The G-7 economies – which, no surprise, have dictated international standards for the last 20 years – have rarely hesitated to name and shame emerging economies for their failure to comply with global norms.	G-7经济体——毫不奇怪，它们在过去20年中决定着国际标准——在指名道姓指责新兴经济体没有遵守国际范式方面从来不会犹豫。


Though China’s domestic regulatory regime remains subject to severe constraints, China’s leaders could use the G-20 summit to change the narrative, highlighting the failure of the US and Europe to complete their regulatory agendas.	尽管中国的国内监管机制仍饱受各种约束，但中国领导人可以利用G-20峰会改变口风，强调美国和欧洲没有完成它们的监管日程。


If China managed to compel them to do so, it would benefit considerably – and not just in terms of its international reputation.	如果中国成功迫使它们这样做，将带来巨大的好处——不仅限于其国际声望。


With an export-oriented economy and the world’s largest pile of foreign reserves, not to mention a conservative domestic financial system, China is exposed to international economic and financial volatility.	作为出口导向型经济和拥有世界最大规模外汇储备的国家——更不用提其保守的国内金融体系了——中国已暴露在国际经济和金融的动荡之下。


China may not be able to achieve all of its goals next year.	明年，中国也许无法实现所有目标。


But, if it plays its cards right, it could do much to increase its international influence, while enhancing global economic and financial stability.	但如果它能打出好牌，就可以极大地增加其国际影响力，同时增强全球经济和金融稳定。


That should give China’s leaders much to consider in the coming months.	这应该成为未来几个月中国领导人的重点考虑问题。


China’s Chance to Lead on Development	中国领导发展的机会


BEIJING – In September, China will host the G20 meeting of world leaders for the first time.	北京—9月，中国将首次主办G20世界领导人会议。


It could not have chosen a more opportune moment to assume a leadership role.	这是扮演领导角色的最佳良机。


Chinese President Xi Jinping should seize the occasion to push China’s ambitious development agenda globally.	中国国家主席习近平应该抓住这次机会，将中国雄心勃勃的发展日程推向全球。


Specifically, Xi should make the case that development done right benefits everyone, and he should launch discussions on a multilateral investment agreement to be developed in the next year.	具体而言，习近平应该证明正确的发展能让所有人受益。 他还应该发起关于明年制定多边投资协定的讨论。


This is an achievable goal for the summit: the G20 has a record of relative success in coordinating multilateral efforts, such as in its response to the 2008 global financial crisis.	这是此次峰会的一个可以实现的目标：G20在协调多边合作方面具有相对成功的记录，如应对2008年全球金融危机的措施。


Moreover, the ingredients of successful development are very well known.	此外，成功的发展的秘诀早已众所周知，包括不断的技术进步（持续增长和就业的关键）；


They include constant technological improvement, which is critical for sustained growth and employment; a focus on maximizing human and physical capital; and infrastructure investments geared toward reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency.	专注于人力和实物资本最大化； 以及能降低交易成本和增进效率的基础设施。


We also know the current gaps that exist in development.	我们还知道目前在发展方面存在哪些缺口。


Developing countries today are constrained by low levels of human and financial capital, and by low reserves of or access to foreign exchange, which limits their ability to import the raw materials and equipment needed to ascend global value chains.	发展中国家受制于人力和金融资本水平低下，以及外汇储备不足或难以获得外汇（这限制了它们进口提高其全球价值链地位所需要的原材料和设备的能力）。


The best way to close the gaps in human and financial capital, and to increase access to foreign exchange, is through foreign direct investment.	填补人力和金融资本缺口、扩大获得外汇的渠道的最佳办法是通过外国直接投资（FDI）。


FDI should not be difficult to attract, because the potential returns should be higher in developing countries, where capital is scarce relative to labor.	FDI应该不难吸引，因为发展中国家资本相对劳动力较为稀缺，潜在回报应该更高。


But as Nobel laureate Robert Lucas noted, capital has been flowing in the wrong direction, from low- to high-income countries.	但诺贝尔奖得主罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）指出，资本的流向出了问题，从低收入向高收入国家流动。


This trend is depleting developing countries’ available capital, limiting development, and widening the global income gap.	这一趋势正在耗尽发展中国家的可用资本，限制它们的发展，也扩大了全球收入差距。


As Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych pointed out in a 2008 study for the Review of Economics and Statistics, poorer countries are deprived of capital flows partly because they lack the institutions that are needed to receive and facilitate investments.	劳拉·阿尔法罗（Laura Alfaro）、赛博内姆·卡伦里-奥兹坎（Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan）和瓦蒂姆·沃洛索维奇（Vadym Volosovych）在《经济学和统计学》（Review of Economics and Statistics）2008年的一篇研究中指出，穷国之所以资本流出，部分是因为它们缺少接收和便利投资的机构。


In a sense, these countries are trapped, because they need capital to develop these necessary institutions in the first place.	从某种程度上讲，这些国家陷入了陷阱，因为它们首先需要资本发展必要的机构。


A multilateral investment agreement could fix this problem by making it easier to invest in developing countries.	多边贸易协定能让投资于发展中国家更加容易，从而解决这一问题。


It could also strengthen the economic foundation for growth in developing countries by establishing investment protections and incentives, dispute-resolution procedures, corporate social responsibility benchmarks, and regulatory frameworks for investments made by state-owned enterprises and sovereign funds.	它还能建立投资保护和激励、纠纷解决程序、公司社会责任基准和国有企业和主权基金投资的监管框架，从而强化发展中国家的经济基础。


The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the natural place to negotiate this agreement, but past efforts have failed partly because negotiations were seen as heavily favoring developed countries over developing ones.	世界贸易组织是进行这一协定的谈判的当然场所，但过去的努力以失败告终，部分是因为谈判被视为严重偏袒发达国家。


With the global investment environment having changed dramatically in the past decade, negotiations should be restarted.	过去十年中，全球投资环境发生了巨大的变化，谈判也应该重新启动。


As the figure below shows, developing countries now account for a growing share of global outward direct investment (ODI).	下图表明，目前发展中国家占全球对外直接投资（ODI）的比重越来越大。


This means that some emerging market economies themselves are becoming a source of capital and thus have a role to play in any future investment framework.	这意味着一些新兴市场经济体本身正在成为资本的来源，因此能够在未来投资框架中大显身手。


China is the prime example.	中国是最显著的例子。


As the following graph shows, China has benefited so much from FDI that it is now increasing its own ODI.	下图显示，中国从FDI中获益良多，所以如今其自身ODI也在增长。


According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, in 2013 China became the third largest source of other countries’ FDI and is expected to become a net capital exporter for the first time in 2016.	据联合国贸易和发展会议，2013年中国成为其他国家FDI的第三大来源，并预计将在2016年首次成为资本净输出国。


This trend can only continue, considering the combined impact of China’s “Go Out Policy” of prodding domestic companies to make investments abroad, and it’s “One Belt, One Road” framework to build continent-wide trade infrastructure.	考虑到中国鞭策国内公司赴海外投资的“走出去政策”以及建设洲际贸易基础设施的“一带一路”框架的合力，这一趋势还将持续下去。


In time, China will likely be the world’s largest source of FDI.	假以时日，中国很有可能将成为世界上最大的FDI来源国。


Having gone from being a recipient of FDI to a net contributor in recent decades, China is perfectly positioned to lead G20 discussions on global development.	在最近几十年中，中国从FDI接受国一跃成为净输出国，非常适合领导G20的全球发展讨论。


It should do so by setting a concrete goal for a workable development framework with a clear timeline for reaching specific milestones.	中国的做法，应该是为可行发展框架制定一个切实目标，这个目标要带有实现具体里程碑的明确时间表。


An early milestone should be to establish a non-binding investment facilitation framework for developing countries.	一个早期里程碑应该是为发展中国家建立一个非约束性的投资便利框架。


And, more generally, the agreement should emphasize inclusiveness and honest dealing to foster economic growth for developing and developed countries alike.	此外，整体上，该协定应该强调包容和以诚相待，从而促进发展中和发达国家的经济增长。


China and the Future of Commodity Prices	中国和大宗商品价格的未来


MANILA – There is no doubt that China’s ongoing growth slowdown has had far-reaching effects on the global economy.	马尼拉—毫无疑问，中国增长的持续放缓对全球经济造成了深远影响。


But its role in the sharp fall in commodity prices that has occurred since 2014 – an outcome that has been devastating for commodity-exporting countries, including once-dynamic emerging economies – is more limited than the conventional wisdom suggests.	但其对2014年以来大宗商品价格暴跌的作用要比传统智慧所认为的有限得多。 大宗商品的暴跌给大宗商品出口国带来了灾难，包括曾经充满活力的新兴经济体。


In fact, China’s slowdown is only a part of the commodity-price story.	事实上，中国减速只是大宗商品价格故事的一部分。


To be sure, there is a clear correlation between Chinese GDP growth and commodity prices.	诚然，中国GDP增长和大宗撒谎那个品及挨个之间存在明确的相关性。


In the early 2000s, when Chinese growth accelerated, commodity prices rose sharply; since China’s slowdown began in 2011, energy prices have fallen by 70%, metals prices by 50%, and agricultural commodity prices by 35%.	21世纪初，当中国增长加速时，大宗商品价格暴涨； 自2011年中国开始减速以来，能源价格跌去70%，金属价格跌去50%，农产品价格跌去35%。


But the view that China’s slowdown is the main driver of the collapse in commodity prices is incomplete, at best.	但认为中国减速是大宗商品阿济格暴跌的主要推动力的观点是不完全的。


As new research by the Asian Development Bank shows, while China plays a significant role in commodity markets – accounting for about half of global consumption of metals, coal, and pork, for example – it is not nearly as dominant as is widely believed.	亚洲开发银行的新研究认为，尽管中国在大宗商品市场上起着非常重要的作用——比如，中国消费了全球大约一半的金属、煤炭和猪肉——但并没有像人们广泛认为的那样起着主导作用。


China accounts for less than one-fifth of world consumption of sugar, wheat, poultry, and beef; 12% of world consumption of crude oil; and 5% of natural gas.	中国只占世界糖、小麦、家禽和牛肉消费的不到五分之一，原油消费的12%，天然气的5%。


And, in fact, some of the commodities that have experienced the largest price declines – most notably, oil (down 73%) and natural gas (down 55%) – are those in which China is a relatively minor player.	而事实上，一些下跌幅度最大的大宗商品价格——最显著的是石油（下跌73%）和天然气（下跌55%）——中国都只是相对次要的因素。


Moreover, China’s actual commodity consumption is even lower than the figures suggest.	此外，中国的实际大宗商品消费要比数据所显示的更小。


Conventional measures, instead of taking into account cross-border production chains, simply take the sum of a country’s production and net commodity imports to determine its level of consumption.	传统衡量指标不考虑跨国生产链，只计算一国产出和大宗商品净进口的和来衡量消费水平。


But, for China, a sizeable proportion of the commodities it “consumes” is actually used in the production of goods that will be exported to the rest of the world.	但是，对中国来说，其所“消费”的大宗商品中有相当大的部分实际上被用于生产出口至世界其他地区的商品。


Indeed, almost one-third of Chinese metals demand is used to satisfy export demand.	事实上，近三分之一的中国金属需求被用于满足出口需求。


Subtracting the commodities embedded in China’s exported manufactured goods would substantially reduce China’s apparent role in these markets.	扣除包含在中国出口制造品中的大宗商品将大大降低中国在这些市场上的显著作用。


A look at the commodity-price fluctuations themselves reinforces this view.	研究大宗商品价格波动本身便可强化这一观点。


Consider copper: From 2001 to 2006, prices gyrated wildly, with price declines of 30% in some years and increases of 150% in others – all while growth in Chinese industrial production and demand for copper remained relatively steady, at 15% and 20%, respectively.	以铜为例：从2001年到2006年，其价格大幅震荡，一些年份下跌30%，另一些年份上涨150%——而中国工业产量和铜需求增长均保持相对稳定，分别为15%和20%。


Clearly, other factors – ranging from supply-side factors and global demand to speculative demand and inventory adjustment – are also playing a major role in driving outcomes in commodity markets.	显然，其他因素——供给侧因素、全球需求、投机性需求、存货调整等——也在推动大宗商品市场走势方面起着重要作用。


So what does China’s continuing slowdown imply for commodity prices?	那么，中国持续减速对大宗商品价格意味着什么？


Even though China’s growth has moderated since 2011, the country’s commodity-consumption growth still outpaces that of the rest of the world.	中国增长平庸化始于2011年，但其大宗商品消费增长仍高于世界其他地区。


As a result, its share in global commodity consumption has been rising.	因此，其占全球大宗商品消费比重一直在上升。


This should not be surprising, given that Chinese GDP growth, though down significantly from its double-digit heyday, remains above 6%.	这并不令人惊奇，因为中国GDP增长虽然教两位数时期大幅下降，但仍保持在6%以上。


While the shift from an investment-led to a consumption-driven growth model will weaken growth in demand for metals and energy, it will also bring an increase in demand for food products and services, and hence for agricultural commodities.	从投资拉动增长模式向消费驱动增长模式的转变会减弱金属和能源需求增长，但也会带来食品和服务增长的增加，因此农产品需求也会增加。


The conclusion is clear: China’s changing economic situation does not spell disaster for commodity exporters.	结论是清晰的：中国经济状况的变化绝非大宗商品出口国的灾难。


On the contrary, even if, as many fear, China’s economic growth slows further, its impact on commodity prices will be limited.	相反，即使如许多人担心的那样，中国经济继续放缓，其对大宗商品价格的影响也将是有限的。


Bolstering prospects for commodity prices further is the promise that demand in other emerging giants, such as India and Indonesia, will accelerate in the coming years.	进一步提振大宗商品价格前景的是其他新兴巨人——如印度和印度尼西亚——未来几年很有可能加速。


The rest of developing Asia’s economy is currently about 4% larger than China’s, and twice as large as China was in 2000, when growth in the country’s commodity demand began to accelerate.	其他发展中亚洲经济体之和目前比中国规模大4%左右，而2000年（中国大宗商品价格需求开始加速时）大约为中国的两倍。


If solid growth in Asia’s other emerging economies continues over the next decade and a half, it will generate commodity demand at least as large as China’s in the boom years.	如果其他亚洲新兴经济体在未来十五年保持强劲增长，也能产生不亚于中国在其繁荣年份所带来的大宗商品需求。


The drag on commodity prices from China’s growth moderation is real.	中国增长平庸化对大宗商品价格的拖累作用是实实在在的。


But the sharp and generalized drop seen in commodity prices should not be laid entirely at China’s feet.	但大宗商品价格全面剧烈下跌不应该完全归咎于中国。


Perhaps more important, with the country still importing large volumes of commodities and the rest of developing Asia set to generate a new surge in commodity demand, the prospects for a commodity-price rebound look brighter.	也许更重要的是，中国仍然在进口大量大宗商品，而其他亚洲发展中经济体也将产生新一轮大宗商品需求激增，大宗商品价格反弹的前景看上去更加光明了。


Making Space for China	为中国创造空间


LONDON – When the United Kingdom announced earlier this month that it had agreed to become a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), most of the headlines focused not on the news itself, but on the friction the decision had caused between the UK and the United States.	伦敦—当英国在本月早些时候宣布同意成为中国主导的亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）创始成员时，大部分新闻的焦点并不是这个消息本身，而是这一决定在英国和美国之间造成的摩擦。


The White House issued a statement urging the British government to “use its voice to push for adoption of high standards."	白宫发布了一份声明，敦促英国政府“发声推动采取高标准的”。


And one senior US administration official was quoted accusing the UK of “constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power."	据称一位美国高官指责英国“一直通融中国，这绝非与崛起力量打交道的最佳方式”。


In fact, it is the US that is advocating the wrong approach.	事实上，宣扬错误方针的是美国。


In the UK, the diplomatic spat served as an occasion for the British press to air criticism from those who believe that the government should adopt a stronger stance on China.	在英国，这场外交口水让英国媒体抓住机会传播那些认为政府应该对中国采取更强硬立场的人的批评。


For example, they say that the government should have spoken out more forcefully in support of last year's pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and that it should not have distanced itself from the Dalai Lama (as it seems to have done) during Prime Minister David Cameron's visit to China in 2013.	比如，他们说政府应该以更有力的声音支持去年的香港民主示威，不应该在2013年卡梅伦首相访华期间与达赖喇嘛保持距离（英国政府似乎这么做了）。


The UK does need to stand up for itself, but there is no reason for it to become confrontational about internal Chinese matters – especially in the case of Hong Kong, where it lost its standing when it agreed to return the city to Chinese control in 1997.	英国确实需要为了自己而站出来，但没有理由要对中国内政说三道四——特别是香港的问题。 1997年同意中国收回香港主权后，英国就已经失去了香港问题上的立场。


The US, too, would be wise to stop resisting the fact that the world is changing.	对美国来说，也最好不再拒绝世界正在改变的事实。


The US Congress has yet to ratify a 2010 agreement providing China and other large emerging economies greater voting power in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.	美国国会仍没有批准给予中国和其他新兴大经济体在世界银行和国际货币基金组织中更大话语权的2010年协议。


In the meantime, the agreement has become obsolete; China's economy has nearly doubled in size since the deal was struck.	与此同时，这一协议已经过时了，中国经济自该协议达成以来已经扩大了近一倍。


America's reluctance – and that of France, Germany, and Italy – to give the emerging powers an appropriate voice in the established international financial institutions is counterproductive.	美国——以及法国、德国和意大利——不愿在现有国际金融机构给予新兴力量合理的话语权只能起到适得其反的效果。


It drives the creation of new parallel institutions such as the AIIB and the New Development Bank, founded in 2014 by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).	这促成了新的类似金融机构的诞生，如亚投行和2014年由金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和南非）建立的新开发银行。


In the coming days, I will be visiting China in my role as Chair of the British government's Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, and also as a participant in the Boao Forum for Asia, an event similar to the annual gathering of the World Economic Forum in Davos.	在未来几天中，我将作为英国政府抗耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）主席以及博鳌亚洲论坛（类似于达沃斯世界经济论坛的年度会议）与会者的身份访问中国。


I hope to encourage Chinese policymakers to make the fight against antimicrobial resistance a priority when China chairs the G-20 in 2016.	我希望鼓励中国决策者将与耐药性的斗争作为2016年中国作为G-20主席国期间的当务之急。


And though I am not the British ambassador, I will be happy to state my belief that the UK government was wise to join the AIIB, and that the US administration, in voicing its opposition, was not.	而尽管我不是英国大使，但我仍然乐于表明我的态度：英国政府加入亚投行是明智之举，而美国政府表示反对不是明智之举。


China's $10 trillion economy is bigger than those of France, Germany, and Italy combined.	中国10万亿美元的经济比法国、德国和意大利的总和还要大。


Even if its annual output growth slows to 7%, the country will add some $700 billion to global GDP this year.	即使其年度产出增长减速至7%，今年仍能让全球GDP增加7,000亿美元。


Japan would have to grow at something like 14% to have that type of impact on the world.	日本要想取得同样的影响力，必须达到14%的增长率才行。


For anyone who wants to engage in global trade, it is thus vital to identify what China wants.	对任何想参与全球贸易的人来说，认识到中国想要什么至关重要。


In the case of the UK, this obviously includes finance (as well as sports, music, fashion, and perhaps health care).	对英国来说，这显然包括金融（以及体育、音乐、时尚，也许还有医疗）。


The UK is simply being smart when it promotes its own interests by cooperating with China.	与中国合作实现自身利益显然是英国的聪明做法。


One of the few positive consequences of the 2008 financial crisis was the elevation of the G-20's global role; in principle, it is a far more representative forum for international leadership than the G-7 ever was.	2008年为数不多的积极结果之一是G-20全球影响力的加强； 理论上，G-20是远比G-7代表性更强的国际领导力论坛。


There is, however, a downside to the G-20's emergence: the large number of participants can make it difficult to reach agreements and get things done.	但是，G-20的出现有一个弊端：庞大的参与者数量使其难以形成一致意见并办成事。


A new G-7 needs to be created within the G-20, thereby providing China with a degree of influence that reflects its economic weight and requires it to assume a commensurate proportion of global responsibility.	新的G-7需要在G-20内部构建，从而为中国提供一定程度的影响力以反映其经济实力，并要求它承担相称比例的全球责任。


Space at the table for China could be obtained if the eurozone countries, signaling their commitment to the common currency, agreed to surrender their individual seats in exchange for one representing the entire monetary union.	如果以表达出共同货币承诺的欧元区国家同意放弃个体国家席位，以货币联盟占据一个代表席位，则中国就将获得空间。


The US, too, would finally have to accept China's heightened global role.	美国最终也必须接受中国的重要全球作用。


Later this year, the IMF will recalibrate the weights in its unit of account, the so-called Special Drawing Rights, which comprises a basket of currencies that currently includes the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen.	今年晚些时候，IMF将重新制定其账户单位——由目前包括美国、欧元、英镑和日元的一揽子货币所组成的所谓的特别提款权的权重。


According to almost every economic and financial criterion, the SDR basket should now include China's renminbi.	几乎不论根据什么经济和金融标准，特别提款权现在都应该包括中国的人民币。


The US would be wise to not oppose such a move.	美国的明智做法是不要反对这一变化。


Otherwise, it would risk accelerating the decline of the established international financial institutions.	否则，就有可能加速现有国际金融机构的衰落。


Similarly, the US Congress should ratify the agreed changes to the governance of the IMF and the World Bank.	类似地，美国国会应该批准已经形成一致的IMF和世界银行治理结构的变化。


By founding the AIIB and the New Development Bank, China and other emerging powers have signaled that they will not wait for their voices to be better heard.	中国和其他新兴力量通过成立亚投行和新开发银行，表明它们不会坐等它们的声音被听见。


And decisions like that of the UK – and France, Germany, and Italy – show that they are not alone.	而英国——以及法国、德国和意大利——的决定表明它们也这样想。


China’s New World Order	中国的新世界秩序


SEOUL – China – already the world’s largest exporter, manufacturer, and international-reserve-asset holder – is poised to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy (measured according to purchasing power parity) this year.	发自首尔——中国，这个世界上最大的出口者，制造者以及国际储备资产持有者，已经随时准备在今年取代美国成为世界上最大的经济体（以购买力平价计算）。


Now, it is using its growing clout to reshape global economic governance.	如今该国正利用其不断膨胀的政治影响力来重塑全球经济治理。


Indeed, the country’s days of following Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to “hide brightness and cherish obscurity” are long gone.	事实上，中国遵循邓小平“韬光养晦”指示的日子早已一去不返了。


After decades of actively participating in international economic institutions – including the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization – China has begun to resemble a revisionist power seeking to create a new world order.	在数十年如一日积极参与国际经济机构——包括G20，国际货币基金组织，世界银行，世界贸易组织——的运作之后，中国开始变得像一个试图创建新世界秩序的修正主义势力。


Last month, China and 20 other Asian countries signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a new multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	就在上月，中国就和其他二十个亚洲国家签订了一份谅解备忘录，以建立一个新的多边开发银行——亚洲基础设施投资银行。


Viewed as the first serious institutional challenge to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the AIIB was proposed by China.	作为对世界银行以及亚洲开发银行的首个关键性体制冲击，该银行正是由中国动议的。


In a sense, this shift should not be surprising, given the widespread debate over the inherent weaknesses of existing international institutions and governance structures – in particular, China’s disproportionately small role in them.	在某种意义上，考虑到对现有国际机构及治理架构的自身内在缺陷——尤其是中国在这些体系中不成比例的跑龙套角色——的广泛讨论，这一转变其实毫不令人感到意外。 相比于美国在国际货币基金组织中16.


China accounts for a 3.8% voting share of the IMF and a 5.5% share of the ADB, compared to 16.8% and 12.8%, respectively, for the United States and 6.2% and 12.8% for Japan.	8%的投票份额，以及亚洲开发银行12. 8%的份额（日本的该两项比例为6.


Moreover, the advanced economies have staked their claim to leadership in these institutions.	此外，此外各发达经济体早已把自身的领导权牢牢地根植在这些机构之中。


Europeans have led the IMF and Americans have controlled the World Bank since their establishment after World War II.	自二战后建立至今，国际货币基金组织和世界银行就分别由欧洲人和美国人把持着。


Likewise, the ADB has had Japanese presidents since its founding in 1966.	同样，亚洲开发银行是1966年成立以来就一直由日本人担任总裁。


Meanwhile, emerging economies like China face significant barriers to boosting their capital contributions to – and their status in – these institutions.	与此同时，像中国这样的新兴经济体如果想要在这些机构中提升自身出资额度（以及地位）的话也是困难重重。


And reforms, though widely discussed, have faced long delays.	而对这些机构的改革虽然已经进行过广泛讨论，却迟迟未能推动。


For example, IMF quota and governance reform, on which G-20 leaders agreed in 2010, has yet to be implemented.	以国际货币基金组织的配额和治理改革为例，G20各国领袖早已在2010年表决同意，如今却依然是一纸空文。


Frustrated, China finally decided to push for the establishment of the AIIB, in which it will be the largest shareholder, with a stake of up to 50%.	饱经挫败之后，中国最终决定要推动亚洲基础设施投资银行的建立，并自任最大的股东，持有最多达50%的股份。


China will also provide the AIIB’s first president, and the bank’s headquarters will be in Beijing.	该银行的首任总裁也将由中国人担任，并将总部设在北京。


China can leverage its considerable influence over the AIIB to bolster its international image, particularly by strengthening its relationships with developing countries.	中国可以借助自身对亚洲基础设施投资银行的巨大影响力来壮大其国际形象，尤其是通过进一步加强与发展中国家的关系。


Many developing Asian countries, for example, have significant unmet need for infrastructure investment to buttress their long-term economic growth.	因为许多发展中国家都存在巨大的基础设施投资缺口，急需补足来支撑其长期经济发展。


The AIIB can not only channel more resources toward developing countries; it can do so in a way that is better suited to their needs, with fewer bureaucratic barriers and more flexibility than its more established counterparts.	亚洲基础设施投资银行不仅可以向发展中国家输送更多的资源；


The AIIB would complement China’s rapidly increasing bilateral development financing, with the added benefit of a multilateral structure that ensures better governance and higher operating standards.	而且可以以一种更加契合受资助国需要的方式行事，相比其他建立已久的国际组织来说官僚主义条条框框更少，也更为灵活。


What the AIIB may not be able to do is contribute to improved economic governance in Asia – not least because Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea, whose total GDP is roughly equal to China’s, are not yet members.	而亚洲基础设施投资银行或许无法做到的则是帮助提升亚洲的经济治理水平——尤其是因为日本，澳大利亚，印尼和韩国这几个GDP总量加起来几乎与中国相等的国家尚未成为银行成员。


Without these economies to counterweigh China’s influence or a resident board of directors, the AIIB could allow China to impose its will on members and beneficiaries alike.	如果没有这些国家去制衡中国的影响力，或者缺少一个常驻董事会的话，该银行同样也会沦为中国向成员国及受益国强加其意志的工具。


For example, as former Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor has suggested, China may use the AIIB to help finance a new Silk Road, an overland and maritime route connecting East Asia with Europe.	例如，正如前印度外交部长沙希·塔鲁尔（Shashi Tharoor）所指出的那样，中国或许会利用亚洲基础设施投资银行来协助投资建立一条新的丝绸之路，构建一条连接东亚和欧洲的跨大陆及海运交通线。


While the project could have significant regional benefits, stimulating economic development by promoting integration and connectivity, it would serve primarily China’s interests, expanding the country’s international influence and reducing the gap between its eastern and western regions.	虽然该项目可以为所处区域带来极大的好处，通过推动一体化整合及巩固联系来刺激经济发展，但主要还是为中国的利益服务，协助扩张该国的国际影响力，并减少该国国内东西部地区之间的经济差距。


At the same time, it could exacerbate geopolitical tensions and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors.	与此同时，这也可能使中国及其邻国之间的地缘政治紧张局势和领土争端进一步恶化。


More generally, some development experts have raised concerns about whether the AIIB can operate according to international standards of governance and transparency, enforce safeguards, refuse to work with incompetent or corrupt governments, and follow effective procedures.	更宏观的来看，一些发展专家已经对亚洲基础设施投资银行是否能遵照治理及透明度的国际标准，执行银行金融风险防范措施，拒绝与无能腐败政府合作，以及遵循有效程序进行运作而感到担心。


They also worry that, by fragmenting international development finance, the AIIB could weaken its impact considerably.	他们同时也担心，由于令国际开发融资变得碎片化，亚洲基础设施投资银行可能会极大削弱自身的影响力。


To be sure, China has made an effort to address such concerns, emphasizing repeatedly that the AIIB aims to complement, not compete with, other institutions.	无可否认，中国也在着手应对这些担忧，反复强调新银行的目的是对其他机构进行补充，而非与之竞争。


Following the AIIB’s launch, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that it “needs to follow multilateral rules and procedures” and should learn from “existing multilateral development institutions in their good practices and useful experience.”	在该银行建立之后，中国国家主席习近平宣称该行“应当遵循多边规则和程序”并学习“现有多边开发机构的优秀运作和有益经验”。 。


But China must support such statements with an active commitment to fair and efficient governance.	但如果要落实这些声明的话，中国必须积极承诺采取公平和有效的治理。


Specifically, it should consider lowering its own voting share, instituting a rotating presidency, and broadening membership to include advanced Asian economies.	尤其是应该考虑降低自身的投票份额，构建一个轮值主席机制，并将各亚洲发达经济��纳入到成员国的范围之内。


The AIIB is a welcome initiative.	亚洲基础设施投资银行是一个令人鼓舞的动议。


But, given deep mistrust and a multitude of conflicts involving China, its regional neighbors, and the United States over security, environmental, and human-rights issues, its success is far from guaranteed.	但考虑到中国，其邻国，以及美国在安全，环境和人权事务方面存在的深刻不信任和大量冲突，讨论该动议的成功还为时过早。


It is up to China to make the necessary compromises to enable the AIIB to reach its potential.	而中国必须作出必要的让步来令该银行发挥其最大潜力。


China’s approach to influencing global governance is only beginning to emerge.	中国影响全球治理的手法还是小荷才露尖尖角。


One hopes that it starts off on the right foot.	唯一希望的，就是它能采取正确的步伐。


China’s New Global Leadership	中国的新全球领导力


NEW YORK – The biggest economic news of the year came almost without notice: China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest economy, according to the scorekeepers at the International Monetary Fund.	纽约—今年最大的经济新闻几乎没有引起什么主意：根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的排名，中国取代美国成为世界最大经济体。


And, while China’s geopolitical status is rising rapidly, alongside its economic might, the US continues to squander its global leadership, owing to the unchecked greed of its political and economic elites and the self-made trap of perpetual war in the Middle East.	而尽管中国的地缘政治地位也在随着经济实力而迅速提升，但美国仍在挥霍其全球领导力——拜其政治和经济精英肆无忌惮的贪婪和其作茧自缚的中东持久战所赐。


According to the IMF, China’s GDP will be $17.6 trillion in 2014, outstripping US output of $17.4 trillion.	根据IMF的数据，中国GDP将在2014年达到17. 6万亿美元，超过美国17.


Of course, because China’s population is more than four times larger, its per capita GDP, at $12,900, is still less than a quarter of the $54,700 recorded in the US, which highlights America’s much higher living standards.	4万亿美元的产出。 当然，由于中国人口比美国多四倍多，其12,900美元的人均GDP仍不足美国的54,700美元，这表明美国的生活水平比中国高得多。


China’s rise is momentous, but it also signifies a return.	中国的崛起是个大事件，但也意味着回报。


After all, China has been the world’s most populous country since it became a unified state more than 2,000 years ago, so it makes sense that it would also be the world’s largest economy.	毕竟，自从中国在2,000多年前成为统一国家以来，一直是世界上人口最多的国家，因此其成为世界最大经济体理所应当。


And, indeed, the evidence suggests that China was larger (in terms of purchasing power parity) than any other economy in the world until around 1889, when the US eclipsed it.	事实上，证据表明，直到1889年前后被美国超过前，中国比世界其他任何经济体规模都要大（以购买力平价衡量）。


Now, 125 years later, the rankings have reversed again, following decades of rapid economic development in China.	如今，125年过去了，在中国经历了几十年的高速经济发展后，名次再次发生逆转。


With rising economic power has come growing geopolitical clout.	经济实力的提高带来了地缘政治力量的增加。


Chinese leaders are feted around the world.	中国领导人受到了全世界的热捧。


Many European countries are looking to China as the key to stronger domestic growth.	许多欧洲国家将中国视为增强国内增长的关键。


African leaders view China as their countries’ new indispensable growth partner, particularly in infrastructure and business development.	非洲领导人将中国视为新的不可或缺的增长伙伴，特别是在基础设施和商业开发方面。


Similarly, economic strategists and business leaders in Latin America now look to China at least as much as they look to the US.	类似地，拉丁美洲的经济战略家和商业领袖现在也认为中国至少与美国一样值得重视。


China and Japan seem to be taking steps toward better relations, after a period of high tensions.	在经历了一段时间的剑拔弩张后，中国和日本似乎在采取措施改善关系。


Even Russia has recently “tilted” toward China, establishing stronger connections on many fronts, including energy and transport.	甚至俄罗斯最近也“倾身”倒向中国，在包括能源和交通在内的许多领域构建更紧密的中俄联系。


Like the US after World War II, China is putting real money on the table – a lot of it – to build strong economic and infrastructure links with countries around the world.	就像二战后的美国，中国拿出真金白银——而且是大量真金白银——用于构建与全世界的强大经济和基础设施联系。


This will enable other countries to boost their own growth, while cementing China’s global economic and geopolitical leadership.	这有利于其他国家提振本国增长，同时也有利于巩固中国的全球经济和地缘政治领导力。


The number of Chinese initiatives is staggering.	中国四面出击，计划数量之多令人咋舌。


In just the past year, China has launched four major projects that promise to give it a greatly expanded role in global trade and finance.	仅仅是在去年，中国就启动了四项大工程，这些工程可以极大地扩大其在全球贸易和金融中的作用。


China joined Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa in establishing the New Development Bank, to be based in Shanghai.	中国联合俄罗斯、巴西和南非成立了新开发银行（New Development Bank），并将总部设在了上海。


A new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to be based in Beijing, will help to fund infrastructure projects (roads, power, and rail, among others) throughout the region.	新的位于北京的亚洲基础设施投资银行（Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank）将帮助亚洲地区的基础设施（公路、电力、铁路等）提供融资。


The New Silk Road land belt seeks to connect China with the economies of East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Europe through an expanded grid of rail, highways, power, fiber, and other networks.	新丝绸之路寻求通过扩大的铁路、高速公路、电力、光纤和其他网络连接中国与东亚、南��、中亚和欧洲的经济体。


And the new 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is aimed at boosting ocean-based trade in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.	新的21世纪海上丝绸之路则旨在提振东亚和印度洋的海上贸易。


All told, these various initiatives are likely to leverage hundreds of billions of dollars in investment over the coming decade, speeding growth in the counterpart countries while deepening their production, trade, and financial linkages with China.	总之，这些各种各样的计划有望在未来十年撬动数千亿美元的额投资，加速相关国家的增长，深化它们与中国的生产、贸易和金融联系。


There is no guarantee that all of this will succeed or proceed smoothly.	这些计划未必都能成功或平稳推进。


China faces huge internal challenges, including high and rising income inequality, massive air and water pollution, the need to move to a low-carbon economy, and the same risks of financial-market instabilities that bedevil the US and Europe.	中国面临巨大的内部挑战，如高企并仍在不断加剧的不平等性、严重的空气和水污染、向低碳经济转型的必要性以及令美国和欧洲也深受困扰金融市场动荡风险。


And if China becomes too aggressive toward its neighbors – for example, by demanding rights to offshore oil or territory in disputed waters – it will generate a serious diplomatic backlash.	而如果中国在其邻国面前表现得过于咄咄逼人——比如要求争议水域的离岸石油和领土权利——将会引起严重的外交反弹。


No one should assume smooth sailing for China (or for any other part of the world, for that matter) in the years ahead.	中国在未来几年的行程（任何世界其他国家也是如此）绝非坦途。


Still, it is striking that just as China is rising economically and geopolitically, the US seems to be doing everything possible to waste its own economic, technological, and geopolitical advantages.	但是，在中国经济和地缘政治崛起的同时，美国似乎在竭尽全力浪费其所拥有的经济、科技和地缘政治优势，这着实令人惊讶。


The US political system has been captured by the greed of its wealthy elites, whose narrow goals are to cut corporate and personal tax rates, maximize their vast personal fortunes, and curtail constructive US leadership in global economic development.	美国政治制度饱受其富豪精英的贪欲的掣肘，他们的狭隘目标是削减公司和个人税率、让个人拥有的巨额财富最大化、制约全球经济发展中的建设性美国领导力。


They so scorn US foreign assistance that they have thrown open the doors to China’s new global leadership in development financing.	他们对美国的对外援助嗤之以鼻，洞开大门让中国获得发展融资的全球领导力。


Even worse, as China flexes its geopolitical muscles, the only foreign policy that the US systematically pursues is unceasing and fruitless war in the Middle East.	更糟糕的是，在中国大秀地缘政治肌肉的同时，美国唯一系统性追求的外交政策竟然是毫无结果的中东持久战。


The US endlessly drains its resources and energy in Syria and Iraq in the same way that it once did in Vietnam.	美国没完没了地在叙利亚和伊拉克浪费其资源和能源，一如曾经在越南所做的那样。


China, meanwhile, has avoided becoming enmeshed in overseas military debacles, emphasizing win-win economic initiatives instead.	与此同时，中国避免卷入海外军事乱局，而是强调双赢经济计划。


China’s economic rise can contribute to global wellbeing if its leaders emphasize investment in infrastructure, clean energy, public health, and other international priorities.	如果中国领导人强调基础设施、清洁能源、公共卫生和其他国际当务之急的投资，那么中国的经济崛起就有利于全球福祉。


Still, the world would be better off if the US also continued to lead constructively, alongside China.	但是，如果美国能够与中国合作，继续致力于建设性领导，世界将会变得更好。


The recent announcement by Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping of bilateral agreements on climate change and clean energy show the best of what’s possible.	美国总统奥巴马和中国国家主席习近平最近宣布达成关于气候变化和清洁能源的双边协议，这是最好的结果。


America’s perpetual war-making in the Middle East shows the worst.	美国在中东的持久战则是最坏的结果。


China Going Forward	中国向前进


BEIJING – China’s per capita income, at $3,800, has now surpassed the threshold for a middle-income country.	北京——中国的人均收入达到3，800美元，已经超过了中等收入国家的收入标准。


But, even as economists and strategists busily extrapolate China’s future growth path to predict when it will catch up to the United States, the mood inside China became somber and subdued in 2010.	可就在战略和经济学家忙于推测中国的发展道路，预测中国何时能赶超美国的时候，中国的国内情绪在2010年却显得既严肃又克制。


Indeed, Premier Wen Jiabao sees China’s growth as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable.”	事实上，温家宝总理认为中国的发展“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、并且最终不可持续。 ”


Economic growth, of course, has never been linear in any country.	当然，任何国家的经济增长都绝非一帆风顺。


Throughout history, there are countless examples of middle-income countries becoming stuck in that category for decades and/or eventually falling back to low-income status.	纵观历史，中等收入国家进入这一发展阶段后数十年停滞不前，和/或最终退回到低收入国家的例子不胜枚举。


The Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence has pointed out that after WWII, only a handful of countries were able to grow to a fully-industrialized level of development.	诺贝尔奖得主迈克尔·斯宾塞指出在第二次世界大战后，只有少数几个国家最终达到了完全工业化的发展水平。


China’s progress over the past three decades is a successful variation on the East Asian growth model that stems from the initial conditions bequeathed by a planned socialist economy.	令中国在过去30年取得巨大成功的发展模式是以社会主义计划经济为初始条件的一种东亚发展模式的变体。


That growth model has now almost exhausted its potential.	但这种发展模式现在已经耗光了大部分潜力。


So China has reached a crucial juncture: without painful structural adjustment, its economic-growth momentum can suddenly be lost.	因此中国已经到了紧要关头： 如果不进行痛苦的结构调整，中国的经济增长势头就有可能嘎然而止。


China’s rapid growth has been achieved at extremely high cost.	中国为实现高速增长付出了昂贵的代价。


Only future generations will know the true price.	这种代价可能只有后代子孙才能够真正计算的清楚。


The country’s investment rate now stands at more than 50% – a clear reflection of China’s low capital efficiency.	中国的投资增速现在保持百分之五十以上——这明确体现出中国资本使用效率的低下。


There are two worrying aspects of this high rate.	中国的投资热中有两方面特别令人忧虑。


First, local governments influence a large proportion of investment decisions.	首先，地方政府影响很大一部分投资决策。


Second, investment in real-estate development accounts for nearly one-quarter of the total.	其次，房地产开发投资占总投资额的将近四分之一。


Some local governments are literally digging holes and then filling them in order to create GDP.	有些地方政府简直是用先挖坑再填上的方法来制造GDP。


As a result, there are simply too many luxurious condominiums, magnificent government office buildings, and soaring skyscrapers.	中国已经有太多的豪华公寓、宏伟的政府办公楼和高耸的摩天大厦。


Hotels in China’s provincial cities can make five-star hotels in Western capitals looked shabby.	中国省级市修建的酒店可以让西方位于首都的五星级酒店相形见绌。


China has become one of the most polluted countries in the world.	中国已经成为全世界污染最严重的国家之一。


Dust and smog choke its cities.	粉尘和烟雾笼罩着一座座大城市。


All of the country’s major rivers are contaminated.	国内所有的主要河流均已遭到污染。


Deforestation and desertification are rampant.	尽管取得了一些进步，森林砍伐和荒漠化依然非常严重。


Drought, floods, and landslides have become commonplace.	干旱、水灾和山体滑坡已经非常普遍。


Relentless extraction is quickly depleting China’s resource deposits.	毫无节制的开采正在迅速耗光中国的资源储备。


With China’s trade-to-GDP ratio and exports-to-GDP ratio already exceeding 60% and 30%, respectively, the economy cannot continue to depend on external demand to sustain growth.	在中国贸易和出口占GDP比重已经超过60%和30%的情况下，已经无法继续依靠外部需求来实现经济发展的目的。


Unfortunately, with a large export sector that employs scores of millions of workers, this dependence has become structural, which implies that to reduce China’s trade dependency and trade surplus is much more than a matter of adjusting macroeconomic policy.	不幸的是，由于出口部门为数千万工人提供了就业岗位，导致这种依赖已经转变为一种结构性问题，而这意味着，降低中国的贸易依存度和贸易顺差已经不单单是调整宏观经济政策所能解决的问题。


After decades of rapid expansion, China has become the workshop of the global economy.	经历了数十年的快速扩张后，中国已经奠定了世界经济工厂的地位。


The problem is that it is no more than a workshop: lack of innovation and creation form the economy’s Achilles’ heel.	问题在于它不过就是工厂而已： 中国经济的致命弱点是缺乏创新和创造力。


For example, in volume terms, China now is the largest car producer in the world, churning out 17 million this year.	比如单从数量上看，中国现在是全世界最大的汽车制造国，今年一年的汽车产量就达到1700万台之多。


But the share of models developed by Chinese carmakers is negligible.	但由中国制造企业自主研发的车型却屈指可数。


In an era of rapid technological progress, creativity, and innovation, the global economic landscape can change rapidly.	在这样一个以快速技术进步、创新和创造力为核心的年代，全球经济风景线瞬息万变。


Without a strong capacity for innovation and creativity, even a giant has feet of clay.	没有强大的创新和创造能力，即使是巨人也有致命的软肋。


And when a giant falls, many are hurt.	当巨人倒下时，很多人都不能幸免。


Indeed, while China’s living standards have risen dramatically over the past 30 years, the gap between rich and poor has widened sharply.	事实上，尽管中国的生活水准在过去30年内已经有了很大提高，但贫富差距也已经急剧扩大。


Income distribution has skewed in favor of the rich for too long, and the government has failed to provide decent public goods.	收入分配向富人倾斜的时间已经过长，政府也未能为公众提供足够的公共产品。


With the contrast between the opulent lifestyle of the rich and the slow improvement of living conditions for the poor fomenting social tension, a serious backlash is in the making.	富人奢华的生活方式和穷人生活水平缓慢改善之间的强烈反差激起了社会的紧张情绪，对这种现象的强烈反弹随时可能发生。


If China fails to tackle its structural problems in a timely fashion, growth is unlikely to be sustainable.	如果中国未能及时解决这些结构性问题，经济发展很可能无法持续。


Any structural adjustment is painful.	任何结构性的调整都十分痛苦。


But the longer the delay, the more painful it will be.	但延误越久，调整的痛苦就越剧烈。


China’s strong fiscal position today gives it a window of opportunity.	中国今天强大的财政实力赋予了它成功调整的机会。


But that window will close fast, because beneficiaries of specific reform policies have morphed into vested interests, which are fighting hard to protect what they have.	但这样的机会稍纵即逝，因为特定改革政策的特定受益者已经形成既得利益阶层，他们会不惜一切代价保护已经得到的利益。


What the Chinese public resents most is the collusion between government officials and businesspeople, described by the respected Chinese economist Wu Jianglian as “capitalism of the powerful and rich.”	中国公众最为痛恨的是官商勾结，倍受尊敬的中国经济学家吴敬琏将其称之为“权贵资本主义。


Breaking this unholy alliance will be the big test for China’s leadership in 2011and beyond.	” 打破这一邪恶联盟是中国领导人在2011年和今后所面临的最大考验。


Under China’s current institutional arrangements, meritocracy is a prerequisite for good governance.	在中国目前的制度条件下，精英管理是廉政善政的先决条件。


But meritocracy has been eroded by a political culture of sycophancy and cynicism.	但阿谀奉承和玩世不恭的政治文化已经对精英管理造成了严重的侵蚀。


So once again, the dialectics of economic development has brought political reform back to the fore.	因此，经济发展的辩证法已经再次凸显了政治改革的重要性。


Abroad, China’s rise has caused admiration, envy, suspicion, and even outright hostility in some corners.	在国外，中国的崛起已经激起了钦佩、嫉妒、怀疑，甚至在某些角落已经引发了公开的敌意。


No matter how often Chinese leaders repudiate any hegemonic ambition, wariness about China’s true intentions will remain.	无论中国领导人如��频繁地否认霸权野心，仍然无法消除某些人对中国真实意图的怀疑。


That is understandable: the rise of new powers has always disrupted the established international order.	这种情况也可以理解： 历史上新的大国崛起一定会冲击既有国际秩序。


When this new power is a nation of 1.3 billion people living under an alien political system and ideology, its rise is bound to cause even more uneasiness.	如果这个新兴大国拥有13亿人口和陌生的政治制度和意识形态，那么它的崛起自然会引发更多的忧虑。


Fortunately, because of globalization, China’s rise is in everyone’s interest, as is the rise of other emerging economies.	幸运的是，由于全球化趋势的存在，中国的崛起像其他新兴经济体的崛起一样，符合所有人的利益。


In the coming years, in areas such as climate change, global imbalances, and reform of the international monetary system, China should and will play a more active role as a major global stakeholder.	在今后若干年内，在气候变化、全球失衡和国际货币体系改革等领域，作为重要全球利益攸关方，中国应该而且会发挥更积极的作用。


Needless to say, reciprocity will be necessary.	但有一点应该不言自明：互惠互利是必须遵守的原则。


China’s Intervention Lessons	中国的干预教训


BEIJING – China’s stock market has been a hot topic since the summer, when a rapid rise gave way to a major plunge, triggering a global equities sell-off.	北京—今年夏天以来，中国股市成为一个热门话题。 急速上涨变成大崩盘，引发了全球股市大甩卖。


The question now is what can be done to prevent further volatility.	现在的问题是如何防止进一步波动。


To answer that question requires understanding how China got to this point.	要回答这个问题，需要理解中国如何走到今天这一步。


For years, with the authorities’ encouragement (or at least acquiescence), China’s securities companies spared no effort in pumping up China’s stock exchanges with fashionable financial instruments and practices, the sole aim being to realize capital gains from rising prices (dividends are rarely distributed).	多年来，在当局的鼓励（或至少是默许）下，中国证券公司卯足了劲用各种新奇金融工具和做法推高指数，其唯一的目的是在股价上涨中收获资本利得（中国很少派发股息）。


As a result, after years of poor performance, the Shanghai Composite Index soared by more than 100% in less than seven months, from 2,505 points in November 2014 to over 5,178 last June – a level that was not merited by China’s economic fundamentals.	结果，在多年的熊市后，上证指数在不到七个月的时间里飙升100%度，从2014年11月的2,505点涨到今年6月的5,178点——这一水平是中国经济基本面无法支撑的。


The most important instrument driving this surge was margin trading, which enabled investors to borrow heavily to purchase shares.	助力这波涨势的最重要的工具是保证金交易。 保证金交易让投资者大量借钱购买股票。


According to Bank of America strategist David Cui, some CN¥7.5 trillion ($1.2 trillion) in market positions are being carried on margin, “equivalent to some 13% of A-share’s market cap and 34% of its free float.”	据美国银行策略师崔伟的估计，7. 5万亿元人民币的股票头寸来自保证金，“相当于A股市值的13%和流通市值的34%。


Part of the problem was that margin trading was not limited to institutional investors.	问题的一部分在于保证金交易并不只限于机构投资者。


Lightly regulated “fund matching” companies, for example, would distribute margin loans to virtually anyone, resulting in about CN¥2.3 trillion in online private fund matching and CN¥1 trillion in offline private fund matching, with a leverage ratio of up to 5:1 for the latter.	比如，监管薄弱的“配资”公司可以让几乎所有人都获得保证金贷款，这带来了2. 3万亿元人民的在线私募配资和1万亿人民币的线下私募配资，后者的杠杆率高达5:1。


In mid-June, the prolonged surge in stock prices finally drove an unnerved China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to impose restrictions on offline private fund matching.	6月中旬，股价不断飙升终于让紧张的中国证监会下令限制线下私募配资。


The decision immediately triggered a sell-off, with the Shanghai Composite Index falling 2% in just one day.	这一决定立刻引起大甩卖，上证指数一天下跌2%。


Initially, this looked like a natural correction.	一开始，这看上去只是自然修正。


But the prevalence of margin trading caused the decline to turn quickly into a rout.	但保证金交易的普遍性导致下跌迅速演变为崩盘。


First, as plummeting stock prices caused the equity in investors’ accounts to fall below the maintenance margin, brokers began issuing margin calls, forcing investors to offload more assets to come up with the needed cash.	首先，暴跌的股价导致投资者账户中的股票下降到维持保证金水平以下，于是经纪商开始催缴保证金，迫使投资者甩卖更多资产以获得所需要的现金。


When they failed to pay margin calls on time, their shares were sold by brokers, pushing stock prices down further.	如果他们无法及时追加保证金，他们的股票就会被经纪商卖出，进一步打压股价。


The authorities scrambled to stanch the bleeding.	当局急忙试图止血。


On June 27, the People’s Bank of China lowered the reserve requirement ratio and the benchmark interest rate.	6月27日，中国人民银行下调存款准备金率和基准利率。


But the Shanghai Composite Index kept falling, reaching 4,200 on July 1.	但上证综指继续下跌，7月1日已跌至4. 200点。


At that point, the CSRC launched a succession of desperate measures: it suspended initial public offerings, allowed companies to stop trading, and limited short selling.	此时，中国证监会出台了一系列紧急措施：停止首次公开发行（IPO）、允许上市公司停牌、限制卖空。


It even organized a “national team” of 21 large securities companies, led by a government-controlled financial corporation, to purchase shares to buttress the Shanghai Composite Index.	它甚至组织了一支由21家大券商组成的“国家队”，在政府控制的证金公司的领导下买入股票支持上证综指。


In doing so, China’s regulatory authority changed many well-established rules of the game virtually overnight.	为此，中国监管当局几乎在一夜之间打破了许多早已完善的规则。


And, while massive official intervention may have halted the rout, it could have permanently damaged regulators’ credibility.	此外，尽管大规模官方干预或许阻止了崩盘，但也过早透支了监管者的信誉。 而这完全是没有必要的；


And it was not even merited; the banks were not overly exposed, so there were no systemic risks.	银行并未过度暴露在风险中，也不存在任何系统性风险。


But the policy failures fueling this stock-market fiasco go back further, to the massive government-fueled surge in credit since the global financial crisis.	但导致股市溃败的这一政策失灵的后果并不仅限于此，而是导致了全球金融危机以来政府助推的信用飙升。


Without that, brokerages would not have had all of that liquidity to lend for margin trading.	若非如此，经纪商拿不出足够的流动性为保证金交易提供全部贷款。


After the crisis struck, instead of recognizing the decline in potential growth and adjusting accordingly, the government remained implicitly wedded to an unrealistic target of 10% annual GDP growth.	危机爆发后，政府没有认识到潜在增长的下降并据此调整，而是继续间接坚持不现实的10%的年GDP增长目标。


But, while the CN¥4 trillion stimulus package propped up growth temporarily, return on investment was deteriorating, because potential growth was already lower than actual growth.	但是，尽管4万亿元刺激计划暂时提振了增长，投资回报却出现了恶化，因为潜在增长已经低于实际增长。


As a result, credit demand was relatively weak; in many cases, commercial banks had to persuade enterprises to accept loans, with a large proportion of the credit ultimately devoted to chasing assets in the capital market.	因此，信用需求相对疲软； 在许多情况下，商业银行必须说服企业接受贷款，很大一部分信用最终被用于在资本市场中竞逐资产。


At first, the excess liquidity fueled real-estate bubbles.	一开始，过剩流动性助长了房地产泡沫。


After the government clamped down on lending for residential and commercial projects, risky shadow banking activity surged.	政府打压住宅和商用项目贷款后，高风险影子银行活动激增。


After the government clamped down on that too, the liquidity was channeled toward stock exchanges; once those crashed, it sloshed into the bond market.	政府打压影子银行后，流动性来到了股市； 股市崩盘后，流动性又融入了债市。


But the bond market is not large enough to absorb it all, so some has now returned to the stock exchanges, leading to a partial recovery in share prices, with the Shanghai index reaching 3,500.	但债券市场不够大，吸收不了那么多流动性，因此其中一些流动性又回到了股市，股价出现了局部反弹，上证综指达到了3,500点。


Declining economic growth strengthens the temptation to loosen monetary policy.	经济增长势头的减弱增加了放松货币政策的诱惑。


But in today’s deflationary environment, typical monetary expansion alone can do little to help the real economy, because the money either remains idle or fuels asset bubbles and capital outflows.	但在当今通缩环境中，光靠典型的货币扩张是无法帮助实体经济的，因为钱要么闲置，要么助长资产泡沫和资本外流。


If China’s government is to prevent a debt-deflation spiral from causing a hard landing, it should shift its focus to targeted expansionary fiscal policy.	如果中国政府要阻止债务-通缩循环演变为硬着陆，它应该将重点转到定向财政政策宽松。


With a budget deficit of 2.3% of GDP, China can certainly afford to increase government expenditure and reduce taxes.	中国政府预算赤字只占GDP的2. 3%，必然能够负担政府支出的增加和减税。


Critically, the package should be financed by government bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance, not by commercial banks via local-government financing vehicles.	关键是，政策应该由财政部发行的政府债券融资，而不应该由商业银行通过地方政府融资平台融资。


Any loosening of monetary policy should be aimed directly at accommodating fiscal policy.	任何放松货币政策的措施都应该直接着眼于配合财政政策。


That way, financial resources would be channeled into the real economy, rather than inflating asset bubbles.	这样，金融资源将被引导到实体经济中而不是吹起资产泡沫。


To support this effort, China’s government should loosen its grip on the exchange rate, while maintaining appropriate capital controls.	要支持这一政策，中国政府应该放松汇率管制，同时保持适当的资本管制。


Renminbi internationalization should not be a policy priority.	人民币国际化不应该作为政策重点。


China’s experience in recent years holds valuable lessons for the country’s leaders.	近几年来中国的经验为中国领导人带来了极有价值的教训。


With a more balanced approach to intervention that reflects those lessons, they could put China’s economy on a much more stable path.	如果实行反映这些教训的更加平衡的干预防针，中国领导人能够让中国经济走上更加稳定的道路。


That said, as China undergoes structural economic transition, the stabilization potential of macroeconomic policy is limited.	但是，中国正在经历结构性经济转型，宏观经济政策的稳定潜力有限。


Without more fundamental reforms, even an impeccable macroeconomic policy mix would not work.	如果不进行更多的基本面改革，即使是完美无瑕的宏观经政策组合也无法奏效。


Reforms take time, which means that China may need to brace itself for more troubles and a protracted period of slow growth.	改革需要时间，这意味着中国需要勇敢面对更多的麻烦和漫长的低速增长期。


China’s Green-Energy Revolution	中国的绿色能源革命


SYDNEY – China generates most of its electricity by burning fossil fuels, just as every rising economic power has done since the Industrial Revolution.	悉尼——如同工业革命以来所有崛起经济体一样，中国的发电系统大多依赖燃烧化石燃料。


But to focus on this single fact risks overlooking a notable trend.	但只看到这一点就可能忽视一种值得关注的趋势。


The Chinese system of power generation is turning green – far more quickly than any other system of comparable size on the planet.	中国的发电系统正在朝绿色化方向发展——并且速度远非地球上规模相当的其他系统能够比拟。


This trend is visible in three areas.	上述趋势体现在三个方面。


The first is electricity generation.	其中首先是发电领域。


According to data released by the China Electricity Council, the amount of power that China generated from fossil fuels in 2014 decreased by 0.7% year on year, the first drop in recent memory.	中国电力企业联合会发布的数据显示，中国的化石燃料发电量2014年有史以来首次同比下降了0. 7%。


Meanwhile, power generation from non-fossil-fuel sources increased by 19%.	此外，非化石燃料发电量则同比增长19%。


Remarkably, nuclear energy played only a small role in this change.	值得注意的是，上述变化绝大部分并非来自核能。


Electricity generated by strictly green sources – water, wind, and solar – increased by 20%, with the most dramatic growth occurring in solar power generation, which rose a staggering 175%.	水能、风能和太阳能等严格意义上的绿色能源发电增长了20%，其中以太阳能发电的增幅最大，实现了175% 的惊人涨幅。


Solar power also surpassed nuclear in terms of new energy produced, providing an extra 17.43 terawatt-hours last year, compared to 14.70 terawatt-hours from nuclear sources.	太阳能发电在新能源产出方面同样超过核电，去年太阳能发电量增长17. 43太瓦时，而核能发电量仅增长14.


And, for the third consecutive year, China generated more electricity from wind than from nuclear energy.	7太瓦时。 而且中国风力发电的贡献量连续第三年超过核能。


Given this, the argument that China will be dependent on nuclear power plants for non-carbon sources of electricity appears to have little merit.	有鉴于此，中国非碳发电将依赖核电的说法似乎并不准确。


The second area in which the green trend has become apparent is China’s total electricity-generating capacity.	绿色趋势越来越明显的还有中国的总发电量领域。


The country’s power system is now the world’s largest, capable of producing 1.36 terawatts, compared to the United States’ one terawatt.	中国的电力系统目前居世界之首，其发电能力为1. 36太瓦，超过美国1太瓦的总发电能力。


Direct comparisons of different power sources are difficult, because the use of wind, solar, nuclear, and fossil-fuel plants varies according to the time of day.	直接比较不同种类的能源发电难度很大，因为一天内的不同时间风能、太阳能、核能和化石燃料的使用并不一致。


But a look at annual data can offer insights into how the entire system is changing.	但审视年度数据就可以了解发电系统的变化趋势。


Last year was the second in a row in which China added more generating capacity from non-fossil-fuel sources than from fossil-fuel sources.	去年中国连续第二年非化石燃料新增发电量超过化石燃料。


China increased its ability to generate electricity from fossil fuels by 45 gigawatts, to reach a total of 916 gigawatts.	中国化石燃料新增发电能力45千兆瓦，总计拥有916千兆瓦的化石燃料发电能力。


At the same time, it increased its capacity to produce electricity from non-fossil-fuel sources by 56 gigawatts, achieving a total of 444 gigawatts.	与此同时，��国非化石燃料新增发电能力56千兆瓦，总计实现444千兆瓦的非化石燃料发电能力。


Wind, water, and solar plants added 51 gigawatts of generating capacity.	风能、水能和太阳能电厂新增51千兆瓦的发电能力。


As a result, wind, water, and solar power accounts for 31% of China’s total electricity-generation capacity, up from 21% in 2007, while nuclear power accounts for another 2%.	这样一来，风能、水能和太阳能发电量从2007年占中国总发电量的 21%增长至31%，此外核能发电还额外占据总发电量的2%。


These results exceed the goal established by China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, which projected that power generating capacity based on non-fossil-fuel sources would account for approximately 30% of the country’s electricity system by 2015.	目前的成绩超出了中国十二五规划的既定目标，该计划预计中国非化石燃料发电能力到2015年将占到国内电力系统的30%。


Finally, the trend toward green energy can be seen in China’s investment patterns.	最后，中国的投资模式可以明确反映出绿色能源趋势。


The evidence is plain: The country is putting more money toward green sources of electric power than toward those reliant on fossil fuels.	证据非常简单：相比化石能源发电中国正将更多资金投入到绿色发电领域。


Indeed, China is spending more on green energy than any other country.	事实上，中国在绿色能源投入领域已经领先世界。


Investment in facilities producing energy from fossil fuels has consistently declined, from CN¥167 billion (roughly $24 billion) in 2008 to CN¥95 billion in 2014 ($15.3 billion), while investment in non-fossil-fuel sources has increased, from CN¥118 billion in 2008 to at least CN¥252 billion in 2014.	化石燃料发电设备投资持续下降，从2008年的1，670亿人民币（约合240亿美元）下降至2014年的950亿人民币（约合153亿美元）。 而同期的非化石燃料发电设备投资则持续上升，从2008年的1，180亿人民币上升至2014年的至少2，520亿人民币。


The share of energy investment going into renewable electric generation has increased steadily, reaching 50% in 2011, up from 32% just four years before.	进入可再生能源发电领域的投资比重稳步上升，2011年已从短短四年前占投资总额的32%上升至占投资总额的50%。


In 2013, renewables’ share of investment reached no less than 59%.	2013年，不低于总投资额的59%流入到可再生能源投资。


Much depends on the success of China’s energy reforms, and in particular on its efforts to build the world’s largest renewable power system – an ambition far larger than anything imagined, much less attempted, in the West.	中国的能源改革成功与否事关重大，尤其是该国打造世界最大可再生能源发电系统的努力——中国的雄心超出所有人的想象，西方做出的努力根本无法与之相比。


This makes it all the more important to report accurately on the system as it evolves, in order to comprehend the overall direction of change.	因此为了把握变化的总体方向，对中国发电系统的变化情况进行跟踪就显得愈加重要。


China’s power system remains heavily based on coal, and much more will be burned before the system can accurately be described as more green than black.	中国的电力系统依然在很大程度上依赖于煤炭，在真正完成从黑色到绿色的转变之前还要烧掉很多煤。


But the direction of change is clear.	但变化的方向十分明确。


This needs to be acknowledged – and factored into discussions of global energy and energy policy.	我们必须承认这种变化——并在全球能源和能源政策谈判中予以考虑。


China’s Dual-Track Challenge	中国的双轨挑战


HONG KONG – With China's economic slowdown more apparent than ever, its prospects of avoiding a hard landing are weakening.	香港—中国经济减速的迹象从未如此明显。


Whether policymakers succeed will depend on whether they can navigate the challenges stemming from an increasingly divided dual-track economy.	决策者是否能够成功避免硬着陆，取决于他们是否能够应对来自日益分化的双轨经济的挑战。


The latest year-on-year data, from January, highlight the danger.	1月份的最新同比数据彰显出危险程度。 消费物价指数下跌0.


The consumer price index dropped to 0.8%; the producer price index fell by 4.3%; exports contracted by 3.3%; imports were down by 19.9%; and growth of broad money (M2) slowed by 1.4%.	9%； 广义货币（M2）增速放缓1.


Moreover, the renminbi has come under downward pressure, owing partly to economic recovery in the United States, which has fueled capital outflows.	此外，人民币正在经受贬值的压力，部分是因为美国经济复苏加速了资本外流。 考虑到工业利润增长下降（从2013年的12.


Given huge declines in industrial profit growth (from 12.2% in 2013 to 3.3% last year) and in local-government revenues from land sales (which fell by 37% in 2014), there is considerable anxiety that today's deflationary cycle could trigger corporate and local-government debt crises.	2%下降到去年的3. 3%）和地方政府卖地收入下降（2014年下降37%），不禁令人担忧，目前的通缩周期可能引发企业和地方政府的债务危机。


China hopes to secure its long-term economic development by shifting from a state-directed to a market-led economy.	中国希望通过实现从国家主导的经济向市场导向的经济转变，以确保长期可持续的经济发展。


But the process has created significant discrepancies in economic performance, with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performing significantly worse than their private-sector counterparts, despite having better access to credit.	但该过程导致其双轨经济在效益方面的裂变，国有企业表现明显劣于民营企业，尽管前者比后者更容易获得信贷。


And there is a widening disparity between real-estate prices in China's thriving first- and second-tier cities and its lagging third- and fourth-tier cities (though higher household incomes in the former make housing there more affordable).	而中国繁荣的一、二线城市和落后的三、四线城市之间的房地产行情差别也越来越大。 一二线城市的地产行情不仅好过三四线城市，前者由于平均家庭收入更高而对房价的承受力更强。


The authorities' task now is to determine how to support continued growth on the better performing track (the private sector and the first- and second-tier cities), while eliminating overcapacity and boosting productivity on the weaker track (SOEs and third- and fourth-tier cities).	政府目前的任务是一方面如何针对表现较好的民营企业和一二线城市出台可以巩固及持续其增长的措施，另一方面如何针对表现较差的国有企业和三四线城市出台可以消除过剩产能和提高生产率的措施。


To succeed, they must address the fallout of the previous approach, which, by providing more money and preferential policies to the lagging track, ended up fueling overcapacity and unsustainable local debts.	要想成功，就必须纠正此前政策的缺陷——向落后者提供更多资金和优惠政策，否则将助长产能过剩和不可持续的地方债务。


In other words, China must confront the sunk costs of bad local-planning decisions.	换言之，中国必须面对由于过去地方计划及决策失误而已经发生的成本（经济学称其为沉淀成本，因为我们不能改变历史），不能继续指望靠官僚系统的干预来粉饰有缺陷及不可持续的项目。


Instead of continuing to hope that bureaucratic intervention can repair flawed projects, officials should take a market-based approach, allowing losses to be allocated through the bankruptcy process, thereby enabling all stakeholders to move on to more productive activities.	政府应该采取市场化的方法，让这些失败的项目的财务损失通过破产程序来处理，从而让所有相关的生产要素解放出来，并转向更具创造性的活动。


The Chinese economy's dual-track structure also presents unique challenges for macro-financial management.	中国经济的双轨结构也带来了宏观金融管理方面的独特挑战。


As the fast-growing sectors absorb an increasing amount of resources, a shift toward more market-oriented interest rates is needed to ensure efficient allocation.	高速增长部门吸收了越来越多的资源，因此需要利率市场化来确保资源可以有效配置。


Meanwhile, the slow-growing sectors risk falling into a “balance-sheet recession," with highly indebted SOEs and local governments becoming so focused on paying down their debts that they stop investing in needed infrastructure, even when interest rates fall.	与此同时，低速增长部门有可能陷入“资产负债表衰退”，比如，高负债的国有企业和地方政府将主要精力用在偿还债务上，而无法继续投资于必要的基础设施，甚至在利率下降时也是如此。


As a result, conventional monetary and macro-prudential policies are caught between competing demands for credit, with one track needing to support productive growth and the other attempting to buy time for restructuring.	结果，传统的货币政策和审慎的宏观政策都难以满足目前双轨经济对信贷的大量竞争性需求。 一轨需要更多贷款来支持其创新及生产率增长，而另一轨则需要更多贷款用于兼并、重组、破产、维稳及为改革赢得时间。


The People's Bank of China (PBOC) has attempted to confront this dilemma by differentiating reserve requirements according to sector or type of financial institution.	中国央行试图通过根据部门或金融机构的类型，采取不同的准备金要求以应对这一困境。


The results have not been encouraging.	但结果并不乐观。


For example, when the PBOC cut its benchmark interest rate last November, in order to help reduce private-sector borrowing costs, it triggered a speculative stock-market boom.	比如，去年11月，当央行降低基准利率以减轻民营部门借贷成本时，却引起了投机性的股市暴涨。


Following January's disappointing macroeconomic data, the PBOC acted again, by lowering the reserve ratio for banks by 50 basis points, with additional cuts for banks focused on small and medium-size enterprises (50 basis points) and for the Agricultural Development Bank of China (400 basis points).	继1月份令人失望的宏观经济数据，央行再次采取行动，将准备金率降低50个基点，并进一步降低了专注于中小企业贷款的银行和中国农业发展银行的准备金率（分别降低了50个基点和400个基点）。


Despite these efforts, neither track seems satisfied that their credit demands are being met.	尽管采取了这些措施，但两条轨道的经济主体似乎还面临信贷不足的状况。


Efforts to address these structural challenges are being frustrated not just by institutional barriers, but also by entrenched official corruption.	应对这些结构性挑战的措施之所以不容易推进，不仅因为有制度壁垒，也因为根深蒂固的官员腐败。


The problem is that anti-corruption measures, despite enjoying broad public support, undermine bureaucratic effectiveness in the short term – a significant issue in a critical reform year, especially given slowing growth.	反腐措施赢得了广泛的民众支持，但也在短期影响了官僚体系的效率——在关键的改革之年解决这一问题尤其紧迫，特别是考虑到目前经济增长显著放缓的情况。


Institutional reforms aimed at combating corruption, reducing overcapacity, and dealing with unsustainable local debts will generate long-term dividends and sustainable payoffs.	结构改革旨在打击腐败、削减过剩产能、处理不可持续的地方债务，以此产生长期的改革红利与可���续的回报。


But short-term stimulus measures, such as tax cuts and higher fiscal deficits, will be needed to minimize growth disruptions.	但结构改革在短期从宏观层面其实不可避免的会有紧缩效果，这就很自然地需要短期对冲刺激手段——如减税和增加财政赤字——来保证增长波动不会太大。


This would mean reversing the recent decline in the government budget deficit, which narrowed to 1.8% last year, from 2% of GDP in 2013.	这意味着需要改变目前政府预算赤字下降的趋势。 中国预算赤字从2013年占GDP的2%下降到去年的1.


The transition from a dual-track economy to a market-based economy will not be easy.	从双轨经济向市场经济的转型绝非易事。


The Chinese economy is clearly in urgent need of repair.	中国经济的增长方式显然亟需修复。


But the news is not all bad: a substantial portion of the economy continues to expand, underpinning much higher overall growth rates than in most other economies.	但我们看到的并非都是坏消息：中国经济的大部分仍在发展，其总体增长率仍高于世界其它经济体。 此外，尽管存在对资本外流的担忧，中国拥有坚实的净外汇资产头寸，高达1.


Moreover, despite some concerns about capital outflows, China's consolidated net foreign-asset position, which stands at $1.7 trillion (17.6% of GDP), remains sufficient to sustain China through this tough transition.	7万亿美元（占GDP的17. 6%），足以维持中国渡过艰难的转型期。


China's leaders recognize the long-term imperative of serious institutional reform, even as concerns about slowing growth heighten the temptation to embrace short-term fixes.	中国领导人认识到为了确保可持续增长，重要的制度改革势在必行，虽然对短期增长放缓的担忧不可避免的会要求出台一些解决当前问题的措施。


The authorities are taking strong action to curb pollution, improve energy efficiency, implement pension reform, and expand access to health care and low-cost housing.	当局正在采取强硬手段治理污染、提高能源利用效率、实施养老金改革、扩大医疗保障和廉租房覆盖面。


More immediately, China's leadership is committed to excising the cancer of corruption.	更重要的是，中国领导层决心铲除腐败的毒瘤。


The key, as with any critical surgery, is to ensure that the necessary life-support systems are in place.	与实施人命关天的重要手术一样，成功的一个重点在于确保必要的生命支持系统（如供氧、供血、止痛）运转良好。


In China's case, that means maintaining adequate liquidity.	对中国来说，这意味着，在强力推进结构性改革的时候，需要保持充足的金融流动性及财政支持。


In the end, sustainable development will require that China's two economic tracks merge.	最终，可持续发展需要中国经济的双轨合一。


With the right approach, relatively stable and rapid growth can be maintained throughout the reform process. Avoiding a hard landing would be good not only for China; it would ensure much-needed growth and stability for the global economy.	在这个正确的方向下，在改革的过程中维持相对稳定快速的增长，并避免硬着陆，不仅对中国有利，还能确保全球经济所亟需的增长与稳定。


Why China Can Grow According to Plan	为何中国能够按计划增长


BEIJING – China’s recently finalized 13th five-year plan maps out its economic strategy and ambition for the 2016-2020 period.	北京—最近，中国完成了十三五规划的制定，为2016—2020年勾勒出经济战略和目标地图。


Among its objectives are a doubling of GDP and average rural and urban household incomes relative to their 2010 levels.	其中一个目标是实现GDP和平均农村和城市家庭收入在2010年水平的基础上翻一番。


These targets would require China’s economy to grow at an average annual rate of at least 6.5% during the next five years.	这些目标需要中国经济平均年增长率在未来五年至少达到6. 5%。


While this pace would be significantly slower than the 9.7% growth the country has averaged since 1979, it is undeniably fast by international standards.	这一速度比1979年以来平均每年9. 7%的增长率低不少，但从国际标准看，毫无疑问仍属于高增长。


And, given that China’s growth has decelerated every quarter since the beginning of 2010, some have questioned whether it is achievable.	此外，考虑到自2010年初以来中国每个季度增长都有所放缓，一些人开始质疑这一目标是否可以实现。


I believe that it is.	我相信答案是肯定的。


Economic growth results from increases in labor productivity caused by technological advance and industrial upgrading.	经济增长来自由技术进步和产业升级带来的劳动生产率的增加。


High-income countries, already on the cutting edge of productivity, must earn their increases through technological and organizational breakthroughs; as a result, their typical growth rate is about 3%.	高收入国家已经处于生产率的前沿，必须通过技术和组织突破才能实现增长； 因此，它们的典型增长率在3%左右。


Developing countries, however, could potentially accelerate productivity growth, and thus GDP growth, by borrowing technology from advanced countries – that is, tapping the latecomers’ advantage, as China has done.	但是，发展中国家可以通过从发达国家借技术——即像中国那样利用后发优势——加快生产率增长，从而加快GDP增长。


The question for China, after 36 years of catching up, is how much longer it can continue to benefit from this process.	在经历了36年的赶超之后，中国的问题是还能从这一过程获益多久。


Some scholars believe it has reached its limits.	一些学者认为极限已经达到。


Using historical data compiled by the economic historian Angus Maddison, they show how other East Asian countries experienced a deceleration of economic growth after their per capita GDP reached about $11,000 in purchasing-power-parity terms relative to constant 1990 US dollar prices, or $17,000 in constant 2005 US dollar prices.	他们使用经济史学家安格斯·麦迪逊（Angus Maddison）的历史数据，说明了其他东亚经济体如何在人均GDP达到11,000美元左右时（按以1990年美元价格为基准的购买力平价计算，若按2005年美元价格，则为17,000美元）经历经济增长减速。


For example, in the five years after Japan reached that level, its economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.6%.	比如，在日本到达这一水平后的五年里，其经济平均年增长率为3. 6%。


In South Korea, growth fell to 4.8%.	在韩国，增长率下降到4.


In Hong Kong, it slowed to 5.8%.	8%。 香港下降到5.


Given that China is projected to cross the same threshold sometime this year, many believe its average annual growth over the next five years will fall well below 7%.	8%。 中国预计将于今年达到相同的阈值，因此很多人相信其未来五年平均年增长率将大大低于7%。


I disagree.	我不这么看。


What this analysis fails to take into account is the fact that advanced countries are not sitting by idly; they are growing and making technological breakthroughs.	这一分析没有考虑到一个事实，即发达国家不是袖手旁观者； 它们在增长并做出技术突破。


And that creates opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn.	而这给发展中国家创造了持续学习的机会。


Those who predict a slowdown in China are correct to look at its per capita GDP, which is a reflection of a country’s average labor productivity and thus the level of its technical and industrial advancement.	预测中国减速者着眼于人均GDP，这是正确的，人均GDP体现了一国平均劳动生产率，因此也体现了其技术和工业进步水平。


But the best indicator of China’s growth potential is not its per capita GDP relative to some arbitrary threshold; it is the difference in per capita GDP between China and the United States, the world’s most advanced economy.	但中国增长潜力的最佳指标不是其人均GDP相对于任意确定的阈值的水平； 而是中国和美国（世界上最发达的经济体）人均GDP之差。


And on this measure, China has plenty of room for expansion.	以这一衡量指标，中国还有充足的扩张空间。


When Japan crossed the $11,000 threshold in 1972, its per capita GDP was 72% of the US level.	1972年，当日本迈过11,000美元阈值时，其人均GDP相当于美国水平的72%。


When Taiwan crossed it in 1992, its per capita GDP was 48% of America’s.	当台湾在1992年迈过这一阈值时，其人均GDP为美国的48%。


The comparable figure for China today is only about 30%.	今天，中国的可比数字只有30%左右。


In 2008 – the last year for which Maddison provided figures before he died in 2010 – China’s per capita GDP was 21% of the US level.	2008年——麦迪逊2010年去世前提供数字的最新年份——中国人均GDP为美国的21%。


By examining how other East Asian economies performed when they were at a similar point compared to the US, we can estimate China’s potential for growth.	我们可以考察其他东亚经济体在类似水平上的表现，以此估计中国的增长潜力。


Japan’s per capita GDP was 21% of America’s in 1951, and in the following 20 years it grew at an average rate of 9.2%.	日本人均GDP在1951年达到美国的21%，随后20年，其经济以平均每年9. 2%的速度增长。


In the two decades after Singapore hit that level in 1967, it grew at an average of 8.6%.	新加坡在1967年达到这一水平，随后20年的平均增长率为8. 6%。


And the story is similar in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea; in the 20 years after their per capita GDP were 21% of the US level, they grew at around 8%.	台湾、香港和韩国也都类似； 在人均GDP达到美国的21%之后的20年，它们的增长率在8%左右。


There is no reason not to believe that China has the potential to do the same until 2018.	没有理由认为中国在2018年前不具备这一水平的潜力。


The Chinese economy’s current slowdown is the result of external and cyclical factors, not some natural limit.	中国经济目前的放缓是外部和周期性因素的结果，而不是自然极限。 中国一直在承受2008年金融危机和出口需求暴跌的影响。


China has been suffering from the aftereffects of the 2008 financial crisis and plummeting export demand.	从1979年到2013年，年出口增长率平均为16. 8%。


From 1979 to 2013, annual export growth averaged 16.8%.	2014年，出口增长率下降到6. 1%；


In 2014, it dropped to 6.1%; in 2015, it dropped further, to -1.8 %.	2015年进一步下降，为-1. 8%。


This external drag is likely to continue, as politics in developed countries impedes efforts to implement the structural reforms – such as reducing wages, lowering social benefits, financial deleveraging, and consolidating budget deficits – needed to revive economic growth.	外部拖累可能会维持下去，因为发达国家的政治局面妨碍它们实施重振经济增长所需要的结构改革——比如降低工资、削减社会福利、金融去杠杆和整固预算赤字。


Indeed, like Japan beginning in 1991, much of the developed world risks lost decades.	事实上，与始于1991年的日本类似，发达世界中的许多国家有可能迎来失去的几十年。


To achieve its growth targets, China will have to rely on domestic demand, including investment and consumption.	要想实现增长目标，中国需要依靠内需，包括投资和消费。


Thankfully, it has strong prospects in both areas.	幸运的是，这两方面均前景可期。


Unlike developed countries, which often struggle to find productive investment opportunities, China can pursue improvements in infrastructure, urbanization efforts, environmental management, and high-tech industries.	发达国家常常难以发现生产性投资机会，与此不同的是，中国可以追求基础设施改善、城市化措施、环境管理和高科技行业。


And, unlike many of its developing-country rivals, China has ample fiscal space, household savings, and foreign-exchange reserves for such investments.	此外，与许多发展中国家竞争对手不同，中国拥有充足的财政空间、家庭储蓄和外汇储备来进行这些投资。


The investments will generate jobs, household income, and consumption.	投资将产生就业、家庭收入和消费。


As a result, even if external conditions do not improve, achieving 6.5% and above annual growth is well within China’s reach.	因此，即使外部条件不改善，实现6. 5%或以上的年增长也绝对在中国的能力范围内。


In that case, the country will continue to be the world’s primary economic engine, contributing about 30% of global growth until at least 2020.	如此，中国将继续成为世界主要经济引擎，至少在2020年前贡献30%的全球增长。


China’s Not-So-New Not-So-Normal	中国新常态，不新亦不常


HONG KONG – I just spent a week in China, where I participated in the Boao Asia Forum, a conference similar to the annual gathering of the World Economic Forum in Davos.	香港—我刚刚在中国度过了一周时间，参加了类似于达沃斯世界经济论坛的一年一度的博鳌亚洲论坛。


The topic of my panel was what President Xi Jinping has called the Chinese economy’s “new normal”: an era of relatively slower growth, following three decades of double-digit economic expansion.	我所在的讨论组的主题是中国国家主席习近平所提出的中国经济的“新常态”：在三十年的两位数经济扩张期后，中国将迎来一个增长相对较缓的时期。


But what strikes me most about China’s economy is how remarkable it is.	但让我印象最深的是中国经济的非凡之处。


Indeed, its performance continues to astound me.	事实上，它的表现仍然让我震惊。


Though it undoubtedly faces plenty of challenges, the key question is how likely they are to bring down the economy.	尽管它毫无疑问面临着诸多挑战，但关键问题是这些挑战会怎样影响经济。


Of the four BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – Xi’s is the only one that has met my expectations for growth so far this decade.	在金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、 印度、中国）中，习近平的国家是在这个十年以来唯一一个达到我的预期的。


From 2011 to 2014, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 8% per year.	从2011年到2014年，中国经济平均每年增长8%。


If it continues to grow by around 7% for the rest of the decade, as the authorities and many observers expect, it will achieve an average pace of expansion of 7.5%, in line with my projections.	如果在这个十年的剩余时间以每年7%左右，即中国当局和许多观察者所预计的速度增长，则整个十年的平均扩张速度为7. 5%，与我的预测相当。


The phrase “new normal” is a clever bit of messaging by China’s leaders, who must explain to the country’s 1.4 billion citizens why the economy will no longer be growing by 10% a year.	“新常态”一词是中国领导人机智的说法。 他们必须向14亿中国人解释为何经济不会再以每年10%的速度增长。


But there is nothing normal about an economy that is already twice as large as the next largest, Japan, and will possibly outstrip the European Union within the next five years.	但对一个已是位居其后的日本两倍规模，并且可能在未来五年内超越欧盟的经济体来说，这样的速度一点都不“常”。


I was in China primarily in my role as Chair of the British government’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance; but I also sought opportunities to speak to people about the challenges facing the economy.	我来中国主要是以英国政府抗耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）主席的身份； 但我也寻找机会与人讨论中国经济所面临的挑战。


Many international observers have been worried about the country’s oversupply of housing and the related credit boom, making me wonder whether I have been overly sanguine about these risks.	许多国际观察者担心中国房地产的过度供给和相关信用繁荣，这让我怀疑是否对这些风险过于乐观了。


But my conversations persuaded me that both problems are likely to be manageable.	但通过对话我相信，这两个问题都是可管理的。


To be sure, the housing market is in the doldrums.	诚然，房地产市场的景气已经过去了。


But, as many pointed out to me, this is partly the result of deliberate government measures to deflate it (also comforting is the fact that consumers are in general not overleveraged).	但是，许多人对我说，这部分是政府有意压制的结果（另一个令人放心的事实是总体而言消费者并未过度负债）。


Some builders will experience problems with credit, and so might some local authorities.	一些建筑商将面临信用问题，一些地方当局亦然。


But spending by the central government is such a small percentage of the country’s total GDP that policymakers have a lot of room for maneuver if intervention becomes necessary in these areas.	但中央那政府支出占中国总GDP比重很小，如果有必要在这些领域进行干预，决策者拥有很大的动作空间。


Foreign observers frequently speculate that the Chinese authorities may be deliberately overstating the economy’s strength.	外国观察者频繁预测中国当局也许有意高估了经济的强度。


But it is equally possible that the size of some sectors is being understated.	但同样可能的是一些部门的规模被低估了。


After spending a few days in Beijing, it was abundantly clear that China is undergoing a boom in Internet use, including as a consumer platform.	在北京的几天中，很明显中国正处于互联网应用的热潮中，包括将其作为消费平台。


Online commerce is offsetting some of the other weaker areas of the economy, and its full impact might actually be underreported in official statistics.	在线商务抵消了经济其他领域的弱势，其完全影响力在官方数据中实际是被低估的。


I do worry that the government is not moving fast enough to grant the country’s millions of migrant workers official residency in the cities where they work and live.	我确实担心政府给予中国数百万农民工在他们工作和生活的城市的正式居留权的动作不够迅速。


Migrants’ continued lack of access to public services might prevent a large rise in consumption as a share of GDP.	农民工仍然无法获得公共服务可能会阻止消费占GDP比重的大幅上升。


But, as I was told during my visit, the central government’s reluctance to move more quickly reflects its wariness of imposing immense fiscal pressures on local authorities.	但是，在中国之旅中有人告诉我，中央政府不愿加快动作节奏是因为担心给地方当局增加太大的财政压力。


Another area of serious concern is health care.	另一个令人严重关注的领域是医疗。


At some stage, the central government will have to address the sector’s deficiencies.	总有一天中央政府必须解决这一部门的缺陷。


I learned about one example when discussing antimicrobial resistance, to which the government has responded by attempting to limit the quantity of antibiotics a patient may take.	在讨论抗耐药性问题是我了解到一个例子，政府对抗耐药性的反应是试图限制病人可用抗生素的剂量。


The trouble is that many hospitals and doctors rely on drug sales for a large portion of their revenues, which creates a powerful incentive to find ways to circumvent the rules.	麻烦在于许多医院和医生的收入很大一部分来自卖药，这给了他们很大的激励想办法规避规则。


Pollution remains a grave challenge as well.	污染也仍然是一个严峻的挑战。


But it must also be noted that China’s carbon dioxide emissions declined notably in 2014, offering what is perhaps the first tangible evidence that the country is making some progress on this front.	但同样应该注意的是2014年中国二氧化碳排放量大幅下降，这也许是第一个实在的证据证明中国正在这方面取得进步。


Energy efficiency and renewable energy use are both on the rise as well.	能源效率和开再生能源的使用也都在增加。


Most important, despite the challenges it faces, the Chinese economy’s singular importance is now widely recognized.	最重要的是，尽管面临这些挑战，中国经济的巨大的重要性已获得广泛承认。


The country’s recent international achievements – particular its ability to secure the backing of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy for its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the face of opposition from the United States – imply a high degree of confidence that China will address its problems successfully.	目前，中国的国际成就——特别是它有能力确保英国、法国、德国和意大利不顾美国的反对支持其亚洲基础设施投资银行——表明中国很有信心成功解决它的问题。


China’s role within existing international financial institutions could change this year as well.	中国在现有国际金融机构中的作用也可能在今年发生改变。


In December, the International Monetary Fund will consider adding renminbi to the basket of currencies that comprise the Fund’s unit of account, known as Special Drawing Rights, alongside the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen.	12月，国际货币基金组织（IMF）将考虑将人民币与美元、欧元、英镑和日元一起纳入其账户单位即所谓的特别提款权的货币篮子中。


And the world is still waiting for the US to implement a 2010 reform of the IMF that would strengthen the position of China and other large emerging economies in the institution’s governance structure.	而世界仍在等待美国实施IMF的2010年改革。 这项改革将加强中国和其他新兴大经济体在IMF治理结构中的地位。


Given the significance of the Chinese economy, continuing to leave this unaddressed is anything but normal.	考虑到中国经济的重要性，不解决这一问题绝不正常。


China’s Next Agenda	中国的下一个日程


CAMBRIDGE – I recently returned from Beijing, where I had spent a week talking with Chinese officials and attending the China Development Forum (CDF), the major annual gathering of Chinese and senior foreign officials and top business executives.	坎布里奇—我刚刚从北京返回。 我在北京呆了一周，与中国官员会谈，还参加了中国发展论坛。


The Chinese government had just released its 13th Five-Year Plan, and officials were eager to explain what it means for China’s future.	中国发展论坛是一年一度的中国和国外高级官员和顶级企业高管会议。 中国政府刚刚发布了十三五规划，官员们急切地想解释它对中国未来的意义。


Although the latest plan contains a seemingly endless list of specific projects and goals, the major new theme this year is “supply-side restructuring,” a term that includes a wide range of policies aimed at boosting economic growth and living standards.	尽管这一最新的规划包含一份看似无穷无尽的具体的项目和目标清单，但今年的主要新主题是“供给侧结构调整”，这个词包括了范围甚广的一系列旨在提振经济增长和生活水平的政策。


The term “supply side” is intended to distinguish these new policies from the traditional demand-side measures of easy money and a slightly larger fiscal deficit that are already aimed at strengthening economic activity.	“供给侧”一词意在将这些政策与传统的需求侧措施（已经将目标对准增强经济活动的宽松的货币和略微扩大的财政赤字）相区别。


High on the list of supply-side policies is eliminating some of the excess capacity of state-owned firms in the steel and coal industries.	在供给侧政策清单上名列前茅的是消灭一些国有企业和钢铁和煤炭行业的过剩产能。


This means shedding some four million workers, a number equal to about 0.5% of China’s workforce.	这意味着要分流四百万工人，相当于中国劳动力数量的0.


The plan authorizes a special fund to provide assistance to those who remain unemployed.	5%左右。 规划成立了一个特别基金，为失业者提供帮助。


Experts believe that much more downsizing is needed; but the authorities are starting small to see how it works and to monitor the public’s response.	专家认为还需要更大规模的裁员； 但当局起步十分谨慎，以观察政策效果和监控公众反应。


China will also be shifting millions of people from low-productivity agricultural areas to dozens of new cities, accompanied by ambitious plans to build 50 new airports and thousands of miles of new roads and railroads.	中国还将让数百万人从生产率低下的农村地区流向数十个新城市，并提出了兴建50座新机场和数千英里新公路和铁路的宏伟计划。


The authorities also tout the One Belt, One Road project, which will use Chinese financial assistance and resources to develop ports, railroads, and highways linking China with other parts of Asia, central Asia, and potentially even Europe.	当局还提出了一带一路计划，该计划将通过中国的金融援助和资源开发连接中国和亚洲、中亚乃至欧洲各部分的港口、铁路和高速公路。


The foreign-policy goal is to expand Chinese influence in the region and beyond.	外交政策的目标是扩大中国在该地区内外的影响力。


It will also provide an opportunity to export some of China’s excess industrial capacity.	一带一路计划还将提供出口一些中国过剩工业产能的机会。


Moreover, officials intend to stimulate innovation through research and development, including by lowering tax rates for high-technology firms.	此外，官员意欲通过研发刺激创新，包括降低高科技企业的税率。


Tax reform will also extend China’s value-added tax to the service sector.	税收改革还将把中国的增值税扩大到服务业。


And financial reforms will eliminate the limits on interest rates that banks can pay on deposits and charge on loans.	而金融改革将取消银行存贷款利率限制。


At the same time, there is substantial confusion about China’s new foreign-exchange regime.	与此同时，关于中国的新外汇机制存在重大认识混乱。


In recent years, the renminbi’s decline relative to the dollar has prompted complaints from American firms that compete with Chinese products.	近几年来，人民币相对美元贬值导致与中国产品竞争的美国企业怨声载道。


But the renminbi has also strengthened by 25% relative to other advanced-country currencies since 2010.	但自2010年以来，人民币相对其他发达国家货币也升值了25%。


The authorities promise to allow the market to determine the exchange rate, and that there is no reason for a sustained decline.	当局承诺让市场决定汇率，并且没有理由认为人民币会继续下跌。


But officials continue to report the renminbi’s movements relative to the dollar because they fear that emphasizing exchange-rate management relative to a currency basket will suggest further decline relative to the dollar, an expectation that would increase capital outflows.	但官员仍然报告人民币相对美元的波动，因为他们担心强调相对于一揽子货币的汇率管理意味着兑美元进一步下跌，这一预期将增加资本外流。


Policies to improve the environment are also high on the government’s agenda for the next five years.	改善环境的政策也是未来五年政府日程的重点。


The public is eager for cleaner air, rivers, and land.	公众渴望获得更清洁的空气、河流和土地。


To achieve this, the government will adopt new regulations and create “green bonds” to finance remediation and low-carbon energy sources.	为了实现这一目标，政府将采取新监管措施，并创造“绿色债券”为环境修复和低碳能源资源提供融资。


Chinese auto firms are being encouraged to produce hybrid cars, and the government is warning foreign auto companies that it will take steps to reduce their market share if they don’t conform.	中国汽车企业被鼓励制造混合动力汽车，政府也警告外国汽车公司，如果不遵守规定，将采取措施降低它们的市场份额。


Improving the quality of life also requires boosting the quality of products that Chinese consumers can buy.	改善生活质量还需要增提高中国消费者所购买的产品的质量。


One government minister at the CDF noted that the one million Chinese tourists who went abroad last year used their credit cards to buy about $1 billion worth of goods that they cannot obtain at home (while noting the irony that some of those European and American branded goods are actually manufactured in China).	在中国发展论坛上，一位政府部长指出，去年一百万中国出境游客刷信用卡购买了价值大约十亿美元的国内买不到的商品（并且讽刺地指出了其中一些欧洲和美国品牌实际上为中国制造）。


China is still a low-income country, with per capita GDP of just $14,000, about one fourth of that in the United States.	中国仍是一个低收入国家，人均GDP只有14,000美元，相当于美国的四分之一。


Although Beijing and Shanghai are relatively prosperous, there is still much poverty.	尽管北京和上海相对繁荣，但中国仍存在大量贫困。


It is revealing that to achieve the Five-Year Plan’s goal of eliminating poverty by 2020, which requires reducing the number of poor people by 55 million, the poverty line is defined as just $354 a year, or less than one dollar a day.	具有启发性的是，为了实现十三五规划到2020年消灭贫困的目标，将需要让贫困人口减少5,500万人，为此，贫困线被划定在一年354美元，每天还不到1美元。


Chinese corporations’ high level of debt could be a source of financial instability, although several officials stressed that they were not worried.	中国公司债务水平高企可能成为金融动荡的来源，尽管一些官员强调他们并不担心。


Government data show that the ratio of bank loans to GDP is about twice that of the United States.	政府数据表明，银行债务与GDP之比已经两倍于美国水平。


More worrying, the share of nonperforming loans may be dangerously high.	更令人担心的是，不良贷款比例之高可能已经非常危险。


But even if that share is higher than official statistics indicate, China’s bad-debt problem is very different from that of the West.	但即使这一比例比官方数字更高，中国的坏账问题与西方也大不相同。


China’s largest corporate debtors are state-owned firms, and their creditors are state-owned banks.	中国最大的公司债务人是国有企业，而它们的债权人是国有银行。


So resolving the bad debts would involve transferring the losses from the state-owned banks to the government.	因此解决坏账意味着将损失从国有银行转移给政府。


And, because the government debt is relatively low – about 17% of GDP – it would not be difficult for the government to absorb these losses.	而由于政府债务相对较低——约为GDP的17%——因此政府吸收这些损失并不困难。


If necessary, it could also deal with the excess debts that local governments, encouraged by the central authorities, incurred in 2008 and 2009.	如有必要，政府还能处理地方政府在中央当局的鼓励下在2008和2009年增加的过多债务。


What was not discussed at the CDF is the major crackdown on high-level corruption that President Xi Jinping is pursuing and that many say is impeding economic decision-making and slowing GDP growth.	中国发展论坛没有讨论习近平主席正在采取的重拳打击高层腐败行动。 许多人说这妨碍了经济决策，降低了GDP增长。


Nor was there any discussion of the widespread concern about an ideological shift to the left that could threaten property rights, leading to capital flight as individuals seek to protect their wealth.	论坛也没有讨论广泛存在的意识形态左倾，这可能威胁到财产权利，导致资本因为个人寻求财富安全而外流。


But while China remains a complicated puzzle, the authorities are clearly pursuing pro-market reforms designed to produce real annual growth of 6.5% or more during the next five years, leading to the doubling of real per capita income by 2020 that the Chinese Communist Party called for in 2010.	但尽管中国依然是一个复杂的谜题，当局仍显然在追求市场改革，试图在未来五年维持6. 5%或以上的真实年增长率，实现中共在2010年提出的2020年真实人均收入翻一番的目标。


If that target is missed, it will not be for a lack of effort on the part of the Chinese government.	如果这一目标没有实现，不能说是中国政府没有采取措施。


China’s High-Income Future	中国的高收入未来


LONDON – “What if this is ‘as good as it gets’?”	伦敦—“如果这是‘尽善尽美’会怎样？


Jack Nicholson asks, as he walks through his psychiatrist’s waiting room in the eponymous film.	”在同名电影中，杰克·尼克尔森（Jack Nicholson）一边在心理医生的候诊室来回踱步一边问。


At the recent meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Shanghai, participants were asking much the same question – and not just with regard to medium-term expectations of weak global growth.	在最近的G-20财长上海会议上，与会者也问了相同的问题——不仅仅是为萎靡的全球增长中期预期而问。


Many are now wondering whether China’s current growth rate will be as good as it gets for a long time to come.	现在，许多人疑惑中国的当前增长率是否能够长时间“尽善尽美”。


Determining the validity of such fears requires understanding what is driving China’s economic slowdown.	研究这些担忧的合理性需要理解什么导致了中国经济减速。


Some offer a straightforward explanation: China, along with other major emerging economies, has become ensnared in the dreaded “middle-income trap,” unable to break through to advanced-economy status.	一些人给出了直观的解释：中国和其他主要新兴经济体一样，落入了致命的“中等收入陷阱”，无法突破跻身发达经济。


But this assumes that some exogenous force or tendency causes countries to become “stuck” at a particular income level – a view that one academic study after another has debunked.	但这需要假设一些外生力量或倾向导致国家“定”在某个收入水平上——这一观点被一项又一项学术研究所批驳。


To be sure, countries do often struggle to achieve high-income status.	诚然，各国确实常常难以实现高收入。


According to the World Bank, only 13 of 101 countries classified as middle income in 1960 had reached high-income status in 2008.	据世界银行的数据，1960年归为中等收入的101个国家，只有13个在2008年跻身高收入行列。


Moreover, some middle-income countries, after promising growth, spent decades “trapped” at a certain per capita income level.	此外，一些中等收入国家在经历了强劲增长后在某个人均收入水平上被“困”了几十年。


Argentina, for example, kept pace with the United States in per capita income growth from 1870 to 1940; since then, the gap has been widening steadily.	比如，1870—1940年间，阿根廷人均收入增长堪比美国； 此后两国差距逐渐拉开。


In this manner, even countries that make it to high-income status sometimes regress to middle-income levels.	同理，甚至有的国家已经进入高收入行列，但有倒退到中等收入水平。


But there is no historical necessity that dictates that countries get stuck at particular levels of income.	但各国被定在某个收入水平的现象不具有历史必然性。


On the contrary, studies suggest that fast-growing low-income economies are also likely to become fast-growing middle-income economies, and ultimately to graduate to high-income status.	相反，研究表明，高速增长的低收入国家也有可能成为高速增长的中等收入国家，并最终成为高收入国家。


If an economy gets stuck, it is because it has failed to adjust, as the basis for growth changes.	如果经济被定住，那是因为它调整失败，而调整是增长变化的基础。


And, in fact, the lack of capacity for self-transformation normally would have been visible at low-income levels, too.	事实上，缺乏正常地自我转型的能力的现象在低收入水平上也可以观察到。


What, exactly, does the needed adjustment entail?	那么，那些调整是必要的？


While the specifics vary across countries, the innovation-focused Neo-Schumpeterian growth theory, proposed by the economists Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, offers some important insights.	各国具体情况各不相同，但由经济学家菲利普·阿齐安（Philippe Aghion）和彼得·霍伊特（Peter Howitt）提出的注重创新的新熊彼特主义增长理论提供了了一些重要洞见。


Aghion and Howitt view innovation as any change that leads to the introduction of new products or processes in the market where a firm operates.	阿齐安和霍伊特将创新定义为一切将新产品或工艺引入企业在其中经营的市场的变化。


Countries far from the world technology frontier are better off imitating existing technologies and adapting them to local conditions, but over time such countries must improve their capacity for innovation.	远离世界技术前沿的国家因为模仿已有技术并根据本地条件改造而获益，但假以时日，这些国家必须改善自身创新能力。


Studies have also shown a positive link between innovation and social mobility, and even between innovation and income inequality.	研究还表明，创新和社会流动之间存在积极联系，甚至创新和收入不平等之间也是如此。


Central to the innovation-focused perspective is the notion that economic growth requires technology transfers and an environment in which new firms can form, grow, and exit (thereby reallocating factors of production to more successful firms).	注重创新的角度的核心是以下概念：经济增长需要技术转移和新企业能够形成、成长和退出（从而将生产要素重新配置给更加成功的企业）的环境。


Quality of management obviously plays a key role, but institutions and human capital also matter; corruption, credit constraints, and lack of access to high-quality education all make economic transformation more difficult.	管理质量显然起着重要作用，但制度和人力资本也很重要； 腐败、信用约束和难以获得高质量教育都会导致经济转型更加困难。


But fostering innovation is not a silver bullet.	但促进创新不是万灵丹。


While providing returns to innovators can help to spur more innovation, it can also allow businesspeople to capture too large a share of the transformation process.	向创新者提供回报有助于更多创新，但也让商人攫取了转型过程的太大比例。


For example, whereas Bill Gates has probably been good for economic transformation, the Mexican telecoms billionaire Carlos Slim has not.	比如，比尔·盖茨也许对经济转型是有利的，但墨西哥电信业富豪卡洛斯·斯利姆（Carlos Slim）就不是这样。


Encouraging one kind of innovator could easily give rise to the other.	鼓励前一种创新者可能导致后一种轻易崛起。


What does all this mean for China?	这对中国来说意味着什么？


As the country attempts to create the conditions for greater genuine innovation, it must also address myriad short-term challenges.	中国正在试图为更大的真正创新创造条件，它必须解决诸多短期挑战。


It is caught in a deflationary spiral, with falling prices and increased anxiety over the economy’s prospects reinforcing each other.	它陷入了通缩螺旋，下跌的物价和对经济前景担忧的增加彼此强化。


And excessive lending to the corporate sector, particularly in manufacturing, has led to massive excess capacity and a growing mountain of bad debt, suppressing growth.	而公司部门特别是制造业过度贷款导致巨大的过剩产能和越来越多的坏账，制约了增长。


Compounding the challenge, China’s economy is more globally relevant and interconnected than ever before, which means that any action it takes can have far-reaching effects.	让挑战更加复杂的是，中国经济比以往任何时候都更加具有全球重要性和互联性，这意味着它所采取的任何行动都可能产生深远影响。


With tried and tested policies unlikely to work in this new context, the government is having to improvise.	已经尝试并经受考验的政策在新环境下不再管用，政府需要因地制宜。


And, as anxious markets clearly recognize, that approach carries the potential for policy mistakes.	此外，焦虑的市场显然认识到，这一方针可能导致政策错误。


Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that China can succeed, given that the country’s economic history indicates an impressive capacity for transformation.	尽管如此，有很好的理由认为中国能够成功，因为中国经济史表明它具有令人印象深刻的转型能力。


Of course, China’s economy has come a long way since Deng Xiaoping initiated the policy of reform and opening up in 1978.	当然，自1978年邓小平启动改革开放政策以来，中国经济已经取得了长足的进步。


But even in more recent years, the skill content in China’s output has improved radically, and resources have been successfully transferred from agriculture to the services sector, rather than to the manufacturing sector, where large state-owned firms still dominate many industries.	但是，即使在最近几年，中国产出中的技能内容也得到了大幅改善，资源也成功地从农业转移到服务业而不是大型国有企业仍在许多行业占主导地位的制造业。


If the recent research debunking the middle-income trap is correct, China – one of history’s most miraculous growth stories – has a very good chance of succeeding in the transition to high-income status with similar vigor.	如果最近批驳中等收入陷阱的研究是正确的，那么中国——历史上最不可思议的增长故事之一——很有希望带着同样的力道成功进入高收入行列。


The underlying structural changes that have occurred in China in recent years reinforce this optimism.	近几年来中国所出现的基础结构变化更加强了这一乐观。


China will need to continue reforms and overcome vested interests, particularly in the state-owned sector, but its chances of success remain high.	中国需要继续改革和克服既得利益，特别是在国有部门，但它成功的机会仍然很高。


The China Delusion	中国错觉


NEW YORK – China’s management of its exchange-rate peg continues to rattle global financial markets.	纽约—中国对其汇率盯住机制的管理仍在影响全球金融市场。


Ongoing uncertainty about renminbi devaluation is fueling fears that deflationary forces will sweep through emerging markets and deliver a body blow to developed economies, where interest rates are at or near zero (and thus cannot be lowered to defend against imported deflation). Fiscal gridlock in both Europe and the United States is heightening the angst.	关于人民币贬值的持续不确定性正在助长恐慌——通缩压力将席卷新兴市场，并严重打击利率已经达到或接近零水平（因此无法继续下降对抗输入性通缩）的发达经济体


But the current bout of exchange-rate anxiety is really just a symptom of the fact that China’s transition from an export-led growth strategy to one propelled by domestic consumption is proceeding far less smoothly than hoped.	但最近的汇率焦虑其实是另一个事实的症候：中国增长战略从出口拉动型转向内需推动型的过程远远不像人们希望的那样平稳。


For some people, visions of the wonders of capitalism with Chinese characteristics remain undiminished.	对一些人来说，中国特色资本主义的美好前景仍然没有褪色。


They are certain that, after more than three decades of state-directed growth, China’s leaders know what to do to turn their slumping economy around.	他们笃定地认为，在经历了三十多年国家引导的增长后，现在中国领导人知道如何扭转低迷的经济。


The optimists’ unreality is rivaled by that of supply-siders, who would apply shock therapy to China’s slumping state sector and immediately integrate the country’s underdeveloped capital markets into today’s turbulent global financial system.	这些乐观派的幻想受到了供给派的挑战。 供给派认为应该对中国低迷的国有部门采取休克疗法，并立即将中国尚不发达的资本市场融入如今动荡不已的全球金融体系。


That is a profoundly dangerous prescription.	这是一个极其危险的药方。


The power of the market to transform China will not be unleashed in a stagnant economy, where such measures would aggravate deflationary forces and produce a calamity.	转变中国的市场力量不可能产生自一个停滞的经济中，如果经济停滞，这些措施将加剧通缩压力，导致灾难。


The persistent downward pressure on the renminbi reflects a growing fear that Chinese policymakers have no coherent solution to the dilemmas they face.	人民所承受的持续贬值压力反映出人们越来越担心中国决策者对他们所面临的困境一筹莫展。


Floating the renminbi, for example, is a dangerous option.	比如，让人民币浮动是一个危险的选项。


After all, with the Chinese economy undergoing wholesale economic transformation, estimating a long-term equilibrium exchange rate that will anchor speculation is virtually impossible, particularly given persistent doubts about data quality, disclosure, and opaque policymaking processes.	毕竟，中国经济仍在经历总体经济转型，估算能够锚定投机的长期均衡利率几乎是不可能的，特别是在人们一直在怀疑数据质量、披露和决策过程不透明的情况下。


But if the current exchange-rate peg to a basket of currencies fails to anchor the renminbi and prevent sharp depreciation, the deflationary consequences for the world economy will be profound.	但如果当前盯住一揽子货币的汇率机制无法锚定人民币、防止急剧贬值的话，给世界所造成的通缩性后果将非常严重。


Moreover, they will feed back on the Chinese export sector, thus dampening the stimulative impact of a weakened currency.	此外，这些影响将反馈在中国的出口部门，从而制约货币贬值的刺激性效应。


The key to stabilizing the exchange rate lies in creating a credible development policy.	稳定汇率的关键在于制定可信的发展政策。


Only then will the pressure on the renminbi, and on China’s foreign-exchange reserves, subside, because investors both within and outside the country will see a clear way forward.	惟其如此，对人民币的压力，以及对中国外汇储备的压力才会有所减少，因为国内外投资者将能够看清楚未来情况。


Establishing policy credibility will require diminishing the muddled microeconomic incentives of state control and guarantees.	树立政策信誉需要减少国家控制和担保所带来的混乱的微观经济激励。


It will also require reinvigorating aggregate demand by targeting fiscal policy to support the emerging economic sectors that will underpin the new growth model.	此外，还需要通过财政政策支持将成为新增长模式基石的新兴经济部门，从而重振总需求。


But, as usual with China, such a strategy is riddled with contradictions.	但是，和中国的往常情况一样，这套战略充满着矛盾。


For example, reducing the size of the state-enterprise sector is necessary, yet would be certain to depress aggregate demand at a time when demand is already soft.	比如，缩小国有企业的规模是必要条件，但在需求已经十分疲软的情况下，这样做必然将进一步抑制总需求。


Likewise, cutting fiscal support (via government-directed bank lending) to zombie firms would free up fiscal capacity and enable resources to be redirected to new sectors that facilitate services and urban employment; but this would exacerbate – at least at first – today’s demand shortfall.	类似地，削减（通过政府指定银行贷款的）对僵尸企业的财政支持能够释放财政能力，让资源能够会被引导进入有利于服务业和城市就业的新部门； 但这也将加剧——至少在一开始是如此——眼下的需求短缺。


Slashing the state sector abruptly and expecting to achieve transformation through austerity is not the way forward.	大刀阔斧地削减国有部门、期待通过紧缩实现转型绝不是可行的道路。


Economic historians, notably Michael A. Bernstein in his study of the Great Depression in the United States, have convincingly shown that an economy in transition requires strong aggregate demand to pull resources into new sectors.	经济历史学家，特别是迈克尔·伯恩斯坦（Michael A. Bernstein）在其对美国大萧条的 研究中，令人信服地指出，转型中的经济需要强大的总需求让资源流入新部门。


If both the old and new sectors of an economy are in a slump, capital formation will sputter, investment in upgrading human capital will decline, and structural adjustment will stall.	如果经济体的新旧部门都萎靡不振，资本形成将会熄火，升级人力资本的投资将会收缩，结构调整也将会停顿。


Robust aggregate demand is always essential to successful transformation.	强大的总需求永远是成功转型的关键。


An equally large obstacle to China’s economic transition – the problem that almost dare not speak its name – is the widespread worship of China’s hybrid market economy.	对中国的经济转型来说，另一个同样巨大的障碍——人们甚至不敢指名道姓地说出它的名字——是对中国混合市场经济的普遍崇拜。


Simply put, today’s muddled market incentives impede transformation by favoring state-owned enterprises.	简言之，眼下模糊的市场激励有利于国有企业，因此不利于转型。


In early 2012, when the Chinese leadership moved toward stronger private ownership, stocks in the private-sector sub-index outperformed the state-owned sector sub-index on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges.	2012年初，中国领导层开始推动更强大的私人所有权，股市的民营企业细分指数表现要好于国有企业细分指数，在上海和香港都是如此。


But since the spring of 2014, this trend has reversed, and the state-owned sector sub-index has outperformed the private-sector sub-index.	但自2014年春以来，这一趋势出现了逆转，国有企业细分指数表现好于民营企业细分指数。


As the Chinese economy slows and default risk grows, the value of state guarantees rises, directing capital away from private-sector growth.	随着中国经济的减速和违约风险的增加，国家担保的价值也水涨船高，让资本进一步远离民营部门增长。


This hybrid system clearly impedes credit allocation from catalyzing development, while creating and sustaining vested interests opposed to reform.	这一混合制度显然导致信用分配不利于推动发展，同时也产生并维持着反对改革的既得利益。