Fine, but what happens to people, like the poor of hurricane-struck New Orleans, who don’t own boats?	似乎有理，但那些没有船的人们又会怎样呢？ 比如生活在被飓风袭击的新奥尔良的那些穷人？


Growing inequality would not be such a problem if governments could simply raise taxes on the rich and strengthen subsidies to the poor.	如果各国政府提高针对富人的税收并加强对穷人的补贴，那么��益扩大的不平等本来不会如此恶化。


Unfortunately, any country that taxes capital too aggressively will only succeed in chasing it to regions where the tax burden is lighter.	很不幸，任何一个对资本税负过重的国家，只会把资本驱赶到税负较轻的地区。


In a globalized world, national governments’ ability to tax potentially mobile factors of production is sharply circumscribed.	在一个全球化的世界，国家政府对潜在的流动性生产要素征税的能力已大打折扣。


The same mechanism that pours profits into the pockets of global corporations also prevents governments from claiming a larger share of the spoils.	使全球性大公司赚得盆满钵满的机制也同样阻止政府从这种攫取中分更大的一杯羹。


Unfortunately, the long-term trend towards ever-lower income shares for unskilled workers is likely to continue over the coming decades, as modern technology permeates the globe, and as emerging markets like China, India, Brazil, and Eastern Europe continue to integrate into global production.	不幸的是，随着现代技术在全球的渗透和中国、印度、巴西及东欧继续融入全球化的生产，非熟练工人工资减少的长期趋势在未来几十年中可能还要持续。


This is not to say that unskilled workers are actually being made worse off by globalization in absolute terms; the vast majority are actually breaking even or better.	这并不是说全球化使非熟练工人在绝对意义上变得更贫困； 实际上他们当中的大多数已经可以收支平衡，甚至更好。


But unskilled workers’ incomes are not keeping pace with overall economic growth, and the resulting social strains are a ticking bomb.	但非熟练工人的收入增长速度跟不上总体的经济增长，由此带来的紧张社会关系是一颗定时炸弹。


If so, then Hollywood’s cartoon-like caricatures of evil multinational corporations may some day seize mainstream consciousness, leading to political upheavals that shatter today’s social contract.	果真如此，那么好莱坞对跨国公司卡通式的描绘可能在某一天会赢得主流意识，并造成政治巨变，从而撕毁当今的社会契约。


That won’t be good for profits, or for the poor.	那对于得利者和穷人都没有好处。


Governments – and corporations – must find better ways to provide equal opportunity through improved education, broader financial markets, and other channels.	政府—和大公司们—必须寻求更好的方式，通过更好的教育，更广泛的金融市场和其他渠道提供平等机会。


Otherwise, globalization’s storyline may not proceed according to the script.	否则全球化的故事情节就可能会按剧本发展了。


Homeless at Home	境内无家可归者


Today, the United Nations estimates that 77 million people – more than 1% of the world’s population – are displaced within their own countries, having been forced to flee their homes by armed conflicts, violence, urbanization, development, and natural disasters.	今天，联合国估计有7700万人、也就是超过世界总人口的1%在他们自己的国内流离失所，他们因为武装冲突、暴力、城市化、开发项目和自然灾害等原因而被迫离开他们的家园。


This is more than the population of France, the United Kingdom, or Turkey.	其规模甚至超过了法国、英国或者土耳其的人口总数。


These people are not “refugees,” because they have not crossed an international border, but their experiences are often equally devastating.	这些人并不是“难民”，因为他们并没有跨越国境，但是他们的经历常常却是同等毁灭性的。


Today, the number of people who have been internally displaced by conflicts alone is twice that of refugees.	今天，单单因为武装冲突而在国内流离失所的人就是难民人数的两倍。


With the increasing pattern of internal, rather than international, armed conflicts, and the rising regularity of extreme weather events affecting millions of people, internal displacement poses an even greater challenge to future generations.	随着更多的是国内而不是国际武装冲突数量的增多以及影响数百万人的极端天气事件越来越频繁地爆发，境内流离失所问题对于我们的后辈提出了一个越来越严峻的挑战。


Uprooted from their homes and livelihoods, and traumatized by the violence or sudden disaster that forced them to flee, the displaced are often thrust into an extremely precarious future with few resources.	被迫放弃他们的家园和生计，受到迫使他们逃离家园的暴力冲突或突如其来的灾害所带给他们的精神创伤，流离失所者常常面对着资源稀缺、极度不安定的未来。


Think of the 15 million Chinese displaced following the Sichuan earthquake, the more than two million Iraqis uprooted within their country’s borders by sectarian and other violence, the 2.4 million displaced in Darfur, or the hundreds of thousands who have fled Mogadishu in the last year.	想一想在四川大地震后有1500万中国人流离失所，200多万伊拉克人因为宗派或其他性质的冲突而在他们国家里无家可归，达尔富尔有240万人流离失所，还有在去年有几十万人逃离了摩加迪沙。


In the last decade, those displaced by conflicts alone rose from 19 million to 26 million, with millions more displaced by disasters.	过去十年间，因为武装冲突而流离失所的人从1900万上升到了2600万，还有数百万的人因为自然灾害而流离失所。


The plight of these victims long went unrecognized, as governments and the international community alike failed to acknowledge their rights to protection and assistance.	这些受害者的困境在很长时间内一直无人关注，各国政府和国际社会都忽视了他们得到保护和帮助的权利。


In 1998, the UN issued Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which sets out these legal rights.	1998年，联合国发布了《关于境内流离失所问题的指导原则》，明确规定了这些人的合法权利。


Ten years on, what impact have the Principles had on displaced people’s lives?	十年过去了，原则对流离失所者的生活产生了什么样的影响呢？


The achievements are notable, if insufficient.	成绩是显著的，尽管也许还很不够。


We have raised awareness of the plight of the displaced, brought about changes in government policies, and raised billions of dollars to respond to their basic needs.	我们提高了对于流离失所者困境的认识，使政府改变了它们的政策，并且募集了几十亿美元用于满足他们的基本需求。


This has helped save countless lives.	同时它还帮助拯救了无数的生命。


Humanitarian efforts continue to be strengthened, including through a new rapid funding mechanism, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund.	人道主义努力不断得到加强，包括通过一个新的快速募资机制即联合国中央应急基金来实施的人道主义努力。


But for every gain we have made, enormous difficulties still remain.	但是尽管我们取得了很多成绩，我们依然面临着巨大的困难。


The number of those displaced by natural disasters is rising, as the adverse effects of climate change continue to mount.	由于气候变化的负作用持续递增，使得因为自然灾害而流离失所的人数在持续上升。


Nine of every ten recorded disasters are now climate-related.	在当前有记录的灾害中，有90%是与气候相关的。


As many as 50 million people around the world are estimated to be displaced each year by floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides.	据估计全世界每年有大约5000万人因为洪灾、飓风、海啸、地震和塌方而流离失所。


However sudden the initial displacement, the impact can last for generations, together with a long-term need for clean water, shelter, health care, and other basic services, as victims of Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 know from bitter experience.	尽管一开始流离失所可能是突如其来的，但是其影响可能会延续数代人，同时还面临对清洁水、住所、健康护理和其他基本服务的长期需求，正如1998年发生在中美洲的米奇飓风给其受害者所带去的痛苦经历。


Nor are rich countries immune.	富裕国家同样也不能幸免。


Two years after Hurricane Katrina, thousands of people remain in temporary shelters.	在卡特琳娜飓风发生两年后，依然有数以千计的人生活在临时住所内。


Moreover, violent armed groups, be they government-supported militias or rebel movements, increasingly embrace terror as a tactic to force civilians from their homes, as seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Iraq, and elsewhere.	此外，暴力武装组织，不管它们是政府支持的民兵还是反叛组织，都越来越多地把恐怖活动作为迫使平民离开他们的家园的一种战术，正如在刚果民主共和国、索马里、伊拉克和其他地方所发生的那样。


Millions of people remain impoverished, face discrimination, and suffer long-lasting trauma even after the guns fall silent.	即便在战火平息后，依然有数以百万计的人生活贫困、遭受歧视和承受着难以抹去的精神创伤。


Life in camps is demoralizing and ultimately dehumanizing.	难民营的生活会使人堕落，最终使人丧失人性。


The world rightly focuses on the tragedy in Darfur, but overlooks another four million Sudanese still displaced as a result of the north-south conflict, many of whom continue to live in terrible poverty in Khartoum slums or in makeshift camps across the country, with little opportunity to re-build their lives.	世界正确地关注了发生在达尔富尔的悲剧，但是却忽略了还有另外四百万苏丹人因为南北冲突而依然流离失所，其中很多人继续一贫如洗地生活在喀土穆的贫民窟或者遍布全国的临时难民营内，很难有机会再去重建他们的生活。


We must prevent displacement from occurring, and end it as quickly as possible.	我们必须防止流离失所问题的发生，并且尽可能快地结束它。


On the preventive front, countless lives can be saved by simple actions such as flood-proofing coastlines, or strengthening earthquake codes for hospitals and schools.	在防止问题发生这一方面，通过像修建防洪堤或提供医院和学校的防震标准这样简单的行动就可以挽救无数的生命。


Countries like Bangladesh and Mozambique have proven that disaster risk reduction and preparedness can be a life-saving investment.	孟加拉国和莫桑比克等国家已经证明降低灾害风险及为灾害做好准备是一项能拯救生命的投资。


In conflict situations, preventing displacement primarily requires political will.	在冲突情况下，防止流离失所问题的发生主要依靠政治意愿。


Those who forcibly displace civilians in violation of international law must be held accountable in order to deter others in the future.	那些违反国际法迫使平民流离失所的人必须为此承担责任，从而阻止其他人在未来再干同样的事。


States that are not involved in the conflict are also required to uphold the rights of the displaced, including the right to return to their homes wherever possible, and this must be addressed in peace agreements and enforced in peacekeeping mandates.	没有参与冲突的国家也应该被要求保护流离失所者的权利，包括在可能的情况下让他们回到自己的家园的权利，这些必须在和平协议中明确规定，并且在维和行动中予以实施。


So here’s the bottom line: conflicts will continue and natural disasters are growing in frequency and intensity.	形势归根到底就是，冲突���会继续发生，而自然灾害发生的频率和强度也会越来越高，要从根源上解决问题以及降低流离失所的影响，首先要关注受害者的声音。


Addressing the root causes and reducing the impact of displacement should start by heeding victims’ voices – their needs and wishes must be understood and their rights respected.	他们的需求和愿望必须被理解，他们的权利必须得到尊重。


The international community can help. But national authorities must lead.	国际社会对此可以提供帮助，但是各国政府必须起带头作用。


Ten years after the Guiding Principles were signed, the time for excuses and inaction has run out.	在指导原则签署十年后，再做任何辩解或者无动于衷是不会再让人接受的。


Homeless in Iraq	伊拉克的无家可归者


BAGHDAD -- American officials report that the number of sectarian and other killings in Iraq has declined since the onset of the military “surge.”	美国官员报告说在伊拉克因为教派冲突和其他原因伤亡的人数自从增兵计划实施以来已经开始下降了。


But, while the number of killings may, indeed, have fallen, does that mean Iraq is really safer?	但是，即便伤亡的人数真的下降了，这是否意味着伊拉克变得更安全了呢？


Insecurity in Iraq is most strikingly illustrated by the number of people fleeing their homes.	最能表现伊拉克的不安全的是逃离家园的民众的惊人数目。


The United Nations estimates that, since July, the number has risen by 60,000 every month.	联合国估计自七月份以来这一数目正以每个月6万人的幅度增长。


The best estimate is that around 16% of Iraq’s population, or one in six Iraqis, no longer live in their homes.	精确的估算是伊拉克大约16%的人口，或者六分之一的伊拉克人，已经不再居住在他们的家园里。


Roughly half of those who have fled have also left the country, implying two million refugees.	在这其中大约有半数逃离家园的人离开了他们的国家，这意味着有二百万的难民。


This leaves another two million who have been displaced internally, and who represent an emerging humanitarian tragedy.	还有另外二百万人成为留在国内的难民，带来了一个日益严重的人道主义悲剧。


There have been international reports and fundraising campaigns to support Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan, but the internally displaced have received less attention, despite their greater vulnerability, owing to their proximity to the conflict and the poor standard of basic services in Iraq.	现在有许多国际报道和募集资金的活动来支持流落在叙利亚和约旦的伊拉克难民，但是流落国内的难民却很少受到关注，尽管他们因为更贴近冲突以及伊拉克基本服务设施的糟糕水平而更容易受到伤害。


They tend to be less visible, and it is more difficult for donors and agencies to assist them.	他们不太容易引起人们的注意，并且捐献者和机构要去帮助他们也显得更加困难。


Internal displacement predates the 2003 Iraq invasion.	国内难民在2003年入侵伊拉克之前就已经存在了。


During former President Saddam Hussein’s rule, large numbers of people were forcibly relocated through either conflict or government policy.	在前总统萨达姆的统治下，大量民众因为冲突或政府的政策而被迫搬到新的地方。


Since 2003, displacement has affected all the peoples of Iraq, and the central reason remains the same – the use of violence to expel people from an area with the aim of increasing political and economic power.	自从2003年以来，伊拉克所有的民众都深受流离失所的影响，其中心原因都在于使用暴力迫使人们离开某个地方以提高政治和经济力量。


Mixed neighborhoods across Iraq have been targeted by one side or another as sectarian violence has risen and local militias wield power.	伊拉克各地有多个教派生活在一起的地区在教派冲突升级和地方民兵组织行使权力的情况下成为一方或另一方的攻击目标。


The inability of the government or the multi-national force to curb this intimidation reflects the absence of the rule of law.	政府和多国部队无力制止这种威胁反映出法制的缺失。


Other factors causing displacement include operations of the multinational force itself, crime, the lack of basic services, and desperate poverty.	其他造成民众流离失所的因素包括多国部队本身的军事行动、犯罪、缺乏基础服务设施和极度的贫穷。


The complexity of Iraq’s society and history means that many people have been displaced more than once, or have returned from exile only to become internally displaced.	伊拉克社会和历史的复杂性意味着许多人曾不止一次流离失所，或者从流亡国外回来后依然在国内无家可归。


According to the UN, 69% of those displaced since February 2006 come from Baghdad, which demonstrates the extent of the “sectarianization” of the capital.	根据联合国的统计数字，2006年2月份后出现的难民中有69%来自巴格达，这表明首都“教派化”的程度。


Thus, one reason for the “success” claimed by supporters of the military surge may well be that sectarian cleansing in Baghdad has been hugely effective and is now nearly complete.	因此，支持增兵的人所欢呼的“成功”的原因之一可能就在于巴格达的教派清洗非常有成效并且已经接近于完成了。


Displaced Iraqis who remain in the country move to areas where their community is strong.	留在国内的伊拉克难民迁移到他们的部族势力较强的地区。


Displaced Shi’a tend to move from the center of the country to the south, Sunnis from the south to the center, and Christians to Nineveh province.	什叶派难民倾向于从这个国家的中部迁到南部，逊尼派从南部迁到中部，而基督教派迁到了尼尼微省。


In mixed cities such as Baghdad and Baquba, those forced to move gravitate towards newly homogenized districts.	在像巴格达和巴古拜这样有多个教派生活在一起的城市，那些被迫离开家园的人倾向于搬到新出现的教派单一的地区。


Most displaced people rent accommodation, stay with family or friends, or squat, while a smaller number take refuge in camps.	大多数流离失所的人租房子、与家人或朋友住在一起或者擅自居住在别人留下的空房子里，还有一小部分人住在难民营里。


There are big refugee camps in Kerbala, Wasit, Diyala, and Nineveh, but most of the displacement is urban rather than camp-based, and thousands of displaced families live in major cities such as Baghdad and Mosul.	在卡尔巴拉、瓦西特、迪亚拉和尼尼微等地都建有很大的难民营，但是大部分流离失所的现象都出现在城市里而不是难民营周围，还有数以千计流离失所的家庭生活在像巴格达和摩苏尔这样的大城市里。


These people now account for many of the eight million Iraqis who are in absolute poverty and in need of emergency assistance.	这些人构成了八百万处于赤贫状态并且需要紧急援助的伊拉克人中的大部分。


Education is minimal, health care is inadequate, and many die without even being accounted for.	教育少得可怜，健康护理很不够，许多人的死亡甚至没有给出什么解释。


Whereas between 25% and 40% of Iraqis may require food assistance at any given time, this figure is much higher for displaced people, owing to their poor access to the public distribution system.	尽管有25%至40%左右的伊拉克人在任何时候都需要食品援助，但是在难民中这一数字要高得多，因为他们很难得到公共分配体系分配的食品。


Only a third of the displaced had access to the system last year, while half reported receiving food rations only occasionally.	去年大约只有三分之一的难民得到过该体系分配的食品，还有一半的人报告说只是偶尔获得定量配给的食品。


It is a new phenomenon in Iraq to see people, particularly women and children, looking in the rubbish every day for something to eat.	伊拉克出现的一个新现象是人们，尤其是妇女和儿童，每天在垃圾堆里寻找吃的东西。


In such conditions, many young people feel they have little choice but to join violent groups, if only to provide some income and a level of protection.	在这种情况下，许多年轻人感到他们除开加入暴力团伙外别无选择，至少它们可以提供一些收入和一定程度的保护。


Female-headed households, in particular, face great difficulties in protecting and supporting their families.	由女性当家的家庭在保护和维系她们的家庭上尤其面临巨大的困难。


There are increasing reports of Iraqi women resorting to prostitution and of trafficking in women and children to neighboring countries.	现在已经有越来越多关于伊拉克妇女在妓院卖淫以及妇女和儿童被卖到邻国的报道。


The government recently announced the extension of a program of emergency cash allowances to widows.	政府最近宣布延长一项向寡妇提供紧急现金补贴的计划。


However, this is insufficient to help most of the three million widows, while corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency hamper efforts further.	然而，这对于帮助三百万寡妇中的大多数人是远远不够的，而腐败和官僚机构的低效率会进一步阻碍这种努力。


Another tragedy of the current conflict has been its impact on minority communities, which make up 10% of the population and are targets for eradication.	当前冲突所带来的另一个悲剧是它对少数民族团体的影��，后者占了总人口的10%并且常常成为种族灭绝行动的目标。


Violent attacks have caused a huge exodus, jeopardizing the existence of Christians, Yazidis, and Mandeans, who have lived in Iraq for hundreds of years.	暴力袭击使许多人移居国外，并且给基都教派、雅兹迪教派和曼德恩人的生存造成了巨大的威胁，这些人已经在伊拉克生活了好几百年了。


Despite the vulnerability of minorities, the religious breakdown of displaced people closely reflects that of the country: 64% Shi’a, 32% Sunni, and 4% Christian.	尽管少数民族容易受伤害，但是难民的宗教派别比例还是基本反映了这个国家人口的宗教比例：什叶派占64%，逊尼派占32%，而基督教派占4%。


But the ethnic breakdown of displaced people – 93% Arab, 4% Assyrian, and 1% Kurd – illustrates the grave insecurity in central Iraq and the relative stability of Kurdistan.	但是难民的种族比例——阿拉伯人占93%，亚述人占4%，库尔德人占1%，却反映出伊拉克中部严重的不安定以及库尔德地区相对的稳定。


With the prospects of return continuing to deteriorate, prolonged displacement may well become permanent.	随着回归家园的希望日益破灭，离开家园时间越长很可能就意味着永久的流离失所。


Should levels of displacement remain high, as appears likely, the humanitarian crisis may deepen further, especially because strained local resources have led some governorates to begin refusing to admit displaced people.	如果难民的水平继续保持在一个很高的水平，看上去情况很有可能会是这样，那这场人道主义危机将会进一步恶化，尤其是有限的地方资源使一些省份开始拒绝接收难民。


Their predicament, too, must be reflected in any calculation of Iraq’s security conditions.	他们的困境也必须被反映在任何对伊拉克的安全状况的衡量中。


Home Sweet Second Home	家园,令人神往的第二家园


Whenever I speak at finance and economics conferences around the world, I find that a great conversation starter with the spouses of the middle-aged business people who attend is to inquire about their vacation home.	每当我在世界各地的金融经济会议上演讲,都会发现和与会中年商人的配偶开始谈话的最佳话题是询问他们的度假住宅。


I then find myself entertained by stories of gorgeous ocean sunsets seen from the porch, views onto expanses of colorful wildflowers on mountainsides, and happy family reunions in beautiful seclusion (as well as problems with the plumbing).	接下来我会听到令人神往的故事，比如在自家门廊上观赏壮观的海上落日、山坡上大片大片五颜六色的野花，以及幽静美丽的环境中快乐的家庭团聚（此外还有各式各样的管道问题）。


Years ago, I never asked about vacation homes.	几年前，我从不询问度假住宅的情况。


They never seemed so much on people’s minds.	那时的度假住宅远没有如今这样受人关注。


Purchases of second homes for pleasure were confined to the rich, and thus did not seem quite so much of a conversation topic for the rank-and-file business people that I meet at such conferences.	为休闲娱乐购买第二住宅似乎是富人的专利，因此对于我在会上碰到的普通商人来讲并不是多有意思的话题。


But now the world is undergoing a second-home boom: an increasing number of people are buying vacation homes in beautiful and fun places that are within a few hours’ flying time from their first homes and jobs.	但如今第二住宅的势头正劲：越来越多的人在风景秀丽、令人神往的地方购买度假住宅，而后者一般离他们的工作和居住地点只有几个小时的航程。


Their second homes are a retreat where they will spend only a fraction of the year, and recently pristine mountain ridges and ocean cliffs are being dotted with new homes to meet the demand.	他们的第二住宅不过是度假地点，房主们一般只在一年中逗留很短的时间。 近年来，古朴的山脊和海边峭壁盖起了零零星星的宅邸，来满足人们日益增长的需求。


A study by the National Association of Realtors (NAR) indicates that 13% of all homes purchased in the United States in 2004 were vacation homes.	全美房地产经济协会进行的研究显示：2004年美国购房总量的13%是度假住宅。


This does not include buyers who purchased homes as investment properties, mostly to rent out.	这其中不包括投资目的的购买者，他们买房主要是为了出租。


According to the NAR, investment buyers account for another 23% of home sales, bringing second-home purchases to 36% of the total.	全美房地产经济协会透露，投资买家占购房总量的另外23%，结果是第二住宅的购买占到了购房总量的36%。


Some of the US counties with a high proportion of vacation homes are seeing price increases that rival, if not outstrip, the booming metropolitan areas.	度假住宅高度集中的地区房价迅速上涨，即便没有超过飞速发展的城市区域也已经相差无几。


For example, according to the Case-Shiller Indexes, home prices in the fashionable Cape Cod vacation area in Massachusetts soared 184% from 1997 to 2005, compared to the 131% increase in nearby Boston over the same period.	举例来讲，Case-Shiller指数显示：倍受欢迎的马萨诸塞州科德角度假区住宅价格从1997到2005年间上涨了184%，而离科德角不远的波士顿房价在同期的上涨幅度只有131%。


America is not alone.	这种情况并不是美国所独有。


Europeans are buying gemütliche Alpine ski chalets, glamorous condominiums with Mediterranean views in the South of Spain, and, increasingly, villas in picturesque sites in Turkey, Hungary, and Croatia.	欧洲人也在购买度假时居住的阿尔卑斯山滑雪小屋、西班牙南部俯瞰地中海美景的迷人公寓，以及越来越多位于土耳其、匈牙利和克罗地亚的景色如画的度假别墅。


Australians are buying oceanfront properties at the Sunshine Coast and the Whitsundays.	澳大利亚人则在阳光海岸和降灵岛购买滨海房产。


Japan’s vacation-home boom of the 1980’s has largely fizzled with its collapsing stock market and urban land market.	20世纪80年代日本的度假住宅市场已经由于股市和城市土地市场的崩溃而繁荣不再。


But even there, the market for vacation homes remains hot in places like Karuizawa, Lake Kawaguchi, and Hakone.	但即使在那里，轻井泽、河口湖和箱根等地的度假住宅市场也呈现一派繁荣景象。


Being able to afford a vacation home in beautiful surroundings may mean a lot to some people.	能够在优美环境中购置度假宅邸可能对有些人来讲有着重要的意义。


Indeed, sometimes the talk that I hear about these properties seems to integrate them into the true meaning of life.	实际上，有时我所听到的观点似乎把它们当成了人生的真正意义。


After all, where do we imagine that philosophers and poets and gurus live?	归根结底，我们想象中哲学家、诗人和教士住在哪儿？


In one of these captivatingly charming places, of course, and not as tourists in hotel rooms.	当然是在其中某个引人入胜的迷人所在，而不会像游客一样入住酒店的客房。


Most people who couldn’t possibly afford such a vacation home probably don’t miss it.	大多数买不起度假住宅的人并没有这样的愿望。


Craving one seems to be a desire, like fine wine, that one discovers only when one has substantial wealth.	对度假宅邸的渴望就像对美酒的向往，只有在具备了相当的经济实力后才会渐渐萌生。


So, as global economic growth continues, and as household incomes rise in today’s most populous emerging countries, demand – and thus prices – for vacation homes in beautiful places, either at home or abroad, will most likely soar.	因此随着全球经济持续增长，随着今天多数人口稠密的新兴国家家庭收入日益提高，对国内外风景名胜度假宅邸的需求，以及价格都很可能大幅飙升。


There is reason to worry about this.	对这种现象的担忧也不无道理。


Real GDP has been growing at around 3% a year in many advanced countries, and twice that or more in some emerging countries.	很多发达国家国内总产值的实际增长率约为每年3%，而某些新兴国家相应的数字是它的两倍或者更多。


Properties in beautiful places are likely to be what economists call “superior goods” – those goods that account for a higher proportion of consumption as incomes rise.	风景名胜的房产很可能被列为经济学家所谓的“高级商品”¾上述商品随着收入的增长在消费中占据了更高的比例。


With fixed supply, rents on these properties should increase at a rate equal to or above the rate of GDP growth.	由于供给有限，这些房产的租金应该以等同或者超过国内生产总值的速度增长。


Prices could increase much faster at times.	而在特定的时候，价格增长可能会迅猛得多。


On the other hand, in some places, a speculative bubble is fueling today’s boom in vacation-home prices.	另一方面，在某些地方，投机泡沫为今天度假住宅的价格飞涨火上浇油。


The vacation-home boom appears psychologically tied to the urban home-price bubble in many of the world’s “glamour cities,” and prices of these vacation homes are similarly vulnerable to a significant drop in coming years.	在世界各地的“魅力城市”，度假住宅的繁荣似乎在心理上与城市住宅的价格泡沫密切相关，而这些度假住宅的价格也同样可能在未来几年内经历大幅度的下降。


Moreover, there are plenty of ways for the construction industry to offer untold millions more people the opportunity to call some beautiful place home, simply by building more high-density and high-rise vacation apartment buildings there.	此外，建筑行业有各式各样的方法让无数人在风景胜地拥有自己的家，而他们所要做的不过是在当地建设更多高密度、高层次的公寓大楼。


Many of the single-family vacation mansions or low-density apartment buildings that are being built today will likely eventually be sold, torn down, and replaced with higher-density megastructures, boosting supply and thus easing pressure on prices of the remaining low-density vacation homes.	今天修建的很多供一家一户使用的度假宅邸或低密度��寓很可能最终会被出售、拆除、并代之以高密度的巨型结构。 这样一来不仅能扩大供给，还能够缓解剩余低密度度假住宅的价格压力。


Such higher-density construction must be the best possible outcome, for it will please the most people.	这种高密度建筑肯定是可能的最佳方案，因为它可以满足多数人的愿望。


Most vacationers seem to derive a sense of excitement from the presence of many other vacationers around them. Large numbers of people contribute to a holiday atmosphere and attract entertainment and sports industries.	多数度假者都由于身边其它度假者的存在而兴奋不已，因为人多能创造出一种节日气氛，吸引娱乐和体育行业的目光。


But, for many of those who imagine relaxing in a place that offers a quaint life of undisturbed beauty, there is a strong risk that prices will rise out of reach in future decades.	而对于很多偏好在不受打扰的美景中放松身心的人们来说，未来几十年中价格的变化很可能会让他们无法承受。


No economic strategy can change that, even if it produces spectacular GDP growth.	没有任何经济对策能改变这种状况，即便这种政策能带来可观的GDP增长。


Hope for Hong Kong	香港的希望


LONDON – Hong Kong’s democracy movement has gained admiration worldwide.	伦敦—香港的民主运动令全世界仰慕。


The principles, decency, and behavior of its youthful vanguard inspire confidence in the qualities of the generation that one day will run the great city.	香港青年先锋的原则、体面和行为让人们对未来执掌这座伟大城市的新一代充满信心。


That said, it is time to move on to a sensible endgame.	尽管如此，应该开始让这场运动明智地结束了。


The longer the standoff between Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and the demonstrators continues, the more likely it is that individual citizens – and Hong Kong itself – will be hurt.	香港特首与示威者的对峙进行得越久，个体公民——以及香港本身——就越有可能被伤害。


The Hong Kong government should demonstrate some statesmanship, which the so-called “Umbrella Movement” – occupying the moral high ground and not wishing to risk losing public support – would surely reciprocate.	香港政府必须表现出一些政治家风度，所谓的“雨伞运动”（Umbrella Movement，占据道德高地而不希望失去公共支持——定会有所回馈。


A substantive and successful dialogue with the government would not require the protesters to call off their campaign for democracy; it would simply end the current phase of a campaign that eventually will succeed.	与政府的真正的、成功的对话不会要求示威者停止民主运动； 而只是结束这场最终必将成功的运动的当前阶段。


Despite their protestations to the contrary, Hong Kong Chief Executive C. Y. Leung and his government have considerable room for maneuver.	香港特首梁振英及其政府尽管反对游行，但仍有很大的周旋空间。


As many Hong Kong citizens have argued, the Chinese government’s current position is based on a report, submitted by Leung’s officials, which purported to reflect accurately the outcome of local consultations on constitutional development.	许多香港公民认为，中国政府的当前立场基于梁振英官员所递交的报告，这份报告标榜正确反映了宪政发展的本地协商的结果。


But the report plainly understated the degree of public support for change.	但该报告显然低估了公共对变革的支持。


Given what has happened in the last few weeks, Leung could quite properly give a new report to the authorities in Beijing focusing on two issues not proscribed by Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law.	从过去几周的形势看，梁振英很有可能向北京当局递交了以香港宪法——《基本法》所未述及的两大问题为核心的新报告。


The first issue concerns not just the immediate question of the terms on which the Chief Executive will be elected in 2017, but also how the Legislative Council should be elected in 2016 and after.	第一个问题不但事关2017年特首如何选举的紧迫问题，也事关2016年及以后如何遴选立法会的问题。


The procedure is largely a matter for the Hong Kong government to decide.	该程序大体上将由香港政府决定。


It is surprising that 17 years after the handover of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China, Hong Kong still does not have a directly elected legislature.	香港主权回归中国已经17年，但香港仍没有直选的立法机构，这令人震惊。


In December 1992, Margaret Thatcher suggested in a speech in the House of Lords that, if all went well, Hong Kong could have universal suffrage by 2007.	1992年12月，撒切尔夫人在英国上议院讲话中指出，如果一切顺利，香港将在2007年实现普选。


Unfortunately, all has not gone well.	不幸的是，并非一切顺利。


The legislature today comprises a mix of directly elected members and those representing functional constituencies: corporate interests and groups of employees.	今天的立法会既有直选委员，也有代表功能选区的委员，包括公司利益和员工团体等。


Some civic groups have advocated increasing the number of directly elected legislators and opening up the functional constituencies to broader electorates.	一些公民团体要求增加直选立法委员的人数并扩大功能选区的基数。


Moreover, the brake that the functional constituencies can put on legislation should be scrapped, leaving decisions to a simple majority.	此外，功能选区在立法会拥有否决权的情况应该改变，让简单多数决定决策。


This could be accompanied by a pledge to create a legislature composed entirely of directly elected members in 2020.	相应地，可以承诺在2020年实现立法会委员全部由直选产生。


The second issue concerns the composition and the voting rules of the handpicked 1,200-member election committee that will choose the Chief Executive in the future.	第二个问题关注拥有1,200位精挑细选的委员、选择未来香港特首的选举委员会的组成和投票规则。


The current proposed arrangements would permit the Chinese government to veto any candidate that it did not like, prompting criticism that what is on offer is an Iranian-style election: “You can vote for anyone we choose.”	当前的安排方案规定中国政府可以否决任何它不喜欢的候选人，这助长了伊朗式选举的危机：“你们可以给任何我们所选择的人投票。 ”


The Hong Kong government could call for changes to increase the openness and fairness by which the Chief Executive is chosen, without abandoning its current method in favor of universal suffrage.	香港政府可以在不放弃支持普选的当前道路的情况下要求增加特首选择的公开性和公正性。


According to the Basic Law, the election committee should be “broadly representative” – a provision that the committee’s current composition violates.	根据《基本法》，选举委员会应该具有“广泛代表性”——而目前的组成情况违反了这一条款。


Its membership is chosen by only 7% of the total Hong Kong electorate, and its voting procedures seek to prevent the nomination of any candidates who may harbor democratic sympathies.	其成员由只占香港选民总数7%的人选出，其投票程序是为了阻止任何同情民主的候选人得到提名。


Since 1997, 55-61% of voters have voted for democratic candidates in Legislative Council elections.	自1997年以来，55—61%的投票者在立法会选举中支持民主候选人。


The last time a slightly smaller election committee met (to choose Leung), less restrictive constraints on candidate selection were in place, and the leader of the Democratic Party was able to be nominated (though he still received less than 7% of the vote).	上一次较小规模（选出梁振英）选举委员会会议上，实施了对候选人选择的较轻的限制，民主党（Democratic Party）领导人也能获得提名（尽管仍然只获得不到7%的选票）。


So Leung and his team should put forward proposals to broaden the electoral base of the election committee and open up the nominating process for candidates.	因此梁振英及其团队应该提出扩大选举委员会选基（electoral base）、开放候选人提名程序的方案。


There are plenty of recommendations from civil-society groups about how to accomplish these objectives.	公民社会团体提出了大量关于如何完成这些目标的建议。


Both sides will need to give a little to prevent the confrontation in the streets from escalating, with the police forced to provide a substitute for a sensible policy.	双方都需要做一些让步以阻止街头冲突升级——警察被迫成为明智政策的替代品。


The British government has said that it is important that “the people of Hong Kong have a genuine choice.”	英国政府说，“香港人民拥有真正的选择”至关重要。


Leung and his colleagues can give them one.	梁振英及其同事可以给予他们这一选择。


This would not be all that the Umbrella Movement has demanded, but it should encourage the protesters to reach a compromise without departing from their longer-term goal.	这也许不是雨伞运动的全部要求，但应该能够促使示威者在不偏离长期目标的情况下达成妥协。


That is why Leung should embrace dialogue and compromise.	这就是梁振英应该采取对话和妥协的原因。


Even a ruler whose mandate comes from heaven should heed the words of the Confucian sage Mencius: “Heaven sees with the eyes of its people.	即使是天授神权的统治者，也应该遵循孔孟之道：“天视自我民视，天听自我民听。


Heaven hears with the ears of its people.”	”


The Way Ahead in Hong Kong	香港的前途


LONDON – It is not wholly true to say that the eyes of the entire world are on Hong Kong.	伦敦—说全世界的目光都集中在香港，这有失偏颇。


They would be, of course, if people in mainland China were allowed to know what is happening in their country’s most successful city.	当然，如果中国大陆的人们被允许知道这个国家最成功的城市正在发生什么，他们的目光都会向香港集中。


But China’s government has tried to block any news about the Hong Kong democracy demonstrations from reaching the rest of the country – not exactly a sign of confidence on the part of China’s rulers in their system of authoritarian government.	但中国政府试图封锁一切关于香港民主示威的消息，阻止它们被中国其余部分获知——这决非中国统治者对其极权政府充满信心的信号。


Before suggesting a way forward for Hong Kong’s ham-fisted authorities, three things need to be made clear.	在给香港的愚蠢当局指出前路之前，有三点必须澄清。


First, it is a slur on the integrity and principles of Hong Kong’s citizens to assert, as the Chinese government’s propaganda machine does, that they are being manipulated by outside forces.	首先，如中国政府宣传机器所做的那样指责香港公民受外部势力操纵是对他们的正直和原则的污蔑。


What motivates Hong Kong’s tens of thousands of demonstrators is a passionate belief that they should be able to run their affairs as they were promised, choosing those who govern them in free and fair elections.	让数万香港示威者走上街头的是他们坚信他们应该像被承诺的那样获得管理自身事务的权利，自由、公平的选择谁来治理他们。


Second, others outside of Hong Kong have a legitimate interest in what happens in the city.	其次，其他香港之外的人对于香港的局势有合法利益在其中。


Hong Kong is a great international center, whose freedoms and autonomy were guaranteed in a treaty registered at the United Nations.	香港是一个伟大的国际中心，它的自由和自治受联合国注册在案的条约的保护。


In particular, the United Kingdom, the other party to this Sino-British Joint Declaration, sought and received guarantees that the survival of Hong Kong’s autonomy and liberties would be guaranteed for 50 years.	特别地，作为《中英联合声明》的另一方，英国要求并得到保证香港的自治和自由将50年不变。


So it is ridiculous to suggest that British ministers and parliamentarians should keep their noses out of Hong Kong’s affairs.	因此，认为英国政府和议会不应该掺和香港事务的观点是荒谬可笑的。


In fact, they have a right and a moral obligation to continue to check on whether China is keeping its side of the bargain – as, to be fair, it has mostly done so far.	事实上，他们有权利和道德义务继续监督中国是否遵守诺言——公平地说，到目前为止中国表现很好。


But, third, the biggest problems have arisen because of a dispute about where Hong Kong’s promised path to democracy should take it, and when.	但是，第三，最大的问题在于香港所获得的民主承诺是否应该兑现、如何兑现。


No one told Hong Kongers when they were assured of universal suffrage that it would not mean being able to choose for whom they could vote.	在香港被保证获得普选权时，没人告诉香港人这并不意味着他们能够选择他们可以投票的对象。


No one said that Iran was the democratic model that China’s Communist bureaucracy had in mind, with the Chinese government authorized to exercise an effective veto over candidates.	没有人说中共官僚体系的民主榜样的伊朗，因此中国政府可以对候选人行使实际否决权。


In fact, that is not what China had in mind.	事实上，中国并不是这么想的。


As early as 1993, China’s chief negotiator on Hong Kong, Lu Ping, told the newspaper People’s Daily, “The [method of universal suffrage] should be reported to [China’s Parliament] for the record, whereas the central government’s agreement is not necessary.	早在1993年，中国香港问题首席谈判官员鲁平告诉《人民日报》，“[普选路线]应该报[中国人大]备案，尽管不必获得中央政府同意。


How Hong Kong develops its democracy in the future is completely within the sphere of the autonomy of Hong Kong.	未来香港如何发展民主完全是香港自治权范���内的事务。


The central government will not interfere.”	中央政府不会干涉。


The following year, China’s foreign ministry confirmed this.	”第二年，中国外交部又确认了这一点。


The British Parliament summarized what had been said and promised in a report on Hong Kong in 2000.	2000年，英国议会在一份关于香港的报告中总结了中国说了和承诺了什么。


“The Chinese government has therefore formally accepted that it is for the Hong Kong government to determine the extent and nature of democracy in Hong Kong.”	“因此，中国政府正式接受应该由香港政府决定香港民主的程度和性质。 ”


So, what next?	那么，然后呢？


The peaceful demonstrators in Hong Kong, with their umbrellas and refuse-collection bags, will not themselves be swept off the streets like garbage or bullied into submission by tear gas and pepper spray.	香港的和平示威者，连通他们的雨伞和废品收集袋，不会自动像垃圾一样从街头扫走，或在催泪弹和胡椒喷雾的高压下屈服。


Any attempt to do so would present a terrible and damaging picture of Hong Kong and China to the world, and would be an affront to all that China should aspire to be.	这样做只能向全世界展示一幅可怕的、令人受伤的香港图景，与中国的利益完全背道而驰。


The Hong Kong authorities have gravely miscalculated the views of their citizens.	香港当局严重误判了民意。


Like the bad courtiers against whom Confucius warned, they went to Beijing and told the emperor what they thought he wanted to hear, not what the situation really was in the city.	和孔子所警告的佞臣一样，他们前往北京，捡皇帝想听的报告，并不如实上报香港的真实局面。


They must think again.	他们必须三思。


Under the existing plans, there is supposed to be a second phase of consultations on democratic development to follow what turned out to be a counterfeit start to the process.	根据现有计划，在现已证明徒有其表的民主进程起点之后应该有关于民主发展的第二阶段磋商。


Hong Kong’s government should now offer its people a proper second round of consultation, one that is open and honest.	香港政府现在应该向香港人民提供合适的第二轮磋商，一轮公开、诚实的磋商。


Dialogue is the only sensible way forward.	对话是唯一可行的进步之道。


Hong Kong’s citizens are not irresponsible or unreasonable.	香港公民负责又理性。


A decent compromise that allows for elections that people can recognize as fair, not fixed, is surely available.	达成允许人民认为公平而非内定的选举举行的积极妥协显然是可行的。


The demonstrators in Hong Kong, young and old, represent the city’s future.	香港的示威者，不论老少，代表着这个城市的未来。


Their hopes are for a peaceful and prosperous life in which they can enjoy the freedoms and rule of law that they were promised.	他们的希望是和平而繁荣的生活，让他们享有被承诺的自由和法治精神。


That is not only in the interest of their city; it is in China’s interest, too.	这不但符合香港的利益，也符合中国的利益。


Hong Kong’s future is the main issue; but so, too, is China’s honor and its standing in the world.	香港的未来是主要问题； 但中国的荣耀及其在世界的地位亦然。


Hong Kong Holds its Breath	香港屏住呼吸


Hong Kong's residents used to be branded as "apolitical."	曾几何时香港的居民以"不问政治"而著称。


But that description hardly seems appropriate nowadays.	而现在这样的描述却不再适用。


Since turning out to rally in record numbers on the anniversary of the handover to China in 2003, hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens have taken peacefully to the streets on various occasions to protest government decisions and demand political reform.	自从前所未有的人群出现在2003年回归纪念日的集会上，已有成千上万的香港市民在不同的场合以和平的方式上街游行以抗议政府的决策并要求政治改革。


But China's government clings to the belief that Hong Kong's people are not ready for democracy.	但中国政府坚持认为香港人还没有为民主政治做好准备。


In April 2004, China's legislators ruled out universal suffrage in Hong Kong's 2007 election of its chief executive, as well as for its 2008 Legislative Council election.	2004年4月，中国的立法者们取消了在2007年香港最高行政长官和2008年立法委员会选举中实施全民投票的计划。


They acknowledged that under the city's special constitution, the Basic Law, these elections could be the first opportunities for the territory to choose its representatives according to the principle of "one person, one vote."	他们承认在香港的特别宪法《基本法》的前提下，这些选举是该地区根据"一人一票"的原则选择自己代表的第一次机会。


But they expressed concern that major reform could undermine political stability and economic development.	但他们同时也对大刀阔斧的改革可能会影响政治稳定和经济发展表示担心。


Currently, all eyes in China are on Hong Kong's upcoming legislative election on September 12, which will indicate to Hong Kong's government and to China's leaders what people think about the pace and direction of reform.	目前，中国正时刻关注着香港即将在9月12日进行的立法会选举。 该选举会向香港和中国的政府反映民众对改革步伐和方向的态度。


A high turnout in favor of pro-democracy candidates is expected, although this won't guarantee them a majority in the legislature because of Hong Kong's unusual political structure.	亲民主的候选人获得较高的支持率是意料之中的，虽然由于香港特殊的政治架构这并不能保证他们在立法机构中获得多数席位。


For this month's election, Hong Kong's 3.2 million registered voters can elect only 30 of the 60 seats.	在这个月的选举之中，香港的320万注册选民只能选举出60个席位中的30个。


The pro-democracy camp is likely to win 22 seats of those 30 seats, which are based on five large geographical constituencies.	就5个大的地理选区的情况而言，亲民主的阵营很可能会赢得30个席位中的22个。


The other 30 seats, however, are chosen through functional constituencies, which represent specific interests, such as banks, insurance companies, stockbrokers, chambers of commerce, and transport operators.	但其余的30个席位则是通过功能性的选区选出。 这些选区代表着银行、保险公司、股票经纪、商会和交通业者等的具体利益。


Only 199,000 voters, some of them representatives from corporations, elect the legislators who fill these seats.	这些选区仅有包括大公司代表在内的199，000名选举人但却会决定这些立法者席位。


Some of these constituencies have only a few hundred voters and are easily controlled by a small number of vested interests.	有些这样的选区只有几百个选民因而容易被少数既得利益者控制。


Indeed, at the close of nomination on August 4, eleven functional candidates were chosen without opposition, including those representing banks and the Chinese chamber of commerce.	的确，在8月4日提名截止时，有11位候选人在无人反对的情况下获得提名，其中包括银行和中国商会的代表。


The British and Chinese governments in the 1980's designed Hong Kong's awkward political system during their negotiations over the eventual transfer of sovereignty.	中英两国政府在上世纪80年代关于香港主权的最终移交的谈判中为香港设计了这种尴尬的政治体制。


Its purpose was to ensure that the will of the public could not be fully expressed through the ballot box.	其目的就是确保民众的意愿不能完全通过投票箱表达出来。


After 1997, Hong Kong's government made doubly sure that legislators' already limited powers to initiate debates, legislation, and amendments to laws were further restricted.	在1997之后，香港政府进一步确保了立法者在引发辩论、立法和修正法律方面本已有限的权力被进一步削弱。


It imposed rules requiring majority support from members of functional constituencies as well as geographic constituencies to take such steps.	它制定规则，要求来自于功能和地理选区选民的多数支持来确保这些举措的实施。


So resistance to change is built into the system.	因此变革的阻力已经被内置与该体制当中。


If the government can influence 16 of the 30 functional votes, it can thwart proposals from the directly elected legislators.	如果政府能够影响30张功能选票中的16张，它就能阻碍由直选选出的立法者们所提出的议案。


This has happened with controversial issues concerning political reform and government accountability over the past few years.	这一点已在过去几年的政治改革和政府责任等颇具争议的问题上有所表现。


Yet no one should forget that on July 1, 2003, over 500,000 people protested because the government refused to allow more time to discuss proposed national security legislation.	然而没人应该忘记由于港府拒绝延长讨论国家安全法提案的时间致使50多万人在2003年7月1日举行游行示威。


Hong Kong's government felt it could ignore public opinion and push the bill through with a large majority of the functional members, plus a handful of directly elected pro-government legislators.	香港政府认为可以不顾民众意见，在大多数功能性立法委员和少数亲政府的直选立法委员的支持下强行通过该议案。


It only backed down when the pro-government Liberal Party, which held a number of functional seats, broke ranks as a result of intense public pressure.	直至拥有数个功能性席位的亲政府的自由党在强大的公众压力下乱了阵脚，港府方才作罢。


The Civic Exchange-Hong Kong Transition Project's latest survey results, from early August, recorded a sharp upturn in public protests over the past year.	Civic Exchange-"香港过渡计划"自8月初以来的最新民意调查显示公众抗议在过去的一年出现大幅提升。


It noted that people increasingly adopted informal means of expressing unhappiness with Hong Kong's government, because they did not think that formal channels were sufficient.	该调查结果反映出公众在认为正式渠道不足的情况下，更多地采取了非正式的方式来表达对香港政府的不满。


People began taking matters into their own hands by attending rallies, signing petitions, and donating to political parties and activist groups in unprecedented numbers.	人们开始以自己的方式寻求解决问题的办法。 其具体表现形式是参加集会、签名请愿和向政治党派和活动集团捐助的市民达到了前所未有的人数。


The survey also showed that although China's government ruled out universal suffrage in the 2007 and 2008 elections, over 40% of respondents still wanted democracy by then, with nearly 20% more wanting it by the next round of elections in 2011 and 2012.	该调查还显示虽然中国政府取消了在2007和2008年选举中实施全民投票的计划，仍有40%的被调查者希望在那时实现民主，另有20%的人希望民主能在2011和2012年的下一轮选举中实现。


Furthermore, the majority did not think democratization would hurt the economy, although there were clear concerns that political instability could arise from China's intervention in Hong Kong affairs.	虽然被调查者对中国干预香港事务可能引发的政治不稳定表示了明确的担忧，但大多数人都不认为民主化会损害香港经济。


China's government may well adopt a new Hong Kong policy after the election.	中国政府完全可能在选举之后采取新的香港政策。


The best case would be if China agreed to universal suffrage no later than the 2011 and 2012 elections, gaining legitimacy in Hong Kong by backing reform of the political system.	最佳的情况可能是中国同意最迟于2011和2012年的选举中实施全民投票，通过支持政治体制改革在香港赢得信任。


While China's rulers may fear losing control, they also need to recognize that the current system is causing intense discontent.	虽然中国的领导人们可能会担心失去对香港的控制，但他们也应该意识到现行体制正造成强烈的不满。


The worst case would be if China disregarded a decisive pro-democracy win in 2007 and 2008 and continued to insist that Hong Kong's people were unready for democracy or to allege foreign manipulation of the pro-democracy camp.	最糟的情况则可能是中国无视亲民主派在2007和2008年选举中的决定性胜利并继续坚持香港民众还没有准备好迎接民主的立场或宣称亲民主阵营被外来势力左右。


Hong Kong's people may well conclude that they have no alternative but to use every occasion to protest chief executive Tung Chee-hwa's unpopular government, making it even harder for him to govern.	而香港的民众则极可能认为他们别无选择只能用一切手段抗议特首董建华领导下的不受欢迎的政府，从而使其执政变得更为困难。


Hong Kong’s Independence Trap	香港的独立陷阱


LONDON – Nearly 40 years ago, when I visited Moscow for the first time, my initial reaction was surprise.	伦敦—近40年前，我第一次访问莫斯科，得到的第一反应是惊讶。


The hotels and restaurants were so poorly run that it seemed shocking that the military could be run competently enough to pose a genuine threat to the Soviet Union’s adversaries.	从饭店和餐馆经营不善的情况看，难以置信苏联的军事能够给敌人造成真正的威胁。


Yet we in the West feared the Red Army – and with good reason.	但我们西方人仍然忌惮红军——并且绝不是杞人忧天。


Hong Kong, my favorite city, sends the opposite message.	香港是我最喜欢的城市，它给我的印象完全相反。


Its restaurants are run with precision, and it boasts some of the world’s best hotels.	它的餐馆经营十分精准，并且拥有全世界最好的饭店。


Surely any city that can look after visitors so superbly should have nothing to worry about, except, perhaps, how best to use the proceeds of its competence and entrepreneurial genius.	显然，能够为游客提供如此卓越的接待的城市理应高枕无忧，也许只有一个例外：如何最好地利用它的能力和企业家天赋。


But, again, things may not be quite what they seem.	但是，香港的情况也和表面上看上去的大相径庭。


Hong Kong’s success partly reflects a fundamental moderation within the culture, a competency and rationality that enables the city – an autonomous Chinese territory – to thrive in a complex context.	香港的成功部分反映了其文化内部的根本性中和，一种让这个作为中国自治地方的城市能够就在复杂环境中蓬勃兴旺的能力和理性。


But, when I visited Hong Kong last month – my first visit since the momentous but abortive democracy demonstrations of 2014 – people seemed more nervous than they had in some time.	但是，当我上个月访问香港时——这是自2014年至关重要但胎死腹中的民主游行以来我第一次访问香港——人们似乎比一段时间以来更加紧张。


The reason is that a fledgling independence movement is shaking things up in Hong Kong.	原因在于一股独立运动雏形正在动摇香港。


It started with characteristically moderate calls for greater democracy.	一开始，这场运动的特征是温和要求更多的民主。


But menacing noises from China, together with the Hong Kong government’s failure to attempt a sensible dialogue with its critics about governance concerns or economic challenges, has driven many democracy activists to extremism.	但来自中国的威胁声音，以及香港政府并未尝试与其批评者就治理问题和经济挑战进行对话，让许多民主活跃分子走向了极端。


This is unwise.	这是不明智的。


The reality is that Hong Kong is not an incipient nation-state, and it will not become one.	现实是香港不是一个方兴未艾的民族国家，以后也不可能是。


China would oppose this idea to the bitter end.	中国将誓死杜绝这一可能。


It is not a fight Hong Kong would win.	这不是香港能够赢得的斗争。


Instead, Hong Kong is a Chinese city with a strong sense of identity as a free, plural, decent, and open society under the rule of law.	相反，香港是一个有着强烈的身份感的城市——这是一个照耀在法治之下的自由、多元、体面和开放的社会。


This is what democracy activists should be discussing.	这才是民主活跃分子应该讨论的东西。


This is where they are on sound footing and can advance positive goals.	这才是他们拥有可靠立足点、能够推进积极目标的方向。


As soon as those activists begin demanding independence, however, they risk splintering their support and losing the moral high ground that they gained with their campaign in 2014.	但是，只要这些活跃分子开始要求独立，就有可能割裂他们的支持者，失去他们在2014年的运动中所获得的道德制高点。


This plays into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party and its stooges in Hong Kong.	这正中中国共产党及其香港傀儡的下怀。


As if demanding independence were not damaging enough to the pro-democracy cause, some independence campaigners are using brash tactics that are guaranteed to backfire.	好像要求独立对民主事业的伤害还不够大似的，一些独立运动家采取了必然适得其反的刚烈策略。


Most consequential, two young pro-independence campaigners who were elected to the Legislative Council – Yau Wai-ching and Sixtus Leung – chose to make a mockery of their oath of office last September.	引起轩然大波的两名独立运动家——当选为立法委员的游惠贞和梁颂恒——在9月份的宣誓现场所上演的闹剧。


Such oaths are common for legislators.	宣誓对于立法者而言是非常常见的。


In the United Kingdom, for example, you cannot assume your role as an elected representative without taking one.	比如，在英国，不宣誓就不能履行当选代表的职责。 但游梁二人想在宣誓方面“搞个大新闻”。


But Yau and Leung wanted to win publicity for their cause.	因此他们篡改誓词；


So they altered the words of the oath; displayed a banner stating that “Hong Kong is not China”; and referred to China using what many consider a slur.	打出“香港不是中国”的横幅； 并用许多人视为耻辱的用词称谓中国。


Yau and Leung immediately incurred the wrath of China’s central government.	这立刻激怒了中国中央政府。


Although the Hong Kong courts surely could have dealt with the issue themselves – under the “one country, two systems” framework, Hong Kong is assured an independent court system, in addition to the right to elect its own legislature – an enraged China intervened.	尽管香港法院绝对可以处理香港的问题——“一国两制”保证香港拥有独立司法体系，并有选举自己的立法机关的权利——但愤怒的中国仍然进行了干预。


Restraint is not, after all, a Leninist virtue.	毕竟，克制绝不是列宁主义的美德。


In an extraordinary move, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee stepped in to “clarify” Article 104 of the Basic Law, declaring that all oaths taken by office-holders must be “solemn, accurate, complete, and sincere.”	中国人大常委会罕见地介入“说明”基本法第104条，宣布所有官员就职宣誓必须“准确、完整、庄重、真诚”。


Yau and Leung were barred from taking their seats in the Legislative Council.	游梁二人被取消在立法会的席位。


To most Hong Kong lawyers, the display of political authority did not represent simply a reinterpretation of old rules, but a move toward making new ones.	对大部分香港律师而言，如此展示政治权威不仅仅是重新解释旧规则，也是制定新规则的一个步骤。


And, in fact, Hong Kong’s government is now launching legal challenges against four more legislators – all relatively moderate pro-democracy activists – arguing that their oaths of office were also invalid.	事实上，香港政府目前正在对其他四名立法会议员——均为相对温和的民主活跃分子——采取法律手段，指责他们的就职宣誓也是无效的。


In short, Hong Kong’s democracy may now be more constrained than it was before.	简言之，如今香港的民主可能比从前受到更大的约束。


It is depressing to see Hong Kong once more bereft of inclusive leadership and roiled by political grandstanding.	目睹香港再次失去包容的领导层，受到政治哗众取宠的干扰令人沮丧。


If this situation persists, China’s moves to assert more authority in Hong Kong could well become even more brazen.	如果这一局面持续下去，中国将更加恬不知耻地在香港主张威权。


That is why it is so important for the people of Hong Kong to ensure that their vision is not clouded by extremism, and to stand up to protect the virtues that comprise their unique identity.	因此，香港人民绝对必须确保他们的愿景不能被极端主义遮蔽，站起来捍卫构成他们的独特身份的优点。


Fortunately, there are many in Hong Kong doing just that.	幸运的是，许多香港人正在这么做。


The legal profession, in particular, continues to show brave leadership in upholding the rule of law, a target of regular criticism by Communist Party officials who either do not understand what it means or know all too well.	特别是法律界一直在坚持法治方面起着勇敢的领导作用。 法治一直是中共官员——他们要么不理解法治的意义，要么心知肚明而别有用心——的批评目标。


Similarly, civil-society organizations such as the Project Citizens Foundation are committed to educating the public on Hong Kong’s rules and rights.	类似地，公民实践培育基金（Project Citizens Foundation）致力于教育香港大众规则和权利。


Thanks partly to their efforts, the public tends to be knowledgeable and vigilant about encroachment on Hong Kong’s freedoms, such as the recent abduction of five book publishers by mainland agents.	部分拜他们的努力所赐，香港公众大多察觉并警惕对香港的自由的侵犯，如最近大陆特工绑架五名图书出版人的事件。


These are anxious times for Hong Kong.	这些是香港的焦虑时刻。


But the problem is not so entrenched that it could not be solved by a bold attempt to forge a consensus between the government and those whom it is supposed to serve.	但问题尚未深入到无法通过果断措施构建政府及其应该服务的市民之间的共识来解决的程度。


With enough political will – and level heads – Hong Kong can return to a path leading toward a freer, more open democracy.	只要有足够的政治意愿——以及清醒的头脑——香港能够回归偷网更自由、更开放的民主的道路。


Who Loves China?	谁爱中国


NEW YORK – Tens of thousands of people have been “occupying” the tear-gas-filled streets of Hong Kong’s Central district to fight for their democratic rights.	纽约成千上万人“占领”着满是催泪弹的香港中环，为民主权利作斗争。


Many more may soon join them.	更有许多人或许马上会加入他们。


Though some businessmen and bankers are annoyed by the disruption, the demonstrators are right to protest.	尽管一些商人和银行家因为受到干扰而恼怒，但示威者举行游行是正确的。


China’s government has promised Hong Kong’s citizens that they can freely elect their Chief Executive in 2017.	中国政府承诺香港公民，他们可以在2017年自由选举首席行政长官。


But, given that candidates are to be carefully vetted by an unelected committee of pro-Chinese appointees, citizens would have no meaningful choice at all.	但是，由于候选人需要受到由亲中派担任委员的非选举产生的委员会的仔细审查，实际上公民可以说完全没有选择。


Only people who “love China” – that is, love the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – need apply.	只有“爱中国”的人——也就是爱中国共产党的人——需要申请。


One can almost understand why China’s leaders should be baffled by this show of defiance in Hong Kong.	你几乎可以理解为何中国领导人为何应该对这场香港的反抗秀感到困惑。


After all, the British simply appointed governors when Hong Kong was still a crown colony, and nobody protested then.	毕竟，当香港还是殖民地时，英国也任命执政者，当时没有人示威游行。


Indeed, the deal that Hong Kong’s colonial subjects appeared to accept – leaving politics alone in exchange for the opportunity to pursue material prosperity in a safe and orderly environment – is not so different from the deal accepted by China’s educated classes today.	事实上，香港的殖民地臣民所接受的交易——把政治抛在一边，换取在安全有序环境中追求物质繁荣的机会——与当今中国受教育阶层所接受的交易并无多少不同。


The common opinion among British colonial civil servants, businessmen, and diplomats was that the Chinese were not really interested in politics anyway; all they cared about was money.	英国殖民地公务员、商人和外交官的共同观点是，中国人并不对政治真的感兴趣； 他们关心的是赚钱。


Anyone with the slightest knowledge of Chinese history knows that this view was patently false.	稍稍了解中国历史的人都知道，这一观点打错热错。


But, for a long time, it seemed to be true in Hong Kong.	但是，长期以来，在香港它似乎是正确的。


There was, however, a significant difference between Hong Kong under the British and under China today.	但是，英国的香港和今天中国的香港之间有一个重大差异。


Hong Kong was never a democracy, but it did have a relatively free press, a relatively honest government, and an independent judiciary – all backed by a democratic government in London.	香港从未成为民主实体，但它确实拥有自由言论，相对诚实的政府和独立司法——所有这些都受到伦敦民主政府的支持。


For most Hong Kong citizens, the prospect of being handed over in 1997 from one colonial power to another was never an entirely happy one.	对大部分香港公民而言，1997年从一个殖民地势力被转交给另一个殖民地势力绝不是一幸福的事。


But what really invigorated politics in Hong Kong was the brutal crackdown in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and in other Chinese cities in 1989.	但真正鼓舞了香港政治的是1989年北京天安门事件和其他中国城市发生的事。


Huge demonstrations took place in Hong Kong to protest the massacre, and massive commemorations of the event are held every June, keeping alive a memory that is repressed and fading in the rest of China.	香港爆发了大规模示威活动反对大屠杀，每年6月香港都要举行大规模纪念仪式，保持在中国其余部分受到压制、正在逝去的鲜活记忆。


It was not simply humanitarian rage that galvanized so many people in Hong Kong to act in 1989.	1989年让如此多的香港人行动起来的并不仅仅是人道主义暴行。


They recognized then that under future Chinese rule, only genuine democracy might safeguard the institutions that protected Hong Kong’s freedoms.	当时他们意识到，在未来的中国统治下，只有真正的民主能捍卫保护香港自由的机构。


Without any significant say in how they were to be governed, Hong Kong’s citizens would be at the mercy of China’s leaders.	没有在关于他们如何被治理的问题上的话语权，香港公民就会成为中国领导人板上的鱼肉。


From the point of view of China’s Communist rulers, this seems perverse.	在中共领导人看来，这是大逆不道。


They regard Hong Kongers’ democratic demands as a misguided effort to mimic Western politics, or even as a form of nostalgia for British imperialism.	他们将香港人的民主要求视为受到蛊惑的照搬西方政治的行为，甚至是为英帝国主义招魂。


Either way, the demonstrators’ agenda is considered “anti-Chinese.”	无论如何，示威者的日程都被认为是“反中”的。


The way China’s rulers see it, only firm control from the top and the CCP’s unquestioned supremacy can create the conditions needed for a rich and powerful China to emerge.	中国统治者认为，因此只有从头开始严格控制和中共最高权威不容置疑才能创造中国崛起并富强所需要的条件。 在他们眼中，民主导致混乱；


Democracy, in their view, leads to disorder; freedom of thought causes popular “confusion”; and public criticism of the Party tends toward the breakdown of authority.	思想自由导致群众“迷失”； 对党的公共批评导致权威的粉碎。


In this sense, the CCP is rather traditional.	从这个角度讲，中共相当传统。


But, though Chinese government always was authoritarian, it was not always as corrupt as it is now.	但是，尽管中国政府从古至今无不集权，但并非总是像现在那样腐败。


Nor were China’s politics always as lawless.	中国政治也并非总是想现在那样无法无天。


China traditionally had institutions – clan associations, religious communities, business groups, and so on – that were relatively autonomous.	中国历来存在相对自治的机构——宗族、教会、商帮，等等。


Imperial rule may have been authoritarian, but there were large pockets of independence from central control.	帝国法规也许是集权的，但可以在中央控制下获得相当大的独立。


In that sense, Hong Kong is perhaps more traditional than the rest of China, excluding, of course, Taiwan.	从这个角度讲，香港也许比中国其他部分——当然，台湾除外——更传统。


Today, the CCP’s political supremacy places it above the law, which encourages corruption among Party officials, whether at the local or national level.	如今，中共的政治权威使它可以凌驾于法律之上，这鼓励了中共官员的腐败，不管是地方官员还是国家官员。


Strict Party control of religious, academic, artistic, and journalistic expression stifles the dissemination of necessary information and creative thought.	党对宗教、学术、艺术以及新闻传播的严格控制扼杀了必要信息和创造性思维的传播。


The lack of an independent judiciary undermines the rule of law.	缺少独立司法破坏了法治精神。


None of this benefits future development.	所有这些都不利于未来发展。


When Hong Kong was formally handed back to China 17 years ago, some optimists thought that the former colony’s greater freedoms would help to reform the rest of China.	17年前，当香港正式回归中国时，一些乐观者认为前殖民地更大的自由将有助于中国其余部分的改革。


The example of a clean bureaucracy and independent judges would strengthen the rule of law throughout the country.	清廉官僚系统和��立司法的范例将强化整个中国的法治精神。


Others, for the same reason, regarded Hong Kong as a dangerous Trojan horse that could seriously undermine the Communist order.	也有人出于同样的理由认为香港是一匹危险的特洛伊木马，可能严重威胁共产主义秩序。


So far, there is no evidence that the protesters in Hong Kong’s Central district have any ambition to undermine, let alone topple, the government in Beijing.	目前，没有证据表明香港中环的示威者有任何野心破坏——更不用说颠覆——北京政府。


They have their hands full just standing up for their own rights in Hong Kong, and the chance that they will succeed appears to be slim.	他们站出来，只是为了他们自己在香港的利益，而他们获得成功的机会看起来十分渺茫。


Chinese President Xi Jinping is anxious to show how tough he can be.	中国国家主席习近平急切地想表明强硬态度。


Compromise would smack of weakness.	妥协将意味着软弱。


His aim seems to be to make Hong Kong more like the rest of China, rather than the other way round.	他的目标是让香港向中国其他部分靠拢，而不是相反。


And yet, there is every reason to believe that China would benefit greatly from the opposite course.	但是，有充分的理由相信反其道而行之才会给中国带来巨大好处。


Less official corruption, more trust in the law, and greater freedom of thought would make China a more stable, more creative, and even more prosperous society.	更少的官员腐败、更信任法律、更多思想自由能让中国成为更稳定、更有创造力、甚至更繁荣的社会。


In the short term, this probably will not happen.	从短期看，这可能不会发生。


But the people who truly “love China” are more likely to be found in the streets of Hong Kong than in the closed government compounds of Beijing.	但真正“爱中国”的人更有可能在香港街头找到，而不是在北京紧闭的政府大门内找到。


China’s Hong Kong Follies	中国的香港愚政


HONG KONG – The massive public demonstrations by students and young members of the middle-class that have roiled Hong Kong in recent weeks are ostensibly demands for democracy.	香港—在最近几周席卷香港的学生和年轻中产阶级大规模群众示威表面上是在争取民主。


But they actually reflect frustration among a population that has been poorly governed by a succession of leaders picked by China’s central government more for their loyalty than their competence.	但实际上这反映了由中国中央政府选出的、忠诚比能力更重要的诸任领导人治理不力，无法令香港人民满意。


In fact, the current near-uprising is the culmination of a long series of demonstrations since Hong Kong’s handover from the United Kingdom to China in 1997, after Chris Patten, the last British governor failed to persuade China to allow Hong Kong to establish a genuine democratic government.	事实上，目前近乎暴动的局面是1997年香港从英国回归中国以来一系列示威的高潮。 当是时，英国末代港督彭定康没有说服中国允许香港建立真正的民主政府。


In China’s view, Patten’s position was hypocritical, even offensive, given that the British had ruled Hong Kong autocratically.	在中国看来，彭定康的立场充满了伪善甚至冒犯，因为英国对香港实行的也是独裁统治。


China believed that it could easily manage the same kind of “executive-led” government that had served Hong Kong well for 150 years under the British.	中国相信它可以轻易地管理好150年来在英国统治下运转良好的“行政长官领导”的政府。


In order to placate Hong Kong’s restive population – which included many refugees from China – a “one country, two systems” policy was embedded in the region’s constitution, promising Hong Kong “a high degree of autonomy,” except in foreign and defense affairs for 50 years.	为了抚慰桀骜不驯的香港人——包括大量来自中国的难民——“一国两制”政策被写入了香港宪法，承诺香港将在50年内获得除外交和防务之外的“高度自治”。


Indeed, Hong Kong enjoys many freedoms that the rest of China lacks, including a judiciary system that is guided by British common law and independent from the executive branch.	事实上，香港享受了中国其余部分所没有的许多自由，包括以英国普通法为基础、独立于行政部门的司法系统。


China has yet to follow through on its second promise: that Hong Kong would elect its chief executive by “universal suffrage” by 2017.	但中国没有履行第二个承诺：香港将在2017年通过“普选”选出行政长官。


Instead, a committee – initially comprising 800 members, but since expanded to 1,200 – selects the chief executive in accordance with the Chinese government’s wishes.	相反，由一个委员会（最初由800名委员组成，后扩大为1,200人）根据中国政府的意愿选择行政长官。


Hong Kong’s first chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was widely viewed as a wise choice.	香港首任行政长官董建华被广泛视为明智之选。


The Western-educated heir to a shipping fortune, and unusually well connected with the global elite, Tung was thought to be a conservative, thoughtful, cosmopolitan man imbued with liberal values and free of ties to the powerful families that dominated the real-estate industry in the territory.	他身为船王继承人，受西式教育，与全精英保持良好关系。 董建华被认为是一个保守、睿智、开放的人，受过自由价值灌输，与主宰房地产业的大家族没有瓜葛。


This perception could not have been more wrong.	这种感觉大错特错。


Tung turned out to be shallow, radical in his views, more chauvinist than China’s top leaders, and prone to rash decision-making on important policies with wide-ranging social and economic consequences.	董建华表现得相当肤浅，观念极端，比中国高层领导人还要沙文主义，常常在有广泛社会和经济影响的重要政策的决策方面表现鲁莽。


He forced out his competent chief secretary, Anson Chan, a veteran Hong Kong civil servant, for her colonial background, thereby signaling his mistrust of the entire civil service that the British had created.	他以殖民地背景为由逼走有能力的政务司司长、老牌香港公务员陈方安生，这表明他根本不信任英国创立的一整套公务员体系。


It did not take long for Hong Kongers to realize that their new leader harbored a deep – and deeply flawed – “patriotic” worldview that regarded Western “values” as unsuitable for Hong Kong, the first globalized Chinese city in modern history.	不久，香港人就认识到他们的新领导人怀有根深蒂固——也大有缺陷——的“爱国主义”世界观，认为西方“价值”不适合中国现代史上第一个全球化城市香港。


But it was not until Tung tried to ram through draconian internal-security legislation that many of Hong Kong’s citizens began to feel that they were being overtaken by the repressive governance from which they were supposed to be exempt.	但直到董建华试图实施严苛的内部安全立法，许多香港人才开始感到他们被压迫性政府接管了，而此前他们认为自己可以免受此待遇。


Under Tung’s leadership, mass protests became a frequent sight in Hong Kong.	在董建华的领导下，群众示威开始在香港频繁出现。


The Chinese government also belatedly recognized that Tung was a liability.	中国政府也后知后觉地发现董建华是一个负担。


In 2004, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao unceremoniously dressed down Tung on live television.	2004年，时任国家主席胡锦涛罕见地在电视直播中训斥了董建华。


Three months later, Tung resigned for “health reasons” and was elected Vice Chairman of the largely symbolic Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.	三个月后，董建华以“健康原因”辞任，并当选为基本只有象征意义的中国政协副主席。


Tung’s successor, Donald Tsang, was chosen reluctantly.	董建华的继任者曾荫权不情愿地被选中了。


But he was a senior civil servant, and seemed to be the only technocrat who could credibly hold together Hong Kong’s disaffected civil service, which China knew was indispensable to governing the territory, regardless of its British heritage.	但他是资深公务员，也似乎是唯一一个能可信地保持心存不满的香港公职人员团结的技术官僚。 中国明白，公务员是治理香港不可或缺的要素，尽管香港公务员制度继承了英国。


But Tsang brought his own weaknesses to Hong Kong’s government – most notably, greed.	但曾荫权给香港政府带来了他自己的弱点——其中最令人瞩目的便是贪婪。


Tsang, who enjoyed spending time with the wealthy on their yachts and in their private suites, pursued a restrictive land policy that boosted real-estate values – and thus the wealth of the land-owning tycoons.	曾荫权流连于富豪游艇和私人会所之间，追求严格的土地政策，抬升房地产价值，从而也增加了地产大亨的财富。


Prices rose so high, however, that real estate became accessible only to the very well-off, such as the families of high officials from the mainland.	但是，房价长得太高，以至于只有很有钱的人才负担得起，比如来自大陆的高官家族。


This kind of corrupt behavior earned Tsang a disgraceful exit from government.	这种类型的腐败行为让曾荫权极不体面地离开了政府。


Next came Leung Chun-ying, the current governor.	接着上任的是梁振英，即现任行政长官。


Leung – who was not China’s first choice for the position – inherited a mess.	接手烂摊子的梁振英并非中国的第一选择。


But he did not do himself any favors with his cabinet choices, many of whom had mediocre records that indicated corruptibility.	但他并没有对许多成员政绩平平、腐败迹象暴露无遗的内阁进行调整。


One of them, Paul Chan Mo-po, was tasked with managing Hong Kong’s land-supply policy, despite a history of corruption in his personal property transactions.	其中一位成员陈茂波被授以管理香港土地供应政策重任，尽管他个人存在地产交易腐败记录。


Worse, Leung pushed forward an unpopular plan to introduce “patriotic education” to Hong Kong, stoking fear among students of a China-dictated brainwashing.	更糟糕的是，梁振英退出了一项引入“爱国教育”的不受欢迎的政策，在学生中间引起了被中国洗脑的担忧。


After the failure of three consecutive Chinese-selected leaders to address Hong Kong’s concerns, it is no wonder that Hong Kong’s citizens are increasingly seeking to loosen China’s grip on their government.	连续三位中国选择的领导人都没有打消香港人的顾虑，因此毫不奇怪香港公民开始日益寻求摆脱中国对香港政府的控制。


But, for the Chinese authorities, this movement reflects an unacceptable challenge to China’s sovereignty.	但是，对中国当局来说，这场运动是对中���主权的不可接受的挑战。


In this sense, Hong Kong is locked in a vicious circle – and it is up to China’s government to break it.	从这个角度讲，香港陷入了恶性循环——需要中国政府来打破它。


The fact is that Hong Kong’s citizens understand that they need China, and they have no interest in subverting the central government – nor do they have the power to do so.	事实上，香港公民明白他们需要中国，明白推翻中央政府并不符合他们的利益——他们也没有能力这样做。


Their demands for democracy are simply calls for good governance.	他们的民主要求无非是为了更好的治理。


They believe that free and fair elections represent their best chance of having a competent leader – someone like Patten, China’s former nemesis, who is remembered fondly in Hong Kong.	他们相信自由公正的选举最有可能产生能力胜任的领导人——比如中国的前对手、在香港有口皆碑的彭定康。


China’s government is doing itself a disservice by demanding that Hong Kong’s citizens bow before their sovereign, while blaming “outside hostile forces” for spurring some kind of unconstitutional rebellion.	中国政府要求香港公民屈服于主权，同时谴责“外部敌对势力”煽动违反宪法的暴乱，这只能适得其反。


Instead, it should focus on the problems created by the chief executives that it chose for the wrong reasons, and it should resolve the underlying governance problems that the demonstrations reflect.	相反，中国政府应该专注于其出于错误理由选择的行政长官所造成的问题，并且应该解决示威所反映的根本性治理问题。


The New Geo-Economics	新型的地缘经济


COLOMBO, SRI LANKA – Last year was a memorable one for the global economy.	发自科伦坡——去年对于全球经济来说堪称难忘的一年。


Not only was overall performance disappointing, but profound changes – both for better and for worse – occurred in the global economic system.	这不仅来自于令人失望的整体表现，更由于在全球经济体系中发生的诸多深刻变化——无论是好是坏。


Most notable was the Paris climate agreement reached last month.	最值得注意的是上月达成的巴黎气候协议。


By itself, the agreement is far from enough to limit the increase in global warming to the target of 2º Celsius above the pre-industrial level.	就其本身而言，该协议远远不足以限制全球变暖以达到相对工业化前水平增加2ºC以内的目标。


But it did put everyone on notice: The world is moving, inexorably, toward a green economy.	但它确实知会了大家：世界正无情地向绿色经济迈进。


One day not too far off, fossil fuels will be largely a thing of the past.	在不太遥远的某一天，化石燃料将成为过时的玩意。


So anyone who invests in coal now does so at his or her peril.	因此，任何敢在当今投资煤矿的人都要掂量一下自己的风险。


With more green investments coming to the fore, those financing them will, we should hope, counterbalance powerful lobbying by the coal industry, which is willing to put the world at risk to advance its shortsighted interests.	随着越来越多的绿色投资纷纷涌现，我们希望这些资助这类项目的人们能抵消强大的煤炭行业游说势力，打败那种为了实现其自身短期利益而置全球风险于不顾的人。


Indeed, the move away from a high-carbon economy, where coal, gas, and oil interests often dominate, is just one of several major changes in the global geo-economic order.	事实上，摆脱由煤炭，天然气和石油利益占主导地位的高碳经济的过程仅仅是全球地缘经济秩序的几项重大变化之一。


Many others are inevitable, given China’s soaring share of global output and demand.	此外随着中国占全球产出和需求的份额不断扩大，许多变化是不可避免的。


The New Development Bank, established by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), was launched during the year, becoming the first major international financial institution led by emerging countries.	由金砖五国（巴西，俄罗斯，印度，中国及南非）成立的新开发银行将在年内正式启动，成为由新兴国家领导的第一个大型国际金融机构。


And, despite US President Barack Obama’s resistance, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established as well, and is to start operation this month.	同时尽管美国总统奥巴马不断阻挠，由中国带头发起的亚洲基础设施投资银行依旧顺利成立，并在这个月开始运作。


The US did act with greater wisdom where China’s currency was concerned.	美国确实针对中国货币采取了更为明智的举措。


It did not obstruct the renminbi’s admission to the basket of currencies that constitute the International Monetary Fund’s reserve asset, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).	它并未阻止人民币被纳入构成国际货币基金组织的储备资产（特别提款权）的一揽子货币。


In addition, a half-decade after the Obama administration agreed to modest changes in the voting rights of China and other emerging markets at the IMF – a small nod to the new economic realities – the US Congress finally approved the reforms.	此外，在奥巴马政府同意后适度调整等中国以及其他新兴市场在世界货币基金组织的投票权——这算是对新经济现实的一点认可——的五年之后，美国国会最终也批准了这项改革。


The most controversial geo-economic decisions last year concerned trade.	而去年最具争议的地缘经济决定则与贸易有关。


Almost unnoticed after years of desultory talks, the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round – initiated to redress imbalances in previous trade agreements that favored developed countries – was given a quiet burial.	经过多年断续���判之后几乎被忽视的世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判——最初旨在纠正原本有利于发达国家的贸易协定所导致的不平衡——最终无疾而终。


America’s hypocrisy – advocating free trade but refusing to abandon subsidies on cotton and other agricultural commodities – had posed an insurmountable obstacle to the Doha negotiations.	美国的伪善——鼓吹自由贸易且拒绝放弃对棉花和其他农产品的补贴——成为了一个多哈谈判难以逾越的障碍。


In place of global trade talks, the US and Europe have mounted a divide-and-conquer strategy, based on overlapping trade blocs and agreements.	在全球贸易谈判中，美国和欧洲都设置了一个构建于重叠的贸易集团和协定之上的，各个击破的策略。


As a result, what was intended to be a global free-trade regime has given way to a discordant managed-trade regime.	这样一来，原本计划的一个全球自由贸易体制已经让位给了不和谐的托管贸易体制。


Trade for much of the Pacific and Atlantic regions will be governed by agreements, thousands of pages in length and replete with complex rules of origin that contradict basic principles of efficiency and the free flow of goods.	太平洋和大西洋地区的大多数贸易将通过协议来管辖，充斥着长篇累牍的条款和复杂的原产地规定，这些都与效率和货物自由流动的基本原则背道而驰。


The US concluded secret negotiations on what may turn out to be the worst trade agreement in decades, the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and now faces an uphill battle for ratification, as all the leading Democratic presidential candidates and many of the Republicans have weighed in against it.	美国通过秘密谈判缔结一项可能是近几十年来最差劲的贸易协议，即所谓的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定，如今又为协议的最终批准而陷入了苦战，因为几乎所有民调领先的民主党总统候选人以及许多共和党人都在考虑反对此协议。


The problem is not so much with the agreement’s trade provisions, but with the “investment” chapter, which severely constrains environmental, health, and safety regulation, and even financial regulations with significant macroeconomic impacts.	现在重点并不是在协议的贸易条款，而是其中的“投资”一章，此章严重制约了对环境，健康和安全的监管，甚至制约了可能对宏观经济产生显著影响的金融监管。


In particular, the chapter gives foreign investors the right to sue governments in private international tribunals when they believe government regulations contravene the TPP’s terms (inscribed on more than 6,000 pages).	尤其是该章节给予了外国投资者在认为某国政府规定违反了协议条款（内容超过6000页）时在国际法庭对该政府提起诉讼的权利。


In the past, such tribunals have interpreted the requirement that foreign investors receive “fair and equitable treatment” as grounds for striking down new government regulations – even if they are non-discriminatory and are adopted simply to protect citizens from newly discovered egregious harms.	在过去，这类法庭已经认定外国投资者得到“公正与公平待遇”的要求是推翻新的政府法规的基础——即使这些法规是非歧视性的，只是为了保护公民免遭新发现的糟糕危害。


While the language is complex – inviting costly lawsuits pitting powerful corporations against poorly financed governments – even regulations protecting the planet from greenhouse-gas emissions are vulnerable.	由于条款极为复杂——令实力强大的公司可以对那些财政状况不佳的政府发起耗资巨大的诉讼——即使是那些保护地球免遭温室气体排放影响的法规都显得不堪一击。


The only regulations that appear safe are those involving cigarettes (lawsuits filed against Uruguay and Australia for requiring modest labeling about health hazards had drawn too much negative attention). But there remain a host of questions about the possibility of lawsuits in myriad other areas.	唯一安全的规定是那些涉及香烟（烟草企业控告乌拉圭和澳大利亚政府要求降低烟盒健康危害措词严重程度的诉讼已经引来了太多负面关注），但在无数其他领域的依然存在诉讼可能性。


Furthermore, a “most favored nation” provision ensures that corporations can claim the best treatment offered in any of a host country’s treaties.	此外，“最惠国”条款保证企业可以获得在任何一个东道国协定所提供的最优待遇。


That sets up a race to the bottom – exactly the opposite of what US President Barack Obama promised.	这就建立了一个竞相杀价的机制——和美国总统奥巴马所作出的承诺完全相反。


Even the way Obama argued for the new trade agreement showed how out of touch with the emerging global economy his administration is.	即便奥巴马鼓吹新贸易协定的方式也暴露了他的政府与新出现的全球经济有多么脱节。


He repeatedly said that the TPP would determine who – America or China – would write the twenty-first century’s trade rules.	他多次表示，跨太平洋伙伴关系协定将决定由谁——美国还是中国——来订立二十一世纪的贸易规则。


The correct approach is to arrive at such rules collectively, with all voices heard, and in a transparent way.	但正确的做法其实是利用集体决策来订立规则，聆听各方的声音，并通过透明的方式。


Obama has sought to perpetuate business as usual, whereby the rules governing global trade and investment are written by US corporations for US corporations.	奥巴马却希望走从前的老路，让美国公司为实现美国公司的利益来编写全球贸易和投资规则。


This should be unacceptable to anyone committed to democratic principles.	这是无法让任何致力于民主原则的人所接受的。


Those seeking closer economic integration have a special responsibility to be strong advocates of global governance reforms: If authority over domestic policies is ceded to supranational bodies, then the drafting, implementation, and enforcement of the rules and regulations has to be particularly sensitive to democratic concerns.	那些寻求更紧密经济一体化的国家有着特殊的责任去大力提倡全球治理改革：如果决定国内政策的权力被割让给超国家机构，那么起草，实施和强制执行的规则和条例的过程就应当尤其服从民主原则。


Unfortunately, that was not always the case in 2015.	不幸的是，这些情况并不总在2015年出现。


In 2016, we should hope for the TPP’s defeat and the beginning of a new era of trade agreements that don’t reward the powerful and punish the weak.	在2016年，我们应该希望跨太平洋伙伴关系协定的走向失败，并开启一个贸易协定不再锄弱扶强的新时代。


The Paris climate agreement may be a harbinger of the spirit and mindset needed to sustain genuine global cooperation.	而巴黎的气候协议可能会成为一个维持真正全球合作所需的精神和心态的好预兆。


Hopeless Unemployment	没有希望的失业


BERKELEY – However bad you think the global economy is today in terms of the business cycle, that is only one lens through which to view the world.	伯克利—不管从商业周期的角度讲眼下全球经济是多么困难，这只是看待世界的一个视角。


In terms of global life expectancy, total world wealth, the overall level of technology, growth prospects in emerging economies, and global income distribution, things look rather good, while on still other dimensions – say, global warming or domestic income inequality and its effects on countries’ social solidarity – they look bad.	从全球寿命预期、世界总财富、技术总水平、新兴国家增长前景和全球收入分配看，情况相当强劲，而在其他领域——比如全球变暖和国内收入比平等及其对各国社会稳定的影响——则看起来相当糟糕。


Even on the business-cycle dimension, conditions have been far worse in the past than they are today.	即便从商业周期角度看，如今的情况也比过去好得多了。


Consider the Great Depression and the implications of market economies’ inability back then to recover on their own, owing to the burden of long-term unemployment.	想想大萧条吧，它给市场经济造成了多大的冲击，由于长期失业的重压，市场经济根本无法自力更生走向复苏。


But, while we are not at that point today, the Great Depression is no less relevant for us, because it is increasingly likely that long-term unemployment will become a similar impediment to recovery within the next two years.	但是，尽管我们今天还没有走到这般田地，却也不能说大萧条跟我们一点关系都没有，因为有个状况可能性越来越大了——长期失业将在未来两年对复苏造成类似大萧条的影响。


At its nadir in the winter of 1933, the Great Depression was a form of collective insanity.	在1933年冬天的低谷时期，大萧条简直称得上是集体性精神紊乱。 到处都是游手好闲的工人，因为没有企业雇用他们；


Workers were idle because firms would not hire them; firms would not hire them because they saw no market for their output; and there was no market for output because workers had no incomes to spend.	企业不雇用工人是因为它们看不到产品的销路； 而产品没有销路是因为工人没钱消费。


By that point, a great deal of unemployment had become long-term unemployment, which had two consequences.	当是时，大量失业已转变为长期失业，造成了两个后果。


First, the burden of economic dislocation was borne unequally.	第一，经济配置不当的负担并不是被公平地分担的。


Because consumer prices fell faster than wages, the welfare of those who remained employed rose in the Great Depression.	由于消费价格比工资下跌得更快，大萧条时期保住工作的人的财富有所上升。


Overwhelmingly, those who became and remained unemployed suffered the most.	丢掉工作并一直处于失业状态的人承担了绝大部分后果。


Second, reintegrating the unemployed even into a smoothly functioning market economy would prove to be very difficult.	第二，让失业者重新回到市场经济——即使是运转平稳的市场经济——十分困难。


After all, how many employers would not prefer a fresh entrant into the labor force to someone who has been out of work for years?	毕竟，有哪个雇主会喜欢新晋劳动力市场大军胜过有多年工作经验的工人呢？


The simple fact that an economy had recently undergone a period of mass unemployment made it difficult to recover levels of growth and employment that are often attained as a matter of course.	经济刚刚经历了大量失业时期，这一简单事实使得增长和就业水平的复苏十分困难（而复苏通常被视为是理所当然之事）。


Devalued exchange rates, moderate government budget deficits, and the passage of time all appeared to be equally ineffective remedies.	贬值的汇率、温和的政府预算赤字以及时间看起来都无法成为良药。


Highly centralized and unionized labor markets, like Australia’s, did as poorly as decentralized and laissez-faire labor markets, like that of the United States, in dealing with long-term unemployment.	高度集中的工会化劳动力市场（比如澳大利亚）与分散的自由放任劳动力市场（如美国）一样在长期失业面前束手无策。


Fascist solutions were equally unsuccessful, as in Italy, unless accompanied by rapid rearmament, as in Germany.	法西斯主义（如意大利）同样解决不了问题，除非伴随迅速的军力扩张（如德国）。


In the end, in the US, it was the approach of World War II and the associated demand for military goods that led private-sector employers to hire the long-term unemployed at wages they would accept.	最后，在美国，二战的逼近以及伴随而生的军工产品需求使得私人部门雇主开始以可接受的工资水平雇用长期失业者。


But, even today, economists can provide no clear explanation of why the private sector could not find ways to employ the long-term unemployed in the near-decade from the winter of 1933 to full war mobilization.	但是，直到今日，经济学家仍无法清楚地解释，为什么在1933年到全面战争动员开始的近十年时间里私人部门无法找到雇用长期失业者之道。


The extent of persistent unemployment, despite different labor-market structures and national institutions, suggests that theories that pinpoint one key failure should be taken with a grain of salt.	持久性失业的程度——尽管各地劳动力市场和国家制度各不相同——表明，详尽解释某个方面重大失灵的理论是不可能放之四海而皆准的。


At first, the long-term unemployed in the Great Depression searched eagerly and diligently for alternative sources of work.	首先，大萧条时期的长期失业者急切而努力地寻找其他工作。


But, after six months or so passed without successful reemployment, they tended to become discouraged and distraught.	但是，在找工作半年而未果后，他们变得灰心丧气、心烦意乱。


After 12 months of continuous unemployment, the typical unemployed worker still searched for a job, but in a desultory fashion, without much hope.	失业一年后，典型的失业者仍会寻找新工作，但已不再十分上心，也不抱有多大希望。


And, after two years of unemployment, the worker, accurately expecting to be at the end of every hiring queue, had lost hope and, for all practical purposes, left the labor market.	而在失业两年后，失业者会认为对于任何一个��位，自己都是最后才被考虑的人选，他会丧失现实希望，离开劳动力市场。


This was the pattern of the long-term unemployed in the Great Depression.	这就是大萧条时期长期失业的模式。


It was also the pattern of the long-term unemployed in Western Europe at the end of the 1980s.	这也是西欧20世纪80年代末长期失业的模式。


And, in a year or two, it will be the pattern again for the long-term unemployed in the North Atlantic region.	而如今，在一两年后，这也将成为北大西洋地区长期失业的模式。


I have been arguing for four years that our business-cycle problems call for more aggressively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and that our biggest problems would quickly melt away were such policies to be adopted.	四年来，我一直指出，我们的商业周期问题需要更积极的货币和财政扩张政策，只有采取这样的政策，我们最大的问题才能较快地解决。


That is still true.	这一点仍然正确。


But, over the next two years, barring a sudden and unexpected interruption of current trends, it will become less true.	但是，在未来两年中，除非当前趋势被突然地、出乎意料之外地打断，否则这一点的正确性将有所下降。


The current balance of probabilities is that two years from now, the North Atlantic’s principal labor-market failures will not be demand-side market failures that could be easily remedied by more aggressive policies to boost economic activity and employment.	目前看来，发生概率较大的情况是，两年后北大西洋主要劳动力市场数据将不再指向需求面市场失灵（这类失灵可以通过更积极的经济活动和就业刺激政策较为容易地解决）。


Rather, they will be structural market failures of participation that are not amenable to any straightforward and easily implemented cure.	劳动力市场将面临结构性市场参与失灵，没有简单容易的药方可以把这个问题治愈。


Hope or Hype for Personalized Medicine?	个性化用药：希望还是炒作？


STANFORD – During the past several decades, treatment for a variety of conditions has begun to shift from a “one size fits all” approach to a more personalized strategy.	斯坦福——在过去几十年中，对多种病情的诊疗开始从“万能方法”朝个性化方法转变。


As a result, patients can more often be matched to the best drug for their genetic makeup or the exact subcategory of their disease.	结果，越来越多的病人能够获得与其基因构造或其具体病症最为契合的药物。


This enables physicians to avoid prescribing a medication (or a dosage) that might cause serious side effects in certain populations.	这使得医生得以避免开出可能对特定人群产生严重副作用的药方（或剂量）。


In other words, even among patients who apparently have the same disease and symptoms, the treatment for each one would be determined by various predictive or prognostic tests.	换句话说，即使是显然患有相同疾病、出现相同症状的患者，每个人的治疗方案也将由诸多预报性检查决定。


Eventually, these tests could extend even to the sequencing of the DNA in an individual patient’s cancer cells, for example.	这些检查可能会深及具体患者癌细胞的DNA序列。


But, while this high-tech approach could be a boon to patients, it could prove detrimental to drug companies’ bottom lines.	但是，尽管这一高科技方法能给患者带来福音，却不利于制药公司的利润。


The reasons are subtle.	其中的原因相当微妙。


Personalized drug therapy uses biological indicators, or “biomarkers” – such as DNA sequences or the presence or absence of drug receptors – as an indicator of how patients should be treated, as well as to estimate the likelihood that the intervention will be effective.	个性化药物疗法使用生物指标，即所谓的“生物标记”——比如DNA序列以及是否存在药物受容体——作为应该如何治疗病患的指标，同时估算疗法产生效果的可能性。


This concept is not new: it has been known for decades, for example, that people who have a genetic deficiency of an enzyme called G6PD can experience severe and precipitous anemia if they are exposed to certain drugs.	这一概念并不新颖：比如，几十年前人们就已经知道，有的人体内一种叫G6PD的酶存在基因缺陷，某些药物可以导致他们产生严重的急性贫血。


Similarly, ethnic groups and individuals vary widely in their ability to clear medications from the bloodstream, owing to differences in the activity of the enzymes that metabolize, or degrade, drugs.	类似地，不同族群和个人清除血液中药物成分的能力具有很大差别，这是由促进药物新陈代谢或降解的酶的能力差异造成的。


That is important because low metabolizers clear certain drugs slowly and have more medication in their systems for longer periods of time than high metabolizers.	这一点非常重要，因为新陈代谢能力较低者与能力较高者相比，其清除某些药物的速度较慢，生理系统中药物残存量较大。


Thus, the former might be prone to overdose, and the latter to insufficient levels of the same drug.	因此，对同一药物，前者容易产生剂量过度，而后者可能剂量不足。


Prognostic biomarkers have begun to make a big difference in cancer therapy.	预报性生物指标已开始改变癌症疗法。


Drugs such as Erbitux and Vectibix work only in tumors containing the normal version of a gene called KRAS.	像爱必妥（Erbitux）和维克替比（Vectibix）这样的药物，它们只对具有常规种类KRAS基因的肿瘤有效。


If mutations of KRAS are present, the drugs are ineffective.	如果KRAS出现突变，这些药物就无效了。


Such mutations explain about 30-40% of cases in which patients fail to respond to these drugs, and mutations in another gene called BRAF could account for another 12%.	KRAS基因突变能够解释药物对患者无效情形的30—40%的原因，另一种叫BRAF的基因的突变可以解释另外12%。


Knowing this crucial information about a cancer patient’s genes will reduce sharply the number who are unnecessarily subjected to the side effects (and expense) of drugs that will not work.	了解癌症病患基因的这一关键信息能够显著降低因使用无效药物而产生不必要的副作用（和经济负担）的患者数量。


Improving the efficacy and reducing the side effects of drug therapy will be a boon to doctors, patients, and insurance companies, to be sure, but why should pharmaceutical companies embrace personalized medicine in the long term?	毫无疑问，增进药效、减少副作用对医生、病患和保险公司都是好事，但为什么从长期看制药公司也应该接受个性化疗法呢？


On the positive side, the presence of biomarkers will enable drug companies to perform smaller, better-targeted clinical studies in order to demonstrate efficacy.	从积极的角度看，生物指标的出现可以让制药公司进行更小、更有针对性的临床研究，以证明其产品的疗效。


In any kind of experiment, a fundamental principle is that the greater the number of subjects or iterations, the greater the confidence in the study’s results.	不管做什么实验，一条基本原则是试验的对象和次数越多，研究结果就越可信。


Unless the effect of the intervention is profound, small studies generally have large uncertainties in results.	除非干预能产生深远效果，否则总体而言小型研究会产生具有高度不确定性的结果。


That is where biomarkers make a difference.	这时，生物指标的威力就显现出来了。


They can help drug makers to design clinical studies that will show a high “relative treatment difference” between the drug and whatever it is being compared to (often a placebo, but sometimes another treatment).	利用生物指标，制药公司所设计的临床研究可以显示出试验药物和对比疗法（通常是无效对照剂，但有时也会是另一种疗法）之间的高度“相对疗法区别”。


Thus, when drugs are ultimately approved based on the use of biomarkers, the description of the medication’s approved uses, which is printed on the label, might be more restrictive – that is, it might reduce the size of the patient population for which the drug is intended.	于是，当药物最终在使用生物指标的基础上获得批准时，对该药物的批准用途的描述——将写在标签上——将更加严格，也就是说，将缩小该药物适用病患的数量规模。


For example, a drug broadly approved for “arthritis” – inflammation of joints that may be due to dozens of different disease processes – can be more widely marketed than one approved to treat only the arthritis that accompanies psoriasis or gout.	比如，被宽泛地批准用于“关节炎”——多种疾病都可能引起的关节炎症——的药物可以被更广泛推广，而只准用于伴随着牛皮癣和痛风的关节炎的药物则否。


In reality, however, the situation is more complex.	不过，现实情形要更复杂一些。


Assessments of safety and efficacy often do not move closely in tandem, so that even if smaller, better-targeted clinical trials offer clear evidence of a drug’s efficacy, regulators might demand far larger studies to provide evidence of the drug’s safety.	安全性和疗效的评估通常会平行进行，因此即使小型的、更具针对性的临床试验能提供关于疗效的明确证据，监管者仍可能要求进行更大型的实验以证明药物的安全性。


Increasingly defensive about accusations that drugs and vaccines are inadequately tested for safety, in recent years safety-obsessed regulators have required massive, hugely expensive, and time-consuming clinical trials designed to detect even very rare side effects.	为了免于受到药物和疫苗安全测试不足的指控，最近几年来，监管者过度重视安全性，开始要求大规模、高成本、长时间的临床试验，以检验可能是非常罕见的副作用。


Consider, for example, that before its US approval, a vaccine against rotavirus (a common, sometimes fatal gastrointestinal infection in children) was tested in more than 72,000 children – and another 40,000-plus in post-marketing studies.	比如，某种轮状病毒（一种可能令幼儿致死的常见肠胃病）疫苗在得到美国的批准之前先在72 000名幼儿身上进行��试用，后来有进行了40 000例上市后研究。


On a similar scale, a vaccine to prevent human papilloma virus infection and cervical cancer was tested in almost 30,000 young women.	另一种用于预防人类乳突淋瘤病毒传染和宫颈癌的疫苗也进行了规模相当的试验，在近30 000名年轻女性身上进行了试用。


Such studies are very costly, and, by any reasonable standard, the number of patients included in them is grossly excessive.	这些研究成本巨大，而且从任何的合理标准看，接受试验的病患数量都大大过多了。


Thus, the impact of personalized medicine in the short term might be positive at the patient’s bedside, but vast clinical trials to demonstrate the safety of new drugs will impose huge development costs that manufacturers might never recover.	因此，个性化用药的影响从短期看有利于病患方，但用大量临床试验来证明新药的安全性将给制药方带来巨大的开发成本。


(Currently, only about one in five drugs approved by US regulators ever recoup their development costs.) This situation would not be sustainable in the long term.	（现在，只有大约五分之一被美国监管者批准的药物能够收回开发成本。 ）从长期看，这一状况是不可持续的。


If society is to derive the maximum benefit from personalized medicine – which will require companies to pursue it – regulators worldwide will need to adopt reasoned and reasonable policies.	如果社会要从个性化用药中获得最大利益——这要求制药公司也主动这样做——那么全世界的监管者就应该采取可靠合理的政策。


The current Japanese government, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, would like to revise the pacifist constitution, as a necessary first step toward weaning the country off its total dependence on the US.	首相安倍晋���领导的现任日本政府或将修订和平宪法，以此作为摆脱完全依赖美国的必不可少的第一步。


Horse Trading and Climate Change	讨价还价与气候变化


AMSTERDAM – When the panda smiles, the world applauds.	发自阿姆斯特丹——当熊猫展露笑容之际，全世界都为之欢呼雀跃。


Or so it seemed after Chinese President Hu Jintao’s recent speech at the United Nations.	而最近中国国家主席胡锦涛在联合国发表了一场演说之后的情况大概也是如此。


Judging by the way much of the media reported his words, it seemed as if China had actually made an important announcement on cutting greenhouse-gas emissions.	从大多数媒体报道此事件的方式来判断，似乎中国已经在削减温室气体排放问题上发出了一份重要宣言。


It hadn’t.	但这都不是真的。


All President Hu really said was that China would now “endeavour” to curb its carbon emissions by a “notable” margin.	胡锦涛主席真正所说的只是中国将“尽力”削减“极大”数量的碳排放。


But how does one measure “endeavour” or “notable”?	但我们该如何界定“尽力”和“极大”究竟指的是多少？


As someone with close links to the Chinese administration told me when pressed: “What was said was actually pretty meaningless.”	在我的逼问之下，有个跟北京政府关系密切的人告诉我说：“这些话根本就毫无意义。 ”


Indeed, there were no specific targets and, as any China watcher knows, the “greening” of the government is old news.	而事实上根本就不存在什么具体目标，而所有中国观察家也都知道，中国政府对“绿色”的强调早已不是新闻了。


Official Chinese policy in recent years has been to make GDP growth greener.	近年来的中国官方政策都要求将GDP增长变得更加环保。


But not at the expense of growth itself – and China plans to grow pretty fast.	但这些政策可不能以牺牲增长为代价——而中国正计划飞速发展。


At least the panda smiled.	不过熊猫至少表示了些善意。


Poor Barack Obama didn’t even have that to offer.	而可怜的美国总统奥巴马连这点意思都没有。


He offered no pledge to cut emissions in the United States, and, with vote-sapping battles already underway over health-care reform, one wonders how much time and energy Obama will have for environmental imperatives.	他没能作出美国的减排承诺，而当民主共和两党正在美国卫生体制改革问题上激烈争夺选票之时，很难想象奥巴马又能有多少时间和精力在环境问题上下指示。


If all the world got out of this UN General Assembly meeting of government leaders was insubstantial rhetoric, the worse news is that it got more of the same at the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh.	而如果说全世界在本次联合国大会政府首脑会议中收获的只是些华而不实的花言巧语的话，那么更坏的消息则是情况在G20匹兹堡峰会上变得更加严重。


As one finance minister told me rather wistfully, when I asked him what had actually been delivered on climate change: “Words,” he said, "just words.”	当我询问一位财政部长峰会在气候变化问题上究竟取得了什么成果时，他的答案相当不满：“说辞，”他说，“仅仅是些说辞。 ”


Given that there are little more than two months until the Copenhagen summit on climate change, which is supposed to frame the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, this is depressing.	但如果考虑到距离哥本哈根气候变化峰会只剩两个月多一点的时间，而这场峰会必须为一个取代《京都议定书》的协议做好框架，那么一切都令人感到沮丧。


Perhaps the only people not suddenly depressed are those immersed in the negotiations.	不过也许那些深陷于谈判之中的人不会对此感到意外。


With more than a thousand points still to be agreed, all the policymakers I’ve spoken to recently say that they cannot see how a meaningful deal can be reached by December in Copenhagen.	由于还在超过一千个论点上未能达成共识，因此最近跟我交流过的所有政策制定者都说，他们看不到能在12月哥本哈根出台一个有实际意义之协议的可能性。


In reality, everyone is gearing up behind the scenes for a “Copenhagen 2,” and what those involved in the negotiations are calling “an even greater slog.”	实际上所有人都在幕后铆足了劲准备应付“第二轮哥本哈根会议”，而那些参与谈判的人则将其称之为“更艰苦的跋涉”。


Even if some sort of communiqué is cobbled together in December – and countries with elections coming up, such as the United Kingdom, will push for one – it is hard to believe that it will contain sufficient detail or reflect the proper level of commitment to have the impact so desperately needed.	但即便能在12月能够拼凑出某种协议——比如英国这些国家就会推动这么一个协议的产生，因为大选临近——但依然很难相信该协议会拥有足够的细节或者恰当程度的承诺来产生急需的影响力。


“Copenhagen 1” was always bound to fail, partly because – and this may sound strange at first – it is all about climate change.	预计“第一轮哥本哈根会议”注定会失败，这在某些方面是因为——乍一听可能会觉得怪异——会议的内容仅限于气候变化。


Although cuts in CO2 emissions and agreement on funding and finance are necessary goals, the geopolitical reality is that climate change cannot be decoupled from trade or discussions on exchange rates, the IMF, reform of the UN, and so on.	虽然减少二氧化碳排放和如何筹集减排资金是必然目标，但地缘政治的现实告诉我们，气候变化问题不可能脱离了贸易或者货币汇率，国际货币基金组织，联合国改革等种种议题来进行讨论。


There is a quid pro quo that no one explicitly talks about but which must be addressed: trade-offs between these negotiations, not just within them.	有一个没人曾明确谈到过的等价交换行为必须得到关注：那就是在上述各种议题之间的讨价还价，而不是仅仅是一个议题之内的利益交换。


Meaningful action on climate change will not be seen until it is agreed within this broader framework.	而除非能拉到这么一个更广泛的框架内进行讨论，否则针对气候变化方面的有意义行动将无影无踪。


This means taking the issue out of its current compartment and being realistic enough to understand that Brazil’s position on cutting down rainforests, for example, will be affected by whether or not it is given a seat on the UN Security Council.	这意味着要跳出原来的框架想问题，并且足够理性地意识到巴西在砍伐热带雨林方面的立场，是与其是否能在联合国安理会获得一个席位息息相关。


It means being sophisticated enough to understand that as long as China feels under pressure to stop propping up the renmimbi, it is unlikely to deliver commitments on emissions cuts.	也必须足够老谋深算地认识到，只要中国继续在人民币汇率方面遭受到国际压力，那么他们当然也不会在减排上作出什么承诺。


Widening the scope of the next round of negotiations so that much more can be used as bargaining chips would make the job of the negotiators considerably harder.	扩大下一轮谈判的范围，让更多的东西可以成为谈判筹码的举措可能会令谈判工作益发艰难。


But it would also give them considerably more to work with.	但这也给了他们更多运筹帷幄的空间。


In fact, there is no other way to prevent the process from remaining a zero-sum game.	事实上除了这条路之外，没有什么方法能阻止谈判变成一场零和游戏。


Worryingly, “Copenhagen 2” will not only have to navigate this complicated terrain, but it must do so in less than five years.	但令人担忧的是，“哥本哈根会议第二轮”不但要在这种复杂的情势下进行探索，而且还必须在5年之内展开运作。


The climate bomb is ticking, and there is a palpable sense of urgency among policymakers.	气候问题的炸弹已经被装上了导火索，而在政策制定者当中也弥漫着紧迫感。


For, as the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has explicitly warned, if emissions do not fall before 2015, and only fall from then onwards (and the overall trend is that they have been rising), we will reach the point of no return.	因为依照来自联合国气候变化问题政府间讨论小组的明确警告，如果排放量在2015年之前还不能降下来，并只是从那时起才开始下降（而整体的趋势依然是增多），我们就将陷入万劫不复的境地。


At that point, the Armageddon scenarios of droughts, rising sea levels, floods, energy and resource wars, and mass migration will become a reality.	到了那个时候，《圣经》中世界末日那种干旱，海平面升高，洪水，能源和资源战争以及大规模逃难都将变成现实。


Just think of the images of recent storms and floods in the Philippines and Vietnam that displaced and killed thousands, and multiply those horrors manifold. That is what we are up against.	只要回想一下最近风暴和洪水在菲律宾和越南夺去数千条生命的惨景，然后再把上述所有灾难都叠加起来，就是我们即将面对的冲击。


Climate change negotiations are arguably the most important of our lifetime, because their outcome will determine the fate of our planet.	气候变化谈判是我们一生中最重要的大事，因为它将决定我们这个星球的命运。


It is essential that they take place within structures and frameworks that encourage agreement by putting other major multilateral issues up for discussion.	因此很有必要将其放在一些鼓励在其他主要多边事务上达成协议的架构或者框架内进行讨论。


The world’s governments must be able to trade horses if pandas and presidents are to do more than smile.	如果要让熊猫和总统都在笑容之外做出点实事的话，全世界的领导人都要作好讨价还价的准备。


Houses in the Air	空中楼阁


Over the past six months, attention and worry have shifted from America’s enormous trade deficit to its surging property markets and real-estate bubble.	过去六个月以来，人们的注意力和担忧从美国巨大的贸易赤字转到了其一路高歌猛进的不动产市场和房产泡沫上。


At least two of the reasons for high – and rising – home prices in the United States are well understood.	造成房价高企，且持续攀升的原因当中至少有两个是广为人知的。


What remains highly uncertain, however, is whether an obviously overheating market can be cooled without sending America, and its main trading partners around the world, into an economic tailspin.	但明显过热的市场是否能够降温而又不至于让美国及其世界主要贸易伙伴陷入经济恐慌则仍然是个未知数。


The US housing boom is due, first, to low interest rates, which mean that large amounts of money can be borrowed for mortgages with moderate monthly payments.	美国房地产市场的繁荣首先是由于低利率。 这意味着人们能够以适中的月供款额，就向银行借到大笔的按揭贷款。


Low interest rates strengthen the ability to pay, and thus boost demand.	低利率增强了人们的还款能力，从而拉动了需求。


And, with demand high and housing supply fixed – at least in the short run – prices go up.	在需求高涨而房屋供应量—至少在短期内—固定的情况下，房价自然走高。


Second, the 70-year period that began with the widespread diffusion of the automobile –during which one could get nearly anywhere in a typical metropolitan area in half an hour or less – is over.	其次，在过去70年里人们可以驾车在半小时或更少的时间里到达一个典型都市区内任何地点的情况已不复存在。 而这一阶段是以汽车成为大众消费品为开端的。


Before there was widespread automobile ownership, land prices depended on location, and proximity to the central city or to the local railroad station carried a premium.	在汽车进入千家万户之前，地价是由土地所在位置和距离市中心或当地火车站的远近等溢价因素来决定的。


Now, with serious congestion slowing traffic in major cities to a crawl, the land gradient in housing prices is steep once again.	现在，随着交通堵塞让各大城市的车流陷入爬行，土地梯度在房价中的重要性又重新凸现。


Perhaps this steepening of the location gradient could be delayed for a decade if we were willing to shift to denser residential patterns.	如果我们先前愿意接受更为密集的居住方式的话，这一梯度的抬升或许还能被推迟十年。


We could, for example, tear down San Francisco’s row houses and replace them with buildings more like those of New York’s Upper West Side.	例如，我们本可以拆除旧金山的连排别墅并代之以更像纽约上西城那样的楼宇。


But we aren’t willing to do that.	但我们并不愿意那样做。


These two factors – low mortgage rates, and the fact that the country has filled up so much that our cars no longer marginalize location costs – go a long way toward explaining the surge in housing prices over the past decade or so.	这两个因素—低贷款利率和这个国家已经如此拥挤以至于汽车再也无法使区位成本边际化的事实—是解释房价在过去十年左右飙升的重要方面。


But they don’t go all the way.	但这毕竟不能完全解释这一现象。


On top of these two powerful fundamental factors sits a bubble.	在这两个重要的根本因素之上还浮着一层泡沫。


The bubble is filled by people with money who are buying extra houses because they think home prices will continue to rise, and by people without money who are buying $400,000 houses in less-fashionable neighborhoods with zero percent down and floating interest rates.	这层泡沫的制造者是那些认为房价会继续上涨因而购置富余住房的有钱人，和那些以零首付和浮动利率贷款的方式在不那么高级的地段购买40万美金左右的房产的没钱的人。


Both groups’ demand is inherently ephemeral. When the first group discovers that housing prices don’t always go up, they will try to dump their properties.	两类人的需求都是短期的：当第一类人发现房价并不总是在上涨时，就会抛售房产；


And when the second group discovers that interest rates don’t always stay low, many of them will be unable to meet their higher mortgage payments and will likewise try to dump their properties.	而当第二类人发现利率并不会总维持在低水平，而他们无力偿还更高额的按揭贷款时，也同样会试图抛售他们的房产。


The end of the American housing bubble might not turn out badly.	美国房产泡沫的破灭或许并不一定是件坏事。


But if it does, it will probably be due to a sharp rise in interest rates.	但如果结果真的很糟，那也很可能是因为利率的急剧提高。


This could happen for two reasons. First, investors, recognizing that the dollar is overvalued and that they are likely to suffer large losses when it returns to its fundamental value, could start selling their Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgage-backed securities.	这种情况可能是由两种原因造成的：首先，当美元回归其根本价值时，投资者们意识到美元的价值被高估从而很可能使他们蒙受巨大损失，于是就可能开始出售手中的政府、公司债券及按揭证券。


As the prices of these assets fall, their yields will rise.	随着这些资产的价格下跌，它们的收益则会增加。


At some point, the yields on bonds and mortgages will be high enough that investors’ appetite for yield will balance their fear of exchange-rate depreciation.	在某种情况下，债券和抵押证券的收益会足够高，以至于投资者们对其的追求能够平衡他们对汇率下跌的恐惧。


In the corridors around my office, all the economists agree that this factor should have pushed US interest rates up three years ago.	我身边的经济学家们都认为这个因素本可以在三年前就使美国利率上升。


But so far it has not.	然而这一情况直到现在都没有出现。


Does this mean that a hurricane could hit world financial markets at any moment?	这意味着世界金融市场真是山雨欲来吗？


Yes.	是的。


Or it could also mean that economists’ baseline model of the international economy – especially the assumption of “uncovered interest parity,” which holds that foreign interest income expressed in the domestic currency should equal the domestic interest rate – is simply wrong.	或者它也可能意味着经济学家们所坚持的国际经济的基线模式—特别是“抛补利率平价说”的假设（即用本地货币表示的国外利息收入应该和本地利率相等）--根本就是错的。


The second factor that could push US interest rates sharply upward is not fear of a decline in the future value of the dollar, but the fact of a past decline in its value.	另一个可能导致美国利率急升的因素不是对美元终值下跌的恐惧，而是其价值在过去曾经下跌的事实。


The US imports the equivalent of 16% of its GDP.	美国的进口额相当于其GDP的16%。


A 40% fall in the value of the dollar – of which half passes through to increased dollar prices of imports – thus implies a 3.2% rise in the overall price level.	美元贬值40%--其中有一半是通过进口货物美元价格的上涨发生的—就意味着总体价格水平上升3. 2%。


A Federal Reserve committed to effective price stability will likely raise interest rates rather than allow any year’s inflation rate to jump from 3% to 6%.	致力于保持有效的价格稳定性的美联储就很可能会提高利率，而不是任由某一年的通胀率从3%跳到6%。


If there is a sharp spike in interest rates – caused either by capital flight in anticipation of a dollar decline or by tight monetary policy in reaction to a dollar decline comes to pass – we will see how good the Federal Reserve really is.	如果出现了利率的急剧波动—不论是由于预见到美元贬值而发生的资本逃逸造成的，还是由于应对美元贬值所采取的紧缩的财政政策造成的—我们都有机会看到美联储究竟有多��的本领。