Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new government has embraced a revolutionary (rather than evolutionary) economic-policy approach that engages several initiatives, some of which were once deemed implausible, unthinkable, or even undesirable.	日本首相安倍晋三（Shinzo Abe）领导的新政府采取了一个革命性（而非渐变的）经济政策手段，这种方法包括了若干举措——其中有些曾被认为是不合情理、无法想象甚至不受欢迎的。


From the doubling of the money supply to additional fiscal stimulus and wide-ranging structural reforms, the new policy paradigm is nothing less than one of the boldest economic-policy experiments in Japan’s post-war history.	从增加一倍货币供应量来进行额外财政刺激到广泛的结构性改革，新的政策范式堪称得二战后日本最大胆的经济政策实验之一。


To demonstrate their seriousness, Japanese officials moved quickly to commit to measurable metrics.	为显示他们的严肃性，日本官员们迅速开始打造可衡量的指标。


On the policy input side, they have specified and begun to implement purchases of securities totaling $75 billion per month (three times as much, in relative terms, as the US Federal Reserve currently purchases under its unconventional monetary-policy regime).	在政策投入方面，他们已经详细制定方案并开始每月购买总额达750亿美元的证券（按相对价值计算，这是目前美联储在其非常规货币政策制度下购买量的三倍）。


On the output side, and after many years of persistent deflation (prices fell 0.5% last month), Japan is now targeting a 2% inflation rate within two years, thus underscoring its commitment to avoid a pre-mature withdrawal of monetary support for growth.	在产出方面，在多年的通货紧缩之后（上个月价格下降了0. 5%），日本现在的目标是两年内通货膨胀率达到2%，从而坚定了自身的承诺——不会提前撤回对经济增长的货币支持。


Already, financial markets have responded with alacrity.	金融市场迅速做出了反应。


The Japanese equity market is up an impressive 55% since hints of the paradigm shift started hitting investors’ radar screens.	自投资者开始接收到政策范式转变的暗示之后，日本股票市场令人印象深刻地上升了55%。


At the same time, the Japanese yen has depreciated sharply, including by more than 20% against the struggling euro.	与此同时日元迅速贬值，就算对困境中的欧元都贬值了20%以上。


This response is part of the transmission mechanism for the Japanese government’s policies.	这种反应是对日本政府政策传导机制的一部分。


The surge in the stock market benefits domestic investors, making them likelier to spend more (what economists call the “wealth effect”).	股票市场的激增令日本国内投资者受益，这使得他们更有可能提高消费（这就是经济学家所说的“财富效应”）。


This, in turn, should revive corporate “animal spirits,” leading to higher investment in new plants and equipment, together with higher wages and salaries.	反过来，这应该也会恢复公司的“动物精神”，从而增加对新工厂和设备的投资，随之而来的则是更高的工资和薪金。


These are, of course, the same mechanisms that the Fed has targeted for almost three years in its own efforts to stimulate higher growth in the US.	当然，这些与美联储近三年来刺激美国经济更高增长的机制是一样的。


The macroeconomic outcomes have consistently fallen short of expectations, and there is reason to believe that it will be even more difficult in Japan for monetary policy alone to gain sufficient traction.	宏观经济产出一直低于预期，而我们有理由相信日本仅靠货币政策来刺激经济要困难得多。


Japan’s aging population mutes the potential impact of both the wealth effect and animal spirits.	日本的老龄化人口减弱了财富效应和动物精神的潜在影响。


Resource flexibility is lower than in the US. Interest rates are already low.	其资源弹性比美国要小，且其利率已经很低。


The experience of deflation is well entrenched.	人们对通货紧缩的体验根深蒂固。


And, given Japan’s high level of public indebtedness, the risks of collateral damage and unintended consequences are potentially higher.	而且考虑到日本公共负债的高水平，其遭受附带损害和意外后果的风险可能更高。


With gross overall government debt already at 238% of GDP, some worry that Japan would face the threat of economic and financial dislocation were a failed policy experiment to lead its private sector – which traditionally has displayed an enormous home bias – to disinvest from Japan.	日本政府的总负债高达GDP的238%，有人担心日本会面临经济和金融动荡的威胁，从而成为一个导致私营企业——它们一直显示出高度的“本土偏好”——削减投资的失败政策实验。


This does not mean that Japan’s policy revolution will necessarily disappoint.	这不并是说日本的政策改革必然会令人失望。


But, critically, it does mean that even if you believe that the BOJ’s actions are necessary for Japan to emerge from its economic malaise, they certainly are not sufficient.	但严格来说，这确实意味着即便你相信日本央行的这些举措为使日本从低迷经济中走出来是必要的，它们肯定也是不充分的。


Japan’s experiment requires meeting two additional conditions if it is to avoid going the way of previous failed policy initiatives: meaningful structural reforms that essentially change how segments of the economy respond and operate; and other countries’ continued acquiescence in the currency depreciation needed to boost the impact of slower-moving domestic dynamics through meaningful gains in global market share.	如果要避免以前那种失败的政策举措，日本的经济实验需要实现两种额外的条件：一是结构性改革，从本质上改变日本各经济部门反应和运行的方式； 二是其它国家对当前日元贬值的持续默许，日本需要这种贬值来获得全球市场份额以刺激国内缓慢的经济运行动力。


Meeting the first condition is in the hands of Japanese citizens and their elected representatives.	能否达到第一个条件取决于日本公民和他们选举出来的代表。


The required reforms, though achievable, will test the government’s resolve and implementation capabilities, as well as the population’s willingness to face immediate disruptions in exchange for the promise of longer-term gains.	所需要的改革虽然可以实现，但会考验政府的决心和执行能力，还有公众接受经济当下停滞以换取长期收益的意愿。


The second requirement is very different.	要达到第二个条件很困难。


It can be achieved only if other countries are willing to sacrifice output, either because they have no choice, or because they believe that, over the medium-term, a stronger Japanese economy will benefit them as the longer-term income effects offset the impact of immediate market disruptions.	只有其他国家愿意牺牲其产出才能达到：要么因为它们别无选择，要么它们相信在中期调整后，更强大的日本经济会使自身在长期上受益，并足以抵消当前市场受阻所带来的影响。


But will the rest of the world accommodate Japan’s bold policy experiment, or will it take protective steps and thus impede the operation of a crucial policy transmission mechanism?	但是世界其他国家能容纳日本大胆的经济政策实验么，还是会采取自保手段从而阻碍这个重要政策传导机制的运行？


While initial indications are encouraging, the jury is still out.	虽然最初的迹象是鼓舞人心的，但还没有最终定论。


Many affected countries – including those hit by the trade effects (such as China, South Korea, Taiwan, and eurozone members) and those susceptible to the capital-flow channel (such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico) – have not yet had enough time to react.	很多受到影响的国家——包括那些遭受贸易影响的国家（比如中国、韩国、台湾和欧元区成员国）和那些容易受到资本流动渠道影响的国家（比如巴西、印尼和墨西哥）——目前还没有来得及做出反应。


Japan’s policy change was big and abrupt, and several of the countries on the receiving end have been focused on complex domestic challenges.	日本的政策变化既巨大又突然，几个受影响国家之前则一直专注于应付本国内复杂的挑战。


A few countries – particularly Brazil, China, and South Korea – have noticed.	其中一些国家——尤其是巴西、中国和韩国——已经注意到这个问题。


But their reactions have been generally muted by Japan’s success in getting a US-led initiative at the G-20 to classify its policy response as constituting the use of “domestic tools” to pursue “domestic objectives.”	但它们的反应被普遍弱化了，因为日本成功让美国领头在G-20峰会上提出其政策反应只不过是利用“国内工具”来追求“国内目标”。


It is just a matter of time until the rest of the world catches up with the reality of how Japan’s experiment affects them.	世界各国意识到日本的经济实验如何影响了它们只不过是时间问题。


The hope is that, bolstered by evidence of Japan’s serious pursuit of structural reforms, they will accommodate the experiment in two ways: by not retaliating, and by undertaking their own domestic reforms that compensate for the output lost to Japan.	而希望在于，由于在日本认真地追求结构性改革，它们会用以下两种方法来适应这个实验：不报复、同时进行本国的国内改革来弥补来自日本方面所带来的产出损失。


In other words, a growing pie for all better accommodates all.	换句话说，把经济馅饼做大对所有国家来说都是有利的。


The fear is that neither Japan’s subsequent actions nor the affected countries’ domestic realities will justify the risk of lost market share, especially at a time when the global economy as a whole – and global policy coordination – is struggling.	令人担忧的是无论是日本的后续行动还是受影响国家的国内现实都无法保证放弃市场份额的风险是值得的，尤其是在全球经济整体——和全球政策协调——都陷入困境的时期。


Here the risk involves currency wars and other beggar-thy-neighbor disruptions.	这里所说的风险包括发生货币战争以及其它以邻为壑的破坏行为。


There is currently insufficient data to predict either outcome confidently.	虽然目前没有足够的数据来断定会走向哪一种结果。


As we await additional evidence, let us appreciate how rarely we witness, in real time, such a momentous policy shift.	但在等待额外证据之时，请让我们为能实时见证到一场如此巨大的政策转变尔感到庆幸。


The Undeserving One Percent?	无辜的百分之一？


CHICAGO – It is amazing how the “one percent” epithet, a reference to the top 1% of earners, has caught on in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world.	芝加哥——美国和其他发达国家的“百分之一”——即收入最高的1%人群——正沦为千夫之所指，这实在有些令人吃惊。


In the United States, this 1% includes all those with a 2006 household income of at least $386,000.	在美国，1%指的是2006年家庭收入至少为386 000美元者。


In the popular narrative, the 1% is thickly populated with unscrupulous corporate titans, greedy bankers, and insider-trading hedge-fund managers.	在公众眼中，这帮人大多是寡廉鲜耻的公司高管、贪得无厌的银行家以及大搞内幕交易的对冲基金经理。


Reading some progressive economists, it might seem that the answer to all of America’s current problems is to tax the 1% and redistribute to everyone else.	读读那些进步经济学家的文章，你会觉得，美国当前的所有问题都只需要向1%人群征税然后再分配给每个人就能解决。


Of course, underlying this narrative is the view that this income is ill-gotten, made possible by Bush-era tax cuts, the broken corporate governance system, and the conflict-of-interest-ridden financial system.	当然，这种感觉背后的观点是，这些收入来路不正，是通过布什时代的减税、失灵的公司治理体系以及充满利益冲突的金融体系获得的。


The 1% are not people who have earned money the hard way by making real things, so there is no harm in taking it away from them.	1%人群不属于勤劳致富的类型，因此要他们把钱吐出来没什么坏处。


Clearly, this caricature is based on some truth.	显然，这样的刻画有其现实基础。


For instance, corporations, especially in the financial sector, reward too many executives richly despite mediocre performance.	比如，企业——特别是金融部门的企业——对高管的奖赏太过慷慨，尽管他们的表现只能说是差强人意。


But apart from tarring too many with the same brush, there is something deeply troubling about this narrative’s reductionism.	但把它们一棍子打死难免有打击面过大之嫌，这一观点的简单粗暴令人颇为担心。


It ignores, for example, the fact that many of the truly rich are entrepreneurs.	比如，这一观点忽略了许多真正富有的人是企业家这一事实。


It likewise ignores the fact that many of the wealthy are sports stars and entertainers, and that their ranks include professionals such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, and even some of our favorite progressive economists.	类似地，这一观点还忽视了，富翁中有很多是体育和娱乐明星，更不乏医生、律师、咨询顾问以及不少我们最喜欢的进步经济学家。


In other words, the rich today are more likely to be working than idle.	换句话说，当今的富人更有可能是劳动者，而不是有闲阶级。


But what might be the most important overlooked fact is that the rise in income inequality is not just at the very top, though it is most pronounced there.	但或许被忽视的最重要事实是，收入不平等性的恶化并不局限于最高阶层，尽管这一阶层最为明显。


Academic studies suggest that the top tenth percentile of income distribution in the US, and elsewhere, is also moving farther away from the median earner.	学术研究表明，美国和其他地区收入最高的10%与中位收入者的差距也在拉大。


This is an inconvenient fact for the progressive economist.	对进步经济学家来说，这是个不太美妙的事实。


“We are the 90%,” sounds less dramatic than “we are the 99%.”	“我们是90%”这样的说远没有“我们是99%”那么给力。


And, for some of the protesters, it may not even be true.	而对某些抗议者来说，这根本不是事实。


Perhaps most problematic, though, is that something other than plutocrat-friendly policies is largely responsible for the growing inequality.	不过，也许问题最大的地方在于某些并非有利于富翁阶层的政策也大大助长了不平等性的恶化。


That something is education and skills.	那就是教育和技能。


True, not every degree is a passport to a job.	诚然，文凭并非工作的唯一敲门砖。


Freshly-minted degree holders, especially from lower-quality programs, are finding it particularly hard to get a job nowadays, because they are competing with experienced workers who are also jobless.	如今，新晋毕业生，特别是层次较低的毕业生，会发现自己很难找到工作，因为他们要与同样没有工作的有经验的工人竞争。


Nevertheless, the unemployment rate for those with degrees is one-third the unemployment rate for those without a high school diploma.	尽管如此，拥有学位者的失业率要比没有高中毕业文凭者低三分之一。


Close examination suggests that the single biggest difference between those at or above the top tenth percentile of the income distribution and those below the 50th percentile is that the former have a degree or two while the latter, typically, do not.	详细的考察表明，位于收入阶梯前10%与后50%者之间的最大区别是前者拥有一两个学位，而后者通常没有学位。


Technological change and global competition have made it impossible for American workers to get good jobs without strong skills.	技术变迁和全球竞争使得没有良好技能的美国工人根本无法找到好工作。


As Harvard professors Claudia Golden and Larry Katz put it, in the race between technology and education, education is falling behind.	哈佛大学教授戈登（Claudia Golden）和卡茨（Larry Katz）指出，在技术与教育的竞争中，教育已经落后了。


To acknowledge the fact that the broken educational and skills-building system is responsible for much of the growing inequality that ordinary people experience would, however, detract from the larger populist agenda of rallying the masses against the very rich.	但是，承认教育和技能培养体系的崩坏应该对普通人所经历的不平等性恶化负有很大责任这一事实会破坏民粹主义者将脏水泼到巨富阶层身上的大计。


It has the inconvenient implication that the poor have a role in pulling themselves out of the morass.	可怜之人必有可恨之处，这一推论有些令人难以接受。


There are no easy and quick fixes to education – every US president since Gerald Ford in the mid-1970’s has called for educational reforms, with little effect.	修正教育并非一两天就能完成的事情——自20世纪70年代的福特开始，历任美国总统都呼吁进行教育改革，但收效甚微。


In contrast, blaming the undeserving 1% offers a redistributive policy agenda with immediate effects.	相反，将矛头指向无辜的1%有利于立刻可以减小的再分配政策的出台。


The US has tried quick fixes before.	美国并非没有试过快速修正法。


Income inequality grew rapidly in the last decade, but consumption inequality did not.	在过去的十年中，收入不平等性恶化得很快，但消费不平等性则否。


The reason: easy credit, especially subprime mortgages, which helped those without means to keep up with the Joneses.	原因就在于宽松的信用，特别是次级按揭贷款。 次级按揭贷款让穷人也能过上与邻居们相当的生活。


The ending, as everyone knows, was not a happy one.	最终的结局大家都看到了，绝非喜剧。


The less-well-off ultimately became even worse off as they lost their jobs and homes.	由于丢掉了工作和房子，后进者终于变成了后退者。


The US needs to improve the quality of its workforce by developing the skills that are relevant to the jobs that its firms are creating.	美国必须让提高劳动人口与企业提供的职位相关的技能，这样才能改善平等性。


Several steps can be taken towards these goals, including improving community attitudes towards education, reforming schools, tying the curriculum in community colleges and vocational institutions more closely to the needs of local firms, making higher education more affordable, and finding effective ways to retrain unemployed workers.	不少措施都有助于这一目标，包括改善社区教育观念、改革学校、让社区学院和职业学校的课程设置与当地企业需求相匹配、降低高等教育负担，以及找出对失业工人进行有效在培训的办法，等等。


None of this is easy or likely to produce results quickly, and some of it may require more resources.	所有这些都不容易，也不可能很快见效，其中一些还要求较多的资源投入。


While eliminating inefficient spending, especially inefficient tax subsidies, can generate some of these funds, more tax revenues may be needed.	消除低效支出，特别是低效的税收补贴，能够为这些措施筹集一些资金，但归根结底还需要更多的税收。


The rich can certainly afford to pay more, but if governments increase taxes on the wealthy, they should do it with the aim of improving opportunities for all, rather than as a punitive measure to rectify an imagined wrong.	富人阶层当然付得起更高的税收，但如果政府对富人增税，就应该将着眼点放在改善所有人的机会上，而不是将增税视为对假想责任人的惩罚措施。


The Unexamined Crisis	有待详细考察的危机


CHICAGO – Three years have now passed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which triggered the start of the most acute phase of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.	芝加哥—— 三年前，雷曼兄弟公司倒闭，将2007—2008年金融危机推向了高潮。


Is the financial world a safer place today?	如今，三年过去了，金融业变得安全了吗？


Within days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the US had erected new and enormous security measures at airports throughout the country.	2001年，9·11恐怖袭击后不久，美国出台了大规模的新安全措施，在全国机场内生效。


Within a month, the US military was on the ground in Afghanistan.	一个月内，美军就登上了阿富汗的领土。


Within three years the US had an official report on the causes of the events of 9/11; the well-resourced expert commission that produced it identified the weaknesses of America’s national-security agencies and provided recommendations for addressing them.	三年内，美国出台了9·11起因的正式报告，专家委员会在动用了充足的人力物力进行调研后指出了美国国家安全机构的弱点，并给出了如何改进的建议。


But what do we have three years after the financial crisis began?	金融危机爆发迄今已超过三年，我们又做了些什么呢？


To be sure, America has the 2,000-page Dodd Frank Act to show for its efforts.	平心而论，美国还是做出了一些努力，2 000页厚的多德-弗兰克法案就是明证。


Unfortunately, few of those pages address any problem suspected to have caused the financial crisis.	不幸的是，这一法案对于修正可能是金融危机起因的问题几乎无济于事。


Bond investors’ heavy reliance on credit-rating agencies, which tend to be laxer with powerful issuers, has not been fixed.	债券投资者严重倚赖评级机构，而评级机构总是倾向于给有权有势的债券发行者打高分，这一问题就没有得到解决。


The shadow banking sector’s dependence on the official banking sector’s liquidity and guarantees, and thus ultimately on the government, has not even been touched.	影子银行部门依赖正式银行部门的流动性和担保，从而最终依赖政府担保，这一问题根本没有提及。


And limits on financial institutions’ leverage will change only in the next decade.	至于对金融机构杠杆规模的限制，要到下一个十年才会起效。


The list of shortcomings goes on and on.	多德-弗兰克法案的不足之处还能举出很多很多。


Money-market funds’ perverse incentives to take on excessive risk remain largely intact.	货币市场基金存在不当激励促使它们承担过度风险，这一问题大致上仍然保持着原状。


Problems with incentive pay have been ignored.	激励薪酬的问题被忽视了。


The most highly touted change – the separation between proprietary trading and commercial banking (also known as the “Volker rule,” after former US Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volker) – has nothing to do with what caused the crisis, and most likely was approved because it was ineffective.	被吹得最神的变革——将自营交易部门和商业银行部门相分离（即所谓的“沃克尔规则”，以前美联储主席保罗·沃克尔的名字命名）——与危机起因根本毫无关系，而其之所以被通过，最大的可能是因为它根本不会见效。


The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, chaired by Phil Angelides, did produce a report on the crisis – in fact, three reports.	以安吉莱德斯（Phil Angelides）为首的金融危机调查委员会（Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission）确实给出了关于危机的报告——事实上，给出了三份报告。


By contrast, the Rogers Commission, which investigated the causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, produced just one report.	相反，调查挑战者号航天飞机事故的罗杰斯委员会（Rogers Commission）只给出了一份报告。


The best minds of the time, including the Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman, were part of the investigation, and no stone was left unturned in finding the cause.	当时，美国最优秀的人才，包括诺贝尔物理学奖获得者费曼（Richard Feynman），都参加了罗杰斯委员会的调查，在寻找原因的过程中，所有的蛛丝马迹都没有漏过。


Ultimately, the culprit was precisely identified as a defective O-ring that became too stiff at low temperatures and caused a leak.	最后，报告认定，问题出在一个有缺陷的O型环上，该环由于低温而失去了弹性，导致泄漏。


To convince the public, Feynman demonstrated that conclusion with a televised experiment.	为了让公众明白整个过程，费曼通过电视直播实验对结论做了演示。


Economics is not as precise a science as physics, but this cannot justify the failure of the   Angelides Commission.	经济学并不像物理学那样精确，但这并不能作为安吉莱德斯委员会无所作为的借口。


With sufficient data, we do have methods to identify the likely causes of an economic phenomenon.	只要有充分的数据，我们是有办法识别经济现象的可能原因的。


We are even better at refuting potential explanations.	对于反驳潜在的解释，我们的办法就更多了。


The major limits are imposed by the availability of data, not by our methodologies.	主要的困难在于数据的可获得性，而不在于我们的方法。


But the data were not made available, because the interested parties were (and remain) afraid to share it, knowing full well what would be revealed.	但在数据获取方面出现了人为的刁难，因为利益集团害怕（当时是，现在依然是）分享数据，他们对于数据所能揭示的东西心知肚明。


Unfortunately, the Commission – composed mostly of elected officials, rather than experts – wasted its time in political squabbles.	不幸的是，安吉莱德斯委员会——大部分成员是当选官员，而不是专家——在无尽的政治扯皮中浪费着宝贵的时间。


Its members could not agree even on how to define subprime mortgages and calculate how many such mortgages there were in the United States at the time of the crisis.	其成员甚至对于如何定义次级抵押贷款、如何计算危机发生时美国存在多少次级抵押贷款这样的问题都无法达成一致。


A subsequent investigation into the work of the Commission was more thorough than the Commission’s investigation of the crisis.	一项针对安吉莱德斯委员会成果的后续调查要比安吉莱德斯委员会对危机的调查彻底多了。


After reading through the emails, a congressional report found evidence that the Commission’s work was guided by politics rather than fact-finding.	在阅读了相关电子邮件后，一份国会报告发现，安吉莱德斯委员会的工作指导原则是政治，而不是找出事实。


After all, the fixes had already been decided and approved, before any fact was found; the Commission’s focus was on supporting or discrediting (depending on the commissioner’s political party) the Dodd/Frank legislation, rather than on establishing the truth.	毕竟，当人们还没有找出任何事实的时候，修正方案就已经确定并被批准了； 安吉莱德斯委员会的目的是支持或反对（取决于委员们属于哪个政党）多德-弗兰克法案，而不是确认事实。


It was a great opportunity lost.	于是，良机就这样失去了。


With its subpoena power, the Angelides Commission could have collected and made available to researchers the data needed to answer many crucial questions about the crisis.	安吉莱德斯委员会拥有传唤权，原本可以收集回答关于此次危机的诸多关键性问题的数据并把它们交给研究者。


Did companies that compensated their traders (and not just their CEOs) more highly take more risk?	那些给交易员（而不仅仅是首席执行官）更多薪酬的公司承担了更多的风险吗？


Was financial institutions’ assumption of excessive risk the result of incompetence or stupidity, or was it a rational response to the implicit guarantee offered by the government?	金融机构过度承担风险是因为无能和愚蠢，还是对隐性政府担保的理性反应？


Did the market see the spread of lax lending standards and price the relevant pools of loans accordingly, or was it fooled?	市场是发现了贷款标准有所放松，并据此对相关贷款进行定价，还是被愚弄了？


Who were the ultimate buyers of these toxic products, and why did they buy them?	这些有毒产��的最终买家是谁？ 他们为什么要买这些产品？


How important a role was played by fraud?	欺诈在其中起了什么作用？


These are the questions that needed to be answered.	这些问题都有待回答。


Unfortunately, they are likely to remain unanswered without a major mandatory disclosure of data.	不幸的是，除非下达大规模披露数据的指令，否则这些问题是找不到答案的。


Barring that, there is the risk that we will find out what caused this crisis after the next one.	对数据遮遮掩掩将让我们暴露于风险之中——我们很可能只有在下一场危机之后才能弄清楚这场危机的原因。


Austerity’s Children	紧缩儿童


WASHINGTON, DC – When economists discuss “fiscal adjustment,” they typically frame it as an abstract and complex goal.	发自华盛顿——当经济学家谈到“财政调整”时，他们通常会将其描述成一个抽象复杂的目标。


But the issue is actually simple: Who will bear the brunt of measures to reduce the budget deficit?	但这个问题其实很简单：谁来承受这些用以降低预算赤字的紧缩措施的冲击。


Either taxes have to go up for some people, or spending must fall – or both.	要么提高对某些人群的征税，要么减少支出——或者两者同时进行。


“Fiscal adjustment” is jargon; what austerity is always about is the distribution of income.	“财政调整”是行话； 其实紧缩这东西就是个收入分配问题。


Much of Europe is already aware of this, of course.	欧洲大部分国家都已经意识到了这一点。


Now it’s America’s turn.	现在轮到美国了。


And current indications there suggest that the people most directly in line for a fiscal squeeze are those who are least able to defend themselves – relatively poor children.	目前那里的迹象表明：受财政紧缩直接冲击的是那些最无力保护自己的人群——来自相对贫穷家庭的儿童。


For example, the current budget sequester (that is, across-the-board spending cuts) is already hurting programs like Head Start, which supports pre-school education.	例如当前的预算扣押（Budget sequester，即全面开支削减）像开端计划（Head Start）这种支持儿童学前教育的项目。


The American comedian Jimmy Kimmel recently poked fun at his compatriots’ lack of fiscal knowledge by asking pedestrians on Hollywood Boulevard what they thought of  “Obama’s decision to pardon the sequester and send it to Portugal.”	美国喜剧演员吉米·吉梅尔（Jimmy Kimmel）最近调侃自己的同胞缺乏财政知识，他在好莱坞大道上问行人如何看待“奥巴马赦免这种在押人员（sequester的另一含义）并将其送往到葡萄牙的决定。


The segment is hilarious, but also sad, because the impact on some people’s lives is very real.	”这些采访片段很滑稽，但也很悲哀，因为它实际影响着一些人的生活。


Around 70,000 children are likely to lose access to Head Start on our current fiscal course.	在我们目前的财政进程下约七万名儿童很有可能失去参与开端计划这类项目的机会。


And much larger cuts are in store for early-childhood nutrition programs and health care.	与幼龄儿童营养项目和医疗保健相关的项目还将开始更大规模的开支削减。


Perhaps most shocking are the dramatic cuts to the Medicaid health-insurance program that the House of Representatives’ Republican majority have embraced in their latest budget proposal.	或许最令人震惊的是美国众议院共和党多数已经在其最新预算提案中提出要大幅收缩医疗补助（Medicaid）项目下的保险计划。


Paul Ryan, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, proposes to balance the budget over the next 10 years largely by slashing the program.	保罗·赖恩（Paul Ryan）——众议院预算委员会主席，提出在未来十年主要通过砍掉这个计划来实现预算平衡。


About half of all people covered by Medicaid are children.	而这一医疗补助计划覆盖的人群有一半是儿童。


Is it fair to force low-income children to bear the burden of fiscal adjustment?	让低收入家庭的儿童来承担财政调整的负担，这公平吗？


According to data available on the economist Emmanuel Saez’s invaluable Web site, from 1993 to 2011, average real income for the bottom 99% of the population (by income) rose by 5.8%, while the top 1% experienced real income growth of 57.5%.	根据经济学家伊曼纽尔·塞斯（Emmanuel Saez）极有价值的网站所提供的数据，从1993年到2011年，位于社会顶端1%的人口却得到了57. 5%的实际收入增长，而在这些人之下的99%人口平均实际收入却只提高了5.


The top 1% captured 62% of all income growth over this period, partly owing to a sharp rise in returns to higher education in recent decades.	8%，而。 顶端1%的人口在这段时期得到了全部收入增长的62%，部分原因是最近几十年高等教育的回报率急剧上升。


(On average, those with only a high school education or less have few good income prospects.)	（通常，只有高中或以下学历的人都没有良好的收入前景。 ）


This implies that, if anything, the tax system should become more progressive, with the proceeds invested in public goods that are not sufficiently provided by the private sector – things like early childhood education and preventive health care to minimize educational disruption resulting from common ailments like childhood asthma.	如果说着这意味什么的话，那就是税收系统应该更具有进步性，其收入应该投入到那些私人无法充分提供的公共物品上——比如幼龄儿童教育和预防性保健，从而尽量减少���类似儿童哮喘这种普通疾病所引发的辍学情况。


Think of it this way: In recent decades, some families chose locations and occupations that seemed to offer a reasonable means of support – and good prospects for their children.	这样来想：最近几十年，有些家庭选择了一些似乎能合理支持其生活——及其儿女美好前景——的地点和职业。


Many of these decisions turned out badly, largely because information technology (computers and how they are used) eliminated many middle-class jobs.	但其中许多这类决定却导致了糟糕的后果，而这很大程度上是因为信息技术（电脑以及其运用方式）消灭了很多中产阶级的工作。


Increasing globalization of trade also did not help in this regard.	全球贸易的发展也加剧了这种势态。


In addition, as Till von Wachter of Columbia University has documented, prolonged periods of unemployment for parents have a severe and lasting negative impact on their children.	此外，正如哥伦比亚大学的提尔·冯·韦希特尔（Till von Wachter ）所证明的那样，父母的长期失业对其子女有着严重而持久的负面影响。


Children whose families cannot provide a decent start in life deserve help.	那些无法从家庭中获取人生良好开端的儿童应该得到帮助。


But America has not provided it – a point recently made by Jeb Bush, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016.	但美国却没能提供这种帮助——共和党2016年总统提名人竞争的领先者杰布·布什（Jeb Bush）最近提出了这一点。


“In our country today,” Bush said in a speech to fellow conservatives, “if you’re born poor, if your parents didn’t go to college, if you don’t know your father, if English isn’t spoken at home, then the odds are stacked against you.”	“现在在我们国家，”布什在对党内保守派的演讲中提到，“如果你出生在贫穷的家庭，如果你的父母没上过大学，如果你连自己的父亲是谁都不知道，如果你家里不说英语，那么你成功的机会就很渺茫。 ”


Nor is America likely to provide such help in the future, given the coming budget cuts’ disproportionate impact on children at the lower end of the income distribution.	鉴于未来预算削减对低收入家庭儿童所造成的过大影响，美国也不大可能在未来提供这种帮助。


America can easily afford to do better, of course.	其庞大的预算赤字反映了下列一系列事件的影响：有利于富人和上层中产阶级的减税； 缺乏资金支持的医保覆盖面的扩大（包括处方药在内）；


Its large budget deficits reflect the impact of tax breaks that favor the wealthy and upper middle class; an unfunded expansion of Medicare coverage to include prescription medicines; two foreign wars; and, most important, a banking system that was allowed to get out of control, inflicting massive disruption on the real economy (and thus on tax revenue).	两场海外战争； 最重要的是，一个被允许失控的银行系统，对实体经济造成了严重损害（税收收入也因此降低）。


Today’s children did not play a role in any of these policy mistakes.	今天的儿童并未参与制定这些错误政策。


The preschoolers who are about to lose access to Head Start weren’t even born when they were made.	那些即将失去参与开端计划资格的学前儿童在这些错误的决策产生时甚至都还没有出生。


Imposing austerity on poor children is not just unfair; it is also bad economics.	对低收入家庭的儿童实施紧缩不仅是不公平的；


When economists, again with their dry jargon, talk about a country’s “human capital,” what they really mean is the cognitive and physical abilities of its people.	而且也是糟糕的经济计算。 当经济学家再一次用他们干巴巴的术语谈及一国的“人力资本”时，他们真正指的是其人民的认知及身体能力。


As I pointed out in recent Congressional testimony, poor education leads to poor job prospects, poor families, and back to poor education – if not with a detour through incarceration, which makes it even harder to break the cycle.	正如笔者在近期的国会证词中指出的一样，教育程度低导致工作前景差，家庭收入低，反过来又导致教育程度低——如果再加上犯罪入狱的话，要打破这种循环就更难了。


Unfortunately, no one in a position of power is likely to heed such arguments.	但不幸地是，没有一个当权者会留意这样的争论。


They should.	他们应该注意到这一点。


When you travel to a foreign country for the first time, and you see neglected, ill-fed, and uneducated children, do you regard that country as likely to be one of the world’s great economic powers over the next half-century? Or do you worry for its future?	当你首次踏足某个国家的时候，你看到被忽视的、营养不良、未受教育的孩子，你是认为这样的国家有可能在未来半个世纪屹立于世界经济强国之林，还是为其前途担忧？


The Unfinished Cold War	没有结束的冷战


MOSCOW – This November will mark the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.	莫斯科——11月将迎来柏林墙倒塌二十周年纪念日。


But the end of confrontation in Europe may be proving only temporary.	但事实证明欧洲对峙的终结可能只是暂时现象。


One year after last summer’s war in Georgia, old divisions seem to be re-emerging in a different form.	去年夏天格鲁吉亚战争一年后，原有的分裂似乎又以新形式重新浮出水面。


Although the Cold War in Europe was declared over, the truth is, it never really finished.	尽管人们宣称欧洲冷战已经结束，但真实情况是，冷战从未真正退出历史舞台。


When the Soviet Union withdrew from Central and Eastern Europe, we Russians believed that NATO would not be extended to the countries and territories from which we had withdrawn.	苏联当时从中东欧撤军的时候，我们俄国人相信北约不会向我们撤出的国家和地区扩张。


Our hope was for unification with Europe, a “common European home,” and the creation of a Europe “united and free.”	我们希望与欧洲实现统一，建立“欧洲共同家园”，缔造一个“团结而又自由”的欧洲。


Our hopes were not starry-eyed self-deception.	我们的希望并非不切实际的自欺欺人。


After all, the leaders of the United States and Germany had promised Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastward.	毕竟，美国和德国领导人曾经对米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫亲口承诺北约绝不会向东扩张。


At first, after they had vanquished communism, Russians regarded themselves as victors.	起初在战胜共产主义之后，俄国人认为自己是胜利者。


But, after a few euphoric years, the West began acting more and more like the Cold War’s winners.	但这种愉快情绪持续了几年后，西方的所作所为越来越像冷战的赢家。


Once the potential “military threat” posed by the Soviet Union had vanished into thin air, successive waves of NATO enlargement served neither a military nor an ideological purpose.	由苏联造成的潜在“军事威胁”消失得无影无踪之后，持续不断的北约东扩浪潮既不符合各方的军事利益，也不符合意识形态方面的要求。


The West’s logic for enlargement was geopolitical: to bring the former Soviet republics and socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western sphere of political and economic influence.	地缘政治是西方国家东扩的逻辑基础：把前苏联共和国的中东欧社会主义国家纳入到西方政治和经济影响力的范畴。


At first, NATO’s new members were declared to have met both democratic and military criteria.	起初，北约新成员国被宣布已经达到民主和军事方面的要求。


Later, these criteria were abandoned when NATO began to invite even the most backward and corrupt states to join.	后来，随着北约开始向最腐败落后的国家发出邀请，这些标准更是被弃之不顾。


NATO, moreover, not only enlarged its membership, but also transformed itself from an anti-Communist defensive alliance into an offensive grouping (with operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan).	此外，北约在吸收更多会员国的同时，也把自身从一个反共产主义的防御性联盟逐渐演化为一个进攻性组织（在南斯拉夫、伊拉克和阿富汗发起军事行动）。


NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s own borders, and the membership of countries whose elites have historical complexes in regard to Russia, increased anti-Russian sentiment inside the alliance.	北约向俄国边境的扩张，以及精英阶层与俄国有历史渊源国家的陆续加入，导致联盟中的反俄情绪有所抬头。


For all its efforts to improve its image, many Russians now view NATO as a much more hostile organization than they did in the 1990’s, or even before then.	尽管北约为改善自身形象进行了种种努力，但许多俄国人现在已经把北约看作一个比20世纪90年代，甚至比那以前抱有更多敌意的组织。


Moreover, NATO enlargement has meant that Europe itself has still not emerged from the Cold War.	此外，北约东扩意味着欧洲自身尚未摆脱冷战的阴影。


No peace treaty ended the Cold War, so it remains unfinished.	没有哪项和平协议宣布冷战结束，因此冷战仍在进行中。


Even though the ideological and military confrontation of those times is far behind us, it is being replaced with a new stand-off – between Russia, on one hand, and the US and some of the “New Europeans” on the other.	尽管那些时代的思想和军事对峙早已不复存在，但新的对峙形式又取而代之——对峙的一方是俄罗斯，而另一方则是美国和某些“新欧洲国家”。


My hope is that, when historians look back at Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia of last summer, the Ossetians, Russians, and Georgians killed in that war will be seen as having not died in vain.	我衷心期望，当历史学家回顾去年夏天格鲁吉亚对南奥塞梯袭击的时候，被那场战争夺去生命的奥塞梯人、俄罗斯人和格鲁吉亚人不会白白牺牲。


Russian troops crushed Georgia’s army on the ground, but they also delivered a strong blow against the logic of further NATO expansion, which, if not stopped, would have inevitably incited a major war in the heart of Europe.	俄罗斯军队在战场上击败了格鲁吉亚部队，同时也沉重打击了北约进一步东扩的逻辑理由，这种理由如果继续盛行下去，必然在欧洲心脏地带引发一场大规模战争。


For the time being, the situation remains open.	从目前情况看，仍然无法确定局势的发展方向。


The US failed to unleash some new form of Cold War after the South Ossetian episode, not least because of the global financial and economic crisis.	美国未能在南奥塞梯一幕发生后发动某种全新形式的冷战，这在一定程度上是受到全球金融和经济危机的影响。


It is my hope that the global economic crisis and Barack Obama’s presidency will put the farcical idea of a new Cold War into proper perspective.	我衷心希望全球经济危机和巴拉克·奥巴马当选总统能对新冷战的荒唐理念进行正确的评估。


Greater Europe, in which I include not only Russia, but also the US, needs a new peace treaty, or rather system of accords, that draw a line under Europe’s horrible twentieth century and thus prevent a historical relapse.	我认为包括俄罗斯和美国在内的泛欧地区需要订立新的和平协议，或者协议体系。 这套体系能给欧洲可怕的二十世纪画上句号，防止历史重蹈覆辙。


What is needed is a new pan-European treaty on collective security, signed either by individual countries or by NATO and the EU, as well as by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.	我们需要就集体安全问题订立新的泛欧协议，订立方或者以国为单位，或者是北约和欧盟，还有俄罗斯和独联体。


Countries not included in any of the current security systems would be able to join in the treaty and receive multilateral guarantees.	尚未包括在目前任何安全体系当中的国家应该能够加入协议并获得多边保证。


NATO enlargement would	应当实际冻结北约东扩的进程。


With the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in mind, we must seek to prevent the further fragmentation of states, and also their forcible reunification.	随着苏联和南斯拉夫的分裂，我们应当竭力防止国家进一步陷入分裂，还需要防止受迫情况下的重新统一。


Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia must be the last of the states that break away through force.	科索沃、南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹应该是借助武力独立的最后的国家。


The “Pandora’s box” of self-determination must be closed.	装有民族自决的“潘多拉宝盒”必须关闭。


Once the legacy of confrontation inherited from the twentieth century has been overcome, perhaps deep cuts in the Russia and US nuclear arsenals may become possible, together with coordination of military-strategic policies.	一旦克服了从二十世纪传承下来的对立传统，大幅度削减俄美核武器和协调军事战略政策或许会成为可能。


In this scenario, Russian-US cooperation in crisis situations like Afghanistan, or in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, would become much more profound.	在这种情况下，在阿富汗危机或者防止大规模杀伤性武器及核武器领域的俄美合作将会变得更加深入。


In Europe proper, a union between Russia and the EU should be founded, based on a common economic space, a common energy space – with cross-ownership of companies that produce, transport, and distribute energy – and a common human space that would be visa-free and include coordinated Russian and EU international policies.	在欧洲区域内，应当在共同经济利益和能源利益的基础上，建立欧盟和俄罗斯之间的联盟——对涉及能源生产、运输和配送领域的企业实现交叉持股，并建立统一免签证的人员流动空间，包括统一协调的俄国和欧盟国际政策。


Emphasis should also be placed on establishing a new system for governing the global economy and finance, whose creation will be even more difficult if the confrontations of the Cold War are not resolved.	此外还应重点建设管理全球经济和金融的新体系，如果冷战对抗情况不加以缓解，新体系的建设就会更加难以完成。


Europe, Russia, and the US must finish the “unfinished war.”	欧洲、俄国和美国应当结束这场“没有结束的战争”。


Then, perhaps in 2019, the year that will mark the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles, we may finally bid farewell to the twentieth century.	而后，也许到2019年，也就是《凡尔赛条约》签订100周年之际，我们或许能够最终与二十世纪告别。


The Euro on the Mend	修补中的欧元


PARIS – A year ago the eurozone was in serious trouble.	巴黎—一年前，欧洲陷入了严重麻烦。


A series of policy actions – the creation of a rescue fund, a fiscal treaty, and the provision of cheap liquidity to the banking system – had failed to impress financial markets for long.	一系列政策动作——成立援助基金、财政条约并向银行系统提供廉价流动性——均未能带来金融市场的长期稳定。


The crisis had moved from the monetary union’s periphery to its core.	危机从欧元区外围向核心蔓延。


Southern Europe was experiencing a sell-off of sovereign debt and a massive withdrawal of private capital.	南欧经历了主权债务卖出潮和大规模私人资本回流。


Europe was fragmenting financially.	欧洲在金融上陷入了分裂。


Speculation about a possible breakup was widespread.	人们纷纷猜测欧元区将崩溃。


Then came two major initiatives.	接着出现了两个大手笔动作。


In June 2012, eurozone leaders announced their intention to establish a European banking union.	2012年6月，欧元区领导人宣布计划建立欧洲银行联盟。


The euro, they said, had to be buttressed by transferring banking supervision to a European authority.	他们说，欧元必须通过将银行监督权转给一个欧洲当局才能实现稳定。


For the first time since the onset of the crisis in Greece, it was officially recognized that the root of the eurozone’s problem was not the flouting of fiscal rules, and that the very principles underlying the monetary union had to be revisited.	这是自希腊危机爆发以来，官方第一次认识到欧元区问题的根源不在于藐视财政规则，而在于货币联盟的基本原则需要修正。


The endeavor was bound to be ambitious.	这方面的努力注定是大手笔。


In the eyes of most observers, to reach the leaders’ goal of “break[ing] the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” required centralizing authority for bank resolution and rescue.	在大部分观察者看来，实现领导人“打破银行和主权之间的恶性循环”要求将银行清算和援助权力集中起来。


The second initiative came a month later.	第二个大手笔于1个月之后到来。


Speaking on July 26, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi announced that the ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro: “Believe me,” he said, “it will be enough.”	7月26日，欧洲央行行长德拉吉宣布欧洲央行准备“竭尽全力”捍卫欧元：“相信我，”他说，“这足以解决问题。


The meaning of these words became clear with the subsequent announcement of the ECB’s “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) scheme, under which it would purchase short-term government bonds issued by countries benefiting from the European rescue fund’s conditional support.	”这句话意味着什么呢？ 随后欧洲央行宣布实施“直接货币交易”（OMT）说明了一切，在OMT计划下，欧洲央行将买入由从欧洲援助基金有条件支持中获益的国家发行的短期政府债券。


Both measures had an immediate and profound impact on financial markets.	两大措施在金融市场上立刻形成了深远的影响。


Seen from Wall Street, the euro was moving closer to becoming a normal currency.	在华尔街看来，欧元正日益迈向普通货币。


Turmoil in bond markets began to abate.	债券市场之乱开始消退。


A year later, where are we?	一年后，我们情况如何？


First, the two initiatives resulted in markedly improved borrowing conditions for southern European governments (at least until Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke created new shockwaves with his indication in mid-June that the US would wind down more than three years of so-called quantitative easing).	首先，两个大手笔为南欧政府营造了大为改善的借贷条件（至少在美联储主席在6月中旬暗示美国将逐步退出实施了三年多的所谓量化宽松、从而引起了新一波冲击之前是如此）。


Capital stopped flowing out of southern Europe and speculation eased.	资本不再流出南欧，流言蜚语也有所消退。


Second, an agreement on authorizing the ECB to oversee the banking sector was reached at the end of last year.	其次，授权欧洲央行监督银行部门的协定在去年年底达成。


In a year, the new regime will be fully operational – not a trivial achievement in view of the complexity of the issue.	一年后，新制度将具有完全的操作性——考虑到该问题的复杂性，这绝不可不谓大成就。


Third, discussions are being held to prepare the next steps, namely how to arrange the resolution of failed banks and support for ailing ones.	第三，后续步骤的讨论正在进行中，即如何安排倒闭银行的清算和支持受困银行。


Ministers recently agreed upon a template for action.	各位部长最近同意了一个行动模板。


So there are clear positive outcomes. But questions remain.	这些是显而易见的积极成果，但也有问题。


One problem is architectural: any banking union is only as strong as its weakest component.	其中之一是结构设计问题：银行联盟的强度取决于最弱的一环。


What matters for markets is not what happens in normal times, or even what happens when uncertainty and volatility rise; what markets care about are possible scenarios in truly adverse conditions.	掀起市场波澜的不是正常时期的状况，甚至不是不确定性和波动性上升的时期； 而是引起真正不利情景的可能状态。


Breaking the negative feedback loop between distressed sovereigns and distressed banks – whereby bank rescues exhaust fiscal resources and make it likely that the next financial institution in trouble will not be able to count on government support – requires ensuring that it will not recur even in extreme circumstances.	打破受困主权国家和受困银行之间的负反馈环——银行援助耗尽财政资源，致使下一个陷入麻烦的金融机构可能无法获得政府支持——需要确保及时在极端环境下，这一情形也不会重现。


Merely “weakening” this loop, as European officials recently advocated, could prove deeply insufficient.	仅仅“减弱”这一循环——这正是欧洲官员最近所宣传的——是远远不够的。


There are two ways to eliminate the feedback loop.	可以分两步消除负反馈环。


One is to exclude bank rescues altogether: only creditors would have to pay for bankers’ mistakes.	一是彻底排除银行援助：只让债权人为银行家的错误买单。


This type of rule could insulate governments from banking risk only if applied systematically, even at the expense of financial stability.	这样的规则只有在得到系统性实施（即使会导致金融动荡）时才能将政府与银行风险隔绝。


Simply put, governments should be ready to let banks fail.	简言之，政府应该做好银行倒闭的准备。


The other solution is to mutualize the cost of rescue at the margin.	另一个步骤是边际援助成本的共同化。


States could be involved and accept losses, but catastrophic risks would have to be shared among all eurozone members.	各国可能遭遇并接受损失，但灾难性风险必须由所有欧元区成员国共同承担。


Europe these days is vacillating between these two approaches.	近些天来，欧洲在这两个方法之间摇摆。


France does not want to rule out state-financed bailouts; Germany is reluctant to mutualize budgetary costs.	法国不想排除国家出资��援助； 德国不愿看到预算成本共同化。


A compromise is being worked out, but it must pass the test of reality.	妥协方案正在达成，但必须经过现实的考验。


Unfortunately, the middle way between two logically consistent solutions may itself not be a logically consistent one.	不幸的是，两种逻辑上一致的方案的中间道路可能在逻辑上不一致。


Meanwhile, the credibility of Draghi’s atomic weapon is being undermined.	与此同时，德拉吉原子弹的信誉正在遭到破坏。


The miracle of the OMT scheme is that, since it was announced a year ago, it has had its intended effect without ever being used.	OMT计划的奇迹，是自一年前宣布以来，它从未使用，但却达到了预期的效果。


Strong opposition on the part of the Bundesbank and many German academics, however, has raised questions about whether and how it could ever be used.	然而，德国央行和大量德国学者的强烈反对不禁让我们怀疑它是否可以动用。


To defend its legality in hearings before Germany’s Constitutional Court, the ECB itself has argued that the OMT program is a less potent instrument than many believe.	为了在德国宪法法庭听证会上辩解其合法性，欧洲央行本身指出，OMT计划的功效没有很多人想象的那样好。


Although the German government has been adamant that it is not a German court’s role to rule on the legality of ECB instruments, markets have taken note.	尽管德国政府德国政府坚称裁决欧洲央行方案的合法性绝非德国法庭的责任，但市场在拭目以待。


In a few months, it will be four years since the eurozone crisis began – almost an eternity by historical standards.	不出几个月，欧元区就将迎来危机爆发四周年——从历史标准看，称得上旷日持久了。


Much has been done to overcome it.	为了克服危机，我们已经做了很多。


But it is still too early to declare the job done and claim victory.	但宣布任务胜利完成仍然太早。


DNA at 60	DNA 60岁


LONDON – On April 25, 1953, Francis Crick and James Watson published a one-page paper that many believed would revolutionize biological research.	伦敦—1953年4月25日，克里克和沃森发表了一篇一页的论文，很多人认为这篇文章将掀起生物研究革命。


Building on the work of Rosalind Franklin and Maurice Wilkins, they had discovered DNA’s double-helix structure, providing the first glimpse into how organisms inherit and store biological information.	克里克和沃森在富兰克林（Rosalind Franklin）和威尔金斯（Maurice Wilkins）工作的基础上发现了DNA的双螺旋结构，第一次窥探了生命体如何继承和储存生物信息。


But, 60 years later, has their discovery really had the transformative impact that the world expected?	但是，60年后，他们的发现真的如人们所预料那样产生了革命性的影响吗？


The media marked the publication’s 60th anniversary with much fanfare, hailing the breakthrough that “ushered in the age of genetics,” and calling it “one of the most important scientific discoveries of all time.”	媒体大肆宣传克里克和沃森的论文发表60周年，称赞这一突破“引领了遗传学时代”，称之为“有史以来最重要科学发现之一。


The British newspaper The Guardian featured the headline, “Happy Birthday, DNA!	”英国报纸《卫报》标题赫然写着《生日快乐，DNA！


The golden moment that changed us all.”	改变我们所有人的黄金一刻》。


To some extent, they are right.	从某种程度来讲，这是正确的。


The finding forms the basis of genetics and has opened up promising new research areas, such as synthetic biology, in which biological systems are created or modified to perform specific functions.	这一发现构成了遗传学的基础，并开启了新兴研究领域，合成生物学便是其中之一，在该学科中，生物系统可以被创造或改造以实现特定的功能。


Likewise, it has facilitated important innovations, such as pharmacogenetic cancer treatment, in which drugs target specific genetic defects within cancer cells.	类似地，DNA还推动了重要创新，比如药物遗传学癌症疗法，即专门对付癌细胞内的具体遗传缺陷。


Moreover, DNA has acquired a certain mystique in popular culture.	此外，DNA还引发了一些流行文化的神秘元素。


According to Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee, it has become a sacred entity – the modern equivalent of the Christian soul, an individual’s essence.	根据内尔金（Dorothy Nelkin）和林迪（Susan Lindee）的说法，DNA已经成为神圣实体（sacred entity）——基督灵魂的现代等价物、个体生命的本质。


While some forms of biological determinism, such as the belief that race or gender dictates a person’s destiny, have been widely rejected, the idea that a person can be genetically predisposed, say, to get into debt, become a ruthless dictator, or vote regularly in elections remains socially acceptable.	某些形式的生物决定论——比如认为种族和性别决定了一个人的命运已被大众所拒绝，但一个人可能天生具有（比如）负债倾向、容易变成残酷的独裁者、或定期参加选举的观点仍被社会所接受。


But, almost from the beginning – and most intensely since 1971, when Time magazine published a special section entitled “The New Genetics: Man into Superman” – science and society alike have tended to overestimate the impact of genetics.	但是，几乎从一开始——特别是在1971年《时代》杂志发表名为《新遗传学：从人变成超人》的特写文章以来——科学和社会就高估了遗传学的影响。


When the Human Genome Project published the first draft of the fully sequenced human genome in 2000, Henry Gee, an editor of the journal Nature, predicted that scientists would be able “to alter entire organisms out of all recognition to suit our needs and tastes” by 2099.	2000年人类基因组计划发布了第一张完全测序的人类基因组草图，《自然》杂志编辑亨利·吉（Henry Gee）预言，到2099年科学家将能“彻底改变生命体，使之适合我们的需要和品味”。


“We will have extra limbs, if we want them,” he asserted, “maybe even wings to fly.”	“我们会有不止四肢，如果我们想要变成这样，”他说，“兴许还会有翅膀可以飞。 ”


Thirteen years later, Gee’s prediction looks increasingly unlikely, with the Human Genome Project so far having failed to meet expectations.	十三年后，吉的预言变得越来越不可能，而人类基因组计划也没有达到预期。


Indeed, in 2010, the science writer Nicholas Wade lamented that, a decade after the project was launched, geneticists were “almost back to square one in knowing where to look for the roots of common disease.”	事实上，2010年，科学作家瓦德（Nicholas Wade）哀叹，在人类基因组计划启动十年后，遗传学家“几乎回到了原点，明白了往哪里寻找常见疾病的根源。 ”


For example, a 12-year study of 19,000 white American women found that 101 genetic markers that had been statistically linked to heart disease had no predictive value.	比如，一项耗时12年、观察了19 000名美国白人女性的研究发现，与心脏病具有统计关系的101遗传标记没有预测价值。


Self-reported family histories, by contrast, proved very accurate in predicting the disease.	相反，自我报告的家族史在预测心脏病方面相当准确。


In fact, most diseases are not caused by single genes.	事实上，大部分疾病都不是由单一基因引起的。


As a result, after a few early successes with atypical single-gene disorders such as Huntington’s disease, progress has stalled.	结果，在非典型的单一基因失调疾病如亨廷顿氏症方面早期取得一些成功后，进展就停滞了。


Common variants typically explain a small fraction of genetic risk.	常见变异通常只能解释一小部分遗传风险。


Genetics has been a source of particularly high hopes when it comes to cancer treatment.	遗传学在癌症治疗方面被寄予厚望。


Between 1962 and 1985, cancer-related deaths in the United States rose by 8.7%, despite the use of aggressive chemotherapy drugs and radiation therapy, highlighting the dangers of a one-size-fits-all approach to treatment.	1962—1985年间，尽管有了强力的化学药物和放射疗法，美国的癌症相关死亡数量仍增加了 8. 7%，表明一刀切治疗方法的危险性。


An understanding of the genetic determinants of patients’ therapeutic response, it was believed, would enable doctors to develop individualized treatment programs, sparing more responsive patients from harmful overtreatment.	人们认为，了解病人治疗反应的遗传决定因素能让医生开发个性化治疗方案，让更多的反应患者免于有害的过度治疗。


But patients are not the only variable.	但患者并不是唯一的变数。


Cancer, too, is heterogeneous, even in patients with the same diagnosis.	癌症也是多样化的，即使在症状相同的患者中间。


After sequencing the entire genomes of 50 patients’ breast cancer tumors, researchers found that only 10% of the tumors had more than three mutations in common.	在对50名患者的乳腺癌肿瘤进行完全基因组测序后，研究者发现只有10%的肿瘤存在三个以上的相同变异。


According to a recent study mapping genetic mutations in 2,000 tumors, breast cancer can actually be divided into ten subgroups.	一份测序了2000个肿瘤基因变异的最新研究表明，乳腺癌实际上应该被分为十种子类。


Similarly, a genome-wide analysis of malignant cells from four kidney-cancer patients showed that, while they were related, they had mutated in many different directions.	类似地，一份对四位肾癌患者恶性细胞的全基因组分析表明，尽管它们之间寻在关系，但突变的方向大不相同。


Two-thirds of the genetic faults identified were not repeated in the same tumor, let alone in any other metastasized tumors in the body.	被识别出来的遗传错误中有三分之二不会再同一个肿瘤中得到复制，更不用说体内的其他转移肿瘤了。


Given that a pharmacogenetic drug targets one mutation in the tumor, it will not necessarily work on the other mutations.	由于药物遗传学药物定向于肿瘤的某种突变，因此它不一定对其他突变有效。


In addition, as the cancer adjusts to the drug, further mutations are likely to occur, diminishing the drug’s efficacy.	此外，随着癌症适应药物，可能发生后续突变，抑制药物的疗效。


To be sure, pharmacogenetics has made a profound difference for some patients.	平心而论，对某些患者来说，药物遗传学带来了极大的不同。


Barbara Bradfield, one of the original subjects in research trials for the pharmacogenetic cancer drug Herceptin, has now been stable on the drug for more than 20 years.	药物遗传学癌症药物赫赛汀的研究试验原始实验对象芭芭拉·布拉德菲尔德（Barbara Bradfield）因该药而情况稳定地生活了20多年。


But such success stories are far too rare to constitute a “golden age” of genetics.	但类似的成功太罕见，不足以构成遗传学的“黄金时代”。


The high price of such drugs is limiting their impact as well.	这类药物高企的价格也限制了它们的影响。


Herceptin can cost up to $40,000 annually, and newer cancer drugs cost even more, making them prohibitively expensive for most patients.	赫赛汀每年的花费高达4万美元，新的癌症药物花费更高，大部分患者根本负担不起。


The US Supreme Court is currently faced with the question of whether genes can be patented.	美国最高法院最近面临着基因是否可以申请专利的问题。


If the court upholds the biotechnology company Myriad Genetics’ patents on two genes which, in some variants, are linked to higher risk for breast and ovarian cancer, the company will retain exclusive rights to use the genes in research, diagnosis, and treatment for two decades, preventing rivals from developing cheaper alternatives.	如果法院支持生物技术公司Myriad Genetics对两种基因的专利要求（这两种基因的某个变体与乳腺癌和卵巢癌高发有关），那么该公司将获得将这两个基因用于研究。 诊断和治疗的长达二十年的专属权利，从而阻止廉价替代方案的开发。


Women have already been denied access to a diagnostic test, because insurers refuse to pay the company’s high prices.	女性已经难以得到诊断测试，因为保险公司拒绝支付该公司的高要价。


Manufacturers claim that gene patents, which now cover 25-40% of the human genome, are vital to recouping their investments.	制造商称，基因专利——目前覆盖了人类基因组的25—40%——是振兴投资的关键。


But such patents mar DNA’s “birthday” celebrations for the patients who stand to benefit from the fruits of genetic research – if only they could afford them.	但这些专利堪称DNA“生日”的污点，因为它们阻止了患者获得遗传研究的好处——除非他们花得起钱。


The Ungreening of the World	世界范围的绿化破坏


Everyone I meet claims to love trees -- I mean  really love trees -- yet collectively the human race behaves as if it abhors green things.	我遇到的每一个人都声称他们喜欢树，我是说真的喜欢，然而从总体上讲人类的行为却似乎让人感觉它憎恶绿色。


If you take a step back from whatever biome you are in at the moment and look at the entire Earth and its forests through recorded history, you will see that the relationship between humans and trees looks  Strangely Like War (the title of a recent book on forests by Derrick Jensen and George Draffan).	如果你从你现在所处的任一生物群落区抽身，从历史记载上来看整个地球和它的森林，你会发现人类和树木的关系看上去奇怪地像一场战争（这是德里克·简森和乔治·德拉芬最近出版的一本关于森林的书名）。


The exact extent of the damage is difficult to discern, because for many years records were not kept, but the estimates are that 75% of the world’s original forests have been logged or burned by humans.	确切的破坏程度很难搞清楚，因为有许多年的记载没有被保存下来，但是据估计，世界上大约75%的原始森林遭到了人类的砍伐或焚烧。


Some of them have grown back of course, or have been replanted, but it is thought that we now have only half of the amount of forest land we once had on this planet.	当然其中的一些又重新长了出来，或者被重新种上了树，但是普遍认为我们现在拥有的林地数目只有当初的一半左右。


In some places, particularly the drier places of the globe, the deforestation was so severe, and was followed by such intense grazing, that forests have not been able to grow back.	在某些地方，尤其是地球上比较干燥的地区，森林被如此严重地砍伐，随之又受到如此严重的牧群啃食，以致没能再重新生长出来。


The landscape has been permanently altered.	地貌受到了永久性的改变。


When you imagine Greece, Italy, and Iraq, it is likely that you imagine a dry landscape with open views, the way they look today.	当你想象希腊、意大利和伊拉克，你很可能会想到一大片开阔的干地,就象你今天所看到的一样。


Historical records indicate, however, that these places were once covered by dense forests.	然而历史记载显示，这些地方曾经被茂密的森林覆盖。


The forests fell as civilizations flourished, so the earlier a place became “civilized” the sooner it became deforested.	森林随着人类文明的繁荣而退却了，所以一个地方越早变得“文明”，那么它那儿的森林就会越快被砍伐掉。


This march of so-called progress resulting in the loss of forests was documented by John Perlin in his 1989 book  A Forest Journey .	这个失去森林的所谓进程的结果被约翰·柏林记录在他1989年出版的《一次森林旅程》一书中。


So today we sit on a planet with only 50% of its forest cover remaining.	今天我们所生活的地球只剩下了它50%的森林植被。


And here’s the part that should bring tears to your eyes: we continue to lose more forest cover every year.	而下面这一点又将使你黯然泪下：我们每年又在失去更多的森林。


The more recent losses are well documented.	近年的损失都被很好地记载了下来。


Every five years the United Nations produces a summary report called the Global Forest Resource Assessment; The team in charge of assembling the assessment relies on internet reporting and satellite surveillance to come up with the figures.	每隔五年，联合国都会公布一份称作《地球森林资源评估》的总结性报告； 该小组专门负责根据互联网上的报道和卫星监测的结果进行综合评定以得出数据。


According to the most recent report, between 2000 and 2005, we lost forest acreage equivalent to the land mass of Panama -- more than 77 thousand square kilometers of forest gone, some of it never to return.	根据最新的报告，在2000年至2005年间，我们失去了相当于巴拿马国土面积大小的森林面积，就是说失去了超过7万7千平方公里的森林，其中的一些永远不会再得到恢复了。


The next report is due to be released in 2010.	下一份报告预计将在2010年发表。


I will not be surprised when it is released and I read that the global forest area has continued to shrink.	那时如果我读到地球森林的面积还在继续萎缩我将不会感到惊讶。


If this happens when we claim to love trees, I shudder to think what would happen if we were ambivalent about them?	如果说这些是在我们宣称热爱树木的情况下发生的，那么如果我们对它们的态度是模棱两可的话情况会是怎样呢？


Or thought we could live without them?	或者如果我们认为没有它们我们照样能生存下去情况又会是怎样呢？


In the United States, deforestation began as soon as the colonies were settled.	美国的森林砍伐早在殖民地时代就开始了。


Before long, the colonies were exporting wood to the many nations that no longer had the timber they needed for ships, casks, shingles, and other construction materials.	不久，殖民地把木头出口到那些已经不再有木材的国家供它们制造船只、木桶、木瓦和其他建筑材料。


Trees were also cut to clear cropland, provide heat, and the fledgling nation was using up its forests to build its own ironworks and railroads as well.	树木还被砍伐掉以清理耕地、供热，而这个新兴国家还耗尽它的森林以建造它自己的铁制品还有铁路。


By 1920, more than three-quarters of the US’s original forests had been cut.	到1920年，美国超出四分之三的原始森林被砍伐掉了。


Similar to the global figures, today the US has only half the forest cover that it had in 1600.	与全球的数据一样，今天美国的森林植被只有它1600年时的一半。


And we continue to destroy forest land.	而我们还在继续破坏林地。


At the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro it was agreed that, “efforts should be undertaken towards the greening of the world.”	正像里约热内卢的联合国环境与发展会议所一致同意的：“必须采取措施加强世界的绿化”。


The UN recognizes that “forests are essential to economic development and all forms of life.”	联合国认识到“森林对于经济发展和生活的各方面都非常重要”。


But the UN Charter also reads: “states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources.”	但是联合国宪章上也说：“各国有开发自己资源的主权。


And so we do.	”而我们正在那样做。


Although the UN and my country recognize the value of forests, both ecologically and economically, such recommendations are not strong enough to stop my local council from voting “yes” to deforestation.	尽管联合国和我的国家认识到森林在生态和经济上的价值，但是这些建议并不能阻止我们的地方委员会投票“同意”砍伐森林。


Last week, I went to a zoning meeting in the town where I live.	上星期，我去参加了我所生活的城市的一个分区会议。


A real estate housing project developer wanted to cut many acres of trees so he could build houses.	一个房地产开发商准备砍伐掉数公顷的树木以供他建造房屋。


That forest land will be lost, probably forever, and a few more numbers will be added to the global deforestation total next year.	那块林地将会消失，也许将永远地消失了，并且给明年的全球森林砍伐总面积添加一些数目。


Why do local politicians, tree lovers all, allow yet more forest destruction?	为什么全都热爱树木的那些地方政客会同意砍伐更多的森林呢？


Why do humans all claim to love trees, but their actions deny their claim?	为什么人们都宣称热爱树木，但他们的行动却与之背道而驰呢？


I think it has to do with fear.	我想是出于惧怕。


When a would-be exploiter of trees stands before a politician and requests, or demands, the right to clear a forest, the politician, out of fear, complies.	当一个潜在的树木破坏者站在一位政治家的面前要求，或者强求清除一片森林的权利时，政治家出于惧怕允许了。


But we do not fear trees.	但是我们并不惧怕树木。


We do not fear their retaliation.	我们不惧怕它们的报复。


Trees stand mute despite our betrayal.	树木面对我们的背叛依然默默地树立在那儿。


Perhaps that is one of the reasons we really love them.	也许这正是我们爱它们的原因之一。


But if we want to do more than love them, if we want to save them, we must become fearless.	但是如果我们想比爱它们做得更多，如果我们想拯救它们，我们必须无所畏惧。


The Unilateral Road to Peace	通往和平的单边道路


In the next three weeks, the Israeli army will do something unprecedented: instead of defending the country against external enemies or terrorism, it will evacuate – by force if necessary – 9,000 Israelis from their homes.	再接下来的三个星期里，以色列军队会有一些前所未有的行动：它将会把9000名以色列人从其家园撤出—必要的时候甚至动用武力—而不是保卫国家不受外部敌人或恐怖主义的袭击。


Israel’s unilateral withdrawal is the outcome of a deep political shift that has been caused by two somewhat contradictory convictions that have characterized Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s policies since 2003: first, that the US-initiated “road map” is going nowhere and, second, that the status quo is untenable.	以色列的单方面撤离是一种深刻的政治转变的结果。 这种转变是由总理沙龙自2003年以来所实行政策中反映出的两种颇为矛盾的信念造成的：首先，美国所制定的“路线图”已经走进了死胡同；


Certainly, according to Sharon’s thinking, there is no future for 9,000 Jewish settlers living among 1.2 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.	其次，目前的局势难以维持。 当然，在沙龙看来，生活在加沙地带120万巴勒斯坦人中的9000犹太定居者是没有前途的。


Hence, in the absence of negotiations, a unilateral withdrawal is the only meaningful step towards de-escalation and stabilization.	所以，在没有进行谈判的情况下，单方面的撤离是通向平息事态和稳定大局的唯一有效步骤。


This policy has deeply divided Israel: the settlers – mostly, but not exclusively religious – feel betrayed by Sharon, “The Father of the Settlements.”	这一政策使以色列出现了深刻的分化：定居者们-大多但不完全是教徒-感到被“定居点之父”，沙龙背叛。


It is now the Israeli left that, however reluctantly, realizes that Sharon’s new pragmatism may be the first step in the right direction.	直到现在，以色列的左翼，不论有多勉强，才认识到沙龙的新实用主义可能是通往正确方向的第一步。


Like de Gaulle in Algeria, Sharon has reshuffled the cards of Israel’s politics.	正如戴高乐之于阿尔及利亚，沙龙对以色列的政治重新洗牌。


The last weeks have seen massive demonstrations, some of them verging on violence; many of the settlers have declared that they will not obey government orders to evacuate.	过去的几周以色列发生了大规模的示威，有的几乎已经到了暴力冲突的边缘； 许多定居者已宣布他们不会遵从政府的命令撤离定居点。


The army and the police have mobilized almost 50,000 troops to carry out evictions.	军队和警察已经调动了近5万人来执行撤离计划。


This forcible approach is traumatic not only for the settlers, but also for many other Israelis.	这种强制的方式不仅对定居者，就是对普通的以色列人也都是一种创痛。


Only the next days and weeks will tell whether the evacuation proceeds peacefully or not.	只有接下来的几天或几周的时间里我们才会知道撤离是否能和平地进行。


In the meantime, Sharon has paid heavily for his policies.	与此同时，沙龙也为他的政策付出了沉重的代价。


Two right-wing parties have left his ruling coalition, he has lost his majority within his own Likud Party, and his finance minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has quit his government.	两个右翼党派离开了他的执政联盟，他在自己的利库德集团内部也失去了大多数的支持。 他的财政部长内塔尼亚胡也从政府辞职。


Only by bringing Shimon Peres’s Labor Party into his cabinet did Sharon manage to retain his parliamentary majority.	只有通过将西蒙·佩雷斯的工党拉入内阁才勉强保住了自己在议会的多数席位。


The question, of course, is what will happen after the Gaza disengagement.	当然，问题是在加沙撤离之后会发生什么。


Many governments were initially skeptical about disengagement, but realized that – as the Washington saying goes – “this is the only game in town.”	许多在一开始对这一撤离计划持怀疑态度的国家，现在意识到—正如在华盛顿人们所讲的行话—“这是这个地方唯一能玩的游戏。


Among them, as well as among the Palestinians, one hears the hope that after the Gaza withdrawal, it will be possible to return to the road map and to resume negotiations leading to a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.	”这些国家和许多巴勒斯坦人一样，都从加沙的撤离中看到了希望。 他们希望这有可能让形势重新回到路线图上，重开谈判，以便最终达成以色列和巴勒斯坦人之间的协议。


This is a major mistake.	这是一个重大错误。


While motivated by the best of intentions, the hope of reviving the road map is out of touch with reality.	虽然是处于良好的意愿，但重新激活路线图的希望是不现实的。


Future negotiations will have to deal with the ultimate borders between Israel and Palestine, the fate of 200,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank, the status of Jerusalem, and with the problem of the 1947-48 Palestinian refugees.	未来的谈判必须着手解决以色列和巴勒斯坦之间的最终边界，（约旦河）西岸20万犹太定居者的命运，耶路撒冷的地位及1947-48年间形成的巴勒斯坦难民问题。


On all of these issues, the gulf between the Israeli and Palestinian positions has not narrowed since the failed negotiations at Camp David in 2000, while fear and distrust have increased.	在所有这些问题上，以色列和巴勒斯坦立场之间的分歧自2000年戴维营谈判破裂以来并未缩小，而双方的恐惧和不信任却与日俱增。


To attempt negotiations under these circumstances would not only be an exercise in futility, but may merely deepen alienation and suspicion on both sides.	在这样的情况下试图谈判不仅会徒劳无功，还可能只会加深双方之间的疏远和猜疑。


The failure of the Annan Plan for Cyprus suggests that good intentions are not enough – and the disagreements in Cyprus were miniscule compared to what divides Israelis and Palestinians.	为塞浦路斯制定的《安南计划》的失败告诉我们仅有良好的意愿是不够的—而发生在塞浦路斯的争端与巴以之间的分歧比起来几乎就是微不足道。


So what can be done?	那么我们能做什么呢？


Probably the only rational way to proceed would be to acknowledge that unilateral steps on both sides can still further the cause of de-escalation and ultimate reconciliation.	或许唯一理性的做法就是承认双方的单边行动仍然可以推动局势的稳定和最终的和解。


On the Israeli side, further disengagement from dozens of isolated and small settlements on the West Bank, entailing the evacuation of between 20,000 and 30,000 settlers, may be politically feasible and would give the Palestinians a contiguous territory on the West Bank.	在以色列方面，进一步从西岸十数个孤立的小定居点撤退意味着将撤出2-3万定居者。 这在政治上是可行的，同时也会给巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸的比邻领土。


On the Palestinian side, consolidation of the Palestinian Authority’s control over a dozen security services and militias would be an important step.	在巴勒斯坦方面，加强巴勒斯坦当局对十数个安全和民兵组织的控制也会是一个重要步骤。


The Palestinian leader, Abu Mazen, recognizes this, but the question is whether he can deliver.	巴勒斯坦领导人，阿布·马赞认识到了这一点，但问题是他是否能做到。


The Palestinian leadership could also start down the difficult road of telling the refugees that – contrary to almost 50 years of Palestinian propaganda – they will not return to Israel, but will have to be settled in the West Bank and Gaza, the areas that will become part of the eventual Palestinian state.	巴勒斯坦的领导层还可以开始一项艰苦卓绝的工作—告诉难民们他们将不得不在约旦河西岸及加沙地带定居，而不是像50年来的宣传攻势中所讲的那样重返以色列。 这两个地方最终会成为巴勒斯坦国的一部分。


In an ideal world, conflicts end by agreements and treaties.	在理想状态下，冲突有协议和条约来解决。


But in the real world – and Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo may be examples – stabilization and the slow de-escalation of violence can sometimes achieve the same end, even without formal agreement.	但在现实世界里—塞浦路斯、波斯尼亚和科索沃便是例证—稳定局势和缓慢地平息暴力有时可能会达成同样的目的，即便是在没有正式协议的情况下。


In the absence of plausible alternatives, one hopes that this will also be the case for Israelis and Palestinians.	在没有更好的选择时，人们希望这样的情况同样适用于巴以之间。


The Unraveling of Europe’s Peace	欧洲和平的撕裂


COPENHAGEN – The European Commission recently unveiled long-awaited measures to bring neighboring countries in the Mediterranean and the former Soviet Union closer to Europe.	发自哥本哈根——欧洲委员会最近公布了一系列期待已久的措施，希望促进地中海沿岸以及前苏联地区各国进一步向欧洲靠拢。


On the same day, another department of the same Commission presented proposals aimed at curbing visa-waiver programs for some non-European nationals.	但就在同一天，委员会属下的另一个部门却公布了一项旨在限制某些非欧盟国家公民免签证入境的政策提案。


Few missed the irony of formulating two plans that pointed in opposite directions.	估计也很少有人注意两套自相矛盾的计划中所含有的讽刺意义。


Attracting neighbors has long been a noble aspiration – and something of a European specialty.	四邻归慕一直以来都是欧洲的远大理想——或者说某种特质。


The European Union’s embrace of post-communist republics in Central Europe represented a most powerful symbol of the reach of Western liberal democracy.	而欧盟对中欧那些前社会主义共和国的包容也算是西方自由民主不断延伸的最有力体现。


In today’s neighborhood, where EU expansion is not in the cards, Europe hopes to shore up its presence by opening its huge internal market and increasing assistance.	面对如今这些不太可能被纳入欧盟版图的邻国，欧洲也希望通过开放内部市场以及增加援助来提高自身影响力。


Crucially, the Commission’s recent proposals include the creation of “mobility partnerships” with Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, aimed at facilitating travel for local students and businesspeople.	最关键的是欧洲委员会新近的提案指出要与突尼斯、摩洛哥和埃及建立“灵活的伙伴关系”以促进各地留学生和商务人士的自由往来。


By contrast, the proposed restrictions on the visa-waiver program include “safeguard clauses” that would temporarily suspend access to Europe’s Schengen area, most likely for those from Balkan countries.	与此相反，包括“保护条款”在内的免签证政策限制则会在短期内阻止某些人——尤其是巴尔干半岛各国人民——进入申根地区。


This is controversial enough: the decision is motivated by a large influx of asylum-seekers, often offering frivolous reasons, originating from Serbia.	这一做法非常具有争议性：因为这一决策主要针对的是来自塞尔维亚的政治避难者，这些人数量极为庞大，但申请避难的理由却往往站不住脚。


But visa liberalization has been the main concrete signal of Europe’s goodwill towards this neglected backyard, which dreams of joining the EU.	免签证一直是欧盟对巴尔干这个惨遭忽视却渴望入伙的欧洲后院示好的 切实信号。


Whatever this plan’s impact in practice, the political message is clear: when in doubt, Europe is better off sealing its borders.	如今无论这个限制计划实际影响如何，其发出的政治信号也相当明确：一旦时局动荡，欧洲就会关上大门  。


The same Janus-faced approach is evident in Europe’s response to the Arab Spring.	欧洲这种两面三刀的嘴脸在对“阿拉伯之春”的反应上表露无遗。 一开始欧洲对起义漠然处之；


After a lukewarm reaction to the uprisings, Europe was eager to show its support for democratic movements in the region. At the same time, with boatloads of migrants arriving from Tunisia, some rather drastic measures have been adopted.	后来随着事态逐渐深入又开始积极表态支持阿拉伯地区的民主运动，同时却对从突尼斯乘船涌来的大量难民采取了相当严厉的限制措施。


A recent dispute between Italy (the main port of arrival) and France (the principal final destination) ended with the French reintroducing border controls.	最近意大利（难民主要登陆区）和法国（难民主要目的地）之间的冲突则导致法国重新执行边境管制。


In an unrelated move, Denmark did the same, ostensibly to prevent cross-border crime.	在另一个毫无关联的行动中丹麦也效仿法国的做法，号称是为防止跨境犯罪。


To its credit, the European Commission also issued strong calls to member states for better legislation and practices concerning migration.	值得赞扬的是，欧洲委员会也强烈呼吁各成员国针对移民问题制定更完善的法律措施。


But there is a clear correlation between unrest at the EU’s doorstep and Europe’s irresistible instinct to keep trouble at arm’s length.	而欧盟家门口的这场动乱与欧洲将麻烦拒之门外的本能是密切相关的。


For once, the rot is not in Brussels, but rather in a growing number of European capitals.	首先，问题的根子不在布鲁塞尔，而是欧洲各国。


The case of Italy is instructive: “human tsunami” is the unfortunate phrase used by senior policymakers to warn against the possible flood of migrants.	对此意大利就是个富有启发性的例子：意大利的高层政策制定者使用了“人肉海啸”这个不太友善的词来警告可能出现的难民大规模涌入。


But, almost six months into the North African upheavals, the number of arrivals on the southern island of Lampedusa has reached roughly 30,000.	结果在北非起义持续6个月后抵达意大利蓝佩杜萨岛的难民才只有约3万人。


By comparison, Sweden, with one-sixth the population of Italy, accepted the same number of asylum-seekers in 2009.	相比之下瑞典这个人口不到意大利1/6的小国在2009年就已经接收了同等数量的政治避难者。


Italian officials privately confirm that the current figures are not unmanageable.	意大利的官员私下还承认即便是这3万人都已经应付不来了。


The problem for Italian officials, as for the other governments concerned by the recent migration flows, is the pressure of right-wing populist parties, which no longer need to be on the defensive.	而意大利官员（以及其他各国）在面对近期移民潮时的所作所为主要源自于其国内右翼民粹主义政党所施加的压力——这些政党在政治上早已转受为攻了。


The case for openness, inclusion, and diversity in European societies has become much harder to make.	现在欧洲社会走向开放、包容和多元的阻力越来越大。


Not coincidentally, mainstream leaders, from German Chancellor Angela Merkel to British Prime Minister David Cameron, have caught up with the current mood by deeming European multiculturalism a failure.	而德国总理默克尔和英国首相卡梅隆等一众大国领导人都受到了当前这种情绪的影响，认定欧洲多元文化主义即将破产了。


This turn of events comes at a price.	这种急速转向是需要付出的代价。


The genius of modern Europe has consisted in linking long-term stability to the pursuit of ever-deeper economic and political integration.	现代欧洲的智者们一直强调本地区的长期稳定必须通过经济和政治的更深刻整合来实现。


For the past half-century, this has represented Europe’s revolutionary recipe for peace, and has served as something of a microcosm of globalization.	在过去半个世纪里这也成为了欧洲的革命性和平药方，同时还实现了某种小范围的全球化。


The ever-freer and faster flow of capital, labor, goods, and ideas found in the EU a model and a forerunner.	资本、劳动力、商品和理念的高速自由流动使欧洲成为了典范和先驱。


Free movement of people within Europe constitutes this visionary project’s most tangible feat.	而人员的自由流动则是整个欧洲壮举中最具体的一项成绩。


One unintended effect of the Arab revolutions is that the link between security and integration that forms Europe’s foundation is decoupling.	阿拉伯革命所导致的一个意外结果就是弱化了安全和整合之间那种奠定欧盟基础的重要联系。


The advantages of pooling sovereignty and resources ring increasingly hollow to ordinary Europeans.	整合国家主权和资源的好处日渐难以得到普通欧洲人的认同。


Governments find it more politically rewarding to pursue security by erecting administrative or physical barriers.	而各国政府则发现在边境上加强行政或实体管制在政治上更加有利可图。


As election campaigns beckon in some of the countries that are now debating immigration controls, this trend is unlikely to be reversed any time soon. But Europeans should make no mistake about the consequences.	鉴于正在激烈辩论移民管制政策的部分国家即将举行选举，这一趋势在短期内将不会有所改变。


Opposing Europe now means not only standing up to an unelected behemoth in Brussels, as Euro-skeptics would have it.	但欧洲人应该清楚意识到由此产生的后果。


Nor is it merely about questioning the sources of Europe’s influence in a fast-changing world. Unraveling the nexus between security and integration means nothing less than rejecting the formula of Europe’s peace.	如今的反欧洲行为可不仅限于对抗那个非选举产生的庞大欧盟总部机构（正如那些欧元怀疑论者所为），也不单是质疑欧盟在这个快速变化的世界上究竟从何获取影响力，还有一种就是这种撕裂安全与整合之间联系的行为，因为这等于跟欧洲的和平方略背道而驰。


Grand Mal Economics	癫痫经济学


BERKELEY – Across the North Atlantic region, central bankers and governments seem, for the most part, helpless in restoring full employment to their economies.	伯克利—在整个北大西洋地区，中央银行和政府看起来对于让经济重回充分就业束手无策。


Europe has slipped back into recession without ever really recovering from the financial/sovereign-debt crisis that began in 2008.	欧洲再次陷入了衰退，自2008年金融/主权债务危机以来，它从未真正复苏。 美国经济目前已每年1.


The United States’ economy is currently growing at 1.5% per year (about a full percentage point less than potential), and growth may slow, owing to a small fiscal contraction this year.	5%的速度增长（大约比潜在增长率低了整整一个百分点），且这一速度极有可能不保，因为今年的财政将略有收缩。


Industrial market economies have been suffering from periodic financial crises, followed by high unemployment, at least since the Panic of 1825 nearly caused the Bank of England to collapse.	工业化国家一直经历着周期性的金融危机，随后是高就业，这至少可以追溯到1825年几乎导致英格兰银行倒闭的大恐慌。


Such episodes are bad for everybody – workers who lose their jobs, entrepreneurs and equity holders who lose their profits, governments that lose their tax revenue, and bondholders who suffer the consequences of bankruptcy – and we have had nearly two centuries to figure out how to deal with them.	如此周期让所有人都受害——工人失业，企业家和股东损失利润，政府损失财政收入，债权人遭遇破产后果——对于如何解决这一问题，我们也已经有了至少两百年的经验。


So why have governments and central banks failed?	那么，为何政府和央行总是失败？


There are three reasons why the authorities might fail to restore full employment rapidly after a downturn.	当局为何无法在衰退后迅速重塑充分就业，原因有三。


For starters, unanchored inflation expectations and structural difficulties might mean that efforts to boost demand show up almost entirely in faster price growth and only minimally in higher employment.	首先，未锚定的通胀预期和结构性困难可能意味着提振需求的努力几乎全部转化为价格的更快增长，而对提高就业毫无用处。


That was the problem in the 1970’s, but it is not the problem now.	这就是20世纪70年代遇到过的问题，但这不是如今遇到的问题。


The second reason might be that even with anchored inflation expectations (and thus price stability), policymakers do not know how to keep them anchored while boosting the flow of spending in the economy.	第二个理由可能是，即使通胀预期被锚定（因此价格稳定），决策者也不知道如何在保持其锚定状态的同时提振经济的支出流。


And here I stop, flummoxed.	在这里我感到十分困惑，不得不停下。


At least as I read the history, by 1829, Western Europe’s technocratic economists had figured out why these periodic grand mal economic seizures occurred.	至少从我所阅读的历史看，到1829年，西欧理论经济学家已经指出了为何会发生周期性、癫痫式的经济痉挛。


That year, Jean-Baptiste Say published his Cours Complet d’Economie Politique Pratique, admitting that Thomas Malthus had been at least half right in arguing that an economy could suffer for years from a “general glut” of commodities, with nearly everybody trying to reduce spending below income – in today’s jargon, to deleverage.	1829年，萨伊（Jean-Baptiste Say）出版了《实用政治经济学全教程》（Cours Complet d’Economie Politique Pratique），承认马尔萨斯所指出的经济可能因商品的“一般过剩”遭受多年苦难，几乎所有人都要忙于将支出减到收入之下——用现在的行话说，就是去杠杆化——的论点至少有一半是正确的。


And, because one person’s spending is another’s income, universal deleveraging produces only depression and high unemployment.	而由于某甲的支出无非是某乙的收入，因此人人去杠杆只能导致萧条和高失业。


Over the following century, economists like John Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, Irving Fisher, Knut Wicksell, and John Maynard Keynes devised a list of steps to take in order to avoid or cure a depression.	在此后的一个世纪中，约翰·穆勒、沃尔特·白芝浩（Walter Bagehot）、欧文·费雪、（Irving Fisher）、克努特·维克塞尔（Knut Wickesll）和约翰·凯恩斯等经济学家给出了一系列避免或治疗萧条的步骤清单。


1.	1.


Don’t go there in the first place: avoid whatever it is – whether external pressure under the gold standard, asset-price bubbles, or leverage-and-panic cycles such as that of 2003-2009 – that creates the desire to deleverage.	首先要免于不如萧条：不管是什么萧条——不管是金本位下的外部压力、资产泡沫，还是类似2003—2009年的杠杆-恐慌循环——只要它会造成去杠杆化的渴望。


2.	2.


If you do find yourself there, stop the desire to deleverage by having the central bank buy bonds for cash, thereby pushing down interest rates, so that holding debt becomes more attractive than holding cash.	如果你发现已经步入了萧条，通过让央行以现金买入债券，从而压低利率来停止去杠杆化的渴望，让持有债券比持有现金更有利。


3.	3.


If you still find yourself there, stop the desire to deleverage by having the Treasury guarantee risky assets, or issue safe ones, in order to raise the quality of debt in the market; this, too, will make holding debt more attractive.	如果你发现你仍未走出萧条，通过让财政部担保风险资产或发行安全资产以提高市场上的债券的质量来停止去杠杆化，这样也能让持有债券更有利。


4.	4.


If that fails, stop the desire to deleverage by promising to print more money in the future, which would raise the rate of inflation and make holding cash less attractive than spending it.	如果这也失灵，通过承诺未来印钞——这将导致通胀率上升，让持有现金不如花掉它有利——来停止去杠杆化。


5.	5.


In the worst case, have the government step in, borrow money, and buy stuff, thereby rebalancing the economy as the private sector deleverages.	最糟糕的情形是，让政府介入其中，借钱花钱，从而在私人部门去杠杆化的同时平衡经济。


There are many subtleties in how governments and central banks should attempt to accomplish these steps.	关于政府和央行应该如何完成这些步骤，其中微妙之处颇多。


And, indeed, the North Atlantic region’s governments and central banks have tried to some degree.	而事实上，被大西洋地区的政府和央行也做了一定程度的努力。


But it is clear that they have not tried enough: the “stop” signal of unanchored inflation expectations, accelerating price growth, and spiking long-term interest rates – all of which tell us that we have reached the structural and expectational limits of expansionary policy – has not yet been flashed.	但显然，它们做得还不够：未锚定通胀预期的“停止”信号尚未闪现，通胀预期仍在推高价格、提高长期利率——所有这些告诉我们，我们已经到达了扩张性政策的结构和预期极限。


So we remain far short of full employment for the third reason.	因此，我们仍远未到达充分就业状态是拜第三个原因所赐。


The issue is not that governments and central banks cannot restore employment, or do not know how; it is that governments and central banks will not take expansionary policy steps on a large enough scale to restore full employment rapidly.	问题不在于政府和央行无法重塑就业，或不知道如何重塑就业； 而在于政府和央行不会采取规模足够大的扩张性政策步骤来迅速重塑充分就业。


And here I reflect on the 1930’s, and on how historical events recur, appearing first as tragedy and then, pace Karl Marx, as yet another tragedy.	在这里，我得回顾一下20世纪30年代，想想历史事件是如何循环的——先是一场悲剧，随后马克思主义横空出世，带来另一场悲剧。


Keynes begged the policymakers of his time to ignore the “austere and puritanical souls” who argue for “what they politely call a ‘prolonged liquidation’ to put us right,” and professed that he could “not understand how universal bankruptcy can do any good or bring us nearer to prosperity.”	凯恩斯乞求当时的决策者忽略“简朴的清教徒式信念”——这一信念支持“让被礼貌地称为‘延长清算’的东西使一切变得正常，”并承认他“无法理解大面积破产是一件好事，能让我们离繁荣更近”。


Today’s policymakers, so eager to draw a bold line under expansionary measures, should pause and consider the same question.	如今，决策者急不可待地想在扩张性措施之下划出一条清晰的界线。 他们应该停下来，好好想想同样的问题。


The Unreality of the “Real” Business Cycle	“现实”商业周期的不现实性


LONDON – Testifying recently before a United States congressional committee, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said that the recent financial meltdown had shattered his “intellectual structure.”	伦敦--前美国联邦储备委员会主席格林斯潘最近在国会作证时说，目前的金融危机打破了他的“智识结构”。


I am keen to understand what he meant.	我倒是想要知道他是什么意思。


Since I have had no opportunity to ask him, I have to rely on his memoirs, The Age of Turbulence , for clues.	由于我没法直接问他，因此我只好借助于他的自传<<动荡岁月>>，以图找到线索。


But that book was published in 2007 – before, presumably, his intellectual structure fell apart.	但是这本书出版于2007年，早于其智识结构崩溃。


In his memoirs, Greenspan revealed that his favorite economist was Joseph Schumpeter, inventor of the concept of “creative destruction.”	在其自转中，格林斯潘披露说他所欣赏的经济学家是熊彼得，即所谓“创新性破坏”这一概念的发明人。


In Greenspan’s summary of Schumpeter’s thinking, a “market economy will incessantly revitalize itself from within by scrapping old and failing businesses and then reallocating resources to newer, more productive ones.”	格林斯潘对熊彼得的思路总结道，“市场经济将会通过淘汰陈旧破产的企业并且把资源重新分配给更新更有效率企业而不断从内部重振自我”。


Greenspan had seen “this pattern of progress and obsolescence repeat over and over again.”	格林斯潘“目睹了这一进步和淘汰模式一次又一次地重复发生”。


Capitalism advanced the human condition, said Schumpeter, through a “perennial gale of creative destruction,” which he likened to a Darwinian process of natural selection to secure the “survival of the fittest.”	熊彼得说，资本主义通过“创新性破坏不停的飓风”推进了人类的状况。 他把这比喻成为达尔文主义式的物竞天择来确保“适者生存”。


As Greenspan tells it, the “rougher edges” of creative destruction were legislated away by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, but after the wave of de-regulation of the 1970’s, America recovered much of its entrepreneurial, risk-taking ethos.	格林斯潘说，罗斯福总统的新政通过立法形式把创新性破坏的“残酷无情的一面”软化了，但是在二十世纪七十年代破除监管的浪潮之后，美国创业和勇于冒险的民族精神大体上得到了恢复。


As Greenspan notes, it was the dot-com boom of the 1990’s that “finally gave broad currency to Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction.”	格林斯潘认为，正是二十世纪九十年代的互联网繁荣才“最终在大范围基础上验证了熊彼得的创新性破坏的理论”。


This was the same Greenspan who in 1996 warned of “irrational exuberance” and, then, as Fed chairman, did nothing to check it.	正是这一格林斯潘在1996年对“非理性繁荣”发出了警告。 而且，当时作为美联储主席，他却对此听之任之。


Both the phrase and his lack of action make sense in the light of his (now shattered) intellectual system.	他的言论以及无动于衷在其目前垮掉的智识系统背景下都是符合逻辑的。


It is impossible to imagine a continuous gale of creative destruction taking place except in a context of boom and bust.	除了在繁荣和破灭环境下，人们无法想像会发生连续不停的创新性破坏。


Indeed, early theorists of business cycles understood this.	确实，有关商业周期的早期理论也知道这一点。


(Schumpeter himself wrote a huge, largely unreadable book, with that title in 1939.)	(熊彼得本人也曾在1939年写过一部基本上让人无法读懂的巨著。 )


In classic business-cycle theory, a boom is initiated by a clutch of inventions – power looms and spinning jennies in the eighteenth century, railways in the nineteenth century, automobiles in the twentieth century.	经典的商业周期理论认为，经济繁荣往往是有一组发明引起的，例如，十八世纪的动力织布机和詹妮纺织机，十九世纪的铁路以及二十世纪的汽车。


But competitive pressures and the long gestation period of fixed-capital outlays multiply optimism, leading to more investment being undertaken than is actually profitable.	但是竞争性压力和长期固定资产开支孕育过度放大了人们的乐观，导致更多的投资，超过世纪营利所需。


Such over-investment produces an inevitable collapse.	这种过度投资产生不可避免的崩溃。


Banks magnify the boom by making credit too easily available, and they exacerbate the bust by withdrawing it too abruptly.	银行通过过度放松信贷而加大了繁荣规模，而且它们又通过过于唐突地抽回信贷而加重了泡沫破裂。


But the legacy is a more efficient stock of capital equipment.	但是遗留下来的东西是更为有效的固定设备存货。


Dennis Robertson, an early twentieth-century “real” business-cycle theorist, wrote: “I do not feel confident that a policy which, in the pursuit of stability of prices, output, and employment, had nipped in the bud the English railway boom of the forties, or the American railway boom of 1869-71, or the German electrical boom of the nineties, would have been on balance beneficial to the populations concerned.”	二十世纪早期的“现实”商业周期理论家罗伯森写道：“某一政策追求价格、产量以及就业的稳定而将四十年代的英国铁路泡沫、1869年到1871年之间的美国铁路泡沫或者九十年代德国的电气泡沫扼杀于萌芽之中，在总体上这一政策对相关人们有益。 我对于这一政策并不抱有信心”。


Like his contemporary, Schumpeter, Robertson regarded these boom-bust cycles, which involved both the creation of new capital and the destruction of old capital, as inseparable from progress.	正如他的同一时代人熊彼得一样，罗伯森认为这些包含建立新资本和消灭旧资本的泡沫和破灭周期是��进步不可分离的。


Contemporary “real” business-cycle theory builds a mountain of mathematics on top of these early models, the main effect being to minimize the “destructiveness” of the “creation.”	当代“现实”商业周期理论在这些早期模型上建立了大量的数学数据，其主要效用就是尽可能地降低所谓“创新”的破坏性。


It manages to combine technology-driven cycles of booms and recessions with markets that always clear (i.e., there is no unemployment).	它将由技术驱动的繁荣和衰退周期与总是明晰的市场结合起来(也就是说没有人失业) 。


How is this trick accomplished?	这一把戏是怎么做到的呢？


When a positive technological “shock” raises real wages, people will work more, causing output to surge.	如果积极的技术“冲击”提高了实际工资，人们就会更加卖力工作，导致产量激增。


In the face of a negative “shock,” workers will increase their leisure, causing output to fall.	在负面“冲击”的情况下，工人们就会加大他们的闲暇时间，导致产量下降。


These are efficient responses to changes in real wages.	对于实际工资的变化存在有效的对应手段。


No intervention by government is needed.	政府干预是没有必要的。


Bailing out inefficient automobile companies like General Motors only slows down the rate of progress.	拯救通用汽车这样没有效率的汽车公司只是减缓进步的步伐。


In fact, whereas most schools of economic thought maintain that one of government’s key responsibilities is to smooth the cycle, “real” business-cycle theory argues that reducing volatility reduces welfare!	实际上，大多数经济学派认为，政府的主要职责之一就是延缓周期，而“现实”商业周期理论认为减少动荡就是减少福利！


It is hard to see how this type of theory either explains today’s economic turbulence, or offers sound instruction about how to deal with it.	人们难以想见这一理论如何解释当今的经济动荡，或者提供有效的解决之道。


First, in contrast to the dot-com boom, it is difficult to identify the technological “shock” that set off the boom.	首先，与互联网泡沫不同的是，人们难以确定引发泡沫的技术“冲击”。


Of course, the upswing was marked by super-abundant credit.	当然，增长的标志就是大量过剩的信贷。


But this was not used to finance new inventions: it was the invention.	但是这并非用来为新的发明提供资金，而它本身就是发明。


It was called securitized mortgages.	这一发明叫做证券化房屋贷款。


It left no monuments to human invention, only piles of financial ruin.	它对人类发明并没有做出什么贡献，只是留下了一大堆金融烂摊子。


Second, this type of model strongly implies that governments should do nothing in the face of such “shocks.”	第二，这一模式有力表明政府在“冲击”面前应当什么也不做。


Indeed, “real” business-cycle economists typically argue that, but for Roosevelt’s misguided New Deal policies, recovery from the Great Depression of 1929-1933 would have been much faster than it was.	实际上，“现实”商业周期经济学家们通常认为，如果不是因为罗斯福新政失策，1929年到1932年之间经济大萧条的复苏本可以早点到来。


Equivalent advice today would be that governments the world over are doing all the wrong things in bailing out top-heavy banks, subsidizing inefficient businesses, and putting obstacles in the way of rational workers spending more time with their families or taking lower-paid jobs.	如今类似的建议就是，全世界各国政府拯救那些头重脚轻的银行，补贴没有效率的企业以及阻碍理性的工人们与家人多花一点时间或者接受较低收入的工作，这些都是错误之举。


It reminds me of the interviewer who went to see Robert Lucas, one of the high priests of the New Business Cycle school, at a time of high American unemployment in the 1980’s.	这让我想起了一个去找卢卡斯面试的人。 卢卡斯是二十世纪八十年代美国失业高峰时期的新失业周期学派领军人物之一，1995年诺贝尔奖得主。


“My driver is an unemployed Ph.D. graduate,” he said to Lucas.	他对卢卡斯说：“我的司机是个失业博士。


“Well, I’d say that if he is driving a taxi, he’s a taxi-driver,” replied the 1995 Nobel Laureate.	”卢卡斯说道：“如果这样，那么，要是他开出租，那么他就是出租司机了”。


Although Schumpeter brilliantly captured the inherent dynamism of entrepreneur-led capitalism, his modern “real” successors smothered his insights in their obsession with “equilibrium” and “instant adjustments.”	尽管熊彼得出色地抓住了企业家主导的资本主义的内在活力，但是他的现代“现实”继承者却在“均衡”和“快速调节”的痴迷中窒息了他的洞察。


For Schumpeter, there was something both noble and tragic about the spirit of capitalism.	对于熊彼得而言，资本主义精神中包含有高尚和悲剧性的东西。


But those sentiments are a world away from the pretty, polite techniques of his mathematical progeny.	但是，这些情感与其数学结果漂亮而又礼貌的技术失之千里。


The UN’s Mandate Gap	联合国的训令鸿沟


The United Nations peacekeeping operations now underway in Lebanon offer a big opportunity for the UN to demonstrate its relevance and impact on the world stage in the 21st century.	正在进行之中的联合国黎巴嫩维和行动为联合国在21世纪的世界舞台上展现自己的影响力提供了一个绝好的机会。


If only those member states who claim to be the UN’s biggest supporters put their money where their mouths are.	现在只要那些自称是联合国最大支持者的成员国们出钱出力，别光说不练就行了。


Many world leaders, particularly those in Europe, decry the Bush administration’s undermining of the UN, especially since 2003.	许多世界领导人，尤其是欧洲领导人，都谴责布什政府削弱了联合国的力量，特别是在2003年以来。


Yet leaders in France, who expressed outrage when the US sidestepped the UN and invaded Iraq without the international community’s blessing, stunned the world in August when they backed down from their promise to send 2,000 peacekeepers to intervene in southern Lebanon, and instead only committed 200.	然而，在美国绕开联合国并未经国际社会同意就入侵伊拉克时表示愤慨的法国领导人们，却在今年8月再次令世界惊愕。 他们没有信守向黎巴嫩南部派遣一支2000人的维和部队的承诺，而只派出了200人。


Fortunately, France has reconsidered, Germany will provide limited naval assistance, and Italy has stepped up to contribute 3,000 peacekeepers. In addition, China has recently pledged 1,000 troops.	所幸的是，法国正在重新考虑派遣维和部队，德国将会至少提供有限的海军支援，而意大利则主动出兵3000参与维和行动。


But Europe’s response, like the US response in other cases, highlights a critical issue for all supporters of the UN and international institutions more generally.	但欧洲的反应，就如同美国在其它事件上的反应一样，凸显了联合国和更广泛国际机构的支持者们所遭遇的一些关键性问题。


If we cannot do what it takes to make them more effective, we will increasingly find that nations will bypass them altogether.	如果我们不能让这些机构和组织更有效率，那么我们会越来越多地发现各国都会置它们于不顾了。


UN Security Council Resolution 1701 “calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire.”	《联合国安理会1701号决议》“呼吁以色列和黎巴嫩支持永久停火”，从而为联合国官员为和平部队制定“交战规则”提供了基础。


It thus set the stage for UN officials to establish the “Rules of Engagement” (ROEs) for its peacekeepers, which dictate when and under what circumstances UN troops can fire their weapons to defend themselves.	该规则规定联合国部队在什么样的情况下可以开火自卫。


But as the current UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) well knows, defending yourself is not the same as protecting yourself from hostile fire in the first place.	但正如当前正在黎巴嫩执行维和行动的部队(UNIFIL)所体会到的，自我防卫和保护自己在交火时不受敌方炮火的伤害并不是一回事。


In this context, the French are understandably worried about the fate of their soldiers – soldiers charged with supporting the Lebanese government in its efforts to establish control over the Hezbollah-controlled south.	在这种情况下，法国人对本国士兵命运的担忧也是情有可原—这些士兵的责任是支持黎巴嫩政府在真主党控制的南部建立控制权。


The terrible French peacekeeping experience in Bosnia in the early 1990s, in which France lost 84 soldiers serving in a humanitarian capacity under restrictive ROEs, justifies their fears.	1990年代法国在波斯尼亚惨痛的维和经历是他们这种担忧的来源。 在这次行动中法国失去了在限制性“交战规则”指导下执行人道主义使命的84名维和士兵。


But ROEs are only the symptom of a deeper problem.	但这些“交战规则”只是更深层次问题的表象。


The real issue is a yawning gap between paper and practice.	真正的问题是文件和行动之间的巨大鸿沟。


In the heat of an international crisis, the Security Council passes resolutions to great public fanfare, establishing an official UN “mandate.”	在国际危机白热化之际，安理会高调地通过决议，以建立一种正式的联合国“训令”。


But then the UN Secretary General is left, resolution in hand, to ask UN member states for the actual, tangible resources necessary to implement what has been commanded.	可接下来，就剩下手持训令的联合国秘书长要求各成员国提供实现训令要求所必需的实际而有形的资源了。


In the overwhelming majority of cases, those resources fall far short of what is required to successfully intervene in a crisis.	在绝大多数情况下，可得的资源都与成功干预危机所需要的差距甚远。


A 2006 UN mandate review finds that UN member states adopt hundreds of mandates each year, conferring “additional responsibilities with neither corresponding funds nor guidance” on how resources should be used.	一份联合国2006年的训令评估表明其成员国每年接受数百份训令，但这些训令赋予成员国在资源的使用上“没有相应资金和指导的额外责任”。


In American domestic politics, these kinds of commands from the US Congress to states are known as “unfunded mandates;” ordering results without providing the resources necessary to achieve them.	在美国国内政治生活中，这种由国会下达到政府的训令被称作“没有经费的训令”，只下令达到某些结果，但却不提供配套的资源。


It’s political theater - big headlines, small results.	这是政治做秀—雷声大，雨点小。


The UN’s experience in Lebanon is not encouraging.	联合国在黎巴嫩的经验并不令人鼓舞。


According to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, up to now UNIFIL has operated on an annual budget of $94 million and suffers chronic budget shortfalls due to unpaid assessments from member states.	据联合国维和行动部的资料，UNIFIL的年预算是9400万美金并由于成员国拖欠付款而经受着长期的资金短缺。


Now consider what an expanded UNIFIL is mandated to do under Resolution 1701: peacekeepers must monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah; support and accompany the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy in southern Lebanon; assist Lebanon’s government in securing the country’s borders and ports to keep illegal weapons from getting into Hezbollah’s hands; and “help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.”	现在再来看看扩大后的UNIFIL在《1701号决议》下的具体职责：维和士兵们必须监控以色列和真主党之间的停火情况； 支持和护卫黎巴嫩政府武装在黎南部的部署；


This is a Herculean task.	协助黎巴嫩政府守卫边界和港口，以确保非法武器不会流入真主党手中；


But over a month after the resolution, barely 5,000 troops are deployed.	还要“帮助确保对平民的人道主义援助到位和流离失所的人自愿 、平安地重返家园。 ”这是一项非同寻常的重大任务，但在决议通过后的一个月里，维和行动部署的士兵还不到5000人。


Even if all 15,000 UN troops could be found and deployed, the challenges in Lebanon will remain daunting.	即便是15000名联合国维和士兵可以全部到位，黎巴嫩所代表的挑战依然是令人生畏的。 联合国坚持《1701号决议》不是要强制解除真主党武装；


The UN insists that Resolution 1701 does	除了以色列几乎没有一个国家愿意让自己的士兵去承担这样的任务。 所以这项工作就落到了黎巴嫩政府和武装部队的身上。


That is only the military aspect of the peacekeeping effort.	而这只是维和行动的军事方面。


Lebanon’s infrastructure – especially in the south – has been decimated.	黎巴嫩的基础设施—特别是在南部—已经毁坏殆尽。


Homes and livelihoods have been destroyed.	家园和生活设施都不复存在。


Who will build or re-build hospitals?	谁来修建或重建医院呢？


How will communications infrastructure be rebuilt?	���样重建通信基础设施？


Who will repair Lebanon’s bridges and roads?	谁来修复黎巴嫩的桥梁和道路？


The mandate gap reflects the way the world has done business with the UN for decades – big promises, small pay-outs, much scapegoating if the UN then fails.	训令鸿沟反映了多年以来世界和联合国打交道的方式—夸大的承诺、吝啬的钱包，一有闪失就让联合国当替罪羊。


But today the international community has a tremendous window of opportunity to secure a small but significant peace in the Middle East along the volatile border of Lebanon and Israel.	但今天国际社会面临一个在冲突不断的中东地区黎以边界实现小范围但却意义重大的和平的绝好机会。


How member states respond now – especially those who believe in the purpose and value of the UN - may help shape the outcomes of other, wider ongoing regional conflicts, notably with Iran and Syria, both of which support Hezbollah.	联合国的各成员国现在如何应对—特别是那些相信联合国的使命和价值的国家—可以在解决其它更为广泛的现时地区冲突中助一臂之力，特别是在都支持真主党的伊朗和叙利亚的事务方面。


The UN provides the mechanism for a global response, but as Kofi Annan often repeats, it does not exist apart from its member states.	联合国提供了一种全球反应机制。 但正如安南常常重申的那样，这一机制不能脱离其成员国而存在。


It is up to those members – to all of our governments - to provide both the necessary will and the required resources.	关键是各成员国—我们所有的国家政府—能提供必要的意愿和必须的资源。


Otherwise the UN is nothing more than a handy mechanism for outsourcing political blame.	否则，联合国就无外乎是一个任人御用的出气桶。


Our commitment to bring peace to the Middle East, or Darfur, or Congo, or Kosovo, or Haiti, is not measured by our words but by our wallets.	我们在中东或达佛、刚果、科索沃或海地重建和平的承诺，并不是由我们的豪言壮语来衡量，而是由我们的钱包来衡量的。


The world gets what it pays for.	这个世界就是要花钱办事。


The UN Takes Charge	让联合国来发号施令


NEW YORK – While discussions about economic “green shoots” continue unabated in the United States, in many countries, and especially in the developing world, matters are getting worse.	发自纽约——当经济是否正迸发“新芽”的讨论在美国国内不绝于耳之时，在许多国家，特别是那些发展中国家的形势却在不断恶化。


The downturn in the US began with a failure in the financial system, which quickly was translated into a slowdown in the real economy.	对于美国来说，经济低迷首先起源于金融系统的失误，并在随后转化为实体经济的萎缩。


But, in the developing world, it is just the opposite: a decline in exports, reduced remittances, lower foreign direct investment, and precipitous falls in capital flows have led to economic weakening.	但发展中国家的遭遇则截然不同：出口萎缩，境外汇款减少，外国直接投资额下降以及资本流动的锐减才是令经济疲软的原因。


As a result, even countries with good regulatory systems are now confronting problems in their financial sectors.	问题之严重，以至于那些原本拥有良好金融管制系统的国家都逐渐在金融领域遇到麻烦了。


On June 23, a United Nations conference focusing on the global economic crisis and its impact on developing countries reached a consensus both about the causes of the downturn and why it was affecting developing countries so badly.	然而就在6月23日，一个着眼于全球金融危机及其对发展中国家影响的联合国会议，却成功地就经济低迷的成因，以及对发展中国家影响为何如此剧烈这两个问题达成了共识。


It outlined some of the measures that should be considered and established a working group to explore the way forward, possibly under the guidance of a newly established expert group.	同时会议还列出了一系列需要考虑的问题，并成立了专责小组，希望能在一个新成立的专家小组的指引下就这些问题探索相关解决方案。


The agreement was remarkable: in providing what in many ways was a clearer articulation of the crisis and what needs to be done than that offered by the G-20, the UN showed that decision-making needn’t be restricted to a self-selected club, lacking political legitimacy, and largely dominated by those who had considerable responsibility for the crisis in the first place.	上述共识显然意义重大：因为它在许多方面上都更清晰地解释了这场危机并提出了应对之道，而且比G20集团所提出的解释和应对方案更为优胜，而通过这个举措，联合国也证明了应对经济危机的决策决不应该被一个G20集团这么一个孤芳自赏，缺乏政治合法性而其许多成员都是危机始作俑者的组织所垄断。


Indeed, the agreement showed the value of a more inclusive approach – for example, by asking key questions that might be too politically sensitive for some of the larger countries to raise, or by pointing out concerns that resonate with the poorest, even if they are less important for the richest.	事实上，通过提出某些对于大国而言太过具有政治敏感性而难以启齿的问题，或者通过列出一些对富国意义不大，却能在穷国中产生共鸣的关注点，这个共识展示了一个更具包容性的解决之道。


One might have thought that the United States would have taken a leadership role, since the crisis was made there.	有人可能会认为，做为经济危机的始作俑者，美国将会在应对危机问题上承担领导者的角色。


Indeed, the US Treasury (including some officials who are currently members of President Barack Obama’s economic team) pushed capital- and financial-market liberalization, which resulted in the rapid contagion of America’s problems around the world.	因为正是美国财政部（甚至包括一些正在奥巴马经济团队中任职的官员）推动了资本市场和金融市场的自由化，导致美国的问题迅速蔓延到了全世界。


While there was less American leadership than one would have hoped, indeed expected under the circumstances, many participants were simply relieved that America did not put up obstacles to reaching a global consensus, as would have been the case if George W. Bush were still president.	但恰恰当美国的领导角色并没有想象中那么重要时，许多与会成员反而会感到宽慰，因为美国将不会像小布什总统在任时那般对全球共识的达成设置诸多障碍。


One might have hoped that America would be the first to offer large amounts of money to help the many innocent victims of the policies it had championed. But it did not, and Obama had to fight hard to extract even limited amounts for the International Monetary Fund from a reluctant Congress.	有人也希望美国能带头拿出一大笔钱来接济那些因其政策而遭难的受害者，但美国却没有这样做，甚至连总统奥巴马都要在国会作了大量工作之后才能从世界货币基金组织(IMF)有限的资金中抽一点出来使用。


But many developing countries have just emerged from being overburdened with debt; they do not want to go through that again.	但许多发展中国家正是在摆脱了过往的庞大债务中之后才得以崛起的，因此大家都不想再走上负债的。


The implication is that they need grants, not loans.	这意味着他们需要的并不是IMF的贷款，而是援助金。


The G-20, which turned to the IMF to provide most of the money that the developing countries need to cope with the crisis, did not take sufficient note of this; the UN conference did.	但依靠IMF来为发展中国家提供绝大多数纾困资金的G20却并没有注意这一点，联合国会议却注意到了。


The most sensitive issue touched upon by the UN conference – too sensitive to be discussed at the G-20 – was reform of the global reserve system.	而联合国会所涉及的最敏感话题——太过敏感以致G20都不去讨论——则是全球货币储备系统的革新。


The build-up of reserves contributes to global imbalances and insufficient global aggregate demand, as countries put aside hundreds of billions of dollars as a precaution against global volatility.	外汇储备的不断增加主要源自于全球经济不平衡以及全球积累总需求的不足，这导致许多国家必须储备数千亿资金来应对全球经济的波动。


Not surprisingly, America, which benefits by getting trillions of dollars of loans from developing countries – now at almost no interest – was not enthusiastic about the discussion.	毫无疑问，从发展中国家所借出的数���亿美元中直接受益——且利息近乎零——的美国当然对改革的讨论毫不热心。


But, whether the US likes it or not, the dollar reserve system is fraying; the question is only whether we move from the current system to an alternative in a haphazard way, or in a more careful and structured way.	但不管美国方面是否乐意，美元的外汇储备系统正在走向瓦解； 问题只是在于我们是选择在下一场危机到来之时仓促地转向下一个替代系统，还是采取一个更小心而具有结构性的步骤。


Those with large amounts of reserves know that holding dollars is a bad deal: no or low return and a high risk of inflation or currency depreciation, either of which would diminish their holdings’ real value.	其实那些手握大量外汇储备的国家知道持有美元不是一笔好买卖：不但没有或只有极低回报，甚至还面临着通胀和货币贬值的巨大危险，这其中任何一项都将蒸发这些国家手中储备的实际价值。


On the last day of the conference, as America was expressing its reservations about even discussing at the UN this issue which affects all countries’ well being, China was once again reiterating that the time had come to begin working on a global reserve currency.	在此次会议的最后一天，即便美国对在联合国讨论这个事关所有国家福祉的问题都持保留态度，中国依然再次重申是时候要共同合作创立全球储备货币。


Since a country’s currency can be a reserve currency only if others are willing to accept it as such, time may be running out for the dollar.	当其他国家不再被迫将一个国家的货币作为自己的储备时，美元的好日子就快到头了。


Emblematic of the difference between the UN and the G-20 conferences was the discussion of bank secrecy: whereas the G-20 focused on tax evasion, the UN Conference addressed corruption, too, which some experts contend gives rise to outflows from some of the poorest countries that are greater than the foreign assistance they receive.	而联合国和G20会议的议题中显示出最大不同的就是关于银行保密问题的讨论：当G20集团只是专注于解决逃税问题时，联合国会议同时还着眼于腐败现象，因为许多专家都指出，某些穷国每年流出的资金量甚至比它们所接受的援助还要大。


The US and other advanced industrial countries pushed globalization.	美国和其他发达工业国推动了全球化。


But this crisis has shown that they have not managed globalization as well as they should have.	但这场危机显示它们在管理全球化时并没有尽到自己应尽的义务。


If globalization is to work for everyone, decisions about how to manage it must be made in a democratic and inclusive manner – with the participation of both the perpetrators and the victims of the mistakes.	如果要让全球化服务于每一个人的话，那么如何管理的决策就该通过一个更加民主且更具包容性的方式来作出——这意味着作恶者和受害者双方都要参与其中。


The UN, notwithstanding all of its flaws, is the one inclusive international institution.	而即便还有许多不足之处，但联合国依然足够资格成为那个具有包容性的国际机构。


This UN conference, like an earlier one on financing for developing countries, demonstrated the key role that the UN must play in any global discussion about reforming the global financial and economic system.	而这场联合国会议，正如上一场为发展中国家融资的会议一样，展示了联合国必须在所有有关全球经济和金融改革的讨论中，尽力发挥自己的关键作用。


The UN to the Rescue on Climate Change	让联合国来拯救气候变化


PARIS – The United Nations’ General Assembly is the world’s only body in which all countries vote, with majority rule prevailing.	发自巴黎 —— 如果要在全世界范围内找一个既能赋予所有国家以投票权，又奉行少数服从多数原则的议事机构，那就非联合国大会莫属了。


There is no unanimity requirement or veto in the General Assembly, which might well be why it has not been called upon in the effort to fight climate change.	该大会的决议方式并不遵照全体同意原则，也没有设立任何否决权，而这也恰恰是它为什么没被用来对抗气候变化的原因。


Yet the General Assembly is the only place where obstruction by major countries – for example, by China and the United States at December’s global climate talks in Copenhagen – can be bypassed.	因为大会可以忽略那些大国所设立的障碍 —— 比如中国和美国在去年 12 月哥本哈根全球气候峰会上的所作所为。


Of course, the UN has played a leading role on climate change before now.	毫无疑问，联合国从前一直都在气候变化问题上扮演着领导角色。


A “Conference of Parties” (COP) has met almost every year since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.	自从 1992 年在里约热内卢签订了《联合国气候变化框架协议》 (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) 以来，几乎每年都会召开一个“团体会议” (Conference of Parties, COP) 。