Allegations like these have whipped up nationalism, hatred, and anti-Western hysteria, distracting Russians from Putin's culpability for their country's economic crisis.	类似的指控助长了民族主义、仇恨和反西方西斯底里，将俄罗斯人的注意力从普京对俄罗斯经济危机的责任上移开。


As menacing as Putin's Russia may be, however, nothing about it is original.	但是，普京的俄罗斯尽管吓人，其所有行为都不是原创。


In 1934, Joseph Stalin, too, ordered a thorough investigation into the murder of a rival: Sergei Kirov, the head of the Communist Party in Leningrad.	1934年，斯大林也下令彻底调查其对手、列宁格勒共产党首脑基洛夫被杀案。


The NKVD, the precursor to the KGB, orchestrated the assassination on Stalin's order, but the inquiry gave the Soviet dictator a pretext for eliminating other opponents.	克格勃的前身内务部根据斯大林的指令实施了这次暗杀，但调查给了这位苏联独裁者一个借口清洗反对派。


The search for Kirov's murderers eventually culminated in the Great Terror, a massive purge of Party leaders, military commanders, and intellectuals.	追查杀害基洛夫的凶手的过程最后演变为大清洗，大量苏共领导人、军官和知识分子被杀。


Putin may not have ordered the hit on Nemtsov or any of the others.	普京也许没有下令除掉涅姆佐夫和其他所有人。


But, like Stalin, he has nurtured a climate of fear and lawlessness, in which those who rally behind the Kremlin feel a duty to eliminate the leader's opponents however they can, and in anticipation of his will.	但是，与斯大林一样，他营造了一种恐惧和无法的气候，让克里姆林宫背后的团体觉得有责任竭尽全力揣摩领袖的意愿除掉他的反对者。


An atmosphere in which unlawful deeds become heroic acts was a signature feature of Stalin's rule.	不法行为成为英雄壮举的气氛是斯大林统治的一大特征。


That stifling dynamic has returned under Putin.	这一令人窒息的动态在普京手里有了改变。


During the darkest days of the Soviet Union, the chiefs of the NKVD were the country's second most important officials.	在苏联最黑暗的时期，内务部头目是苏联第二重要的官员。


Today, Andrei Lugovoi, the KGB agent that the British government suspects of delivering the polonium that killed Litvinenko, sits in the Russian Duma.	如今，安德烈·卢戈沃伊（Andrei Lugovoi，克格勃特工，英国政府怀疑是他用钋投毒杀了利特维年科）在俄罗斯杜马供职。


So what will happen next?	接下来会发生什么？


Will Putin, like Stalin, unleash his own great terror, and murderously pursue supposed adversaries?	普京会像斯大林那样制造属于他的大恐慌、以杀戮手段对付认定的对手吗？


Or will Nemtsov's death finally move complacent and obedient Russians to action?	还是涅姆佐夫之死最终将驱使满足而顺从的俄罗斯人行动起来？


In the first decade of this century, it was easy to love Putin.	本世纪的头一个十年让你很容易爱上普京。


He made Russians rich, cosmopolitan, and respected.	他让俄罗斯人变得富有、放眼全球、赢得尊重。


Today, as low oil prices and Western sanctions bite, he is making them poor and nearly universally despised.	如今，随着石油价格下跌和西方制裁影响，他正在让俄罗斯人变穷并遭到近乎全世界人民的唾弃。


On March 1, the day Nemtsov was to lead his protest, tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets with slogans like “Nemtsov is love, Putin is war."	3月1日是涅姆佐夫原定领导示威的日子，数万俄罗斯人走上街头，打着“涅姆佐夫是爱，普京是战争”之类的标语。


Could it be that Russia's culture of impunity has reached an inflection point?	俄罗斯的逍遥法外文化是否到达了一个拐点？


Putin's regime relies on the promise of economic prosperity, without which it could begin to unravel – if not as a result of mass protest, then because insiders no longer have a stake in its political survival.	普京政权依赖于经济繁荣的承诺，没有这一承诺，其政权就会开始崩溃——如果不是因为大规模示威的话、随后内部人士不再能从普京政权的存在中获益的话。


At that point, when Putin is at his most vulnerable, his allies will have to act carefully – and keep looking over their shoulders.	到那时，普京将十分脆弱，他的盟友必须小心行事——并且看好自己的脑袋。


Neo-Liberalism Meets Neo-Confucianism	新自由主义遭遇新儒教


The West has dominated the world ever since the industrial revolution.	西方自工业革命以来就主导着世界。


Today that dominance seems threatened by the East Asian heirs to Confucianism, the ideology par excellence of state cohesion.	而今天，这一主导地位似乎正面临着来自东亚的儒教后人的威胁。 儒教是国家凝聚力的最佳意识形态。


Centuries of inculcation with Confucianism was as important to the rise of East Asia’s hyper-growth economies as the conjunction of Protestantism and the rise of capitalism was to the west.	数千年来儒教的谆谆教诲之于东亚的经济崛起，就如同新教之于西方资本主义的崛起一样重要。


Confucianism’s tenets still provide an inner compass to most East Asians in a post-Confucian age, just as Biblical admonitions remain standards for the West in a post-religious age.	儒教的原则在后儒教时代的东亚仍然为人们提供着内在的指引，正如《圣经》的训诫仍然是后宗教时代的西方不可或缺的标准一样。


The basic thrust of Confucianism has changed little since Confucius’s disciples recorded his aphorisms a generation before Socrates.	自从孔子的门徒在早于苏格拉底的一代人以前将其格言辑录成册以来，儒教的本质几乎没有发生过变化。


Indeed, Confucianism became the official ideology of the Chinese state two centuries before the birth of Christ.	的确，在耶稣基督诞生的两百年之前，中国就已经将儒教确立为官方的意识形态了。


Confucianism was essentially a philosophical justification of government by benevolent bureaucracy under a virtuous ruler.	儒教实质上是对一个在有德行的统治者治理下的仁爱的官僚政府的哲学辩护。


Virtue ensured harmony between man and nature, as well as obedience within a stratified society.	“德”确保了人与自然的和谐，以及在等级森严的社会中的顺从状态。


As one Confucian classic put it: Possessing virtue will give the ruler the people.	正如孔子在其儒学经典《大学》中所言：有德，此有人；


Possessing the people will give him the territory.	有人，此有土；


Possessing the territory will give him its wealth.	有土，此有财；


Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure.	有财，此有用。


Virtue is the root; wealth is the result.	德者本也，财者，末也。


During the neo-Confucian renaissance of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a metaphysical dimension was added to fill a gap exposed by Buddhism’s inroads into China.	在11和12世纪新儒教复兴中，又增添了一个形而上的层面，以弥合儒教在佛教传入中国的过程中所暴露出的不足。


Thereafter, a good Confucian could, with untroubled conscience, scorn the Buddhist renunciation of the world.	至此以后，凡有着平和良知的儒教追随者都会蔑视佛教徒的出家。


This restatement of fundamental precepts restored Confucianism to a primacy in China and neighboring states that remained unchallenged for 700 years.	这一对根本原则的重述，重新确立了儒教在中国以及其邻国中整整700年至高无上的地位。


Neo-Confucianism provided the basic ideology for China’s admiring neighbors – Japan, Korea, and Vietnam – until the advent of the West.	在西方介入之前，新儒教为中国那些诚服的邻邦—日本、朝鲜和越南—提供了基本的意识形态。


Its tenets were highly appropriate to the settled, sophisticated agrarian civilizations of pre-nineteenth-century East Asia, for they knitted together society and polity in a manner calculated to promote stability and harmony.	其原则在19世纪以前稳定、世故的东亚农业文明中备受推崇。 因为它们精当地将社会和政治组织结合起来以促进稳定与和谐。


The ultimate guarantee of harmony was the ruler’s justness, which permitted him to enjoy the “mandate of heaven”; the people had a right, indeed an obligation, to rebel against a tyrant.	和谐的终极保证是统治者的公平，这使他能够行使“天降大任”； 人民有权利，甚至可说是有义务反抗暴君。


But while the ethical basis of Neo-Confucianism was crucial, the Chinese also understood the need for a morally motivated bureaucracy, and thus perfected in the seventh century the world’s first examination system for selecting bureaucrats, with the Confucian canon as the syllabus.	虽然新儒教的伦理基础至关重要，但中国人同时也明白具有高度的道德操守的官僚体系的必要性。 于是他们在7世纪完善了世界上第一个以儒教经典为课程大纲的选拔官员的科举制度。


Of course, the Neo-Confucian system was not immune to mankind’s appetites.	当然，新儒教的体系并非能够摆脱人的欲望。


Many Confucian emperors were brutal.	许多儒家的皇帝都是残暴的。


Yet stability was achieved.	但稳定的局面还是实现了。


There was only one change of dynasty in China between 1368 and the end of the imperial era in 1911.	从1368年到1911年封建帝制终结，中国只有过一次朝代更替。


The Tokugawa Shoguns, who completed the reunification of Japan in 1600, remained in power for more than two and a half centuries.	德川幕府的将军们在1600年统一了日本，其后继续掌权两个半世纪。


In Korea, the Yi dynasty ruled from 1382 until the Japanese conquest of 1910.	在朝鲜，李朝的统治从1832年一直延续到1910年日本人的征服。


Periodic civil strife and rebellion were not eliminated, but only in Vietnam was the longevity of a dynasty a cloak for inextinguishable internecine warfare.	周期性的内部冲突和叛乱没有被根除，但只有在越南，朝代的长盛不衰才成为持续内战的庇护。


Like a happy and secure childhood, Confucian civilization bestowed upon its practitioners the self-confidence to meet the challenge of the West.	正如一个快乐的童年对人的影响一样，儒教文明给予其奉行者面对西方挑战的自信。


Since Confucianism was essentially an agnostic ideology, concerned with the management of the visible world, the post-Confucians experienced little of the spiritual angst that afflicted Hindus, Muslims, and Christians in their collision with the “materialism” of industrial society.	由于儒教在本质上是一种不可知论的意识形态，只关注可见的世界的管理，所以后儒家弟子们几乎没有经历过那种印度教徒、穆斯林和基督徒在与工业社会的“唯物主义”的冲突中所引发的精神痛苦的折磨。


Confucian civic culture also provided the basis for a long history of successful self-government.	儒家的公民文化也为成功自治的漫长历史奠定了基础。


East Asians entered the modern world of nation states in self-consciously discrete secular units.	东亚的人们以一种自觉分散的世俗单位的形式进入了现代民族国家。


By contrast, the Indian subcontinent, with two major religions and a dozen major linguistic groups, was united in modern times only under British rule.	相比之下，有着两种主要宗教和十数种主要语族的印度次大陆，则只有在英国的统治之下才在现代得以统一。


Applied learning is the key to the post-Confucian states’ success.	实用的知识是后儒教国家成功的关键。


Confucian literati, shunning manual labor, grew their fingernails long, but they never displayed antipathy towards the world of affairs.	儒家的文人避免体力劳动，留着长指甲，但他们却并从不对世事表示憎恶。


The Chinese myth of success was the bright peasant boy whose village clubbed together to educate him and whose subsequent success resulted in the elevation of all who had helped him on his way into the civil service.	中国人成功的秘诀在于，一个聪明的农家少年所在的村庄不遗余力地为他提供教育，而在他成功踏上仕途的过程中，所有帮助过他的人的地位都得以提升。


Ideally, state and family were mirror images.	理想地说，国与家是镜像。


The emperor was the supreme paterfamilias, his benevolent rule reciprocated by the obedience of his ministers and subjects, while family members were fixed in their appropriate hierarchical relationships.	皇帝是至高无上的家长，他以德治人，以回报大臣和国民的顺从，同时家庭成员之间都有着固定的等级关系。


Families and nations that obeyed together stayed together.	家庭与民族共同顺从也相互依存。


Meiji Japan grasped the advantages of making the nation a macrocosm of the family.	明治时期的日本充分发挥了将国家作为宏观意义上的家庭的优势。


An imperial order in 1890 outlined the objectives of education: the Confucian concepts of loyalty, obedience, and filial piety were to be transferred from the family to the nation.	1890年颁布的一道圣谕指出了教育的目标：将忠诚、顺从和孝行的儒家思想从家庭转移到整个国家。


At about the same time, the Chinese scholar Yen Fu – whose translations of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Montesquieu were read even by the young Mao – also concluded that filial piety fostered habits of disciplined subordination to authority that could be applied to the factory and the polity.	几乎与此同时，中国学者严复—他所翻译的亚当斯密、米尔、斯宾塞和孟德斯鸠的作品甚至被年轻的毛泽东读过—也总结说忠孝所培养出的服从上级、遵守纪律的习惯可以运用到工厂和政治组织之中。


During the past century, the post-Confucian states have accustomed themselves to a pluralistic world of theoretically equal nation states.	在过去的一个世纪里，后儒教国家已经习惯了一个由理论上平等的民族国家所组成的多元世界。


But it is difficult to know how deep that adjustment has gone.	然而，要了解这样的调整究竟达到了怎样的深度是困难的。


If the West is perceived to be attempting to maintain the leadership it snatched 200 years ago by industrializing first, thereby denying the post-Confucians the fruits of their dynamism permanently, the Chinese, in particular, will conclude that pluralism is eyewash and that the West’s worldview in fact replicates their traditional one.	如果西方被认为是想维持它在200年前通过率先工业化所攫取的领导地位，因而要永久地否认后儒教国家活力的成果，那么，中国人尤其会认为多元化不过是表面文章，而西方的世界观也不过是对他们传统世界观的复制罢了。


Today’s trade and currency battles would then become a Kulturkampf.	今天的贸易和货币之争就会因此变成一场文化之战。


In a few decades, when China’s economy equals America’s in size, the winner will be hard to pick.	数十年以后，当中国的经济规模与美国向当时，就很难决出胜者。


Better for the West to accept equality now – and struggle to maintain it.	西方最好现在就接受平等—并努力维持。


Trouble in Nepali Paradise	尼泊尔天堂的麻烦


NEW DELHI – Away from the glare of global headlines, Nepal is grappling with a constitutional crisis that could once again propel the tourist mecca, sensitively situated between India and China, into full-fledged conflict.	新德里—在全球媒体未予关注之处，尼泊尔正在经历一场宪政危机。 这场危机可能导致这个位于印度和中国之间敏感地带的旅游胜地陷入全面的冲突。


From 1996 to 2006, Nepal was wracked by a brutal civil war that pitted a Maoist insurgency against the long-ruling monarchy, whose powerful army initially enjoyed the support of the country's democratic political parties.	从1996年至2006年，尼泊尔饱受残酷内战摧残，毛泽东主义者反叛长期执政的王室，强大的王军起初得到了尼泊尔民主政党的支持。


Peace (brokered by India, with active United Nations support) came only after the Maoists and the democrats agreed in 2005 to establish a Constituent Assembly.	和平（由印度牵线，联合国也给予了积极的支持）在毛泽东主义者和民主派2005年同意建立立宪大会后才得以实现。


The first election was held in 2008, two years after a “people's movement" forced King Gyanendra to abdicate.	第一次选举在2008年进行，此时“人民运动”迫使贾南德拉国王下台已经过去了两年。


In that election, the Maoists emerged as the largest party, winning 240 of the 601 seats.	在这场选举中，毛泽东主义者成为最大政党，赢得601个议席中的240席。


Then came long-established forces like the Nepali Congress, a social-democratic party modeled on its Indian namesake, and the moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), which, despite its name, is committed to electoral politics within a democratic system.	紧随其后的是尼泊尔国大党（Nepali Congress以同名印度政党为模式成立的社会民主党）和温和的尼泊尔共产党（马克思主义和列宁主义联合阵线，尽管名叫共产党，但其宗旨是民主制度下的选举政治）等老牌力量。


And new mobilized parties of Nepal's southern plains, representing the Madhesi people, won 80 seats on a platform of greater federalism, ensuring that no single party or grouping could dominate the assembly.	尼泊尔南部平原新动员成立的政党（代表玛德西（Madhesi）族，以更广大的联邦主义为宗旨）赢得80席，这意味着没有一个政党或集团可以主导立宪大会。


But this balance devolved into paralysis, as the parties consistently failed to overcome their differences to make progress toward a constitution.	但这一平衡滑向了瘫痪，各政党始终无法克服不同，朝制定宪法的防线前进。


The deadlock spilled over into the country's politics, with shifting coalitions forming four successive governments that collapsed within months, each time in a welter of recrimination from the parties that had been excluded.	僵局的影响溢出到尼泊尔政坛，组成四个后继政府的不同执政联盟无不在几个月内就分崩离析，每次都因为排除在执政联盟外的政党的诘难而夭折。


In 2012, the Supreme Court intervened, decreeing that the Constituent Assembly had outlasted its mandate, and installed an interim unity government led by the chief justice.	2012年，最高法院出手干预，裁定立宪大会权力到期，并成立了由首席大法官领导的过渡联合政府。


In 2013, it ordered new elections that changed the political balance, with the Nepali Congress emerging as the largest party and forming a coalition government with the Communists.	2013年，它下令进行了改变了政治平衡的新选举，尼泊尔国大党成为最大政党并与尼泊尔共产党建立了联合政府。


The Maoists were left with only 80 seats, and the Madhesi forces with 50.	毛泽东主义者只获得80席，玛德西力量则获得50席。


The new government made a public commitment to deliver a new constitution by January 22, 2015.	新政府公开承诺在2015年1月22日制定完成新宪法。 但是，尽管国大党总理科伊拉拉（Sushil Koirala）及其共产党副总理奥利（K.


But, though the Congress prime minister, Sushil Koirala, and his Communist deputy, K.P. Oli, have presided over a more stable country, they have been unable to forge consensus on a new constitution.	P. Oli）带来了更稳定的国家，但仍不能形成关于新宪法的共识。


The parties remain sharply divided on several fundamental questions.	各政党在一些根本问题上仍存在尖锐冲突。


Should a new, federal Nepal be divided into states along a north-south axis, as the ruling parties prefer, even though this would give the dominant hill castes of the north a majority everywhere?	新的尼泊尔联邦应该按照执政党偏好的那样沿南北轴线分割成州，即使这将导致北方主宰种姓在所有地区都赢得多数？


Or should the new states be delineated according to local ethnic identities, giving minority groups a sense of ownership of at least part of the country?	或者，新州应该根据地方民族成分划分，让少数群体成为这个国家至少一部分的所有者？


Should Nepal adopt a parliamentary system, an executive presidency, or some combination of the two?	尼泊尔应该采取议会制度、总统制，还是两者兼取？


Should it employ the British first-past-the-post electoral system traditionally used on the Indian subcontinent, or should it institute a form of proportional representation?	尼泊尔应该采取印度次大陆传统上所采用的英式简单多数选举制度，还是采取比例代表制？


Perhaps the most important conflict is over how such questions should be settled.	也许最重要的冲突是这些问题如何解决。


The opposition Maoist-Madhesi alliance wants the decision rule to be consensus, whereas the exasperated government proposes requiring a two-thirds majority.	反对派毛泽东主义-玛德西联盟希望以共识为决策规则，而恼怒不已的政府提出采用三分之二多数制。


Constituent Assembly Chairman Subash Chandra Nembang has attempted to resolve the problem his own way, preparing questionnaires on disputed constitutional issues that, if used, would effectively institute a majority process.	立宪大会主席内姆邦（Subash Chandra Nembang）试图以自己的方式解决这一问题，他制作了有争议的宪法草案的调查表。 如果宪法草案采用，将在事实上引入多数程序。


The opposition has since boycotted all Constituent Assembly proceedings.	此后，反对派便抵制一切立宪大会议程。


The opposition parties have gained wide support for their position, with Nepal's largest media organizations, key civil-society leaders, minority activists, and women's groups all opposing the ruling coalition's effort to railroad a constitution through the Constituent Assembly.	反对党的立场赢得了广泛支持，尼泊尔最大的媒体组织、重要公民社会领袖、少数派活动家和妇女群体都反对执政联盟通过立宪大会强行推行宪法的做法。


India, too, supports an inclusive approach, having recognized from its own experience of managing diversity the importance of providing minority groups with a sense of security.	印度也支持包容方针，从自身管理多样性的经验中，印度认识到为少数群体提供安全感十分重要。


And the United Nations Security Council has called for an inclusive constitution with the broadest possible support.	联合国安理会也呼吁制定赢得最广泛支持的包容性宪法。


Yet Nepal's ruling coalition remains convinced that it has the numbers to achieve its preferred outcome.	但尼泊尔执政联盟仍认为它拥有实现其自身所骗好的结果的数量。


The result is a profound cleavage that carries serious risks.	结果是十分危险的深刻分裂。


The conflict is already spilling into the streets, with opposition-called strikes paralyzing daily life in large parts of Nepal.	冲突已经蔓延到街头，反对派所谓的罢工导致尼泊尔大部日常生活瘫痪。


And, unless the constitutional crisis is resolved soon, the strikes will be only the beginning.	除非宪政危机很快得到解决，否则罢工只是起点。


The Maoists are disenchanted with the democratic process.	毛泽东主义者不再对民主程序抱有幻想。


The monarchists are hoping for a return to absolutism.	君主制拥护者希望回归专制。


Centralists view federalism as a fig leaf for secession.	中间派将联邦主义视为分裂的幌子。


And ethnic separatists of various hues are indeed seeking autonomy.	各种派别的种族分裂主义者也已经开始寻求自治。


With all sides keeping their powder dry, failure to reach a constitutional settlement could plunge Nepal back into war.	各方各派都是剑拔弩张，无法实现宪政解决方案将让尼泊尔再次陷入战争。


It probably would not take long to raise the resistance.	也许过不了多久就会出现抵抗。


The Maoists disbanded their 19,000-member army in 2011-2012, integrating 1,500 fighters into the regular army and pensioning off the rest.	毛泽东主义者在2011—2012年间遣散了19 000人规模的军队，1 500名战士转为常备军，其他人则退役。


But many observers believe that the veterans could easily be reactivated and equipped from hidden arms caches.	但许多观察者认为这些老兵很容易就能重新动员并用藏匿的武器武装起来。


Open fighting in Nepal would not be good for China or India, both of which fear a flashpoint between them.	尼泊尔公开交火对中国和印度都不利，两国担心中间夹着一个火药桶。


If, as is believed, China is sympathetic to the Maoists, it could ultimately be dragged, in some capacity, into a war in Nepal.	如果如所信的那样中国对毛泽东主义者持���情态度，则其可能最终以某种方式介入尼泊尔的战争。


But it is India – which maintains open borders with Nepal, and received millions of Nepali refugees during the civil war – that probably has the most at stake, as renewed conflict would destabilize India's hill districts, while leaving its Himalayan borders vulnerable to Chinese encroachment.	但受影响最大的可能还是印度，因为心冲突可能动摇印度喜马拉雅山区，导致山区与中国接壤地区极易受到侵犯。 印度与尼泊尔保持边境开放，内战期间曾接受过数百万尼泊尔难民。


In this context, India must make a strong diplomatic push to help resolve the conflict, even at the risk of fueling resentment among Nepalese, who are wary of foreign interference.	在这一背景下，印度必须以强力外交手段帮助解决冲突，哪怕因此助长担心外部干预的尼泊尔人的不满。


Soon, the snow in the hills above Kathmandu will begin to melt.	很快，加德满都之上的群山就会积起雪来。


But Nepal's political landscape is showing no sign of a thaw.	但尼泊尔的政治局势表明融雪遥遥无期。


Paradise has never seemed more fraught.	天堂从未如此令人忧愁。


These are testing times in Shangri-La.	这是香格里拉的考验时刻。


The Lesson of Nepal	尼泊尔的教训


LONDON – A disaster happens. Bilateral aid is promised.	伦敦——灾难发生后，国际社会承诺双边援助。


Then the waiting game begins.	之后就开始了漫长的等待过程。


It is a pattern that is all too common, and it is one that, sadly, is being repeated in Nepal.	这种模式太过平常，可悲的是，它现在正在尼泊尔重演。


More than a week after the earthquake and aftershocks killed more than 7,000 people and devastated the capital, Kathmandu, and despite the mobilization of massive amounts of aid from international agencies, the country’s finance minister had yet to receive any of the money promised by foreign countries.	在死亡七千余人并摧毁首都加德满都的地震和余震发生一个多星期后，尽管大量国际机构承诺给予援助，但尼泊尔财长至今为止尚未收到一分钱的国外援助。


Disaster aid for education in such circumstances almost always flows far too slowly, because there is no central pool of funds available to be distributed when a crisis erupts.	因为在危机爆发时缺乏可用的中央资金池，导致上述状况下的教育援助几乎总是太过缓慢。


And for the children of Nepal, the consequences are doubly devastating.	对尼泊尔儿童而言，地震的后果具有双倍的破坏力。


More than 1.7 million children require immediate aid, according to UNICEF Australia.	按照澳大利亚联合国儿基会的统计，需要紧急援助的儿童超过170万。


More than 16,000 schools have been damaged, including some 5,000 that were completely destroyed.	16,000多所学校被毁，其中5，000所已经被彻底毁坏。


Of the 500 schools in the hard-hit Gorkha district, 450 have been leveled or are now derelict.	遭受地震重创的廓尔喀地区共有500所学校，其中的450所已经被夷为平地，或者处于废弃状态。


The United Nations is doing what it can.	联合国正在尽全力救灾。


According to the UN resident coordinator, there has been a quick airlift and supply of materials – such as the well-known “School in a Box,” a pre-packaged educational kit suitable for teaching up to 40 children, Early Childhood Development Kit, and Recreation Kits – for displaced boys and girls.	按照联合国驻地协调员的说法，联合国组织了快速空运和物资供给——尽人皆知的“箱式学校”就是个例子。 这是一种预先打包好、可以容纳40名儿童同时上课的教育套件，此外还有为流离失所的男孩和女孩准备的早期儿童开发和休闲娱乐套件。


In the meantime, the best that can be hoped for Nepal’s children is that tents and shelters can be brought in to create Child-Friendly Spaces.	与此同时，唯有期待运来的帐篷和庇护所能为尼泊尔儿童创造适宜儿童成长的空间。


An entire education system is under threat.	尼泊尔的整个教育系统都在遭受威胁。


Schools that remain intact are now housing the homeless, and school buses have been requisitioned to help victims travel out of Kathmandu.	无家可归的人们住进了完好的学校，校车也被征用将地震受害者运出加德满都。


As the death toll spirals upward and the full horror unfolds, much of the relief effort is on hold, unable to move ahead until the funds that have been promised arrive – a process that could take weeks or months.	随着死亡人数急速上升和恐怖气氛不断蔓延，在承诺资金到来之前（上述过程可能需要数周甚至数月），大部分救援工作都处在搁置状态无法展开。


The world must end this paralysis.	世界各国必须结束这种瘫痪状态。


With established pools of aid being stretched to address immediate needs – medical assistance, shelter, and food – education is being neglected.	随着现有稀缺资源被用于解决医疗、住房和食物等燃眉之急，教育正处于被忽视状态。


Indeed, only a fraction of humanitarian aid budgets, roughly 1%, is allocated to education.	事实上，仅有人道主义援助预算的一小部分——约占总额的1%——被分配到教育领域。


Meanwhile, long-term development budgets are set in stone years in advance and lack the flexibility to respond to natural and man-made disasters.	此外，提前制定好的长期发展预算缺乏必要的灵活性，无法应对自然和人为灾害。


A humanitarian fund for education in emergencies needs to be established, and soon, so that when calamity strikes, vulnerable children are not forced to wait in misery and insecurity while the adults pass around the begging bowl.	必须尽快建立紧急状态下的人道主义教育基金，这样当灾难来临时，弱小的儿童才不会在成年人四处乞讨时被迫在痛苦和不安中等待。


Such a pool of money would help the roughly 50% of the world’s children who are out of school – some 28 million boys and girls – because of conflicts, civil wars, or humanitarian emergencies.	这样一笔基金能帮助50%因冲突、内战或人道主义紧急状况而失学的全球儿童——符合条件的男孩和女孩约有2，800万。


It would have been helpful during the Ebola outbreak, when extra funding would have helped to reopen schools quickly, rather than leaving five million children unable to pursue their studies.	这样一笔基金也可以在埃博拉疫情爆发时发挥作用，这笔额外资金本可以迅速修复学校，而不是任由500万儿童无法完成学业。


It could provide opportunities for students in Iraq and Palestine whose schools were destroyed and have yet to be reopened, as well as for some half-million Syrian children in Lebanon, displaced by four years of mayhem.	这笔基金还能为伊拉克和巴勒斯坦儿童提供机会，那里被毁的学校还有待重建，此外黎巴嫩因四年动乱而流离失所的约50万叙利亚儿童也有可能受益。


In the case of Nepal and other disaster-prone regions, the fund could, and should, be used to strengthen immediate relief plans, improve coordinated responses, and support longer-term efforts to bridge humanitarian relief and development, including preventive measures, such as retrofitting schools.	在尼泊尔和其他灾害易发地区，上述基金可以也应该被用来实施紧急救济计划、加强协调应对和支持弥合人道主义救济和发展差距的长期努力，包括落实改造学校等预防性措施。


Initial reports following the recent disaster suggest that schools that were retrofitted as a precaution against earthquakes (the typical cost was $8,000) escaped most of the damage.	此次灾难后的初步报告显示经过防震改造的学校（一般成本为8，000美元）避开了绝大部分破坏。


No one is asking donors to make education a priority over immediate life-saving responses, or that financing be diverted from other emergency relief efforts.	我们并不是要求捐助者将教育摆在即时救生措施的前面，也不是要求从其他紧急救援工作中进行资金分流。


But it is crucial to realize that, for children, educational opportunity underpins all humanitarian and development interventions.	但关键是要认识到对儿童来讲，教育机会贯穿着所有的人道主义和发展措施。


Schools provide more than the skills that children will need in later life; they also serve as vehicles for disseminating lifesaving health and safety information.	学校所提供的不仅是儿童今后生活中所需的技能； 此外也充当传播救生医疗和安全信息的介质。


The average refugee child spends more than ten years in exile; that child’s education cannot wait until he or she is able to return home.	普通的难民儿童花十年以上的时间来进行流亡； 不能等到他或她重返家园时再开展教育工作。


Education may not provide humanitarian support in exactly the same way that the provision of medical care, food, or shelter does, but the risks facing children out of school during crises – including labor, marriage, human trafficking, and recruitment as soldiers – can be as grim as any other type of suffering.	教育或许不能以像医疗、食品或住房那样提供人道主义援助，但危机期间失学儿童所面临的童工、早婚、人口拐卖和士兵招募等风险其严酷程度丝毫不亚于其他类型的苦难。


On July 7, the Norwegian government will convene a conference on education in Oslo.	7月7日，挪威政府将召开奥斯陆教育会议。


The assembled leaders and policymakers should take the opportunity to heed the call of organizations – such as the International Network for Education in Emergencies, UNICEF, and UNHCR – to ensure that no child falls into the gap between humanitarian and development assistance.	与会领导人和决策者应该借此机会听取紧急教育国际网络、联合国儿基会和联合国难民署等机构的呼声，以确保所有儿童都被人道主义和发展援助覆盖到。


Schools provide their students with something that no other service or humanitarian assistance program can offer: hope of a return to normalcy and of a future worth planning for after those delivering the emergency response have left.	学校能为学生提供其他服务或人道主义援助所提供不了的东西：回归正常生活的希望和在紧急救助者离开后值得为之憧憬的未来生活。


Nepal\u0027s Remarkable Peace	尼泊尔了不起的和平


KATMANDU – Nepal’s Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as “Prachanda,” has now been sworn in as the first prime minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, having won an overwhelming vote in the Constituent Assembly elected in April.	加德满都－尼泊尔以“普拉昌德（Prachanda）”著称的毛主义领导人普斯帕·卡马尔·达哈尔，在四月份选举的制宪会议中以压倒性多数选票获胜，现在已经作为尼泊尔联邦民主共和国的第一任总理宣誓就职。


The Assembly’s opening action had been to vote almost unanimously to abolish the 239-year-old monarchy, and in June former King Gyanendra Shah departed from the palace, remaining in the country as an ordinary citizen.	制宪会议的第一个行动就是以几乎一致同意的票数废除了尼泊尔具有239年历史的君主政体，接着在六月份，前国王贾南德拉·沙哈离开皇宫，以后将以平民身份在尼泊尔国内生活。


Nepal fleetingly made headlines after the 2001 palace massacre of the previous monarch and his family.	在2001年杀害前君主及其家人的皇宫大屠杀后，尼泊尔以飞快的速度引起了世人的瞩目。


Its bloody ten-year civil war, however, was seldom in the international limelight.	但是，其血腥的十年内战，却很少成为国际瞩目的焦点。


So, too, the country’s unique peace process has rarely gained outside attention since the guns fell silent two years ago.	而且，从两年前战争停止后，尼泊尔独特的和平进程也很少获得外界的注意。


Yet, amid too many continuing conflicts and failing peace processes around the world, a success story deserves to be recognized and supported.	然而，在世界上那么多的连续冲突和没有任何结果的和平进程中，尼泊尔的成功故事应该得到世界的认可和支持。


I came to Nepal in mid-2005, when human rights violations committed by both sides in the armed conflict, together with Gyanendra’s crackdown on democratic rights as he seized absolute power, led the international community to support a monitoring presence from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.	我在2005年年中来到尼泊尔，当时，武装冲突双方对人权的践踏，以及贾南德拉攫取绝对权力后对民主权利的镇压，导致国际社会支持联合国人权事务高级专员到尼泊尔进行监督。


With no end in sight to a war with thousands of civilian victims, and democracy far from the horizon, nobody could have foreseen how Nepal’s people would express their demand for peace and change.	在对有几万平民伤亡的战争看不到任何结束的迹象，以及民主遥遥无期的情况下，没有人能够预见到尼泊尔人民会怎样表达他们对和平和变革的需要。


The turning point was the April 2006 people’s movement, when hundreds of thousands took to the streets for nineteen successive days.	事件的转折点是2006年4月份的人民运动，当时，几百万人走上街头进行长达19天的反对国王的运动。


The king was compelled to hand power back to the political parties, while a peace agreement emerged that ended the conflict, bringing the Maoists into an interim parliament and government and promising elections to a Constituent Assembly.	随后尼泊尔各方达成结束冲突的和平协议，毛主义者进入临时国会和政府并承诺选举制宪会议成员，尼泊尔国王被迫将权力交还给政党。


The people’s movement also took the lid off social pressures often disregarded by Nepal’s elites.	人民运动也揭露了经常被尼泊尔精英漠视的社会压力。


Although established as a unitary Hindu kingdom, with politics directed from the Himalayan foothills, today around half the population live in the fertile southern plains and more than one-third are from over 50 indigenous, largely non-Hindu communities.	虽然尼泊尔曾建立了一个统一的印度教王国，有来源于喜马拉雅山麓的政见，但是，现在它大约一半的人口居住在富饶的南部平原，超过1/3的人口来自50多个大部分为非印度教徒的土著团体。


Others are also historically marginalized from the social and political life of the nation, notably the Dalits, sometimes known as “untouchables,” who are at the bottom of the Hindu caste system.	这个国家的其他人也在历史上就被在国家的社会和政治生活中边缘化了，特别是达利兹（Dalits），他们有时候也被称为“贱民”，是处于印度等级制度中最底层的人。


For these groups, the restoration of democracy was a step toward social transformation, enabling them to participate more equally in the life of the country.	对这些团体来说，恢复民主是向着社会改革前进了一步，使他们可以更公平的参与国家社会生活。


Given that the elections to the Constituent Assembly needed to ensure their representation, a complex system of quotas was devised.	鉴于制宪会议选举需要保证有他们的代表，尼泊尔设计了一个复杂的配额制度来保障代表的代表性。


Along with the success of socially diverse candidates fielded by the Maoists, the Constituent Assembly that was elected in April represents an unprecedented array of marginalized groups.	随着毛主义者成功派上场具有社会多元性的候选人，在四月份选举的制宪会议史无前例地代表了一批被边缘化了的社会团体。


Women, too, had been almost invisible in political life – and, indeed, in the peace process.	过去在政治生活中也几乎看不见妇女——而且，事实上，在和平进程中也是如此。


Now nearly one-third of the Constituent Assembly’s members are women – the highest proportion in South Asia and fourteenth place in the world for nationally elected bodies.	现在，制宪会议中几乎1/3的成员是妇女——这一比例在南亚是最高的，在世界各国由全国选民选举的机构中排名14。


The challenges that face Prime Minister Prachanda, the incoming coalition government, and the Constituent Assembly, are immense, and trust is fragile.	普拉昌德总理，即将任职的尼泊尔联合政府以及制宪会议都面临着非常巨大的挑战，而且人们对他们的信任也是很脆弱的。


The Nepali Congress Party, for example, has chosen to remain in opposition, dubious of the Maoists’ commitment to democratic politics.	例如，尼泊尔国会党（Nepali Congress Party）已经选择做反对派，它对毛主义者对民主政治的承诺表示怀疑。


Nowhere in the world is the transformation of an armed insurgent group into a peaceful political movement quick or easy.	世界上没有任何一个地方将武装战乱团体转变成和平政治运动是很快并且很容易的。


The Maoists enter the government still with their own army – confined to cantonments, with their weapons stored under UN monitoring – and a Young Communist League that has persistently acted outside the law.	毛主义者在进入政府的时候仍然拥有自己的军队——虽然它们被限制在军营里，其武器在联合国的监督下存放起来——以及一个经常不按照法律行为的共产主义青年团。


Commitments to resolve the future of the Maoist combatants, along with what the peace agreements call the “democratization” of the state army, must now be implemented.	承诺解决毛主义武装人员的前途问题，以及和平协议声称的国家军队的“民主化”，尼泊尔现在都必须加以实现。


But the biggest challenges go to the roots of the insurgency: poverty, injustice, and discrimination.	但是，最大的挑战来自于战乱的根源：贫困，不公以及歧视。


One cost of the conflict has been the retreat of local governance and arrested development in a desperately poor country where over 80% of the population lives in rural districts.	尼泊尔冲突的代价之一是当地治理的倒退，以及一个80%以上人口生活在农村地区的极度贫困的国家的发展停滞。


Moreover, as Nepal aspires to become a federal democratic republic, expectations are high among diverse groups for greater control of their lives and resources.	而且，当尼泊尔渴望成为一个联邦民主共和国的时候，不同的团体对他们对其生活和资源有更多的控制的期望是很高的。


But what federalism will mean in practice, taking account of the geographic and ethnic peculiarities of Nepal, remains elusive and potentially divisive.	但是，考虑到尼泊尔的地理和种族特性，联邦主义在实践中意味着什么仍然是难以捉摸并可能是会引起争论的。


Reaching a national consensus will be a formidable task for the Constituent Assembly, and meanwhile the Nepali people cannot be expected to wait patiently until a new constitution is drafted to see real improvement in their daily lives.	在尼泊尔达成全国性共识对制宪会议来说是一个艰巨的任务，同时，也不可能期望尼泊尔人民会耐心等待，直到看见起草一部新的宪法来真正改善他们的日常生活。


But there is reason to be hopeful.	但是，人们还是有充满希望的理由的。


Nepal’s peace process has been truly indigenous: it has not been mediated or managed by any external party.	尼泊尔的和平进程真正地具有当地特色：它没有外部力量的调解或操纵。


The UN has encouraged and facilitated the process – through quiet good offices during the last years of the conflict, human rights monitoring, assistance to the Constituent Assembly election, and monitoring arms and armies during the transition.	联合国鼓励并推动了这一进程——在过去几年的冲突中，联合国通过低调的调停、人权监督、对制宪会议选举的帮助，以及在过渡期间监督尼泊尔的军队和武器的方式来推动其和平进程。


The Maoist and non-Maoist parties have asked the UN to maintain a political presence while the issue of the former combatants is resolved, and we stand ready to support peace-building, recovery, and long-term development.	毛主义者和非毛主义者都请求联合国在前武装分子问题得到解决的时候，在尼泊尔保留政治存在，我们已经做好了支持缔造和平、重建尼泊尔以及该国长期发展的准备。


But the world, too, must be generous and steady in assisting Nepal to sustain the still fragile success of a remarkable peace process.	但是，世界也应该慷慨而坚定不移地支持尼泊尔继续保持仍然很脆弱但是了不起的和平进程的胜利。


The Horseman of the Jewish Apocalypse	犹太启示录的骑士


TEL AVIV – The nuclear agreement reached by Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom), plus Germany, is not about Iran’s capitulation, as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu wished.	特拉维夫—伊朗和联合国安理会五大常任理事国（中国、法国、俄罗斯、美国和英国）加德国所搭乘的核协议并非如以色列总理内塔尼亚胡期待的那样代表伊朗屈服。


And it is about as imperfect as any negotiated agreement between disputing parties can be.	它和任何争议各方通过谈判达成的协议一样不完美。


Nonetheless, it creates a solid framework to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons for the next 10-15 years – and that is a very positive development.	尽管如此，它建立了一个可靠的框架阻止伊朗在未来10—15年制造核武器——而这是一个非常积极的结果。


Netanyahu, if he wished, could take a lot of the credit for this achievement.	如果他愿意，内塔尼亚胡可以说是这一成就的大功臣。


Had he not fueled global hysteria over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the crippling international sanctions regime that eventually pushed Iran to a deal might never have been implemented.	要不是他煽起对伊朗核野心的全球歇斯底里，国际社会也许就不会对伊朗采取严厉制裁，最终促使伊朗签下协议。


But Netanyahu has stubbornly insisted that the agreement is a strategic fiasco, citing its ambiguities in matters such as the mechanism of inspection, the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, and the conditions for re-imposing sanctions if Iran breaches the accord.	但内塔尼亚胡顽固地声称该协议是一次战略大失败，批评其在检查制度、允许伊朗所拥有的离心机数量以及伊朗违反条约情况下重新实施制裁的条件等内容上含糊不清。


In pursuing this course, Netanyahu has not only missed the opportunity to claim a major diplomatic victory; he has also reinforced Israel’s international isolation.	在此过程中，内塔尼亚胡不但错失了赢得重大外交胜利的机会； 还加剧了以色列的国际孤立。


Netanyahu is now doing all he can to persuade the US Congress to pass a “resolution of disapproval.”	现在，内塔尼亚胡正使出浑身解数说服美国国会通过“不赞成决议”。


This is highly unlikely to occur, especially in an election year, given that it would require 13 Democratic senators and 48 Democratic representatives to break with US President Barack Obama.	他得逞的可能性极低，特别是在选举年中，因为这需要13位民主党参议员和48位民主党众议员与美国总统奥巴马决裂。


Indeed, Netanyahu’s effort is succeeding only in turning Israel into an increasingly divisive partisan issue in US politics.	事实上，内塔尼亚胡的这一动作正在成功地让以色列日益成为美国政坛上的分裂性党派问题。


That is a dangerous game: The US has broken with the international community to support Israel in the past; it is less willing to do so today.	这是个危险的游戏：美国在过去为了支持以色列而与国际社会决裂； 如今它不太愿意再这么做。


Even if Netanyahu managed to secure such a Congressional resolution, doing so would not serve his interests.	即使内塔尼亚胡成功确保美国国会通过这一决议，也不符合他的利益。


Given that the resolution would affect only US sanctions, it might not nullify the agreement, with the lifting of sanctions by all other international powers proving sufficient motivation for Iran to uphold its end of the bargain.	该决议只能影响美国制裁，而不能让协议作废，事实证明，其他所有国际力量取消制裁便足以促使伊朗不再讨价还价。


Worse, Iran could then decide to gallop toward the bomb, now with the support of countries like China and Russia, within an increasingly fragmented international system.	更糟糕的是，随后伊朗可能进行核弹研发——它有中国和俄罗斯等国家的支持，而国际体系又日益支离破碎。


Despite the obvious problems with Netanyahu’s position, dismissing it would be a mistake.	内塔尼亚胡的立场显然大有问题，但否定它也是个错误。


Contrary to popular belief, he is not just a cynical politician in search of an agenda to deflect attention away from growing domestic problems and the conflict with Palestine.	与流行的观念相反，他并不是追求让人们的注意力从日益严重的国内问题和对巴勒斯坦冲突上转移的犬儒主义政客。


His obsessive focus on Iran – not to mention the seemingly irrational calculus that is driving him toward a politically suicidal confrontation with the US, his country’s most important benefactor – stems from deep-rooted convictions, a system of political thought, and his own perspective on Jewish history.	他之所以顽固地关注伊朗——更不用说让他政治自杀式地与以色列最重要保护人美国对立的看似不理性的算计了——是因为根深蒂固的观念（政治思想体系）和他自己对犹太史的理解。


Netanyahu is an ideologue of Jewish catastrophe.	内塔尼亚胡是犹太灾难理论家。


His view of Jewish history reflects that of his father, the historian Benzion Netanyahu, who went to America in the 1940s to challenge the Allies’ failure to rescue European Jewry from the Holocaust, and thus to mobilize support for Zionism.	他的犹太史观继承自其父、历史学家本锡安·内塔尼亚胡（Benzion Netanyahu）。 本锡安20世纪40年代前往美国，谴责盟国没能保护欧洲犹太人免遭大屠杀，从而动员对犹太复国主义的支持。


In fact, Netanyahu remembered his father’s efforts in his address to the US Congress last March.	事实上，内塔尼亚胡在去年3月的美国国会演讲中追忆了他的父亲的努力。


But Netanyahu goes a step further than remembering the past.	但内塔尼亚胡在追忆过去的基础上更进了一步。


Zionism was supposed to enable the Jews to break with their history.	犹太复国主义本应让犹太人与他们的历史决裂。


Netanyahu, however, has imbued the Israeli state’s existence with all of the Jewish people’s past anxieties, pains, and struggles.	但内塔尼亚胡将所有犹太民族过去的焦虑、痛苦和挣扎注入了以色列国的存在中。


It does not matter that Israel possesses, according to foreign sources, a nuclear arsenal, as well as a robust economy and a strong alliance with the world’s most powerful country; for Netanyahu, it is essentially an old Jewish ghetto, attempting to hold out against relentless threats.	以色列拥有（据外媒报道）核武库不重要，以色列拥有强健的经济和与全世界最强大国家的强大联盟不重要； 对内塔尼亚胡来说，它本质上是一个犹太人社区，试图摆脱无情的威胁。


In this Hobbesian worldview, the threats can stem from virtually any development – political, strategic, or otherwise – and amount to existential challenges to the entire Jewish nation.	在这一霍布斯式（Hobbesian）的世界观中，威胁来自几乎任何发展趋势——政治的、战略的或其他的——并构成对整个犹太国家（nation）的生存挑战。


The only way to avoid catastrophe is to remain constantly vigilant.	避免灾难的唯一办法是永远保持警惕。


By this logic, risks and challenges cannot be approached with a view toward resolution; they must be held up as reminders for the Jewish people to keep up their guard.	根据这一逻辑，风险和挑战无法通过解决方案的观点接近； 而必须将它们视为一个提醒，让犹太人保持警惕。


Netanyahu would dismiss as political lunacy the notion that the nuclear agreement opened a 10-15-year window for creative statesmanship to reshape regional politics.	内塔尼亚���会认为，伊核协议开启了一个10—15年的机会窗口以供创造性政治家精神重塑地区政治，这一概念纯属政治失心疯。


A regional system of peace and security based on an accord with Arab countries that includes nuclear non-proliferation is, he would argue, the agenda of naïve dreamers, not of a leader so aware of the lessons of Jewish history.	一个构建在与阿拉伯国家的包括核不扩散内容的协定基础上的和平稳定的地区体系，他会这样认为，纯属痴人说梦，绝不是了解犹太史教训的政治家所追求的目标。


Palestine is no different from Iran, from this perspective.	从这一角度讲，巴勒斯坦和伊朗没有区别。


The Palestinian conflict is unsolvable, too; at best, it can be managed.	巴勒斯坦冲突也是无法解决的； 它最多只能管理。


With Hamas control in Gaza reinforcing the view of Palestine as a threat, the issue galvanizes the Israeli-Jewish nation.	哈马斯控制加沙加强了巴勒斯坦是威胁的观念，因此也刺激了以色列-犹太国家。


If Israel is to reverse its shift toward international isolation, and help build a stable regional security environment, it must change its approach.	如果以色列想要扭转国际孤立化的趋势，为构建稳定的地区安全环境贡献力量，就必须改变方针。


Paranoia and antagonism must give way to sober politics, with Israeli leaders discussing potential strategic compensation with the US, working with other powers to address Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and considering a credible revival of peace negotiations with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.	偏执和对抗必须让位给清醒政治，以色列领导人应该讨论与美国的潜在战略报酬，与其他大国合作解决伊朗支持哈马斯和真主党的问题，并考虑可信地重启与巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯的和平谈判。


Israel’s Labour Party, which is now debating whether to join Netanyahu’s government, should consider carefully whether it can bring about such a shift.	正在讨论是否加入内塔尼亚胡政府的以色列工党（Labour Party）应该仔细考虑它是否能够带来这样的转变。


If it cannot, and no other force emerges to do the job, Netanyahu’s prophecies of doom risk becoming self-fulfilling.	如果不能，并且也没有其他力量站出来完成这一任务，内塔尼亚胡的末日预言就有可能自我实现。


Bibi Goes to Washington	比比来到华盛顿


NEW YORK – Why did he do it?	纽约—为何他要这么做？


What possessed Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin “Bibi" Netanyahu to accept an invitation from the Republicans in the US Congress to come and attack President Barack Obama's policy on Iran without letting the White House know?	什么让以色列总理、“比比”（Bibi）内塔尼亚胡接受美国国会共和党的邀请前来抨击总统奥巴马的伊朗政策还不让白宫知道？


Netanyahu claims that his was “a fateful, even historic mission" to voice his concern for the fate of Israel and all Jews.	内塔尼亚胡把他的华盛顿批评称为“重大的，甚至称得上是历史性的任务”以表达他对以色列和全体犹太人命运的关注。


But we already knew about his concerns – and that many Jews, in the US and elsewhere, do not feel that he was speaking for them.	但我们都知道他关注什么——而许多美国和其他地区犹太人并不觉得他是在为他们说话。


Did Netanyahu crave the applause of his Republican supporters?	内塔尼亚胡恳请他的共和党为他喝彩了吗？


Is he gambling on the chance of a Republican presidency in 2016?	他是不是在下注2016年共和党拿下总统选举？


If so, he got the applause; but, given the current polls, the latter motive would be quite a gamble.	如果是的话，那么他得到了喝彩，并且根据最新民调，他的注码赢的概率颇高。


Or was Netanyahu simply using the US Congress as a venue for his own campaign to keep his job?	或者内塔尼亚胡只是利用美国国会作为其自身表演的舞台，目的是保住自己的位置？


Did he wish to impress voters back home with a starring role on a world stage?	他是否希望给国内的选民留下他在世界舞台上纵横捭阖的形象？


This, too, would seem to be a gamble: many Israelis, however worried they might be about an Iranian nuclear bomb, have been highly critical of Netanyahu's provocation of Obama, and of many Jewish Democrats.	这也像是一场赌博：许多以色列人，不管他们多么担心伊朗的核弹，都对内塔尼亚胡挑衅奥巴马和众多犹太人民主党提出了尖锐批评。


Two former Mossad directors joined a chorus of Israelis in arguing that he should no longer be prime minister.	两名前摩萨德高官也加入其中，认为内塔尼亚胡已不适合继续担任总理。


Meir Dagan, who resigned as the Israeli intelligence chief in 2011, called Bibi's grandstanding in Washington “destructive to the future and security of Israel."	2011年辞任以色列情报部门首脑的梅尔·达甘（Meir Dagan）称比比在华盛顿的哗众取宠“破坏了以色列安全的未来”。


Whatever his motives, Netanyahu has achieved what no Israeli leader ever has: not only infuriating the US president (who was already quite angry with him), but also earning the public rebuke of people who would normally have supported any Israeli leader, whatever they might have thought in private.	不管动机如何，内塔尼亚胡实现了以色列领导人从未实现的东西：不但激怒了美国总统（奥巴马此前对他便已相当不忿），还收获了公众的千夫所指——许多人不管私下里想法如何，通常情况下总是会支持以色列领导人的。


If an Israeli prime minister cannot even count on the backing of a man like Abraham Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League, he is in trouble.	如果以色列总理连反诽谤联盟（Anti-Defamation League）全国主管亚伯拉罕·福克斯曼（Abraham Foxman）的支持都无法获得，那么说明他有麻烦了。


By forcing Americans – and not just Jews or Democrats – to choose between their loyalty to Israel and the president of their own country, Netanyahu has punched a large hole in Americans' normally bipartisan support for Israel.	内塔尼亚胡强迫美国人——不仅是犹太人和民主党——选择忠于以色列还是忠于本国总统，这实际上给正常情况下美国两党一致支持以色列的局面挖了一个大坑。


This is not to say that US politicians have always agreed with Israeli policies.	这并不是说美国政客以往总是支持以色列的政策。


But few have thought it worth their while to express their criticism in public.	但很少有人认为值得公开发表批评。


The benefits of doing so rarely outweigh the costs: lost campaign contributions, accusations of anti-Semitism, charges of betraying a close ally (“the only democracy in the Middle East"), and so on.	这样做绝大部分情况下都得不偿失：失去选举献金、戴上反犹帽子、被指责背叛紧密盟友（“中东唯一的民主国家”），等等。


The fact that Israel could always count on US backing, especially on such public occasions as congressional speeches by an Israeli leader, only confirmed the assumption of many people around the world that Israel and the US are joined like Siamese twins.	以色列总是可以赢得美国的支持——特别是在以色列领导人赴美国国会做演讲这样的公开场合上——让全世界许多人坚信以色列和美国就像一对连体婴。


Some think that Israel is the cat's paw of the US; others believe it is the other way around.	有人认为以色列是美国的爪牙； 也有人认为美国才是以色列的爪牙。


In the spirit of that notorious nineteenth-century czarist forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, anti-Semites think “the Jews" run the US government, Wall Street, and the media.	根据臭名昭著的十九世纪沙俄伪书《锡安长老会纪要》（The Protocols of the Elders of Zion）的精神，反犹主义者认为“犹太人”把持着美国政府、华尔街和媒体。


Such beliefs, of course, have been around for much longer than the modern state of Israel.	当然，这些观念存在的时间远比现代以色列国更长久。


Nineteenth- and twentieth-century European nationalists often regarded the US as the natural home for capitalists and “rootless cosmopolitans" without any loyalty to their native soil.	十九世纪和二十世纪欧洲民族主义者常常把美国视为天然的资本家和“无根游子”大本营，毫无故土忠诚可言。


Only money ruled in America, it was thought, so that meant that the Jews ruled.	他们认为，在美国钱主宰一切，这也就意味着是犹太人在统治。


Though it was Stalin who used the phrase “rootless cosmopolitans" to describe unwanted Jews, anti-Semites believed that Jews were natural Bolsheviks and probably pulled the strings in the Soviet Union, too.	尽管用“无根游子”一词形容讨厌的犹太人的是斯大林，但反犹主义者认为犹太人是天生的布尔什维克，并且有可能连苏联也是他们把持的。


It was widely assumed than Jews, whether capitalist or communist, knew no allegiance except to their own people; after 1948, that increasingly came to mean the state of Israel.	一个广泛存在的观点是犹太人，不管是资本主义者还是共产主义者，绝不会忠诚于本民族以外的事物； 1948年后，“本民族”日益意味着以色列。


By claiming to be the leader of all Jewish people, wherever they live, Netanyahu has only strengthened that notion.	内塔尼亚胡自称为所有犹太人的领袖，不管他们身居何处，这进一步强化了这一观念。


In fact, the US was not always as pro-Israel as it is today.	事实上，美国并非总是如今天那样亲以色列。


The French were Israel's greatest supporters until President Charles de Gaulle turned away from the Jewish state after the Six-Day War in 1967.	从前，法国才是以色列的最大支持者，直到法国总统戴高乐在1967年六日战争后离开以色列。


America's subsequent patronage of Israel had less to do with evangelical passion for the Holy Land, or a spontaneous love for the Jewish people, than with the Cold War.	美国随后成为以色列的赞助者，其原因与其说是福音派对圣地（Holy Land）的向往或对以色列人民的自发的热爱，不如所是因为冷战。


But over time, especially in conservative political discourse, criticism of Israel increasingly came to be regarded as not just anti-Semitic but also anti-American.	但随着时间的推移，特别是在保守政治环境中，对以色列的批评日益被认为不但反犹，而且反美。


There is some truth to this view.	这一观念不乏真理。


The old anti-Semitic myth about America being run by Jews has not completely disappeared – especially (but by no means only) in the Middle East.	关于美国由犹太人把持的旧反犹神话并未完全消失——特别是在中东（但绝非只限于中东）。


But the almost automatic identification in Washington of US interests with Israel's has made it difficult to criticize either country without criticizing the other.	但华盛顿几乎自动地把美国利益与以色列利益等同，这意味着很难批评两国之一而不批评另一个。


Now, by openly seeking to undermine the US president, Netanyahu is breaking that link.	如今，内塔尼亚胡公开贬低美国总统，打破了这一联系。


He has made it easier for American Jews, even those who feel a deep devotion to Israel, to be critical of its leaders.	他让美国犹太人更容易对他们的领导人持批评态度——哪怕是那些热爱以色列的美国犹太人。


This will also make it less costly for American politicians to oppose Israeli policies with which they disagree.	这降低了美国政客反对他们不同意的以色列政策的成本。


Some might see this as a defeat for Israel.	有人也许认为这是以色列的不幸。


In fact, the opposite may be true.	事实上也许正好相反。


Bibi's ill-considered trip to Washington might be the best thing that could have happen to Israel.	比比的华盛顿之旅打错了算盘，但有可能使对以色列最有利的事件。


It is in neither country's interest to be seen as the other's pawn.	被视为对方的人质对两国都不利。


And a tougher US stance toward its ally might force the Israelis to try harder to come to terms with the Palestinians.	而美国对其盟友采取更强硬的立场也许会迫使以色列更加努力地与巴勒斯坦达成和解。


This is not what Netanyahu intended.	这不是内塔尼亚胡想要的。


But it might end up being his greatest achievement.	但最终也许会成为他的最大成就。


A Raisin in the Israeli Sun	以色列阳光下的葡萄干


WASHINGTON, DC – Decades of efforts to reduce the death toll from drunk driving in the United States produced the mantra, “Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.”	华盛顿—几时年来，降低醉驾死亡人数的努力在美国造就了一个咒语：“让人醉驾的朋友不是真朋友。


After Israel’s election last week, the country’s friends around the world should adopt a similar slogan: “Friends don’t let friends govern blind.”	”上周以色列选举结束后，全世界的以色列朋友应该把这个咒语改一改：“让朋友盲目统治的不是真朋友。 ”


Israel’s blindness is self-induced.	以色列的盲目完全是自找的。


Its government cannot solve the conflict with the Palestinians on Israeli terms, so it has decided to behave as if the entire issue did not exist.	以色列政府无法用以色列的条件解决与巴勒斯坦人的冲突，于是干脆装作整个问题根本不存在的样子。


Astonishingly, when Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the United States Congress earlier this month, his 39-minute speech about Iran’s existential threat to Israel did not contain a single mention of the Palestinian people.	令人震惊的是，当其总理内塔尼亚胡本月早些时候在美国国会发表演讲时，他39分钟时间大谈伊朗对以色列造成的生存威胁，根本没有提到巴勒斯坦人民。


Campaigning at home, however, he talked only about the threat some Palestinians pose to Israeli security today, never of the opportunity that other Palestinians offer for peace tomorrow.	但是，在国内选战中，他只谈及某些巴勒斯坦人现在给以色列安全所造成的威胁，完全不提其他巴勒斯坦人为明天的和平所提供的机会。


Israeli voters chose the politics of fear over the politics of possibility.	以色列选民选择了恐惧的政治，而没有选可能性的政治。


Whether to support the right or the center-left was a classic choice between guns and butter, security and prosperity.	选择右翼还是中左翼是一个与选择枪炮还是黄油、选择安全还是繁荣相当的经典选择。


The Zionist Union, the principal opponent of Netanyahu’s Likud party, focused mostly on domestic issues like housing, the high cost of living, and growing economic inequality.	内塔尼亚胡的利库德集团的主要反对者——犹太复国主义联盟（Zionist Union）将焦点主要集中于住房、高生活成本和日益加剧的经济不平等性等国内问题。


Netanyahu emphasized the threat Israel faces from Iran, the Islamic State, and Hamas.	内塔尼亚胡强调以色列所面临的来自伊朗、伊斯兰国和哈马斯的威胁。


He even added a racist dimension to the fear mongering on Election Day, warning that, “Arab voters are coming out in droves to the polls.”	在选举日，他甚至给这一恐惧加上了种族主义色彩，警告说“阿拉伯选民正在成群结队走向投票箱。 ”


During the campaign, Netanyahu also renounced any possibility under his government of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	选战期间，内塔尼亚胡还宣布他的政府绝不可能接受以巴冲突的两国解决方案。


An interviewer with an Israeli news site asked, “Are you saying that if you are Prime Minister, a Palestinian state will not be created.”	一家以色列新闻网站在采访内塔尼亚胡时问：“您的意思是，只要您当总理，巴勒斯坦国就不可能建立吗？


Netanyahu answered: “Correct.”	”内塔尼亚胡回答：“对。 ”


Once secure in his victory, Netanyahu immediately retracted the statement.	一旦确保了胜利，内塔尼亚胡马上放松了口风。


He claimed that he meant only that a two-state solution was not achievable under current conditions, as long as the Palestinian Authority is in a coalition with Hamas and as long as vacated territories bring the “rise of militant Islam.”	他说他的意思只是两国方案在现有条件下不可行，即只要巴勒斯坦权力机构与哈马斯结盟，或者只要空出的领土导致“军事伊斯兰的崛起”，两国方案就不可行。


But it is too late for clarifications.	但做出澄清为时已晚。


Palestinians heard clearly and explicitly what they have long assumed: the Israeli government has no interest in reaching a peace deal.	巴勒斯坦人清楚明白地听到了他们一直以来的假设：以色列政府根本没兴趣达成和平协议。


It would prefer to keep building settlements and to hunker down behind security walls.	以色列政府更像维持定居点建设，伺机潜伏在安全墙背后。


That is a tragedy, because it drives both sides into a cycle of action and reaction that ultimately will make impossible a negotiated two-state solution – the kind of solution in which each side gives up something it wants in order to gain something that both sides want more.	这是一个悲剧，因为这把双方拉进了冤冤相报的循环，这个循环最终将让协商的两国方案——双方都放弃一些想要的东西，以换取双方都更想要的东西——无从实现。


Israel now faces three scenarios, all of them bad.	如今，以色列面临三个前景——都是糟糕的前景。


One is increasing international isolation and the politicization of support for Israel in the US, traditionally its staunchest military and diplomatic ally.	一是在国际上日益孤立，以及其传统的军事和外交坚定盟友——美国支持以色列的政治化。


Younger US voters, generations removed from the Holocaust, do not share most of their elders’ reflexive habit of support for Israel.	年轻的美国选民没有经历过大屠杀，并不具有老一辈人条件反射式的支持以色列的习惯。


They do not see Israel the way Israel sees itself, as a nation under threat; instead, they see a government that has explicitly aligned itself with the Republican Party.	他们看待以色列的方式与以色列看待自己的方式不用，他们不认为以色列是出于威胁中的国家； 相反，他们认为以色列政府显而易见把它自己与共和党相挂钩。


They will also begin to question why the US stands with Israel in the United Nations when even America’s closest allies in Europe and elsewhere have begun to peel away.	他们还会开始质疑美国为何要在最紧密的欧洲和其他地区盟友开始远离以色列的情况下仍然在联合国与以色列站在一起。


Though Netanyahu received many rounds of applause when he addressed Congress, more than 60 Democrats boycotted his speech.	尽管内塔尼亚胡的美国国会演讲赢得了多次掌声，但仍有60多位民主党抵制了他的演讲。


Losing the support of Europeans and a significant number of Americans cannot be good for Israel’s security and prosperity.	失去欧洲和大量美国人的支持显然不利于以色列的安全与繁荣。


The Palestinians will now pursue with renewed determination and vigor a path to statehood through unilateral recognition.	如今，巴勒斯坦人将带着焕然一新的决心和力量通过单方面承认建立国家。


If they succeed, Israel will face a Palestinian state with borders to which it did not agree and a continuing conflict that will become a formal inter-state war, subject to international law.	如果他们成功，以色列将面临一个边界不为其所承认的巴勒斯坦国以及一场将演变为正式跨国战争、受国际法约束的持续冲突。


If the Palestinians fail, they will most likely turn again to violence: a third intifada, bigger and with greater international support than the first two.	如果巴勒斯坦人失败，他们极有可能再次转向暴力：第三次起义，这次的规模将更庞大，并且比前两次得到更多的国际支持。


Israel will have no option but to repeat the horrors of recent Gaza wars on a much larger scale, filling the world’s media with images of dead children, destroyed schools and hospitals, and heavily armed Israeli troops taking on rock-throwing teenagers.	耶伦将别无选择，只能在大得多的范围上重复最近的加沙战争的恐怖，给全球媒体大量体现儿童死亡、学校和医院被毁、重装以色列军队碾压投掷石块的孩子的影像。


That is not an experience that Israel or its friends could possibly want.	这是以色列及其朋友不可能愿意看到的。


Netanyahu thinks that he can build a fence and let the problem simply fester forever.	内塔尼亚胡认为他可以竖起藩篱，让问题永远溃烂下去。


But one should heed the words of Langston Hughes’ famous poem, which became a refrain of the US civil rights movement.	但我们不妨听听已成为美国民权运动旋律的朗斯坦·休斯（Langston Hughes）的著名诗篇。


In a slightly abridged version, it reads:	稍作删节，诗曰：


“What happens to a dream deferred?	“延迟的梦想发生了什么？


Does it dry up	它干涸了吗


like a raisin in the sun?	就像阳光下的葡萄干？


Or fester like a sore—	还是像一处溃疡——


And then run?	然后消失？


Maybe it just sags	也许它只是下垂


like a heavy load.	就像是一个重负。


Or does it explode?”	或者它会爆炸吗？ “


Successive Israeli governments have shown that they can meet and contain explosions of Palestinian frustration and rage.	一代又一代以色列政府证明，他们可以面对并遏制巴勒斯坦失望和愤怒的爆发。


But each time they do, Israel loses a little more of its soul.	但每做一次，以色列就会失去更多的魂。


Israel is a special and vibrant country, filled with talented, hard-working, and committed people who have much to contribute to the world.	以色列是一个特殊的充满活力的国家，它的人民有才华、工作努力、坚忍不拔，能够为世界作出卓越贡献。


But right now its leaders, by ignoring Palestinian dreams, are courting a nightmare.	但如今它的领导人完全不顾巴勒斯坦梦，而正在炮制一场噩梦。


Netanyahu’s Choice	内塔尼亚胡的选择


Ramallah – As the summit between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approaches, most of the discussion has focused on whether or not the newly elected Israeli leader will finally say that he backs a two-state solution.	拉马拉—在美国总统奥巴马和以色列首相内塔尼亚胡的高峰会谈即将举行之际，外界讨论的焦点大都集中在这位新当选的以色列领导人是否会最终表示支持两个国家的解决方案。


This is the wrong approach.	这种讨论是错误的。


Israelis should not determine the status of the Palestinian entity, nor should Palestinians have a say in what Israelis call their own state.	以色列人不应该决定巴勒斯坦实体的地位，而巴勒斯坦人也不应该对以色列人如何称呼自己的国家拥有发言权。


The only question that Obama should ask Netanyahu is, When will Israel quit the occupied Palestinian territories?	奥巴马应该问内塔尼亚胡的唯一问题是：以色列将何时撤出巴勒斯坦的被占领土？


Attempts at obfuscation – whether by talking about an “economic peace,” or insisting that Arabs recognize the Jewishness of the state of Israel – should not be allowed to derail the goal of ending the inadmissible occupation.	不应允许任何混淆视听的企图—不论是关于“经济和平”的言论还是坚持阿拉伯人承认以色列国的犹太性—来干扰结束这种难获承认的占领的目标。


During Obama’s first meeting with a Middle East leader, a simple and courageous Arab plan was outlined.	在奥巴马第一次会晤一位中东领导人时，一项简单而勇敢的计划被勾勒出来。


Empowered by Arab leaders, Jordan’s King Abdullah II officially presented the peace plan devised by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic States.	在阿拉伯领导人的强力支持下，约旦国王阿卜杜拉二世正式提出了这项由阿拉伯联盟和伊斯兰国家组织设计的和平计划。


Despite the Israeli wars on Lebanon and Gaza, Arabs offered  normal relations with Israel once it quits the lands that it occupied in 1967.	尽管以色列还在黎巴嫩和加沙进行战争，阿拉伯人仍然承诺一旦以色列撤出1967年占领的土地，就与其实现关系正常化。


The plan also calls for a  “fair” and “agreed upon” resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.	这个方案同时还呼吁一项解决巴勒斯坦难民问题的“公正”和“达成共识”的决议。


The fact that Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on a solution of the refugee issue neutralizes unwarranted Israeli fears about the demographic threat posed by the Palestinians’ right of return.	以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间就难民问题解决方案达成协议可以消除以色列的无端恐惧。 它担心巴勒斯坦人的回归权会对以色列的人口结构造成威胁。


Last summer, when he was shown a poster with 57 flags representing the Arab and Islamic countries that will normalize relations with Israel, then candidate Obama told Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that the Israelis would be “crazy” to reject that plan.	去年夏天，当作为总统竞选人的奥巴马看到一张海报上面绘有57面愿意与以色列实现关系正常化的阿拉伯和伊斯兰国家的旗帜时，他告诉巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯如果以色列拒绝这一计划将是“疯狂的。 ”


Obama’s impressive signals since taking office – telephoning Arab leaders before European allies, appointing special envoy George Mitchell and speaking on Al-Arabiyeh for his first interview – reflect a different approach from the staid and unimaginative past.	奥巴马自就任以来所发出的明显信号—在照会欧洲盟友之前与阿拉伯领导人通电话，指派中东特使乔治•米切尔并在Al-Arabiyeh上接受第一次采访，发表讲话—反映出一种与刻板和缺乏想象力的过去所不同的方式。


The US has repeatedly opposed the 1967 Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and has called for its end.	美国不断地反对以色列在1967年对巴勒斯坦领土的占领，并呼吁结束这种状态。


It has consistently voiced disapproval of settlement activities.	它也一直明确反对建立定居点的活动。


Leaders of both major US parties have articulated a policy that calls for a viable, contiguous Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967.	美国两党的领袖也宣布了一项政策，呼吁在1967年的被占领土上建立一个可行的、完整的巴勒斯坦国家。


The US has also opposed Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem, and – along with every country on the planet – refused to recognize the application of Israeli law to residents of East Jerusalem.	美国还反对以色列对东耶路撒冷的单边吞并，并（和地球上所有国家一起）拒绝承认对东耶路撒冷的居民适用以色列法律。


Yet Israel's actions on the ground have gone counter to American and international positions.	然而，以色列的实际行动却与美国和国际社会的立场背道而驰。


The newly established Israeli government refuses even to pay lip service to the internationally accepted requirements for peace.	新建立的以色列政府甚至懒得对国际承认的和平条件阳奉阴违。


On the other hand, the freely elected Palestinian leadership faces international boycott until it accepts a solution that the Netanyahu government rejects.	而在另一方面，通过自由选举产生的巴勒斯坦领导层在接受一个被内塔尼亚胡政府拒绝的解决方案之前，也面临国际抵制。


Among the international community's demands of Israel has been a total freeze on all settlement activity, including expansion and natural growth.	在国际社会对以色列的要求之中包括接受两国解决方案和全面冻结包括扩张和自然增长在内的所有定居点活动。


Freezing settlement will certainly be a central focus of the robust diplomacy of Mitchell and his team.	冻结定居点活动自然将会是米切尔及其团队所实行的健全外交政策的核心。


Mitchell, who was deeply involved in crafting the settlements language of the Mitchell Report of 2001, understands the capacity of the settlements to destroy the prospect for a two-state solution.	作为深度介入关于定居点的2001年《米切尔报告》的当事人，米切尔了解定居点对于两国方案的毁灭性影响力。


Jerusalem is another on-the-ground issue that will be a litmus test for the Obama administration.	耶路撒冷是又一个对奥巴马政府构成严峻考验的现实问题。


Demolition of Palestinian houses and Israeli provocations in East Jerusalem highlight the need to confront this issue without delay.	拆除巴勒斯坦人的房屋和以色列在东���路撒冷的挑衅都表明直面解决这一问题已经迫在眉睫。


The focus of Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to the Middle East was Jerusalem’s importance to Christians, Muslims, and Jews, so that attempts to Judaize the Holy City must stop immediately.	教皇本笃十六世访问中东的焦点是耶路撒冷对基督徒、穆斯林和犹太人的重要性。 所以将圣城犹太化的企图必须立即停止。


A third imperative for Palestinians is to reunite the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.	巴勒斯坦人的第三个当务之急是重新统一约旦河西岸和加沙地带。


Irrespective of the outcome of the internal Palestinian dialogue taking place in Cairo, there is a need to reconnect Palestinians.	不论在开罗的巴勒斯坦内部对话结果如何，巴勒斯坦人都需要重新结合。


There is no excuse why Palestinians living in either remaining sliver of Mandatory Palestine should be barred from traveling to the other part of the occupied Palestinian territories.	没有任何理由禁止生活在所剩无几的托管地带的巴勒斯坦人进入其他的巴勒斯坦被占领土。


Israeli officials’ claims that barring the movement of people and goods is required for security reasons do not withstand scrutiny.	以色列官员们对于禁止人员和货物流动是出于安全需要的说法经不起推敲。


Under the leadership of US General Keith Dayton (Mitchell’s security deputy), the most vigorous security checks can be made to allow such travel.	在基思·戴顿（米切尔的安全副手）将军的领导下，通过最严格的安全检查可以让这种流动得以实现。


With renewed peace talks, results must be stressed over endless process.	随着和平谈判的重新启动，我们必须强调结果而不是无休止的过程。


The last failed promise by President George W. Bush came at Annapolis in late 2007, when he vowed that an independent, viable, and contiguous Palestinian state would be created before the end of his term.	上一个没有兑现的承诺是布什总统于2007年在安纳波利斯做出的。 他当时信誓旦旦地说一个独立、可发展且具有连续边界的巴勒斯坦国将在他的任期结束前创立。


More than four decades after United Nations Security Council resolution 242, occupying land by force, illegal construction of exclusive Jewish settlements, and restrictions on movement continue unabated.	在联合国安理会通过242号决议的四十多年以后，以武力占领土地、非法建设排他性犹太定居点和行动限制仍然一如既往。


Time is no longer on the side of those who favor two states.	对于支持两国（解决方案）的人们来说，真是时不我待。


The Obama administration must seize the initiative and insist that Netanyahu unequivocally support Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories – the sine qua non for a two-state solution.	奥巴马政府必须采取主动，坚持让内塔尼亚胡政府明确支持两国解决方案。


Otherwise, tension looms in the Israeli-American relationship, and calls for one state with equal rights for all will begin to drown out older ideological visions, as settlement activity forecloses the prospect of two states.	否则，以美关系将变得紧张，而随着定居点活动破坏两国方案的前景，建立一个平权国家的呼声会逐渐湮没从前的思想愿景。


Netanyahu the Palestinian	熟悉巴勒斯坦人的内塔尼亚胡


PHILADELPHIA – In January, Israeli voters will go to the polls for an election that promises to hand Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu a renewed mandate.	费城——1月，以色列选民将举行投票，授权总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡连任的可能性很大。


Few prospects are more loathsome to the Israeli left, US President Barack Obama’s administration, most European leaders, or many American Jews.	而在以色列左派、美国总统奥巴马、绝大多数欧洲领袖和众多犹太裔美国人看来，没有什么比内塔尼亚胡连任更令人厌恶。


But no one regards the prospect of another Netanyahu government with more anguish than the Palestinians.	但最痛恨内塔尼亚胡连任的莫过于巴勒斯坦人。


In the Arab-Israeli conflict’s long, tortured history, they have reviled no Israeli prime minister – with the possible exception of Ariel Sharon – more than Netanyahu.	在阿以冲突漫长的血泪史上，也许除阿里埃勒·沙龙之外，最令巴勒斯坦人痛恨的以色列总理非内塔尼亚胡莫属。


The reason is simple: he is one of them.	原因很简单：他是他们中的一份子。


Literally, of course, he is not.	如果仅从表面上看，事实当然并非如此。


But, unlike previous Israeli prime ministers (again, with the possible exception of Sharon), Netanyahu has emulated the Palestinian political strategy of sumud, or steadfastness.	但内塔尼亚胡与此前以色列总理的不同之处在于他成功仿效了巴勒斯坦人打持久战（sumud）的政治策略。


The philosophy of sumud is rooted in Palestinians’ implacable belief in the righteousness of their cause and the justness of their methods.	打持久战的理念植根于巴勒斯坦人对自身目标正义性和方法正当性的不可动摇的信念之中。


It operates both passively and actively in Palestinian culture, demanding stubbornness and tolerating ruthlessness, violence, and duplicity.	它在巴勒斯坦文化中同时起到了积极和消极的作用，既造就了巴勒斯坦人的坚定顽强，也纵容了他们的残忍、暴力和口是心非。


At sumud’s core lies the unswerving, blinkered view that Israel is illegitimate and its duration limited.	狭隘而坚定地认为以色列政权不具备合法性、迟早有一天将要垮台是持久战理念的核心内容。


As a result, Palestinian leaders have for decades mobilized their society to outlast Israel.	巴勒斯坦领导人几十年来动员全社会将以色列拖垮。


Indoctrination begins at a young age through family, education, and media, and later encourages more aggressive resistance, including terrorism.	巴勒斯坦人从孩提时期就开始通过家人、学校和媒体接受这种理念，年龄稍长后又被鼓励运用恐怖手段等更加激进的抵抗活动。


In other words, Palestinians are playing a long game.	也就是说，巴勒斯坦人正在打一场持久战。


But plans for a functioning Palestinian state that do not depend on foreign aid have been conspicuously absent, save for the recent efforts of Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.	但除去巴勒斯坦民族权力机构总理萨拉姆·法耶兹最近的努力外，根本不存在建立不依赖外国援助即可正常运转的巴勒斯坦国的计划。


Netanyahu’s version of sumud is evident in his policies and rhetoric, which focus on Israel’s legitimacy, necessity, and permanence.	内塔尼亚胡版的持久战理念在他的施政和演讲中都清晰可见，以色列的合法性、必要性和持久性是他的关注对象。


Indeed, his speeches frequently offer lessons in Jewish history, while casting the “Holy Land” as both a Jewish right and an Israeli national symbol.	事实上，他在讲话中经常提到犹太史上的经验教训，并把“圣地”当作犹太人权利和以色列国家的象征。


Addressing the United Nations in September, Netanyahu highlighted his core message for all, especially Israelis: “Three thousand years ago, King David reigned over the Jewish state in our eternal capital, Jerusalem. I say that to all those who proclaim that the Jewish state has no roots in our region, and that it will soon disappear.”	九月面对联合国讲话时，内塔尼亚胡当着所有人，特别是以色列人强调了他的核心理念：“我要对那些宣扬犹太国家在本地区没有根基、必将很快消失的人宣布，三千年前，大卫王就在我们永恒的首都耶路撒冷统治着犹太国家。


Such rhetoric compliments a long-term strategy of strengthening Israeli control over core areas, especially Jerusalem and its suburbs.	”上述讲话极力推崇强化以色列对耶路撒冷及其市郊等核心区域控制的长期战略。


Indeed, while settlement-building in the West Bank has slackened, it continues.	事实上，尽管速度有所放缓，但在约旦河西岸修建定居点的行为一直在持续。


Moreover, aggressive counter-terrorism activities and the separation barrier have decisively reduced cross-border attacks, containing mounting pressure in Palestine as the conflict remains on the back burner.	此外，积极的反恐措施和修建隔离墙成功地抑制了跨境袭击，并随着冲突的不断发酵而导致巴勒斯坦内部压力越积越多。


And Netanyahu continues to oversee economic expansion and improved foreign relations, despite hostile rhetoric from Europe and elsewhere.	尽管面对欧洲和其他国家的敌对言论，内塔尼亚胡仍然成功地发展了经济并改善了外交关系。


The Palestinians seem to recognize Netanyahu’s variety of sumud for what it is.	巴勒斯坦人似乎认清了内塔尼亚胡各种持久战策略的本质是什么。


His steadfastness – and declining international interest in their struggle, as the world’s focus shifts to the Arab Spring’s Islamist winter – stymies any advance toward an agreement.	他的持久战策略和伴随世界将注意力转向阿拉伯之春所带来的伊斯兰严冬以及国际社会对巴勒斯坦人斗争越来越提不起兴趣将导致协议无法达成。


The US is, perhaps, equally frustrated.	美国或许同样灰心丧气。


Israeli prime ministers are supposed to come in two varieties: heavily accented Eastern European men and grizzled military officers who talk a good game before acquiescing to the latest American or international demands for concessions, talks, and aid.	在美国人看来以色列总理应当分为两类：操着浓重口音的东欧男子和在高谈阔论之后屈从于让步、谈判和援助等美国或国际社会要求的头发花白的军官。


While previous prime ministers like Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir were not averse to lecturing, they lacked strategic cunning.	虽然梅纳赫姆·贝京和伊扎克·沙米尔等前任总理并不抵触说教，但他们却不具备战略上的狡猾性。


Netanyahu’s unwillingness to compromise disconcerts, confuses, and often enrages Americans.	内塔尼亚胡拒绝妥协的态度往往在激怒美国人的同时令他们备感困惑。


His relentless disquisitions on Israel’s strategic environment, security requirements, red lines, and Jewish history are offset only by conciliatory talk about reopening negotiations, which are immediately reject by the Palestinians, who, like him, fear showing weakness.	只有重开谈判的和解言论才能抵消他对以色列战略环境、安全要求、民族禁忌和犹太历史的无情评论，而这样的言论往往会即刻遭到像他一样害怕示弱的巴勒斯坦人的拒绝。


Furthermore, Netanyahu’s unsentimental assessment of the Middle East does not line up with that of the Obama administration – in thrall to its collapsing romance with moderate Islamists – and its devoted supporters among Jewish Americans.	此外，在伊斯兰温和主义者渐趋瓦解的浪漫和毫不动摇的犹太裔美国支持者的束缚下，内塔尼亚胡对中东问题实事求是的看法无法与奥巴马政府保持一致。


These groups do not understand Netanyahu, who proclaims Jewish rights, defends his country’s interests, and hints at conciliation but gives up little – much like a traditional Arab leader.	上述团体无法理解内塔尼亚胡，无法理解他为什么像传统的阿拉伯领袖那样公开要求犹太权利、捍卫国家利益、不断做出和解暗示却几乎不做任何实质性的让步。


Despite considerable Israeli disgust with Netanyahu’s party, allies, and policies, no credible rival exists.	虽然不少以色列人厌恶内塔尼亚胡的党派、联盟和政策，但内塔尼亚胡却几乎找不到任何真正的对手。


Israelis grudgingly accept that the country and its geopolitical situation are relatively stable, especially in view of its immediate neighborhood – a burning Syria, a smoldering Egypt, and a volatile Lebanon.	以色列人不情愿地接受了国内及地缘政治局势相对稳定的事实，特别是在与战火熊熊的叙利亚、四处冒烟的埃及和动荡不安的黎巴嫩等邻国相比较的时候。


Moreover, those variables that could upend Netanyahu’s re-election – the situation in Gaza and Lebanon, for example, or deteriorating conditions in Sinai and Jordan, any of which could drag Israel into unwanted military operations – now appear unlikely to influence the outcome.	此外，有可能颠覆内塔尼亚胡再次当选的加沙及黎巴嫩局势或西奈半岛及约旦局势恶化等诸多变量都可以将以色列违心地拖入一场军事行动，但现在这些因素却不太可能影响选举结果。


As a result, Netanyahu’s position is strong.	因此内塔尼亚胡的地位非常稳固。


The Palestinians initiated a zero-sum game that has given him the upper hand.	由巴勒斯坦人发起的这场零和游戏让他占尽了先手。


By using the Palestinians’ own strategy, he has cornered them.	他用以其人之道还治其人之身的策略将巴勒斯坦人逼上了绝路。


After all, genuine peace efforts by the Palestinians – based on a two-state solution with no “right of return” for post-1948 refugees – would enrage Hamas and revive factional violence, adding another self-defeat to an already long list.	毕竟，以两国制方案为基础且剥夺1948年后难民“回归权”的巴勒斯坦人真正的和平努力将激怒哈马斯并重燃派系暴力，从而在众多的失败中再加上一个砝码。


With such help from the Palestinians – for example, Hamas bitterly castigated Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas recently after he inadvertently implied giving up the right of return – Netanyahu may well rule Israel and Palestine for the foreseeable future.	在巴勒斯坦人的全力帮助下（比如巴勒斯坦权力机构主席马哈茂德·阿巴斯在无意中暗示放弃回归权后遭到了哈马斯不遗余力的抨击），以色列和巴勒斯坦很可能在可以预见的将来继续接受内塔尼亚胡的统治。


Netanyahu’s Useless Demand	内塔尼亚胡无效的要求


HAIFA – Ever since the Six Day War of June 1967, a small number of Israelis, not all on the left, supported the idea of two states as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	海法——自从1967年6月的6天战争以来，对于以色列和巴勒斯坦冲突，一小部分的以色列人（当然他们也不完全是左派）支持“两个国家”的构想。


Most of their compatriots rejected it, as did the Palestinians.	但绝大多数的以色列人和巴勒斯坦人不同意这样做。


Israelis justified their stance with this question: Just when did the Palestinians become a nation deserving of statehood?	以色列人的逻辑是：什么时候开始巴勒斯坦人也能成立一个国家？


The Palestinians were asking in return: Why should the Jews, a religious community dispersed around the world, have their own state?	，巴勒斯坦人也反唇相讥：为什么犹太人，这个被全世界赶得四处逃窜的犹太群体，也配得上有自己独立的国家？


A lot of water had to pass under the bridge before the idea of a two-state solution, whether as a moral or a practical matter, began to filter into the Israeli and Palestinian political and ideological environments.	早在“两个国家”的概念形成之前，已经存在了很多既有的事实，这其中包括许多现实或道德层面的问题，它们潜移默化地影响着以色列和巴勒斯坦人的政治和意识形态领域。


People gradually became accustomed to the expression “Palestinian state,” and those who embraced it received support and gained prestige on the international scene.	人们开始慢慢接受“巴勒斯坦国”的概念，在国际社会中也得到一定的共鸣。


After the Labor leaders Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ehud Barak embraced the two-state concept, there came the first tentative movements in that direction from Likud members: Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert, and Ariel Sharon.	自从有以色列工党的领袖希蒙·佩雷斯，伊扎克·拉宾和埃胡德·巴拉克接受“两个国家”的概念以来，利库德集团的成员也开始了这方面的探索，他们包括：齐皮·利夫尼，埃胡德·奥尔默特和阿里埃勒•沙龙。


Now, from the very bastion of the right, came Benjamin Netanyahu.	现在轮到了来自右翼集团大本营的本雅明·内塔尼亚胡。


We can congratulate ourselves: better late than never!	我们现在可以拍手庆贺了：从来没有这么好的局面！


We are all aware that the road toward the realization of this dream is full of obstacles and difficulties, both on the Israeli and the Palestinian side.	然而，我们还须认识到，在实现梦想的道路上，充满了来自以色列和巴勒斯坦两方面的障碍和困难。


I believe that some of the preconditions posed by the Israeli prime minister in his recent, widely reported speech are fully justified.	最近以色列总理发表了一篇讲话，在这个被广泛报道的讲话中，我觉得其中有些前提条件是有一定道理的。


Others, however, are useless and only complicate further an already complex and problematic situation.	而其他的一部分则是无用的，甚至可以说是激化了原本就矛盾重重的问题。


Netanyahu’s demand that the future Palestinian state be demilitarized is just, reasonable, and necessary.	合理的部分包括，内塔尼亚胡关于未来的巴勒斯坦国解除军事武装的要求，这是有道理而且是必要的。


One look at a map is enough to understand this.	关于这点，大家只要看看地图就可以理解。


Even Egypt, a great and sovereign nation, accepted demilitarization of Sinai as a part of its peace process with Israel.	即使是周边强大的主权国家埃及，也把西奈半岛的解除军事武装作为换取和以色列和解的前提条件。


Indeed, demilitarization of Sinai is one of the fundamental elements of the stability of Egypt’s peace with Israel.	实际上，这也是以色列和埃及签定和平协议的基础。


Other great and independent countries, such as Japan, Germany, and Austria, have been subjected for decades to limitations on their acquisition of certain weapons and military equipment.	其他一些伟大的国家，例如日本，德国和奥地利，长期以来也一直受到不能拥有某种武器和军事装备的限制条件。


Similarly, the refusal of Palestinian refugees’ claim to a right of return to Israel proper is understandable, logical, and just.	同样的，关于巴勒斯坦难民的返回定居地的问题，以色列的拒绝也是可以理解的，有一定逻辑性和现实性。


What sense would it make to bring back millions of Palestinians into a state whose character and symbols are foreign to them – a state where the majority belongs to another ethnic group?	如果真的有数以百万计的巴勒斯坦人回来——犹太人反而成为了少数族群？


Are they to go back to homes and farms that no longer exist?	就算巴勒斯坦人返回之后，他们曾经熟悉的家园也已荡然无存。


These refugees could much more properly establish themselves in the new state of Palestine, their mother country, among their compatriots, under a Palestinian flag and Palestinian authority, merely 30 kilometers from the homes and farms that they abandoned, or from which they were expelled, more than 60 years ago.	对于这些人而言，更为现实的做法是在新的巴勒斯坦国定居下来，和他们的同胞一起，生活在巴勒斯坦旗帜下面，接受巴勒斯坦国的管理，况且，新的生活工作地点距离他们60年前离开的故土也只有30公里。


But the other condition demanded by Netanyahu, that the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to their own state, or the existence of the Jewish nation, is completely arbitrary.	但是，内塔尼亚胡的其他条件，例如巴勒斯坦人承认犹太人和以色列的关系问题，也就是承认以色列是一个犹太国家的要求，看来有点不太现实。


In my opinion, it is superfluous to ask the Palestinians to recognize the nationhood of a people with thousands of years of history and a state that maintains diplomatic relations with 150 countries around the world.	在我看来，对于这个有着上千年的历史和已经被世界上150多个国家承认的国家而言，要求巴勒斯坦人的承认显然是多此一举。


A demand of this kind was not made of Egypt or Jordan when Israel signed peace agreements with those countries, and it constitutes an entirely useless obstacle on the road to peace with the Palestinians.	想当年，以色列和埃及或是约旦等国家签署和平协议时，也没有提出这样的要求。


It will be more than sufficient to ask the Palestinians to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel, a state whose territorial boundaries and political identity are known to all.	这其实对和巴勒斯坦的和解人为地制造了障碍，已经超过了要求巴勒斯坦人承认以色列国家的合法地位，国界等，这些是大家已经认可的东西。


On our part, we also will be recognizing not so much the Palestinian people, which one day may merge with the people of Jordan, as an independent and sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.	在我们这边来说，巴勒斯坦国不仅仅是巴勒斯坦人的，或许，某一天巴勒斯坦和约旦合并以后，一个全新的巴勒斯坦国就会诞生。


Framing the issue in this way makes sense for two reasons.	关于犹太国家的概念，存在着两个问题。


First, the question of Jewish nationality is, in fact, very complicated, even for Jews themselves, as many consider themselves Jewish only in a religious sense.	首先，犹太国籍的问题实际上来说，非常复杂，即使对犹太人自己来说，很多人都认为犹太只是一个宗教的概念。


Second, the Palestinians’ refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state is motivated by, among other things, the presence of a Palestinian minority in Israel.	其次，巴勒斯坦人拒绝的理由可能有其他方面的考虑，比如在以色列居住地巴勒斯坦少数族裔人。


But relations between Israel’s Jewish majority and Arab minority is an internal, delicate question in which it is not wise to involve Palestinians outside of Israel.	因为以色列的犹太族是多数族裔群、他们和阿拉伯少数族裔的关系是他们自己内部的事务，外部的巴勒斯坦人不应该插手。


For more than 60 years, the two groups have managed to live together in an acceptable manner, confronting with relative dignity the inferno of terrorism and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip.	在过去的60多年中，虽然时常的恐怖袭击伴随着以色列对约旦河西岸和加沙地区的占领冲突，这个两个族裔都在相互地磨合。


With the advent of peace, we all hope that this bond will become consolidated around a common Israeli citizenship.	为了大家的和平，我们希望他们可以融合成为共同的以色列公民。


There will be enough problems in negotiating the creation of a Palestinian state, so we should avoid adding other, gratuitous obstacles.	在建立巴勒斯坦国的问题上，目前已经是麻烦不断，我们不能再节外生枝，人为制造障碍。


Let’s focus on resolving the most important of the problems – demilitarization, settlements, borders, and refugees – and allow the reality of peace to leave behind, or postpone until the distant future, the solution of problems that are essentially historical and theological.	让我们集中目标来解决最为核心的问题——解除武装，定居，边界和难民等问题——以便和平早日到来，而要想解决这些问题，历史和宗教是解开问题的关键要素。


The Net-Zero Imperative	零净排放势在必行


OXFORD – The world has reached an historic agreement on climate change.	牛津——世界各国已经就气候变化达成了历史性的协议。


The deal concluded at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris commits countries to take steps to limit warming to “well below” 2º Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels and to pursue “efforts” to limit warming to 1.5ºC.	巴黎联合国气候变化大会协议要求各国必须采取措施将变暖限制在比前工业化水平高2摄氏度以内，同时“努力”将变暖限制在1. 5摄氏度以内。


It also obliges developed countries to provide $100 billion per year in assistance to developing countries.	协议还要求发达国家每年为发展中国家提供1，000亿美元的发展援助。


But, unfortunately, the final negotiations dropped the one number that truly matters for the future of our planet: zero.	但不幸的是，最终谈判放弃了零这个唯一对地球未来真正重要的数字。


That is the net amount of carbon dioxide we can emit if we are ever to stabilize the planet’s temperature at any level.	零意味着将地球温度稳定在任何水平上我们能够排放的净二氧化碳含量。


Zero, none, nada.	零、没有、一点不排放。


The Earth’s atmosphere-ocean system is like a bathtub filling up with CO2 and other greenhouse gases: The higher the level, the warmer the planet will be.	地球的大气-海洋系统就像一个充满了二氧化碳和其他温室气体的浴缸：地球温度将随着排放水平持续增长。


The emissions tap must be turned off once the bathtub reaches a level associated with a certain level of warming – say, 2ºC, above which, scientists nearly unanimously agree, the risks become severe, tipping points become possible, and civilization’s ability to adapt is not guaranteed.	一旦浴缸达到与特定变暖程度相关联的水平（比方说2摄氏度），排放的龙头就必须关上。 科学家们一致认为，超出这一水平风险就会非常严重、有可能达到临界点、文明的适应力也无法得到保障。


Otherwise, the atmospheric bathtub will keep being filled, warming the planet 3º, 4º, 5º, and so on, until emissions eventually stop – or we go extinct.	若非如此，大气浴缸将不断混入二氧化碳，导致地球变暖3度、4度、5度，依此类推，直到最终停止排放——或者人类陷入灭绝。


The sooner we turn off the tap, the lower the temperature at which the climate stabilizes, the less risk we will face, and the lower the cost we will incur in adapting to a warmer planet.	越早关闭龙头，气候就会稳定在相对较低的温度上，我们面临的风险就越小，适应全球变暖仅需付出较低的代价。


Only about half the CO2 we dump into the atmosphere stays there – the rest is quickly redistributed into the oceans and biosphere.	我们排放到大气中的二氧化碳只有一半停留在大气里——���余的则迅速被海洋和生物圈所吸收。


But, as the oceans become increasingly saturated and able to absorb less, the amount that is redistributed is declining.	但随着海洋饱和度不断升高和吸收力不断下降，所吸收的二氧化碳量也越来越少。


Likewise, warming temperatures cause soils to release more CO2, causing yet more warming.	同样，气温升高导致土壤释放出更多的二氧化碳，从而导致温度进一步升高。


The only way to get CO2 out of the bathtub once it’s there is, almost literally, to bail it out.	毫不夸张地讲，将二氧化碳排出浴缸的唯一方法就是，从字面上理解，将其舀出。


There are natural processes that “re-fossilize” CO2, but they are far too slow to matter.	自然界存在“再化石化”二氧化碳的方法，但因其速度太过缓慢而很难起到明显的作用。


Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology takes CO2 out of emissions from coal- and gas-powered generating plants and sequesters it underground.	碳捕获和封存（CCS）技术将二氧化碳从燃煤及天然气发电厂的排放物中滤出并封存在地下。


While this does not do anything about the existing CO2 in the bathtub, CCS is technically capable of reducing emissions from coal and gas close to zero.	尽管对浴缸中现有的二氧化碳没有影响，但碳捕获和封存从技术上几乎可以彻底消除煤和天然气排放。


But it remains very expensive, and efforts to develop the technology at scale have moved slowly.	但这项技术目前的价格依然昂贵，大规模推广工作进展是非常缓慢的。


From large-scale CCS, it is only a small step to take existing CO2 from the air and sequester it.	一旦实现大规模碳捕获和封存，从空气中过滤现有二氧化碳并将其封存只需再迈一小步。


But “CO2 disposal” technologies are still at a relatively early stage of development.	但“二氧化碳处理”技术仍处于相对初级的发展阶段。


If we continue on our current path, the scale on which they would have to operate would be formidable.	如果继续沿这条路走下去，我们需要操作的规模将非常巨大。


So we are in a race.	因此我们正在与时间赛跑。


Can we turn the tap to zero net emissions before the tub hits a level that takes us above the 2ºC threshold set in Paris?	我们能否在浴缸达到巴黎规定的2摄氏度阈值之前将龙头关到零净排放？


In fact, even that level may not be low enough.	事实上，即使达到这样的水平可能依然不够。


As the Paris agreement recognizes, many scientists believe that warming above 1.5ºC is risky and that adaptation to it will be extremely expensive, particularly for developing countries and island states.	巴黎协议承认，很多科学家认为变暖超过1. 5摄氏度就有危险，尤其对发展中国家和岛屿国家而言，适应过程将付出巨大的代价。


The good news is that if we somehow stopped all emissions today, temperatures would continue to rise only for a decade or so, before stabilizing.	好消息是如果不论采取何种手段今天停止排放，那么气温将持续升高十年左右，之后趋于稳定。


But with the emissions tap still on high, we are rapidly running out of room in the tub.	但因为排放的龙头仍然大开着，浴缸里的空间正在迅速耗光。


We can emit less than half of our historical CO2 emissions to date before we probably exceed the 2ºC threshold.	迄今为止我们只需排放低于历史半数的二氧化碳就很可能超越2摄氏度的限定目标。


On our current course, we will reach that point by 2040-2050.	按照现在的速度，我们将在2040-2050年达到这一目标。


This is why most scientists and a growing number of business leaders and investors are calling for a clear goal that emissions must go to net-zero before warming reaches 2ºC.	这就是为什么大多数科学家和越来越多的商界领袖和投资者呼吁制定必须在变暖超过2摄氏度之前达到零净排放的目标。


In May 2015, the International Chamber of Commerce and CEOs from around the world called for a zero emissions goal.	2015年5月，国际商会和来自世界各地的首席执行官们呼吁设定零排放目标。


In Paris, leading investors and Bank of England Governor Mark Carney, along with Bloomberg CEO Michael Bloomberg, also endorsed net-zero emissions, citing systemic risks to the financial system from climate change.	在巴黎，著名投资人兼英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼和彭博社首席执行官迈克尔·布隆伯格携手赞同零净排放，提出气候变化是威胁金融体系的系统性风险因素。


It is a goal that sends an unambiguous signal that CO2-emitting industries will either have to change or die, and that the future lies with zero-emissions technologies and businesses.	这向世界传递了二氧化碳排放行业要么改变要么消亡的明确信号。 它向世人表明，未来属于零排放的技术和企业。


While the net-zero objective was dropped by the negotiators in Paris, it should be endorsed by individual countries in their plans, reinforced by the G-20, and eventually enshrined in the UN agreement.	虽然巴黎谈判人士不再要求零净排放，但这应当成为各国计划的目标，得到20国集团的批准，并最终体现在联合国协议当中。


For the planet, it is zero or bust.	对地球而言，要么实现零净排放，要么走向灭亡。


BERLIN – The emissions from burning coal, oil, and gas are heating up our planet at such a rapid rate that increasingly volatile and dangerous climate conditions seem almost inevitable.	柏林—燃烧煤炭、石油和天然气产生的排放正在以飞快的速度加热我们的地球，气候条件的日益波动和日益危险已看似不可避免。


To be fair, the IPCC’s latest assessment report highlights the imperative of cutting CO2 emissions drastically to avoid exceeding the world’s small – and still risky – carbon budget.	平心而论，IPCC的最新评估报告��调了大幅削减二氧化碳排放以避免超出全球小型（但仍然十分危险）碳预算的紧迫性。


So, instead of embarking immediately on a radical emissions-reduction trajectory, we can continue to emit massive amounts of CO2 – and even establish new coal plants – while claiming to be taking climate action by “supporting” the development of CCS technology.	因此，我们不必马上采取彻底的减排措施，而大可以继续排放大量二氧化碳——甚至建设新的煤电厂——同时略作“支持”CCS技术的开发就算是采取气候行动了。


That is 14-65 times the amount of land the United States uses to grow corn for ethanol.	90亿英亩种植柳枝稷。 这相当于美国用来种植乙醇玉米的面积的14—65倍。


The US Department of Energy estimates that such methods could make 67 billion barrels of oil – three times the volume of proven US oil reserves – economically recoverable.	美国能源部测算，这一方法将产生670亿桶有利可图的石油开采量——是美国探明石油储量的三倍。


Never Again to Genocide Trials	永远不要再进行种族屠杀审判


HEIDELBERG – Rarely does one read such hopeful news: in late June, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) acquitted former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide.	海德堡——很少看到如此振奋人心的消息：6月下旬，前南问题国际法庭（ICTY）宣判前波斯尼亚塞族领导人拉多万·卡拉季奇的种族灭绝罪名不成立。


That might sound like a bad thing: Karadžić, who once warned Bosnia’s Muslims that war would lead them down the road to hell, surely deserves to be sentenced for the acts of which he was just acquitted – murder, siege, and slaughter almost beyond naming.	这乍听上去似乎是件坏事：卡拉季奇曾警告波黑穆斯林战争会将他们引入地狱，他曾犯下难以名状的谋杀、围困和杀戮等罪行，假使因为刚刚得到赦免的行为而被判有罪也毫不稀奇。


But for genocide? Better not.	可被控种族灭绝恐怕并不合适。


In fact, we would be better off getting rid of genocide as a crime altogether.	其实，我们最好能够彻底取消种族灭绝罪。


The legal concept of genocide is so incoherent, so harmful to the purposes that international law serves, that it would be better if we had never invented it.	种族灭绝罪的法律概念如此混乱，对国际法所服务的宗旨如此有害，最好从来没有人发明过它。


Karadžić’s acquittal – precisely because he is still on trial on other counts related to the same atrocities – is an opportunity to move toward the sensible goal of retiring it.	卡拉季奇被判无罪恰恰因为他还在为与同样暴行有关的其他罪名受审，而这是实现取消种族灭绝罪名目标的一次合理的机会。


This was not just any acquittal.	这并非只是一次简简单单的宣判无罪。


The ICTY decided that, after a two-year trial, the prosecution had not presented enough evidence for any judge to find Karadžić guilty of genocide early in the Bosnian War (he faces a separate count for the July 1995 massacre at Srebrenica, and the prosecution is appealing the acquittal).	前南问题国际法庭裁定在长达两年的审判后，控方并未拿出足够证据说服任何法官卡拉季奇在波黑战争初期犯有种族灭绝罪（卡氏同时还面临1995年7月斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀的独立审判，而控方正就无罪宣判提起上诉）。


The court has been consistent: with just a few trials left, it has issued no convictions for genocide apart from Srebrenica.	法院的态度非常坚定：虽然目前只剩下为数不多的几次庭审，但除斯雷布雷尼察外法院尚未做出任何有关种族灭绝罪的判决。


The broader charge was always risky, but, for many advocates, it is an article of faith that genocide was Bosnia-wide.	扩大诉讼范围常常伴随着风险，但对很多支持者而言，他们坚定不移的相信波斯尼亚全境普遍发生了种族灭绝。


Still, the problem with genocide is not narrow judging, but that the crime itself is doubly irredeemable: it is defective in its definition and troubling in its moral and political effects.	尽管如此，种族灭绝真正的问题并不在于狭义的判断，而在于这种罪行本身的性质加倍的无可救药：种族灭绝在定义上就存在缺陷，同时又会造成令人不安的道德和政治影响。


Genocide requires “special intent.”	种族灭绝要求具有“特别的意图”。


A genocidaire must intend both to commit a defined crime and to destroy the victim’s group.	种族灭绝必须故意犯下特定罪行，同时还要以毁灭受害者群体为目标。


In domestic law, the motive behind a crime is usually irrelevant – and for good reason.	犯罪背后的动机在国内法中通常无关痛痒——之所以如此的确也有着充分的理由。


People have complex reasons for acting illegally.	人们违法行为的原因非常复杂。


War – a collective enterprise in which killing your enemies can be legal – increases that complexity.	而战争这种可以合法杀死敌人的集体行动令这种复杂又更胜一筹。


Trying to prove genocidal intent has drawn prosecutors into thickets of interpretation – such as giving lessons on the history of Greater Serbia – that distract from trials’ forensic core and encourage their politicization, as defendants “hijack” proceedings with their own justificatory glosses.	尝试证明种族灭绝企图将控方拖入了错综复杂的主观解读——比方说讲授大塞尔维亚历史课——这不仅偏离了庭审的司法核心，造成庭审政治化，还让被告利用粉饰性的辩护言辞“劫持”法庭诉讼。


But the alternative – relaxing evidentiary standards – would undermine values such as legality and reasonable doubt, which are essential to a fair trial.	但放松证据标准将可能有损合法性及合理怀疑等价值观，这些在公正的审判过程中又必不可少。


Genocide’s stringent requirements mean that it is – and should be – difficult to convict a defendant.	种族灭绝的严格规定意味着它很难，而且也应当很难给被告定罪。


That is consistent with our intuition that genocide is unique.	这也符合我们有关族灭绝独特性的直觉。


But, while granting supreme status to the “crime of crimes” may seem morally attractive, the gravitational effect of genocide distorts international law and politics.	但尽管授予“罪中罪” 至高无上的地位似乎在道德上极有诱惑力，但种族灭绝强大的引力作用造成了国际法和国际政治的扭曲。


Genocide makes other crimes seem less important.	种族灭绝似乎令其他罪行相形见绌。


When Goran Jelisić – a camp guard in Bosnia who called himself “the Serb Adolf” – was acquitted of genocide in 1999, one might have concluded from the prosecution’s stunned reaction that Jelisić had walked free.	当自诩为“塞族阿道夫”的集中营守卫Goran Jelisić1999年被判种族灭绝罪名不成立后，人们似乎从控方目瞪口呆的表情中解读出Jelisić已经逍遥法外。


In fact, he confessed to 31 other counts covering the same underlying acts, and was sentenced to 40 years in prison.	事实上，他对由同样基本行为支撑的其他31项罪行均供认不讳，并被判处40年徒刑。


Likewise, reactions to the Karadžić decision show how inflated the perceived stakes are.	同样，对卡拉季奇判决的反应显示了人们感知的影响有多大。


Some say that acquitting him denies his victims’ suffering – as if only genocide mattered.	有人说他的无罪释放否认了受害者所经历的苦难——似乎只有灭绝种族罪才最重要。


But it is only because acknowledgement of suffering has become identified so dogmatically with one crime that anything else seems inadequate.	但这其实只是因为对苦难的认可被与某种罪行教条地联系在一起，以致于其他任何形式都显得不够。


The problem extends beyond Bosnia.	问题还不仅限于波斯尼亚。 提出“算不算种族灭绝？


Asking “Was it genocide?” does little to illuminate what was done to which Armenians by which Ottomans during World War I. Today, Turks willing to discuss or even apologize for the massacres refuse to confess to the “supreme crime,” but Armenians can accept no other label.	”这样的问题对一战期间说明奥斯曼人对亚美尼亚人的所作所为几乎没有任何帮助。 今天，就连愿意谈论那次屠杀甚至为之道歉的土耳其人都拒绝承认犯下了“至高罪行”，但亚美尼亚人却不接受其他任何形式的说法。


Any group whose suffering is not called “genocide” feels like a second-class victim.	如果所经受的苦难不能被称为“种族灭绝”，那么受害人就会感觉自己低人一等。


This is morally perverse.	这在道德上不具有正当性。


It is not more wrong to kill people because of their ethnicity than it is to kill them because of their political beliefs, gender, or for the sheer pleasure of watching them die.	因为种族杀人并不比因为政治信仰和性别杀人、或者纯粹为了享受看人死去所带来的乐趣罪过更大。


Yet this is precisely what elevating genocide presupposes.	但上述差别却正是提出种族灭绝概念的前提。


The political cost is high.	人们因此将会付出高昂的政治代价。


Genocide’s status eases the pressure to intervene in crises that are “only murderous.”	种族灭绝减轻了对“纯粹杀人型”危机的干预压力。


Yet crying genocide too liberally quickly cheapens its value, entangling efforts to respond to ongoing exterminations in debates about their precise legal nature.	但过于轻易地呼喊种族灭绝迅速贬低了这个词的价值，并将对持续灭绝采取对策的努力限制在对法律性质的纯粹辩论中。


Despite these problems, prosecuting genocide might be worthwhile if it were the only way to hold mass murderers accountable.	尽管存在上述种种问题，但如果它是追究大规模屠杀责任的唯一方式，针对种族灭绝提起诉讼或许依然是值得的。


But it is not.	但实际情况却又并非如此。


Buried beneath the headlines about Karadžić’s acquittal are those other charges: he will be tried for the same acts, but classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes.	在宣判卡拉季奇无罪的头条下面隐藏着其他所有指控：他将因为同样的行为而接受审判，只是罪名被归结为危害人类罪和战争罪。


If the prosecution produces enough evidence, Karadžić will be sentenced for the same shelling and sniping, the same killings and rape.	如果控方能够提出足够的证据，卡拉季奇将为同样的炮击和伏击、同样的奸淫和杀戮行为而被定罪。


All that will be lost is the opportunity to label those acts “genocide.”	人们所损失的仅仅是为这些行为贴上“种族灭绝”标签的机会。


This is the real reason to drop “the crime of crimes”: its redundancy.	这才是取消“罪中罪”的真正原因：因为它纯属多余。


There is no act of genocide that is not also another crime.	没有哪种种族灭绝行为不同时是另外一种犯罪。


Genocide is a crime of characterization, an interpretation.	种族灭绝只是一种犯罪的表征和解释。


Rather than parse killers’ motives, we better affirm our own values by denying that any reasons could ever justify such acts.	与其分析凶手的动机，我们还不如肯定自己的价值观，否认有任何理由能够证明这种行为的合理性。


Genocide is a socially meaningful way to describe a species of annihilation; it is the legal category that we must question.	种族灭绝在概括各类灭绝时具有社会意义，但我们必须质疑的是它的法律分类。


We need international crimes that are minimally characterized – commonsensical analogues of domestic crimes – with as little room for interpretation as possible.	我们需要尽可能去掉国际犯罪中所含的描述因素，从而与国内犯罪进行常识性的类比操作，以便尽可能去除其中的主观因素。


In court, we need not know why men slaughter to condemn them for it.	在法庭上，我们不需要知道人们为什么杀人才能为其定罪。


So let us end genocide as we know it – by stopping genocides, but also by abandoning the crime of genocide.	让我们结束种族灭绝的概念——这意味着停止种族灭绝，也意味着放弃种族灭绝的定罪。


Let us call its constituent evils by their ancient names.	让我们用构成种族灭绝罪行的古老名字来为它们命名。


That will do for Karadžić, when judgment comes: he is still on trial, and we can still name his crimes.	这在卡拉季奇审判的时候就会产生效果：他仍在接受审判，而且我们仍然可以列举他的罪行。


New Alliances for a New Century	新世纪的新联盟


In 1970, I traveled to Egypt as part of a delegation representing the United States at the funeral of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.	1970年，我作为美国代表团的一员前往埃及参加纳赛尔总统的葬礼。


Back then, Egypt was closely aligned with the Soviet Union.	当时，埃及与苏联紧密结盟。


When we arrived in Cairo, it seemed that everywhere one looked there was evidence of the Soviet presence – Soviet tanks, missiles, and troops.	我们抵达开罗之时，苏联的存在随处可见，到处都是苏联坦克、导弹和士兵。


During the visit, we were scheduled to meet with Anwar Sadat.	我们预定在在访问中会见萨达特。


No one in our delegation was sure what to expect, given the uneasy relations between our two countries at the time.	鉴于当时两国之间的紧张关系，代表团中无人确信会发生什么。


To our surprise, Sadat told us that he, in fact, had respect for the US.	让我们惊讶的是，萨达特告诉我们说，他实际上对美国报有尊敬。


The reason?	原因呢？


As a young military officer, he had visited our country and had had an excellent experience.	他作为一名年轻的军官曾经访问过我国并度过了美好的时光。


And, indeed, within two years of taking power, Sadat expelled the Soviets from Egypt and began to build a friendship with the US that, despite challenges and periodic differences, has proven important and valuable ever since.	上台两年内，萨达特把苏联人驱逐出了埃及，而且开始与美国建立友谊。 尽管存在挑战和不时的分歧，这一友谊证明是重要的而且比以往更为具有价值。


I mention the importance of these military-to-military relationships because the US in this new century is undergoing a significant transformation of its military arrangements and partnerships around the globe – necessary adjustments based on the new realities, and new threats, that have emerged since the end of the Cold War.	我提及这些军队间关系的重要性，这是因为在这一新世纪中，美国正在经历一场重大军事安排和全球伙伴的变革。 由于冷战结束后涌现的新现实以及新威胁，这些调整是必要的。


It is important to note that since 2001, the US has probably done more things, with more nations, in more constructive ways, and in more parts of the world, than at any other time in its history.	应当注意到，2001年以来，美国也许比历史上的任何时候都与更多的国家、以更为建设性的方式、在世界更多的地方作出了更多的工作。


In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush helped fashion and lead the largest coalition in history – 80-plus nations – to fight the global war on terror.	2001年9月11日恐怖分子攻击事件后，布什总统为进行全球反恐战争帮助组建并领导了有80多个国家参加、历史上最大的联盟。


Furthermore, roughly 60 nations are currently cooperating in the Proliferation Security Initiative to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from being transported to terrorists or outlaw regimes.	而且，大约60个国家目前正扩散安全倡议中通力合作来防止危险武器和原料运送到恐怖分子或者非法政权手中。


There has been a rethinking of the structure and role of our traditional military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is setting up a new NATO Response Force and has moved outside Europe for the first time with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.	我们对包括北约组织在内的传统军事联盟的结构和作用进行了反思。 北约目前正在建立一支新的北约反应部队，而且随着在阿富汗部署国际安全援助部队，北约第一次跨越了欧洲。


The focus of attention today is on Iraq and Afghanistan.	当今，我们把精力主要集中在伊拉克和阿富汗上。


But in future decades, priorities will change.	但是在未来的几十年中，优先重点将会变化。


And much of what we may be called on to do in the future will likely be determined by choices made by others.	而且，将来要求我们做的许多事情可能会由其他人作出的选择决定。


Consider Russia, a nation with vast natural resources, an educated population, and a rich heritage of scientific and cultural achievements.	让我们考虑一下俄罗斯。 这是一个拥有巨大自然资源、人民教育程度良好、科学和文化成就源远流长的国家。


Like Americans and others around the world, they are threatened by violent extremism.	正如美国人民和世界其它各地的人们一样，他们也受到暴力极端主义的威胁。


Russia is a partner with the US on some security issues, and our overall relationship is the best it has been in decades.	在某些安全问题上俄罗斯是美国的伙伴，而且我们之间的总体关系在最近几十年来是最好的。


But in other ways Russia has been unhelpful – using energy resources as a political weapon, for example, and in their resistance to positive political changes in neighboring countries.	但是在其他方面，俄罗斯并未予以帮助。 例如，它把能源资源作为一种政治武器，而且他们对邻国积极的政治变革进行抵制。


The same holds true for China.	中国也是一样。


The Chinese people are educated and talented, and their country has great potential, with high economic growth rates and an industrious work force.	中国人民具有很好的教育水平和天赋，他们的国家潜力巨大，经济增长迅速，劳动力吃苦耐劳。


Nonetheless, some aspects of Chinese behavior remain unsettling and complicate our relationship.	但是，中国行为的某些方面还是令人不安，令我们的关系复杂化。


Last year, a US Department of Defense report noted that China’s defense expenditures appear to be much higher than acknowledged by the Chinese government.	去年，美国国防部的一份报告说中国的军费开支看起来要远远高于中国政府承认的数字。


Coupled with a notable lack of transparency, this understandably concerns China’s neighbors.	加之极为缺乏透明度，这一情况自然让邻国们担忧不已。


In addition to the choices that these and other countries make, America’s own choices will be an important factor determining what kind of future it faces.	除了这些国家以及其他国家所作的选择外，美国自身的选择对于决定美国面对何种未来也非常重要。


From time to time, US public sentiment has opposed playing an active role in the world and fulfilling our commitments to allies – and, indeed, to the cause of freedom.	美国公众情绪不时反对美国在世界上发挥积极的作用并履行我们对盟国以及自由事业的承诺。


In the early 1970’s, as US ambassador to NATO, I remember having to fly back from Europe to testify against legislation in our Congress that would have pulled US troops out of Western Europe and NATO, just as the Soviet Union was in the midst of a huge military buildup.	我记得二十世纪七十年代早期，作为美国驻北约大使，我不得不从欧洲飞回美国作证，反对国会提出的将美国军队撤离西欧以及北约的法案，而当时苏联正在大幅增加军备。


Today, nations that were members of the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact, as well as some of the former Soviet Republics – countries that we used to call “captive nations” – are valued members of NATO and represent some of our most stalwart allies in the War on Terror.	我们以前称前苏联的华约成员国以及前苏联加盟共和国为“俘虏国家”。 今天，它们是北约的重要成员并且是我们反恐战争中最为坚定的盟国。


This did not happen by accident or by chance.	这��非偶然。


Looking forward, I am convinced that if we have the wisdom, courage, and strength to adjust long-standing strategic arrangements, embrace new partners, and, above all, persevere in the face of adversity and difficulty, we will see a similar victory in this “long war” against violence extremism and the other threats that may emerge in an uncertain new century.	展望未来，我相信如果我们具有智慧、勇气以及力量来调整长期战略安排、接纳新的伙伴，并且最重要的是在逆境和困难面前百折不挠，我们将会在这场与暴力极端主义以及在这个飘忽不定的新世纪中可能出现其他威胁的“长久战争”中赢得相同的胜利。


New and True Europeans	全新的真正的欧洲人


The fiasco of the European Union’s summit in Brussels has brought into sharp relief differences in attitudes between most new member countries from East Central Europe and the “old” members.	欧盟布鲁塞尔峰会的失败收场使最新加入的东欧中部成员国和“元老级”成员国之间的态度形成了极度鲜明的对照。


Perhaps surprisingly for many, such differences were not played out according to the expected script, in which the new members would be ruthlessly pragmatic, and demanding as much EU money as they could get, while most Western countries would in the end tone down their national egoism in favor of the decades-old ideals of European integration.	也许令很多人吃惊的是，这场演出并没有按照人们预想的剧本那样上演。 人们原以为新成员国将会毫不留情地奉行实际主义，尽可能地多向欧盟要钱，而大部分西欧国家将最终放下他们的国家利己主义以支持数十年来的欧洲一体化的理想。


In the end, it was the EU’s eastern flank—the supposedly money-hungry and immature democracies—that called most loudly for a compromise in the name of salvaging political integration, while most of the old European democracies ruthlessly fought for their own “national interests.”	结果，却是欧盟的东部——人们预料中亟需钱财的不成熟民主国家——以拯救政治一体化之名大声呼吁峰会的和解，而大部分老欧洲民主国家却在为他们自己的“国家利益”激烈争斗。


In view of some big countries’ intense national egoism, the failure to agree on the EU’s 2007-2013 budget could have ominous political consequences for Europe.	由于某些大国强烈的国家利己主义，欧盟2007-2014年财政预算的谈崩将给欧洲带来不利的后果。


Statements by new EU members’ leaders at the summit indicated that they were aware of such a possibility.	欧盟新成员国领导人在峰会的讲话表示他们已经意识到了这种可能性。


They were worried about the EU’s future—certainly more so than their Western counterparts.	他们对欧盟的未来担忧——当然比他们的西方同伴要担忧得多。