John J. Armstrong, now the assistant director of operations for US prisons in Iraq, resigned from his previous post when he was named in two wrongful death lawsuits at one of those prisons.	现任美国在伊监狱助理主管的约翰•J•阿姆斯特朗从上一职位退休时与所在监狱发生的两桩非正常死亡诉讼有牵连。


Sergeant Ivan Frederick, the man directly in charge of the infamous Abu Ghraib "hard site," previously worked as a Virginia corrections officer.	直接负责臭名昭著的阿布革勒布"囚场"的伊万•弗雷德里克军士曾任弗吉尼亚的劳教官。


In Pennsylvania, a 1998 inquiry into a supermax prison notorious for racist guards revealed videotapes of routine beatings and elaborate rituals of humiliation.	在宾夕法尼亚州，一项于１９９８年进行的对一所以种族主义狱警而臭名昭著的监狱的调查出示了记录对犯人经常性的殴打和例行羞辱的录像带。


Specialist Charles A. Graner, identified as a ringleader in the Abu Ghraib depravity, has worked at that prison since 1996.	被确认的阿布革勒布暴行的头目之一，监狱专家查尔斯•A•格拉纳从１９９６年起就在这所监狱工作。


Some of the worst abuses have surfaced in Texas, America's death penalty capital and home to more prisoners than Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands combined.	一些最为严重的虐待行为在德克萨斯被曝光。 这里是美国的死刑之都，关押的犯人总数超过了德国、法国、比利时和荷兰犯人总和。


When George W. Bush was governor, a federal judge ruled that the state's entire penal system was pervaded by a "culture of sadistic and malicious violence."	在布什任州长期间，一位联邦法官就裁定该州的整个刑事体系充斥着"施虐文化和恶意的暴力"。


Texas prison guards regularly rely on excessive force, the judge concluded, officials ignore sexual enslavement, and the state's isolation units function as "virtual incubators of psychoses."	该法官总结说德克萨斯的狱警经常依赖于过渡的暴力，官员对性奴役置若罔闻，且该州的隔离单位功能（isolation units function）成为"心理变态的有效孵化器"。


Despite this appalling record, the US occupation authorities in Iraq appointed a former director of the Texas prison system, Lane McCotter, to help set up operations at Abu Ghraib in May 2003.	尽管有着如此骇人听闻的纪录，美国驻伊拉克的军事占领当局还是在２００３年５月指派德克萨斯监狱系统的前主管雷恩•麦考特协助建立阿布革勒布监狱的运作。


Two months earlier, McCotter's private prison company was cited by the US Justice Department for lax supervision and mistreatment of inmates at a New Mexico jail.	就在两个月以前，麦考特的私人监狱公司还因为对一所新墨西哥的监狱疏于监管和虐待囚犯被美国司法部点名。


Before that, McCotter led Utah's corrections department, but was forced to resign after the death of a schizophrenic inmate who had been stripped naked and strapped to a restraining chair for 16 hours.	在此之前，麦考特任犹他州改造部的主管，但却由于一个患精神分裂症的犯人的死亡而被迫辞职。 该犯人被剥光衣服绑在刑讯椅上长达１６小时。


Of course, malicious imprisonment is by no means uniquely American.	当然，监狱暴行并不仅仅是美国的专利。


Even in Western Europe, which boasts the most rehabilitation-oriented penal systems, ghastly scandals periodically erupt.	即便是在最以改造为导向的刑事体系著称的西欧，也定期报出惊人的丑闻。


In 2000, the chief physician at Paris's crumbling La Santé penitentiary, Veronique Vasseur, wrote a scathing exposé of "virtually medieval" conditions, complete with rat infestations, rotten food, extreme temperature variations, desperate self-mutilations, bullying, drug-dealing guards, and widespread sexual assault, often perpetrated by staff.	在２０００年，巴黎摇摇欲坠的拉桑德劳教所的首席医生维罗尼克•瓦索措词严厉地披露了该机构"真实中世纪"的状况：鼠类横行、变质食物、极端温差、绝望的自残行为、恃强凌弱、狱警贩毒和常由职员实施的广泛的性侵犯。


According to a 2003 report, conditions have worsened since Dr. Vasseur's report, and France's overcrowded prisons are on a "descent to hell."	一份２００３年的报告显示，自瓦索医生的报告公布以来，情况进一步恶化了。 法国人满为患的监狱正"陷入地狱"。


Particularly troubling is France's protracted incarceration of pre-trial suspects.	而法国对候审嫌犯的延期拘押是最大的问题。


In a country that regards itself as a civilized counterweight to belligerent American hegemony, nearly half of all prisoners have never been convicted of a crime.	在这样一个将自己视为美国暴力霸权的文明对照的国家，近一半的在押人员居然从未被定罪。


Why do prisons the world over concentrate such suffering and misconduct?	为什么全世界的监狱都集中着这样的苦难和劣行呢？


Partly by design.	部分原因是其设计使然。


Prisons herd together angry, unruly people against their will.	监狱将愤怒而难于管束的人集中在一起。


While the best facilities provide programs to help prisoners reintegrate into society, prisons also subject inmates to strict, often arbitrary discipline and depersonalizing rituals like numbering and strip searches - practices that foster more rage than reformation.	尽管它们通过最好的设施实行帮助犯人重新融入社会的计划，但监狱同时也将犯人置于严格甚至时常是武断的纪律约束和剥夺自我意识的惯例（如编号和裸体搜查－这些形式往往滋生更多的愤懑而不是革新）之下。


On the other side of the bars, low-paid, often poorly trained corrections officers exercise near-absolute authority over an irascible population.	在铁栏的另一边，报酬低廉、训练无素的改造官对一群暴躁的人行使着近乎绝对的权威。


In time, even the most well meaning come to regard their wards with cold detachment, if not dehumanizing contempt.	如此一来，甚至是最具素质的监管人员对囚犯的态度即便不是毫无人性的蔑视也会变成冷眼旁观。


Not all prisons succumb to these corrosive and polarizing dynamics.	并非所有的监狱都受到这些腐败和极端的因素影响。


But penologists recognize that certain factors - including overcrowding, insufficient guard training, detached management, shoddy infrastructure, racial tensions, and lack of public accountability - make disaster almost inevitable.	但刑罚学者们认为某些因素－包括人满为患，狱警训练不足，管理疏离，糟糕的基础设施，种族压力和缺乏公众责任－使得灾难的发生几乎不可避免。


Many of these conditions pervade prisons worldwide.	许多上述的情况在世界各地的监狱中都广泛存在。


All of them were present in Iraq - in addition to the strains of combat and officially approved interrogation techniques that senior US officials now admit violated the Geneva Conventions.	它们在伊拉克得到了完全地体现－再加上战斗的紧张局面和官方批准的审讯技术（美国高级官员现在承认这些技术是违反《日内瓦公约》的）。


Rather than heeding warnings from the Red Cross and others, however, Pentagon officials let dangerous prison dynamics spin out of control.	而五角大楼的官员们并没有理会国际红十字会的警告，还任由危险的监狱因素发展直至失控。


A flurry of investigations will now try to figure out what went disastrously awry at Abu Ghraib.	通过一阵慌乱的调查，美国现在试图找出阿布革勒布虐囚惨剧背后的原因。


But ensuring that "justice is done," as US Secretary of State Colin Powell promised, means that judgment must not stop at the low-ranking soldiers who were foolish enough to pose for demented snapshots.	但要确保如国务卿柯林•鲍威尔所承诺的那样让"正义得到伸张"，就意味着对事实的判断不能只停留在那些愚蠢的、任人拍照的低军衔的士兵身上。


More importantly, the abuses in Iraq demand careful scrutiny of detention practices not only there, but in our own communities as well.	更为重要的是，发生在伊拉克的虐囚行为需要我们不仅对当地，还要对本国的拘押惯例进行仔细的审查。


The Bankers’ Capital War	银行的资本之战


PARIS – Almost everyone nowadays agrees that banks need more capital.	巴黎——如今，几乎所有人都同意银行需要更多的资本。


Christine Lagarde chose to make it her first campaign as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.	克里斯汀·拉加德选择将这一点作为IMF总裁新官上任的第一把火。


And conventional analyses of the financial crisis focus on the weak capital base of many banks, which left them with insufficient reserves to absorb the losses they incurred when asset prices fell sharply in 2007-2008.	传统金融危机分析将也注意力放在众多银行孱弱的资本金上，资本金过少让它们在2007—2008年资产价格暴跌时缺乏足够的储备来吸收所发生的损失。


Taxpayers, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom, were obliged to step in to fill that hole.	纳税人，特别是美国和英国的纳税人，被迫站出来填补这一漏洞。


The same disaster movie is now playing in the eurozone.	如今，同样的灾难在欧元区上演了。


We can only hope that the bankers are eventually rescued from the burning eurotower by Super-Sarkozy and Wonder-Frau Merkel – and that the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors ensures that there will be no sequel.	唯一的希望是银行家最终被萨科齐大帝和默克尔天后救活，同时巴塞尔银行监督委员会站出来确保下不为例。


The Basel Committee has proposed strengthening considerably both the quantity and the quality of capital in the global banking system.	巴塞尔委员会打算大举强化全球银行体系的资本数量和质量。


This would mean much larger core equity capital for all banks and a range of additional reserves – a capital conservation buffer, a countercyclical buffer, and a surcharge for systemically vital institutions – to be added by local regulators as they see fit.	这将意味着所有银行都必须持有比现在多得多的核心权益，并按当地监管当局要求持有各种附加储备——包括留存资本缓冲、反周期缓冲以及具有系统重要性的机构的额外缓冲。


Unfortunately, the final implementation date for these new obligations has been deferred until 2019 – by which point a few banks might still be left standing.	不幸的是，这些新规则的最终实施日期已经排到了2019年，而且即使到那时，仍会有一部分银行逃脱束缚。


In fact, the view that banks need more capital, while widespread, is not unanimous.	事实上，银行需要更多资本这一广为流传的观点并非无可非议。


Two notable holdouts are Jamie Dimon and Walter Bagehot.	杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）和沃尔特·白芝浩（Walter Bagehot）就是反对派阵营中的两大巨头。


Dimon, the Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan, has been making his contrarian views known to regulators, most recently almost coming to blows, according to eyewitnesses, in a spat with Governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Carney, who chairs a group that is designing parts of the new regime.	JP摩根主席戴蒙一直公开对监管者的方案表达异议，据目击者称，在最近一次与加拿大银行行长马克·坎尼（Mark Carney，他担任新机制中某个部分的设计小组组长）的口水战中几乎大打出手。


Walter Bagehot is in no position to threaten Carney, or any other regulator.	沃尔特·白芝浩则不会威胁坎尼或其他监管者的立场。


He died in 1877.	他1877年就去世了。


But in his great work on finance, Lombard Street, published in 1873, he asserted that, “A well-run bank needs no capital.	但在他的金融学名著、1873年出版的《伦巴第街》（Lombard Street）中，他写道：“运转良好的银行不需要资本。


No amount of capital will rescue a badly run bank.”	再多资本也救不了运转不良的银行。


I expect that Dimon, who has steered Morgan through the crisis without the need for public support, would say “amen.”	”我估计戴蒙——作为JP摩根的舵手，他成功引导该银行在不需要公共支持的情况下度过了危机——会说“的确如此。 ”


Of course, regulators cannot easily require all banks to be “well-run” in Bagehot’s sense.	当然，监管者无法要求所有银行都达到白芝浩的“运转良好”标准。


So banks require capital as a backstop.	因此银行就需要用资本来当后盾。


It is not a bad substitute for perfect judgment, and at least it can be defined and measured.	这是对完美判断的一种不坏的替代，而且至少可以被定义和测量。


But how much capital is enough?	但多少资本才算足够？


Even if, at heart, they take the Bagehot view, all bankers recognize that market confidence requires them to demonstrate a more solid capital base to attract wholesale funding, as well as to satisfy the stricter demands of regulators.	从根本上说，即使他们和白芝浩观点一致，也没有银行家不认为市场信心要求他们拿出更坚实的资本基础来吸引批发融资和满足监管者更严厉的要求。


But a wide gap has opened up between the financial authorities and the banks on the costs and benefits of the much higher requirements now demanded by Basel.	但金融当局与银行在关于巴塞尔所要求的大举提高资本要求的利弊方面出现了重大分歧。


Basel 3, the Basel Committee’s new global regulatory standard on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity, will more or less double the equity requirements, and will impose extra costs on banks deemed “too big to fail.”	巴塞尔3，即巴塞尔委员会的新版全球银行资本充足度和流动性监管标准，将把权益要求提高大约两倍，此外对被认为“太大而不能倒”的银行还要施加额外成本。


The Committee’s analysis of the economic consequences found that the impact on growth would be modest, perhaps reducing GDP by 0.33% after five years – easily within the margin of forecast error.	巴塞尔委员会的经济后果分析表明，资本要求提高所带来的增长影响有限，大约会导致5年后的GDP下降0. 33%，完全处在预测误差范围内。


The OECD took a different view, putting the growth impact at about twice that level, and rather higher in Europe, where companies rely far more on bank financing than they do in the US.	经合组织的观点有所不同，认为经济增长所受到的影响将是巴塞尔委员会估计程度的两倍，而欧洲所受影响更大，因为欧洲公司对银行融资的依赖性远大于美国。


In sharp contrast, the Institute of International Finance, the leading trade association for the world’s top banks, believes that the impact of higher capital requirements could be far stronger.	这与国际金融研究所（Institute of International Finance，IIF，全球顶级银行主要交易联盟）的结果大相径庭。


The IIF believes that GDP could be fully 5% lower after five years, with unemployment more than 7% higher.	IIF认为，提高资本要求会造成严重后果。 5年后GDP会因此下降整整5%，失业率将提高7%。


The IIF’s forecast may seem alarmist, but the competing estimates are based on some intriguing analytical differences.	IIF的预测似乎有些危言耸听，但这些互相矛盾的估算间存在相当有趣的分析差异。


Regulators take the view that the impact of higher capital requirements on the cost of credit to borrowers will be modest, as the overall cost of funds to banks will not rise much.	监管者认为，更高资本要求对借款人信贷成本的影响是有限的，因为对银行来说，资金总成本并没有提高多少。


They rest their case on the famous Modigliani-Miller theorem, which implies that a company cannot alter its capital cost by changing the balance between equity and debt on its balance sheet.	他们的估算基于著名的莫迪里阿尼-米勒（Modigliani-Miller）定理，即改变资产负债表上的权益和债务结构并不会改变公司的资本成本。


If there is more equity, then logically debt should be cheaper, as the company (or bank) is better insulated from default.	如果权益更多，那么债务成本自然就会下降，因为公司（或银行）的违约可能下降了。


Bankers accept that, in the long run, the theorem might hold, but argue that it will take time, especially given recent events, to persuade investors that banks are genuinely safer, and that their shares should be thought of as closer to utility stocks, yielding a lower return.	银行家认为，从长期看，莫迪里阿尼-米勒定理也许是对的，但也指出，要说服投资者银行实际上很安全，银行股应该被视为类似于公用事业股，应该具有较低的回报，这需要很长一段时间，特别是在现今事故频发的当口。


Indeed, Franco Modigliani also argued that investors have a “preferred habitat,” and that coaxing them out of it carries some cost.	事实上，弗朗哥·莫迪里阿尼也指出，投资者存在“偏好停留”，要将他们赶出偏好停留地得付出点血本才行。


That does not bode well for banks, which have been a very poor investment in the last few years.	对过去几年来投资表现甚差的银行来说，这可不是好消息。


Moreover, the banks assume that they will need to hold more capital than regulators ostensibly require in order to maintain a margin of safety.	此外，银行认为它们需要握有比监管者字面要求更多的资本，这样才能维持安全边际。


These assessments are unusually divergent.	各路观点的差异程度有些反常。


Though economists are notoriously disputatious, their estimates do not often differ by a factor of ten.	尽管经济学家向来以意见不一闻名，但他们的估计一般不会出现数量级级别的差异。


It would be wise, before the rules are set in stone, to refer the issue to the World Institute for the Resolution of Economic Disputes in Baltimore, or “The Wire.”	明智之举是在规则尘埃落定之前把这一问题交给巴尔的摩世界经济争论解决方案研究所（World Institute for the Resolution of Economic Disputes in Baltimore）。


Unfortunately, there is no such institute, in Baltimore or anywhere else.	不幸的是，巴尔的摩也好，其他地方也好，都不存在这样的研究所。


There is no one who can offer a timely and, above all, authoritative view on which forecast is the more compelling scenario.	没有人能够提供及时和（最重要的）权威的观点，让我们做出更有说服力的预测。


The stakes of not knowing are very high.	两眼一抹黑的代价是沉重的。


The Banking Conundrum	银行难题


BARCELONA – Central bankers and regulators tend to worry that too much competition in the financial sector increases instability and the risk of systemic failure.	巴塞罗那——央行行长和监管者总是担心，金融部门竞争过度会增加不稳定性，产生系统失灵风险。


Competition authorities, on the other hand, tend to believe that the more competition, the better.	另一方面，竞争当局则认为竞争越多越好。


Both can’t be right.	但这两种观点都不正确。


There is a trade-off between competition and stability.	在竞争和稳定之间存在权衡。


Indeed, greater competitive pressure may increase the fragility of banks’ balance sheets and make investors more prone to panics.	事实上，更大的竞争压力可能会增加银行资产负债表的脆弱性，令投资者更易陷入恐慌。


It may also erode the charter value of institutions.	竞争也可能会削弱机构许可证的价值。


A bank with thin margins and limited liability does not have much to lose, and will tend to gamble – a tendency that is exacerbated by deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail policies.	利润率低、负债少的银行属于光脚的不怕穿鞋的那一类，它们会倾向于赌博——在存款保险和“太大而不能倒”的政策下，这一倾向愈加明显。


The result will be more incentives to assume risk.	结果是银行有了更多的承担风险的激励。


Indeed, for banks close to the failure point in liberalized systems, the evidence of perverse risk-taking incentives is overwhelming.	事实上，对于自由体系中濒临倒闭的银行而言，过度承担风险的激励根本无法抵制。


That is why crises began to increase in number and severity after financial systems in the developed world started to liberalize in the 1970’s, beginning in the United States.	这就是为什么在20世纪70年代发达国家金融体系自由化（始于美国）之后频发严重危机的原因。


This new vulnerability stands in stark contrast to the stability of the over-regulated post-World War II period.	新出现的脆弱性与二战之后过度监管时期的稳定性形成了鲜明对比。


The crises in the US in the 1980’s (caused by the savings-and-loan institutions known as “thrifts”), and in Japan and Scandinavia in the 1990’s, showed that financial liberalization without proper regulation induces instability.	20世纪80年代在美国（由所谓的“储贷银行”引起）以及90年代在日本和斯堪的纳维亚地区爆发的危机表明，没有合适监管的金融自由化会导致不稳定。


In an ideal world, the competition-stability trade-off could be regulated away with sophisticated risk-based insurance mechanisms, credible liquidation and resolution procedures, contingent convertibles, and capital requirements with charges for systemic institutions.	在理想世界中，竞争-稳定权衡可以通过监管解决，如成熟的基于风险的保险机制、可信的清算和解散程序、或有可转债，以及包含系统制度费用的资本要求。


The problem is that regulation is unlikely to eliminate completely market failures: the competition-stability trade-off can be ameliorated, but not eliminated.	问题在于，监管不可能消除所有的市场失灵：竞争-稳定权衡只能被改善，无法被消除。


For example, the United Kingdom’s Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) has proposed ring-fencing retail activities from investment-banking activities in separately capitalized divisions of a bank holding company.	比如，英国银行业独立委员会（ICB）的初衷是将零售业务与投资银行业务隔离，将它们放入银行控股公司两个资本互不干涉的部门中去。


This is a compromise aimed at minimizing the incentive to gamble with public insurance while allowing some economies of scale for banking activities.	这是一种妥协，其目的是在允许银行业务存在一定规模经济的情况下使银行倚仗公共保险进行豪赌的激励最小化。


But the devil is in the details, and, even in the most optimistic scenario, the trade-off between competition and stability will remain.	但如何设置细节成了一场噩梦，即使是在最乐观的情景中，竞争-稳定权衡问题也无法消除。


One shortcoming of the measure consists in the fact that the crisis has hit both universal and specialized banks.	这一措施的一大短处是危机对全业务银行和专业化银行都产生了冲击这一事实。


Furthermore, the definition of the boundary between retail and investment-banking activities will leave an important grey area and generate perverse incentives.	此外，如何定义零售业务和投资银行业务的分野留下了十分重要的灰色地带，造成了负面激励。


And the regulatory boundary problem persists: risky activities may migrate to areas where regulation is lax and reproduce the problems with the shadow banking system that we have witnessed during the crisis.	此外，监管边界问题依然存在：冒险行为可能被转移到监管较松的领域，形成影子银行系统，让问题死灰复燃——这正是当前危机的写照。


As a result, investment-banking operations might need to be rescued if they pose a systemic threat.	结果，当投资银行业务造成了系统性风险时，人们就不得不出手救助。


The massive regulatory failure exposed by the financial crisis that began in 2008 underscores the need to concentrate on reforms that provide the correct incentives to banks.	2008年金融危机所暴露出来的监管大面积失灵表明，人们应该专注于能为银行提供正确激励的改革。


But, if the past is any guide to the future, we should be aware of the limits of regulation.	但是，所谓前车之鉴，后事之师，我们必须清醒认识到监管的局限性。


The UK’s ICB has rightly stated that there is room to improve both competition and stability, given the current weak regulatory framework, but it would be imprudent to strive for the complete elimination of market power in banking.	英国ICB正确地指出，从当前软弱无能的监管框架看，竞争和稳定的都具有改善空间，但要将市场力量从银行业中完全剔除是很不明智的。


The design of optimal regulation has to take into account the intensity of competition in the different banking segments.	最优监管的设计必须考虑到不同银行细分部门的竞争的激烈程度。


For example, capital charges should account for the degree of friction and rivalry in the banking sector, with tighter requirements in more competitive contexts.	比如，资本费用应该体现银行部门的摩擦和竞争，竞争性越强的部门，资本要求应该收得越紧。


It follows, then, that prudential regulation and competition policy in banking should be coordinated.	其次，银行业的审慎监管和竞争政策必须相互协调。


This is all the more true in crisis situations, in which a protocol of collaboration should be implemented to delineate liquidity help from recapitalization, and to establish the conditions for restructuring in order to avoid competitive distortions.	这一点在危机情景中极为重要，此时应该实施合作协议，以规定如何从资本重组中获得流动性援助，以及如何设置重组条件从而避���竞争性扭曲。


What implications does this have for market structure?	这些措施对市场结构会产生什么影响？


Concentration in well-defined deposit and loan markets is linked with competitive pressure.	界定清晰的存贷款市场的集中度与竞争压力有关。


In more concentrated markets, banks tend to offer worse terms to customers.	在集中度较高的市场，银行倾向于向客户提供苛刻的条件。


The crisis has affected both concentrated banking systems (for example, the UK and the Netherlands) and non-concentrated systems (e.g., the US and Germany).	最近的危机既影响了集中银行体系（比如英国和荷兰），也影响了非集中银行体系（如美国和德国）。


In both cases, it has brought consolidation, leaving fewer players with increased market power and too-big-to-fail status.	不管集中与否，银行体系都出现了整合现象，银行数量减少了，生存下来的银行市场实力增强了，也变得愈加“太大而不能倒”了。


Witness the takeover by Lloyds TSB of the troubled HBOS (Halifax/Bank of Scotland) in the UK, or post-crisis consolidation in the US.	劳埃德TSB集团（Lloyds TSB）收购HBOS（苏格兰哈利法克斯银行）案以及美国的几起危机后整合案便是明证。


All this would not be so problematic if the increased market power of the merged institutions were a temporary reward for past prudent behavior.	这些都不是大问题，只要合并后的机构的市场实力只不过是对过去审慎行为的暂时性奖赏。


In that case, the benefits would wane in importance as new competitors entered the banking fray.	在这种情形下，兼并者获得的好处会随着新竞争者进入银行领域而消失。


But if banks’ market power increases due to barriers to entry, consumers and investors will suffer.	但如果银行的市场实力的上升是由于准入壁垒产生的，那么消费者和投资者就要蒙受损失了。


An active competition policy will be needed.	我们需要积极的竞争政策。


But the degree to which the authorities will be able to push for more competition in banking will depend crucially on the regulatory framework.	但当局能够在多大程度上推进银行业的竞争，关键取决于监管框架。


Let us fix and strengthen that framework, while bearing in mind that a simple mandate to maximize competitive pressure in banking is no more possible, or desirable, than one that would aim at eliminating instability completely.	我们必须修复并强化监管框架，与此同时也要牢记，简单地要求银行业竞争压力最大化已不再可行，也不再可取，试图完全消除不稳定性亦然。


Central Banking’s New Face	中央银行业务的新面孔


LONDON – A changing of the guard is underway at many of the world’s leading central banks.	伦敦—世界上许多主要央行正在经历首脑变化。


Haruhiko Kuroda is now installed as the governor of the Bank of Japan (BOJ), faced with the daunting task of ending two decades of stagnation.	黑田东彦上任日本银行行长，他面临着结束二十年经济停滞的艰巨任务。


Mark Carney, the Bank of Canada’s current governor, who is set to take over as the governor of the Bank of England (BoE) in July, is already making his presence felt in British monetary-policy debates.	加拿大银行现任行长马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）将于7月出任英格兰银行行长，现在已经让英国货币政策争论感到了他的存在。


And in the United States, the expected conclusion of Ben Bernanke’s term as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in January is already inviting speculation about his successor.	在美国，人们预计伯南克的美联储主席任期将在明年1月结束，并且已经开始猜测他的继任者。


The only holdouts among the world’s leading economies are the eurozone and China.	在世界领先经济体中，保持不动的只有欧元区和中国。


But that does not necessarily imply constancy.	但这并不意味着不变。


Mario Draghi has been the president of the European Central Bank for barely a year, and the governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, was almost replaced when he reached retirement age in February.	德拉吉出任欧洲央行行长才一年左右，中国人民银行行长周小川也因为到达退休年龄而差点在2月被替。


Twenty years ago, such developments would have interested mostly bankers and businesspeople.	二十年前，如此变化会大概只能引起银行家和商界人士的注意。


But, since the global financial crisis, the need to revive and sustain economic growth in the US, the United Kingdom, and Japan – and to avoid financial collapse in the eurozone – has prompted major central banks to be more outspoken and pursue more aggressive monetary policies, including unconventional measures like quantitative easing (QE).	但自从全球金融危机以来，美国、英国和日本重振和维持经济增长以及欧元区避免金融崩溃的需要让主要央行更加直言不讳、采取了更激进的货币政策，包括量化宽松（QE）等非常规手段。 结果，央行行长的名字家喻户晓；


As a result, many central bankers have become household names; some even have tabloid nicknames, like “super Mario” Draghi.	一些人甚至还获得了绰号，比如德拉吉被称为“超级马里奥”。


This new prominence has also forced some central bankers to reassess their decision-making processes.	成为新显贵也迫使一些央行行长重新评估他们的决策过程。


In Japan, outsiders recently got a rare glimpse into the BOJ’s activities when minutes of a policy meeting were leaked.	在日本，日本银行流出的某次政策会议的记录罕见地让人们得以一窥其活动。


Likewise, the accidental release a day early of the minutes from the Fed’s March rate-setting meeting to more than 100 people, including banking executives, congressional aides, and bank lobbyists, raised questions about how the bank controls the disclosure of privileged information.	类似地，美联储3月利率制定会议记录提前一天遭遇意外泄漏，包括银行高管、过会助手和银行游说者在内的100多人提前获知，引起了人们关于美联储如何控制保密信息披露的质疑。


In fact, the Fed has been under increasing scrutiny since 2008, when near-zero nominal interest rates drove it to become the first central bank to adopt QE.	事实上，自2008年将名义利率降至近零水平、成为首个采取QE的央行以来，美联储被越来越多的人紧紧观察。


In a push to reduce the cost of borrowing, the Fed purchased long-term assets in the market, injecting liquidity into the financial system.	为了降低借贷成本，美联储从市场上购入长期资产，将流动性注入金融系统。


The BoE and the ECB have since adopted similar measures.	英格兰银行和欧洲央行此后也采取了类似措施。


In early April, the BOJ announced plans to unleash the most aggressive bond-buying program of all, promising to inject $1.4 trillion into the economy over the next two years in order to meet an inflation target of 2%.	4月初，日本央行宣布了最激进的债券购买计划，承诺在未来两年中向经济注入1. 4万亿美元以实现2%的目标通胀率。


This is monetary policy on steroids, and, to opponents of inflation-inducing money creation, it amounts to playing with fire.	这一货币政策就像是打鸡血，对于制造通胀型货币创造的反对者来说，这无异于玩火。


But, for Japan, which has been struggling with deflation for a generation, it is a risk worth taking.	但是，对于与通缩搏斗了一代人的时间的日本来说，这一风险值得承担。


Whether Kuroda’s assault will bolster domestic consumption and investment remains to be seen.	黑田东彦的攻击能否提振国内消费和投资还有待观察。


Unconventional measures are part of a broader transformation of monetary policymaking.	非常规手段只是范围更广的货币决策变化的一部分。


In addition to becoming bolder and more expansive, it has become increasingly intertwined with fiscal policy.	除了更激进、更扩张，货币政策还越来越多地与财政政策互相纠结。


This is most explicit in Japan, where monetary policy is a central component of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic strategy, dubbed “Abenomics,” implying collaboration between the government and the central bank.	这在日本表现得最为明显。 在日本，货币政策是首相安倍晋三的经济战略——即“安倍经济学”的核心成分，意味着政府和央行之间的合作。


Does this undermine central-bank independence by amounting to a de facto subordination of unelected technocrats to elected politicians?	非选举产生的技术官僚向选举产生的政客低头，这是否破坏了央行的独立性？


Arguably, Japan is an exceptional case, with the constraint of the zero bound on nominal interest rates demanding, at long last, a deviation from conventional measures.	极有可能日本是一个例外，名义利率处于零区间的约束最终要求另辟蹊径。


In Europe, however, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann has criticized the ECB for overstepping its mandate with its “outright monetary transactions” program, through which Draghi aims to fulfill his pledge to guarantee the euro’s survival.	但是，在欧洲，德国央行行长魏德曼批评欧洲央行采取“直接货币交易”计划是僭越，德拉吉想通过该计划兑现其捍卫欧元生存的承诺。


As a result, questions about the role of monetary policy and the independence and accountability of central banks, once confined to rarefied academic discussions, are fixtures of broad policy debate.	结果，过去纯属学术讨论的货币政策角色和中央银行的独立性和可问责性问题成了广义政策争论的常规话题。


But, rather than try to define a single approach, central bankers should aim to develop individualized approaches within the orthodox monetary-policy framework, which revolves around price stability and independence.	但是，央行航政不应该尝试一刀切的解决办法，而应该致力于在正统货币政策框架内（即围绕货币稳定和独立性）发展个性化办法。


For example, the Fed’s mandate dictates that price stability can be explicitly linked to active support for GDP growth and employment; for the BoE and the ECB, it can be a condition for achieving the broader goal of sustainable growth and employment.	比如，美联储的要求规定价格稳定必须明确与积极支持GDP和就业挂钩； 对英格兰银行和欧洲央行来说，这可以成为实现更广的可持续增长和就业目标的条件之一。


As long as politicians observe the rule of non-interference – at least publicly – central banks will be perceived as unconstrained by political interests.	只要政客坚守不干涉（至少不公开干涉）规则，央行便不会被人认为屈从于政治利益。


The BOJ, by demonstrating that aggressive money creation is a legitimate approach to fighting deflation, has broken previously sacrosanct conventions.	日本央行通过证明激进货币创造是对抗通缩的合理方法打破了此前神圣不可侵犯的惯例。


At the same time, it has taken the unprecedented step of incorporating monetary policy into a comprehensive economic strategy based on coordination among different policy areas and their associated institutions.	与此同时，它还采取了前所未有的动作，让货币政策成为基于不同政策领域和相关机构协调合作的全方位经济战略的一部分。


This integrated approach could prove effective in countries where the real economy and the financial sector are closely linked, ensuring the timely, orderly implementation of policies, while preventing adverse spillovers.	这一一体化方法在实体经济与金融部门紧密相连的国家或许会见效，它能确保政策及时、有序地实施，同时防止消极溢出效应。


Such coordination would infringe on central-bank independence no more than multilateral cooperation undermines the sovereignty of the countries involved.	此类协调合作对央行独立性的破坏不会亚于多边合作对参与国主权的破坏。


While the impact of Abenomics on Japan’s economy remains to be seen, its impact on debates about monetary policy and the relationship between central banks and governments is already becoming apparent.	安倍经济学对日本经济的影响还有待观察，但其对货币政策以及央行与政府的关系的争论的影响已经十分明显。


One hopes that Carney will follow this trend of challenging conventional wisdom at the BoE.	我们希望卡尼能跟随这一趋势，挑战关于英格兰银行的传统智慧。


A new era of active and varied monetary policy may have begun, with potential benefits for all.	新的积极而多样的货币政策时代或许已经开始，并能让所有人获益。


The Battle for Churchill’s Bust	丘吉尔的半身像之争


NEW YORK – The election of the United States’ next president is surely the most important contest in the democratic world.	纽约——美国下届总统选举无疑是民主世界中最重要的竞赛。


Yet the issues being contested can seem awfully trivial.	但竞赛的问题可能显得极其琐碎。


Consider, for instance, the question of Winston Churchill’s bust.	打个比方，温斯顿·丘吉尔的半身像。


A bronze sculpture of the British prime minister had been in the Oval Office of the White House since the 1960’s.	20世纪60年代后，白宫的椭圆形办公室中一直摆放着英国首相的青铜像。


On becoming President, Barack Obama replaced it with a bust of Abraham Lincoln.	奥巴马当选总统后把它换成了亚伯拉罕·林肯的半身像。


Mitt Romney, his Republican opponent in November’s election, has vowed to restore it if he wins.	奥巴马在11月竞选中的共和党对手米特·罗姆尼发誓如果自己赢得竞选就要重新摆放丘吉尔的半身像。


Then a White House spokesman said that the bust was still on the premises, just in a different room, whereupon the story changed once more: there were apparently two busts of Churchill; one still in the White House, and one that Obama returned to the British embassy.	之后一位白宫发言人表示，半身像仍然放在白宫，只不过更换了房间而已，于是事情再次发生了变化：显然有两座丘吉尔的半身像； 一座仍然摆放在白宫，而另一座被奥巴马送回了英国大使馆。


Why would anyone care about this?	为什么会有人在意这个问题？


One answer was provided by two of Mitt Romney’s advisers, who stated that their candidate particularly valued the “special relationship” with Britain because of the shared “Anglo-Saxon heritage.”	两名米特·罗姆尼的顾问对此做出了解答，称他们的候选人因为共同的“盎格鲁－萨克逊传统”而特别注重与英国的“特殊关系”。


This heritage, they claimed, was not sufficiently “appreciated” by the current president.	他们称现任总统并未充分“重视”这种关系。


When this bizarre statement, with its racist undertones, threatened to become a scandal, Romney quickly distanced himself from it.	当这个带有种族意味的怪异声明眼看要发展成一项丑闻时，罗姆尼很快与这项声明保持了距离。


He did not want to be seen as a racist.	他不想被视为一名种族主义者。


But how else is his peculiar nostalgia for Churchill’s bust to be understood?	但他对丘吉尔半身像特别的怀旧情绪还能怎么解释？


In fact, the phrase “Anglo-Saxon” is not often heard any more in the US, where the majority of the population has not been of Anglo-Saxon origin for a long time (which is also true of Britain’s largest cities).	其实，“盎格鲁－萨克逊”这个短语在美国已很少听到，很久以前美国的大部分人就已经不再有盎格鲁－萨克逊血统了（英国大城市也同样如此）。


When Americans use the term, it is usually to differentiate white Americans from the rest, which is not something that most Americans, least of all presidential candidates, would now choose to do in public.	美国人使用这个短语通常是为了区分白种美国人，这可不是多数美国人，尤其是总统候选人，愿意公开做的事。


“Anglo-Saxon” is more often used in a negative sense by the French, as in “Anglo-Saxon bankers” or “Anglo-Saxon conspiracies” (to keep the French down).	法国人使用“盎格鲁－萨克逊”一词时往往带有消极涵义，比方说“盎格鲁－萨克逊银行家”或“盎格鲁－萨克逊阴谋”（以压制法国为目的）。


Just recently Le Monde had the wonderful headline: “[President] Hollande Defends French Foie Gras against Anglo-Saxon lobbies” (the reference was to California’s ban on foie gras under its animal-cruelty laws).	不久前法国《世界报》还刊登了一条精彩的报导：奥朗德[总统]在盎格鲁－萨克逊游说者面前捍卫法国的鹅肝”（这条新闻实际指的是加州按照禁止虐待动物法的规定禁售鹅肝的措施）。


Even Churchill himself did not speak of Anglo-Saxons much.	即使是丘吉尔本人也不常提到盎格鲁－萨克逊这个词。


He talked about “the British race” or the “English-speaking peoples.”	他曾经提到“大不列颠种族”或“以英语为母语的民族。


The so-called “special relationship” between Britain and the US, certainly prized by Churchill, was not so much racial as it was a product of World War II – and a rather complicated one at that.	” 所谓英美“特殊关系”确实也曾被丘吉尔所看重，但它其实是没有多少种族意味的二战产物——而且是在极其复杂的背景下产生的。


During the war, Churchill and Roosevelt shared the idea that once Germany and Japan were defeated, British and US military forces should act as global policemen.	二战期间，丘吉尔和罗斯福都相信一旦打败德国和日本，英美军队就会充当起全球警察的角色。


They believed that the world would be safe from future Hitlers if it were, at least for some time, under the enlightened leadership of the democratic English-speaking peoples.	他们相信如果世界能够至少在一段时期内接受讲英语民族的文明民主领导，就可以避免未来希特勒的统治。


By the end of the war, however, Britain was too exhausted to police the world.	但是到战争真正结束时，英国已经筋疲力尽，无法再承担世界警察的角色。


The country was bankrupt and His Majesty’s colonial subjects were growing restive.	国家陷入破产，国王陛下的殖民地臣民则越来越难以驾驭。


The future belonged to the US and the Soviet Union, neither of which had sentimental feelings about the British Empire, let alone the “Anglo-Saxons.”	未来属于美国和苏联，这两个国家对大英帝国、更不要说“盎格鲁－萨克逊人”都没有多少感伤情怀。


But the British elite, fully aware of their country’s decline, took the “special relationship” with the US very seriously, for it was the only way for Britain to feel like it was still a major power, unlike, say, France.	但大不列颠精英们彻底认清了自己国家的衰落，于是异常重视与美国的“特殊关系”，因为这是让英国感觉自己不同于法国，依然隶属于大国行列的唯一方式。


They still do.	直到今天依然如此。


Churchill certainly saw it that way, but so did Tony Blair, who presented President George W. Bush with the second Churchill bust.	丘吉尔无疑持这种看法，托尼·布莱尔也是，是他把第二尊丘吉尔的半身像交给了乔治·W·布什总统。


Americans, on the whole, have far less interest than the British in the “special relationship.”	而美国就总体而言，对“特殊关系”远没有英国那么大的兴趣。


But they are often sentimental about Churchill.	但他们往往对丘吉尔充满了感情色彩。


He is the man whom many American presidents would like to emulate, not because of any racial affinities, but because of his allure as a wartime leader.	他是很多美国总统希望仿效的前辈，但这并不是因为什么种族亲和力，而是因为他作为战时领导人的光环。


The US is the strongest military power in the world, just as Britain was in Churchill’s youth.	美国是全世界最强的军事大国，英国在丘吉尔年轻时也是。


And, like British empire-builders in the past, US elites often claim a moral mission to remake the world in America’s image.	而且就像大不列颠帝国建设者们曾经做过的那样，美国精英们也往往宣称美国肩负着改造世界的道德使命。


Churchill, in other words, became a symbol of presidential hubris in the US, even as the “special relationship” can be viewed as a symbol of British decline.	换句话讲，即使“特殊关系”可以视为英国衰落的象征，但丘吉尔却已成为美国总统傲慢的标志。


People tend to forget that Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem about “the white man’s burden” was not an ode to the British Empire, but to the US colonial enterprise in the Philippines.	人们往往忘记吉卜林“白人负担”的著名诗句并不是大英帝国的颂歌，而是为了歌颂美国在菲律宾的殖民事业。


Too much power corrupts, as we all know.	正如我们所知，过度的权力会带来腐败。


Hubristic presidents contemplating Churchill’s bust in their office are prone to believe that they have been called upon to be “war presidents” – that they, like Churchill in 1940, must oppose the next Hitler.	面对办公室中丘吉尔半身像的傲慢的总统更愿意相信他们就像1940年的丘吉尔那样，正肩负着“战时总统”抵抗未来希特勒的使命。


This siren song drew the US into Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.	这种难以抗拒的诱惑致使美国卷入到越南，阿富汗和伊拉克的冲突。


So, when Obama decided to remove Churchill’s bust from his office in 2008, this struck me as a very sensible gesture.	因此，在2008年奥巴马决定把丘吉尔的半身像从他办公室里请走那一刻，我立即觉得这是一个非常明智的姿态。


A little less hubris would do the US, as well as the world, some good.	少一些傲慢会使美国和全世界从中受益。


But now Romney wants him back.	可现在罗姆尼希望请他回来。


Whatever else he might be, Romney does not come across as a convincing war leader.	无论罗姆尼有哪些潜质，但他绝不是一位令人信服的战争领袖。


Businessmen rarely are.	商人很少能成为合格的战时领袖。


Yet he likes to portray himself as a tough patriot, and Obama as an un-American wimp.	但他喜欢把自己描绘成一位不屈的爱国者，而将奥巴马描绘成不符合美国精神的懦夫。


Perhaps Romney wants another war, in which he can play Churchill.	也许罗姆尼想要另外一场战争，他可以在这场战争中扮演丘吉尔的角色。


Or perhaps his two advisers were speaking the truth.	又或者他的两位顾问说的是实话。


Maybe Romney really is feeling sentimental about the “Anglo-Saxon heritage,” even as Asian power grows.	或许罗姆尼的确感怀“盎格鲁－萨克逊”式的传统，即便亚洲大国正在迅速崛起。


If so, nostalgia for Churchill is hardly a sign of American vitality, but more like a romantic rearguard battle, typical of a country in decline.	如果真的如此，对丘吉尔的怀旧恐怕很难与美国的活力扯上关系，而更像是一个衰落国家一场浪漫而又徒劳无益的战斗。


The Battle for Hope	为了希望而战


PARIS – Since the arrival of President Barack Obama in the White House, there has been an undeniable rapprochement between Europe and the United States.	巴黎——自从巴拉克·奥巴马总统入主白宫以来，美国和欧洲的关系日益好转。


But on the deeper and more fundamental level of emotions and values, is it possible that the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic has widened?	然而，在更为核心和基础的情感因素和价值观上，这两个隔着大西洋的地区是否离得越来越远了？


Today, there is much more collective hope and much more individual fear in America in the wake of the global economic crisis.	如今正值全球经济危机之时，美国表现出整体性的乐观，和个体性的悲观。


But the reverse is true in Europe.	欧洲的情况恰恰相反。


Here one encounters less collective hope and less individual fear.	为什么会有如此对立的结果呢？


The reason for this contrast is simple: the US has Obama, and Europe has the welfare state.	原因也很简单：美国出了个奥巴马，而欧洲则是一个高福利的国家。


So what can be done to promote an “Americanization” of Europe in political terms and a “Europeanization” of America in social terms?	那么，我们如何在政治上推广“美国化”的欧洲，而在社会层面上，我们又如何实现“欧洲化”的美国呢？


Comforted by a new President who incarnates a return of hope, who inspires and reassures at the same time, Americans are starting to believe that the worst of the economic crisis is behind them.	有了作为“希望回归”化身的全新总统，美国人信心满满，重新燃起了希望。 他们开始认为，经济最坏的时刻已经过去。


What was at the beginning of this spring no more than “a glimmer of hope,” to use Obama’s phrase, has become a more serious and positive trend.	今年春天不仅仅是“希望的开始”，奥巴马现象已经成为“认真乐观”的代名词。


Animated collectively by a combination of natural optimism and deep nationalism, Americans have made their president’s campaign slogan, “Yes, we can,” their own.	美国人有着天然的乐观主义精神，伴随着深厚的民族主义感情，他们把本次总统竞选的口号称为“是的，我们能行”。


By contrast, when the personal situations of many individual Americans are examined through European eyes, the extreme individualism that constitutes a key part of American optimism translates into an unacceptable social scandal.	与此相反，在欧洲人眼中，一些美国人是极端个人主义的代表； 在某种程度上，美国式的乐观主义也被解读为难以接受的社会丑闻。


“Cities of Tents are Filling with the Victims of the Economic Crisis,” read one headline a month ago on the front page of a mass-circulation American newspaper.	一个月之前，美国主流报纸头版的标题是：“经济危机导致城市的露天帐篷里住满了无家可归的人群。


Journalists report tragic stories of middle-class Americans losing their jobs and homes, potentially putting their lives at risk without any social protection.	”媒体连篇累牍地报导有关失去工作和家庭的美国中产阶级的悲惨故事，缺乏社会保障体系自然是他们沦落如此的原因。


Who will pay for your costly cancer treatment if you lose the health insurance policy that came with your job?	一个人如果失去工作，健康医疗保险自然也就丧失，那么，一旦他得了癌症，谁将为他支付医疗费用呢？


It is wrong to assume, as some ultra-free marketers do, that the absence of social protection makes you stronger.	在那些积极鼓吹市场化的人眼里，越是没有福利保障的社会，人们自我进取的动力就越强。


The ambition of a country and a society born of the principles of the Enlightenment cannot be to create a people armed to the teeth with guns yet entirely disarmed in the face of illness.	这显然是错误的。 在一个充满希望和机遇的国度，我们不能让那些努力打拼的人们在面临疾病的威胁时，变得束手无策。


Moreover, in a society that “lives to work,” where one’s job is such a central component of one’s identity, the loss of work is more destabilizing than in a culture where one “works to live,” as in Europe.	进一步来说，对一个有着“工作就是生活”哲学的社会里，一个人的工作是证明个人身份的重要标签。 如果失去工作，在他们眼里就是很大的事情。


Americans’ perspective on retirement is highly revealing: they are afraid of it.	而在那种奉行“为了生活而工作”哲学的社会，例如欧洲，没有工作相对来说没那些可怕。


What will they do?	美国人对于退休的态度就可见一斑，他们害怕退休，因为一旦退休之后，他们如何安排自己的生活呢？


This perspective is not simply rooted in economics, even if today a large proportion of older Americans are rushing back to work as the downturn wrecks their retirement plans.	如今，当听说他们的养老金由于经济危机而大幅缩水时，一些老年的美国人又重新回到工作岗位。 即便如此，有这样的观念也不一定完全出于经济的考虑。


The geographic separation of families, owing to America’s size and Americans’ mobility, makes the association between retirement and being a grandparent less practicable in the US than it is in Europe.	由于美国广阔的国土和相对流动性的人口结构，家庭成员往往天各一方。 这样来说，退休之后颐养天年的概率就比欧洲要小的多。


In Europe, meanwhile, there is undeniably less collective hope and probably a little less individual fear.	在欧洲，他们的集体性的乐观情绪较少，然而，个体也许也没有那么多的担忧。


Perhaps because they are older and more cynical, European societies seem to bask in a “collective moroseness,” from which they have difficulty emerging.	这可能因为是他们的人口结构老龄化和个性更加悲观一些。 欧洲社会似乎有那么一点“集体的忧郁”，他们有点死气沉沉。


The record level of abstention in the recent European Parliament elections is further proof of that growing cynicism and alienation.	看看近期欧洲议会的选举，参与投票的人数又创新低。 这更加证明了欧洲悲观和孤立的情绪正在不断攀升。


Of course, it is neither possible nor desirable to “clone” Obama in each of the European Union’s 27 member states.	当然，就欧洲的27个独立国家而言，我们不能也没有必要每个国家都克隆出一个“奥巴马”。


But what is needed to reduce the deficit of hope that plagues Europe today?	那怎样才能减少当今欧洲的失望和悲观情绪呢？


The answer is far from obvious.	回答这个问题看来并不容易。


Europe suffers from a shortage of leaders who can speak in its name; from a shortage of ambition (what, after all, is the collective ambition of Europeans now that the EU is perceived more as part of the problem than part of the solution).	欧洲缺乏一个能代表整个欧洲大陆的领袖，可能是他们缺少雄心，（欧盟作为欧洲一体化的产物，可以看作是他们雄心的体现，但对许多欧洲人看来，欧盟非但不能解决问题，往往是问题的本身。


But, above all, Europe suffers from an identity deficit, for no one seems to know what it means to be a European nowadays.	），不管怎么说，欧洲没有一个整体的认同感。 也许没有人知道“欧洲人”究竟意味着什么？


America, by contrast, seems to have an abundance of all the things Europe lacks.	相反的，这些欧洲人所缺乏的东西好象正是美国人所大量拥有的。


Formulated in such terms, the European challenge seems even more formidable than the American one.	由此说来，欧洲比美国所面临的挑战更为艰巨。


Nevertheless, it is far from clear that the US will find it easier to reform its health and social security system, and thus alleviate the individual fears of its citizens, than for Europe to inspire its citizens with a sense of collective hope.	当然，美国也有自身的老大难问题，例如医疗社会保障系统的改革。 相比于如何激发欧洲民众信心来说，如果想要减轻普通美国人的不安全感，可能要付出更大的代价。


In reality, Europe and America should represent a source of mutual inspiration that would reduce the human consequences of inequality in the one, and restore a sense of hope in the other.	实际上，欧洲和美国应该携起手来，相互激励，取长补短，联合起来一起消除人与人之间的不平等，重新燃起人们对未来的希望。


Turkey’s Class Struggle	土耳其的阶级斗争


NEW YORK – One interpretation of the anti-government demonstrations now roiling Turkish cities is that they are a massive protest against political Islam.	纽约——人们对目前土耳其城市涌动的反政府示威浪潮的一种解读是这是一次反对政治化伊斯兰教的大规模抗议活动。


What began as a rally against official plans to raze a small park in the center of Istanbul to make way for a kitschy shopping mall quickly evolved into a conflict of values.	最初从反对政府将伊斯坦布尔市中心一座小公园拆毁改建俗气购物中心开始的群众集会活动迅速演变为一场价值观的碰撞。


On the surface, the fight appears to represent two different visions of modern Turkey, secular versus religious, democratic versus authoritarian.	表面上看，冲突似乎代表了现代土耳其世俗与宗教、民主与专制两种截然不同的价值观。


Comparisons have been made with Occupy Wall Street.	有人把土耳其抗议运动与华尔街占领运动相提并论。


Some observers even speak of a “Turkish Spring.”	某些观察家甚至提出了“土耳其之春”的说法。


Clearly, many Turkish citizens, especially in the big cities, are sick of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian style, his steely grip on the press, his taste for grandiose new mosques, the restrictions on alcohol, the arrests of political dissidents, and now the violent response to the demonstrations.	显然，很多土耳其民众，尤其是大城市民众，对总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安愈加独裁的作风、他对媒体的严格控制、他对修建宏伟清真寺的偏好、他对酒精饮品的限制、他对持不同政见者的逮捕和对当前示威活动做出的暴力反应都非常厌恶。


People fear that sharia law will replace secular legislation, and that Islamism will spoil the fruits of Kemal Atatürk’s drive to modernize post-Ottoman Turkey.	人们担心伊斯兰教法将取代现有的世俗法律，伊斯兰教将毁坏后奥斯曼时期凯末尔·阿塔图尔克推动土耳其现代化所取得的成果。


Then there is the issue of the Alevis, a religious minority linked to Sufism and Shi’ism.	此外还有与苏菲及什叶派相关的宗教少数群体阿列维派的事务。


The Alevis, who had been protected by the secular Kemalist state, deeply distrust Erdoğan, who further unsettled them by planning to name a new bridge over the Bosphorus after a sixteenth-century sultan who massacred their forebears.	受世俗凯末尔国家保护的阿列维派对埃尔多安的不信任深入骨髓，后者用16世纪屠杀阿列维人祖先的苏丹名字为横跨博斯普鲁斯海峡一座新桥命名的打算加深了阿列维派民众的不安情绪。


Religion, then, would seem to be at the heart of the Turkish problem.	因此，宗教似乎是土耳其问题的核心。


Political Islam’s opponents regard it as inherently anti-democratic.	政治伊斯兰教的反对者认为宗教从本质上与民主水火不容。


But things are not so simple.	但问题并非如此简单。


The secular Kemalist state was no less authoritarian than Erdoğan’s populist Islamist regime; if anything, it was more so.	世俗的凯末尔国家并不比埃尔多安的民粹主义伊斯兰政权更加民主； 甚至可能更为独裁。


And it is also significant that the first protests in Istanbul’s Taksim Square concerned not a mosque, but a shopping mall.	还有一点非常重要，即伊斯坦布尔塔克西姆广场首名抗议者所反对的不是清真寺，而是购物中心。


Fear of sharia law is matched by anger at the rapacious vulgarity of developers and entrepreneurs backed by Erdoğan’s government.	对伊斯兰教法的恐惧与对埃尔多安政府支持的开发商和企业家粗俗贪婪的愤怒不相上下。


There is a strong leftist bent to the Turkish Spring.	土耳其春天表现出强烈的左倾情怀。


So, rather than dwell on the problems of contemporary political Islam, which are certainly considerable, it might be more fruitful to look at Turkey’s conflicts from another, now distinctly unfashionable, perspective: class.	因此，尽管当代政治伊斯兰教存在诸多问题，但与其在这些问题上纠缠不清，还不如换个视角，从显然已经过时的阶级角度看问题更有成效。


The protesters, whether they are liberal or leftist, tend to be from the urban elite – Westernized, sophisticated, and secular.	无论开明还是左倾背景的示威者大都来自城市的精英阶层——西化、世故、世俗是他们的共同特点。


Erdoğan, on the other hand, is still very popular in rural and provincial Turkey, among people who are less educated, poorer, more conservative, and more religious.	另一方面，埃尔多安在土耳其外省和乡村仍然颇具人气，教育程度不高、相对贫困、保守、信奉宗教的人对他的接受程度更高。


Despite Erdoğan’s personal authoritarian tendencies, which are obvious, it would be misleading to regard the current protests purely as a conflict between democracy and autocracy.	虽然埃尔多安明显存在个人独裁主义倾向，但把当前的抗议活动纯粹视为民主和专制的碰撞恐怕会有所误导。


After all, the success of Erdoğan’s populist Justice and Development Party, as well as the increasing presence of religious symbols and customs in public life, is a result of more democracy in Turkey, not less.	归根结底，埃尔多安民粹主义正义与发展党的成功，以及公共生活中越来越多宗教符号和习俗的出现是土耳其日渐民主化的结果。


Customs that the Kemalist secular state suppressed, such as women’s use of headscarves in public places, have reappeared, because rural Turks have more influence.	曾被凯末尔世俗国家压制的风俗习惯（比方说妇女在公共场所佩戴头巾）重新出现是因为土耳其农村民众的影响力更大。


Young religious women are turning up at urban universities.	年轻的宗教女性正进入城市大学求学。


The votes of conservative provincial Turks now count.	而保守的外省土耳其民众在投票中开始发挥作用。


Likewise, the alliance between businessmen and religious populists is hardly unique to Turkey.	同样，商人和宗教民粹主义者结盟并非土耳其的独有现象。


Many of the new entrepreneurs, like the women in headscarves, are from villages in Anatolia.	众多新兴企业家，比方说戴着头巾的妇女，都来自安纳托利亚的村庄。


These newly rich provincials resent the old Istanbul elite as much as businessmen from Texas or Kansas hate the East Coast elites of New York and Washington.	这些新富起来的外省民众厌恶原来的伊斯坦布尔精英就像得克萨斯或堪萨斯商人痛恨纽约华盛顿的东海岸精英一样。


But to say that Turkey has become more democratic is not to say that it has become more liberal.	但说土耳其更民主与说土耳其更自由完全是两回事。


This is also one of the problems revealed by the Arab Spring.	这也是“阿拉伯之春”所揭示的问题之一。


Giving all people a voice in government is essential to any democracy.	让所有人掌握话语权对任何民主政府来讲至关重要。


But those voices, especially in revolutionary times, are rarely moderate.	但尤其在革命时期，上述话语权却极少持有温和立场。


What we see in countries such as Egypt and Turkey – and even in Syria – is what the great British liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin described as the incompatibility of equal goods.	我们在埃及、土耳其、甚至叙利亚等国所看到的现象���伟大英国自由主义哲学家以赛亚·伯林所述同等善物不相容的典型代表。


It is a mistake to believe that all good things always come together.	相信好的东西总能一同降临仅仅是一种误解。


Sometimes equally good things clash.	有时同样好的东西也会发生碰撞。


So it is in the painful political transitions in the Middle East.	中东痛苦的政治转型过程恰恰就是这样。


Democracy is good, and so are liberalism and tolerance.	民主是桩善举，同样的还有自由和宽容。


Ideally, of course, they coincide.	当然在理想状况下它们能够和平共处。


But right now, in most parts of the Middle East, they do not.	但现在在中东的绝大部分地方，它们却相互冲突。


More democracy can actually mean less liberalism and more intolerance.	民主的增强可以在现实生活中意味着自由和宽容的削弱。


It is easy to sympathize with the rebels against Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in Syria, for example.	比方说，人们很容易同情叙利亚反对巴沙尔·阿萨德独裁统治的反政府武装。


But the upper classes of Damascus, the secular men and women who enjoy Western music and films, some of them members of the Christian and Alawite religious minorities, will have a hard time surviving once Assad is gone.	但大马士革的上层阶级、喜爱西方音乐电影的世俗男女、其中某些人还是基督教徒和阿列维宗教少数派的成员，在阿萨德倒台后恐怕很难继续生存。


Baathism was dictatorial and oppressive – often brutally so – but it protected minorities and the secular elites.	复兴主义的确独裁压制，而且往往手段都非常残酷——但少数族裔和世俗精英却处在它的保护之中。


But keeping Islamism at bay is not a reason to support dictators.	但控制伊斯兰教并不是支持独裁者的理由。


After all, the violence of political Islam is largely a product of these oppressive regimes.	归根结底，政治伊斯兰教的暴力活动主要是上述压迫性政权的产物。


The longer they stay in power, the more violent the Islamist rebellions will be.	它们掌权的时间越长，伊斯兰就会发生更加猛烈的叛乱活动。


This is no reason to support Erdoğan and his shopping-mall builders against the protesters in Turkey, either.	这同样不是支持埃尔多安及其购物中心建造者、打压土耳其示威群众的理由。


The demonstrators are right to oppose his haughty disregard of public opinion and his stifling of the press.	示威群众有权反对他肆无忌惮地压制媒体和公众舆论。


But to see the conflict as a righteous struggle against religious expression would be equally mistaken.	但把冲突看成反对宗教表达的正义斗争同样是一种谬误。


Higher visibility for Islam is the inevitable result of more democracy in Muslim-majority countries.	伊斯兰地位提高是民主在穆斯林多数国家地位提升的不可避免的结果。


How to stop this from killing liberalism is the most important question facing people in the Middle East.	中东民众最重要的问题是如何防止民主扼杀普遍自由。


Turkey is still a democracy.	土耳其依然是民主国家。


It is to be hoped that the protests against Erdoğan will make it more liberal, too.	我们应当期待反对埃尔多安的示威活动能够让土耳其变得更加自由。


The Battle for Ukraine	乌克兰的战争


The old axioms are true: firmness can pay; resolution can see you through. We who are struggling to maintain our democracy in Ukraine believe this.	旧的公理真是千真万确：坚定的意志能帮我们成功，毫不动摇的决心能让我们度过难关。


Now, more than ever, we must believe this, for Russian troops wearing Ukrainian uniforms have entered our country, because Ukrainian soldiers are refusing to carry out orders to crush those who are demonstrating to defend our democracy.	正在为维护乌克兰民主英勇奋斗的我们抱定了这样的信念，现在这一点比以往任何时候都更重要。 这是因为身着乌克兰制服的俄罗斯军队已经进入了我们边境，因为乌克兰士兵拒绝执行命令，镇压那些捍卫民主的示威群众。


We will need the solidarity of our neighbors, and of freedom-loving peoples around the world, to assure that our democratic dreams are realized in peace.	我们需要与邻国和全世界爱好自由的人们团结一致，才能确保我们的民主之梦能够和平地实现。


The struggle to secure the victory of Viktor Yushchenko, the true winner in last Sunday’s presidential election, as Ukraine’s new president is not one that we sought.	争取尤申科胜利、成为乌克兰新总统的斗争不是我们曾经期望的，尤申科是上周日总统大选中真正的获胜者。


But, that battle for our freedom having been imposed upon us, we will not be found wanting in either courage or resolve.	尽管如此，我们却不得不为自由而战，我们既不缺乏勇气，也不缺乏决心。


The days and nights ahead will be difficult, and the secret presence of Russian troops will make them all the more dangerous.	今后的日日夜夜会难关密布，俄国军队的秘密介入更使局势变得凶险万分。


The forces of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych foolishly stuffed ballots and intimidated the country’s electoral commission to an absurd degree.	亚努科维奇总理的军队愚蠢地挤满了投票站，选举委员会受到了近乎荒谬的威胁。


They then tried to force the Ukrainian people to swallow this sham – threatening to ban public gatherings, close our borders to new visa seekers, and silence any word of our protests on television.	而后他们想迫使乌克兰人吞下这枚苦果－威胁要禁止公众集会、停止发放签证、压制电视上的任何抗议声音。


More and more members of a governmental machine that thought it could impose a fraudulent election on Ukraine’s people are shying away from imposing that choice by force.	越来越多的政府成员原来以为可以迫使乌克兰人民接受欺骗性的选举结果，但现在也不愿再以武力镇压的方法来实现自己的初衷。


Members of the army, the security services, and government officials are all balking at doing the bidding of the Yanukovych clique. Such a volatile ruling elite cannot be counted on to be consistent from now on.	军队、安全部队和政府官员都不愿执行亚努科维奇私党的命令，从今以后，人们再也无法指望如此动荡的统治集体能够长期存在。


The way ahead is a minefield.	前面的道路危机四伏。


We recognize that an unstable government can swing back to uncompromising intransigence. It will try to erode our support by infiltrating our protests with loyalists who will carry the virus of defeatism, and it will seek to outflank us by appealing to ordinary, hard-working Ukrainians, worried about feeding and clothing their children, that a tottering economy needs stability to be saved.	我们知道风雨飘摇的政府可能会寸步不让，他们的效忠者会在抗议声中释放失败主义的流毒，还会拉拢辛勤劳作、为孩子的温饱而忧心忡忡的乌克兰普通公民，告诉他们目前千疮百孔的经济只有稳定才能够继续支撑。


It will try to divide the country between Russian and Ukrainian speakers.	它还可能在讲俄语和乌克兰语的居民间铸起一堵分裂的高墙。


But it is too late for divide and misrule strategies to work.	但使用分裂和暴力已经来不及了。


Ukrainians know that the choice they make now, that their decision to stand firm with Viktor Yushchenko today, will determine their freedom forever, as well as the health of their nation – its independence as well as its economic strength.	乌克兰人已经清楚的知道：他们今天的选择，他们和尤申科同舟共济的决心会决定他们能否得到永久的自由，以及他们的国家能否健康地发展¾会决定国家能否独立自主、经济能否欣欣向荣。


So we will stand firm in the cold and the snow to see that our democratic choices are respected.	因此，我们会在冰雪和严寒中坚持到底，看着我们的民主选择得到应有的尊重。


To do otherwise is to surrender not only our freedom, but our hopes for better lives.	不这样做牺牲的不只是自由、还有我们对美好生活抱有的期望。


We defy those who seek to corrupt our democracy, but we stand with the hand of friendship extended to all of our neighbors, including Russia.	我们与破坏民主的人誓不两立，但同时也向所有邻国伸出友谊之手，俄国也不例外。


It has no reason to intervene.	它没有理由干预。


A vibrant Ukrainian democracy will need the comradeship of Russia and of Europe to build the kind of society that our people desire.	生机勃勃的乌克兰民主需要俄国和欧洲的通力合作，这样我们才能建设理想中的社会。


Our boldness is tinged by realism. By securing our democracy, we help secure Russia’s own.	我们的无畏中包含着现实的成分，如果我们实现了民主，那么对俄国自身的民主也会有所帮助。


For we are engaged not in revolution, but in peaceful democratic evolution.	我们想要的不是革命，而是和平的民主演变。


Ukrainians have endured the worst that man can do to his fellow man: Stalin’s orchestrated famines of the 1930’s and the Nazi slaughterhouse of World War II.	乌克兰曾经遭受过人与人之间最可怕的残杀：20世纪30年代管弦乐伴奏下的斯大林饥荒，还有二次大战中的纳粹杀人场。


So do not doubt our ability to endure and stand firm.	因此我们的忍耐和意志都能经得住考验。


We shall persist, and our democracy shall prevail.	我们会坚持到底，我们的民主会生根发芽。


Stand with us.	和我们站在一起吧。


The Battle of the Bonds	债券之争


LONDON – Everyone knows that Greece will default on its external debt.	发自伦敦——每个人都知道希腊即将出现自身外债违约。


The only question concerns the best way to arrange it so that no one really understands that Greece is actually defaulting.	唯一的问题是如何把这件事打理得光鲜靓丽，好让所有人都不知道希腊其实已经开始违约了。


On this topic, there is no shortage of expert plans – among them bond buy-backs, bond swaps, and the creation of Eurobonds, a European version of the “Brady” bonds issued by Latin American countries that defaulted in the 1980’s. What all such schemes amount to is piling one lot of bonds on top of another in an attempt to square the circle of Greece’s inability to pay, and to minimize the losses faced by its creditors – mostly European banks.	在这个问题上充斥着各种专家方案——其中包括债券回购，债券交换以及创设欧元债券（一种欧洲版本的“布雷迪”债券，由在1980年代发生债务违约的拉丁美洲国家发行，得名于时任美国财政部长的尼古拉斯·布雷迪），而所有这些方案都是想用新债填旧债的方式试图突破希腊无力偿还债务的死循环，并尽量减少借贷者（主要是欧洲各大银行）的损失。


Every week, a preposterous coterie of European bankers and finance ministers drags itself from one capital to another to discuss which default/restructuring plan to adopt.	每周我们都会看到那个由欧洲银行家和财政部长组成的小滑稽团从一个国家的首都跑到另一个国家的首都，讨论究竟采取哪种债务违约/重建方案。


Meanwhile, Greece’s agony continues, and the “markets” wait to swoop down on Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain.	与此同时希腊的痛苦依旧持续，而“市场”则等着看葡萄牙、爱尔兰，意大利和西班牙的好戏。


No one who is not well versed in financial legerdemain can make much sense of this battle of the bonds.	不太精通金融的人往往难以深刻理解这场围绕着债券的斗争。


But behind it lie two moral attitudes, which are much easier to grasp.	但这场斗争背后的两个道德观则相对容易让人理解。


The first is traditional disapproval of debt.	第一个就是传统上对债务的排斥。


The oldest rule in personal finance is to avoid debt – that is, never spend more than you earn.	个人金融的最古老信条就是避免负债——就是永远不要花得比挣的多。


Economists and moralists have been united in believing that you should actually spend less than you earn – in order to “save” for the proverbial rainy day or for old age.	经济学家和道德家们都一致相信你应当量入为出——以便“存”钱未雨绸缪或者养老。


Getting into debt was long associated with profligacy or fecklessness.	负债一直都跟挥霍无度或者不负责任联系在一起。


And, if a person became indebted, it was a point of honor to repay the obligation when it fell due, by selling assets, reducing consumption, working harder, or some combination of the three.	如果一个人借了债，那么就必须在债务到期时通过变卖资产，减少消费或者努力工作等方式偿还，因为这事关个人荣誉。


Indeed, it was often more than a point of honor: failure to repay debt on time landed the debtor in prison.	事实上这个问题往往会超出荣誉的范畴，因为无法偿还的负债者将被投入监狱。


The same attitude governed institutional debt.	而同样的道德观也适用于机构债务。


Banks grew out of a practice by gold smiths and silver smiths, who, for a small price, accepted deposits for safekeeping.	银行产生于金银匠人的实践之中，人们只需要支付一笔小钱就能把金银安全寄存在他们那里。


When they became lending institutions, their earliest rule was to keep almost 100% of cash reserves against their loans, so that they would not be caught short if most of their depositors decided to withdraw their money at the same time.	而当这些人演变成借贷机构时，最早的规章就是要保证有100%的现金储备，以便在大多数客户同时决定取出存款时不至于无款可付。


Similarly, before the introduction of limited liability in the nineteenth century, a company’s shareholders or partners were each liable for all of the firm’s debts, which severely restricted businesses’ willingness to borrow to finance trade.	同样，在19世纪引入有限责任这个概念之前，一家公司的股东或者合伙人都必须为这家公司的所有债务负责，而这也严重限制了企业借贷来进行贸易的积极性。


For public finance, too, the orthodox rule was that budgets should always be balanced; except in emergencies, governments should never spend more than they “earned” in taxation.	对于公共财政也是如此，正统思想认为预算应该保持平衡； 除非发生紧急事件，否则政府不能支出超过其税收“收入”的数额。


Again, it was a point of honor for governments to pay back such debts as they were incurred, whatever the sacrifice to the country.	同样政府偿还债务也是一个“尊严”问题，不管国家经济因此遭到了多大损害也一定要偿还。


Until recently, the conventional view was that “mature” sovereigns always honored their debts, while only banana republics failed to do so.	直到最近，普遍的观点依旧认为一个“成熟”的主权国家必须能承担起自己的负债，只有那些经济单一，政局混乱的“香蕉共和国”才会欠债不还。


These historically embedded norms and practices were only slowly superseded.	但这类历史遗留下来的规范和实践也逐渐被缓慢取代。


But, in the twentieth century, with greater security of conditions and continuous economic growth, it became normal for individuals, companies, and governments to borrow in anticipation of earnings – to spend money they did not have, but that they expected to have.	但在20世纪，随着安全局势进一步稳定以及经济的持续发展，个人，企业和政府基于预期收入的借贷变得越来越平常——所谓预期收入支出，就是消费那些还没到自己手里，但预计会到自己手里的钱。


With fear of bank runs and defaults receding, banks’ reserve ratios became ever smaller, thus increasing their lending facilities.	虽然依旧害怕遭遇挤提和烂帐，但银行的存款准备金比率依然逐渐下调，并借此逐渐扩大其贷款能力。


On this bedrock rose an imposing edifice of bond markets and banks that drove down the cost of finance, and thus sped up the rate of economic growth.	在此基础上崛起了一个由债券市场和银行组成的庞然大物，不但降低了金融成本，还有助于加速经济增长的速度。


It was this system of financial intermediation whose near-collapse in 2008 seemed for many to justify the ancient warnings of the perils of indebtedness.	而正是这个在2008年几乎崩溃的金融中介系统使许多人重新认识到了关于借贷风险的古老信条。


In their exhaustive historical review of financial crises, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff write: “Again and again, countries, banks, individuals, and firms take on excessive debt in good times without enough awareness of the risks that will follow when the inevitable recession hits.”	经济学家卡梅隆·莱因哈特和肯尼思·罗格夫在他们全面回顾经济危机的著作中写到：“一次又一次，国家、银行，个人和企业都在年景好的时候过度负债，却没有意识到这些债务在无法避免的危机降临时所带来的风险。 ”


But there is a contrary moral attitude, the essence of which is that, whereas excessive debt is to be deplored, the blame for it lies with the lender, not the borrower.	而与此同时,也有一个与上述道德观相对立的理念，认为虽然过度负债固然不对，但真正应该被谴责的其实不是借债者，而是放债者。


“Neither a borrower nor a lender be,” Polonius admonished in Hamlet.	在莎士比亚名剧《哈姆雷特》中，波洛尼厄斯就曾告诫他人“别放债，莫借债”。


Lending money at interest was identified with “usury,” or making money from money rather than from goods and services – a distinction that goes back to Aristotle, for whom money was barren.	放债收利息的行为被等同于“高利贷”或者通过钱来赚钱而不从事其他生产和服务——这种区分可以追溯到亚里士多德，在他看来钱是毫无意义的物品。


The moneylender was the most hated figure in medieval Europe.	在中世纪欧洲，放债者是人们最为憎恨的角色。


The last legal restrictions on taking interest on money were lifted only in the nineteenth century, when they succumbed to the economic argument that lending money was a service, for which the lender was entitled to charge whatever the market would bear.	最后一个禁止有息贷款的法律限制直到19世纪才得以放宽，因为人们开始认同放债其实是一种服务的经济观点，而放债者有权去收取市场可以承受的利息。


But the theory of usury survived in the view that it was morally wrong to extract some additional amount that was made feasible by the borrower’s weak bargaining position or extreme need.	但那种“高利贷有罪”理论依然存在，因为人们认为利用借款者的弱势谈判地位或者迫切需要而榨取额外收益的行为是不道德的。


These two moral attitudes confront each other today in the battle of the bonds.	这两种道德观在当今这场关于债权的斗争中冲突不断。


The demand for debt repayment confronts the philosophy of debt forgiveness.	债务偿还的需求遭遇了放弃债权的哲学观。


In the lender’s view, the 17% interest rate that Greece’s government now has to pay for its 10-year bonds accurately reflects the lender’s risk in buying Greek government debt.	在放贷者看来，希腊政府为其10年期国债支付的17%利率完全体现了自己购买这些债务时所承担的风险。


It is the price of past profligacy.	这也是希腊人为过去挥霍无度所付出的代价。


But in the borrower’s view it is usurious – taking advantage of the borrower’s desperation.	但借贷人却将此视为高利贷行为——就是乘借贷人绝望之际狠宰一刀。


The sensible middle position would surely be an agreed write-off of a portion of the outstanding Greek debt, combined with a five-year moratorium on interest payments on the remainder.	而明智的折衷方式则是一方面同意减免一部分希腊超额债务，另一方面则在备忘录中加上将利息支付延后五年的条款。


This would immediately relieve pressure on Greece’s budget and give its government the time and incentive to put the country’s economy in order.	此举将迅速缓解希腊所面对的预算压力，也为其政府提供了足够的时间和激励因素去重整国家经济。


In the long run, however, we will have to answer the broader question that the eurozone’s various debt crises have raised: Is the social value of making finance cheap worth the days of reckoning for stricken debtors?	但在长期看来，我们必须对欧元区一连串债务危机所引发的问题作出回应：如今借款人所遭受的末日审判般的苦痛，相对于用降低金融服务成本所创造的社会价值来说究竟是亏了，还是赚了？


The Battle of the Temples	寺庙之争


BANGKOK – The military skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia that have claimed more than two dozen lives, caused scores of injuries, and displaced tens of thousands of people since February are primarily attributable to domestic politics in both countries.	发自曼谷——自1月以来，泰国和柬埔寨之间爆发的军事冲突已经造成了超过24人死亡，近百人受伤，数千人流离失所，但这一事件的主要动因却是两国的国内政治因素。


Rooted in ancient enmities and the legacy of the colonial era, the fighting is damaging the entire region. So virulent is the dispute that even a short-term settlement will require third-party mediation.	这场根植于两国传统对立情绪和殖民时代遗毒的斗争正在侵害整个区域的利益，两方的敌对状态竟然恶化到连一个短期协议都需要第三方从中斡旋。


A secure peace will depend mainly on how the endgame to Thailand’s domestic political crisis plays out in the coming months – and on Cambodia’s willingness to stay out of this process.	而和平能否到来则主要取决于泰国的国内政治危机在未来几个月内如何收尾——此外柬埔寨又是否会插手这一进程。


At issue in the conflict is 4.6 square kilometers that adjoin a millennium-old Hindu temple known as “Preah Vihear” to Cambodians and “Phra Viharn” to Thais.	冲突的核心是一座千年印度教古寺所在的4. 6平方公里区域，寺院名为柏威夏寺，但两方的称谓略有不同（柬方称为“Phra Viharn”而泰方称为“Phra Viharn”）。


Cambodia insists that the disputed land has been under its territorial sovereignty since a landmark case decided by the International Court of Justice in 1962. In its 9-to-3 verdict, the ICJ ruled that Cambodia’s map, drawn up by French surveyors in 1904-1907, put the temple area in Cambodia, and that Thailand (known as Siam until 1939) had not objected previously.	柬埔寨坚称对这一区域拥有主权，因为依照1962年联合国国际法院的边界裁决，法官以9比3的票数认定了由法国勘测人员在1904至1907年间制作的柬埔寨地图，并将古寺区域划在柬埔寨境内，而泰国（在1939年前称为暹罗）事前也并未对此表示反对。


During the hearings, Cambodia asked the ICJ to rule on the adjoining land, but the judges confined their decision only to the temple, as Cambodia originally requested.	在听证会上，柬埔寨请求国际法院对寺庙所处的区域做出裁决，但法官们却只是将裁决限定在柬埔寨原先要求的寺庙之上。


The French-made map became the core of the dispute, because it manipulated natural geographic divisions.	这张法国人测绘的地图随后成为了冲突的核心，因为它修改了两国间的自然地理分界。


Thailand rejects the map, which contravenes a Franco-Siamese agreement in 1904 stipulating a demarcation along a watershed line separating the two countries.	泰国拒不承认这份地图，因为在1904年制定的法国-暹罗协议将古寺附近的一条地理分水线定为两国边界。


Moreover, the French mapping effort took place just a decade after Siam ceded a clutch of territories – much of today’s western Cambodia – to France, which was then perched above Indochina as the colonial master At that time, a vulnerable Siam was compelled to sign a host of unequal treaties with European powers in exchange for maintaining its independence.	此外，当时法国人的地图勘探行动正是在暹罗割让一部分土地——如今柬埔寨西部的大部分地区——给法国的十年后展开的，而法国人正是当年统治整个印度支那半岛的殖民宗主。 势单力薄的暹罗只能被迫与欧洲列强签订一系列不平等的协议以换取自身的独立。


Until recently, the overlapping claims on the 4.6 square kilometers were not a serious issue.	但直到最近几年，对这片4. 6平方公里主权重合地域的争议还不那么严重。


Villagers and merchants from both sides conducted a brisk business and border trade unfettered by the authorities.	两国的边民和商人们都在当局的许可下进行着繁忙的边境贸易。


Bilateral tensions flared when Thai politics heated up after the September 2006 military coup that overthrew the democratically elected prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, on charges of corruption and disloyalty to the monarchy.	然而双边关系在2006年9月之后骤然紧张，当时泰国军方发动政变推翻了民选总理他信·西那瓦，指控他贪污腐败并对王室不忠。


In 2008, after the self-exiled Thaksin’s proxy force, the People’s Power Party, took power following an election victory, the Thai government signed a joint communiqué agreeing to Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site.	到了2008年，在他信流亡国外后的代理人人民力量党在选举胜利上台后，泰国政府签署了一份联合公报，同意柬埔寨将柏威夏寺申报为联合国教科文组织世界遗产。


The communiqué became a lightning rod for Thaksin’s opponents at home, spearheaded by the People’s Alliance for Democracy.	但这份公报也旋即成为了他信反对者手中的致命武器，而其中的领导势力则是泰国人民民主联盟（简称民盟）。


The PAD depicted the UNESCO registration of Preah Vihear as a treasonous sell-out of Thai sovereignty, and used it to destabilize the pro-Thaksin government.	民盟将柏威夏寺注册成为联合国世界遗产的事件描绘成出卖泰国主权的叛国行为，并以此来冲击亲他信政府。


When the PAD seized control of Government House and Bangkok’s two airports, its protest leaders hectored Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and likened him to a hooligan.	当人民民主联盟占据了政府大楼以及位于曼谷的两座机场后，其抗议领袖竟然出言攻击柬埔寨首相洪森并将其比作街头流氓。


Exacerbating matters, the PAD progenitor of that insult became Thailand’s foreign minister after Thaksin’s opponents regained power in December 2008, led by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and reinforced by the army.	更令事态恶化的是，在反对派在2008年12月重夺大权后，这些攻击之词的始作俑者竟然在军方支持的总理阿披实·维乍集瓦内阁当上了外交部长。


At that point, tensions with Cambodia became inevitable.	到了这个时候，泰柬两国之间的紧张局势就变得无法避免。


Hun Sen had scores to settle with the anti-Thaksin coalition of the Democrat Party, the PAD, and the army.	洪森也伺机跟民主党反他信同盟，人民民主联盟和泰国军方算账。


In 2009, Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as economic adviser to the Cambodian government and invited him to deliver a high-profile public address in Phnom Penh.	在2009年，洪森任命他信为柬埔寨政府经济顾问并邀请他在金边发表了一场高规格的公开讲话。


The bilateral relationship has been rocky ever since, alternating between periods of friction and conciliation.	两国关系自那以后就风雨飘摇，在摩擦和调停间反复摇摆。


The spate of armed clashes along the border this year stems from PAD provocations.	而今年爆发的边界武装冲突正是来源于民盟的挑衅行为。


Although some of its members entered the cabinet under Abhisit, PAD leaders felt betrayed and abandoned by Abhisit and some of his powerful backers.	虽然它的其中一些成员进入了阿披实内阁，但民盟领导人却认为自己被阿披实及其背后的势力所出卖和抛弃了。


The PAD’s yellow-clad supporters returned to the streets, this time under the banner of ultra-nationalism over Preah Vihear and a domestic anti-corruption campaign. The PAD has openly called for a military coup to clean up Thai politics.	于是民盟的黄衫军又打着与柏威夏寺有关的极端民族主义和国内反腐败口号再次回到街头，甚至公开要求发动一场军事政变来肃清泰国政治。


The PAD initially found little traction.	人民民主联盟的叫嚣原本并未起到什么作用。


The Thai army stayed out of the Preah Vihear controversy, and Abhisit’s government shrugged off the PAD’s machinations.	对这场古寺争端泰国军方选择置身事外，阿披实政府也作壁上观。


But, as the anti-establishment, pro-Thaksin “red shirts” staged huge protests of their own against the army’s suppression of their fellow demonstrators in April-May of last year, the men in uniform became agitated.	但随着反当权派亲他信的红衫军发动了一场抗议军方在去年4，5月间镇压其示威者的活动时，军方终于被激怒了。


A major tipping point may have been the red-shirt leaders’ allusion to the conspicuous royal silence in response to the army’s violent suppression, which heightened the army’s fear of a clear and present danger to the monarchy.	而其中的一个爆发点可能是红衫军领袖对于泰国王室明显纵容军队暴力镇压的指责，使军方感觉君主制正在受到实实在在的威胁。


The Thai army abandoned its neutral posture and became increasingly belligerent.	于是泰国军方放弃了其中立立场，转而变得好斗起来。


It unilaterally ruled out the presence of regional observers on the Thai-Cambodian border, a deal mediated by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in February.	它单方面拒绝在泰柬边境部署区域观察员的安排，而这一安排是由印尼外交部长马提·纳塔莱加瓦在2月斡旋设立的。


The Abhisit government, congenitally beholden to the army, took its cue and effectively reneged on the Indonesia-brokered peace drive.	而以军方做后台的阿披实政府则接受了这一暗示并随即推翻了由印尼斡旋的和平进程。


It was a blow not only to Indonesia as the chair of Association of Southeast Asian Nations this year, but also to ASEAN itself, particularly given the organization’s quest to become an ASEAN Community by 2015.	这不但等于打了东南亚联盟主席国印尼一个耳光，也是对东南亚联盟本身的当头一棒，尤其是当该组织正寻求在2015年组成东南亚共同体的���候。


If ASEAN is not allowed a mediating role, the Thai-Cambodian spat may wind its way back to the United Nations Security Council, which earlier delegated the issue to ASEAN amidst heavy lobbying by Cambodia and Thailand.	如果东南亚联盟无法从中斡旋，泰柬两国将会求助于联合国安理会，而正是联合国早前在泰柬两国的努力游说下将这一事务委派给东南亚联盟。


Cambodia wants to multilateralize the border conflict as much as Thailand tries to limit it to bilateral negotiations.	柬埔寨希望将这个边境事务国际化，而泰国则试图将其限定在双边谈判的范围内。


Though the Thai-Cambodian border battles have involved tanks and heavy artillery, they are unlikely to degenerate into open, large-scale warfare.	虽然这场边境冲突的双方都出动了坦克和重型火炮，却不太可能演化成公开的大规模武装冲突。


The ASEAN framework acts as a safety net and mutual commercial interests should ultimately prevail.	东南亚联盟的框架起到了一个安全网的作用，而多方的经济利益因素也会最终产生影响。


But sporadic shooting and verbal antagonism between the two sides will continue, as Thailand’s powers-that-be close ranks in a right-wing turn towards the symbols and institutions of royalism, entangling Hun Sen, who should have stayed on the sidelines, in the endgame unfolding in Bangkok.	但双边之间的零星对射和口水仗将依旧持续，因为在曼谷这场争端的最后阶段中，泰国原本立场偏右的当权者已经转而倾向保皇主义，还要加上一个本应置身事外的洪森。


The Beauty in Ugly Elections	丑陋大选中的美丽


Elections in countries that have been strangers to democracy are never pretty, as Afghanistan's recent vote demonstrated and as any election in Iraq is likely to be.	在远离民主的国家举行的大选从来就不美丽，阿富汗不久前的投票和伊拉克选举都属于这种情况。


But electoral flaws are not always the whole picture.	但在这些选举中也不能只看到缺陷。


Consider Kazakhstan, where five million people cast ballots in September for their parliament's lower house.	想想哈萨克斯坦，那里的500万民众今年9月刚刚举行了议会下院的选举。


Western media judged the election a failure.	西方媒体认为这是一次失败的选举。


CNN reported it "neither equitable nor free."	CNN说它"既不平等也不自由。


The Economist snidely referred to the "results" in quotation marks.	" 《经济学家》杂志 也冷嘲热讽，说"选举结果"是个大大的问号。


Most quoted the OSCE's finding that the elections were riddled with "serious shortcomings."	很多媒体都援引欧洲安全与合作组织的调查结论，说这次选举工作存在着"严重的缺陷。 "


Those elections were flawed. But only a small percent of the breaches were the result of deliberate manipulation.	那些选举 是有 缺陷，但也只有很少一部分违规行为是人为操纵的结果。


We were there, and visited eight urban and rural polling places, talked with roughly a hundred voters, election officials and observers, as well as officials from six parties.	选举时我们就在那儿，而且走访了8家城乡投票点，还和大约100名投票民众、选举官员、观察家和6个政党的官方人士进行了交谈。


The majority of shortcomings resulted from organizational ineptitude.	多数缺陷是组织工作不当造成的结果。


The worst cases of outright manipulation occurred when local bureaucrats - all appointed from above - pressured voters to support President Nursultan Nazarbayev's Otan Party.	最糟糕的直接操纵行为恐怕要数上峰任命的地方官僚给投票者施压，要求他们支持总统努尔苏丹·纳扎尔巴耶夫领导的祖国党。


This problem will doubtless persist until more local officials are chosen through elections.	这个问题肯定还会继续下去，直到更多的地方官员也能通过选举的方式产生。


Many, probably most, of the other problems were managerial in nature.	很多其它问题，甚至可能大部分问题还是属于管理缺陷的范畴。


Often, voter lists were incomplete or inaccurate.	选民名单不完整或不准确的情况时常出现。


The head of the Central Electoral Commission has now proposed that members of the local public join election officials and administrators in compiling the lists.	中央选举委员会负责人已经提议：选举名单由当地民众代表和选举官员、管理者共同制定。


Electronic voting, used at 10% of polling stations, also caused problems.	选举中约有10%的投票站采用了电子投票，而这也带来了一些问题。


Even though voters could choose between electronic and paper ballots, difficulties remained, especially among older voters.	尽管投票者可以在电子和纸面投票中进行选择，但还是给一些选民，特别是老年选民带来了困难。


Another problem was the bar code system designed to prevent duplicate voting.	另一个问题就是旨在防止重复投票的条形码系统。


Some qualified voters didn't get their bar codes; others feared that employers might use them to learn how they voted.	有些有投票资格的人没领到条形码，而另外一些人则担心条形码会被老板利用来查询自己的投票结果。


Despite the new election law's assurance of equal coverage in the main media, government TV channels devoted more time to the pro-government parties.	尽管新选举法规定主要媒体要对参选政党进行平等的报道，但官方电视频道还是给了政府支持者们更多的时间。


Protests by some parties that could not afford the high cost of TV spots and billboards mirror similar complaints in the US.	有些政党由于无力支付电视和户外广告高额费用而叫苦不迭，这与美国大选中的情况倒有几分相似。


Far more serious was the lack of transparency in the Central Electoral Commission and the political imbalances on some local commissions.	相比之下，中央选举委员会缺乏透明度和某些地方委员会的政治失衡要严重得多。


Some of this may have been deliberate, but incompetence also played a part.	有些问题可能出于故意，但力所不及也是一个重要的因素。


So how bad was the election?	那么这次选举到底有多糟糕？


Exit polls suggest that ballot totals fairly closely reflect voter choices.	票站口民意调查显示：投票状况基本能够反映选民的意愿。


But how to explain charges of "gross violations" by the Ak Zhol Party, the largest opposition group, or the decision by the Minister of Information, an Ak Zhol candidate, to resign in protest?	可又如何解释最大的反对党Ak Zhol党提出的所谓"严重违规"指控，以及信息产业部长、Ak Zhol党候选人不惜辞职抗议的决定？


Or the 89 charges of violations filed by just one bloc?	还有一个街区的违规指控居然达到89件，这又该做何解释呢？


The ex-minister's charge is disingenuous.	这位前部长的指控并无诚信可言。


He himself presided over many violations, a fact noted by the OSCE back in 1999.	他本人就有不少违规操作，这一点早在1999年就得到了欧洲安全与合作组织的证实。


He resigned only after winning election to parliament.	他是在议会选举获胜后才提出辞职的。


Clearly, Ak Zhol used accusations of impropriety as a weapon against the government parties.	显而易见，Ak Zhol把违规指控当成了攻击执政党最好的武器。


Indeed, many opposition groups engaged in dirty tricks.	实际上，很多反对党也参与了肮脏的阴谋。


Nevertheless, the elections represented significant progress. First, they were competitive.	不过，这次选举还是代表着很大的进步。


The official registration of ten parties, including opposition groups, surpassed any previous election, and the OSCE admitted that voters had "a real choice."	首先，选举的性质是公开竞争，正式登记参选的政党达到了10个，其中也不乏反对党的参与，这都是以前的选举所无法比拟的。 就连"欧洲安全与合作组织"都承认，选民们有了"真正的选择权。


Had systematic manipulation occurred, one-third of the races would not have gone to runoffs.	"如果真的发生了大规模的人为操纵，那么就不会有三分之一的选举需要进入复选。


Moreover, there were real surprises.	不仅如此，选举结果中也出现了真正的意外。


The Asar Party, founded and led by President Nazarbayev's daughter, was expected to claim second place, assuring her eventual succession.	由纳扎尔巴耶夫总统的女儿创建并领导的Asar党曾被看好会获得次席，从而确保她最终能顺利接任。


But, despite ample funding and abundant media access, Asar finished third.	可尽管有充足的资金和无条件的媒体支持，Asar党还是只获得了第三的位置。


At the same time, 17% of all candidates were women, far more than in earlier elections.	此外，此次候选人总数的17%为女性，远远超过了以前女性候选人所创下的记录。


Runoff votes will send more women than ever to Kazakhstan's parliament.	通过最后复选进入哈萨克斯坦议会的女议员人数将是史无前例的。


Turnout was relatively high, at 57% of registered, particularly given that the OSCE had intoned that "public interest does not seem to be high"; other experts wrote of "voter fatigue."	此外，本次投票人数只占到了登记选民总数的57%。 投票之前，欧洲安全与合作组织就说"公众对这次选举的兴趣似乎并不高"，还有其它专家提到了"选民疲劳症。


Defying such sour predictions, voters clearly felt that elections matter.	"面对着这样悲观的预测，选民们显然认识到了选举的重要。


For the first time, parties could make their case in seven debates aired on national television. Many voters changed their choices after watching these.	于是破天荒第一次，各政党可以在电视直播的7场辩论中阐明自己的观点，而很多选民看过直播后都改变了自己原来的选择。


Another first was that observers from all parties monitored the polling.	再一个第一次就是所有政党都派观察员对选举进行了监控。


Thousands of volunteers took their role seriously, producing the complaints that the Prosecutor is now investigating.	成千上万名志愿者认真地完成了这项任务，还引发了对检察院调查的不少抱怨。


Another 1,029 foreign observers came from as far away as India and Thailand.	另外还有1029名国外观察员从印度和泰国远道而来。


The government knew monitors would turn up improprieties, but believes that it has nothing to hide, and much to gain, from honest criticism.	政府知道监察员会举报不正当行为，但却相信在诚实的批评面前，自己不仅不需要隐藏，还能够从中获益匪浅。


Even the experiment with electronic voting machines was a qualified success.	即便是采用电子投票机的试验，也不能不说是一次成功。


The decision to use them should have been made earlier to allow more training, but most voters experienced no problems.	这一决策确实应该提早一些达成，以便给培训留出更充裕的时间。 但实际上，大多数选民在使用过程中没碰到任何问题。


Equally important, no newspapers were closed, stories suppressed, or journalists harassed, as occurred in earlier Kazakh elections.	同样重要的是，这次没有传出关闭报纸、封锁新闻或骚扰记者的报道，而这在哈萨克斯坦以前的选举中都是家常便饭。


Obviously, the election's flaws cannot be swept under the carpet. But nor is Kazakhstan seeking to do so.	选举过程中的缺陷显然不该被掩盖，可哈萨克斯坦也没有试图掩盖。


Public debate about how to improve the system has commenced.	有关如何改进选举体系的公众辩论已经开始。


At the same time, the process as a whole further legitimizes elections in the eyes of people accustomed by Soviet rule to dismissing all votes as charades.	同时开始改变的还有苏联统治下把所有投票都当成一种游戏的习惯。


Kazakhstan deserved the criticism it received from Western election monitors. But it also earned kudos that have been withheld.	西方选举监察员给哈萨克斯坦的批评并不冤枉，但他们同时也获得了印象分。


Kazakhstan's elections mark a big step forward.	哈萨克斯坦的选举是重要进步的标志。


Even an ugly election can be beautiful if it advances democracy - an important lesson for countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.	如果能够推进民主，即便是丑陋的选举也会变得无比美丽－这是阿富汗和伊拉克等国必须学会的重要一课。


The Beginning of the End for Guantánamo	关塔那摩监狱开始走向末路


The “war on terror” has forced democracies to grapple with the extent to which they can afford to protect the civil rights and liberties of both their citizens and foreigners.	“反恐战争”迫使民主国家深思它们可以在多大程度上保护自己的公民和外国人的民权和自由。


The debate has been most intense in the United States, where the refrain that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact” and that national security can justify extraordinary measures is heard repeatedly.	这一争论在美国最为激烈。 在该国，宪法不是“自杀协议”、为了国家安全可以采取超常措施等等老调不绝于耳。


Some measures – unauthorized searches of bank records and wiretapping of telephone calls – compromise the liberty of all.	某些手段，例如未经许可调查银行记录和窃听电话损害所有人的自由。


Others – most notoriously, the confinement of roughly 450 alleged Muslim fighters in Guantánamo Bay – impinge on people thought to be the enemy.	其他措施则影响到被认为是敌人的人们，最臭名昭著的是在关塔那摩湾关押约450名被指称的穆斯林战士。


Amid rising allegations of abuse, President George W. Bush’s government realized some time ago that it could not maintain its Guantánamo detention camp forever.	面对日益增多的虐待传言，布什总统的政府已经意识到无法永远维持关塔那摩监狱。


Yet it did not want to repeat the experience of the Zacharias Moussaoui trial, in which, after many propagandistic appeals from the dock, the alleged twentieth September 11, 2001, hijacker was finally convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.	然而，它不想重复审判穆萨维的体验。 在这个审判中，在被告次数众多的宣传性上诉后，最终宣布这位2001年9月11日的第20位劫机嫌疑犯有罪，处以终生监禁。


So the Bush administration proposed a middle way: a military commission under military judges, which would recognize fewer rights for the accused and bar appeals to civilian courts.	因此布什政府采取了一条中间路线，也就是成立军事法庭，由军事法官负责，军事法庭认可被告的权利较少，并不得向民事法院上诉。


In its recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , the US Supreme Court said “no”: Bush’s exercise of executive power went too far.	美国最高法院在近期的哈姆丹诉拉姆斯菲尔德一案的判决中说“不”。 也就是说布什运用行政权力过分。


As a result, the decision will have a lasting impact on America’s constitutional structure.	最终，这个判决将对美国的宪政结构产生持久的影响。


Salim Ahmad Hamdan served as Osama bin Laden’s personal driver.	哈姆丹是本拉登的私人司机。


Other than drive his boss around and attend meetings, he did nothing more to promote the terrorist attacks of September 2001.	除了开车送老板兜风和参加会议之外，他没有做更多的事情帮助2001年9月的恐怖袭击。


Yet his driving and his knowledge of Al Qaeda’s purposes struck the military as sufficient to charge him with entering a conspiracy to kill civilians and engage in terrorists acts.	然而，他开车接送并且知道基地组织的目标促使军事当局认为足以指控他参与同谋杀害平民和参与恐怖活动。


When his trial began, the prosecution tried to exclude Hamdan from the room during the testimony of a witness against him.	审判开始以后，检察官试图在指证哈姆丹有罪的证人出庭作证时让哈姆丹离开法庭。


The government wanted to protect its sources.	政府想保护人证。


But this unusual procedure, permitted in the military commissions, runs afoul of accepted canons of federal, Constitutional, and international law.	但是这种军事法庭所允许的非常程序违背了联邦法律、宪法和国际法中公认的规则。


The defense immediately sought an injunction in federal court to prevent the trial from continuing.	辩护人立即要求联邦法院下达禁令禁止审判继续进行。


The federal court ruled that under the Geneva Conventions, Hamdan, as a prisoner of war, was entitled to a court hearing that followed the same procedures as one judging soldiers of the detaining power, that is, an American court martial.	联邦法院裁定根据日内瓦公约，哈姆丹作为一名战俘有权参加法庭听证会，听证会应遵循与审判拘留国家士兵的法庭，也就是美国军事法庭同样的程序。


The Supreme Court, however, sidestepped the question of whether Hamdan was a prisoner of war, arguing instead that the conflict was governed by common Article III in all the Geneva Conventions, which regulates armed conflict ”not of an international character.”	然而，最高法院却回避了哈姆丹是不是战俘的问题，主张这场冲突不属于日内瓦公约所有附约共同条款第三条的范围。 该条款调节的是“非国际性质”的武装冲突。


In such cases, there is a duty to guarantee that all sentences are passed “by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”	在此类情况中，有责任保证所有的判决都是由“提供文明社会认为不可或缺的司法保障的正常组建的法院”作出的。


Bush’s military commissions were found to fall below this standard.	调查发现，布什的军事法庭没有达到这个标准。


While the discussion of the Geneva Conventions and procedural rights is important, the more profound portion of Justice John Paul Stevens’ majority opinion addresses the boundaries of the law of war, and specifically whether the conspiracy charge against Hamdan constitutes a violation of this body of customary international law.	虽然有关日内瓦公约和程序性权利的讨论具有重要意义，但是，史蒂文斯法官的多数意见中更为深刻的部分涉及到了战争法的适用范围，特别是对哈姆丹的同谋指控是否违反了习惯国际法中这方面的法规。


Everyone agrees that, under US law, the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to violations of the laws of war, so if conspiracy cannot be charged, Hamdan and others like him cannot be tried in any military courts, not just the ad hoc commissions.	每个人都同意,根据美国法律,军事法庭只能管辖违反战争法的案件，因此，如果不能指控同谋罪，不仅仅是 特别 军事法庭 ， 任何 军事法庭都不能审判哈姆丹和其他与之相似的人。


In order to resolve the question of whether conspiracy constitutes a crime under the laws of war, Justice Stevens followed the arguments made in the brief that I submitted on behalf of Experts on Conspiracy and the Law of War.	为了解决同谋是否属于战争法范畴的问题，史蒂文斯法官接受了我代表同谋和战争法专家组提交的案情摘要中提出的观点。


The law of war, the Court reasoned, must reflect the consensus of all legal systems.	最高法院推理说，战争法必须反映所有法律制度中的共识。


But conspiracy, as a stand-alone offense, is particular to Anglo-American common law.	但是，同谋罪作为一个独立的罪名在英美法系中是一个特例。


This argument has been well known since the Nuremberg trials, which rejected charges of conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.	自从纽伦堡审判以来，这个观点已经为人熟知。 纽伦堡审判拒绝指控同谋犯有战争罪和反人类罪。


Justice Stevens cited Telford Taylor, the chief prosecutor in Nuremberg, who made the same point about the oddity of conspiracy charges in international tribunals.	史蒂文斯法官引用了纽伦堡首席检察官泰勒的观点，泰勒对国家法院中的同谋指控这个难题作出了相同的判断。


Moreover, arguments about international law in the post-WWII period have quietly dropped all references to conspiracy charges.	而且，二战后有关国际法的论述中已经悄无声息地不再提及同谋指控。


This admittedly has not been an explicit process, but the pattern is undeniable.	这诚然不是一个特别明显的过程，但是这种模式却不可否认。


As Justice Stevens wrote, “The crime of ‘conspiracy’ . . . does not appear in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions – the major treaties on the law of war.”	正如史蒂文斯法官所论述的那样：“‘同谋’罪在日内瓦公约和海牙公约这两大战争公约中都没有出现。


He could have added the Rome Statute and UN resolutions establishing the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.	”他本来还可以再加上国际常设刑事法院公约和联合国为前南斯拉夫和卢旺达成立特别法庭的决议案。


The international community’s rejection of conspiracy charges is correct, I believe, because international criminal proceedings are oriented to post hoc justice – to judging those who are alleged to have already brought about massacres and other major crimes that concern the international community.	我认为，国际社会放弃同谋指控是正确的，因为国际司法诉讼是以发生于其后者必然是其结果的司法原则来审判那些被指控进行大屠杀和犯有其它涉及到国际社会的严重罪行的人。


Conspiracy, by contrast, is suited to a legal system that emphasizes early police intervention, before criminal plans are carried out.	与之相反，同谋罪适用于强调在犯罪计划实施之前进行早期警方干预的法律制度。


Early intervention is possible in a domestic legal system, but there is no international police force that could fulfill a similar function.	早期干预在国内法律体系下是可能的，但却没有国际警察能够行使同样的功能。


The Bush administration is now left in an embarrassing position.	布什政府现在陷入了一个尴尬的境地。


It does not want to prosecute the Guantánamo detainees in federal courts, but it is unlikely that it can prosecute them under the law of war as interpreted in the Hamdan decision.	它不愿意在联邦法院起诉关押关塔那摩未在押犯，但是，它也不可能按照哈姆丹判决中对战争法的解释根据战争法来起诉他们。


Although Hamdan recognizes the legitimacy of confining enemy combatants until the end of hostilities, doing so is untenable.	虽然哈姆丹判决认可了在敌对状态结束前拘禁敌方战斗人员的合法性，但是这样做却是站不住脚的。


The international community will not accept this form of massive preventive detention, with continuing allegations of abuse and torture.	随着虐待和拷打的传言越来越盛，国际社会将不会接受这种大规模预防性拘禁方式。


Sooner or later, Bush will have to decide between prosecutions in federal court or closing the camp.	或早或晚，布什都将不得不在向联邦法院起诉还是关闭监狱之间作出选择。


The Bell Tolls for India’s Congress Party	丧钟为印度国大党而鸣


NEW YORK – Politics in Asia’s two giants, India and China, has suddenly turned very uncertain.	纽约—亚洲两强印度和中国的政局突然间变得扑朔迷离起来。


China remains in authoritarian mode, of course.	当然，中国仍然是专制国家。


But egregious human-rights violations and suppression of dissent are raising the specter of growing internal disruptions, particularly in the wake of purges within the top leadership.	但侵犯人权大丑闻和镇压持异见者正在造成越来越严重的内部混乱，特别是高层清洗事件。


By contrast, India, with its firmly rooted liberal democracy, smells to some like roses.	与此相反，印度有着稳固的自由民主根基，与中国相比，它散发着迷人的气息。


But many believe that India, too, faces uncertain political prospects.	但很多人认为印度同样面临着不确定的政治前景。


In particular, there is widespread belief in India today that one of the country’s two main political parties, the Indian National Congress, essentially run by Sonia Gandhi and her son, Rahul Gandhi, has now run its course and will sink into oblivion.	特别是，如今印度人广泛相信该国两大政党之一的国大党（由索尼娅·甘地及其子拉胡尔·甘地实际控制）大势已去，将成明日黄花。


According to The Economist: “The Congress Party…is in a funk” and “in danger of…long-term decline.”	用《经济学人》（Economist）的话说，“国大党……四面楚歌”，“面临长期衰落……的危险” 。


But the Congress has been written off before: the article from The Economist was published in January 2003.	但国大党此前并不是没有“被衰败”过：这篇《经济学人》的文章发表于2003年1月。


Indeed, the uniform prediction prior to the 2004 election was that, after having lost three elections in a row, the Congress was heading for its fourth defeat and eventual dissolution.	事实上，2004年大选前人们普遍预测，在连续遭受三次选举失利后，国大党即将迎来第四次失败并最终解散。


Yet it won that election, and then won a second parliamentary election in 2009.	但最终国大党在选举中胜出，并在2009年再次赢得议会选举。


Politics is, of course, full of reversals of fortune.	当然，政治充满了绝处逢生和运气。


But, unlike in 2004, it is unlikely, for several reasons, that the Congress can survive the dire predicament that it now faces today.	但是，与2004年不同的是，诸多理由表明，这一回国大党将无法从它所面临的绝境中幸存下来。


For starters, in 2004, the Congress was challenging an incumbent government that had served for six years.	首先，2004年国大党挑战的是已经执政了六年的现任政府。


This time, the Congress has formed the incumbent government for two consecutive terms, and its tenure has recently been marked by scandals that have made it look ineffectual, rudderless, and corrupt.	如今，国大党本身是连任两届的现任政府，其党员丑闻缠身，给人们的印象是无用、无能、腐败。


To make matters worse, India is experiencing a sharp economic slowdown, further undermining the Congress’s prospects in elections that must be held no later than June 2014.	更糟糕的是，印度正在经历严重的经济减速，这给国大党在不晚于2014年6月的大选前景蒙上了又一层阴影。


Second, and more important, voter attitudes have shifted significantly during the past decade.	其次，更重要的是，过去十年来选民态度有了很大变化。


Average annual economic growth of 8.5% over the eight-year period from 2003 to 2011 has led to a revolution of perceived possibilities.	2003—2011年间所保持的年均8. 5%的经济增长率极大地改变了人们对不确定性的感觉。


As the economists Poonam Gupta and Arvind Panagariya have demonstrated, voters in most Indian states now support leaders and parties that deliver good economic outcomes, and turn out those who do not.	经济学家古普塔（Poonam Gupta）和帕纳加里亚指出，印度大部分邦的选民如今支持能交出满意经济结果的领导人和党派，反对做不到这一点的领导人和党派。


This marks a major shift from the fatalistic attitudes of the past, which generally helped incumbents, who benefited from voters’ belief that there was no real alternative to existing arrangements.	这标志着过去的宿命论观念已经发生了重大转变，而宿命论观点总是有利于现任政府——选民认为现有安排并不存在实际替代品。


This voting behavior has been reinforced by recent examples of political failure and success.	投票行为的改变可以从最近的政治成败案例中得到印证。


Brazenly corrupt leaders such as Kumari Mayawati of Uttar Pradesh and Digambar Kamat of Goa were each bundled out after one term.	厚颜无耻的腐败领导人，如北方邦的玛雅瓦蒂（Kumari Mayawati）和果阿邦的卡马特（Digambar Kamat），在一个任期之后就被赶下了台。


Meanwhile, positive role models like Nitish Kumar of Bihar, Narendra Modi of Gujarat, and Navin Patnaik of Orissa have all been returned to power as Chief Ministers at least once; all have delivered remarkable results while maintaining an unblemished record of personal integrity.	与此同时，积极的榜样，如比哈尔邦的库马尔（Nitish Kumar）、古吉拉特邦的穆迪（Narendra Modi）和奥里萨邦的帕特奈克（Navin Patnaik），均至少重新夺回首席部长（Chief Minister）之职一次； 交出了令人瞩目的成就，个人记录也没有污点。


The Congress will inevitably be under acute pressure to perform, as the electorate now knows that better performance is not beyond its grasp.	国大党免不了将陷入尖锐的改革压力之中，因为如今的选民已经明白，改善绩效并不是不可能的事情。


Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination over two decades ago created a wave of sympathy for his widow, Sonia, on whose sari-tails the Congress won in 2004.	总理拉吉夫·甘地20多年前的遇刺使得人们对其遗孀索尼娅·甘地产生了强烈的同情，这也是国大党在2004年赢得选举的原因。


Today, no such tragedy is likely to help the Congress.	如今，没有类似的悲剧可以再一次助国大党一臂之力了。


Sonia Gandhi is rumored to have cancer, but, rather than capitalizing on it, she has kept the details within the walls of the Gandhi family compound in New Delhi.      	索尼娅·甘地被传已罹患癌症，但她并没有利用这一点大做文章，而是将它作为甘地家族的内部秘密。


But the real problem is that brand-name politics is increasingly at a discount in India, much as it is in the United States.	但真正的问题还在于像美国一样，名望政治在印度越来越不灵了。


Like the Kennedy and Bush brands, the Nehru-Gandhi label has lost its luster in India.	正如肯尼迪和布什在美国，尼赫鲁-甘地标签在印度已经失去了威力。


That is partly a function of rapidly changing demographics.	这部分是拜人口结构的快速变化所赐。


Individuals born after 1975 now account for a very large proportion of the electorate.	1975年后出生的印度人如今占据着选民相当大的比例。


For these voters, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi are merely historical figures, and are a distant memory even for many voters born before 1975.	对这些选民来说，贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁和英迪拉·甘地只不过是历史人物，即使对1975年以前出生的选民来说，他们也已经是遥远的回忆了。


It is not surprising that Rahul Gandhi proved unable to bring the Congress a victory in a recent election in a constituency that historically had been a bastion of support for his family.	毫不奇怪，最近拉胡尔·甘地没能为国大党赢得历史上一直充当甘地家族票仓的地区选举。


Indeed, the Nehru-Gandhi condominium that has dominated Indian politics has itself undermined the party’s survival prospects by making it immensely difficult for it to recruit and develop new leaders.	事实上，曾经主宰印度政坛的尼赫鲁-甘地联盟使得国大党很难找到和培养新领导人，从而威胁到该党自身的生存。


It is common knowledge that, for the last eight years, Sonia Gandhi has exercised virtually total control within the party.	众所周知，在过去八年中，索尼娅·甘地一直牢牢地把持着国大党。


As a result, no rival to Rahul Gandhi has emerged.	因此没有人能够挑战拉胡尔·甘地。


With Sonia Gandhi in ill health, Rahul unable to connect to the electorate even in his historically “safe” constituency, and the Nehru-Gandhi brand name having lost its appeal, the prospects for the Congress in 2014 look bleak.	随着索尼娅·甘地健康状况的恶化、而拉胡尔连维系传统“安全”选区都做不到，加之尼赫鲁-甘地名望已衰，国大党的2014年选举前景凶多吉少。


Only the outcome will tell whether it can survive.	只有选举结果才能告诉我们国大党是否能够幸存下来。


The Benefits of Chinese FDI	中国FDI的好处


BERKELEY – In a rare act of bipartisanship, the United States Congress recently passed legislation to encourage more inward foreign direct investment.	伯克利—美国两党罕见地合作了。 最近，国会通过了旨在鼓励吸引外国直接投资的法案。


Democrats and Republicans agree that FDI, or “insourcing,” is important to US jobs and competitiveness.	民主党和共和党都同意，外国直接投资（FDI），即“内包”（insourcing）对美国就业和竞争力至关重要。


They are right.	这是正确的。


But, even as they propose new measures to court foreign investors, many members of Congress in both parties harbor deep concerns about FDI from China, on both national-security and economic grounds.	但是，尽管他们提出了新的措施吸引外国投资者，许多国会议员（两党都有）仍对来自中国的FDI忧虑重重，其中既有国家安全方面的顾虑，也有经济方面的担心。


These concerns are unwarranted, and discriminatory policies to restrict such investment are ill-advised.	这类忧虑纯属庸人自扰，采取歧视性政策以限制这类投资更是馊主意。


The US government already has adequate controls in place to review and block FDI from all countries, including China, that pose anti-competitive and national-security risks.	美国政府已经拥有足够的控制力审查和阻挠来自任何国家的FDI，只要它会带来反竞争和国家安全风险，中国也不例外。


Investments that clear these controls benefit the US economy in numerous ways and should be welcomed.	符合这些控制要求的投资会给美国经济带来诸多好处，应该受到欢迎。


Foreign-owned firms in the US account for 5% of private-sector employment, 17% of manufacturing jobs, 21% of exports, 14% of research and development, and 17% of corporate-income taxes.	在美国，外国所有企业贡献了5%的私人部门就业，17%的制造业就业，21%的出口，14%的研发和17%的公司所得税。


Recognizing FDI’s significant contributions to the US economy, President Barack Obama’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness endorsed the administration’s new Select USA program to coordinate government-wide efforts to promote it.	奥巴马总统的就业和竞争力委员会（Council on Jobs and Competitiveness）认识到FDI对美国经济的重大贡献，因此大力支持政府的新“选择美国”（Select USA）计划，通过协调政府行为促进FDI。


To be sure, the US remains the world’s leading destination for FDI, accounting for 15% of global flows.	实事求是地说，美国仍是世界最大的FDI目标国，占全球FDI流量的15%。


But its share is declining, while China, using both carrots (like tax holidays and special enterprise zones) and sticks (like explicit and implicit local-content requirements) to attract foreign companies, has become the second-largest destination.	但美国所占份额正在下降，而中国通过胡萝卜（如免税期和特别企业区）加大棒（如直接或间接的本地条件要求）吸引了大量外国公司，已成为FDI的第二大目标国。


China has remained a small source of FDI outflows, but that, too, is changing rapidly. Chinese outward FDI soared from an average of $3 billion per year before 2005 to $60 billion in 2010, catapulting China into the top five sources of FDI on a three-year moving-average basis.	在对外FDI方面，中国仍是小国，��也在迎头赶上，由2005年之前的平均每年30亿美元升高到了2010年的600亿美元，一跃成为世界前五FDI母国（用三年移动平均值衡量）。


Given the size of China’s economy, its growth rate, and the experience of other developing economies, FDI from China is likely to increase by $1-2 trillion by 2020.	考虑到中国经济的规模、增长率以及其他发展中国家的经验，来自中国的FDI将在2020年提高1—2万亿美元。


An increase in FDI outflows is a priority in China for two reasons.	中国将对外FDI作为当务之急，是出于两大原因。


First, China has an understandable interest in diversifying its substantial holdings of foreign-exchange reserves away from low-yielding US Treasuries to real productive assets with higher returns.	首先，不难理解，中国很想让其巨额外汇储备多样化，不再绑定于低收益的美国国债，而是进军回报率更高的实体生产性资产。


That is why China established its sovereign-wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, and why CIC decision-makers are seeking more FDI opportunities.	这就是为什么中国要成立自己的主权财富基金——中投公司，也是为什么中投公司决策者要寻找更多的FDI机会。


Second, China’s businesses have been encouraged to “go global” and invest abroad to find new markets, secure access to energy and raw materials, and enhance their competitiveness by acquiring new technologies, brands, and management skills.	其次，中国企业被鼓励“走向全球”，到海外去投资，以寻找新的市场、确保能源和原材料通道、并通过收购新技术、品牌和管理技能加强竞争力。


In a recent report, the People’s Bank of China urged Chinese companies to acquire foreign firms as the first stage of a ten-year plan to ease China’s capital-market restrictions – long a goal of US policymakers.	在其最新报告中，中国人民银行敦促中国公司把收购外国企业作为中国资本市场管制放松十年计划的第一步，而这一目标也是美国决策者早就制定了的。


So far, China’s FDI outflows have been concentrated in developing countries and a handful of resource-rich developed countries, including Australia and Canada, and have been aimed at facilitating trade and acquiring access to natural resources.	到目前为止，中国对外FDI集中于发展中国家和一小撮资源丰富的发达国家（如澳大利亚和加拿大），主要目标是促进贸易和收购自然资源。


But the patterns and destinations of China’s outward FDI will change as rising wages, an appreciating real exchange rate, and the entry of new suppliers from other emerging countries erode Chinese companies’ competitiveness, motivating them to invest abroad to upgrade their technology and management capabilities, find new growth opportunities, and move up the value chain.	但随着工资上涨、汇率升值以及其他新兴国家新供应者的进入侵蚀了中国公司的竞争力，中国对外FDI的模式和目标地将发生变化，其投资目的也变为提高技术和管理能力、寻找新的增长机会以及提升自己在价值链中的地位。


Currently, the US receives only about 2-3% of FDI flows from China.	目前，中国对外FDI中只有2—3%流向了美国。


But China’s direct investments in the US have increased rapidly, from less than $1 billion annually in 2003-2008 to more than $5 billion per year in 2010-2011.	但中国在美国的直接投资增长很快，从2003—2008年的不到10亿美元增加到了2010—2011年的50亿美元（年投资量）。


At least 38 US states now host FDI projects from China, and competition for Chinese investment has intensified as states’ budgets have contracted.	至少有38个美国州存在来自中国的FDI项目，而随着各州预算情况吃紧，争夺中国投资的竞争也日趋激烈。


Of course, alongside the potential economic benefits of attracting a much larger share of Chinese FDI, legitimate competitive and national-security concerns do need to be addressed.	当然，尽管大力争取中国对外FDI份额能带来潜在的经济利益，合理的竞争和国家安全考虑也是必要的。


First, like all mergers and acquisitions involving both domestic and foreign investors, investments in or acquisitions of US companies by Chinese companies, whether state-owned or private, must be evaluated by the US Justice Department for their impact on market competition.	首先，与所有包括国内和国外投资者的并购活动一个样，中国公司（不管是国有企业还是民营企业）投资或收购美国公司都必须接受美国司法部对其收购行为对市场竞争的影响的评估。


Investments with significant anti-competitive effects must be modified or blocked.	存在重大反竞争效应的投资必须要求修改或予以禁止。


Second, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) must screen investments in or acquisitions of US companies by foreign companies, including Chinese companies, for national-security risks.	其次，外国对美投资委员会（Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States，CFIUS）必须密切审查外国公司（包括中国公司）投资或收购美国公司所带来的国家安全风险。


Such screening is a common and justifiable practice around the world.	这类审查属于全球惯例，无可置喙。


In recent years, CFIUS has defined national security broadly to encompass not only defense activities and dual-use technologies, but also critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy, and transport – areas of particular interest to Chinese companies.	近几年来，CFIUS把国家安全定义得相当广泛，不但包括防务行为和军民两用技术，还包括关键性基础设施（如通信、能源和交通），而后者正是中国公司最感兴趣的领域。


Many Chinese investors view the CFIUS screening process as protectionist and targeted at them, but there is no evidence of this.	许多中国投资者把CFIUS的审查过程视为保护主义、是专门针对中国投资者的行为，但并无迹象表明确实如此。


The United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Israel accounted for more than half of all CFIUS cases reviewed in 2008-2010, while China accounted for only about 5%.	英国、加拿大、法国和以色列占据了2008—2010年CFIUS审查案的一大半，而中国只占5%。


Only a small fraction of Chinese FDI in the US is subject to CFIUS review, and most of these projects, like most reviewed by CFIUS, are approved, sometimes with mitigation measures.	中国的在美FDI只有一小部分被CFIUS审查，这些项目中大多数都获得了批准，有时候会在于些许小挫折，与CFIUS的绝大多数审查案并无二致。