In any case, she seems destined to establish a new South Korea focusing on her landmark pledge ‘jul pu se,’ literally meaning ‘reduce-loosen-strengthen tax-cuts,’ deregulation, and law and order, not just to add another chapter to her father’s old book.	无论如何，她似乎注定要促成韩国关注她里程碑式的‘jul pu se’承诺，其字面意思是‘减税’、放松管制、重建法律秩序，而不单纯是延续其父辈的传统。


Her administration would mark a fresh departure from the country’s troubled recent past.	以她为首的政府将首次摆脱韩国近年来问题重重的过去。


Left-leaning pundits claim that the dictator’s daughter has the same autocratic vision as her father, though Park invariably prefers incremental change to radical measures, and cut her political teeth in the tough-minded politics of the GNP.	尽管较之极端措施朴始终更偏好渐进式的变化并成功改变了大国家党顽固不化的政治意志，左倾学者依然声称独裁总统的女儿与其父有着同样的专制目标。


Others take a flagrantly sexist stance, arguing that a woman president would be a non-starter as long as the North Korean regime continues to threaten national security.	也有人明目张胆地采取性别歧视立场，声称只要北朝鲜政权继续威胁国家安全，女性总统就不可能取得成功。


Although these criticisms don’t seem to bother the electorate very much, Park’s path to victory may yet prove narrower than her supporters expect.	尽管这些批评似乎对选民影响不大，但朴的胜利之路可能并没有其支持者所想像的那般宽阔。


She has been called the “Queen of Elections,” in particular since she won a campaign in 2006 after being slashed with a box cutter by a deranged man.	2006年被一个疯子用美工刀砍伤后仍然赢得竞选为朴槿惠赢得了“选举皇后”的美誉。


But she must convincingly outline practical strategies to resolve South Korea’s most serious problems, including high unemployment, worsening educational performance, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.	但她必须拿出解决韩国最严重问题的令人信服的实际策略，包括高失业率、教育质量下降和北朝鲜的核武器问题。


Ms. Park once pledged to provide loans for working-class families from elementary school to college years, while contending that local universities should be empowered to have more autonomy.	朴女士曾承诺为工薪家庭提供从小学到大学的贷款，同时提出地方大学应拥有更多自主权力。


She favors engagement policy and the six-party talks so as to resolve the nuclear troubles.	她倾向于通过接触政策和六方会谈解决核问题。


Come presidential election-day in 2012, South Korean voters will pick the candidate who embodies pragmatism and centrism over a partisan or ideologue.	2012年总统大选日到来时，韩国选民会把���投向务实温和的竞选者，而不是党派界线分明的空想家。


Park’s success will depend, in the end, on the effectiveness of her campaign in further defining her character along those lines.	朴槿惠的成功终将取决于其竞选活动能否有效地凸显她在上述方面的特色。


Unlike former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori’s daughter, who lost her presidential bid in Peru last month, Park is likely to defy her family’s tragic history.	与上个月在秘鲁竞选中落败的前秘鲁独裁者阿尔贝托·藤森的女儿不同，朴槿惠可能改变其家族悲剧性的历史。


If she does, she will be Asia’s most powerful woman, perhaps the most powerful in the world, at the end of next year.	如果真是这样，她将在明年年底成为亚洲、也许是全世界最有权力的女性。


A Day for Planetary Justice	一个追求地球正义的日子


PRINCETON – What we are doing to our planet, to our children and grandchildren, and to the poor, by our heedless production of greenhouse gases, is one of the great moral wrongs of our age.	发自普林斯顿——我们现在对地球，对我们的子孙后代以及穷人的所作所为——肆无忌惮地制造温室气体——是我们这一代人所犯下的最大的道德过失。


On October 24, you can stand up against this injustice.	但在10月24日这天，你可以对这种不公正的现象说一声“不”。


October 24 is 350 Day.	10月24日就是所谓的“350日”。


The name comes from the number of parts per million of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that, according to Jim Hansen, perhaps the world’s leading climate scientist, we should not exceed if we are to avoid potentially catastrophic climate change.	而这个名字则源自于大气中每百万份之350的二氧化碳含量值，照全世界最杰出的气候科学家吉姆·汉森所说，如果我们要避免遭遇潜在大规模气候变化的话，那么大气中的二氧化碳含量就不能超出这个数。


It is a measure of the seriousness of our problem that CO2 is already at 386 ppm, and is rising by two ppm each year.	而这一测量手段也同时凸显了当前问题的严峻性，因为目前二氧化碳含量已经达到了386ppm，并以每年2ppm的速度在不断增长。


The need to cut greenhouse gases has become increasingly clear as predictions of global warming – denounced as “alarmist” when they were first made just a few years ago – have repeatedly turned out to have been too conservative.	随着对全球变暖的预言——在几年前还被讥为“杞人忧天”的论调——的反复出现并变得极富争议性，削减温室气体排放的必要性也逐渐变得清晰起来。


We are approaching a point of no return, at which feedback loops will kick in and continue to warm the planet, no matter what we do.	而我们正在走进一个死胡同，不论做出何种努力，这场恶性循环都将持续下去并使地球暖化。


The melting of arctic ice is one example.	北极冰层的融化就是一个例子。


Four hundred years ago, explorers sought the legendary “Northeast Passage” across the north of Europe and Russia to China.	在400年前，探险先驱们试图找到一条从北欧/俄罗斯方向通往中国的“东北航道”。


They found the arctic ice impenetrable, and soon gave up their quest.	但他们在发现北极冰层难以被贯穿之后放弃了这一尝试。


This year, commercial vessels successfully navigated the Northeast Passage.	而就在今年，商船却成功打通了这条“东北航道”。


That is one of many recent dramatic signs that our climate is changing and that our planet is warmer than it has been for a very long time.	这个例子只是那些引人注目现象的其中之一，证明我们的气候正在改变而地球也比过去一个长时期变得更暖了。


But ice-free arctic waters are more than a symptom of global warming. They are themselves a cause of further warming: ice and snow reflect the sun’s rays.	但再无冰块漂浮的北冰洋并不仅仅是全球暖化的表象，它们也将是进一步暖化的成因：须知冰和雪都是可以反射太阳光线的。


An ice-free surface absorbs more warmth from the sun than one covered in snow or ice.  In other words, our greenhouse gas emissions have, by causing enough warming to melt the arctic ice, created a feedback loop that will generate more warming, and melt more ice, even if we were to stop emitting all greenhouse gases tomorrow.	一块没有冰雪覆盖的土地将吸收更多的太阳热能。 换句话说，我们的温室气体排放通过制造足以融化北极冰层的热量，反过来又制造了一个产生更多热量的循环并随之融化更多的冰层，而即便我们能在明天就完全杜绝温室气体排放，这个循环将依然继续运作下去。


Other feedback loops pose a similar danger.	而另一个循环则昭示了类似的危险。


In Siberia, vast quantities of methane, an extremely potent greenhouse gas, are locked up in what used to be called “permafrost” – regions in which it was assumed that the ground was permanently frozen.	在塞尔维亚，大量的沼气（一种对温室效应影响极大的气体）都被封存在曾被称为“永久冻土”的地区，因为人们相信这些地区的土地都将永久处于封冻状态。


But areas that used to be frozen are now thawing, releasing methane and thus contributing to further warming – and to further thawing, which releases more methane.	但如今这些土地开始解冻并释放出沼气，并因此而导致进一步暖化——以及进一步解冻和更多沼气的释放。


Developing nations are grasping just how outrageous the current distribution of greenhouse-gas emissions really is.	发展中国家都意识到了当前温室气体排放量分配方案的不合理之处。


At the United Nations Summit on Climate Change in September, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda pointed out that, while developed nations outside Africa are almost entirely responsible for the problem, its greatest impact will probably be on Africa, which has few resources to cope with the challenge.	在9月的联合国气候变化峰会上，卢旺达总统保罗·卡加梅就指出说，当非洲以外的发达国家必须为问题负上全部责任之时，气候变化最大的受害者却可能是非洲国家，而这些国家也缺乏足够的资��去应对这些问题。


Kagame then suggested giving every country an annual per capita quota for CO2 emissions, and allowing developing countries that are below the quota to trade their excess quota with countries that are above theirs.	卡加梅因此建议给各国家都订立一个年人均二氧化碳排放额，并允许那些排放低于限额的国家将排放量出售给那些超出限额的国家。


The money that developing countries would receive for this would not be aid, but rather a recognition that the rich nations must pay for something that in the past they simply appropriated: far more than their fair share of our atmosphere’s capacity to absorb our waste gases.	这些交易所得的资金不是援助，而是富国为过去看上去理所当然的一些行为所必须付出的代价：这要远远多于那些富国在我们大气废气吸收能力中所占的合理份额。


Sri Lanka took a similar stance, using studies from the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to calculate that in 2008, environmentally permissible carbon emissions totaled no more than 2,172 kilograms per person.	斯里兰卡也采取了同样的立场，依照联合国气候变化跨部门小组在2008年的统计，环境许可的碳排放不得高于每人2172公斤。


In fact, the world’s per capita emissions were 4,700 kilograms, or more than double the permissible limit.	但事实上目前世界人均排放量已经高达4700公斤，是允许排放量的二倍有余。


But, while emissions in the rich nations were far above the permissible limit, Sri Lankan emissions were, at 660 kilograms, well below it.	然而当富国的排放量远远超出限额之时，斯里兰卡的人均排放量却只有极低的660公斤。


As Sri Lanka’s government pointed out, “That means low-emitting countries like us could not emit more because our space has already been exploited by developed or global heavy polluting countries without our consent.”	正如斯里兰卡政府所指出的那样：“这意味着我们这些低排放国家已经不能进行更多的排放，因为我们所处的空间已经在毫不知情的情况下被发达国家和全球污染排放大国所占据了。 ”


This situation is an injustice of vast proportions, reminiscent of – and arguably much worse than – the now-repudiated colonialism of the Western powers in the nineteenth century.	这种大范围的不公正不禁使人联想起如今遭到批判的西方列强的19世纪殖民主义行为——甚至可能危害更甚。


The task of remedying it must begin at the meeting on climate change that will be held in Copenhagen in December.	而对此的纠正措施必须在12月的哥本哈根气候会议上贯彻展开。


Many political leaders have expressed support for strong action on climate change, but what most of them regard as “strong action” will not be enough to get us back below 350 ppm.	虽然许多政治家都赞成对气候变化采取强力行动，但其中大多数人所认为的“强力行动”并不足以把我们带回到350ppm的大气二氧化碳含量水平。


In some countries, including the United States, there are major political obstacles to taking even modest steps.	而在包括美国在内的一些国家，即使想要采取更为温和的措施都要面对巨大的政治阻力。


On October 24, people in nearly every country will be taking action to raise awareness of the need for an international treaty to bring our atmosphere back to 350 ppm of CO2.	在10月24日这天，几乎所有国家的人们都将采取行动，激发起对一项能带领人们重回350ppm的国际条约的必要性认识。


There will be climbers hanging banners high in the Himalayas, where the glaciers are melting, and scuba divers at Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, which is threatened by climate change.	登山者将在冰川逐渐融化的喜马拉雅山上拉起横幅标语，而在遭到气候变化威胁的澳大利亚大堡礁，潜水员们也将有所宣示。


Churches will ring bells 350 times, 350 cyclists will circle towns, and, in many places, 350 trees will be planted.	教堂将鸣钟350响，350名单车手将绕城骑行，而在许多地方将有350棵树的植树仪式。 通过 www.


At www.350.org you can find out what is happening near you and join in, or put your own idea online.	350. org 这个网站你可以查询到你附近人们的活动方案并参与其中，还可以在网上发表自己的点子。


But don’t just sit back and hope that others will do enough to make an impact.	但不要选择袖手旁观，期待他人去完成一切。


One day your grandchildren will ask you: what did you do to meet the greatest moral challenge of your time?	因为有一天你的孙子们会问：“当面对你那个年代最艰巨的道德挑战时，你都做了些什么？ ”


A Day of Liberation	解放日


When I was seven years old, in 1960, my grandmother Angelica opened my eyes to the meaning of 8 May 1945, the day when Nazi Germany surrendered and World War II ended in Europe.	在我七岁那一年，就是1960年，我的祖母安朱丽卡让我明白了1945年5月8日的意义：那一天纳粹德国投降，二战在欧洲结束。


We were spending our summer holidays in Normandy where the liberation of Europe from Nazism had started on D-Day, 6 June 1944.	当时我们正在诺曼底度暑假。 在那里，欧洲挣脱纳粹统治的纪念日是从1944年6月6日盟国登陆西欧那一天算起的。


One evening, I listened to my parents and my grandmother talking about the past.	一天傍晚，我听到父母和祖母在谈论过去。


I have forgotten the details of their conversation, but I can still hear my grandmother’s sigh of relief when she said “Thank God we lost that war!”	我已不记得谈话的细节，但是耳边始终回响着当时祖母长舒了一口气说的那句话：“感谢上帝，我们输了那场战争。 ”


From a child’s perspective, it wasn’t self-evident that losing was a good thing.	从一个孩子的角度看，把失败当成一件好事确实不容易理解。


But of course, my grandmother was right to equate defeat with liberation.	但无疑，祖母把失败和解放等同起来是正确的。


The more I have thought about the lesson she taught me 45 years ago, the clearer I have seen another, less obvious dimension in what she said: It is “we” who lost the war.	我对她45年前教给我的这一课思考的越多，就越能看清楚另外一个不太显露的层面：是“我们”输了这场战争。


Collectively, the Germans had not been the innocent victims of a small gang of criminal outsiders called “Nazis” – Nazism had been an inside ideology supported by millions of Germans, and every German was liable for its atrocities whether or not he or she had adhered to it individually.	作为一个民族来讲，德国人并不只是那一小撮被叫作“纳粹”的罪恶并注定会失败的人的无辜牺牲品。 “纳粹主义”是无数德国人内心根深蒂固的理念，每一个德国人都应对德国的残暴行为负责任，反思自己是否曾经固守过这一理念。


In today’s Germany, an overwhelming majority subscribes to the proposition that 8 May 1945 was a day of liberation – not only for Europe, but also for Germany itself.	今天的德国，绝大多数人赞成：不仅对于欧洲，对德国自身来讲， 1945年5月8日也是一个解放日。


Compared to public opinion in 1960, that’s certainly an enormous progress.	相对1960年的公众看法而言，这当然是个巨大的进步。


But paradoxically, it may also contain an element of forgetfulness, because it tends to conceal the fact that liberation required a military defeat.	但自相矛盾的地方在于， 这其中可能包含了一种叫作“健忘”的因素，因为它往往掩藏了一个事实：有解放就必然有军事上的胜利。


To use my grandmother’s parlance, it is not “us” who were the liberators, but “them”.	引用我祖母的说法，解放者并不是“我们”，而是“他们”。


The way people see the past tells us more about their present attitudes than about the past itself.	人们看待过去的方式更多的告诉我们他们现在所持的态度，而不是过去本身。


This is what the term “politics of memory” is meant to indicate.	这就是“记忆的政治”这个术语的所指；


And this is why it doesn’t matter whether the relevant events happened 60 years ago (as World War II), 90 years (as in the case of the Armenian genocide) or even 600 years (such as the battle of Kosovo in 1389).	这也是为什么说相关事件是发生在60年前（二战），90年前（亚美尼亚大屠杀），还是600年前（比如1389年科索沃战争）都不是很要紧的原因。


A violent conflict in the past may survive as a war of memories in the present, as can be observed in the current dispute between China and South Korea on one side, and Japan on the other.	过去的暴力冲突可能在今天，作为记忆中的战争，继续存活下去。 正如我们看到现在发生在中国、韩国和日本之间的冲突。


A war of memories, in turn, may sometimes lead to a violent conflict in the future.	记忆中的战争，可能因此引发未来的暴力冲突。


Former perpetrators often try to de-legitimize their former victims’ moral superiority by claiming they were victims themselves.	从前的罪人时常企图通过声明他们自己也是牺牲品来否定真正受害者那更优越的道德取向。


Therefore, the 60th anniversary of the firebombing of Dresden by Allied forces on 13 February 1945 has probably been a more crucial moment in terms of the German “politics of memory” than the 60th anniversary of 8 May 1945 is going to be.	因此，就“记忆的政治”这个词来说，1945年2月13日这个盟军向德累斯顿开火的第60个纪念日，相对于1945年5月8日这个第60个纪念日，便可能是一个更关键性的时刻。


Far-right groups infamously dubbed the attack by which at least 30,000 people were killed “Dresden’s Holocaust of bombs.”	极右势力卑鄙的导演了“德累斯顿大屠杀”，在侵袭中至少三万人被杀害。


Fortunately, their propaganda campaign has been a failure.	幸运的是，他们的宣传活动以失败告终。


Although it is true that thousands of the civilians killed in Dresden and other German cities were innocent at an individual level, there can be no doubt it was morally imperative that Germany be defeated collectively.	虽然成千上万在德累斯顿和德国其它城市被杀害的德国平民作为个体确是无辜的，但从道义上讲，毫无疑问德国应该作为一个民族被挫败。


On the left side of the German political spectrum, the proposition that 8 May 1945 was a day of liberation remains unchallenged.	在德国政坛的左派当中，关于把1945年5月8日看成解放日这一提法向来毋庸置疑。


However, it is sometimes repressed that the massive use of force had been necessary to achieve that result.	然而，取得这一结果必须大规模使用武力，这一事实却时而被压置。


Left-wing pacifism tends to overlook this simple fact.	左翼和平主义往往忽略这个清楚的事实。


Its slogan “Never again war!” is only half the truth – the other half is “Never again appeasement!” 8 May 1945 was not “zero hour,” as a popular saying in Germany goes.	它的口号“再也不要战争！ ”只是真相的一部分，另一部分是“再也不要绥靖！


It had an antecedent, that is, a lack of pre-emptive resistance at home and abroad to the threat that built up in Nazi Germany during the 1930’s.	”。 1945年5月8日并不是德国流行说法所提及的“零时”，因为已经有先例，那就是：缺乏对20世纪30年代纳粹德国国内外威胁的“先发制人”的抵制。


There is yet another lesson to be learned.	还有一个教训要吸取。


Yes, 8 May 1945 was a day of liberation to which the Soviet army contributed decisively.	是的，1945年5月8日是苏军起到绝对性贡献作用的一个解放日。


But for millions of Central and East Europeans, liberation was followed by Stalin’s oppressive regime.	但对于数以百万计的中欧和东欧人民来说，解放后，随之而来的是斯大林的高压统治。


The current war of memories between the Baltic republics and Russia, with regard to the international celebration in Moscow on 9 May this year, reminds Germany of a special historic responsibility.	如今对波罗的海共和国与俄罗斯之间战争的记忆，是今年5月9日在莫斯科举行的国际庆典的主题，这让德国意识要负一个特殊的历史责任。


The German-Soviet non-aggression treaty, the so-called Hitler-Stalin pact, concluded in August 1939, had been supplemented by a secret appendix dividing the border states Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania into spheres of interest for the two parties.	德苏之间的“互不侵犯”条约，即中止于1939年8月的所谓“希特勒－斯大林”协定，曾经作过修订，追加的是一个秘密附录――关于如何把边境国家：芬兰、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、波兰和罗马尼亚划分到这两大势力国的利益范围。


But excusing Nazi atrocities by pointing to Stalinist crimes is an intellectually and morally unacceptable stratagem.	但是企图把矛头转向斯大林的罪行来为纳粹暴行辩护，无论在知性还是道义上都说不过去。


When Chancellor Schröder travels to Moscow for the Red Square celebrations, he should bear in mind Nazi Germany’s contribution to the Baltic tragedy.	当施罗德总理来到莫斯科红场参加庆祝仪式的时候，他应该反思的是德国要为波罗的海诸国的悲剧承担多少责任。


On 8 May this year, public speakers will remind us how important it is not to forget.	今年5月8日，公众的声音会提醒我们“不能忘记”有多重要。


They will stress that if the lessons of history are not learned, history is bound to repeat itself.	他们会强调如果不吸取历史教训，历史就必然会重演。


All this is perfectly true.	这些都是完全正确的。


But personally, I will also remember my grandmother’s sentence “Thank God we lost that war!”	但是，作为个人来讲，我还要记住我祖母的那句话：“感谢上帝，我们输了这场战争。


Thank God – and thanks to all those brave Allied soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the sake of Europe’s liberty.	”感谢上帝，还要感谢为保卫欧洲自由而牺牲了自己生命的所有盟军战士。


But in terms of the all-important roles of a currency as an investment vehicle or reserve asset, the outlook for the renminbi is much less promising, owing to China’s still-tight capital controls and low level of financial development.	但对于���币最重要的作用——投资载体或储备资产而言，人民币的前景并不那么美妙，因为中国资本管制仍然十分严格，金融发展水平也较低。


A Defeat for International Tax Cooperation	国际税收合作的挫折


NEW YORK – Most of the world’s governments – eager to mobilize more tax revenues to finance development and curb pervasive tax-avoidance schemes, such as those revealed in the so-called Luxembourg Leaks scandal last year – have an interest in collaborating on taxation matters.	纽约—全球大部分政府急于动员更多的税收收入为发展融资以及遏制无处不在的避税机制（比如去年所谓的卢森堡泄密所揭示的），在税收问题上展开合作符合它们的利益。


Yet at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa last month, the momentum toward strengthening international tax cooperation came to an abrupt halt.	但在上个月在亚的斯亚贝巴举行的第三届国际发展融资会议（International Conference on Financing for Development）上，强化国际税收合作的势头突然停止了。


Developed countries blocked a proposal at the conference to establish an intergovernmental tax body within the United Nations to replace the current UN Committee of Experts.	发达国家在会上阻止了在联合国内部成立跨政府税收机构取代目前的联合国转接委员会的方案。


These countries insist that tax cooperation should take place exclusively under the leadership of the OECD, a body that they control.	这些国家坚持税收合作只能在它们所控制经合组织的领导下进行。


The rest of the world should hope this will prove to be a pause rather than an end to progress on international tax cooperation, which began 13 years ago, at the first International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico.	其他国家应该希望这只是国际税收合作的暂时停止而非终结。 国际税收合作始于13年前墨西哥蒙特雷首届国际发展融资会议。


Two years later, in 2004, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) upgraded its “ad hoc group” of tax experts to a regular committee.	两年后，2004年，联合国经济与社会委员会（ECOSOC）将其税收专家“临时小组”升级为常设委员会。


This meant that the experts would meet regularly and have an expanded mandate that went beyond merely updating a model double-taxation treaty.	这意味着专家们将定期召开会议，其权限也将得到扩展，而不仅仅是更新双税条约（double-taxation treaty）样板。


Four years later, at the Second Conference on Financing for Development, in Doha, Qatar, policymakers acknowledged that more needed to be done in tax matters, and asked ECOSOC to consider strengthening institutional arrangements.	四年后，在卡塔尔多哈举行的第二届发展融资会议上，决策者承认在税收���题上做得不够，并要求ECOSOC考虑加强制度安排。


And then, in the year leading up to the Addis Ababa conference, the UN Secretary-General endorsed the need for “an intergovernmental committee on tax cooperation, under the auspices of the United Nations.”	接着，在亚的斯亚贝巴会议前一年，联合国秘书长表示支持有必要建立“联合国框架下的跨政府税收合作委员会”。


His endorsement, along with strong support from nongovernmental organizations and the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, gave greater force to the demand by developing countries, organized around the Group of 77 and China, for an equal voice in setting global tax norms.	秘书长的支持，以及来自非政府组织和国际公司税改独立革委员会（Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation）的强烈支持让发展中国家的要求更加有力。 在77国集团和中国的组织下，发展中国家要求在制定全球税收规范中获得平等的发言权。


Up until the 11th hour of negotiations in Addis Ababa, they stood firm in calling for an intergovernmental body with the mandate and resources to create a coherent global framework for international tax cooperation.	直到亚的斯亚贝巴谈判的第11个小时，它们都坚决要求通过拥有权力和资源的跨政府机构建立一致的全球性国际税收合作框架。


But to no avail: Developed countries, led by the United States and the United Kingdom –home to many of the multinational corporations implicated in the “Lux Leaks” – succeeded in blocking this much-needed advance in global governance.	然而没有什么用：以美国和英国——“卢森堡泄密”中所牵涉到的众多跨国公司的母国——为首的发达国家成功地阻挠了这一全球治理所急需的进展。


In the end, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda provides that the current Committee of Experts will continue to function according to its 2004 mandate, with three additional meeting days per year, all funded through voluntary contributions.	最终，亚的斯亚贝巴行动日程（Addis Ababa Action Agenda）规定，目前的专家委员会将继续根据其2004年的权限行使功能，每年增加三次会议，完全以自愿捐款的方式筹集资金。


That is a profoundly disappointing outcome.	这是一个令人失望透顶的结果。


The developed countries have an argument – but not a convincing one.	发达国家有它们的理由——但是并不令人信服。


The OECD, whose members are essentially the world’s 34 richest countries, certainly has the capacity to set international standards on taxation.	事实上由全球34个最富裕国家组成的经合组织显然有能力制定国际税收标准。


Yet the domination of a select group of countries over tax norms has meant that, in reality, the global governance architecture for taxation has not kept pace with globalization.	但一小撮国家主宰税收规范意味着，在现实中，税收问题的全球治理结构早已与全球化脱节。


The Monterrey Consensus reached in 2002 included a call to enhance “the voice and participation of developing countries in international economic decision-making and norms-setting.”	2002年所达成的蒙特雷共识（Monterrey Consensus）呼吁强化“发展中国家在国际经济决策和规范制定中的声音和参与”。


But although the OECD invites some developing countries to participate in its discussions to establish norms, it offers them no decision-making power.	但尽管经合组织邀请了一些发展中国家参与规范制定的讨论，却没有提供任何决策权力。


The OECD is thus a weak surrogate for a globally representative intergovernmental forum.	因此，经合组织只是有全球代表性的跨政府论坛的劣等替代品。


Such a body must operate under the auspices of the United Nations, which bears the institutional legitimacy necessary to respond effectively to the challenges of globalization with coherent global standards to combat abusive tax practices and ensure fair taxation of corporate profits worldwide.	这样一个机构必须在联合国框架下运行，联合国拥有必要的机构合法性，能够以一致的全球标准打击税收不法行为、确保全球公司利润公平纳税，从而有效应对全球化挑战。


Despite the disappointment in Addis Ababa, the call for reform of the international tax system is not likely to be silenced.	尽管亚的斯亚贝巴会议令人失望，但国际税收制度改革的呼声不可能平息。


Instead, it will grow louder on all sides, as the developed countries’ counter-productive resistance to any give and take on international cooperation results in a tsunami of unilateral tax measures beyond OECD control.	相反，随着发达国家适得其反地拒绝在国际税收合作问题上做出让步导致了经合组织控制不了的单方面税收措施风暴，各方的呼声都会日益增强


The Making of Euro-Jihadism	欧洲圣战主义的形成


MADRID – The Belgian historian Henri Pirenne linked Europe’s birth as a Christian continent in the eighth century to its rupture with Islam.	马德里——比利时历史学家亨利·皮雷纳将欧洲这块基督教大陆的诞生与公元八世纪与伊斯兰教的决裂联系在一起。


Pirenne probably would never have expected a Muslim ghetto in Brussels to emerge, much less become a hub of jihadism, with marginalized and angry young Muslims revolting against Europe from within its own borders.	皮雷纳或许永远也不会想到布鲁塞尔有朝一日会出现穆斯林贫民窟，更不会想到这里会成为圣战主义的中心，眼睁睁看着被边缘化和愤怒的穆斯林青年从欧洲的境内反抗欧洲。


Divorce is not an option these days.	现阶段用离婚来解决问题已经并不现实。


But nor is the kind of marriage that the Islam scholar Tariq Ramadan advocates.	但也不能容许伊斯兰教学者塔里克·拉马丹所宣扬的那种婚姻继续下去。


Ramadan, a grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is a Swiss citizen and a resident of the United Kingdom who argues that Islamic ethics and values should be injected into the European system.	埃及穆斯林兄弟会创始人的孙子拉马丹是一名瑞士公民，同时在英国拥有居民身份，他提出伊斯兰教的道德和价值观应当被注入到欧洲国家的体制。


Europe would then not just tolerate Islam, but actually embrace it as an integral part of itself.	那样欧洲就不仅要容忍伊斯兰教，而且还要在实际上接受它作为自身的有机组成部分。


The problem with Ramadan’s vision is that Europe is an overwhelmingly secular continent, with a profoundly forward-thinking approach to ethics.	拉马丹愿景的问题在于欧洲是一块世俗势力占压倒性优势的大陆，在道德观方面有着深刻的前瞻性思维。


Islamic societies, by contrast, are both deeply religious and deeply embedded in the past.	而伊斯兰社会则恰恰相反，拥有深刻的宗教色彩并且深深植根于过去。


When Islamists speak of political or social reform, they are typically looking backward, hoping to resurrect a time when core European principles – from gender equality to gay marriage – were repudiated.	当伊斯兰教徒谈论政治和社会改革的时候，他们普遍都在回首过去，希望复兴的那个时代否定从性别平等到同性婚姻在内的欧洲核心原则。


Even Muslims who support the modernization of Islam would typically stop well short of Europe’s ethical vision.	就连那些支持伊斯兰教现代化的穆斯林往往也会对欧洲的道德愿景望而却步。


The flaws in Ramadan’s proposed solution to Euro-jihadism mirror the flaws in his explanation for the phenomenon, which he attributes largely to Europe’s involvement in the wars in the Middle East, its supposed collusion with Israel’s suppression of the Palestinians, and its support of Arab autocrats.	拉马丹所提的针对欧洲圣战主义解决方案的缺陷其实是他对这种现象解释的缺陷的反映。 他把圣战主义在欧洲的泛滥大致归咎于欧洲卷入了中东战争、欧洲所谓的与以色列勾结对巴勒斯坦人的镇压以及其对阿拉伯独裁者的支持。


“We cannot,” he writes, “support dictatorships … be silent when civilians are massacred south of our borders, and hope that we will not receive a response to the injustice and humiliation we have provoked.”	当平民在我们的边境以南遭受屠杀时保持沉默，并且希望我们不会因为挑起不公和屈辱而遭到回应。 ”


But it is the United States that launched wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, offers unconditional support to Israel, and has repeatedly propped up Arab autocrats.	但是美国发动了伊拉克和阿富汗战争、为以色列提供无条件支持并一再支持阿拉伯独裁者。


And it is Europe that has consistently criticized these policies – often harshly.	欧洲一直对这些政策持批评态度——往往言辞还非常激烈。


Yet America is not being subjected to a major surge of jihadist sentiment within its borders.	但美国并没有遭受到境内圣战情绪高涨的打击。


It might have helped that US President Barack Obama backed away from some of these policies.	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马逐渐收回这些政策或许有助于缓解对美国的仇恨情绪。


When the Arab Spring uprisings began, for example, he was quick to cut support for Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, allowing protesters – inspired by the Western model of democracy – to secure regime change.	例如，在阿拉伯之春起义开始时，他很快切断了对突尼斯总统宰因·阿比丁·本·阿里和埃及总统穆巴拉克的支持，并允许受西方民主模式启发的抗议者实现政权更替。


The return to autocracy in Egypt in 2013, via Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup d’état, certainly was not aided by the US or Europe, both of which supported the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood.	美国或欧洲肯定从未支持2013年埃及借助阿卜杜勒 - 法塔赫·塞西政变回归专制，美欧双方都对通过民主选举产生的穆斯林兄弟会表示支持。


Europe has offered even more direct help to Arab countries in recent years.	近年来，欧洲甚至为阿拉伯国家提供了更多的直接帮助。


If it were not for Europe’s military intervention, Libyans would still be living under the tyrannical Muammar el-Qaddafi.	如果不是欧洲的军事干预，利比亚人迄今将仍在残暴的卡扎菲统治下生活。


True, Europe could have done more to prevent the ensuing chaos in Libya.	的确，欧洲本来可以付出更大努力来阻止利比亚随后发生的混乱。


But the people of Libya surely must take responsibility for the proliferation of competing militias that refuse to unite to save their state from total collapse.	但利比亚民众无疑也应该对拒绝联合起来挽救国家陷入彻底崩溃命运的四处扩张的民兵武装负责。


More broadly, though the West – especially the US – has made grave policy errors in the Arab world over the last 50 years, external powers cannot be blamed entirely for the region’s meltdown.	从更广义的角度讲，虽然西方——尤其是美国——过去50年来在阿拉伯世界的确犯下了严重的政策错误，但外部势力却不能完全对地区的危机负责。


That is the result of a profound civilizational crisis – one that can be redressed only by the people of the Arab world.	目前的局势是一场深刻的文明危机的结果——只有阿拉伯世界的民众才能解决它。


If Europe’s foreign policy is not responsible for the Arab world’s current turmoil, it certainly cannot be the reason for the rise of jihadism within its own borders.	如果欧洲的外交政策并不承担阿拉伯世界当前局势混乱的责任，那么它无疑也不应是欧洲境内圣战主义崛起的理由。


The real problem lies at home: a disastrous deficit of effective policies related to social justice, education, housing, and employment for young European Muslims.	真正的问题其实在于国内：在于严重缺乏与欧洲穆斯林青年社会正义、教育、住房和就业相关的有效政策。


Marginalization generates frustration, which is subsequently fed by growing Islamophobia and the rise of raucous right-wing movements throughout the continent.	边缘化带来挫败感，日益严重的伊斯兰恐惧症和整个欧洲大陆吵吵嚷嚷的右翼运动崛起又为这种挫败感火上浇油。


This link is apparent in the fact that the majority of European jihadists come from underprivileged backgrounds.	欧洲圣战者绝大多数来自底层证明了这种联系确实存在。


Not particularly well versed in the true teachings of Islam, and lacking opportunities to improve their lives, they become easy prey for extremists.	他们既缺乏对伊斯兰教教义的真正理解，也缺乏改善生活的实际机会，因此非常容易成为极端分子的猎物。


Jihadism, with its absolute certainty and grand mission, offers a sense of purpose, pride, and identity – not to mention adventure – and an outlet for their anger against the “home” that has denied them those things.	圣战主义以其绝对的确定性和庄严的使命感为这些迷茫青年提供了目的感、自豪感和自我认同——更不用说还有冒险的机会——此外还为他们提供了对剥夺其上述权利的“家园”发泄愤怒情绪的出口。


The story of America’s Muslims is the measure of Europe’s failure.	美国的穆斯林现状凸显了欧洲的失败政策。


Like most Americans, Muslims in the US maintain a certain amount of faith in the American dream.	像绝大多数美国人一样，美国穆斯林仍然在一定程度上相信美国梦。


They are mostly middle class, and, despite all the talk about rising economic inequality, they have not given up on the belief that, in the US, hard work and initiative are rewarded.	他们大多是中产阶级，而且尽管所有人都在谈论经济不��等日益严重，但他们并没有放弃在美国辛勤工作和积极主动就能得到回报的信仰。


America is a country of immigrants, with a dynamic economy that has enabled newcomers, time and again, to achieve great success.	美国是一个移民之国，其充满活力的经济一次次的让新移民取得了巨大的成功。


In Europe, by contrast, improving one’s social standing has always been very difficult; and, at a time of economic stagnation and staggeringly high unemployment, it is not getting any easier.	而欧洲的情况则恰恰相反，提升一个人的社会地位一向是相当困难的； 而且在经济停滞和失业率惊人高企的情况下，提升社会地位的难度更是可想而知。


Socially, America also offers something to Muslims that Europe does not.	在社会领域，美国也能赋予穆斯林某些欧洲无法赋予的宽容。


Its fundamentally religious culture enables Muslims to retain their identity to a far greater extent than in secular Europe.	美国本质上的宗教文化使得穆斯林能比在世俗的欧洲在更大程度上保留对自身身份的认同。


Indeed, America’s core values – personal responsibility and constitutional patriotism – can be easier for Muslims to swallow than Europe’s more aggressively secular brand of liberalism.	事实上，美国个人责任和宪法爱国主义的核心价值观相比欧洲更激进的世俗自由主义对穆斯林而言更容易接受。


As a result, integration and assimilation tend to be easier for Muslims in America.	因此，穆斯林移民在美国的融合和同化更容易取得成功。


All of this suggests that Europe must look inward to address homegrown jihadism effectively.	所有这些表明，欧洲必须自我审视才能有效解决内生性的圣战主义问题。


This does not mean that it should temper its secularism, much less its liberal values.	这并不意味着它必须改变世俗主义，更不意味着要改变自由主义价值观。


Rather, Europe must breathe life into its own “European dream,” ensuring that all people have access to real opportunities to improve their lives.	恰恰相反，欧洲必须为“欧洲梦”注入新的活力，确保所有人都有切实的机会改善自己的生活。


Otherwise, it will face a lost generation of millions of young Europeans – Muslim and otherwise.	否则，它将面临着由成百上千万欧洲年轻人组成的失去的一代——其中既包括穆斯林也包括欧洲其他民众。


The New Climate Economics	新气候经济学


NEW YORK – This Friday, in its latest comprehensive assessment of the evidence on global warming, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will show that the world’s climate scientists are more certain than ever that human activity – largely combustion of fossil fuels – is causing temperatures and sea levels to rise.	纽约—本周五，联合国政府间气候变化专门委员会（United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）对全球变暖的证据的最新评估表明，世界气候科学家比此前任何时候都要确定人类活动——主要是燃烧化石燃料——正在引起气温和海平面升高。


In recent years, a series of extreme weather events – including Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey, floods in China, and droughts in the American Midwest, Russia, and many developing countries – have caused immense damage.	近几年来，一系列极端天气事件——包括纽约和新泽西的桑迪飓风、中国的洪水和美国中西部、俄罗斯和众多发展中国家的旱灾——造成了严重伤害。


Last week, Mexico experienced simultaneous hurricanes in the Pacific and in the Gulf of Mexico that devastated towns and cities in their path.	上周，墨西哥经历了太平洋和墨西哥湾飓风的同时袭击，飓风过境之处，村镇和城市俱毁。


Climate change will be a major driver of such events, and we risk much worse.	气候变化是此类事件的重要因素，而且我们面临的局面越来越糟糕。


This puts a new debate center stage: how to reconcile increased action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with strong economic growth.	这把一个新争论带到了舞台中央：如何协调越来越多的行动以降低伴随强劲经济增长出现的温室气体排放。


It is a debate that is already mired in controversy.	这一争论已经迷失在争议之中。


As most countries have started making serious investments in renewable energy, and many are implementing carbon prices and regulations, critics complain that such policies may undermine growth.	大部分国家已开始动真格投资于可再生能源，许多国家更是开始实施碳定价和监管，与此同时，批评家指责这些政策会阻碍增长。


With the global economy still recovering from the 2008 financial crash, higher energy costs – not yet fully offset by greater energy efficiency – are worrying business and political leaders.	全球经济仍在从2008年金融动荡中复苏，更高的能源价格——无法通过提高能源效率充分抵消——让商业和政治领袖颇为担心。


The advent of shale gas has confused the energy debate even more.	页岩气的出现让能源争论更加扑朔迷离了。


If gas is substituted for coal, it can be a useful bridge to a low-carbon future.	用气代替煤不失为通往低碳未来的捷径。


But astonishingly, it is coal, the dirtiest fuel, that is experiencing the sharpest increase in use.	但是，令人震惊的是，用量增加最剧烈的恰恰是最肮脏的燃料——煤。


Companies and investors are hedging their bets by taking a few resource-efficiency measures and investing in some low-carbon assets, but leaving their high-carbon portfolios and activities largely intact.	公司和投资者通过采取些许资源效率措施、投资些许低碳资产对冲赌注，但他们的高碳投资组合和行为并未出现多大改变。


Policy vacillation in some countries has not helped.	一些国家的政策犹豫也不利于大局。


Advocates of stronger action respond that low-carbon investments can generate much stronger, cleaner growth.	加强行动的支持者回应道，低碳投资可以带来强劲得多、洁净得多的增长。


They point to the savings available from energy efficiency, and to the market opportunities generated by clean-energy technologies as the processes of learning and discovery take hold.	他们指出，随着学习和发现的进行，能源效率能带来节约，而清洁能源技术能带来市场机会。


They seek to demonstrate the benefits that a more sustainable pattern of development can bring to the world’s cities, to people’s health (from the reduction in air pollution), to energy security, and to the ability of the world’s poor to access energy.	他们试图证明，更加可持续的发展模式给世界各大城市、（通过减少空气污染）给人民健康、给能源安全带来诸多好处，也能让穷人获得更多的能源。


And they propose green bonds and public investment banks to finance new infrastructure and jobs at a time when world interest rates are low and demand is depressed in many countries.	他们建议发行绿色债券，敦促上市投资银行利用世界利率较低、许多国家需求受抑制的时机为新基础设施和就业提供资金支持。


These are serious economic debates, but too often they have become entangled in ideological disputes about the appropriate response to the economic crisis and the value of government intervention in markets.	这些都是很严肃的经济学争论，但它们往往演化为关于经济危机的合理应对措施和政府干预市场的价值的意识形态纠纷。


That is regrettable.	这实在令人遗憾。


Climate change is not a partisan issue, and climate policy is essentially market-based.	气候变化并非派系之争，气候政策从根本上说也是基于市场的。


It is about correcting market failures so that markets and entrepreneurship can play their proper role of ensuring innovation and efficient resource allocation.	这是关于纠正市场失灵从而使市场和企业家精神能够在保证创新和有效资源配置中扮演适当角色的问题。


In order to escape this impasse, we have helped to launch the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.	为了跳出这一僵局，我们协助成立了全球经济和气候委员会（Global Commission on the Economy and Climate）。


The Commission’s New Climate Economy project brings together seven leading policy research institutes from six continents, overseen by a panel of former heads of government and finance ministers and prominent business leaders, and advised by a panel of leading economists from across the world.	委员会的新气候经济（New Climate Economy）项目集合了六大洲的七大领先政策研究机构，由前政府首脑、财政部长和注明商业领袖组成的专家委员会监督，由全球著名经济学家组成的专家委员会担任顾问。


Its purpose is to provide authoritative new evidence concerning how governments and businesses can achieve stronger economic growth while simultaneously addressing climate risks.	其目的是提供关于政府和企业如何在实现更强的经济增长的同时纠正气候风险的权威新证据。


Few governments or investors start from the standpoint of climate change.	很少有政府或投资者以气候变化为出发点。


They want to promote investment and economic growth, create jobs, stabilize public finances, expand markets, turn profits, ensure reliable energy and food supplies, produce goods and services, reduce poverty, and build cities.	他们想促进投资和经济增长、创造就业岗位、稳定公共财政、扩大市场、带来利润、保证可靠的能源和食品供给、生产商品和服务、减少贫困以及建设城市。


So the primary question that we need to ask is not whether we can reduce emissions, but how public policy can help to achieve these core goals while reducing emissions and building a more climate-resilient economy.	因此，我们需要问的主要问题不是能否减少排放，而是公共政策如何帮助在实现这些核心目标的同时减少排放、建设气候恢复力强的经济。


There is now a lot of experience around the world in this area.	在这方面，全世界范围有许多经验可以遵循。


When the Stern Review on the economics of climate change was published seven years ago, the subject was largely theoretical.	七年前关于气候变化经济学的《斯特恩报告》（Stern Review）发布时，这个主题基本上还停留在理论阶段。


Now countries at all stages of development are pursuing new patterns of economic growth that take climate into account.	如今，处于各个发展阶段的各国都在追求新的考虑气候问题的经济增长模式。


Germany, for example, is planning the world’s most ambitious low-carbon energy transition, based on energy conservation and renewables.	比如，德国正在规划全世界最有雄心的低碳经济转型，该计划以节能和可再生为基础。


South Korea has made “green growth” a central economic goal.	韩国将“绿色增长”制定为核心经济目标。


Mexico’s 2012 General Law on Climate Change has put it on course for a major increase in clean power.	墨西哥2012年气候变化一般法（General Law on Climate Change）将大大提高清洁电力的用量。


China has placed the industrial development of green technologies at the top of its agenda.	中国将绿色技术产业开发作为其日程的最优先项目。


Ethiopia is seeking to move to lower-carbon farming.	埃塞俄比亚正在寻求发展低碳农业。


Brazil has significantly reduced the rate of deforestation in the Amazon.	巴西极大地降低了亚马孙森林的采伐速度。


Some major businesses are providing powerful examples of what is possible.	一些大企业提供了有力的例子，让我们知道可以做到什么程度。


Unilever has committed to the sustainable sourcing of agricultural and forest products.	联合利华承诺使用可持续的农业和森林产品源。


Coca-Cola is phasing out all use of climate-polluting hydrofluorocarbons.	可口可乐正在彻底停用污染气候的氢氟碳化合物。


The retail giant Wal-Mart is driving emissions reduction throughout its supply chain.	零售巨头沃尔玛在其全供应链推动减排运动。


Meanwhile, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank have stopped lending to high-emission coal plants.	与此同时，世界银行和欧洲投资银行也不再向高排放煤电贷款。


Yet genuine questions remain about how fast economies should move on to a low-carbon path, and the most effective way to do so.	但真正的问题依然存在——经济可以以多快的速度迈向低碳之路，以及什么通过什么办法实现最有效。


Some low-carbon policies have clearly been expensive, while other, apparently cost-effective options, have not been pursued at all.	一些低碳政策显然代价十分高昂，而一些显然成本很低的选择则完全没有人实施。


Any structural transformation involves costs, trade-offs, and uncertainties, and it is vital that we understand these properly.	任何结构性变化都包括成本、权衡和不确定性，合理地理解这些因素十分重要。


Powerful interests will, of course, oppose any low-carbon transition, dismissing and often drowning out those who stand to benefit.	当然，强大的既得利益会反对一切低碳转型，打压甚至挤出低碳转型的受益者。


That makes it even more important to clarify the choices.	这意味着澄清选择更加重要了。


As science makes clear how imperative the climate question is, it is time for economists and policymakers to explain how it can be answered.	科学已经清楚地证明了气候问题的紧迫性，现在该轮到经济学家和决策者来解释如何应对这一紧迫性了。


Only the Poor Die Young	只有穷人才会早逝


ROTTERDAM – People who are lower on the socioeconomic ladder (indicated by their level of education, occupation, or income) have shorter and less healthy lives, on average, than those on higher rungs.	鹿特丹—平均而言，在社会经济阶梯中处于下半截的人（可以用教育水平、职位和收入来作为指标）寿命更短、健康状况更差。


Indeed, life expectancy at birth often varies by 5-10 years, depending on social and economic well-being, with poorer people spending 10-20 more years of life suffering from illness or disability than their wealthier counterparts.	事实上，根据社会和经济福利的不同，出生寿命预期通常可以相差5—10年，较贫困人群每年要多花10—20年与病魔或残疾搏斗。


In the nineteenth century, this situation would not have been surprising, given low average income, widespread poverty, and lack of social security.	在十九世纪，这一结果并不令人惊奇，因为那时平均收入较低、贫困普遍存在，也缺乏社会保障。


But such data are commonly reported for high-income countries today, including those ranking high on indices of economic prosperity and human development – even Western Europe’s highly developed welfare states.	但是，这一数据在当今高收入国家也屡见不鲜，包括在经济繁荣和人类发展指数排名上位居前列的国家，甚至是西欧高度发达的福利国家。


Since the end of World War II, Western European countries have tried to reduce socioeconomic inequality, or offset its consequences, through progressive taxation, social security programs, and a wide range of collectively financed provisions, such as public housing, education, health care, and cultural and leisure facilities.	二战结束以来，西欧国家试图通过累进税、社会保障计划和各种集体出资项目（比如公共住房、教育、医疗和文化和休闲设施）来抑制社会经济不平等性或抵消其后果。


But, while these policies have reduced inequalities in some social and economic outcomes, including income, housing quality, and health-care access, they have been insufficient to eliminate health inequalities.	但是，尽管这些政策在一些社会和经济结果中降低了不平等性（包括收入、住房质量和卫生服务等方面），它们仍不足以消除健康不平等性。


Long-term time-series data indicate that the socioeconomic mortality gap narrowed before the 1950’s, but has grown substantially since then.	长期时间序列数据表明，社会经济死亡率差异在20世纪50年代以前有所缩小，但此后显著增大。


More puzzling is the fact that more generous welfare policies do not translate into smaller health disparities.	更令人难以费解的事实是更慷慨的福利政策并不能转换为更小的健康差异。


Even the Nordic countries – world leaders when it comes to creating universal and well-designed welfare policies that cover citizens from cradle to grave – face significant health disparities, despite their relatively low income inequality.	即使是以设计完美的“从出生到坟墓”的全民覆盖福利政策为天下���的北欧国家，也面临着极大地健康差异，尽管它们的收入不平等性相对较低。


To be sure, modern welfare states have far from abolished social inequality, with disparities in access to material and human resources continuing to generate highly unequal lives among their citizens. But the welfare state’s aim has never been radical redistribution of wealth.	平心而论，现代福利国家距离消灭社会不平等性还相去甚远，获得物质和人力资源能力的差异仍然在这些国家的国民之间造就着极为不平等的生活。


Rather, welfare policies are intended to create a compromise between the interests of employees and employers, laborers and the middle classes. As a result, their redistributive effects are modest.	但福利国家的目标从来不是彻底的财富再分配。


So, while a partial failure of the welfare state may help to explain the persistence of health inequalities, one must look elsewhere to understand – and reverse – their rise. Two possible explanations have emerged from the rapidly growing scientific literature on the subject: selective upward social mobility and delayed diffusion of behavioral change.	相反，福利政策的初衷是在雇员和雇主、在劳动力和中产阶级的利益之间形成妥协。


In reality, both factors are at work.	因此，其再分配效应是温和的。


During the twentieth century, social mobility increased slowly but steadily in all high-income countries, with educational achievement and occupational status depending less on family background and more on cognitive ability and other personal characteristics.	因此，尽管福利国家的局部失败有助于解释健康不平等性的持续存在，但我们必须在他处寻找其愈演愈烈的原因并扭转这一趋势。


As a result, the lower socioeconomic groups have not only shrunk in size, but have probably also become more homogeneous in terms of personal characteristics that increase the risk of health problems.	两个可能的原因可以从这一主题迅速增长的学术论文中一窥端倪：选择性向上的社会流动和行为变化的滞后扩散。 在现实中，这两大因素都在起作用。


Moreover, people with a higher socioeconomic position tend to adopt new behaviors first, and to abandon more readily behaviors that are found to damage health, such as smoking and high-fat diets.	在20世纪，高收入国家的社会流动增加缓慢而稳定，教育成就和职位地位更少地以来家庭背景，更多地以来认知能力和其他个人特质。


Given this, new behavioral recommendations by health authorities tend to exacerbate health inequalities, at least temporarily.	于是，地位较低的社会经济群体不但规模缩小，在增加健康问题风险的个人特质上，他们可能也变得更为同质了。


Significant disparities in smoking, physical exercise, diet, and alcohol consumption afflict many of Western Europe’s welfare states.	此外，地位较高的社会经济群体总是首先改变行为，更能抛弃危害健康的行为，比如吸烟和高脂肪饮食。


The welfare system, which was created to combat poverty, has been less effective against “diseases of affluence” like heart disease and lung cancer.	因此，卫生当局的新行为建议总是会（至少暂时地）扩大健康不平等性。


All of this highlights the need for creative solutions to disparities that unnecessarily and unfairly blight the lives of those who have the least, generate massive health-care costs, and pose a barrier to increased labor-force participation (impeding efforts in some countries to raise the retirement age).	吸烟、锻炼、饮食和酒精消费的巨大差异折磨着众多西欧福利国家。 福利制度本是用来消灭贫困的，而在消灭“富贵病”（比如心脏病和肺癌）方面效果较差。


In the last few decades, social policy in most Western European countries has moved away from redistribution. This is a mistake, given that the consequences of this shift – rising income inequality, weaker social safety nets, and reduced health-care access – will aggravate health inequalities in the long run.	所有这些表明我们迫切需要创新性解决方案对付让最穷的人不必要也不公平地遭遇生命凋零的差异，这些差异还造成了的规模的卫生成本，也造成了增加劳动力参与的障碍（阻碍了一些国家提高退休年龄的努力）。


In fact, more, better-targeted redistributive policies, which account for the effects of selective upward social mobility and different rates of diffusion of behavioral change, are crucial to improving health outcomes in lower socioeconomic groups.	过去几十年来，大部分西欧国家的社会政策已不再着重于再分配。


Income support should be complemented by preventive health programs, while health literacy programs could help to diminish the link between low cognitive ability and bad health.	这是一个错误，因为这一转变的后果——收入不平等性上升、社会保障网弱化以及卫生医疗普及度下降——会在长期加剧健康不平等性。


Equal access to health care is not enough. Reducing inequalities in health outcomes requires more intensive health care for patients in lower socioeconomic brackets, tailored to their specific needs and challenges.	事实上，定位更合理的再分配政策——它们解释了选择性向上社会流动效应和行为变化扩散速度的不同——对于改善较低社会经济地位群体的健康结果至关重要。


For example, revenues from tobacco taxation, which disproportionately affects lower income groups, should be used to fund cessation-support programs that target disadvantaged smokers.	收入支持必须辅之以预防性卫生项目，同时健康教育计划也有助于降低低认知能力和健康状况不良之间的关联。


Significant and persistent health inequality indicates that, by raising the health levels of those with lower incomes or less education, massive strides could be made in improving populations’ overall health.	平等获得卫生医疗是不够的。 降低健康结果的不平等性需要加强对较低社会经济地位患者的卫生措施，解决他们特殊的需要和挑战。


This may require reshaping the welfare system to some extent, but the payoff would be well worth the effort.	比如，烟草税——该税种极大影响较低收入群体——应该被用于定向于弱势吸烟群体的戒烟支持项目。


Read more from "Visionary Voices"	巨大而持久的健康不平等性表明，通过提高较低收入或教育程度群体的健康水平，人口总体健康状况可以获得大幅改善。 这或许需要在某种程度上重新定义福利机制，但它带来的好处绝对可以弥补成本。


The Mouse Click that Roared	咆哮的鼠标


CAMBRIDGE – Until recently, cyber security has primarily interested computer geeks and cloak-and-dagger types.	美国剑桥—直到最近，关注网络安全的还大多是电脑极客和阴谋论者。


The Internet’s creators, part of a small, enclosed community, were very comfortable with an open system in which security was not a primary concern.	互联网的创造者——他们属于一个封闭的小圈子——对安全并非主要顾虑的开放系统感到十分满意。


But, with some three billion or so users on the Web nowadays, that very openness has become a serious vulnerability; indeed, it is endangering the vast economic opportunities that the Internet has opened for the world.	但是，如今有三十亿网络使用者，这一开放性成了严重的弱点； 事实上，这个弱点正在威胁到互联网为世界打开的广袤的经济机会海洋。


A “cyber attack” can take any number of forms, including simple probes, defacement of Web sites, denial-of-service attacks, espionage, and destruction of data.	 “网络攻击”可以以数不清的形式出现，包括简单的侵入、涂鸦网站、拒绝服务攻击、间谍活动和毁坏数据。


And the term “cyber war,” though best defined as any hostile action in cyberspace that amplifies or is equivalent to major physical violence, remains equally protean, reflecting definitions of “war” that range from armed conflict to any concerted effort to solve a problem (for example, “war on poverty”).	“网络战”一词也是千变万化——尽管最好的定义是放大或等同于重大实体侵犯的网络空间上的敌对行动——可以反映从武装冲突到齐心协力解决问题（比如“减贫战”）在内的一系列“战”的定义。


Cyber war and cyber espionage are largely associated with states, while cyber crime and cyber terrorism are mostly associated with non-state actors.	网络战和网络间谍大多与国家有关，与此同时，网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义往往由非国家行动者发出。


The highest costs currently stem from espionage and crime; but, over the next decade or so, cyber war and cyber terrorism may become greater threats than they are today.	目前，最大的成本来自间谍和犯罪； 但是，在未来十年中，网络战和网络恐怖主义有可能成为比今天更大的威胁。


Moreover, as alliances and tactics evolve, the categories may increasingly overlap.	此外，同盟和战术的演化，分类也可能日渐重叠。


Terrorists might buy malware from criminals, and governments might find it useful to hide behind both.	恐怖主义可以从犯罪分子那里买来恶意软件，政府可能会在背后指使。


Some people argue that deterrence does not work in cyberspace, owing to the difficulties of attribution.	有人认为，威慑在网络空间中并不管用，因为其来源难以确定。


But that is facile: inadequate attribution affects inter-state deterrence as well, yet it still operates.	但这简直是信口开河：不充分的来源确定同样影响着国家间的威慑，但威慑仍然常常被使用。


Even when the source of an attack can be successfully disguised under a “false flag,” governments may find themselves sufficiently enmeshed in symmetrically interdependent relationships such that a major attack would be counterproductive.	即便攻击源头可以用“伪旗”成功掩盖，政府仍可能陷入对称依赖的关系，让重大攻击产生适得其反的效果。


China, for example, would lose from an attack that severely damaged the American economy, and vice versa.	比如，中国可能因为严重危害美国经济的袭击中受到损失，反之亦然。


An unknown attacker may also be deterred by cyber-security measures.	未知的攻击者还能被网络安全措施威慑。


If firewalls are strong, or redundancy and resilience allow quick recovery, or the prospect of a self-enforcing response (“an electric fence”) seems possible, an attack becomes less attractive.	如果防火墙够强，或冗余性和恢复力足以让其快速回复，或有可能产生自我强化反应（“电围栏”），实施攻击就会变得不再具有吸引力。


While accurate attribution of the ultimate source of a cyber attack is sometimes difficult, the determination does not have to be airtight.	尽管准确地确定网络攻击的最终来源有时十分困难，但也不是一筹莫展。


To the extent that false flags are imperfect and rumors of the source of an attack are widely deemed credible (though not legally probative), reputational damage to an attacker’s soft power may contribute to deterrence.	由于伪旗的不完善性以及关于攻击来源的传闻被广泛认为是可靠的（尽管未经法律验证），对攻击者软实力的名誉伤害也能形成威慑。


Finally, a reputation for offensive capability and a declared policy that keeps open the means of retaliation can help to reinforce deterrence.	最后，攻击能力的名声和公开宣布以牙还牙政策也有助于增强威慑。


Of course, non-state actors are harder to deter, so improved defenses such as pre-emption and human intelligence become important in such cases.	当然，非国家行动者更难侦测，因此改善防线——比如先发制人和人力情报——在这类案件中就变得十分重要。


But, among states, even nuclear deterrence was more complex than it first looked, and that is doubly true of deterrence in the cyber domain.	但是，在国家之间，即便是核威慑也比乍看上去更复杂，在网络空间中的威慑更是如此。


Given its global nature, the Internet requires a degree of international cooperation to be able to function.	出于其全球性，互联网需要一定程度的国际合作才能运行。


Some people call for the cyber equivalent of formal arms-control treaties.	有人呼吁制定互联网版的正式武器控制条约。


But differences in cultural norms and the difficulty of verification would make such treaties hard to negotiate or implement.	但文化规范差异和查证困难将使这类条约难以谈判和实施。


At the same time, it is important to pursue international efforts to develop rules of the road that can limit conflict.	与此同时，追求制定防止冲突的国际规则十分重要。


The most promising areas for international cooperation today most likely concern problems posed for states by third parties such as criminals and terrorists.	如今，最有希望的国际合作领域是第三方给国家带来的问题，比如犯罪和恐怖主义。


Russia and China have sought to establish a treaty establishing broad international oversight of the Internet and “information security,” which would prohibit deception and embedding malicious code or circuitry that could be activated in the event of war.	俄罗斯和中国寻求制定条约建立对互联网和“信息安全”的全面国际监督，该条约将禁止欺诈和嵌入在可以在战争事件发生时激活的恶意代码和电路。


But the US has argued that arms-control measures banning offensive capabilities could weaken defenses against attacks and would be impossible to verify or enforce.	但美国认为限制攻击能力的武器控制措施会削弱针对攻击的防御，并且难以论证和强制实施。


Likewise, in terms of political values, the US has resisted agreements that could legitimize authoritarian governments’ censorship of the Internet – for example, by the “great firewall of China.”	类似地，在政治价值方面，美国拒绝了可能让独裁政府审查互联网合法化的协定——比如“中国防火长城”。


Moreover, cultural differences impede any broad agreements on regulating online content.	此外，文化差异阻止了任何监管在线内容的广泛协定。


Nonetheless, it may be possible to identify behaviors like cyber crime that are illegal in many domestic jurisdictions.	尽管如此，在本国司法辖区内鉴别网络犯罪等非法行为仍是可能的。


Trying to limit all intrusions would be impossible, but one could start with cyber crime and cyber terrorism involving non-state parties.	阻止一切侵入或许不可行，但可以从网络犯罪和非国家行动方参与的网络恐怖主义着手。


Here, major states would have an interest in limiting damage by agreeing to cooperate on forensics and controls.	在这方面，通过同意在取证和控制方面达成一致来限制伤害符合大国的利益。


The transnational cyber domain poses new questions about the meaning of national security.	跨国网络空间给我们带来了关于国家安全含义的新问题。


Some of the most important responses must be national and unilateral, focused on hygiene, redundancy, and resilience.	一些最重要的应对措施必须是国家层面的、单方面的，专注于清扫、冗余性和恢复力。


It is likely, however, that major governments will soon discover that the insecurity created by non-state cyber actors will require closer cooperation among governments.	但是，很有可能大国政府很快就会发现，由非国家网络行动者造成的不完全将要求各国政府间进行紧密合作。


A Democratic Burma?	民主缅甸？


TOKYO – Historic transformations often happen when least expected.	东京——历史转型的发生总是出人意料的。


Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union emerged at one of the Cold War’s darkest hours, with US President Ronald Reagan pushing for strategic missile defense and the two sides fighting proxy wars in Afghanistan and elsewhere.	在冷战正酣的时候，戈尔巴乔夫在苏联推出了改革与新思维的自由化政策，而美国总统里根推出了战略导弹防御系统，并在阿富汗和其他地区的实施双边战争代理人战争。


Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening followed China’s bloody – and failed – invasion of Vietnam in 1978.	邓小平的经济开放政策是在1978年中国对越南的血腥入侵（以失败告终）之后推行的。


And South Africa’s last apartheid leader, F. W. de Klerk, was initially perceived as just another apologist for the system – hardly the man to free Nelson Mandela and oversee the end of white minority rule.	而南非的末代种族隔离领导人德克拉克一开始被普遍认为只是旧体制的又一个捍卫者，几乎无人想到他会释放曼德拉并结束少数白人的统治。


Now the world is suddenly asking whether Burma (Myanmar), after six decades of military dictatorship, has embarked on a genuine political transition that could end the country’s pariah status.	现在，世界突然对缅甸产生了疑问，在60年的军事独裁之后，缅甸真的将开始走向终结该国贱民地位的实质性政治转型了吗？


Is Burma, like South Africa under de Klerk, truly poised to emerge from a half-century of self-imposed isolation?	缅甸会像德克拉克的南非一样，真正从半个世纪的自我封闭中走出来吗？


And can Aung San Suu Kyi, the heroic opposition leader, and Thein Sein, Burma’s new president, engineer a political transition as skillfully and peacefully as Mandela and de Klerk did for South Africa in the early 1990’s?	反对派的英雄领导人昂山素季和新任缅甸总统登盛能像20世纪90年代初曼德拉和德克拉克在南非那样推行巧妙而和平的政治转型吗？


Despite her two decades of house arrest and isolation, Suu Kyi possesses two of the gifts that enabled Mandela to carry out his great task: a reassuring serenity and an utter lack of vindictiveness.	尽管昂山素季经历了20年的软禁和隔离，但仍具有让曼德拉完成伟大成就的两大素质：心止如水和悲天悯人。


As Burma’s authorities test reform, these gifts, together with her negotiating skills and, most of all, her vast moral authority, will be tested as never before.	随着缅甸当局开始改革检验，这些素质和她的谈判技能——以及最重要的，她在道德上的居高临下——一起，将受到前所未有的考验。


Moreover, unlike Mandela during his 27-year imprisonment, Suu Kyi has had her hopes raised – and dashed – before.	除此以外，与曼德拉的27年铁窗生涯不同，昂山素季曾经有过燃起希望并几乎成功的经历。


In the mid-1990’s, and again in 2002-2003, reconciliation between Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and the military junta seemed to be in the offing.	在20世纪90年代中期以及2002—2003年间，昂山素季的国家民主联盟和军政当局几乎要形成妥协了。


On both occasions, however, the regime’s hardliners gained the upper hand, crushing prospects for reform.	但是，最终体制内的强硬派占了上风，扼杀了改革希望。


Yet Suu Kyi, and much of the Burmese opposition, is beginning to admit that today’s political liberalization might be the real thing.	但昂山素季以及大部分缅甸反对派均开始承认，今天的政治自由化可能是来真的。


Because Burma’s generals say almost nothing in public, it is difficult to fathom why they allowed elections that elevated Thein Sein to power, or to explain their willingness to embrace dialogue with the long-suppressed opposition.	由于缅甸的将军们在公开场合几乎总是缄口不言，因此很难看出他们为何会容许把登盛推上权力宝座的选举发生，也很难解释为什么他们愿意与被长期镇压的反对派展开对话。


Recent events suggest one possible explanation: Burma’s rulers have grown wary of China’s almost smothering embrace – a result of the country’s international isolation.	最近的事件显示了一种可能的解释：缅甸的当权者开始担心令人窒息的把持——而这又是该国国际孤立的结果。


Indeed, public protests against China’s commercial exploitation of Burma’s natural resources became so widespread that the government called a halt to construction by Chinese investors on the huge and environmentally damaging Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River.	事实上，缅甸公众反对中国对缅甸自然资源的商业开发已成燎原之势，以至于政府不得不叫停中国投资者可能造成严重环境破坏的瓦底江密松大坝项目。


Thein Sein’s decision to halt the project is clearly an important policy shift.	登盛叫停密松大坝项目的决定显然是一个清晰的政策转向信号。


It is also a signal to the outside world that Burma’s new government may be much more willing than any of its predecessors to heed both public pressure and international opinion, both of which vehemently opposed the dam’s construction.	此外，这还向外界表明，缅甸新政府要比其所有前任都更加愿意关心公众压力和国际舆论——这两样均强烈反对大坝的建设。


Almost simultaneously, Thein Sein offered even stronger signals that his was a very different Burmese administration: he freed political prisoners and invited Suu Kyi for direct talks with him.	几乎是在同时，登盛还给出了一个更加强烈的信号，表明这一届政府是一个完全不同的政府：他释放了一批政治犯，并邀请昂山素季和他展开直接对话。


Indeed, Suu Kyi now enjoys far greater freedom of movement than she has at any time since she received the Nobel Peace Prize 20 years ago, and the NLD recently announced that it will field candidates in the forthcoming by-elections to the country’s newly established parliament.	事实上，如今昂山素季过着她20年前获得诺贝尔和平奖以来最自由的生活，国家民主联盟最近宣称，该组织将推举即将到来的新议会候补选举候选人。


If Suu Kyi is permitted to campaign free of restraint, for both her own seat and to boost the electoral chances of her NLD colleagues, it will be clear that Thein Sein and his government are truly determined to bring their country in from the cold.	不管昂山素季还是她的国家民主联盟同志，能够自由参选无疑表明登盛及其政府真心实意地想让缅甸走出铁幕。


For both Suu Kyi and Thein Sein, every step from now on will be delicate, to be calibrated with the same care and deliberation that Mandela and de Klerk used in bridging their differences and leading their country out of isolation.	对昂山素季和登盛来说，从现在开始的每一步都将如履薄冰，人们将用曼德拉和德克拉克拨乱反正、将祖国带出孤立状态的自由化举措来要求他们。


But the international community, too, must act with great care.	但国际社会也必须小心行事。


While Thein Sein would undoubtedly wish to see the myriad economic and political sanctions imposed on Burma quickly lifted, it is too soon for a general easing of such measures.	毫无疑问，登盛愿意看见施加于缅甸的大量经济和政治制裁迅速被取消，但现在就放松制裁还为时过早。


But the outside world should demonstrate that every clear move toward greater political openness will merit more international political and economic engagement.	不过，外部世界应该表明态度：任何朝增进政治开放方向的进步都会得到国际政治和经济回报。


The Japan Investment Bank’s decision to invest in port development in Burma – essential if the economy, too, is to be opened – is one positive sign that the world will keep pace with Thein Sein step for step.	日本投资银行决定投资缅甸的港口开发——如果缅甸经济也开放的话，这将是很重要的——这是一个积极的信号，表明世界对于登盛的每一次进步都会投桃报李。


And US President Barack Obama’s decision to send Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Burma to meet Thein Sein is another clear sign that the world is ready to end the country’s isolation.	美国总统奥巴马决定派国务卿希拉里·克林顿前往缅甸会晤登盛是另一个信号，表明世界时刻准备着结束缅甸的孤立状态。


Closer to home, ASEAN’s recent decision to give Burma a chance to chair the organization in 2014 underscores its neighbors’ desire for the country’s full participation in Asia’s growing prosperity.	在近邻方面，东盟最近决定将2014年的主席国地位授予缅甸，这表明邻国也渴望缅甸完全融入亚洲的日渐繁荣。


No one should rush to judgment yet, but Thein Sein’s decisions, at least so far, are beginning to resemble those of South Africa’s de Klerk when he initiated his country’s reform process.	现在就下判断为时过早，但至少从目前来看，登盛的决定正走在德克拉克激活南非改革进程的道路上。


Fortunately, Burma already has in Aung San Suu Kyi its very own Nelson Mandela.	幸运的是，缅甸已经找到了自己的曼德拉——昂山素季。


A Devaluation Option for Southern Europe	解决南欧问题的方案——货币贬值


CAMBRIDGE – This year is likely to mark a make-or-break ordeal for the euro.	剑桥 ——对于欧洲而言，今年很可能是欧元生死存亡的考验。


The eurozone’s survival demands a credible solution to its long-running sovereign-debt crisis, which in turn requires addressing the two macroeconomic imbalances – external and fiscal – which are at the heart of that crisis.	欧元区若要继续存在，则需要提出一项可靠的方案，解决其长期存在的主权债务危机问题，而这反过来又需要解决外部失衡和财政失衡两大问题，这两种宏观经济失衡问题正是这一危机的核心。


The crisis has exposed the deep disparities in competitiveness that have developed within the eurozone.	此次危机暴露出欧元区内部成员国在经济竞争力方面存在很大的差距。


From 1996 to 2010, unit labor costs in Germany increased by just 8%, and by 13% in France. Compare that to 24% in Portugal, 35% in Spain, 37% in Italy, and a whopping 59% in Greece.	从1996年到2010年，德国单位劳动力成本仅上升8％，法国上升13％，而葡萄牙上升24%，西班牙上升35％，意大利上升37％，希腊上升则高达59％。


The result has been large trade imbalances between eurozone countries, a problem compounded by large fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt in southern Europe (and France) – much of it owed to foreign creditors.	这一问题导致欧元区内部国家贸易极度不平衡，而南欧和法国庞大财政赤字和公共债务庞大，使这一问题更为复杂，原因很大部分要归咎于外国债权人。


Does addressing these imbalances require breaking up the eurozone?	难道必须要欧元区解体才能解决这些贸易不平衡问题吗？


Suppose, for example, that Portugal were to leave and re-introduce the escudo. The ensuing exchange-rate devaluation would immediately lower the price of Portugal’s exports, raise its import prices, stimulate the economy, and bring about much-needed growth.	假如葡萄牙退出欧元区，重新引入埃斯库多（葡萄牙货币单位），那么随后而来的汇率贬值会使葡萄牙出口产品价格下跌，进口产品价格上涨，刺激葡萄牙经济发展，带来其急需的经济增长。


But a euro exit would be a messy affair. The resulting turmoil could very well trump any short-term gains in competitiveness from devaluation.	但是，脱离欧元将是一件很棘手的事，因为它所带来的金融风暴将胜过任何通过货币贬值来增强竞争力中获得的短期收益。


There is a remarkably simple alternative that does not require southern Europe’s troubled economies to abandon the euro and devalue their exchange rates.	有这样一种非常简单的解决方案，南欧经济困难国家不必放弃欧元，也不必贬低本国货币汇率。


It involves increasing the value-added tax while cutting payroll taxes.	这一方案包括提高增值税，同时削减工资税。


Our recent research demonstrates that such a “fiscal devaluation” has very similar effects on the economy in terms of its impact on GDP, consumption, employment, and inflation.	我们最近进行的研究表明，这样的“财政货币贬值”，无论在国内生产总值，消费还是就业和通胀方面，对经济产生的影响与贬低本国货币汇率产生的影响相当。


A currency devaluation works by making imports more costly and exports cheaper. A VAT/payroll-tax swap would do exactly the same thing.	货币贬值能行得通，因为这样会使进口产品更加昂贵，出口产品更加便宜，而提高增值税，削减工资税也能发挥这样的作用。


An increase in VAT raises the price of imported goods, as foreign firms face a higher tax.	提高增值税会提高进口货物的价格，外国企业面临更高的关税。


To ensure that domestic firms do not have an incentive to raise prices, an increase in VAT needs to be accompanied by a cut in payroll taxes.	为确保国内企业不会提高价格，在增加增值税的同时，必须削减工资税。


Moreover, since exports are exempt from VAT, the price of domestic exports will fall.	此外，由于出口产品免征增值税，国内出口产品价格也将下降。


The desired competitiveness effects of exchange-rate devaluation can thus be had while staying in the euro.	这样以来，即使不脱离欧元区，不进行汇率贬值，也能增强经济竞争力，收到同样的预期效果。


This policy can also help on the fiscal front.	这项政策在财政方面也会有所帮助。


As is true of an exchange-rate devaluation, the positive impact on growth of an increase in competitiveness can strengthen the fiscal position by raising tax revenues.	汇率贬值确实能够增强竞争力。 增强竞争力对经济增长产生积极影响，通过提高税收，可以改善财政状况。


Moreover, an important advantage of fiscal devaluations is that they generate additional revenues in proportion to the country’s trade deficit.	此外，财政货币贬值的一项重要优势体现在，其产生的额外收入与国家的贸易赤字比例相当。


For countries that are suffering from weak competitiveness and, as a consequence, running trade deficits, this typically means more revenues, especially in the short run.	对于正遭受因竞争力不强而因此产生贸易赤字的国家而言，此举通常意味着能获得更多的收入，在短期内尤为如此。


Like exchange-rate devaluations, fiscal devaluations create winners and losers.	财政货币贬值和汇率贬值一样，在这一过程中既会有赢家也会有输家。


Both act as a wealth levy: inflation means that bondholders suffer a real loss in proportion to their wealth and the size of the devaluation.	两者都起着财富杠杆的作用：通胀意味着债券持有人会遭受实际损失，这一损失与他们的财富多少及贬值的幅度相称。


If taxes on capital are not adjusted, holders of domestic stocks suffer a comparable loss.	如果不调整资本税，国内股票持有人也会蒙受类似的损失。


By contrast, many transfers, such as unemployment benefits, health benefits, and public pensions, are indexed to inflation, and thus maintain their real value.	相比而言，许多资金转移，如失业福利，卫生福利，公共养老金等，都与通货膨胀挂钩，从而维持了其实际价值。


The same is true of minimum wages.	最低工资也是如此。


These distributive effects play an important role in the politics of exchange-rate devaluations, and most of these effects appear in fiscal devaluations as well.	这些资金分配产生的影响在汇率贬值方面发挥了重要的政治作用，这些影响大部分也在财政货币贬值中得到体现。


Fiscal devaluations already have some advocates.	财政货币贬值的做法已经得到了一些人士的拥护。


Indeed, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s government just announced one.	事实上，法国总统尼古拉·萨尔科齐政府就刚刚宣布了一项财政货币贬值计划。


And concerns that a fiscal devaluation will conflict with euro rules can be met by simply pointing out that Germany’s government carried one out in 2007, though by another name, when it raised VAT from 16% to 19% and cut employers’ contribution to social insurance, from 6.5% to 4.2%.	若有些人担心财政货币贬值将会与欧元规则相互冲突，则可以援引德国举例即可。 德国政府2007年实施了一项类似的计划（没有公开说明），将增值税从16％提高到19％，将雇主对社会保险的贡献率从6.


In short, there are simple fiscal alternatives to exchange-rate devaluation that can address southern Europe’s short-term competitiveness problems.	总之，除了推行汇率贬值以外，还存在其他解决南欧短期竞争力问题的简单财政方案。


To be sure, feasible fiscal devaluations would be limited in size.	可以肯定的是，可行的财政货币贬值方案必须将规模控制在一定限度内。


But, together with debt restructuring, accommodative monetary policy, liquidity support from the European Central Bank, and much-required structural reforms, they can help to put these troubled economies on a sound footing without a euro breakup or a major austerity-induced recession.	但是，伴随着债务重组，宽松的货币政策，欧洲央行的资金流动性支持及非常必要的结构性改革，这些可行的财政货币贬值方案，可以在欧元区不解体，并且不会导致紧缩引起的严重经济衰退的前提下，帮助那些经济困难的国家踏上正轨。


A Dissident in China	一位中国的异议人士


TOKYO – 2009 was a good year for China.	东京 —— 对于中国而言， 2009 年可是一个好年头。


The Chinese economy still roared ahead in the midst of a worldwide recession.	在全球一片衰退的景象之中，中国经济却独领风骚、大步前进；


American President Barack Obama visited China, more in the spirit of a supplicant to an imperial court than the leader of the world’s greatest superpower.	美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马在他的中国之行中，表现的更像是一位置身帝国宫廷内的有求之人，而非一名全球最强超级大国的元首；


Even the Copenhagen summit on climate change ended just the way China wanted: failure in its attempt to commit China, or any other industrial nation, to making significant cuts in carbon emissions, with the United States getting the blame.	甚至连关于气候变化问题的哥本哈根峰会，都以令中国称心如意的方式落幕：它未能令中国或其他任何一个工业国承担起重大的减排义务，而此罪责却由美国承担。


The Chinese government, under the Communist Party, has every reason to feel confident.	共产党领导下的中国政府有充分的理由感到自信。


So why did a gentle former literature professor named Liu Xiaobo have to be sentenced to 11 years in prison, just because he publicly advocated freedom of expression and an end to one-party rule?	这样，为何一位儒雅的原文学教授（刘晓波）却仅仅因为公开倡导言论自由及一党统治的终结，而要被判处十一年徒刑呢？


Liu was co-author in 2008 of a petition, Charter 08, signed by thousands of Chinese, calling for basic rights to be respected.	刘晓波是 2008 年的请愿文件 —— 《 08 宪章》的共同作者，这份呼吁尊重基本权利的文件，业已征得数千中国人的签名。


Liu is not a violent rebel. His opinions, in articles published on the Internet, are entirely peaceful.	刘晓波并非是一名暴力叛乱分子，他在发表于互联网的文章中所表达的观点，完全不带戾气。


Yet he was jailed for “inciting subversion of state power.”	即便如此，他还是因“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”而被判入狱。


The notion that Liu might be capable of subverting the immense power of the Communist Party of China is patently absurd.	认为刘晓波或有能力颠覆中共巨大权力的观点，显然是一派胡言。


And yet the authorities clearly believe that they had to make an example of him, to prevent others from expressing similar views.	然而当局却明显相信：自己必须杀一儆百，以防他人发表类似观点。


Why does a regime that appears to be so secure consider mere opinions, or even peaceful petitions, so dangerous?	为何对于一个看似稳固的政权来说，那些纯粹的观点、或者甚至是和平的请愿活动，却被认为是如此危险呢？


Perhaps because the regime does not feel as secure as it looks.	这或许是因为该政权并不像它看上去那般坦然无惧。


Without legitimacy, no government can rule with any sense of confidence.	若失去了合法性，任何政府都无法自信地施行统治。


There are many ways to legitimize political arrangements. Liberal democracy is only a recent invention.	为政治制度赋予合法性的方式多种多样：自由民主制只是近来的一种创新而已；


Hereditary monarchy, often backed by divine authority, has worked in the past.	通常由君权神授为依托的世袭君主制，曾在历史上大行其道；


And some modern autocrats, such as Robert Mugabe, have been bolstered by their credentials as national freedom fighters.	而某些现代的独裁者（如罗伯特·穆加贝），则是以民族解放斗士这一资历作为其统治的依据。


China has changed a great deal in the last century, but it has remained the same in one respect: it is still ruled by a religious concept of politics.	中国在过去的一个世纪内发生了巨大的变化，但在某一个方面，它却依然如故：宗教式的政治观念仍在统御着这个国家。


Legitimacy is not based on the give and take, the necessary compromises, and the wheeling and dealing that form the basis of an economic concept of politics such as that which underpins liberal democracy.	这种观念的合法性并非基于互谅互让、讨价还价以及做出必要的妥协； 而这些行为构成了经济式政治观念的基础，其中，自由民主制度的支柱便是一例。


Instead, the foundation of religious politics is a shared belief, imposed from above, in ideological orthodoxy.	相反，宗教式政治的基石是一种以意识形态正统性为体现的、由上而下强加于民的共有信念。


In imperial China, this meant Confucian orthodoxy.	在帝制中国，这便意味着儒家的正统观念。


The ideal of the Confucian state is “harmony.”	儒家邦国的理想状态即为“和谐”。


If all people conform to a particular set of beliefs, including moral codes of behavior, conflicts will disappear.	如果所有人都能遵从一套包括行为道德准则在内的特定信念的话，冲突就将消失。


The ruled, in this ideal system, will naturally obey their rulers, just as sons obey their fathers.	在这种理想体系之中，被统治者正如子女遵从父亲一般、自然而然地听命于统治者。


After the various revolutions in the early decades of the twentieth century, Confucianism was replaced by a Chinese version of Communism.	在二十世纪前期数十年的种种革命之后，儒家思想被中国式的共产主义所取代。


Marxism appealed to Chinese intellectuals, because it was bookish, introduced a modern moral orthodoxy, and was based, like Confucianism, on a promise of perfect harmony.	对于中国的知识分子而言，马克思主义颇具吸引力，这一方面是因为它带着书卷的气息，引入了一套现代道德正统观念；


Ultimately, in the Communist utopia, conflicts of interests would melt away.	另一方面则是因为马克思主义与儒家学说一样，都建立在一种关于完美和谐的诺言基础之上：在共产主义乌托邦内，最终将再无利益的冲突。


Chairman Mao’s rule combined elements of the Chinese imperial system with Communist totalitarianism.	毛泽东主席的统治，便是对中国帝制体系与共产主义极权制度诸元素的结合。


This orthodoxy, however, was also destined to fade away.	然而，这种正统思想注定也将消亡。


Few Chinese, even in the top ranks of the Communist Party, are convinced Marxists anymore.	很少有中国人仍旧是马克思主义的忠实信徒，甚至在共产党高层内部，情况也是如此。


This left an ideological vacuum, swiftly filled in the 1980’s by greed, cynicism, and corruption.	这种状况留下了一个意识形态真空，它在上世纪八十年代被贪婪、腐化以及玩世不恭所快速占据。


Out of this crisis came the demonstrations all over China, collectively known as “Tiananmen.”	这场危机催生了遍及中国全境的示威活动，它们被笼而统之地冠以“天安门事件”之名。


Liu Xiaobo was an active spokesman in 1989 for the student protests against official corruption and in favor of greater freedom.	刘晓波在 1989 年，便身为学生针对官员腐化、并要求获得更大自由的抗议活动之积极代言人。


Soon after the bloody crackdown on Tiananmen, a new orthodoxy replaced Chinese Marxism: Chinese nationalism.	在天安门的血腥镇压行动后不久，一种新的正统思想取代了中国式马克思主义的地位，这便是中国的民族主义。


Only one-party rule would guarantee the continuing rise of China and put an end to centuries of national humiliation.	只有一党统治，方可确保中国能继续崛起，并为数百年的民族屈辱史画上句号；


The Communist Party represented China’s destiny as a great power.	共产党代表着中国的大国宿命。


To doubt this was not just mistaken, but unpatriotic, even “anti-Chinese.”	对���观点心存疑虑已不单是一种错误，还是一种不爱国、甚至“反华”的表现。


From this perspective, Liu Xiaobo’s critical views were indeed subversive.	以此看来，刘晓波的批判观点的确是颠覆性的。


They cast doubt on the official orthodoxy, and thus on the legitimacy of the state.	这些观点为官方正统思想打上了问号，也由此对国家政权的合法性提出了质疑。


To wonder, as many have, why the Chinese regime refused to negotiate with the students in 1989 – or to find some accommodation with its critics today – is to misunderstand the nature of religious politics.	许多人对于中国政府为何拒绝在 1989 年与学生进行谈判、或对如今的批判者做出一些迁就而感到惊讶，这恰恰是误解了宗教式政治的本质。


Negotiation, compromise, and accommodation are the marks of economic politics, where every deal has its price.	谈判、妥协与迁就皆为经济式政治的特征， 这种政治模式可以就事论事；


By contrast, those who rule according to a shared belief cannot afford to negotiate, for that would undermine the belief itself.	与之形成鲜明对比的是，那些根据共有信念施行统治的人，是无力承担谈判之代价的，因为谈判行为将会对信念本身造成伤害。


This is not to say that the economic concept of politics is utterly strange to the Chinese – or, for that matter, that the religious notion of politics is unknown in the democratic West.	这并非意味着经济式政治观念对于中国人来说，是一种完全陌生的模式； 就此而言，这也不是指奉行民主制度的西方就不知宗教式政治观念为何物。


But the insistence on orthodoxy is still sufficiently strong in China to remain the default defense against political critics.	然而在中国，人们对于正统观念的坚持，依旧强大到使其足可继续作为对政治批评者的默认防范方式之地步。


These things can change.	这些情况可以发生转变。


Other Confucian societies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, now have thriving liberal democracies, and there is no reason to believe that such a transition is impossible in China.	诸如韩国、台湾以及日本等其他的儒家社会，如今都已拥有繁荣的自由民主制度，人们没有理由相信：中国不可能经历这种转型。


But external pressure is unlikely to bring it about.	但外部压力不太可能带来这种变革。


Many non-Chinese, including me, have signed a letter of protest against the jailing of Liu Xiaobo.	包括我在内的许多外国人士，都已在针对刘晓波被判入狱一事的抗议信上签字。


One hopes that this will lend comfort to him, and give a moral boost to Chinese who share his views.	人们只是希望此举能聊表慰藉，并给予那些与刘晓波志同道合的中国人以道义上的鼓舞；


But it is unlikely to impress those who believe in the current orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism.	但对于那些笃信当前中国民族主义正统思想的人士而言，此举不太可能令其受到震动。


Until China is released from the grip of religious politics, Liu’s ideals are unlikely to take root.	在中国从宗教式政治的控制下获得解放之前，刘晓波的理念不太可能生根。


This does not bode well for China, or, indeed, for the rest of the world.	对于中国（实际上也对世界其他国家）而言，这可不是个好兆头。


A Drug War on Auto-Pilot	不由分说的禁毒战争


THE HAGUE – The war in Afghanistan, now approaching its tenth year, may seem to many to have no end in sight, but Latin America has endured an even longer fight, one that has recently become much more bloody: the “war” against drug trafficking.	海牙——阿富汗战争迄今为止已经打了十年，在很多人看来或许仍没有结束的迹象，但拉丁美洲却忍受了更为漫长的战争，而且近来血腥程度甚至愈演愈烈： 这就是打击贩毒的“战争”。


So rote – and so violent – has that war become that many people in Latin America now wonder which side is suffering the more pathological addiction.	这场战争已经变得如此生硬——如此暴力——以致于拉美很多人现在感到惊讶，弄不清病理性成瘾更为严重的究竟是哪一方。


The new strategy that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been promoting to staunch the upward trend of narco-trafficking-related murders – which leaked Mexican government reports put at more than 22,000 since late 2006 – is to build “stronger, more resilient communities.”	建设“更强大，适应力更强的社会”是美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿宣传能够阻止与毒品贩运有关谋杀上升趋势的新战略——泄露出来的墨西哥政府报告统计2006年以来与贩毒有关的谋杀已经超过 22,000起。


Ciudad Juárez, a sprawling Mexican border town that is now the homicide capital of the world, would have to be high on the list.	不断扩张的墨西哥边境小镇华雷斯市现在已经成为全世界的杀人之都，肯定应该高居名单的榜首位置。


Four bridges and innumerable tunnels and drainage canals connect Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, Texas.	华雷斯市和得克萨斯州的艾尔帕索县通过四座桥梁和难以数计的隧道和排水沟连接在一起。


Rival cartels sparring for control of a plaza, the name given to any trafficking route, butcher each other and the security forces.	具有竞争关系的卡特尔拼命为争夺广场的控制权互相残杀并屠杀安全部队，广场是人们对任何贩毒路线的称谓。


There is apparently no shortage of young, unemployed men willing to join the carnage.	显然愿意加入这场屠杀的无业年轻男性大有人在。


Addressing the deep-seated social and economic problems of a city like Juárez, however, is a lot harder than flooding its streets with 8,000 soldiers carrying assault rifles.	不过解决像华雷斯这样一座城市根深蒂固的社会和经济问题比派8，000名手持突击步枪的士兵占据这座小城的街道要困难得多。


Mexican President Felipe Calderón has, in this respect, remained faithful to the script written in previous theaters in the drug war, whether in Bolivia, Colombia, or Peru, where governments have used military force and extradition to placate the US and punish those with the least voice and influence.	在这方面，墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙继续忠实于玻利维亚、哥伦比亚或秘鲁等国禁毒战争此前写好的电影脚本，这些国家政府依靠武力和引渡来平息美国的怒气，惩罚那些最没有发言权和影响力的穷人。


But the language used by the Obama administration to describe the violence and state corruption that snakes from the Andes to the US border is starting to capture new thinking on narcotics.	但奥巴马政府形容从安第斯山脉流向美国边境的暴力和国家腐败时所用的语言正开始抓住毒品问题的全新思维。


Three former Latin American presidents, Mexico’s second richest man, Ricardo Salinas, and the Supreme Court of Argentina, among others, have criticized the war on drugs as a manifest failure that has lowered street prices, fueled production, and undermined weak states.	值得一提的是三位前拉美总统，墨西哥排名第二的富翁里卡多·萨利纳斯以及阿根廷最高法院已经批评禁毒战争是一场显而易见的失败，它拉低了房地产价格、推升毒品产量，并对弱国造成了破坏。


More strikingly, both Bolivia and Ecuador are governed by presidents who suffered directly from the collateral insensitivities of the war on drugs.	更令人惊奇的是，玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔两国总统都是禁毒战争所忽略问题的直接受害者。


Bolivia’s Evo Morales rose to prominence as leader of the country’s coca growers during a brutal campaign to wipe out their crops, the so-called Dignity Plan.	玻利维亚总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯在一场消灭古柯作物的残酷运动中崛起为这个国家古柯种植者的领袖，这场运动就是所谓的尊严计划。


Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa’s father was jailed for smuggling drugs to the US when the future leader was five years old.	而厄瓜多尔总统拉斐尔·科雷亚的父亲在这位未来的领袖只有五岁时因走私毒品而被捕入狱。


These leaders’ profound ambivalence toward the goal of a world free of illegal drugs is shared by the European Union, where restrictions on narcotics consumption have slackened over the past decade.	与这些领袖一样对无非法毒品世界目标抱有矛盾心理的还有欧盟，它过去几十年来已经放松了对毒品消费的限制。


The past three US presidents, furthermore, have all admitted to consuming – to one extent or another – illegal psychoactive substances, while seven million Americans, according to the United Nations, are regular cocaine users.	此外，之前的三任美国总统都已经承认或多或少吸食过非法的精神刺激药物，而据联合国统计，有七百万美国人都是常规的可卡因使用者。


But the inertia of a bureaucratic drug-enforcement superstructure (worth approximately $40 billion each in the US and the EU), sustained by a deep-seated fear of the “threat” posed by drugs and cartels, appears to push policy repeatedly towards the familiar option of repressive auto-pilot.	但禁毒执法上层建筑的惯性（在美国和欧盟价值均达到400亿美元）在对毒品和卡特尔所造成“威胁”根深蒂固的恐惧的推动下，似乎一而再、再而三地将政策推向不由分说镇压的一成不变的选择。


For example, US support for Mexico’s campaign against the cartels looks set in stone, with Congress apparently ready to provide $300 million for another year of military and security upgrading.	比如，美国对墨西哥打击卡特尔运动的支持似乎牢不可破，国会显然已经做好准备为又一年的军事和安全设施升级提供3亿美元的经费。


In Colombia, seven new joint military installations are planned, and support for US private contractors who have cornered the market in crop fumigation presumably will not be interrupted.	人们计划在哥伦比亚建设七座联合军事设施，并且对垄断作物熏蒸市场的美国私人承包商的支持很可能也不会动摇。


Nevertheless, as the flaws in the four-decade-old edifice of counter-narcotics become more visible, it is increasingly difficult to regard the risks of drug use as being greater than the damage done by repression.	尽管如此，随着历经四十年的禁毒大厦缺点逐渐暴露，认定使用毒品的风险大于镇压所造成的破坏已经越来越难。


Prohibition hikes the mark-up on prices – an astounding 15,000% in the case of cocaine traveling to Europe from Andean processing facilities.	禁毒措施促成了毒品价格上涨，从安第斯加工厂运到欧洲的可卡因令人震惊的上涨15,000%。


While the war on drugs focuses on bringing down cartels and their kingpins, it perversely aids the health of their markets, which nestle within legitimate trade flows and respond to price incentives.	在禁毒战争关注摧毁卡特尔及其主要人物的同时，却顽强地促进了在合法贸易流动的夹缝中生存并对价格激励作出反应的毒品市场的健康。


Interviewed by the Mexican magazine Proceso this year, the second-in-command of the giant Sinaloa cartel, Ismael Zambada, made the point clearly: “The narco problem involves millions of people.	在年内接受墨西哥杂志《Proceso》采访时，规模庞大的锡那罗亚卡特尔的二号人物伊斯梅尔•尚巴达明确指出： “毒品问题涉及成百上千万人口。


How do you control it?	这样的问题怎么控制？


The capos can be jailed, killed, or extradited, but their replacements are already wandering around.”	领头的人可以被监禁、杀死或者引渡，但顶替者已经在周围徘徊等候。 ”


The emergence of Latin America’s powerful drug mafias cannot be traced to the radical evil of certain individuals.	拉美强大贩毒集团的出现究其原因并非是由于某些个人的极端邪恶。


These people emerged under conditions created in deeply inequitable societies by a misapplied, inconsistent, and bureaucratic war.	这些人是在一场由滥用权力、反复无常和充满官僚气息战争造成的严重不公的社会条件下自然产生的。


Indeed, the furies of the Zetas in Mexico originate in the counter-insurgency training provided in the 1990’s to a select group of special-forces soldiers, who later deserted.	事实上，墨西哥的齐塔复仇女神最初接受过20世纪90年代向选定的特种部队士兵提供的反暴动训练，而后逃离了特种部队。


The Zetas’ star recruits in recent years have come from the Guatemalan military’s special forces, whose infamous induction technique involved biting off the head of a live chicken.	近年来齐塔人招募的明星新锐大多具有危地马拉军队的特种部队背景，这支部队一种臭名昭著的入门技术是咬掉一只活鸡的头颅。


Meanwhile, in Jamaica and across the rural outposts of Central America, drug lords have become benefactors and heroes to the poor.	与此同时，在牙买加以及中美洲的农村前沿，毒枭正在扮演着穷苦人的救世主兼英雄的角色。


It is time for serious reconsideration of the status and regulation of illegal drugs, pointing to selective legalization, as well as reclassification of the market as a public-health, rather than a criminal, concern.	认真重新考察局势和非法毒品管理状况的时候到了，可以考虑实行有选择的合法化，对这个市场重新进行公共健康而不是刑事方面的考量。


For now, policymakers across the Americas are tiptoeing towards the obvious.	现在，美洲各国的决策者正悄悄向显而易见的解决方案靠拢。


A Global \	全球“新政”？


ATHENS – The International Monetary Fund’s belated admission that it significantly underestimated the damage that austerity would do to European Union growth rates highlights the self-defeating character of “orthodox” recipes to address the causes of the debt crisis that followed the financial crash of 2008-2009.	雅典—IMF终于承认它严重低估了紧缩给欧盟增长率带来的伤害，这表明纠正2008—2009年金融危机后发生的债务危机的根源的“正统”药方起到了弄巧成拙的效果。


Conventional theory suggests that a single country (or group of countries) consolidating its finances can expect lower interest rates, a weaker currency, and an improved trade position.	传统智慧认为，就个别国家（或一组国家）而言，整合其财政意味着降低利率、货币贬值和改善贸易处境。


But, because this cannot happen for all major economies simultaneously – one country’s (or group of countries’) austerity implies less demand for other countries’ products – such policies eventually lead to beggar-thy-neighbor situations.	但是，由于这无法同时在所有主要经济体发生——一个国家（或一组国家）的紧缩意味着其他国家产品需求下降——这些政策最终会导致以邻为壑局面。


Indeed, it was this dynamic – against which John Maynard Keynes fought – that made the Great Depression of the 1930’s so grim.	事实上，凯恩斯所反对的正是这一动态，正是它导致了20世纪30年代悲惨的大萧条。


Today’s problems are compounded by a lack of sufficient private demand – particularly household consumption – in the advanced economies to compensate for demand losses stemming from austerity.	当今问题的一个组成部分是发达国家私人需求（特别是家庭消费）不振，不足以补偿紧缩带来的需求损失。


During the last two decades, consumption drove these countries’ economic growth, reaching historically high GDP shares.	在过去20年中，消费推动着这些国家的经济增长，其占GDP比重达到了历史新高。


Moreover, major advanced economies, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, face longer-term fiscal problems in the form of aging populations or oversize welfare states, limiting their capacity to contribute to demand management.	此外，美国、德国和日本等主要发达国家面临老龄化、福利国家规模太大等长期财政问题，制约着它们的需求管理能力。


Recent moves to ease monetary policy have been a step in the right direction; but, so far, they have not proved to be a game changer.	当前的货币宽松政策方向是对的，但到目前为止并没有起到扭转局势的作用。


For domestic demand to act as an engine of growth, policies should shift resources from investment to consumption.	由于内需成了增长引擎，因此政策应该将资源从投资引向消费。


While the magnitudes involved are huge, they must be attained if an extended period of low growth, high unemployment, and declining living standards among the world’s poorest is to be avoided.	尽管所涉规模巨大，但必须完成，否则就会导致低增长、高失业、全球最贫困人口生活之质量下降。


International economic policy coordination should be significantly strengthened in order to deal effectively with changes on such a scale.	应该着力强调国际经济政策协调，以便有效地应对如此规模的变局。


Start with Europe.	从欧洲开始。


It is by now patently obvious that austerity and domestic reforms are not enough to pull the eurozone’s periphery out of deep recession.	如今，毫无疑问紧缩和国内改革不足以将欧元区外围国拉出衰退。


Growing awareness of the failure of current policies is causing social discontent, civil disorder, and political instability, with the recently concluded Italian elections and the growing popular resistance to Greek reform efforts serving as a bellwether.	人们越来越意识到当前的政策是失败的，这正在造成社会不满、国内失序和政局动荡，最近结束的意大利选举和希腊改革措施所受到的越来越大的阻力就是明证。


Returning the eurozone’s peripheral economies to the path of growth requires more than structural reforms and fiscal consolidation.	要让欧元区外围国回归增长之路，光有结构性改革和财政整合是不够的。


It also requires a substantial reform of the monetary union’s system of economic governance, aimed at restoring financial stability and lowering borrowing costs, together with a boost in external demand in order to compensate for the effects of austerity.	欧元区经济治理制度也必须有彻底的改革，其目标应是重塑金融稳定、降低借贷利率，同时提振外部需求以补偿紧缩措施带来的后果。


Reforming governance implies significant progress toward economic unification: centralizing European debt through Eurobonds, mobilizing sufficient rescue funds, allowing the European Central Bank to intervene in the primary bond markets, and establishing both a fiscal and a banking union.	改革治理意味着向经济联盟迈出一大步：通过欧元债券将欧洲债务集中化； 动员足够的救援资金；


This is a tall order, in view of the reluctance of most EU member states to cede competences to European institutions.	这似乎是个不可能的任务，因为大部分欧盟成员国都不愿把权力割让给欧洲机构。


But Europe should move more decisively in this direction.	但欧洲应该坚决地向这一方向迈进。


Otherwise, speculation on member states’ national debt will persist, keeping borrowing costs at levels that are inconsistent with the conditions required to sustain economic recovery.	否则的话，关于成员国国民债务问题的猜疑就不会停止，这会导致借贷成本维持在与维持经济复苏不相容的水平。


Concerning external demand, intra-European help in the form of reflationary policies in stronger economies is unlikely to prove sufficient, owing primarily to the fiscal and political conditions prevailing in Germany.	在外部需求问题上，坚挺国实施再通胀政策的欧洲内部援助不可能充分，其主要原因在于德国国内的财政和政治条件。


Implementing a Marshall Plan-type initiative by mobilizing EU budget resources and additional lending by the European Investment Bank to finance investments in weaker countries could be an alternative, but it lacks political support.	通过动员欧盟预算资源并增加欧洲投资银行向疲软国金融投资项目的贷款等形式实施的欧洲内部版马歇尔计划可以成为替代方案，但缺少政治支持。


On a global scale, neither the US nor Japan is in a position to provide significant external stimulus.	在全球范围内，美国和日本都没有提供重大外部刺激的条件。


Only the emerging and developing economies of Asia could effectively contribute to lifting global demand through a coordinated effort aimed at boosting domestic consumption, which, in turn, would stimulate additional investment.	只有亚洲的新兴和发展中国家能通过旨在提振国内消费——这反过来能够刺激更多的投资——的政策协调有效地提振全球需求。


Recent IMF experience suggests that, through appropriate coordination, private funds could be mobilized for big private-public partnership projects linking demand expansion with infrastructure investment.	IMF的最新经验表明，通过适当的协调，私人资金可以动员起��参与大型公司合作项目，将需求扩张和基础设施投资结合起来。


In other words, a global “New Deal” – combining policies designed to achieve an orderly realignment of consumption and investment worldwide – seems to be required.	换句话说，我们需要全球“新政”——将旨在有序重列全球消费和投资的政策结合起来。


The advanced economies should promote productivity-enhancing structural reforms with renewed vigor.	发达国家应该打起精神推进增进生产率的结构性改革。


The eurozone should solidify its currency union.	欧元区应该巩固其货币联盟。


And the emerging and developing economies should support domestic sources of growth.	而新兴和发展中国家应该支持内部增长源。


For such a deal to become possible, certain preconditions must be met.	为了让这一新政成为可能，必须满足一定的先决条件。


First, international policy coordination by the G-20 must be tightened by creating a permanent secretariat to make policy proposals and recommendations concerning macroeconomic and financial developments.	首先，G20必须加紧国际政策协调，这可以通过成立永久性秘书处负责考虑关于宏观经济和金融发展的政策方案和建议。


The secretariat should actively cooperate with the IMF to benefit from its analysis, notably regarding exchange rates.	这一秘书处应该积极地与IMF合作，利用后者的分析结果，特别是汇率问题上的分析结果。


Second, global financial reform must proceed at a faster pace.	其次，全球金融改革必须加快节奏。


The financial sector requires tougher regulation, strengthened supervision, and internationally consistent resolution mechanisms to address the problems posed by very large, global institutions that are considered too big (or too complex) to fail.	金融部门需要加强监管、强化监督，还需要国际一致的解决机制以纠正太大（或太复杂）而不能倒的大型全球性机构带来的问题。


Such reform is essential if the international financial system is to mediate the sizeable resource transfers that will underpin the required changes in the structure of global demand.	这类改革至关重要的，如果想要国际金融体系成为大规模资源转移媒介的话（而这又是全球需求结构必要变化的基础）。


Finally, a new trade pact – possibly, but not necessarily, within the Doha Round – is needed to ensure the major trading powers’ access to foreign markets.	最后，还需要新的贸易契约——可能（但不一定）在多哈回合中形成——以确保主要贸易大国能够进入外国市场。


This is critically important for inspiring confidence in Asian countries, which might be persuaded to favor domestic, as opposed to external, sources of demand.	这对于激发亚洲国家信心具有关键重要性，说服它们开发内部而不是外部需求源。


Moreover, trade liberalization will also increase consumer confidence worldwide.	此外，贸易自由化也能增加全世界消费者的信心。


The time is right for a new global settlement that targets growth, addresses crisis conditions in certain parts of the world, and rebalances the global economy to set it back on a path of strong and steady growth.	新的全球协定正当时。 这一协定的目标应该是提振增长、消除世界某些地区的危机环境以及实现全球经济的再平衡以使其回到强劲、稳健的增长道路上来。


The Other Financial Crisis	另一种金融危机


NEWPORT BEACH – Two variants of financial crisis continue to wreak havoc on Western economies, fueling joblessness and poverty: the one that we read about regularly in newspapers, involving governments around the world; and a less visible one at the level of small and medium-size businesses and households.	发自纽波特滩——金融危机的两个变体正继续蹂躏着西方经济，令失业和贫穷状况进一步加剧：一个是我们经常在报纸上读到的涉及各国政府的金融危机； 另一个不那么起眼的则是中小型企业和家庭层面上的危机。


Until both are addressed properly, the West will remain burdened by sluggish growth, persistently high unemployment, and excessive income and wealth inequality.	在这两种危机得到恰当应对之前，西方世界将继续背负着增长滞缓、失业率长期居高及收入与财富差距过大的负担。


The sovereign-debt crisis is well known.	主权债务危机是众所周知的。


In order to avert a likely depression, governments around the world engaged in fiscal and monetary stimulus in the midst of the global financial crisis.	为了避免出现经济萧条，各国政府在全球金融危机期间都忙于实施财政及货币刺激政策。


They succeeded in offsetting nasty economic dislocations caused by private-sector deleveraging, but at the cost of encumbering their fiscal balances and their central banks’ balance sheets.	此举成功抵消了因私营部门去杠杆化所导致的严重经济紊乱，但却是以破坏自身财政收支平衡以及扰乱央行资产负债表为代价的。


While sovereign credit quality has deteriorated virtually across the board, and will most probably continue to do so, the implications for individual countries vary.	虽然主权信贷的质量几乎全面恶化——并很可能继续恶化下去——但它对各国的影响却有所不同。


Some Western countries – such as Greece – had fragile government accounts from the outset and tipped quickly into persistent crisis mode.	某些西方国家——比如希腊——起初其政府账目就非常糟糕，所以很快就陷入了长期持续性的危机模式。


There they remain, still failing to provide citizens with a light at the end of what already has been a long tunnel.	这些国家将一直深陷危机，即便很长一段时期之后都依然无法为其公民带来一丝希望。


Other countries had been fiscally responsible, but were overwhelmed by the liabilities that they had assumed from others (for example, Ireland’s irresponsible banks sank their budget).	其他国家过去在财政上一直尽职尽责，却无力应对那些从别处承担的债务（例如那些不可靠的爱尔兰银行就毁了本国的预算）。


Still others, including the United States, faced no immediate threat but failed to make progress on longer-term issues. A few, like Germany, had built deep economic and financial resilience through years of fiscal discipline and structural reforms.	另外一些国家——包括美国——没有受到直接的威胁，但无法在某些长期事务上取得进展。 而有几个像德国这样的国家则通过多年的财政纪律和体制改革拥有了深厚的经济和金融复原能力。


It is not surprising that policy approaches have also varied.	各国的应对政策各不相同，这也并不奇怪。


Indeed, they have shared only one, albeit crucial (and disappointing) feature: the inability to rely on rapid growth as the “safest” way to deleverage an over-indebted economy.	但事实上，这些政策之间只拥有一个至关重要（也令人失望）的共同点：那就是无法依靠经济快速增长这个“最安全”的方法来为其过度负债的经济去杠杆化。


Greece essentially defaulted on some obligations.	希腊实际上已经在某些债务上出现了违约。


Ireland opted for austerity and reforms, as has the United Kingdom.	爱尔兰和英国一样选择了紧缩政策和改革。


The US is gradually transferring resources from creditors to debtors through financial repression.	美国正逐步通过金融抑制手段把资源从债权人转移到债务人手上。


And Germany is slowly acquiescing to a prudent relative expansion in domestic demand.	而德国正逐渐适应在国内需求方面的稳健相对扩张。


So much for the sovereign-debt crisis, which, given its national, regional, and global impact, has been particularly well covered.	关于主权债务危机我想说的就这么多，因为考虑��其对国家、区域及全球的影响，对其的讨论已经足够丰富了。


After all, sovereigns are called that because they have the power to impose taxes, regulations, and, at the extreme, confiscation.	毕竟，它之所以被称之为主权，就是因为它们拥有征税、监管，甚至极端点说，没收的权力。


But the other credit crisis is equally consequential, and receives much less attention, even as it erodes societies’ integrity, productive capabilities, and ability to maintain living standards (particularly for the least fortunate).	另外一种信贷危机也同样重要，但其受到的关注却少得多，即使它损坏了社会的凝聚力、生产力以及人们维持自身生活水平的能力（尤其是对底层人群来说）。


I know of very few Western countries where small and medium-size companies, as well as middle-income households and those of more limited means, have not experienced a significant decline in their access to credit – not just new financing, but also the ability to roll over old credit lines and loans.	据我所知，绝大部分西方国家的中小企业、中等收入以及收入拮据的家庭都经历过信贷获取渠道显著下降——不仅针对新的融资，还包括更新过往信贷额度和借款的能力。


The immediate causes are well known.	这种信贷危机产生的直接原因大家都知道。


They range from subdued bank lending to unusually high risk aversion, and from discredited credit vehicles to the withdrawal of some institutions from credit intermediation altogether.	其范围涵盖从银行抑制贷款到异常的高风险规避行为、从信贷工具信誉崩溃再到某些机构完全撤出信用中介机构的举措。


Such credit constraints are one reason why unemployment rates continue to rise in so many countries – often from already alarming levels, such as 25% in Greece and Spain (where youth unemployment is above 50%) – and why unemployment remains unusually high in countries like the US (albeit it at a much lower level).	这种信贷约束是许多国家失业率持续上升的一个原因——通常这些国家的失业率原本已经处于令人担忧的水平了，例如希腊和西班牙25%的失业率（这两个国家的青年失业率已经超过了50%）——同时也是像美国这样的国家失业率居高不下的原因（虽然相对而言美国的失业率并不高）。


This is not just a matter of lost capabilities and rising poverty; persistently high unemployment also leads to social unrest, erosion of trust in political leaders and institutions, and the mounting risk of a lost generation.	这不仅仅是生产力流失和贫困加剧的问题； 长期的高失业率还会导致社会动荡、对本国政治领导人的不信任以及产生失落一代的风险。


Indeed, unemployment data in many advanced countries are dominated by long-term joblessness (usually defined as six months or more).	确实，许多发达国家的失业数据主要由长期失业构成（通常定义为六个月或以上）。


Skill erosion becomes a problem for those with prior work experience, while unsuccessful first-time entrants into the labor force are not just unemployed, but risk becoming unemployable.	技能的逐渐丧失对那些原本有工作经验的人来说是个问题，而首次就业不成功则不仅意味着失业这么简单，还隐含着不会被雇佣的风险。


Governments are doing too little to address the private credit debacle.	政府们在处理私人信贷危机上做得太少了。


Arguably, they must first sort out the sovereign side of the crisis; but it is not clear that most officials even have a comprehensive plan.	虽然理论上它们必先解决危机中的主权债务方面； 然而目前尚不清楚大部分官员是否制订了一个全面计划。


Policy asymmetry is greatest for the countries most acutely affected by the sovereign-debt crisis.	那些受到主权债务危机影响最剧烈的国家的政策非对称性最为明显。


There, the private sector has essentially been left to fend for itself; and most households and companies are struggling, thus fueling continued economic implosion.	在这些国家，政府基本上任由私营部门自生自灭； 大部分家庭和企业都处在挣扎之中，因此加剧了长期的经济崩溃。


Other countries appear to have adopted a “Field of Dreams” – also known as “build it and they will come” – approach to private credit markets, In the US, for example, artificially low interest rates for home mortgages, resulting from the Federal Reserve’s policy activism, are supposed to kick-start prudent financing.	其他国家则仿佛采取了一种“寻梦之地”——也被称之为“平台建好了，人就来了”——的方法来处理私人信贷市场，例如，在美国，由于美联储的政策措施，人为降低了对住房抵押贷款的利率，以期启动审慎的融资。


The European Central Bank is taking a similarly indirect approach.	欧洲央行也正在采取这么一个间接手段。


In both places, other policymaking entities, with much better tools at their disposal, appear either unwilling or unable to play their part.	但在这两个地方，掌握有更有力工具的其他政策制定实体似乎既不愿意也无力承担自己的角色。


As such, action by central banks will repeatedly fail to gain sufficient traction.	在这种情况下，央行的行动将一直无法产生足够的牵引力。


In fact, only the UK is visibly opting for a more coordinated and direct way to counter the persistent shortfalls stemming from the private part of the credit crisis.	事实上，只有英国明确选择了更协调也更直接的方式来抵消由私人信贷危机引起的长期短缺。


There, the “Funding for Lending Scheme,” jointly designed by the Bank of England and the Treasury, seeks “to boost the incentive for banks and building societies to lend to UK households and non-financial companies,” while holding them accountable for proper behavior.	由英国格兰银行和财政部共同设计的“贷款资助方案”旨在“提高银行和建房互助协会向英国家庭和非金融企业借贷的动力”，同时也要求前者为自身的行为负责。


The UK example is important; but, given the scope and scale of the challenges, the proposal is a relatively modest one.	英国的例子很重要； 但是考虑到整个挑战所涉及的范围和规模 ，该提案还是相对保守的。


The program may stimulate some productive credit intermediation, but it will not make a significant dent in what will remain one of the major obstacles to robust economic recovery.	这一计划也许能刺激一些有益的信用中介行为，但它依然无法对那些继续阻碍强劲经济复苏的因素产生重大影响。


Proper access to credit for productive segments is an integral part of a well-functioning economy.	生产部门能够拥有适当的信贷获取渠道对一个运转良好的经济体来说至关重要。


Without it, growth falters, job creation is insufficient, and widening income and wealth inequality undermines the social fabric.	否则经济增长就将止步不前，也无法充分创造就业，不断扩大的财富与收入差距将腐蚀整个社会结构。


That is why any comprehensive approach to restoring the advanced countries’ economic and financial vibrancy must target the proper revival of private credit flows.	这就是为什么任何恢复发达国家经济和金融活力的综合性手段都必须着眼于适当复苏私人信贷流的原因。


Toxic Politics Versus Better Economics	有害的政治学和更好的经济学


NEW YORK – The relationship between politics and economics is changing.	纽约—政治学和经济学之间的关系在变化。


Advanced-country politicians are locked in bizarre, often toxic, conflicts, instead of acting on a growing economic consensus about how to escape a protracted period of low and unequal growth.	发达国家政客陷于古怪并且常常有害的冲突之中，而没有在关于如何摆脱长期不平等低增长时期的问题上按照日益一致的经济共识行事。


This trend must be reversed, before it structurally cripples the advanced world and sweeps up the emerging economies, too.	这一趋势必须扭转，否则它将破坏发达经济的结构，并让新兴经济体也陷入困境。


Obviously, political infighting is nothing new.	显然，政治内斗不是什么新鲜事。


But, until recently, the expectation was that if professional economists achieved a technocratic consensus on a given policy approach, political leaders would listen.	但是，直到最近，人们一直认为，如果职业经济学家能就给定的政策方针形成技术官僚一致，政治领导人是能够听进去的。


Even when more radical political parties attempted to push a different agenda, powerful forces – whether moral suasion from G7 governments, private capital markets, or the conditionality attached to International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending – would almost always ensure that the consensus approach eventually won the day.	即使有更多激进政党试图推行不同的日程，但强大的力量——不管是来自G7政府的到的劝告、私人资本市场，还是国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行贷款的附加条件——几乎总能确保共识方针最终能够胜出。


In the 1990s and 2000s, for example, the so-called Washington Consensus dominated policymaking in much of the world, with everyone from the United States to a multitude of emerging economies pursuing trade liberalization, privatization, greater use of price mechanisms, financial-sector deregulation, and fiscal and monetary reforms with a heavy supply-side emphasis.	比如，从20世纪90年代到21世纪初，所谓的华盛顿共识主导着世界大部的政策决定，从美国到诸多新兴经济体，所有人都在追求贸易自由化、私有化、扩大价格机制用途、金融业去监管，以及着重强调供给侧的财政和货币改革。


The embrace of the Washington Consensus by multilateral institutions amplified its transmission, helping to drive forward the broader process of economic and financial globalization.	多边机构采用华盛顿共识放大的这一传导机制，推动了更广大的经济和金融全球化过程。


Incoming governments – particularly those led by non-traditional movements, which had risen to power on the back of domestic unease and frustration with mainstream parties – sometimes disagreed with the appropriateness and relevance of the Washington Consensus.	即将上任的新政府——特别是那些由非传统运动的政府，它们之所以能够掌权，依靠的是国内的焦虑情绪和对主流政党的失望——有时华盛顿共识的适当性和重要性有不同意见。