And it paid tribute to the ability of US markets and financial firms to create innovative instruments to “attract and sustain high levels of capital inflows.”	它还赞美了美国市场和金融企业创造创新型工具以“吸引和保持高资本流入水平”的能力。


Indeed, US markets were described as “deep, flexible, sophisticated, and by and large well-regulated.”	事实上，美国市场被描述为“深度、灵活、成熟，总体而言监管良好。 ”


But the most remarkable misjudgment appears in the discussion of credit risk transfer.	但最令人瞩目的误判出现在关于信用风险转移的讨论。


The IMF concluded that “a wider dispersion of credit risk has derisked the financial sector.”	IMF认为，“信用风险的更广泛的传播降低了金融部门的风险。


As a result, “banks should become more resilient and financially stable,” the consequences of which “should be seen in fewer bank failures and more consistent credit provision.”	”因此，“银行恢复力应该会更强，财务应该会更稳定，”其结果“应该是更少银行会倒闭，信用供给更加连贯。


We have entered an era in which “commercial banks may be less vulnerable to credit or economic shocks.”	”我们进入了一个“商业银行受信用或经济存量影响更小”的时代。


This was not, shall we say, the IMF’s finest hour.	我们得说，这绝非IMF的光辉时刻。


It brings to mind John Kenneth Galbraith’s famous quip that economic forecasters were put on Earth to make astrologers look good.	它让人想起了约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）著名的戏谑：经济预测家来到地球上是为了让占星家看起来是好人。


So maybe we should take the IMF’s more recent reports, which are full of dark warnings, with a grain of salt.	因此，也许我们应该对IMF充满悲观警告的最新报告有所保留。


It would not be surprising if, even a decade on, the Fund continues to be influenced by its failure to warn in good time that a global financial crisis – the worst in nearly 80 years – was a material risk.	尽管已经过去了十年，但既然IMF继续受到其没能在好光景时警告全球金融危机——近80年来最严重的金融危机——是一个实实在在的风险的影响，这也没什么好奇怪的。


And, indeed, there are signs that the IMF now sees trouble everywhere it looks.	事实上，有迹象表明如今IMF眼中处处是麻烦。


But, though the Fund’s economists may be at risk of forecasting ten of the next three crises, it would be unwise to dismiss their concerns entirely on the basis of past errors.	但是，尽管IMF经济学家有可能会预测未来三次危机中的十次，但完全因为过去的失误而全盘否定他们的担忧也是不明智的。


(That has been the trivializing response of “Brexit” campaigners to warnings by the European Union, the IMF, and the OECD, that withdrawal from the EU would cause severe damage to the British economy.)	（“英国退出”阵营就对欧盟、IMF、经合组织所发出的退出欧盟将严重打击英国经济的警告嗤之以鼻。


The Fund makes some strong points, but others appear much less well founded.	）IMF提出了一些相当强的观点，但也有一些观点不那么可靠。


The IMF’s strongest arguments concern China and European banks.	IMF的最强观点是关于中国和欧洲银行的。


It is surely true that the buildup of debt in China calls for close monitoring, and that corporate deleveraging, which is urgently required, “should be accompanied by a strengthening of banks and social safety nets, especially for displaced workers in overcapacity sectors.”	毫无疑问，中国债务的积累值得紧密监控，紧迫需要的公司去杠杆化“应该辅之以银行和社会安全网的强化，特别是对产能过剩部门的下岗工���。


There is no reason why that cannot be achieved – the overall balance sheet of China, Inc. remains strong – but the domestic distributional consequences will require careful management.	”没有理由表明无法实现这一点——中国有限公司（China, Inc. ）的资产负债表依然坚挺——但国内分配结果需要谨慎管理。


The second big challenge that the IMF identifies – excess capacity in the eurozone banking system, and the related problem of non-performing loans – is also, in principle, solvable.	IMF所辨别的第二大挑战——欧元区银行体系容量过剩及相关的不良贷款问题——理论上也是可以解决的。


The European Central Bank is well aware of the risk from weaker banks; but, with the eurozone economy heavily reliant on bank credit, addressing it is not straightforward.	欧洲央行很明白疲软的银行所带来的风险； 但是，欧元区经济严重依赖银行信用，因此不能直截了当地解决这一问题。


And continued massive ECB intervention in the bond markets can only postpone the day of reckoning, not avert it.	而欧洲央行对债券市场的持续大规模干预也只能推迟而不能避免清算日的到来。


But the third problem detected by the IMF may not be a problem at all.	但IMF所看到的第三个问题也许完全不是个问题。


The Fund argues that the life insurance industry could be a future source of systemic risk, and should therefore be subject to macroprudential stress testing, or counter-cyclical capital buffers, on the model used for banks.	IMF认为，寿险行业可能成为未来系统性风险的来源之一，因此应该仿照银行模式进行宏观审慎压力测试或实行反周期资本缓冲。


The first recommendation is curious: IMF staff seem unaware that a stress-testing regime for insurers has already been put in place in some jurisdictions, notably the United Kingdom.	第一项建议十分有趣：IMF人员似乎不了解，在某些司法辖区特别是英国，保险公司压力测试机制已然存在。


Indeed, there are stress tests, and so-called reverse stress tests, whereby insurers are required to describe what would need to occur to make them fail.	事实上，不但有压力测试，还有所谓的逆向压力测试，即要求保险公司描述发生什么事情会让它们倒闭。


And of course insurers did – almost universally – pass a real-world stress test in the form of the financial crisis.	当然，保险公司已经——几乎毫无例外地——通过了真实世界压力测试，即金融危机。


The one big failure, AIG, occurred because of problems in its non-insurance business.	大型破产事件（AIG）的发生原因不是保险业务。


Likewise, the IMF’s makes no compelling case for a macroprudential countercyclical approach to insurance capital.	类似地，IMF的保险资本宏观审慎反周期方法也不具有说服力。


The Fund’s own analysis does not demonstrate that insurers behave in a procyclical way.	IMF自身的分析并没有证明保险公司的行为方式是顺周期的。


On the contrary, there is some evidence that they acted counter-cyclically in the crisis.	相反，有证据表明它们在危机中采取了反周期行动。


Even the IMF concludes that “the evidence is not unequivocal.”	就连IMF也认为“证据含糊。 ”


That is a thin basis on which to propose a new set of capital requirements, which would be “built up during upswings of the financial cycle and run down during periods of financial stress.”	提出新的资本要求的基础也很薄弱。 资本要求“在金融周期的上升阶段积累，在金融压力时期消耗。


Why such tinkering is appropriate on the asset side of the balance sheet, while liabilities remain unchanged, is not explained.	”为何这样的小修小补在资产负债表的资产端进行，而负债端保持不变没有得到解释。


Perhaps it would be better if the IMF’s 2006 report could be put beyond reach, behind a firewall or somewhere on the dark web, in an unindexed museum of forecasting disasters.	也许，IMF的2006年报告封存起来，保存在防火墙后或黑暗网络深处，放在没有索引的灾难预测博物馆中更好。


Then the IMF could again take a balanced view, rather than issuing so many false alarms that it is ignored when a real fire starts.	然后，IMF可以再次采取平衡视角，而不是发布大量错误警报以至于当火真烧起来时没人会去注意。


The IMF’s “Tough Choices” on Greece	IMF在希腊问题上的“艰难选择”


ATHENS – The International Monetary Fund’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, recently asked a simple and important question: “How much of an adjustment has to be made by Greece, how much has to be made by its official creditors?”	雅典—国际货币基金组织（IMF）首席经济学家奥利佛·布兰查德（Olivier Blanchard）最近提出了一个简单而重要的问题：“希腊应该做出多大调整，它的官方债权人又应该做出多大调整？


But that raises two more questions: How much of an adjustment has Greece already made?	”但这引出了另外两个问题：希腊做出了多大的调整？


And have its creditors given anything at all?	它的债权人给予过任何东西吗？


In May 2010, the Greek government agreed to a fiscal adjustment equal to 16% of GDP from 2010 to 2013.	2010年5月，下列政府同意在2010—2013年做出相当于GDP的16%的财政调整。


As a result, Greece moved from a primary budget deficit (which excludes interest payments on debt) of more than 10% of GDP to a primary balance last year – by far the largest such reversal in post-crisis Europe.	结果，希腊从超GDP的10%的初级预算赤字（不含债务利息支付）变为去年超GDP的10%的初级预算盈余——到目前为止，这是危机后时期欧洲最大幅度的改善。


The IMF initially projected that Greece’s real (inflation-adjusted) GDP would contract by around 5% over the 2010-2011 period, stabilize in 2012, and grow thereafter.	IMF一开始预计希腊真实（经通胀调整的）GDP将在2010—2011年间收缩5%左右，在2012年稳定下来，并在此后开始增长。


In fact, real GDP fell 25%, and did not recover.	事实上，GDP下降了25%，并且从未复苏。


And, because nominal GDP fell in 2014 and continues to fall, the debt/GDP ratio, which was supposed to stabilize three years ago, continues to rise.	而由于2014年名义GDP继续下降，本应在三年前就稳定下来的债务/GDP之比还在继续上升。


Blanchard notes that in 2012, Greece agreed “to generate enough of a primary surplus to limit its indebtedness” and to implement “a number of reforms which should lead to higher growth.”	布兰查德指出，2012年希腊同意“形成足够大的初级盈余以限制债务负担”并实施“应该能提高增长的多项改革”。


Those so-called reforms included sharply lower public spending, minimum-wage reductions, fire-sale privatizations, an end to collective bargaining, and deep pension cuts.	这些所谓的改革包括大幅削减公共支出、降低最低工资、“大甩卖”式私有化、结束集体讨价还价，以及大幅减少退休金。


Greece followed through, but the depression continued.	希腊履行了改革，但萧条仍在继续。


The IMF and Greece’s other creditors have assumed that massive fiscal contraction has only a temporary effect on economic activity, employment, and taxes, and that slashing wages, pensions, and public jobs has a magical effect on growth.	IMF和其他希腊债权人认为大规模财政收缩只会给经济活动、就业和税收带来暂时的影响，而大幅下降的工资、退休金和公共职位会给增长带来魔法效应。


This has proved false.	事实证明这是错误的。


Indeed, Greece’s post-2010 adjustment led to economic disaster – and the IMF’s worst predictive failure ever.	事实上，2010年后的希腊调整导致了经济灾难——以及IMF史上最离谱预测。


Blanchard should know better than to persist with this fiasco.	布兰查德应该了解情况，不至于出现如此失策。


Once the link between “reform” and growth is broken – as it has been in Greece – his argument collapses.	只要“改革”和增长之间的关系不成立——希腊的情况正是如此——他的观点也就破产了。


With no path to growth, the creditors’ demand for an eventual 3.5%-of-GDP primary surplus is actually a call for more contraction, beginning with another deep slump this year.	由于找不到增长之路，债权人所要求的最终达到相当于GDP的3. 5%的初级盈余实际上相当于要求进一步收缩，而今年的深度衰退只是开始。


But, rather than recognizing this reality and adjusting accordingly, Blanchard doubles down on pensions.	但是，布兰查德并没有认识到这一现实并据此调整，而是对退休金变本加厉。


He writes:	他写道：


“Why insist on pensions?	“为什么在退休金问题上坚持？


Pensions and wages account for about 75% of primary spending; the other 25% have already been cut to the bone.	退休金和工资占初级支出的75%左右； 另25%已经减到不能再减。


Pension expenditures account for over 16% of GDP, and transfers from the budget to the pension system are close to 10% of GDP.	退休金支出占GDP之比超过16%，而从预算到退休金体系的转移支付接近GDP的10%。


We believe a reduction of pension expenditures of 1% of GDP (out of 16%) is needed, and that it can be done while protecting the poorest pensioners.”	我们认为将退休金支出减少相当于GDP的1%（总量为16%）是必要的，并且可以同时做到保护最贫困退休者。 ”


Note first the damning admission: apart from pensions and wages, spending has already been “cut to the bone.”	首先注意到布兰查德赤裸裸承认了，除了退休金和工资，支出已经“减到不能再减”。


And remember: the effect of this approach on growth was negative.	然后请记住：这一方针对增长造成的效应是消极的。


So, in defiance of overwhelming evidence, the IMF now wants to target the remaining sector, pensions, where massive cuts – more than 40% in many cases – have already been made.	因此，IMF不顾压倒性证据，把目标对准了剩下的部分——退休金，而退休金也已经做出了巨大的削减（很多人的退休金降低了40%）。


The new cuts being demanded would hit the poor very hard.	新的削减要求将严重伤及穷人。


Pension payments now account for 16% of Greek GDP precisely because Greece’s economy is 25% smaller than it was in 2009.	如今，退休金占希腊GDP的16%，原因正在于希腊经济比2009年缩小了25%。


Without five years of disastrous austerity, Greek GDP might be 33% higher than it is now, and pensions would be 12% of GDP rather than 16%.	如果没有这五年灾难性的紧缩，希腊GDP将比现在高33%，退休金占GDP之比将是12%而非16%。


The math is straightforward.	其中的算术就是真么简单。


Blanchard calls on Greece’s government to offer “truly credible measures.”	布兰查德要求希腊政府拿出“真正可信的措施”。


Shouldn’t the IMF do likewise?	难道IMF不应该这样做吗？


To get pensions down by one percentage point of GDP, nominal economic growth of just 4% per year for two years would suffice – with no further cuts.	要让退休金占GDP之比降低一个百分点，只需要经济以名义率4%增长两年——根本不需要进一步削减。


Why not have “credible measures” to achieve that goal?	为何不采取“可信措施”实现这一目标？


This brings us to Greek debt.	这就引出了希腊债务问题。


As everyone at the IMF knows, a debt overhang is a vast unfunded tax liability that says to investors: enter at your own risk.	IMF所有人都知道，对投资者来说，债务积压是一笔巨额无资金准备的税收负债（unfunded tax liability）：风险自负。


At any time, your investments, profits, and hard work may be taxed away to feed the dead hand of past lenders.	你的投资、利润和努力工作随时随地会被税收的形式收走，流入过去贷款人的死亡之手。


The overhang is a blockade against growth.	债务积压是增长的一大障碍。


That is why every debt crisis, sooner or later, ends in restructuring or default.	正因如此，每一次债务危机迟早都会以重组或违约结束。


Blanchard is a pioneer in the economics of public debt.	布兰查德是公共债务经济学方面的顶尖专家。


He knows that Greece’s debt has not been sustainable at any point during the last five years, and that it is not sustainable now.	他知道希腊的债务在过去五年中一直是不可持续的，现在也是不可持续的。


On this point, Greece and the IMF agree.	从这一点讲，希腊和IMF是一致的。


In fact, Greece has a credible debt proposal.	事实上，希腊有一套可信的债务方案。


First, let the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) lend €27 billion ($30 billion), at long maturities, to retire the Greek bonds that the European Central Bank foolishly bought in 2010.	首先，让欧洲稳定基金（European Stabilization Mechanism，ESM）发放270亿欧元长期限贷款，以替换欧洲央行2010年愚蠢地购买的希腊债券。


Second, use the profits on those bonds to pay off the IMF.	其次，用这些债券上的利润偿付IMF。


Third, include Greece in the ECB’s program of quantitative easing, which would let it return to the markets.	第三，将希腊纳入欧洲央行的量化宽松计划，这能让希腊回归市场。


Greece would agree to fair conditions for the ESM loan.	希腊将同意关于ESM贷款的公平条件。


It does not ask for one cent of additional official funding for the Greek state.	它不会要求为希腊多出一个子儿的官方融资。


It is promising to live within its means forever, and rely on internal savings and external investment for growth – far short of what any large country, controlling its own currency, would do when facing a comparable disaster.	它将承诺永远自力更生，依靠内部储蓄和外部投资刺激增长——远远少于任何控制自身货币的大国在面临类似灾难时的要求。


Blanchard insists that now is the time for “tough choices, and tough commitments to be made on both sides.”	布兰查德坚持认为现在是“做出艰难选择，也是双方做出艰难承诺”的时刻。


Indeed it is.	诚然。


But the Greeks have already made tough choices.	但希腊人已经做出了艰难的选择。


Now it is the IMF’s turn, beginning with the decision to admit that the policies it has imposed for five long years created a disaster.	现在轮到了IMF，首先是决定承认其五年来所施加的政策制造了一场灾难。


For the other creditors, the toughest choice is to admit – as the IMF knows – that their Greek debts must be restructured.	对其他债权人来说，最艰难的选择时承认——如IMF所知——他们的希腊债务必须重组。


New loans for failed policies – the current joint creditor proposal – is, for them, no adjustment at all.	为失败政策组织新贷款——即当前的联合债权人方案——对他们来说根本不是调整。


IMF Go Home	卷铺盖走人吧IMF


BRUSSELS – The curtains are up on another act of the Greek debt drama.	发自布鲁塞尔——新的一出希腊债务闹剧已经正式拉开帷幕。


Eurozone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund have agreed with Greece to begin, per the IMF’s demands, providing some debt relief to the country, and to release €10.3 billion ($11.6 billion) in bailout funds.	欧元区财政部长会议和国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund，简称IMF）已与希腊达成一致，应国际货币基金组织的要求为该国提供一定金额的债务减免，并发放103亿欧元（约合116亿美元）的救助资金。


Greece, for its part, has agreed to another round of austerity and structural reform.	而希腊方面则同意实施新一轮财政紧缩和经济结构改革。


Until recently, the IMF insisted that it would participate in the next Greek rescue program only if it deemed Greek debt to be sustainable.	直到最近，国际货币基金组织都坚称只有在认定希腊债务可持续的情况下才会参与下一轮救助计划。


Based on the IMF’s most recent debt sustainability analysis, that is not the case.	根据该组织最新发布的债务可持续性分析报告，显然还未能达到这一标准。


Germany, however, insisted that the IMF remain on board – and, with the latest deal, it seems to have prevailed, in exchange for agreeing to debt relief that it opposed.	然而德国一直坚持要拉上国际货币基金组织——而根据这份最新协议，该组织也做出了让步，以换取德国同意推行该国一直反对的债务减免行动。


The victory may well not have been worth the sacrifice.	但人们为这场胜利所付出的牺牲可能有点不值。


In fact, it would have been better to let the IMF pull out, for two reasons. First, the IMF’s assessments of debt sustainability in Greece are undermined by a deep conflict of interest.	事实上让国际货币基金组织退出其实更好，原因有二：首先，国际货币基金组织对希腊债务的可持续性评估遭遇了深层次利益冲突的破坏。


Second, and more important, IMF credits are too expensive.	其次，也是更重要的，国际货币基金组织的贷款成本太高了。


In a normal bailout procedure, the IMF acts as an impartial judge of the troubled country’s debt sustainability; then, if it so chooses, it can step in as the lender of last resort.	在一个正常的救助过程中，国际货币基金组织会针对受困国家的债务可持续性扮演一个公正裁决者的角色； 那么如果它选择这样做，就可以作为最后贷款人进行介入。


This is what happened in 2010, when the private sector wanted to flee from Greece and a systemic crisis loomed.	这就是2010年私营部门设法逃离希腊，系统性危机逐渐逼近时的情况。


But today Greece has only a few private-sector obligations. Eurozone governments are the ones offering large amounts of funding.	但如今希腊只对少数私营部门负有债务，欧元区各国政府才在提供大量资金的一方。


For its part, the IMF has a large volume of credits outstanding.	而国际货币基金组织手里则存在大量未偿付的贷款。


Of course, if Greece’s creditors accept a haircut, the IMF’s credits would become more secure – hence the conflict of interest.	当然，如果希腊的债权人接受债务减免，国际货币基金组织的贷款将变得更加安全——利益冲突也会因此减少。


Indeed, the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis can hardly be considered neutral, and would surely be rejected by private-sector actors.	事实上该组织的债务可持续性分析报告很难被认为是中立的，而且肯定会遭到私营部门参与者拒绝。


A neutral judge – not one of the creditors – usually sets the terms in insolvency proceedings.	一个中立的裁决者——而非其中一位债权人——通常会设定破产程序中条款。


This is not to say that the IMF’s conclusion is necessarily wrong.	这并不是说该组织的结论是一定是错误的。


In fact, one could debate the question of Greece’s debt sustainability endlessly.	事实上针对希腊债务可持续性问题的讨论可能永无休止。


Some might suspect that Greece’s debt is sustainable, since the Greek government has to pay less in interest than Portugal or Italy, both of which have much lower debt levels.	有些人可能会怀疑希腊的债务其实是可持续的，因为该国政府所以支付的利息比葡萄牙和意大利这两个债务水平远低于希腊的国家所需支付的更少。


The IMF, however, argues that, despite these low interest payments, the refinancing needs of Greece will surpass 15% of GDP (an arbitrary threshold, to be sure) at some point – perhaps as soon as 15 years.	但国际货币基金组织则认定尽管只需支付较低利息，希腊的再融资需求会在某个时刻超过GDP的15％（当然这个阈值的设定过于武断）——这个时刻最快可能在15年后到来。


What the IMF fails to highlight is that, if that happens, it will be primarily because of the IMF itself – or, more precisely, the high cost of its loans.	而该组织未能强调指出的是，如果出现这种情况，主要应归咎于组织自身——或者更确切地说，因为其高昂的贷款成本。


The IMF is charging a much higher interest rate (up to 3.9%) than the Europeans (slightly above 1%, on average), largely because it has surcharges of up to 300 basis points on its own funding costs, compared to less than 50 basis points for the European lenders.	国际货币基金组织所收取的利率（达3. 9％）比其他欧洲债权人（平均略高于1％），主要是因为它还要在其自身融资成本的基础上收取多达300个基点的附加费，而欧洲债权人的标准则不足50个基点。


Moreover, IMF loans are to be repaid in just 5-7 years, on average, compared to up to 50 years for the European funding.	此外国际货币基金组织的贷款必须在平均5 ~7年的短时限内偿还，相比之下欧洲贷款偿还期可达50年。


The IMF assumes that its loans will be substituted by private-sector loans at even higher interest rates (over 6%).	国际货币基金组织假设其贷款将被利率更高（6％以上）的私营部门贷款所取代。


This would cause Greece’s debt to snowball, given that its GDP growth is highly unlikely to achieve such a rate in the foreseeable future.	这将导致希腊的债务越滚越大，因为该国的GDP在可预见的将来都不太可能达到这样的增速。


The good news is that there is a simple way to avoid this outcome: replace the IMF’s expensive short-term funding with cheap long-term European loans.	好消息是有一个简单的方法来避免这种结局：以廉价的欧洲长期贷款取代国际货币基金组织的昂贵短期资金。


With that switch, Greek debt may well become sustainable, even by IMF standards.	一旦实现了这一转换，希腊债务就可能变得可持续——即便按照国际货币基金组织的标准也是如此。


Of course, this would require more funding from the European Stability Mechanism, the eurozone’s rescue fund.	当然，这需要由欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism）这个欧元区救助基金中提取更多资金。


But the ESM would face lower risks, because the IMF has “super-senior status,” meaning that its loans are supposed to be repaid first, anyway. (It should be noted that the most senior creditor usually charges the lowest, not the highest, interest rate, as the IMF does.)	但稳定机制将面临较低风险，因为国际货币基金组织拥有“超高级地位”——意味着它的贷款都会被优先偿还（应当指出的是，最高级别债权人的收费通常是最低的，而非像国际货币基金组织那样开价最高）。


The savings for Greece would be huge.	希腊将因此节省巨额资金。


Given that the average surcharge on the IMF’s Greek loans is about 250 basis points, and the IMF has more than €14 billion in outstanding credits, the IMF is extracting huge profits from Greece – more than €800 million annually since 2013, nearly the equivalent of the Fund’s yearly operating costs.	由于国际货币基金��织的希腊贷款平均附加费约为250个基点，且手握超过140亿欧元的未偿还信贷，该组织从希腊赚取了巨额利润——自2013年以来每年超过8亿欧元，基本相当于基金的年度运营成本。


The IMF is a valuable global institution, but it should not be financed mainly by Greek taxpayers (and pre-financed by eurozone taxpayers).	虽然国际货币基金组织是一个相当有存在价值的全球性机构，但不应主要由希腊纳税人资金（且由欧元区纳税人预先支付）来维持。


By sending the IMF packing today, Greece might save several billion euros over the next decade, with a commensurate reduction in risk for European creditors.	如果能让国际货币基金组织收拾包袱退出，希腊就能在未来十年间省下数十亿欧元，也相应减少了欧洲债权人所面临的风险。


Add to that the IMF’s inability to provide impartial analysis of Greece’s debt sustainability, and it is hard to see how anyone can argue that the Fund can make a contribution to the Greek negotiations today.	加之该组织无法提供对希腊债务可持续性的公正分析，也没有什么人会认为基金可以对当今的希腊谈判做出贡献。


There is a broader point as well.	关于这个问题还有一个更广泛的意义。


Greece is not the only country suffering from the high cost of IMF loans.	希腊可不是唯一一个遭受国际货币基金组织高成本贷款折磨的国家。


The outstanding IMF loans held by Ireland and Portugal, which amount to another €23 billion, should also be re-financed.	爱尔兰和葡萄牙所欠的230亿欧元国际货币基金组织贷款也应进行重新融资。


If IMF loans are replaced with ESM financing, eurozone taxpayers will save hundreds of millions of euros per year.	如果国际货币基金组织贷款能被欧洲稳定机制的融资所取代，欧元区纳税人每年都将节省数亿欧元。


The IMF’s participation in the rescue programs for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal has already cost taxpayers in those countries nearly €9 billion in excess charges.	国际货币基金组织对希腊，爱尔兰和葡萄牙救助方案的参与已经令这些国家的纳税人额外支出了90亿欧元费用。


While that mistake cannot be reversed, it can be rectified.	虽然这一错误无法逆转，却可以被纠正。


If it is handled quickly enough, some €4 billion could still be saved.	如果处理速度足够快的话，还能省下40亿欧元。


A few years ago, European bodies may not have had the expertise to manage adjustment programs without the IMF’s guidance.	几年前，欧洲机构可能缺乏专业知识去管理调整方案，因此需要国际货币基金组织的指导。


That is no longer true. There is no good reason to keep the IMF around today – and there are billions of good reasons to send it home.	但如今时过境迁，也不再有很好的理由让该组织继续插手——却有数十亿个理由赶紧它卷铺盖走人。


How the IMF Failed Greece	IMF如何让希腊走向失败


NEW DELHI – Democracy is about real choices.	新德里—民主事关真正的选择。


But, throughout their country’s crisis, the Greek people have been deprived of them.	但是，在整个国家危机中，希腊人民被不剥夺了真正的选择。


For this, the Europe Union and especially the International Monetary Fund bear considerable responsibility.	对于这一点，欧盟，尤其是国际货币基金组织（IMF）负有重大责任。


Greece was offered two stark choices: Leave the eurozone without financing, or remain and receive support at the price of further austerity.	希腊面临两个严峻的选择：离开欧元区而得不到融资； 或留在欧元区得到融资，但付出进一步紧缩的代价。


But Greece should have been offered a third option: Leave the euro, but with generous financing.	但希腊应该得到第三个选项：离开欧元区但得到慷慨的融资。


This option should have been put on the table, recognizing that Greece has broader political reasons for staying within the eurozone.	这一选择应该被摆上台面，认识到希腊有更广的政治理由留在欧元区中。


Although exiting the monetary union would have yielded considerable benefits, “Grexit” would have entailed sizeable costs as well.	尽管退出货币联盟能带来可观的好处，但“希腊退出”也将造成巨大的代价。


The benefits would have included a massive devaluation, which would have restored some dynamism to what was once a fast-growing economy.	好处将包括剧烈贬值，这将重塑一些这个曾经高速增长的经济体的活力。


But the costs were terrifying.	但代价十分恐怖。


The government would have had to default, the banks would have been ruined, and both would have struggled for years to regain the trust of financial markets.	希腊政府将不得不选择违约，银行将遭到重创，两者都将挣扎多年以重新获得金融市场的信任。


As a result, interest rates would have remained high for a long time to come, impeding efforts to restore growth.	结果，利率将在相当长的时间内保持高位，阻碍重塑增长的措施。


Is it any wonder that the Greek government shrank from this horror and chose the “safe” option of austerity?	希腊政府在这一恐怖情景面前退缩了，选择了“安全”的紧缩选项，这有什么可奇怪的？


But this option may not be safe at all.	但这个选择可能一点都不安全。


It is in fact, to quote T.S. Eliot, that “awful daring of a moment’s surrender...”	事实上，用艾略特（T. S.


Greece will now need to grind away at austerity, hoping that in some distant future “internal devaluation” – that is, wage and price deflation – will help to spark a recovery.	Eliot）的话说，这是“可怕地敢于片刻投降……”目前，希腊需要加紧紧缩，期望在遥远的未来“内部贬值”——即工资和物价通缩——能给复苏带来曙光。


Only the IMF could have offered the third option of an orderly exit.	只有IMF可以提供有序退出的第三选择。


Greece should have been told that it could reap the benefits of devaluation, while the international community would act to minimize the attendant costs.	希腊应该被告知，它可以获得贬值的好处，同时国际社会将行动起来尽量降低随之产生的成本。


The precise terms of Grexit – agreed by the troika (the IMF, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank) and Greek authorities – surely would have included a negotiated reduction in Greece’s debts, as well as a strategy for recapitalizing the banking system in order minimize uncertainty, pain, and disruption.	“希腊退出”的具体条款——由三驾马车（IMF、欧盟委员会和欧洲央行）与希腊当局商定——肯定必须包括协商降低希腊的债务，以及一个重组银行体统以使不确定性、痛苦和干扰降到最小的战略。


Still, the costs would have been sizeable, so the IMF would have needed to offer generous financing, covering the country’s import requirements for, say, two years while providing the liquidity to manage the transition to a new currency.	但是，成本仍将极其巨大，因此，IMF将需要提供慷慨的融资，覆盖希腊（比如）两年的进口要求，同时提供流动性以实现向新货币的平稳过渡。


Of course, this would have increased the IMF’s already-large exposure to Greece; but this would have been a worthwhile trade-off, because it would have served a strategy that would have had a much better chance of success.	当然，这将增加IMF已然相当高的希腊风险敞口； 但这将是一个值得的权衡，因为它有利于一个成功几率高得多的战略。


But is there any strategy that could have succeeded in restoring the Greek economy?	但有战略能成功重塑希腊经济吗？


After all, under any scenario, Greece will need to run a primary surplus and undertake structural reforms to transform its economy.	毕竟，不管从哪种情景看，希腊都需要转为初级盈余并实施结构改革以实现经济转型。


And many insist that this will not happen, because Greece simply refuses to change.	许多人认为这不会发生，因为希腊根本拒绝变化。


And yet such assessments overlook the record of the past few years, during which successive governments have taken some fairly radical measures to strengthen Greece’s fiscal position and scale back the public payroll.	然而这样的主张忽视了过去几年来的记录。 在此期间，一届又一届政府实施了公平地说相当彻底的措施来增强希腊的财政状况、削减公职人数。


Moreover, the skeptics overlook the fact that incentives to carry out structural reforms are partly endogenous.	此外，怀疑派还忽视了一个事实：实施结构改革的激励部分来自内生。


After all, without devaluation and the prospect of debt relief, reform merely spells more short-term pain, not less.	毕竟，如果不贬值和看不到债务纾困前景，改革职能带来更多而不是更少的短期痛苦。


The reason why an assisted Grexit was never offered seems clear: Greece’s European creditors were vehemently opposed to the idea.	为什么从未有过协助希腊退出的选项，原因很明白：希腊的欧洲债权人强烈反对这个主意。


But it is not clear that the IMF should have placed great weight on these concerns.	但IMF是否应该更多地考虑这些顾虑并不清楚。


Back in 2010, creditor countries were concerned about contagion to the rest of the eurozone. If Grexit had succeeded, the entire monetary union would have come under threat, because investors would have wondered whether some of the eurozone’s other highly indebted countries would have followed Greece’s lead.	2010年，债权国担心如果希腊退出发生，危机将传染到欧元区其他国家，整个货币联盟都会遭到危险，因为投资者将怀疑一些欧元区其他高度负债的国家是否会重蹈希腊的覆辙。


But this risk is actually another argument in favor of providing Greece with the option of leaving.	但这一风险实际上有利于论证给予希腊离开选项的合理性。


There is something deeply unappealing about yoking countries together when being unyoked is more advantageous.	当分道扬镳更有利时，将各国强行捆绑在一起味同嚼蜡。


More recently, creditor countries have been concerned about the financial costs to member governments that have lent to Greece.	后来，债权国开始担心向希腊提供贷款的成员国政府的财政成本。


But Latin America in the 1980s showed that creditor countries stand a better chance of being repaid (in expected-value terms) when the debtor countries are actually able to grow.	但20世纪的拉丁美洲表明，当债务国真的能够增长时，债权国有更大的机会获得偿付（从预期价值角度）。


In short, the IMF should not have made Europe’s concerns, about contagion or debt repayment, decisive in its decision-making.	简言之，IMF不应该让欧洲的顾虑——不管是关于传染还是关于债务偿付——成为其决策的决定性因素。


Instead, it should have publicly pushed for the third option, which would have been a watershed, for it would have signaled that the IMF will not be driven by its powerful members to acquiesce in bad policies.	相反，它应该公开推出第三选择，这一选择本来将成为一道分水岭，因为它将释放出一个信号，IMF不会受强力成员的驱使采取坏政策。


Indeed, it would have afforded the Fund an opportunity to atone for its complicity in the creditor-driven, austerity-addled misery to which Greeks have been subject for the last five years.	事实上，这能给IMF带来一个机会弥补其参与债权人推动的、以紧缩为手段所造成的痛苦。 希腊人民已经承受了五年这样的痛苦。


Above all, it would have enabled the IMF to move beyond being the instrument of status quo powers – the United States and Europe.	最重要的是，这将让IMF能够避免沦为现有大势力——美国和欧洲的工具。


From an Asian perspective, by defying its European shareholders, the IMF would have gone a long way toward heralding the emergence of a new institution: a truly International Monetary Fund, in place of today’s Euro-Atlantic Monetary Fund.	从亚洲的角度看，否决欧洲股东的IMF将大踏步地脱胎换骨，成为一个新机构：真正的国际货币基金组织，而不再是今天的欧洲-大西洋货币基金组织。


All is not lost.	还有一线生机。


If the current strategy fails, the third option – assisted Grexit – remains available.	如果目前的战略失败，第三选择——获得援助的希腊退出——仍然可行。


The IMF should plan for it.	IMF应该做好计划。


The Greek people deserve some real choices in the near future.	希腊人民理应在近期获得真正的选择。


The IMF Needs More Lagarde	IMF需要更多拉加德


DAVOS – Christine Lagarde has said she is open to serving another five-year term as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.	达沃斯—拉加德曾说，她对再当五年国际货币基金组织（IMF）总裁持开放态度。


She should get it.	她应该留任。


The IMF has never had better leadership, and its board of directors should give her the chance to finish the work she has begun.	IMF从未有过比她更好的领导层，IMF理事会应该给她一个完成由她自己开始的工作的机会。


When Lagarde took the helm in July 2011, she inherited an institution in crisis.	拉加德在2011年7月履新，接手的是一个危机重重的机构。


The global financial meltdown in 2008 and its economic aftershocks had discredited Western-led multilateral lenders and the free-market “Washington Consensus.”	2008年全球金融大崩盘及其经济余波让西方领导的多边贷款机构和自由市场“华盛顿共识”信誉扫地。


Lagarde’s leadership has helped to restore the Fund’s reputation.	拉加德的领导帮助IMF重新确立了名誉。


Much attention is paid to her personal qualities – and rightly so.	许多目光投向了她的个人品质——理应如此。


She is frank, forceful, warm, and engaging.	她坦承、强力、温暖、动人。


In country after country, officials with whom she has met, often under delicate circumstances, describe her as both a teller of difficult truths and a sensitive listener.	与她碰面的各国官员（常常是在微妙的环境中碰面）纷纷表示她敢于说出困难的现实，同时也是一个敏感的聆听者。


These are important qualities for the leader of an institution that must negotiate, rather than dictate, terms of agreement.	对于一个必须就协定条款进行谈判而不是主宰一切的机构领导人来说，这些都是重要的品质。


The Europeans did not like it much when Lagarde told them their banks needed to be restructured or that they needed to build a firewall to protect against financial contagion – but they did it.	拉加德告诉欧洲人，他们的银行需要重组，否则就必须建立防火墙防止金融传染。 忠言逆耳，但欧洲人还是照办了。


Likewise, she made tough calls on providing IMF support to countries – for example, Greece, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Ukraine – that are crucial to global stability.	类似地，她大声疾呼向一些国家提供IMF支持——比如希腊、巴基斯坦、突尼斯和乌克兰——这对于全球稳定至关重要。


And there’s much more.	还有数不清的例子。


The Fund is not often associated with creativity and compassion.	IMF并不擅长创新，通常也不是激情万丈。


Lagarde has begun to change that.	拉加德开始改变这一点。


In the process, she has provided a human face for an institution often associated with the prescription of bitter medicine.	在此过程中，她让这个常常开出苦口药方的机构有了一张人道的面孔。


Helping to manage the Middle East’s refugee crisis, for example, is not an expected part of the IMF’s mandate.	比如，帮助管理中东难民危机原本并非IMF的职责范围。


Yet, under her leadership, the Fund adjusted a program so that Jordan’s government could spend more to help those displaced by conflict in Syria and Iraq (more than a million of whom are housed in camps within its borders).	但是，在她的领导下，IMF调整了计划，让约旦政府能够将更多资金用于帮助因叙利亚和伊拉克冲突而流离失所的人（超过一百万人居住在约旦境内的难民营中）。


Similarly, when Ebola struck West Africa in 2014, Lagarde directed the IMF to use its available cash to buy debt relief for countries in crisis, which enabled them to pay more doctors and nurses – the first-ever such use of IMF capital.	类似地，2014年，当西非埃博拉疫情爆发时，拉加德领导IMF用可动用资金为危机中的各国提供债务豁免，这让它们能提高医生和护士待遇——这是IMF首次如此使用自己的资本。


In addition, Lagarde has identified, and acted on, three of the most important challenges facing today’s world.	此外，拉加德认识到当今世界面临着三大最重要的挑战，并针对它们展开行动。


First, she has been both a forceful voice for the introduction of more women into the workforce and an exemplar of the value of having women in leadership positions.	首先，她强势地要求让更多女性加入劳动力大军，她本人便是女性担任领导岗位的价值体现榜样。


In countries as different as Saudi Arabia and Japan, she has urged leaders to stop wasting so much human talent – and thereby realize their economies’ potential.	在从沙特阿拉伯到日本的各式各样的国家，她敦促领导人停止浪费如此巨大的人才资源——并以此实现经济潜力。


Second, under her leadership, the IMF has also addressed the broader question of income inequality.	其次，在她的领导下，IMF还解决了收入不平等这一更广大的问题。


This is not simply a question of basic fairness.	这不仅仅是一个基本的公平问题。


The Fund’s research has highlighted the direct link between narrowing the gap between rich and poor and higher economic growth.	IMF的研究强调，减小贫富差距和提高经济增长之间存在直接联系。


The IMF is not the first to make this case, but its stature gives the issue greater prominence and urgency.	IMF并不是第一个证明这一点的机构，但它的地位让这一问题显得更加突出和紧迫。


Lagarde’s personal commitment to driving home this point has been essential to advancing the argument.	拉加德个人一直致力于宣传这一点，这是其紧迫性提高的关键。


Third, Lagarde has done important work in helping the world begin to understand the full implications – some of them frighteningly destabilizing – of technological change.	第三，拉加德在帮助世界认识技术变迁的全部影响方面——其中一些将造成令人害怕的破坏性影响——起到了重要作用。


For example, automation will continue to make manufacturing more efficient and less costly, but it will also ensure that economic growth generates fewer jobs than in the past.	比如，自动化将继续提高制造业的效率、降低其成本，但也意味着经济增长所产生的就业岗位数量不如以前。


The political, economic, and social consequences of this emerging reality deserve recognition and serious study.	这一新兴现实的政治、经济和社会后果值得我们去认识和认真研究。


Lagarde has brought the IMF into the center of that work.	拉加德让IMF成为这一工作的核心。


Critics will say that it’s time for an IMF head who represents the developing world.	批评者会说，是时候让发展中国家代表领导IMF了。


Lagarde is, after all, the 11th consecutive European to hold the post, a privilege that has become hard to justify in today’s world.	毕竟，拉加德已是连续11位担任此职的欧洲人，欧洲拥有如此特权，在当今世界已经难以服众。


Others will say that the failure to recognize the full effects of IMF-endorsed austerity on Greek citizens proves that she is out of touch with ordinary people.	也有人会说，IMF所支持的希腊紧缩并没有取得十足的效果，这证明她已经与普通大众脱节。


Still others will argue that the charges she faces in connection with a financial scandal in France will distract her from IMF business.	还有人会指出，她面临与法国的金融丑闻有涉的指控，这将让她从IMF的工作中分心。


After the ugly scandal surrounding Dominique Strauss-Kahn, her predecessor at the Fund, the Fund, critics will insist, can’t afford such a distraction.	在她的前任多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩（Dominique Strauss-Kahn）深陷丑闻后，批评者认为IMF决不能再一次因���类似事件而分心。


Let’s take these objections one at a time.	我们来逐个分析这些反对意见。


The IMF (and the World Bank) should welcome leadership from beyond Europe and the United States.	IMF（以及世界银行）应该欢迎来自欧洲和美国之外的领导者。


But the purpose of ending this Western privilege is to make the leadership selection process one that is based on merit, not political considerations.	但结束这一西方特权的目的是让领导者遴选过程以才干而不是政治考虑为基础。


Lagarde is the best candidate for the job, and emerging powers like the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have not united behind an alternative.	拉加德是IMF总裁的最佳人选，金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）等新兴力量并没有联合推举替代人选。


The leadership of a European managing director probably facilitated the IMF’s decision late last year to add China’s renminbi to the basket of currencies underpinning its Special Drawing Rights.	由欧洲人担任IMF总裁或许也是去年年底IMF决定将人民币加入决定其特别提款权价值的货币篮子的有利因素之一。


In addition, Lagarde displayed impressive political dexterity in finally persuading Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress to pass governance reforms that not only bolster the IMF’s firepower to fight financial crises, but also more accurately reflect changing global economic dynamics.	此外，拉加德以令人印象深刻的政治灵活性，最终说服美国国会的共和党和民主党批准了IMF治理改革，这些改革不仅增强了IMF遏制金融危机的弹药库，也更加正确地体现了变化的全球经济动态。


The BRIC countries, for example, are now among the IMF’s top ten shareholders.	比如，现在金砖四国已经跻身IMF前十大股东行列。


On Greece, Lagarde made some characteristically blunt – some would say clumsy –comments last year.	在希腊问题上，去年拉加德做了一些颇有个人风格的直率——也有人认为是不合适的——评论。


But she is not near the top of the list of those responsible for the economic pain endured by Greeks, and her tenure at the IMF makes abundantly clear that no managing director in history has done more to lead the Fund in efforts to alleviate the suffering of people in crisis.	但她绝不是给希腊人带来经济痛苦的罪魁，她在IMF的任期充分地表明，在IMF历史上从未有哪位总裁像她那样做了如此多的事情领导IMF努力缓解危机中人民的痛苦。


Finally, the French charges against Lagarde were filed over the objection of the country’s prosecutor-general, and her involvement in the case appears tangential at best.	最后，法国对拉加德的指控受到了法国总检察官的反对，并且拉加德至多只是略微牵涉其中。


The world badly needs a leader dedicated to making the world a safer and more prosperous place.	世界急需一位致力于让世界更安全、更繁荣的领导人。


Lagarde has shown that she is such a leader, committed to making the IMF fit for the twenty-first century.	拉加德已经证明她正是这样的领导人，她致力于让IMF适应二十一世纪。


She deserves the chance to finish what she started.	她理应获得有始有终的机会。


How to Reform the IMF Now	现在如何改革IMF


WASHINGTON, DC – More than four years have passed since an overwhelming majority of the membership of the International Monetary Fund agreed to a package of reforms that would double the organization’s resources and reorganize its governing structure in favor of developing countries.	华盛顿—国际货币基金组织（IMF）绝大部分成员国同意改革方案已经过去了四年。 这套方案将让IMF的资源扩大一倍，并以有利于发展中国家的方式重新组织其治理结构。


But adopting the reforms requires approval by the IMF’s member countries; and, though the United States was among those that voted in favor of the measure, President Barack Obama has been unable to secure Congressional approval.	但事实改革需要IMF成员国的批准； 而尽管美国也投票支持改革措施，但总统奥巴马一直无法确保国会通过。


The time has come to consider alternative methods for moving the reforms forward.	现在，应该考虑换别的办法推进改革了。


The delay by the US represents a huge setback for the IMF.	美国的迟迟不作为反映了IMF的一个巨大退步。


It stands in the way of a restructuring of its decision-making process that would better reflect developing countries’ growing importance and dynamism.	它正在进行决策过程的重组，以更好地反映发展中国家日益增加的重要性和活力。


Furthermore, with the reforms in limbo, the IMF has been forced to depend largely on loans from its members, rather than the permanent resources called for by the new measures.	此外，改革问题悬而未决迫使IMF基本只能依靠成员国贷款而非新措施所要求的永久性资源。


These loans, meant as a temporary bridge before the reforms entered into effect, need to be reaffirmed every six months.	这些贷款原本只是改革实施前的过渡手段，每六个月就必须重新确认一次。


In our view, the best way forward would be to decouple the part of the reforms that requires ratification by the US Congress from the rest of the package.	我们认为，最好的前进方式是将改革需要美国国会批准的部分与其他部分脱钩。


Only one major element – the decision to move toward an all-elected Executive Board – requires an amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and thus congressional approval.	只有一个重要要素——将执委会（Executive Board）改革委完全选举制的决定——需要IMF修订其章程，因而也需要国会批准。


The other major element of the reform package is an increase and rebalancing of the quotas that determine each country’s voting power and financial obligation.	另一个改革的重要要素是决定每个成员国投票权和金融义务的配额的增加和再平衡。


This change would double the IMF’s resources and provide greater voting power to developing countries.	这一变化将让IMF的资源扩大一倍，并给发展中国家更大的投票权。


Congress would still need to ratify the measure before the US’s own quota increased, but its approval would not be required for this part of the reform package to take effect for other countries.	国会仍需要在美国自身的配额增加前批准该措施，但其批准对于改革的该部分在其他国家生效并非必要条件。


The connection between the two parts of the reforms has always been unnecessary; the measures are independent, require different approval processes, and can be delivered separately.	改革的这两部分从来没有必要联系起来； 措施是独立的，要求不同的批准过程，也可以各自实施。


Removing the link between them would require the support of the US administration, but not ratification by Congress.	消除它们之间的联系需要美国政府的支持，但不需要国会的批准。


This separation could be implemented smoothly.	将它们分离的过程可以平稳实施。


A simple majority of the IMF’s Executive Board would recommend it to the Board of Governors, where a resolution separating the reforms into two parts would require 85% of the votes.	IMF执委会的简单多数就可以向理事会（Board of Governors）提出建议，而理事会需要85%以上多数方可形成将改革分为两个部分的决议。


In 2010, the reform package passed with more than 95% of the votes.	2010年，改革所得到的支持超过95%。


The changes to the quotas could then quickly become effective.	配额的变化可以随之迅速生效。


The quotas for each member country have already been agreed, so there would be no need for further complex and time-consuming negotiations.	每个成员国的配额数已经形成了一致，因此不需要进一步的复杂又耗时的谈判。


Countries that are willing and able to pay their quota increases would be allowed to do so, increasing the IMF’s resources and boosting their relative voting power.	愿意并且能够支付配额增加的国家可以这样做，从而增加IMF的资源和它们的相对投票权。


The key obstacle to this proposal is the requirement of congressional approval to increase America’s quota share.	这一方案的主要障碍是增加美国配���比例需要国会批准。


This opens the possibility that the US’s voting power could temporarily fall below the 15% threshold needed to veto decisions that require the support of 85% of IMF members’ votes.	这就造成了一种可能性，即美国的投票权可能暂时下降到15%以下，也就是无法达到否决需要IMF成员国85%支持率的决定的阈值。


In order to secure US support, the Board of Governors could commit not to consider any draft decision requiring 85% backing without America’s consent.	为了确保美国的支持，理事会可以承诺在没有美国同意的情况下不考虑任何要求85%支持的决定草案。


This guarantee could be included in the resolution dividing the reform package into two parts.	这一保证可以包括在将改革分为两部分的决议中。


It would remain valid until the US was in a position to increase its quota and recover its voting share.	它将一直保持有效直至美国愿意增加其配额并回复其投票权比例。


The Executive Board could approve an analogous commitment and request the IMF’s managing director to refrain from submitting any draft decision requiring an 85% majority without first obtaining US support.	执委会可以批准类似的承诺，并要求IMF总裁在没有先获得美国支持的情况下不提交任何需要85%多数支持的决定草案。


The US administration might face criticism from Congress for accepting a measure that would temporarily cut the country’s voting share and for relying on a political agreement to preserve its veto power.	美国政府可能面临国会的批评，指责它接受会暂时减少美国投票比例的措施、依靠政治协议保留否决权。


But the agreement could also act as an incentive for ratifying the reforms.	但该协议也能成为批准改革的激励。


The power to reinstate the US’s formal veto power would lie entirely in the hands of Congress – making it unlikely that another four years would pass before the matter is finally resolved.	恢复美国的正式否决权的权力将完全掌握在国会手中——这意味着不可能再需要四年才能最终解决这一问题。


Airing the IMF’s Dirty Laundry	为国际货币基金组织打扫门庭


BERKELEY – Following the International Monetary Fund’s controversial actions in the Asian financial crisis of 1998, when it conditioned liquidity assistance to distressed countries on government belt-tightening, the IMF established an Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) to undertake arm’s-length assessments of its policies and programs.	发自伯克利——由于国际货币基金组织在1998年亚洲金融危机期间要求各受灾国必须压缩政府财政支出否则拒绝发放流动性援助的做法引发了极大争议，该组织成立了一个名为独立评估办公室（Independent Evaluation Office）的机构来对其政策和项目进行中立性评估。


That office has now issued a comprehensive critique of the Fund’s role in Europe’s post-2008 crisis.	而最近该办公室就针对基金在欧洲2008年危机后这段时间所起到的作用发布了一份全面批评报告。


Many of the IEO’s conclusions will be familiar.	这份报告中的许多结论说起来也不新鲜。


IMF surveillance, intended to detect economic vulnerabilities and imbalances, was inadequate.	用于侦测经济脆弱性和不平衡的基金监督机制其实并不完备。


While staff sometimes pointed to booming credit, gaping current-account deficits, or stagnant productivity, they downplayed the implications.	虽然基金工作人员有时也会指出某国存在信贷规模不断扩大，经常账户赤字增加或生产力停滞不前的问题，但他们往往会低估了这些事件的影响力。


Strong institutions like the European Commission and the European Central Bank had superior management skills. Monetary union, for some less-than-fully articulated reason, changed the rules of the game.	不管该基金是否意识到了这一点，但这反映了一种倾向，认为欧洲是不一样的——其先进经济体不会存在与新兴市场类似的漏洞，欧盟委员会和欧洲央行这类强大机构拥有优秀的管理技能，而货币联盟的存在则改变了游戏规则——虽然未能充分阐述其缘由。


Such self-serving claims were in the interest of European officials, but why was the IMF prepared to accept them?	这种自欺欺人的说法对那帮欧洲官员来说当然是有利的，但为何国际货币基金组织却照单全收？


One answer is that European governments are large shareholders in the Fund.	对此一个说法是欧洲各国政府都是基金的大股东。


Another is that the IMF is a predominantly European institution, with a European managing director, a heavily European staff, and a European culture.	另一个说法则指出国际货币基金组织是一个欧洲主导的机构，有一个欧洲人总裁，以欧洲人为主的员工队伍和欧式文化氛围。


The report, still on familiar ground, then goes on to criticize the Fund for acquiescing to European resistance to debt restructuring by Greece in 2010. It criticizes the IMF for setting ambitious targets for fiscal consolidation– necessary if debt restructuring was to be avoided – but underestimating austerity’s damaging economic effects.	不出意外，该报告随后批评该基金默许欧洲否决了2010年的希腊债务重组，它批评基金为财政巩固措施——在避免债务重组的情况下是有必要实施的——设定了过于激进的目标，但低估了紧缩对经济效应的破坏效应。


More interestingly, the report then asks how the Fund should coordinate its operations with regional bodies like the European Commission and the ECB, the other members of the so-called Troika of Greece’s official creditors. The report rejects claims that the IMF was effectively a junior member of the Troika, insisting that all decisions were made by consensus.	更有趣的是，该报告指明基金组织应当如何与欧盟委员会和欧洲央行（三者并称希腊官方债权人的三驾马车）这类区域性机构协调行动，并驳斥了所谓基金组织其实是三驾马车中的小跟班的说法，坚持所有决策都得在协商一致后作出。


But that is difficult to square with everything we know about the fateful decision not to restructure Greece’s debt.	但这一切都很难跟我们所了解的关于放弃重组希腊债务的重大决定对得上号。


IMF staff favored restructuring, but the European Commission and the ECB, which put up two-thirds of the money, ultimately had their way.	基金组织工作人员倾向重组，但资金规模占了2/3的欧盟委员会和欧洲央行选择了另一条道路。


He who has the largest wallet speaks with the loudest voice.	谁的钱包最鼓，谁说话的分量就最大。


In other words, there are different roads to “consensus.”	换句话说，人家达成“共识”的方式显然不一样。


The Fund encountered the same problem in 2008, when it insisted on currency devaluation as part of an IMF-EU program for Latvia. In the end, the Fund felt compelled to defer to the EU’s opposition to devaluation, because it contributed only 20% of the funds.	其实基金在2008年就遇到过同样的问题，当时基金组织坚持将货币贬值作为基金-欧盟联合援助拉托维亚方案的一部分，却最终不得不屈服于欧盟的反对意见，因为它只为该方案贡献了20％的资金。


The implication is that the IMF should not participate in a program to which it contributes only a minority share of the finance.	其含义就是国际货币基金组织不应参与到那些它只提供了小部分资金的项目中去。


But expecting the IMF to provide majority funding implies the need to expand its financial resources.	但如果要国际货币基金组织提供大多数资金的话，就得扩大其财政资源。


This is something that the IEO report evidently regarded as beyond its mandate – or too sensitive – to discuss.	而这一讨论显然有点超出独立评估办公室的职权范围——或者过于敏感了。


And was the ECB even on the right side of the table in these European debt discussions?	而欧洲央行是否就处于这些欧洲债务讨论的正确一方？


When negotiating with a country, the IMF ordinarily demands conditions of its government and central bank.	当与一个国家进行谈判的时候，国际货币基金组织通常要求其政府和央行遵从相关条件。


In its programs with Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, however, the IMF and the central bank demanded conditions of the government.	不过在与希腊，爱尔兰和葡萄牙的援助方案中，基金组织和欧洲央行也会要求当地政府服从一些条件。


This struck more than a few people as bizarre.	很多人都会对此感到荒谬。


It would have been better if, in 2010, the IMF had demanded of the ECB a pledge “to do whatever it takes” and a program of “outright monetary transactions,” like those ECB President Mario Draghi eventually offered two years later.	如果2010年国际货币基金组织能要求欧洲央行做出“不惜一切代价实施救助”的承诺并执行一项类似“直接货币交易计划”的措施——像欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）在两年后最终给出的那样——形势估计会变得为明朗。


This would have addressed the contagion problem that was one basis for European officials’ resistance to a Greek debt restructuring.	这就能解决危机蔓延的问题，而该问题正是欧洲官员反对希腊债务重组的基础。


One objection to imposing conditions on the ECB is that the eurozone, as a regional entity, is not an IMF member. Only countries, not regions, are entitled to draw IMF resources.	向欧洲央行施加条件的障碍是作为一个区域性实体的欧元区并非国际货币基金组织的成员，而只有国家——不是地区——有权提请基金组织提供资源。


But nothing prevents the IMF from demanding policy commitments from regional bodies when lending to their member governments.	但其实没有什么能阻止基金组织在贷款给某国政府时要求该国所属区域机构做出政策承诺。


This has been done before when African and Caribbean monetary unions and central banks were involved.	这在非洲和加勒比海地区货币联盟和中央银行身上早就有先例了。


Finally, the report criticizes IMF management for failing to ensure adequate involvement by the Executive Board, its oversight committee of 24 national representatives.	最后，报告批评了基金组织管理层未能确保执行董事会（由24个国家代表组成的监督委员会）对决策的充分参与。


Board approval was sought, but only after the key decisions were already made.	虽然所有决策都会呈交董事会签字批准，但那时候关键决策早就制定完毕了。


Moreover, the Board was forced to act under intense time pressure and lacked the information needed to challenge management recommendations.	此外，董事会被迫承受着巨大时间压力来运作，也缺乏质疑管理层的政策建议所需的信息。


The IEO’s report suggests involving the Board more meaningfully, in order to provide a counterweight to political pressure from regional stakeholders.	独立评估办公室的报告建议执行董事会更深入地参与进来，以便有效制衡来自区域性利益关联方的政治压力。


But this merely threatens to substitute one form of political influence for another.	但这仅仅是威胁用替代一种形式的政治影响力去取代另一种而已。


But this presupposes freeing the IMF from dependence on financial contributions from its regional stakeholders. And it requires IMF management to demonstrate that it can consistently make decisions based on program countries’ economic interest, not on the political preferences of powerful national shareholders.	让一个独立的管理团队按照央行政策委员会的方式做出不受政治干预的决定当然是更好的，但实现这一点的前提是解除国际货币基金组织对区域利益关联方捐款的依赖，也要求基金组织管理层能证明自身可以持续基于受援国的经济利益——而不是强势国家股东的政治偏好——来做出决策。


The Inequality Trifecta	不平等性三驾马车


LAGUNA BEACH – There were quite a few disconnects at the recently concluded Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.	拉古娜海滩—最近结束的国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行年会颇有些不和谐。


Among the most striking was the disparity between participants’ interest in discussions of inequality and the ongoing lack of a formal action plan for governments to address it.	其中最显著的是参与国在关于不平等性问题上的利益分歧以及一直缺少解决不平等性的正式政府行动计划。


This represents a profound failure of policy imagination – one that must urgently be addressed.	这反映出政策想象力的巨大失败——这个问题相当紧迫。


There is good reason for the spike in interest.	利益冲突其来有自。


While inequality has decreased across countries, it has increased within them, in the advanced and developing worlds alike.	尽管国家间不平等性在降低，但国家内部不平等性在升高，发达国家和发展中国家均是如此。


The process has been driven by a combination of secular and structural issues – including the changing nature of technological advancement, the rise of “winner-take-all” investment characteristics, and political systems favoring the wealthy – and has been turbocharged by cyclical forces.	这一过程受长期问题和结构性问题的联合推动——包括科技进步性质的改变、“赢家通吃”投资特征的出现以及有利于富人的政治制度——并受到周期性力量的推波助澜。


In the developed world, the problem is rooted in unprecedented political polarization, which has impeded comprehensive responses and placed an excessive policy burden on central banks.	在发达国家，问题的根源在于前所未有的政治极化。 政治极化阻碍了全面应对措施，也给中央银行造成了过重的政策负担。


Though monetary authorities enjoy more political autonomy than other policymaking bodies, they lack the needed tools to address effectively the challenges that their countries face.	尽管货币当局比其他决策机构享受着更大的政治自主权，但它们缺少必要的工具有效解决国家所面临的挑战。


In normal times, fiscal policy would support monetary policy, including by playing a redistributive role.	在常规时期，财政政策可以支持货币政策，扮演再分配角色就是办法之一。


But these are not normal times.	但这只是在常规时期。


With political gridlock blocking an appropriate fiscal response – after 2008, the United States Congress did not pass an annual budget, a basic component of responsible economic governance, for five years – central banks have been forced to bolster economies artificially.	当政治僵局阻碍合理的财政应对措施时——2008年后，在五年的时间里，美国国会都没有通过年度预算，而年度预算乃是负责任的经济治理的一大要素——中央银行就被迫人为提振经济。


To do so, they have relied on near-zero interest rates and unconventional measures like quantitative easing to stimulate growth and job creation.	为了完成这一目标，它们依靠近零利率和量化宽松等非常规手段刺激增长和就业创造。


Beyond being incomplete, this approach implicitly favors the wealthy, who hold a disproportionately large share of financial assets.	这一方针不但不够完善，还有偏向于持有绝大部分金融资产的富人。


Meanwhile, companies have become increasingly aggressive in their efforts to reduce their tax bills, including through so-called inversions, by which they move their headquarters to lower-tax jurisdictions.	与此同时，公司更加热衷于降低税单——包括通过所谓的海外避税（inversions，即将总部迁往税率较低的司法辖区）。


As a result, most countries face a trio of inequalities – of income, wealth, and opportunity – which, left unchecked, reinforce one another, with far-reaching consequences.	结果，大部分国家面临着三重不平等——收入、财富和机会——若不加以改观，三者之间将互相强化，造成影响深远的后果。


Indeed, beyond this trio’s moral, social, and political implications lies a serious economic concern: instead of creating incentives for hard work and innovation, inequality begins to undermine economic dynamism, investment, employment, and prosperity.	事实上，三重不平等除了道德、社会和政治影响外，还造成了严重的经济隐忧：不平等性并没有激励努力工作和创新，反而开始破坏经济活力、投资、就业和繁荣。


Given that affluent households spend a smaller share of their incomes and wealth, greater inequality translates into lower overall consumption, thereby hindering the recovery of economies already burdened by inadequate aggregate demand.	丰裕家庭花费收入和财富的比例较低，因此，不平等性的升高会带来总体消费水平的降低，从而制约已不堪总需求不足重负的经济复苏。


Today’s high levels of inequality also impede the structural reforms needed to boost productivity, while undermining efforts to address residual pockets of excessive indebtedness.	今天的高度不平等性还阻碍了提振生产率所需要的结构性改革，也不利于修复过度负债者干瘪的钱包。


This is a dangerous combination that erodes social cohesion, political effectiveness, current GDP growth, and future economic potential.	这是个危险的组合，它侵蚀社会凝聚，破坏政治效率，拉低当前GDP增长，抑制未来经济潜力。


That is why it is so disappointing that, despite heightened awareness of inequality, the IMF/World Bank meetings – a gathering of thousands of policymakers, private-sector participants, and journalists, which included seminars on inequality in advanced countries and developing regions alike – failed to make a consequential impact on the policy agenda.	因此，令人颇感失望的是，尽管有数千位��策者、私人部门参与者和记者参与、包括了许多关于发达国家和发展中地区不平等性问题研讨会的IMF/世界银行会议对不平等性问题心知肚明，却没有对政治日程形成重大影响。


Policymakers seem convinced that the time is not right for a meaningful initiative to address inequality of income, wealth, and opportunity.	决策者似乎认为，采取有意义的措施解决收入、财富和机会不平等时机未到。


But waiting will only make the problem more difficult to resolve.	但等待只会让问题变得更加难以解决。


In fact, a number of steps can and should be taken to stem the rise in inequality.	事实上，可以也应该采取一系列措施阻止不平等性的升高。


In the US, for example, sustained political determination would help to close massive loopholes in estate planning and inheritance, as well as in household and corporate taxation, that disproportionately benefit the wealthy.	比如，在美国，保持政治决心有助于填补财产规划和继承方面的巨大漏洞，填补家庭和公司纳税漏洞——这两大漏洞让富人获得了巨大好处。


Likewise, there is scope for removing the antiquated practice of taxing hedge and private-equity funds’ “carried interest” at a preferential rate.	类似地，我们有空间取消税务对冲（taxing hedge）和以优惠税率对私募股权基金的“附带收益”征税的过时做法。


The way home ownership is taxed and subsidized could be reformed more significantly, especially at the top price levels.	住房所有权的征税和补贴办法应该进行更大的改革，特别是对最高价格水平的房产。


And a strong case has been made for raising the minimum wage.	提高最低工资也是强有力的办法。


To be sure, such measures will make only a dent in inequality, albeit an important and visible one.	平心而论，这些措施只能略微降低不平等性，尽管这非常重要也可以轻松看到。


In order to deepen their impact, a more comprehensive macroeconomic policy stance is needed, with the explicit goal of reinvigorating and redesigning structural-reform efforts, boosting aggregate demand, and eliminating debt overhangs.	要深化效果，必须采取更全面的宏观经济政策立场，树立明确复兴和重新设计结构性改革措施、提振总需求、消除债务积压的目标。


Such an approach would reduce the enormous policy burden currently borne by central banks.	这一方针将减轻目前央行所承担的巨大的政策负担。


It is time for heightened global attention to inequality to translate into concerted action.	对不平等性的全球关注应该转变为集体行动。


Some initiatives would tackle inequality directly; others would defuse some of the forces that drive it.	一些措施可以直接降低不平等性，另一些措施则针对不平等性背后的因素。


Together, they would go a long way toward mitigating a serious impediment to the economic and social wellbeing of current and future generations.	合在一起，它们可以极大地助益于减轻我们和子孙后代的经济和社会福祉的巨大阻力。


The Migration Superpowers	移民超级大国


LONDON – We have entered the age of migration.	伦敦——我们已经进入到移民时代。


If all the people who live outside the country of their birth united to form their own – a republic of the rootless – it would be the fifth-largest country in the world, with a population of more than 240 million people.	如果所有生活在国外的人联合起来成立自己的流浪共和国，该国将成为拥有超过2. 4亿人口的世界第五大国。


Though much has been written about how a world on the move is changing national politics, there has been little consideration of its geopolitical effects.	虽然以移民世界如何改变国家政治为主题的文章不胜枚举，但对地缘政治的影响却很少有人考虑过。


But the mass movement of people is already creating three types of migration superpowers: new colonialists, integrators, and go-betweens.	但人口大规模迁徙已经创造了3类移民超级大国：即新殖民主义者、整合者和中间人。


The new colonialists call to mind the settlers from Europe who spread across the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, benefiting not just themselves, but also their homelands.	新殖民主义者让人回想起18及19世纪从欧洲分散到全世界定居的殖民者，这样做不仅惠及他们自身，而且惠及了他们曾经生活的祖国。


Similarly, the most mobile populations of the twenty-first century are helping their countries of origin obtain access to markets, technology, and a political voice in the world.	同样，21世纪最具流动性的人口正在帮助其原籍国获得市场、技术和世界政治领域的发言权。


The American journalist Howard W. French describes how Africa has become “China’s second continent,” as more than a million new Chinese settlers remake Sub-Saharan Africa.	美国记者霍华德·弗兰奇描绘了非洲如何成为“中国的第二大陆”，因为超过100万新来的中国移民正在改造撒哈拉以南非洲。


With more Chinese citizens living outside mainland China than there are French people living in France, a similar story is playing out on almost every continent.	在生活在中国大陆以外的中国公民超过法国国内的法国公民的情况下，类似的故事几乎在每块大陆上演着。


When those migrants return to China, their capabilities are expertly harvested.	当那些移民返回到中国，他们的能力都能得到熟练的应用。


Known in China as “sea turtles,” they dominate their country’s technology industry.	他们在中国被称为“海龟”，并主宰着这个国家的科技行业。


India, too, has a large diaspora of an estimated 20 million citizens who are super-successful and hyper-connected.	据估算，印度同样拥有约2千万超级成功且与外界紧密联系的民众。


Indian-born entrepreneurs are responsible for setting up one in ten companies in Silicon Valley.	出生在印度的企业家是1/10的硅谷企业的创立者。


Microsoft’s chief executive is of Indian origin, as is the inventor of the Intel Pentium processor, the former chief technology officer at Motorola, and the CEO of Google.	微软的首席执行官是印度裔，同样情况的还有英特尔奔腾处理器的发明人、摩托罗拉前首席技术官和谷歌的首席执行官。


How does this benefit India?	印度从中得到了什么好处？


For starters, India receives more than $70 billion in remittances every year, the largest sum worldwide, amounting to nearly 4% of its GDP, which is more than it spends on education.	首先，印度每年接收的汇款超过700亿美元，汇款金额为世界之最，在印度GDP中占比近4%，超过了印度的教育支出。


And while it may not be possible to prove a causal connection, the influx of Indians into America has coincided with a shift in both countries’ geopolitical orientations, as evidenced by the historic 2008 nuclear deal by which the US abandoned its policy of equidistance between India and Pakistan.	而且尽管可能无法证明其因果关系，但印度人涌入美国期间恰巧两国的地缘政治取向发生了变化，证据是在2008年历史性的核协议中美国放弃了与印度和巴基斯坦保持等距的政策。


With so many people on the move, it is even possible to become a settler superpower without being recognized as a state.	因为移民人数如此之多，在没有认可国家地位的情况下就成为移民超级大国是完全可能的。


The estimated 35 million Kurds – who regard themselves as a nation without a country – are becoming one of the most politically active migrant populations in Europe.	据估算有3500万自称“无国家民族”的库尔德人正在成为欧洲政治上最活跃的移民人口。


It is likely no coincidence that the governments of Sweden and Germany, with their large populations of Kurdish origin, are providing militarily support to the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against the Islamic State (ISIS).	拥有大量库尔德裔民众的瑞典和德国为库尔德自由斗士抵抗伊斯兰国（ISIS）的斗争提供军事支持很可能并不是巧合。


The second type of superpower is the integrator.	第二类超级大国是整合者。


Libraries could be filled with books about how the United States has benefited from its ability to transform people from around the world into American citizens.	图书馆里描述美国如何从将来自世界各地的移民转化成美国人中受益的书籍绝对不在少数。


Similarly, Angola and Brazil have reversed the brain drain and are receiving large flows of immigrants from their former colonial ruler, Portugal.	同样，安哥拉和巴西已经扭转了人才外流的状况，接收来自前殖民统治者葡萄牙的大量移民流入。


But the two most eye-catching experiments in integration today are Israel and ISIS.	但移民融合两个最抢眼的试验品当属以色列和伊斯兰国。


Immigration from the diaspora is essential to Israel, which is reflected in the Hebrew word for it: aliyah, derived from the verb “to ascend.”	离散的犹太移民对以色列而言至关重要，这反映在以动词“提升”为词根的希伯来语单词“aliyah”中。


Indeed, the government provides “aliyah consultants,” as well as free one-way flights, language classes, and practical support.	事实上，政府设立了“aliyah顾问”，还有免费的单程航班、��言课和各种各样的实际支持。


As a result, Israel’s population has risen ninefold since the country’s founding in 1948.	结果导致1948年以色列建国以来人口出现了9倍的增长。


In Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle, co-authored with Saul Singer, the American writer and political adviser Dan Senor poses a fundamental question.	在与索尔·辛格合著的《初创国：以色列经济奇迹的故事》一书中，美国作家兼政治顾问丹·塞纳提出了一个根本性的问题。


“How is it,” he asks, “that Israel – a country of 7.1 million people, only sixty years old, surrounded by enemies, in a constant state of war since its founding, with no natural resources – produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom?”	“这究竟是怎么回事”，他问道，“以色列——一个只有710万人口、6年历史、被敌人所包围、从建国以来就战争不断且没有任何自然资源的国家成立的创业公司比日本、中国、印度、朝鲜、加拿大和英国等和平稳定的大国还要多？


The answer, of course, is immigration.	”答案当然是移民的功劳。


ISIS’s leaders would not be happy with the comparison, but their group’s rapid emergence on the map has drawn some lessons from Israel.	这个比喻可能令伊斯兰国的领导人感到不快，但其组织在地图上的快速崛起其实是借鉴了以色列某些经验的。


The so-called Islamic State may not be officially recognized by anyone, but it is being built on the basis of immigration.	所谓的伊斯兰国或许并未得到所有人的正式承认，但正处在以移民为基础的迅速建立的过程中。


According to the Soufan Group, roughly 30,000 people from 86 countries have traveled to ISIS-held territory in Syria and Iraq.	按照苏凡集团的统计，约有来自86个国家的3万人已经前往叙利亚和伊拉克境内的伊斯兰国控制区。


The third type of immigration superpowers are go-betweens, which use their geography to extract concessions from migration-phobic neighbors.	第三类移民超级大国是中间人，利用其自身地理优势迫使患移民恐惧症的邻国作出让步。


The most notable example is Turkey; once forced to beg to be considered for European Union membership, it now dictates the terms of its relationship with Brussels.	土耳其是其中最为明显的； 该国曾一度祈求获得欧盟成员资格，但现在却成为与布鲁塞尔关系条款的制定者。


A leaked transcript of a recent summit with European leaders revealed how President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan threatened to bus refugees to Greece and Bulgaria if his demands were not met.	一份泄露出来的欧盟领导人最新峰会谈话揭示了埃尔多安总统如何威胁如果不满足其要求就将难民用大巴运到希腊和保加利亚。


Niger is another go-between.	还有一个中间人是尼日尔。


As a major transit hub through which 90% of all West African migrants pass on their way to Italy, Niger succeeded in securing €600 million ($680 million) in the last EU aid budget.	作为90%西非难民前往意大利的主要交通枢纽，尼日尔成功地从上一份欧盟援助预算中获得了6亿欧元（约合6. 8亿美元）的援助保障。


In doing so, it followed the example of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, who famously warned that Europe would “turn black” if it did not pay him to hold back migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean.	该国这样做是效仿了利比亚的卡扎菲，卡扎菲曾当众警告欧洲如果不向他付费截住试图跨越地中海的移民欧洲就会变得“漆黑一片”。


If the established powers that first benefited from the globalization of trade are known as the G-7, the countries, regions, and organizations that are benefiting from migration – China, India, Kurdistan, Israel, ISIS, Turkey, and Niger – could be called the M-7.	如果首先从贸易全球化中受益的大国被称为G7，那么从移民潮中获益的国家、地区和机构——包括中国、印度、库尔德斯坦、以色列、伊斯兰国、土耳其和尼日尔——可以称为M7。


As control over population flows become a currency of power, states that follow the M-7’s lead will have the opportunity to boost their geopolitical heft.	随着对人口流动的控制权逐渐成为一种权力货币，接受M7领导的国家将有机会提升自己的地缘政治分量。


For the West, the biggest challenge will be to reconcile domestic pressure for closed borders with the geopolitical advantages of embracing migration.	对西方而言，最大的难题将是在关闭边境的国内压力和接收移民的地缘政治优势间进行协调。


For now, at least, it seems that the G-7 – for which an easily affordable influx of refugees has somehow become a “crisis” – will continue to aid the M-7’s rise.	至少，从目前情况看，似乎成本极低的难民流入俨然已成为某种“危机”的G7将继续帮助M7走上崛起的道路。


Immigration into the Welfare State	向福利国家移民


MUNICH – The armed conflict destabilizing some Arab countries has unleashed a huge wave of refugees headed for Europe.	慕尼黑—动摇一些阿拉伯国家的武装冲突导致一大波难民涌向欧洲。


About 1.1 million came to Germany alone in 2015.	2015年，光是德国就接收了110万难民。


At the same time, the adoption of the principle of freedom of movement within Europe has triggered massive, but largely unnoticed, intra-European migration flows.	与此同时，欧洲内部自由迁徙原则的实施也引发了大规模（但基本没有得到关注的）欧洲内部移民流。


In 2014, Germany experienced an unprecedented net inflow of 304,000 people from other EU countries, and the number was probably similar in 2015.	2014年，德国前所未有地出现了来自其他欧盟国家的304,000人的净流入，2015年的数字可能与此相当。


Some EU members, including Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Spain, France, and the initially welcoming Denmark and Sweden, have reacted by practically suspending the Schengen Agreement and reinstating border controls.	一些欧盟成员国——包括奥地利、匈牙利、斯洛文尼亚、西班牙、法国以及最初欢迎移民的丹麦和瑞典——的应对措施是事实暂停了申根协定，重新开启边境控制。


Economists are not really surprised at this.	经济学家对此其实一点也不奇怪。


In the 1990s, dozens of academic papers addressed the issue of migration into welfare states, discussing many of the problems that are now becoming apparent.	20世纪90年代，几十篇学术文章探讨了向福利国家移民的问题，其中的许多问题如今正在日益显现。


I myself wrote much on the subject at the time, trying – mostly in vain – to raise awareness among policymakers.	当时，我本人也写了很多文章，试图引起决策者的注意——但大多徒劳无功。


A fundamental issue is at stake.	一个基本问题摆在眼前。


Welfare states are defined by the principle that those who enjoy above-average income pay more taxes and contributions than what they get back in the form of public services, while those with below-average earnings pay less than they receive.	福利国家的定义是，收入高于平均水平的国民缴纳税收和捐赠多于他们从公共服务中所获得的量，而收入低于平均水平的公民付出少于他们所获得的量。


This redistribution, channeling net public resources toward lower-income households, is a sensible correction to the market economy, a kind of insurance against life’s vicissitudes and the rigors of scarcity pricing that characterize the market economy and have little to do with equitableness.	这一再分配让公共资源净流向较低收入家庭，它是对市场经济的明智的纠正，一种针对生活起伏和作为市场经济特征、与平等背道而驰的稀缺性定价的严酷性的保险。


Welfare states are fundamentally incompatible with the free movement of people between countries if the newcomers have immediate and full access to public benefits in their host countries.	福利国家与国家间人口自由流动之间存在根本性不相容，如果新来者马上就能在东道国获得完全的公共福利的话。


In such cases, countries can act as welfare magnets, attracting many more migrants than would be economically advisable, because the newcomers receive, in addition to their wages, a migration grant in the form of public transfers.	若是如此，国家就有可能成为福利磁铁，吸引远大于经济上合理数量的移民，因为新来者除了工资，还能获得以公共转移支付为形式的移民津贴。


Only if migrants received only wages could efficient self-regulation in migration be expected.	只有在移民只能获得工资的情况下，才能期望产生有效的自我移民监管。


British Prime Minister David Cameron drew the right conclusion from this: Welfare magnetism not only leads to an inefficient geographical distribution of people; it also erodes and damages the magnet.	英国首相卡梅伦正确地据此推论：福利磁性不但导致低效的人口地理分布； 还会腐蚀和伤害福利磁铁。


That’s why Cameron is demanding a limitation of the inclusion principle, even for intra-European economic migrants.	因此，卡梅伦要求，包容原则应该有个界限，即使对欧洲内部的经济移民也是如此。


Even if they find a job, says Cameron, migrants should get access to tax-financed welfare benefits only after four years.	卡梅伦说，即使移民找到了工作，也应该在四年后再享受税收融资的福利。


As it stands, a substantial waiting period is in force only for non-working EU migrants, who must be resident in the United Kingdom for five years to gain full access to public benefits.	目前，漫长等待期只对无工作的欧盟移民生效，只有在英国居住满五年，才能获得完全的公共福利。


The proposal does not necessarily imply hardship for EU migrants; it simply means that any support they may require over the four-year period is to be financed by their home country.	这一建议未必会给欧盟移民造成困难； 它只是意味着，移民在四年等待期期间的任何支持要求都必须由母国出资。


There is indeed much to be said for frontloading the home-country principle in EU rules: a migrant’s country of origin should continue to be responsible for providing social benefits for a certain number of years, until the inclusion principle is applied.	诚然，将母国原则置于欧盟规则之前大可商榷：移民的来源国应该继续负责提供社会福利一定年份，直到包容原则生效。


It is difficult to see why, for example, a German welfare recipient who is unfit for work should be supported by the Spanish state if he decides to live in Mallorca.	比如，很难接受为何生活在马略卡的不适合工作的德国籍福利受领者应该由西班牙供养。


It would be equally implausible to deny this person the right to choose his place of abode just to protect the Spanish state.	仅仅为了保护西班牙而剥夺这位德国人选择居住地的权利也同样站不住脚。


If we are to take the free movement of people seriously, we should slaughter the sacred cow of immediate eligibility for host-state benefits.	如果我们认真对待人的自由迁徙这一问题，就必须先将立刻能获得东道国福利的资格拉下圣坛。


This of course does not apply to economic migrants from non-EU countries, and even less to refugees.	当然，这不适用于来自非欧盟国家的经济移民，更不适用于难民。


The home-country principle would usually be impossible to apply in these cases.	母国原则在这些例子中常常不可能应用。


But, for the same reasons outlined above, these migrants cannot be integrated by the hundreds of thousands into the welfare state without jeopardizing the system’s viability.	但是，出于前文所举的原因，这些移民不可能以数十万的规模融入福利国家而不影响福利制度的可行性。


Therefore, the currently prevailing wage-replacement benefit system, which is applied when recipients do not work, should be replaced with a system offering wage supplements and community work.	因此，应该用提供工资补助和社区工作的制度取代当前流行的、在领受者不工作时应用的工资替代福利制度。


This would lower the benefits’ net costs and weaken incentives to migrate.	这将降低福利的净成本，减小移民激励。


Andrea Nahles, Germany’s labor minister, recently suggested as much, defending what Germans call the one-euro-jobs concept, which basically converts welfare into a wage.	德国劳工部长那勒斯（Andrea Nahles）最近便提出了这样的建议，为德国人所谓的一欧元岗位（one-euro-job）概念（其实是将福利转换为工资）辩护。


That is sound advice in an otherwise chaotic state of affairs.	这是一个一团乱象中的可靠建议。


If freedom of movement within Europe is to be maintained – and if high inflows of non-EU citizens continue – European welfare states face a stark choice: adjust or collapse.	要想保持欧洲内部的自由迁徙——以及保持大量非欧盟公民流入——欧洲福利国家将面临艰难的选择：调整还是崩溃。


The Politics of Polio Eradication	根除脊髓灰质炎的政治学


CAMBRIDGE – A few years ago, the global campaign to eradicate polio seemed to have stalled.	剑桥—几年前，全球根除脊髓灰质炎运动似乎陷入了停滞。


After decades of eradication efforts, the virus remained stubbornly endemic in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria.	在进行了几十年的根除努力后，脊髓灰质炎病毒仍然在巴基斯坦、阿富汗和尼日利亚肆虐。


Then, in 2013 and 2014, it was found to have returned to seven previously polio-free countries in Africa and the Middle East, prompting the World Health Organization to declare the disease’s resurgence a “public-health emergency of international concern.”	接着，在2013年和2014年，它被发现重新出现在此前已经消灭了脊髓灰质炎的七个非洲和中东国家，世界卫生组织因此宣布该疾病的复现是“值得国际关注的公共卫生紧急情况”。


Despite this recidivism, the world today is closer than ever to eradicating polio.	尽管出现了遮掩的反复，当今世界比以往任何时候都更加接近于根除脊髓灰质炎。


In 2015, there were just 74 new cases of the disease – 80% fewer than the previous year and the lowest annual total ever.	2015年只有74例新病例——比前一年减少80%，也是历史上最低的年度数字。


And all of the cases were concentrated in just two countries, 54 in Pakistan and 20 in Afghanistan.	并且所有病例都集中在两个国家，54例在巴基斯坦，20例在阿富汗。


Moreover, it has been eighteen months since the virus was last detected in Africa.	此外，距离该病毒上一次在非洲被检测到已经过去了十八个月。


The reasons behind this remarkable turnaround are instructive, illustrating the challenges facing public-health workers and the best ways to overcome them.	这一令人瞩目的转机背后的原因很具有说明性，它告诉了我们公共卫生工作者面临着怎样的挑战，克服这些挑战的最佳方法呢又在哪里。


The barriers to polio eradication are no longer medical; the disease does not occur where vaccination programs operate unhindered.	根除脊髓灰质炎的壁垒早已不是医学； 只要能不受���碍地推广疫苗计划，就不会出现这种病例。


During the past five years, polio cases have occurred almost exclusively in five conflict-affected countries: Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria.	过去五年来，脊髓灰质炎病例几乎全部发生在五个饱受冲突影响的国家：尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、阿富汗、索马里和叙利亚。


Because immunization programs are led by national governments and the WHO, which, as a specialized agency of the United Nations, works closely with incumbent regimes, it can be difficult to carry out vaccinations in areas where militants wage war against the state.	由于免疫计划由国家政府和世卫组织领导，而世卫组织作为联合国的专门机构，需要与执政政权紧密合作，因此在发生反抗国家的军事冲突的地区，很难推广疫苗。


The fall in the number of polio cases largely resulted from improved access to such areas.	脊髓灰质炎病例数量的下降主要是因为更容易进入这些地区了。


In Nigeria and Pakistan, vaccination programs were able to proceed after troops asserted the state’s control over conflict-affected territory.	在尼日利亚和巴基斯坦，国家军队控制冲突地区后，疫苗计划得以推行。


Most polio cases occurred in northern and eastern Nigeria, where the terrorist group Boko Haram had killed and kidnapped immunization workers, disrupting vaccination programs and leaving more than a million children unprotected.	大部分脊髓灰质炎病例发生在尼日利亚北部和东部，在这些地区，恐怖组织博科圣地（Boko Haram）杀害和绑架免疫工作者，干扰疫苗计划，让超过一百万儿童得不到保护。


After a regional military force pushed the group into sparsely populated mountains and forests, immunization workers were provided access to previously rebel-controlled areas.	在地区军事力量将博科圣地组织赶入人口稀少的山区和丛林后，免疫工作者得以进入此前由叛军控制的地区。


In Pakistan, polio is concentrated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest of the country, where the Taliban are strongest.	在巴基斯坦，脊髓灰质炎集中在北部的联邦直辖部落区，那里的塔利班势力最为强大。


In 2012, militant leaders in the region banned immunization programs over concerns that they were being used to gather intelligence for drone attacks by the United States.	2012年，该地区军方领导人禁止疫苗计划推行，理由是担心这些计划被利用来为美国的无人机袭击搜集情报。


Consequently 1-3.5 million Pakistani children were not vaccinated.	结果，100—135万巴基斯坦儿童没有得到接种。


That changed in the summer of 2014, when the Pakistan military brought large areas of the region under government control.	这在2014年夏天发生了改变。 巴基斯坦军方将该地区大部控制在政府掌控下。


In the space of a single year, the number of polio cases fell from 306 to 54.	在一年的时间里，脊髓灰质炎病例从306下降到54。


Using troops to assert control over conflict-affected areas is not the only way to improve access for polio workers, and in some cases it may not be the most effective.	动用军队控制冲突影响地区不是让脊髓灰质炎工作人员进入那里的唯一办法，在一些地区，这也不是最有效的办法。


In Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria, the government was either unable or unwilling to assert authority over rebel-controlled territory.	在阿富汗、索马里和叙利亚，政府要么无力、要么不愿控制叛乱区。


Instead, immunization workers adapted to the political reality and worked with militants to gain access to areas under their control.	相反，免疫工作者根据政治现实作出调整，与交战方合作进入他们所控制的额地区。


The Afghan Taliban have cooperated with polio vaccination programs since the 1990s.	阿富汗塔利班从20世纪90年代开始与脊髓灰质炎疫苗计划合作。


In most cases, local-level leaders have welcomed immunization workers, seeing vaccination programs as a form of patronage that reinforces their authority.	在大部分情况下，地方层面领导人欢迎免疫工作者，将疫苗计划视为一种保护，可以增强他们的权威。


The few polio cases that have been detected have been either cross-border transmissions from Pakistan or have occurred in areas where intense conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government has temporarily disrupted polio campaigns.	极少数被发现的脊髓灰质炎病例要么来自巴基斯坦的跨境传播，要么发生在塔利班和阿政府冲突激烈、脊髓灰质炎根除计划受阻的地区。


By contrast, in Somalia, the terrorist group al-Shabaab has historically forbidden polio workers from operating in areas under their control, viewing vaccination campaigns as part of a foreign campaign to impose a centralized government.	相反，在索马里，恐怖组织青年党（al-Shabaab）向来禁止脊髓灰质炎工作人员在他们控制的地区执行任务，将疫苗计划视为外国势力强加中央政府的措施的一部分。


One million children were unvaccinated between 2010 and 2013, when a polio outbreak occurred.	2010年到2013年，有一百万儿童没有接种疫苗，结果脊髓灰质炎疫情爆发。


Since then, immunization campaigns have improved their access to rebel-controlled areas by employing locally recruited staff to work within their own clans and negotiate access with local-level militant leaders.	自此以后，免疫运动在本地招募工作人员，让他们在本家族内工作，并与地方军事领导人商谈进入开展工作事宜，以此进入叛军控制地区。


In Syria, after the start of the uprising in 2011, the government prevented the WHO from operating in areas outside its control.	在叙利亚，2011年动乱爆发后，政府阻止世卫组织在其所控制地区之外开展工作。


Over three million children were not vaccinated for polio, leading to an outbreak in rebel-controlled regions in 2013.	三百万以上儿童没有接种脊髓灰质炎疫苗，导致2013年叛军控制地区疫情爆发。


In response, an ad hoc coalition, including moderate opposition groups, Turkish authorities, and local NGOs carried out a series of vaccination campaigns and contained the outbreak.	为了应对这种情况，包括温和反对组织、土耳其当局和地方非政府组织在内的临时联盟实施了一系列疫苗运动，遏制了疫情。


The coalition negotiated access with local rebel leaders, allowing them to choose volunteer vaccinators.	该联盟与地方叛军领导人商谈进入事宜，允许他们选择志愿接种工作者。


Militant groups – even the so-called Islamic State – permitted immunization campaigns to operate in areas under their control.	军事集团——甚至所谓的伊斯兰国——都允许免疫运动在它们控制的地区展开工作。


The lesson is clear.	教训是明确的。


Successful immunization campaigns must secure the support of de facto political leaders – whether of an internationally recognized state or of a vilified militant organization.	成功的免疫运动必须确保在任政治领导人的支持——不管是国际承认的国家还是声名狼藉的军事组织。


As objectionable as working with groups like the Islamic State might be, it is important to remember that the main objective of efforts like the campaign to eradicate polio is to improve the health of people wherever they may live.	与伊斯兰国等组织进行合作令人不快，但同样重要的是要记住根除脊髓灰质炎运动这样的努力的目标是改善人们的健康，不管他们生活在何处。


Executing Foreign Policy	执行外交政策


NEW YORK – The filmmaker Woody Allen is often quoted as saying that “Showing up is 80% of life.”	纽约—导演伍迪·艾伦（Woody Allen）常常被人引用的一句话是“生活的八成是表演。


One can quibble with the percentage, but Allen’s insight is important: You have to get in the game – be a player – to have any chance of obtaining your objectives.	”比例也许有问题，但艾伦的洞见很重要：你必须入局——成为演员——才能获得实现目标的机会。


The same is true of world affairs.	世界事务也是如此。


If showing up is 80% of life, at least 80% of foreign policy is following up.	如果说生活的八成是“演”，那么外交政策至少有八成是“跟”。


Smart plans, good intentions, and strong negotiating skills are essential, but they are never enough – not even close.	明智的计划，良好的意图和强大的谈判技能至关重要，但它们绝不是全部——甚至不是远远不够。


As with business, education, and much else in life, most of what makes foreign policy work – or not – is a matter of implementation and execution.	和商业、教育和生活中的其他方方面面一样，让外交政策起或不起作用的大多是实施和执行问题。


This observation will be tested more than once in 2016 and subsequent years.	这一观察将在2016年及随后数年经受多次考验。


One prominent example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the trade pact signed in October by 12 Pacific Rim countries in Asia and the Americas.	一个显著的例子是跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），该贸易契约由12个太平洋周边亚洲和美洲国家在10月12日签署。


If the accord enters into force, it will expand world trade, boost economic growth, and strengthen the United States’ ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.	如果该协定生效，将能够扩大世界贸易、刺激经济增长、强化美国与地区盟友的联系（否则它们可能投向中国）。


The agreement’s entry into force, though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories’ legislatures.	然而，该协定是否能够生效取决于12个签署国的立法机构的批准。


The outcome in the US and Japan, the world’s largest and third largest economies, respectively, will be particularly consequential.	美国和日本——分别为世界第一大和第三大经济体——的结果特别重要。


Indeed, everyone is waiting to see what happens in the US.	事实上，所有人都在翘首以待美国会发生什么。


But approval by the US Congress is far from certain, especially as the presidential candidates –all of the Democrats and the leading Republicans – have come out against it.	但美国国会的批准绝非板上钉钉，特别是当总统候选人——所有的民主党候选人和领先的共和党候选人——也反对它的时候。


The vote, if it takes place, will be close, and the stakes are high, as failure to ratify the TPP would raise fundamental questions about America’s political effectiveness and ability to be a reliable partner to its allies.	如果进行投票，结果将十分接近，而赌注非常高，因为不能批准TPP将对美国的政治效率和作为其盟友的可靠伙伴的能力造成根本性的质疑。


A second test will come in Syria, arguably the biggest international failure of recent years.	第二项考验来自叙利亚，这也许是近几年来最大的国际失败。


In December, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which establishes a political framework for a civil war that has raged for nearly five years, claiming as many as 300,000 lives and creating millions of refugees.	12月，联合国安理会一致通过2254号决议，该决议将为叙利亚内战建立一个政治框架。 这场内战已经肆虐了近五年，造成300,000人死亡，导致数百万人成为难民。


A framework, however, is nothing more than an outline.	但是，框架充其量只是一个提纲。


In this case, it was less than that, because the resolution was silent about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s political fate and the timing of his departure.	而在叙利亚问题上，框架连提纲都算不上，因为该决议对于叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的政治命运以及下台时间只字未提。


It also raised more questions than it answered about which Syrian opposition groups would participate in negotiations.	在哪些叙利亚反对派组织可以参与谈判方面，它引出的问题比它所回答的问题还要多。


Given the many divisions both within Syria and among its neighbors, getting from the resolution to a cease-fire and political settlement is likely to take years – and even that assessment may prove to be overly optimistic.	叙利亚国内及其周边国家遍布着众多派别，从决议实现停火和政治和解可能需要好几年——就连这也有可能过于乐观。


Yet a third test for diplomats also stems from the climate agreement reached in Paris in December.	但对外交官的第三项考验来自12月在巴黎达成的气候变化协定。


The agreement comprises voluntary pledges by governments that amount to no more than promises to do their best.	该协定由政府的自愿承诺构成，无非就是承诺尽力而已。


In many cases, there is a lack of specificity about what is to be done.	从诸多情况看，它缺少关于需要做什么的具体内容。


And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver.	而由于该协定对签署国不具有法律约束力，其唯一可以做出的制裁是对没有履行承诺的国家“指名令其蒙羞”。


A fourth test stems from the agreement signed over the summer by the Security Council’s five permanent members, Germany, and Iran limiting Iran’s nuclear program.	第四项考验来自今年夏天联合国五大常任理事国、德国和伊朗之间签署的限制伊朗核计划的协定。


There are sure to be numerous disagreements over whether the parties in general, and Iran in particular, are meeting their obligations.	显然，关于各方尤其是伊朗是否能履行协定义务的问题存在诸多分歧。


Perhaps most important, steps will need to be taken to reassure Iran’s neighbors so that they are not tempted to proceed with their own nuclear programs.	也许最重要的是，需要采取措施让伊朗的邻国放心，让它们不必启动自身的核计划。


At some point, the implementation challenge will include additional measures to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons once the agreement’s time limits on specified programs expire.	在某个时点，实施挑战将包括采取更多的措施保证伊朗在协定对具体项目的限制到期后不开发核武器。


There are a few lessons to be learned from all of this.	在所有这些考验中，我们可以汲取一些教训。


For starters, while international accords are rarely reached easily, no one should get carried away at the signing ceremony.	首先，尽管国际准则非常难以达成，但也不能抛下任何一方。


The negotiators still must be able to deliver their governments’ full backing, and this is never automatic, especially when it comes to democracies such as the US, where different branches of government are often controlled by different political parties.	谈判员仍然必须能够给出政府的全力支持，而这一点绝不是天经地义，特别是在美国这样的民主国家，政府不同部门常常由不同的政党控制。


A second reality is that there is an unavoidable trade-off between negotiations and implementation.	第二个现实是，谈判和实施之间存在一个不可避免的权衡。


In many cases, agreement is possible only if critical details are left unresolved.	在许多情形中，只有不拘关键性小节才有可能达成协定。


But such “creative ambiguity” also ensures that the implementation phase will be more difficult, as tough choices that were postponed suddenly must be addressed.	但这些“创造性模糊”也意味着实施阶段会更加困难，因为在谈判阶段被阻断的艰难选择猛然间变得非解决不可了。


Third, there will inevitably be moments when one or another party does not implement the pact in a manner judged to be adequate.	第三，难免有些时候，一方或另一方的契约实施情况不充分。


Dealing with episodes of alleged non-compliance can prove to be every bit as demanding as the original negotiation.	处理这些有不遵守协议嫌疑的情况一点也不比一开始的谈判容易。


Which brings us back to where we began.	让我们回到开头。


All four of the major international accords reached in 2015 – the TPP, the Security Council’s Syria resolution, the Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear deal – required great effort to negotiate.	2015年所达成的所有四项重大国际准则——TPP、安理会叙利亚决议、巴黎气候协定和伊朗核协议——都需要巨大的谈判努力。


Making them work in 2016 and beyond will prove even harder.	让它们在2016年及以后起作用将更加艰难。


As Woody Allen could tell you, it is akin to the difference between writing a screenplay and making a movie.	伍迪·艾伦说得好，这就像是写剧本和拍电影的区别。


Europe’s Plan A	欧洲的A计划


FRANKFURT – Europe’s politicians nowadays are desperately looking for someone to blame for the euro crisis.	发自法兰克福——时下欧洲的政客们正拼命地找人当欧元危机的替罪羊。


Germany blames France, and vice versa.	德国责怪法国，反过来法国又埋怨德国。


Even lawyers are getting into the act, trying to identify legal responsibility for the monetary union’s design flaws.	甚至连律师们都插一手进来，试图确定该货币联盟自身设计缺陷的法律责任应由谁来承担。


Meanwhile, as the crisis has deepened, a new consensus about Europe’s monetary union has emerged.	同时，随着危机加深，人们对欧洲货币联盟已经有了一个新的共识。


The euro, according to this view, was devised in a fit of giddy and irresponsible optimism – or, alternatively, panic at the prospect of German hegemony over Europe – in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall.	根据这种观点，欧元的设计本身就出于轻率而不负责任的乐观主义——要不就是害怕随着柏林墙倒塌后的德国会执掌欧洲霸权。


Nothing could be further from the truth.	这与事实相差甚远。


The Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community, which laid out the euro blueprint, was presented in April 1989 – a time when no one (with the possible exception of some Kremlin strategists) was thinking about German reunification.	制定欧元蓝图的对欧洲共同市场经济和货币联盟的报告于1989年4月就已经出台了，当时没有人（可能除了一些克里姆林宫的战略家）想到两德会统一。


Moreover, the salient issues concerning monetary unions were well understood, and remedies for the most significant obstacles were proposed at the outset.	而且当时人们也对关于货币联盟的突出问题有透彻的了解，并从一开始就提出了对那些重大障碍的补救措施。


The committee that drafted the report – now known as the Delors Report, after its chairman, Jacques Delors – was a fundamentally rather conservative group of central bankers, with even the governor of the Bank of England (BoE) signing on.	该报告——现在被称为德洛尔报告，这是用其主席雅克·戴洛尔（Jacques Delors）的名字为命名的——的起草委员会成员从根本上说还是一群相对保守的中央银行家，甚至连英格兰银行（BoE）行长都位列其中。


Its internal debates highlighted two problems of the potential monetary union.	而其内部讨论则突出了这个潜在货币联盟的两大问题。


First, the committee explicitly discussed whether the capital market would suffice to impose fiscal discipline on the currency union’s members, and agreed that a system of rules was needed.	首先，该委员会明确讨论了资本市场是否有能力对货币联盟的成员国实施财政纪律，并一致同意需要建立一个规则体系。


But those rules were steadily weakened, and by the early 2000’s were widely derided (including by Romano Prodi, Delors’ successor as President of the European Commission), as governments found that they could run large deficits without paying higher market interest rates.	但是那些规则已被逐步削弱了，到二十一世纪初甚至广受耻笑——连罗马诺 ·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)这位戴洛尔在欧洲委员会的继任者也对其嗤之以鼻，因为各国政府发现自己都可以保持高额赤字却无需支付更高的市场利率。


The second problem was more serious.	第二个问题更加严重。


In the original plan for the European Central Bank, the proposed institution would have had overall supervisory and regulatory powers.	在欧洲中央银行的原计划中，这个货币联盟机构原本应该有实施全面总体性监督和监管的权力。


Indeed, the drafters of the ECB statute produced an astonishingly far-sighted approach to banking supervision.	确实，欧洲央行条例的起草者们针对银行监管想出了一个极具远见的方法。


Their 1990 version of the Maastricht Treaty’s Article 25 on Prudential Supervision included the following provisions (placed in square brackets to show that they were not completely consensual): “The ECB may formulate, interpret, and implement policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit and other financial institutions for which it is designated as competent supervisory authority.”	1990年版的《马斯特里赫特条约》关于审慎监管的第25条包括了以下规定（这些条款被括在方括号内以表明它们并未获得成员国一致同意）：“对于那些指定由欧洲中央银行担任主管监督当局的信贷机构和其他金融机构，欧洲央行可以制定、解释并执行与这些机构有关的谨慎监管政策。 ”


The demand that the ECB should be the central supervisory authority in an integrated capital market met strong resistance, above all from Germany’s Bundesbank, which worried that a role in maintaining financial stability might undermine the Bank’s ability to focus on price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy.	提议欧洲央行应当成为一体化资本市场中核心监管当局的想法遭遇了强烈抵抗，尤以德意志银行为甚——它担心保持金融稳定的角色会削弱欧洲央行维持价格稳定这一货币政策首要目标的能力。


There was also bureaucratic resistance from existing regulators.	同时还有来自现有监管机构的官僚阻力。


Most important, supervision suggested some potential responsibility to recapitalize problematic banks, and thus involved a fiscal cost.	最重要的是，监督意味着存在对问题银行资本重组的潜在责任，并因此涉及到财政支出。


The most energetic actor behind the early thinking on banking supervision was a BoE official, Brian Quinn.	在对银行监管的早期思考中最积极的人就是英国央行官员布莱恩·奎因（Brian Quinn）。


But his credibility was sapped in the wake of criticism of the BoE’s handling of the collapse in 1991 of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International – an episode that anticipated later issues in managing the failure of large, cross-border institutions.	但随着英国央行因处理1991年国际商业信贷银行破产不力而大受指责，布莱恩·奎因的信誉也受到了损害，而这一事件也预示了后来在处理大型跨国机构破产事务上的失败。


A legal vestige of the original plan may offer an easy path to a greater ECB supervisory role today.	原计划留下的一点法律痕迹或许能为今天欧洲央行扮演更多监管角色提供一条容易的路径。


According to Article 25 of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB may “offer advice to and be consulted by” the Commission or the Council on the scope and implementation of legislation relating to prudential supervision.	根据《马斯特里赫特条约》第25条，欧洲央行可以“在涉及审慎监管的立法范围及其实施方面，向理事会或委员会“提出建议和接受咨询”。


When that phrase was inserted in the Treaty, it appeared as if the hurdles to effective European banking supervision could hardly be set higher.	当这段话被添加到条约中时，看上去好像妨碍有效欧洲银行监管的障碍已经不可能被设置得更高了。


The ECB was not given overall supervisory and regulatory powers.	欧洲央行并未被授予全面监督和监管的权力。


And, until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 highlighted the connections between financial and fiscal health, no one considered that a problem.	而且，在2007-2008年金融危机的爆发凸显了金融和财政健康两者之间的联系之前，没有人认为这是一个问题。


They do now.	如今他们明白了。


Nevertheless, fiscal rules and common banking supervision are still regarded in many quarters as an illegitimate encroachment on member states’ sovereignty.	然而，财政规章以及通用的银行监管仍在许多地方被视为对成员国主权的非法侵犯。


After all, the European Union has avoided becoming a focus of heated contestation precisely because it never got much of a share of what Europeans produced (its budget, at just over 1% of the EU’s GDP, has barely changed in relative terms for the past 40 years).	毕竟欧盟之所以避免了成为激烈争论的焦点就是因为它从来没能占据多少欧洲人的生产成果（它的预算仅仅超过欧盟GDP的1%，这在过去40年内几乎没有什么变化）。


It was the member states that did politics and budgets.	政治和预算都是由欧盟成员国自己处理的。


Delors had a different vision.	过去德洛尔对此有一个不同的愿景。


At the time of his report, he concluded that the European budget would amount to some 3% of GDP – identical to the peacetime US federal budget’s share of GDP during the country’s first stage of monetary union, in the nineteenth century.	在当年那份报告发表的时候，他推断欧盟的预算会达到其GDP的3%——这和19世纪处在货币联盟第一阶段的美国联邦和平时期预算占GDP的比重相同。


Moreover, as in Europe today, when Alexander Hamilton proposed a central banking system, the Bank of the United States, alongside consolidation of states’ Revolutionary War debt into federal debt, the implementation of his sensible plan was imperfect.	此外，像现在的欧洲一样，当年亚历山大·汉密尔顿（Alexander Hamilton）提出了一个中央银行系统，即所谓美利坚合众国银行，同时把各州的独立战争债务并入到到联邦债务之中，这个合理的计划却并未得到完美的执行。


In the American case, the principles of federal finance were not worked out until the Civil War, and the Federal Reserve System was established even later, coming only in 1913.	在美国这个例子里，联邦金融的相关准则在南北战争之前还没有被制定出来，而美联储系统则出现得更晚，直到1913年才创建。


Europeans can learn from the United States and implement a fundamentally sound plan.	欧洲人可以向美国学习并实施一个在根本上合理的计划。


But they must also recognize that political backlashes and setbacks are inevitable – and thus that the road from vision to reality may be longer than expected.	但他们也必须意识到政治反弹和挫折是无法避免的——因此把愿景变成现实也许要花费比预想中更长的时间。


National Security Babies	国家安全婴儿


WASHINGTON, DC – From the emergence of the Islamic State to Russian expansionism and China’s rise, there is no shortage of national-security challenges facing the United States.	华盛顿—从伊斯兰国的出现到俄罗斯的扩张和中国的崛起，美国的国家安全挑战层出不穷。


But, as a new report – Worthy Work, STILL Unlivable Wages – demonstrates, nothing poses a more potent threat to America’s future than the failure to provide adequate care and education to children under the age of five.	但是，最新报告——《值得的工作，但仍难以过活的工资》（Worthy Work, STILL Unlivable Wages）表明，对于美国的未来来说，最大的威胁莫过于无法为五岁以下儿童提供足够的看护和教育。


If young children do not receive high-quality care from educated professionals who understand how to stimulate and shape brain development, the next generation of Americans will suffer from an ever-widening achievement gap relative to their counterparts in other advanced countries and emerging competitors.	如果幼儿不能从受过教育、明白如何刺激和促进大脑发育的专业人士那里获得高质量教育，下一代美国人与其他发达国家和新兴竞争对手的成就差距将不断扩大。


Yet Americans pay these trained professionals the same wages paid to those who park our cars, walk our dogs, flip our burgers, and mix our drinks.	但美国人给这些受过训练的专业人士的薪酬与给我们停车、遛狗、煎汉堡、混合饮料 的人一样。


The implication is clear: American children require no more nuanced attention than animals or inanimate objects.	影响显而易见：美国儿童所需要的关注并不比动物或无生命物体更加细致。


This is a grave error.	这是一个要命的错误。


Early childhood care can shape a person’s lifelong capacity for learning, emotional resilience, confidence, and independence.	早期儿童看护可以形成一个人一生的学习能力、情感恢复力、信心和独立性。


In fact, providing high-quality care that engages and instructs children in their first five years of life has a greater impact on their development than any other intervention over the course of their lifetime.	事实上，在人们生命的第一个五年中提供高质量看护和指导比此后终其一身任何其他干预的影响都要大。


This is not new information.	这并非新鲜结论。


The book Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development, published more than a decade ago by the National Academy of Sciences, begins by acknowledging that, from conception to the first day of kindergarten, the pace of development exceeds “that of any subsequent stage of life.”	十多年前国家科学院（National Academy of Science）出版的《邻域中的神经元：早期儿童发育的科学》（Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development）开宗明义地承认，从怀孕到进入幼儿园的第一天，这段时间的发育速度超过“此后生命中的任何一个阶段”。


That development “is shaped by a dynamic and continuous interaction between biology and experience.”	发育“由生理和经验的动态而持续的交互决定”。


This observation is now backed by neuroscience, which has identified how the brain develops over that period and has created a system for measuring learning gaps.	如今，这一发现获得了神经科学的支持。 神经科学研究了这段时期大脑如何发育，并开发了一套测量学习差距的系统。


Such research has confirmed that building the brain is just as important as feeding the body to produce healthy, intelligent, productive, and resilient adults.	这项研究确认，对于形成健康、聪慧、有创造力、有韧劲的成年人来说，构筑大脑和喂养身体一样重要。


A recent study tallied the results of the Carolina Abecedarian Project, a North Carolina social experiment that began in the early 1970s.	一项最新研究与卡罗莱纳启蒙工程（Carolina Abecedarian Project）的结果一致。


The study compared two sets of disadvantaged children, with one set receiving excellent nutrition and high-quality, stimulating care for eight hours a day from birth to age five, and the other receiving ordinary formula and care.	卡罗莱纳启蒙工程是始于20世纪70年代的一项北卡罗来纳州社会实验。 研究比较了两组贫困儿童，一组获得了充分的营养和每天八小时的高质量刺激性看护，从出生一直持续到五岁。


Four decades later, the adults who had received better care were not only physically healthier; they were more than four times likelier to have a college degree.	四十年后，曾经获得过较好看护的成人不但身体更加健康，获得大学文凭的几率也要高出四倍。


Clearly, there is a lot more to early-childhood care than setting out juice and cookies, supervising naps, and taking kids to the playground.	显然，早期儿童看护绝不仅仅是榨点果汁、做点饼干、督促睡觉和带去操场玩。


According to Megan Gunnar, who specializes in the intersection of developmental psychology and neuroscience, a good early childhood caregiver “requires [the] capacity to analyze what’s happening in the moment” and determine what concept – whether a numerical concept, or one related to language or physics – the child could be learning.	根据梅根·甘纳（Megan Gunnar，发育心理学和神经科学交叉专家）的说法，好的早期儿童看护师“需要分析此刻正在发生什么的能力”并确定什么概念——不管是数字概念还是与语言或物理相关的概念——是被看护儿童可以学习的。


Responding “in the moment, dynamically, really takes analytic skills, executive function, ordering and sequencing, and knowing a lot of information.”	“在‘当是时’情形下，动态地”反应“真的需要分析技巧、执行能力、顺序和排位，并且知道大量信息。 ”


Unfortunately for America’s children, the high-functioning circuits in the caregiver’s prefrontal cortex that these skills demand are directly affected by stress.	对美国儿童来说不幸的是，看护师的前额皮质（这些技能需要前额皮质中的高能回路）受到压力的直接影响。


And, in the US, the vast majority of early-childhood workers are under enormous economic stress.	此外，在美国，绝大多数早期儿童工作者承受着巨大的经济压力。


In 2012, almost half of all childcare workers’ families received some kind of federal public support, from food stamps to children’s health insurance.	2012年，近一半的儿童工作着家庭接受过某种形式的联邦公共支持，包括食品券、儿童医保等。


Such economic stress does not decrease with education.	如此经济压力不随教育���度的增加而减小。


A male teacher working in the civilian labor force with a bachelor’s degree or higher in 2012 had an average annual salary of $88,000.	2012年，拥有学士及以上学位的公立男性教师平均年薪为88,000美元。


Early childhood educators with the same qualifications had an average annual salary of $27,000-28,000.	资质相同的早期儿童教育者平均年行只有27,000—28,000美元。


The exception is the US military, which pays teachers according to the same scale as other defense department employees, based on criteria like training, education, seniority, and experiences.	美国军队是一个例外，它根据与其他防务部门雇员相同的规模支付教师薪酬，基于训练、教育、年资和经验等标准。


In other words, the segment of the US government that is directly responsible for upholding national security recognizes the need to attract and retain highly educated workers to provide care and early learning to the children of all employees.	换句话说，美国政府的这一直接负责捍卫国家安全的细分部门认识到吸引和留住高教育程度员工为所有雇员的孩子提供看护和早期学习服务的必要性。


Could this be because the military and civilian leaders of the US defense establishment have seen first-hand the costs of stunted intellectual growth, hyperactivity, and lack of impulse control?	这有可能是因为美国国防体系的军队和文职领导人现场目睹过智力发育停滞、多动症和冲动控制缺陷的代价吗？


To compete in a digital global economy, the US – indeed, any country – needs a capable, well educated, innovative, and healthy workforce.	为了在数字全球经济中竞争，美国——事实上，是所有国家——需要有能力、受过教育、能创新、健康的劳动力。


The development of such a workforce begins at birth.	这样一支劳动力的发展要从婴儿抓起。


Anyone can change a diaper, but not everyone can engage, stimulate, and respond to a baby or a toddler in a way that will build neurons, much less impart skills calibrated to the child’s stage of development.	所有人都会换尿布，但不是所有人都能以能够塑造神经元参与、刺激和响应婴儿或幼童，拥有契合儿童发育阶段的传授技能的人就更少了。


The US has the world’s most dynamic technological sector – not least because it offers the high salaries needed to attract the best talent.	美国拥有全世界最有活力的技术部门——因为它能够提供高薪以吸引最优秀的人才。


You get what you pay for, and Americans are paying far too little for their children to thrive.	你付多少钱就能获得怎样的人，而美国人为他们的儿童所付的钱远远不能保证繁荣的未来。


Impotent America?	无力的美国？


JERUSALEM – Israel’s 60th anniversary has come and gone.	耶路撒冷—以色列建国六十周年的日子来了又去了。


So, too, has President George W. Bush’s final visit to the Middle East.	同样，乔治沃克·布什总统对中东最后一次访问也是如此。


Amidst the celebrations and the soul-searching, no meaningful breakthrough in the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is visible.	在庆祝和真挚的自我反省中，限于僵局中的以色列－巴勒斯坦谈判没有取得明显的有意义的突破。


There are immediate reasons why this is so: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government is weak and unpopular, mainly due to the botched 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.	造成这个局面的直接原因是：主要由于2006年针对黎巴嫩真主党的糟糕的战争，以色列总理埃胡德·奥尔默特领导的政府很无力并且不受欢迎。


The Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas is even weaker, having lost control of Gaza to Hamas after a violent putsch last year.	在马哈茂德·阿巴斯领导下的巴勒斯坦政权就更虚弱了，它已经在去年哈马斯暴力暴动之后失去了对加沙的控制权。


On the Palestinian side, this is part of a deeper phenomenon: a longstanding failure to create the institutional structures necessary for nation building.	在巴勒斯坦一方，这是更深层次现象的一部分：长期以来没能建立起来建国需要的体制结构。


For example, in 1936-1939, a Palestinian uprising against British rule deteriorated into a bloody civil war, in which more Palestinians were killed by their brethren than by the British army or the Jewish self-defense forces.	例如，在1936年到1939年间，一场反抗英国统治的巴勒斯坦起义恶化成为一场血腥的内战，在这场内战中，被自己同胞杀死的巴勒斯坦人要比英国军队或者是犹太自卫队杀死的多。


This is repeating itself now in Gaza.	现在历史正在加沙重演。


Looking back at 60 years of American involvement in the region, one can discern two scenarios in which the United States can bring the local players to an agreement.	回顾美国介入该地区60年的历程，人们可以清楚的看到，美国要想使当地的各种势力达成共识需要两个背景条件。