At some point, America will awaken from its geopolitical slumber; there are already signs that it has opened one eye.	因为迟早有一天美国将从地缘政治的沉睡中觉醒； 种种也迹象表明：后者早已睁开了一只睡眼。


But China has begun to make serious mistakes.	但中国已经开始犯下一系列严重错误。


After Japan acceded to Chinese pressure and released a captured Chinese trawler in September 2010, China went overboard and demanded an apology from Japan, rattling the Japanese establishment.	2010年9月日本在中国压力下释放了逮捕的中国渔船船长，但中方仍不罢休，要求日方道歉，并不断向日本执政当局施压。


Similarly, after North Korean shells killed innocent South Korean civilians in November 2010, China remained essentially silent.	类似的还有2010年11月，当朝鲜的炮弹炸死了无辜的韩国百姓时，中国却保持了必然的沉默。


In a carefully calibrated response, South Korea sent its ambassador to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for the imprisoned Chinese human-rights activist Liu Xiaobo in December 2010.	而韩国在谨慎拿捏一番后也对此做出了回应，于2010年12月派大使参加了诺贝尔和平奖的颁奖典礼——该奖颁给了正在狱中服刑的中国人权活动家刘晓波。


China has also ruffled many Indian feathers by arbitrarily denying visas to senior officials.	中国在印度高级官员签证事务上的反复无常也惹怒了后者。


Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao subsequently calmed the waters in meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, but such unnecessary provocations left a residue of mistrust in India.	虽然中国国家总理温家宝随后会见印度总理曼莫汉·辛格来平息事端，但是这种毫无必要的挑衅却在印度种下了不信任的苦果。


But all of these mistakes pale in comparison with what China did to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July.	但上述错误相比今年7月中国对东南亚国家联盟的所作所为来说都是小菜一碟。


For the first time in 45 years, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) failed to agree to a joint communiqué, ostensibly because ASEAN’s current chair, Cambodia, did not want the communiqué to refer to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea.	东盟部长会议自召开45年里来首次无法在联合公报上达成共识，表面上是因为现任东盟主席国柬埔寨不希望在公报中谈及南中国海的双边争端。


But the whole world, including most ASEAN countries, perceived Cambodia’s stance as the result of enormous Chinese pressure.	但全世界，包括大部分东盟国家，都认为柬埔寨的立场是在中国的巨大压力做出的。


China’s victory proved to be Pyrrhic.	中国的胜利是得不偿失的。


It won the battle of the comminiqué, but it may have lost 20 years of painstakingly accumulated goodwill, the result of efforts such as the ASEAN-China free-trade agreement, signed in November 2002.	她赢得了在东盟联合公报上的斗争，却可能失去了20年苦心经营积累下来的善意——也正是它们促成了2002年11月签订的东盟-中国自由贸易协定。


More importantly, China’s previous leaders had calculated that a strong and unified ASEAN provided a valuable buffer against any possible US containment strategy.	更重要的是，中国过去几任领导人都认为一个强大统一的东盟能够为中国提供宝贵的缓冲空间去抗衡美国有可能采取的遏制战略。


Now, by dividing ASEAN, China has provided America with its best possible geopolitical opportunity in the region.	如今因为东盟的分裂，中国为美国提供了最好的机会去实施地缘政治手段。


If Deng Xiaoping were alive, he would be deeply concerned.	如果邓小平在世，估计会对此忧虑不已。


It may be unfair to blame China’s leaders for the ASEAN debacle.	但指责中国领导人造成了东盟的分裂也是有失公平的。


More likely than not, over-zealous junior officials pushed a hard line on the South China Sea, whereas no Chinese leader, if given the choice, would have opted to wreck the AMM Communiqué. But the fact that it happened reveals the scope of China’s recent poor decision-making.	与其说是领导人的责任，不如说是那些精力过剩的低级官员在南中国海采取了强硬路线，没有中国领导人会选择去破坏东盟联合公报，但事情既然已经发生了，也就暴露出中国最近的决策水平究竟低劣到了何种程度。


The “nine-dotted line” that China has drawn over the South China Sea may prove to be nothing but a big geopolitical millstone around China’s neck.	中国在南中国海画下的“九段线”也许最终会被证明是一个勒住了中国脖子的地缘政治重担。


It was unwise to attach the map in a note verbale responding to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009.	2009年5月，作为对越南和马来西亚共同向联合国委员会提出的《大陆架范围》的回应，中国不明智地在一份照会附加了一份上述地图。


This was the first time that China had included the map in an official communication to the UN, and it caused great concern among some ASEAN members.	这也是中国第一次与联合国的官方通讯中纳入该地图，也因此引发了一些东盟成员国的严重关切。


The geopolitical opportunity implied by inclusion of the map has not been lost on America, which is why the US, somewhat unusually, has made another effort to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention.	美国也没有放过这份地图中隐含着的地缘政治机遇，这就是为什么该国有点不寻常地推动了《海洋法公约》的出台。


Having tabled the nine-dotted line at the UN, China walked into a no-win situation, owing to the difficulty of defending the map under international law.	向联合国提交了“九段线”地图后，中国陷入了一个无法取胜的局面，因为难以在国际法的框架下为这幅地图辩护。


Indeed, as the eminent historian Wang Gungwu has pointed out, the first maps to claim the South China Sea were Japanese, and were inherited by Nationalist China.	事实上正如著名历史学家王赓武指出的那样，第一个绘制地图宣示南中国海主权的是日本，并由中华民国继承了下来。


Domestically, too, the nine-dotted line may cause problems for the government by presenting critics with a useful weapon.	在中国国内，“九段线”也为当局带来了问题，因为这将成为批评政府的有用武器。


Any hint of compromise will expose officials politically.	任何妥协的暗示都将使官员在政治上遭到攻击。


In other words, a few rocks in the South China Sea have put China between a rock and a hard place.	换句话说，南中国海的这几块礁石把中国置于了进退两难的境地。


There is no doubt that China will have to find a way to compromise over the nine-dotted line. In private, it has begun to do so.	毫无疑问，中国将不得不想办法在“九段线”上做出妥协，而且早已私下进行了。


Even though the line covers the waters northeast of the Indonesian-owned Natuna Islands, the Chinese government has given Indonesia categorical assurances that China does not claim the Natuna Islands or their Exclusive Economic Zone.	虽然这条线覆盖了印尼纳土纳群岛的东北水域，但中国政府给予印尼绝对的保证，不会���求纳土纳群岛及其专属经济区的主权。


These private assurances calmed relations with Indonesia.	这些私下的承诺缓和了中国与印尼的关系。


So why not make similar overtures to other ASEAN states?	那为什么不向其他东盟国家也做出类似的友好姿态？


The legacies of Deng and his predecessor, Mao Zedong, are very different.	邓小平所留下的遗产与其前任毛泽东迥然不同。


But the People’s Republic’s two most important leaders did agree in one area: both bent over backwards to make territorial concessions to resolve border disputes.	但这两位共和国最重要的领导人有一个共识：在领土上做出让步以解决边界争端。


This explains why China was so generous to Russia, for example, in its border settlements.	这就解释了中国为什么在边界定居点等问题上对俄罗斯如此慷慨。


Mao and Deng could do this because both provided China with strong leadership.	毛泽东和邓小平可以这样做是因为他们都拥有极高的威信。


The challenge for the world now is that China has become politically pluralistic: no leader is strong enough to make wise unilateral concessions.	而目前世界所面临的挑战则是一个政治权威多元化的中国：没有领导人足够强势去做出明智的单方面让步。


Nothing will happen in China until the leadership transition is completed in November.	在11月的领导人换届完成之前中国将不会有任何动作。


The new administration of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will need some time to settle in.	新上台的习近平和李克强需要一些时间来坐稳大位。


But America is waking up. So, too, will the rest of the world in 2016.	但美国正在觉醒，世界其他国家也将在2016年复苏。


The big question then will be: Is China as geopolitically competent as number one as it was when it was number two?	到时最大的问题将会是：这个占据了头把交椅的中国，是否还具备当年位居次席时的地缘政治竞争力？


Is China Overplaying Its Hand?	中国是否用力过猛了?


LONDON – Remember the G-2?	发自伦敦 —— 还记得 G-2 么？


America’s financial difficulties and foreign entanglements, together with China’s economic ascent, led many last year to envisage the emergence of a sort of global condominium between the two countries.	美国的内部财政困局和外部的种种麻烦事，再加上中国经济地位的提升，令许多人在去年不禁想象是否会出现某种中美两国共同统治世界的景象。


The G-8 had morphed by necessity into the G-20, which, whenever it really mattered, would shed its zero: the United States and China would call the shots.	G-8 集团不可避免地扩大成了 G-20 集团，但在有必要的情况下会把“ 20 ”后面的“ 0 ”去掉：这一使命将交由中美两国来完成。


The idea was an over-simplified reflection of global realities.	但当时这种想法其实是把全球的现实情况过度简单化了。


It left out other emerging powers like Brazil and India.	它一方面把巴西和印度等正在崛起的大国排除在外；


It exaggerated the weakness of America, which remains the world’s only superpower.	又夸大了美国的弱势，须知美国依然是世界上唯一的超级大国；


It also reeked of the European Union’s peevish realization that its inability to get its act together on contentious issues was likely to place it firmly on the sidelines.	同时还体现出一种令欧盟相当恼火的意识：那就是欧盟各国未能在某些争议性议题上站在同一阵线的状况，将使其在国际事务中牢牢地被边缘化。


At the Copenhagen climate summit last December, don’t forget, a deal of sorts was cobbled together by the US and the emerging economies over the EU’s head, even though Europe had the most advanced set of proposals on tackling climate change.	别不记得在去年 12 月的哥本哈根气候峰会上，虽然欧洲手里握有一整套应对气候变化的最先进提案，美国和新兴经济体双方对此却不感冒，最终合伙拼凑了一份粗制滥造的协议。


Despite all this, there was enough credibility in the G-2 idea to give it legs.	尽管如此，依然有足够的证据来支撑 G-2 这个构想。


President Barack Obama’s first visit to China last November, in which he accepted the role of pliant suitor at the court of the emperor, strengthened the impression of a deal between today’s great power and tomorrow’s.	美国总统奥巴马在去年 11 月的首次访华，以及他所表现出的那种卑微而有求于人的形象，更加强了这种当今和未来两大强权之间可能达成协议的印象。


That was last year.	但这都是去年的陈年旧事了。


This is now, and the idea looks a lot less plausible.	如今时过境迁，这一构思看上去好像也没那么有说服力了。


Why has the G-2 become so far-fetched so fast?	那是什么令 G-2 忽然间又变得如此遥不可急了呢？


First, the weak and largely jobless economic recovery in America and Europe shines the spotlight on China’s surging exports and the non-tariff barriers confronted by would-be importers to China.	首先，欧美地区虚弱且大规模失业的经济复苏使得焦点又汇聚在了中国不断喷涌的出口以及潜在进口商所遭遇的非关税壁垒上。


You would have difficulty finding many members of the US Congress who do not ascribe some of America’s problems, including the hollowing out of the middle class, to China’s alleged currency manipulation.	事实上，你很难找到几个不把美国所遭遇的问题归罪于中国的国会议员，包括中产阶级的流失，到中国所谓的货币管制。


China may point to the mountain of US Treasury bonds that it has bought up, thereby helping to sustain America’s budget deficit.	中国或许会指出自己已经购买了巨额美国国债，从而帮美国撑住了预算赤字（那中国最近抛出美国国债的行动意味着什么？


(What China’s recent sell-off of US T-bills will mean is, for now, anyone’s guess.)	谁也说不准）。


They grumble at the injustice of blaming them for the global economy’s imbalances.	中方抱怨将他们指责为全球经济不平衡的始作俑者是不公平的。


But China does have a case to answer.	但中国也必须对这么一个问题作出回应。


Critics think that pegging the currency below its real value is part of a deliberate strategy to keep growth rolling, thereby avoiding the tricky politics of growing unemployment in a system that has no institutionalized channels for expressing popular grievances.	有批评认为，将人民币汇率固定在其实际价值之下的做法是一种老谋深算的维持持续增长策略的一部分，以便在一个没有提供制度化渠道来宣泄民众不满的系统中避免失业率增加所带来的棘手政治问题。


Unless this issue is addressed soon, it will lead inexorably to protectionism in America and Europe.	而除非这个问题立刻得到化解，否则将不可避免地引发欧美的贸易保护主义政策。


Advocates of tit-for-tat trade polices have even found supportive quotes from Adam Smith on the subject.	而对这种以牙还牙行为的鼓吹甚至能在亚当·斯密的言论中得到印证。


A second issue likely to blow the G-2 apart before it has actually taken shape is the impact of China’s authoritarianism on the free movement of information.	第二个可能在 G-2 集团最终成型之前导致其流产的问题，则是中国在信息自由方面的专制主义行为。


China’s clash with Google and US protests at cyber attacks on American targets remind the outside world, as well as America’s media and political elites, of the difference in values between the two countries.	中国官方与谷歌公司的冲突，以及美国对美方目标遭到网络攻击的抗议提醒了外界以及美国的媒体和政治精英们：两国价值观之间的差异究竟有多大。


This is particularly awkward at a time when the Chinese authorities seem to be taking an even harder line on dissent.	这个问题这在中国官方似乎对异见分子采取更强硬手段时显得尤为棘手。


The human rights activist Liu Xiaobo has just been locked up for 11 years, drawing widespread condemnation.	官方最近判处人权分子刘晓波 11 年有期徒刑的行为遭到了广泛的批评。


The veteran campaigner for the release of political detainees, John Kamm, argues that this was “a tipping point” for the Chinese authorities, and that “they will have to work themselves out of this in a less hard-line way.”	对此长期致力于政治犯问题的活跃分子约翰·卡姆则认为，这对中国官方来说是个“引爆点”，而“他们将被迫用软处理的手��来摆脱这个局面。 ”


The outcome of the climate talks in Copenhagen is a third reason for concern.	而第三个要关注的理由则是哥本哈根气候会谈的成果。


China has been widely accused of blocking a more ambitious result, mostly because of its resistance to external surveillance of its agreed targets, appealing to state sovereignty with all the self-righteousness that the world was accustomed to hearing from former US President George W. Bush.	外界广泛批评中国阻挠达成一个更宏大的目标，主要是由于其不同意让外国来监察本国实现减排目标的情况，把什么都跟国家主权联系在一起，那种自以为是的态度简直跟美国前总统小布什不相上下。


Maybe the criticism is unfair.	这些批评或许不太公平。


But it certainly was unwise to allow a junior official to shout and wag his finger at Obama at one of the key Copenhagen meetings.	但任由一个低级官员在一场关键的哥本哈根会议中指着奥巴马鼻子大声驳斥也是不明智的。


Americans, too, Chinese officials should remember, have “face” that they do not wish to lose.	中国的官员们可要记住，即便是美国人也是要“面子”的。


Some people cite the spat over arms sales to Taiwan and the Dalai Lama’s visit to Washington as a fourth dampener on all the G-2 talk.	此外有些人还指出对台军售和达赖喇嘛访美是 G-2 会谈的第四个阻碍因素。


I am not so convinced.	但我对此不以为然。


These are fairly ritualistic issues, and Chinese officials are smart enough to know that, given the Chinese government’s recent behavior, Obama had little choice but to decide on them as he did.	这些都是些老把戏了，中方官员不是笨蛋，自然也明白对中国政府最近的作为奥巴马没什么好方法应对，只能翻翻旧帐了。


Far more worrying is an issue that is yet to play out.	但此外还有一个更值得忧虑，却尚未浮现的问题。


How will China react to any move to introduce tougher sanctions on Iran if no progress is made in efforts to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons?	那就是如果在制止伊朗发展核武器方面还是难以取得进展的话，中国将对更严厉的国际制裁作何反应。


If China blocks action in the United Nations Security Council, relations with America will be set back to a point where any G-2 talk will seem laughable.	倘若中国阻挠在联合国安理会实施行动，那美国对此的反应将令任何 G-2 对话变成一场闹剧。


Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic rise, advised his colleagues to move stealthily in dealing with the rest of the world.	中国经济起飞的总设计师邓小平曾经告诫他的同志们，在跟其它国家打交道的时候要采取暗中行事的策略。


“Hide your brightness, bide your time,” he counseled.	他说了这四个字：“韬光养晦”。


As someone who believes that China’s rise should be good for the world, I hope that Deng’s wise advice will be heeded by those Chinese officials who seem to think that this is a good moment to start stamping their feet.	而我作为一个觉得中国崛起将对世界有利的人，则希望那些以为目前正是时候大展拳脚的中国官员们，能听一下邓小平的箴言。


Is China Overtaking America?	中国正在超越美国吗?


CAMBRIDGE – The twenty-first century is witnessing Asia’s return to what might be considered its historical proportions of the world’s population and economy.	发自剑桥——21世纪的人们正见证着亚洲逐步夺回其历史上曾经在经济和人口方面所占据的地位。


In 1800, Asia represented more than half of global population and output.	在1800年，亚洲的人口和生产总值分别占到了全球的1/2以上。


By 1900, it represented only 20% of world output – not because something bad happened in Asia, but rather because the Industrial Revolution had transformed Europe and North America into the world’s workshop.	但在100年后的1900年，亚洲的生产总值萎缩到仅占全世界的20%——这可不是因为什么天灾人祸，而是当时的工业革命已经使欧洲和北美两地摇身一变，成为了世界工厂。


Asia’s recovery began with Japan, then moved to South Korea and on to Southeast Asia, beginning with Singapore and Malaysia.	亚洲的复苏发端于日本，随后延伸到韩国再到以新加坡和马来西亚为首的东南亚地区。


Now the recovery is focused on China, and increasingly involves India, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the process.	如今这场复苏正聚焦于在中国并开始逐步影响到印度，在此过程中数亿人得以摆脱贫困。


This change, however, is also creating anxieties about shifting power relations among states.	但这一转变同样也引发了国家间实力对比发生变化的忧虑。


In 2010, China passed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy.	在2010年，中国超越日本成为世界第二大经济体。


Indeed, the investment bank Goldman Sachs expects the Chinese economy’s total size to surpass that of the United States by 2027.	事实上，高盛公司预计中国的经济总量将在2027年超越美国。


But, even if overall Chinese GDP reaches parity with that of the US in the 2020’s, the two economies will not be equal in composition.	但即便中国的GDP能在2020年代赶上美国，这两大经济体在内部经济构成方面依然不尽相同。


China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside.	中国依然拥有落后的广大农村地区。


Assuming 6% Chinese GDP growth and only 2% US growth after 2030, China would not equal the US in terms of per capita income – a better measure of an economy’s sophistication – until sometime near the second half of the century.	即便在2030年后中国的GDP年增长率达到了6%而美国只有2%，中国的人均收入也无法与美国并驾齐驱——而这一指标也能更好地反映经济的成熟程度——直到21世纪下半叶才会有所转变。


Moreover, linear projections of economic growth trends can be misleading.	此外，以线性预测的方式来推测经济发展可能会误入歧途。


Emerging countries tend to benefit from imported technologies in the early stages of economic takeoff, but their growth rates generally slow as they reach higher levels of development.	新兴经济体在经济起飞早期都倾向于从进口的技术中获益，而当他们达到更高发展程度的时候经济增长率就会变慢。


And the Chinese economy faces serious obstacles to sustainable rapid growth, owing to inefficient state-owned enterprises, growing inequality, massive internal migration, an inadequate social safety net, corruption, and inadequate institutions, all of which could foster political instability.	中国经济目前则面临着诸多阻碍可持续迅速增长的严重障碍，比如低效率的国企、日益扩大的贫富差距、大规模国内人口流动、尚未完善的社会安全网， 腐败和不合理的体制，而上述各因素都可能影响到国内的政治稳定。


China’s north and east have outpaced its south and west.	中国东部和北部地区的发展速度远远抛离了西南地区。


Almost alone among developing countries, China is aging extraordinarily fast.	而其人口老龄化速度在发展中国家中也是数一数二。


By 2030, China will have more elderly dependents than children.	到2030年，中国将更多地依靠老人而非儿童。


Some Chinese demographers worry that the country will get old before getting rich.	一些中国人口学家也担忧中国会在实现富裕之前先行老去。


During the past decade, China moved from being the world’s ninth largest exporter to its leader, displacing Germany at the top.	在过去10年中，中国从世界第9大出口国的位置逐渐攀升，最终超越德国跃居世界第一。


But China’s export-led development model will need to be adjusted as global trade and financial balances become more contentious.	但在世界贸易及财政平衡摩擦不断增多的情况下，中国的出口导向型发展模式必须有所调整。


Indeed, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan is aimed at reducing dependence on exports and boosting domestic demand.	事实上中国的第十二个五年计划就是着眼于减少对出口的依赖并刺激国内需求。


Will it work?	但问题是：这个方法有用吗？


China’s authoritarian political system has thus far shown an impressive capacity to achieve specific targets, for example, staging a successful Olympic Games, building high-speed rail projects, or even stimulating the economy to recover from the global financial crisis.	中国的专制政治系统已经向世人展示了其在实现某些特定目标时的惊人能力，比如说承办一场辉煌的奥运会，建设高速铁路项目，或甚至是刺激经济从全球金融危机中复苏。


Whether China can maintain this capability over the longer term is a mystery to outsiders and Chinese leaders themselves.	但对于外国人以及众国领导人自己来说，中国是否能长期维持这一能力还是个未知之数。


Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to channel the demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income.	与建国之初就确立了民主体制的印度不同，中国至今还没有找到一条途径去容纳与不断增加的人均收入相伴而生的政治参与（如果不是民主的话）要求。


Communist ideology is long gone, so the legitimacy of the ruling party depends on economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism.	共产主义意识形态早已褪去，因此执政党的合法性只能依赖经济增长以及鼓动汉族民族主义。


Whether China can develop a formula to manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen.	中国是否能发展出一种手段去与不断增长的城市中产阶级打交道，消除区域不平衡和平息少数民族不满，这都有待观察。


The basic point is that no one, including the Chinese, knows how China’s political future will affect its economic growth.	但最基本的一点则是没有任何人，包括中国人自己，���道中国的政治未来将对其经济增长产生何种影响。


Some analysts argue that China aims to challenge America’s position as the world’s dominant power.	有些分析家认为中国希望挑战美国的世界霸主地位。


Even if this were an accurate assessment of China’s intentions (and even Chinese cannot know the views of future generations), it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible.	就算这是对中国意图的正确解读（须知连中国人自己都不知道下一代会怎么想），但中国似乎不可能拥有实现这一点的军事实力。


To be sure, Chinese military expenditures, up more than 12% this year, have been growing even more rapidly than its economy.	毫无疑问，中国军费支出（今年增加12%）的增长速度甚至超出了其经济增长速度。


But China’s leaders will have to contend with other countries’ reactions, as well as with the constraints implied by the need for external markets and resources in order to meet their economic-growth objectives.	但中国领导人也将为此面对其他国家的相关反应，以及为实现其经济增长目标而产生的对国外市场和资源进口的需求所隐含的限制性因素。


A Chinese military posture that is too aggressive could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbors, thereby weakening China’s hard and soft power.	一个太过具有侵略性的中国军事姿态将促使其邻国组成联盟来进行制衡，并因此削弱了中国的软实力和硬实力。


In 2010, for example, as China became more assertive in its foreign policy toward its neighbors, its relations with India, Japan, and South Korea suffered.	比如说在2010年，随着中国在针对其邻国的外交政策上转趋强硬，它和印度，日本和韩国的关系都遭到了削弱。


As a result, China will find it more difficult to exclude the US from Asia’s security arrangements.	结果中国发现越来越难以将美国排挤出亚洲安全协定之外了。


China’s size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-à-vis the US in the coming decades.	中国的巨大体积及其高速经济增长率几乎肯定会在未来几十年内改善其与美国的实力对比。


This will certainly bring the Chinese closer to the US in terms of power resources, but China will not necessarily surpass the US as the most powerful country.	这肯定会使中国将在权力资源方面更加接近于美国，但中国并不一定要夺取美国世界第一强国的地位。


Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections based on GDP growth alone are too one-dimensional: they ignore US military and soft-power advantages, as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the internal Asian balance of power.	即使排除中国发生任何重大政治动荡的可能性，当前许多基于GDP增长的预测依然是过于狭隘的：他们忽视了美国的军事以及软实力优势，以及中国在亚洲内部实力平衡方面所面临的地理劣势。


My own estimate is that among the range of possible futures, the more likely scenarios are those in which China gives the US a run for its money, but does not surpass it in overall power in the first half of this century.	逼着本人的预测则是在本世纪上半叶，最可能出现的情景是中国在财富方面超过美国，但却在总体实力上屈身于美国之下。


Most importantly, the US and China should avoid developing exaggerated fears of each other’s capacities and intentions. The expectation of conflict can itself become a cause of conflict.	最重要的是，美国和中国应当避免激发对各自实力和意图的过度恐惧，因为对冲突的预期本身也可能成为冲突的导火索。


In reality, China and the US do not have deeply rooted conflicting interests.	其实在现实中中美两国并不存在任何深层次的利益冲突。


Both countries, along with others, have much more to gain from cooperation.	而如果两国，加上世界其他国，都能开展合作的话，必将获益更多。


Is China Really Immune to the Crisis?	中国真能在危机中独善其身么?


CAMBRIDGE – Addressing the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao explained his government’s plans to counter the global economic meltdown with public spending and loans.	剑桥--在一年一度的瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛上所发表的演讲中，中国总理温家宝阐释了他的政府采用公共开支和贷款来应对全球经济危机的计划。


He all but guaranteed that China’s annual growth would remain above 8% in 2009.	他保证中国经济2009年的增长率会维持在8%以上。


Wen’s words were like warm milk to the recession-numbed audience of global political and business leaders.	温家宝的话语对于被经济衰退折磨得麻木的全球政商界领袖们而言，就如同久旱逢雨。


But does the Chinese government really have the tools needed to keep its economy so resilient?	但中国政府真的有能力使其经济具有如此的韧性么？


Perhaps, but it is far from obvious.	很有可能，但却并不明显。


America’s deepening recession is slamming China’s export sector, just as it has everywhere else in Asia.	美国持续恶化的经济衰退正重创中国的出口行业，正如其他亚洲国家也不能幸免。


The immediate problem is a credit crunch not so much in China as in the United States and Europe, where many small and medium-size importers cannot get the trade credits they need to buy inventory from abroad.	目前的问题是一场信贷危机（不如欧美的严重）使许多中小进口商无法获得向国外购买商品所需要的贸易融资。


As a result, some once-booming Chinese coastal areas now look like ghost towns, as tens of thousands of laid-off workers have packed their bags and returned to the countryside.	因此，随着成千上万的下岗工人收拾行李，回到农村，一些曾经繁荣的中国沿海地区现在看起来如同鬼城。


Similarly, in Beijing’s Korean section, perhaps half of the 200,000-300,000 inhabitants – mainly workers (and their families) who are paid by Korean companies that produce goods in China for export – reportedly have gone home.	同样，据报道在北京的韩国人聚居区，其20-30万常住人口中的一半—主要是受雇于在中国生产出口商品的韩国企业的雇员（及其家眷）--已经回国。


With roughly $2 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves, the Chinese do have deep pockets to fund massive increases in government spending, and to help backstop bank loans.	拥有约2万亿美元的外汇储备，中国人确实有足够的财力来维持急剧增长的政府开支并支持银行贷款。


Many leading Chinese researchers are convinced that that the government will do whatever it takes to keep growth above 8%.	许多著名的中国专家都坚信政府会不惜代价确保经济增长率保持在8%以上。


But there is a catch. Even if successful in the short run, the huge shift toward government spending will almost certainly lead to significantly slower growth rates a few years down the road.	但问题在于，即便这些举措在短期内有效，这种转向政府支出主导的趋势在接下来的几年里几乎肯定会导致经济增长率的大幅下降。


Simply put, it is far from clear that marginal infrastructure projects are worth building, given that China is already investing more than 45% of its income, much of it in infrastructure.	简而言之，鉴于中国目前已将其财政收入的45%作为投资，而其中的相当部分都投入到基础设施中，因此这些边缘化的基础设施是否值得修建还未可知。


True, some of China’s fiscal stimulus effectively consists of loans to the private sector via the highly controlled banking sector.	诚然，中国的一些财政刺激政策有效地包含了通过高度监管下的银行部门向私营部门的贷款。


But is there any reason to believe that new loans will go to worthy projects rather than to politically connected borrowers?	但是有任何理由让我们相信新的贷款能够流向有价值的项目而不是那些有政治门路的借款人么？


In fact, China’s success so far has come from maintaining a balance between government and private sector expansion.	实际上，到目前为止中国的成功来自于维持政府和私营部门扩张之间的平衡。


Sharply raising the government’s already outsized profile in the economy will upset this delicate balance leading to slower growth in the future.	急剧提升政府在经济中业已优势的地位会干扰这种微妙的平衡，从而导致未来经济增长的下降。


It would be preferable for China to find a way to substitute Chinese for US private consumption demand, but the system seems unable to move quickly in this direction.	更好的方式是中国找到以国内市场需求来替代美国私人消费需求的办法，但中国的经济体系在这方面似乎举步维艰。


If government investment has to be the main vehicle, then it would be far better to build desperately needed schools and hospitals than “bridges to nowhere,” as Japan famously did when it went down a similar path in the 1990’s.	如果政府投资不得不成为主要的拉动力，那么修建急需的学校和医院也比修筑“偏远的桥梁”要好得多。 （就像日本在1990年代遭遇类似状况时所做的那样。


Unfortunately, China’s local officials need to excel in the country’s “growth tournament” to get promoted.	）不幸的是，中国的地方官员需要在“增长竞赛”中脱颖而出才能获得提拔。


Schools and hospitals simply do not generate the kind of fast tax revenue and GDP growth needed to outperform political rivals.	学校和医院则不能带来超过政治对手所需要的那种立竿见影的税收和GDP增长。


Even prior to the onset of the global recession, there were strong reasons to doubt the sustainability of China’s growth paradigm.	即便在全球经济衰退之初，也有足够的理由来怀疑中国经济增长模式的可持续性。


The environmental degradation is obvious even to casual observers.	对最不经意的观察者而言，环境的恶化也是显而易见的。


And economists have started to calculate that if China were to continue its prodigious growth rate, it would soon occupy far too large a share of the global economy to maintain its recent export trajectory.	经济学家们也已经开始计算如果中国要保持其超凡的增长率，它很快就需要占领全球过于庞大的市场以维持其最近的出口轨迹。


So a shift to greater domestic consumption was inevitable anyway.	因此转向依靠内需也是必然的。


The global recession has simply brought that problem forward a few years.	全球经济衰退只不过让中国提前几年遭遇了这个问题。


Interestingly, the US faces a number of similar challenges.	有趣的是，美国也面对着类似的挑战。


For years, the US achieved fast growth by deferring attention to a variety of issues, ranging from the environment to infrastructure to health care.	多年以来，美国也是在忽视从环境到基础设施及以医疗等一系列问题的情况下取得了快速的经济增长。


Even absent the financial crisis, addressing the shortcomings in these areas would likely have slowed down US growth.	即便没有金融危机，弥补这些短板也很可能使美国的经济增长放缓。


This is not to say that the US and China are the same.	这并不是说美国和中国的情况是相同的。


One of the great challenges ahead is to find a way to bring these two countries’ savings into line, given the vast trade imbalances that many believe planted the seeds of financial crisis.	有鉴于在许多人看来是引发金融危机的原因之一的贸易不平衡，未来的最大挑战之一就是使这两个国家的储蓄（习惯）合理化。


I was reminded of the challenge recently when a Chinese researcher explained that men in China today feel compelled to save in order to find a bride.	最近。 当一位中国专家向我解释说中国的男士们感到必须为娶媳妇而储蓄时，我又体会到了这样的挑战。


The same week, a former student of mine who lost his lucrative financial-sector job explained that he had no savings because it was so expensive to date in New York!	在同一周里，我的一位失去了高薪的金融部门工作的前学生也对我说他没有积蓄，因为在纽约约会太昂贵了！


These social differences have little to do with the yuan-dollar exchange rate, although that matters, too.	这些社会习惯的不同与人民币—美元汇率几乎不相干，虽然汇率也非常重要。


One way or the other, the financial crisis is likely to slow medium-term Chinese growth significantly.	不论如何，金融危机也很可能大幅地降低中国中期的经济增长。


But will its leaders succeed in stabilizing the situation in the near term?	但中国领导人们能成功地稳定中国的短期形势么？


I hope so, but I would be more convinced by a plan tilted more toward domestic private consumption, health, and education than to one based on the same growth strategy of the past 30 years.	我希望如此。 但对我而言，一项以国内私有消费、医疗和教育为主题的计划比一项基于与前30年相同的增长战略的计划更有说服力。


Is China’s Economy Overheating?	中国的经济过热了吗？


The Chinese economy has been growing at such a breathtaking annual pace – 9.5% in the year ending in the second quarter of 2005 – that it is the toast of the world, an apparent inspiration for developing countries everywhere.	截至2005年第二季度末的财政年度，中国经济9. 5%的年增长率都非常令人震惊，它也因此被视为世界的骄傲，成为全球发展中国家力量的源泉。


But is China getting too much of a good thing?	但中国会不会乐极生悲呢？


Since he became president in 2003, Hu Jintao has repeatedly warned that China’s economy is overheating, and his government has recently acted accordingly, raising interest rates last October, imposing a new tax on home sales in June, and revaluing the Yuan in July.	2003年当选总统后，胡锦涛一再警告中国经济有过热的迹象，政府最近采取了相应的措施，于去年10月提高了利率，6月又开始征收新的国内销售税，7月批准了人民币升值。


But claims that China is overheating don’t seem to be based on observations of inflation.	但中国经济过热的说法似乎并不是以对通货膨胀的观察为依据的。


While China’s consumer price index rose 5.3% in the year ending in July 2004, this was due primarily to a spike in food prices; both before and since, inflation has been negligible.	尽管2004年7月结束的财政年度里中国的消费价格指数上涨了5. 3%，但造成上涨的主要原因是食品价格居高不下，而无论此前还是此后，通货膨胀都小到可以忽略不计。


Nor are these claims based on the Chinese stock market, which has generally followed a downward path over the past few years.	过热的说法也并非以股市为依据，因为过去几年来，股市一直处于下降通道之中。


Instead, those who argue that the Chinese economy is overheating cite the high rate of investment in plant and equipment and real estate, which reached 43% of GDP in 2004.	恰恰相反，认为中国经济过热的人列举了厂房、设备和固定资产投资的居高不下，上述投资占到了2004年国内生产总值的43%。


On this view, China has been investing too much, building too many factories, importing too many machines, and constructing too many new homes.	按照这种观点，中国投入了过多的资金、建起了太多的工厂、进口了太多的机器、盖起了太多的新居。


But can an emerging economy invest too much?	但新兴经济存在投资过多的问题吗？


Doesn’t investment mean improving people’s lives?	难道投资不是意味着人民生活的改善？


The more factories and machines a country has, and the more it replaces older factories and machines with more up-to-date models, the more productive its labor force is.	一个国家的工厂和机器越多，替代老旧厂房和机器的现代化设备越多，也就意味着生产效率越高。


The more houses it builds, the better the private lives of its citizens.	建设的房屋越多，人民的生活就越富裕。


A number of studies show that economic growth is linked to investment in machines and factories.	若干研究结果表明，经济增长与机器和工厂的投资息息相关。


In 1992, Bradford DeLong of the University of California at Berkeley and Lawrence Summers, now President of Harvard University, showed in a famous paper that countries with higher investment, especially in equipment, historically have had higher economic growth.	1992年，伯克利加利福尼亚大学的布拉德福特·德龙和现任哈佛大学校长的劳伦斯•萨默斯在一篇著名的论文中显示：投资较高，特别是设备投资较高的国家，从历史上看有更高的经济增长率。


One of their examples showed that Japan’s GDP per worker more than tripled relative to Argentina’s from 1960 to 1985, because Japan, unlike Argentina, invested heavily in new machinery and equipment.	他们举了个例子，说明日本每个工人的国内总产值自1960到1985年间相比阿根廷的增长超过3倍，因为日本和阿根廷不同，对新机器和设备投入了大量资金。


In short, the more equipment and infrastructure a country is installing, the more its people have to work with.	简言之，国家安装的设备和基础设施越多，人民的工作经验就越丰富。


Moreover, the more a country invests in equipment, the more it learns about the latest technology – and it learns about it in a very effective, “hands-on” way.	不仅如此，国家的设备投资越多，就会学到更多的最新技术－而且学习的方式更加有效，也更接近实际。


It would thus appear that there is nothing wrong with China continuing to buy new equipment, build new factories, and construct new roads and bridges as fast as its can.	这样看来，中国以最快的速度不停地购买新设备、建设新工厂、修建新道路和桥梁似乎并没有错。


The faster, the better, so that the billion or so people there who have not yet reached prosperity by world standards can get there within their lifetimes.	建设的速度越快越好，因为惟其如此，按照世界标准还没有实现富裕的中国人口就能在有生之年实现这一目标。


And yet any government has to watch that the investment is being made effectively.	但任何政府都必须确保投资的有效性。


In China, the widespread euphoria about the economy is reason for concern.	在中国，对经济所持的普遍的乐观情绪才是值得关注的理由。


Some universal human weaknesses can result in irrational behavior during an economic boom.	有些人类所共有的弱点会导致人们在经济繁荣时的行为失去理性。


Simply put, China’s problem is that its economic growth has been so spectacular that it risks firing people’s imaginations a bit too intensely.	简单地讲，中国的问题在于其经济增长得太过顺利，有可能导致人们想象力的过度发挥。


At times like these, people can easily imagine that an apartment in Shanghai will be worth some enormous amount in 10 or 20 years, when China is vastly more prosperous than it is today.	在这种时候，人们会轻易认为上海的公寓在10或20年间会涨成天文数字，因为那时中国的繁荣程度绝非现在可比。


And if it will be worth an enormous amount in 10 or 20 years, then it should be worth a lot today, too, since real interest rates – used to discount future values to today’s values – are still low in China.	而如果它在10或20年内会成为一笔可观的财富，那么今天自然也就奇货可居，因为用于将未来价值折算成现在价值的实质利率在中国仍然很低。


People are excited, and they are lining up to buy.	于是人们变得异常兴奋，他们开始排队抢购。


To be sure, their reasoning is basically correct.	当然，他们的推理本质上并没有错。


But when the ultimate determinants of values today become so dependent on a distant future that we cannot see clearly, we may not be able to think clearly, either.	但如果最终决定今天价值的因素如此依赖于我们无法清楚预见的遥远未来，我们也可能无法再理智地进行思考。


Since the true value of long-term assets is so hard to estimate, it is human nature to focus on the rate of increase in their observed prices, and to allow one’s attention to become fixated on these assets just as their value is increasing very fast.	由于长期资产的真正价值很难预测，人们会自然而然地把注意力集中到观察价格的上涨比率，并仅仅由于价值的迅速提升而去关注这些资产。


This can lead people to make serious mistakes, paying more for long-term assets than they should, even assuming that the economy will perform spectacularly well in the future.	这样会让人犯下严重的错误，为长期资产付出太多的代价，甚至预期未来经济也能够保持强劲的发展势头。


They can overextend their finances, fall victim to promotions, invest carelessly in the wrong assets, and direct production into regions and activities on the basis of momentary excitement rather than calculation of economic fundamentals.	���瞬间的兴奋而不是对经济基本原理测算的驱使下，人们会透支自己的财力，受到广告的蛊惑，不小心投资错误的资产、投资不恰当的地区以及经济行为。


So, maybe the word “overheated” is misleading.	因此，“过热”一词也许有误导之嫌。


It might be more accurate to say that public attention is over-focused on some recent price changes, or over-accepting of some high market values.	用公众注意力过于集中在最近的价格变化、或过于接受某些高市场价值来形容也许更加准确。


Whatever one calls it, it is a problem.	但无论怎么去命名这种现象，这都是一个值得关注的问题。


Fortunately, people also tend to trust their national leaders.	幸运的是，人们似乎也十分信任他们的领导。


For this reason, it is all the more important that the leaders not remain silent when a climate of speculation develops.	而正因为如此，国家领袖们在投机氛围蔚然成风时不能袖手旁观也才更为重要。


Silence can be presumed to be tacit acceptance that rapid increases in long-term asset price are warranted.	沉默可能被理解为默许，也就是允许长期资产价格的快速上涨。


National leaders must speak out, and they must match their words with concrete actions, to help signal to the public that the speculative bubble cannot be expected to continue.	国家领导人必须大声疾呼，必须采取具体的行动，以便向公众展示投机泡沫不能再继续下去。


That is what the Chinese government has begun to do.	这也是中国着手做的事情。


The real-estate boom appears to be cooling.	房地产繁荣似乎正在回冷。


If the government continues to pursue this policy, the salutary effects in terms of public trust in the country’s businesses and institutions will help ensure stable, sustainable economic growth for years to come.	如果政府继续推行上述政策，那么公众对国家商业和机构信赖的有益效果将协助确保在未来若干年内继续有稳定、可持续的经济发展。


Is China Strong or Weak?	中国究竟是强是弱？


IRVINE, CALIFORNIA – China’s government has been using unusually strong language of late to assert its sovereignty over disputed stretches of international waters near to its shores.	发自加利福尼亚州欧文市——中国政府最近使用了不同寻常的强硬语调来宣示其对有争议的国际水域所拥有的主权。


This has led to a ratcheting up of tensions, in particular between China and the United States, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressing that the Obama administration is now ready to step in and help ensure the fair adjudication of disputes relating to the South China Sea.	这导致了一系列紧张态势，尤其是在中美之间，对此美国国务卿希拉里强调说奥巴马政府正准备介入以确保对南中国海争端的公平裁定。


Chinese spokesmen denounced this as a throwback to the days when America thought it could, and should, try to “contain” the People’s Republic.	而中方发言人则对此表示谴责，认为这无异于回到那个美国自以为可以，甚至应该尝试去“遏制”中国的年代。


One way to interpret China’s elevated rhetoric – and its tough response to joint US-South Korean military maneuvers – is as another indication that Chinese leaders have grown supremely self-confident and are eager to throw their weight around.	其中一种解读中国不断升级的措辞——及其对美韩军演的强硬回应——的套路就是认为这显示出中国领导人目前极度自信并试图展示其实力。


The reality, though, is more complex. A closer look reveals that President Hu Jintao’s words and deeds are often shaped by a mixture of insecurity and cockiness, and that Chinese officials alternate between playing up and playing down the country’s rise.	但事实其实更为复杂，通过更仔细的分析，我们会发现中国国家主席胡锦涛的言行举止其实是一种缺乏安全感以及骄傲自大的混合体，而中国官员则经常在夸大或是掩饰中国的崛起之间游移。


Of course, there are moments when China’s leaders do seem like people who know that they are succeeding and want others to acknowledge it.	当然，有时候中国领导人确实看上去春风得意并且乐于四处炫耀。


Even before the current diplomatic controversies, China’s leaders were gleefully drawing attention to how much more effective their stimulus package had been than Obama’s in countering the negative effects of the financial crisis.	即便在最近的外交争端中，中国领导人也很喜欢将自己的经济刺激计划与奥巴马的相比较，显示自己在对抗金融危机方面效率如何之高。


And yet, when news broke last month that China had officially replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, instead of crowing about surpassing a longtime rival and having the top spot, held by the US, in its sights, the government issued statements emphasizing that theirs remains a “poor, developing” country.	可是当媒体在上月大肆报道中国正式超越日本成为世界第二大经济体的时候，中国政府却没有为压倒一个长期竞争对手，进而剑指美国而欢呼雀跃，而是发布声明强调中国依然是个“贫穷的发展中国家”。


The self-confident side of the leadership’s split personality is often what worries China’s neighbors and the US alike.	虽然中国领导层这种分裂型人格的自大一面经常会令邻国及美国深感忧虑。


Still, it is important to remember that there’s a positive aspect to the Party’s self-confidence.	但也有必要记住共产党的自信也有其积极效应。


As political scientist Kevin O’Brien has argued, China’s increased readiness to compromise with some domestic protesters, rather than treat all forms of collective action as subversive, can be seen as reflecting a growing sense of security.	正如政治学家凯文·奥布莱恩所说，中国政府越来越愿意与国内示威者达成妥协，而不是一概将这些集体行动视作颠覆行为，这显示出其日益增加的安全感。


Conversely, some of China’s most disturbing moves can be chalked up to exaggerated feelings of insecurity.	与此相反，中国某些最令人恼火的举动可以归结为其内心缺乏安全感的夸张表现。


Consider the harsh treatment of the gadfly critic Liu Xiaobao, sentenced to 11 years in prison on trumped-up charges of “subversion” for launching an Internet petition drive championing civil liberties.	以对异见人士刘晓波的严厉处理为例，官方指控其在网上发动捍卫公民权力的请愿行为，并以“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判处有期徒刑11年。


Would a truly self-confident ruling elite have been so skittish about his activism?	试想一个真正拥有自信的统治精英会对刘晓波的这种举动如此敏感吗？


The confident side of the Chinese leadership’s split personality is easy to understand.	其实这种分裂型人格中自大的一面是非常容易理解的。


From the late 1980’s until 2000, many observers presented the Party as being on its last legs, certain to succumb to the “Leninist extinction” that began with communism’s collapse in Europe.	从1990年代末到2000年，许多观察家都认为共产党的统治已经是强弩之末，肯定会走上由东欧剧变作为开端的“列宁主义灭亡”之路。


But the Party remains in charge today.	但中国共产党的政权却一直维持到了今天。


Airport bookstores that once displayed Gordon G. Chang’s The Coming Collapse of China now offer Martin Jacques’ When China Rules the World.	戈登·G·昌格所写的《中国即将崩溃》一书曾经在机场书店中热销，如今也已被马丁·雅克斯的《当中国统治世界》取而代之了。


Why, then, do China’s rulers continue to backslide into doubt and fear, and why do they seek to avoid having China labeled a superpower?	那么中国的统治者为什么会不断倒退到怀疑和恐惧之中？ 他们又为什么要尝试避免中国被定义为超级大国呢？


For starters, downplaying China’s rise has practical benefits.	在竞争中对中国崛起的刻意低调是有其好处的。


It helps to be seen as a “poor, developing” country, not as an economic giant, because “developed” nations are expected to do more to combat major global challenges, like climate change.	一个“贫穷落后的发展中国家”比一个经济巨人好处更大，因为在应对全球性的重大挑战（比如气候变化）方面，“发达国家”必须付出更多。


At the same time, China really is still a “poor” country in terms of per capita income.	与此同时，在人均收入方面中国确实还是一个“贫穷”国家。


And parts of the country are more similar to sections of troubled “developing” countries than to China’s showplace cities.	而除了那些光鲜靓丽的大城市之外，其国内某些地区确实就是一个混乱的“发展中”国家。


The Party is in a vulnerable position – and knows it.	中共正处于一个非常敏感脆弱的境地——而他们也有所察觉。


That is no excuse for paranoia and repression, but just because the Party has outlasted predictions of its demise does not mean that it has no Achilles heel.	虽然过去的那些预测和悲观情绪都是错误的，但中共的存活时间比预期要长并不意味着它就没有弱点。


Most notably, the anger over corruption and nepotism that fueled the Tiananmen protests has never gone away.	最明显的就是当年引发天安门事件的那种对腐败和裙带关系的愤怒至今依然未曾消散。


China’s leaders thus continue to depend on a form of nationalism structured around tales of victimhood.	因此中国领导人只能继续依靠一种围绕着历史流血牺牲事迹营造的爱国主义来维持（统治）。


They now base their legitimacy on the notion that the Party, which rose to power as the nation fought foreign domination, is uniquely qualified to keep China from being bullied in a hostile international arena, and that only they can provide the stable environment needed for growth.	他们的合法性来自于中国共产党崛起于反抗外国统治过程中的历史，并由此断定共产党特别适合中国，使其能在一个敌对的国际环境中免遭恐吓，而且只有他们才能提供发展所需的稳定环境。


The Chinese leadership’s split personality explains a curious phenomenon that former US State Department adviser Susan Shirk noted in her book China: Fragile Superpower.	中国领导层的分裂型人格也解释了前美国国务院顾问苏珊·舍克在其著作《中国：脆弱的超级大国》中所提到的一个有趣现象。


When she mentioned the book’s title to American friends, they wondered why she used the modifier “fragile,” whereas Chinese friends said calling their country a “superpower” was premature.	当她向美国朋友们提到该书的书名时，他们都奇怪为什么她要用“脆弱”这个修饰语，而她的中国朋友们却说将中国定义为“超级大国”还为时过早。


Shirk’s title still captures a significant phenomenon that bedevils diplomatic affairs. Outsiders are increasingly convinced that China is a superpower, and that it needs to show that it can be a responsible one.	舍克的书名还包含着一个困扰着外交事务的重要现象：外国人日渐确信中国就是一个超级大国，并以此认为中国有必要负担起相应的责任。


But China’s rulers only sometimes embrace the designation – and the Party still sometimes behaves as if it had only a tenuous hold on power.	虽然中国的统治者有时会接受这种称号——但中共有时的行为，却仿佛其手中的政权正岌岌可危似的。


Is China the New World Bank?	中国，新的世界银行？


SINGAPORE – The Chinese are everywhere. Or, more accurately, Chinese money is everywhere, thanks particularly to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank.	发自新加坡——无论你走到世界哪个角落，都能发现中国人的身影，或者更准确地说，发现中国资金的身影，这首先得感谢中国国家开发银行和中国进出口银行。


As the two institutions responsible for all Chinese overseas financing, they are making waves around the world.	作为负责所有中国海外资金项目的两大机构，它们正在全世界范围内掀起阵阵涟漪。


According to The Financial Times, Chinese lending in 2008-2010 surpassed World Bank assistance by approximately $10 billion.	据英国《金融时报》报道，2008~2010年间中国对外贷款金额比世界银行援助金额还要多近100亿美元。


By the end of 2010, the CDB’s reach extended to more than 90 countries, whose total indebtedness reached $141.3 billion.	至2010年年尾，中国国家开发银行的触角已经延伸到世界90多个国家，总贷款额达1413亿美元。


So, is China reshaping the landscape of development assistance?	这是否意味着中国正在重塑世界发展援助的总体局面？


In a nutshell, yes.	一言以蔽之，没错！


Consider the following: Chinese investment in Zambia’s rich copper and coal reserves accounts for 7.7% of the country’s GDP.	请看下面的例子：中国对赞比亚铜矿和煤矿的投资贡献了该国GDP的7. 7%。


In Saudi Arabia, the state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation built the Al-Mashaaer Al-Mugadassah light-rail project to ease traffic pressure during the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.	在沙特阿拉伯，国营的中国铁建股份有限公司承建的Al-Mashaaer Al-Mugadassah轻轨项目将有助于缓解麦加朝圣期间的交通压力。


There are even said to be plans for an Arctic highway to facilitate trade throughout the polar region.	甚至有传言说中国计划建设一条北极地区高速公路以促进附近区域的贸易活动。


Closer to home, a Himalayan railway project to link Tibet to Khasa, at the border with Nepal, is currently under construction, with plans to extend the line all the way to Kathmandu, the Nepalese capital.	而中国国内目前正建设一条连接西藏和中尼（泊尔）边境口岸Khasa（中文名为樟木镇）的铁路，并计划延伸到尼泊尔首都加德满都。


In Cambodia, China contributed $260 million in assistance in 2009, replacing Japan as the country’s largest aid provider and overtaking both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank’s lending portfolios.	在柬埔寨，中国援助金额于2009年达到2. 6亿美元，取代日本成为该国最大的援助国，同时也令世界银行和亚洲开发银行相形见拙。


Last year, China signed 14 bilateral agreements with Cambodia, totaling $1.2 billion, to finance every conceivable item, from irrigation canals to uniforms for the Cambodian military.	仅仅去年一年中柬两国就签订了总值12亿美元的14项双边协议，而且资助范围极为广泛，从灌溉设备到军队制服无所不包。


Recipient governments are reportedly pleased with China’s aid approach.	据说这些受资助国都对中国的援助方式感到满意。


For one thing, there is a notable absence of expensive consultants folded into so-called “technical assistance” packages, a practice that has been a key focus of criticism directed at many funding agencies.	首先是中国的“技术援助”协议里并未包含昂贵的顾问费用，而这一点恰恰是许多援助机构饱受诟病的地方。


Second, Chinese aid does not require pre-project “missions” by bureaucrats who arrive from distant headquarters for a sort of development tourism that wreaks havoc on the routines of the local counterparts who must accompany them on their poverty excursions.	其次，以往援助项目开工之前通常都会迎来一些“代表团”——一帮从援助机构总部远道而来的官员大驾光临，当地合作方只好放下日常事务陪他们四处参观贫困状况，来一场所谓的“开发之旅”——这种做法在中国援助项目里可找不到。


Third, Chinese aid is dispensed rather quickly and unceremoniously, lacking the burdensome fanfare of lengthy negotiations and voluminous project documents, a practice many scholars and practitioners term “checkbook diplomacy.”	第三，中国的援助谈判较少繁文缛节，不像其他援助项目那样充斥着冗长的谈判和堆积如山的项目文件，而后者被许多学者和项目执行者讥之为“支票外交”。


Fourth, China dispenses aid without compliance conditions such as environmental protection measures or community-participation exercises.	最后中国援助项目的展开也无需遵照环境保护或社区参与等限制条件。


Excruciatingly laborious “stakeholder” consultations – of the type that lasted nearly ten years to construct the World Bank-funded Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric power plant in Laos – are not required of Chinese aid.	历尽艰辛的“利益相关者”咨询过程——比如世界银行老挝南屯2号（Nam Theun 2 ）水电站大坝援助工程就耗费了近十年时间来咨询——在中国援助中根本就不会发生。


China’s unique aid model is one of the main pillars of what the Chinese scholar Sheng Ding calls the country’s “soft power” strategy.	因此这种独特的援助模式也成为中国学者丁盛（音译）提出的所谓中国“软实力”战略的主要依据之一。


Beyond the provision of cheap credit and concessional loans is the global export of China’s way of doing business.	除了提供低利率和优惠贷款之外，这种模式还向全世界输出了中国人的办事方式。


As economic relations deepen, cultural relationships develop.	随着经济纽带进一步深化，文化联系也随之得到发展。


Confucius Institutes are sprouting from Sri Lanka to Nigeria to promote the study of Mandarin.	从斯里兰卡到尼日利亚等地都建立了孔子学院以推广汉语。


Alongside these linguistic programs are seasonal performances by touring Chinese acrobats.	与这些语言项目同时进行的还有中国杂技团的定期巡演。


Call it global courtship by an avid Chinese suitor.	这一切看上去简直就像一个中国求爱者激情四射的全球征友行动。


But worrying signs about China’s seemingly benign lending practices are emerging.	但与此同时，外界对这些看似善意的贷款行为也日渐忧虑。


Chinese financial assistance is tied to the extraction of natural resources, particularly oil and minerals.  Environmentalists worry that without a more conscientious “green” component to Chinese lending, unchecked exploitation could lead to resource depletion.	中国金融援助往往着眼于对自然资源的开采，尤其是石油和矿产。 环保分子担心如果这些贷款不附带一个更加严格的“绿色”条款的话，不合理的开发将导致资源枯竭。


Moreover, Chinese assistance packages often come with Chinese technology and laborers, implying limited employment opportunities and capacity-building for local people.	此外，中国的援助项目通常会采用自己的技术和劳工，这意味着受援地区的居民只能得��有限的就业机会和技能培训。


For example, 750 Chinese workers were shipped to Indonesia, along with 630,000 tons of steel, to construct the five-kilometer Suramadu bridge linking Surabaya to Madura.	比如为了建设连接印尼Surabaya和Madura地区，全长5公里的苏拉马度大桥，中方就专门从本国运来了750名劳工和63万吨钢铁。


The need for disclosure and transparency mechanisms has been emphasized time and again.	对信息披露和透明机制的诉求也被一再强调。


There is no Chinese counterpart to the Development Assistance Committee, which publishes annual reports on global aid flows from OECD member countries.	目前中国还没有一个类似经合组织国家发展援助委员会（Development Assistance Committee）这样的机构，自然也没有人就中国向全球的援助资金流向撰写年度报告。


Nor is there an overarching mechanism, as called for in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, that would align Chinese aid with national development strategies, or establish a forum for coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors.	此外也缺乏一个像2005年《巴黎有效援助宣言》(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness)这样的统筹性机制，确保援助能和中国国家战略步调一致，或者建立一个与其他双边或多边援助方进行合作的论坛。


Fears abound that Chinese aid is beginning to run amok.	因此也产生了许多忧虑中国的援助将变得独断专行的声音。


Concerns such as these are likely to increase as China emerges as a formidable development player.	中国正在逐渐崛起成为一个无法忽视的发展援助参与者，而类似的关注也将随之不断增多。


Yet, by and large, Chinese assistance is welcomed rather than feared.	当然总的来说世界对中国的援助还是欢迎大于恐惧的。


Those who promote equitable and inclusive development wish to see Chinese aid as part of an integrated international community of providers that is governed by responsible co-ownership.	在那些致力于推动平等和包容性发展的人眼中，中国援助应当成为一个统一国际援助者体系的组成部分，在该体系中各国都将本国援助项目的所有权让渡出来并结合成一体，并将其委托给一个负责任的机构进行运作。


This entails fair and open rules, mutual accountability practices, and sustainable development objectives, all of which require active Chinese participation.	这需要公平和公开的规则，共同的责任性实践，以及可持续的发展目标，所有这一切都需要中国的积极参与。


In a world weary of the limited effectiveness of most development programs in curtailing endemic poverty, China’s growing role in countries around the world provides ample opportunity to reconstruct the landscape of economic aid and financing.	在这个世界上已经充斥着太多在缓解区域性贫困方面缺乏成效的发展援助计划，而中国在世界各地逐渐明朗的身影则提供了丰富的机会去重构全球经济援助和资助项目的大局。


But reaching that goal requires a plan, and China must play its part in formulating it.	但实现这一目标的前提就是首先制定一个计划，对此中国也必须在整个计划的制定中做出自己的贡献。


Is Cold War II Underway?	第二次冷战爆发了吗？


TOKYO – President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington is coming at an increasingly tense moment in Sino/American relations.	东京——胡锦涛主席在中美关系日趋紧张的时候访问华盛顿。


Indeed, mesmerized by China’s vast military buildup, a new constellation of strategic partnerships among its neighbors, and America’s revitalized commitment to Asian security, many shrewd observers suggest that 2010 saw the first sparks of a new Cold War in Asia.  But is “Cold War II” really inevitable?	事实上，中国的大规模军事集结、各邻国间全新战略伙伴关系的建立和美国重振保卫亚洲安全的决心吸引了很多精明的观察家，他们认为2010年已经迸发出亚洲新一轮冷战的第一簇火花。   但“第二次冷战”真的无法避免吗？


Although appeasing China’s drive for hegemony in Asia is unthinkable, every realistic effort must be made to avoid militarization of the region’s diplomacy.	尽管遏制中国在亚洲谋求霸权的冲动根本无法想象，我们必须尽一切努力避免地区外交关系军事化。


After all, there was nothing very cold about the Cold War in Asia.	归根结底，所谓的亚洲冷战其实并不是真正的冷战。


First in the Chinese civil war, and then in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Indochina – particularly Vietnam – the Cold War raged not as an ideological/propaganda battle between rival superpowers, but in dogged, often fratricidal combat that cost millions of lives and retarded economic development and political democratization.	中国内战最先爆发，而后蔓延到朝鲜、印尼、马来西亚和中南半岛——尤其是越南——亚洲冷战并不是超级大国之间的思想/宣传攻势之争，而是夺去数百万人生命、阻碍经济发展和政治民主化进程的残酷的、自相残杀的战争。


It is this grim history that makes China’s current disregard for Deng Xiaoping’s maxim that China “disguise its ambition and hide its claws” so worrying for Asian leaders from New Delhi to Seoul and from Tokyo to Jakarta.	正是过去这段严峻的历史使中国目前违背邓小平“韬光养晦”原则的所作所为引发了从新德里到首尔，从东京到雅加达领导人的普遍担忧。


From its refusal to condemn North Korea’s unprovoked sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and shelling of South Korean islands, to its claims of sovereignty over various Japanese, Vietnamese, Malay, and Filipino archipelagos and newly conjured claims on India’s province of Arunachal Pradesh, China has revealed a neo-imperial swagger.	从中国拒绝谴责北朝鲜无端炸沉韩国军舰天安号并炮击韩国小岛，到中国对日本、越南、马来和菲律宾岛屿宣誓主权，再到最新提出的对印度阿鲁纳恰尔邦的领土要求，新帝国主义的狂妄自大在中国身上已经表现得非常明显。


So it should surprise no one that “containment” is coming to dominate Asian diplomatic discourse.	因此“遏制”策略开始主导亚洲外交领域并不值得大惊小怪。


But it is wrong – at least for now – to think that a formal structure of alliances to contain China is needed in the way that one was required to contain the Soviet Union.	但认为需要建立像遏制苏联那样的正式联盟结构来遏制中国是错误的，至少从目前来看这是一种错误的选择。


Containment, it should be recalled, was organized against a Soviet totalitarian regime that was not only ideologically aggressive and in the process of consolidating its colonization of Eastern Europe (as well as Japan’s Northern Territories), but also deliberately sealed off from the wider world economy.	我们应该记得，对苏联集权主义政权的遏制不仅是因为苏联侵略性的意识形态及其在东欧（以及日本北方领土）巩固殖民统治的企图，还因为苏联故意封锁世界经济的险恶用心。


Today’s China is vastly different.	今天中国的情况却与此有着显著的不同。


Overt military imperialism of the Soviet sort has, at least historically, rarely been the Chinese way.	苏联那种公开的军事帝国主义至少从历史上看很少被中国采用。


Sun Tzu, the great Chinese theorist of warfare, focused on the weakening of an adversary psychologically, not in battle.	伟大的中国战略理论家孙子主张不战而屈人之兵。


Until recently, much of China’s bid for regional hegemony reflected Sun’s concepts.	直到不久前，中国寻求地区霸权的努力还处处反映出孙子的理念。


More importantly, China abandoned economic autarky three decades ago.  Today, its economic links in Asia are deep, and – it is to be hoped – permanent.	更为重要的是，中国三十年前就放弃了维持经济自给自足的政策。   今天，它已经与亚洲各国建立了深厚的经济联系，我们希望这种联系是永久性的。


China’s export machine sucks in vast quantities of parts and components for final assembly from across Asia – Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, as well as richer Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.	中国的出口机器从亚洲各地吸纳大量零部件用于最后组装，其中包括泰国、马来西亚、菲律宾、印度尼西亚以及更加富足的新加坡、台湾、韩国和日本。


Membership of the World Trade Organization has helped to bind China to highly sophisticated pan-Asian production networks.	加入世贸组织让中国进入了高度发达的泛亚生产网络。


Everybody has benefited from these ties.	上述联系让所有人受益匪浅。


Throughout China’s three-decade rise from poverty to economic juggernaut, trade within East Asia has grown even faster than the region’s trade with the rest of the world, suggesting deeper specialization and integration.	在中国从一贫如洗成长为经济大鳄的三十年崛起过程中，东亚区域的内部贸易比东亚与世界其他地区之间的贸易增长速度更快，深层次的专业化和一体化趋势非常明显。


Indeed, China’s rise has profoundly altered the course of Asia’s trade flows.	事实上，中国的崛起从根本上改变了亚洲贸易路线。


Japan no longer focuses on exporting finished goods to Europe and North America, but on exporting parts and components for assembly in China.	日本不再一门心思向欧洲和北美出口制成品，而把更多精力放在出口零部件到中国组装。


In turn, Japan now imports from China finished goods (such as office machines and computers) that once came from America and Europe.	反过来，日本现在从中国进口办公设备和电脑等制成品，而这些制成品原先的进口地是美国和欧洲。


Given that as many as half of China’s 1.3 billion people remain mired in abject poverty, it is in China’s interest to ensure that these economic relationships continue to flourish.	由于中国13亿人口中近半数仍处在赤贫状态，确保上述经济联系继续发展符合中国的利益。


In the past, China has recognized the vital need for good neighborly relations.	过去，中国一直认可与邻国保持良好关系的重要性。


During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Chinese officials did not engage in competitive devaluation of the renminbi.	1997－1998年亚洲金融危机期间，中国官员并未允许人民币参与竞争性贬值。


Unfortunately, such clear-sighted and responsible policymaking is a far cry from what we are seeing today.	但不幸的是，这种明智而负责任的决策离我们今天看到的景象相去甚远。


China’s dizzying increase in its military capacity is another obvious source of concern in Asia.	中国军事实力令人目眩的增长是亚洲另一个显而易见的忧虑来源。


But, even according to the highest estimates, China’s military budget is only now about equal to that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India, and Russia, all of which border China – not to mention Indonesia, South Korea, and a militarily modernizing Taiwan.	但即使按照最激进的估计，中国的军事预算也只相当于与日本持平，当然与日本、印度和俄罗斯（上述三国均与中国接壤）——更不用说印尼、韩国和军事现代化台湾的军事预算总额相去甚远。


Moreover, Russia and India possess nuclear weapons, and Japan has the technological wherewithal to reconfigure its defense posture to meet any regional nuclear threat.	此外，俄罗斯和印度拥有核武器，而日本则掌握重新调整防御态势应对地区核挑战的技术资源。


So the challenge that China poses today remains predominantly political and economic, not military.	因此中国今天造成的威胁仍然主要局限在政治和经济领域，而不是在军事方面。


The test of China’s intentions is whether its growing economic and, yes, military capacities will be used to seek to establish Asian hegemony by working to exclude America from the region and preventing regional partnerships from flourishing.	对中国意图的考验在于它是否会运用日益强大的经济和军事能力谋求建立亚洲霸权，将美国排除在亚太区域之外，并阻止区域伙伴关系进一步发展。


The alternative is a China that becomes part of a cooperative effort to bind Asia in a rules-based system similar to that which has underpinned long-term peace in Europe.	与此相对应的选择是中国成为稳固亚洲规则体系的合作力量的组成部分，同样的合作力量曾经确保了欧洲国家的长远发展。


In this sense, Asia’s rise is also a test of US competitiveness and commitment in Asia.	从这个意义上讲，亚洲的崛起也是对美国在亚洲竞争力和决心的严峻考验。


America’s historical opposition to hegemony in Asia – included as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 – remains valid.	美国一直以来反对亚洲霸权的态度（1972年中美上海联合公报明确规定的中美共同目标）仍然没有改变。


It will have to be pursued, however, primarily by political and economic means, albeit backed by US power.	但这一目标的实现虽然离不开美国的武力支持，但仍然主要依靠政治和军事方面的手段。


Before 2010, most Asian countries would have preferred not to choose between China and the US.	2010年前，多数亚洲国家不愿在中美两国之间做出选择。


But China’s assertiveness has provided enormous incentives to embrace an Asian multilateral system backed by America, rather than accept the exclusionary system that China seeks to lead.	但中国的自信态度已经促成了接受由美国主导的亚洲多边体系的强烈意愿，亚洲国家宁愿接受由美国主导的多边体系，也不愿接受中国谋求领导的排他性制度。


In 2011 we may begin to see whether those incentives lead China’s rulers to re-appraise their diplomatic conduct, which has left them with only the corrupt, basket case economies of Burma and North Korea as reliable friends in Asia.	2011年，我们可能目睹上述意愿是否会引导中国领导人重新评价自己的外交政策，这样的外交政策导致中国在亚洲的可靠盟友只剩下腐败并陷入经济困境的缅甸和北朝鲜。


Is Democracy Possible in the Arab World?	阿拉伯世界有可能实现民主吗？


With Iraq rapidly descending into bloody chaos, the prospects for holding successful democratic elections in January, as the US and the Iraqi interim government have promised, look bleak.	随着伊拉克很快陷入血腥和混乱，美国和伊拉克临时政府在一月成功举行民主大选的承诺前景黯淡。


Some skeptics go further, arguing that the Iraq debacle proves that prospects for democracy throughout the Arab world are dim.	有些持怀疑态度的人甚至更悲观，认为伊拉克政局的崩溃证明整个阿拉伯世界实现民主的希望渺茫。


Are they right?	这样说对吗？


Half the world's countries are democracies, yet none of the 22 Arab countries is among them.	全世界有半数国家实现了民主，但22个阿拉伯国家却不在其中。


The United Nations' Arab Human Development Report is frank in its criticism of the region's economic and social progress.	联合国的《阿拉伯发展报告》直言不讳地批评了该地区的经济和社会发展。


Economic growth has been slow, approximately half of women are illiterate, and the region is not well integrated into the world economy.	经济增长非常缓慢，文盲约占妇女总数的一半，经济状况也难以和世界接轨。


Indeed, with a population of more than 300 million, Arab countries export less to the world, excluding oil and gas, than Finland.	实际上，尽管人口达3亿之众，阿拉伯国家除石油天然气外对世界的出口还比不上一个芬兰。


An enormous "youth bulge" in the Arab world's demographic tables looms, with 45% of the population now under the age of 14, and the population as a whole set to double over the next quarter-century.	青年人在阿拉伯世界的人口统计表上数量激增，目前总人口的45%都在14岁以下，而后四分之一世纪的总人口数肯定会翻番。


Yet the region has inadequate opportunities for young people to find meaningful work. Unemployment hovers at 20%.	但阿拉伯地区的青年却缺乏有意义的就业机会，失业率长期在20%左右徘徊。


At the same time, the Middle East is awash with modern communications, much of it with an anti-Western slant.	与此同时，现代信息的大潮冲击着中东地区，其中不少都带有反西方的色彩。


During the Cold War, America's approach to the Middle East was to foster stability in order to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, ensure the supply of oil, and provide security for Israel.	冷战时期，美国的中东策略是促进地区稳定，防止苏联影响的进一步蔓延，及确保石油供应和以色列的安全。


The American strategy was management through autocratic leaders, and a "don't rock the boat" approach.	美国的战略是靠独裁领袖实现统治，始终抱着一种"维持现状"的态度。


After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration launched an ambitious new policy to encourage a democratic transformation of the Middle East.	2001年911恐怖袭击后，布什政府开始推行雄心勃勃的新政策，鼓励中东实现民主转变。


Saddam Hussein's removal was intended as only the first step.	铲除萨达姆·侯赛因只不过是最初的一步。


In August 2003, US National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice argued that "much as a democratic Germany became a linchpin of a new Europe that is today whole, free, and at peace, so a transformed Iraq can become a key element in a very different Middle East in which the ideologies of hate will not flourish."	2003年8月，美国国家安全顾问赖斯宣称"就像民主的德国成了今天统一、自由、和平的新欧洲的关键所在，变革后的伊拉克也能够成为截然不同的中东的重要部分。 仇恨理念永远不会在那里泛滥。


Germany and Japan were, indeed, postwar success stories.	德国和日本确实是战后的成功实例。


But both were relatively homogeneous societies with significant middle classes and no organized resistance to American occupation.	但两国的社会都相对均衡，中产阶级的力量比较强大，没有组织起来反抗美国的占领。


Yet both transitions still took nearly a decade.	可即便如此，两国的转型也用了10年时间。


Moreover, Iraq's possession of oil is a mixed blessing, because few oil-based economies have proven hospitable to liberal democracy.	不仅如此，伊拉克的石油资源令人喜忧参半，因为几乎所有的产油国都对自由民主缺乏兴趣。


Moreover, cultural differences between the US and Germany were not as great as those between the US and the Middle East.	此外，美德两国间的文化差异远不像美国和中东之间那么大。


Of course, cultural barriers are not insurmountable: democracy has taken root in Japan, South Korea, and in other Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.	当然了，文化壁垒并不是没法克服：民主也在日本、韩国和其它穆斯林国家生根发芽，比如土耳其、印尼和孟加拉。


But the time horizons required for a fundamental makeover are measured in decades, not years.	但如此根本性的转变要十年为单位计算，绝不能在几年时间里一蹴而就。


Democracy is, after all, more than mere voting.	毕竟，民主不只是投票选举。


Since the Middle East's autocratic regimes destroyed their liberal oppositions, in many countries radical Islamists represent the only dissent, feeding on widespread resentment of corrupt regimes, opposition to American policies, and popular fears of modernization and globalization.	由于自由反对派被中东独裁政权彻底摧毁，因此在很多国家，激进的伊斯兰教徒是唯一敢于反抗的声音，对腐败政权的普遍仇恨、对美国政策的持续反抗和对现代化、全球化的普遍恐惧成了它们赖以生存的土壤。


At the same time, the global economy and modernization can also promise better education, more jobs and opportunities, and improved health care, and opinion polls indicate that a majority of the region's population desires these benefits.	与此同时，全球经济和现代化也能够改善教育、催生更多就业机会和提高医疗卫生条件，而民意测验表明该地区的多数居民都对此十分期待。


Given ambivalence among Arab moderates, there remains a chance to isolate the extremists and gradually build stable polities with broader participation.	由于阿拉伯温和人士普遍怀有矛盾的心态，因此我们还有机会孤立极端份子，逐步建立起为人们广泛参与的稳定政体。


To achieve this will require policies that open up economies, reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth, improve educational systems, and encourage the types of gradual political changes now seen in small countries like Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco.	为了让上述目标早日实现，就需要开放经济、减少官僚控制、加速经济发展、改善教育体系和鼓励巴林、阿曼、科威特和摩洛哥等小国实行的政治渐变。


Japan and Korea demonstrated that democracy could be combined with indigenous values in Asia. The Arab world, too, can develop intellectuals, social groups, and eventually countries with liberal economies and societies that are consistent with local cultures.	日韩两国证明民主可以和亚洲的本土价值观完美地融合，而阿拉伯世界也一样可以培养知识分子、社会团体，最终建立经济自由、也能适应本土文化的国家。


But this will take time and patience - and it will need to be accompanied by policy changes on Iraq, Palestine-Israel, and the regional economy.	但实现这些需要时间和耐力－还得伴随着在伊拉克、巴勒斯坦－以色列、以及地区经济问题上的政策变化。


Equally important will be whether Western countries cooperate to create a long-term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges that can help develop a richer and more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries.	还有一点同等重要，那就是西方国家是否能够合作建立长期的文化和教育交流策略，帮助中东国家成长为富有、开放的平民社会。


The most effective advocates for democratic change are not American or European officials, but citizens of the region who understand Western virtues as well as flaws - and can adapt them to indigenous conditions to press for social change.	民主改革最有力的宣传者不是美国或欧洲的官员，而是了解西方优劣的地区百姓－这些人不但要深入了解，还要与当地条件有机地结合，推动社会走向变革。


Corporations, foundations, universities, and other non-profit organizations can promote much of this work.	公司、基金、大学和其它非赢利性组织能够发挥很大作用。


Companies and foundations can offer technology to help modernize Arab educational systems and take them beyond rote learning.	公司和基金会能发展科技，促进阿拉伯教育体系的现代化，让它们跳出生搬硬套的怪圈。


Western universities can host more students and faculty.	西方大学可以招收更多的学生和教员。


Other organizations can support specific institutions in Arab countries, or programs that enhance the professionalism of journalists.	其它组织可以支持阿拉伯国家的机构或项目，以提升记者的职业素养。


But governments also have an important role to play.	但政府的作用也不容忽视。


By supporting the teaching of foreign languages and financing student exchanges, they can help people in the region accomplish their own goals as spelled out in the Arab Human Development Report .	通过支持外语教学和资助学生交流，他们就能像《阿拉伯发展报告》中规定的那样，帮该地区的人们实现自己的目标。


There are many strands to an effective long-term strategy to promote conditions for stability and broader political participation in the Arab world.	要想在阿拉伯世界创造稳定、扩大参政，任何长期有效的策略都还要面临很多挑战。


This is America's declared goal. But getting there requires American policies that are consistent with the comprehensive approach that democratic transformation requires.	这是美国明确的既定目标，但要真的实现需要美国政策符合民主改革提出的全面要求。


Is Dialogue with Iran and Syria Worth It?	与伊朗和叙利亚的对话是否值得？


Despite frequent claims to the contrary, the fundamental problem in the Middle East is not intervention by the West.	尽管总有人强调相反的一面，但困扰中东地区的本质问题并不是西方的干预。


On the contrary, the real problem is that, for all their dabbling, the Western powers seem capable of neither war nor dialogue.	恰恰相反，尽管西方列强不断参与中东事务，但他们似乎既不愿意挑起战争，也不愿意进行对话。


This leaves everyone in the region at the mercy of the Middle East’s oppressive regimes and proliferating terrorists.	于是生活在中东地区的民众就完全听命于那里的压迫性政府和愈演愈烈的恐怖主义。


Advocates of the Iraq war lacked an understanding of the complexities on the ground to wage an effective war of liberation and democratization.	伊拉克战争的倡导者对当地的复杂局势缺乏深入了解，因此发动不了有效的民主解放战争。


As a result, their policies merely ended up eliminating Iran’s two major regional rivals: the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime.	结果是他们的政策只不过替伊朗消除了两大地区性对手：塔利班和萨达姆·侯赛因政权。


This presented Iran with a golden opportunity to project itself as a regional hegemon, and Iran’s leaders are unlikely to let this opportunity slip away.	这给伊朗提供了充当地区霸主的天赐良机，而伊朗统治者是绝对不会放过这种机会的。


Advocates of dialogue with the Iranians and their Syrian allies, like former United States Secretary of State James Baker, labor under the delusion that they can actually reach an understanding that can enable a graceful US exit from Iraq and help stabilize that wounded country.	像美国前国务卿詹姆斯·贝克（James Baker）那样倡导与伊朗及其叙利亚盟友展开对话的政客梦想能够与伊朗达成谅解，使美国能够从伊拉克体面地撤军，从而在这个已经满目疮痍的国家实现稳定。


The delusion is based on two false assumptions: that the Iranians and the Syrians can succeed in Iraq where the US has failed, and that the international community can afford to pay the price of ensuring their cooperation.	这样的幻想是基于两种错误的假设：其一是尽管美国在伊拉克遭到了失败，但伊朗和叙利亚能够成功； 其二是国际社会能够付出确保伊朗和叙利亚合作所必须的代价。


True, Syria and Iran are playing a major role in supporting Iraqi insurgents, and Syria is still encouraging the trafficking of jihadists and weapons across its borders with Iraq.	叙利亚和伊朗在支持伊拉克起义中发挥着重要的作用，这一点勿庸置疑，而且叙利亚仍在暗中鼓励通过叙伊边境运送杰哈德好战分子和武器。


But the idea that these activities can be halted at will is naïve.	但认为这样的行动可以随意停止未免有些太过天真。


For one thing, the interests of the Shia communities in Iraq and Iran are not the same.	首先，伊拉克和伊朗什叶派穆斯林的利益不尽相同。


Iraqi Shia have never accepted Iranian dictates, and many took part in Saddam’s war against Iran in the 1980’s.	伊拉克什叶派从未接受过伊朗的独裁统治，很多人都曾投身于20世纪80年代萨达姆反对伊朗的战争。


After all, the Iraqi Shia are Arabs, and if they are now willing to coordinate their activities with their Persian counterparts, their main goal will always be to secure an independent course as soon as possible, even while they carry on with their internecine disputes within Iraq.	归根结底，伊拉克什叶派是阿拉伯人，就算如今他们愿意与波斯湾的伙伴同仇敌忾，他们的主要目标也一定是尽快走上独立之路，即便独立以后他们要在伊拉克内部继续自相残杀。


Iran is in no better position than the US to convince them to resolve their differences.	在说服他们化解分歧方面，伊朗并不见得比美国更有办法。


President Basher al-Assad of Syria faces a similar dilemma. Although he has opened Syria’s border to jihadists and has allowed Saddam’s supporters to operate freely there, that choice may not be entirely his.	叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar al-Assad）也面临着同样的窘境。


Syria’s aid to Saddam in maneuvering around the United Nations’ oil-for food program brought Iraqi money to inhabitants of the border region, who have always been closer in customs, dialect, and outlook to their Iraqi neighbors than to their fellow Syrians.	尽管阿萨德向杰哈德分子开放叙利亚边境，允许萨达姆的支持者在那里自由活动，但他并不是完全自愿地做出这样的选择。


In the absence of government investment, local inhabitants’ loyalty went to Iraqi Baathists who helped improve their lot. Indeed, even local security apparatuses have been unwilling to comply with dictates from Assad and his clique to seal the borders.	叙利亚向萨达姆提供援助影响联合国的石油换食品计划，这样生活在边境上的居民才能够得到来自伊拉克的资金，这些人在风俗习惯、语言和外表上与伊拉克邻居的相似度要远远高于与叙利亚国人。


In these cirumstances, neither Syria nor Iran seems capable of delivering anything but mayhem in Iraq.	在这样的情况下，叙利亚和伊朗只能使伊拉克的局势更加混乱。


What, then, would the proposed dialogue between the US and these states achieve other than continue to empower their corrupt yet ambitious regimes?	那么，美国和这些国家之间即将举行的会谈除了继续为腐朽但依然野心勃勃的政权积聚力量外，还能有什么作用呢？


The story gets more complicated when one considers the UN inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.	将联合国调查前黎巴嫩总理拉菲克·哈里里（Rafiq al-Hariri）被刺的因素考虑进来以后，问题变得更为复杂。


Assad wants nothing more than to see this affair forgotten – and the proponents of dialogue think that they can give him what he wants in the hope of breaking Syria’s alliance with Iran.	阿萨德最希望的事情莫过于这件事尽快被世人忘记¾而叙美谈判的倡议者认为如果有希望使叙利亚与伊朗决裂，他们能够以此作为交换条件。


But that is merely another erroneous (not to mention amoral) assumption.	但这样的假设仍然是错误的（更不用说还很不道德）。


The alliance between Syria and Iran dates back more than two decades, and was explicitly reaffirmed by the two ruling regimes as recently as January 2005.	叙利亚和伊朗的联盟关系已经有20年的历史，就在2005年1月这种联盟关系还得到了双方统治者的共同认可。


Indeed, the two regimes are now joined at the hip.	这两个政权实际已经密不可分了。


Assad’s recent refusal to attend a summit in Tehran with his Iranian and Iraqi counterparts was a mere tactical move designed to appeal to the proponents of dialogue.	阿萨德不久前拒绝与伊朗和伊拉克同僚一道参加德黑兰举行的会议只不过是一次试图打动对话倡导者的战术行动。


In fact, Iran has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Syria, and annual bilateral trade tops a billion dollars.	实际上，伊朗对叙利亚投资达数亿美元，年双边贸易额超过10亿美元。


Irani’s growing influence over the Syrian security apparatus is well established, and Iran is funding an effort to create Syrian Shia militias to compensate for Assad’s sagging support in the army and in the minority Alawite community.	伊朗对叙利亚安全设施的影响根深蒂固，而且伊朗出资建设叙利亚什叶派民兵，以弥补阿萨德在军队和阿拉维特派居住地区日渐衰落的威望。


Assad cannot turn his back on all of this.	阿萨德根本不可能对此无动于衷。


No deal would be sweet enough, even if it included the return of the Golan Heights.	没有任何许诺比这更有吸引力，即便归还格兰高地也不能与伊朗相提并论。


For Assad and his supporters, survival is more important than sovereignty.	对阿萨德及其支持者来讲，生存比主权的完整更为重要。


Still, to read the well-known names of commentators and policymakers who are recommending engaging Syria and/or Iran is a testament to how inconsequential and cut off the Western powers have become from the realities on the ground in the world’s most turbulent region.	即便如此，那些卖力建议吸引叙利亚和/或伊朗的鼎鼎大名的评论家和决策者名字证明了西方列强在世界最动荡地区的现实情况面前显得多么束手无策。


That, it seems, is the price of their arrogance.	这似乎是他们为自己的傲慢自大所付出的代价。


Is Doping Wrong?	是非兴奋剂


There is now a regular season for discussing drugs in sports, one that arrives every year with the Tour de France.	现在讨论体育运动中的违禁药物问题似乎有了一个常规的季节，它每年和环法自行车大赛一同到来。


This year, the overall leader, two other riders, and two teams were expelled or withdrew from the race as a result of failing, or missing, drug tests.	今年，领骑运动员、两名其他选手和两个车队由于未能通过或错过药物检测被勒令或自动退出比赛。


The eventual winner, Alberto Contador, is himself alleged to have had a positive test result last year.	最终的获胜者，阿尔伯托•孔塔多本人也被爆去年的药检结果呈阳性。


So many leading cyclists have tested positive for drugs, or have admitted, from the safety of retirement, that they used them, that one can plausibly doubt that it is possible to be competitive in this event otherwise.	如此之多的顶尖自行车运动员都被药检为阳性，或在退役以后的安全情况下承认他们曾使用过违禁药物，以至于人们真的要怀疑要在这一运动项目中保持竞争力除了服药可能就别无他法了。


In the United States, the debate has been fueled by the baseball player Barry Bonds’ march towards the all-time record for home runs in a career.	在美国，一场辩论正因为棒球运动员Barry Bonds向其职业生涯全垒打的前无古人的纪录迈进而更为激烈。


Bonds is widely believed to have been helped by drugs and synthetic hormones.	Bonds的赛场表现得益于药物和人工荷尔蒙已是众所周知了。


He is frequently booed and mocked by fans, and many thought that baseball’s commissioner, Bud Selig, should not attend games at which Bonds might tie or break the record.	他常常被球迷们奚落和嘲笑。 许多球迷都认为职棒大联盟主席Bud Selig对于任何Bonds可能逼平或打破纪录的比赛都不应出席。


At the elite level, the difference between being a champion and an also-ran is so miniscule, and yet matters so much, that athletes are pressured to do whatever they can to gain the slightest edge over their competitors.	在精英运动员的层面上，冠军与亚军的成绩差距微乎其微，但它又是如此重要，以至于压力之下的运动员们都不惜代价地争取超过对手的些微优势。


It is reasonable to suspect that gold medals now go not to those who are drug-free, but to those who most successfully refine their drug use for maximum enhancement without detection.	我们因而有理由怀疑获得金牌的并非那些不使用药物的运动员，而是那些以最成功的方式管理药物的使用从而最大限度提升运动成绩而又不会被发现的运动员。


As events like the Tour de France turn farcical, bioethics professor Julian Savulescu has offered a radical solution.	随着环法自行车大赛这样的赛事变成闹剧，生物伦理学教授Julian Savulescu提出了一个激进的解决方案。


Savulescu, who directs the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at Oxford University and holds degrees in both medicine and bioethics, says that we should drop the ban on performance-enhancing drugs, and allow athletes to take whatever they want, as long as it is safe for them to do so.	Savulescu拥有药物学和生物伦理学的学位，并领导着牛津大学的Uehiro应用伦理学中心。 他说我们应该取消对兴奋剂类药物的禁令，允许运动员在保证自身安全的情况下服用任何药物。


Savulescu proposes that instead of trying to detect whether an athlete has taken drugs, we should focus on measurable indications of whether an athlete is risking his or her health.	Savulescu提议我们应该关注那些显示运动员是否在冒损害健康的风险的可测量指标，而不是检测他们服用了什么药物。


So, if an athlete has a dangerously high level of red blood cells as a result of taking erythropoietin (EPO), he or she should not be allowed to compete.	因此，如果一名运动员由于服用促红细胞生长素 (EPO)而使红细胞水平高到了危险的程度，那么就不应该允许其参赛。


The issue is the red blood cell count, not the means used to elevate it.	问题的关键是红细胞的指标本身而不是使其提升的手段。


To those who say that this will give drug users an unfair advantage, Savulescu replies that now, without drugs, those with the best genes have an unfair advantage.	对于那些认为这种方式会给予使用药物者不公平的竞争优势的人，Savulescu回答说没有药物的帮助，那些基因最佳的人才拥有不公平的竞争优势。


They must still train, of course, but if their genes produce more EPO than ours, they are going to beat us in the Tour de France, no matter how hard we train.	当然他们也必须训练，但如果他们的基因能够制造出比一般人更多的EPO，那么不管其他运动员多么努力训练，还是会在环法大赛中落败。


Unless, that is, we take EPO to make up for our genetic deficiency.	除非他们服用EPO以弥补基因的不足。


Setting a maximum level of red blood cells actually levels the playing field by reducing the impact of the genetic lottery.	规定红细胞水平的上限实际上是通过减小基因选择的影响而创造更公平的竞赛环境。


Effort then becomes more important than having the right genes.	如此一来后天努力就比先天基因更重要了。


Some argue that taking drugs is “against the spirit of sport.”	有人认为服用药物“违背体育精神”。


But it is difficult to defend the current line between what athletes can and cannot do in order to enhance their performance.	但要捍卫为了提高运动成绩的可为与不可为之间的界线实在困难。


In the Tour de France, cyclists can even use overnight intravenous nutrition and hydration to restore their bodies.	在环法自行车大赛中，运动员们甚至可以使用前一晚静脉注射营养素和水合物的方法来恢复体力。


Training at high altitude is permitted, though it gives those athletes who can do it an edge over competitors who must train at sea level.	高纬度训练也被允许，虽然这会使有条件这样做的运动员比没条件的多一分优势。


The World Anti-Doping Code no longer prohibits caffeine.	《世界反兴奋剂规则》也不再禁止咖啡因的使用。


In any case, performance-enhancement is, Savulescu says, the very spirit of sport.	Savulescu认为在任何情况下，提升运动成绩都是运动精神的表现。


We should allow athletes to pursue it by any safe means.	我们应该允许运动员以任何安全的方式追求这一目标。


Moreover, I would argue that sport has no single “spirit.”	次外，我还想说体育运动没有单一的“精神”。


People play sports to socialize, for exercise, to keep fit, to earn money, to become famous, to prevent boredom, to find love, and for the sheer fun of it.	人们从事运动是为了社交、锻炼、保持身材、赚钱、成名、打发时间、寻找爱情或仅仅为了享受运动本身的乐趣。


They may strive to improve their performance, but often they do so for its own sake, for the sense of achievement.	他们可能会努力提升成绩，但很多时候只是为努力而努力，寻求一种成就感而已。


Popular participation in sport should be encouraged.	应该鼓励大众参与到体育运动中来。


Physical exercise makes people not only healthier, but also happier.	运动不但使人更健康，还使人更快乐。


To take drugs will usually be self-defeating.	服用药物的最终结果只能是自欺欺人。


I swim for exercise, and I time myself over a set distance to give myself a goal and encourage myself to work harder.	我以游泳的方式来锻炼。 我在设定距离内给自己计时从而鼓励自己通过更多努力达成目标。


I am pleased when I swim fast, but I would get no sense of achievement from improving my time if the improvement came out of a bottle.	当我游得快时我很高兴，但如果我的成绩提升的来源是药瓶，那么即使时间缩短也不会给我带来成就感。


But elite sport, watched by millions but participated in by few, is different.	但极少数人从事但却拥有亿万观众的精英运动却不同。


For the sake of fame and glory now, athletes will be tempted to risk their long-term health.	为了当下的名誉和荣耀，运动员们会受到诱惑而去冒损害长期健康的风险。


So, while Savulescu’s bold suggestion may reduce drug use, it will not end it.	因此，尽管Savulescu的大胆建议可能减少药物的使用，但却不会杜绝这一现象。


The problem is not with the athletes, but with us.	问题不在于运动员而在于我们。


We cheer them on.	我们为他们加油打气。


We acclaim them when they win.	我们在他们获胜时为他们欢呼。


And no matter how blatant the drug use may be, we don’t stop watching the Tour de France.	不论药物使用的问题闹得有多么不可开交，我们对环法大赛还是照看不误。


Maybe we should just turn off the television and get on our own bikes.	也许我们应该关掉电视，骑上自己的自行车。


Is “Eurabia” Inevitable?	“欧洲阿拉伯”不可避免吗？


What is it that makes young Muslims in the West susceptible to radicalism?	是什么力量使得生活在西方的穆斯林容易受到极端主义的蛊惑？


What is it about the experience of the West’s rising generation of Muslims that leads a small minority to see violence as a solution to their economic and political dilemmas, and suicide as their reward and salvation?	西方穆斯林崛起的一代的体验究竟是什么，从而导致一小撮人把暴力视为其经济和政治困境的解决之道、而自杀是它们的报偿和拯救呢？


Britain, which will soon mark the anniversary of last year’s bombings in London, provides a test case for seeking answers to these questions.	英国即将纪念伦敦爆炸案一周年。 它为寻找这些问题的答案提供了先例。


For young British Muslims, our globalized world challenges key beliefs, destabilizing their identity and thus encouraging a defensive response.	对于年轻的英国穆斯林来说，我们这个全球化世界对主要的信仰提出了挑战，破坏了他们的身份认同并且因此鼓励一种防备性反应。


British citizenship, of course, guarantees freedom of expression and minority rights, and young Muslims take full advantage of this.	当然，英国国籍保证了言论自由和少数人权利，年轻的穆斯林因此当仁不让。


Yet they are using this freedom to deepen family and cultural ties to the closed world of their inherited Muslim identity, particularly its politics.	但是，他们利用这种自由来加深与他们所继承的穆斯林身份的封闭世界的家族和文化、特别是政治上的联系。


In practice, this means that many young Muslims are utterly preoccupied with events in the Arab and Muslim world.	在实践上，这就意味着许多年轻的穆斯林完全专注于阿拉伯以及穆斯林世界的事件。


They see what we see: a region where autocratic countries seem corrupt and paralyzed.	他们看到的与我们的一样，那就是这个由专制国家构成的地区看起来是腐败而又陷于瘫痪。


But they also see an unprecedented level of hostility from the West, with regime after regime seeming to be either in peril or facing chaos.	但是，他们还看到了一种来自西方的、前所未有的敌意。 那里的政权一个接一个地风雨飘摇或者面临动荡。


Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and now Iran: all seem to be under attack as part of the “global war on terror.”	先是阿富汗、伊拉克以及巴勒斯坦，现在轮到了伊朗。 所有这些国家都在“全球反恐战争”中受到了攻击。


As a result, the West’s strategic choices appear inherently anti-Islamic to countless of its young Muslims.	结果，对于无数年轻的穆斯林来说，西方的战略选择看起来本质上是反伊斯兰的。


This preoccupation with the Middle East is at the heart of young Muslims’ politics in British universities, mosques, and websites.	这种对中东问题的专注是英国大学、清真寺以及网站中年轻穆斯林政治的核心。


Although most do not support Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, or the al-Saud family, they see hypocrisy in Western criticism of these leaders that is designed to manipulate and marginalize – after all, the West does not really want to push these regimes too far.	尽管大部分人并不支持巴基斯坦的穆沙拉夫、埃及的穆巴拉克或者沙特家族,但是他们把西方对这些领导人的批评视为伪善，其目的在于操纵和边缘化。 毕竟，西方并不真的想要把这些政权逼得太甚。


Access to the Internet, satellite television, and travel is drawing these young Muslims into a community that shares their vision and their rage.	接触到互联网、卫星电视以及旅游正在把这些年轻穆斯林拉进到一个具有共同世界观和愤怒的社区之中。


So technology is heightening the tensions that exist between the mechanics of a modern free society and the sense of a vast conspiracy against Muslims.	因此，技术正在突出存在于现代自由社会的机制以及加害穆斯林的弥天阴谋之间的紧张关系之中。


This has led to a schism between the hopes young Muslims have for successful lives in the West and their aspirations for their Muslim brothers and sisters, who have suffered so many terrible disappointments.	这就导致了年轻穆斯林对在西方的成功生活所抱有的希望和他们对那些饱经深深失望的穆斯林兄弟姐妹持有的抱负之间的落差。


As young Muslims in Britain (and across the West) try to maneuver between the various, and often conflicting, aspects of their identity, three clear tendencies have emerged.	英国以及整个西方的年轻穆斯林们试图在其不同的、而且经常是相互冲突的身份特征之间辗转之际，出现了三个明显的趋势：


A secular and pragmatic response, which makes Islam a private matter; A conservative stance that reconciles cultural, religious, and familial ties with ‘Britishness’; A radical response to the perceived collision between the foreign policies of their new homelands and the welfare of the Islamic world.	世俗的以及现实主义的反应，这样使得伊斯兰成为一件个人的事情； 调和文化、宗教以及家族联系与“英国国民性”的保守立场；


Messianic waves from the Middle East, reaching both schools and mosques, help draw young Muslims into radicalism.	对他们的新的国家的外交政策以及伊斯兰世界的福址之间察觉得到的冲突的激进反应。


One such wave is created by the hardline Saudi/Wahhabi education system, which is based on the concept of al-wala’ wa al bara’ , loyalty to the system and hostility to the infidels.	来自中东的对救世主的期待浪潮波及学校和清真寺，并把年轻的穆斯林带入激进主义。 其中的一个浪潮是由沙特瓦哈比教育体系造成的。


This curriculum, exported Westward by fat Saudi subsidies, is heavily punctuated with denunciations of the infidels and calls to jihad.	这一体系建立在对其制度的忠诚以及对异教徒的敌意之上。 沙特的大量补贴将这一教育向西方出口，其内容充满了对异教徒的谴责并呼吁圣战。


Designed to secure the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy at home, it is indoctrinating young Western Muslims with values antithetical to open and free societies.	这一教育目的在于确保沙特王室统治的合法性，向西方的年轻穆斯林灌输与公开和自由社会所对立的价值观。


Britain’s government is beginning to recognize the danger, and is trying to clamp down on schools and mosques that spread hate.	英国政府正在开始认识到这一危险，而且正在试图对传播仇恨的学校和清真寺予以打压。


Unfortunately, such repression has been merely reactive and shortsighted, with no clear long-term vision about the nature of Islamic education in the West.	不幸的是，这一镇压仅仅是被动的，而且目光短浅，对于在西方的伊斯兰教育的性质没有清晰的长远构想。


Thus, it merely feeds young Muslims’ fears that they are being singled out for persecution.	这样，这仅仅是在让年轻穆斯林们害怕，那就是他们被区分出来遭受迫害。


One difficulty with the British government’s response is that it classifies all Muslims as just that: Muslim.	英国政府的反应的困难之一就是把所有的穆斯林都划归到一种类别，即穆斯林。


By defining people on the basis of their religion, nuances – of national identity or of the degree of orthodoxy – are lost.	根据宗教确定人群就丢失了民族身份或者正统程度之间的细微差异。


This plays into the hands of radicals, because it makes Islam the central element of identity.	这样就正好落入了激进分子的圈套，因为这就使得伊斯兰成为人的身份的中心要素。


This process, indeed, is echoed in the 22 Arab countries, where religious orthodoxy rules out any significant liberal political opposition.	的确，这一进程在22个阿拉伯国家中得到了回应，那里的宗教正统排除任何重大的自由化政治反对派。


In such circumstances, the Mosque becomes the sole public space in which people can voice political views.	在这种情况下，清真寺成为人们可以发表政治见解的唯一的公共空间。


Politicization of the mosque has, sadly, also become the norm in Britain.	不幸的是，在英国，清真寺的政治化已经是通常现象了。


Islamic radicalization and terror need not continue to flourish in the West.	伊斯兰激进化和恐怖无需在西方蓬勃发展。


Regardless of their disappointments with the Western countries’ foreign policy, young Muslims have been exposed to their undeniable democratic spirit.	抛开他们对西方国家外交政策的失望不谈，年轻的穆斯林们还是接触到了其无可否认的民主精神。


They may now seek a deeper connection to their Muslim identity, but, having learned to question authority, they are unlikely to accept rigid parental or Islamic traditions.	他们可能寻求一种和他们的穆斯林身份更深的联系，但是，由于学会了对权威提出质疑，他们不大可能接受僵化的家长传统或者伊斯兰传统。


Like other young people around them, they want to be the agents of their own destiny.	就向他们周围的其他年轻人一样，他们想要掌握自己的命运。


This desire is changing Islam, especially in the West.	这种愿望正在改变伊斯兰，特别是在西方。


The basic texts remain the same, but their interpretation, and the application of religion in people’s lives, has not.	伊斯兰的基本文本没有变化，但是它们的解释以及宗教在人们的生活中的运用却发生了改变。


Young Muslims, particularly in the West, are setting an example that is slowly being echoed in the Middle East, despite massive state repression.	年轻的、特别是在西方的穆斯林正在确立一种范例，尽管中东国家予以大力压制，但还是缓慢地在那里得��回应。


The task for Western policymakers is to recognize the interconnection of foreign and domestic policies.	西方的决策者们的任务是认识到外交政策和国内政策的相互关联。


They must become serious about backing legitimate democratic representation in Muslim countries, for only then will Western policy seem less hypocritical.	他们必须认真对待支持穆斯林国家中和法的民主代表，因为只有那时，西方的政策才看起来不那么伪善。


They must also ensure that career choices are as open to their Muslim citizens as they are to everyone else.	他们还必须确保事业的选择像其他任何人一样也向穆斯林公民敞开。


In short, young Muslims in the West need to believe that democratic principles are respected abroad and applied equally at home.	总之，西方的年轻穆斯林需要相信，民主原则在国外受到尊重，而且在国内得到平等的实施。


Only when such a belief becomes general will despair stop fueling terrorism, and suicide bombing come to be viewed as an obscene calling.	只有在这一信念成为共识的时候，绝望才会停止激化恐怖主义，而且自杀式爆炸才会被认为是一种可憎的感召。


Is Europe on a Cross of Gold?	欧洲会重蹈黄金覆辙吗？


ROME – Increasingly, one hears predictions that the euro will go the way of the gold standard in the 1930’s.	罗马—现在，关于欧元将重蹈20世纪30年代金本位覆辙的传闻越来越流行。


And, increasingly, the reasoning behind such forecasts seems persuasive.	这一传闻背后的原因似乎极具说服力。


But does that mean that the euro doomsayers are right?	但这就意味着欧元的丧钟注定要敲响吗？


Following the 1929 stock market crash, Europe was hit by a massive deflationary shock.	1929年股市大崩盘后，欧洲又经历了严重的通缩冲击。


Output collapsed and unemployment soared.	产出剧减，失业率剧增。


Unable to agree on coordinated reflationary action, governments opted to move unilaterally.	各国政府没能达成相互合作、一起采取通胀手段的协议，而是选择各自为政。


One after another, they abandoned the gold standard, depreciating their currencies.	结果，各国一个接着一个放弃了金本位，贬值了本国货币。


By loosening credit in this way, they recovered, one after another, from the Great Depression.	通过这种方式的信贷宽松，它们一个接着一个从大萧条中实现了复苏。


Today, Europe has been hit again by a massive deflationary shock.	如今，欧洲再一次经历着严重的通缩冲击。


This time, the constraint on reflationary action is the euro.	这一回，套在通胀手段头上的枷锁是欧元。


Governments lack a national currency to depreciate, and lack the power to relax credit, having delegated monetary policy to the European Central Bank.	各国政府没有本国货币可实施贬值，也不能放松信贷，货币政策由欧洲央行代为执行。


As unemployment again rises to catastrophic heights, they will have no alternative, it is said, but to abandon the euro unilaterally.	随着失业率再一次上升至足以引发崩盘的高度，看起来各国别无选择，只能单方面抛弃欧元。


I wrote the book on Europe and the gold standard.	我曾写过关于欧洲和金本位的书。


Literally. In Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, published in 1992, I argued that the deflationary engine that was the gold standard was a key cause of the 1930’s depression, and that abandoning it opened the door to recovery.	在1992年出版的《金色的羁绊：金本位和大萧条》（Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression）中，我指出，金本位这一通缩机制是20世纪30年代大萧条的主要罪魁之一，而抛弃金本位打开了复苏之门。


Yet I am reluctant to believe that things will turn out the same way this time.	但我并不认为这一回历史会重演。


Four differences lead me to believe that maybe – just maybe – the euro will survive.	四大不同点让我相信，也许——仅仅是也许——欧元可以存活下来。


First, mounting an appropriate monetary response is easier when you have a single central bank.	首先，单一央行更方便实施合适的货币应对措施。


Under the gold standard, it still would have been possible for central banks to reflate their depressed economies had they moved together.	即使在金本位下，如果各国央行能够集体行动，仍然可以对萧条的经济实施通胀措施。


Unfortunately, getting central banks to move together is easier said than done.	不幸的是，让各国央行集体行动说起来容易做起来难。


Central bankers speak different languages.	不同国家的央行立场不同。


They view economic prospects through different lenses.	它们评估经济前景的着眼点彼此相异。


By contrast, were the ECB to adopt decisive measures, it could reflate the entire eurozone and obviate the need for countries to act unilaterally.	相反，只要欧洲央行拿出果断措施，它就可以让整个欧元区实现再通胀，使各国单方面行动不再必要。


But, while the ECB has the capacity, the question remains whether it is has the will.	但是，尽管欧洲央行能则能矣，为或不为则未可知。


A second difference is that, notwithstanding recent cuts in social programs, the unemployed receive more extensive public support than in the 1930’s.	第二个不同点在于，尽管最近以来社会保障项目有所削减，但失业者所获得的公共支持仍比20世纪30年代多得多。


This makes populist pressure to abandon the euro correspondingly less severe – the key questions, of course, being how much less severe, and whether the political center can hold. 	这意味着抛弃欧元的民粹主义压力将小得多，当然，关键问题在于这一压力能小多少以及政治核心能不能顶住。


A third difference is that the political preconditions for a cooperative response are better today.	第三个不同点是如今合作应对的政治条件要好于当初。


In 1931, France refused to help stem the Central European financial crisis because it believed that Germany was rearming, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, signed at the end of World War I. Political tensions between France and Germany may very well grow in the coming months and years, following François Hollande’s victory in the French presidential election, but they will not begin to rise to that level.	1931年，法国拒绝帮助阻止中欧金融危机，因为它认为德国正在重建武装力量，违反了一战后签署的凡尔赛和约。 奥朗德在法国总统大选中胜出后，法德之间的政治冲突可能会在未来数月到数年时间里逐渐激烈，但不会严重到当年的程度。


Moreover, European countries today are prepared to go to great lengths to save the euro, fearing that its collapse would jeopardize their single market.	此外，今天欧洲各国都准备倾其所有挽救欧元，唯恐欧元的崩溃危害到单一市场。


By contrast, when countries started abandoning the gold standard in 1931, tariff barriers had already gone up.	与此相对的是，1931年当各国开始抛弃金本位时，关税壁垒早已高筑。


There was no longer a single market to protect.	当时根本没有单一市场可供保护。


Finally, abandoning the gold standard was less disruptive than abandoning the euro would be.	最后，抛弃金本位的破坏性不如欧元。


Reintroducing national currencies today would take weeks, at a minimum, whereas Britain in 1931 could take sterling off gold while the markets were closed for the weekend.	今天，抛弃欧元重新引入本国货币至少需要几周时间，而1931年英国利用周末市场不开盘的时间就能让英镑脱离黄金。


Back then, countries still had their national currencies; they could simply stop supporting them.	当是时，各国仍然用着各自的本国货币； 它们所做的只是停止支持本币。


Bank deposits, along with most other private and public debts, were denominated in that national currency.	银行存款和大部分其他公私债务都是用本国货币计价的。


Today, these assets and liabilities are all in euros.	如今，这些资产和负债均是由欧元计价的。


Reintroducing the national currency in order to depreciate it, but leaving the euro value of other financial instruments untouched, would destroy balance sheets and wreak financial havoc.	重新引入本国货币从以实现贬值而改变其他金融工具的欧元价值，这将摧毁资产负债表，引发金融浩劫。


The alternative – converting those other instruments into the new national currency – would tie up the offending country in litigation for years.	替代方案——将其他金融工具也转换为新的本国货币——将使一意孤行的国家在未来多年中诉讼缠身。


Each of these differences casts doubt on the notion that the euro will go the way of the gold standard.	所有这些不同点都让人质疑关于欧元将重蹈金本位覆辙的观点。


But a fifth difference points in the other direction.	但第五个不��点正好相反。


In the 1930’s, countries could not act together because they could not agree on a diagnosis of the problem.	20世纪30年代，各国之所以不能集体行动，是因为它们对问题的判断无法达成一致。


Each attributed the Great Depression to different causes, leading them to prescribe different remedies, which they administered unilaterally.	每个国家所看到的大萧条原因各不相同，因此（单方面）开出的补救措施也彼此相异。


Agreement today on the diagnosis facilitates mounting a common response.	如今，对问题判断的一致性有利于采取共同应对措施。


Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that the medicine on which European countries have agreed – austerity – is killing the patient.	不幸的是，越来越多的证据表明，欧洲各国一致同意的药方——紧缩正在起到杀死病人的反作用。


There is now talk of adjusting the dosage, but talk has not yet given way to action.	现在关于调整剂量的声音已经出现，但并不足以转化为行动。


Will things turn out differently this time?	这一回会有所不同吗？


There is no question that the greater scope for cooperation that exists today bodes well for the euro.	毫无疑问，今天合作的空间更大，这对欧元是有利的。


But it is the precise policies on which European governments cooperate that will tell the tale.	但起决定作用的是欧洲各国政府合作实施的具体政策。


Is Europe’s Financial Crisis Over?	欧洲金融危机结束了吗？


LONDON – The European Central Bank’s recently announced policy of bond buying, what it calls “outright monetary transactions” (OMTs) marks a convergence of European central banks with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.	伦敦—欧洲央行最近宣布了自称为“直接货币交易”（OMT）的债券购买计划，这标志着欧洲央行开始向其盎格鲁-撒克逊同侪靠拢。


While the ECB’s actions represent the best chance yet to put an end to a crisis that has been playing out since 2010, the Bank has markedly raised the stakes for governments.	欧洲央行的举措代表着终结2010年爆发的欧洲债务危机的最佳办法，但也将显著增加各国政府的风险。


The ECB’s policy framework is well suited to fighting systemic blazes, but poorly suited to local fires, which thus can spread uncontrollably.	欧洲央行的这一政策框架很适合扑救系统性大火，但不适合局部火灾，而后者可能形成燎原之势。


The OMT program, which allows the ECB to buy sovereign bonds of countries that have agreed to reform their economies, significantly levels the playing field between the Bank and its advanced-economy peers.	OMT计划允许欧洲央行购买同意实施经济改革的国家的主权债券，从而让欧洲央行与其发达国家同侪站在了同一水平线上。


Spain has the same fiscal and structural problems that it had prior to the OMT program’s launch, but now it has an external lender of last resort.	西班牙在OMT计划宣布之前就存在相同的财政和结构问题，但现在，它有了外部最后贷款人。


That is a game-changer.	这可能扭转整个局面。


Under the pre-OMT regime, a capital outflow from Spain, whether through the sale of government bonds or the liquidation of private claims, resulted in tighter monetary conditions.	在前OMT时期的制度中，西班牙的资本外流——不管是通过国债出售还是私人债务清算——都会导致货币条件趋紧。


The sale of sovereign bonds under the fixed exchange-rate regime put direct upward pressure on their yields, while sales of private securities by foreigners had a similar effect, but through indirect channels.	在固定汇率制度下出售主权债券会形成收益率上升的直接压力，外国人出售私人证券也具有类似的效应，但渠道不同。


Monetary tightening was forestalled only to the extent that another source of foreign capital (either private or ECB) could replace the outflow.	货币紧缩将一直持续到另一种外国资本资源（不管来自资本还是欧洲央行）能够取代资本外流为止。


The point at which credit risk becomes exchange-rate/redenomination risk is ambiguous.	信用风险演变成汇率/重新计价风险的转换点在于何处很难确定。


But the metamorphosis tends to go hand in hand with localized monetary contractions that exacerbate the correlated risk of sovereign default and bank failures.	但质变总是与放大主权违约和银行倒闭相关风险的局部货币收缩有关。


In Spain, as in Greece before it, the monetary squeeze has become chronic as banks run short of ECB-eligible collateral.	在西班牙及之前的希腊，货币紧缩因为银行可用于欧洲央行资本品的资产不足而变得旷日持久。


Under the OMT program, the ECB can replace foreign outflows from sovereign-bond markets through direct purchases, putting Spain on par with non-eurozone countries like the United Kingdom.	在OMT计划下，欧洲央行可以通过直接购买将西班牙提升至与英国等非欧元区国家相同的水平，从而代替从主权债券市场逃离的外国资本。


And, to the extent that there is even an informal price target associated with the ECB’s commitment to purchase bonds, foreign outflows, at least from the sovereign-bond market, are automatically replaced, in full, with ECB cash.	此外，由于欧洲央行的债券购买承诺包括了一个非正式的价格目标，因此外国资本外流——至少是从主权债券市场上的外流+——可以自动、完全地被欧洲央行的现金代替。


Without the ECB’s willingness to buy a potentially unlimited volume of sovereign bonds to achieve its very imprecise objective of mitigating redenomination risk, the eurozone would have been doomed to recurring episodes of internal funding stress.	如果欧洲央行不愿购买实质无限量的主权债券以达到降低重新计价风险这一极不精确的目标，欧元区就注定会一再发生内部融资压力。


The OMT program breaks the volatile liquidity cycle that stems from chronic shortages of bank collateral and a limited fiscal transfer mechanism.	OMT计划打破了由于银行抵押品长期短缺和财政转移支付机制效力不足导致的高波动的流动性周期。


More broadly, the ECB’s marginal lending facility is an indirect means of monetizing sovereign debt.	从更广的角度看，欧洲央行的边际贷款便利在间接将主权债务货币化。


It is an even less direct way to address the private, related-debt overhang.	在纠正私人相关债务宿醉问题方面，它的效果更不直接。


But it works.	但它确实有效。


That said, much can still go wrong.	尽管如此，仍需小心避免犯错。


The ECB has bought time, but it has also raised the stakes.	欧洲央行已经赢得了时间，但也提高了风险。


The credibility of its pledge depends as much on what it will do (buy unlimited quantities of government bonds) as on what it will not do (buy them from countries that do not fulfill conditionality).	其承诺的信誉在很大程度上取决于它会做什么（买入无限量政府债券），但也以同样的程度取决于它不会做什么（购买不满足条件的国家的债券）。


Without a credible threat to cut off wayward sovereigns, the ECB’s pledge provides a free lunch to investors and governments alike.	没有对放任恣睢国家的可信威胁，欧洲央行就好比是在为投资者和政府提供免费午餐。


The problem is that following through on that threat would severely test the ECB’s commitment to do whatever it takes.	问题在于，完成这一威胁将严峻地考验欧洲央行尽其所能的承诺。


After all, if markets truly believed that the ECB would refuse to backstop errant governments, investors would run away from participating countries at the first sign that conditionality was not being met.	毕竟，如果市场真的认为欧洲央行将拒绝支持行为不当的政府，投资者会在一国无法满足条件的信号刚刚显露时就不再参与它。


As with its predecessor, the Securities Markets Program, the OMT program is legally and democratically questionable: it violates the spirit, but not the letter, of the European Union treaty’s no-bailout clause; its promise of equal treatment with private creditors still has no precedent; and it involves back-door fiscal transfers, leaving the ECB heavily exposed to political backlash – witness the visceral reaction of the German press to ECB President Mario Draghi’s announcement.	它承诺平等对待私人债权人，但这在以前从未有过先例； 它还包括一个秘密财政转移支付机制，这让欧洲央行暴露在政治风险之中——看看德国人对欧洲央行行长德拉吉宣布计划时所表现出来的真实反应就可略知一二。


But OMTs also fit well with a large body of historical evidence that, in times of crisis, policymakers must focus on extinguishing the fire, rather than negotiating over who owns the water and what its cost should be.	但OMT倒是与诸多历史记录颇为吻合：在危机时期，决策者必须专注于灭火而不是就谁拥有水源、水源应该价值多少吵个不停。


The OMT program will cause credit conditions to ease, but without necessarily reversing the financial balkanization of the eurozone that has occurred over the last three years.	OMT计划将放松信用条件，但并不一定能够逆转过去三年来欧元区金融分裂的趋势。


Reversal of that process will likely not occur until the three key elements of banking union – common supervision, common deposit insurance, and a common resolution fund – are within tangible reach.	逆转这一趋势在银行联盟的三大关键要素���—共同监管者、共同存款保险和共同清算基金——都切实具备之前是不可能的。


Indeed, if Spanish savers become truly afraid of redenomination risk in the interim, the OMT will not matter: they will just take their cash and deposit it as quickly as possible in, say, a German bank.	事实上，如果西班牙储蓄者真的担心在存款存续期间发生重新计价事件，那么OMT有没有都一样：他们会简单地尽快把现金和存款取出存入（比如）德国银行。


The eurozone is still prone to bad equilibria as long as growth on its periphery remains weak.	由于外围国增长依然疲软，欧元区仍很有可能陷入坏均衡。


Even with OMTs, there remain crucial differences between the eurozone and the Anglo-Saxon economies.	即使有了OMT，欧元区和盎格鲁-撒克逊经济也存在重大差异。


Fixed exchange rates within the eurozone impose a constraint that simply does not exist in the UK or the United States, and quantitative easing by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve is unconditional in nature.	欧元区内部的固定汇率便是一种约束，而这种约束在英国和美国内部是不存在的，此外，英格兰银行和美联储的量化宽松都是无条件的。


With OMTs, the ECB has converged toward the Fed in its ability to backstop each of its individual parts.	有了OMT，欧洲央行在支持各个体部分方面向美联储有所靠拢。


Whether that hastens or hinders political progress toward fiscal and banking federalism is the next big question.	而这将加快还是延缓迈向财政和银行联邦的政治进程则是下一个大问题。


In the interim, OMTs enable financial markets to start breathing again.	在此期间，OMT将使金融市场重新赢得喘息空间。


The acute crisis is over, at least for now.	危机的急性发作期已经过去了，至少现在如此。