If they succeed, perhaps they should add a black border around the proud Islamic green of their flag – the black not of mourning, but of justice.	如果成功，或许他们应该在荣耀的绿色伊斯兰国旗周围添加一个黑色的边框——不是表示哀悼的黑色，而是代表正义的黑色。


Schooling and Social Change in Pakistan	学校教育与巴基斯坦社会变革


ISLAMABAD – The importance of education – and especially schooling – cannot be overestimated.	伊斯兰堡—教育，尤其是学校教育的重要性怎么强调都不过分。


Not only has the expansion of primary and secondary education been linked to accelerated economic growth, poverty eradication, and improved income equality, but education also appears to be closely associated with social enrichment and inclusion, the upgrading of human capital, increased opportunities, and enhanced freedom and welfare.	中小学教育的普及与加快经济增长、减少贫困和增强收入平等直接相关，而教育更是与社会的多样化和包容性、人力资本的升级、机会的增加以及自由与福利的巩固紧密相关。


That is why, as Pakistan’s prime minister, I have placed universal access to education very high on the national agenda.	因此，作为巴基斯坦总理，我将教育普及作为国家日程的重中之重。


Education influences the way people perceive the world around them, understand issues, and find solutions to their problems.	教育影响人们认识周边世界、理解问题以及寻找问题解决方案的方式。


It makes them more aware of their rights and duties and affects how they interact within their communities and with the state and its institutions.	教育让人们更加能够认识到他们的权利与义务，影响他们如何在社区内与人互动以及与国家和国家机构互动。


Above all, it enables them to think critically and question established wisdom, thereby enabling them to rise above prejudice, myth, and restrictive historical legacies.	最重要的是，教育让人们能够批判性思考和质疑传统智慧，从而让他们超越偏见、传说和历史传统的桎梏。


In this sense, education is a major driver of social progress.	从这个角度讲，教育是社会进步的重要推动力量。


And it is the key to fulfilling my promise, made when I took office two years ago, to create a new framework for social change in Pakistan, one that ensures equal opportunities and social justice for everyone and stops the exploitation of the poor and harnesses their potential.	教育也是实现我在两年前开始执政时所作的承诺的关键——为巴基斯坦建立新的社会变化框架，这个框架将确保所有国民机会公平和社会正义，停止剥削穷人、阻碍他们发挥潜力。


As the Oslo Summit on Education for Development approaches, I remain firm in my commitment to securing the right to a high-quality education for every child in Pakistan – especially for girls, who have long faced high barriers to education.	随着奥斯陆为了发展的教育峰会（Oslo Summit on Education for Development）的临近，我坚持固守我的承诺——确保每一个巴基斯坦儿童获得高质量教育的权利，特别是女孩，她们长期面临大量教育阻碍。


But there remain considerable obstacles to fulfilling that commitment.	但实现这一承诺面临着诸多障碍。


Indeed, nearly six million Pakistani children are currently out of school, and many more are not learning even basic mathematics or reading skills.	事实上，目前有近六百万巴基斯坦儿童在学校大门外徘徊，更有多得多的儿童无法学习基本数学和阅读技能。


Dropout rates are high.	辍学率很高。


And, perhaps worst of all, terrorists and extremists have been targeting schools, blowing up their buildings and threatening their teachers, particularly in the northern part of the country.	此外，也许最糟糕的是，恐怖分子和极端分子将学校作为目标，炸毁学校建筑，威胁学校教师，在巴基斯坦北部尤其猖獗。


In a particularly tragic incident last December, terrorists attacked young students and teachers at a school in Peshawar.	在去年12月的一起惨绝人寰的事件中，恐怖分子袭击了白沙瓦（Peshawar）一座学校的年轻学生和教师。


I now reiterate the promise that I made after that attack.	现在，我重申我在白沙瓦袭击后所做的承诺。


My government will not allow Pakistan’s schools – so vital to our country’s future – to become targets of terrorism.	我的政府决不允许巴基斯坦学校——它们对巴基斯坦的未来至关重要——成为恐怖主义的目标。


Education is the most important investment we can make in our most precious assets – our children – and we will not tolerate even the slightest threat to it.	教育是我们对我们最宝贵的资产——儿童所做的最重要的投资，我们绝不容忍对这项投资的哪怕是最轻微的威胁。


Protecting schools from extremists today will help to stem the rise of extremism tomorrow.	如今，保护学校免受极端分子威胁有助于阻止未来极端主义的崛起。


Indeed, given the contribution of ignorance, lack of choice, and socioeconomic deprivation to the rise of extremism in parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, ensuring that future generations have better education, improved capabilities, and more opportunities will ensure that the next generation will not become easy prey for terrorist organizations.	事实上，拜无知、缺少选择以及社会经济剥削所赐，巴基斯坦和阿富汗局部恐怖主义大行其道，这意味着保证子孙后代得到更好的教育、拥有更强的能力、获得更多的机会能够让下一代不会轻易沦为恐怖组织的猎物。


In addition to the risk that a few would be tempted by extremism is the certainty that, if we fail to meet our commitment to universal education, millions of children would be relegated to a life of poverty and struggle, with their hopes, dreams, and potential squandered, undermining the country’s development potential.	除了少数人会受到极端主义蛊惑的风险外，如果我们无法兑现普及教育的承诺，可以肯定数百万儿童将不得不在贫困和挣扎中度过一生，他们的希望、梦想和潜力都无从实现，而这将破坏巴基斯坦的发展潜力。


More than half of Pakistan’s population is under the age of 25; theirs is the generation with the potential to drive progress and prosperity in the country – if, of course, they receive the education they deserve.	一半以上的巴基斯坦人口年龄不到25岁； 他们这一代人拥有推动巴基斯坦进步与繁荣的潜力——当然，如果他们能够获得应有的教育的话。


Given how unlikely it is that a free-market approach would lead to the equitable provision of education, my government has committed to increase the public resources allocated for education, which averaged only 2.4% of GDP from 2004 to 2013, to 4% percent of GDP over the next three years.	自由市场方针不可能带来公平的教育方案，因此我的政府致力于增加教育方面的公共资源配置，教育经费占GDP之比从2004—2013年间的平均2. 4%增加到此后三年的平均4%。


Such funding will support the steps needed to fulfill the promise, contained in our country’s constitution, that the state will “provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period.”	这笔资金能够支持实现被写入巴基斯坦宪法的承诺——巴基斯坦将“在尽可能短的时间内实现免费中学义务教育”——的必要措施。


Those steps include cooperation with provincial governments – which bear the primary responsibility for primary and secondary education in Pakistan – to devise a roadmap for universal enrollment.	这些措施包括与省级政府合作——省级政府承担着小学和中学教育的主要责任——制定全民入学的路线图。


In order to improve the quality of teaching and learning, we are working not only to expand facilities for teacher training, but also to draw more talented people to the profession by recognizing and honoring the service of teachers.	为了改善教学质量，我们不但寻求扩大教师培训计划，还计划通过承认和表彰教师事业吸引更多优秀人才加入教师队伍。


And we are investing in computers and other advanced learning tools to ensure that our children can compete internationally.	此外，我们还在投资于计算机和其他先进学习工具以确保巴基斯坦儿童具有国际竞争力。


We have also launched several new initiatives to make education more widely accessible.	我们还开展了多项新计划进一步普及教育。


One such initiative is the National Endowment Scholarships for Talent, which finances the education of poor students.	计划之一是全国捐赠人才奖学金（National Endowment Scholarships for Talent），该计划为贫困学生的教育提供财务支持。


Finally, we are strengthening the institutional scaffolding of Pakistan’s education system.	最后，我们正在强化巴基斯坦教育体系的制度框架。


For example, we have created the National Curriculum Council, which will standardize school curricula throughout the country, while ensuring that they are consistent with national requirements and international benchmarks.	比如，我们成立了全国课程委员会（National Curriculum Council）负责全国学校课程的标准化，同时确保它们与国家需要和国际基准相一致。


Reforms to the examination system are being introduced to complement this effort.	改革考试制度也是这一措施的补充。


My pledge is being turned into action.	我的承诺正在转化为行动。


But my government cannot do it alone.	但我的政府无法独力实现承诺。


To overcome the challenges we face and fulfill our promise to our children, we need active support from the international community.	要克服我们所面临的挑战、兑现我们对儿童的承诺，我们需要来自国际社会的积极支持。


The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of achieving universal primary education was expected to reach its target this year; it has not.	曾经我们预期实现全民小学教育的千年发展目标（MDG）将在今年实现；


And so now is the ideal moment for the world to renew its commitment to education.	但是没有。 因此，过社会更新教育承诺正逢其时。


We must approach the Sustainable Development Goals, which aim to carry on the work of the MDGs, with a clear direction, a sense of purpose, and strong resolve.	我们必须带着明确的方向、使命感和强大的决心向可持续发展目标（SDG，MDG的继任者）前进。


For our part, we have created a SDG unit in our Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform to coordinate their timely achievement.	对巴基斯坦来说，我们已经在计划、发展和改革部（Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform）建立了SDG小组以协调确保目标的及时实现。


We hope that other countries will show the same commitment.	我们希望其他国家也拿出同样的承诺。


For Pakistan, education is not merely a priority – it is a policy imperative.	对巴基斯坦来说，教育不仅仅是一项重点——他也是政策当务之急。


Pakistan’s Iranian Shadow	巴基斯坦的伊朗阴影


As the future of both Pakistan and its president, Pervez Musharraf, wallow in uncertainty in the wake of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, parallels are being drawn to the 1979 fall of the Shah and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.	随着巴基斯坦和总统穆沙拉夫的前景因为贝·布托的遇刺而变得不确定起来，人们开始联想起1979年发生在伊朗的国王被驱赶下台和伊斯兰革命。


Once again, a “pro-American” autocrat seems to be rapidly losing his grip on power, with his US ally only half-heartedly standing by him.	又一次，一个“亲美”的独裁者似乎正在快速地失去他对权力的控制，而他的美国盟友只是半心半意地站在他的一边。


The liberal elite and intelligentsia rail against the dictator, confident that their country is primed for secular democracy.	自由主义精英和知识分子联合起来对抗独裁者，相信他们的国家已经准备好迎接世俗民主。


The obvious lesson to be drawn from 1979 is that America unwisely rested its entire strategic relationship with Iran on the shoulders of an unpopular dictator.	1979年带给我们的一个明显的教训是美国不明智地把它与伊朗的战略关系完全放在一个不受欢迎的独裁者身上。


When his regime crumbled, so did America’s ability to realize its interests there.	于是当他的政权垮台时，美国实现在该地区的利益的能力也失去了。


But the Iranian revolution holds another lesson for Pakistani liberals: obsessed with evicting the Shah, Iran’s intelligentsia was delusional about their own society and their potential to emerge victorious via an abrupt political upheaval.	但是伊朗革命还给巴基斯坦的自由主义者提供了另一个教训：因为一心想要驱逐国王，伊朗的知识分子妄想他们这个阶层和他们的潜力能够通过一次突如其来的政治骚乱最终走向胜利。


Once the Shah left, the radical minority that was willing to fight and die for its cause devoured the “moderate majority,” establishing Islamist rule in short order.	当国王下台后，愿意为他们的事业斗争甚至死亡的激进的少数派吞噬了“温和的多数派”，在短时间内建立了伊斯兰主义的统治。


To be sure, profound political and cultural distinctions exist between Iran in the 1970’s and contemporary Pakistan.	当然，二十世纪七十年代的伊朗与现在的巴基斯坦在政治和文化上都存在很大的差别。


Iran lacked an independent judiciary, basic press freedoms, and civil society organizations.	伊朗缺乏独立的司法系统、基本的新闻自由以及由平民组成的社会团体。


Contemporary Pakistan has, to varying degrees, all of these.	而这些现在的巴基斯坦在不同程度上都有。


More importantly, Iran’s Shia clerics were both organized and politically active in a way that Pakistan’s Sunni clergy have not been.	更为重要的是，伊朗的什叶派教徒拥有良好的组织，并且在政治上很活跃，而巴基斯坦的逊尼派教徒却不是这样。


Indeed, Pakistan’s Islamist parties have never won more than 12% of the popular vote.	事实上，巴基斯坦的伊斯兰主义党派在选举中的得票率从来没有超过12%。


It would be wrong, however, to think that Pakistan is immune from the Muslim world’s Islamist undercurrents.	不过，如果我们认为巴基斯坦与穆斯林世界的伊斯兰主义潜流完全绝缘那就错了。


Around 40% of Pakistanis live below the poverty line, half the population is illiterate, and, among those who are literate, many have been schooled in Wahhabi-funded madrasas.	大约有40%的巴基斯坦人生活在贫困线下，有一半的人口是文盲，而在那些受过教育的人当中，许多人是在由瓦哈比教派资助的伊斯兰学校里上的学。


Various opinion polls consistently show that a sizable minority of Pakistanis has a favorable view of Osama bin Laden, an unfavorable view of the US, and believe that implementing Islamic law (Sharia) should be a priority.	各种民意测验一再显示了巴基斯坦有相当一部分少数民族对本·拉登抱有好感、憎恨美国并且认为应该优先实施伊斯兰教教法。


A Pakistani intellectual once confessed to me, “I fear the weak electoral showings of Islamists in Pakistan has more to do with the fact that a compelling, charismatic Islamist leader – a Pakistani Hassan Nasrallah – has yet to emerge, not that his message wouldn't resonate.”	一位巴基斯坦的知识分子曾经坦率地跟我说：“我担心伊斯兰主义者在巴基斯坦选举中的低得票率更多地是因为他们缺少一个令人信服、有超凡魅力的领导人，也就是巴基斯坦的纳斯鲁拉，而不是因为他发出的号令没有得到共鸣。


Few Iranians had ever heard of Ayatollah Khomeini until 1978, but it didn’t take long for his message to electrify millions.	”在1978年以前还很少有伊朗人听说过霍梅尼，但是不久以后在他的号令下有数百万人跟从了他。


The army has always been the strongest bulwark in assuring that Pakistan does not go the way of Iran.	军队的强大保障使人们相信巴基斯坦不会走上伊朗的道路。


But while the officer corps may be steadfast defenders of secular rule, the rank and file reflects Pakistani society.	但是尽管军官团也许是世俗统治的忠实守卫者，基层士兵才真正反映了巴基斯坦社会的心声。


In the event of an Islamist political awakening, the army’s allegiances are not guaranteed.	当伊斯兰主义者在政治上的觉醒变得强烈起来时，我们并不敢保证军队的效忠。


In Iran, apart from senior commanders, who were either killed or fled the country, the Shah’s powerful, staunchly secular army switched sides to Khomeini’s revolutionary government virtually overnight.	在伊朗，除开那些高级指挥官，他们不是被杀就是逃到了国外，国王强大并且忠诚可靠的世俗军队几乎在一夜之间就倒向了霍梅尼的革命政府。


This is not to suggest than an Islamist awakening in Pakistan is on the horizon, or that Pakistanis must choose between an unpopular autocrat or a Taliban-style government.	这并不是说巴基斯坦的伊斯兰主义者即将走上复兴之路，或者巴基斯坦人必须在一个不受欢迎的独裁者和一个塔利班式的政府之间做出选择。


On the contrary, Pakistan’s liberals are brave to agitate for democracy, the rule of law, and accountability for Musharraf, whose presidency appears beyond rehabilitation.	恰恰相反，巴基斯坦的自由主义者勇敢地鼓动民主、法治以及要求穆沙拉夫负起责任，后者的总统位置似乎还没有得到稳固。


But they should learn from Iran’s revolution that their means of agitating for political reform are relevant to the political ends they hope to achieve.	但是他们应该从伊朗的革命中吸取教训，即他们采用什么方式来鼓动政治改革将是与他们希望取得怎样的政治结果直接相关的。


Emotions are raw in the aftermath of Bhutto’s death.	贝·布托去世后国内的情绪非常激动。


More than 50 people have been killed in riots, and both her party and that of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif are contemplating mass demonstrations to bring down Musharraf's government.	有50多个人死于骚乱，而她的党派以及前总理谢里夫的党派正在计划发动大规模游行示威，以便把穆沙拉夫政府赶下台。


But the politics of rage, retribution, and rioting will not bring the kind of tranquil, pluralistic democracy that Bhutto envisioned.	但是愤怒、报复和骚乱的政治不会带来贝·布托曾经希望出现的平稳和多元化的民主。


The desire to exact revenge on Musharraf for stifling democracy and failing to provide Bhutto with sufficient security will only inflame a political atmosphere that Pakistani liberals seek to de-radicalize.	因为穆沙拉夫压制民主以及没有给贝·布托提供足够的安全保卫而希望对他进行报复只会给巴基斯坦自由主义者寻求消除过激立场的政治环境煽风点火。


Not only in Iran, but also in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq, history has shown that Islamists thrive amid political chaos and violence.	不仅是伊朗，黎巴嫩、巴勒斯坦和伊拉克的历史都表明了伊斯兰主义者往往是在政治骚乱和暴力活动中兴盛起来的。


Similarly in Pakistan, it is dangerous to bet that the country’s pro-democracy lawyers, intellectuals, and students will emerge victorious in the tumult and potential carnage of street politics.	同样地在巴基斯坦，寄希望于这个国家赞成民主的律师、知识分子和学生会在动乱和对街头政治潜在的大屠杀中最终走向胜利是很危险的。


As John Limbert, the erudite Iran scholar and retired US diplomat (taken hostage in Iran for 444 days) once reflected on the 1979 Iranian revolution, “Our liberal-minded Iranian friends proved to be helpless in political turmoil....[T]hey could write biting editorials,” but lacked the stomach to “throw acid, beat up opponents, organize street gangs...and engage in the brutality that wins” in political uprisings.	正如约翰·林伯特，知识渊博的伊朗学者和退休美国外交官（曾在伊朗作为人质被关押了444天），对1979年伊朗革命的反思：“我们有着自由主义思想的伊朗朋友在政治骚乱中被证明是那样地无助……他们可以写一些辛辣的社论”，但是却缺乏勇气“投掷硫酸、殴打反对者、组织街头团伙……以及使用暴力来赢得”政治地位的上升。


Pakistani liberals may be right that their country is invulnerable to an Islamist power grab.	巴基斯坦的自由主义者认为他们的国家不会被伊斯兰主义者掌握权力也许是对的。


But the costs are too high to be impulsive, and the storms of political Islam are difficult to forecast.	但是这种代价太高昂而不会使这个国家免受伤害，而政治伊斯兰的风暴是很难预测的。


In 1978, Iran’s liberals were bent on removing the Shah by any means.	1978年，伊朗的自由主义者决意采用一切手段把国王赶下台。


Instead of creating an atmosphere conducive to an Iranian Gandhi, they unwittingly helped usher into power Ayatollah Khomeini and a theocratic regime less tolerant than the one they helped unseat.	但是他们没能创造出一个有利于伊朗式的甘地站出来的环境，而是在无意识的情况下把霍梅尼推向了权力的中心，迎来了一个比他们帮助推翻的政权更加令人难以容忍的神权统治政权。


Three decades later, millions of chastened Iranians wish they could relive those heady days differently; their Pakistani counterparts would be wise to heed their hindsight.	三十年后，数百万受到惩罚的伊朗人希望他们能够在那些鲁莽的年代里有不同的表现； 而他们的巴基斯坦同胞应该明智地听取他们的事后反思。


Pakistan’s Next Fight	巴基斯坦的下一场战役


NEW YORK – The terrorist sanctuary in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan’s tribal frontier with Afghanistan is coming apart.	发自纽约——位于巴基斯坦和阿富汗两国交界的南瓦齐里斯坦部落地区一直都是恐怖分子庇护所，但如今这个恐怖阵地已有土崩瓦解之势。


It took a while for the Pakistani Army to move against the region’s rising violence and chaos, but its campaign in South Waziristan is making progress.	虽然巴基斯坦军队花了很长一段时间才平定了当地不断爆发的暴力和骚乱活动，但巴军在南瓦齐里斯坦地区的行动也确实取得了成效。


The campaign’s immediate impact consists in Pakistan’s determination to establish its authority in the area. But the window for the military to fill the power vacuum will be open only briefly.	这场行动所造成的直接影响则在于巴基斯坦当局决心要在当地重新树立自己的管治权威，然而留给巴军来填补这一权力真空的时机却也相当短暂，因为恐怖分子过去的行动已经证明，这些人随时可能发动突袭，组织反击，甚至重建其恐怖网络。


Indeed, even as the Pakistani Army launched operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) in October, a dozen devastating terrorist attacks in Pakistan’s major cities demonstrated the reach of the South Waziristan militants.	事实上，即使巴军已经在10月发动了“拯救之路”行动，在巴基斯坦几个主要城市发生的一系列破坏巨大的恐怖袭击依然显示出一些南瓦齐里斯坦武装人员的踪迹。


In a few instances, senior army and intelligence officers were targeted outside their homes in Islamabad, despite extensive security measures in and around the capital.	在某些个案中，尽管当局已经在首都内外广泛部署了大量保安力量，但巴军的一些高级军官和情报官员却在他们位于首都伊斯兰堡的家外面遭到了跟踪。


The October 11 attack on Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi was the most daring of all – and sent shudders across the military command, because the terrorists knew the layout of the military and security buildings.	而在最近10月11日发生的，针对拉瓦尔品第市巴基斯坦陆军总部的恐怖袭击无疑是其中最为胆大妄为的一起——这甚至在巴军高层都造成了恐慌，因为恐怖分子竟然对军队和安全部队大楼的内部布局都了如指掌。


But this inside knowledge also worked against the militants, because it demonstrated what was at stake for the country at large. No large street protests against the military operation in South Waziristan have been reported from anywhere in Pakistan.	但这类行动对于武装分子来说同样也是不利的，因为这完全昭示出威胁巴基斯坦的最大元凶究竟是何人，至此在巴国境内也再也没有什么大规模的，反对巴军南瓦齐里斯坦军事行动的街头抗议了。


But success in South Waziristan is only the starting point for dealing with the problem.	但是，在南瓦齐里斯坦地区所取得的成功只是处理整个恐怖主义问题所迈出的第一步。


Militant hubs are scattered throughout the sparsely-populated tribal areas, including the North Waziristan, Orakzai, and Mohmand regions.	一方面恐怖分子据点依然在那些人烟稀少的部落地区星罗棋布，包括北瓦齐里斯坦，奥拉克扎伊和莫赫曼德等地。


Moreover, violent militancy has now spread into Pakistan proper.	此外，暴力武装行动已经扩散到巴基斯坦城市地区。


Southern Punjab is seeing a rapid growth in the number of religious fanatics, and rooting out the problem there is much more challenging than acting in the Pashtun tribal areas.	南旁遮普地区的宗教狂热者数量正不断增加，而铲除这个症结要比在普什图族部落地区展开行动更具挑战性。


Many militants in Punjab worked closely with the Pakistani intelligence services for years, and their infrastructure is dispersed and hidden in various towns and villages.	许多旁遮普武装分子已经和巴基斯坦情报部门密切合作了很多年，而其组织则分散隐藏在许多城镇乡村之中。


The Army, which recruits heavily in the Punjab, will not use force there in the way it is doing in the tribal areas.	与此同时，这些地方还是巴基斯坦部队招募新兵的主要来源地，因此巴军也不能像在部落地区那样使用武力。


Only a concerted law-enforcement effort, with the full support of the intelligence services, can succeed in the Pakistani heartland.	只有靠合作贯彻执行法律，加上情报部门的尽力配合，才能在这些巴基斯坦心脏地带取得成功。


The deep security crisis in Pakistan is mirrored across the border in Afghanistan, which offers a model of what not to do.	而巴基斯坦如今所面临的深重安全危机，其实是阿富汗边境地区状况的翻版，而阿富汗则提供了一个前车之鉴。


The Afghan Taliban, removed from power and routed from the country by the end of 2001, needed only a few years to revive itself, owing to the failure of the Afghan government and its international backers to rebuild and stabilize the country.	虽然阿富汗塔利班政权早已在2001年末被推翻，但却在短短几年之内就成功恢复元气，卷土重来，究其原因，都是因为阿富汗政府及其国际支持者没能成功重建，并把这个国家稳定下来。


A critical factor in the Taliban’s revival was the haven that it found in the distant reaches of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the support that it continued to receive from elements within Pakistan.	而塔利班得以卷土重来的其中一个关键因素则是因为他们找到了位于巴阿两国边境的庇护所，以及来自巴基斯坦国内一些组织源源不断的支持。


This time, as the Afghan Taliban are expelled from Pakistan, NATO and Afghan forces must be ready to take them on.	因此此时此刻，当阿富汗塔利班被驱逐出巴基斯坦之时，北约和阿富汗部队就必须着手对付他们。


Observing the fighting in Pakistan, the United States, Afghanistan, and India expect the Pakistani army to take on both the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani militants.	在观察巴军行动之时，美国，阿富汗和印度三方都希望巴军能同时消灭阿富汗塔利班和巴基斯坦武装分子。


But thousands of fighters are thought to be dispersed in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan, with many of them focused on operations in Afghanistan.	但据估计，依然有上千名武装分子分布在巴基斯坦的普什图族部落地区，而其中大多数都将目光集中在阿富汗境内的行动。


The cross-border movement of radicals suggests the importance of international cooperation.	而极端分子的这种跨境行动则彰显出各国展开国际合作的重要性


Moreover, alliances among radical groups are constantly shifting, a reflection of tribal traditions and opportunism.	除此之外，极端组织之间也在不断合纵连横，这其中既有部落传统，也是一种机会主义行为。


Outsiders watching these shifts, and the Pakistani government’s handling of them, have been unable to discern a consistent pattern that would explain Pakistani policy.	但即便是那些观察这类结盟行为以及巴基斯坦当局对这些结盟的掌控手段的局外人，也难以说清楚巴基斯坦的政策是否有延续性。


But here, regional politics must be taken into account, especially the continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan.	但在这个地方，区域政治的因素也必须要考虑在内，尤其是印度和巴基斯坦之间长期持续的敌对态势。


At every stage of the lengthy conflict that has brought the US into the region, Pakistan has sought to limit Indian influence in Afghanistan.	在这场将美国卷入该地区的漫长冲突的各个阶段，巴基斯坦都努力在阿富汗地区遏制印度的影响力。


Indeed, India’s growing influence and investment in Afghanistan is disturbing to Pakistan’s national security apparatus.	事实上，印度在阿富汗地区不断增加的影响力和投资都令巴基斯坦的国家安全部门非常头疼。


Ultimately, the dynamics of Afghan politics will determine Afghanistan’s fate.	虽然阿富汗的内部政治动力将最终决定这个国家的命运。


But a collaborative India-Pakistan effort to stabilize the country could work wonders.	但倘若印巴两国能形成合力来稳定这个国家的话，将可能创造奇迹。


For both Pakistan and India, Afghanistan risks turning into a new disputed territory, like Kashmir, where conflict has damaged both countries for more than 60 years.	对于巴基斯坦和印度两国来说，阿富汗有可能变成一个新的，类似克什米尔这样的不稳定地区，而克什米尔的冲突已经祸害了两国超过60年。


In Afghanistan today, they have an opportunity to reject that precedent and act on their mutual interest in stability.	在当今的阿富汗，印巴两国有机会去避免重蹈覆辙，并在稳定中实现两国的共同利益。


Pakistan must be able to focus internally on its future.	巴基斯坦必须要仔细考虑自己国家的未来。


Financially insolvent and politically paralyzed, Pakistan needs international help to bring development to its liberated tribal areas and hope to the young people – 65% of the population – who live there.	对于这个经济上破产而且政治上几乎瘫痪的国家来说，国际援助可以为被解放了的部落地区以及居住在那里的年轻人——这些人占总人口的65%——带来希望。


For India, stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan would ease its rise to global economic power.	对于印度来说，巴基斯坦和阿富汗两国的稳定将有助于其世界经济力量的崛起。


Both countries should take advantage of the opportunity for cooperation provided by the Pakistani Army’s campaign against Waziristan’s militants.	而两国也该利用巴军针对瓦齐里斯坦地区武装分子的军事行动，来赢得一个展开合作的宝贵机会。


Pakistan\u0027s War of All Against All	巴基斯坦全民对全民的战争


The alliance in the fight against terrorism between Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and the United States is imperative not only for America, but for Pakistan-a Muslim-majority nation whose social fabric is being torn apart by militancy and lawlessness.	巴基斯坦总统穆沙拉夫将军和美国在抗击恐怖主义方面的结盟不但对美国是势在必行，对巴基斯坦也是如此-战斗和不法状态正撕裂着这个穆斯林主导下的国家的社会结构。


But will an exclusive focus on military power ultimately prove to be counter-productive?	但一味地重视军事力量会最终事与愿违吗？


The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, perhaps the country's most credible human rights body, argues that while "the violence now deeply embedded in society is to be rooted out over the coming years," that task "presents bigger challenges than merely picking up, detaining, and torturing those who authorities claim are militants."	"巴基斯坦人权委员会"（可能是该国最具公信力的人权机构）表示虽然"现在深深根植于社会之中的暴力会在未来的岁月里被铲除"，但这项任务"代表着比搜捕、拘押和折磨那些被当局斥为武装分子的人更大的挑战。 "


In opposing how the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is fought, many in Pakistan's minuscule middle class find themselves aligned with people they abhor: extremists whose distorted religiosity violates the tolerant version of Islam prevalent in this region.	在反对针对"基地"和塔利班的战争的形式的过程中，巴基斯坦势单力薄的中产阶级发现自己和为自己所憎恨的人站在了同一阵线上：那些以扭曲的宗教虔诚亵渎在这一地区被广为接受的宽容的伊斯兰教义的极端主义者。


Many upwardly mobile urbanites thus find themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma: how to reconcile aspirations for a better lifestyle, as symbolized by America, with increasing abhorrence of US policies.	因此许多一心向上的都市人发现自己陷入了一个两难的境地：如何才能在追求美国式的更佳生活方式与对美国政策日渐强烈的痛恨中寻求妥协呢？


Those on the religious right have no dilemma: they just hate America and its policies outright, and oppose all things "un-Islamic," including television, films, radio, and even indigenous forms of dance and music.	对于伊斯兰教右翼的人士来说则不存在这种困境：他们极度憎恶美国及其政策，并反对包括电视、电影、收音机和甚至土风舞蹈及音乐在内的所有"非伊斯兰"的事物。


Interestingly, computer technology is exempted, as it can be used to further the extremist cause.	有趣的是，计算机技术却并不在此列，因其可以被利用于进一步发展极端主义事业。


However, while Pakistan's progressives oppose militarism and violence in principle, religious fundamentalists have no compunction in resorting to violence to reinforce their point of view - thus posing a threat not just to General Musharraf, who has survived at least two assassination attempts, but also to human rights workers.	然而，在巴基斯坦的进步人士原则上反对军国主义和暴力的同时，原教旨主义者们却毫不在乎地诉诸暴力以强化他们的观点-因而不仅对至少已逃过两次刺杀之劫的穆沙拉夫将军构成威胁，也对人权工作者们构成威胁。


Indeed, the prominent feminist lawyer Asma Jahangir has 24-hour armed guards.	确实，知名女权主义律师阿斯玛·嘉翰戈尔就处在24小时的武装保护之中。


Militants have also attacked non-governmental organizations, particularly those located in the undeveloped tribal Northern Areas that lie beyond the writ of Pakistani law.	武装分子还袭击了非政府组织。 特别是那些地处巴基斯坦法律鞭长莫及的落后的北方部落地区的组织。


Sharing a mountainous - and porous - border with Afghanistan, this region includes many Taliban sympathizers among their fellow Pashtuns.	这一地区与阿富汗接壤，地形多山多洞，还有许多包括普什图族人在内的塔利班同情者。


Human rights groups have long urged the necessity of extending the writ of Pakistan's Constitution to the tribal belt, where religion-based parties have wide support.	人权组织长期以来一直强调将巴基斯坦《宪法》的效力延伸到该部落地带的必要性。 以宗教为基础的党派在该地区拥有广泛的支持。


These religious parties, a coalition of which now heads the provincial government in the North West Frontier Province, were politically marginalized until given a central role by Pakistan's military dictator of the 1980's, General Zia ul Haq, who led Pakistan's covert intervention in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.	这些宗教党派（它们的一个联盟现在主导着西北边疆省政府）在被20世纪80年代的军事独裁者齐亚哈克将军赋予中心化的角色之前，一直处于政治边缘化的状态。 齐亚哈克领导了对阿富汗抗击前苏联的战争的秘密干预。


Throughout his rule, religion-based politics grew along with the number of madrassahs and fighters trained and equipped by Pakistani and US intelligence agencies.	在他统治期间，以宗教为基础的政治长足发展，同时宗教学校和由巴基斯坦及美国的情报部门训练和装备的战士的数量也有所增加。


The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent pressure from Washington, led to a U-turn by Pakistan away from pro-jihadi policies.	2001年"9 . 11"恐怖袭击之后，来自华盛顿的压力导致巴基斯坦"亲圣战"政策发生重大转变。


Today, many former officials associated with those policies, such as Mushahid Hussain, a former information minister, concede that Pakistan should have contained militancy long ago.	现在，许多与这些政策有关联的前官员们（如前信息部长穆萨希德·侯赛因）也承认巴基斯坦本应该早就遏制住了交战状态。


Cautious steps are being taken, like the review of religion-based laws and curricula that have contributed to a creeping talibanization of Pakistani society.	政府正采取谨慎的步骤来处理这些问题。 如重新评审以宗教为基础的法律和课程设置-这些都无形中促成了巴基斯坦社会的塔利班化。


For human rights activists, it is ironic that an elected (but basically military-led) government that they oppose in principle should be undertaking reforms they have long advocated, but that elected civilian governments ignored.	对于人权活动家们来说，具有讽刺意味的是一个他们在原则上反对的获选（但实质上是军方主导的）政府会实行他们长期倡导的改革，而一个获选的文官政府却对此置若罔闻。


Despite fierce opposition from religious parties, there have been minor victories, like a couple of madrassahs agreeing to include secular subjects like math, English, and computer studies in their curricula.	尽管遭到了来自宗教党派的强烈反对，这些举措还是取得了有限的胜利。 如几所宗教学校同意将数学、英语和计算机等世俗学科纳入其课程之中。


There has also been administrative action against a few religious institutions for encroaching on public space - practically unheard of since official patronage of religious parties began in the 1970's, when their cadres were needed in the war against the Soviets.	还有几所宗教机构因蚕食公共空间而受到行政处分-这在20世纪70年代宗教党派通过向抗苏战争输出干部正式介入政治以来几乎是闻所未闻的。


But the "war on terror" has also provided this government with an excuse to arrest and detain suspects without charge.	但"反恐战争"也为这届政府无需罪名就逮捕和拘押嫌疑犯提供了借口。


More heinous human rights violations have also come to light.	更严重的侵犯人权的情况也被曝光了。


Qari Noor Mohammad, a religious activist in Faisalabad in Punjab province, was arrested recently and held without charge for several days before his corpse was dumped in front of his house.	旁遮普省费萨拉巴德的一位宗教活动家，加利·努尔·默罕默德最近在未被指控的情况下被逮捕和拘押了几天。 最后他的尸体被扔到了自家门口。


The lack of transparency that surrounds Pakistan's fight against "terrorism" is contributing to a growing public sentiment against the anti-militancy drive, which is largely perceived to be taking place under US pressure.	巴基斯坦打击"恐怖主义"的战争缺乏透明度正造成公众对反战斗状态行动的日益增长的抵触情绪。 这一行动在很大程度上被人认为是屈服于美国的压力而实施的。


Particularly contentious is the ongoing military operation in Wana district in the Northern Areas, which the Pakistani army has entered for the first time ever.	最具争议的是目前正在北方地区瓦纳区进行的军事行动。 巴基斯坦军队第一次进入该地区。


The army action in Wana, aimed against Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives who are believed to be hiding there, has led to several civilian casualties, including women and children, and rendered over 30,000 people homeless.	以窝藏在这一地区的"基地"和塔利班分子为目标的瓦纳军事行动已经造成了包括妇女和儿童在内的一些平民死亡并使3万人无家可归。


But human rights groups question how the five to six hundred Al-Qaeda operatives that the government claims were holed up in the area came to be based there in the first place.	政府声称有五、六百名"基地"分子被关押在这一地区。 但人权组织对这些人怎么会最初以此为基地提出质疑。


Locals interviewed independently say that some of those captured are in fact innocent local people from Wana, not foreign militants.	接受独立采访的本地人说有些被俘虏的人其实是无辜的瓦纳人，而不是外国武装分子。


Compared to his military predecessor, Musharraf, who touts the catch-phrase of "enlightened moderation," is conveniently progressive.	与其军界前任相比，提出"开明温和"路线的穆沙拉夫显得颇为进步。


Whereas the devoutly religious Zia was useful for boosting religious Islamic sentiments against the Soviets, Musharraf is needed nowadays to contain those very forces, which threaten not just global security but Pakistan itself.	如果说虔诚的教徒齐亚（哈克）对激发反苏联的伊斯兰宗教情绪功不可没，那么穆沙拉夫现在却必须遏制这些势力。 这些势力不仅对全球安全，也对巴基斯坦本身构成威胁。


It remains to be seen, however, whether he will be progressive enough.	然而，他是否足够进步还需拭目以待。


Pakistan’s War with Itself	巴基斯坦与自己的战争


LAHORE – Pakistan is now a nation caught between its army and the Taliban, fighting a war not of its own making.	拉合尔——目前，巴基斯坦正身处其军队与塔利班的夹缝之间，进行一场并非出自本意的战争。


Its population lives in fear of bombings and suicide attacks – the next one could be at the local mosque, an internet café, or a roadside restaurant.	其民众抱着对爆炸与自杀性袭击的恐惧度过每一天，下一处受袭地点既可能是本地的清真寺，也可能是一个网吧或路边餐馆。


Most Pakistanis are now resigned to full-scale army action being extended across the country.	大部分巴基斯坦人如今对于在该国蔓延的全方位军事行动只得听天由命。


Despite all the stakeholders – Pakistan’s army and government, as well as Western countries – knowing the scale of recent army action in Swat and Buner, millions of innocent people were left to fend for themselves as bombs rained down on them from the sky.	尽管巴基斯坦军方与政府、以及西方国家等利益攸关方对于近期在斯瓦特与布纳地区开展的军事行动的规模心知肚明，但数以百万计的无辜民众却无人问津，只得自己设法在从天而降的弹火洗礼中求生。


They were not evacuated. They were left to walk for miles and days to safety.	无人对其进行疏散，民众只能长途跋涉前往安全区域。


The United States and the Pakistani army, meanwhile, evidently believe that their sole responsibility is to keep the Taliban at bay.	与此同时，美国与巴基斯坦军方显然相信其唯一职责便是遏制塔利班势力。


Indeed, only when the mass of internally displaced people swelled to 1.5 million – the worst humanitarian disaster since the Rwanda genocide – did foreign countries, including the US, decided to provide emergency aid.	果然，只有当国内难民的数目涨至150万时（这是自卢旺达种族灭绝事件后最严重的人道主义灾难），包括美国在内的外国方面方才决定提供紧急援助。


If the government of Pakistan and its friends do not accept that this human suffering was preventable, a chain of similar disasters will take place as army action heats up in Waziristan and other parts of the country.	如果巴基斯坦政府与其盟友不接受民众所受灾难本可避免这一说法，那么，一系列相似的灾难将随着军事行动的愈演愈烈而在瓦齐里斯坦与该国其他区域继续上演。


The US administration is extremely concerned about the Taliban’s advances in Pakistan. So are Pakistan’s people.	美国政府极度关注塔利班在巴基斯坦的发展情况，巴基斯坦民众也同样关心；


But the two have different sets of concerns – and herein lie their inherently different perceptions of the situation.	但两者的关注结构不同，他们对于目前形势所持的、天然有别的判断便源于此。


The US media and government focus their rhetoric on the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into Taliban hands.	美国媒体与政府将关注的焦点放在巴基斯坦的核武库落入塔利班之手的可能性上；


The other obvious Western concern – recently expressed by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown – is the threat of a “crucible of terrorism” in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan endangering world security.	此外，西方另一个显而易见的、并在近期由英国首相戈登·布朗表达的关注点在于：地处阿富汗与巴基斯坦两国边境地区的“恐怖主义坩埚”对于世界安全构成的威胁。


Pakistanis, on the other hand, are the people actually living with that threat.	但另一方面，巴基斯坦人才是真切地伴随这种威胁生活的人们。


The Taliban have brought violence and terror.	塔利班已经带来了暴力与恐怖。


The innumerable blasts and attacks all across the country, the killing of Benazir Bhutto, and the routine television images of splatters of blood covered with flies have wrecked their nerves.	遍布全国的无数次爆炸与袭击，贝娜齐尔·布托的遇刺以及例行出现在电视屏幕中的那些苍蝇环绕的喋血镜头，无不摧残着他们的神经。


Now the Taliban are blasting girls’ schools and flogging women.	眼下，塔利班正在炸毁女校、鞭笞妇女。


This is not Pakistan. Had it been Pakistan’s ethos, the Taliban in Swat wouldn’t have needed to blast schools – people would have happily pulled their daughters from the schools themselves.	这些现象并不符合巴基斯坦的常态，如果巴基斯坦的风气原本如此，那就无需斯瓦特地区的塔利班势力动手将学校炸毁，民众自会乐于将他们在学校的女儿们领回家中；


Ordinary men and women in Swat believe in education, but the Taliban were terrorizing them out of exercising their legal and constitutional rights.	但斯瓦特地区的普通民众相信教育，只是在塔利班的威慑下，他们曾经放弃了行使这一符合法律与宪法的权利。


This illiterate, armed, Wahhabi brand of ideology was imported – as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted recently before House Appropriations Committee – by the US from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries in order to undermine the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s.	正如美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿近期向众议院拨款委员会承认的那样，这种不碰笔杆子、只耍枪杆子的瓦哈比派意识形态正是由美国于上世纪八十年代、为了削弱苏联对阿富汗的占领，从沙特阿拉伯和其他一些中东国家引入的。


Once the mission was accomplished and the Soviets vanquished, the Wahhabi virus was left to fester in Pakistan’s border areas.	当这一目标实现、苏维埃被击败后，瓦哈比病毒便被放任，继续在巴基斯坦边境地区滋生。


In the eight years of General Pervez Musharraf's dictatorship, the US and Pakistan’s army fought against the Taliban in Pakistan’s tribal regions.	在佩尔韦兹 ·穆沙拉夫将军的八年独裁时期，美国与巴基斯坦军队在该国部落地区与塔利班作战。


Only occasionally was the fighting “officially” reported.	这种战斗只是偶尔才会得到“官方”的报道；


Access to the area was denied to independent media. Many locally-based correspondents were killed in suspicious circumstances.	独立媒体进入该地区的申请被拒绝，许多身处当地的记者则死于可疑的情况。


There was a simple reason why Musharraf was the Western media’s blue-eyed boy: he delivered.	穆沙拉夫何以成为西方媒体的宠儿？ 原因很简单：他同意引渡。


He and the Pakistani army delivered many of the Al Qaeda members most wanted by the US – Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Egyptians, Yemenis, Saudis, and so on.	穆沙拉夫与巴基斯坦军方将许多美国最希望抓获的基地组织成员交了出去，这其中包括哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德以及埃及籍成员、也门籍成员、沙特籍成员等等。


For Pakistanis, however, Musharraf’s martial rule emasculated civil liberties, pressured media whenever he disagreed with editorial content, massively increased the intelligence service’s meddling in politics, and papered over the genuine grievances of disenfranchised people.	然而，对于巴基斯坦人而言，穆沙拉夫的军管措施深深伤害了公民自由； 只要他对社论中的内容存有不同看法时，媒体就会受到打压；


Eight years and many billions of dollars later, the Pakistani Taliban seized control of the Swat region, terrorizing the adjoining district of Buner and raising alarm and consternation through the rest of Pakistan.	在花费了八年时间与数十亿美元之后，巴基斯坦塔利班势力反而夺取了对斯瓦特地区的控制权，对毗邻的布纳地区形成了恐怖威慑，并在该国其余各地敲响了警钟、唤起了人们的惊恐。


Post-Musharraf Pakistan is a rather fragile democracy.	穆沙拉夫时代结束后的巴基斯坦是一个相当脆弱的民主国家。


Even today, the government’s focus remains killing and bombing.	即便是在今日，���府的焦点仍放在杀戮与爆炸上；


There is no genuine attempt at politically mainstreaming the troubled areas, no understanding of what democracy entails.	既没有在政治上将动荡地区纳入主流的真正尝试，也没有对民主制度所附要求的理解领悟；


There is not even any money being spent on equipping hospitals in Peshawar and the rest of Pakistan with adequate blood banks and trauma units, despite the regular inflow of bombing victims.	甚至没有任何财政支出被用于为白沙瓦以及巴基斯坦其他地区的医院配备充足的血库与创伤科室，哪怕经常有爆炸袭击的受害者被送入医院。


The Pakistani army would rather be seen as the country’s savior than own up to its own shortsightedness and make clear whether it has decided to change course by obeying the constitution.	巴基斯坦军方则宁愿被视为国家的救星，而不愿坦率承认其短视，并就其是否已决定遵从宪法改变路线一事表明态度。


Meanwhile, many worries and concerns remain: Will the internally displaced be able to return home and – despite the countless hastily dug graves that scar their beautiful landscape – reconnect with their old lives?	同时，还存在着许多的担忧与关注：这些国内难民能否重返家园、回归往日生活（撇开无数破坏美丽风光、草草挖就的墓穴不谈）？


Will the political parties finally realize that they must stop looking to the US and start being more responsive to their own people?	各政党是否能最终认识到他们必须停止唯美国马首是瞻的做法，转而开始更加顺应其本国民众的诉求？


But the most important questions are these: Will the face of the enemy become clear?	但最重要的问题是另外三点：敌人的面目能否变得清晰？


Who is providing the Taliban with guns and money?	是谁在向塔利班供应武器与资金？


And will army shelling really end the war?	军队的武力打击是否真能结束战争？


Palestine after Abbas?	阿巴斯下台后的巴勒斯坦?


RAMALLAH – A political leader’s decision not to seek re-election usually triggers fervent discussion about potential heirs.	发自拉马拉——但凡有政治领袖决定不再寻求连任，必然会激起关于其潜在接班人的热烈讨论。


Yet, President Mahmoud Abbas’s withdrawal from the presidential election scheduled for January 24, 2010, has produced nothing of the kind in Palestine – not because of a dearth of leadership or a reluctance to mention possible successors, but because the presidency of the Palestinian Authority has become irrelevant.	但巴勒斯坦总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯放弃竞逐即将在2010年1月24日举行的总统大选时，巴勒斯坦国内却一片平静——这可不是因为缺乏领导人选或者是羞于提及可能的继任者，而是由于巴勒斯坦民族权力机构的主席职位早已被边缘化了。


Abbas’s withdrawal comes at a time when Palestinian frustration with the political process has rendered suspect the entire rationale behind the PA, established in the mid-1990’s, following the Oslo Accords.	阿巴斯的退让恰逢巴勒斯坦人对政治进程感到沮丧之时，而这种感觉使人们对巴勒斯坦当局于1990年代中期《奥斯陆协议》后确立的整个政治逻辑都怀疑不已。


The main component of the PLO’s agreement with Israel was a five-year interim period during which negotiations were expected to lead to an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.	而当时巴解组织与以色列达成协议的主要内容，就是用五年的过渡期来展开谈判，并最终寻求在以色列国土旁建立一个巴勒斯坦国家。


Sixteen years later, it has become clear that the Israelis have made no effort to come to terms with Palestinian national aspirations – and that no effective effort has been made to convince them.	一转眼16年过去了，人们却越发明确地意识到以色列根本就没打算满足巴勒斯坦人的建国渴望——也根本没想用什么实际的努力去让巴勒斯坦人明白到这一点。


The number of illegal Jewish settlers in Palestinian areas has doubled, leaving Palestinians increasingly convinced that negotiations are a waste of time.	在巴勒斯坦土地上非法居住的犹太定居者数量已经翻了一番，这让巴人逐渐明白到谈判也只不过是浪费时间。


Many recall the preferred strategy of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir: “I would have conducted negotiations on autonomy for ten years, and in the meantime we would have reached a half-million people in the West Bank.”	许多人都回想起以色列前总理伊扎克·沙米尔所提出的所谓首要战略：“我会把自治谈判拖上10年，好让西岸地区的以色列人口数量达到50万”


Initially, the five-year interim agreement called for the election of a Palestinian Legislative Council and an executive leader whom the Israelis wanted to call a “chairman,” spurning the word “president.”	最初，5年过渡协议要求选举出一个巴勒斯坦立法委员会以及一位执行领导人，而以色列人希望将此人称之为“主席”而不是“总统”。


Because Arabic makes no distinction between chairman and president, the Israelis accepted use of the Arabic word rayyes in the official English text.	但由于阿拉伯语里“主席”和“总统”不分，最后以色列人同意在正式英文文本中使用“rayyes”这个阿拉伯词汇来表示这个领导人的身份。


Palestinian refugees in exile and other Palestinians living in the diaspora were not allowed to vote.	流亡的巴勒斯坦难民和外侨都被剥夺了投票权。


East Jerusalem Palestinians were allowed to vote only at the post office or at booths outside the city limits.	而居住在东耶路撒冷的巴勒斯坦人只能在邮局或者是城区限制线之外的投票点投下自己的一票。


Abbas’s withdrawal merely confirms the obvious.	如今阿巴斯的退让只不过是确认了目前再明显不过的现状而已。


Another such election in the near future, including the one set for January, is unlikely to occur, mainly owing to the continuing rift between the PLO and Hamas, which controls Gaza.	另外一场类似的选举，包括准备在一月举办的那场，也很可能不会举行，主要原因则是巴解组织和哈马斯之间的持续冲突，而后者控制着加沙地区。


Hamas participated in the 2006 legislative elections, which followed Israel’s military withdrawal from Gaza.	哈马斯参与了2006年以军撤离加沙后举行的立法选举。


But for years Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups have rejected the Oslo process, on the grounds that free elections under Israeli occupation would be absurd.	但许多年以来哈马斯和其他激进派别一直都抵制奥斯陆进程，理由是在以色列占领的情况下举行自由选举简直是荒唐的。


Hamas has the power to stymie the vote and has indicated that it would do so.	与此同时，哈马斯有能力去阻挠投票过程并暗示其将如此行动。


Moreover, Abbas has not given up his positions as head of the PLO and leader of its biggest faction, Fatah, which remains in control in the West Bank.	此外，阿巴斯并没有放弃其巴解组织领袖以及组织内最大派别法塔赫的领导人之位，法塔赫依然控制着西岸地区。


Abbas cannot resign from his post for the foreseeable future, lest the Hamas-backed speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council take over.	阿巴斯在可见的未来都不会辞职，因为他唯恐有哈马斯在背后撑腰的巴立法委员会议长会取而代之。


At the same time, no PLO official is likely to seek the presidency without Abbas’s approval, which he will withhold until a new mechanism for ending the occupation is found.	与此同时，巴解组织官员也不会在没有阿巴斯点头的情况下竞逐总统之位，直到总统本人找到一个可以解决占领问题的新机制为止。


The PLO will likely gain much from Abbas’s decision, because it de-emphasizes the status of the PA president and raises the profile of his post as chairman of the PLO’s executive committee.	而巴解组织将可能从阿巴斯的决定中得到很多好处，因为这个决定一方面弱化了巴勒斯塔民主权力机构总统的权威，另一方面却提升了阿巴斯本人作为巴解组织执行委员会主席的地位。


That shift, in turn, clears the way for a generational change in leadership – and, more importantly, a transition to post-Oslo politics.	这一上一下反过来为领导层的更新换代铺平了道路——而更重要的是，向后《奥斯陆协议》时代的转换。


The PLO’s old guard – men like Yasser Arafat and Abbas, who led the liberation organization from exile and returned home with the Oslo Accords – dominated the Palestinian political landscape up to now.	那些巴解组织的老一辈——比如阿拉法特和阿巴斯这种带领流亡解放组织坚持斗争，最后带着《奥斯陆协议》衣锦还乡的人——至今还掌握着巴勒斯坦的政治大权。


After they depart the scene, Palestinian leaders who were born under occupation and spent time in Israeli prisons will most likely fill the vacuum.	但当他们退出历史舞台之后，那些在占领区出生，蹲过以色列大牢的新一代领导人就将填补空白。


The most prominent such figure is Marwan Barghouti, the leader of the student movement at Birzeit University in the 1980’s and one of the main organizers of the First Intifada, resulting in his deportation by Israel in the late 1980’s.	新一代中风头最劲的人物非马尔万·巴尔古迪莫属，此人一手领导了巴勒斯坦比尔泽特大学（Birzeit University）的学生运动，还是1987年第一次巴勒斯坦人暴动的主要组织者，最终在1980年代末期被以色列人驱逐出境。


In 2002, he was arrested and sentenced to a long prison term on charges that he led the Second Intifada, which had begun two years earlier, and ordered some of its military attacks.	2002年他被捕，以色列指控说他自2000起就开��领导第二次巴人暴动，还直接下令进行武装袭击，最后判了很长的刑期。


Despite being imprisoned, Barghouti was recently elected to Fatah’s central council, and a number of others who spent time in Israeli prisons will join him.	虽然还在监狱里蹲着，但巴尔古迪依然在最近被选进了法塔赫的中央委员会，而同时入选的还有其他几个在以色列大牢里呆过的兄弟。


One is Jibril Rajoub, imprisoned for 19 years and deported in the First Intifada, only to return to lead one of the security services after the PA was established.	一个是吉布里尔·拉贾布，坐了19年牢并在第一次巴人暴动后被驱逐出境，在巴勒斯坦民族权力机构成立之后才得以回归并领导一支安全部队。


Another is Mahmoud Dahlan, also an ex-prisoner and former security official, although the loss of Gaza to Hamas, for which many Palestinians hold him partly responsible, has dimmed his leadership prospects.	另一个则是马哈茂德·达兰，此人同样是一个前囚犯和前安全部队官员，但此人对加沙地区落入哈马斯之手负有责任，许多巴勒斯坦人也对他半信半疑，所以其政治前途也相对比较暗淡。


Finally, there is Nasser al-Qudwa, the former PLO representative at the United Nations.	最后还有纳萨尔·阿尔-齐瓦，前巴解组织驻联合国代表。


Qudwa is a dark-horse candidate to succeed Abbas – a possible compromise figure who has never been directly involved in security or military activities.	齐瓦此人堪称阿巴斯继任人选中的一匹黑马——这个可能的折中人选从未直接参与过任何安全或者军事行动。


For many Palestinians, Qudwa, a soft-spoken, multi-lingual nationalist (and Arafat’s nephew), presents an acceptable face for Palestine locally and internationally.	对于许多巴勒斯坦人来说，一个精通多国语言的民族主义者（加上是阿拉法特的侄子）既能被巴勒斯坦本地人所接受，在国际上也吃得开。


The coming months will reveal whether we are, indeed, witnessing the dawn of the post-Oslo era in Palestinian politics, and whether a new leader, with new supporters, will be required to revive the Palestinian cause.	接着的几个月将揭晓我们是否真的正在见证巴勒斯坦政治中后《奥斯陆协议》时代的到来，而一个拥有新支持者的新领导人将能否为巴勒斯坦建国大业重新带来生机。


Whoever emerges on top will have to present an effective strategy to end four decades of military occupation and bring about a truly independent state that a majority of Palestinians can embrace.	无论是谁最后爬上权力巅峰，他都必须提出一个有效的战略，一方面结束长达40年的以色列军事占领，另一方面则是建立一个绝大多数巴勒斯坦人可以接受的，真正独立的巴勒斯坦国。


Palestine as a Failed State	巴勒斯坦积习难返


Every week, it seems, brings another backward step for Palestine.	似乎每一个星期都会发生巴勒斯坦退步事件。


President Mahmoud Abbas’s failure to convene the Palestinian Legislative Assembly, due to a Hamas boycott, may lead inexorably to the final breakdown of the political structures created under the Oslo Accords.	因为哈马斯抵制，阿巴斯主席未能召集巴勒斯坦立法会开会，这也许会不可避免地导致根据奥斯陆协议建立的政治结构的最终失败。


Sadly, this is only the latest chapter in the Palestinians’ tragic history of failed attempts to create a nation-state.	可悲的是，这只不过是巴勒斯坦为建立一个民族国家所做的种种失败努力的悲剧历史的最新一章而已。


Palestinians see their history as one of struggle against Zionism and Israel.	巴勒斯坦人把他们的历史看作是一部与犹太复国主义和以色的斗争史。


But the reality is more complicated, and marked by repeated failures to create a coherent body politic, even when historical opportunities beckoned.	但是其真实情况却要复杂得多，即使历史性机遇招手之际，依旧是为建立一个具有凝聚力的国家所做的努力的一再失败。


Perhaps the first failure occurred in the 1920’s, when the British Mandatory government in Palestine encouraged the two national communities – Jewish and Arab – to establish communal institutions of self-government to look after education, welfare, housing, and local administration.	第一次的失败也许发生在二十世纪二十年代。 当时在巴勒斯坦的英国托管政府鼓励两个民族共同体犹太人和阿拉伯人建立共同的自治政府机构来处理教育、福利、住房和地方管理事务。


The Jews – then less than 20% of British Palestine’s population – set up what became known as the National Committee (Va’ad Leumi), based on an elected body, the Representative Assembly of Palestinian Jews.	犹太人当时其人口不到英属巴勒斯坦总人口的20%，成立了民族委员会（Va’ad Leumi），并且选举产生了一个机构巴勒斯坦犹太人代表大会。


Regular elections to this Assembly took place, sometimes with more than a dozen parties competing.	该代表大会定期进行选举，有时有十几个政党参加竞选。


This autonomous institution became the forerunner of the political structure of the nascent Jewish state, and its leaders – David Ben-Gurion among them – emerged as Israel’s future political elite.	这个自治机构成为了新生的以色列国的政治结构的前身，而它的领导人，其中就有大卫·本-古理安将成为以色列未来的政治精英。


Israel succeeded as a nation, with a vibrant and sometimes obstreperous parliamentary life, precisely because its leaders used this opportunity.	以色列人成功地建立起了一个国家，并且有了一个活跃、有时有点喧闹的议会，正是因为领导人抓住了这个机遇。


The Palestinians, however, never created similar embryonic state structures: an Arab Higher Committee was established, made up of regional and tribal notables, but no elections ever took place.	而巴勒斯坦人从来没有能够建立起类似的萌芽期的国家结构。 他们建立了一个由地区和部族的显要人物组成的阿拉伯高级委员会，但是并没有进行选举。


The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini (later an ally of Nazi Germany), became its chairman, but it never succeeded in creating a generally accepted national leadership or in providing the Arab community the panoply of educational and welfare services offered to the Jewish community by its elected institutions.	耶路撒冷的大穆夫特，哈吉·阿明·侯赛尼（后来他成为纳粹德国的帮凶）成为了该委员会的主席，但是它从未能成功地建立一个被广泛接受的民族领导层，也没有为阿拉伯族人提供以色列族人通过他们选举出的机构所获得的完整的教育和福利服务。


The second failure occurred during the Arab Revolt against British rule in Palestine in 1936-1939, which was accompanied by massive terror attacks against Jewish civilians.	第二次失败发生在1936-1939年阿拉伯人为抗议英国人在巴勒斯坦的统治而发动的起义期间，这次起义伴随了对犹太公民大规模的恐怖袭击。


The revolt itself was brutally suppressed by the British army, but not before a split within the Palestinian community resulted in two armed militias – one based on the Husseini clan, the other on the more moderate Nashashibis – that turned viciously on each other.	起义本身被英国军队残忍地镇压了。 但是在起义失败之前巴勒斯坦族就分裂成了两支民兵武装——一支以Husseini氏族为基础，另一支以相对温和的 Nashashibis氏族为基础，他们之间爆发了激烈的对抗。


More Palestinians were killed by contending militias than by the British army or the Jewish self-defense forces.	被参与对抗的民兵杀害的巴勒斯坦人要远比被英国军队或者犹太人自卫队杀死的巴勒斯坦人多得多。


The third failure – even more tragic – occurred in 1947-48, when Palestinian Arabs rejected the United Nations partition plan, which envisaged separate Arab and Jewish states after the departure of the British.	第三次失败——也是更加悲剧性的失败——发生在1947-1948年，当时巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人拒绝了联合国的分割计划，该计划设想在英国人离开后把阿拉伯人和以色列人划分成两个国家。


While Jews accepted this compromise, the Palestinian Arabs, supported by the Arab League countries, rejected it and went to war against the emerging State of Israel.	以色列接受了这个妥协，但是巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人在阿拉伯联盟国家的支持下拒绝了该计划，并且发动了与刚刚诞生的以色列国的战争。


The Palestinian Arab defeat in this endeavor, and the resulting refugee problem, is a defining moment for Palestinians.	巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人在这次努力中失败了，而随之而来的难民问题成为了对巴勒斯坦人决定性的时刻。


But what sometimes gets lost in this narrative is that, while practically all sectors of Palestinian Arab society rejected the UN plan, Palestinians were unable to devise coherent political institutions and a unified military command with which to confront the much smaller Jewish community.	但是在谈到这个问题时大家往往忽略的情况是，尽管事实上巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人的所有部门都反对联合国的计划，但是巴勒斯坦人却未能设计出有凝聚力的政治机构和一支统一领导的军队来对抗比他们小得多的以色列族。


By contrast, the besieged Jewish community, under David Ben-Gurion and the Jewish self-defense force (the Hagannah) was able to mobilize, through its democratic institutions and with only marginal dissent, the resources needed for a successful military campaign.	与之相对应的是，在大卫·本-古理安的领导下，受到围困的以色人族和犹太人自卫队却能够通过它的民主机构——其中只有很少的不同意见——调动起赢得一场军事战争所需要的所有资源。


Indeed, many Palestinian political leaders absconded to Beirut or Cairo once violence broke out.	事实上，许多巴勒斯坦政治领导人在暴力活动爆发后立即逃往了贝鲁特和开罗。


The Husseini clan set up its militia in the Jerusalem area.	Husseini氏族在耶路撒冷地区建立了它的民兵。


Near Tel Aviv, in adjoining Jaffa, a competing militia under Hassan Salameh, took control.	而特拉维夫附近与海法毗邻的地方被Hassan Salameh的民兵控制了。


In the north of the country, a Syrian-based militia, under Fawzi al-Kaukji, attacked Jewish villages.	在国家的北部，一支以叙利亚为基地的民兵，在Fawzi al-Kaukji的领导下，袭击着犹太村民。


The more moderate Haifa Arabs tried, not very successfully, to stay out of the fray.	相对温和的海法阿拉伯人则试图——但并不很成功——脱离于冲突之外。


Disunity made the Arab defeat almost inevitable.	不团结使得阿拉伯人的失败几乎是无法避免的。


Moreover, the scars of the 1930’s virtual civil war have still not healed: mutual suspicion and memories of internecine massacres vitiated cooperation and trust.	此外，二十世纪三十年代事实上的内战所留下的伤疤并没有得到愈合：相互的猜疑和对血腥大屠杀的记忆使相互合作和信任变得不再可能。


The last failure occurred when the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO set up the autonomous Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat.	最后一次失败发生于根据1993年以色列和巴勒斯坦民族解放组织签订的奥斯陆协议建立了以阿拉法特为领导的巴勒斯坦自治政府。


Instead of creating the infrastructure of the future Palestinian state, with various functions slowly transferred from the Israeli army to the Palestinian Authority, Arafat created a mukhabarat (security services) state, as in Egypt, Syria, and (until Saddam Hussein’s fall) in Iraq.	但是随着各项职能被慢慢地从以色列军队转移给巴勒斯坦自治政府，阿拉法特并没有为将来的巴勒斯坦国建立基础设施，而是像埃及、叙利亚和伊拉克（萨达姆倒台前）那样建立了一个情报机构国家。


Arafat and his Fatah-based supporters established almost a dozen competing security services – sometimes indistinguishable from clan-based militias – which consumed more than 60% the Palestinian Authority’s budget, at the expense of education, housing, welfare, and refugee rehabilitation.	阿拉法特和他以法塔赫为基础的支持者几乎建立了十几支相互竞争的安全部队——有时它们与氏族民兵看上去并没有什么区别，它们占去了巴勒斯坦权力机构超过60%的预算，侵占了本该用于教育、住房、福利和难民安置的经费。


Into this vacuum burst Hamas, with its network of schools, welfare services, community centers, and support organizations.	在这种真空下，哈马斯凭借它的学校网络、福利服务、社区中心和援助组织迅速地崛起了。


The Hamas takeover of Gaza was but the latest step in this development.	哈马斯对加沙的占领只不过是这一发展势头的最新进展而已。


It is easy to blame the current Palestinian crisis on individuals – be it Arafat or Abbas.	把巴勒斯坦目前的危机归罪到个人头上——阿拉法特或是阿巴斯，是件很容易的事。


It is even easier to blame the Israeli occupation or American policies.	我们也大可指责以色列的占领和美国的政策。


To be sure, there is a lot of blame to go around.	确实，它们有很多值得指责的地方。


But all national movements – the Greek as well as the Polish, the Jewish as well as the Kurdish – begin in adversity.	但是所有的民族运动——希腊人、波兰人、犹太人还有库尔德人的——都是从苦难中开始的。


The Palestinians have a difficult history – one of internal disunity and murderous internecine conflict – to overcome.	巴勒斯坦人需要克服艰难的历史——内部的不团结和血腥的相互冲突。


They now stand again at a crossroads, and whether they will be able to transcend their tragic heritage depends on them.	现在他们再一次站到了十字路口，而他们是否能超越他们的悲剧遗产完全取决于他们自己。


No one can help them if they cannot come up with a coherent, consensual, and reasonably united leadership – what Abbas himself calls “one law, one authority, one gun.”	如果他们不能够组成一个具有凝聚力的、意见一致的以及合理的联合领导机构——就像阿巴斯本人所呼吁的“一部法律、一个行政管理机构一杆枪”，那么没有人能够帮助他们。


Internet or Intifada?	网络还是叛乱？


TEL AVIV – According to Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the ongoing wave of knife attacks on Jews by young Palestinian “lone wolves” can be blamed entirely on incitement by Palestinian Authority and Islamist websites.	特拉维夫——在以色列总理内塔尼亚胡看来，巴勒斯坦青年“孤狼”对犹太人发起的持刀攻击应该完全归咎于巴勒斯坦权力机构和伊斯兰网站的煽动。


Netanyahu evidently expects Israelis, and the world, to believe that if these sites were posting cat videos, the Palestinians would cease their agitation and submit quietly to occupation.	内塔尼亚胡显然希望以色列和世界民众相信，如果这些网站上传的是萌猫视频，巴勒斯坦人就会停止煽动，平静地接受占领。


Palestinians are indeed being provoked, but by Israeli actions – beginning with the perpetual encroachment on their rights that occupation entails.	巴勒斯坦人确实已被激怒，但激怒他们的恰恰是以色列的行为——占领导致巴勒斯坦民众权利遭受到永久性的破坏。


Beyond facing daily humiliation at checkpoints, Palestinians have seen Israeli settlers destroy their crops and olive groves, and even torch a West Bank home, burning three family members and killing a toddler.	除每天在检查站所受的屈辱外，巴勒斯坦人还亲眼目睹以色列定居者毁坏他们的庄稼和橄榄树，甚至放火焚烧了约旦河西岸的一所住宅，导致三名家庭成员被烧死，丧生者中还有一名蹒跚学步的小孩。


Add the Israeli military’s frequent late-night house raids in search of “terror suspects” and the relentless expansion of Israeli settlements, and it becomes pretty clear that Palestinians don’t need to scour the Internet for reasons to be angry.	再加上以色列军队经常深夜突袭民宅寻找“恐怖嫌犯”和以色列定居点的残酷扩张，巴勒斯坦人显然不需要上网寻找愤怒的理由。


It is ironic that Netanyahu, of all people, is accusing anyone of incitement.	颇具讽刺意味的是所有人当中，居然是内塔尼亚胡指责有人煽动叛乱。


Was it not incitement when, just days before Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in 1995 for his efforts to achieve peace with the Palestinians, Netanyahu addressed a rally where posters depicted Rabin in a Nazi SS uniform?	就在1995年拉宾总理为实现以巴和平被刺身亡的前几天，内塔尼亚胡还在面对高举海报的集会民众大声演讲（海报上绘着拉宾身着纳粹党卫军制服的画像），这样的所作所为难道就不算煽动？


Was it not incitement when he attempted to mobilize Jewish voters earlier this year by warning of “Arabs voting in droves, bussed in by the left.”	内塔尼亚胡年初曾试图鼓动犹太选民、警告“左翼大巴车正成群结队运送阿拉伯人参与投票”，这难道就不算煽动？


Just this month, one of Netanyahu’s shamelessly incendiary statements – the claim that Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, gave Adolf Hitler the idea of annihilating Europe’s Jews during World War II – sparked a media firestorm.	就在这个月，内塔尼亚胡无耻的煽动点燃了一场媒体风暴——他声称是耶路撒冷大穆夫提哈吉·阿明·侯赛尼向希特勒灌输了二战期间消灭欧洲犹太人的想法。


When it comes to anti-Jewish zeal, Husseini’s record hardly needs false footnotes – unless, apparently, one has an interest in presenting the Palestinians as co-perpetrators of the Holocaust.	在反犹热情问题上，侯赛尼的记录几乎不需要任何虚假的注脚——除非，显而易见，有人想把巴勒斯坦人说成是大屠杀的同谋。


In this case, it seems that Netanyahu may have gone too far; after more than a week of condemnation, including from Israeli historians, he was forced to retract the statement.	这次内塔尼亚胡似乎做得有些过头； 在包括以色列史学家在内各派力量一个多星期的谴责后，内塔尼亚胡被迫收回其声明内容。


But he is unlikely to be chastened.	但他不太可能因此受到惩罚。


For Netanyahu, incitement is a powerful political tool.	对内塔尼亚胡而言，煽动是一种强大的政治手段。


He fuels Israeli fears and disillusionment, in order to preserve a status quo that, at least in the case of Palestine, benefits Israel.	他激起以色列人的恐惧和失望，从而至少在巴勒斯坦问题上保持对以色列有利的局面。


As Netanyahu put it last month in a closed meeting of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Israel must continue “controlling all the territory,” adding that the country “will forever live by the sword.”	正如内塔尼亚胡上个月在国会外交和国防委员会一次封闭会议上所说的那样， 以色列必须继续“控制所有领土”，他还补充说该国“将永远在刀尖下生活。 ”


Of course, this approach is not always successful; for example, Netanyahu was unable to block the international nuclear deal with Iran, despite his best efforts.	当然，这种方法并非总能成功； 比方说，尽管尽了最大努力，内塔尼亚胡仍无法阻止伊朗国际核协议的达成。


But, rather than rethink his approach, he has simply redirected it, in order to restore the Palestinians to their position as the principal existential threat to Israel.	但他只是调整而非反思自己的做法，目的是重新让外界认为巴勒斯坦人是以色列生存的重要威胁。


Today’s emerging intifada demonstrates the profound danger implied by this approach.	今天的叛乱显示了这种方法所隐含的危险因素。


Fueling Israelis’ fear and resentment of Palestinians does not only undermine the chances of a political solution; it also exacerbates Palestinians’ frustration and anger with Israelis.	激起以色列人对巴勒斯坦人的恐惧和不满不仅破坏了政治解决机会； 同时还加剧了巴勒斯坦人对以色列人的失望和愤怒。


And that anger is already intense, especially among young Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.	上述愤怒已经非常强烈，尤其是在以色列占领下的巴勒斯坦青年人当中。


Consider what life is like in East Jerusalem, the epicenter of the decentralized rebellion, where some 77% of Palestinians live below the poverty line.	想想叛乱中心东耶路撒冷的生活场景，那里有77%的巴勒斯坦人生活在贫困当中。


Not only are municipal services poor or non-existent; Palestinians also face persistent pressure from Jewish religious groups bent on asserting Israeli control.	不仅市政服务水平低下甚至根本不存在； 巴勒斯坦人还面临来自主张以色列控制的犹太宗教团体的持续性施压。


Young Palestinians – the third generation to live under occupation – have run out of patience.	年轻的巴勒斯坦人——在以色列占领下生活的第三代——已经失去了耐心。


Despite being a largely secular generation, they are using the narrative of jihad (the knife is a conspicuous Islamic State symbol) to defy their parents’ docility, challenge an incompetent Palestinian leadership, and, most of all, to resist the Israeli occupiers.	虽然多数人赞成世俗理念，但他们正试图利用圣战理念（刀是象征伊斯兰国的显著标志）来公然反抗顺从的父母、挑战不称职的巴勒斯坦领导层、而且最重要的是，反抗以色列占领军。


That is why they have made Islam’s holy shrines on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif to Muslims) into icons of their rebellion.	这就是他们为什么会选用耶路撒冷圣殿山上的伊斯兰教圣殿来作为自己反抗标志的原因。


If iron-fisted authoritarian governments in countries like Egypt and Tunisia could not stop their populations from overthrowing them in the Arab Spring, how can one expect the crippled Palestinian Authority to stop this rebellion?	如果像埃及和突尼斯那样的铁腕独裁政府也无法避免在阿拉伯之春运动中被民众推翻，又怎么能指望跛脚的巴勒斯坦政府阻止这样的反叛运动？


Indeed, at this point, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is more worried about avoiding the fate of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak or Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali than he is about stopping the violence.	事实上，从目前情况看，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿巴斯更关心如何避免埃及穆巴拉克和突尼斯本·阿里那样的命运，而不是如何阻止暴力活动。


To preempt young Palestinians’ wrath, he has refused to condemn their terror campaign and indirectly fueled anger over Israel’s supposed violation of the status quo on the Temple Mount.	为了利用巴勒斯坦青年的愤怒，他拒绝谴责他们的恐怖行为，并间接点燃了对以色列所谓破坏圣殿山现状行为的怒火。


This approach will have far-reaching consequences, for a similarly dangerous vehemence regarding the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, has lately been gaining traction among Israelis.	这种做法将会产生深远的影响，因为对犹太教圣地圣殿山某种相似的危险激情近来日益在以色列民众间传播影响。


Though Jewish law explicitly forbids Jews from ascending the Temple Mount, lest they profane this most sanctified of Jewish shrines before the coming of the Messiah, a growing number of Israelis – from religious fanatics to members of Israel’s ruling coalition – now support defying that prohibition.	虽然犹太法律明令禁止犹太人登上圣殿山，以避免在救世主降临前亵渎最神圣的犹太圣地，但越来越多的以色列人——从宗教狂热分子到以色列执政联盟成员——现在主张无视这项禁令内容。


They claim that Jews must frequent the holy site, and even build a temple, to strengthen Israel’s sovereignty there.	他们称犹太人必须频繁瞻仰圣地、甚至修建庙宇，以强化以色列对那里的主权。


The focus on the Temple Mount has given the current confrontation an apocalyptic quality.	对圣殿山的关注赋予了当前局势世界末日般的分量。


It is time for both sides – and especially the Israelis – to recognize just how dangerous the situation is.	现在双方——尤其是以色列人——应该认识到局势发展已危险到何种程度。


By blurring the borders between Israel and the Palestinian territories, Israel has created the conditions for permanent civil war.	通过混淆以色列和巴勒斯坦间的领土界限，以色列已经为永久内战创造了条件。


The two-state solution might not be particularly attractive to either party anymore; but a binational solution, at least as it is unfolding these days, would be a living nightmare.	两国方案可能对任何一方都不再有吸引力； 但两民族方案——就像现在所表现的那样——将会成为一场活生生的噩梦。


Palestine’s Moment of Decision	巴勒斯坦的抉择时刻


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED BEFORE JANUARY 10	NOT TO BE PUBLISHED BEFORE JANUARY 10


The victory of Mahmoud Abbas in the Palestinian presidential election poses a huge challenge to the Palestinian leadership.	马哈茂德·阿巴斯在巴拉斯坦民族权力机构主席的选举中取得胜利，这对巴勒斯坦领导层而言是一个挑战。


By being voted chairman of the PLO’s executive committee hours after the death of Yasser Arafat, Abbas clinched the support of the organization that represents all Palestinians, including those in the diaspora.	阿拉法特逝世后几小时，阿巴斯就被推举为巴解组织执委会总书记，牢牢获得该组织的支持。 巴解组织代表了全巴勒斯坦人，包括那些在外散居的犹太人。


Popular election as President of the Palestinian National Authority gives Abbas the grassroots legitimacy to carry out his political program.	巴解组织主席选举给了阿巴斯实现其政治主张一个最起码的合法性。


That program, while similar to Arafat’s, differs in key ways.	这一主张尽管与阿法特的相近，但主要方式不同。


Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) has been publicly and consistently critical of what he calls the “militarization of the intifada.”	阿巴斯（又名阿布·马赞）一直不断地公开地批评被他称为“反抗运动的军事化”的现象（即巴勒斯坦人对以色列占领的反抗运动）。


Even before Arafat’s death, Abbas argued that the use of force by militants weakens the Palestinian negotiating position.	即使在阿拉法特去世前，阿巴斯认为使用武力削弱了巴勒斯坦的谈判资本。


He stuck to this position throughout his electoral campaign, refusing the demands of hard-line Palestinian factions that he apologize for his previous statements.	在整个竞选活动中，阿巴斯始终坚持这一立场，拒绝巴勒斯坦强硬派要求其为从前的言论作出道歉。


Abbas conducts himself in a business-like manner, and he strongly believes in the rule of law and in the need for real civilian governance to assume preeminence in Palestinian politics.	阿巴斯的处事颇有商业化味道，他坚信依法治国和执政为民可以使自己在巴拉斯坦政坛卓越非凡。 在这点上，他也和阿拉法特不同。


In this he also differs from Arafat, who believed that the revolutionary mindset must continue so as long as Palestinians lived under an illegal foreign occupation.	阿拉法特认为只要巴拉斯坦人民生活在非法的外国势力统治下，革命就必须进行到底。


Until liberation, there could be no business as usual.	解放之日未到，休谈什么商业活动。


By winning election on a clear anti-violence and pro-rule of law platform, Abbas has the mandate and the responsibility to carry out this policy.	阿巴斯凭借反暴力和倾法制的明确立场赢得了选举，他有权利和义务去贯彻他的政策。


He needs to make it clear to every armed Palestinian that there will be no tolerance for any unofficial group carrying arms or conducting military attacks from Palestinian territory.	他需要向每一个巴勒斯坦军人明确一点，绝对不允许任何非官方组织在巴勒斯坦的土地上携带武器或发动军事袭击。


In order to preserve national unity, Abbas will obviously need to use all his persuasive skills to convince radical groups (some in his own Fatah movement) to respect that approach.	为了维护国家统一，阿巴斯有必要运用一切游说技巧去劝说极端组织（还包括他自己的法塔赫运动中的一些组织）关注考虑他提出的方案。


As chairman of the PLO, he will be under extreme pressure not to delegitimize the internationally sanctioned acts of resistance against Israeli military targets.	作为巴解组织主席，阿巴斯将在重重压力下使抵抗以色列军事定点清除的行动合法化，这些行动得到国际社会的支持。


In order to counter that pressure, he will have to show that a cessation of violence is in the higher interest of Palestinians.	为了抵御这一压力，他将不得不向世人展示停止暴力是为了巴勒斯坦人民的更高利益。


Abbas will find it equally challenging to apply rule-of-law principles to a traumatized community that is reeling after nearly five years of violence, oppression, and draconian travel restrictions imposed by the Israelis.	近五年的暴力、压迫和以色列政府实施的严格通行限制使巴勒斯坦满目疮痍。 面对这样一个国家，阿巴斯感到要贯彻依法治国同样很具有挑战性。


As in the issue of the militarization of the intifada, this is not a simple matter, as it concerns forces outside the control of Abbas and his government.	反抗运动军事化并非易事，因为这涉及到超出阿巴斯和他的政府势力范围之外的力量。


Nevertheless, internal policies will be of grave importance.	然而，对内政策极为重要。


The day-to-day lives – and livelihoods – of Palestinians need immediate improvement.	巴勒斯坦人民每天的生活和生计需要立即改善。


The Israeli-built wall to the west of the West Bank means that Palestinian unemployment will continue to rise and living standards will continue to drop.	以色列在约旦河西岸西面建墙意味着巴勒斯坦的失业率将继续上升，生活水平持续下降。


To counter this, Abbas will have to seek external Arab and international support.	考虑到这点，阿巴斯将不得不寻求阿拉伯以外的国际社会的支持。


The real need is to encourage investment, primarily from Palestinians and Arabs.	真正需要的是鼓励人们投资，主要是巴勒斯坦人和阿拉伯人。


But this is unlikely without major legal and administrative reforms, and, more generally, good governance and ironclad application of the rule of law.	但是如果没有法律和行政改革，广而言之，没有良好的执政能力和严格的法制监管，吸引投资是不可能的。


The key to establishing civil order is peace.	建立社会秩序的关键是和平。


No matter how persuasive Abbas is in convincing radical groups to put down their arms, a unilateral ceasefire will not last long if it is not mutual.	无论阿巴斯在劝说激进组织放下武器时多有说服力，如果停火不是双边的，那么单边停火也不会持续很久。


The role of the Israeli occupation forces will thus be crucial in determining the success of Abbas’s daunting mission.	阿巴斯肩负令人畏惧的任务，它成功的关键在于以色列占领军队扮演的角色。


Indeed, the task that Abbas faces will become impossible if the Israeli policy of “targeted killings” is allowed to continue while Palestinian leaders are working seriously to put an end to acts of violence against Israelis.	确实，如果以色列的“定点清除计划”继续得以实行而巴勒斯坦领导人着手制止抵抗以色列的暴力事件，阿巴斯面对的就是不可能完成的使命。


Ultimately, the main agenda for the new Palestinian president in negotiations with Israel will be to push the Israelis to make good on their repeated international assurances that a viable contiguous Palestinian state is a realistic goal in the near future.	最后，巴勒斯坦领导人与以色列谈判时主要的任务就是催促以色列履行它们反复向国际社会做出的保证，即完成在不远的将来在其边界建立一个切实可行的巴勒斯坦国的目标。


But if left to Israelis and Palestinians alone, the goal of Palestinian independence within the 1967 borders of Palestine will most likely remain out of reach.	但是如果把这一问题仅仅丢给以色列和巴勒斯坦，那么巴勒斯坦在其1967年的边界内独立的目标将会遥不可及。


The international community, lead by the United States, must invest effort and political capital to realize this goal.	以美国为首的国际社会必须为这一目标付出努力和政治资本。


The new Palestinian president faces a challenging agenda and high popular expectations.	新一届巴勒斯坦主席面临着极富挑战的任务和民众很高的期望。


Much will depend on how Abbas handles himself and how he governs.	这得看阿巴斯如何把握自己、如何执政。


But the ultimate question is what Israel and the international community will do if Abbas fulfills his pledge to end anti-Israeli violence and apply the rule of law in a functioning democracy.	但最终的问题是如果阿巴斯履行承诺——制止抵抗以色列的暴力事件，并且在一个运作正常的民主国家内实行依法治国，那么以色列和国际社会将会做什么呢？


Palestinians have chosen; now the world must do so as well.	巴勒斯坦人民已经做出选择，现在轮到国际社��了。


Palestine Stands Up	巴勒斯坦站起来


JERUSALEM – Although the crisis over Israel’s naval interventions to defend its blockade of Gaza is gaining all the headlines around the world, something of far more historic importance is taking place in the Middle East.	发自耶路撒冷——虽然全世界媒体的头条都聚焦在了以色列为继续封锁加沙而进行的海上拦截行动上，但实际上中东地区还有某些更具历史意义的事件正在酝酿着。


The Palestine National Authority is preparing to issue a unilateral declaration of independence, and it is taking concrete steps on the ground to make any such declaration viable.	巴勒斯坦民族权力机构正准备拟定一份单方面的独立宣言，并一步一步地将这份文本付诸现实。


When US President Barack Obama appointed former Senator George Mitchell as his special envoy for Middle East peace negotiations, Mitchell’s mandate was to achieve within two years not only an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, but also overall peace between the Jewish state and the whole Arab world.	当美国总统奥巴马委任前国会议员乔治·米切尔出任中东和平谈判特使之时，米切尔的使命就是不但要在两年内达成以巴和平协议，还要在犹太人和整个阿拉伯之间实现整体和平。


But, after 15 months on the job, and innumerable visits to the region, all Mitchell has to show for his efforts is an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to start indirect “proximity talks” – which it is hoped will lead to direct talks in due course.	虽然特使上任至今已经15个月，且不断到访中东，但取得的成果仅仅是令到以巴之间达成了开始“间接谈判”的协议——并寄望这能在一段时间后升级到直接谈判。


When one bears in mind that both sides have been negotiating directly for 15 years, Mitchell’s achievement appears even more minuscule.	但当人们回忆起双方之间其实早就进行了长达15年的直接谈判之后，米切尔的成绩就更是微乎其微了。


Under such circumstances, calling Mitchell’s work up to now a failure is the only polite – and realistic – thing to do.	由此看来，将此人至今的工作称之为失败已经算是很礼貌（而且是现实）的了。


It is as easy to blame Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s intransigence – his enforcement of the Gaza blockade, for example – as it is to point out that the Palestinian Authority does not control Hamas-ruled Gaza, with its 1.2 million inhabitants, leaving it in no position to speak authoritatively for Palestinians.	对此，人们很容易把责任推到以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的拒不妥协上——比如他下令封锁加沙的举动，此外也可以指责巴民族权力机构无能，因为它丧失了对哈马斯治下的加沙以及120万当地居民的控制，这令其失去了任何为巴勒斯坦人代言的合法性。


As a result, one thing that both Israelis and Palestinians agree on is that the proximity talks will most likely lead nowhere, so both sides are currently busy ensuring that the other side will be blamed for the failure.	因此唯一能得到以色列和巴勒斯坦两方认可的一点就是这场间接谈判将无疾而终，所以双方都在密锣紧鼓地筹划如何才能把谈判失败的责任全部推到对方身上。


On too many issues – borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem – the gaps between the two sides are too deep to be easily bridged.	双方在太多的事务上——比如边界划分，犹太定居点，难民和耶路撒冷问题——都有着极为巨大的分歧，因此根本无法轻易弥合。


In these circumstances, an idea recently raised – tentatively but courageously – by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad should be eagerly welcomed.	僵局之下，一个由巴勒斯坦总理萨拉姆·法耶兹最近提出的，既具试探性但也勇气可嘉的想法可能会受到欢迎。


It may or may not fly, but it is arrestingly novel: if negotiations fail – so Fayyad says – sometime in 2011 the Palestinians should declare independence unilaterally.	这个想法或许有点夸张，但同时也非常吸引人：那就是如果谈判最终破裂的话，正如法耶兹所说的那样，在2011年的某个时候，巴勒斯坦人将会单方面宣布独立。


This may be a real game changer.	这个做法可能会完全颠覆整个当地局势。


Obviously, it would not resolve the conflict; it might not even immediately change the situation on the ground.	很显然，这样做无法平息冲突；


Indeed, it could even precipitate some unforeseen Israeli countermeasures.	甚至不能迅速改变当地的状况，而且肯定会诱发以色列方面的某些对抗性措施。


But it would certainly mean a paradigm shift for a conflict in which everyone has been treading water for almost two decades.	但此举必将意味着这场持续了近20年，令参与各方都身陷险境的冲突将向一种新的形式转化。


If the Palestinians declared independence unilaterally, and if, as is expected, some sort of recognition by at least some states followed, the contours of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would change dramatically.	如果巴勒斯坦人单方面宣布独立，然后某些国家不出所料地承认了这个新国家，那么以巴冲突的形式将发生戏剧化的转变。


Indeed, the conflict would become, if one can use the expression, more “normal” – no longer between an occupying power and an occupied people, but between two countries, two states, that disagree about a lot of issues, including borders, mutual relations, and control over populations.	事实上，这场冲突（如果有人可以用某种词汇来形容的话）将变得更加“正常”——这不再是一个占领政权以及被占领人民之间的斗争，而是两个国家，两个政权之间在许多问题上的冲突，包括边界划分，双边关系以及对当地人口的划分。


In a way, a unilateral declaration of independence would make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a bit more like the Israeli-Syrian conflict – an inter-state conflict. It might even force Israel to make decisions that until now it found easier to avoid.	因此在某种程度上，单方面宣布独立将令以巴冲突变得更像以色列和叙利亚之间的冲突，变成一场国家与国家之间的斗争，这甚至可能迫使以色列去下一些现今情况下很容易被排除在外的决策。


Such a declaration would also be an enormous act of self-empowerment for the Palestinians.	而这么一份宣言同时也是巴勒斯坦人在自我授权方面的重要举措。


Until now, they have failed abysmally in institutional nation-building, a necessary requirement for any successful national movement.	时至今日，巴勒斯坦人在建国家的制度化建构方面都做得非常失败，但制度化也是任何成功的建国运动所必须具备的条件。


Palestinian nationalism is deeply ingrained in the consciousness of most Palestinians – yet, since 1948, when the United Nations proposed partitioning British Palestine into two states, a Jewish and an Arab one, it has failed to move from ideology towards reality.	虽然巴勒斯坦民族主义早已深深地根植于大多数巴勒斯坦人的意识之中——担当联合国于1948年提议将英属巴勒斯坦分割为一个犹太国和一个阿拉伯国之时，该方案就一直难以从设想付诸现实。


Neither violence nor terrorism nor relying on outside powers (the UN, the Arab League, the Soviet Union, the US, the European Union) succeeded in delivering statehood, which a people can achieve only by its own agency – what Zionist ideology calls “auto-emancipation.”	无论是暴力和恐怖主义，还是依赖外部力量（联合国、阿拉伯联盟、苏联，美国以及欧盟）最终都无法帮助���拉伯人建国，因为人们只有推举出了自己的代表机构才能建立国家——也就是犹太复国主义意识形态所宣称的“自我解放”。


Fayyad is the first Palestinian leader who did not emerge from the Fatah movement, and he may thus understand what other Palestinian leaders failed to comprehend, mired as they were in a toxic combination of self-righteous ideology and violence.	而法耶兹总理是首位不是由法塔赫出身的巴勒斯坦领导人，因此他可能会想明白一些其他巴勒斯坦领导人所无法理解的东西，而后者已经陷入了一个由自以为是的思维定势以及暴力所融合成的危险泥沼之中，根本无法自拔了。


It may just be that the Palestinians are on the verge of a new chapter in their history – and in the history of Israel and the whole region as well.	由此看来，即将发生的这一切很可能意味着巴勒斯坦人即将翻开自身历史的新一页——而对于以色列以及整个中东来说，也是如此。


Palestine’s Time	巴勒斯坦时刻


PARIS – This September, Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, took the bold step of directly asking the United Nations to grant official recognition to the state of Palestine.	巴黎——今年9月，巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯迈出了大胆的一步，直接要求联合国承认巴勒斯坦的国家地位。


The UN’s 193 member states look geared to vote on that request within the next few months.	联合国193个成员国将在未来几个月内就这一要求投票表决。


The world’s focus is now on Palestine.	现在，巴勒斯坦成为了世界的焦点。


It is almost two decades since the “quartet” – the UN, the United States, the European Union, and Russia – agreed that the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government should establish peace by coexisting as two separate states.	        过去近20年来，“四方”——联合国、美国、欧盟和俄罗斯——都同意，巴勒斯坦权力机构和以色列政府应该以两个相互分离的共存国家身份实现和平。


And yet, while US President Barack Obama has referred to the quartet’s decision as his guiding principle for diplomatic action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation remains as dire as ever, because the devil remains in the details.	但是，尽管美国总统奥巴马将四方决定作为其在以巴冲突问题上的外交指导原则，但以巴局势并没有因此得到进展，因为在诸多细节上根本无法达成一致。


The Palestinians want an independent state, but on the condition that they secure Jerusalem as its capital, and that Israel ceases to expand settlements on territory that it has occupied since the 1967 Six-Day War.	巴勒斯坦人希望建立独立的国家，且必须以耶路撒冷作为首都，同时以色列必须停止在自1967年“六日战争”以来所占领的土地上扩大定居点建设。


Israel, however, has never considered ceding Jerusalem to Palestine.	而以色列从未考虑过将耶路撒冷让给巴勒斯坦。


Many hope that, under pressure to reform municipal boundaries, Israel will consider this solution.	许多人希望，迫于进行耶路撒冷城界改革的压力，以色列会虑接受这一解决方案。


But the question of the settlements is even more difficult to resolve.	但定居点的问题更加棘手。


Even under pressure from the international community and, most powerfully, from the US, Israel has consistently refused to slow expansion of its settlements in the West Bank.	即使在国际社会的压力（以及来自美国的更大压力）下，以色列也从未同意放缓约旦河西岸的定居点扩张计划。


Tragically, strong resistance from Israel and the Jewish diaspora has led Obama to acknowledge openly his powerlessness in the conflict, and thus to abandon US political pressure on Israel.	悲剧的是，由于以色列以及侨居犹太人的强烈抵制，奥巴马不得不公开承认自己在以巴冲突中调停力有限，因而不再对以色列施加政治压力。


As a result, a small group of pro-Israeli congressmen has been free to threaten and pressure those countries likely to vote for the recognition of the Palestinian state.	结果，一小撮亲以色列国会议员开始公开威胁和施加压力于可能投票赞成承认以色列国家地位的国家。


In any event, Israel’s leaders are not actually interested in a realistic peace.	无论如何，以色列领导人实现和平并没有多大兴趣。


Instead, they seem to want a solution reminiscent of nineteenth-century Ireland – which led to a century of casualties on both sides.	相反，他们希望看的是类似于19世纪爱尔兰的解决方案，一个两败俱伤的办法。


Israel is effectively demanding the disappearance of Palestinian identity.	事实上，以色列要求的是让“巴勒斯坦”这一名字从地球上消失。


The rest of the world should not tolerate that effort, even if the US does.	世界不应该容忍这样的要求，即使美国给以色列撑腰也不行。


Every country knows that it is difficult and costly to engage in an explicit conflict with the US.	所有国家都明白，卷入和美国的直接冲突很麻烦，而且代价巨大。


But when the US fails to act as a global leader because of its fragile internal politics, other countries do not have to follow its example.	但当美国因国内政治乱象没有承担起作为全球领导人的责任时，其他国家应该坚决对美国说不。


Abbas well understands the riskiness of his strategy: there will be brutal retaliation from Israel.	阿巴斯很明白自己的战略的风险：这会招来以色列的强烈报复。


But his persistence in pursuing this last chance at peace has clearly gained him increased popularity at home and greater respect abroad.	但他坚持追求这一和平建国的最后机会的举动让他在巴勒斯坦支持率大增，也赢得了更多的国际尊重。


Hamas, the Palestinian Authority’s rival in Gaza, will undoubtedly try to thwart Abbas’s effort.	巴勒斯坦权力机构在加沙的对手哈马斯肯定会阻碍阿巴斯的大计。


An organization like Hamas, which supports permanent war – and with which Israel negotiated for five years for the release of one abducted Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in exchange for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners – is exactly the enemy that Israel needs to justify its hardline stance.	像哈马斯这样的支持持久战（且以色列花了5年时间与其谈判释放被其绑架的以色列士兵沙利特（Gilad Shalit）并愿意以1 000多名巴勒斯坦囚犯作为交换）的组织，才是以色列需要为证明其强硬立场所要对付的敌手。


For a long time, Israeli leaders have lobbied supporters like me, who, since the Holocaust, have defended the Jewish people’s right to security and statehood.	在很长一段时间里，以色列领导人游说像我这样的支持者（出于大屠杀的原因，我一直支持犹太人民捍卫国家和安全的权利）。


But Israel’s tactics regarding Palestine have been unconscionable.	但以色列对待巴勒斯坦的方式是极不合理的。


They have strengthened Hamas, a hostile opponent of peace, pushed the US to vote against the Palestinian state whose birth it defends, and refused outright to accept any conditions that might resolve the conflict.	他们的做法肥了和平的大敌哈马斯，把原本支持巴勒斯坦国家的美国推向了另一边，还彻底拒绝接受任何可以解决冲突的条件。


No civilized country can permit this behavior.	没有哪个文明国家可以长时间如此恣意妄为。


Palestine must be granted legal status so that, at the very least, its people will have access to the international legal court, with the understanding that international support is required to aid and defend this young state.	巴勒斯坦必须得到法律地位，从而让国际法庭不再拒绝巴勒斯坦人民。 我们都应该明白，这个年轻的国家需要国际支持的援助和捍卫。


The Americans have lost their moral right to leadership in resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict.	美国已经丧失了成为解决以巴冲突事物领导人的道德权利。


It is time for Europe to step into the fray.	欧洲应该站出来解决争端。


Palestine’s War of Generations	巴勒斯坦上的世代之战


Yasir Arafat may be dead, but his Machiavellian strategies linger.	阿拉法特已溘然辞世，但他的马基雅弗利主义战略却遗留下来。


Ever protective of his position as sole leader of the Palestinian people, Arafat sought to block any means by which a potential rival could challenge him. But in protecting his position, Arafat also blocked the appointment of a successor in his lifetime.	作为巴勒斯坦人民的最高领袖，他曾为了维护他的绝对领导地位而试图封死任何来自潜在竞争对手的挑战，但这也使他在有生之年找到一名接班人变得困难重重。


In the first weeks after Arafat’s death, that seemed not to matter.	在阿拉法特刚去世的几周内，接班人危机还未突现。


Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat’s longtime deputy and the architect of the Oslo accords, quickly secured the backing of Fatah, the PLO’s core body.	默罕默德·阿巴斯--阿拉法特的长期副手，也是"奥斯陆协议"的巴方设计师，迅速获得了巴勒斯坦解放组织的核心--法塔赫的全力支持。


A seamless transition appeared possible. But now Marwan Barghouti, Fatah’s leader in the West Bank during the current Intifada, has decided to contest Abbas for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA) from his Israeli jail cell.	眼看着这场政治权力转交将在平静中度过，马尔万·巴尔古提，这位曾组织了法塔赫约旦河西岸因提法达起义的领导人，虽然此刻身陷以色列囹圄，却决定参加巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席一职的角逐，向阿巴斯发起挑战。


Facing economic stagnation and what Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei calls “the anarchy of weapons,” a succession struggle is the last thing Palestinians need.	面对停滞不前的经济发展，以及被巴自治政府总理哈迈德·库赖称为"枪械管理混乱"的局面，巴勒斯坦人最不愿意看到的就是这场权力交接再起风波。


Any new leader must spur the economy, enforce the rule of law, fight corruption, unify the PA’s security agencies, and preserve public safety – and he must do so quickly or lose authority.	无论谁最终上台，都必须做到以下几点：刺激经济发展、加强执法力度、抵制打击腐败、统一巴各安全机构并保证公众安全，而且必须在短期内做到，否则就得拱手相让权力宝座。


Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) represents the Old Guard of Palestinian politics.	阿巴斯（又名阿布·马泽）是巴勒斯坦政治的元老派代表，但是少壮派如今却也想在政治权力上多分一杯羹。


But the Young Guard – those who led the first Intifada (1987-1993), as well as those making their names in the current Intifada – want a share of power.	他们曾发动了第一次因提法达起义(1987-1993)，并因此在因提法达地区名声大振。


Abbas will thus need to find support within this rising generation of nationalist leaders if he is to succeed.	阿巴斯若要赢得选举胜利就必须要寻求这支新进年轻民族主义领导派别的支持。


Resolving this generational struggle peacefully will require democratic elections within Fatah for membership of both the Revolutionary Council and the Central Committee.	要和平解决这场元老派与少壮派之间的斗争，就必须在法塔赫内部民主选举产生法塔赫革命会和巴勒斯坦全国委员会中央委员会。


The Sixth Fatah Congress, the first in sixteen years, will take place in August 2005 and will seek to reconcile the conflict between the Old and Young Guard.	第六届法塔赫议会将于2005年8月举行，旨在寻求解决这场斗争的良方。 这也是巴勒斯坦十六年以来第一次召开议会。


Unlike Arafat and his fellow exiles, Barghouti, the most prominent leader among the Young Guard, grew up under Israeli occupation, and was arrested and detained several times.	与阿拉法特及其流亡追随者们不同的是，巴尔古提--少壮派最居威望的领导人，自小在以色列的军事占领下成长，曾多次被捕监禁。


Barghouti’s popularity also stems from his refusal from the beginning to take any office in Arafat’s corrupt PA and its institutions.	由于他认为阿拉法特的巴解组织及其机构营私舞弊、涉嫌腐败，因此从一开始就拒绝该组织中任职，这一点为他赢得不少人气。


Although he was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996, Barghouti’s reputation soared when the current Intifada began in September 2000.	虽然他在1996年就当选巴勒斯坦立法委员会，但是他声名大振还是在2000年9月开始的因提法达起义中。


His support for attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories, which he argues is legitimate under international law, has earned him immense popularity among Palestinians, but also a sentence of five life terms plus 40 years in an Israeli prison.	他主张暴力袭击在巴被占领土上的以色列士兵和定居者，且认为这在国际法框架内属合法行为。 他的这一立场另他在许多巴勒斯坦人中享有威望，但他也因此被以色列判了5次终身监禁另加40年监禁。


Whether he can be released from prison is now a source of intense speculation.	他是否能被释放现在成了人们关注的新焦点。


But Barghouti has begun speaking out from his jail cell on the political situation, and his presence is growing.	虽然身处牢房，巴尔古提已经开始对外发表政治演讲，媒体曝光率也大幅提升。


His decision to challenge Abbas means that the “secular” forces within the Palestinian movement may be divided at a time when rivals with a robust Islamic agenda – principally Hamas and Islamic Jihad – are challenging them.	他向阿巴斯发起挑战的这一决定意味着，一旦奉行伊斯兰计划的强硬派别，主要是哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战组织，向巴解组织内部的各"传统"派别发起挑战，该组织也许将发生分裂。


Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad are highly disciplined organizations, exercising tight control over their political and military wings.	哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战组织都是训练有素的组织，对政治和军事派别实行严格控制。


Although Hamas has been weakened by Israel’s targeted assassinations of Sheik Ahmad Yassin and Abdel-Aziz Rantisi, it retains strong military capabilities and popular support ranging between 25-30%, making it the second leading faction in the West Bank and Gaza.	尽管在以色列的"定点暗杀"政策中他们痛失亚辛和阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·兰提西，遭受严重创伤，但它仍保持着强大的军事力量，在民众中的支持率始终在25%至30%之间，是约旦河西岸和加沙地带第二大强势派系。


Hamas has declared that it will not nominate its own candidate for the PA presidency.	哈马斯已宣布他们不会提名本组织候选人参加巴勒斯坦大选。


Hassan Yusuf, a Hamas leader who was recently released from an Israeli jail after 28 months of administrative internment, explained to Al-Jazeera that “if Hamas assumed the leadership at this time, it would be vilified and isolated by the international community, and then the people would suffer.”	哈马斯的一名领导人哈桑·尤素福对半岛电视台声称，"如果哈马斯在这个时候谋权，就会受到国际社会的鄙视和孤立，而最终巴勒斯坦人民将为此承担痛苦。 "哈桑 在以色列监狱服刑28个月后不久前刚被释放。


Although Hamas is boycotting the election, many Hamas sympathizers will vote for the candidate most committed to defending the Palestinians’ core demands.	尽管哈马斯对此次大选采取抵制态度，但许多哈马斯支持者表示还是会支持最能保护巴勒斯坦人民核心利益的候选人。


Here Hamas members are simply reiterating Arafat’s views, which will continue to limit the concessions any new leader can make.	而哈马斯只是简单地再次重申阿拉法特的立场，这使任何新领导人都不能在和平问题上做出更多的让步。


Arafat set forth a blueprint including an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a fair and just solution to the refugee problem.	阿拉法特绘制的中东和平蓝图中包括在约旦河西岸和加沙地带建立独立的、以东耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国，以及公平合理地解决巴难民问题。


Changing leaders will in no way alter these conditions for making peace.	领导人的交接决不能改变这些实现和平的条件。


So the question is this: who will Palestinians, in particular the Hamas constituency, think is better able to secure these goals, Abbas or Barghouti?	因此，问题就在于，在巴勒斯坦人民，尤其是哈马斯支持者的心中，谁能更好地实现这一目标，是���巴斯还是巴尔古提？


That answer will most likely determine who will be the PA’s next leader.	这一答案在很大程度上能决定谁能成为巴解组织下一任领导人。


But in the end, Israel will also have to make a choice, because peace will require Israeli concessions, not just compromises from the Palestinians.	但是最终，以色列还是得做出抉择，因为要实现和平不仅需要巴勒斯坦方面的妥协，还需要以色列的让步。


Israel must freeze its settlement activity in the West Bank and stop constructing its barrier wall on Palestinian territories. Israel must also free Palestinian prisoners, remove all checkpoints between Palestinian villages and town, and redeploy its forces to positions held prior to September 28, 2000, in accordance with phase I of the Road Map.	根据路线图的第一阶段计划，以色列必须冻结在约旦河西岸所有定居点的建造以及在巴领地修建隔离墙的活动，释放巴勒斯坦囚犯，拆除所有巴勒斯坦村庄和城镇之间的检查点，并重新部署2000年9月28日前的军事点。


Either Abbas or Barghouti would certainly meet such a demonstration of good faith with good faith of his own.	无论是阿巴斯还是巴尔古提，都必须要用他们的崇高信仰来实现这一同样象征着崇高信仰的计划。


The Last Gentlemen’s Club	最后的绅士俱乐部


LONDON – Is one of the last bastions of gender inequality in the rich democracies finally starting to crumble?	伦敦—发达民主国家最后的性别不平等堡垒开始崩塌了吗？


In the past few weeks, Janet Yellen was nominated as the first female chair of the US Federal Reserve Board, and Karnit Flug became the first woman to be appointed Governor of Israel’s central bank.	在过去几周，珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）被提名为美联储首位女主席，卡尼特·弗鲁格（Karnit Flug）成为第一位被任命为以色列央行的女性。


If money is power, then women must no longer be excluded from controlling the supply of it.	如果说金钱就是权力，那么女性将不再被排除在控制金钱供给的圈子之外。


Although women do head central banks in 17 emerging markets – including Malaysia, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana – they are the exceptions that prove a general rule: women are excluded from the world of monetary policymaking.	女性已经占据了17个新兴市场国家的央行行长之位，包括马来西亚、俄罗斯、阿根廷、南非、莱索托和博茨瓦纳等，但她们只是例外，一般的规则是，女性被排除在世界货币决策之外。


Yellen’s appointment is particularly important, because she breaks the glass ceiling in the advanced economies.	耶伦的任命尤其重要，因为她打破了发达经济体的玻璃天花板。


Until her promotion, no member of the G-7 had a woman heading its central bank.	在她获得升职之前，G-7国家没有女性央行领导人。


Moreover, men occupy all 23 seats on the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council.	此外，男性占据着全部23个欧洲央行理事会职位。


Since the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee was established in 1997, only three women have been appointed as external members – and no woman has even been nominated since 2002.	自英格兰银行货币政策委员会自1997年成立以来，只有三名女性被任命为外部成员，并且自2002年以来再无女性与该委员会发生关系。


The Bank of Japan has only one woman on its Policy Board.	日本银行政策委员会也只有一名女性成员。


Women, nowadays, are more likely to occupy top political jobs.	如今，女性占据顶尖政治职位的可能性更大。


Angela Merkel was recently reelected for a third term as German Chancellor; Britain’s voters elected Margaret Thatcher three times as Prime Minister; and France has had a female prime minister.	默克尔最近第三次当选德国总理； 英国选民也三次选择撒切尔作为首相，法国也有了女总理。


But no woman has come close to leading these countries’ central banks.	但从未有女性接近这些国家的央行行长之位。


Equality seems to have eluded central banks even in gender-conscious Scandinavia.	平等性似乎对央行唯恐避之不及，就连以性别平等著称的斯堪的纳维亚也是如此。


For example, Norway, which has been promoting positive gender discrimination for years and recently elected Erna Solberg as its first female prime minister, has yet to allow a woman to control the purse strings – at either the central bank or the finance ministry, with its powerful sovereign wealth fund.	比如，一直推行偏向女性政策、最近选举索尔伯格（Erna Solberg）为首位女首相的挪威也从未让女性来看管钱袋——不管是央行、财政部还是该国强大的主权财富基金。


Recent attempts to compel change have been counter-productive.	最近强力推动变化的努力带来了反作用。


In an effort to promote diversity and gender equality in the ECB, the European Parliament in 2012 blocked the appointment of Luxembourg’s Yves Mersch to the bank’s executive board.	为了在欧洲央行推行多样化和性别平等，2012年欧洲议会否决了任命卢森堡的摩尔什（Yves Mersch）为执行委员会委员的任命。


But MEPs then failed to propose a plausible female alternative, leaving the ECB understaffed for weeks during the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis.	但MEP随后并未提出合理的女性替代者，导致欧洲央行在欧元区主权债务危机爆发期间的几周内人手不足。


Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament’s handling of Mersch’s appointment was widely ridiculed, and his nomination was eventually confirmed.	毫不奇怪，欧洲议会对摩尔什任命的处理遭到了千夫所指，而摩尔什的任命最终还是得到了批准。


But many people drew the wrong conclusion from the episode, which they viewed as affirming the idea that competence and experience must always trump ill-conceived ideas about positive discrimination.	但许多人从此得出了错误的结论——他们认为能力和经验应该毫无例外地压倒积极歧视的错误观念。


If there are no suitable female candidates, it was argued, then the best candidate should prevail, regardless of gender.	如果没有合适的女性候选人，则就应该让最佳候选人胜出，不管他是什么性别。


But this view misses the point.	但这一观点没有切中要害。


Why were there no suitable female candidates in the first place?	为什么一开始会没有合适的女性候选人？


Women hold around 30% of economics doctorates in developed countries, including Europe, and not one of them could be brought forward for the ECB post?	女性获得了发达国家（包括欧洲）30%的经济学博士学位，难道就没有一人可以入主欧洲央行？


The more reasonable conclusion to be drawn from Mersch’s appointment is that no serious effort was made to identify qualified women early on.	在摩尔什任命的事件中，更合理的结论是一开始就没有采取认真的措施挑选胜任的女性。


On the contrary, female candidates tend simply to be overlooked.	相反，女性候选人容易被忽视。


This was the case for both Yellen and Flug – until the preferred, male applicants dropped out.	不管是耶伦还是弗鲁格都是如此——她们直到更优先的男性候选者出局后才获得了任命。


Flug was finally offered the top job only in the absence of a male rival, though she was already occupying the position temporarily while the board searched for Stanley Fischer’s successor.	弗鲁格在没有男性对手的情况下最终获得了她的顶尖职位，尽管在寻找费舍尔（Stanley Fischer）后继者的过程中她一直担任的临时央行行长。


Neither Yellen nor Flug was held back by a lack of academic credentials – both are accomplished scholars – or by the catch-all charge of having “limited experience.”	耶伦和弗鲁格都不缺少学术水平——她们都是卓有成就学者，也不适用万能的“经验有限”借口。


Flug has been the Bank of Israel’s deputy governor since 2011; Yellen has been involved in the Fed system for almost two decades, first in San Francisco and subsequently as Vice Chair of the Fed’s Board of Governors.	弗鲁格自2011年开始担任以色列银行副行长； 耶伦加入美联储已近二十年，先是在旧金山，随后又出任美联储理事会副主席。


If a lack of skills or experience is not preventing women from reaching the summit of monetary policymaking, what is?	如果不是技能和经验的缺乏阻止了女性问鼎货币决策巅峰，那是什么？


The most plausible explanation is that, as organizations with non-elected leaders and limited transparency, central banks tend to function as clubs whose largely male membership hire and promote familiar types; governments usually reinforce this by simply rubber-stamping the banks’ preferred candidate for the top job.	最有说服力的解释是，作为领导人非选举产生、透明度十分有限的组织，央行就像是俱乐部，其成员大部分是男性，他们总是延请和提拔同类； 政府通常也助长了这一作风——总是充当橡皮图章批准央行更愿意看到的领导人候选者。


If gender is a proxy for diversity, then central banks fail a basic test of it.	如果性别是多样性的一个窗口，那么央行没有通过基本测试。


Promoting diversity – not only in terms of gender, but also with respect to age and, in many countries, ethnic background – is a matter of effectiveness as much as a question of social justice.	促进多样性——不仅是性别多样性，在许多国家还包括年龄和种族多样性——既事关效率，也事关社会公正。


A broader, more transparent recruitment process would reduce groupthink, challenge the status quo, and, one hopes, leave central banks better equipped to handle a financial crisis.	更广泛、更透明的选人流程能能减少集体迷思、挑战现状，并（但愿如此）让央行更好地处理金融危机。


The promotion of Yellen and Flug is a good start; now the doors of these fusty male-dominated clubs must be flung wide open.	耶伦和弗鲁格的升职是一个好开端； 陈腐的大男子俱乐部之门应该开得更大。


The Business of Korean Reconciliation	怎样调和朝鲜半岛


SEOUL – Can trade and commerce foster peace and mutual understanding between hostile governments?	首尔—贸易和商业可以在敌对的政府之间建立和平和互相理解吗？


When it comes to the Koreas, this question may seem to be beside the point, given the ruthless purge now underway in the North.	对于韩国和朝鲜来说，这一问题似乎根本不是重点问题，因为朝鲜现在正在进行残酷的清洗。


But it remains an essential consideration for the longer-term future of North Korea and other outcast regimes.	但对于朝鲜和其他被推翻的政权的未来来说，这仍然是一个关键问题。


The Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint venture of the North and South Korean governments, is both a tribute to the concept of diplomatic reconciliation through business and a difficult test of its feasibility.	朝鲜和韩国政府共办的开城工业园区既是同构商业实现外交协调的概念的体现，也是对这一概念的可预见性的严格检验。


Roughly 50,000 North Korean workers are employed in 123 factories that produce about $450 million worth of goods (mainly textiles, shoes, and household goods).	在开城工业园区，大约5万名朝鲜工人在123加工厂工作，生产了大约4500亿美元的商品（主要是纺织品、鞋和家用物品）。


Kaesong is an expensive investment for South Korea, which provides capital and infrastructure, including a power station, a water purification plant, and a hospital.	开城是韩国的一项大手笔投资，提供了大量资本和基础设施，包括一座电站、一座水净化工厂和一座医院。


But, more than a decade after its inauguration, the complex runs at 40% capacity and has attracted only medium-size companies.	但是，在开门十年后，该工业园区只利用了40%的产能，只能吸引中等规模的公司。


Despite generous tax incentives, South Korea’s huge conglomerates, the chaebol, have spurned the experiment, at least partly because of enduring transportation and communications problems.	尽管有慷慨的税收减免激励，但韩国财阀仍对这场实验相当冷漠，至少有部分原因在于交通和通信问题迟迟得不到解决。


The complex can be accessed only through the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, which requires entry and exit passes.	开城工业园区只有通过位于韩朝边境的非军事区抵达，且进出都需要通行证。


The lack of mobile-phone networks and broadband Internet means that South Korean managers must communicate with their headquarters by landline phones and fax.	没有移动电话网络和宽带互联网意味着韩国管理人员必须通过固话线路和传真才能与总部联系。


Of course, commercial gain is not the only motivation behind the Kaesong complex.	当然，商业利益并非开城工业园区背后唯一的动机。


The South Korean authorities are rightly proud of the initiative, which they view as an investment in future reunification with the North.	韩国当局对这一工程颇为自豪，把它看做是对未来统一的投资。


Seen from this perspective, North Korea’s recent announcement that it will open another 14 special economic zones is a positive development – one that is underpinned by significant financial incentives.	从这个角度看，朝鲜最近宣布将开设其他14个特别经济区是一个积极的信号——其背后有重要的金融动机支撑。


Aside from enabling the North to acquire technology and learn market-oriented business practices, the Kaesong complex generates about $80 million annually in workers’ compensation (the monthly wage of $160 is far higher than in North Korea).	除了让朝鲜获得技术、学习市场经济商业实践外，开城工业园区每年还为工人发放大约8000万美元薪酬（160美元的月薪水平远远超过朝鲜国内薪资水平）。


But political and historical tensions continue to shape daily life in Kaesong, where companies operate under the constant threat that North Korea, for whatever reason, will react rashly, even abandoning the joint project altogether.	但政治和历史恩怨仍左右着开城工业园区的日常生活，园区内的企业经营一直笼罩在朝鲜随时可能翻脸甚至取消这一合资工程的威胁下。


Already last year, rising inter-Korean tensions led to a temporary shutdown of the complex.	今年，韩朝关系紧张已经导致园区被暂时关闭了一段时间。


As a result, firms must dedicate considerable time and effort to dealing with North Korea’s often volatile and opaque politics, exemplified in the recent execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek.	因此，企业不得不把大量的时间和精力用于和朝鲜变化莫测、难以看懂的政坛波动周旋上，最近朝鲜领袖金正恩的曾经炙手可热的姑父张成泽被处决就是明证。


This challenging climate undermines the project’s viability, even though the business model – based on lower-cost workers from the North producing labor-intensive goods – makes sense.	环境的多边影响了工业园区项目的可行性，尽管其业务模式——用朝鲜的低成本工人制造劳动密集型产品是有效的。


Kaesong is a bit of George Orwell’s 1984, with added elements of nineteenth-century paternalism.	开城工业园区让人想起了乔治·奥威尔的《1984》，但还要加上十九世纪家长作风的元素。


The atmosphere is stilted and muffled, with workers moving around in silence and guards everywhere.	这里的氛围呆板而压抑，工人一言不发地走动，到处都是警卫。


During a recent visit – the first by a foreign delegation since 2006 – the cold and snowy weather intensified this feeling, creating the sense of being suspended in time and space.	在最近的访问中——2006年以来第一次接受外国代表团的访问——寒冷和雨雪更加加剧了这种感觉，好像时间和空间都被停止了似的。


The visit began with military jeeps escorting our convoy into North Korean territory.	访问从军用吉普护送我们进入朝鲜领土开始。


The vehicles’ number plates were covered with white cardboard, and red flags had been affixed to the doors next to the side-view mirrors – for which none of our South Korean hosts was able to offer an explanation.	这些车辆的号牌用白色硬纸板遮住，侧视镜旁的车门上贴着红旗——我们的韩国东道主没人能解释为何要这样做。


Even the preparation for our visit, which was confirmed less than 24 hours before it began, was somewhat Orwellian.	就连针对我们的访问的准备工作——大约在访问行程开始前不到24小时才获得批准——也有点奥威尔风格。


Detailed packing instructions were issued, informing us that we could not bring radios, mobile phones, wireless devices, printed materials, photos, cassette tapes, or DVDs.	我们得到了详尽的物品说明，被告知不能携带收音机、移动电话、无线设备、印刷材料、照片、磁带和DVD。


Despite being limited to cameras with lenses under 160mm, we were not permitted to take photos of the demilitarized zone between the industrial complex and the border, or of North Korean soldiers or workers.	我们唯一可以携带的是160mm以下照相机，但不允许在位于工业园区和边境之间的非军事区牌照，也不准给朝鲜士兵和工人牌照。


Our cameras were checked when we left the country to verify compliance.	在离开朝鲜时，相机都要受到检查以确定没有违规。


The border between the two Koreas is virtually impenetrable, with gates that open for a half-hour at a time a few times per day.	韩朝之间的边境大概连鸟都飞不过去，每一天，边境上的大门只开合几次，每次开启半小时。


As a result, all personal contact occurs through official channels.	因此，所有的人际联系都要通过官方渠道。


Even as diplomatic visitors, we were prohibited from speaking with or giving anything to the workers, whom we watched with a mixture of curiosity and sympathy.	虽然我们属于外交访问者，但仍然被禁止与工人说话，我们只能带着好奇和同情看着他们。


The North Koreans seemed to share our desire to connect, as they sought to engage with us to whatever extent they could.	朝鲜人似乎与我们一样渴望联系，因为他们尽可能地试图与我们互动。


The diminutive border guard looked into my eyes, smiled warmly, and asked where I was from.	身材矮小的边境卫兵注视着我，露出温暖的微笑，问我从哪里来。


Likewise, lined-up workers at one of the factories responded to my gesticulations with waves and smiles as we passed them.	类似地，在一家工厂排成队形的工人们对路过的我所打出的手势报以挥手和微笑。


Given the prevailing paranoia, fueled by propaganda and genuine ignorance, on both sides of the border, it is possible that our hosts were being excessively cautious.	由于宣传和真正的无知，朝鲜半岛边境两边充满了偏执和多疑，东道主对我们太过小心了。


Nonetheless, our pre-trip “indoctrination” stifled our reactions, regrettably preventing us from trying harder to reach out to the workers we encountered – an experience that seemed to exemplify the difficulty of bringing North Korea into the international community.	尽管如此，我们所得到的前期“灌输”抑制了我们的反应，很遗憾没有更努力地接触我们所遇到的工人——这一经验或许可以说明让朝鲜融入国际社会是多么困难。


Despite their flaws, initiatives like the Kaesong complex help to build an environment of collaboration and trust.	尽管有诸多缺陷，但类似开城工业园区这样的项目有助于建立合作和信任的氛围。


As Asia’s recent history shows, authoritarian regimes tend to open up in response to a combination of grassroots movements and gradual top-down reforms.	亚洲的最新历史表明，集权主义政权通常会因为草根运动和自上而下的渐进改革而开启国门。


North Koreans may well be prepared to provide the former, but whether the government is prepared to do its part remains highly uncertain, to say the least.	朝鲜人可能已经做好了草根运动的准备，但政府是否做好了自上而下的渐进改革则远未可知。


The expansion of special economic zones – supported by increased private investment, especially from firms that are not South Korean or Chinese – would significantly improve the odds that North Korea’s regime eases its repressive rule and embraces a program of economic reform, as China did more than three decades ago.	特别经济区的扩张——通过私人投资，特别是来自韩国或中国的企业的私人投资的支持——将极大地增加朝鲜政权像三十多年前的中国那样放松高压政策、采取经济改革的可能性。


The task of defusing the threat to regional peace and stability that North Korea poses should be one that is shared across Asia.	消除来自朝鲜的地区和平与稳定威胁的任务应该由所有亚洲国家共同承担。


The new kind of global governance that the Paris agreement exemplifies, which substitutes rolling processes for fixed rules, is far better suited to the kinds of global problems we face today.	巴黎协定彰显出一种新的全球治理，它用滚动程序代替固定规则，远比固定规则更加适合���们现在面临的各种全球问题。