Rather, Greenspan's mistake – if it was a mistake – was his failure to overrule the market and aggressively push the interest rate up above its natural rate, which would have deepened and prolonged the recession that started in 2001.	与其这样，不如说格林斯潘的错误在于（如果能被称为错误的话）他未能支配市场并激进地将利率推到其自然水平之上，那样做将会加深并延长自2001年开始的衰退过程。


But today is one of those days when I don’t think that Greenspan’s failure to raise interest rates above the natural rate to generate high unemployment and avert the growth of a mortgage-finance bubble was a mistake. There were plenty of other mistakes that generated the catastrophe that faces us today.	不过今天我并不认为格林斯潘未能将利率调至自然水平之上以造成高失业率、但避免抵押融资泡沫的出现这一点是一个错误，有太多其他的错误使得我们如今面对的灾难得以生成。


Defusing the Syrian Time Bomb	化解叙利亚定时炸弹


TEL AVIV – It is remarkable that a stern warning about the scale of the threat posed to the United States by Syria’s civil war has gone practically unnoticed.	特拉维夫——叙利亚内战对美国威胁的严厉警告几乎没有引起任何重视，这不能不令人感到惊诧。


Is President Barack Obama’s administration stumbling toward the abyss?	奥巴马总统政府是否正跌跌撞撞地朝着深渊走去？


Earlier this month, the Wall Street Journal reported that, according to the CIA’s deputy director, Michael Morell, “Syria’s volatile mix of Al Qaeda extremism and civil war now poses the greatest threat to US national security” – indeed, “probably the most important issue in the world today.”	《华尔街日报》月初一篇报导援引中央情报局副局长迈克尔·莫雷尔的说法，称“叙利亚基地极端主义和内战这对不稳定组合现在对美国安全构成了最严重的威胁”——事实上，“极有可能成为当今世界最严重的问题。


By contrast, Morell described the Iranian regime’s “merging of...nuclear ambitions with its desire to be a hegemonic power in the Middle East” as a mere “cause for concern.”	” 相比之下，在莫雷尔看来，伊朗政权“核野心与对中东霸权的渴望”仅仅是“值得关注”的问题。


Morell, who is preparing to step down from the CIA soon, has little reason to dissemble.	莫雷尔即将从中情局卸任，因此似乎没什么理由进行掩饰。


Just two months ago, in mid-June, when the Syrian crisis was the focus of international attention and the subject of heated policy debate, such a statement by a senior administration official would have drawn strong reactions from several quarters.	两个月前的6月中旬，当叙利亚危机还是国际社会关注的焦点和政策激烈辩论的主题时，政府高官这样的声明会在若干领域引起强烈的反响。


But Syria has since moved from the center of attention, displaced by the coup and ongoing crisis in Egypt, the threat of an Al Qaeda terror offensive in Yemen and elsewhere, and the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.	但从那以后叙利亚已不再是人们关注的核心，取而代之的是埃及政变和持续危机、也门和其他地方“基地”组织的恐怖进攻威胁以及以巴和谈的重启。


The apparent (and deceptive) lull in the fighting in Syria has contributed to this shift.	叙利亚国内局势欺骗性的平静表象也促成了人们注意力的转移。


After the government’s military achievements in Quseir and Homs, there has been some tactical regrouping by the opposition.	政府军在库塞尔和霍姆斯打过几场胜仗后，反对派的战术重组就已经开始。


Both sides are trading minor blows as they prepare for a major round of fighting in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, now held by the opposition.	双方在叙利亚最大的城市阿勒颇（目前由反对派占领）准备大规模交火之前都有一些零星的行动。


Overall, and despite the regime’s recent victories, the fighting remains at a stalemate.	虽然叙政府最近打了几场胜仗，但总体而言战争的僵持局面并没有打破。


So this is a convenient time for the international community to look away from a crisis that seems to have no good solutions.	因此国际社会正好借此机会转移对这场看似无解危机的关注。


But this does not diminish the gravity of what is happening in Syria, or lessen the seriousness of Morell’s warning.	但这样做缓和不了叙利亚的紧张局势，也无助于解决莫雷尔的严重警告。


As Morell put it, the most acute danger is that a regime with a large stockpile of weapons of mass destruction will be supplanted by a regime affiliated with, or dominated by, Al Qaeda.	正如莫雷尔所言，与基地组织有染或受其操纵的政府取代掌握大规模杀伤性武器政府的危险现在正迫在眉睫。


Pointing to the inflow of jihadis, Morell said that Syria’s “current track is toward the collapse of its central government,” after which it would replace Pakistan as Al Qaeda’s preferred haven.	谈到大批圣战份子流入的问题时，莫雷尔指出叙利亚“中央政府正在走向解体，” 叙利亚此后将取代巴基斯坦成为基地组织首选的避风港。


Morell thus placed himself squarely within one of the two principal schools of thought in the policy debate on Syria (a debate that is articulated almost exclusively in geopolitical terms and ignores humanitarian issues).	莫雷尔的观点恰好与叙利亚政策辩论中两种主流思想的其中一种相符（该政策辩论几乎只关注地缘政治，而完全忽略了人道主义事务）。


One school regards Syria primarily as a theater of battle against Al Qaeda and other extremists.	一种思想把叙利亚看作对抗基地组织和其他恐怖份子的主战场。


Its adherents, preoccupied with the prospect of a jihadi takeover in Syria, argue (sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly) that the US and its allies must not support or intervene on the side of the rebels and, in fact, should view Bashar al-Assad’s regime as the lesser evil.	这种思想的追随者完全沉浸在圣战份子对叙利亚占领的恐惧中无法自拔，他们（有时含蓄有时明确地）主张美国及其盟友不应支持或者代表叛乱分子，而应把巴沙尔·阿萨德政府看作两害相权取其轻的选择。


Those who fear a jihadi takeover cite recent events in Sinai.	害怕圣战份子占领的人往往以最近西奈半岛发生的事件为例。


Just a few days ago, Israel closed its airport in Eilat after receiving a warning that jihadis in Sinai planned to attack it with rockets.	就在前几天，以色列还因为收到西奈圣战份子火箭袭击计划的警告而关闭了埃拉特机场。


This, it is argued, is only a dress rehearsal for what can be expected in a post-Assad Syria.	有人认为这不过是后阿萨德时代叙利亚局面的一次预演。


The other school of thought does not take this scenario lightly.	另一派��想并未对这种情况掉以轻心。


Nonetheless, it argues that a victory in Syria by a coalition of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Assad’s regime would pose an even greater danger.	但他们认为俄国、伊朗和阿萨德政权联盟在叙利亚胜利带来的危险只会更大。


Moreover, in the event of the Assad regime’s fall, there would be plenty of ways to deal with the jihadi groups in Syria.	此外，如果阿萨德政权倒台，对付叙利亚圣战团体的方法还有很多。


But the most appropriate response to Morell’s statement is that the US does not necessarily have to choose between two sharply defined options.	但对莫雷尔说法的恰当反应是美国不一定非要在两个截然对立的选项中做出选择。


Yes, Syria’s secular opposition is weak and divided, while the jihadis are more dynamic; but jihadi supremacy in the event of an opposition victory is not inevitable.	是的，叙利亚世俗反对派既软弱又分歧严重，而圣战份子无疑更有力量； 但即使反对派胜出也并不一定由圣战份子领导。


The US and its allies should conduct a robust policy, make a more significant investment in the secular opposition, and articulate clear goals.	美国及其盟友应当推行强有力的政策，对世俗反对派给予大笔资金支持，并明确提出自己的目标。


In June, Obama announced that Assad’s regime had used chemical weapons against its own population and had thus crossed his administration’s “red line.”	今年6月，奥巴马宣布阿萨德政权曾使用化学武器对付其国内民众，也因此越过了其政府划定的“红线”。


But no coherent action or policy followed this powerful statement.	但继高调声明后并没有采取统一的政策和行动。


For Obama, Syria’s fate simply does not seem urgent; but when the decisive battle for Aleppo begins, it may be too late.	对奥巴马而言，叙利亚的命运似乎并不紧迫； 可一旦阿勒颇决战开始，一切就可能无法挽回了。


Morell’s warnings may yet be vindicated – by default, if not by design.	事实仍可能证明莫雷尔警告的正确性——即便不是有意为之，也有可能因为过错。


No More Aleppos	不要再有阿勒颇


MADRID – It has been nearly four years since the first uprisings in Damascus and the beginning of the Syrian civil war.	马德里—距离大马士革首次爆发起义、叙利亚内战开始已经过去了四年。


Across the country, more than 240,000 people have died.	放眼整个叙利亚，已有240,000多人丧生。


Another 7.5 million have lost their homes or fled the country, becoming refugees.	另有750万人流离失所或逃至别国，沦为难民。


Syria is drowning in a bloody, cruel, and pointless conflict.	叙利亚正在血腥、野蛮、毫无意义的冲突中挣扎。


It is time to say “enough” – starting in the devastated city of Aleppo.	我们应该大声说出“够了”——从被摧毁的阿勒颇市开始。


Bringing the fighting to a halt will not be easy.	让战斗停止绝非易事。


It will require the coordination and cooperation of regional and global rivals.	这需要地区和全球对手之间的协调与合作。


But the chance to forge a ceasefire is not only an opportunity to end a humanitarian disaster; it could also mark the beginning of a new approach to resolving and preventing crises elsewhere.	但促成停火的可能不仅是结束人道主义灾难的机会； 也是解决和防止其他地区爆发危机的新方针的开始。


Aleppo is one of the oldest inhabited cities in the world – and one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in the war.	阿勒颇是全世界最早有人定居的城市之一——也是叙利亚内战中最血腥的战场之一。


The ancient walled city is one of Syria’s six UNESCO World Heritage sites.	这一古老的有墙之城是叙利亚六座联合国教科文组织世界遗产之一。


Much of it has already been irreversibly damaged.	城中很大一部分已遭到不可逆转的损坏。


Today, Aleppo is under rebel control – surrounded by the Syrian army.	如今，阿勒颇由叛军控制并被叙利亚军方包围。


Militants loyal to the Islamic State lie in wait a few dozen kilometers away.	忠于伊斯兰国的军队正在数十公里外虎视眈眈。


The series of international failures in this conflict so far is inexcusable.	到目前为止，针对这场冲突的国际措施都以失败告终，这是不可原谅的。


Each subsequent breakdown in negotiations, including the Geneva talks, has not only led away from peace, but has also contributed to calamitous developments, including the resurgence of extremist terrorism and the emergence of the Islamic State.	每一次谈判的破裂（包括日内瓦谈判）都不但离和平又远了一步，也让情况进一步恶化，包括极端恐怖主义的死灰复燃和伊斯兰国的出现。


A ceasefire in Aleppo cannot be postponed any further.	阿勒颇挺火不能再拖了。


Enormous humanitarian efforts will be needed to address the catastrophic situation the war has left, and UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura’s immense dedication will be critical.	我们需要巨大的人道主义努力才能应对战争留下的一片废墟，联合国特使米斯图拉（Staffan de Mistura）的巨大奉献将是关键性的。


Fortunately, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s two main allies, Iran and Russia, have reasons for seeking a ceasefire.	幸运的是，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的两大主要盟友——伊朗和俄罗斯都有理由寻求停火。


Falling oil prices and economic sanctions have affected both countries.	石油价格下跌和经济制裁影响着这两个国家。


Iran increasingly feels drained by the economic support it gives to the Syrian army and to Hezbollah in Lebanon, while Russia’s authorities, now also confronting a currency crisis, are battling the perfect storm.	伊朗日益被其给予叙利亚军方和黎巴嫩真主党的经济支持压得喘不过气，而俄罗斯当局目前也面临货币危机，需要处理完美风暴。


Both countries also have reasons to demonstrate that they can contribute to regional and global stability – Iran, especially, as international negotiations over its nuclear program are at a critical stage.	这两个国家也有理由需要证明自己能为地区和全球稳定做出贡献——特别是伊朗，关于其核计划的国际谈判正处于关键阶段。


If Russia and Iran threaten to withdraw support, Assad will have no option other than to come to the table.	如果俄罗斯和伊朗威胁撤出支持，巴沙尔就别无选择，只能回到谈判桌前。


However, the biggest obstacle to a ceasefire is the same one that presented itself during negotiations over Syria’s chemical weapons: any deal will require accepting Assad as a partner in the negotiations.	但是，停火的最大障碍和与叙利亚化学武器谈判期间自动浮现的障碍一样：任何协议都必须接受巴沙尔作为谈判伙伴。


If a ceasefire is achieved at this stage, it will reflect the rapidly shifting nature of today’s geopolitical environment.	如果现阶段实现停火，则反映出当今地缘政治环境性质的快速变化。


Bringing a halt to the fighting will require the United States, the European Union, Russia, Iran, and possibly Saudi Arabia and Qatar to work together toward a common goal.	停止战斗需要美国、欧盟、俄罗斯、伊朗——也许还有沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔——向共同目标一起努力。


In order to achieve results in the future, international coalitions will have to be broader, more inclusive, and more representative of the interests of all.	为了在未来实现目标，国际联盟必须更加广泛、更加包容、更能代表所有人的利益。


Today, a variety of strategic “poles” is available, each with the capacity to attract and influence.	如今，我们可以看到各种战略“极”，每一极都拥有吸引力和影响力。


In this multipolar context, unilateral action will increasingly fail to achieve its objectives.	在这一多极环境中，单方面行动越来越难以达到目标。


If the negotiations so far had recognized this and been conducted with more tenacity, the conflict in Syria could have been resolved long ago, averting much death and destruction.	如果现在的谈判中早就认识到这一点，并且进行得更加坚定，叙利亚冲突可能早已解决，死伤和毁坏情况也不会那么严重。


For Europe, Syria’s meltdown should serve as a wakeup call.	对欧洲来说，叙利亚的崩溃应该成为警世钟。


The difficulties presented there are not confined to the chronically unstable Middle East, and Europe must confront the situation immediately.	叙利亚所体现的困难并不局限于长期动荡的中东，而欧洲必须立刻直面这一局面。


But the European pole’s power of attraction is waning.	但欧洲吸引力之极正在消失。


Even as the EU continues to struggle with economic malaise, it finds itself in the midst of a growing geopolitical maelstrom, with crises in Ukraine, Russia, North Africa, and the Middle East each presenting important challenges.	尽管欧盟仍在与经济萎靡作斗争，但与此同时还面临着日益严重的地缘政治乱局，包括乌克兰、俄罗斯、北非和中东危机，每一场危机都是重大挑战。


The EU needs to acknowledge that it is no longer the center around which its neighbors revolve.	欧盟需要承认它不再是周边地区围绕着旋转的中心。


As Stefan Lehne, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, recently put it, Europe is undergoing a Copernican revolution.	正如欧洲卡耐基中心（Carnegie Europe）访问学者勒内（Stefan Lehne）最近所指出的，欧洲正在经历一场哥白尼革命。


The reality of a multipolar world is that other players can attract and influence.	多极世界的现实是其他行动方也可以拥有吸引力和影响力。


For example, China is working to restore the last stretch of the old Silk Road to reach the ports of the Mediterranean.	比如，中国正致力于重建古丝绸之路直达地中海港口。


That stretch passes through the Balkans.	这条丝绸之路将亘穿巴尔干半岛。


European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has asked the new commissioner for regional policy, Johannes Hahn, to make recommendations aimed at redefining the European Neighborhood Policy, the framework through which the EU relates to its immediate geopolitical environment.	欧盟委员会主席容克要求新任地区政策委员哈恩（Johannes Hahn）就改造欧洲周边政策（European Neighborhood Policy）提出建议。 该政策是欧盟处理紧邻地缘政治环境的框架。


The policy needs a complete overhaul.	该政策需要彻底大修。


It no longer makes sense to apply a single standard.	它不再适宜单一标准。


The EU’s offer is no longer unique, and faces competition from other frameworks for integration, other actors, and myriad strategic opportunities.	欧盟的方案不再是独一无二的，并且面临着来自其他融合框架、其他行动方和众多战略机会的竞争。


In this context, it may be equally important to consider the neighbors of Europe’s neighbors.	在这样的环境下，考虑欧洲周边的周边也同样重要。


The European Neighborhood Policy must be made more flexible.	欧洲周边政策必须更加灵活。


Conditionality has plainly failed to deliver the intended results, because, ultimately, its success depends on countries’ willingness to accept the European agenda.	条件性（conditionality）根本不能带来合意结果，因为说到底，其成功取决于各国接受欧洲日程的意愿。


Countries that are considered strategically important will require more attention and more commitment.	具有战略重要性的国家会要求更多关注和更多承诺。


International politics is witnessing exceptional and far-reaching change.	国际政治正在经历无与伦比的深远变革。


Unless multipolarity is met with an efficient multilateral approach, problems like Syria’s civil war will become much more frequent – and more difficult to resolve.	除非多极性能够得到有效的多极方针的配合，否则像叙利亚内战这样的问题将更加频繁——也更加难以解决。


Syria, and its largest city, is the perfect place to start seeking a better way.	叙利亚及其最大城市是寻求更佳方法的理想起点。


Syria’s Continuing Chemical Fallout	叙利亚化学武器阴云仍在


THE HAGUE – The international community’s failure to bring the Syrian civil war to an end is a tragedy – especially for the country’s long-suffering people.	海牙—国际社会无法结束叙利亚内战，这是一场悲剧——特别是对长期饱受苦难的叙利亚人民来说。


In one respect, multilateral action has had a clearly positive impact: the elimination of the Syrian government’s chemical-weapons program.	从某种角度讲，多边行动起到了显而易见的积极作用：取缔了叙利亚政府的化学武器计划。


And yet there are persistent reports that chemical weapons, including sulfur mustard (commonly known as mustard gas) and chlorine bombs deployed against civilians, continue to be used in Syria.	一直有报道说，叙利亚仍在使用针对平民的化学武器，包括芥子气和氯气炸弹。


The stakes could not be higher.	兹事体大。


The perpetrators of these attacks must be identified and brought to justice.	这类袭击的罪犯必须抓住并绳之以法。


Allowing the use of chemical weapons to go unpunished not only could reverse one of the few promising developments in the Syrian conflict; it also threatens to undermine international norms on the use of toxic gas and nerve agents, increasing the possibility that they will be used in terrorist attacks.	放任使用化学武器不但将让叙利亚冲突仅有的积极发展趋势逆转； 还有可能破坏使用毒气和神经毒剂的国际规范，增加它们在恐怖袭击中的使用。


In August 2013, rockets containing deadly sarin gas struck Ghouta, a rebel-controlled suburb near Damascus.	2013年8月，含有致命沙林毒气的火箭弹袭击了古塔（叛军控制的大马士革外围地区）。


Horrific images of women and children dying in agony mobilized international consensus against the use of these types of weapons.	许多妇女和儿童在极度痛苦中死去，这些令人毛骨悚然的影像让国际社会形成了反对使用这类武器的共识。


In October 2013, following Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, a joint mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations was tasked with eliminating the country’s chemical arsenal and production facilities.	2013年10月，叙利亚加入化学武器公约，禁止化学武器组织（OPCW）和联合国的联合任务组承担了销毁叙利亚化学武器库和生产设施的重任。


Less than a year later, the mission accomplished what no military intervention could have achieved; the strategic threat from Syria’s chemical weapons was effectively eliminated.	不到一年，该任务组就完成了任何军事干预都没能实现的成果； 叙利亚化学武器的战略威胁被实际消除。


Work to clarify certain aspects of the government’s initial declaration about its weapons program is ongoing; but 1,300 metric tons of chemical weapons, including sulfur mustard and precursors for deadly nerve agents, have been accounted for and destroyed under the watchful eyes of OPCW inspectors.	验证叙利亚政府先前的武器计划声明的若干方面的工作仍在进行中； 但1,300吨化学武器，包括芥子气和致命神经毒剂的中间产品，已经在OPCW检查人员的监督下收缴并销毁。


This achievement must not be allowed to be rolled back.	这一成果不容倒退。


The Chemical Weapons Convention is one of mankind’s most successful disarmament efforts.	化学武器公约是人类历史上最成功的武器销毁措施之一。


Since 1997, 192 countries have agreed to be bound by its provisions, and 91% of the world’s declared chemical weapons have been destroyed.	自1997年以来，192个国家签署并受该公约条款约束，91%的世界已知化学武器已经被销毁。


The continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict is not only causing terrible suffering among the country’s civilian population; it also risks eroding the convention’s credibility.	叙利亚冲突中继续使用化学武器不但造成贫民的可怕痛苦； 也有可能损害该公约的信誉。


A fact-finding mission established by the OPCW in April 2014 found “compelling confirmation” that a toxic chemical – most likely chlorine gas – was used “systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon in villages in northern Syria.	OPCW在2014年4月启动的真相调查行动“令人信服地确认” 一种有毒化学品——极有可能是氯气——在叙利亚北部村庄中被“系统性和反复地”用作武器。


It was on the basis of these findings that the UN Security Council agreed in August 2015 to create a joint investigative mechanism of the OPCW and the UN and task it with identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the conflict.	基于这些发现，联合国安理会在2015年8月成立了OPCE和联合国联合调查行动，负责追查在冲突中使用化学武器的责任人。


The fog of war cannot be allowed to create a fog of responsibility.	绝不容战争迷雾制造责任迷雾。


The perpetrators of chemical attacks must be held to account, whoever they are.	化学袭击的罪犯必须绳之以法，不管是谁。


International investigators deployed in Syria bring vital expertise to this important mission.	派往叙利亚的国际调查者为这一重要任务带来了关键的专家知识。


It is crucial that political leaders express confidence in their impartiality, allow them to carry out their work unobstructed, and not second-guess their conclusions.	政治领导人不偏不倚地对他们表示信心、允许他们不受干扰地展开工作、不去胡乱质疑他们的结论，这是其中的关键。


Once those responsible for the use of chemical weapons have been identified, the international community must ensure that they are prosecuted, in order to send a clear signal about the inviolability of the global ban.	一旦挖出了化学武器使用负责人，国际社会必须保证他们受到起诉，这样才能明确地证明国际禁令的不可侵犯性。


Persistent allegations that non-state actors are using chemical weapons in Syria and northern Iraq are of particular concern, as they raise the possibility of toxic chemicals being used in terrorist attacks.	一直有人指责非国家行动者在叙利亚和伊拉克北部使用化学武器，这尤其令人担心，因为这增加了有毒化学品正在用于恐怖袭击的可能性。


Manufacturing nerve agents is a complex process, but extremists can easily deploy toxic industrial chemicals – such as chlorine gas – if they have them in their possession.	制造神经毒气是一个复杂的过程，但极端分子可以轻松地使用有毒工业化学品——比如氯气，只要他们手上有这些东西。


A conventional attack against a chemical facility is another potentially devastating risk – one that is not beyond the capabilities of a well-funded terrorist group.	站队化学设施的常规袭击是另一个可能带来灾难性后果的风险——资金充裕的恐怖组织完全有能力这样做。


Nearly two decades after the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force, the treaty is facing a major test.	化学武器公约生效已近二十年，目前该条约正面临严峻考验。


The threat that toxic gas or nerve agents will be deployed in a conflict between countries has been all but eliminated.	毒气或神经毒剂将用于国家间冲突的威胁绝没有消除。


Failure to punish their use in the Syrian civil war risks undermining the regime that has brought us to the threshold of a chemical weapons-free world.	无法惩罚它们在叙利亚战争中被使用的行为有可能让把我们带到无化学武器的世界大门口的制度胎死腹中。


Syria’s Final Countdown	叙利亚最后的倒计时


TEL AVIV – A series of crucial defeats of the Syrian army has laid to rest any illusions that the government in Damascus is in control of its country.	特拉维夫——叙利亚军的一系列关键性失败已经把大马士革政府控制国家的任何幻想击得粉碎。


By spreading his forces thinly across Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has drastically reduced his capacity to win decisive battles, and he is now being forced to evacuate wide areas of the country to concentrate his army around Damascus and the Alawite enclave in the northwest.	军队部署战线过长已经降低了巴沙尔·阿萨德总统赢得决定性战役的能力，他正在被迫从其他地方撤兵，并将军队集中到大马士革周边和西北方向的阿拉维派飞地。


As it becomes clear that Assad is likely to lose the war, his closest allies – as well as world powers and regional players – are beginning to plan for the end game.	随着阿萨德可能在战争中失败的局势逐渐清晰，他最亲密的盟友——以及全球大国和地区势力——都开始筹划最后的战略。


In late May, the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, gave a speech that spoke volumes about the impact of the Syrian war on his organization.	5月下旬，黎巴嫩真主党领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉在演讲时就叙利亚战争对其组织的影响进行了充分的阐释。


“The threat we face is existential,” Nasrallah said.	“我们所面临的是存在性威胁”，纳斯鲁拉说。


“We now have three options: to expand the war and fight far more than we have fought in the last four years, to capitulate and be slaughtered, or to disperse throughout the world, walking humiliated and purposeless from catastrophe to catastrophe.”	“我们现在有三个选择：扩大战争，打比过去四年多得多的仗、投降并遭受杀戮、或者分散到世界各地，屈辱而漫无目的地从一场灾难走向另一场灾难。 ”


More than 3,000 Hezbollah fighters have died in Syria, and another 4,000 have been injured.	3000多名真主党战士已经死于叙利亚，另有4，000人受伤。


Syrian militants, including Islamic State fighters, have penetrated Lebanon, threatening to rekindle the country’s ethnic war and undermining Hezbollah’s legitimacy as the guarantor of its security.	包括伊斯兰国战斗人员在内的叙利亚武装分子已经渗透到黎巴嫩，威胁重燃该国民族战争的战火，并破坏作为安全保障的真主党合法性。


Assad’s fall would deny the organization its vital logistic hinterland in Syria, making it vulnerable to challenges by insurgent Sunni militias.	阿萨德倒台会使该组织失去叙利亚腹地的重要后勤保障，使该组织更容易受到逊尼派反叛民兵的威胁。


Iran, too, is likely to face a reckoning, as its ally in Damascus approaches defeat.	随着大马士革的盟友离失败越来越近，伊朗也有可能面临清算的威胁。


The country’s strategic calculations are bound to have been affected by the ascension of Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to the Saudi throne, a real game changer that has resulted in a shift of alliances among the region’s Sunni powers.	该国的战略筹划注定要受到萨勒曼·本·阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·阿勒沙特在沙特登位的影响，这一游戏规则的改变已经导致该地区的逊尼派势力改变联盟。


Stronger ties among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar – and the spectacular successes of the latter’s Sunni proxies in Syria – will put pressure on Iran to cut Assad loose or risk being drawn even deeper into the Syrian quagmire.	沙特、土耳其和卡塔尔之间更加牢不可破的关系——以及后者的叙利亚逊尼派代理所取得的惊人成绩——将迫使伊朗放弃阿萨德，或冒险被拖进叙利亚泥潭更深处。


The regional proxy war between the Iran-backed Assad government and Sunni-backed rebels has largely undermined America’s influence on the course of events in Syria.	伊朗支持的阿萨德政府和逊尼派支持的反政府武装之间的区域代理战争在很大程度上削弱了美国对叙利亚进程的影响力。


Sunni fighters have ignored calls by the United States to focus on fighting the Islamic State instead of the Assad regime.	逊尼派武装人员无视美国重点打击伊斯兰国而非阿萨德政府的要求。


In fact, the most effective fighting force in the country is Jaish al-Fatah – The Army of Conquest – a collection of Sunni rebel groups, some of which the US considers to be terrorist organizations.	事实上，该国最有效的战斗力当属征服者部队（Jaish al-Fatah），该部队由一系列逊尼派叛乱团体组成，其中有些被美国认定为恐怖组织。


The US is rightly worried that a victory by Jaish al-Fatah and others might empower anti-Western elements in Syria.	美国有理由担心征服者部队及其他势力获胜可能增强叙利亚的反西方势力。


Drawing from its sad experience in Iraq, the US government fears that Assad’s fall would be quickly followed by the collapse of the Syrian army, leaving the country without a stabilizing force.	根据在伊拉克的悲伤经验，美国政府担心阿萨德倒台将很快造成叙利亚军队崩溃，导致该国不再有任何稳定力量。


Rather than turning their attention to the Islamic State, the fractious victors would most likely turn on one another.	与其期待愤怒的获胜者会转而对付伊斯兰国，还不如期待他们会相互撕咬。


As in Libya, the fighting would make the country ungovernable.	就像利比亚一样，战争将摧毁该国的一切治理结构。


Meanwhile, Russia, which considers the naval base of Tartus to be strategically vital, can be counted on to do all it can to prevent a total defeat of the regime.	同时，我们认为将塔尔图斯海军基地视为具有重要战略意义的俄罗斯将会竭尽所能防止阿萨德政权的彻底失败。


When Secretary of State John Kerry proposed, at a meeting last May, a joint international approach to contain the conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin was not interested.	国务卿克里在去年五月会议上提议联合国际力量共同遏制冲突时，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京不感兴趣。


But the Russian regime is not blind to the realities of the battlefield.	但俄罗斯并非没有注意到战场上的现实。


Following the loss of the city of Palmyra to the Islamic State, families of Russian advisers began to be repatriated.	继巴尔米拉市被伊斯兰国攻陷后，俄罗斯顾问家属的撤离工作正式开始。


In preparation for a possible future without Assad, the Kremlin is now trying to gain influence in opposition groups.	面对可能没有阿萨德的未来，克里姆林宫正试图在反对派团体内部培植影响力。


For now, Assad is doing his best to cling to power.	就目前来讲，阿萨德正在竭尽所能固守权力。


A power-sharing agreement is all but unthinkable, and Syria’s geography is not well suited to an orderly division along sectarian lines.	分权协议几乎不可想象，而叙利亚的地理环境并不支持按教派势力范围的有序分裂。


Assad’s war aims have been reduced to avoiding decisive defeat and gaining international legitimacy, in the hope of a favorable political solution.	阿萨德的战争目标已经降低到避免决定性失败并争取国际合法性，以期在政治解决中取得优势。


The rise of the Islamic State did lend support to the government’s claims that Syria risks being taken over by terrorist groups; nonetheless, the regime is finding itself increasingly isolated.	政府所谓叙利亚可能被恐怖团体接管的说法的确受到了伊斯兰国崛起的支持； 尽管如此，政府正在越来越深地陷入孤立。


Assad’s final days are unlikely to be pretty.	阿萨德最后的日子并不愉快。


The tight-knit members of his clan, his political allies, and many members of the Alawite minority will be fighting for their survival.	与阿萨德关系密切的集团成员、他的政治盟友和阿拉维派少数民族将为自己的生存而战。


Unless a political solution is somehow found, Syria’s fate will come down to the prophetic words a Sunni frontline fighter from Homs told a German reporter in 2012.	除非以某种形式实现政治解决，否则叙利亚的命运将应验2012年逊尼派霍姆斯前线的一名战士告诉一位德国记者的预言。


“It’s a question of numbers,” he said.	“这就是个数字问题，”他表示。


“There are 18 million Sunnis against him.	“反对他的有1，800万逊尼人。


Assad must kill them all.	阿萨德必须把他们全部杀死。


Otherwise, we’ll win and kill him and his henchmen.”	否则，我们将会获胜并杀死他和他的亲信。 ”


Solving Syria in the Security Council	在安理会框架内解决叙利亚问题


NEW YORK – The ongoing bloodletting in Syria is not only the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster by far, but also one of its gravest geopolitical risks.	纽约—持续不断的叙利亚流血局势不但造成了迄今为止全世界最大的人道主义灾难，也是一场最严重的地缘政治危机。


And the United States’ current approach – a two-front war against the Islamic State and President Bashar al-Assad’s regime – has failed miserably.	而美国当前的方针——对伊斯兰国和巴沙尔·阿萨德政权两面开战——是一场彻头彻尾的失败。


The solution to the Syrian crisis, including the growing refugee crisis in Europe, must run through the United Nations Security Council.	叙利亚危机，包括欧洲日益严重的难民危机的解决办法必须通过联合国安理会进行。


The roots of US strategy in Syria lie in a strange– and unsuccessful – union of two sources of American foreign policy.	美国的叙利亚战略源自一个奇怪的——也是不成功的——美国外交政策两大来源的结合。


One comprises the US security establishment, including the military, the intelligence agencies, and their staunch supporters in Congress.	一个来源是美国现有安全体系，包括军队、情报机关以及他们在国会中的坚定支持者。


The other source emerges from the human-rights community.	另一个来源是人权组织。


Their peculiar merger has been evident in many recent US wars in the Middle East and Africa.	这两个来源的特殊结合体现在最近美国在中东和非洲的多场战争中。


Unfortunately, the results have been consistently devastating.	不幸的是，结果无不是灾难。


The security establishment is driven by US policymakers’ long-standing reliance on military force and covert operations to topple regimes deemed to be harmful to American interests.	现有安全体系背后是美国决策者长期以来军力和秘密行动颠覆被认为有害于美国利益的政权。


From the 1953 toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh’s democratically elected government in Iran and the “other 9/11” (the US-backed military coup in 1973 against Chile’s democratically elected Salvador Allende) to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and now Syria, regime change has long been the coin of the US security realm.	从1953年颠覆民选的伊朗摩萨德政府和“其他9/11”（美国支持的针对民选的智利总统阿连德的1973年军事政变），到阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亚以及现在的叙利亚，颠覆政权长期以来一直是美国安全政策的不二法门。


At the same time, parts of the human-rights community have backed recent US military interventions on the grounds of the “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P.	与此同时，某些人权组织支持最近美国打着“保护责任”（Responsibility to Protect）旗号进行的军事干预。


This doctrine, adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 2005, holds that the international community is obliged to intervene to protect a civilian population under massive attack by its own government.	保护责任思想在2005年联合国大会上获得一致通过，它认为，国际社会有义务实施干预以保护遭受本国政府大面积打击的平民。


In the face of the brutality of Saddam Hussein, Muammar el-Qaddafi, and Assad, some human-rights advocates made common cause with the US security establishment, while China, Russia, and others have argued that R2P has become a pretext for US-led regime change.	面对萨达姆、卡扎菲和巴沙尔等人的暴政，一些人权活动家与美国安全体系站到了一起，而中国、俄罗斯和其他人则认为保护责任已成为美国领导的颠覆政权行动的借口。


The problem, as human-rights advocates should have learned long ago, is that the US security establishment’s regime-change model does not work.	人权活动家想必早就清楚，问题在于美国安全体系的颠覆政权模式并没有效果。


What appears to be a “quick fix” to protect local populations and US interests often devolves into chaos, anarchy, civil war, and burgeoning humanitarian crises, as has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and now Syria.	貌似保护当地民众和美国利益的“速决之计”常常带来混乱、无序、内战和剧烈的人道主义危机，阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亚和现在的叙利亚莫不如此。


The risks of failure multiply whenever the UN Security Council as a whole does not back the military part of the intervention.	当联合国安理会作为一个整体不支持干预的军事部分时，失败风险就会成倍增加。


The US intervention in Syria can also be traced to decisions taken by the security establishment a quarter-century ago to overthrow Soviet-backed regimes in the Middle East.	美国对叙利亚的干预也可以追溯到其安全体系在四分之一个世纪前所做出的颠覆苏联支持的中东政权的决定。


As then-Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to General Wesley Clark in 1991: “We learned that we can intervene militarily in the region with impunity, and the Soviets won’t do a thing to stop us… [We’ve] got about five to ten years to take out these old Soviet ‘surrogate’ regimes – Iraq, Syria, and the rest – before the next superpower [China] comes along to challenge us in the region.”	时任国防部副部长保罗·沃尔福威茨（Paul Wolfowitz）1991年向韦斯利·克拉克上将（General Wesley Clark）解释说：“我们发现我们可以对该地区进行惩罚性军事干预，苏联不会采取任何措施阻止我们……[我们已经]有五到十年时间在下一个超级大国[中国]开始在该地区挑战我们之前除去这些旧苏联的‘代理’政权——伊拉克、叙利亚及其他。 ”


When al-Qaeda struck the US on September 11, 2001, the attack was used as a pretext by the security establishment to launch its long-desired war to topple Saddam.	2001年9月11日，基地组织袭击了美国，这场袭击被美国安全体系作为借口发动了其酝酿已久的颠覆萨达姆的战争。


When the Arab Spring protests erupted a decade later, the US security establishment viewed the sudden vulnerability of the Qaddafi and Assad regimes as a similar opportunity to install new regimes in Libya and Syria.	十年后，阿拉伯之春暴动爆发，美国安全体系认为卡扎菲和巴沙尔政权的急转直下是类似的机会，可以利用它们扶持利比亚和叙利亚的新政权。


Such was the theory, at any rate.	无如论如何，理论上就是如此。


In the case of Syria, America’s regional allies also told President Barack Obama’s administration to move on Assad.	在叙利亚的例子中，美国的地区盟友也要求奥巴马政府除掉巴沙尔。


Saudi Arabia wanted Assad gone to weaken a client state of Iran, the kingdom’s main rival for regional primacy.	沙特阿拉伯希望巴沙尔的倒台能削弱这个沙特争夺地区主导权的主要对手——伊朗的附庸国。


Israel wanted Assad gone to weaken Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.	以色列希望巴沙尔倒台能削弱伊朗对黎巴嫩南部真主党的补给线。


And Turkey wanted Assad gone to extend its strategic reach and stabilize its southern border.	土耳其希望巴沙尔倒台能扩大它的战略接触面、稳定其南部边界。


The humanitarian community joined the regime-change chorus when Assad responded to Arab Spring protesters’ demand for political liberalization by unleashing the army and paramilitaries.	巴沙尔面对阿拉伯之春暴动者要求解散军队和预备役以实现政治自由化的要求的应对方法让人权组织也加入了颠覆政权阵营。


From March to August 2011, Assad’s forces killed around 2,000 people.	2011年3月至8月，巴沙尔的军队杀害了约2,000 人。


At that point, Obama declared that Assad must “step aside.”	此时，奥巴马宣布巴沙尔必须“下台”。


We don’t know the full extent of US actions in Syria after that.	我们不知道此后美国在叙利亚行动的全貌。


On the diplomatic level, the US organized the “Friends of Syria,” mainly Western countries and Middle East allies committed to Assad’s overthrow.	在外交层面，美国组织了“叙利亚之友”，成员主要是决心颠覆巴沙尔政权的西方国家和中东盟友。


The CIA began to work covertly with Turkey to channel arms, financing, and non-lethal support to the so-called “Free Syrian Army” and other insurgent groups operating to topple Assad.	中央情报局开始与土耳其秘密合作向所谓的“自由叙利亚军”和其他以颠覆巴沙尔为目标的叛军集团输送军备、资金和非致命支持。


The results have been an unmitigated disaster.	结果是彻头彻尾的灾难。


While roughly 500 people per month were killed from March to August 2011, some 100,000 civilians – around 3,200 per month – died between September 2011 and April 2015, with the total number of dead, including combatants, reaching perhaps 310,000, or 10,000 per month.	2011年3月至8月，每个月只有大约500人被杀，而2011年9月至2015年4月有大约100,000平民死亡——也就是每个月3,200人，而总死亡人数（包括战斗人员）也许高达310,000，或每个月10,000人。


And, with the Islamic State and other brutal extremist groups capitalizing on the anarchy created by the civil war, the prospect of peace is more distant than ever.	此外，伊斯兰国和其他残暴极端组织也开始利用内战所造成的无序，和平的希望更加渺茫了。


Military intervention led or backed by the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya has produced similar debacles.	美国领导或支持的阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚军事干预也造成了类似的结果。


Toppling a regime is one thing; replacing it with a stable and legitimate government is quite another.	颠覆一个政权是一回事； 用一个稳定合法的政府取而代之是完全不同的另一回事。


If the US wants better results, it should stop going it alone.	如果美国想要获得更好的结果，就不能一意孤行。


The US cannot impose its will unilaterally, and trying to do so has merely arrayed other powerful countries, including China and Russia, against it.	美国不能单方面强加自己的意志，这样做只能让其他有实力的国家（包括中国和俄罗斯）一起反对它。


Like the US, Russia has a strong interest in stability in Syria and in defeating the Islamic State; but it has no interest in allowing the US to install its choice of regimes in Syria or elsewhere in the region.	与美国一样，叙利亚的稳定和打击伊斯兰国对俄罗斯的安全也具有重大意义； 但允许美国在叙利亚和该地区其他地方渗透自己的选择不符合俄罗斯的利益。


That is why all efforts by the UN Security Council to forge a common position on Syria have so far foundered.	正因如此，目前联合国安理会所有试图形成叙利亚问题共同立场的努力都以失败告终。


But the UN route can and must be tried again.	但仍必须再次尝试联合国这条路。


The nuclear pact between Iran and the Security Council’s five permanent members (the US, China, France, Russia, and the UK) plus Germany, has just provided a powerful demonstration of the Council’s capacity to lead.	伊朗和联合国五大常任理事国（美中法俄英）加德国所形成的核协议有力地证明，安理会具备领导力。


It can lead in Syria as well, if the US will set aside its unilateral demand for regime change and work with the rest of the Council, including China and Russia, on a common approach.	如果美国放弃其单方面的颠覆政权要求，与安理会其他成员（包括中俄）合作推进共同方针的话，安理会也可以在叙利亚问题上成为领导者。


In Syria, only multilateralism can succeed.	在叙利亚，只有多边主义能够成功。


The UN remains the world’s best – indeed its only – hope to stop the Syrian bloodbath and halt the flood of refugees to Europe.	联合国仍是全世界最大——事实上，也是唯一——的停止叙利亚流血、阻止难民涌向欧洲的希望。


No Time to Lose in Syria	叙利亚时间紧迫


MADRID – The arrival of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children seeking refuge from conflict has confronted the European Union with two stark realities.	马德里——成千上万涌入欧洲寻求庇护的男男女女令欧盟面临着严峻的现实。


First, its member states are not all meeting their obligations, both to one another and according to international law.	首先，很多欧盟成员国并未全部履行其相互义务和国际法义务。


Second, its position regarding Syria’s civil war is unsustainable.	其次，欧盟在叙利亚内战问题上的立场不可持续。


To be clear: failing to work towards peace in Syria is just as grave an error as turning away those fleeing from persecution.	再说得明确一点：未能开展叙利亚和平工作的错误和赶走试图逃离迫害的难民一样严重。


The defects in Europe’s asylum legislation and the difference among its member states’ practices have been evident for some time.	欧洲庇护法的缺陷及其成员国之间的分歧已经持续了一段时间。


But the 350,000 refugees who crossed European borders, and the more than 2,600 who drowned trying to reach them, in the first eight months of this year have opened our eyes.	但今年头八个月350,000名跨越欧洲边境的难民和在逃亡欧洲途中超过2，600人被淹死让我们睁开了双眼。


The inhumane conditions these refugees face are unacceptable.	这些难民所面临的惨无人道的境况不可接受。


Now, on top of the so-called “north-south” split that emerged from the economic crisis, the United Kingdom’s potential exit from the EU, and the critical situation in Greece, a new breach, between east and west, has appeared in Europe.	现在，除了因经济危机造成的所谓“南北”分裂、英国有可能退出欧盟以及希腊的危急局势，新的东西裂痕又在欧洲出现。


The EU cannot afford any more cracks.	欧盟无法承受有更多的裂痕出现。


Therefore, it must use all possible means to compel its members to abide by their international and European legal obligations.	因此必须用尽一切办法迫使其成员国按国际法和欧洲法的义务行事。


That same urgency must be applied to peacemaking in Syria; after all, the refugees are a product of the country’s long, brutal, multi-sided civil war.	叙利亚维和问题也必须有同样的紧迫感； 毕竟，难民是该国长期、残酷、多方位战争的产物。


The seriousness of the situation in Syria cannot be overstated.	叙利亚的局势之严峻怎样强调都没有夸大之嫌。


Since the conflict began in 2011, it has produced more than four million refugees, and approximately eight million internally displaced people.	冲突自2011年开始以来已经带来了超过400万难民，还有约800万人在国内流离失所。


More than 200,000 people have died.	超过200，000人死于战乱。


To put that in perspective: more than half of the 22 million people living in Syria in 2011 are either dead or displaced.	客观一点看：2011年生活在叙利亚的2，200万民众中有半数不是死亡就是流失失所。


Control of Syria’s territory is now divided between President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, various armed opposition groups, the Kurds, and the Islamic State.	现在总统巴沙尔•阿萨德政权、各路武装反对势力、库尔德人和伊斯兰国共同掌握着叙利亚的控制权。


The civil war has enabled the extremist Islamic State to build up its capacity to the point that, if the Syrian regime were to collapse entirely, the group would likely be able to take advantage of the power vacuum to seize control of the entire country.	内战导致极端主义伊斯兰国的势力迅速扩大，如果叙利亚政权彻底崩溃，该组织将极有可能利用由此造成的权力真空控制整个国家。


Nonetheless, Russia’s claim that Syria faces a choice between Assad or the Islamic State is false.	尽管如此，但俄国称叙利亚必须在阿萨德和伊斯兰国间选择的说法并不确切。


Suspicions about Russia’s intentions have lately ballooned, as the country allegedly steps up its aid to the Assad regime, a longtime ally, and calls increasingly loudly for cooperation with the regime to combat the Islamic State.	近来俄国主张所引发的怀疑激增，因为据称该国已经加紧了对其长期盟友阿萨德政权的援助，而且越来越激烈地要求与上述政权合作对抗伊斯兰国。


While Russia’s emphasis on keeping Assad in power is likely driven by its own interests in retaining influence in the Middle East, it is right about one thing: the Islamic State must be stopped.	尽管俄罗斯坚持阿萨德掌权很可能是为保持其在中东的影响力，但有一点它并没有说错：那就是必须制止“伊斯兰国”。


And it is a grave mistake to think that this can be achieved without a political solution to the conflict in Syria – the conflict that enabled the organization’s explosive growth.	而且认为不必政治解决叙利亚冲突就能实现上述目标是个严重的错误，伊斯兰国实现爆炸性增长恰恰是借助冲突。


Only if external powers think beyond military operations and devise a political solution to the crisis can the fight against the Islamic State succeed.	只有外部力量超越军事行动的桎梏制定政治解决方案，才有可能成功打击伊斯兰国。


Such a political solution must, first and foremost, reflect an understanding of past errors and a commitment not to repeat them.	上述政治解决方案必须首先反映对过去错误的认识，并承诺不重犯这些错误。


Recall that in Iraq, the attempt to rebuild the state began with the complete dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime and all existing governance structures.	回想伊拉克战争，重建国家的努力始于彻底消灭侯赛因·萨达姆政权及其所有的现行治理结构。


The power vacuum that this approach produced was filled by Sunni militias and, ultimately, the Islamic State.	逊尼派民兵填补了这种方式造成的权力真空，并最终缔造了伊斯兰国。


For Syria, this means that part of the existing state, including Assad’s Alawite sect, should be included in a broad coalition, along with the opposition and the Kurds.	对叙利亚而言，这意味着现有政府的组成部分，包括阿萨德的阿拉维派在内，均应与反对派和库尔德人一道加入到全面联盟。


Without such broad representation, no Syrian government can hope to defeat terrorist forces and lead the country toward a more stable future.	没有如此全面的代表性，任何叙利亚政府都无法击败恐怖主义力量、带领国家走向更稳定的未来。


Of course, implementing such a solution will not be easy – not least because of sharp divisions among relevant external powers.	当然，尤其鉴于相关外部势力分歧尖锐，实施这样的解决方案绝不会轻而易举。


Like Russia, Iran – which will be crucial to the success of any solution – backs the regime.	在解决方案中起关键作用的俄国、伊朗等国支持阿萨德政权。


Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar are unwilling to support any solution that includes Assad.	但与此同时，沙特、土耳其和卡塔尔却不愿支持任何包含阿萨德的方案。


This deadlock cannot persist.	必须打破这样的僵局。


And, fortunately, it doesn’t have to.	而且，幸运的是，这样的僵局可以被打破。


All crises end in the same way: with all parties sitting at the negotiating table.	所有危机最后均以各方坐到谈判桌前的方式来结束。


That must be the goal in Syria now.	现在叙利亚必须为实现这一目标而努力。


This is where EU leadership can prove vital.	由此证明欧盟领导作用至关重要。


Exercising it will require EU member states to maintain a common position, supporting the efforts of the United Nations special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, to work with all relevant players – including the EU, the United States, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – to achieve peace in Syria.	行使领导权要求欧盟成员国达成相同立场，支持联合国叙利亚问题特使斯塔凡·德·米斯特拉与所有相关方——包括欧盟、美国、俄罗斯、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯——合作实现叙利亚和平的工作。


A good place to start would be by urging the so-called E3/EU+3 group – that is, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the US, and the UK), Germany, and the EU – to convene.	敦促所谓E3/欧盟+3团体——即联合国安理会五个常任理事国（中国、法国、俄罗��、美国和英国）、德国和欧盟聚在一起开会是个不错的开始。


Given that these countries recently managed to overcome their strong differences to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, this might be the right forum to begin building consensus on a political solution in Syria.	鉴于上述国家最近成功克服了强烈分歧达成伊朗核协议，或许应该借助这一论坛就政治解决叙利亚问题达成共识。


Negotiations could subsequently progress to include other major actors, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.	之后谈判可能会纳入其他重要力量，特别是沙特阿拉伯、伊朗和土耳其。


Syria is out of time.	解决叙利亚问题时间紧迫。


Its people have been besieged by brutality and mayhem for far too long; they can find respite in far too few countries; and they are being forced to undertake journeys that are far too dangerous.	叙利亚民众太久以来一直为残酷和混乱所困； 少有国家能给他们喘息的机会；


The UN General Assembly cannot end its 70th session without taking decisive steps toward effective negotiations – and an effective solution.	他们被迫踏上极度危险的逃亡之旅。 联大不向有效谈判——和有效解决迈出决定性的步骤就无法结束第70届大会。


The world, urged by the EU, must work to bring peace to Syria now, and to establish a strong state capable of guaranteeing peace in the future.	世界在欧盟的敦促下必须现在就全力实现叙利亚和平，并建立有能力保障未来和平的强有力的政府。


Engaging the World in Syria	世界参与解决叙利亚问题


ABU DHABI – A global security crisis of historic proportions is raging in the Middle East, and spreading by the day, as millions of refugees flee Syria and Iraq.	阿布扎比——一次历史性的全球安全危机正在中东肆虐并日益蔓延，导致数百万难民逃离叙利亚和伊拉克。


The crisis is now affecting not just all of Syria’s immediate neighbors, straining their resources and exacerbating social and ethnic tensions; it now directly involves all of the current permanent members of the Security Council except China.	当前的危机不仅影响了所有叙利亚邻国，导致资源紧缺，而且还加剧了社会和种族的紧张局势； 现在除中国外的所有现任安理会常任理事国都已经卷入。


It is time for all would-be permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – namely, Germany, India, Japan, Brazil, and Egypt – to step up.	现在是联合国安理会所有准常任理事国——德国、印度、日本、巴西和埃及——站出来的时候了。


The desire for a political settlement that could end the Syrian civil war is palpable; but just what that settlement would look like remains open to debate – or to further conflict.	想达成结束叙利亚内战政治方案的意愿十分明显； 但各方仍未就该方案的内容达成一致——这种情况或会引发进一步的冲突。


Indeed, Russia and the United States are circling each other like boxers before the contest actually begins, supporting different factions and trying to ensure that their allies in the multi-sided conflict are advancing, or at least holding ground.	事实上，俄罗斯和美国就像比赛开始前的拳手那样围绕彼此转来转去，支持不同派别并试图确保其盟友在多方冲突中占得优势，或至少保持住现有的局势。


The need for broad cooperation – and the support of the entire UN Security Council – is apparent.	扩大合作——和整个联合国安理会的支持十分必要。


That is why US Secretary of State John Kerry is talking to the Russians, the Saudis, and the Turks to build support for a new round of international talks.	美国国务卿约翰·克里因此与俄罗斯、沙特和土耳其人会谈为新一轮国际谈判争取支持。


And the UN and Arab League’s special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has created a set of working groups, chaired by Europeans, to “create a framework for concrete talks between Syria’s government and opposition.”	联合国及阿盟叙利亚问题联合特使斯塔凡德·米斯图拉联手创建了一系列由欧洲人担任主席的工作组，“为叙利亚政府和反对派之间的具体谈判构建框架”。


In enabling a peace deal, a coalition of countries that are not yet directly involved in the crisis could be very helpful.	在制定和平协议的过程中，尚未直接参与危机的国家联盟可能作用重大。


Such a coalition – involving, say, Germany, India, Japan, Brazil, and Egypt – could increase the pressure on President Bashar al-Assad to negotiate by convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin that the world is watching his deal-making efforts closely and that his prestige is on the line.	上述联盟——比方说包括德国、印度、日本、巴西和埃及——可以增加巴沙尔·阿萨德总统参与谈判的压力，说服俄罗斯总统普京世界正在密切关注其协议的签署工作，而这项工作的成败直接关系到他的声望。


Moreover, coalition members could convince other relevant regional players to push for a lasting peace.	此外，联盟成员还可以说服其他地区参与者推动持久的和平目标。


Germany, for example, already recognizes that the only long-term solution to Europe’s refugee influx lies in eliminating the need to flee, and has begun to make some moves.	例如，德国已经认识到欧洲难民潮唯一的长期解决之道在于消除移民逃离的必要性，并已经开始采取某些行动。


Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier traveled to Turkey in September to help broker a deal on keeping refugees in Turkey, in exchange for restarting talks on Turkish accession to the European Union.	九月，外交部部长施泰因迈尔出访土耳其协助达成了一项将难民留在土耳其的协议，以换取重启土耳其加入欧盟的谈判工作。


A leading German foreign policy expert, Volker Perthes, is chairing one of de Mistura’s working groups.	德·米斯图拉的一个工作组目前正由德国著名外交政策专家沃克尔·珀瑟斯所领导。


The other countries have yet to take action.	其他国家仍尚未采取行动。


But they, too, have plenty of motivation – and plenty to offer.	但他们也有充分的动机，而且也不乏力量。


India – as well as Pakistan – has a great deal to gain from strengthening Southwest Asian trade, energy, and investment ties.	加强西南亚贸易、能源和投资关系能让印度和巴基斯坦获益巨大。


Since the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, India has been contemplating renewing the plan for an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, with the participation of China and Russia.	自伊朗核协议签署以来，印度一直在考虑与中国和俄罗斯合作重启伊朗-巴基斯坦-印度天然气管道计划。


But that will be impossible without a settlement in Syria and a decision by Iran to stop supporting Hezbollah.	但如果叙利亚问题得不到解决、伊朗不停止对真主党的支持上述目标是不可能实现的。


India has a strong relationship with Iran, underpinned by long-standing cultural, social, political, and economic ties, with India now funding an overhaul of the Iranian port of Chabahar, which will give it direct access to Afghanistan.	印度与伊朗的密切关系建立在长期文化、社会、政治和经济关系的基础之上，目前印度正在出资进行伊朗港口查赫巴尔的修缮工作，以期通过该港口打通阿富汗的直达通道。


This places India in a strong position to push Iran to put pressure on Assad.	这使得印度有能力推动伊朗向阿萨德施压。


Likewise, India can leverage its relationship with Russia – it remains a major importer of Russian arms – to help drive progress.	印度同样能充分利用其对俄关系——它仍然是俄罗斯武器主要的进口国——以协助推动进步。


Japan’s potential contribution also involves Iran, with which Japan has lately been pursuing a closer relationship – not least because Japan needs Iranian oil and gas.	日本的潜在贡献同样涉及伊朗，日本近来一直寻求密切两国关系——日本需要伊朗的石油和天然气仅仅是其中部分理由。


Earlier this month in Tehran, the Japanese and Iranian foreign ministers agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty.	本月早些时候在德黑兰，日本和伊朗外长同意开始就双边投资条约举行谈判。


Japan also wants to speed up implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, so that it can take advantage of the business opportunities that will result when economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic are lifted.	日本还希望加快实施伊朗核协议，以使其能充分利用对伊朗伊斯兰共和国取消经济制裁所带来的商业机会。


But if Iran is truly to rejoin the international community, it must play a constructive role in its region.	但如果伊朗真的重返国际社会，就必须在地区内发挥建设性作用。


Japan, which now aspires to enhance its own role on the world stage, must not shy away from making that clear.	渴望在世界舞台上发挥更大作用的日本必须向伊朗表明自己的态度。


A bonus here is that Japanese and Indian interest in the Syrian peace process could spur China to play an active role in reaching, rather than blocking, a solution.	其中的好处是日本和印度对叙利亚和平进程的兴趣可以刺激中国在签署、而非阻碍解决方案的达成方面发挥积极的作用。


Brazil, despite confronting plenty of domestic problems right now, is also in a position to help.	尽管巴西目前面临许多国内问题，但它也能在叙利亚问题上有所帮助。


Not only does it have substantial ties with Russia; it is also linked to Turkey, exemplified by the two countries’ 2010 effort to broker a deal with Iran over its nuclear program.	它不仅与俄罗斯有实质性关系； 而且也与土耳其关系密切，具体表现为2010年两国曾试图与伊朗就其核计划问题达成协议。


Moreover, in 2011, Brazil put forward a concept paper at the UN outlining how countries seeking to implement the “responsibility to protect” doctrine should behave.	此外，2011年，巴西在联合国提出了一份概念性文件，大致阐述想要落实“保护责任”信条的国家应采取何种对策。


With the Syrian government – through its murder of tens of thousands of civilians with barrel bombs and poison gas – having more than fulfilled the criteria for triggering the international community’s obligation to intervene, Brazil could suggest what an intervention that reflected the principle of “responsibility while protecting” might look like.	因为叙利亚政府用桶爆弹和毒气谋杀数万平民早已满足了触发国际社会干预义务的条件，巴西可以进一步在提案中细化反映“责任”原则的干预内容究竟是什么。


Finally, Egypt – a perennial candidate for a permanent or rotating African seat in a reformed Security Council – has important relationships throughout the region, particularly with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries that are directly supporting some Syrian opposition groups.	最后，在改革后的安理会争取永久或轮值非洲席位的长期候选人埃及与区域各国、特别是直接支持叙利亚反对派团体的沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家的关系十分重要。


The government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has emphasized the need for a comprehensive political settlement, is tacitly supporting Assad, but is also deeply concerned about the Islamic State.	一直强调全面政治解决必要性的埃及总统阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西政府暗中支持阿萨德，但也对伊斯兰国深表忧虑。


Egyptian diplomats are thus excellent candidates to exert pressure for compromise.	埃及外交官因此成为施加压力逼迫妥协的上佳人选。


Many of these countries’ governments might say that the Syrian conflict is too far away to affect them directly.	很多国家政府可能会说叙利亚冲突过于遥远，乃至很难直接对其造成影响。


But global leadership does not simply mean enjoying the prestige that accompanies presumed power.	但是，全球领导地位并不意味着仅仅享受伴随着假定权力的威望。


The UN Charter requires countries to use their power to identify “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and to decide which measures must be taken “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”	《联合国宪章》要求各国动用武力找出“一切和平威胁、扰乱治安或侵略行为”，并决定必须采取哪些措施“保持或恢复国际和平与安全”。


The Syrian crisis is a major “threat to the peace,” and the world must address it together.	叙利亚危机是一个主要的“和平威胁”，世界必须齐心合力才能解决它。


The Key to a Syrian Accord	通往叙利亚协议的关键


DAVOS – The Syrian peace talks that are scheduled to resume in Geneva on January 25 will take place under a framework set out in Vienna in October.	达沃斯—计划于1月25日在日内瓦重开的叙利亚和平谈判将在10月份维也纳确定的框架下进行。


These principles, agreed upon by the most important foreign players in Syria’s war, include a commitment to secular governance, the eventual defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) and other terrorist groups, the maintenance of Syria’s prewar borders, the preservation of its state institutions, and the protection of minority groups.	这些由叙利亚战争最重要的外部行动方所一致确定的原则包括承诺世俗治理、最终击败伊斯兰国和其他恐怖组织、维持叙利亚战前疆界、保留其国家机构，以及保护少数群体。


What they do not include is an effort to address the largest obstacle to lasting peace: the ongoing attacks against civilians and other atrocities that are intensifying divisions among the Syrian factions who will eventually have to govern together.	这些原则没有包括的是如何克服持续和平的最大障碍：没完没了的针对平民的袭击以及恶化最终必须共同执政的叙利亚各派别分歧的暴行。


If the deliberate carnage does not stop soon, diplomacy alone will be unlikely to suffice to end the conflict.	如果有意为之的大屠杀不马上停止，光靠外交是无法结束冲突的。


The war has continued for so long, in part, because both the Syrian government and the armed groups it is fighting believed that they would ultimately prevail.	叙利亚战争之所以持续了如此长时间，部分原因在于叙利亚政府以及与之对抗的武装组织认为都认为自己最后会胜出。


Russia’s entry into the conflict has helped change that calculus.	俄罗斯介入冲突改变了这一平衡。


But, while Russian airpower has bolstered the government enough to keep it from collapsing, it has not been enough to make significant progress against the opposition.	但是，尽管俄罗斯空中力量足以让叙利亚政府避免崩盘，但并不足以让它获得对反对派的重大优势。


Meanwhile, the attacks in Europe by ISIS, combined with the mass exodus of Syrian refugees, has spurred a new push for a political compromise.	与此同时，伊斯兰国在欧洲发动的袭击，以及叙利亚难民的大量涌入刺激了政治妥协意愿。


The European Union, the United States, and other interested countries hope that Syria’s warring parties will stop fighting each other, and turn their weapons instead on ISIS and other extremist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra.	欧盟、美国和其他相关利益国家希望叙利亚战争各方停止战斗，将枪口对准伊斯兰国和救国阵线（Jabhat al-Nusra）等其他极端组织


One of the toughest nuts to crack in the peace negotiations is the fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his henchmen.	和平谈判中最难啃的骨头是叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德及其党羽的命运。


The Assad regime is responsible for the highest number of civilian casualties by far, having carried out indiscriminate attacks in populated opposition-held areas, besieged entire populations, blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid, and tortured and executed prisoners.	巴沙尔政权的罪行包括到目前为止的巨大平民伤亡、在人口密集的反对派控制地区发动无差别攻击、围困全体人民、阻止人道主义援助运输以及虐待和处决囚犯等。


And yet, while Assad’s opponents insist that he relinquish power, that clearly will not be a precondition for the talks.	但是，尽管巴沙尔反对者坚持要求他放弃权力，但这显然不可能成为谈判的先决条件。


As a practical matter, Assad leads one of the conflict’s most powerful factions, one that must be represented at the negotiating table if peace is to be achieved.	从务实角度看，巴沙尔领导者叙利亚冲突中力量最强大的一方，想要达成和平，就必须让这一方坐上谈判桌。


Furthermore, the abrupt removal of Assad could deal a fatal blow to the Syrian state – an outcome that is in no one’s interest (with the exception of ISIS and other extremists).	此外，猛然推翻巴沙尔可能给叙利亚国家带来致命打击，这一结果不符合任何人的利益（伊斯兰国和其他极端分子除外）。


The dissolution of Syria’s security forces and judicial system could be especially dangerous for Syria’s minorities.	叙利亚安全部队和司法体系的解体对于叙利亚少数群体来说尤其危险。


That is why a managed transition must be the goal of all participants in the talks.	因此，所有谈判各方都必须将有管理的转型作为目标。


One logical compromise would be for Assad to retain power for a short period.	一个合乎逻辑的妥协是让巴沙尔在短期内保留权力。


Even Russia and Iran, his most vociferous supporters, have hinted that they could accept his departure if he steps down through negotiations, rather than being ousted by a popular revolt (and as long as the successor regime is friendly to them).	即使是其最坚决的支持者——俄罗斯和伊朗也暗示，如果巴沙尔通过谈判下台而不是被起义推翻（并且如果继任者对俄罗斯和伊朗保持友好），那么他的下台也是可以接受的。


If Assad and his murderous cronies agree to relinquish power, they will undoubtedly seek amnesty for their crimes.	如果巴沙尔及其凶残亲信同意交出权力，毫无疑问会寻求赦免罪行。


That must be firmly rejected.	这必须严词拒绝。


Since the early 1990s, the international community has rightly withheld its imprimatur from amnesties for mass atrocities.	自20世纪90年代初以来，国际社会一直正确地拒绝赦免大屠杀罪行。


Indeed, international law requires that such proposals be rejected.	事实上，国际法规定必须拒绝这样的要求。


In any case, an amnesty in Syria would not protect Assad from prosecution.	无论如何，在叙利亚获得赦免并不能保证巴沙尔免于被起诉。


If a future Syrian government were to join the International Criminal Court and consent to retroactive jurisdiction, the court would be free to prosecute any mass atrocities it saw fit to investigate.	如果未来叙利亚政府要加入国际刑事法院、同意追溯司法管辖权（retroactive jurisdiction），国际刑事法院就完全可以起诉任何它认为应该调查的大规模暴行。


Similarly, foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction over alleged Syrian war criminals found on their territory would be free to ignore an amnesty.	类似地，行使普通司法管辖权（universal jurisdiction）、对在本国境内被找到的叙利亚战犯提起诉讼的外国法院也完全可以忽视赦免。


And precedents from Argentina, Chile, and Peru have shown how even in countries where the atrocities occurred, amnesties granted under pressure of violence can be ruled invalid.	阿根廷、智利、秘鲁等国的先例表明，即使在暴行发生国，在暴力压力下给予的赦免也可以被判定为无效。


Of course, it would not be realistic to expect Assad and his henchmen to deliver themselves directly to prosecutors in The Hague.	当然，指望巴沙尔及其亲信把自己送上海牙法庭是不现实的。


They are more likely to use their power in Syria to shield themselves and, if weakened, flee to Moscow or Tehran, delaying efforts to apprehend them.	他们更有可能在动用在叙利亚的权力保护自己，或者在权力被削弱的情况下逃往莫斯科或德黑兰，阻挠对他们的抓捕行动。


In the meantime, negotiators face the difficult question of who should replace Assad.	与此同时，谈判员们面临一个难题：应该由谁来取代巴沙尔。


According to the Vienna declaration, that question would ultimately be decided by UN-supervised elections.	根据维也纳宣言，这一问题最终应该由联合国监督下的选举决定。


But credible elections in war-torn Syria, where millions have been displaced, will take much time and preparation to organize.	但在饱受战争摧残、数百万人流离失所的叙利亚举行可信的选举需要大量时间和准备工作才能组织起来。


In the meantime, it will be necessary to establish a coalition government by agreement.	与此同时，根据协议成立一个联合政府是必要的。


The Vienna declaration calls for “credible, inclusive, non-sectarian governance.”	维也纳宣言呼吁“可信、包容、不带宗派色彩的治理”。


In practice, this will mean choosing political figures who have credibility among both Syria’s Sunni majority and the Alawite and other minorities whose members have largely turned to Assad for protection.	在实践中，这意味着需要选择在叙利亚逊尼派多数和阿拉维派和其他少数群体（他们大多仰仗巴沙尔的保护）中都信誉卓著的政治人物。


The international community could facilitate agreement by insisting on the exclusion of people from any side who, through a fair, open, and contested process, are found responsible for serious abuses.	国际社会应该将一切在公平、开放和竞争程序中发现需要为严重暴力负责的人排除在外，以此促进协议。


Achieving an accord along such lines depends on developing a level of trust among Syria’s warring factions that is currently lacking.	形成符合这些原则的协议取决于在叙利亚交战各方之间形成目前所缺乏的信任水平。


It is difficult to shake hands with opponents who are killing one’s families and neighbors.	与杀害你的家人和邻居的反对者握手绝非易事。


That is why US Secretary of State John Kerry is wrong to prioritize striking a deal over ending atrocities.	因此，美国国务卿克里将形成协议置于比结束暴行跟重要的位置是不对的。


Stopping the deliberate slaughter of civilians is not a byproduct of a peace deal, but a prerequisite for successful negotiations.	结束故意为之的屠杀平民行为不是和平协议的副产品，而是成功的谈判的先决条件。


Syria’s Dangerous Liaisons	叙利亚的危险联系


All eyes turned to Syria following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.	前黎巴嫩总理拉菲克·哈里里遇刺之后，全世界的目光都盯住了叙利亚。


Opposition groups in Lebanon, as well as Hariri supporters, openly accused Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime of being responsible for the killing.	黎巴嫩反对党和哈里里的支持者公开指责叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权要对刺杀事件负责。


The Bush administration, while not formally blaming Syria, virtually did so and recalled its ambassador to Damascus.	布什政府虽然没有正式指责叙利亚，却用实际行动表达了相同的意思，召回了驻大马士革的大使。


The US is said to be extremely angry at Syria’s refusal to withdraw its forces from Lebanon in line with a United Nations resolution.	叙利亚拒绝按照联合国决议从黎巴嫩撤出军队，有消息说这引起了美国的极大愤慨。


Growing opposition to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon is but one of four related problems Syria faces, all of which it has addressed inadequately.	黎巴嫩反抗叙利亚霸权的斗争日益激烈，但这只是叙利亚需要解决的四个问题之一，在上述四个方面，叙利亚所作的努力都远远不够。


The other three are Syria’s behavior in Iraq, its relations with the US, and the need for domestic reform.	另外三个问题是：叙利亚在伊拉克的所作所为、叙美关系和国内改革的需求。


While corrosive immobility is a trademark of the Syrian regime, these challenges threaten to reinforce each other and marginalize Syria internationally even more so than today.	叙利亚政权向来以充满危害的顽固闻名于世，上述挑战有可能愈演愈烈，使叙利亚比现在遭到国际社会的更多排斥。


In Lebanon, the Syrians have repeatedly misread the Bush administration’s intentions.	在黎巴嫩问题上，叙利亚多次误解了布什政府的意愿。


Last September, the US, together with France, sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1559 demanding a Syrian pullout and the disarming of militias – mainly Hezbollah.	去年9月，美国与法国一道提出了联合国安理会1559号决议，要求叙利亚撤军并解除以真主党为首的一切民兵武装。


This came after Assad last September imposed an unconstitutional extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s mandate, despite French and American warnings.	这项提议是在去年9月阿萨德置法美警告于不顾，违反宪法规定加大黎巴嫩总统埃米勒·拉胡德的权限后做出的。


Yet to this day, Syrian officials privately say that they don’t think the US is serious about a withdrawal.	但迄今为止，叙利亚官员还在非公开场合认为美国的撤军要求不是认真的。


Syria’s leaders also continue to dismiss demands from within Lebanon for an end to Syria’s 28-year military presence.	叙利亚领导人还继续对黎巴嫩结束28年叙利亚军事占领的呼声置之不理。


Such demands escalated dramatically after Hariri’s death, as tens of thousands of the former prime minister’s partisans, who previously sat on the fence when it came to Syria, shouted “Syria out.”	哈里里之死使上述要求更加强烈，因为前总理的数万名党内支持者从前涉及到叙利亚问题都严守中立，现在却大声疾呼“叙利亚滚出去。 ”


Indeed, a broad multi-communal opposition front has formed in Beirut to demand Syria’s departure.	实际上，贝鲁特已经成立了由不同群体组成的广泛的反抗阵线，要求叙利亚撤离。


Yet rather than address the front’s demands and shape a healthy bilateral relationship between equal countries, Syria has sought to divide the opposition and reassert control.	但叙利亚不但没有满足他们的要求，建立平等、健康的双边关系，反而试图分裂反对派，以便重掌大权。


Hariri’s assassination makes that far more difficult, and Syria must prepare for a strong backlash from the US and France.	哈里里被刺事件大大增加了这样做的难度，叙利亚还必须为由此引发的美法强烈反应做好准备。


In Iraq, since the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, Damascus has shown undue nostalgia for the old system.	在伊拉克问题上，2003年4月9日巴格达被占领后，大马士革就对过去的政权表现出异乎寻常的怀念。


Though the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties were bitter foes, there was consolation in that both were members of a confederacy of despotisms.	尽管叙利亚和伊拉克复兴党曾经誓不两立，但同为专制联盟的成员无形之间拉近了两国的距离。


For the Syrians, a democratic Iraq friendly to the US was always far worse than Saddam Hussein, the enemy they knew – and later profitably traded with – during the years of international sanctions against Iraq.	对叙利亚人来讲，亲美国的民主伊拉克远比不上萨达姆·侯赛因，他们了解这个老对手，后来还在伊拉克遭到国际制裁时从双边贸易中获利颇丰。


Syria’s suspected support for Iraqi Baathist exiles threatens to damage relations with the new Iraq.	叙利亚被怀疑支持伊拉克复兴党流亡份子可能会破坏与伊拉克新政府之间的关系。


Baghdad has repeatedly accused the Assad regime of allowing Iraqi funds to be channeled to insurgents, and recently notified the Syrians that the photograph of a senior Syrian intelligence official taken with an Islamist combatant was found on the latter’s body in Falluja.	巴格达不断指责阿萨德政权纵容伊拉克资金流向叛乱份子，不久前还通报叙利亚在费卢杰被击毙的伊斯兰武装份子身上发现了他与高级叙利亚情报官员的合影。


As a legitimate Iraqi authority emerges following the elections, the Syrians will have to show foresight in jettisoning their pro-Saddam acquaintances.	作为选举产生的伊拉克合法政府，叙利亚应该表现出应有的远见，放弃对萨达姆政权的留恋。


The Bush administration’s growing impatience with Syrian involvement in the Iraqi insurgency is a major reason for Syria’s deteriorating relationship with the US.	叙利亚卷入伊拉克叛乱使布什政府渐渐失去了耐心，这也是叙美关系日益恶化的主要原因。


Indeed, there is palpable disdain for Syria in Washington.	实际上，人们能够感受到华盛顿对叙利亚的明显蔑视。


That is why Syria’s denials that it is playing a spoiler role in Iraq are rarely taken seriously, and why Assad has not gained American support for renewed negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights.	这也是为什么人们很少把叙利亚否认在伊拉克扮演了破坏性的角色当真，也解释了为什么阿萨德在叙以格兰高地再度谈判中失去了美国的支持。


There are signs that the Syrians are unable to gauge American intentions on other issues as well.	另有迹象表明，叙利亚在其它问题上也未能摸准美国的意图。


For example, Assad apparently still does not realize how much the Bush administration associates his regime with terrorism.	比如，阿萨德显然没有意识到布什政府认为他与恐怖主义有多少联系。


Syrian officials believe that because the Baath Party is secular, the US will invariably support it against an Islamist resurgence.	叙利亚官员认定由于复兴党的非宗教性，美国肯定会支持它镇压伊斯兰叛乱。


They fail to see that American officials regard Syria as complicit in the activities of Islamist terrorist groups in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Lebanon.	他们没能看出美国官员认为叙利亚与巴勒斯坦、伊拉克和黎巴嫩领土上的伊斯兰恐怖组织串通一气，大搞恐怖活动。


At home, Assad’s regime also finds itself in a bind.	阿萨德政权在国内也进退两难。


Political and economic reform, when it advances, does so at a glacial pace.	政治和经济改革的推进速度极为缓慢。


A major item of discussion in Syria is the revival of Islam as an alternative to a political and economic system offering few incentives except to regime grandees.	叙利亚国内讨论的主要问题是复兴伊斯兰教，替代政治经济体制，但这一动议除了达官显贵外很难引起别人的兴趣。


France’s opposition to Syria’s presence in Lebanon was at least partly a reflection of disenchantment with Assad’s reformist ambitions, and the European Union has expressed similar reservations.	法国反对叙利亚驻军黎巴嫩至少部分反应了对阿萨德改革宏愿的清醒认识，欧盟也曾提出过类似的保留意见。


Assad is now in a consolidation phase, leaving little room for reform.	阿萨德正处在政权的巩固期，没有多少改革的空间。


Indeed, his new interior minister, Ghazi Kanaan, an old-school hardliner, spearheaded a crackdown on reformers and Kurds in the past year or so.	实际上，他的新任内务部长，强硬保守派加西·卡南（Ghazi Kanaan）去年亲自领导了对改革派和库尔德人的镇压。


The reshuffle last November that brought Kanaan and others into the cabinet was seen to reflect Assad’s preferences.	去年11月内阁调整，把卡南和其它人召入政府就被视作反应了阿萨德的偏好。


In the coming month, several rounds of retirements should allow the president to place more of his people in positions of power.	未来数月内的几轮退休潮会使总统有机会替换更多手握实权的官员。


Consolidation, however, is not reform.	但政权巩固不是改革。


Assad must show that his enhanced authority can lead to genuine transformation.	阿萨德必须证明他越来越大的权力能够带来真正的改革。


Until now, the president has toed a hard line on Iraq, on Lebanon, and in domestic affairs.	迄今为止，总统在对伊问题和国内事务上都执行了强硬路线。


If he’s a reformer, few are convinced.	没几个人相信他是真正的改革者。


Syria may pay a heavy price for that ambiguity.	这样的含混可能会让叙利亚付出惨重的代价。


Syria’s Sectarian Stalemate	叙利亚的宗派僵局


PRINCETON – What began in Syria as a revolt against an oppressive regime has evolved into a sectarian civil war and, more recently, into a proxy conflict.	普林斯顿—叙利亚的反抗压迫性政权的革命已经演变为宗派内战，最近更是成了代理冲突。


In the process, the struggle has become increasingly convoluted, with conflicting agendas among allies, together with deep-seated communal tensions, rendering the situation nearly intractable.	在此过程中，斗争变得越来越复杂，各阵营间的冲突日程加上深层次的社会紧张，让局面几近不可收拾。


On one side, the United States, the European Union, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are backing the opposition – a welter of armed factions with diverse agendas and ideologies that range from Syrian nationalist to global jihadi.	一方面，美国、欧盟、土耳其、约旦、沙特和卡塔尔支持着反对派——由各种武装派系组成的大杂烩，日程和意识形态各式各样，从叙利亚民族主义到全球圣战主义无所不包。


This disunity reflects the fissures in Syrian society, a result of more than four decades of brutal authoritarian rule.	其一盘散沙的状态反映了叙利亚社会的裂缝，这是四十多年残酷独裁统治的后果。


On the other side, Russia and Iran (and its proxy, Lebanon’s Hezbollah), each for its own reasons, are supporting President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	另一方面，俄罗斯和伊朗（及其代理人黎巴嫩真主党）出于各自的理由支持着巴沙尔·阿萨德政权。


Russia’s motivations are tied to the legacy of the Cold War.	俄罗斯的动机与冷战残留思想有关。


The Assad regime has consistently adopted an anti-Western stance, aligning itself with the Soviet Union and later with Russia.	巴沙尔政权一直采取反西方立场，与苏联（后来与俄罗斯）站在同一条战壕里。


Today, Syria represents Russia’s only remaining toehold in the Arab world, while all of Assad’s regional opponents are US allies.	如今，叙利亚代表着俄罗斯在阿拉伯世界的仅存的硕果，而巴沙尔政权的地区敌人皆是美国盟友。


Iran’s involvement reflects a different, much older struggle – that between Sunni and Shia for control of the Middle East.	伊朗的介入反映了另一场历史远为悠久的斗争——逊尼派和什叶派对中东地区的争夺战。


With Shia-dominated Iran providing weapons, money, troops, and training for Assad’s forces, the conflict’s sectarian dimension has taken on greater significance.	什叶派主导的伊朗为巴沙尔军队提供武器、金钱、军队和训练，让冲突的宗派色彩更加浓厚了。


Indeed, government forces have devolved into a sectarian army, motivated by the fear that, if the largely Sunni rebels are victorious, they will annihilate the Shia-affiliated Alawite minority that has ruled Syria for decades.	事实上，政府军已经演化为宗派部队，其作战动机是担心一旦逊尼派占多数的反对派获胜，他们就会清除统治叙利亚几十年之久的、人数占少数地位的、属于什叶派的阿拉维派。


As it stands, Assad’s regime possesses an overwhelming military advantage, with an air force, tanks, missiles, and chemical and biological weapons.	巴沙尔政权拥有压倒性的军事优势，有空军、坦克、导弹和生化武器。


In order to defeat them, the opposition needs more sophisticated weapons – and its backers are ready to oblige.	为了打败他们，反对派需要更先进的武器——而支持者已经做好了提供准备。


Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar – all Sunni-led countries – have sharply increased their military aid to the Syrian rebels in recent months.	近几个月来，土耳其、沙特、约旦和卡塔尔——都是逊尼派主导的国家——极大地提升了给叙利亚叛军的军事援助。


Even the United States, which has so far refused to provide lethal aid for fear of arming global jihadis, recently announced that it is working on a plan to deliver weapons to opposition forces.	就连美国——由于担心武装全球圣战分子，美国到目前为止仍拒绝提供致命武器援助——最近也宣布正在起草向反对派军队提供武器的计划。


Sunni-Shia tensions tend to rise sharply during geopolitical power struggles, such as in Iraq in 2006-2008.	逊尼派-什叶派对峙总是会在地缘政治势力缠斗时迅速发酵，比如2006—2008年的伊拉克。


Prior to that, the last great Sunni-Shia battle in the Middle East involved near-constant war between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and Iran’s Shia Safavid Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.	前一次中东逊尼派-什叶派大斗争则是几乎横亘整个16和17世纪的逊尼派奥斯曼帝国和伊朗的什叶派萨菲帝国战争。


The Ottomans won by a small margin, ultimately securing control over Iraq.	最终结果是奥斯曼帝国险胜，最终捍卫了对伊拉克的控制。


But the protracted conflict contributed to the decline of both empires and devastated Iraq, leaving behind a deep sectarian cleavage.	但后续冲突一直持续到两大帝国崩溃并摧毁了伊拉克，留下的是深刻的宗派割据。


This does not bode well for Syria.	这对叙利亚来说绝非吉兆。


Since the 1970’s, the Assads have failed to foster Arab nationalism in order to unite the religiously divided population, resorting instead to divisive sectarian politics to control Syria’s population.	自20世纪70年代以来，巴沙尔一直没能培养出阿拉伯民���主义从而将信仰不同的人民统一起来，而是采用分裂的宗派政治控制叙利亚人民。


While ensuring that their Alawite allies filled key positions in the military and intelligence services helped the Assads to retain their grip on the country, it was a strategy that widened and reinforced the Sunni-Shia rift among the population.	尽管保证阿拉维派盟友把持军队和情报机构要职帮助巴沙尔控制着叙利亚，但这一战略扩大并加深了叙利亚人民之间的逊尼派-什叶派仇恨。


When the Arab Spring began to unfold, Assad adopted the same approach, hoping that it would rally his Alawite supporters and scare the rest of the public into submission.	阿拉伯之春开始发酵时，巴沙尔采取了相同的套路，希望能提振其阿拉维派支持者、把其他人民吓得投降。


This time, however, the plan backfired.	但是，这一回，巴沙尔的算盘落空了。


Syria’s Sunni population, inspired by the revolutions in other Arab countries and outraged by the regime’s brutality, simply stopped being afraid – a potentially game-changing development for Arab authoritarianism.	叙利亚逊尼派人民受其他阿拉伯国家革命的鼓舞、出于对巴沙尔政权残酷统治的愤怒，变得不再害怕——这是巴沙尔独裁游戏的转折点。


Now, the consequences of the Assads’ failure to promote a shared national ideology are becoming fully exposed.	如今，巴沙尔在推行共同国家意识方面的失败充分暴露了。


Syria’s Sunnis are increasingly invoking theology to justify hatred of the Shia minority, and forms of Sunni exclusivism, similar to Al Qaeda’s ideology and worldview, are becoming the norm.	叙利亚逊尼派越来越多地用神学来论证对什叶派少数派的怎哼，逊尼派沙文主义——类似于基地组织的意识形态和世界观——正在成为常态。


While Assad has secured the Alawite community’s renewed support, he has done so at the cost of increasing the very real danger that the rebels will punish all Alawites for the regime’s crimes.	巴沙尔成功地确保了阿拉维派重新支持他，但为此付出的代价是叛军可能会惩罚整个阿拉维派。


As the war grinds on, prospects for a negotiated solution are diminishing.	随着战事的发展，通过谈判形成解决方案的前景日渐渺茫。


As Iran throws its weight – and billions of dollars – behind the Alawites, and the Gulf States do likewise in support of the Sunnis, Syria is being torn apart.	伊朗下注于阿拉维派，已经抛出了几十亿美元，波斯湾国家也对逊尼派做出了类似规模的支持，在这样的环境下，叙利亚正在分崩离析。


Soon, it will be too far gone for either side to be able to claim victory.	很快，局面就将不可收拾，任何一方都无法宣布自己胜利。


Uniting Syria	统一的叙利亚


BERLIN – Syrian opposition activists regularly express disappointment with the level of international support that they receive.	柏林—叙利亚反对派积极分子总是对他们所得到的国际支持表示失望。


Although the last meeting of the so-called “Friends of Syria” (a group of countries that convenes periodically to discuss Syria’s situation outside of the United Nations Security Council) brought more financial aid, the degree of genuine outside commitment to their cause remains questionable.	尽管所谓的“叙利亚之友”（定期集会在联合国安理会框架之外讨论叙利亚状况的一组国家）的上一次会议决定增加财务援助，但真正外部援助承诺仍相当可疑。


The United States, the European Union, Turkey, and most Arab countries agree that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is no longer legitimate.	美国、欧盟、土耳其和大部分阿拉伯国家一致认为叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权已不再合法。


They have intensified sanctions against the government, and have provided different kinds of support to opposition groups.	他们收紧了对叙利亚政府的制裁，并给予反对势力各种各样的支持。


Some states have delivered automatic weapons, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades.	一些国家提供了自动化武器、弹药和火箭弹。


But arms deliveries have dried up, and the rebels’ pleas for anti-aircraft weapons remain unanswered.	但武器提供已经枯竭，起义军对防空武器的要求也一直没有回应。


Moreover, neither Syria’s neighbors nor Western governments are willing to intervene militarily.	此外，不论是叙利亚的邻国还是西方国家，政府都不愿采取军事干预。


Indeed, despite expressions of solidarity, they have refused to establish a protection zone for Syrian civilians along the border of neighboring states, or to impose a no-fly zone for Syrian military aircraft.	事实上，尽管口头宣称团结一致，但它们拒绝沿邻国边境建立叙利亚平民保护区，或为叙利亚空军设置禁飞区。


As a result, Syrian opposition groups believe that they have been left to confront Assad’s brutal regime alone.	结果，叙利亚反对派认为他们是在孤军与巴沙尔的苛政奋战。


But Syrian oppositionists must recognize that the lack of decisive international action is not only the result of Russia and China vetoing any meaningful action in the Security Council, or NATO countries’ unwillingness to enter into another war in the region.	但叙利亚反对派必须明白，国际社会未能采取决定性行动并不只是因为俄罗斯和中国否决了任何有意义的安理会行动，或只是因为北约国家不愿意涉足另一场地区战争。


In fact, the international community is waiting for Syria’s disorganized opposition to transform itself into a coherent, effective force as much as the opposition is waiting for the international community.	事实上，国际社会在等待叙利亚一盘散沙的反对派自己形成一股团结、有效的力量，正如反对派在等待国际社会的行动一样。


This entails forming a common platform that represents all relevant groups, including the Local Coordination Committees, the Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union, and the Free Syrian Army’s military councils.	这要求建立一个代表所有相关势力的共同平台，包括地方协调委员会（Local Coordination Committees）、叙利亚革命协调联盟（Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union）以及自由叙利亚军（Free Syrian Army）军事委员会。


To be sure, the rebels have made some progress.	平心而论，起义军做出了一些进步。


They have created four regional military councils, which have helped to consolidate leadership and solidify their control over significant areas of the country, particularly near the Turkish border.	他们成立了四个地区军事委员会，这有助于他们巩固领导权和对叙利亚广大地区的控制，特别是土耳其边境地区。


Yet the Syrian opposition has so far failed to present itself as a unified actor.	但叙利亚反对派并没能形成一股统一的势力。


This is astonishing, given that highly respected, influential figures and political parties have been speaking for the opposition at international gatherings.	这一点令人吃惊，因为德高望重、影响力极大的人物和政党一直在国家会议上为代表反对派发声。


The Syrian National Council (SNC), for example, includes many such figures, and has managed to gain material support from several countries.	���如，叙利亚国民委员会（SNC）就包括了很多遮掩的人物，并设法获得了不少国家的物资支持。


But it is not inclusive enough to serve as the Syrian opposition’s sole representative.	但它的包容性还不足以成为叙利亚反对派的唯一代表。


Attempts to enlarge the SNC have been unsuccessful, owing to reservations expressed by some important groups, such as the Democratic Forum, about joining an organization that relies on foreign sponsors.	扩大SNC的努力没有获得成功，因为民主论坛（Democratic Forum）等一些重要集团对加入依靠外国赞助人的组织采取保留态度。


The Syrian opposition needs to establish an umbrella organization accepted by all, including the de facto civilian and military leaders who have emerged locally over the last year and a half.	叙利亚反对派需要建立一个能被各方（包括过去一年半以来则各地出现的事实上的文职和军职领导人）接受的组织联盟。


These groups already share a common goal – to bring down Assad’s regime – and most of them (with a few ultra-militant exceptions) hope to build a peaceful, inclusive, and democratic state.	这些集团已经存在共同目标——推翻巴沙尔政权——且其中的绝大部分（除了少数极端军政主义者）希望建立一个和平、包容、民主的国家。


Influential opposition figures – such as former parliamentarian and political prisoner Riad Seif and the SNC’s former leader, Burhan Ghalioun – have proposed promising strategies for forming such an umbrella organization.	有影响力的反对派人物——如前议员兼政治犯赛义夫（Riad Seif）、SNC前领导人加里昂（Burhan Ghalioun）等——提议为建立这样一个组织联盟而做出战略承诺。


For example, a “group of wise persons” who do not seek political positions could oversee the creation of a provisional council that includes all relevant political groups and coalitions, the military councils, the business community, and religious leaders.	比如，成立一个不追求政治地位的“智者集团”（group of wise persons），以之监督包括所有政治集团和联盟、军事委员会、商界人士和宗教领袖的临时委员会的建立。


But such plans have not been realized, owing to the absence of a cooperative culture.	但这些计划并未成为现实，因为叙利亚缺少合作的文化。


Given that Syrians were socialized in a deeply authoritarian system, even those who are fighting for a democratic system are inexperienced in the art of coalition building.	叙利亚社会是一个深度独裁的社会，即使是那些为民主制度而奋斗的人，在建立联盟方面也毫无经验可言。


Also, potential politicians have never been able really to measure their popularity in democratic contests.	此外，潜在政客从未真正学会在民主竞争中估算自己的支持度。


As a result, not a few of them overestimate their actual influence and tend to compete for leadership rather than cooperate.	结果，他们中有不少人高估了自己的实际影响力，更愿意竞争领导地位而不是合作。


Syria’s opposition leaders do not need to sweep their political differences under the rug in order to gain the international community’s support.	叙利亚反对派领导人不需要为了赢得国际社会支持而关门他们之间的解决政治分歧。


They simply need to create a common body that all relevant groups on the ground can accept, as the Libyan opposition did when it set up the National Transitional Council.	他们需要做的只是建立一个可以为所有相关集团所接受的共同机构，比如利比亚反对派所建立的国民过渡委员会。


After that, they should establish a legitimate authority inside Syria that can administer liberated areas, distribute aid, and provide services to civilians.	在此基础上，他们在叙利亚内部建立一个合法当局治理解放区、分配援助物资并为平民提供服务。


Such a transitional authority could call upon the international community for needed support more easily than an exiled rebel group could.	与流亡起义军集团相比，过渡当局更容易要求国际社会给予所需支持。


The Syrian revolution is essentially a civilian and political rebellion against dictatorship – one that is gradually unraveling Assad’s regime.	叙利亚革命根本上是一次反对独裁的平民和政治起义，并在逐渐形成推翻巴沙尔政权的燎原之势。


The opposition must begin to lay the groundwork for a new order based on unity and cooperation.	反对派必须开始为基于团结和合作的新秩序打好基础。


Otherwise, smaller groups of armed militants – supported, or even manipulated, by external actors – will dictate Syria’s future.	否则的话，小规模的武装军事力量——由外部行为人支持甚至控制——将主宰叙利亚的未来。


Syria’s Darkest Hour	叙利亚最黑暗的时刻


MADRID – The conflict in Syria becomes more complex every day that it continues, and the country’s prospects have gotten only worse.	马德里—叙利亚冲突每持续一天都会变得更加复杂，国家前景也变得更加渺茫。


The daily horrors that Aleppo’s besieged citizens are now experiencing mark a new low point, following the collapse of the latest ceasefire, brokered by the United States and Russia, which disturbingly fell apart precisely at the same time that world leaders were gathered together for the United Nations General Assembly.	深陷重围的阿勒颇市民天天担惊受怕，由美国和俄罗斯调停的最新停火协议崩溃后，这种体验现在又达到了新高度。 在世界领导人齐聚联合国大会之际，停火协议的崩溃让局面变得万分被动。


When the Syrian conflict finally ends, three of its defining features will complicate reconstruction efforts.	叙利亚冲突最终结束后，其三个主要特征将让重建变得十分复杂。


For starters, parties on all sides of the fight have disregarded international human-rights law and violated basic humanitarian norms.	首先，战斗各方鸽派都践踏了国际人权法，违反了基本人道主义准则。


In fact, blocking humanitarian aid, attacking civilians, and targeting sites specially protected by international law have become strategies of war.	事实上，阻止人道主义援助、袭击平民以及专门针对受国际法保护的据点，这些行为已经成为战争策略。


Just since April, Syrian hospitals have suffered dozens of attacks, and aid has been withheld from some of the most devastated villages.	仅仅从4月以来，叙利亚医院就遭遇几十宗袭击，援助被阻挠，无法进入一些破坏最严重的村庄。


Many hospitals in Aleppo have had to close after being targeted during the siege.	阿勒颇的大部分医院在围城期间成为打击目标，被迫关门。


These actions may constitute war crimes, and they are sadly not new.	这些行为可以构成战争罪，但悲哀的是，它们并非新鲜事。


In 2015 alone, medical installations in Syria affiliated with Doctors Without Borders incurred 94 attacks, leaving 23 of the organization’s workers dead and another 58 wounded.	光是在2015年，无国界医生组织旗下的叙利亚医疗站就遭到94宗袭击，导致该组织23名工作人员死亡，58人受伤。


Last May, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for all parties involved in Syria to respect international humanitarian law; now, Security Council members are accusing one another other of violating their own resolution.	去年5月，联合国安理会通过决议呼吁叙利亚所涉各方尊重国际人道主义法； 如今，安理会各成员国纷纷彼此指责违反自己同意的决议。


A second dynamic that could frustrate any peace effort is the conflict’s complex map of players, all of which will have to be accounted for in a final accord.	可能让一切和平措施难以为继的第二个动态是冲突各方属性复杂，而要形成协议，必须协调所有各方的利益。


While this map has changed significantly since the war began, the level of fragmentation within the groups on either side has become increasingly evident lately.	自战争爆发以来，各方属性发生了重大变化，各方内部各集团的分裂程度也变得越来越清楚。


Now that the jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra has changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and reportedly dissociated itself from al-Qaeda, it is better positioned to ally with other rebel factions that have also rejected al-Qaeda.	圣战组织救国阵线（Jabhat al-Nusra）已更名为胜利阵线（Jabhat Fatah al-Sham），并且据说已与基地组织脱离，这也使它能够更好地与其他同样拒绝了基地组织的叛军派系结盟。


But while this rapprochement strengthens the fighting groups militarily, it also blurs the lines between rebels and Islamist radicals.	尽管这一关系重塑加强了斗争集团在军事上的联系，它也模糊了叛军与伊斯兰激进派的界限。


This has occurred while rebel groups not closely aligned with al-Nusra have become weaker, allowing the Syrian regime to insist that it is not suppressing a rebellion, but fighting a war against terrorism.	与此同时，与救国阵线关系疏远的叛军集团江河日下，这让叙利亚政府坚持自己并不是在镇压叛军，而是在于恐怖主义作战。


Thus, at the UN General Assembly, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem recently accused the US-led coalition in Syria of abetting terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State.	因此，在联合国大会上，叙利亚外交部长瓦利德·穆阿里木（Walid al-Moallem）指责美国领导的叙利亚联盟支持包括伊斯兰国在内的恐怖组织。


Some months ago, discussions about a peace process centered on the question of whether Assad should go immediately, or remain during a transitional government; now, the question is whether the former al-Nusra is a viable partner.	几个月前，和平进程的讨论集中在应该让巴沙尔·阿萨德立即下台还是让他继续留在过渡政府中的问题上； 现在，问题是救国阵线是否是可靠的合作者。


But the pro-Assad side has divisions of its own.	但亲巴沙尔方也有自己的裂痕。


In addition to the Russian army, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Afghan groups are also fighting for the regime, and each of these actors has its own interests.	除了俄军，叙利亚、伊拉克、伊朗和阿富汗集团也在于政府打仗，并且这些行动饭各有各的利益。


Some parties’ interests in the war are well known: Assad wants to remain in power; Russia wants to demonstrate its status as a great power capable of resisting the US; and Iran wants to increase its regional influence and secure access to the Mediterranean.	一些行动方的利益众所周知：巴沙尔想保住权力； 俄罗斯想证明其作为有能力拒绝美国的强国地位；


When the fighting ends, these positions will only become more entrenched.	伊朗想增加地区影响力并确保地中海入海口。 战斗结束后，这些立场必然更加根深蒂固。


A third obstacle in the path toward Syrian peace is the US-Russia stalemate.	通往叙利亚和平的第三个障碍是美俄僵局。


After so many broken ceasefires, the two countries clearly lack mutual trust.	在经历了多次停火破产后，两国显然缺少互信。


And as Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center has pointed out, the latest failure could have far more worrying consequences than past diplomatic impasses.	卡耐基莫斯科中心的德米特里·特里宁（Dmitri Trenin）指出，最近的停火失败所造成后果比过去的外交僵局更加严重。


So far, the US and Russia have not only broken off bilateral negotiations; mutual nuclear agreements have also come under threat.	目前，美国和俄罗斯不但双边谈判破裂； 双方的核协议也岌岌可危。


After the US accused Russia of committing war crimes in Syria, Russia declared that it was suspending an agreement to dispose of surplus plutonium unless the US meets certain conditions, including compensating Russia for the costs of Western sanctions imposed after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014.	美国指责俄罗斯在叙利亚犯有战争罪，随后俄罗斯宣布暂停披露处置剩余钚的协议，直到美国满足一些条件，包括补偿俄罗斯因为2014年3月吞并克里米亚而受到的西方制裁所导致的损失。


For its part, the US is in an uncertain position now that rebel factions have regrouped and its direct cooperation with Russia is on hold.	至于美国，由于叛军各派系重新聚合，同时美俄合作陷入搁置，它现在也处于不确定的处境。


President Barack Obama has only a short time left in office, which makes any major foreign-policy shift under his administration almost impossible.	总统奥巴马即将卸任，这意味着其政府几乎不可能会有重大外交政策转变。


As the battle for Aleppo rages on, so, too, does the US presidential election campaign that will determine his successor.	阿勒颇战事正在升级，将产生奥巴马继任者的美国总统选战也在升级。


After more than five years of conflict in Syria, retreating without having found a solution is not an option.	叙利亚冲突已经爆发了五年多，在没有形成解决方案的情况下就撤退绝不是选项之一。


Although the new map of players complicates things, there is no doubt that they must all participate in a peace deal; otherwise, any agreement will prove ephemeral.	尽管各行动方的属性新动向让局面复杂化，但毫无疑问，它们必须都参与到和平协议中； 否则，任何协议都将是短暂的。


Likewise, in order to rebuild Syrian civil society for the long term, all of the warring parties will have to take responsibility for their crimes.	类似地，要想从长计议重建叙利亚公民社会，所有战争各方都必须为战争罪承担责任。


The issue of responsibility will be one of the most difficult challenges in the effort to achieve lasting peace.	责任问题将是实现持久和平最困难的挑战之一。


We will need committed leaders both inside and outside Syria.	我们需要叙利亚内外的领导人全力投入。


Although the US presidential election will be consequential, it has also become clear that peace cannot be delivered by the US and Russia on their own.	尽管美国总统大选意义重大，但显然和平无法只靠俄罗斯和美国实现。


European leaders should step in to restart negotiations.	欧洲领导人也应该介入，重启谈判。


The European Union has mistakenly sat on the sidelines of these talks for too long, despite Syria’s importance to its own security and interests, and despite its responsibility to Syria’s citizens.	长期以来，欧盟错误地选择旁观谈判，尽管叙利亚对欧洲自身的安全和利益十分重要，并且欧洲对叙利亚人民也负有责任。


The EU should make every diplomatic and humanitarian effort to bring together all participating parties and end the violence as soon as possible.	欧盟应该竭尽一切外交和人道主义可能，让所有参与各方坐下来谈判，并尽快结束暴力。


Only then can Syria’s reconstruction begin.	惟其如此，叙利亚才能开始重建。


Why Syriza Will Blink	左翼联盟必败论


LONDON – Once again, Greece seems to have slipped the financial noose.	伦敦—希腊似乎再一次踏入了金融圈套。


By drawing on its holdings in an International Monetary Fund reserve account, it was able to repay €750 million ($851 million) – ironically to the IMF itself – just as the payment was falling due.	借助其在国际货币基金组织（IMF）储备账户中的资金，它得以在最后一刻偿还7. 5亿欧元——讽刺的是，还的正是IMF本身。


This brinkmanship is no accident.	如此惊险绝非巧合。


Since coming to power in January, the Greek government, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza party, has believed that the threat of default – and thus of a financial crisis that might break up the euro – provides negotiating leverage to offset Greece’s lack of economic and political power.	自1月执政以来，由总理齐普拉斯的左翼联盟（Syriza）党领导的希腊政府认为，违约——以及可能由此导致的欧元区崩溃——威胁能够给希腊提供谈判筹码，抵消其在经济和政治实力上的弱势。


Months later, Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, an academic expert in game theory, still seem committed to this view, despite the lack of any evidence to support it.	几个月后，齐普拉斯和他的财政部长、博弈论专家瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）似乎仍坚持这一观点，尽管根本没有证据可以支持这一看法。


But their calculation is based on a false premise.	但他们的算计基于一个错误的前提。


Tsipras and Varoufakis assume that a default would force Europe to choose between just two alternatives: expel Greece from the eurozone or offer it unconditional debt relief.	齐普拉斯和瓦鲁法基斯认为违约将迫使欧洲在两个选项中进行选择：将希腊逐出欧元区，或无条件债务减免。


But the European authorities have a third option in the event of a Greek default.	但如果希腊违约，欧洲当局还有第三条路。


Instead of forcing a “Grexit,” the EU could trap Greece inside the eurozone and starve it of money, then simply sit back and watch the Tsipras government’s domestic political support collapse.	它可以不强迫“希腊退出”发生，而是把希腊困在欧元区内又不给它钱，然后坐视齐普拉斯政府国内支持率崩盘。


Such a siege strategy – waiting for Greece to run out of the money it needs to maintain the normal functions of government – now looks like the EU’s most promising technique to break Greek resistance.	如今，这一包围战略——等待希腊耗尽维持政府正常功能所需要的资金——或许是欧盟最有希望的让希腊就范的办法。


It is likely to work because the Greek government finds it increasingly difficult to scrape together enough money to pay wages and pensions at the end of each month.	它有成功的可能，因为希腊政府越来越难以筹集足够的资金在每个月底支付工资和退休金。


To do so, Varoufakis has been resorting to increasingly desperate measures, such as seizing the cash in municipal and hospital bank accounts.	于是，瓦鲁法基斯开始采取越来越绝望的措施，如冻结市政和医院的银行账户。


The implication is that tax collections have been so badly hit by the economic chaos since January’s election that government revenues are no longer sufficient to cover day-to-day costs.	其影响是自1月选举以来税收工作因为经济混乱而大受冲击，以至于政府收入已不足以覆盖日常成本。


If this is true – nobody can say for sure because of the unreliability of Greek financial statistics (another of the EU authorities’ complaints) – the Greek government’s negotiating strategy is doomed.	果真如此的话——没有人知道确切答案，因为希腊金融数据根本不可靠（这是另一件深受欧盟当局诟病的事）——希腊政府的谈判战略必将破产。


The Tsipras-Varoufakis strategy assumed that Greece could credibly threaten to default, because the government, if forced to follow through, would still have more than enough money to pay for wages, pensions, and public services.	齐普拉斯-瓦鲁法基斯战略假设希腊可以提出可信的违约威胁，因为希腊政府如果被迫坚持到底，仍有足够的钱支付工资、退休金和维持公共服务。


That was a reasonable assumption back in January.	在1月份，这是一个合理的纪念社。


The government had budgeted for a large primary surplus (which excludes interest payments), which was projected at 4% of GDP.	政府预算存在巨大的初级盈余（不含利息支付），据预测可达GDP的4%。


If Greece had defaulted in January, this primary surplus could (in theory) have been redirected from interest payments to finance the higher wages, pensions, and public spending that Syriza had promised in its election campaign.	如果希腊在1月份违约，这一初级盈余（理论上）将不再用于支付利息，而是为左翼联盟在选战中所承诺的提高工资、退休金和公共支出提供资金。


Given this possibility, Varoufakis may have believed that he was making other EU finance ministers a generous offer by proposing to cut the primary surplus from 4% to 1% of GDP, rather than all the way to zero.	基于这一可能性，瓦鲁法基斯也许认为，他提出的将初级盈余从GDP的4%削减到1%（而不是直接减到零）已是对其他欧盟财政部长的慷慨赏赐。


If the EU refused, his implied threat was simply to stop paying interest and make the entire primary surplus available for extra public spending.	如果欧盟拒绝，他的隐含威胁将是停止支付利息，把所有可动用初级盈余用于扩大公共支出。


But what if the primary surplus – the Greek government’s trump card in its confrontational negotiating strategy – has now disappeared?	但如果初级盈余——希腊政府在谈判战略冲突中的王牌——现在已经消失了该怎么办？


In that case, the threat of default is no longer credible.	这样的话，违约威胁就不再可信。


With the primary surplus gone, a default would no longer permit Tsipras to fulfill Syriza’s campaign promises; on the contrary, it would imply even bigger cutbacks in wages, pensions, and public spending than the “troika” – the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF – is now demanding.	没有了初级盈余，违约就不再可以让齐普拉斯实现左翼联盟的竞选承诺； 相反，这只能进一步拉低工资、退休金和公共支出，比“三驾马车”——欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF现在所要求的程度还要大。


For the EU authorities, by contrast, a Greek default would now be much less problematic than previously assumed.	反之，对欧盟当局而言，现在希腊违约的问题比此前认为的要小得多。


They no longer need to deter a default by threatening Greece with expulsion from the euro.	它们不再需要威胁将希腊逐出欧元区来迫使它不违约。


Instead, the EU can now rely on the Greek government itself to punish its people by failing to pay wages and pensions and honor bank guarantees.	相反，现在欧盟可以让希腊政府自己去惩罚它的人民——无法在支付工资和退休金，也无法在兑现银行担保。


Tsipras and Varoufakis should have seen this coming, because the same thing happened two years ago, when Cyprus, in the throes of a banking crisis, attempted to defy the EU.	齐普拉斯和瓦鲁法基斯应该已经看到了这一可能，因为同样的事情两年前发生过——深陷银行危机的塞浦路斯试图挑战欧盟。


The Cyprus experience suggests that, with the credibility of the government’s default threat in tatters, the EU is likely to force Greece to stay in the euro and put it through an American-style municipal bankruptcy, like that of Detroit.	塞浦路斯的经验表明，如果政府违约威胁不再可信，欧盟可能强迫希腊留在欧元区，然后让它经历美国式的市政破产——比如底特律。


The legal and political mechanisms for treating Greece like a municipal bankruptcy are clear.	像市政破产那样对待希腊有着明确的法律和政治机制。


The European treaties state unequivocally that euro membership is irreversible unless a country decides to exit not just from the single currency but from the entire EU.	欧洲条约明确指出，欧元成员资格是不可撤销的，除非一国在退出单一货币的同时也退出整个欧盟。


That is also the political message that EU governments want to instill in their own citizens and financial investors.	这也是欧盟各政府希望给本国公民和金融投资者灌输的政治信息。


If Greece defaults, the EU will be legally justified and politically motivated to insist that the euro remains its only legal tender.	在希腊违约事件中，欧盟具有法律正当性和政治动机坚持欧盟是其唯一法定货币。


Even if the Greek government decides to pay wages and pensions by printing its own IOUs or “new drachmas,” the European Court of Justice will rule that all domestic debts and bank deposits must be repaid in euros.	即使希腊政府决定用它自己的白条或“新德拉克马”支付工资和退休金，欧洲法院（European Court of Justice）也将裁决所有本国债务和银行存款必须用欧元支付。


That, in turn, will force a default against Greek citizens, as well as foreign creditors, because the government will be unable to honor the euro value of insured deposits in Greek banks.	着反过来将迫使希腊公民和外国债权人遭遇违约，因为希腊政府无法保证希腊银行存款的欧元价值。


So a Greek default within the euro, far from allowing Syriza to honor its election promises, would inflict even greater austerity on Greek voters than they endured under the troika program.	因此，留在欧元区内的希腊违约根本无法让左翼联盟兑现竞选承诺，反而会给希腊选民带来比三驾马车的计划更加大规模的紧缩。


At that point, the government’s collapse would become inevitable.	到那时，希腊政府的倒闭将是不可避免的。


Instead of Greece exiting the eurozone, Syriza would exit the Greek government.	希腊不会退出欧元区，左翼联盟倒是会被赶出希腊政府。


As soon as Tsipras realizes that the rules of the game between Greece and Europe have changed, his capitulation will be just a matter of time.	只要齐普拉斯认识到希腊和欧洲的博弈规则已经改变，他的投向将只是时间问题。


The Greek Austerity Myth	希腊紧缩神话


BRUSSELS – Since the anti-austerity Syriza party's victory in Greece's recent general election, the “Greek problem" is again preoccupying markets and policymakers throughout Europe.	布鲁塞尔—自反紧缩的左翼联盟党（Syriza）在希腊最新大选中获胜以来，“希腊问题”再次占领了全欧洲市场和决策者的注意力。


Some fear a return to the uncertainty of 2012, when many thought that a Greek default and exit from the eurozone were imminent.	一些人担心2012年的不确定性卷土重来。 当时，许多人认为希腊马上就要违约并退出欧元区。


Then as now, many worry that a Greek debt crisis could destabilize – and perhaps even bring down – Europe's monetary union.	而如今，许多人担心希腊债务危机可能动摇——甚至可能颠覆——欧洲货币联盟。


But this time really is different.	但这一回真的不同。


One critical difference lies in economic fundamentals.	一个关键不同在于经济基本面。


Over the last two years, the eurozone's other peripheral countries have proven their capacity for adjustment, by reducing their fiscal deficits, expanding exports, and moving to current-account surpluses, thereby negating the need for financing.	在过去两年中，欧元区的其他外围国证明了调整能力，减少了财政赤字，扩大了出口，并出现了经常项目盈余，从而不再有融资需要。


Indeed, Greece is the only one that has consistently dragged its feet on reforms and sustained abysmal export performance.	事实上，希腊是唯一一个深陷改革困境和出口表现持续萎靡的国家。


Providing an additional shield to the peripheral countries is the European Central Bank's plan to begin purchasing sovereign bonds.	欧洲央行计划开始购买主权债券，这为外围国提供了新的保障。


Though the German government does not officially support quantitative easing, it should be grateful to the ECB for calming financial markets.	尽管希腊政府并未官方支持量化宽松，但它应该感谢欧洲央行安抚金融市场。


Now Germany can take a tough stance on the new Greek government's demands for a large-scale debt write-off and an end to austerity, without fearing the kind of financial-market turbulence that in 2012 left the eurozone with little choice but to bail out Greece.	如今，德国可以针对希腊新政府大规模债务减记和结束紧缩的要求采取强硬立场，而不必担心2012年的金融市场动荡——当时，这场动荡让欧元区别无选择，只能援助希腊。


In fact, both of the Greek government's demands are based on a misunderstanding.	事实上，希腊政府的要求都建立在误解的基础上。


For starters, Syriza and others argue that Greece's public debt, at a massive 170% of GDP, is unsustainable and must be cut.	首先，左翼联盟和其他人认为希腊的公共债务——高达GDP的170%——是不可持续的，必须削减。


Given that the country's official debt constitutes the bulk of its overall public debt, the government wants it reduced.	由于该国官方债务构成了其公共债务总额的一大半，因此政府希望削减。


In fact, Greece's official creditors have granted it long enough grace periods and low enough interest rates that the burden is bearable.	事实上，希腊的官方债权人已经给了它足够长的宽限期和足够低的利率，因此希腊的债务负担是可承受的。


Greece actually spends less on debt service than Italy or Ireland, both of which have much lower (gross) debt-to-GDP ratios.	实际上，希腊的债务维持成本比意大利和爱尔兰都低，而后两国的（毛）债务-GDP比率远远低于希腊。


With payments on Greece's official foreign debt amounting to only 1.5% of GDP, debt service is not the country's problem.	希腊官方外债偿付额只占其GDP的1. 5%，因此维持债务不是希腊的问题。


The relatively low debt-service cost also removes the justification for Syriza's demands for an end to austerity.	相对较低的债务维持成本也使得左翼联盟结束紧缩的要求站不住脚。


The last bailout program from the “troika" (the International Monetary Fund, the ECB, and the European Commission), initiated in 2010, foresees a primary budget surplus (which excludes interest payments) of 4% of GDP this year.	“三驾马车”（国际货币基金组织、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）的最新援助计划始于2010年，原本计划今年出现相当于GDP的4%的（不含利息偿付的）初级预算盈余。


That would be slightly more than is needed to cover interest payments, and would thus allow Greece finally to begin to reduce its debt.	这个数字将略高于希腊利息偿付负担，因此能够使希腊最终开始减少债务。


The new Greek government's argument that this is an unreasonable target fails to withstand scrutiny.	希腊新政府认为这是不合理的目标，但这一说法经不起考验。


After all, when faced with excessively high debt, other European countries – including Belgium (from 1995), Ireland (from 1991), and Norway (from 1999) – maintained similar surpluses for at least ten years each, typically in the aftermath of a financial crisis.	毕竟，在面临过高的债务时，其他欧盟成员国——包括比利时（1995年起）、爱尔兰（1991年起）和挪威（1999年起）——都至少维持了十年的类似盈余，并且它们也都起步于金融危机后。


To be sure, one can reasonably argue that austerity in the eurozone has been excessive, and that fiscal deficits should have been much larger to sustain demand.	平心而论，你可以合理地认为欧元区的紧缩确实过度了，并且财政赤字应该比现在大得多以维持需求。


But only governments with access to market finance can use expansionary fiscal policy to boost demand.	但只有能获得市场融资的政府才能使用扩张性财政政策提振需求。


For Greece, higher spending would have to be financed by lending from one or more official institutions.	对希腊来说，增加支出只能通过从一家或多家机构更多地借入贷款实现。


For the same reason, it is disingenuous to claim that the troika forced Greece into excessive austerity.	同理，认为三驾马车迫使希腊采取过度紧缩也是狡辩。


Had Greece not received financial support in 2010, it would have had to cut its fiscal deficit from more than 10% of GDP to zero immediately.	如果希腊在2010年没有获得金融支持，它就必须立刻将其财政赤字从占GDP的10%以上减少到零。


By financing continued deficits until 2013, the troika actually enabled Greece to delay austerity.	三驾马车继续为赤字提供融资直到2013年，实际上帮助希腊延迟了紧缩。


Of course, Greece is not the first country to request emergency financing to delay budget cuts, and then complain that the cuts are excessive once the worst is over.	当然，希腊不是第一个要求紧急融资以延迟削减预算，然后在最坏时期过去之后抱怨削减幅度过大的国家。


This typically happens when the government runs a primary surplus.	这种情况通常发生在政府存在初级盈余时。


When the government can finance its current spending through taxes – and might even be able to increase expenditure, if it does not have to pay interest – the temptation to renege on debt intensifies.	当政府能够通过税收为其当前支出提供资金时——甚至还可以提高支出，如果不需要偿付利息的话——债务违约的诱惑就会加强。


It was widely anticipated that Greece would be tempted to follow this route when the troika program was initiated.	当三驾马车的计划刚刚启动时，人们广泛认为希腊也将走这条路。


Last year, the new Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, confirmed the prediction, arguing that a primary surplus would give Greece the upper hand in any negotiations on debt restructuring, because it could just suspend repayments to the troika, without incurring any financing problems.	去年，新任希腊财政部长雅尼斯·瓦洛法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）证实了人们的预测，他说，初级盈余将令希腊在一切债务重组谈判中赢得优势，因为它大可以中止向三驾马车偿付而不会引发任何金融问题。


That approach would be a mistake.	这一观点是错的。


The practical problem for Greece now is not the sustainability of a debt that matures in 20-30 years and carries very low interest rates; the real issue is the few payments to the IMF and the ECB that fall due this year – payments that the new government has promised to make.	如今，希腊的实际问题不是二三十年后才到期、并且利率极低的债务的可持续性问题； 真正的问题是不向IMF和欧洲央行偿付今年到期的应还款——这是政府已经承诺的偿付。


But, to follow through on this promise (and hire more employees), Greece will need more financial support from its eurozone partners.	但是，要履行这一承诺（以及雇用更多雇员），希腊需要欧元区伙伴国给予更多金融支持。


Moreover, the country's financial system will need continuing support from the ECB.	此外，希腊金融系统也需要欧洲央行的持续支持。


In other words, Greece's new government must now try to convince its European partners that it deserves more financial support, while pushing for a reduction of its existing debt and resisting the austerity policies on which previous lending was conditioned.	换句话说，希腊新政府现在必须让欧洲伙伴相信它值得获得更多的金融支持，同时追求现有债务的减免并抵制作为此前贷款条件的紧缩政策。


For Syriza and its voters, the political honeymoon could be short.	对左翼联盟及其选民来说，政治蜜月期注定很短。


Tabloid Climate Science	街头小报的气候学