Last but not least, the three pillars could not have remained standing without the anchor provided by the fourth.	最后，前三大支柱无法在没有第四大支柱为它们提供锚定的情况下起作用。


Until now, its success was based on positive competition between local governments and different ministries, benchmarked according to performance indicators such as GDP and fiscal revenues.	到目前为止，中国的成功基础是地方政府和各部委之间的积极竞争，其基准便是GDP和财政收入等绩效指标。


Unfortunately, this has led to problems of social equity and environmental sustainability, which require complex coordination of bureaucratic silos in order to overcome the resistance of powerful vested interests.	不幸的是，这已经引起了社会公平和环境可持续性等问题，需要各个官僚部门之间进行复杂合作才能克服权势既得利益的阻挠。


There is general recognition and consensus that the path of reform requires profound re-engineering of all four pillars.	一般性的认识和共识是改革之路需要对所有四大支柱彻底改造。


First, the production chain must shift from export dependence toward domestic consumption.	首先，生产链必须从出口依赖型转变为内需型。


Realigning China’s infrastructure means emphasizing quality over quantity, and reducing state ownership and controlled prices in favor of market forces.	重新规划中国的基础设施意味着重质不重量，并减少国有成分和价格控制以利于市场力量起作用。


State orchestration should instead be focused on fighting corruption, reducing transaction costs, promoting competition, lowering entry barriers, and removing excess capacity.	国家队应该专注于反腐、降低交易成本、促进竞争、降低进入壁垒以及解决过剩产能。


For the financial supply chain, the key is to address systemic risks and realign incentives in order to induce investors to support the engines of real economic growth, rather than the creation of asset bubbles.	至于金融供应链，关键在于解决系统性风险，协调各方激励，从而促使投资者支持实体经济增长引擎而不是创造资产泡沫。


The Chinese miracle was engineered by institutional and process innovation at all levels of the government services supply chain.	中国奇迹的推动力是政府服务供应链各层次的制度和过程创新。


China requires nothing less than another radical re-engineering to become a more balanced, socially equitable, and sustainable economy.	中国十分需要彻底的重新设计从而成为更加平衡、社会更公平、更加可持续的经济。


That process has already begun with another round of experimentation through three new Special Economic Zones in Hengqin, Qianhai, and Nansha to pilot the emergence of a creative, knowledge-based services economy.	这一过程已经开始，打头炮的便是新一轮新经济特区实验：横琴岛、前海区和南沙港，它们将作为创造性的、基于知识的服务型经济的先行者。


Of course, such an economy relies crucially on the quality of governance.	当然，这样一种经济关键取决于治理的质量。


The real challenge for Chinese officials is how to balance creativity and institutional innovation with order, thereby ensuring the integrity of all four of its economy’s pillars.	中国官员的真正挑战是如何通过指令平衡好创造力和制度性创新，从而确保中国经济四大支柱的完整性。


China’s “Peaceful” Rise?	中国的“和平”崛起？


In recent weeks, China announced a 12.6% increase in its defense spending; America’s CIA director, Porter Goss, testified about a worsening military balance in the Taiwan Strait; and President George W. Bush pleaded with Europeans not to lift their embargo on arms sales to China.	最近几周，中国宣布将其国防开支增加12. 6%，美国中央情报局局长Porter Goss证实了台湾海峡日益恶化的军事平衡，乔治·W·布什总统要求欧洲不要解除对华军售禁令。


Yet Chinese leaders have spoken of China’s “peaceful rise” or, more recently, its “peaceful development.”	然而，中国领导人已经谈及中国的“和平崛起”，或最近提出的“和平发展”的说法。


Analysts such as John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago have flatly proclaimed that China cannot rise peacefully, and predict that “the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”	诸如芝加哥大学的约翰·米尔夏默（John Mearsheimer）等分析家已经断言，中国不可能和平崛起，并预言“美国与中国很有可能陷入一场紧张激烈且涉及可观战争潜力的安全竞争”。


Optimists point out that China has engaged in good neighbor policies since the 1990’s, settled border disputes, played a greater role in international institutions, and recognized the benefits of using soft power.	乐观主义者指出，自1990年代起中国一直奉行友好的邻交政策，解决了边境争端，在国际机构中扮演越来越重要的角色，并且认识到了使用软力量的益处。


But skeptics reply that China is merely waiting for its economy to lay the basis for future hegemony.	但是怀疑论者反驳说，中国只是在等待经济强大为其未来的霸权作准备。


Who is right?	谁是谁非？


We will not know for some time, but the debaters should recall Thucydides’ warning more than two millennia ago that belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.	我们暂时还不得而知，但是争论者们应该想起修西底德（Thucydides）在两千多年前的警告，持有战争必然发生的信念会成为导致战争的主要原因。


Each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations that are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears.	由于任何一方都相信争端最终要以战争方式结束，就会采取合理的军事准备，而这在另一方看来证实了他们的担忧。


In fact, the “rise of China” is a misnomer.	事实上，“中国的崛起”用词并不恰当。


“Re-emergence” would be more accurate, since by size and history the Middle Kingdom has long been a major power in East Asia.	“再次出现”也许更为确切，因为无论是从面积还是历史来说，中国长久以来一直是东亚地区的主要力量。


Technically and economically, China was the world’s leader (though without global reach) from 500 to 1500.	从技术和经济角度来说，在公元500年至1500年间，中国是世界领导者（尽管没有做过全球性的研究）。


Only in the last half-millennium was it overtaken by Europe and America.	仅仅是在最近五百年，它才被欧美赶超。


The Asian Development Bank has estimated that in 1820, at the beginning of the industrial age, Asia accounted for three-fifths of world output.	据亚洲发展银行估计，在1820年，也就是工业时代的开端时期，亚洲占世界总产量的五分之三。


By 1940, this fell to one-fifth, even though Asia was home to three-fifths of the world’s population.	到1940年，尽管亚洲拥有世界五分之三人口，它的生产量却跌到了世界总产量的五分之一。


Rapid economic growth has brought output back to two-fifths of the world total today, and the Bank speculates that Asia could return to its historical levels by 2025.	如今亚洲迅猛的经济发展已经将其生产量重新提回到了五分之二的水平，并且亚洲发展银行还推测，到2025年，亚洲将重新回到它的历史水平。


Asia, of course, includes Japan, India, Korea, and others, but China will eventually play the largest role.	当然，亚洲包括日本、印度、韩国和其他国家，但是中国将最终成为角色最为重要的一个。


Its high annual growth rates of 8-9% led to a tripling of its GNP in the last two decades of the twentieth century.	它高达8-9%的年增长率导致它的GNP在二十世纪最后二十年中增长为原来的三倍。


Nonetheless, China still has a long way to go and faces many obstacles.	然而，中国还有很长的路要走，它还面临着诸多困难。


The US economy is about twice the size of China’s; if it grows by only 2% annually, and China’s economy grows by 6%, they could reach parity sometime after 2025.	美国经济约是中国的两倍，如果它每年增长2%，中国经济每年增长6%，那么在2025年后某个时间它们将平起平坐。


Even so, they would not be equal in composition or sophistication.	即使这样，他们在国家构成和高精尖方面还是不平等的。


China would still have a vast, underdeveloped countryside, and would not equal the US in per capita income until sometime after 2075 (depending on the measures of comparison.)	中国仍然拥有广袤落后的乡村，（根据准确性测量）在2075年之前无法达到美国的人均收入水平。


China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to American preponderance that the Kaiser’s Germany posed when it surpassed Britain in the years leading up to World War I.	中国要对美国的优势形成如同凯撒的德国在一战结束后几年内赶超英国时所形成的威胁，尚有很大距离。


Moreover, simple projections of economic growth trends can mislead.	此外，单纯预测经济增长走势会起误导作用。


Countries tend to pick the low-hanging fruit as they benefit from imported technologies in the early stages of economic take-off, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development.	许多受益于进口技术的国家在经济腾飞早期倾向于撷取可轻易实现的目标，而当经济达到一个更高的发展水平时增长率就会逐渐下降。


In addition, China’s economy suffers from inefficient state-owned enterprises, a shaky financial system, and inadequate infrastructure.	更何况，中国的经济还受到效率低下的国营企业、不稳定的金融系统以及不完善的基础设施的拖累。


At the same time, politics has a way of confounding economic projections.	同时，政治常常介入经济预测。


Creating a rule of law and institutions for political participation has lagged behind economic growth, and growing inequality, massive internal migration, an inadequate social safety net, and corruption could foster political instability.	为方便政治参与经济预测而设立法治和制度的做法远远落后于经济增长，并且，逐渐加剧的不平等、大量的国内迁徙、不尽完善的社会保障网络以及腐败将会导致政治不稳。


Indeed, some observers fear instability caused by a weak , rather than a rising, China.	其实，让观察家担心的，与其说是崛起的中国还不如说是疲软的中国所带来的不稳定。


As long as China’s economy does grow, its military power will likely increase, thus making China appear more dangerous to its neighbors and complicating America’s commitments in Asia.	只要中国的经济继续增长，它的军事力量就很有可能加强，这将会使中国看起来对其邻国更具危险性，使美国在亚洲的事务变得更为复杂化。


A RAND study projects that by 2015, China’s military expenditure will be more than six times higher than Japan’s, and its accumulated military capital stock will be roughly five times higher (measured at purchasing power parity).	一项RAND研究预计到2015年，（根据购买力平价估计）中国的军事开支将会比日本高出六倍，中国的累计军事资本股将大约高出五倍。


Whatever the accuracy of such assessments of China’s military growth, the outcome will also depend on what the US and other countries do.	不管这些对中国军事力量增长的预估精确与否，结果还是得看美国和其他国家怎样做。


The key to military power in the information age depends on the ability to collect, process, disseminate, and integrate complex systems of space-based surveillance, high speed computers, and “smart” weapons.	在信息时代，军事力量的关键在于收集、处理、传播并整合天基侦查系统、高速计算机和灵巧武器的能力。


China and others will develop some of these capabilities, but, according to many military analysts, China is not likely to close the gap with the US soon.	中国和其他国家将会发展这些能力，但是据许多军事分析家认为，中国要在短期内缩短与美国的差距的可能性不大。


China’s inability to compete with the US on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the US in East Asia, or that war over Taiwan is impossible.	中国在全球范围内难以与美国竞争的事实并不意味着它也不能在东亚范围内对美国形成挑战，否则有关台湾的战争就不可能了。


Weaker countries sometimes attack when they feel backed into a corner, such as Japan did at Pearl Harbor or China did when it entered the Korean War in 1950.	有时，较弱的国家在他们��觉自己陷入困境时发起攻击，诸如日本在珍珠港或中国在1950年参加朝鲜战争所做的那样。


If, for example, Taiwan were to declare independence, China would likely intervene with armed force, regardless of the perceived economic or military costs.	举例而言，万一台湾要宣布独立，中国有可能将会不顾经济或军事代价进行武装干涉。


But it would be unlikely to win such a war, and prudent policy on both sides can make such a war unlikely.	但是要赢得这场战争却不太可能，并且双方谨慎的政策也在尽量避免这场战争。


There is no need for the US and China to go to war.	美国和中国没有必要卷入一场战争。


Not every rising power leads to war – witness America’s overtaking of Britain at the end of the nineteenth century.	并非所有崛起的力量都会导致战争——美国在十九世纪末赶超英国的例子就证明了这一点。


If China’s rise remains peaceful, it promises great benefits to its own people and to its neighbors – and to Americans.	如果中国保持和平崛起，对于它的人民和邻国——以及美国，中国都应允了巨大利益。


But, remembering Thucydides’ advice, it will be important not to mistake analysts’ theories for reality, and to continue pointing this out to political leaders and publics.	但是，请记住修西底德（Thucydides）的忠告，它对避免错误解读分析家的现实理论十分重要，并且还将继续向政治领导人和公众指出这一点。


China’s Political Storm	中国的政治风暴


NEW DELHI – As senior leaders are purged and retired provincial officials publicly call for Politburo members to be removed, it has become clear that China is at a crossroads.	新德里—随着高级领导人的撤职和退休省级高官公开呼吁撤销某些政治局委员，很显然，中国走到了十字路口。


China’s future no longer looks to be determined by its hugely successful economy, which has turned the country into a world power in a single generation.	中国的未来不再由其获得巨大成功的经济决定。 经济的强势使得中国在一代人的时间里成为世界一极。


Instead, the country’s murky and increasingly fractured politics are now driving its fate.	如今，中国的命运掌握在波诡云谲、日渐分化的政坛动向手中。


One need look no further than the ongoing power struggle in the run-up to this autumn’s planned leadership changes, or official figures showing that rural protests have been increasing at the same rate as China’s GDP.	欲知水有多深，只消看看为今秋领导层转换而进行的权力斗争即可，从关于农村动乱的官方数字不亚于GDP数字也可以一窥端倪。


The sudden downfall of Bo Xilai – and the call from Yunnan Province for the removal of the two Politburo members closest to him – is just one example of the no-holds-barred infighting now taking place in Zhongnanhai, the closed leadership compound in Beijing.	薄熙来的突然下台——以及云南省要求两位与他关系最密的政治局委员下台——只不过是目前中南海无所不用其极的内斗的一个例子。


Indeed, the internecine squabbles are said to be so vicious that there have been rumors, denied by the regime, that the Communist Party’s congress at which a new president and prime minister are to be anointed this autumn, might be postponed.	这场两败俱伤的斗争激烈到什么程度？ 据说（但被当局否认）原本将于今秋决定上台新主席和新总理的十八大将会推迟举行。


The Party’s abrupt vilification of Bo after lauding him for his leadership in Chongqing has fueled public cynicism over his orchestrated downfall and laid bare the leadership’s thin ideological core.	中共昨天还在赞扬薄熙来在重庆的功绩，今天便翻脸严责，于是一时间空穴来风，民众纷纷讽刺此乃精心安排的作局，暴露了领导层单薄的意识形态核心。


If China is to preserve its gains in global stature, it must avoid a political hard landing.	如果中国想要维持自己的国际形象，就必须避免政治硬着陆。


For the time being, at least five different scenarios are conceivable.	随着时间的推移，至少有五种情况可能发生。


Re-equilibration: The Party protects its legitimacy, keeps the military subordinate, and manages to put a lid on popular dissent.	再平衡：中共捍卫自身合法性，保持军队的党属性，并设法压制民众的异议。


In other words, the status quo prevails for the foreseeable future.	换句话说，现状将在可预见的未来得以维持。


This is the least likely scenario, owing to deepening internal Party disagreements and rising popular discontent.	这是最不可能发生的情况，因为党内分歧日渐分化，民众的不满也在发酵。


Implosion: This likelihood of political disintegration, economic collapse, and social disorder may be no higher than that of re-equilibration.	内部分裂：政治分裂、经济崩溃、是社会失序。 这种情况的发生可能性不会高于再平衡。


The government’s fixation on weiwen, or stability maintenance, has resulted in China becoming the world’s only important country whose official internal-security budget is larger than its official national-defense budget.	中国政府的维稳需要已经导致中国成为世界上唯一一个内部安全预算高过国防预算的大国。


This underscores the extent to which authorities have to carry out internal repression to perpetuate one-party rule and maintain control over the restive ethnic-minority homelands that make up more than 60% of China’s landmass.	这其实说明了中国当局必须花费巨大的资源来维持一党专政和控制国内桀骜不驯的少数民族故土（约占中国国土面积的60%）。


But it may also explain why one self-immolation in Tunisia helped to kindle the Arab Spring, whereas some three dozen self-immolations by Tibetan monks and nuns have failed to ignite a similar popular movement against the Chinese state.	但这也解释了为什么突尼斯的一次自焚事件能够点燃阿拉伯之春，而三十多名西藏喇嘛的自焚没能在西藏点燃类似的群众运动。


The Soviet Union imploded because the party was the state, and vice versa.	苏联之所以崩溃，是因为党即是国，国即是党。


China, by contrast, has established strong institutional capacity, a multi-tiered federal structure, a tradition of civilian leadership turnover every ten years, and a well-oiled, sophisticated security apparatus that has kept pace with technological advances.	而中国不同，它已经建立起了强大的宪政力量、多层次的联邦结构、文职领导人十年一换的传统以及紧跟技术进步潮流的有力成熟的安全机器。


Thus, China’s government can pursue a policy of wai song nei jin – relaxed on the outside, vigilant internally.	因此，中国政府可以采取外松内紧的政策。


Guided reform: A process of gradual political change begins, in keeping with outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao’s warning that without “urgent” reforms, China risks turmoil and disruption of economic growth.	有指导的改革：开始渐进性的政治变革，以响应即将卸任的总理温家宝的警告——如不“马上”改革，中国将面临经济增长破坏和崩溃的危险。


Can China emulate the recent example of neighboring Myanmar (Burma), which has initiated significant, if still tenuous, political reforms?	中国会模仿邻国缅甸最近的动作，采取重大（虽然仍只能称为细节上的）政治改革吗？


As the political heirs of the country’s Communist revolutionaries, the third-generation leaders that are taking over the reins of power in China may possess a strong pedigree, but they are also scarred and limited by it.	作为中国共产主义革命的政治传承者，接过权杖的中国第三代领导人或许血统纯正，但也受着血统的伤害和制约。


These so-called princelings are trapped in the same political culture that led to the death of millions of Chinese and the continuing repression of opponents (real or imagined).	这些所谓的太子党受着导致数百万中国人死亡和镇压（真正和想象的）反对派的政治文化的束缚。


They do not look like political reformers in the slightest.	他们身上看不到任何政���改革家的影子。


Great leap backward: A new “Cultural Revolution” erupts, as the clique in power ruthlessly seeks to suppress dissent within and outside the establishment.	大跃退：爆发新的“文化大革命”，当权派残忍地镇压内部政见不同者和体制外人士。


As the Dalai Lama recently warned, there are still plenty of “worshippers of the gun” in power in China.	正如达赖喇嘛最近所警告的，中国当权者仍然深信“枪杆子里出政权”。


Indeed, such is China’s political system that only the strongest advance.	事实上，中国的政治制度仍然是弱肉强食的制度。


One fallen princeling, Bo, has been accused of cruelty and corruption – traits that are endemic in China’s cloistered but fragmented oligarchy, which values family lineage and relies on networks of allies.	倒台的太子党薄熙来被指又残忍又腐败——此乃中国鲜为外人知但又颇为分散化的政治寡头群体的典型性格，他们注重家族血统，依靠派系网络发家。


Praetorian takeover: The People’s Liberation Army rules from behind a civilian mask, increasingly calling the shots with government officials, who are beholden to it.	军队接管：解放军通过文职傀儡执政，和受其控制的政府官员一起决策。


While the civilian leadership has become diffuse (every Chinese leader since Mao Zedong has been weaker than his predecessor), the military has enjoyed greater autonomy and soaring budgets since 1990.	中国的文职领导权变得越来越分散（自毛泽东以来，每一代领导人的权力都没有上一代大），但军队自治权在不断扩大，自1990年以来军费预算也在不断增加。


Indeed, the Party, having ceased to be a rigid monolith obedient to a single leader, has become dependent on the military for its political legitimacy and to ensure domestic order.	事实上，中共早已不再是最高领导人一言九鼎，已变得越来越依赖军队维持其政治合法性并维持国内秩序。


The PLA’s growing political clout has been manifest in the sharpening power struggle within the Party.	解放军的政治影响力在党内日趋激烈的权力斗争中越来越重要了。


In recent weeks, an unusual number of senior military officers have published articles in official newspapers calling for Party discipline and unity, and alluding to the military’s role in containing the infighting.	在最近几周中，大量高级军官在官方报纸上发表文章，要求共产党保持纪律和团结，暗示军队在发酵的内斗中所起的作用，这很不寻常。


Another development is the increasing tendency of military generals to speak out of turn on strategic issues and undercut diplomatic strategy.	另一个趋势是越来越多的军队将领宣称要转变战略思维，弱化外交战略。


The simple truth is that the foreign ministry is the Chinese government’s weakest branch, often overruled or simply ignored by the security establishment, which is ever ready to upstage even the Party. 	简单的事实是，外交部是中国政府中最弱势的部门，经常被安全部门否定或忽略，安全部门甚至做好了与中共抢镜的准备。


China’s internal politics has a bearing on its external policy.	中国的内部政治决定着其外部政策。


The weaker the civilian leadership has become, the more China has been inclined to discard Deng Xiaoping’s dictum tao guang yang hui (hide brightness, nourish obscurity).	文职领导层越软弱，中国就越有背离邓小平韬光养晦遗训的倾向。


China has lately taken more to the spotlight than to the shadows.	最近，中国越来越自豪于亮剑而不是韬晦。


Under any plausible scenario, a restrained and stable Chinese foreign policy may become more difficult.	不管哪种最后出现的是情况，中国外交政策要保持克制和稳定将越来越困难。


China\u0027s Political Time Warp	中国的政治时间异常


On June 1, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a surgeon at Beijing 301 Military Hospital, and his wife, Dr. Hua Zhongwei, both seventy-two years old, left home to pick up a visa at the American Embassy.	六月一日，北京解放军301医院72岁的外科医生蒋彦永与同岁的妻子Hua Zhongwei医生离家去美国大使馆领取签证。


They have not been heard from since.	可他们这一去却杳无音讯。


Family and friends assumed that Public Security Bureau police detained them and that the couple would be released after the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre of fifteen years ago passed.	家人和朋友都认为是公安局拘留了他们，夫妻俩应该在六月四日天安门事件15周年纪念日之后被释放。


But on June 8, unnamed officials asked the doctors' son to collect some personal effects for his parents, including dentures, and deliver them to the authorities.	然而在六月八日，不知名的官员通知两人的儿子为其父母收拾一些包括假牙在内的个人用品，并送到指定的机关。


This was not, of course, the first time someone had been detained without explanation in China, so it was not a good omen.	当然，这并不是有人第一次在中国被莫名拘留，所以这不是一个好兆头。


With China's economy booming, foreign investors flocking, and the country's role in global markets ever more central, the disappearance of this elderly couple hardly caused a break in China's hectic march.	随着经济的急速发展，外国投资者蜂拥而入，中国在全球市场中的地位也日益重要。 因而一对老年夫妻的失踪在大步行进的中国几乎是波澜不兴。


But the disappearance underscores the ongoing imbalance between economic and political reform.	然而，这一事件却凸现了中国经济和政治改革的不平衡。


Jiang Yanyong is no ordinary doctor.	蒋彦永不是普通的医生。


He is someone who had long since reached the point in life when he felt compelled by duty and patriotism to step beyond the role of a surgeon and become a public citizen.	他是一位早已到达了人生的一个新阶段的老人。 在这一阶段他在责任感和爱国主义的驱使下决定突破其医生的职业角色而成为一名 公众公民 。


His odyssey began on June 4, 1989, when he spent a horrific night trying to save hundreds of wounded and dying victims who flooded through his hospital's eighteen operating rooms as the People's Liberation Army opened fire on its way to Tiananmen Square.	他的艰难跋涉始于1989年六月四日。 那天晚上，当解放军在向天安门广场行进的途中开火时，成百的受伤和垂死的人被送进蒋医生所在医院的18个手术室。


Dr. Jiang, traumatized and anguished, nonetheless kept his silence.	他在抢救生命中度过了那可怕的一夜。 蒋医生极度悲愤，但却不得不保持沉默。


However, as the SARS epidemic flared up in 2003, Dr. Jiang realized in April that Health Ministry reports of only 19 confirmed cases of the disease in Beijing were bogus - he knew of almost ten times that amount.	然而，当SARS在2003年爆发时，蒋医生意识到卫生部在4月份发布的关于北京有19粒确诊病例的报告是虚假的-他所知的确诊病例就几乎是该数字的十倍。


He decided to go public.	他决定公开真相。


"I felt I had to reveal what was happening, not just to save China, but to save the world," he said.	他说："我感到我必须揭露真相，不仅仅是为了救中国，更是为了救整个世界。 "


His exposé of the SARS epidemic cover-up forced China's government to confront the disease more openly and aggressively, averting a public health catastrophe.	他对政府掩盖事实的做法的揭露迫使中国政府更公开和积极地应对SARS，从而避免了一场公共健康的灾难。


But if Dr. Jiang became a hero in the process, he was also marked as insubordinate, the kind of potentially uncontrollable person that the Chinese Communist Party fears.	但如果说蒋医生在这个过程中成为了一位英雄，那么他同时也被被标定为一个不听话的人，那种让中共担心的，暗地里不服管束的人。


Indeed, the Party's worst fears were realized this past March just before the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre.	的确，中共最担心的事在今年三月份，天安门事件15周年纪念日的前夕成为现实。


As the National People's Congress was meeting, Dr. Jiang broke his silence by writing a long, heartfelt appeal to the leaders of China.	在全国人大会议期间，蒋医生打破沉默，上书中国领导人。


In it, he charged that "a small number of leaders who supported corruption" had resorted to measures on June 4th that were "unprecedented in the world or China" when it used "tanks, machine guns, and other weapons to suppress totally unarmed students and citizens."	在这份发自肺腑的长信中，他控诉"少数支持腐败的领导人"在六月四日采取了"不仅在中国乃至在整个世界上都史无前例"的手段用"坦克、机枪和其它武器镇压手无寸铁的学生和市民。 "


In grim detail, his letter described the bloody mayhem that the slaughter brought to his hospital and the hysteria of ordinary people as they arrived to find children and loved ones dead.	在信中，他详细描述了那场杀戮给他所在的医院带来的血腥混乱以及普通市民赶到医院发现亲人死去后悲痛欲绝的惨状。


Without deference to or fear of the Party, Dr. Jiang castigated China's leaders for the way that they "mobilized all sorts of propaganda to fabricate lies and used high-handed measures to silence the people across the country."	他以大无畏的勇气指控中国的领导人"运用一切宣传工具制造谎言并采用高压手段让全国人民保持沉默。 "


Finally, Dr. Jiang implored the Party to re-assess the 1989 student movement by "reversing its verdict" from "counter-revolutionary rebellion" or "political storm" to "patriotic acts that had the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in Beijing and the country."	最后，蒋医生恳求中共重新评判1989年的学生运动，将其从"反革命暴乱"或"政治风波"的结论中"重新定性"为"得到了北京和全国大多数民众支持的爱国主义行为。


"Our Party must address the mistakes it has made," he concluded unambiguously. "Anyone whose family members were unjustly killed should voice the same request."	""我们的党必须纠正自己的错误，"他在信的最后毫不含糊地总结说："任何一个在这一事件中失去了亲人的人都应该提出同样的要求。


Before giving his name, address, and phone number, he said, "Of course, I have considered the consequences that I might encounter after writing this letter.	在给出自己的姓名、地址和电话号码之前，他写到，"当然，我已经考虑过写了这封信以后可能会面临的后果。


But, I have decided to tell you all the facts."	但我还是决定直言不讳。 "


How does one reconcile an isolated retrograde incident such as the disappearance of an elderly Chinese couple with the hopeful progress of the "Chinese economic miracle" that has so transformed this once seemingly desperate, backward land?	我们怎样才能将一对中国老年夫妻失踪的孤立而倒退的事件与转变了这个曾一度绝望而落后的国度的"中国经济奇迹"的巨大进步联系起来呢？


China today is a contradiction.	当今的中国是一个矛盾体。


The tensions between its increasingly open economy and its still closed political system and institutions (established during the Stalin era in the 1950's) make China the most conflicted nation of consequence in the world today.	日益开放的经济和仍然封闭的政治体制（建立于20世纪50年代的斯大林时代）是中国成为全世界在逻辑上最为矛盾的国家/


The old state planner Chen Yuan once cautioned that Chinese reformers had created "a birdcage economy" in which a capitalist bird was growing within a socialist cage.	计划经济的元老陈云曾警告说中国的改革者们缔造了一种"鸟笼经济"，即资本主义的鸟成长在社会主义的笼里。


His inference was that, unless Party leaders were careful, this capitalist bird would literally burst out of its socialist cage, spelling an end to China's Marxist-Leninist revolution.	他这番话的寓意是说中共的领导人必须非常小心，否则资本主义的鸟就会撑破社会主义的笼，从而终结中国的马克思-列宁主义革命。


Indeed, the old socialist economic birdcage has now been largely burst by China's capitalist reforms, releasing with a vengeance a mutant "people's republic" into the global marketplace of consumerism.	确实如此，中国的资本主义改革已经在很大程度上冲破了旧的社会主义的经济模式，报复般地将一个异化的"人民共和国"释放到消费主义的全球市场上。


But the demolition process that has transformed or razed so many of China's old Stalinist economic institutions has not been matched by a demolition of stultifying political structures.	但这一转变或废除了中国旧的斯大林主义经济体制的摧枯拉朽的过程却并没有和一个改变政治体制的过程相辅相成。


Although Chinese leaders speak of "One country, two systems" as their formula for governing Hong Kong - and possibly Taiwan some day - their slogan is far more relevant to China itself, given the co-existence of a capitalist economic system within a Leninist political system.	虽然中国领导人将"一国两制"作为治理香港-可能有朝一日还会用于台湾-的方案，但这一口号在目前资本主义经济体制和列宁主义政治体制并存的情况下与中国自身的情况更为贴切。


Dr. Jiang Yanyong may become a millionaire, wear any clothes he likes, redecorate his living room, even buy a car, but he cannot inform the public about an epidemic or write government officials an honest letter of admonition.	蒋彦永医生本可以成为一位衣着光鲜、有房有车的百万富翁，但那样他就不能向公众披露疾病的真相也不能向政府官员勇进忠言了。


Does this matter?	这又何干呢？


That depends on whether one believes that Leninist capitalism is a viable and stable form of government for China over the long term.	这要取决于一个人是否相信列宁主义化的资本主义在中国是一种长期可行而且稳定的政府形式。


China\u0027s Post-Olympic Challenge	中国奥运后的挑战


NEW YORK – Almost everyone in the world who watched the 2008 Olympics in Beijing was impressed by China’s preparations, the acumen of the Chinese in running such a complex and challenging event, and the rich harvest of medals – especially gold medal – that Chinese athletes won.	纽约--中国北京2008年奥运会的筹备工作、承办这一复杂艰巨的赛事所体现出的聪明才智以及 中国运动员奖牌、特别是金牌大丰收给几乎所有观看赛事的人留下了印象。


It was abundantly evident in the run-up to the Games how important it was to Chinese everywhere to show themselves to advantage.	毫无疑问，临近奥运会之际，展现美好形象对于全球华人极为重要。


One got a sense of this when China’s reputation and the Games’ status came under attack during the Tibetan demonstrations and protests against the Olympic torch as it made its tortured progress around the world.	在西藏示威以及奥运会火炬全球传递过程屡遭挫折，中国的声誉和奥运会的地位因此都受到了冲击。 那时人们就可以感受到这一点。


But, when all was said and done, through what turned out to be often Draconian controls, China pulled off quite a feat!	但是，在所有言行结束的时候，中国通过严加控制取得了巨大的成功！


Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the British will care as much, or go to such extremes, for the London Olympics in 2012.	确实，人们很难想象英国会如此在意并且全力以赴主办2012年伦敦奥运会。


For many years, especially since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, China has felt a deficit of global respect.	多年来，特别是1989年天安门屠杀事件以来，中国缺少了国际尊重。


This feeling has deeply troubled its leaders and filled its people with a sense that, despite all their economic progress, their proper place in the world was not only eluding them, but being denied to them by the endless criticism of the so-called “developed world.”	这一感觉让中国领导人难受，也让中国人感到，尽管他们取得了经济进步，但是他们的国际地位不仅还是差强人意，而且还让所谓的“发达国家”没完没了地批评，根本就没有得到什么应有的地位。


For the last two decades, Chinese leaders have been diligently trying to build a new edifice in order to gain some of that missing respect.	在过去二十年里，中国领导人一直努力建造一个新的门面来赢得丢失的尊重。


This made a successful Olympic Games, when all the world would be watching, an urgent matter.	这也就让成功举办全球瞩目的奥运会成为当务之急。


But, now that the Games have ended, Chinese leaders cannot quite say, “Mission accomplished.”	但是现在奥运会结束，中国领导人还不能说完事大吉。


While China’s achievement is worthy of genuine esteem, its efforts to gain a full measure of international respect and real “great power” status will not succeed until it matches its new economic and military power with a certain essential moral force.	尽管中国的成就值得真心的敬重，但是在以某种基本道德力量对应其新的经济和军事实力之前，其赢得完整的国际尊重和确实的“大国”地位的努力尚难以成功。


That, in turn, requires a society and a leadership that seeks to be exemplary in all ways that make human beings more human, including respect for truthfulness, openness, tolerance, and people’s right to disagree with their government.	而这反过来又要求社会和领导阶层寻求在所有的方面都具有表率作用，让人更加具有人性，包括尊重诚实、开放、宽容以及人民对政府持有异议的权利。


I fear that China’s leaders and people will continue to feel a certain gnawing, inchoate sense of deficiency and incompleteness in their quest for global respect until they find the strength to begin addressing the crucial, but elusive, issue of making China an ethical, as well as an economic and military, power.	我担心，在中国领导人和人民找到勇气开始解决让中国不仅成为经济和军事大国、而且是伦理大国这一关键而又扑朔迷离的问题之前，在他们寻求全球尊重的时候还将继续感受到某种程度的不济和缺失。


For a country steeped in millennia of Confucianism, the need for ethical leadership should be clear.	对于一个具有上千年儒家思想的国家而言，符合伦理的领导要求应当是清楚的。


To fully address the question of the moral and ethical base of a new form of Chinese governance, China’s government and its people must be able to look back freely and come to terms with their recent history: the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the events of 1989, Tibet, and other sensitive issues.	为了完整处理管理中国新形式的道德和伦理基础问题，中国政府和人民必须能够自由地审视和接受其近代历史，包括大跃进、文革、1989年的事件以及其他敏感问题。


They must also freely be able to discuss the future and what kind of society they wish to see rise from the ashes of Mao’s revolution.	他们还必须能够讨论未来以及他们想要见到何种社会从毛泽东的革命废墟中崛起。


I make these somewhat critical observations about China not with any sense of moral superiority or a wish to relieve myself of the responsibility to level the same critique at my own country’s recent failures.	我对中国做出这些有点批评的评论并非是我感到在道德上高人一等或者希望推卸自己的评说自己国家近年来失策的责任。


As most of the world knows, America’s quest to maintain its claim to the title of “greatness,” has, of late, also been elusive.	正如世界上大多数人所知，美国维持其“伟大”国家称号的行为近年来也是差强人意。


Arriving from different staring points, both the United States and China now find themselves confronting a similar challenge: restoring global trust and respect.	美中两国从不同的出发点得出结论，现在都发现要面对一个类似的挑战，也就是恢复全球信任和尊重。


Their success inevitably requires directly confronting their evident moral failures.	它们的成功不可避免地要求直接处理其明显的道德缺陷。


If many of those same viewers who have been impressed by China’s successes in Beijing now also find themselves recoiling at the idea of a stronger and more prideful China, that is understandable.	假如那些对北京奥运会印象深刻的观众同时担忧中国更为强大和自傲的话，那时可以理解的。


For strength unalloyed by checks and balances – and by a capacity for self-critical reflection about the rightness and wrongness of state action – can be unnerving.	没有对国家行为的对错自我反省的能力以及没有制衡的强力会让人害怕。


Many Americans, too, have recently had to learn this.	许多美国人最近也是了解了这一点。


One hopes that China will derive a new measure of respect and self-confidence from these astounding Games.	人们希望中国会从这一奥运盛会中获得尊重和自信。


But one also hopes that China’s successes will enable its leaders to feel strong enough to begin looking honestly at China’s recent past in a more critical way.	但是人们也希望中国的成功将会让其领导人感到具有足够的力量以具有批评性的态度来直面近来的历史。


Such forthrightness is not easy for any country.	对于任何国家来说，这一直率都并非容易。


But, having completed such an important step forward, China must now find new, more humanistic ways to continue to re-invent itself.	但是，中国已经向前迈出了如此重要的一步，现在就必须找到新的、更为具有人道主义的方式继续改造自我。


The Invisible-Border War	无形边境战争


NEW DELHI – A half-century after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the border between China and India remains undefined and a constant source of friction between the world’s two most populous countries.	新德里—1962年中印战争已经过去了半个世纪，中国和印度边境仍然没有划定，这两个世界人口众多的国家之间的潜在冲突源仍然存在。


Following three weeks of fighting in 1962, it was agreed to draw a Line of Actual Control (LAC).	1962年战事结束后三周，中印同意划一条实际控制线。


But, five decades later, the map has yet to be delineated.	但是，五十年后，地图仍然没有更新。


As a result, both sides routinely send patrols up to the point where they believe the LAC should be – the latest episode being a three-week incursion by Chinese troops into Indian-held territory that began in April.	结果，双方都不断地派遣巡逻队越过实际控制线应该在的地方，最新的动静是4月份中国军队进入印控领土三周时间。


Face-offs in the no-man’s land that lies between where China and India each envisage the LAC are so common that the militaries of the two countries have developed a modus vivendi, whereby one side tells the other to withdraw peacefully.	中国和印度以想象中的实际控制线为凭在两国之间的无人地带对峙早已稀松平常，两国军队已形成了便宜之计，即一方告知另一方和平撤退。


Both sides have routinely abided by the informal protocol that has evolved over the years.	通常双方都遵守着多年来形成的不成文的协议。


But not this time.	但这次不同了。


In the area of Daulat Beg Oldie, near Depsang Plains, in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, a patrol of about 15 People’s Liberation Army soldiers crossed into Indian-held territory and set up camp for an extended stay.	在查谟和克什米尔（Jammu and Kashmir）的拉达克（Ladakh）地区的达普桑盆地（Depsang Plains）附近的道拉伯格玉尔地（Daulat Beg Oldie），解放军的一支15人规模的巡逻队越境进入印控领土并安营扎寨，停留多日。


Stretching from the strategic Karakoram Pass, near Pakistan in the north, the LAC runs south, along the ridges of the eastern Himalayas to the ancient Buddhist monastery town of Tawang.	实际控制线从北接巴基斯坦、具有战略重要性的喀喇昆仑山口开始向南，沿着东喜马拉雅山起伏的山脊一直延伸到佛教香火兴盛的达旺（Tawang），然后与1941年划定的麦克马洪线回合。


After that, it traces the old McMahon Line drawn in 1914 – and rejected by China as an imperial dictate – to demarcate British India from what was then Tibet.	麦克马洪线是英属印度与当时的西藏的分界线，中国不承认这条线，认为它是帝国主义强加的。


The LAC then meanders until the point where India, China, and Burma meet.	接着，实际控制线一直延伸到中国、印度和缅甸的交界处。


China’s strategic interest in the line that separates India from a restive Tibet and the troublesome province of Xinjiang is straightforward.	对于这条分隔印度和躁动不安的西藏和麻烦不断的新疆的实际控制线，中国的战略利益是显而易见的。


For India, Daulat Beg Oldie is an important outpost near the entrance to the Karakoram Pass and the Siachen Glacier region.	道拉伯格玉尔地是靠近喀喇昆仑山口和锡亚琴冰川的重要前哨站。


So, was China’s incursion into Indian territory an error by a local PLA commander?	因此，中国入侵印度领土只是当地解放军军官的失误吗？


Or was a more complex calculation in play?	还是基于更复杂的算盘的动作？


The towering Karakoram Pass was part of the old silk route that connected Ladakh and Kashmir with Xinjiang – now, like Tibet, an “autonomous region” of China.	高耸的喀喇昆仑山口是连接拉达克和克什米尔与新疆的古丝绸之路的一部分（新疆和西藏一样，现在都是中国的“自治区”）。


As two observers recently described it, Daulat Beg Oldie was a kind of transfer point for goods to be loaded on to pack ponies “for the cruel journey over the Saser La into the more hospitable Shyok river valley” leading to “Leh, Turtok, or Srinagar [in Kashmir].”	正如两名观察家最近所指出的，道拉伯格玉尔地是一个转运站，靠马驮人拉的货物在这里落脚。 这里位于“穿过Saser La进入较平坦的Shyok河谷”并抵达“Leh、Turtok和斯利那加（Srinagar，在克什米尔境内）”的“艰难旅途”中间。


India’s parliament, not surprisingly, denounced the Chinese incursion in the harshest possible terms.	毫不奇怪，印度议会用最强硬的语调谴责中国的入侵。


The government, perplexed at first, tried unsuccessfully to make light of the presence of the PLA troops.	一开始有点懵的印度政府试图将解放军的出现轻轻掩饰过去，但未获成功。


A tent competition followed; because China had pitched four, India pitched eight.	接着出现的是争相驻军扎营； 中国扎四个营，因此印度扎八个。


The Financial Times quoted Sun Hongnian, a Chinese border expert: “For India, every meter of road and every bunker in that area is a strategic win of territory” that brings them “closer to the main road on our side.”	《金融时报》援引中国边境问题专家孙宏年：“对印度来说，在该地区的每一米公路和每一个堡垒都是领土的战略胜利”，能让他们“更靠近迈向中国的大路。 ”


The standoff came to an end on May 6, as suddenly as it had started.	僵局在5月6日被打破，与它的开始一样突然。


India’s foreign minister, having earlier termed the incursion a “localized incident,” had to change his tune under parliamentary pressure, and cautioned China that India might have to reconsider his projected visit to Beijing.	印度外交部长此前将此次入侵称为“局部事件”，在议会的压力下，他不得不改变口风，警告中国印度可能不得不重新考虑他对北京的访问。


Was all of this a Chinese effort to obtain, in Henry Kissinger’s words, “strategic deterrence”?	所有这些会不会是中国意在获得基辛格所谓的“战略威慑”的努力？


Or was it a deliberate push toward realizing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s proposal to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in South Africa in March?	还是实现中国国家主席习近平在3月份南非金砖国家会晤上向印度总理辛格提出的方案的有意动作？


Xi told Singh that he sought “a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement based on mutual understanding and accommodation,” adding significantly, “Let’s settle the boundary framework agreement quickly.”	习近平对辛格说，他追求“互相理解和让步的公正、合理、双方都能接受的解决方案，”并加上了重要的一句：“让我们尽快形成边境框架协议。


Was the Chinese incursion intended to serve as a sort of diplomatic accelerator?	”中国的入侵的目的是形成外交加速器吗？


India should take to heart former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s prescient observation that “China, a nation of foreign and security policy realists, respects strategic strength and is contemptuous of vacillation and weakness.”	印度应该���真思考前澳大利亚总理陆克文颇具远见卓识的观察：“中国是外交和安全政策的现实主义者，它尊重战略强硬，鄙视犹豫和软弱。


After all, one of the lessons of the 1962 war was that a vacillating response to Chinese aggression is self-defeating, particularly in situations like that posed by the incursion at Daulat Beg Oldie.	”毕竟，1962年之战的一个教训是对中国的进犯的软弱反应无异于自掘坟墓，特别是在入侵道拉伯格玉尔地这样的局面上。


One thing seems clear from the recent incident: a new dispensation reigns in China, and will continue to guide policy for the next decade under Xi’s leadership.	从最近的事件中我们可以清楚地看清一点：新制度支配着中国，并将在习近平的领导下指导未来十年的政策。


The PLA troops in Daulat Beg Oldie are a reminder that China has no intention of allowing unresolved border issues to be swept under the rug.	道拉伯格玉尔地的解放军提醒我们，中国不会允许悬而未决的边境问题一直被掩盖。


Indeed, almost simultaneously with the PLA incursion, scholars at an official Chinese think tank questioned Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.	事实上，在解放军入侵的几乎同时，中国官方智库的学者开始对日本的冲绳主权开炮。


Whether Xi’s appeal to India to “settle the boundary framework quickly” was an exhortation or a warning, other Asian countries can no longer afford to ignore their own border disputes with China.	不管习近平向印度建议“尽快形成边境框架”是劝告还是警告，其他亚洲国家都无法再忽视其自身与中国的边境纠纷了。


As what happened in Daulat Beg Oldie demonstrates, China’s new leaders are not interested in preserving the status quo.	道拉伯格玉尔地事件表明，中国新领导人对保持现状不感兴趣。


China’s Roadmap	中国的路线图


China is about to adopt its 11th five-year plan, setting the stage for the continuation of probably the most remarkable economic transformation in history, while improving the well-being of almost a quarter of the world’s population.	中国即将执行第11个五年计划，这在为继续开展其历史上最令人叹为观止的经济转型打下坚实基础的同时，也改善着占世界人口四分之一的人民的生活质量。


Never before has the world seen such sustained growth; never before has there been so much poverty reduction.	在此之前，世界还从未看到过这样的可持续发展，也没有见到过这样大规模的消除贫困。


Part of the key to China’s long-run success has been its almost unique combination of pragmatism and vision.	中国的长期成功部分有赖于其几乎是独一无二的眼光和脚踏实地的作风。


While much of the rest of the developing world, following the Washington Consensus, has been directed at a quixotic quest for higher GDP, China has once again made clear that it seeks sustainable and more equitable increases in real living standards.	达成《华盛顿共识》后，在其它发展中国家都对提高国内生产总值情有独钟时，中国再次重申人民生活水平的持续、均衡提高才是它所追求的目标。


China realizes that it has entered a phase of economic growth that is imposing enormous – and unsustainable – demands on the environment.	中国已经进入了给环境造成严重、不可持续负担的经济发展阶段，这一点中国自己非常清楚。


Unless there is a change in course, living standards will eventually be compromised.	除非加以改变，否则人民生活水平的提高将最终受到威胁。


That is why the new five-year plan places great emphasis on the environment.	这也是新的五年计划把环境问题当作重中之重的原因所在。


Even many of the more backward parts of China have been growing at a pace that would be a marvel, were it not for the fact that other parts of the country are growing even more rapidly.	即便是中国很多落后地区也以惊人的速度向前发展，但与中国其它地区更快的发展速度相比却相形见绌。


While this has reduced poverty, inequality has been increasing, with growing disparities between cities and rural areas, and between coastal regions and the interior.	这在减少贫困的同时也加剧了不平等，使得城市和农村、沿海和内地的差距越来越大。


This year’s World Bank World Development Report explains why inequality, not just poverty, should be a concern, and China’s 11th five-year plan attacks the problem head-on.	本年度世界银行的《世界发展报告》说明了为什么不平等、而不只是贫穷问题应该引起人们的关注。 而中国的第11个五年计划试图正面解决这个问题。


The government has for several years talked about a more harmonious society, and the plan describes ambitious programs for achieving this.	几年来政府一直宣传和谐社会，而第11个五年计划具体描述了实现和谐社会的雄伟宏图。


China recognizes, too, that what separates less developed from more developed countries is not only a gap in resources, but also a gap in knowledge.	中国也认识到，落后国家和发达国家不止在资源上存在着差距，在知识上也同样存在差距。


So it has laid out bold plans not only to reduce that gap, but to create a basis for independent innovation.	因此中国制定了大胆的计划，不仅要缩小这种差距，还要为独立创新奠定坚实的基础。


China’s role in the world and the world’s economy has changed, and the plan reflects this, too.	中国在世界和世界经济中扮演了迥然不同的角色，这一点在五年计划中也有真实的反映。


Its future growth will have to be based more on domestic demand than on exports, which will require increases in consumption.	中国未来的发展要依靠国内需求而不是出口，这样就需要扩大国内消费。


Indeed, China has a rare problem: excessive savings.	实际上，中国面临的问题十分罕见：那就是存款过多。


People save partly because of weaknesses in government social-insurance programs; strengthening social security (pensions) and public health and education will simultaneously reduce social inequalities, increase citizens’ sense of well-being, and promote current consumption.	人们存款部分是由于政府的社会保险计划存在缺陷，而加强社会安全（养老）、公众健康和教育能够同时减少社会不平等，增强公民的福利意识，促进现实消费。


If successful – and, so far, China has almost always surpassed even its own high expectations – these adjustments may impose enormous strains on a global economic system that is already unbalanced by America’s huge fiscal and trade imbalances.	如果目标成功实现－迄今为止，中国几乎总能超额完成自己设定的最高目标－这些调整就会给全球经济体系带来巨大的压力，而后者已经由于美国巨额的财政和贸易赤字而严重失衡。


If China saves less – and if, as officials have announced, it pursues a more diversified policy of investing its reserves – who will finance America’s more than $2 billion a day trade deficit?	如果中国存款减少－如果真像官员们所说的那样执行多样化的储备投资政策－那么谁还有能力为美国每天超过20亿美元的贸易赤字买单？


This is a topic for another day, but that day may not be far off.	这个问题目前似乎不是迫在眉睫，但我们距离那天已经不会太远。


With such a clear vision of the future, the challenge will be implementation.	对未来有了这样清醒的认识，接下来执行就成了最大的挑战。


China is a large country, and it could not have succeeded as it has without widespread decentralization.	中国幅员辽阔，如果没有广泛的分权作为基础，根本不可能取得任何成功。


But decentralization raises problems of its own.	但权力分散又会带来很多问题。


Greenhouse gases, for example, are global problems.	举例来讲，温室气体的排放是个全球性问题。


While America says that it cannot afford to do anything about it, China’s senior officials have acted more responsibly.	在美国宣称无能为力的同时，中国高级官员的所作所为无疑更负责任。


Within a month of the adoption of the plan, new environmental taxes on cars, gasoline, and wood products were imposed: China was using market based mechanisms to address its and the world’s environmental problems.	计划被采纳后短短一个月内，中国政府就对汽车、汽油和木制产品征收了新的环境税：中国正在用市场机制解决自己和全世界的环境问题。


But the pressures on local government officials to deliver economic growth and jobs will be enormous.	但这对地方政府官员发展经济、创造就业机会的压力无疑是巨大的。


They will be sorely tempted to argue that if America cannot afford to produce in a way that preserves our planet, how can we?	他们会激烈争辩说如果美国不能以环保的方式组织生产，我们又怎么能够做到？


To translate its vision into action, the Chinese government will need strong policies, such as the environmental taxes already imposed.	为了把远见变成行动，中国政府需要推行强有力的政策，其中已经开始征收的环境税即为一例。


As China has moved toward a market economy, it has developed some of the problems that have plagued the developed countries: special interests that clothe self-serving arguments behind a thin veil of market ideology.	随着向市场经济的过渡，一直困扰发达国家的问题也开始困扰中国：那就是国内有一个特殊利益群体，在薄薄的市场面纱后面隐藏着自私自利的企图。


Some will argue for trickle-down economics: don’t worry about the poor, eventually everybody will benefit from growth.	有些人可能会为涓滴经济学辩解：不要去管那些穷人，每个人都会从发展中最终获益。


And some will oppose competition policy and strong corporate governance laws: let Darwinian survival work its wonders.	还有人可能反对竞争政策和强有力的企业管理法：主张让达尔文主义的生存法则来决定一切。


Growth arguments will be advanced to counter strong social and environmental policies: higher gasoline taxes, for example, will kill our nascent auto industry.	随着政府推行强有力的社会和环境政策，与发展有关的争论会进一步升级：比如有人会说，高额的燃油税会扼杀我们新生的汽车工业。


Such allegedly pro-growth policies would not only fail to deliver growth; they would threaten the entire vision of China’s future.	这样所谓的发展政策不仅不能带来发展，还会威胁到中国的未来。


There is only one way to prevent this: open discussion of economic policies in order to expose fallacies and provide scope for creative solutions to the many challenges facing China today.	阻止的办法只有一个：那就是公开探讨经济政策。 只有这样才能发现谬误、为制定有创造性的解决方案创造条件。


George W. Bush has shown the dangers of excessive secrecy and confining decision-making to a narrow circle of sycophants.	乔治·W·布什为我们树立了暗箱操作、把决策权交给一小撮溜须拍马之徒的反面典型。


Most people outside China do not fully appreciate the extent to which its leaders, by contrast, have engaged in extensive deliberations and broad consultations (even with foreigners) as they strive to solve the enormous problems they face.	而绝大多数外国人并不真正了解中国领袖在解决所面临的重大问题时是如何广泛听取意见（甚至包括外国人的意见）的。


Market economies are not self-regulating.	市场经济不能全靠自我调整。


They cannot simply be left on autopilot, especially if one wants to ensure that their benefits are shared widely. But managing a market economy is no easy task.	不应该挂上自动档就放手不管，特别是如果想确保所有人都能分享市场经济带来的好处就更不能放任自流。


It is a balancing act that must constantly respond to economic changes.	但管理市场经济不是个轻松的任务，必须按照经济的变化随时进行调整。


China’s 11th five-year plan provides a roadmap for that response.	中国的第11个五年计划规划了调整的蓝图。


The world watches in awe, and hope, as the lives of 1.3 billion people continue to be transformed.	全世界目瞪口呆地静观其变、默默祈祷，看着13亿中国人生活继续发生着翻天覆地的变化。


China’s See-No-Evil Diplomacy	中国的非礼勿视外交


Ever since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has adhered to a foreign policy of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs – or so it claims.	中华人民共和国成立以来一直如其所宣传的那样坚持不干涉其他国家内部事务的外交原则。


But with China’s rapid ascent and ever-closer integration with the outside world, this doctrine has become increasingly anachronistic.	但是随着中国的迅速崛起和与外部世界越发紧密的联系，这一原则变得越发在时代上错误。


Overseas, China’s role in places like Sudan and Burma not only draws international opprobrium, but also taints its reputation.	中国在海外像苏丹和缅甸等地方发挥的作用不仅遭到国际谴责，而且也破坏了它的声誉。


By maintaining cozy relations with repressive regimes and protecting them from international sanctions, China risks being seen as their accomplice.	通过与专制政权保持亲密的关系和让它们免遭国际制裁，中国就有可能被视为它们的帮凶。


Even when China’s voice could be decisive in resolving crises or preventing bloodshed, instead of acting, its diplomats repeat the old platitudes about non-interference.	即使中国的声音在解决危机或者防止流血上具有决定性作用，它不仅没有行动，其外交官反而重复着不干涉内政的老调。


The recent “saffron revolution” in Burma presented China with not only a challenge, but also an opportunity to exert its influence.	最近缅甸的“僧侣革命”带给中国不仅是一个挑战，而且也是一个发挥影响力的机会。


Yet it failed the test of statesmanship once again by sitting on its hands and merely calling for restraint.	但是中国无所作为，仅仅呼吁克制，从而再一次在政治家测试中不及格。


Thanks to China’s collusion, the suffering of Burma’s people continues.	由于中国的勾结，缅甸人们的痛苦在持续。


China’s mixture of inaction with a mercantilist approach to its Third World trading partners attests to the hypocrisy of its foreign policy.	中国的无所作为与其对待第三世界贸易夥伴的唯利是图的策略表明了其外交政策的伪善。


For, where access to natural resources is concerned, China is more than willing to discard its non-interference doctrine.	因为，只要涉及掌握自然资源，中国十分愿意抛弃它的不干涉原则。


This has not gone unnoticed, as a wave of anti-China movements has spread across Africa.	在反华运动浪潮遍及非洲大陆之际，人们注意到了这一点。


In Zambia, Chinese mining firms’ indifference to the death of their African employees provoked large protests against China’s presence.	在津巴布韦，中国矿业公司对于非洲雇员们的死亡无动于衷，引发大规模抗议中国存在活动。


Though China finally pacified the situation by threatening to withdraw investment, doing so meant reneging on the promise not to meddle in other countries’ domestic affairs.	尽管中国最终通过威胁撤回投资而平息了局势，这样做意味着违犯不干涉其他国家内政的保证。


Of course, interference in the internal affairs of another country isn’t inherently evil.	当然，干涉其他国家内政并非天生是邪恶的。


When it is harnessed to promote growth and human rights, interference should be appreciated, regardless of the regime that is doing it.	当干涉用来促进增长和人权的时候就应当予以赞赏，而无论干涉的政权如何。


China’s vast influence over a few fellow dictatorships still holds out the best hope of softening their misrule.	中国对一些同类专制者的影响力依旧是缓和其暴政的最佳希望。


But can China be persuaded to wield its influence constructively, rather than maintaining its pretense of neutrality when its assistance is badly needed?	但是，能否说服中国建设性地利用其影响力，而不是在急需其帮助的时候维持其中立的表象呢？


So far, China’s leaders have not seen the merits of abandoning non-interference.	目前为止，中国领导人还没有看到放弃不干涉的好处。 他们的理由也好像颇为实际。


Their reasons also seem to have a pragmatic ring: they don’t want to cause North Korea to collapse by being too harsh; they fear losing influence in Burma to India or the United States; no one is doing much about Darfur, so to jeopardize the supply of Sudanese oil by pushing the regime in Khartoum appears futile.	他们担心把对缅甸的影响力拱手让给印度或者美国； 世界在达尔富尔问题上基本无所作为，所以冒着苏丹石油供应的风险来推动咯土穆政权看起来就是徒劳的。


But pragmatism has its limits, particularly when it permits dangerous situations to fester.	但是现实主义也有局限，特别是它让危险的局势恶化的时候。


Indeed, China’s pandering to dictators in its quest for resources contradicts its long-term interest in being acknowledged as a benign and legitimate power and commanding the international respect that it craves.	实际上，中国迎合独裁者以寻求自然资源与其被认可为善意和合法的打过以及支配它所向往的国际尊重的长期利益相抵触。


Had China put pressure on the Burmese junta to stop slaughtering its own people, it would have earned substantial moral credit around the world.	如果中国对缅甸军政权施加压力，停止屠杀本国人民，那么它就会在全世界赢得实在的道义赞扬。


Moreover, the suspicions of China’s neighbors fueled by its rise could be partly allayed by such efforts to improve regional stability.	而且，中国的邻国由于中国崛起而产生的疑虑也会由于这些改善地区稳定的工作而得到部分消除。


China now faces a dilemma.	中国现在面临两难选择。


Should its parochial interests give way to more cosmopolitan responsibilities?	其狭隘的利益是否应该让位于更为博大的责任呢？


How it answers this question will largely determine how the world views it for decades to come.	它如何回答这一问题将在很大程度上决定世界将在未来几十年中如果看待它。


If China doesn’t want to be seen as complicit in the crimes of its client regimes, then it is time for it to alter its concept of diplomatic interference.	如果中国不想被视为其附庸政权的犯罪同夥，那么，它现在就应该改变其外交干涉的观念。


If China maintains its non-interference policy, it will become increasingly difficult to mask that doctrine’s malevolence behind the façade of the country’s “charm offensive.”	如果中国坚持其不干涉政策，把这一原则的恶毒隐藏在中国“魅力攻势”的表象后面就会越发困难。


China still has a long way to go before it will be perceived as a responsible stakeholder in the world.	中国在被认可为世界上负责任的利益相关者之前还要很长的路要走。


Reforming the non-interference doctrine is a necessary step in that direction.	改革不干涉原则是这一方向必要的一步。


China’s Shrinking Trade Surplus	收缩中的中国贸易顺差


BEIJING – Throughout 2010, China was criticized by the United States Congress (and many others) for “manipulating” its currency in order to maintain an advantage for exports, and thus preserve its trade surplus.	发自北京——整个2010年，中国都淹没在美国（及其他各国）国会关于“操纵”人民币以抢占出口优势并维持贸易顺差的指责之中。


China’s behavior, it was alleged, was the source of today’s huge global imbalance.	各方都声称中国的所作所为就是当今全球巨额贸易不平衡的根源。


China, however, refused to accept the blame and declined repeated US demands to undertake a large revaluation.	中国对此则不以为然，并一再拒绝了美国对人民币大幅升值的要求。


The exchange rate of the renminbi against the US dollar rose only about 3% between June 2010 and the year’s end.	人民币兑美元的汇率在2010年下半年只上升了约3%。


According to an analysis used by some American economists and politicians, the low rate of currency appreciation, combined with Chinese export growth of 31% in 2010 over 2009, should have increased China’s trade surplus by a wide margin.	照某些美国经济学家和政客的分析方法，低升值率再加上中国2010年出口31%的增长（对比2009年），中国的贸易顺差显然是进一步扩大了。


In fact, China’s trade surplus decreased by 6.4% in 2010 compared to 2009.	但实际上，中国2010年的贸易顺差总额较2009年下降了6.


And that decline follows a 30% drop in China’s trade surplus in 2008, owing to the global financial crisis and subsequent recession.	4%，更何况之前的2008年已经在经济危机及后续衰退的影响下跌去了30%。


Overall, China’s trade surplus has decreased by 36% in absolute US dollar terms, and has dropped by more than half (53%) in proportion to GDP over the past two years.	总体来说，中国的贸易顺差按绝对美元计算已经下跌了36%，占GDP的比例也在过去两年中下跌了超过一半（53%）。


So the ratio of China’s current-account surplus to GDP is down to 4.6%, significantly below the recent peak of 11.3%, reached in 2007.	因此中国经常帐户盈余占GDP的比例已经下降到4. 6%，显著低于2007年的高峰11.


These data demonstrate conclusively that the “exchange-rate centered” theory of the trade imbalance does not match reality.	上述数据明确表明关于贸易不平衡的“汇率中心”理论是不符合实际的。


China’s economy over the past two years has become much more balanced in its external trade relationships, despite there being no significant exchange-rate adjustments.	即便没有进行显著的汇率调整，中国经济在过去两年间在对外贸易关系方面也已经变得更加均衡。


The reason, of course, is the strong increase in Chinese domestic demand.	而其中的原因当然是国内需求的强劲增长。


Total sales of consumer goods increased by 14.8% in 2010 and domestic fixed investment grew by 19.5%, both in real terms.	按实际价值计，生活消费品总销售额在2010年增长了14. 8%，而国内固定投资额则上升了19.


As a result, in US dollar terms, import demand grew by 38.7%, outpacing export growth of 31%.	5%。 另一方面以美元价值计算的进口需求增长了38.


Simply put, if a country can improve its domestic balance, it will become more balanced externally, regardless of how little the exchange rate changes.	7%，超过进口增长达31%。 简而言之，如果一个国家能改善其国内经济平衡状况，那么无论汇率变化究竟有多细微，它在对外贸易方面也会变得更加平衡。


The second question is this: can China reduce its trade surplus still further while continuing to maintain its policy of “gradual appreciation” of the renminbi?	第二个问题是，中国是否能在继续维持人民币“逐渐升值”政策的同时进一步减少其贸易顺差？


Such an outcome is, in fact, quite likely in the next years, during the period of the new Five Year Plan.	事实上这样的结果很可能在随后几年中发生，在新的五年计划（“十二五”）期间。


To begin with, several significant fiscal/taxation reforms are now underway or in the pipeline, such as an increase in the collection of state-owned companies’ dividends and a hike in the resource tax on industries such as oil and coal mining, in order to reduce corporate savings.	首先，数项重大财政/税收改革现正在进行或是筹划中，比如增加国有企业的利润提取，或是提高石油和采矿等行业的资源税，以达到减少企业储蓄的目的。


There will also be cuts in personal-income tax in the next few years in order to increase households’ disposable income.	未来几年内也将降低个人所得税征税额，以增加家庭可支配收入。


In the new Five-Year Plan for 2011-2015, some binding targets are set for the social safety-net reforms.	在2011-2015的新五年计划中还针对社会安全网的改革设定了一系列政策目标。


The social-security system will finally provide universal coverage, including the rural population and migrant workers in China’s cities.	社会安全系统将最终实现包括农村人口和城市农民工在内的普遍覆盖。


More public funds will be available for rural education and rural health care.	更多公共资金将投入到农村教育和农村医疗卫生方面。


More public services will be provided to newly urbanized rural migrants.	更多的公共服务将提供给新城市化进程中的农村居民。


All of these changes will increase household consumption in both the short and long term.	而所有这些变化将同时在短期和长期内增加家庭消费。


When all of these reforms are realized, China’s national saving rate may be reduced to 45%, from 51% currently.	当所有这些改革都是实现了之后，中国的国家储蓄率将从当前的51%下降到45%。


That will have a very significant effect in terms of reducing the current-account surplus, which reflects net national savings.	这将在减少经常账户顺差——这个数字则反映了国家的净储蓄——方面产生巨大作用。


Moreover, the Chinese government, at both the central and local levels, will remain keen to continue infrastructure investments aimed at further urbanization and industrialization.	此外，中国的中央和地方政府将继续追加对城市化和工业化的基础设施投资。


An ambitious plan for a national high-speed train system has been set forth.	一个宏大的国家高速铁路计划已经启动。


And all major urban areas, including some second-tier cities, are building their public transportation systems to include more subways and light-rail networks.	所有主要城市区域，包括一些二线城市正在建设包括地铁和轻轨在内的公共运输系统。


Other urban facilities will also be in strong demand, because China’s urban population will continue to increase massively for the foreseeable future.	此外中国国内对其他城市基础设施也拥有巨大需求，因为中国的城市人口将在可见的未来大幅增加。


Given that the urbanization ratio is still quite low, at 48%, a relatively high investment in infrastructure may be sustained for a long time.	考虑到城市化比率依然相对较低（48%），相对较高的基础设施投资额将持续一段长的时期。


Those investments will drain most of the country’s domestic savings and sustain high demand for imports.	这些投资将消耗中国大部分国内储蓄并维持对进口的高需求。


So it seems likely that China’s current-account surplus will dip below 4% of GDP before long – and probably go even lower, if not turn into an outright deficit.	因此似乎中国的经常账户顺差将在不久之后下降到占GDP的4%以下——甚至可能继续下降，只要不转化为逆差的话。


In other words, China could easily reach the target set by the “indicative guidelines” for reducing global imbalances by 2015, as proposed by US officials recently at the G-20 ministerial meeting in Seoul last November.	换言之，中国能轻易地达到美国官员在去年11月首尔G20部长级会议上提出的在2015年减少全球不均衡的“标志性指导方针”。


The key question is: what is going on with the US, which, after all, represents the other side of the great imbalance?	关键问题是，代表了巨大不平衡另一端的美国应当做些什么？


The US current-account deficit has been narrowing in recent quarters, thanks to export growth.	得益于出口增长，美国的经常账户逆差在最近几个季度收窄了。


That is good news.	这是个好消息。


Moreover, it happened without much downward exchange-rate adjustment so far, owing to the weakness of the euro and some other key currencies.	而且这一状况是在没有进行大幅汇率下调的情况下实现的，原因是欧元和其他几个主要货币的走弱。


The monetary easing undertaken by the US Federal Reserve raised expectations for a devaluation of the US dollar that might help US exports.	美联储推行的货币宽松政策增加了外界对美元贬值的预期并有助于出口。


But domestic savings remain low in the face of persistently high levels of public debt.	但美国的国内储蓄依旧极低，同时还背负着巨额的公共债务。


Again, the fundamental cause of today’s global imbalance can be found in domestic structural problems on both sides. Exchange rates will play only a secondary role in rebalancing.	总的来说，当今这种国际不平衡的根本原因都可以在双方的国内经济结构问题中找到，而汇率在重新平衡的过程只是扮演了次要的地位而已。


China\u0027s Silent Rural Revolution	沉默的中国农村革命


When China's National People's Congress (NPC) concluded its annual meeting recently, it voted to enshrine protection of human rights and private property in the constitution.	在最近结束的中国全国人民代表大会（全国人大）年会上，对人权和私有财产的保护被写入宪法。


But other major changes in China's development strategies that appear to be taking place have attracted far less notice.	但在中国的发展战略中出现的一些重要变化却远远没有引起外界的足够关注。


China's current leadership, one year after coming to power, has criticized "the single-minded pursuit of GDP growth" over the past decade and unveiled a new approach to modernization characterized as "balanced, human-centered, and environmentally friendly."	上任一年的中国现任领导层批评了过去十年来"片面追求GDP增长"的做法，并公布了以"平衡、以人为本和有利于环境"为特点的实现现代化的新思路。


The change in priorities - and outsiders' tendency to overlook it - is not difficult to understand.	发展重点优先次序的改变-容易被外界忽视-却并不难理解。


The world is fascinated by China's economic miracle, but it is much less interested in the costs associated with the country's 8-9% annual growth rate in the past 25 years.	当世界惊异于中国的经济奇迹时，却对其在过去25年来为实现8-9%的经济年增长率所付出的代价漠不关心。


For instance, the energy consumption of every unit of Chinese industrial output is close to three times the global average.	例如，中国每单位工业产出的能源消耗比全球平均水平高出近三倍。


In may places, the environment has been devastated almost beyond recovery.	在一些地方，环境已经遭到了近乎不可逆的破坏。


Similarly, a recent Chinese bestseller, A Survey of Chinese Peasants , reveals the tremendous human costs of China's modernization drive.	无独有偶，一本新近的中文畅销书《中国农民调查》披露了中国为现代化所付出的高昂人力成本。


The book caught the attention of both the elites and the mass public with its heart-breaking stories of the suffering endured by 900 million farmers and its bold criticism of the government's rural policies.	该书以其对9亿农民困苦境况的细致描述和对政府农村政策的大胆批评，引起了精英阶层和普通大众的注意。


Beyond the glamorous skyscrapers of Beijing, Shanghai, and other urban centers, the majority of Chinese who live in the countryside have gained little from the material progress of the past two decades.	在北京、上海和其它中心城市鳞次栉比的摩天大厦以外，生活在农村的大多数中国人从过去20年的物质进步中所获得的利益极为有限。


On the contrary, the initial benefits that peasants gained from the rural reforms of the late 1970's and early 1980's have disappeared; real income among farmers has dropped in recent years as their production costs rise and agricultural prices decline.	相反，农民从上世纪七十年代末和八十年代初的农村改革中所获得的初始利益已不复存在； 由于生产成本的提高和农产品价格的降低，农民的实际收入在近几年呈下降之势。


In most parts of China, farming can no longer sustain a respectable standard of living.	在中国的大多数地方，从事农业生产已不能维持合理的生活水平。


Most worrying is the ever-growing tax burden placed on the rural population.	最令人担忧的是针对农村人口的税务负担不断加重。


While average agricultural income grew by 90% in the 1994-97 period, the rural tax burden jumped by 800%.	在1994-97年间农民的平均收入增加了90%，而同期的税赋却激增了8倍。


More than 300 taxes and fees have been imposed on peasants by all levels of government.	各级政府向农民征收的税费多达300余项。


For example, some townships demand 14 kinds of fees to register a marriage.	例如，一些乡镇对注册结婚都会征收14项费用。


Today, a farmer's annual income is only one-sixth that of an urban dweller's, but he has to pay three times more in taxes.	如今，一个农民的年收入只有城市居民的六分之一，但他的纳税额却是城市居民的三倍。


This comes in addition to many other financial burdens exacted at the local level.	除此之外，还有地方政府施加的财政负担。


Indeed, 25 years of reforms have changed nothing of China's "one country with two systems" - a model that segregates China's urban centers from its agricultural areas, with development of the former realized at the expense of the latter.	事实上，25年的改革并没有改变中国"一个国家，两种体制"-这一把中国的中心城市和广大农村隔离开来，并以牺牲后者的利益实现前者发展的模式。


If we use what is called the "Gini coefficient" to measure this income gap, with "0" indicating perfect equality of income distribution and "1" meaning perfect inequality, the number for China is 0.454 in 2002.	如果我们用"吉尼系数"来衡量这一城乡收入差距，以"0"表示收入分配的绝对平等，用"1"表示绝对不平等，则中国在2002年的吉尼系数为0.


This is an internationally recognized level of "absolute disparity."	454。 这是国际公认的"绝对悬殊"水平。


India, long known for gross disparities between rich and poor, has a Gini coefficient that has hovered around 0.30 to 0.32 over the past five decades.	印度素以其贫富差距"著称"，而该国的吉尼系数在过去50年来一直在0. 30-0.


So today's China is a much less equitable society than India.	32间波动。 所以当今的中国是一个比印度更为贫富悬殊的社会。


A recent study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences concluded that China's urban-rural income gap is the worst on earth, maybe only slightly better than Zimbabwe.	中国社会科学院的最近的一项研究所得出的结论是中国的城乡收入差距几乎是"全球之冠"，或许只比津巴布韦略好一些。


The irony here is that China is widely hailed as a success story, while Zimbabwe is generally viewed as a failed state.	具有讽刺意味的是，中国被一致认为是成功的典范，而津巴布韦则一向被认为是一个积重难返的国家。


Such an unfair distribution of wealth based on economic exploitation, social injustice and political exclusion has caused silent but persistent resistance by Chinese peasants.	这种基于经济剥削、社会不公和政治排斥的财富分配不均，导致了中国农民沉默但却持久的抵抗。


They protest, they petition, and they participate in local riots when all other means are exhausted.	他们抗议，他们请愿，他们在走投无路之际加入地方的骚乱。


Yet little changes.	但情况毫无改观。


As a result, the "peasant question" is now threatening social stability and is potentially explosive in a way reminiscent of when Mao organized his revolution around peasant disaffection with the rural policies of the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek.	结果是"农民问题"现在已威胁到社会稳定并可能带来爆发性的后果，正如当年毛泽东以农民对国民党蒋介石政府的农村政策的不满来组织革命那样。


In response, Premier Wen Jiabao announced a series of measures during the NPC, ranging from phasing out agricultural taxes over the next five years to measures aimed at increasing farmers' income.	作为回应，温家宝总理在全国人大会议期间公布了一系列措施，从在未来五年逐渐减免农业税到旨在增加农民收入的举措。


But while official attention to rural poverty is music to the ears of the poor, experience shows that such promises are usually inadequate.	但经验表明，只要官员们对农村贫困的关注还是"雷声大，雨点小"，这样的承诺是不足以解决问题的。


Wen's predecessor, Zhu Ronji, also said that his "biggest headache" was how to reduce the rural tax burden and increase peasant income.	温家宝的前任朱镕基也说过他"最大的头痛"就是如何减少农村的税务负担和增加农民收入。


Yet the situation only worsened.	而情况却进一步恶化了。


China's government must acknowledge that deep income inequality and rural poverty is no longer exclusively an economic problem, but threatens social peace and political stability.	中国政府必须承认严重的收入不平等和农村贫困已不仅仅是一个经济问题，而是影响到社会安定和政治稳定的问题。


Comprehensive reform is the only way out.	全面改革是唯一的出路。


Unless China commits to greater political openness, allowing the poor and disadvantaged to voice their concerns, represent themselves, and monitor policy implementation, it will continue to be jeopardized by a false and perilous prosperity.	除非中国致力于更大程度的政治公开，允许贫困和弱势群体表达他们的意愿，代表他们自己并监控政策的实施，否则它将会继续受到这种虚假和危险的繁荣所带来的危害。


China’s Soft-Power Offensive in Taiwan	中国大陆对台湾的软实力攻势


TOKYO – China’s behavior during the recent presidential election in Taiwan demonstrates that its leaders have learned some lessons, if only the hard way.	发自东京——中国大陆在最近台湾总统大选期间的所作所为显示出该国的领导人已经在过往的失败经历中得到了一些教训。


They have learned that China can have a greater impact on Taiwanese voters through trade and making people feel richer than by threats – even threats to fire missiles – which had been China’s electoral tactics in previous Taiwanese elections, particularly when a pro-independence candidate looked popular enough to win.	他们认识到大陆可以通过贸易或者提升令台湾民众富裕感来对选民施加影响，而不是像以往历届大选（特别是台独派候选人有望胜选的时候）那样采取威胁性策略——甚至声称要威胁导弹。


Indeed, fearing the popularity of Lee Teng-hui, who ran in the 1996 presidential election on a pro-independence platform, China’s People’s Liberation Army actually fired missiles close to the nearby coast of Keelung.	事实上，出于对李登辉这位极受欢迎的台独派总统候选人的恐惧，中国人民解放军曾于1996年台湾大选期间向基隆港附近海域发射了导弹。


But this saber rattling backfired. Lee won.	但这一炫耀武力的举动却产生了反效果，李登辉最终赢得了大选。


The presidential election on January 14 was the first of the transfers of power in China and Taiwan that will take place this year.	而1月14日的那场大选则是两岸政权各自实施权力交接的第一幕。


Later this year, China’s President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will be succeeded by men chosen by the Communist Party long ago.	随后，中国国家主席胡锦涛和总理温家宝将被中国共产党早已选定的接班人所取带。


Avoiding new tension with Taiwan appears to have been a calculated decision by China’s leaders as they begin their own – perhaps not yet fully settled – changing of the guard.	防止对台出现紧张态势看上去似乎是中国领导人早已计算好的决定，特别是他们开始自己的——或者尚未完全尘埃落定的——权力交接之时。


For almost two decades, Taiwan’s presidential elections have attracted global attention not only for the robustness of Taiwan’s democratic culture, but also for the perennial question of whether the winner would seek formal independence for Taiwan.	近20年来，台湾的总统选举吸引了全球的注意：这一方面是源自于其生机勃勃的民主文化，另一方面则是出于一个悬而未决的问题——选举的胜者是否将谋求台湾的正式独立。


This time, Tsai Ing-wen, the woman nominated by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), mounted a late charge on the Kuomintang incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou. But China did not bluster as Tsai surged in the polls.	在本次大选中，在野台湾民主进步党所推举出来的候选人蔡英文在选举最后阶段对执政的国民党总统马英九造成了极大威胁，但大陆方面却并未对此作出过激举动。


Instead, China did all that it could do boost Ma, who has presided over a massive increase in economic ties with the mainland.	相反，中国不惜一切代价去支持马英九这位在第一任期间大力增强两岸经济纽带的总统。


For example, China provided cheap airplane tickets to roughly 400,000 of the one million Taiwanese living on the mainland to enable them to return home to vote.	例如目前有大概100万台湾人居住在中国大陆，而中国则向其中约40万人提供廉价机票以便他们回乡投票。


Given that Ma won by 800,000 votes, this tactic may not have been decisive, but it most likely played a considerable part in determining the outcome.	鉴于马英九本次以80万票的优势胜选，这一策略或许并非是决定性的，但却很可能在决定选举结果方面扮演了一个重要的角色。


Paradoxically, the strong performance of James Soong Chu-yu of the People First Party, which split from the Kuomintang, helped Ma by giving voters a second alternative to him.	而奇怪的是，从国民党分裂出来的亲民党候选人宋楚瑜的优异表现帮助了马英九，因为前者提供了一个马英九之外的第二选项（因此那些不喜欢马英九的选民也不一定非要投给蔡英文）。


And America’s quiet instructions to all candidates to avoid nationalist provocation undoubtedly also played a role in dampening tension with China – another factor that probably benefited Ma.	与此同时，美国为免激怒大陆民族主义者而对所有候选人采取的沉默态度也无疑在缓和与中国大陆的紧张态势中发挥了作用——这也是另一个可能对马英九有帮助的因素。


As part of China’s new “soft” approach to Taiwan, Wen emphasizes “conceding interests” to Taiwan.	所谓中国大陆对台新的“软性”策略的一部分，温家宝强调要“出让利益”给台湾。


In Taiwan’s south, long a DPP stronghold, that approach appears to have paid off.	而在长期以来一直是民进党大本营的台湾南部地区，这一策略似乎获得了成功。


The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan has enabled farmers and fishermen in southern Taiwan to prosper by selling agricultural and fisheries products to the enormous Chinese market, and the Kuomintang received higher support in the region than in past elections.	大陆与台湾之间的经济合作框架协议（简称ECFA）使得南部地区的农民和渔民能将自己的收获销往广阔的大陆市场，而国民党在这些地区所获得的支持也比以往历次大选更多。


Of course, promoting economic interaction with Taiwan is not China’s ultimate goal; unification is.	当然，大陆的最终目标并不是推动两岸经济互动，而是统一。


China’s government appears to believe that Ma’s victory is a step in this direction.	大陆当局似乎相信马英九的当选似乎是想这一目标又迈进了一步。


But economic integration is one thing, and political integration quite another.	但经济整合是一回事，政治整合又是另一回事。


After experiencing the benefits of democracy and freedom of expression, Taiwanese are unlikely to want to settle for anything less than the open society that they have today.	在经历过了民主制度以及言论自由的好处之后，台湾民众不会接受一个比当前开放程度更低的社会。


Indeed, with increased contact between Taiwan and the mainland, ordinary Chinese could begin to envy the modern democracy that the Taiwanese people have built – and spread the idea of an open society to the Chinese mainland.	事实上，随着两岸接触的日益增加，大陆普通民众将开始羡慕台湾人所建立起来的现代民主制度——并将开放社会的理念在大陆散播开来。


Ma’s role in his second term should be to serve as just such an evangelist for democracy in China.	而马英九在其第二任期间所扮演的角色则应当是一个像大陆传播民主的传道者。


Well aware of this “danger,” China is implementing five policies.	而大陆方面对这一“危险”也有充分认识，并采取了五项应对政策。


The first is to expand the ECFA, so that more Taiwanese companies feel its benefits.	首先是进一步扩大ECFA的范围，使得更多台湾企业能从中受益。


Second, and similarly, China will try to shake up the DPP’s base by further targeting the commercial interests of Taiwanese farmers and fishermen in the south.	与之类似的第二项则是继续瞄准台湾南部地区农民和渔民的商业利益，并以此动摇民进党的基础。


Third, China will emphasize common Chinese culture in order to reduce Taiwanese fear of unification.	第三则是强调共同的中国文化来缓解台湾人对统一的恐惧。


A fourth goal is to win over young legislators elected during this presidential election.	第四项目标是争取那些在本次总统选举期间选举出来的新立法委员的支持。


Finally, China will seek to prevent the use of the name Taiwan and force the international use of the awkward name “Chinese Taipei.”	最后，大陆将试图阻止国际社会使用“台湾”字样，并以拗口的“中华台北”取而代之。


But the greatest issue affecting cross-strait relations is the Chinese economy itself.	但影响两岸关系的最大事务其实是中国经济本身。


Signs of decline in China’s economy, which has racked up double-digit growth for decades, would affect all of its Taiwan policies.	在经历了数十年的两位数增长之后，中国经济放缓的迹象将影响其全面对台政策。


When Shanghai stocks fell by about 20% last year, Taiwanese stocks fell by a similar amount almost simultaneously – proof of how synchronized the Chinese and Taiwanese economies have become.	当上海股市在去年下跌20%之时，台湾股市几乎在同一时间下跌了同一幅度——也证明了两岸经济的同步一致性。


China will not be able to get its way if the profitability of this synchronization breaks down.	而一旦这一同步利益纽带出现破裂，大陆也无法继续按自己的想法行事。


So, will Taiwan become more like the mainland, or vice versa?	因此，台湾是否会变得更像大陆，还是反其道而行之？


To ask that question is to reprise a debate that was heard when Hong Kong and Macau reverted to China, but that is seldom encountered nowadays.	问这样一个问题实际上等于重启当年香港澳门回归大陆时的讨论，但在今天已经不多见了。


Whether serious moves toward unification change that fact will depend on the effectiveness of China’s soft-power approach, which cannot be limited only to the attractiveness of its economy if it is actually to succeed.	是否能在统一方面实现重大进展将取决于中国软实力政策的效力，而这一���策要取得成功的话，也不能仅仅被局限于经济方面的吸引力。


China’s Stability Gambit	中国的稳定话题


BEIJING – The first principle that I learned when I started focusing on China in the late 1990’s is that nothing is more important to the Chinese than stability – whether economic, social, or political.	北京—我从20世纪90年代末开始关注中国，我从中学到的第一条原则就是，在中国，稳定压倒一切，不管是经济、社会还是政治。


Given centuries of turmoil in China, today’s leaders will do everything in their power to preserve stability.	中国饱经上千年动乱，因此今天的中国领导人将竭尽全力保证稳定。


Whenever I have doubts about a potential Chinese policy shift, I examine the options through the stability lens. It has worked like a charm.	每当我认为中国会出现潜在的政策变化时，我都会用稳定性来检查可能的选择，屡试不爽。


Stability was on everyone’s mind at the annual China Development Forum (CDF) held March 17-20 in Beijing.	在3月17—20日举行的一年一度的中国发展论坛（CDF）上，稳定占据着每一位与会者的头脑。


Hosted by Premier Wen Jiabao, with many ministers of the State Council in attendance, the CDF is China’s most important international conference.	这次论坛由温家宝总理主持，多位国务院所属部长出席，是中国最重要的国际会议。


Yet, literally two days before this year’s CDF began, the controversial Bo Xilai was removed as Party Secretary of Chongqing.	但是，就在今年CDF召开前两天，颇具争议的重庆市委书记薄熙来被免去了职务。


As a strong candidate to join the Standing Committee of the Politburo, China’s inner circle of leadership, Bo’s sudden demise was stunning.	薄熙来本是进入中共中央政治局常委的有力竞争者，他的突然去职令人震惊。


There was a palpable buzz in the air as we convened in the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse.	我们在钓鱼台国宾馆开会的时候，明显地感觉到暗流在涌动。


The formal sessions played out predictably, placing great emphasis on the coming structural transformation of China’s growth model – a colossal shift from the all-powerful export- and investment-led growth of the past 32 years to a more consumer-led dynamic.	会议的正式部分按部就班地进行，着重强调了即将采取的针对增长模式的结构性改革——从过去32年的完全依靠出口和投资的增长向更依赖消费的模式的巨大转变。


There is now broad consensus among China’s senior leadership in favor of such a rebalancing.	中国高层领导已经形成了广泛的一致，将促进再平衡。


As one participant put it, “The debate has shifted from what to do to how and when to do it.”	正如一位与会者所言，“争论已经从做什么转变为何时开始做。 ”


Many of the other themes flowed from this general conclusion.	许多其他主题都是围绕这一大前提展开的。


A shift to services-led growth and an innovations-based development strategy were highlighted.	向服务拉动型增长转变以及基于创新的发展战略尤其令人瞩目。


At the same time, there was considerable concern about the recent resurgence of state-owned enterprises, which has tilted the distribution of national income from labor to capital – a major impediment to China’s pro-consumption rebalancing.	与此同时，最近强势复现的国有企业也是吸引了相当多的关注——着眼点在国民收入分配从以劳动为基础向以资本为基础的转变，这也是中国偏向消费的再平衡目标的主要障碍。


The World Bank and the China Development Research Center (the CDF’s host) had just released a comprehensive report that addressed many aspects of this critical issue.	世界银行和中国发展研究中心（CDF主办单位）刚刚发布了一份如何修正这一关键问题的诸多方面的详细报告。


But the CDF’s formal proceedings never even hinted at the elephant in the chambers of Diaoyutai.	但CDF的正式进程与钓鱼台国宾馆内的真正关注点一点关系都没有。


There was no mention of Bo Xilai and what his dismissal meant for China’s domestic politics in this critical year of leadership transition.	关于薄熙来及其在今年——领导层过渡的关键之年——免职对中国国内政治的影响的内容只字未提。


While it is easy to get caught up in the swirling tales of palace intrigue that have followed, I suspect that Bo’s removal holds a far deeper meaning.	打听关于随后发生的宫廷阴谋的流言并非难事，而我认为，薄熙来的免职意义深远。


Chinese officials faced the risk of a dangerous interplay of political and economic instability.	中国的官员面临着政治和经济不稳定相互交织的风险。


Hit by a second external demand shock in three years – first, America’s subprime crisis, and now Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis – any outbreak of internal political instability would pose a far greater threat than might otherwise be the case.	过去三年中，中国经历了两次外部需求的打击——先是美国次贷危机，然后是现在的欧洲主权债务危机——此时爆发内部政治动荡将产生严重得多的危险。


Bo personified that risk.	薄熙来就是这一风险的写照。


He embodied the so-called “Chongqing model” of state capitalism that has been ascendant in China in recent years – government-directed urbanization and economic development that concentrates power in the hands of regional leaders and state-owned enterprises.	他鼓吹所谓的“重庆模式”——一种近年来在中国颇为得势的国家资本主义，即将权力集中在地方领导人和国企手中的政府引导的城市化和经济发展。


I spent some time in Chongqing – a vast metropolitan area of more than 34 million people – last summer.	去年夏天，我在重庆呆了一段时间。 这是一个有着3400万人口的超级都市。


I left astonished at the scope of the city’s plans.	重庆市计划之宏伟令我颇为震惊。


Orchestrated by Chongqing Mayor Huang Qifan, the principal architect of the spectacular Pudong development project in Shanghai, the goal is to transform the Liangjiang area of Chongqing into China’s first inland urban development zone.	重庆计划由市长黄奇帆谱写，他也是上海浦东开发项目的主要缔造者。 重庆计划的目标是将重庆两江地区打造为中国首个内陆城市开发区。


That would put Liangjiang on a par with coastal China’s two earlier showcase projects – Pudong and the Binhai area of Tianjin.	这将使两江区与已有的两个沿海示范区——浦东和天津滨海区并驾齐驱。


Yet this is the same state-dominated development model that came under heavy criticism at this year’s CDF – and that stands in sharp contrast to the more market-driven alternative that has gained broad consensus among senior Chinese leaders.	但该计划正属于在今年的CDF上受到口诛笔伐的国家主导发展模式，亦与中国高层领导人普遍认同的市场导向替代模式相悖。


In other words, Bo was perceived not only as a threat to political stability, but also as the leading representative of a model of economic instability.	换句话说，薄熙来不仅被认为是政治稳定的威胁，同时也被视为经济动荡模式的主要代表。


By dismissing Bo so abruptly, the central government has, in effect, underscored its unwavering commitment to stability.	如此突然地免去薄熙来的职务实际上是中央政府对稳定承诺的坚定不移的强调。


This fits with yet another curious piece of the Chinese puzzle.	这与中国谜团的另一个有趣部分相契合。


Five years ago, Wen famously warned of a Chinese economy that was in danger of becoming “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”	五年前，温家宝发出过著名的警告：中国经济正面临着“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、不可持续”的危险。


I have repeatedly stressed the critical role that Wen’s “Four Uns” have played in shaping the pro-consumption strategy of the “Next China.”	我一再强调，温家宝的“四不”警告对促进消费的“下一个中国”战略的形成是至关重要的。


Wen’s critique paved the way for China to face its rebalancing imperatives head on.	温家宝的批评为中国扫清了再平衡之路上的障碍。


But, in their formal remarks to the CDF this year, China’s senior leadership – including Premier-designate Li Keqiang – dropped all explicit references to the risks of an “unstable” Chinese economy.	但在今年CDF的正式讲话中，中国高层领导人——包括未来总理李克强——并未明言任何“不稳定”的中国经济风险。


In short, the Four Uns have now become three.	简言之，四不已经变为了三不。


In China, such changes in language are no accident.	在中国，这种用语变化绝非偶然。


The most likely interpretation is that those at the top no longer want to concede anything when it comes to stability.	最有可能的解释是，高层已经无法容忍任何在稳定问题上的让步了。


By addressing economic instability through pro-consumption rebalancing, and political instability by removing Bo, stability has gone from a risk factor to an ironclad commitment.	通过用促进消费的再平衡解决经济不稳定问题以及用免职薄熙来解决政治不稳定问题，稳定已经从一个风险因素转变为铁板一块了。


There can be no mistaking the Chinese leadership’s core message nowadays.	中国领导层的中心意思已经再无可疑了。


They are the first to concede that their growth and development strategy is at a critical juncture.	他们是首批承认增长和发展战略正处在关键的十字路口的领导人。


They worry that the “reforms and opening up” of Deng Xiaoping are in danger of losing momentum.	他们担心，邓小平的“改革开放”政策有失去动力的危险。


By addressing the interplay between economic and political risks to stability, the government is clearing the way for the next phase of China’s extraordinary development.	通过消除经济和政治风险相互作用给稳定带来的危险，中国政府已经为下一波超凡发展阶段铺平了道路。


I would not advise betting against their commitment to achieving that goal.	在我看来，质疑他们能否达到这一目标是不明智的。


China’s Struggle to Slow	中国：减速的纠结


BEIJING – At the opening of the annual session of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), Premier Wen Jiabao announced that the government’s target for annual economic growth in 2012 was 7.5%.	北京—在一年一度的人大会议开幕时，温家宝总理宣布，中国政府2012年的年经济增长目标为7. 5%。


With the global economy still struggling to recover, Wen’s announcement of such a significant dip in China’s growth rate naturally sparked widespread concern around the world.	在全球经济依然在挣扎着复苏的时候，温家宝宣布中国增长率的大幅下降自然而然地引起了全世界的广泛关注。


But it is important to note that Wen was expressing a policy rather than forecasting performance.	但需要指出的一个要点是，温家宝所表达的更多的是一种政策姿态，而不是在预测经济表现。


The purpose of targeting a lower growth rate, he explained, is “to guide people in all sectors to focus their work on accelerating the transformation of the pattern of economic development and making economic development more sustainable and efficient.”	他解释说，降低增长率目标是为了“引导各方面把工作着力点放到加快转变经济发展方式、切实提高经济发展质量和效益上来。 ”


Fixed-asset investment is the most important engine of China’s growth.	固定资产投资是中国增长的最重要引擎。


As a developing country with annual per capita income of less than $5,000, there is still significant room for China to increase its capital stock.	中国是一个发展中国家，年人均收入不足5000美元，仍有重组的空间可用于资本存量的增加。


But the growth rate of investment is too high.	但投资增长率显得太高了。


The issue is not whether China needs more investment, but whether China’s absorption capacity can continue to accommodate the rapid investment growth of the past decade.	问题不在于中国是否需要更多的投资，而在于中国的吸收能力是否能像过去十年那样适应快速的投资增长。


In this sense, the investment rate, which in China approaches 50% of GDP and is rising, can be regarded as a measure of the stress that fixed investment places on the economy.	出于这样的考虑，投资率——在中国，投资占GDP的比重超过50%，而且还在不断上升——可以作为固定投资对经济的压力的指标。


It is not entirely an exaggeration to say that the economy’s capacity for investment growth has reached its limit.	说中国经济的投资增长耐受力已经到达了极限并不是很夸张的说法。


The recent high-speed rail debacle is a case in point.	最近的高铁项目问题就是这一问题的写照。


In 2003, China built its first high-speed-rail project.	2003年，中国上马了第一个高铁项目。


As a key component of the RMB4 trillion ($630 billion) stimulus package introduced during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, investment in high-speed-rail construction increased by leaps and bounds.	作为2008—2009年全球金融危机时出台的4万亿人民币刺激项目的关键部分，高铁建设投资可谓一日千里。


By the end of 2010, China’s operational high-speed-rail network surpassed 8,000 kilometers, with an additional 17,000 kilometers under construction.	到2010年底，中国运营高铁网络超过8000公里，另有17000公里在建。


By contrast, all Western countries combined took a half-century to build a total of 6,500 kilometers.	与此形成对照的是，西方国家花了半个世纪的时间才建造了6500公里高铁线路。


Built in such haste, catastrophe was almost inevitable.	如此匆忙上马，灾难在所难免。


Investment growth that surpasses an economy’s absorption capacity will lead to a rapid deterioration in the efficiency of investment, which in turn will harm long-term growth prospects.	超过一国吸收能力的投资增长会快速恶化投资的效益，进而危害长期增长前景。


Evidence of this in China today is all too prevalent.	现今在中国出现的迹象一点都不令人奇怪。


To reverse this trend, some respite in investment growth is not only necessary, but also inevitable in a profit-driven economy.	为了扭转这一趋势，适当放缓投资增长不仅必要，而且是利润驱动的经济所不可避免的过程。


While China’s investment rate should be brought down to a sustainable level, an equally, if not more, important challenge is to adjust the structure of investment.	中国的投资率必须下降到一个可持续水平，与此同时，另一个重要性有过之而无不及的挑战是调整投资结构。


For many years, the single most important category of investment in China has been real-estate development, which accounts for roughly 10% of GDP and a quarter of total investment.	多年来，房地产开发在中国的投资中独占鳌头，大约可占到GDP的10%和总投资的25%。


But resources need to be allocated to projects that build up human capital, provide public goods, and foster creativity and innovation.	但更多的资源应该被配置到建设人力资本、提供公共品和促进创造力和创新的项目中。


Adjusting the investment structure, however, will inevitably cause investment growth to decelerate, at least in the transitional period, thus leading to a slowdown in overall GDP growth.	但是，调整投资结构将不可避免地引起投资增长放缓，至少在过渡期内是如此，因而会拉低总体GDP的增长率。


International trade has played a pivotal role in China’s economic development over the past 30 years.	过去30年来，国际贸易在中国的经济发展中扮演着关键角色。


However, the global market is no longer able to absorb China’s massive exports, not to mention the immediate impact of economic malaise in Europe and the United States on export demand.	但是，全球市场已经无法吸收中国庞大的出口了，何况欧洲和美国的经济低迷立刻会对出口需求形成冲击。


Moreover, rising labor costs and a stronger renminbi will also undermine China’s export sector, causing GDP growth to slow this year.	此外，劳动成本的增加和人民币升值也将不利于中国出口部门，造成今年GDP增速放缓。


Few would argue against China’s need for slower but better growth.	毫无疑问，中国需要较慢但更好的增长。 问题在于，如果中国希望将GDP增长率由2011年的9.


The problem is that if China wishes to lower the GDP growth rate to 7.5% in 2012, from 9.2% in 2011, without worsening the growth pattern by raising the high investment rate even further, the annual growth rate of investment must be equal to or less than 7.5%.	2%放缓为2012年的7. 5%，同时又不想通过进一步提高投资率来恶化增长方式，那么年投资增长就必须不高于7.


A back-of-the-envelope calculation suffices to show that, unless the government is prepared to tolerate a further increase in the investment rate, achieving a GDP growth target of 7.5% implies a significant fall in the growth rate of investment.	无需复杂的计算就可以得出，除非政府已做好了忍受投资率进一步攀升的准备，否则达到GDP增长7. 5%的目标意味着投资增长率的大幅下降。


To compensate for the negative impact on GDP growth, and with export growth constrained by weak global demand, consumption must rise even more sharply, which is hard to imagine.	为了补偿由此产生的对GDP增长的不利冲击，在出口增长仍受全球需求萎靡约束的情况下，消费必须出现迅速增加，而这一点很难实现。


In other words, lowering the GDP growth rate to 7.5% without making China’s growth pattern even more irrational is an impossible mission.	换句话说，降低GDP增长率至7. 5%而又不让中国增长模式更加非理性是一个不可能完成的任务。


So a more likely growth scenario for 2012 is that China’s growth will be lower than in 2011, but still significantly higher than 7.5%.	因此，更可能的2012年增长剧本是经济增长率低于2011年，但仍显著高于7. 5%。


Correspondingly, its investment-driven growth pattern will be strengthened further, though at a slowing pace.	相应地，投资驱动的增长模式将被进一步强化，尽管速度有所放缓。


Otherwise, a policy-induced hard landing would be difficult to avoid.	否则就难以避免政策引发的硬着陆。


Indeed, how to achieve a more moderate growth rate without causing a hard landing is one of the most severe challenges confronting the Chinese government.	事实上，如何实现增长率放缓而不导致硬着陆是中国政府所面临的最严峻的挑战。


A hard landing is simply not an option.	硬着陆绝不是可选项。


With the country’s fiscal position still positive, it is difficult to image that the Chinese leadership would be so headstrong about “accelerating the transformation of the pattern of economic development” as to risk such an outcome.	中国的财政状况依然坚挺，因此中国领导人不太可能不惜风险一根筋地“加速经济发展模式转型”。


Even if it is, GDP-obsessed and debt-ridden local governments are likely to strive to achieve the highest possible growth rates for themselves, while paying lip service to Wen’s call for a slowdown.	就算中央政府确实如此，迷信GDP又债务缠身的地方政府仍有可能勉力追求尽可能高的增长率，同时在口头上鼎力支持温家宝的减速呼声。


That is why, despite the official target, most Chinese economists still bet on a growth rate well above 8% for 2012.	这就是为何大部分中国经济学家在官方目标大幅下调的情况下仍预测2012年的增长率将远高于8%。


China’s Struggling Public Intellectuals	中国公共知识分子的挣扎


Is China’s political environment loosening up, or is the government cracking down?	中国的政治环境正在放松，抑或政府在进行打压？


It’s hard to tell.	很难一概而论。


President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao sometimes seems to be going both ways simultaneously.	中共总书记和国家主席胡锦涛有时看似兼而有之。


For example, Hu has decided to honor the memory of his mentor, former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, in order to burnish his aura as a reformist.	例如，胡锦涛决定纪念其导师、前总书记胡耀邦，用来擦亮其作为改革者的光环。


But, in many ways, Hu Jintao’s tenure as the head of the fourth generation of Communist leaders, which began when he became party secretary in 2002, differs sharply from that of his mentor.	但是，胡锦涛从2002年成为总书记、第四代共产领导人首领以来的所作所为在许多方面与其导师大相径庭。


Hu Yaobang was a founder of the China Youth League, regarded as a relatively liberal institution in the People’s Republic, who in the 1980’s promoted political reforms and rehabilitated virtually all the victims of the Mao Zedong’s purges.	胡耀邦是中国共青团的创始人之一，共青团被认为是中国相对较为开明的组织。 胡耀邦在上世纪八十年代促进政治改革，为毛泽东清洗运动的几乎所有受害者平反。


By contrast, the younger Hu has narrowed the public space for political discourse that had opened up during the latter years of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, when market pressure was forcing media outlets to be more daring and wide-ranging.	与之相比，胡锦涛收缩了其前任江泽民后期几年开放的政治讨论的公共空间。 当时，市场压力迫使传媒更加大胆，报道更为广泛。


Since taking over, Hu Jintao has arrested a number of outspoken journalists in an effort to rein in the media.	胡锦涛自接管以来，拘捕了数位直言的记者以控制传媒。


His government has also detained an array of public intellectuals who have been critical of its policies, including cyber-dissidents Liu Di and Shi Tao (who was arrested thanks to Yahoo’s collaboration with the police in identifying him) and freelance writers Yu Jie and Liu Xiaobo.	政府还扣押了一批批评其政策的公共知识分子，包括网络异议人士刘荻和师涛（其被捕是由于雅虎勾结警察当局辨认该人）以及自由作家余杰和刘晓波。


Military doctor Jiang Yanyong was detained in 2003 after he publicly rebutted the Party’s assertion that the SARS epidemic had been brought under control.	军医蒋彦永于2003年公开戳穿中共的萨斯疫情已得到控制的断言后而遭拘捕。


In 2004, he was placed under surveillance when he called on the Party to revise its judgment of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstration.	2004年，他因呼吁中共平反有关1989年天安门广场示威定性而被监视居住。


Hu’s tightening of controls over political discourse and the media intensified with the publication in September 2004 of a list of “Top Fifty Public Intellectuals” in Southern Weekly.	2004年9月，南方人物周刊发表“当代中国50名公共知识分子”名单，胡锦涛对政治讨论和传媒的控制因此加剧。


The list, dominated by intellectuals who in the 1990’s had called for freedom of speech and political participation, appeared with the statement: “This is the time when China is facing the most problems in its unprecedented transformation, and when it most needs public intellectuals to be on the scene and to speak out.”	二十世纪九十年代间呼吁言论自由和政治参与的知识分子在这份名单中榜上有名。 该名单说明：“当今中国在前所未有的转变中正面临最大的问题，现在是最需要公共知识分子现身直言的时候。


On November 23, 2004, an article in the Shanghai Party Committee’s orthodox Liberation Daily disagreed.	2004年11月23日，正统的中共上海市委解放日报的一篇文章提出不同意见。


It attacked the concept of “public intellectuals,” claiming that their “independence drives a wedge” between intellectuals and the Party and between intellectuals and the masses.	它抨击“公共知识分子”的概念，声称他们的“独立性”将会在知识分子和中共以及知识分子和群众之间“挑起不合”。


Hu’s leadership has tried to draw public attention to the growing gap between rich and poor.	胡锦涛的领导层试图将公众注意力集中到不断拉大的贫富差距上。


But its reaction to the book A Survey of Chinese Peasants, which is based on interviews over several years with farmers in the poor province of Anhui, was a telling reminder that public intellectuals are not welcome to contribute to that effort.	但是，其对于<<中国农民调查>>一书的反应则有力地告诫：并不欢迎公共知识分子为减少贫富差距贡献力量。 <<中国农民调查>>是基于对贫困省份安徽的农民的历时几年的访谈而写成。


The authors, the husband-and-wife team of Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, who spent their early years in the countryside, described in detail the imposition of unfair taxes by local officials and the authorities’ rapacious seizure of land farmed by rural residents.	该书作者陈桂棣和吴春桃夫妇早年在农村度过。 他们详细描绘了地方官员强征苛捐杂税以及当局抢掠农村居民耕种的土地。


The increasingly impoverished lives of peasants that the book vividly documented resulted from the very abuses of power that Hu Jintao had declared himself to be against.	该书所细致记录的农民日益贫困的生活来自于滥用权力，而胡锦涛则声言其反对滥用权力。


Yet, in February 2004, one month after its publication, A Survey of Chinese Peasants was banned.	但是，2004年2月，<<中国农民调查>>在出版一个月后被禁。


Hu’s government has also tightened controls over the media.	胡锦涛政府还对传媒加紧控制。


Reports on peasant and worker demonstrations against corrupt officials and illegal property confiscations have been banned.	有关农民和工人抗议贪官以及非法剥夺财产的报道已被禁止。


Those who dare to protest, such as Beijing University journalism professor Jiao Guobiao, are silenced.	那些像北京大学新闻学教授焦国标那样敢于抗争的人则被打入冷宫。


Similarly, Wang Yi, a law lecturer at Chengdu University who called for freedom of speech and association, was barred from teaching.	类似的事件是，成都大学法律系讲师王怡呼吁言论和结社自由而被停课。


The liberal journal Strategy and Management was closed down.	自由派杂志<<战略和管理>>被查封。


Even the editor-in-chief of China Youth Daily, the newspaper affiliated with Hu Jintao’s own China Youth League power base, which had been aggressive in exposing official corruption, was recently detained.	中国青年报隶属于胡锦涛团派根基，大力揭露官员腐败，其主编最近已被拘留。


Hu Jintao’s rule is not a return to the Mao Zedong era.	胡锦涛的统治并非回到毛泽东时代。


Despite the regime’s vast means of censorship, its embrace of new communications technologies like the Internet make it increasingly difficult for the party to maintain effective control over people’s views.	尽管当局审查方法众多，但采纳类似互联网那样的新通讯技术则使得中共愈发难以对民众的观念实施有效的监控。


Moreover, persecution of political dissenters does not now reach far beyond the accused to involve their associates.	此外，迫害政治异议人士并不实行株连。


While scores have lost their positions and others have been imprisoned, most are briefly detained and then allowed to find other jobs in China’s burgeoning civil society.	尽管许多人丢失了职位，另外一些人遭到监禁，大多数仅仅是短暂拘留，随之又被准许在中国日益兴盛的民间社会找到其他工作。


By comparison with the late 1990’s, however, the space for political discourse has undeniably narrowed, crushing expectations that the country would continue on a liberalizing course.	但是，与二十世纪九十年代末相比，政治讨论的空间无疑被收紧了，从而打破了国家将继续自由化进程的期望。


Hu Jintao may have made a genuflection to his more liberal mentor, but in the two decades since the elder Hu’s fall from power, even as private space has expanded, China has become a politically far less open society.	胡锦涛可能膜拜其更为开明的导师，但是，自胡耀邦倒台二十年以来，尽管私有空间得以扩大，中国业已变成为一个在政治上大为不开放的社会。


Reforming China’s Commanding Heights	重塑中国的“制高点”


MILAN – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s massive anti-corruption campaign has advanced a number of key objectives: It has gone a long way toward restoring confidence in the Communist Party’s commitment to a merit-based system; countered a decades-old pattern of public-sector domination; reduced the power of vested interests to block reform; and bolstered Xi’s popularity among private-sector actors, if far less so with the bureaucracy.	发自米兰——中国国家主席习近平的大规模反腐运动已经推进了一系列关键目标：极大恢复了外界对中共承诺按能力提拔干部制度的信心； 逆转了长达数十年之久的公共部门主导模式；


In short, Xi’s effort to root out corruption has empowered both the Party and the reformers.	削弱了既得利益阶层阻挠改革的力量； 并提高了习近平本人在私人部门经营者心中的声誉（在官僚机构中则相反）。


The question is how far they will take their reform ambitions.	总而言之，习近平铲除腐败的行动同时为中共和改革派增添了力量。 而问题则在于他们的改革野心究竟有多大。


Xi is certainly not finished yet, having outlined a set of legal reforms at last month’s Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party aimed at creating a more level playing field for the public and private sectors.	习近平显然不会到此为止，在上个月的中共第十八届四中全会中，他提出了一系列法律改革，为公共和私营部门构建一个更为公平的竞争平台。


If implemented properly, the reforms will create a more efficient system for the creation and enforcement of contracts, ease the path for market entrants, and strengthen the application of China’s competition laws.	如果这些改革能得到正确实施，就将为合同的制定和执行创造一个更加有效的体系，放宽新市场参与者的进入渠道，并强化中国一系列竞争法的应用。


Greater fidelity to the rule of law will also lead to the creation of a legal and financial infrastructure that reduces fraud in the private sector, including in financial reporting.	更加忠于法治的举措同时也会创造出一个减少私人部门欺诈行为（包括财务报表申报）的法律和经济基础环境。


That, together with increased access to capital, will help to accelerate the development of the services sector, which is needed to create urban employment.	这些再与不断增加的资本获取渠道相结合，将有助于加速服务行业的发展，并以此创造更多的城镇就业岗位。


Better management of China’s considerable public assets – which include $3.5-4 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves, substantial land holdings, and majority ownership of the state-owned enterprises that dominate the economy – would complement these efforts.	而对中国大规模的公共资产——其中包括3. 5~4万亿美元的外汇储备，持有的大量土地，以及对主导经济的国有企业的主要控制权——的更合理管理将进一步补足上述措施。


Indeed, it could help to boost competition, encourage innovation, strengthen the financial system, and expand access to capital.	事实上，这将有助于刺激竞争，鼓励创新，强化金融系统并扩大融资渠道。


The question is how China could achieve this.	但问题是，中国究竟将如何实现这一点。


As it stands, China’s economy follows, to some extent, the old Leninist “commanding heights” model, with the Party holding all political power and controlling major enterprises and sectors, even as the burgeoning private sector drives growth and employment.	在目前的情况下，中国经济在某种程度上依然遵循着从前列宁主义的“制高点”模式——由党来控制着所有的政治权力以及主要企业和经济部门，即便在由蓬勃发展的私人部门推动增长和就业的情况下也是如此。


In this context, the kind of “meritocratic professionalism” that China is pursuing is important; but it is no substitute for genuine competition in the public or private sector – at least not if innovation and structural change are the goals.	在这个背景下，中国所追求的“精英领导阶层专业主义”就非常重要； 但这并不能取代在公共或私人部门中的真实竞争——至少不能在把创新和结构改革作为目标时这样做。


Of course, Xi could simply declare that China’s version of state capitalism has worked well in the past, and will continue to do so.	当然，习近平可以直接宣称中国版的国家资本主义在过去是行得通的，而且会一直这样下去。


But experience with the microeconomic dynamics of advanced economies (where China is headed) makes this a weak stance – and, thus, one that Xi is unlikely to take.	但在见识过发达国家的微观经济动力（这正是中国的目标）之后，这种说法就站不住脚了——因此习近平也不太可能发表类似观点。


The alternative would be to embark on a sustained program of privatization to shrink the asset side of the state’s huge balance sheet.	而替代方案可能是着手实施一个持续私有化项目，以缩减该国庞大的资产负债表中的资产项目。


But China’s balance sheet has served it well, enabling the extraordinarily high rates of investment that have fueled rapid growth.	但中国的资产负债表运行良好，令政府可以通过极高投资比率去推动快速增长。


Meanwhile, many advanced economies have suffered considerably from their balance-sheet composition, with limited, poorly measured assets and outsize debt and non-debt liabilities.	与此同时，所许多发达经济体却因为自身资产负债表中只有极为有限且未能精确统计的资产，加上孤独庞大的债务和非债务偿付责任而深受其害。


In fact, given an increasingly unequal distribution of income between capital and labor (as well as across the income spectrum for labor) a larger store of public assets certainly has merit, as it equalizes the distribution of capital and wealth, albeit indirectly.	事实上考虑到资本和劳动两者（以及不同工种之间）日渐失衡的收入分配，更大的公共资产储备显然是有利的，因为它能以非直接的方式平衡资本和财富的分配。


Not only can public assets be used to cushion shocks and counter adverse trends; they can also help fund an expansion of social insurance.	这些公共资产，不仅可以用来缓冲冲击即逆转反向趋势； 还有助于为社会保险范围的扩大提供资金。


The problem in China is not the volume of state-owned assets, but their concentration in a few companies and industries – a situation that poses risks to economic performance.	而中国所面对的问题并非国有资产的规模，而是这些资产都过度集中于少部分企业和行���之中——这种情况会为经济表现带来风险。


Given this, the logical solution is not to dispose of the state’s asset holdings, but to diversify them over time.	有鉴于此，合理的解决方案并不是处理掉国家持有的资产，而是逐步将它们分散到各个部门。


Such an approach would have a number of benefits.	这种做法将有一系列的好处。


First and foremost, it would reconcile a large state balance sheet with an expanding role for markets, bolstering employment, stimulating innovation, and advancing the economy’s structural transformation.	首先，这将产生一个拥有庞大市场职能的国家资产负债表，提振就业，刺激创新，并推进整个经济体的结构转型。


To this end, public investment in infrastructure, human capital, and the economy’s knowledge and technology base would remain crucial.	毕竟对基础设施，人力资本和经济体的知识技术基础的公共投资依然是至关重要的。


Furthermore, the diversification of China’s asset holdings would deepen its financial markets considerably.	此外，中国国家资产的多样化将极大深化其金融市场。


Over the next several years, as the traded or tradable share of the state-owned sector’s market capitalization increased from today’s low base of 10-15%, more institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, would become involved in Chinese equity trading, which is currently dominated by retail investors.	在未来数年中，随着国有部门的市场资本的已交易或可交易份额从目前10~15%的较低水平逐步上升，更多机构投资者，例如养老基金和保险公司，都将参与到中国的股市交易之中——而目前这还主要是散户在操作。


This would augment savings options for an increasingly affluent population and strengthen support for long-term investment and development.	这将为日渐富裕的民众提供更多储蓄选项并增强对长期投资和发展的支持力度。


Debt markets would also benefit from such an initiative.	债券市场也会从这些举措中受益。


Blurring the line between the private and the state-owned sectors would, over time, reduce the latter’s privileged access to – and overuse of – bank financing, leading to the expansion of corporate bond markets.	随着时间不断推移，私人和国有部门之间界限的逐渐模糊将削弱后者获取——及滥用——银行融资渠道的优势，令到企业债券的市场不断扩张。


With public entities like the social security system and sovereign-wealth funds holding more diversified asset portfolios, incentives would be substantially reduced for market intervention favoring incumbents in which the state owned a large share.	随着社会保障系统和主权基金这样的公有实体持有更加多样化的资产组合，也就会大大减少偏袒国家持有较多份额的已有企业的市场干涉行为。


This, along with enhanced enforcement of competition law, would go a long way toward leveling the playing field in markets.	这与竞争法的更强大的执行力度一道，向着营造一个公平市场竞争平台迈出一大步。


Clearly specified fiduciary responsibilities and governance would help to ensure that publicly held assets were managed to maximize long-term risk-adjusted returns, with the state and citizens as beneficiaries and the market as the arbiter of efficiency and innovation.	明确界定的受托责任和治理将有助于确保公有资产能最大限度地追求规避风险的长期回报，使得国家和公民同时收益而市场则成为效率与创新程度的裁决者。