China’s greatest challenge lies in balancing its decentralized, family-based traditions with its centralized governance, thereby developing in its institutions the kind of antifragility that is already present in its culture.	中国最大的挑战在于平衡以家庭为主体的分治传统和集权的中央政府这两者的关系，进而孕育出根植于中国文化中的那种抗脆弱能力。


China has been struggling to balance centralization and fragmentation – that is, control and uncertainty – throughout its long history of rising and falling dynasties, domestic decay, and foreign invasion.	在不断的改朝换代、内部衰退和外族入侵的漫漫历史上，中国一直在努力平衡中央集权与地方分治——也就是控制与动荡之间的关系。


While the open, meritocratic selection of “scholar-officials” helped to sustain China’s closed dynastic governance structure for more than 2,000 years, it could not offset the system’s growing fragility under the Qing Dynasty, as territorial gains increased the empire’s population from 150 million to 450 million.	尽管任人唯才的公开选拔“学者型官员”的制度（学而优则仕）帮助中国封闭的帝国王朝治理结构延续了两千多年，但随着帝国人口随领土扩张从1. 5亿猛增到4.


Rampant corruption, rising social unrest, and the inability to resist modern Western powers ultimately caused the dynasty, and the world’s longest-lasting bureaucracy, to crumble in 1912.	5亿，这种选拔制度终究无法抵消清王朝体制暴露出来的日益明显的脆弱特征。 由于腐败猖獗、社会动荡以及无力抵御现代西方列强，清王朝以及全世界历史最悠久的官僚制度最终于1912年彻底崩溃。


The nationalist government that followed, which established the Republic of China, also failed to address the tension between centralization and fragmentation – what the macro-historian Ray Huang called China’s “mathematical unmanageability.”	随后成立的中华民国国民政府同样未能缓和中央集权和地方分治之间的矛盾——这就是宏观历史学家黄仁宇（Ray Huang）所谓的中国无法实现“数目字管理”。


Indeed, it never developed the property-rights infrastructure or the monetary and fiscal policies needed in a family-dominated agrarian economy with an elite-run government.	事实上，中国从未发展出精英政府治理下以家庭为主体的农业经济所需的产权基础设施和货币财政政策。


By effectively enforcing property rights and implementing national policy, the Chinese Communist Party became the institutional mechanism that bridged the divide between the elites (the Party) and the masses.	通过有效执行产权并落实国家政策，中国共产党成为连接整合政党精英和广大群众的制度体系。


But, in 1958-1961, excessive central planning to support the Great Leap Forward (Mao Zedong’s intensive campaign to industrialize and collectivize China’s economy) generated systemic fragility.	但是1958年至1961年，大跃进，也就是毛泽东为实现中国经济工业化和集体化的政治运动，导致了过度的中央计划及体制性脆弱。


The situation began to improve in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping began to implement market-oriented reforms and open up the economy, giving China access to new opportunities for economic growth and employment. Through the so-called Four Modernizations, the crucial sectors of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology were strengthened.	1978年形势才开始好转，邓小平推行以市场为导向的改革和开放政策，为中国带来了经济增长和就业的全新机遇，即通过所谓“四个现代化”来加强农业、工业、国防和科学技术等关键领域。


At the same time, China was slow to open up its financial system – even as other East Asian economies pursued efficiency by liberalizing their capital accounts in the 1990’s.	20世纪90年代，其他东亚经济体为追求效率而开放其资本账户的时候，中国还没有放松对金融体系的管制。


As a result, when the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997, China was insulated from the volatility that ravaged its fragile neighbors.	结果1997年亚洲金融危机来袭时，中国幸免于难，而其邻国受到强烈冲击、显示出其脆弱性。


In fact, the crisis became an opportunity, prompting China to join the World Trade Organization, implement reforms of its financial system and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), list major banks publicly, and privatize civil-service housing.	中国将这次危机当契机，及时推动加入世贸组织、金融系统和国有企业 改革、大型银行上市、及公务员住房私有化等制度改革。


But many of China’s antifragile measures have been piecemeal and incomplete.	但中国许多抗脆弱性改革并不够彻底，没有达到标本兼治。


The need to overhaul SOEs, for example, remains on the agenda, owing to the power of vested interests that oppose further privatization and market-based reforms.	比方说，由于既得利益集团反对进一步推进民营化和市场化，国企改革仍停留在理论探讨层面。


China’s leaders now must identify the specific areas in which to build antifragility, and approach the required reforms prudently.	中国领导人现在必须确定采取抗脆弱性改革的具体领域，同时谨慎推进必要的改革。


While they must ensure that reforms are comprehensive, they also must avoid attempting too much too fast, which could trigger resistance from deeply entrenched players or unintentionally trigger dangerous chain reactions.	在确保全面改革的同时，他们还必须避免动作过大过快而引发的既得利益者抵抗，或者无意间引发危险的连锁反应。


Fortunately, China’s relatively strong fiscal and foreign-exchange positions can cushion the economy against short-term shocks.	幸运的是，中国相对强劲的财政和外汇状况可以缓解对经济的短期冲击。


And, notwithstanding corruption-induced fragility, the bureaucracy’s capacity to implement policy is sound.	而且，尽管腐败导致一定的脆弱性，中国的官僚机构仍有不错的政策执行落实能力。


A major challenge will be delineating the roles and responsibilities of the Party, the state, the market, and civil society.	关键是如何界定党、政府、市场和民间团体的作用和职责。


Given the government’s proven capacity to intervene, the default option during a crisis has been to rely on administrative measures rather than on market forces.	鉴于政府历史上显示出的干预市场及社会的能力，危机发生时，中国的上下阶层往往默认应依赖政府措施而非市场力量来应对，而不是容忍市场自身无序的自查自纠。


To allow disorderly self-correction by markets would require confidence at all levels of governance, from the central government to village administrations, and among SOEs.	要利用市场的抗脆弱能力，从中央到地方的各级行政机构以及国有企业都需要对市场抱有更多的信心。


Moreover, China’s leaders must build sufficient institutional power within the judiciary, civil society, and the media to implement the rule of law and enhance long-term antifragility.	此外，中国必须在司法、民间团体和媒体范围内建设更充分的制度及功能，以实现法治，以强化长期抗脆弱能力。


This entails preventing administrative abuses, establishing a level playing field for SOEs and other companies, and divorcing regulators from regulated entities.	这需要防止行政权力滥用，为国企和其他企业创造公平的竞争环境，并实现监管者与被监管者的彻底分离。


As they undertake structural reforms across multiple sectors, China’s leaders have the opportunity to bolster their country’s long-term prosperity.	随着跨部门结构改革的进行，中国领导人有机会构筑国家长期繁荣的基石。


But success will require striking a balance between maintaining systemic stability and allowing the country’s massive economy to adapt and grow – a challenge with which China has struggled for centuries.	但成功需要在维持系统稳定和允许中国这个庞大经济体不断适应及成长之间保持平衡——这正是中国几百年以来面临的巨大挑战。


China\u0027s Anti-Secession Law Boomerangs	中国的反分裂国家法自食其果


The passage of any law by China’s rubber-stamp National People’s Congress is always a mere formality.	中国形同虚设的全国人大通过任何法律都只不过是走走过场。


But the controversial legislation to outlaw Taiwanese secession has proved anything but routine.	但事实证明，引起争议的反分裂法却非例行公事。


It raised the stakes for the island’s pro-independence camp and increased the risk of a cross-Strait military conflict.	这项法律提高了岛内台独阵营的赌注，增加了海峡两岸发生军事冲突的风险。


The anti-secession law’s vague language and attempt at softened wording – perhaps geared toward mollifying foreign critics – paradoxically increases rather than decreases the likelihood that China and the United States could be unwittingly and unwillingly drawn into an avoidable military conflict.	矛盾的是，反分裂法模棱两可的语言和极力软化的措辞——或许是为了平息外国舆论——不但没有降低，反而增加了中美两国违背意愿地卷入一场不可避免的军事冲突的可能性。


By failing to clearly delineate presumed or potential “red lines” for Taiwan, the law leaves open the possibility of substantial miscalculation or misinterpretation.	由于没有明确说明台湾假定或潜在的“红线”，这项法律既有可能导致严重的错误估计或误解。


Despite several weeks of intense US pressure to soften - or even retract - the proposed law, China’s leaders did little more than attempt to reinforce their position that “non-peaceful” (i.e., military) measures would serve strictly as a last resort - which had already been assumed anyway.	尽管几周来美国大力施压，企图软化——甚至阻止——这项法案，中国的领导人们却无动于衷，仅仅是重申了他们的立场，即绝不承诺放弃“非和平”（即军事化）手段——反正人们早就知道。


The Bush administration’s reaction was uncharacteristically blunt, with its call for “Beijing to reconsider the passage of the law'” – a rather directly worded intrusion into what China considers to be an internal matter.	布什政府的反应异常生硬，呼吁“北京重新考虑是否通过这项法律”——在中国看来，这是对内政相当直接的干涉。


Taiwan’s December 2004 legislative elections had delivered an unexpected defeat for Chen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and the pro-independence camp’s failure to secure a legislative majority was seen as a positive development for relations with the mainland.	陈水扁和他领导的执政党民进党（简称DPP）在2004年12月台湾立法选举中出人意料的失败，加上台独阵营未能获得立法院的大多数席位，被看作是与大陆关系的积极进展。


Indeed, the start of 2005 saw some movement on improved ties, with the introduction of a hugely successful lunar new year charter-flights program.	的确，2005年初两岸联系有所好转，包括春节包机计划的成功实行。


This gave rise to serious discussion about instituting permanent direct air links to aid bilateral trade flow.	这样本可深入讨论建立永久性的直飞航线，以推动双边贸易。


Now, in the aftermath of the anti-secession law, the future of the charter-flights scheme looks bleak.	现在，在反分裂法的余波下，未来的包机计划前景不妙。


Opinion polls in Taiwan reflect public dismay over the Chinese legislation, and this negative sentiment will raise the pressure on President Chen, who recently antagonized some of his more ardent pro-independence supporters by reaching out to the pro-unification opposition People First Party.	台湾的民意调查反映出民众对中国立法的不安。 这种消极的情绪将增加陈总统身上的压力，况且他最近因为向泛蓝反对派亲民党示好而招致了更加激进的支持者的不满。


A survey by Taiwan’s China Times found that 56% of those polled resented the anti-secession law, with 47% saying that Taiwan should retaliate by either holding a public referendum on the issue or introducing counter-legislation of its own.	台湾《中国时报》进行的一场调查发现，接受调查的人中有56%对反分裂法不满，47%称台湾应该进行反击，对此问题举行全民投票，或者制定自己的反立法。


There are now serious concerns that the so-called dark greens – the harder-line faction in Taiwan’s pro-independence pan-green political camp – will seize this issue as a stick with which to beat President Chen.	现在，很多人担心所谓的深绿派——台独泛绿阵营中的激进派——将抓住这件事作为打击陈总统的大棒。


As DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim recently said, the anti-secession law “will make it very hard for us to be moderates”.	正如民进党立委萧美琴最近所言，反分裂法“会让我们很难成为温和派”。


One of the more frustrating elements of the anti-secession law is the fact that it is an entirely unnecessary provocation.	反分裂法还有一点更加让人沮丧，即它是完全不必要的挑衅。


The absence of laws mandating force to block separatist activity has never stopped Chinese authorities from brutally persecuting individuals and groups who have called for an independent Tibet or Xinjiang.	西藏和新疆没有批准军队镇压分裂主义活动的法律，但中国政府从来没有停止野蛮地迫害那里要求独立的个人和群体。


There is thus little reason to believe that a more explicitly assertive stance is necessary for dealing with the “splittist” government in Taipei.	因此，我们没理由相信在应付台北的“分裂主义”政府时有必要以更加明确的方式表明立场。


Missile tests, PLA military exercises and threatening rhetoric have been sufficient deterrents until now.	在此以前，导弹试验、解放军军事演习和威胁性的措辞一直是有效的威慑手段。


Mainland officials justify the law in terms of clarifying their policy and establishing a legal premise for invading the island.	大陆官方用政策明朗化和建立入侵台湾的法律前提来为此辩护。


In practice, however, the construction of legal foundations could weaken the Chinese government’s operational flexibility when responding to a Taiwanese move toward independence.	然而实际上，法律基础的构筑可能会削弱中国政府在回应台湾人的分裂举动时的战术灵活性。


The law of unintended consequences dictates that this effort to deny ambiguity to Taiwanese activists could backfire, and instead leave mainland leaders without room to maneuver if Taiwan does attempt to revise the status quo.	这项法律出乎预料的后果说明这种在对待台湾活动分子的态度上拒绝含糊其辞的做法可能后院起火，一旦台湾企图改变现状，大陆领导人将没有回旋的余地。


This means that the Hu Jintao administration could well have its hands tied, and find itself unable to pursue some kind of compromise solution to a situation that is already fraught with nuance and complexity, and which shows no sign of getting easier to manage with the passage of time.	这意味着胡锦涛政府很可能自缚双手，无法寻求某种妥协方案，来解决目前这个已经充满麻烦和复杂性，而且随着时间的流逝，根本没有迹象会变得容易解决的状况。


While outright military conflict is still considered unlikely, the combination of China’s vague “red lines” and non-specific threats will certainly raise the likelihood of miscalculation and misinterpretation on both sides.	尽管彻底的军事冲突仍不太可能，中国含糊其辞的“红线”和不明确的威胁肯定会增加双方错误估计和误解的可能性。


More broadly, the fact that the anti-secession law was introduced at all comes as a major disappointment to those who had been impressed by the apparent sophistication and skillfulness of recent Chinese diplomacy.	在更大范围上，对那些对近年来表面上老练巧妙的中国外交留下了深刻印象的人来说，反分裂法的建立本身将使他们大感失望。


Coming in the same week as China’s poorly handled removal of Tung Chee-hwa as Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, the anti-secession law episode illustrates that the mainland’s PR savvy has its limits and that Taiwan will remain an emotional and divisive thorn in the side of Sino-US relations.	反分裂法的制定发生在中国笨手笨脚地罢免香港特首董建华的同一周，说明大陆的公关才能是有限的，也说明台湾仍将是中美关系上一个敏感而不和谐的棘手问题。


China’s Baby Step	中国的婴儿脚步


Whatever the ultimate economic effects of China’s first modest step towards floating its currency, one has to admire its strategic brilliance.	中国在货币升值方面迈出了细小的第一步，无论最终会产生什么样的经济影响，都让人对其卓越的谋略感到佩服。


The genius of China’s mini-move (allowing the Yuan to rise 2% against the dollar) is that no one can tell when or what is going to happen next.	中国这个小小的动作（允许人民币对美元升值2%）聪明就聪明在没有人知道接下来在什么时候会发生什么。


Protectionists in the United States and Europe, itching to slap huge punitive tariffs on Chinese goods, have been caught flat-footed.	美国和欧洲那些恨不得对中国货物征收惩罚性巨额关税的贸易保护主义者们被打了个措手不及。


They want to keep bathing in press coverage, but if they push their China-bashing too far and too fast, the protectionists will be seen as hindering delicate behind-the-scenes negotiations.	他们想继续泡在媒体舆论中，但如果这些贸易保护主义者在对中国的责难中走得太远太快，人们就会觉得他们妨碍了微妙的幕后谈判。


But no one knows whether China’s baby step is the start of something much bigger, as China’s authorities hint one day and deny the next.	但是没有人知道中国的婴儿脚步是不是更有力措施的前奏，而中国的领导人前一天还在这样暗示，第二天又予以否认。


By relenting just a little to intense global pressure to revalue its exchange rate, the Chinese leadership has masterfully stifled the growing chorus of demands to rein in its growing trade surplus.	面对严峻的国际压力，中国领导人稍微让了一小步，重新调整了人民币的汇率，于是巧妙地堵住了越来越多的人要求他们管制贸易顺差增长的呼声。


The key question, however, remains whether China is defying market forces at its own risk.	然而关键的问题仍然是中国是否正在以自身为代价抵抗市场的力量。


On the surface, at least, the mini-revaluation hardly seems to have compromised China’s ability to bend exchange markets to its will.	至少从表面上看，汇率的微调似乎还没有削弱中国按照自己的意愿操纵外汇市场的能力。


Foreign experts had warned that a small Yuan appreciation might be worse than none.	外国专家曾警告说，人民币略微升值还不如不升。


While hardly denting global trade imbalances, a small move would bring in a flood of foreign capital, overwhelming China’s currency defenses and leading to chaos.	小幅度的升值不但不能缓解全球贸易的不平衡，而且会导致外国资金大量涌入，摧毁中国的货币防卫机制，引起混乱。


So far, that has not happened and, China once again seems to have gone its own way and proved the experts wrong.	迄今为止，这种情况还没有发生，中国的我行我素似乎再次证明专家们的错误。


But hold the applause.	但暂且不要鼓掌。


Perhaps the speculative-inflow scenario will play out, but in slow motion.	或许投机性资金涌入的情况最终会发生，只不过较慢而已。


After all, China is not a country where investors can just take their money in a heartbeat.	毕竟，中国不是投资者心跳一下就能拿到钱的国家。


It can hold the fort because it maintains one of the world’s strictest regimes of exchange and capital controls.	中国可以保住阵地，因为它实行的是世界上最严格的外汇与资金管制制度之一。


Unlike many Latin American and former Soviet-bloc countries, where similar controls are honored mainly in the breach, violating capital controls in China is virtually a capital offense.	许多拉美国家及前苏联国家实行类似的管制制度，然而违反的人比遵守的还多。 与这些国家不同的是，在中国，违反资金管制基本上算一项死罪。


But, over the past fifty years, when many other countries, including France and Italy, implemented draconian controls, the result was always the same: eventually, the private sector adapted and eroded the controls’ effectiveness.	不过，倒退五十年，许多其他国家，包括法国和意大利，也曾实施过严格的管制制度，结果全都一样：最终，私有部门改变和腐蚀了管制的有效性。


Whether by misreporting imports and exports or exploiting corrupt government officials (which China has in ample supply), private capital eventually starts finding its way around the controls if the incentives are strong enough.	不管是通过虚报进出口情况，还是利用腐败的政府官员（在这方面中国货源充足），只要有足够的动力，私有资金最终会找到绕过管制的方法。


Thus, even if the Chinese authorities can somehow keep their capital controls from hemorrhaging as the country’s financial system becomes more sophisticated and decentralized, they will not be able to stop the controls from dying a death of a thousand cuts.	因此，即使中国政府能够勉强保持资金管制制度不被大幅度削弱，随着全国金融体系日趋复杂化和非集权化，政府终将无法阻挡千疮百孔的管制制度消亡。


After that, China will be able to keep its exchange rate pegged only by slavishly following US interest-rate policy, which makes no sense for such a large and diverse region.	毕竟，中国只有通过亦步亦趋地追随美国的利率政策才能保持汇率固定不变，而这对于如此庞大且多样化的地区来说毫无意义。


Indeed, over the longer term, the biggest concern for China is that some day money will be trying to get out.	更长远地看来，中国面临的最大问题在于某一天资金会向外流出。


Even China’s vast reserves will not be enough to stave off a painful devaluation.	哪怕是中国海量的外汇储备也不足以阻止货币痛苦地贬值。


It is a lot easier to exit from a fixed exchange rate regime when the pressures on the currency are upwards.	如果趁着货币受到升值压力的时候放弃固定汇率制，事情就要容易得多。


While it may seem hard to imagine that the speculative tide might ever turn against China, exchange-rate pressures can turn in an instant.	虽然投机风潮转为不利于中国的情况似乎难以想象，汇率压力却可能在刹那间转向。


Today’s darling currency can be tomorrow’s dog.	今天被人当作掌上明珠的货币，明天可能让人避之犹恐不及。


Considering China’s huge and growing income inequalities, and its massive disguised rural unemployment, it is easy to imagine a period of political instability that sends investors heading for the exits.	考虑到中国巨大且不断扩大的收入差距，以及农村大规模的隐性失业现象，很容易想象政局不稳的那一天，投资者们会争先恐后地逃走。


Mix in China’s shaky financial system and the prospect of trade sanctions after an altercation over, say, Taiwan, and it is clear that the Yuan might not always be a one-way bet.	再加上中国不牢固的金融体系，以及与别人——如台湾——发生争端之后可能出现的贸易制裁，很明显，人民币不一定总是只赚不亏的赌注。


Last but not least, the Chinese authorities desperately need to maintain the country’s breakneck economic growth in order to preserve the Communist Party’s legitimacy.	最后，但决非最不重要的是，为了维护共产党的合法性，中国政府需要不顾一切地追求超常的国家经济增长。


But, as the economy becomes richer and more complex, there will be no escaping the market imperative in internal credit allocation.	然而随着经济生活越来越丰富，越来越复杂，中国将无可避免地遭遇内部信用分配的市场规则。


Every other emerging market, even in Asia, has eventually had to cross this bridge.	其他所有的新兴市场，即便是在亚洲，最终也都不得不跨过这道坎。


Indeed, the need to pursue financial liberalization to maintain growth is a central reason why middle-income countries are so prone to financial crises.	毫无疑问，追求金融自由化和维持增长是中等收入国家容易受金融危机影响的核心原因。


That’s why Chinese authorities should move to greater flexibility now, and not wait until it is too late.	这就是为什么中国政府应该趁现在提高灵活性，而不要等到后来悔之晚矣。


So should we expect to see much bigger currency moves in China anytime soon?	那么，近期内我们会看到中国更加强有力的货币调整吗？


Should we ever expect to see wild gyrations in China’s exchange rate of the sort one routinely sees in, say, the Australian dollar or the South African rand?	我们会不会终有一天看到中国的汇率大幅度地上下浮动，就像平时看到的澳大利亚元和南非兰特那样？


Neither scenario is very likely.	两种情况都不太可能。


Only fire-breathing free-market advocates, seemingly oblivious to the fact that China’s shaky financial system cannot survive liberalization overnight, are calling for an extreme version of floating.	只有狂热的自由市场鼓吹者才会要求极端自由的货币浮动，而他们似乎忘了，中国的金融体系基础不牢，经受不住一夜之间的自由化。


But there may well be a lot more to come over the next 12-18 months.	不过，在今后一年到一年半的时间里可能还会有更多的调整。


The first round of Yuan revaluation won’t be over until the currency is up against the dollar by at least 10%, and probably more.	在人民币对美元汇率至少上升10%甚至更多之前，第一轮的调整不会结束。


China’s first currency move was brilliant only if it is not the last.	中国的首次货币调整是英明的，不过前提是这不是最后一次。


China’s Bad Debtor	中国的不良债务人


BEIJING – Before the global financial crisis hit, critics of China’s economic imbalances – its twin fiscal and trade surpluses – mainly concentrated on the misallocation of resources that occurs when poor countries borrow from rich countries at high interest rates and lend the money to them at low interest rates.	发自北京 —— 在金融危机爆发之前，外界对中国经济不平衡 —— 表现为其财政与贸易的双盈余 —— 的批判主要集中在资源的错误配置上，这种错配表现为穷国以高利率向富国借款之余又以低利率向富国贷款。


The great irony of the financial crisis is that the situation has become worse, not better.	而金融危机带给我们最大的讽刺就是目前的状况非但没有得到改善，反而更加恶化了。


China ’s foreign-exchange reserves, indeed, are facing a triple whammy: a decline in the US dollar’s purchasing power, a fall in the prices of US government securities, and possible inflation in the longer run.	事实上，当前中国的外汇储备正承受着三重冲击击：美元购买力下降，美国政府债券价格下滑以及在未来一段长时期内的通胀可能性。


The bulk of China’s $2.3 trillion in foreign reserves are held not for the purpose of protection against negative external shocks, but as savings in the form of US Treasury notes.	中国持有 2. 3 万亿的庞大外汇储备不是为了应付外部的冲击，而只是以美国国债的形式表现出来的储蓄。


China thus needs to preserve the value of its savings.	因此中国必须要让自身储蓄得以保值。


But there is no question whatsoever that the US dollar will go south in the long run – a depreciation that started in April 2002 and, after a short interval, resumed in March 2009.	但从长期来看，美元肯定会贬值 —— 这一进程早在 2002 年 4 月就已经启动，其间短暂中断之后又在 2009 年 3 月再度开启。


Unless the US economy improves its trade balance, the dollar will fall.	如果美国经济无法改善其国际贸易收支的话，美元就肯定会贬值。


But the US cannot improve its trade balance unless the dollar falls.	但如果美元不贬值，美国国际贸易收支状况又无法得到改善。


Measured by the dollar index, therefore, capital losses on China’s foreign exchange reserves are inevitable.	可见用美元来衡量的中国外汇储备势必将不可避免地承受资本损失。


Due to the huge US budget deficit, the supply of American government bonds will increase astronomically in the years ahead.	此外，考虑到美国庞大的预算赤字，美国政府在未来几年将大量发行政府债券。


But there is no guarantee that demand for these Treasury notes among foreign investors – including foreign governments – will be sufficient.	但是国外投资者（包括外国政府）对这种债券是否卖账则是未知之数。


So it is very likely that when the global economy has returned to a sort of normality and safe-haven demand has declined, the prices of US government securities will fall and their yields will rise.	因此，在全球经济回复常态以及资本避难需求减少的情况下，美国政府债券的价格就会下滑，而该债案的收益率就会上升。


As a result, China’s dollar-denominated foreign-exchange reserves, which account for the largest share of all the foreign holdings of US government securities, will suffer interest-rate losses.	这样导致的结果是，以美元计价的中国外汇储备


Moreover, the US Federal Reserve is targeting a 4% annual inflation rate.	而且，美联储把年度通胀率定为 4% 。


This alone means that under normal circumstances the purchasing power of China’s foreign-exchange reserves will automatically depreciate by 4% each year.	单单这一点就意味着，在正常情况下，中国的外汇储备每年都要自动贬值 4% 。


Due to the extremely expansive US monetary policy that has been in place since the sub-prime crisis began two years ago, the real value of China’s foreign-exchange reserves has already been eroded, with or without inflation.	而自两年前美国次贷危机爆发后，美国出台了极度扩张性的货币政策。 在此政策下，无论是否存在通胀，中国的外汇储备都已经受到侵害。


China is like the shareholders of a company that has increased the supply of its shares in a stealthy way: the share price may not have fallen yet, but it will.	现在，中国就像一家公司的股东，而这家公司却暗中增加了自身股票的供应：因此虽然现在这家公司还维持着自身的股价，但总有一天会跌的。


Unless the Fed successfully implements an exit strategy from monetary expansion, which is doubtful, China will not be able to recover its losses.	除非美联储成功地执行了一套从当前扩张性货币政策中退出的战略（这是相当令人怀疑的），否则中国无法靠自身来讨回自己的损失，。


A less likely but more damaging scenario is that all the money dropped on the economy by US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke will eventually stoke a bout of serious inflation.	另一个可能性较低但更具破坏性的局面则是所有被美联储主席本·伯南克投到美国经济中的货币最终将引发一波严重的通胀。


If this nightmare comes true, China’s packed savings in the form of US government securities (which now amounts to some $900 million in Treasury bills alone) will simply go down the drain.	如果这一噩梦成真的话，那中国以美国政府债券形式所拥有的储蓄（目前大约为价值


Despite China’s limited room for maneuver with regard to its stocks of foreign-exchange reserves, it should never give up its efforts to safeguard the value of its hard-earned wealth, which has been entrusted to the good will and supposedly responsible hands of the US government.	虽然留给中国政府调配其外汇储备的空间十分有限，但它也不应放弃捍卫其历尽艰辛挣回来的，又托付给了有信誉而且负责任的美国政府的财富的价值。


As the stronger and more experienced party, the US can help to allay China’s fears about the safety of its national savings.	作为更具实力和更富经验的一方，美国有能力帮助中国减轻其对其国际储蓄安全的忧虑。


For example, the US government should offer more financial instruments like Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), thereby allowing China to convert some of its holdings of US government securities into similar but safer assets.	比方说，美国政府可以发行更多诸如长期通货膨胀保值债券的金融工具，从而使中国能够把其手中持有的部分美国政府债券转换成与之类似，但更为安全的资产。


Furthermore, China should be allowed to convert part of its foreign-exchange reserves into assets denominated in the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights (SDRs).	另外，中国应该被允许把部分外汇储备换成以国际货币基金组织特别提款权来计价的资产。


Of course, China should not rule out the possibility of adjusting the composition of its foreign-exchange reserves to mimic the composition of the SDR.	当然，中国也不应排除模仿国际货币基金组��特别提款权的构成来调整自身外汇储备结构的做法。


Finally, if the US government cannot safeguard the value its securities, it should compensate China in one way or another.	最后，如果美国政府不能保证其政府债券的价值，它就应该以某种形式来弥补中国为此承受的损失。


Only then can China and the world be certain that America’s irresponsible attitude – “the dollar is our currency, but your problem” – has become a thing of the past.	只有如此，中国和世界才能确定美国那种不负责任的态度 —— 表现为“美元是我们的货币，所产生的问题却是你们的” —— 已经一去不复返了。


China’s Bad Growth Bet	中国的赌博式恶性增长


LONDON – I recently took two trips to China just as the government launched its 12th Five-Year Plan to rebalance the country’s long-term growth model.	发自伦敦——最近我先后两次踏足中国，恰逢政府启动“十二五计划”以重新调整其长期增长模式的时间点。


My visits deepened my view that there is a potentially destabilizing contradiction between China’s short- and medium-term economic performance.	而这两次访问使我更加深信：中国的短期和中期经济状况之间存在着可能影响稳定的潜在冲突性因素。


China’s economy is overheating now, but, over time, its current overinvestment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally.	中国经济目前已经过热，但再过一段时间，当前的过度投资将引发其国内乃至全球的通货紧缩。


Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible – most likely after 2013 – China is poised for a sharp slowdown.	一旦不断增加的固定资产投资无以为继——这很可能在2013年发生——中国经济的发展就可能严重放缓。


Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium.	可见中国的政策制定者应当关注的不是如何确保在当前实现软着陆，而是经济发展可能在五年计划后半段严重受阻的问题。


Despite the rhetoric of the new Five-Year Plan – which, like the previous one, aims to increase the share of consumption in GDP – the path of least resistance is the status quo.	虽然新计划也像上一个五年计划那样宣称要增大消费占GDP的比例——但对政府来说，政治阻力最小的做法依然是维持现状。


The new plan’s details reveal continued reliance on investment, including public housing, to support growth, rather than faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), liberalization of the household registration (hukou) system, or an easing of financial repression.	公开发布的新计划细节也显示：经济的增长依然要仰仗投资（包括兴建公共住房）来支撑，而不是以实施更迅速的货币升值，面向家庭的大规模财政转移支付，税收和/或国有企业的私有化，解除户口制度限制以及放宽财政管制的方式来实现。


China has grown for the last few decades on the back of export-led industrialization and a weak currency, which have resulted in high corporate and household savings rates and reliance on net exports and fixed investment (infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacity for import-competing and export sectors).	过去几十年以来，中国都是靠以出口为导向的工业化和弱势货币来实现增长，并因此催生了极高的企业和家庭储蓄率，以及对净进口和固定资产投资（基础设施，房地产以及来料加工和出口部门的生产能力）的依赖。


When net exports collapsed in 2008-2009 from 11% of GDP to 5%, China’s leader reacted by further increasing the fixed-investment share of GDP from 42% to 47%.	当净出口金额从2008~2009年度的占GDP11%下降到5%的时候，中国领导人的应对措施就是将固定资产投资占GDP的比例从42%拉高到了47%。


Thus, China did not suffer a severe recession – as occurred in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in emerging Asia in 2009 – only because fixed investment exploded.	凭借着爆发性的固定资产投资，中国得以摆脱了2009年日本，德国和亚洲新兴国家所遭遇的严重经济衰退。


And the fixed-investment share of GDP has increased further in 2010-2011, to almost 50%.	但固定资产投资占国内GDP的比例也因此进一步上升到2010~2010年度的近50%。


The problem, of course, is that no country can be productive enough to reinvest 50% of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem.	这就暴露出一个问题：任何国家都不可能拥有足够的发展速度，足以在将50%的GDP重新投资的情况下最终避免遭遇巨大的产能过剩和令人忧心的不良贷款问题。


China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure, and property.	中国内部到处充斥着在实物资本，基础设施和不动产方面的过量投资。


To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns, and brand-new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.	在一个访问者眼中，证据就是那些光鲜靓丽却旅客寥寥的机场和高速列车（这将减少45个计划兴建中的机场的客流量），通往偏僻之地的高速公路，数千座高大的中心城镇和地方政府建筑，空无一人的新城区，以及被迫关闭以避免引发全球价格下跌的崭新铝冶炼厂。


Commercial and high-end residential investment has been excessive, automobile capacity has outstripped even the recent surge in sales, and overcapacity in steel, cement, and other manufacturing sectors is increasing further.	商业和高级住宅方面的投资早已过剩，汽车的产能即便在最近的销售热潮中也已经过量了，钢铁，水泥和其他制造部门的产能过剩问题也在不断恶化。


In the short run, the investment boom will fuel inflation, owing to the highly resource-intensive character of growth.	在短期内，这场投资繁荣将刺激通货膨胀，这是源自于其高度资源密集型的增长特点。


But overcapacity will lead inevitably to serious deflationary pressures, starting with the manufacturing and real-estate sectors.	但过剩的产能将无法避免地带来严重的通货紧缩压力，而制造业和房地产部门则首当其冲。


Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing.	中国大概会在2013年后遭遇一场硬着陆。


All historical episodes of excessive investment – including East Asia in the 1990’s – have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth.	事实上所有与过度投资有关的历史场景——包括在1990年代的东亚地区所发生的一切——都会以一场金融危机和/或长期的低增长来谢幕。


To avoid this fate, China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP, and boost the share of consumption.	如果要避免这一命运的话，中国需要降低储蓄率，减少固定资产投资，削减净出口占GDP的比例，并刺激消费所占的比重。


The trouble is that the reasons the Chinese save so much and consume so little are structural.	但问题是中国人之所以乐于储蓄而不愿消费，是有其结构性原因的。


It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to overinvest.	而要扭转这一过度投资的诱因，可能需要整整20年的改革。


Traditional explanations for the high savings rate (lack of a social safety net, limited public services, aging of the population, underdevelopment of consumer finance, etc.) are only part of the puzzle.	对于高储蓄率的传统解释（缺乏社会安全网，有限的公共服务，人口老化，消费信贷的不发达）只是这一迷局的其中一部分。


Chinese consumers do not have a greater propensity to save than Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan; they all save about 30% of disposable income.	中国大陆地区的消费者并不比香港，新加坡和台湾等地的同胞更倾向于储蓄——他们都同样会将大概30%的可支配收入存起来。


The big difference is that the share of China’s GDP going to the household sector is below 50%, leaving little for consumption.	但最大的区别在于家庭部门占中国GDP的比例小于50%，因此也只给消费留下了一个很小的空间。


Several Chinese policies have led to a massive transfer of income from politically weak households to politically powerful companies.	中国实施的一系列政策都是将大量收入从政治上处于弱势的家庭转移到了强势的大企业手里。


A weak currency reduces household purchasing power by making imports expensive, thereby protecting import-competing SOEs and boosting exporters’ profits.	弱势的人民币使进口商品变得昂贵，降低了家庭购买力，却保护了那些出口型国企并增加了出口商的利润。


Low interest rates on deposits and low lending rates for firms and developers mean that the household sector’s massive savings receive negative rates of return, while the real cost of borrowing for SOEs is also negative.	面向家庭的低存款利率和面向企业和开发商的低贷款利率意味着千家万户的巨额储蓄实际上的是在赔钱，而国企的贷款成本却是负数。


This creates a powerful incentive to overinvest and implies enormous redistribution from households to SOEs, most of which would be losing money if they had to borrow at market-equilibrium interest rates.	这就产生了一个强大的过度投资诱因并意味着从家庭向国企的大规模转移支付——倘若这些企业以市场利率贷款的话肯定是要亏损的。


Moreover, labor repression has caused wages to grow much more slowly than productivity.	此外，对工人的压榨也导致工资上升的幅度远远低于生产力的增长速度。


To ease the constraints on household income, China needs more rapid exchange-rate appreciation, liberalization of interest rates, and a much sharper increase in wage growth.	如果要放宽对家庭收入的限制的话，中国必须让人民币更快地升值，放开利率管制，并大幅增加工资。


More importantly, China needs either to privatize its SOEs, so that their profits become income for households, or to tax their profits at a far higher rate and transfer the fiscal gains to households.	更重要的是，中国要么必须将其国企私有化，让这些企业的利润能转化为家庭收入，要么像这些企业征收更高的税收并将这些财政收入转移给家庭。


Instead, on top of household savings, the savings – or retained earnings – of the corporate sector, mostly SOEs, tie up another 25% of GDP.	事实上，除家庭储蓄之外，企业部门（大部分为国企）的储蓄——或者说保留利润——已经占到了GDP的25%。


But boosting the share of income that goes to the household sector could be hugely disruptive, as it could bankrupt a large number of SOEs, export-oriented firms, and provincial governments, all of which are politically powerful.	但增加家庭占总收入比例的举措将产生极大的破坏效应，因为这会导致一大批国企，出口企业和地方政府破产，而这些又是在政治上很有权势的部门。


As a result, China will invest even more under the current Five-Year Plan.	最终导致的结果就是中国只能在这个五年计划中继续增加投资。


Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, real estate, and infrastructure, and thus will intensify the coming economic slowdown once further fixed-investment growth becomes impossible.	继续沿着这条投资导向的道路走下去将使已经暴露出来的制造业，房地产和基础设施产能饱和现象进一步恶化，并将在固定资产投资增长无法继续扩大的情况下加剧未来的经济放缓。


Until the change of political leadership in 2012-2013, China’s policymakers may be able to maintain high growth rates, but at a very high foreseeable cost.	但直到领导层在2012-2013年换届之前，中国的政策制定者们都将继续在罔顾巨额未来成本的情况下维持一个高增长率。


China’s Banking Revolution	中国的银行改革


One of the greatest challenges China must confront before the WTO treaty enters into force in 2007 is to prepare the country’s banking system for privatization and competition with foreign banks.	2007年世贸条约生效之前中国必须面对的最大挑战之一是为国内银行系统的民营化和与外国银行竞争做好准备。


The government has established a new agency, Central Hujin Investment Company, to manage and re-capitalize big state-owned banks before they are sold.	政府已经建立了一个新的机构，中央汇金投资公司，在大型国有银行被售之前进行管理和资产重组。


Hujin has already injected $60 billion of China’s foreign-exchange reserves into the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank.	汇金已经将600亿美元外汇储备注入中国银行、中国建设银行、以及工商银行。


The Agricultural Bank will also require new capital, although the government is not yet preparing it for privatization.	农业银行也将需要新的资金，尽管政府还没有开始为其民营化做准备。


The government’s rescue policies appear to be working.	政府的救援政策似乎正在起作用。


During the past two months, Bank of America has announced a $2.5 billion investment in return for a 9% stake in the China Construction Bank, and The Singapore-based holding company Temasek paid $1.4bn for a 5.1% stake in China Construction Bank.	上两个月内，美国银行宣布斥资25亿美元购买中国建设银行9%的股份，新加坡控股公司淡马锡则宣布计划斥资14亿美元买进中国建设银行5. 1%的股份。


The Royal Bank of Scotland is leading an investment group that will invest $3.1 billion more in the Bank of China, while Goldman Sachs and Germany’s Allianz are close to an agreement to acquire a 9.9% stake in the Industrial and Commercial Bank for a similar sum.	苏格兰皇家银行正率领一个投资集团打算向中国银行追加31亿美元的投资，同时高盛和德国安联也准备签约投资类似数额的资金收购工商银行9. 9%的股份。


The government hopes that these foreign investments will set the stage for the banks to go public on stock exchanges in Hong Kong and elsewhere during 2006, whereas foreign banks are investing with an eye to penetrating the enormous Chinese market.	政府希望通过这些外资为2006年银行在香港和其他地方的证券交易所上市做好准备，然而外国银行投资的目的却是要打入巨大的中国市场。


The big three state-owned banks have vast branch networks and employ hundreds of thousands of people.	三大国有银行拥有广泛的支行网络，雇佣了数十万员工。


Foreign banks could never hope to achieve such comprehensive coverage without a local partner.	没有本地合作伙伴，外国银行永远也别想实现如此全面的覆盖率。


They will focus initially on sectors such as credit cards but could develop other joint ventures.	外国银行开始会主要集中在信用卡等领域，不过也可以建立其他的合资企业。


HSBC also announced a major investment in Ping An Insurance, which could set the stage for experiments with Bancassurance in the future.	汇丰银行也宣布向平安保险注入巨额投资，可能以次促进未来银行保险的实践。


The Bank of Communications listed on the Hong Kong stock market shortly after the HSBC investment, so it has been able to provide the market with more information than have the banks that are still awaiting privatization.	交通银行在吸纳汇丰的投资后不久即在香港股票市场上市，因此和那些还在等待民营化的银行相比，它能给市场提供更多资讯。


Goldman Sachs is bullish, believing that the bank can record 17% loan growth this year, a 20-basis-point improvement in margins, and significant growth in fee income.	高盛持乐观态度，认为这家银行今年能实现17%的贷款增长、20个基本点的盈余增长、以及大幅度的收费收入增长。


The major concern, however, is evidence of a growing volume of non-performing loans.	然而，最大的忧患在于不断增加的不良贷款。


The Bank of Communications’ performance suggests that China’s lending boom of 2003 and 2004 could lead to another wave of defaults this year and next.	交通银行的业绩说明，中国2003和2004年的贷款高峰可能在今年和明年引发另一波坏账。


In 2004, the investment share of GDP rose to 45%—one of the highest levels in recorded financial history—as banks financed a huge expansion of property development and manufacturing capacity.	2004年，随着银行向巨幅增长的房地产开发和制造业放款，投资占GDP的比例上升到45%——这是有记录的金融史上最高的水平之一。


Now, the largest banks are claiming significant increases in non-performing property loans, while the glut of new industrial capacity implies that some firms may not have adequate profits to service their debts.	现在，最大的几家银行都声称不良房地产贷款数额大大增加，同时新的工业生产能力过剩，说明某些企业可能没有足够的利润偿还债务的利息。


Alhough the Bank of China curtailed its lending growth to only 6% last year because of concerns about credit quality, many new local banks have expanded their lending aggressively, and could now suffer huge losses as the economy slows and firms’ solvency weakens.	尽管去年中国银行出于对信用质量的担心减缓放款，但许多新的地方银行却迅速提高了各自的放款量，随着经济增长的减速和企业偿债能力的减弱，它们可能蒙受巨大损失。


In these circumstances, privatization will have profound consequences for China’s economy.	在这样的情况下，民营化将对中国经济产生深远的影响。


The recent capital-spending boom produced a burst of speculative lending in 2003 and 2004 because the banking system was still state-owned and responsive to political pressure—until the government itself imposed credit controls in April 2004 to prevent a sharp upsurge in non-performing loans.	因为银行系统仍归国有，要响应政策压力，上次的资本投资狂潮引起了2003和2004年投机性放贷的爆发——直到2004年4月政府实施了信用管理来防止不良贷款的飙升。


In the next business cycle, China’s banks will be privately owned for the first time since 1949.	在今后的商业循环中，中国的银行将自1949年以来首次归民间资本所有。


They will make loans on the basis of commercial criteria rather than relations with big state-owned companies.	它们将根据商业标准而不是与大型国有企业的关系来放贷。


They will be less vulnerable to political pressure from local governments to finance development projects.	地方政府为发展项目的资金对它们施加的压力将会减弱。


They are likely to place much greater emphasis on consumer lending, especially mortgages and credit cards.	它们很可能将更加重视消费贷款，特别是按揭和信用卡。


With China’s mortgage lending equal to only 10% of GDP, compared to 60-70% in the Anglo-Saxon countries, there is huge opportunity for growth.	由于中国的按揭贷款仅相当于GDP的10%，远低于英美国家的60-70%，因此增长的潜力非常巨大。


The transformation in China’s banking system, coupled with the recent decision to revalue China’s currency, will require major changes in the conduct of monetary policy.	中国银行系统的转变，加上最近调整人民币汇率的决策，要求在货币政策的实施上做出重大改变。


Until recently, an exchange-rate peg dominated China’s monetary policy, with interest rates unchanged for nine years until October 2004, as the government attempted to manage lending through administrative guidance and credit controls.	直到不久以前，中国的货币政策还由固定汇率支配，利率在2004年10月前连续九年不变，因为政府企图通过行政指导和信用管理控制放款。


In the future, China will have to rely more heavily on interest rates to manage monetary policy, using the price of capital, not political considerations, to influence how firms make investment decisions.	将来，中国必须更多地依靠利率来管理货币政策，利用资本价格而不是政治考虑来影响企业的投资决策。


The transformation in China’s banking system is complex and difficult because it involves a change in its fundamental nature.	中国银行系统的转变因为涉及到根本性质的变化而异常复杂和艰难。


However, barring any major economic bumps, the changes will have a positive impact, as capital allocation becomes more efficient.	但是，除非经济上出现重大颠簸，否则，随着资金分配效率的提高，这些变化将产生正面的影响。


Increased emphasis on household lending should also create a better balance in the economy between capital spending and consumer spending than was possible during the expansion of 2002-2004.	与2002至2004年放款增长期间相比，提高对家庭贷款的重视也会使资本支出和消费支出之间的经济平衡更加优化。


China’s Best Hope	中国的最佳希望


2008 will not be remembered chiefly for noble or heroic acts.	人们并不是主要由于2008年发生的高尚或者英勇的行为而怀念这一年。


Yet, amidst the news reports over the past few months of financial fraud, bloodshed in India and Gaza, and global economic disasters, one item stood out for its bravery and nobility.	但是，在过去几个月有关金融诈骗、印度和加沙流血以及全球经济灾难的新闻报导中，有一个事件则由于其勇敢和高尚而引人注目。


On December 10, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more than 300 Chinese citizens, ranging from law professors to businessmen, farmers, and even some government officials, put their names to a remarkable document, entitled Charter 08.	12月10日是世界人权宣言发表60周年纪念日，三百多名中国各界人士，包括法学教授、商人、农民甚至某些政府官员在零八宪章这一非凡的文件上签名。


The signatories, later joined by thousands more, asked where China was heading in the twenty-first century: “Will it continue with ‘modernization’ under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system?”	后来又有几千人签名，他们问到，中国在二十一世纪究竟走向何处。 中国是否继续在独裁统治下实现“现代化”，还是接受普世人权价值标准，加入文明国家主流并且建设民主体制？


There is nothing incendiary about Charter 08, no call for violent rebellion, no thirst for revenge or retribution.	零八宪章中根本就没有什么煽动性言论。 它并不呼吁暴力叛乱，也没有复仇或者报复的饥渴嚣张。


It merely asks for what citizens of all liberal democracies take for granted: the right to question government policies, protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, and multi-party elections.	它只是要求所有自由民主国家公民中认为是理所当然的东西，也就是质疑政府政策的权利、保护人权、独立司法以及多党选举。


The model for Charter 08 was Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77.	零八宪章建立在捷克斯洛伐克的七七宪章模式基础之上。


In 1977, several prominent signatories, such as Václav Havel, were arrested as a result.	1977年，哈维尔等几名著名的签署人因此遭到监禁。


Likewise, one of the bravest, most lucid Chinese intellectuals, Liu Xiaobo, was arrested in December for signing Charter 08, and has yet to be released.	同样，刘晓波是最为勇敢、头脑最为清晰的知识分子之一。 他由于签署零八宪章而被捕，现在还没有被释放。


Other signers have been interrogated and harassed.	其他签署人也遭到了盘查和骚扰。


Charter 08 has not received the attention it deserves, perhaps because most people have other, more pressing concerns.	零八宪章还没有受到应有的注意，可能是因为其他人还有更为迫切的关心事项。


But there is also a tendency, not only in China, to dismiss such calls for democracy as irrelevant, even misguided.	但是还有一种倾向，也就是把这些对民主的呼吁驳斥为无关紧要、甚至误入歧途。


Recent American policies have given the promotion of democracy a bad name.	这一倾向并不限于中国。 美国最近的政策也给促进民主坏名声。


In China, and other remaining areas of Asian authoritarianism, it has become customary, even among some self-professed “liberals,” to argue that democracy may be fine for Europeans and Americans, but is unsuited to Asian conditions.	在中国和其他现存的亚洲独裁国家中，人们、甚至那些自诩为“自由派”人士已经惯于争辩说民主可能对欧美国家是好事，但是它并不适用于亚洲传统。


China is too big, its culture too different, and its population still too poor and uneducated to support a democratic system.	中国国家太大，它的文化不同，而且其人口过于贫困、没有接受教育而无法支撑民主体制。


An alternative to this line of argument is to claim that China has its own kind of democracy, based on a Confucian idea of government benevolence and the Chinese people’s cultural propensity to sacrifice individual rights to collective goods.	这一论调的另一个说法就是，中国具有自身民主形式，它建立在孔夫子政府仁义以及中国文化偏向于为了集体利益而牺牲个人权利的基础之上。


To those who take this view – and on this point many Western businessmen are in complete agreement with the Chinese Communist Party – the signatories of Charter 08 are simply out of touch with their own culture.	许多西方经商人士完全赞同中共这一观点。 对于那些持这一观点的人而言，零八宪章的签署人完全脱离了自身的文化。


In terms of its immediate impact, it is true that Charter 08 will hardly make a ripple in the pond of Chinese politics.	就其直接影响而言，零八宪章几乎无法在中国政治的池塘中产生什么波痕，这是不假。


The government will not even discuss the Charter’s ideas, let alone do anything to implement them.	政府甚至不会讨论宪章的观点，更不要说采取行动加以落实了。


But this is no reason to call it irrelevant.	但是这并不是称之为无关紧要的理由。


In 1977, few people would have predicted that Havel would one day preside over a Czech democracy.	在1977年，很少有人会预计哈维尔将会有一天成为捷克总统。


He and his fellow dissidents were a tiny minority, too.	他和其他异议人士也是沧海一粟。


A liberal-democratic China may not come soon, but after Charter 08 no one can deny that many Chinese desperately want it.	自由民主的中国可能无法马上实现，但是在零八宪章发表后无人能够否认许多中国人迫切想要实现自由民主。


The expression of this desire is especially important now that the world is gripped by a terrifying economic crisis.	现在表达这一愿望尤其重要，因为世界目前正经受令人担忧的经济危机。


Widespread economic distress is never without political consequences.	大规模的经济困境从来都不会没有政治后果。


Xenophobic populism is on the rise in Europe.	欧洲的排外正在抬头。


President Barack Obama will have a difficult time curbing resentful protectionism in the United States.	奥巴马总统限制美国国内怀恨在心的保护主义将会遇到困难。


Japanese might revert to angry nationalism. Nowhere, however, are the political and social consequences of an economic slump more potentially destabilizing than in China.	但是，没有任何一个地方的经济下滑带来的政治和社会后果要比中国更为具有潜在的破坏稳定后果。


This is because the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power can be justified only by continued rapid economic growth, without which workers and farmers will lose their jobs, and the urban middle classes their chance of increasing prosperity.	这是因为只有中国经济持续快速增长才能够给中共权力垄断提供合法性。 没有了经济增长，工人和农民就会失业，城市中产阶级就会失去不断繁荣的机会。


The economic boom is the only source of legitimacy that the one-party state has left.	一党专制国家合法性的唯一来源就是经济繁荣。


Few people, even Party members, still believe in Marxism-Leninism, let alone Maoism.	甚至包括党员在内，很少有人还相信马列主义，更不要说是毛泽东思想了。


And the general discontent with official corruption and political oppression was amply demonstrated in all regions of China in 1989.	1989年，大众对官员腐化以及政治压迫不满在全中国都充分地展现了出来。


The Communist government managed to stay in power after Tiananmen not just through brute force.	中共政府在天安门惨案后依旧保持政权并非仅仅是通过暴力。


A semblance of political legitimacy, especially among the educated middle class, was purchased with the promise of greater wealth.	中共用更多财富的保证从特别是受过教育的中产阶级那里收买了政治合法性的外表。


As long as people felt that they were getting richer, demands for more freedom of speech, better protection of human rights, and the right to vote could be postponed.	只要人们感到他们在逐渐致富，对言论自由、保护人权以及选举权力的要求就可以推后。


But if this arrangement collapses, and increasing material prosperity can no longer be taken for granted, many things could happen – few of them pleasant.	但是如果这一安排崩溃以及日益增长的物质繁荣不再唾手可得，那么形势就会大不一样了。 不会有什么让人高兴的事情发生。


Rural areas and industrial cities might explode in massive riots.	农村地区和工业化城市中会爆发大规模骚乱。


While the government might be able to crush such disturbances with force, a loss of confidence among the middle class would be more serious.	政府或许会用强力镇压这些骚乱，但是中产阶级丧失信心可能会更加严重。


Militant nationalism, partly encouraged by nervous rulers, might be one consequence.	惊恐不已的统治者鼓动会鼓动激进的民族主义，这或许会是一个后果。


Attempts by the military to stem unrest by taking control of government might be another.	军队通过控制政府而平息骚乱也许是另一个后果。


If there were no alternative ideas to one-party authoritarianism, military rule, or nationwide chaos, the future of China would be very bleak indeed.	如果除了一党专制、军人统治或者全国大乱之外没有别的���法可供选择，那么中国的未来就确实非常严峻。


But there is an alternative.	但是还是有一个选择。


It has been set out eloquently and persuasively in Charter 08.	零八宪章有力而又雄辩地提出了这一选择。


If China manages one day to follow the example of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and join the “mainstream of civilized nations” by establishing a liberal democracy, then December 10, 2008, will go down in history as one of the key dates of its conception.	如果中国有朝一日跟随韩国、日本以及台湾的榜样，通过建立自由民主而加入“文明国家的主流”，那么，2008年12月10日就会成为孕育这一变革的关键日期而名垂青史。


China’s Blackstone Coup	中国的黑石妙计


When China National Offshore Oil Company tried to buy America’s UNOCAL two years ago, it set off a political firestorm in the United States.	当中国海洋石油总公司（中海油）在两年前企图收购美国的优尼科公司时，在美国的政界激起了轩然大波。


When Dubai Ports World bought Britain’s P&O Steam Navigation Company, the fact that P&O operated ports inside the US led to more controversy in America.	当迪拜港口世界公司（Dubai Ports World）收购了英国的铁行轮船集团(P&O Steam Navigation Company)后，由于后者在美国国内运营一些港口，所以此项并购案也在美国引发了更多的争议。


One would think that a country like the US, with a current account deficit of roughly $800 billion a year, would realize that such a yawning external gap is inevitably financed only by selling off assets, which means that foreigners with money acquire ownership and control of US-based businesses.	人们会认为像美国这样一个经常项目下的赤字每年高达约8000亿美金的国家，会意识到这样一个巨大的外部缺口不可避免地要靠出售资产来填补。 这就意味着资金雄厚的外国人能够获取美国公司的所有权和控制权。


But the US – or at least Congress and the media – doesn’t get it.	但美国—至少是国会和媒体—却不明白这一点。


Americans evidently hope for a world in which they can have feckless deficit-generating fiscal policies, a very low private savings rate, and a moderate rate of investment, all financed by foreign capital whose owners are happy to bear the risks yet have no control over their assets.	美国人显然是希望世界能够如其所愿地让他们实施不负责任的、催生赤字的财政政策，保持非常低的人均储蓄率和适当的投资率。 这一切最好都由外国资本买单，而金主没有对其资产的控制权但却乐于承担风险。


One might think that foreign investors would quake in terror at these terms and shy away from dollar-denominated assets.	人们或许以为外国投资者在这些条件面前会不寒而栗并对以美元计算的资产敬而远之。


But this has not been the case.	但事实却并非如此。


High oil prices have created huge export revenues for Middle Eastern governments, which still want to park their earnings in American assets.	高企的石油价格为中东各国政府创造了巨大的出口收入。 而这些政府仍然希望将它们的盈收固化为美国资产。


The same is true of Russia, whose oligarchs, as well as the huge state investment fund that finance minister Alexi Kudrin has created, also want to invest their oil revenues in the US.	俄罗斯也是如此。 该国的（石油）寡头和财政部长Alexi Kudrin创建的巨无霸国家投资基金也想将它们来自石油的收入投资到美国。


As for Asia’s governments, with China in the lead, the US remains the importer of last resort.	对于亚洲各国政府而言，以中国为代表，将美国作为进口国仍然是下下策。


The key to their development strategy is to put migrants from the countryside to work making exports destined for the US market.	它们发展战略的关键是将农村人口转化为城市的劳力，生产以美国为目标市场的出口商品。


They doubt that an alternative development strategy based on boosting domestic demand would succeed.	它们对以推动内需为基础的发展战略能否成功表示怀疑。


Thus, the real values of their currencies must be kept low relative to the dollar, which means that their reserves now invested in the US must continue to grow.	因此，它们货币的真实价值必须相对美元保持在较低水平。 这就意味着他们投资美国的外汇储备必须持续增长。


Someday, of course, this will come to an end.	当然，总有一天这种情况会终结。


Perhaps Asian real currency values will rise sharply as a result of a burst of inflation in Asia.	可能亚洲货币的真实价值会由于通胀的爆发而大幅提升。


Perhaps the dollar will collapse and there will be a burst of inflation in the US as the Federal Reserve Board decides that temporarily abandoning its price-level peg is a lesser evil than the unemployment fallout that will result from a dollar collapse and interest rate spike.	可能美元会崩溃，美国也会爆发通货膨胀。 因为美联储认为两害相权，暂时放弃美元与价格水平的联系机制比由于美元崩溃和利率提升所造成的失业率高居不下的结果要好。


A government that buys political risk insurance by placing an ever-growing stock of reserve assets in dollar securities guards against some dangers.	一个国家的政府通过将日益增长的外汇资产投入美金证券的方式来购买政治风险保险的做法有一定的避险作用。


But it is exposed to other risks, especially if it confines its investments to that slice of the asset pool, US Treasury and high-grade corporate bonds, that American politicians are comfortable having foreigners own.	但这种做法会面临其它的风险，特别是当这种投资局限于小部分的资产形式，即美国政客们特别愿意让外国人持有的美国国库券和高级别公司债券。


Nominal bonds are not well hedged against inflation, and, over the long run, assets that are claims to cash without effective control are highly vulnerable to financial vultures.	名义债券对于通胀的避险功能较弱，并且长期来看，未得到有效控制的可变现资产很容易受到金融秃鹫们的攻击。


Prudent foreign government and private investors would find some way to diversify.	审慎的外国政府和私人投资者会寻求途径使投资多元化。


But how?	但应该如何做呢？


Buying other countries’ bonds would mean abandoning the goal of keeping real currency values low against the dollar.	收购他国的资产意味着放弃相对美元保持货币实际价值低水平的目标。


Buying up whole enterprises triggers angry speeches in the US Congress.	整体收购企业会在美国国会引发激烈的言论。


What are needed are intermediary organizations that will grant a measure of control to foreigners, allow diversification across a wider range of US-located assets, and yet still appear 100% American to US politicians.	现在所需要的就是一个中间组织，既能够给予外国人一定程度的控制权，使其投资能够多元化地分布在更广泛的美国本地资产中，又能使得这些资产在政客们的眼里仍然是100%的美国资产。


Enter the Blackstone Group.	于是黑石集团应声而出。


China’s $3 billion investment in Blackstone, while insignificant relative to China’s $1.3 trillion of reserve assets – a sum headed for $1.5 trillion by the end of this year and likely to hit $2 trillion sometime in 2009 – is but a toe dipped in the water, a test run.	中国在黑石的30亿美元投资，尽管相对于中国1. 3万亿美元的外汇资产储备不值一提—这一数额在今年底会直冲1.


At the start of the process, China will have small and indirect ownership stakes in a great many US enterprises, and the odds are that the usual objections will be absent.	5万亿，并可能在2009年的某个时候达到2万亿—但这也只是小试锋芒。 在这一进程之初，中国会获得大量美国企业的小部分间接所有权。


China will gain a measure of risk diversification, reduce the price pressure that has kept earnings on its foreign exchange reserves low, and avoid running into political trouble.	而这样的操作很可能不会遭遇通常的反对。 中国会获得一种分散风险的方式，降低使其外汇储备收益保持低水平的价格压力，同时避免陷入政治麻烦。


Blackstone will gain extra cash to deploy and extra fees.	而黑石会得到额外的现金和丰厚的佣金。


Some observers think that the US political backlash against foreigners “buying up America” is what will bring the current configuration of global imbalances to an end.	有些观察家认为美国政界对外国人“收购美国”的强烈反弹将会终结现今的全球不平衡状态。


Deals like China’s investment in Blackstone postpone that backlash, but not for long: $3 billion is equivalent to what China accumulates in reserve in less than three working days.	像中国投资黑石这样的交易会延缓这种反弹，但并不会持久：30亿美金只相当于中国在三个工作日里所积累的外汇储备。


The question following China’s Blackstone investment is this: how far can this process go?	在中国对黑石投资以后的问题是：这一进程能走多远？


And how much control will US investors ultimately find that they have given up?	美国的投资者们最终会发现他们到底放弃了多大的控制权？


China’s Burma Test	中国在缅甸面临的考验


Burma’s peaceful protests are nearing their tipping point, with the military junta weighing the potential costs of a full military crackdown.	缅甸的和平抗议活动正在接近其倾覆点，而军政府正在衡量全面军事镇压可能的代价。


But Burma’s generals will have little incentive to opt for an alternative to bloodshed and repression if China continues to provide them with support and protection against sanctions at the UN Security Council.	但是如果中国继续给他们提供支持以及保护他们免受联合国安理会的制裁，缅甸的将军们几不太可能选择流血镇压。


China has more influence over Burma’s ruling generals than any other country.	中国比任何其他国家对缅甸执政的将军们都有更大的影响力。


Indeed, without Chinese support, it is debatable whether the Burmese regime could sustain itself.	事实上，如果没有来自中国的支持，缅甸政权是否还能维持下去很值得疑问。


So, while the current crisis in Burma is not of China’s making, any peaceful settlement may be possible only if China acts to support it.	所以，尽管缅甸目前的危机并不是中国造成的，但是任何和平的解决方案只有得到中国的支持才有可能实现。


China is thus facing an unwanted test of its claim to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community.	中国因而就面临着一次它自己并不愿意看到的对于它声称要在国际社会充当一个负责任的利益相关的参与者的考验。


With 3,000 villages destroyed and 1.5 million people already displaced in eastern Burma, a humanitarian disaster has been unfolding for some time now.	到目前为止，在缅甸东部已经有3000座村庄被毁坏、150万人无家可归，这场人道主义灾难已经延续了很长一段时间了。


Throughout these troubles, China has held its tongue, sticking to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any nation.	但是中国一直以来对此都闭口不谈，而是坚持它不干涉别国内政的政策。


But that policy may no longer be tenable, because it is in China’s interest to find an effective alternative to a brutal crackdown, which would only remind the world vividly of the massacres in Rangoon in 1988 and in Tiananmen Square the following year.	但是那个政策也许已经站不住脚了，因为寻找到避免血腥镇压发生的有效替代解决方案符合中国的利益，一场血腥的镇压只会让整个世界鲜活地回忆起1988年发生在仰光以及接下来的一年发生于天安门广场的大屠杀。


With some international celebrities already keen to start a campaign to boycott the Beijing Olympics because of China’s support for some of the world’s most repressive and incompetent regimes, a military crackdown in Burma is the last thing the Chinese authorities can afford.	鉴于一些国际知名人士已经因为中国支持世界上某些最最残酷地镇压百姓以及不称职的政权而掀起抵制北京奥运会的运动，缅甸发生军事镇压是中国当局最不愿意看到的事情。


Moreover, China’s rulers are focused on the looming 17th Congress of the Communist Party, which could likewise be spoiled by a bloody confrontation in Burma.	此外，中国的执政者正把精力集中在即将召开的党的十七大上，而这有可能被缅甸发生的血腥冲突所破坏。


Yet China may be able to pre-empt such an outcome by making the option of a brutal crackdown prohibitively high to the Burmese regime.	然而中国也许可以通过让选择血腥镇压将让缅甸政权付出高得令人望而生畏的代价来预先制止这样一种结果。


It should privately threaten to cut off all aid and trade links, and to end its protection of the regime within the United Nations from any additional international sanctions.	它应该私下里威胁切断所有的援助和贸易联系，以及停止在联合国内保护其政权免受任何额外的国际制裁。


As an inducement to peaceful change, China can also guarantee the personal safety and wealth of the military junta should its members have to leave Burma suddenly.	作为对和平政权更迭的诱导，中国也可以保证一旦军政府的成员被迫突然离开缅甸，将保护他们的人身安全和财富不受损失。


But China should make it clear that such protection requires the Burmese generals to cooperate in finding a peaceful solution.	但是中国应该清楚地表明这种保护需要缅甸的将军们共同寻找到一条和平的解决方案。


China should also publicly work within the UN and with ASEAN to find a way in which the international community can help to resolve the crisis peacefully.	中国还应该公开地在联合国和东盟内寻找到一条国际社会可以帮助和平地解决这场危机的途径。


Ultimately, a solution can be found only within Burma itself.	但是最终，危机只能在缅甸内部解决。


The junta can do worse than releasing and working with Aung San Suu Kyi, who still has sufficient status and appeal to rally public support for a peaceful transfer of power to civilian rule and, in due course, to a democratic government.	军政府如果不想让事情更糟的话，也许可以把昂山素季释放出来与她进行合作，后者依然拥有足够的地位和号召力获得公众的支持让政权和平过渡到平民执政，再经过一定的过程，过渡到民主政府。


It may be morally repulsive to allow the junta’s members to retire with their ill-gotten gains, but any alternative will exact a dramatically higher price from Burma’s people.	允许军政府的成员可以带着他们非法积聚的财物退休在道义也许令人难以接受，但是任何替代方案都将会使缅甸的百姓付出高得惊人的代价。


China’s national interest does not require it to prop up the Burmese junta forever.	中国的国际利益要求它不能永久地支持缅甸军政府。


Of course, China benefits greatly from access to Burma’s energy and other natural resources.	当然，中国也因为能够开采缅甸的能源和其他自然资源中获得了巨大的利益。


But, by playing a positive role in bringing about a successful and peaceful transfer of power, China can secure a friendly neighbor in Burma more effectively than with its current policy, which merely incurs the hatred of the Burmese people.	但是，通过在引导权力成功和和平的更迭中扮演积极的角色，中国可以比它现行的政策更有效地让缅甸成为一个友好的邻国，因为它现在的政策只会引发缅甸人民的仇恨。


As a matter of geo-political strategy, taking a positive lead in Burma can help China reassure its neighbors that its policy of a “peaceful rise” is real and beneficial.	作为一项地缘政治战略，在缅甸担当积极的主导作用可以使中国让它的邻国确信它的“和平崛起”政策是真实的并且有益的。


Whatever ASEAN governments say in public welcoming that rise, their lingering doubts and suspicions will not be erased unless they see China actively playing a positive role in assuring regional stability.	不管东盟各国政府在公开场合怎样欢迎这种崛起，但是除非它们看到中国在确保地区稳定上担当积极的正面角色，否则它们内心所存在的疑虑是不会消除的。


The current crisis in Burma offers China a rare opportunity to do so.	当前缅甸发生的危机正给中国提供了这样的一个绝佳机会。


The international community, too, has a vested interest in seeing that China rises peacefully.	国际社会对于中国的和平崛起也有既得利益。


It should encourage and support China in taking the lead over Burma, so long as China commits itself to finding a peaceful solution.	它应该鼓励和支持中国主导缅甸问题的解决，只要中国致力于寻找一条和平的解决方案。


The international community’s objective should be restricted to a peaceful outcome that allows Burma’s people to work out their own solution.	国际社会的目标应该被限定在让缅甸人民能够制定他们自己的解决方案这一和平结果上。


Any change of regime in Burma will not be the result of international intervention, but of political negotiations between the junta and its domestic opponents.	缅甸任何政权的更迭将不会是国际社会干预的结果，而只能是军政府和它的国内反对者之间政治谈判的结果。


China should thus recognize that using its influence would not imply accepting as a matter of principle intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs.	因此中国应该认识到运用它的影响力并不代表它是在干涉别国的内政。


China’s Scientific Revolution	中国的科学革命


BEIJING – The Chinese economy has undergone radical transformation in recent years and is now laying the groundwork for impressive advances in science and technology.	北京——中国经济近年来发生了根本性的变化，正在为科技的卓越进步打下坚实的基础。


In particular, China is setting itself up to be a major player in the fight against disease, and there are many reasons to believe that the country will play a central role in the life-sciences research of the future.	尤其是，中国参与了与疾病的斗争，而且，人们有理由相信该国将在未来的生命科学研究中发挥核心作用。


For starters, according to a report in McKinsey Quarterly, China spends more than $200 billion on research annually, a level of investment that is second only to the United States.	首先，麦肯锡季刊发布的一份报告显示，中国每年耗资2000亿美元进行研发，而且该投资水平仅次于美国。


Chinese President Xi Jinping has positioned science-based innovation near the top of the national agenda, with the government’s 13th Five-Year Plan prioritizing complex projects in emerging fields like brain research, gene science, big data, and medical robotics.	中国国家主席习近平将科技创新列为国家计划的首要任务。 中国政府的第13个5年计划将重点放在大脑研究、基因科学、大数据和医疗机器人等新兴领域的复杂项目。


China is devoting so much to medical research in part because the country has significant unmet medical needs.	中国医疗科研投资如此之巨部分原因是该国有着尚未满足的巨大的医疗需求。


By 2050, the Chinese population over age 65 is expected to increase by about 190 million.	到2050年，中国65岁以上人口预计将增加约1. 9亿。


Meanwhile, chronic illnesses now account for more than 80% of China’s disease burden.	此外，慢性疾病现在占中国疾病负担的80%以上。


So it is no surprise that China is already the world’s second largest pharmaceutical market, or that its innovation expenditure, according to the McKinsey Quarterly report, is expected to reach $1 trillion by 2020.	因此，中国自然已成为全球第二大医药市场，换句话说，据麦肯锡季刊报告显示，中国的创新经费到2020年将达到1万亿美元的规模。


Another reason to expect a Chinese research revolution is that China now graduates more university students in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics than any other country – about 2.5 million students per year, or about five times more than the US.	预期中国爆发科研革命的另一个原因是中国现在毕业的科学、技术、工程和数学领域的大学生比其他任何国家都多——每年毕业生数量约为250万，大约比美国多5倍左右。


In science and engineering alone, China generates nearly 30,000 PhDs annually.	仅在科学和工程领域，中国每年就培养出近30,000名博士生。


At the same time, government incentives are luring Chinese scientists who have been working abroad – many with top-tier Western institutions – back home.	与此同时，政府的激励措施正在吸引一直在海外工作的中国科学家回国创业，其中很多人都曾在西方顶级机构工作。


From its inception in 2008 through mid-2014, this “Thousand Talents” program has attracted more than 4,000 returnees.	从2008年开始实施到2014年年中，这项“千人计划”已经吸引了4000多名海外学者归国。


These trends clearly indicate that China has a real opportunity to become a major force in global pharmaceuticals research, and that there will soon come a time when breakthrough innovation occurs in China on a regular basis.	这些趋势都清楚地表明中国确有机会成为全球药品研发的主要力量，而且中国定期出现突破性创新的时点可能将很快到来。


Global pharmaceutical companies have taken notice.	全球药品企业已经有所察觉。


My own company has been working in research and development in China for ten years.	我自己的公司10年来一直坚持在中国进行研发活动。


Back in 2006, we opened the first integrated R&D facility in the country, and the largest among international firms.	早在2006年，我们就在中国设立了首家综合性研发机构，其规模在国际企业中也可谓首屈一指。


And we recently opened a new R&D center in Shanghai’s Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park.	而且我们不久前在上海的张江高科园区开设了一家新的研发中心。


In Shanghai, premier scientists – many having returned to China from major research centers like Harvard Medical School and MIT – will focus on diseases that are endemic to the Chinese population.	在上海，很多从哈佛医学院和麻省理工学院等知名研究中心归国的顶级科学家将着重研究中国民众易患的疾病。


These include lung, liver, and gastric cancers, as well as other liver diseases, such as chronic hepatitis B, liver fibrosis, and cirrhosis.	其中包括肺、肝及胃癌，以及其他肝脏疾病，如慢性乙型肝炎、肝纤维化和肝硬化等。


These diseases disproportionately affect people in China.	超大比例的中国民众感染上述疾病。


For example, the incidence of hepatitis B in China is nearly 30 times higher than in the US; stomach and liver cancer rates are 11-18 times higher than in the US or Europe.	比方说，中国乙肝发病率比美国高近30倍； 胃癌及肝癌发病率比美国或欧洲高11到18倍之多。


Thanks to advances in recent years, scientists can now identify epigenetic modification enzymes that regulate gene activities.	多亏近年来所取得的进展，科学家们现在可以确定调节基因活动的表观遗传修饰酶。


This area of research is especially promising in the search for effective new oncological therapies.	上述研究领域在寻找有效的肿瘤疗法方面尤其有前途。


And by better understanding how these diseases manifest in Chinese patients, the industry is honing targeted therapies that can then be introduced in other settings worldwide.	通过深入研究这些疾病在中国患者身上的表现，制药行业正在完善针对性的治疗方法，以便在世界其他地区加以推广应用。


China could very well set the global standard for using epigenetics to gain a better understanding of the underlying causes of diseases.	中国很可能会成为利用表观遗传学深入了解疾病深层原因的全球标准制定者。


In China, Novartis scientists alone are already running 15 drug discovery projects at different stages, and this pace of development will only accelerate.	中国诺华制药的科学家已经在推进处于不同阶段的15个药品研发项目，而这样的研发速度只会不断提高。


I am inspired by China’s potential for making landmark scientific discoveries.	我为中国得出里程碑式科研成果的可能性而倍感鼓舞。


As the country becomes increasingly important to global R&D, its contributions will be a boon for the fight against disease, both in China and worldwide.	随着中国全球研发地位的不断提升，它所做出的贡献将在中国国内和世界各地促进人类与其病的斗争。


China’s Connectivity Revolution	中国的互联革命


NEW HAVEN – Long the most fragmented nation on earth, China is being brought together like never before by a new connectivity.	发自纽黑文——作为一个有着悠久碎片化历史的国家，中国正被一种新的联系工具以前所未有的方式连结在了一起。


Its Internet community is expanding at hyper speed, with profound implications for the Chinese economy, to say nothing of the country’s social norms and political system.	该国的网络社区正急速扩大，不但深刻影响了整个经济，还对社会行为模式和政治体制造成了冲击。


This genie cannot be stuffed back in the bottle. Once connected, there is no turning back.	这是一个无法被赶回神灯的幽灵：一旦联通起来，就没有回头路可走了。


The pace of transformation is breathtaking.	这条转型之路是非常激动人心的。


According to Internet World Stats, the number of Internet users in China has more than tripled since 2006, soaring to 485 million in mid-2011 – more than three times that in 2006.	根据世界互联网统计中心（Internet World Stats）的数字，中国的网民数量自2006年以来已经翻了三倍有多，并于2011年中期达到4. 85亿人。


Moreover, China’s rush to connectivity is far from over. As of mid-2011, only 36% of its 1.3 billion people were connected – far short of the nearly 80% penetration rates seen in South Korea, Japan, and the United States.	此外中国面向互联性的狂飙还远未停止：在2011年中期，13亿中国人中只有36%能够上网——这个数字相比韩国，日本和美国等地高达80%的渗透率来说还是偏低。


Indeed, with the cost of connectivity falling sharply – China’s mobile users are expected to surpass PC users by 2013 – and, with urbanization and per capita incomes also rising sharply, it is not unreasonable to expect China’s Internet penetration rate to cross the 50% threshold by 2015. That would be the functional equivalent of adding about three-fourths of all existing Internet users in the US.	事实上，随着互联成本大幅下降——中国的手机用户数量预计将在2013年超过个人电脑用户——还有城市化以及人均收入大幅上升，中国的互联网渗透率将在2015年越过50%的门槛就毫不意外了，而因此增加的人数相当于美国当前所有网民数量的3/4。


Nor are the Chinese casual and infrequent Internet users.	中国那些不常使用互联网的人数也是如此。


Consistent with what the social-network theorist Clay Shirky has dubbed a society’s penchant for unlocking the “cognitive surplus” embedded in net-based activities, survey data from the China Internet Network Information Center suggest that Chinese netizens log an average of 2.6 hours per day online – a full hour longer than the average 15-49-year-old Chinese citizen spends watching television. 	正如网络理论家克莱·舍奇（Clay Shirky）所说，社会具有开启基于网络行为“认知过剩”现象的强烈嗜好，而中国互联网信息中心的调查数据也与该理论不谋而合：中国网民平均每天上网近2. 6个小时，比15~49岁中国人平均每天看电视的时间还多出整整一个小时。


China’s microblogs, or social networks, where usage tends be most intense, were estimated to have approximately 270 million users as of late 2011.	中国使用最为频密的微博（或者是社会网络）估计在2011年年末达到2.


And there is plenty of upside.	7亿的用户量，而且还拥有极大的上升空间。


Worldwide, about 70% of all Internet users currently engage in some form of microblogging, which is the fastest-growing segment of the Internet.	在全球范围内大约有70%的互联网用户也在使用某种形式的微博，也是当前网络增长最快的部分。


In China, this share is just 55%.	而在中国，这个比例只有55%。


When it comes to analyzing China, it is always easy to get carried away with numbers – especially those driven by the country’s sheer size.	当对中国进行分析的时候，我们往往容易被数字所迷惑，尤其是其庞大的基数。


But the real message here concerns the implications of connectivity, not just its scale.	但真正有价值的信息则着眼于互联性，而不仅仅是其规模。


A key implication is the Internet’s potential to play a significant role in the emergence of China’s consumer society – a critical structural imperative for a long-unbalanced Chinese economy.	其中一个关键的含义就是互联网在中国消费社会的崛起中可能扮演某种重要角色的潜力——而消费社会恰恰是长期不平衡的中国经济所急需的重要架构。


With connectivity comes a national awareness of spending habits, tastes, and brands – essential characteristics of any consumer culture.	随着互联性而生的则是一种关于消费习惯，品味和品牌的国家意识——这也是任何消费文化所必备的特质。


The consumption share of China’s economy, at less than 35% of GDP, is the lowest of any major country.	消费占中国GDP的比例还不够35%，在世界几大国之间是最低的。


Surging Chinese Internet usage could well facilitate the pro-consumption initiatives of the recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan.	而不断增加的中国互联网使用量将极大有利于最近推行的第十二个五年计划中的消费促进方略。


The Internet could also enable freer and more open communications, upward mobility, transparent and rapid dissemination of information, and, yes, individuality.	互联网同样也能实现更自由也更开放的沟通，阶层流动，透明和迅速的信息传播，还有毫无疑问的一点：个人主义。


China’s leadership has been increasingly vocal in raising concerns about growing inequalities that might otherwise hinder the development of what they call a more “harmonious society.”	中国的领导层也逐渐认识到不断加剧的贫富不均现象可能阻碍他们所谓“和谐社会”的发展。


Online connectivity could be a powerful means to help China come together and achieve this goal.	而网上互联则可成为一个帮助中国团结起来并实现这一目标的有力工具。


Finally, there is the Internet’s potential as an instrument of political change.	最后，互联网也有成为政治变革工具的潜力。


That is hardly an inconsequential consideration for any country in the aftermath of last year’s Arab Spring, which was facilitated in many countries (especially Tunisia and Egypt) by network-enabled mobilization.	这是所有反思过去年“阿拉伯之春”的国家都认真考虑的问题，而网络所赋予的动员性也确实对许多国家（尤其是突尼斯和埃及）的变革有所助力。


While reform of China’s single-party state has always been viewed as an important objective in modern China – from the so-called Fifth Modernization of Wei Jinsheng in the late 1970’s to recent speeches by Premier Wen Jiabao – meaningful progress has been limited.	虽然中国这个一党制国家的改革常常被视为现代中国一个最重要的目标——从1970年代末魏京生所说的“第五次现代化”到最近国家总理温家宝的讲话都有涉及——但所取得的进展却极为有限。


Is this likely to change as China embraces the Internet?	那么随着中国拥抱互联网，变革也会因此而生吗？


China is no exception in requiring leadership, accountability, and responsiveness as conditions of political stability.	政治稳定的实现需要领导力，可靠性和责任心，中国也毫不例外。


Its rapidly expanding Internet community has repeatedly raised national awareness of tough local issues.	该国迅速扩大的互联网社区使得民众对重大区域性事件的关注度迅速提升。


This was especially evident in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, ethnic violence in Xinjiang in 2009, and the high-speed rail crash in Wenzhou in 2011.	而这一点在2008年四川地震，2009年新疆暴乱和2011年温州高铁等事件中则显得尤其突出。


As the Arab Spring demonstrated, the Internet can quickly transform local incidents into national flashpoints – turning the new connectivity into a potential source of political instability and turmoil.	正如阿拉伯之春所显示的那样，互联网能将本地事件迅速转化为全国性的爆点——将新的互联性转化成引发政治不稳定和混乱的潜在源头。


But that has been the case only in countries ruled by highly unpopular autocratic regimes.	但这些个案仅仅发生在那些由不受民众拥戴的独裁政权统治的国家。


By contrast, China’s leadership is viewed with a much greater degree of public sympathy.	相比之下，中国领导层所获得的公众支持看上去更高。


Their quick and direct response to the recent incidents in Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Wenzhou are important cases in point.	他们对最近在四川，新疆和温州等事件所作出的迅速直接反映说明了这一点。


Senior Party leaders – especially Premier Wen – were quick to lead an empathetic national response that was largely effective in countering the outpouring of concern expressed on the Internet.	面对网上喷涌而出的关注之声，党的高级领导人——尤其是总理温家宝——迅速做出了国家层面的感人回应，并起到了极大作用。


None of this is to deny the dark side of the Chinese Internet explosion – namely, widespread censorship and constraints on individual freedom of expression.	但上述一切也无法掩盖中国互联网爆炸过程中的阴暗面——也就是对个人自由表达权利的广泛审查和限制。


China’s “SkyNet” team (rumored to be greater than 30,000) is the largest cyber police force in the world.	中国的“天网”团队（据说人数超过3万人）是全世界最大的网络警察力量。


Moreover, while China is not alone in censoring the Internet, self-policing by many of the nation’s largest portals amplifies official oversight and surveillance.	此外，虽然中国不是唯一进行网络审查的国家，该国许多大型门户网站的自我审查也强化了官方的监管和盯梢。


Recent restrictions on microbloggers – especially denial of access to those who use untraceable aliases – have heightened concerns over Chinese Internet freedom.	最近对微博作者的监管——尤其是禁止那些使用化名且无法追查的人登录——也令人更加关注的中国的互联网自由。


Such restrictions, of course, cut both ways – potentially limiting personal expression, but also constraining disguised and reckless vigilante attacks.	当然，这类管制在双方面都起到了作用——既限制了个人表达的自由，也遏制了某些在网上的恶意造谣抹黑行为。


Filtered or not, a long-fragmented China now has a viable and rapidly expanding network.	但不管是否存在网络过滤行为，一个长期碎片化的中国如今拥有了一个切实存在并迅速扩张的网络。


The power of that network – especially insofar as economic, social, and political change is concerned – is hard to predict.	而这个网络的力量——尤其在经济，社会和政治变革都被关注的情况下——将难以预测。


But connectivity adds a new dimension of cohesion to modern China. That can only accelerate the speed of its extraordinary development journey.	但互联性为现代中国的凝聚力增加了一个新的维度，而这也只会加速其超常规发展的速度。


China’s Construction Fetish	中国的建设狂热


NEW HAVEN – As we digest the implications of China’s $586 billion stimulus plan, it is intriguing to ponder why China chooses infrastructure, buildings, and big projects every time growth needs a boost.	纽黑文－在我们揣摩中国5860亿美元经济刺激计划的含义时，思考中国为什么每次在需要促进经济增长的时候，都选择基础设施建设、房屋以及大项目，是很有趣的。


Should, or can, China achieve long-term growth only by adding physical structures?	中国应该或者能够仅仅通过增加实体建筑来取得长期增长吗？


If and when the time comes to pause or change course, will China’s existing political-economic institutions accommodate such a transformation?	如果当要暂停或改变经济增长的路径的时候，中国现存的政治－经济制度能够适应这样的变化吗？


During a recent trip to Brazil, my taxi driver complained about Sao Paulo’s bumpy streets and highways.	在最近到巴西的一次旅行中，我的出租车司机抱怨圣保罗崎岖不平的街道和公路。 我回应道，“我以为高油价和高铁矿石价格已经使巴西繁荣起来了….


I responded, “I thought the high oil and iron ore prices had made Brazil boom….Why hasn’t Brazil spent more on its infrastructure?”	巴西为什么不在其基础设施建设上花更多的钱呢？ ”


He replied, “The Brazilian economy has been doing well.	出租车司机回答说，“巴西经济运行良好。


But, whenever the government has extra money, President Lula likes to give tax rebates and subsidies to people, instead of using it on the roads.	但是，只要政府有额外的钱，卢拉总统总是喜欢减税并补贴人民，而不是将这些钱用在修建道路上。 为什么？


Why?”	”


“Well,” I said, “Brazil is a democracy.	“哦，”我说，“巴西是一个民主国家。


Imagine you were Lula and had $18 billion at your disposal.	想象你是卢拉并且有180亿美元可以支配。


Would you rather spend it on highways, or give each Brazilian $100?”	你是将这些钱花在修建公路上，还是宁愿给每个巴西人发100美元？ ”


“Yes, give it to the people, just to win more votes.”	“当然将它给人民，以赢得更多的选票。 ”


In China, the government is not elected, so winning more votes is not part of the calculation, and returning money to the people is never the choice.	“在中国，政府不是选举产生的，所以赢得更多的选票不是政府考虑的一部分，而且，将钱返还给人民从来就不是一个选择。


The government doesn’t just spend it, but seems always to favor tangible things like skyscrapers, fancy government buildings, highways, and big industrial projects.	中国政府不仅仅是花掉钱，而且似乎总是喜欢像摩天大楼，华丽的政府建筑物，公路以及大工业项目这样有形的东西。 ”


This partly explains not only why democracies such as India and Brazil lag behind China in infrastructure, but also why China is focusing its new stimulus package on transport systems (railroad projects alone will receive more than half of the $586 billion stimulus).	这不仅部分地解释了像印度和巴西这样的民主国家在基础设施上落后于中国的原因，也解释了中国将其新经济刺激计划集中于运输系统上的原因（仅仅铁路项目就会得到5860亿美元经济刺激计划一半以上的投资）。


In a non-democracy, officials are held accountable to their superiors, not to voters.	在一个不民主的国家，官员是对其上级负责，而不是对选民负责。


And for one’s superiors, tangible projects are the easiest to recognize.	对官员的上级来说，有形的项目是最容易识别的东西。


Indeed, while China’s new stimulus plan overwhelmingly emphasizes infrastructure, it gives short shrift to social programs, such as health care and education, even though they can reduce household saving pressure and increase private consumption.	事实上，虽然中国的新经济刺激计划极其强调基础设施建设，但是却对诸如医疗和教育这样的社会保障项目不予理睬，即使这些社会保障项目可以降低家庭的储蓄压力并增加私人消费。


This type of spending structure is nothing new to China.	这种支出结构对中国来说一点也不新鲜。


In 2007, government expenditure on health care, social security, and unemployment welfare programs totaled about $88 billion, or 15% of the fiscal budget and 2.4% of GDP (far below the typical percentage in both developed and developing democracies).	在2007年，中国在医疗、社会保险和失业福利项目上的政府开支总计约880亿美元，即财政预算的15%，GDP的2. 4%（既远远低于发达民主国家，也远远低于发展中民主国家的一般百分比）。


Brazil’s government spends 4.7% of GDP on health care alone.	巴西政府仅仅在医疗上的开支就占其GDP的4. 7%。


China’s government expenditure on education is approximately 3% of GDP, compared to 5.4% in Brazil.	中国政府在教育上的开支大约是GDP的3%，而巴西的是GDP的 5. 4%。


Due to the lack of public oversight on government budgeting, China’s political system is especially biased to favor big physical projects, and, through taxation and state ownership, the government maintains almost full control over much national income and wealth, maximizing the impact of this bias.	由于缺乏对政府预算的公众监督，中国的政治体系特别偏向于赞成大型实体项目，并且，通过税收和全民所有制，中国政府几乎维持着对绝大多数国民收入和财富的完全控制，从而将这种偏向的影响最大化。


The wonderful Olympics sites in Beijing were no accident, but rather a result of the system.	北京令人惊叹的奥林匹克场馆不是一个意外，而是这种体系的结果。


Taxation power is hardly checked by the National People’s Congress or the media.	在中国，征税权力几乎不受全国人民代表大会和媒体的制约。


As a result, from 1995 to 2007, inflation-adjusted government fiscal revenue increased 5.7 times.	结果，从1995年到2007年，调整通胀后的政府财政收入增加了5. 7倍。


In contrast, over the same period, the cumulative increase was 1.6 times for urban residents’ per capita disposable income and 1.2 times for rural peasants’ per capita income.	与此形成对比的是，在同期，城市人均可支配收入的累积增长是1. 6倍，农村人均可支配收入的累积增长是1.


So, China’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is an economy where an increasing share of national income goes to the state.	2倍。 所以，中国“具有中国特色的社会主义”经济制度，是越来越多的国民收入归国家所有的经济制度。


Despite privatization, there are roughly 119,000 state-owned enterprises today, with a book value of about $4 trillion.	尽管进行过私有化，但是，现在中国仍然有大约119000家国有企业，这些企业的账面价值大约有4万亿美元。


State-owned land is valued at more than $7 trillion.	中国国有土地的价值超过了7万亿美元。


Combined, these state-owned assets total almost three-quarters of China’s national productive wealth.	加起来，这些国有资产合计几乎达到了中国国家生产财富的四分之三。


With the state owning so much, most of the gains in asset values experienced over the past 30 years have gone into the government’s coffers.	因为国家占有了这么多东西，所以在过去30年里，中国资产价值的收益都进入了政府的口袋。


When most households own no productive assets, they cannot share any of the asset appreciation or property income.	当大多数家庭不拥有生产资产的时候，它们不能分享资产升值和财产受益。


For most citizens, wages are the only source of income.	对大多数中国公民来说，工资是唯一的收入来源。


But wages have grown at a far slower pace than GDP.	但是，在中国工资的增长速度远远低于GDP的增长速度。


No wonder domestic consumption cannot grow in a manner commensurate with GDP.	难怪中国的国内消费不能以与GDP相适应的方式增长。


Transforming China from an export-driven economy to one that relies on domestic consumption requires two fundamental reforms.	将中国从一个出口驱动型的经济体转变成为一个依靠国内消费的经济体需要进行两个根本性的改革。


First, ownership rights to the remaining state assets should be distributed equally to China’s 1.3 billion citizens.	首先，剩下的国家资产的所有权应该公平地分配给13亿中国人。


This can be done by putting these assets into national wealth funds and distributing the funds’ shares to citizens at no cost.	这可以通过将这些资产置于国家财富基金之下，并免费将基金的份额分配给中国公民的方式来实现。


Second, the government budgeting process must be opened up through both public hearings in the national legislature and public participation via the media.	其次，政府的预算过程必须通过国家立法机构的公开听证和经过媒体的公众参与进行公开。


Such increased accountability will shift government spending toward programs related to people’s needs and away from physical structures.	因为这样而增加的责任，可以使政府开支离开实体构造建设，向与人民需要相关的项目转移。


Without such structural reforms or returning fiscal surpluses to families through tax cuts and rebates, government investment-based stimulus efforts can provide, at best, a short-term economic boost.	没有这样的结构改革和通过减税以及退税将财政盈余返还给家庭的行动，中国政府建立在投资上的经济刺激努力最多可以在短期内对经济起到促进作用。


They cannot transform China’s export- and investment-oriented political-economic system.	它们不能改变中国的出口和投资导向型的政治－经济体��。


Indeed, even after the new stimulus package, China will still depend on investment and export for growth.	事实上，即使在新的经济刺激一揽子计划之后，中国仍然依靠投资和出口带动增长。


For 30 years, concentrating resources in the government’s hands through state ownership and taxes has served China well.	30年来。 通过全民所有制和税收将资源集中到政府手中，对中国的发展起到了很大的作用。


It provided a basis for China’s nation-building policy of “Concentrate Resources and Do Big Things.”	它为中国“集中资源办大事”的国家建设政策提供了基础。


Today, however, China has decent infrastructure, impressive buildings, and an excessive industrial base.	但是，现在中国已经有了体面的基础设施，令人印象深刻的大楼以及过剩的工业基础。


What is missing is sufficient private consumption to power endogenous growth.	中国缺乏的是促进内生性增长的足够的私人消费。


To correct this, China needs to boost its people’s sense of future financial security and affect a rise in private income commensurate with GDP growth.	为了改变这一点，中国需要提高其人民对未来的金融安全感，并使私人收入的增长和GDP的增长相适应。


Building a nation demands more than steel and concrete.	建设一个国家需要的不仅仅是钢铁和混凝土。


China’s Consumer Communism	中国的消费者共产主义


China has changed dramatically since the mid-1980’s.	自八十年代中期以来，中国发生了巨变。


It’s not just the increase in the number of freeways, billboards, and skyscrapers that disorient long-time visitors.	变化不仅仅是增加了让长久未来的访客不知所措的高速公路、广告牌以及摩天大楼。


Even a visit to a bookstore can shock anyone who first came to know China decades ago, when it seemed inconceivable that works by non-Marxist theorists would ever outnumber those by Marxists.	甚至去一下书店就足以让在几十年前了解中国的人震惊。 那时，非马列主义理论的著作会超过马列主义者是不可想象的。


A theatre company has even been allowed to stage “Animal Farm,” George Orwell’s famous anti-authoritarian allegory, once known to socialist-bloc readers only via underground editions.	一家话剧演出公司甚至被允许上演乔治·奥维尔著名的反专制主义讽喻剧<<动物庄园>>。 社会主义阵营的读者以往只是通过地下版本知道这部作品。


The changes run deeper, of course.	当然，变化还要深刻。


In the 1980’s, there were no beggars on city streets, and the main social cleavage divided the small number of politically well-connected people, who enjoyed a privileged lifestyle, from everyone else.	在八十年代，城市马路上没有乞丐，而主要的社会分歧则只是将一小部分在政治上有后台、享受特权生活方式的人与平民百姓分离开来。


Now, there are both beggars and a burgeoning middle class.	如今，乞丐与蓬勃兴起的中产阶级并存。


It used to be difficult to find anything to do on a Saturday night in Shanghai.	以前在上海，星期六晚上无事可做。


Now, Time magazine calls the city the “most happening” place on earth.	现在，美国时代周刊把上海称为地球上“最为热闹非凡”的地方。


While preparing for my first trip to China twenty years ago, George Orwell’s dark masterpiece, Nineteen Eighty-Four, seemed a useful lens through which to view this “people’s republic.”	当我在二十年前准备中国之行的时候，乔治·奥维尔的黑色名著<<1984年>>看起来就是一个观察这个“人民共和国”的有用的镜片。


Control in China was not nearly rigid enough to make it the embodiment of an all-embracing, authoritarian Big Brother state, but there were parallels, from the disparagement of many forms of “bourgeois” enjoyment and entertainment to periodic propaganda campaigns insisting that two plus two equaled five.	当时中国的专制还没有严重到使其成为极度独裁的“大哥”国家的化身，但与之也有相似之处，如对各种“资产阶级”享受和娱乐活动的轻视和定期的坚持声称二加二等于五之类的宣传运动。


Still, despite all the changes, when foreign commentators nowadays want to spice up a China piece with a literary allusion, Orwell remains the seasoning of choice.	然而，尽管发生了巨大的变化，当今天的国外评论员想要在评论中国的作品中引用文学典故时，奥维尔的作品仍然是首选。


Big Brother is invoked in stories about Internet censorship.	“大哥”陷入了实行互联网审查制度的报道里。


When the authorities issue a White Paper on human rights, references are made to Newspeak.	当中国政府发布了人权《白皮书》后，其中的言辞在官方新闻语言中被大量引用。


But is this really the best lens through which to see China now?	但是，这仍旧是观察当今中国最好的镜子吗？ 奥尔德斯·贺胥黎是否提供了一个更为贴切的视角呢？


It is worth considering whether Aldous Huxley, who taught Orwell at school and who wrote another great and portentous piece of political fiction, Brave New World, provides a more relevant perspective.	这个问题值得考虑。 他是奥维尔的老师，写过另外一部伟大的预言性政治小说――《美丽新世界》。


Huxley’s masterpiece, which had more to say about materialism, mood-control, mass-distraction, and social fragmentation than Orwell’s, offers a new kind of insight into what is really happening in twenty-first-century China.	贺胥黎的名著比奥维尔的作品对唯物主义、精神控制、大众娱乐和社会分裂有更多的描述，提供了一个观察21世纪中国正在发生的变化的新视角。


With its bliss-inducing drug “soma” and sensuous entertainments known as “feelies,” which provided the sort of engrossing distraction now offered by video games and iPods, Brave New World’s perspective adds a new dimension to understanding the durability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a protean ruling party.	《美丽新世界》提供了一种诱导精神愉悦的药物“躯体”和名为“多感觉宣传媒介”的感官娱乐活动（与现在电子游戏和iPods所提供的引人入胜的娱乐活动相似），增加了一个新的视角和观察维度，从中可以理解中国共产党作为一个经常变化的执政党所拥有的持久生命力。


Of course, Newspeak is alive and well in many places, and there are certainly Orwellian echoes in the authorities’ pronouncements and actions.	当然，官方新闻语言在很多地方仍然大行其道，在官方的声明和行动中也肯定有奥维尔的作品中所描述的那些事情的痕迹。


But Orwell’s critique doesn’t help in explaining the CCP’s surprising ability to retain power long after the demise of most of the socialist bloc, even in the face of widespread protests, including an estimated 74,000 separate incidents across China in 2004 alone.	但是奥维尔的批评无助于解释说明中国共产党令人惊奇的执政能力，尤其是在大多数社会主义国家变质之后，并且面临着普遍抗议的情况下，据估计2004年仅中国就爆发了74,000起分裂事件。


After reading Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1949, the year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Huxley sent his former pupil a letter praising the novel.	在1949年也就是中华人民共和国成立的那一年阅读过《1984》年之后， 贺胥黎给他从前的学生写了一封信，对这本小说提出了表扬。


He noted the emphasis that it put on rule via “boot-on-the-face” techniques and puritanical distaste for pleasure.	他对小说强调的通过掩耳盗铃式的技巧和娱乐方面严格的道德倾向进行统治做出了重点说明。


But wasn’t it more likely, Huxley mused, that future ruling elites would strive to keep the governed in line by distracting them with sexual allurement, entertainment, and other forms of pleasure, à la Brave New World?	但是贺胥黎思考是的下面这个问题，未来的统治精英通过如《美丽新世界》描述的性诱惑、娱乐和其它形式的娱乐活动努力使得被统治者与他们保持一致，这难道不是更有可能出现的吗？


In many ways, today’s Chinese consumer culture is precisely the kind of palliative that Huxley described.	中国今天的消费文化在许多方面与贺胥黎描述的缓和剂完全一样。


Another of Brave New World’s strategies for control was to maximize divisions among the populace.	《美丽新世界》中另一个控制策略是将民众之间的分隔界线最大化。


Whereas the main distinction in Nineteen Eighty-Four is between rulers and ruled, in Brave New World, people are divided into different social orders defined by disparate tastes and lifestyles.	在《1984》和《美丽新世界》中统治者与被统治者主要的区别是由完全不同的品味和生活方式决定的不同的社会等级。


The same could be said of China today, where the gaps between rich and poor, urban and rural populations, and coastal and inland culture are so great that it is much harder than before for people from varied walks of life to feel that they share common plights and goals.	中国今天的情况与此类似，贫富、城乡、沿海和内地文化之间的差距如此之大，以至于与以前相比，不同阶层的人们感觉越来越难以拥有共同信念和目标。


Of course, no single novel provides a perfect lens through which to view any society.	当然，没有任何一本小说可以提供观察任何一个社会的完美的镜子。


Sometimes, such as when violence was recently used to quell South Chinese peasants protesting official land grabs, the CCP still shows its willingness to use “boot-on-the-face” suppression.	有的时候，如平息中国南方抗议官员剥夺田地的农民暴乱时，中国共产党仍旧使用“掩耳盗铃”式的镇压方式。


Still, there have been more moments lately that favor Huxley’s vision of political order over that of Orwell.	但是，最近更多的时候发生的更多的事件支持贺胥黎的政治等级观点而不是奥维尔的。


During my first post-1989 trip to China, a bartender introduced me to a phrase that perfectly characterized the new official mood: “Meiyou yundong, shenme dou keyi” (As long as there are no political movements, anything goes).	在我的第一次后1989年中国之旅中，一个酒吧间男服务员向我介绍了一个明确反映新的官方精神的习语：“没有运动，什么都可以”（只要没有政治运动，干什么都可以）。


Orwell’s Big Brother would not have been amused by this remark.	奥维尔描述的“大哥”不会觉得这种评论有趣。


But a member of Brave New World’s ruling elite would have taken it in stride.	但《美丽新世界》中描述的统治精英则会对此付之一笑。


China’s Crippled Financial Sector	跛脚的中国金融部门


BEIJING – Even in the best of times, it is difficult for China’s small and medium-size enterprises to get bank loans.	发自北京——即便是在年景最好的时候，中国的中小企业也难以从银行获得贷款。


But with the current regimen of credit austerity, imposed to contain economic overheating and inflationary pressure, making conditions for SMEs worse, the financial sector – the least reformed sector in China – now is suffocating the beating heart of the country’s economic dynamism.	如今随着政府为遏制经济过热和通胀压力而实施信贷紧缩，中小企业的日子也就更加难过了。 金融，这个中国改革最为滞后的部门，如今正压迫着整个国家经济的动力核心。


In normal times, the informal financial market helps SMEs to get by; but the recent woes of Wenzhou, a city in southern Zhejiang province renowned for its freewheeling private economy, have shown that the informal financial market can be very volatile and undependable.	平时中小企业可以借助民间金融市场进行周转； 但最近在以灵活私营经济著称的中国浙江省温州市所爆发的事件，却暴露了民间金融市场缺乏稳定且可靠性低的缺陷。


Several major lenders absconded with large amounts of deposits, and defaults by ordinary companies have become a serious concern.	当地几大借款人携巨额借款潜逃，普通企业的欠债违约现象也引发高度关注。


Things have gotten so bad as to warrant a visit by Premier Wen Jiabao.	形势如此恶劣，以致国家总理温家宝都得亲赴当地处理。


China’s official foreign reserves are increasing at a rate of about $1 billion per business day, almost all of which is used to buy US Treasury bonds and other international assets that carry a minimal rate of return.	中国的官方外汇储备几乎以每个工作日10亿美元的速度不断增加，其中绝大部分都用来购买回报率极低的美国国债或其他国际资产。


At the same time, about 40% of China’s bank savings are not lent out.	与此同时，中国各大银行有40%的储蓄无法转化成贷款。


One might thus think that returns to capital are low in China.	有人大概会认为这是资产回报低的缘故。


But one would be wrong: studies have consistently shown that the rate of return to capital has been more than 10% since the late 1990s.	但这个看法也是错误的，因为有研究显示中国的资产回报率自1990年代以来一直都高于10%。


Why then, can’t China’s SMEs rely on the formal financial sector to finance their daily operations?	那么中国的中小企业为何要依赖民间金融市场来获取日常营运资金？


To be sure, it is not easy for SMEs in other countries to get formal financing.	这是因为虽然其他国家的中小企业在争取银行贷款方面也相对较难，但其困难程度无法与中国相比；


But not many countries are experiencing the same level of difficulties; surveys consistently show that only about 10% of Chinese SMEs’ finance comes from banks, while the global average doubles.	一系列调查都显示只有约10%的中国中小企业融资来自银行，是全球水平的1/2。


Moreover, none of these countries has a capital surplus of China’s magnitude.	此外也没有一个国家拥有中国这样巨大的贸易顺差。


The main impediment in China is local governments, which compete with SMEs for bank loans and inevitably crowd them out from the formal banking sector.	而中小企业融资的主要障碍则是中国的地方政府，它们和中小企业争夺贷款并不出意外地将后者挤压出正式金融部门。


Local governments rely on bank credit to invest in infrastructure and real-estate development.	地方政府以来银行信贷来支撑基础设施建设和房地产发展。


A report released early this year by the People’s Bank of China showed that close to one-third of the country’s total outstanding loans, or 14 trillion renminbi ($2.2 trillion), were owed by local governments.	中国人民银行今年年初发布的报告显示全国近1/3的未偿还贷款（14万亿人民币，折合2. 2万亿美元）由地方政府欠下。


In the last few years, 30-40% of bank credits went to government infrastructure projects.	在过去几年，有30~40%的贷款被投入政府基础设施建设项目。


Another impediment is the dominance of large banks.	另外一个障碍则是大银行的统治地位。


The four largest banks in China account for 60% of the country’s total bank lending.	中国四大银行的贷款额占全国总量的60%。


While the US banking sector is similarly concentrated, it has far more financial institutions – roughly 18,000 commercial banks, savings and locals associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions, compared to only around 400 commercial banks and 3,000 rural credit unions and township banks in China.	虽然美国的银行部门也同样高度集中，但除此之外依然存在约1. 8万家金融机构，包括商业银行、储蓄贷款协会，共同储蓄银行以及信贷联盟，相比之下中国只有大概400家商业银行，3000家农村信用合作社以及相关城镇金融机构。


This means that banks in China on average are larger than in the US, especially in view of the difference in the size of the two countries’ GDP.	这意味着中国各银行的平均规模要比美国更大，如果考虑到两国GDP规模的巨大差异的话，这一点就更加显著。


Large banks tend to lend to large companies in order to save costs.	为了节省成本，大型银行都倾向于大企业贷款。


This bias is mitigated in advanced economies by various flexible financing tools offered by large banks.	在先进经济体中，这种偏袒现象可以通过大银行提供的各种灵活金融工具来抵消。


For example, a small business with a decent credit history can borrow large amounts with a major credit card.	比如说信用历史良好的小企业可以通过一张由大机构发行的信用卡来借到很大一笔资金。


This is absent in China.	但这种做法在中国尚不存在。


In the end, it is the crippled financial system that is driving the wedge between China’s large surplus of capital and formal financing for the country’s SMEs.	最后，正是这个跛脚的金融系统成为了横亘在中国巨大贸易顺差与中小企业正式金融部门通道之间的障碍。


Indeed, in some parts of southern China, the informal financial sector is growing to match the size of the formal financial sector.	事实上在中国南部的某些地区，民间金融部门正不断增大以适应正规金融部门的规模。


From depositors’ point of view, participating in the informal sector is a rational choice.	而从储蓄者的角度看，参与民间金融部门也是个理性的选择。


Bank interest rates on savings are lower than the inflation rate – and many multiples lower than the rates promised by the informal sector.	正式银行储蓄利率不但赶不上通胀率——甚至比民间集资者承诺的利率还要低许多倍。


Default rates in the informal sector are high, and lenders may disappear with depositors’ money, as happened in Wenzhou.	民间部门的默认利率都相当高，而且正如温州所发生的那样，集资者也会携款潜逃。


But, despite these risks, investing in the informal market can still be a better choice than keeping one’s money in the bank.	但尽管存在这些风险，投资民间金融市场依然要比存银行更加划算。


The record of the last 20 years shows that the Chinese monetary and banking authorities have a habit of taking an ostrich approach to the informal financial sector, pretending that they are regulating the sector until serious problems emerge.	过去20年的历史显示中国的货币和银行监管部门都喜欢对民间金融部门采取鸵鸟政策，自欺欺人地假装在监管这个领域，直到严重问题爆发为止。


This approach cannot last forever, and changing it means acknowledging the backwardness of the formal financial sector and taking remedial action.	这不是长久之计，而改变则意味着必须认识到正式金融部门的缺点并采取补救措施。


An immediate step that the authorities should take, as many economists have argued for years, is to allow the saving rate to reflect the cost of investment.	而正如许多经济体多年来所提出的那样，相关部门应当迅速改变利率机制，使储蓄利率能反映投资的成本。


That way, ordinary depositors would put their savings back into banks, because the formal financial sector would offer them a way to tap into the benefits offered by China’s phenomenal growth.	这样一般储户才能再次将钱存入银行，因为正式金融部门将提供给他们一个分享中国巨大增长的机会。


With more deposits at their disposure and a more flexible interest rate policy, banks would be able to price risks more easily and thus lend more to SMEs.	而银行一方面能拥有更多的可支配储蓄，另一方面具备更灵活的利率政策，因此也能更容易地评估风险价格并因此贷款给广大中小企业。


China’s Cyber-Warriors	中国的网络战士


NEW DELHI – The world now accepts that protecting our atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere – the “global commons” – is the responsibility of all countries.	新德里 —— 对于每个国家都有责任保护大气层、水圈、岩石圈和生物圈等“全球公域”这一点，全世界已经达成了共识；


The same norm must apply to cyberspace, which is critical to our everyday life, economic well-being, and security.	而对于在我们的日常生活、经济福祉与安全中具有至关重要地位的网络空间，我们也必须实施同样的规范。


At a time when cyber attacks are increasing worldwide, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was right to declare that an attack on one nation’s computer networks “can be an attack on all.”	在这个全球范围内、网络攻击日渐高发的时代，美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿采取了正确的做法，她宣布对一国计算机网络所实施的攻击 “将是对全体的攻击”。


Indeed, the attacks are a reminder that, as a new part of the global commons, cyberspace already has come under threat.	事实上，这些攻击便是在提醒人们：网络空间这一全球公域中新的成员，已经处在了威胁之下。


Cyberspace must be treated, along with outer space, international waters, and international airspace, as property held in common for the good of all.	网络空间必须与外层空间、国际水域以及国际空域一道，被视作为全人类所共有并造福于所有人的财产；


And, like ocean piracy and airplane hijacking, cyber-crime cannot be allowed to go unpunished if we are to safeguard our common assets and collective interests.	而如果我们打算保卫这份共有财产与集体利益的话，那么网络犯罪就应当如海盗行为与劫机行为一样，绝不能被允许逍遥法外。


Naming China among a handful of countries that have stepped up Internet censorship, Clinton warned that “a new information curtain is descending across much of the world.”	克林顿将中国列入一批已加强网络审查的国家名单之中，并就此警告说：“一道新的信息大幕已在全球许多地区降下”。


Her statement, with its allusion to the Cold War-era Iron Curtain, amounted to an implicit admission that the central assumption guiding US policy on China since the 1990’s – that assisting China’s economic rise would usher in greater political openness there – has gone awry.	她的此番声明与关于冷战期间铁幕的暗示，相当于含蓄承认了自上世纪九十年代以来，引导美国对华政策的核心假设（即认为帮助中国经济崛起，将会为该国带来更大的政治开放性），已经出现了问题。


The strategy of using market forces and the Internet to open up a closed political system simply is not working. Indeed, the more economic power China has accumulated, the more adept it has become in extending censorship to cyberspace.	利用市场力量与互联网，以使封闭的政治体系得以开放的战略，明显没有奏效。 事实上，中国所积累的经济力量越大，该国就越是变得擅长于将审查制度向网络空间进行推广。


If anything, China has proven that a country can blend control, coercion, and patronage to stymie the Internet’s politically liberalizing elements.	中国至少已经证明了一国可以融合控制、强制与施以恩惠等多种手段，以阻碍互联网在政治层面上具有自由化效应的元素。


Through discreet but tough controls, Beijing pursues a policy of wai song, nei jin – relaxed on the outside, vigilant internally.	通过谨慎却又强硬的控制措施，北京方面执行了一种外紧内松的政策（即外表松懈，内部警惕）。


Google is now crying foul over “ a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China.”	谷歌如今正在痛诉受到了一场“来自中国的、针对本公司基础设施的、高度复杂且极具针对性的攻击”。


But, despite its corporate motto – “Don’t be evil” – Google itself was instrumental in aiding online censorship in China, having custom-built a search engine that purges all references and Web sites that the Chinese government considers inappropriate.	不过，尽管该公司有着“不要作恶”的格言，但它自身却在协助中国实施网络审查方面发挥过作用，谷歌为该国量身定制了一款搜索引擎，其搜索结果清除了所有被中国政府认为不妥的关联词与网站。


Now Google itself has become a victim of China’s growing cyber prowess, in the same way that appeasement of Hitler boomeranged onto France and Britain.	正如当年英法两国对希特勒实施绥靖战略、最终却自作自受一样，谷歌如今也成为了中国日益增强的网络能力之受害者。


China deploys tens of thousands of “ cyber police” to block Web sites, patrol cyber-cafes, monitor the use of cellular telephones, and track down Internet activists. But the threat to the new global commons comes not from what China does domestically.	中国部署了数万名“网警”，以封锁网站、在网吧中进行巡查、监控移动电话的使用、并追踪互联网上的活跃人士。


Rather, it comes from the way in which the know-how that China has gained in fashioning domestic cyber oversight is proving invaluable to it in its efforts to engage in cyber intrusion across its frontiers.	但全球新的公域所受之威胁，并非来自于中国在其国内的做法，而是来自于另一个方面：即中国在构建国内网络监控这一过程中所学到的技术，已被证明对其从事跨境网络入侵的努力具有无从估量的价值这一点。


Canadian researchers have discovered a vast Chinese surveillance system called “GhostNet,” which can compromise computers in organizations abroad through booby-trapped e-mail messages that automatically scan and transfer documents to a digital storage facility in China. This is what happened when computers of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India, were attacked last year.	加拿大研究者已经发现了中国的一个巨型监控系统 —— “幽灵网络”，该系统可以通过内含恶意代码的电子邮件侵入外国组织的计算机中，这些邮件可以自动进行扫描、并将文件传回位于中国的一个数字存储设施。 这便是去年位于印度达兰萨拉地区的西藏流亡政府的计算机受到攻击时所上演的一幕。


India’s national security adviser recently complained that his office was targeted yet again by hackers.	印度国家安全顾问于近日抱怨道，其办公室的电脑又一次成为了黑客的目标，他指出：“人们看起来很确信，攻击者是中国方面。


“People seem to be fairly sure it was the Chinese,” he said. Officials in Germany, Britain, and the US have acknowledged that hackers believed to be from China also have broken into their government and military networks.	”德国、英国以及美国的官员同样也承认：据信来自于中国的黑客，已侵入其政府与军方的网络之中。


The state-sponsored transnational cyber threat is at two levels.	这种受到国家支持的跨国网络威胁包括两个层次。


The first is national, with the hackers largely interested in two objectives. One is to steal secrets and gain an asymmetrical advantage over another country.	其中第一层带有国家性质，黑客主要关注于两种目标：一种目标是窃取机密、获得对他国的不均衡优势。


Cyber intrusion in peacetime allows the prowler to read the content and understand the relative importance of different computer networks so that it knows what to disable in a conflict situation.	和平时期的网络入侵，使侵入者可以知晓网络中的内容、并了解不同计算机网络的相对重要性，这样它便知道在冲突发生时、应当使哪些网络陷入瘫痪了。


The other objective is commercial: to pilfer intellectual property.	另一种目标则事关商业方面，即窃取知识产权。