Maximizing the impact of scarce resources on the lives of the world’s poorest people demands tough choices.	实现稀缺资源作用最大化、改善世界最贫困人群的生活水平需要做出艰难的选择。


In an ideal world, universal, high-quality education at all levels would be worth pursuing.	在理想世界中，各层次齐全的全民优质教育是值得追求的目标。


But, amid competing demands for basic necessities like health care and potable water, narrower, more cost-effective education targets are essential.	但是，健康和饮用水等基本需要也得满足，因此必须找出性价比最高的教育目标。


Instead of aiming to improve billions of people’s circumstances slightly – at high cost – with the same promises that have been made since 1950, the international community should aim first to transform the lives of millions of children in Sub-Saharan Africa.	国际社会不应该追求与1950年一样的承诺，以高昂的代价轻微改善数十亿人的生活环境，而应该首先致力于改变撒哈拉以南非洲数百万儿童的生活。


This approach, if applied to all of the goals included in the international community’s next development agenda, would ensure that the world of 2030 is a much better place.	如果将这一方针应用于包括在国际社会的下一个发展日程中的所有目标，可以肯定2030年的世界将远比现在更加美好。


The Poverty of Renewables	可再生能源带来的贫穷


MIAMI – According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Climate change harms the poor first and worst.”	迈阿密——联合国秘书长潘基文曾说，“最先受到气候变化损害且受损最严重的是穷人。


This is true, because the poor are the most vulnerable and have the least resources with which to adapt.	”他说的是事实，因为穷人最脆弱，也缺少资源去适应和调整。


But we often forget that current policies to address global warming make energy much more costly, and that this harms the world’s poor much more.	但我们往往忘记了目前应对全球变暖的政策抬高了能源价格，而全世界的穷人因此受害最深。


Solar and wind power was subsidized by $60 billion in 2012. This means that the world spent $60 billion more on energy than was needed.	2012年有高达600亿美元的资金用来补贴风能和太阳能，也就是说全世界在能源消费领域比必要状况多花了600亿美金。


And, because the total climate benefit was a paltry $1.4 billion, the subsidies essentially wasted $58.6 billion.	而且因为这笔钱带来的总的气候利益只有区区14亿美元，另外586亿美元的补贴基本都成了沉落成本。


Biofuels were subsidized by another $19 billion, with essentially no climate benefit.	还有190亿美元用于补贴生物燃料，而这笔钱所带来的气候利益几乎为零。


All of that money could have been used to improve health care, hire more teachers, build better roads, or lower taxes.	这些钱本来可以用来改善医疗条件、增聘师资、修建更好的道路或者是降低税收。


Forcing everyone to buy more expensive, less reliable energy pushes up costs throughout the economy, leaving less for other public goods.	迫使所有人购买更贵、可靠性更差的能源推高了经济成本，也因此损伤了公益。


The average of macroeconomic models indicates that the total cost of the EU’s climate policy will be €209 billion ($280 billion) per year from 2020 until the end of the century.	宏观经济模型均值表明从2020年到本世纪末的每一年，欧盟气候政策的总成本将高达2090亿欧元（合2800亿美元）。


The burden of these policies falls overwhelmingly on the world’s poor, because the rich can easily pay more for their energy.	上述政策负担大部分落在全世界穷人的头上，因为富人可以轻而易举地购买涨价后的能源。


I am often taken aback by well-meaning and economically comfortable environmentalists who cavalierly suggest that gasoline prices should be doubled or electricity exclusively sourced from high-cost green sources.	经济条件优越的环保主义者虽然用心是好的，但他们提出汽油价格应该翻番或者只允许使用高成本绿色能源的所谓骑士精神却常常令我目瞪口呆。


That may go over well in affluent Hunterdon County, New Jersey, where residents reportedly spend just 2% of their income on gasoline.	这样的政策在生活富裕的新泽西州亨特顿县或许可以落实下去，据说那里的居民仅将收入的2%用来购买汽油。


But the poorest 30% of the US population spend almost 17% of their after-tax income on gasoline.	但最贫困的30%美国民众却把税后收入的近17%都用来购买汽油。


Similarly, environmentalists boast that households in the United Kingdom have reduced their electricity consumption by almost 10% since 2005.	同样，环保主义者夸口说英国家庭自2005年后已经降低了近10%的电力消耗。 但他们却忘了提到这是因为电价上涨50%，而涨幅的绝大部分都是从1.


But they neglect to mention that this reflects a 50% increase in electricity prices, mostly to pay for an increase in the share of renewables from 1.8% to 4.6%.	8%增长到4. 6%的可再生能源造成的。


The poor, no surprise, have reduced their consumption by much more than 10%, whereas the rich have not reduced theirs at all.	毫无疑问，穷人耗电的降幅远超过10%，而富人耗电却根本没有减少。


Over the past five years, heating a UK home has become 63% more expensive, while real wages have declined.	近五年一个英国家庭供暖费用上涨了63%，而实际工资却在持续下降。


Some 17% of households are now energy poor – that is, they have to spend more than 10% of their income on energy; and, because elderly people are typically poorer, about a quarter of their households are energy poor.	17%的英国家庭买不起能源——换句话说他们被迫把10%的收入花在能源上； 而且因为老年人经济能力普遍较差，约有四分之一的老年家庭陷入能源贫穷。


Deprived pensioners burn old books to keep warm, because they are cheaper than coal, they ride on heated buses all day, and a third leave part of their homes cold.	领取退休金的贫困老人因为便宜而被迫焚烧旧书取暖，他们一天到晚待在有暖气的公交车上，有三分之一的人家里的暖气根本没烧。


In Germany, where green subsidies will cost €23.6 billion this year, household electricity prices have increased by 80% since 2000, causing 6.9 million households to live in energy poverty.	今年德国的绿色补贴将耗资236亿美元，居民电价从2000年来上涨了80%，导致690万家庭陷入能源贫困。


Wealthy homeowners in Bavaria can feel good about their inefficient solar panels, receiving lavish subsidies essentially paid by poor tenants in the Ruhr, who cannot afford their own solar panels but still have to pay higher electricity costs.	巴伐利亚州经济宽裕的房主可以为低效率的太阳能电池板感觉良好，享受着由鲁尔区穷人最终支付的高额补贴，而这些穷人则因为自己买不起太阳能电池板，还要继续支付高昂的用电费用。


The list goes on.	类似的例子不胜枚举。


In Greece, where tax hikes on oil have driven up heating costs by 48%, more and more Athenians are cutting down park trees, causing air pollution from wood burning to triple.	希腊对石油大举增税将取暖成本推高了48%，越来越多的雅典人都去砍伐公园的树木，燃烧木柴造成的空气污染是烧油的三倍多。


But climate policies carry an even larger cost in the developing world, where three billion people lack access to cheap and plentiful energy, perpetuating their poverty.	但气候政策令发展中国家付出更大的代价，那里的30亿民众无法得到充足的廉价能源，于是永远无法摆脱贫困状况。


They cook and keep warm by burning twigs and dung, producing indoor air pollution that causes 3.5 million deaths per year – by far the world’s biggest environmental problem.	他们靠燃烧树枝和牛粪来做饭取暖，由此造成的室内空气污染每年导致350万人死亡——这才是世界范围内最迫在眉睫的环境问题。


Access to electricity could solve that problem, while allowing families to read at night, own a refrigerator to keep food from spoiling, or use a computer to connect with the world.	用电可以解决这个问题，这样可以让家庭成员能在晚上看书、购买冰箱防止食物变质，或者用电脑和全世界沟通。


It would also allow businesses to produce more competitively, creating jobs and economic growth.	这样企业也可以更有竞争力，从而创造就业机会和带动经济增长。


Consider Pakistan and South Africa, where a dearth of generating capacity means recurrent blackouts that wreak havoc on businesses and cost jobs.	以南非和巴基斯坦为例，那里发电量不足导致企业频繁停电，同时也对就业机会产生了很大影响。


Yet the funding of new coal-fired power plants in both countries has been widely opposed by well-meaning Westerners and governments.	但这两个国家为新建燃煤电厂的筹资却遭到了用心良苦的西方民众和政府的普遍抵制。


Instead, they suggest renewables as the solution.	相反，他们提议用可再生能源来解决能源短缺问题。


But this is hypocritical.	但此举充满了虚伪的味道。


The rich world gets just 1.2% of its energy from hugely expensive solar and wind technologies, and we would never accept having power only when the wind was blowing.	富裕国家利用耗资巨大的太阳能和风能仅占能源总量的1. 2%，而且我们永远也不可能接受只在刮风的时候才有电用。


Over the next two years, Germany will build ten new coal-fired power plants to keep the lights on.	今后两年德国将兴建十座新燃煤电厂以保障照明之用。


In 1971, 40% of China’s energy came from renewables.	1971年，中国能源总量的40%来自可再生能源。


Since then, it has powered its explosive economic growth almost exclusively with highly polluting coal, lifting 680 million people out of poverty.	其后，中国全靠高污染的煤炭让6. 8亿人摆脱贫困，并实现了爆炸式的经济增长。


Today, China gets a trifling 0.23% of its energy from wind and solar.	今天，中国使用的太阳能和风能仅占其能源总量的0. 23%。


By contrast, Africa gets 50% of its energy today from renewables – and remains poor.	相比之下，非洲能源总量却有50%来自可再生能源 ——而且仍未能摆脱贫困。


A new analysis from the Center for Global Development quantifies our disregard of the world’s poor.	全球发展中心一份新的分析报告量化了我们对全世界穷人的漠不关心。


Investing in renewables, we can pull one person out of poverty for about $500.	投资于可再生能源，我们需要约500美元才能帮一个人摆脱贫困。


But, using gas electrification, we could pull more than four people out of poverty for the same amount.	但用燃气发电，同样的投资可以帮四个人脱贫。


By focusing on our climate concerns, we deliberately choose to leave more than three out of four people in darkness and poverty.	我们以气候问题为重相当于在明知后果的情况下故意让超过四分之三的民众无法摆脱黑暗和贫穷。


Addressing global warming effectively requires long-term innovation that makes green energy affordable to all.	有效解决全球变暖需要长期创新，让所有人都用得起绿色能源。


Until then, wasting enormous sums of money at the expense of the world’s poor is no solution at all.	在此之前，以损害穷人利益为代价浪费巨额财富根本不可能解决问题。


Global Warming’s Upside-Down Narrative	全球变暖的颠倒说法


NEW YORK – When politicians around the world tell the story of global warming, they cast it as humanity’s greatest challenge.	纽约——世界各地的政界人士在讲述全球变暖的故事时，把全球变暖描绘成人类最严峻的挑战。


But they also promise that it is a challenge that they can meet at low cost, while improving the world in countless other ways.	不过他们承诺能以较低成本加以应对，同时从无数其他方面改善世界各地的局面。


We now know that is nonsense.	我们现在知道这纯属无稽之谈。


Political heavyweights from US Secretary of State John Kerry to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon call climate change “the greatest challenge of our generation.”	从美国国务卿克里到联合国秘书长潘基文这样的重量级政界人士均称气候变化是“我们这代人最严峻的挑战”。


If we fail to address it, Kerry says, the costs will be “catastrophic.”	克里称如果解决不了这一问题，人类将会付出灾难性的代价。


Indeed, this has been the standard assertion of politicians since the so-called Stern Review commissioned by the British government in 2006.	事实上，从2006年由英国政府委托撰写的所谓斯特恩报告出炉后，这已经成为政要们的标准说法。


That report famously valued the damage caused by global warming at 5-20% of GDP – a major disruption “on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the twentieth century.”	斯特恩报告尽人皆知的断言全球变暖引发的损失将占GDP的5-20%，并称这是“与大规模战争和二十世纪上半叶经济衰退规模类似”的重大破坏。


Tackling climate change, we are told, would carry a much lower cost.	我们被告知解决气候变化问题可以大幅降低所付出的代价。


The president of the European Commission promised that while the European Union’s climate policies are “not cost-free,” they would amount to just 0.5% of GDP.	欧盟委员会主席承诺虽然欧盟气候政策“并非毫无成本”，但只占GDP的0. 5%。


Indeed, politicians of all stripes have reiterated the Stern Review’s finding that global warming can be curtailed by policies costing just 1% of world GDP.	事实上，各路政要重申了斯特恩报告的观点，即可以通过仅占全球GDP1%的成本成功控制全球变暖。


Climate policies, moreover, are said to help in many other ways.	此外，据说气候政策的作用还体现在其他很多方面。


US President Barack Obama promised that policies to combat global warming would create five million new green jobs.	美国总统奥巴马承诺应对全球变暖的政策将创造出500万个新的绿色就业机会。


The EU claimed that green energy would help “improve the EU’s security of energy supply.”	欧盟则称绿色能源将有助于“改善欧盟在能源供应领域的安全。 ”


With the completion of the latest report by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we can now see that this narrative is mostly wrong.	联合国政府间气候变化委员会（IPCC）最新报告完成后，我们知道这种说法错得多么荒诞。


The first installment of the IPCC report showed that there is indeed a climate problem – emissions of greenhouse gases, especially CO₂, lead to higher temperatures, which will eventually become a net problem for the world.	首期IPCC报告显示气候问题确实存在——温室气体、特别是二氧化碳的排放导致气温升高，最终会危及到这个世界。


This result was highly publicized.	这一结果已经广为人知了。


But the report also showed that global warming has dramatically slowed or entirely stopped in the last decade and a half.	但报告同时显示过去15年中全球变暖速度已经大幅减慢或者完全停止。


Almost all climate models are running far too hot, meaning that the real challenge of global warming has been exaggerated.	几乎所有气候模型的测算数据都过于炎热，也就是夸大了全球变暖的实际问题。


Germany and other governments called for the reference to the slowdown to be deleted.	德国和其他几个国家的政府呼吁删除全球变暖速度减缓的证据。


The second IPCC installment showed that the temperature rise that we are expected to see sometime around 2055-2080 will create a net cost of 0.2-2% of GDP – the equivalent of less than one year of recession.	第二期IPCC报告显示我们预计将在2055-2080年前后看到的气温升高会带来占GDP0. 2-2%的净成本——相当于不到一年的经济衰退。


So, while the IPCC clearly establishes that global warming is a problem, the cost is obviously much less than that of the twentieth century’s two world wars and the Great Depression.	因此，虽然IPCC明确提出全球变暖会带来问题，但其带来的成本显然远低于二十世纪的两次世界大战和经济大衰退。


Again, not surprisingly, politicians tried to have this finding deleted.	不出所料，此次政要们再次力求删掉这项发现。


British officials found the peer-reviewed estimate “completely meaningless,” and, along with Belgium, Norway, Japan, and the US, wanted it rewritten or stricken.	英国官员认为这项经过同行审议的估算实际“毫无意义”，并且纠集比利时、挪威、日本和美国想要将这部分内容删除重写。


One academic speculated that governments possibly felt “a little embarrassed” that their previous exaggerated claims would be undercut by the UN.	一位学者推测联合国驳斥此前政要们的夸大其辞可能让他们感到“有些下不来台”。


The third installment of the IPCC report showed that strong climate policies would be more expensive than claimed as well – costing upwards of 4% of GDP in 2030, 6% in 2050, and 11% by 2100.	第三期IPCC报告显示强硬的气候政策也比之前所说的更加昂贵——2030年将占GDP的4%，2050年6%，2100年11%。


And the real cost will likely be much higher, because these numbers assume smart policies, instantly enacted, with key technologies magically available.	而真正的成本可能还会更高，因为以上数据都假定政策处置恰当且立即生效，同时还神奇地采用了关键技术。


Again, politicians tried to delete or change references to these high costs.	政要们再次试图删除或修改上述高成本的发现。


British officials explained that they wanted such cost estimates cut because they “would give a boost to those who doubt action is needed.”	英国官员解释道他们希望降低相关的成本估算，因为它们“会助长怀疑需要采取行动者的气焰。 ”


Green jobs have been created only with heavy subsidies, costing a similar number of jobs elsewhere.	绿色就业完全依赖巨额补贴，会导致其他领域损失相近的就业数。


Indeed, each extra job created cost more than $11 million in the US.	事实上，耗资超过1100万美元才能在美国额外创造出一份绿色就业。


And facile claims that renewable sources can boost energy security look a lot less convincing after the crisis in Ukraine; Europe now understands that only large and stable energy supplies matter.	乌克兰危机爆发后可再生能源改善能源安全的肤浅说法可信度大幅降低； 欧洲现在知道只有大量而稳定的能源供应关系才值得考虑。


Climate change has been portrayed as a huge catastrophe costing as much as 20% of world GDP, though brave politicians could counter it at a cost of just 1% of GDP.	气候变化曾被描绘成一场损失高达全球GDP20%的巨型灾难，虽然勇气可嘉的政要们称能用1%的GDP解决这一问题。


The reality is just the opposite: We now know that the damage cost will be perhaps 2% of world GDP, whereas climate policies can end up costing more than 11% of GDP.	但现实情况却恰好相反：我们现在知道损失成本或许是全球GDP的2%，而气候政策最终却可能耗资超过GDP的11%。


What makes this story all the more amazing is that experts have known almost all of these facts for a long time.	让这个故事更为神奇的是所有这些事实专家们其实早就知道。


The Stern Review was produced by bureaucrats and never subjected to peer review.	斯特恩报告是从未经过同行审议的官僚体制的产物。


Economists knew that the damage costs had been extensively massaged, and that the estimates were outliers compared to the academic literature.	经济学家们知道损失成本其实经过大幅篡改，预测数据其实仅仅是学术文献中的剔除值。


The unfathomably low projections for policy costs were artifacts of ignoring most liabilities, again contradicting the academic literature.	政策成本低得不可思议其实是忽略了多数不利因素的人为产物，再次与学术文献形成了鲜明的对比。


The media, eager for breathless headlines, share the blame with politicians for this state of affairs.	事情演变到今天这种状况渴望头条新闻让人喘不过气来的媒体要与政要共同承担责任。


Following the release of the Stern Review, one British newspaper reportedly wrote: “Act now or the world we know will be lost forever.”	斯特恩报告发布后，据称一家英国报纸曾经报导：“要么即刻采取行动，要么听任我们熟悉的世界永久失去。


Being accurate is less sexy, but much more informative.	”准确报道虽然不那么性感，但远比危言耸听更加翔实。


We live in a world where one in six deaths are caused by easily curable infectious diseases; one in eight deaths stem from air pollution, mostly from cooking indoors with dung and twigs; and billions of people live in abject poverty, with no electricity and little food.	我们生活的世界有六分之一的人死于本来可以轻松治愈的传染性疾病； 八分之一的人死于空气污染，主要原因是很多人用牛粪和树枝为燃料在室内做饭；


We ought never to have entertained the notion that the world’s greatest challenge could be to reduce temperature rises in our generation by a fraction of a degree.	数十亿人生活在赤贫当中，既缺少电能又食不果腹。 我们永远不该接受这样的观点，认为我们这代人在全球范围内最严峻的挑战是将气温升高降低零点几度。


The solution is to stop applauding politicians who warn of catastrophe and promote poor policies.	我们应该停止为警告将会发生灾难并推动糟糕政策的政要们击节叫好。


Instead of subsidizing inefficient solar and wind power with little benefit, we need to invest in long-term green innovation.	与其补贴很难产生实际效益的低效的太阳能及风能发电，还不如投资于长期的绿色创新项目。


And we need to give more attention to all of the other problems.	还有其他很多问题需要我们给予更多的关注。


This is perhaps less entertaining, but it will do much more good.	这或许不像危言耸听那么有趣，却会带来更好的实际效果。


The Economics of Violence	暴力经济学


COPENHAGEN – What is the biggest source of violence in our world?	哥本哈根——什么是世界上最大的暴力来源？


With the brutal conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere constantly in the news, many people would probably say war.	因为叙利亚、乌克兰和其他国家的暴力冲突经常见诸报端，很多人可能会说战争。


But that turns out to be spectacularly wrong.	但这原来大错特错。


Getting it right matters if we are to find cost-effective solutions to this and other global problems.	如果想找到解决这些全球问题的经济有效的办法，第一步就是要先确定暴力的来源。


Obviously, everyone would like to stop wars and violence, just as we would like to end poverty, hunger, and global warming, while providing education to all.	显然，每个人都愿意制止战争和暴力，就像我们想要消除贫困、饥饿和全球变暖，并为所有人提供教育资源。


But, given limited resources, the international community can only do so much.	但资源的有限性制约着国际社会。


We have to prioritize, which is what an economic analysis of costs and benefits can do.	我们必须分出轻重缓急，对成本效益进行经济分析可以做到这一点。


The international community is working on new development goals for the next 15 years, and the Copenhagen Consensus has asked some of the world’s leading economists to give their assessment of the smartest targets they can choose.	国际社会正在制定今后15年新的发展目标，而《哥本哈根共识》已要求一些世界知名经济学家评估他们眼中最明智的目标。


Is reducing violence a goal worthy of resources that would otherwise be spent on, say, reducing hunger?	用本可以用于减少饥饿的资源来减少暴力是否值得？


And, if so, which forms of violence should be targeted?	如果答案是肯定的，那么需要针对的暴力形式有哪些？


A study by James Fearon of Stanford University and Anke Hoeffler of Oxford University’s Center for the Study of African Economies argues that societal violence – homicides and especially violence against women and children – is a much bigger problem than civil wars.	斯坦福大学詹姆斯·费伦和牛津大学非洲经济研究中心安柯·霍芙勒的研究结果显示杀人、尤其是针对妇女和儿童的社会暴力远比内战更具破坏性。


Nine people are killed in interpersonal violence for every battlefield death in a civil war, and one child is killed for every two combatants who die.	人际暴力与内战的死亡比率高达9：1，而且每牺牲两名战士就有一名儿童死亡。


In 2008, there were 418,000 homicides around the world, with far too many countries recording a murder rate of more than 10 per 100,000, which the World Health Organization regards as an epidemic.	2008年全球发生凶杀案共计418,000起，太多国家有记录的谋杀率达到100，000分之10以上。 世卫组织将其视为一种传染病。


A single homicide in America costs the individual and society $9.1 million.	美国一起凶杀案给个人和社会造成的损失高达910万美元。


If we scale this by national income across the world, this single category of violent crime costs 1.7% of global GDP.	如果按照全球国民收入计算，仅此一项暴力犯罪就让全球GDP付出1. 7%的代价。


Of course, this is not a direct financial loss to the global economy, but a way of expressing the impact.	当然，这并非全球经济的直接损失，而是衡量影响的一种方法。


If murders could be eliminated, societies around the world would be better off in ways that can be valued at 1.7% of GDP.	如果谋杀得以消除，各国社会得到的好处可以用1. 7%的GDP来衡量。


Compare this to the much lower cost of civil wars, which are equivalent to about 0.2% of global GDP.	与此相比内战成本要低得多，大致相当于全球GDP的0. 2%。


But this is still much less than the biggest source of violence of all: violence against women in the home.	但这仍远逊于妇女所受的家庭暴力这一最大的暴力来源。


Based on studies published in Science, 28% of all women in Sub-Saharan Africa reported experiencing violence in the past year at the hands of their partners or family.	《科学》杂志发表研究显示，撒哈拉以南非洲女性总人口的28%反应去年曾遭受过伴侣或家人的家庭暴力。


This includes women subjected to beatings, forced marriage at an early age, sexual assault, “honor” crimes, and female genital mutilation.	其中包括妇女遭到殴打、在年龄很小的时候被迫结婚、性侵、“荣誉”犯罪和女性生殖器阉割。


A conservative estimate puts the welfare cost of intimate partner violence alone at $4.4 trillion, or 5.2% of global GDP.	保守统计显示仅伴侣施暴一项的社会福利成本就高达4. 4万亿美元，占全球GDP的5.


The second-largest source of violence is the abuse of children, 80% of which is inflicted by parents.	虐童是第二大暴力来源，80%的虐童案作案者都是父母。


The definition of what constitutes child abuse varies by culture; but about 15% of children suffer each month from what the UN calls severe physical punishment.	虐童的定义依文化的不同而不同； 但约有15%的儿童每月都遭到联合国所谓的严厉体罚。


This includes being slapped on the face, head, or ears, and a quarter of these children are beaten with some kind of implement repeatedly and as hard as possible.	体罚内容包括掌掴面部、头部、耳朵，而且其中有四分之一的儿童遭到某种器械的反复殴打。


Every month, some 290 million children endure such suffering.	每月都有2. 9亿儿童忍受这样的痛苦。


The welfare cost is $3.6 trillion, or 4.2% of global GDP.	虐童相关的社会福利成本为3. 6万亿美元，约合全球GDP的4.


A tiny fraction of international aid funding currently goes toward reducing societal violence and improving criminal justice systems.	只有很少一部分国际援助基金目前被用于减少社会暴力和改善刑事司法系统。


The enormous cost borne by society and individuals seems to cry out for action.	社会和个人付出的巨大代价要求我们采取行动。


Unfortunately, there is still little hard evidence about where resources should best be focused.	不幸的是，依然鲜有硬性证据显示资源分配的最佳去处。


All we can say is that the money spent to reduce violence might be better targeted.	我们只能说减少暴力的资金可能有更好的用途。


Considerable amounts of aid are directed toward “fragile states” to help stop or prevent civil war, but only 0.27% of international aid goes to projects with a “crime prevention” component.	有相当数量的援助流向“脆弱国家”用以结束或预防内战，但只有0. 27%的国际援助流向包括“预防犯罪”的项目。


Other programs may help in indirect ways, but there obviously is much room for improvement.	其他计划可能带来某种间接的好处，但显然还有极大的空间有待提高。


Some solutions, it is clear, do work very well.	显而易见，某些解决方法很有效果。


Stronger social services can reduce violence against children.	加强社会服务可以减少儿童暴力案件。


Studies in Washington State show that home visits from trained staff can reduce child abuse, improve children’s quality of life and physical and mental health, and reduce child-welfare and litigation costs.	华盛顿州研究显示由训练有素的工作人员家访可以减少虐童案件，改善儿童的身心健康和生活质量，降低儿童福利和诉讼成本。


A dollar spent on this program produces benefits of $14, making it a highly cost-effective policy.	该项目上每投入1美元可以产出14美元效益，这项政策因此成本效益很高。


In many cases, changes in social attitudes are needed.	很多情况下需要改变社会态度。


To reduce violence against women and girls, one program in Uganda, called SASA!	为减少针对妇女和女童的暴力，乌干达一个名为SASA! （斯瓦西里语“现在！


(Kiswahili for “Now!”) promotes the view that partner violence is unacceptable, and has helped to halve the rate of it.	”）的项目宣传伴侣暴力不可接受的理念，并协助实现了降低伴侣暴力比例一半的目标。


This is a fantastic outcome, of course, though there has been no analysis of how cost-effective it is.	这当然是个梦幻般的结果，虽然没有人实际分析过它的成本效益有多高。


There are other examples of countries taking effective action.	还有国家采取有效行动的其他实例。


In 1993, Bogota suffered 80 murders per 100,000 people.	1993年，波哥大每100,000人发生80起谋杀。


By taking an integrated approach – limiting the hours during which alcohol can be sold, reclaiming public space, and improving the police and justice systems – the homicide rate was reduced to 21 per 100,000 in 2004.	通过采取综合性举措——包括限制卖酒时间、回收公共空间和改善警察及司法系统——2004年谋杀率下降到每100,000人21起谋杀。


That is still high, but it is far below the rate of 55 per 100,000 in Detroit.	上述比率依然很高，但远好于底特律的每100，000人55起谋杀的现状。


Alcohol is a factor in many assaults, and controlling its availability could have a significant part to play, as the findings in Bogota suggest.	酒精是众多袭击事件的罪魁祸首，波哥大的结果显示控制其泛滥程度可以在很大程度上控制谋杀。


In the United Kingdom, a pilot study on stronger enforcement of existing rules showed that assaults could be reduced in a very cost-effective way, with the benefits outweighing the costs by 17 to one.	英国有关加强执行现行规则的试点研究表明能够以高成本效益的方式减少袭击事件，其中收益与成本的比例高达17：1。


While we still don’t know enough, two points are certain.	虽然我们的了解依然有限，但有两点疑问已经排除。


First, domestic violence against women and children imposes a social cost of $8 trillion each year, making it a huge – and vastly underreported – global issue.	首先，针对妇女和儿童的家庭暴力每年耗费8万亿美元的社会成本，使之成为巨大——而且被严重低估的全球性问题。


Second, there are solutions that can help to tackle some of these problems very cost-effectively.	其次，针对上述问题存在经济实用的解决方案。


That is why reducing domestic violence belongs on the short-list for the world’s next set of development goals.	控制家庭暴力也因此在全球下一组发展目标清单上赫然在目。


Black Bears and Television Junkies	黑熊和电视中毒


This summer, friends who live a few kilometers from us in rural Montana in the western US had to interrupt their dinner when a black bear suddenly came out of the trees. They went indoors to watch as it came up to the picnic table, licked the dishes clean, and then drank two cans of beer.	今年夏天，在离我们仅几公里外的美国西部蒙大拿乡村，每当一只黑熊突然从树林里跑出来，住在那里的朋友就不得不中断用餐，躲到屋子里，看着它走近野餐桌，把盘子舔得干干净净，再喝下两罐啤酒。


Over the following days, the bear turned over the garbage cans of two neighbors and terrorized children and pets.	接下来几天里，那只熊又掀翻了两个邻居的垃圾桶，并且吓坏了宠物和儿童。


Forest Service rangers set up a cage and put some bacon inside, soon catching and transporting the bear 30 kilometers into the wilderness.	美国森林局的护林员们准备了一个笼子，放进了一些咸肉，很快就捉住了这头熊，把它运到了30公里外的荒郊野地中。


The bear was tagged before it was released, to show that it had been causing trouble.	这头熊被放走前身上做上了标记，表明它曾经找过麻烦。


“Unfortunately,” said the ranger, “that bear may be back here even before our truck returns.	护林员说："不幸的是，往往是我们的卡车还没回来，熊就已经回来了。


Once they develop a taste for bacon and beer, you can't keep them away.”	一旦尝到了咸肉和啤酒的滋味，就没法再把它赶走了。


If a tagged bear is caught two or more times causing disruption, the rangers have orders to shoot it.	" 如果做过标记的熊回来捣乱被抓住两次以上，护林员就有权力射杀它。


It is easy to feel sorry for an animal that discovers tasty food and can’t resist getting more the easy way.	一只发现了美味的动物抵制不了再次轻易获得美味的诱惑，我们都会为它感到遗憾。


The bear has no idea that its days are numbered unless it remains in the forest and hunts in the traditional way for its meals.	除非待在树林里以传统的方式捕猎食物，否则它的生命就已经进入了倒计时，这一点黑熊并不清楚。


But that bear was following the wisdom natural selection had programmed in its genes: food that is high in proteins and sugars is good for you, and the less energy you expend getting it, the better.	可那头黑熊是按照自然选择在它基因中种下的智慧来采取行动：富含蛋白质和糖的食物非常有益，而且获取食物消耗的能量越少越好。


That much the bear knows well.	这一点黑熊很清楚。


It had no chance to learn – and probably never will – that picnic tables and garbage cans are defended by forest rangers with orders to kill.	它没有学习的机会¾也许永远也没有¾它无从知道野餐桌和垃圾桶受到护林员的保护，必要的时候甚至可以射杀。


How much luckier we humans are, knowing what is good and bad for us.	相比之下我们人类是多么幸运，知道什么对我们有益，而什么又有害。


We cannot be trapped so easily by things that taste good but will cause our downfall.	如果一件东西看上去很好却会让我们跨掉，我们就不会那么轻易地受到诱惑。


But, in reality, most of us are no different from that bear.	但实际上，我们大多数人和那只熊并没有什么不同。


Most people are aware that high-fat diets, too much alcohol, smoking, promiscuous sex, and recreational drugs, while pleasant, can ruin one's health.	高脂肪食品、烟酒过量、滥性和迷药尽管能带来一时之乐，却可以毁掉一个人的健康。


Yet we can’t resist the lure of the garbage can and its delights.	尽管如此，我们也抵御不了垃圾桶和快乐的诱惑。


But at least we have had clear warnings about the dangers of such habits, so people who want to use such knowledge can avoid being trapped.	可我们至少清楚这种陋习的后果，这样愿意听从劝告的人就不会落入圈套。


There are other potentially harmful pleasures in the environment that are less known, but not less destructive than those that are.	我们周围还有很多乐趣不那么为人了解，却和那些为人们熟知的陋习一样能造成伤害。


One of the most seductive of these pleasures – and thus one of the most dangerous – is television.	这些活动中最富诱惑力、也最危险的就是电视。


Television is attractive to the architecture of the human nervous system: our brains are built to absorb information and follow rapid changes in the sensory field.	电视对人类的神经系统颇具吸引力：我们的大脑天生就适合接受信息和快速变幻的感官刺激。


TV provides these in easily digestible, sumptuously prepared morsels.	电视以非常易于接受的方式为人类提供了大量的感官刺激。


Constant change and the appearance of excitement absorb viewers’ attention.	片刻不停的变幻和刺激吸引了观众的注意力。


The Sistine Chapel cannot compare with it – most children will become bored after ten minutes by the frescoes of Michelangelo, but will watch a detergent commercial with riveted interest.	西斯廷教堂根本无法与之相比¾大多数孩子10分钟以后就会对米开朗基罗的壁画感到厌倦，但却能对洗涤用品广告保持长久的注意力。


All of this applies just to the way the medium works, without taking content into consideration.	这些都是由于介质的缘故，与内容毫不相干。


The content in turn reinforces the seductive qualities of the medium by offering generous helpings of sex, violence, easy comfort, and other material that we are genetically prepared to respond to, but that in large doses detract from the ability to lead productive and serene lives.	而内容又再次强化了介质的诱惑力，为人们慷慨地提供性、暴力、低级娱乐和其它方面的趣味，而我们天性上就容易受到这些东西的诱惑。 长此以往，大量的低级趣味让人们丧失了丰富而又平静地生活的能力。


Indeed, by now the evidence that television watching is a dangerous habit has grown to such proportions that it is a wonder that stronger warnings and effective prevention have not been adopted.	实际上，看电视是种危险陋习的证据已经十分明显，以至于没有人提出强烈的警告和有效的防御措施，的确让人感到非常奇怪。


Among the many findings is that watching too much television induces passivity, both at the level of neural functioning and of behavior and that it interferes with learning and reduces political and civic participation.	发现之一是过多地看电视会让人变得被动，无论从神经还是行为反应上都是如此。 它会影响人们学习新知识，影响他们参与政治活动。


It also encourages aggressive behavior in children and produces negative moods such as sadness and loneliness.	它还会鼓励儿童采取过激行为，让人们产生悲伤孤独等负面情绪。


Nor is there any evidence of benefits to counterbalance these negative effects.	此外也没有发现任何好处，能够平衡这些负面的影响。


When television was in its infancy, many thinkers  and not surprisingly, television producers – painted the future of the medium in glowing terms: TV would keep us informed, cultured, and entertained; it would strengthen family life and civic virtues.	电视还处于襁褓中的时候，很多思想家，不难想象还有电视的制造者¾用闪闪发光的语汇描述着这种媒介的未来：电视会为我们输送信息、让我们了解文化、获得娱乐，此外还有利于家庭生活和传播人类美德。


None of this happened.	但这些都没有成为现实。


Even the informational value of television turned out to be a dream: individuals and communities that watch TV often know much less about what is happening in the world than comparable audiences that do not.	即便是信息传递方面的价值也根本无从谈起：一般来讲，看电视的群体和个人对周边世界的了解要远逊于对照组。


The only clearly positive effect of TV watching is that people feel relaxed while doing it, and many people are willing to exchange that relaxation for the more enjoyable and useful things they might be doing instead.	看电视唯一一个显而易见的好处是能让人们放松，而很多人为了这种放松宁愿牺牲更加有趣和有用的选择。


Like the bear that learned to fill his stomach comfortably, they feel satisfied to be entertained without having to exert themselves.	就像学会轻松填饱肚子的狗熊一样，不用付出努力就能得到娱乐让人们感到非常满意。


Of course, television can be nice when consumed in small doses and with discernment.	当然，如果有选择地少量观看，电视也会带来不少益处。


Like drinking a glass or two of wine, it helps digestion and lightens the mind.	就像饮下一两杯红酒，看电���会有利消化，放松心情。


But those who spend hours watching it each evening, with less and less control over their attention, and deriving progressively less enjoyment from what they watch, risk becoming as besotted as an alcoholic who only feels alive when he blots out reality.	但如果每晚都花费几个小时，对注意力的分配越来越失去控制，从所看节目中获得的乐趣也日益减少，就会冒着沦为酒鬼的危险，只在脱离现实的时候才有生命力。


No bear, if it knew what we do, would fall into that trap.	如果能够知道我们会做什么，那么没有一只黑熊会愿意落入圈套。


Black Swan World	黑天鹅世界


BERLIN – In today’s global financial crisis, the image of a black swan has become a symbol for the seemingly impossible that somehow occurs, turning the world upside down.	柏林 ——在当今全球金融危机的背景下，黑天鹅的形象已经成为表面看似不可能的事情但不知何故而发生，最终导致世界起伏跌宕的象征。


This year will afford us ample opportunity to examine the black swans that are already among us, and to prepare for the arrival of even more.	今年给我们提供了足够多的机会来审视周围已经存在的黑天鹅，并为即将到来的更多黑天鹅做好准备。


November, for example, marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.	例如，今年十一月将要迎来柏林墙倒下20周年纪念日。


The night of November 9, 1989, marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union and its empire, and thus also of the bipolar world that had, for five decades, divided Germany and Europe.	1989年11月9日的夜晚，标志着苏联以及整个苏维埃帝国崩溃的开始，同时也是分裂德国和整个欧洲的两极世界终结的开始。


A year before, few people considered this world-shaking event even a remote possibility.	而在此前的一年，即使发生的概率是微乎其微，仍然很少有人认为如此震惊世界的事件会发生。


Yet it happened, and the world changed almost overnight.	然而事件却发生了，世界几乎在一夜之间被改变。


After the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order, victorious Western capitalism, under the leadership of the only world power, the United States, reigned supreme in global politics, and even more so in the global economy.	在苏联和两极世界消失后，胜利的西方资本主义在唯一的世界霸主美国的领导下，称霸全球政治，甚至统治全球经济。


Nothing and no one, it seemed, could stem the global triumph of the market, with its transcendence of all previous limits on wealth – that is, until September 15, 2008, the fateful date when Lehman Brothers went bust and the meltdown of the global financial system began.	好像没有任何事情和任何人能够阻止拥有超过之前所有财富的市场经济在全球范围内的胜利——直到2008年9月15日，这个日子是雷曼兄弟倒闭和全球金融体系走向崩溃的开始。


While a distraught world is still trying to fathom the consequences of this global crash and to mitigate its impact, the call of the next black swan can already be heard: the global climate disaster.	当惊慌失措的世界正在努力估测这次全球金融危机的后果并减轻其影响的时候，下一个黑天鹅的叫声已经清晰可见：全球气候灾难。


It seems to be part of human nature willfully to deny the possibility of great crises, or at least to downplay them.	人们往往对于巨大危机发生的可能固执地否认或者不予重视，这也许是人的本性之一。


“Impossible” or “It won’t be all that bad” are the two magic formulae on which we tend to rely.	“不可能”或者“不会那么糟的”是两个我们常常依赖的惯用套词。


And we refuse to learn the lesson of the black swan even when the next one is already visible for all to see!	甚至下一个黑天鹅已然清晰可见的时候，我们仍拒绝吸取已经发生的黑天鹅事件的教训。


Although the generations alive today have witnessed two completely unexpected crises of epic proportions within the last 20 years, we indulge in a shocking collective repression of a climate disaster with far more serious – and foreseeable – consequences.	虽然当今的一代在过去不到20年的时间内目睹了两个未曾想象的百年难遇的危机，但是我们对于即将到来的气候灾难以及之后更严重的可预见的后果，却是集体性的置若罔闻。


But, in fact, by linking the answers to the global climate and economic crises, we can find a way out of both.	但是，其实将全球气候和经济危机的结果联系起来的话，我们可以找到一种解决这两个问题的方法。


The solutions to the climate crisis are already well known, the money is available, and so are the technologies, or where they aren’t, they could be developed.	解决气候危机的方法我们已经找到，资金不是问题，技术也还可以（即使有些地方还不足，也可进一步发展）。


What is lacking is the strategic vision and determined action of the major political players.	我们所欠缺的就是全球主要政治人物战略的眼光和坚决的行动。


As for the economic crisis, bailouts and stimulus packages on the order of billions of dollars, euros, yen, or yuan have been planned or implemented to stem the further slide of the global economy.	对于经济危机来说，数十亿美元、欧元、日元或者人民币的的政府救援和财政刺激计划已经被计划或执行以阻止全球经济的进一步下滑。


But, while references to the Great Depression are justified, the lesson of that crisis, and of the New Deal, is that effective programs can at best cushion the fall and bring about stabilization.	但是，如果以大萧条的经验正确的话，危机的教训是：罗斯福新政执行的计划最多只是使得经济不再继续下滑，逐渐企稳而已。


The real economic recovery – and this is the bad news – came only with WWII and the long Cold War that followed.	真正的经济复苏——这可能是个坏消息——只能来自于之后的第二次世界大战和冷战。


Rather than relying on war as an economic mega-project to end today’s recession, the international community should bet on the fight against the climate crisis, because globalization will continue, rapidly increasing the threats to the world’s climate.	如果不用战争来解决眼下的经济衰退的话，国际组织应该考虑使用抗击全球气候危机的办法，因为全球化仍在继续，这大大增加了对于世界气候的威胁。


In 1929, there were slightly more than two billion people living on the planet; today, there are 6.7 billion, and in 2050 there will be nine billion.	1929年，大约只有20亿多一点的人口生活在这个星球上； 而今天，大约有67亿人，到2050年将会有90亿人。


All of them, thanks to globalization and new communication technologies, will strive for the same standard of living, give or take, which will necessarily lead to an overstretched global ecosystem.	由于全球化和新通信技术，所有这些人都会为标准化的生活（可能略有差异）而奋斗，这会导致全球生态系统的过渡扩张。


The question of whether to use coal or nuclear power is simply no longer apposite: without a breakthrough in renewable energies, global energy demand cannot be met, not to mention the dangers of a new Chernobyl.	是否能使用煤或者核能的问题已经不再恰当了：如果没有在可再生能源上的突破，全球能源的需求将不能得到满足，更别提一个新的切尔诺贝利事件的危险了。


Where this will lead the world can be seen even today: China already has the world’s most ambitious scheme for expanding nuclear energy, and every year it builds coal-fired power plants whose electricity output is roughly equivalent to the capacity of the entire British power grid!	这些今天已经有所显现：中国已经做好世界最大的核能计划，而且其每年所建造的火电厂的发电量大体相当于整个英国电网的容量。


So the black swan of the climate crisis is already preparing to land.	因此气候危机的黑天鹅已经将要到来。


To fight the climate crisis effectively demands nothing less than a green revolution of the global economy, the mega-project of the twenty-first century.	抗击气候危机对于全球经济来说不亚于一场绿色革命，这是21世纪的战争般的巨大计划。


Only the rich industrial nations of Europe, America, and Japan can afford to pay for the necessary investments in emerging countries.	只有富裕的工业国例如欧洲，美国和日本才能够负担得起在新兴国家的必要投资。


But this green revolution must be about more than spending money; it must also be about laws and standards, i.e. about political regulation and new technologies, as well as new products and markets, which mean new economic opportunities.	但是这个绿色革���不仅仅只是花钱，还要有相关法律与标准与之配套。 例如，政治监管和新的技术，还有意味着新经济机会的新产品和新市场。


This year, a new global climate agreement will be negotiated in Copenhagen to replace the Kyoto Protocol.	今年，一项新的全球气候协议将在哥本哈根进行商讨，目的是取代京都议定书。


This is effectively the last chance to prevent the next black swan from landing.	这是有效阻止下一个黑天鹅到来的机会。


But we must understand that Copenhagen is also a big chance to revive the global economy.	但是我们必须知道，哥本哈根必须是复苏全球经济的一次绝佳的机会。


All of the relevant powers of the twenty-first century are represented in the G-20, and they should see the success of Copenhagen as part of their direct responsibility.	作为所有21世纪相关国家代表的20国集团应该将哥本哈根的成功视作其直接责任的一部分。


This time, unlike at the London G-20 meeting, they should do the job properly – both to protect our climate and to reboot the global economy.	这次不同于伦敦的20国集团会议，他们应该充分做好他们的工作——不仅仅是为了保护我们的气候，也是为了重振全球经济。


Blair’s EU disaster	布莱尔的欧盟灾难


When voters in France and the Netherlands turned down the proposal for a Constitution for the European Union, the world knew that the European project was in deep trouble.	法国和荷兰选民否决欧盟宪法提案后，全世界都知道欧洲项目陷入了深深的困境。


Last week’s bruising battle over the medium-term future of the Union’s budget has confirmed that verdict with a vengeance.	上周有关欧盟中期预算的激烈争执再次明白无误地证明了这个判断。


It also brought to a sorry close the UK’s six-month presidency of the European Council, confirming Britain’s long-standing reputation as the odd-man-out in the European Union.	这次争执也使英国6个月的欧洲理事会主席任期黯然结束，让人们再次看清了长久以来英国在欧盟内部形单影只的尴尬处境。


The two events are intimately connected.	这两个问题的关系盘根错节，密不可分。


French and Dutch voters did not say why they voted against the planned Constitution. But many commentators believe that they were protesting against what they perceived as the precipitate admission of ten new member states, mainly much poorer countries from Central and Eastern Europe.	法荷选民并没有明确说出反对宪法提案的原因，但很多评论家都认为他们是在对欧盟突然吸纳10个新成员国的做法进行抗议，这些新成员国主要包括来自中东欧的贫困国家。


In particular, voters were afraid that their jobs would be lost to hordes of Eastern immigrants, exemplified in the image widely quoted at the time, of the low-cost Polish plumber.	选民们尤其担心工作会被成群结队的东欧移民抢走，价格低廉的波兰管道工是当时东欧移民在欧洲人心目中的普遍形象。


The irony, of course, was that most of the 15 old member states had refused to give the new members full and immediate access to the Western job markets.	当然，具有讽刺意味的是：欧盟15个老成员国中的绝大多数都拒绝让新成员国立即全面地进入西欧劳务市场。


But in any event, it was too late to protest: the ten Eastern states had already been granted membership of the Union.	但无论如何，抗议已经为时太晚：10个东欧国家已经取得了欧盟成员的地位。


But now the 25 member states must deal with the financial consequences of that enlargement, not just in the overall size of the European Union budget for the next seven years, but in who pays and who benefits.	但现在这25个成员国必须面对扩盟带来的财政后果，这种后果不仅体现在未来7年内欧盟预算的总体数量，还体现在谁将付出而谁将获益。


In particular, the central issue is how far the old member states are willing to pay to boost the less developed economies of the new members.	具体地讲，核心问题是原有成员国愿意为促进发达程度较低的新成员国经济发展付出多大的代价。


In the event, it turned into a three-way battle between Britain, France and the new member states.	这种情况最终变成了英国、法国和新成员国三方之间的角力。


Traditionally, a large majority of the budget has gone either on agriculture or on the development of backward regions.	过去，预算的绝大部分都用于农业或者落后地区的发展。


In practice, this has meant large flows of money either to big agricultural producers, like France, or to poorer member states, like Greece and Portugal.	而实际上，这意味着会有大批的资金流入法国这样的农业生产大国，或者像希腊和葡萄牙这样的相对贫困的国家。


On both counts, the new member states expected to benefit substantially from the EU system.	在这两个方面，新成员国都将从欧盟系统获得巨大的补助。


In the past, the big loser from the EU system, in budgetary terms, was the UK; for while agriculture accounted for two thirds of all EU spending, the UK had a small farm sector, and therefore received small farm payments.	过去，英国是欧盟系统财政领域最大的输家。 因为尽管农业占到了欧盟开支的三分之二，英国的农业规模却很有限，因此得到的农业补助也微乎其微。


The British long complained of the unfairness of these rules, especially in view of the fact that the UK was one of the relatively poorer member states; and in 1984, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government demanded, and got, a massive rebate on its net contribution to the EU budget.	英国人很早就抱怨游戏规则的不公，尤其考虑到英国还属于欧盟内部相对贫困的国家。 1984年，玛格丽特·萨切尔执政的保守党政府提出并获得了欧盟的批准，英国对欧盟的净税额自此大幅度降低。


Today, the situation has changed in three important respects.	今天，整个局面有了3个方面的改变。 欧盟的农业政策开始实行改革，农业拨款占欧盟预算的份额也从60%下降到了40%。


EU farm policy has started to be reformed, and its share of the EU budget has fallen from over 60% to 40%; Britain has for several years enjoyed significantly faster economic growth than most other member states, so that it is now one of the richer EU countries, even compared with France and Germany; and the new member states are so much poorer than even the poorest of the old members, that they have an unanswerable moral case for a generous share of whatever budget could be negotiated.	近几年来英国的经济增长比其它多数欧盟成员国要快得多，早已进入了欧盟富裕国家的行列，即便与法、德两国相比也毫不逊色。 而新成员国的经济状况即便与旧成员国中最穷的相比依然相去甚远，因此英国在谈判确定的预算额度中负有不可推卸的道义责任。


When negotiations started six months ago, it was Britain’s turn to take over the Presidency of the European Council.	6个月前谈判开始时，恰逢英国接任欧洲理事会主席职务。


Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, electrified the world of European politics by telling the European Parliament that he was a “passionate pro-European”.	英国首相托尼·布莱尔向欧洲议会宣布自己是“充满热情的欧洲支持者”，他的这一表态轰动了整个欧洲政界。


This was a message for which Britain’s European friends had long been hoping, and for which they had waited in vain since Blair’s election in 1997.	英国的欧洲朋友们早就期待这样的表态，自从布莱尔1997年当选后他们就毫无结果地苦苦等候。


Certainly, he had never expressed any such sentiment inside the British Isles during the previous eight years.	当然，过去8年布莱尔从未在英伦诸岛表达过这样的观点。


Since Britain had been one of the most insistent advocates of enlargement of the EU to the candidates from Central and Eastern Europe, one might have expected that the Blair government would have wished to be correspondingly generous to the new-comers in the conduct of the budgetary negotiations.	由于英国自始至终坚持吸纳中东欧国家加入欧盟，人们可能会认为布莱尔政府在预算谈判中也会对新成员国表现出相应的慷慨。


At first, this seemed to be the British government’s chosen tactic.	开始时，这似乎是英国政府的既定战术。


Against all expectations, it struck a morally advantageous posture by offering to surrender some part of its budget rebate, but only if the rest of the European Union (i.e. France, in particular) would agree to fundamental reforms of EU farm policy.	出乎所有人的预料，英国提出可以放弃部分财政优惠，从而在道义上赢得了主动。 但兑现承诺的条件是欧盟其它国家（比如法国）同意对欧盟农业政策进行根本的改革。


It took some time before the British came to understand that since President Jacques Chirac is a beleaguered lame-duck President, who will remain in office but not in power until 2007, he is in no position to agree to any such bargain.	英国花了很长时间才明白：希拉克是个倍受秸难的软弱总统，任期持续到2007年但却掌握不了实权，他没有能力接受这样的讨价还价。


So when the British came to terms with this harsh reality, they played out the lamentable end-game of their management of the negotiations with small-minded cheese-paring and logic-chopping offers, all designed primarily to safeguard narrow British interests, mainly at the expense of the new member states.	因此当英国人认清这种严酷的现实后，他们在谈判中抛出了鼠目寸光、强词夺理的可悲提议，目的主要是以牺牲新成员国的利益为代价，维护英国自身的狭隘利益。


It is a sad conclusion to a presidency, launched six-months ago, with Blair’s claim that he was a “passionate pro-European”. Yet the full text of his speech tells it all.	对于6个月前开始的主席任期，听惯了布莱尔“充满热情的亲欧洲人士”的漂亮口号，这恐怕是一个令人哀伤的结局。


Blair is in favour of Europe; but not this Europe.	布莱尔支持欧洲，但不支持现在的欧洲。


He wants to be a part of a political Europe; but only if the other member states follow Britain’s model of economic and social reform.	他希望成为欧洲政治的组成部分，但前提是其它欧盟国家遵循英国提出的经济和社会改革模式。


The problem is that economic and social reform are purely national responsibilities, and do not lie within the competence of the Union; if there is to be economic and social reform in France and Germany, that is a matter exclusively for French and German voters and politicians.	问题是经济和社会改革纯属于国家责任，超出了欧盟所能管辖的范畴。 如果法德两国要进行社会改革，那也只能是法德选民和政治家的事情。


It could only be a European matter, if the EU were a real federation.	只有当欧盟成为真正的联盟，上述���题才有可能成为欧洲事务。


Is Blair a federalist, then?	那么布莱尔是不是联邦主义者？


Heavens, no!	不！


He is merely an unthinking nationalist, living in terror of the nationalist yellow tabloid press.	他只是个轻率的民族主义份子，沉浸在民族主义份子低俗小报制造出来的恐怖氛围中。


So why does he say he is a passionate pro-European?	那么他为什么说自己是个热情的欧洲支持者？


Because he has not thought about the question for one moment.	原因是这个问题他连想都没想过。


Blair’s European Dilemma	布莱尔在欧洲进退两难


Tony Blair has achieved a remarkable third successive electoral victory.	托尼·布莱尔在第三次竞选中大获全胜。


But his sharply reduced majority in the House of Commons, and his damaged personal reputation, mean that his political position is seriously weakened.	但是工党在下议院中剧减的席位，布莱尔本人受损的个人声誉，意味着他的政治地位受到严重创伤。


As a result, he will be poorly placed to handle the challenges ahead, the most intractable of which will be the European Union’s new Constitution.	结果，可怜的他不得不着手于眼前的挑战，最难应付的就是欧盟的新宪法。


The Constitution, adopted by the 25 member states last year, is not, in itself, a big deal.	欧盟25国去年签署的宪法本身并不是一个大问题。


It introduces some significant improvements for majority voting in the Council of Ministers. It gives some more powers to the European Parliament.	它就部长联席会中的多数决投票引进了一些重大改进，赋予欧洲议会更多权力。


It includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights. It might help harmonize the foreign policies of the member states.	它还包含了一本基本权利宪法，这也许有助于平衡各成员国的外交政策。


But it is no revolutionary document.	但是它不是一份革命性的文件。


According to normal British constitutional practice, the government would be expected to ratify this Constitution by a vote in the House of Commons; and, until the recent general election, the government’s huge majority should have been more than sufficient.	按照正常的英国宪法惯例，政府应当根据下议院的投票批准宪法； 在最近的这次大选之前，政府拥有的多数支持对通过这项宪法应该绰绰有余。


But Blair, beset by controversy over the unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq, thought he could avoid trouble at Westminster by postponing ratification until 2006 (that is, a comfortably long time in the future), and proposing that it be carried out by popular referendum.	但是，被围困在有关这场不得人心并且可能是非法的伊拉克战争的是非争论中的布莱尔，认为他可以拖到2006年（那可是很长一段时间）再批准，这样就可避免在Westminster的麻烦，并建议举行全民公投来批准它。


Unfortunately, as things stand, this is a referendum that Blair will not win, because all polls show a large and solid majority against the European Constitution.	不幸的是，就当前情况来看，这是一场布莱尔不会赢得的全民投票，因为所有的选票都显示绝大多数人坚决反对欧洲宪法。


Blair’s government may hope to be rescued by outside events.	布莱尔政府也许指望发生在国外的事件能救他们一把。


France will hold a referendum on the Constitution for the end of this month, and a French “No,” the British seem to think, might make their problem go away.	法国将在本月底就宪法举行全民公决，在英国看来，法国的一声“不”也许就能解决他们的问题。


For the general expectation is that if France rejects the Constitution, the Constitution would be dead, and no British referendum would be needed.	因为人们普遍认为，如果法国反对宪法，那么宪法就不会生效，那么英国也就不需要举行什么公投了。


If this is Blair’s calculation, he is mistaken.	如果布莱尔打着这样的如意算盘的话，他就错了。


Moreover, it is the kind of mistake that the British have been making in relations with Europe for the past half-century.	事实上，这正是过去半个世纪中英国在他们与欧洲关系问题上一直在犯的错误。


Some recent French polls now show a majority in favor of the Constitution.	最近法国的一些民意测验表明大部分人支持宪法。


But even if the French do vote “No,” that will not solve the British problem: on the contrary, it will precipitate a major political crisis, in France and across Europe, concerning the future of the EU – the type of crisis that the British have spent fifty years trying to evade. For if the Constitution is indeed dead, what happens next?	但是即使法国投了否决票，那也不会解决英国的问题：相反，它还会加速一场在法国及全欧洲范围内的有关欧盟未来的严重政治危机——这正是英国五十年来试图避免的那一种危机。


None of the leading members of the Union will be interested in Britain’s views on this question.	没有任何一个欧盟领导国家会对英国对这一问题的看法感兴趣。


When Tony Blair swept to power in 1997, he was widely welcomed throughout Europe as the most pro-European British Prime Minister since Edward Heath a quarter of a century earlier.	自托尼·布莱尔1997年掌权以来，他在欧洲大受欢迎，成为自约二十五年前英国首相Edward Heath之后最为亲欧的英国首相。


He spoke French and seemed at ease with Britain’s neighbors across the Channel; more importantly, he seemed to sympathize with European integration.	他说法语，看起来和英国海峡两岸的邻里都相处融洽； 更为重要的是，他看起来认同支持欧洲整合。


Eight years on, Europe knows better.	但是八年之后，欧洲看得更明白了。


It is now clear to all that Blair is fundamentally opposed to the idea of a more politically integrated Europe.	现在所有人都很清楚，布莱尔从内心深处反对一个政治更加整合的欧洲概念。


Not only has he kept Britain out of the single European currency over the past four years, he made it clear during the election campaign that he does not expect the UK to join the Euro during the next five years either.	过去四年中，他不仅在让英国置身于单一欧洲货币之外，并在他的竞选活动中明确表明，他不希望英国在今后五年中加入欧盟。


Occasionally Blair flirts with the idea of more European cooperation on foreign policy and defense.	偶尔，布莱尔会对在外交和国防政策上进行更多的欧洲性合作表现出浓厚兴趣。


But the past three years proved in practice that he prefers subservience to the war policy of President Bush to any sense of community with Europe.	但是过去的三年却证明，比起任何一种与欧洲团体的合作，他事实上更喜欢对布什的战争政策俯首帖耳。


In short, Blair is as opposed to the European project as all his predecessors.	简而言之，布莱对和他所有的前任一样反对欧洲计划。


One fundamental difference between France and Britain is that most of the mainstream political elite in France has long been broadly pro-European.	法国与英国最本质的差异之一就是大部分的法国主流政治精英长期以来都是明确亲欧的。


If the French electorate votes “No,” it will be much less a vote against the Constitution than a protest vote against President Jacques Chirac, or an expression of anxiety about the implications of the EU’s enlargement to Central Europe.	如果法国选民投了否定票，那与其说是反对宪法，还不如说是反对法国总统希拉克的投票，或者是他们对欧盟扩大至中欧的信号表示出的焦虑。


By contrast, Blair cannot win a referendum on the Constitution, not only because it is opposed by virtually all the popular press, but also because neither he nor any major political leader in Britain has ever had a good word to say about European integration.	相比之下，布莱尔无法赢得这场关于欧洲宪法的公投，不仅仅因为宪法确确实实受到所有广大媒体的反对，也因为不管是布莱尔还是任何其他英国重要政治领导人都从来没有说过欧洲整合的好话。


The crisis over the Union’s future direction triggered by a French “No” vote could last for some time.	法国的一票否决票所引发的欧盟未来方向的危机可能会持续一段时间。


But if the British imagine that the Constitution will just die, and that that will be the end of the story, they are deceiving themselves.	但是如果英国人认为宪法就这样消逝了，认为这样故事就结束了，那么他们就是在自欺欺人。


On the contrary, they will find themselves embroiled, like the rest of Europe, in a fundamental debate about the objectives of the Union.	相反，他们会发现他们已经像欧洲其他国家一样被卷入了一场有关欧盟目标的重要讨论之中。


They will then be forced to make public and explicit choices about the sort of Europe that they want, and this will put them at odds with their neighbors.	那时他们就会被迫在公众面前明确选择他们所要的欧洲类型，这将会引发他们与邻国之间的争执。


In the end, the French and other leading member states are likely to explore alternative ways of working towards a more politically integrated Europe.	最终，法国和其他欧盟领导成员国有可能去探寻不同的工作方法来实现一个政治更加整合的欧洲。


The most plausible institutional mechanism for this alternative way forward will be the existing grouping of those member states that have wanted to belong to a more united Europe by joining, or seeking to join, the euro zone.	这个方法最可能运用到的体系机制就是将那些正要加入或谋求加入欧元区、想要属于一个更为团结的欧洲的国家分组。


If the Constitution is rejected, the British, having chosen to stay out of that grouping, may find that they have maneuvered themselves into an even more remote outer circle of Europe.	如果宪法被否决��，选择远离分组的英国也许会发现他们把自己放在了一个更远的欧洲外圈之中。


Blame the Economists, Not Economics	要责备的是经济学家，而不是经济本身


CAMBRIDGE – As the world economy tumbles off the edge of a precipice, critics of the economics profession are raising questions about its complicity in the current crisis.	剑桥——当今世界经济面临着崩溃的边缘，对经济学家的批评之声也日渐兴起，甚至有人认为他们是导致此次经济危机的同谋。


Rightly so: economists have plenty to answer for.	还是让我们来听听经济学家自己的说法吧。


It was economists who legitimized and popularized the view that unfettered finance was a boon to society. They spoke with near unanimity when it came to the “dangers of government over-regulation.”	经济学家一直都提倡金融秩序的自由性，几乎异口同声地反对“政府的过度监管”，认为自由的金融可以促进社会的繁荣。


Their technical expertise – or what seemed like it at the time –gave them a privileged position as opinion makers, as well as access to the corridors of power.	由于是以所谓专业的身份——当时好象大家也是这么认为的——他们掌握了一定的话语权，甚至可以进入权力的核心。


Very few among them (notable exceptions including Nouriel Roubini and Robert Shiller) raised alarm bells about the crisis to come.	除了鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼和罗伯特·希勒之外，很少有经济学家对即将到来的金融危机发出预警。


Perhaps worse still, the profession has failed to provide helpful guidance in steering the world economy out of its current mess.	恐怕更为糟糕的是，他们对如何摆脱经济危机也没有提出建设性的办法。


On Keynesian fiscal stimulus, economists’ views range from “absolutely essential” to “ineffective and harmful.”	对于凯恩斯主义者的经济刺激计划来说，经济学家的观点从“绝对必须”到“没有效率而且有害”，真是无所不包。


On re-regulating finance, there are plenty of good ideas, but little convergence. From the near-consensus on the virtues of a finance-centric model of the world, the economics profession has moved to a near-total absence of consensus on what ought to be done. 	在对金融的监管方面，经济学家们不乏有一些好的建议，但也没有达成什么共识，过去他们一致地大力鼓吹“金融中心论”的好处，而现在，大家几乎各自一词，努力都出了自己的良方。


So is economics in need of a major shake-up?	难道经济学要有一个大的变革么？


Should we burn our existing textbooks and rewrite them from scratch?	难道我们要烧毁现在的教科书而从头再来么？


Actually, no. Without recourse to the economist’s toolkit, we cannot even begin to make sense of the current crisis.	当然不是，如果没有经济学家们的分析，我们现在都还不能意识到目前所面临危机的本质。


Why, for example, did China’s decision to accumulate foreign reserves result in a mortgage lender in Ohio taking excessive risks?	例如，为什么中国的外汇储备积累会引起俄亥俄州的房贷过剩？


If your answer does not use elements from behavioral economics, agency theory, information economics, and international economics, among others, it is likely to remain seriously incomplete.	如果你不懂得运用行为经济学原理，代理理论，信息经济学和国际经济学等，你可能就不知道其中的关联。


The fault lies not with economics, but with economists.	问题不是出在经济学本身，而是在经济学家身上，经济学家们（以及听从他们的人）过分相信自己所偏好的经济学模型，这包括：市场是有效的；


The problem is that economists (and those who listen to them) became over-confident in their preferred models of the moment: markets are efficient, financial innovation transfers risk to those best able to bear it, self-regulation works best, and government intervention is ineffective and harmful.	谁能掌握金融的创新，谁就可以很好地化解风险； 金融行业自律是最好的监管；


They forgot that there were many other models that led in radically different directions.	他们可能忘记了其他的一些可能导致完全不同的结果的经济学模型。


Hubris creates blind spots.	过于的自信必然是潜在的危险。


If anything needs fixing, it is the sociology of the profession.	如果要有什么需要改变的的话，应该是他们的认知能力。


The textbooks – at least those used in advanced courses – are fine.	教科书，至少目前运用在顶尖学府的教科书，应该是没有问题的。


Non-economists tend to think of economics as a discipline that idolizes markets and a narrow concept of (allocative) efficiency.	几乎没有经济学家认为经济学是把市场看作一成不变，一种单一的经济理论不可能解释整个市场。


If the only economics course you take is the typical introductory survey, or if you are a journalist asking an economist for a quick opinion on a policy issue, that is indeed what you will encounter.	如果你只是参加一个入门的经济学课程，或是你是一个记者，问经济学家对当前政策的简要评论时，你可以会得到这个粗浅的答案。


But take a few more economics courses, or spend some time in advanced seminar rooms, and you will get a different picture.	而当你再进一步学习经济学课程，或是在高级研讨班里再多花一些时间，你就会得出完全不同的答案。


Labor economists focus not only on how trade unions can distort markets, but also how, under certain conditions, they can enhance productivity.	劳动经济学家不仅知道工会对市场的危害，同样也知道，在某种程度下，工会对提高生产力也有一定的好处。


Trade economists study the implications of globalization on inequality within and across countries.	贸易经济学家研究的是全球化对不同国家之间贸易不平衡，以及导致的后果。


Finance theorists have written reams on the consequences of the failure of the “efficient markets” hypothesis.	金融经济学家研究的是“有效市场”理论失效的后果。


Open-economy macroeconomists examine the instabilities of international finance.	开放经济学的宏观经济学家研究的是国际金融的不稳定性。


Advanced training in economics requires learning about market failures in detail, and about the myriad ways in which governments can help markets work better.	通过进一步对经济学的研究，你就会知道市场失灵的种种表现，以及政府对市场干预的各种有效手段。


Macroeconomics may be the only applied field within economics in which more training puts greater distance between the specialist and the real world, owing to its reliance on highly unrealistic models that sacrifice relevance to technical rigor.	宏观经济学家需要更为严格的训练，由于他们所依赖的是严格理想的数学模型，和现实有明显的区别，所以能够分清楚专家的理论和现实世界的差距尤其重要。


Sadly, in view of today’s needs, macroeconomists have made little progress on policy since John Maynard Keynes explained how economies could get stuck in unemployment due to deficient aggregate demand.	可悲的是，在目前看来，自从约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯解释了由于市场需求的不足，经济是如何受制于失业率的理论之后，宏观经济学家们并没有什么新的贡献。


Some, like Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, would say that the field has actually regressed.	正如同布拉德•德隆和保罗•克鲁格曼所说的，宏观经济学实际上已经在退步。


Economics is really a toolkit with multiple models – each a different, stylized representation of some aspect of reality. One’s skill as an economist depends on the ability to pick and choose the right model for the situation.	经济学是一个有着多种模型的工具——每一种都代表着现实生活的某个方面，经济学家的能力就体现在如何运用正确的模式来解决当前问题。


Economics’ richness has not been reflected in public debate because economists have taken far too much license. Instead of presenting menus of options and listing the relevant trade-offs – which is what economics is about – economists have too often conveyed their own social and political preferences.	经济学的博大精深并不为公众所知道，原因是经济学家们有了太多的特权，经济学的本质是列出可能解决问题的方法，以及有关联的一些折中解决方案，而现在的经济学家只是将自己个人的偏好加在上面，不是运用理性的分析，而是将自己的意识形态，把自己所偏好的选项提交出来。


Furthermore, economists have been reluctant to share their intellectual doubts with the public, lest they “empower the barbarians.” No economist can be entirely sure that his preferred model is correct.	更有甚之，经济学家不愿意将自己的质疑和大众分享，更不用说对社会大众的“教诲”，没有一个经济学家会认为自己的模式是完全正确的。


But when he and others advocate it to the exclusion of alternatives, they end up communicating a vastly exaggerated degree of confidence about what course of action is required.	但当他们在推销自己的方案时候，他们会以过分自信地口吻来表达，以此说服大家。


Paradoxically, then, the current disarray within the profession is perhaps a better reflection of the profession’s true value added than its previous misleading consensus.  Economics can at best clarify the choices for policy makers; it cannot make those choices for them.	具有讽刺意味的是，当前的经济学家们纷纷提出了自己不同观点，可谓是五花八门，这正说明了经济学家这个职业本身的价值所在。 经济学的本身是提出所有解决问题的可能性，而不是给出解决问题的答案。


When economists disagree, the world gets exposed to legitimate differences of views on how the economy operates.  It is when they agree too much that the public should beware.   	当经济学家有不同意见的时候，大家对经济如何运行会有着更为深刻的认识，而当所有的经济学家都发出一个声音的时候，那就是我们该保持警惕的时候了。


Bleed the Foreigner	谁把外债当回事


PRINCETON – Today, the world is threatened with a repeat of the 2008 financial meltdown – but on an even more cataclysmic scale.	普林斯顿——当前，世界正面临重演2008金融崩溃的危险——甚至更厉害。


This time, the epicenter is in Europe, rather than the United States.	这回的震中是在欧洲，而不是美国。


And this time, the financial mechanisms involved are not highly complex structured financial products, but one of the oldest financial instruments in the world: government bonds.	而这次出事儿的金融工具，不是高度复杂的结构性产品，而是一种最古老的金融工具——政府债券。


While governments and central banks race frantically to find a solution, there is a profound psychological dynamic at work that stands in the way of an orderly debt workout: our aversion to recognizing obligations to strangers.	尽管有关政府和央行急着想对策，但有一种深刻的心理机制阻碍着债务问题的有序解决：我们不太把欠陌生人的债当回事儿。


The impulse simply to cut the Gordian knot of debt by defaulting on it is much stronger when creditors are remote and unknown.	如果债权人远在他乡又素不相识，就会有比较强的冲动，索性违约，一了百了。


In 2007-2008, it was homeowners who could not keep up with payments; now it is governments.	2007~2008年，是购房者还不起钱，如今换成了政府。


But, in both cases, the lender was distant and anonymous.	但不论是当时还是今日，债主都是遥远的陌生人。


American mortgages were no longer held at the local bank, but had been repackaged in esoteric financial instruments and sold around the world; likewise, Greek government debt is in large part owed to foreigners.	美国人的按揭并未留在本地银行的账上，而是被打包成玄奥的金融工具卖到全世界。 同样地，希腊国债也有很大一部分攥在外国债主手里。


Because Spain and France defaulted so much in the early modern period, and because Greece, from the moment of its political birth in 1830, was a chronic or serial defaulter, some assume that national temperament somehow imbues countries with a proclivity to default.	鉴于西班牙和法国在近代早期曾多次违约，而希腊自从1830年独立以来更是习惯性违约者，有人便揣测，是不是民族性格令有些国家染上了违约的瘾。


But that search for long historical continuity is facile, for it misses one of the key determinants of debt sustainability: the identity of the state’s creditor.	但追溯这么漫长的历史连贯性有些想当然，因为忽略了决定某国是否能保持债务稳健的一个关键因素：谁是债主。


This variable makes an enormous difference in terms of whether debt will be regularly and promptly serviced.	在是否按时、迅速还债的问题上，这个变量影响巨大。


The frequent and spectacular early modern bankruptcies of the French and Spanish monarchies concerned for the most part debt owed to foreigners.	近代早期法国和西班牙经常上演的壮观的破产闹剧，大多数跟欠外债有关。


The sixteenth-century Habsburgs borrowed – at very high interest rates – from Florentine, Genovese, and Augsburg merchants.	16世纪的哈布斯堡王朝以极高利息向佛罗伦萨、日内瓦和奥格斯堡的商人借债。


Ancien régime France developed a similar pattern, borrowing in Amsterdam or Geneva in order to fight wars against Spain in the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, and against Britain in the eighteenth.	“旧制度”统治下的法国也发展出相似的行为模式，总是向阿姆斯特丹和日内瓦借钱，用来打仗，16、17世纪跟西班牙人打，到了18世纪跟英国人打。


The Netherlands and Britain, however followed a different path.	但荷兰和英国走的就是另外一条路。


They depended much less on foreign creditors than on domestic lenders.	它们的外债远远不如内债多。


The Dutch model was exported to Britain in 1688, along with the political revolution that deposed the Catholic James II and put the Dutch Protestant William of Orange on the English throne.	1688年英国光荣革命废黜了信仰天主教的国王詹姆斯二世，不仅把来自荷兰的新教徒威廉·奥伦治扶上英国王座，也把偏好内债的荷兰模式带到了英国。


Indeed, the Glorious Revolution enabled a revolution in finance.	事实上，光荣革命也促成了一场财政革命。


In particular, recognition of the rights of parliament – of a representative assembly – ensured that the agents of the creditor classes would have permanent control of the budgetary process.	尤其是议会权利的确立，使得预算从制定到执行的全过程都逃不开债权人阶级的代理人的监督。


They could thus guarantee – also on behalf of other creditors – that the state’s finances were solid, and that debts would be repaid.	他们督促国家保持财政稳健并偿还债务，也连带着保护了外国债权人的利益。


Constitutional monarchy limited the scope for wasteful spending on luxurious court life (as well as on military adventure) – the hallmark of early modern autocratic monarchy.	立宪君主制限制了宫廷的奢侈浪费和军事冒险，这两样可以说是近代早期专制君主制（如法国和西班牙）的招牌。


In short, the financial revolution of the modern world was built on a political order – which anteceded a full transition to universal democracy – in which the creditors formed the political class.	简言之，近代世界的财政革命依托于一种政治秩序——债权人构成政治阶级，这种秩序是后来普遍民主制的先声。


That model was transferred to many other countries, and became the bedrock on which modern financial stability was built.	那种模式传播到许多国家，成为近代财政稳健的基石。


In the post-1945 period, government finance in rich industrial countries was also overwhelmingly national at first, and the assumptions of 1688 still held.	二战以后，发达国家的财政原本也是内债优先的，仍然保守着1688年的传统。


Then something happened.	后来，事情起了一些变化。


With the liberalization of global financial markets that began in the 1970’s, foreign sources of credit became available.	随着20世纪70年代开始的全球金融市场自由化，外国信贷资源变成可及之物。


In the mid-1980’s, the US became a net debtor, relying increasingly on foreigners to finance its debt.	到了20世纪80年代中期，美国成为净债务国，对外债的依赖程度与日俱增。


Europeans, too, followed this path.	欧洲也步其后尘。


Part of the promise of the new push to European integration in the 1980’s was that it would make borrowing easier.	20世纪80年代兜售欧洲一体化的广告词，有一条就是，一体化以后借债变得更容易。


In the 1990’s, the main attraction of monetary union for Italian and Spanish politicians was that the new currency would bring down interest rates and make foreign money available for cheap financing of government debt.	20世纪90年代，统一货币构想对意大利和西班牙政客的主要吸引力就在于，引入新货币既能压低利率，又能打开外国人的钱袋子，使政府可以实现廉价融资。


Until the late 1990’s and the advent of monetary union, most government debt in the European Union was domestically held: in 1998, foreigners held only one-fifth of sovereign debt.	一直到20世纪90年代末，欧元启动前夕，欧盟国家的国债还大都是内债：1998年，主权债务中外债比重只有五分之一。


That share climbed rapidly in the aftermath of the euro’s introduction.	欧元引入后，外债比重迅速上升。


In 2008, on the eve of the financial crisis, three-quarters of Portuguese debt, half of Spanish and Greek debt, and more than 40% of Italian debt was held by foreigners.	到2008年金融危机爆发前夜，葡萄牙国债的四分之三、西班牙和希腊国债的一般、意大利国债的四成多都成了外债。


When the foreign share of debt grows, so do the political incentives to impose the costs of that debt on foreigners.	随着外债比重上升，向外国人转嫁债务成本的政治诱惑也越来越大。


In the 1930’s, during and after the Great Depression, a strong feeling that the creditors were illegitimate and unethical bloodsuckers accompanied widespread default.	20世纪30年代大萧条期间及其后一段时间，世人曾有一种强烈的情绪，认为债权人就是一帮非法、败德的吸血鬼，于是当时违约成风。


Even US President Franklin Roosevelt jovially slapped his thigh when Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht told him that Nazi Germany would default on its external loans, including those owed to American banks, exclaiming, “Serves the Wall Street bankers right!”	当德意志帝国银行行长沙赫特（Hjalmar Schacht）对富兰克林·罗斯福说，纳粹德国将要对外债违约，包括欠美国一些银行的债务时，这位美国总统竟然一拍大腿，笑着说：“华尔街银行家罪有应得！


In Europe today, impatient Greeks have doubtless derived some encouragement from excoriations of bankers’ foolishness by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	”请看今日欧洲，德国总理默克尔、法国总统萨科齐屡屡苛责银行家们“愚蠢”，岂不也在纵容希腊人赖账的决心？


The economists’ commonplace that a monetary union demands a fiscal union is only part of a much deeper truth about debt and obligation: debt is rarely sustainable if there is not some sense of communal or collective responsibility.	“统一货币需要统一财政”，这句经济学家的老生常谈，其实揭示了一条更深刻的关于债务的真理：若没有责任共担之心，便难有可靠之债。


That is the mechanism that reduces the incentives to expropriate the creditor, and makes debt secure and cheap.	只有遵循这个道理，才能打消赖账之心，让债务变得安全而便宜。


At the end of the day, a collective, burden-sharing Europe is the only way out of the current crisis.	最终，欧洲只有团结起来，分担重担，才能平安走出当前危机。


But that requires substantially greater centralization of political accountability and control than Europeans seem able to achieve today.	但那需将政治责任和权力大��集中起来，远远超越欧洲人今日所能做到之程度。


And that is why many of them could be paying much more for credit tomorrow.	这也就是为什么，许多欧洲国家还只顾今天能挥霍，不管明天要还钱。


Blind in Gaza and Jerusalem	失明于加沙和耶路撒冷


LONDON – I spent the New Year in Sydney, watching the fireworks above the iconic bridge welcome in 2009.	伦敦--我的元旦是在悉尼度过的。 我当时观看着烟火绽放在悉尼大桥上空欢迎2009年。


The explosions over Gaza that night were not intended to entertain, but rather to break Hamas and discredit it in the eyes of Palestinians.	而当天夜晚在加沙的爆炸则并不是打算让哈马斯高兴，而是想要破除其在巴勒斯坦人心目中的威信。


It was the latest resort to terrible violence in order to resolve how to share in peace what Christians still like to call the Holy Land.	这是最新的一次施暴行动，意在解决和平分享基督教徒称为的圣地。


Mahatma Gandhi criticized the biblical justification of retribution, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”	甘地批评圣经把“以牙还牙，以眼还眼”的报复合法化。


Followed through to its end, he argued, it would mean that all were blind.	他认为，如果听从这一教唆就会意味着所有人都失明。


And so it has proved in Palestine and Israel.	在巴勒斯坦和以色列就证明了这一点。


Blind in Gaza, blind in Jerusalem.	加沙和耶路撒冷都失明了。


Much of what has happened was predictable, as well over 1,400 men, women, and children have died and more than 4,000 have been injured.	超过1400名男子、妇女和儿童丧失，另有四千多人受伤，而大部分事情都是在预料之中的。


First, the United States justified the Israeli assault and blamed everything on Hamas, just as it used to pin all responsibility for whatever went wrong on Yasir Arafat and Fatah.	首先，美国给以色列的进攻予以合法化并且把责任全部推到哈马斯身上，正如以前它把所有的责任都算在阿拉法特和法塔赫头上一样。


Second, despite French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s welcome high-profile diplomacy, Europe has been irrelevant, if not quite invisible.	第二，尽管法国总统萨尔科奇高调外交斡旋受人欢迎，但是欧洲在这一事件中即使不是没有踪影，也是无关紧要。


As Israeli officials point out, Europeans are always there for the photo opportunity.	正如以色列官员指出的那样，欧洲人总是在那里摆姿势照照像而已。


The Quartet’s peacemaker, Tony Blair, is as unctuously nugatory as ever.	中东四方调停人布莱尔和以往一样没有效用。


He appears on CNN , but has he actually visited Gaza since his appointment in the summer of 2007?	他出现在有线新闻网之中，但是，从2007年他得到任命后有没有实际访问加沙呢？


No.	没有。


Third, as usual, Israel has accused of anti-Semitism those who have dared to criticize its disproportionate response to Hamas’s indefensible rocket attacks and its collective punishment of Palestinians.	第三，正如以往一样，只要有人敢于批评以色列对哈马斯火箭袭击反应过度及其对巴勒斯坦人的集体惩罚，以色列都指责为反犹主义。


An Italian cardinal, who admittedly spoke intemperately, was accused of using the language of Holocaust denial.	一位意大利的红衣主教一时失言，就被指责为使用否认犹太人大屠杀的语言。


By that standard, does my unqualified criticism of Hamas’s rocket attacks make me an Islamophobe?	那么根据这一标准，如果我不当地批评哈马斯的火箭袭击，是否我也是反伊斯兰教主义者呢？


Coincidentally, the deadly attack on Gaza came at the same time that a clutch of America’s most distinguished would-be Middle East peacemakers published books about how the task should properly be tackled.	凑巧的是，这次对加沙的致命攻击发生的时候，将会成为美国最为着名的中东和平使者出版了书籍，谈论如何正确解决问题。


It all sounded a bit like a series of job applications – the war for President Barack Obama’s ear.	这听起来就是求职申请，在争取奥巴马总统的注意力。


One thing all these experts could agree on is that President George W. Bush was a disaster.	这些专家的共识之一就是布什总统把事情搞糟了。


American policy might as well have been made in Likud’s headquarters.	美国的政策好像是在利库德总部里制定的一样。


Even at the end, when the United Nations Security Council voted on Gaza, Bush was happy to humiliate Condoleezza Rice at Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s bidding.	即使在最后，当联合国安理会对加沙问题投票的时候，布什还是乐意给莱斯难堪来讨好以色列总理奥尔穆特。


These “wise men,” advisers one and all to President Bill Clinton and other presidents, all seem to concede that the failure of the proposed Camp David accord in 2000 could not, after all, be laid solely at Arafat’s door.	这些“贤人”都是克林顿和其他总统的幕僚。 他们好像都承认2000年戴维营和平提议失败毕竟不能全部归咎于阿拉法特。


Former Israeli premier Ehud Barak should carry his share of the blame.	以色列前总理巴拉克也应该承担责任。


Moreover, they all criticize the Clinton-era practice of routinely clearing America’s policy positions first with Israel, which is hardly likely to win Arab confidence or support.	而且，他们都批评克林顿时代的政策首先获得以色列的认同，这样就难以赢得阿拉伯人的信任和支持。


The American diplomats’ arguments about process did not on the whole carry over into disagreement about the content of a peace deal.	美国外交官有关和平进程的观点总体上并不涉及有关和平协议内容的分歧。


All more or less agree on this.	所有人都大体同意以下几点。


Two states.	那就是，巴以建立两个国家；


Security guarantees for Israel.	对以色列做出安全保证；


A Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, adjusted by agreement through mutual land swaps.	通过协商互换领土调整在1967年边境内建立巴勒斯坦国；


An end to most West Bank settlements.	结束大多数西岸定居点；


No “right of return” for Palestinian refugees, but financial compensation for them.	巴勒斯坦难民不得实施“返回家园”的权利，但是给予经济补偿；


Some system of joint or international sovereignty over Jerusalem’s holy places and the division of the city so that it can become the capital of two states.	对耶路撒冷的圣地建立联合或者国际主权体系； 分割耶路撒冷以便成为两国的首都。


Of course, this is what should happen.	当然，这是理应发生的事情。


And I suppose that it is conceivable that it could still happen with the help of welcome new mediators like Qatar and Turkey, whose prime minister called Israel’s attack “a serious crime against humanity.”	而且我认为，在新的受人欢迎的调停国家卡塔尔和土耳其的帮助下这依旧可能。 土耳其总理把以色列的袭击称为“严重的反人类罪行”。


But I have begun to wonder whether it will really be possible to achieve peace on this basis.	但是我开始怀疑是否真的可能在这一基础上实现和平。


Fatah, and Palestinian moderates like President Mahmoud Abbas, have been totally discredited.	法塔赫和阿巴斯总统等巴勒斯坦温和派人物完全失去了信用。


Palestinians on the whole have been further radicalized.	巴勒斯坦人在整体上变得更为激进了。


Hamas, whose engagement and support is essential for any settlement, has sworn revenge.	任何和解都离不开哈马斯的参与和支持，而它却扬言复仇。


Every day, new Palestinian sorrows strike heaven in the face.	每天都会却发生新的巴勒斯坦人悲剧。


The widows and the mothers of the dead weep and cry out for bloody justice.	寡妇们和死者的母亲们痛哭流涕要求偿命。


Should we be surprised?	我们是否应该感到惊讶呢？


Had the British government pursued peace and the destruction of the IRA in Northern Ireland by bombing Catholic Derry, would that have alienated or won over Catholic opinion?	如果英国政府追求和平以及通过轰炸天主教城市摧毁北爱尔兰的共和军，那么这种做法是会离间还是赢得天主教舆论？


On the Israeli side, which political leaders really want a Palestinian state and are prepared to take the political risks associated with trying to establish one?	在以色列方面，那个政治领导人真正想要巴勒斯坦国家而且愿意冒着伴随试图建立巴勒斯坦国的政治风险呢？


Which of them are strong enough to deal with the West Bank settlers?	他们那个人足够强大来应付西岸的定居者呢？


There will be no peace settlement otherwise.	否则就不会有和平协议。


Which leaders will teach the facts of life to the more extreme members of the Jewish diaspora in America?	那个领导人会向美国犹太人中的极端分子讲述事实呢？


Who among Israel’s leaders understands that reconciliation is more important that retribution and revenge?	以色列领导人中谁理解和解要比报复和复仇更为重要呢？


However tough things looked in the past, I have never felt such a sense of despair about Palestine and Israel.	无论过去看来多么困难，我都没有对巴以问题感到绝望。


Reason has been drowned in blood.	理性被吞没在了鲜血里。


It seems as though the politics of hope have given way to the politics of the cemetery.	看起来希望的政治已经让位给了墓地的政治。


Poor Palestine. Poor Israel.	可怜的巴勒斯坦，可怜的以色列。


Who is there now who can still light a candle in the dark?	谁可以在黑暗中点燃蜡烛呢？


The End of Big Banks	大银行的终结


WASHINGTON, DC – After nearly a decade of crisis, bailout, and reform in the United States and the European Union, the financial system – both in those countries and globally – is remarkably similar to the one we had in 2006.	发自华盛顿特区——在美国及欧盟经历了近十年的危机，救市和改革后，金融体系——无论是在这些国家和全球——变得非常与2006年时的样子非常相似。


Many financial reforms have been attempted since 2010, but the overall effects have been limited.	自2010年以来人们尝试施行了多项金融改革，但总体效果却相当有限的。


Some big banks have struggled, but others have risen to take their place.	一些大银行陷入了困境，而其他一些则取而代之。


Both before the 2008 global financial crisis and today, just over a dozen big banks dominate the world’s financial landscape.	无论是2008年全球金融危机之前还是今时今日，金融版图上照样是十几个大银行一统天下的局面。


And yet the ground is shifting beneath the financial sector, and big banks could soon become a thing of the past.	但如今金融业正发生着某种变革，而大银行可能很快也将沦为明日黄花了。


Few officials privately express satisfaction with the progress of financial reform.	没有几个官员私下对金融改革的进展感到满意。


In public, most of them are more polite, but the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Neel Kashkari, struck a chord recently when he called for a reevaluation of how much progress has been made on addressing the problem of financial institutions that are “too big to fail” (TBTF).	不过在公开场合，他们大多都比较收敛，但明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行总裁尼尔·卡什卡利（Neel Kashkari）则最近激起了人们共鸣，因为他呼吁要对在应对那些“大而不能倒”的金融机构所导致的问题上所取得的进展进行重新评估。


Kashkari worked for Henry M. Paulson in the US Treasury Department, beginning in 2006.	卡什卡利自2006年开始在美国财政部长亨利·M·保尔森（Henry M. Paulson）手下任职。


He not only watched the financial crisis develop; in October 2008 he became the assistant secretary responsible for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), with the goal of stabilizing the financial system.	此人不仅旁观了金融危机的全过程，更亲身参与其中； 2008年10月，他就任负责问题资产救助计划的副部长，受命稳定金融体系。


He is a Republican who has worked at both Goldman Sachs (a big bank) and PIMCO (a large asset-management company).	他也是一位同时在高盛（大型银行）和太平洋投资管理公司（大型资产管理公司）工作过的共和党人。


So people pay attention when he says, “I believe the biggest banks are still too big to fail and continue to pose a significant, ongoing risk to our economy.”	因此当他发表“我认为那些大银行仍然是大而不能倒，并继续对我们的经济构成显著且持续的风险。 ”这番谈话时自然就引起了人们的警觉。


And Kashkari is correct in his assessment of the Dodd-Frank financial reforms of 2010.	同时卡什卡利对2010年多德 - 弗兰克金融改革法案的评价也是正确的。


This legislation and the ensuing regulations have moved some issues in the right direction.	该立法以及随之出台的法规确实将某些事务推向了正确的方向。


“But given the enormous costs that would be associated with another financial crisis and the lack of certainty about whether these new tools would be effective in dealing with one,” he argues, “I believe we must seriously consider bolder, transformational options.”	“但考虑到另一场金融危机可能引发的庞大成本，同时这些新工具能否有效应对危机的不确定性，”他指出，“我认为我们必须认真考虑一些更大胆的，转型性的选项。 ”


Kashkari is now proposing exactly the right approach: to hold public conferences and extensive discussions to evaluate whether large banks should be broken up, whether they (and other financial institutions) should be forced to fund themselves with more equity and less debt, or whether there should be a debt tax to discourage excessive leverage.	卡什卡利目前提议采用一个完全正确的手段：举行公众会议和广泛的讨论以评估大型银行是否应该被分拆，是否这些银行（以及其他金融机构）应被强制留置更多资产并承担更少债务，或者是否应该征收债务税以遏制过度杠杆。


The first conference will be on April 4 (I will be one of the speakers).	第一次会议定于4月4日召开（而笔者也是演讲者之一）。


Kashkari is just one of 12 presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks.	卡什卡利只是地区性联邦储备银行的12位总裁之一。


And he sits on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which sets monetary policy – but not on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which oversees bank regulation.	他同时担任联邦公开市场委员会委员，负责制定货币政策——但不是在负责监督银行监管的联邦储备系统理事会。


Still, his call for an evaluation of the TBTF problem will have a major impact for three reasons.	但他要求评估大而不能倒问题的呼吁将产生重大的影响，原因有三：


First, the views he expresses are entirely sensible and mainstream, based on deep experience (his and others) with this and other financial crises.	首先，他表达的意见完全合理并符合主流，并构建于（他和其他人）对这场和其他金融危机的深厚经验之上。


Kashkari is presenting from a position of authority a message that many other reasonable people have been trying to convey for nearly a decade.	卡什卡利运用自身所处的权威角色，传达了许多其他理性的人们在近十年来一直在试图传达的信息。


Second, Kashkari has articulated – in appropriate central-bank language – precisely the same view that the remaining Democratic presidential candidates are putting before the voting public.	其次，卡什卡利所阐述的——以适当的央行语言——与余下的民主党总统候选人在选民面前提出的观点完全相同。


Hillary Clinton has a detailed and thoughtful plan for financial reform, with emphasis on taxing leverage and increasing capital requirements.	希拉里·克林顿为金融改革提出了一项细致周到的计划，将重点放在对杠杆征税并提高资本金要求上。


Bernie Sanders would prefer to break up the banks.	伯尼·桑德斯则倾向于分拆银行。


But the goal is the same; and, as Kashkari points out, any of these tools can potentially get us to a better place.	但目标是相同的;正如卡什卡利所指出的那样，任何这些工具都有可能让我们到达一个更好的境地。


When reasonable Republicans and Democrats begin to converge on policy, we are more likely to get sensible change.	当理性的共和党和民主党人开始在政策上趋同时，我们就更有可能实现合理的变革。


Third, Kashkari’s timing coincides with the arrival of new “blockchain” technology, which makes it possible to organize financial transactions in a more decentralized way.	第三，卡什卡利提出手段的时机与新“区块链（blockchain）”技术的到来恰巧同步，使得人们可能以更分散的方式来组织金融交易。


Various versions of this technology are either already available or currently under development – and there is a very real prospect that this will reduce transaction costs across much of the financial sector.	这种技术的各种版本要么已经面市要么正在开发——而且都有着一个非常真实的前景，将降低大多数金融行业的交易成本。


We do not yet know which version will prevail, and there is active discussion about how to ensure that the new standards and systems enhance stability, rather than (as with some previous financial innovations) producing unpleasant unintended consequences.	我们还不知道哪个版本会最终通行，同时也有关于如何确保新标准和系统得以增强稳定性，而不是（与以前的一些金融创新那样）产生不愉快的意外后果的热烈讨论。


Most important, blockchain technology has the potential to reduce substantially, or even eliminate, the value of being a trusted intermediary such as a large bank.	最重要的是，区块链技术有潜力去大幅减少——或甚至消除——那些可信中介机构（如大型银行）的存在价值。


And yet the big banks themselves are pouring money into this technology – presumably hoping to save at least some part of their business by limiting the degree of ultimate decentralization.	而大银行本身也在大量注资这类技术的研发——大概是希望通过限制最终放权的程度以挽救它们自身的一部分业务。


Kashkari will lead the way to rethinking – and, one hopes, ending – the TBTF problem in traditional big banks.	卡什卡利将带领我们去反思——并希望能结束——传统大型银行的大而不能倒问题。


In a blockchain world, he and his colleagues are likely to work hard to prevent any variant of TBTF from reappearing.	在区块链的世界里，他和他的同事们会努力工作，以防止任何大而不能倒的变体死灰复燃。


Block Thinking	思维一律


“Multiculturalism” has become a suspect term almost everywhere in the world nowadays, and particularly in Europe.	“多元文化”在当今世界的每一个地方，尤其是在欧洲，几乎成了可疑的代名词。


People say things like: “I used to be for openness and toleration of difference, but now I see where it’s leading.”	人们会说：“我曾经对不同的文化抱有开放以及宽容的态度，但是现在我看到它正引向何方了。


But where is it leading?	”但是它 正 引向何方呢？


Almost every reason for toleration’s apparent fall into disrepute concerns Islam.	几乎所有从宽容明显跌落到声名狼藉的原因都与伊斯兰教有关。


Even simple requests, like that of schoolgirls to wear headscarves in class, are suddenly freighted with immense political significance and treated as issues that must be resolved at the highest level of government.	甚至是简单的要求，就像女学生在班上戴头巾，都突然被装载了重大的政治性，并且被当成是必须由最高层的政府来解决的问题。


People – and their elected leaders as well -- often have the feeling that such seemingly innocent proposals are in fact part of an ominous “hidden agenda.”	人们以及他们选举出的领导人常常认为这些貌似清白的提议实际上是某个不祥的“暗藏的动机”的一部分。


That agenda is “Islam,” which many imagine to include all the terrible things that we can read about in the press every day: the stoning of adulterous women under Sharia law in northern Nigeria, the amputation of thieves’ hands in Saudi Arabia, honor killings of women who refuse arranged marriages in Pakistan (or even northern English cities like Bradford and Manchester), the willingness to justify suicide bombings.	那个动机就是“伊斯兰教”，许多人想象它包含了我们每天从媒体上读到的所有恐怖的事情：在尼日利亚北部根据伊斯兰教教法用石头砸死通奸的女人，在沙特阿拉伯砍下小偷的手，在巴基斯坦（或者甚至英国北方的城市，像布拉德福德和曼彻斯特）杀死拒绝接受包办婚姻的女人，为自杀性人体炸弹辩护的意愿。


If you reply that the girls who want to wear headscarves to school aren’t living in Nigeria or Saudi Arabia, and almost certainly don’t share the extreme Wahhabi views found in those countries, you will be met with a look of almost indulgent pity, a look of the type reserved for the terminally naïve.	如果你回答说想要戴头巾去上学的女孩并非生活在尼日利亚或沙特阿拉伯，并且几乎肯定不会持有在那些国家存在的瓦哈比教派的极端观点，你肯定会被回以一种几乎是宽容地怜悯的目光，一种为不可救药地天真的人保留的目光。


Or you will be told stories about how Saudi trained imams are twisting the girls’ arms, turning them into unwilling stalking-horses for “Islam.”	或者你会被告知沙特受过训练的伊玛目怎样扭住女孩子的手臂，把她们变成“伊斯兰教”不情愿的掩饰物的故事。


Indeed, it is virtually impossible nowadays to talk about headscarves as an issue in its own right.	事实上，今天要按其本来面目谈论头巾完全是不可能的事情。


All the sociological evidence about the girls’ motives, which are in fact very varied, is swept aside as irrelevant.	所有有关女孩子动机的社会学证据，事实上它们各不相同，因其不相干而被置之不理。


All that matters is the threat posed by Islam.	人们唯一关心的是伊斯兰教所带来的威胁。


This is a classic example of what I call “block thinking,” which seems to have made huge strides in Europe in recent years.	这正是我所称之为“思维一律”的典型例子，这种现象近些年在欧洲蔓延得非常快。


John Bowen’s recent book Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves documents this shift.	约翰·鲍文的近作《为什么法国不喜欢头巾》就记录了这种转变。


Block thinking fuses a varied reality into one indissoluble unity, and in two ways.	思维一律把各不相同的现实都融进一个牢不可破的联合体中，用的两种方式。


First, different manifestations of Islamic piety or culture are seen as alternative ways of expressing the same core meaning.	第一种是对伊斯兰教的虔诚或文化的不同表现被看成是以不同的方式表达了同一核心理念。


Second, all Muslims are then seen as endorsing these core meanings.	第二种方式是所有的穆斯林人都被看成是支持这些核心理念的。


The possibility that a girl wearing a headscarf might in fact be rebelling against her parents and their kind of Islam, and that others might be deeply pious while being utterly revolted by gender discrimination or violence, is lost from view.	一个女孩佩戴头巾事实上可能是对她父母以及 他们 所奉行的那种伊斯兰教的反抗，而另一些女孩可能对伊斯兰教非常虔诚同时对性别歧视或暴力极度反感。 但是人们从来不去关心这些可能性。


Block thinking is an age-old phenomenon, and we all do it to some degree.	思维一律的现象早已有之，并且我们每个人都有某种程度的思维一律。


But, while in another age we might have been indulgent about its consequences, today it has explosive potential, because people who think in this manner are prime recruits for seeing the world in terms of Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations.”	但是，在另一个时代我们也许会很宽容它所带来的后果，今天它却可能带有爆炸性的潜在力量，因为以这种方式思考的人最有可能按照萨默尔·亨廷顿的“文明冲突论”的观点来看这个世界。


What’s worse, the way such people then act tends to edge us closer to Huntington’s nightmare scenario.	更糟糕的是，以这种方式思考的人随后采取的行动会更把我们推向亨廷顿所描绘的恶梦般的局面。


By treating all the varied segments of Islam as nothing more than parts of a unified threat to the West, they make it harder for Muslims to stand out and criticize their own block thinkers – people like Osama bin Laden, who are building their own unified enemy, composed of “Christians and Jews.”	他们把持有不同观点的所有伊斯兰教徒都统统看成是对西方的威胁，使得穆斯林更难站出来批评他们自己的思维一律者——就像本·拉登，后者正在树立他们自己的由“基督教徒和犹太教徒”组成的联合敌人。


Block thinkers on each side give aid and comfort to block thinkers on the other side, and with each exchange they pull us closer toward an abyss.	两方的思维一律者都给另一方的思维一律者以援助和安慰，而伴随这边每一次变动他们把我们推向了更深的深渊。


So how can we stop this madness?	那么我们怎样才能制止这种极度愚蠢的思维方式呢？


Block thought persists in part because its critics on each side are unknown to those on the other side.	思维一律者之所以如此顽固部分是因为一方对其的批评者并不为另一方对其的批评者所知晓。


Indeed, how many times does a critic of European block thought meet this kind of response: “But where are the Muslims who are criticizing extremist Islam?”	事实上，欧洲思维一律者的批评者经常会碰到这样的回答：“但是哪里有批评极端伊斯兰的穆斯林呢？ ”


Of course, one isn’t likely to meet them in the drawing rooms of Paris journalists or the wider European professional political class.	当然，你不太可能在巴黎记者或者更广泛的欧洲职业政治阶层的客厅里碰到他们。


But explaining that to block thinkers will never have the impact of a real connection to the multi-faceted discourse that is actually taking place on the other side.	但是对思维一律者解释这一点永远不会起到让他们真正接触在另一面真实发生着的多层面的讨论那样的作用。


The real question, then, is this: Where are the crossover figures who can provide that urgently needed connection?	那么，真正的问题就是：能够提供迫切需要的接触的横跨两面的人在哪里呢？


BMW\u0027s and Chinese Justice	BMW与中国的司法公正


In most places, the name "BMW" implies luxury and exclusivity.	在世界的大多数地方，"BMW" 代表着华贵奢侈和与众不同。


But in China, the brand has unwittingly found itself enmeshed in tales that illustrate the powerlessness of ordinary Chinese against the powerful and corrupt.	但在中国，这一品牌却无意间卷入了一些非常事件。 这些事件反映了普通的中国老百姓面对权势和腐败的无奈。


The first scandal occurred last year, after a tractor filled with green onions scraped the side of a BMW in Harbin.	第一桩丑闻发生在去年的哈尔滨，其起因是一辆满载着大葱的拖拉机与一辆BMW擦挂。


The drivers of both the tractor and the metallic-silver luxury car were 45-year-old women, but any similarity between them ended there: the former was a peasant, the latter the wife of a wealthy businessman.	拖拉机和镀着银灰色金属漆的豪华轿车的驾驶者都是45岁的妇女，但她们之间的共同点也仅止于此了：前者是位农妇，而后者则是一位富商之妻。


After a confrontation between the two, the wealthy wife drove her BMW into the growing crowd of spectators on the roadside, killing the peasant woman and injuring 12 others.	在一番对峙之后，富商之妻驾车冲进街沿上越来越多的围观者，将农妇当场撞死并撞伤了12个围观者。


The case went to the local court, where the judge ruled it an "accidental traffic disturbance" and gave the driver a two-year suspended sentence.	这一案件在地方法院进行审理，法官的判决结果是"意外扰乱交通秩序"，撞人者被判入狱两年并缓期执行。


The judge's ruling spurred rumors that he went easy on her because her husband was related to senior provincial officials.	法官的判决使得流言四起，其内容都是说法官对肇事者手下留情是因为此人的丈夫与省里的高官有关系。


It quickly became a story of "rich versus poor," widely cited as an example of high-level corruption.	该案很快就演变成一个"富对贫"的故事并被人们广泛引用为高层腐败的写照。


Over the next few months, newspapers and television stations ran with the story as it snowballed into a national obsession.	在接下来的几个月里，由于报纸和电视台对该事件滚雪球般地报道使其成为一个全国上下共同关注的话题。


Alarmed by the public reaction, the Harbin magistrate ordered the case reopened, only to have the suspended sentence confirmed when the case was closed this March.	在公众舆论的压力下，哈尔滨地方法院重新开庭审理了该案，但在今年三月结案时的结论也只是维持缓刑的原判。


The big BMW story of late 2003 resurfaced quietly, before being buried again forever.	此时，另一个发生在2003年末的，与BMW相关的事件也在几乎永远退出公众视线之前，再次悄然浮现。


That same month, a lottery scandal threw the BMW brand into the limelight once again.	就在同一个月，一桩彩票抽奖丑闻再一次让BMW这一品牌成为公众关注的焦点。


Lottery officials in Shaanxi province rejected a winning ticket, calling it a fake and denying its bearer, a 17-year-old security guard named Liu Liang, the grand prize of a $58,000 BMW and 120,000 yuan ($14,510) in cash.	陕西省负责彩票发行的官员以造假为由拒绝兑现一张中了头奖的彩票。 这张彩票的持有人是17岁的保安刘亮，他应获的奖品是一辆价值58，000美金的BMW轿车和120，000元现金（约合14，510美金）。


Liu became so angry about being accused of fraud and denied the car that he climbed atop a high advertising billboard and threatened to jump as a show of innocence.	被控造假和领奖被拒使刘亮怒不可遏，以至于他爬上一块广告牌并威胁要纵身跳下以示清白。


But the story didn't end when police officers managed to talk him down.	但故事并没有以他被警察劝服而结束。


News broadcasts covered his continued insistence that he did not forge his ticket, along with the lottery center's claims that their rejection of the ticket was legitimate.	新闻媒介仍报导着他坚持自己没有伪造彩票的事实和 彩票中心合法拒奖的声明。


The police finally stepped in and, after a careful investigation, announced that they had found the true criminal: Yang Yongming, a private businessman whom the local lottery administration had contracted to organize ticket sales.	警方终于介入了这一事件，并在一番仔细调查之后宣布查出了真正的祸首：杨永明，一个与当地彩票发行部门签约负责组织彩票销售的个体商人。


Yang had conspired with the government officials directing the lottery, who were arrested for malfeasance, to fraudulently obtain the top prizes.	杨与一些政府官员合谋操纵抽奖试图诈骗头奖奖品。 这些官员也因渎职而被捕。


In June Liu Liang finally got what he deserved - a BMW-325i sedan and a sincere apology from the lottery center.	在今年6月，刘亮终于得到了他应得的奖品-一辆BMW-325i型轿车和来自彩票中心的诚挚歉意。


If the first scandal was a tragedy, the second was more like a farce.	如果说第一桩丑闻是个悲剧，那么第二桩则更像是出闹剧。


But both offer keys to understanding contemporary Chinese psychology.	但两个事件都为我们提供了了解当代中国人心态的机会。


The outcry after the first BMW case was not really about the light sentence given to a rich woman, but about the lack of confidence ordinary people have in China's judicial system.	在第一桩BMW案发生之后，民间呼声并不在于法庭对富商之妻的判刑太轻而在于普通民众对中国的司法制度缺乏信心。


In China, power, money, and connections trump the law.	在中国，权力、金钱和关系凌驾于法律之上。


Even as they are becoming ever more litigious, many Chinese believe that they have no hope of securing justice against the powerful.	即便是在人们越来越习惯于诉诸法律的情况下，许多中国人也认为面对权势他们不可能获得司法公正。


The apathetic response of the dead peasant woman's husband to the $10,000 in compensation he received was telling.	这种心态从死亡农妇的丈夫在得到10，000美金的赔偿时无动于衷的反应中可见一斑。


"I don't care about the verdict and whether it is justice or not," he said.	他表示："我不在乎法院的判决，也不在乎它是否公正。 "


The most harmful consequence is the public's loss of trust in the system.	最为不利的后果是公众对司法体系丧失了信任。


Social trust is not something you can buy with money.	社会信任不是用金钱可以买到的。


If an entire society believes that you cannot depend on legal rights for protection - that one must instead rely on a web of relationships with those who have power and influence - questions about whether such a society is livable or desirable will remain.	如果整个社会都认为不能依靠法律维权-而必须依靠与那些有权有势的人所建立的关系网-那么这样的社会是否是人们愿意归属的社会就成为一个问题。


Similarly, in the second BMW case, people didn't blame a corrupt businessman; they ascribed culpability to the lottery center, a government body.	同样，在第二桩BMW案中，人们没有谴责一个腐败的商人； 他们将过失归咎于彩票中心，一个政府机构。


So instead of mistrusting one person, they grew suspicious of an institution - even of government itself.	因此他们开始怀疑一个机构，而不是某位个人-他们甚至怀疑政府本身。


When a stubborn teenager went up against the mighty lottery authority with its army of auditors and inspectors and initial alibis, this individual, not the system, was the clear winner of the public's admiration.	所以，当一位执拗的青年孤身挑战拥有众多审计员、公证员和借口的彩票机构时，让人们钦佩的真正胜利者就是他这个人，而不是司法制度。


Liu Liang may have been just a working-class kid, but there was wisdom in his words that there is still a "silent majority" who can affect the workings of China's fragile society.	刘亮或许只是一个工人阶层的小孩，但他的话语中却透出睿智。 他说仍然有一群"沉默的大多数"可以影响脆弱的中国社会的运转方式。


He refused to settle privately, because he believed that if he let corrupt government officials off the hook, "they'll keep scamming the public."	他拒绝了私下调解，因为他相信如果他放过了腐败的政府官员，"他们会继续欺骗公众。


Thanks to his perseverance and the media's investigation, the fraud was laid bare.	"在他的不懈努力及媒体的调查下，这场骗局终于真相大白。


Power corrupts everywhere, but individuals in China such as Liu have come to form a countervailing force.	权力的腐败随处可见，但像Liu这样的个体的中国人已经形成了一股与之对抗的力量。


Even so, such marginal forces do not yet constitute a system for redressing grievances.	可即便如此，这种边缘的力量还没有能形成一种纠正社会不公的制度。


While pop music fans in China can listen to whatever they like, including Madonna singing "I'm gonna shake up the system," ordinary Chinese need courage to speak such messages aloud.	中国的流行音乐爱好者们能够听任何想听的音乐，包括麦当娜所唱的"我会动摇整个体制"。 普通的中国人也需要勇气呐喊这样的讯息。


As one saying goes, "There is not want of conscience in Chinese, but there is want of courage."	有一句话说得好："中国人现在需要的不是良知，而是勇气。 "


From Bubbles to Bridges	从透明罩到桥梁


LONDON – As the season in which public companies hold their annual general meetings progresses, one persistent issue is the lack of genuine dialogue between company officials and the general public.	伦敦—随着上市公司年度股东大会召开季的推进，一个一直存在的问题是公司官员和大众之间缺乏真正的对话。


In place of robust debate and discussion among investors, executives, the workforce, and the community at large, the conversation seems to be taking place in different silos, with one group sitting around the boardroom table and another gathered at the kitchen table.	在投资者、高管、员工以及社区展开激烈争论和讨论的场合，都给人一种各说各的感觉，一群人围坐在董事会会议桌周围，另一群人则集中在餐桌四周。


From the outside, a boardroom is all too often viewed as a kind of bubble where big decisions that influence thousands of lives are made by faceless people.	从外部看来，董事会常常像是一个透明罩，在这个罩子里，平庸刻板之士做出影响成千上万人生活的重大决定。


They are perceived as places where big bonuses are awarded to chief executives and where horse-trading and old boy networks are more important than merit or hard work.	人们对董事会的印象是，在这里，大笔奖金被授予高管； 讨价还价和人际关系比功绩和努力工作更重要。


With people outside the boardroom increasingly demanding to hold those inside it to account, opening up avenues of communication is now critical to companies’ long-term success.	随着董事会外部人日益要求能够问责董事会成员，开启沟通渠道现已成为公司长期成功的关键。


An important feature of this shift will be the realization by high-profile executives that they can no longer afford to brush off criticism with the you-just-don’t-understand defense.	这一转变的一个重要特征将是高层管理人员认识到他们无法再用“你根本不懂”为借口将批评拒之门外。


When Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, said that he didn’t think that United States Senator Elizabeth Warren “fully understands the global banking system,” many were infuriated at the arrogant condescension of his pronouncement.	JP摩根大通CEO杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）说他认为美国参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren ）并不“完全明白全球银行体系”，结果马上导致许多人愤怒地谴责他的伪善（arrogant condescension）。


His words tapped into a wider feeling that CEOs are out of touch and unwilling, or unable, to respond to tough questions with sincere answers.	他的言辞引申出一种更广泛的感觉：CEO们“不食人间烟火”，不愿或无法就尖锐问题给出真诚的回答。


Even the widely respected investor Warren Buffett missed the mark when he said that Warren “would do better if she was less angry and demonized less.”	就连广受尊敬的投资者巴菲特也无法免俗，他说沃伦“如果少点怒气和妖魔化会更好。 ”


In the absence of genuine dialogue about issues like wage discrepancy, corporate social responsibility, data privacy, and a bonus culture that does not seem to provide the right incentives for hard work or to adequately penalize failure, worries and mistrust are guaranteed to fester.	在工资差异、企业的社会责任、数据隐私以及无法提供正确的努力工作的激励或充分惩罚失败的奖金文化等问题上缺少真正的对话，难怪会产生担忧和不信任。


Lack of transparency, absence of clarity, and a paucity of answers feeds into the perception that companies are too often engaged in dodgy dealings and can’t be trusted.	透明度不足、缺少明确性，以及缺少答案催生了一种感觉：公司常常进行可疑的交易，无法信任。


Worst of all, the breakdown in communication deprives those around both the boardroom and kitchen tables of the opportunity to realize that they are talking about similar problems and share similar desires to find solutions to them.	最糟糕的是，沟通破裂让董事会和餐桌的人都失去了认识到他们在讨论类似的问题，有着类似的找到这些问题解决办法的渴望的机会。


Chief executives and board chairs need to think of those with whom they interact as people to talk with rather than at.	高管和董事需要将与他们互动的人当成是对话者而不是听众。


Leaders who can talk are fine; but those who can listen are even better.	能说的领导人固然好，但懂得听的领导人更优秀。


Business executives need to realize that if they cannot explain their decisions in ways that investors, regulators, workers, and consumers can understand, then they – not the people with whom they are talking – are the problem.	企业高管需要认识到，如果他们不以投资者、监管者、工人和消费者能够理解的方式解释他们的决策，那么他们——而不是他们的对话者——才是问题。


When activist investors want to take a look at a company, the boardroom instinct should not be to circle the wagons and call in consultants to do battle.	当积极投资者希望探一探公司究竟时，董事会的本能不应该是结成利益共同体，召集顾问对付积极投资者。


Instead, boards and executive teams need to ask themselves why their company has become a target and whether there are legitimate concerns to be addressed.	相反，董事会和高管团队需要扪心自问，随什么他们的公司会成为目标，是否存在合理的疑虑需要解决。


Annual general meetings provide an ideal opportunity to stand up and ask hard questions – an opportunity that investors and community members should make certain is not wasted.	股东年会提供了理想的机会直面和回答尖锐问题——投资者和社区成员应该确保这一机会不被浪费。


At Yahoo!’s recent annual meeting, the board was asked a wide range of questions; but, with the exception of a question or two about Alibaba, few of them addressed any of the real issues facing the company today.	在最近的雅虎年会上，董事会被问及一系列问题； 但是，除了一两个与阿里巴巴有关的问题外，董事会几乎没有解决任何公司现在所面临的实际问题。


CEO Marissa Mayer was asked questions like why the “underline” icon had been removed from the formatting options in Yahoo! Mail and why there was so much spam in Yahoo!	CEO玛丽萨·梅耶（Marissa Mayer）被问及的问题包括为何雅虎邮箱取消了格式选项中的“下划线”图标、雅虎财经为何有如此多的垃圾邮件等。


Finance. If companies like Yahoo! are to benefit from occasions like this, individual and institutional investors alike need to up their game and ask real questions about the business in the open forum of the annual general meeting instead of airing their concerns behind closed doors.	如果雅虎这样的公司想从这样的场合中获益，个人和机构投资者需要动真格，在股东年会这样的开放论坛中问问真正触及业务的问题，而不是只在闭门会议中提出疑虑。


For the conversation to be truly effective, however, it must continue between annual meetings.	但是，对话要想真正有效，就必须在年会间隔期间继续展开。


Smart business leaders must provide frequent opportunities for the exchange of ideas and expressions of concern.	聪明的企业领袖必须经常提供机会交换观点和关注。


Silos must be knocked down and bubbles must be pierced, with bridges being built in their place.	各说各的情况必须打破，透明罩必须戳穿，架设沟通的桥梁。


Tomorrow’s successful executives will be those who take the opportunity to join a real conversation and draw wisdom from the crowd.	未来的成功高管将是那些抓住机会参与真正对话并从群众中汲取智慧的人。


The Age of Bobby Fischer	博比·费舍尔的时代


CAMBRIDGE – The brilliant new Hollywood movie “Pawn Sacrifice” portrays the life of tormented chess genius Robert James “Bobby” Fischer from his early days as a prodigy to his historic 1972 match, at age 29, with Russian world champion Boris Spassky.	美国剑桥—好莱坞新大片《弃卒》（Pawn Sacrifice）讲述的是国际象棋天才“博比”罗伯特·詹姆斯·费舍尔（Robert James “Bobby” Fischer）跌宕起伏的一生，从传奇般的早年岁月到1972年29岁与俄罗斯世界冠军鲍里斯·斯帕斯基（Boris Spaasky）的历史名局尽在其中。


Actor Toby Maguire portrays Fischer with remarkable authenticity – indeed, pitch-perfect for those of us who met Fischer in his prime.	影星托比·马奎尔（Toby Maguire）的表演足以以假乱真——对我们这些目睹费舍尔全盛期的人来说，马奎尔的表演可谓完美演绎。


The film depicts a match that became a signature event in the Cold War between Russia and the United States.	影片讲述了一个已成为冷战期间俄美标志性事件的对局。