As Pope Francis said in a recent speech in Bolivia: “This system is by now intolerable: farm workers find it intolerable, laborers find it intolerable, communities find it intolerable, peoples find it intolerable.	教皇方济各最近在玻利维亚的演讲中说：“这个制度现在已经令人无法容忍：农业工人无法容忍、劳工无法容忍、共产主义者无法容忍、各民族无法容忍。


The earth itself – our sister, Mother Earth, as Saint Francis would say – also finds it intolerable.”	地球本身——用圣方济各的话说，我们的姐妹大地（Mother Earth）——也无法容忍。 ”


But are the problems that upset Francis the consequence of what he called “unbridled capitalism”?	但让方济各感到如此不安的问题是他所谓的“放肆的资本主义”的结果吗？


Or are they instead caused by capitalism’s surprising failure to do what was expected of it?	或者，它们是资本主义令人意外地没有完成人们所期待的使命所造成的吗？


Should an agenda to advance social justice be based on bridling capitalism or on eliminating the barriers that thwart its expansion?	旨在推进社会正义的日程应该基于控制资本主义还是消除制约资本主义扩张的壁垒？


The answer in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia is obviously the latter.	拉丁美洲、非洲、中东和亚洲的答案显然是后者。


To see this, it is useful to recall how Karl Marx imagined the future.	要明白这一点，回忆一下马克思所构想的未来是很有裨益的。


For Marx, the historic role of capitalism was to reorganize production.	对马克思来说，资本主义的历史作用是再组织生产。


Gone would be the family farms, artisan yards, and the “nation of shopkeepers,” as Napoleon is alleged to have scornfully referred to Britain.	家庭农场、手工作坊、“店主的国度”（据说拿破仑曾经带着鄙夷如此称呼英国）都将 一去不返。


All these petty bourgeois activities would be plowed over by the equivalent of today’s Zara, Toyota, Airbus, or Walmart.	所有这些小资产阶级活动都会被类似于今天的Zara、丰田、空中客车和沃尔玛等大机构颠覆。


As a result, the means of production would no longer be owned by those doing the work, as on the family farm or in the craftsman’s workshop, but by “capital.”	因此，生产方式将不再像家庭农场或手工作坊那样由做工作的人所有，而是由“资本”所有。 工人只拥有自身的劳动，并被迫用劳动换取可怜的工资。


Workers would possess only their own labor, which they would be forced to exchange for a miserable wage.	尽管如此，他们仍将比“失业的后备军”更加富有。


Nonetheless, they would be more fortunate than the “reserve army of the unemployed” – a pool of idle labor large enough to make others fear losing their job, but small enough not to waste the surplus value that could be extracted by making them work.	由闲置劳动力组成的“失业的后备军”规模足够大，足以让他们害怕失去工作； 又足够小，不会浪费让他们工作所能榨取的剩余价值。


With all previous social classes transformed into the working class, and all means of production in the hands of an ever-dwindling group of owners of “capital,” a proletarian revolution would lead humanity to a world of perfect justice: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” as Marx famously put it.	从前所有的社会阶级都会转变为工作阶级，所有的生产方式都集中在不断减少的“资本”所有者群体手中，在这种情况下，无产阶级革命将给人类带来完美正义的世界：用马克思的名言，就是 “各尽所能，按需分配”。


Clearly, the poet and philosopher Paul Valéry was right: “The future, like everything else, is no longer what it used to be.”	显然，诗人兼哲学家保罗·瓦勒里（Paul Valéry）是正确的：“未来和其他所有东西一样，不再会与昨日相同。


But we should not make fun of Marx’s well-known prediction error.	”但我们不应该哂笑马克思的著名的错误预言。


After all, as the physicist Niels Bohr wryly noted, “Prediction is difficult, especially about the future.”	毕竟，物理学家尼尔斯·玻尔（Niels Bohr）讽刺性地指出：“预言是困难的，特别是对未来的预言。 ”


We now know that as the ink was drying on the Communist Manifesto, wages in Europe and the United States were beginning a 160-year-long rise, making workers part of the middle class, with cars, mortgages, pensions, and petty bourgeois concerns.	现在我们知道，《共产党宣言》墨迹未干，而欧洲和美国的工资便开始了长达160年的增长，让工人跻身中产阶级，拥有汽车、按揭、退休金和小资产阶级情调。


Politicians today promise to create jobs – or more opportunities to be exploited by capital – not to take over the means of production.	今天的政客承诺创造就业机会——或者更多的供资本剥削的机会——而不接收生产方式。


Capitalism could achieve this transformation because the reorganization of production allowed for an unprecedented increase in productivity.	资本主义之所以能够实现这一转变，是因为生产的再组织让生产率得以前所未有地提高。


The division of labor within and across firms, which Adam Smith had already envisioned in 1776 as the engine of growth, allowed for a division of knowhow among individuals that permitted the whole to know more than the parts and form ever-growing networks of exchange and collaboration.	在1776年就被亚当·斯密预见为增长引擎的企业内部的劳动分工实现了个体之间的知识分工，使整体知识能够大于各部分之和，并形成了不断增长的交换与合作的网络。


A modern corporation has experts in production, design, marketing, sales, finance, accounting, human resource management, logistics, taxes, contracts, and so on.	现代公司拥有生产专家、设计专家、市场专家、销售专家、财务专家、会计师、人力资源管理专家、物流专家、税务师、合同专家等各种专业人员。


Modern production is not just an accumulation of buildings and equipment owned by Das Kapital and operated mechanically by fungible workers.	现代生产不仅仅是资本（Das Kapital）所有的建筑和设备的堆积加上可替代的工人的机械操作。


Instead, it is a coordinated network of people that possess different types of Das Human-Kapital.	相反，现代生产是一张由拥有不同类型人力资本（Das Human-Kapital）的人才组成的协作网络。


In the developed world, capitalism did transform almost everyone into a wage laborer, but it also lifted them out of poverty and made them more prosperous than Marx could have imagined.	在发达世界，资本主义确实将几乎所有人都改造成为受薪劳工，但资本主义也让他们走出贫困，让他们获得了比马克思所想象的更繁荣的生活。


That was not the only thing Marx got wrong.	这不是马克思唯一的错误。


More surprisingly, the capitalist reorganization of production petered out in the developing world, leaving the vast majority of the labor force outside its control.	更令人意外的是，资本主义生产再组织在发展中世界逐渐消失，让绝大多数劳动力脱离它的控制。


The numbers are astounding.	数字令人震惊。


While only one in nine people in the United States are self-employed, the proportion in India is 19 out of 20.	美国只有九分之一的人是自由职业者，而印度的这一比例为20分之19。


Fewer than one-fifth of workers in Peru are employed by the kind of private businesses that Marx had in mind.	不到五分之一的秘鲁工人受雇于马克思所构想的私人企业。


In Mexico, about one in three are.	在墨西哥，这一比例为三分之一。


Even within countries, measures of wellbeing are strongly related to the proportion of the labor force employed in capitalist production.	即使在国家内部，福利政策也与有多少比例的劳动力被资本主义生产雇用强烈相关。


In Mexico’s state of Nuevo León, two-thirds of workers are employed by private incorporated businesses, while in Chiapas only one in seven is.	在墨西哥新莱昂州，三分之二的工人受雇于私人企业，而恰帕斯的这一比例只有七分之一。


No wonder, then, that per capita income is more than nine times higher in Nuevo León than in Chiapas.	因此，毫不奇怪，人均��入在新莱昂州要比恰帕斯州高九倍多。


In Colombia, per capita income in Bogota is four times higher than in Maicao.	在哥伦比亚，波哥大人均收入比麦考（Maicao）高四倍。


Unsurprisingly, the share of capitalist employment is six times higher in Bogota.	毫不奇怪，波哥大的资本主义就业率要高出六倍。


In poverty-stricken Bolivia, Francis criticized “the mentality of profit at any price, with no concern for social exclusion or the destruction of nature,” along with “a crude and naive trust in the goodness of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing economic system.”	在饱受贫困困扰的玻利维亚，方济各批评“不管什么价格都要有利润，而丝毫不考虑社会排斥和自然环境破坏问题的心态，”以及“原始而天真地相信行使经济权力的人的善意以及被神圣化的现有经济制度的作用。 ”


But this explanation of capitalism’s failure is wide of the mark.	但如此解释资本主义的失败根本不着边际。


The world’s most profitable companies are not exploiting Bolivia.	世界上最盈利的公司并没有在剥削玻利维亚。


They are simply not there, because they find the place unprofitable.	它们根本就没有来到玻利维亚，因为这里无法盈利。


The developing world’s fundamental problem is that capitalism has not reorganized production and employment in the poorest countries and regions, leaving the bulk of the labor force outside its scope of operation.	发展中世界的根本问题是资本主义没有再组织最贫穷国家和地区的生产和就业，将大部分劳动力排斥在经营范围之外。


As Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch have shown, the world’s poorest countries are not characterized by naive trust in capitalism, but by utter distrust, which leads to heavy government intervention and regulation of business.	拉斐尔·迪·特拉（Rafael Di Tella）和罗伯特·麦考洛克（Robert MacCulloch）指出，世界上最贫穷的国家的特征不是天真地相信资本主义，而是完全不相信资本主义，这导致了大规模政府干预和商业管制。


Under such conditions, capitalism does not thrive and economies remain poor.	在这样的条件下，资本主义无法繁荣，经济也一直贫穷。


Francis is right to focus attention on the plight of the world’s poorest.	方济各将目光集中于世界最贫穷群体的处境，这是正确的。


Their misery, however, is not the consequence of unbridled capitalism, but of a capitalism that has been bridled in just the wrong way.	但是，他们的苦难不是放肆的资本主义造成的，而是被错误地约束的资本主义造成的。


Does “Curing” Cancer Kill Patients?	“治愈癌症”会杀死病人吗？


TAMPA – Patients and politicians increasingly demand a “cure” for cancer.	坦帕——癌症患者和政治家“治愈”癌症的要求越来越强烈。


But controlling the disease may prove to be a better strategy than striving to cure it.	但事实证明控制可能是比治愈更切合实际的方法。


A century ago, the German Nobel laureate Paul Ehrlich introduced the concept of “magic bullets” – compounds engineered to target and kill tumor cells or disease-causing organisms without affecting normal cells.	上个世纪，德国诺贝尔奖得主保罗·奥利克首创了“神奇弹药”概念——这是一种能杀灭肿瘤细胞或者致病组织、同时又不伤及正常细胞的化合物。


The success of antibiotics 50 years later seemed to validate Ehrlich’s idea.	50年后抗生素研制成功似乎证实了奥利克的想法。


So influential have medicine’s triumphs over bacteria been that the “war on cancer” continues to be driven by the assumption that magic bullets will one day be found for tumor cells if the search is sufficiently clever and diligent.	药物灭菌带来如此巨大的胜利喜悦，以致于“抗癌斗争”一直以来都是基于这样一种假设：如果研究人员足够的聪明和勤奋，总有一天我们能够找到杀灭癌细胞的神奇弹药。


Yet lessons learned in dealing with exotic species, combined with recent mathematical models of the evolutionary dynamics of tumors, indicate that eradicating most cancers may be impossible.	但人们以往与异常物种打交道的经验和最近有关肿瘤进化动力学的数学模型告诉我们，彻底治愈绝大多数癌症可能是不现实的目标。


Trying to do so, moreover, could worsen the problem.	不仅如此，这样做还有可能使问题进一步恶化。


In 1854, the year Ehrlich was born, the diamondback moth was first observed in Illinois.	在奥利克出生的1854年，伊利诺伊州首次发现了小菜蛾。


Within five decades, the moth had spread throughout North America.	后来的五十年里，小菜蛾传遍了北美地区。


It now infests the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australia.	现在美洲、欧洲、亚洲和澳洲都能找到它的身影。


Attempts to eradicate it using chemicals worked only fleetingly.	使用化学药剂杀灭小菜蛾的努力只在很短的时间内起到了效果。


In the late 1980’s, biologists found strains that were resistant to all known insecticides.	20世纪80年代末，生物学家发现了对所有已知杀虫剂具有耐药性的菜蛾品种。


So farmers abandoned their efforts to eliminate the moth.	于是农民们不再试图彻底消灭小菜蛾。


Instead, most now apply insecticides only when infestation exceeds some threshold level, with the goal of producing a sustainable and satisfactory crop.	相反，多数人为了持续达到相对满意的作物产量，现在只有在感染率超过一定限度时才使用杀虫剂。


Under the banner of “integrated pest management,” hundreds of invasive species are now successfully controlled by strategies that restrict the population growth of pests but do not attempt to eradicate them	在“综合害虫治理”的大旗下，数百种入侵物种现在借助限制害虫繁殖数量，但并不试图彻底消灭它们的策略得到了成功地控制。


The ability of tumor cells to adapt to a wide range of environmental conditions, including toxic chemicals, is similar to the evolutionary capacities demonstrated by crop pests and other invasive species.	肿瘤细胞适应各种环境条件、包括有毒化学物质的能力与农作物害虫和其他入侵性物种所表现出来的进化能力非常相似。


As in the case of the Diamondback moth, successful eradication of disseminated cancer cells is rare.	像小菜蛾的例子所表明的那样，扩散的癌细胞很少能够被成功的杀灭。


But despite the paucity of success, the typical goal in cancer therapy remains similar to that of antimicrobial treatments – killing as many tumor cells as possible under the assumption that this will, at best, cure the disease and, at worst, keep the patient alive for as long as possible.	但尽管少有成功的先例，但癌症治疗的典型目标仍然与杀菌治疗非常相似——那就是尽可能多的杀死癌细胞。 人们认为这样在最好情况下能够治愈疾病，而在最坏情况下也能尽可能延长患者的存活时间。


Some types of cancer – for example, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, testicular cancer, and acute myeloid leukemia – can be consistently cured using aggressive chemotherapy.	某些类型的癌症，比如霍奇金淋巴瘤、睾丸癌和急性髓细胞性白血病，一般都可以借助积极的化疗达到治愈目的。


But these malignant cells seem to be particularly responsive to “treatment.”	但这些恶性细胞似乎对“治疗”特别敏感。


Just as invasive species adapt to pesticides, most cancer cells adapt to therapies.	就像入侵性物种会适应杀虫剂一样，多数癌细胞也会适应治疗措施。


Indeed, the parallels between cancerous cells and invasive species suggest that the principles for successful cancer therapy might be found not in the magic bullets of microbiology but in the evolutionary dynamics of applied ecology.	事实上，癌细胞和入侵性物种之间的相似之处表明成功治疗癌症的原则或许并不在于微生物学领域的神奇弹药，而在于应用生态学领域对进化动力学的研究。


Recent research suggests that efforts to eliminate cancers may actually hasten the emergence of resistance and tumor recurrence, thus reducing a patient’s chances of survival.	最近的研究显示治愈癌症的努力实际可能加速催生抗药性，导致癌症复发，从而降低患者的存活几率。


The reason arises from a component of tumor biology not ordinarily investigated: the cost of resistance to treatment.	究其原因是由于肿瘤生物学中不为人知的部分：那就是抗药性对癌症治疗的削弱作用。


Cancer cells pay a price when they evolve resistance to chemotherapy.	在对化疗产生抗药性的过程中癌细胞会遭受损失。


For example, to cope with toxic drugs, a cancer cell may increase its rate of DNA repair, or actively pump the drug out across the cell membrane.	比如为了对抗有毒药品，癌细胞可能会加快DNA的修复速度，或者主动将抗癌药物挤出细胞膜。


In targeted therapies, in which drugs interfere with the molecular signaling needed for proliferation and survival, a cell might adapt by activating or following alternative pathways.	在靶向治疗中，药物对癌细胞存活以及扩散所需要的分子信号产生干扰，而癌细胞则有可能通过激活或者采用替代路线来适应抗癌药物。


All these strategies use up energy that would otherwise be available for invasion into non-cancerous tissues or proliferation, and so reduce a cell’s fitness.	这些方法将会耗尽本可以用于入侵健康细胞或者进行扩散的能量，并以此来降低癌细胞的健康程度。


The more complex and costly the mechanisms used, the less fit the resistant population will be.	实际采用的抗癌机制越是复杂昂贵，与之对抗的癌细胞的健康状况就越差。


That cancer cells pay a price for resistance is supported by several observations.	若干研究成果支持了癌细胞为获得抗药性而付出代价的假设。


Cells in   laboratory cultures that are resistant to chemotherapies typically lose their resistance when the chemicals are removed.	在实验室环境中对化疗产生抗药性的细胞一般会在化疗解除后失去抗药性。


Lung cancer cells that are resistant to the chemotherapy gemcitabine are less proliferative, invasive, and motile than their drug-sensitive counterparts.	对吉西他滨化疗产生抗药性的肺癌细胞比对药物治疗敏感的其他肿瘤细胞的扩散性、侵略性和能动性都有所下降。


Although resistant forms are commonly found in tumors that haven’t yet been exposed to treatment, they generally occur in small numbers.	虽然抗药细胞在从未接受过治疗的肿瘤中也十分常见，但它们的数量通常很小。


This suggests that resistant cells are not so unfit that drug-sensitive cells completely out-competed them, but that they struggle to proliferate when both types are present.	这种现象表明抗药细��并没有被对药物敏感的细胞彻底击溃，而是在两种细胞混合的情况下竭力扩张。


Our models show that in the absence of therapy, cancer cells that haven’t evolved resistance will proliferate at the expense of the less-fit resistant cells.	我们的模型显示在不进行任何治疗的情况下，没有抗药性的癌细胞将会战胜不那么健康的抗药细胞。


When a large number of sensitive cells are killed, say, by aggressive therapies, resistant types can proliferate unconstrained.	但当敏感细胞被积极的治疗手段大量杀死的时候，那么抗药细胞就会不受限制地大量扩散。


This means that high doses of chemotherapy might actually increase the likelihood of a tumor becoming unresponsive to further therapy.	这意味着高剂量化疗实际可能会使进一步治疗无效的几率加大。


So, just as judicious use of pesticides can control invasive species, a therapeutic strategy designed to maintain a stable, tolerable tumor volume could improve a patient’s prospects for survival by allowing sensitive cells to suppress the growth of resistant ones.	因此，正像恰当的使用杀虫剂可以控制侵入性物种一样，旨在保持癌细胞数量稳定可控的治疗方法也可以让敏感细胞抑制住耐药细胞的生长，从而提高患者的生存几率。


To test this idea, we treated a human ovarian cancer, grown in mice, with conventional high-dose chemotherapy.	为了验证这一理念，我们采用传统高剂量化疗的方法对小白鼠所患的人类卵巢癌进行治疗。


The cancer rapidly regressed but then recurred and killed the mice.	结果是癌细胞迅速减少，但随之快速复发，杀死了小白鼠。


Yet when we treated the mice with a drug dose continuously adjusted to maintain a stable tumor volume, the animals, though not cured, survived for a prolonged period of time.	但当我们用调整到能够保持癌细胞数量稳定的药物剂量为小白鼠进行治疗的时候，实验动物虽然没有被完全治愈，但却实现了长时间存活。


Designing therapies to sustain a stable tumor mass rather than eradicate all cancer cells will   require a strategy that looks beyond the immediate cytotoxic effects of any one treatment.	设计一套保持肿瘤细胞稳定而不是彻底杀灭所有癌细胞的治疗方案需要不计较任何一次治疗的即时杀伤效果。


Researchers will need to establish the mechanisms by which cancer cells achieve resistance and what it costs them.	研究人员需要明确癌细胞获得耐药性及其所付出代价之间的联系机制。


They will need to understand the evolutionary dynamics of resistant populations, and design strategies to suppress or exploit the adapted characteristics.	他们需要理解耐药癌细胞的进化动力状况，并设计出抑制或者利用其适应性特点的相关治疗策略。


Of course, cancer researchers should not abandon their search for ever-more-effective cancer therapies, even for cures.	当然，癌症研究人员不应放弃对更有效的癌症治疗方法、甚至是治愈方法的研究。


But it may be time to temper our quest for magic bullets and recognize the cold reality of Darwin’s evolutionary dynamics.  Medicine’s goal of a glorious victory over cancer may need to yield to our recognizing that an uneasy stalemate may be the best that can be achieved.	但或许是时候调整我们对神奇弹药的探索，承认达尔文进化动力学的冰冷现实。 彻底战胜癌症的医学目标可能需要让位于这样一种理念，那就是维持来之不易的平衡局面或许是能够实现的最高目标。


Does Debt Matter?	债务问题要紧吗？


LONDON – Europe is now haunted by the specter of debt.	伦敦—如今，欧洲上空飘荡着债务的幽灵。


All European leaders quail before it.	这个幽灵令所有欧洲领导人心惊胆寒。


To exorcise the demon, they are putting their economies through the wringer.	为了把它赶走，他们正在把各自的经济推向磨难。


It doesn’t seem to be helping.	但这一招似乎并不显灵。


Their economies are still tumbling, and the debt continues to grow.	他们的经济仍然蹒跚，而债务并没有停止增长。


The credit ratings agency Standard & Poor’s has just downgraded the sovereign-debt ratings of nine eurozone countries, including France.	评级机构标准普尔刚刚下调了欧元区九国主权债务评级，法国赫然在列。


The United Kingdom is likely to follow.	英国很可能将步其后尘。


To anyone not blinded by folly, the explanation for this mass downgrade is obvious.	如果你还没有被愚昧蒙蔽了双眼，那么这次大面积降级的原因就很容易看清。


If you deliberately aim to shrink your GDP, your debt-to-GDP ratio is bound to grow.	如果你有意要让GDP下降，那么你的债务-GDP必定会随之上升。


The only way to cut your debt (other than by default) is to get your economy to grow.	削减债务，除了违约之外，唯一的办法就是让经济增长起来。


Fear of debt is rooted in human nature; so the extinction of it as a policy aim seems right to the average citizen.	担心债务乃是人类本能； 因此，消灭债务的政策目标在普通公民眼中断然是不会错的。


Everyone knows what financial debt means: money owed, often borrowed.	众所周知，财务债务的意思是欠钱，通常是借来的钱。


To be in debt can produce anxiety if one is uncertain whether, when the time comes, one will be able to repay what one owes.	如果你对到时候无法偿还所欠的钱感到不确定，那么你的债务就会让你产生焦虑。


This anxiety is readily transferred to national debt – the debt owed by a government to its creditors.	这种焦虑已经转移到了国民债务层面，也就是政府欠其债权人的债务。


How, people ask, will governments repay all of the hundreds of billions of dollars that they owe?	人们会问，政府将如何偿还它们所欠下的数千亿美元债务？


As British Prime Minister David Cameron put it: “Government debt is the same as credit-card debt; it’s got to be paid back.”	正如英国首相卡梅伦所言：“政府债务和信用卡债务是一样，迟早要还的。 ”


The next step readily follows: in order to repay, or at least reduce, the national debt, the government must eliminate its budget deficit, because the excess of spending over revenue continually adds to the national debt.	接下来出现的是，为了偿还（或至少减少）国民债务，政府必须消除其预算赤字，因为支出超过收入会继续增加国民债务。


Indeed, if the government fails to act, the national debt will become, in today’s jargon, “unsustainable.”	事实上，如果政府行动不力，那么国民债务将变得——用今天的行话讲——“不可持续”。


Again, an analogy with household debt readily suggests itself.	在这里，仍然可以用家庭债务来类比。


My death does not extinguish my debt, reasons the sensible citizen.	我的逝世并不会让我的债务消失，稍有头脑的公民都知道这一点。


My creditors will have the first claim on my estate – everything that I wanted to leave to my children.	我的债权人将拥有对我的财产——即我准备遗留给子孙后代的所有东西——的第一索偿权。


Similarly, a debt left unpaid too long by a government is a burden on future generations: I may enjoy the benefits of government extravagance, but my children will have to foot the bill.	类似地，政府长期未能偿还的债务也将成为子孙后代的负担：我可以从政府的铺张浪费中获得好处，这得由我的子孙后代买单。


That is why deficit reduction is at the center of most governments’ fiscal policy today.	这就是为什么削减债务成为大多数政府财政政策的核心。


A government with a “credible” plan for “fiscal consolidation” supposedly is less likely to default on its debt, or leave it for the future to pay.	一个具有“可信”的“财政整合”计划的政府想必不太会对其债务违约，或把它留给未来去偿还。


This will, it is thought, enable the government to borrow money more cheaply than it would otherwise be able to do, in turn lowering interest rates for private borrowers, which should boost economic activity.	人们认为，这能让政府以更低的成本借到钱，反过来拉低私人借款人的利率，从而能够提振经济活动。


So fiscal consolidation is the royal road to economic recovery.	于是，财政整合就成了经济复苏的不二法门。


This, the official doctrine of most developed countries today, contains at least five major fallacies, which pass largely unnoticed, because the narrative is so plausible.	这便是如今大多数发达国家的指导方针，但其中至少有五大漏洞，而由于财政整合说听起来无懈可击，因此这五大漏洞很少有人注意到。


First, governments, unlike private individuals, do not have to “repay” their debts.	首先，政府不同于个人，其债务并不是必须“偿还”的。


A government of a country with its own central bank and its own currency can simply continue to borrow by printing the money which is lent to it.	拥有本国中央银行的政府可以通过印刷本国货币借给自己。


This is not true of countries in the eurozone.	这一点对欧元区国家是不成立的。


But their governments do not have to repay their debts, either.	但这些国家的政府也不是必须“偿还”其债务的。


If their (foreign) creditors put too much pressure on them, they simply default.	如果（外国）债权人给它们施加太多的压力，它们可以选择违约。


Default is bad.	违约绝不是好事。


But life after default goes on much as before.	但违约之后的日子并不会比不违约差。


Second, deliberately cutting the deficit is not the best way for a government to balance its books.	其次，刻意削减赤字并不是政府平衡预算的最佳方式。


Deficit reduction in a depressed economy is the road not to recovery, but to contraction, because it means cutting the national income on which the government’s revenues depend.	在经济萧条时削减赤字绝非复苏之路，反之，恰恰是收缩之路，因为这意味着连同政府收入所依赖的国民收入一起削减了。


This will make it harder, not easier, for it to cut the deficit.	这会让赤字削减变得更困难而不是更容易。


The British government already must borrow £112 billion ($172 billion) more than it had planned when it announced its deficit-reduction plan in June 2010.	英国政府于2010年6月宣布赤字削减计划，但现在，它所必须借入的资金规模比计划中多了1120亿英镑。


Third, the national debt is not a net burden on future generations.	第三，国民债务并不是子孙后代的净负担。


Even if it gives rise to future tax liabilities (and some of it will), these will be transfers from taxpayers to bond holders.	尽管这会提高未来税收负担，但这一负担会从纳税人手中转移到债权人那里。


This may have disagreeable distributional consequences.	���可能会造成令人不快的分配后果。


But trying to reduce it now will be a net burden on future generations: income will be lowered immediately, profits will fall, pension funds will be diminished, investment projects will be canceled or postponed, and houses, hospitals, and schools will not be built.	现在试图削减国民债务将给子孙后代造成净负担：收入会马上出现下降，利润会缩水，退休基金规模会不足，投资项目会被取消或中止，住房、医院、学校也将无法建设。


Future generations will be worse off, having been deprived of assets that they might otherwise have had.	未来政府的境况会因此更加糟糕，因为它们失去了本可以留在手中的资产。


Fourth, there is no connection between the size of national debt and the price that a government must pay to finance it.	第四，国民债务规模和政府融资成本之间并没有多少联系。


The interest rates that Japan, the United States, the UK, and Germany pay on their national debt are equally low, despite vast differences in their debt levels and fiscal policies.	日本、美国、英国和德国的国民债务偿还成本一样低，尽管它们的债务水平和财政政策相差极大。


Finally, low borrowing costs for governments do not automatically reduce the cost of capital for the private sector.	最后，政府借债的低成本并不会自动拉低私人部门的资本成本。


After all, corporate borrowers do not borrow at the “risk-free” yield of, say, US Treasury bonds, and evidence shows that monetary expansion can push down the interest rate on government debt, but have hardly any effect on new bank lending to firms or households.	毕竟，公司借款人不可能以像美国国债那样的“无风险”收益率借钱，有证据表明，货币扩张可以拉低政府债务的利率，但很难影响银行向公司和家庭发放的新贷款的利率。


In fact, the causality is the reverse: the reason why government interest rates in the UK and elsewhere are so low is that interest rates for private-sector loans are so high.	事实上，这里的因果关系正好相反：英国和其他地区的政府利率之所以如此之低，是因为私人部门贷款利率太高了。


As with “the specter of Communism” that haunted Europe in Karl Marx’s famous manifesto, so today “[a]ll the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise” the specter of national debt.	马克思著名的《共产党宣言中》中说道，“共产主义的幽灵”游荡在欧洲上空，而如今，“就欧洲的所有势力已经结成了一个神圣同盟，驱逐”国民债务的幽灵。


But statesmen who aim to liquidate the debt should recall another famous specter – the specter of revolution.	但意在清除债务的政客们应该记住另一个著名的幽灵——革命的幽灵。


Does Europe Have a Death Wish?	欧洲是否有意求死？


BERLIN – From the start of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, the major European players should have understood the risks and consequences that it posed for the European Union.	柏林——自2010年希腊债务危机伊始，欧洲主要国家就应该已经清楚它可能给欧盟带来什么样的风险和后果。


They certainly don’t give that impression to onlookers.	但在旁观者看来显然并非如此。


The crisis was always about much more than Greece: a disorderly insolvency there would threaten to pull other economies on the EU’s southern periphery, including some very big ones, into the fiscal abyss, along with major European banks and insurers.	受危机影响的远远不只希腊：无序破产可能把欧盟南部周边经济体（包括某些大国在内）拖入财政深渊，而主要欧洲银行和保险公司也将同时倒下。


That could plunge the global economy into another financial crisis, delivering a shock equivalent to the autumn of 2008.	全球经济将由此陷入另一场金融危机，其所造成的冲击力不亚于2008年秋。


It would also mean a eurozone failure that would not leave the Common Market unharmed.	随之而来的欧元区失败将不可能无损于欧洲共同市场。


For the first time in its history, the very continuance of the European project is at stake.	有史以来第一次，事态的发展直接关系到欧洲计划的生死存亡。


And yet the behavior of the EU and its most important member states has been irresolute and dithering, owing to national egotism and a breathtaking absence of leadership.	但因为严重缺乏领导和国家利己主义作怪，致使欧盟及其重要成员国犹豫不决，迟迟无法采取行动。


States can go bust just like companies, but, unlike companies, they don’t disappear when that happens.	国家可以像企业那样破产，但与企业不同的是，他们破产之后也不会消失。


That is why states should not be punished, and why their ongoing interests should not be underestimated.	国家因此不应受到惩罚，他们的长期利益也不容忽视。


Insolvent states need help with restructuring, both in the financial sector and well beyond it, so that they can work their way out of crisis.	破产国家可能需要外界协助在金融及其他诸多领域展开重组，这样才能逐步摆脱危机的影响。


This is certainly true of Greece, whose structural problems are much more sweeping than even its financial difficulties.	上述判断显然适用于希腊，希腊的结构性问题甚至比目前的财政困难影响更大。


Thus far, the EU and the Greek government have failed to address Greece’s structural problems.	到目前为止，欧盟和希腊政府还未能解决希腊的结构性问题。


But they need to develop (and fund) an appropriate strategy for economic reconstruction, in order to make clear to the Greeks – and to skittish financial markets – that there is light at the end of the tunnel.	但为了让希腊人——和变幻莫测的金融市场——看到隧道尽头的亮光，他们需要制定（并资助）恰当的经济重建政策。


Everyone knows that Greece will be unable to work its way out of crisis without massive debt relief.	希腊人没有大规模债务减免就无法摆脱危机已是不争的事实。


The only question is whether the country’s debt restructuring will be orderly and controlled or chaotic and contagious.	唯一问题是该国的债务重组是有序可控、还是混乱并具有传染性。


Either way, Germany’s internal debate about whether to pay for the Greek debt is risible.	无论如何，德国是否为希腊债务买单的国内辩论都显得滑稽可笑。


Refusing to pay is not a viable option, because Germany and all other eurozone members are in the same boat.	根本没有可能拒绝买单，因为德国和其他所有欧元区国家都在同一条船上。


A Greek default would threaten to sink them, too, for it would raise immediate concerns about the solvency of Europe’s systemically important banks and insurance companies.	如果希腊债务违约引发人们对欧洲体系中举足轻重的银行和保险公司的即时关注，那么他们也将随这条船一同沉没。


So what are the eurozone’s heads of government waiting for?	那么欧元区政府首脑们还在等些什么？


Are they reluctant to come clean with their people out of fear for their own political futures?	他们是否因为个人的政治前途而不愿对民众和盘托出？


The European financial crisis is really a political crisis, because EU leaders are unable to decide on the necessary measures.	欧洲金融危机实质是一场政治危机，因为欧盟领导人无法做出必要的决策。


Instead, time is lost on secondary issues largely rooted in domestic policy concerns.	反之，大把的时间都被浪费在国内政策等次要问题上。


It is certainly right, in principle, to argue that the banks should participate in financing the resolution of the debt crisis.	从原则上看，要求银行参与化解债务危机的融资无疑是正确的。


But it makes little sense to insist on it as long as losses by banks that remain “too big to fail” could trigger a renewed financial crisis.	但如果“大到不能倒闭的银行”的亏损可能诱发新一轮的金融危机，坚持让银行买单就没有什么道理了。


Any chance to make this work would have required overhauling the financial system early in 2009, but that opportunity was largely wasted.	实现这一目标需要在2009年初对金融系统进行全面检查，但那次机会基本已经被浪费掉了。


As long as the EU’s life-threatening political crisis continues, its financial crisis will continue to destabilize it.	只要关系到欧盟生死的政治危机得不到解决，欧盟的稳定就会继续遭到金融危机的破坏。


At the heart of resolving the crisis lies the certainty that the euro – and with it the EU as a whole – will not survive without greater European political unification.	化解危机确定的核心问题是：如果不实现欧洲政治统一，欧元和作为整体的欧盟就无法继续存在。


If Europeans want to keep the euro, we must forge ahead with political union now; otherwise, like it or not, the euro and European integration will be undone.	如果欧洲人希望保住欧元，我们必须立即达成政治联盟； 如若不然，欧元和欧洲一体化的成果就将付之东流。


Europe would then lose nearly everything it has gained over a half-century from transcending nationalism.	欧洲也将失去半个多世纪来超越民族主义所取得的一切收获。


In the light of the emerging new world order, this would be a tragedy for Europeans.	在新的世界秩序正逐步形成的背景下，这对欧洲人而言无疑是场悲剧。


Unfortunately, when the outgoing president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, proposed a step in this direction by suggesting that a “European Secretary of the Treasury” be created, heads of state and government dismissed the idea out of hand.	遗憾的是，即将卸任的欧洲央行行长让·克洛德·特里谢建议设立的“欧元区财长”一职遭到国家和政府首脑们不假思索的否决。


Hardly anyone on the European Council seems willing even to acknowledge the depth of the EU crisis.	欧洲理事会甚至几乎没有人愿意承认这场欧洲危机的深度。


Resolving this crisis requires more Europe and more integration, not less.	解决这场危机需要加强而非削弱欧洲一体化。


And yes: the rich economies – first and foremost Germany – will have to pay for the way out.	是的：富裕国家——首先是德国——将必须承担解决危机的费用。


Germany and France, the two crucial players in this crisis, will have to devise a joint strategy, because only they, working together, can push through a solution.	这场危机的两大关键角色德国和法国必须制定联合对策，因为只有他们齐心协力才能促成解决方案顺利通过。


The problem is that the French referendum on the EU constitution in 2005 vetoed further political integration, while further economic integration may now fail because of Germany.	问题在于2005年法国针对欧盟宪法的全民公投否决了政治一体化进程的深入，而经济一体化进程的深入则可能因为德国的犹豫而陷入失败。


What is required, therefore, is an open bilateral French-German dialogue about a comprehensive realignment of the monetary union.	因此必须要进行全面调整货币联盟的法德双边公开对话。


Treaty changes are impossible; therefore, different methods will need to be found, which makes the Franco-German partnership all the more important.	更改协议绝无可能，因此必须找到其他的办法，这也使法德合作显得尤为重要。


Regardless of the EU’s political crisis and paralysis, Europeans should not forget how important its existence is and will continue to be.	无论欧盟陷入了怎样的政治危机和困境，欧洲人都必须记住欧盟存在无论对现在还是未来有多么重要。


One has only to look back to the first half of the twentieth century to understand why.	你只要回顾一下20世纪早期的情况就明白我为什么这样说。


Does Europe Have a Korean Option?	欧元区可以走韩国之路吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – On the surface, at least, the situation in the eurozone today and South Korea in the fall of 1997 look very different.	华盛顿——至少从表面上看，欧元区当前状况与韩国在1997年崩盘时截然不同。


Both are cases of severe economic crisis, to be sure. But the eurozone’s problems stem from high levels of government debt, while South Korea faced massive capital flight and a collapsing currency – and almost all of the debt was in the corporate sector.	两者都是严重的经济危机，但欧元区的问题来自政府债务水平高企，而韩国的问题来自大规模资本外逃和货币崩溃，且债务基本上全部来自公司部门。


Nevertheless, the eurozone could learn from the experience of South Korea, which came through its crisis more quickly than anyone expected, combining sensible reforms with a rapid recovery.	尽管如此，欧元区还是可以从韩国身上学到经验，后者当年以任何人都没想到的速度走出了危机，实现了明智的改革和快速复苏。


The key to the South Korean turnaround was a large depreciation of the currency, the won.	韩国迅速扭转局势的关键在于韩元的大幅贬值。


A depreciation of the euro seems to be one likely way that the eurozone will turn the corner.	欧元贬值似乎也是欧元区扭转局势的可行之道。


Every crisis is different, but South Korea shared many features with other troubled emerging markets in the 1990’s.	不同的危机各有各的不同，但韩国危机与20世纪90年代的其他新兴市场危机有着诸多相似之处。


Large, politically well-connected groups of companies – known as chaebol – expanded rapidly by taking on large amounts of cheap debt.	“财阀”——即政治上紧密联系的大型公司集团——通过低成本债务迅速扩张。


Outside shareholders had little influence over the powerful individuals who ran the chaebol, and creditors lent money freely, assuming that the leading chaebol were too important for the government to allow them to go bankrupt.	外部股东对财阀内部的权势人物无法产生任何影响，债权人放心地把钱借给财阀，因为他们认定大财阀对政府而言非常重要，政府不会坐视它们倒闭。


Meanwhile, political factors played an important role in allowing debt to build up – creating vulnerabilities that could quickly become an economic crisis once investors became nervous.	与此同时，政治因素在债务积累过程中扮演着重要角色，创造了极大的脆弱性，当投资者感到情况不妙时，经济危机就迅速发生了。


Even though South Korean state-owned banks nominally controlled the flow of capital, tight relationships between the private sector and the government meant that the chaebol felt they had little to fear.	尽管韩国国有银行在名义上控制着资本流动，但私人部门和政府之间的机密联系让财阀有恃无恐。


In the fall of 1997, after crises battered Thailand and Indonesia, full-scale panic erupted in South Korea.	在1997年的崩盘中，危机先是袭击了泰国和印度尼西亚，然后在韩国引起了全面恐慌。


As the currency depreciated, the corporate sector’s foreign loans became more onerous – further exacerbating the panic.	随着韩元的贬值，公司部门的外国贷款负担大大增加，这进一步加剧了恐慌。


Early support offered by the International Monetary Fund did not stabilize the situation.	IMF的早期支持都没能让情况稳定下来。


The eurozone today does not have a foreign-debt problem – all of the debt in question is in euros, and most of it is owed by European governments to their own countries’ banks.	如今，欧元区不存在外债问题——所有的问题债务都是欧元债，且大部分是欧洲政府欠本国银行的债务。


But this is a toxic combination, as Greece and Italy have discovered.	但正如希腊和意大利所显示的，这是一个危险的组合。


European debt dynamics are quite distinct from those in South Korea, but the problem in both instances could be considered insurmountable.	欧洲债务动态与韩国截然不同，但两者的问题都是难以克服的。


The obvious escape route leads through economic growth, which would reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio and make interest payments look reasonable.	显而易见的危机疏散同道是经济增长，经济增长能拉低债务-GDP比率，让利息支付看起来更加合理。


But the standard ways to stimulate the European economy are not available: fiscal policy is constrained by already-high debt levels; and the European Central Bank, fearing inflation, has kept a tight rein on monetary policy.	但欧洲并不具备采取标准刺激手段的条件：债务水平高企让束缚住了财政政策的手脚，而担心通胀的欧洲央行又不肯放松货币政策。


None of the other ideas on the European table, including various kinds of “structural reform,” will provide fast growth in the short term.	欧洲谈判桌上的其他办法，包括各种各样的“结构性改革”，均无法提供短期快速增长之路。


In September, Portugal planned to pursue a form of “internal devaluation,” by cutting payroll taxes and increasing the VAT; this has now been shelved, presumably because it is politically unworkable.	9月，葡萄牙曾计划采取一种“内部贬值”，降低薪资税，提高增值税； 但这一计划现在已被束之高阁，最主要的原因是在政治上不可行。


A genuine devaluation, on the other hand, would work wonders for the real economy.	另一方面，真实贬值可以对实体经济产生神奇疗效。


The moribund Italian economy would spring to life if the euro fell by 30%, adjusted for inflation.	如果欧元贬值30%（经通胀调整），死气沉沉的意大利经济就能重获生机。


In 1997, South Korea’s economy took a nosedive, and 1998 was still difficult, but GDP soared by 11.1% in 1999.	1997年，韩国经济发生崩盘，1998年毫无起色，但到了1999年，GDP大增11. 1%。


How the euro would be able to depreciate, given that it is a floating currency with very little intervention – that is, the exchange rate is largely market determined – depends on monetary policy.	欧元是一种自由浮动货币，很少会被干预——也就是说，其汇率是由市场决定的——如何让它贬值取决于货币政策。


If the ECB agreed to loosen monetary policy or provide enough “liquidity” to support various bailouts, investors would fear inflation, weakening the euro.	如果欧洲央行同意放松银根，提供足够“流动性”以支持各种各样的援助计划，那么投资者会担心通胀，从而欧元会走弱。


On the other hand, if the ECB preferred to let major countries, such as Italy, default on their debts, this would likely weaken the euro even further, as investors feared a contagion of defaults.	另一方面，如果欧洲央行更想让主要国家（如意大利）对其债务违约，那么欧元可能会进一步贬值，因为投资者会担心违约将蔓延。


While depreciation would never be eurozone officials’ stated policy, it currently looks like all roads lead in that direction.	贬值永远不会是欧元区官员直言不讳的选择，但从目前来看，这正是欧洲在走的路。


Of course, currency depreciation is not a panacea.	当然，货币贬值也不是万能灵药。


The South Korean situation also involved difficult steps, including a confrontation between the government and the largest chaebol, some of which had quite blatantly violated the law.	韩国当年的步子就迈得相当艰难，政府和大财阀之间冲突不断，有的财阀甚至公开违抗法律。


After a series of showdowns, in which one company, Daewoo, threatened to default, and political forces rallied to its assistance, the government won; the hugely powerful Daewoo group underwent bankruptcy and restructuring.	在一系列争锋相对后——在此期间，大宇公司威胁要违约，各政治势力联手挽救——政府取得了胜利； 炙手可热的大宇集团破产并被重组。


Overall, South Korea managed to curb its corporate sector’s excessive power (which holds lessons for dealing with today’s mega-banks).	总的来说，韩国成功地削弱了公司部门的过度权力（这给如今如何对付巨型银行提供了经验）。


Similarly, Europe needs to fix its deeper structural problems.	类似地，欧洲需要修复其深层次结构性问题。


It needs a fiscal center – much as the United States needed a federal authority to tax in 1787.	欧洲需要一个财政中心——正如1787年的美国需要一个联邦机构来征税。


Indeed, the Europeans need the equivalent of the US Constitutional Convention – and the difficult ratification debate that followed.	事实上，欧洲需要举行一次美国先发会议——及其后的艰难宪法批准争论。


But some depreciation of the euro would provide a bridge to reach internal governance reform.	但欧元一定程度的贬值有助于促进内部治理改革的实现。


And, like it or not, rising pressure on the euro is likely to force European officials to cross it.	此外，不管你喜不喜欢，欧元的压力正在与日俱增，欧洲领导人可能被迫走上贬值之路。


Does Growth Have a Future?	增长能有未来么？


MILAN – What can we expect as the world’s economy emerges from its most serious downturn in almost a century?	米兰——当全球正在走出近一百年来最严重的经济危机之时，我们能有什么期待么？


The short answer is a “new normal,” with slower growth, a de-risked and more stable core financial system, and a set of additional challenges (energy, climate, and demographic imbalances, to name a few) with varying time horizons that will test our collective capacity to improve management and oversight of the global economy.	简单的回答就是“全新的模式”，也就是放缓增长步伐，建立一个少一点风险，多一点稳定的金融系统，应对不同时期的一些挑战（例如能源，气候和地球人口分布的不平衡性等），这将考验我们是否有能力管理和监控世界的经济。


Lower growth is the best guess for the medium term.	从中期来看，较低的增长率是很有可能的一个走向。


It seems most likely, but no one really knows.	虽然可能性很大，但没有人真正知道现实的发展是如何。


The financial crisis, morphing quickly into a global economic downturn, resulted not just from a failure to react to growing instability, risk, and imbalance, but also from a widespread pre-crisis inability to ”see” the rising systemic risk.	此次金融危机来势汹汹，不仅让我们看到了全球经济增长的不稳定性，风险和不平衡性； 也告诉我们，在危机发生之前，没能“预见”到不断增加的系统性风险的存在。


These defining characteristics will condition the responses and the results in coming years.	这些负面的影响会在接下来的几年里体现出来。


There are countervailing forces. The high-growth countries (China and India) are large and getting larger relative to the rest.	一些快速增长的国家，例如中国和印度，对其他国家的影响要大一些。


That alone will tend to elevate global growth compared to the world where industrial countries, and the US in particular, were in the growth driving seat.	他们对世界经济回暖的贡献要大于一些发达国家。 但美国无疑还是全球经济回暖的龙头。


The current crisis has come to be called a “balance-sheet recession” of global scope and tremendous depth and destructive power because of its origins in the balance sheets of the financial and household sectors.	目前的金融危机被称为全球的"资产负债表式"的萧条，之所以有如此深而广泛的破坏力，问题在于资产负债表上的金融和房屋项目上。


Extreme balance-sheet destruction is what made it distinctive.  In the future, central banks and regulators will not be able to afford a narrow focus on (goods and services) inflation, growth, and employment (the real economy) while letting the balance-sheet side fend for itself.	资产负债表的破坏有其特殊性。 在未来，央行和各国监管机构不能仅仅把焦点放在（货物和服务的）通胀，增长和（真实经济的）就业状况上，还需要兼顾资产负债表的变化。


Somewhere in the system, accountability for stability and sustainability in terms of asset valuation, leverage, and balance sheets will need to be assigned and taken seriously.	例如对稳定性的保证，衡量资产的可持续性，金融杠杆和 资产负债表等都需要我们密切地关注。


Financial re-regulation should and will emphasize capital, reserve, and margin requirements; limiting systemic risk buildup by constraining leverage; eliminating fragmented and incomplete regulatory coverage and regulatory arbitrage (a huge challenge internationally); and a focus on transparency.	金融监管需要修改，关注的重点应该放在资金，外汇储备和利润等要素； 对金融杠杆加以限制，以降低系统风险。


Isolating and further constraining a portion of the banking system, so that the channels of credit intermediation are less prone to complete and simultaneous breakdown, also seems likely.	加强监管的全面性和打击国际性的套利行为等。 关注系统的透明性，对银行系统的一些功能加以隔离和限制，这样全球的信贷市场就不那么容易崩盘。


Relative to the recent past, the cost of capital will increase, debt will be more expensive and less ubiquitous, and risk spreads will not return to pre-crisis compressed levels.	近期以来，运用资金的成本开始增加。 债券开始升值。


Assets bubbles will not disappear, but they will be less likely to be turbocharged by leverage.	风险的扩散也不会回到危机爆发之前的水平。 资产泡沫虽然不能消除，但也不会被金融杠杆而放大。


American consumers will save more and spend less, abandoning the pattern of the last few years.	美国消费者将会放弃以往的消费模式，开始增加储蓄，减少开支。


The large hole (on the order of $700 billion or more) in global aggregate demand will have to be filled over time by a compensating increase in consumption in surplus economies, such as China and Japan.	全球需求上的巨大窟窿（大约至少7000亿美元）将会随着时间，通过一些经济体国家，例如中国和日本的逐步增长的消费而慢慢弥补。


The longer this takes, the greater the incentives at the national level to capture a share of global demand via protectionist measures.	复苏持续的时间越长，通过贸易保护主义的方法，发展中国家在全球市场上所占份额就会越大。


The recent increase in protectionist measures is an understandable political price for a range of stimulus packages in advanced and developing countries.	近期，发达国家和发展中国家都推出了一套刺激方案，这些贸易保护主义措施是可以理解的。


But such measures may increase – and will be harder to phase out over time – in the context of a shortfall in aggregate demand.	但这也会导致需求放慢，而且很难在短期内得到改善。


This is the forward-looking version of the global imbalance issue.	对全球不平衡性问题来说，我们要有前瞻性的眼光。


Its resolution via coordinated policy action (or a failure to resolve it through such action) will have a huge impact (for good or ill) on the multinational incentive structure surrounding the global economy – and hence on its likely growth.	通过采取相互合作的政策，不管是否有效，都将对全球经济的多国激励结构产生巨大影响，从而对未来的发展产生影响。


Responsibility for overseeing the global economy is passing rapidly from the G-7/8 to the G-20, as it should.	为了更好地监管世界经济，过去的七国或是八国峰会已经演变到了现在的20国家峰会。


The latter accounts for 90% of global GDP and two-thirds of the world’s population, so this shift is highly desirable – indeed, essential.	这是件好事情，因为这20个国家的GDP占全球的90%，人口占全球总人口的三分之二，所以说这样的改变是必要的。


But there is a risk that the interests of the remaining one-third of the world’s people (and the majority of the small countries) will not be adequately represented as the international architecture for managing the global economy evolves.	但这也存在一些风险，例如剩下来的三分之一人口（大多数是一些小国家）的利益如何体现出来，特别是他们在全球经济架构中的位置如何得以保证。


In the current crisis, a substantial fraction of countries outside the G-20 are essentially defenseless: small relatively poor economies, no fiscal capacity for stimulus, and inadequate reserves to offset the capital outflows that occurred to shore up damaged balance sheets in advanced markets.	在此次危机中，有相当多的20国集团以外的国家基本上没��什么防范：他们相对是一些小而贫穷的国家，没有可用的财政资源，缺乏外汇储备来增加市场的流动性，无法修复难看的资产负债表。


Within the G-20 countries, there are mechanisms that attend to the interests of the most vulnerable citizens.	在20国集团内部，存在着一些措施来保护绝大多数的公民。


In the global economy, the most vulnerable are whole countries.	而在全球经济中，最容易受到伤害的是这些中小国家。


Inattention to their interests is not just a moral issue, but a potentially explosive social and economic one.	忽视他们的利益不仅仅是道德层面的问题，同样会引起潜在的社会经济层面的问题。


As a result, the world’s international economic institutions will need to be strengthened in terms of governance and resources so that they can act as circuit-breakers in the event of future financial and economic turbulence.	因此，国际经济组织的作用就需要加强，让他们有足够地权利和资源来做这些事情，这样，在未来可能发生金融经济动荡的时候，他们可以起到“断路器”的作用，。


Entering the crisis, the International Monetary Fund was underfunded, and it continues to lack credibility and trust in certain systemically important parts of the world.	在此次危机中，IMF不仅资金不足，而且在一些重要的国家中缺乏公信力。 现在IMF被赋予更多的资源。


It is now in the process of being better funded, but we are eight months into a crisis in which international capital flows became volatile and were driven largely by emergency responses rather than underlying economic fundamentals.	从经济危机的爆发开始，时间已经过去了8个月，我们还只是停留在临时的紧急救助计划上，而不是对整个系统进行修补。


Thus, there remains the central question of trust and confidence in the system, which have been badly damaged and will take time to rebuild.	同样的，目前的核心问题还是对市场的信心，看来恢复起来还需要一定时间。


At the moment, the majority view in most countries is that the financial system failed badly, but that the incentives and dynamics of the broader market-based system in a relatively open global architecture remain the best avenues for wealth creation, poverty reduction, and the expansion of opportunity.	目前，普遍的观点是，在绝大多数国家中，金融市场已经受到严重的破坏。 但是，相对开放的市场体系仍然是有活力的，它可以增长财富，减少贫穷和增加机会。


There are, of course, dissidents, and the balance could shift quickly. It is not inconceivable that the baby will be thrown out with the bath water.	同时，这也会产生一些不平衡和不稳定的因素，但是，我们不能在倒掉洗澡水的同时，连婴儿也一起丢掉。


There is no magic bullet for today’s crisis.	对于目前的危机没有什么灵丹妙药。


Pragmatic, steady progress at the national and international levels in improving the regulatory architecture and increasing our collective ability to avoid non-cooperative behavior and suboptimal equilibria, is the best course to follow.	我们可能采取的步骤只能是：务实而稳定的推进，在国家和国际层面上提高监管水平，增强国与国联合行动的能力，以避免单独行动和不协调的行动。


It is the course we are on.	我们也正在这么做。


But for now, it is a journey without a clearly defined, widely accepted endpoint.	但目前来看，如何有一个清晰明确的路线，大家还没有什么共识。


Does Legalizing Prostitution Work?	卖淫合法化有用吗？


AMSTERDAM – Prostitution is virtually the only part of the personal services industry in the Netherlands that works.	阿姆斯特丹－卖淫大概是荷兰个人服务业中唯一有效率的部分。


One can’t get a manicure in Amsterdam without booking an appointment two weeks in advance, but men can buy sex anytime – and at an attractive price.	在阿姆斯特丹，在没有提前两周预约的情况下，修个指甲都不行，但是，男性却可以在任何时候买到性——并且价格还很具有吸引力。


The legalization of prostitution in October 2000 merely codified a long-standing Dutch tradition of tolerance towards buying and selling sex.	荷兰在2000年10月将卖淫合法化，只不过是将荷兰长期存在的容忍卖淫嫖娼的传统条文化而已。


But is legalization the right approach?	但是，将卖淫合法化是解决问题的正确途径吗？


Even in the Netherlands, women and girls who sell their bodies are routinely threatened, beaten, raped, and terrorized by pimps and customers.	即使是在荷兰，那些出卖其身体的妇女和女孩子，也常常遭到皮条客和嫖客的威胁、殴打、强奸和恐吓。


In a recent criminal trial, two German-Turkish brothers stood accused of forcing more than 100 women to work in Amsterdam’s red-light district ( De Wallen ).	在最近的一次刑事审判中，土裔德籍的俩兄弟被指控强迫100多位妇女到阿姆斯特丹的红灯区( De Wallen )工作。


According to the attorney who represented one of the victims, most of these women come from families marred by incest, alcohol abuse, and parental suicide. Or they come from countries in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia and have fallen victim to human trafficking, lured by decent job offers or simply sold by their parents.	根据一位受害人的代理律师的说法，这些妇女中的大多数人来自被乱伦，酗酒以及父母自杀破坏的家庭，或者来自东欧或东南亚国家，受到体面工作机会的诱惑或被其父母卖掉，从而成为非法人口买卖的牺牲品。


These women are Amsterdam’s leading tourist attraction (followed by the coffee shops that sell marijuana).	这些妇女是阿姆斯特丹旅游最吸引人的地方（接下来是卖大麻的咖啡馆）。


But an estimated 50-90% of them are actually sex slaves, raped on a daily basis with police idly standing by.	但是，这些妇女中估计有50％到90%的人事实上就是性奴隶，每天都遭到强奸而警察却袖手旁观。


It is incomprehensible that their clients are not prosecuted for rape, but Dutch politicians argue that it cannot be established whether or not a prostitute works voluntarily.	她们的客人没有因为强奸而被起诉，是令人难以理解的，然而，荷兰政治家认为，妓女是不是自愿工作不能确定。


Appalled by their daily routine, police officers from the Amsterdam vice squad have asked to be transferred to other departments.	因为受到这些妓女日常遭遇的惊吓，有些阿姆斯特丹刑警队的警官要求调到其他部门工作。


Only this year, the city administration has started to close down some brothels because of their ties to criminal organizations.	只有在今年，阿姆斯特丹市政当局才开始因为有些妓院和犯罪组织有联系，而将它们关掉。


According to a study published in the American Journal of Epidemiology , the average age of death of prostitutes is 34.	根据《美国流行病学杂志》刊登的一份研究报告，妓女的平均死亡年龄是34岁。


In the United States, the rate at which prostitutes are killed in the workplace is 51 times that of the next most dangerous occupation for women, working in a liquor store.	在美国，妓女在工作场所被杀害的机率是妇女从事的第二危险的工作——在酒类专卖店的工作——的51倍。


Other studies show that nine out of ten prostitutes urgently want to escape the job.	其他的研究显示，十个妓女中就有九个急切地想要逃离卖淫的工作。


Almost half have attempted suicide at least once.	几乎有一半的妓女企图自杀过至少一次。


In 1999, the Swedish government decriminalized the sale of sex, but made it an offense to pimp or to buy sex.	在1999年，瑞典政府将卖淫非刑事犯罪化，但是，却将拉皮条或嫖娼规定为犯罪。


Under Sweden’s so-called “Sex Purchase Law,” paying for sex is punishable by fines or up to six months in prison, plus the humiliation of public exposure.	在瑞典被称为“嫖娼法”的法律规定下，付钱买性可以通过罚款或高达六个月的监禁加以处罚，还要加上向公众曝光作为羞辱。


According to the Swedish authorities, the number of prostitutes in Sweden has dropped 40% as a result.	按照瑞典政府的说法，在瑞典的妓女数量因此而减少了40％。


Human trafficking rings tend to avoid Sweden, because business has gone sour.	因为生意不景气了，人口贩卖犯罪集团倾向于避开瑞典。


Norway, a country that has a reputation to lose when it comes to women’s rights, carefully compared the Swedish and Dutch models and concluded that Sweden’s was the one to follow.	挪威，一个有提到妇女权利就会被比下去的名声的国家，仔细对比了瑞典模式和荷兰模式，确定瑞典模式是应该遵循的模式。


It has now changed its legislation accordingly.	现在，它已经相应地改变了其立法。


The success of the Swedish approach is not so surprising.	瑞典模式的成功并不令人惊奇。


According to a study in California, most men who bought sex would be deterred by the risk of public exposure.	根据加州的一项研究，大多数嫖娼的男性都会因为公开曝光的风险而不敢嫖娼。


For example, 79% said that they would be deterred if there was a chance that their families would be notified.	例如，79%的人说如果嫖娼可能会被通报给他们的家人，他们就不敢嫖娼。


And a whopping 87% said that they would be deterred by the threat that the police might publish their photographs or names in the local newspaper.	而高达87%的人说，如果受到警方可能将他们的照片或名字在当地报纸上公布的威胁，他们就不敢嫖娼。


Most of these men showed pathological behavior towards women.	这些男性中的大多数人对女性表现出病态的行为。


One in five admitted to having raped a woman, while four out of five said that going to prostitutes was an addiction.	他们中每五人就有一人承认强奸过一名妇女，而每五人中就有四人说嫖娼成瘾。


Prostitution is often dubbed “the oldest profession.”	卖淫经常被称作是“最古老的职业”。


But this is merely a way of justifying the exploitation of mostly vulnerable women (there is also a much smaller number of male prostitutes in the Netherlands, but they are not pimped out like female prostitutes).	但是，这仅仅是证明剥削通常易受攻击的女性（在荷兰也有少量男妓，但是，他们没有像妓女那样被皮条客兜售）的正当性的方法。


It takes leadership and a vision of true gender equality to put an end to prostitution.	结束卖淫，需要领导能力和真正的性别平等观念。


The Swedish practice of naming and shaming is quite un-Dutch.	瑞典公开姓名和进行羞辱的方法完全是非荷兰式的。


But, for some men, part of the pleasure of buying sex may be the humiliation conferred on the woman involved.	但是，对有些男性来说，嫖娼乐趣的一部分可能就是施加在有关的女性身上的羞辱。


For others, like former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, the promise of discretion and anonymity may be the most appealing aspect of buying sex.	对另一些男性来说，像纽约州前州长艾略特·斯皮策（Eliot Spitzer）那样，嫖娼最吸引人的地方可能是小心翼翼和匿名的承诺。


In any case, pillorying the clients is both a just punishment and an effective deterrent.	但是，无论如何，将嫖客示众既是公正的惩罚，又是有效的威慑。


Does the UN Still Matter?	联合国仍有生命力么？


With 192 members and a mandate that covers everything from security to refugees to public health, the United Nations is the world’s only global organization.	拥有192个成员国和从安全到难民再到公共卫生的包罗万象的授权，联合国是世界上唯一一个全球化组织。


But polls in the United States show that two-thirds of Americans think the UN is doing a poor job, and many believe it was tarnished by corruption during the Iraq oil-for-food program under Saddam Hussein.	但在美国的民意调查表明三分之二的美国人认为联合国行事不力。 很多人认为这个组织被在萨达姆掌权时的“石油换食品”计划中所产生的腐败玷污了。


Many also blame the UN for failing to solve the Middle East’s myriad problems.	还有许多人认为联合国应该为中东林林总总的无法解决的问题负责。


But such views reflect a misunderstanding of the UN’s nature.	但这样的观点反映出人们对联合国特点的误解。


The UN is more an instrument of its member states than an independent actor in world politics.	联合国在更大程度上是其成员国的一个工具而不是国际政治舞台上的一个独立角色。


True, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon can make speeches, convene meetings, and propose actions, but his role is more secretary than general.	诚然，联合国秘书长潘基文可以发表演讲、召集会议并提出动议，但他所扮演的角色更多的是一位秘书而不是“长”。


Sometimes likened to a “secular Pope,” the UN Secretary General can wield the soft power of persuasion but little hard economic or military power.	有时联合国秘书长被比作一位“世俗的教皇”，他可以运用说服的软实力，但在经济或军事的硬实力方面却很难有所作为。


What hard power the UN has must be begged and borrowed from the member states.	联合国所拥有的硬实力必须从其成员国求借而来。


And when they cannot agree on a course of action, it is difficult for the organization to operate.	而当成员国们不能就某项动议达成一致时，联合国也就举步维艰了。


As one wag has put it, “We have met the UN and it is us!”	正如有人不无诙谐地说：“我们已经碰到过联合国了，我们就是联合国！


When blame is assigned, much of it belongs to the members.	”成员国应该为联合国所受的责难承担相当的责任。


Consider the oil for food program, which was designed by member states to provide relief to Iraqis hurt by sanctions against Saddam’s regime.	就拿石油换食品计划来说吧。 该计划是成员国为缓解在针对萨达姆政权所进行的禁运给伊拉克人造成的伤害而设计的。


The secretariat did an inadequate job of monitoring the program and some corruption was involved.	联合国秘书处在监控计划进行方面的工作不到位，其间还产生了腐败行为。


But the much larger sums that Saddam diverted for his own purposes reflected how the member governments designed the program, and they chose to turn a blind eye to the abuse.	被萨达姆挪作他用的更大部分资金反映了各成员国政府对该计划的设计。 它们对这种滥用职权的行为故意熟视无睹。


Yet the program’s problems are portrayed in the press as “the UN’s fault.	然而，该计划的问题却被新闻界扭曲为“联合国的错。 ”


The cost of the entire UN system is about $20 billion, or less than the annual bonuses paid out in a good year on Wall Street.	整个联合国系统的成本约为每年200亿美元，这比华尔街在一个景气的年份所派发的红利都要少。


Of that sum, the secretariat in New York accounts for a mere 10%.	在总预算中，位于纽约的秘书处所得到的仅占10%。


Some universities have larger budgets.	有些大学的年预算都比这要多。


Another $7 billion supports UN peacekeeping forces in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Haiti, and the Balkans.	另有70亿美元用于支持联合国在如民主刚果共和国、黎巴嫩、海地和巴尔干等地进行的维和行动。


The rest – more than half – is spent by the UN’s specialized agencies, which are located around the world and often play an important role in managing global trade, development, health, and humanitarian assistance.	剩下的预算—一半以上—都由联合国的特别机构开支掉了。 这些机构分布于世界各地，通常在管理全球贸易、发展、卫生和人道主义援助方面发挥着重要作用。


For example, the UN High Commission for Refugees helps to alleviate the problems of displaced persons, the World Food Program provides assistance to malnourished children, and the World Health Organization supports the public health information systems that are crucial for dealing with threats from pandemics like avian flu.	世界粮食计划署为营养不良的儿童提供帮助； 而世界卫生组织则支持公共卫生信息系统。


The UN does not have the resources to solve the problems in new areas like AIDS or global climate change, but it can play an important convening role in galvanizing the actions of governments.	这些系统对应对来自于禽流感等流行性疾病的威胁至关重要。 联合国没有资源解决如艾滋病或全球气候变化等新问题，但它在敦促各国政府采取行动方面可以起到重要的召集者的作用。


Even in the area of security, the UN retains an important role.	即便在安全方面，联合国仍然发挥着重要作用。


The original 1945 concept of collective security, by which states would band together to deter and punish aggressors, failed because the Soviet Union and the West were at loggerheads during the Cold War.	在1945年制定的最初的集体安全概念里，各国应该联合起来阻止并惩罚侵略者。 这一概念由于苏联和西方在冷战时期的敌对而未能实现。


For a brief moment after a broad coalition of countries acted together to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in 1991, it looked like the original concept of collective security would become “a new world order.”	当多个国家的联盟共同行动在1991年将萨达姆驱逐出科威特以后，在很短的一段时间里，集体安全的最初概念似乎会成为一种“世界新秩序”。


Such hopes were short-lived.	但这样的希望只是昙花一现。


Consensus within the UN proved unachievable on both Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003.	1999年的科索沃和2003年的伊拉克问题都证明了在联合国内部不能达成共识。


Skeptics concluded that the UN had become irrelevant for security questions.	怀疑者们总结说联合国已变得与安全问题无关。


Yet in 2006, when Israel and Hezbollah fought to a stalemate in Lebanon, states were only too happy to turn to a UN peacekeeping force.	然而在2006年，当以色列与真主党在黎巴嫩的冲突陷入僵局时，各成员国又忙不迭地寻求联合国维和部队的介入。


Ironically, peacekeeping was not specified in the original charter.	具有讽刺意味的是，维和行动并未出现在最初的宪章里。


It was invented by the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson after Britain and France invaded Egypt in the Suez crisis of 1956.	它是由第二任秘书长Dag Hammarskjold和加拿大外交部长Lester Pearson于英法在1956年的苏伊士危机中入侵埃及后所发明的。


Since then, UN peacekeeping forces have been deployed more than 60 times.	从那以后，联合国维和部队已经执行了超过60次的任务。


There are now roughly 100,000 troops from various countries wearing UN blue helmets around the world.	现��有来自于不同国家的约10万名士兵在世界各地佩戴着联合国的蓝色头盔。


Peacekeeping has had its ups and downs.	维和行动也经历了起起落落。


Bosnia and Rwanda were failures in the 1990’s, and then Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed reforms to deal with genocide and mass killings.	波斯尼亚和卢旺达是1990年代的失败。 时任联合国秘书长的科菲•安南便提出了维和计划改革的动议，以应对种族灭绝和大屠杀的问题。


In September 2005, the states in the UN General Assembly accepted the existence of a “responsibility to protect” vulnerable peoples.	在2005年9月的联合国大会上，各成员国接受了对弱势族群的“保护责任”。


In other words, governments could no longer treat their citizens however they wanted.	也就是说，各国政府不能再对其公民为所欲为了。


A new Peace-building Commission was also created to coordinate actions that could help prevent a recurrence of genocidal acts.	联合国还为此设立了一个新的“和平建设委员会”以协调防止种族清洗行为再度发生的行动。


In East Timor, for example, the UN proved vital in the transition to independence, and it is now working out plans for the governments of Burundi and Sierra Leone.	例如在东帝汶独立的过渡进程中，联合国就发挥了至关重要的作用。 它现在正为布隆迪和塞拉利昂的政府制定相关计划。


In the DRC, peacekeeping forces have not been able to curb all violence, but they have helped to save lives.	在民主刚果共和国，维和部队虽然未能阻止所有的暴力，但却帮助拯救了生命。


The current test case is the situation in Sudan’s Darfur region, where diplomats are trying to establish a joint peacekeeping force under the UN and the African Union.	现在的考验就是苏丹达尔福尔地区的局势。 在那里，外交官们正试图建立一支由联合国和非洲联盟共同领导下的维和部队。


In the poisonous political atmosphere that has bedeviled the UN after the Iraq War, widespread disillusionment is not surprising.	在伊拉克战争后已将联合国妖魔化的有毒政治空气中，广泛的幻灭感也不足为奇。


Ban Ki Moon has a tough job.	潘基文的担子不轻。


But, rather than calling the UN into question, states are likely to find that they need such a global instrument, with its unique convening and legitimizing powers.	但各个成员国很可能会发现他们需要联合国这样一个拥有独特的召集和合法化力量的全球化工具，而不应该对其提出质疑。


While the UN system is far from perfect, the world would be a poorer and more disorderly place without it.	虽然联合国的体系远非完美，但没有它这个世界将会更加贫穷和混乱。


Dog Days For The Super Dollar	超级美元的衰败


CAMBRIDGE -- Is the United States’ position as the world’s dominant superpower at risk if the dollar loses its super-currency status?	如果美元丧失其超级货币的地位，美国作为世界主导超级大国的地位是否会随之动摇呢？


Maybe not, but Americans will certainly find global hegemony a lot more expensive if the dollar falls off its perch.	可能不会，但是，如果美元从霸主位置跌落，美国人肯定会发现其全球霸权将会大为费钱。


Until now, Americans have been raking in profits by borrowing cheaply from pliant foreigners and investing the money in high-yield foreign equities, land, and bonds.	知道目前，美国人通过从轻易受到影响的外国人那里廉价借钱并且把钱投资于高回报的外国资产、土地以及债券而攫取利润。


Counting capital gains, Americans have profited to the tune of $300 billion to $400 billion annually in many recent years – an amount roughly equivalent to the entire US military budget.	如果把资本收益计算进去，那么，在最近几年中，美国人每年获得了大致3000亿美元到4000亿美元的利润，这一数目大体相当于美国整个军事预算。


Former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing once famously complained about America’s “exorbitant privilege.”	法国前总统德斯坦曾经引人注目地抱怨美国的“嚣张特权”。


D’Estaing was incensed that the US seemed to be able to flood the world with dollar currency and debt without ever seeming to pay a price in terms of higher inflation or interest rates.	美国似乎可以让世界充斥美元货币和债务，而不必为更高的通货膨胀或者利率而付出代价。 德斯坦对此十分气恼。


At least half the $800 billion US currency supply is held abroad, mainly in the world’s underground economy.	价值8000亿美元的货币供应中至少有一半是在外国持有，主要是在世界上的地下经济。


But the really big bucks come from the fact that places like the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan passively hold enormous volumes of low-interest US debt, while Americans romp around the world with venture capital, private equity, and investment banks, reaping huge gains.	但是，中日两国中央银行持有巨额低息美元债务，而美国人则用风险资本、私人股本以及投资银行在世界上横冲直撞，赚取巨额收益。 这才是真正大钱所在。


It has been a great ride for the US, and America’s financial supremacy has certainly eased the burden of being a superpower.	美国风光了一阵，而美国的金融霸主肯定消除了作为超级大国的负担。


But, between the sub-prime US mortgage crisis and the dollar’s ongoing decline, America’s exorbitant privilege now looks a bit shaky.	但是，在美国次级房贷危机已经正在下滑的美元当中，美国的嚣张特权现在似乎有点不稳了。


The dollar is already down 25% over the past five years, and if the US tips into recession – a 50/50 chance right now -- the dollar is going to drop a lot more.	在过去五年中，美元已经贬值25%。 如果美国经济衰退(目前的机率是一半对一半)，美元还会贬值更多。


Foreign investors are already reshuffling their portfolios, moving into euros, pounds, and even emerging-market currencies like the Brazilian real and the South African rand.	外国投资者们已经开始重新分配他们的投资组合，将货币转换成欧元、英镑，甚至是新兴市场国家货币例如巴西的雷亚尔和南非的兰特。


Controversial “sovereign wealth funds,” which invest funds for governments in the Middle East, Asia, Russia, and elsewhere, are just one manifestation of the search for alternatives to low-yielding, rapidly depreciating, dollar bonds.	饱受争议的“国家财富基金”为中东、亚洲、俄国以及其他地方的各国政府投资。 它们只是从低回报并且迅速贬值的美元债券中转移并寻求替代投资的表象之一。


Even without any portfolio shift, Americans shouldn’t expect their recent luck to hold up in the future.	即使没有投资组合转移，美国人也不应该指望他们近年来的运气可以在今后保持。


If there is a global downturn, any region that is long stocks and short bonds is going to get burned.	如果出现全世界的经济下滑，任何买空股票以及卖空债券的地区都会损失惨重。


Unfortunately, faced with the growing risks to the dollar’s status, American policymakers, rather than nursing the country’s premier export, seem to be more interested in milking it.	不幸的是，美国的决策者们面临美元地位日益增长的风险不仅不扶持美国的主要出口，而是似乎更愿意竭力加以利用。


The US government itself has taken advantage by running vast deficits.	美国政府本身通过大量的赤字已经受益。


The Federal Reserve appears to care about exchange rates only to the extent that they affect growth and inflation, and right now the weak dollar is helping US exports.	对于汇率问题，美联储似乎只是关心其对于经济增长和通货膨胀的影响，而当前，疲软的美元正在促进美国的出口。


Last but not least, US tax policy hardly encourages private-sector savings, especially giving the preferential tax treatment of real estate.	最后但是不是最为次要的一点是，美国的税收政策根本不鼓励私有部门的储蓄，特别是给房地产以税收优惠。


Professor Maury Obstfeld of the University of California at Berkeley and I have been warning for some time that without pro-active policy adjustments, the dollar is vulnerable to a sharp collapse, with many attendant risks.	我和加州大学伯克利分校的奥茨菲尔德教授一段时间以来一直警告说，如果不加以积极主动的政策调整，美元有可能会大幅度崩盘，并且伴随许多风险。


Unfortunately, that scenario now seems to be unfolding.	不幸的是，这一局面似乎正在显现。


This year alone, the dollar’s value has fallen by another 10% in purchasing power terms against America’s major trading partners, and it could fall at the same rate in 2008 – or faster if global investors decide to cut and run.	仅仅在今年，与美国的主要贸易伙伴相比，美元的购买力价值已经下降了10%，而且在2008年可能还会下降这么多。 而如果全球的投资者们决定从美元脱身，美元下跌可能会更快。


When the Chinese premier, OPEC heads of state, and the world’s richest supermodel all express concern about the dollar, you can be sure we are in for a bumpy ride.	在中国总理、石油输出国组织各国领导人以及世界上最富有的超级模特都对美元表示担忧的时候，你就可以知道我们将会面临崎岖不平的道路。


The good news for Americans is that there is enormous inertia in the world trading and financial system.	美国人的好消息是，世界交易和金融体系存在巨大的惰性。


It took many decades and two world wars before the British pound lost its super-currency status.	历经几十年和两次世界大战英镑才失去其超级货币地位。


Nor is there any obvious successor to the dollar yet.	现在美元还没有任何明显的继任者。


Indeed, the sub-prime crisis has made the European financial system look just as vulnerable as that of the US.	确实，次级房贷危机让欧洲的金融体系看起来也和美国的一样弱不禁风。


Likewise, while the Chinese Yuan might be king in 50 years, China’s moribund financial system will prevent it from being crowned anytime soon.	同样道理，尽管人民币可能在50年内称雄世界，但是中国百病丛生的金融体系不会让它马上就加冕。


A huge share of world trade is denominated in dollars, even if some OPEC presidents, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, openly preach mutiny.	即使某些石油输出国组织领导人像委内瑞拉的查维斯公开地呼吁打击美元，绝大部分世界贸易还是以美元计价的。


Central banks still hold more than 50% of their foreign exchange reserves in dollars.	各国中央银行所持有的外汇储备的一半以上依然是美元。


But danger signs abound.	但是还有很多危险信号。


Unless the US gets its act together soon, it may find the value of its super-currency franchise much diminished.	除非美国立即行动起来，否则，其超级货币霸主的地位就会大为减损。


American voters, who are famously loathe to increase taxes, might start thinking a lot harder about the real economic costs of their country’s superpower status.	美国的纳税人一贯以痛恨加税著称，他们可能会开始考虑美国超级大国地位的实际的经济代价。


Doing Better on Climate Change	更好地解决气候变化问题


Los Angeles – Tackling global warming, we are often told, is the defining task of our age.	洛杉矶——我们经常听到，应对全球变暖是我们这个时代的确定任务。


An army of pundits tells us that we need to cut emissions, and cut them immediately and drastically.	一大群权威学者告诉我们必须刻不容缓地大幅度降低排放。


But this argument is clearly losing the battle for hearts and minds.	但是这种说法显然正在丧失人心。


Global warming has now become the lowest-priority policy problem among Americans, according to a new Pew survey.	根据最新的皮尤调查，全球变暖已经成为美国人最不看重的政策问题。


Another Pew survey showed that China, the world's biggest emitter, cares even less than the US about global warming.  Just 24% of Chinese regard global warming as a very serious problem, making China the world's least concerned country.	另一项皮尤调查则显示全世界最大的排放国中国比美国更不看重全球变暖问题。 只有24%的中国人认为全球变暖是一个严重问题，中国也因此成为全世界最不看重全球变暖的国家。


In the UK, an Opinium survey shows that most voters think green taxes are mainly for raising cash rather than the environment, and 7 out of 10 are not willing to pay more in taxes to combat climate change.	在英国，一项Opinium公司的调查显示多数选民认为环境税的主要目的是聚敛钱财，而不是保护环境，而10个受调查者中有7个不愿为应对气候变化缴纳更多赋税。


At the same time, the proposed solutions for the problem of global warming have been awful.	与此同时，全球变暖问题拟议中的解决方案糟糕透顶。


In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, politicians from wealthy countries promised to cut emissions by 2000, but did no such thing.	1992年在里约热内卢，来自富裕国家的政界人士承诺到2000年降低排放，但却没有履行。


Leaders met again in Kyoto in 1997 and promised even stricter carbon cuts by 2010, yet emissions keep increasing, and Kyoto has done virtually nothing to change that.	1997年领导人在京都再次会面，承诺到2010年执行更严格的碳减排政策，但碳排放量却持续攀升，而《京都议定书》在改变现状方面几乎不起任何作用。


What is most tragic is that when leaders meet in Copenhagen this December, they will embrace more of the same solution: promises of even more drastic emission reductions that, once again, are unlikely to be fulfilled.	更悲惨的是当今年12月领导人在哥本哈根会面的时候，他们还将拿出更多一模一样的方案：再一次做出不大可能真正兑现的彻底的减排承诺。


Measures that consistently over-promise and under-achieve at vast cost do not win hearts and minds in the best of times. And this is manifestly not the best of times.	即使在最好的时候，不断在付出巨大代价的情况下承诺过高而又无所作为也无法赢得民心，更何况现在显然谈不上是最好的时候。


Fortunately, we have a much better option, with a much better chance of success: we should make low-carbon energy sources like solar power become a real, competitive alternative to old energy sources, instead of the preserve of rich people who want to feel “greener.”	幸运的是，我们有更好的选择，获取成功的几率要高得多：我们应该把像太阳能那样的低碳能源发展成旧有能源真正有竞争力的替代品，而不是让它们成为想感觉更加“绿色”的富人的保留节目。


We should therefore invest on an effective scale in inventing new technology.	因此我们应当对新技术发明进行有效的投资。


Contrary to what one would imagine, the Kyoto Protocol has not prompted this research.	与人们想象的恰恰相反，《京都议定书》并没有促进这方面的研究。


Indeed, research investment has plummeted since the 1980’s and has actually not increased since, even among Kyoto-participating countries.	实际上，科研投资从20世纪80年代就开始下降，并且从那以后就没有上升过，即使在《京都议定书》的缔约国中也同样如此。


Investing heavily in research and development of low-carbon energy, solar power, or other new technologies would become cheaper than fossil fuels much more quickly.	大规模投资于低碳能源、太阳能或其他新技术的研发很快就会使新能源价格低于化石燃料。


Economic estimates show that for every $1 spent, we would do $16 worth of good.	效益估算显示每耗费1美元投资，我们就能取得16美元的效益价值。


Every country should agree to spend 0.05% of its GDP on low-carbon energy R&D. The total global cost would be 15 times higher than current spending on alternative energy research, yet six times lower than the cost of Kyoto.	所有国家都应该同意拿出国内生产总值的0. 05%用于低碳能源的研究与开发。


An agreement of this nature could be the new Kyoto treaty for the world – the principal difference being that this protocol would actually make a difference and stand a good chance of global acceptance.	这样全球总开支将会比目前的替代能源研究开支高出15倍，即便如此依然比《京都议定书》低6倍之多。 如此性质的一份协议将成为全世界新的《京都议定书》——主要的不同是这份协议会真正发挥作用，得到全世界认可的机会也更高。


Why not do both: invest in R&D, but still promise to cut carbon emissions now?	为什么不双管齐下：一方面投资于研发，另��方面继续承诺降低碳排放？


Kyoto-style policies can only ever be an expensive distraction from the real business of weaning us off fossil fuels.	京都议定书式的政策永远只能是摆脱化石燃料道路上让我们付出惨痛代价的歧途。


There are two fundamental reasons why a focus on reducing carbon emissions is the wrong response to global warming.	有两个根本原因决定了在应对全球变暖过程中把重点放在降低碳排放是错误的选择。


First, using fossil fuels remains the only way out of poverty for developing countries.	首先，使用化石燃料仍然是发展中国家唯一的一条脱贫致富路。


Coal provides half of the world’s energy.	煤炭提供了全世界能源需求的半数。


In China and India, it accounts for about 80% of power generation, and is helping Chinese and Indian laborers enjoy a quality of life that their parents could barely imagine.	在中国和印度，煤炭占到总发电量的80%之多，它们帮助中国和印度的劳工过上了他们的父辈难以想象的高质量生活。


Capping emissions means, effectively, ending this success story for hundreds of millions of people.	限制排放因此意味着为数亿人的成功故事画上句号。


There is no “green” energy source that is affordable enough to replace coal in the near future.	还没有哪种“绿色”能源能在不远的将来便宜到可以替代煤炭的应用。


Instead, our upsized research will make green energy cheaper than fossil fuels by mid-century.	相反，我们大规模的研究努力将在本世纪中叶使绿色能源低于化石燃料的价格。


Second, immediate carbon cuts are expensive – and the cost significantly outweighs the benefits.	其次，立即降低碳排放非常昂贵——其所需的成本远远超过了相关的收效。


If the Kyoto agreement had been fully implemented throughout this century, it would have cut temperatures only by an insignificant 0.2°C (0.3°F), at a cost of $180 billion every year.	如果本世纪《京都议定书》彻底得到落实，它只能使温度降低微乎其微的0. 2oC（合0.


In economic terms, Kyoto only does about 30 cents worth of good for each dollar spent.	3°F），而每年却必须付出高达1800亿美元的代价。 从经济的角度讲，《京都议定书》每投资1美元只能产生约30美分的效益。


And deeper emissions cuts like those proposed by the European Union – 20% below 1990 levels within 12 years – would reduce global temperatures by only one-sixtieth of one degree Celsius (one-thirtieth of one degree Fahrenheit) by 2100, at a cost of $10 trillion.	而像欧盟提出的更深层次的碳减排目标——即12年后比20世纪90年代降低20%——只能在付出10万亿美元成本的前提下，实现全球温度截止2100年降低六十分之一摄氏度（约合三十分之一华氏度）。


For every dollar spent, we would do just four cents worth of good.	这样1美元产生的效益只有区区4美分。


The saddest thing about the global warming debate is that nearly all of the key protagonists – politicians, campaigners, and pundits – already know that the old-style agreement that is on the table for Copenhagen this December will have a negligible effect on temperatures.	全球变暖争论最不可救药的问题是几乎所有的主要倡导人物——政治家、竞选者和学者权威——都已经知道今年12月哥本哈根谈判桌上的旧式协议对温度可以产生忽略不计的效果。


Unless we change direction and make our actions realistic and achievable, it is already clear that the declarations of “success” in Copenhagen this December will be meaningless.	除非我们改变方向，让我们的所作所为切实可行，否则今年12月在哥本哈根的“成功”宣言将会毫无意义已经再清楚不过。


We will make promises.	我们将会做出承诺。


We will not keep them.	但我们不会履行承诺。


And we will waste another decade.	我们将浪费另外10年的光阴。


Instead, we must challenge the orthodoxy of Kyoto.	恰恰相反，我们必须挑战《京都议定书》的正统提法。


We can do better.	我们有能力做得更好。


Doing Development Better	更好地发展


CAMBRIDGE – Jim Yong Kim’s appointment as World Bank president may have been predictable, given the long-standing tradition that renders the selection an American prerogative.	美国剑桥—金墉被任命为世行行长或许是意料中事，长期以来，这个位子都是美国人的特权。


But even the appearance of competition between Kim and the other candidates, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and José Antonio Ocampo, served to expose a deep fissure within the field of development policy, because Kim and his two rivals represented dramatically different approaches.	但仅仅是金墉需要与另两名候选者奥孔乔-伊韦拉和奥坎波竞争这个事实便已表明在发展政策领域存在深刻的分歧，因为金墉和两位竞争对手的观点是完全不同的。


The vision for which Kim stands is bottom-up.	金墉的观点是自下而上。


It focuses directly on the poor, and on delivering services – for example, education, health care, and microcredit – to their communities.	他直接关注穷人，关注向贫困社区提供服务（如教育、卫生和微信贷）。


This tradition’s motto could be, “Development is accomplished one project at a time.”	这一传统的信条可以用“发展就是一步一个脚印”来概括。


The other approach, represented by Okonjo-Iweala and Ocampo, takes an economy-wide approach.	奥孔乔-伊韦拉和奥坎波代表了另一种观点，这种观点将着眼于整个经济。


It emphasizes broad reforms that affect the overall economic environment, and thus focuses on areas such as international trade, finance, macroeconomics, and governance.	它强调影响整个经济环境的广泛的改革，因此关注国际贸易、金融、宏观经济学和治理等领域。


Practitioners in the first group idolize NGO leaders like Mohammad Yunus, whose Grameen Bank pioneered microfinance, and Ela Bhatt, a founder of India’s Self-Employment Women’s Association (SEWA).	第一种观点的实践者偶像是非政府组织领袖，如微金融领域先驱、格莱珉银行创始者尤努斯和印度自由职业女性联合会（Self-Employment Women’s Association，SEWA）创始人伊拉·巴特（Ela Bhatt）。


The heroes of the second group are reformist finance or economy ministers such as India’s Manmohan Singh or Brazil’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso.	第二种观点的偶像则是具有改革精神的财政和经济部长，如印度的曼莫汉·辛格（Manmohan Singh）和巴西的卡多佐。


At first sight, this might seem like another dispute between economists and non-economists, but the rift runs within, rather than between, disciplinary boundaries.	乍一看，这无非是又一场经济学家和非经济学家之争，但分歧其实在于学科分野之内，而不是之间。


For example, recent work with field experiments and randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which has caught on like wildfire among development economists, lies strictly in the tradition of bottom-up development.	比如，最近如星火燎原般成为发展经济学热门的田野实验和随机控制试验（RCT）便严格地属于自下而上的发展传统。


The relative effectiveness of the two visions is not easy to determine.	两种观点的相对效率很难判断。


Proponents of the macro approach point out that the greatest development successes have typically been the product of economy-wide reforms.	宏观方法的支持者指出，最成功的发展通常是整体经济改革的结果。


The dramatic reductions in poverty achieved by China over the span of a few decades, as well as by other East Asian countries like South Korea and Taiwan, resulted largely from improved economic management (as much as earlier investments in education and health may have played a role).	中国（以及其他东亚地区韩国和中国台湾）在二三十年间就能取得如此重大的减贫成果，很大程度上要归功于经济管理的改善（早先在教育和卫生方面的投资也起着同样重要的作用）。


Reforms in incentives and property-rights arrangements, not anti-poverty programs, enabled these economies to take off.	激励和产权安排方面的改革，而不是减贫计划，才是让经济腾飞的动力。


The trouble is that these experiences have not proved as informative for other countries as one might have wished.	麻烦在于，这些经验并没有如人们所愿那样为其他国家起到榜样性的作用。


Asian-style reforms do not travel well, and, in any case, there is significant controversy about the role of specific policies.	亚洲式改革并不放之四海而皆准，且关于具体政策的作用也存在重大争议。


In particular, was the key to the Asian miracle economic liberalization or the limits that were placed on it?	特别是，亚洲奇迹的关键到底是经济自由化还是给经济自由化加以限度？


Moreover, the macro tradition vacillates between specific recommendations (“set low and uniform tariffs,” “remove interest-rate ceilings on banks,” “improve your ‘doing business’ ranking”) that find limited support in cross-country evidence, and broad recommendations that lack operational content (“integrate into world economy,” “achieve macroeconomic stability,” “improve contract enforcement”).	此外，宏观传统在跨国证据支持力有限的具体建议（“实行统一的低关税”、“取消银行利率上限”、“改善你的‘做生意’排名”）和缺少操作内容的笼统建议（“融入世界经济”、“追求宏观经济稳定”、“改善契约执行”）之间摇摆不定。


Development specialists in the bottom-up tradition, for their part, can deservedly claim success in demonstrating the effectiveness of education, public health, or microcredit projects in specific contexts.	站在自己的立场上，自下而上传统的发展专家可以面无愧色地宣称，成功需要用教育、公共卫生或具体环境下的微信贷项目的效率来证明。


But, too often, such projects treat poverty’s symptoms rather than its causes.	但这些项目往往治标不治本。


Poverty is often best addressed not by helping the poor to be better at what they are already doing, but by getting them to do something altogether different.	减贫的最佳办法往往不是帮助贫困者在现有生计方面做得更好，而是要让他们从事不同的生计。


This calls for diversification of production, urbanization, and industrialization, which in turn require policy interventions that may lie at considerable distance from the poor (such as fixing regulations or targeting the value of the currency).	这就需要生产的多样化、城市化和工业化，而这些反过来有要求看起来与扶贫相去甚远的政策干预（比如修正监管规则和为货币价值定位）。


Moreover, as with macro-level economic reforms, there are limits to what can be learned from individual projects.	此外，与宏观层面的经济改革一样，具体项目所能提供的经验也相当有限。


An RCT conducted under specific conditions does not generate usable hard evidence for policymakers in other settings.	在具体条件下进行的随机控制试验无法产生可供条件不同的决策者参考的有用硬经验。


Learning requires some degree of extrapolation, converting randomized evaluations from hard evidence into soft evidence.	参考经验需要做一定程度的外推，将得自硬经验的随机评估转换为软经验。


The good news is that there has been real progress in development policy, and, beneath the doctrinal differences, is a certain convergence – not on what works, but on how we should think about and do development policy.	好消息是，在发展政策方面已经取得了世纪进步，而且在意识形态不同的背后也存在一定程度的趋同——不是关于什么才是有用的，而是关于我们应该怎��看待发展政策。


The best of the recent work in the two traditions shares common predilections. Both favor diagnostic, pragmatic, experimental, and context-specific strategies.	两种传统的最佳新近成果所指向的预期是相同的，均赞成诊断式、实用性、实验性、具体环境具体分析的策略。


Conventional development policy has been prone to fads, moving from one big fix to another.	传统发展政策有跟风倾向，总是从一个大方向倒向另一个大方向。


Development is held back by too little government, too much government, too little credit, the absence of property rights, and so on.	政府干预过少、政府干预过多、信贷不足、产权缺位等等，这些东西都会阻碍发展。


The remedy is planning, the Washington Consensus, microcredit, or distributing land titles to the poor.	补救措施是规划、华盛顿共识、微信贷以及让穷人获得地权。


By contrast, the new approaches are agnostic. They acknowledge that we do not know what works, and that the binding constraints to development tend to be context-specific.	与此相对的是，新办法采取了不可知论的立场，承认我们并不知道什么会起作用，并认为束缚发展的约束往往要具体问题具体分析。


Policy experimentation is a central part of discovery, coupled with monitoring and evaluation to close the learning loop.	政策实验是发现过程的核心同时需辅之以监控和评估，以缩短学习循环。


Experiments do not need to be of the RCT type; China certainly learned from its policy experiments without a proper control group.	实验并不一定得是随机控制试验，毫无疑问，中国就在没有合适控制组的情况下从政策实验中学到了很多经验。


Reformers in this mold are suspicious of “best practices” and universal blueprints.	这一类型的改革者不相信有“最佳实践”和普适方案。


They look instead for policy innovations, small and large, that are tailored to local economic circumstances and political complications.	他们的着眼点在于适合本地经济和政治环境或大或小的政策创新。


The field of development policy can and should be reunified around these shared diagnostic, contextual approaches.	发展政策领域可以也应该重新统一，以共享诊断式具体分析方法为中心。


Macro-development economists need to recognize the advantages of the experimental approach and adopt the policy mindset of enthusiasts of randomized evaluation.	宏观发展经济学家需要认识到实验方法的优势，接受热衷于随机化评估的政策方法。


Micro-development economists need to recognize that one can learn from diverse types of evidence, and that, while randomized evaluations are tremendously useful, the utility of their results is often restricted by the narrow scope of their application.	微观发展经济学家需要认识到，你可以从各种经验中学习，尽管随机化评估非常有用，但其效果通常局限于狭窄的适用范围。


In the end, both camps should show greater humility: macro-development practitioners about what they already know, and micro-development practitioners about what they can learn.	最后，两大阵营应该更加谦逊：宏观发展实践者不能思而不学，微观发展实践者不能学而不思。


The Dollar Joins the Currency Wars	美元加入货币战争


NEW YORK – In a world of weak domestic demand in many advanced economies and emerging markets, policymakers have been tempted to boost economic growth and employment by going for export led-growth.	纽约—如今，许多发达经济体和新兴市场内需疲软，决策者开始用出口导向型增长提振经济增长和就业。


This requires a weak currency and conventional and unconventional monetary policies to bring about the required depreciation.	这需要弱势货币以及常规和非常规货币政策实现需要的贬值。


Since the beginning of the year, more than 20 central banks around the world have eased monetary policy, following the lead of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan.	今年年初以来，全球20多家央行在欧洲央行和日本银行的引领下放松了货币政策。


In the eurozone, countries on the periphery needed currency weakness to reduce their external deficits and jump-start growth.	在欧元区，外围国需要弱势货币以减少外部赤字和刺激增长。


But the euro weakness triggered by quantitative easing has further boosted Germany’s current-account surplus, which was already a whopping 8% of GDP last year.	但由量化宽松导致的欧元弱势进一步刺激了去年已经高达GDP的8%的德国经常项目盈余。


With external surpluses also rising in other countries of the eurozone core, the monetary union’s overall imbalance is large and growing.	其他欧元区核心国的外部盈余也在上升，这使得整个货币联盟的总体失衡十分庞大并且不断增加。


In Japan, quantitative easing was the first “arrow” of “Abenomics,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reform program.	在日本，量化宽松是首相安倍晋三的改革计划——“安倍经济学”的第一支“箭”。


Its launch has sharply weakened the yen and is now leading to rising trade surpluses.	它让日元急剧贬值，现在正在导致贸易盈余增加。


The upward pressure on the US dollar from the embrace of quantitative easing by the ECB and the BOJ has been sharp.	欧洲央行和日本银行采取量化宽松让美元承受了巨大的升值压力。


The dollar has also strengthened against the currencies of advanced-country commodity exporters, like Australia and Canada, and those of many emerging markets.	美元兑其他发达大宗商品出口国（如澳大利亚和加拿大）和许多新兴市场货币的汇率也出现了走强。


For these countries, falling oil and commodity prices have triggered currency depreciations that are helping to shield growth and jobs from the effects of lower exports.	对这些国家来说，油价和大宗商品价格下跌引发货币贬值，有助于抵消出口下降对增长和就业的影响。


The dollar has also risen relative to currencies of emerging markets with economic and financial fragilities: twin fiscal and current-account deficits, rising inflation and slowing growth, large stocks of domestic and foreign debt, and political instability.	美元兑经济和金融十分脆弱的新兴市场货币也在升值。 这些经济体存在财政和经常项目双赤字、通胀抬头和增长放缓、巨额存量内外债务以及政治动荡。


Even China briefly allowed its currency to weaken against the dollar last year, and slowing output growth may tempt the government to let the renminbi weaken even more.	甚至中国在去年也短暂地允许人民币兑美元贬值，而产出增长放缓可以诱使政府让人民币贬值更多。


Meanwhile, the trade surplus is rising again, in part because China is dumping its excess supply of goods – such as steel – in global markets.	与此同时，贸易盈余再次上升，部分是因为中国在全球市场上大量倾销其供给过剩的商品——如钢铁。


Until recently, US policymakers were not overly concerned about the dollar’s strength, because America’s growth prospects were stronger than in Europe and Japan.	直到最近，美国决策者对美元强势并不十分担忧，因为美国增长前景比欧洲和日本都要光明。


Indeed, at the beginning of the year, there was hope that US domestic demand would be strong enough this year to support GDP growth of close to 3%, despite the stronger dollar.	事实上，今年初，人们希望美国内需足以支持其GDP增长率接近3%，即使美元表现出强势。


Lower oil prices and job creation, it was thought, would boost disposable income and consumption.	人们认为，油价下跌和就业创造将提高可支配收入和消费。


Capital spending (outside the energy sector) and residential investment would strengthen as growth accelerated.	（能源部门以外的）资本支出和住宅投资将随着增长的加速而走强。


But things look different today, and US officials’ exchange-rate jitters are becoming increasingly pronounced.	但如今，情况已有所不同。 美国官员的汇率神经过敏症正在日益显露。


The dollar appreciated much faster than anyone expected; and, as data for the first quarter of 2015 suggest, the impact on net exports, inflation, and growth has been larger and more rapid than that implied by policymakers’ statistical models.	美元升值速度比所有人的预期都要快； 而2015年一季度数据显示，美元升值对净出口、通货膨胀和增长的影响也比决策者的统计模型所表明的更大更快。


Moreover, strong domestic demand has failed to materialize; consumption growth was weak in the first quarter, and capital spending and residential investment were even weaker.	此外，强劲的内需没有成为现实； 一季度消费增长十分疲软，资本支出和住房投资更是萎靡不堪。


As a result, the US has effectively joined the “currency war” to prevent further dollar appreciation.	结果，美国实际上已经加入了阻止美元进一步升值的 “货币战争”。


Fed officials have started to speak explicitly about the dollar as a factor that affects net exports, inflation, and growth. And the US authorities have become increasingly critical of Germany and the eurozone for adopting policies that weaken the euro while avoiding those – for example, temporary fiscal stimulus and faster wage growth – that boost domestic demand.	美联储官员开始直言美元是影响净出口、通货膨胀和增长的因素。 美国当局也开始日益批评德国和欧元区采取弱化欧元的政策而不采取刺激内需的政策——比如临时性财政刺激和加快工资增长。


Moreover, verbal intervention will be followed by policy action, because slower growth and low inflation – partly triggered by a strong dollar – will induce the Fed to exit zero policy rates later and more slowly than expected.	此外，口头干预之后将是政策动作，因为增长放缓和低通胀——部分是拜强势美元所赐——将让美联储比预期更晚更慢地退出零政策利率。


That will reverse some of the dollar’s recent gains and shield growth and inflation from downside risks.	这将逆转部分最近的美元涨幅，阻止增长和通胀的下降风险。


Currency frictions can lead eventually to trade frictions, and currency wars can lead to trade wars.	货币摩擦最终可能导致贸易��擦，而货币战争可能导致贸易战争。


And that could spell trouble for the US as it tries to conclude the mega-regional Trans-Pacific Partnership.	而这可能让正在着力完成大型地区级跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP）的美国陷入麻烦。


Uncertainty about whether the Obama administration can marshal enough votes in Congress to ratify the TPP has now been compounded by proposed legislation that would impose tariff duties on countries that engage in “currency manipulation.”	关于奥巴马政府是否能够在国会赢得足够选票批准TPP的问题现在变得更加不确定，因为一项立法提案试图对参与“货币操纵”的国家征收关税。


If such a link between trade and currency policy were forced into the TPP, the Asian participants would refuse to join.	如果这一将贸易和货币政策联系起来的立法被写入TPP，亚洲参与者将拒绝加入。


The world would be better off if most governments pursued policies that boosted growth through domestic demand, rather than beggar-thy-neighbor export measures.	如果大部分政府追求通过内需刺激增长的政策，而不是以邻为壑的出口手段，世界将会变得更好。


But that would require them to rely less on monetary policy and more on appropriate fiscal policies (such as higher spending on productive infrastructure).	但这需要它们更少依赖货币政策，更多依赖合理的财政政策（如增加生产性基础设施的支出）。


Even income policies that lift wages, and hence labor income and consumption, are a better source of domestic growth than currency depreciations (which depress real wages).	甚至提高工资、因此提高劳动收入和消费的收入政策也比货币贬值（这样会抑制真实工资）更有利于国内增长。


The sum of all trade balances in the world is equal to zero, which means that not all countries can be net exporters – and that currency wars end up being zero-sum games.	全球贸易余额总数等于零，这意味着不可能所有国家都成为净出口国——而货币战争终归是一场零和博弈。


That is why America’s entry into the fray was only a matter of time.	因此，美国加入战团只是时间问题。


Dollars and Depression	美元和经济萧条


The falling dollar has emerged as a source of profound global macroeconomic distress.	一路下跌的美元已经成了导致全球性大规模宏观经济萧条的源泉。


The question now is how bad that distress will become.	现在的问题是此次经济萧条究竟会糟糕到何种地步。


Is the world economy at risk?	世界经济是不是正面临着危险？


There are two possibilities.	目前存在着两种可能性。


If global savers and investors expect the dollar’s depreciation to continue, they will flee the currency unless they are compensated appropriately for keeping their money in the US and its assets, implying that the gap between US and foreign interest rates will widen.	如果全球储户和投资者预期美元将会继续贬值，那么除非把钱存在美国及美元资产中能得到适当的补偿，这就意味着美国和外国的利息差距将会拉大，否则他们将会抛售手中持有的美元资产。


As a result, the cost of capital in the US will soar, discouraging investment and reducing consumption spending as high interest rates depress the value of households’ principal assets: their houses.	其结果是，美国的资本成本会大幅度提高，利率居高不下会导致家庭的主要资产——住宅价值缩水，从而打击投资者的积极性，降低消费支出。


The resulting recession might fuel further pessimism and cutbacks in spending, deepening the downturn.	由此产生的经济衰退也许会导致悲观情绪进一步蔓延、消费开支进一步缩减，从而加剧美元的贬值趋势。


A US in recession would no longer serve as the world’s importer of last resort, which might send the rest of the world into recession as well.	身处经济萧条之中的美国不可能再扮演世界最后一个进口商的角色，而这可能会使世界其他国家也陷入衰退的泥潭。


A world in which everybody expects a falling dollar is a world in economic crisis.	人人认为美元即将贬值的世界将是一个陷入经济危机的世界。


By contrast, a world in which the dollar has already fallen is one that may see economic turmoil, but not an economic crisis.	与此形成鲜明的对照，在美元已经贬值的世界中，可能会发生经济动荡，但不可能发生经济危机。


If the dollar has already fallen – if nobody expects it to fall much more – then there is no reason to compensate global savers and investors for holding US assets.	如果美元已经贬值——如果没有人认为美元还会进一步大幅缩水——那么就没有必要为持有美国资产的全球储户和投资者提供补偿。


On the contrary, in this scenario there are opportunities: the dollar, after all, might rise; US interest rates will be at normal levels; asset values will not be unduly depressed; and investment spending will not be affected by financial turmoil.	恰恰相反，在这种情况下却存在着机遇：归根结底，美元还可能探底回升。 美国利率将维持正常水平，资产价值也不会过度缩水，投资开支也不会受到金融动荡的影响。


Of course, there may well be turbulence: when US wage levels appear low because of a weak dollar, it is hard to export to America, and other countries must rely on other sources of demand to maintain full employment.	当然，还有可能出现其他混乱：当美国的工资水平由于美元贬值而显得低廉时，向美国出口的难度就会增大，而其他国家也必须依靠其他的需求来源维持各自国内的就业状况。


The government may have to shore up the financial system if the changes in asset prices that undermined the dollar sink risk-loving or imprudent lenders.	如果对美元构成威胁的资产价格变化让热爱风险或鲁莽的贷款人陷入麻烦，政府也许不得不对金融体系给予某种程度的支撑。


But these are, or ought to be, problems that we can solve.	但这些都是、或者应该是我们能够解决的问题。


By contrast, sky-high US interest rates produced by a general expectation of a massive ongoing dollar decline is a macroeconomic problem without a solution.	而恰恰相反，大规模持续性美元贬值的普遍预期所带来的居高不下的美元利率却是没有办法解决的宏观经济问题。


Yet so far there are no signs that global savers and investors expect a dollar decline.	但迄今为止还没有迹象表明全球储户和投资者预期美元将会贬值。


The large gap between US and foreign long-term interest rates that should emerge from and signal expectations of a falling dollar does not exist.	这种预期理应产生的美元和外国长期利率间的巨大息差并没有出现，而如果息差出现，就能够反应出人们对美元的贬值预期。


And the $65 billion needed every month to fund the US current-account deficit continues to flow in.	不仅如此，填平美国经常帐户赤字所需的每月650亿美元继续源源不断地流入。


Thus, the world economy may dodge yet another potential catastrophe.	这样世界经济也许能躲开一场可能发生的灾难。


That may still prove to be wishful thinking.	事实也许会证明这只是一厢情愿。


After all, America’s still-large current-account deficit guarantees that the dollar will continue to fall.	归根结底，美国仍然庞大的经常帐户赤字注定了美元将会继续贬值。


Even so, the macroeconomic logic that large current-account deficits signal that currencies are overvalued continues to escape the world’s international financial investors and speculators.	即便如此，大规模经常帐户赤字表明货币价值高估的宏观经济逻辑却继续被国际金融投资者和投机者们视而不见。


On one level, this is very frustrating: we economists believe that people are smart enough to understand their situation and capable enough to pursue their own interests.	在某种层次上，这一事实令人沮丧：我们经济学家相信人们有足够的智慧理解周边的环境，也有足够的能力保护自己的利益。


Yet the typical investor in dollar-denominated assets – whether a rich private individual, a pension fund, or a central bank – has not taken the steps to protect themselves against the very likely dollar decline in our future.	但投资于美元计价资产的典型投资者——无论他是富有的个人、退休基金还是中央银行——都没有采取措施保护自己不受未来很可能发生的美元贬值的侵害。


In this case, what is bad for economists is good for the world economy: we may be facing a mere episode of financial distress in the US rather than sky-high long-term interest rates and a depression.	在这种情况下，经济学家眼中的坏事对世界经济而言却是件好事：我们面对的也许只是美国的金融衰退，而不是居高不下的长期利率和全球经济萧条。


The fact that economists can’t explain it is no reason not to be thankful.	经济学家无法解释这样的现象，但却没有理由不为此感到庆幸。


Do Low Interest Rates Ensure High Asset Prices?	低利率保证高资产价格吗？


Asset prices– stocks, commercial real estate, and even oil – are, historically, at high levels around the world.	世界范围内的资产价格—股票、商业不动产，甚至石油—都处在历史的高位。


Although history is often a good predictor of future trends, every now and then something fundamental changes that makes for a new pattern.	虽然通过历史可以很好地预测未来趋势，但根本性的变化不时发生，从而催生新的模式。


The important question now is whether today’s high asset prices are the result of some such fundamental development, or whether bubbles have formed.	现在的一个重要问题时，今天高企的资产价格是否是某些根本性变化的产物，或者说泡沫是否已经形成。


One oft-heard justification for high asset prices is that real (inflation-adjusted) long-term interest rates are very low.	一种对高资产价格耳熟能详的辩护认为实际的（计入通胀因素的）长期利率是非常低的。


But investors should be wary of this argument.	但投资者们应该对这种观点保持警惕。


It may sound plausible, but it is hardly conclusive, and, more importantly, it certainly does not tell us that high prices are sustainable.	它看似有理，但却并不是结论性的，更重要的是，它的确没有告诉我们这种高价格是可持续的。


It is, of course, true that real long-term interest rates have declined quite markedly – not suddenly and not only recently, but at a fairly steady pace for more than twenty years.	当然，不可否认的是，实际长期利率已经显著降低—这种变化不是突如其来，也不是最近才有，而是在过去的二十多年里以一种较为平稳的速度发生的。


According to the IMF, world real long-term interest rates peaked at nearly 7% on average in 1984, and fell to just below 2% by 2004.	根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的说法，世界实际长期利率在1984年达到顶点，平均为7%，而到了2004年则降低到2%以下。


There were some ups and downs along the way, but the overall trend has been downward, and the magnitude of the decline – nearly five percentage points – is striking.	在此期间利率有所起伏，但总体上呈下降趋势，且下降的幅度—近5个百分点—是惊人的。


Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors and a likely candidate to succeed Alan Greenspan as the Federal Reserve’s chairman in January, has called the decline in real interest rates over just the last decade a “global savings glut.”	布什总统经济顾问委员会主席，极有可能在明年一月份接替格林斯潘，继任美联储主席的候选人之一，Ben Bernanke将过去十年以来的实际利率下降称作一场“全球性储蓄过剩”。


It is not that there is “too much” saving around the world today, but that the amount of saving has been high enough that returns, as measured by real interest rates, are a lot lower than they once were.	但当今全球的储蓄并不是“过多”，而是储蓄额高到了足够的程度，以至于以实际利率来衡量的收益要比以前低很多了。


In a March 2005 speech, Bernanke argued that this “glut” helps explain several features of the American economy, possibly including the enormous fiscal and trade deficits.	在2005年三月的一次演讲中，Bernanke 说这一“过剩”，可以用来解释美国经济的几个特点，其中还可能包括巨大的财政和贸易赤字。


Low real long-term rates mean that any long-term asset that pays, say, $100 a year in real terms would have been worth a real $1,429 in 1984, when it yielded 7%, but would have to be worth a real $5,000 now, when it yields just 2%.	低实际利率意味着任何长期资产，如果年实际收益为100美金，那么在1984年按收益率7%计算的实际价值是1429美金，但同样的收益按今天仅2%的收益率计算，则其实际价值必须是5000美金。


A decline in long-term rates of such magnitude would thus appear to imply massive price inflation for real assets, justifying the high prices we are in fact seeing.	因而如此大幅度的长期利率下跌似乎意味着实际资产的价格膨胀，从而解释了我们现今所见的高价格。


Case closed, according to some advocates of pricey investments.	在一些高价投资的鼓吹者们看来，这就是盖棺定论了。


But there are holes in this case.	但这样的说法是有漏洞的。


We have to look at the reasons that real interest rates were so much higher 10 or 20 years ago, and think about what that means, and we also have to look at the broader history of asset prices and their relation to real interest rates.	我们必须考查实际利率在10或20年前高出许多的原因，并思考其内涵。 我们还必须从更广泛的历史中考查资产价格及其与实际利率的关系。


Twenty years ago, real short-term interest rates were exceptionally high by historical standards because the major central banks of the world wanted to combat what was seen at the time as inaction against spiraling inflation.	20年前，实际短期利率以历史标准来看非常之高，那是因为当时世界各国的央行想要对其在持续上升的通货膨胀面前的无所作为开刀。


It took the courage – or recklessness, depending on your point of view – of US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to send the world into recession in 1981-2 in order to break the back of inflation.	对于当时的美联储主席Paul Volcker而言，为了遏止通胀而在1981-1982年间让世界陷入经济衰退，需要相当的勇气—或是鲁莽，观��因人而异。


That recession was destructive, but it had one silver lining: an inspiration to the world that an independent central bank can take tough measures to ensure price stability.	这场衰退是破坏性的，但它也有一个亮点：给予全世界一个启示—一家独立的中央银行为确保价格稳定可以采取强硬措施。


But, while the worldwide recession of 1981-2 brought inflation down rapidly, nominal long-term interest rates did not fall immediately, for the world’s markets were still not convinced.	然而，当世界范围的1981-1982经济衰退使通胀迅速降低时，名义长期利率却并未立即下降，因为世界市场仍然没有对此信服。


Hence, real long-term rates remained quite high in the mid-1980’s.	因此，实际长期利率在1980年代中期仍然保持在高位。


Gradually, with lenders becoming increasingly confident in subsequent years that low inflation was here to stay, real long-term interest rates began heading south.	逐渐地，随着贷方对未来持续低通胀的信心日益增强，实际长期利率才开始下降。


But this history means that the true real long-term interest rate was not as high in the 1980’s as our measures show, because long-term inflation expectations must have been much higher than the one-year inflation rate was at the time.	但这段历史说明1980年代真正的实际长期利率并不像我们所计算的那样高。 因为那时对长期通胀的期望值肯定比某一年份的通胀率要高得多。


Holders of long-term bonds, for example, must have thought that inflation would come roaring back after the effects of the 1981-2 global recession had passed.	例如，长期债券的持有者一定认为在1981-1982年的全球经济衰退过去之后，通胀会强力反弹。


The inflation-indexed bond markets were not well developed in the 1980’s.	在1980年代，与通胀指数挂钩的债券市场发育还不健全。


But we do know that in 1984 the best-developed such market (in the United Kingdom) was quoting long-term real interest rates of only around 3% – far below the IMF’s figure.	但我们的确知道1984年最发达的此类市场（在英国）报出的长期实际利率仅为3%左右—比IMF的数字低得多。


Even if we were to accept that real rates were genuinely very high in the mid-1980’s, then the logical conclusion would be that the stock and housing markets should have been even lower in the 1980’s, not that real prices should be very high in 2005.	即便我们接受实际利率在1980年代中期确实很高的说法，那么由此做出的符合逻辑的结论则是1980年代的股票和房地产市场的价格本应该更低，而不是2005年的实际资产价格应该很高。


In fact, if one takes a longer view of real interest rates in the US, calculated by subtracting the previous year’s inflation from the nominal government bond yield, one finds that, while they are much lower than 20 years ago, they are not low by historical standards.	实际上，如果我们从更长期的观点来考量美国的实际利率，将前一年的通胀从政府债券的实际收益中扣除，我们会发现虽然它们比20年前低了很多，但就历史标准而言却并不低。


The average real long-term government interest rate in 1891-1979 – a period ending just before Volcker oversaw soaring growth in borrowing costs – was a mere 1.25%, which is very close to the real long-term interest rate today.	1891-1979年期间（在Volcker监察到借款成本急剧上升之前刚结束的这段时期）的平均实际长期政府利率仅为1. 25%。


In short, we simply shouldn’t read too much into the decline in real long-term interest rates over the last 20 years.	简而言之，我们不应该过分纠缠于过去20年以来的实际长期利率的降低。


Historically, real rates have jumped around a lot, showing little correlation with asset prices.	从历史上看，实际利率变化起伏颇大，却并未表现出与资产价格的相关性。


Whatever their other benefits, the low rates we see around the world now hardly amount to insurance against future drops in asset prices.	不论其在另外方面会带来什么好处，现今全世界范围内的低利率都无法保证未来的资产价格不会下跌。


The African Paradox	非洲悖论


PARIS – Earlier this month, the trial of Pascal Simbikangwa, accused of complicity in the genocide in Rwanda, in which 800,000 people were killed between April and July 1994, began in Paris.	巴黎—本月早些时候，帕斯卡·辛比康瓦（Pascal Simbikangwa）审判在巴黎开始。


Unfortunately, mass killings in Africa continue.	辛比康瓦被控参与了导致1994年4月—7月800,000人丧生的卢旺达种族灭绝。


In South Sudan, Africa’s newest state, massacres of civilians are still taking place, particularly around the city of Bor.	不幸的是，非洲的大规模杀戮仍然没有停止，特别是在博尔（Bor）市附近。


And French military intervention in the Central African Republic has not put an end to severe inter-communal violence there.	法国对中非共和国的军事干涉并没有结束那里的社会间暴力。


Yet, paradoxically, even as such episodes continue to occur in Africa, perhaps on a larger scale than anywhere else in the world, the continent has also become a beacon of hope.	然而奇怪的是，尽管非洲的社会间暴力一直存在，并且或许比世界其他地区更加严重，却扔不妨碍这个块大陆成为希望之光。


Indeed, the perpetuation of extreme violence contrasts starkly with Africa’s favorable demographic profile, and its economic – and even political and social – progress in recent years.	事实上，极端暴力的持久存在与非洲有利的人口结构及其近几年来的经济——甚至政治和社会——进步形成了鲜明的对比。


One way to think about this paradox is in terms of the closing of a four-century-long parenthesis.	解释这一悖论的一个思路是一段长达四个世纪的插曲的结束。


Since the seventeenth-century, Africa has been mainly an object of history.	自十七世纪以来，非洲一直主要作为一个历史客体（object of history）存在。