Second, liberal reformers must continue to lead when it comes to increasingly salient issues – such as the environment, non-discrimination, marriage equality, and drug-policy reform – that politicians of the traditional left and right are unable to address.	其次，自由改革派必须在面对日益尖锐的问题时继续承担领导责任——比如环境、无歧视、婚姻自由和毒品政策改革等——传统左派和右派政客无法解决这些问题。


But they must do so in a way that appeals to broad swaths of the electorate, not only to highly schooled elites.	但他们解决问题的方式必须受到最广大选民的支持，而不是只有受过高等教育的精英阶层的支持。


Last but not least, reform-minded democrats must lead the reform of democracy itself.	最后，持改革思维的民主党人必须领导民主改革本身。


Citizens are increasingly suspicious of politicians, parliaments and political parties.	公民对政客、议会和政党的怀疑日益增加。


That is bad news for citizens, not just for politicians.	这不但对政客，对公民来说也是坏消息。


By leading the charge to reinvigorate democracy, centrist reformers can draw on the best of the liberal traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to ensure Latin America’s success in the new millennium.	中间改革派可以通过引领民主复兴最大程度地利用十九世纪和二十世纪的自由传统，确保拉丁美洲在新千年取得成功。


Faulty Political Narratives	有问题的政治叙事


LIMA – Across Latin America, voters who, until recently, were enthusiastic about their leftist governments seem to be having a change of heart.	利马——在拉美各国，直到不久前还对左翼政府充满热情的选民心意似乎正在悄然变化。


In Brazil and Venezuela, voters want to oust their leaders.	在巴西和委内瑞拉，选民想要推翻自己的领袖。


In Argentina, they already have.	在阿根廷，他们已经完成了这项任务。


In Bolivia, voters rejected President Evo Morales’s effort to amend the constitution so that he could seek another presidential term.	在玻利维亚，选民否决了莫拉莱斯总统修改宪法寻求连任的努力。


And in Peru, no left-wing candidate made it into the second round of the presidential election, to be held on June 5.	而在秘鲁，没有一位左翼候选人进入到将在6月5日举行的第二轮总统选举。


But learning from experience is much trickier than it seems.	但从经验中汲取教训比乍看上去棘手得多。


We cannot relive the past; we can only tell stories about it – and the stories we tell tend to have a rather loose relationship with what really happened.	我们无法重温过去； 而只能讲述过去的故事——我们所讲的故事往往仅与真实事件有着松散的关系。


Nowhere is that more true than in Latin America.	在拉丁美洲，这样的状况最为真实。


The narrative espoused by the region’s recent leftist leaders – particularly Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, and Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner – was based on a revamped class struggle between “the people” and what could be called the “anti-people.”	拉丁美洲左翼领袖——尤其是巴西的路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦、委内瑞拉的查韦斯和阿根廷的克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔所倡导的叙事基于“人民”和所谓“反人民力量”之间经过改造的阶级博弈。


The policies that preceded theirs were said to be pro-rich, because the governments that pursued them were subservient to the rich.	他们称前任实行所谓“亲富政策”，因为实行这些政策的政府屈从于富人。


Their own popular movements supposedly rebelled against a political structure – local elites often in bed with imperialism (meaning mainly the United States) – that protected the interests of the anti-people.	他们自己的民众运动据说是为反抗保护反人民力量利益的政治构架——他们称当地精英往往与帝国主义（主要指美国）结为一体。


But if voters are now jettisoning the left and its supposedly “pro-people” policies, it is not because they now prefer the “class enemy.” It is because they have changed narratives.	但如果选民现在抛弃左翼力量及其所谓的“亲民”政策，这并非是因为他们现在更喜欢“阶级敌人”，而是因为他们已经改变了叙事方式。


Besides class, at least three other narrative structures are politically salient in Latin America.	除阶级说外，至少有3种其他的叙事架构在拉丁美洲的政界流行。


One focuses on corruption: The previous guys were corrupt, so we kicked the rascals out.	其中一种专注谈论腐败：之前的那些家伙贪腐成性，因此我们将这些流氓赶下台。


Now the new guys started stealing, too, so – regardless of their policies – it is time for them to go.	但现在新上来的家伙也开始偷窃，因此无论他们实行何种政策，他们现在都必须下台。


A third narrative is based on competing economic theories.	第三种叙事是基于相互竞争的经济理论。


The 1990s was the era of neoliberalism, an economic worldview that wrongly assumed that the benefits of economic growth would trickle down to those at the bottom; government should embrace austerity and do little more than let markets work.	20世纪90年代是新自由主义的年代，当时的经济世界观错误地认为经济增长的好处能够一点一滴地惠及身处底层的民众； 政府应当实行紧缩政策，什么也不做而让市场发挥作用。


The new left-wing governments had a better economic theory, one that could boost economic growth while creating opportunities at the bottom.	新任左翼政府提出了更好的经济理论，能在促进经济增长的同时为底层民众创造机会。


Now, in the midst of inflationary stagnation, voters may be questioning that alternative.	现在，面临通货膨胀和经济停滞，选民们可能会质疑这种方案能否行得通。


The final narrative highlights the role of external conditions – good luck, not good policies – in determining economic performance.	最后一种叙事凸显了以好运气而非好政策为代表的外部条件在决定经济效益时所起的作用。


When commodity prices are high and international capital is abundant and cheap, as in the 1970s and in 2004-2012, policymakers look like geniuses.	在20世纪70年代和2004到2012年那样商品价格高企且国际资本既丰富又廉价的时代，决策者们看上去都像天才的化身。


When the high tide recedes, as it has recently, they look like fools.	但当高潮像不久前发生的那样褪去，决策者们看上去又都像是傻瓜。


Governments will become more effective in the future only if voters learn to become more demanding of the policies that future governments adopt.	如果选民学会提高对未来政府的政策要求，政府或许能在不久的将来实现效率提升。


And yet none of Latin America’s political narratives teaches voters anything new or useful.	但迄今为止，没有一种拉美政治叙事教会选民新的或者有效的技能。


Lula and Chávez, after all, did not unseat right-wing governments: They were preceded by left-wing governments, led by members of the Socialist International.	归根结底，卢拉和查韦斯并没有推翻右翼政府：他们的前任是左翼政府，领导者是社会主义国际的成员。


Lula did not invent conditional cash transfers: he just expanded and changed the name of a program that he inherited.	卢拉并非有条件现金转移的发明者：他不过是拓展并更改了从前任继承下来的一个项目名称。


Likewise, Chávez did not nationalize the oil industry; that was done in 1976.	同样，查韦斯也没有推行石油产业国有化，1976年这项任务就已经完成。


And Cristina and Néstor Kirchner (her husband and predecessor) were Peronists; but in their narrative, their party’s role in power when the bulk of the killing took place during the “Dirty War” of the 1970s has been erased from history.	而克里斯蒂娜和（身为她丈夫及前任的）内斯托尔·基什内尔都是庇隆主义者； 但在他们两人的政治叙事中，彻底抹去了20世纪70年代“肮脏战争”大规模屠杀爆发期间其所在政党在执政岗位上所起的历史作用。


The truth is that most countries in Latin America mismanaged the boom of the 1970s and, when the tide turned, ended up in the 1980s debt crisis.	现实情况是，拉美多数国家对20世纪70年代的繁荣大潮管理不善，所以当潮水退去时，陷入了20世纪80年代的债务危机。


They all initially mismanaged the crisis, too.	这些国家又都在开始阶段对危机处置不当。


Governments suddenly found themselves with much lower revenues than they expected; when markets proved unwilling to lend them the difference, they ended up printing money, causing exchange rates to weaken and inflation to rise.	政府突然发现实际收入远远低于他们的预期； 而当事实证明市场不愿借钱给他们补足差额时，他们就开始印刷钞票，从而导致汇率走软和通胀上升。


To prevent this, they opted for yet another economic dead end: currency and price controls.	而为了防止这种情况，他们又选择了实行货币和价格管制这另一条经济死胡同。


Eventually, in the late 1980s, they adopted a different strategy: They restructured the debt, eliminated financial controls, and imposed austerity, raising taxes and cutting spending in order to stop printing money.	最后，他们在20世纪80年代后期采取了不同的策略：他们对债务进行了重组、取消了财务管制并实施紧缩政策，增加税收并为停止印钞而削减开支。


And voters ended up re-electing presidents like Carlos Menem of Argentina, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori of Peru precisely because they were able to overcome the debt crisis, balance the budget, and bring down inflation.	而选民们则选出了像阿根廷的梅内姆、巴西的费尔南多·恩里克·卡多佐和秘鲁的藤森那样的总统，因为他们能够战胜债务危机、平衡预算及控制通货膨胀。


But just when they were supposed to be reaping the benefits of their hard work, the East Asian crisis of July 1997 caused commodity prices to collapse, which forced Russia into default in August 1998 and shut down all emerging markets through financial contagion.	但就在他们看似能够收获其辛勤工作所带来成果��，1997年7月爆发的东亚危机导致商品价格崩溃，并迫使俄国于1998年8月发生债务违约，更有甚者，这场危机通过金融传染的方式关闭了所有新兴市场的大门。


Crises in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2001) followed, leading to the election of Chávez, Lula, and Kirchner.	委内瑞拉危机（1998年）、巴西危机（1999年）和阿根廷危机（2001年）相继爆发，导致查韦斯、卢拉和基什内尔当选总统。


As luck would have it, the situation changed quite dramatically in 2004: Commodity prices started their longest boom ever – the super-cycle – and investors’ appetite for emerging-market debt soared.	但幸运的是，2004年形势发生了戏剧性的转变：商品价格开始了有史以来持续时间最长的繁荣（所谓的超级周期），同时投资者对新兴市场债务的胃口大增。


The need for austerity went out the window, as more spending could occur without printing money or running out of foreign exchange.	紧缩的需求被丢到了窗外，因为更多的消费可以在不印钞票、不消耗外汇储备的情况下完成。


But the windfall was mismanaged, fueling fiscal profligacy, and the end of the boom left economies in recession and voters with broken dreams.	但这次没有得到妥善管理的意外横财助长了财政挥霍，而繁荣周期的终结则导致经济陷入衰退，选民的希望再次落空。


Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela got themselves into a situation surprisingly similar to that of the late 1980s.	阿根廷、巴西和委内瑞拉陷入了和20世纪80年代惊人相似的窘境。


So the solutions are bound to look similar as well.	因此，解决方案无疑也会有众多相似之处。


Voters enthusiastically supported extravagant spending during a boom.	选民在繁荣期间热情洋溢地支持奢侈消费。


They applauded when Rafael Correa of Ecuador eliminated an oil stabilization fund he inherited and when Chávez, rather than putting money aside for a rainy day, quintupled the public external debt.	他们为厄瓜多尔的科雷亚淘汰前任设立的石油稳定基金而击节叫好，并全力支持查韦斯借贷五倍的公共外债，而不是存钱以备不时之需。


Now that the party is over, they want more conservative governments to stabilize the economy and restore the market confidence needed to encourage private investment.	现在，狂欢结束了，他们又希望保守派政府来稳定经济并恢复鼓励私人投资所需的市场信心。


Until voters learn what to ask for from their governments, they are bound to dislike what they end up getting.	除非选民学会如何要求他们的政府，他们将注定不会满意政府的所作所为。


Unfortunately, Latin America’s dominant political narratives are not helping that process along.	不幸的是，拉丁美洲主流的政治叙事并没有协助推动这一进程。


Exit Latin America’s Left	离开拉丁美洲左派


BOGOTA – The crushing defeat of the long-ruling Chavista government in Venezuela’s recent parliamentary election, together with the end of 12 years of Peronist rule in Argentina, mark the end of a cycle of left-wing hegemony in much of Latin America.	波哥大—长期执政的查韦斯主义政府在最近的委内瑞拉议会选举中遭遇惨败，执政12年的阿根廷庇隆主义统治亦然，这标志着拉美多国左翼霸权周期的结束。


But this is not a political watershed marking the renewal of ideological confrontation.	但这并非标志意识形态冲突复萌的政治分水岭。


Rather, it is a measured transition toward political pragmatism.	相反，这是一场转向政治务实主义的克制的转型。


And it is very good news.	只是极好的消息。


Perhaps the best evidence that this is not an ideologically-driven sea change is to be found in what triggered it: an economic downturn.	也许证明这并非是一场意识形态驱动的剧变的最佳证据便是其触发因素：经济衰退。


For over a decade, the region relied on “Socialism of the Twenty-First Century,” which Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chávez, used to galvanize groupings like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and Petrocaribe, an oil alliance including Caribbean states and Venezuela.	十多年来，该地区依靠“二十一世纪社会主义”，已故的委内瑞拉总统查韦斯以此激励玻利维亚美洲人民联盟（Alliance for the Peoples of Our America，ALBA）和包括加勒比国家和委内瑞拉在内的石油联盟（Petrocaribe）等组织。


But economic collapse, hyperinflation, and food shortages have destroyed faith in that system.	但经济崩溃、恶性通胀和食物短缺摧毁了对这套制度的信念。


It should be noted that the very same factors, largely the result of unforgiving global conditions, enabled Latin America’s leftist parties to win and consolidate power by blaming the market-oriented policies that preceded them.	应该指出，同样的因素——主要是恶劣的全球环境所致——让拉美左翼政党通过抨击前任的市场导向政策赢得和巩固了权力。


Brazilians elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency in 2002, and Argentinians chose Néstor Kirchner in 2003.	2002年，巴西人选择了总统卢拉； 2001年，阿根廷人选择了内斯托尔·基什内尔。


Financial meltdown restored the Institutional Revolutionary Party to power in Mexico in 2012, and Michelle Bachelet’s leftist Nueva Mayoría party won in Chile in 2013.	2012年，金融崩溃让墨西哥制度革命党（Institutional Revolutionary Party）重新掌权，2013年，米歇尔·巴切莱特的左翼政党新多数党（Nueva Mayoría）在智利获胜。


Leftist governments then took advantage of a sustained commodities boom to increase spending on consumer subsidies and social welfare, without depending on international creditors.	接着，左翼政府抓住了大宗商品的持续繁荣，在不依赖国际债权人的情况下增加了消费补贴和社会福利支出。


From 2003, the year of Kirchner’s election, to 2011, when his wife and successor Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected to her second term in a landslide, soybean prices rose by more than 7% annually, on average, boosting overall GDP growth.	从基什内尔当选的2003年到其妻子兼继任者克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德兹·基什内尔以压倒性优势赢得连任的2011年，大豆价格平均每年上涨超过7%，刺激了总体GDP增长。


Likewise, Brazil’s economy, propelled by commodity exports of its own, grew by about 4.5% per year.	类似地，巴西经济受其自身大宗商品出口的推动，每年增长大约4.


This enabled the country, like Argentina, to fight extreme poverty and boost the purchasing power of an emerging middle class, which thus became deeply loyal to leftist governments.	5%。 这让巴西与阿根廷一样得以遏制极端贫困，刺激新型中产阶级的购买力，并让后者成为左翼政府的死忠。


In Argentina, it took a 30% inflation rate, massive corruption scandals, and restrictions on foreign-currency purchases to bring about a slim majority for the center-right Mauricio Macri in the recent presidential election.	在阿根廷，30%的通胀率、大规模腐败丑闻加上外汇购买限制才让马克里的中右翼政党在最近的总统选举中险胜。


The root cause of this reversal of fortune was a global environment that could no longer support high commodity prices.	这一财富趋势逆转的根源是不再支持大宗商品高价的全球环境。


In particular, China’s slowing growth has weakened demand for Latin American commodities.	特别是，中国增长减速削弱了对拉美大宗商品的需求。


In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa has become increasingly authoritarian – recently amending the constitution to enable him to run for a fourth term – in response to the impact of the shrinking economy on popular support for his “dictatorship of the heart.”	在厄瓜多尔，总统科雷拉变得日益极权——最近修改了宪法以使其能够第三次连任——以此来应对经济萎缩对其“人心专政”（dictatorship of the heart）的民众支持的冲击。


In Venezuela, where oil represents 95% of export revenues, voters naturally turned on the ruling Socialist Party.	委内瑞拉的出口收入中95%来自石油，选民自然支持执政的社会党（Socialist Party）。


While Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, remains president, the opposition now holds two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly.	查韦斯的继任者马杜罗仍然是总统，但反对者已经在国民大会中占据三分之二议席。


Long before the Venezuelan election, Cuba’s government, which had become heavily dependent on Chavista largesse, was already taking pragmatic steps toward normalizing relations with the United States.	委内瑞拉选举前很久，曾经严重依赖查韦斯式慷慨的古巴政府便已开始采取务实措施迈向对美关系正常化。


Raúl and Fidel Castro – who know firsthand how the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s main benefactor during the Cold War, affected their country – sensed the impending loss of Venezuela’s lavish subsidies and acted accordingly.	劳尔和菲德尔·卡斯特罗——他们对冷战期间古巴的主要赞助者苏联的解体对古巴的影响有着第一手的认识——认识到查韦斯的滥发补贴所可能带来的损失，并据此行动。


Even in Chile – perhaps the best-run economy in the region, but still highly dependent on copper exports – Bachelet’s approval rating has plunged to unprecedented lows, threatening her ambitious agenda of constitutional and educational reforms.	智利是地区内表现最好的经济体，但仍高度依赖铜出口，而巴切莱特的支持率也下降到前所未有的新低，威胁到她雄心勃勃的宪法和教育改革日程。


Add to that corruption scandals involving Bachelet’s son and weaknesses in the ruling center-left coalition, and the center right’s return to power in the 2017 presidential election seems increasingly likely.	此外，巴切莱特的儿子卷入了腐败丑闻，执政的中左翼联盟尽显弱势，中右翼在2017年的总统选举中重获权力的可能性日增。


But elections are not the only means of impelling change.	但选举并非推进变化的唯一办法。


With the most severe economic slowdown in 25 years expanding the budget deficit to record levels, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has been forced to turn to austerity, including cuts in unemployment and welfare benefits.	25年来最严重的经济减速让预算赤字扩大到创纪录的水平，巴西总统罗塞夫被迫转向紧缩，包括削减失业救济的福利补贴。


To be sure, massive corruption scandals have also severely eroded Rousseff’s standing, and are the key reason why she is now facing impeachment proceedings.	诚然，大规模腐败丑闻也严重削弱了罗塞夫的地位，也是她现在面临弹劾程序的关键原因。


But when the economy was growing, corruption was less politically explosive.	但当巴西经济增长时，腐败的政治炸弹作用就不那么显著了。


Similarly, after Venezuela’s army made it clear that defending Chavismo was not worth opposing the people’s will, Maduro was forced to pledge that the revolution would now “pass into a new phase.”	类似地，当委内瑞拉军方明确表示不值得冒委内瑞拉人民之大不违捍卫查韦斯主义后，马杜罗被迫宣布革命“进入了新阶段”。


And even if Macri had not managed to win Argentina’s presidency, his opponent Daniel Scioli – who served as Vice President under Néstor Kirchner, but represents a more moderate Peronism – probably would have had to implement pragmatic policies aimed at boosting market confidence.	而即便马克里未能赢得阿根廷总统选举，其反对者丹尼尔·西奥里（Daniel Scioli，他是内斯托尔·基什内尔的副总统，但代表更加温和的庇隆主义）也有可能实施旨在提振市场信心的务实政策。


Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of Latin American left-wing politics comes from Colombia, where President Juan Manuel Santos has made achieving peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Latin America’s oldest guerrilla group, his top priority.	也许压垮拉美左翼政治的最后一根稻草来自哥伦比亚，哥伦比亚总统桑托斯实现与哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC，拉美最古老的游击队）的和平作为最重要的事项。


A right-leaning president, Santos won reelection in 2014 by emphasizing these peace efforts, which garnered him strong support from the left.	作为一名右倾总统，2014年桑托斯凭借强调和平——这让他获得了来自左翼的强烈支持——实现连任。


Now, the two sides are on the cusp of a peace agreement, expected to be signed in March.	如今，双方即将达成和平协议（预计将在3月签署）。


Even more than current economic struggles, which are driven largely by global forces, peace in Colombia will reinforce for Latin American voters the benefits of pragmatism over ideology – something that even FARC has recognized.	哥伦比亚的和平将让拉美选民进一步了解务实主义的好处比意识形态更大，其效果甚至要好于当前的经济困境，后者主要是全球因素造成的。


A new era of moderate, sensible policymaking could be what enables Latin America to diversify its economies and build more sustainable and inclusive prosperity.	就连FARC也认识到这一点。 新的温和明智的决策时代能够让拉美实现经济多样化，构建更加可持续和包容的繁荣。


Latin America’s Commodity Windfall	拉美大发商品横财


BUENOS AIRES – Latin America is experiencing an exceptional boom, owing to soaring income from exports of natural resources.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——由于自然资源出口收入激增，拉美正在掀起一股特殊的热潮。


But is the region making the most this opportunity?	但拉美地区能否最大限度地把握这次机会？


Have these funds been used as effectively as possible?	这笔资金的使用效果是否有待提高？


With the exception of Central America, rising commodity prices have improved the external accounts and fiscal positions of Latin American countries.	除中美地区外，商品价格暴涨已经改善了拉美国家的境外账户和财政状况。


Revenue from natural-resource exports represented 25% of total income in the public sector in 2008.	自然资源出口收入占到2008年公共部门总收入的25%。


In Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, it exceeded 40%.	委内瑞拉、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔和墨西哥占比甚至达到40%以上。


This comes to around 7% of GDP in these countries (more than 11% in Venezuela and Bolivia, and 8% in Ecuador and Mexico).	此项收入占上述国家GDP的约7%（委内瑞拉和玻利维亚超过11%，厄瓜多尔和墨西哥则占8%）。


To determine what should be done with this windfall, it is important to know whether the increase in commodity prices is likely to be permanent or transitory.	要想确定如何使用这笔横财，一定要先搞清楚商品价格上涨是永久还是暂时性的。


If the latter, the best course of action would be to save the additional income or use it, as a second-best option, to reduce the national debt.	如果是后者，那么最好的选择莫过于把这笔额外收入积攒起来，或者退而求其次，用它来偿还国家债务。


If the increase were considered permanent, however, it would make sense to increase spending or reduce tax pressure.	可如果涨价是永久性的，增加开支或减轻税收压力就成为明智的选择。


The choice will depend on the characteristics of the country.	如何选择由具体国家的特点决定。


There would be more reason to reduce taxes in Norway, for example, than in Latin America, where the general course would be to increase spending.	比方说，挪威比拉美国家更有理由减轻税负，而增加开支则应是拉美国家具有共性的选择。


It is reasonable to presume that the commodity boom’s positive effect on Latin America’s terms of trade will last for an extended period – perhaps 10-15 years – but that it will not be permanent.	我们有理由相信商品繁荣对拉美贸易条件的积极影响将长期持续——也许10－15年——但却不会永远持续下去。


Moreover, it could be argued that if more knowledge is not added to exports, it will be hard to achieve sustainable economic development based on natural resources.	此外，可以说如果不提高出口的知识附加值，就难以实现以自然资源为基础的长期经济增长。


Given this, it would be wise to spend at least part of the windfall on improving the capacity to innovate, which is essential for a long-term growth beyond the fluctuation of international commodity prices.	有鉴于此，将这笔横财的至少一部分用于提高创新能力不失为明智之举，这将对实现摆脱国际商品价格影响的长期增长至关重要。


That means investing in education and building incentives to increase productivity through changes in products, processes, or organization.	换句话说就是要投资教育，通过产品、流程或组织方式的改革来促进提高生产力的积极性。


So what happened to the additional revenues derived from the commodity boom of recent years?	那么近年来商品繁荣所带来的额外收入究竟用途如何？


Some of these funds were aimed to improve countries’ fiscal balance.	一部分资金被用于改善国家的财政平衡。


While the primary deficit (before interest payments) in 2002 was similar among countries with and without important natural resources, in 2007, the former showed a surplus equivalent to 3.8% of GDP – compared to 1.6% of GDP for non-commodity-exporting countries.	2002年有无重要自然资源的国家其基本赤字（付息前）状况大体相似，而到2007年，前者财政盈余占到GDP的3. 8%——而非商品出口国只占GDP的1.


As a result, public debt fell to 28% of GDP region-wide in 2008, from 51% in 2003.	结果是地区性公共债务从2003年的51%，大幅下降到2008年的28%。


Fiscal consolidation was not, however, the result of formal fiscal rules.	但这种财政状况的改善并不是官方财政政策的结果。


While several countries established legal limits to control spending, deficits, and debt, in some cases –for example, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela – such laws were not enforced.	虽然有些国家（比方阿根廷、厄瓜多尔和委内瑞拉）在特定情况下制定了控制开支、赤字和债务的法律限制，但上述法律并没有真正得到贯彻。


In addition to reducing debt, Chile used its additional revenues to increase the resources of two fiscal funds: when the recession began, there were more than $22 billion in assets in both funds.	除减少债务外，智利还利用这笔额外收入补充了两项财政基金的资源： 衰退开始时，这两项基金总额累计超过220亿美元。


Despite imprudent fiscal management, Venezuela, too, maintained considerable resources in specific funds ($11 billion at the end of 2008).	尽管其财政管理失之草率，但委内瑞拉也在指定基金中累积了可观的资源（到2008年底为110亿美元）。


Ecuador and Colombia, by contrast, eliminated their stabilization funds in 2005 and 2008, respectively.	厄瓜多尔和哥伦比亚则恰恰相反，分别于2005和2008年取消了稳定基金配置。


Beyond improving public accounts, a large part of the revenues from high commodity prices were used to increase public spending, although this proportion varied from country to country.	除用于改善公共账户状况，高价商品所带来的很大一部分收入被用于加大公共开支，尽管增加比例各国不尽相同。


At one extreme stands Argentina, with the largest increase in public spending relative to GDP in Latin America (almost ten points).	一个极端的例子是阿根廷，其公共开支相对于GDP占比的大幅增加在拉美国家中首屈一指（几乎达到百分之十）。


At the other extreme are Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.	智利、哥斯达黎加和乌拉圭则是与阿根廷相反的例子。


Since there is no attribution in countries’ fiscal accounts of income from products linked to natural resources, we can only hazard a reasonably informed guess about how that spending was allocated.	因为来自自然资源相关产品的收入在国家财政收入中并未单独归类，我们只能对这笔开支如何分配进行合理的猜测。


Between 2001-2002 and 2007-2008, social-welfare spending in countries with abundant natural resources increased by around 55% in real terms, with spending relative to GDP rising by nearly 3.5 percentage points.	2001－2002及2007－2008年间，拥有丰富自然资源国家的社会福利开支扣除物价因素的实际涨幅约为55%，其相对于GDP的占比也提升了将近3.


Therefore, on a regional level, a large part of the additional resources were used to increase public spending, especially for social security, health, and education, in that order.	5%。 因此，具体到地区层面，很大一部分额外资源被用于增加公共开支，位居前三的分别是社会保障、医疗和教育。


In some countries there were also increased subsidies.	某些国家还增加了补贴数额。


Argentina, for example, increased subsidies for energy and transport to the equivalent of 3% of GDP.	比方说在阿根廷，增加的能源和交通补贴就相当于GDP的3%。


Something very similar occurred in Ecuador and Venezuela throughout the decade.	厄瓜多尔和委内瑞拉近十年间也出现了类似状况。


In contrast, spending for other objectives – for example, research and development on new products and processes – increased very little.	与此形成鲜明的对照，用于其他目标的开支——如研发新的产品和流程——则几乎没有多少增长。


In short, Latin American countries have used their additional export revenues to pay down debt and increase social spending.	简言之，拉美国家已经利用这笔额外出口收入偿还债务并追加社会开支。


Both were necessary, but, with few exceptions, the region is not using the commodity windfall to do what it must: improve technological capacities sufficiently to ensure that future economic growth does not depend entirely on the fickle furtunes of finite natural resources.	这两种做法都很有必要，但除少数国家外，拉美国家并没有利用这笔商品横财完成必须要完成的任务： 那就是充分提高技术能力，确保未来的经济增长与有限自然资源的起起落落脱钩。


Latin America’s Integration Muddle	拉美融合之惑


SANTIAGO – Regional integration is usually regarded as a way for countries to strengthen themselves.	圣地亚哥——地区融合一向被视为国家增强自身实力的一种方式。


But today’s efforts at regional integration in Latin America seem to have a different purpose altogether.	但今天拉丁美洲地区融合的努力似乎有着截然不同的目的。


They are put forward to help the proponents of various plans jockey for power and influence on both the regional and global stage.	这些提案的目标是帮助不同计划的支持者在地区和全球舞台上争夺权力和影响。


Indeed, none of the current initiatives to boost Latin American regional integration resemble at all the European integration process.	事实上，目前推动拉美地区融合的计划与欧洲统一进程根本没有相似之处。


Nor can they be considered the first tentative steps towards such a shared destiny, in the manner of the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, which began the project for European unity.	很难将其视为拉开欧洲统一序幕的1952年《欧洲煤钢共同体条约》式的向着地区共同命运迈出的试探性步骤。


At first glance, the almost constant bombardment of integration proposals in Latin America makes it appear as if the region’s presidents are trying to outdo each other in seeing who can come up with the greatest number of proposals.	乍看之下，拉美融合计划几乎没有间断的轰炸让人似乎感到该地区的总统们正全力比试看谁提出的融合计划更多。


All the while, scant attention is paid to the region’s already established bodies, which are in sad shape.	但已经建立的机构却始终乏人问津，这些机构所处的状态非常令人担忧。


Consider MERCOSUR, the main post-Cold War regional initiative.	以冷战后主要的地区性计划南美共同市场为例。


According to the Argentine scholar Roberto Bouzas, MERCOSUR is in a critical state of affairs, owing to the inability of its institutions to maintain “the common objectives which drove its member states to engage in the process of regional integration and the consequent loss of focus and capacity to prioritize underlying political problems.	阿根廷学者罗伯托·博萨斯提出因其下属机构无法持续制定推动成员国参与地区融合进程的共同目标，再加上由此造成的无法确定主要政治问题的优先顺序，南美共同市场现在的状态已经十分危急。


Similar diagnoses are made with respect to the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and other regional organizations.	拉丁美洲经济体系、安第斯国家共同体和其他地区性组织也被诊断出存在相似的问题。


Contributing to this loss of dynamism is the flood of proposals rushing out of Venezuela, including the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA, with its own standing army), the Trade Treaty of the Peoples (TCP), the Bank of the South, and the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS).	导致活力进一步减弱的是委内瑞拉涌出的大量提案，包括设有常备军的玻利瓦尔美洲国家替代计划（AlBA）、民族贸易条约（TCP）、南方银行和南大西洋公约组织（OTAS）。


Some of the Venezuelan initiatives are going nowhere, but others, such Petrocaribe, Petrosur, and TeleSUR, are taking off.	其中一些委内瑞拉计划走进了死胡同，而加勒比石油计划、南美石油组织和南方电视台的其他计划仍在不断的推出。


Meanwhile, Brazil is intent on assuming a regional and global political role that corresponds to its growing economic weight.	与此同时，巴西对发挥与其不断增长的经济重要性相适应的地区和全球政治作用充满着热衷。


The challenge is to find a regional role that is compatible with the country’s size, but that does not create mistrust and, at the same time, benefits the rest of the region.	难点在于确定与其国家规模相适应的地区作用，但这样的地位既不能导致误会，还要对本地区其他国家有所帮助。


The proposed Union of South American Nations (Unasur), like the South American Defense Council, is part of a Brazilian regional strategy to encourage cooperation within Latin America in order to counterbalance the power of the United States and act as a mediator in regional disagreements.	正在探讨的南美国家联盟（Unasur）像南美国防委员会一样，是巴西为了抗衡美国力量和调解地区分歧，鼓励拉美合作的地区性战略的组成部分。


While the Unasur proposal may have been formulated in a more rigorous way than other initiatives, its failure to contemplate trade integration means that there is nothing to tie member states together beyond political will.	尽管在起草南美国家联盟提案时可能比其他计划更加谨慎，但其未能将贸易一体化纳入考虑意味着除去单纯的政治意愿外，再没有其他因素可以联系各成员国。


Discussions about international free trade, however, have generally been held outside the region, in Doha or in the G-20, with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico representing Latin America.	而有关国际自由贸易的讨论却一般选择在拉美地区之外，比方说多哈谈判和二十国峰会，以阿根廷、巴西和墨西哥作为拉美的代表。


Although Unasur aims to progress beyond free-trade agreements, this requires a more streamlined integration within the organization – one that expands its current role as a forum for discussing problems and seeking solutions for Latin America as a whole.	虽然南美国家联盟的目标超越了自由贸易协定，但这需要在组织内部推行更精简的整合举措——整合的目的是扩大联盟当前的管辖范围，让其成为探讨拉美整体问题和寻找解决方案的有效场所。


Unasur, however, has highlighted the cooling of relations between Brazil and Mexico, which is not a member of the new organization.	但是南美国家联盟已经凸显了巴西和墨西哥两国关系的冷却，后者并不是这个新组织的成员国。


This may well have an impact on future regional political coordination, although Mexico’s future membership has not been ruled out.	虽然并不排除墨西哥会在未来加入这一组织，但这很可能影响到未来的区域政治协作。


(Furthermore, Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s participation in the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development in Bahia in December 2008 suggests that Mexico has not turned its back on the possibility of coordinating regional positions.)	（此外，墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙出席2008年12月在巴伊亚举行的拉美加勒比地区一体化和发展首脑会议向人们表明：墨西哥并没有放弃协调地区立场的可能性。 ）


The South American Defense Council, however, has stalled.	但南美国防委员会却已经陷入停顿。


To increase its effectiveness, the mistrust that permeates Unasur must be quelled, and the goals of member states must be more clearly defined.	要想提高效率，必需抑制影响南美国家联盟的不信任感，并更加明确地界定各成员国的目标。


This is especially true of Brazil, the source of much of this mistrust.	其中巴西尤其如此，这个国家是南美国家联盟间不信任感的主要源头。


Finally, Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, some time ago proposed an Organization of Latin American States to replace the Organization of American States (OAS).	最后，厄瓜多尔总统拉斐尔·科雷亚不久前曾提议组建取代美洲国家组织的拉美国家组织。


Although the inclusion of all Latin American states goes some way towards repairing the weakened Brazilian-Mexican axis, and creates a new and more positive environment for future political coordination, this new organization is unlikely to contribute much to actual regional integration.	尽管所有拉美国家的加入能够在某种程度上修复已经削弱的巴墨轴心，并为未来的政治协作创造新的、积极的环境，但这个新组织却不大可能为实际的地区融合作出多大贡献。


The lack of regional common policies is particularly noticeable in the areas of regional defense and internal security, where it has been impossible to identify a common position on inter-state tensions, the fight against organized crime, and drug trafficking.	区域共同政策的缺位在地区防御和国内安全领域尤其显著，以致在国家间紧张局势、反对有组织犯罪和毒品贩运等领域根本无法确定共同的立场。


These difficulties are exacerbated by the OAS’s inability to address complex situations such as the coup d’état in Honduras, the conflict between Ecuador and Colombia, or broader regional problems.	美洲国家组织在解决洪都拉斯政变、厄瓜多尔和哥伦比亚冲突或涉及面更广的地区性问题等复杂局势时所表现出来的无能为力进一步加剧了这样的困难。


This regional stasis may worsen as a result of growing nationalism; an increase in social divisions within states; weapons proliferation and an increase in military spending; and environmental degradation.	这样的区域停滞可能伴随民族主义滋长、国家内部社会分化、武器扩散和军事开支增加以及环境质量恶化而变得更加严重。


It seems that Latin America has abandoned the principles, commitments, and foundations of full regional integration.	拉丁美洲似乎已经放弃了全面地区融合的原则、目标和基础。


Indeed, national interests and nationalistic egos have now moved to center stage.	事实上，国家利益和民族自尊心现在已经开始登上舞台。


Latin America’s Military Factor	拉美的军事因素


BUENOS AIRES – In 2009, Latin America scored an unrecognized achievement: the global economic crisis did not affect the continent as dramatically as it did other regions.   Politically and institutionally, however, Latin America’s weaknesses and perils worsened.	布宜诺斯艾利斯 ——2009 年，拉美悄无声息地取得了一项成就：拉美经济并未像其他地区那样遭到全球经济危机的严重破坏。 但在政治和制度上，拉美的弱点和危险却进一步恶化。


Indeed, while the various legislative and presidential elections held throughout Latin America reinforced – beyond the outcomes in each case – popular commitment to pluralism and democracy, they also reflected growing levels of political polarization and persistent institutional shortcomings.	事实上，尽管拉美各国举行的立法和总统选举无论结果如何都强化了民众对多元化和民主的信念，但同时也反映出越来越严重的政治极化和持续存在的制度缺陷。


In a way, this reveals a paradox of Latin American democracy: exclusive, minority governments that devalue and weaken the state are no longer acceptable, while the rise of personalismo – a concentration of power and coupled with refractory political tactics – are bringing about fragmentation and unruly governance.	从某种角度讲，这揭示了拉美地区民主的悖论：贬低和削弱国家价值的少数人组成的排外政府再也不为民众所接受，但借助顽固政治手段集权的个人统治却正在抬头 —— 它导致政府执政四分五裂，毫无秩序可言。


In the region’s international relations, there were both promising and discouraging signs.	地区国际关系领域也并存着希望和困难。


On the one hand, Brazil continued its successful rise as an emerging power with global aspirations.	一方面，巴西继续作为怀有全球抱负的新兴国家成功崛起。


On the other hand, intra-regional ruptures were an indication of the deterioration of Latin America’s current collective negotiating power, despite the inclusion of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the G-20.	但另一方面，区域裂痕表明尽管阿根廷、巴西和墨西哥已加入 20 国集团，但拉美目前的集体谈判力量却在持续削弱。


The region as a whole continues to lose weight in world politics, largely because it lacks a coherent, common project.	拉美作为一个整体在世界政治中的份量越来越无足轻重，这在很大程度上是因为缺乏一个连贯的共同计划。


The greatest cause of concern, however, is that the military question has reappeared.	但最让人忧虑的是军事问题的重现。


The coup d’état that brought down President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, for example, made that country the first case of successful neo-putschism in Central America in the twenty-first century.	比方说推翻洪都拉斯总统 曼努埃尔·塞拉亚的政变，让洪都拉斯成为二十一世纪中美第一个叛乱成功的国家。


Its repercussions could be enormous, because the contradictory and erratic response of the United States to the coup could be interpreted as tacit encouragement for other would-be coup leaders elsewhere in the region, at least in Central America.	这可能产生的影响十分巨大，因为美国对政变毫无规律可循的矛盾反应可能会被理解为对拉美，至少是中美地区其他可能发动政变的领袖的一种沉默的纵容。


Moreover, there has been an alarming increase in regional tensions.	此外，地区紧张局势也越来越严重。


In some cases, they involve border disputes (Peru and Chile, Bolivia and Chile, and Colombia and Nicaragua).	有些涉及到边境冲突（像秘鲁和智利、玻利维亚和智利、以及哥伦比亚和尼加拉瓜）。


In others, they concern armed factions (Colombia and Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador), the environment (Argentina and Uruguay, Colombia and Ecuador), migration (Mexico and Guatemala), human rights (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and energy (Brazil and Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay, Argentina and Chile).	还有些涉及到武装派别（哥伦比亚和委内瑞拉、哥伦比亚和厄瓜多尔）、环境冲突（阿根廷和乌拉圭、哥伦比亚和厄瓜多尔）、移民问题（墨西哥和危地马拉）、人权纠纷（海地和多米尼加共和国），以及能源问题（巴西和玻利维亚、巴西和巴拉圭、阿根廷和智利）。


With few exceptions, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, the militarization of the “war on drugs” is also starkly evident.	除阿根廷、智利和乌拉圭等少数几个国家之外，另一个明显的趋势是“反毒品战争”的日益军事化。


The armed forces’ role in fighting narcotics – which has been ineffective in every country where it has been tried – is encouraged by a coercive, misguided, bipartisan US strategy.	美国民主共和两党共同信奉的误导性高压政策鼓励了军队在反毒品斗争中作用的强化，而这种策略在曾经做过尝试的所有国家都没有得到很好的收效。


Ominous examples of the rising importance of the military in Latin American political affairs include the reinforcement of Plan Colombia and implementation of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Central America, the reestablishment of the American Navy’s IV Fleet (deactivated in 1950), and the growing importance of the Southern Military Command in US foreign policy in the region.	军队在拉美政治事务中地位强化的不祥例证包括巩固哥伦比亚计划及在墨西哥和中美地区执行梅里达倡议。 同样的事例还包括重建美国海军第四舰队（这支部队曾于 1959 年解散），以及美国南方司令部在美国地区外交政策中的地位不断提高。


There have been significant increases in defense budgets and weapons purchases, particularly in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela.	尤其在巴西、哥伦比亚、智利和委内瑞拉等国，国防和武器采购预算都已大幅增加。


This could rekindle security dilemmas and degenerate into uncontrolled conflicts.	这可能重新凸显安全困境，并最终蜕变为无法控制的冲突。


On top of this, José Alencar, Brazil’s vice-president, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez have reintroduced the nuclear question with statements that seem to point beyond legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy.	这些还不是全部，巴西副总统若泽·阿伦卡尔和委内瑞拉总统 乌戈· 查韦斯已经发表声明，并似乎在其中暗示了超越核能和平合法应用以外的意图，这重新引发了人们对于核问题的关注。


Alencar has suggested that Brazil should “advance” in the development of nuclear weapons, while Chávez has strengthened his alliance with Iran on this front.	阿伦卡尔已经提出巴西应该在核武器研发方面“更进一步”，而查韦斯则在这个问题上巩固了与伊朗的联盟。


Finally, Colombia’s unresolved and cruel conflict persists.	最后，哥伦比亚悬而未决的残酷冲突仍在持续。


Moreover, under a bilateral agreement, the US will have access to seven Colombian military bases, deploying up to 1,400 men (800 soldiers and 600 private contractors) with legal immunity under Colombian law.	此外，根据双边协定，美国将有权使用七座哥伦比亚基地，并部署高达 1400 名（包括 800 名士兵和 600 名私人承包商）不受哥伦比亚法律管辖的人员。


Beyond the arguments about the wisdom of this treaty, this agreement seems certain to raise the probability of a negative internationalization of Colombia‘s problems.	即便对该协定是否明智的质疑声不予理会，该协定似乎肯定会扩大哥伦比亚问题消极国际化的可能性。


In sum, 2009 ended with a mixed panorama in Latin America, with economic, political, and international progress accompanied by regressive and worrying trends.	总而言之， 2009 年拉美的综合局势错综复杂，既有经济、政治和国际领域的进步，但同时也伴随着后退趋势和令人担忧的潮流。


The military question – believed to have been resolved after the region’s transition to democracy which came with the Cold War’s end, the effort to achieve regional integration, and the push toward globalization – has reappeared.   Indeed, it is now clear that one of the main regional challenges is to preserve civilian control of the military, which will require that Latin American elites avoid the temptation to strengthen disproportionately the armed forces’ place in their countries’ domestic and international politics.	冷战结束后随着拉美地区完成向民主政体的过渡以及实现地区融合和全球化的努力，曾经被认为已经解决的军事问题已经开始回潮。 事实上，显然该地区面临的主要挑战之一就是要保持民众对军队的控制，这需要拉美精英抵制住超比例增强武装部队在国内国际政治中所起作用的诱惑。


If that challenge is not met, 2010 will be a year in which Latin America will live dangerously.	如果未能很好地应对上述挑战， 2010 年将成为拉美地区的危险年份。


The socio-economic context is critical.	社会经济关系至关重要。


The region’s performance during the global financial crisis has not hidden fundamental problems: the heavy burden of an unrealized agenda of social inclusion and a combination of inequality and injustice that could turn lethal in the near future.	拉美地区在全球金融危机中的表现并未掩盖其根本问题：拉美地区不仅面临着社会融合计划尚未实现的重担，还面临着可能在不远的将来造成致命影响的不平等不公正的问题。


Disgruntled Democracies	民主不高兴


MEXICO CITY – In 2011 and 2012, tens of thousands of students demonstrated in Santiago, Chile, demanding greater access to higher education.	墨西哥城—2011年和2012年，几万学生在智利圣地亚哥举行示威，要求高等学校扩招。


Earlier this year, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians marched in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte, calling for improved public-health services, better schools, and cheaper, more efficient public transport.	今年早些时候，几万巴西人走上圣保罗、里约热内卢和贝洛哈里桑塔，要求改善公共卫生服务、提高教育质量和更廉价、更高效的公共交通。


And Colombians and Peruvians from all walks of life (especially peasants, farm owners, and mineworkers), as well as Mexican school teachers, now occupy the centers of Bogotá, Lima, and Mexico City, disrupting inhabitants’ daily lives and creating serious problems for the authorities.	如今，哥伦比亚和秘鲁的各界人士（特别是农民、农场主和矿工）以及墨西哥教师占领了波哥大、利马和墨西哥城市中心，干扰了居民的日常生活，也给当局造成了严重麻烦。


These countries, once models of economic hope and democratic promise in Latin America, have become examples of democracies without legitimacy or credibility.	曾几何时，这些国家无不是拉丁美洲经济希望和民主前途的榜样，而如今，它们成为缺少合法性和信誉的民主的例子。


Although they have made significant social progress in recent years, they have become centers of popular unrest.	尽管它们近几年取得了重大的社会进步，但却沦为公共动荡的中心。


And their presidents, despite their undeniable competence, are watching their approval ratings plummet.	这些国家的总统尽管具有不容置疑的能力，却眼睁睁地目睹支持率日薄西山。


These paradoxes are both perplexing and revealing. For starters, they reflect an economic-growth problem.	这些悖论既令人费解，又具有启发性。


Chile’s economy has performed well over the past two years, despite low world copper prices; but its annual growth rate is nowhere near that of the previous 25 years.	首先，它们反映了经济增长的问题：尽管铜价低迷，智利经济在过去两年中表现出色； 但年增长率与过去25年相比有差距。


The economic balm applied to old social and cultural wounds is losing its effectiveness.	治疗社会和文化老伤口的经济药方正在失效。


Similarly, while Brazil’s economy remained relatively resilient after the 2009 recession, growth slowed almost to zero last year.	类似地，尽管巴西经济在2009年衰退后相对而言韧劲十足，但在去年放缓到了几近零增长。


Growth rates last year in Colombia and even Peru, which has performed better than any other Latin American country since 2000, also dropped significantly.	去年，哥伦比亚甚至秘鲁（自2000年以来，后者的表现比其他拉美国家更为出色）也出现了大幅放缓。


And Mexico, the worst-performing of the five economies over the last 15 years, has outdone itself; this year, growth is expected to reach barely 1%, if that.	而这五个经济体中过去15年表现最差的墨西哥也毫无起色，今年的经济增长预计只有1%（如果有的话）。


At the same time, while all of these countries built the political and judicial institutions needed to consolidate their transitions to democracy – from Brazil’s in the mid-1980’s to Mexico’s in 2000 – these institutions have become (and in some cases always have been) remarkably insulated from popular demands.	与此同时，尽管所有这些国家都建立了巩固民主转型的政治和司法制度——从1980年代的巴西到2000年代的墨西哥——但这些制度变得（在一些国家则一直如此）与公众要求大相脱节。


As a result, the protests took these countries’ seemingly responsive presidents by surprise.	结果，示威让这些国家看似积极响应公众要求的总统们大惊失色。


Indeed, Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos Calderón and Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff – both skilled and experienced politicians – were utterly unprepared for their countries’ protests.	事实上，哥伦比亚的卡尔德隆和巴西的罗塞夫——他们都是经验丰富、技巧娴熟的政治家——对各自国家出现的示威完全措手不及。


Likewise, Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto and Peru’s Ollanta Humala, who have otherwise seemed to be perceptive leaders, failed to sense the gathering storm.	类似地，墨西哥的涅托和秘鲁的乌马拉——他们曾表现得相当敏锐——也没有察觉到风暴的降临。


As the Chilean economist and politician Carlos Ominami put it: “The children of democracy have become the prime movers of change; the social movement they represent lacks political leadership, and the country’s political forces have practically broken off all their connections to the social world.”	智利经济学家兼政治家奥米纳米（Carlos Ominami）指出：“民主的孩子们成为变革的主要推动力量； 他们所代表的社会运动缺少政治领导，而国家的政治力量实际上已经切断了他们与社会的所有联系。


This year, Chile will hold its sixth consecutive democratic election, with two women – former Labor Minister Evelyn Matthei and former center-left President Michelle Bachelet (both daughters of high-ranking military officers) – currently leading in the polls.	今年，智利将举行连续第六次民主选举，两位女性——前劳工部长马特西（Evelyn Matthei）和前中左翼总统巴切莱特（Michelle Bachelet）——她们均为高级军官之女——在民意调查中领先。


Whoever wins will have to choose between deeply transforming Chile’s institutions and letting social unrest spin out of control.	不管谁当选，都必须做出选择，要么深化智利制度改革，要么让社会动荡迈向失控。


Brazil faces a similar trial, as next year’s soccer World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics test the resilience and adaptability of the social and macroeconomic frameworks that have shaped the country’s development for almost two decades.	巴西也面临类似的局面，明年的足球世界杯和2016年夏季奥运会将检验给巴西带来近二十年发展的社会和宏观经济框架的恢复力和适应力。


To be sure, pro-active anti-poverty programs, loose credit, a commodity-export boom, and heavy government spending (financed by an equally heavy tax burden) lifted millions out of poverty.	平心而论，积极主动的减贫计划、宽松的信用、商品出口繁荣和大手笔政府支出（通过同样大手笔的税收融资）让几百万人摆脱了贫困。


But the expectations of the emerging middle class – including efficient infrastructure, high-quality education and health services, and well-paid jobs – have not been met.	但新兴中产阶级的期望——包括高效的基础设施、高质量的教育和卫生服务以及高新的工作——并未得到满足。


If they cannot even enter the luxurious new stadiums to see their national team play, they will not be happy.	如果他们连走进豪华的新球场观看国家队比赛的愿望都打不到，他们肯定不会高兴。


Similarly, although Mexico has experienced rapid population growth and significant standard-of-living improvements over the last 15 years, many believe that they are not getting what they deserve – or what they were promised.	类似地，尽管墨西哥在过去15年中经历了快速的人口增长和大幅度的生活水平改善，但许多人仍认为他们并没有得到应得的——或者说没有得到被许诺的。


Teachers are furious at being blamed for the wretched state of the country’s education system and view Peña Nieto’s “educational reform” law as an excuse to limit the power of their unions while avoiding genuine institutional reform.	教师被指为墨西哥教育系统不振的罪魁，这让他们义愤不已，视涅托的“教育改革法”为一个借口，其目的是限制教师工会的权力而不进行真正的制度性改革。


Mexico City’s middle-class residents – who wield disproportionate influence countrywide – are also incensed, both at the teachers for disrupting their lives and at the federal and local authorities for failing to restore order.	墨西哥城的中产阶级居民——他们对墨西哥有着无与伦比的影响力——也是满腔怨气，既针对教师扰乱了他们的生活，也针对联邦和地方当局不能重建秩序。


Against this background, the credibility of Mexico’s political institutions is rapidly eroding.	在这样的背景下，墨西哥政治制度的信誉正在快速破坏。


But there is a more fundamental issue at play that stems from the accumulated imperfections of representative democracy in countries where social and economic conditions are less than ideal.	但对这些社会和经济条件远为达到理想状态的国家来说，代议制民主的不完美名的日积月累造成了一个更加根本的问题。


When post-authoritarian excitement abounded and rapid economic growth prevailed, these imperfections were manageable; now, with the former fading and the latter a memory, they have become immense challenges.	当人民充满着后集权主义的振奋之情、快速经济增长遍地开花时，这些不完美性都是可管理的； 而如今，振奋之情已经消退，快速增长已成回忆，不完美性变成了紧迫的挑战。


This problem transcends Latin America.	这一问题超出了拉丁美洲的能力范围。


As observers like Joshua Kurlantzick have pointed out, a global shift away from representative government, driven by increasingly disillusioned middle classes, is underway.	柯兰茨克（Joshua Kurlantzick）等观察家指出，全球变化的趋势是远离代议制政府，其背后的推动力是幻想破灭的中产阶级。


For elected leaders, the dilemma is that there are no simple solutions – and little public patience for more complex ones.	对当选领导人来说，困境在于不存在简单的解决办法——而公众对复杂办法又缺少足够耐心。


Latin America’s Two Lefts	拉丁美洲的两个左派


A perception has been growing over the last few years – and picking up strength in recent months – that Latin America is swinging back to the left.	过去几年来，有种看法越来越被人们所接受，最近几个月以来尤其如此，那就是拉丁美洲正在向左翼回归。


The unimpressive – and sometimes dismal – results of economic reform seem to have generated a backlash that has elected leftist presidents across the continent, starting with Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela at the end of the 1990’s, and continuing with those of Ricardo Lagos in Chile and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, and more recently that of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay.	经济改革平淡无奇、甚至有时凄凉惨淡的结果似乎催生了强大的后座力，带来了南美大陆左翼总统的频频当选：起初是20世纪90年代末乌戈·查韦斯在委内瑞拉选举中获胜，而后是里卡多·拉戈斯在智利、内斯托尔·卡洛斯·基什内尔在阿根廷当选，最近还有巴西的卢拉·达·席尔瓦和乌拉圭的塔瓦雷·巴斯克斯。


More left-wing victories seem to be in store in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia.	看起来左翼人士在墨西哥、秘鲁和玻利维亚似乎还会有更多的胜利。


But while the premises underlying this broad trend are clear, Latin America’s voters are electing not one left, but two.	尽管这种大趋势作为前提已经再清楚不过，但拉丁美洲的投票者选出的却不是一个左派，而是两个。


To be sure, although 2004 was one of the region’s better years in terms of economic growth, the outcome of two decades of so-called structural reform remains disappointing.	可以肯定的是，尽管拉美地区2004年的经济发展十分可喜，但近20年来所谓的结构改革却让人大失所望。


Inequality has increased, poverty has been reduced only slightly at best, employment remains stubbornly low, corruption, violence, crime, and political gridlock continue unabated, and foreign investment and free-trade agreements with the US have yet to deliver the goods.	不平等现象进一步加剧、贫穷最多也只是稍有缓解、就业率仍然很低、腐败、暴力、犯罪和政治僵局愈演愈烈，国外投资和与美国自由贸易协议的结果还有待观察。


In these circumstances, a strong ideological and policy reaction against the pro-market “Washington Consensus,” with its emphasis on liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, is anything but a surprise.	在这种情况下，人们在意识形态和政策导向上强烈反对面向市场、强调贸易自由、放松管制和私有化的“华盛顿共识”，这根本就不值得大惊小怪。


At the same time, however, that reaction is much less uniform and clear-cut than many observers believe.	但与此同时，这种反应并没有像很多观察家预想的那么普遍和清晰。


To begin with, those parties, leaders, and movements that have truly socialist and progressive roots – such as Lagos and his Socialist Party in Chile, Lula and the Workers’ Party in Brazil, and Vázquez in Uruguay – are following pragmatic, sensible and realistic paths.	毕竟从一开始，这些党派、领袖和运动就有着真正的社会和进步根源－比如拉戈斯的智利社会党、卢拉的巴西工人党，还有乌拉圭的巴斯克斯－他们都遵循着务实、理智和现实的原则。


Their policies are remarkably similar to those of their predecessors; their respect for democracy is full-fledged and sincere.	他们的政策与前任总统非常相似，都对民主抱有全心全意、发自内心的尊重。


Their old school anti-Americanism has been tempered by years of exile, realism, and resignation.	多年的流亡、现实和政治上的服从使他们不再坚持自己的反美立场。


Conversely, leftist leaders who arise from a populist, purely nationalist past, with few ideological underpinnings – Chávez with his military background, Kirchner with his Peronist roots, and Mexico City mayor and presidential frontrunner Lopez Obrador, with his origins in the Institutional Revolutionary Party – has proven much less responsive to modernizing influences.	恰恰相反，左翼领袖们大都出身贫寒，而且都曾是纯粹的民族主义者，在意识形态上没有多少理论支撑ľ查韦斯出身军旅、基什内尔信奉庇隆主义、墨西哥城市长及总统候选人奥布拉多则源自革命制度党ľ事实证明他们对现代化的影响并不那么热衷。


For them, rhetoric is more important than substance and power is more important than how it is exercised.	在他们看来，花言巧语比实质更为重要，而权力本身的重要性则远远超过了行使权力的方式。


The despair of poor, provincial, and clientelistic constituencies is a tool rather than a problem, and belittling the US by aligning with Fidel Castro trumps promoting their countries’ real interests in the world.	穷人和各省选民的绝望情绪不过是可以利用的工具，而不是大不了的问题，他们通过与牛皮大王菲德尔·卡斯特罗结盟来贬低美国，从而争取各自国家在世界上的利益。


Secondly, the left in general – whether of socialist or populist origins – has “spoken loudly” and carried a “small stick,” so to speak.	其次，不管是社会主义还是平民主义，两种左派都“大声疾呼”，可以说手里都握紧了“棍棒”。


Actual policies, with the passing exception of Argentina’s negotiation with its international creditors – and the IMF, in particular – are remarkably similar to those of their predecessors.	除了过去阿根廷与国际债权人、特别是国际货币基金组织之间的谈判，它们的实际政策与前人总统有着惊人的相似。


Chávez continues to invite foreign oil companies to drill in the Orinoco basin, Lula maintains hefty budget surpluses, Kirchner ultimately accepts IMF conditionality, and Lagos maintains unmatched relations with Chile’s highly conservative private sector.	查韦斯继续邀请国外石油公司在奥里诺科盆地采油，卢拉继续保持着巨大的预算盈余，基什内尔最终接受了国际货币基金组织的限制政策，拉戈斯也与智利高度保守的私有经济保持着千丝万缕的联系。


Overall, macroeconomic orthodoxy seems to be taking root.	总的来讲，宏观经济的正统观念似乎落地生根了。


Indeed, it is only on the margins where Latin America’s left is striving to differ – and partly succeeding.	实际上，拉美左翼人士试图改变的仅限于一些边缘问题ľ并且取得了部分成功。


The areas where this new and old left can make a difference include improving anti-poverty programs, expanding housing and property rights, effective land reform, developing education, science, and technology, and, perhaps most importantly, strengthening democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in a region where they have been woefully absent for decades.	新老左派之间的不同之处包括改善反贫困计划、扩大住房和财产权利、进行有效的土地改革、发展教育、科学和技术，以及最重要的，加强拉美地区几���年来不曾有过的民主、人权和法治建设。


To succeed with this bold and necessary agenda, Latin America’s left must purge its dangerous and destructive nationalist and authoritarian strains.	要想在这项大胆但却必要的计划中取得成功，拉美左派必须除去自身危险、破坏性的民族和独裁主义限制。


The new left, if it stays the course on modernization and reform, can be a boon to the region.	如果新的左派能坚持现代化和改革的方向，那么最终会使这个地区从中受益。


Latin America’s Trump Problem	拉丁美洲的特朗普问题


SANTIAGO – Donald Trump reached the White House by bringing out the worst in the United States’ electorate.	圣地亚哥—特朗普通过吸引美国最糟糕的选民入主白宫。


Will his administration now bring on the worst – both economically and politically – for Latin Americans?	现在，他的政府是否会引出拉丁美洲经济和政治最糟糕的一面？


The initial signs are nothing if not ominous.	最初的迹象是什么都没有，如果不是噩兆的话。


Not since the days of gunboat diplomacy a century ago has a yanqui leader treated the countries south of the US border and their citizens so badly.	自一个世纪前的舰炮外交时代以来，还没有一位扬基领导人如此恶劣地对待美国边境以南的国家和这些国家的公民。


Trump infamously branded Mexican migrants rapists and murderers.	特朗普臭名昭著地将墨西哥移民打上强奸犯和杀人犯的标签。


Guatemalans, Ecuadoreans, and Colombians, though not explicitly mentioned, did not feel particularly reassured.	危地马拉人、厄瓜多尔人和哥伦比亚人尽管没有被他公然提及，滋味肯定也不好受。


With US participation in the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) dead in the water, the next question is whether Trump will make good on his vow to renegotiate the rules governing the North American Free Trade Area, or even to pull out of NAFTA altogether.	美国退出12个国家的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）已成定局，下一个问题是特朗普是否会认真对待他重新谈判北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）规则甚至干脆撤销NAFTA的承诺。


Trade agreements with Central America, Colombia, Chile, and Peru could also be at risk.	与中美洲、哥伦比亚、智利和秘鲁的贸易协定也是岌岌可危。


No one (perhaps not even Trump) knows what the new administration will do in this regard.	没人知道（也许连特朗普也不知道）新政府在这方面会怎么做。


A US president can renounce these pacts unilaterally.	美国政府可以单方面废除这些契约。


But the volumes and volumes of implementing legislation were enacted by Congress, and can be modified only by a congressional vote.	但国会通过了卷帙浩繁的实施立法，要做出修改只能通过国会投票。


The US economy (and businesses) would not benefit from an overnight and wholesale abandonment of the rules governing not only trade in goods and services, but also investment, intellectual property, and government procurement across much of the Western Hemisphere.	美国经济（和企业）不可能因为一夜之间彻底抛弃规则获益，这些规则不仅管理着西半球大部分国家的商品和服务贸易，也管理着投资、知识产权和政府采购。


The Republicans may no longer be the party of free trade, but it is hard to imagine a Republican-controlled Congress willingly jumping off that cliff.	共和党也许不再是自由贸易之党，但难以想象共和党控制的国会会主动跳下悬崖。


For Mexico and the Caribbean basin, trade with the US is crucial.	对墨西哥和加勒比海地区而言，对美贸易至关重要。


For the countries of South America, which trade as much or more with Asia – especially China – and the European Union, macroeconomics and finance are far more important.	对南美诸国而言，宏观经济和金融更加重要，至于贸易，它们更多的是与亚洲（特别是中国）和欧洲进行。


The expectation of a surge in infrastructure spending in the US under Trump has caused a number of commodity prices to soar (overall uncertainty has also sent investors packing into metals such as gold and copper, which function as safe-haven assets).	预计在特朗普治下，美国基础设施支出将急剧增加，这导致许多大宗商品价格飙升（总体不确定性也导致投资者纷纷购买黄金和铜的具备安全港资产功能的金属）。


So, in the short run, mineral exporters like Peru and Chile are benefiting.	因此，在短期，秘鲁和智利等原材料出口国是受益的。


But the run-up in prices may turn out to be short-lived, especially if Chinese growth continues to slow.	但价格涨势可能是短暂的，特别是如果中国增长继续放缓的话。


If Trump does half of what he has promised, cutting taxes on the rich and increasing defense and infrastructure spending, the US will run a much more expansionary fiscal policy.	如果特朗普的承诺兑现一半，对富人减税并增加防务和基础设施支出，美国将采取极具扩张性的财政政策。


The resulting boost to aggregate demand would then buttress the case for the Federal Reserve to raise short-term interest rates faster than it had been planning to do.	结果是总需求得到提振，支持美联储以比计划速度更快地提高短期利率。


But, while such a change in the fiscal-monetary mix might be beneficial for the US in the short term, it would create new challenges for Latin America’s emerging economies.	但是，尽管这样的财政政策组合变化短期或许有利于美国，它将给拉丁美洲的新兴经济体造成新的挑战。


Tighter money and a looser fiscal stance in the US almost surely would mean a stronger dollar.	美国的紧货币和宽财政立场几乎肯定会让美元升值。


That is bad news for governments and companies south of the border.	这对于它南边的政府和公司来说是坏消息。


Yes, more prudent policies and better regulatory frameworks have allowed local-currency bond markets to flourish in recent years.	诚然，最近几年来，更加审慎的政策和更好的监管框架使本币债券市场欣欣向荣。


But in Latin America, much of public and especially private debt remains dollar-denominated, which limits how much central banks can allow currencies to depreciate in response to higher US interest rates.	但在拉丁美洲，大量公共债务（私人债务更加如此）仍为美元计价，这限制了央行允许本币为应对美国利息升高而贬值的幅度。


A decade ago, economists were optimistic that flexible exchange rates would allow emerging markets to insulate their economies from monetary-policy shocks coming from the developed countries.	十年前，经济学家乐观地认为弹性汇率将让新兴市场经济免于来自发达国家的货币政策冲击。


Floating is still the best alternative, but today the overall assessment is much less sanguine.	浮动仍然是最佳策略，但如今总体情况远远没有那么乐观了。


Not only is such flexibility de facto limited by dollar debts; US monetary conditions, it seems, are transmitted to other countries quite independently of their exchange-rate regimes.	汇率的弹性不但受到美元债务的限制； 并且美国货币环境似乎也传递到其他国家，根本不受这些国家汇率机制的影响。


London Business School’s Hélène Rey has argued that US monetary-policy shocks affect risk premia, and that this channel operates internationally as well as domestically.	伦敦商学院的伊莲·雷（Hélène Rey）指出，美国货币政策冲击影响风险溢价，并且这一渠道对国际和国内都有效。


This “risk-taking” channel of monetary policy is so powerful internationally that when the Fed loosens policy, credit grows all over the world, and vice versa.	这一货币政策的“风险承担”渠道具有极大的国际性力量，当美联储放松政策时，全世界的信用都会增长，反之则反是。


So if higher interest rates in the US went hand in hand with higher premia and a reduced appetite for risk among investors, Latin America could find itself under financial stress.	因此，如果美国利率的升高与溢价的升高和投资者风险偏好的下降出现同步，拉丁美洲可能陷入金融压力。


This brings us to the broader question: how will Trump affect perceptions of risk worldwide?	这就引出了一个范围更广的问题：特朗普将如何影响全世界的风险感知？


Larry Summers and other thoughtful observers have long argued that the US could use more investment in roads, bridges, and ports, and that at today’s record-low long-term interest rates, such investments would pay for themselves.	拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和其他思想深邃的观察家早就指出，美国可以加大道路、桥梁和港口投资，并且，在当今创纪录的低长期利率环境下，这样的投资足以收回成本。


Trump is adding to that recipe massive tax cuts for the wealthy.	特朗普在此基础上又加上了对富人大量减税。


The much larger deficits and debts (add several portions of nationalist rhetoric and a generous helping of foreign-policy inexperience to the mix) could easily prompt a surge in risk aversion and a sizeable increase in long-term interest rates – which would undermine much of the rationale behind self-financing infrastructure investments.	赤字和债务的激增（再加上一些民族主义修辞和外交政策方面经验严重缺乏的慷慨助力）可以非常轻易地激起风险厌恶和长期利率大涨——这将破坏许多自我融资的基础设施投资背后的逻辑。


No one wants to live in a more uncertain world – least of all people in the still-vulnerable countries of Central and South America.	没人愿意生活在更加不确定的世界中——至少对于仍然十分脆弱的中美和南美国家人民而言。


Those vulnerabilities are political as well as economic.	这些脆弱性即来自政治，也来自经济。


Just when recent electoral results in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, coupled with term limits for incumbents in Bolivia and Ecuador, suggested that South America was reaching the end of a cycle of left-wing populism, the US – and much of Europe – seems to be entering a cycle of right-wing populism.	阿根廷、秘鲁和委内瑞拉的最新选举结果，以及玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔领导人任期的即将结束，表明南美正在接近左翼民粹主义周期的终点，而与此同时，美国——以及欧洲大部——似乎正在进入右翼民粹主义周期。


There is no shortage of Latin American demagogues who will likely try to emulate Trump’s campaign.	拉丁美洲绝不缺少可能模仿特朗普选战的煽动家。


The lesson will not be lost on them that no statement is so outrageous that the news media will not cover it, and that the benefits of increased attention outweigh the political costs of the outrage.	他们不可能不认识到，再骇人听闻的言论，新闻媒体也会报道，而关注度提高所带来的好处要胜过愤慨的政治代价。


Just as in the US and Europe, immigration – not from Muslim countries, but from neighboring states – could provide a convenient lightning rod.	和美国和欧洲一样，移民——不是来自穆斯林国家，而是来自邻国——可以提供方便的避雷针。


So could nationalism: there is a certain poetic symmetry at work when local left-wing activists complain about threats to national self-determination – just as Trump did – in arguing against the TPP and other trade agreements.	民族主义也可以：当地方左翼活动家在反对TPP和其他贸易协定的过程中抱怨民族自决的威胁（如特朗普那样）时，仿佛一种诗般的对称在起作用。


For Latin America, a return to the facile rhetoric and self-defeating policies of populism would be the most dangerous side effect of Trump’s victory.	对拉丁美洲而言，回归民粹主义的肤浅修辞和适得其反的政策也许是特朗普胜选最危险的副作用。


One can only hope that, during his presidency, Trump plays as fast and loose with his campaign promises as he did with the truth during the campaign.	我们只能寄希望于，在担任总统期间，特朗普对待他的竞选承诺如同他在竞选期间对待事实那样轻率。


Global Flows and Global Growth	全球流和全球增长


BERKELEY – A growing share of the world’s economic activity involves cross-border flows.	伯克利—世界经济活动中越来越大的比例与跨境流有关。


But just how interconnected is the global economy?	但全球经济的互联性有多大？


How are cross-border flows among activities, sectors, and countries changing?	不同活动、部门和国家间的跨境流如何变化？


How do national economies rank in terms of their cross-border flows or “interconnectedness”?	国家经济体的跨境流或“互联性”排名如何？


And what are the implications for business and policymakers?	对商业和决策者又有哪些影响？


A new report from McKinsey Global Institute addresses these questions by analyzing the inflows and outflows of goods, services, finance, people, and data and communications for 195 countries over the past 20 years.	新的麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）报告通过分析195个国家在过去20年中的商品、服务、金融、人员和数据与通信流入流出量回答了这些问题。


Both aggregate data and micro examples confirm that the world has become more tightly linked, with cross-border flows increasing in scope and complexity – and embracing a larger number of countries and participants within them.	加总数据和微观粒子都印证了世界已变得紧密互联，跨境流在规模和复杂性上都有所增加，涉及的国家和参与者数量也有所扩大。


Despite a significant contraction from 2007 to 2009, resulting from the deep global recession, the combined value of financial flows and trade in goods and services was 36% of global GDP in 2012 – 1.5 times higher than in 1980.	尽管2007—2009年拜深度全球衰退所赐出现了重大回撤，但金融流和商品和服务贸易总价值在2012年仍占全球GDP的36%，比1980年高1. 5倍。


The report also confirms that greater openness to global flows has been a significant source of economic growth for individual countries and worldwide.	报告还证实，增加对全球流的开放度是个体国家和全世界经济增长的重要源泉。


Overall, the research estimates that global flows have contributed 15-25% of global growth each year, with more interconnected countries receiving 40% more of the growth benefits than less interconnected ones.	总体而言，报告估计全球流每年要贡献全球增长的15—25%，互联性较强的国家获得的增长好处比互联性较弱国家多40%。


This is consistent with economic theory: interconnectedness fosters growth via productivity gains from specialization, scale, competition, and innovation.	这与经济理论一致：互联性可以通过专业化、规模化、竞争和创新提高生产率，从而提振增长。


Cross-border flows of goods, including commodities, remain the largest category, growing at 11% per year during the last decade and surpassing their pre-recession peak in 2012.	跨境商品流（包括大宗商品）仍是最大的流动项，在过去十年中以每年11%的速度增加，并在2012年超过了危机前峰值。


Today, more than 35% of goods cross national borders.	如今，35%以上的商品在跨国流动。


Cross-border flows of services have also recovered to pre-recession levels and have been growing rapidly at 10% per year since 2002.	服务的跨境流也恢复到危机前水平，自2002年以来，每年以10%的速度增长。


Nonetheless, although services account for roughly two-thirds of world GDP, cross-border flows of services are less than one-quarter those of goods.	尽管如此，虽然服务占全球GDP的约三分之二，但跨境服务流仍不足商品的四分之一。


Cross-border flows of finance are still 70% off their pre-recession peak, yet even at today’s depressed levels they account for more than one-third of all global financing.	跨境金融流仍比危机前峰值低了70%，但即便以今天严重缩水的规模，也可以占到全球融资总额的三分之一强。


By contrast, the cross-border flow of people, measured by the percentage of people living outside their country of birth, is small, hovering around 2.7% since 1980.	相反，跨境人员流——以居住在非出生国的人数占比衡量——自1980年以来一直徘徊在2. 7%左右。


But cross-border movements of people for short-term purposes – tourism, work-related travel, and education, for example – have been growing by 3.5-4.8% annually during the last decade.	但短期目的人员跨境流动——如旅游、出差和教育——在过去十年中以每年3. 5—4.


And cross-border flows of data and communications have exploded, expanding by more than 50% per year since 2005.	跨境数据和通信流呈现爆发式增长，自2005年以来每年都扩张50%以上。


International telephone minutes have doubled, and cross-border Internet traffic has increased by 1,800%.	国际长途电话时长出现了翻番，跨境互联网流量增长了1800%。


Migration flows may not be gaining as a share of the world’s population, but as a result of digitization, people are more interconnected than ever before.	移民占世界人口的比重或许没有增加，但拜数字化所赐，人与人之间的互联性比以往任何时候都要高。


Digitization is also transforming cross-border trade flows in three ways: the creation of digital goods and services, such as entertainment and products manufactured by 3D printers; so-called “digital wrappers,” including tracking devices for physical flows; and digital sales platforms, such as eBay and Alibaba.	数字化还在三个方面改变了跨境贸易流：创造数字商品和服务，如娱乐和3D打印制造品； 所谓的“数字封装”，包括实物流追踪装置；


On eBay, for example, more than 90% of commercial sellers export products to other countries, compared to less than 25% of traditional small firms.	比如，在eBay，超过90%的商业卖家向他国出口产品，而传统小企业的这一比例只有不到25%。


Digital technologies are boosting global flows and competition, enabling even the smallest companies – and even individual entrepreneurs – to be “micro-multinationals.”	数字技术正在提振全球流和竞争，让最小的公司——甚至个体户——成为“微型跨国公司”。


Knowledge-intensive flows requiring relatively high levels of human capital and research and development are now larger than labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and resource-intensive flows and are growing faster than all three.	需要相对较高的人力资源和研发水平的知识密集型流现已超过劳动密集型、资本密集型和资源密集型流，并且以比后三者更快的速度增长。


Flows of low-value, labor-intensive goods like apparel are declining as a share of global flows, while flows of R&D-intensive products, such as pharmaceuticals and business services, are gaining share.	低价值、劳动密集型商品流（如服装）展全球流的比重在下降，而研发密集型商品流（如制药和商业服务）份额在增加。


By 2012, knowledge-intensive flows accounted for nearly half of the combined total value of flows of goods, services, and finance.	2012年，知识密集型流占商品、服务和金融流总值的近一半。


This trend is an advantage for developed countries, which account for two-thirds of knowledge-intensive flows.	这一趋势是发达国家的优势，发达国家占了知识密集型流的三分之二。


China is the exception, claiming the second-largest share of flows (after the United States).	中国是个例外，占知识密集型流比重第二位（仅次于美国）。


Traditional measures of an individual country’s global interconnectedness compare the size of its global flows to its GDP.	传统的衡量个体国家全球互联性的方法是比较其全球流与其GDP的规模。


According to these measures, smaller countries with smaller domestic markets appear to be more interconnected than larger ones.	根据这一方法，本国市场较小的小国总是比大国呈现出更大的互联性。


But this approach is misleading, because it does not consider a country’s share of global flows.	但这一方法有误导作用，因为它并未考虑一国占全球流的比重。


The McKinsey report’s index of global connectedness remedies this shortcoming by considering both the size of a country’s global flows relative to GDP and its overall share of global flows.	麦肯锡报告的全球互联性指数纠正了这一缺陷，考虑了一国全球流与其GDP的比较及其占全球流的比重。


The MGI Connectedness Index shows Germany, Hong Kong, and the US ranking first, second, and third, respectively.	在麦肯锡全球研究所互联性指数中，德国、香港和美国分居一二三名。


But some major economies fall well behind.	但一些主要经济体大大落后了。


Despite strong exports, South Korea and Japan rank 20th and 21st out of 85 countries, because they lag on immigration and cross-border Internet traffic.	尽管出口强劲，但韩国和日本在85个国家中分别只名列第20名和第21名，因为它们在接受移民和跨境互联网流量上落后了。


China, which ranks 25th, has a strong export engine and large capital inflows but ranks low on people and data flows.	中国名列第25名，它的出口很强，资本流入也很大，但在人员和数据流方面排名很低。


On average, emerging market economies rank lower than advanced economies, but several emerging market economies – including Morocco, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and China – have improved their ranking significantly since the mid-1990’s.	平均而言，新兴市场经济体排名低于发达经济体，但一些新兴市场经济体——包括摩洛哥、印度、巴西、沙特阿拉伯和中国——自20世纪90年代以来排名大幅上升。


Today, emerging markets account for about 38% of global flows, triple their share in 1990.	如今，新兴市场占全球流的比重为38%左右，是1990年的三倍。


Yet a “digital divide” between developed and emerging economies persists in both data and communication flows and knowledge-intensive flows – and that gap does not appear to be closing.	但发达和新兴经济体在数据和通信流以及知识密集型流上都存在“数字分化”——并且差距似乎没有缩小迹象。


Emerging economies produce 40% of global output, and are home to 80% of the world’s population, yet they account for only 24% of cross-border Internet traffic.	新兴经济体生产了40%的全球产出，居住着80%的世界人口，但只贡献了24%的跨境互联网流量。


The economic gains of interconnectedness are significant, but so are the challenges.	互联性的经济好处是巨大的，挑战亦然。


To capitalize on the opportunities of digitization and the shift to knowledge-intensive trade, countries must invest in talent and infrastructure; reduce barriers to cross-border flows of people and information, without jeopardizing their citizens’ privacy and security; and expose their producers to robust foreign competition while ameliorating the resulting costs of disruption for their communities and workers.	要抓住数字化和知识密集型贸易变迁的机会，各国必须投资于人才和基础设施、在降低人员和信息的跨境流壁垒的同时保护好公民的隐私和安全，并让生产商参与激烈的外国竞争，同时减轻由此造成的社会和工人饱受干扰的成本。


If the gains from globalization are not widely shared, political support for greater openness to global flows will decline – as will the economic benefits that such flows create.	如果全球化的好处不能广泛共享，增加对全球流的开放度的政治支持就会削弱——这些流动所创造的的经济好处也会随之减少。


Intelligent Machines and Displaced Workers	智能机器与失业工人


BERKELEY – In their compelling new book The Second Machine Age, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee document the progress in artificial intelligence that is enabling computers to exceed what they were capable of only a few years ago.	发自伯克莱——在他们颇具说服力的新书《第二次机器时代》中，埃里克·布仑乔尔森和安德鲁·麦卡菲记录了人工智能在协助电脑超越自身已有技能方面的进展。


The leaps in machine intelligence, along with the connection of human beings around the world in a common digital network, will enable the development of new technologies, goods and services.	机器智能的飞跃，加上全世界人们在一个共同数码网络下互相连接起来的状况，将促进新技术，商品和服务的研发。


The authors are optimistic about the “bounty” or economy-wide benefits of brilliant machines. But they warn that the distribution or “spread” of these benefits will be uneven.	作者们对智能机器的“好处”或者经济上的优点相当乐观，但同时也警告说这类好处的分布或者“覆盖”将是不平均的。


Their fears are justified.	他们的担心是合理的。


During the last three decades, even before breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, computers have been replacing and multiplying the physical labor of human beings.	在过去三十年来，即便是在人工智能技术取得突破之前，电脑已经在逐步取代人类的体力劳动，且效率成倍提高。


Improvements in computer and communications technologies have also enabled employers to offshore many routine tasks that machines cannot directly replace.	而电脑和信息技术方面的进步也令企业主们可以把许多机器无法直接取代的常规工作外包到国外。


As a result of both technological displacement and technology-enabled globalization, the share of employment in occupations in the middle of the skill distribution has declined rapidly in both the United States and Europe.	作为科技替代以及科技引发之全球化的结果，美欧两地处于技能分布中间区间的职位在整体工作职位中所占的份额显著下滑。


Demand for workers who perform routine tasks has been falling at an accelerating pace in recent decades, destroying well -paid middle-skill jobs in both manufacturing and clerical occupations.	对常规工作职工的需求近年来呈加速下降之势，导致那些制造业和文书工作的高收入中等技能工作不复存在。


Technological progress has also been skill-biased: it has increased the relative demand for workers with the human capital to fill occupations that involve cognitive and abstract tasks, while eliminating middle-skill routine occupations.	科技进步同时也是基于一定技能的：一方面对拥有特定技能的劳动者的需求相对增加，让他们从事与认知和抽象理论相关的工作，同时消灭那些中等技术的常规岗位。


It has also been a major factor behind the emergence of large and growing differences in the wages of workers with a college education or higher and those of workers with lower levels of educational attainment.	这同时也是导致拥有高级文凭劳动者和低素质劳动者工资水平日趋分化拉大背后的主要因素


These differences have persisted in the most recent decade, even though tepid economic growth and labor displacement by smarter machines have weakened demand for high-skill, high-cognition occupations.	即便缓慢增长的经济以及更智能机器的劳动替代作用也削弱了对高技能高分析能力职业的需求，但这些差距在最近十年依然存在。


Many college-educated workers simply have been forced down the occupational ladder into jobs traditionally performed by lower-skilled workers, who in turn have been pushed further down the occupational ladder or out of the labor force altogether.	许多大学生直接被挤压到原本由低技能劳工承担的职业层次，而后者则被压到下一个层次甚至直接被排挤出劳动力市场。


As a result, the real wages of workers without a college education have fallen even further behind.	因此如果一个劳动者没有大学文凭，他的工资收入只会进一步下降得更低。


Skill-biased technological change has propelled growing inequality in labor incomes both within and across occupations, in turn fueling the marked increase in overall income inequality.	以技能为基础的科技变革导致各职业内部以及不同职业之间的劳动收入日趋不平等，又反过来加剧了整体的收入不均状态。


Smart machines and global connections have also boosted income inequality in two other ways: by increasing the size and scope of global markets for top-rated talent in a variety of fields (the so-called winner-take-all effect), and by generating huge excess returns or monopoly rents from the creation and ownership of intellectual property and intangible capital.	智能机器和全球互联同时也以另外两种方式促进了收入不均：一是通过扩大特定领域的顶尖人才所面对的全球市场规模和范围（所谓胜者通吃理论）； 二是让那些知识产权和无形资产的创造和拥有者们获取超额回报或是垄断收入。


Ever-smarter machines and ever-tighter global connections are likely to aggravate adverse labor-market trends and growing income inequality, as technology displaces more and more workers.	随着科技取代越来越多的劳动者，日趋职能的机器和更加紧密的全球互联很可能导致负面的劳动市场趋势以及不断恶化的收入不均。


No one is certain about how many workers are at risk; but, based on the pace of recent technological advances, there is reason for concern.	没人能说清有多少劳动者可能会丢掉工作； 但从目前科技进步的速度看来，很有必要去重视这一点。


Using a variety of measures to assess the susceptibility of jobs to computerization, a recent study of 702 occupations finds that nearly half of total US employment is at risk.	借助一系列手段来评估职业针对电脑化的受影响程度，最近一项覆盖702种职业的研究发现其中近一半的美国劳动者都面临着风险。


And, if Brynjolfsson and McAfee are correct, the labor-displacement process will be much faster than anticipated.	如果布仑乔尔森和麦卡菲是对的话，这一职业替代进程将比预期更快。


How should policymakers respond?	在此政策制定者们有何对策？


First, it is important to acknowledge that weak aggregate demand and anemic economic growth, not an acceleration in the labor-displacement rate, explains the slow jobs growth of the last decade.	首先，一定要认识到导致过去十年的职位增加放缓的原因是疲软的总需求和经济增长，而非劳动替代率的加速。


Under these conditions, monetary policy should remain accommodative and further fiscal austerity should be eschewed.	在这种情况下，货币政策应该更加灵活且避免进一步的财政紧缩。


Second, the educational attainment levels of the workforce must be increased.	其次，必须提升劳动者的教育水平。


The effects of technology on workers’ occupational and wage prospects will continue to depend on their education for the foreseeable future.	在可预见的将来，科技对劳动者职位和工资前景的影响将持续取决于他们的教育程度。


The higher the educational attainment level associated with an occupation’s requirements, the lower the probability of its displacement by a smart machine.	一个职位所要求的学历越高，就越难以被智能机器所取代。


In the US, educational attainment levels are not keeping pace with technology’s demands.	在美国，教育水平与科技的需求并不协调。


The US ranks 11th among developed countries in high-school graduation rates and is the only developed country in which the secondary-school graduation rates of 25-34 year olds are no higher than those of 55-64 year olds.	美国的高中毕业率在发达国家中排名第十一，也是唯一一个25~34年龄段人群中学毕业率低于55~64年龄段的国家。


In the latest (2012) scores on international achievement tests, US teenagers scored below the OECD average, dropping to 31st place in math; 24th place in science and 11th place in reading.	在最新（2012年）的国际能力测试中，美国青少年得分低于经合组织国家平均水平，数学能���下降至31位； 科学能力排名第24，阅读能力位列第11。


After ranking first for decades, the US has fallen to 16th place in college graduation rates.	在傲视群雄数十年之后，美国的大学毕业率降至第16位。


And both the educational achievement gap and the college completion gap by income level have been increasing in the US over the past few decades.	而在过去几十年中由教育成就差距和完成大学学业差距导致的收入水平差异正不断扩大。


As smart machines become more powerful and pervasive, they will pose a challenge to a fundamental feature of the US economy: most people gain their income by selling their labor.	随着智能机器变得更为强大且无处不在，它们会对美国经济的一个基本特征提出挑战：大部分人都是通过出售自身劳动赚钱。


So what happens when the labor of a large number of working-age Americans, regardless of their education, is rendered technologically redundant or no longer commands an income adequate to provide a minimally decent standard of living?	因此如果一大批劳动年龄的美国人，无论教育水平高低，变成了技术上的闲置人员或不再拥有一份维持最基本体面生活水平的收入，情况会变得怎么样？


Millions of American workers have already reached that point.	但数百万美国工人已经触及了这一点。


The near-term policy remedies are clear: raise the minimum wage to a level that will keep a fully employed worker and his or her family out of poverty, and extend the earned-income tax credit to childless workers.	近期的政策对策很明确：把最低工资提升到足以一个全职工人及其家庭免于贫困的水平，扩大对无子女劳动者的工资所得税减免。


President Barack Obama has proposed doing both.	奥巴马总统提议两者同时施行。


In the longer term, more radical policies – such as the introduction of a negative income tax or a basic income – must be considered, with the goal of providing a guaranteed minimum standard of living regardless of employment status and market wage.	而中长期来看，必须考虑更激进的政策——例如引入负所得税或者基本收入，无论就业状况或是市场薪金多寡，都得提供一个有保障的最低生活标准。


Decades ago, when intelligent machines and androids were found in science fiction rather than the real world, Milton Friedman, a champion of free-market capitalism, recommended a negative income tax to help the poor without undermining their incentive to work. He proposed a progressive consumption tax as a way to pay for it.	数十年前，当时智能机器和机器人还是科幻小说里的东西，自由市场理论的领军人物米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）就提出要引入负所得税，以便在不伤害穷人工作积极性的情况下对其施以援手，同时又提出征收累进消费税来补贴负所得税。


Ultimately, whether the benefits of artificial intelligence and digitization are distributed broadly or continue to accrue to a small minority of the population will depend not on the design of smart machines, but on the design of smart policies appropriate for the new machine age.	最终，决定人工智能和数码化的好处是将惠及大众或是局限于一小部分人并非那些智能机器本身，都将取决于适应这个新机器时代的明智政策。


Which Corporate Taxation for America?	美国该用哪种公司税制？


BERKELEY – Corporate tax reform is one of the few issues that garner bipartisan support in a deeply divided US Congress.	伯克利—在党派裂痕极深的美国国会中，公司税改革是极少数同时获得两党支持的问题之一。


The current system, all agree, is deeply flawed: the corporate tax rate is too high by global standards, and the corporate tax base is too narrow, owing to numerous credits, deductions, and special provisions that distort economic decisions.	所有人都同意，现行制度有着致命的缺陷：从全球标准看，美国公司税率太高，而由于各种扭曲经济决策的税收减免和特殊优惠，公司税基又太窄。


But there is significant debate about how to fix the system.	但在如何纠正公司税制度的问题上争议重重。


One major area of disagreement is how to tax the foreign earnings of US multinational companies (MNCs), a disagreement highlighted by the recent proposals issued by Senator Max Baucus, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee.	一个主要分歧领域是对美国跨国公司海外利润如何课税，参议院金融委员会主席马克斯·鲍库斯（Max Baucus）所提出的最新方案就凸显出这一争议。


The current US system is based on a worldwide principle: the foreign earnings of US companies are subject to US corporate tax, with the amount owed offset by a tax credit for taxes paid in foreign jurisdictions.	当前的美国公司税制度基于全球原则：美国公司的海外利润也必须遵守美国公司税法，所欠税额可以用外国司法官辖区税收减免来冲抵。


Most other developed countries, by contrast, have adopted “territorial” systems that largely exempt their MNCs’ foreign earnings from home-country taxation.	其他发达国家大多采用“领地”原则，基本豁免跨国公司海外利润的母国缴税义务。


MNCs headquartered in countries that employ a worldwide tax system are at a disadvantage when they compete in third-country markets with MNCs headquartered in territorial systems.	总部设在采用全球税收制度的跨国公司在第三国市场上与总部设在采用领地税收制度的跨国公司竞争时处于劣势。


Whereas US MNCs must pay the high US corporate tax rate on profits earned by their affiliates in low-tax foreign locations, MNCs headquartered in territorial systems pay only the local tax rate on such profits.	美国跨国公司在低税率的海外地区赚得的利润也必须缴纳高昂的美国公司税，而总部设在领地税收制度地区的跨国公司的这类利润只需要按当地税率纳税。


For example, when a US firm and a firm headquartered in a territorial system compete in a country where the local tax rate is 17%, the foreign firm owes 17% of its profits in taxes to the local country, while the US firm owes 35% of its profits in taxes – 17% to the local country plus 18% to the US.	比如，当如果一家美国企业和一家总部设在领地税收制度地区的企业在当地税率为17%的国家竞争，那么外国企业需要按所在国税率17%为其利润缴税，而美国企业的利润需要以35%的税率缴税——17%给所在国，18%给美国。


That difference translates into a sizeable cost advantage that allows the foreign firm to charge lower prices and capture market share from its US counterpart.	其中的差别造成了巨大的成本优势，使得外国公司能承受更低的价格，从美国竞争对手中抢夺市场份额。


Current US law attempts to offset this competitive disadvantage through deferral: US MNCs are allowed to defer – potentially indefinitely – payment of US corporate tax on their foreign earnings until the earnings are repatriated to their US parent firms.	目前，美国应对这一竞争优势的做法是税收递延：美国跨国公司可以延迟——时限可至无限期——支付海外利润的美国公司税，直到这笔利润转给美国母公司。


Not surprisingly, most US MNCs take advantage of the deferral option for at least some of their foreign earnings.	好比奇怪，大部分美国跨国公司都至少在一部分海外利润上利用了递延选择权。


As a means of bringing back this estimated $1.7 trillion in foreign earnings, the Senate Finance Committee’s draft proposals suggest the elimination of deferral.	为了召回这笔据估计可达1. 7万亿美元的海外利润，参议院金融委员会的方案草案建议取消税收递延。


However, faced with the threat to their competitiveness that this would pose, many US MNCs would shift their headquarters to countries with lower corporate tax rates and territorial systems.	但是，这将给美国跨国公司带来竞争力威胁，因此许多美国跨国公司将总部迁往公司税率更低、采取领地税收制度的国家。


The global competitiveness of US MNCs and where they are based matter to the health of the US economy.	美国跨国公司的全球竞争力以及它们将总部设在哪里关系到美国经济的健康。


Despite the rapid growth of foreign markets, US MNCs still locate significant shares of their real economic activities – about 65% of their sales, 68% of their employment, 70% of their capital investment, and 84% of their R&D – at home.	尽管海外市场快速增长，但美国跨国公司仍将大部分实际经济活动——大约65%的销售额、68%的工作岗位、70%的资本投资和84%的研发安排在国内。


Much of their domestic activity – particularly R&D, which has significant local spillover benefits – is related to their headquarter functions.	许多国内活动——特别是具有极大的地方积极溢出效应的研发活动——与总部功能有关。


And foreign direct investment by US MNCs is not zero-sum: it encourages rather than reduces employment, investment, and R&D in the US.	美国跨国公司的外国直接投资也不是零和的：它们鼓励而不是妨碍了美国的就业、投资和研发。


Deferral is essential to maintaining US MNCs’ competitiveness as long as the US relies on a worldwide corporate-taxation system.	只要美国继续采用全球公司税制度，税收递延对于保持美国跨国公司竞争力是至关重要的。


But deferral is not without significant costs for US MNCs and the US economy alike.	但税收递延也给美国跨国公司和美国经济带来的极大的成本。


Deferred earnings held abroad are “locked out” of the US economy, in the sense that they are not directly available for domestic use by US MNCs and their shareholders.	留在海外的递延利润被“锁定”在美国经济之外，因为美国跨国公司及其股东无法直接拿来用于国内用途。


Moreover, deferral distorts corporate balance sheets and capital-allocation decisions.	此外，税收递延扭曲了公司资产负债表和资本配置决策。


For example, firms may use earnings held abroad as collateral to take on more debt and incur higher borrowing costs at home.	比如，企业可能将留在海外的利润用作抵押发行更多债务，引起国内借贷成本升高。


Or they may use these earnings to make investments abroad that yield a lower return than investments at home.	或者它们可能将这些利润用于回报不如国内的海外投资。


Overall, such efficiency costs are estimated to be 1-5% of deferred earnings, rising as deferrals accumulate.	总体而言，这一效率成本据估计可达递延利润的1—5%，并且随着递延数额的上升而上升。 。


As the Senate Finance Committee’s draft proposals suggest, the US should jettison its worldwide approach to corporate taxation and adopt a territorial system for taxing US MNCs’ foreign earnings.	正如参议院金融委员会的方案草案所指出的，美国应该抛弃其全球公司税原则，采用领地制度对美国跨国公司海外利润课税。


Such a system would provide a level playing field that supports US MNCs’ global competitiveness. It would also eliminate the efficiency costs of deferral and boost US MNCs’ repatriation of foreign earnings, with significant benefits for output and employment.	这一制度将为美国跨国公司提供公平的全球竞争平台，还能消灭递延的效率成本、促使美国跨国公司将更多的海外利润转回国内，这大大有利于产出和就业。


Based on recent research that incorporates conservative assumptions, we estimate that under a territorial system US MNCs would repatriate an additional $100 billion a year from future foreign earnings, adding about 150,000 US jobs a year on a sustained basis.	基于采取保守假设的最新研究，我们估计，在领地税收制度下，美国跨国公司每年会转回1 000亿美元的新增海外利润，持续地让美国每年新增150 000个工作岗位。


We also estimate that under a transition plan for taxing the existing stock of foreign earnings held abroad, similar to one proposed by US Representative Dave Camp, US MNCs would repatriate about $1 trillion of these earnings, adding more than $200 billion to US GDP and about 1.5 million US jobs over the next few years.	我们还估算出，在存量海外利润课税过渡计划下，美国跨国公司将转回约1万亿美元的海外理论，在未来数年中让美国GDP增加2 000亿美元和150万个美国工作岗位，这与美国众议员戴夫·坎普（Dave Camp）的估计相当。


These are significant gains for an economy that is still operating far below potential, remaining about 1.5 million jobs short of its pre-recession employment level.	对于经济在远低于潜力的水平上运行、就业岗位数量仍比衰退前水平少150万个的美国来说，这算得上重大改进。


A territorial tax system does have one potential disadvantage: it could strengthen US MNCs’ existing incentives to shift their profits to lower-tax jurisdictions.	领地税收制度确实有一个潜在劣势：它可能强化已经存在于美国跨国公司的将利润转移到税率较低的司法官辖区的激励。


Competitive cuts in corporate tax rates, the spread of tax havens, and the rising importance of easily movable intangible capital have already made these incentives more powerful.	公司税率降低竞赛、避税港的扩张，以及容易转移的无形资本的重要性的增加已经导致这一激励十分强大。


Recent studies find growing segregation between where MNCs locate their real economic activities and where their profits are reported for tax purposes.	最新研究发现，出于避税目的，跨国公司的实际经济活动发生地和利润报告地之间的差异越来越大。


Income shifting and the resulting erosion of domestic tax bases pose serious challenges, and countries with territorial systems have adopted tough countermeasures to combat them.	收入转移及其对国内税基的侵蚀作用带来了严峻的挑战，采取领地税收制度的国家采取了严厉的反制措施。


If the US moves to a territorial system, it should follow suit.	如果美国转向领地税收制度，也应该这样做。


A modern territorial system with adequate safeguards against income-shifting and base erosion is the right approach to taxing the foreign earnings of US MNCs.	领地税收制度和充分的针对收入转移和税基破坏的保护措施相结合的现代税收制度才是美国跨国公司海外利润税收的合理方针。


Putting America’s Recovery to Work	让美国的复苏走进就业


BERKELEY – America’s economy grew much more rapidly than expected in 2013 and appears poised to strengthen further this year.	伯克利—2013年美国经济增长比预期快很多，今年似乎会进一步走强。


But there is still considerable slack in the labor market, and, as long as it persists, the gains from faster growth will continue to be concentrated at the top of the income distribution, as they have been throughout the recovery.	但劳动力市场仍然颓势尽显，而只要这一状况得不到改善，增长加速的好处就会继续向收入分布顶层集中——在整个复苏过程中一直都是这样。


According to recent BEA estimates, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP grew at a 2.7% average annual rate in 2013, compared to only 2% in 2012.	根据最新的BEA统计，实际（经通胀调整的）GDP在2013年的平均年增长率为2. 7%，2012年为2%。


Most forecasters – including the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, the so-called Blue Chip consensus, and the Federal Reserve – predict that annual real growth will reach at least 2.8% in 2014.	许多预测机构——包括无党派色彩的国会预算办公室、所谓的蓝筹（Blue Chip）共识和美联储——都认为2014年年实际增长率至少可以达到2. 8%。


Despite two recent lackluster employment reports, there are many reasons to expect that growth will accelerate in 2014.	尽管最近两期的就业报告都没有亮点可寻，但仍有许多理由可以期待2014年会有增长加速。


The headwinds buffeting the US recovery – impaired household balance sheets, a depressed housing market, and government spending and employment cuts – are dissipating.	影响美国复苏的阻力——被破坏的家庭资产负债表、萧条的住房市场以及政府支出和就业的下降——正在消失。


Household debt has fallen to levels last seen in the early 1990’s, real household net worth has returned to its pre-recession peak, and residential investment as a share of GDP is rising.	家庭债务已经降到20世纪90年代初的水平，实际家庭净值已经回到了衰退前的峰值水平，住房投资占GDP的比例也在上升。


Meanwhile, state and local-government budgets are improving, and the federal budget is on track to subtract only about 0.5% from GDP in 2014, compared to 1.75% in 2013.	与此同时，州和地方政府预算正在改善，预计2014年联邦预算将只占GDP的0. 5%，而2013年为1.


In a Congressional election year, another destabilizing showdown over the federal debt limit is unlikely.	75%。 在国会选举年也不太可能再次发生可能引起动荡的联邦债务上限问题上的闹剧。


Moreover, monetary policy is likely to remain accommodative, and inflation remains lower than expected.	此外，货币政策有望继续保持有利，通胀水平也将比预期更低。


US Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen was a vocal co-architect of the Fed’s accommodative policy stance under the leadership of her predecessor, Ben Bernanke, so policy continuity is expected.	在前任伯南克领导期间，美联储主席耶伦是美联储有利政策的坚定支持者，因此可以预期美联储政策的延续性。


Indeed, the Fed has reiterated its intention to hold the federal funds rate near zero well past the time that the unemployment rate falls below 6.5%, while gradually trimming its purchases of long-term assets – so-called quantitative easing – by $10 billion a month.	事实上，美联储重申了其将联邦基金利率保持在近零水平直到失业率下降到6. 5%以下、同时将其月度长期资产购买（即所谓的量化宽松）规模缩减100亿美元的意图。


Meanwhile, private spending grew 3.9% year on year in 2013, the strongest rate in a decade, and the outlook for 2014 is promising.	与此同时，私人支出在2013年同比增长3. 9%，为十年来最强劲的一年，2014年的前景展望也相当乐观。


Improving household balance sheets imply stronger consumer sentiment.	改善的家庭资产负债表意味着更强的消费者情绪。


Real personal-consumption spending rose at a 2.3% annual rate in 2013, up from 2% in 2011 and 2012.	2013年实际个人消费支出按年率增长了2. 3%，而2011年和2012年为2%。


Stronger consumer spending, along with record-high corporate profits, should boost investment spending further this year, as will re-shoring of economic activity and an improving trade balance, owing to a decline in energy and labor costs in the US.	更强的消费支出以及创纪录的公司利润应能在今年进一步提振投资支出，得益于美国能源和劳动力成本下降的经济活动的回流和贸易平衡的改善亦然。


Indeed, shale energy and big-data analytics, two areas in which the US has a strong competitive edge, could be significant supply-side “game changers” for growth.	事实上，页岩能源和大数据分析——美国拥有强大竞争优势的两个领域——可以成为强大的供给端增长“局面改变因素”。


Nonetheless, the outlook for US workers is less sanguine and more uncertain.	尽管如此，美国工人所面临的前景更加暗淡，也更不确定。


Despite stronger growth in 2013, net monthly job creation, at about 193,000, was only slightly above its 2012 level (186,000) and still below its pre-recession average of 200,000.	尽管2013年增长有所走强，但月度就业岗位创造量（约193,000个）只是比2012年的水平（186,000）略有增加，并仍低于危机前的平均水平（200,000个）。


Employment at the end of 2013 was still 1.1 million short of its pre-recession peak; regaining this peak requires 7.7 million more jobs, in addition to absorbing subsequent monthly entrants to the labor force.	2013年年底，就业人数仍比危机前峰值低110万； 要恢复峰值水平需要新增770万个岗位，以吸收后续增加的劳动力市场新军。


In November 2013, monthly job openings topped four million for the first time since 2008.	2013年11月，月度就业职位空缺数字2008年以来首次突破四百万。


But the number of job seekers exceeded the number of openings in every industry.	但在所有行业，找工作者的数字都超过了职位空缺数。


When the recession officially ended in June 2009, there were 6.2 unemployed workers for every job opening.	2009年6月，当衰退正式结束时，每个空缺岗位对应6. 2个失业工人。


In November, this ratio had fallen to 2.7, compared to 1.8 before the recession began (and just 1.1 in 2000).	去年11月，这一比例降至2. 7，而衰退开始时的这一比例为1.


When the recession hit, unemployment rates for workers at all education levels jumped, and they have yet to fall back to pre-recession levels.	当衰退来袭时，所有教育水平工人的失业率都出现了剧增，并且至今没有降回衰退前水平。


While the short-term unemployment rate (those unemployed for 26 weeks or less) has fallen back to its 2001-2007 pre-crisis average, the long-term unemployment rate remains higher than at any time since the measure was introduced in 1948.	尽管短期失业率（失业26周或以下）已经降到2001—2007年危机前时期的平均水平以下，但长期失业率仍处于该指标自1948年发布以来的最高水平。


The long-term unemployed account for about 36% of total unemployment, down from nearly 46% in March 2011 but still far above the previous peak of 26% reached 30 years ago.	长期失业占总失业的36%左右，低于2011年3月时的46%，但仍比30年前所录得的前期峰值26%高得多。


The long-term unemployed tend to be older – the number of unemployed workers aged 50-65 has doubled – and those who have been laid off from previous jobs.	长期失业者往往年纪较大——50—65岁失业者数量翻了一倍——或者因为被裁而失业。


Faster economic growth and more job openings are less likely to benefit these workers: the longer they are unemployed, the more their skills become obsolete and the more their actual or perceived employability deteriorates.	经济增长的加速以及岗位空缺的增加不太可能让这些工人受益：失业时间越久，技能就落伍得更多，实际和感觉的就业能力也将因此下降。


Moreover, both the short-term and long-term unemployment rates underestimate the slack in the labor market caused by the significant and sustained decline in the labor-force participation rate (LFPR) since the recession began.	此外，短期和长期失业率都低估了衰退开始以来劳动力参与率（LFPR）的剧烈而持久的下降对劳动力市场的冲击。


In 2007, 66% of Americans were working or actively seeking work; today, that number stands at 63%, the lowest level since 1977.	2007年，66%的美国人有工作或者在积极寻找工作； 如今，这一数字为63%，是1977年以来的最低值。


If the LFPR had remained at its pre-recession high, the unemployment rate today would be nearly 12%.	如果LFPR保持在衰退前的高峰，那么现在的失业率将是12%。


If it had stabilized when the unemployment rate peaked in October 2009, unemployment today would be over 9%.	如果LFPR在2009年10月失业率达到顶峰后保持稳定，现在的失业率将是9%。


A critical policy question is why the LFPR has continued to decline.	一个关键的政策问题是为何LFPR会持续下降。


Demography clearly plays a role: a larger share of the workforce is reaching retirement age, while the share of those aged 16-24 who are pursuing education is rising.	人口结构显然是一个因素：更大的劳动力比例达到了退休年龄，而16—24岁年龄段上学的比例也在增加。


But the recession triggered sudden and sustained declines in the LFPR across all age groups in response to weak demand and poor job prospects.	但衰退在所有年龄段都引起了突然而持续的LFPR下降，这是拜疲软的需求和暗淡的就业前景所赐。


A recent CBO analysis attributes about one-half of the decline in the LFPR from the end of 2007 to the end of 2013 to these cyclical factors, with the remainder explained by secular demographic trends.	最新的CBO分析认为2007年底到2013年底的LFPR下降有一半可以归因于周期性因素，其他则可以用长期人口结构趋势解释。


As has been painfully obvious during the last several years, prolonged labor-market slack means falling real wages for most workers, with the negative effect intensifying as one moves down the wage distribution.	过去几年的一个显而易见的痛苦事实是，劳动力市场的长期不振意味着大部分工人实际工资的下降，工人在工资分布中的地位下移，由此进一步加剧了消极影响。


By the same logic, stronger growth in 2014 and tightening labor markets should lead to healthier wage gains for the 70% of the workforce whose real wages have not yet returned to their pre-recession level.	同理，2014年的增长走强和劳动力市场紧张应该带来比较有利的局面：70%的劳动力——他们的实际工资仍没有回到衰退前水平——工资将有所增加。


But, as President Barack Obama argued in his recent State of the Union address, it will take more than faster economic growth for American workers to recover from the Great Recession.	但是，正如奥巴马总统在最近的国情咨文中所指出的，更快的经济增长不足以让美国工人从大衰退中走出。


Extending unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless, combating the stigma against hiring them, creating more on-the-job training opportunities and apprenticeships, and raising the minimum wage are all essential steps toward a more equitable distribution of the recovery’s benefits.	将失业保险范围扩大至长期失业、战胜聘用长期失业者之耻、创造更多的在职培训机会和学徒制，以及提高最低工资都是迈向复苏好处分配更平等的重要步骤。


Bridges to Somewhere	寻找修路钱


BERKELEY – After another round of brinkmanship, a rancorous US Congress passed a last-minute bill to avert the bankruptcy of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), the primary source of federal funding for America’s highway and transit infrastructure.	伯克利—在又一次边缘政策后，充满敌意的美国国会在最后关头通过了一项法案，避免了公路信托基金（Highway Trust Fund， HTF）的破产。


The HTF finances about $50 billion of infrastructure spending a year, and its bankruptcy would have forced state and local governments to shelve thousands of projects, threatening tens of thousands of construction jobs.	公路信托基金是美国公路和交通基础设施的主要联邦资金源，每年为基础设施支出提供约500亿美元的资金，其破产将迫使州和地方政府的数千个项目搁置，威胁数十万建筑业工人的饭碗。


The new legislation provides a temporary $11 billion fix that will postpone the HTF’s bankruptcy for about ten months.	新立法将提供110亿美元的临时补助，并将公路信托基金的破产程序暂停十个月。


Through fiscal gimmickry, the bill’s funding costs are pushed beyond the arbitrary ten-year budget window behind which Congress hides to signal its fiscal responsibility.	该法案通过财政技巧将法案的融资成本推延到国会为了表明其财政责任而武断划定的预算窗口——十年之外。


But there is nothing fiscally responsible about this legislation.	但对于这一立法，并无财政上的责任可以追究。


Investment in public infrastructure in the US has plunged to less than 2% of GDP, its lowest level since the federal government started tracking these data in 1992.	美国公共基础设施投资已降至GDP的2%以下，为1992年联邦政府开始追踪该数据以来的最低水平。


The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) gives a grade of D+ to infrastructure in the United States, reflecting both delayed maintenance and underinvestment.	美国土木工程师协会（American Society of Civil Engineers，ASCE）给美国基础设施的评分是 D+，反映了维护拖延和投资不足两大问题。


An estimated one out of every nine US bridges is structurally deficient, and 42% of urban roads are congested, costing the economy an estimated $101 billion a year in wasted time and fuel consumption.	据估计，美国有九分之一的桥梁具有结构缺陷，42%的城市道路存在拥挤，每年浪费掉的时间和能源成本据估计高达1,010亿美元。


Deficient and deteriorating transit systems impose another $90 billion in annual economic costs.	有缺陷又维护不力的交通体系每年也会带来900亿美元的经济成本。


The ASCE calculates that the US needs about $1.7 trillion of investment in surface-transportation infrastructure through 2020 to achieve a passing grade.	ASCE测算，美国大约需要1. 7万亿美元路面交通基础设施投资，才能在2020年获得及格分。


It projects an investment shortfall of about 50% based on current funding levels.	按目前的融资水平看，预计投资缺口将高达50%。


Most economists agree that underinvesting in infrastructure is economically unwise and fiscally irresponsible.	大部分经济学家都同意，基础设施投资不足在经济上不明智，在财政上不负责。


In a 2013 survey of economists by the University of Chicago, 75% of the respondents agreed that, “because the US has underspent on new projects, maintenance, or both, the federal government has an opportunity to increase average incomes by spending more on roads, bridges, railways, and airports.”	在2013年芝加哥大学经济学家调查中，75%的回应者认为“由于美国在新项目或维护上的支出不足，或两者兼而有之，联邦政府有机会通过增加道路、桥梁、铁路和机场支出提高平均收入。 ”


From a macroeconomic perspective, investing in infrastructure is a “twofer”: It strengthens productivity and competitiveness in the long run and boosts demand and creates jobs in the short run.	从宏观经济学角度讲，基础设施投资“事半功倍”：它能在长期强化生产率和竞争力，在短期创造就业岗位。


According to the Congressional Budget Office, infrastructure spending is one of the most cost-effective forms of federal government spending in terms of the number of jobs created per dollar allocated.	根据国会预算办公室的数据，从每一美元所创造的的就业数量衡量，基础设施支出是联邦政府性价比最高的支出形式。


The HTF is funded by the federal gasoline tax, which is the federal government’s single most important source of transportation funding.	公路信托基金的资金来源是联邦汽油税，这也是联邦政府最为重要的交通融资源。


The tax has been stuck at 18.4 cents per gallon in nominal terms since 1993.	自1993年以来，该税的名义标准一直是每加仑18. 4美分。


Meanwhile, the costs of building and maintaining highway and transit systems have increased significantly, and rising fuel efficiency has reduced gasoline tax revenues per mile driven.	与此同时，建设和维护高速公路和运输体系的成本有了极大的增长，而能源效率的提高也降低了每英里汽油税收入。


As a result, the purchasing power of the federal gas tax declined by about 30% from 1997 to 2011.	结果是，从1997年到2011年，该联邦税的购买力下降了 30%左右。


Since 2008, Congress has been filling the yawning HTF gap by providing $54 billion from general revenues.	自2008年以来，国会从一般税收收入中划拨540亿美元用于填补公路信托基金缺口。


But makeshift solutions have become more contentious and harder to find, culminating in this year’s gimmick-ridden ten-month patch.	但权宜之计争议越来越大，也越来越难以找到，到了今年，只能抛出聊胜于无的暂停十个月方案。


The CBO recently estimated that the HTF gap will widen to $172 billion over the next decade.	国会预算办公室最近预计，十年后公路信托基金缺口将扩大到1,720亿美元。


An increase in the federal gasoline tax, with a built-in inflation adjustment, would be the easiest and most effective way to increase revenues for federally funded investment in transport infrastructure.	提高联邦汽油税并纳入通胀调整机制将是最简单、最有效的增加联邦出资交通基础设施投资收入源的方式。


Even Thomas Donohue, President of the anti-tax US Chamber of Commerce, calls an increase in the gas tax the simplest and most straightforward way to finance a long-term highway transportation bill.	即使是反纳税的美国商会（Chamber of Commerce）主席托马斯·多诺霍（Thomas Donohue）也称提高汽油税是最简单、最直接的长期高速公路交通融资办法。


In a recent survey, more than half of the respondents expressed a willingness to pay more for gasoline to finance improvements in roads, bridges, and mass transit.	在最新调查中，超过一半的受访者表示愿意接受通过汽油涨��改善道路、桥梁和公共交通的融资情况。


The CBO estimates that an increase of ten cents a gallon would be required in 2015 simply to offset the last 16 years of inflation and fuel-efficiency gains and to maintain current (inadequate) funding levels.	国会预算办公室估算，若要在2015年弥补过去16年的通胀和燃料效率提高影响并维持当前的融资水平（处于不足状态），汽油价格需要调高10美分/加仑。


A considerably larger hike would be needed to prevent the underinvestment predicted by the ACSE.	要阻止ACSE所预测的投资不足情况，需要大得多的涨幅。


But, with a mid-term congressional election in November, there is strong opposition to such an increase, both in Congress and President Barack Obama’s administration.	但是，在11月中期国会选举即将到来之际，如此涨幅的反对声音很强，不管在国会还是在奥巴马政府中都是如此。


That is entirely understandable.	这是十分难以理解的。


I was Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers in 1994, when President Bill Clinton successfully championed the last gas-tax increase, of just 4.3 cents per gallon.	1994年，我是经济顾问委员会主席，当时，克林顿总统成功地实行了最后一次汽油税提高，提高幅度仅为每加仑4. 3美分。


Some of his “politically naive” economic advisers, including me, advocated a much larger increase, phased in gradually over five years, on both fiscal and environmental grounds.	他的一些“政治上颇为幼稚的”经济顾问（包括我在内）从财政和环境角度出发，提出应该在五年的时间里逐渐大幅提高汽油税，4. 3美分是远远不够的。


Clinton’s Republican opponents characterized the increase as the “largest ever increase in taxes on the middle class.”	克林顿的共和党反对者将增税称为“有史以来对中产阶级最大规模的增税”。


That misleading claim contributed to the Democrats’ deep mid-term election losses that year.	这一误导性结论导致民主党在当年的中期选举中惨败。