并且会同美国和欧盟交换二氧化碳和其他温室气体排放权利而换取发展援助。


But, all these years later, I have yet to meet anyone who knows what they are talking about who is prepared to defend Kyoto as a substantive global public policy. ”It was a way of getting the ball rolling,” on climate change, say some. ”It was a way of waking up the world to the seriousness of the problem,” say others.	但是，这么多年过去，把京都议定书辩解为实在的全球性公共政策、同时又言而有据的人，我还没有遇到一个。 关于气候变化，有人说：“这是开端”。


Under neither of these interpretations can those who negotiated and signed the Kyoto Treaty be said to have served the world well.	那些谈判签署议定书的人用以上两种解释都不能说明他们造福了世界。


Of course, the world has been served a lot worse since.	当然，议定书签署以来这个世界更为糟糕。


President George W. Bush sided with his vice president, Dick Cheney, in denying that a global-warming problem even exists (his treasury secretary, Paul O’Neill, and his administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Christine Whitman, disagreed).	布什总统同副总统切尼一同否认甚至存在全球气候变暖的问题（而其财政部长奥尼尔和环境保护署署长惠特曼则意见相左）。


This has probably cost the world a decade of wasted time in developing a policy to deal with the problem, particularly given that intentional inaction is likely to continue until Bush’s term is finished.	这恐怕让世界耽误了整整十年来制定处理问题的政策，特别是鉴于在布什任期结束前，国际上的无所作为还有可能持续。


But the political cards will be reshuffled, and there will be a new deal on global warming, when America next elects a president in November 2008.	但是，政治牌将会重新洗过，而且当2008年11月美国选举一位新总统时，将会有一个有关全球气候变暖的新协议。


By 2009, the US may have a State Department willing to speak up again.	到2009年，美国新的国务院可能会重新直抒己见。


Unless we are extraordinarily fortunate and learn that climatologists have overlooked some enormously important channels of carbon sequestration, the models predicting global warming will still be grimly accurate in 2009.	除非我们极为幸运，而且知道气候学家忽略了碳隔离的某些极为重要的渠道，在2009年的时候，预测全球气候变暖的模型还将会特别不精确。


When the time comes to revisit international policies on global warming, two things should happen.	在重新审视有关全球气候变暖的国际政策时，应当做两件事情。


First, the world’s industrial core must create incentives for the developing world to industrialize along an environmentally-friendly, C02- and CH4-light, path.	首先，世界主要工业化国家必须激励发展中国家沿着环境友好、二氧化碳和甲烷排放量轻微的道路实现工业化。


Slow growth of greenhouse-gas emissions in rapidly-growing economies must be accompanied by credible promises to deliver massive amounts of assistance in the mighty tasks of industrialization, education, and urbanization that China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and many other developing countries face.	中国、印度、墨西哥、巴西以及其他许多发展中国家面临工业化、教育以及城市化的艰巨任务。 这些经济国家高速发展而体温室气体排放增长缓慢，这必须辅之以切实保证提供大量援助。


Second, the world’s industrial core must create incentives for its energy industries to undertake the investments in new technologies that will move us by mid-century to an economic structure that is light on carbon emissions and heavy on carbon sequestration.	第二，全球主要工业化国家必须鼓励其能源产业向新技术投资。 这些新技术可以使我们在本世纪中叶的时候拥有一个碳气排放轻微而隔离显著的经济结构。


Providing the proper incentives for effective research and development will not be easy.	为有效的研发提供适当的激励不是轻而易举的。


Public programs work less well when the best route to the goal – in this case, the most promising post-carbon energy technologies – is uncertain.	当实现目标的最佳途径并不明朗之时（对于这种情况而言是最为有前途的后碳能源技术），公共规划项目并不切实可行。


Private R&D is difficult to encourage when investors suspect that success would lead the fruits of their work to be taken by some form of eminent domain and used throughout the world with little compensation.	当投资者怀疑成功可能导致他们的劳动成果被以某种征并在世界范围内几乎无偿使用时，就难以鼓励私营部门的研发。


The world could continue to close its eyes to global warming and hope for the best: a slightly warmer climate that produces as many winners (on the Siberian, Northern European, and Canadian prairies) as losers (in already-hot regions that become hotter and dryer), and that the Gulf Stream continues warming Europe, the monsoons are not disrupted, and that the Ganges delta is not drowned by stronger typhoons.	世界可以对全球气候变暖视而不见并且指望出现最好的结果，那就是气候略微暖和，既产生受益者（西伯利亚、北欧以及加拿大中部省份），也产生受害者（已经炎热的地区将更为炎热和干燥）； 海湾暖流继续温暖欧洲，季风不受破坏，而且恒河三角洲不被更为猛烈的台风淹没。


Or perhaps we are hoping that the “we” whose interests are taken into account when important decisions are made will not be the “we” who are among the big losers.	或者，我们可能希望，在制定重大决策时利益被考虑进去的“我们”不是那些受害大户的“我们”。


Perhaps we will continue to close our eyes.	我们也可能继续视而不见。


But our chances of ensuring a more sustainable world would be higher if we had not allowed ourselves to be blinded for the past decade by the combination of the public-relations stunt known as the Kyoto Treaty and the idiocy-as-usual known as the Bush administration.	但是，如果过去十年来我们未曾让我们自己被称之为京都议定书的公关噱头以及称之为布什行政当局的一贯愚蠢所蒙蔽，我们确保一个更为可持续发展的世界的机会会更大。


The Chan-Zuckerberg Solution	陈-扎克伯格方案


BERKELEY – When Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, and his wife, Priscilla Chan, recently announced their plan to devote some $45 billion in Facebook shares toward making the world a better place, some critics wrote off the move as a public-relations ploy.	伯克利—Facebook创始人扎克伯格和他的夫人普莉希拉·陈最近宣布计划将大约450亿美元Facebook股票用于改善世界。 一些批评者称他们的这一举动为公关花招。


They noted that Chan and Zuckerberg were not putting their shares in a charitable foundation, but rather into an investment company that can allocate funds however it chooses – and that it can choose for-profit investments.	他们指出，陈和扎克伯格并没有将股票注入慈善基金会，而是放在一个投资公司中，这家公司可以任意配置这笔资金——也可以选择用于营利投资。


Skeptics also noted that instead of making an irrevocable legal commitment, the couple had only pledged to donate “most of their wealth” to the fund.	质疑者还指出，扎克伯格夫妇并没有订立不可撤销的法律承诺，而只是说要向该基金捐出“大部分财富”。


According to one mean-spirited critic, Zuckerberg was simply moving his “money from one pocket to the other” with a substantial “PR return-on-investment [that] dwarfs that of his Facebook stock.”	据一位卑劣的批评者说，扎克伯格只是把“他的钱从一个口袋转移到另一个口袋”，而其中极端的“公关投资回报足以令他的Facebook股票相形见绌”。


The truth is quite different.	真相与此截然不同。


The strategy adopted by Chan and Zuckerberg, a combination of traditional philanthropy and impact investing, is exactly in sync with the most promising trends in modern altruism.	陈和扎克伯格所选择的策略是传统慈善与影响力投资的结合，正符合现代利他主义的潮流。


The defining strength of traditional philanthropy is its ability to take risks.	传统慈善的绝对优势是其承担风险的能力。


Philanthropies don’t have to answer to public officials or generate returns for private shareholders.	慈善机构不需要回应公共官员，也不必给私人股东创造回报。


That allows them to finance bold, innovative ideas.	这让它们能够为大胆的创新概念提供融资。


And, in contrast to both the public and for-profit sectors, they can adopt a very long time horizon for problems that require decades to solve.	此外，与公共和营利部门不同，它们可以采取非常长的时界，针对需要几十年时间才有可能解决的问题。


In many ways, traditional philanthropies operate like venture capitalists.	从很多方面看，传统慈善的运营类似于风险资本。


They might know that many of their projects will not pay off, but they are betting that a few will turn out to be pioneering breakthroughs, and that their success will spark policy changes or attract larger flows of public and for-profit private funding.	它们也许知道，许多项目不会形成回报，但它们下注于某些项目能够成为开创性突破，它们的成功能促使政策转变或吸引更大的公共和营利私人资金流。


But philanthropy is only one way to address social and environmental challenges.	但慈善只是解决社会和环境挑战的方法之一。


Impact investing – a term coined in 2007 at a conference sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the oldest traditional philanthropies – is another.	另一种方法是影响力投资。 影响力投资一词由世界上最古老的慈善机构之一——洛克菲勒基金会赞助的一次2007年的会议上被提出。


Unlike philanthropic donors, impact investors seek both social and financial returns on their investments.	和慈善捐赠人不同，影响力投资者寻求获得社会和财务回报。


Impact investing not only broadens the pool of available wealth; it fosters projects that will produce self-sustaining returns.	影响力投资不但扩大了可用财富规模； 也带来了能产生自我维持的回报的项目。


In recent years, the money flowing into impact investing has expanded rapidly, and the range of assets available to impact investors has grown to match.	近几年来，流入影响力投资的资金迅速扩张，影响力投资者的可投资产范围相应地拓宽了。


Social venture capital firms, which seek a “double bottom line” (healthy financial returns, as well as broader social or environmental benefits) are one of the fastest-growing segments of the venture-capital industry.	社会风险资本企业寻求“双重利润”（健康的财务回报以及更广泛的社会或环境收益），它们是风险资本业的一个增长迅猛的细分。


In Northern California, for example, the Bay Area Equity Fund has invested $100 million since 2004 in companies such as Revolution Foods, Pandora, SolarCity, and Tesla.	比如，在北加州，湾区权益基金（Bay Area Equity Fund）自2004年以来向Revolution Foods、Pandora、SolarCity和Tesla等公司投资了1亿美元。


All told, the fund estimates that those investments have created 15,000 jobs and generated an internal rate of return of 24.4%.	该基金估计这些投资总共产生了15,000个工作岗位和24. 4%的内部回报率。


Big institutional players, meanwhile, are becoming significant impact investors by pouring money into Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) mutual funds.	与此同时，大型机构也在日益变身为重要的影响力投资者，向环境、社会和治理（ESG）共同基金注入资金。


By one estimate, investment in ESG funds has exploded, from $202 billion in 2007 to $4.3 trillion in 2014.	一项估计表明，ESG基金投资呈现出爆炸式增长，从2007年的2,020亿美元增加到2014年的4.


A growing number of ESG funds are now directly available to retail investors.	3万亿美元。 越来越多的ESG基金目前散户投资者也可以直接投资。


Even giant pension funds are eager to enter the arena, and the US Department of Labor recently made that easier.	就连体量巨大的退休基金也急切地要进入到该领域，美国劳工部最近为此提供了便利。


In October, Secretary of Labor Tom Perez revised existing rules to allow pension fund managers to consider the social impact of investments as long as doing so does not compromise the managers’ fiduciary obligations.	10月，劳工部长佩雷兹（Tom Perez）修订了现有规则，允许退休基金经理考虑社会影响力投资，只要这种投资不与基金经理的信托义务相悖。


A similar 1978 ruling, allowing pension funds to allocate some of their investments to non-traditional assets, helped fuel the growth of the venture capital industry.	1978年的一项类似规则允许退休基金将一些投资配置给非传统资产，结果助推了风险资本业的增长。


Purely philanthropic foundations face major constraints.	纯慈善基金会面临着重大约束。


They are, in theory, allowed to act as impact investors to make “program-related investments” in projects consistent with their stated missions; in practice, however, they face strict fiduciary rules that make them reluctant to do so.	理论上，它们被允许作为影响力投资者，在于它们的规定职责相符的项目中做一些“项目相关投资”； 但是，在实践中，它们面临着严格的信托规则，使它们根本不愿意去做这样的投资。


A growing number of foundations – such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation – are increasing their investment in activities that further their philanthropic goals.	越来越多的基金会——比如比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会、洛克菲勒基金会和克雷奇基金会（Kresge Foundation）——都在增加对有利于其慈善目标的活动的投资。


Unfortunately, program-related investments still represent only 1% of the capital deployed by foundations, with just 0.05% of that going toward equity investments.	不幸的是，项目相关投资仍只占基金会资本配置的1%，而其中又只有0. 05%投向了股权投资。


The Chan-Zuckerberg initiative is a high-profile example of the rapid growth of social-impact finance that complements and supports traditional philanthropy.	陈-扎克伯格计划是一个显著的例子，说明了社会影响力融资的高速增长能够补充和支持传统慈善。


Chan and Zuckerberg will receive no tax benefit from transferring their wealth to a limited liability corporation.	陈和扎克伯格不会因为将财富转移到有限责任公司而获得税收优惠。


But when they donate Facebook shares to a charitable organization, the recipient won’t have to pay capital gains tax when it liquidates the shares and puts the money to work.	但如果他们将Facebook股票捐给慈善组织，那么该组织在套现股票将所获资金用于运营时不必支付资本利得税。


And Chan and Zuckerberg will get a charitable deduction for the value of the shares at the time they are donated.	陈和扎克伯格也将在捐献股票时获得股票价值的慈善支出扣除。


Meanwhile, they will be free to use part of their fortune as impact investors in for-profit social enterprises that promise both financial and social returns (and they will have to pay taxes on the profits they reap).	与此同时，他们也可以用部分财富作为影响力投资者投资营利性社会企业，获得财务和社会回报（他们必须为所获利润缴税）。


They can also choose to invest in advocacy and even political activity to encourage change.	他们也可以选择投资于宣传甚至政治活动以鼓励变革。


This is exactly the approach that many of this generation’s major tech-based philanthropists, from Pierre Omidyar to Laurene Powell Jobs, are using.	从皮埃尔·奥米迪亚（Pierre Omidyar）到劳伦斯·鲍威尔·乔布斯（Laurene Powell Jobs），这一代靠高科技支付的慈善家都在使用这一方法。


None of this is to say that the government should relinquish its own role in addressing major public challenges.	所有这些都不是在说政府应该撇清其在应对重大公共挑战中的作用。


For all their money, not even billionaire philanthropists like Zuckerberg and Gates can implement solutions on a regional, national, or global scale.	即使是扎克伯格和盖茨这样的亿万富翁慈善家，也没有财力实施地区、国家或全球规模的方案。


But they can assume the upfront risks of developing and testing new approaches to tackling long-term social and environmental problems.	但他们可以承担开发和测试应对长期社会和环境问题的新方法的前端风险。


And then they can advocate for policy changes and public funding to scale those approaches that work.	然后，他们可以鼓动政策变革和公共资金扩大有效方法的规模。


In short, there is nothing wrong with public-spirited innovation capital.	简言之，公共精神的创新资本没有问题。


On the contrary, its soaring popularity suggests that it will be a crucial component of twenty-first-century problem-solving.	相反，其蓬勃发展表明它将是二十一世纪解决问题之道的关键组成部分。


Face-to-Face with Facebook	跟Facebook面对面


NEW YORK – Long ago, when Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg was in grade school, I wrote a book (Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age) in which I lauded something called “P3” (now p3p), the platform for privacy preferences.	发自纽约——很久很久以前，当Facebook的创立者马克·扎克伯格还在念小学的时候，我写了本名叫《版本2. 1 : 数码时代的生活规划》的书，书中盛赞了一种叫“P3”的理念（如今叫p3p, the platform for privacy preferences，为私隐数据所设的平台）。


I was sure that people would start using P3 or something like it to control access to data about themselves.	当时我确信人们会开始用P3或者其他类似的东西来管理一些与自身有关的数据。


Of course, I was wrong...for about 10 years.	谁知无人响应，因为我的理念超前了整整十年……


Now, at last, it’s starting to happen – though not exactly the way I envisioned it. Nor is it exactly the way Zuckerberg envisioned it...	如今，这一切终于露出了苗头——虽然不是以我所预料的方式，但也不是扎克伯格所预想的那样。


While many people are up in arms about Facebook’s shifting privacy policies, millions of others are calmly managing their reputations online, using the tools that Facebook and other social Web sites provide.	在许多人竭力反对Facebook变更私隐政策之时，数百万人正在利用Facebook以及其他社交网站所提供的工具平静地经营着自己的声誉。


In fact, Facebook has helped them learn how to do that.	事实上，正是Facebook教会了他们如何去做。


Statistics recently published by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project (http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.aspx) indicate that young people manage their reputations online more carefully than do older people.	据美国皮尤研究中心发布的“网络与美国人生活”项目统计资料(http://pewinternet. org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.


I don’t think that means that the young care more about privacy; in fact, I think Zuckerberg is right when he says, “People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people.	但我不认为这就意味着年轻人更注重私隐； 事实上，扎克伯格说得有道理：“人们不但非常乐于分享更多各类资讯，而且愿意更加开放地与更多的人分享。


That social norm is just something that has evolved over time.”	这种社会规范已经贯穿了我们的整个生活。 ”


The younger generation is comfortable with sharing precisely because they know how to control it.	而年轻一代之所以更加乐于分享，恰恰是因为他们知道如何去掌控自己的信息。


Zuckerberg is right that they don’t necessarily want privacy or what analyst Danah Boyd calls “seclusion,” but they do want “control.”	扎克伯格是对的，这一代人并不一定是要私隐或者是分析家戴安·博尔德所谓的“隔绝”，他们真正想要的是“控制”。


They won’t blindly follow defaults.	他们不会盲目接受网站的默认设置。


Generally, young people post more information of an edgy nature about themselves and about their friends than do older adults, so they are quickly learning the need for specific controls.	一般来说，年轻人比年长者更多地在网上发布一些自己及其同伴所干的傻事，因此他们也迅速学会了对某些方面的信息加以控制。


By contrast, older users (1) are less likely to do stupid things in the first place, and (2) are less likely to do so in range of a camera. (Of course, there are notable exceptions.)	反过来，年长的网络用户一方面较少胡作非为，另一方面也很少把这些蠢事暴露在别人的镜头之下（当然也有例外）。


But they, too, don’t want default settings that leave them feeling exposed.	但他们也不愿意使用那些可能泄露私隐的默认设置。


They want to “evolve” on their own, rather than be pushed (or led unwittingly) by Facebook.	他们希望依靠自己的力量去“升级，而不是被Facebook推着走（或者是不情愿地被带领着）。


In short, the market is working, slowly, and consumers are educating themselves, slowly.	简而言之，市场正在缓慢成长，而消费者们同样也正逐步地进行自我教育。


Facebook has been a big part of that: it has provided the tools to do so, and is constantly tweaking them. It has also publicized those tools, often inadvertently, by setting overly public defaults.	Facebook是整个过程的重要一部分：它提供了相关工具，还不断加以改进，而且（常常在无意中）通过修改公共默认设置的方式推广了这些工具。


But in its rush to make money, the company seems to have been greedy – and pretty tone-deaf – in its response to critics.  The critics may not represent the majority of users, but they deserve a polite and considered response.	但在忙于攫取利润的过程中，该公司在回应外界批评方面似乎有点吝啬——以及闭目塞听。 那些批评可能不代表大多数用户的意见，但也应该得到礼貌且严肃的回应。


And when the company does screw up – as with Beacon and more recently its plans for user data-sharing with favored vendors such as Pandora – it needs to show more humility.	而当该公司在其广告系统Beacon方面遭遇挫折，最近又与Pandora这类专属供应商在用户数据分享方面闹翻之时， 企业就需要表现得更加人性化了。


That’s not a moral judgment, but a business one.	这不是一个道德判断，而是一个商业分析。


If the market is working towards a world where users exercise the power to manage their own reputations, it will ultimately punish companies that become too arrogant.	当我们正迈向一个用户有权管理自己名声的世界，而市场也正朝着同一方向发展的时候，所有逆流而动的公司都将受到惩罚。


But that is only part of the privacy discussion.	上述事实仅仅是私隐讨论的其中一部分。


The comforting thing about the kind of data that Facebook primarily deals with is that it’s public. If your friends and other people can see it, so can you.	令人欣慰的是，Facebook主要处理的都是一些公共数据，这意味着如果你的朋友看得到的话，你自己也能看到。


More troubling is the data you don’t even know about – the kind of data about your online activities collected by ad networks and shared with advertisers and other marketers, and sometimes correlated with offline data from other vendors.  By and large, that’s information you can’t see – what you clicked on, what you searched for, which pages you came from and went to – and neither can your friends, for the most part.	而更令人困扰的则是一些你没意识到的数据——比如你的在线活动，网络广告公司将这类信息收集起来并传递给广告商和其他市场经营者，有时还会和其他供应商所提供的线下活动资料相结合。 总的来说，这就是你所无法看到的数据——你点击了什么，搜索了什么，你在哪些网页之间浏览——而你的朋友们基本上也无法得知这些。


But that information is sold and traded, manipulated with algorithms to classify you and to determine what ads you see, what e-mails you receive, and often what offers are made to you.	但这些信息却被贩卖出去，通过统计整理来将你归入一个门类，最终决定你看到什么广告，收到什么邮件，得到什么优惠信息。


Of course, some of that information could go astray...	毫无疑问，有些信息还可能被滥用……


Personally, I don’t really mind, but there are many people who would, if they understood what was going on in the first place.	我个人对此并不太在意，但对于许多突然意识到发生了什么的人来说，这可是件要紧的事情。


I predict that, whether it’s this year or in ten years, this will become a much greater issue than what information people share openly with friends.	据我推测，在今年或者未来十年以内，这个议题将比人们向同伴公开分享何种信息更具争议性。


The challenge is to make this hidden sharing of information less confusing, more explicit, and more transparent before the majority of people discover it for themselves in a way that leaves them feeling deceived.	而挑战则在于令这些被暗中分享的信息变得更加容易被理解，更加明确，也更加透明，而且要抢在公众通过某种方式发觉自己被蒙蔽之前。


I regularly attend advertising industry events and raise this issue, and the answers I get are something along the lines of “what people don’t know won't hurt them,” or “all we’re doing is giving them ads better targeted to their interests.”	我经常在与广告业有关的场合提出这一点，而经常得到的就是“人们不知情的事也不会伤害他们”或者“我们都是为了他们好，这样人们看到的都是自己感兴趣的广告”这样的答复。


But people have a way of objecting to being manipulated like that. They like to be treated as individuals, not to be put into buckets.	但人们从来都不喜欢这样被操纵，他们喜欢被作为独立的个体来对待，而不是被分门别类放在一个篮子里。


I keep telling marketers that this is not a threat, but an opportunity.	我不断告诫市场经营者这不是一个威胁，而是一个机会。


Just as Facebook has educated people, clumsily, about privacy controls, so marketers must educate people, ideally more elegantly, about tracking controls.	正如Facebook在磕磕碰碰中教会了人们私隐控制那样，市场经营者们也应该用一种更为优雅的方式教育人们何为数据跟踪控制。


I hope it won’t take ten years and a lot of bad publicity for advertisers to figure that out.	我想实现这一点不需要10年，也不没必要用一大批广告商暴出丑闻的方式来实现。


From my own perspective, as I look at the emerging market for people generating and using their own health/behavior data, this commotion is useful.	正如我一路看着人们收集并使用自身健康和行为数据的市场蓬勃兴起那样，目前市场的这种混乱是有益的。


People who share health data are likely to be much more adept at managing it than they would have been just a few years ago. They will also be fairly skeptical about the companies they entrust it to.	那些分享健康数据的人会比几年前更加熟练地管理那些数据，也会对托管这类数据的公司怀有一份合理的戒心。


That ultimately argues for transparency and paid models, so that consumers don’t wonder what other allegiances companies may have.	而这将最终涉及到透明度和付费模式，令消费者们不再为自己的数据将被贩卖到何处而感到困惑。


“I pay you to manage my data,” is pretty straightforward.	“我给你钱来管理我的数据”是相当直截了当的做法。


“I give you my data and you give me a free service” leaves the customer wondering what else the company may do with the data.	而“我给你数据，你给我免费服务”则会让消费者们不禁存疑：究竟还有哪间公司在使用自己的数据呢？


The Second Nuclear Age	第二核时代


NEW HAVEN – North Korea’s launch of a long-range missile in mid-December was followed by a flurry of global condemnation that was almost comical in its predictability and impotence.	纽黑文—12月中旬，朝鲜发射了远程导弹，此举引起了全球的谴责，这些无关痛痒的谴责闭着眼睛都能想到，显得颇为滑稽。


But the launch underscored a larger reality that can no longer be ignored: the world has entered a second nuclear age.	但朝鲜的发射动作凸显了已不可再坐视不理的大现实：世界进入了第二个核时代。


The atomic bomb has returned for a second act, a post-Cold War encore.	原子弹在后冷战时代卷土重来了。


This larger pattern needs to be understood if it is to be managed.	若要处理好这一局面，就必须更好地理解大图景。


The contours of the second nuclear age are still taking shape.	第二核时代的轮廓仍在形成之中。


But the next few years will be especially perilous, because newness itself creates dangers as rules and red lines are redefined.	但未来几年将充满危险，因为随着规则和红线的定义，新情况本身就制造着危险。


This took at least ten years in the first nuclear age, and this time may be no different.	在第一核时代中，整个过程历时十年之久，这一回也不会不同。


In the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, old rivalries now unfold in a nuclear context.	在中东、南亚和东亚，旧对手们正在开展核竞赛。


This has already changed military postures across the Middle East.	这已经改变了中东的军事格局。


Part of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is being shifted to sea, with atomic warheads on diesel submarines, to prevent their being targeted in a surprise attack.	以色列的部分核武器正在向大海移动，常规动力潜艇装载着原子弹头，以防止它们成为突然袭击的目标。


Israel also is launching a new generation of satellites to provide early warning of other countries’ preparations for missile strikes.	以色列还部署了新一代卫星系统，以提供其他国家准备进行导弹打击的先期预警。


If Iran’s mobile missiles disperse, Israel wants to know about it immediately.	如果伊朗机动导弹出现动静，以色列希望马上能够知晓。


Thus, the old problem of Arab-Israeli peace is now seen in the new context of an Iranian nuclear threat.	于是，阿拉伯-以色列和平的就问题有了新背景——伊朗核威胁。


The two problems are linked.	这两个问题有着千丝万缕的联系。


How would Israel respond to rocket attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, or Egypt if it simultaneously faced the threat of nuclear attack by Iran?	以色列如何在同时面对伊朗核打击威胁的情况下应对加沙、黎巴嫩或埃及的火箭袭击？


What would the United States and Israel do if Iran carried its threat to the point of evacuating its cities, or placing missiles in its own cities to ensure that any attack on them would cause massive collateral damage?	如果伊朗的威胁达到了疏散城市，或将导弹对准自己的城市以确保任何对它们的打击都能形成大规模附带伤害，美国和以色列会怎么做？


Pakistan has doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal in the last five years.	过去五年，巴基斯坦的核武库扩张了一倍。


Its armed forces are set to field new tactical nuclear weapons – short-range battlefield weapons.	其武装部队已开始装备战术核武器——短程战场武器。


India has deployed a nuclear triad – bombers, missiles, and submarines – and in 2012 tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, giving it the ability to hit Beijing and Shanghai.	印度已经形成了核武器铁三角——轰炸机、导弹和潜艇——并于2012年测试了洲际弹道导弹，足以打击北京和上海。


India almost certainly has a multiple warhead (known as a MIRV), in development, and has also launched satellites to aid its targeting of Pakistan’s forces.	印度几乎肯定已开始研发多弹头导弹（被称为MIRV），并且发射了卫星以协助其锁定巴基斯坦军队。


In East Asia, North Korea has gone nuclear and is set to add a whole new class of uranium bombs to its arsenal.	在东亚，朝鲜已经成为有核国家，并马上将拥有新的铀炸弹。


It has rehearsed quick missile salvos, showing that it could launch attacks on South Korea and Japan before any counter-strike could be landed.	它已经进行了导弹发射演习，证明了它能够在任何反导装备到达前打击韩国和日本。


China, too, is shifting its nuclear forces to mobile missiles and submarines.	中国的和力量也在向机动导弹和潜艇转型。


These weapons can be put on alert in a way that would be highly visible to US satellites and the global media.	这些武器可以在美国卫星和全球媒体的注目下进入戒备状态。


Thus, the Chinese can easily “nuclearize” a crisis with the US or anyone else.	因此，中国可以轻易地将与美国和其他国家的问题“核化”。


They do not have to detonate a nuclear weapon, but only alert adversaries to the dramatic increase in the political stakes and dangers of a showdown.	他们无需引爆核武器，只消警告对手就能大大增加政治赌注和摊牌威胁。


Russia, not wanting to be left out of the act, has recently staged the largest nuclear exercises in decades to remind everyone that it remains a serious nuclear player, too.	俄罗斯也不甘居于人后，最近进行了数十年来规模最大的核演习，以提醒世人它仍是核大国。


These individual developments are troubling.	这些发展态势都很危险。


But they cannot be understood in isolation from the larger multipolar system of major powers that is forming.	但不能脱离它们所形成的更大的多极系统来看待它们。


To a great extent, this is a nuclear multipolar system: possessing nuclear weapons contributes to a country’s global status as a major power.	从很大程度上说，这是一个多极核系统：拥有核武器有助于一国赢得强国地位。


To see this, consider the following question: When was the last time that the US or anyone else seriously proposed that India sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – that is, that India give up the Bomb.	为了理解这一点，可以考虑以下问���：美国或其他国家认真地建议伊朗签署核不扩散条约——即让伊朗放弃核弹是在什么时候。


Given America’s economic problems and looming defense cuts, as well as growing Chinese power, there is no longer even a remote possibility that this demand will be made.	美国经济问题重重，防务开支也将削减，而中国的实力正在崛起，在这样的环境下，这样的要求无论如何没有可行性。


India has become an accepted, legitimate member of the nuclear club, the fiction of the NPT notwithstanding.	印度已成为被广泛接受的合法核俱乐部成员，核不扩散条约已经成了笑柄。


It is even less likely that China or Russia would disarm for the sake of a nuclear-free world.	要中国或俄罗斯为了无核世界销毁核武器更是不可能的任务。


But the most urgent problem stems from the breakdown of major countries’ one-time nuclear monopoly and the empowerment of smaller countries like North Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and, quite possibly, Iran.	但最紧迫的问题是大国对和力量的垄断被打破，朝鲜、巴基斯坦、以色列（极有可能还有伊朗）等小国也拥有了核武器。


A new set of rules for diplomacy, military strategy, and arms control is needed to stabilize this emerging nuclear order.	为了稳定新出现的核秩序，必须有新的外交、军事战略和武器控制规则。


Pretending that it does not exist is not a strategy.	装作什么都没发生不是战略。


Fads, Frenzies, and Finance	狂热，疯狂和金融


Barcelona – The financial crisis, credit crunch, and ensuing economic downturn have severely damaged the credibility of financial markets, institutions, and traders.	巴塞罗纳－金融危机、信贷紧缩以及随之而来的经济下滑，已经严重损害了金融市场、金融机构以及交易商的信誉。


More and more people are claiming that markets are characterized by irrationality, bubbles, fads, and frenzies, and that economic actors are driven by behavioral biases.	越来越多的人认为，金融市场是以非理性、泡沫、狂热和疯狂为特征的，其中的经济参与者都受到了偏差行为的驱使。


George Soros’s recent book on the credit crisis is a good example of this line of thinking.	乔治·索罗斯关于信贷危机的近作就是这种思维方式的一个极好的例子；


He even suggests that established financial theory is obsolete.	他甚至提出，现在已经确立起来的金融理论都是很陈旧的。


His view, in essence, means that the current financial crisis is the final proof that markets do not process information efficiently.	实质上，索罗斯的观点意味着，当前的金融危机是金融市场没有有效处理信息的最终证据。


If this is true, we are closer to John Maynard Keynes’s view of the market as a casino than to Friedrich von Hayek’s view of it as a marvelous mechanism for processing dispersed information.	如果这是事实，那么，比起弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克（Friedrich von Hayek）的市场是一个处理分散信息的非凡机制的观点来，我们更接近梅纳德·凯恩斯（Maynard Keynes）的市场就是赌场的观点。


For example, the recent spike in oil prices would have been driven by an irrational frenzy in futures markets.	例如，最近油价的波动就是由期货市场的非理性狂热所驱动的。


Market operators would have miscalculated systematically, been overconfident about their information, and overreacted to news.	金融市场的交易商可能有系统地误判，对他们的信息过于自信，并且对新闻反应过度。


I believe, however, that there is another explanation for these phenomena, which is based on rational calculation and information processing by institutions and traders.	但是，我认为，对这些现象有另外一个解释，这一解释是建立在机构和交易商的合理考量和信息处理的基础上的。


The problems we see in the financial markets have very much to do with lack of good information, misaligned incentives, and, in fact, rational responses to the environment.	我们在金融市场发现的问题和有益信息的缺乏、动机的不当以及事实上对环境的 理性 反应有很大关系。


When information is scarce and unevenly distributed, prices may well depart from the reality of fundamentals.	当信息缺乏并且分配不均的时候，价格可能就会和基本面的实际情况相差甚远。


We see this when new technologies arrive on the scene.	当新技术出现的时候，我们会看到这种现象。


The Internet bubble is the most recent example, but a similar phenomenon occurred with the construction of railways more than a century ago.	网络泡沫就是最近的一个例子，但是，在一个多世纪前的铁路建设中，也出现了同样现象。


It can be argued that the sophisticated loan packages created by banks in recent years are, likewise, a new and unknown product, so information and experience to aid pricing has been scarce and dispersed.	银行在最近几年里创造的复杂的贷款项目，可以认为被就像是一个新的不知名的产品，因而，人们对其的信息和支持定价的经验不足，并且很零散。


In such circumstances, prices may well move far from the fundamentals as assessed by a hypothetical collective wisdom that would pool all information in the market.	在这样的情形下，价格可能和通过假设汇集所有市场信息的集体智慧所确定的基本面相去甚远。


Trading on the momentum of price movements may then become a rational activity that becomes self-fulfilling, as investors decide to “ride the bubble” while it lasts.	当投资者决定在泡沫破灭之前“驾驭泡沫”的时候，按照价格变化趋势进行交易就变成了自我实现的理性行为。


The bubble is inflated further by the asymmetry between those who bet that prices will rise and buy, and those who forecast a fall, but stay out because to sell short is too costly.	由于那些赌价格会上涨并且买入的人和那些预测价格会下跌但是因为卖空代价太大而仍然坚持的人之间的不对称，泡沫进一步被吹大。


This means that important and relatively persistent departures of prices from fundamental values are possible, and even likely, when information is dispersed – but that a correction to align them with reality will always follow.	这意味着，价格和基本价值重大而相对持久的偏离是可能的，并且，当信息分散时——但是将价格和实际联系起来的修正总是会随之而来，更有可能。


Eventually, stock prices do reflect the fundamentals of the economy.	最终，股票价格确实反映了经济的基本面。


This explains why the market can look like Keynes’s casino in the short term and like Hayek’s marvel in the long term.	这解释了为什么市场可以在短期内看起来像凯恩斯所称的赌场，在长期内看起来像哈耶克所说的奇迹。


So how does this explain the overexposure of many institutions to sub-prime mortgage risk and the collapse of the interbank market?	那么，这怎样解释许多机构在次级抵押风险中的过度风险暴露以及银行间市场的瓦解呢？


Were banks that chose to securitize sub-prime loans instead of keeping them on their balance sheets behaving irrationally?	那些选择将次级贷款证券化而不是将它们保留在其资产负债表上的银行，其行为是非理性的吗？


Again, informational asymmetries and misaligned incentives are at the heart of what happened.	再一次的，信息不对称和动机不当在当前的危机中处于中心地位。


Keeping those loans on the books would have meant that a bank would have had to incur a large capital adequacy provision and monitor the loans’ performance, at a cost to itself.	银行将这些贷款记在账上意味着，它将不得不满足巨额的资本充足要求，并且要自己花钱监控贷款的使用。


Securitization avoided such costs and placed the new product advantageously – with the complicity of rating agencies, which stood to profit from investors’ inexperience and lack of information.	银行将贷款证券化避免了这样的成本，并且在利用投资者的经验不足和信息缺乏获利的评级机构的帮助下，很容易处理这样的新产品。


Executives collected generous bonuses, and equity holders were protected by limited liability.	而各个机构的管理人员获得大量的奖金，股权持有人受到有限责任的保护。


A probable cause of the collapse of the interbank market is precisely informational failure.	银行间市场瓦解的一个很大的可能原因正是信息失灵。 这是一个众所周知的现象；


This is a well-known phenomenon; indeed the study of the market for automotive “lemons” won George Akerlof the Nobel Prize.	事实上，乔治·阿克罗夫（George Akerlof）因为对汽车“柠檬（在美国口语中意为次品）”市场的研究，获得了诺贝尔奖。


Banks still don’t trust each other, since each wonders how many skeletons the other has in its closet.	现在，各个银行互不信任，因为每家银行都在想对方还有多少问题没有暴露出来。


There is no irrationality here.	在这里，没有非理性。


The debate over the irrationality of financial markets is no mere academic argument.	对金融市场的非理性的争论，不仅仅是学术上的讨论。


If we believe that economic actors are irrational, then we will enact paternalistic policies aimed at controlling behavior or bailing out failed agents and institutions, which could be self-defeating and even dangerous.	如果我们认为经济参与者是非理性的，那么我们就会针对行为控制或对陷入困境的机构的援救制定家长式的政策，这是自我挫败甚至是危险的。


This may include restrictions on investments by institutions and individuals and intrusive regulation that limits, or dictates, their conduct in the market.	这样的政策可能包括对机构和个人投资的约束，以及限制或规定他们的市场行为的干预性规则。


The calls to curb speculation in derivatives markets or short sales have this flavor.	呼吁遏制衍生品市场的投机以及限制卖空具有这样的意味。


If, on the other hand, we believe that economic actors will respond rationally to incentives and information, then we can usefully reform regulatory frameworks with well-targeted measures, including restrictions on off-balance sheet vehicles, tougher disclosure requirements, and controls on rating agencies’ conflicts of interests.	如果，在另一方面，我们认为金融市场参与者会对动机和信息作出理性的反应，那么，我们就能采取目标明确的措施——包���对表外工具的限制，更严格的信息披露要求以及对评级机构利益冲突的控制，来有效地改革金融市场的监管体系。


Failing states in Central America	中美洲的失败国家


When the US Defence Department produced a report in December in which it named Mexico as one as one of two countries (along with Pakistan) at risk of rapidly becoming a failed state there was a predictable rejection of its findings in many quarters.	当美国国防部在12月提交一份报告，指责墨西哥是存在迅速沦为失败国家风险的两个国家之一（另外一个是巴基斯坦）时，不难预料这样的结论将在许多地区受到谴责。


In fact, the authors may have got their analysis right, just for the wrong country.	实际上，这份报告的作者可能分析正确，但只是搞错了国家。


Head further south to Central America – Guatemala in particular – and the failed state paradigm may be far more applicable.	更靠近中美洲南部的国家——特别是危地马拉——可能更适合被称为失败国家。


Considering the apparent progress made by democracy in the region since the 1990’s, this assessment may seem a little harsh.	如果考虑到20世纪90年代该地区民主的显著进步，失败国家的评估可能显得有些苛刻。


But dig a little closer to look at the quality of democracy, above all in the condition of state institutions such as the judiciary and the police, and the picture becomes less rosy.	但如果更深层次地审视民主的内在质量，特别是从司法和警察等国家机构的层面，情况似乎就变得不那么乐观。


Ironically, it is Mexico’s hardline strategy against the drug cartels on its own territory which is making the situation worse; gangs are seeking the relative sanctuary of Central America as a base for their operations.	颇具讽刺意味的是，造成局势恶化的正是墨西哥对待本国领土上贩毒卡特尔的强硬政策，贩毒团伙也因此试图把中美防御相对薄弱的国家建成自己的行动基地。


The evidence from Guatemala is particularly worrying.	从危地马拉搜集的证据尤其令人忧心。


Some 80% of Latin American cocaine reaching the US passes through the country at some point.	拉美近80%运抵美国的可卡因全部途经该国。


President Álvaro Colom in February claimed that 40% of the 6,200 murders recorded in 2008 were linked to drug-related violence.	阿尔瓦罗·科洛姆总统2月声称2008年有案可查的6，200起谋杀中有40%与毒品暴力有关。


Investigators from the US and Guatemala believe that the two biggest Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa and Gulf gangs, are spreading their tentacles across various departments; the Gulf cartel’s notorious armed wing, Los Zetas, is held responsible for a spate of massacres in the country in the past year.	美国和危地马拉的调查人员相信锡那罗亚和海湾集团这两个墨西哥最大的贩毒卡特尔正在把魔爪伸向各个部门，海湾卡特尔臭名昭著的武装派别 Los Zetas被指应对去年该国大量的屠杀事件负责。


Many economists believe that a major reason for the quetzal’s strength against the dollar in recent years has been the amount of drug money laundered through the Guatemalan financial system.	许多经济学家认为近年来克沙尔对美元走强的主要原因是大量的贩毒黑钱通过危地马拉金融系统得以转移。


Compared with the strong-arm tactics employed by his Mexican counterpart Felipe Calderón, Colom seems resigned to defeat.	较之墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙所采取的强硬策略，科洛姆似乎甘于接受失败。


Comments in January that the country was helpless against an ‘avalanche’ of drug-trafficking from the north were aimed at securing international support, but do little to inspire confidence in his leadership.	1月有关危地马拉面对北方贩毒‘雪崩’束手无策的评论目的是争取国际支持，但对于激发对其领导能力的信心却鲜有作用。


The sad truth is that he may well be right: the national police (PNC) are notoriously corrupt, understaffed and inefficient, as much a part of the problem as the drug gangs themselves.	令人悲哀的现实是他说的或许没错：国家警察（PNC）的腐败臭名昭著，人员配备不足而且效率低下，就像贩毒集团一样是问题的组成部分。


Moreover, the armed forces have become a shadow of their former self, and still have human rights legacies hanging over them from the country’s bitter civil war.	此外，武装部队已经退化到不成样子，到现在依然无法摆脱惨烈内战遗留下来的人权传统。


Even if the PNC were to convert itself overnight into the world’s most effective crime-fighting machine, it would still be unlikely to have a significant immediate impact.	即便国家警察在一夜间转型为全世界最高效的打击犯罪机器，仍然不大可能立即产生重大影响。


Without an overhaul of the entire judicial system, any government measures or societal pressure are not going to make much of a difference.	如果不对整个司法系统进行彻底的检查，任何政府措施或社会压力都不会取得明显的效果。


This is true as much as for the rest of Central America – with the general exception of Costa Rica and Panama – as it is for Guatemala alone.	这在危地马拉和中美州其他国家都是现实情况——唯一例外的是哥斯达黎加和巴拿马。


Evidence from El Salvador would appear to bear this point out: the Salvadoran police are widely regarded as stronger and more efficient, but crime rates remain roughly on a par with Guatemala.	从萨尔瓦多搜集的证据似乎能够证实这种说法：人们普遍认为萨尔瓦多警方更强大也更高效，但这个国家的犯罪率大致和危地马拉持平。


In both countries, impunity is the key: in Guatemala only 4% (at most) of all crimes, and less than 2% of murders, result in a criminal conviction.	在这两个国家，逃脱刑罚都是问题的关键：在危地马拉只有全部犯罪的大约4%（至多）和谋杀罪的不超过2%最终获得刑事定罪。


The condition of the Central American judiciary is at the heart of the prospect of state failure.	中美洲司法制度的现状是可能导致国家失败的核心问题。


Already weak and inefficient, prone to corruption, politicisation, lack of co-ordination between departments, and outright intimidation of its officials, judicial systems across the isthmus have been an easy target for organised crime.	因为脆弱、低效、腐败、政治化、不同部门间缺乏协调以及对官员的露骨恐吓，跨越地峡的司法制度一直是有组织犯罪的攻击目标。


Guatemala has been the most obvious victim so far, but Honduras also suffers all the similar conditions to be the next in line.	危地马拉是到目前为止最明显的受害者，但洪都拉斯也存在同样的问题，是继危地马拉之后的下一个失败国家。


Bringing the judicial system and other key state institutions to their knees is the main aim of the drug cartels.	迫使司法体系和其他关键国家机构屈服是毒品卡特尔的主要目标。


Being in virtual control of large swathes of Central American territory and being able to act with relative impunity are ultimately very good for business.	实际控制大片的中美洲领土和能够相对不受责罚地进行犯罪活动对贩毒业务很有好处。


The US may view its war on drugs in Mexico and Colombia as partially successful; the danger is that Central America does not have those countries’ institutional resilience, leaving the way open for new fronts to be opened.	美国可以认为在墨西哥和哥伦比亚的缉毒战争取得了部分胜利，但中美洲的危险之处在于并不具备上述国家的制度弹性，从而使开辟新战线成为可能。


Quite aside from the terrible human and institutional impact, this situation also undermines the long-term economic strategies of Central American governments.	除去恶劣的人文和制度影响，上述局面还破坏了中美国家政府的长期经济战略。


For better or for worse, democracy in the region has been accompanied by policies of economic liberalisation and efforts to attract foreign investment, culminating in the signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2005.	无论怎样，中美洲民主一直伴随着经济开放政策和吸引外资的努力，2005年《中美自由贸易协定》的签署使这种努力达到了高潮。


While foreign companies have not been deliberately targeted, regular headlines of new killings hardly present a positive international image.	尽管外国公司并没有成为刻意攻击的目标，但是对新发杀人案的定期新闻报导很难促成一种积极的国际形象。


On-the-surface political stability and favourable investment laws may be in place, but in the absence of an effective judiciary or reliable security forces, committing capital to promising projects becomes that much more difficult.	表面上政治稳定和有利的投资法律可能已经到位，但缺少了高效的司法或可靠的安全力量，把资金投入前景看好的项目变得困难得多。


Significant improvements to this situation will be hard won.	对局面的重大改变很难获得。


Central American politicians’ habitual tough talk on violent crime has paid few dividends in practice; it makes little impact on drug cartels, whose resources often far outweigh those of the local police or army.	中美洲政客针对暴力犯罪惯用的强硬态度实际上起不到什么作用，它对贩毒卡特尔几乎没有影响，贩毒集团掌握的资源常远远超过当地的军队和警察。


Attention will inevitably be focused on the US to provide more material and technical support to the security forces; drips of funding for Central America under the term of the Mérida Initiative agreed with Mexico are welcome, but likely to be insufficient in the grand scheme of things.	人们毫无疑问会关注美国向安全部队提供更多的物资和技术支持，《梅里达倡议》条款规定的中美洲资金援助受到广泛的欢迎，但从全局来看可能仍然不够。


Meanwhile, the economic downturn is doing its bit to help the gangs’ cause: jobs will dry up, poverty will increase and the government’s ability to provide basic welfare and social services will be tested, making a life of crime all the more attractive and rewarding.	此外，经济低迷也为贩毒团伙的事业提供了帮助：就业机会将会枯竭，贫困将会增加，政府提供基本福利和社会服务的能力将受到考验，这使得犯罪生涯更有吸引力也能带来更多好处。


The possible implications of this Catch-22 are troubling to say the least.	往好里说，《第二十二条军规》的涵义至少也是困难重重。


Failing the Syria Test	叙利亚决议的失败


MADRID – On October 2nd in Istanbul, Syria’s disparate opposition movements gave the go-ahead for the formation of a “Syrian National Council.”	马德里——10月2日，各路叙利亚反对运动在伊斯坦布尔朝着成立“叙利亚国家委员会”又迈进了一步。


This is the most important step yet taken by the fragmented forces that have been trying since May to lead a peaceful uprising against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	这是这些各自为政的势力自5月份开始试图领导一场针对总统阿萨德政权的和平起义以来所迈出的最重要的一步。


The Council’s formation boosted the morale of those who have been demanding stronger and more unified representation.	叙利亚国家委员会的成立鼓舞了那些一直在要求更强大、更团结的代表的人的士气。


But a mere two days after its creation, the embryonic Council suffered its first big setback.	但成立仅仅两天后，尚在雏形中的委员会就遭遇了第一次重大挫折。


France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Portugal, in collaboration with the United States, presented a draft resolution before the United Nations Security Council seeking to condemn repression in Syria and put an end to the use of force against civilians.	法国、英国、德国和葡萄牙联合美国一起向联合国安理会递交了一份叙利亚决议草案，谴责叙利亚的镇压行为，要求叙利亚停止对平民动用武力。


The draft was a sugarcoated version of a previous text, proposed last June. This one contained nebulous terms such as “specific measures” or “other options.”	该草案是去年6月提出的方案的糖衣版，使用了“特别措施”、“其他选择”等模棱两可的字眼。


It stressed the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria, and emphasized the need to resolve the current crisis peacefully, by means of an inclusive political process – and called for a national dialogue led from within the country.	该草案强调叙利亚的主权、独立和领土完整，强调当前危机需要通过包容性政治议程和平解决，并呼吁进行叙利亚内部的国民对话。


The draft called for a 30-day period to study the options, up from 15 days in the earlier draft.	该草案提出用30天时间来研究各种选择，而去年6月的方案只给了15天。


The object was plain: to gain a Russian, and consequently, a Chinese abstention.	目的很明确：争取俄罗斯的弃权，从而让中国也弃权。


But Russia and China vetoed the proposal anyway, and only nine members of the Security Council voted in favor, with Brazil, India, South Africa, and Lebanon abstaining.	但俄罗斯和中国还是对该草案投了反对票，而整个安理会也只有9个成员国投了赞成票，巴西、印度、南非和黎巴嫩都投了弃权票。


There are three key implications of the Security Council’s vote.	安理会的投票结果具有三大影响。


First, violence will increase.	首先，暴力会有所抬头。


Since the protests erupted last March, there have been an estimated 2,700 deaths, more than 10,000 people displaced to Turkey, and thousands more arrested.	去年3月游行活动爆发以来，据估计已有2 700人丧生，超过10 000人流亡到了土耳其，另有数千人被捕。


The Assad government does not hesitate to fire on civilians, lay siege to cities, or shut off their electricity and water.	阿萨德政府毫不犹豫地朝平民开火，包围城市，切断水电供应。


And a few days ago, it was reported that some 10,000 Syrian soldiers had defected, with several hundred joining rival movements such as the Free Syrian Army and the Free Officers Movement.	几天前有报道称，约10 000名叙利亚士兵倒戈，其中数百人加入了自由叙利亚军（Free Syrian Army）和自由军官运动（Free Officers Movement）等运动。


Unless some international protection arrives, a movement that began peacefully risks entering a new and dangerous phase.	除非国际保护介入，否则一场始于和平的运动很可能进入一个危险的新阶段。


Second, there will be grave consequences for regional security.	其次，地区安全形势也会有严重后果。


Syria is a strategic hinge in the Middle East.	叙利亚是中东地区的战略枢纽。


It has been one of the countries most hostile toward Israel, mainly through its support of Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah.	它一直以来都是反以色列最力的国家，主要通过支持哈马斯、伊朗和黎巴嫩真主党和以色列作对。


Chaos in Syria would threaten Lebanon’s stability and alter Iran’s geopolitical influence in the region.	叙利亚陷入混乱将威胁到黎巴嫩的稳定，也将改变伊朗在该地区的地缘政治影响力。


Iraq, governed by Shia political forces, also keeps close tabs on Syria’s evolution, as does Turkey, which, until fairly recently, considered Syria a keystone of its regional policy.	由什叶派政治势力统治的伊朗也密切关注着叙利亚局势。 土耳其亦然，直到最近，叙利亚一直是该国地区政策的关键着眼点。


Finally, the Security Council vote exposed a clear division within the international community.	最后，安理会的投票结果暴露出国际社会存在明显的分歧。


Among the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, all of which happen to be on the Security Council currently – two vetoed and the rest abstained (along with Lebanon, for obvious reasons).	金砖五国——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非，目前正好全部都是安理会理事国——中有两国投了反对票，其他投了弃权票（黎巴嫩也投了弃权票，不过它这样做的原因是显而易见的）。


In the case of the resolution on military intervention in Libya, the BRICS decided "to let" Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi be overthrown.	在此前关于军事干涉利比亚的决议中，金砖五国决定“让”卡扎菲被推翻。


Not so with Syria, where none aligned itself with the positions supported by the European Union and the US.	但对叙利亚就不同了，金砖五国无一与欧盟和美国站在同一个战壕里。


The Security Council’s composition wouldn’t be substantially different if an “ideal” distribution of seats were to be achieved.	要想让安理会席位达到“理想”的分配状况，其构成就不会发生重大变化。


So the fact that no agreement has been reached on Syria forces us to reflect on the future difficulties that we will face in managing global security.	因此在叙利亚问题上无法达成一致这一事实迫使我们思考未来全球安全治理事务中会遇到哪些困难。


Of course, there is no “one size fits all” model for intervention, but that does not justify evading our “responsibility to protect” – a fine concept promoted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and adopted by all UN member states in 2005.	当然，不存在“普适”的干预模式，但决不能因此认为我们可以回避前联合国秘书长科菲·安南所大力宣扬并于2005年被所有联合国成员国所接受的“保护责任”概念。


Support for the resolution would have weakened Assad’s position, as it would have revealed him as isolated from his traditional allies, Russia and China.	支持干预叙利亚决议能够打击阿萨德的地位，让他知道他已经被其传统盟友俄罗斯和中国抛弃了。


It would also have shown the international community to be unanimous in its rejection of repression and committed to protecting the Syrian people (though the draft made no mention of military intervention).	这样做还能证明，国际社会在反对镇压和承诺保护叙利亚人民方面是完全一致的（尽管该草案并未提及任何军事干预）。


The sanctions adopted by the EU and the US against Assad’s regime are not enough.	欧盟和美国对阿萨德政府所采取的制裁措施还不够。


But, unless further measures are channeled through – and thus legitimized by – the Security Council, other alternatives are limited.	但是，除非进一步措施在安理会���过从而获得合法性，否则要实行替代方案就会相当束手束脚。


In recent years, with countries such as China, India, and Brazil taking their rightful place on the international scene, the G-7 has given way to the G-20.	近几年来，随着中国、印度和巴西等国家在国际事务中逐渐获得了应有的地位，G7已开始让位给G20。


Likewise, an ambitious reform of the International Monetary Fund was adopted in 2010 to reflect changes in the global distribution of power.	类似地，2010年通过的IMF大改革也反映了全球实力格局的变化。


But this change in global governance must not be limited to economic policymaking.	但全球治理的这一变化不能局限于经济决策。


After all, globalization has brought many overall benefits, but also less friendly aspects, such as the ones dealing with global security.	毕竟，全球化已经带来了不小的总体利益，但也不乏负面因素，比如全球安全问题。


Despite our growing interconnectedness, the UN Security Council has not yet been unable to achieve sufficient consensus to resolve pressing matters such as Syria.	尽管世界各国的联系一日紧过一日，但联合国安理会并未能就叙利亚的紧急状况这样的问题达成充分一致。


Nobody ever said that the road to stronger global governance would be straight or simple to navigate.	加强全球治理的道路从来不是一片坦途。


But there are no detours: without effective structures of power and a genuine commitment from all players, the future does not look promising for global stability and prosperity.	但我们别无选择：除非有有效的实力结构和所有成员的真心承诺，否则全球稳定和繁荣的前景绝不是铁板一块。


The Failure of Free Migration	自由移民的失败


LONDON – The horrendous attack by a French-Tunisian man on a crowd in Nice celebrating Bastille Day, which killed 84 and injured hundreds more, will give National Front leader Marine Le Pen a massive boost in next spring’s presidential election.	伦敦—法国国庆日，一位突尼斯裔法国人对尼斯庆祝人群发动了可怕的袭击，造成84人死亡，数百人受伤，该事件将极大地提振国民阵线领导人马琳·勒庞在明年春季总统大选中的支持度。


It doesn’t matter whether the murderer, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, had any links to radical Islamism.	凶手Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel是否与极端伊斯兰教有关联并不重要。


Throughout the Western world, a toxic mix of physical, economic, and cultural insecurity has been fueling anti-immigration sentiment and politics precisely at the moment when the disintegration of post-colonial states across the Islamic crescent is producing a refugee problem on a scale not seen since World War II.	放眼西方世界，人身、经济和文化不安定构成了一个危险的组合，并在助长反移民情绪和政治，而与此同时，伊斯兰新月地带后殖民地时代国家的分崩离析正在制造二战结束以来所未见的大规模难民问题。


In the last 30 years or so, a key benchmark for liberal-democratic societies has been their openness to newcomers.	在过去30年中，自由民主社会的一个关键基本特征是对新来者的开放性。


Only bigots could not see that immigration benefits both hosts and migrants; so the task of political leadership was to keep such views out of the dominant discourse, and to facilitate integration or assimilation.	只有顽固不化的人才看不见移民对东道国和移民本身的好处； 因此，政治领导层的任务是将这样的观点排除在主流叙事之外，并为融合和吸收提供便利。


Unfortunately, most Western elites failed to appreciate the conditions of success.	不幸的是，大部分西方精英没有意识到成功的条件。


Although the movement of peoples has been a constant feature of human history, it has been relatively bloodless only when it was into scantily settled or developing territories.	民族的迁徙是人类历史的永恒特征，但只有当迁徙目的地为不太适合居住或尚需发展的领地时，才会相对和平。


A classic case was the nineteenth-century emigrations from Europe to the New World.	一个经典的例子是十九世纪欧洲向新世界移民。


Between 1840 and 1914, 55 million people left Europe for the Americas – much larger, relative to population, than migration since WWII.	1840年至1914年期间，5,500万人离开欧洲来到美洲——就人口比例而言，比二战以来移民规模庞大得多。


Nearly all the movers were economic migrants, pushed out of their countries by famine and agricultural depression and pulled to the New World by the promise of free land and a better life.	几乎所有这些移民都是经济移民，因为饥荒和农业萧条而背井离乡，受到免费的土地和更好的生活的感召来到新世界。


As the world industrialized and filled up with people, the flow of people from developed to developing areas reversed.	随着世界的工业化和人类足迹的遍布，移民从发达地区向发展中地区的流向发生了逆转。


Poverty and starvation still pushed migrants off the land in poor countries; now, however, the pull factor was not free land, but better jobs in developed countries.	贫困和饥荒仍然在驱使移民离开穷国； 但是，如今，移民的动力不再是免费的土地，而是发达国家更好的工作岗位。


This set up today’s tension.	这造成了今天的紧张局面。


After WWII, Western governments devised policies that aimed to balance the economic benefits of immigration (cheap labor) with protection of domestic jobs and ways of life.	二战后，西方政府设计了旨在平衡移民的经济利益（廉价劳动力）和保护本国工作岗位和生活方式的政策。


For example, between 1955 and 1973, West Germany admitted 14 million “guest workers,” largely from Turkey.	比如，从1955年到1973年，西德允许1,400万“外籍劳工”入境，大多来自土耳其。


But, though the guests were expected to return home after two years, these controls gradually weakened as part of the general movement toward free trade and free capital movements.	但是，尽管这些外国人应该在两年后回国，但在自由贸易和自由资本流动的大势面前，此类管制逐渐废弛。


Alongside economic motives for migration there has always been another: ethnic, religious, and political persecution.	移民除了经济动机，一直也有其他动机：种族、宗教和政治迫害。 例子包括1492年犹太人被驱逐出西班牙；


Examples include the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492, of Huguenots from France in 1685, of Germans and others from Eastern Europe following WWII, of some Palestinians from Israel in 1948, and of Indians from Uganda in the 1970s.	1948年一些巴勒斯坦人被驱逐出以色列； 20世纪70年代印度人被驱逐出乌干达等。


In recent years, refugees have mainly been fleeing either persecution or extreme insecurity following state disintegration.	近几年来，难民主要因为迫害或因国家分裂导致的极端危险而逃离家园。


We saw this in the Balkans in the 1990s, and in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa in the 2000s.	20世纪90年代的巴尔干地区、21世纪初的阿富汗和非洲之角都是如此。


The five million Syrians now in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are the latest and most dramatic example of this pattern.	如今有五百万叙利亚人身处土耳其、黎巴嫩和约旦，这是这一模式最近也是最惹人关注的例子。


For this class of migrant, push factors are by far the most important.	对这类移民，到目前为止推动因素是最重要的。


But the line between refugees and economic migrants blurs over time.	但难民和经济移民之间的界限逐渐模糊。


History indicates that most refugees do not return to their country of origin.	历史表明，大部分难民不会回到原来的国家。


It takes too long for the feeling of extreme insecurity to subside; and, meanwhile, the lure of a better life takes hold.	极端不安全感需要极长的时间才能消除； 而与此同时，更好的生活的诱惑一直存在。


This explains an important fact about popular perception: most people in the host countries do not distinguish between economic migrants and refugees.	这解释了关于流行的观点的一个重要事实：大部分来到东道��的人不区分经济移民和难民。


Both are typically viewed as claimants on existing resources, not as creators of new resources.	他们大多都被认为是坐吃现有资源的人，而不是新资源的创造者。


The flight of East Asians from Kenya during that country’s “Africanization” campaign led directly to the UK’s anti-immigration legislation of 1968.	东亚人在肯尼亚“非洲化”运动期间的大逃亡直接导致了1968年英国反移民立法。


This historical perspective suggests three conclusions.	这一历史角度意味着三点。


First, anti-immigrant sentiment is not based only on prejudice, ignorance, or political opportunism.	首先，反移民情绪不是基于偏见、傲慢或政治投机主义。


Anti-immigrant language is not just socially constructed.	反移民叙事不仅仅是社会构造（socially constructed）的。


Words are not mirrors of things “out there,” but they have some relation to such things.	叙事不是“彼处”（out there）事物的镜像，但与这些事物存在某些关联。


You cannot manipulate something unless there is something to manipulate.	要先操纵某个东西，必须现有东西可供操纵。


We have little chance of changing the words unless we alter the realities to which they refer.	除非我们改变所提到的现实，否则很难改变叙事。


Second, the era of unregulated mass population movement is drawing to a close.	其次，不受管制的大规模人口迁徙时代正在进入尾声。


As the Brexit vote shows, Europe’s political class greatly underestimated the strains caused by free mobility across borders – a shibboleth of the failed neoliberal project of maximizing market-based resource allocation.	英国退出投票表明，欧洲政治阶级极大地低估了跨境自由流动所造成的张力——这是最大化市场资源配置这一失败的新自由主义计划的陈词滥调。


Critics of neoliberalism cannot consistently exempt population movements from regulation.	新自由主义的批评者无法一直让人口流动免于管制。


Indeed, the fatal flaw of free mobility in the EU is that it always presupposed a state to manage the movement.	事实上，欧盟内自由迁徙的致命漏洞在于它永远预设了一个国家（state）去管理人口流动。


This state does not exist.	这个国家是不存在的。


Giving people an EU passport doesn’t legitimize a single labor market, which is why “emergency brakes” on migration within the EU are inevitable.	给予人们欧盟护照并没有让单一劳动力市场合法化，这就是欧盟内部移民“紧急刹车”无法避免的原因。


Third, we need to accept the fact that most of the refugees arriving in the EU will not return home.	第三，我们需要接受一个事实，即大部分到达欧盟的难民不会回去。


The way forward is difficult.	前路艰辛。


The easiest steps are those that increase voters’ security, in the widest sense, because such policies are within the control of political leaders.	最容易的步骤是增强选民最广义的安全，因为这类政策在政治领导人的可控范围内。


These measures will include not just a cap on the number of economic migrants, but also policies leading to expectation of full employment and continuity of income.	这些措施不仅仅包括限制经济移民的数量，也包括形成充分就业和收入持续预期的政策。


Only if voters’ economic insecurity is diminished is there any hope for active policies to assimilate or integrate refugees, whose numbers Western leaders cannot directly control.	只有选民的经济不安全性得到遏制，才有希望采取积极政策吸收或融合难民。 难民的数量不是西方领导人能够直接控制的。


The unsolved problem is how to reduce those factors pushing people out of their own countries.	悬而未决的问题是如何遏制推动人们离开祖国的因素。


We may hope that economic development in Eastern Europe – or Mexico – will equalize conditions sufficiently to end net flows from one region to another; but ending the flow of refugees from the Middle East and Africa is altogether more daunting.	我们可以希望东欧——或墨西哥——的经济发展将让条件变得足够平等，结束从一个地区流向另一个地区的净流动； 但结束来自中东和非洲的难民流的难度让人望而生畏。


Restoration of order and creation of legitimate authority are preconditions of economic development, and we don’t know how this is to be done.	重塑秩序和创造合法权力是经济发展的先决条件，我们不知道应该如何完成这个条件。


In some cases, it may require redrawing borders.	在一些例子中，这也许需要重画边境。


But it is hard to see that happening without years of fighting, or to know how the West can reduce the bloodshed.	但不经历多年的战争，或知道西方如何能够减少流血，就很难实现这一点。


One thing seems certain to me: without increased security at both ends, political violence will spill over from the Islamic world to its nearest neighbors in Europe.	对我来说，有一点似乎是肯定的：没有两端安全的增加，政治暴力将从伊斯兰世界溢出至最接近的欧洲邻国。


The Win-Win Fantasy of Liberal Democracy	自由民主的双赢幻想


WASHINGTON, DC – Few analysts expected Britons to vote to exit the European Union or Americans to choose Donald Trump as their next president.	华盛顿—很少有分析师预计到英国会投票退出欧盟，或者美国会选择特朗普做下任总统。


Yet it did not take long for a consensus explanation of these miscalculations to emerge.	但很快，人们就对这些误算的发生形成了一致解释。


When it comes to such complex and consequential developments, however, we should beware of facile reasoning.	但是，面对如此复杂和重大的形势，我们必须小心翼翼，不能轻率推论。


The current consensus blames the “elites” – in academia, media, and business – for becoming so caught up in their relatively cosmopolitan and connected world that they failed to listen carefully to less educated and connected groups.	目前的共识指责“精英”——学术、媒体和商业精英——过度沉浸在他们相对大同互通的世界中，而没有去聆听教育和互通程度较低的人民的声音。


Because the latter groups are those that have benefited the least from globalization, they were the most likely to reject supranational institutions (in the case of Brexit) or establishment candidates (in the case of Trump).	由于后者正是从全球化中获益最少的群体，他们也最有可能拒绝超国家制度（英国退欧的例子）和建制派候选人（特朗普的例子）。


Ignoring them was, in many ways, an obvious mistake.	从诸多方面讲，忽视他们是一个显而易见的错误。


There is considerable merit to this view.	这一观点有很大的价值。


“Group think” regularly afflicts today’s financial and intellectual elite, including pollsters, who often have similar educational backgrounds, work together, read the same media, and congregate at the same conferences and events, from Davos to Aspen.	“集体思维”时不时折磨着当今金融和知识精英，包括民意调查专家，他们常常具有相近的教育背景，在一起工作，阅读同样的媒体，出席从达沃斯到阿斯彭的同样的会议和场合。


Members of this crowd tend to believe that they have absorbed the great lessons of history.	这群人倾向于认为他们已经汲取了历史的重大教训。


They tend to decry racism and even milder forms of ethnocentrism, and are unlikely to reject feminism.	他们倾向于评判种族主义甚至比较温和的民族中心论，也不可能拒绝女权。


Though these groups are not paragons of diversity, there is a widespread recognition of diversity’s value, and the dominance of men, at least, is beginning to decline.	尽管这些群体并非多元化的典范，但对于多元化的价值人们已经有了广泛认识，而男权主宰至少已经开始走下坡路。


The other common denominator of this group is wealth.	这一群体的另一个“公分母”是财富。


While not all members of this group are multimillionaires, they do tend to have the education and skills needed to reap the benefits of economic globalization.	这一群体并非人人都是百万富翁，但他们确实大多具备收获经济全球化果实所需要的教育水平和技能。


As a result, they did not generally recognize rising inequality, particularly in the US, as a major problem until recently (though, to be sure, many of the wealthiest elites have engaged in an unprecedented amount of philanthropy).	因此，总体而言他们知道最近才认识到不平等性加剧是一个大问题（尽管平心而论，许多最富有的精英对慈善前所未有地慷慨），美国尤其如此。


It is clear that the cosmopolitan elites who are making consequential decisions in critical sectors, from business and finance to politics, must pay more attention to the grievances of the less fortunate, the less educated, and the less connected.	显然，在关键领域——从商业和金融到政治——做出重大决策的大同论精英必须更加关注不太幸运、教育和互通程度较低的人群的怨恨。


Rather than congregating with like-minded people in silos, they must create platforms that connect people of more diverse backgrounds and circumstances – including those whose experiences with globalization are very different.	他们不能只和思维相近的人闭门聚会，而必须建立连接背景和条件更加多样化的人群的平台——包括那些对全球化有着非常不同的体验的人。


Such platforms would help to address the fragmentation of public debate.	这些平台有助于解决公共争论的撕裂。


Yet ideological “bubbles” are not the only problem.	但意识形态“泡沫”不是唯一的问题。


For one thing, the elites have failed not only to predict recent populist victories, but also to anticipate that the decidedly non-populist François Fillon would win the French center-right Republicans’ presidential primary by a wide margin.	一方面，精英不但没能预见到最近的民粹主义胜利，他们也没有预见到坚定的反民粹主义者弗朗索瓦·菲永以绝对优势赢得法国中右翼共和党的总统初选。


Clearly, ignorance of working-class anger is not the only factor jamming their political radars.	显然，忽视工作阶级的愤怒不是扰乱政治雷达的唯一因素。


Of course, it is comforting to believe that, if only the facts were better known and people could discuss them more dispassionately, voters would become more unified and politics more constructive.	当然，认为唯有事实被更好地了解，并且人们可以更冷静地讨论事实，选民才能更加团结，政治才能更加具有建设性，这样的信念令人欣慰。


But, even with better, more fact-based discourse, people’s interests will diverge.	但是，即使存在更好的、更加以事实为基础的讨论，人们的利益仍将趋于多元化。


Those who voted for Brexit or Trump did not simply fail to understand the true benefits of globalization; they currently lack the skills or opportunities to secure a piece of the pie.	支持英国退欧或特朗普的人并不只是因为无法理解全球化的真正好处； 他们目前缺少技能或机会保证能够分得一杯羹。


Beyond communication, therefore, lies a genuine need for redistributive policies, which are fundamentally not win-win.	因此，除了沟通，还有对再分配政策的真正需求，而再分配从根本上说无法双赢。


The main beneficiaries of free trade and technological change must actively compensate the losers through taxation, subsidies, and employment support.	自由贸易和技术变迁的主要受益者必须通过税收、补贴和就业支持补偿输家。


Similarly, the assumption that the liberal-democratic West is largely consistent in its economic and geopolitical interests is fundamentally flawed.	类似地，认为自由民主的西方具有基本一致的经济和地缘政治利益的观点也存在根本性缺陷。


The truth is that the traditional Western powers, despite having plenty in common, diverge in many areas, from energy policy – Europe is far more dependent on hydrocarbons than the US – to security.	真相是传统西方列强尽管有诸多共同点，但在许多方面仍然是多样化的，从能源政策——欧洲碳氢化合物依赖远大于美国——到安全莫不如此。


In this context, simply communicating better and agreeing on the facts will not be enough to facilitate agreement on cooperation.	在这样的背景下，仅仅加强沟通和在事实方面取得一致意见不足以促进合作协定。


Negotiations will be needed, with both sides sacrificing something.	谈判仍然是必要的，双方都要做出一些牺牲。


Both of these issues point to a broader flaw in the Western worldview: the belief in win-win solutions.	这些问题都指向西方世界官中一个更加广泛的缺陷：信奉双赢方案。


In fact, liberal democracy, in both its center-right and center-left incarnations, is underpinned by the belief that such solutions (the most important one being peace) can benefit a “society” – or, indeed, humanity as a whole – in the long run.	事实上，自由民主——不管以中右翼还是中左翼的面貌出现——的基础是信奉双赢方案（最重要的一点是和平）从长期看有利于“社会”——事实上是指全人类。


Democracy negotiates the twists and turns and manages the short-run sacrifices.	民主国家用谈判解决周折（twists and turns）、管理短期牺牲。


But, in the end, everyone benefits.	但是，最终人人都能获益。


Of course, failure to secure win-win solutions often results in lose-lose situations.	当然，不能确保双赢方案常常导致双输局面。


In the first half of the last century, it was widely believed that failing to conquer agricultural space would condemn countries to starvation.	在上个世纪前半叶，人们广泛认为不能征服农业领域将导致国家陷入饥饿。


Today, similar arguments are made about energy.	如今，类似的观点的目标变成了能源。


The reality is more complicated.	现实要复杂得多。


For economies to secure the “win” of inclusive growth, the very rich may well have to submit to a form of regulation and taxation, including international rules, that cost them substantial wealth in the long run.	对想要确保包容增长“赢”的经济来说，巨富人群必须遵从某种形式的监管和纳税，包括国际规则，从长期看，这将让他们付出沉重的财富代价。


While that would not turn the wealthy into losers (they would still be wealthy), one cannot deny that they would incur a loss.	尽管这无法让富者沦为输家（他们仍将是富者），但无法否认他们会蒙受损失。


What the liberal-democratic approach does get right is that there is virtually always room for compromise.	自由民主方针确实正确的方面是几乎永远有妥协空间。


While not everyone will go home feeling like a true winner, individuals and countries are better off working together and striking deals than they would be if they appropriated and guarded limited space and resources by all available means.	尽管无法做到人人都能获得真正的赢家感，但个体和国家因为合作和形成协议而获益，比它们竭尽全力划定和捍卫有限的空间和资源时境况有所改善。


The costs of modern conflicts, including domestic political deadlock, are too large, to the point that even the winners end up losing.	现代冲突——包括国内政治僵局——的代价过于高昂，即使是最后的赢家也有可能得不偿失。


In the wake of recent miscalculations, we must recalibrate our political radars – and that means accounting for all potential sources of interference, not just those that fit a neat narrative.	在出现了最近的误算的情况下，我们必须校准我们的政治雷达——而这意味着考虑一切潜在干扰源，而不只是符合条理的干扰源。


Here, the fundamental difference in the worldview of liberal or social democrats and hardline ideologues, whether nationalist or otherwise, may be the most consequential.	在这方面，自由或社会民主与强硬空想家——不管是民族主义者还是其他——的世界观的根本性区别也许是最为重要的。


The former should acknowledge medium-term win-lose situations, but maintain their long-term faith in gradual democratic change at home, while working to uphold international peace.	前者应该承认中期输赢局面，但保持对国内渐进式民主变革的长期信念，并致力于保持国际和平。


Fair Contracts for Poor Countries	与穷国签订公平合同


A number of countries in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere are abrogating or renegotiating contracts with multinational enterprises (MNEs), and others are likely to follow suit.	拉丁美洲、非洲、东欧和其他地区的一些国家正在废除与跨国企业的合同或正与后者重新谈判，而其他的国家也可能步其后尘。


The costs can be high.	但（这样做的）代价可能是高昂的。


Governments may get better terms, but they may also become embroiled in international investment disputes and discourage other investors.	政府虽然可能获得更有利的合同条款，但它们也可能被牵扯到国际投资争端中，从而打击投资者的信心。


For companies, renegotiations mean uncertainty and possible interruptions of production and revenue.	对公司而言，重新谈判意味着不确定因素和对生产和收入可能被打断。


Significant shifts in power (typically as a result of changes in commodity prices) and ideology, or changes in the economics of projects, can lead to renegotiations, especially when it comes to large investments in natural resources and infrastructure.	实力（通常是商品价格变化的结果）和意识形态的转变，或项目经济效益的变化都可能导致重新谈判，特别在资源和基础设施的巨额投资方面更是如此。


But often the reason is that the host country considers a contract to be unfair.	但通常的原因是东道国认为某项合同不公平。


While “fairness” may well be in the eyes of the beholder, in some cases, the host country may not have had the expertise required to negotiate the best possible deal – a frequent situation when MNEs negotiate with the least developed countries (the world’s 50 poorest countries, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa).	虽然“公平”是个仁者见仁的概念，但在某些情况下，东道国可能没有足够的能力通过谈判获得最佳的交易—这是在跨国企业与最不发达国家（世界最穷的50个国家，大多位于撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲）谈判时经常出现的情况。


Mittal’s 2005 deal with Liberia (renegotiated last year) and various contracts with Congo probably fall at least partly into this category, as do some deals in ex-Soviet countries.	Mittal’s与利比亚在2005年达成的交易（于去年重新谈判）以及与刚果的各种合同至少在一定程度上属于这一类型。 其在前苏联国家签订的合同也是如此。


Suppose a $500 million petroleum or copper contract needs to be negotiated.	假设需要谈判签订一项价值5亿美元的石油或铜的合同。


This will most likely involve a leading MNE, which can field a negotiating team that includes world-class lawyers, geologists, and financial analysts who understand, for example, the trade-offs between taxes and royalties and can put them in appropriate language.	这很可能会牵涉一家领导性的跨国企业。 该企业能够组织一个由世界级的律师、地质学家和懂得诸如公司税和特许使用费之间的平衡并言之切切的分析师所参与的谈判团队。


The host country, on the other hand, simply cannot match such a team.	而东道国的谈判团队则不可能有这样的豪华阵容。


Perhaps it does not even know what to ask for.	很可能它甚至还不知道自己想从中获得什么样的利益。


The resulting contract is all the more problematic because it is likely to involve one of the host country’s few important resources, which can generate more predictable (and probably higher) revenues than official development assistance – and over a long period of time.	如此情况下签订的合同更是问题多多，因为它通常会涉及到东道国为数不多的几种重要资源之一，而该资源在相当时期里会产生比官方发展援助更多的收入。


So, even without corruption, it is not surprising when a future government demands that the contract be renegotiated.	所以，即便在没有腐败的情况下，未来的某一届政府要求对该合同重新进行谈判也不足为奇了。


Clearly, the playing field with MNEs should be leveled.	诚然，与跨国企业的博弈应该在同一水平上进行。


In theory, the host country could hire its own international experts to assist it in negotiations.	从理论上讲，东道国也可以聘请自己的国际专家来协助谈判。


But poor countries typically lack the funds needed to pay such a team’s fees.	但穷国通常负担不起如此巨额的费用。


Nor do the World Bank and regional development banks have the in-house expertise – or, as a rule, the funds – to provide technical assistance.	世界银行和区域性开发银行也没有自己的专家—或，相应的资金—来提供技术支援。


But what if MNEs provided the funds?	但如果跨国企业为此买单呢？ 显然，它们尽可能给自己争取最大的利益；


Obviously, MNEs want the best possible deal for themselves; but they also want durable contracts that won’t be repudiated by the next government.	但它们也想签订一份长期有效，不会让下一届政府拒绝履行的合同。 因此，谈判订立一份（在外界看来也是）公平的合同是符合它们利益的。


So they have an interest in negotiating a fair deal, and one that is	另外，在大型项目中，谈判团队的费用所占比例相对较小（或者可以由项目收入流以外的方式来报销）。


But, even if a company embraces this approach, problems abound.	但即便是公司采取这样的方式，还是存在诸多问题。


How can it be implemented without looking like bribery (in case the company gives the funds directly to the government)?	怎样实施而又不会有贿赂之嫌（在公司将资金直接支付给政府的情况下）？


And how can companies prevent some of the funds from being misused (say, if the government hires a third-rate team)?	以及相关公司如何防止一部分资金被滥用（比如该国政府聘用了三流的团队）？


Here is a proposal: an Investment Contract Aid Facility (ICAF) under the umbrella of a well-respected organization.	这里有一个提议：在一个广受尊敬的组织监管下建立一种“投资合同援助机制” (ICAF)。


The ICAF would function like an escrow account into which the firm pays the funds required for the host country to hire a negotiating team.	ICAF的功能类似于一个第三方托管账户，公司将东道国雇用谈判团所需要的资金汇入其中。


The escrow account manager then invites the country to select a team, suggesting what skills are required and perhaps even providing a roster of experts.	然后由账户管理人提出资质建议，甚至专家花名册让东道国定夺。


The country would be free to choose its own team, but the escrow account manager, aided by an international advisory board of expert volunteers, would need to agree that it is, in fact, world-class.	东道国可以自由选择自己的谈判团队，但必须要由账户管理人在一支由专家志愿者组成的国际顾问委员会的协助下来确认这支团队是世界级的。


One could even include a capacity-building element by adding to the team one or two local negotiators.	东道国甚至还可以通过在团队中加入一两名当地的谈判专家来扩充实力。


The result should be a contract that is as fair as possible under the given circumstances – and perceived as such.	其结果应该是一份在同等条件下尽可能公平的合同—并且在外界看来也是如此。


It would be enough for a handful of CEOs and prime ministers to say that they are prepared to consider using such a Facility on a case-by case basis.	只要有一些CEO和总理们表示他们准备根据具体情况来考虑采用这一机制就足够了。


While this would not end the abrogation or renegotiation of contracts, it would eliminate one important reason them, benefiting countries and companies alike.	它虽然不会终止对合同的废除和重新谈判，但却会消除一个这样做的理由，让东道国和跨国企业都受益。


The Arc of Climate Justice	气候正义之弧


ISLAMABAD – It is a painful irony of climate change that those least responsible for the problem are often the most exposed to its ravages.	伊斯兰堡—气候变化是一个令人痛苦的讽刺，对这个问题责任最小的人往往是受气候变化蹂躏最惨的人。


And if any country can claim to be the victim of this climate injustice, it is Pakistan.	而最有资格声称是气候不公平受害者的国家莫过于巴基斯坦。


As world leaders prepare to meet at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, the country is reeling from the aftereffects of devastating floods that damaged buildings, destroyed crops, swept away bridges, and killed 238 people.	在全球领导人准备齐聚巴黎联合国气候变化会议之际，巴基斯坦正在大洪灾过后的一地狼藉中挣扎。 洪水摧毁了房屋，毁灭了庄稼，冲垮了大桥，还夺走238人的生命。


Such weather-related tragedies are not new to Pakistan; what’s different is their frequency and ferocity.	这些与天气有关的悲剧对巴基斯坦来说绝不是什么新鲜事； 不同之处在于它们的频繁度和猛烈度。


Deadly floods have become a yearly occurrence; in 2010, record-breaking rains killed nearly 2,000 people and drove millions from their homes.	致命洪水已成为一年一遇的事件； 2010年，创纪录的降雨杀死了近2,000人，令数百万人失去家园。


Even as Pakistan fights one of the world’s most pitched battles against terrorism, increasingly violent weather is pushing up the cost of food and clean water, threatening energy supplies, undermining the economy, and posing a potent and costly security threat.	巴基斯坦是全世界反恐斗争形势最严峻的国家之一，而日益“暴力”的天气正在推高粮食和清洁水的价格，威胁能源供给，破坏经济，造成严重的、代价高昂的安全威胁。


There is little doubt that the country’s climatic woes are caused, at least in part, by the greenhouse-gas emissions that industrialized countries have pumped into the air since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.	毫无疑问，巴基斯坦气候混乱部分要归因于工业革命以来工业化国家向空气中排放的温室气体。


Even today, Pakistan produces less than 1% of the world’s emissions.	即使在今天，巴基斯坦的排放量也不到世界总量的1%。


Meanwhile, Pakistan is consistently ranked among the countries that are most vulnerable to the harmful effects of climate change, owing to its demographics, geography, and natural climatic conditions.	与此同时，巴基斯坦一直是最容易受到气候变化有害影响的国家之一，这是因为它的人口、地理和自然气候条件决定的。


From 1994 to 2013, climate change cost Pakistan an average of $4 billion a year.	从1994年到2013年，气候变化平均每年给巴基斯坦带来的损失为40亿美元。


By comparison, in 2012, terrorism in Pakistan resulted in losses of roughly $1 billion.	相比而言，2012年恐怖主义给巴基斯坦带来的损失为10亿美元左右。


When the country isn’t suffering from floods, it is subject to water shortages, ranking as one of the most water-stressed in the world, according to the Asian Development Bank.	当巴基斯坦没有遭遇洪水时，又会受到水短缺的困扰。 据亚洲开发银行的数据，巴基斯坦是世界上水压力最大的国家之一。


And climate change is compounding both problems, wearing away at the glaciers and snowpack that serve as natural regulators of water flow, even as increased erosion caused by flooding contributes to the siltation of major reservoirs.	气候变化让这两个问题都变得更加严重了，作为水流自然调节器的冰川和积雪日益消融，而洪水造成的日益严重的侵蚀导致主要水库淤积严重。


Meanwhile, rising temperatures are increasing the likelihood of pests and crop diseases, jeopardizing agricultural productivity and subjecting the population to increasingly frequent heatwaves.	与此同时，气温升高正在增加爆发庄稼病虫害的可能性，制约了农业生产率，也让巴基斯坦人民遭遇日益频繁的热浪袭击。


Rising sea levels are increasing the salinity of coastal areas, damaging mangroves, and threatening fish species’ breeding grounds.	海平面的上升增加了沿海地区的盐度，破坏了红树林，威胁鱼类的栖息地。


And higher ocean temperatures are leading to more frequent and dangerous cyclones, endangering the country’s coast.	而海洋温度的升高正在导致更加频繁和危险的气旋，威胁着巴基斯坦海岸线。


The outlook for the future is no less alarming: worsening water stress, increased flash flooding, and the depletion of the country’s water reservoirs.	未来前景也令人警觉：水压力恶化，暴雨山洪增加，水库枯竭。


By 2040, projections indicate that an average rise in temperatures of 0.5º Celsius could destroy 8-10% of Pakistan’s crops.	预测数据表明，到2040年，气温平均升高0. 5℃将摧毁巴基斯坦8—10%的庄稼。


This burden must not be left for Pakistan to carry alone.	这一负担不能完全由巴基斯坦独自承担。


Thus far, progress at international climate-change talks has been incremental at best.	目前，国际气候变化的进展十分缓慢。


Fossil-fuel lobbies, reluctant governments in industrialized countries, and disengaged electorates have delayed and obstructed the emergence of a robust agreement to reduce global greenhouse-gas emissions.	化石燃料游说集团、工业化国家不肯作为的政府，以及漠不关心的选民导致减少全球温室气体排放的强大协议障碍重重，迟迟无法形成。


But while expectations of a breakthrough in the fight against climate change in Paris are optimistic, a push for equitable distribution of the costs of global warming must be made.	但尽管人们乐观地预计巴黎能够带来遏制气候变化的突破，还必须为全球变暖成本制定平等的分配方案。


Despite an increase in funding for climate adaptation and mitigation in the developing world, Pakistan’s share has remained tiny, relative to the disasters it has suffered in the last five years alone.	尽管发展中国家气候适应和减灾资金有所增加，但光从过去五年所遭受的灾难看，巴基斯坦所占比重仍然很小。


By 2050, the average annual cost of climate-change adaptation in Pakistan will be $6-14 billion, according to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.	到2050年，据联合国气候变化框架公约的数据，巴基斯坦气候变化适应年均成本将达到60—140亿美元。


Mitigation will run another $17 billion per year.	减灾每年另需170亿美元。


As climate change continues to take its terrible toll, Pakistan cannot allow the billions of dollars in damages it suffers at the hands of the world’s largest polluters to go uncompensated.	气候变化继续摧残着巴基斯坦，而巴基斯坦决不能允许它因为世界最大污染国蒙受数十亿美元的损失而得不到补偿。


Whatever the ultimate agreement in Paris, climate negotiators must ensure that the accrued losses resulting from global emissions are borne fairly and do not remain the sole burden of those suffering the greatest harm.	不管巴黎达成怎样的最终协议，气候谈判员必须确保全球排放所孳生的损失得到公平分担，决不能只由蒙受最大伤害的国家承担。


As one of the world’s smaller polluters, Pakistan is well within its rights in seeking resources and funds to cope with the impact of problems for which it is not responsible.	作为全球污染小国，巴基斯坦绝对有权利要求获得资源和资金应对并非由它所造成的问题带来的影响。


So are many other countries.	其他许多国家也是如此。


Our demand for a binding international mechanism to distribute the burden of climate change – a mechanism to ensure climate justice – must not go unheeded in Paris.	我们要求形成一个有约束力的国际机制，根据这个机制分配气候变化的负担，确保气候正义，这个要求巴黎决不能置之不理。


The Responsibility to Protect Migrants	保护移民的责任


CORK – Migrants face countless perils.	科克—移民面临着数不清的危险。


Vicious mafias smuggle them across borders with reckless disregard for their lives.	各种黑道人士在边境附近肆无忌惮地抢掠，根本不顾移民的死活。


Rapacious recruiters fleece them of their earnings.	贪婪的蛇头将他们的所得席卷一空。


Abusive employers exploit their labor.	雇主不把他们的劳动力榨干不罢休。


And, adding insult to injury, anti-immigrant sentiment erodes the political will to confront these challenges.	此外，让他们雪上加霜的是，反移民情绪让政客不愿意直面这些挑战。


Yet, when it comes to protecting migrants’ well-being and rights, smart practices abound – and should be promoted more widely and implemented more frequently.	但是，在保护移民的福利和权利方面，我们有许多明智的实践，它们应该得到鼓励和更广泛、更频繁地实施。


With the number of international migrants on track nearly to double in the coming decades, such practices must become reference points for action.	近几十年来，能跟踪到的国际移民数量接近翻番，这些实践必须作为行动的参照点。


The plight of migrants is particularly tragic when its source is violent conflict, like in Syria and Libya, or natural or manmade disasters.	暴力冲突（比如叙利亚和利比亚）和自然或人为灾难产生的移民状况尤其悲惨。


In crises like these, migrants’ lives and physical safety are jeopardized through no fault of their own.	在这些危机中，移民生命和人身安全受到了严重侵害，而这并不是因为他们自身的原因产生的。


Yet the world has no clear guidelines for how to protect them.	但世界仍没有明确的原则指导如何保护他们。


Libya’s civil war placed the vulnerability of migrants in stark relief, with hundreds of thousands caught in the crossfire.	利比亚内战使人们对移民的脆弱性一览无余，千百万人遭遇了战火。


And, while Libyans were badly affected by the war, foreign workers were even more vulnerable, as they were largely left out of schemes aimed at protecting civilians.	此外，与饱受战争摧残的利比亚人相比，外来工人甚至更加脆弱，因为他们被排除在以保护公民为目的的政策之外。


What stood out were the very different fates migrants faced.	由此带来的是移民命运的大相径庭。


Most were left to their own devices to escape the violence, and many died trying.	大部分移民必须靠自己躲避暴力，很多人在此过程中丧命。


Some were killed after being falsely targeted as mercenaries (largely owing to the color of their skin).	一些人因为被误认为雇佣兵而被杀（这主要是因为他们的肤色）。


Other groups, however, fared better.	不过，其他群体状况要好一些。


High-skilled migrants employed by Western oil companies, for example, were airlifted to safety.	比如，受雇于西方石油公司的高技能移民被飞机转移到安全地带。


Nationals from countries with robust protection protocols, and sufficient financial resources, were efficiently evacuated (the Philippines was exemplary in this regard).	来自有强大保护代理人和足够资金来源的国家的公民也得到了充分的撤离（菲律宾在这方面树立了榜样）。


Libya was thus a vivid reminder of the serious gaps that exist in helping migrants in life-threatening situations.	因此，利比亚为我们提供了生动的写照，让我们看到了在帮助移民面对威胁生命局面时各国表现的严重差异。


Their vulnerability is heightened due to their legal status and other obstacles – restrictions on exercising their fundamental rights, language barriers, constraints on their movement, and limited social capital and networks.	移民的脆弱性因为法律地位和其他障碍而突出，比如对行使其基本权利的限制、语言障碍、移动限制和社交资本和网络限制等。


The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR, the United Nations’ refugee agency, were heroic in going above and beyond their mandates to protect migrants at risk in Libya, as were many NGOs.	国际移民组织（IOM）和UNHCR（联合国难民署）以及其他许多非政府组织在保护利比亚受威胁移民方面上下奔走，成果显著。


The World Bank also acted quickly to provide funds to evacuate Bangladeshi nationals.	世界银行也迅速行动起来，为撤离孟加拉国公民提供资金。


But international organizations alone cannot solve the problem.	但光靠国际组织解决不了问题。


Before the next crisis erupts, we need to clarify the critical roles that all key actors – including countries of origin and destination, neighboring states, businesses, and civil society – should play.	在下一次危机爆发前，我们需要厘清各主要行动方所应扮演的关键角色，包括来源国和目的国、邻国、企业和公民社会。


Last year, I began urging states and others to define a framework for action on helping migrants caught in crisis situations.	去年，我开始敦促国家和其他组织为针对陷入危机局面的移民的援助措施制定框架。


It would include a set of principles, such as this fundamental one: During a crisis, emergency assistance should be afforded to citizens and migrants alike, without discrimination.	该框架包括一组原则，其中一项最根本的原则是：在危机期间，紧急援助应该棉线所有公民和移民，不能区别对待。


I am grateful to the United States and the Philippines – working closely with the IOM, the UNHCR, and civil-society groups – for offering to help lead an initiative to address the situation of migrants caught in acute crises.	我要感谢美国和菲律宾，在IOM、HNHCR和公民社会团体的紧密合作下，它们帮助发起了旨在改变陷入严重危机的移民的境况的项目。


Georgetown University and the MacArthur Foundation also are playing indispensable roles.	乔治敦大学和麦克阿瑟基金会也起到了不可或缺的作用。


Already, some countries have identified measures that stakeholders can take before, during, and after crises in order to keep migrants out of harm’s way.	一些国家已经有了一些措施，相关方可以在危机之前、之中和之后采取这些措施使移民免受伤害。


Countries that are especially experienced in protecting their workers abroad offer a blueprint for action.	在保护本国海外工人方面经验丰富的国家提供了行动蓝本。


An early warning system in the Philippines, for instance, mobilizes government agencies to react quickly to crises, while a special fund pays for emergency evacuations.	比如，菲律宾的早期警告系统动员政府机构快速响应危机，并成立了特别基金出资紧急撤离。


The government also provides compulsory pre-departure and post-arrival orientation, so that migrants know what to do in an emergency.	政府还提供义务的撤离前和到达后指导，以便难民知道在紧急状况中应该怎样做。


Registration systems, such as Mexico’s matricula consular, help to ensure that countries know the location of their migrants – including those who are undocumented – in a crisis.	注册系统，比如墨西哥的身份证系统（matricula consular），有助于确保各国了解危机发生时本国移民的为止，包括没有记录在案者。


Destination countries have equally profound responsibilities in crises.	危机发生时，目的国也有同样重要的责任。


Evacuation from danger zones and humanitarian aid should be provided regardless of legal status – as the United States did last year in the wake of Hurricane Sandy.	撤离危险区和人道援助应是人人都能获得的权利，不论其法律地位如何——比如美国在去年遭受飓风桑迪袭击时做的那样。


Likewise, after the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, Japanese authorities broadcast information in 17 languages, assuring migrants that they could seek emergency services.	类似地，在2011年地震和海啸发生后，日本当局用17种语言广播信息，保证移民可以找到紧急服务。


Migrants also typically need emergency travel documents after a crisis, as well as legal assistance to help them recover lost assets.	危机发生后，移民通常还需要紧急旅行文件和帮助他们找回遗失资产的法律援助。


Neighboring countries have a vital role to play, too – for example, by keeping borders open so that migrants do not become trapped, as Egypt and Tunisia so generously demonstrated during the Libya crisis.	邻国也扮演着关键作用——比如保持边境开放以使移民免受困顿——利比亚危机期间，埃及和突尼斯非常慷慨地这么做了。


Employers, meanwhile, are linchpins during a crisis.	与此同时，雇主也是危机期间的关键角色。