In the interwar Great Depression, the economist Irving Fisher accurately described the process of debt deflation, in which lenders, worried by the deterioration of their asset quality, called in their loans, pushing borrowers to liquidate assets.	在两次世界大战间的大萧条中，经济学家欧文·费雪（Irving Fisher）准确地描述了债务通缩的过程，在这一过程中，对其资产质量恶化感到担忧的借款人，催收他们的贷款，这迫使借款人清算资产。


That, in turn, merely drove down prices further, leading to more credit rationing, bankruptcies, and bank failures.	而这只会进一步使价格下降，导致更多的信贷配��，破产以及银行倒闭。


The political response to deflation is to call for a stronger state.	对通缩的政治回应，是呼吁国家变得更为强有力。


Dealing with deflation is impossible within the bounds of normal market operations.	在常规市场操作的范围内应对通缩是不可能的。


Only the state is reliable enough to take on all debt, which private institutions are too risk-intolerant to hold.	只有国家足够可靠到去承担所有的债务，对此私人机构因为无法承受其风险而不愿持有。


But economists’ abstract description of the resulting state intervention as an expansion of “aggregate demand” conceals the fact that the government conducts specific expenditures and makes political decisions that rescue specific businesses and individuals.	但是，经济学家将对因而发生的国家干预抽象地描述为“总需求”的扩张，掩盖了政府进行具体支出和救助具体行业和个人的政治决策的事实。


In the climate of scarcity that characterizes debt deflations, the specificity of bailout operations inevitably leads to intense political debate.	在以稀缺为特征的债务通缩背景下，援救操作的具体性不可避免地导致了激烈的政治争论。


We see this in the current discussion about the distributional effects of rescuing the automobile industry; or the worry that hedge funds, which are widely blamed for today’s financial malaise, should have access to the Fed’s emergency credit lines.	我们在当前有关救助汽车业的分配效应的讨论中，能看到这一点； 在对冲基金有权使用美联储的紧急信用额度的担忧中——对冲基金被广泛认为应该对现在的金融危机负责，也看到了这一点。


Currently, parallels are being drawn to Japan’s experience in the 1990’s – a “lost decade” in economic terms that also undermined the legitimacy of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.	当前，有人将危机和日本20世纪90年代的经历进行对比——这是日本“失去的十年”，在经济方面它也削弱了日本执政的自民党的正当性。


The Great Depression produced more alarming outcomes, as the political response to deflation throughout Central Europe and Latin America destroyed the prevailing order, including several democracies.	当中欧和拉丁美洲对通缩的政治回应破坏了主流的秩序时，大萧条产生了更加震撼的结果。


Statism has been a characteristically twentieth-century response to new uncertainty. Its inadequacy may lead to the formulation of a much older answer: revulsion against the market economy, accompanied by indiscriminate condemnation of debt and debt instruments.	中央集权是20世纪对新的不确定性的典型回应，其不足可能会导致一个早前出现过的反应的形成：伴随着对债务和债务工具不加区分的指责，人们产生了对市场经济强烈的反感。


Indeed, as governments scramble to respond to the current crisis, we should remember that deflation tends to produce not only radical anti-capitalism, but also a profound hostility to any kind of economic or political organization.	事实上，当政府手忙脚乱地对当前的危机作出回应时，我们应该记住，通缩不仅会导致激进的反资本主义，也会使人们对各种经济或政治组织产生深刻的敌意。


The Deflation Bogeyman	通缩鬼怪


BRUSSELS – Central banks throughout the developed world have been overwhelmed by the fear of deflation.	布鲁塞尔—发达世界的中央银行被通缩恐慌压得喘不过气来。


They shouldn’t be: The fear is unfounded, and the obsession with it is damaging.	本不应该如此：这一恐慌没有根据，沉溺于此十分危险。


Japan is a poster child for the fear.	日本是通缩恐慌的典型代表。


In 2013, decades of (gently) falling prices prompted the Bank of Japan to embark on an unprecedented monetary offensive.	2013年，几十年的物价（温和）下跌促使日本银行采取了前所未有的货币攻势。


But while headline inflation increased for a while, the factors driving that increase – a competitive depreciation of the yen and a tax increase – did not last long.	但尽管标题通胀一度上升，推动这一上升的因素——日元竞争性贬值和增税——并不持久。


Now, the country is slipping back into near-deflation – a point that panicked headlines underscore.	如今，日本又回到了接近通缩的状态——慌张的标题纷纷大力报道。


But, contrary to the impression created by media reports, the Japanese economy is far from moribund.	但是，与媒体报道所营造的印象相反，日本经济离行将就木还有十万八千里。


Unemployment has virtually disappeared; the employment rate continues to reach new highs; and disposable income per capita is rising steadily.	失业几乎不存在； 就业率不断创出新高；


In fact, even during Japan’s so-called “lost decades,” per capita income grew by as much as it did in the United States and Europe, and the employment rate rose, suggesting that deflation may not be quite as nefarious as central bankers seem to believe.	人均可支配收入稳步上升。 事实上，即使在日本所谓的“失去的几十年”期间，人均收入增长也与美国和欧洲相当，而就业率的增加表明通缩也许并不像央行行长们所认为的那样可恶。


In the US and Europe, there is also little sign of an economic calamity resulting from central banks’ failure to reach their inflation targets.	在美国和欧洲，也没有迹象表明会发生因为央行没能实现通胀目标而导致经济灾难。


Growth remains solid, if not spectacular, and employment is rising.	增长虽然不漂亮，但保持稳定，就业也在增加。


There are two key problems with central banks’ current approach.	央行的当前方针有两个关键问题。


First, they are focused on consumer prices, which is the wrong target.	首先，它们着重于消费物价，而这是个错误的目标。


Consumer prices are falling for a simple reason: energy and other raw material prices have declined by more than half in the last two years.	消费物价下跌的原因很简单：能源和其他原材料价格在过去两年下跌了一大半。


The decline is therefore temporary, and central banks should look past it, much as they looked past the increase in consumer prices when oil prices were surging.	因此，这一下跌是暂时性的，央行应该将眼光跳过它，正如在石油价格节节攀升时跳过消费物价的增加。


Instead, central banks should focus on the rate of revenue increase, measured in nominal GDP growth; that is, after all, what matters for highly indebted governments and enterprises.	相反，央行应该着重于以名义GDP增长衡量的收入增长率； 毕竟，对于重债政府和企业来说，这才是重要的事情。


By this measure, there is no deflation: The GDP price index (called GDP deflator) in developed countries is increasing by 1-1.5%, on average.	从这一指标看，根本没有通缩：发达国家GDP价格指数（称为GDP平减指数）平均增长率为1—1. 5%。


In the eurozone, it is rising at 1.2%.	在欧元区，该指标增长率为1.


This may fall short of the European Central Bank’s target of “below but close to 2%,” but not by a margin substantial enough to justify the ECB’s increasingly aggressive use of monetary instruments to stimulate the economy.	2%。 这也许还没有到达欧洲央行“低于但接近2%”的目标，但显然无法论证欧洲央行日益激进地动用货币工具刺激经济。


Moreover, nominal GDP growth exceeds the long-term interest rate.	此外，名义GDP增长超过长期利率。


When, as is usually the case, the long-term interest rate is higher than the GDP growth rate, the wealthy may accumulate wealth faster than the rest of the economy – a point made by the economist Thomas Piketty.	在通常情况下，长期利率高于GDP增长率，此时富人积累财富的速度比经济其余部分更快——经济学家托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）如是说。


But today, nominal GDP growth far exceeds average long-term interest rates (which, in some countries, include risk premia of up to 100 basis points) – even in the eurozone, where nominal GDP growth is expected to reach about 3% this year.	但如今，名义GDP增长远远超过长期利率（在一些国家，长期利率包括最多高大100个基点的风险溢价）——即使是欧元区也是如此，那里的名义GDP增长预计今年可达3%左右。


This means that financing conditions are as favorable as they were at the peak of the credit boom in 2007, and much better than they have been at any other point in the last 20 years.	这意味着融资环境与2007年信用繁荣顶峰时一样有利，也远比过去20年中的任何时点更好。


One might expect this evidence to compel central bankers to rethink their current concerns about deflation.	你也许指望这一证据能让央行行长们反思他们目前对通缩的担忧。


But they remain committed to pursuing their inflation targets, convinced that even a slight bout of deflation could initiate a downward spiral, with falling demand causing prices to decline further.	但他们仍致力于追求通胀目标，认定即使是轻微的通缩也可能引发下降螺旋，需求下降导致物价进一步下跌。


This is their second mistake.	这是他们的第二个错误。


Of course, a deflationary spiral is possible, and its consequences could be serious.	当然，通缩循环的可能性是有的，其结果也可能非常严重。


If real interest rates were significantly positive, demand could plummet, pushing down prices to the point that it becomes impossible for borrowers to service their debts.	如果真实利率显著为正，需求可能崩溃，从而拖累物价，使得借款人不再能够维持债务。


Such a spiral contributed to the Great Depression in the US in the 1930s, with prices falling, in some years, by some 20-30%.	这一通缩循环导致了20世纪30年代的美国大萧条，几年内物价下跌了20—30%。


But we are nowhere near such conditions today.	但我们现在距离这样的环境还十分遥远。


In fact, nominal interest rates are at zero, while the broadest price indices are increasing, albeit gently.	事实上，名义利率处于零水平，而广义物价指数正在上升（尽管幅度很小）。


Given that financing conditions are so favorable, it is not surprising that domestic demand has remained robust, allowing unemployment to return to pre-crisis lows almost everywhere.	考虑到融资条件如此有利，毫不奇怪内需依然强劲，几乎所有国家的失业率都回到了危机前的低点。


The eurozone is the only large developed economy where unemployment remains substantial, and thus the only economy where the case could be made for a downside risk of deflation.	欧元区是唯一一个失业仍然严重的大型发达经济体，因此也是唯一一个应该考虑通缩风险的经济体。


But even in the eurozone, GDP growth is slightly above its (admittedly very meager) potential, so that the remaining output gap is being closed gradually.	但即使是欧元区，GDP增长也略高于潜在水平（平心而论，其潜在水平相当低迷），因此，依然存在的产出缺口正在逐渐填��。


Furthermore, the only reason why unemployment remains high in the eurozone is that the labor-force participation rate has continued to increase throughout the recession; and, indeed, employment is returning to pre-crisis levels.	此外，欧元区失业保持高企的唯一原因是劳动力参与率在整个衰退期间继续上升； 而事实上，就业水平正在回归危机前水平。


This is the exact opposite of what the deflation hawks warn about.	这与通缩鹰派所警告的内容正好相反。


The popular “discouraged worker” hypothesis holds that a slide into deflation is costly, because a long recession induces workers to leave the labor force altogether.	流行的“沮丧的工人”假说认为，滑向通缩代价高昂，因为长期衰退让工人彻底离开劳动力大军。


That is simply not the case in Europe today.	这绝不是当今欧洲的情形。


The evidence is clear.	证据是明确的。


Developed-economy central banks should overcome their irrational fear of a deflationary spiral, and stop trying desperately to stimulate demand.	发达经济体央行应该克服它们对通缩螺旋的不理性的恐慌，停止不顾一切地刺激需求。


Otherwise, they will find themselves with massively expanded balance sheets, and very little to show for it.	否则，它们将背负大幅扩张的资产负债表而做不出什么成绩。


Deflation Doldrums?	通缩之忧？


CAMBRIDGE – The rate of inflation is now close to zero in the United States and several other major countries. The Economist recently reported that economists it had surveyed predict that consumer prices in the US and Japan will actually fall for 2009 as a whole, while inflation in the euro zone will be only 0.6%.	坎布里奇——美国和其他一些主要国家的通货膨胀率现在接近为零。 《经济学人》最近报道说，他们所调查的经济学家们预测美国和日本的消费价格水平在2009年实际上将会总体下降，欧元区的通胀率则将仅为0.


South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand will also see declines in consumer price levels.	6%。 韩国，台湾和泰国也会出现消费价格水平下降。


The prospect of falling prices reflects the collapse of industrial production, the resulting high level of unemployment, and the dramatic decline in commodity prices.	价格下降的前景反映出工业生产的崩溃，随之而来的高失业率，以及商品价格的急剧下降。


Industrial production is falling at double-digit rates in the negative-inflation countries, and the price index for all commodities is down more than 30% over the past year.	在负通胀的国家，工业生产正以两位数的速度下降，所有商品的价格指数同比都下降了超过30%。


Deflation is potentially a very serious problem, because falling prices – and the expectation that prices will continue to fall – would make the current economic downturn worse in three distinct ways.	通货紧缩可能将会是一个非常严重的问题，因为下降的价格，以及价格会继续下降的预期将会导致现在的经济衰退以三种不同的方式恶化。


The most direct adverse impact of deflation is to increase the real value of debt.	通缩最直接的不利影响是会增加债务的实际价值。


Just as inflation helps debtors by eroding the real value of their debts, deflation hurts them by increasing the real value of what they owe.	如同通胀会通过减少债务的实际价值来帮助债务人，通缩会以增加他们所欠债务的实际价值的方式来损害他们。


While the very modest extent of current deflation does not create a significant problem, if it continues, the price level could conceivably fall by a cumulative 10% over the next few years.	虽然现在极其轻微的通缩不会产生严重问题，但如果继续下去，价格水平可想而知将会在接下来的几年中累积下降超过10%。


If that happens, a homeowner with a mortgage would see the real value of his debt rise by 10%.	如果发生这一幕，贷款买房者就会发现他的债务的实际价值增加了10%。


Since price declines would bring with them wage declines, the ratio of monthly mortgage payments to wage income would rise.	由于价格下降也会导致他们的工资下降，每月贷款所占工资总额的比例就会上升。


In addition to this increase in the real cost of debt service, deflation would mean higher loan-to-value ratios for homeowners, leading to increased mortgage defaults, especially in the US.	除了债务实际成本的上升，通缩对房屋拥有者还意味着更高的贷款与房屋价值比率，会增加贷款拖欠现象，尤其是在美国。


A lower price level would also increase the real value of business debt, weakening balance sheets and thus making it harder for companies to get additional credit.	更低的价格水平还会增加商业债务的实际价值，削弱资产负债表，从而让公司更难获得额外的信贷。


The second adverse effect of deflation is to raise the real interest rate, that is, the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of “inflation.”	通缩的第二个不良作用就是抬升实际利率，即名义利率和“通胀”率之差。


When prices are rising, the real interest rate is less than the nominal rate since the borrower repays with dollars that are worth less.	当价格上涨时，实际利率必要比名义利率低，因为贷款人所还的美元贬值了。


But when prices are falling, the real interest rate exceeds the nominal rate.	但当价格下跌时，实际利率则高于名义利率。


This is exacerbated by the fact that borrowers can deduct only nominal interest payments when calculating their taxable income.	而贷款人在计算他们的应纳税收入时只能减掉所支付的名义利息的事实更加剧了这种情况。


Because the US Federal Reserve and other central banks have driven their short-term interest rates close to zero, they cannot lower rates further in order to prevent deflation from raising the real rate of interest.	因为美联储和其它各央行已将短期利率降得几近零点，所以它们也无法为防止通缩抬升实际利率而进一步降息。


Higher real interest rates discourage credit-financed purchases by households and businesses.	更高的实际利率会遏制家庭和公司的信贷消费。


This weakens overall demand, leading to steeper declines in prices.	而这就削弱了总体需求，导致更大幅度的价格下跌。


The resulting unusual economic environment of falling prices and wages can also have a damaging psychological impact on households and businesses.	随之而来的价格和工资普降的非常经济环境又会给家庭和公司造成破坏性的心理影响。


With deflation, we are heading into unknown territory.	在通缩影响下，我们正进入一片未知领地。


If prices fall at a rate of 1%, could they fall at a rate of 10%?	如果价格下降1%，那么还会下降10%么？


If the central bank cannot lower interest rates further to stimulate the economy, what will stop a potential downward spiral of prices?	如果央行不能继续降息来刺激经济，那么有什么能阻止价格的持续下跌呢？


Such worries undermine confidence and make it harder to boost economic activity.	这样的忧虑有损信心，并令推动经济活动的工作变得更加艰难。


Some economists have said that the best way to deal with deflation is for the central bank to flood the economy with money in order to persuade the public that inflation will rise in the future, thereby reducing expected real long-term interest rates.	有些经济学家曾说应对通缩的最佳办法是让央行超量供应货币以让公众相信在未来会发生通胀，从而降低预期的实际长期利率。


That advice would lead central banks to keep expanding the money supply and bank reserves even after doing so no longer lowers interest rates.	这一建议会让各央行继续扩大货币供应量，并且甚至在采取如此举措后不再降低利率。


In fact, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan are doing just that under the name of “quantitative easing.”	实际上，美联储、英格兰银行和日本银行正在以“定量宽松（quantitative easing）”的名义这样做。


Not surprisingly, central bankers who are committed to a formal or informal inflation target of about 2% per year are unwilling to abandon their mandates openly and to assert that they are pursuing a high rate of inflation.	毫不意外，致力于确保2%的（正式或非正式）年通胀率的央行官员们不愿意公开放弃成命并坚持说他们在追求更高的通胀率。


Nevertheless, their expansionary actions have helped to raise long-term inflation expectations toward the target levels.	不论如何，他们的扩张性举措有助于提升达成目标水平的长期通胀预期。


In the US, the interest rate on government bonds now rises from 1.80% at five years to 2.86% for 10-year bonds and 3.70% for 30-year bonds.	在美国，政府债券利率从五年期的1. 80%上升到十年期的2.


Comparing these interest rates with the yields on government inflation-protected bonds shows that the corresponding implied inflation rates are 0.9% for five years, 1.3% for 10 years and 1.7% for 30 years.	将其与政府的通胀保护债券相比显示出相应的预期通胀率为五年期0. 9%，十年期1.


Ironically, although central banks are now focused on the problem of deflation, the more serious risk for the longer term is that inflation will rise rapidly as their economies recover and banks use the large volumes of recently accumulated reserves to create loans that expand spending and demand.	具有讽刺意味的是，虽然各央行现在专注于应对通缩问题，但更长期、更严重的风险却是随着各国经济复苏和各银行动用新近获得的大量储备来创造扩大支出和需求的信贷，通胀会很快抬头。


REDD+ Handed in Paris	巴黎的REDD+


BERLIN – It’s been 30 years since the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations launched the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, the first global intergovernmental initiative to halt forest loss.	柏林—联合国粮农组织启动第一个全球政府间阻止森林流失的项目——热带森林行动计划已经三十年。


Since then, deforestation has continued unabated, and the latest international effort to stop it – an initiative known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) – looks no more likely to be effective.	三十年来，森林采伐之势从未减小，而最新的阻止滥伐措施——被称为“减少滥伐和毁林所致排放”（Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation，REDD+）——看上去也不太可能收到成效。


Far from protecting the world’s forests, the most notable outcome of these two agreements has been, ironically, the production of reams of expensive consultancy reports.	这两个协议远远没有达到保护世界森林的效果，其最邻人瞩目的结果反倒是昂贵咨询报告的层出不穷。


REDD+ was created as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the agreement governing its implementation is expected to be finalized during the UN Conference on Climate Change in Paris.	REDD+是联合国气候变化框架公约的一部分，而管理其实施的协定预计将在联合国气候变化巴黎会议上完成。


But if world leaders are serious about halting forest loss, they should instead abandon REDD+ and replace it with a mechanism that addresses the underlying drivers of large-scale deforestation.	但如果世界领导人认真对待阻止森林流失的问题，就应该放弃REDD+，替之以解决大规模采伐的根本动机的机制。


The flaws in REDD+ are evident in how it approaches the problem it is meant to solve.	REDD+的缺陷确凿地表现在它应对它意欲解决的问题的方法上。


The vast majority of its projects treat forest peoples and peasant farmers as the main agents of deforestation.	其绝大多数项目将林居民族和农民视为滥伐的主要群体。


REDD project developers seem to be especially fond of projects that focus on restricting traditional farming practices, even as they shy away from efforts to tackle the true causes of deforestation: the expansion of industrial agriculture, massive infrastructure projects, large-scale logging, and out-of-control consumption.	REDD项目开发者似乎腿与着重于限制传统农业的项目特别感兴趣，却回避真正的滥伐原因：工业化农业的扩张、大规模基础设施工程、大规模采伐作业以及失控的消费。


These shortcomings are exemplified in the Socio Bosque Program, a REDD+ initiative in Ecuador, in which efforts to control forest communities and peasant farming overlook the far larger potential damage caused by industrial activity.	这些缺陷在社会丛林计划（Socio Bosque Program）中尽显无疑。 社会丛林计划是REDD+的一个厄瓜多尔项目，它着眼于控制森林社区和农民耕作，却忽略了工业活动带来的远远更加巨大的潜在伤害。


Under the program, forest-dependent communities sign five-year agreements with the Ministry of Environment, agreeing to restrict forest use in return for small cash payments.	经过该计划，依赖森林生活的社区与环境部签署了一份为期五年的协议，同意限制森林使用，他们获得的回报是一小笔的现金补偿。


At the same time, the program’s documentation explicitly nullifies the agreement if the area under its jurisdiction becomes slated for oil exploitation or mining.	与此同时，该计划档案明确规定，如果其辖区成为油田或矿床，那么协议无效。


Today, peasant farmers are being barred from forests as part of the fight against climate change; tomorrow, the same forests could be uprooted in order to allow companies to extract the fossil fuels that are the underlying cause of the problem.	今天，农民被阻挡在森林之外，这是遏制气候变化的一部分； 明天，同一片森林可以被连根拔起，因为有公司要开采作为气候变化问题根源的化石燃料。


There is a disturbing rationale for this myopic focus on peasants and forest people and for the prominence of this approach on the agendas of international agencies and climate negotiators.	短视地将目标集中在农民和森林民族，并且这一方针在国际机构和气候谈判员的日程中占主导地位，其背后有一套危险的逻辑。


REDD+, it turns out, has less to do with stopping forest loss than with allowing industrialized countries to continue to pollute.	看起来，REDD+与阻止森林流是没有什么关系，倒是大方地允许工业化国家继续污染。


The approach underlying the initiative is part of a broader effort to create a market for emission credits, which would allow polluters to continue releasing greenhouse gases if they can produce a certificate attesting that they have contributed toward preventing a similar amount of emissions elsewhere.	该计划背后的方法是一盘更大的棋——建立排放额度市场的一部分。 排放额度市场允许污染者继续排放温室气体，只要它们获得证实它们在其他地方帮助阻止了等量排放的证明即可。


The forests being protected by REDD+ are important producers of these tradable certificates to pollute, known as carbon credits.	REDD+所保护的森林是这些可贸易污染资格——碳额度的重要来源。


And REDD implementation through experimental projects provides advocates of this approach a solid foundation on which to advance their agenda.	通过实验性项目实施REDD为这一方针的支持者提供了推动其日程的坚实基础。


For industrialized countries, carbon credits have proved to be an easy way to meet their international commitments under agreements like the Kyoto Protocol.	对工业化国家来说，碳额度可以让它们轻松实现在京都议定书等协议中做出的国际承诺。


If REDD credits are approved in Paris, countries and companies could pay peasant farmers in Ecuador or elsewhere to protect trees that programs like REDD+ claim they otherwise would have chopped down – thereby avoiding the need to make difficult structural changes to cut emissions at home.	如果REDD额度在巴黎获得通过，各国和各公司可以付钱给厄瓜多尔或其他地区的农民保护REDD+等项目规定可以采伐的树木——从而不必做出艰难的结构变化来削减国内排放。


Under the rules governing these transactions, the fact that no emissions were actually cut does not matter; what is important is that the tradable permission to pollute has been obtained.	根据约束这些交易的规则，实际排放量为零这一事实并不重要，重要的是获得了可交易的污染许可。


Unfortunately, few of those meeting in Paris have incentives to question this approach.	不幸的是，巴黎会议的与会者几乎没有激励质疑这一方针。


For governments, programs like REDD+ offer an opportunity to avoid politically costly changes.	对政府来说，REDD+这样的项目提供了一个避免政治成本高昂的变化的机会。


And for international conservation groups like The Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Wildlife Conservation Society, the program provides access to international development and philanthropic funding.	对于大自然保护协会（The Nature Conservancy）、保护国际（Conservation International）、世界野生动物基金（World Wildlife Fund）、野生动物保护协会（Wildlife Conservation Society）等国际保护组织来说，该计划带来了国际发展和慈善资金。


The biggest beneficiaries, of course, are the corporations whose hunger for land is driving most of the large-scale deforestation.	当然，最大的受益者是公司，它们对土地的饥渴是大部分大规模滥伐的动因。


In addition to allowing them to continue cutting down trees as long as they can produce the necessary carbon credits, REDD+ effectively shifts the blame for forest loss away from their actions and onto communities that have the greatest stake in forests’ long-term health.	除了允许它们继续砍树——只要它们能带来必须的碳额度，REDD+还在事实上将森林流失的罪魁从它们的行为转移到了与森林的长期健康关系最紧密的社区身上。


If the climate negotiators meeting in Paris are truly interested in halting forest loss and bringing climate change under control, they should pull the plug on REDD+ and address the underlying causes of these problems.	如果巴黎的气候谈判员真的想要阻止森林流失、控制气候变化，他们就应该抛弃REDD+，解决这些问题的根源。


Rather than attempting to control the lives and actions of forest peoples and peasant farmers, the effort in Paris should focus on ending large-scale deforestation and leaving fossil fuels in the ground.	巴黎的措施不应该是控制森林民族和农民的生活和行为，而应该着重于结束大规模滥伐、把化石燃料留在地底下。


Defusing Iran’s Oil Weapon	让伊朗的石油武器失去效用


Like North Korea, the Iranian government will not shy from a showdown over its nuclear program.	像北朝鲜一样，伊朗政府不会畏怯于在它的核计划问题进行摊牌。


Why should it?	为什么要畏怯呢？


A nuclear weapon is the ultimate guarantee that the United States can never do to Iran what it did to Iraq.	核武器正是让美国不敢像对伊拉克那样对付伊朗的终极保证。


Moreover, this struggle with the US rallies much-needed domestic support.	此外，这场与美国之间的斗争还可以收到他们迫切需要的国内支持。


What, then, can the US do to undermine Iran’s position?	那么，美国如何才能削弱伊朗的地位呢？


As the world’s fourth largest oil exporter, Iran has profited mightily from the tripling of global oil prices over the last four years.	作为世界上的第四大石油出口国，伊朗从过去四年来全球翻了三倍的石油价格中获得了巨大的利益。


Its economic stability is dependent on oil revenues, so it is here that Iran’s rulers are vulnerable.	它的经济稳定依赖于石油收入，而这正是伊朗统治者最最脆弱的地方。


American diplomats are never going to persuade the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran’s energy exports.	美国的外交官从来没有要求联合国安理会对伊朗的能源出口施加制裁。


But the Bush administration can seek ways to contain global energy prices – and it should begin by refusing to be baited into escalating tensions whenever Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pleases.	但是布什政府可以寻求办法来遏制全球的能源价格，而这应该首先从拒绝被伊朗总统内贾德引诱进他随心所欲地逐步增强的紧张局势开始。


Ahmadinejad has proven resourceful in driving the diplomatic conflict.	内贾德在挑起外交冲突上很有一套。


His government has rejected international calls to halt uranium enrichment, ignored UN-imposed deadlines, armed Iraqi militias, supplied Hezbollah with weapons for attacks on Israel, denied the Holocaust, and staged military exercises near the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world’s sea-traded oil passes.	他的政府拒绝国际社会要求它中止铀浓缩活动的呼吁，无视联合国要求的最后期限，武装伊拉克的民兵组织，提供武器给真主党与以色列进行战争，否认二战期间纳粹对犹太人的大屠杀，以及在霍尔姆兹海峡附近进行军事演习，世界上40%通过海上进行运输的石油需要从那里经过。


All these provocations add upward pressure on oil prices, enriching the Iranian government.	所有这些挑衅使得油价持续上涨，从而肥了伊朗政府的腰包。


When Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hinted that Iran could play the oil card, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dismissed the idea.	当最高领导人哈梅内伊暗示伊朗将会打石油牌时，美国国务卿赖斯并不相信他的说法。


“Let’s just remember that Iran is some 80% dependent on oil in its budget,” she said, so it is “not really able to live with a disruption.”	“别忘了伊朗大约80%的预算要依赖石油，”她说，所以如果它“中断石油供应的话它根本无法生存下去。 ”


But if Iran pulls modest amounts of its oil from international markets, price increases are likely to offset (perhaps completely) any loss in revenue from the supply cut.	但是如果伊朗略微减少一下它投放到国际市场上的石油数量，那么价格的上涨很有可能抵消（也许是全部）它因为减少出口数量而带来的损失。


In addition, threats to the Strait of Hormuz would allow Iran to force prices up without any reduction in output.	此外，对于霍尔姆兹海峡的威胁可以使伊朗无需减少出口量就迫使石油价格上涨。


It is not an accident that virtually every public move Iran’s government has made in the international arena over the past year has added risk to energy markets.	事实上去年伊朗政府每一次在国际舞台上的公开行动都增加了能源市场的风险并不是偶然的。


At times, the US has effectively – if unintentionally – undercut Iran’s position.	有些时候，美国有效地、也许不是有意地削弱了伊朗的地位。


This summer, the Bush administration offered Iran direct talks.	今年夏天，布什政府提出愿意与伊朗进行直接对话。


In September, Bush made an unexpectedly low-key speech to the UN General Assembly.	九月份，布什联合国大会上作了出人意料地低调的演讲。


Resistance to sanctions from Russia, China, and France has persuaded US officials to “allow more time for diplomacy” before pushing for punitive action in the Security Council.	俄罗斯、中国和法国的拒绝对实行制裁劝说美国官员在安理会采取惩罚性的行动前给“外交努力提供更多的时间”。


All of these choices helped return slack to energy markets.	所有这些选择都帮助平抑了能源市场的价格。


Oil prices have fallen from above $78 per barrel in mid-July to less than $60 in early October.	油价已经从七月中旬的每桶78美元降到了十月初的不到60美元。


The drop – due in no small measure to an easing of tensions over Iran’s nuclear program – is costing the Iranian government money, compounding the regime’s domestic problems.	这种下跌归功于为化解伊朗核计划问题的紧张局势所作的巨大努力，使伊朗政府丧失了金钱，也加剧了该政权的国内问题。


Inflation in Iran is rising, perhaps to as high as 20%.	伊朗国内的通货膨胀正变得越来越严重，也许已经达到了20%。


On October 1, Khamenei called on Ahmadinejad to address the growing problem.	哈梅内伊已经要求内贾德关注这一越来越严重的问题。


There are price freezes on certain subsidized goods and services, and rising inflation makes these subsidies even more expensive for the government.	某些补贴的物品和服务的价格是被冻结的，但是持续上升的通货膨胀使得这些补贴对于政府来说负担越来越重。


Indeed, the government indicates that it may begin rationing gasoline.	事实上，政府已经暗示它也许会实行石油配额制。


Unemployment stands at about 12%, and is probably twice as high among young people.	失业率达到了大约12%，而在年轻人中的比例也许是这个的两倍。


The US can undermine the Iranian regime by avoiding statements and actions that help drive energy prices higher and bolster Iran’s economy.	美国可以通过避免会导致能源价格上涨和稳固伊朗经济的声明和行动来削弱伊朗政权。


Administration officials should lower the political temperature.	政府官员应该降低政治温度。


They should again offer Iran direct talks.	他们应该向伊朗提出进行直接对话。


Bush should invite Ahmadinejad to Washington.	布什应该邀请内贾德到华盛顿来。


Better yet, invite him to Crawford.	甚至是请他到克劳福德农场去。


Make him breakfast.	为他做早餐。


Washington can also press the Saudis, who control virtually all of the world’s spare capacity, to keep their output high to contain prices.	华盛顿方面还应该敦促实际上掌控着世界上所有的闲置生产能力的沙特阿拉伯把它们的出口维持在一个高水平以遏制油价。


Saudi Arabia’s ruling Sunnis are more threatened than is the US by Iran’s support for a shift in the regional balance of power toward Shia Muslims.	沙特阿拉伯掌权的逊尼派比美国更多地受到伊朗支持让地区权力平衡倾向什叶派的威胁。


Yes, Ahmadinejad will probably find a way to re-escalate the conflict.	是的，内贾德也许会找到办法来重新挑起冲突。


No one can stop Iran from threatening the Strait of Hormuz.	没人能够阻止伊朗威胁霍尔姆兹海峡。


But no one can blame the US for that when Bush is offering to talk.	但是如果布什提出进行对话的话那么就没人能够再指责美国了。


Iran probably needs two or three years to develop a nuclear weapon.	伊朗也许还需要两到三年的时间才能造出核武器。


How strong will Ahmadinejad’s domestic position be then?	到那时候内贾德在国内的地位又将如何呢？


If the US does not provide him with threats that help rally domestic support, his failure to revitalize Iran’s economy will erode his standing at home.	如果美国不对他施加威胁从而帮助他获得国内支持，那么如果他无法重振经济就会削弱他在国内的地位。


Lower oil prices would mean less money to spend on domestic projects that buoy his popularity – or on the nuclear program.	更低的油价意味着可以花在会给他带来声望的国内工程，或者是核计划上的钱会少得多。


If cutting into Iran’s oil income fails to weaken Ahmadinejad, the US would retain military options.	如果减少伊朗的石油收入没能削弱内贾德的地位，那么美国还保留着采取军事行动的选择。


But undermining his domestic standing by limiting Iran’s revenues stands a better chance of succeeding than diplomatic efforts to persuade the regime to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily, or coercive sanctions.	但是通过鉴定限制伊朗的收入来削弱他的国内地位比通过外交努力来劝说他的政权自愿搁置铀浓缩活动或者强行采取制裁成功的可能性更大。


Easing tensions will not win Bush points with those who prefer a muscular strategy.	缓解紧张局势不会让布什得到那些主张采取强有力的战略的人的支持。


But the administration’s confrontational approach is failing, because it is precisely what Iran’s rulers want.	但是政府采取对抗的办法正面临着失败，因为这正是伊朗的统治者们所想要的。


Defusing Russia’s Energy Weapon	解除俄罗斯的能源武装


COPENHAGEN – As winter approaches, many people in Central and Eastern Europe remember the chill caused last winter by Russia’s deliberate cut-off of gas supplies.	发自哥本哈根——随着冬天的临近，居住在中东欧地区的人们又会再度回忆起去年冬天因俄罗斯故意停止天然气供应而带来的森森寒意。


That shutdown was a harsh reminder that gas is now the Kremlin’s primary political instrument as it seeks to re-establish its privileged sphere of interest in what it thinks of as Russia’s “near-abroad.”	那场冲突提醒人们，天然气现在已经变成了克林姆林宫最重要的政治工具，因为它正试图在那些自认为是俄罗斯“近邻”的地区重新确立自己的优先利益。


If Russia is allowed to continue imposing Moscow rules on Europe’s energy supplies, the result will be costly – not only for Europe, but for Russia as well.	而如果我们依然允许莫斯科在欧洲能源供应上颐指气使的话，那么付出的代价就将非常沉重——不但是欧洲，还有俄罗斯。


So it is past time that the European Union stopped treating energy as a bilateral issue, with some of the larger member states trying to protect their own narrow interests at the expense of the common European good.	欧盟把能源问题视为双边事务来处理的日子已成过去，因为目前有一些较大的成员国正尝试在牺牲欧洲整体利益的情况下维护自己的狭隘利益。


The EU urgently needs to build a common energy policy and a single market for natural gas.	对此欧盟迫切需要建立一个共同的天能源政策以及一个天然气的单一市场。


Until both are established, there is a grave risk that Russia will use new blockades to continue the kind of divide-and-rule policy that the world has witnessed since Vladimir Putin came to power.	倘若不能确立这两方面政策的话，那么可能引发的灾难性风险就是俄罗斯将会设立新的障碍，继续维持这个自普京上台执政以来就已经在全世界眼皮底下实施的“分而治之”策略。


The planned Nord Stream gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea is a good example of the problems that everyone in Europe is facing.	而那条计划在波罗的海底铺设的北溪天然气管道就是一个绝佳范例，让欧洲所面临的问题暴露无遗。


The pipeline has been established as a Russian-German-Dutch consortium, but it is the Russian energy giant Gazprom that is in the driver’s seat with 51% of the shares.	该管道由俄罗斯－德国－荷兰三国合资联营，但其中能源巨头俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司却独占51％的股份并因此牢牢掌握着主导权。


Nord Stream will enable Russia to deliver natural gas directly to Germany without using the existing land-based connections.	而铺设这条管道的作用，则是令俄罗斯可以直接将天然气输送到德国而无需借道现有的陆上管道。


At first glance, there seems to be no problem.	这件事初看上去没有什么问题。


But the real reason Russia wants to build Nord Stream – which is more expensive than the existing gas-pipeline network – is that it will enable Russia to interrupt gas supplies to EU member countries like Poland, the Baltic states, and neighbors like Ukraine, while keeping its German and other West European customers snug and warm.	但俄罗斯希望兴建北溪管道的真正原因——须知这条管线可比现有管网更为昂贵——则是这条管线可以让俄罗斯在切断某些欧盟国家（比如波兰），波罗的海国家和邻国（如乌克兰）天然气供应的同时，继续保持对德国以及其他西欧国家的天然气供应。


Countries that have good reason to fear a Russian manufactured chill have loudly proclaimed that Nord Stream is politically rather than economically motivated.	那些有充足理由去恐惧俄罗斯停供天然气的国家都为此大声呼吁，认为兴建北溪管道的政治目的远大于经济需要。


After all, it would be much cheaper to expand existing land pipelines than to build undersea.	毕竟扩展现有陆上管网的成本将比铺设海底管线便宜得多。


Moreover, Russia’s ability to meet future gas demand from commercially viable reserves suggests that Nord Stream could be used to cut off gas sales to unfavored clients.	此外俄罗斯足以满足未来需求的天然气商业开采储量也意味着北溪管道可以被用来切段对那些“不讨俄罗斯喜欢”的国家的供应。


Yet these concerns have been pushed aside by the powerful pro-Nord Stream lobby, led by former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who, having approved Nord Stream while in office, was quickly hired by Gazprom after he left it.	但这些关注却都被强大的北溪关系政治游说团抛到了一边，而该游说团正是由当年在位时批准了北溪管线计划，并在卸任后旋即受雇于俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司的德国前总理格哈德·施罗德所率领的。


In most democracies, such a move would have quickly received prosecutorial attention.	在大多数民主国家，这样的举动很快会受到监察部门的关注。


But no serious investigation of the propriety of Schröder’s dealings was ever launched, perhaps because of the scale and importance of German-Russian economic ties.	但对施罗德受雇于该公司的正当性的严肃调查却从来没有启动过，这可能是受制于德俄两国经济关系的范围和严重性。


This November, Nord Stream was given a surprising go-ahead by three Scandinavian countries that will lend their seabed to the project: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.	而在今年11月，北溪管道计划意外地得到了三个斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家（丹麦，瑞典和芬兰）的批准，三国还同意在本国领海的海床上铺设管线。


They seem to regard the case as a “technical issue,” and are now satisfied because environmental guarantees have been given.	而他们似乎只是将这个事件视为“技术性问题”，并在得到了环境保护方面的承诺之后就心满意足了。


But Nord Stream is no “technical issue.”	但北溪管道可不是一个“技术性问题”。


The concerns of countries that fear being left out in the cold must be addressed, which is why it is necessary to establish a single EU market for natural gas.	那些害怕遭到停气威胁的国家的意见必须得到尊重，而这也是为什么需要建立一个单一的欧盟天然气市场的原因。


That way, no one would be left exposed to Russian pressure.	只有这样，才能确保任何一个国家都不会匍匐于俄方的压力之下。


Europe undoubtedly needs Russian gas, but fears that this gives Russia a monopolistic stranglehold over Europe are exaggerated.	毫无疑问，欧洲需要俄罗斯的天然气，但对俄罗斯会因此而垄断并钳制欧洲的担心也是略显夸张了。


Russia’s share of total EU gas imports is just above 40% today, compared to 80% in 1980.	须知目前俄罗斯占欧洲天然气总进口量的份额才刚刚达到40%，已经比1980年的80%好了很多。


Moreover, Russian gas represents only 6-7% of the EU’s total primary energy supply.	此外，俄罗斯天然气只占欧洲基本能源总供应量的6%-7%。


So, in general, dependence on Russian gas should not be feared.	所以在总体上，我们无需在俄罗斯天然气依赖这个问题上如此恐慌。


The problem is that some countries in the eastern part of the EU are much more dependent on Russian gas than the average figures suggest.	但问题是许多位处东部的欧盟国家对俄罗斯天然气的依赖度高于平均水平。


Thus, they must be guaranteed the kind of solidarity that is fundamental to EU membership.	因此这些国家必须得到某种稳定的承诺，而这也是它们身为欧盟成员国所应得的。


Last year’s experience with interrupted gas supplies did have one benefit: new life was blown into plans for alternative routes, like the Nabucco pipeline that is to bring Azeri gas to Europe through Turkey.	当然，有了去年遭遇切断天然气供应的经验也有一个好处：新的可替代管线计划孕育着新的希望，比如借道土耳其将阿塞拜疆天然气输往欧洲的“纳布科”管线。


An early warning system on potential supply cuts has also been agreed between Russia and the EU.	欧盟和俄罗斯双方也达成了在可能停气之前事先知会对方的协议。


And it looks like Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has charmed Prime Minister Putin into concluding a new gas deal.	而充满魅力的乌克兰女总理尤丽亚·季莫申科似乎已经成功说服普京签订一个新的供气协定。


Yet anxiety remains high in the countries most exposed to new supply cuts.	但在那些最可能面临停气的国家中，恐慌依然严重。


It is in Russia’s own interest that the EU deal with it as a united entity.	此外，和作为一个统一整体的欧盟签订天然气协定也符合俄罗斯的利益。


Continued fear and uncertainty about Russian gas supplies would undoubtedly lead the most exposed EU countries to seek to protect themselves by blocking EU-Russia negotiations on new partnership and cooperation agreements.	对俄罗斯天然气供应的持续恐慌和不确定无疑会使那些最容易遭遇停气的国家想方设法阻挠欧盟和俄罗斯双方形成新的伙伴关系和合作协议。


In his State of the Nation speech this November, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stressed the need for modernization of the Russian economy.	就在今年11月的国情咨文讲话中，俄罗斯总统迪米特里·梅德韦捷夫强调了俄罗斯经济现代化的迫切需要。


Closer cooperation with the EU is the most obvious way to make this possible.	而与欧盟之间更紧密的联系很显然是实现这一目标的最佳路径。


But, so long as Russia is perceived as an energy blackmailer and not a partner, such cooperation will be impossible.	但只要俄罗斯一天还被视为一个敲诈者而不是一个合作者的话，这样的合作，就永远不可能发生。


Northeast Asia on the Brink	危险边缘的东北亚


TOKYO – China’s refusal to attend this year’s summit with Japan and South Korea as scheduled comes at a trying moment for all three countries.	东京——中国拒绝如期出席今年的中日韩峰会将三国拖入了困难时期。


Although Asia is the world’s most dynamic region, it has a paucity of institutional mechanisms for resolving – or at least mitigating – international disputes of the type that are ratcheting up tension across the region.	尽管亚洲地区活力居全球之冠，但却缺少解决——或至少是缓和——激化地区紧张局势的国际争端的组织机制。


Because the now-annual trilateral summits offer real hope for creating an institutionalized dialogue among Northeast Asia’s “Big Three,” China’s unwillingness to participate this year does not bode well.	因为当前的三方年度峰会带来了东北亚三巨头制度性对话的切实希望，中国不愿参与今年的峰会绝非好的预兆。


Of course, international summits are usually an occasion for countries to sign agreements, not for the hard bargaining that can begin to improve their relations with one another.	当然，各国往往选择在国际峰会上签署协议，而不是艰苦地讨价还价试图改善关系。


But with China, Japan, and South Korea due to meet at a time of growing tension among all three countries, the three leaders could have seized the moment to enhance strategic stability across Northeast Asia.	但此次中、日、韩在紧张关系升级之际会面，三国领导人本可以借此机会加强东北亚的战略稳定局势。


Instead, tensions are now likely to continue to fester.	但实际情况却恰恰相反，紧张关系很可能持续下去。


The first step in putting relations on a more stable footing is for each leader to acknowledge –and emphasize for their citizens – the ever-increasing interdependence of the three economies.	稳定关系的第一步是领导人承认并向民众强调三国经济越来越高的依存度。


Trade, investment, and production chains now link China, Japan, and South Korea in ways that no one could have imagined 20 years ago.	贸易、投资和生产链正在以20年前人们无法想象的方式将中、日、韩三国联系在一起。


As European history since 1945 has demonstrated, shared economic interests can provide a solid foundation for building both regional security, and ushering in historic reconciliations.	1945年以后的欧洲历史证明，共同的经济利益为实现区域安全和历史性和解奠定了的坚实基础。


Moreover, the region’s greatest threat – North Korea’s nuclear arsenal – endangers all three countries.	此外，作为地区头号威胁的朝鲜核武库同时损害了三国的利益。


While the threat may not affect them equally, none can afford a misstep.	尽管威胁有大有小，但失策的后果任何人都承受不起。


So even security interests can serve to foster greater cooperation, if the countries’ leaders discuss and develop a common approach.	因此如果三国领导人讨论并制定共同方案，安全利益同样可以促进合作。


The sad paradox, however, is that, as economic integration among China, Japan, and South Korea has deepened, and even as their security risks have sometimes merged, their diplomatic ties have deteriorated.	可悲的悖论是在中、日、韩一体化不断深入、甚至连安全风险都或有重合的同时，三国的外交关系却陷入不断恶化的境地。


Of course, none can fully entrust their security to the word of the others – Japan’s alliance with the United States is perhaps the only time in history when a great power has ever done that.	当然，谁都无法将自身安危系于别国的承诺，日美联盟或许是有史以来大国依靠承诺维系安全的唯一实例。


Each will undoubtedly pursue – and find the means to secure – its own interests.	各国无疑都将追求——并想方设法确保自身的利益。


But that does not mean that clashes are inevitable.	但这并不是说冲突是不可避免的。


In today’s Asia, it is impossible to manage rival ambitions through hegemony, given the size of the countries involved and the structure of their alliances.	鉴于当今亚洲的国家规模及联盟结构，通过霸权来控制对手的野心根本无法考虑。


So all three countries must learn to live together amicably.	因此这三国必须学会友好相处。


Here the first step is relatively straightforward:  all three countries must give greater weight to factoring into their diplomatic calculations the others’ national-security fears.	第一步相对简单：三国都必须在外交考量中更多地考虑到别国的安全担忧。


They also need to recognize that rhetoric and actions aimed at domestic audiences, no less than actual policies, can inflame suspicions.	他们还必须意识到，针对国内民众的言论行动和实际政策一样可以引发别国的疑虑。


Unfortunately, key groups in all three countries claim that the contest for regional mastery now underway means that talk about cooperation is not only naïve, but obsolete.	遗憾的是，中日韩三国主要团体称正在举行的地区争霸赛意味着探讨合作问题不仅幼稚、而且不合时宜。


Some Japanese and Korean strategic thinkers believe that China is intent not only on displacing the US as Asia’s leading power, but also on economic domination of the region.	有些日韩战略思想家认为中国不仅要取代美国的亚洲领导地位，而且要在经济上主宰亚洲。


They see a China seeking to re-establish itself as “The Middle Kingdom,” with its neighbors reduced to vassal and tributary states.	他们认为中国想重新成为“中央帝国”，而邻国则只能俯首称臣。


While China’s military capacities are no match for America’s, its current military build-up is viewed as posing unacceptable risks nonetheless, because China also is seeking technological means to negate America’s military advantages.	尽管中国的军事实力与美国不可同日而语，但因为中国正在寻找削弱美国优势的技术手段，其目前的军事集结仍被视作为不可接受的危险之举。


Should China succeed, its neighbors – which are increasingly tied to its economy – might adjust their policies to appease Chinese preferences.	如果中国取得成功，与中国经济关系日益紧密的邻国就有可能为了取悦中国而调整自己的政策。


A Sino-centric Asia could emerge without a shot being fired.	中国有可能不费一枪一弹就成为亚洲的核心国。


But the region looks very different through Chinese eyes.	但中国人眼中的地区局势却是完全不同的样子。


From this perspective, a declining US is doing everything that it can to thwart China’s rise.	从他们的角度看，日渐衰落的美国正用尽一切手段阻挠中国的崛起。


America might speak the language of cooperation, but its real game is containment.	美国人可能整天把合作挂在嘴边，但遏制才是真正的目的。


So any sustained cooperation with the US and its regional allies – Japan and South Korea – would only help America to shackle China.	因此与美国及其地区盟国日韩的任何长期合作都只会帮助美国捆住中国的手脚。


Instead, China should openly confront those neighbors with which it has disputed claims.	恰恰相反，中国应该公然对抗那些提出争议要求的邻国。


Given these disparate visions of what Asia looks like, is there any point in seeking cooperation among Northeast Asia’s Big Three?	鉴于对亚洲局势的看法相去甚远，在东北亚三巨头之间寻求合作究竟有没有意义？


A China that balks at participating in a trilateral summit seems to think there is not.	拒绝出席三边峰会的中国似乎给出了否定的答复。


If challenged, all three would undoubtedly do what they must to preserve their security.	如果受到挑战，三国无疑都将为了维护自身的安全而竭尽全力。


But to adopt confrontation as their preferred strategy would be a serious mistake.	但以对抗作为首选战略将成为严重的失误。


Any conflict among them would leave them all significantly worse off.	三国间爆发任何冲突都将严重损害所有三方的利益。


And, when peace was restored, they would find themselves back at square one, still needing to build a regional order in which the others would play a big part.	而且重建和平后，他们将发现自己再度回到原点，无法避开建设另两方起重要作用的地区秩序。


The current situation in Northeast Asia does not require any of the three countries to abandon cherished national claims.	东北亚的当前局势并不需要三国中任何一国放弃珍视的民族要求。


But their leaders must distinguish between those that are aspirations and those that are realizable, and they must begin to explain to their citizens this distinction.	但三国领导人必须在愿望和现实间加以区别，并且必须对国内民众做出解释。


None should reduce their diplomatic and security relations to a zero-sum game over claims to this or that island, for example. Nor should China’s continued rise, Korea’s eventual reunification, or Japan’s renaissance be regarded by the others as a strategic threat.	举例来讲，三方均不应为了某个小岛而把外交和安全关系变为一场零和游戏，而且中国的持续崛起、朝鲜的最终统一抑或日本的复兴也不应被另外两国视为战略威胁。


Crisis management is no way to sustain relationships that are economically close but riddled by rival claims and bitterly contested historical narratives.	危机管理根本无法维系经济关系密切、但主权要求和历史主张相反的国与国关系。


As long as China, Japan, and South Korea regard every encounter with one another as an opportunity to settle scores or gain some strategic advantage, brinkmanship will remain Northeast Asia’s fate.	只要中日韩三国继续把每一次接触都看作算旧帐或夺取战略优势的机会，东北亚就始终无法逃脱边缘政策的命运。


Indeed, the main beneficiary of the current tensions among the Big Three is the region’s most reckless actor – North Korea.	事实上，三巨头目前的紧张关系让地区最不计后果的朝鲜成了最大的受益者。


That outcome is as frustrating as it is ironic.	这样的结果令人沮丧，而且充满讽刺。


None of the Big Three can be seriously threatened without triggering direct resistance and the security guarantees of allies.	只要不触发盟国的直接对抗和安全保障承诺，三巨头就都不会面临真正的威胁。


For this reason, the leaders should find a way to meet soon and commit themselves to seeking genuine cooperation, as well as to building mechanisms that will enable them to reconcile their visions and interests with those of the others.	因此三国领导人必须想法设法会晤并寻求真正的合作，同时力求建设能够协调相互愿景和利益的全新机制。


De Gaulle at the Barricades	路障前的戴高乐


LONDON – By coincidence, this is a busy year for round-number anniversaries for France’s greatest leader since Napoleon.	伦敦——今年恰巧是法国继拿破仑之后最伟大领袖的整数周年纪念高度集中的年度。


Charles de Gaulle was born 120 years ago in Lille.	120年前查尔斯·戴高乐出生于里尔。


He died 40 years ago at his home in Colombey-les-deux-Églises, expiring of a heart attack as he played solitaire one evening.	他在40年前一天傍晚玩纸牌游戏时因心脏病发作病逝于科隆贝双教堂村的家中。


Seventy years ago, he delivered his celebrated call to resistance over the BBC after flying to London from France as it collapsed in June 1940.	70年前，他在1940年6月法国沦陷后乘飞机飞到伦敦，在BBC发表了那次著名的讲话，号召法国人民奋起抵抗纳粹的侵略。


This year also marks a much less noted anniversary, an occasion on which de Gaulle showed how his rare combination of determination, political skill, and rhetorical ability could be brought to bear to face down determined opposition.	今年同样面临着知名度远不那么高的周年纪念，当时戴高乐向世人展示了他集于一身的罕见的决心、政治技巧及演说能力，他正是凭借着这些与意志坚定的反对派直接对抗。


It was a central moment in the establishment of the Fifth Republic, which continues to this day.	这是延续至今的第五共和国在创立过程中的核心时刻。


The war in Algeria played the key role in enabling de Gaulle to return to power in May 1958, at the age of 67.	阿尔及利亚战争在促使戴高乐以67岁高龄于1958年重新掌权的过程中发挥了重要作用。


Though his memoirs paint a characteristic portrait of a leader who knew what he was doing, research for my new biography shows that his policy towards the crisis across the Mediterranean combined hope and frustration.	尽管他的回忆录描绘了一幅深知自己意图的领袖人物的典型形象，但我为新传记所进行的研究工作却表明他针对地中海危机的政策实际是希望和挫折的融合。


He hoped that France could dominate the National Liberation Front (FLN) militarily, and was frustrated at the extremely messy political situation on the ground and the difficulty of persuading the settlers that maintaining the status quo was untenable.	他希望法国能够在军事上控制民族解放阵线（FLN），同时又因为极端混乱的政治局势和难以说服移民保持现状的选择行不通而感到懊丧。


In 1958, he told a crowd in Algiers made up mainly of pieds noirs Europeans “Je vous ai compris” (“I have understood you”).	1958年，他对阿尔及尔主要由欧洲黑脚构成的人群说“我理解你们”。


But, by 1960, euphoria had given way to rancor among those whom he had used to regain office but who now saw him as a traitor to be neutralized along with the regime he had brought into being.	但到了1960年，这种短期的愉悦已经让位于曾受他利用重新掌权的人们的仇恨，这些人将他视为叛徒，恨不能令他和他一手创立的政权一同消失掉。


The catalyst for what came to be known as “Barricades Week” was an interview published in the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung with the parachute general Jacques Massu, in which he said that part of the army regretted having called de Gaulle back to power, did not understand his policy, and was disappointed that he had become “a man of the left.”	催生著名“路障周”的是在德国报纸《南德意志报》上发表的对伞兵部队将领雅克·马苏的访问，马苏在访问中说军队中的部分人士后悔要求戴高乐重新上台，无法理解他的政策，并为他成为“左翼人士”而感到失望。


Massu, a convinced Gaullist, should have known better than to say such home truths publicly, whatever his own frustrations.	马苏作为一名坚定的戴高乐主义者，本应该知道无论他感到多么沮丧，都不该当众毫不掩饰地讲出这样的大实话。


He was promptly sidelined to a command in provincial France.	他此后立即被调往法国乡村的一个指挥所。


After a stormy meeting with de Gaulle at the Élysée Palace, Massu telephoned his chief of staff, Colonel Antoine Argoud, who had been pressing for a coup.	在爱丽舍宫与戴高乐情绪激动的会晤后，马苏致电给自己敦促发动政变的总参谋长安托尼·阿古德上校。


A general strike was called, and militant students threw up barricades in the center of Algiers.	随后举行了大规模罢工，激进的学生在阿尔及尔市中心竖起路障。


When police attacked with tear gas, pieds noirs opened fire.	当警察释放催泪瓦斯的时候，黑脚们选择了开火。


In the ensuing gun battle, 14 members of the security forces and eight demonstrators were killed, and 200 people were wounded.	在随后发生的枪战中，14名安全部队成员和8名示威者丧生，200人受伤。


“The hour has come to bring down the regime,” the extremist ideologue, Jean-Jacques Susini declared.	极端主义理论家让雅克苏西尼宣布，“推翻独裁政权的时候到了。


“The revolution will start from Algiers and reach Paris.”	” “革命之火将从阿尔及尔燃烧到巴黎。 ”


De Gaulle was at Colombey, but returned immediately to Paris.	戴高乐当时待在科隆贝，但立即回到了巴黎。


An official who saw him in the corridor of the palace recalled him muttering: “What a business!	据一位在总统府走廊上看到他的官员回忆他当时正在小声嘟囔： “麻烦极了！


What a business!”	“麻烦极了！


At a cabinet meeting, he insisted that the challenge to the new republic had to be put down.	在召开内阁会议时，他坚持认为必须平息这场对新生共和国发起的挑战。


The prime minister, Michel Debré, was sent to Algiers, but the rebels treated him contemptuously, and he flew back empty handed.	总理米歇尔·德勃雷被派往阿尔及尔，但叛乱分子对他不屑一顾，他毫无建树，空手而归。


Rumors flew of the creation of a shadow government by extremists in Paris.	巴黎到处流传着极端主义者成立影子政府的谣言。


Members of the presidential military staff were told to carry handguns.	总统的军事事务官员被告知要随身佩戴手枪。


Summoning Massu’s successor, General Jean Crépin, de Gaulle told him, “The Europeans do not want the Arabs to make a choice, [but] the Muslims do not want to be Bretons.	戴高乐召见马苏的后继者让克雷将军，告诉他“欧洲人不想让阿拉伯人作出选择，[但]穆斯林人不想步布列塔尼亚人的后尘。


If the army collapses, it is Algeria [and] France which collapses.”	如果军队崩溃，那么崩溃的是阿尔及利亚[以及]法国。 ”


The decisive moment came when de Gaulle, in military uniform, went on television to demonstrate his mastery of the new medium.	随着戴高乐身着军装，在电视上向人们展示他对这一全新媒介的全面控制，决定性的时刻到来了。


“Well, my dear and old country, here we are again facing a heavy test,” he said. Insisting that self-determination was the only way ahead, he called on the army to reject even passive association with the insurrection and instructed it to re-establish public order.	他说，“我古老而又亲爱的国家，现在再次面临着一次严峻的考验，” 他坚称掌握自决权是唯一的出路，并号召军队抵制与叛乱分子的被动联系，并下令重建公共秩序。


If the state bowed before the challenge it faced, “France would be no more than a poor, broken toy floating on an ocean of uncertainty,” he warned.	如果国家在所面临的挑战面前屈服，“法国将比在前途未卜的海洋上漂浮着的破旧的可怜玩具好不了多少，”他发出警告。


Within 15 minutes of the General’s face fading from the screen, 40 army units in Algeria declared their loyalty.	将军的面孔从电视屏幕上消失还不到15分钟，阿尔及利亚的40支部队就宣誓效忠。


The men at the barricades were persuaded to leave their stronghold; the insurrectionary leaders were either detained or escaped to Spain.	设立路障的人们被劝告离开据点，叛乱领袖被捕或逃往西班牙。


The defeat of the military revolt was the first time that the republican authority of Paris had been asserted over the pieds noirs who had helped to bring down the Fourth Republic.	击败军事叛乱是巴黎的共和国当局首次在与为推翻第四共和国出过力的黑脚们的较量中占得上风。


De Gaulle’s firmness and rhetoric – aided, it must be said, by the fumbling of the rebels – established the primacy of the state.	戴高乐的坚决果断和演说才能——在叛乱者们支支吾吾、笨手笨脚的反衬下——成就了国家权力的至高无上。


The next day, de Gaulle’s face was drawn, but he was resolute and full of energy.	第二天发表了戴高乐的画像，但画像上的那张面孔充满了坚定和力量。


Ministers who sympathized with the settlers, notably the long-time Gaullist Jacques Soustelle, were sacked.	同情移民的政府部长，特别是长久以来的戴高乐主义者雅克·苏斯戴尔遭到解雇。


The National Assembly granted de Gaulle the power to rule by decree for a year.	国民议会授予戴高乐一年的法令执政权限。


Trade unions held a symbolic one-hour strike to back the government.	工会举行象征性的一小时罢工，以示支持政府。


An opinion poll gave the General 75% backing.	民意调查显示将军的支持率高达75%。


The Fifth Republic was safe, and a historic page had been turned.	第五共和国转危为安，历史性的一页已经翻过。


The disdain felt by de Gaulle, a man of the north, for the emotional settlers across the sea had deepened.	北方出生的戴高乐对远隔重洋的情绪化的移民群体更加蔑视。


Two years later, after de Gaulle’s steeliness repulsed a second uprising, the Evian peace agreements between France and the FLN brought Algeria’s independence.	两年之后，在戴高乐的冷酷无情引发了第二次叛乱后，法国和民族解放阵线签订的依云和平协议让阿尔及利亚最终实现独立。


Demand or Supply?	需求还是供给？


CHICAGO – Economics is all about demand and supply.	芝加哥——经济学的全部内容就是需求与供给。


Typically, the two are equal, and, if not, powerful forces push them towards each other.	供需一般相互平衡，否则的话就会产生强大的力量让两者相互靠近。


But, with high and persistent levels of unemployment in the United States, there is a real question about the nature of the problem: is aggregate demand too low, or are there problems with supply?	但美国失业率长期居高不下意味着供需出现了本质性问题： 是总需求太低，还是供给出现了问题？


President Barack Obama’s administration seems to think that the problem is one of demand, and has passed stimulus measure after stimulus measure, reducing taxes and increasing transfers and government spending in order to boost consumption and investment.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统政府似乎认为问题出现在需求领域，因此一次次通过刺激措施在降税的同时增加转让和政府开支，以此刺激消费和投资。


The Federal Reserve is of a similar mind, not only maintaining rock-bottom short-term interest rates, but also embarking on an adventurous policy targeting long-term rates.	美联储也抱有类似的想法，不仅将短期利率压至最低，而且采取冒险政策控制长期利率。


Some progressive economists want even more.	某些改革派经济学家鼓吹采取更激进的措施。


Why have these policies not worked thus far in bringing down unemployment, even though the growth recovery is well under way?	这些政策为什么没能抑制失业，即使经济复苏已经开始？


The progressive economist says that stimulus worked, staving off a much deeper recession – if not worse – but that the measures were too timid to generate a robust recovery.	改革派经济学家说刺激计划已经成功阻止了更深的衰退（情况甚至可能更糟），但是这些措施太束手束脚，无法带来强劲的复苏。


The conservative economist responds that it is precisely because the government has become so free with taxpayers’ money that households, fearful of future taxes, are hunkering down and increasing savings.	保守派经济学家回应正是因为政府对纳税人的钱财如此大手大脚，才导致害怕未来加税的美国家庭放低姿态，增加储蓄。


Moreover, the increasingly activist government has left businesses uneasy about future regulatory and tax measures, and thus reluctant to invest.	此外，越来越激进的政府也让企业对未来的监管和税收措施感到不安，因此不愿进行投资。


The truth probably lies somewhere in between.	两者的观点都有一定道理。


Government spending – especially on unemployment benefits, aid to states, and some construction projects – probably helped avert a more wrenching downturn, but continued red ink worries households, which are also trying to rebuild savings and reduce debt after a spending binge.	用于救济失业、州别援助和某些建设项目的政府开支很可能避免了一场更令人痛苦的衰退，但居高不下的赤字也令美国家庭深感忧虑，他们在消费狂潮褪去后试图降低负债，重新储蓄。


The regulatory uncertainty created in areas such as health care makes it difficult not only for the health-care industry to make long-term investment decisions, but also for businesses to make long-term hires.	医疗保健等领域的监管变数不仅令其难以做出长期的投资决策，也使企业难以建立长期的雇佣关系。


Nevertheless, before rushing to judgment about current policy, we should recognize the trend in recent US recoveries of slow job growth.	不过，在迫不及待地评判现行政策之前，我们应该对近来美国经济复苏期就业增长缓慢的问题有一个清醒的认识。


From 1960 until 1991, recoveries from recessions in the US were typically rapid.	从1960到1991年，美国一般能迅速从经济衰退中复苏。


From the trough of the recession, the economy recovered the lost jobs in eight months on average.	从经济复苏的谷底算起，平均需要八个月恢复到之前的就业率。


The recoveries from the recessions of 1991 and 2001 were very different.	1991到2001年经济衰退的复苏过程难度很大。


For instance, in 2001, it took just one quarter for output to recover, but 38 months for jobs to come back.	比如在2001年，产值恢复只用一个季度，就业恢复却用了38个月。


Explanations abound.	造成这一结果的原因颇多。


Some economists argue that, unlike past recessions, in which workers were temporarily laid off from an industry only to be rehired as the recovery picked up, job losses starting in 1991 were more permanent.	有些经济学家提出与以往经济衰退期临时解雇工人，恢复期又重新雇佣不同，1991年开始的岗位裁撤更加长期。


Matters were exacerbated by firms’ postponement until a recession of hard choices about closing unviable plants and shedding workers.	企业一直拖到衰退期才决定关闭没有商业价值的工厂并解雇工人加大了经济衰退的冲击力。


As a result, unemployed workers had to find jobs in new industries, which took more time and training.	这导致失业工人被迫转行寻找工作，这样需要的时间更长，也需要接受更多培训。


Others suggest that the Internet has made it easier for firms to hire quickly.	还有人提出网络的普及降低了企业快速雇工的难度。


So, rather than hire in a panic at the first sign of recovery, as they did in the past, for fear that they will be unable to do so later and lose sales, firms today would rather ensure that the recovery is well established before hiring.	因此，企业像过去那样在复苏初期因害怕雇不到人而影响销售，从而进行恐慌性雇佣的行为减少，今天的企业宁愿先确认复苏已切实开始。


Hence also the growth in temporary hires today.	这也解释了今年雇临时工流行的原因。


Regardless of what the right explanation is, the history of recent recessions suggests that we should not be surprised that the job recovery is taking time.	不管正确的解释是什么，近期经济衰退的历史表明，就业恢复需要时间并不稀奇。


There is, however, an aspect of the problem that is different this time: layoffs in construction.	但问题的某个方面的确与以往有所差异： 那就是建筑工人大批失业。


Therein lies an additional explanation for tepid job growth, as well as a salutary lesson about policy.	这从另一个侧面解释了就业增长为何始终不温不火，也为政策决定给出了有益的启迪。


In the last boom, construction jobs expanded significantly, with investment in housing as a share of GDP increasing by 50% from 1997 to 2006.	建筑就业在之前的繁荣期大幅增加，房地产投资的GDP占比从1997到2006年增长了50%。


As my colleague Erik Hurst and his co-authors have shown, states that had the largest rise in construction as a share of GDP in 2000-2006 tended to have the greatest contraction in that industry in 2006-2009.	正如我的同事埃里克·赫斯特及其合作者所揭示的那样，2000－2006年间建筑就业GDP占比增长最快的州在2006－2009年收缩也最猛烈。


These states also tended to have the largest rise in unemployment rates between 2006 and 2009.	这些州在2006－2009年失业率的变化也最剧烈。


The unemployed comprise not only construction workers, but also ancillary workers, such as real-estate brokers and bankers, as well as all those who work on houses, such as plumbers and electricians.	失业大军中不仅包括建筑工人，还包括水暖工和电工等房地产附属工种，以及房地产中介和银行职员等辅助性行业。


So the job losses extend far beyond those in the construction industry.	因此失业波及的范围远远超过建筑业。


It is hard to believe that any increase in aggregate demand will boost the housing market – which, remember, was buoyed by visions of steady price appreciation that few seem likely to hold today – sufficiently to re-employ all these workers.	很难想象总需求的任何增长能够推动房地产市场重新雇佣所有人员，而且请记住一点，稳定升值预期支撑了房地产市场的��荣发展，而今天看来这些希望已经彻底破灭。


Hurst estimates that this “structural” unemployment may account for up to three percentage points of total unemployment.	据赫斯特估算这种“结构性”失业可能占总失业数的三个百分点。


In other words, were it not for construction, the US unemployment rate would be 6.5% – a far healthier situation than today.	换句话讲，如果不是建筑业拖累，美国的失业率可能只有6. 5%——远好于今天的失业率数据。


Policymakers should remember that the housing boom was fueled by easy monetary policy, which sought to expand job growth as the US recovered from the last recession.	决策者们应该记住是宽松的货币政策推进了房地产市场繁荣，美国上次经济衰退恢复期间依靠同样政策成功推高了就业率。


Indeed, high-school graduation rates dropped in Las Vegas as people left school for readily available unskilled construction jobs.	事实上，很多人离开学校从事无需任何技术的建筑工种，导致拉斯维加斯高中毕业率显著降低。


Now those uneducated unemployed are experiencing more than three times the unemployment rate of college graduates.	现在这些没受过教育的失业者不得不面对比大学毕业生高出两倍以上的失业率。


It will be very hard for them to return to the workforce.	他们很难再找到合适的工作机会。


The lesson for policymakers is clear: instead of constantly trying to boost spending and potentially creating problems for the future, a more sustainable way to improve job growth is to facilitate the “re-skilling” of the unemployed, especially those who were in construction-related jobs.	决策者应当吸取的教训显而易见： 与其一次次拼命刺激需求，给未来留下一大堆潜在问题，改善就业的长效方法是推动失业人员“再培训”，特别是针对那些从事建筑相关行业的劳动力。


Eventually, better labor-force supply will create healthier and more sustainable demand.	最终，更良性的劳动力供给将创造更健康、更长效的需求。


Demilitarizing Muslim Politics	去军事化的穆斯林政治


ISLAMABAD – Can Muslim governments free themselves from their countries’ powerful militaries and establish civilian control comparable to that found in liberal democracies?	伊斯兰堡—穆斯林政府可以将自己从本国权势军方手中解放出来，建立可以与自由民主国家相提并论的文官执政吗？


This question is now paramount in countries as disparate as Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey.	埃及、巴基斯坦和土耳其等国尽管情况大相径庭，却都面临着这一相同紧要问题。


To predict how this struggle will play out, it helps to understand the region’s past.	要预测这场斗争结果如何，就必须理解地区的历史。


Since Islam’s founding in the seventh century, it has maintained a tradition of deep military engagement in politics and governance.	自从伊斯兰教于700年前创立以来，就一直有着军队深度干预政治和治理的传统。


Indeed, Islam’s increasing military prowess helped it to spread rapidly around the world.	事实上，伊斯兰教军事力量的见涨是其在全世界快速传播的助力器。


The military was responsible for Islam’s implantation throughout the Middle East, as well as in Persia, Southern Europe, and the Indian sub-continent.	军队是伊斯兰教在中东以及波斯、南欧和印度次大陆生根发芽的关键。


And once a Muslim state was established in newly conquered lands, the military became integral to its governance.	只要新征服的土地上建立起穆斯林国家，那么军队就是其治国的全部。


The military’s incorporation into the state was most prominent in the Ottoman Empire, whose rulers created a new type of military force that drew its manpower mostly from Islamic-ruled parts of Europe.	军队全面干预国家的顶峰是奥斯曼帝国，其统治者建立了一支新式军队，军士大多来源于伊斯兰教控制的欧洲国家。


These Janissaries (Christian boys conscripted to serve in Ottoman infantry units) were either recruited from Europe or abducted from countries under Ottoman control.	这些苏丹亲兵（被编入奥斯曼帝国步兵的基督教雇佣军）要么从欧洲征召，要么从奥斯曼帝国控制下的国家强征。


Janissaries were not allowed to marry or to own property, which prevented them from developing loyalties outside of the imperial court.	苏丹亲兵被禁止结婚，也不能拥有物业，这防止了他们对奥斯曼王朝之外的东西产生忠诚感。


But, after these restrictions were removed in the sixteenth century, and up until their extermination in the nineteenth century, the Janissaries became extremely powerful in Istanbul (and even established their own dynasty in Egypt).	但是，这些限制在16世纪被取消，此后直到苏丹亲兵在19世纪被消灭之前，他们一直是伊斯坦布尔最有实力的力量（甚至在埃及建立了自己的王朝）。


Military domination in Muslim countries survived right up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century.	穆斯林国家的军队主导状况随着19世纪早期奥斯曼帝国的灭亡而崩溃。


The colonial powers that filled the vacuum left by the declining empire had their own militaries, and therefore did not need local forces to govern.	殖民势力填补了帝国衰落之后留下的空缺，它们拥有自己的军队，因此不需要当地力量来进行治理。


But when Europeans withdrew from the Muslim world in the twentieth century, these forces rushed back in to wrest control of politics.	但当20世纪欧洲人从穆斯林世界撤离时，当地力量死灰复燃，开始角逐政治控制。


The military rose to power in Egypt, Pakistan, and other Arab countries in the early and mid-twentieth century.	20世纪中叶，军队在埃及、巴基斯坦和其他阿拉伯国家掌握了权力。


In Turkey, the military proclaimed itself the guardian of the secular Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, himself a military man.	在土耳其，军队将自己描述为世俗土耳其共和国的卫士，但1923年成立的土耳其共和国的建立者阿塔图尔克本人便是一名军人。


Today, the revolutions rocking much of the Muslim world are bedeviled by Islam’s military past.	如今，动摇着穆斯林世界大部的革命运动正受着伊斯兰军队统治史的束缚。


In the first phase of these popular uprisings, those who had been politically and economically excluded began to demand inclusion and participation.	在这些民众起义的早期，被排挤在政治和经济权利之外的人群开始要求包融和参与。


Now a second phase is underway, marked by a serious effort to divest the old military establishment of its power.	现在，革命进入了第二阶段，其标志是出现了要求旧军事势力不再掌权的正式努力。


This struggle is manifesting itself in different ways in Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan.	这场斗争正在埃及、土耳其和巴基斯坦以各自不同的形式展开着。


In Egypt, the military’s takeover of the political transition after the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak is unacceptable to Muslim and secular forces alike.	在埃及，前总统穆巴拉克被罢黜后接管政治转型的军方不为穆斯林和世俗力量所容。


Most Egyptians want the soldiers to leave politics and return to their barracks.	大部分埃及人希望士兵远离政治，回到军营中去。


Essam el-Erian, whose Islamist Freedom and Justice Party recently won the most seats in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, recently said that the Muslim Brotherhood (to which the party is closely tied), does not expect the military rulers to relinquish power voluntarily.	伊沙姆·艾利安（Essam el-Erian）的伊斯兰自由正义党（Islamist Freedom and Justice Party）在最近的埃及议会选举中赢得了最多的席位。 最近，艾利安说，穆斯林兄弟会（Muslim Brotherhood，伊斯兰自由公正党的紧密盟友）并不指望军事统治者会自愿放弃权力。


They will have to be persuaded to leave, and, if that does not work, forced out.	他们需要被说服离开，如果说服不能奏效的话，就需要动用武力。


The parliament’s first step in ultimately removing them would be to defend its authority to choose the members of a planned 100-person constitutional assembly.	议会驱逐军事统治者的第一步是捍卫其选择100位立宪大会参与者的权利。


Meanwhile, in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, which has strong roots in the country’s Islamic tradition, is now seeking to limit the military’s role.	与此同时，在土耳其，有着深厚伊斯兰传统根基的正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party）正在寻求限制军队的作用。


The armed forces, however, claim a constitutional mandate to protect the Republic’s secular traditions.	不过，土耳其武装力量声称负有宪法使命来保护土耳其共和国的世俗传统。


And Turkey’s generals have intervened in politics several times to defend Kemalism – Atatürk’s secular ideology of modernization that pushed Islamic Turkey towards European-style liberalism.	土耳其的将军们多次干预政治，捍卫基马尔主义（Kemalism，即将伊斯兰土耳其推向欧洲式自由主义的阿塔图尔克关于现代化的世俗意识形态）。


But, of the three countries, Turkey has most successfully demilitarized its politics.	但是，对于这三个国家来说，土耳其在政治去军事化方面做得最成功。


The charismatic prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, having won three consecutive elections, has been able to exert his authority over the military.	信奉基督教的总理埃尔多安已经连续三次赢得连任，他可以凌驾于军队之上行使权力。


Controversially, he has jailed the army’s top general, İlker Başbuğ, whom Turkish prosecutors have accused – many say implausibly – of plotting to overthrow the government.	他颇有争议地囚禁了军方高级将领伊尔克·巴斯布格（İlker Başbuğ）。 土耳其检方指控他意图颠覆政府——尽管许多人认为这根本是无稽之谈。


Finally, Pakistan’s military, which has governed the country for half of its 64-year history, is fighting hard to retain influence over policymaking.	最后，巴基斯坦军队——治理巴基斯坦长达32年，占巴基斯塔全部历史的一半——正在努力地重新赢得决策影响力。


Humbled by its inability to control United States military operations, including the one that killed Osama bin Laden, the army is struggling to play a hand in the country’s evolving relations with India and the US.	由于无法控制美国军队的行动——包括击毙本·拉登——巴基斯坦军队正在竭力试图插手该国与印度和美国的关系。


Nevertheless, wary of provoking widespread hostility, military leaders have indicated recently that they have no intention of intervening in politics.	尽管如此，军方临到人忌惮树敌过多，因此在最近宣布它们无意干涉政治。


Since the Arab Spring began, four long-established regimes have been removed, while others are under increasing pressure, giving ordinary Arabs hope that their demands will no longer be ignored, and that those who govern will be mindful of citizens’ needs.	自从阿拉伯之春爆发以来，已有四个根深蒂固的体制被推翻，其他体制也受到了日益增加的压力，这给阿拉伯人民带来了希望，他们的要求不再会被忽视，新来的治理者将考虑到他们的需求。


But that – the real revolution – will happen only when true representatives of citizens, rather than the military, begin to set their countries’ political course.	但真正的革命只有在人民有了真正的代表，而不是军队开始左右国家的政治进程时才会发生。


Syria’s No-Solution Solution	叙利亚不是解决办法的解决办法


MADRID – Syria is a blood-soaked shambles.	马德里—叙利亚一片血腥狼藉。


Four years of civil war have left more than 200,000 dead, one million wounded, and 6.7 million people internally displaced.	多年的内战导致200,000多人死亡，一百万人受伤，670万人在国内流亡。


Another 3.8 million are living as refugees outside the country, and 13 million (out of a pre-war population of 20 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance.	另有380万人以难民身份流落国外，1,300万人（战前人口总共只有2,000万）需要人道主义援助。


Two illustrious United Nations special envoys – Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi – have resigned in the face of Syria's self-perpetuating spiral of violence.	两名优秀的联合国特使——科菲·安南和拉赫达尔·布拉西米（Lakhdar Brahimi）因为叙利亚自动孳生的包里循环而辞职。


But, against this bleak background, there is reason for cautious optimism.	但是，在这一悲剧的背景下，我们仍有理由保持谨慎乐观。


Kurdish forces recently succeeded, after months of heavy fighting, in expelling the Islamic State from the border town of Kobane.	库尔德武装在进行了几个月的苦斗后最近终于成功地将伊斯兰国势力清除出边境小镇科巴尼（Kobane）。


Moreover, the new UN envoy, Staffan de Mistura, has initiated a pragmatic and determined “Aleppo first" strategy, which aims to freeze military operations in the shattered city and facilitate the entry of aid.	此外，新的联合国特使斯特凡·德米斯图拉（Staffan de Mistura）发起了务实而有决心的“阿勒颇第一”战略，旨在冻结这一被摧毁城市的军事行动，方便援助的进入。


Could this mark a turning point for Syria?	这会成为叙利亚的转折点吗？


When the crisis in Syria erupted, nobody predicted how serious, protracted, and complex it would turn out to be.	叙利亚危机爆发时，没人预测到会如此严重、漫长和复杂。


For starters, observers underestimated citizens' ever-deepening sense of hopelessness, which has driven them to support jihadi groups or the Assad regime.	首先，观察者低估了叙利亚人民不断加深的绝望感，这种感觉促使他们支持圣战组织或巴沙尔·阿萨德政权。


The conflict is also unique in its asymmetry, stemming from the numerous and disparate actors involved.	叙利亚冲突的另一个独特之处是其不对称性，这一不对称性来自冲突所包括的众多不同的行动方。


There are only two conventional armies: the Kurdish fighters and the forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad.	常规军队只有两支：库尔德武装和忠于总统巴沙尔的部队。


The opposition comprises factions dependent on foreign sponsors.	反对派由依赖外国赞助的派系组成。


Indeed, the “nationalist" opposition is merely an assortment of factions responsible for protecting small territories, and the “Free Syrian Army" is little more than a fantasy.	事实上，“民族主义”反对派只是众多负责保护小片领土的派系的松散组合，“自由叙利亚军”（Free Syrian Army）则无异于幻想。


The stark reality is that the best-organized groups are the jihadists: the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic Front.	严峻的事实是组织最好的集团是圣战者：伊斯兰国、叙利亚救国阵线（Jabhat al-Nusra）和伊斯兰阵线（Islamic Front）。


De Mistura's plan aims to stabilize the situation by shifting the policy focus away from a relentless military campaign – an approach that is benefiting only the Islamic State.	德米斯图拉的计划旨在通过将政策焦点从无情的军事行动上移开稳定局面——以军事为焦点只能令伊斯兰国受益。


The plan's emphasis on Aleppo – which is not only a commercial hub and Syria's largest city, but also represents a sort of microcosm of the country – distinguishes it from the shaky cease-fires that have been implemented in Homs and elsewhere in the country.	该计划强调阿勒颇——它不仅是商业枢纽、叙利亚最大城市，也是叙利亚的一个微缩景观——这使该计划与在霍姆斯（Homs）和叙利亚其他地区所实施的不可靠的停火协议不同。


The strategy's main strength is that it is not, in itself, a peace project.	德米斯图拉的战略的主要优点是其本身并非和平计划。


Instead of requiring that any or all factions surrender or relinquish their weapons, it calls only for the cessation of heavy fighting, to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevent Aleppo's total collapse.	它不要求任何或所有派系投降或解除武装，相反，它只是呼吁停止激烈战斗，让各种人道主义援助得以实行从而防止阿勒颇的全面崩溃。


Such a freeze – guaranteed by an effective enforcement mechanism – would present an important opportunity to make progress in confidence-building.	这一冻结战事——由有效的执行机制保证——将是一次信心建设取得进展的重要机会。


Recent talks in Cairo and Moscow produced small, but not negligible, steps in that direction.	最近在开罗和莫斯科的谈判取得了朝这个方向的成果，虽然规模很小但不容忽视。


The objective should be to initiate a productive dialogue – and, ultimately, achieve consensus – among relevant actors.	目标应该是启动相关行动方之间的建设性对话——并最终达成一致。


In this proxy war, no solution will be possible without the agreement of the factions' main sources of support – Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.	在这场代理战争中，如果不在各派系的主要支持源——伊朗、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔之间形成协议，就无法产生解决办法。


Likewise, Turkey must not only address the inflow of refugees, security concerns along its border with Syria, and its position as a transit country for jihadists; it must also develop a coherent policy toward the Islamic State that is not subsumed in official anxiety over demands by the country's Kurdish minority.	类似地，土耳其不但必须解决难民流入问题、与叙利亚边境的安全问题，以及它作为圣战者中转国的立场问题，它还必须制定与官方对该国库尔德人少数群体要求的担忧不同的针对伊斯兰国连贯政策。


Other powers will also have a key role to play.	其他力量也可以起到作用。


Support by the United States for de Mistura's initiative symbolizes a quiet – and constructive – shift by President Barack Obama's administration from its demand that Assad step down immediately.	美国对德米斯图拉计划的支持象征着总统奥巴马政府的悄然的建设性变化——不再要求巴沙尔立即下台。


The European Union's policy toward Syria, however, remains confused, with member states having managed to agree only to create a “regional trust fund" to address the crisis.	但是，欧盟对叙利亚政策仍是一团糟，成员国只是同意成立一个“地区信托基金”解决这场危机。


Given the EU's strong interest in a more stable Syria, rooted in its geographical proximity, it is time for European leaders to take an unequivocal stance on Syria.	稳定的叙利亚对欧盟具有重大意义，这谁由其地理位置决定的，因此欧洲领导人应该在叙利亚问题常采取绝不含糊的立场。


But a lasting solution to the conflict ultimately comes down to the Syrians.	但这场冲突的持续解决办法最终还是取决于叙利亚人民，。


In fact, the foundations for the kind of Syrian-led political solution that is needed were laid with the 2012 Geneva I Communiqué.	事实上，形成叙利亚领导的解决办法所需要的基础在2012年的第一次日内瓦协商（Geneva I Communiqué）中就已经建立。


At that time, successive rounds of negotiations failed, owing to an all-or-nothing mentality, based largely on the mistaken assumption that Assad, like Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, would be ousted relatively quickly.	当时，连续多伦协商都以失败告终，原因是“要么全有，要么全无”思维，而这又主要是因为错误地认为巴沙尔与土耳其的本·阿里和埃及的穆巴拉克一样，将在相对较短的时间内被推翻。


But de Mistura has made it clear that he aims neither to build a lasting peace with Assad nor to establish Assad's departure from power as a precondition for peace.	但德米斯图拉明确地表明他的目标不是与巴沙尔保持长期和平，也不把巴沙尔交出权力作为和平的先决条件。


The solution lies between these two options, and the West – especially Europe – must accept that.	他的解决方案介于这两者之间，西方——特别是欧洲——必须接受它。


Placing unrealistic demands on a Syrian peace process is a sure route to failure.	对叙利亚和平进程提出不切实际的要求必然会以失败告终。


Pragmatism is essential, even if it means that some relevant actors, including the EU, have to swallow their pride.	务实是至关重要的，即使这意味着一些重要行动方，包括欧盟，必须放下矜持。


The stability of the region and the lives (and what is left of the livelihoods) of the Syrian people depend on it.	该地区的稳定和叙利亚人民的生死（以及活下来的叙利亚人的命运）都取决于此。


A Democratic Hurricane	民主飓风


NEW YORK – Nothing concentrates the mind like a full-blown crisis.	纽约—没有什么比全面发酵的危机更能吸引眼球的了。


Like millions of other people in New York City, I heard Hurricane Sandy rattling my windows and battering my doors.	和其他数百万纽约市民一样，我也听到了飓风桑迪掠过我窗、吹打我门的声音。


I was luckier than many. Rattling is all it did.	不过我比很多人幸运一点，飓风对我的侵扰也只限于吹打而已。


For many years, experts have been warning that such storms would overwhelm the city’s antiquated urban infrastructure.	多年来，专家一直在警告类似风暴会摧毁纽约市陈旧的市政基础设施。


Salt water came streaming into open subways.	海水灌入了开放的地铁。


Damage to the power supply reduced a third of Manhattan to a pre-modern state of darkness.	断电将三分之一曼哈顿陷入了前现代的黑暗状态。


And that was just New York.	而这只是纽约的情况。


In parts of New Jersey, many people fortunate enough still to have a house are cut off by rivers of raw sewage lapping at their doors.	在新泽西州的不少地方，许多仍拥有自己的房子的幸运者被汹涌的污水流灌进的家里。


No one can say with certainty that this particular storm was caused by global warming, but almost all experts agree that the effects of polar-ice melt and sea-level rise will make future storms worse. And yet neither candidate in the United States’ presidential campaign bothered to mention the potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change.	没人能斩钉截铁地说这场大风暴是由全球变暖引起的，但几乎所有专家都同意，极点海冰融化和海平面上升的影响将导致未来风暴更加厉害。


In this sense, Hurricane Sandy was like gun violence.	从这个角度看，飓风桑迪就像是枪支暴力。


Throughout the campaign season – and despite several highly publicized mass shootings in this period – neither President Barack Obama nor his challenger, Mitt Romney, wished to discuss the problem of laws in many states that allow almost anyone to carry lethal weapons and spray death around at random.	在整个竞选季中——尽管在此期间发生了数起受到高度关注的群体枪击事件——不管是总统奥巴马还是其挑战者罗姆尼都不愿意讨论许多州都存在的法律问题，即允许任何人携带致命武器，随时随地制造死亡案件。


The reason, of course, is that there are not enough votes to be gained in addressing these matters.	当然，个中原因在于解决这些问题无法带来足够的选票。


Even if a majority of Americans agree that climate change is real, future disasters seem a long way off, or might happen somewhere else, so why worry about them now?	即使多数美国人同意气候变化确实存在，未来灾难似乎也是遥不可及，或者会发生在其他地方，既然如此，为什么现在有什么好担心的呢？


Perhaps more should be done to protect New York, among many other places, against future flooding, but, as a former city official told an interviewer: “Until things happen, people aren’t willing to pay for it.”	也许纽约和其他许多地方要做很多事情才能防止未来的洪水，但是，正如一位前市政官员在一次采访中所说的，“不到事情发生，人们是不会愿意为它掏腰包的。 ”


Does this point to a serious weakness in the democratic system?	这是否是民主制度的一个严重弱点？


Most voters, after all, think about their immediate interests – less taxation, more jobs, lower gasoline prices, and so on – and not about planning for the future, which is, in any case, unpredictable.	毕竟大部分选民考虑的是眼前的利益——更少税负、更多工作、更低汽油价格，等等——而不会去规划未来，因为未来是不可预测的。


We want to feel good right now.	我们只希望当下感觉良好。


And that is precisely the sentiment to which democratically elected politicians will cater.	而这正是民主选举的政客所迎合的情绪。


The future will take care of itself.	未来嘛，它会自己照顾自己的。


There is something to be said for this attitude.	对于这种态度，我有话要说。


The kind of politics that imposes sacrifices for the sake of future utopias has caused immense human suffering in the service of a variety of impossible ideals.	号召为未来乌托邦而牺牲的政治让人为了各种不可能实现的理想而奋斗，给人类造成了严重的灾难。


Better, then, to stick to the here and now.	既然如此，不如还是坚守当下吧。


Yet postponing, for the sake of immediate gratification, a certain degree of planning for the future collective good can be as disastrous as indulging in utopian schemes.	但为了当下的享受而停止一定程度的未来集体利益和沉迷于乌托邦幻境一样有害。


Perhaps there are some non-utopian ways of transcending selfish interests and doing what is necessary.	或许存在一些超越自私自利、做必需完成之事的非乌托邦方法。


For example, in various countries, voters have been tempted to elect business tycoons: enough with politicians bickering over selfish interests – let the can-do strongmen take charge and run countries like corporations.	比如，在许多国家，选民甘愿把票投给商业大亨：受够了政客为自身利益喋喋不休，让雷厉风行的强人执政，像经营公司一样治理国家吧。


Silvio Berlusconi was one such figure.	贝卢斯科尼就是这样一个人物。


Mitt Romney, in a milder, less flamboyant manner, has appealed to these sentiments as well: he knew how to run an investment company, so why not the US federal government?	从某种程度上说，罗姆尼也在诱导这一情绪，只是没那么赤裸裸罢了：他知道如何经营一家投资公司，既然如此，为什么不能经营好美国联邦政府呢？


In practice, however, such tycoon politicians have their own interests and gratifications to pursue.	但是，在实践中，这类大亨政客有自己的利益和目的需要追求。


Berlusconi did indeed run Italy the way he runs his companies: like a private fiefdom, promoting cronies, intimidating critics, and paying people vast sums of money in exchange for their slavish devotion.	贝卢斯科尼确实在按照精英公司的方法治国：如同私人采邑一样提拔亲信、威吓批评者，用大把金钱换取人们如奴婢般的忠诚。


And, two years after the earthquake in L’Aquila in 2009, which killed hundreds of people, nothing much had been done to reconstruct the city, despite an initial flurry of publicity stunts showing Berlusconi, posing in a fireman’s hat, personally taking charge.	2009年夺去数百人生命的L’Aquila地震两年后，该市重建工作仍毫无进展，尽管在地震发生后的公共秀当中，贝卢斯科尼戴着一顶消防帽亲自坐镇指挥。


What about the more serious-minded technocrats who run the Leninist-capitalist People’s Republic of China?	更加认真的技术官僚是如何治理列宁资本主义中华人民共和国的呢？


The “Chinese model,” combining a capitalist economy with authoritarian government, has frequently been hailed as superior to the messy, dithering, compromising ways of liberal democracies.	“中国模式”是资本主义经济和专制政府的结合，并被频繁地宣传比混乱、猥琐、妥协的自由民主制度更优越。


With no need to concern themselves about elections, China’s leaders can afford to plan for the longer term and do what is necessary without being impeded by petty selfish interests or a carping press.	中国领导人不需要担心选举问题，可以做更长远的规划，完成必要的工作，而不会受到狭隘私人利益和吹毛求疵媒体的干扰。


These arrangements have indeed made it possible for China to build entire cities in a matter of years, as well as high-speed railways, opera houses, stadiums, industrial parks, massive dams, and whatnot.	这样的安排事实上可以让中国用多年的时间建设完整的城市以及高速铁路、剧场、体育场、工业园、超级大坝和其他大型项目。


Many people have been lifted out of poverty, and those with the right political connections have become enormously rich.	许多人因此脱贫，拥有正确政治关系的人更是攫取了巨额财富。


But the lack of transparency in this type of autocracy has also led to massive corruption and huge blunders, not to mention the growing signs of ecological ruin.	但这种类型的专制缺少透明度，因此导致了大规模腐败和重大错误，更不用说愈演愈烈的生态破坏了。


Chinese critics of the government, or even those who simply wish to report mistakes or wrongdoing, are silenced with a heavy hand: beatings in police stations, draconian jail sentences, or even murder.	中国政府的批评者——即便是那些只愿意报道错误和失误的批评者——都在高压之下噤了声：或者在警署被殴打，或者被判处严厉徒刑，有的甚至惨遭谋杀。


That is what happened to the parents who openly expressed their anger about the ill-constructed school buildings that collapsed in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, killing their children.	这些人包括2008年四川地震后公开表达对学校建筑质量低下、导致孩子丧生的愤怒之情的家长。


The children died because corrupt local officials had allowed developers to enrich themselves by using inferior building materials.	这些孩子之所以丧生，是因为腐败的当地官员放任开发商使用劣质建筑材料中饱私囊。


Despite its flaws, a system in which elected officials are held publicly accountable and can be voted out of office is still preferable to rule by tycoons or technocrats.	尽管有各种各样的缺陷，但当选官员需受公众问责，并有可能被选民选下台的制度仍比大亨或技术官僚治国的制度好。


And, sometimes, radical changes are made, even in democracies, though a severe crisis often is required to mobilize voters behind a collective push for essential reform, as was true of the Great Depression in the 1930’s, which led to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.	此外，有时候，即使是民主国家也会发生重大变化，尽管动员选民为推动必要改革齐心协力往往需要以严重危机为契机，20世纪30年代导致罗斯福新政的大萧条便是显例。


Perhaps Hurricane Sandy will spur US citizens and politicians to take climate change seriously – and to implement public policies aimed at protecting America’s cities and coastlines.	也许飓风桑迪将刺激美国公民和政客认证对待气候变化问题，并采取旨在保护美国城市和海岸线的公共政策。


If so, we can only hope that this crisis will not have come too late.	果真如此的话，我们倒要抱怨这场危机来的太晚了。


Democracy Begins At Home	民主从本国开始


The Bush administration has put expansion of democracy at the center of its foreign policy.	布什政府已经扩大了它的外交政策中心的民主成分。


This is a far nobler calling than simply expanding American hegemony.	比起单纯扩展美国霸权，这是更为高尚的使命。


The question is, does Bush really mean it, and does he genuinely understand what democracy means?	问题是，布什真的会这么做吗？ 他真得明白民主的含义吗？


The Bush administration praised Saudi Arabia’s municipal elections, but what about the rights of women—including their voting rights?	布什政权对沙特阿拉伯的地方选举大家赞扬，但是妇女的权利呢——包括她们的选举权呢？


It welcomed (if it did not actively participate in) the toppling of Venezuela’s democratically elected leader, but it continues to support Pakistan’s military dictator.	它对委内瑞拉民主选举产生的领导人的倒台拍手称好（如果它并没有积极参与策划他的倒台的话），却继续支持巴基斯坦的军事独裁者。


It criticizes Russian President Vladimir Putin, but only after he goes against business interests.	它批评俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京，但仅仅只是在普京有违商业利益之后。


And it may raise concerns about media concentration in Russia, but remains silent about media concentration in Italy.	布什政权对俄罗斯的媒体集中化颇为担忧，但却对意大利的媒体集中化却保持沉默。


There is a taint of hypocrisy in a more fundamental sense.	从更基本的理解层面来说，美国的行为有伪善之嫌。


The Bush administration is right to emphasize the importance of elections, without which democracy is inconceivable.	布什政府强调选举重要性，它做得很对，因为不这么做就无法进行选举。


But democracy entails more than periodic elections, and the legitimacy of elections depends on the public’s confidence in the electoral process itself.	但是民主包含的内容远远甚于定期选举，选举的合法性也取决于民主对选举程序本身的信赖度。


In this respect, the last two American presidential elections have hardly been models for the world.	从这个角度而言，最近两届的美国选举都无法为全世界做出楷模。


Former President Jimmy Carter, whose Atlanta center monitors elections around the globe, has raised questions about whether America’s recent election lives up to the standards the United States should uphold.	美国前总统吉米·卡特已经对美国最近的选举是否符合美国应当遵守的标准提出质疑。 由他创立的亚特兰大中心监督全球的选举。


Where former President Bill Clinton sought to ensure that all Americans who are entitled to vote are registered to vote, the Republicans have tried to reverse these advances, putting obstacles in the way both of registration and voting.	尽管前总统比尔·克林顿努力确保所有授权选举的美国人能登记选举，但是共和党人试图撤销这项进程，在登记和选举过程中都设置了障碍。


Modern technology makes it easy to have a paper trail for voting machines, at little cost; yet several states chose not to provide this minimal safeguard.	现代技术能轻而易举地以最低的成本获得投票机器的文件记录，但是还是有几个州拒绝使用这种成本微小的安全装置。


Beyond elections, citizens can provide an effective check on government only if they are well informed.	撇开选举不说，公民们只有在消息灵通的条件下，才能有效检查政府的工作。


That is why right-to-know laws are so important.	那正是知情权如此重要的原因。


Of course, politicians prefer to work in secrecy, without oversight.	当然，政治家们总喜欢在不受监督的条件下秘密工作。


No one can imagine hiring a worker, but allowing him not to inform his employer about what he is doing on the job.	我们无法想象，雇用一个工人，但却允许他不必向他的老板汇报他正在做什么。


Politicians work for the citizenry, which has the right to know what their employees are doing.	政治家们为公民工作，公民有权知道他们雇佣的人正在做些什么。


Citizens have the right to know how their money is being spent and who is being consulted to form policy.	公民有权知道他们的钱何去何从，制定政策是在向谁咨询。


They have the right to know whether Enron and the oil companies are shaping energy policy.	他们有权知道安隆 （Enron）和石油公司是否在影响能源政策。


They have the right to know why America, and the world, was misled by false claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.	他们有权知道，为什么美国人和全世界被伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的虚假情报所误导。


My research has focused on the consequences of asymmetries in information for the functioning of the economy.	我把调查的重点放在不对等的信息对经济运作的影响。


But a lack of accurate information has equally, if not more, severe consequences for political processes.	但是，正确信息的匮乏对政治进程产生了一样严重的后果。


The decision to go to war in Iraq is the most dramatic example of this, but there have been many others in America under Bush.	决定发动伊拉克战争是最具戏剧性的例证，但是在布什执政期间美国还有许多其他例子。


Providing drug benefits under Medicare, America’s health-care program for the aged, may have been the right decision.	美国老年健康医疗计划在医疗保险中提供药物福利，也许是个正确的决定。


But restricting government’s ability to bargain with the drug companies was a pure give-away, and nothing justifies providing grossly distorted information about the costs—now estimated to be in excess of 1.1 trillion over the next decade.	但是限制政府与医药公司讨价还价的权利却纯粹是个投降之举，并且提供完全失真的成本信息是说不过去的——根据目前估计该成本将在今后十年超过一万一千亿美元。


This is three times the amount original projected by the Bush administration.	这是布什政府原本计划数量的三倍。


Today, the Bush administration is engaged in a disinformation campaign about an impending social security crisis.	当前，布什政府卷入了一场有关社会保障危机的虚假信息风波。


While something should be done, the magnitude of the problem hardly foreshadows a crisis.	尽管布什政府应该有所作为，但是这个问题的程度还不足以引起一场危机。


On the contrary, the system could almost surely be put on a solid footing for the next 75 years with a fraction of what was spent on the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.	相反，只要2001年和2003年花费在减税计划中的一小部分钱，该体系基本能在未来75年保持根基稳定。


Good information requires not just the right to know, but also the right to tell—a diversified media.	良好的信息沟通不仅要求知情权，也需要话语权——一个多样化的媒体。


There are, as we noted, justified complaints about the lack of diversity in television broadcasting in Russia, yet Bush has not opposed efforts by America’s Federal Communications Commission to weaken laws on media concentration.	正如我们已经注意到的那样，在俄罗斯出现了对电视广播缺乏多样性的正当投诉，但是布什并没有对美国联邦通信委员会努力削弱媒体集中化法律作法提出反对。


Democracy also requires recognizing the rights of individuals.	民主体系也要求认可个人权利。


Undermining any individual’s rights jeopardizes everyone’s rights.	破坏任何个人权利的行为将危害到每个人的权利。


Yet under Bush, the US has undermined basic civil rights, such as habeas corpus, which guarantees individuals recourse to judicial review when the state detains them.	尽管在布什政权下，美国已经破坏了基本民权，诸如可以保证个人在遭到政府拘禁时求助于司法审查权的人身保护权。


The extended detention of dozens of individuals in Guantanamo—without charge and without trial—is a basic abrogation of this right.	许多人在关塔纳摩（Guatanamo）被延长扣留——没有控诉也没有审判——这就是对这一权力的根本性破坏。


Fortunately, even if Bush does not understand such basic principles, America’s courts do, and they are now, albeit belatedly, forcing his administration to abide by them.	幸运的是，即使布什不明白这些基本准则，美国的法庭却是明白的，虽然它只是马后炮地迫使它的政府遵守这些条例。


Finally, of what value is the right to vote without recognition of the right to a certain minimal standard of living, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?	最后，如果对达到《世界人权宣言》所称的最低生活水平的权利毫无意识的话，又何来选举权的价值？


In countries where much of the population lives below subsistence level, buying votes is all too easy.	在那些大多数人民生活在最低生活保障下的国家，购买选票实在太容易了。


But the only economic rights the Bush administration recognizes are intellectual property rights, putting the interests of drug companies ahead of those with life threatening diseases, and the free mobility of capital, which has had such devastating effects on many countries.	但是唯一让布什政府意识到的经济权是知识产权，把医药公司的利益放在那些威胁人们生命的疾病、资金的自由流动之前，这对许多国家都产生了破坏性的影响。


America’s democracy remains the envy of much of the world, and it is good that the Bush administration now champions the expansion of democracy forcefully.	美国的民主体系仍是世界大部分国家的敌人，而现在布什政府大力普及民主的做法值得称道。


But the administration would be far more credible, and have far more success, if it took a closer look at home, if it examined its own practices more honestly, and if it engaged in a broader discussion of what democracy really means.	但是如果它更仔细地看看自己的国家，如果它更诚实地检查它自己的行为，如果它加入一个更广范围内的有关民主究竟意味着什么的谈话，布什政府也许能变得更加可信，取得更多的胜利。


Democracy’s Broken Promises	被破坏的民主承诺


SANTIAGO – Liberal democracy is under siege.	圣地亚哥——自由民主正处在重重包围之中。


Populists of the right and left are not only lashing out at globalization or stagnating middle-class incomes; they are calling into question the legitimacy of the institutions of liberal democracy and of the political elites who manage those institutions.	左翼和右翼民粹主义者不仅猛烈抨击全球化和中产阶级收入停滞不前； 他们正在质疑自由民主制度的合法性以及管理上述制度的政治精英。


It’s facile to blame the politics of post-truth practiced by populists.	人们很容易将现状归咎于民粹主义分子奉行的后真实主义政治。


Lies and exaggerations would not work if current democratic practice were without problems.	如果当前民主实践没有问题，谎言和夸张将很难奏效。


We must re-examine and, if possible, redress what the Italian democratic theorist Norberto Bobbio called the “broken promises of democracy.”	我们必须重新审视，如果可能的话，彻底解决意大利民主，也就是理论家诺贝尔托·博比奥所谓的“被破坏的民主承诺。 ”


Anyone who has ever campaigned for office has heard voters’ familiar refrain: “We only see you politicians at election time.”	任何曾经参加过竞选的人都曾听到过选民那种熟悉的疑虑：“我们只在选举的时候才能看到你们政治家。


Politicians seem distant and untrustworthy, citizens tell pollsters.	”政治家似乎遥远而且不值得信任，民众对民调组织这样说。


Populists exploit that gap.	民粹主义分子恰恰利用了这种距离。


Modern democracy is representative.	现代民主采取代议制。


When elected representatives spend more time in Parliament than they do interacting with citizens, they are not neglecting their duties; they are doing their job.	当民选代表花费更多时间在议会而非与民众互动，他们并不是在忽略自己的职责； 他们恰恰是在履职。


But the rhetoric of modern democracy claims otherwise: it emphasizes closeness to voters and their concerns.	但现代民主的陈词滥调却提出截然不同的说法：强调贴近选民，保持对他们的关注。


When the contrast with reality is too glaring, political leaders’ credibility suffers.	当与现实的对比显得太过刺眼，政治领导人的信誉就会遭受损失。


In democratic systems, politicians are agents acting on a mandate from the principals (the voters).	在民主体制下，政治家是委托人（即选民）所授权的代理。


And, as in economics, democracies’ principal-agent problem is a problem because the principal may not be able to distinguish capable agents from inept ones.	而且，像经济领域一样，因为委托人可能无法分辨合格和无能代理而产生了民主的委托-代理问题。


And agents may have interests of their own that clash with the principal’s.	而且代理人自身利益可能与委托人不一致。


As a result, citizens have plenty of reasons not to trust politicians.	结果是民众有很多理由不信任政界人士。


Democracies endeavor to ensure by institutional means that the interests of politicians and voters are aligned.	民主政体通过体制手段努力确保政客和选民的利益保持一致。


In Britain, the constituencies that elect members of Parliament are relatively small, and in the United States, members of the House of Representatives must seek reelection every two years.	在英国，选举议会议员的选区相对较小，而在美国，众议院议员必须每两年寻求连任。


But these solutions are not without their own problems, including parochialism and the risk that the frequency of elections will make politicians beholden not to voters, but to the special interests that finance their campaigns.	但这些方法本身并非没有问题，包括狭隘主义以及竞选频率过大所导致的政客受制于资助其竞选活动的特殊利益集团而非选民。


Democratic politicians also try to persuade voters that their own interests are aligned with those of the electorate.	民主政治家也试图说服选民他们自身的利益与选民利益一致。


Such efforts can be healthy, as when officials disclose the sources of their campaign funds and possible conflicts of interest.	这样的工作可能是健康的，比如当官员公开其竞选资金来源及可能的利益冲突。


But they can also be unhealthy, as when candidates pander to voters’ fears and resentments.	但这种做法也有可能产生不健康的后果，比方说当候选人迎合选民的恐惧和愤怒。


Indeed, two fascinating recent papers by researchers at Harvard and MIT explain the emergence of populism in terms of politicians’ efforts to signal to voters that they are not beholden to powerful interests.	事实上，哈佛大学和麻省理工学院研究人员最近发表的两篇引人入胜的论文从政客试图向选民证明他们并未受制于权势影响的角度解释了民粹主义的崛起。


Thus, although populist policies reduce overall economic welfare, rational voters choose them because they are the price of distinguishing between different types of politicians.	因此，尽管民粹主义政策牺牲整体经济福利，但理性的选民仍会选择它，因为它们是区分不同类型政治家所付出的代价。


As one of the papers puts it: “once leaders are not necessarily honest, it may be worth hiring those that are incompetent.”	正如其中一篇论文所指出的那样：“一旦领导人不一定保持诚实，雇佣那些无能的领袖就似乎体现出价值。 ”


Bobbio emphasizes that lack of trust in democratic politicians also arises from two additional difficulties.	博比奥强调对民主政客信任的缺失同样源于另外两大难题。


One is that modern societies are pluralistic, with many interests vying to be represented; there is no general will for a politician to represent.	其一是现代社会极致多元化，众多利益竞相争夺代表资格； 政客无法代表普遍意志。


The other is that in a representative democracy there is no binding mandate for the elected politician to act in a certain way.	还有就是在代议制民主中，没有任何约束力量强制当选政治家以某种特定的方式行事。


Once she is elected, it is up to her to decide what the good of society is and which policies will advance it.	一旦当选，她就有权确定什么是社会利益，以及实行什么样的政策来推动它。


The potential for conflict is obvious.	冲突的可能性是显而易见的。


Even in the unlikely event that the interests a politician represents do not clash with one another, there will be no easy agreement about the best policies.	即使在政客所代表的意义并不相互冲突的不太可能的情况下，就最佳政策达成一致也并不容易。


Worse, an able and honest politician may indeed choose the best policies; but, in an environment of imperfect information, she may be unable to persuade voters that she did the right thing.	更糟的是，一名能干而且诚实的政治家可能确实选择了最佳政策； 但在不完全信息环境下，她可能无法说服选民她做了正确的事。


Suppose that the goal is to create jobs, and that the politician chooses the best policy to achieve that goal.	假设目标是创造就业机会，而这位政治家选择了实现这一目标的最佳政策。


Then, an external shock causes employment to fall.	但之后发生的外部冲击导致就业下降。


Voters can never be sure of what the correct policy was, but they suspect the politician of exaggerating the size of the shock to explain away lost jobs.	选民们永远无法确定正确的政策是什么，但他们怀疑政治家夸大了外部冲击的影响，并借此来推卸工作机会丧失的责任。


All voters know is that they cannot get a job when they want one, and they blame the politician for this.	所有选民都知道在需要工作时无法找到工作，而他们将这个问题归咎于政治家。


As societies become more complex and the difficulty of evaluating and choosing policies grows, so will the potential for this kind of tension.	随着社会复杂程度越来越高，评估和选择政策的难度不断加大，这种紧张局面发生的概率也随之不断增加。


Technocrats endowed with the knowledge needed to make complex policy decisions will rise in social importance but fall in public esteem.	拥有做出复杂政治决策知识的技术专家们在社会地位上越来越重要，但公众评价却不断恶化。


Recall former UK justice minister Michael Gove’s remark in the midst of the Brexit debate: “people in this country have had enough of experts.”	记得前英国司法部长迈克尔·戈夫在英国退欧辩论中说过：“这个国家的民众已经受够了专家。


Or, as Bobbio puts it, “technocracy and democracy are antithetical: if the expert is the protagonist of industrial society, this rules out a central role for ordinary citizens.”	”或者，就像博比奥所说的那样，“专家执政和民主是对立的：如果专家还是工业社会的主人公，普通民众就将丧失核心作用。 ”


Add one final complicating factor: technology vastly increases the speed at which citizens transmit multiple demands.	还有最后一个令事态变��更加复杂的因素：即技术导致民众传递多重需求的速度大幅增加。


A town’s mayor will know almost instantly from Twitter and Facebook if rubbish is not collected from a street corner.	如果街角的垃圾没有被收走，一座城市的市长几乎立刻就会从推特和Facebook上了解情况。


And yet modern checks and balances slow down any response.	但现代的制衡体系拖慢了采取对策的速度。


Suppose the mayor wants to institute a new rubbish collection and disposal system. Detailed environmental impact assessments and lengthy citizen consultations will be required.	假设市长希望建立一套新的垃圾收集和处理系统，就需要进行详细的环境影响评估和漫长的公民协商。


In the years that it will take for the new system to be up and running, rubbish will occasionally go uncollected, sharpening – almost by the day – the potential for conflict between what citizens expect and what democracy can deliver.	在新体系确立并运行所需的数年时间里，偶尔会出现垃圾无法收集的状况，这种状况几乎每天都在增加民众期望和民主成效之间可能产生的冲突。


Perhaps the fault lies not only with the current practice of democracy, but also with the expectations raised by some of democracy’s advocates.	也许问题不仅在于当前的民主实践，而且在于某些民主倡议者所提出的期望。


Democracy’s promises have indeed been broken.	民主的承诺确实已被打破。


“But,” Bobbio asks, “were they promises which really could have been fulfilled?	“但是”，博比奥质疑，“这些承诺是否真能兑现？


I would say no.”	我的答案是不能。 ”


The old Churchillian dictum may apply here: democracy is the worst system of government except for all the others.	这里可能适用丘吉尔古老的格言：民主是排除其它一切选择后最糟糕的政府制度。


Under modern representative democracy, people enjoy more personal freedom and more material prosperity than at any other time in human history.	在现代代议制民主体制下，民众比人类历史上任何时候都享有更多的个人自由和物质繁荣。


We are closer than ever to fulfilling the values of liberty and dignity for all.	我们比以往任何时候都更可能实现赋予所有人自由和尊严的价值观。


Are those not sufficiently powerful advertisements for liberal democracy?	难道这些还不足以作为自由民主最有力的宣传？


Democracy Comes Second	民主缓行


Democracy is slowly spreading around the world.	民主正缓慢的向全世界各处传播。


From the Middle East to Latin America and Asia, many autocracies are taking gradual steps towards more democratic and accountable forms of government, or have become fully-fledged and well functioning democracies.	从中东到拉丁美洲和亚洲，许多专制政权或正逐渐采取步骤朝着更民主和更负责任的政府形式的方向迈进，或已成为羽翼丰满、功能完善的民主政体。


The US administration is determined to consolidate political freedoms in many developing countries under its sphere of influence; indeed, expansion of democracy has become a cornerstone of American foreign policy.	美国政府决心运用其影响力在许多发展中国家强化政治自由； 的确，民主的扩张业已成为美国对外政策的基石。


There are many reasons to celebrate the current democratic wave.	有很多理由使得当前的民主潮可喜可贺。


Democracy is associated with less injustice and abuse, with basic civic and political freedoms, and with greater sensitivity by governments for the true priorities of its citizens.	民主是与更少的不公正和滥用权力，与基本的公民和政治自由以及与政府对其公民真正优先事务的敏感度联系在一起的。


But how important is democracy for economic success?	但民主对经济成功有多重要呢？


Not much, the empirical evidence suggests.	据经验显示，没有多重要。


This might appear surprising.	这可能有些出乎意料。


After all, is it not true that virtually all rich countries have democratic forms of government, while the poorest countries (mainly in Africa) are non-democracies?	毕竟，并非所有的富国都有民主政府，而最穷的国家（主要在非洲）也并不都是非民主的。


Indeed, throughout the world, democracy is strongly correlated with higher per capita income.	的确，就全世界来看，民主与较高的人均收入都有很强的关联。


But this correlation goes missing when one looks at the dimension of time rather than space.	但当我们从时间而不是空间层面来看时，这种关联就不复存在了。


Countries that become democracies do not, on average, achieve faster economic growth after their political transition; and, vice versa, democracies that fail and relapse into autocracy do not, on average, do worse than before.	成为民主政体的国家在其政治转型之后通常不会获得更快的经济增长； 而反之亦然，未能成功实现民主或重归专制的国家的经济发展也通常不会比以前更糟糕。


The positive correlation between income and democracy that one sees across countries could be due to reverse causation: democracy is more likely to persist as a country grows richer.	我们在一些国家看到的收入与民主之间的正相关性可能是一种因果倒置：民主由于国家日渐富裕而很可能会更稳固。


It could also be due to special historical or cultural circumstances: some societies are just more successful than others, both in terms of economic development and with regard to their ability to develop and maintain democratic political institutions.	它也有可能是由于特殊的历史或文化环境引起的：在经济发展和发展及维持其民主政体的能力方面，有些社会就是比另一些社会更成功。


Whatever the reason for the observed positive cross-country correlation between income and democracy, it should not be confused with causality.	我们在不同国家观察到的收入与民主之间的正相关性不管是由于什么原因，都不应与因果关系混为一谈。


Being democratic does not seem important in securing economic success.	民主对于实现经济成功似乎并不重要。


Of course, there are many different kinds of democratic transitions, and lumping them all together might be misleading.	当然，民主转型的方式繁多，将其简单叠加就难免会有误导之嫌。


An important distinction in practice concerns the interaction between the economic and the political system.	在现实中，经济与政治体系的互动与一种重要的特性有关。