European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet is well aware of this: in the early 1990’s, he confronted such a crisis as Governor of the Bank of France.	欧洲央行行长让-克劳德·特里谢深知这一点：在1990年代初，时任法国央行行长的他就应对过类似的危机。


Some contemporary observers of the ERM thought that there was an easy fix for these troubles.	当时某些汇率机制观察家认为这些问题不难解决。


If the central bank of the country that printed its “strong currency” (Germany) had been willing to provide unlimited support to a “weak currency,” things would have been sorted out.	只要那些印刷“硬通货”的国家央行（比如德国）愿意向那些“软通货”同僚们提供无限度的支持，问题自然迎刃而解。


Germany’s Bundesbank, it was suggested, would stand ready to buy “unlimited quantities” of lire or francs, so no one would dare to short either currency.	倘若德国央行时刻准备着购入“无限数量”的意大利里拉或者法郎，当然也没人敢做空这些货币了。


The notion of “unlimited quantities” was important: speculators would force officials to exhaust limited quantities, with the purchasing authority (the Bundesbank) eventually bearing the loss.	 “无限数量”这个概念其实相当重要：如果数量有限的话，投机者就可以迫使官员们耗尽这个数量，最终让购入机构（德国央行）蒙受损失。


Monetary support would lead to fiscal transfers, making limited interventions a non-starter.	而货币支持又可能影响财政转移，使有限干涉成为一句空话。


With unlimited support, by contrast, every single speculator could be quashed, and no loss would be borne (since intervention to support a weak currency would succeed).	而如果提供无限支持的话，每一个投机者都会被制服，也无需承受任何损失（因此支撑一个弱势货币的干涉手段也能获得成功）。


The only problem was that both the Bundesbank and the German government always fiercely resisted such an arrangement, on the grounds that it could lead to the printing of unlimited quantities of Deutschmarks, and thus stoke inflation.	但唯一的问题是德国央行和德国政府经常会强烈抵制这一安排，理由是这可能导致印刷无限数量的德国马克并催生通胀。


Instead, Europe developed the euro, which solved the problem of speculative attacks and monetary credibility by replacing individual currencies with a new one.	于是欧洲就创设了欧元这个新单一货币，以此取代各国货币并解决投机冲击和货币信用的问题。


It was impossible to short the lira or the franc because there were no more lire or francs.	既然里拉或者法郎已经废除，那么自然也无从做空了。


But Italy and France had to give something in return for this security: the ECB was made independent of all eurozone governments.	但意大利和法国也必须为这种安全保障付出代价：欧洲中央银行独立于任何欧元区国家之外，不受他们管辖。


Yet the current debt crisis has resurrected the old problem, with debt now filling the role that currencies played under the ERM.	但当前的债务危机却令从前的老问题死灰复燃，而债券则扮演了当年汇率机制中货币的角色。


Some eurozone countries borrowed excessively and have been punished by the markets, perhaps deservedly so, while others, in the resulting climate of anxiety, have become targets for speculators.	某些欧元区国家过度借债并受到了市场的惩罚，这或许是罪有应得，但其他国家却在忧虑气氛中受到了牵连，进而沦为投机者的目标。


On July 21, eurozone leaders agreed to make “more extensive” use of the new European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) by permitting it to purchase endangered eurozone countries’ debt in secondary markets.	在7月21日，欧元区国家领导人同意“进一步扩大”新欧洲金融稳定基金的适用范围，允许其在二级市场购入受灾欧元区国家的债券。


But the EFSF’s “more extensive interventions” recalls the “unlimited quantities” of foreign-exchange intervention proposed to rescue the ERM.	但欧洲金融稳定基金的“更广泛干涉”令人不禁回想起当年为拯救汇率机制而提出的“无限数量”外汇干涉手段。


If “more extensive” means piecemeal limited commitments that will eventually be exhausted, the scheme runs the risk of creating losses (just as the Bundesbank would have suffered losses had it engaged in limited defense of weak ERM currencies).	如果“更广泛”意味着零散的有限承诺将最终被耗尽，那么这一方案就可能有蒙受损失的风险（正如德国央行如果有限度地维护弱势汇率机制成员国货币的话就将承受损失）。


To rule this out, “unlimited interventions” would be needed.	为了避免这一点就需要实施“无限干涉”。


But with whose resources, and under whose authority?	但此举应当由谁出钱，又该听谁的指挥呢？


This explains the growing excitement about issuing “Eurobonds.”	这就解释了为何发行“欧元债券”的讨论会愈演愈烈。


The conversion of all eurozone national bonds into obligations jointly recognized by all eurozone governments is a replica of the solution to the ERM’s breakdown, which consisted in abandoning national currencies in favor of the euro.	将所有欧元区国家发行的债券转化成一种所有欧元区政府都认可的债券，这如同当年防止汇率机制崩溃方案的翻版。


This would cost Germany control over the quality of its credit, just as the replacement of the Bundesbank by the ECB implied Germany’s loss of control over the quality of its currency (though it was given a large role in designing the ECB).	但德国政府所付出的代价就是无法掌握本国的信用，正如当年废德国央行立欧洲央行导致德国无法控制其货币的成色一样——虽然作为补偿，德国在建立欧洲央行的过程中被赋予了更重要的角色。


What is missing in today’s proposals is the equivalent of the ECB’s independence, which ensured Germany’s participation in the euro.	但如今缺失的则是与欧洲央行独立性等同的机制，只有实现了这一点才能确保德国的参与。


It is no coincidence that one of the leading opponents – the ECB’s first chief economist, Otmar Issing – of the “unlimited interventions” policy under the ERM recently rebuked both the “extended-EFSF” and Eurobonds.	那么当年“无限干涉”政策的主要反对者——欧洲央行第一任首席经济学家奥托马·伊辛——最近又开始指责“欧洲金融稳定基金广泛干涉”和欧元债券就并非巧合。


The current proposals, Issing argues, are “undemocratic.”	在伊辛看来，当前这个方案是“不民主的”。


The concessions needed to ensure German participation are likely to be enormous.	为确保德国参与就很可能要做出极大让步。


With markets’ ability to monitor dubious borrowers, the guarantees will probably have to be institutional, constitutional, and political – probably formal control over European fiscal policy by a body at least as credible as the ECB, which would mean a dramatic reduction in the power of national parliaments.	这个具备市场般监控乱借贷者能力的担保人大概需要实现机构化，宪法化以及政治化——或许意味着成立��个至少与欧洲央行具有同等信用的机构来正式掌管全欧财政政策，而这又意味着极大削弱各国议会的权力。


Such radical changes would require the consent of all eurozone countries.	这样的激进变革必须取得全部欧元区国家的共识。


And the Bundestag (not Standard and Poor’s) would have to be happy.	同时又必须让德国联邦议院（而非标准普尔这类评级机构）感到满意。


Anything short of this is bound to fail.	一旦缺少了这一点，任何方案都注定半途而废。


Getting to \	学会和伊朗和解


There is a wise American saying: “If you are in a hole, stop digging.”	美国有句明智的谚语，那就是，“如果你在洞中，就不要再挖洞。


The six governments that are currently considering the next steps to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany – should heed that advice.	”六国政府，也就是联合国安理会五个常任理事国和德国目前正在考虑下一步的步骤来防止伊朗发展原子弹。


Otherwise, they could end up without any handle on the Iranian nuclear program, and only one – useless – option left, a military strike.	它们应当听听这一谚语，否则，它们在伊朗核问题上将会一无所获，而剩下唯一的一个无用的选择就是军事打击了。


Yet the six governments seem determined to continue with what has been their strategy so far.	但是六国政府看起来好像决心继续它们目前为止的策略。


Their condition for negotiating with Iran is a prior halt of its nuclear enrichment activities.	它们与伊朗谈判的先决条件是其事先暂停核子浓缩项目。


Only in exchange for Iran’s permanent renunciation of enrichment will they provide major rewards – from lifting all sanctions and trade restrictions to security guarantees.	只有伊朗永久性地放弃浓缩项目，这六国才会作为交换提供主要的奖励，也就是解除所有的制裁和贸易限制乃至提供安全保证。


This strategy has not worked and will not work.	这一策略并未奏效，而且也不会奏效。


Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which Iran is still a member, countries are entitled to engage in enriching uranium for civilian purposes, and Iran claims that this is all it wants.	伊朗依旧是核不扩散条约的成员国。 根据这一条约，各国有权进行民用核浓缩，而伊朗宣称它所要的就是这些。


True, Iran’s total halt of its enrichment program would be welcome, not least because its government has hidden these activities for almost two decades from Treaty inspectors, suggesting other than purely civilian motives.	确实，伊朗完全终止其浓缩项目将会是受人欢迎的，因为伊朗政府在过去二十年中一直向条约检查员们隐瞒这些活动，从而表明它所做的并非纯粹的民用动机。


But the issue of enrichment has been blown up into such a symbol of national sovereignty in Iran that no government there, not only the current Achmadinejad administration, will climb down.	但是浓缩问题在伊朗已经被抬高到如此一个国家主权的象征，乃至不仅仅是当前的内贾德政府，而是伊朗的任何政府都不会后退。


Indeed, when the UN Security Council formally demanded a stop to the enrichment program and imposed mild sanctions last December, Iran’s defiant answer was to increase enrichment activity.	确实，当联合国安理会在去年12月份正式要求停止浓缩项目并实施轻微的制裁之时，伊朗对抗性的回答就是增加其浓缩活动。


So what to do now?	那么现在又当如何呢？


The Bush administration, predictably, is pushing for new and tougher sanctions, based on an implied warning in the earlier UN Resolution, and arguing, as it did in the run-up to the invasion in Iraq, that the UN’s credibility is at stake.	人们可以预料得到的是布什当局根据先前的联合国决议中隐含的警告正在推动新的和更加严厉的制裁，而且正如其在入侵伊拉克前夕那样说联合国的信誉度与此息息相关。


But the only real test of UN credibility in this conflict is whether it can succeed in restricting Iran as much as possible to a purely civilian nuclear program.	但是在这一冲突中联合国信誉度的唯一测定标准是它能否成功地尽量将伊朗限制到完全的民用核子项目上来。


If the Security Council fails to agree on new sanctions – which is likely, given Chinese and Russian objections – it would be exposed as a paper tiger.	鉴于俄国和中国的反对，安理会无法就新制裁达成协议是可能的。 如果这样，联合国就会显得是一个纸老虎。


If, on the other hand, it works out a consensus on more economic and possibly even military punishment, the UN’s credibility would depend on whether these moves produce Iranian compliance.	如果在另一方面它就更多的经济甚至可能的军事惩罚达成一致，那么，联合国的信誉度将会取决于这些行动是否会让伊朗就范。


That, however, is unlikely.	然而，这一结局是不大可能的。


Tougher economic sanctions will not force Iran to comply; instead, sanctions will merely hit this oil- and gas-rich country’s trading partners.	更为严厉的制裁无法让伊朗就范； 相反，制裁只会打击这个石油和天然气储量丰富国家的贸易伙伴。


More threats will only push the international community further along the spiral of escalation and, possibly, into military action.	更多的威胁只会把国际社会进一步推向升级的旋涡，甚至可能是军事行动。


There are those in Bush’s entourage who would like nothing better.	布什身边有人就是想要这个。


While even a major air attack would fall short of destroying all of Iran’s nuclear installations and, moreover, leave the technical know-how intact, it might at least slow down the program for a while and serve as a warning to other potential proliferators.	尽管即使是一场大规模空袭也无法摧毁伊朗所有的核子设施，而且让技术诀窍毫发无损，但是，空袭可能至少在一段时间减缓核子项目并且警示其他潜在的核子扩散者。


But it is a foolhardy gamble.	但是，这却是一场鲁莽的赌博。


Today, Iran declares that it wants to observe the NPT, and that has no intention of building a nuclear bomb.	今天，伊朗宣布它想要遵守核不扩散条约，而且它并无意建造原子弹。


After a military attack by the United States, both promises would be history.	在美国军事袭击后，两个保证都将会成为历史。


If the six governments want to avoid the escalation spiral and curb the proliferation dynamic, they need to change strategy and objective.	如果六国政府想要避免局势升级并且限制核子扩散的动力，那么，它们就需要改变策略和目标。


Instead of making a halt to uranium enrichment the be-all and end-all of their effort, their central objective should be to subject the Iranian activities to as much verification as possible: if Iran wants to enrich, so be it, but it must accept intrusive international inspections.	它们所有努力的最终目标不应当是停止其浓缩铀，其中心目标应当是让伊朗的活动尽可能地接受核查。 可以放任伊朗搞浓缩，但是它必须接受严格的国际核查。


This is a bargain that the Iranians themselves have repeatedly hinted at.	伊朗自己也多次暗示想要达成这一协议。


The Six have refused because verification cannot provide an absolute guarantee against the diversion of some enriched uranium to military use.	六国加以拒绝，因为核查并不能够绝对保证不将某些浓缩铀转移用于军事用途。


But as the superpowers learned in the Cold War, the absence of airtight verification does not render inspections useless.	但是正如超级大国们在冷战中所了解到的那样，尽管核查并非无懈可击，但也不是一无是处。


They would still submit the Iranian program to greater restrictions than is the case today.	它们还是可以将伊朗的项目置于比目前更多的限制之下。


And such an agreement would open the way to a wider agreement between Iran and the West for cooperation and regional stability.	而这样的一个协议将会为有关伊朗和西方的合作和地区稳定更多的协议打开道路。


That is why the Six should stop digging a deeper hole.	这就是为何六国应当停止再挖更深的一个洞。


Instead of formulating new sanctions for the UN Security Council, they should use the next few months to explore confidentially what level of restrictions combined with verification Iran would consider in exchange for undisputed enrichment.	它们不应为联合国安理会制订新的制裁，而是应该利用今后的几个月来不公开地探索伊朗会考虑何种水准的限制辅之以核查来换取不受争议的浓缩活动。


By all means, the Six should keep the option of more biting resolutions as an inducement to Iranian compromise.	六国当然应当保持更多更为严厉的制裁作为让伊朗妥协的诱因。 但是那些现在呼吁安理会立即谴责伊朗的行为的人应当记住两件事情。


But those who now call on the Security Council to issue rapid condemnations of Iran’s behavior should keep two things in mind: they are unlikely to have any effect, and the US has already used such resolutions as a pretext for launching military action on its own.	第一，这些不大可能奏效。 第二，美国已经使用了这些决议作为擅自发动军事行动的借口。


Getting to Yes With Iran	伊朗攻略


WASHINGTON, DC – With the release of America’s National Intelligence Estimate, according to which Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons program, the prospect of military confrontation with the Bush administration dimmed.	华盛顿特区—随着美国《国家情报预估》的发布，伊朗与布什政府发生军事冲突的可能性已经降低了。 据该报告称伊朗已经中止了其核武器计划。


But months later, it is clear that the danger is not past, because Iran has not renounced the production of nuclear weapons, which its enriched uranium could eventually be used to fuel.	但危险还没有过去，因为伊朗并未放弃制造核武器，而它所获得的浓缩铀最终可以被用于该目的。


All parties need to find a formula to resolve the issue before it again threatens to erupt into conflict.	相关各方都需要寻找到一个解决方案，在这种危险演化成冲突之前将其化解。


Western diplomacy in recent years has focused on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as the key to resolving the crisis.	近几年西方外交的焦点是将伊朗总统内贾德作为解决危机的关键。


But this approach is a blind alley.	但这种策略走入了死胡同。


Let us recall the fate of Ahmedinejad’s two immediate predecessors.	让我们回想一下内贾德的两位前任。


Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005) tried to implement dramatic political reform, while Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-97) tried to open the Iranian economy to the West.	卡塔米(1997-2005)试图实行大刀阔斧的政治改革，而拉夫桑贾尼(1989-97)则企图让伊朗经济向西方开放。


Both failed, because Iran’s presidents do not run the country.	但两人都没有成功，因为伊朗这个国家并不是由总统主导的。


A solution to the nuclear dilemma – or any other problem in Iran’s foreign relations – is in the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.	核困境的解决方案—或者任何其他伊朗外交关系中的问题的解决方案—都由“最高领导人”哈梅内依决定。


Among his responsibilities, Khamenei serves as commander-in-chief of the military, controls the intelligence services, and appoints directors of the national media.	哈梅内依的还担任军队的总司令，掌控情报机构，任命中央媒体的负责人。


His appointees effectively control most ministries and Iran’s major cities.	被他任命的人有效的控制着大部分部委和伊朗的主要城市。


In diplomacy, Khamenei tends to operate in a clever but recognizable fashion.	在外交上，哈梅内依的行事方式总是聪明但又具有明显的个人风格。


He sends different diplomats into negotiations with contradictory instructions.	他派遣不同的外交官带着相互矛盾的指示去谈判。


Each claims to be acting with the Supreme Leader’s full authority, but ultimately are unable to make commitments because they have little idea of what Khamenei wants to do.	每一位都声称全权代表“最高领导人”，但最终谁都不能做出承诺，因为他们揣摸不透哈梅内依的心思。


After a time, they are removed, and a new set of representatives is dispatched.	每过一段时间，他们就会被免职，而新的一批代表又奉命出征。


In order to dominate decision-making, Khamenei prefers weak presidents.	为了主导决策，哈梅内依喜欢弱势的总统。


Ahmedinejad is no different.	内贾德即是如此。


His political base has faded, owing to Iran’s deepening economic crisis, which has been intensified by the conflict with the West over the nuclear issue.	由于伊朗不断深化的经济危机在与西方关于核问题的冲突中更加恶化，所以内贾德的政治基础已经削弱了。


His support in the parliamentary election next March seems particularly weak, which will no doubt please Western observers.	他在明年三月议会选举中所能获得的支持似乎特别有限，这无疑会令西方的观察家们高兴。


But the election results will not matter: parliament, too, has little influence over Iran’s foreign policy.	但选举的结果将是无关紧要的：议会对伊朗的外交政策也几乎没有什么影响力。


Some Western diplomats recognize the Supreme Leader’s role.	有些西方外交官认识到“最高领导人”角色。


In practice, however, Western diplomacy tends to ignore Khamenei, who sabotages any effort to get around him as the final arbiter of Iranian policy. This might partly explain why Khamenei has been mistrustful of negotiations with the West.	然而，在现实中，西方外交又常常忽视哈梅内依，这位会暗中破坏任何无视他作为伊朗政策终极裁定者身份的努力的领导人。


Westerners don’t seem to understand who is in charge.	西方人似乎不明白谁说了算。


Indeed, some analysts argue that former President Bill Clinton’s efforts to achieve a breakthrough with Iran failed because they were addressed to Iran’s presidents.	的确，有些分析家坚持认为前总统克林顿想实现与伊朗关系突破的努力之所以失败是因为其目标是伊朗的总统们。


The West should learn from the example of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who did not travel to Iran until he was allowed a direct meeting with Khamenei, during which Putin is reported to have made a proposal to end the nuclear stand-off.	西方应该向俄罗斯总统普京学习。 他直到被允许直接与哈梅内依会见才出访伊朗。


There has been no answer yet, though there does seem to be some recent movement between Russia and Iran on the provision of nuclear fuel for Iran’s controversial reactors.	据报道，在会谈期间普京提出了一个结束核僵局的方案。 虽然伊朗方面还没有回应，但最近俄方似乎有向伊朗颇受争议的反应堆提供核燃料的动作。


To be sure, Khamenei is reluctant to meet with non-Muslim foreign leaders.	确切地说，哈梅内依不太愿意会见非穆斯林的外国领导人。


But that shouldn’t stop the West from reaching out to him directly, or pressing him to publicly appoint the representatives who negotiate with the West.	但这也不应阻止西方直接向他伸出橄榄枝，或敦促他公开任命与西方进行谈判的代表。


One American politician who understands how to work with the Iranian power structure is former Congressman Lee Hamilton, now head of the Woodrow Wilson Center.	一位知道如何同伊朗的权力层打交道的美国政客就是前国会议员，现任伍德罗•威尔逊中心主任的Lee Hamilton。


When Wilson Center researcher Haleh Esfandiari was arrested in Iran, Hamilton wrote to Khamenei, pleading for her release on humanitarian grounds.	当威尔逊中心的研究员Haleh Esfandiari在伊朗被捕时，Hamilton给哈梅内依写信，请求对方在人道主义的立场上释放她。


Khamenei responded – reportedly the first time he answered an American – and Esfandiari was released in a matter of days.	哈梅内依回信了—据报道这是他第一次回应一位美国人—Esfandiari在几天之后即获释。


Khamenei would be hard-pressed to ignore a direct invitation from the US to negotiate on Iran’s most vital concerns.	如果哈梅内依无视美国就伊朗最关键的问题与其进行谈判的直接邀请，那么他将承受巨大的压力。


His clear priority is the Islamic Republic’s survival, not the fate of particular Iranian politicians.	很明显，他优先考虑的是这个伊斯兰共和国的生存，而不是某些伊朗政客的命运。


While Ahmedinejad’s apocalyptic vision makes it difficult for westerners to deal with him, Khamenei does not want to stumble into a military confrontation with the West, which would destabilize Iran and possibly lead to the regime’s downfall.	虽然内贾德启示录般的愿景让西方人很难与其打交道，但哈梅内依却不愿意跌入与西方的军事对抗。 这种对抗可能会使伊朗陷入不稳定状态，并可能导致该政权的垮台。


To resolve outstanding issues with Iran, the West should be dealing with the only person powerful enough to make deals and deliver concessions.	为了解决与伊朗之间悬而未决的问题，西方应该与唯一一位有足够的权力达成协议并做出让步的人打交道。


That person is Khamenei, not Ahmedinejad.	这个人是哈梅内依，而不是内贾德。


Ghettoizing Identity	少数民族聚居区的身份


PARIS – Once, as I picked up the Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen at his hotel, the receptionist asked me if I was his driver.	巴黎—一次，当我到诺贝尔经济学奖获得者Amartya Sen所住的饭店去接他时，接待员问我是不是他的司机。


After hesitating, I nodded yes.	一阵犹豫后，我点头说是。


Among my various identities that day, that of driver was the most obvious to her.	在我那天众多的身份中，司机的身份显然最符合她的看法。


This sense of multiple identities is something that Sen himself highlighted mischievously in his book Identity and Violence : “The same person can be, for example, a British citizen, of Malaysian origin, with Chinese racial characteristics, a stockbroker, a non-vegetarian, an asthmatic, a linguist, a bodybuilder, a poet, an opponent of abortion, a bird-watcher, an astrologer, and one who believes that God invented Darwin to test the gullible.”	这种多重身份的感觉正是Sen本人在他的著作《身份和暴力》顽皮地宣扬的：“同一个人可以是，比如说，一个英国公民，出生于马来西亚，有着中国人的种族特征，一个股票经纪人，一个非素食主义者，一个气喘病患者，一个通晓几种语言的人，一个参加健身运动的人，一个诗人，一个反对堕胎者，一个占星学家，以及一个相信是上帝创造了达尔文以便测试轻信者的人。


Only a minimum of introspection shows that our difficulty in answering the question, Who am I?, arises from the complexity we face in distinguishing between our many identities and understanding their architecture.	只有少得可怜的一些内省展示了我们在回答“我是谁”这个问题上的困难，这个问题源于我们在区别我们众多的身份和理解它们的架构时所面临的复杂性。


Who am I, indeed, and why should I accept people reducing me and the richness of my identity to only one of its dimensions?	我是谁，以及为什么我要接受人们把我以及我的身份的丰富性降格到只有其中的一个方面呢？


Yet such reductionism lies behind one of today’s dominant concepts, multiculturalism, according to which one of our identities must prevail above all others, serving as the sole criterion for organizing society into distinct groups.	然而这种降格的背后是当今盛行的一种观念，即多元文化。 根据这种观念，我们的某种身份必然盖过所有其他身份，作为把社会分化成各不相同的团体的首要标准。


Nowadays, we are often told that there are only two ways for people to integrate into a society: the “British” model of cultural pluralism, and the “French” model, based on acceptance of Republican values and, above all, the concept of equality.	今天，我们经常被告知人们只有两种融入社会的方式：“英国”模式的文化多元主义和“法国”模式，基于接受共和政体的价值观以及最主要的平等的观念。


According to the conventional wisdom, Britain’s social model is based on coexistence between different communities, with each continuing to observe its conventions and customs while respecting the country’s laws – an informal federation of communities.	根据通常的观点，英国的社会模式是基于不同群体的共存，每一个群体都遵循它自己的风俗习惯，同时也尊重这个国家的法律——一个非正式的社会群体的联盟。


But that common wisdom is grossly mistaken, because British law grants immigrants from all the Commonwealth countries something extraordinary: the right to vote in British elections, even national ones.	但是这种共同的观点在很大程度上被误解了，因为英国的法律授予了来自所有英联邦国家的移民某种特别的东西：即在英国选举中、甚至是在国家层面的选举中投票的权利。


Citizens know by experience that democracy does not consist in universal suffrage alone, but also requires a public sphere that is equally open to all.	公民根据经验知道民主并不仅仅存在于全体公民都拥有的选举权上，同时还要求向所有人都平等开放的公共领域。


In the United Kingdom, a large group of immigrants thus share with native Britons the right to participate in public debates on all matters of general interest, whether local or national.	在英国，巨大的移民团体与土生土长的英国人共享着参与公共事务的权利，在与大众利益相关的所有问题上——不管是地方性的还是国家层面的——进行辩论。


Because fundamental equality is granted in this way, the British system manages to cope better than others do with a greater expression of distinctive identities.	因为这种方式所赋予的就是根本性的平等，所以英国的体系在让不同身份的人更好地表达自己的观点方面比其他国家的体系做得更好。


Nowadays, however, Britain’s government itself seems to be forgetting the bedrock conditions of this British model by trying to satisfy the desire of particular communities’ for public recognition by officially promoting things like state-subsidized denominational schools.	不过，今天，英国政府自身似乎正在忘记英国模式的基本条件，他们试图取悦于特殊群体获得公共认知的需求而在官方层面推动像由国家补贴教派学校这样的事情。


According to Sen, this is regrettable because it leads to people giving one of their identities – religious, say, or cultural – priority over all others at a time when it is essential that children broaden their intellectual horizons.	在Sen看来，这是非常令人遗憾的，因为它让人们在孩子需要扩展他们的知识层面的关键时候把他们的某一种身份——宗教上的或是文化上的——凌驾于所有其他身份之上。


By embracing the kind of separatism that such schools represent, the British are now saying, “This is your identity and you can have nothing else.”	通过接受这类学校所代表的隔离主义的观念，英国人现在在说的是：“这是你的身份，你不能再有其他身份了。


That approach amounts to communitarianism, not multiculturalism.	”这种观念代表的是社群主义，而不是多元文化。


In the last few years, the “French model” has also been subjected to misinterpretation, due to confusion about its basis – genuine inclusion in the life of society, which means genuine equality in terms of access to public services, the social welfare system, schools and universities, employment, and so on.	在过去几年里，“法国模式”同样也受到了误解，这是源于对它的基础的模糊认识。 而它的基础是社会生活的真正包容，这就意味着可以平等获得公共服务、进入社会福利体系和大专院校以及获得就业等机会。


Republicanism grants each individual, regardless of his or her other identities equal rights in order to achieve universal equality.	共和主义给每一个人——不管他或她是什么身份——同等的权利，以获得全体的平等。


It does not deny distinctive identities and gives each the right to express itself within the private sphere.	它不否认个体不同的身份，并且给予每一个人在个人范围内表达其自身观点的权利。


The temptation of communitarianism, which the French have debated for at least a decade, comes from the wish to turn the failure of genuine equality into something positive. It offers integration by default within the differentiated space of various communities – a sort of imprisonment by civilization, Sen would say.	法国人至少争论了十年的对于社群主义的向往来自人们把在真正的平等上的失败转换为某种积极的东西的希望，因为它为各个群体存在很大差异的空间提供了一种缺席融合——一种文明所带来的禁闭，Sen会这样说。


But you cannot dress up failure in the clothes of success.	但是你不能为失败套上成功的外衣。


As long as urban areas are socially and economically deprived, communitarianism will only serve to mask the violation of the principle of equality.	只要农村地区还是在社会和经济上无法享受权利的，那么社群主义就只能掩盖对平等原则的颠覆。


Social groups are then measured in terms of their “ethnic” or “racial” differences.	社会群体因而也只能根据它们“民族”或“种族”的差异来衡量。


Because the social conditions of the “French model” have been so neglected, the model is now a living contradiction of its core principle: equality.	因为“法国模式”的社会条件一直以来被忽视了，现在这种模式与它的核心原则——即平等产生了鲜明的对立。


To reverse the trend, French republicanism must, like English multiculturalism, contradict itself in order to fulfil itself.	要逆转这种趋势，法国的共和主义必须像英国的多元文化主义一样站起来驳斥它自己以便实现它自己。


The French must recognize that equality before the law is a core principle, but a weak one; it needs to be complemented by a stricter vision of how to achieve equality.	法国人必须认识到法律面前人人平等是一个核心原则，但同时也是一个很脆弱的原则； 它需要依靠对于如何实现平等更严格的认识才能实现。


This vision should make republican efforts proportional to the importance of people’s handicap in order to free them from the burden of their initial conditions.	这种认识应该付出与人们的不利条件相称的共和努力来使他们摆脱他们的原始条件所带来的负担。


Genuine equality in the public sphere – which differs according to the values and history of each country – implies a minimal level of acceptance of a country’s history and values.	在公共领域真正的平等——这因为各个国家的价值观和历史而各不相同——意味着对一个国家的历史和价值观最低水平的接受。


Sen says that what is being accepted here should be thought of as national identity.	Sen指出在这里被接受的应该被认为是国家身份。


But this identity must be open.	但是这种身份必须是开放的。


It is an identity we share by living together and by what we have in common, whatever the differences between our multiples identities.	这是一种因为我们共同生活在一起而拥有的身份，并且应该是我们共同拥有的身份，不管我们不同的身份之间有多大的差异。


The great British novelist Joseph Conrad, born Józef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski to Polish parents in Russian-ruled Ukraine, said that words are the biggest enemy of reality.	伟大的英国小说家约瑟夫·康拉德，原名Józef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski，父母都是波兰人，出生于俄罗斯人统治下的乌克兰。


The appeal of “national identity” must not be turned into a collective smokescreen behind which inclusion becomes a disembodied dream coexisting with the communitarianism that is now emerging from its failure.	他说语言是现实最大的敌人。 对“国家身份”的呼唤绝对不能转变成一种集体的烟幕，在其背后包容变成了一种与现在从其失败中浮现出来的社群主义共存的脱离现实的梦想。


The IMF’s Next Test	IMF的下一个考验


CAMBRIDGE – In October, central bankers, policymakers, private-sector executives, academics, and representatives of civil-society organizations will convene in Washington, DC, for the annual joint meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	美国剑桥—10月，央行行长、决策者、私人部门高管、学者和公民社会组织代表将在华盛顿参加一年一度的IMF和世界银行联合会议。


Among the most important outcomes this year will be the IMF Board of Governors’ decision regarding how to address current international monetary issues.	在今年最重要的结果中，IMF理事会关于如何解决当前国际货币问题的决定是其中之一。


Global economic conditions remain precarious, with no signs of healthy GDP growth in the eurozone, a weak recovery in the United States, commodity-exporting countries like Australia suffering from diminishing Chinese demand, and an emerging-market slowdown that is now well into its third year.	全球经济仍然充满着不确定，欧元区GDP增长没有显露出健康信号，美国复苏疲软，大宗商品出口国（如澳大利亚）因为中国需求的放缓而遭受阻力，而新兴市场减速已经快要迎来三周年。


In such an uncertain environment, even small changes in advanced countries’ monetary policy can destabilize developing economies.	在如此不确定的环境下，发达国家货币政策略有变化也会动摇发展中经济体。


For example, the mere announcement in May that the Federal Reserve would “taper” its purchases of long-term assets drove down the value of emerging-market currencies.	比如，5月份，美联储仅仅宣布将“逐渐减少”长期资产购买量就导致了新兴市场货币贬值。


With the Fed considering exiting its quantitative-easing policy altogether and raising interest rates over the next year, global markets are set to experience significant turbulence.	美联储考虑推出量化宽松政策并在明年提高利率的，这将给全球市场带来巨大动荡。


The world needs strategies to mitigate this looming volatility.	世界需要减轻剧烈波动的战略。


The IMF – whose mandate is to maintain balance-of-payments stability worldwide – should be the institution that provides them.	IMF——其使命是维持世界收支平衡稳定——正是提供这些战略的机构。


Rather than waiting for a crisis to erupt before intervening, the IMF should provide “forward guidance” on how it will tackle potential disruptions in international financial markets.	IMF不应该等到危机爆发再出手干预，而应该提供“前瞻性指引”指导如何处理国际金融市场中的潜在波动因素。


Central banks are increasingly using such guidance to communicate monetary policy and anchor market expectations.	各国央行越来越多地使用前瞻性指引传达货币政策、锚定市场预期。


For example, the Fed has pledged to keep interest rates low at least until the unemployment rate falls to 6.5% – a move that has arguably lowered long-term borrowing costs.	比如，美联储承诺在失业率降至6. 5%之前不会提高利率——人们认为这一举动降低了长期借贷成本。


Likewise, Mark Carney, in his first policy action as Governor of the Bank of England, announced forward guidance for short-term interest rates.	类似地，马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）成为英格兰银行行长后的第一个政策动作是公布了关于短期利率的前瞻性指引。


Although the effect of such interest-rate guidance on the economy cannot be determined without additional data, there are many arguments in its favor.	尽管这些利率指引对经济的效果还有待更过的数据验证，但仍然获得了许多人的支持。


Perhaps the most telling recent example of a central bank using forward guidance effectively was European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s July 2012 announcement that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to ensure the euro’s survival.	也许关于央行前瞻性指引有效性的最能说明问题的最新例子是欧洲央行行长德拉吉2012年的承诺——欧洲央行将“竭尽全力”保证欧元的存续。


That pledge alone stabilized borrowing costs and dramatically reduced interest-rate spreads for struggling eurozone countries.	仅仅是这一承诺，借贷成本就稳定了下来，受困欧元区成员国的利差也大大降低。


Investors’ belief that the ECB would buy up government debt if bond yields rose too high was enough to restore calm; indeed, no central-bank intervention in secondary markets has been necessary since then.	投资者相信欧洲央行会在债券收益率过高时买入政府债务，这便足以让市场恢复平静，迄今为止欧洲央行从未在二级市场出手干预过。


The IMF’s policy tool here is the dollar amount that it is willing to pledge as a backstop in balance-of-payments crises.	在这方面，IMF的政策工具是承诺拿出多少美元来为收支平衡危机兜底。


By promising to intervene in vulnerable markets in the event of excessive financial volatility, the IMF, as the largest player, would reduce coordination problems among investors.	通过承诺在金融波动过大时出手干预脆弱的市场，作为最大行动方的IMF可以极大地减少投资者间的协作问题。


Moreover, by communicating ex ante its willingness to provide emergency funds, the IMF would reduce the stigma against countries that turn to it for assistance – a stigma that has led countries to delay requesting support until it is too late to mitigate domestic political damage.	此外，通过事前公布准备提供紧急资金，IMF可以减少向其求助的国家的耻辱感——这一耻辱感让各国迟迟不愿求助，直到为时过晚、造成不可消除的国内政治伤害。


The good news is that the IMF has already shown some interest in the idea of forward guidance.	好消息是IMF已经显示出一些关于前瞻性指引的兴趣。


At the annual meeting of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in August, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde suggested that the Fund would intervene to help emerging markets in crisis.	在8月的IMF杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）央行行长年会上，IMF总裁拉加德表示IMF将干预帮助陷入危机的新兴市场。


The bad news is that Lagarde’s vague announcement seems to have done little to shape market expectations or make governments more comfortable requesting IMF assistance.	坏消息是拉加德的含糊表态并不能形成市场预期或让各国政府在要求IMF援助时更加安心。


This underscores a fundamental point: successful forward guidance requires, above all, credibility.	这凸显出一个基本问题：成功的前瞻性指引最重要的条件是信誉。


After the US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, sparking a global financial crisis whose repercussions are still being felt, G-20 countries offered firm commitments to increase the IMF’s lending resources, thereby enabling the Fund to mitigate the effects of the crisis.	2008年美国投资银行雷曼兄弟倒闭并引发全球金融危机（其后果至今仍随处可见）后，G20纷纷做出了切实的承诺增加IMF的贷款资源从而使其能够减轻危机的影响。


Today, G-20 leaders must again use their influence over IMF policy, this time to push for timely forward guidance and another round of reform of the international financial architecture.	如今，G20领导人必须再次利用他们对IMF政策的影响力，推动及时的前瞻性指引和新一轮国际金融结构改革。


The Fed’s decision in September to postpone tapering its quantitative-easing program has given emerging markets some breathing room, which they should use to bolster themselves against the inevitable reversal of easy-money inflows from the US.	9月，美联储决定中止其逐渐减少量化宽松的计划，这给了新兴市场一些喘息空间，新兴市场应该借此对美国宽松资金流入之势不可避免的逆转未雨绸缪。


This is also an opportunity for the IMF to formulate and announce its policy to address global financial market turbulence.	这也是IMF制定并宣布其解决全球金融市场动荡政策的机会。


To be sure, there is no shortage of issues – such as poverty eradication, aid effectiveness, and international development – to be discussed at the upcoming IMF/World Bank meeting.	平心而论，在即将到来的IMF/世界银行会议上，有不少问题需要讨论——比如减贫、援助效率和国际发展。


But the failure of IMF leaders to produce a forward-looking strategy to confront impending market turmoil would undermine progress in all of these areas.	但IMF领导人没能做出针对即将到来的市场动荡的前瞻性指引在各个方面妨碍了进展。


The last thing that a still-fragile global economy needs is more uncertainty.	对于仍然十分脆弱的全球经济来说，最不需要的就是更多的不确定性。


Giving the Well-Performing State Its Due	给运转良好的国家应有的赞扬


MADRID – The triumph of democracy and market-based economics – the “End of History,” as the American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama famously called it – which was proclaimed to be inevitable with the fall of the Berlin Wall, soon proved to be little more than a mirage.	马德里—柏林墙倒塌后，人们一度认为民主和市场经济的胜利是不可阻挡的——美国政治哲学家福山（Francis Fukuyama）非常著名地将称之为“历史的终结”——但很快，人们发现，这纯属一种幻想。


However, following China’s intellectual pirouette to maintain one-party rule while embracing the capitalist credo, history’s interpreters shifted their focus to the economy: not everybody would be free and elect their government, but capitalist prosperity would hold sway worldwide.	然而，中国在意识形态上的长袖善舞——既坚持一党执政，又采用资本主义信条——让历史解读家们将注意力转向了经济：不是所有人都有自由选择自己的政府，但资本主义繁荣可以支配全世界。


Now, however, the economic tumult shaking Europe, the erosion of the middle class in the West, and the growing social inequalities worldwide are undermining capitalism’s claim to universal triumph.	然而，如今，经济动荡困扰的欧洲，西方中产阶级的衰落以及全世界不断恶化的不平等性问题正在破坏资本主义夺取全面胜利的基础。


Hard questions are being asked: Is capitalism as we know it doomed?	人们提出了诸多尖锐的问题：我们所熟知的资本主义注定要失败吗？


Is the market no longer able to generate prosperity?	市场不再能够制造繁荣了吗？


Is China’s brand of state capitalism an alternative and potentially victorious paradigm?	中国的国家资本主义大旗将取而代之吗？


The pervasive soul-searching prompted by such questions has nurtured a growing recognition that capitalism’s success depends not only on macroeconomic policy or economic indicators.	对这些问题的普遍而深刻反思越来越让人们感到，资本主义的成功只是凭借着宏观经济政策和经济指标。


It rests on a bedrock of good governance and the rule of law – in other words, a well-performing state.	它取决于良好的治理和法治精神——换句话说，即运转良好的国家。


The West overlooked the fundamental importance of this while it was fighting communism.	西方在与共产主义作斗争时忽视了这一点的基础重要性。


The standard bearers of the Cold War were not just the United States and the Soviet Union, but, in ideological terms, the individual and the collectivity.	冷战的对峙并不只是美国和苏联的对峙，从意识形态的角度看，还是个人主义和集体主义的对峙。


When competing in newly independent or developing countries, this ideological opposition became Manichean, fostering a fierce suspicion, if not outright rejection, of rival principles.	在新晋独立和发展的国家竞争中，这一意识形态的对立演变成了摩尼教主义，形成了一种对异端原则的根深蒂固的怀疑（如果不是断然拒绝的话）。


As a result, strengthening state institutions was too often seen in the West as communist subterfuge, while the Soviet bloc viewed the slightest notion of individual freedom and responsibility as a stalking horse for capitalist counter-revolution.	结果，西方人将加强国家机器一概视为共产主义做派，而苏维埃阵营将最轻微的个人自由和责任视为资本主义反革命毒草。


Leading economists have long argued that the West’s greater reliance on markets resulted in faster and more robust economic growth.	主流经济学家一直认为，西方之所以更依赖市场，是因为经济增长更快更稳的缘故。


But viewing the state and the market in terms of their inherent conflict no longer reflects reality (if it ever did).	但从彼此之间内在冲突的角度审视国家和市场已不再能够反映现实（如果一度反映过的话）。


Indeed, it is increasingly obvious that the threat to capitalism today emanates not from the state’s presence, but rather from its absence or inadequate performance.	事实上，日渐明显的是，如今对资本主义的威胁并不来自国家的存在，而是来自国家的缺位和表现不力。


Consider recent events in Argentina, which is facing certain economic losses as anxious investors have second thoughts about the country in the aftermath of the government’s nationalization of energy giant YPF.	以阿根廷最近发生的事情为例。 在政府将能源巨头YPF国有化之后，不安的投资者开始重新评估这个国家，因此阿根廷必将遭受经济损失。


That response is only logical, as investors seek the security of a well-functioning legal system to protect them from capricious political decisions.	投资者的反应在正常不过了，因为他们需要运转良好的法律制度保护他们不受政治决策反复无常的伤害。


Mexico provides further proof that the market alone is not enough.	墨西哥则是提供了另一个单靠市场并不足够的例子。


An efficient judiciary and effective policing are necessary for capitalism to thrive.	有效的司法制度和高效决策是资本主义繁荣的必要条件。


In Brazil, the government is daring, for the first time, to address the lawlessness of the overcrowded favelas that ring the country’s large cities.	在巴西，政府第一次敢于向大城市拥挤不堪的贫民窟缺少法律基础设施的现象开刀。


Or consider Ghana’s prosperity and how, like Brazil’s, it is going hand in hand with improved governance.	也可以想想加纳的例子，它的繁荣与巴西一样，与治理的改善同步发生。


At the opposite extreme, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s undermining of his country’s institutions, prodding it onto a narco-state trajectory, places Venezuela alongside Haiti as an exception to Latin America’s recent economic success.	反面的极端例子是委内瑞拉，其总统查韦斯破坏了原有的国家制度，大搞警察国家，结果委内瑞拉和海地一起错过了拉丁美洲最近的经济繁荣。


More generally, the world’s thriving countries are those with strong and effective institutions, backed by legal frameworks that guarantee the rule of law.	更一般地讲，放眼世界，繁荣国家皆有强大而高效的制度，以能够保证法治精神的法律框架为支撑。


Latin America and Africa are not the only examples that prove the point.	拉丁美洲和非洲绝不是仅有的例证。


The European Union’s internal problems, and its ongoing sovereign-debt crisis, are clearly linked to the weakness of its institutions, and, on Europe’s periphery, it still confronts feckless democracies.	欧盟内部的问题及其没完没了的主权债务危机显然与其制度疲软大有关系，欧洲外围国家民主制度不够坚挺也是原因之一。


Indeed, on Europe’s doorstep, the show trial and imprisonment of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko is jeopardizing her country’s international economic standing.	事实上，在地处欧洲边缘的乌克兰，对前总理季莫申科形式化的审判及关押正在危及该国的国际经济地位。


In particular, President Viktor Yanukovych’s contempt for the rule of law has put Ukraine’s relations with the European Union in cold storage, with a comprehensive free-trade and association agreement on hold pending the release of Tymoshenko and other political prisoners.	特别是总统亚努科维奇对法治精神的蔑视导致乌克兰和欧盟关系冷淡，全面自由贸易和合作协议也被冻结，在季莫申科和其他政治犯重获自由之前不会重启。


Meanwhile, political trials in Egypt are attracting international attention and deterring foreign investment.	与此同时，埃及的政治审判也吸引了国际注意力，外国投资者纷纷选择静观其变再做决定。


In Asia, China is exposing the fallacy of looking at state capitalism as a competing alternative to liberal capitalism.	在亚洲，中国的错误是将国家资本主义视为堪与自由资本主义相提并论的替代方案。


Approaching them as alternatives is, in fact, little more than an intellectual remnant of the Cold War, much like the concept of “state capitalism” itself.	事实上，这样的做法与冷战思维并无二致——“国家资本主义”这一概念本身便是如此。


With its remarkable ability to adapt, China is making strides to accommodate the rising power of its markets and people.	中国显示出了惊人的适应力，大踏步地容纳着其不断崛起的市场和人民的实力。


In the process, officials are acknowledging the importance of good governance, as demonstrated by recent efforts to justify the purge and investigation of Bo Xilai as an example of the Communist Party “safeguarding the rule of law.”	在此过程中，官员开始承认良好治理的重要性，最近将薄熙来撤职并进入调查程序便是中共“捍卫法治精神”的明证。


Adam Smith, that icon of market theory, argued that wealth is created when public institutions enable the “invisible hand” of the market to align interests.	市场理论的先知亚当·斯密指出，当公共制度解放了市场这一“看不见的手”，让它来协调利益时，财富就产生了。


The Cold War distorted that wisdom.	冷战是对这一智慧的扭曲。


In a world free of that era’s ideological constraints, it is time to say loud and clear that the future of capitalism is linked to effective governance and the rule of law, and thus to the consolidation of well-functioning states.	在一个摆脱了冷战时期意识形态束缚的时代，如今我们应该明白无误地大声说，资本主义的未来取决于有效的治理和法治精神，从而也取决于运转良好的国家的整合。


Giving Till it Heals	捐赠直至复愈


In my new book The End of Poverty , I show how extreme poverty can be ended by 2025, but only if the rich world follows through on its promise to help the poorest countries.	在我的新书《贫穷的终结》中，我说明了极度贫困将如何在2005年终结，但是只有当富裕国家履行了帮助最贫穷国家的承诺， 这种情况才会出现。


In order to thrive, and to foster the private-sector investment needed for long-term growth, an economy requires functioning health and education systems, investments in soil nutrients and water management, and basic infrastructure such as electricity and motorized transport.	为了繁荣并培养长期经济增长所需的私营机构投资，一个经济体系需要正常运作的医疗和教育体系，土壤养分和水资源管理，以及诸如电力和机动化交通的基础组织。


Yet the poorest countries, even well governed ones, lack the resources to finance these investments.	然而在最贫穷国家中，即使是那些治理较好的国家，都缺乏为此投资提供资金的来源。


Lack of adequate foreign assistance is one of the greatest disgraces on our planet, and the United States has been the biggest laggard of all.	缺乏足够的对外援助是我们这个星球最大的羞耻之一，并且，美国已经成为最拖后腿的一个。


It is urgent that the US wake up to global realities, and that it follow through on its commitments.	美国应当尽快醒悟，了解全球现实状况并履行完它的义务。


The most famous single promise by the rich countries has been to provide aid to the poorest countries equal to at least 0.7% of their GNP.	富有国家曾给出的最著名的承诺就是至少将他们国民生产总值（GNP）的0.


The commitment began 44 years ago, in 1961, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the objective that foreign assistance should increase significantly, “so as to reach as soon as possible approximately 1% of the combined national incomes of the economically advanced countries.”	7%用于对最贫困国家的援助。 这个许诺始于66年前的1961年，当时联合国大会将大幅增长外援助定为目标，“以达到所有发达国家经济收入的约1%”。


At the time, foreign assistance was about 0.5% of rich-country income.	那时候，对外援助约占富裕国家收入的0. 5%。


Despite the promises, aid continued to decline.	尽管作了承诺，援助却一直在减少。


By the early 1990’s, official development assistance was still around 0.33% of donor GNP, and by the early 2000’s, it had declined to around 0.22% of GNP.	到上世纪90年代初，官方发展援助仍然在捐赠国GNP的0. 33%处徘徊，到2000年初为止，降到了0.


Now it is roughly 0.25% of GNP.	22%左右。 现在约占GNP的0.


But the long-term decline in the ratio of aid to GNP did not stop the rich world from promising time and again to reach 0.7% of GNP, including at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the Copenhagen Summit on Social Development in 1995.	但是援助数额对GNP比例的长期下滑并没有停止富裕世界一而再再而三地给出达到0. 7%GNP的承诺，包括在1992年的里约地球峰会和1995年的哥本哈根社会发展首脑会议上。


At the start of the new millennium, the world’s leaders got together to adopt the Millennium Development Goals, the global commitment to halve extreme poverty by 2015.	在新前年开始之际，世界各国领导人齐聚一堂制定了《千禧发展目标》，即在2015年以前将贫困问题减半。


To implement these commitments, world leaders, including US President George W. Bush, met again in Monterrey, Mexico, to adopt the Monterrey Consensus on how to achieve the breakthrough from poverty.	为了完成这些任务，世界领导人，包括美国总统乔治W·布什，在墨西哥蒙特雷再次会面，就如何从贫困中寻求突破达成了“蒙特雷共识”。


The personal presence of Bush is notable, because the rich countries once again adopted the target of 0.7% of GNP, with the US being a signatory.	布什的出席颇为引人关注，因为富裕国家再一次通过了0. 7%GNP的目标，美国也在签约国家之列。


The US government often declares these days that it is not bound by any “arbitrary” numerical target such as 0.7% of GNP.	这些天，美国政府却经常申明它并不受到任何“武断的”诸如GNP0. 7%的数字目标的约束。


Top officials even declare that the US never signed on to such a goal.	高层官方人员甚至宣称美国从来没有在这样一个目标上签过字。


Yet the US and other countries did sign the Monterrey Consensus urging “developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7% of Gross National Product as official development assistance.”	尽管美国和其他国家确实签署了“蒙特雷共识” ，催促“那些还没有为拿出国民生产总值的0. 7%作为官方发展援助的国家做出实质性努力”。


It could hardly be more clear.	这再清楚不过了。


Alas, the US has shown absolutely no “concrete efforts” towards keeping this commitment.	唉，现在美国已经完全表明它不会对兑现这个承诺做任何“实质性努力”了。


In fact, US official development assistance amounts to just 0.15% of America’s GNP, which is less than one-fourth the global target.	事实上，美国官方发展援助只占其GNP的0. 15%，还不到全球目标的四分之一。


This contrasts with the 4% of GNP that the US spends on its military, roughly $500 billion this year.	这与美国今年花了约5000亿美元（约占4%GNP）在其军备上形成鲜明对比。


So the US spends around thirty times more on the military than it does on peaceful development aid for the poorest countries.	也就是说，美国在军备上的花费比它为最贫困国家所作的和平发展援助所花费的多出三十多倍。


From a global point of view, there are currently five countries that have reached 0.7% of GNP in aid: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.	从全球角度来看，现在有五个国家已经达到了占0. 7%GNP的援助水平，它们分别是：丹麦、卢森堡、荷兰、挪威和瑞典。


Six more countries, all in Europe, have recently set a timetable to reach 0.7% of GNP by the year 2015.	还有六个欧洲国家：比利时、芬兰、法国、爱尔兰、西班牙和英国最近也分别制定了在2015年前达到0.


They are Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.	7%GNP水平的时间表。


UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report in advance of the UN summit of world leaders in September 2005, has called on all donor countries to reach at least 0.5% of GNP in aid by 2009, and 0.7% by 2015.	联合国秘书长科菲·安南 在2005年9月即将举行的联合国领导人峰会之前的一份报告中，呼吁所有捐赠国在2009年前至少达到0. 5%GNP的援助水平，在2015年前达到0.


He also noted that countries like Germany and Japan that aspire to permanent UN Security Council membership have a particular responsibility of global stewardship in reaching the target.	7%水平。 他还指出，像德国和日本这样期望成为安理会永久理事国的国家尤其在全球参与完成此目标方面负有特殊责任。


Sadly, the ideological mouthpieces for the super-rich in the US, especially the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal , remain bitterly opposed to foreign aid, even if it’s just 70 cents per hundred dollars of income!	令人沮丧的是，代表着美国顶级富裕群意识形态的喉舌，尤其是华尔街日报的社论版，对对外援助保持坚决反对态度，即使它只占每一百元美元收入中的70美分。


In criticizing my book, a Wall Street Journal review said that I was calling for “Giving Till it Hurts.”	华尔街日报在对我的新书的评论中，批评我在叫嚷着“捐赠直至受损”。


But there is a limit to greed.	但是，贪婪要有所限度。


I am quite sure that The Wall Street Journal does not really represent the interests or views of many or even most of American rich people, including the millionaires and billionaires whose contributions to aid could make a huge difference for the lives of millions of people.	我很确信《华尔街日报》并不真正代表美国多数甚至大部分富裕人群的利益或观点，包括那些捐款能给百万人的生活带来非同凡响的变化的百万富翁和亿万富翁。


Many remarkable philanthropists, such as Bill Gates, are already leading the way.	许多声名显赫的慈善家，诸如比尔·盖兹，已经开始带头了。


I believe that few wealthy people would refuse to contribute a small portion of their huge wealth for the chance to save the lives of millions of people each year and help the poorest countries get the first foot on the ladder of economic development.	我相信，很少有富人会拒绝每年捐出他们巨额财富的一小部分来拯救百万人的生命并帮助最贫困的国家踏上经济发展之路的第一步。


They will know that they would not only save lives, but also contribute to a much safer and more prosperous world.	他们将明白，他们将不仅仅拯救生命，也在为一个更为安全繁荣的世界做出贡献。


Instead of worrying that 70 cents per $100 is giving till it hurts, our slogan in the rich countries should be “Giving Till it Heals.”	与其担心100美元中70美分会“捐赠直至受损”，还不如将我们在富裕国家中的口号变成“捐赠直至复愈”。


Global Action for Global Recovery	为了全球复苏，需要全球行动


WASHINGTON, DC – The global economy has entered a dangerous new phase.	华盛顿——全球经济步入了一个危险的新阶段。


There is a path to sustained recovery, but it is narrowing.	持续复苏之路雄关漫道真如铁。


To navigate it, we need strong political will around the world – leadership over brinksmanship, cooperation over competition, and action over reaction.	为了实现持续复苏，全世界都要拿出坚定的政治意愿——领导力必须压倒边缘政策，合作必须压倒竞争，主动出击必须压倒被动反应。


One of the main problems today is too much debt in the global financial system – among sovereigns, banks, and households, and especially among the advanced economies.	今日的主要问题是全球金融体系债务过多——国家、银行和家庭都是如此，发达经济体尤是。


This is denting confidence and holding back spending, investment, and job creation.	债务过多损害了信心，拖累了支出、投资和工作岗位的创造。


These countries face a weak and bumpy recovery, with unacceptably high unemployment.	这些国家面临疲软而不稳定的复苏，失业率一直维持在极高水平。


The eurozone debt crisis has worsened, and financial strains are rising.	欧元区债务危机深化了，财政困境越收越紧。


Political indecision in some quarters is making matters worse.	某些方面的政治上的首鼠两端让情况恶化了。


Social tensions bubbling beneath the surface could well add fuel to the crisis of confidence.	社会紧张正在悄悄膨胀，这大大加速信心危机。


In these circumstances, we need collective action for global recovery along four main policy lines: repair, reform, rebalancing, and rebuilding.	在这样的情况下，我们需要集体行动来提振全球复苏，主要包括四条政策路线：修复、改革、再平衡和重建。


First, repair.	首先是修复。


Before doing anything else, we must relieve some of the balance-sheet pressures – on sovereigns, households, and banks – that risk smothering the recovery.	只有一直困扰着复苏的资产负债表压力（包括国家、家庭和银行的资产负债表）有所缓解之后，我们才有能力做其他事情。


Advanced countries need credible medium-term plans to stabilize and reduce public debt.	发达国家需要拿出可信的中期计划来稳定和削减公共债务。


But consolidating too quickly can hurt the recovery and worsen job prospects.	但过快的整合会伤害复苏、恶化就业前景。


There is a solution.	我们有解决的办法。


Credible measures that deliver and anchor savings in the medium term will help create space to accommodate growth today – by allowing a slower pace of consolidation.	可信的提振并稳定储蓄的中期措施将有助于为今日的增长创造空间，因为这样的措施能减缓整合节奏。


Of course, the precise path is different for each country, as some are under market pressure and have no choice, while others have more space.	当然，具体做法每个国家各不相同，有的国家承受着巨大的市场压力，别无选择； 其他国家的空间则更大一些。


It is also important to relieve pressure on household and banks.	纾解家庭和银行的压力也很重要。


With respect to the United States, I welcome President Barack Obama’s recent proposals to address growth and employment; actions like more aggressive principal-reduction programs or helping homeowners to take advantage of low-interest rates would also help.	就美国而言，奥巴马总统最近提出了重振增长和就业的方案，此外还有更为积极的债务本金削减计划和协助屋主利用低利率的计划，这些计划都将有所助益，我对此十分欢迎。


And, in Europe, the sovereigns must address firmly their financing problems through credible fiscal consolidation.	在欧洲，各国必须切实通过可信的财政整合解决各自的融资问题。


In addition, to support growth, banks must have sufficient capital buffers.	此外，为了支持增长，银行必须持有充足的资本缓冲。


The second issue is reform, with the financial sector a high priority.	其次是改革，其中金融部门是重中之重。


On the positive side, we have broad agreement on higher-quality capital and liquidity standards with appropriate phase-in arrangements.	从积极的方面看，我们在高质量资本和流动性标准方面已经达成了广泛的共识，具体安排也已经获得了一定进展。


But substantial gaps remain and must be addressed through international cooperation in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage.	但还远远不够，我们还需要通过国际合作来避免监管套利。


I would also include the social dimension under the reform banner – particularly the need to identify and nurture sources of growth capable of generating sufficient jobs.	我认为，除了金融改革，还需要社会改革，��别是，我们需要识别并培养有助于充分就业的增长源。


This is especially important for the young.	这一点对年轻人来说尤其重要。


The third target of collective action, rebalancing, has two meanings.	集体行动的第三大目标是再平衡。 这包括两方面的含义。


First, it means shifting demand back to the private sector when it is strong enough to carry the load.	第一，这意味着当私人部门强劲到足以成为增长引擎的时候，需求源应该回到私人部门。


That hasn’t happened yet.	这一点目前还没有达到。


Rebalancing also involves a global demand switch from external-deficit countries to those running large current-account surpluses.	再平衡还包括全球需求从外部赤字国转移到拥有大量经常项目盈余的国家。


With lower spending and higher savings in the advanced economies, key emerging markets must take up the slack and start providing the demand needed to power the global recovery.	发达国家的支出将减少，储蓄将增加，在这样的情况下，关键新兴市场必须填补空白，提供全球复苏所需要的需求。


But this rebalancing, too, has not happened sufficiently, and if the advanced economies succumb to recession, nobody will escape.	但这一类型的再平衡也仍然不足，而若发达经济体滑入衰退深远，没人能够独善其身。


The fourth policy imperative is rebuilding.	第四大政策是重建。


Many countries, including those with low income levels, need to rebuild their economic defenses – for example, by strengthening their budget positions – to protect themselves against future storms.	许多国家，包括低收入国家，需要重建经济防御设施——比如强化预算状况——以保护自己不受未来动荡侵扰。


This will also help to provide the space for growth-enhancing public investment and important social safety nets.	这还有助于为提振增长的公共投资和重要的社会安全网建设提供空间。


In these circumstances, the International Monetary Fund – with its 187 member countries – is uniquely positioned to foster collective action.	在这样的情况下，IMF——及其187个成员国——就处在了引导集体行动独一无二的位置。


Our policy advice can help shine a light on the pressing issues of the day – growth, core vulnerabilities, and interconnectedness.	我们的政策建议能为当前重大问题（增长、核心脆弱性和相互关联性）提供指导。


Our lending can provide breathing space for countries in difficulty.	我们的贷款能够为受困国家提供呼吸空间。


And, looking beyond the crisis horizon, the IMF can also help construct a safer and more stable international financial system.	此外，危机结束后，IMF仍能帮助创造一个更安全、更稳定的国际金融体系。


This is no time for half-measures or muddling through.	时不我待，我们应该立刻停止消极应付和得过且过。


If we seize the moment, we can navigate our way out of this crisis and restore strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth.	如果我们能够抓住时机，而偶们可以安度危机并重建强劲、可持续且均衡的全球增长。


But we need to act quickly – and together.	但我们必须尽快团结一致，行动起来。


Do We Want Powerful Leaders?	我们想要强力领导人吗？


CAMBRIDGE – A trend toward greater authoritarianism seems to be spreading worldwide.	坎布里奇—一股转向更大极权的趋势似乎正在全世界蔓延。


Vladimir Putin has successfully used nationalism to tighten his control over Russia and seems to enjoy great popularity.	普京成功地利用民族主义收紧了他对俄罗斯的控制，并且似乎还很受民众支持。


Xi Jinping is regarded as China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, presiding over a growing number of crucial decision-making committees.	习近平被认为是自毛泽东以来最强力的中国领导人，主持着越来越多的关键决策委员会。


Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, recently replaced his prime minister with one more compliant with his drive to concentrate executive power.	土耳其总统埃尔多安最近把总理换成了更适合他集中行政权力的人。


And some commentators fear that if Donald Trump wins the US presidency in November, he could turn out to be an “American Mussolini.”	更有一些评论家担心，如果唐纳德·特朗普赢得11月美国总统大选，有可能成为“美国墨索里尼”。


Abuse of power is as old as human history.	权力的滥用和人类历史一样久远。


The Bible reminds us that after David defeated Goliath and later became king, he seduced Bathsheba and deliberately sent her husband to certain death in battle.	圣经告诉我们，大卫击败歌利亚并在随后成为过国王勾引了拔士芭，并故意把她的丈夫派上战场送死。


Leadership involves the use of power, and, as Lord Acton famously warned, power corrupts.	领导力包括权力的使用，而阿克顿勋爵有一句名言，权力产生腐败。


And yet leaders without power – the ability to cause others to do what we want – cannot lead.	但权力乃是让人们按照你的意图行事的能力，没有权力，领导人无从领导。


The Harvard psychologist David C. McClelland once distinguished three groups of people by their motivations.	哈佛大学心理学家大卫·麦克柯兰德（David C. McClelland）曾经用动机把人分为三类。


Those who care most about doing something better have a “need for achievement.”	最关注把事情做得更好的人有“成就需求”。


Those who think most about friendly relations with others have a “need for affiliation.”	最注重和他人的友好关系的人有“结盟需求”。


And those who care most about having an impact on others show a “need for power.”	最关注影响他人的人有“权力需求”。


This third group turned out to be the most effective leaders, which brings us back to Acton.	第三类人便是最有效的领导人，这又让我们回到阿克顿勋爵。


But power is not good or bad per se.	但权力本身无所谓好坏。


Like calories in a diet, too little produces emaciation, and too much leads to obesity.	就像食谱中的卡路里，太少导致虚弱，太多导致肥胖。


Emotional maturity and training are important means of limiting a narcissistic lust for power, and appropriate institutions are essential to getting the balance right.	心智成熟和训练是遏制自恋式权力欲（narcissistic lust for power）的重要方法，合适的制度则是获得正确平衡的关键。


Ethics and power can be mutually reinforcing.	道德和权力可以相辅相成。


But ethics can also be used instrumentally to increase power.	但道德也可以间接用来增加权力。


Machiavelli addressed the importance of ethics for leaders, but primarily in terms of the impression that visible displays of virtue made upon followers.	马基雅维利论述过道德对领导人的重要性，但主要是在可见地表现品德高尚的印象能吸引追随者的层面展开。


The appearance of virtue is an important source of a leader’s soft power or the ability to get what one wants by attraction rather than coercion or payment.	品德高尚的面貌是领导人软实力或通过吸引而不是胁迫或收买来让人按照他的意图行事的能力的重要来源。


Indeed, for Machiavelli, a prince’s virtues should only be apparent, never real.	事实上，对马基雅维利来说，君主的高尚品德应该仅仅是显眼的，而从来不真实。


“I will even venture to affirm that if he has and invariably practices them all, they are hurtful, while the appearance of having them is useful.”	“我甚至敢断言，如果他具备并一贯地实践所有这些美德，它们是有害的，而貌似具备它们很有用处。 ”


Machiavelli also stressed the importance of the hard power of coercion and payment when a leader faces a tradeoff with the soft power of attraction, “since being loved depends upon his subjects, while his being feared depends upon himself.”	马基雅维利还强调当领导人面临与吸引力的软实力的权衡时，胁迫和收买的硬实力的重要性，“受到爱戴取决于他的臣民，而受到畏惧取决于他自己。


Machiavelli believed that when one must choose, it is better to be feared than to be loved.	”马基雅维利相信，当你必须做出选择时，最好是被畏惧而不是受爱戴。


But he also understood that fear and love are not opposites, and that the opposite of love – hatred – is particularly dangerous for leaders.	但他也明白，畏惧和爱戴不是反义词，爱戴的反义词——憎恨——对于领导人来说是非常危险的。


The anarchic world of Italian Renaissance city-states was more violent and dangerous than that of today’s democracies, but elements of Machiavelli’s advice remain relevant to modern leaders.	意大利文艺复兴城邦的无政府世界比今天的民主国家更暴力、更危险，但马基雅维利的建议的要素对于现代领导人来说仍然十分重要。


In addition to the courage of the lion, Machiavelli also extolled the strategic deceptiveness of the fox.	除了狮子的勇气，马基雅维利狐狸的战略欺骗。


Idealism without realism rarely reshapes the world, but as we judge our modern democratic leaders, we should keep both Machiavelli and Acton in mind.	脱离了现实主义的理想主义很难改变世界，但我们在平价现代民主领导人时，应该同时考虑马基雅维利和阿克顿。


We should look for and support leaders who possess an ethical element of self-restraint and a need for achievement and affiliation as well as for power.	我们应该寻找和支持具备自我克制并且实现和结盟需求���亚于权力需求的领导人。


But there is another aspect of Acton’s dilemma besides the ethics of leaders: the demands of followers.	但除了领导人的道德，阿克顿困境黑油另一个角度：追随者的要求。


Leadership is a combination of leaders’ traits, followers’ demands, and the context in which they interact.	领导力是领导人的个性、追随者的要求以及它们之间的互动环境的结合。 担心国家地位的俄罗斯群众；


A Russian public anxious about its status; a Chinese people concerned about rampant corruption; a Turkish population divided over ethnicity and religion: All create enabling environments for leaders who feel a psychological need for power.	关注横行的腐败的中国人民； 在种族和宗教上陷入分裂的土耳其人口：这些因素形成了有利于具备权力需求心理的领导人的环境。


Similarly, to satisfy his narcissistic need for power, Trump magnifies the discontent of a part of the population through clever manipulation of television news programs and social media.	类似地，为了满足他的自恋式权力需求，特朗普通过巧妙地操纵电视新闻节目和社交媒体放大了部分人口的不满。


This is where institutions play a crucial role.	制度的关键重要性就在这里。


In the early United States, James Madison and the new country’s other founders saw that neither leaders nor followers would be angels, and that institutions must be designed to reinforce restraints.	在美国建国之初，詹姆斯·麦迪逊和其他开国元勋发现，领导人和追随者都不是天使，必须通过制度设计加强约束。


They concluded from their study of the ancient Roman Republic that what was needed to prevent the rise of an overweening leader like Julius Caesar was an institutional framework of separation of powers, whereby faction would balance faction.	他们从他们对罗马帝国的研究中发现，为了防止凯撒式的自负领导人崛起，需要制度框架来分割权力，实现派系之间的互相制衡。


Madison’s answer to the possibility of an “American Mussolini” was a system of institutional checks and balances ensuring that the US would never resemble Italy in 1922 – or Russia, China, or Turkey today.	麦迪逊对可能出现“美国墨索里尼”的解决办法是一个制度制衡系统，确保美国不会重蹈1922年意大利——或今天的俄罗斯、中国或土耳其——的覆辙。


The American founders wrestled with the dilemma of how powerful we want our leaders to be.	美国开国元勋着力解决了我们希望我们的领导人多么强力的困境。


Their answer was designed to preserve liberty, not maximize government efficiency.	他们的答案是设计保护自由而不是政府效率最大化的制度。


Many commentators have complained about institutional decay, while others point to changes – such as the advent of reality television and social media – that have coarsened the quality of public discourse.	许多评论家抱怨制度的衰变，而其他人认为变革——比如真人秀和社交媒体的兴起——影响了公共讨论的质量。


Later this year, we may find out how resilient the American founders’ framework for power and leadership really is.	今年晚些时候，我们或许可以看到美国开国元勋所涉及的权力和领导力框架到底有多大的韧性。


The Threat To Global Banking Standards	全球银行标准的威胁


LONDON – The financial crisis of 2008 gave a big boost to the global standard-setters.	伦敦—2008年金融危机极大地提高了全球标准制定者的地位。


Suddenly, the Basel Committee (which sets the standards for international banking supervision) was leading the financial news.	一夜之间，巴塞尔委员会（它负责制定国际银行监督标准）开始引领财经新闻。


Dinner parties in Manhattan and Kensington were consumed with the finer points of Basel II and the evils of procyclical capital requirements.	曼哈顿和肯辛顿（Kensington）的晚宴派对上充斥着关于巴塞尔II的细节和顺周期资本要求的弊端的闲言碎语。


Governments that had been suspicious of international interference were eager for tougher global rules to prevent banking crises from spilling across borders and infecting others, like bouts of Asian flu.	被质疑进行国际干预的政府急切地渴望更加严格的全球规则以防止银行危机溢出国界，像亚洲流感一样传染给其他国家。


The concrete consequences of this enthusiasm were the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), born out of the ashes of the Financial Stability Forum, at the G20’s London summit in April 2009, and inclusion of representatives of all G20 members among the key rule makers in Basel and elsewhere.	这一热情的具体结果就是金融稳定委员会（FSB），它脱胎于金融稳定论坛，于2009年4月在G20伦敦峰会上成立，其成员包括所有G20成员国的代表以及巴塞尔委员会和其他机构的规则制定者。


The G7’s domination gave way to the hope that broader membership would produce more comprehensive buy-in and stronger political support for increasing the banking system’s capital.	G7主导模式不再，人们希望更加广泛的参与能为增加银行系统资本要求带来更加全面的接受和更多政治支持。


All this change has worked, up to a point.	所有这些变化都起了作用，但作用有限。


The Basel III regulations, for example, more than doubled the capital an individual bank should hold, and enhanced the quality of that capital.	比如，巴塞尔III规则将个体银行的资本要求提高了一倍，并加强了资本的质量。


The system looks somewhat safer as a result.	金融系统也因此看上去更加安全了。


But now there are dangerous signs that the commitment to stronger global standards – indeed, to any common standards – may be on the wane.	但如今，危险迹象表明加强全球标准——事实上，是一切共同标准——的努力可能正在消退。


Many predicted this trend, but for the wrong reason.	许多人都预测到了这一趋势，但理由是错误的。


Skeptics warned that it would be far harder to reach agreement among 20 or more countries than it had been among the dozen pre-crisis Basel Committee members (mainly European countries, with only the US, Canada, and Japan representing the world beyond).	怀疑派警告说，在20多个国家之间达成一致要比在十多个危机前巴塞尔委员会成员国（主要是欧洲国家，其他地区的代表只有美国、加拿大和日本）之间达成一致要困难得多。


In practice, that has not turned out to be a major problem.	实际上，这并没有成为大问题。


Basel III was agreed far more quickly than Basel II was.	巴塞尔III获得一致通过耗时远比巴塞尔II少。


Political pressure from finance ministers, expressed through the FSB, proved effective.	财政部长们通过FSB所施加的政治压力证明是有效的。


In fact, recent tensions have been more old-fashioned, pitting the US against the eurozone, with the UK and others stuck in between.	事实上，最近的紧张局面变得更加似曾相识，美国与欧元区针锋相对，英国和其他国家夹在中间。


The US has been pressing for tighter controls on banks’ internal models, and for a limit on how much a bank’s models can reduce its assets on a risk-weighted basis.	美国要求更严格地控制银行的内部模型，并根据风险加权水平限制银行模型可以降低其资产的限度。


Agreement on these so-called output floors has so far proved impossible.	欧洲人认为他们的银行的企业贷款天然风险较低。


The Europeans argue that their banks’ corporate lending is inherently less risky. After all, EU banks lend more to higher-rated large companies, which access US capital markets, rather than borrowing from banks.	毕竟，欧盟银行更多地是向评级较高的大公司贷款，而它们能够进入美国资本市场，不必向银行借钱。


They also hold more low-risk mortgages on their balance sheets, in the absence of a European equivalent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (America’s two quasi-public mortgage banks), which hoovered up securitized US mortgages.	它们的资产负债表上的按揭风险也较低，因为欧洲没有房利美和房地美（美国的两大准公有按揭银行，它们为美国按揭证券化推波助澜）。


At its meeting in Santiago, Chile, in November, the Basel Committee conspicuously failed to agree on a solution, and kicked the issue upstairs to the committee of Governors and Heads of Supervision, which will try again in January.	在11月的智利圣地亚哥会议上，巴塞尔委员会引人注目地没能形成一致方案，而是将问题踢给了上级、监督机构首脑（Governors and Heads of Supervision）委员会，后者将于1月再次开会尝试。


They will probably find a way to thread this particular needle.	他们可能会找到办法穿过这根特别的针。


But the future for global standards looks more uncertain than it has for some time.	但全球标准的未来比此前一段时间看上去不确定性更大了。


Since the 2008 crisis, many countries, while ostensibly supporting the development of tighter global rules, have been taking other measures to protect their own financial systems.	2008年危机后，许多国家表面上支持制定更严格的全球标准，实际上却在采取其他措施保护自己的金融系统。


The collapse of Lehman Brothers and others showed, in former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King’s memorable phrase, that big banks are “global in life, but national in death.”	雷曼兄弟各其他公司的倒闭表明，用英格兰银行前行长默文·金（Mervyn King）令人难忘的话说，大银行“生是全球的，死是国家的。


In other words, when a global bank crashes, the host-country regulators must pick up the local pieces.	”换句话说，当一家全球银行倒闭时，所在国监管者必须为该银行在该国的部分“收尸”。


That’s why requirements to establish local subsidiaries, with local capital, have been adopted.	因此，凭当地资本建立当地分支的要求才被接受。


Gone are the days when banks could set up branches all over the planet, with support from the parent’s balance sheet.	银行可以凭借母公司资产负债表的支持在全球各地建立分支的日子已经一去不返了。


Subsidiarization is now the rule.	子公司化才是现在的规则。


And, looking ahead, we can see that the two biggest players in the FSB and Basel have other preoccupations.	而放眼未来，我们可以看到，FSB和巴塞尔委员会的两个最重要的行动方有其他问题需要分心。


Donald Trump’s incoming US administration has already signaled its suspicion of foreign entanglements and international commitments.	即将履新的唐纳德·特朗普美国政府已经表现出对美国涉足国外和国际承诺的质疑。


Making America great again is not likely to involve new enthusiasm for more intrusive rules made in Basel.	让美国重新伟大的观念容不下巴塞尔委员会所制定的侵略性规则。


Those who advocate rolling back much of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation, in favor of a higher leverage ratio, as promoted in a bill advanced by Representative Jeb Hensarling, envisage a “Made in the USA” version of banking regulation.	支持更高的杠杆率、撤销2010年多德-弗兰克金融改革立法的大部分内容的人——如众议员杰布·亨萨林（Jeb Hensarling）所提出的一项法案——着眼于“美国制造”的银行监管规则。


But, while the idea has some merit, it would not sit easily within the current Basel framework.	但是，尽管这一想法有一些道理，但难以与当前巴塞尔框架轻松相容。


Europe faces other worries.	欧洲面临着其他担忧。


Regulators there are now keenly focused on the implications of Brexit, which will require complex arrangements to manage a new relationship between London and the eurozone.	欧洲监管者目前全部精力都放在了英国退欧的影响上。 英国退欧需要复杂的安排来管理新的英欧关系。


The top priority for the European Central Bank must be to preserve the integrity of the EU banking union, which is under pressure from both Brexit and the crisis gripping Italy’s banks.	欧洲央行的最重要的工作必须放捍卫欧盟银行联盟的完整性上，英国退欧和困扰意大利银行的危机正在威胁这一完整性。


Against this background, it will be a challenge to retain the primacy of global standards and to secure continued buy-in to the Basel process.	在此背景下，保持全球标准的首要地位并确保继续致力于巴塞尔进程是一项挑战。


The Bank for International Settlements’ new general manager, Agustín Carstens, a former governor of Mexico’s central bank, will have a key role to play, as will whoever replaces Mark Carney (the current Governor of the Bank of England) next year as Chairman of the FSB.	国际清算银行的新任总经理、墨西哥央行前行长奥古斯丁·卡尔斯滕斯（Agustín Carstens）将扮演关键角色，另一个关键角色是明年将履新FSB主席的马克·卡尼（Mark Carney，现任英格兰银行行长）的继任者。


It is likely, too, that there will soon be a new Chair of the Basel Committee itself.	也有可能，巴塞尔委员会本身也即将诞生新主席。


Stefan Ingves of Sweden is due to step down next June.	瑞典人斯特凡·英格弗斯（Stefan Ingves）任期到明年6月到期。


These three new leaders will need all of their diplomatic skills to navigate treacherous political waters.	这三位新领导人需要祭出所有外交技能履政治薄冰。


The stakes are high.	兹事体大。


If the commitment to global standards wanes, everyone will suffer in the long run.	如果向全球标准的努力消退，长期看所有人都将受损。


Countries will impose incompatible local requirements, which will reduce the efficiency of capital utilization and make the system less robust in the event of renewed financial instability.	各国将实施互不相容的地方要求，而这将影响资本利用效率，也让金融系统在新的金融动荡面前无法保持稳健。


Putting Public Health on the Map	将公共健康编成地图


SEATTLE – Twenty-five years ago, the state of public health for large populations was like that of a doctor trying to treat a patient without a proper diagnosis.	西雅图—二十五年前，大人口公共卫生的状态就像是医生试图治疗没有得到确切诊断的病人。


The diseases and injuries that cut lives short and caused widespread suffering were not rigorously tracked.	导致短寿和大面积受苦的病痛没有得到严格的追踪。


Back then, well-meaning advocates for different diseases published death tolls that helped them make the case for funding and attention.	当时，不同疾病的初衷良好的主张者发布死亡统计，以此招徕资金和关注。


But when all the claims were added up, the total was many times greater than the number of people who actually died in a given year.	但当这样的做法越来越流行时，总数比给定年份的实际死亡人数还要多好几倍。


And even when policymakers had accurate data, it usually included only causes of death, not the illnesses that afflicted the living.	而即使决策者拥有准确的数据，也常常只包括致死原因，而不包括影响生活质量的疾病。


To address this problem, Alan Lopez and I launched the Global Burden of Disease project (GBD) in 1990.	为了解决这一问题，艾伦·洛佩兹（Alan Lopez）和我在1990年启动了全球疾病负担（GBD）项目。


Decision-makers need information about the world’s biggest health threats and how they have changed over time, across age groups, and by sex, so they can ensure that everyone has the opportunity to live the longest, healthiest life possible.	决策者需要关于世界最大健康威胁以及它们如何随时间、年龄段和性别的不同而不同的信息，以便他们确保所有人都有机会获得最长寿、最健康的生命。


By ensuring that each death is counted just once, and by providing comprehensive statistics on the causes of ill health, the GBD can compare the impact of cancer to that of lower back pain or depression.	通过确保每一例死亡只被计算一次，以及提供关于不健康原因的全面统计数字，GBD能够比较癌症和腰痛或抑郁的影响。


It also enables comparison of health-care performance among countries.	GBD也能够比较各国的医疗表现。


GBD’s 1990 study and subsequent revisions raised the bar for population health measurement, providing decision-makers with more reliable and useful information.	GBD的1990年的研究及后续版本为人口健康措施提供了标杆，为决策者提供更可靠、更有用的信息。


It also opened the international development community’s eyes to the importance of overlooked afflictions, such as mental illness and road injuries.	它还打开了国际发展界的眼界，着眼于被忽略的病痛的重要性，如精神病和交通事故伤害。


Donors such as the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation use GBD data to guide their investments, and more than 30 countries have conducted their own burden-of-disease studies.	世界银行和比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会等出资者用GBD的数据指导投资，30多个国家已开展了各自的疾病负担研究。


Countries such as Australia, Botswana, China, Mexico, Norway, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom are using GBD findings to inform health policies.	澳大利亚、博茨瓦纳、中国、墨西哥、挪威、卢旺达、沙特阿拉伯和英国等国家都在使用GBD数据指导卫生政策。


In China, the results of the GBD project, launched at a policy summit in 2013, raised awareness about the deadly impact of air pollution on the country’s population.	在中国，2013年的一次政策峰会发布了GBD项目的结果，引起了关于空气污染对中国人的致死影响的关注。


Those findings helped shape the Chinese government’s efforts to curb the negative effects of pollution on health, and Chinese researchers are now key members of the global collaborative effort.	这些发现影响了中国政府遏制污染对健康的负面影响的措施，中国研究者如今也成为全球合作的关键成员。


In Rwanda, when the GBD study revealed that indoor air pollution from cooking with solid fuel was a leading cause of death, the government launched a program to distribute one million clean stoves to the most vulnerable households.	在卢旺达，GBD研究揭示，用固体燃料烹饪造成室内空气污染是主要致死原因，政府据此制定了一个计划，为最脆弱家庭提供了一百万只清洁炉灶。


Rwandan scientists and officials from the Ministry of Health – including the minister herself – are important contributors to the GBD.	卢旺达科学家��卫生部官员——包括部长本人——也是GBD的重要贡献者。


Today, the GBD is constantly improving, thanks to the efforts of more than 1,300 collaborators in 114 countries.	如今，GBD在持续改善，这是114个国家的1,300多名合作者的贡献。


These collaborators improve the models on which the project is built, vet the study results, contribute new data sets, and communicate the results to media outlets, educational institutions, and decision-makers.	这些合作者改进了作为该项目基础的模型，核验研究结果，建立新数据集，并与媒体、教育机构和决策者沟通研究结果。


The latest GBD study revealed that another disease seldom discussed in international development circles, lower back and neck pain, is the fourth largest cause of health loss globally.	最新的GBD报告揭示，另一种在国际发展圈中鲜有讨论的疾病——腰痛和颈痛——是全球健康损失的第四大原因。


It also highlighted the rapid pace of epidemiological transition in middle-income countries and the persistence of communicable, maternal, newborn, and nutritional disorders in Sub-Saharan Africa.	报告还强调，流行病在中等收入国家正在快速转变，而可传染、产妇、新生儿和营养失调在撒哈拉以南非洲根深蒂固。


But the GBD could do more to inform policy debates and spur action to improve health if it were able to provide more detailed breakdowns of data.	但如果GBD能够提供跟详细的分类数据，它能够为澄清政策争论、刺激改善健康状况的行动作出更大贡献。


Policymakers are accountable, first and foremost, to their constituents, whose unique needs they must meet.	决策者首先要接受选民的问责，选民的需要必须得到满足。


Estimates of local disease burdens will be essential for combating afflictions like Ebola, checking the rising toll of non-communicable diseases in middle-income countries, and meeting the Sustainable Development Goals relating to maternal and child health in Sub-Saharan Africa.	对地方疾病负担的估计对于打击埃博拉等疾病、确认中等收入国家非传染病死亡以及实现有关撒哈拉以南非洲母婴健康的可持续发展目标来说至关重要。


To help decision-makers make better use of their data, the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, which I head, is creating geospatial maps of disease burdens with a groundbreaking level of resolution.	为了帮助决策者更好地利用他们的数据，由我主持的健康标准和评估研究所（Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation）正在以前所未有的决心编制疾病负担地理空间地图。


Creating these maps is possible thanks to methods developed by the Malaria Atlas Project, which has produced a better spatial understanding of malaria than we have for any pathogen.	疟疾地图计划（Malaria Atlas Project）所开发的方法所赐，编制这些地图是可行的。 疟疾地图计划让我们对疟疾病原体的空间分布的理解远远胜过了其他病原体。


Geospatial maps can pinpoint areas that are making outstanding progress, allowing us to identify communities that have done things differently from their neighbors.	地理空间地图可以指出正在取得重大进步的地区，让我们看到那些社区完成了与相邻社区不同的事。


These case studies can empower communities to replicate one another’s successes.	这些案例研究能够让各社区复制其他社区的成功。


One example is Cali, Colombia, which drove down homicide rates in the 1990s after the city’s mayor, Rodrigo Guerrero, tightened alcohol restrictions, introduced community-development programs in the most impoverished neighborhoods, and imposed temporary gun bans in public places.	一个例子是哥伦比亚卡利市，20世纪90年代，该市市长罗德里格·格雷罗（Rodrigo Guerrero）加紧了酒精控制，在大部分贫困社区引入了社区发展计划，并实施公共场合临时禁枪令，结果，卡利市谋杀率成功下降。


The mayor of Colombia’s capital, Bogota, learned about the program in Cali and implemented similar measures, which have helped reduce homicides steadily in the city.	哥伦比亚首都波哥大市市长学习了卡利的经验，实施了类似的措施，结果波哥大市谋杀率也稳步下降。


Since then, Guerrero has worked with the Inter-American Development Bank to develop programs that help other Latin American countries reduce violence in their communities.	此后，格雷罗与泛美开发银行合作制定计划，帮助其他拉美国家降低了社区暴力。


In 2014, Guerrero won the Roux Prize for his use of data to improve health, further elevating awareness of his work.	2014年，格雷罗因为利用数据改善健康状况而获得鲁克斯奖（Roux Prize），这进一步提升了他的工作的知名度。


Geospatial mapping will help us identify more Rodrigo Guerreros and champion their achievements.	编制地理空间地图有助于我们发现更多的罗德里格·格雷罗，推广他们的成果。


As the international community comes together to agree on the tools needed to finance and monitor progress toward the MDGs’ successor framework, the Sustainable Development Goals, geospatial mapping will be critical for tracking progress and indicating where course corrections might be needed.	随着国际社会齐聚一堂、商定通往MDG的后续框架——可持续发展目标所需要的金融和监控进步，编制地理空间地图将是跟踪进步、指出哪里可能需要修正方向的关键。


We are far beyond where we were in 1990 in terms of health measurement.	从衡量健康状况的角度，我们已经大大超越了1990年的水平。


With focused effort and further innovation, we can make even more progress in the next 25 years to help the world make the most of our collective health investments.	我们关注于实干和进一步创新，能够在未来25年取得更大进步，帮助世界做出大部分集体健康投资。


Making Climate Promises Count	兑现气候承诺


OTTAWA – This year will be one of the warmest on record.	渥太华——今年将是有记录以来最温暖的一年。


Over the last decade, greenhouse-gas emissions have accelerated, and the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased in the past year at the fastest rate in nearly three decades, reaching a level that is 15% higher than in 1990.	过去十年来，温室气体的排放速度已经加快，过去一年大气中二氧化碳浓度的增速比20世纪90年代高出15%，达到近三十年来的顶点。


As the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emphasizes, the disconnect between an intensifying climate crisis and stalled international negotiations has never been greater.	正像政府间气候变化专门委员会（IPCC）最新报告所强调的那样，气候危机加剧和国际谈判停滞之间的脱节也达到历史顶点。


Needless to say, a lot is riding on next year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, which could shape strategies to reduce global greenhouse-gas emissions until 2050.	毋庸讳言，明年将在巴黎举行的 联合国气候变化大会极为重要，有效期到2050年的削减全球温室气体排放战略将在此次峰会上成形。


But the summit is unlikely to deliver the global agreement that is so badly needed, unless world leaders broaden their focus to include not only emissions reduction, but also carbon pricing.	但本次峰会不太可能达成迫切需要的全球协议，除非各国领导人将工作重点从单纯的减排拓展到碳排放定价。


A growing number of experts – including those at the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, and the World Bank – agree that no climate plan can be successful without an effective and efficient carbon-pricing system.	越来越多专家——包括国际货币基金组织、经合组织和世界银行的专家——认可没有高效的碳定价机制气候计划就不可能成功。


The IPCC has concluded that if a single global carbon price is not established soon, it will be virtually impossible to prevent global warming from surpassing 2ºC above preindustrial levels – the threshold beyond which the most devastating effects of climate change would become unavoidable.	政府间气候变化专门委员会认定如果不迅速建立统一的全球碳定价机制，阻止全球变暖超过工业化前2ºC的目标就几乎不可能完成——而气候变化一旦越过这道门槛，最具破坏性的影响将会不可避免地发生。


The one-dimensional approach based exclusively on emissions-reduction targets is preventing even the regions that have been most active on climate change, such as the European Union, from making sufficient progress.	单纯以碳减排目标为基础的一维法则正在阻碍哪怕如欧盟等应对气候变化最积极的地区取得长足进步。


Yet, in late October, EU member states agreed on a new policy framework for climate and energy for 2030 – one that, like the EU’s 2020 climate and energy package, lacks a solid foundation.	但十月下旬，欧盟成员国商定了2030年 气候与能源全新政策框架——该框架与 欧盟2020年气候与能源一揽子计划相似，缺乏赖以存在的坚实的基础。


The EU’s established goal of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 40% by 2030 is supported only by non-binding energy-efficiency and renewable-energy targets.	欧盟2030年削减温室气体排放40%的目标只能靠非强制性能源效率和可再生能源目标的支撑。


Devoid of true carbon-pricing reform, the deal depends on the EU’s derelict Emissions Trading System.	没有真正意义上的碳定价改革，计划的实施只能依靠欧盟废弃的碳排放交易机制。


The result is a set of impressive-sounding commitments without instruments for effective implementation.	结果是一堆冠冕堂皇的承诺，但却缺乏有效的手段加以实施。


The same can be said of the widely touted new bilateral agreement between the United States and China, the world’s two largest carbon emitters.	美中这两个世界最大碳排放国新订立的双边协议也是如此。


Given the deadlock that previously prevailed, the deal represents welcome progress; but it, too, lacks adequate instruments to support its ambitions.	鉴于此前曾经陷入僵局，这份协议取得的进展令人欢欣鼓舞； 但这份协议同样缺乏充分的手段来支持其实现目标。


The Paris summit next year needs to produce a more substantial agreement, with national emissions-reduction targets underpinned by adequate and coordinated tools for implementation, including a trial global carbon price.	明年举行的巴黎峰会需要达成更具实质内容的协议，采取包括试行全球碳定价在内的统一有效手段来支持国家实现减排目标。


On an issue as urgent as climate change, there simply is no room for ambiguity.	在像气候变化这样万分紧迫的问题上，我们绝对不该闪烁其词。


The first step toward creating such an agreement is to initiate a debate, supported by academic research and scientific evidence, aimed at determining a desirable global carbon price and outlining the linkages between current and future prices, taking into account equity, efficiency, and effectiveness.	发起由学术研究和科学证据支持的辩论是签署上述协议的首要一步，旨在确保公平、效率和效益的基础上，确定合理的全球碳定价和当前及未来价格间的关系。


Such a debate – not emissions-reduction targets guaranteed only by states’ “political will” – will be the mark of a successful summit.	这样的辩论——而不仅仅是由国家“政治意愿”担保的节能减排目标——将被视为峰会成功的标志。


In fact, no outcome would be worse than a “feel-good” agreement composed of vague, unenforceable targets.	事实上，最糟的结果莫过于达成由无法落实的模糊目标构成的“感觉良好”的协议。


The US government’s recent statements in favor of a “political” agreement rather than a “legally binding” accord is yet another indication that official declarations alone will produce precisely such a result.	美国政府最近支持“政治”协议而非“有法律约束力”的协议的表态再次证明单靠官方声明恰恰会产生这样的���果。


In the longer term, a constructive debate in Paris on an appropriate global carbon price could pave the way for the development of a new, polycentric approach to climate governance that would value territorial and local initiatives, in addition to national efforts.	从长远看，在巴黎举行有关制定全球合理碳价格的建设性讨论可以为确立多中心的气候治理方式铺路，上述方式在注重区域和地方主观能动性的同时还强调加强各国的不懈努力。


At that point, discrete carbon prices could gradually converge toward a single price, as has occurred with prices for commodities like oil.	届时独立碳价可能会像石油商品价格一样逐渐趋于统一。


EU leaders often boast to their global partners of their commitment to mitigating climate change.	欧盟领导人常常在全球伙伴面前炫耀其在缓解气候变化方面的承诺。


And they may be right.	也许他们并没有错。


But, so far, the EU has stood out more because the rest of the world is lagging than because it has designed a truly effective strategy to address the problem; its recently concluded agreement could actually serve as a counter-model for next year’s summit.	但到目前为止，欧盟各国表现相对突出仅仅是因为其他国家太过落后，而并非因为欧盟制定了真正有效的战略来解决气候变化问题； 欧盟最近达成的协议甚至可以在明年峰会上被当作反面典型。


The price of carbon effectively amounts to the price of human wellbeing on this planet.	碳价格实际等同于人类在这个星球上的福祉。


If Europe truly wants to lead the fight against climate change, it should bring the issue of a harmonized carbon-pricing system to the negotiating table in Paris.	如果欧盟真想领导应对气候变化的斗争，就应当在巴黎的谈判桌上谈判统一的碳定价机制。


In doing so, it would launch a critical shift toward a comprehensive and, for the first time, effective climate agreement.	欧盟这样做能启动一次关键的过渡，首次签署全面而有效的气候变化协议。


The Crisis of Our Crises	危机的危机


PRINCETON – At first glance, today’s major international crises seem to have little in common.	普林斯顿——乍看上去，今天的主要国际危机似乎各有不同。 有些，比方说希腊债务闹剧，属于经济灾难；


Some, such as Greece’s debt drama, are economic disasters; others, like Syria’s implosion, are characterized by brutality and political chaos; and still others, most notably Ukraine’s predicament, fall somewhere in between.	其他，比方说叙利亚的国内崩溃，则属于暴力和政治混乱的范畴； 还有些，尤其是乌克兰困境，介乎于两者之间。


But, despite what policymakers might like to believe, these events are not unrelated.	但不管决策者怎么想，上述事件却并非毫无关联。


On the contrary, they reflect a deeper crisis of international integration and cooperation.	相反，它们从深层次上反映了国际一体化与合作的危机。


Over the last 60 years, the world experienced unprecedented peace and prosperity for a simple reason: countries voluntarily integrated themselves into an international community underpinned by shared rules and norms.	过去60年来，世界经历了前所未有的和平与繁荣。 原因非常简单：国家主动与共同规则和规范基础上的国际社会相融合。


But this trend has given way to piecemeal crisis responses, whether austerity or localized damage control, that are based on the unreasonable assumption that problems like those in Greece, Syria, and Ukraine will eventually correct themselves.	但上述趋势已经被零散的危机应对所取代，无论紧缩政策还是局部损害控制，都是基于希腊、叙利亚和乌克兰问题最终能够自我修正的不合情理的假设。


In relying on stopgap measures to address crises, global leaders seem to have forgotten how interdependent the world has become.	在依靠临时措施解决危机时，全球领导人似乎已经忘记了世界是怎样相互依存的。


Upheaval or stagnation in one part of a complex system can have outsize consequences elsewhere, in the form of, say, a refugee crisis or an uptick in inequality.	复杂系统中某部分的动荡或停滞可以在其他地方以难民危机或不平等加剧等形式产生巨大的影响。


For example, Europe’s malaise – which has persisted partly because its leaders have insisted on muddling through, rather than seeking comprehensive solutions – has had serious consequences for Ukraine, a country teetering on the edge of a meltdown.	举例来讲，欧洲的痼疾——部分因领导人拒绝寻求全面方案而坚持得过且过才长期存在——已经为濒临崩溃的乌克兰带来了严重后果。


By the end of this year, Ukraine’s economy is expected to be 15% smaller than it was 2013, and its debt-to-GDP ratio may be near 200%, exceeding Greece’s at its worst.	到今年底，乌克兰经济预计将比2013年收缩15%，其债务占GDP的比重可能接近200%，超过希腊最差时期的状况。


And the security situation in the eastern part of the country is deteriorating.	该国东部的安全局势正在恶化中。


Creditors cannot be expected to be any more lenient with Ukraine than they have been with Greece, a member of the eurozone.	人们无法指望债权人对乌克兰会比对身为欧元区成员国的希腊更为宽松。


But a hard stance on Ukraine while it fights a war with Russia could threaten Europe’s strategic buffer from the Baltic to the Balkans.	但在乌克兰对俄作战时对其采取强硬立场可能威胁到欧洲从波罗的海到巴尔干的战略缓冲。


The economist Albert O. Hirschman once said that a crisis can be either disintegrative or integrative.	经济学家艾伯特·赫希曼曾说危机既可以分裂也可以整合。


Individuals and organizations, confronted with adversity and lacking faith in policymakers, can either “exit” from the institutions and societies that bind them, or rally together to revitalize them.	面对逆境且对决策者缺乏信心的个人和机构既可以“退出”约束他们的机构和团体，也可以团结一心重振这些机构。


Unfortunately, today’s crises so far have seemed largely disintegrative.	不幸的是，当今危机到目前为止似乎在很大程度上起到分裂的作用。


Consider capital flight, which forced Greece to impose controls.	比如说迫使希腊实行强制控制的资本外逃。


Of course, exit mechanisms like capital flight can have a positive impact.	当然，资本外逃等退出机制也可以产生积极的影响。


In the eighteenth century, capital flight kept predatory rulers in check.	十八世纪，资本外逃就曾抑制过统治者的掠夺。


Adam Smith viewed the rise of movable capital as a force that would encourage enlightened public policies that serve the general interest.	亚当·斯密曾将动态资本视为崛起的力量，能够鼓励为民众利益服务的开明的公共政策。


But, in today’s interconnected world, capital can move much more quickly and to many more destinations, crossing borders with the click of a mouse.	但在今天的互联世界中，资本可以更快抵达更多目的地，资本跨境流动只需轻点鼠标。


Moreover, the global financial industry is largely autonomous, driven by self-interest, rather than a desire to advance the common good.	此外，全球金融业在很大程度上自主，受其自身利益驱使，而非推动共同利益的愿望。


As we have seen in Europe since 2010, as well as in Ukraine and Puerto Rico more recently, the ability to rush for the exit at any time removes investors’ incentive to compromise.	2010年来我们在欧洲、乌克兰、最近又在波多黎各看到，随时有退出机会导致投资人不愿妥协。


As policymakers struggle to create a consensus around a reform agenda, the prospects of rejuvenating the pacts and policies underlying integration and cooperation deteriorate.	在决策者争取就改革议程达成共识的时刻，融合与合作赖以存在的重振协议政策的可能性却在不断恶化。


But the world order is by no means fated to devolve into chaos.	但世界秩序绝非注定要陷入混乱。


Today’s crisis of international integration can become the catalyst for the creation of a new or revitalized global system.	今天的国际一体化危机可以推动全新或重新焕发活力的全球制度建设。


This has happened before.	这种情况之前也发生过。


Indeed, the current world order arose from the major crises of the Great Depression and World War II, with countries building the social pacts and economic institutions that would underpin peace and prosperity for the next several decades.	事实上，现行世界秩序源于大萧条和二战等重大危机，各国建设支持未来数十年和平与繁荣的社会契约和经济机构。


To ensure that a crisis produces such a constructive integrative response, policymakers must change their mindset.	要想确保危机产生上述建设性融合反应，决策者必须改变思维方式。


Instead of seeing only problems that need to be contained, they should view crises as an opportunity for progress.	他们应当将危机视为进步的机遇，而不要只看到哪些问题需要得到遏制。


Today, some important integrative policies lie within reach.	今天，人们触手可及某些重要的一体化政策。


On the economic front, policymakers should stop pouring public money into bailouts that benefit private creditors at the expense of taxpayers, and they should end austerity programs that kill growth prospects and do not address debt overhang.	经济战线上，决策者应该停止大把的将公共资金用于损害纳税人、惠及私有债权人的救助。 他们应当结束扼杀增长前景、不解决债务危机的紧缩政策。


They must also reform tax systems and improve cooperation to reduce tax evasion, using the added revenues to invest in physical infrastructure and education.	他们还必须改革税收制度、加强合作打击逃税，并将增量收益投入到基础设施和教育建设。


Such measures will create jobs today, and secure prosperity for tomorrow.	上述措施将为今天创造就业机会，并确保明天能够实现繁荣。


Political measures are also needed.	此外也需要政治举措。


Europe needs a more democratic framework that keeps financiers at the negotiating table.	欧洲需要迫使金融机构参与谈判的民主架构。


Similarly, with the possibility of admitting Ukraine to NATO a dead letter, the West should take steps to ease tensions with Russia, in order to ensure its continued participation in international efforts to address key threats (as it did when negotiating the recent agreement to rein in Iran’s nuclear program).	同样，鉴于吸纳乌克兰加入北约已成为一纸空文，西方应采取措施缓和对俄关系紧张，以确保其继续参与解决关键威胁（就像它最近在遏制伊朗核计划谈判中所做的那样）的国际工作。


Muddling through can lead to only one outcome: disintegration.	蒙混过关只能导致分裂一种结果。


Only when world leaders recognize the common source and the interconnectedness of current international crises will they be in a position to address them effectively.	只有当世界领导人认识到当前国际危机的共同来源和相互关系，他们才能有效地控制危机的结果。


Is It Time for Global Money?	全球货币正当时？


NEW YORK – Today’s world is more economically and financially integrated than at any time since the latter half of the nineteenth century.	纽约—当今世界的经济和金融一体化程度比十九世纪下半叶以来的任何时候都要深。


But policymaking – particularly central banking – remains anachronistically national and parochial.	但决策——特别是央行决策——仍在国家层面进行并且只考虑本国，这已不合时宜。


Isn’t it time to re-think the global monetary (non)system?	现在难道不是反思全球货币（无）体系的时机吗？


In particular, wouldn’t a single global central bank and a world currency make more sense than our confusing, inefficient, and outdated assemblage of national monetary policies and currencies?	特别是，难道单一全球央行和单一世界货币不是比我们的令人困惑、效率低下并且早已过时的国家货币政策和货币“大杂烩”更有意义吗？


Technology is now reaching the point where a common digital currency, enabled by near-universal mobile phone adoption, certainly makes this possible.	如今，科技已经发展到这样一种程度，几乎人手一台的移动电话已经让共同数字货币无疑具备了这一可能。


And however farfetched a global currency may sound, recall that before World War I, ditching the gold standard seemed equally implausible.	不管全球货币的思想是多么牵强，想一想第一次世界大战前，打破金本位也同样不合情理。


The current system is both risky and inefficient.	当前的体系风险高、效率低。


Different monies are not only a nuisance for tourists who arrive home with pockets full of unspendable foreign coins.	不同的货币是旅行者的大麻烦，他们总是带着一大把不能花的外国硬币回家。


Global firms waste time and resources on largely futile efforts to hedge currency risk (benefiting only the banks that act as middlemen).	全球企业也将时间和资源消耗在基本毫无用处的货币风险对冲上（只是肥了作为中介的银行的腰包）。


The benefits of ridding the world of national currencies would be enormous.	摆脱国家货币能给世界带来巨大的好处。


In one fell swoop, the risk of currency wars, and the harm they can inflict on the world economy, would be eliminated.	货币战争风险以及它们对可能对世界经济带来的冲击一下子烟消云散了。


Pricing would be more transparent, and consumers could spot anomalies (from their phones) and shop for the best deals.	定价将更透明，消费者能够察觉反常（通过他们的手机），获得最佳交易机会。


And, by eliminating foreign-exchange transactions and hedging costs, a single currency would reinvigorate stalled world trade and improve the efficiency of global capital allocation.	此外，单一货币消除了外汇交易和对冲成本，将让停滞的世界贸易重焕活力，改进全球资本配置效率。


In short, the current state of affairs is the by-product of the superseded era of the nation-state.	简言之，现状是过时的民族国家时代的副产品。


Globalization has shrunk the dimensions of the world economy, and the time for a world central bank has arrived.	全球化已经降低了全球经济的维度，世界中央银行的时代已经到来。


Dream on.	做梦。


A single world currency is in fact neither likely nor desirable.	单一世界货币事实上既不可能，也不可取。


Central banks, while ideally independent from political influence, are nonetheless accountable to the body politic.	在理想情况下，中央银行应该独立于政治影响，但它仍受到全体人民的问责。


They owe their legitimacy to the political process that created them, rooted in the will of the citizenry they were established to serve (and from which they derive their authority).	它们的合法性来自成立它们的政治程序，植根于它应该服务（以及让它们获得权威）的全体公民的意愿。


The history of central banking, though comparatively brief, suggests that democratically derived legitimacy is possible only at the level of the nation-state.	央行历史相对来说比较简单，但也表明，民主授权的合法性只可能在民族国家水平上实现。


At the supra-national level, legitimacy remains highly questionable, as the experience of the eurozone amply demonstrates.	在超国家层面，合法性仍大有问题，欧元区的经验充分地证明了这一点。


Only if the European Union’s sovereignty eclipses, by democratic choice, that of the nation-states that comprise it will the European Central Bank have the legitimacy it requires to remain the eurozone’s sole monetary authority.	唯有欧盟主权通过民主选择压倒组成欧盟的民族国家的主权，欧洲央行才具备成为欧元区唯一货币当局所需要的合法性。


But the same political legitimacy cannot be imagined for any transatlantic or trans-Pacific monetary authority, much less a global one.	当让跨大西洋或跨太平洋货币当局获得同样的政治合法性是无法想象的，更不用说全球货币当局了。


Treaties between countries can harmonize rules governing commerce and other areas.	国家间条约能够协调管理商业和其他领域的规则。


But they cannot transfer sovereignty over an institution as powerful as a central bank or a symbol as compelling as paper money.	但它们无法将主权让渡像央行这样的权力机构或像纸币这样的强制性象征。


Central banks’ legitimacy matters most when the stakes are highest.	央行合法性在干系最大的事情上最重要。


Everyday monetary-policy decisions are, to put it mildly, unlikely to excite the passions of the masses.	客气地说，日常货币政策决定根本不会引起群众的兴趣。


The same cannot be said of the less frequent need (one hopes) for the monetary authority to act as lender of last resort to commercial banks and even to the government.	但对于（人们希望）的不太频繁的对货币当局的需要——作为商业银行甚至政府的最后贷款人，情况就不是这样了。


As we have witnessed in recent years, such interventions can be the difference between financial chaos and collapse and mere retrenchment and recession.	我们在近几年中看到，这些干预可能决定着是金融混乱还是金融崩溃，是仅仅是紧缩还是衰退。


And only central banks, with their ability to create freely their own liabilities, can play this role.	而只有央行，以及它们自由创造自身负债的能力，能够但起这个责任。


Yet the tough decisions that central banks must make in such circumstances – preventing destabilizing runs versus encouraging moral hazard – are simultaneously technocratic and political.	但央行在这些情况中需要做出艰难的决定——阻止破坏性挤兑还是鼓励道德风险，这些决定既有技术性，也有政治性。


Above all, the legitimacy of their decisions is rooted in law, which itself is the expression of democratic will.	最重要的是，它们的决定的合法性植根于法律，而法律本身是民主意愿的表达。


Bail out one bank and not another?	援助这家银行而不是那家银行？


Purchase sovereign debt but not state or commonwealth (for example, Puerto Rican) debt?	购买主权债务而不是州和海外领地（比如波多黎各）债务？


Though deciding such questions at a supranational level is not theoretically impossible, it is utterly impractical in the modern era.	尽管在超国家层面决定这样的问题在理论上并非不可能，但在现时代的操作性很低。


Legitimacy, not technology, is the currency of central banks.	合法性而不是技术才是央行的货币。


But the fact that a single global central bank and currency would fail spectacularly (regardless of how strong the economic case for it may be) does not absolve policymakers of their responsibility to address the challenges posed by a fragmented global monetary system.	但单一全球央行和货币必将惨败（不管其经济理由多么充分），这一事实并不意味着决策者没有责任解决因为全球货币体系分散而带来的挑战。


And that means bolstering global multilateral institutions.	而这意味着巩固全球多边机构。


The International Monetary Fund’s role as independent arbiter of sound macroeconomic policy and guardian against competitive currency devaluation ought to be strengthened.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）作为可靠宏观经济政策的裁判官和阻止竞争性货币贬值的保护者的责任应该加强。


Finance ministers and central bankers in large economies should underscore, in a common protocol, their commitment to market-determined exchange rates.	大经济体的财政部和央行应该做出共同承诺，让汇率由市场来决定。


And, as Raghuram Rajan, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India, recently suggested, the IMF should backstop emerging economies that might face liquidity crises as a result of the normalization of US monetary policy.	此外，如印度储备银行行长拉詹（Raghuram Rajan）最近所指出的，IMF应该支持因为美国货币政策正常化而可能面临流动性危机的新兴经济体。


Likewise, a more globalized world requires a commitment from all actors to improve infrastructure, in order to ensure the efficient flow of resources throughout the world economy.	类似地，更加全球化的世界要求所有行动方都承诺改善基础设施，以确保资源在整个世界经济中的高效流动。


To this end, the World Bank’s capital base in its International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be increased along the lines of the requested $253 billion, to help fund emerging economies’ investments in highways, airports, and much else.	在这方面，世界银行在其火鸡复兴开发银行的基础资本金应该根据所要求的2,530亿美元增加，以帮助新兴经济体融资投入高速公路、机场和其他各种设施。


Multilateral support for infrastructure investment is not the only way global trade can be revived under the current monetary arrangements.	对基础设施投资的多边支持不是当前货币安排下唯一的复兴全球贸易之道。


As was amply demonstrated in the last seven decades, reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers would also help – above all in agriculture and services, as envisaged by the Doha Round.	我们在过去七十年中充分证明，降低关税和非关税壁垒也能起到作用——其中最重要的便是农业和服务业的关税和非关税壁垒，这也是多哈回合的设想。


Global financial stability, too, can be strengthened within the existing framework.	全球金融稳定也可以在当前框架中得到加强。


All that is required is harmonized, transparent, and easy-to-understand regulation and supervision.	所需要的全部无非是协调、透明、易于理解的规则和监督。


For today’s international monetary system, the perfect – an unattainable single central bank and currency – should not be made the enemy of the good.	对今天的国际货币体系来说，完美——无法实现的单一全球央行和货币——不应该成为善的敌人。


Working within our existing means, it is surely possible to improve our policy tools and boost global growth and prosperity.	致力于已有的方法，也绝对能够改善我们的政策工具、提振全球增长和繁荣。


The Debt Dilemma	债务困境


LONDON/WASHINGTON, DC – Greece’s divisive negotiations with the EU have placed debt back at the center of debates about economic growth and stability.	伦敦/华盛顿——希腊与欧盟四分五裂的谈判使得债务问题重新回到经济增长和稳定辩论的核心。


But Greece is not the only country struggling to repay its existing debt, much less dampen borrowing.	但希腊并非难以偿还现有债务的唯一国家，更不要说对借贷行为起到抑制作用。


Its fraught negotiations with its creditors should spur other countries to take action to address their own debt overhangs.	希腊与债权国令人忧心忡忡的谈判理当刺激其他国家解决好自己的债务问题。


Since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, the world’s debt has risen by $57 trillion, exceeding GDP growth.	2008年全球金融危机爆发以来，全球债务总额已累计增长了57万亿美元，超过GDP的增长幅度。


Government debt has increased by $25 trillion, with the advanced economies accounting for $19 trillion – a direct result of severe recession, fiscal-stimulus programs, and bank bailouts.	政府债务增长了25万亿美元——其中发达经济体增长了19万亿美元——这是严重经济衰退、财政刺激计划和银行救助计划的直接结果。


While American households have reduced their debt considerably (mainly through mortgage defaults), household debt in many other countries has continued to grow rapidly.	虽然美国家庭债务（主要是抵押贷款违约）已大幅减少，但其他许多国家的家庭负债继续呈快速上升趋势。


In all major economies, the debt-to-GDP ratio (including both public and private debt) is higher today than it was in 2007.	今天所有主要经济体债务（包括公共和私人债务）占GDP的比重都比2007年还要高。


Much of this debt accumulation was driven by efforts to support economic growth in the face of deflationary headwinds after the 2008 crisis.	债务骤增大都源于2008年危机爆发后面对通货紧缩等不利因素对经济增长的支持。


That was especially so in China, which, together with other developing economies, accounts for nearly half of the debt incurred since 2008.	中国的情况尤其如此，中国连同其他发展中经济体占到2008年后累积债务的将近一半左右。


To be sure, debt itself is not bad.	债务本身肯定并非坏事。


But excessive reliance on debt creates the risk of financial crises, which undermine growth.	但过分依赖债务却能够带来金融危机，拖慢增长速度。


Given this, the world needs to find both less credit-intensive routes to growth and ways to eliminate existing debt burdens.	鉴于此，各国需要找到不那么依赖债务的增长方法，还要设法消除现有债务。


To help limit future debt accumulation, countries have three options.	各国有三种方法可以有助于限制债务。


First, they can employ countercyclical macroprudential measures to dampen credit cycles and prevent excessive borrowing.	首先，可以实行反周期的宏观审慎政策来抑制信贷周期并防止借贷过度。


For example, stricter loan-to-value-ratio limits and higher capital requirements for banks could slow credit growth when housing or commercial real-estate markets are overheating.	比方说严格限制贷款估值比并提升银行资本要求可以在住宅及商用地产市场过热时减缓信贷增速。


Yet precisely the opposite approach is now being taken in the United States, where some first-time homebuyers have now been given access to 97% loan-to-value mortgages.	但美国现在的做法却恰恰相反，有些首次购房者甚至可以拿到97%的贷款按揭成数。


A second strategy for curbing the buildup of debt could be to introduce mortgage contracts that enable more risk sharing between borrowers and lenders, essentially acting as debt/equity hybrids.	遏制债务规模的另一种方法是引入抵押合同，在借贷双方间实现风险分担，这基本相当于债权和股权的混合。


As the Great Recession grimly illustrated, when a period of soaring real-estate valuations and rising household debt is followed by a period of falling prices, and households attempt to deleverage, the results can be catastrophic.	大萧条残酷地显示当房地产估值飙升、家庭债务快速增长期过去，家庭部门在房价下跌的同时竭力去除杠杆，经济��能因此进入灾难性的阶段。


The talent for financial innovation that produced harmful new home-mortgage options before the crash should now be harnessed to develop more flexible mortgages that help borrowers avoid default.	在经济崩溃前亲手制定了有害的新房抵押计划的那些金融创新人才现在应该开发出协助借款人避免陷入违约的更加灵活的抵押方案。