China is also probably unsuited at the moment to play a central role in reforming the global financial and monetary system in 2009 because it has not yet fully liberalized its capital accounts and financial system.	要中国在2009年的全球金融和货币体系改革中发挥核��作用，目前也可能是不适合的，因为它尚未完全放开其资本账户和金融体系。


So Chinese negotiators would rather play a supporting role and let others, both developed and developing countries, take the lead in most issues concerning risk control and regulations.	因此，中国的谈判官员们宁愿发挥辅助的作用，让他国，包括发达国家和发展中国家，在大多数风险控制和监控的问题上起主导作用。


But China is likely to increase its voice on one issue – the US dollar’s status as global reserve currency.	但是，中国很可能在一个问题上会加强它的声音，即作为全球储备货币的美元的地位。


China has been criticized in the past for allegedly manipulating its exchange rate, because it did not revalue its currency as much as the US demanded.	中国过去一直因涉嫌操纵汇率而遭到批评，因为它没有按美国的要求让人民币升值。


So China might like to see, for example, amendments to the IMF mandate or the addition of a “chapter” to the IMF’s working agenda that discipline America’s money supply and debt accumulation.	因此，中国可能会希望看到，例如，修改国际货币基金组织的工作或在国际货币基金组织的工作议程中增设一“章程”，以制约美国的货币供应量和债务积累。


In China’s view, it is not enough merely to require others to accommodate themselves to dollar devaluation.	在中国看来，只要求别人来适应美元的贬值是不够的。


As a developing country with US$ 2,500 per capita income and 35% of its labor force still in agriculture, where workers earn only about $600 per year, China’s domestic problems remain enormous.	作为一个人均收入2500美元和35 ％的劳动力仍从事农业的发展中国家，其工人每年收入只有约600美元，中国国内的问题仍然是巨大的。


Thus, development will continue to be the top priority, including the development of China’s own financial market.	因此，发展将继续是最重要的，包括发展中国自己的金融市场。


The good news is that China recognizes how much it has benefited from the marketization and openness of the past 30 years.	好消息是，中国认识到在过去30年里，它从市场化和开放中所获得的益处是多么地巨大。


There is no turning back on its path toward full involvement in the global market, despite the current crisis.	尽管存在当前的危机，但中国在全面参与全球市场的道路上已没有回头路可走。


Indeed, the real challenge for China in the year ahead will be to find ways to deal with growing global protectionism as the financial crisis and economic recession bite ever deeper in its main foreign markets.	实际上，中国真正的挑战在于，当金融危机和经济衰退在其主要的海外市场不断加深时，明年将找到怎样的方法处理日益严重的全球贸易保护主义的问题。


In online retailing via mobile devices, Alibaba held an 84.2% share of the market last year, with the next largest online retailer, JD.com, capturing just 5.7%.	在移动设备在线零售领域，去年阿里巴巴占据了84. 2%的市场份额，第二大在���零售商京东只获得了5.


China’s Corporate-Debt Challenge	中国的企业债挑战


WASHINGTON, DC – The Chinese economy has slowed in recent years, but it is still a strong performer, contributing about one-third of total economic growth worldwide.	发自华盛顿特区——虽然中国经济在最近几年有所放缓，但相对其他经济体来说仍属强劲，贡献了约1/3的全球经济增长。


It is also becoming more sustainable, in line with the shift in its growth model away from investment and exports and toward domestic demand and services.	在其经济增长模式由投资出口向国内需求和服务转移后，其经济模式也变得更具可持续性。


In the run-up to next month’s G20 summit in Hangzhou, China has been calling loudly for new commitments to structural reforms to stimulate growth in advanced and emerging-market economies.	在杭州 G20 峰会即将于下月召开之际，中国一直大声呼吁发达和新兴市场经济体应当做出新的结构性改革承诺以刺激增长。


But China faces serious risks at home. Above all, domestic credit continues to expand at an unsustainable pace, with corporate debt accumulating to dangerous levels.	但中国也面临着严峻的国内风险：尤为显著的是国内信贷继续以不可持续的速度扩张，企业债务额也积累到了相当危险的程度。


According to the International Monetary Fund’s recently published annual report on the Chinese economy, credit is growing about twice as fast as output. It is rising rapidly in both the non-financial private sector and in an expanding, interconnected financial sector that remains opaque.	根据国际货币基金组织最近发表的中国经济年度经济报告，信贷的增长几乎相当于产出量的两倍，并同时在非金融私营部门以及不断延伸且相互连接的不透明金融部门中迅速扩张。


Moreover, while credit growth is high by international standards – a key indicator of a potential crisis – its ability to spur further growth is diminishing.	此外，虽然信贷增长按照国际标准来说极高——而这一关键指标暗示着潜在的危机——其进一步刺激经济增长的效果却不断减弱。


Warning signs are flashing, and the Chinese government has acknowledged the overall problem.	警灯长鸣之下，中国政府也已意识到了这个整体性问题。


But, to avoid a crisis, it should immediately implement comprehensive reforms to address the root causes of the corporate debt problem.	但为了避免危机爆发，它应立即实施全面改革以铲除企业债务问题的根源。


These include soft budget constraints for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments, implicit and explicit government guarantees of debt, and excessive risk taking in the financial sector – all of which have been perpetuated by unsustainable official growth targets.	这些包括对国有企业和地方政府的松散预算约束、 政府对债务的隐性/公开担保以及金融领域的过度冒险行为——所有这些行为都是不可持续的官方增长目标下长期存在。


To tackle the problem, the Chinese government must, in the words of Premier Li Keqiang, “ruthlessly bring down the knife [on] zombie enterprises.”	为解决这一问题，中国政府得像中国国家总理李克强所说的那样“对僵尸企业狠下刀子”，而此举应同时结合切实的策略来对那些有挽救价值的公司进行重组；


This culling should be combined with a concrete strategy to restructure salvageable firms; recognize and allocate creditor losses; account for displaced workers and other social costs; and further open private-sector markets.	识别和分配债权人的损失； 承担工人失业和其他社会成本；


More fundamentally, the government must accept the inevitability of lower near-term growth.	并进一步开放私营部门市场。 更重要的是，政府必须接受短期增长率较低的必然性。


It is especially important to restructure SOEs.	对国有企业的重组尤其重要。


Many are essentially on life support, contributing only one-fifth of total industrial output but accounting for about half of all corporate debt.	许多国企基本上都是靠财政输血维持，对国家工业总产值的贡献只有1/5，却占据了1/2的企业总负债。


A serious restructuring effort – including stricter budget constraints and an end to lending to non-viable firms and government guarantees on debt, along with other supply-side reforms already underway – will create space for more dynamic companies to emerge and contribute to growth.	认真的重组 — — 包括更严格的预算限制，停止向无挽救希望的企业贷款以及政府债务担保，再加上其他正在进行的供给侧改革 — — 这将为那些更具活力的公司腾出成长空间并促进发展。


China is unique in many respects, but it is not the first country to experience corporate-debt difficulties.	虽然中国在许多方面都具有自身特色，但它不是第一个遭遇企业债务难题的国家。


Its leaders should heed three broad lessons from other countries’ experience.	该国领导人也应该从其他国家的经验中吸取以下三大经验教训：


First, the authorities should act quickly and effectively, lest today’s corporate-debt problem become tomorrow’s systemic debt problem.	首先，当局应迅速有效地行动起来，以免当前的企业债务问题升级为将来的系统性债务问题。


Second, they should deal with both creditors and debtors – some countries’ solutions address only one or the other, sowing the seeds for future problems.	其次，应同时处理好债权人和债务人的问题— — 有些国家只解决了其中一方的问题，为日后其他问题播下种子。


Finally, the governance structures that permitted the problem to arise must be identified and reformed.	最后，必须对导致问题出现的治理结构进行识别和改革。 中国至少需要一个有效的制度来处理破产问题；


At a minimum, China needs an effective system to deal with insolvency; strict regulation of risk pricing and assessment; and robust accounting, loan-loss provisioning, and financial disclosure rules.	对风险定价和评估进行严格监管； 以及健全的会计， 贷款风险准备金以及财务披露规则。


Influential voices in China are quick to draw the lesson from international experience that tackling corporate debt can limit short-term growth and impose social costs, such as unemployment.	中国的高层人士很快从国际经验中认识到应对企业债务问题将会限制短期经济增长和增加社会成本——例如失业。


These are valid concerns, but the alternatives – half measures or no reform at all – would only make a bad situation worse.	也应该对这些问题给予关注，但这样的选择 — — 半吊子改革或根本没有改革 — — 只会导致情况进一步恶化。


China should begin by restructuring unviable companies in its fastest-growing regions, where workers will find new jobs more quickly and reforms are not likely to hurt growth.	中国应该首先在其增长最快的地区开始进行破产企业重组，因为那里工人能更快找到新的就业机会，改革也不至于损害经济增长。


Policymakers can then be more selective when it comes to restructuring in slower-growing regions and cities where a single company dominates the local economy.	随后在那些单一企业主导当地经济的增长较慢地区和城市，政策制定者就会在推进转型时拥有更多选择余地。


Moreover, structural unemployment and worker resettlement costs can be mitigated with a strong social safety net that includes funds for targeted labor redeployment so that workers can get back on their feet.	此外，结构性失业及工人重新安置费用可���通过强大的社会安全网来缓解，其中包括有针对性的劳动者重新安置资金，让劳动者们可以重新站稳脚跟自食其力。


This approach would show the government’s commitment to those at risk of displacement.	这种手段将体现政府对那些改革受影响者的承诺。


To its credit, China has already made some efforts to solve its debt problem and begin deleveraging.	值得赞扬的是，中国在解决债务问题方面已经取得一些成果，并开始去杠杆化。


The current Five-Year Plan aims to reduce excess capacity in the coal and steel sectors, identify and restructure nonviable “zombie” SOEs, and fund programs to support affected workers.	当前五年计划的目标是减少煤炭和钢铁行业产能过剩、 划定和重组走没有挽救价值的僵尸国有企业，并投入资金帮助受影响工人。


Now is the time for China to push for far-reaching reforms.	中国是时候推动意义深远的改革。


Banks’ balance sheets still have a relatively low volume of non-performing loans (and high provisioning).	银行的资产负债表中仍有总额相对较低的不良贷款（以及大量风险准备金）。


The costs of potential losses on corporate loans – estimated at 7% of GDP in the IMF’s latest Global Financial Stability Report – are manageable.	潜在的企业贷款损失成本 — —国际货币基金组织的最新《全球金融稳定报告》估算约相当于GDP的 7% — —是可控的。


Furthermore, the government maintains high buffers: debt is relatively low, and foreign-exchange reserves are relatively high.	此外政府依然拥有较大的缓冲空间︰ 债务相对较低，外汇储备相对较高。


The question is whether China will manage to deleverage enough before these buffers are exhausted.	问题在于中国能否在缓冲消耗殆尽之前实现充分的去杠杆化。


Given its record of economic success and the government’s strong commitment to an ambitious reform agenda, China can rise to the challenge. But it must start now.	鉴于它过去的经济成就和政府对大手笔改革议程的坚定承诺，中国可以应对这一企业债务挑战，但如果不立刻动手，就来不及了。


China’s Credit Overdose	中国的信用过量


SHANGHAI – The days of double-digit economic growth in China are over.	上海—两位数的经济增长已经一去不返了。


Indeed, the annual growth rate, which has been lingering at about 7.5% since 2012, is predicted to fall to 7% this year – and is likely to go lower.	事实上，中国年经济增长率自2012年以来一直徘徊在7. 5%左右，今年预计将下降到7%，并且有可能继续降低。


This is China’s “new normal,” characterized, according to China’s leaders, by “medium-to-high-speed” (instead of high-speed) growth.	这是中国的“新常态”，用中国领导人的话说，其特征是“中高速”（而不是高速）增长。


But perhaps even this is optimistic.	但也许“中高速”也有些乐观了。


In the last two years, credit grew almost twice as fast as GDP, and total social financing grew even faster.	在过去两年中，信用增长几乎是GDP的两倍，社会融资总额增长得还要快。


Yet GDP growth slowed considerably – from an annual average of 10.2% in 2002-2011 – suggesting that China may be moving closer to a medium-to-low-speed growth path.	但GDP增长较2002—2011年间的年平均水平10. 2%大幅放缓，表明中国也许更接近于中低速增长路径。


One possible explanation for the divergence between credit and GDP growth is that potential growth has already dropped to 7%.	信用和GDP增长分化的一个可能解释是潜在增长已经下降到7%。


But such a sharp decline in potential growth typically implies a powerful brake, in the form of an external shock or major internal adjustments.	但潜在增长如此剧烈的降幅通常意味着猛烈的“刹车”，以外部冲击或重大内部调整的形式发生。


Under normal circumstances, an economy’s potential growth rate adjusts naturally and gradually, as structural change progresses.	在正常情况下，经济的潜在增长率会随着结构变化进展而自然缓慢地调整。


In fact, there is no definitive evidence that China’s potential growth rate has plunged.	事实上，没有确切证据表明中国潜在增长率下降。


China weathered the 2008 global economic crisis better than other emerging economies.	中国比其他新兴经济体更好地抵御了2008年全球经济危机。


And, though structural factors, including an aging population and shrinking labor force, can certainly undermine potential growth, their effects are not sudden.	此外，固然老龄化和劳动力减少等结构性因素可能破坏潜在增长，但它们不会突然爆发。


So what explains the sharp decline in China’s economic output, in an environment of rapid credit expansion?	那么，怎样解释中国经济产出在信用高速扩张背景下的剧降？


The answer is simple: the way the credit is being used.	答案很简单：信用是如何使用的。


Before the crisis, credit expansion in China kept pace with GDP growth.	危机前，中国信用扩张与GDP增长是匹配的。


Since the end of 2008, however, credit amounting to 35% of GDP has been issued annually, causing the credit-to-GDP ratio to soar from less than 150% before the crisis to 250% today.	但是，自2008年底以来，每年发行的信用量相当于GDP的35%，导致信用-GDP之比从危机前的150%飙升到现在的250%。


That means that credit has become much less efficient.	这意味着信用的效率大幅下降。


The problem stems from the CN¥4 trillion ($660 billion) stimulus plan that the government launched in 2008, which fueled the creation of about CN¥14 trillion worth of credit – and supported a rapid increase in fixed-asset investment, especially in infrastructure and real-estate development.	问题源自中国政府2008年所实施的四万亿人民币刺激计划，这助长了大约14万亿人民币的信用创造——也支撑了固定资产投资特别是基础设施和房地产开发的快速增长。


When, in late 2009, the investment-intensive economy began to show signs of overheating, the government imposed strict macroeconomic controls, forcing investors to halt ongoing projects.	2009年末，当投资密集型经济开始出现过热信号时，政府采取了严格的宏观经济调控，迫使投资者暂停正在进行的项目。


Growth fell immediately.	增长应声而落。


Meanwhile, debt continued to rise – not least because of the continued accumulation of interest.	与此同时，债务在继续增加——因为利息在不断积累。


Indeed, according to the political economist Victor Shih, the interest that accrued to all debts in China in 2010 amounted to 80% of incremental nominal GDP.	事实上，根据政治经济学家史宗瀚（Victor Shih）的估算，因利息而形成的增量债务在2010年达到了新增名义GDP的80%。


In 2012, the two figures were nearly equivalent, with interest rising to 140% of incremental nominal GDP in 2013 and, Shih expects, to 200% for 2014.	2012年，两者已经等量齐观，而在2013年，利息升高到新增名义GDP的140%。 史宗瀚预测2014年这一比例将达到200%。


Local governments, in particular, have struggled with a colossal volume of bad debt, which has undermined their capacity for capital expenditure and frozen out private demand for productive investment.	特别是，地方政府需要应对巨大的不良债务，这破坏了它们的资本支出能力，也冻结了对生产性投资的私人需求。


Stringent controls on the real-estate market placed a heavy burden on the developers themselves, as well as related industries like steel.	严格的房地产市场调控给开发商本身造成了严重负担，钢铁等相关行业也大受影响。


Yet China’s government failed to acknowledge – much less address – the bad debts in a timely manner, instead allowing them to grow even larger.	但中国政府没有及时认识到——更谈不上解决——不良债务问题，而是放任这一问题不断扩大。


Given that the only way to enable borrowers to avoid default – at least temporarily – has been to provide an ever-increasing amount of liquidity, even banks facing liquidity constraints have remained willing to extend new loans.	由于让借款人避免违约——至少暂时避免——的唯一办法是提供不断增加的流动性，因此，即使银行面临流动性约束，也仍然愿意扩大新贷款。


Though China’s high national savings rate means that it does not have to borrow liquidity from abroad or print large amounts of money, the risks it faces should not be underestimated.	尽管中国国民储蓄率很高，意味着不需要向外部借取流动性发行大量货币，但其所面临的风险不可低估。


With such a large share of the new liquidity being used to cover debt service, there is little left to finance new, growth-stimulating investment.	如此大比例的新流动性被用于维持债务的支出，留给刺激增长的新投资的部分寥寥无几。


Moreover, as debts grow ever larger, banks’ willingness to lend will decline, driving debtors to the unregulated shadow-banking sector, where interest rates are extremely high, for their liquidity needs.	此外，随着债务的不断增加，银行的放贷意愿会降低，促使债务人转向不受监管、利率畸高的影子银行部门以满足流动性需求。


The rising cost of financing will further undermine fixed-asset investment (and thus economic growth).	融资成本的上升将进一步阻碍固定资产投资（进而阻碍经济增长）。


China’s “new normal” is actually not normal at all.	中国的“新常态”其实一点都不正常。


While the growth curve and structural changes in the East Asian economy from the 1960s to the 1990s suggest that China could experience medium-to-high growth rates for another decade, the country must address its debt problem first.	东亚经济20世纪60—90年代的增长曲线和结构变化表明中国可能继续维持十年的中高速增长，但中国必须首先解决其债务问题。


The first step is to cut interest rates immediately, thereby reducing the burden on debtors and bolstering GDP growth.	第一步是立刻降息，从而降低债务人的负担、提振GDP增长。


The government must also pursue a more active fiscal policy, rather than focusing on monetary policy.	政府还必须实施更加积极的财政政策，而不是只注重货币政策。


Furthermore, given that local governments and state-owned enterprises are responsible for the majority of China’s bad debts, write-offs, funded by central-government bonds, will probably be necessary – and soon.	此外，由于地方政府和国有企业占了中国不良债务的大头，因此通过中央政府债券提供资金予以减记也许是必不可少的——并且要快。


Though the “debt swap” scheme that the finance ministry just introduced – which allows highly leveraged local governments to swap CN¥1 trillion of debt maturing this year for bonds with lower interest rates – is a step in the right direction, it is far from adequate.	财政部刚刚推出的“债务置换”机制——允许高负债地方政府将1万亿人民币的今年到期的债务置换为利率更低的债券——方向是正确的，但远远不够。


With the central government enjoying such favorable fiscal conditions – its debt-to-GDP ratio stands at only about 20% – now is the ideal time to initiate a much larger debt-swap program.	中央政府面临非常有利的财政环境——债务-GDP之比只有20%左右——实施更大规模的债务置换计划正当其时。


Of course, curbing future debt accumulation is also vital to China’s long-term prosperity.	当然，遏制未来债务积累对中国的长期繁荣也很关键。


That is why China must reduce local governments’ dependence on banks to meet their financing needs, by nurturing bond and equity markets.	因此，中国必须通过培育债券和股票市场来降低地方政府对通过银行满足融资需求的依赖。


The debt-induced distortions in China’s economy today are precisely that – distortions.	如今，债务所导致的中国经济的扭曲可谓名副其实——扭曲。


They are not a fundamental feature of the economy, and they need not characterize China’s new normal.	它们不是经济的根本特征，也不是中国新常态的必然特征。


With the right strategy, the authorities can eliminate these distortions and allow the economy to reach its medium-to-high-speed growth potential over the next decade.	当局可以用正确的战略消除这些扭曲，让经济在未来十年中达到中高速的增长潜力。


False Alarm on China	错误的中国警报


NEW HAVEN – The prospect of an economic meltdown in China has been sending tremors through global financial markets at the start of 2016.	纽黑文—2016年伊始，中国经济崩溃论给全球金融市场造成了剧烈动荡。


Yet such fears are overblown.	但这样的恐慌过于夸张。


While turmoil in Chinese equity and currency markets should not be taken lightly, the country continues to make encouraging headway on structural adjustments in its real economy.	中国股票和货币市场动荡决不能掉以轻心，但中国在实体经济的结构调整方面仍然取得了令人鼓舞的进步。


This mismatch between progress in economic rebalancing and setbacks in financial reforms must ultimately be resolved as China now enters a critical phase in its transition to a new growth model.	如今，中国已经进入向新增长模式转型的临界点，经济再平衡的进步与金融改革的退步之间的错配最终必须得到解决。


But it does not spell imminent crisis.	但这并不意味着危机近在眼前。


Consistent with China’s long experience in central planning, it continues to excel at industrial reengineering.	与中国长期中央计划的经验相符，如今它仍然擅长产业再造。 2015年的趋势印证了这一点：服务业扩张8.


Trends in 2015 were a case in point: The 8.3% expansion in the services sector outstripped that of the once-dominant manufacturing and construction sectors, which together grew by just 6% last year.	3%，超过了曾经的领头羊制造业和建筑业，后两者总量去年只增长了6%。 2015年，所谓的第三产业占中国GDP之比为50.


The so-called tertiary sector rose to 50.5% of Chinese GDP in 2015, well in excess of the 47% share targeted in 2011, when the 12th Five-Year Plan, was adopted, and fully ten percentage points larger than the 40.5% share of secondary-sector activities (manufacturing and construction).	5%，大大高于2011年实施十二五规划时的目标47%，更是比第二产业活动（制造业和建筑业）的40. 5%高出了整整十个百分点。


This significant shift in China’s economic structure is vitally important to the country’s consumer-led rebalancing strategy.	中国经济结构的这一重大变化对于其消费拉动的再平衡战略具有关键重要性。


Services development underpins urban employment opportunities, a key building block of personal income generation.	服务业发展奠定了城市发展机会，而城市发展机会有是个人收入的重要基础。


With Chinese services requiring about 30% more jobs per unit of output than manufacturing and construction, combined, the tertiary sector’s relative strength has played an important role in limiting unemployment and preventing social instability – long China’s greatest fear.	对于每单位产出，中国服务业所需要的就业岗位数量比制造业和建筑业加起来还要多30%，因此，第三产业的相对强势对于遏制失业、防止社会动荡（长期以来这一直是中国最大的担忧）具有重要作用。


On the contrary, even in the face of decelerating GDP growth, urban job creation hit 11 million in 2015, above the government’s target of ten million and a slight increase from 10.7 million in 2014.	相反，即使面临GDP增长减速，2015年城市就业岗位仍然增加了1,100万个，高于一千万的政府目标，也比2014年的1,070万略有增加。


The bad news is that China’s impressive headway on restructuring its real economy has been accompanied by significant setbacks for its financial agenda – namely, the bursting of an equity bubble, a poorly handled shift in currency policy, and an exodus of financial capital.	坏消息是中国在实体经济重组方面取得重大进步的同时，其金融日程遭遇重大挫折——股市泡沫破裂，货币政策变化处置不当金融资本发生外逃。


These are hardly inconsequential developments – especially for a country that must eventually align its financial infrastructure with a market-based consumer society.	这些绝非癣疥之疾——特别是考虑到中国最终必须让其金融基础设施与其基于市场的消费社会相符。


In the end, China will never succeed if it does not bring its financial reforms into closer sync with its rebalancing strategy for the real economy.	说到底，如果中国不让其金融改革与实体经济的再平衡更加同步，就无法取得成功。


Capital-market reforms – especially the development of more robust equity and bond markets to augment a long dominant bank-centric system of credit intermediation – are critical to this objective.	资本市场改革——特别是发展更加稳健的股票和债券市场，扩大长期以银行系统为核心的信用中介体系——对于这一目标至关重要。


Yet in the aftermath of the stock-market bubble, the equity-funding alternative is all but dead for the foreseeable future.	但股市泡沫破裂后，股票融资之路在可预见的未来都行不通。


For that reason alone, China’s recent financial-sector setbacks are especially disappointing.	仅仅从这一点出发，就可以看出中国最近的金融业退步是多么令人沮丧。


But setbacks and crises are not the same thing.	但退步和危机不是一回事。


The good news is that China’s massive reservoir of foreign-exchange reserves provides it with an important buffer against a classic currency and liquidity crisis.	好消息是中国巨大的外汇储备意味着它拥有重要的缓冲可以应对经典的货币和流动性危机。


To be sure, China’s reserves have fallen enormously – by $700 billion – in the last 19 months.	诚然，中国的储备在过去19个月中大幅下降，减少了7,000亿美元。


Given China’s recent build-up of dollar-denominated liabilities, which the Bank for International Settlements currently places at around $1 trillion (for short- and long-term debt, combined), external vulnerability can hardly be ignored.	最近，中国新增大量美元计价负债，国际清算银行的数据认为在1万亿美元左右（短期和长期债务之和），绝不能忽视外部脆弱性。


But, at $3.3 trillion in December 2015, China’s reserves are still enough to cover more than four times its short-term external debt – well in excess of the widely accepted rule of thumb that a country should still be able to fund all of its short-term foreign liabilities in the event that it is unable to borrow in international markets.	但是，2015年12月中国仍拥有3. 3万亿美元储备，是其短期外债的四倍多——远超一国在无法从国际市场上借贷的情况下偿清所有短期外部负债所需资金量的经验法则。


Of course, this cushion would effectively vanish in six years if foreign reserves were to continue falling at the same $500 billion annual rate recorded in 2015.	当然，如果外汇储备继续以每年5,000亿美元（2015年的数字）的速度消耗，这一缓冲将在六年后耗尽。


This was precisely the greatest fear during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, when China was widely expected to follow other so-called East Asian miracle economies that had run out of reserves in the midst of a contagious attack on their currencies.	这正是20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机期间最大的担忧，当时，人们广泛预期中国将步其他所谓的东亚奇迹经济体后尘。 这些经济体因为本币遭遇传染性袭击（contagious attack）而耗尽湖北。


But if it didn’t happen then, it certainly won’t happen now: China’s foreign-exchange reserves today are 23 times higher than the $140 billion held in 1997-98.	但既然当时并没有发生这一情况，现在也肯定不会发生：如今，中国外汇储备是其1997—98年持有量1,400亿美元的23倍。


Moreover, China continues to run a large current-account surplus, in contrast to the outsize external deficits that proved so problematic for other Asian economies in the late 1990s.	此外，中国仍保持巨大的经常项目盈余，这与20世纪90年代末其他亚洲经济体纷纷出现大规模外部赤字截然不同。


Still, fear persists that if capital flight were to intensify, China would ultimately be powerless to stop it.	但是恐慌仍然存在：如果资本外逃加剧，中国最终将无力阻止。


Nothing could be further from the truth.	大错特错。


China’s institutional memory runs deep when it comes to crises and their consequences.	中国的制度对于危机及其后果有着深刻的记忆。


That is especially the case concerning the experience of the late 1990s, when Chinese leaders saw firsthand how a run on reserves and a related currency collapse can wreak havoc on seemingly invincible economies.	20世纪90年代末尤其如此，当时的中国领导人在第一线目睹了储备���尽和相关货币的崩溃是如何席卷看似坚不可摧的经济体的。


In fact, it was that realization, coupled with a steadfast fixation on stability, that prompted China to focus urgently on amassing the largest reservoir of foreign-exchange reserves in modern history.	事实上，正是这一认识，以及毫不动摇地坚持保持稳定，让中国抓紧时间囤积了现代历史上规模最大的外汇储备。


While the authorities have no desire to close the capital account after having taken several important steps to open it in recent years, they would most certainly rethink this position if capital flight were to become a more serious threat.	近几年来，当局采取了多项开放资本账户的重要措施，它们并不想重新关闭资本账户，但如果资本外逃成为更加严重的威胁，它们几乎肯定会重新思考立场。


Yes, China has stumbled in the recent implementation of many of its financial reforms.	诚然，最近所实施的诸多金融改革让中国步履蹒跚。


The equity-market fiasco is especially glaring in this regard, as was the failure to clarify official intentions regarding the August 2015 shift in exchange-rate policy.	股市大崩盘尤其令人触目，对2015年8月的汇率政策变化不做官方解释亦然。


These missteps should not be taken lightly – especially in light of China’s high-profile commitment to market-based reforms.	这些失误决不能掉以轻心——特别是考虑到中国所做出的引人注目的市场改革承诺。


But they are a far cry from the crisis that many believe is now at hand.	但这些与很多人相信近在眼前的危机还有很大距离。


China’s Monetary-Policy Surprise	中国的货币政策惊奇


NEW HAVEN – In economic policy, as in most other areas, actions speak louder than words.	纽黑文—与其他大多数领域一样，经济政策也是言大于行。


By cutting its benchmark policy interest rates on November 21, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has underscored the tactical focus of the government’s stabilization policy, which aims to put a floor of around 7% on GDP growth.	中国人民银行降低基准政策利率的措施彰显出中国政府对稳定政策的战术性关注。 中国政府将GDP增长下限定在7%左右。


Achieving this goal will be no small feat.	实现这一目标是个不小的成就。


China’s economy is caught in the crossfire of structural and cyclical headwinds. Structural pressures have arisen from the shift to a new model of services- and consumer-led growth, and cyclical pressures stem from a tough global environment that has put downward pressure on the old model of export and investment-led growth.	中国经济面临结构性问题，这些问题来自经济转型（向新的服务和消费拉动经济）以及周期性压力（严峻的全球环境对旧的出口和投资拉动型模式形成了压力）。


The cyclical challenges, in particular, are proving to be more vexing than anticipated.	特别是，周期性挑战要比预想的更加严重。


Though exports have declined considerably from their pre-crisis peak of 35% of GDP, they continue to account for about 24%, leaving China exposed to the global growth cycle – especially to markets in the developed world, where demand is exceptionally weak.	尽管出口占GDP之比已经从危机前峰值35%大幅下降，但仍高达24%，这意味着中国需受全球增长周期的影响——特别是需求尤其疲软的发达国家市场。


Indeed, 42% of Chinese exports go to Europe, the United States, and Japan – three economies that are flirting with secular stagnation.	事实上，42%的中国出口流向了欧洲、美国和日本——这三个经济体都在经历长期停滞。


And Europe, China’s largest export market, has struggled the most.	其中最大出口市场欧洲最为困难。


Given that development strategies typically begin to fail when economies reach middle-income status – a threshold that China is rapidly approaching – China cannot afford to allow mounting cyclical risks to undermine its structural transformation.	当经济达到中等收入水平时，发展战略就会开始失效，而中国正在迅速达到这一水平，因此中国不能允许高企的周期性风险阻碍其结构型转型。


Modern history shows that the easiest way for a developing country to become ensnared in the dreaded “middle-income trap” is to cling to its old model for too long.	现代历史表明，最容易使发展中国家踏入可怕的“中等收入陷阱”的办法莫过于纠结于模式太久。


The fact is that only structural transformation can lift a middle-income developing country to high-income developed status.	事实上，只有结构转型能让发展中国家步入高收入发达水平。


Fortunately, China’s leaders recognize this, and are committed to achieving it.	幸运的是，中国领导人认识到了这一点并决心实现这一点。


President Xi Jinping has been spearheading the effort to press ahead with reform and rebalancing.	国家主席习近平一直承担着推进改革和再平衡的领导责任。


A year ago, at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi and his team created the country’s most ambitious economic-reform agenda in 35 years.	一年前，在中共十八大三中全会上，习近平和他的团队制定了35年来中国最有雄心的经济改革日程。


This, together with the 12th Five-Year Plan that was enacted in 2011, highlights the authorities’ commitment to bolstering the services sector and domestic consumption.	这一日程和2011年的十二五规划彰显出当局对提振服务业和内需的决心。


At the same time, China has been shifting responsibility for implementing reform from its antiquated planning apparatus (the National Development and Reform Commission) to a more effective market-based mechanism embedded in the CCP’s structure (the Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms).	与此同时，中国一直在将实施改革的责任从过时的计划部门（发改委）过渡给效率更高的党内市场机制（全面深化改革领导小组）。


Add to that Xi’s unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, and there is no turning back on China’s road to rebalancing and structural change.	此外还有前所未有的反腐运动，中国的再平衡和结构变迁之路也没有回头路可走。


But the risk of cyclical disruptions, such as an unexpected decline in global economic growth, remains.	但周期性干扰的风险（如出人意料的全球经济增长下降）仍然存在。


This raises an important tactical challenge for China.	这构成了中国的一个重要战术性挑战。


How can it stay the reform course without being derailed by a significant growth slowdown in the short term?	它如何保持改革进程，同时又免受短期增长严重减速的影响？


This is not the first time that China has confronted this challenge – nor will it be the last.	中国已不是第一次面临这样的挑战。


The Great Recession of 2008-2009 also pushed China to the brink of outright recession.	事实上，2008—2009年大衰退曾将中国推向衰退边缘。


With global trade collapsing and Chinese export demand having plummeted from 26% annual growth in mid-2008 to a 27% contraction by early 2009, the government moved aggressively to inject CN¥4 trillion ($586 billion) into the economy.	全球贸易崩溃，中国出口需求年增长率从2008年年中的26%下降到2009年年初的-27%，面对这一情况，政府果断行动，向经济注入4万亿元人民币。


Though this enabled growth to recover by the end of 2009, it also contributed to new problems, including excessive debt, a property-market overhang, and mounting local-government financial risk.	尽管这一措施使经济在2009年底实现复苏，但也创造了新的问题，包括债务过多、房地产市场积压和大量地方政府金融风险。


The last thing China needs is more fiscal stimulus.	中国最不需要的就是财政刺激。


Today’s cyclical disruption pales in comparison to that of 2008-2009, and, unlike the fiscally reckless developed economies, China recognizes excessive government debt as a legitimate threat to sustainable growth and development.	今天的周期性干扰远远不如2008—2009年，此外，与在财政上十分鲁莽的发达经济体相比，中国认识到债务过多是可持续增长和发展的威胁。


Moreover, unlike major developed economies, most of which have used up all of their conventional monetary-policy ammunition by reducing their policy interest rates to zero, China has plenty of monetary stimulus on reserve to address cyclical disruptions.	此外，主要发达经济体已将政策利率下降至零水平，用尽了常规货币政策，而中国有足够的货币刺激储备解决周期性干扰。


In these circumstances, it makes sense for China to lean more on monetary policy than on fiscal expansion.	在这样的情况下，有理由认为中国会更倾向于货币政策而不是财政政策。


Nonetheless, the PBOC’s tactical decision is not without potential pitfalls – not least because interest-rate cuts encourage the extension of more credit at a time when China is trying to wean itself from debt-intensive growth.	尽管如此，中国人民银行的战术性决定也存在潜在漏洞，因为这鼓励了信用规模扩张，而中国正在竭力摆脱债务密集型增长。


A key challenge will be to avoid escalating credit risk, which could undermine the process of reform and rebalancing.	一个关键的挑战将是避免信用风险升级��浙江破坏改革和再平衡过程。


From the start, China’s leaders knew that the interaction between structural transformation and the business cycle would be complex.	首先，中国领导人知道，结构转型和商业周期的互动将是复杂的。


As former Premier Wen Jiabao noted nearly eight years ago, China’s economy had become increasingly “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”	前总理温家宝在近八年前就指出，中国经济增长越来越“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、不可持续”。


The longer China delayed addressing its problems, the more intractable the solution became.	中国在解决问题上拖延的越久，就越难以找到办法。


Xi and his colleagues are resolute in attempting to solve this problem by staying the course to rebalance the Chinese economy, while remaining acutely aware of cyclical risks.	习近平和他的同志们决心坚持中国经济再平衡的事业，与此同时也要保持对短期周期性风险的清醒认识。


After all, China’s vulnerability to such risks is rooted in its old growth model, which was allowed to remain in place for far too long.	毕竟，中国之所以容易受到这些风险的影响，根源在于旧增长模式维持得太久。


With the recent monetary easing, the Chinese authorities seem to be drawing a line in the sand to prevent an excessive drop in growth. This suggests that they now view a cyclical disruption as a real threat to the country’s longer-term structural-reform agenda.	最近的货币宽松表明中国当局正在划定阻止增长过度减弱的底线，他们将周期性干扰视为对中国长期结构改革日程的真正威胁。


To the extent that those fears persist, additional monetary easing can be expected.	由于这一担忧是持久的，可以预期还会有更多的货币宽松。


A Water War in Asia?	亚洲的水资源战争？


BERLIN – Tensions over water are rising in Asia – and not only because of conflicting maritime claims.	柏林——亚洲水资源紧张局势正在升级——而且不仅因为海洋权益主张相互矛盾。


While territorial disputes, such as in the South China Sea, attract the most attention – after all, they threaten the safety of sea lanes and freedom of navigation, which affects outside powers as well – the strategic ramifications of competition over transnationally shared freshwater resources are just as ominous.	虽然南中国海海域领土争端吸引了绝大部分注意力——毕竟，它们威胁到海上航道安全和航行自由，从而影响到域外大国的利益——但对跨国共享淡水资源争夺的战略影响同样是不可忽视的。


Asia has less fresh water per capita than any other continent, and it is already facing a water crisis that, according to an MIT study, will continue to intensify, with severe water shortages expected by 2050.	亚洲的人均淡水资源保有量低于其他任何大陆，并且根据麻省理工学院的一项研究，亚洲面临的水资源危机将持续加剧，预计到2050年可能面临严重的水资源短缺。


At a time of widespread geopolitical discord, competition over freshwater resources could emerge as a serious threat to long-term peace and stability in Asia.	在这样一个地缘政治纷争随处可见的年代，对淡水资源的过度争夺可能演变为对亚洲长期和平与稳定的严重威胁。


Already, the battle is underway, with China as the main aggressor.	水资源争夺战目前已经开始，而中国是主要的进攻方。


Indeed, China’s territorial grab in the South China Sea has been accompanied by a quieter grab of resources in transnational river basins.	事实上，中国在南海进行领土掠夺的同时还悄无声息地侵占了跨国流域资源。


Reengineering cross-border riparian flows is integral to China’s strategy to assert greater control and influence over Asia.	重新设计跨境河流的流动是中国加强对亚洲控制和影响战略的重要部分。


China is certainly in a strong position to carry out this strategy.	中国毫无疑问有能力执行这项战略。


The country enjoys unmatched riparian dominance, with 110 transnational rivers and lakes flowing into 18 downstream countries.	该国享有无与伦比的沿岸主导优势，拥有110条跨国河流和湖泊流入到十八个下游国家。


China also has the world’s most dams, which it has never hesitated to use to curb cross-border flows.	中国同时拥有全世界数量最多的水坝，而且毫不犹豫地利用这些设施来遏制跨国河流流入其他国家。


In fact, China’s dam builders are targeting most of the international rivers that flow out of Chinese territory.	事实上，中国在流出本国领土的绝大多数跨国河流上都修建了水坝。


Most of China’s internationally shared water resources are located on the Tibetan Plateau, which it annexed in the early 1950s.	中国绝大部分国际共享水资源均位于青藏高原，青藏高原于二十世纪五十年代成为中国的领土。


Unsurprisingly, the plateau is the new hub of Chinese dam building.	不出所料，青藏高原成为中国水坝建设的新枢纽。


Indeed, China’s 13th five-year plan, released this year, calls for a new wave of dam projects on the Plateau.	事实上，中国第十三个五年计划呼吁在青藏高原启动新一轮水坝建设项目。


Moreover, China recently cut off the flow of a tributary of the Brahmaputra River, the lifeline of Bangladesh and northern India, to build a dam as part of a major hydroelectric project in Tibet.	此外，中国最近切断了作为孟加拉国和印度北部生命线的布拉马普特拉河的支流，用于修建一座水坝作为西藏一个主要的水电项目。


And the country is working to dam another Brahmaputra tributary, in order to create a series of artificial lakes.	而且该国正在布拉马普特拉河上修建另一座水坝，目的是从无到有创造一系列人工湖。


China has also built six mega-dams on the Mekong River, which flows into Southeast Asia, where the downstream impact is already visible.	中国还在同样流入东南亚的湄公河上修建了六座大坝，对下游已经造成的影响日渐显著。


Yet, instead of curbing its dam-building, China is hard at work building several more Mekong dams.	但中国不仅没有遏制其水坝建设，反而在湄公河上抓紧修建另外几座大坝。


Likewise, water supplies in largely arid Central Asia are coming under further pressure as China appropriates a growing volume of water from the Illy River.	同样，中亚大部分干旱地区供水也面临着进一步的压力，因为中国占用的伊犁河水越来越多。


Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash is now at risk of shrinking substantially, much like the Aral Sea – located on the border with Uzbekistan – which has virtually dried up in less than 40 years.	哈萨克斯坦的巴尔喀什湖现在面临的大规模收缩的风险，对于乌兹别克斯坦边境线上的咸海也是一样——在不到四十年的时间里咸海已经近乎枯竭了。


China is also diverting water from the Irtysh, which supplies drinking water to Kazakhstan’s capital Astana and feeds Russia’s Ob River.	中国还将水调出额尔齐斯河，这条河向哈萨克斯坦首都阿斯塔纳提供饮用水，并且河水最终流入俄罗斯的鄂毕河。


For Central Asia, the diminished transboundary flows are just one part of the problem.	对中亚地区而言，跨境水资源流量不断减少还不是问题的全部。


China’s energy, manufacturing, and agricultural activities in sprawling Xinjiang are having an even greater impact, as they contaminate the waters of the region’s transnational rivers with hazardous chemicals and fertilizers, just as China has done to the rivers in its Han heartland.	中国在新疆地区不断发展的能源、制造和农业活动正在造成更深远的影响，因为就像汉族核心地区的河流一样，这些活动排放的有毒化学品和化肥污染了区域跨国河流的河水质量。


Of course, China is not the only country stoking conflict over water.	当然，中国并非唯一一个因水资源引发冲突的国家。


As if to underscore that the festering territorial dispute in Kashmir is as much about water as it is about land, Pakistan has, for the second time this decade, initiated international arbitral tribunal proceedings against India under the terms of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.	就像为了凸显克什米尔的领土争端既因为水资源也因为领土一样，巴基斯坦在短短十年中第二次根据1960年印度河水域条约的规定，启动了针对印度的国际仲裁法庭诉讼。


The paradox here is that downstream Pakistan has used that treaty – the world’s most generous water-sharing deal, reserving for Pakistan more than 80% of the waters of the six-river Indus system – to sustain its conflict with India.	个中的悖论是地处下游的巴基斯坦利用该条约——全世界最慷慨的水资源共享协议——为自身保留了印度六河体系超过80%的水资源——以便支持印巴冲突。


Meanwhile, landlocked Laos – aiming to export hydropower, especially to China, the mainstay of its economy – has just notified its neighbors of its decision to move ahead with a third controversial project, the 912-megawatt Pak Beng dam.	此外，地处内陆以水��出口为支柱产业的老挝为了向以中国为首的国家出口水电刚刚通知邻国其决定修筑发电量为912兆瓦的北宾大坝，这也是第三个具有争议的项目。


It previously brushed aside regional concerns about the alteration of natural-flow patterns to push ahead with the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dam projects.	之前老挝不顾区域其他国家有关改变水流自然模式的忧虑，执意推进沙耶武里和栋沙宏大坝项目。


There is no reason to expect a different outcome this time.	没有理由期待这次会产生不同的结果。


The consequences of growing water competition in Asia will reverberate beyond the region.	亚洲不断增长的水资源竞争后果将远远超越地区的范畴。


Already, some Asian states, concerned about their capacity to grow enough food, have leased large tracts of farmland in Sub-Saharan Africa, triggering a backlash in some areas.	已经有一些亚洲国家因为担心能否种出足够的粮食，在撒哈拉以南非洲地区租用了大片农地，并在一些地区引发了抗议活动。


In 2009, when South Korea’s Daewoo Logistics Corporation negotiated a deal to lease as much as half of Madagascar’s arable land to produce cereals and palm oil for the South Korean market, the ensuing protests and military intervention toppled a democratically elected president.	2009年，当韩国大宇物流公司谈判达成租赁协议租用马达加斯加高达半数的耕地种植谷物和棕榈油供应韩国市场时，由此引发的抗议活动和军事干预推翻了一任民主选举的总统。


The race to appropriate water resources in Asia is straining agriculture and fisheries, damaging ecosystems, and fostering dangerous distrust and discord across the region.	亚洲占用水资源的竞争正在给农业和渔业施加压力，破坏生态系统，并且造成整个地区的不和谐与不信任。


It must be brought to an end.	这种情况必须结束。


Asian countries need to clarify the region’s increasingly murky hydropolitics.	亚洲国家需要澄清该地区越来越黑暗的水文政治。


The key will be effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and agreement on more transparent water-sharing arrangements.	解决问题的关键在于建立有效的争端解决机制和更加透明的水资源共享安排协议。


Asia can build a harmonious, rules-based water management system.	亚洲可以建设一套和谐并基于规则的水资源管理系统。


But it needs China to get on board.	但这套系统需要中国的加入。


At least for now, that does not seem likely.	至少从目前的情况看，似乎不太可能实现这一目标。


China in the Debt-Deflation Trap	中国如何避免债务通缩陷阱？


HONG KONG – In the wake of a global stock-market sell-off triggered by economic turmoil in China, the US Federal Reserve has just decided to postpone raising interest rates.	香港—中国经济近期的下滑及波动触发了全球股市抛售潮，在此形势下，美联储刚刚宣布了暂缓升息。


Indeed, China is facing the huge challenge of dealing with the risk of a global debt-deflation trap.	事实上，中国正面临巨大挑战：应对全球范围的过度负债风险及避免因被迫减债而导致的通缩陷阱。


In 1933, Irving Fisher was the first to identify the dangers of over-indebtedness and deflation, demonstrating their contribution to the Great Depression in the United States.	1933年，欧文·费雪（Irving Fisher）第一个指出过度负债和随后被迫减债而导致的通缩危险，并说明了它们在触发美国大萧条中所起的“作用”。


Forty years later, Charles Kindleberger applied the theory in a global context, emphasizing the problems that arise in a world lacking coordinated and consistent monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies, as well as an international lender of last resort.	四十年后，查尔斯·金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberger）将这一理论用到了全球金融体系中，强调了在全球范围由于缺乏协调一致的货币、财政和监管政策以及缺乏国际最后贷款人时全球经济可能出现的问题。


In 2011, Richard Koo used Japan’s experience to highlight the risks of a prolonged balance-sheet recession, when over-stretched debtors deleverage in order to rebuild their balance sheets.	2011年，辜朝明（Richard Koo）用日本案例强调了资产负债表衰退的长期风险，在这类衰退中，过度负债的债务人为了重建更健康的资产负债表而不得不在相当长的一段时间采取去杠杆的措施。


The debt-deflation cycle begins with an imbalance or displacement, which fuels excessive exuberance, over-borrowing, and speculative trading, and ends in bust, with procyclical liquidation of excess capacity and debt causing price deflation, unemployment, and economic stagnation. The result can be a deep depression.	债务通缩周期始于不断加剧的过度繁荣、过度借贷和不断加码的投机性交易，也就是失衡，之后是泡沫破灭，而过剩产能和债务的顺周期特点导致流动性紧缩、物价通缩、失业及经济停滞、甚至是深度萧条。


In 2000, the imbalance was America’s large current-account deficit: the world’s largest economy was borrowing heavily on international capital markets, rather than lending, as one might expect.	2000年，失衡反映在美国的巨额经常项目赤字：世界第一大经济体在国际资本市场上大量借入资金而非借出资金。


According to then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the problem was that countries running large surpluses were buying so many US Treasuries that they were negating the Fed’s monetary-policy efforts.	时任美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）将问题归结于有巨大贸易盈余的国家购买了太多的美国国债，从而抵消了美联储从紧的货币政策。


But, as Claudio Borio, Hyun Shin, and others have pointed out, excessive off-balance-sheet and offshore lending by US and European banks also added procyclical pressure.	但是，博里奥（Claudio Borio）、Hyun Shin和其他人则指出：美国和欧洲的银行过度发展表外和离岸借贷活动加剧了债务的顺周期扩张。


As a result, risk-taking and leverage grew, facilitated by inadequate regulation, culminating in the global financial crisis of 2008.	结果，冒险和杠杆日增，而监管不力让这些行为变得更加便利，终于引发了2008年的全球金融危机。


To prevent asset bubbles from collapsing and buy time for more sustainable policy fixes, advanced-country central banks implemented massive monetary easing and cut interest rates to zero.	为了阻止资产泡沫爆裂并为更加可持续的政策解决方案赢得时间，发达国家的央行采取了大规模货币宽松政策并将利率削减至零。


Unfortunately, policymakers in most countries wasted the time they were given; moreover, so-called quantitative easing had far-reaching spillover effects.	不幸的是，大部分国家的决策者都浪费了央行为他们争取到的时间； 此外，发达经济体的量化宽松政策给新兴市场经济体带来了影响深远的信贷扩张溢出效应。


Within China, a second displacement occurred: the government implemented a ¥4 trillion ($680 billion) stimulus package in November 2008 to offset weak demand in its major export markets.	中国的债务失衡则始于2008年11月时中国政府开始实施的4万亿元刺激经济计划。 当时中国决策层希望这个计划可以抵消主要出口市场需求萎靡的影响。


While the Chinese authorities had the right idea, two of the policy’s outcomes have complicated the reform prcoess today.	这个想法并没错，但计划执行后的两个结果却给今天的中国改革过程平添不少复杂的困扰。


First, instead of reducing excess capacity and encouraging a structural shift to higher-productivity activities, the authorities’ investment-led strategy increased manufacturing capacity further, along with excess capacity in global commodity production.	首先，当时以投资为主的发展战略没有能够及时减少已经过剩的产能、也没有及时推动产业结构向生产率更高的方向转型，反而进一步增加了低端制造业及全球大宗商品剩余产能。


Second, the stimulus was funded by a debt binge, especially among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments.	其次，当时的刺激经济计划主要通过激增的债务来给项目融资。


The private sector, too, built up debt, with its limited access to equity capital driving firms to the shadow banking sector. The result is a debt overhang of 282% of GDP.	不仅新增大量国有企业和地方政府债务，民营企业债务也通过影子银行大增，因为中国企业很难进入股权形式的资本市场，导致中国的债务上升到占 GDP之比达 282%。


In short, China now faces the same debt-deflation challenge that much of the rest of the world must address.	简而言之，如今中国面临着与世界许多其他国家一样的债务通缩挑战。


The question, of course, is how.	当然，关键在于如何应对这一挑战。


Some argue that the answer is more of the same: continued monetary easing and additional fiscal stimulus. Accumulating more debt (at lower interest rates) can indeed buy time for economic restructuring.	一些人认为答案与发达国家采取的措施类似：继续货币宽松及加码财政刺激，包括以较低利率、更长的期限、及更多的债务来置换现有的坏账，从而为调整经济结构赢得时间。


But it will merely make matters worse if politicians do not use the time to implement effective reforms.	可是，如果政策执行者不能善用这段宝贵的时间来实施有效的结���改革，情况将会变得更糟。


There is no politically painless way out of the debt trap.	跳出债务陷阱必然会带来政治痛苦。


Indeed, the first step in that process is to face up to losses, both in accounting and in real terms.	事实上，这一过程的第一步是直面损失，包括会计意义上的损失和实质性的社会及经济损失。


In the short run, even efforts to spur technological progress and innovation, which might generate recovery through new profits, are likely to have a negative overall impact on employment, owing to the creative destruction of obsolete industries.	在短期，刺激技术进步和创新的措施虽然有利于创造新利润及复苏，但对就业的总影响也不一定是正面，因为创新也有可能对传统行业带来创造性的破坏。


Recognizing this, some argue that the way to force reform is to allow interest rates to reflect credit risks.	认识到这些复杂的挑战，一些人认为强推结构改革之道在于让利率体现信用风险。


For China, whose net international investment position at the end of last year was a surplus of $1.8 trillion , or 17% of GDP, it will be possible to implement internal debt restructuring through debt/equity swaps at the project level.	对中国来说，其去年年底的净国际投资头寸，也就是净对外资产，为盈余1. 8万亿美元或GDP的17%，这意味中国经济整体对外没有资不抵债的问题。


Far-reaching governance and structural reforms in the state and private sectors should follow.	通过国内项目层次的债务/股权互换，也就是实施内部债务及股权结构重组来避免债务通缩是有可能的。 当然财务重组后，应该对国有及民营行业都进行更深入的治理和结构改革。


According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the central and local governments’ net assets amounted to ¥93 trillion, or 164% of GDP, at the end of 2013.	根据中国社会科学院的研究，2013年底中国中央和地方政府净资产为93万亿元，占GDP的164%。


Because SOEs and local governments accounted for more than half of the credit issued through the banking system, proper debt restructuring of state-owned assets would strengthen the projects they were funding, by allowing private or professional management teams to improve overall returns.	国有企业和地方政府占了银行系统发行的信用总量的一大半。 因此，国有资产及债务结构的重组可以让民营投资者及职业管理团队通过改善总回报来增强资金的效率及项目的成功率。


Such reforms are crucial, because, ultimately, escaping the debt-deflation trap will require China to rejuvenate total factor productivity – an effort that the private sector is better equipped to lead.	这些改革是非常关键的，因为归根结底摆脱债务通缩陷阱要求中国提升全要素生产率——在这一方面，民营部门更适合充当推动者的角色。


As the Scandinavian experience has shown, state ownership need not be an obstacle to productivity growth, provided that public assets are professionally and transparently managed, for example, by placing them in the portfolios of pension funds.	北欧斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家的经验表明，国有资产未必阻碍生产率的提升，只要这些公共资产得到专业、透明的管理，比如将它们注入退休基金的投资组合中。


The advanced countries have fallen into the debt-deflation trap because they were unwilling to accept the political pain of real-sector restructuring, relying instead on financial engineering and loose monetary and fiscal policies.	发达国家陷入债务通缩陷阱是因为它们不愿接受实体经济部门结构重组的政治痛苦，而是依赖金融工程和宽松的货币和财政政策来避免短痛。


Here, China’s one-party system provides a clear advantage: the country’s leaders can take politically painful decisions without worrying about the next election.	在这方面，中国的由党来领导重大改革的政治体制可能有其显而易见的优势：中国领导人能够做出政治上十分痛苦的决定而不必担心短期的选举。


One hopes that they do.	希望中国决策层可以果断去做那些应该做的治理及结构性改革。


A couple of months after Alibaba's IPO, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution to prevent online companies like Google from “abusing" their market position.	阿里巴巴IPO后几个月，欧洲议会通过了一项非约束性决议，防止谷歌等在线公司“滥用”市场地位。


Indeed, the gravest cyber crimes originate from precisely those countries, including China and Russia, that are leading the balkanization movement.	事实上，最恶劣的网络犯��正是来自这些在分割运动中一马当先的国家，包括中国和俄罗斯。


China’s Daring Depreciation	中国敢于贬值


BEIJING – On August 11, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) lowered the central parity rate of the renminbi by 1.9%, sending shockwaves around the globe.	北京—8月11日，中国人民银行将人民币中间汇率下调1. 9%，引起了全球冲击。


Many foreign commentators condemned the devaluation as a blatant attempt to boost Chinese exports – a move that would, they warned, spark a new round of currency wars.	许多外国评论家指责贬值是赤裸裸地为了提振中国的出口——他们警告说，此举将引发新一轮货币战争。


But there are good reasons to believe that this was not China’s motivation at all.	但有很好的理由相信这绝非中国贬值的初衷。


In fact, China knows full well that currency wars are self-defeating.	事实上，中国十分清楚，货币战争无异于拿起石头砸自己的脚。


During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s economic situation was much worse than it is today, but the government still resisted the temptation to devalue the renminbi – and the country managed to emerge from the crisis virtually unscathed.	1997年亚洲金融危机期间，中国经济状况比现在糟糕得多，但中国政府仍然抵制住了贬值的诱惑——而中国也成功地在危机中毫发无伤。


Today, a devaluation would probably do little for China’s trade surplus.	如今，贬值对中国的贸易盈余也许根本起不了什么作用。


After all, the country already accounts for more than 12% of global exports, so expanding its share further would probably worsen its terms of trade.	毕竟，中国已经占据全球出口量的12%强，因此进一步扩大这一比例可能恶化贸易条件。


The dominance of processing trade in China – the import of raw materials and components and the export of finished goods – makes the effectiveness of devaluation even more dubious.	在中国的贸易中，加工贸易占主导地位——即进口原材料和部件，出口制成品——这意味着贬值的效果更加模棱两可。


Moreover, China now holds a massive volume of overseas assets and liabilities; its non-financial corporations have borrowed as much as $1 trillion abroad.	此外，目前中国持有巨额海外资产和负债。 其非金融公司海外借款高达1万亿美元。


As devaluation causes businesses’ debt burdens to grow in renminbi terms, the risk of non-performing loans and bankruptcies rises.	贬值将增加企业债务负担的人民币值，因此不良贷款和破产的风险也将增加。


Beyond an awareness of the short-term risks of competitive devaluation lies the Chinese government’s serious commitment to its longer-term goal of shifting the country’s growth model from one based on investment and exports to one driven by domestic consumption.	除了明白竞争性贬值的短期风险，中国政府还认真地致力于其长期目标——将增长模式从基于投资和出口转变为由国内消费驱动。


Indeed, China plans to shrink its trade surplus – which, to be sure, remains large – and offset the negative impact of that process by increasing domestic demand.	事实上，中国计划减少其贸易盈余——当然，其规模仍然十分庞大——并通过增加内需抵消由此带来的消极影响。


Given these factors, it seems likely that the recent devaluation was driven by a different goal.	考虑到这些因素，也许最近的贬值另有其目的。


And, in fact, an announcement made on the same day as the devaluation – one that has been largely overshadowed by the panic – offers an important indication of what that goal was.	事实上，在贬值的同一天，中国宣布了另一个事项——因为恐慌而没有引起什么关注——这个事项也许更能暗示贬值的目标。


From now on, China’s government declared, the renminbi’s central parity rate will align more closely with the previous day’s closing spot rates.	中国政府宣布，从现在开始，人民币汇率中间价将更紧密地与前一日的收盘现货汇率相一致。


This suggests that the devaluation was aimed primarily at giving the markets a greater role in determining the renminbi exchange rate, with the goal of enabling deeper currency reform.	这表明贬值主要是为了让市场在人民币汇率的决定中起到更大的作用，其目标是进一步深化货币改革。


As it stands, Chinese exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate by a maximum of 2% on either side of the central parity, which the PBOC fixes daily.	目前，中国的汇率可以在由人民银行每日公布的汇率中间价上下2%之内波动。


When the moving market rate reaches the edges of the fluctuation band, the PBOC can intervene in the market by buying or selling its foreign-exchange reserves.	当市场汇率达到波动区间的边界时，人民银行将通过买入或出售其外汇储备干预市场。


Market makers now have been instructed that the offer prices they report to the PBOC should be based on the market’s closing parity rate from the previous day, along with the demand and supply conditions in the foreign-exchange market and the movements of major currencies’ exchange rates.	现在，做市商被通知，它们向人民银行报告的卖出价应基于前一日市场汇率收盘价，与外汇市场供求条件以及主要货币汇率的波动相一致。


No one outside the PBOC knows how the market makers will meet these demands.	除了人民银行，其他人都不知道做市商如何满足这一要求。


If the PBOC is now simply moving closer to averaging the offer prices that are not subject to its interference, it is moving closer to an entirely market-based exchange-rate regime.	如果人民银行现在只是进一步拉平不受其干预约束的卖出价，那么它就是在进一步靠近完全基于市场的汇率机制。


But this shift carries serious risks.	但这一动作蕴含着严重的风险。


If the renminbi were to depreciate by, say, 2% every day, it would take very little time for the currency to lose 20% of its value – enough to cause a panic and, regardless of the country’s economic fundamentals, send the exchange rate into a tailspin.	如果人民币每天贬值（比如）2%，那么不消多久，其币值就会跌去20%——足以引发恐慌，造成汇率混乱，不管经济基本面如何。


That is why the PBOC has retained the right to influence the reporting of offer prices by market makers and intervene directly in the market.	因此，人民银行保留了影响做市商报告卖出价和直接干预市场的权利。


And this is precisely what the PBOC did on August 12-13, when stronger-than-expected depreciation pressure and surging devaluation expectations raised the risk that the planned one-off exchange-rate adjustment could trigger a rout.	而这正是人民银行在8月12—13日所做的，当时，比预期更大幅度的贬值压力和飙升的贬值预期导致了一个风险，即计划中的一次性汇率调整可能引发崩盘。


So the PBOC informed the market that the depreciation would not exceed 3% – a credible statement, given abundant official reserves with which to stabilize the exchange rate.	因此人民银行通知市场，贬值不会超过3%——这是一个可信的陈述，因为人民银行拥有充足的官方外汇储备稳定汇率。


The renminbi rebounded, and calm was restored.	人民币随之反弹，市场重归平静。


This episode showed that the renminbi is under significant depreciation pressure, which is likely to intensify as the PBOC, amid weak GDP growth, loosens monetary policy (particularly as the US Federal Reserve is gradually tightening its monetary policy).	这一事件表明，人民币存在着巨大的贬值压力，而随着GDP增长的走弱，人民银行开始放松货币政策（特别是在美联储逐渐收紧其货币政策时），这进一步加剧了这一压力。


Add to that efforts to liberalize the capital account and internationalize the renminbi, and some exchange-rate volatility can be expected.	除此之外，中国还要实施资本账户自由化和人民币国际化，因此可以预期会出现一些汇率波动。


For China’s monetary policymakers, reforming the exchange-rate system, while preventing depreciation from getting out of hand, poses a serious challenge.	对中国的货币决策者来说，改革汇率制度，同时防止贬值失控是一个严峻的挑战。


For the rest of the world, encouraging China to loosen its grip over the exchange rate, even as the renminbi depreciates significantly, is an equally serious imperative.	对世界其他国家来说，鼓励中国放松对汇率的管制（即使人民币大幅贬值）也是同样严峻的要务。


Neither side can afford to fail.	两方面都不容有失。


Channeling China’s Animal Spirits	激发引导中国的企业家精神


HONG KONG – The People’s Bank of China has cut interest rates for the third time in six months, in order to lighten the debt burdens of companies and local governments.	香港—为了减轻企业和地方政府的债务负担，中国人民银行在六个月内第三次降低了利率。


But the PBOC’s monetary easing – accompanied by complementary fiscal and administrative adjustments – has done little to increase demand for new loans.	但人行的货币宽松——以及配套的财政政策和行政机构改革——对于增加新贷款需求没有起到理想的效果。


Instead, it has triggered a sharp rise in China’s stock markets.	相反，货币政策的调整导致了中国股市大涨。


The question now is whether that could turn out to be a very good thing.	现在的问题是，这是否能够变成一件大好事。


There is little doubt that China’s economy is shifting gears very quickly.	毫无疑问，中国经济正在快速换挡。


Official statistics show a slowdown in real growth in the old manufacturing and construction-based economy, reflected in declining corporate profits, rising defaults, and an increase in non-performing loans in poorer-performing cities and regions.	官方数据表明，旧制造业和以建筑业为基础的经济实际增长已经放缓，这反映在出口利润下滑、违约率上升和不良贷款增加，特别表现在业绩表现较差的城市和地区。


Meanwhile, the government’s policies to tackle corruption, overcapacity, excess local-government debt, and pollution have put downward pressure on investment, consumption, and the government’s capacity to deliver its promised growth rate.	与此同时，政府在治理腐败、产能过剩、地方过度负债和污染等问题的措施也给投资、消费以及增长造成了压力。


With harder budget constraints imposed by the central government, local officials and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have curbed their spending on investment, and are now being overly cautious.	在中央政府所施加的预算约束趋紧的情况下，地方官员和国有企业削减了投资支出，并且变得过于谨慎。


In the short run, this restructuring could lead to localized balance-sheet recessions, despite the authorities’ efforts to create a more accommodating macroeconomic environment.	从短期看，这些结构调整可能导致局部地区及行业的资产负债表衰退，即使中央政府正在尽力创造更宽松合适的宏观经济环境。


The private sector, by contrast, is picking up steam, with recent administrative reforms having contributed to a 54% rise in business registrations since March 2014.	另一方面，一些私营企业及部门却蒸蒸日上，最新的行政体制改革导致2014年3月以来的企业注册量增加了54%。


Increased innovation and the rise of the services sector have helped China move beyond its role as the world’s factory to develop its own version of the Internet of Things, driven by platform companies like Alibaba and Tencent.	创新产业和服务业的崛起帮助中国超越其作为世界工厂的角色。 在阿里巴巴和腾讯等互联网平台企业的推动下，中国已经开始发展自身的物联网行业。


Some 14.3 million new stock-market trading accounts were opened in China last year.	去年，中国股市新增开户数量1,430万户。


And the PBOC’s interest-rate cuts, together with reductions in banks’ mandatory reserve ratios, have fueled a rise in the Shanghai, Shenzhen, and ChiNext indices of 95%, 198%, and 383%, respectively, since January 2013.	中国人银行的降息和降准政策导致上海、深圳和创业板指数自2013年1月以来分别上扬95%、198%和383%。


Chinese stock-market capitalization grew from 44% of GDP at the end 2012 to 94% of GDP earlier this month.	中国股市市值占GDP之比从2012年的44%增加到本月初的94%。


This has important potential implications – both positive and negative.	这些政策影响既有利也有弊。


On the positive side, the revival of China’s stock market in a low-interest-rate environment represents an important shift in asset allocation away from real estate and deposits.	从有利的角度看，中国股市在低息环境中的复苏代表着重要的资产配置变化，即资金从房地产和储蓄中流出。


Roughly 50% of Chinese savings – amounting to as much as half of GDP – lie in real estate alone, with 20% in deposits, 11% in stocks, and 12% in bonds.	大约50%的中国储蓄——高达GDP的50%——存在于房地产中，20%为存款，11%在股市中，12%在债券上。


To compare, in the United States, real estate, insurance, and pensions each account for about 20% of total savings, with 7.4% in deposits, 21% in stocks, and 33% in bonds.	比较而言，在美国，房地产、保险与退休养老金各占总储蓄的20%左右，存款占7. 4%，股票市占21%，债券占33%。


Rising stock-market capitalization also helps to reduce the real economy’s exposure to bank financing.	中国股市市值的上涨还有助于降低实体经济对银行融资的过度依赖及其风险暴露。


The US is much more “financialized” than China, with stocks and bonds amounting to 133% and 205% of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2013.	美国的“金融深化”程度远远超过中国，2013年底美国股市和债券分别占GDP的133%和205%。


Those ratios were only 35% and 43%, respectively, in China.	中国的这两个比例分别为35%和43%。


Meanwhile, China’s bank assets amounted to 215% of GDP – more than double America’s 95%.	与此同时，中国银行资产占GDP之比为215%，是美国的95%的两倍多。


Finally, China’s surging stock prices increased net wealth by CN¥37 trillion ($6 trillion), equivalent to 57% of China’s GDP, in just 18 months.	最后，中国股市的大涨让净财富在18个月中增加了37万亿元人民币，相当于中国GDP的57%。


If stock prices can be sustained, the implications for consumption, liquidity, and leverage will be profound.	如果股价可以维持，对于消费、流动性和去杠杆的影响将是深远的。


Smart households and entrepreneurs could take profits and reduce their debts.	明智的家庭和企业可能兑现股市利润、降低债务。


Similarly, both private enterprises and SOEs could use market buoyancy to raise equity to fund new investments.	同时，民企和国企都可能利用牛市热情增发股本为新投资项目融资。


But the rapid run-up in equity prices also carries considerable risks – namely, the possibility that the financial sector will misuse the newfound liquidity to finance more speculative investment in asset bubbles, while supporting old industries with excess capacity.	但股价的飙升也带来了大量风险。 金融行业可能会滥用新出现的流动性，为创造资产泡沫的投机性行为融资，并支持产能过剩的旧行业。


That is what happened in 2008-2009, when a run-up of the Shanghai index (which reached 6,092 in October 2007), together with the government’s CN¥4 trillion stimulus package, sustained overcapacity in traditional industries.	2008—2009年的教训需要铭记，当时，上证指数2007年曾达到6092点，加上政府4万亿人民币的刺激计划维持了传统行业的过剩产能。


Most of the credit went to real estate and local infrastructure projects, effectively reinforcing the most problematic trends in China’s economy.	大部分信贷涌向了房地产和地方基础设施项目，加剧了中国经济结构的不平衡。


This time, one hopes, will be different.	我们希望这次会有所不同。


But even if Chinese retail investors begin to channel their money toward innovative ventures, identifying the companies and industries most likely to succeed will be difficult.	虽然中国散户投资者已经开始将资金投向创新型企业，但发掘成功企业和行业绝非易事。


In the US, the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000 entailed a $4 trillion loss in market capitalization. But the US managed to avoid a systemic crisis.	在美国，2000年高科技泡沫的破裂导致市值缩水4万亿美元，但当时美国股市的破灭并没有导致系统性经济危机。


If China’s animal spirits are allowed to operate through market mechanisms, distinguishing real value from aspirational prices, China, too, can stay the course toward the new economy, despite the failures and consolidation that will inevitably occur.	如果中国的企业家精神可以通过市场机制起作用，在预期“梦幻”价格中找到真实价值，那么中国也可成功走向新经济，尽管在此过程中难免会有个别企业的失败和股市的调整。


As China’s animal spirits are channeled, they will increasingly test the authorities’ resolve to resist price intervention, instead allowing market forces to propel the business cycle.	随着中国的企业家精神得到发挥，将日益考验当局不干预股价，而是允许市场力量来驱动商业周期的决心。


This will not be easy, given that the PBOC has plenty of additional room for monetary easing.	这绝非易事。


Indeed, at the end of last year, China still had CN¥22.7 trillion of statutory reserves, amounting to 36% of GDP, that had long been used to “sterilize” its large foreign-exchange holdings.	中国人民银行有足够的空间实行宽松的货币政策。 事实上，截至去年底，中国仍有22.


Such “locked liquidity” can be returned to the market in the form of new bank credit or new equity.	长期以来，法定准备金是“冲销”巨额外汇储备的手段。 这一“被锁定的流动性”可以以新增银行贷款或新股本的方式重新输回到市场中。


That is why the real test of China’s administrative reforms is whether, through improved bankruptcy mechanisms and regulations that block fraud and market manipulation, they allow – and even facilitate – the effective functioning of market forces.	因此，中国行政改革的真正考验是当局能否通过改进破产制度和阻止欺诈及市场操纵的监管，让市场力量能够真正主导资源配置。


With animal spirits – not the authorities – guiding it, China can build the high-value-added, high-tech economy it needs to compete in the future.	只有当企业家精神，而不是当局的行政指导，真正发挥作用时，中国才能够发展出具有未来竞争力的高附加值、高科技经济。


China’s Economic Identity Crisis	中国的经济身份危机


BEIJING – Unlike the West, where former US President George H.W. Bush once mockingly referred to “the vision thing,” China takes economic strategy very seriously.	北京—中国和西方不同。 美国前总统老布什曾经戏谑“愿景这玩意儿”（the vision thing），而中国对待经济战略非常严肃。


That much was clear at the recent China Development Forum (CDF) in Beijing, an important gathering held each year since 2000, immediately after the conclusion of the annual National People’s Congress.	这在最近的北京中国发展论坛上表现得淋漓尽致。 中国发展论坛始于2000年，是每年在“两会”后不久举行一次的重要会议。


Originally conceived by former Premier Zhu Rongji – one of modern China’s most strategy-minded reformers – the CDF quickly became a high-level platform for engagement between senior Chinese policymakers and an international lineup of academics, foreign officials, and business leaders.	中国发展论坛最初由前总理朱镕基——中国最有战略眼光的现代改革家之一——决心举办，并很快成为中国高级决策者和国际学者、官员和商界领袖的高规格交流平台。


It is, in essence, an intellectual stress test – forcing Chinese leaders to defend newly formulated strategies and policies before a tough and seasoned audience of outside experts.	本质上，这是知识压力测试——迫使中国领导人在严格而理性的外部专家面前为其新制定的战略和政策辩护。


It’s not always easy to distill a singular message from an event like this, especially as the CDF, once a small intimate gathering, has morphed into a Davos-like extravaganza of some 50 sessions spread out over three days.	对于这样的场合，要提炼出简单的信息向来不易，尤其是中国经济发展论坛，它曾经只是小规模非公开会议，但现已发展成为类似于达沃斯论坛的大会，要举行三天，进行50场左右的讨论。


But, having attended 16 of the 17 meetings (I missed the first one), my sense is that CDF 2016 was especially rich in its strategic implications for China’s daunting economic challenges.	但是，我出席了17次会议中的16次（错过了第一届），我的感觉是2016年中国发展论坛对于中国所面临的艰巨经济挑战来说具有特别丰富的战略含义。


And, as I saw it, the elephant in the room was the core identity of China’s economic model – a producer-led versus a consumer-led model.	据我所见，房间中的大象是中国经济模式的核心身份——由生产者拉动还是由消费者拉动。


China’s 30-year development miracle – 10% real annual GDP growth from 1980 to 2010 – was all about the country’s prowess as the ultimate producer.	中国的30年发展奇迹——从1980—2010年保持10%的年真实GDP增长——是通过作为终极生产者的强大实力实现的。


Led by manufacturing and construction, China enjoyed a uniquely powerful impetus.	在制造业和建筑业的拉动下，中国获得了独特的强大动力。


In 1980, exports and investment collectively accounted for 41% of Chinese GDP; by 2010, the combined share was 75%.	1980年，出口和投资加起来占中国GDP的41%； 到2010年，这一比例为75%。


The export portion increased the most – by nearly six-fold, from 6% in 1980 to a pre-crisis peak of 35% in 2007 – as new capacity and infrastructure, low-cost labor, and accession to the World Trade Organization made China the world’s greatest beneficiary of accelerating globalization and surging trade flows.	出口比例增加最多——翻了近六倍，从1980年的6%增长到2007年危机前35%的峰值水平——新产能和基础设施、低成本劳动力和加入世界贸易组织让中国成为加速的全球化和急剧增长的贸易流的最大受益者。


Yet the producer model was not the definitive formula for achieving China’s aspirations of becoming a moderately prosperous society by 2020.	但生产者模式不是中国到2020年实现小康的公式。 这一认识滥觞于现已妇孺皆知的前总理温家宝的“四不”批评。


This realization was foreshadowed by the now-famous “Four Uns” critique of former Premier Wen Jiabao, who back in 2007 correctly diagnosed the producer model as “unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”	2007年，温家宝正确地指出生产者模式“不平衡、不稳定、不协调、不可持续。 ”


Those, of course, were code words for surplus saving, excessive investment, open-ended resource demand, environmental degradation, and mounting income inequalities.	当然，这些批评的对象是储蓄盈余、过度投资、无尽的资源需求、环境破坏和日益加剧的收入不平等。


A new model was needed not only to escape such pitfalls, but also to avoid the dreaded “middle-income trap” that ensnares most fast-growing developing economies when they reach income thresholds that China was rapidly approaching.	需要新的模式来摆脱这些全套，并避免大部分高增长发展中国家在到达中国正在迅速靠近的收入门槛时陷入的可怕的“中等收入陷阱”。


Wen’s critique triggered an intense internal debate that resulted in a key strategic decision to rebalance the Chinese economy by shifting to a consumer-based model, as framed by the 12th Five-Year Plan of 2011-2015.	温家宝的批评激起了激烈的内部争论，最后形成了一个重要战略决定——通过向基于消费者的模式的转型实现中国经济再平衡，并写入了2011—2015年的十二五规划。 这一新方针强调三个主要成分：转向服务业以增加就业创造；


This new approach stressed three major components: a shift to services to boost job creation; accelerated urbanization to raise real wages; and a more robust social safety net to provide Chinese families with the security needed to channel their newfound income from fear-driven precautionary saving into discretionary consumption.	加速城市化以提高真实工资； 以及更加坚挺的社会安全网向中国家庭提供安全保证从而让他们将从出于恐惧而进行的预防性储蓄中获得的收入用于自由裁量支出。


The results of the now-completed 12th Five-Year Plan were impressive – especially in light of the formidable challenge that structural change implies for any economy.	现已完成的十二五规划成果卓著——特别是考虑到对任何经济体来说都十分艰巨的结构变化挑战。


But that’s where China’s strategic focus is most effective – providing an over-arching framework to guide the economy from point A to point B.	但中国的战略重点在哪里影响最大——这提供了一个指导中国经济从A点走向B点的整体框架。


But this journey is far from complete.	但这一过程还远未完成。


While China’s targets for services and urbanization were exceeded, the end results fell short on many aspects of building a more robust (that is, fully funded) social safety net.	中国的服务业和城市化目标超额完成，但最终结果在很多方面并未达到构建更加坚挺（即资金充裕）的社会安全网的目标。


As a result, personal consumption inched up from just 35% of GDP in 2010 to only about 37% in 2015.	结果，个人消费只是从2010年仅占GDP的35%增加到2015年的37%左右。


Notwithstanding the unfinished business of consumer-led rebalancing, China now appears to be embracing yet another shift in its core economic strategy – driven by a broad array of “supply-side initiatives” that range from capacity reduction and deleveraging to innovation and productivity.	尽管向消费拉动的再平衡尚未完成，中国目前仍开始了其核心经济战略的另一个转变——其背后推动因素是范围广泛的“供给侧改革方案”，包括产能收缩、去杠杆、创新和生产率。


That emphasis was formalized in Premier Li Keqiang’s recent “Work Report,” which outlined the new strategy of the just-enacted 13th Five-Year Plan (covering the 2016-20 period).	这一着重点由李克强总理在最新《政府工作报告》中提出，该报告还提出了刚刚开始实施的十三五规划（2016—2020年）的新战略刚要。


In identifying the top “eight tasks” for 2016, Li put supply-side reforms at number two – second only to the government’s focus on economic stability in countering China’s growth slowdown.	在确定2016年的“八大任务”中，李克强将供给侧改革排在第二——仅次于应对增长放缓的经济稳定政策。


By contrast, emphasis on boosting domestic demand – long the focus of China’s consumer-led rebalancing strategy – was downgraded to third place on the so-called work agenda.	相反，对提振内需的强调——长期以来一直是中国消费拉动再平衡战略的重点——在所谓的工作议程中排位下降到第三。


In China, where internal debates are carefully scripted, nothing happens by accident.	在中国，内部争论总是被小心掩饰，不存在偶尔发生的事故。


In the keynote speech at this year’s CDF, Vice Premier and Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhang Gaoli drove this point home, emphasizing the need to direct supply-side initiatives at China’s “main threat.”	在今年中国发展论坛的主旨演讲上，中共中央政治局常委、副总理张高丽强调了这一点，重点指出了引导供给侧方案对准中国“主要威胁”的必要。


By contrast, there were only passing mentions of consumer-led rebalancing.	相反，对于消费者推动的再平衡，张高丽只是一带而过。


Maybe I am guilty of splitting hairs.	也许我有些钻牛角尖了。


After all, every economy needs to focus on both the supply and the demand sides of its growth equation.	毕竟，所有经济体都需要同时注重增长等式的供给和需求侧。


But this shift in emphasis – in the 13th Five-Year Plan as well as in the debate and messaging at this year’s China Development Forum – appears to be an important signal.	但强调点的转变——包括十三五规划以及今年中国发展论坛的争论和吹风——似乎是一个重要的信号。


I worry that it could indicate a premature shift away from the consumer-led model back to China’s comfort zone of a producer model that has long been more amenable to the industrial engineering of central planning.	我担心这意味着过早地从消费者拉动模式回到中国的舒适区——长期以来更加顺从于中央计划的产业工程的生产者模式。


Strategy is China’s greatest strength, lending credibility to its commitment to structural transformation.	战略是中国最大的优势，也是其结构转型承诺的信誉来源。


Yet much remains to bring the Chinese consumer to life.	但要让中国消费者拥有活力还有很多事要做。


Yes, it is a tough challenge.	诚然，这是一个艰巨的挑战。


But de-emphasizing that strategic commitment could call into question a crucial shift now required of China’s core economic identity.	但不再强调这一战略承诺可能让中国核心经济身份所要求的关键转变出现问题。


China’s Bumpy New Normal	中国的坎坷新常态


SHANGHAI – China’s shift from export-driven growth to a model based on domestic services and household consumption has been much bumpier than some anticipated, with stock-market gyrations and exchange-rate volatility inciting fears about the country’s economic stability.	发自上海——中国正在实施的从出口驱动型向基于国内服务和家庭消费的增长模式转型要比一些人预想中更多波折，而股市暴跌和汇率波动则体现了对该国经济稳定状况的忧虑。


Yet by historical standards, China’s economy is still performing well – at near 7% annual GDP growth, some might say very well – but success on the scale that China has seen over the past three decades breeds high expectations.	不过按历史标准衡量，中国的经济仍然表现良好——接近7%的GDP年增长率在某些人看来已经非常好了——而中国在过去三十年间取得的巨大成功则催生了很高的期望。


There is a basic lesson: “Markets with Chinese characteristics” are as volatile and hard to control as markets with American characteristics.	一个基本的教训是：“中国特色的市场”就跟美国特色的市场一样充满波动和难以控制。


Markets invariably take on a life of their own; they cannot be easily ordered around.	市场一贯都有自身的生命力； 也不太愿意按指令行事。


To the extent that markets can be controlled, it is through setting the rules of the game in a transparent way.	在某种程度上，控制市场就得通过某种透明的方式来设置游戏规则。


All markets need rules and regulations.	所有的市场都需要规章制度。


Good rules can help stabilize markets.	好的规则可以帮助稳定市场。


Badly designed rules, no matter how well intentioned, can have the opposite effect.	而设计有缺陷的规则，无论出发点是多么用心良苦，都可以产生反效果。


For example, since the 1987 stock-market crash in the United States, the importance of having circuit breakers has been recognized; but if improperly designed, such reforms can increase volatility.	比如有了1987年美国股市崩盘的前车之鉴，全世界都知道了设立熔断机制的重要性； 但如果设计不当，这种改革反而会增加波动性。


If there are two levels of circuit breaker – a short-term and a long-term suspension of trading – and they are set too close to each other, once the first is triggered, market participants, realizing the second is likely to kick in as well, could stampede out of the market.	如果两个级别的熔断——短期和长期交易暂停——被设置得太过接近，一旦触发第一级，市场参与者会意识到第二级很快会来到，于是争相逃离市场。


Moreover, what happens in markets may be only loosely coupled with the real economy. The recent Great Recession illustrates this.	此外，市场状况与实体经济之间只会有松散的联系，而最近的大衰退就说明了这一点。


While the US stock market has had a robust recovery, the real economy has remained in the doldrums.	尽管美国股市已强劲复苏，实体经济却依然低迷。


Still, stock-market and exchange-rate volatility can have real effects.	尽管如此，股市和汇率的波动可以产生真正的影响。


Uncertainty may lead to lower consumption and investment (which is why governments should aim for rules that buttress stability).	不确定性可能会导致较低水平的消费和投资（这就是为何政府应把目标放在巩固稳定的规则之上）。


What matters more, though, are the rules governing the real economy.	而更重要的则是管理实体经济的规则。


In China today, as in the US 35 years ago, there is a debate about whether supply-side or demand-side measures are most likely to restore growth.	在今日的中国，正如35年前的美国一样，存在着究竟是供应侧还是需求侧措施才最可能恢复增长的讨论。


The US experience and many other cases provide some answers.	而美国的经验和许多其他案例则可以提供一些答案。


For starters, supply-side measures can best be undertaken when there is full employment.	首先，在存在充分就业的情况下最好实施供应侧措施。


In the absence of sufficient demand, improving supply-side efficiency simply leads to more underutilization of resources.	在缺乏足够需求的情况下，提高供应侧效率只会导致更严重的资源利用不足。


Moving labor from low-productivity uses to zero-productivity unemployment does not increase output.	把劳动力从低生产率活动向零生产率的失业迁移并不会增加产量。


Today, deficient global aggregate demand requires governments to undertake measures that boost spending.	而如今全球总需求的缺乏也需要政府采取刺激消费的措施。


Such spending can be put to many good uses.	这些支出可以用在很多很好的地方。


China’s critical needs today include reducing inequality, stemming environmental degradation, creating livable cities, and investments in public health, education, infrastructure, and technology.	当今中国的关键需求包括减少不平等现象，遏制环境恶化，打造宜居城市，以及投资于公共卫生，教育，基础设施和技术。


The authorities also need to strengthen regulatory capacity to ensure the safety of food, buildings, medicines and much else.	当局还需要加强在食品，建筑，医药和其他许多方面的安全监管能力。


Social returns from such investments far exceed the costs of capital.	这些投资所产生的社会回报也将远远超过其资金成本。


China’s mistake in the past has been to rely too heavily on debt financing.	中国过去的错误在于过于依赖债务融资。


But China also has ample room to increase its tax base in ways that would increase overall efficiency and/or equity.	但中国也有足够的空间去以提高整体效率和/或资产的方式增加其税基。 环境税可能会在带来大量政府收入的情况下催生更好的空气和水质量；


Environmental taxes could lead to better air and water quality, even as they raise substantial revenues; congestion taxes would improve quality of life in cities; property and capital-gains taxes would encourage higher investment in productive activities, promoting growth.	拥堵税将改善城市的生活质量； 财产和资本利得税能刺激更多向生产性活动增加投资，促进经济增长。


In short, if designed correctly, balanced-budget measures – increasing taxes in tandem with expenditures –could provide a large stimulus to the economy.	简而言之，只要设计合理，平衡预算措施——在提升支出的同时增加税收——就相当于一个庞大刺激计划。


Nor should China fall into the trap of emphasizing backward-looking supply-side measures.	中国也不应落入强调过去供应侧措施的陷阱。


In the US, resources were wasted when shoddy homes were built in the middle of the Nevada desert.	在美国，那些坐落于内华达州沙漠中的劣质房屋是被浪费的资源。


But the first priority is not to knock down those homes (in an effort to consolidate the housing market); it is to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently in the future.	但首要任务不是清拆那些房屋（以巩固住房市场）； 而是确保资源能在未来得到有效分配。


Indeed, the basic principle taught in the first weeks of any elementary economics course is to let bygones be bygones – don’t cry over spilt milk.	事实上，在任何初级经济学课程的第一周所教授的基本原则都是要向前看——不要打翻的牛奶哭泣。


Low-cost steel (provided at prices below the long-term average cost of production but at or above the marginal cost) may be a distinct advantage for other industries.	低成本的钢材（以低于长期平均生产成本却等于或高于边际成本的价格供应）对其他行业来说显然是福音。


It would have been a mistake, for example, to destroy America’s excess capacity in fiber optics, from which US firms gained enormously in the 1990s.	比如说，消除美国的光纤产能过剩状况可能是错误的（美国企业在1990年代从中大举获益）。


The “option” value associated with potential future uses should always be contrasted with the minimal cost of maintenance.	与未来潜在未来使用相关的“选项”价值应该与维护的最低成本相权衡。


The challenge facing China as it confronts the problem of excess capacity is that those who would otherwise lose their jobs will require some form of support; firms will argue for a robust bailout to minimize their losses.	而中国在产能过剩问题方面面临的挑战是，那些失去工作的人将需要某种形式的援助； 企业会要求大笔救助款以减少自身损失。


But if the government accompanied effective demand-side measures with active labor-market policies, at least the employment problem could be effectively addressed, and optimal – or at least reasonable – policies for economic restructuring could be designed.	但如果政府能把有效的需求侧措施和积极劳动力市场政策相结合，那么至少就业问题能得到有效解决，还可以设计出最优的——或者至少是合理的——经济结构调整政策。


There is also a macro-deflationary problem.	此外还有一个宏观通缩的问题。


Excess capacity fuels downward pressure on prices, with negative externalities on indebted firms, which experience an increase in their real (inflation-adjusted) leverage.	产能过剩增加了价格下行的压力，对负债企业产生了负外部性，令企业感到（计入通胀后）真实杠杆有所增加。


But a far better approach than supply-side consolidation is aggressive demand-side expansion, which would counter deflationary pressures.	但比一个比巩固供应侧更好的做法是积极的需求方扩张，这将遏制通缩压力。


The economic principles and political factors are thus well known.	经济原则和政治因素是众所周知的。


But too often the debate about China’s economy has been dominated by naive proposals for supply-side reform – accompanied by criticism of the demand-side measures adopted after the 2008 global financial crisis.	但针对中国经济的讨论往往被天真的供应侧改革提议所主导——伴随着对2008年全球金融危机后采取的需求侧措施的批评。


Those measures were far from perfect; they had to be formulated on the fly, in the context of an unexpected emergency.	这些措施远远称不上完善； 在意外的紧急状态下必须在执行的同时得到规管。


But they were far better than nothing.	但这要远胜于呆在原地毫无应对。


That is because using resources in suboptimal ways is always better than not using them at all; in the absence of the post-2008 stimulus, China would have suffered substantial unemployment.	这是因为以次优的方式使用资源总是比不使用要好； 如果没有2008年后的刺激，中国将遭遇大规模失业。


If the authorities embrace better-designed demand-side reforms, they will have greater scope for more comprehensive supply-side reforms.	如果当局能实施设计更完善的需求方改革，他们将有更大空间去实施全面的供应侧改革。


Moreover, the magnitude of some of the necessary supply-side reforms will be markedly diminished, precisely because the demand-side measures will reduce excess supply.	此外，一些必要的供应侧改革的幅度将显着减少，正是由于需求侧的措施将减少供应过剩。


This is not just an academic debate between Western Keynesian and supply-side economists, now being played out on the other side of the world.	这可不仅仅是发生在世界另一端的西方凯恩斯主义者和供给侧经济学家之间的一个学术争论。


The policy approach China adopts will strongly influence economic performance and prospects worldwide.	因为中国实施的政策手段将极大影响全球的经济表现和前景。


China’s Vicious Growth Circle	中国的恶性增长循环


LONDON – Most economists have a reason to be worried about China’s economy – whether it be low consumption and large external surpluses, industrial overcapacity, environmental degradation, or government interventions like capital controls or financial repression.	伦敦—大部分经济学家都有为中国经济担心的原因——消费不足和巨大的外部盈余啦，工业产能过剩啦，环境破坏啦，资本管制或金融抑制之类的政府干预啦，等等。


What many fail to recognize is that these are merely the symptoms of a single underlying problem: China’s skewed growth model.	很多人没有意识到的是，这些大多只是同一个根本问题的症候：中国增长模式存在缺陷。


That model is, to some extent, a policy-induced construct, the result of a deep-rooted bias toward construction and manufacturing as the leading drivers of economic development.	从某正程度上说，这一模式是政策导致的结构，是根深蒂固地偏好建筑和制造业作为经济发展主要引擎的结果。


This predilection harkens back to the Great Leap Forward of the 1950s, when scrap metal was melted to meet wildly optimistic steel-production targets, thereby advancing Mao’s dream of rapid industrialization.	这一偏好可以追溯到20世纪50年代的大跃进，在这场运动中，为了满足太过于乐观的钢铁产量目标，进而实现毛泽东的快速工业化梦想，炼出了大量废金属。


Today, China’s proclivity for industrial production is manifested in large-scale manufacturing and infrastructure projects, encouraged by direct and indirect government subsidies.	如今，中国对工业产量的热衷可以从大规模制造业和基础设施工程中一览无余，这些工程的背后是直接和间接的政府补贴。


By boosting investment and generating tax revenue for local governments, this approach has a more immediate positive impact on GDP than efforts to develop the service sector.	这一方针能刺激投资、为地方政府带来税收收入，因此比发展服务业的政策对GDP有更加迅速的积极影响。


But the model also carries considerable costs.	但该模式也带来了巨大的代价。


Indeed, China is now locked in a vicious economic circle, sustained by seemingly unrelated distortionary policies that are, in fact, deeply interconnected, even symbiotic.	事实上，如今中国陷入了一个恶行经济循环，这一循环由看似无关，但事实上彼此关系紧密甚至是共生关系的扭曲性政策维持。


One of the most glaring features of this pattern is the disparity between China’s GDP growth, which has averaged nearly 10% annually over the last few decades, and its employment growth, which has amounted to just 1-2% annually.	这一模式的一个最显著的特征是中国GDP增长（在过去几十年中平均每年接近10%）与其就业增长（每年只增加1—2%）之间的不匹配。


Clearly, industrialization and export expansion alone cannot absorb China’s massive labor force.	显然，工业化和出口扩张无法吸收中国巨大的劳动力。


The problem is that rapid labor-productivity growth in the industrial sector – more than 10% per year over the last two decades – is reducing the need to hire more workers.	问题在于，工业部门快速的劳动生产率增长（过去二十年每年大于10%）正在减少雇用更多工人的需要。


The service sector, by contrast, experienced much slower labor-productivity growth (about 5% annually over the same period), meaning that it could be far more effective in generating employment growth.	相反，服务业劳动生产率增长要缓慢得多（过去二十年每年大约5%），这意味着其在创造就业增长方面远比工业部门有效。


In the United States, about 80% of the total labor force was deployed in the services sector in 2012.	在美国，2012年80%左右的劳动力在服务业中就业。


Another consequence of China’s skewed growth model has been a decline in household income as a share of GDP, from 70% in 1990 to 60% in 2009, whereas in the US, for example, the ratio has remained stable, at around 80% of GDP.	中国有缺陷的增长模式的另一个后果是家庭收入占GDP比重从1990年的70%下降到2009年的60%，而（比如）美国的这一比例稳定在GDP的80%左右。


In other words, Chinese households are missing out on the benefits of economic growth.	换句话说，中国家庭并没有获得经济增长的好处。


This phenomenon, too, can be blamed largely on distortionary policies.	这一现象也可以主要归咎为扭曲性政策。


In order to cap the rise in labor costs, wages were suppressed, growing by only 5% annually over the last 20 years, even as productivity grew at an annual rate of 8.5%.	为了限制劳动力成本的上升，工资被抑制，在过去20年中每年只增加5%，尽管生产率增长年率高达8. 5%。


Meanwhile, financial repression lowered the cost of capital.	与此同时，金融抑制降低了资本成本。


In the last decade, the average real (inflation-adjusted) return on deposits has been near zero.	在过去十年中，存款平均真实（经通胀调整）回报接近于零。


With about 80% of Chinese household savings deposited in banks, this implicit tax on savings has had a major economic impact, reinforcing Chinese households’ tendency to save and thus undermining consumption growth and exacerbating global imbalances.	中国家庭储蓄中有大约80%是银行存款，这一隐性存款税带来了巨大的经济影响，强化了中国家庭的储蓄倾向，从而削弱了消费增长、恶化了全球失衡。


In this way, China’s distortionary policies have helped to perpetuate a dysfunctional growth model.	中国的扭曲性政策就这样长期维持着一个功能不健全的增长模式。


Wage suppression, financial repression, and an undervalued exchange rate subsidize exports and production, at the expense of households, which are thus compelled to save, weakening domestic demand.	工资抑制、金融抑制和汇率低估补贴了出口和生产，而承担代价的是被迫存款的家庭，这削弱了内需。


In order to achieve growth targets, the government thus must depend on exports and investment – an approach that leads to the accumulation of massive reserves, which subsequently need to be sterilized.	为了实现增长目标，政府不得不依靠出口和投资——从而积累起巨额储备，而储备必须予以冲销。


Low interest rates help to contain the cost of sterilization at the national level and reduce costs at the firm level – again at the expense of households.	低利率有助于遏制国家层面的冲销成本、降低了企业成本——而承受代价的又是家庭。


Breaking the cycle will not be easy, but there is no other way to address many of the most pressing problems confronting China’s economy.	打破这一循环并不容易，但要解决中国经济所面临的大部分紧迫问题，没有别的路可走。


Indeed, the current growth model is also taking a heavy toll on the environment, with pollution threatening the population’s health, especially in urban areas.	事实上，当前的增长模式还对环境造成了重大影响，污染威胁着人民的健康，特别��在城市地区。


Moreover, the bias toward manufacturing and export industries leads to a severe misallocation of capital.	此外，偏好制造和出口也导致了严重的资本错配。


Less efficient industrial sectors have accumulated significant excess capacity, destabilizing the entire economy, while more productive, efficient sectors lack access to the resources they need.	低效率行业积累了大量过剩产能，动摇着整个经济，而生产率更高的高效率行业又难以获得需要的资源。


Restructuring the economy is perhaps the most urgent – and most difficult – challenge facing China’s leaders today.	因此，重组经济也许是当今中国领导人所面临的最紧迫也是最艰难的挑战。


Given that the current distortions are interlinked, they may need to be addressed simultaneously.	当前的诸多扭曲盘根错节，必须同时解决。


China’s gradualist approach may no longer work.	中国的渐进方针也许不再管用了。


China’s Slow-Growth Opportunity	中国的慢增长机会


BEIJING – After four disappointing years, Chinese economists have realized that slowing GDP growth – from a post-crisis peak of 12.8% in 2010 to about 7% today – is mainly structural, rather than cyclical.	北京—在经历了令人失望的四年后，中国经济学家已经意识到，GDP增长的放缓——从2010年危机后峰值12. 8%下降到今天的7%左右——主要是结构性的，而不是周期性的。


In other words, China’s potential growth rate has settled onto a significantly lower plateau.	换句话说，中国潜在增长率已经下降到显著更低的平台。


While the country should be able to avoid a hard landing, it can expect annual growth to remain at 6-7% over the next decade.	尽管中国应能避免硬着陆，但可以预期未来十年年增长率保持在6—7%。


But this may not necessarily be bad news.	但这未必是坏消息。


One might question why GDP in China, where per capita income recently surpassed $7,000, is set to grow so much more slowly than Japan’s did from 1956 to 1970, when the Japanese economy, with per capita income starting from about $7,000, averaged 9.7% annual growth.	你也许会问，为何人均收入最近才越过7,000美元的中国，其GDP即将比1956—1970年的日本慢许多。 1956—1970年，日本人均收入也在7,000美元左右，但其年增长率平均为9.


The answer lies in potential growth.	7%。 答案就在于潜在增长率。


Whereas, according to Japan’s central bank, Japanese labor productivity grew by more than 10% annually, on average, from 1960 to 1973, Chinese productivity has been declining steadily in recent years, from 11.8% in 2001-2008 to 8.8% in 2008-2012, and to 7.4% in 2011-2012.	据日本银行的数据，1960至1973年间，日本劳动生产率平均每年增长10%以上，而中国生产率增长在近几年中稳步下降从2001—2008年的11. 8%下降到2008—2012年的8.


Japan’s labor supply (measured in labor hours) was also growing during that period, by more than 3% annually.	4%。 日本劳动供给（以劳动时长衡量）也在1960至1973年期间有所增长，每年增长幅度超过3%。


By contrast, China’s working-age population has been shrinking, by more than three million annually, since 2012 – a trend that will, with a 4-6-year lag, cause labor-supply growth to decline, and even turn negative.	相反，自2012年以来，中国工作年龄人口开始下降，每年下降规模超过三百万——这一趋势将以4—6年的时滞导致劳动供给增长下降甚至由正转负。


Given the difficulty of reversing these trends, it is difficult to imagine how China could maintain a growth rate anywhere close to 10% for another decade, despite its low per capita income.	扭转这些趋势很困难，因此很难想象中国如何能够在未来十年继续维持接近10%的增长率，尽管其人均收入仍然较低。


But there is more.	但还有其他原因。


As the Japanese economist Ryuichiro Tachi has pointed out, Japan also benefited from a high savings rate and a low capital coefficient (the ratio of capital to output) of less than 1.	日本经济学家馆龙一郎（Ryuichiro Tachi）指出，日本还从高储蓄率和小于1的低资本系数（资本与产出的比率）中获益。


Though a precise comparison is difficult, there is no doubt that China’s capital coefficient is much higher, implying a larger gap between the growth rate of capital intensity (the total amount of capital needed per dollar of revenue) and that of labor productivity.	尽管精确比较十分困难，但毫无疑问中国资本系数要远高于日本，这意味着更大的资本密集度（每一美元收入所需要的资本总量）和劳动生产率增长缺口。


At times, a high investment rate can offset a high capital coefficient’s negative impact on growth.	有时，高储蓄率可以抵消高资本系数对增长的负面影响。


But China’s investment rate is already too high, accounting for almost half of GDP.	但中国的储蓄率已经过高，几乎占了GDP的一半。


With capital intensity increasing significantly faster than labor productivity in China, the inefficiency of investment is clear.	由于中国资本密集度增长远高于劳动生产率，投资的低效率显而易见。


In this context, increased investment would only exacerbate the problem.	在这样的情况下，提高投资只能恶化问题。


Making matters worse, China’s corporate debt is already the highest in the world, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP.	更糟糕的是，中国的公司债务已是世界最高，不管以绝对值衡量还是以相对GDP衡量都是如此。


In this context, increasing investment would not only reduce capital efficiency further; it would also heighten the risk implied by companies’ high leverage ratios.	在这样的情况下，增加投资不但会进一步抑制资本效率，还会增加公司高杠杆率带来的风险。


With all major indicators suggesting a significant decline in China’s growth potential, China’s leaders must accept the reality of lower growth and adjust their priorities accordingly.	所有主要主表都表明中国增长潜力将显著下降，中国领导人必须接受增长放缓的现实并据此调整重点。


Succumbing to the temptation of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus, such as that pursued in the wake of the global economic crisis, would not only fail to boost growth in a sustainable way; it would actually undermine growth and stability in the medium to long term.	接受大规模货币和财政刺激的诱惑——如全球经济危机爆发时那样——不但不能刺激可持续增长； 实际上还会破坏中长期增长和稳定。


A better approach would focus on making economic growth more sustainable.	更好的方针是将重点放在让经济增长更加可持续。


On this issue, Japan has some useful lessons to offer.	在这一问题上，日本可以提供一些有用的教益。


In the 1970s, recognizing the inevitability of a slowdown, Japan shelved its ambitious plan to “remodel” the Japanese archipelago.	20世纪70年代，日本意识到放缓已不可避免，提出了“改造”日本列岛的宏大计划。


Policymakers shut down energy-intensive factories in the heavy chemical industry, promoted innovation, and took steps to address air and water pollution.	决策者关闭了重化工业的能源密集型工厂，刺激创新，并采取措施解决空气和水污染。


As a result, the quality of Japan’s economic growth improved considerably, even as its rate fell by nearly half in the decade after the oil shock in 1973.	结果，日本经济增长质量大幅改善，虽然其增长率在1973年石油冲击后的十年中下降了近一半。


The good news is that China’s leaders seem intent on adopting a similar approach, including avoidance of monetary and fiscal expansion, unless growth seems set to collapse.	好消息是中国领导人似乎倾向于采取类似地方方针，包括直到增长要崩溃才考虑货币和财政扩张。


Indeed, at the recently concluded National People’s Congress, Prime Minister Li Keqiang affirmed the authorities’ 7% target for GDP growth this year, while reiterating the importance of deepening reform and carrying out structural adjustments.	事实上，在最近结束的全国人大会议上，李克强总理确认今年当局的GDP增长目标为7%，并重申了深化改革、实施结构调整的重要性。


For China, accepting lower growth provides a crucial opportunity to support stable and sustainable development.	对中国来说，接受更低的增长为支持稳定的可持续发展提供了关键机会。


If China’s leaders stay the course of reform and rebalancing, the entire global economy will be better off.	如果中国领导人坚持改革和再平衡，全球经济都能从中获益。


What Should China Do?	中国应该做什么？


STANFORD – The Chinese government’s heavy-handed efforts to contain recent stock-market volatility – the latest move prohibits short selling and sales by major shareholders – have seriously damaged its credibility.	斯坦福—中国政府大手笔遏制最近的股市波动——最新的举措是禁止卖空和大股东减持——严重损害了它的信誉。


But China’s policy failures should come as no surprise.	但中国的政策失败并不令人惊奇。


Policymakers there are far from the first to mismanage financial markets, currencies, and trade.	中国决策者绝非金融市场、货币和贸易管理不当的“先锋”。


Many European governments, for example, suffered humiliating losses defending currencies that were misaligned in the early 1990s.	比如，20世纪90年代初，许多欧洲政府因为试图捍卫估值不正确的货币而蒙受了巨大损失。


Still, China’s economy remains a source of significant uncertainty.	不过，中国经济仍然是巨大的不确定性来源。


Indeed, although the performance of China’s stock market and that of its real economy has not been closely correlated, a major slowdown is underway.	事实上，尽管中国股市以及实体经济表现之间的关系并不密切，但大减速已经开始。


That is a serious concern, occupying finance ministries, central banks, trading desks, and importers and exporters worldwide.	这是一个严重问题，令全世界财政部长、央行行长、交易界和进出口行业担心不已。


China’s government believed that it could engineer a soft landing in the transition from torrid double-digit economic growth, fueled by exports and investments, to steady and balanced growth underpinned by domestic consumption, especially of services.	中国政府相信它可以在从出口和投资推动的动辄两位数的经济增长向以国内消费特别是服务业消费为基础的稳定均衡增长的过程中实现软着陆。


And, in fact, it enacted some sensible policies and reforms.	而事实上，中国政府也实施了一些明智的政策和改革。


But rapid growth obscured many problems.	但高增长掩盖了许多问题。 比如，官员们寻求通过实现短期经济目标确保升迁，这导致了资源配置不当；


For example, officials, seeking to secure promotions by achieving short-term economic targets, misallocated resources; basic industries like steel and cement built up vast excess capacity; and bad loans accumulated on the balance sheets of banks and local governments.	基础行业（如钢铁业和水泥业）累积了巨大的过剩产能； 而银行和地方政府的资产负债表上也累积了大量不良贷款。


Nowhere are the problems with this approach more apparent than in the attempt to plan urbanization, which entailed the construction of large new cities – complete with modern infrastructure and plentiful housing – that have yet to be occupied.	最能体现这一问题莫过于城镇化规划，城镇化让大型新城市纷纷投入建设——包括现代基础设施和大量住房——却无人入住。


In a sense, these “ghost cities” resemble the Russian empire’s Potemkin villages, built to create an impressive illusion for the passing Czarina; but China’s ghost cities are real and were presumably meant to do more than flatter the country’s leaders.	从某种程度上讲，这些“鬼城”与沙俄的波将金村（Potemkin village）类似，只是为了个路过的沙皇皇后营造印象深刻的幻觉； 但中国的鬼城是实实在在的，也许不仅仅是为了取悦领导人。


Now that economic growth is flagging – official statistics put the annual rate at 7%, but most observers believe the real number is closer to 5% (or even lower) – China’s governance problems are becoming impossible to ignore.	如今，经济增长已经慢了下来——官方年增长率数据为7%，但大部分观察者认为接近5%（甚至更低）——中国的治理问题也变得不容忽视。


Although China’s growth rate still exceeds that of all but a few economies today, the scale of the slowdown has been wrenching, with short-run dynamics similar to a swing in the United States or Germany from 2% GDP growth to a 3% contraction.	尽管中国的增长率仍超过当今绝大部分经济体，但放缓的规模令人担忧，其所造成的短期动态类似于美国或德国GDP从2%的增长变为3%的收缩。


A China beset by serious economic problems is likely to experience considerable social and political instability.	陷入严重经济问题的中国可能发生严重的社会和政治动荡。


As the slowdown threatens to impede job creation, undermining the prospects of the millions of people moving to China’s cities each year in search of a more prosperous life, the Chinese Communist Party will struggle to maintain the legitimacy of its political monopoly.	随着减速开始拖累就业创造，每年迁往中国城市的数百万人将更加难以找到优渥的生活，在这样的情况下，中国共产党的政治垄断合法性将受到质疑。


(More broadly, the weight of China’s problems, together with Russia’s collapse and Venezuela’s 60% inflation, has strained the belief of some that state capitalism trumps market economies.)	（从更广的角度看，中国问题，再加上俄罗斯的崩溃和委内瑞拉的60%的通货膨胀率，将让很多人不再相信国家资本主义优于市场经济。 ）


Given China’s systemic importance to the global economy, instability there could pose major risks far beyond its borders.	中国对于全球经济具有系统重要性，因此中国出现动荡所产生的危险远远不止于其国界线内。


China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities, a major trade partner for the US, Europe, Latin America, and Australia, and a key facilitator of intra-Asian trade, owing partly to the scale of its processing trade.	中国是美国国债最大的外国持有者，美国、欧洲、拉丁美洲和澳大利亚的主要贸易伙伴，也是内亚贸易的关键推动者，这部分是因为其巨大的加工贸易规模。


The world has a lot at stake in China, and China’s authorities have a lot on their plate.	中国对于世界可谓牵一发而动全身，而中国当局已经快要左支右绌了。


The government must cope with the short-term effects of the slowdown while continuing to implement reforms aimed at smoothing the economy’s shift to a new growth model and expanding the role of markets.	中国政府必须解决减速的短期影响，同时继续实施旨在让经济平稳过渡到新增长模式和扩大市场作���的改革。 外国企业正在试图争夺中国快速增长的中产阶级。


Foreign firms are seeking access to China’s rapidly growing middle class, which the McKinsey Global Institute estimates already exceeds 200 million.	据麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）估算，中国中产阶级已超过2亿人。


But that implies a stable business environment, including more transparency in government approvals, and looser capital controls.	但这需要稳定的商业环境，包括增加政府批准的透明度和放松资本管制。


With these goals in mind, China’s government recently engineered a modest currency devaluation – about 3% so far.	为了实现这些目标。 中国政府最近发动了温和的货币贬值——到目前为止贬值了大约3%。


That is probably too small to alter China’s trade balance with Europe or the US significantly.	这一幅度也许无法让中国与欧洲或美国的贸易平衡发生重大变化。


But it signals a shift toward a more market-oriented exchange rate.	但它释放出一个向更加市场导向的汇率变化的信号。


The risk on the minds of investors, managers, and government officials is that currency markets – or government-managed currencies buffeted by market forces – often develop too much momentum and overshoot fundamental values.	投资者、管理者和政府官员所想到的风险是货币市场——或者受市场力量冲击的政府管理的货币——常常动能过大，导致基础价值发生过度调整。


As China’s government uses monetary policy to try to calm markets, micro-level reforms must continue.	在中国政府使用货币政策稳定市场的同时，微观层面的改革必须继续进行。


China must deploy new technologies across industries, while improving workers’ education, training, and health.	中国必须在各行业部署新技术，同时改善工人的教育、培训和卫生情况。


Moreover, China needs to accelerate its efforts to increase domestic consumption, which, as a share of GDP, is far below that of other countries.	此外，中国需要加强提振国内消费的力度，目前中国国内消费占GDP的比重仍远低于其他国家。


That means reducing the unprecedentedly high savings rate, a large share of which accrues to state-owned enterprises.	这意味着降低前所未有的高储蓄率——很大一部分储蓄流向了国有企业。


If private firms and households are to replace government-led investment as the economy’s main drivers of growth, the state must reduce its stake in major enterprises and allow more profits to be paid directly to shareholders, while providing more of the profits from its remaining shares to citizens.	如果要让民营企业和家庭取代政府引导的投资成为经济的主要增长引擎，国家就必须降低在大企业中的股份，允许更多的利润直接分配给股东，并从剩余利润中拿出更多给公民。


The shift away from excessive state control should also include replacing price subsidies and grants to favored industries with targeted support for low-income workers and greater investment in human capital.	降低过度国家控制的转变还应该包括用针对低收入工人的定向支持和增加人力资本投资取代给予重点行业的补贴和补助。


In addition, China must reduce administrative discretion, introducing sensible, predictable regulation to address natural monopolies and externalities.	此外，中国必须减少行政自由裁量权，引入明智的、可预测的监管解决自然垄断和外部性问题。


Back at the macro level, China needs to reallocate responsibilities and resources among the various levels of government, in order to capitalize on their comparative advantage in providing services and raising revenue.	回到宏观层面，中国需要在各级政府间重新分配责任和资源，以利用它们在提供服务和筹集收入方面的比较优势。


And the country must gradually reduce its total debt load, which now exceeds 250% of GDP.	经济必须逐渐降低债务负担（目前已经超过GDP的250%）。


Fortunately, in facing the difficult adjustment challenges that lie ahead, China’s $3.6 trillion in foreign-currency reserves can serve as a buffer against unavoidable losses.	幸运的是，在面临前方艰巨的调整挑战时，中国3. 6万亿美元的外汇储备可以作为不可避免的损失的缓冲垫。


But China must also avoid reverting to greater state control of the economy – a possibility glimpsed in the authorities’ ham-fisted response to the correction in equity prices.	但中国也必须避免重回加强国家对经济的控制的老路——当局在股价出现修正走势时所表现出来的激烈反应凸显出这一可能性。


That approach needs to be abandoned once and for all, before it does any more damage to China’s quest for long-term stability and prosperity.	这条老路需要彻底抛弃，决不能让它对中国的长期稳定与繁荣造成更大伤害。


Can China Avoid Deflation?	中国能避免通缩吗？


BERLIN – In his speech at the 2015 World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang acknowledged that China’s economy is facing strong headwinds.	北京—在2015年达沃斯世界经济论坛上，中国总理李克强在讲话中成人中国经济面临强大阻力。


Annual GDP growth in 2014 was 7.4%, the lowest rate since 1990.	2014年GDP增长为7. 4%，是1990年以来的最低值。


But, to stabilize economic growth, he pledged that China will “continue to pursue a proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy.”	但是，为了稳定经济增长，他承诺中国将继续“追求积极的财政政策和审慎的货币政策。 ”


China’s current economic slowdown was policy-induced.	中国当前的经济减速时政策导致的。


During the last two years, the government has tightened fiscal and monetary policy, in the hope of offsetting the adverse effects of the large stimulus package implemented in response to the 2008 global financial crisis.	在过去两年中，中国政府收紧了财政和货币政策，以期抵消为应对2008年全球金融危机而实施的大规模刺激政策的副作用。


Li’s Davos speech was intended to signal that the Chinese government will not allow the growth rate to slip further.	李克强的达沃斯讲话意在向世人表明中国经济不会放任增长率进一步下滑。


China’s stimulus package was by far the world’s largest and most effectively implemented.	中国的刺激计划是迄今全世界规模最大、实施最力的。


It stabilized growth in China and moderated the global economic contraction.	它稳定了中国的增长、缓和了全球经济收缩。


But it left in its wake some serious problems for the Chinese economy.	但它也给中国经济带来了一些严重问题。


Most important, the country’s economy has become highly leveraged.	最重要的是，中国经济的杠杆率大大增加了。