The practical difficulty is in recognizing when political professionals are distorting reality.	现实的困难是当政治专业认识歪曲事实的时候予以承认。


There is an important role here for the media, the political elite, and the educational system, which must all act as watchdogs.	在此，媒体、政治精英人物以及教育系统发挥重要的作用。 他们必须发挥监督的作用。


In addition, the public needs to be inoculated against the various techniques of deception.	此外，公众需要接受灌输，抵制形形色色的欺骗伎俩。


The most effective techniques operate at the subconscious level.	最为有效的技术在潜意识的层面上运作。


When emotions can be aroused by methods that bypass consciousness, the public is left largely defenseless.	当超越意识的方式撩起情绪的时候，公众就无所防卫。


But if the public is made aware of the various techniques, it is likely to reject them.	但是，如果公众知道了不同的技术，他们就有可能拒绝它们。


One influential technique – which Republican pollster Frank Luntz says that he learned from 1984 - simply reverses meanings and turns reality on its head.	共和党民意测验专家伦茨说，他从小说《1984年》中学到了其中一个颇有影响力的技术。 这一伎俩改变含义并颠倒事实。


Thus, Fox News calls itself “fair and balanced,” and Karl Rove and his acolytes turn their opponents’ strongest traits into their Achilles’ heels, using insinuations and lies to portray the opponents’ achievements as phony.	如此，福克斯新闻自称为“公平和不偏不倚”，而卡尔罗夫及其助手们则将其对手最为强大的特征变为其致命的弱点，他们使用暗示和谎言来诋毁对手的成就。


That is how insinuations of cowardice and foul play helped defeat two highly decorated Vietnam War veterans, Senator Max Cleland in 2002, and John Kerry in 2004, while Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney – both of whom avoided military service – were portrayed as true patriots.	他们就是如此用胆小鬼和奸诈的暗示击败了两位���功卓著的越战老兵，就是2002年的克里兰和2004年的克里，而布什和副总统切尼尽管两人都逃避服兵役，却被描绘成为真正的爱国者。


Another technique is transference: accusing opponents of having motives or using methods that characterize the accuser himself.	另一种伎俩就是移花接木，也就是指责对手心怀鬼胎或者使用指摘者自己的伎俩。


For example, David Horowitz, who accuses me of being “the Lenin of the anti-American conspiracy,” is a former Trotskyite for whom opponents are never adversaries to be debated, but rather enemies to be crushed.	例如，沃儒威茨指责我是“反美阴谋的列宁”，而他自己就是一个前托洛茨基份子。 对于他来说，对手不应予以辩论，而是予以歼灭。


The American public has proven remarkably susceptible to the manipulation of truth, which increasingly dominates the country’s political discourse.	美国公众极为容易受到真相的操纵，而这越发统治着国家的政治话语。


Indeed, a whole network of publications, some of which manage to parade as mainstream media, is devoted to the task.	实际上，有一整套的出版物就是从事这样的工作，其中有些还宣称是主流媒体。


Yet I believe that it is possible to inoculate the public against false arguments by arousing resentment against Orwellian Newspeak.	但是我相信，通过激发对于奥威尔式的新闻的憎恨还是有可能让公众免于虚假论点的。


What is needed is a concerted effort to identify the techniques of manipulation – and to name and shame those who use them.	现在需要的是齐心合力指出操纵的伎俩，并且点出使用这些伎俩的人的名字并让他们蒙羞。


Now is an ideal time to begin that effort.	现在就是开始这一努力的绝佳时机。


Americans are now awakening, as if from a bad dream.	美国人正好像从一个恶梦中清醒。


What we have learned from recent years’ experience – what we should have known all along – is that the supremacy of critical thought in political discourse cannot be taken for granted.	从近几年的经历中我们知道了政治对话中思辩的最高地位不是理所当然得到的。 我们早就应该知道这一点。


It can be ensured only by an electorate that respects reality and punishes politicians who lie or engage in other forms of deception.	只有尊重事实并且惩罚撒谎或者进行其他欺骗的政坛人物的选民才能够做到这一点。


From Lady Di to Michelle Obama	从黛安娜王妃到米歇尔·奥巴马


NEW YORK– In one week, Michelle Obama sat for a formal White House portrait, dressed in somber, tailored clothes; posed for a snazzy People magazine cover, dressed in a slightly down-market, hot-pink lace outfit that showed plenty of skin; let the national media know that the First Family would be getting its new puppy from a rescue shelter; and had her press office mention casually that “secretaries and policy makers” had been invited for popcorn and movies at the White House.	纽约－在入主白宫的第一个星期里，米歇尔·奥巴马（Michelle Obama）穿着颜色灰暗剪裁考究的服装，坐着让人画正式的白宫肖像画； 穿着稍显廉价的、露出许多肌肤的大红色蕾丝边裙子，摆出造型让华而不实的《人物》杂志拍摄封面照；


That same week, in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the 1930’s, a national poll found that support for President Barack Obama was remarkably high, with respondents consistently saying that he “cares about people like me.”	在同一个星期，在20世纪30年代以来最严重的经济危机还在持续的过程中，美国一个全国性的民意测验显示，美国人对巴拉克·奥巴马的支持率非常高，许多参加民意测验的人一致回答说他“关心像我这样的人”。


These two phenomena are closely related.	这两个现象是紧密相连的。


Almost from her first appearance in the public eye, Michelle Obama has used clothing, etiquette, and such cues as where she shops and entertains to send out a subtle but radical message to American voters and to the world.	几乎从米歇尔·奥巴马第一次出现在公众面前开始，她就在利用服装、礼仪以及诸如在哪里购物和娱乐这样的暗示，向美国选民和世界传达出微妙而激进的信息。


For the first time since the days of Andrew Jackson, the White House is aggressively “democratizing” the highest office in the land, and symbolically inviting in the common man – and now the common woman.	这是自安德鲁·杰克逊（Andrew Jackson）时代以来，白宫首次积极地“民主化”美国领土上的最高职务，并象征性地邀请普通男性和女性到白宫做客。


In other words, Mrs. Obama is managing to set herself up, unprecedentedly, as the “people’s First Lady.”	换句话说，奥巴马夫人为自己树立“人民的第一夫人”的形象的努力，是前所未有的。


She has carefully studied not only Jackie Kennedy – a comparison obvious from her sheath dresses, boat collars, and page-boy haircut – but also the triumphs and failures of that other glamorous but underestimated stealth radical, Princess Diana.	她不仅仔细研究了杰奎琳·肯尼迪——将她的紧身裙装、船形衣领以及发尾内卷的发型和杰奎琳·肯尼迪进行对比，就可以明显地看出这一点——而且还研究了另一个富有魅力但是被低估了的隐形激进分子黛安娜王妃成功和失败的地方。


Princess Di’s legacy in generating iconography that opened the way to tremendous social change is grossly underappreciated.	黛安娜王妃为巨大的社会变革开辟道路所进行的努力，被极大地低估了。


In her brief lifetime, she was often lauded for qualities (her beauty and style) that were secondary to her life’s work, and derided for other aspects of her character (her emotionality and chaotic personal life) that were equally beside the point.	在黛安娜王妃短暂的一生中，她经常因为可以点缀她一生努力的品质（她的美貌和时尚）而受到赞美，并因为性格中无关紧要的其他方面（她的情绪化和混乱的私人生活）而被人嘲笑。


As a result, few people noticed how genuinely, powerfully transformative her agenda was, how well she had thought it out, and how audaciously she sought to manage it.	结果，很少有人注意到她的工作是多么具有真实而强大的变革力量，她对问题考虑得多么仔细以及她是多么大胆地努力实现这一点。


Without a formal education, Diana self-consciously set about pushing open the doors of an encrusted monarchy, challenging the sanctities of a long-established class structure, and affirming the value and immediacy of a Britain that was more diverse and socially mobile than ever before.	黛安娜王妃没有接受过正规的教育，但是，她却自发行动起来，为世人打开壁垒森严的君主政体的大门，挑战确立已久的阶级结构的权威性，并肯定比以前任何时候都更多元化和具有社会流动性的英国的价值和紧迫性。


Sometimes her efforts were heavy-handed, as when she embraced AIDS victims physically as a metaphor for social inclusion; sometimes they backfired, as when her shared intimacies with servants provided fodder for a flood of posthumous tell-all books.	有时候她的努力是很拙劣的，例如她将拥抱艾滋病受害者作为社会包容的隐喻； 有时候她的努力是事与愿违的，例如她为人所知的和仆人的亲密关系，在其死后为泛滥成灾的揭秘书籍提供了素材。


But, again and again, by showing up for Elton John and not just for the ballet, or by taking her sons away from the hunting preserve of Balmoral to careen down a waterslide at a tacky amusement park, she told ordinary Britons that their world was as important as any other.	但是，一次又一次地，黛安娜王妃用参加艾尔顿·约翰（Elton John）的演唱会而不是仅仅只看芭蕾舞，或将她的儿子带离巴尔莫勒尔（Balmoral）打猎区，去俗气的娱乐公园玩滑水的方式，告诉普通的英国人，他们的世界和任何其他人的世界一样重要。


She told them that she wanted to know them, and that she wanted her sons to know them, too.	她告诉他们她想了解他们，她也想让的她的儿子了解他们。


It was this radical popularizing/democratizing mission –�not her knowledge of her former husband’s secrets or her later intimate relationship with a Muslim – that made her such a threat to the British establishment.	正是她的这种激进的大众化/民主化努力——而不是她知道前夫的秘密或者她后来和一个穆斯林的亲密关系——让黛安娜成为英国制度的一大威胁。


And she was successful: she taught leaders that they would have to invite the people in – and treat them with basic respect – if they were to maintain their position.	而且，黛安娜成功了：她告诉各位领导人，他们要将人民融入进来——并给予他们基本的敬意——如果他们要保住他们的位置的话。


So, what Michelle Obama is doing is not trivial.	所以，米歇尔·奥巴马正在做事情的并不是微不足道的。


It was not an earth-shattering policy revelation when she astutely followed reports of Sarah Palin’s $150,000 wardrobe by remarking casually on a late-night talk show that she was wearing a chain-store brand, and that “you can get lots of cute things online.”	当她敏锐地在莎拉·佩琳（Sarah Palin）服装费用达15万美元的报道之后，在一次深夜谈话节目中不经意地说她的衣服是一个连锁店品牌，并且说“能在网上找到很多好东西”的时候，这不是一个惊天动地的政策启示。 但是，这仍然是一个有力的宣言——对女性来说尤其如此：我不是南茜·里根（Nancy Reagan），穿着加里安诺（Galliano），住在有警卫的社区里；


But it was nonetheless a powerful statement, especially to women, that said: I am not Nancy Reagan, dressed in Galliano, living in a gated community; I am not Mrs. Clinton, disregarding such things because I must argue major cases or run states; I am you – busy, on a budget, overworked, shrewd, cute, clever, finding a way.	我不是克林顿夫人，因为必须为重大的案子进行辩护或参加竞选而不理会这些事情； 我和你们一样——忙碌，精打细算，工作过度，机灵，可爱，聪明，在找出路。


Likewise, her invitations to the White House are being used for populist messaging.	同样，米歇尔·奥巴马邀请人们到白宫做客也被用来传递平民化信息。


Who came over to watch the White House chef with Mrs. Obama?	谁来和奥巴马夫人一起观看白宫厨师做饭？


Local cooking school students.	当地烹饪学校的学生。


Who sang at a White House event?	谁在白宫的活动中唱歌？


Local public high school students.	当地公立高中的学生。


Again, “secretaries and policy makers,” not “policy makers and secretaries,” are coming over for film night.	而且，是“各部部长和政策制定者们”，而不是是“政策制定者们和各部部长”，来白宫度过了一个电影之夜。


She is deliberately, coolly signaling that secretaries are just as good and important as policy makers, if not more so.	米歇尔·奥巴马刻意冷静地表明，各部部长如果不是比政策制定者更好更重要的话，也是一样的好，一样的重要。


This is a guest list that says to an anxious electorate: I respect you, wherever you are on the socioeconomic scale.	这是一份向焦急的选民传达出如下信息的客人名单：我尊敬你，不管你处于什么社会经济水平。


Many White House speechwriters have used that rhetoric, but almost no First Ladies have walked the talk and passed the popcorn.	许多白宫讲稿撰写人使用过这样的措辞，但是，几乎没有第一夫人信守承诺，也没有第一夫人向客人分发过爆米花。


When I worked on messaging for Al Gore’s 2000 presidential campaign, I often argued with white, older, affluent, male advisers who cared intensely about what was said in the elite media but ignored the popular venues to which most Americans pay attention.	当我在进行阿尔·戈尔（Al Gore）2000年总统竞选的信息传达工作时，经常和富裕的年长白人男性顾问发生争论，这些人非常关注在精英媒体上说些什么，但是却忽略了大多数美国人关注的大众场所。


They had learned nothing from the right, whose candidates knew how powerful the right colors, clothing, imagery, and even lighting can be, and how strongly personal narratives – Ronald Reagan in riding boots, or George W. Bush in a flight suit – resonate with voters.	他们从右派那里什么也没有学到，右派候选人知道正确的肤色、服装、形象，甚至灯光的力量能够多么强大，以及个性表现——例如穿着长统靴的罗纳德·里根，或者穿着飞行服的乔治·布什——能够使选民产生多么大的共鸣。


Meanwhile, the nerdy, wonky left kept issuing data points, policy summaries, and white papers –�and generally, since Clinton, kept losing – until a young couple showed up and understood that Americans don’t just read; they watch.	然而，书生气而且虚弱的左派，却在不停地发表数据观点、政策摘要以及白皮书——并且自从克林顿时代以来，基本上是一直失败的——直到一对年轻的夫妇出现并且明白了，美国人不仅阅读； 他们还看。


You can tell the nation more about your values by saying where you will seek a dog for your daughters than you can through reams of unread position papers.	通过表明你会在哪里为你的女儿找一条狗来养，比通过大量无人阅读的有关立场的论文，更能告诉整个国家你的价值观。


At a time of crisis, the Obamas are sending a powerful message, and Mrs. Obama, as the female archetype who has picked up Princess Di’s dropped baton, is instrumental in crafting it: no matter who you are, how stressed, how broke, there is, figuratively speaking, a seat in the White House with your name on it.	在经济危机中，奥巴马夫妇传递着强有力的信息，而且奥巴马夫人，作为捡起黛安娜王妃掉落的指挥棒的女性的典型，在传达这一信息上是有帮助的：不管你是谁，多么有压力，多么一文不名，都象征性的在白宫有一个写着你名字的座位。


From Middle Israel to Middle Palestine	从以色列中部到巴勒斯坦中部


Haifa – Americans speak of “Middle America” and Britons of “Middle England.”  Both are near mythic places that supposedly embody the authentic character of the nation.	海法--美国谈论“美国中部”，而英国人谈论“英国中部”。 这两个都是虚构的、好似体现国家真实特征的地方。


Israel, too, has its “Middle Israel,” but it is very different from the place that Americans and Britons describe.	以色列也有自己的“以色列中部”，但是它与美国人和英国人所描绘的有很大不同。


Rather than being somewhat provincial, Middle Israel is educated, bilingual or multilingual, and extremely well connected to the wider world.	以色列中部不仅并不狭隘，而是受过良好教育、将双语或者多语而且与大千世界的联络极为广泛。


It has provided Israel with the high-tech success that it has enjoyed over the last decade.	过去十年来，它让以色列在高科技领域获得巨大成功。


Middle Israel is mostly secular, though it also includes the moderately religious.	以色列中部大多数是世俗派的，尽管有时候也包括温和的宗教人士。


It is liberal, and despises any sort of fanaticism, whether orthodox or nationalist.	它属于自由派，而且厌恶任何形式的激进主义，无论是正统派的还是民族主义派。


It is based on a strong, legally entrenched (though never perfect) ethos of gender equality that has typified Zionism from its start.	性别平等是它的强大、并且在法律上得到确认巩固的基本气质，以色列复国主义从一开始就体现了这一气质。


Middle Israel is also gay-friendly and distinctly non-xenophobic.	以色列中部也对同性恋友好，而且非常没有排外思想。


It is mostly Jewish, though a young Arab professional class is now coming out of the universities and making its way – with difficulties – into the heartland of civil society.	它大部分是犹太人组成。 尽管如此，一个年轻的阿拉伯专业人士阶层正走出大学不无困难地并且进入民间社会的中心。


And, lest we forget, Middle Israel is earning the money and paying the taxes that support a wide assortment of traditionalists, fundamentalists, chauvinists, and other extremists – Jewish and Muslim – from Gaza to Jerusalem to the West Bank.	而且我们不要忘记，以色列中部的收入以及交纳的税收支撑了从加沙地带到耶路撒冷直到约旦河西岸的范围广泛的传统主义者、原教旨主义者、沙文主义者以及其他犹太或者穆斯林的极端主义者。


This quiet majority is under-represented in the Knesset because its members steer clear of political careers.	这一默默无闻的大多数人群在以色列议会中没有得到应有的代表，因为其成员远离政治事业。


It is far too large to be considered an elite.	这些人数量庞大，难以被认为是精英。


It is not exclusively urban, and it includes people of different cultural origins.	它并不完全是城市居民，而且包括不同文化背景的人。


It has a powerful common identity, shared memories, and a rich culture.	它具有一个强大的共同身份特征，共同的记忆以及丰富的文化。


It is neither inward-looking nor atavistic.	它既不目光短浅也不隔代遗传。


Some Palestinians hope to become, one day, something like Middle Israel.	有些巴勒斯坦人希望有一天也成为以色列中部。


They, too, would like life, pragmatism, creativity, and even joy to gain the upper hand.	他们也是想要生活、现实主义、创造力甚至是快乐能够占据上风。


They, too, want moderation and modernity, if perhaps not full secularization, to prevail.	他们也是想要温和主义以及即使不是完全的世俗主义话的现代化获得胜利。


These Palestinians are Middle Israel’s natural allies.	这些巴勒斯坦人是以色列中部的天然盟友。


Fed by a meager diet of media reporting and some coarse think-tank buzz, European and American friends often ask me why our universities are awash with self-hating, anti-Israel “post-Zionists.”	媒体鲜有有关他们的报导，而智库对此的研究也是粗糙。 我的欧洲和美国朋友经常问我我们的大学为何充斥了自我仇恨、反以色列的“后犹太复国主义”。


But they are not.	但是情况并非如此。


Post-Zionism is a much hyped phantom, a term flourished in the mid-1990’s, when it seemed that Israeli and Palestinian leaders were building a peace process.	后犹太复国主义是一个被人夸大的幻影。 这一名词在九十年代中期广为人知，当时以色列和巴勒斯坦领导人好像正在进行和平进程。


In response, Israelis quickly developed their own “End of History” thesis, suggesting that soon Zionism would be a thing of the past, primarily because there would no longer be a need for any ideology to support what would be a normal modern state, at peace with its neighbors and with its past traumas.	作为回应，以色列人迅速提出了其自己的“历史终结”的理论。 这一理论说，犹太复国主义马上就将成为历史，主要是因为再也没有必要用任何意识形态来支撑理应是正常的、与邻国和平相处并且与过去的苦难经历和解的国家。


Back then, historians and sociologists dug into Zionism supposed “sins” – for example, that Israel’s Arab citizens have never, to this day, enjoyed equal civil rights.	在那个时候，历史学家和社会学家研究复国主义所谓的“罪责”。 例如，以色列的阿拉伯公民直到今天从来没有享受过平等的民权。


Others looked at crimes against Palestinians in the wake of our self-defensive War of Independence.	其他人则研究以色列自卫的独立战争以后对巴勒斯坦人犯下的罪行。


Many people denied these facts; many others looked them in the eye.	许多人否认这些事实； 还有许多人则毫不回避。


Those of us who were not post-Zionists, but liberal Zionists, were even proud of the way our society had entered this phase of self-inspection and self-critique.	我们有的人并不是后犹太复国主义者，而是自由派复国主义者。 我们甚至并不对我们的社会进入这一自我审视和自我批评的方式感到骄傲。


The gravest problem for Middle Israel is the Palestinian predicament in the occupied West Bank and in deadlocked Gaza.	以色列中部最严重的问题是生活在约旦河西岸和处于僵局状态的加沙地带的巴勒斯坦人身处困境。


Our leaders, from Levy Eshkol (and much more so Golda Meir) to Yitzhak Shamir, erred gravely in not seizing the earliest opportunity to arrange a territorial separation and a horizon of sovereignty for the post-1967 Palestinians.	我们的领导人从艾希科尔(梅厄尤其如此) 到沙米尔没有抓住较早的机遇来为1967年战争以后的巴勒斯坦人安排领土分割以及国家独立主权，从而铸成了大错。


They erred gravely in allowing Jewish settlers to have their way on the Biblical mountaintops, while Middle Israel looked the other way.	他们允许犹太人定居者利用了圣经山顶的记载也犯下了大错，而以色列中部则不闻不问。


They erred gravely – and this is less often recognized – in discouraging the moderate Palestinian middle class, many of whom have quit the occupied territories, leaving behind a generation of young, ignorant, hungry, and angry warriors.	还有并不为人所熟知的是，他们阻碍温和的巴勒斯坦中产阶级，他们中的许多人已经离开了被占领土，留下了整整一代年轻无知以及愤怒的武士。 这样也犯下了大错。


But there is a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	但是巴以冲突还是有一个解决办法。


It is geographical: a division of territory and a separation of homelands that involves painful but conceivable compromises on both sides.	这一办法是地理上的，也就是分割领土，这需要双方都做出痛苦但是可行的妥协。


Jerusalem will be divided, Palestinian refugees will not return to their ancestral homes, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank will, like their Gaza counterparts, be dismantled or (inconceivably) left to fend for themselves.	分割耶路撒冷，巴勒斯坦难民并不返回古代家园，而西岸地带的犹太人定居点将会像加沙地带那样拆除或者(难以想像地)自我防卫。


Of course, extremists will hate it.	当然，极端主义者会恨这一办法。


By contrast, moderates – all moderates – will accept it, albeit unhappily.	与此相比，所有的温和派人士都将会接受，尽管并不十分高兴。


If the moderates win, then a “Middle Palestine” will at last rise to prominence.	如何温和派人士获胜，那么，“巴勒斯坦中部”将会最终崛起。


Paralleling Middle Israel, though perhaps not initially befriending it or liking it very much, this kind of Palestine will be the best news that the Middle East will have had for a long time.	巴勒斯坦中部类似以色列中部，尽管也许并不一开始就与它交友或者非常喜欢它。 这些巴勒斯坦人将会是中东长久以来得到的最好的消息。


For now, we in Middle Israel must curb our own extremists and hold out for the Palestinian moderates to prevail.	目前，我们这些以色列中部的人必须限制我们自己的极端主义者并且坚持让巴勒斯坦温和人士获胜。


From Neoliberalism to No Liberalism?	新自由主义的终结


WASHINGTON, DC – The era of free-market capitalism launched in the 1980’s by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan – often called “neoliberalism” by its opponents – is over.	华盛顿特区--里根和撒切尔夫人在二十世纪八十年代开启的自由市场时代经常被反对者称为“新自由主义”。 如今这一时代结束了。


This ideological wave has crashed with the ongoing financial market crisis, but its decline was a long time coming.	这一意识形态浪潮随着当前的金融市场危机而崩溃，但是其衰退却是姗姗来迟。


In the last few years, while American leaders continued to ride the neoliberal wave, much of the rest of the world was already standing on the shore.	当美国领导人最近几年继续在新自由主义乘风破浪之际，世界其他大部分地方已经隔岸观火了。


Disenchantment with “neoliberal,” pro-market ideas began in developing countries that had once been their ardent admirers.	发展中国家一度是新自由主义忠实的崇拜者，而正是在这些国家开始了对新自由主义的不满。


Latin American countries that embraced free-market policies in the 1990’s rejected them in the mid-2000’s, as a new wave of left-leaning leaders came to power.	拉丁美洲国家在九十年代实行自由市场政策。 到了本世纪早些时候，随着新一轮的左翼倾向领导人掌权，这些国家拒绝这一新自由主义。


Russia, which adopted market-oriented reforms in the 1990’s, moved to a managed form of state capitalism in the 2000’s with “oligarchs” forced to submit to state control.	俄国在九十年代实行市场主导的改革。 到了二十一世纪转向有管理的国家资本主义，其“寡头”被迫屈服于国家控制。


As a result, the United States, the European Commission, and the multilateral development banks have become increasingly isolated in their efforts to advance free-market thought and policies worldwide.	结果，美国、欧盟委员会以及各多边发展银行在全世界推进自由市场观念和政策中越发孤立。


The deepening financial crisis weakens their position further.	日益严重的金融危机进一步削弱了它们的立场。


After all, how can the US or the Western multilateral institutions advocate bank privatization now?	毕竟，美国或者西方的多边机构现在如何能够再鼓吹银行私有化呢？


The decline of free-market orthodoxy in the rest of the world was caused by two factors: its failures as an approach to economic policy and the decline of US prestige and “soft power.”	世界其他地方的自由市场教条衰退是由两个因素造成的，也就是这一教条并非经济良策加上美国声望和“软实力”的下降。


“Neoliberalism” grew in popularity as a result of its successes in jump-starting economic growth in the US, the United Kingdom, and some developing countries in the 1980’s and 1990’s.	“新自由主义”由于在二十世纪八十年代和九十年代成功地大力推动了美国、英国以及某些发展中国家的经济而赢得推崇。


However, its weaknesses also became apparent during the mid- to late-1990’s.	但是，其弱点在九十年代的中后期也显现出来。


The attempt to implant free-market philosophy in Russia, for instance, proved catastrophic.	例如，企图在俄国移植自由市场理念造成灾难性后果。


Whereas the Russian experience clearly demonstrated the importance of strong state institutions in regulating a market economy, the free-market model’s fierce ideological opposition to a large state role in the economy offered a poor guide to building them.	俄国的经验清楚地表明国家机构在管理市场经济中的重要性，自由市场模式意识形态上强烈反对国家在经济中发挥更大作用提供了糟糕的建立市场经济指引。


After some successes, most notably in Chile, “neoliberal” advice in Latin America also failed, most dramatically in the case of Argentina’s currency board, but most damagingly by increasing inequality, which worsened the continent’s central political-economic problem.	新自由主义在特别是智利取得一些成功以后在拉丁美洲也失败了。 最为明显的是在阿根廷的货币委员会，但是危害最大的在于增加了不平等，从而恶化了南美大陆的核心政治经济问题。


In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva showed that significant departures from free-market prescriptions worked better.	巴西总统卢拉表明，从自由市场药方分道扬镳更为有效。


Worldwide, most of the high-growth countries of the 1990’s and 2000’s broke with free-market orthodoxy by maintaining a stronger state hand in the economy.	在世界范围内，大多数九十年代和二十一世纪的高增长国家通过加强国家在经济中的作用脱离了自由市场教条。


Belief in “neoliberalism” also was based on the success of the US economy, which for much of the 1990’s seemed to demonstrate the superiority of free markets.	对于“新自由主义”的信念还建立在美国经济成功的基础之上。 美国经济在九十年代的大部分时间里好像展示了自由市场的优越性。


But the rapid decline of US prestige and “soft power” during the 2000’s sowed doubt outside the US.	但是二十一世纪中美国威望和“软实力”的快速下降在美国以外播下了怀疑的种子。


As the global agenda shifted to concerns about global warming, inequality, and the stability of the international system, the US no longer seemed to be a shining example, but rather an immovable obstacle on many of these issues.	在全球议题转向担忧全球气候变暖、不平等以及国际体制稳定之际，美国不再是闪光的榜样了，而是成为许多这些问题不可逾越的阻碍。


America’s elites turned a blind eye to these developments, rejecting all criticism, together with the crude anti-Americanism with which it was often expressed.	美国的精英们对这些情况视而不见，拒绝接受所有的批评以及所表达出的粗硬反美主义。


Today, the story is different.	如今，局面不同了。


A massive reassessment is finally in progress, with US elites now recognizing that market capitalism is in crisis, and that the world will not blindly follow their lead.	大规模的重新评估最终正在进行。 美国的精英们现在承认市场资本主义处于危机之中，而其他国家不要盲目追随美国。


But that leaves some large questions unresolved.	但是这还是没有解决某些重大问题。


If “neoliberalism” has failed, what comes next?	如果”新自由主义“失败了，那么接下来是什么呢？


And what must the US do to regain its stature and influence in the international economy?	美国必须采取什么行动来重新取得其在国际经济中的地位和影响力呢？


As New York and London lose their undisputed claim to being the world’s financial capitals, the rising centers of the global economy will gain an increasing say in international economic policy.	在纽约和伦敦丧失其无可非议的国际金融之都称号之际，正在崛起的全球经济中心们将会在国际经济政策中获得越发重要的发言权。


Most, if not all, are located in countries that have a stronger tradition of state involvement in the economy.	它们的绝大多数都位于那些具有强大国家干预经济传统的国家。


Jeffrey Garten, the dean of Yale’s School of Management, got it right when he labeled this the era of “state capitalism.”	耶鲁大学管理学院院长格登把这一时代称为“国家资本主义”的确有道理。


The state is on its way back as an economic player – not least in the US.	国家正在重新成为经��生活中的主角，不仅仅是美国如此。


But is that a good thing?	但是这就是好事吗？


While many critics will be tempted to celebrate the end of “neoliberalism,” it remains to be seen whether or not what succeeds it represents an improvement.	许多批评家会受到诱惑庆贺新自由主义“的终结，取代它的东西是否代表进步还有待观察。


Various forms of statism have been tried before; all have been found lacking.	以前曾经尝试过不同形式的国家统制但是都不成功。


After all, while “neoliberalism” was criticized as technocratic and elitist, it was nonetheless a form of liberalism, and it was also consistent with the spread of democratic governance worldwide.	毕竟，人们批评”新自由主义“具有技术官僚和精英色彩，但是它还是一种自由主义，而且是与在全世界传播民主管治是一致的。


The new era may not be so propitious for political liberties.	新时代对于政治自由而言未必是好消息。


As rising authoritarian powers, China or Russia, for example, have no reason to use their growing international influence to promote democracy; on the contrary, they increasingly counterbalance the efforts of Western countries to promote political liberty.	作为上升的极权大国，中国和俄国没有理由利用其增长的国际影响力来促进民主。 相反，它们越发抵制西方国家促进政治自由的努力。


As statist models of economic development become more appealing, democratic governance will become less so.	随着经济发展的国家统制模式越发具有吸引力，民主管治将会变得不是如此有吸引力。


Nor is it clear that “state capitalism” can generate the same degree of innovation and entrepreneurship as the liberal models did in their prime.	“国际资本主义”是否可以带来自由模式在鼎盛时期带来的同样水平的重新和创业水平也不清楚。


In order to redeem the liberal project, American and European leaders will need to reformulate it in such a way that it can provide convincing solutions to problems such as environmental degradation and economic inequality.	为了挽救自由主义，美国和欧洲领导人必须重新设计它，从而使得它能够给类似环境恶化和经济不平等等问题提供令人信服的解决方案。


This will be no easy task, and one that may be far from policymakers’ minds as they grapple with the current crisis.	这决非易事，而且由于决策者关注于解决当前危机可能不在他们的头脑考虑之中。


But, unless they do, the emphasis on economic and political freedom that lies at the heart of liberalism may not survive.	但是，除非他们加以考虑，否则，以强调经济和政治自由为核心的自由主义也许无法存活下去。


From Oil to Information	从石油到信息


Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia’s former oil minister and a founding architect of OPEC, once said, “The stone age came to an end not for a lack of stones, and the oil age will end, but not for a lack of oil.”	沙特阿拉伯前石油部长、OPEC的缔造者之一，Sheikh Yamani曾说：“石器时代的结束并不是因为缺少石头； 石油时代的结束也不会是因为缺少石油。


Humans stopped using stone because bronze and iron were superior materials.	”人类停止使用石器是因为青铜和铁是更好的材料。


But will we really stop using oil when other energy technologies similarly provide superior benefits?	但我们真的会在其它相似能源技术能提供更好的能源时停止使用石油吗？


The threat of depleting the world’s scarce energy resources has maintained a powerful hold on popular thinking ever since the oil shocks of the 1970’s.	自从1970年代的石油危机以来，世界稀缺能源耗尽的威胁就是大众心中挥之不去的梦魇。


Nor is our fear limited to oil.	我们的恐惧也不仅限于石油。


For example, the classic 1972 bestseller Limits to Growth predicted that the world would run out of gold in 1981, silver and mercury in 1985, and zinc in 1990.	例如，1972年出版的经典畅销书《增长的极限》就预言世界会在1981年耗尽金，在1985年耗尽银和汞，在1990年耗尽锌资源。


We have the benefit of hindsight today, but even now most discussions of the issue are predicated on the logic of Limits to Growth .	虽然我们现今有了后见之明，但即便是现在有关这些问题的大多数讨论还是在“增长的极限”的逻辑下进行预测的。


Moreover, the issue is not merely that we have not run out of natural resources.	此外，问题不仅仅是我们还没有耗尽自然资源。


The American economist Julian Simon allegedly issued a challenge in 1980 to a group of environmentalists, saying that if scarcity were to be measured in terms of higher prices, they should invest in stocks of any raw metal.	据称美国经济学家Julian Simon在1980年向一群环境保护主义者发出挑战，说如果稀缺性是以更高的价格来衡量，那么他们就应该在任何与生金属有关的股票上投资。


The environmentalists put their money on chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten, and picked a time frame of 10 years.	环境主义者们将资金投入到铬、铜、镍、锡和钨等金属的股票上，投资为期十年。


By September 1990, each of the metals had dropped in price: chromium by 5%, tin by a whopping 74%.	到了1990年，所有这些金属都跌价了：铬跌了5%，锡更是大跌了74%。


The doom-mongers lost.	末日论者们失算了。


More importantly, they could not have won even if they had invested in petroleum, foodstuffs, sugar, coffee, cotton, wool, minerals, or phosphates: all of these commodities had become cheaper.	更为重要的是，即便是他们投资了石油、粮食、糖、咖啡、棉花、羊毛、矿产或磷酸盐也还是会亏：这些商品都跌价了。


Today, oil is the most important and valuable internationally traded commodity, and its significance to our civilization is underscored by the recurrent worry that we are running out of it.	现今，石油是最重要和最有价值的国际贸易商品。 它对我们文明的重要性由于我们对其消耗殆尽的担忧而更加凸显。


However, statistical estimates of its depletion hide much more than they reveal.	然而，消耗预测的统计数据只为我们展现了冰山的一角。


A typical oilfield yields only 20% of the reservoir, with close to 63% remaining buried in the earth even when the most advanced technologies are used.	一座典型的油田的产出只占其储量的20%，有近63%的资源深藏于地下，即便用当今最先进的技术也无法开采。


Moreover, economists contend that energy consumption per capita is declining, owing to more efficient use.	再者，经济学家们认为由于使用效率的提升，人均能耗正在下降。


Fuel efficiencies in the automotive sector have increased by more than 60% in the past three decades, while overall wealth produced per unit of energy has doubled during the same period.	在过去的30年中汽车产业的能效提升超过60%，而同期每单位能源所创造的全部财富则翻了一番。


But, whereas metal prices have fallen, oil prices are reaching record highs.	但是，在金属价格下跌的同时，油价却正创造着历史新高。


The reason is simple: metal usage has been substituted by many alternatives, but most still require petroleum products as inputs, and decades-long efforts to develop sufficient alternative energy sources have yielded little success.	原因很简单：金属的使用被许多其它材料代替了，但这些材料却大都需要以石化产品为原料。 而且我们在开发足够代替能源方面的数十年努力成效甚微。


So, if oil substitutes are not easily available, modern societies should focus on the sources of demand, most of which is attributable to the transport sector.	因此，如果石油的代替品来之不易，那么现代社会就应该关注需求的来源，而绝大部分能源需求都来自于交通部门。


Indeed, more than 80% of modern societies’ consumption of energy generated by oil, either in the form of electricity or fuel, is used to move commuters.	的确，现代社会超过80%的来自于石油的能源消耗，不论是电力还是燃料，都发生在通勤交通部门。


Is all of this oil consumption really necessary?	我们真的要消耗这么多的石油吗？


With the rising contribution of services to global GDP, now is the time to reassess the need for travel to work.	随着服务业对全球GDP的贡献率不断提高，现在是到了我们检讨通勤上班的需求的时候了。


Service-sector workers commute daily, only to be present in an environment that has no economic need for them, for they are facilitating information exchange far more than exchange of physical goods.	服务业的从业人员每天通勤，但却是出现在一个对他们没有经济需求的环境之中，因为他们更多地是在为信息交流而不是为实物商品的交流提供便利。


Do we really need to bring together so many people for so little gain and at such a high cost?	我们真的需要以如此高昂的代价将如此之多的人集中在一起，就为了创造那一点点的价值吗？


The cost is not merely in terms of natural resources, which should be sustained and passed on to future generations, not exhausted by our own.	而这样的成本并不仅仅以自然资源的形式出现。 自然资源的消耗是持续不变的，并可以被未来世代沿袭。


The rise in the amount of time spent commuting is a drag on both national productivity and the quality of life in modern cities.	我们不会将其耗尽。 在现代城市，花在通勤上的时间对国家生产力和生活质量都是一种拖累。


A survey conducted in the Indian city of Mumbai revealed that railway commuters’ average daily journey was 22 kilometers, while rapid urbanization there and in much of the developing world is only likely to increase the length of commutes.	在印度城市孟买进行的一项调查表明，坐火车通勤的上班族平均每天的通勤距离是22公里。 同时，该地和许多发展中地区一样的快速城市化似乎只会增加通勤的距离。


Likewise, passenger air transport is dominated by business travel.	同样，商务旅行者是航空交通的主力。


But, given the high-speed data transmission capacities of current telecommunications and information technology, it is now possible to reduce business travel significantly.	但是，鉴于现代电信和信息技术的高速数据传输能力，我们现在有可能大幅度地减少商务旅行。 外包现象正削弱对劳动力流动的需求。


Whereas the outsourcing phenomenon is attenuating the need for labor migration, domestic migration can be limited further by the use of home offices, which can eventually reduce stress on real estate, public transport networks, roads, and airports.	而本地的人员流动也可以通过在家办公来进一步加以限制。 在家办公能最终降低对地产、公共交通网络、道路和机场的通勤压力。


Indeed, human travel in general should become increasingly limited to tourism and pleasure trips.	确实，人类的旅行应该越来越限于以旅游和休闲为目的。


We now have the technological infrastructure to bring most job-related information to workers while allowing them to collaborate closely.	我们现有的技术设施能够将绝大部分与工作有关的信息传递给工人，并使他们能够紧密协作。


This requires a lifestyle change – one that governments should begin encouraging employers and workers to embrace.	这需要我们生活方式的改变—一种政府应该鼓励雇主和雇员都接受的改变。


If they do, the age of oil will not end.	如果他们这样做了，那么石油时代就不会终结。


But the age of worrying about it just might.	而终结的很可能是这个担忧石油耗尽的时代。


From Opportunity to Reality in the Middle East	中东：从机遇到现实


It has been a long time since the words “opportunity” and “Middle East” appeared in the same sentence.	“机会”与“中东”二词许久未在同一句话中出现。


But now they are.	但现在我们却看到了。


Even better, this optimism may have some basis in reality.	更欢欣鼓舞的是这种乐观主义起根发由于现实基础。


One important reason for this change in attitude is, of course, Yasir Arafat’s disappearance from the scene.	当然，导致这一看法改变的重要原因是，亚瑟尔·阿拉法特从政治舞台的消失。


Like the Thane of Cawdor in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, “Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.”	就像莎士比亚的《麦克白》中的考多郡的新郡主，“他一生中没有哪件事比他的离世对他来说更恰如其分。 ”


Arafat never grew beyond the man who appeared at the United Nations decades ago with both an olive branch and a gun.	几十年前，阿拉法特手持橄榄枝和枪出现在联合国，自那以后，他的形象就再也没有改变过。


His unwillingness to jettison terror and choose diplomacy proved his undoing, as he lost legitimacy in the eyes of both Israel and the United States.	他不愿意放弃使用恐怖主义、拒绝外交手段的做法导致以色列和美国不愿承认他的合法性。


The result was the failure to create a Palestinian state.	其结果就是巴勒斯坦的建国以失败告终。


But it is not simply Arafat’s passing that provides cause for optimism.	但是，并非阿拉法特辞世带来了这种乐观主义。


We now have a Palestinian leadership legitimized by elections, one that appears to be opposed to using terrorism as a tool to achieve political aims.	我们现在拥有一个通过选举合法产生的、反对把恐怖主义作为达到其政治目的的工具的巴勒斯坦领导政权。


Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has a good record of questioning the wisdom of the intifada that has taken too many lives and caused only misery and destruction on all sides of this enduring conflict.	默罕默德·阿巴斯（阿布·马赞）向来质疑intifada（巴勒斯坦发起的对以色列的报复行动）的行为。 intifada已经肆虐了太多生命，它给这场旷日持久的斗争各方带来的只是悲惨和破坏而已。


Changes in Israel are also contributing to the mood swing.	以色列国内的变化也对人们的心态动荡产生一定影响。


There is a growing awareness in Israel that the current situation – one of open-ended Israeli occupation of lands mostly populated by Palestinians – is inconsistent with Israel’s determination to remain a secure, prosperous, Jewish, and democratic state.	当前形势下，以色列人越来越意识到，无限期占领居住者多为巴勒斯坦人的土地——有违于以色列要保持一个安全、繁荣、民主的犹太国家的决定。


The formation of a new Israeli government, one more centrist in its composition and support, is another positive development.	以色列新政府组成中所出现的更多的中间派及其支持者，是另一个积极发展的信号。


Israel is now led by a prime minister who has the ability to make historic choices and a government inclined to support him.	当前，以色列正在一名能够做出历史性抉择的总理领导之下，他很有可能得到政府的全力支持。


But opportunity is just that.	但是所谓的机会仅限于此。


Middle East history is replete with examples of missed and lost chances to make peace.	中东的历史写满了与和平机会失之交臂的历史。


The challenge now is to break this pattern and turn today’s opportunity into reality.	当前的挑战就是打破这一格局，把今日的机遇转化为现实。


This requires that the promised Israeli disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank succeed.	这就需要以色列能成功履行从加沙地带和约旦河西岸撤军的承诺。


But “success” entails more than departing Israelis. It also requires that Palestinians demonstrate that they can govern responsibly and that they can put an end to terrorist violence emanating from Palestinian soil.	但这“成功”不仅仅牵涉到以色列的撤离，还需要巴勒斯坦证明他们能够进行有效管理，并能结束起源于巴勒斯坦的恐怖主义暴力活动。


What happens in Gaza after Israel leaves will have a profound impact on Israeli politics.	自从色列撤军后，发生在加沙地带的事件对以色列政治产生了深远的影响。


If Gaza turns into a lawless failed state, one that is a base for attacks on Israelis, it will be extremely difficult to persuade Israel to withdraw from other areas that it now occupies.	如果加沙地带变成一个非法的失败国家，成为一个针对以色列发动攻击的基地，那么要劝说以色列从其他占领地区撤军就会变得困难至极。


But if Palestinians in Gaza demonstrate that they can rule themselves and be a good neighbor, a key justification for Israel’s continuing occupation elsewhere will weaken.	但是如果加沙地带的巴勒斯坦人证明他们有能力实行自治并成为以色列的好邻居，那么这将无疑削弱以色列在任何地区持续占领的主要理由。


Palestinians will need help if things are to turn out right in Gaza.	若加沙地带的形势要走上正轨，巴勒斯坦人民还需要各方援助。


The US, Europe, and Arab states such as Egypt, along with Russia and the UN, all have a responsibility to assist Abu Mazen.	美国、欧洲和阿拉伯国家，诸如埃及等，与俄罗斯以及联合国一起，都有义务帮助阿布·马赞。


Palestinians need financial and technical help to build up a unified and capable security establishment, to revive a moribund economy, and to build a modern, transparent political system.	巴勒斯坦人需要金融和技术援助来建立一个统一的、足以保持安全的国家，恢复一蹶不振的经济，建立一个现代的、透明的政治体系。


It is also important that the Gaza withdrawal be a beginning, not an end, to the political process.	当然，同样重要的是，加沙地带的撤军将意味着一个政治进程的开始，而非终结。


There must be a link between what takes place in Gaza and a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian question if Mazen is to persuade a majority of his people that diplomacy and compromise deliver more than violence and confrontation.	如果马赞要使大部分他的民众相信外交与和解比暴力和冲突更有效的话，加沙地带发生的一切与全��解决巴勒斯坦问题之间就必然存在着某种联系。


Here, too, there is an important role for America to play.	在这一块，美国还扮演着一个重要角色。


In fact, the US has already begun to do what is required.	事实上，美国已经开始按要求行动了。


In a September 2004 letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, President George W. Bush reassured Israelis that it was “unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.”	2004年9月份，在一份给以色列总理阿里埃勒·沙龙的信中，美国总统乔治·W布什再次重申，“要期待巴以最后阶段谈判结果重新完全回到1949年停火线的状态是不现实的”。


The framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue “will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.”	巴勒斯坦难民问题的解决方案框架“需要在建立巴勒斯坦国的过程中寻求，巴勒斯坦难民要安置在那里，而不是在以色列”。


These promises meant a great deal to Sharon as he faced domestic political challenges.	面对着国内的政治挑战，这些承诺对沙龙来说意义更为深远。


What is needed now is a parallel letter from Bush to Abu Mazen.	布什应该也同时给阿布·马赞写一封信。


Such a letter could spell out the US commitment to a viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines, with compensation provided by Israel wherever territorial adjustments are agreed.	这封信将阐述美国有责任帮助巴勒斯坦在以色列提供的补偿下，根据1967年停火线，建立一个可行的、与以色列相邻的、主权独立的国家，无论双方是否能达成领土调整协议。


The US would also commit itself to provide resources to help construct a modern society and economy.	美国也将致力于提供各种资源，帮助建立一个现代社会和现代经济体系。


Help would also be extended to settle the Palestinian refugees, whether in Palestine, other Arab countries, or, in special cases where Israel agrees for humanitarian reasons, in Israel itself.	美还将加大援助力量解决巴勒斯坦难民问题，包括巴勒斯坦境内、其他阿拉伯国家境内以及以色列出于人道主义原因批准的在其境内的特殊地区。


In return, Palestinians would need to pledge to reject the use of violence and terror once and for all.	作为回应，巴勒斯坦也应该做出保证，坚决放弃使用暴力和恐怖主义。


The US should not, however, make the establishment of a full Palestinian democracy a prerequisite for territorial return and peace.	然而，美国不该以领土归还和实现和平为前提条件，来帮助巴勒斯坦建立一个完全民主的国家。


To delay negotiations until Palestinian democracy matured would only persuade Palestinians that diplomacy was a ruse and give many a reason to turn to violence.	不断拖延谈判直至巴勒斯坦的民主体系成熟的做法，只会让巴勒斯坦人相信民主只是一种诡计，并给他们足够的理由重拾暴力手段。


After more than a half-century of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, translating opportunity into reality will be difficult enough without introducing new requirements that, however desirable, are not essential.	经过半个多世纪的巴以冲突，如果不引入某些必备条件，再好的机遇也难以转变为现实，尽管这些条件悦人心仪，但却并非必不可缺。


From People Power to Putin Power	从人民权力到普京权力


As I attended a small but dignified memorial ceremony in Paris last week in honor of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya – a woman “brave beyond limits,” in the words of her French editor – I was reminded of another posthumous tribute I participated in nearly 17 years ago in Moscow.	上个礼拜，我参加了在巴黎举行的缅怀俄国记者安娜·波利特科夫斯卡娅（Anna Politkovskaya）的一场规模很小却不失庄重的纪念仪式。 借用与她合作的法国编辑对她的评价，安娜是一个“大无畏”的女人。


Unlike Politkovskaya, the great scientist and human right activist Andrei Sakharov had not been murdered, and the tribute given to him then looked like the celebration of a new era.	安娜的纪念仪式不禁让我想起17年前在莫斯科参加的另外一次悼念活动。 与波利特科夫斯卡娅不同的是，伟大的科学家和人权活动家安德烈·萨哈罗夫（Andrei Sakharov）并非死于谋杀，而那次举办的悼念活动更像是在庆祝一个崭新时代的开始。


A new page was being turned, one that was full of uncertainty but also of hope that Russia was on its way to becoming a “normal country.”	历史翻开了新的一页，在成为“正常国家”的漫长道路上，俄国局势在充满变数的同时也充满了希望。


It is this page that has been probably fully closed with the assassination of Politkovskaya.	随着波利特科夫斯卡娅遭到暗害，这充满希望的一页也许永远地合上了。


What the small crowd of intellectuals gathered in Paris was mourning was their hope for a different Russia.	这一小群知识分子在巴黎聚会，缅怀的是自己对改变俄国现状的期望。


We were burying the collective dream of intellectuals and democrats for a Russia where freedom and the rule of law would, after a long and cold Soviet winter, take root and bloom.	我们埋葬的是知识分子和民主人士共同的梦想，我们曾经盼望在苏联漫长而寒冷的严冬过后，自由和法治会在一片废墟上生根发芽、开花结果。


The portraits of Politkovskaya, like a multitude of mirrors, were calling us back to a much darker reality.	波利特科夫斯卡娅的遗像就像一面镜子，折射出无比黑暗的现实世界。


The dream was over.	梦想破碎了。


It had, most likely, never been realizable.	它也许从来就未曾实现。


What we are witnessing today is a totally different story.	今天我们所看到的是一个截然不同的世界。


Russia is literally buying its way back into the international system as a preeminent actor, one that is regaining power and clout by replacing nuclear weapons with oil and gas and substituting greed for fear.	俄国简直是用大把的钞票买回了国际体系中引人注目的地位，石油和天然气代替核武器，为俄国重新赢回了权力和影响，贪婪也最终代替了恐惧。


The balance of terror of the Soviet era has given way to unilateral energy dependency in favor of Russia.	苏联的恐怖平衡时代已经一去不返，单方面依赖俄国能源的时代已经到来。


With their enormous cash flow, Russian billionaires are buying sumptuous properties all over the world, and Russia is buying prominent Germans like the former Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, if not the support of Germany as such.	俄国的亿万富翁用大笔的金钱在世界各地购买豪华资产，而俄国则以其雄厚的财力拉拢像前总理格哈德·施罗德那样的德国显贵，甚至用这种方式买到了德国的支持。


Whatever the enormous differences that may separate them, post-communist Russia and fundamentalist Iran have much in common.	无论有着什么样的差异，后共产主义时代的俄国和原教旨主义的伊朗都有着很多共同之处。


Energy wealth gives them a sense of unique opportunity, the conviction that time is playing in their favor, and that they can now redress the humiliations they have suffered from the outside world.	两国都享受着能源财富所赋予的独一无二的机会，两国都坚信运气始终会站在自己一边。 两国都相信现在应当让外界为自己曾经受到的屈辱付出代价。


It is as if they were combining the Arab/Islamic world’s culture of humiliation and Asia’s culture of hope.	这两个国家似乎把阿拉伯/伊斯兰世界的屈辱文化与亚洲国家的希望文化紧紧结合在一起。


Both are marked by a defiant nationalism, and both feel irresistible, all the more so because they sense that the United States is in decline as a result of the quagmire in Iraq, if not in Afghanistan as well.	两国都有着目空一切的民族主义，都相信自己的力量无法抗拒，而美国因陷入伊拉克和阿富汗战争的泥沼而江河日下更使他们觉得无所畏惧。


Of course, the differences between Russia and Iran are enormous.	勿庸置疑，俄国和伊朗之间的差异显而易见。


The Iranian regime is highly ideological and animated by an open passion to destroy Israel.	伊朗专制政权崇尚意识形态，摧毁以色列的热情是他们取之不竭的动力源泉。


It does not enjoy the massive backing of its society, except when it comes to national pride and the quest for nuclear status.	但在与国家尊严与核地位无关的问题上，伊朗政权并不能得到社会民众的广泛支持。


Russia’s regime, by contrast, is animated by money, not ideology.	与伊朗不同的是，金钱、而非意识形态，才是俄国政治制度的驱动力量。


In its quest to rebuild Russia’s geopolitical power and influence, Presdient Vladimir Putin has the support of the immense majority of the population.	在重塑俄国地缘政治强国影响力的问题上，普京总统赢得了绝大多数民众的一致支持。


His motto, “Get rich and keep quiet,” sounds like Guizot’s priorities in mid-nineteenth century France, even if it is “seasoned” with a strong touch of imperial pride.	虽然掺杂了帝国尊严的浓重味道，但他所信奉的格言“保持沉默，拼命挣钱”与十九世纪中叶法国政治家基佐的看法不谋而合。


As long as the oil money keeps flowing, most Russians will express no nostalgia for the democratic opening of the Yeltsin years, with its accompanying combination of chaos, corruption, international weakness, and disrespect for the state.	只要石油赚得的收入源源不断，多数俄国人就不会对叶利钦时代曾一闪而过的民主机遇抱有任何的留恋，因为随之而来的还有混乱、腐败、国际地位衰弱以及无法国家尊严的缺失。


Are Russians so different from us in the western democratic world, or is democracy a luxury that only old, stable, prosperous, and satisfied societies can afford?	俄国民众真的与西方民主世界的民众如此不同吗？ 抑或是民主是只有历史悠久、政治稳定、经济繁荣和安居乐业的社会才能够享用的奢侈品？


In their quest for post-Soviet stability, Russians seem to have found reassurance in Putin.	在对后苏联时期稳定局势的追求中，俄国人似乎给予了普京极高的信任。


He does not match Peter the Great in physical stature, but he has proven to be a gifted politician, capable of grasping, then controlling, the mood of the Russian people.	他虽然不像彼得大帝那样高大伟岸，但事实证明他是一位高明的政治家，能够轻松地掌控俄国民众的喜怒哀乐。


For a majority of Russian citizens, economic prosperity and televised entertainment have become the modern equivalent of the panem et circenses formula of Roman times.	对多数俄国公民来说，经济繁荣和电视娱乐已经成了罗马时代“面包与马戏”模式在当今的替代品。


The war in Chechnya may contribute to the moral corruption of Russia as a whole, to its frightening descent into a culture of violence.	车臣战争可能会导致整个俄国道德的沉沦，造成俄国向暴力文化堕落的可怕后果。


But it is also feeding a patriotic emotion – a popular longing for the restoration of Russia’s imperial status and prestige – that Putin’s regime has shrewdly exploited.	但这场战争也点燃了人们爱国情绪¾俄国民众普遍希望恢复俄国昔日的帝国尊严与威望，而普京政权察觉到这种情绪并敏锐地加以利用。


Meanwhile, ordinary Russians have gained little.	与此同时，普通的俄国民众却获益甚微。


The multiplication of assassinations of political opponents and economic rivals, the mafia practice of contract murders, cannot be seen as signs of a regained stability.	政治和经济对手惨遭暗害的事件成倍增加、黑手党实施协议谋杀时有恃无恐，这些都绝对不是恢复稳定的迹象。


Nor can the Putin regime’s manipulation of popular xenophobia against citizens of the former Soviet empire, such as Georgians.	同样令人无法容忍的还有普京政权大肆煽动普通俄国人对格鲁吉亚等前苏联帝国民众的排外情绪。


Russia may have recovered its status as a strong power, but is it a respected, or even a happy one?	俄国或许已经恢复了自己的强国地位，但它是否真的能够受人尊重，或者至少能够自我满足吗？


Russia is rich, but Russians, at least most of them, remain poor, with a life expectancy that is closer to Africa than to Western Europe.	俄国的确富有，但俄国人，至少他们当中的绝大多数，仍然十分贫穷，民众的总体寿命与非洲，而不是西欧国家相当。


Eventually, they will have to recognize that modern nations cannot live by power alone.	归根结底，他们必须意识到现代国家无法单纯依靠权力生存下去。


From Prague Spring to Velvet Revolution	从布拉格之春到天鹅绒革命


WARSAW – What was the Prague Spring, or the events of 1968 more generally?	华沙--布拉格之春以及更为广义上的1968年发生的事件的性质究竟是什么呢？


Their meaning, it seems, has become more, not less, debatable with the passage of time.	随着时间的推移，这些事件的意义好像越发值得辩论，而非相反。


My generation was forged by protests and police truncheons, by the hopes generated not only by the Prague Spring, but also by the Polish student movement that March, the Paris events of May, and the first signs of Russian democracy voiced in the early books of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.	我这一代人是抗议和警棍塑造而成的。 塑造我们的不仅仅是布拉格之春，还有当年三月的波兰学生运动、五月的巴黎事件以及萨哈罗夫和索尔仁尼琴早期作品所表达的俄国民主最初迹象产生的希望。


For those of us imprisoned in Poland, the Prague Spring was a harbinger of hope.	对于我们那些在波兰被投入监狱的人而言，布拉格之春是希望的前兆。


Even Poland’s communist newspapers, read behind bars, somehow conveyed news of the great changes taking place in our neighbor to the south.	即使是在狱中所阅读的波兰共产党报纸也好似传递了我们南边邻国正在发生巨变的消息。


So I remember my shock when I learned about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, and the trauma that lingered long after.	所以当我得知苏联在八月入侵捷克斯洛伐克的时候，我无比惊讶，其痛楚随后挥之不去。


On the tenth anniversary of that invasion, Václav Havel, Jacek Kuron, and I, along with other dissidents, met on the Czech-Polish border.	我现在还记忆犹新。 在那一入侵事件十周年纪念的时候，哈维尔、库隆和我以及其他异议人士相聚在捷克和波兰边境。


There is a photograph of that occasion: future presidents, ministers, and parliamentarians who were at that time pursued by the police like common criminals.	我们照了一张像。 我们这些未来的总统、部长以及议员们当时就像普通罪犯一样被警察通缉追捕。


These encounters were an extension of the climate of the Prague Spring.	这些会面是布拉格之春气候的延伸。


We all felt that we were creating something new, something that might, one day, turn out to be an important component of democracy in our countries.	我们都感到我们是在创造某些新气象，或许终有一日会成为我们国家民主的重要组成部分。


And so it was.	结果就是这样。


In August 1989, I proposed in the Polish Diet a draft resolution apologizing to the Czechs and Slovaks for Polish involvement in the 1968 invasion.	1989年8月，我在波兰议会提出一项决议草案，为波兰参与1968年入侵而向捷克和斯洛伐克道歉。


I felt that a historical circle was being closed: the ideas of the Polish March and the Prague Spring, the ideas of our mountain meetings, were becoming political facts.	我感到一个历史循环正在终结，也就是说，波兰三月学运和布拉格之春以及我们山上会面的理想正在成为政治现实。


Three months later, the Velvet Revolution began in Prague.	三个月后，天鹅绒革命在布拉格爆发了。


The main difference between the Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution was that the former was mostly the work of Communist Party members and others who wanted to bring about “socialism with a human face.”	布拉格之春和天鹅绒革命之间的主要区别在于，前者主要是共产党员所为，而其他人则想要带来“具有人性的社会主义”。


As a result, some people nowadays dismiss the Prague Spring as a power struggle between communists.	结果，现在有些人把布拉格之春贬低为共产党内部的权力之争。


But there were many roads to – and through – communism, and many of them converged with national traditions.	但是，通向以及穿越共产主义的道路不止一条，而且许多都与国家民族传统重合。


Indeed, communism was attractive for many reasons, including the idea of universal justice and humanized social relations; a response to the great spiritual crisis after World War I and, later, to the Nazis’ genocide; and the conviction that Western dominance of the world was nearing its end.	确实，共产主义有许多吸引人的地方。 它们包括全面正义和人性化的社会关系、回应了第一次世界大战之后巨大的精神危机以及后来纳粹种族屠杀，以及相信西方对世界的统治正在结束。


Finally, in a world divided by Yalta, communism was, for some, the only realistic choice for central Europe.	最后，在一个被亚尔塔协议瓜分的世界里，共产主义对于某些人来说是中欧唯一现实的选择。


In Czechoslovakia in 1968, communist reformers appealed to democratic ideals that were deeply rooted in the country’s pre-World War II past.	在1968年的捷克斯洛伐克，共产主义改革派求助于二战后该国根深蒂固的民主理想。


Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the Czechoslovak communists and the symbol of the Prague Spring, personified hope for democratic evolution, real pluralism, and a peaceful way to a state governed by law and respectful of human rights.	捷共领导人杜布切克是布拉格之春的象征。 他体现了民主变革、真正的多元主义以及以和平手段采用法治和尊重人的方式治理国家的希望。


By contrast, in Poland, which had witnessed its own tentative opening in the March student movement, a nationalist-authoritarian faction exploited all that was intolerant and ignorant in Polish tradition, employing xenophobia and anti-intellectual rhetoric.	与此相比，波兰见证了其三月学运中短暂开放，而其民族主义和专制主义派别利用了所有波兰传统中的顽固和无知、排外和反知识阶层的花言巧语。


Polish Interior Minister Mieczyslaw Moczar, the leader of the nationalist faction, combined communist rhetoric with a language proper to fascist movements in order to mobilize the masses against the “cosmopolitan-liberal intelligentsia.”	波兰内务部长莫查尔是民族主义派别的领导人。 他把共产主义言辞和法西斯运动语言结合在一起，把群众调动起来反对所谓的“大都市自由派知识阶层”。


The Polish freedom movement of 1968 lost its confrontation with police violence; the Prague Spring was crushed by the armies of five Warsaw Pact members.	1968年的波兰自由运动在警察暴力中失败； 布拉格之春被五个华约国家的军队镇压。


But in both countries, 1968 gave birth to a new political consciousness.	但是在这两个国家中，1968催生了一个新的政治意识。


The Polish and Czech opposition movements that emerged only a few years later had their roots in the events of 1968.	仅仅几年后产生的波兰和捷克的反对派运动则起源于1968年发生的事件。


The Prague Spring was provoked by a crisis in the Communist Party, but the claim that it was merely a result of political squabbles among Party members falsifies history and rejects a significant fragment of the national heritage.	布拉格之春是共产党内部危机造成的，但是说它仅仅是共产党党内斗争的结果却是在篡改历史，并且是在否定民族遗产中的重要一部分。


Attitudes towards communism were always a controversial subject for the anticommunist opposition.	对于反共反对派而言，对共产主义的态度总是一个充满争议的话题。


Some rejected communism in all its forms.	有些人全盘否定共产主义。


The majority though, in one way or another, had some contact with communism, through intellectual fascination, participation in state institutions, or the cold conviction that only by accepting the reality of life under communism could one do something useful for one’s country.	而大多数人则是在某种程度上与共产主义有所过往，要么是智识上的迷恋，要么是参与国家机构，要么坚信人只有接受在共产主义统治下的生活现实才能为国家做点有用之事。


These people, “tainted by communism,” constituted the majority of the participants in all revolts against the communist dictatorships.	这些受到“共产主义感染”的人构成了参与所有反抗共产主义独裁的大多数。


There was, however, another, category of people: the “careful and untainted,” who absented themselves from the world of politics.	���是还有另外一种人。 他们是一些“小心谨慎而且没有受到感染”的人，逍遥于政治世界之外。


They hated communism, but, convinced that the system could not be reformed, they avoided the democratic opposition.	他们痛恨共产主义，但是却相信体制无法改良，回避要求民主的反对派。


While others took risks or sat in jails, they functioned in official and legal structures.	当其他人冒险或者蹲监狱的时候，他们在官场和法律界活动。


One should not blame anyone today for such behavior.	人民不应当在今天指责这样的行为。


But it is surprising when these people accuse participants in the Prague Spring and the democratic opposition of links with communism.	但是，这些人指责布拉格之春的参与者以及反共民主反对派的时候就令人惊讶了。


Communism was obviously an instrument of Soviet domination over conquered societies, but it was also a modus vivendi for large parts of these nations under the conditions in which they were obliged to live.	共产主义明显是苏联统治其所征服的社会的工具，但是它也是这些国家中那些不得不在这一情形下谋杀的大多数人的方式。


Imre Nagy, the leader of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and Dubcek became parts of their national legends, which belies the claim that communism was exclusively a foreign imposition.	1956年匈牙利革命领导人纳吉以及杜布切克成为各自国家的象征，这就否定了那种共产主义完全就是外国强加之物的说法。


The Prague Spring appealed to elementary values: freedom, pluralism, tolerance, sovereignty, and rejection of the dictates of communist orthodoxy.	布拉格之春感召了基本价值，也就是自由、多元、宽容、主权以及拒绝共产主义教条。


When I recall these events after 40 years, I see not only revolt, but also the great illusion that it might be possible to outfox the Kremlin and painlessly move society from communism to democracy.	四十年后我重温这些往事的时候，我看到的不仅是反抗，而且还有巨大的幻觉，也就是或许有可能智胜苏联、毫无痛苦地把社会从共产主义移向民主。


This belief was naïve, but it also underpinned a national awakening in which the potential for freedom found its voice.	这一信念是天真的，但是也突出了自由表达潜能的民族觉醒。


From Resource Curse to Blessing	资源福祸辩


KAMPALA – New discoveries of natural resources in several African countries – including Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique – raise an important question: Will these windfalls be a blessing that brings prosperity and hope, or a political and economic curse, as has been the case in so many countries?	坎帕拉—在一些非洲国家（包括加纳、乌干达、坦桑尼亚和莫桑比克），新自然资源的发现引发了一个重要问题：这些飞来横财是富还是祸？ 会带来繁荣和希望还是与众多先例一样成为政治和经济的诅咒？


On average, resource-rich countries have done even more poorly than countries without resources.	平均而言，资源富裕国要比资源贫乏国表现更差。


They have grown more slowly, and with greater inequality – just the opposite of what one would expect.	资源富裕国增长更慢，不平等性也更严重，与你所设想的正好相反。


After all, taxing natural resources at high rates will not cause them to disappear, which means that countries whose major source of revenue is natural resources can use them to finance education, health care, development, and redistribution.	毕竟，对自然资源课以高额税收不会让它们消失，这意味着以自然资源为主要收入来源的国家可以用它们来为教育、医疗、发展和再分配融资。


A large literature in economics and political science has developed to explain this “resource curse,”and civil-society groups (such as Revenue Watch and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) have been established to try to counter it.	经济学和政治学有一个较大的分支致力于解释这一“资源的诅咒”，公民社会团体（如岁入观察和采掘业透明度计划）的成立便是为了与此斗争。


Three of the curse’s economic ingredients are well known:	众所周知，资源的诅咒包括三大经济成分：


Resource-rich countries tend to have strong currencies, which impede other exports;Because resource extraction often entails little job creation, unemployment rises;Volatile resource prices cause growth to be unstable, aided by international banks that rush in when commodity prices are high and rush out in the downturns (reflecting the time-honored principle that bankers lend only to those who do not need their money).Moreover, resource-rich countries often do not pursue sustainable growth strategies.	由于资源开采通常不会创造很多就业，因此失业率会上升； 资源价格的波动导致增长极不稳定，国际银行在商品价格高企时涌入，在商品价格低迷时涌出（这反映出一条亘古不变的原理——银行家总是把钱借给根本不需要钱的人）恶化了这一状况。


They fail to recognize that if they do not reinvest their resource wealth into productive investments above ground, they are actually becoming poorer.	此外，资源富裕国通常不会追求可持续增长战略。 它们不会认识到，如果它们不将资源财富用于地上的生产性投资项目，事实上它们会越变越穷。


Political dysfunction exacerbates the problem, as conflict over access to resource rents gives rise to corrupt and undemocratic governments.	政治上的无能加剧了这一问题，因为争夺资源租的冲突滋生了腐败和不民主的政府。


There are well known antidotes to each of these problems: a low exchange rate, a stabilization fund, careful investment of resource revenues (including in the country’s people), a ban on borrowing, and transparency (so citizens can at least see the money coming in and going out).	对于这些问题，每一个都有众所周知的解药：低汇率、稳定基金、对资源收入（包括该国人民）的小心投资、禁止借贷，以及透明化（以便让公民至少了解钱从何来，向何处去）。


But there is a growing consensus that these measures, while necessary, are insufficient.	但逐渐形成的共识是，这些措施虽然必要，却并不充分。


Newly enriched countries need to take several more steps in order to increase the likelihood of a “resource blessing.”	新致富国需要采取多个步骤才能增加“资源祝福”的可能性。


First, these countries must do more to ensure that their citizens get the full value of the resources.	首先，这些国家必须在确保公民获得资源的完全价值方面做得更多。


There is an unavoidable conflict of interest between (usually foreign) natural-resource companies and host countries: the former want to minimize what they pay, while the latter need to maximize it.	在（通常是外来的）自然资源公司和本国人民之间往往存在不可避免的利益冲突：前者希望将支出最小化，而后者希望将之最大化。


Well designed, competitive, transparent auctions can generate much more revenue than sweetheart deals.	巧妙设计的竞争性透明拍卖能带来比暗箱操作多得多的收入。


Contracts, too, should be transparent, and should ensure that if prices soar – as they have repeatedly – the windfall gain does not go only to the company.	契约也应该透明化，并应该确保万一价格上涨——一再发生的事情——飞来横财不会完全流入公司的腰包。


Unfortunately, many countries have already signed bad contracts that give a disproportionate share of the resources’ value to private foreign companies.	不幸的是，许多国家已经签署了坏契约，资源价值的大头被私人外国公司攫走了。 但有一个简单的解决办法：重新谈判；


But there is a simple answer: renegotiate; if that is impossible, impose a windfall-profit tax.	如果重新谈判不可行的话，可以征收意外利润税。


All over the world, countries have been doing this.	放眼全球，各国已开始如此行动了。


Of course, natural-resource companies will push back, emphasize the sanctity of contracts, and threaten to leave.	当然，自然资源公司也会逆袭，强调契约精神不可侵犯，还会以离开相威胁。


But the outcome is typically otherwise.	但结果通常正好相反。


A fair renegotiation can be the basis of a better long-term relationship.	公平谈判可以成为更好的长期合作关系的基础。


Botswana's renegotiations of such contracts laid the foundations of its remarkable growth for the last four decades.	博茨瓦纳对此类契约的重新谈判为其过去40年令人瞩目的增长奠定了基础。


Moreover, it is not only developing countries, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, that renegotiate; developed countries like Israel and Australia have done so as well.	此外，不但玻利维亚和委内瑞拉等发展中国家财务了重新谈判的做法，以色列和澳大利亚等发达国家也在这么做。


Even the United States has imposed a windfall-profits tax.	连美国也出台了意外利润税。


Equally important, the money gained through natural resources must be used to promote development.	同样重要的是，从自然资源中赚得的钱必须用于促进发展。


The old colonial powers regarded Africa simply as a place from which to extract resources.	就殖民势力将非洲视为榨取资源的对象。


Some of the new purchasers have a similar attitude.	一些新的资源买家也抱有相同态度。


Infrastructure (roads, railroads, and ports) has been built with one goal in mind: getting the resources out of the country at as low a price as possible, with no effort to process the resources in the country, let alone to develop local industries based on them.	基础设施（公路、铁路和港口）的建设带有唯一的目的：让资源以最低的价格运离该国，在开采国处理资源根本不予考虑，更不用说开发基于资源的本地工业了。


Real development requires exploring all possible linkages: training local workers, developing small and medium-size enterprises to provide inputs for mining operations and oil and gas companies, domestic processing, and integrating the natural resources into the country’s economic structure.	真正的发展要求利用所有可以利用的关系：培训本地工人、发展中小企业以供应开采作业和油气公司的投入品、就地处理资源，以及将自然资源嵌入该国经济结构中。


Of course, today, these countries may not have a comparative advantage in many of these activities, and some will argue that countries should stick to their strengths.	当然，如今这些国家在这诸多方面并不具有比较优势，有人会说国家应该坚持自己的优势。


From this perspective, these countries’ comparative advantage is having other countries exploit their resources.	从这个角度讲，这些国家的比较优势是让其他国家开采它们的资源。


That is wrong.	这是错误的。


What matters is dynamic comparative advantage, or comparative advantage in the long run, which can be shaped.	起作用的是动态比较优势，或曰长期比较优势，这是可以培育的。


Forty years ago, South Korea had a comparative advantage in growing rice.	40年前，韩国的比较优势是种植水稻。


Had it stuck to that strength, it would not be the industrial giant that it is today.	如果它坚持这一优势，那么永远不会成为如今那样的工业巨人。


It might be the world’s most efficient rice grower, but it would still be poor.	韩国也许是世界上最具效率的水稻生产国，但会一直穷下去。


Companies will tell Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique to act quickly, but there is good reason for them to move more deliberately.	公司会告诉加纳、乌干达、坦桑尼亚和莫桑比克快点行动，但它们有充分的理由谨慎行事。


The resources will not disappear, and commodity prices have been rising.	资源不会凭空消失，商品价格也在上涨。


In the meantime, these countries can put in place the institutions, policies, and laws needed to ensure that the resources benefit all of their citizens.	与此同时，这些国家可以实施所需的制度、政策和法律以确保资源的好处能被所有公民分享。


Resources should be a blessing, not a curse.	资源应该是福，而不是祸。


They can be, but it will not happen on its own. And it will not happen easily.	它们可以是福，但不会自己变福，也不会轻易地变福。


From Rome to Moscow	从罗马到莫斯科


One of the late Pope John Paul II’s unfulfilled dreams was to visit Moscow and forge a rapprochement with the Orthodox Church.	前任教皇保罗二世一直梦想访问莫斯科，与东正教重修旧好，却未能如愿。


But, although he was invited to Moscow by Russia’s three most recent presidents – Vladimir Putin, Boris Yeltsin, and Mikhail Gorbachev – opposition to the visit by Orthodox Patriarch Alexi prevented the Pope from making the journey before he died.	尽管曾受到俄罗斯最近三位总统——普京、叶利钦及戈尔巴乔夫访问莫斯科的邀请，但由于东正教大主教亚力克西极力反对，教皇至死也未能成行。


Will Pope Benedict XVI achieve the breakthrough that his friend and predecessor failed to realize?	教皇本尼迪克特十六世能完成自己前任兼好友未尽的心愿，成功突破吗?


Despite the recent return to Russia of the icon of Our Lady of Kazan that once hung in John Paul’s bedroom, relations between the Vatican and the Patriarchate remain strained.	尽管一直挂在约翰﹒保罗卧室中的喀山圣母像已于最近归还了俄罗斯，但梵蒂冈与东正教教会之间关系紧张依旧。


So Putin, who usually seems omnipotent, remains wary of issuing an invitation to Pope Benedict.	因此，就连好像一贯拥有无上权力的普京，在对教皇本尼迪克特发出邀请的问题上，也一直态度谨慎。


That wariness is reinforced by a new political factor: a defense of Orthodoxy has become a pillar of the national idea on which Putin seeks to base the legitimacy of his regime.	现在，保卫东正教已成为俄罗斯国家理念的支柱之一，普京要靠此来维护自己政权的合法性。 这一新的政治因素让普京在邀请教皇问题上，更为谨慎。


This is one reason why Putin was one of the few leading heads of state to miss attending Pope John Paul’s funeral.	这也是普京没有参加教皇约翰﹒保罗葬礼的原因之一。 只有为数寥寥的国家首脑没有参加此次葬礼。


Although the Orthodox Church did send a delegation, immediately after the funeral Patriarch Alexi warned that the disagreements between the two branches of Christianity go much deeper than the former Pope’s Polish nationality, which was always a particular sore spot for Russian Orthodox Slavs.	尽管在葬礼后，东正教立刻就派出了代表团，但大主教亚力克西警告说，基督教两大分支之间的分歧已远不止于前任教皇的波兰国籍问题。 前任教皇的国籍问题一直是信奉东正教的俄罗斯斯拉夫人心头之痛。


Russians saw John Paul’s Polish nationality as linking him to a long history of perceived oppression of Russian Orthodoxy.	在俄罗斯人眼里，约翰﹒保罗的波兰国籍一直把教皇与俄罗斯东正教长年来受压迫的历史联系在一起。


No less a figure than Alexander Pushkin wrote in 1836 that “Orthodoxy has always been persecuted by Catholic fanaticism….Their missionaries cursed the Orthodox Church, with hypocrisy and threats tried to recruit into Catholicism not only ordinary people but Orthodox priests as well.”	连亚历山大﹒普希金这样鼎鼎大名的人物都曾在1836年写道“东正教一直受到天主教狂热主义的迫害……他们的传教士诅咒东正教，骂东正教虚伪，威胁东正教，不仅企图把普通人，还企图把东正教传教士一起拉入天主教中。


Those Russians who continue to view the Catholic Church as a threat regularly quote these lines.	”现在那些依旧视天主教为威胁的俄罗斯人，还经常引用普希金的这番话。


Pope Benedict, being from Germany, a predominantly Protestant country, does not carry the weight of this bitter history.	教皇本尼迪克特来自新教占绝对优势的德国，因此不用承担这一苦涩的历史重负。


Perhaps this is one reason why Alexi responded positively to Benedict’s first speech urging reconciliation, saying that he hopes that this will improve “Orthodox-Catholic relations on the post-Soviet territory.”	这也许是亚力克西对本尼迪克特的首次演讲做出正面反应的原因之一。 在此次演讲中，本尼迪克特敦促双方修好，说他希望这能改善“苏联解体后，这片土地上东正教与天主教的关系。


This positive spirit can be nurtured by Russia’s government, which usually has cordial relations with the Vatican.	这一正面态度可能得到俄罗斯政府的支持。 俄罗斯政府与梵蒂冈关系向来不错。


Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has many projects for which he thinks the Vatican can be of help, particularly in advancing the cause of reconciliation and creating a “partnership between civilizations.”	事实上，俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫认为，在很多项目上，梵蒂冈能助其一臂之力，尤其是在推动双方和解，创建“不同文明之间的伙伴关系”方面。


Recently, another key Vatican figure, Cardinal Walter Casper, the head of the Council for Christian Unity, called for a Catholic-Orthodox high level meeting that would address unifying both branches of Christianity.	最近，梵蒂冈另一重要人物，基督教联合委员会主席，红衣主教华特·卡斯珀号召召开天主教与东正教的高层会议，商讨这两大基督教分支的统一问题。


Cardinal Casper is well regarded in Russia for being the man who returned Our Lady of Kazan to its homeland.	红衣主教卡斯珀在俄罗斯享有较高声誉，俄罗斯人认为因为卡斯珀，喀山圣母像才得以重归故里。


In his public speeches, Casper more than once suggested that the Vatican considers Christian unification its main goal, and – most important from the Orthodox perspective -- that “unity does not have to mean sameness.”	卡斯珀在公开演说中，不止一次建议梵蒂冈将基督教的统一问题列为自己的主要目标，并从东正教角度称“统一并非一定意味着完全一致”，这点更是至关重要。


The fact that Pope Benedict and Cardinal Casper are both Germans is important, because Russian-German relations are perhaps warmer now than they have ever been.	教皇本尼迪克特和红衣主教卡斯珀都是德国人，这点非常重要。 因为与以前相比，现在俄罗斯和德国的关系也许更为和谐。


Putin, in particular, is at home in the German language, having spent many years in East Germany during his days as a KGB agent.	尤其值得一提的是，普京在为克格勃作间谍期间，曾长驻东德，精通德语。


Moreover, unlike Pope John Paul II, who, as a Pole, always saw communist Russia as an oppressor, Benedict carries the German sense of guilt stemming from the country’s Nazi past and its brutal invasion of Russia.	此外，教皇约翰﹒保罗二世身为波兰人，总视共产主义俄罗斯为压迫者。 而本尼迪克特则不同，作为德国人，他一直有负罪感，这种负罪感根源于德国的纳粹历史及当年对俄罗斯残暴的侵略。


In both Rome and Moscow, there is growing hope that a road to Christian unity can be built, but it is increasingly clear that the road can be completed only by passing through Berlin.	无论是在罗马还是在俄罗斯，修建一条通往基督教统一的道路的希望都越来越大，但是人们也日渐清楚，这条道路只能通过柏林，才有望竣工。


From Shock Therapy to Sleep Therapy	从休克疗法到睡眠疗法


If the 1990’s was the era of economic shock therapy, the present decade may be remembered for economic reform paralysis.	如果说20世纪90年代经济休克疗法曾盛行一时，那么现在的十年也许会作为经济改革的瘫痪时期被载入史册。


Although the reasons for gridlock differ across countries, the bottom line is that few politicians anywhere are having much success in limbering up their economies.	尽管陷入瘫痪的原因各有不同，但底线是各国很少有政治家能成功地重新刺激经济的发展。


The problem is not just in emerging markets such as Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil, where an ascendant left has failed to find a viable alternative to the much reviled “Washington Consensus” of economic liberalization.	问题不仅出现在印尼、墨西哥和巴西等新兴市场国家，那里日益壮大的左翼势力未能找出可行的方法来替代备受攻诘的经济自由化“华盛顿共识”。


One sees the same phenomenon across many rich countries as well.	在很多富裕国家，人们也看到了同样的现象。


In a remarkable coincidence of timing, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called for early elections in the hope of energizing reform.	令人惊奇的巧合是，日本首相小泉纯一郎和德国总理施罗德几乎同时为激活改革而宣布提前选举。


In Germany, the most urgent needs are for tax and labor-market reform. In Japan, the Koizumi government wants to privatize the behemoth postal service, whose giant financial arm is wrapped like a python around the country’s banking system.	德国最迫切需要改革的是税收和劳动力市场，而日本的小泉政府力图将庞大的邮政系统私有化，邮政机构巨大的金融触手就像巨蟒般紧紧地缠住了日本的金融体系。


Even in the United States, one of the few places where economic liberalization is not a dirty word, President George W. Bush has his own frustrations.	即便是在美国，这个少数几个没有把经济自由化列入不受欢迎字眼的国度，乔治·W·布什总统也有着自己的困扰。


Despite a huge investment of time and energy, he has failed to marshal even his own troops in support of a relatively modest proposal to stave off collapse of the nation’s old-age insurance program.	尽管投入了大量的时间和精力，他仍然未能说服自己的队伍支持一项相对缓和的提案，从而延缓美国老年保险计划的崩溃。


Indeed, Bush’s popularity has taken a beating over pension reform.	实际上，养老金改革的失败已经使布什的支持率受到了很大的影响。


Some people ascribe the global collapse of reform efforts to a peculiarly ineffective collection of leaders.	有人把全球范围内的改革失败归咎于当政领导人的效率低下。


This view is nonsense, and besides, if the public is so unhappy with its leaders’ performance, why does it keep electing and re-electing them?	这种观点纯属无稽之谈。 而且，如果公众对领导人的表现如此不满，那为什么还一再为他们投票？


No, the problems run deeper.	不，问题绝没有那么简单。


The fact is that people everywhere are having trouble coming to terms with the rapid changes resulting from technology and globalization.	事实是世界各地的人们对技术和全球化所带来的快速变化很难适应。


For, although globalization spins off a lot more winners than losers, many people are worried, and worried people press their leaders to slow things down.	因为虽然全球化的赢家远远多于输家，很多人还是忧心忡忡，而这些忧心忡忡的人迫使领导人放慢改革的步伐。


You can tell Americans and Europeans that they should rejoice over the boundless cheap goods and cheap credit that trade with Asia has supplied. But all their politicians seem to worry about is how some farmer or textile worker may lose their job.	你可以告诉美国人和欧洲人他们应该为亚洲贸易所带来的享用不尽的廉价商品和信贷感到欣喜，但政治家唯一担心的问题似乎是某些农场主或纺织工人会因此而丢掉工作。


You can tell Latin Americans or Africans that Asia’s unquenchable thirst for natural resources will keep pushing up the prices of their commodity and agricultural exports in perpetuity, turning wheat fields into gold mines.	你也可以告诉拉丁美洲人和非洲人亚洲对自然资源无法抑止的饥渴会推动他们的商品和农产品出口价格一路上扬，把麦田变成富饶的金矿。


But all their politicians seem to want to worry about is protecting doomed domestic manufacturers against low-wage Asian competition.	但所有政治家愿意关心的似乎只是保护厄运缠身的国内制造者不受亚洲低薪竞争的伤害。


Outgoing US Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan preaches flexibility as a way of dealing with globalization.	即将卸任的美联储主席阿兰·格林斯潘反复宣传灵活才是应对全球化的方法。


At some level, of course, he is right.	当然，从某种意义上讲他是对的。


Today’s world is one of fast-changing currents, where a region flourishes one day, and the next its factories collapse economically as if hit by hurricane Katrina.	今天的世界就像瞬息万变的潮水，某个地区可以一夜暴富，而第二天工厂就像遭受了飓风卡特里娜袭击般地（Katrina）纷纷倒闭。


If change is inevitable, we must make our economies more flexible and prepare to live with the consequences.	如果变革不可避免，我们必须让我们的经济更为灵活，随时准备接受挑战。


There is no other way.	除此之外别无他法。


So why doesn’t the public accept this need for flexibility, which, in the end, is what market-based economic liberalization is all about?	那么，公众为什么不接受这种对灵活性的需要，毕竟它才是市场经济自由化的全部真谛。


The problem is that most people are not thrilled to live in a world of blindingly fast change.	问题是多数人都不喜欢生活在瞬息万变的世界中。


Most people are creatures of habit; they crave predictability.	人们大多是习惯动物，他们渴望按部就班。


German workers who make high-end machine tools are proud of their craft, and they don’t want to be told that the same work can be done for much less in Poland and Slovakia.	制造高端精密机床的德国工人为自己的手艺感到骄傲，他们不想知道同样的工作在波兰和斯洛伐克成本要低很多。


Clothing makers in Italy have long been the envy of the world.	意大利的服装工人一直备受羡慕。


These craftsmen don’t want to be told that they should start retraining as tour guides to service the inevitable horde of middle-income Chinese tourists, as that country takes over high-end light manufacturing like tailoring.	他们也不愿意听到自己要开始接受导游再培训，为成群结队不可避免的中国中产阶级旅游者提供服务，因为包括成衣业在内的高端轻工业制造重心已经转移到了中国。


With such resistance to change, it is no wonder that so many political leaders try to lull their subjects to sleep, hoping that when everyone wakes up, it will all have proven a dream.	有了这些对变革的阻力，难怪那么多政治领袖试图让改革休眠，他们希望人们一觉醒来，所有这一切就像梦一般地烟消云散。


Asia, of course, is different.	亚洲当然大不相同。


China is developing at a dizzying pace.	中国正在以令人眩目的速度发展。


Whole cities are rising out of desert sands overnight.	一夜之间整座城市就从沙漠中拔地而起。


China is building more roads, airports, and bridges every five years than Europe and the US combined build in 20.	中国每五年修建的道路、机场和桥梁比欧洲和美国每20年建造的总和还要多。


With a long history of cataclysmic, often violent change, Chinese society is perhaps more adaptable than most.	由于历史上灾难深重，变化天翻地覆，中国社会也许比多数国家更能适应变革。


In India, which is said to have “a strong consensus for weak reform,” things are moving far more slowly – but always forward.	而在据说“一致同意实行缓和改革措施”的印度，发展的速度虽然慢很多¾但却一直在向前发展。


Whereas India is not yet nearly the factor in global trade that China has become, its 1.2 billion people are pushing inexorably onto the scene.	尽管印度在全球贸易中的地位还远远赶不上中国，但它的12亿人口正在毫不留情地挤到前台。


Will today’s reform paralysis outside Asia continue?	目前亚洲以外地区的改革僵局是否还会继续？


Will the political winds shift to reinvigorate economic liberalization, with politicians reminiscent of Britain’s Margaret Thatcher or the US’s Ronald Reagan coming to the fore, breathing the fire of change?	政治之风的朝向能否改变，为经济自由化重新注入活力，让那些怀念英国首相玛格丽特·撒切尔或美国总统罗纳德·里根的政治家们走上前台，为改革呼风唤雨？


Will politicians finally tell their citizens that if their economies continue to sleep, they may not wake up?	政治家们是否最终会告诉自己的人民，如果经济继续沉睡，可能就再也无法苏醒？


I believe that in most countries, the era of sleep therapy will come to an early end.	我相信在大多数国家，休眠疗法的时代会很快结束。


But I fear that change might cause a global economic crisis resulting from, say, an ugly unwinding of extravagant US borrowing trends.	但我害怕这种改变会导致由美国过度借贷风潮盛行而造成的全球经济危机。


Only then may people start waking up and voting for politicians who insist on re-energizing economic reform.	只有到那个时候，人们才会开始清醒，并为坚持恢复经济改革的政治家们投票。


From Solidarity to Freedom	从“团结”到“自由”


Although the rise 25 years ago of Solidarity, the first independent civic movement in the former Soviet empire, had huge political consequences, Solidarity was, primarily, neither a political movement nor a labor union.	25年前，前苏联帝国范围内首个独立的公民运动“团结工会”宣告成立，尽管它所产生的政治影响不可忽视，但“团结”从本质上看既非政治运动亦非工会组织。


First and foremost, Solidarity was a cry of dignity.	首先，“团结”是对尊严的渴望。


We simply had reached the end of our endurance with the omnipresent and all-powerful communist apparatchiks who ruled in our workplaces, neighborhoods, even places of rest.	我们再也无法忍受无孔不入、无所不能的共产党爪牙，忍受不了他们对工作场所、居住社区、甚至是休闲地域的统治。


Writers, journalists, and artists could no longer stand the heavy-handed censorship and supervision.	作家、记者和艺术家再也无法忍受那种严厉的审查和监管。


In factories as well, Party bureaucrats wanted to know everything and decide everything.	工厂的情况也同样糟糕，党内官僚想要无所不知，大权独揽。


Every civic initiative, every activity of any kind was subject to ideological evaluation and control.	任何公民运动、任何形式的任何活动都要在意识形态领域里接受检查和控制。


All who were tempted to disobey were certain to be “taken care of” by the secret police.	如果谁胆敢反抗，必将受到秘密警察的“特殊照顾”。


Last winter, I saw a similar cry for dignity in Ukraine.	去年冬天，我在乌克兰看到了类似的要求尊严的呼声。


Those hundreds of thousands of people who camped for weeks on the freezing streets of Kiev did so because they were demanding their dignity.	那些在基辅冰冻的街道上风餐露宿达数周之久的成千上万的人们之所以会这么做，是因为他们要求本属于自己的尊严。


Both the Polish and the Ukrainian experiences have convinced me that the will to live in dignity is the most powerful engine of human action, an engine that is capable of overcoming even the greatest fear.	波兰和乌克兰的经验使我坚信：有尊严的生活是人类行为的最强动力，这种动力甚至能够战胜最深层次的恐惧。


But the desire for dignity is not enough to secure it. Something else is needed as well.	但仅有对尊严的渴望还是不够的，获得尊严还需要其它的因素。


Second, Solidarity was a social movement.	其次，“团结”是一种社会运动。


This meant that Solidarity – ostensibly a labor union – became a home for people from all social groups and classes in Poland: workers and intellectuals, engineers and artists, doctors and patients.	这意味着表面上只是工会组织的“团结”成了波兰各社会团体和阶层人们共同的家：这里面有工人和知识分子、工程师和艺术家、医生和病人。


Some passionately discussed economic reform, others talked about developing culture, while still others planned to reform education and the scientific establishment or assure the defense of the environment.	他们中有人热烈地探讨经济改革，有人谈论发展文化，还有人打算改革教育和科研机构，或者确保捍卫环境。


Solidarity created a public space for all of these discussions, while protecting us all against the party apparatus.	“团结”为所有这些探讨提供了场所，同时保护我们不受国家机器的迫害。


But Solidarity was still something more.	而“团结”的作用还不只于此。


It was a Polish version of the ancient Greek agora, a meeting place of all citizens, a locus of a free conversation about our communal and individual future, about all kinds of problems and their solutions.	它是古希腊“集会”在波兰的翻版，是所有公民聚会的场所，是自由探讨公众和个人未来的避风港，可以毫无顾忌地解剖所有问题，探讨解决之道。


We did not yet have a free state, but we already had something more important than that: a free civil society engaged in discussing the common condition of its members.	我们还没有建立真正自由的国家，但我们已经有了更为重要的事物：那就是致力于探讨成员共同处境的自由的公民社团。


The society embraced by Solidarity counted 10 million members; indeed, 10 million real citizens.	“团结”所代表的公众达到了千万之巨，而且它所代表的是1千万真正的公民。


But even that was not enough to achieve the final victory over the party and police apparatus of the state.	但即便如此也不足以最终战胜国家的政党和警察机器。


Third, Solidarity was an institution; indeed, a unique one given the conditions under which we lived, and it is to its special institutional form that we owe our ultimate victory.	第三，“团结”是一种制度，如果考虑到我们的生存环境，“团结”更是一种独一无二的制度，而正是其独特的制度形式使我们取得了最终的胜利。


Between the organizational structure of Solidarity and the official state and party organizations there was what might be called a “gap between civilizations.”	“团结”与党和国家官方的组织架构存在着可以称之为“文化鸿沟”的巨大差异。


Against the authoritarian and hierarchical structures of the regime, we raised a decentralized institution, a huge organism striving to achieve consensus about its aims and the methods of action.	为了与当权者的独裁和等级结构对抗，我们提出了非中央集权的制度，它是力求就行动目标和方法达成一致的巨大的有机体。


It was an institution committed to respecting the integrity of all individuals and all other institutions.	这种制度致力于尊重所有个人人格的完整，以及其它组织所固有的统一。


This may not be extraordinary in old democratic communities; but in our authoritarian environment, it was strikingly new.	在已有的民主社会看来这也许平淡无奇，但在我们生活的独裁环境下，却有着撼人心魄的神奇力量。


And only such a new institutional structure could respond to that deep cry for dignity.	也只有这样崭新的制度架构才能够顺应人们内心深处对于自尊的渴望。


So what is left of all this today?	那么对今天又有何影响？


To be sure, Solidarity achieved a stunning political success.	可以肯定的是，“团结”取得了令人眩目的政治成功。


Poland is a free country, a member of NATO and of the EU, while the Soviet Union is no more.	波兰成了自由的国度，也是北约和欧盟的成员，而苏联却早已风光不再。


But recent history has not been kind to the victors.	但近来的历史却令胜利者感到了残酷。


The leaders of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe quickly faded in the new environment.	东欧民主革命的领袖在新环境中迅速消失得无影无踪。


Democratic elections brought out new and savvier politicians, often from among those who were part of the old regime.	新的、更加睿智的政治家从民主选举中脱颖而出，而新领导往往过去曾是旧政权的组成部分。


More strikingly, some of our hopes for a new social order also crashed against the rocks of the new rules of the game.	更令人惊奇的是，我们对新社会秩序的某些渴望也在新游戏规则的岩石上撞得粉碎。


True, Poland’s democratic institutions, despite their flaws, function rather well.	的确，尽管有这样或那样的缺陷，波兰的民主制度还在正常运转。


Economic growth has been impressive, and life is definitely getting better.	经济增长令人欣喜，人民的生活质量也稳步提高。


But the vibrancy of civil society, the sense of common purpose, the universal manifestations of social solidarity that our union stood for in its time – all these things are largely gone.	但民主社会的生机勃勃、为共同目标而努力的情感和无所不在的社会团结，所有这些我们工会曾经为之奋斗的梦想，大多已经随风而逝。


The union itself is a shell of its own former self, a partisan and mostly right-wing movement of workers buffeted by the new economic reality.	“团结”工会只剩下了以前的空壳，成了遭受新经济现实打击的工人们自发组成的右翼组织。


Most notably, the unifying character of Solidarity gave way to social divisions and, among many of Poland’s people, a large dose of alienation from both politics and civic engagements.	最显著的变化是，“团结”工会的统一性质已经被社会分割所取代，对很多波兰人来讲，他们在很大程度上已经开始远离了政治和公众事业��


Is this what normalcy always means?	难道这就是所谓的常态？


Do heady times of struggle always give way to a somewhat deflating taste of victory?	是否如急风骤雨般的奋斗总是会结出淡而无味的胜利果实？


Am I merely a veteran wistfully reminiscing about the old days of struggle?	是否我只是个复员的老兵，还在充满渴望地回忆过去战斗的峥嵘岁月？


Perhaps.	也许如此。


But I am not a nostalgic type.	但我并没有多少怀旧情结。


I know that we have come a long way, and I do not want to go back.	我知道我们已经走了很远，而且我不愿意回头。


But was it really inevitable that so much solidarity had to escape our Solidarity?	但“团结”之梦从我们的“团结”组织中褪去是否真的就无可避免呢？


Global Capital Heads for the Frontier	全球资本涌向前沿市场


PRINCETON – So-called “frontier market economies" are the latest fad in investment circles.	普林斯顿—所谓的“前沿市场经济”已成为投资圈的新宠。


Though these low-income countries – including Bangladesh and Vietnam in Asia, Honduras and Bolivia in Latin America, and Kenya and Ghana in Africa – have small, undeveloped financial markets, they are growing rapidly and are expected to become the emerging economies of the future.	尽管这些低收入国家——包括亚洲的孟加拉国和越南、拉丁美洲的洪都拉斯和玻利维亚以及非洲的肯尼亚和加纳——规模小、金融市场不发达，但它们增长很快，并且预计将成为未来新兴经济体。


In the last four years, inflows of private capital into frontier economies have been nearly 50% higher (relative to GDP) than flows into emerging market economies.	在过去四年中，流入前沿经济体的私人资本比新兴经济体高50%（相对GDP而言）。


Whether that should be cheered or lamented is a question that has become a kind of Rorschach test for economic analysts and policymakers.	这是好事还是坏事已成为经济分析家和决策者罗莎测试（Rorschach test）。


We now know that the promise of free capital mobility has not been redeemed.	现在我们知道，资本自由流动的承诺并未减弱。


By and large, the surge in capital inflows has boosted consumption rather than investment in recipient countries, exacerbating economic volatility and making painful financial crises more frequent.	目前，资本流入的大增刺激了流入国的消费而非投资，放大了经济波动，也导致痛苦的金融危机变得更加频繁。


Rather than exerting discipline, global financial markets have increased the availability of debt, thereby weakening profligate governments' budget constraints and over-extended banks' balance sheets.	全球金融市场并未带来纪律，而是让负债变得更加容易，从而减弱了挥霍政府的预算约束，也导致银行资产负债表过度膨胀。


The best argument for free capital mobility remains the one made nearly two decades ago by Stanley Fischer, then the International Monetary Fund's number two official and now Vice Chair of the US Federal Reserve.	资本自由流动的最大理由仍然是近二十年前由时任国际货币基金组织（IMF）二号人物、现美联储副主席斯坦利·费希尔（Stanley Fischer）所提出的。


Though Fischer recognized the perils of free-flowing capital, he argued that the solution was not to maintain capital controls, but to undertake the reforms required to mitigate the dangers.	尽管费希尔认识到自有资本流动的弊端，但他认为解决办法不是维持资本管制，而是采取降低风险所需的改革。


Fischer made this argument at a time when the IMF was actively seeking to enshrine capital-account liberalization in its charter.	费希尔提出这一观点时IMF正在积极推动将资本账户自由化写入章程。


But then the world witnessed financial crises in Asia, Brazil, Argentina, Russia, Turkey, and eventually Europe and America.	但此后亚洲、巴西、阿根廷、俄罗斯、土耳其以及最终的欧洲和美国纷纷爆发金融危机。


To its credit, the Fund has since softened its line on capital controls.	值得赞赏的是，IMF因此放松了其对资本管制的要求。


In 2010, it issued a note that recognized capital controls as part of the arsenal of policy tools used to combat financial instability.	2010年，IMF提出资本管制也属于遏制金融动荡的政策工具。


Nonetheless, at the IMF and in advanced countries, the prevailing view remains that capital controls are a last resort – to be used only after conventional macroeconomic and financial policies have been exhausted.	尽管如此，在IMF和发达国家，主流观点依然是资本管制是最后手段——只有在常规宏观经济和金融政策用尽时才可使用。


Free capital mobility continues to be the ultimate goal, even if some countries may have to take their time getting there.	资本自由流动仍然是终极目标，即使一些国家达到这一目标还需时日。


There are two problems with this view.	这一观点有两个问题。


First, as advocates of capital mobility tirelessly point out, countries must fulfill a long list of prerequisites before they can benefit from financial globalization.	首先，资本流动派坚持不懈地提出的论点是，在国家可以从金融全球化收益之前，它必须满足大量先决条件。


These include the protection of property rights, effective contract enforcement, eradication of corruption, enhanced transparency and financial information, sound corporate governance, monetary and fiscal stability, debt sustainability, market-determined exchange rates, high-quality financial regulation, and prudential supervision.	这些条件包括产权保护、有效的契约执行机制、治理腐败、强化的透明度和金��信息、可靠的公司治理、货币和财政稳定、债务可持续性、市场决定的利率水平、高质量金融监管以及审慎监督等。


In other words, a policy aimed at enabling growth in developing countries requires first-world institutions before it can work.	换句话说，旨在提振发展中国家增长的政策只有在拥有第一世界水平的机构和制度时才能运转。


Worse, the list is not only long; it is also open ended.	更糟糕的是，先决条件不但多，而且“无底”。


As the advanced countries' experience with the global financial crisis has demonstrated, even the most sophisticated regulatory and supervisory systems are far from being failsafe.	发达国家在全球经融危机中的经验表明，哪怕是最成熟的监管和监督体系，也远远做不到万无一失。


Thus, demanding that developing countries build the kind of institutions that will render capital flows safe not only puts the cart before the horse; it is also a fool's errand.	因此，要求发展中国家构建保证资本流安全的机构和制度超过了它们的能力，注定徒劳无功。


Caution dictates a more pragmatic approach, one that recognizes a permanent role for capital controls alongside other regulatory and prudential tools.	谨慎起见，应该采取更务实的方针，必须承认资本管制是与其他监管和审慎工具并行的持久性工具。


The second problem concerns the possibility that capital inflows may be harmful to growth, even if we leave aside concerns about financial fragility.	第二个问题是资本流入可能有害于增长，即使抛开金融脆弱性问题不谈也是如此。


Advocates of capital mobility assume that poor economies have lots of profitable investment opportunities that are not being exploited because of a shortage of investible funds.	资本流动派认为，由于可投资资金短缺，穷国有的是有尚未利用的利可图的投资机会。


Let capital come in, they argue, and investment and growth will take off.	他们说，引入资本，投资和增长就会随之腾飞。


But many developing countries are constrained by a lack of investment demand, not a shortage of domestic saving.	但许多发展中国家受制于投资需求不足而非本国储蓄不足。


The social return on investment may be high, but private returns are low, owing to externalities, high taxes, poor institutions, or any of a wide array of other factors.	投资的社会回报也许很高，但由于外部性、高税收、制度和机构不健全或以上因素的综合作用，其私人回报很低。


Capital inflows in economies that suffer from low investment demand fuel consumption, not capital accumulation.	对于苦恼于地投资需求的经济体，资本流入会刺激消费而非资本积累。


They also fuel exchange-rate appreciation, which aggravates the investment shortage.	资本流入还会导致汇率升值，从而加剧投资短缺。


The profitability of tradable industries – those most likely to suffer from appropriability problems – takes a hit, and investment demand falls further.	可贸易行业——最容易受到专属权问题影响的行业——的可盈利性会受到打击，从而投资需求进一步下降。


In these economies, capital inflows may well retard growth rather than stimulate it.	在这些经济体，资本流入妨碍而不是刺激了增长。


Such concerns have led emerging economies to experiment with a variety of capital controls.	这些担忧让新兴经济体采用了各种资本管制尝试。


In principle, frontier market economies can learn much from this experience.	理论上，前沿市场经济体可以从这一经验中学到很多东西。


As the Johns Hopkins University economist Olivier Jeanne pointed out at a recent IMF conference organized to spur such learning, the capital-flow measures that have become fashionable of late do not work very well.	约翰霍普金斯大学经济学家奥利佛·珍妮（Olivier Jeanne）在最近的IMF会议上指出，要刺激学习，最近开始流行的资本流措施未必有利。


That is not because they fail to affect the quantity or composition of flows, but because such effects are quite small.	这并不是因为它们没有影响资本流的质量或组成，而是因为作用太小。


As Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, and others have learned, limited controls that target specific markets such as bonds or short-term bank lending do not have a significant impact on key outcomes – the exchange rate, monetary independence, or domestic financial stability.	巴西、哥伦比亚和韩国等国家已经知道，以具体市场——如债券或短期银行借贷市场——为目标的有限管制对重要结果——汇率、货币独立性或国内金融稳定起不了多大效果。


The implication is that capital controls may need to be blunt and comprehensive, rather than surgical and targeted, to be truly effective.	影响是，要想真正起作用，资本管制也许必须是粗放全面而非精确定向的。


Capital controls by themselves are no panacea, and they often create worse problems, such as corruption or a delay in needed reforms, than they solve.	资本管制本身绝非万灵丹，并且常常导致更糟糕的问题，如腐败和推迟必要的改革。


But this is no different from any other area of government action.	但其他政府活动领域也没有区别。


We live in a second-best world where policy action is almost always partial (and partially effective), and well-intentioned reforms in one area may backfire in the presence of distortions elsewhere in the system.	我们生活在一个次优的世界中，政策活动几乎总是局部的（因此只能局部有效），某一领域初衷良好的改革可能给系统中的其他领域带来扭曲。


In such a world, treating capital controls as the last resort, always and everywhere, has little rationale; indeed, it merely fetishizes financial globalization.	在这样一个世界中，不论时间场合将资本管制作为最后手段绝非理性； 事实上，这是对金融全球化的盲目迷信。


The world needs case-by-case, hardheaded pragmatism, recognizing that capital controls sometimes deserve a prominent place.	世界需要具体案例具体分析的冷静的务实主义，承认资本管制有时值得作为主要措施。


Fukushima and Derivatives Meltdowns	福岛危机与金融衍生品崩盘


CAMBRIDGE – Financial commentators have likened Japan’s earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe to derivatives’ role in the 2008 financial meltdown. The resemblance is clear enough: each activity yields big benefits and carries a tiny but explosive risk.	发自剑桥——许多经济评论家们都将本次日本地震，海啸与核灾难比作金融衍生品在2008年金融危机中所扮演的角色——两者的相似之处其实显而易见：一方面都能谋取巨额收益，另一方面却也暗含着概率极低的爆炸性风险。


But the similarity between the two types of crisis ends where preventing their recurrence begins.	然而在人们防止危机重演的举措方面，两场危机的相似性却荡然无存了。


For the Fukushima nuclear-power plant, a 1,000-year flood and ordinarily innocuous design defects combined to deprive the reactors of circulating water coolant and cause serious radiation leaks.	对福岛核电站来说，一波千年一遇的海啸和一个平时不太要紧的设计瑕疵碰到了一起，最终引发几座反应堆冷却水断供并导致严重核辐射泄漏。


In financial markets, an unexpected collapse in real-estate securities and design defects in the derivatives and repo markets combined to damage core financial institutions’ ability make good on their payment obligations.	而金融市场则是房地产债券意外崩溃和金融衍生品与再购协议市场的设计缺陷两者联合作用，极大削弱了了金融机构履行其偿还责任的能力。


While the basic risks originated outside the systems – a tsunami for Fukushima, over-investment in real-estate mortgages for financial institutions – design defects and bad luck meant that the system couldn’t contain the damage.	当基本风险来自系统之外的时候——正如福岛的海啸以及金融机构对房地产抵押贷款的过度投资——设计缺陷和坏运气意味着系统无法承受其破坏效应。


In the United States, AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers – all with large derivatives and/or repo investments – failed, freezing up credit markets for a scary few weeks.	在美国，美国国际集团（AIG），贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟——手里都握有大笔金融衍生品和再购协议投资——相继垮台，使整个信用市场陷入了持续几周之久的可怕停滞之中。


We now understand the Fukushima risks and design defects well.	我们如今都对福岛的风险和设计缺陷了如指掌。


Not so for the derivatives risks that jeopardized the global economy.	但对危害全球经济的金融衍生物风险却依然一知半解。


For Fukushima, crews are valiantly trying to stop the radiation leakage.	在福岛事件中，一批勇士试图冒死阻止核辐射泄漏。


But for derivatives, the analogous efforts are misdirected and won’t save us from the financial fire next time.	但在金融衍生品方面，类似的努力却走上了邪路，更无法防止人们继续重蹈覆辙。


We are rebuilding derivatives and related financial structures atop the same, still-active faults.	事实上我们正以同样的而且依然适用的错误方式来重建整个衍生品以及相关金融架构。


Financial players use derivatives to transfer risk: one player assumes the risk of, say, euro fluctuation, but doesn’t want yen risk, while for another, it’s the opposite.	金融参与者们利用衍生品来转移风险：比如说一个参与者能承受欧元汇率波动的风险，但却不希望在日元方面冒险； 而另一位炒家则恰恰想反。


So the former promises to deliver euros next June 1, while the latter promises to deliver yen.	于是前者承诺在6月1日交付欧元，而后者则承诺交付日元。


If one currency declines relative to the other, the loser pays the difference.	这时如果一种货币相对另一货币发生贬值，那么判断失误者就必须支付其中差价。


Repos are financing transactions.	再购协议则是一系列金融交易。


Financial firms sell assets, like Treasury bonds or real-estate securities, for cash, and promise to buy those assets back (i.e., to repurchase them or, for short, to do a “repo”), typically the following day.	金融企业出售资产（比如政府债券或者房地产债券）来换取现金，并承诺会买回这些资产（换言之就是从市场上回购，或用行话说：做一个“再购”），一般都是在出售的第二天。


But, with the cash coming from short-term repos making up much of core financial firms’ balance sheets, tremors in financial markets could hit them hard, drying up repo financing for a few, as occurred in 2008. Some, like Bear Stearns, then failed.	问题是这些来自短期再购协议的现金却成为了许多关键金融企业资产负债表中的主要部分，一旦金融市场像2008年那样发生动荡，这些企业就将遭受重创，大批企业一时间断绝了再购协议资金来源，而其中有一些企业，比如贝尔斯登，只能宣告破产。


Individual derivatives and repo transactions are hardly nefarious.	单一的金融衍生品和再购协议交易其实危害性都很低。


Each alone legitimately transfers risk to those better able to bear it, or backs financial holdings.	两者都合法地将风险转移到了那些更有能力承担的金融参与者身上，或者对金融资产起到了支撑作用。


But, when over-used by systemically vital firms, they can blow up the financial system, owing to its design defects.	但在被那些掌握金融系统命脉的企业滥用了之后，这些东西就能摧毁整个金融系统——原因就是该系统的设计缺陷。


Even today, about 70% of the core US financial firms’ liabilities are very short-term loans, like overnight repos.	即便是今天，全美国各大核心金融企业依然有大约70%的债务是类似隔夜再购协议这样的超短期借款.


In the US, the main design defects are in bankruptcy law, which exempts derivatives and repos from most regular bankruptcy constraints.	在美国，主要的设计缺陷在于破产法，该法律将金融衍生品和repo都排除在了一般破产约束条件之外。


For example, investors holding derivatives and repo contracts with a weakened financial institution can grab the firm’s assets ahead of – and at the expense of – its regular creditors, possibly sealing its fate, when, with a little extra time, the firm might have survived.	比如说，如果投资者持有与一个被削弱的金融机构签订的衍生品或者再购协议合约，那么他就能抢在该机构的一般债权人之前——或者牺牲债权人利益的情况下——夺取机构资产，甚至很可能因此左右该机构的命运：或许只要再争取多一点时间，那家机构就能生存下来。


Such runs were the ruin of AIG, Bear Stearns, and others during the financial crisis.	但在金融危机中，美国国际集团，贝尔斯登和其他企业都因此遭遇了不幸。


Worse still, because derivatives and repo investors jump to the head of the repayment line in so many ways, they have less incentive to foster market discipline by closely monitoring their counterparties’ solvency and carefully rationing their exposure to any single counterparty.	更糟的是，因为衍生品和再购协议投资者能以各种方式获取优先取回其资本，因此也缺乏足够的诱因去培育市场纪律——比如密切注意合作方的偿还能力，以及小心安排自己对任何单一另一方的信息披露。


They typically get repaid, regardless.	因为他们知道不管怎样，自己的钱都能拿得回来。


True, someone has to come first.	没错，市场上总是有人要首先遭殃的。


Other financial players take on more risk because derivatives and repo players’ bankruptcy exemptions put them first.	衍生品和再购协议参与者的破产豁免权令其他金融参与者承担了更多的风险。


Usually, we would expect the others to have an interest in more market discipline.	通常我们可以预期这些“其他”参与者更乐于推行更多的市场纪律。


But the next player in line is too often the US government, as guarantor of too-big-to-fail financial institutions, and it is poorly positioned to regulate these markets on a day-to-day basis.	问题是这个参与者往往就是美国政府——首先是那些“大而不能倒”金融机构的担保人，其次又无法每天去规管这些市场。 此外政府在金融上很难灵活应变；


It is not financially nimble; it is often captured by the regulated; and when economic times are good, no official wants to spoil the party.	经常被受监管者牵着鼻子走； 当光景好的时候，又没有官员愿意去惹怒那些金融机构，给自己找麻烦。


The US Congress had a chance to fix this design defect in the major financial overhaul that it enacted last summer via the Dodd-Frank bill. But it didn’t.	美国国会曾经拥有一个修复这个设计缺陷的机会，其工具就是去年夏天颁布的多德-法兰克法案（Dodd-Frank bill），但却没有最终做到这一点。


If investors in derivatives, repos, and credit-default swaps lacked favored treatment, they would behave differently.	如果那些衍生品，repo和信用违约交换的投资者不受到优待的话，他们的行为就会截然不同。


Above all, they would insist more often that their counterparties be well capitalized.	首先，他们会更频繁地要求对方保持资金充足。


They accepted the risk implied by ultra-thin capitalizations when it was mainly US government money on the line; they would be more reluctant to do so if it was mostly their own money that they were wagering.	当美国政府出钱的时候，他们都倾向于承担极高的资本风险，但如果这都是他们自己的钱的话，他们肯定会变得更加谨慎。


The public perceives Fukushima-type risks and derivatives risks differently.	公众对福岛危机和衍生品危机的观感也截然不同。


Many fear nuclear risks, which are vivid, slowing the industry’s development amid safety concerns.	许多人恐惧于肉眼可见的核风险，出于安全考虑不断延缓核工业的发展。


But the derivatives and repo markets present risks that are poorly understood, difficult to communicate in the media, and hard for politicians to debate and resolve.	但对衍生品和再购协议市场的风险人们却知之甚少，媒体难以报道，政治家也难以讨论解决。


During a crisis, these markets attract public attention and scorn, but, as the economy steadies, ordinary people lose interest, leaving the financial industry to control its own destiny with legislatures.	在危机袭来时，这些市场受到了公众的注意和嘲讽，但随着经济形势逐步稳定，普通民众就对此话题失去了兴趣，于是金融业又能利用立法机关为所欲为了。


For Fukushima-type risks, analysts are already discussing how nuclear plants can be designed and built to contain earthquake and tsunami risks via passive cooling.	对于福岛和事故这类风险，已经有分析在讨论如何设计通过被动冷却方式来应对地震和海啸。


It is possible, the thinking now runs, to design and build nuclear plants that can keep the fuel rods cool even if all power is lost.	目前的思考认为，有可能去设计和建造那些可以在停电情况下依然保持核燃料棒冷却的核电站。


But little of importance has yet been done to prevent the damage that derivatives and repo bankruptcy priorities could cause in another financial-system meltdown.	但对衍生品和再购协议破产优先权可能在另一场金融崩溃中造成的破坏，人们却没有做出任何重要的举措。


New rules to require end-users (such as oil companies using derivatives to guard against unexpected oil-price changes) and others to put up good collateral are being developed.	一系列新条例要求最终使用者（比如利用衍生品来对抗油价意外波动的石油企业）和其他参与者提供优质附属担保品。


But these rules don’t address the main problem: the weakened incentives for market discipline for core financial institutions.	但这些条例却并未解决核心问题：那些核心金融机构不断违反市场纪律的诱因。


It’s as if we reacted to Fukushima by better handling gas emissions in oil-shale projects.	这令情况变得很荒谬，就像用更严格监管油页岩开采项目的气体排放来应对福岛危机那样。


We should be examining how to make derivatives and repo investors assume the full risk of their decisions when dealing with systemically vital financial institutions.	我们必须研究如何令金融衍生品和再购协议投资者在和系统关键性金融机构做交易时承担其决策的全部风险。


Instead, we survived the financial tsunami of 2008, only to rebuild in the same place, on the main financial fault-lines, using the same flawed design.	但我们却没有这样做，我们只是从2008年的金融海啸中侥幸生还，又在同一个地方进行重建，又走上了同一条错误金融路线，用的也还是那个有缺陷的设计。


Fukushima, Europe\u0027s Nuclear Test	福岛，欧洲核能测试


MADRID – Seen from Europe, the irrationality of the political and media discourse over nuclear energy has, if anything, increased and intensified in the year since the meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power plant.	马德里——从欧洲的角度来看，自从日本福岛第一核电站熔炉事件发生后，对于核能的政治和媒体方面的不理智报道的数量在这一年不断增加，密度越来越大。


Yet a dispassionate assessment of nuclear energy’s place in the world remains as necessary as it is challenging.	关于核能在世界范围内的地位问题的评估仍然很有必要，并且很具有挑战性。


Europeans should not pontificate on nuclear-energy policy as if our opinion mattered worldwide, but we do.	欧洲人在核能问题上不应该像教皇教条地发表言论，似乎我们欧洲人的言论在全世界范围内都很重要一样，但是我们现在就在这样做。


On the other hand, Europe does have a qualified responsibility in the area of security, where we still can promote an international regulatory and institutional framework that would discipline states and bring about greater transparency where global risks like nuclear power are concerned.	在安全领域，我们仍然可以倡导制定国际惯例，或者制定制度条框以便可以更好规范各国，使得像核能源一样的全球危机问题上带更加透明化。 在这些安全领域，欧洲的确有不可推卸的责任。


Europe is equally responsible for advancing research on more secure technologies, particularly a fourth generation of nuclear-reactor technology.	推动在更加安全的科学技术方面的安全性，尤其是第四代核反应器技术方面，欧洲同样有相同的责任。


We Europeans cannot afford the luxury of dismantling a high-value-added industrial sector in which we still have a real comparative advantage.	破坏一个非常具有价值的工业部门，从这些工业部门中我们仍然有真正的相对优势，我们欧洲人无法承担破坏这个部门所引发的巨大损失。


In Europe, Fukushima prompted a media blitz of gloom and doom over nuclear energy.	在欧洲，福岛事件引发了媒体就核能的兴衰问题狂风暴雨般的报道。 德国杂志《明镜》将福岛事件称作“核能工业的9.


The German magazine Der Spiegel heralded the “9/11 of the nuclear industry” and “the end of the nuclear era,” while Spain’s leading newspaper El Pais preached that supporting “this energy [was] irrational,” and that “China has put a brake on its nuclear ambitions.”	11事件”和“核能时代的终结”。 西班牙龙头报纸西班牙国家报指出，支持“这种能源是不理智的”，以及“中国已经终止了了其核能野心”。


But reality has proven such assessments to be both biased and hopelessly wrong.	但是事实证明这些评估是偏激的，而且大错特错。


True, a few countries – Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, with Peru the only non- European country to join the trend – formally declared their intention to phase out or avoid nuclear energy.	诚然，一些国家已经正式宣布他们将逐渐退出或者放弃使用核能。 这些国家包括比利时，意大利，德国，瑞士，以及秘鲁---唯一一个加入这项声明的非欧洲国家。


These decisions affect a total of 26 reactors, while 61 reactors are under construction around the world, with another 156 projected and 343 under official consideration.	这些决定影响了26个核反应堆，然而61个核反应堆正在全世界范围内兴建，另外还有156个正在计划进行，还有343个反应堆政府正在考虑。


If these plans are realized, the number of functioning reactors, currently 437, will double.	如果这些计划都得以实现，运行的反应堆数量会从从目前的437个增长一倍。