Within a few hours of the accident, critics trained their sights on all the usual suspects: the Minerals Management Service, for giving BP a pass on routine inspections and lapsing into a relationship with the oil industry that United States President Barack Obama denounced as “cozy”; Obama himself, for having failed to enact the reforms at the Interior Department that he had promised while campaigning for election; the oil services firm Transocean, for the faulty blowout preventer; and, of course, BP, for a “lax” and even “reckless” safety culture.	在事故发生几小时之内，批评就指向了所有可疑的方面：首先是美国联邦矿产管理局，因为该单位在例行检查中向英国石油公司开了绿灯，照美国总统奥巴马的说法，它还和石油企业保持着某种“亲密”关系； 接着是总统奥巴马本人，因为他未能兑现自己选举时许下的承诺，对内政部进行改革；


After weeks of swirling wrath, primary responsibility eventually landed on BP’s shoulders.	在持续数周的愤怒声讨之后，主要责任最终落到了英国石油公司身上。


At hearings before a US Senate subcommittee, BP CEO Tony Hayward’s evasive maneuvering and failure to answer point-blank questions infuriated Congressmen and the American public alike.	在美国参议院小组委员会的听证会上，该公司CEO东尼·海伍德的敷衍塞责和答非所问不但激怒了议员们，还惹火了美国公众。


His expression of “contrition” may provide some relief that the key culprit has been fingered, but it brought the sealing of the well no closer.	他所表示的“悔恨”虽然让人感到一丝宽慰，觉得终于揪出了主犯，但对阻止油井继续泄漏却毫无帮助。


Furthermore, the situation in the Gulf of Mexico is worsening.  Oil is not leaking at the rate of 1,000 barrels per day, as BP originally estimated, nor up to 19,000 bpd, as calculated by the Flow Rate Technical Group.	而与此同时，墨西哥湾的情况正不断恶化。 泄露的速度既不是英国石油公司原先预计的每天1000桶，也不是流量技术集团计算的每天1.


As a newly released BP internal document revealed, the actual flow is up to 100,000 bpd.	9万桶，而是最近披露的一份英国石油公司内部文件所指出的——每天10万桶。


While there is no denying that the accident will create a long list of victims – the residents of the Gulf states being among the worst affected – the American public also is to blame.	虽然这起事故无疑会有一大批受害者——首当其冲的就是海湾沿岸各州的居民——但美国公众不会因此而逃脱罪责。


An historical addiction to cheap gasoline, and opposition to energy reform as “un-American,” has fueled an obsession with drilling, damming, and digging the country’s way out of problems.	他们长久以来对廉价石油的痴迷，以及用“非美国生活方式”的理由来反对能源改革的做法助长了一种试图用钻探，围堰和采掘等方式来解决国家能源问题的迷思。


This emphasis on the supply side (increasing access to energy fuel) has obscured cheaper and possibly more beneficial actions on the demand side (cutting energy consumption by changing people’s behavior).	这种对供应（增加获取能源的途径）的强调掩盖了通过遏制需求来解决问题的途径（通过改变人们的生活方式来减低能源消耗），而后者则是更廉价且更为有效的。


For example, while Americans could have supported more aggressive fuel-economy standards or increased federal taxes on energy, they didn’t.	比如说，美国人应该支持制订更高的燃油经济性标准或是提高联邦能源税，但他们却拒绝这样做。


Under the illusion that lifestyles revolving around cheap oil and big cars were America’s perennial right, fuel-economy standards languished for decades, and politicians avoided the t-word like the plague.	美国人总有种错觉，认为围绕着廉价石油和大排量汽车的生活方式是自己的天然权利，对提高燃油经济性标准的渴望已经持续了很多年，但政客们却像对待瘟疫一样避之唯恐不及。


All the while, Americans have been enjoying the cheapest gasoline in the developed world.	一直以来，美国人享用着发达国家中最便宜的燃油价格。


The country failed to anticipate the rise of China and India, whose exponential demand growth would have obvious implications for global energy prices.	另外，这个国家也没有预料到中国和印度的崛起会引发对燃料的爆炸性需求，进而对全球能源价格产生极大影响。


Instead, the supply-demand gap has been partly bridged by increasingly sophisticated engineering techniques.	而事实上，不断成熟的工程技术在某程度上弥合了供需之间的上述差距。


Technical feats like three-dimensional seismic imaging and tube-rotary drilling are no doubt impressive, but they are problematic when unaccompanied by adequate emergency-response plans or the regulatory oversight needed to ensure that accidents are prevented and mitigated.	毫无疑问，类似三维地质成像和管道水平钻井这样技术都令人眼前一亮，但如果没有和适当的应急反应方案相配套，或者定时检查以确保防止和减少事故的话，这些技术都很容易产生问题。


This is plain to see today, and it resulted in Obama’s knee-jerk imposition of a moratorium on deepwater drilling permits and suspension of existing projects in the Gulf of Mexico.	如今这些问题都清楚明白地暴露了出来，以致奥巴马当即下定暂缓一切深海钻探项目的审批，并引发了人们对墨西哥湾所有现存采油项目的怀疑。


While a regulatory overhaul of offshore drilling procedures and policies is clearly necessary, it will be insufficient to reduce the risk of spills and accidents if it is not accompanied by other demand-side measures.	即便对离岸钻井程序和政策的调整制订已是当务之急，但如果缺乏其他控制需求方面的措施的话，效果就必然是不全面的。


For example, now is the time to begin reducing US oil demand through improved fuel-economy standards and/or progressive increases in fuel taxes.	比如说，现在就是时候用提高燃料经济性标准以及/或者是提高燃油税的方法来降低美国的石油需求。


Both may be necessary, because, while average fuel economy has made slight gains in recent years, the longer distances that people are traveling have offset any improvement.	这两项措施都是非常有必要的，因为当燃料使用效率在近年获得少量改进之时，人们更加长途的旅行却抹杀了这些改进。


The government also could start aggressively pushing a shift to electric vehicles.	政府同时也可以大力推行向电动汽车的转换。


In terms of total lifecycle costs, these vehicles are three to six times more energy-efficient than their petroleum counterparts.	在整车使用寿命成本上计算，这类汽车比汽油/柴油动力汽车节能4到6倍。


People could make even simpler changes to their lifestyles by properly inflating their tires, driving more slowly on the highway – a car is most fuel efficient at about 55 miles (90 kilometers) per hour – and abandoning their SUVs.	人们甚至可以稍稍改变自己的生活方式，通过给轮胎适当加压，在高速公路上开慢一点（90公里/小时是最省油的速度）以及停开自己的SUV这些方法来节省能源。


The mantra of “opportunity found in crisis” has been uttered endlessly over the course of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. But seizing that opportunity requires moving past blame, learning from mistakes, and identifying how best to achieve a sensible, long-term national energy policy.	“从危机中找机会”的论调在深海地平线号钻井事故的整个过程中都萦绕在耳边，但要抓住机会就必须从过去的指责中超脱出来，从错误中学习，并找到一个切合实际的长期国家能源政策。


If Americans want a future without other Deepwater Horizon-style accidents and oil-tarred wildlife, they must reduce oil demand, in addition to ensuring that oil production is carried out responsibly and safely.	如果美国人不想发生到另一个类似深海地平线号的事故，也不忍再看到那些浑身黑油的���生动物的话，他们就必须先减少自身的石油需求，还得确保石油生产是负责而且安全的。


An Answer to the Russian Challenge	对俄罗斯挑战的回答


BERLIN – For 19 years, the West (America and Europe) has been putting off answering a critical strategic question: what role should post-Soviet Russia actually play globally and in the European order?	柏林－19年来，西方（美国和欧洲）一直在推延回答一个关键的战略问题：苏联后的俄罗斯应该在国际上、在欧洲秩序中扮演什么角色？


Should it be treated as a difficult partner or a strategic adversary?	它应该被当作是一个难以相处的伙伴，还是被当作是一个战略对手？


Even when this choice became critically acute during the crisis of Russia’s short war against Georgia last summer, the West didn’t provide a conclusive answer to this question.	即使在去年夏天俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚短暂的战争危机期间，当进行选择变得极其尖锐的时候，西方也没有为这个问题提供一个确定的答案。


If you follow most East Europeans, the United Kingdom and the Bush administration, the answer is “strategic adversary.”	如果你追随大多数东欧国家，英国以及布什政府，答案就是“战略对手”。


But most West Europeans prefer “difficult partner.”	但是，大多数西欧国家倾向于认为俄罗斯是一个“难以相处的伙伴”。


These seemingly mutually exclusive alternatives have one thing in common: neither of them has been thought through to the end.	这两个表面上相互排斥的选择在有一点上是共同的：人们都没有最终将它们想清楚。


If you see Russia as a strategic adversary – and the restoration of Great Russian power politics under Vladimir Putin, to the detriment of the rule of law in domestic and foreign policy, does indeed speak for it – then the West should fundamentally change its agenda.	如果你将俄罗斯看作是一个战略对手——而且，在弗拉基米尔·普京领导下的大俄罗斯权力政治的回归，损害了俄罗斯的国内政策和外交政策的法治精神，这一点确实说明俄罗斯是一个战略对手——那么，西方就应该从根本上改变其议程。


While Russia is no longer the superpower it was in the Soviet era, militarily it is still a great power, at least in Europe and Asia.	虽然俄罗斯再也不是苏联时期的超级大国了，但是，从军事上讲，它仍然是一个大国，至少在欧洲和亚洲是如此。


To address the numerous regional conflicts (Iran, Middle East, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Central Asia, North Korea) and global challenges (climate protection, disarmament, arms control, nuclear anti-proliferation, energy security) that have high priority on the Western agenda, cooperation with Russia is necessary.	为了应对众多的区域冲突（伊朗，中东，阿富汗/巴基斯坦，中亚，北朝鲜）以及那些在西方的议程上具有很高优先级别的全球挑战（气候保护，裁军，军备控制，防止核扩散，能源安全），西方和俄罗斯进行合作是必要的。


A strategic confrontation with Moscow, i.e., a new kind of “mini-Cold War,” would undermine this agenda, or at least complicate its implementation significantly.	西方和莫斯科的战略对抗，例如，新型的“迷你冷战”，会破坏这一议程，或者，至少会严重使其施行变得复杂化。


So the question is simply whether the threat emanating from Russia is so grave that this kind of strategic reorientation on the part of the West is required?	所以，简单来讲，西方要回答的问题是，源自俄罗斯的威胁是否严重到需要西方方面进行战略再定位？


I believe it is not.	我认为答案是否定的。


Putin’s claim to great-power status and his great-power policies are structurally very vulnerable.	普京的强国地位主张以及其强国政策，在结构上都是很脆弱的。


This is especially true at times where the price of oil has fallen below $40 per barrel.	这一点在油价已经跌到每桶40美元以下的时候，尤其如此。


And he knows that.	而且，普京很清楚这一点。


Demographically, Russia is in a dramatic nose-dive; it remains economically and socially backward; its infrastructure is underdeveloped, as are its investments in education and vocational training.	从人口统计角度看，俄罗斯处在急剧的衰落之中； 它的经济和社会都在倒退；


Economically, it mainly relies on energy and commodity exports, and in its modernization efforts, it is largely dependent on the West, particularly Europe.	它的基础设施落后，在教育和职业培训方面的投资也是如此。 从经济上讲，它主要依赖能源和商品出口，并且在其现代化的努力中，它在很大程度上依靠西方，特别是欧洲。


Due to its geopolitical position and its potential, however, Russia will remain a permanent strategic factor in Europe and Asia that cannot be ignored.	但是，因为其地缘政治位置和潜力，俄罗斯仍然是在欧洲和亚洲不可忽略的永久性战略因素。


To integrate the country into a strategic partnership is therefore in the West’s interest.	因此，将俄罗斯 融入战略伙伴关系符合西方的利益。


But this would require a Western policy based on long-term thinking and a self-confident and strong power position, because the Kremlin will perceive any sign of division and weakness as encouragement to return to Great Russian power politics.	但是，实现这一点需要一项建立在长期考虑上的西方政策以及一个自信而实力强大的地位 ，因为克里姆林宫会将任何分歧和软弱看作是对其回归大俄罗斯权力政治的鼓励。


A few months ago, the Russian government came up with a proposal to negotiate a new European order within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.	几个月前，俄罗斯政府提出了一个在欧洲安全与合作组织框架内谈判新欧洲秩序的提议。


Russia considers the agreements from the 1990’s unjust, based as they were on its weakness at the time, and it wants to revise them.	俄罗斯认为20世纪90年代签订的协议是不公正的，因为这些协议是建立在当时的俄罗斯处于弱势的基础上的，并且希望对它们进行修改。


Moscow’s main strategic objective is the weakening or even roll-back of NATO as an Ant-Russian military alliance and the re-establishment of its East European and Central Asian zones of influence.	俄罗斯的主要战略目标是，作为反对俄罗斯的军事联盟的北约的削弱，或者甚至后退，并且重新建立其在东欧和中亚的势力范围。


But Putin is making a big mistake here, because all these aims are unacceptable for the West, and the Kremlin still doesn’t seem to understand that the best and most effective guarantee of NATO’s existence was, is, and will continue to be an aggressive Russian foreign policy.	但是，普京在此犯了一个大错误，因为所有这些目标对西方来说都是无法接受的，而且克里姆林宫似乎仍不明白，北约存在最好并且最有效的保证，在过去，在现在和在将来，都是具有攻击性的俄罗斯外交政策。


In the former mother country of Marxism-Leninism, the leaders still don’t seem to understand dialectics.	作为曾是马克思列宁主义发源地的俄罗斯，其领导人似乎仍然不明白辩证法。


After all, if Russia’s government really wanted to achieve a change in the post-Soviet status quo, it should, first and foremost, pursue a policy vis-à-vis its neighbors that reduces rather than increases fears.	毕竟，如果俄罗斯政府真正想要对苏联后的现状进行改变，首要的是，它 应该追求在与邻国相关的政策中，减少它们担忧，而不是增加它们的担忧。


But this applies similarly, if in reverse, to the West: on the one hand, the principles of a new Europe as defined by the OSCE after 1989/1990 don’t allow decisions about alliances to be subject to the veto of a large neighbor.	但是，如果反过来，这同样对西方适用：一方面，在1989/1990年后由欧洲安全与合作组织确定的新欧洲的原则，不允许有关联盟的决定可以遭到一个相邻的大国的否决。


The same is true for free and secret elections and the inviolability of borders.	在自由和秘密选���以及边境神圣不可侵犯上，也是如此。


On the other hand, the missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the prospect of NATO accession for Georgia and Ukraine, assume confrontation where this was not at all necessary.	另一方面，在波兰和捷克共和国的导弹防御系统以及格鲁吉亚和乌克兰可能的对北约的加入，承担起在根本不必要的地方进行对抗的责任。


The West should not reject Russia’s wish for new negotiations on a European security system.	西方不应该拒绝俄罗斯对欧洲安全体系进行新的谈判的期望。


Instead, it should be viewed as an opportunity finally to answer the key question of Russia’s place within Europe.	相反，这应该被看作是一个最终回答俄罗斯在欧洲的地位这一关键问题的机会。


NATO must play the central role here, because it is indispensable for the vast majority of Europeans and for America.	在此，北约必须起到中心作用，因为它对绝大多数欧洲国家以及美国来说，是绝对必要的。


The possible trade-off could be that the existing principles and institutions of the post-Soviet European order, including NATO, remain unchanged and are accepted and implemented by Russia, which would get a significantly enhanced role within NATO, including the perspective of full membership.	西方和俄罗斯可能进行的交易可以是，包括北约在内的现存的后苏联欧洲秩序的原则和机制不变，并且这些原则和机制为俄罗斯所接受和施行，而俄罗斯在北约内部发挥的作用得到极大地增强，包括未来取得北约完全成员国地位的可能。


The peripheral nature of the NATO-Russia Council was clearly not enough and did not work.	北约－俄罗斯理事会实质上的边缘性显然不够，并且不起作用。


But why not think about transforming NATO into a real European security system, including Russia?	但是，为什么不考虑将北约转变成为一个包括俄罗斯的真正的欧洲安全体系呢？


The rules of the game would be changed and a whole variety of strategic goals could be achieved – European security, neighborhood conflicts, energy security, arms reduction, anti-proliferation, etc.	如果这样，游戏的规则就会发生变化，各种各样的战略目标——欧洲安全，邻国间的冲突，能源安全，裁减军备，防止核扩散，等等——都可以实现。


Yes, such a bold step would transform NATO.	是的，这样大胆的举动可以使北约发生改变。


But it would transform Russia even more.	但是，它对俄罗斯导致的改变更大。


If the West approaches these discussions with Russia without illusions, with a clear understanding of its own strategic interests, and with new ideas for partnership and cooperation, the worst to be feared is failure.	如果西方在和俄罗斯讨论这些问题时，不抱幻想，并且明白自身的战略利益，带着和俄罗斯结成伙伴关系和进行合作的新观点进行谈判，那么，人们要担心的最糟的情况就是失败了。


Of course, this approach presupposes two things that don’t exist at the moment: a common transatlantic approach to dealing with Russia, and a European Union that acts in much greater unison and is therefore stronger.	当然，这种方法需要两个在当前不存在的条件：大西洋两岸应对俄罗斯的共同的方式，以及一个行动更加一致并因而更加强大的欧盟。


Nonetheless, the challenge posed by Russia does not allow any further procrastination.	然而，俄罗斯带来的挑战不允许进行进一步的拖延。


There is simply too much at stake.	对此加以解决至关重要。


Insecure Europe	不安全的欧洲


MADRID – For the last five years, Europe has been shaken by financial and economic convulsions that have wreaked havoc on many of its citizens’ livelihoods.	马德里—过去五年来，欧洲经历了金融和经济危机，许多欧洲公民的生活毁于一旦。


The good news is that progress is finally being made in redeveloping the European Union’s economic and monetary architecture, which should help to bring about a return to growth.	好消息是欧盟经济和货币制度终于又有了新的进展，这将有助于回归增长之路。


But EU leaders’ focus on internal problems has caused them largely to neglect external policies, particularly in the area of security.	但欧盟领导人的注意力集中在欧盟内部，这让他们忽视了外部政策，特别是安全政策。


As 2014 begins, economic insecurity is giving way to worries about the EU’s strategic position.	随着2014年的到来，对经济不安全的担忧将让位给欧盟的战略定位。


There were expectations that the European Council’s December meeting would signal a return to a more outward-looking approach, especially on security matters.	人们期待12月的欧洲理事会会议能成为欧洲回归更加外向的政策方针的标志，特别是在安全事务上。


Unfortunately, these hopes were quickly dashed.	不幸的是，这一希望很快就落空了。


Indeed, the disparate assortment of initiatives that were agreed at the meeting, though interesting, lack the needed breadth and scope, and will have to be integrated within a weak and outdated strategic framework.	事实上，这次会议通过了多项相去甚远的方案，尽管很有意思，但缺少必要的广度和范围，并且不得不通过过时的虚弱战略框架来整合。


The flawed nature of the current European Security Strategy – drafted in 2003, with a token revision in 2008 – reflects the circumstances surrounding its conception.	起草于2003年并在2008进行过一次修订的现行欧洲安全战略（European Security Strategy，ESS）存在缺陷，其缺陷反映了其概念的所处环境。


The ESS was developed in the aftermath of the Iraq war, amid heated debate over a proposed European constitution, in a hasty and reactive process hijacked by those who sought to position Europe as a counterweight – or even a rival power – to the United States.	ESS是在伊拉克战争后、欧洲宪法草案引起热烈争论时发展起来的，其起草过程匆忙而被动，并被意图将欧洲定位为美国的制衡甚至敌对力量的人所把持。


Making matters worse, the geopolitical environment has changed fundamentally in the decade since the ESS was ratified, owing to economic rebalancing toward Asia, the upheavals in the Arab world, the revival of Russian assertiveness, and the rise of isolationist tendencies in the US.	更加糟糕的是，自ESS起草以来，由于经济向亚洲倾斜、阿拉伯世界动荡、俄罗斯重振雄风以及美国日渐倒向孤立主义等因素，地缘政治环境发生了根本性变化。


As a result, the ESS does not capture the reality of today’s world – a fact that is obvious from its opening declaration that “Europe has never been so prosperous.”	因此，ESS已不适应当前世界的现实，这从它的开宗明义——“欧洲从未如此繁荣”中便可见一斑。


To be sure, the ESS’s three basic tenets – development assistance, soft power, and effective multilateralism – remain important.	诚然，ESS的三大基本原则——发展援助、软实力和有效的多边主义仍然十分重要。


But Europe’s leaders must reconceive these concepts in light of today’s challenges.	但欧洲领导人必须在当今挑战的背景下重新认识这些概念。


In terms of development, Europe must move away from the idea that aid should be used to bolster trade linkages and acknowledge the importance of foreign investment.	就发展而论，欧洲必须摆脱援助必须用于增进贸易联系的观念，认识外国投资的重要性。


In fact, net private capital flows to developing countries now outweigh official development assistance by nearly ten to one worldwide.	事实上，从全球看，发展中国家的净私人资本流入规模已是官方发展援助的近十倍。


As the world’s second-largest source of foreign direct investment, the EU wields considerable influence, with European investors bringing credibility to projects and regions, thereby serving to attract further investment.	作为世界第二大外国直接投资来源地，欧盟有着卓著的影响力，欧洲投资者给项目和地区带来信誉，从而有利于吸引更多投资。


For example, Morocco’s Ouarzazate Solar Power Plant and its Drinking Water Efficiency Program were launched with €37 million ($50.6 million) from the EU’s Neighborhood Investment Facility; these projects subsequently gained additional funding totaling more than €600 million.	比如，摩洛哥的瓦尔扎扎特（Ouarzazate）太阳能电站及其饮用水效率计划（Drinking Water Efficiency Program）便是在欧盟周边投资基金（Neighborhood Investment Facility）3,700万欧元的支持下建设的； 这些项目招徕了大量后续融资，总额高达6亿欧元以上。


The ESS’s emphasis on soft power is also in urgent need of reassessment.	ESS对软实力的强调也迫切地需要重估。


The upsurge of protest across the Arab world raised expectations among Europeans that these countries would, to some extent, emulate Western institutions, values, and norms.	阿拉伯世界风起云涌的示威潮让一些欧洲人认为这些国家将在某种程度上模仿西方的制度、价值和规范。


But, while that did not occur, European principles certainly have not lost their allure, as recent protests in Ukraine, triggered by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to shun closer ties with Europe, have shown.	但是，尽管这并没有实现，但欧洲原则也显然没有失去吸引力，最近乌克兰总统亚努科维奇决定与欧洲决裂的消息引起乌克兰人民示威游行就是明证。


Nonetheless, the ESS’s soft-power vision should not be allowed to obscure the security challenges that Europe faces.	尽管如此，ESS的软实力方针不能掩盖欧洲所面临的安全挑战。


With the rise of non-traditional threats, Europeans are increasingly overlooking classical security risks like inter-state warfare, believing that they are no longer relevant – a notion that is reflected in the ESS.	随着非传统威胁的日益增加，欧洲日益忽视国家间战争等传统安全风险，认为它们不再与自己有关——这一概念便体现在ESS中。


But, as China’s increasingly assertive stance in the South and East China Seas starkly demonstrates, this idea is not only wrong; it can be very dangerous.	但是，正如中国在南海和东海立场日益强硬所凸显的，这一观念不但是错误的，而且可能十分危险。


This brings us to the ESS’s third tenet: advancing “the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions, and a rule-based international order.”	这就引出了ESS的第三个原则：推进“发展更强大的国际社会、运转良好的国际机构和基于规则的国际秩序”。


In this case, the problem comes down to a lack of commitment, with the EU choosing the convenience of informal and ad hoc groupings over the challenge of reforming key institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, which are essential for effective multilateralism.	在这方面，问题在于缺少承诺，欧盟宁可选择权宜的非正式安排带来的便利，而不愿对联合国、国际货币基金组织和世界银行等对有效的多边主义至关重要的机构进行改革。


Indeed, the EU is among the leading actors in the current “G” fad, which has culminated most recently in the G-20.	事实上，欧盟一直是近来流行的“G”俱乐部——最新的版本是G-20——的领导者之一。


And, despite being an embodiment of international law, the EU indulges in soft-law approaches, whether at the recent COP-19 climate-change meeting in Warsaw, or by supporting the “Geneva agreement” on Iran’s nuclear program, which, it is now clear, is nothing more than two aspirational declarations linked by a press release.	此外，尽管身为国际法的化身之一，欧盟却沉迷于软法（soft-law）方针，不管是在华沙COP-19气候变化会议上还是在支持关于伊朗核计划的“日内瓦协定”上都是如此。 如今，显而易见媒体夸大了这两件事的成果。


In developing its new security strategy, Europe must consider America’s role as an essential component of the geopolitical environment, viewing the US not as a foil, but as a nuanced partner.	在发展新的安全战略的过程中，欧盟必须考虑美国作为地缘政治环境关键组成部分的角色，美国不止是陪衬，而是微妙的伙伴。


Beyond NATO, which remains important even at a low ebb, the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership offers a potent opportunity to shape a rule-based international order.	除了北约（虽然它正处于低潮期，但仍然十分重要），谈判中的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系提供了形成基于规则的国际秩序的好机会。


The shine may have come off the EU, but the gripping scenes from Kyiv’s Maidan Square are a powerful reminder of the enduring appeal of Europe’s core values.	欧盟或许已经在走下坡路，但基辅独立广场（Maidan Square）的壮观景象有力地提醒我们，欧洲的核心价值仍具有吸引力。


What the EU needs now is an updated external strategy that capitalizes on this allure to bolster its influence, security, and prosperity, thereby halting its slide toward irrelevance.	欧盟现在需要的是更新其外部政策，利用其吸引力构建影响力、安全和繁荣，从而避免纠结于细枝末节。


The Messages of May 25	5月25日的信号


KYIV – Europe recently experienced two watershed elections, with very different outcomes.	基辅—最近，欧洲经历了两次里程碑式的选举，产生了非常不同的结果。


Whereas Ukraine’s presidential election has been widely hailed as the end of the beginning of Ukraine’s political transition, the European Parliament election has been lamented as the beginning of the end of the idea of an ever-closer union.	乌克兰总统选举被广泛认为是乌克兰政治转型结束的开端，而欧洲议会选举一直被宣传成日益紧密的联盟的观点结束的开端。


The polls, both held on May 25, not only provide insight into the mindset of the respective electorates; the behavior of each electorate also offers important lessons for the other.	两次选举都在5月25日举行，它们不但提供了一窥各自选民的思维的角度。 两地选民的表现也给彼此提供了重要借鉴。


Ukraine’s election was shaped by an acute awareness of the risks facing the country.	左右乌克兰选举的是对该国所面临的风险的敏锐意。


Following the “Euromaidan” revolution – which brought about the demise of President Viktor Yanukovych’s government – and a four-month interim administration, this election centered on change.	继推翻总统亚努科维奇的政府的“欧洲独立广场”（Euromaidan）革命和四个月的过渡时期之后举行的这场选举的核心是变革。


Yet Ukrainians’ chosen president, Petro Poroshenko, is the very embodiment of the establishment, having served as Economics Minister under Yanukovych and Foreign Minister under his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, not to mention his position within the country's traditional economic elite.	但乌克兰人选出的总统波罗申科是老体制的化身，他担任过亚努科维奇的经济部长以及亚努科维奇的前任尤先科的外部帐。


This is not as surprising as it might seem.	这并不像咋看上去那样令人惊奇。


Ukrainians were making a sober decision, voting with their heads, not their hearts.	乌克兰人做出了冷静的决定，他们用头脑而不是屁股在投票。


Indeed, polls indicate that Poroshenko’s appeal lay largely in his focus on immediate internal challenges.	事实上，选票表明波罗申科的支持大部分来自其专注于紧要的内部挑战。


By contrast, his rivals, most notably Yulia Tymoshenko, emphasized a rapid shift toward NATO and the European Union.	相反，他的竞争对手，特别是季莫申科（Yulia Tymoshenko），强调快速倒向北约和欧盟。


Ukrainians also eschewed the temptations of populism and extreme nationalism.	乌克兰人也抵制住了民粹主义和极端民族主义的诱惑。


The poor performance of the right-wing Svoboda and Right Sector candidates – which together won less than 2% of the vote – should finally quash Russian assertions of a fascistic regime in Kyiv.	右翼政党斯沃博达党（Svoboda）和右倾部门党（Right Sector）的候选人的拙劣表现——加起来才获得不到2%的选票——可以说宣布了俄罗斯在基辅扶持法西斯主义政权的图谋的彻底破产。


Ukrainians hope that Poroshenko, with his moderate approach and willingness to negotiate, will be better equipped to resolve the country’s perilous security situation than his more ardent rivals.	乌克兰人希望持温和态度并愿意谈判的波罗申科能够比其更激进的竞争对手更有利于解决乌克兰所面临的危急安全局面。


While Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently toned down his rhetoric, violence persists – a clear indication of the challenge that lies ahead.	尽管俄罗斯总统普京最近的语气有所缓和，但暴力仍在持续——清楚地表明了未来的挑战。


Indeed, Ukraine remains on the verge of becoming a failed state.	事实上，乌克兰仍处于崩溃边缘。


Security may be the most pressing issue, but it is certainly not the only one.	安全可能是最紧迫的问题，但决不是唯一的问题。


Poroshenko’s government must also reinvigorate and strengthen Ukraine’s economy.	波罗申科政府还必须重启谈判并强化乌克兰的经济。


Doing so requires, first and foremost, measures to halt the decline in foreign direct investment, which fell by 30% from 2012 to 2013.	这首先需要采取扭转外国直接投资的下降趋势的手段。 2012—2013年，乌克兰外国直接投资减少了30%。


Improved governance is also critical – no small challenge for a country that ranks 144th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, alongside Iran and Nigeria.	改善治理也很关键——对于这个名列透明国际（Transparency International）清廉指数（ Corruption Perceptions Index）第144位、与伊朗和尼日利亚等量齐观的国家来说，这决非轻而易举的挑战。


Ukraine’s election became a focal point for reconstruction.	乌克兰选举成为复兴的关键点。


The outcome was driven by voters’ recognition of their country’s fundamental problems – starkly apparent in the tents that remain on Maidan Square, the loss of Crimea, and the separatist violence in Donbas – and their desire for an effective government to address those problems.	其结果的背后是选民对国家根本问题的认识——仍存在于解放广场（Maidan Square）上的帐篷、克里米亚的丧失以及顿巴斯地区分裂主义暴力说明了一切——以及对选出更高效的政府来解决这些问题的渴望。


The next step in this process – a parliamentary election – should occur as soon as possible.	这一过程的下一步——议会选举——将尽快进行。


The European Parliament election, by contrast, was an exercise in disruption.	相反，欧洲议会选举走的是一条破坏之路。


Support for far-right and far-left parties was based on citizens’ frustrations with Europe’s flaws, rather than on any realistic, thoughtful agenda.	对极右翼和极左翼政党的支持背后是公民对欧洲的缺陷的不满，而不是对任何深思熟虑的现实日程的不满。


Populists and Euroskeptics fed on the discontent of those who have felt neglected by EU institutions, and now believe that the benefits of the European project, such as freedom of movement, no longer outweigh the burdens, like immigration and austerity. There is growing reticence among Europeans about further integration, owing largely to fears that ever-closer union will diminish national identity.	langnp1033


Of course, the notion of returning to the pre-EU world is fundamentally flawed, owing to the simple fact that individual European countries cannot compete in the modern global economy.	民粹主义者和欧洲怀疑派助长了认为自己被欧盟机构忽视的人的不满，这些人现在相信，欧洲工程带来的好处（如迁徙自由）已不再大于负担（如移民涌入和紧缩）。


Nonetheless, a sense of nostalgia drove many voters’ decisions. Simply put, Europeans voted from the heart.	越来越多的欧洲人抵制进一步一体化，主要是因为担心日益紧密的联盟会削弱国家身份。


What Europe needs is serious debate, not emotional reactions. The problem is that the European Commission and the European Parliament have consistently failed to generate a compelling narrative, leaving ordinary Europeans unconvinced of the EU’s value.	当然，回归前欧盟世界的概念是有根本性漏洞的，因为个体欧洲国家根本无从在现代全球经济中立足。


Making matters worse, national and European leaders have allowed – even encouraged – citizens to believe that integration is inevitable, lowering the stakes for European elections.	尽管如此，怀旧感仍左右着许多选民的决定。 简言之，欧洲人是用屁股在投票。


This is where the Ukrainian election can offer a critical lesson to the EU, despite the vast differences between the challenges that they face.	欧洲需要的是严肃的争论，而不是感情用事。


The European project is a complicated and ambitious endeavor, the viability of which depends on constant care and adjustment.	问题在于欧盟委员会和欧洲议会一直不能发出强有力的声音，这让普通欧洲人无法认同欧盟的价值。


Unless Europeans recognize that the Union is not a given, and acknowledge the value of the prosperity and security that it provides, the recent election may come to be seen not as a wake-up call, but as a swan song for the integration project.	更糟糕的是，国家和欧洲领导人放任——甚至鼓励——公民相信一体化是不可避免的，从而降低了欧洲选举的重要性。


The European election’s outcome also has a powerful message for Ukraine: there are limits to its European prospects.	这就是乌克兰选举可以给欧盟上关键一课的地方，尽管双方面临的挑战有着天壤之别。


To be sure, Ukraine has a strong partner in the EU – particularly if its government responds effectively to voters’ call for improved governance.	欧洲工程是一个雄心勃勃的复杂计划，它的可行性依赖持续的关注与调整。


But, whatever Ukraine achieves, it cannot overcome Europeans’ fears of further integration, much less enlargement. That is up to Europe.	除非欧洲人认识到欧盟并不是天上掉下来的，并且认同它所提供的繁荣与安全的价值，否则最新选举就不会被视作警世钟，而只会被认为是一体化工程的绝唱。


In the immediate future, Ukraine and the European Union must focus on building a functioning relationship.	欧洲选举的结果也给乌克兰带来了重要的信号：它的欧洲前景有局限性。 诚然，乌克兰在欧盟有强大的伙伴——特别是如果其政府有效地响应选民改善治理的呼声的话。


For Ukraine to push for more, such as by requesting membership in the EU, would be a tactical mistake.	但是，不管乌克兰取得什么成就，都无法克服欧洲人对进一步一体化、进一步扩大的担忧。 这要取决于欧洲。


In this sense, the lesson of the May 25 elections is the same for both Ukraine and the EU: it is time for each to put its own house in order.	与此同时，乌克兰必须专注于构建与欧洲的功能性关系。 进一步说，要求欧盟或北约成员资格是战术上的错误。


Read more from "Europe's Ever-Closer Disunion"	从这个角度讲，5月25日的两场选举对乌克兰和欧盟的教训是一样的：应该管好自己的三分三。


America’s Strategic Blindness	美国的战略盲目


MADRID – The recriminations over US spying activities, triggered by the revelations of the former American intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden, have now reached fever pitch.	马德里—由前美国情报承包商斯诺登的大揭秘掀起的对美国间谍行为的控诉目前进入了白热化。 疑问重重——总统奥巴马知道了什么、何时知道的；


Questions abound – about what President Barack Obama knew and when, about the legitimacy of eavesdropping on friendly foreign leaders’ conversations, about the future of transatlantic relations, and even about the meaning of the term “ally.”	窃听友邦领导人对话的合法性； 跨大西洋关系的未来；


But the current firestorm, like other recent diplomatic crises for the United States, reflects a more fundamental problem: the lack of strategic vision in American foreign policy.	但最近的风波与其他与美国相关的当前外交危机一样，反映了一个更加根本的问题：美国外交政策缺少战略眼光。


Until the US is able to establish an overarching, purpose-oriented framework through which it relates to the world, a reactive approach is inevitable, with high-intensity incidents such as we have seen this month continuing to be the norm.	在美国能够建立起包罗万象、目的导向的框架来与世界发生关系之前，难免要采取被动方式，我们在本月所看到的轩然大波将继续成为常态。


For more than 40 years, the Cold War policy of containment of Soviet influence provided America its strategic framework.	在四十多年的时间里，遏制苏联影响力的冷战政策一直是美国的战略框架。


Though US tactics were debated and shifted from administration to administration, the overarching approach remained consistent, because it was broadly supported by Republicans and Democrats alike.	尽管在策略上一直存在争论，并且随着政府的变换而改变着，但总体方针一直没有变化，因为这受到了共和党和民主党的广泛支持。


Of course, an overarching national-security strategy provided no guarantee against problems or even major disasters in countries like Vietnam and Nicaragua.	当然，总体国家安全战略并不能保证解决问题，甚至没有能够避免美国在越南和尼加拉瓜遭遇的灾难。


Nonetheless, in hindsight, containment infused an order and organization on US foreign policy that is absent today.	尽管如此，事后看来，遏制给美国外交政策带来了如今所缺乏的秩序和组织。


After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the necessity that had been driving containment disappeared.	柏林墙倒塌后，促成遏制战略的必要性已不复存在。


The US, inebriated by victory, saw in the triumph over the Soviet bloc another sign of its exceptionalism, and found itself taken in by the mirage that its Cold War success was itself a strategy.	自满于胜利的美国认为瓦解苏联集团是其卓异论（exceptionalism）的又一明证，并且陷入了一个幻觉：其冷战的成功本身即是一种战略。


What followed was a decade of scattershot foreign policy marked by notable cases of inaction, together with individual initiatives taken largely without reference to a broader doctrine.	随后的十年是外交政策漫无目的的十年，不作为和不参考更广泛的看法一意孤行的例子比比皆是。


Unchallenged in the world’s unipolar moment, the US had the luxury of not knowing its strategic goals.	在单极时代，美国没有对手，可以奢侈地无需考虑战略目标。


Shocked by the attacks of September 11, the US forced a new framework onto its still-unquestioned belief in the inexorable movement of history toward freedom.	9·11袭击令美国震惊，于是强行在其仍未受质疑的通往自由的历史洪流思维上推出了新框架。


Unfortunately, what emerged was a deeply flawed approach, not least because in declaring a “war on terror,” America positioned itself against a tactic, not an entity or an ideology.	不幸的是，随后出现的是有严重缺陷的方针，因为宣布“反恐战争”的美国的对立面是一套策略，而不是一个实体或一种意识形态。


Under Obama, the US has begun to depart from this approach.	在奥巴马治下，美国开始远离这一方针。


The problem is that it remains a departure without any meaningful destination.	问题在于美国仍没有找到有意义的方向。


As in the 1990’s, the US has no organizing imperative, and the result is the same: a combination of inactivity and incoherent initiatives.	与20世纪90年代一样，美国没有有组织的当务之急，而结果也是一样的：不作为和不协调的行动的结合。


And, at a time of domestic political polarization, the lack of a global strategy denies a potential rallying point around which Democrats and Republicans can unite.	此外，在美国国内出现政治两极分化的情况下，全球战略的缺位让美国失去了一个能统一民主党和共和党的聚焦点。


Two decades ago, geopolitical conditions limited blowback from America’s foreign-policy vacuum.	二十年前，地缘政治环境限制了美国外交政策真空的回力。


Today, the US remains the world’s essential power, but it is no longer the exclusive power.	如今，美国仍是世界最重要强国，但已不再是唯一的强国。


It cannot solve problems that directly affect it by acting on its own, though its leadership remains indispensable.	美国不再能够单枪匹马解决直接影响自身的问题，尽管美国的领导仍是不可或缺的。


That is all the more true given that the nature of such problems has also changed.	考虑问题的性质也发生了变化，这一点更显得正确了。


America, like the rest of us, is vulnerable to climate change, pandemics, and terrorism – challenges that require coordinated global solutions.	与我们其他人一样，美国也无法逃避气候变化、流行病和恐怖主义——这些挑战需要全球合作解决。


For the US, however, the utility of multilateralism is purely situational.	但是，对美国来说，多边主义的功效完全是权宜性的。


Above all, multilateralism is never preferable to a “good” bilateral solution – a view that has reinforced behavior that undermines, rather than strengthens, the capacity for effective international action.	说到底，多边主义永远不会比“好的”双边方案更好——这一观点强化了削弱（而不是增强）有效国际行动的能力。


Indeed, always ready to negotiate treaties but rarely prepared to sign – and even less likely to ratify – them, the US remains absent from such key global agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.	事实上，美国永远准备谈判条约，但很少愿意签署——批准的情况就更少了——这使得美国仍游离于京都议定书、禁止地雷公约和联合国海洋法宣言等全球协定之外。


Its inspired creativity and support in building formal institutions like the United Nations and World Bank has given way to a predilection for weak, informal, and ad hoc groupings, such as the various G-somethings and “coalitions of the willing.”	其在建立联合国和世界银行等正式机构上所表现出来的灵光一现的创造力和支持让位给了对孱弱、非正式和临时性组织的偏好，比如各种“G-某”集团和“意愿联盟”。


Establishing effective multilateralism requires an emphasis on rules and institutions that facilitate coordination.	建立有效的多边主义需要强调有利于协调的规则和机构。


The recent decision by the US to sign the Arms Trade Treaty could be a good start – if only Congress could marshal the bipartisan support needed to ratify it.	美国最近决定签署武器贸易条约，这或许是一个好的开始——只要国会能取得批准这一条约所需要的跨党派支持。


But scattered moves in the right direction will not suffice.	但朝着正确方向的零星动作是不够的。


What is really needed is a change in vision and mentality – a shift from viewing multilateralism as a tactic to embracing it as a strategic imperative.	真正需要的是目光和心态上的变化——不再将多边主义视为一种策略，而是视为一种战略当务之急。


The current spying scandal is the product of a rudderless US foreign policy focused on narrowly drawn tactical objectives that exist outside the conceptual funnel of a comprehensive vision.	最近的间谍丑闻是美国外交政策缺少方向、集中于全面大局的概念范围之外的狭隘的策略性目标的结果。


The result in this case has been damage to the transatlantic relationship, with some in Europe even calling for a halt to the talks on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).	此案的结果危害了跨大西洋关系，一些欧洲人甚至要求暂停计划中的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）谈判。


Suspending the trade talks would be folly, not just in terms of the regional impact, but also because the TTIP should be an exercise in rule-making that echoes globally.	中止贸易谈判是愚蠢的，不仅从地区角度看是如此，也是因为TTIP应该成为影响全球的规则制定操作。


The current diplomatic crisis, too, is an opportunity to ensure that transatlantic discussions about privacy and surveillance reverberate in a multilateral setting; seizing it would represent a small but significant contribution to the strategic vision that has been sorely lacking for the last quarter-century.	当前的外交危机也是一次机会，可以利用它来保证关于隐私和监控的跨大西洋讨论可以在多边基础上进行； 抓住这一机会将是一个小进步，但这一小步对于过去二十五年所极度缺少的战略眼光来说是一个大贡献。


Europe’s Juncker Revolution	欧洲的容克革命


MADRID – Before his appointment as EU Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker was pilloried as an old-school federalist who would do little to alter the status quo.	马德里—在被任命为欧盟委员会主席之前，让-克劳德·容克被抨击为老派联邦主义者，他的上任无益于改变现状。


But the new structure that he has imposed on the Commission implies a radical overhaul of how things are done in Brussels.	但他给欧盟委员会带来的新结构可以说是给布鲁塞尔做了一次彻底大修。


Up to now, a focus on who has been appointed to what post – in particular, the appointment of the relatively inexperienced Federica Mogherini as EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – has overshadowed the Commission’s structural transformation.	目前，对谁被任命为什么职位的关注——特别是相对缺少经验的费得利卡·莫格里尼（Federica Mogherini）被任命为欧盟共同外交和安全政策高级代表——困扰着欧盟委员会的结构转型。


But individual commissioners are far less important than the trends that have caused the Commission to shift its priorities from enlargement and the internal market toward energy and monetary union.	但个别委员的重要性远没有导致欧盟委员会将其重点从扩张和内部市场转移到能源和货币联盟的趋势那么大。


One such trend is Europeans’ growing skepticism toward integration, exemplified in May’s European Parliament election.	趋势之一是欧洲人对一体化的日益质疑，5月的欧洲议会选举说明了这一点。


With newer European Union members backsliding – Romania on the rule of law, Bulgaria in corruption, and Hungary on democratic norms under Viktor Orbán’s government – now is the time, or so it seems, to focus on existing members.	较新的成员国出现了退步——比如罗马尼亚的法治精神、保加利亚的腐败和维克托·奥班（Viktor Orbán）治下的匈牙利民主规范等——因此，现在应该将注意力集中在现有成员国。


Reinforcing this shift is Turkey’s drift toward authoritarianism, which is undermining the viability of its candidacy for EU membership.	加强这一变化的因素是土耳其向极权主义靠拢，这将威胁到其欧盟成员资格。


As for Ukraine, recent gestures of solidarity, such as the signing of an association agreement, are unlikely to develop into anything substantial in the foreseeable future.	至于乌克兰，目前的团结姿态——比如签署入盟协议——在可以预见的未来已不可能有任何大进展。


In downgrading EU enlargement as a formal policy priority, the Commission is preparing itself to take other important steps.	欧盟扩大作为首要政策已是明日黄花，欧盟委员会正在准备其他重要步骤。


The upheaval among Europe’s southern and eastern neighbors may well bring about a long-overdue revamping of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.	欧洲南部和东部邻邦的剧变或许会带来拖延已久的欧盟邻国政策变化。


And, in pursuit of other avenues for expanding the EU’s reach, European leaders might reinvigorate the European Economic Area.	此外，在为扩大欧盟范围寻找其他办法时，欧洲领导人应该复兴欧洲经济区（European Economic Area）。


Another policy area that has lost its centrality is the internal market – a notable decision, given that it has been the centerpiece of the European project since the Commission was created in 1958.	另一个重要性下降的政策领域是内部市场——这是一个值得关注的决定，因为自1958年欧盟成立以来，它一直是欧洲工程的核心。


The internal market’s four pillars – the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people – have underpinned broader EU measures, in areas like foreign policy and justice and home affairs, and will now be subsumed under new policy labels, from economy and financial affairs to the digital agenda.	内部市场的四大支柱——商品、服务、资本和人力的自由转移——撑起了一整套欧盟措施，如外交政策和司法和内部事务等领域，而现在将归于从经济和金融事务到数字日程的各种新的政策领域。


This move away from the internal market can be explained partly by member governments’ aversion to more EU-level legislation.	之所以将注意力从内部市场转移到其他地方，部分原因在于成员国政府厌恶更多的欧盟层面立法。


Though complaints about the “bloated” acquis communitaire (the body of EU law) are often unfounded, the EU legislative process is not without its shortcomings, as recent attempts at harmonization clearly demonstrate.	尽管关于欧盟现行法（acquis communitaire）“臃肿”的抱怨常常毫无道理，但欧盟立法程序也不是没有缺点，最近的协调努力就是明证。


For example, for the EU-wide statutory audit that was completed in April, the European Parliament agreed to a revised directive and new regulation that should have been directly applicable in all 28 member countries.	比如，对4月完成的欧盟法定审计，欧洲议会同意采取经过修订的指引和应该适用于所有28个成员国的新的监管。


But, in more than 20 cases, member states were given discretion over its implementation and interpretation.	但是，有20多个成员国被授予实施和解释的自由裁量权。


The new Commission will attempt to change this by focusing on rule implementation and oversight, rather than creation.	新欧盟委员会将试图改变这一点，办法是专注于规则实施和监督而不是创立。


This effort will be coordinated by representatives in seven newly established vice-presidential positions, and spearheaded by the first vice president to have a portfolio focused on “better regulation.”	这一办法将由新成立的七个副主席岗位的代表合作进行，牵头的是首席副主席，目标是建立一个专注于“更好的监管”的组合。


To be sure, easing regulatory burdens is a longstanding leitmotif of the EU.	平心而论，解放监管负担是欧盟的长期主旋律。


Though the last two Commissions, led by José Manuel Barroso, espoused a commitment to rationalizing, clarifying, and compiling rules, little concrete action has been taken.	尽管由何塞·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐所领导的前两届委员会赞成致力于合理化、明确化并撰写规则，但几乎没有实际行动。


Juncker’s changes, however, may portend genuine progress on this front, as well as toward monetary and energy union.	但是，容克的变化也许预示着这��面以及迈向货币和能源联盟的真正进步。


Indeed, the new Commission’s structure suggests that Juncker hopes to enhance its role in guiding the European Monetary Union and related policies, control over which largely rested with the European Council and EU member governments (especially Germany) during the crisis.	事实上，欧盟委员会的结构表明容克希望加强其在指导欧洲货币联盟和相关政策方面的作用。


Similarly, a new vice president has been introduced for energy, which has been reframed as “energy union.”	类似地，欧盟委员会已经引入了负责能源事务的新副主席，并将能源事务重命名为“能源联盟”。


The lack of progress on this front during the last two Commissions was rooted mainly in Germany’s Russian modernization project, which has shaped its approach to energy security.	这方面在过去两届委员会中迟迟得不到进展，这主要是拜德国的俄罗斯现代化工程所赐——这决定了它的能源安全方针。


For its part, France has been reluctant to build an interconnected European grid, owing to its heavy reliance on nuclear energy.	此外，法国因为严重依赖核能而一直不愿建立互相连通的欧洲电网。


Given Russian behavior in Ukraine, however, EU leaders have been rethinking their approach.	但是，考虑到俄罗斯在乌克兰的行径，欧盟领导人已开始反思这一方针。


In this context, the Commission’s new structure – not to mention the fact that the new European Council president, former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, has long sought an energy union – may well push the policy forward.	在这样的情况下，欧盟委员会的新结构——更不用说新的欧洲理事会主席、前波兰总理唐纳德·塔斯克（Donald Tusk）早就开始寻求能源联盟这一事实了——可能会极大地推进这方面的政策。


Though it is impossible to understand fully the implications of the Commission’s new structure at this early stage, some of its institutional ramifications are already emerging.	尽管不可能在早期阶段就完全了解欧盟委员会的新结构，但一些机构架构已经浮现出来。


Beyond inciting a kind of tug-of-war with the European Council, the Commission’s shift away from lawmaking will alter the European Parliament’s role, which it has forged over the last five years on the back of the Commission’s active legislative agenda.	除了与欧洲理事会角力之外，欧盟委员会的偏离立法功能还将改变在过去五年里欧洲议会紧跟欧盟委员会的积极立法日程建立起来的角色。


With little authority to initiate legislation, the Parliament, too, will have no choice but to pivot toward oversight.	欧洲议会没有权力实施立法，因此别无选择，也只能将重点转向监督。


Precisely how all of this all plays out in the coming months and years will determine whether the European project progresses or stagnates.	所有这些在未来几个月和几年里如何发展将决定欧洲工程是进步还是停滞不前。


Perhaps observers should be paying a little less attention to the “who” and a bit more to the “what.”	也许观察者应该更少关注“谁”，更多关注“什么”。


Africa Beyond Ebola	埃博拉之外的非洲


MADRID – Among this summer’s grave global worries, the spread of the Ebola virus has monopolized the discussion of Sub-Saharan Africa and reinvigorated hoary notions of disorder and despair – at a time when a new image of a dynamic Africa was emerging.	马德里—在今年夏天全世界的死亡恐惧中，埃博拉病毒的蔓延主宰了撒哈拉以南非洲问题的讨论，也在活力非洲的新形象冉冉升起时重新点燃了混乱和绝望的古老印象。


In fact, there is still strong reason for optimism about the region’s prospects.	事实上，对于非洲地区的前景，我们仍有很强的理由保持乐观。


The Ebola outbreak overshadowed three key events affecting the region.	埃博拉的爆发让影响非洲地区的三个重要事件黯然失色。


On July 1, a major organizational restructuring at the World Bank Group was implemented.	7月1日，世界银行集团实施了一项重大组织重构。


Two weeks later, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced the establishment of the New Development Bank.	两周后，金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）宣布成立新开发银行。


And, in early August, African government and business leaders gathered in Washington, DC, for a summit that could portend transformative private investment in Africa.	8月初，非洲政府和商界领袖齐聚华盛顿，参加推进可改变非洲的私人投资的峰会。


Such investment is essential in a world in which net private capital flows to developing countries outstrip official development assistance by a margin of ten to one.	如今，流向私人净资本流是官方发展援助的十倍，在这样的背景下，这类投资十分关键。


If this is to be a turning point for Africa, rather than another false dawn, this summer must be the start of a prolonged effort to stimulate private-sector engagement.	如果这成为非洲的反转点而不是又一次假反弹，那么今年夏天必然是刺激私人部门参与的长期努力的起点。


The reorganization of the World Bank is a central part of a larger effort under its president, Jim Yong Kim, to reposition the Bank as a facilitator vis-a-vis the private sector, rather than a primary provider.	世界银行的重组是行长金墉（Jim Yong Kim）所领导的更加宏大的计划的一部分，金墉努力使世界银行重新定位为与私人部门齐头并进的促进器，而不是主要援助提供者。


From 2009 to 2013, new investment commitments by the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private-sector lending arm, have risen 73%.	从2009年到2013年，世界银行私人部门贷款机构国际金融公司（International Finance Corporation）所作出的投资承诺增长了73%。


Meanwhile, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the Bank’s provider of political risk insurance covering investments in developing countries, has moved to expand its activities, both by broadening the types of projects that it supports and widening existing definitions to allow greater coverage.	与此同时，世界银行为发展中国家投资提供政治风险保险的机构跨国投资担保局（Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency）采取双管齐下措施扩展活动范围——既扩大了其所支持的项目种类，也扩充了现有限定条件以增加覆盖面。


July’s restructuring occurs within the context of these broader moves.	7月的重组就发生在这些范围更大的动作的背景下。


In reorganizing the World Bank Group’s central component, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kim has adopted a management-consulting model that unites expertise with regional coverage.	在重新组织世界银行集团核心部分——国际复兴开发银行（International Bank for Reconstruction and Development）过程中，金墉采取了将专家知识与地区覆盖相统一的管理顾问模式。


Seeking to eliminate the bureaucratic “silos” that have isolated regional experts from one another, 14 global practice groups in areas such as energy, water, and education have been established to bring to bear the full force of the World Bank’s considerable knowledge on projects and partnerships.	为了拔出将地区专家彼此之间互相隔离的官僚主义“据点”，建立了14个能源、水和教育等领域的全球行动组织以充分调动世界银行可观的关于项目与合作的知识。


Just as the World Bank was repositioning itself, the BRICS agreed to establish their own bank.	正如世界银行在重新给自己定位，金砖国家一致同意���立自己的银行。


There are significant outstanding issues about how the New Development Bank will operate, but early indications suggest that infrastructure will be central to its activities, with an emphasis on Africa.	关于新开发银行如何运行，还存在许多重大问题有待解决，但早期迹象表明基础设施将是该银行活动的核心领域，而非洲则是重点地区。


The World Bank estimates that insufficient infrastructure reduces productivity in Africa by approximately 40%.	世界银行估算，基础设施不足令非洲生产率下降了约40%。


The entrance of a new player with initial authorized capital of $100 billion – along with the United States’ Power Africa program, which has garnered $26 billion in commitments since its launch last year, and the World Bank’s new Global Infrastructure Facility – promises to help ease infrastructure financing significantly.	拥有1,000亿美元初始授权资本的新开发银行的加入——以及自去年启动以来以筹集到260亿美元出资承诺的美国非洲加油计划（Power Africa program）和世界银行新成立的全球基础设施基金（Global Infrastructure Facility）——能够极大地缓解基础设施融资难问题。


But, as of now, the New Development Bank is little more than a statement of political solidarity, and whether it comes into existence remains to be seen.	但是，眼下新开发银行仍然比只是一份政治团结宣言，是否能够成为现实还有待观察。


Even if it does begin to function, the BRICS lack what gives development banks, and the World Bank in particular, legitimacy and weight: a staff composed mostly of dedicated experts who are among the world’s best.	即使它真的开始运作，金砖国家也缺乏更给予各种开发银行（特别是世界银行）合法性和分量的东西：主要由具备世界顶尖水平的敬业专家工作人员。


Finally, the high profile of the US-Africa Leaders Summit, with more than 40 heads of state in attendance, as well as President Barack Obama’s direct involvement, generated buzz about Africa.	最后，美非领导人峰会的规格相当高，有40多个国家的元首出席，奥巴马总统也直接参与了峰会，这使得非洲话题成了热门。


US businesses and investors certainly gained more awareness about Africa’s potential and a deeper understanding of the variety of investment climates throughout the continent.	美国企业和投资者显然更好地了解了非洲的潜力，也根深地认识到非洲大陆投资气候的多样性。


But, though the summit may be called a success, its long-term implications are unclear, particularly given the uncertainty about what will follow.	但是，尽管此次峰会可谓成功，其长期影响仍不清楚，特别是在考虑到未来不确定性的情况下。


At the moment, there does not seem to be a plan to institutionalize the summit.	眼下，似乎没有将峰会制度化的打算。


Moreover, the participation of so many heads of state overshadowed that of African business leaders.	此外，如此多国家元首的参与掩盖了非洲商界领袖的风头。


The practical connections that US companies will need when deciding whether to invest could have been cultivated on the summit’s margins, or in its aftermath, but were not.	美国公司在决定是否投资时所需要的务实关系理应在峰会期间或之后有所进展，但并非如此。


Laying a foundation for future engagement requires ongoing commitment and effort that goes beyond mere publicity.	打好未来参与的基础需要不断的承诺和努力，光靠宣传是不行的。


The same could be said about the World Bank.	世界银行也是如此。


There is much work to be done in integrating the new organizational model with existing Bank structures and practice areas.	将新组织模式融入现有银行结构和实践领域还有很多工作要做。


Even if this transition occurs seamlessly, the Bank faces a serious internal struggle against entrenched bureaucratic interests and a pervasive institutional mindset that is overly risk-averse and fixates on processes rather than outcomes.	即使能够实现无缝转型，世界银行仍面临着艰苦的内部斗争，需要战胜根深蒂固的官僚利益和无处不在的过度厌恶风险、过度注重过程而非结果的制度思维。


In recent years, Africa, once a land of pity, has emerged as a land of opportunity.	近几年来，昔日的可怜之地非洲正在崛起为机会之地。


If it is to become a land of performance, the goal must be to facilitate investment, both domestic and foreign.	如果非洲想要成为表现之地，就必须将目标放在促进国内外投资商。


That will demand effort and commitment; given that a stable international order increasingly depends on a prosperous and growing Africa, it is a goal that the world cannot afford to miss.	这需要努力和承诺； 由于稳定的国际秩序日益需要繁荣而增长的非洲，因此这也是全世界不可丧失的机会。


Europe’s Iranian Imperative	欧洲的伊朗使命


MADRID – Last month, with the world’s attention fixed on the crisis in Crimea and the search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, the latest round of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, plus Germany) passed quietly in Vienna.	马德里—上个月，当全世界的目光都投向克里米亚危机和寻找马航370航班时，伊朗和P5+1（美国、中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国加上德国）之间的谈判在维也纳静悄悄地结束了最新一轮。


Even with discussions set to continue next week, the talks’ outcome remains far from certain – and world leaders cannot afford to become distracted.	虽然下周讨论还将继续，但谈判的结果远未可知——并且世界领导人都不得不把注意力集中于此。


This is especially true for Europe, whose unified approach to Iran has been invaluable up to this point.	欧洲尤其如此，在这个节骨眼上，它对伊朗的统一态度是至关重要的。


Indeed, it was the bite of European sanctions that ultimately brought Iran to the negotiating table, and the force of unified European diplomacy facilitated the “joint plan of action,” which set out the terms for reaching a comprehensive long-term agreement within six months.	事实上，正是欧洲制裁的威力让伊朗最终来到谈判桌前，而统一的欧洲外交也将助力“联合行动计划”，为六个月内达成全面长期协议贡献力量。


But now, at the plan’s halfway point, there has been little concrete progress, with last month’s negotiations producing no headway on two key issues being discussed: the acceptable level for uranium enrichment in Iran and the future of the heavy-water reactor at Arak.	但如今，在计划进行了一半时，我们却看不见实实在在的进展，上个月的谈判在可接受的伊朗铀浓缩水平和阿拉克（Arak）重水反应堆的未来等关键问题的讨论上没有取得任何成果。


The sharp contrast between this lack of achievement and Iran’s recent declarations about reaching a final deal by July raises important questions about Iran’s strategy and goals – questions that negotiators must consider carefully when determining the best approach.	成果寥寥与伊朗最近宣布将在7月达成最终协议之间的鲜明反差产生了关于伊朗战略和目标的重要问题——在决定最佳方针时，谈判者必须小心对待这些问题。


The key to success is the background against which the process plays out.	成功的关键在于进程的背景。


Iran is a land of contrasts.	伊朗是矛盾之地。


On a recent visit organized by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the coexistence of entrenched tradition and rapid transformation was starkly apparent.	在欧洲外交关系委员会（ECFR）组织的最新访问中，根深蒂固的传统与快速的变迁如何共存的问题显得颇为突出。


Central Tehran – ebullient with young people and high-heeled women donning testimonial headscarves and mid-thigh jackets over pants – embodies a thirst for openness.	在德黑兰市中心，年轻人青春洋溢，女性脚踩高跟鞋，头戴传统头巾，身穿夹克衫、系腰带、穿裤子——彰显出对进步的渴望。


More than 60% of Iranians were born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and more than 40% were born after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980’s.	60%的伊朗人口出生于1979年伊斯兰革命之后，40%多的伊朗人出生于20世纪80年代两伊战争之后。


For them, the revolution is a part of history, not the main source of their personal values.	对他们来说，革命只是历史，而不是个人价值的主要来源。


The toll taken by years of tough economic sanctions is also apparent.	多年的严厉经济制裁的后果也随处可见。


Despite Iranian officials’ best efforts to downplay the sanctions’ impact, it is difficult to spin inflation in excess of 30% and projected GDP growth of just 1% this year.	尽管伊朗官员竭尽全力降低了制裁的影响，但通货膨胀仍然难以控制在30%以下，今年的GDP增长率预计只有1%。


The combination of a young population and a crumbling economy is a combustible mix, one that amounts to an existential threat to the regime – and the regime knows it.	年轻的人口和蹒跚的经济的组合是危险的，会给政权带来生存威胁——政权也知道这一点。


In this sense, the imperative to reach a prosperity-enhancing agreement with the international community is greater than ever for Iran’s leadership.	从这个角度讲，与国际社会达成巩固繁荣的协议对伊朗领导人来说从未如此紧迫。


Furthermore, Iran’s negotiating style, like its capital city, can be both fatiguing and confusing.	此外，伊朗的谈判风格就像它的首都，既让人心力憔悴，又让人困惑不解。


Just moments after elaborating at length on the Koran’s prohibition of nuclear weapons, an interlocutor would declare that the underground Fordow nuclear facility’s impregnability to airstrikes must be central to any deal.	在详细阐释了可兰经的核武器禁忌几个月后，伊朗谈判员又宣称福尔道（Fordow）地下核设施不可空袭是任何协议的核心问题。


The reality is that Iran does not envisage giving up its nuclear breakout capacity.	现实是，伊朗从未想过放弃其核突破能力。


The negotiations are aimed not at eradication, but at lengthening lead-time – specifically, limiting uranium-enrichment levels to 3.5%, establishing a strong inspections regime, and reaching an agreement on the Arak nuclear facility.	谈判的目标不在于扑灭这一能力，而在于延长时间——具体地说，在于将铀浓缩丰度限制在3. 5%以内，在于建立严格的检查制度，在于就阿拉克核设施问题达成协议。


But even this may not happen.	但即使这些目标可能也无法达成。


After all, Iranian officials have thus far not demonstrated their commitment to accepting stringent and verifiable checks.	毕竟，伊朗官员并未表达过接受严格的、可验证的检查的承诺。


Moreover, Iran has managed to separate the nuclear negotiations from broader, related issues like its ballistic-missile program, its support for groups like Hezbollah, and its domestic human-rights record.	此外，伊朗设法将核谈判和其他范围更广的相关问题（如弹道导弹计划、其对真主党等组织的支持以及其国内人权纪录等）分离。


With the US loath to introduce potential spoilers into the mix, there is no chance that any of these issues will be up for discussion.	美国不愿意在现有局面中再增加干扰因素，因此这些问题都不可能被提到讨论议程上来。


In this context, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton’s meeting with dissidents during her most recent trip to Tehran was merely a symbolic gesture.	在这样的背景下，欧盟高级代表凯瑟琳·阿什顿（Catherine Ashton）在最近访问德黑兰期间与持异见者的会晤只不过是象征性的姿态。


This leaves Iran the opening it needs to place a strategic bet that the Syrian conflict will generate increasing friction between the West and Iran’s regional archrival, Saudi Arabia.	这给了伊朗所需要的战略赌注机会——叙利亚冲突将造成西方与伊朗的主要地区对手沙特阿拉伯之间的摩擦升级。


For Iran, a staunch supporter of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a weaker US-Saudi relationship is key to shifting the regional balance of power – especially if it is accompanied by the easing of Western economic sanctions.	对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权的坚定支持者伊朗来说，美国-沙特关系的削弱是改变地区实力平衡的关键——特别是伴随着西方经济制裁放松的话。


To some degree, this hope is reinforced by Iran’s perception of US President Barack Obama as a motivated partner in the nuclear talks.	从某种程度上说，这一希望因为伊朗将美国总统奥巴马视为核谈判中有积极性的伙伴而加强了。


After all, a long-term agreement would be both a singular foreign-policy achievement for Obama and a boon to his efforts to disentangle the US from the Middle East.	毕竟对奥巴马来说，与伊朗的长期协议不但是突出的外交成就，也有利于他让美国摆脱中东。


But Iran also recognizes that the clock is ticking.	但伊朗也认识到时间紧迫。


Obama’s presidency is coming to an end, the Republicans are poised to regain control of the Senate in November’s mid-term election, and Democrats are increasingly reticent to be viewed as “soft on Iran.”	奥巴马的总统任期正在走向尾声，共和党大有在11月的中期选举中控制参议院之势，而民主党则日益被认为“对伊朗太软弱”。


As a result, the US Congress appears to be growing more hostile toward a deal; indeed, the longer it takes to conclude a final agreement, the more likely Congress is to scupper it.	因此，美国国会应该会对与伊朗的协议敌意越来越大； 事实上，最终协议达成越晚，国会阻挠的可能性就越大。


In this context, Europe has a key role to play.	在此背景下，欧洲将起到关键作用。


While Europe’s reputation for foreign-policy “softness” continues to shape Iranian perceptions, the EU’s role in compelling Iran to negotiate underpins the current talks.	尽管在伊朗看来，欧洲在外交政策上一直有“软弱”的名声，但欧洲在迫使伊朗参与谈判方面起到的作用一直是当前对话的基础。


Likewise, it was France’s insistence on more stringent controls that initially blocked the agreement in Geneva last November.	类似地，导致去年11月没能在日内瓦达成协议的原因是法国坚决主张严格控制。


A decade ago, Europe disappointed Iran by withdrawing from negotiations, under pressure from the US – a move that some have suggested aided former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rise to power.	十年前，欧洲因为美国的压力而从谈判中撤出，让伊朗大失所望——有人认为这促进了伊朗前总统内贾德的上台。


Today, Europe will be critical to driving progress, particularly in the event that the US Congress torpedoes a sensible agreement.	如今，欧洲将在推动进程方面起到关键作用，特别是在美国国会阻挠有利协议的情况下。


Indeed, on Iran, Europe’s unified approach has enabled it to have a greater impact than on any other significant foreign-policy issue.	事实上，在伊朗问题上，欧洲的统一意见能让它获得比其他重要外交政策问题更大的影响力。


This should be regarded as a model for the future and a lesson for the present.	这应该被树立为未来的榜样和现在的经验。


By preserving its unity of purpose and maintaining the pressure and negotiating momentum that it has generated, Europe can demonstrate to Iran, the US, and itself that it has what it takes to be a major global actor.	统一目标、保持它所带来的压力和谈判动力可以让欧洲向伊朗、美国及其本身展示什么才是真正的全球行动者。


Forsaken Syria	被遗忘的叙利亚


MADRID – In this year of ubiquitous commemorations, the centennial of Jan Karski’s birth has been largely overlooked.	马德里——扬·卡尔斯基诞辰一百周年纪念日已大抵淹没在今年俯拾皆是的纪念活动当中。


And yet Karski’s legacy is more important than ever – nowhere more so than in Syria.	但卡尔斯基留下的遗产却比以往任何时候都更重要——尤其是在叙利亚。


As the Geneva II peace process slogs along – leaving cadavers and atrocities to pile up – Karski’s dedication to bringing the plight of Poland’s Jews to the world’s attention during World War II, despite the inertia of governments and publics, embodies exactly what Syria desperately needs.	随着日内瓦第二次和平进程的艰难前行——身后留下了堆积如山的尸体和罄竹难书的暴行——卡尔斯基不顾政府和公众所表现出的惰性，尽力让世界了解二战期间波兰犹太人困境的壮举恰恰体现了叙利亚所迫切需要的精神。


In 1942, Karski, a Polish-born diplomat, traveled to the United Kingdom to report on what came to be called the Holocaust.	1942年，波兰出生的外交官卡尔斯基前往英国报告后来被称之为大屠杀的暴行。


The next year, he embarked on a mission to the United States to brief President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other dignitaries on the horrors that he had witnessed.	第二年他又踏上了向美国总统富兰克林·D·罗斯福及其他政要汇报他亲眼目睹的恐怖行径的旅程。


In both cases, he was met with skepticism and apathy.	他的英美之旅无一例外地遭遇了怀疑和冷漠。


Indeed, it was only toward the end of the war that action was taken to stop the slaughter.	事实上，直到战争末期国际社会才为阻止屠杀采取了行动。


Although the Holocaust is a category of persecution sui generis, one cannot avoid thinking of Karski in light of the international community’s approach to Syria today.	虽然没有什么能与大屠杀造成的破坏相比，但想到国际社会今天对叙利亚的态度人们不禁会想起卡尔斯基。


Expectations for the Geneva talks are so low that trivial matters – such as the fact that President Bashar al-Assad’s negotiators and the opposition are sitting together in the same room (though not at the same table) – are being hailed as successes.	外界对日内瓦会谈几乎不抱什么希望，以致于巴沙尔·阿萨德总统的谈判代表和反对派同坐在一间屋子里（虽然并没有坐在一张桌前）这样微不足道的琐事都被看做是一种成功。


Even the agreement to allow women and children to leave blockaded areas of the city of Homs – an anti-Assad stronghold – fell far short of international mediators’ vision (and even this achievement seems to be in doubt).	就连允许妇女儿童离开霍姆斯市（阿萨德反对派大本营）封锁区的协议都距离国际调解员的目标相去甚远——而且就连这一点点成就现在似乎都值得怀疑。


Instead of allowing a United Nations aid convoy to bring humanitarian aid to the area, the government agreed to release women and children on an as-yet-uncertain timeline, while men can leave only after their names had been cleared, raising fears of arrest.	政府并未允许联合国援助车队为该地区民众带去人道主义援助，而是同意按照尚未确定的时间表释放妇女和儿童，而男性则只有在洗脱罪名之后才能离境。 政府的举动导致人们因害怕被捕而人心惶惶。


Meanwhile, amid plodding deliberations of incremental steps that are clearly inadequate, Syrians are being displaced, wounded, tortured, and killed in droves.	此外，因为对渐进步骤审议进展缓慢且明显无法满足需要，叙利亚人正陷入流离失所、惨遭伤害、折磨和大批被杀的困境当中。


By any measure, the level of suffering in Syria is shocking.	无论采用何种标准，叙利亚的苦难指数都令人触目惊心。


Although figures do not convey the cruelty by all sides, it has become de rigueur to cite the numbers: more than 100,000 dead, 2.3 million refugees, and four million people internally displaced.	虽然数字并不足以显示各方行为的残酷，但列举数字已经成为一种礼节性的需求：超过100,000人丧生、230万登记难民和超过400万民众在国内流离失所（有人估计国内流离失所的民众甚至高达650万人）。


But a year ago, the figures were already dire: 60,000 dead, 700,000 international refugees, and two million internally displaced.	但一年前这个数字其实已经非常可怕：60,000人死亡、700,000名难民以及200万国内民众流离失所。


If there were a threshold of misery that would cause the world to say, “Enough is enough,” it surely would have been crossed by now.	如果苦难达到一定限度就能让国际社会说“够了”，那么叙利亚现在的情况早就已经突破了这个限度。


The ugly truth is that the world’s response to this crisis has been shaped by geopolitical interests, not the need to put an end to appalling human suffering.	丑陋的真相是世界对危机的反应并不是结束这场骇人听闻的人间苦难，反而是争夺各参与方的地缘政治利益。


Indeed, it is no secret that the conflict serves as a proxy for larger struggles – between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the US and Iran, Russia and the US, Shia and Sunni Muslims, and moderates and extremists – and that resolving it will require significant effort on all of these fronts.	事实上，叙利亚冲突只是沙特和伊朗、���特和卡塔尔、美国和伊朗、俄国和美国、什叶和逊尼派穆斯林以及温和派和极端派更大规模斗争的代理早已不是什么秘密——解决这场冲突需要各方面共同付出艰苦的努力。


From an American perspective, Syria is not strategically critical.	从美国的角度看，叙利亚并不是一颗战略上的关键棋子。


President Barack Obama’s administration has maintained an intensely inward-looking focus, reinforced by a public wary of foreign engagements.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统政府一直强烈关注国内事务，美国公众也异常警惕介入国外问题。


Nothing short of a drastic change in the conflict’s nature that threatened America’s core interests would lead to direct US involvement.	除非叙利亚冲突性质突然急剧变化并威胁美国核心利益，否则都不要指望美国直接干预叙利亚问题。


Guilt, after all, is a poor motivator for international action.	单靠负疚感采取国际行动显然远远不够。


Even the UK and France – the only two countries that were not shy about threatening military action against Assad’s regime – got cold feet when confronted with the possibility of going it alone.	就连英国和法国——毫不避讳地威胁要对阿萨德政权采取军事行动的唯一两个国家——也在面对孤军奋战的可能性时充当了逃兵。


Instead, the world is responding to graphic images of unspeakable brutality – torture by the regime or executions carried out by the opposition – with sterile shows of outrage.	相反，世界正在对难以言喻的暴行画面表现出纯粹的愤怒——包括阿萨德政权的酷刑拷问或反对派执行的处决。


The stream of statements, half-measures, and clumsy initiatives has done little to improve the situation – and, in some instances, has made things worse.	一系列的声明、折中举措和笨拙行动并未起到改善局势的作用——甚至在某些情况下进一步恶化了现有局势。


Consider Obama’s call, backed by no action, for Assad to “step aside,” and his repeated promises, dating to early 2012, to provide non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition – promises that were finally fulfilled late last year, and then only temporarily.	想想奥巴马要求阿萨德“下台”的缺乏实际行动支持的空洞呼吁，以及可以追溯到2012年初期的反复承诺为叙利亚反对派提供非致命性援助——直到去年下半年奥巴马的承诺才终于兑现，但也只是兑现了一段时间而已。


This gap between rhetoric and action left a vacuum; Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and private donors subsequently filled it by channeling support to extremist elements of the opposition, strengthening their hand at the expense of those being called moderates.	言论和行动的巨大差距留下了一段真空； 沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔和私人捐助者随后通过支持反对派极端势力填补了这段真空，并在巩固自己势力的同时削弱了温和派的势力。


But the most infamous example of this policy paralysis was Obama’s 2012 declaration that the use of chemical weapons was the “red line” beyond which the US would be forced to intervene.	但奥巴马于2012年宣布化学武器将成为美国被迫干预的“红线”是美国政策瘫痪最臭名昭著的例子。


His ultimate failure to follow through on his proclamation emboldened and, in a way, re-legitimized Assad.	他最终未能兑现诺言让阿萨德变得更加大胆，并且在某种程度上重新获得了合法地位。


It remains to be seen whether Geneva II will follow this pattern.	日内瓦二次会议是否会沿用这一模式尚有待观察。


The price of the talks has already been high, with all sides having ramped up violence to strengthen their respective positions ahead of the negotiations.	谈判已经付出了高昂的代价，因为各方都通过加紧暴力活动巩固自己在谈判桌上的位置。


This is to say nothing of the fiasco surrounding the withdrawn invitation to Iran, whose buy-in will be essential for any resolution.	这还不算撤回对伊朗邀请所代表的惨败，有效解决叙利亚问题必须得到伊朗的支持。


In any case, the incremental nature of the talks belies the situation’s urgency.	无论如何，谈判的渐进性掩盖了局势的紧迫性。


Amid the current focus on regime change, a transitional government, and negotiating delegations, there is a real danger that the desperate humanitarian situation will be overlooked.	在对政权更迭、过渡政府和谈判代表的关注中，确实有可能忽略已然陷入绝境的人道主义局势。


Here, citizens have a critical role to play.	民众在这种情况下能够起到关键的作用。


But, like their leaders, publics everywhere have been reticent to act.	但各国民众像其领袖一样行事一直谨小慎微。


Indeed, opinion polls show that, despite near-universal awareness of the situation in Syria, there is very little public support for intervention.	事实上，民意调查显示尽管对局势几乎达成了普遍看法，但对叙利亚采取干预行动却很少得到民众的支持。


But handwringing will not help; we – individuals – must accept real responsibility for ending the tragedy and press our leaders to act.	但焦躁不安没有任何用处； 普通民众必须承担责任结束这场悲剧，迫使本国领导人采取行动。


It has been more than 70 years since Karski presented his report to the world.	卡尔斯基向世界报告大屠杀已经过去70年了。


In that time, we have created the United Nations, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and discussed endlessly governments’ “responsibility to protect” their citizens.	在此期间，我们建立了联合国、通过了世界人权宣言，并且无休止地探讨政府对民众的“保护责任”。 但眼看叙利亚的悲剧不断发展，人们可能认为情况没有发生任何变化。


Yet, watching the Syrian tragedy develop, one might conclude that nothing has changed. How many times must we say, “Never again”?	我们究竟还要多少次地发誓“永远不再允许这样的悲剧重演”，才能真正杜绝这样的悲剧再次发生？


A Nation of Vidiots	沉迷电视的国度


NEW YORK – The past half-century has been the age of electronic mass media.	发自纽约——过去半个世纪是电子化大众媒体的时代。


Television has reshaped society in every corner of the world.	电视已经重塑了世界各地的社会面貌。


Now an explosion of new media devices is joining the TV set: DVDs, computers, game boxes, smart phones, and more.	现在，一系列新视频工具正在加入电视的行列：DVD，电脑，游戏机，智能手机等等。


A growing body of evidence suggests that this media proliferation has countless ill effects.	但同时也有越来越多的证据显示，这些媒体的扩散将带来无穷的祸患。


The United States led the world into the television age, and the implications can be seen most directly in America’s long love affair with what Harlan Ellison memorably called “the glass teat.”	美国把世界带入了电视时代，而因此造成的影响可以从美国与哈兰·艾莉森所谓“玻璃奶嘴”的著名论断之间的漫长爱情故事中得到最直接体现。 在1950年，拥有电视机的美国家庭比例不到8%；


In 1950, fewer than 8% of American households owned a TV; by 1960, 90% had one.	到了1960年，90%的美国家庭都拥有了一台电视机。


That level of penetration took decades longer to achieve elsewhere, and the poorest countries are still not there.	相比之下世界其他国家要多花几十年才能使电视机的普及率达到了美国同样的水平，而那些最贫困国家到目前为止都还未能企及。


True to form, Americans became the greatest TV watchers, which is probably still true today, even though the data are somewhat sketchy and incomplete.	尽管相关统计稍显粗略和不完整，但相关数据显示，美国人不但过去曾是最大的电视迷，现在也依然如此。


The best evidence suggests that Americans watch more than five hours per day of television on average – a staggering amount, given that several hours more are spent in front of other video-streaming devices.	最有力的证据显示美国人每天平均看电视5小时以上——别忘了在看电视之前他们还花了几个小时在其他的视频设备上，这是一个多么惊人的数字啊。


Other countries log far fewer viewing hours.	其他国家花在看电视上的时间就少得多了。


In Scandinavia, for example, time spent watching TV is roughly half the US average.	比如在斯堪的纳维亚半岛，人们花在看电视上的时间大约只有美国的一半。


The consequences for American society are profound, troubling, and a warning to the world – though it probably comes far too late to be heeded.	对全世界来说，电视对美国社会造成的影响是一道深刻而又令人烦恼的的警钟——尽管现在说什么都晚了。


First, heavy TV viewing brings little pleasure.	首先，电视看多了，快乐就少了。


Many surveys show that it is almost like an addiction, with a short-term benefit leading to long-term unhappiness and remorse.	许多调查显示，看电视就像吸毒，短暂的快感换来的只是长期的痛苦和自责。


Such viewers say that they would prefer to watch less than they do.	这些电视迷说要是可以重新选择的话，他们宁愿少看点电视。


Moreover, heavy TV viewing has contributed to social fragmentation.	另外，沉迷于电视会导致社会分裂。


Time that used to be spent together in the community is now spent alone in front of the screen.	人们曾经花在社区交际上的时间现在都被用来独自看电视了。


Robert Putnam, the leading scholar of America’s declining sense of community, has found that TV viewing is the central explanation of the decline of “social capital,” the trust that binds communities together.	美国研究社区意识衰落问题的泰斗罗伯特·普特南发现，电视节目是导致“社会资本”——即维持社区凝聚的信任——衰减的核心因素。


Americans simply trust each other less than they did a generation ago.	现在的美国人比他们的上一代人更少互相信赖。


Of course, many other factors are at work, but television-driven social atomization should not be understated.	当然，还有其他因素导致社会分裂，但是电视促进的社会原子化是不可忽略的重要原因。


Certainly, heavy TV viewing is bad for one’s physical and mental health.	毫无疑问，沉迷电视对个人的身体和精神健康都有害。


Americans lead the world in obesity, with roughly two-thirds of the US population now overweight.	美国是世界上肥胖症最严重的国家，当前，大约2/3的美国人身体都过胖。


Again, many factors underlie this, including a diet of cheap, unhealthy fried foods, but the sedentary time spent in front of the TV is an important influence as well.	当然导致身体过胖的原因也有很多，包括长期吃廉价、不健康的油炸食品，不过长时间坐在电视机前不动也是一个很重要的原因。


At the same time, what happens mentally is as important as what happens physically.	同时，精神上收到的影响与肉体上的同样重要。


Television and related media have been the greatest purveyors and conveyors of corporate and political propaganda in society.	在社会上，电视和相关的媒体是公司广告和政治宣传最大的传输工具。


America’s TV ownership is almost entirely in private hands, and owners make much of their money through relentless advertising.	美国的电视台几乎都掌握在私人手里，而电视台老板则通过不断播出广告而赚钱。


Effective advertising campaigns, appealing to unconscious urges – typically related to food, sex, and status – create cravings for products and purchases that have little real value for consumers or society.	有效的广告宣传，迎合了消费者无意识的冲动——这些冲动通常与食物，性和身份地位有关——推动了消费者购买那些对其自身或社会来说都没有多少价值的产品。


The same, of course, has happened to politics.	政治上也有类似的情形。


American politicians are now brand names, packaged like breakfast cereal.	眼下，美国政治家们都成了一个品牌名称，被包装在诸如谷物早餐等商品上。


Anybody – and any idea – can be sold with a bright ribbon and a catchy jingle.	利用彩带和动人的旋律可以打包卖掉任何人——和任何思想。


All roads to power in America lead through TV, and all access to TV depends on big money.	在美国，要想当权都要借道电视机，而要获得电视台的帮助就要花大钱。


This simple logic has put American politics in the hands of the rich as never before.	这一简单的逻辑使美国的政治史无前例地掌握在了富人的手上。


Even war can be rolled out as a new product.	甚至连战争都能最作为新产品在电视上���销。


The Bush administration promoted the premises of the Iraq war – Saddam Hussein’s non-existent weapons of mass destruction –in the familiar colorful, fast-paced, and graphics-heavy style of television advertising.	布什政府利用与电视广告类似的颜色，快节奏和图片风格来推销其攻发动拉克战争的原因——萨达姆侯赛因拥有所谓的大规模杀伤性武器。


Then the war itself began with the so-called “shock and awe” bombing of Baghdad – a made-for-TV live spectacle aimed at ensuring high ratings for the US-led invasion.	然后，战争一开始就以所谓的“震慑与恐惧”的轰炸来袭击巴格达——这是为了确保群众支持美国入侵伊拉克而安排的特写镜头。


Many neuroscientists believe that the mental-health effects of TV viewing might run even deeper than addiction, consumerism, loss of social trust, and political propaganda.	许多神经科学家认为，电视节目对精神健康的影响远远不止于导致上瘾，引发消费主义，导致社会信任消失以及政治洗脑。


Perhaps TV is rewiring heavy viewers’ brains and impairing their cognitive capacities.	或许，电视正在重构沉迷电视者大脑的接收系统，并使他们丧失认知能力。


The American Academy of Pediatrics recently warned that TV viewing by young children is dangerous for their brain development, and called on parents to keep children under two away from the TV and similar media.	美国儿科学会最近发出警告说，电视节目有害于少年儿童大脑的发展，并呼吁父母们要让他们的孩子远离电视和类似媒体。


A recent survey in the US by the organization Common Sense Media reveals a paradox, but one that is perfectly understandable.	美国媒体常识组织最近的调查揭示了一个看似矛盾，却很好理解的现象。


Children in poor American households today not only watch more TV than children in wealthy households, but are also more likely to have a television in their room.	今天，美国贫穷家庭的孩子不但比富裕家庭的孩子多看电视，而且他们的房子里都会放一台电视。


When a commodity’s consumption falls as income rises, economists call it an “inferior” good.	当一种商品的消费随着收入的上升而下降时，经济学家称其为“次优”品。


To be sure, the mass media can be useful as a provider of information, education, entertainment, and even political awareness.	不可否认，作为信息，教育，娱乐，甚至政治意识的供应商，大众媒体的作用是巨大的。


But too much of it is confronting us with dangers that we need to avoid.	但过度地使用大众媒体则会有害，这要求我们懂得适可而止。


At the very least, we can minimize those dangers.	至少，我们可以使那些伤害最小化。 世界上行之有效的方法包括限制电视宣传，特别是对少年儿童；


Successful approaches around the world include limits on TV advertising, especially to young children; non-commercial, publicly-owned TV networks like the BBC; and free (but limited) TV time for political campaigns.	如BBC这样的非商业化，公有电视网络； （在限定的）电视时间内免费播放政治选举宣传片。


Of course, the best defense is our own self-control.	当然，最好的防御方法还是靠我们的自我控制。


We can all leave the TV off more hours per day and spend that time reading, talking with each other, and rebuilding the bases of personal health and social trust.	每天，我们完全可以少看电视，花更多时间阅读，交流和重建个人健康和社会信任的基础。


Anatomy of a Crisis	对一场危机的剖析


BERKELEY – Getting out of our current financial mess requires understanding how we got into it in the first place.	伯克利－从我们当前的金融混乱状态脱身首先需要了解我们是怎样陷入其中的。


The fundamental cause, according to the likes of John McCain, was greed and corruption on Wall Street.	根据像约翰·麦凯恩这样的人的观点，最根本的原因是华尔街的贪婪和腐败。


Though not one to deny the existence of such base motives, I would insist that the crisis has its roots in key policy decisions stretching back over decades.	虽然我不否认这样的基础动力的存在，但是，我还是坚持认为这场危机根源于过去几十年里关键的政策决定。


In the United States, there were two key decisions.	在美国，有两个关键的决定。


The first, in the 1970’s, deregulated commissions paid to stockbrokers.	第一个是在20世纪70年代解除了对支付给股票经纪人的佣金的管制；


The second, in the 1990’s, removed the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on mixing commercial and investment banking.	第二个是在20世纪90年代废止了《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》对商业银行和投资银行混业经营的限制。


In the days of fixed commissions, investment banks could make a comfortable living booking stock trades.	在固定佣金的时代，投资银行可以通过登记股票交易很舒适的生存下去。


Deregulation meant competition and thinner margins. Elimination of Glass-Steagall then allowed commercial banks to encroach on the investment banks’ other traditional preserves.	解除对固定佣金的管制意味着竞争和利润的减少，而《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》的废止使商业银行可以蚕食投资银行的其他传统业务领域。


In response, investment banks branched into new businesses like originating and distributing complex derivative securities.	作为回应，投资银行渗透到像创设和发行复杂的衍生证券这样新的业务领域。


They borrowed money and put it to work to sustain their profitability.	它们借钱然后进行运作以维持其利润率。


This gave rise to the first causes of the crisis: the originate-and-distribute model of securitization and the extensive use of leverage.	这引发了危机产生的第一个原因：证券化的创设和发行模式以及对杠杆的广泛使用。


It is important to note that these were unintended consequences of basically sensible policy decisions.	注意到这些都是基本明智的政策决定的计划之外的后果，是很重要的。


Other things being equal, deregulation allowed small investors to trade stocks more cheaply, which made them better off. But other things were not equal.	在其他各方面相同的情况下，解除佣金管制使小投资者可以以更低的成本交易股票，这使他们的经济状况变好。


In particular, the fact that investment banks, which were propelled into riskier activities by these policy changes, were entirely outside the regulatory net was a recipe for disaster.	但是各方面情况并不相同，特别是，被这些政策变化驱使从事风险更高的活动的投资银行，完全游离在监管网络之外的事实，是引 起灾难的原因。


Similarly, eliminating Glass-Steagall was fundamentally sensible.	同样，废止《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》从根本上讲是明智的。


Conglomerates allow financial institutions to diversify their business, and combining with commercial banks allows investment banks to fund their operations using relatively stable deposits instead of fickle money markets.	混业经营使金融机构的业务多样化，和商业银行的结合使投资银行可以使用相对稳定的存款而不是变幻无常的货币市场来为其运营提供资金。


This model has proven its viability in Europe over a period of centuries, and its advantages are evident in the US even now with Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill Lynch.	这种模式在欧洲的几个世纪中证明了其生命力，即使是现在，在美国银行购买美林的活动中，其在美国的优势也是很明显的。


But conglomeratization takes time.	但是，混业经营需要时间。


In the short run, Merrill, like the other investment banks, was allowed to double up its bets.	在短期内，美林和其他投资银行一样，被允许并到其他机构内。


It remained entirely outside the purview of the regulators.	它仍然完全处在监管的范围之外。


As a stand-alone entity, it was then vulnerable to market swings.	作为一个单独的实体，那么，它就易于受到市场波动的影响。


A crisis sufficient to threaten the entire financial system was required to precipitate the inevitable conglomeratization.	需要一个足以威胁整个金融系统的危机来加速不可避免的混业经营。


The other element in the crisis was the set of policies that gave rise to global imbalances.	危机中的另一个因素是引起全球失衡的一系列政策。


The Bush administration cut taxes. The Fed cut interest rates in response to the 2001 recession.	布什政府减税，美联储降低利率以回应2001年的衰退都是这样的政策。


Financial innovation, meanwhile, worked to make credit even cheaper and more widely available.	同时，金融创新促使信贷更便宜并可以为更多的人获得。


This, of course, is just the story of subprime mortgages in another guise.	当然，这是次级抵押贷款以另一种姿态的出现。


The result was increased US spending and the descent of measured household savings into negative territory.	这些政策的结果是美国开支的增加和标准家庭储蓄由减少变成了负增长。


Of equal importance were the rise of China and the decline of investment in Asia following the 1997-1998 financial crisis.	同样重要的是，在1997－1998年金融危机之后中国的崛起和在亚洲投资的下降。


With China saving nearly 50% of its GNP, all that money had to go somewhere.	随着中国的储蓄率几乎达到了其国民生产总值的50％，所有这些钱必须有一个去向。


Much of it went into US treasuries and the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.	这些钱中有许多进入了美国国库和成为房利美及房地美的债券。


This propped up the dollar and reduced the cost of borrowing for US households, encouraging them to live beyond their means.	这对美元构成了支撑并降低了美国家庭的借款成本，鼓励了他们过一种他们的能力无法达到的生活；


It also created a more buoyant market for the securities of Freddie and Fannie, feeding the originate-and-distribute machine.	这也为房地美和房利美的证券创造了一个活跃的市场，滋养了创设和发行的机器。


Again, these were not outright policy mistakes.	再一次的，这些都不是完全的政策错误。


Lifting a billion Chinese out of poverty is arguably the single most important event in our lifetimes.	使十亿中国人脱离贫困可能是我们一生的时间里一件最重要的事件。


The fact that the Fed responded quickly prevented the 2001 recession from worsening.	事实是，美联储在2001年衰退时的快速反应阻止了衰退的恶化。


But there were unintended consequences.  The failure of US regulators to tighten capital and lending standards when abundant capital inflows combined with loose Fed policies ignited a furious credit boom.	但是，这产生了计划之外的后果。 当大量的资本流入和宽松的美联储政策结合在一起的时候，美国监管者没能收紧资本和贷款标准，这引燃了一个极度的信贷繁荣。


The failure of China to move more quickly to encourage higher domestic spending commensurate with its higher incomes added fuel to the fire.	中国没能快速采取措施鼓励和其更高的收入相称的更多的 国内开支，为这一繁荣火上浇油。


Now, a bloated financial sector is being forced to retrench.	现在，臃肿的金融部门正在被迫收缩。


Some outcomes, like the marriage of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, are happier than others, like the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.	有些结果，像美国银行和美林的联姻，要比其他的结果令人高兴一些，例如雷曼兄弟的破产。


But, either way, there will be downsizing.	但是，不管是哪一种结果，金融部门的规模都会减小。


Foreign central banks are suffering capital losses on their unthinking investments.	外国中央银行都在经受其考虑不周的投资带来的资金损失。


As they absorb their losses on US treasury and agency securities, capital flows toward the US will diminish.	当他们接管美国国库和机构证券中他们的损失的时候，流向美国的资本将会减少。


The US current-account deficit and the Asian surplus will shrink.	美国经常账户赤字和亚洲国家的盈余都会减少。


US households will have to start saving again.	美国家庭将不得不再次开始储蓄。


The one anomaly is that the dollar has strengthened in recent weeks.	一个异常现象是美元在最近几周的走强。


With the US no longer viewed as a supplier of high-quality financial assets, one would expect the dollar to have weakened.	随着美国不再被认为是高质量的金融资产的提供者，人们可能会期望美元已经走弱。


The dollar’s strength reflects the knee-jerk reaction of investors rushing into US treasuries as a safe haven.	美元的走强反映了投资者仓促涌入美国将美国国库作为安全港的下意识反应。


It is worth remembering that the same thing happened in August 2007, when the sub-prime crisis erupted.	值得记住的是，当2007年8月次级抵押贷款危机爆发的时候，发生了同样的事情。


But once investors realized the extent of US financial problems, the rush into treasuries subsided, and the dollar resumed its decline.	但是，一旦投资者认识到美国金融问题的程度，涌入美国国库的资金就会减少，美元就会继续下跌。


Now, as investors recall the extent of US financial problems, we will again see the dollar resume its decline.	现在，当投资者回想起美国金融问题的程度时，我们会再次看到美元继续下跌。


Emphasizing greed and corruption as causes of the crisis leads to a bleak prognosis.	强调贪婪和腐败是危机的根源会导致悲观的预测。


We are not going to change human nature.	我们不会去改变人性。


We cannot make investors less greedy.	我们不可能让投资者不那么贪婪。


But an emphasis on policy decisions suggests a more optimistic outlook.	但是，强调政策决定提供了一个更积极的前景。


Unintended consequences cannot always be prevented.	计划之外的 结果不是总是可以防止的。


Policy mistakes may not always be avoidable.	政策错误不是总是可以避免的。


But they at least can be corrected.  That, however, requires first looking more deeply into the root causes of the problem.	但是，政策错误至少是可以被纠正的。 然而，这首先需要对问题的根本原因有更深刻的认识。


Anatomy of a Financial Meltdown	对金融危机的剖析


NEW YORK – A vicious circle is currently underway in the United States, and its reach could broaden to the global economy.	纽约-美国目前正经历着一个恶性循环，并且可能会影响到全球的经济。


America’s financial crisis has triggered a severe credit crunch that is making the US recession worse, while the deepening recession is leading to larger losses in financial markets – thus undermining the wider economy.	美国的经济危机所引发的严重的信贷紧缩加剧了美国经济的衰退，而越来越深重的衰退正在引发金融市场更大规模的损失，从而损害更广层面的经济。


There is now a serious risk of a systemic meltdown in US financial markets as huge credit and asset bubbles collapse.	随着巨大的信贷和资产泡沫的破裂，美国金融市场正面临严重的系统性危机的风险。


The problem is no longer merely sub-prime mortgages, but rather a “sub-prime” financial system.	现在的问题已经不单单是次级抵押贷款而更像是一场“次级”金融体系的危机。


The housing recession – the worst in US history and worsening every day – will eventually see house prices fall by more than 20%, with millions of Americans losing their homes.	房地产市场的衰退是美国有史以来最严重的一次并且每天都在持续恶化，将最终导致房地产价格下跌超过20%，使数以百万计的美国人失去他们的住所。


Delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures are now spreading from sub-prime to near-prime and prime mortgages.	拖欠债务、违约和取消抵押品赎回权的现象正从次级抵押贷款蔓延到近优和优质抵押贷款上。


Thus, total losses on mortgage-related instruments – include exotic credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – will add up to more than $400 billion.	与抵押贷款相关的投资工具包括像债务抵押证券（CDOs）这样的外来的信贷衍生产品的损失总计将超过4000亿美元。


Moreover, commercial real estate is beginning to follow the downward trend in residential real estate.	此外，商业房地产也开始跟随居民房地产出现持续下跌。


After all, who wants to build offices, stores, and shopping centers in the empty ghost towns that litter the American West?	不管怎样，有谁愿意在散落在美国西部那些空旷、被遗废的城市建造办公楼、商店和购物中心呢？


In addition to the downturn in real estate, a broader bubble in consumer credit is now collapsing: as the US economy slips into recession, defaults on credit cards, auto loans, and student loans will increase sharply. US consumers are shopped-out, savings-less, and debt-burdened.	除开房地产市场的下跌，消费信贷更大的泡沫也正在破裂：随着美国经济滑向衰退，对信用卡、汽车贷款和学生贷款不履行还款义务的现象正在急剧上升。


With private consumption representing more than 70% of aggregate US demand, cutbacks in household spending will deepen the recession.	鉴于个人消费占据美国需求总量70%以上的份额，房地产消费的缩减将进一步加剧这场衰退。


We can also add to these financial risks the massive problems of bond insurers that guaranteed many of the risky securitization products such as CDOs.	在这些金融风险之中，我们还可以加上债券保险商为许多像债务抵押证券这样有风险的证券化产品提供担保所带来的巨大问题。


A very likely downgrade of these insurers’ credit ratings will force banks and financial institutions that hold these risky assets to write them down, adding another $150 billion to the financial system’s mounting losses.	这些保险商的信用评级极有可能出现的下降将迫使持有这些风险资产的银行和金融机构对它们进行冲销，从而给金融体系已经越积越高的损失中再增加1500亿美元的损失。


Then there is the exposure of banks and other financial institutions to rising losses on loans that financed reckless leveraged buy-outs (LBOs).	此外还有银行和其他金融机构在为鲁莽的杠杆收购（LBOs）进行融资的借贷中所遭受的越来越大的损失。


With a worsening recession, many LBOs that were loaded with too much debt and not enough equity will fail as firms with lower profits or higher losses become unable to service their loans.	随着衰退的继续恶化，许多背负着过高的债务以及没有足够流动资金的杠杆收购会像利润越来越低或亏损越来越高的公司一样无法偿还它们的贷款。


Given all this, the recession will lead to a sharp increase in corporate defaults, which had been very low over the last two years, averaging 0.6% per year, compared to an historic average of 3.8%.	在这些情况下，衰退将会导致不履行债务的企业急剧增多，这一数字在过去两年曾经非常低，每年平均为0. 6%，而历史平均数为3.


During a typical recession, the default rate among corporations may rise to 10-15%, threatening massive losses for those holding risky corporate bonds.	8%。 在典型的衰退期间，不履行债务的企业的比率可能升高到10-15%，从而使那些持有高风险公司债券的机构面临巨额损失的危险。


As a result, the market for credit default swaps (CDS) – where protection against corporate defaults is bought and sold – may also experience massive losses.	其结果是，信用违约互换（CDS）市场对企业违约的保险进行买卖的市场可能也会遭受巨额损失。


In that case, there will also be a serious risk that some firms that sold protection will go bankrupt, triggering further losses for buyers of protection when their counterparties cannot pay.	如果出现这样的情况，某些出售这类保险的公司极有可能会破产，从而使购买这些保险的机构面临进一步的损失，因为对方没有能力付款了。


On top of all this, there is a shadow financial system of non-bank financial institutions that, like banks, borrow short and liquid and lend to or invest in longer-term and illiquid assets.	除开所有这些情况，非银行金融机构的金融体系也面临着阴影，它们像银行一样，借来短期和流动资金然而借给或者投资在长期和非流动的资产上。


This shadow system includes structured investment vehicles (SIVs), conduits, money market funds, hedge funds, and investment banks.	这种面临阴影的体系包括结构性投资工具（SIVs）、管道（以资产支持商业票据为自己筹资）、货币市场基金、对冲基金和投资银行。


Like banks, all these financial institutions are subject to liquidity or rollover risk – the risk of going belly up if their creditors do not rollover their short-term credit lines.	像银行一样，所有这些金融机构都面临着流动性或资金周转的风险，如果它们的债权人无法周转它们的短期贷款额度，它们就会垮掉。


But, unlike banks, they do not have the safety net implied by central banks’ role as lender of last resort.	但是，与银行不同���它们没有中央银行作为出借方最后的救命稻草为它们提供的安全网。


Now that a recession is underway, US and global stock markets are beginning to fall: in a typical US recession, the S&P 500 index falls by an average of 28% as corporate revenues and profits sink.	在当前衰退不断深化的情况下，美国和全球的股票市场正在开始下跌：在一场典型的美国衰退中，标准普尔500指数会随着公司收入和利润的下滑而平均下跌28%。


Losses in stock markets have a double effect: they reduce households’ wealth and lead them to spend less; and they cause massive losses to investors who borrowed to invest in stock, thus triggering margin calls and asset fire sales.	股票市场的损失会产生双重效应：它们减少了家庭的财富从而使他们的消费下降； 同时它们造成借款投资股票的投资者的损失，从而引发保证金催缴和减价销售资产的风潮。


There is thus a broader risk that many leveraged investors in both equity and credit markets will be forced to sell illiquid assets in illiquid markets, leading to a cascading fall in asset prices to below their fundamental values.	这些很有可能引发许多股权和信贷市场的杠杆投资者将被迫出售非流动市场上的非流动资产的更广泛的风险，从而使资产价格大幅下降到它们的基本价值以下。


The ensuing losses will aggravate the financial turmoil and economic contraction.	随之引发的损失将加剧金融危机和经济紧缩。


Indeed, adding up all these losses in financial markets, the sum will hit a staggering $1 trillion.	事实上，如果把金融市场所有这些的损失加起来，总额将达到惊人的10000亿美元。


Tighter credit rationing will then further hamper the ability of households and firms to borrow, spend, invest, and sustain economic growth.	更严厉的信用评级将进一步阻碍家庭和公司进行借贷、消费、投资和持续经济增长的能力。


The risk that a systemic financial crisis will drive a more pronounced US and global recession has quickly gone from being a theoretical possibility to becoming an increasingly plausible scenario.	一场系统性的金融危机会引发美国和全球更明显的衰退的风险已经从理论上的可能性变成了越来越可能出现的情况。


Anatomy of a Revolution Delayed	解剖一场被贻误了的革命


The ongoing conflict between Iran’s rulers and the Iranian public is the result of a head-on collision between two contradictory forces. In recent years, public attitudes in Iran have become more liberal.	当前发生在伊朗统治者和民众之间的冲突，实际上源自于两种互为矛盾之力的正面碰撞。


At the same time, power has shifted from conservative pragmatism toward a much more militant fundamentalism.  The call by the most important group of Iran’s clerics for the election results to be thrown out is but the latest sign of the fight back of both the reformist and pragmatic conservative factions.	这些年来，伊朗公众的态度日渐自由化，而与此同时，政府权力却从保守实用主义者处传到了更为好战的伊斯兰原教旨主义者手里。 而从伊朗神职人员之中最重要的团体（“战斗教士协会”）处发出的要求废除选举结果的呼吁，则堪称改革派和实用主义保守派集团的最新反击。


Thirty years after the Islamic revolution, Iranians are growing demonstrably less religious and more liberal.	在伊斯兰革命爆发30年后，伊朗人显然已变得更自由化，对宗教的态度也日益开放。


Two face-to-face surveys of more than 2,500 Iranian adults, conducted in 2000 and 2005, clearly show the trend.	分别在2000年和2005年进行的两场各涵盖2500名成年伊朗人的现场调查清楚地揭示了这一趋势。


The percentage of those who “strongly agree” that democracy is the best form of government increased from 20% to 31%.	仅仅相隔5年，“非常同意”民主制是最佳政府组织形式的受访者比例就从20%增加到31%。


Similarly, on a number of questions concerning gender equality – including political leadership, equal access to higher education, and wifely obedience – the numbers continued a downward trend.	同样地，在关于性别平等的一系列问题上——包括领导人性别，高等教育平等权以及妻子行为守则方面——统计数字也向着好的趋势发展。


Those who considered love as the basis for marriage increased from 49% to 69%, while those who depended on parental approval fell from 41% to 24%.	当认为爱情是婚姻基础的人的比例从49%增加到69%之时，依赖父母之命来结为夫妻的比例则从41%降至24%。


In 2005, a much higher percentage than in 2000 defined themselves as “Iranian, above all” rather than “Muslim, above all.”	在2005年的调查中，认为自己“首先是伊朗人”而不是“首先是穆斯林”的人的比例也比2000年显著增加。


This trend is not hard to understand.	事实上，要理解这一趋势可并不难。


The imposition of a monolithic religious discourse on society has made liberal values attractive to Iranians.	因为当全社会都被迫接受某种单一宗教论调的时候，自由主义对伊朗人自然更具吸引力。


But, while this was reflected in reformist trends in the country’s wider political life, a movement toward militant fundamentalism took shape within the regime’s power structure.	但当这一趋势以改革主义的面目在伊朗更广泛的政治生活中被反映出来之时，一场针对好战原教旨主义的运动也在政权权力架构中逐渐凸现出来。


Reform-minded politicians were partly to blame for this change.	当然，改革派领导人必须为这一改变承担一定的责任。


Far from opposing absolutist power as an impediment to religious democracy, they tried to persuade the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, of the value of reform.	因为他们并没有将专制主义视为实现神权民主制的障碍并反对之，而是试图说服专制主义的代表，最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊，希望他能明白改革的价值所在。


But Khamenei had no interest in reform, as he made plain in dismantling the reform movement.	但哈梅内伊显然对改革一点兴趣也没有，他此次肢解改革运动时的所作所为已经很好地证明了这一点。


The presidency of Mohammad Khatami, an avowed reformer, who served eight years, beginning in 1997, convinced the Supreme Leader that his authority would be assured only if the presidency was held by a subservient fundamentalist such as the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.	由于穆罕默德·哈塔米——这个自认改革主义者的政治家——自1997年起连续当了8年伊朗总统，而哈塔米在任期内的作为，使得哈梅内伊坚信只有扶持一个像现任总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德这种言听计从的原教旨主义者在位，他作为最高领袖的权威才能得以保全。


In this, Khamenei was following the lead of the late Shah, who kept Amir Abbas Hoveyda, a loyal retainer, as prime minister from 1965 until the Shah was overthrown in 1979.	而在这点上哈梅内伊的想法和已故的伊朗国王巴列维如出一辙，后者从1965年起就持续任命忠实追随者阿米尔·阿巴斯·胡韦达为首相，直到1979年王朝被彻底推翻为止。


The problem with the Supreme Leader’s calculation, however, is that Ahmadinejad is a loose cannon.	然而最高领袖的政治算计也有个问题，那就是艾哈迈迪-内贾德是个口无遮拦的大嘴巴。


His populist rhetoric and religious fundamentalism have alienated a large section of conservative-pragmatist clerics and their supporters.	他那套民粹主义夹杂宗教原教旨主义的花言巧语早就疏远了一大批信奉保守实用主义的毛拉及其支持者们。


Many members of this group honor the institution of private property, and Ahmadinejad’s talk of redistributing wealth is not to their liking.	这一派毛拉团体的许多成员尊重私有制，而艾哈迈迪-内贾德那套重新分配财富的言论自然不对他们的胃口。


More disturbing to them is his apocalyptic conviction regarding the imminent advent of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, whose appearance is believed to lead to the destruction of the world and the end of time.	更令他们感到不舒服的则是艾哈迈迪-内贾德深信“遁世的伊玛目”，也就是“马赫迪”（救世主）即将降临世上，而传说这意味着世界末日的到来。


Generally, Ahmadinejad begins his public speeches with prayers for the Mahdi’s immediate return.	而艾哈迈迪-内贾德一般在演讲之前都会祈祷，祈祷救世主能尽快回归。


For the Shia religious hierarchy, long accustomed to relegating the advent of the Mahdi to a distant future, Ahmadinejad’s insistent millenarianism is troublesome.	对于伊斯兰什叶派神权阶层来说，传统上救世主降临都被解释成极久远的未来才会发生的事，而艾哈迈迪-内贾德坚持不懈的救世主降临论简直就是自找麻烦。


They have often dismissed as unorthodox, if not heretical, any claim of personal contact with the Imam or speculation about his arrival.	毛拉们经常把那些宣称自己跟“遁世的伊玛目”有亲身接触或者借“降临”投机的人——如果这些人不是异教徒的话——定义为非正统教徒。


Several ayatollahs opined that such talk about the Mahdi is unbecoming of a president or, worse, indicative of an unstable leader.	而一些阿亚图拉（高级神职人员）更认为关于救世主的言论对于一位总统来说极不恰当，甚至严重点来说，这个领导人根本不可靠。


These concerns were reflected in the fact that the Society of Combatant Clergy, a conservative body, was unable to endorse Ahmadinejad’s candidacy.	而这些事实也解释了为什么“战斗教士协会”这样一个保守政治团体会不认可艾哈迈迪-内贾德的总统候选人资格了。


Defiance of the Supreme Leader by millions of Iranians just a day after he firmly endorsed Ahmadinejad threw the country into a political crisis.	另一方面，在最高领袖坚持认定艾哈迈迪-内贾德获胜后的第二天，数百万伊朗人对哈梅内伊的公开抗议立刻把整个国家拖入了一场政治危机��中。


Worldwide broadcasts of the beating and killing of protesters have undermined the regime’s religious credentials.	而在全世界广为播放的殴打屠杀示威者的镜头则令这个政权的宗教公信力大大受损。


Seeking a way out of this difficult situation, the Supreme Leader declared that the electoral disputes must be settled in through legal channels, not on the street.	为了在严峻形势下找条出路，最高领袖公开声明选举纠纷不该通过上街抗议来解决，而是必须通过法律途径。


Given his role in justifying electoral fraud, this argument seems like an effort to buy time to clear the streets of demonstrators, put opposition leaders under severe physical and psychological stress, and isolate Mir Hossein Mousavi, the presumed winner of the real vote.	考虑到他本人就是选举是否舞弊的裁决者，这一声明似乎更像是缓兵之计，好让他有时间清理街头示威者，在肉体和精神上双重打压反对派领导人，并采取手段孤立米尔·侯赛因·穆萨维这个原本预测要赢得大选的候选人。


Nonetheless, Khamenei’s invocation of the law echoes the demands of many conservative-pragmatists who lean toward Mousavi, who is not in a position to challenge Khamenei’s authority directly.	而即便如此，哈梅内伊走法律途径的说法却激起了许多虽无意直接挑战其权威，却倾向穆萨维的保守实用主义者的反响。


Mousavi must carefully continue his legal campaign, without compromising the trust he has gained from the majority of Iranians.	而穆萨维自己则必须小心翼翼地继续其法律行动，更不能把大多数伊朗人赋予的信任给在政治上就这么妥协掉。


He must stand by his two principal demands: nullification of the election and establishment of an impartial committee to rule on the government’s violations of the electoral law.	他必须坚持两个原则性要求：一是废除选举结果，二是建立一个中立的委员会去裁决政府违反选举法的行为。


Should Mousavi persuade Khamenei to reconsider his position, the Supreme Leader’s hold on power will be shaken.	如果穆萨维能成功说服哈梅内伊去接受他的立场的话，最高领袖对权力的掌控就会被动摇。


If Khamenei holds fast, Mousavi cannot gain the presidency, but he will continue to represent the hopes of the majority of Iranians who differ dramatically with their government.	如果哈梅内伊迅速攫紧权力，穆斯维就难以到总统之位，但他至少还继续承载着那些与政府意见相左的大多数伊朗人的期望。


For now, what will happen depends on Mousavi’s perseverance.	而眼下事态的演变，则只能取决于穆萨维本人的韧性了。


Anatomy of Thatcherism	剖析撒切尔主义


London – Thirty years ago this month, Margaret Thatcher came to power. Although precipitated by local conditions, the Thatcher (or more broadly the Thatcher-Reagan) revolution became an instantly recognizable global brand for a set of ideas that inspired policies to free markets from government interference.	伦敦——三十年前的本月，玛格丽特·撒切尔开始执掌政权，虽然受制于英国本国条件，撒切尔式的革命还是立即成为了一个国际标签。


Three decades later, the world is in a slump, and many people attribute the global crisis to these very ideas.	这套理论的核心思想是以自由市场来代替政府的干预。 三十年后的今天，世界正处于经济萧条之中，一些人把此次全球危机的原因归咎于以上的理论。


Indeed, even beyond the political left, the Anglo-American model of capitalism is deemed to have failed.	实际上，即便不是左派人士也会认为，英美模式的资本主义已经失败了。


It is held culpable for the near financial meltdown.	此种模式应该对几乎导致金融体系全面崩盘负责。


But 30 years of hindsight enable us to judge which elements of the Thatcher revolution should be preserved, and which should be amended in the light of today’s global economic downturn.	经过三十年的反思，我们应该判断撒切尔式革命中的哪些因素应该保留，而哪些因素应该被调整修改，以便于将来经济的复苏。


Most obviously in need of amendment is the view that minimally managed and regulated markets are both more stable and more dynamic than those subject to extensive government intervention.	大多数人认为，相对于政府的过度干预而言，对市场监管的越少就越有利于市场的稳定和活力。


The Thatcherite assumption, in other words, was that government failure is far more menacing to prosperity than market failure.	按照亲撒切尔主义者的说法，政府所犯的错误所造成的影响要远超过市场失效所导致的后果。


This was always bad history.	历史也会和我们开玩笑。


The record shows that the period 1950-1973, when government intervention in market economies was at its peacetime height, was uniquely successful economically, with no global recessions and faster rates of GDP growth – and growth of GDP per capita – than in any comparable period before or since.	数据显示，在1950年到1973年之间，在这段和平时期，政府对市场经济的干预相当成功，在此期间即没有全球范围的经济萧条，而且全球GDP（人均GDP）的增长率也处于较快的水平。 比此前和此后的历史表现的都要好。


One can argue that economic performance would have been even better with less government intervention.	有人可能会提出质疑，认为如果当时政府的干预少一些，经济还会表现的更好。


But perfect markets are no more available than perfect governments.	但是，就象没有完美的政府一样，完美的市场也并不存在。


All we have are comparisons between what happened at different times.	我们只能在过去不同的时间阶段，来比较不同的政策效果。


What these comparisons show is that markets plus government have done better than markets minus government.	由此，我们所得出的结论是市场经济加上政府监管要好于市场经济和较少的政府监管。


Nevertheless, by the 1970’s the pre-Thatcher political economy was in crisis. The most notorious symptom of this was the emergence of “stagflation” – simultaneously rising inflation and unemployment.	然后，在1970年代，撒切尔时代之前的经济正处于危机之中，最明显的症状就是“停滞型膨胀”——通货膨胀和高失业率并行。


Something had gone wrong with the system of economic management bequeathed by John Maynard Keynes.	看来，运用凯恩斯主义的理论管理下的经济还是出了问题。


In addition, government spending was on the rise, labor unions were becoming more militant, policies to control pay kept breaking down, and profit expectations were falling.	此外，政府的支出不断增加，工会势力越来越激进。 政府所推出的各项政策开始失灵，企业对利润的预期也开始下调。


It seemed to many as though government’s reach had come to exceed its grasp, and that either its grasp had to be strengthened or its reach had to be reduced.	许多人发现政府已经不能有效地实施职能，解决的方法只有两种：要么进一步加强监管，要么是放弃一部分监管的内容。


Thatcherism emerged as the most plausible alternative to state socialism.	显然，撒切尔主义的出现正是替代国家社会主义的产物。


Nigel Lawson was Thatcher’s second Chancellor of the Exchequer, or finance minister.	尼格尔·劳森是撒切尔时代的第二任财政大臣，或者说是财政部长。


Out of the government’s anti-inflationary efforts emerged the “Lawson doctrine,” first stated in 1984 and broadly accepted by governments and central banks ever since.	因此，当时反通涨采取的政策被称为“劳森原理”，这项在1984年首推的政策一经推出，此后一直被各国政府和央行广泛使用。


“The conquest of inflation,” Lawson said, “should...be the objective of macroeconomic policy.	“解决通货膨胀问题”劳森说； “应该属于是宏观经济政策的范畴。


And the creation of conditions conducive to growth and employment should be...the objective of microeconomic policy.”	而经济增长和创造就业机会的问题是属于微观经济政策的范围。 ”


This proposition overturned the previous Keynesian orthodoxy that macroeconomic policy should aim at full employment, with the control of inflation left to wage policy.	此项提议一举推翻了之前盛行的凯恩斯主义的信条，也就是认为宏观经济政策的目的是保证充分就业，而用薪酬体制来控制通货膨胀。