Located on campus, the program’s facilities resemble colorful Google offices, but with a Finnish twist: video conference rooms have been built into sauna-like structures.	项目办事处就设在校园之内，看去和谷歌五颜六色的办公室十分相像的同时又不乏芬兰特色：酷似桑拿房的建筑里建有视频会议室。


Since its establishment in 2010, 126 companies have graduated from Startup Sauna, having raised more than $37 million in funding.	自2010年成立以来，总计126家企业已经成功脱离了创业企业桑拿计划，它们筹集的资金总额达到3，700万美元以上。


Today, Finland boasts more than 200 gaming startups, which export 90% of their products.	今天，芬兰拥有超过200家的游戏创业企业，其中90%的产品用于出口。


According to Aalto, Finland’s gaming sector experienced 260% revenue growth in 2012-2013, adding 1,000 jobs and $1.5 billion in total value to the Finnish economy just last year.	根据阿尔托公布的数据，芬兰游戏业2012-2013年实现增长260%，仅去年一年就为芬兰经济贡献了1,000个就业岗位和15亿美元产值。


In the Netherlands, the government has taken the lead in promoting innovative activities.	荷兰推动创新的行动由政府带头。


Two and a half years ago, the Dutch government teamed up with IBM and a group of small and medium-size local businesses to jumpstart a big-data hub in the far-northern village of Dwingeloo, home to the Netherlands Institute for Radio Astronomy.	两年半前，荷兰政府联手IBM和一批中小型本地企业在德文格洛（荷兰射电天文研究所所在地）最北部的村庄里快速启动了大规模数据中心项目。


Like Silicon Valley-based initiatives, the project unites academia, talent-rich local companies, and multinationals behind a common goal – in this case, to build the world’s largest radio telescope.	就像硅谷创业计划一样，该项目联合学术界、人才济济的本地企业和跨国公司携手完成共同的目标——具体地讲就是全世界最大射电望远镜的建造。


The device will process and analyze radioactive waves collected from two million individual antennae, enabling researchers to map the shape of the universe by (they hope) 2020.	全套设备将加工分析由200万台天线搜集的辐射波数据，从而使研究人员能够在2020年（至少他们希望如此）前绘制出宇宙的形状。


IBM provides the processing power for the data, while local Dutch companies are building all of the components.	IBM负责提供数据处理能力，而当地的荷兰企业则负责所有零部件的制造。


Beyond its own specific objectives, the initiative can help to catalyze a broader transformation of the Dutch tech culture.	除实现具体目标外，该计划还能促成荷兰高科技文化更为广泛的变革。


Jan de Jeu, Vice President of the University of Groningen, anticipates experts in Dwingeloo and the northern Netherlands training more scientists and IT specialists in the fundamental challenges related to the storage, transfer, and analysis of enormous data sets, thereby creating what de Jeu calls “The Data Industry Valley.”	格罗宁根大学副校长简·德·热预计��文格洛和荷兰北部的专家将在迎接各项挑战的过程中培养出更多的海量数据集存储、传输和分析专家，从而使简·德·热所谓的“数据产业谷”初具规模。


In Southeast Asia, Hong Kong benefits, first and foremost, from a business culture that is unencumbered by either red tape or corruption.	在东南亚，香港首先受益于不为繁文缛节和腐败所累的企业文化。 成立一家新企业只需两天；


It takes about two days to set up a new business; taxes are low; and ample co-working spaces are available.	税收很低； 还有充分的合作办公空间可以利用。


Furthermore, the government-funded Cyberport Incubation Program supports the development of Hong Kong’s information and communications technology industry by providing companies with start-up capital, access to advanced facilities, and training in entrepreneurship, technology, and business development.	此外，由政府出资的数码港孵化项目通过为企业提供启动资金、先进的基础设施、创业技能培训、技术和商业发展来支持香港的信息通讯业。


As a result, the number of entrepreneurs has grown by 300% in the last three years.	结果是过去3年创业者的数量增长高达300%。


For its part, Singapore is increasingly seeing the effects of a decade of regulatory reforms, including government grants and tax incentives to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector.	就其国内而言，新加坡十年的监管改革成效日益显著，包括提供政府补助和税收优惠鼓励外国资本投资新技术。


In 2002-2009, more than 11,000 startups were established.	2002-2009年，超过11,000家创业企业宣告成立。


Singapore’s social-media startup Bubble Motion (recently rebranded as Bubbly) generated more than 20 million users in its first two years – nearly double the number that Facebook or Twitter accrued in the same period in their history.	新加坡的社交媒体创业企业Bubble Motion（最近更名为Bubbly）在最初两年就吸引了超过2，000万用户——相当于Facebook或Twitter历史同期的近两倍之多。


It counts influential Silicon Valley firms such as Sequoia Capital, Northgate Capital, and Comcast Ventures as investors.	闻名遐迩的硅谷风投企业Sequoia Capital、Northgate Capital和Comcast Ventures都是它的投资者。


On mainland China, Alibaba recently made history by raising $25 billion in the world’s largest initial public offering to date.	在中国大陆，阿里巴巴在全世界迄今为止金额最大的首次公开发行中创造了筹资250亿美元的历史记录。


Company founder Jack Ma said that his ambition is to create a thriving “ecosystem” around the corporate headquarters in Hangzhou.	公司创立者马云说他的志向是在杭州企业总部的周围创造出蓬勃发展的“生态系统”。


Alibaba employees, ex-employees, and stockholders already injected more than $6 billion in the local economy in 2013, with Zhejiang University and the Fudi Startup Incubator Centers (founded by a former Alibaba employee) encouraging frenetic startup activity.	阿里巴巴的员工、前员工和股东2013年已经向当地经济注入了超过60亿美元，联合浙江大学和福地企业孵化中心（由阿里巴巴一名曾经的员工创建）鼓励狂热的创业活动。


California’s enclave of tech companies remains the crown jewel of entrepreneurial ecosystems.	加利福尼亚高科技公司的周边依然是创业生态系统皇冠上的明珠。


But international innovators are increasingly recognizing that, as valuations in Silicon Valley soar, the real bargains for tech-savvy investors may be found outside of the US.	但国际创新势力正日趋意识到随着硅谷估值的飞速上涨，精通技术投资者真正的天堂或许在美国国外才可以找到。


LONDON – If Socrates’s gadfly was in Silicon Valley, it would have a lot of lazy horses to sting.	伦敦—如果苏格拉底的牛虻来到硅谷，有的是懒马叮咬。


Viewed from outside, the world sees companies that exude a sense of entitlement – for example, by flouting local regulations as they expand into cities around the world, from Berlin to Rio de Janeiro.	从外部看，这里的公司散发着一种特权的味道——比如在扩张进入全世界各大城市——不管是柏林还是里约热内卢——时藐视当地监管。


This overweening certitude is not new – the United States, after all, was founded on missionary zeal – but the ethical arrogance is.	这一自负的确定并不新鲜——毕竟，美国就是在传教士般的热情下建立起来的——但它们的道德自大是新鲜事。


Much of Silicon Valley’s success stems from its tight networks – people who have been successful and support one another.	硅谷的成功很大程度上要��功于其紧密的网络——成功人士以及他们彼此之间的支持。


In Plato’s Apology, Socrates advocates for the examined life – the habit of rigorous self-reflection and posing hard, heterodox, and possibly upsetting questions.	在柏拉图的《申辩篇》（Apology）中，苏格拉底号召检讨生活——严格自省，提出困难、异端乃至令人难以接受的问题。


Ironically, questioning prevailing wisdom – and thereby inventing radically new solutions – has been Silicon Valley’s modus operandi from the outset.	讽刺的是，提问胜于智慧——从而发明全新的解决方案——自创立之日起就一直是硅谷的特色。


Silicon Valley’s citizens must start applying their skill at innovation – and their pride in “breaking things” – to themselves.	硅谷公民必须开始将他们的创新技能——以及他们对“破坏东西”的骄傲——用在自己身上。


The only way to evolve is by adapting to new environmental pressures, and now Silicon Valley – owing in large part to its own behavior – is facing plenty of them.	唯一的进化之道是适应新的环境压力，而如今，硅谷——很大程度上拜其自身行为所赐——正面临着大量环境压力。


As Plato’s teacher knew – and as every fresh report of the tech sector’s abusive behavior should remind us – a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.	柏拉图的老师知道——每一篇关于科技行业恣睢行为的新鲜报道也无不在提醒我们这一点——一知半解也可能是危险的东西。


Silicon Valley Everywhere	无处不硅谷


CAMBRIDGE – During the last decades of the twentieth century, Silicon Valley was the unparalleled epicenter of high-tech innovation.	坎布里奇—在二十世纪的最后几十年里，硅谷成为无人能望其项背的高科技创新中心。


Other regions tried to imitate its success, but none succeeded.	其他地区试图模仿硅谷的成功，但无一成功。


France’s Sophia Antipolis, a top-down attempt by the government to create an innovation hub near Cannes, never evolved beyond its origins as a relatively tranquil technology park – notwithstanding its mythological name, California-like weather, and the surrounding area’s unbeatable gastronomy.	法国政府在戛纳附近的索菲亚安提波利斯（Sophia Antipolis）进行了一次自上而下的建设创新枢纽的尝试，但在建成一个相对平静的科技园后便停滞不前——它的神话般的名字、和加利福尼亚相似的天气以及周边无与伦比的美食都没有让它进一步发展。


In the twenty-first century, however, Silicon Valley’s competition has gotten fiercer – as reflected by the increasing number of locations affixing the chemical element to their names: Silicon Alley (New York), Silicon Wadi (Tel Aviv), Silicon Sentier (Paris), etc.	但是，进入二十一世纪，硅谷的竞争变得更加激烈了——越来越多的地方将这一化学元素嵌入了名字当中：硅巷（Silicon Alley，纽约）、硅峪（Silicon Wadi，特拉维夫）、硅路（Silicon Sentier，巴黎），等等。


In London, for example, the emergence of Silicon Roundabout in the late 2000s caught the British government almost by surprise.	比如，在伦敦，21世纪第一个十年末出现的硅环路（Silicon Roundabout）几乎让英国政府喜出望外。


Now rebranded Tech City, the innovation hub in the old Shoreditch neighborhood has evolved into one of London’s key economic engines and talent magnets.	现在，硅环路被重新命名为科技城（Tech City），这个位于老肖尔迪奇区（Shoreditch）附近的创新枢纽已经成为伦敦重要的经济引擎和人才磁石之一。


Similar scripts are playing out around the world.	类似的情况在世界各地层出不穷。


In Berlin, a new startup is said to be founded every 20 minutes.	在柏林，据说每20分钟就有一家新初创企业成立。


Paris is busy building what will be Europe’s largest incubator at Halle Freyssinet.	巴黎忙于在弗雷西奈厅（Halle Freyssinet）建设未来欧洲最大的创业孵化园。


And in Tel Aviv, the phrase “Startup Nation” has gone from a political slogan to economic reality.	在特拉维夫，“创业之国”一词已经从政治口号变成了经济现实。


For the first time, “unicorns” (startups that reach a valuation of more than $1 billion) are no longer the exclusive preserve of the United States – a reality that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.	历史上第一次，“独角兽”（估值达到10亿美元以上的初创企业）不再是美国的专属品——几年前这仍然是不可思议的事情。


A bright generation of global youth – from Mumbai to Prague to Kenya to Singapore – is betting on innovation, and American venture capital funds, sustained by access to cheap financing, are sating their investment appetites overseas.	全新一代全球青年——从孟买到布拉格、肯尼亚和新加坡——正在蜂拥涌向创新，以廉价融资为支撑的美国风险资本基金正在海外大肆满足其投资胃口。


There are several factors behind this phenomenon.	这一现象背后有诸多因素。


In a globalized world, capital flows have accelerated and extended their reach.	在全球化的世界中，资本流速度更快、覆盖面更广。


Innovators around the world are able to muster support from traditional venture capitalists or from crowd-funding platforms such as Kickstarter.	全世界的创新者能够集合来自传统风险资本家的支持，也可以依靠Kickstarter等众筹平台。


Ideas move even faster – propelled, sustained, and strengthened by the Internet.	概念的传播更加迅速，得到互联网的推动、维持和强化。


And the ability to turn them into reality is keeping pace, as global supply chains and new technologies like 3D printing reduce implementation times.	而将概念转化为现实的能力也不甘落后，全球供应链和3D打印等新科技缩短了实施时间。


Meanwhile, the Great Recession that followed the 2008 global financial crisis has disrupted traditional industries, while creating a large surplus of creative talent and affordable workspaces.	与此同时，2008年全球金融危机以来的大衰退破坏了传统行业，但也制造了大量创新人才和平价工作场所。


As a highly mobile, well educated, risk-taking workforce converges on urban hubs, the excitement of city life, coupled with the availability of co-working spaces and a variety of supporting mechanisms, helps to sustain innovative momentum.	随着一大群高流动性、高教育程度、高风险偏好的劳动力大军向城市枢纽靠拢，精彩的城市生活以及唾手可得的共同工作空间和各种支持机制一起帮助维持了这股创新动力。


Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg provided what is perhaps the pithiest summary of the attraction of urban life.	纽约市前市长布隆伯格（Michael Bloomberg）对城市生活的吸引力做了也许是最言简意赅的概括。


Speaking at Stanford University’s 2013 commencement, he quipped, “I believe that more and more Stanford graduates will find themselves moving to Silicon Alley, not only because we’re the hottest new tech scene in the country, but also because there’s more to do on a Friday night than go to the Pizza Hut in Sunnyvale.	在2013年斯坦福大学毕业典礼上，布隆伯格戏谑道：“我相信越来越多的斯坦福毕业生会来到硅巷，不但是因为我们有美国最热门的新技术，也是因为这里的周五夜生活比桑尼维尔（Sunnyvale）的必胜客丰富得多。


And you may even be able to find a date with a girl whose name is not Siri” (the digital personal assistant installed on Apple’s handheld devices).	而你们也可以找到约会的妹子，而且不是Siri哟。 ”（Siri是苹果手持设备内置的数字个人助理。


Bloomberg is generally credited as one of the major forces behind Silicon Alley.	布隆伯格被广泛誉为硅巷背后的主要支持力量。


During his tenure in office, he funded early-stage technology companies, hired the city’s first chief digital officer, and launched a new university to develop high-tech talent.	在他任职期间，他出资支持了许多早期科技公司，聘用了纽约市第一位首席数字官，成立了一家新大学开发高科技人才。


Similar policies are now being implemented in many urban areas, in order to attract a critical mass of creative, technologically savvy people.	如今，许多城市区域都在实施类似的政策，以吸引临界量的创新型高科技人才。


Cities, as a recent World Economic Forum report highlights, are rapidly becoming not just drivers of innovation, but also testing grounds for new technologies, such as reprogrammable space, self-driving mobility, urban farming, and intelligent street lighting.	最新的世界经济论坛报告强调，城市不但正在迅速成为创新的驱动力，也在成为新科技的试验场，包括可重复编程空间、自动驾驶汽车、城市农业、智能路灯等。


Meanwhile, vehicle-hailing apps like Uber and apartment-sharing platforms like Airbnb are demonstrating how cities have become some of the most fertile environments for technological development.	与此同时，Uber等打车应用和Airbnb等民宿平台正在向人们表明城市如何成为科技发展最肥沃的土壤。


That is yet another reason why many new startups are putting down roots in urban centers.	这是许多新创业企业扎根于城市中心的另一个原因。


Most likely, this proliferation of innovation is just the beginning.	极有可能，这一创新大爆发才刚刚开始。


As the Internet continues its penetration of all aspects of our lives, we are entering what the computer scientist Mark Weiser has called the era of “ubiquitous computing” – a time when technology is so prevalent that it “recedes into the background of our lives.”	随着互联网继续渗透到我们日常生活的方方面面，我们正在进入计算机科学家马克·维瑟尔（Mark Weiser）所谓的“普遍计算”时代，在这个时代，科技无处不在，“已经成为日常生活的背景”。


Before long, the digital world and the physical world will be indistinguishable.	要不了多久，数字世界和真实世界就将无法区分。


The era of “Silicon Everywhere” is upon us – and it is taking shape in the world’s cities.	“无处不硅谷”的时代就在眼前——并且正在世界各大城市中成为现实。


Depression’s Psychedelic Solution?	抑郁症的迷幻解药?


ZURICH – According to the World Health Organization, depression affects an estimated 350 million people worldwide, making it one of the most prevalent psychiatric conditions.	苏黎世—根据世界卫生组织的数据，抑郁症影响着全球约350万人，这意味着抑郁症是最普遍的精神疾病之一。


But only about half of those who try antidepressant drugs respond to them, and those who do may have to wait several weeks or even months before experiencing relief – a critical failing for people at immediate risk of suicide.	但只有一半的受抑郁症影响者服用抗抑郁药物，而使用抗抑郁药物者有可能要等待数周甚至数月才能有所缓解——这对于存在立即自杀风险的人来说几乎毫无用处。


Fast-acting antidepressants are thus urgently needed.	因此，我们继续快速见效的抗抑郁药物。


Ketamine – a drug primarily used as an anesthetic in veterinary medicine and as a short-term anesthetic and analgesic in hospitals during surgery or other painful procedures – is currently the rising star of depression research.	克他命（ketamine）是一种麻醉剂，主要用于兽医以及手术和其他痛苦疗程的短期麻醉和止痛。 最近，这种药物正在抑郁症研究中成为冉冉升起的明星。


It appears to ease depression’s most severe symptoms within minutes or hours, even in patients who have a dismal track record with other treatments.	它似乎可以在几分钟到数小时内缓解抑郁症最严重的症状，甚至对于其他疗法记录很差的病人也有效果。


In the first controlled study, researchers reported a 50% decline in symptoms of depression within two hours of a ketamine infusion, and one-third of patients were virtually symptom-free within a day.	在首次控制研究中，研究者报告克他命输入后两小时内抑郁症状可以减少50%，有三分之一的患者在一整天的时间里症状几乎完全消失。


Moreover, patients reported diminished thoughts of suicide a mere 40 minutes after receiving an intravenous infusion of the drug.	此外，在接受克他命静脉注射仅仅40分钟内，患者就报告自杀念头减轻。


In some patients, the effects of a single dose can last more than a week.	在一些患者身上，单次剂量效果可以延续一周以上。


Clinicians are not alone in studying ketamine’s potential.	临床医生并非唯一研究克他命潜在效果的群体。


Neuroscientists have hailed it as the first breakthrough in depression-drug research in 50 years.	神经学家把克他命称为抑郁症药物研究50年来的第一次突破。


Unlike conventional antidepressants – which are used to elevate concentrations of the neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine, or noradrenaline – ketamine influences the glutamate system.	传统抗抑郁药物用来提高血清素、多巴胺或去甲肾上腺素等神经递质的浓度，与此不同，克他命影响谷氨酸系统。


Glutamate, the major excitatory neurotransmitter, plays a central role in mediating nearly all forms of brain function, including learning, memory, cognition, and emotion.	谷氨酸是主要兴奋性神经递质，在传递几乎所有形式的大脑功能方面都起着核心作用，包括学习、记忆、认知和情绪。


By blocking glutamate from binding to the NMDA receptor, ketamine leads to an augmented glutamate release, which activates other types of glutamate receptors and enhances the function and density of synapses (the junctions between neurons) in areas of the brain where stress or depression has caused cells to atrophy.	克他命阻止谷氨酸与NMDA受体绑定，引起谷氨酸释放量增加，从而激活其他谷氨酸受体并加强大脑因为压力和抑郁导致细胞萎缩的区域的突触（神经元之间的连接体）的功能和密度。


Increased synaptic plasticity – the ability of synapses to adjust their strength, which is essential to healthy brain function – could be the neurobiological reason for the apparent therapeutic effect in patients.	突触可塑性（突触调整其强度的能力，是健康大脑功能的关键）的增强或许是克他命在患者身上发生显著疗效的神经生物学原因。


But, though ketamine’s promise has stirred excitement among clinicians and neuroscientists, it has also sparked controversy, owing to the drug’s potentially harmful side effects.	但是，尽管克他命的疗效让临床医生和神经科学家兴奋不已，却也引起了激烈的争议，因为这种药物可能有严重的副作用。


Depending on the dose, a patient may experience altered physical, spatial, and temporal states; larger quantities may induce hallucinations and dissolution of the self.	根据剂量不同，患者的身体、空间和时间感可能会发生改变，较大的剂量可能造成幻觉和自体分解（dissolution of the self）。


Intriguingly, ketamine’s psychoactive properties may be responsible for its mood-enhancing effect.	有趣的是，克他命对于精神性质可能是其提振情绪效果的原因。


Psychedelic and psycholytic treatments – popular in the 1960’s and 1970’s, before research was severely restricted and interest in the clinical use of psychedelics faded – were based on the notion that the drug-induced psychological experience was essential to facilitating the psychotherapeutic process.	幻觉和精神病疗法——流行于20世纪六七十年代，此后研究被严格限制，人们对临床使用致幻剂的兴趣也逐渐消退——基于这样一个概念：药物引起的心理体验对于促进精神治疗过程至关重要。


According to this view, the altered state of consciousness produced by ketamine – particularly the dissolution of the self’s boundaries and the experience of union with the world – might constitute a profound and meaningful experience for a patient.	根据这一看法，由克他命引起的知觉的状态的变化——特别是自体边界的分解和与世界融为一体的体验——给患者构成了影响深远且卓有意义的体验。


Integrating this experience into the psychotherapeutic process might facilitate subsequent behavioral changes.	将这一体验嵌入精神治疗过程可能有助于后续行为改变。


In other words, drugs like ketamine that quickly increase neuroplasticity might be particularly clinically efficient in combination with psychotherapeutic interventions.	换句话说，克他命等快速提升神经可塑性的药物与精神治疗干预相结合或许会产生卓越的临床效果。


Unfortunately, research on ketamine addicts and those who take it in large doses as a party drug has revealed that its use may lead to learning and perception problems, as well as memory disorders.	不幸的是，对于克他命致瘾者和在派对上大量服用克他命者的研究显示，克他命的使用可能导致学习和认知问题以及记忆失调。


Another concern is that ketamine’s benefits may be relatively fleeting.	另一个担忧是克他命的效果可能相对短暂。


As a result, ketamine may never develop into an accepted treatment for depression in its current form.	因此，以当前的形式，克他命可能永远不会被接受为抑郁症治疗方法。


In fact, ketamine’s future as a therapy for depression would be uncertain even if its efficacy were more strongly established.	事实上，即使其效果得到更强的认定，克他命作为抑郁症疗法的未来也是不确定的。


Because ketamine has been available for decades, there is no patent for it, so pharmaceutical companies have little financial incentive to carry out research on the drug and seek approval for its use as an antidepressant.	因为克他命已经出现了几十年，没有专利保护，因此制药公司没什么财务方面的动力展开这种药物的研究并寻求批准它用于抗抑郁治疗。


Nonetheless, research on ketamine’s chemistry might help to identify mechanisms for addressing treatment-resistant depression that are based on glutamate-driven neuroplasticity.	尽管如此，克他命化学方面的研究仍有助于认识基于谷氨酸推动的神经可塑性的顽固抑郁症治疗机制。


Indeed, pharmaceutical companies have already begun to investigate other NMDA-receptor antagonists, together with drugs that act on a different part of the glutamate system, as possible treatments for depression.	事实上，制药公司已开始研究其他NMDA受体拮抗剂试图与作用于谷氨酸系统的不同部分的药物相结合作为可能的抑郁症疗法。


This research could eventually lead to an entirely new class of antidepressant – and relief for millions of people worldwide.	这方面的研究有望最终产生一个全新的抗抑郁药物种类，拯救全世界几百万人。


Financial Regulators’ Fine Mess	金融监管者的罚款之乱


WASHINGTON, DC – When an athlete breaks the rules, it is easy to figure out whether the relevant disciplinary body really wants to discourage repeat offenses.	华盛顿—当一名运动员犯规时，要指出相关纪律机构是否想阻止重复犯规时很容易的。


Suspending a player from the sport – as happens in soccer in the case of dangerous fouls – is a real punishment, not only for the individual but also for the team.	把选手罚出场——比如足球比赛中的危险犯规情形——是实实在在的惩罚，不仅惩罚个体，也惩罚了团队。


Consider the case of Michael Clarke, the captain of the Australian cricket team, who recently threatened bodily harm to an opposing player.	以澳大利亚板球队队长迈克尔·克拉克（Michael Clarke）为例。 在最近的一场比赛中，他对一位对方选手构成了人身威胁。


Despite public hand-wringing, Cricket Australia (the governing body) imposed only a small fine (that is, small relative to Clarke’s annual salary).	尽管他的行为引起了公愤，但澳大利亚板球协会（治理机构）只是罚了一小笔款（相对于克拉克的年薪而言）了事。


Whether or not this was appropriate, Cricket Australia was making it clear that such behavior merited only a symbolic punishment.	不管这一惩罚是否合适，澳大利亚板球协会释放出明确的信号，这样的行为只会受到象征性惩罚。


The recent $13 billion settlement between the US Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase (JPM), one of the world’s largest international banks, should be viewed the same way.	最近，美国司法部和世界最大的国际银行摩根大通（JP Morgan Chase）达成了130亿美元的和解，该案也适用于上面的道理。


To the uninitiated, the fine appears significant (which explains all the attention-grabbing headlines), and it certainly has made America’s financial regulators look busy and serious.	对不知情者来说，这笔罚款不可谓不巨（这也是这则新闻吸引眼球的原因），也显然让美国金融监管者有了繁忙且严肃的形象。


But, just like Cricket Australia, the message is clear: There will be no change to business as usual.	但是，和澳大利亚板球协会一样，美国司法部释放了明确的信号：马照跑，舞照跳。


JPM was accused of a wide range of illegal activities, including misrepresenting securities to investors and much more.	摩根大通被诉犯有一系列非法行为，包括但远不限于向投资者提供不当证券。


Better Markets, a pro-financial-reform group, points out that what we know about the settlement suggests that it is largely meaningless. As Dennis Kelleher, head of Better Markets, put it,	支持金融改革的群体“让市场更好”（Better Market）领导人丹尼斯·凯勒赫（Dennis Kelleher）指出，就我们对该案的了解而言，该案没有任何意义。


“Rather than throwing the book at [JPM] and its executives, the Department of Justice called off a press conference and stopped a lawsuit because the bank’s high profile, politically-connected CEO, Jamie Dimon, personally called the Attorney General and asked him to do so.”	“司法部并没有为难（摩根大通）及其高管，而是取消了新闻发布会，中止了诉讼，因为该银行姿态极高、政治后台极硬的CEO杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）以个人身份找到司法部长要求他真么做。 ”


The way in which the settlement was worked out should also give us pause – with Dimon having direct access to US Attorney General Eric Holder, America’s top law-enforcement official.	该和解案达成的方式也值得我们停下来仔细研究——戴蒙可以直接找到美国最高执法官员、司法部长埃里克·霍德尔（Eric Holder）。


“Few if any Americans have the ability to even get the AG on the phone,” Kelleher reminds us, “much less the power to get him to stop him from filing a lawsuit that would have revealed to the public the details of JPMorgan’s alleged illegal conduct.”	“绝大部分美国人连给司法部长打个电话都做不到，”凯勒赫提醒我们，“更不用说找到他、要他停止提起将把摩根大通被控非法行为的细节公诸于众的诉讼了。 ”


As a result, we will not learn exactly what was alleged in the case against JPM, including the evidence used.	因此，我们无从确切地知道摩根大通在此案中被诉的理由是什么，也无从知道有使用了哪些证据。


The level of public scrutiny and concern will subside.	公共检查和质疑的水平也将受到限制。


But at least JPM must pay a high price to make the entire matter disappear, right?	但至少摩根大通不得不花一大笔钱让整个事件消失，对吧？


Well, no.	非也。


A $13 billion “fine” for a company the size of JPM is about as painful as Clarke’s fine is for him – not painful at all.	130亿美元“罚款”对摩根大通这样的公司就像是澳大利亚板球协会对克拉克的罚款，根本不值一提。


Clarke earns about $6 million (Australian dollars) per year; in addition to an annual retainer, he receives a $14,000 match fee for every international test match, along with other tour fees and bonuses.	克拉克每年能挣600万澳元，此外还有津贴——每场国际测试赛都有14 000美元出场费费以及其他差旅费和奖金。


He was fined 20% of the international match fee ($2,800), or about 0.05% of his annual salary.	而对他的罚款只是其出场费的20%（2 800美元），或年薪的0. 05%。


For anyone with an annual income of $50,000 (which is close to the median for US households), this would be equivalent to a fine of $25.	如果你的年收入是50 000美元（大概相当于美国中位家庭收入），这就好比是对你进行了25美元的罚款。


JPM has a total balance sheet of around $4 trillion, measured using international accounting standards.	摩根大通的资产负债表总规模大概在4万亿美元（以国际会计准则衡量）。


As management told shareholders after the settlement was announced, “the Firm is appropriately reserved for all of these matters,” meaning that there would be no material impact on earnings.	和解案宣布后，管理层告诉股东们，“公司对这些问题已经进行了适当的拔备”，这意味着利润不会受到实质性影响。


And, predictably, “the Firm did not admit any violations of law.”	此外，毫不意外，“公司不承认有任何违法行为”。


In fact, while Clark’s paltry fine presumably at least comes out of his own pocket, the penalty levied on JPM is to be paid largely by its shareholders.	事实上，克拉克的罚款尽管微不足道，好歹还得从他自己的腰包中出，而摩根大通的罚款大部分由股东买单。


And, because there is no market for corporate control over megabanks (because protections provided by regulators prevent hostile takeovers or effective shareholder activism), frustration on the part of JPM’s investors cannot result in a change of management.	此外，由于不存在巨型银行控股权市场（因为监管者为了防止敌意收购或实质上的股东维权运动而采取了保护措施），沮丧的摩根大通投资者连更换管理层都做不到。


But, again, JPM’s shareholders have little cause for concern.	但是，摩根大通股东们也没有什么好担心的。


Marianne Lake, JP Morgan’s chief financial officer, has suggested that about $7 billion of the fine is likely to be tax deductible, that is, treated as a form of necessary and usual business expense.	摩根大通首席财务官玛丽安妮·莱克（Marianne Lake）表示，这笔罚款中有大约70亿美元可以适用于税收扣减，也就是说，被当作必要的常规经营费用处理。


The bank was taxed at an effective rate of 31.3% in the first nine months of 2013, according to the Wall Street Journal, implying a tax break worth around $2.2 billion (which could end up higher).	据华尔街日报的数据，2013年前九个月，该银行的有效税率是31. 3%，这意味着税收扣减好处价值22亿美元（可能还要高）。


While JPM is now off the hook, holding individual employees personally accountable for their behavior is still an option.	摩根大通银行已经脱钩，但仍可以问责个别员工的个人责任。


But no one should hold their breath.	但没有人需要为此担心。


The chances that anyone will be suspended from the industry are minimal, and the impact on management is likely to be nil.	有人会因此被驱逐出该行业的可能性极小，对管理层的影响也将接近于零。


Kelleher sent a forceful letter to Holder, urging full disclosure of all relevant details in the case – and there are many.	凯勒赫给霍德尔寄了一封措辞严厉的信，敦促她披露本案的全部细节——大量细节。


Americans owe it to themselves to read it and recommend it to their elected representatives.	美国人应该亲自读一读这封信，并把它推荐给他们选出来的代表们。


Kelleher concludes, “Equal justice for all without fear or favor is the bedrock of our democracy and, indeed, our country.”	凯勒赫说，“法律面前人人平等是民主的基石，事实上，也是我们国家的基石。


Unfortunately, the Department of Justice still seems to believe that very large companies deserve special access and special treatment.	”不幸的是，司法部似乎仍然相信，超级公司可以得到特殊待遇，法外开恩。


The Temptation of the Central Bankers	央行行长的诱惑


WASHINGTON, DC – The banking system has become most central bankers’ Achilles’ heel.	华盛顿—银行系统已成为大部分央行行长的“阿克琉斯之踵”。


This may seem paradoxical – after all, the word “bank” is in their job description.	这似乎有些矛盾——毕竟，“银行”一词已经描述了他们的指责。


But most people currently at the top of our central banks built their careers during the 1980’s and 1990’s, when the threat of inflation was still very real, so this – rather than bank regulation and supervision – remains a major focus of their intellectual and practical concerns.	但如今，在我们的中央银行占居高位的大部分人是在20世纪八九十年代崭露头角的，当时，通货膨胀是非常现实的威胁，因此，这——而不是银行监管和监督——一直成为他们的主要理论和实践关注点。


Moreover, a formative experience for many central bankers over the past half-decade has been the need to prevent a potential collapse of output, including by preventing prices from falling.	此外，在过去五年中，许多央行行长最重要的经验便是需要防止产出的潜在下滑，防止物价下降便是手段之一。


They have achieved this goal largely by propping up credit, regardless of what that may do to the banking sector’s structure or incentives.	他们实现这一目标的方式大体是大量扩张信用，不管这可能对银行部门的结构和激励造成什么影响。


It is not surprising that today’s central bankers continue to be deferential to those who run large private-sector banks.	毫不奇怪，今天的央行行长仍然对大型私人部门银行高管毕恭毕敬。


Central banks have a great deal of control over an economy’s money supply, and they can affect interest rates across a wide range of loans and securities.	央行控制着经济的货币供应，并能通过各种贷款和证券影响利率。


But private-sector banks do the lending, while also bearing responsibility for important dimensions of how financial markets operate.	但实施贷款操作的是私人部门银行，它们还承担了关于金融市场运行的重要责任。


Thus, keeping global megabanks in business and highly profitable has become a key objective for policymakers in the United States, Europe, and many other countries.	因此，让全球大银行继续做生意并获得丰厚利润成为美国、欧洲和其他许多国家的关键政策目标。


All too often, however, this means that central bankers defer to these firms’ executives.	但是，这往往意味着央行行长要唯这些企业高管的马首是瞻。


José De Gregorio, the governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, is an important exception.	2007—2011年担任智利中央银行行长的德格雷戈里奥（José De Gregorio）是一个显著的例外。


In How Latin America Weathered the Global Financial Crisis, he combines recent history and personal insight to offer a fascinating account of how to apply a more balanced policy approach – both in emerging markets and more broadly.	在《拉丁美洲如何抵御了全球金融危机》（How Latin America Weathered the Global Financial Crisis）中，他结合近期历史和个人洞见提出了一套关于如何实施更平衡的政策方针的优美理论——不管对于新兴市场还是其他地区。


(De Gregorio’s book is published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, where I am a senior fellow, though I was not involved in commissioning or editing his work.)	（德格雷戈里奥的书由彼得森国际经济学研究所出版，我是该研究所的高级研究员，但我并未参与这本书的编纂工作。 ）


There is plenty of conventional macroeconomics in De Gregorio’s story, including the value of careful fiscal policy and the advantage of maintaining a flexible exchange rate guided largely by supply and demand in the market.	德格雷戈里奥的理论包含了很多传统宏观经济学，包括审慎的财政政策的价值以及维持以市场供求为主要决定因素的弹性汇率的好处。


When countries seem committed to a fixed exchange rate (say, relative to the US dollar), firms and individuals feel encouraged to borrow in foreign currency (like the dollar) in order to lock in what are typically lower interest rates.	当国家承诺固定汇率时（如相对美元汇率），企业和个人得到了激励借入外币（如美元）以锁定通常较低的利率。


But such a perception can easily become a trap.	但这样的观点很容易演变为陷阱。


When capital flows out of the country – as is happening now in some emerging markets – it may be helpful if the central bank allows the currency to depreciate in an effort to boost exports and reduce imports.	当资本开始流出时——一些新兴市场国家就是如此——央行允许货币贬值以提振出口、降低进口是大有裨益的。


But if the country’s borrowers have a lot of dollar-denominated debt, depreciation can be ruinous.	但如果该国借款人有大量美元计价债务，贬值就可能变成一场灾难。


De Gregorio covers all of these issues very well – and also discusses the importance of luck.	德格雷戈里奥出色地讨论了所有这些问题，还讨论了运气的重要性。


Chinese growth remained relatively strong in 2009 and after, which kept the price of commodities high.	2009年以降，中国的经济增长保持着相对强劲，维持了大宗商品的高价。


This benefited Chile – a major copper producer – and much of Latin America.	这让智利（主要铜生产国）和许多拉美国家获益。


But De Gregorio’s analysis of banking is what really stands out.	但德格雷戈里奥对银行的分析才是最出类拔萃的。


Here the key issue is leverage, or how much banks are allowed to borrow relative to their equity, and the temptation that policymakers face to allow banks to borrow more, particularly when times are good and asset prices are rising.	在这个问题上，命门在于杠杆，即银行可以用股本借多少钱，而决策者面临的诱惑是允许银行借更多的钱，特别是在荣景和资产价格上涨期间。


Big banks’ executives often want to increase their institutions’ leverage, typically because they have various forms of guarantee – in particular, deposit insurance and access to central-bank financing on advantageous terms.	大银行高管通常希望增加他们的银行的杠杆，这往往是因为他们有各种形式的担保——特别是存款保险以及以有利条件从央行获得融资。


In addition, the executives’ pay is typically based on return on equity, unadjusted for risk.	此外，高管薪酬也往往以未经风险调整的股本回报为基础。


The danger for central banks stems from the fact that the implicit subsidies provided to major financial institutions are not measured in any budget.	央行的风险在于一个事实，即给主要金融机构的隐性补贴不会在任何预算中表现出来。


Moreover, the build-up of risk in the financial system that accompanies higher leverage is both hard to measure and likely to materialize only after a few years (for example, after a governor’s term of office has expired).	此外，与杠杆提高相伴而生的额金融系统内风险的堆积既难以测量，也只能在几年后（比如，在央行行长任期结束后）才能厘清。


De Gregorio’s views differ from those of many of his colleagues in other countries, because he sees clearly the risks in allowing banks to become bigger and apply what he calls “clever” strategies that require a great deal of leverage.	德格雷戈里奥与他在其他国家的很多同行不同，因为他明确提出允许银行变大并采取他所谓的需要大量杠杆的“聪明”政策是很危险的。


Higher leverage creates macroeconomic risk – not least for fiscal balances when implicit guarantees must be honored.	杠杆增加形成了宏观经济风险——不仅仅是在需要兑现担保时影响财政平衡。


By keeping banks and other private-sector firms at lower levels of debt, vulnerability to shocks is reduced.	如能减少银行和其他私人部门企业的债务水平，它们抵抗冲击的能力也会有所提高。


In a boom, this may seem irrelevant; but, as De Gregorio knows, pressure on emerging markets – and richer countries – arises all too often, and frequently at unexpected moments.	在繁荣期，这似乎无关紧要； 但是，德格雷戈里奥明白，新兴市场——和发达国家——的压力往往会在出乎意料的时刻出现。


Growth based on high leverage typically proves to be illusory.	基于高杠杆的增长通常是一种幻觉。


And yet the illusion continues to entice policymakers.	但这一幻觉一直在诱惑决策者。


That is why De Gregorio’s book should be required reading for all central bankers.	正因如此，每一位央行行长都应该读一读德格雷戈里奥的书。


The Fed in Denial	拒绝接受现实的美联储


WASHINGTON, DC – The United States Federal Reserve System is one of the most powerful governmental organizations in the history of the world.	华盛顿—美国联邦储备体系是世界历史上权力最大的政府组织之一。


America’s central bank has control over the supply of dollars, and currently exerts great influence over interest rates, both for short-term and long-term borrowing.	美国中央银行控制着美元的供给，目前还对短期和长期借贷利率施加着巨大影响。


And, though the Fed was partly responsible for the regulatory failures that led to the global economy’s near-meltdown in 2008-2009, post-crisis reform has left it with even greater authority and more responsibility for overseeing the financial system.	此外，尽管美联储要为导致2008—2009年全球经济几乎崩溃的监管失责承担部分责任，但危机后的改革让它拥有了更大的权力和监督金融体系的责任。


That is a worrying outcome, because senior Fed officials seem to have slipped back into their pre-2008 ways, ignoring concerns about dangerous financial-sector behavior – even when those concerns are expressed by members of the US Senate Banking Committee.	这一结果令人担忧，因为美联储高级官员似乎正在回归2008年前的老路，忽视对危险的金融业行为的担忧——甚至在这些担忧来自美国参议院银行委员会成员时也是如此。


This is not only unfortunate; it is also dangerous, because the Fed’s political position is much more precarious than its leadership seems to realize.	这不光不是一件幸事，而是十分危险，因为美联储的政治处境要比其领导层所认识到的危险得多。


In many countries, people on the right of the political spectrum provide a bastion of support for the central bank.	在许多国家，政治右翼一直是央行支持者的大本营。


In northern Europe, for example, the European Central Bank’s independence is seen as essential for price stability – and politicians on the right typically attach a higher priority to this goal.	比如，在北欧，欧洲央行的独立性被视为价格稳定的关键——而右翼政客通常对这一目标尤其看重。


The situation is quite different in the US.	美国并非如此。


Here, the right, represented by the Republican Party, has long been suspicious of the Fed, reflecting its opposition to a powerful federal government, as well as nostalgia for the days of the gold standard (particularly the version that operated before the Fed was created in 1913).	在美国，以共和党为代表的右翼长期以来都对美联储持怀疑态度，他们反对强势联邦政府，而对金本位时代充满怀念（特别是1913年美联储成立前的金本位）。


The Fed as it currently operates is being protected by the left (the Democratic Party).	今天的美联储身处左翼（民主党）的卵翼之下。


For example, I recently testified at a hearing of the House Financial Services Committee on Republican-proposed legislation that would impose on the Fed greater limitations on both monetary policy and regulation.	比如，最近我在众议院金融服务委员会的一次立法听证上做了陈词。 这项立法有共和党提出，旨在更大地限制美联储的货币政策和监管权力。


House Democrats oppose the bill and invited me to the hearing, where I explained that the proposed constraints would, in my view, greatly hamper the Fed’s effectiveness – including its ability to help the economy return to full employment and to prevent the financial system from spinning out of control again.	众议院民主党反对这一法案，邀请我出席作证。 我在陈词中解释道，在我看来，该法案所提出的约束会极大地妨碍美联储的效率——包括其帮助经济回归充分就业和防止金融体系再次滑向失控的能力。


Under current circumstances, the Democrats are strong enough – with control of the Senate and of the presidency – to fend off these assaults.	在当前环境下，民主党势力足够强大——控制着参议院，总统也是民主党——能够抵挡住共和党的攻击。


Consequently, senior Fed and White House officials seem rather confident that nothing dramatic will happen that would undermine the Fed’s independence.	因此，美联储和白宫高级官员相当自信地认为不会发生破坏美联储独立性的重大改变。


I would not be so sure.	我并不那么笃定。


The main problem is that the Fed has not moved with alacrity to implement fully key provisions of the Dodd-Frank financial reforms, which were passed in 2010.	主要问题是美联储没有干净利落地充分实施2010年通过的多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革的关键内容。


For example, the Dodd-Frank legislation specifies that all large financial institutions should draw up meaningful “living wills” – specifying how they could be allowed to fail, unencumbered by any kind of bailout, if they again became insolvent.	比如，多德-弗兰克立法明确规定，所有大型金融机构都应该写好有意义的“生前遗嘱”——写清楚如若它们再次出现资不抵债情形应该如何倒闭而不进行任何形式的援助。


Creating such living wills is not an option; it is a requirement of the law.	写好“生前遗嘱”并不是一项选择，而是多德-弗兰克立法的要求。


Yet, in a recent speech that reviewed the landscape of financial reform, Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer skipped over the requirement almost completely.	但是，美联储副主席斯坦利·费希尔（Stanley Fischer）在其概括金融改革图景的最近讲话中几乎对这一要求只���未提。


Fischer appears to prefer to rely on the resolution powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which is empowered to takeover failing financial institutions, with the expectation that it will impose losses on creditors in such a way that will not cause global panic.	费希尔似乎更想依靠联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的解决能力（resolution powers）。 FDIC被授权接管倒闭的金融机构，人们预期它会以不引发全球恐慌的方式让债权人接受损失。


(I am on the FDIC’s systemic resolution advisory committee, but I am not responsible for the agency’s plans or potential actions.)	（我是FDIC系统解决方案顾问委员会成员，但我并不负责该机构的计划或可能的行动。 ）


Unfortunately, as currently constructed, these resolution powers are unlikely to work.	不幸的是，按照目前的结构，FDIC的解决能力不可能起效。


They do not apply across borders, there is not enough loss-absorbing capital in large complex financial institutions, and the funding structure of big bank holding companies remains precarious.	它不能跨境生效，大型复杂金融机构没有足够的损失吸收资本，大银行控股公司的融资结构也非常危险。


Senior Fed officials emphasize that big banks fund themselves with more equity now than they did in the past.	美联储高级官员强调说，与过去相比，目前大银行更多地依靠股本为自己融资。


But the Global Capital Index constructed by Thomas Hoenig, the FDIC’s vice chairman, indicates that the largest US banks are still 95% debt-financed.	但FDIC副主席托马斯·霍尼格（Thomas Hoenig）编制的全球资本指数（Global Capital Index）表明美国最大银行债务融资比例仍高达95%。


With that much leverage, it does not take a lot to create fear of insolvency.	在如此高的杠杆下，稍有风吹草动就会引起偿债能力恐慌。


Yet, despite repeated and responsible expressions of concern – including from Senate Democrats – the Fed continues to ignore these profound problems.	但是，尽管包括参议院民主党在内的各方已在表达负责任的担忧之情，美联储仍然忽视这些影响深远的问题。


If anything, in his most recent speech, Fischer seemed to brush aside any such fears – assuring his audience that there is great social value in continuing to have extremely large financial firms that operate with so very little equity capital (and therefore a great deal of leverage).	费希尔在其最近的讲话中将所有这些问题一笔带过——他向听众保证，放任股本水平极低（因而杠杆水平极高）的超大金融企业继续存在有其巨大的社会价值。


This is more than disappointing.	这着实令人失望。


It is profoundly dangerous to the economy. And it imperils the Fed’s future ability to take action as needed.	这对经济来说极其危险，也影响到未来美联储采取必要行动的能力。


In recent interviews, including with The New Yorker, Fed Chair Janet Yellen has indicated at least general concerns about financial-sector behavior and the vulnerability of big banks.	在最近的采访中——包括《纽约客》（The New Yorker）的采访——美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）至少表达了对金融行业行为以及大银行脆弱性的总体顾虑。


But unless the Fed acts on such concerns – including by implementing the requirement that large financial institutions adopt meaningful living wills – its independence will come under even greater pressure.	但除非美联储根据这些顾虑采取行动——包括落实要求大金融机构写好有意义的“生前遗嘱”——否则其独立性将遭到巨大压力。


Are China’s Banks Next?	接下来是中资银行？


WASHINGTON, DC – America’s recent bout of dysfunctional politics and the eurozone’s on-again, off-again crisis should, on the face of it, present a golden opportunity to China.	华盛顿—最近，美国政坛陷入了瘫痪，而欧元区危机好一阵坏一阵，至少从表面上，这是中国的黄金机会。


To be sure, the malaise in the United States and Europe is likely to hurt Chinese exports; but, over the long term, China wants to reorient its economy toward domestic consumption.	诚然，美国和欧洲的萎靡可能伤及中国的出口； 但是，从产期看，中国希望将其经济导向内需。


With the Tea Party wing of America’s Republican Party scaring investors out of the dollar, interest in the Chinese renminbi’s potential as an international reserve currency can only increase.	美国共和党中的茶党正在把投资者吓得逃离美元，于是人民币成为国际储备货币的潜力必然日渐提升。


This will help China to attract more investors seeking to diversify their portfolios.	这将有助于中国吸引更多的寻求投资组合多样化的投资者。


Chinese government debt will become an important global benchmark asset, which should help its private sector to attract funding on reasonable terms, while the predominance of the US Federal Reserve in determining worldwide monetary conditions would presumably diminish.	中国政府债务将成为重要的全球基准资产，这将有助于其私人部门吸引条件有利的资金，而美联储在决定世界货币条件方面的主导力将受到侵蚀。


The decades-old shift to a multipolar world for manufacturing could thus lead to a more multipolar currency world, with the renminbi as an important player.	于是，几十年来的生产多极化有可能日益带来货币多极化，人民币将在其中扮演重要角色。


But, despite its unique history and current advantages, China harbors a weakness that is quite similar to what has caused so much trouble in the US and Europe: big banks that have an incentive not to be careful.	但是，尽管中国拥有独一无二的历史和现实优势，但中国也有劣势，而正是这一劣势导致美国和欧洲深陷泥淖：大银行有不谨慎行事的激励。


China’s latest moves suggest that while it may now enjoy some years of greater prominence, its encouragement of its financial institutions to go global is likely to lead to serious trouble.	中国的最新动作表明，尽管当下它可以享受几年的主宰力增长，但其鼓励金融机构走向全球的做法可能导致严重麻烦。


Ironically, the British government, while no doubt just trying to be hospitable to foreign investors by laying out a red carpet, is helping to set a trap for Chinese financial institutions – and the broader Chinese economy.	讽刺的是，英国政府——毫无疑问，它正在竭力摆出欢迎外国投资者的姿态——在帮忙给中国金融机构以及更广义的中国经济挖陷阱。


By encouraging China to build global financial institutions with light regulation, the United Kingdom is not just inviting irresponsible behavior; it could help to pull an entire economy toward ultimately unproductive and even self-destructive activities.	英国以宽松的监管鼓励中国建设全球金融机构，这不仅是诱导不负责任的行为，还可能让整个中国经济最终走向非生产性甚至自我毁灭的行为。


China has long kept tight control over its main banks.	长期以来，中国一直紧紧地控制着其主要银行。


Credit policies have helped to juice the economy from time to time, but the authorities have also retained the ability to slow things down when warranted.	信用政策总是能够有助于滋养经济，但中国当局一直掌握着必要时让速度降下来的能力。


Banking has become an instrument of economic policy to ensure GDP growth and employment creation, while keeping inflation at an acceptable level.	银行业务是一种经济政策工具，用于在确保GDP增长和就业创造的同时将通胀保持在可接受水平。


But the Chinese policy elite are also very taken with the idea that a first-rank country needs a prominent banking system that is active internationally.	但中国政策精英同业也十分同意一流国家需要有活跃于国际舞台的一流银行系统的观点。


There is nothing wrong with this ambition, as long as it is handled with great caution.	有这样的雄心壮志并无不妥，只要能谨慎行事。


Unfortunately, it is now becoming clear that the hard lessons of recent financial crises have been lost on China.	不幸的是，如今显而易见的是，中国并未吸取最近的金融危机的惨痛教训。


Bankers never like tight regulation – and they particularly do not appreciate being required to fund their operations with more equity relative to debt.	银行家永远不会喜欢严格的监管——尤其不喜欢被要求用更多的股本而不是债务为经营活动提供资金。


In both good times and bad, their refrain is, “We need lower capital requirements,” meaning they should be allowed to borrow more.	不管是在好光景还是坏光景，他们的老生常谈是：“我们需要更低的资本要求。 ”意思是应该允许他们借得更多。


Iceland, Switzerland, and the UK have all learned the hard way that allowing banks to become big relative to their economies brings with it great risks.	冰岛、瑞士和英国都得到了惨痛的教训——允许银行成为相对经济而言的庞然大物会带来巨大的风险。


Bailouts become more expensive and – as in the case of Iceland – may actually be unaffordable.	援助会变得更昂贵，甚至——从冰岛的情形看——实际上无法负担。


Even when, as in the UK, the cost of losses is not completely ruinous, the direct damage to domestic credit and to broader confidence can be enough to hold back the economy for a half-decade or more.	在英国，尽管损失成本还没有到毁灭性的地步，但对国内信用和更广义的信心的直接伤害之大足以让经济倒退五年甚至更多。


Mervyn King, the former governor of the Bank of England (BoE), is reported to have said, “Banks live globally and die locally.”	据报道，前英格兰银行行长默文·金（Mervyn King）曾说过，“银行生是全球的人，死是本国的鬼。


In other words, when everything is going well, you may be willing to believe that it does not matter where a particular international bank gets its equity funding and in which jurisdiction its debts are issued.	”换句话说，当一切都好时，你会愿意相信，某家国际银行从哪里获得其股本融资、在哪个司法管辖地发行债务无关紧要。


But when bad things happen and there is pressure on financial markets, with fear of insolvency in the air, it matters a great deal if you have a claim on an insured bank in the United States or on an essentially unregulated offshore subsidiary.	但当坏事发生、金融市场承压时，空气中将弥漫着对破产的恐惧气息，如果你持有美国的不安全银行或者某实际上不受监管的离岸分支的债权，这将会给你带来大麻烦。


China wants to build up its banks’ international operations.	中国希望建立其银行的国际经营网络。


And the British are welcoming an expansion of these activities in London – offering to treat Chinese banks operating there as branches (subject to Chinese regulation) rather than as subsidiaries (subject to British regulation).	而英国欢迎这些活动在伦敦的扩张——将向在英经营的种子银行提供分行待遇（受中国监管约束），而不按子公司对待（受英国监管约束）。


Mark Carney, King’s successor at the BoE, said, “We are open for business,” in terms of providing liquidity loans to backstop big banks.	继金担任英格兰银行行长的马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）说，在提供流动性贷款为大银行兜底方面，“我们采取开放态度。


But UK banks’ assets amounted to eight times the country’s GDP before the crisis and will presumably approach that level again with Carney’s encouragement.	”但英国银行的资产在危机前高达英国GDP的八倍，而在卡尼的鼓励下，很有可能将再次回到这一水平。


Can the BoE – and the UK Treasury – really provide downside insurance for this full amount, or are the UK authorities set on the path to becoming another Iceland (where the value of bank assets peaked at more than 11 times the country’s GDP)?	英格兰银行——以及英国财政部——能否真的为此全额提供损失保险？ 英国当局是否走上了成为另一个冰岛（冰岛银行资产比该国GDP高十倍多）的不归路？


The Chinese authorities should take another look at their policies.	中国当局应该对它们的政策三思而后行。


China is like Cinderella – finally allowed to attend the ball and given a chance to become a prominent player.	中国就像是灰姑娘——终于获得了参加盛宴、成为主角的机会。


But midnight could come very quickly, and financial crises do not have fairytale endings.	但午夜时分可能很快就会来临，而金融危机是不会有童话结尾的。


The Future of the Captured State	被俘虏国家的未来


WASHINGTON, DC – Concerns about state capture are nothing new.	华盛顿—关于俘虏（capture）的担忧由来已久。


Special interests hold undue sway over official decision-makers in many countries, and regulators are always prone to see the world through the eyes of the people whose activities they are supposed to oversee.	在许多国家，特殊利益对决策官员有着过度的影响力，监管者也常常通过所作所为应该受其监督的人的眼睛看世界。


But the rise of finance in industrialized countries has cast these issues in a new, much harsher light.	但工业化国家金融的崛起将这些问题带进了新的、更尖锐的环境。


Before 1939, wages and profits in the financial sector in the United States amounted to less than 1% of GDP; now they stand at 7-8% of GDP.	1939年前，美国金融部门的工资和利润还不到GDP的1%； 如今这一比例为7—8%。


In recent decades, financial assets have expanded dramatically relative to any measure of economic activity, as life expectancy increased and the post-WWII baby boomers began to think about saving for retirement.	近几十年来，随着预期寿命的延长以及二战后婴儿潮一代开始为退休而储蓄，金融资产相对任何经济活动指标都大幅扩张。


Compared to the size of the US economy, individual banks are now much bigger than they were in the early 1990’s.	如今，美国个体银行相对经济的规模比20世纪90年代初大幅增加。


(The precise numbers are different in other industrialized countries, but the rise of finance is a general phenomenon.)	（其他工业化国家的具体数字有所不同，但金融的崛起是整体现象。 ）


The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the deep recession that resulted made it plain to see that the financial sector in the US and elsewhere had become too powerful.	2007—2008年全球金融危机及其所导致的深度衰退让我们清楚地看到，美国和其他国家的金融部门已经变得过于强大了。


Since the 1980’s, a form of “cognitive capture” had occurred, with policymakers becoming convinced that innovation and deregulation could only improve the functioning of both financial intermediation and the broader economy.	自20世纪80年代以来，发生了某种形式的“认知俘虏”（cognitive capture），决策者认定创新和去监管化必能改善金融中介和整体经济的功能。


The crisis proved this view completely wrong, imposing massive costs – measured in terms of jobs lost, lives disrupted, and increased hardship – on millions of people.	危机证明这一观点大错特错，并且给数百万人造成了极大的代价——如失业、生活干扰和日渐艰难。


Financial regulation entered a new, much more contested phase in 2010 – at least in the US.	2010年，金融监管进入了一个新的、更加充满争议的阶段——至少在美国是如此。


Most officials now concede the existence of systemic risk as a form of “pollution,” meaning that banks and other financial firms do not necessarily internalize the full costs of their structures and activities.	如今，大部分官员承认系统风险的存在是一种“污染”，意味着银行和其他金融企业不一定将结构和活动的成本完全内部化。


And these costs can be huge – potentially large enough, despite recent reform attempts, to cause Great Depression II (or worse).	而这些成本可能是巨大的，即使在目前的改革措施下，也有可能足以造成第二次大萧条（甚至更糟）。


Operating big financial firms with small amounts of equity capital and a lot of debt may be in the interest of their managers, but it is definitely not in the interest of the rest of society.	经营股本稀薄、债务庞大的大金融企业或许符合管理人员的利益，但显然不符合社会其他成员的利益。


Moreover, providing large implicit subsidies to firms that are too big to fail should not be an attractive policy, because it encourages such firms to take on excessive risk (and to become even bigger).	此外，向太大而不能倒的企业提供巨额间接补贴决非有吸引力的政策，因为这不啻于鼓励这些企业过度冒险（并且变得更大）。


And yet debate about these issues has remained wide open.	而这些问题的争论仍远未形成定论。


The question is no longer so much one of beliefs.	问题早已不在于信念。


Now it is simply about money – particularly campaign contributions, but also the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street, as well as the vast pro-megabank interests that pour millions of dollars into think tanks and other, more shadowy organizations.	现在，唯一的问题是钱——特别是政治献金，以及华盛顿和华尔街之间的旋转门，还有庞大的亲大银行利益集团，他们向智库和其他更神秘的组织动辄捐赠数百万美元。


The Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job raised some sensitivities and led to increased disclosures by some people, including academics, concerning their involvement with the financial industry.	奥斯卡获奖纪录片《监守自盗》（Inside Job）曝光了一些敏感信息，并引来一些人的进一步披露，包括因身涉金融业而担忧不已的学者。


But there remain profound monetary ties between big banks and people who purport to be independent analysts providing expert opinions.	但在大银行和理应以独立分析员的身份提供专家意见的人之间仍存在深刻的金钱联系。


Some officials remain highly captured.	一些官员仍是金融业的俘虏。


But there is also good news: Other officials are now much more resistant and inclined to push back against the industry.	但也有好消息：其他官员已不再愿意就范，更倾向于反击金融业。


Well-informed nonpartisan outsiders are increasingly well organized and influential, particularly when they can work closely with pro-reform officials.	了解情况的无党派外部人士组织越来越好、影响力越来越大，特别是在他们可以与亲改革官员密切合作时。


The latest indications from the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve – a crucial piece of this puzzle – are encouraging.	来自 美联储理事会（这一谜团的关键部分）的最新信号是鼓舞人心的。


For example, new rules for foreign banks operating in the US essentially require them to fund themselves with as much equity as US banks.	比如，关于外资银行在美经营的新规则实际上要求它们与美资银行拥有同样多的股本。


But, on the eve of a new presidential campaign, the struggle over this important precinct of the American state remains far from over.	但是，在新总统竞选即将开始之际，对于这一美国重要票仓的战争还远未结束。


With the exception of the United Kingdom, the extreme free-market view gained less traction in Europe in recent decades than it did in the US; nonetheless, the challenge of implementing financial reforms in the eurozone is actually more difficult.	除了英国，近几十年来极端自由市场观点在欧洲的支持度都不如美国； 尽管如此，在欧元区实施金融改革的挑战其实更加艰巨。


Governments regard domestic banks as important buyers of sovereign debt.	政府把本国银行视为主权债务的重要买家。


The banks argue that more effective regulation would limit credit and slow the pace of economic recovery.	银行则指出有效的监管会限制信用、减慢经济复苏的速度。


As a result, the authorities in Germany and France (as well as Japan) have consistently resisted increasing capital requirements, despite widespread agreement that doing so is an essential part of effective re-regulation.	结果，德国和法国（还有日本）当局一致反对增加资本要求的做法，尽管人们早已形成了广泛一致，这样做是有效再监管的关键部分。


Their opposition has undermined international efforts to build a more resilient system – and it will likely hamper efforts to put the European economy on a sounder footing.	它们的反对有损于建设恢复力更强的体系的国际措施，也有可能不利于巩固欧洲经济基础的措施。


In other words, key European states remain just as captured by financial interests as the American state ever was.	换句话说，重要欧洲国家仍与美国一样被金融利益所俘虏。


And the big American banks now want to use the slow pace of change in Europe as a brake on US policy (for example, through the ongoing free-trade negotiations between the European Union and the US).	而美国大银行现在则向利用欧洲节奏缓慢的变化来给美国的政策刹车（比如，通过欧盟与美国之间正在进行中的自由贸易谈判）。


If the US is to escape the consequences of government capture by big Wall Street banks, it cannot wait for Europe to catch up on regulation, including capital requirements.	如果美国要想摆脱政府被华尔街大银行俘虏所造成的后果，就不能坐等欧洲监管（包括资本要求）自己赶上来。


Taking Systemic Risk Seriously	认真对待系统性风险


WASHINGTON, DC – There are two leading views about the world’s financial system.	华盛顿—关于世界金融体系，有两种主导观点。


The first, heard mostly from executives at leading global banks and their allies, is that the system is safer than it has ever been.	第一种观点大多来自全球大银行及其阵营的高管，认为世界金融体系比以往任何时候都更加安全。


According to this view, the events that led up to the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 cannot happen again; the reform process has succeeded.	根据这一观点，导致2008年爆发的全球金融危机的事件永远不会再发生了； 改革进程已经取得了成功。


By contrast, a growing group of current and former officials continues to express concern about current and potential future risks in the United States, Europe, and globally.	相反，越来越多的现任和前任官员继续表示对存在于美国、欧洲和全球的当前及潜在未来风险的担忧。


US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew made such an argument in a recent congressional testimony, in the context of explaining why the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) should be allowed to consider whether any kind of firm or activity could pose a risk to the broader system.	美国财政部长杰克·卢（Jack Lew）在最近的国会听证中表示了这一担忧，并解释了为何应该让金融稳定监督委员会（Financial Stability Oversight Council，简称SFOC）考虑某个企业或某种活动是否可能给整个体系造成风险。


And a striking new voice has joined the fray – Kara Stein, a commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).	而一个新的声音也加入了战团——证券和交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission，简称SEC）主席卡拉·斯坦（Kara Stein）。


Stein delivered a far-reaching speech in June, in which she argued that systemic risk must become a more central responsibility for financial-market regulators.	斯坦在6月做了一次意义深刻的讲话，在讲话中，她指出系统风险必须成为金融市场监管者更加核心的责任。


Systemic risk refers to problems that spill across different kinds of firms and markets, often in unexpected ways and sometimes very quickly.	系统风险是指影响到所有不同种类企业和市场的问题，通常以出人意料的方式爆发，且爆发速度可能非常迅速。


Perhaps the most prominent example from 2008 is the way that the failure of the investment bank Lehman Brothers risked brining about the imminent collapse of the insurer AIG, while also leading to intense pressure on money-market mutual funds.	自2008年以来，这方面最显著的例子也许是投资银行雷曼兄弟公司的倒闭几乎导致保险商AIG的立刻随之崩溃，还给货币市场共同基金造成了巨大压力。


Jeremy Stein (no relation to Kara Stein), until recently a governor of the US Federal Reserve System, has suggested that forced “fire sales” of assets are one important way that risks are transmitted.	刚刚卸任的美联储官员杰里米·斯坦（Jeremy Stein，与卡拉·斯坦没有关系）指出，被迫的“紧急甩卖”资产行为是风险传播的重要方式。


When asset prices fall as a result of such selling, the solvency of other firms can be affected – even if the creditworthiness of the underlying asset has not really changed.	若资产价格因紧急甩卖而下跌，其他企业的偿债能力就会受到影响——即便基础资产的信誉实际并未发生变化。


Bank regulators are starting to take these issues more seriously – an encouraging change from the 1990s and early 2000s, when the Fed was among the cheerleaders for unfettered financial innovation, without adequate consideration for systemic risk.	银行监管者正在开始更加认真地对待这些问题——这是自20世纪90年代和21世纪初以来令人鼓舞的变化，此前的美联储和其他金融监管机构都鼓吹自由金融创新，没有充分考虑到系统风险。


But securities regulators also need to start thinking along the same lines – and this is where Kara Stein wants them to go.	但证券监管者也需要开始考虑同样的问题——这也是卡拉·斯坦希望它们做的。


For example, the SEC has traditionally thought about adequate equity capital in a regulated business, primarily as the amount needed to help compensate customers in the event that individual firms fail.	比如，传统上SEC监督受监管企业的股本充足度，主要是指当个别企业倒闭时补偿客户所需要的资金数目。


But it would be much better, as Stein suggests, to think about equity capital from a systemic perspective – that is, how much loss-absorption is needed to prevent some form of a cascading confidence crisis.	但斯坦指出，一个好得多的做法是从系统角度看待股本——即需要多少损失吸收资金防止某种形式的信心危机爆发。


Similarly, regulators should start to think about how and when the structure of particular financial transactions creates a potential systemic risk.	类似地，监管者应该开始考虑特定金融交易的结构如何和何时会造成潜在系统风险。


For example, short-term funding markets involve the supposedly safe business of borrowing against the collateral of tradable securities, which is a mainstay of how broker-dealers finance themselves.	比如，短期资金市场包含以可交易证券为抵押的借贷��为，这种借贷理应是安全的，也是经纪自营商自我融资的主要方式。


Unfortunately, as we discovered during the financial crisis, such markets can become less liquid or even dry up completely when lenders start to fear unforeseen problems, either with borrowers or with the assets that they pledge as collateral.	不幸的是，正如我们在金融危机期间所发现的，如果贷款人开始担心未预见问题——不管这些问题来自借款人还是来自充当抵押品的资产——这一市场可能会减少甚至完全丧失流动性。


The systemic risks in this case do not necessarily lie with an individual firm; rather, the issue is the way in which a particular market has come to operate.	这种情形下，系统风险并不一定来自个别企业； 相反，问题在于特定市场如何操作。


Stein has some detailed and credible ideas about how to make such operations less risky for the system as a whole.	斯坦提出了一些关于如何降低操作对整个体系的风险的详细而可信的观点。


More broadly, however, her point is that we need the FSOC to be able to do its job – to look for and assess all kinds of potential systemic risks.	但是，更广泛地说，她提出的要点正是我们需要FSOC能做到的——寻找并评估所有潜在系统风险。


This needs to be done as a technical matter, not as part of the political process.	这需要作为技术问题而不是政治过程的一部分来处理。


Not everyone at the SEC is as sensible as Stein.	并非所有SEC官员都像斯坦那样明智。


There is also some friction among the various regulators in the US, and we surely need more coordination across national borders – including with Europe.	美国各监管机构兼也存在一些摩擦，并且我们显然需要更多跨国合作——包括与欧洲的合作。


But the real danger is that powerful lobbies, working through members of Congress, are pushing back hard against the FSOC and its mandate.	但真正的危险在于权势游说集团，他们能买通国会议员，对FSOC及其权力形成严重阻挠。


No one likes scrutiny, of course.	当然，没人喜欢检查。


And everyone in the asset-management industry seems to fear being put under the Fed’s microscope, which is what happens if the FSOC determines that a business is systemically important.	所有资产管理从业者都害怕被置于美联储的显微镜之下，而若FSOC认为某企业具有系统重要性，它就会得到这一“待遇”。


The nature of externalities means that financial firms do not care about the costs that they may create for others.	外部性的性质决定了金融企业不会关心它们给其他人造成的成本。


Big and small firms can create a wide variety of externalities, and these have to be examined carefully and dispassionately – exactly as Stein is recommending.	大企业和小企业可以造成各种各样的外部性，而这些外部性必须冷静仔细地予以考察——这也正是斯坦的建议。


And yet, though assessing systemic risk is a technical matter, there is ultimately and inevitably a political question.	但是，尽管评估系统风险是一个技术问题，但说到底它难免是一个政治问题。


The FSOC can figure out where the risks are lurking, but will it be allowed to do its job?	FSOC可以找到风险潜伏在哪里，但它能获得处理风险的权力吗？


If not, when the next crisis comes, those who opposed the FSOC’s proper functioning will bear the lion’s share of the responsibility.	若否，当下一场危机爆发时，反对FSOC正常行使权力的人就是罪魁祸首。


Two Views of Finance	两种金融观


WASHINGTON, DC – The International Monetary Fund’s annual meetings will be held on October 10-12 in Washington DC, and the world’s financial sector is a central item on the agenda.	华盛顿—10月10—12日，国际货币基金组织（IMF）年会将在华盛顿举行，世界金融业将是此次年会的一个核心议题。


That will make for an interesting meeting, because two diametrically opposed views of the global financial system will face off against each other.	这意味着此次年会将是一次有趣的会议，因为两种截然相反的全球金融系统观念将针锋相对。


The first view is that “we have done a lot” since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008.	第一种观念是，我们自2008年全球金融危机爆发以来“已经做了很多”。


According to this view, which is put forward on a regular basis by some US Treasury officials and their European counterparts, there may be a bit more to do in terms of implementing reforms, but our banks and other financial firms have already become much safer.	某些美国和欧洲财政部官员时不时宣扬这一观念，认为在实施改革方面或许还有很多可以做，但我们的银行和金融企业已经比以前安全了很多。


The crisis of 2008 cannot soon be repeated.	2008年危机不会很快重现。


The second view is that we are a long way from completing the far-reaching changes that we need.	第二种观念是，我们距离完成我们所需要的深远变化还相去甚远。


Even worse, on at least one key point, the very language used among policymakers and leading journalists to describe finance is badly broken.	更糟糕的是，至少在一个关键点上，决策者和著名记者描述金融状况的用词大相径庭。


The issues are complex and nuances abound, but much of what divides the two sides in this debate comes down to this: Is it acceptable to say that banks “hold” capital?	问题很复杂，充满了微妙的方面，但在这场争论中，双方的分歧主要可以归结为，可以接受银行“持有”（hold）资本的说法吗？


This is an expression used with great regularity among top finance reporters (though not, for example, by Bloomberg/BusinessWeek, which has long been much more careful on this point).	这是顶尖财经记者（也有例外，比如彭博社/《新闻周刊》（BusinessWeek），它们在这一点上向来谨慎得多）经常使用的说法。


“Banks will need to hold more capital” is a common refrain, describing efforts by regulators – and, in the United States, some legislators – to require that financial institutions fund themselves with relatively more equity and less debt.	“银行需要持有更多资本”已成为老生常谈，被用于描述监管者——在美国，也包括一些立法者——要求金融机构用相对更多的股本和更少的债务为自己融资。


Using “hold” in this way is both completely conventional and deeply misleading.	这样使用“持有”一词完全是一种习惯，并且具有深刻的误导性。


In any other common English language usage, “hold” is an active verb or a noun with a similar connotation.	在其他常用英语应用中，“hold”是一个主动动词兼同义名词。


You hold a baby in your arms.	你用手臂hold婴儿。


Please hold on tight to this rope.	请紧紧地hold这根绳子。


He had a strong hold over his colleagues.	他对同事有牢固的hold力。


This matters, because “holding” capital has become a disguised or implicit metaphor.	这很重要，因为“持有”资本已经变为一个伪装或隐含的隐喻。


The implication is that banks are being asked to sequester part of the asset side of their balance sheets – and this naturally leads to the perception that somehow “less is available” to lend, for example, to the real (non-financial) economy.	其影响是银行被要求将资产负债表资产端的一部分扣除——而这自然会导致一些“更少资源可用”于（比如）实体（非金融）经济贷款。


I encounter this view frequently, even in sophisticated circles – for example, on Capitol Hill.	我经常遇到这一观念，即使是在国会山这样的高端圈子中也是如此。


But this interpretation is a complete – and sometimes deliberate – misunderstanding of bank capital and the policies being pursued.	但这一解读完全是对银行资本以及目前所追求的政策的误解，有时这是有意为之。


(Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig have pointed out that there are many misperceptions in this area; but, of these, misconstruing capital is surely the most fundamental.)	（阿纳特·阿德马提（Anat Admati）和马丁·霍尔韦格（Martin Hellwig）指出，在这方面有大量误解； 但是，对资本的误解绝对是其中最根本性的。


Capital, in this context, is simply a synonym for equity, which is on the liability side of a bank’s (or anyone’s) balance sheet.	在这一语境中，资本完全是股本的同义词，而股本位于银行（或其他任何企业）资产负债表的负债端。


It refers to how a bank (or other firm) finances its activities, not to how it uses the funds that it has available.	它是指银行（或其他企业）如何为其活动融资，而不是指如何使用能获得的资金。


Higher capital requirements mean, in essence, more equity funding and – by implication, under any sensible definition – relatively less debt for a given balance-sheet size.	本质上说，提高资本要求意味着更多的股本融资以及——根据任何合理定义都可以推断——给定资产负债表规模情况下相对较少的债务。


This is an attractive and sensible policy, because today’s global banks have relatively small slivers of equity underpinning their operations.	��是一项颇有吸引力和明智的政策，因为今天的全球银行用于支持经营活动的股本相对较少。


The best comparable measures of bank capital are those found in the Global Capital Index produced by Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.	银行资本的最佳可比指标是联邦存款保险公司副主席托马斯·霍尼格（Thomas Hoenig）的全球资本指数（Global Capital Index）。


Hoenig looks at how much equity banks have in the simplest and most transparent measure (also known as leverage).	霍尼格着眼于以最简单、最透明的指标（也称为杠杆）看，银行拥有多少股本。


Six years after the world’s largest financial crisis, our megabanks have equity amounting to no more than 5% of their balance sheets.	世界最大金融危机爆发六年后，我们的巨型银行所拥有的股本不超过资产负债表的5%。


(In fact, some banks have not much more than 3% equity.)	（事实上，一些银行的股本比3%高不了多少。


That means that 95% of their operations are financed by debt – and thus that only a small negative shock would be needed to push them toward insolvency.	）这意味着它们的经营活动有95%是靠债务融资的——因此，只要略有负面冲击就能让它们资不抵债。


Many measures are still needed to address this vulnerability, including the formalization of international cooperation to handle failing financial firms.	仍需要大量措施解决这一弱点，包括将处理倒闭金融企业的国际合作正式化等。


We need these firms to be able to fail without causing a global panic.	我们需要这些企业能够倒闭而不引起全球恐慌。


They should prepare meaningful “living wills,” to show how this will be possible; in fact, such plans are a requirement – still unimplemented – of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reforms in the US.	它们应该准备好有意义的“生前遗嘱”以表明此可能性； 事实上，2010年美国多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革就包括了对这一计划的要求，但从未实施。


But there is a much simpler step that would make a big difference: A senior policymaker, such as a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or the president of the New York Fed, should make a speech that explains clearly what bank capital is (and what it is not).	但只需要简单得多的步骤就可以带来大不同：高级决策者，比如美联储理事会成员或纽约联邦储备银行行长，应该发表讲话解释清楚什么是银行资本（以及什么不是银行资本）。


Journalists who ignore the guidance on terminology in this speech should be called – in private – by the Fed.	无视该讲话的术语解释的记者应该由美联储（私下）谈话。


The Fed devotes considerable effort to ensuring that the public understands its monetary policy; officials should devote similar effort to communicating regulatory policy precisely.	美联储花大力气确保公众理解其货币政策； 官员应该花同样大的力气精确传达监管政策。


And Hoenig’s index should be picked up and publicized by a major organization, such as the IMF.	而霍尼格的指数应该由大机构（如IMF）接手并负责发布。


We need not only more precise use of language, but also timely and accurate measurement of banks’ capital levels.	我们不但需要更准确的用语，也需要及时而准确的银行资本水平指标。


Washington Recaptured	华盛顿再次沦陷


WASHINGTON, DC – Two hundred years ago, Washington DC was captured by the British – who then proceeded to set fire to official buildings, including the White House, Treasury Department, and Congress.	华盛顿—两百年前，华盛顿被英国人攻陷，入城的英国人随后放火烧了包括白宫、财政部和国会在内的公共建筑。


Today, it is a domestic interest group – very large banks – that has captured Washington.	如今，一个国内利益集团——大银行——又攻陷了华盛顿。


The costs are likely to be far higher than they were in 1814.	这次的代价可能比1814年高得多。


America’s largest bank holding companies receive an implicit government subsidy, because they are perceived to be “too big to fail.”	美国最大的银行控股公司接受着政府的隐性补贴，因为它们被认为是“太大而不能倒”。


The authorities will not allow the biggest banks to default on their debts, through bankruptcy or in any other fashion, owing to the need to prevent the financial system from collapsing.	当局不会允许最大银行通过破产或其他任何形式发生债务违约，这是防止金融系统崩溃的需要。


This doctrine became starkly apparent in late 2008 and early 2009; it remains in force today.	这一思想在2008年末到2009年初表露无遗； 今天仍有很大的力量。


This effective exemption from the risk of bankruptcy means that anyone who lends to the largest half-dozen banks receives a government guarantee – free insurance against the risk of a catastrophe.	事实打消了破产风险意味着任何贷款给最大的几家银行的贷款人可以获得政府担保——相当于免费的灾难风险保险。


This allows these banks to obtain more debt financing on better terms (from their perspective).	这意味着这些银行可以以更有利的条件（从它们的角度）获得更多的债务融资。


In particular, their executives operate highly opaque firms, with risks effectively masked from outsiders and very little in the way of loss-absorbing shareholder equity.	特别是，它们的高管经营着高度不透明的企业，外部人士几乎无从了解其中的风险，也几乎没有可以吸收损失的股本。


Simply put, without their government backstop, these murky empires could not exist.	简言之，没有政府支持，这些黑暗帝国根本不可能存在。


Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Republican Senator David Vitter of Louisiana, along with some important colleagues, have long sought to phase out this implicit subsidy.	俄亥俄州民主党参议员谢罗德·布朗（Sherrod Brown）和路易斯安那州共和党参议员大卫·维特（David Vitter）与其他重要同事一道，长期以来一直在寻求取消这一隐性补贴。


And independent analysts, such as Anat Admati of Stanford University, have explained all of the relevant details of how – and why – this should be done. Those details – for example, in Admati’s recent testimony to the Senate subcommittee chaired by Brown – are not in doubt.	而斯坦福大学的阿纳特·阿德马提（Anat Admati）等独立分析家业解释了关于应该如何——以及为何——实现这一目标的所有相关细节。


Thanks to Admati and her colleagues, we have a clear rendering of them in straightforward, non-technical language.	感谢阿德马提和她的同事们，我们可以通过直观的非专业用语清楚地了解这些问题。


Unfortunately, the leading federal government officials remain in denial.	不幸的是，联邦政府高官拒绝承认问题。


The most spectacular recent example of this is a report issued this summer by the Government Accountability Office.	最显著的例子是今年夏天政府审计办公室所发布的一份报告。


The GAO had a simple task: At the request of Brown and Vitter, it was charged with assessing the scale and impact of the implicit guarantees provided by the government to large bank holding companies.	审计办公室的任务很简单：在布朗和维特的要求下，它不得不对政府给予大型银行控股公司的隐性担保的规模和影响做一个评估。


The GAO responded by producing a deeply muddled report that followed the financial industry’s suggestion of focusing almost exclusively on the difference in bond spreads (interest rates on various forms of financing) between the largest banks and some of their competitors.	审计办公室给出了一份相当模棱两可的报告，在金融业的建议下，该报告几乎完全集中在最大银行和它们的某些竞争对手之间的债券利差（不同融资形式的利息）差别上。


Such spreads are only a small component of the funding advantage for big banks, and they are also highly cyclical – meaning that the advantage for the biggest banks manifests itself the most when markets are under pressure, as they were in the fall of 2008.	这一利差只不过是大银行融资优势的一小部分，也具有高度周期性——这意味着最大银行的优势在市场承压时表现得最为明显，比如2008年秋天的时候。


The GAO concluded that these spreads had indeed been high in 2008, and that now they have fallen.	审计办公室认为，这些利差在2008年确实很高，但现在已经回落。


But, as Admati pointed out in her testimony, if the authors had included 2006 and earlier years in their analysis, they would have seen low spreads using their own methodology – despite the obvious fact that massive implicit subsidies were already in place.	但是，正如阿德马提在他的��词中所指出的，如果作者将2006年及其以前的年份纳入分析，那么同样的方法将产生很低的利差——尽管大规模隐性补贴已经成为显而易见的事实。


All that the GAO established is that the macroeconomy was previously in bad shape and it is now doing somewhat better – hardly a profound finding.	审计办公室的全部结论是，先前宏观经济不景气，而如今情况有所好转——这显然不是什么意义重大的发现。


The GAO report also refers to the Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010, including the requirement that large bank holding companies create “living wills.”	审计办公室的报告和提及了2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革，包括其中对大银行控股公司建立“生前遗嘱”的要求。


The industry contends that the existence of these living wills – showing how a big bank’s collapse could be handled without causing global financial panic – means that “too big to fail” is over.	金融业的主张是，这些生前遗嘱的存在表明一家大银行的倒闭可以有序处理而不会引起全球金融恐慌，因此意味着“太大而不能倒”已经成为过去。


Sadly for the GAO, shortly after their report appeared, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rejected the most recent living wills as completely inadequate – meaning that there is still no road map for handling the failure of a very large bank.	审计办公室真是不幸，在报告发布后不久，美联储和联邦储蓄保险公司就认为最新的生前遗嘱完全不够充分，予以拒绝——这意味着处理超大银行倒闭仍没有路线图可以遵循。


Either such a firm would be allowed to fail, with dire consequences for global finance, or there would be some sort of backdoor bailout.	要么这类企业将允许倒闭并掀起全球金融的恶性后果，要么给予其后门援助。


The GAO’s failure to see and state this problem clearly is a major disappointment.	审计办公室没能清楚地看清和表述问题，这着实令人失望。


As FDIC Vice Chairman Tom Hoenig put it, “Despite the thousands of pages of material these firms submitted, the plans provide no credible or clear path through bankruptcy that doesn’t require unrealistic assumptions and direct or indirect public support.”	联邦存款保险公司副主席汤姆·霍尼格（Tom Hoenig）指出，“尽管这些企业递交了几千页材料，但它们的计划并没有提供不需要直接或间接公共支持和不现实假设的可信而明确的破产办法。 ”


To be fair, the GAO is not the only part of official Washington seemingly beguiled by large banks.	平心而论，审计办公室决非唯一一个被大银行诱骗的华盛顿机构。


While the Fed now recognizes that living wills are inadequate, it has taken an extraordinarily long time to reach this rather obvious conclusion – and the Fed’s Board of Governors is still dragging its feet on forcing the banks to simplify their operations.	尽管美联储现在认为生前遗嘱不够充分，但在此之前它花了极其漫长的时间才形成了这一相当明显的结论——而美联储董事会在强迫银行简化经营方面仍然停滞不前。


American forces performed disastrously at the Battle of Bladensburg in August 1814, allowing the British to capture and burn the capital.	在1814年8月的布兰登斯堡战役（Battle of Bladensburg）中，美军的表现是一场灾难，导致首都被英国人攻陷并焚毁。


Two hundred years later, we may well be witnessing that battle’s intellectual and policymaking analogue.	两百年后，我们极有可能经历思维和决策战线上的布兰登斯堡战役。


How to Become an Oligarch	怎样成为寡头


WASHINGTON, DC – Let’s say that you would like to become one of the richest people on the planet, someone with enormous wealth and access to the top rung of political power.	华盛顿—不妨假设你很想变成世界上最富有的人之一，拥有数不尽的财富，并且接近政治权力之巅。


This is not an unreasonable aspiration for any fresh college graduate in today’s winner-take-all economies.	在今天的赢家通吃经济中，这绝不是大学毕业新生不切实际的渴望。


But how realistic is it?	但它又具有多大的现实性？


You could have a good idea for a new technology with potentially widespread demand.	你可能有一个关于新技术的好主意，这一新技术拥有广袤的潜在需求。


With the right credentials and some luck, you could attract investment from a venture-capital fund.	拥有正确的资质和一些运气，你就能吸引到风险资本的投资。


Many such ventures do not pan out; but – particularly in the United States – such equity-financed rapid-growth companies are strongly encouraged.	许多这样的冒险都会以失败告终； 但是——特别是在美国——这些股权融资的快速成长公司备受推崇。


Or you could issue a lot of debt.	或者你可以发行大量债务。


This might seem like a strange idea in the immediate aftermath of a major debt-fueled financial crisis, and with many homeowners still underwater on their mortgages (they owe more than the house is worth, even if they can still afford the monthly payments).	这在刚刚度过一场受债务助长的金融大危机、许多屋主的按揭仍处于资不抵债状态（他们所欠债务比房屋价值还要大，即便他们仍在承担月供）的时候看上去有些奇怪。


In any case, to the extent that any recent American graduate thinks about debt, it is in the context of paying student loans.	无论如何，就新晋美国毕业生对债务的看法而言，你必须置身于偿还学生贷款的背景看待这一问题。


But a new book, Private Equity at Work, by Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt, explains exactly how a few people have become immensely rich through the shrewd strategic use of debt.	但艾琳·阿贝尔鲍姆（Eileen Appelbaum）和罗斯玛丽·巴特（Rosemary Batt）新书《私募股权揭秘》（Private Equity at Work）详细解释了一小撮人如何通过巧妙的债务战略一夜暴富。


The authors present a broad, detailed, and fair assessment of private equity – the business of investing in established companies through debt-financed purchases of controlling stakes.	两位作者对私募股权做了广泛、细致而公正的评价。 私募股权是通过债务融资收购控股股份投资老牌公司的生意。


(By contrast, venture capitalists support start-ups almost entirely through equity.)	（相反，风险资本家几乎完全以股权投资形式支持创业企业。


And Appelbaum and Batt are careful to point out that many private-equity firms bring better management or other efficiency improvements to their portfolio companies.	）阿贝尔鲍姆和巴特小心地指出，许多私募股权公司为其投资组合中的公司带来了更好的管理和其他效率改进。


But some of the largest funds – in fact, most of the brand names in the industry – use the clever trick of securing the debt they issue with collateral owned by the company they buy.	但一些最大的私募股权基金——事实上，可以说业内大牌都是如此——使用了非常聪明的招数，它们用所收购公司拥有的抵押品确保它们所发行的债务。


This is a little bit like buying a house.	这有点像买房子。


A bank or mortgage originator lends you a large amount of money, which is secured by the house as collateral.	银行或按揭供应商借给你一大笔钱，这笔钱有房产作为抵押提供担保。


In other words, if you fail to make your payments on time, the lender can foreclose on the loan and take possession of the property – as millions of homeowners have experienced in the last decade.	换句话说，如果你不能及时偿还按揭款，贷款人可以取消你的贷款偿还权并收走你的房子——过去十年有几百万屋主有过这种经验。


And yet there is a major difference between how private equity operates and how a family buys a home.	但私募股权的操作手法和家庭买房之间有一个重大差别。


Only a small part of the equity ownership acquired by any private equity fund comes from money provided by the partners who found and operate the fund.	任何一家私募股权基金，其收购的股权中只有一小部分来自创建和经营基金的合伙人所提供的资金。


Most of it is raised from outside investors.	大部分资金从外部投资者那里募集来的。


(This would be like a family financing its down payment not from its own savings but from distant relatives about whom the family cares little.)	（这就好比是家庭买房的首付不是自己的储蓄，而是来自于这户人家不太想干的远房亲戚。 ）


The fee structure in this overall arrangement is such that the people running the private-equity fund want to have as much debt as possible; this will increase the way upside returns are calculated, which in turn is the main driver of the compensation that the controlling “general” partners can receive.	这一整体安排的费用结构决定了私募股权基金经营者希望尽可能多地筹钱； 这能提升盈利回报的方式，而这反过来又是控股“普通”合伙人薪酬的主要来源。


More debt, of course, also means more risk; but this is not a sector focused primarily on risk-adjusted returns.	当然，更多的债务也意味着更大的风险； 但私募股权并不是以风险调整回报为主要核心的行业。


If the company cannot make its interest payments, its assets will need to be sold or its activities otherwise scaled back.	如果公司无法偿付利息，其资产就需要甩卖，或者被迫收缩其活动。


But, in contrast to the case of the struggling homeowner, not much of those downside costs typically fall on the general partner.	但是，与苦苦挣扎的屋主遇到的情况相反，这些亏损成本中并没有多少会落到普通合伙人头上。


In addition, there are various other fees – charged to portfolio companies and to investors – that further encourage high levels of debt.	此外，各种其他费用——针对资产组合公司和投资者收取——进一步鼓励了高水平负债。


The US tax code allows interest payments to be deducted as a business expense; there is no equivalent allowance for payments to equity investors.	美国税法允许将利息偿付作为业务费用扣除； 而向股权投资者的支付享受不到这一待遇。


Appelbaum and Batt document in impressive detail the way in which top-tier private-equity funds have been able to earn high returns and ultimately enormous wealth for their founders, while not necessarily helping the companies in which they invest.	阿贝尔鲍姆和巴特令人印象深刻地相信披露了顶级私募股权基金如何��够赚取高回报并最终为创始人带来巨大的财富，而未必对它们所投资的公司起到了助益作用。


Interestingly, when returns are measured properly, the outside “limited” partners in private equity – including pension funds, insurance companies, and university endowments – also do not necessarily do so well.	有趣的是，以合适的手段衡量回报你会发现，私募股权的外部“有限”合伙人——包括养老基金、保险公司和大学捐赠基金——表现未必好。


However, before graduates flock to private equity, they should know that only the very big funds can use debt to skew returns for insiders in this way, primarily because only they can raise the capital needed to buy well-established companies that are rich in fixed assets, and thus in potential collateral.	但是，在毕业生一窝蜂地涌向私募股权之前，他们应该知道，只有非常大的基金才能用这种方式通过债务为内部人士创造回报，主要原因是只有它们能够不筹集到收购拥有大量固定资产（也是潜在抵押品）的老牌公司所需的资本。


Smaller private-equity funds typically buy into younger, smaller companies without such fixed assets, and the leverage in those deals is commensurately less.	较小的私募股权资金通常只能买入较年轻、规模较小、没有如此多固定资产的公司，而这些交易中的杠杆相应地也会较低。


Regulators have recently woken up to the incentives for excessive leverage in this sector – and to the risks that such leverage poses to lenders and the broader economy.	监管者最近开始警觉该行业过度使用杠杆的激励——也意识到了如此大的杠杆对贷款人和整体经济的风险。


Not surprisingly, big private-equity firms seem determined to ignore or otherwise circumvent new restrictions.	毫不奇怪，大私募股权公司似乎决定忽视或绕过新限制。


As the policy debate on this issue heats up, one hopes that all participants will become better informed by reading Private Equity At Work.	随着围绕这一问题的政策争论的升温，我们希望所有参与者都能读一读《私募股权揭秘》以获得更好的了解。


If the new graduate in your life has the connections to join a very large brand-name private-equity fund, the path to immense wealth, political influence, or even power becomes much clearer.	如果你认识的新晋毕业生有关系可以进入大型知名私募股权基金，那么通往一夜暴富、政治影响力甚至权力的路径就变得更加清晰了。


Without such initial connections, however, it is very unlikely that he or she will become an oligarch.	但是，没有这些初始关系，他就不太可能成为寡头。


But you knew that already.	但这一点你早就已经知道了。


Big Banks’ Shadow Dance	大银行的影子之舞


WASHINGTON, DC – One of the great myths propagated by very large financial institutions is that, if they were to become effectively regulated again, many investors and financial transactions would flee to “shadow banks.”	华盛顿—巨型金融机构所宣传的一大传说是，如果它们再一次被有效地监管，许多投资者和金融交易将流向“影子银行”。


That sounds bad.	这听起来十分糟糕。


Anything that lurks in shadows must have nasty intent, potentially dangerous consequences, or both.	潜伏在影子中的东西要么见不得人，要么会造成危险后果，要么兼而有之。


And its very shadowiness implies that nothing can be done about it – whatever is there must be beyond the reach of regulation or effective supervision.	而正是“影子”这一特性决定了你无法对它做些什么——不管影子中有什么，一定超出了监管和有效监督的范围。


So perhaps financial-system risk would increase, not decrease, if we regulated very large non-shadow banks properly.	因此，如果我们对巨型非影子银行实施合理的监管，金融系统风险会上升而不是下降。


So much for scary fairytales.	这中危言耸听我们已经耳熟能详了。


In reality, there are three kinds of “shadow��� activities, all of which are obvious, operate in plain sight, and could be controlled in a straightforward and responsible fashion.	在现实中，有三种“影子”行为，它们都一目了然、明目张胆，可以用直截了当又可靠的形式予以控制。


Whether we have the political will to implement effective controls is, as always, another question – in large part because the big banks are very powerful and they would like the shadows to remain as shadowy as they are now.	我们是否有政治意愿实施有效控制则是——永远都是这样——另一个问题，很大程度上，这是因为大银行很有权力，并且它们希望影子永不变。


The first set of shadow activities includes those conducted by the banks themselves, for example, as a way to reduce the amount of equity funding that they need.	第一种影子行为是银行本身做出的行为，比如减少它们需要的股权融资数量的伎俩。


The people who run big banks like leverage: More borrowed money (and less of their own) means that they get more upside, in the sense of a higher return on capital, unadjusted for risk.	大银行的经营者喜欢杠杆：借钱越多（自己所有的越少）意味着他们更能占上手，即获得更高的不经风险调整的资本回报。


When things go against them, it also means more losses.	当形势不利于他们时，这也意味着损失更多。


But that is why it is good to be big – you can get more downside protection from the Federal Reserve or other official sources.	但做大的妙处就在这里——你可以从美联储或其他官方资源哪里得到更多的损失保护。


For example, Citigroup created so-called “special-purpose vehicles” to invest in mortgage-related securities prior to 2007.	比如，2007年之前，花旗集团创造了所谓的“特殊目的实体”（special-purpose vehicle）来投资按揭相关证券。


They funded this activity with a lot of short-term debt and a wafer-thin cushion of equity.	他们的这类活动的资金来自大量短期负债和极薄的股本缓冲。


When the market boomed, such schemes’ authors were heralded as geniuses.	当市场繁荣时，这一机制的始作俑者被称为天才。


But when house prices fell and mortgage-backed securities (and derivatives based on them) became illiquid, Citigroup took the liabilities back onto its balance sheet – and then needed to be rescued through massive, repeated bailouts.	但当房价开始下跌、按揭支持证券（以及以此为基础的衍生品）失去流动性时，花旗集团又将负债挪回到资产负债表上——于是需要反复的大手笔援助。


These shadow activities were the work of Citigroup and other large complex financial institutions that are subject to regulation.	这些影子行为是花旗集团和其他作为监管目标的复杂大金融机构的杰作。


Their boom-and-bust character reflected nothing more than the relevant regulators’ failure – or refusal – to understand the risks involved.	它们的泡沫-破裂特征所反映的无他，正是相关监管者没有——或拒绝——理解其中所包含的风险。


The regulators were “captured” – meaning that they identified so closely with the intellectual perspective and worldview of large complex financial institutions that they were persuaded to allow something that was actually very dangerous.	监管者被“俘虏”了——这意味着他们与复杂大金融机构的思维和世界观太接近，以至于被说服放任实际上十分危险的行为大行其道。


Unfortunately, despite all we have been through in the past five years, these big banks’ shadows survive in various forms today – and regulators do not seem sufficiently inclined to turn on the lights.	不幸的是，尽管已经过去了五年时间，但这些大银行的影子至今仍以各种形式存在着——而监管者也似乎并不十分愿意照亮影子。


The second set of shadow activities involves banking-type activities that really are conducted outside banks.	第二类影子行为是实际上在银行之外操作的银行行为。


The most prominent example is money-market mutual funds.	最著名的例子是货币市场共同基金。


These entities take money from investors and buy various kinds of assets, some of which may be risky – like short-maturity corporate debt.	这些实体从投资者手中获得资金，然后购买各种资产，其中一些资产风险很高——比如短期限公司债务。


The problem is that these funds create the impression that anything invested with them is just as safe as a deposit at an insured bank.	问题在于，这些基金给人们的印象是它们所投资的一切东西都和可靠的银行存款一样安全。


You can write checks on a money-market account, and your monthly statement shows it to have a stable value – just like your bank account.	你可以凭货币市场账户开支票，你的月账单表明它价值稳定——与你的银行账户别无二致。


In fact, the value of assets held by such funds fluctuates, and it is only an accounting convention – permitted by regulators – that allows them to report a stable value.	事实上，这些基金所持有的资产的价值是波动的，让它们报告稳定价值的纯粹是会计技巧——而这是监管者所允许的。


As a result, when the possibility arises that a money-market fund will be unable to pay investors in full – as happened after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 – all hell breaks loose.	结果，当货币市场基金可能无法充分偿付投资者的可能性升高时——如2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒闭后——地狱之门就打开了。


There were similar fears recently when it became known that US-based money-market funds had lent heavily to European banks.	最近也出现了类似的恐慌——人们了解到美国货币市场基金大量给欧洲银行贷款。


And some leading US banks also rely on money-market funding; here, too, the “shadows” and the banks have aligned interests.	而一些美国主要银行也依赖于货币市场融资； 在这里，“影子”和银行再一次形成了利益同盟。


There is a simple fix to this problem – require money-market funds to show the actual floating value of their assets, so that everyone understands that it is not a fixed number.	这一问题有一个简单的解决办法——要求货币市场基金披露资产的实际价值波动，从而人人都能了解这并不是一个固定数字。


Some US regulators are pushing in this direction.	一些美国监管者正在朝这一方向推进。


Unfortunately, the money-market funds – and their friends in the big banks – are pushing back hard.	不幸的是，货币市场基金——及其在大银行的朋友们——对此抵制很大。


The third set of shadow activities includes those that may yet emerge.	第三类影子活动或许还有待浮现。


We should not underestimate the creativity of financiers seeking to escape capital requirements and leverage up.	我们不应该低估金融家逃脱资本要求、扩大杠杆的创造力。


A brilliant book by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes, demonstrates the pervasiveness of this problem and highlights its potentially devastating consequences for the economy.	来自阿德马提（Anat Admati）和赫尔维格（Martin Hellwig）的出色著作《银行家的新衣》（The Bankers’ New Clothes）说明了这一问题的普遍性，并强调它对经济具有潜在的灾难性效果。


The right approach is to search for and prevent excessive systemic risk wherever it manifests itself.	正确的做法是找出并除去过度的系统性风险，不管它现身何处。


The US authorities now have a legal mandate to do this.	眼下美国当局有这样做的法定权力。


But will they be able to stand up to the powerful lobby of big banks and their shadowy allies?	但他们能抵挡住大银行的强大游说团和影子盟军吗？


The Importance of Being Boring	无聊的重要性


WASHINGTON, DC – The International Monetary Fund is an immensely useful organization, able to deliver substantial amounts of financial and technical assistance at short notice to almost any place in the world.	华盛顿——国际货币基金是一家极其有用的组织，它能在短时间内为全世界几乎所有国家提供大量的资金和技术援助。


It also has the great advantage of almost always being perceived as incredibly boring.	它还有一个巨大的优势是在外界眼中它无聊到令人难以置信。


Unfortunately for the IMF, it now needs a slightly higher public profile to convince the US Congress to agree to some important reforms.	遗憾的是对于国际货币基金组织而言，它现在需要提升公众形象来说服美国国会批准某些重要的改革。


The Ukrainian crisis may prove helpful, though that appears less likely now – which may be a good thing to the extent that one unintended consequence could be a loan to Ukraine that is larger than it really needs.	乌克兰危机本来或许有所帮助，但现在看来已经不太可能——这也许是件好事，因为一个意想不到的后果或许是对乌克兰贷款超过它真正需要的额度。


In the realm of international economics, being perceived as boring confers power to the extent that it allows major decisions to be made without a great deal of external scrutiny.	在国际经济领域，外界眼中的无聊在无需接受大量外部审核即可自主做出重大决策的意义上其实是一种授权。


From 1918 to 1939, international economic cooperation was hard to come by – in large part because all of the attempted deals were put together at high-profile international conferences.	从1918年到1939年国际经济合作非常罕见——这在很大程度上是因为由引人注目的国际会议统一审核所有的拟定议案。


Following the creation of the IMF in 1944, many of the same decisions became routine, a lot less interesting, and much easier to implement.	1944年国际货币基金组织成立后，其中很多决定失去了曾经的趣味性成了家常便饭，但却大大降低了执行的难度。


The IMF rarely makes front-page headlines in the United States or other big countries, except when there is a racy personal dimension.	除非有什么刺激性的个人新闻，国际货币基金组织很少登上美国或其他大国媒体的头版。


The last time that many read a news story about the Fund may have been when then-Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn was forced out in May 2011, following accusations that he sexually assaulted an employee in a New York hotel.	很多人上次读到国际货币基金的报道或许还是2011年5月时任总裁多米尼克·斯特劳斯卡恩被迫离职，当时有人指责他在纽约一家酒店对一名员工进行性侵犯。


Since then, his successor, Christine Lagarde, has helped to restore the Fund’s reputation – and to return coverage of its programs and activities to newspapers’ dry and unemotional business sections.	自那以后，他的继任者克里斯蒂娜·拉加德逐渐恢复了基金组织的声誉——让对其计划和活动的新闻报道回到了枯燥、不带感情色彩的商务版面。


(When I worked at the IMF in the 2000’s, page-three coverage of our events by leading newspapers was typically viewed as preferable to top billing.)	（2000年代我在基金组织工作期间，著名媒体三版对我们活动的报导通常被认为好过大肆宣传。 ）


Of course, in countries receiving assistance – such as Greece in the last few years – the IMF excites great passion.	当然，在希腊等这几年曾经接受过援助的国家，国际货币基金组织能够激发起极大的热情。


But in the halls of the US Congress, few people pay any attention.	但美国国会却鲜有关注的声音出现。


In the highly charged partisan atmosphere of Washington, DC, this is without question almost always an advantage.	在党派氛围浓郁的华盛顿，这无疑是项有利条件。


Imagine if the disbursement of all assistance to countries in trouble required Congressional approval, let alone spending from the US budget.	试想一下所有对困难国家援助都需要经过国会批准，更不要说从美国预算中出钱。


Nothing good would ever happen – and certainly not for the US.	如果真是这样不可能做成一件好事——但责任当然不会由美国承担。


The IMF is founded on the premise that it represents cooperation between all of the countries of the world.	设立国际货币基金组织的前提是代表全世界���有国家合作。


The reality is that it stands for and operationalizes US power, in cooperation with America’s closest allies.	但现实却是它与美国最亲密的盟友共同代表并行使美国的权力。


Anyone who doubts that should review a recent letter orchestrated by the Bretton Woods Committee, addressed to Congressional leaders on behalf of an impressive array of former Republican and Democratic cabinet secretaries.	如果对此抱有疑问可以查阅不久前一封由布雷顿森林委员会精心起草的信件，这封信以众多知名前共和党及民主党内阁部长的名义写给国会领导人。


The first paragraph reads, “The IMF has always been a valuable tool for advancing US national interests globally.”	开头一段写道，“国际货币基金组织一向是在全球推动美国国家利益的重要工具。 ”


The US does not dictate what happens at the IMF, but it does have a disproportionate influence.	美国虽然并不决定基金组织能做些什么，但它的影响力却非常之大。


Given the Fund’s origins in helping to rebuild Europe after World War II, European countries are also very well represented on its executive board and in terms of ownership shares (and thus voting weight on important decisions).	鉴于基金组织起源于二战后的欧洲重建，欧洲国家在执行董事会及所有权份额（进而在重要决策的投票权重）方面也握有相当的发言权。


One major goal in recent decades has been to shift representation at the IMF somewhat away from Europe and toward the world’s emerging markets.	近十年来的主要目标是在某种程度上减少基金组织与欧洲的联系，而让其更多代表全球的新兴市场。


These countries’ global economic and financial significance has grown rapidly, yet they have relatively little representation at the Fund.	这些国家在全球经济和金融领域的重要性增长迅速，但在基金组织却没有太多的发言权。


A package of reforms has been agreed.	已经批准施行一揽子改革方案。


Like most products of international negotiations, the agreement is not perfect; but it does move the ball forward.	改革协议像国际谈判的大多数产物一样并不完美； 但这无疑是一种进步。


(For the technical details, I recommend a recent paper by Edwin M. Truman, my colleague at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.)	（在技术细节方面，我推荐我在彼得森国际经济研究所同事埃德温·M·杜鲁门近期发表的一篇论文。 ）


These reforms need to be agreed, in legislative form, by the US Congress before they can take effect.	上述改革措施生效前必须在美国国会以立法形式达成一致。


For whatever reason, President Barack Obama’s administration did not push this item hard in 2013 and early 2014 – and the agenda of encouraging further IMF reform has therefore languished.	无论出于何种原因，奥巴马总统政府在2013年和2014年初并没有尽力推动这项议案——鼓励基金组织进一步改革的计划也因此陷入到胶着状态。


The Obama administration proposed to tie IMF reform to the presumably imminent approval by Congress of funding for Ukraine.	奥巴马政府提出同步批准基金组织改革与迫在眉睫的对乌克兰一揽子拨款方案。


This is sensible legislative tactics but not appealing as an economic strategy.	这作为立法策略或许有其道理，但作为经济策略却并不吸引人。


In effect, the administration tried to make the IMF more interesting, particularly to encourage Republicans in the House of Representatives to support the reforms.	事实上，政府力求让基金组织更加有趣，特别是鼓励众议院的共和党人支持改革议案。


The latest indications are that the Republicans will not be so enticed.	最新迹象表明共和党人对此没有兴趣。


But the bigger problem is that Ukraine does not really need a massive loan from the IMF.	但更大的问题是乌克兰并不真正需要基金组织的大规模贷款。


What Ukraine needs is a sharp reduction in corruption, as well as real legitimacy (through the ballot box) for people who want to rein in the influence of oligarchs – a group that has sapped the economy through plunder and incompetence over the past two decades.	乌克兰需要大规模削减腐败及（通过投票）让想要控制寡头影响力的民众真正具有合法性——二十年来寡头集团的无能和巧取豪夺一直阻碍着经济发展。


IMF reform is sensible and should be supported.	我们应当支持基金组织的合理改革。


The Europeans do not need their current level of representation, and the positions and voices of middle- and lower-income countries should be strengthened.	欧洲人不需要那么多话语权，应当强化中低收入国家的地位和话语权。


The Obama administration needs to make this case more directly and forcefully to Congress.	奥巴马政府需要更直接有力地向国会说明情况。


The inherent dullness of the IMF makes that hard.	国际货币基金组织不可避免的无趣性让这项任务变得更加艰难。


Is China a Friend of Africa?	中国是非洲之友吗？


YAOUNDÉ – For many developing countries, foreign direct investment is viewed as something very positive.	发自喀麦隆首都雅温得——对许多发展中国家而言，外国直接投资被视为非常积极正面的东西。


International companies can bring cash, skills, technology, and high ethical standards to a host country.	跨国公司为东道国带来资金、技能，技术以及高道德标准。


But others do not always regard such investors favorably: many stand accused of political meddling, polluting the environment, labor abuses, and other unscrupulous practices.	但也有人认为这些投资者不一定都是善意的：许多投资方被指责干预当地政治，污染环境，压榨劳动力以及进行其他非法活动。


This debate is particularly animated with respect to Chinese investment in Africa – a continent with a long history of political, economic, and commercial exploitation by foreign powers.	作为国外势力在政治，经济以及商业开发上都拥有历史的大陆，针对中国在非洲大陆投资的辩论尤为激烈。


The so-called “neocolonialist school,” popular among China skeptics, considers China’s economic relationship with Africa as essentially imperial.	中国怀疑论者中流行的所谓“新殖民主义流派”认为中国与非洲经济关系的本质是帝国统治。


It is, they claim, focused exclusively on extracting maximum, short-term profit, with little regard for governance standards, let alone host countries’ longer-term development goals.	怀疑论者认为，中国专注于榨取最大的短期利润，很少考虑治理标准，更遑论东道国的长远发展目标。


Others consider the relationship less a matter of exploitation than a simple function of capitalism’s free-market principles, according to which those without a strong negotiating position must accept tough terms.	另一些人认为，这种关系更多的是一个资本主义自由市场原则的简单作用，而不是剥削。 因为根据资本主义自由市场原则，没有强势谈判地位的一方自当忍受严苛的条款。


Still others hold a more benign view: Sino-African relations constitute a partnership, in line with the New Partnership of Africa’s Development, a pan-African organization that seeks to empower African states in their international relations.	还有一些人持有一个更善意的观点：正如“非洲发展新伙伴计划”——一个谋求增强非洲国家国际关系的泛非组织——希望的那样，中非之间形成了合作关系。


Who is right?	那么究竟谁是谁非？


Any assessment must address several common accusations about Sino-African relations.	对此的任何评价都必须解答一些常见的关于中非关系的指控。


The first is that China’s trade-and-aid strategy targets only states with abundant natural resources and weak – and thus easily influenced – governments.	第一种观点认为，中国贸易和援助的战略目标，只针对具有丰富自然资源以及易受操纵的弱势国家。


This assertion does not withstand scrutiny. China supports almost all Sub-Saharan African states (except those that do not accept China’s “One China” policy and continue, for example, to recognize Taiwan as an independent country).	这种说法经不起推敲，因为中国几乎支持了撒哈拉以南所有的非洲国家（除了那些一直不接受“一个中国”政策并长期承认台湾独立的国家）。


Indeed, China is no more interested in the continent’s natural resources than are firms from any developed country.	事实上，中国对非洲大陆自然资源的兴趣并不比任何发达国家企业更多。


Another widespread claim is that Chinese companies prefer to employ their own nationals rather than locals.	另一个普遍的说法是，中国公司更喜欢雇用自己的公民，而不是本地人。


This is a serious accusation, given that one of the big attractions of foreign direct investment is local job creation.	这是一个严重的指控，因为外国直接投资的亮点之一就是为当地创造就业机会。


But Chinese firms say that few local workers have the necessary skills; if they do, African governments can dictate some employment terms, including the proportion of local recruits on a project, as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola have done.	但中国公司说，很少非洲本地人具备必要的技能； 如果他们具备相应的技能，非洲各国政府可以颁布一些就业条款，包括本地员工在项目中的比例，就像刚果民主共和国和安哥拉所做的那样。


Critics have also highlighted the poor living conditions provided for Chinese workers, especially when compared to those offered to Western expatriates.	批评者还强调这些企业为中国工人提供的生活条件很差，尤其是跟它们雇用的西方专家相比。


Again, this seems unfair, as Western employees tend to be hired for senior managerial or technical posts, which are more difficult and more expensive to fill.	这说法似乎也不公允，因为西方的员工往往被聘请高级管理或技术岗位，聘用的难度和成本都更高。


One must also recognize that low labor costs are an essential component of China’s competitive advantage.	但必须承认的是，劳动力成本低是中国竞争优势的一个重要组成部分。


Along with tighter margins, low-cost financing, and cheaper materials, this allows Chinese firms to compete for projects with tenders for as little as half the price sought by their Western competitors.	利润紧缩，融资成本低，材料更便宜，这使得中国企业能在投标中用只有西方竞争对手一半的价格来获得项目。


Skeptics might add that China’s cost advantage also includes circumventing environmental and social regulations.	怀疑论者还会说，中国的成本优势还源自于绕过了环境和社会的相关管理法规。


But this point appears to be based more on anecdotes than serious research.	但这一点似乎更多的是基于传闻而不是认真的研究。


And Western multinationals are hardly immune from charges of such abuses in Africa (often stretching back many years).	并且西方跨国公司也无法避免被指责滥用非洲资源（通常还可以追溯到很多年前）。


Insofar as some Chinese firms do lag behind Western standards, they are becoming increasingly sensitive to foreign criticism and are learning fast.	在某种程度上，一些中国企业确实落后于西方标准，但它们对国外的批评正变得越来越敏感，并且学习得很快。


Finally, there is the argument that Chinese FDI fails to transfer technologies and skills to local businesses – what economists refer to as “positive spillovers.”	最后一种说法就是，中国的对外直接投资没有为当地企业带来技术和技能的转移——经济学家称之为“积极的溢出效应”。


These can occur, for example, by bringing local businesses into supply chains, or by working with local experts on research and development.	通过把当地企业引入到供应链中，或通过与本地专家参与技术研发都能带来这种溢出效应。


Such spillovers require the investor to be closely integrated into the local economy.	这种溢出效应要求投资者紧密融入地方经济。


China’s manufacturing investments, however, are often located in industrial parks or special economic zones (SEZs).	然而，中国制造业的投资通常位于工业园区或特殊经济区（特区）。


Such arrangements protect the investor from an unstable business environment, but they can also cut investors off from indigenous businesses; and when SEZs offer investors special tax breaks, the country is deprived of potential revenues.	这种安排可以让投资者远离不稳定的商业环境，但同时也切断了投资者与本地企业的联系； 并且当经济特区为投资者提供特殊的税收优惠时，国家也损失了潜在的收入。


Five SEZs were established in African markets in 2006, and five more were planned the following year.	非洲在2006年建立了首批5个��济特区，另外5个特区也在2007年建成。


Yet research on the impact of Chinese investment in Africa’s SEZs suggests that ties to local enterprises have been numerous and positive, and that they contribute to broader industrialization of the host economy.	然而，对中国在非洲的经济特区投资影响的研究表明，中国投资者与本地企业的联系已经是数量庞大和积极的，它们有助于推进东道国经济的工业化发展。


Overall, there is little hard evidence to support a malign view of China’s investments in Africa.	总的来说，几乎没有确凿的证据去支持中国在非洲投资带有恶意的观点。


Certainly, more can be done to strengthen institutions and ensure sustainable resource management.	当然，在强化体制以及确保资源可持续管理方面还有很多工作可以做的。