The two crises have nothing in common, but their resolution will depend in large part on whether these two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council use their veto power.	这两大危机之间没有任何共同点，但是其解决之道却在很大程度上取决于这两大联合国常任理事国是否动用其否决权。


Comparing the respective abilities of Russia and China to block key international initiatives makes no sense in itself, but it does constitute a useful tool for understanding the transformation of the international system that is now taking place as a direct consequence of the relative decline of America’s global power.	比较中俄两国相应的阻碍主要国际倡议的能力本身没有意义，但是这却是理解美国全球实力相对下降而直接导致的国际体系转变的有用工具。


From that standpoint, the deepening of chaos in the Middle East poses both opportunities and risks for Russia and China, which may force them to define the roles they want to play and the images they want to project in the world.	从这一观点来看，中东混乱加剧给中俄两国带来了机遇和风险。 这些机遇和风险有可能迫使两国确定它们想要在世界上扮演的角色和展示的形象。


The key question is this: Is Russia taking giant steps in the “wrong direction” while China is taking “minuscule” steps in the “right direction”?	关键问题是：俄国是否在“错误的道路”上一意孤行，而中国在“正确的道路”上步履姗姗？


Superficially, Russia and China may give the impression that they are pursuing the same path when they both proclaim with pride that they are “back” on the world stage.	从表面上来看，俄国和中国可能给人的印象是，当它们骄傲地宣称“重返”世界舞台之际，它们正在追寻相同的道路。


But this boast means different things for each country.	但是这一宣扬对于这两国意味着不同的事情。


For China, a deeply self-confident country, to be “back” simply means regaining the country’s historical centrality in the world after an absence of more than two centuries.	中国是一个高度自信的国家。 对于它而言，所谓“重返”只不过是意味着在缺席两百多年以后重新获得历史上的世界中心地位。


After all, at the end of the eighteenth century, China became the world’s first producer of manufactured goods, and it perceives itself as a center of civilization unequalled by any other in Asia, if not the world.	毕竟，在十八世纪末，中国成为世界第一的制造商品国家，而且，中国自认为是文明的中心，即使不称雄世界，至少是在亚洲无可比拟。


China’s renewed self-confidence is based on its remarkable economic prowess, which is derived not from natural resources, but from productivity and creativity.	中国重新树立起来的自信建立在其突出的经济实力基础之上。 其经济实力并非来自自然资源，而是来源于生产效率和创造力。


Whatever the huge political, social, and economic tensions may exist, there is a “feel good” factor in China, a sense of progress, with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing figuring as the symbolic moment that will proclaim to the world the scale of the country’s achievements.	无论有多大的政治、社会以及经济上的紧张局势，人们还是有对中国“感觉良好”的因素。 人们觉得中国取得了进步，2008年的北京奥运会成为一个标志时刻，向全世界表明中国的成就。


Above all, with the exception of the Taiwan issue, China is a satisfied status quo power when it comes to the evolution of the international system – a patient actor that finds it perfectly legitimate to behave and to be seen as the world’s number two power.	除了台湾问题以外，中国在国际体系的转变上首先是一个取得满足的现存大国，也是一个耐心的发挥作用的国家，它认为举止得体而又被世人认为是全球第二大强国完全是合理的。


By contrast, the Russians remain insecure about their status in the world.	与此相比，俄国对其在世界上的地位依旧感到不牢靠。


Russia’s explosive “revisionist” behavior on the eve of the recent G8 summit is an indication of the Kremlin’s “unsatisfied” nature.	在最近的大国集团首脑会议前夕俄国爆炸性的“修正派”行为表明克里姆林宫“心怀不满”的本性。


Because they know they are less potent, particularly in demographic and economic terms, Russians feel they have to do “more.”	因为他们知道他们不是如此强大，特别是在人口和经济方面，因此俄国人感觉到他们要“有所作为”。


For them, to say “Russia is back” means that the humiliating Yeltsin years are over, and that they now must be treated as equals, particularly by the United States.	对于他们而言，说“俄国回来了”意味着令人羞辱的叶利钦年代已经结束，而且他们必须特别是与美国平起平坐。


Russians are nostalgic not for the Cold War as such, but for the international status they lost when it ended.	俄国人并非对冷战本身怀旧，而是思恋冷战结束之际他们所失去的国际地位。


Now that America is no longer a “hyperpower” with no strategic challengers, Russia has reasserted its status as a “superpower,” a claim that is not necessarily supported by reality.	现在美国不再是一个没有战略性挑战者的“超级强权”，因此俄国再一次宣扬其作为“超级大国”地位，而这一宣称并非与事实相符。


Unlike the Chinese, the Russians do not create economic wealth, but merely exploit their energy and mineral resources.	俄国人不像中国人，他们并未创造经济财富，只不过是利用了其能源和矿产资源。 而且，与中国人不同，他们并不对自身在世界上的地位感到自信。


Moreover, unlike the Chinese, they have not always been confident of their position in the world.	俄国从文化和政治角度而言在欧亚之间徘徊，他们深受黑暗的自恋本能所害。


Torn between Europe and Asia in cultural and political terms, victimized by a dark, narcissistic instinct that pervades their reading of their past and their visions of the future, it should surprise no one that Russia is now behaving like a “revisionist” power.	这一本能贯穿于他们对历史的解读和对未来观点。 因此，俄国现在像是一个“修正派”大国也就不足为奇了。


Unsatisfied with their inner identity, it is only natural that Russians should demand changes that make them feel more secure and proud.	俄国人对于内心认同感到不满足，他们要求可以让他们感觉更为安全和自豪的变化也就是自然而然的事情了。


Less than 20 years ago, the Czech Republic and Poland were part of their sphere of influence, so Russians understandably cannot accept the US unilaterally implanting its security system there.	在不到20年前，捷克共和国和波兰是他们的势力范围，所以俄国令人理解地无法接受美国在那里单方面部署其安全防御系统。


Of course, in their respective judgments on Russia and China, the West – and Europeans in particular – may be demonstrating selective emotions.	当然，西方特别是欧洲人对俄国和中国作出判断可能会表现出选择性的情感。


“We” tend to be less demanding of China than of Russia, because we tend to see Russia as “European” (at least culturally).	因为我们趋向于将俄国人视为“欧洲人”（至少是在文化上如此），因此“我们”趋向于对中国不像对俄国那样苛刻。


As a result, the culture of physical violence and verbal provocation that is gaining ground in Putin’s Russia is deeply disturbing, whereas we tend to judge Chinese misdeeds with a greater sense of distance, if not indifference.	结果，身体上的暴力以及言语上的挑衅文化在普京统治下的俄国扎根，非常令人担忧，而我们却对中国的不良行为即使不是无动于衷，也是怀有更大的距离感。


But the differences between Russia and China today may prove to be less significant tomorrow if the deterioration in the Middle East imposes a sense of collective responsibility on all five permanent members of the UN Security Council.	但是，如果中东局势恶化，构成联合国五大常任理事国的集体责任感，那么，如今中俄两国的差别在明天也就不再重要。


It is one thing for Russia and China to exploit America’s growing difficulties from Gaza to Kabul; but it is quite another if the situation deteriorates to the point of general destabilization in the region.	中俄两国利用美国在从加沙到喀布尔的范围内不断日益增加的困境是一回事； 但是，如果局势恶化到整个地区总体上失去稳定，那就是另外一回事了。


Indeed, the Middle East’s deepening problems may impose a sense of restraint in Russia and China by forcing them to calculate not in terms of their global “nuisance value” vis-à-vis the West, but in terms of their ability to make a positive and stabilizing contribution to the world order.	确实，中东不断加剧的问题可能会迫使中俄两国不以其对西方的全球“微妙价值”，而是以其为世界秩序作出积极和稳定性贡献的能力来权衡而给这两个国家施加一种限制的感觉。


China and the Afghan Endgame	中国与阿富汗残局


BEIJING – Ever since US President Barack Obama decided to begin withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan, global interest in what role (if any) China will play in determining that war-ravaged country’s future has grown dramatically.	发自北京——自美国总统奥巴马决定从阿富汗撤军以来，全球开始对中国将在这个饱经战乱之国的未来中（如果会的话）扮演何种角色兴趣大增。


After all, China is not merely a neighbor of Afghanistan, but the world’s most important rising power – indeed, a “world power,” as Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff proclaimed in Beijing this past June.	毕竟中国不仅是阿富汗的邻国，还是全世界最重要的新兴势力——事实上正如美国参谋长联席会议主席迈克·马伦在7月访问北京时所说那样，是一个“世界大国”。


If China proves itself willing to help shore up Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administration, it will not seek to gain any immediate advantage from the withdrawal of US forces.	如果中国想表明自己对阿富汗卡尔扎伊政府的支持，那它将不会试图从美国撤军中攫取任何短期利益。


But, despite the billions of dollars China has invested in developing Afghanistan’s natural resources, it is hard to see it undertaking a policy of broader and proactive engagement there.	纵使中国在开发阿富汗自然资源方面的投资已达数十亿美元之巨，却依然难以观察到一个涵盖范围更广且更为主动的参与性政策。


One reason why China is wary of assuming a bigger role in Afghanistan, despite the country’s undoubted importance for regional stability, is that America’s war there has been controversial in China from the outset.	而虽然中国在维护区域稳定方面的重要性无可置疑，但其之所以不愿在阿富汗承担更重要角色，就是因为其内部从一开始就对美国的这场战争有不同的看法。


Chinese nationalists believe that the war was undertaken by the US partly in order to place its military near one of China’s most sensitive borders.	民族主义者认为美国在某种程度上就是想将自己的部队安插在中国其中一个最为敏感的边境地区。


Moreover, to supply its Afghan forces, the US deepened its military footprint in Central Asia by renting the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, which also shares a border with China.	同时为了支持阿富汗美军，美国还深入中亚地区，在吉尔吉斯斯坦租用马纳斯空军基地，而该国也与中国接壤。


In the eyes of Chinese nationalists, these efforts were all the part of an American conspiracy to encircle China.	在这些民族主义者眼中，这一切都是美国围堵中国阴谋的一部分。


Thus, Chinese nationalists can’t wait to see the back of America’s Afghan military presence.	因此他们也迫切希望美国早日撤军。


For Chinese strategic realists, any support for America’s efforts to help end the Afghan insurgency should be part of a broader China-US bargain.	而对于中国的那些战略现实主义者来说，任何协助美国结束阿富汗军事行动的行为都将成为中美更宏观交易的一部分筹码。


China might agree not to undermine America as it withdraws only if the US agrees to rethink its arms sales to Taiwan, or to pull back from its commitment to support Japan’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the ownership of which China disputes.	只要美国能重新检讨对台军售或者撤回对日本钓鱼岛/尖阁列岛主权诉求的支持，那么中国就不会在阿富汗撤军行动上做手脚。


Obviously, such deals will be unwelcome in the US.	很显然，这种交易在美国没有什么市场。


Given that neither Chinese foreign-policy camp believes that it will get what it wants out of cooperating with the US, both simply want America’s withdrawal to happen as soon as possible, without concern for what Afghanistan will look like afterwards.	考虑到上述两大中国外交政策阵营都不相信自己能从与美国合作中得益，所以他们都单纯地希望美国尽快撤军并对撤军后的阿富汗局势漠不关心。


For both camps, only great-power politics matters for China’s national security, and if diplomacy cannot influence the balance of power, there is little reason to engage with an issue.	对这两大阵营来说，只有大国政治博弈才能保障中国的国家安全，而如果外交手段无法左右势力均衡，那么也没什么理由去卷入这么一场事件。


For Chinese liberals, Afghanistan is fraught with ethnic threats.	对中国的中间派来说，阿富汗是种族威胁的代名词。


By recklessly denying China’s request to extradite Uighur extremists to China for trial, the US showed scant regard for an issue of paramount importance – the threat posed to China’s hard-won unity by separatists.	美国曾一意孤行地拒绝了中国引渡维吾尔极端分子回国受审的要求，可见该国对中国内部至关重要的事务——分离主义者对国家统一的威胁——缺乏足够重视。


Muslim Uighurs from Xinjiang province were captured in Taliban training campus and jailed at Guantánamo Bay with other international terrorists from 2002 through 2009.	在2002至2009年间曾有新疆维吾尔族穆斯林在塔利班训练营被捕并与其他国际恐怖分子一道关押在关塔那摩监狱。


China thought their extradition necessary to undercutting international sympathy for Uighur independence seekers.	中国认为引渡这些人回国受审将有效化解国际上对维吾尔族独立分子的同情情绪。


But the US worried about the potential for human-rights abuses in China and rejected the Uighurs’ extradition.	但美国却担心中国会做出侵犯人权行为并拒绝引渡。


Indeed, former President George W. Bush welcomed Rebiya Kadeer, a leader of the exiled Uighur independence movement, to the White House, embittering many Chinese.	事实上，美国前总统小布什在白宫接待维吾尔族独立运动流亡领导人热比娅·卡德尔的行为激怒了许多中国人。


And given that the Uighur bastion of Xinjiang is close to China’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US was unwise to raise Chinese hackles in this way.	同时考虑到维吾尔族聚居的新疆自治区靠近中国与阿富汗和巴基斯坦的边境，美国在这方面激怒中国显然是不明智的。


Of course, a stable, orderly, and secular Afghanistan serves China’s interests as much as it benefits the rest of the world.	当然，一个稳定，有秩序而且世俗的阿富汗既符合中国的利益，也符合全世界的利益。


Yet few Chinese are willing to confess that the US-led Afghanistan war, which removed the Taliban and Al Qaeda from their dominant roles in the country, improved China’s domestic security.	但仍然只有很少中国人愿意承认是美国领导下的阿富汗战争推翻了塔利班和基地组织在这个国家的统治地位，并因此改善了中国的国内安全形势。


That refusal is clearly the result of the “structural” ambivalence that now exists between the US and China.	而这种抗拒显然是目前中美两国之间存在的“结构性”矛盾心理的结果。


The extent to which China will engage Afghanistan positively will depend in large part on whether China rids itself of the prevailing zero-sum mindset and facilitates America’s military withdrawal by doing what it can to stabilize the country.	中国积极参与阿富汗事务的程度将在很大程度上取决于其能否摒弃当前的这种零和博弈思维，并通过稳定阿富汗局势来协助美国的撤军行动。


China can help by stiffening the resolve of Pakistan’s military to move more aggressively to contain Taliban extremists on its territory; open border regions to help resupply NATO forces in Afghanistan; and invest in the country’s infrastructure.	中国可以通过增强巴基斯坦军队更大规模扫荡本国塔利班极端分子的决心； 开放边境地区来协助阿富汗北约部队补给；


Indeed, China’s relations with Pakistan have assumed greater importance recently, owing to the tensions that now exist between Pakistan and the US.	以及投资阿富汗国内基础设施的方式来提供帮助。 事实上由于巴基斯坦和美国之间的紧张关系，中国和巴基斯坦两国关系的重要性最近更加凸显。


The Obama administration’s challenge nowadays is to calibrate its recent suspension of some military aid to Pakistan in order to maximize its leverage without pushing the government even closer to the extremists.	奥巴马当局当前的挑战就是调整最近停止向巴基斯坦提供军事援助的做法来增大其影响力并避免巴国政府��续向恐怖分子靠拢。


By working with the US on Pakistan, China can help secure its own interest in a strong Pakistani campaign against the militants on its territory.	通过与美国在巴基斯坦并肩合作，中国能在巴基斯坦向武装分子发动强大攻势的同时确保自身利益。


Regardless of the Bush-era disputes with the US over the Uighur prisoners at Guantánamo, China is in a better position to tell its “all-weather” friends in Islamabad that stabilizing Afghanistan is not only an American objective, but a significant Chinese goal as well.	不管在布什时代与美国在关塔那摩维吾尔族囚犯方面发生的争执，中国如今已经占据了一个更有利的地位去告诉自己在伊斯兰堡的“全天候”盟友：阿富汗的稳定不但是美国的事，也是中国的一个重要目标。


China’s cooperation may not be essential to defeating Al Qaeda and other militants in Afghanistan, but it will be if lasting peace and stability is to be realized.	中国的协助行动可能对消灭基地组织和其他武装人员方面并非必要，但对实现阿富汗的长治久安却是必不可少。


Chinese and US interests in Afghanistan are unlikely ever to be perfectly aligned, but the two sides can and must learn to cooperate for their own benefit, and that of the region.	中美两国在阿富汗的利益或许永远无法重合，但双方可以并必须学会为各自以及该区域的利益展开合作。


The challenge for China is to exert its power and influence in a way that harmonizes with the US, despite widespread displeasure among Chinese at America’s position on a variety of issues, from Taiwan to the East and South China seas.	中国的挑战则在于无论中国人在从台湾到中国东海，南海等一系列广范事务上对美国如何不满，也要以一种与美国相协调的方式来施加其实力和影响力。


The Two Innovation Economies	两种创新经济


HONG KONG – For 250 years, technological innovation has driven economic development.	香港—250年来，技术创新推动了经济发展。


But the economics of innovation are very different for those at the frontier versus those who are followers striving to catch up.	但对于创新先锋和创新追随和赶超者来说，创新经济学是大不相同的。


At the frontier, the innovation economy begins with discovery and culminates in speculation.	对创新先锋来说，创新经济始于发现，极于投机。


From scientific research to identification of commercial applications of new technologies, progress has been achieved through trial and error.	从科学研究到新技术的商业应用的认识，进步一直是在试错中实现的。


The strategic technologies that have repeatedly transformed the market economy – from railroads to the Internet – required the construction of networks whose value in use could not be known when they were first deployed.	一再改变市场经济的战略性技术——从铁路到互联网——需要网络建设，而在首次建成之前，网络的价值无法为人所知。


Consequently, innovation at the frontier depends on funding sources that are decoupled from concern for economic value; thus, it cannot be reduced to the optimal allocation of resources.	结果，前沿创新取决于资金来源，而与经济价值考虑无甚关联； 因此，不能把它同最优资源配置问题等量齐观。


The conventional production function of neoclassical economics offers a dangerously misleading lens through which to interpret the processes of frontier innovation.	在解释前沿创新过程方面，新古典经济学的常规生产函数起到了危险的误导作用。


Financial speculation has been, and remains, one required source of funding.	金融投机一直是且现在仍是资金的必要来源之一。


Financial bubbles emerge wherever liquid asset markets exist.	金融泡沫产生于高流动性资产市场存在之处。


Indeed, the objects of such speculation astound the imagination: tulip bulbs, gold and silver mines, real estate, the debt of new nations, corporate securities.	事实上，投机的目标物远超你的想象：郁金香花球、金矿和银矿、房地产、新国的债务、公司证券，等等。


Occasionally, the object of speculation has been one of those fundamental technologies – canals, railroads, electrification, radio, automobiles, microelectronics, computing, the Internet – for which financial speculators have mobilized capital on a scale far beyond what “rational” investors would provide.	偶尔，投机的目标物也会是基础技术——运河、铁路、电气化、无线电、汽车、微电子、计算、互联网——金融投机客为此动员的资本规模远远超过了“理性”投资者所能提供的量级。


From the wreckage that has inevitably followed, a succession of new economies has emerged.	失败是免不了的，但新经济就是这样不断地在投机废墟中崛起。


Complementing the role of speculation, activist states have played several roles in encouraging innovation.	作为投机角色的补充，活跃的国家也在鼓励创新中起着作用。


They have been most effective when pursuing politically legitimate missions that transcend narrow economic calculation: social development, national security, conquering disease.	它们在追求政治上合法又超越狭义境计算机的创新中最有效果，比如社会发展、国家安全、疾病防治。


In the United States, the government constructed transformational networks (the interstate highway system), massively subsidized their construction (the transcontinental railroads), or played the foundational role in their design and early development (the Internet).	在美国，政府建设了交通运输网络（州际高速公路系统）、大量补贴它们的建设（洲际铁路），或在设计和早期开发中扮演基础性角色（互联网）。


Activist states around the world have funded basic science and served as early customers for the novel products that result.	全世界的活跃的国家都为基础科学提供资金，并充当着由此产生的新奇产品的早期客户。


For a quarter-century starting in 1950, the US Department of Defense – to cite one crucial example – combined both roles to build the underpinnings of today’s digital economy.	一个著名的例子是，在1950年开始的25年中，美国国防部将这两个角色合而为一，建设了今天数字经济的基础。


For countries following an innovative leader, the path is clear.	对于作为创新领导者的追随者的国家来说，路径是明确的。


Mercantilist policies of protection and subsidy have been effective instruments of an economically active state.	保护和补贴的重商主义政策一直是经济活跃国家的有效工具。


In the US, the first profitable textile mills blatantly violated British patents.	在美国，第一批盈利纺织厂极大地侵害了英国专利。


And ferociously entrepreneurial private enterprise was supported by a broad array of state investments, guarantees, and protective tariffs, in accordance with the “American System” inspired by Alexander Hamilton and realized by Henry Clay.	凶残的创业私营企业背后是大量国家投资、担保和保护性关税，即亚历山大·汉密尔顿启发、亨利·克莱（Henry Clay）发扬光大的“美国体系”（American System）。


The great, neglected German economist Friedrich List, a student of Hamilton’s work, laid out an innovation roadmap for his own country in 1841, in his National System of Political Economy.	1841年，被人忽视的伟大德国经济学家、汉密尔顿的门徒弗雷德里希·李斯特（Friedrich List）在其著作《国家政治经济制度》（National System of Political Economy）为其祖国勾画和创新路线图。


It has been used repeatedly: by Japan beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century; by the Asian Tigers in the second half of the twentieth century; and now by China.	它被反复使用：19世纪最后一个十年的日本、二十世纪下半叶的东亚诸小龙，以及现在的中国。


List noted how Britain’s emergence as “the first industrial nation” at the end of the eighteenth century depended on prior state policies to promote British industry.	李斯特论证了英国是如何依赖国家政策促进英国工业而在18世纪末成为“第一个工业化国家”的。


“Had the English left everything to itself,” he wrote, “the Belgians would be still manufacturing cloth for the English, [and] England would still have been the sheepyard for the [Hanseatic League].”	“如果英国人把所有东西都留给自己，”他写道，“那么比利时人现在仍在为英国人做衣服，（而）英国现在仍是（汉萨同盟）的大羊圈。 ”


Coherent programs to promote economic catch-up are relatively straightforward.	刺激经济赶超的连贯计划相对来说较为直观。


But the transition from follower to leader at the frontier of the innovation economy is more challenging and elusive.	但从追随者转变为创新经济的前沿领导者更具挑战，也更困难。


The US managed the transition roughly between 1880 and 1930, combining the professionalization of management with a speculative taste for new technologies – electrification, automobiles, and radio – and state tolerance of the Second Industrial Revolution’s great industrial monopolies, which invested their super-profits in scientific research.	美国大约在1880—1930年期间完成了这一转型，它将管理专业化与新技术（电气化、汽车和无线电）的投机性尝试以及国家对第二次工业革命的大型产业垄断者（它们将超高利润投入到科学研究中）的容忍结合了起来。


The post-World War II invocation of national security as the legitimizing rationale for an economically active state extended America’s leadership.	二战后，国家安全的创新成为经济活跃国家合法化的理由，这也扩大了美国的领先地位。


It is not yet clear whether East Asia’s economic powerhouses will succeed in making the transition from follower to frontier.	东亚经济强国是否能成功完成从追随者到前沿领导者的转型还不得而知。


To begin, the “national champions” of the catch-up phase must be rendered accessible to competitive assault.	首先，赶超阶段的“国家冠军”必须去面对激烈的竞争。


More generally, the state’s role must shift from executing well-defined programs to supporting trial-and-error experimentation and tolerating entrepreneurial failure.	更一般地说，国家的角色必须从执行明确的计划转型为支持试错实验和容忍创业失败。


And the debilitating “corruption tax” that seems inevitably to accompany economic revolutions must be curbed, as it was in Britain during the nineteenth century and America during the twentieth.	而看似经济进步阶段不可避免的、具有削弱性质的“腐败税”必须得到遏制，就像英国在19世纪、美国在20世纪做的那样。


Here is the moment of strategic uncertainty.	战略不确定性时刻就出现在这里。


The “made in America” digital economy exhibits ample momentum in the private sector.	“美国制造”数字经济在私人部门表现出强劲动力。


But leadership of the next new economy – the low-carbon economy – is open.	但未来新经济的领袖——低碳经济——是开放的。


America is suffering the consequences of a generation-long effort to render the state illegitimate as an economic actor.	美国正在承受长达一代人时间的判定国家为非法经济行为人的努力带来的后果。


Europe is mired in its oxymoronic commitment to “expansionary fiscal austerity.”	欧洲陷入了它的“扩张性财政紧缩”的矛盾承诺的泥淖。


Can China manage the economic, cultural, and political transitions necessary to assume the leadership role now up for grabs?	中国可以完成必须的经济、文化和政治转型，在见者有份的领导权之争中脱颖而出吗？


I find it intriguing to go back almost 200 years and consider Britain’s political economy when the First Industrial Revolution was gathering steam.	我认为，回顾200年前英国第一次工业革命即将启动时的政治经济学是大有裨益的。


England in 1820 was governed by a corrupt oligarchy that exercised power in intimate collaboration with a national religious establishment.	1820年的英国由腐败的寡头政治统治，紧密的联盟与国教体系把持着权力。


Political legitimacy was validated by fear of anarchy, the terrifying reality of which had been observable across the Channel within living memory.	政治合法性来自于对无政府主义的恐慌——海峡对岸的可怕事实就在眼前，相去未远。


Arbitrary, draconian repression was the rule: under the “Bloody Code” of criminal justice, more than 100 felonies were punishable by death or transportation.	专制、严厉的压迫就是规则：根据刑事判决的“血腥法典”，有100多项罪名可判死刑或流刑。


The patent system was notoriously expensive and inaccessible.	专利制度以昂贵和不可获得而闻名。


England’s rulers sought in vain to keep a lid on the greatest explosion of economic energy and financial wealth in human history.	英国统治者徒劳地试图遏制人类历史上最伟大的经济能量和金融财富大爆发的发生。


Over a long generation, England was transformed.	在很长一段时期内，英国完成了转型。


From the Great Reform Act of 1832 to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 – and on to the civil-service reforms initiated in 1853 and the Representation of the People Act of 1867 – Britain pursued its unique path toward a relatively stable and sustainable democratic capitalism.	从1832年改革法案到1846年谷物法的废除——以及1853年开始的公务员改革和1867年的人民代表法案——英国开创了独一无二的迈向相对稳定而可持续的民主资本主义之路。


No doubt China’s own path will be as distinctive as the processes by which it has reached its current moment of opportunity.	毫无疑问，中国自身的道路别具一格，一如它抵达当前机会时刻的过程。


Whether or not its path proves to be as progressive as England’s may determine who assumes the mantle of global economic leadership.	它的道路是否向英国的道路一样具有进步性或许将决定谁会获得全球经济领导权。


Graft or Growth in China?	中国贪污还是增长？


BEIJING – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, which has already brought down many high-ranking “tigers” in the government, has been widely touted as a key component of the deep structural reforms that China needs if it is to build a more sustainable, inclusive, and market-based economy.	北京—中国国家主席习近平的反腐运动已经将许多政府中的“大老虎”拉下马，这场运动被广泛视为中国构建更加可持续、更加包容、更加市场的经济所需要的深刻结构改革的关键要素。


But worries abound that, in a country where government officials play a major role in promoting economic growth, rooting out corruption might undermine prosperity.	但这引起的担心，在中国这样一个政府官员对刺激经济增长起着主要作用的国家，根除腐败有可能不利于繁荣。


Some have cited the recent struggles of luxury hotels and restaurants (which, in China, are supported largely by government spending) as evidence that the anti-corruption campaign is discouraging growth-enhancing activity.	一些人将最近豪华饭店和餐厅（在中国，它们很大程度上是靠政府支出支撑起来的）惨淡经营的状况视为反腐运动不利于强化增长的活动的证据。


But the decline is likely to be temporary, with new customers emerging after a period of adjustment.	但衰退很有可能是暂时的，新客户在经过一段时间的调整后将陆续出现。


A more credible concern is whether efforts to root out corruption weaken the incentive for government officials to promote growth.	更加可信的担忧是根除腐败的努力是否削弱政府官员刺激增长的激励。


After all, high levels of growth translate into large rents that can, through corrupt practices, be distributed to the officials themselves, as well as to their friends and protégé.	毕竟，高增长水平能带来大量租（rent），而租通过腐败行为在官员本人、他们朋友和亲信之间进行分配。


Eliminate such practices, the logic goes, and officials will be unable to reap large rewards from economic growth – and thus will be less motivated to encourage it.	逻辑上，消灭这一行为意味着官员将无法从经济增长中获得大量好处——因此也就没有很强的动力刺激增长。


But this argument is far from airtight.	但这一观点很不严密。


Among the most common forms of corruption is the “sale” of government positions – a practice that has little to do with growth, especially when it is conducted by high-ranking officers in the army, such as the Peoples’ Liberation Army generals who have been arrested during the campaign for trading promotions for bribes.	腐败最常见的形式之一是“贩卖”政府职位——这一行为和增长没有什么关系，特别是对高级军官而言，比如那些在反腐运动中因收受贿赂升迁部下的解放军将领。


Another major concern is that, if businesses are no longer able to “grease the wheels” – that is, bribe officials to allow them to circumvent excessive regulations – their performance could suffer.	另一个主要担忧是，如果企业不再能够“走后门”——即贿赂官员允许他们规避过度监管——业绩将受到影响。


And, indeed, even after 30 years of reform, China’s economy remains bound by red tape, which drags down productivity considerably.	而事实上，虽然经历了30年的改革，但中国经济仍饱受红头文件束缚，这极大地影响了生产率。


But there are holes in this logic, too.	但这一逻辑也存在漏洞。


Most important, for such bribery to boost economic growth in any significant or sustainable way, it would have to be conducted by a wide range of businesses – not just the wealthiest and best connected.	最重要的是，如果这类贿赂规模可以达到大幅或可持续地刺激经济增长的成都，那么必须是各种企业普遍都在这样做——而不只是最富有、关系最硬的企业这样做。


That is not the case today; most Chinese officials who have been charged so far have taken bribes from a single businessman, thereby allowing his business to acquire a monopoly position.	如今的情况并非如此； 大部分被起诉中国官员都只从一位商人处收受贿赂，让他的企业获得垄断地位。


So, while bribery in China may facilitate growth to some extent, it does not produce the kind of competitive business environment that supports long-term gains.	因此，贿赂或许在一定程度上刺激了中国的增长，但并没有营造出支持长期增长的竞争性商业环境。


Indeed, the reality is that corruption imposes a large, often random, tax on businesses, not least by discouraging officials from cutting red tape for all firms – a move that really would boost growth.	事实上，现实是腐败给企业带来了一项沉重的、往往是随机出现的税负，尤其是这样做让官员更加不愿放松束缚所有企业的红头文件——而这才是真正的刺激增长的行为。


The conclusion is clear: the costs of corruption far outweigh the benefits – and not only in China.	结论很清楚：腐败之弊远大于利——不仅中国如此。


Since World War II, many countries have attempted the transition from low- to high-income status, but only 13 have succeeded – and all had relatively low levels of official corruption.	自二战以来，许多国家都试图从低收入国家变成高收入国家，但只有13个国家取得了成功——而它们的官员腐败情况均相对较好。


Given this, one might ask how China managed to achieve such impressive growth over the last 20 years, despite rampant corruption.	因此，你也许会问，中国式如何在腐败猖獗的情况下实现过去20年如此迅速的增长的。


The answer probably lies in its “selectocracy.”	答案也许在于其“选拔制”（selectocracy）。


Unlike in a democracy, where citizens elect their government officials based on whatever criteria they choose, in China’s selectocracy, the Chinese Communist Party chooses officials for promotion based on their ability to advance the party’s main objectives – especially growth.	与民主国家公民根据自己所选择的标准选举政府官员不同，在中国的选拔制中，中共遴选升迁官员的基础是他们是否有能力推进党的主要目标——特别是增长。


Of course, political connections and loyalty also factor into promotion decisions, especially at higher levels of government.	当然，政治关系和忠诚也在升迁决定中起着作用，特别是在政府高层。


But, as the US-based political scientist Pierre Landry and his colleagues have observed, economic growth is key, particularly among officials at the county and municipal levels, where much of the government’s growth-enhancing activities – such as infrastructure investment – take place.	但是，美国政治学家皮埃尔·拉迪（Pierre Landry）及其同事观察到，经济增长才是关键，特别是在市级层次。 政府的增长强化措施——如基础设施投资——大部分在市级层次展开。


Promotions provide officials with a strong positive incentive to boost growth.	升迁为官员提供了刺激增长的强大正激励。


Consider Liu Zhijun, the former railway minister, who propelled China’s frenzy of high-speed rail construction.	以铁道部前部长刘志军为例，他推动了中国高铁建设的高潮。


His yearning for professional achievement – and, especially, his desire to be promoted – motivated his significant contributions to China’s GDP growth.	他对职业成就的渴望——特别是对升迁的渴望——驱动他为中国GDP增长做出了巨大贡献。


But Liu also engaged in massive abuses of power – including accepting more than $10 million in bribes by the time he was arrested in 2011 – that resulted in significant economic losses for the state.	但刘志军大量滥用权力——包括2011年被捕时收受超过1亿美元贿赂——给国家造成了巨大经济损失。


His (suspended) death sentence should help to deter other officials from choosing the same path.	他的死缓判罚应该有助于威慑其他官员效而仿之。


If corrupt officials can make such significant contributions to growth, imagine what law-abiding officials could do.	如果腐败官员可以为增长做出如此巨大的贡献，可以想象一下遵纪守法的官员能怎么做。


All they need are strong incentives to be proactive.	他们所需要的不过是积极主动的激励。


In this sense, China’s “selectocracy,” which promises promotions to the officials who prove most effective in promoting growth, could be the key to explaining the country’s impressive economic track record.	从这个角度讲，中国的“选拔制”——承诺在刺激增长方面效率最高的官员能获得升迁——也许是解释中国辉煌经济增长记录的关键。


China as a Superpower	超级中国


YALTA – Given its rapid and successful development, there can be no doubt that the People’s Republic of China will become one of the dominant global powers of the twenty-first century. Indeed, despite the massive problems that the country is confronting, it could even emerge as the global power.	柏林——


But it would be a mistake to assume that the reemergence of so-called “XXL powers” like China and India will simply bring a continuation of Western traditions.	近年来，中国的发展速度飞快、成效显著，在二十一世纪的国际舞台上，它必将扮演主要角色。


We will have to deal with a different type of superpower.	事实上，尽管面临挑战，中华人民共和国有可能在这幕大戏中担当领衔主演。


Ever since the European powers set sail at the end of the fifteenth century to conquer the world, historiography and international politics have become accustomed to a certain pattern: military, economic, and technological power is translated into the exercise of influence over other countries, conquest, and even global dominance and empire.	然而，“超大号”强国再度登场并不意味着中印等新角儿会延续老一代西方列强的做派，超级大国的内涵也在发生变化。


This was particularly true in the twentieth century, when, in the wake of two world wars, the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the European world powers on the global stage. The Cold War and the period of US global dominance after 1989/1990 followed this pattern as well.	自十五世纪末欧洲各国开辟航路、征服世界以来，史学和国际政治学界已经习惯将军事活动、经济发展、技术演变都解释为国家间相互影响、弱肉强食甚至争夺全球霸权的结果。


But China’s rise to global power, I believe, will not, owing to its massive population of 1.2 billion people, which threatens to overstretch the structures of any kind of government system and its decision makers. This is all the more true in times of rapid fundamental change, as is occurring in China now.	这种认知模式在二十世纪尤为盛行，特别是在两次世界大战之后，美苏取代欧洲占据强势，冷战以及之后美国全球霸主地位的确立，其间许多事件都因国际影响促成。


The permanent danger of overstretching the country’s internal political structures is unlikely to permit any imperial foreign-policy role.	但我相信，中国崛起的模式将会有所不同：其政策重心将会较为内向。


Insofar as this is true, the United States won’t be replaced as the dominant power unless and until it abdicates that role. This may sound simple, but it will have far-reaching consequences for the coming century’s international order.	原因在于中国人口众多，政府——特别是在目前的变革过程中——面对来自强大的内部压力，这确保了中国无暇施行强权外交，美国的霸主地位进而尚可留存，除非它自愿放弃。


The vital interests guiding Chinese policy are internal modernization, the ruling regime’s political stability and survival, and the country’s unity (which includes Taiwan). These interests are unlikely to change for a long time.	这一重心的改变说来轻巧，却可能对本世纪的国际格局产生深远影响。


As a result, China will become a largely inward-looking superpower, which – precisely for that reason – will pursue its foreign-policy interests in a completely unsentimental manner.	长期来看，中国的核心利益和政策重点在于国内现代化、执政党地位的持续稳定和国家统一（包括台湾问题）。


Militarily, China will focus primarily on its regional supremacy, because the country’s unity depends on it.	所以，中国将成为一个主要关注国内的超级大国，因而奉行实事求是的外交政策。


Otherwise, though, the transformation of China’s economy and society will be all-important, because the regime’s stability depends on it.	军事方面，中国将主要谋求地区内的控制权，以确保国家统一。 另外，为巩固执政党地位，国内经济社会改革也至关重要。


For the Chinese leadership, this means that a growth rate of about 10% per year will be essential for a long time.	因此，将经济增长速度维持在年均10%的高水平对中国政府而言意义重大。


Otherwise, the rapid and fundamental transformation of the country from a largely agrarian to an ultra-modern industrialized society could not proceed without destabilizing the system.	否则，由农业向“超现代”工业的剧变必将引发社会动荡。


But this focus on internal growth will have massive political consequences, both domestically and in foreign-policy terms.	将发展重心置于国内也会带来重大的政治影响。


Domestically, China will be the first country that, due to its sheer size and required GDP growth, is forced to pursue a “green” economy. Otherwise, China would quickly reach its “limits to growth,” with disastrous ecological and, as a result, political consequences.	就国内来看，鉴于其经济规模和增长需求，中国必将成为首个“绿色”经济体，以避免“增长的极限”、环境灾难以及政治上的负面影响。


Since China will be the most important market of the future, it will be decisive in determining not only what we produce and consume, but how.	未来，中国将成为最重要的商品市场，不仅参与生产消费过程，还将定义商业模式。


Consider the transition from the traditional automobile to electric transport. Despite European illusions to the contrary, this will be decided in China, not in the West.	以传统汽车业向电动运输产业的转变为例，尽管欧洲厂家仍存在主导市场的幻想，但在这一转变中起决定作用的将只能是中国。


All that will be decided by the West’s globally dominant automobile industry is whether it will adapt and have a chance to survive or go the way of other old Western industries: to the developing world.	欧美汽车业所能选择的只有：要么适应转变免于出局，要么像其他老牌西方工业一样：到发展中国家中发展。


In foreign-policy terms, China will attempt to protect its domestic transformation by securing resources and access to foreign markets.	就外交而言，为保证国内产业升级，中国将力图从外国获取原料并打入国际市场。


Sooner or later, though, China’s government will come to realize that America’s role as a global regulator is indispensible for China’s vital foreign-policy interests, because China is unable to assume that role, other global players aren’t available, and the only alternative to the US would be a breakdown of order.	然而，中国政府迟早会意识到，对本国外交利益来讲，美国扮演的“全球总管”角色是不可或缺的，因为中国或其他国家难以承担这一重任，则美国的失势必将引发国际秩序的解构。


This US-Chinese tandem will run far from smoothly, and will do little but ameliorate crises and periods of serious economic and political confrontation, like that which is currently looming over the bilateral trade imbalance.	美中并行的国际格局也远非全无争端，实际上中美对话的作用仅限于缓解危机及调和经济政治上对抗局面，如目前的双边贸易不平衡。


Strategically, however, China and the US will have to rely on one another for a long time. This co-dependency will, at some point, also take shape politically, probably to the chagrin of all other international players, particularly the Europeans.	但从战略角度考虑，双方还将在较长时期内维持相互依赖的关系，而且这种关系将会在一定时机确定为双边机制，从而可能引发其他国际角色（尤其是欧洲国家）的不满。


Europe could change the course of this development only if it presented itself as a serious player and stood up for its interests on the global stage. The “G-2” of China and the US would probably be happy about that.	只有欧洲在国际舞台上展现出意志和实力，它才能转变其发展模式，而这或许也是中美“二国集团”所乐意看到的。


But Europe is too weak and too divided to be effective globally, with its leaders unwilling to pursue a common policy based on their countries’ own strategic interests.	然而目前，欧盟力量有限且过于分散，各国领导限于本国战略利益不愿作出共同政策，阻碍了欧盟有效地发挥国际影响。


China’s Brittle Development Model	中国脆弱的发展模式


NEW DELHI – After gaining independence from Britain in 1947, India was something of a poster child for the virtues of democracy – in stark contrast with China, which became a Communist dictatorship in 1949.	新德里——1947年从英国独立后，印度就成了民主优势的代言人——与1949年成立共产党独裁政权的中国形成鲜明的对照。


Until the 1970s, it was widely argued that, while both countries suffered from extreme poverty, underdevelopment, and disease, India’s model was superior, because its people were free to choose their own rulers.	直到20世纪70年代，人们还普遍认为尽管两国同样面临极端贫困、经济落后和疾病的挑战，但印度的模式要好于中国，因为它的民众可以自由选择统治者。


With China’s economic boom, however, the counterargument – that a repressive political system is more conducive to development – has gained currency.	但随着中国经济的蓬勃发展，压迫性政治制度更有利发展的相反论调正在赢得市场。


But while China’s recent performance has been spectacular, India’s model may well stand up better in the long run.	尽管中国近期取得了惊人的成就，但印度模式从长远看可能效果更好。


The conversation changed after 1978, when China surged ahead of India economically, causing many to conclude that India’s chaotic democracy was holding back its people.	1978年后人们的观点开始发生变化，因为中国经济发展比印度更加迅猛，导致很多人认为印度乱成一团的民主制度正在阻碍它的民众。


After all, if China’s leaders want to build a new six-lane expressway, they can bulldoze any number of villages.	毕竟，如果中国领导人希望新建一条六车道高速公路，他们可以不费吹灰之力用推土机推平村庄。


In India, widening a two-lane road could incite popular protests and be tied up in court for years.	而在印度，拓宽一条双车道公路就有可能引发民众抗议，并在法院拖上几年都没有结果。


That old debate has now taken a new twist with the publication of a new book by Daniel A. Bell, a professor at Beijing’s Tsinghua University.	北京清华大学教授贝淡宁出版的一部新著让这种由来已久的争论出现了新的转折。


Bell argues that Chinese authoritarianism – specifically, its “political meritocracy” – is a viable model of governance, possibly even superior to the democracy of India and the West.	贝淡宁提出中国的威权主义——特别是它的“精英政治”——是一种可行的治理模式，甚至可能比印度和西方的民主制度还要好。


The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen famously demonstrated that famines do not occur in democracies with a free press, because their governments cannot ignore the suffering.	经济学家兼哲学家阿马蒂亚·森的名言是因为政府不能无视民众的痛苦，所以言论自由的民主国家不会出现饥荒。


Bell points out that China has also avoided famine, at least since the Great Leap Forward, and has done better than India on malnutrition.	贝淡宁指出至少自大跃进结束后，中国同样成功避免了饥荒，并且与印度相比更好地控制了营养不良。


This, he asserts, proves that a government does not have to be democratic to serve its people effectively.	他断言这证明有效地、为民众服务不一定只有民主政府才能做到。


In fact, Bell argues, China’s merit-based system for selecting and evaluating officials guarantees better leadership than democratic elections, which often lead to victory for ignorance and prejudice.	事实上，贝淡宁提出中国以绩效为主的官员选拔评价体制确保了比民主选举更优秀的领导，后者往往导致无知和偏见占据上风。


Despite some weaknesses (notably complacency and corruption), China’s system ensures orderly governance and development.	尽管的确存在缺陷（尤其是自满和腐败），中国的制度能够确保有序的执政和发展。


Democracy does not necessarily do that, so the “politically relevant question,” Bell says, “is whether democratic elections lead to good consequences.”	民主制度不一定能做到这一点，因此“真正有意义的政治问题是”，贝淡宁说，“民主选举能否带来好的结果。 ”


India debated this question 40 years ago, when then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency.	印度40年前就讨论过这个问题，时任总理英迪拉·甘地宣布国家进入紧急状态。


She suspended civil liberties, locked up opposition leaders, and censored the press, based on the belief that democracy had impeded India’s development.	她暂时取消了公民自由、监禁了反对派领袖并审查新闻媒体，因为她相信民主制度阻碍了印度的发展。


The issue was resolved in 1977, with an election that defenestrated Gandhi and restored democracy.	上述问题在1977年得到解决，选举推翻了英迪拉·甘地、恢复了民主。


But the “bread versus freedom” dilemma remains: Can governments deliver economic growth and prosperity while respecting their citizens’ rights and freedoms?	但“面包或自由”的困境依然存在：政府能否在实现经济增长和繁荣的同时，尊重公民的权利和自由？


The dysfunction of Indian politics in recent years, with its fractious coalitions and disrupted parliament sessions, has made that question seem more relevant than ever.	近年来印度政界的执政障碍，国内断断续续的议会会议和争吵不休的联盟使这个问题显得比以往任何时候都更加重要。


I am not convinced that Bell’s answer is the right one.	我不相信贝淡宁的答案是正确的。


Rapid industrialization and development have lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty, but often at the cost of great human suffering.	快速工业化和经济发展已经使数百万中国人摆脱了贫困，但由此造成的人类痛苦往往也非常巨大。


China may have grown at breakneck speed, but it has broken a lot of necks in the process.	或许中国的增长速度的确惊人，但在此过程中很多人也付出了惨重的代价。


One might like to contrast India’s sclerotic bureaucracy with China’s efficient one, India’s red tape with China’s red carpet for foreign investors, and India’s partisan politics with China’s Party hierarchy.	人们可能愿意用印度僵化的官僚体制和中国的高效进行对比，外国投资者在在中国面对红毯，而在印度却要面对繁琐的程序；


But there is no doubt that India’s pluralist democracy has enabled it to manage its diversity superbly, giving all citizens the sense that they have a strong stake in their country – and a real influence over how it is run.	截然相反的还有印度的党派政治和中国的党内等级。 但印度的多元化民主无疑有效地管理了国内的多样性，使所有民众感到自己关系到国家利益——并能真正影响到国家的执政方式。


In fact, it is India’s large population of poor and disadvantaged citizens – not the elite – that lends Indian democracy its legitimacy.	事实上，印度民主的合法性并非来自精英阶层，而来自占人口绝大多数的贫困和弱势民众。


The poor turn out to vote, because they know that participating in elections is their most effective means of letting the government know their demands.	穷人积极投票，因为他们知道参选是让政府了解他们诉求的最有效的方式。


When they are frustrated with their government, they vote against its leaders in the next election, rather than launching revolts or insurrections.	如果政府让他们感到沮丧，他们会在下届选举中投票反对其领导人，而不是发起暴动和叛乱。


When violent movements do arise, the democratic process often defuses them through accommodation: Yesterday’s militants become today’s chief ministers – and tomorrow’s opposition leaders.	每当暴力运动真正兴起，民主进程往往能借助包容将其化解于萌芽状态：昨天的武装分子成为今天的首席部长——以及明天的反对派领袖。


By contrast, if China’s system faces a fundamental challenge, its only response is repression.	相反，如果中国体制面临重大挑战，其唯一的反应就是镇压。


That may have worked so far, but every autocratic state in history has reached a point where repression was no longer enough to ensure order and progress.	迄今为止这可能收到了效果。 但历史上所有专制国家都有镇压不足以确保秩序和进步的一天。


If China encounters widespread popular unrest, all bets are off.	如果中国出现大规模民众骚乱，那么结果就是满盘皆输。


The dragon could stumble, while the elephant trundles on.	龙可能跌倒，而象则会继续向前。


Moreover, Bell’s perception of China’s meritocracy may be too optimistic.	此外，贝淡宁对中国精英政治的感觉可能过于乐观。


Given that the Chinese system is rigidly bureaucratic, permitting only gradual ascent up the career ladder, it is impossible for a young and relatively inexperienced but dynamic and inspiring leader – like, say, US President Barack Obama – to emerge.	鉴于中国实行严格的官僚体制，只允许在职业阶梯上一步步向上爬，因此像美国总统奥巴马那样相对年轻、缺乏经验但却充满活力且鼓舞人心的领导者几乎不可能出现。


China would not choose gifted leaders who were failures in their youth, like US Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt or Abraham Lincoln.	中国不会选择年轻时犯过错误的天才领袖，比方说像美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福和亚伯拉罕·林肯。


Rebels and non-conformists who have flourished in Indian politics – leaders like Mahatma Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru – would never have gotten started in China’s system.	像圣雄甘地和尼赫鲁那样在印度政界呼风唤雨的反叛人士和离经叛道者——在中国体制下根本不可能开始。


Beyond China, Bell cites the success of authoritarian systems like Singapore and Taiwan.	除中国外，贝淡宁还列举了新加坡和台湾等专制制度的成功。


But these countries probably would have been at least as successful without authoritarianism.	但上述国家的成功可能丝毫不受专制主义影响。


The methods they used to promote growth and development are consistent with democratic principles, to the point that many formerly authoritarian states in East Asia managed to carry out successful transitions to democracy, without derailing their development.	他们用于推动增长和发展的方法符合民主原则，就像东亚很多曾经的威权国家在没有阻碍发展的前提下成功实现了民主过渡。


Finally, Bell’s view can be refuted by a simple observation: No population that has gained democratic rights has clamored for a return to dictatorship.	最后，一个简单的事实就可以驳斥贝淡宁的说法：没有任何已经取得民主权利的民众会为回归专制击节叫好。


That alone should be enough to prove that democracy is a strength, not a weakness.	仅这一点就足以证明民主是种力量而非弱点。


China’s system may have enabled its rapid economic rise, but its dependence on a top-to-bottom consensus means that it functions well only in a predictable environment.	中国的体制或许促成了快速经济崛起，但其对自上而下共识的依赖意味着它只在可以预测的环境中才能取得效果。


India’s system, by contrast, requires consensus on only one point: that everyone does not always need to agree, so long as they agree on how to disagree.	相反，印度的体系只需要就一点达成共识：即人们并不总要达成一致，只要他们同意保留不同意见。


In an unpredictable world, that gives India an undeniable – and invaluable – advantage.	在一个不可预知的世界里，这赋予了印度无可否认的宝贵优势。


Rescaling China’s Debt Mountain	重估中国的债务负担


MONTREAL – There is widespread agreement on two facts about the Chinese economy.	发自蒙特利尔——对于中国经济来说，有两个事实是得到外界普遍同意的。


First, the slowdown has ended and growth is picking up.	首先，经济放缓已经结束，增长有所抬头。


Second, not all is well financially. But there is no agreement on what happens next.	其次，在经济上并非万事大吉，但对今后的走向却未有共识。


Car sales were up nearly 10% in March over the same month in 2015. And retail spending grew at an annual clip of 10% in the first quarter.	好消息是中国国内需求持续增长，3月的汽车销售额相比去年增长了近10％，第一季度的零售支出相比去年同期也提升了10％。


The most dramatic increase, though, is in investment.	但最显著的增长依然是在投资方面。


Real estate investment is growing again, following its collapse in 2015.	房地产投资在2015年雪崩之后重新抬头。


Industrial investment, especially by state-owned enterprises, has been rallying strongly.	工业投资方面也一路狂飙，尤其是国有企业。


At the root of this turnaround is enormous credit growth, as the authorities, concerned that the earlier slowdown was excessive, encourage China’s banks to lend.	而这一转变的根源则是庞大的信贷增长，因为当局认定先前的经济放缓超出限度，所以鼓励银行四处放贷。


Credit growth, known in China as “total social financing,” grew at an annual rate of 13% in the fourth quarter of 2015 and again in the first quarter of this year – that is, double the rate of annual GDP growth.	在2015年第四季度的信贷增长——在中国被称为“社会融资总量”——实现了13％的年化增长率——相当于全年GDP增速的两倍。


Since the financial crisis erupted in September 2008, China has had the fastest credit growth of any country in the world. Indeed, it is hard to point to another credit boom of this magnitude in recorded history.	事实上自金融危机于2008年9月爆发以来，中国实现了比世界任何国家都更快的信贷增长，有历史记录以来的任何一场信贷热潮都难以与之匹敌。


The bad news is that credit booms rarely end well, as the economists Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor have reminded us.	坏消息是，正如经济学家莫里茨·斯图拉里克（Moritz Schularick）和艾伦·泰勒（Alan Taylor）提醒我们的那样，信贷扩张一般都没有好下场。


China’s credit tsunami is financing investment in steel and property, sectors already burdened by massive excess capacity.	中国的信贷海啸为钢铁和房地产这些已经产能严重过剩的产业提供了融资。


The companies doing the borrowing, in other words, are precisely those least capable of repaying.	换句话说，那些借贷的企业正是那些最没有偿还能力的企业。


The International Monetary Fund, which tends to adopt a conservative posture on such matters (not least to avoid antagonizing powerful governments), estimates that 15% of Chinese loans to nonfinancial corporations are at risk.	关于此类事项持往往保守姿态（主要是为了避免得罪各大国政府）的国际货币基金组织估计，中国向非金融企业的贷款中有15％处于危险之中。


With nonfinancial corporations’ debt currently standing at 150% of GDP, the book value of the bad loans could be a quarter of national income.	由于非金融企业目前负担的债务总额相当于GDP的1. 5倍，不良贷款的账面价值可能相当于国民收入的四分之一。


It still may be possible to sell off vacant apartments for a fraction of their construction cost. It may be possible to sell off rolling mill machinery to other countries, or as scrap.	不过仍然可能通过抛售空置住房来抵消一部分建设成本，也可以把这些轧钢机械便宜卖给其他国家，或作为废品处理掉。


But where the loans at risk are concentrated – in steel, mining, and real estate – suggests that losses will be substantial.	但是高风险贷款的高度集中——在钢铁，矿业，房地产等 行业——表明损失将是巨大的。


This is why the supposedly painless solution, debt-for-equity swaps, will not be painless.	这就是为何原先预想中毫无痛苦的解决方案——债转股——会必然经历痛苦。


Yes, bad loans can be purchased by asset-management companies, which can package them up and sell them off to other investors.	没错，不良贷款可以由资产管理公司收购并打包并打折出售给其他投资者。


But if the asset managers pay full book value for those loans, they will incur losses, and the government will have to foot the bill.	但如果资产管理公司按全额账面价值来购买这些贷款，他们就将为此承担损失，而政府将不得不为此买单。


If they pay only market value, it will be the banks that incur losses, and the government will have to repair their balance sheets.	如果他们只支付市场价值，损失方就变成了银行，政府也不得不着手修复其资产负债表。


First, the authorities can issue bonds to raise the funding needed to recapitalize the banks. In doing so, they would effectively transform the corporate debt problem into a public debt problem.	这就产生了三个全都令人纠结的选项：选项一，政府可以发行债券来筹集银行资本重组所需的资金，而这样做实际上就是将公司债务问题转化为公共债务问题。


This would place the financial burden squarely on the shoulders of future taxpayers, which would not enhance consumer confidence.	这等于将地方财政负担转移到了未来纳税人肩头，当然也无法提振增加消费者的信心。


It also would not enhance confidence in the public finances.	这也不会提高人们对公共财政的信心。


Public debt in China is still relatively low; but, as any citizen of Ireland can tell you, it can balloon when banking crises strike.	虽然中国的公共债务总量还算较低； 但任何一位爱尔兰公民都可以告诉你，一旦银行业危机袭来，债务就会像气球那样膨胀。


Alternatively, the central bank could finance the repair by providing credit.	选项二，央行可以通过提供信贷来为修复工作融资。


But, while the authorities relied on this approach in 1999, the last time they were faced with a serious bad-loan problem, running the money printing press is not compatible with officials’ other stated goal: a stable exchange rate.	但尽管当局在1999年他们上一次面临严重不良贷款问题用过这招，货币印刷机却无法与官员的另一既定目标相兼容：稳定的汇率。


We saw last August how investors can panic when the renminbi exchange rate moves unexpectedly.	回想去年八月人民币汇率出现意外走势时投资者是多么恐慌。


Currency depreciation may not only precipitate a destabilizing spiral of capital flight; it could also destabilize the banks, from which money leaving the country must first be withdrawn.	货币贬值可能不仅坠入资本外逃的一个不稳定螺旋； 它也可能会破坏���行，因为资金出境必须首先被取出来。


The final option is to imagine that the bad-loan problem will solve itself.	选项三是想象不良贷款问题会自行解决。


The banks would be encouraged to “evergreen” their loans: to roll them over when repayment falls due.	政府会鼓励银行将鼓励“长青”贷款：在其还款日到期后继续延期。


The fiction that the banks are well capitalized will be maintained.	所谓银行资本雄厚的神话也将得到延续。


Borrowers that need to be liquidated or reorganized will instead stay alive, thanks to the drip-feed of bank finance.	需要进行清算或重组借款人反而会在银行融资的输血下活着。


The result will look familiar to aficionados of Japan’s banking crisis: zombie banks lending to zombie firms, which apply artificial pressure on viable firms, stifling their growth.	这一结果对那些熟悉日本银行危机的人来说无比熟悉：僵尸银行贷款给僵尸公司，反而把压力施加到了有活力的企业身上，扼杀了它们的成长。


Financing bank recapitalization through bond issuance is probably the least bad option.	通过发行债券来为银行资本重组融资可能是最不坏的选择。


This doesn’t mean that it will be painless. Nor is there any assurance that Chinese policymakers will opt for it.	但这并不意味着这将不会产生痛苦，也无法确保中国的政策制定者会选择它。


But if they don’t, the consequences could be dire.	但如果他们不这样做的话，后果可能是非常可怕的。


China’s Bad-Neighbor Policy Is Bad Business	中国强硬的邻国政策于己不利


DENVER – These are difficult times for China.	丹佛——中国正面临着困难时期。


After decades of double-digit GDP growth, today’s slowdown points to an economic system in trouble.	在经历数十年高达两位数的GDP增长之后，今天的经济放缓标志着经济体系出现问题。


Once hailed as a model of development, the Chinese economy now appears sclerotic and cumbersome.	曾经被誉为发展典范的中国经济现在却看似僵硬笨重。


The Chinese public is growing restive and increasingly questioning the system’s ability to deliver on official promises that the country’s economic “miracle” will continue.	中国公众情绪日益躁动，并且对体制能否兑现延续国家经济“奇迹”的官方承诺感到怀疑。


Many Chinese fear that the “Chinese Dream” may be just that: a dream.	许多中国人担心“中国梦”可能只是梦想而已。


China cannot fix its economic problems merely by pulling the right combination of existing policy levers.	中国无法通过拉动适当组合的现有经济杠杆来解决经济问题。


Rather, it must embark on a broader and deeper process of reform and renewal; and it must be willing to swallow the bitter pill of slower short-term growth in the interest of long-term goals.	相反，它必须着手进行广泛和深层次的改革创新过程； 它必须愿意为长期利益吞下短期增长放缓的苦果。


At the same time, an expansive reform effort cannot be advanced by economic decisions alone.	与此同时，全面的改革努力不能仅靠经济决策来推动。


China must also come to terms with the gap between how it wants to be perceived and how the world actually perceives it.	中国必须认识到它希望留给世界的印象和世界对其实际印象的差距。


China should take a lesson from business and recognize that many of its actions and affiliations on the world stage pose serious risks to its reputation – and to its bottom line.	中国应当从经济领域吸取教训，认识到自身在世界舞台上的行动和关系对其信誉所造成的严重影响——同样受到影响的还有它的底线。


For example, consider an international observer’s view of developments in the South China Sea.	比方以国际观察家对南中国海局势发展的见解为例。


China is plainly bullying its southern neighbors by using the menacing term “core interests” (in pursuit of which a country would resort to the use of force) to have its way in various disputes.	中国显然正在利用“核心利益”（为确保核心利益一国将不惜动用武力）这个来势汹汹的词来欺侮它的南部邻国，在一系列争端中保障自己的利益。


But, to hear it from Chinese officials, China is an aggrieved partner in the region.	但在中国官员口中，中国才是利益受到侵害的地区伙伴。


They argue that they have reined in their fishing fleet to avoid incidents with the Vietnamese, only to see Vietnamese fishermen aggressively claim the relinquished waters.	他们辩解中国为避免与越南发生冲突限制了渔船船队的活动，其结果却是越南渔民积极抢占了中国放弃了水域。


China obviously has the strength to drive out the Vietnamese, the Filipinos, the Malaysians, the Indonesians, and almost anyone else it chooses to confront.	中国显然有能力驱逐越南人、菲律宾人、马来西亚人和它选择与之对抗的其他几乎任何人。


Southeast Asia represents but a fraction of China’s size and wealth.	东南亚的国土面积和财富根本无法和中国相比。


But does this behavior make China stronger in the region?	但这种做法是否增强了中国的地区实力？


Does a nineteenth-century approach to pursuing economic gain justify ongoing enmity with one’s neighbors?	19世纪追求经济利益的做法是否能为与邻国对抗作出合理的解释？


The peoples of Southeast Asia, after all, will be China’s neighbors for the rest of its history; while their knives may be short, their memories surely aren’t.	毕竟，东南亚各国将一直作为中国的邻国； 虽然他们的实力不济但却拥有很好的记忆力。


Many Chinese genuinely believe that they are unfairly criticized for China’s new assertiveness in the South China Sea.	很多中国民众认为中国因在南中国海的自信而受到批评是不公正的。


But certitude has little to recommend itself when the price paid is distrust and condemnation from everyone else.	但如果自信是以失去信任和遭到谴责为代价那就没有太大意义。


This is a basic social truth that most people know from their personal lives: Happiness and harmony are far more important than the empty comfort of being convinced you’re right.	多数人从个人生活经验中了解到一个基本社会事实：幸福和和谐远比相信自己正确的空洞安慰来得更有意义。


Beyond Southeast Asia, nowhere in the world is China’s reputation more at stake than on the Korean Peninsula.	除东南亚地区外，莫过于朝鲜半岛问题更能影响中国的信誉。


In the South, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has become a modern, vibrant, and culturally sophisticated country that is admired around the world and addresses its problems forthrightly and transparently.	在半岛南部，韩国已经成为一个举世瞩目的充满活力并拥有先进文化的现代化强国，能够直截了当且公开透明的解决国内问题。


In the North is a state that can best be described as a prison camp, run by a hereditary despotic leader whose regime – most politely described as a cult – is pursuing an unrelenting drive to develop weapons of mass destruction.	而朝鲜却只能被形容为一座战俘营，接受世袭专制领导人的统治，其充其量能被形容为邪教组织的政权正在不屈不挠地研制大规模杀伤性武器。


Its main exports are the black humor produced by its political system, refugees, and claims of exceptionalism that put America’s to shame.	朝鲜的主要出口物资是政治体制制造的黑色幽默、难民和让美国相形见绌的自我标榜的卓异主义。


And China is its only real – albeit increasingly wary – ally.	而中国是其唯一真正的盟友，尽管现在也越来越谨慎。


To be fair, China’s interests on the Korean Peninsula are more complex than how they are often portrayed in the West.	公平地讲，中国在朝鲜半岛上的利益远比西方所描述的更加复杂。


For China, North Korea is not so much a foreign-policy problem as a multifaceted set of issues that impinge on China’s own internal debates as it charts its future course.	对中国而言，朝鲜与其说是中国未来道路上的外交问题还不如说是影响其内部辩论的多层面事务。


What would the demise of North Korea and its potential unification with the ROK mean for Chinese security interests, and for the perception of those interests?	朝鲜的覆灭及其与韩国潜在的统一对中国安全利益及其对上述利益的看法而言意味着什么？


What would be the repercussions of losing a historic “partner” (many Chinese today would bristle at such a description), and potentially strengthening a rival, for China’s own political system or foreign policy?	失去这个历史“伙伴”（很多中国人今天会对这种说法感到恼怒）、并且有可能加强对手实力对中国自身的政治体系和外交政策会产生什么样的影响？


One thing seems certain: the future of the legacy relationship with North Korea will be determined by the Chinese themselves, not by the international community.	有一点似乎可以肯定：决定与朝鲜遗留关系未来的将是中国人自己��而不是国际社会。


Still, weighing the disposition of the Korean Peninsula offers China an ideal opportunity to begin reconsidering its long-term interests.	尽管如此，权衡朝鲜半岛的处置方法为中国提供了重新思考其长期利益的理想机会。


It is here, more than anywhere else, that China can align itself within mainstream international thinking and start to close the gap between how it is viewed by the world and how it views itself.	在这个问题上，中国可以更好地贴近主流国际思维，开始统一世界眼中的中国和中国眼中的中国这两种认知间的差距。


The Art of Capital Flight	资本逃离的艺术


CAMBRIDGE – What impact will China’s slowdown have on the red-hot contemporary art market?	美国剑桥—中国减速将给红得发紫的当代艺术品市场带来什么影响？


That might not seem like an obvious question, until one considers that, for emerging-market investors, art has become a critical tool for facilitating capital flight and hiding wealth.	这似乎不是一个显而易见的问题，但你不妨想想，对新兴市场投资者来说，艺术品已经成为方便资本逃离和隐藏财富的关键工具。


These investors have become a major factor in the art market’s spectacular price bubble of the last several years.	这些投资者已成为过去数年艺术品市场巨大的价格泡沫的主要因素。


So, with emerging market economies from Russia to Brazil mired in recession, will the bubble burst?	因此，随着从俄罗斯到巴西的各新兴市场经济体纷纷陷入衰退，这个泡沫会破裂吗？


Just five months ago, Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, told an audience in Singapore that contemporary art has become one of the two most important stores of wealth internationally, along with apartments in major cities such as New York, London, and Vancouver.	仅仅五个月前，全球最大资产管理公司贝莱德（BlackRock）主席兼CEO拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）在新加坡告诉人们，当代艺术品已成为国际财富最重要的两个储藏工具之一，另一个是大都市高级公寓，如纽约、伦敦和温哥华等。


Forget gold as an inflation hedge; buy paintings.	别再将黄金作为通胀对冲工具了； 买画吧。


What made Fink’s elevation of art to investment-grade status so surprising is that no one of his stature had been brave enough to say it before.	芬克将艺术品提高到投资级别，这令人震惊，因为此前从未有他这个地位的人敢这样说。


I am certainly not celebrating the trend.	我当然不是在赞美这一趋势。


I tend to agree with the philosopher Peter Singer that the obscene sums being spent on premier pieces of modern art are disquieting.	我倾向于同意哲学家彼得·辛格（Peter Singer）的说法：将如此巨大数量的金钱花在现代艺术的名作上令人不安。


We can all agree that these sums are staggering.	我们都同意，数字令人咋舌。


In May, Pablo Picasso’s “Women of Algiers” sold for $179 million at a Christie’s auction in New York, up from $32 million in 1997.	5月，毕加索的《阿尔及尔的女人》（Women of Algiers）在佳士得纽约拍卖会上以1. 79亿美元卖出，而其在1997年的价格为3,200万美元。


Okay, it’s a Picasso.	好吧，这是毕加索。


Yet it is not even the highest sale price paid this year.	但这甚至不是今年的最高价格。


A Swiss collector reportedly paid close to $300 million in a private sale for Paul Gauguin’s 1892 “When Will You Marry?”	据报道一名瑞士收藏家通过私下交易以接近3亿美元的价格将高更1892年的作品《你什么时候结婚》（When Will You Marry? ）收入囊中。


Picasso and Gauguin are deceased.	毕加索和高更都已作古。


The supply of their paintings is known and limited.	他们的画作的供给是已知的，并且有限。


Nevertheless, the recent price frenzy extends to a significant number of living artists, led by the American Jeff Koons and the German Gerhard Richter, and extending well down the food chain.	尽管如此，最近的价格疯狂蔓延到了众多尚在人世的艺术家，首屈一指的是美国人杰夫·昆斯（Jeff Koons）和德国人格哈德·里希特（Gerhard Richter），并且波及许多名声并不那么响亮的艺术家。


For economists, the art bubble raises many fascinating questions, but an especially interesting one is exactly who would pay so much for high-end art.	对经济学家来说，艺术品泡沫带来很多令人着迷的问题，但其中又有趣味的一个正是谁会花这么多钱买高端艺术品。


The answer is hard to know, because the art world is extremely opaque.	答案难以知晓，因为艺术品世界非常不透明。


Indeed, art is the last great unregulated investment opportunity.	事实上，艺术品是最后一个不受监管的大投资机会。


Much has been written about the painting collections of hedge fund managers and private equity art funds (where one essentially buys shares in portfolios of art without actually ever taking possession of anything).	关于对冲基金经理和私募艺术品股权基金（你购买的实际上是艺术品组合的股份，并没有真正拥有任何艺术品）收藏画作的故事已经司空见惯。


In fact, emerging-market buyers, including Chinese, have become the swing buyers in many instances, often making purchases anonymously.	事实上，新兴市场买家，包括中国人，在许多案例中以摇摆买家的面目出现，常常匿名购买。


But doesn’t China have a regime of strict capital controls that limits citizens from taking more than $50,000 per year out of the country?	但中国不是有严格的资本管制、限制公民每年携外汇出国的规模不得超过50,000美元吗？


Yes, but there are many ways of moving money in and out of China, including the time-honored method of “under and over invoicing.”	是的，但有的是办法让钱进出中国，包括由来已久的“开发票”法。


For example, to get money out of China, a Chinese seller might report a dollar value far below what she was actually paid by a cooperating Western importer, with the difference being deposited into an overseas bank account.	比如，要把钱弄出中国，中国卖家会与西方进口商合作，大幅低报后者所实际支付的款项的美元价值，差价则存入海外银行账户。


It is extremely difficult to estimate capital flight, both because the data are insufficient and because it is tough to distinguish capital flight from normal diversification.	估算资本外逃是极端困难的，这既是因为数据不足，也是因为难以区分资本外逃和正常的多样化。


As the late MIT economist Rüdiger Dornbusch liked to quip, identifying capital flight is akin to the old adage about blind men touching an elephant: It is difficult to describe, but you will recognize it when you see it.	已故的麻省理工学院经济学家鲁迪格·多恩布什（Rüdiger Dornbusch）常常戏谑说，识别资本外逃就好比是盲人摸象：你很难描述它，但你看到它的时候你能认得出。


Many estimates put capital flight from China at about $300 billion annually in recent years, with a marked increase in 2015 as the economy continues to weaken.	许多估算认为，近几年来每年逃离中国的资本大约在3,000亿美元，而2015年大幅上升，因为经济持续低迷。


The ever-vigilant Chinese authorities are cracking down on money laundering; but, given the huge incentives on the other side, this is like playing whack-a-mole.	向来警惕性很高的中国当局正在打击洗钱； 但是，由于打击对象资本外逃的动机非常强，打击洗钱就像是一场“打地鼠”游戏。


Presumably, the anonymous Chinese buyers at recent Sotheby’s and Christie’s auctions had spirited their money out of the country before bidding, and the paintings are just an investment vehicle that is particularly easy to hold secretively.	最近的索斯比和佳士得拍卖会上的匿名中国买家相比在出价前就已经将钱挪到了海外，而画作只不过是能够轻易地保密的投资工具。


The art is not necessarily even displayed anywhere: It may well be spirited off to a temperature- and humidity-controlled storage vault in Switzerland or Luxembourg.	艺术品甚至未必会现身，而是一直藏在恒温恒湿的瑞士或卢森堡保存室中。


Reportedly, some art sales today result in paintings merely being moved from one section of a storage vault to another, recalling how the New York Federal Reserve registers gold sales between national central banks.	据报道，今天的一些艺术品买卖只不过是讲画作从某间保存室的某一格移动到另一格，这让人想起了纽约联邦储备银行如何注册各国央行间的黄金交易。


Clearly, the incentives and motives of art investors who are engaged in capital flight, or who want to hide or launder their money, are quite different from those of ordinary investors.	显然，参与资本外逃的艺术投资者，或者希望隐身或洗钱的艺术品投资者，他们的激励和动机与普通投资者大相径庭。


The Chinese hardly invented this game.	中国人绝非这一游戏的发明者。


It was not so long ago that Latin America was the big driver in the art market, owing to money escaping governance-challenged economies such as Argentina and Venezuela, as well as drug cartels that used paintings to launder their cash.	不久前，拉美是艺术品市场的主要推动力量，因为阿根廷和委内瑞拉等治理不善的经济体有大量资金出逃，而毒枭们也用画作洗白他们的现金。


So how, then, will the emerging-market slowdown radiating from China affect contemporary art prices?	那么，因中国导致的新兴市场减速会如何影响当代艺术品价格呢？


In the short run, the answer is ambiguous, because more money is leaking out of the country even as the economy slows.	在短期，答案是两可的，因为随着一国经济的减速，有更多的钱想要逃离这个国家。


In the long run, the outcome is pretty clear, especially if one throws in the coming Fed interest-rate hikes.	在长期，特别是在美联储即将升息的背景下，结果很明确。


With core buyers pulling back, and the opportunity cost rising, the end of the art bubble will not be a pretty picture.	随着核心买家的离场和机会成本的上升，艺术品泡沫的最终结局画面也许不会好看。


China’s War on Western Values	中国的西方价值观之战


CLAREMONT – The news from China these days is mostly depressing, owing to the government’s escalating crackdown on its critics.	克莱蒙特—这些天关于中国的消息大多令人沮丧，因为政府在加紧对批评者的镇压。


But what few observers – particularly economic analysts – seem to understand is that the Chinese leadership’s fight against liberalism and “Western values” is directly undermining its efforts to root out official corruption, promote innovation and entrepreneurship, and deepen engagement with the outside world.	但绝大部分观察者——特别是经济分析家——没有注意到的是中国领导层对自由主义或“西方价值观”的战争直接影响着其根除腐败、促进创新和企业家精神以及更深地融入外部世界的努力。


The regime’s retrograde politics will have serious consequences for China’s continued economic development.	中共政权的政治倒退对中国的后续经济发展将产生严重后果。


For starters, the government has intensified its censorship of the Internet, rendering popular portals and sites – including Google, Facebook, and the New York Times – all but inaccessible.	首先，政府加紧了互联网审查，热门门户和网站——包括谷歌、Facebook和《纽约时报》——都上不去。


Moreover, prominent human-rights lawyers have been jailed; the well-known free-speech advocate Pu Zhiqiang, for one, has already been held for over six months, while prosecutors attempt to build a case against him.	此外，著名人权律师遭遇监禁，著名的言论自由支持者浦志强就是其中之一，目前他已被关押超过半年，检方正在罗织罪名。


Meanwhile, senior Chinese officials have taken to enforcing political discipline within the Chinese Communist Party.	与此同时，中国高级官员开始在中共内部执行政治纪律。


Last June, Zhang Yingwei, Head of the CCP’s discipline inspection office at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), said that the institution – China’s most prestigious government-run think tank – had been “infiltrated by foreign forces” and “was conducting illegal collusion at politically sensitive times.”	去年6月，中纪委驻中国社科院纪检组组长张英伟说，社科院——中国最著名的官办智库——“接受境外势力点对点的渗透”，以及“每逢敏感时期，进行不法的勾连活动”。


Zhao Shengxuan, Vice President and Deputy Party Chief of CASS, responded by pledging that the Academy would “treat political discipline as a criterion of the utmost importance in the assessment of academics.”	中国社科院副院长、党组副书记赵胜轩对此的反应是保证社科院将“政治纪律作为首要因素”。


Soon after, CASS President Wang Weiguang thundered in an essay that class struggle would never be extinguished in China.	不久，中国社科院院长王伟光刊出一篇奇文，称阶级斗争在中国永远不会停止。


Chinese academia more broadly has been the regime’s chief target in its search for enemies, with universities dismissing professors for espousing “seditious” ideas like constitutionalism.	更广泛的中国学界一直是中共政权寻找敌人的首要目标——大学常常开除信奉宪政等“煽动性”思想的教授。


In a particularly egregious case, an official newspaper in Liaoning province dispatched reporters disguised as students to college classrooms to catch professors criticizing the regime.	在一个臭名昭著的例子中，辽宁省的一家官方报纸披露记者乔装成学生进入大学课堂抓住教授批评政府。


A recent pronouncement by China’s education minister, Yuan Guiren, threatens to do damage on a far larger scale.	中国教育部部长袁贵仁的最近言论的打击面更大。


Yuan has vowed never to allow textbooks “promoting Western values” – especially those that “attack or defame the leadership of the Party or smear socialism” – into Chinese classrooms.	袁贵仁说，绝不能让 “传播西方价值观”的教材——特别是那些“攻击诽谤党的领导、抹黑社会主义的言论”——进入课堂。


Given Yuan’s position, this pledge could effectively amount to official policy.	考虑到袁贵仁的地位，这一宣言实际上可以视为官方政策。


One hopes, for China’s sake, that it does not.	为中国的命运着想，但愿这不是真的。


The recent onslaught against free speech and Western values reflects the central political challenge facing President Xi Jinping, who must transform a one-party system enfeebled by greed and mistrust into a well-ordered, ideologically united regime capable of carrying out market-based reforms and sustaining its own long-term survival.	最近针对言论自由和西方价值观的突击反映出国家主席习近平所面临的核心政治挑战。 习近平必须将因贪婪和不信任而衰败无力的一党体系转变为秩序良好、思想统一的体制，使之具备实施市场改革、维持长期生存的能力。


A crackdown on liberalism, he seems to believe, will work alongside his anti-corruption campaign to advance this goal.	他似乎认为，镇压自由主义有利于他推进这一目标的反腐运动。


This vision is as intellectually flawed as it is impractical.	这一观点在理论和实践上都站不住脚。


However hard one tries, it is virtually impossible to root out corruption in a one-party system without press freedom, a robust civil society, or the rule of law.	不管如何努力，一党体系都不可能在没有言论自由、强大的公民社会和法治精神的情况下根除腐败。


Yet these are precisely the “Western values” that CCP apparatchiks are attempting to eliminate.	而这些正是中共高级干部所欲除之而后快的“西方价值观”。


China will pay dearly for this mistake.	中国将为这一错误付出沉重代价。


Consider the impact of Yuan’s textbook campaign on China’s 28 million college undergraduates, who would be left with substandard course materials.	想想袁贵仁的教材批评对中国2,800万本科生的影响，他们将不得不使用不合格的课程教材。


How could these students be expected to compete in the global economy, when their education has been compromised in this way?	受到如此教育，这些学生如何能够在全球经济中竞争？


The current trend implies deteriorating conditions for their teachers as well, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, as academics face tighter restrictions on scholarly exchanges with the West.	当前趋势意味着他们的老师也将面临日益恶化的环境，特别是社会科学和人文科学领域，因为学界与西方的交流将面临更严格的限制。


With fewer opportunities to attend conferences abroad, publish papers in Western academic journals, or spend time teaching or conducting research outside of China, their professional development and careers could be severely impaired.	出国参加会议、在西方学术刊物发表文章或在国外进行教学和研究的机会将越来越少，他们的职业发展和职业生涯将严重受损。


As a result, the government’s suppression of “Western values” – not to mention its relentless war on the Internet – is likely to spur an exodus of the country’s best and brightest.	因此，政府对“西方价值观”的镇压——更不用说无情的互联网战争了——可能促使中国最优秀、最聪明的头脑外流。


In 2013, an unprecedented 413,900 Chinese studied abroad – and the figure is expected to be even higher for 2014.	2013年，中国海外留学生数量达到了前所未有的413,900 人——预计2014年的数字还将更高。


Of those, 90% chose to study in Western countries (plus Japan).	其中90%的留学生选择在西方国家（以及日本）留学。


To be sure, only a small fraction of college-age Chinese students attend universities overseas.	平心而论，只有小部分中国大学生在海外大学就读。


Indeed, the number of students who went abroad in 2013 was equivalent to only 6% of the students admitted to Chinese universities.	事实上，2013年出国留学生人数只相当于中国国内大学生人数的6%。


But China’s ruling elite, far from writing off this group as the price of its long-term survival, is leading the rush to the exits – largely sending its children to the Ivy League and Oxbridge.	但中国的执政精英并不把这一群体视为其长期生存的代价，而是引领着出国潮——大多将孩子们送往常青藤大学和牛津剑桥。


One wonders whether CCP leaders worry that their offspring will be brainwashed by Western values; they evidently already are reluctant to send their children to local universities.	你会奇怪中共领导人到底但不担心他们的子孙后代被西方价值观洗脑； 他们显然不愿将孩子们送入国内大学。


And, if Yuan has his way, China’s universities would increasingly look like their North Korean counterparts, rather than world-class Western institutions.	此外，如果袁贵仁的话当真，中国大学将日益与朝鲜大学而不是世界级西方大学看齐。


That would have far-reaching – and devastating – consequences.	这将带来影响深远的灾难性后果。


The tens of millions of students who remain in China would not gain the knowledge and skills needed to maintain, much less improve, the economy’s global competitiveness.	留在国内的数千万学生将无法获得维持——更不用说增加——中国经济全球竞争力所需要的知识和技能。


Indeed, given that innovation is critical to China’s continued economic development – a point that Xi has repeatedly emphasized – a war against Western influence in Chinese education is downright irrational.	事实上，创新是中国持续经济发展的关键——习近平一再强调这一点——因此对西方对中国教育的影响开战实在不合理性。


Unless the government’s crackdown ends soon, Xi’s “Chinese dream” of national greatness and prosperity will turn into a nightmare of accelerating decline and increasing backwardness.	除非政府的镇压马上结束，否则习近平的国家富强的“中国梦”将演变为加速衰落、日益落后的噩梦。


One way or the other, the war on Western values is a war that China can only lose.	无论如何，向西方价值观开战的中国必将输掉这场战争。


The Grand Strategy of Xi Jinping	习近平的大战略


SEOUL – China spent much of 2014 seeking to revive a concept that Japan proclaimed seven decades ago, when it was an imperial power seeking to impose its will on the region: “Asia for the Asians.”	首尔—2014年，中国花了很多时间重现一个七十年前日本所提出的概念，当时的日本帝国主义向整个地区强加自己的意愿：“亚洲人的亚洲”。


But that effort may not end as badly for China as it did for Japan.	但中国的结局也许会比日本更好。


International relations tend to become destabilized by rapid changes in the distribution of power.	国际关系总是在实力分布迅速变化的时期变得动荡。


Established powers’ resistance to their rising counterparts’ demands for a larger role in setting the global agenda fuel tensions and disrupt the existing world order.	老牌列强拒绝接受崛起新贵在决定全球日程中扮演更重要角色的要求，从而助长紧张、干扰既成世界秩序。


That is precisely what has been occurring lately between China and the United States, and is the impetus for China’s “Asia for the Asians” policy.	最近在中国和美国之间发生的事情就是如此，这也正是中国“亚洲人的亚洲”政策的动力。


In November 2013, China shook the regional order by unilaterally declaring an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) over a large swath of the East China Sea that includes disputed territory – notably the Senkaku Islands (known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands) that are claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan.	去年11月，中国在包括争议海域——主要是中国、日本和中国台湾都主张主权的钓鱼岛——的东海广大海域单方面宣布了防空识别区（ADIZ），此举动摇了地区秩序。


This amounted to an escalation of China’s already assertive stance in the region, with Chinese President Xi Jinping routinely sending maritime-surveillance and fishery law-enforcement ships to the waters surrounding the islands, spurring protests in South Korea and Japan.	这是中国本已咄咄逼人的地区立场的进一步升级，中国国家主席习近平定期派遣海监船和渔政船前往钓鱼岛周边水域，引起韩国和日本的不满。


The US, prompted by its allies’ anger, dispatched two B-52 bombers into the ADIZ.	受盟国之怒的促使，美国派遣了两架B-52轰炸机进入中方防空识别区。


Tensions continued to mount through early 2014, raising concerns about an “accidental war” between China and Japan, which would demand the involvement of Japan’s main ally, the US (as President Barack Obama confirmed on a visit to Tokyo last April).	紧张局面在2014年初继续升级，引起了人们对中日之间“意外战争”（accidental war）的担忧。 若发生意外战争，日本的主要盟国美国也需要介入（奥巴马在4月访问东京时确认了这一点）。


Add to that simultaneous tensions over China’s claims to South China Sea islands and atolls – claims disputed by the Philippines and Vietnam – and a clash between China and the US was beginning to seem inevitable.	与此同时，中国对南海岛礁的领土主张引起菲律宾和越南的反弹，中国和美国之间的冲突看上去不可避免。


Before long, however, the US had to turn its attention to Russia, which under President Vladimir Putin’s leadership has been seeking to recapture the Cold War-era Soviet Union’s geopolitical status.	但是，没过多久，美国就不得不把注意力转向了俄罗斯。 在总统普京的领导下，俄罗斯一直在寻求恢复冷战时期苏丽安娜的地缘政治地位。


With its regional authority apparently threatened by rising pro-European sentiment in Ukraine, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and began supporting separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, prompting the US and Europe to impose increasingly tough political and economic sanctions.	其地区威权显然受到乌克兰日益亲欧情绪的威胁，因此俄罗斯入侵并吞并了克里米亚，并开始支持东乌克兰的分裂主义叛军，促使美国和欧洲对其实施日益严厉的政治和经济制裁。


In this conflict, China has actually become something of a US ally.	在这场冲突中，中国实际成为美国某种意义上的盟友。


Though the conclusion of long-negotiated gas deals between Russia and China may seem to reflect a deepening of the bilateral relationship, China extracted an exceedingly low price from Russia for the gas that it will receive.	尽管俄中天然气协议经过漫长谈判终告成功，或许反映了两国关系的深化，但中国从俄罗斯那里要到了极低的天然气价。


This, together with the fact that China has cut lending to Russia since the Crimea invasion, suggests that, in the longer term, the Chinese envision Russia as a natural-resource vassal, not an equal ally.	考虑到这一点，再加上自俄罗斯入侵克里米亚以来中国减少了对俄贷款这一事实，表明从长期看，中国将俄罗斯视为自然资源库而不是平等盟友。


Chinese and American policies converged even more clearly on North Korea in 2014.	中国和美国的政策趋同在2014年的朝鲜问题上表现得更加明显。


Xi expressed his unwillingness to tolerate any unruly behavior – particularly concerning nuclear weapons – by the country’s unpredictable rulers.	习近平表示他无意容忍朝鲜变幻莫测的统治者的任何恣睢行为——特别是在核武器问题上。


This drove the North, which depends on Chinese aid, to send diplomatic interlocutors to Japan, Russia, and even South Korea.	这促使依赖中国援助的朝鲜向日本、俄罗斯甚至韩国派去外交对话员。


But, following the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution on North Korea’s human-rights situation, the regime announced that it would hold its fourth nuclear test.	但是，随着联合国大会作出关于朝鲜人权状况的决议，朝鲜当局又宣布将进行第四次核试验。


These power shifts are the result less of Russia’s expansionist ambitions or China’s military and economic rise than of America’s declining international leadership.	今年的实力变迁与其说是拜俄罗斯的修正主义野心或中国的军事和经济崛起所赐，不如说是因为美国国际领导力的衰落。


With Obama unwilling – or unable, due to rising political partisanship at home – to take the lead in addressing crises like those in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, challengers to American primacy took heart in 2014, and US allies took fright.	奥巴马不愿——或者不能，因为美国国内政治党派队里日益严重——在解决埃及、利比亚和叙利亚等国的危机中承担领导责任，这让美国地位的挑战者在2014年信心十足，而美国的盟国则心惊胆寒。


Global power must be allocated somewhere; if the US would not fill its leading role on the international stage, an understudy would have to step in.	全球实力必须有一个落脚点； 如果美国不在国际舞台上柜承担主角，那么就必须有替身站出来。


But China’s recent shift away from muscle-flexing, and its confluence of interests with a US-led order, offers hope that it will not fuel large-scale regional instability this year.	但中国最近不在耀武扬威并且与美国领导的秩序协调利益让人感到它不会在明年继续掀起大规模地区动荡。


Indeed, China withdrew its jumbo oil platform from the waters of the disputed Paracel Islands last July, and it has been sending surveillance ships to the Senkaku Islands less frequently.	事实上，7月份中国从争议的西沙群岛到撤回了巨型钻井平台，向钓鱼岛派遣海监船的频率也降低了。


Chinese officials have also become more willing to discuss the creation of a code of conduct for the South China Sea.	中国官员也更加愿意讨论建立南海行为规范的问题。


The most important element of China’s charm offensive is its effort to improve relations with Japan, initiated at a meeting between Xi and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the recent APEC meeting in Beijing.	中国魅力攻势中最重要的元素是其试图改善与日本的关系，首先是在最近的APEC北京峰会上，习近平与日本首相安倍晋三举行了场外会晤。


The long-awaited climate deal that Xi struck with Obama at another peripheral meeting at the same event is no small step, either.	在这次APEC峰会的外围会议上，习近平还与奥巴马达成了人们期待已久的气候协议，这也是个不小的动作。


China’s new, more emollient diplomacy underpins a nuanced foreign policy.	中国新的柔性外交体现了更加细致的外交政策。


By offering generous economic incentives to its Southeast Asian neighbors, it has weakened their will to confront China in a coalition.	通过向东南亚邻国提供慷慨的经济激励，中国削弱了它们联合对抗中国的意愿。


Vietnam, for example, decided to “reset” its relations with China, and not to cooperate with the Philippines in waging a legal battle over China’s maritime claims.	比如，越南决定“重置”对华关系，并且不与菲律宾合作与中国打海权主张的法律战。


Indeed, China has been shifting from hard power to soft throughout the region, and is using its economic power to challenge Western-dominated multilateral institutions.	事实上，中国在整个地区正在从硬实力转向软实力，并且正在利用其经济实力挑战西方主导的多边机构。


Specifically, China has decided to pour huge amounts of money into establishing new development institutions: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Maritime Silk Road Bank, and the New Development Bank (created by the five major emerging economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).	具体而言，中国决定投入大量资金成立新的发展机构：亚洲基础设施投资银行、丝绸之路银行和新开发银行（由五个主要新兴经济体——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非成立）。


Furthermore, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang recently offered $20 billion to finance infrastructure and development projects in the ASEAN countries.	此外，中国总理李克强最近还向东盟国家提供200亿美元用于基础设施和发展项目融资。


With the US economy yet to recover fully from the global economic crisis, and American politics increasingly dysfunctional, there is a global power vacuum that China, with shrewd diplomacy and economic might, hopes to fill – beginning in Asia.	美国经济尚未从全球经济危机中完全复苏，美国政治也日益陷入功能失调，这给拥有精明外交和经济实力的中国带来了其所希望填补的全球实力真空——起点就是亚洲。


This may not yet mean Asia for only the Asians; but it could mean a reduced regional role for the US – especially as America turns inward during the presidential election season that starts this year.	这并不意味着亚洲只是亚洲人的亚洲； 但这可能意味着美国地区作用的减弱——特别是美国将随着2015年总统选举季的开始而转向国内时。


China’s $5 Trillion Opportunity	中国的五万亿美元良机


SHANGHAI – China is facing the difficult task of managing a soft economic landing, after decades of spectacular expansion.	发自上海——在经历了数十年波澜壮阔的发展后，如今的中国正面临着实现经济软着陆的坚巨任务。


Naysayers abound, but never mind them. China has an advantage that other countries in today’s troubled global economy lack: a clear path forward.	虽然唱反调者比比皆是，但我们没有必要去担心这些言论，因为在当前动荡的全球经济形势下，中国有着其他国家并不具备的优势：一个清晰的前进路径。


If China carries out a sustained, comprehensive effort to raise productivity, it can address its growth challenges, reduce the risks of financial crisis, and complete its transition to a consumption-driven, high-income economy with a large and affluent middle class.	只要中国能实施持续全面的举措以提高生产率，就能应对其发展挑战，降低金融危机的风险，并实现向拥有大量富裕中产阶级的消费驱动型高收入经济体过渡。


If it does, its annual GDP could be an estimated $5 trillion larger by 2030 than it is likely to be if policymakers continue to pursue investment-led growth.	如能实现这一点，到2030年中国的GDP总量估计要比政策制定者们单纯追求投资拉动型增长的方式多产出近5万亿美元。


And, in fact, China may have little choice.	事实上，中国可能别无选择。


The traditional drivers of its economy – a vast pool of surplus labor and massive investments in infrastructure, housing, and industrial capacity – are becoming exhausted.	其传统经济驱动引擎——大量剩余劳动力和对基础设施，住房和工业能力的大规模投资——正趋于枯竭。


The working-age population has peaked, urbanization is slowing, and the steel and cement industries are suffering from overcapacity.	劳动年龄人口数量已经见顶，城市化进程正在放缓，而钢铁和水泥行业正饱受产能过剩之苦。


Returns on capital have declined, so China cannot rely on investment spending to generate sufficient growth.	由于资本回报率下降，所以中国不可能再靠投资支出来催生足够的增长。


Fortunately, however, China has substantial room for gains in labor productivity, which is only 10-30% of the level in advanced economies.	但幸运的是，中国的劳动生产率仅相当于发达经济体10~30％的水平，因此具备相当大的提升空间。


When the McKinsey Global Institute analyzed more than 2,000 Chinese companies in industries ranging from coal and steel to auto manufacturing and retail, it found opportunities to raise productivity by 20-100% by 2030.	麦肯锡全球研究院调研了包括煤炭，钢铁，自动制造业和零售业在内的2000多家中国企业，并认为到2030年有机会将生产效率提升20~100％。


Consider China’s service sector.	以中国的服务业为例。


Though the sector has grown rapidly and now accounts for about 50% of GDP, low-value-added businesses still dominate.	虽然行业发展迅速且已占到国内生产总值的50％左右，但占主导地位的依然还是低附加值企业。


On average, service businesses in China are just 15-30% as productive as their counterparts in OECD countries.	平均而言，中国服务业的生产效率只相当于经合组织国家同行的15％~30％。


In addition to streamlining existing operations (for example, by introducing self-checkout systems in retail businesses), China has opportunities to complement its manufacturing sector with high-value-added business services in areas such as design, accounting, marketing, and logistics.	除了理顺和优化现有操作流程（例如通过引入零售企业自助结帐系统）之外，中国还有机会在诸如设计，会计，市场营销和物流领域提供高附加价值的业务服务以辅助其制造部门。


In manufacturing itself, China can do more to automate its factories.	而对制造业本身来说，中国可以进一步提升自身企业的自动化水平。


China is the world’s largest purchaser of robots, but it still has only 36 robots per 10,000 workers, compared with 164 in the United States and 478 in Korea.	中国已经是全球最大的机器人采购过，但每万名工人只搭配36台机器人，与美国的164台和韩国的478台相去甚远。


Chinese companies have already shown that they can mix automated and manual assembly lines. They also can raise productivity by rationalizing operations and improving energy efficiency, bringing their performance closer to that of their global peers.	中国企业已经可以将自动和手动装配流水线协同运作，还可以通过合理化运作和提高能源利用率来提升自身的生产力表现，向全球同行看齐。


Chinese companies are major producers in a broad range of industries, but they have yet to take over the steps that add the most value.	中国企业是多个行业的主要生产商，但它们尚未采取一些能将价值最大化的步骤。


When it comes to semiconductors, for example, Chinese companies mostly serve as foundries for companies that design and sell chips (and, in doing so, capture the most value).	以半导体产业为例，中国企业大多只是作为那些芯片设计和销售（也是大多数价值所在）公司的代工厂。


Similarly, generics account for 90% of Chinese pharmaceutical sales.	同样，仿制药占了中国药品销售额的90％。


China can support innovation in many ways, including by developing research-and-development clusters and helping inventors reap rewards through stronger intellectual property protection and reforms to the process of bringing firms to market.	中国可以以多种方式来鼓励创新，包括构建研发集群并通过加强知识产权保护以及改革企业市场化流程来鼓励发明创造。


In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, a crop of innovative companies is developing a distinctively Chinese approach to drug discovery: massive scale and low-cost technical talent. These firms may be on their way to cracking the more lucrative business of brand-name drugs.	在制药行业，一批创新型企业正利用一种中国独有的优势——数量巨大且低成本的技术人才——来推动药物研究，并通过研发品牌药物来进入更高利润的经营模式。


Some of China’s biggest productivity opportunities are in sectors suffering from overcapacity.	而中国最大的生产力提升空间则来自于那些产能过剩行业。


Over the past decade, overcapacity has reduced annual returns on capital in the country’s coal and steel industries from 17% to 6%.	在过去的十年中，产能过剩导致该国的煤炭和钢铁行业资本投���年回报率从17％下降到了6％。


The Chinese auto industry is capable of building 40 million cars per year for a market that currently consumes 26 million.	中国汽车业年产能达4千万辆，但目前需求量只有2600万辆。


Restructuring industries like steel, by letting uncompetitive players fail and encouraging consolidation, could raise productivity dramatically without compromising the ability to meet demand.	以钢铁行业为例，通过让那些缺乏竞争力的企业破产并鼓励兼并整合，可以在不影响到满足需求能力的情况下大大提高生产率。


As companies move into higher-value-added activities, millions of better-paying jobs will be created, which should raise household incomes and move more Chinese into the middle class.	一旦企业迈入高附加值模式，就能创造数以百万计报酬更高的工作机会，并因此提高家庭收入并使更多中国人称为中产阶级。


In the first two or three years, however, before the income boost from rising productivity kicks in, the massive reallocation of resources could result in considerable pain and dislocation.	当然，在提高生产力进而实现收入提升前的两三年间，大规模的资源重新分配可能对社会造成相当大的痛苦和迷失。


Millions of low-skill workers will need to be retrained and redeployed, and GDP may grow more slowly than expected, before assuming a moderately rapid, steady pace through 2030.	到2030年实现适度快速稳健的增长之前，数以百万计的低技能工人将需要接受再培训并被分配到新的岗位，GDP的增长也将比预期缓慢。


The alternative is a continuation of the status quo, with poorly performing companies propped up in the name of job preservation and social stability – even as they raise risks for Chinese banks.	而另一种方案则是延续现状，以保证就业和社会稳定的名义硬撑起那些业绩不佳的公司——即使这些企业将提高中国各银行的风险。


The country would use its resources unproductively, and its firms would become less globally competitive.	中国的资源利用效率将维持低位，企业的全球竞争力也会走下坡路。


China’s history provides reason to believe that its leaders will make the right choice.	中国的历史使我们有理由相信它的领导人会做出正确的选择。


In the 1990s, ailing state industries and the Asian financial crisis risked dragging down the country’s economy.	在1990年代，境况不佳的国有企业和亚洲金融危机差点拖累了该国的经济。


But, rather than attempting to use fiscal and monetary stimulus to provide a short-term economic boost, the government carried out wrenching reforms and put the country on the path to two decades of awe-inspiring, double-digit growth.	但政府没有试图利用财政和货币刺激政策来提供短期经济刺激，而是进行了痛苦的改革，使该国实现了二十年的两位数增长，令人惊叹不已。


Today, China faces a similar decision.	如今的中国面临着类似的决定。


It can settle for temporary fixes that will ultimately make the problem worse. Or it can seize the opportunity and press ahead with reforms that will boost productivity and create economic prosperity for years to come.	它可以选择暂时修修补补并最终令问题进一步恶化，也可以抓住机遇继续推进改革，以提高生产力并实现未来数年的经济繁荣。


China’s Complexity Problem	中国的复杂性问题


NEW HAVEN – There are many moving parts in China’s daunting transition to what its leaders call a moderately well-off society.	纽黑文—在中国向其领导人所谓的中等富裕社会的艰巨转型中，有许多不断活动的部分。


Tectonic shifts are occurring simultaneously on several fronts – the economy, financial markets, geopolitical strategy, and social policy.	结构性变化在诸多前沿同时发生——经济、金融市场、地缘政治战略、社会政策等。


The ultimate test may well lie in managing the exceedingly complex interplay among these developments.	终极考验也许就在于管理这些发展态势之间的过于复杂的互动。


Is China’s leadership up to the task, or has it bitten off too much at once?	中国领导层能够胜任吗？ 还是会落入“贪心不足蛇吞象”的窠臼？


Most Western commentators continue to over-simplify this debate, framing it in terms of the proverbial China hard-landing scenarios that have been off the mark for 20 years.	大部分西方评论家一直将这一争论过度简化，将其组织为众所周知的中国硬着陆论。 这一论调至少已经存在了20年。


In the wake of this summer’s stock-market plunge and surprising devaluation of the renminbi, the same thing is happening again.	今年夏天，当中国股市暴跌、人民币意外贬值时，同样的论调再一次兴盛起来。


I suspect, however, that fears of an outright recession in China are vastly overblown.	但是，我认为担心中国爆发全面衰退是杞人忧天。


While the debate about China’s near-term outlook should hardly be trivialized, the far bigger story is its economy’s solid progress on the road to rebalancing – namely, a structural shift away from manufacturing and construction activity toward services.	关于中国近期前景的争论很重要，但比这个问题大得多的问题是中国经济稳步迈向再平衡——即从制造业和建筑业活动向服务业的结构转变。 2014年，服务业占中国GDP比重达到了48.


In 2014, the services share of Chinese GDP hit 48.2%, well in excess of the combined 42.6% share of manufacturing and construction.	2%，远超制造业和建筑业之和（42. 6%）。


And the gap is continuing to widen – services activity grew 8.4% year on year in the first half of 2015, far outstripping the 6.1% growth in manufacturing and construction.	并且差距在继续扩大——2015年上半年服务业活动同比增长8. 4%，远超制造业和建筑业的6.


Services are in many respects the infrastructure of a consumer society – in China’s case, providing the basic utilities, communications, retail outlets, health care, and finance that its emerging middle class is increasingly demanding.	从许多角度讲，服务业是消费社会的基础设施——在中国的例子中，服务业提供了中国新兴中产阶级需求日益旺盛的基本公用设施、通讯、零售、医疗和金融。


They are also labor-intensive: in China, services require about 30% more jobs per unit of output than do capital-intensive manufacturing and construction.	服务业也是劳动密集型行业：在中国，服务业单位产出岗位需求比资本密集型制造业和建筑业多30%。


Largely for that reason, China’s employment trends have held up much better than might be expected in the face of an economic slowdown.	大部分是出于这一原因，中国的就业趋势比面临经济减速的标准情形好得多。


Urban job growth averaged slightly more than 13 million in 2013-14 – well above the ten million targeted by the government.	2013—14年城镇就业增长量平均为1,300—1,400万略多——远高于政府目标一千万。


Moreover, the data from early 2015 suggest that urban hiring remains near the impressive pace of recent years – hardly the labor-market stress normally associated with economic hard landings or recessions.	此外，2015年初的数据显示城镇就业在近几年中形势喜人——与经济硬着陆或衰退时常见的劳动力市场吃紧的情况大相径庭。


Services are also the ingredient that makes China’s urbanization strategy so effective.	服务业也是让中国城镇化战略如此有效的要素。


Today, approximately 55% of China’s population lives in cities, compared to less than 20% in 1978.	如今，大约55%的中国人口生活在城市中，而1978年只有不到20%。


And the share should rise to 65-70% over the next 15 years.	未来15年，这一比例应能上升至65—70%。


New and expanding cities sustain growth through services-based employment, which in turn boosts consumer purchasing power by trebling per capita income relative to that earned in the countryside.	新城市和旧城扩张通过基于服务业的就业维持增长，反过来又通过比农村高两倍的城市人均收入提振消费者购买力。


So, despite all the handwringing over a Chinese crash, the rapid shift toward a services-based economy is tempering downside pressures in the old manufacturing-based economy.	因此，尽管中国崩溃论不绝于耳，但向基于服务业的经济的快速转变抵消了旧的基于制造业的经济的下行压力。


The International Monetary Fund stressed the same conclusion in its recent Article IV consultation with China, noting that labor income is now expanding as a share of GDP, and that consumption contributed slightly more than investment to GDP growth in 2014.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）在其最近与中国的第四条款磋商中也得出了这一结论，指出劳动收入占中国GDP的比重正在扩大，2014年消费对GDP增长的贡献已略高于投资。


That may seem like marginal progress, but it is actually quite rapid relative to the normally glacial pace of structural change – a process that began in China only in 2011 with the enactment of the 12th Five-Year Plan.	这看上去也是只是边际进步，但实际上相对于通常十分缓慢的结构变化速度已是相当迅速——中国的结构变化直到2011年才根据十二五规划开始实施。


Alas, there is an important catch.	然而也有一个重要的缺陷。


While progress on economic rebalancing is encouraging, China has put far more on its plate: simultaneous plans to modernize the financial system, reform the currency, and address excesses in equity, debt, and property markets.	尽管经济再平衡的进展令人振奋，但中国一下子想要的太多：同时实现金融体系现代化、货币改革和解决股票、债务和房地产市场过剩问题。


Meanwhile, the authorities are also pursuing an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, a more muscular foreign policy, and a nationalistic revival couched in terms of the “China Dream.”	与此同时，当局还在进行大手笔反腐运动，采取了更加强硬的外交政策，并提出了以“中国梦”为名的民族复兴口号。


The interplay among these multiple objectives may prove especially daunting.	这些多重目标之间的互动也许会造成令人望而生却的结果。


For example, the confluence of deleveraging and the bursting of the equity bubble could create a self-reinforcing downward spiral in the old manufacturing economy that shakes consumer confidence and offsets the emerging dynamism of the new services economy.	比如，去杠杆化和戳破股市泡沫的组合效应可能在旧制造经济中形成自我强化的向下螺旋，动摇消费者信心，冲销新服务经济的新兴活力。


Similarly, military adventures in the South China Sea could damage China’s links to the rest of the world long before it is able to count on domestic demand for economic growth.	类似地，在南海的军事冒险可能威胁到中国与世界其他国家的关系，而眼下中国还远没有能够依靠内需实现经济增长。


Ironically, China’s juggling act may prove even more difficult for the authorities to pull off in a market-based, consumer-oriented system.	讽刺的是，在一个以市场为基础、以消费为导向的体系中，中国当局可能更加难以同时推进多重目标。


Caught in the transition from China’s tightly controlled, state-directed model, the government seems to be waffling – for example, by stressing a decisive shift to markets, only to intervene aggressively when equity prices plummet.	中国政府忙于从中国严格控制、国家主导的模式中转型，思维混乱——比如，强调要决定性地向市场转变，但当股价崩盘时又大手笔干预。


Likewise, it is embracing more of a market-based foreign-exchange regime while guiding the renminbi lower.	类似地，中国采取更加市场化的外汇机制，但又引导人民币贬值。


Add to that a stop-start commitment to reform of state-owned enterprises and China could inadvertently find itself mired in something comparable to what Minxin Pei has long called a “trapped transition,” in which the economic-reform strategy is stymied by the lack of political will in a one-party state.	此外还有一步三回头��国有企业改革承诺，这导致中国在不经意间陷入了裴敏欣提出多时的“受困转型”，即经济改革战略因为一党专政国家缺少政治意愿而陷入困境。


Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, there is no lack of political will in today’s China.	在国家主席习近平的领导下，中国并不缺少政治意愿。


The challenge is to prioritize that will in a way that keeps China on the course of reform and rebalancing.	挑战在于在改革和再平衡的过程中重点发展这一意愿。


Any backtracking on these fronts would lead China into the type of trap that Pei has long feared is inevitable.	这些前沿的任何倒退都会导致中国陷入裴敏欣长期担心中国难免会陷入的陷阱中。


Economic development has always been a daunting challenge.	经济发展永远是一个艰巨的挑战。


As warnings about the “middle-income trap” underscore, history is littered with more failures than successes in pushing beyond the per capita income threshold that China has attained.	关于“中等收入陷阱”的警告表明，在历史上，让人均收入在中国所实现的水平上更进一步的失败例子比成功例子更多。


The last thing China needs is to try to balance too much on the head of a pin.	中国完全不必在针尖上跳舞。


Its leaders need to simplify and clarify an agenda that risks becoming too complex to manage.	中国领导人应该简化和清晰化日程，不要让它变得过于复杂而难以管理。


China Confronts the Global Meltdown	中国面临的全球性危机


BEIJING – For three decades, China has been growing at an average annual rate of 9.8%.	北京-三十年来，中国一直保持着平均每年9 . 8％的增长率。


For most of this time, world markets were favorable, with no major global economic or financial crisis or slowdown.	此期间的大部分时间，世界市场是对中国是有利的，没有出现任何重大的全球性经济和金融危机或经济减速。


Yes, there were regional crises such as Southeast Asia’s financial turmoil of 1997-1998 or the collapse of Japan’s housing bubble in 1990 and America’s high-tech bubble in 2000.	是曾发生过地区性的危机，比如1997- 1998年间的东南亚金融风暴或日本房地产泡沫在1990年的破裂，以及美国的高科技泡沫在2000年的破裂。


But none of these proved a serious obstacle to China’s long boom.	但这些危机没有一个最终对中国的长期繁荣造成严重障碍。


The past three months, however, have seen a significant slowdown in China’s exports, domestic investment, industrial output, and tax revenues.	然而，过去的三个月里，中国的出口、国内投资、工业产值和税收都有相当的放缓。


A major slowdown seems to be looming.	重大的经济减速似乎就要来临。


Will China’s rapid growth persist?	中国的快速增长还会持续吗？


I believe it will.	我相信会。


Within China, the current slowdown is mostly homemade.	中国国内目前的减速主要是自己造成的。


Since 2004, China’s government has sought to cool an overheating economy by bringing the growth rate down from 12% to a more sustainable 8-9%.	自2004年以来，中国政府一直试图给过热的经济降温，把增长率从12 ％降到更具持续性的8-9 ％的水平 。


It even began to tax exports in order to reduce the trade surplus.	国家甚至开始征收出口税，以减少贸易顺差。


Of course, if Chinese policymakers could have predicted what has now happened in the world economy, they might have been less stringent in trying to rein in growth.	当然，如果中国的决策者当时能预料到现在在世界经济中已经发生了的情况的话，他们可能就不会那么严厉地遏制增长了。


But one reason that China has been able to maintain growth over the past 30 years is that it started counter-cycle macroeconomic intervention during the boom times, rather than waiting for a collapse.	但是，中国在过去30年里能够一直保持增长的原因之一就是它在繁荣时代就已经开始了反周期宏观经济干预，而不是坐等崩溃的来临。


China’s government never believed that it should leave what happens in the economy solely to the market.	中国政府从未认为它应该把经济完全交给市场。


When there is no big bubble, there is no need to worry about a big crisis.	当有没有大的泡沫出现时，就没有必要为大危机而担心。


Another reason that China’s strong growth is likely to continue is that its economic fundamentals are sound.	中国的强劲增长很可能将继续的另一个原因是，其经济基本面是好的。


All the factors that encourage high growth remain in place: low labor costs, education, high savings, improving infrastructure, and rapid urbanization.	所有的促进高增长的因素还在：劳动力成本低、教育、高储蓄率、基础设施的改善以及快速的城市化。


Moreover, China’s fiscal position is one of the best in the world.	此外，中国的财政状况是世界上最好的国家之一。


Government deficits rarely exceeded 3% of GDP in past decades, and there were surpluses in recent years.	在过去几十年中，政府赤字极少超过国内生产总值的3 ％，最近几年还有盈余。


Indeed, the government debt-to-GDP ratio is about 20%, compared with more than 80% in the United States, 160% in Japan, and 60-90% in Europe.	事实上，政府债务和国内生产总值的比例约为20 ％ ，而美国为80 ％以上， 日本为160 ％，欧洲则是60-90 ％。


Monetary policy has been prudent, and the threat of inflation has now been lessened by the decline in commodity and oil prices.	中国一直实行谨慎的货币政策，而通货膨胀的威胁已随商品和石油价格的下降而减弱。


The international balance of payments remains in surplus, and there is still a net capital inflow despite the global credit crunch.	国际收支保持顺差。 尽管现在全球信贷紧缩，但中国还仍然有资本净流入。


Official foreign exchange reserves will soon reach US$ 2 trillion.	官方公布的外汇储备额很快将达到2万亿美元。


Thus, policymakers have ample room to maneuver if anything should go wrong.	因此，如果发生意外，决策者会有足够的回旋余地。


The recent $568 billion fiscal stimulus package, which will be spent on railway expansion, subway construction, low-budget housing programs for the poor, irrigation systems, rural social security, and health care, will add a few percentage points to growth over the next couple years.	最近五千六百八十亿美元的财政刺激方案，将用于扩建铁路、地铁建设、为穷人建造低预算的住房、灌溉系统、农村社会保障和卫生保健，这些将在未来几年中为增长添加几个百分点。


With monetary policy and some of the administrative controls on investment and local spending being relaxed, the slowdown should be brief.	随着货币政策和一些对投资的行政控制以及对本地开支的放宽，经济放缓应该是短暂的。


But it is not all good news in China’s economy, because low consumption remains a big weakness.	但是，并不是关于中国经济的情况都是好消息，因为低消费仍然是一个很大的弱点。


Household consumption only accounted for 34% of GDP and total consumption is less than 50% of GDP in 2007.   That weakness, however, is institutional and cannot be easily corrected in the short run.	2007年，家庭消费仅占国内生产总值的34 ％，而总消费量不到国内生产总值的50 ％。 但是，这个弱点是体制上的，在短期内不会轻易改变。


So, with its domestic economy basically secure, is there anything China can do to help the world economy?	因此，中国国内的经济基本上是安全的，那么中国还能做些什么来帮助世界经济呢？


If China can manage to maintain real growth at 8% per annum over the next two years, emerging markets may be able to grow at 4%.	如果中国能够做到在未来两年内每年保持8 ％的实际增长率，那么新兴市场就可增长4 ％ 。


That may prevent the world economy from falling into recession.	这可以防止世界经济陷入衰退。


Indeed, China now looks like it can play the role of “growth anchor.”	事实上，中国现在看起来可以发挥 “增长的靠山 ” 的作用。


But China should not be expected to do too much more.	但是，不应期望中国能做得太多。


World financial stabilization, for example, is not something China can do much to help directly.	例如，世界金融的稳定不是中国可以直接帮忙的。


China played little part in the global derivatives markets, and does not have much toxic securities to clean up or banks to save in order to unfreeze credit flows.	中国在全球衍生产品市场中几乎没有起什么作用，也没有太多的垃圾证券需要清理或银行需要挽救以解冻信贷流动。


Perhaps China should use its $1.9 trillion official reserves to buy more foreign debt, but this huge asset pool is already heavily loaded with foreign sovereign bonds, so any increase can only be incremental.	也许中国应该利用其1. 9万亿美元的官方储备来购买更多的外债，但这一巨额资产的很大一部分已经买了外国主权债券，因此任何的增加只能是渐进式的。