Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once quipped that politicians who have a vision should go and have their eyes checked.	前德国总理赫尔穆特·施密特曾经开玩笑说有梦想的政治家应该去看眼科。


That warning made sense in the 1970’s, when even young parliamentarians in his Social Democratic Party dreamed of revolution.	这样的警告在20世纪70年代显得合情合理，当时就连社会民主党的年轻议员都对革命梦寐以求。


But Schmidt would never have imagined that there would come a day when there would be no politician in search of a vision check.	但施密特永远也不会想到居然会有一天没有哪位政治家需要去做视力检查。


Likewise, in the fall of 2008, the threat of financial Armageddon brought not just Germany but the whole world to the brink of disaster.	同样，2008年秋，金融善恶大决战让德国和整个世界都面临一场灾难。


The worst has been mitigated and obscured in the wealthy countries by running up unprecedented levels of debt, but any moderately streetwise person knows that the next generation – and even the one after that – will be paying for the excesses of the investment bankers.	富裕国家前所未有的债务规模隐藏和缓解了最坏的情况，但任何头脑清醒者都知道我们的下一代——乃至下下代——都将为投资银行的过分行为付出代价。


One cannot help but marvel at how discreetly this topic is being dealt with by Merkel and Steinmeier.	人们不禁惊叹默克尔和施泰因迈耶在谈到这个话题时是多么小心翼翼。


Ask the party strategists and they will tell you that the financial crisis is a topic for losers; voters want to hear something positive.	政党战略家会告诉你金融危机是失败者的主题，而选民们则希望听到积极的评价。


The electorate is experiencing the greatest slump since 1929 like a bad dream that is half over – and politicians don’t want to wake them up.	全体选民正在经历1929年以后最重大的衰退，人们仍然身处噩梦之中——而政治家们则不愿将他们唤醒。


The so-called “autonomous” violent left-wing radicals in Berlin-Kreuzberg enjoy themselves by torching luxury cars, but not a single bank window has been smashed in Germany.	柏林克罗依茨贝格区所谓“自治”的左翼暴力份子焚烧豪华轿车来自娱自乐，但德国却没有一扇银行窗户被砸破。


Nor has a single criminal financier-gambler, who misled the financial regulators with fudged figures, been brought to justice.	尽管依靠篡改帐目误导金融监管机构，但却没有一位作恶的金融赌徒被因此绳之以法。


On the contrary, these bankrupts are filing lawsuits to get the million-dollar bonuses to which they feel entitled.	恰恰相反，破产的银行家们却都在提起诉讼，索回他们认为应得的百万美金红利。


Quite a few of them are already back at the table gambling away with the taxpayer’s money and peddling their new “financial products”; they know that when the next crash comes, the taxpayer will have no choice but to bail them out again.	很多人已经拿纳税人的钱再次回到赌桌，并开始推销所谓新的“金融产品”。 他们清楚如果再来一次危机，纳税人除了再次为他们埋单外依然别无选择。


Only some stalwarts timidly point to the inflammatory question posed by Mack the Knife in Berthold Brecht’s Threepenny Opera: “What is a bank robbery compared to the founding of a bank?	只有少数顽固份子还怯生生地提起“小麦飞刀”在贝托尔特·布莱希特的三分钱歌剧中曾经提到的煽动性质问：“抢劫银行比起创建银行来算得了什么？


What is a pick-lock compared to a debenture share?”	溜门撬锁比起公司债券来算得了什么？


But this slogan is from the 1920’s and seems like a nostalgic reminder of past turmoil that one prefers to see on the stage.	”但这个口号起源于20世纪20年代，似乎更像是对舞台上看到的过去动荡的一种怀旧。


The greatest miracle in the 2009 election campaign is the resurgence of the Liberal Democrats (FDP).	2009年选举最大的奇迹是自由民主党（FDP）的复兴。


In fact, the German political landscape needs nothing more than a truly liberal party, in the US sense of the word “liberal” – a champion of the cause of individual freedom.	事实上，德国政治局势需要的不过是一个符合美国所谓“自由”定义的真正的自由党派，也就是个人自由事业的倡导者。


Unfortunately, under the far-too-long leadership of Guido Westerwelle, the FDP has degenerated into a party notable for defending the freedom only of a few privileged individuals: bankers and businessmen.	遗憾的是在基多·威斯特威勒太过漫长的领导下，自由民主党已经蜕变成为捍卫银行家和商人等少数特权人物自由的伪自由党。


Just a year ago, the FDP fervently adhered to the religion of the American neo-cons, according to which markets regulate themselves. So it vigorously opposed all of the half-hearted attempts to regulate the financial sector.	就在一年前，自由民主党还在狂热地坚持美国新保守主义者的信仰，要求把一切监管职能交给市场。


As late as this past May, the FDP defended the ownership rights of US billionaire Christopher Flowers, a major stockholder in the failed German bank Hypo Real Estate, which was saved from oblivion by state guarantees worth more than €100 billion of taxpayers’ money.	直到今年5月，自由民主党还在捍卫美国亿万富翁克里斯托弗•弗劳尔斯的股份所有权，弗劳尔斯在倒闭的德国银行Hypo Real Estate担任股东。 这家银行全靠价值逾千亿欧元的纳税人财产国家担保才免于倒闭。


Nevertheless, at a time when finance is under a cloud, the party that defends the freedom of the financial gamblers over the freedom of the individual is winning favor with the electorate like no other.	尽管如此，但在金融被阴影所笼罩的时刻，捍卫金融赌徒自由的政党比任何捍卫个人自由的政党都更能得到选民的认同。


The FDP can count on about 13-14% of the vote, which means that it may be able to join with Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union to form a government.	自由民主党肯定会得到13-14%的选票，这意味着它或许能与默克尔的基督教民主联盟共同组建政府。


I cannot explain this dynamic.	我无法解释这种变化。


I do not believe in Karl Marx’s iron laws of history.	我并不相信卡尔·马克思的历史铁律。


Yet one historical law does seem to apply: in an immense economic crisis, the voters stick with the people whose economic competence they have traditionally trusted – that is, the very people who led them to ruin.	但有一条历史规律确实在起作用：在大规模经济危机期间，选民们继续追随经济管理能力一直为他们所信任的政党，而正是这些人把他们引向了毁灭。


But there is an exception to every rule.	但每条规律都存在例外情况。


In this case, it is the former PDS, the successor party to the former East Germany’s ruling party, the SED.	具体到这一次，例外的是前东德执政党统一社会党的后继者前德国民社党（PDS）。


Dissidents in the GDR translated those three letters as “ P ractically t he S ame.”	德意志民主共和国的持不同政见者将PDS解释为“基本维持原状”。


This party, now using the presumptuous name “The Left,” has gained a foothold in West Germany with its impossible promises of higher pensions, a minimum hourly wage of €10, huge public investment schemes, and zero unemployment – in short, exactly the kind of socialist paradise that failed in East Germany.	这个现在想当然使用“左翼”名称的党派已经靠着高退休金、10欧元最低小时工资、巨额公共投资计划和零失业率的空头承诺在西德站住了脚——简言之，这与已经在东德粉身碎骨的社会主义天堂简直一模一样。


And, of course, The Left, which still counts large numbers of former Stasi personnel among its members, also calls for a reassessment of East Germany itself; many party veterans object to the term “dictatorship” for this phase of their lives.	当然，仍然以大批前史塔西（Stasi）人员为骨干的左翼还要求重新确定对东德的评价，许多老党员反对用“独裁”一词来形容他们生命中的这个阶段。


So, besides the FDP, this party, too, is profiting from the mainstream political parties’ half-hearted handling of the global economic crisis.	因此，除自由民主党之外，主流政党三心二意地处理全球经济危机也为这个党派带来了好处。


The only “winner” when Germans vote on September 27 will most likely be the “party” of non-voters.	当9月27日德国投票时，唯一的“赢家”最有可能是不参加投票者。


I do not sympathize with this group, but I do understand that non-voters expect only one thing of Germany’s political parties these days: “practically the same”	我并不同情这个团体，但我的确知道不投票者对于德国政党只抱有一个希望：“那就是基本维持原状”。


German Banks on Top	德国银行最应指责


CHICAGO – Overcoming the European Union’s current economic malaise, as almost everyone acknowledges, requires deeper integration, with the first step taking the form of a banking union supervised by the European Central Bank.	芝加哥—几乎所有人都承认，要克服欧盟当前的经济萎靡，需要更深层次的一体化，第一步是在欧洲中央银行的监督下形成银行联盟。


But Europe’s banking union also requires uniform rules for winding up insolvent financial institutions – and this has become a sticking point.	但欧洲银行联盟还需要清算破产金融机构的统一规则，而这已经成为难以逾越的障碍。


Germany opposes the new bank-resolution mechanism proposed by the European Commission, generating moral and political support at home by portraying its stance as an effort to protect German taxpayers: Why should the German ants pay for the southern European grasshoppers?	德国反对欧盟委员会提出的新银行清算机制，并将其立场描述为试图保护德国纳税人，以此赢得国内的道义和政治支持：为何德国蚂蚁要为南欧蚂蚱掏腰包？


In fact, Germany’s position is a ploy to hide its anticompetitive behavior, whereby the government subsidizes German banks and industry at the expense of everyone else – including German taxpayers.	事实上，德国的立场是其反竞争行为的画皮，德国政府因此可以补贴德国银行和产业界，而出钱的则是其他所有人，包括德国纳税人。


Europe’s common market has been the single greatest success of post-World War II European policy, boosting economic growth and fostering cultural interchange.	欧洲共同市场是二战后欧洲政策中最伟大的成功，它提振了经济增长，造就了文化交流。


But a common market requires a level playing field, and the European Commission has worked hard to achieve this in many sectors over the years.	但共同市场要求公平的竞争，而多年来欧盟委员会在众多领域努力地朝这个方向前进。


Until now, the main exception was banking.	到目前为止，最显著的例外就是银行。


The emerging banking union is not only the first step toward a European fiscal union; it is also the final step toward completing the European common market.	新的银行联盟不仅是迈向欧洲财政联盟的第一步，也是迈向完善欧洲共同市场的最后一步。


Without a common resolution mechanism that levels the playing field, the common market will remain unfinished.	没有创造公平竞争环境的共同清算机制，共同市场就无法彻底完成。


In principle, the EU’s banking rules are common to all member states.	原则上，欧盟银行规则对所有成员国通用。


In practice, their implementation was, until recently, left to national regulators, who applied very different standards.	实践中，到目前为止，规则的实施仍取决于国家监管者，而各国监管者所使用的标准各不相同。


Most important, while state subsidies in all other sectors are forbidden, they are commonly accepted in banking – not only explicit subsidies, such as Germany’s bailout of several Landesbanks after the American subprime-mortgage crisis, but implicit subsidies as well.	最重要的是，尽管其他部门的国家补贴都被禁止，但在银行业，补贴被广泛接受——不仅包括美国次贷危机后德国援助Landesbanks这样的明补，也包括暗补。


Some French banks’ traders openly boast of backing by the French government, which will never let its banks fail.	一些法国银行交易员公开吹嘘，在法国政府的支持下，他们的银行永无倒闭之忧。


Unfortunately, this is not just a French or a German problem.	不幸的是，这不仅仅是德国和法国的问题。


All market players know that EU governments will not let big banks fail.	所有市场参与者都知道，欧盟政府不会让大银行倒闭。


This implicit subsidy not only costs each country’s taxpayers billions of euros; it also distorts competition, because not all implicit subsidies are created equal.	这一暗补不仅花费了各国纳税人数十亿欧元； 还扭曲了竞争，因为非所有暗补都是公平的。


Regardless of its fundamentals, a German bank would be considered safer than an Italian one, because the German government’s implicit guarantee is much more valuable than the Italian government’s.	不论基本面，德国银行会被认为比意大利银行安全，因为德国政府的隐含担保比意大利政府的有价值得多。


As a result, German banks have a lower cost of funding and – all else being equal – higher profitability.	结果，德国银行得到了更低的融资成本和——在其他条件相同的情况下——更高的利润。


To the extent that some of the lower cost is rebated to their clients, even industrial firms in Germany enjoy a lower cost of capital, giving them an unfair advantage vis-à-vis their European competitors.	更低的成本中有一些作为回扣给了其客户，于是，德国的产业界企业也享受到了更低资本成本，使它们相对欧洲竞争对手拥有了不公平的优势。


One way to prevent this distortion would be to create a mechanism to bail out all banks with European money.	防止这一扭曲的一个方法是创造一种机制，用欧洲资金援助所有银行。


But this approach would not only leave German taxpayers on the hook; it would also create perverse incentives in the entire European banking system, maximizing instability.	但这个方法不仅会拖累德国纳税人； 也会在整个欧洲银行系统内创造消极激励，使不稳定最大化。


The preferred alternative is to create a common resolution mechanism, which would apply throughout Europe, regardless of a bank’s country of origin.	更好的替代方案是创造全欧洲适用的共同清算机制，不管银行来自哪国。


Such a mechanism would prevent the need for government intervention.	该机制将打消政府干预的必要。


The recent proposal by Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, is an effort to implement this solution.	由负责内部市场和服务的欧盟委员巴尼尔（Michel Barnier）提出的最新方案便是实施这一办法的努力。


It provides a common resolution mechanism for all banks in Europe, which forces losses to be absorbed by shareholders, bondholders, and large depositors before any government money is committed.	巴尼尔的方案提供了适用欧洲所有银行的清算机制，损失将由股东、债权人和大型存款人强制吸收，然后政府才投入资金。


To provide short-term financing to a bank during any restructuring, the Commission’s plan would create a European Fund, putting all banks on an equal footing.	该方案提出成立一个欧洲基金（European Fund），向重组过程中的银行提供短期融资，并对所有银行一视同仁。


The Commission’s proposal is far from perfect.	欧盟委员会的方案远远称不上完美。


After a bank’s shareholders are wiped out and its creditors take an 8% “haircut,” the European Fund transforms itself into a bailout fund, justifying some of Germany’s fears.	在银行股东血本无归、债权人遭遇8%的“剃头”后，欧洲基金本身将转变为援助基金，这在某种程度上证实了德国人的担忧。


And there is no explicit prohibition of some form of national government bailout.	而且它也没有明文禁止某些形式的国家政府援助。


Even so, the proposal is a step in the right direction.	尽管如此，该方案可谓朝正确的方向迈出了一步。


German criticism should be directed at improving it, not at sandbagging it.	德国的批评应该被引导为改善它，而不是抵制它。


German taxpayers have paid dearly for German banks’ mistakes.	德国纳税人已经为德国银行的错误付出了沉重代价。


In 2008, when the Landesbanks were found to be full of American subprime mortgages, the German government bailed them out with a €500 billion ($650 billion) rescue package at its taxpayers’ expense.	2008年，Landesbanks深陷美国次贷陷阱，德国政府花了5000亿欧元援助它，这笔援助资金便来自德国纳税人。


In 2010, when German banks were badly over-exposed – to the tune of $704 billion – to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, European taxpayers and the ECB helped them to bring most of that money home.	2010年，德国银行在希腊、爱尔兰、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙的风险敞口巨大——达到了7040亿欧元，欧洲纳税人和欧洲央行帮他们将这笔钱的大部分带回了家。


The biggest threat to German taxpayers is not southern European profligacy, but their own country’s banks.	德国纳税人的最大威胁不是南欧的挥霍无度，而是本国的银行。


In this sense, the banking union is not a scheme to burden German taxpayers with the losses of failed southern European banks; rather, it is a mechanism to render all banks (including German ones) accountable for their own mistakes, thereby reducing the burden that they impose on domestic taxpayers.	从这个角度讲，银行联盟并非让德国纳税人承担南欧银行倒闭负担的机制，相反，它是让所有银行（包括德国银行）为自身错误负责、从而减轻它们给国内纳税人造成的负担的机制。


It is about time that German voters understood that the largest grasshoppers are in the center of their own towns.	德国选民应该明白，最大的蚱蜢就来自堡垒内部中心。


Germany’s Zero Hour	德国的零时


The 8th of May always brings back memories of 1945, because for me the end of the war in Europe really was a zero hour.	五月八日总是将我们带回1945年的记忆中，因为对我而言欧洲战争的结束是真正的零时。


When the first Soviet soldiers came up our little street in the Western suburbs of Berlin, we knew that the great slaughter was coming to an end.	当第一名苏联士兵踏上柏林西郊的小道时，我们知道这场规模最大的屠杀终于要到尽头了。


My father who had been in the resistance would come back from Brandenburg prison.	我那参加反抗运动的父亲也将从布兰登堡监狱回来。


I no longer needed to hide as I had done after my release from a Gestapo camp at the beginning of February.	我也不再需要像自二月初从盖世太保集中营被释放后那样躲躲藏藏了。


Somehow a new life would begin.	无论怎样，新生活即将启航。


First, however, was the chaos.	然而，一开始却是一片混乱。


The Nazis were gone, and the occupation powers had not yet set up any kind of administration.	纳粹离开了，占领军队还没有建立起任何行政政府。


We all went looting the local shops; I still have the slim volumes of romantic poetry which my 16-year-old self took from a bookshop.	我们都去抢劫本地商店； 我至今还保留着那时十六岁的我从一个书店拿来的薄薄的浪漫主义诗歌册子。


The occupation troops went on a rampage. Food was hard to find.	占领军队到处闹事，食物出现匮乏。


My father was taken from prison and transported straight to central Berlin, where he was told to set up the office for Berlin’s energy supply, a task that had to be done literally from nothing.	我父亲被从监狱中直接转到了柏林中心地区，被告知要在那里建造起一个柏林能源供应办公室，事实上这是一个需要从零做起的任务。


There was no power, no transport, no organised life of any kind for a period.	那段时间没有电力，没有交通，生活毫无秩序。


Was it defeat or liberation?	那是一次失败还是解放？


For Germans this question was not easily answered, though clearly our family was liberated in every sense.	对德国人来说，这个问题不好回答，尽管从各方面来看，显然我们的家园解放了。


The question then was this: liberated for what?	于是，问题变成了：为什么解放？


Where do we go from here?	我们将从这里走向何方？


“You must help,” my mother said to me.	“你必须得帮忙，”我的母亲对我说。


So I offered my services to the local Soviet authority and helped distribute basic foodstuffs to a small number of outlets in our district of Zehlendorf.	于是我为当地的苏联政权服务，帮忙把一些基本食物分发到我们策伦多夫区一小部分人手中。


Five weeks later, however, I was back at school.	然而，五个星期后，我回到了学校。


I carried a special pass as a “victim of fascism,” but others showed their Iron Cross which they had got for late military action.	作为“法西斯的受害者”，我带着一张特殊的通行证，而其他人则展示着他们在最近军事行动中所获得的铁十字架。


Some were refugees from the East, many had their homes destroyed in air raids, almost all grieved for lost loved ones.	一些人是来自东德的难民，许多人的家都在空袭中成为一堆废墟，几乎所有的人都在为失去的亲人悲痛欲绝。


Yet the zero hour did not last.	尽管零时没有一直持续。


It is almost unbelievable, but three years later the liberalising policies that followed a currency reform set in motion what came to be known as Germany’s economic miracle.	但是三年后紧随货币改革之后的自由化政策启动了后来的德国经济奇迹，这几乎难以置信。


To be precise: this is how West Germany’s economic miracle began.	确切地说，这正是西德经济奇迹的开端。


The German example shows just how different occupation powers can be.	德国的例子说明占领军队会有多大的不同。


In the Soviet zone of occupation, progress was slow and above all coupled with a new enslavement.	在苏联占领地区，进程很慢，并伴随着一种新的奴役。


Even concentration camps like Buchenwald changed their guards and inmates but remained in use.	像Buchenwald等集中营，即使更换了守卫和犯人，但仍然在使用。


The Western powers in Germany, on the other hand, pursued, after a short period of non-fraternisation, a policy of controlled empowerment.	从另外一方面来说，经历了短暂的不亲敌时期，德国国内的西方力量开始实施一种控制赋权政策。


Within a year of the end of the war there were indigenous administrations, within two years elections.	在战争结束后的一年内，德国有了地方政府，在两年之内举行了选举。


Democracy was not just preached but practised, and it could build on German traditions.	基建于德国的传统之上的民主不仅得到宣扬而且还得到实施。


All this, to be sure, was not just benevolence on the part of the occupying powers. It was also a result of the incipient Cold War, and the desire of both sides to consolidate “their” part of Germany.	诚然，所有这些不只是占领军队的善举，也是冷战初期的结果，也是双方力图巩固“他们”那部分的德国的结果。


Even so, there are lessons to be learned from the process.	即使是这样，我们也可以从此进程中吸取教训。


Two of these deserve to be mentioned.	有两件事情值得一提。


One is economic and has to do with the Marshall Plan.	一件事情就是经济，这必须得提到马歇尔计划。


It is perhaps regrettable but nonetheless real that democracy finds roots more easily if economic conditions improve.	也许这个计划颇有遗憾之处，尽管如此，如果经济条件得到改善的话民主就能更为容易地找到根基。


Such improvement requires above all self-help, the actions of individuals who will not accept the misery of the zero hour for long.	这样的进步首先就需要自助，也就是那些不会长久接受零时悲剧的个人行动。


Such self-help can be encouraged by policies (which is what Ludwig Erhard, the father of the “social market economy” did in Germany), but some starting capital helps.	这样的自助也许受到（ “社会市场经济”之父陆德维希·艾哈德在德国实施的）政策的鼓励，但是一些启动资金帮了大忙。


This is where the Marshall Plan of American support became crucial.	这就是美国援助的马歇尔计划至关重要的地方。


Similarly, the European Union has helped, and continues to help the postcommunist countries on their way.	欧盟也以相同的方式帮助了并且将继续帮助后社会主义国家走上自助之路。


The other lesson is moral, and it is more difficult.	另外一个教训是道德层面的，也更为困难。


The Nuremberg trials exposed the guilt of the Nazi leaders beyond doubt, if indeed any such doubt was left in people’s minds.	如果人们对纳粹的罪恶还有所怀疑的话，那么纽灵堡审讯则毋庸置疑地暴露了纳粹头目的罪行。


While these were important, however, Germany did not begin its arduous path away from zero hour with concern for the past.	尽管这些很重要，关注历史的德国并没有远离零时而开始它的辛苦路程。


Indeed, the Adenauer years after 1949 were described by many as years of “restoration” because too many minor Nazi figures had remained in their jobs.	事实上，在1949年之后艾德诺政府的几年被许多人称为“修整”之年，因为太多的纳粹小人物还在工作。


In some ways, the country simply ignored their past and moved forward.	从某些角度来说，这个国家简单地忘却了他们的过去，向前行进。


Years later when a market economy and political democracy were established, Germany did turn toward “coping with the past”, and did so very effectively.	在之后几年，当市场经济和政治民主体系得以建立之后，德国转而“处理他们的过去”，并且做得很好。


Germany’s Nazi past is uniquely horrible, so comparisons with other countries with blighted histories are misleading.	德国的纳粹历史尤为可怕，因此与其他那些拥有毁灭性历史的国家相比较有误导之嫌。


Still, in its own way Poland has followed a similar path after 1989: first the new, then the attempt to come to terms with the past.	波兰在1989年也以自己的方式走上了一条相似的道路：先建立新体系，然后努力接受过去的历史。


On balance this is a better method of dealing with a nation’s zero hour than doing things the other way round.	衡量而言，比起用其他的方法，这是处理一个国家的零时问题的较好方法。


In Europe then, the 8th of May 2005 is an occasion to look back in sorrow and anger. It is also an occasion to look forward with pride in the achievements of recent decades and therefore for hope.	在欧洲，2005年五月八日是一个回顾往昔悲痛和愤怒的时候，也是一个带着对近十几年来所取得的成就的骄傲感展望未来和希望的时刻。


Schäuble’s Gathering Storm	风暴下的朔伊布勒


ATHENS – Europe’s crisis is poised to enter its most dangerous phase.	发自雅典——欧洲的危机正准备进入一个最危险的阶段。


After forcing Greece to accept another “extend-and-pretend” bailout agreement, fresh battle lines are being drawn.	在迫使希腊接受另一项“扩大及 掩盖”援助协议后又出现了一条新战线。


And, with the refugee influx exposing the damage caused by divergent economic prospects and sky-high youth unemployment in Europe’s periphery, the ramifications are ominous, as recent statements by three European politicians – Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, French Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron, and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble – have made clear.	同时难民的涌入也让欧洲外围各国差异极大的经济前景以及超高青年失业率所造成的破坏进一步暴露。 正如最近由意大利总理马泰奥·伦齐（Matteo Renzi），法国经济部长伊曼纽尔·马洪（Emmanuel Macron），以及德国财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）这三位欧洲政治家所发表的声明所明确指出的那样，事态将很可能朝着坏的方向发展。


Renzi has come close to demolishing, at least rhetorically, the fiscal rules that Germany has defended for so long.	伦齐几乎——至少在口头上——推翻了德国捍卫已久的财政规则。


In a remarkable act of defiance, he threatened that if the European Commission rejected Italy’s national budget, he would re-submit it without change.	其中一个明显的对抗行为就是威胁说如果欧盟委员会否决了意大利的国家预算，他会一字不改地再提交一次。


This was not the first time Renzi had alienated Germany’s leaders.	这也不是伦齐第一次跟德国领导人作对了。


And it was no accident that his statement followed a months-long effort by his own finance minister, Pier Carlo Padoan, to demonstrate Italy’s commitment to the eurozone’s German-backed “rules.”	在手下财政大臣皮耶尔·卡洛·帕多安（Pier Carlo Padoan）花费数月的努力去展示意大利支持德国欧元区“规则”的承诺后，他的发言并非偶然。


Renzi understands that adherence to German-inspired parsimony is leading Italy’s economy and public finances into deeper stagnation, accompanied by further deterioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio.	伦齐意识到遵循德国式的紧缩只会导致本国经济和公共财政陷入更深的停滞，并伴随债务与GDP比率的进一步恶化。


A consummate politician, Renzi knows that this is a short path to electoral disaster.	作为一个老练的政治家，伦齐知道这是一场通往选举惨败的高速公路。


Macron is very different from Renzi in both style and substance.	马洪在做事风格和内容上则与伦截然不同。


A banker-turned-politician, he is President François Hollande’s only minister who combines a serious understanding of France’s and Europe’s macroeconomic challenges with a reputation in Germany as a reformer and skillful interlocutor.	银行家出身的他是弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande）总统 下唯一一个既深刻理解法国和欧洲的宏观经济难题，又在德国享有改革家和资深谈判代表声誉的部长。


So when he speaks of an impending religious war in Europe, between the Calvinist German-dominated northeast and the largely Catholic periphery, it is time to take notice.	因此他关于加尔文派德国主导的东北欧和天主教为主的欧洲外围国家之间即将爆发宗教战争的言论非常值得关注。


Schäuble’s recent statements about the European economy’s current trajectory similarly highlight Europe’s cul-de-sac.	朔伊布勒最近对欧洲当前经济运行轨迹的阐述同样指出了欧洲无路可走的窘境。


For years, Schäuble has played a long game to realize his vision of the optimal architecture Europe can achieve within the political and cultural constraints that he takes as given.	多年来朔伊布勒一直将欧洲在政治和文���上的种种限制视为固有的存在，并耐心地四处周旋，力图在不触动这些限制的情况下实现他心目中的理想架构。


The “Schäuble plan,” as I have dubbed it, calls for a limited political union to support the euro.	“朔伊布勒计划”（正如我之前提到的那样）要求建立一个有限的政治联盟来支撑欧元。


In brief, Schäuble favors a formalized Eurogroup (composed of the eurozone’s finance ministers), presided over by a president who wields veto power – legitimized by a Euro Chamber comprising parliamentarians from the eurozone member states – over national budgets.	简而言之，朔伊布勒主张成立一个正式的欧元集团（由欧元区财长组成），由一位掌握否决权的主席来掌管——该集团由一个欧元区各国国会议员集合而成的欧元议会来提供合法性授权。


In exchange for forfeiting control over their budgets, Schäuble offers France and Italy – the primary targets of his plan – the promise of a small eurozone-wide common budget that would partly fund unemployment and deposit-insurance schemes.	而作为对丧失预算控制权的补偿，朔伊布勒承诺会向该计划的两个主要目标——法国和意大利——提供小规模的欧元区共同预算，使其能在某种程度上解决失业和存款保险制度的资金问题。


Such a disciplinarian, minimalist political union does not go down well in France, where elites have always resisted forfeiting sovereignty.	然而这么一个清教徒式的精简化政治联盟并未获得法国的青睐，因为后者国内的精英一贯抵制主权让渡。


While politicians like Macron have moved a long way toward accepting the need to transfer powers over national budgets to the “center,” they fear that Schäuble’s plan asks too much and offers too little: severe limits on France’s fiscal space and a macroeconomically insignificant common budget.	虽然一些像马洪这样的政治家花了很长时间去争取接受这种将制定国家预算的权力转移到“核心”的要求，但他们也担心朔伊布勒计划会要求太多而给予太少：一方面对法国财政空间予以严格限制，另一方面只提供了些在宏观经济上微不足道的共同预算。


But even if Macron could persuade Hollande to accept Schäuble’s plan, it is not clear whether German Chancellor Angela Merkel would consent to it.	但即使马洪能说服奥朗德接受朔伊布勒的计划，也无法确知德国总理默克尔会否同意。


Schäuble’s ideas have so far failed to persuade her or, indeed, the Bundesbank (which, through its president, Jens Weidmann, has been hugely negative toward any degree of fiscal mutualization, even the limited version that Schäuble is willing to trade for control over the French and Italian budgets).	因为朔伊布勒的观点迄今未能说服她，或者更确切地说——德国央行（其行长延斯·魏德曼（Jens Weidmann）一直反对任何程度上的财政融合，即使是朔伊布勒用来交换法国和意大利预算控制权的有限版本也不同意）。


Caught between a reluctant German chancellor and an indisposed France, Schäuble imagined that the turbulence caused by a Greek exit from the eurozone would help persuade the French, as well as his cabinet colleagues, of his plan’s necessity.	在默克尔和法国人之间两头不讨好的朔伊布勒寄望于希腊退出欧元区所产生的动荡将有助于说服法国人和他的内阁同僚们，并让两者认识到这份计划的必要性。


Now, while waiting for the current Greek “program” to collapse under the weight of its inherent contradictions, Germany’s finance ministry is preparing for the battles ahead.	如今在等待当前希腊“项目”在其内在矛盾重压下崩溃的同时，德国财政部正在准备即将到来的战斗。


In September, Schäuble distributed to his Eurogroup colleagues an outline of three proposals for preventing a new euro crisis.	九月，朔伊布勒分发给他欧元集团的同事们一份防止新欧元危机的三项提案大纲。


First, eurozone government bonds should include clauses that make it easy to “bail in” bondholders.	首先，欧元区政府债券应包含使其可以更易于出手“援助”债券持有人的条款。


Second, the European Central Bank’s rules ought to be altered to prevent commercial banks from counting such bonds as ultra-safe, liquid assets.	其次，应改变欧洲央行的规则以防止商业银行将这类债券视为超安全的流动性资产。


And, third, Europe should ditch the idea of common deposit insurance, replacing it with a commitment to let banks fail when they no longer fulfill the ECB’s collateral rules.	第三，欧洲应抛弃共同存款保险的理念，用一个承诺在银行无法满足欧洲央行的抵押规定时允许其破产的规则取而代之。


Implementing these proposals in, say, 1999, might have limited the gush of capital to the periphery immediately following the single currency’s introduction.	如果说能在1999年落实这些提案，就可能遏制因采用单一货币而涌入欧元区外围国家的资本。


Alas, in 2015, given the eurozone members’ legacy public debts and banking losses, such a scheme would cause a deeper recession in the periphery and almost certainly lead to the monetary union’s breakup.	可惜到了2015年，鉴于欧元区成员国长期积累的公共债务和银行亏损，这种方案会导致外围国家陷入更深的经济衰退，几乎肯定会导致货币联盟的解体。


Exasperated by Schäuble’s backtracking from his own plan for political union, Macron recently vented his frustration: “The Calvinists want to make others pay until the end of their life,” he complained.	马洪对朔伊布勒放弃自身政治联盟计划的做法感到非常恼火：“加尔文主义者一辈子都在指望由别人来承担责任，”他抱怨道。


“They want reforms with no contributions toward any solidarity.”	“他们希望改革，却不愿出力来实现任何团结。 ”


The most troubling aspect of Renzi’s and Macron’s statements is the hopelessness they convey.	在伦齐与马洪言论中最令人不安的地方是他们所传达出的那种绝望情绪。


Renzi’s defiance of fiscal rules that push Italy further into an avoidable debt-deflationary spiral is understandable; but, in the absence of proposals for alternative rules, it leads nowhere.	伦齐对那个进一步挤压意大利陷入一个本可避免的债务通缩漩涡的财政规则极为蔑视，这可以理解； 但在没有提出替代规则之前，这种情绪也无济于事。


Macron’s difficulty is that there seems to be no set of painful reforms that he can offer Schäuble to persuade the German government to accept the degree of surplus recycling necessary to stabilize France and the eurozone.	马洪的困难在于，他手里似乎没有一套真心实意的改革方案能提供给朔伊布勒，让后者去说服德国政府接受维护法国和欧元区稳定所需的特定程度顺差回收方案。


Meanwhile, Germany’s commitment to “rules” that are incompatible with the eurozone’s survival undermines those French and Italian politicians who were, until recently, hoping for an alliance with Europe’s largest economy.	与此同时，德国对无益于欧元区生存的“规则”的坚持也伤害了那些——直到最近——依然希望与欧洲最大经济体结盟的法国和意大利政治家们。


Some, like Renzi, respond with acts of blind rebellion.	有些人，比如伦齐，以盲目的反抗行为作为回应。


Others, like Macron, are beginning gloomily to accept that the eurozone’s current institutional framework and policy mix will ultimately lead either to a formal breakup or to a death by a thousand cuts, in the form of continued economic divergence.	其它像马洪这类的则开始沮丧地接受现实，认为欧元区目前的体制框架和政策组合将最终导致联盟正式散伙或缓慢解体，以经济状况持续分化的形式。


The silver lining in the gathering storm cloud is that minimalist proposals for political union, like Schäuble’s plan, are losing ground.	在日渐聚集的风暴云中崭露的一线希望是，像朔伊布勒计划这样的精简化政治联盟提案正在逐渐失势。


Nothing short of macroeconomically significant institutional reforms will stabilize Europe. And only a pan-European democratic alliance of citizens can generate the groundswell needed for such reforms to take root.	任何缺乏宏观经济重要性的制度改革都无法实现欧洲的稳定，也只有一个由公民组成的泛欧洲民主联盟可以为这些改革提供生根发芽的土壤。


Germany’s Golden Opportunity	德国的黄金机会


BERLIN – The German economy appears unstoppable.	柏林—德国经济似乎不可阻挡。


Output is expected to grow by more than 2% this year, and wages by 3%, with the current-account surplus set to reach a towering 8.4% of GDP.	预计今年产出增长将超过2%，工资增长超过3%，经常项目盈余将达到GDP的8. 4%。


Unemployment has been halved over the last decade, and now stands at an all-time low.	失业在过去十年中下降了一半，目前位于历史最低水平。


German exporters remain highly innovative and competitive.	德国出口商保持着强大的创新力和竞争力。


And the government is recording a sizeable budget surplus.	德国政府也报告了可观的预算盈余。


While the rest of Europe remains mired in crisis and self-doubt, Germany’s future seems bright and secure.	当欧洲其他国家仍陷在自我怀疑的危机中时，德国的未来似乎光明又确定。


But appearances can be deceiving.	但外表可能具有欺骗性。


In fact, today’s rosy macroeconomic data tell only part of the story.	事实上，如今漂亮的宏观经济数据只是故事的一面。


Since the euro was established in 1999, Germany’s productivity growth has been no more than average among European countries, real wages have declined for half the workforce, and annual GDP growth has averaged a disappointing 1.2%.	1999年欧元诞生以来，德国生产率增长并不比欧洲国家平均水平更强，一半劳动力的真实工资有所下降，年均GDP增长率也只有令人失望的1. 2%。


A key reason for this lackluster performance is Germany’s notoriously paltry investment rate, which is among the lowest in the OECD.	如此拙劣的表现的一个关键原因是德国出了名的低投资率——在经合组织国家中垫底。


The result is deteriorating infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and schools.	结果是道路、桥梁和学校等基础设施的恶化。


This, together with an inadequate regulatory and business environment, has raised concerns among companies; since 1999, the largest German multinationals have doubled their employee headcounts abroad, while cutting jobs at home.	这，以及监管和营商环境的不足，引起了公司的担忧； 1999年以来，德国规模最大的跨国公司海外员工数量增长了一倍，而国内岗位数量有所下降。


In their 2013 coalition agreement, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats set a goal of raising public and private investment by 3% of GDP, or €90 billion ($100.8 billion) annually, to reach the OECD average.	在2013年的结盟协议中，基督教民主联盟（Christian Democratic Union）和社会民主党（Social Democrats）制定了一个目标，要将公共和私人投资提高GDP的3%或900亿欧元，以达到经合组织平均水平。


Although this is not a particularly ambitious objective – after all, Germany’s current-account surplus at the time amounted to 7.8% GDP – achieving it is vital to the country’s continued prosperity.	尽管这个目标算不上特别宏大——毕竟，当时德国经常项目盈余高达GDP的7. 8%——但实现这一目标将对德国的继续繁荣起到至关重要的作用。


Last August, the German government appointed a 21-member committee of experts (including the three authors) from business, labor unions, finance, and academia to determine how to achieve the target.	去年8月，德国政府认命了来自商界、工会、金融界和学界的21名专家（包括本文的三位作者）组成一个委员会，研究如何实现这一目标。


Last month, the committee presented its ten-point action plan, which, despite disagreement on taxes and private financing of public investment, reflects an unusually broad consensus.	上个月，该委员会提出了一个十点行动计划，该计划在税收和公共投资的私人融资方面仍未取得一致，但仍反映出不同寻常的共识。


For starters, the action plan calls for limiting the impact on public investment of the pressure to consolidate the government budget.	首先，行动计划要求限制政府预算整合压力对公共投资的影响。


The plan does not challenge the constitutional debt brake that forbids the federal government from running structural deficits above 0.35% of GDP.	计划并未挑战宪法所规定的债务上限，即禁止联邦政府结构性赤字超过GDP的0. 35%。


But it does recommend a legally binding commitment to keep investment levels at least as high as the rate of depreciation of state assets, and to use unexpected budget surpluses, first and foremost, for increased public investment.	但计划确实建议采取有法律约束力的承诺将投资至少保持在与国家资产折旧率相当的水平，并首相将意料外预算盈余用于增加公共投资。


In order to support local investment, the expert committee proposes creating a “national investment pact” to enable municipalities to increase investment by at least €15 billion over the next three years.	为支持地方投资，专家委员会提出成立一个“全国投资契约”，让市政层面在未来三年至少增加150亿欧元投资。


And it recommends establishing a public advisory institution to help municipalities realize their investment projects, of which there is currently a €118 billion backlog.	委员会还建议成立一个公共顾问机构以帮助各市落实投资项目，目前，积压的市政投资项目高达1,180亿欧元。


The most controversial issue, within the committee and in Germany, relates to financing infrastructure via public-private partnerships, a seemingly promising solution that nonetheless has proved to be far from a panacea.	在委员会和德国最具争议的问题是通过公私合作为基础设施融资，这一方案似乎大有可为，但效果远未得到证明。


To strike an effective balance, the action plan proposes two publicly owned investment funds – one raising money from institutional investors, and the other from individuals.	为了达到有效的平衡，行动计划建议成立两个公共所有的投资基金——一个从机构投资者筹资，另一个从个人筹资。


The public projects financed by the funds would provide sufficient efficiency gains to attract private financing.	由这两个基金提供融资的公共工程将提供足够高的效率改进吸引私人融资。


As for purely private-sector investment, the committee recommends a focus on developing the sectors that will dominate tomorrow’s economy.	至于纯私人部门投资，委员会建议关注发展将主导未来经济的部门。


As it stands, Germany is strong in traditional industrial sectors, but has fallen behind its competitors in Asia and the United States in terms of investment in research and development.	目前，德国的优势在传统工业部门，而在研发投资方面已落后于亚洲和美国的竞争对手。


To catch up, R&D spending should be raised from less than 3% to at least 3.5% of GDP.	为了实现赶超，研发支出必须从不到GDP的3%至少提高到GDP的3. 5%。


Nowhere is the need to overcome financing bottlenecks more apparent than with Germany’s Energiewende (energy transition).	而最需要克服融资瓶颈的莫过于德国的能源转型了。


To succeed, more than €30 billion, or 1% of GDP, will have to be invested annually in network infrastructure, renewable-energy generation, combined heat and power systems, and storage technologies in the coming decades.	要想获得成功，未来几十年每年必须投资300亿欧元或GDP的1%以上用于基础设施网络、可再生能源生产、热电联动系统和储存技术。


While some of these funds will come from public budgets, the vast majority will have to be provided by the private sector.	其中一些资金将来自公共预算，但大部分必须由私人部门提供。


Moreover, bringing Germany’s digital infrastructure, especially its broadband networks, up to international standards will require significant investment, which an improved regulatory framework could help to encourage.	此外，将德国数字基础设施（特别是宽带网络）提高到国际标准也需要大量投资，在这方面，改善监管框架或许会有帮助。


Regulatory reform is also needed to strengthen support for startup companies – an area in which Germany is notoriously weak, reflected in the difficulties such companies face in obtaining venture capital.	德国还需要通过监管改革加强对创业公司的的支持——这方面是德国的重大劣势，德国创业企业难以获得风险资本就是明证。


A substantial increase in private investment is necessary not just for Germany; it is critical to Europe’s recovery from its ongoing crisis.	大幅提高私人投资不仅是德国的需要； 对于欧洲从危机中复苏也至关重要。


Given Germany’s relative economic strength, it has a special responsibility to help foster investment throughout Europe, including by promoting European-level reforms of transport and energy, supporting incentives for innovation, and backing digital modernization.	考虑到德国的相对经济优势，它有一个特殊责任帮助刺激整个欧洲的投资，包括通过促进欧洲层面的交通和能源改革、支持创新激励、支持数字现代化等。


The expert committee supports EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s plan to channel some €300 billion of private-sector money toward infrastructure, and proposes that if the scheme is successful, it should be transformed into a permanent European investment mechanism.	专家委员会支持欧盟委员会主席容克的计划——将3,000亿欧元左右的私人部门资金引向基础设施，并提出，如果这一机制取得成功，应该将其作为永久性欧洲投资制度。


This would require more funding in the long run for the European Fund for Strategic Investments, to which the German government should contribute directly.	这需要增加欧洲战略投资基金（European Fund for Strategic Investments）的长期资金，而德国政府应该为此做出直接贡献。


Germany’s combination of strong growth, low unemployment, favorable financing conditions, and large budget surpluses present it with a golden opportunity.	德国的高增长、低失业、有利的融资条件和大量预算盈余并存的局面是一个黄金机会。


With increased investment in infrastructure, not to mention a competitive education system and more investment-friendly business conditions, it can place its economy on a stronger footing for the future, and help pull Europe out of its malaise.	如果能够增加基础设施投资——更不用说有竞争力的教育系统和更加有利于投资的商业环境——德国经济将迎来更加强大的未来，也有助于让欧洲不再萎靡。


We now have a plan; all that is needed is the will to implement it.	如今，我们已经有了一个计划，所需要的只是实施计划的意愿。


Germany’s Four Neins	德国的四大错误


BERLIN – Germany’s stance toward Europe has become one of rejection and disengagement.	发自柏林——德国对欧洲的立场正逐渐向抗拒和疏离转变。 该国的政策制定者们否决了那些饱受危机蹂躏的国家所提出的一项更积极财政政策；


Its policymakers deny the eurozone’s crisis-ridden countries a more active fiscal policy; refuse to support a European investment agenda to generate demand and growth; have declared a fiscal surplus, rather than faster potential growth, as their primary domestic goal; and have begun turning against the European Central Bank (ECB) in the struggle against deflation and a credit crunch.	同时拒绝支持一项旨在创造需求和增长的欧洲投资进程； 又宣布将实现财政盈余——而非更快的潜在增长——作为本国的主要目标；


On all four counts, Germany is wrong.	并在与通缩和信贷紧缩的斗争中与欧洲央行背道而驰。 而在这全部四个方面，德国其实都犯下了错误。


To be sure, Germany is justified in rejecting narrow-minded calls by France and Italy for unconditional fiscal expansion.	无可否认，德国完全有理由去拒绝有由法国和意大利提出的，极为短视的无条件财政扩张。


After all, fiscal stimulus can work only if it supports private investment and is accompanied by much more ambitious structural reforms – the kind of reforms that France and Italy are currently resisting.	毕竟只有在能支持私人投资并与更深层结构改革相结合的情况下，这类财政刺激手段才能奏效——而法国和意大利恰恰是这类改革的反对者。


But Germany has all of the leverage it needs to implement the stability-oriented reforms that it wants for Europe.	但与此同时，德国也拥有自身所需的所有杠杆，足以实施该国心中为欧洲制定的促进稳定型改革。


For starters, Germany, together with the European Commission, can compel France to pursue deeper reforms in exchange for more time to consolidate its deficit.	首先，德国可以与欧盟委员会共同迫使法国去实施更深层次改革，让后者可以换取更多的时间去巩固自身赤字。


Germany cannot, however, indulge its obsession with supply-side reforms without also pursuing growth-enhancing policies.	然而德国不可一面纵容自身对供应这一端改革的偏好，一面却不去施行刺激增长的政策。


As Germany knows from its own experience in the early 2000s, the benefits of supply-side reforms – namely, improved competitiveness and higher long-term growth rates – take a long time to emerge.	德国应该从自身在本世纪初的经验中认识到：供应端改革所带来的好处——比如竞争力的提升以及更高的长期增长率——都需要相当长的一段时间才能显现。 。


Time is a luxury that Europe does not have.	对今天的欧洲来说，时间才是最宝贵的奢侈品。


With every month that the economy loses productive capacity, the likelihood of stagnation and deflation rises.	每过一个月，欧洲经济就会流失一些产能，而陷入经济停滞和通缩的可能性也随之不断上升


The key to ending the European crisis is a stimulus plan that addresses deficiencies on both the supply and demand sides.	而结束欧洲危机的关键就是要实施一个同时应对供应端和需求端缺口的刺激计划。


That is why Germany’s refusal to help find a way to finance the proposed European investment agenda – which, for a limited time, would fund productive private investment – is a mistake.	这也是为何德国拒绝为欧洲投资计划（这将在有限的时间内为有益的私人投资提供资金）融资的做法是错误的。


Equally problematic is Germany’s focus on maintaining a fiscal surplus.	同样有问题的是德国在维持财政盈余这个问题上的固执。


With projections for German GDP growth this year and next revised downward by more than 0.6 percentage points in the last few months, the government could be forced to initiate a pro-cyclical fiscal policy to achieve its goal, inducing even lower growth at home and throughout the eurozone.	由于对德国今明两年的GDP增长预测在过去几个月内下调了超过0. 6%，可能迫使政府去启动一项扩大周期性的财政政策来实现自身的目标，导致本国和整个欧元区出现更低速增长。


Given that the German economy’s output gap remains negative, the government should be implementing expansionary fiscal policy that targets the country’s infrastructure weaknesses.	考虑到德国经济的产出缺口依然为负，政府应当实施扩张性财政政策以补足本国的基础设施缺陷。


In this sense, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s plan to spend an additional €10 billion ($12.5 billion) on public investment in 2016-2018 is a step in the right direction.	在这个意义上来说，德国财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒计划在2016至2018年间追加100亿欧元（折合125亿美元）方案是朝着正确方向迈出的一步。


But, at just 0.1% of Germany’s annual GDP, Schäuble’s scheme looks more like an attempt to quiet criticism from the rest of Europe than a genuine policy shift.	但这个金额仅相当于德国年度GDP0. 1%的计划更像是为了安抚欧洲其他国家的权宜之计，而非一个真心诚意的政策变革。


Germany’s fourth policy mistake is its apparent withdrawal of support for the ECB.	德国人的第四个政策错误是其公开拒绝支持欧洲央行的态度。


Over the last seven years, the ECB’s actions have helped Germany’s economy and taxpayers as much as those of its neighbors.	回顾以往，欧洲央行过所作所为不但有利于其他国家，同时也令德国经济和纳税人从中受益。


Moreover, the claim that the ECB’s purchases of asset-backed securities amount to “toxic loans” that transfer risk to German taxpayers is unfounded; after all, there have been almost no defaults since 2008.	此外，那种那种认定欧洲央行购买“有毒贷款”中有资产担保的证券是在向德国纳税人转移风险的说法根本站不住脚； 毕竟自2008年以来这些证券几乎都没有出现违约。


Germany’s leaders need to recognize this – and to defend the ECB publicly from baseless fear mongering.	德国领导人必须意识到这一点——并在毫无根据的制造恐慌事件中公开为欧洲央行辩护。


Failure to do so may reflect an effort to forestall the rise of the far-right anti-European political forces, particularly the Alternative for Germany.	虽然再这方面的不作为可能反映��一种为提前遏制极右翼反欧洲政治力量——尤其是德国另类选择党”(Alternative for Germany）——崛起的努力。


But this strategy merely plays into the party’s hands.	但这一策略却正中这一党派的下怀。 。


If Germany refuses to take a more reasoned approach, it risks undermining the ECB’s credibility, thereby reducing the effectiveness of its measures.	如果德国拒绝去采取一个更加为合理的手段，就可能会损害欧洲央行的信誉，并削弱后者未来政策手段的效果。


If that happens, the ECB may well be compelled to initiate large-scale purchases of eurozone government bonds through its so-called “outright monetary transactions” scheme – a plan that many German policymakers and economists staunchly oppose.	一旦出现这种情况，欧洲央行可能不得不通过自身所谓的“直接货币交易”计划来大规模购入欧元区各国政府债券——而该计划正是许多德国政策制定者和经济学家坚决反对的。


The German government can use its considerable leverage to compel France and Italy to pursue the structural reforms that both countries need, while allowing a growth-friendly demand stimulus to lift the threat of deflation hanging over the eurozone.	德国政府可以利用手中巨大的杠杆去迫使法意两国实施双方所需的结构性改革，同时允许实施一个促进增长的需求刺激计划去驱除高悬在欧元区之上的通缩威胁。


And it has the authority to bolster the ECB’s credibility and thus its efforts to ensure future price stability and prevent financial contagion.	德国也有足够的权威去提升欧洲央行的信誉，因此也可以提升该行在未来确保价格稳定和防止经济停滞方面的作用效力。


Europe needs a grand bargain, involving close coordination on structural reforms and fiscal and monetary policy.	欧洲需要一个庞大的交换协议，包括在结构性改革和财政货币政策方面的密切协调。


Germany’s relative economic and political stability, far from enabling it to disengage from such efforts, makes it among the most important protagonists in their development and implementation.	德国的相对经济和政治治稳定远远不能使其置身于这些措施之外，也因此使其成为这些措施的制定和实施过程中的重要参与者。


The question is whether Germany’s leaders will recognize this before Europe’s economy falls into an even deeper slump.	而问题则在于：德国领导人是否能在欧洲经济向一个更深的深渊滑落之前，意识到这一点。


Getting Bank Culture Right	整顿银行文化


WASHINGTON, DC – Banks and banking rely on trust.	华盛顿—银行和银行业务的基础是信任。


But while trust takes years to establish, it can be squandered abruptly if a particular bank’s ethics are weak, its values poor, and its behavior simply wrong.	信任需要多年时间才能建立，但只要有一家银行不恪守职业道德、价值低迷、行为错误，信任就会在一夜之间毁于一旦。


The events that triggered the 2008 global financial crisis, together with the subsequent scandals that have emerged – from the rigging of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) to sanctions-busting and money-laundering – amount to a catalog of cultural failures within our financial institutions.	引发2008年全球金融危机的事件，以及其浮出水面的一系列丑闻——从操纵伦敦银行间拆放利率（LIBOR）到制裁破坏和洗钱——都是我们金融机构内部的文化失败。


Yes, extensive measures have been taken since the crisis to strengthen the financial system.	是的，自危机以来人们采取了各种措施强化银行体系。


But a profound weakness remains: To be blunt, it concerns the risk-taking culture that still prevails within some departments of global banks and in the financial system itself.	但重大弱点依然存在：直说的话，就是冒险文化仍在全球大银行的一些部门以及金融系统本身大行其道。


Too often, bank bosses’ promises to change the “corporate culture” and ensure their employees’ good conduct have not been matched by fully effective implementation.	银行高管们总是承诺改变“公司文化”并确保员工行为端正，但这一承诺从未有效兑现过。


In too many cases, banks are still failing to fulfill their obligations in serving their communities and the public at large.	一次又一次，银行仍无法兑现服务社区和全体公众的义务。


It is true that the banking sector is paying a high price for its misdeeds: fines, litigation, and regulatory tightening have cost approximately $300 billion so far.	诚然，银行部门正在为其不当行为付出严重代价：罚款、诉讼和监管收紧目前已经让各银行拿出了大约3,000亿美元。


But the tax-paying public – innocent of any wrongdoing – has also had to bear costs, both direct and indirect.	但纳税人——他们没有做错任何事——也必须承担成本，不管是直接成本还是间接成本。


And, while a handful of “rogue traders” (and, most recently, one Libor manipulator) have ended up in prison, it would be overly optimistic to conclude that the punishment has been sufficient to transform bank culture.	此外，尽管一小撮“流氓交易员”（最新的例子是LIBOR操纵者）已经身陷囹圄，但认为惩罚已足以改变银行文化还是过于乐观了。


If banks and other financial institutions are to perform their crucial role in providing support for growth and employment, it is imperative that they take steps to regain the public’s trust.	如果银行和其他金融机构要行使支持增长和就业的关键作用，就必须采取措施重新获得公众的信任。


But how?	但怎样才能实现？


More regulation is not necessarily the best path forward: The rules and norms that define a “right” and “wrong” culture are beyond the wit of regulators and supervisory bodies.	加强监管未必是最好的办法：定义“正确”和“错误”文化的规则和规范超过了监管者和监督机构的责任范围。


But the pressure to devise such rules is bound to mount if banks do not demonstrate that they are grappling effectively with the challenge of cultural change.	但如果银行不能证明它们能够有效应对文化变迁的挑战，制定这些规则的压力就会增加。


Sadly, until now, many banks have adopted an unconvincing piecemeal approach.	悲哀的是，到目前为止，许多银行采取的是无法令人满意的碎片化方法。


It is not enough to strengthen legal compliance.	强化合规是不够的。


A new report published by the Group of Thirty argues that banks must do far more.	三十人小组（Group of Thirty）的一份新报告指出，银行必须做更多的事。 真正的变革必须直指金融机构的日常经营。


Real change must go to the core of an institution’s day-to-day operations.	银行必须改变奖励过度冒险的薪酬模式； 保护揭发者；


Banks must change compensation practices that reward excessive risk; protect whistleblowers; recruit and train staff to reflect proper ethics; and ensure that their boards of directors play a more active oversight role.	招聘和培训合乎职业伦理的员工； 并确保董事会扮演更加活跃的监督角色。


(I believe that if boards had been aware of the egregious behavior being perpetrated within some institutions, from product mis-selling to price-fixing, they would have acted to stop it.)	（我相信，如果董事会了解某些机构的骇人听闻的行为——从滥发产品到价格操纵——他们早就采取行动阻止它们了。 ）


Let me be clear: Setting values and shaping an organizational culture take a long time and a great deal of work.	我要澄清一点：决定价值和铸造组织文化需要很长时间和大量工作。


Successful reform requires changing people’s mindset and habituating them to self-regulation.	成功的改革需要改变人们的思维，让他们习惯于自我监管。


A written code – emphasizing the commercial benefits of ethical business conduct, and the negative consequences of falling short – is part of that effort and may help preserve and strengthen a culture; but a code alone is not enough.	成文规则——强调合乎道德的业务行为的商业价值以及在这方面落于人后的消极影响——是工作的一部分，有助于保护和强化文化，但光靠规则是不够的。


Constant reminders and repetition are essential.	不断地提醒和重复至关重要。


Employees must understand instinctively what may be done and what should never be done.	员工必须本能地理解什么可以做，什么不能做。


They must internalize a culture that values strict adherence to high ethical standards of conduct.	他们必须将注重严格遵守崇高行为道德标准的文化内化。


To that end, banks should make their values and culture integral to their hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.	在这方面，银行应该将其价值和文化融入招聘、裁员和升迁决定中。


Indeed, the values and conduct of a bank’s risk-takers should account for 50% of their annual performance review.	事实上，价值和银行冒险者的行为应该在员工年度表现评估中占50%的权重。


Failing to live up to a bank’s desired cultural norms should have an impact on an employee’s career – and, when necessary, end it.	不能遵守银行所追求的文化规范应该对员工职业生涯产生影响——必要时应该终结其职业生涯。


Banking regulators and supervisors also have a decisive role to play.	银行监管者和监督者也起着决定性作用。


They need to work with boards and senior management to ensure that major reforms are implemented and then consistently applied.	他们需要与董事会和高管层合作确保重大改革得到实施，并一以贯之。


Regular exchanges of views between oversight officials and the banks should be regarded as a crucial component of this process.	监督官员和银行定期交换观点应该作为这一过程的关键组成部分。


Central bankers have been dismayed by many banks’ failure to move forward decisively to address the difficult internal issues of conduct and culture.	许多银行没有迈出决定性的步骤解决棘手的行为和文化的内部问题，这令许多央行行长十分失望。


And now the concerns have grown to the point that delay is no longer an option.	如今，这一问题已经刻不容缓。


Either the banks reform themselves, or public authorities will intervene still further.	要么银行改革自己，要么公共当局进一步干预。


Getting Corruption Right	正确地理解腐败


NEW YORK – I just returned from India, where I was lecturing to the Indian Parliament in the same hall where US President Barack Obama had recently spoken.	发自纽约——最近我回到了印度，站在美国总统奥巴马曾经演讲过的讲台上给国会议员们上了一课。


The country was racked by scandal. A gigantic, ministerial-level scam in the mobile-telephone sector had siphoned off many billions of dollars to a corrupt politician.	这个国家最近丑闻缠身，一名部长级官员在通信行业导演了一场巨大的骗局，敛财达数十亿美元。


But several of the MPs had also been taken aback on discovering that when Obama spoke to them, he read from an “invisible” teleprompter.	但许多议员们突然发现：原来奥巴马向他们发表演讲的时候其实使用了一台“隐形”提字机。


This had misled his audience into thinking that he was speaking extemporaneously, a skill that is highly regarded in India.	听众们原以为总统是即席脱稿演讲的，要知道这在印度可是一项备受推崇的技能。


Both episodes were seen as a form of corruption: one involved money, the other deception.	以上这两个片段都可以被视为某种形式的腐败：前者跟金钱有关，后者则使用了某种诡计。


The two transgressions are obviously not equal in moral turpitude.	这两种罪过虽然在道德上是不同的。


But the Obama episode illustrates an important cross-cultural difference in assessing how corrupt a society is.	但奥巴马那一幕则反映了关于评价一个社会腐败程度的某种重要跨文化差异。


Transparency International and occasionally the World Bank like to rank countries by their degree of corruption, with the media then ceaselessly citing where each country stands.	非政府组织“透明国际”会对各国的腐败程度进行排名，世界银行偶尔也会这样做，而媒体也会不断引用这些数据来说明某些国家的腐败程度。


But cultural differences between countries undermine the legitimacy of such rankings – which are, after all, based on surveys of the public.	但各国之间的文化差异影响了这些排名的合理性——毕竟这些排名都是依据对公众的调查。


What Obama was doing was a common enough practice in the United States (though one might expect better from an orator of his ability); it was not so in India, where such a technique is, indeed, regarded as reprehensible.	奥巴马的行为在美国司空见惯（倘若他真的拥有演说才能的话，这会令人感觉更好）； 但这种做法在印度可行不通，因为使用这类技术是会遭人白眼的。


India certainly has corruption, like almost every other country.	印度无疑也跟世界其他国家一样存在腐败。


But India also has a culture in which people commonly assume that everyone in public life is corrupt unless they prove otherwise.	但在印度文化中，人们会假设每个人在公共生活中都存在腐败行为，除非他能以某种方式证明自己的清白。


Even a blind man will tell Transparency International: “I saw him take a bribe with my own eyes.”	即便是个盲人也会告诉透明国际的调查员：“我亲眼看见他收受了贿赂。


Indeed, a distinguished Indian bureaucrat, a man of unimpeachable character, once told me that his mother had told him: “I believe you are not corrupt only because you are my son!”	”事实上，一位品德无可挑剔的著名印度官员告诉我，他母亲曾对他说：“我相信你是廉洁的，但这只是因为你是我儿子。 ”


So, if you ask Indians whether their governance is marked by widespread corruption, they will answer with gusto: yes!	因此如果你问一个印度人他的政府是否充斥着贪污腐败，他们会热情地回答：“没错！


But their exuberance biases India’s global ranking relative to more empirically minded countries.	”但这种热情扭曲了印度的全球排名，导致其比许多以腐败闻名的国家更低。


A similar bias arises from the occasional tendency to view political patronage elsewhere as being more corrupt than the same practices at home.	另外一种类似的扭曲行为表现在认为其他国家比自己的国家更腐败。


For example, when the East Asian financial crisis broke out, there followed a systematic attempt to pin the blame on the affected countries: “crony capitalism” allegedly had somehow crippled their economies!	比如说，东亚金融危机爆发之后出现了对受影响国家的系统性指责：认为“权贵资本主义”拖累了他们的经济。


In other words, the acquaintances and benefactors of the East Asian leaders were “cronies,” whereas those of US leaders were “friends”?	换句话说，那些东亚领导人的熟人和捐助者都是“权贵”，那么难道美国领导人身边的都是“朋友”？


In fact, it was clear that the culprits were the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury, which had encouraged a shift to capital-account convertibility without understanding that the case for free capital flows was not symmetrical with the case for free trade.	事实上，真正的始作俑者显然是世界货币基金组织和美国财政部，他们推动资本账户开放，却不知道自由资本流动的程度跟自由贸易的程度是不一致的。


But where substantial corruption can unambiguously be found, as it often can, one must recognize that it is not a cultural given.	但在那些腐败大量明显存在地方，人们也不能因此而认为这是一个文化特色。


On the contrary, often it is the result of policies that have fed it.	与此相反，这通常都是政策结下的恶果。


India in the 1950’s had a civil service, and a political class, that were the envy of the world.	1950年代的印度拥有一个为世界所称道的文官集团以及政治阶层。


If that seems shocking today, the loss of virtue must be traced to the all-pervasive “permit raj,” with its licensing requirements to import, produce, and invest, which grew to gargantuan proportions.	这或许会令当今的人们感到震惊，但这种道德沦丧必须追溯到无孔不入的“许可证统治”——任何进口，生产以及投资行为都需要许可证，而且情况不断恶化。


High-level bureaucrats quickly discovered that licenses could be bartered for favors, while politicians saw in the system the means to help important financial backers.	高级官员们很快发现可以利用许可证作为交易筹码，而政客们则利用这一系统去回报资助自己的那些大财主。


Once the system had taken root, corruption percolated downward, from senior bureaucrats and politicians, who could be bribed do what they were not supposed to do, to lower-level bureaucrats, who would not do what there were supposed to do unless bribed.	这个系统一旦生根，腐败行为也一并渗入，高级官员和政客们收受贿赂去做不该做的事，而下级官员则索取贿赂去做自己本该去做的事。


Clerks would not bring out files, or get you your birth certificate or land title, unless you greased their palms.	除非你满足他们的要求，否则政府办事员就不会向你提供相关文件，或者向你颁发出生证明或是地契。


But if policies can create corruption, it is equally true that the cost of corruption will vary with the specific policies.	但如果政策可以催生腐败的话，很明显腐败的成本会随着特定政策而变化。


The cost of corruption has been particularly high in India and Indonesia, where policies created monopolies that earned scarcity rents, which were then allocated to officials’ family members.	腐败所导致的成本在印度和印尼两地都尤其高昂，因为当地政策制造了一大批可以四处寻租的垄断权力，而这些权力又被分配给了官员的亲属。


Such “rent-creating” corruption is quite expensive and corrosive of growth.	这种“寻租”型腐败带来了极高的成本，并对经济增长造成了损害。


By contrast, in China, the corruption has largely been of the “profit-sharing” variety, whereby family members are given a stake in the enterprise so that their earnings increase as profits increase – a type of corruption that promotes growth.	与此相反，中国的腐败通常都是“利益分享”型，那些国有企业高管的家庭成员都拥有股份，他们的收益随着企业盈利的上升而增加——这是某种促进经济增长的腐败。


In the long run, of course, both types of corruption are corrosive of the respect and trust that good governance requires, which can undermine economic performance in its own right.	长远看来，这两种腐败都会腐蚀优秀治理所需的尊重和信任，并最终损害经济增长。


But that does not absolve us of the responsibility to define corruption properly – and to acknowledge obvious and important cultural differences in how it is understood.	但这并不妨碍我们去正确定义腐败——并认识到那些关于如何理解腐败的明显以及重要文化差异


Getting Investment in Europe Right	让欧洲投资走上正轨


PARIS – The European Commission’s new president, Jean-Claude Juncker, has put public investment back on the agenda with his idea of a three-year €300 billion ($378 billion) capital spending plan.	巴黎—欧盟委员会新主席让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）在其三年3,000亿欧元的资产支出计划中把公共投资重新纳入了日程。


The European Union’s leaders are expected to discuss his proposal in December.	预计欧盟领导人将在12月讨论容克的方案。


Everyone seems to agree that more investment would help to strengthen a worryingly feeble European economy.	似乎所有人都同意，增加投资有助于强化摇摇欲坠的欧洲经济。


But, behind the superficial consensus, many questions remain unanswered.	但是，在表面共识下，许多问题仍然没有解决。


For starters, this is not the first time that Europe has considered such an initiative.	首先，这不是欧洲第一次考虑类似的方案。


In 1993, the Commission, under Jacques Delors, proposed a capital spending plan in its White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment.	1993年，欧盟委员会在雅克·德洛尔（Jacques Delors）的领导下在其增长、竞争力和就业白皮书中提出了资本支出计划。


The plan was broadly endorsed, but no action was taken.	该计划得到了广泛支持，但并没有拿出行动。


Likewise, in 2000, as part of its Lisbon Strategy, the EU sought to increase national spending on research and development to 3% of GDP.	类似地，2000年，作为里斯本战略（Lisbon Strategy）的一部分，欧盟寻求将国民研发支出提高到GDP的3%。


It failed to reach this target.	这一目标也没有达到。


More recently, in June 2012, EU leaders adopted a Compact for Growth and Jobs that was supposed to mobilize €120 billion.	最近，2012年6月，欧盟领导人通过了《增长与就业契约》（Compact for Growth and Jobs ），计划动员1,200亿欧元资金。


The check is still in the mail.	至今仍是一张空头支票。


It is indeed easy to pretend to act without taking effective action.	确实，装作行动比采取实际行动容易得多。


One way is to ask the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s development bank, to lend more.	一种办法是要求欧盟的开发银行——欧洲投资银行增加贷款。


Such calls face two limitations: the EIB itself is careful not to jeopardize its financial rating by taking on too much risk, and its loans easily substitute for private financing.	这一要求面临两大局限：欧洲投行本身很谨慎，不会轻易拿自己的金融评级冒险，而其贷款也很容易取代私人融资。


More lending therefore can be pointless if it results in the EIB crowding out private financing of the best available projects.	因此，如果增加贷款导致欧洲投行将私人融资挤出最佳项目，那么这样做也就毫无意义了。


A bridge financed by the EIB may be more affordable than one financed by capital markets, but it remains the same bridge and has the same economic impact.	通过欧洲投行融资的过桥贷款也许比通过资本市场融资更加可行，但仍然是相同的过桥贷款，产生相同的经济影响。


The size of the EIB’s balance sheet is not a good measure of its effectiveness.	欧洲投行的资产负债表规模并不是其效率的好指标。


Instead, three investment levers should be used.	相反，三种投资杠杆应该好好利用。


The first lever is budgetary: Governments that enjoy fiscal space should spend on economically sound projects.	第一种杠杆是预算：拥有财政余地的政府应该将支出投向可靠的项目。


Public investment is a complement to private investment; if designed and targeted well, it can trigger more private investment, rather than crowding it out.	公共投资是私人投资的补充； 如能精心规划和定向，公共投资能带来而不是挤出更多私人投资。


For example, adequate transport and broadband infrastructure favors the burgeoning of business initiatives.	比如，充分的交通和宽带基础设施有利于创业活动的兴盛。


At a time when markets are willing to lend to solvent governments at historically low rates, there should be little room for hesitation.	当市场愿意以历史低利率向有偿债能力的政府提供贷款时，绝不应该犹豫。


Obviously, cheap financing does not justify public investment in projects with dubious social returns, or what development practitioners call “white elephants”: headline-grabbing projects of disputable value but supported by special interests.	显然，廉价的融资并不意味着可以随便进行社会回报可疑的公共投资或发展实践家所谓的“白象”投资，即那些吸引眼球但价值值得商榷、受特殊理由集团支持的项目。


Investments should be assessed on the basis of their overall economic impact, with proper procedures put in place to prevent public money from being wasted.	投资应该以总体经济影响为基础进行评估，应该有合理的程序以防止公共资金被浪费。


The second lever for investment is regulatory in nature.	第二种投资杠杆是监管。


Many large-scale investments that only pay off over the long term – for example, in energy, digital infrastructure, and transport – are concentrated in state-regulated sectors, giving governments the power to influence business decisions.	许多只有在长期才有回报的大规模投资——比如能源、数字基础设施和交通投资——都集中在国家监管领域，政府有权力影响商业决策。


Predictability regarding the future course of regulation would unlock projects held back by uncertainty.	未来监管的可预测性有助于释放因为不确定性而无法实施的项目。


A credible outlook for the price of carbon, for example, would prompt new private-sector investment in cleaner technologies.	比如，可信的碳价格前景将刺激清洁技术领域的私人投资。


Similarly, an agreed European framework for projects that connect countries would remove obstacles to cross-border investment.	类似地，在连接各国的项目上形成一致的欧洲框架能够消除跨境投资壁垒。


These conditions are a long way from being met, which means that profitable investments are not being made.	这些条件都远远没有满足，这意味着有利可图的投资没有能够实施。


Changing that would not cost a single euro; it requires only political resolve.	改变着一点不需要花费一毛钱； 只需要政治决心。


The third lever is financial.	第三种杠杆是金融。


Investment demand has slackened not because interest rates are too high, but because there is not enough risk appetite within the banking system.	投资需求之所以松懈，不是因为利率太高，而是因为银行体系没有足够的风险胃口。


Financing in continental Europe is traditionally bank-based, unlike in the US, where capital markets reign supreme.	欧洲大陆的融资传统上一直以银行为主，不像美国以资本市场为主。


But banks are being told by regulators to reduce their leverage and to post higher capital when they embark on risky lending, and their creditors are being told that they should not expect to be bailed out if banks get into trouble.	但银行受监管者要求降低杠杆并在高风险贷款项目上划拨更高的资本拔备，而银行债权人也被告知不必在银行陷入麻烦是指望援助。


This is intentional.	这些都是有意为之。


Governments and citizens in Europe have paid – and are still paying – an astronomically high price for the reckless lending and investment of the 2000s.	欧洲各国政府和公民因为21世纪初的鲁莽贷款和投资而付出了——并且仍在继续付出——高昂的代价。


Understandably, they do not want to repeat the experience.	不难理解，他们不希望重蹈覆辙。


The consequence, however, is that high-risk, high-return projects are more difficult to finance than they should be.	但是，其结果是高风险、高回报项目更难找到应有的融资。


If Europe wants to revive its economy and escape stagnation, it needs entrepreneurs to take more risk to innovate.	如果欧洲想要重振经济、摆脱停滞，就需要企业家冒更大的险去创新。


But its financial system is undergoing a transition from a bank-based to a market-based system that involves risk aversion.	但其金融体系正在经历从基于银行到基于市场的转变，这一转变会带来风险厌恶。


This is where the public side – both national governments and the EU – should step in and share some of the risk with private players.	公共部门——包括国家政府和欧盟——就应该在此时站出来，替私人部门分担一些风险。


They should temporarily behave more like investors who scrutinize projects, contribute funding, and earn returns.	它们应该暂时以投资者的面貌出现，仔细审核项目、贡献资金、赚取回报。


Using the EIB and national development banks to this end would help overcome the current impasse.	通过欧洲投行和国家开发银行实现这一点有助于克服当前的僵局。


Would these three types of initiatives add up to €300 billion?	这三大杠杆可以加在3,000亿欧元之上吗？


No one knows at this stage.	目前没人可以知道。


But this route would be the surest way to reach the goal.	但这是实现目标的最确定的途径。


Getting Migration Governance Right	加强移民治理


DHAKA – At last year’s United Nations General Assembly summit, world leaders promised to cooperate on ensuring safe, orderly, regular, and responsible migration.	达卡——在去年举行的联大首脑会议上，世界领导人承诺要合作确保建立安全、有序、正规和负责任的移民关系。


This year, they need to do more to realize that pledge.	今年，他们需要更加努力来实现这一承诺。


UN member states have acknowledged migration’s many benefits, including its role in stabilizing global labor markets, spreading knowledge and ideas, creating diasporas that spur increased trade and investment, and sustaining economies worldwide through remittances, which pay for family members’ health care, education, and housing back home.	联合国成员国承认移民具有诸多好处，包括稳定全球劳动力市场、传播知识和理念、创造促进贸易和投资增加的散居环境和通过汇款支持世界各经济体，并为移民家庭在国内的医疗、教育和住房提供支持。


But these benefits are easily squandered if, as we’ve seen recently with crises in the Mediterranean Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Central American corridor, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, migration is not governed responsibly and cooperatively.	但如果移民治理不负责任、缺少合作，这些好处就很容易被挥霍浪费，我们在地中海、安达曼海、中美洲走廊、萨赫勒和非洲之角所看到的危机就是如此。


More than 4,300 migrants have died this year trying to reach their destinations.	今年有4，300多名移民在试图抵达目的地的途中死去。


In the Mediterranean Sea alone, 3,200 people have perished, and in the Andaman Sea, just east of the Bay of Bengal, thousands of migrants have been stranded on boats with nowhere to land, or have been held hostage by their traffickers.	仅地中海一地就有3，200人丧生，而在紧邻孟加拉湾东侧的安达曼海，数千名移民被困在船上无法登陆，或者被人贩子扣为人质。


Against this backdrop, UN member governments should acknowledge the gap between the ideals they espoused last year and the harsh realities many migrants and refugees continue to face today.	在这样的背景下，联合国各成员国政府应当承认他们去年所信奉的理想和今天许多移民和难民持续面临的残酷现实之间有巨大的差距。


World leaders can rectify this at this month’s General Assembly meeting – and specifically at today’s unprecedented summit on migration and refugees.	世界领导人可以在本月举行的联大会议上对此予以纠正——尤其是利用今天前所未有的移民和难民峰会的机遇。


World leaders should first renew their commitment to stronger global governance of migration, and agree to hold a first-ever intergovernmental conference in 2018 to focus exclusively on creating a new global compact on migration, as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed earlier this year.	世界领导人应当首先重申对加强全球移民治理的承诺，并同意在2018年首次举行政府间会议，采纳联合国秘书长潘基文今年年初的提案，专门探讨制定全新移民事务全球协议的议题。


The mere possibility that UN member states may settle on a new global compact is a significant development.	仅仅是联合国成员国达成新全球协议的可能性就是一项显著进步。


For far too long, the international community has struggled to govern migration effectively.	长期以来，国际社会一直竭尽全力对移民进行有效的治理。


Without global-governance institutions and legal frameworks to guide international cooperation, most countries must resort to unilateral management of their own migration flows.	在没有全球治理机构和法律框架指导国际合作的情况下，多数国家不得不退而求其次，依赖于本国国内的移民流动单边管理。


When states fail to govern migration effectively, they create a vacuum that is filled by unscrupulous actors: smugglers, traffickers, and organized-crime.	当国家政府无法有效治理移民，他们所创造的真空就被走私集团、人贩子和有组织犯罪等肆无忌惮的不法势力所填补。


Meanwhile, countries, migrants, and host communities all lose out as they bear the costs of migration without realizing its benefits.	此外，国家、移民和收容社区均面临多输的局面，因为他们承受了移民的成本，却未能享受移民所带来的收益。


The UN currently is falling short of providing effective support to member states, migrants, and the societies that host them.	联合国目前没有能力为成员国、移民和收留移民的社会提供有效的支持。


Its member governments need to agree on universal principles to establish an international framework for dealing with migration, and the UN itself should make governance of migration one of its central missions, rather than scattering the task across different agencies.	联合国成员国政府有必要就制定处理移民事务的国际框架普遍原则达成一致，而联合国自身则不应将移民治理分散至不同的机构，而应将其作为联合国的一项核心任务。


Fortunately, the International Organization for Migration will join the UN system today.	幸运的是，国际移民组织今天将加入联合国体系。


The IOM is expected to play a leading role in making migration governance more coherent and efficient.	人们预期国际移民组织将在实现更加连贯和有效的移民治理方面发挥主导作用。


My own country, Bangladesh, initiated the idea of a global compact specifically to improve migration governance.	我的祖国孟加拉最先提出了签订专门旨在改善移民治理的全球协议。


As the current Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Bangladesh is committed to ensuring that the lessons learned inform the global compact.	作为现任移民与发展全球论坛主席国，孟加拉致力于确保已有的教训可以在全球协议中得到体现。


But, to avoid entering into new agreements that merely re-state or re-negotiate existing commitments, world leaders must act now to lay the institutional and legal groundwork for operationalizing previous proposals and make further progress.	但为了避免签署仅仅是重申或重新谈判现有承诺的新协议，世界领袖必须立即采取行动奠定制度和法律基础，以便落实之前的提案并争取更多进步。


International cooperation on migration should be founded on existing intergovernmental agreements, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the 2013 Declaration of High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.	国际移民合作应当以现有政府间协议为基础，如2030年的可持续发展议程、2015年的亚迪斯亚贝巴行动纲领，2015年的仙台减轻灾害风险框架以及2013年的国际移民与发展高级对话宣言。


Migration is a multidimensional issue; it requires a comprehensive approach that also respects existing national laws and regulations.	它需要制定同时尊重现有国家法律和法规的综合性方案。 决策者应当力求实现移民经济利益最大化；


Policymakers should maximize migration’s economic benefits; facilitate legal channels so that migrants don’t choose illegal alternatives; reduce barriers for employment and remittances; manage irregular migration flows; and protect migrants’ safety, especially in war zones or when migration reaches crisis levels, as it has this year.	管理非正常的移民流动； 以及保护移民安全，特别是在战区或爆发像今年这样的移民危机时。


Countries and nongovernmental organizations must remain vigilant against exploitation of migrants, and governments should share responsibility for accommodating refugees.	国家级非政府组织必须对剥削移民的行为保持警惕，而且政府应当分担难民安置的责任。


And, to keep up with rapidly changing geopolitical conditions, the international community should consider new partnerships in addressing migration and large movements of people.	而且，为了跟上瞬息万变的地缘政治形势，国际社会应当思考在解决移民和民众大规模流动问题上建立全新伙伴关系。


Finally, effective migration governance requires institutional and legal frameworks that can reconcile sometimes-conflicting considerations.	最后，有效的移民治理需要制度和法律框架来调和有时甚至相互冲突的考虑。


For example, countries’ national interest in maintaining their sovereignty, controlling their borders, and enforcing their domestic laws must be balanced against migrants’ human rights, their legitimate desire to improve their lives, and societies’ need for immigrants and increased diversity.	比方说，国家维护主权、控制边境、执行国内法律的内部利益必须与保护移民人权、移民改善生活的合法愿望以及社会对移民和增加多样性的需求达成某种平衡关系。


By addressing all of these concerns together, the international community can uphold the principle of shared prosperity through shared responsibility, which is at the heart of the UN’s 2030 sustainable development agenda.	通过一次性解决人们所有的关注，国际社会可以通过共同承担责任来坚持处在联合国2030年可持续发展议程核心的共同繁荣原则。


The time has come to set the world on a new path of constructive cooperation, instead of populists’ preferred path of destructive unilateralism.	现在是时候让世界走上建设性合作之路，而不是继续坚持民粹主义者所爱好的破坏性单边主义。


We need only recognize that migration benefits us all to maximize the gains and minimize the pain.	要想最大限度的获取收益和减轻痛苦，我们只需要认识到移民有利于我们所有人。


Getting Past the American Election	走过美国大选


The pundits have now weighed in mightily in interpreting the American presidential election.	政坛权威目前在诠释美国大选问题上纷纷提出自己的有力观点。


Did the outcome - together with Republican gains in the Congress - represent an endorsement of Bush's positions?	这次大选结果及共和党在国会的获胜说明布什的立场得到认可了吗？


Has the American electorate swung to the right?	美国选民已经倾向于保守的共和党了吗？


Are Americans now more concerned about "values?"	美国人现在更加关注"价值观"吗？


Like price in economics, a single electoral choice compresses a lot of information.	如同经济学中的"价格"概念一样，单个选民的选择浓缩了很多信息。


It is a summary of whether, taking everything into account, a citizen prefers one candidate to another.	把一切可能的因素考虑在内，这一选择能说明一个市民是否更青睐某一位候选人。


A host of surveys is required to figure out what it really means, for the United States - and for the world.	要对这张选票对美国以及对世界意味着什么做出解释，还需要进行大量调查。


This much is clear, however: there is little confidence in Bush's economic policies.	不过这已经足够清楚的说明了：民众对布什的经济政策信心不足。


The typical American family knows that it is worse off today than it was four years ago, and appears unconvinced that the tax cuts targeted at upper-income Americans brought the benefits heralded by the Bush administration.	典型的美国家庭知道现在的状况比四年前糟糕了许多，他们并不认为针对高收入群的减税政策真的带来了布什政府所预先承诺的好处。


But while Bush was not held back four years ago by the lack of a popular mandate in pushing his agenda, he may be emboldened by the seeming ringing endorsement to push even harder - such as making the tax cuts permanent and partially privatizing social security.	但四年前布什并没有因为缺乏广泛的"选民授权"而延误推行该议程。 如今在强大的声援鼓舞下，他很可能会更大胆的推行这种努力¾比如实行永久减税制度，并部分程度上推进社会保障私有化。


If adopted, these measures will further compound America's fiscal mess.	如果此类政策得以落实，美国的财政混乱会进一步加剧。


To the rest of the world, these are America's problems.	在其他国家看来，这些正是美国的问题所在。


Yes, the soaring deficits may contribute somewhat to international financial instability.	是的，美国的赤字激增会在某种意义上加剧国际金融的不稳定性。


Real interest rates may rise, as America borrows more and more.	随着美国借入资金越来越多，实际利率有上涨的可能。


If declining confidence in US fiscal policy leads to a weaker dollar, Europe and Asia may find it more difficult to export, and if the deficits prove a drag on the American economy, global growth may stall.	如果对美国财政政策的信心指数继续下滑导致美元疲软，欧洲和亚洲的出口会遭遇困境； 如果赤字问题拖了美国经济的后腿，全球的经济增长有可能陷于停滞。


But for much of the rest of the world, the real concern is American unilateralism.	但这些国家中的大部分真正关注的是美国的"单边主义"。


An interconnected world needs cooperation and collective action.	一个相互联系的世界需要合作和共同行动。


Historically, the US has exercised enormous leadership in a world committed to the proposition that no state should dictate collective decisions.	从历史上看：为真正使任何国家的意志都不能代替集体决定，美国曾起过非常重要的领导作用。


Unfortunately, over the past four years, America's president has lost the credibility necessary to exercise that leadership.	不幸的是，在过去的四年中，美国总统已经失去了行使这一领导权所必备的可信度。


Even if the 59 million votes cast for Bush represented a ringing endorsement of his Iraq policy, it would not restore America's international credibility.	即使59，000，000张选票代表了选民对其在伊政策的强大支持和认可，也不能挽回美国在国际社会失去的诚信。


I believe most Americans reject Bush's unilateralism no less than his administration's economic policies.	我相信大多数美国民众像抵制布什政府的经济政策一样抵制他的"单边主义政策"。


Before the invasion of Iraq, they wanted America to go to the UN, and today they recognize that America alone cannot maintain order in the Middle East.	在入侵伊拉克之前，他们希望美国将此事提交联合国处理，现在他们也承认美国没有单独维持中东秩序的能力。


Even if Iraq is to bear more of the cost of its own reconstruction, there will have to be debt forgiveness, and this too requires international cooperation.	即使伊拉克能够负担更多本国重建的费用，那也需要世界各国能减免它所欠下的债务，这同样需要国际协作，共同解决。


Those who voted for Bush may not be as outraged by American involvement in torture, or the misleading information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and connections with Al Qaeda, as those abroad.	对于美国卷入酷刑丑闻，伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器以及伊与基地组织有关联的误传等问题，海外的美国民众可能要比那些投票给布什的民众更感到气愤。


But they do not want America alone to shoulder the burdens of international peace, and they are gradually coming to the realization that leadership and cooperation do not come automatically, simply because America is the only superpower.	但是他们不希望美国独自地担负维护国际和平的重担。 他们渐渐意识到并不因为美国是世界唯一的超级大国，就自然而然地拥有了领导地位和其它国家的合作。


Some worry whether Bush will use his electoral mandate to engage in more ventures.	一部分人担心布什会利用"选民授权"来进行更多的风险投机。


As he himself put it, "I earned capital in the campaign … and now I intend to spend it."	正如他自己所讲："我在大选中赢得了资本…现在我要来享用它。


Had the Iraq venture been more successful, these worries would have been justified.	"如果他在伊拉克的冒险行动比现在成功一些，这些担心是可以理解的。


There is little secret that there were discussions concerning Iran.	在伊朗问题上的争论早就不是什么秘密了。


But the doctrine of preemptive war has been badly tarnished, and I remain hopeful that Congress and the American people have learned a painful lesson.	但是"先发制人"的战争战略已经失去了往日的光泽。 我始终期望美国的国会和民众已经从中吸取了惨痛的教训。


Peace will not quickly be restored to Iraq, and it is hard to conceive of opening up a major new front, when America can hardly manage what it has already undertaken.	伊拉克不会很快恢复和平。 很难想象美国在对付现有事务都应接不暇的情况下，再打开这样一条重要的新战线会是什么样子。


Others will, of course, have to continue to bear the costs of the mistaken and mismanaged adventure in Iraq.	当然，其他人不得不继续消化在���拉克问题上这一错误冒险所酿成的苦果。


Instability in the Middle East will continue to limit oil supplies, discouraging the expansion of production.	中东的不稳定局势会持续影响原油供给，阻碍生产扩大。


High oil prices will dampen global growth in the remainder of 2004 and into 2005.	高昂的油价将从2004年后半年到2005年抑制全球经济增长。


In the short run, the only response is more conservation, and America's allies should put pressure on America to conserve.	从短期看，唯一的应对措施是进一步扩大"储备"规模。 美国的盟国也会在此问题上向其施加压力。


(Another reason stems from recent reports concerning the rapid melting of the polar ice cap, which seem to reconfirm worries about global warming.)	（另外新近关于极地冰冠的快速融化的报导也再次证实了关于全球变暖的担心，这也是我们提出"储备"政策的另外一个原因。 ）


Presidents do make a difference, but every president operates within constraints.	总统与总统之间确有差别，但每一任总统都会受到约束。


The good news is that the constraints that Bush and the American government will face in the next four years will almost surely limit the damage they will cause.	值得庆幸的是布什和美国政府在未来四年中将面临的约束似乎会把他们可能造成危害限制在一定范围内。


The rhetoric and posturing, the lack of commitment to human rights or democratic processes, may be - and should be - upsetting, but there will be far more bark than bite.	他们的煽动性的言语和姿态、以及缺乏对人权和民主进程的必要承诺可能、也应该是令人沮丧的，但口头上的叫嚣可能会多于实际造成的伤害。


While America may continue on a path of unilateralism, other countries' stance will make a difference.	在美国可能继续单边主义的情况下，其他国家的立场也许会对改变这一状况起到一定作用。


Some suggest that the US constitution provided fewer constraints on the president in the conduct of foreign policy, because the requisite checks and balances were to be provided by the powers of the time - Britain and France.	一些人提出，美国宪法在总统实行外交政策方面限制较少，因为当今世界另外两大强国――英国和法国还会对其进行必要的制衡。


Today, with the US as the only superpower, it is even more important for countries to stand up and express their views - and to stick by them even when pressured.	美国以独一无二的超级强权形象出现在今天的国际舞台，其他国家能够在这种情况下站起来、说出自己的观点，并且在面对压力的情况下仍然坚持下去就显得尤为重要了。


Some worry that this will worsen relations with the US.	一些人担心这样会恶化与美国的关系。


But long-term relationships are based on friendship and respect; coherent, well-argued positions will earn that respect.	但长期关系是基于友谊和尊重的； 前后一致而经过充分思考的立场才能赢得尊重。


Today, many Americans, especially the young, feel far more respect for the countries that recognized the lack of evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction than for those whose leaders repeated the American distortions.	今天，许美多国人，尤其是年轻人，往往对于那些敢于承认在"伊拥有大规模杀伤武器"问题上证据不足、而不是重复美国这一谎言的国家，表现出更多的尊重。


It may be unfortunate that Realpolitik is the order of the day, but it is, so others must learn to play the same game.	也许"权利政治"构成当今国际社会的秩序是令人遗憾的，但事实就是这样。


Standing up for multilateralism and international rule of law may not only be the morally right thing to do; it is also in the interests of America's allies and, ultimately, America itself.	所以其他国家必须学会加入到这场游戏当中来。 支持"多边主义"和国际法则也许不仅仅是道义上正确的事情，它还是美国的盟国及美国自己的利益所在。


Getting Practical in Controlling Malaria	切实地控制疟疾


Many international assistance programs fail because they are badly designed and/or too complicated.	许多国际援助计划都以失败告终，其原因在于它们的设计不当并且/或者过于复杂。


The result is that the poor don’t get the help they need, and taxpayers in rich countries lose confidence in the use of their aid funds.	其结果是穷人没有得到所需的帮助，而富国的纳税人对他们援助资金的使用也失去了信心。


A case in point has been malaria control.	比较说明问题的一个案例是疟疾的控制。


If rich countries adopt simpler and more practical strategies to help Africa fight malaria, they can save millions of Africans while building enthusiastic support among their citizens.	如果富国采用更简单且更实用的战略来帮助非洲迎战疟疾，那么它们就能够拯救上百万非洲人的生命并在它们的国民中建立积极有效的支持。


Malaria is a killer disease transmitted by a specific species of mosquitoes.	疟疾是由一种特定种类的蚊子所传播的致命疾病。


It depends on warm temperatures, and thus is largely a tropical malady.	它依赖于温暖的气候，所以主要是一种热带病。


Africa turns out to be especially unlucky, because it has a combination of high temperatures and the mosquitos that are likely to transmit the disease.	非洲真可谓是特别不幸，因为它不但有高的温度，还盛产容易传播疟疾的蚊子。


As a result, Africa accounts for 90% of all malaria deaths in the world – including roughly two million children per year.	其结果就是非洲因疟疾而死的人数占全球的90%--其中还包括每年约200万儿童。


Yet even in Africa, Malaria is largely preventable and completely treatable at low cost.	然而就算在非洲，疟疾在很大程度上也是可以预防并完全能够以较低的成本得到治疗的。


Up until now, there has been far too little malaria control.	到目前为止，疟疾控制的努力还远远不够。


Prevention is best accomplished by modern anti-malaria bed nets, which are treated with insecticide.	预防的最佳方式是现代的防疟疾蚊帐。 这种蚊帐经过了杀虫剂处理。


These nets cover people while they sleep, and repel or kill the mosquitoes, which tend to bite during the night.	这些蚊帐为睡眠中的人们提供保护，能够驱散或杀死在夜间叮人的蚊子。


The nets reduce the number of bites, and the amount of illness, but they do not eliminate them.	这种蚊帐能够减少人们被蚊子叮咬的次数，并减少染上疟疾的几率，但却不能根除蚊子。


If people get bitten despite the nets, they require treatment within a few hours of the onset of symptoms.	如果人们在使用蚊帐之后还是被蚊子叮咬，他们就需要在疟疾症状出现的头几个小时里得到治疗。


There are two major obstacles to solving the malaria problem.	解决疟疾的问题面临两个主要的障碍。


First, Africa’s poor cannot afford insecticide-treated bed nets and the correct medicines.	首先，非洲的穷人负担不起经过杀虫剂处理的蚊帐和适当的药物。


Many end up taking cheap medicines that are not effective because the malaria parasite has developed resistance to them.	许多人不得不服用廉价的药物。 而这些药物不会产生疗效，因为疟原虫已经对其产生了抗药性。


Second, African villagers lack access to cars or trucks, so they have to walk several miles to reach a clinic.	其次，非洲的乡村居民缺少汽车、卡车等交通工具，所以他们不得不走上好几英里才能到达卫生所。


An infected child is often dead or comatose by the time a mother reaches a clinic.	被疟疾感染的小孩在被母亲送到卫生所时往往已经死亡或已陷入昏迷。


If rich-country governments thought practically about malaria and recognized that it is a full-scale emergency, they could support simple and practical solutions: bed nets and timely access to medicine.	如果富国的政府们以实际的方式来思考疟疾的问题，并承认它是一个全面的紧急事件，那么它们就可以支持简单而实用的解决方案：蚊帐和及时可得的药物。


Rich countries would buy bed nets from companies that produce them and work with African governments to distribute them free of charge to every African household.	富国就会从生产蚊帐的公司购买产品，并与非洲各国的政府合作将蚊帐免费分发给每一个非洲家庭。


And they would work with African governments to ensure that the correct medicines are available for quick use within each village.	他们还会与非洲各国政府合作以确保在每个村庄都能便捷地获得适用的药物。


There are one billion people living in rich donor countries, and the total cost of comprehensive malaria control in Africa – giving bed nets at no cost to all Africans, and providing the right medicines within every village – is around $2.5 billion per year, or just $2.50 per citizen of the rich countries.	富裕的捐助国有10亿人口，而在非洲进行全面的疟疾控制—免费向所有非洲人发放蚊帐并为每一个村庄提供适用的药物—的费用约为每年25亿美元，也就是说富国的国民每人只需捐出2. 5美元。


But the rich countries have instead adopted failed strategies.	但富国却偏偏采取了失败的战略。


Rather than giving away bed nets, rich-country organizations like the United States Agency for International Development try to sell them to the extreme poor, albeit at heavily discounted prices.	富国的相关组织，如美国国际发展署试图将这些物品卖给极度贫穷的国家（虽然以很低的折扣价），而不是免费发放。


This policy reflects a shortsighted ambition to promote markets rather than the direct and over-riding goals of saving lives and removing bottlenecks to long-term economic development.	这一政策反映了一种短视的促进市场发育的雄心，而不是直接的，压倒一切的治病救人从而消除经济发展瓶颈的目标。


The tragic result has been extremely low use of nets throughout most of Africa, since impoverished people lack the purchasing power to buy nets.	其可悲的结果是绝大部分非洲地区极低的蚊帐使用率，因为贫穷的人们缺乏获得这些物品的购买力。


Second, donor governments have failed to promote simple ways to ensure the availability of medicines in villages across the continent.	其次，捐助国政府没有能够推广确保在整个非洲大陆上的每一个村庄都能得到特效药的简单方式。


Rather than shipping medicines to each country on the basis of estimated needs, donor agencies have set up a complicated purchasing system that has led to years of delay in getting medicines to the villages.	各捐助机构制定了导致这些村庄年复一年不能及时得到药品的复杂采购体系，而不是按��国的预计需求运送药品。


The pharmaceutical industry, led by Novartis, has been way ahead of donor agencies.	诺华公司领导下的制药行业却远远走在了这些机构的前面。


Novartis has agreed to make these medicines available at the cost of production.	诺华公司同意以成本价出售这些药品。


But, despite Novartis’s large production capacity, donor agencies have failed to order, buy, and ship the medicines in the required amounts.	可尽管该公司产能巨大，但捐助机构却没有能够预订、购买和运送足够量的药物。


Malaria control now faces a period of increasing urgency, as well as renewed hope.	疟疾控制现在面临日益紧迫的形势，同时也有了新的希望。


Malaria is spreading, and new scientific evidence indicates that people infected with HIV are more likely to transmit it to others when they are also infected with malaria.	疟疾正在扩散，而新的科学证据显示当HIV感染者同时感染疟疾时就更可能将HIV病毒传染给他人。


But there is also a growing realization that malaria is a disaster that must be addressed.	但也有越来越多的人认识到疟疾是一场必须应对的灾难。


US President George W. Bush has launched an important new initiative to help 15 African countries to control malaria, and hosted an unprecedented White House summit in December to rally private-sector support.	美国总统布什启动了一个帮助15个非洲国家控制疟疾的新计划，并史无前例地在12月主持了一场白宫峰会以争取私营部门的支持。


Similarly, the Chinese government, the World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank have recently announced plans to scale up their contributions to the fight against malaria.	无独有偶，中国政府、世界银行和伊斯兰发展银行最近也宣布了加大援助疟疾控制力度的计划。


A major new citizens’ initiative called Malaria No More is raising private funds to distribute anti-malaria nets.	一项名为“不再有疟疾”的新民间计划也正募集资金以发放防疟疾蚊帐。


People across Africa have shown that they are ready to mobilize their efforts if we offer practical means to help them.	非洲各地的人们都表示如果我们为他们提供切实的帮助，他们将会全力配合。


The world’s safety, including the safety of people living in rich countries, depends on the global community’s ability to prove that it will come to the aid of all who are in desperate need.	世界的安全，包括生活在富裕国家的人们的安全依赖于国际社会证明它可以对所有困苦中的人们提供援助的能力。


Aid can work wonders if it is practical and directed to those in need.	如果切合实际并急人所急，那么援助就能够创造奇迹。


Malaria control can demonstrate this world-saving lesson once again.	疟疾控制就能够再为我们上一堂拯救世界的示范课。


Getting Serious About Global Poverty	认真对待全球贫困


Institutions and governments, like people, make bold resolutions at the beginning of every year.	新年伊始，各种机构各国政府也像普通人一样立下宏伟的决心。


But, for the millions who face the crushing burden of poverty, mere proclamations that help is on the way are not enough to create jobs or foster development.	但是，对于数以百万计面临贫困重压的人而言，援助正在路上的宣称并不能足以创造就业机会或者促进发展。


This year, the international community must move decisively from pledges to action in the effort to reduce poverty.	今年，国际社会必须切实将承诺落实为行动来减少贫困。


What will this require?	这需要做哪些事情呢？


In 2005, the international community renewed its commitments to help the poorest countries meet the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), which aim to halve poverty by 2015.	2005年，国际社会重申其帮助最贫困国家实现联合国千年发展目标的承诺，该目标计划到2015年将贫困减少一半。


These commitments include significant increases in debt relief and aid.	这些承诺包括大规模增加债务减免和援助。


While there has been progress on implementing debt-relief measures, the international community must follow through on the other part of its pledge, by delivering increased aid and promoting its better use.	尽管在落实债务减免措施上有所进展，国际社会必须通过增加援助以及促进合理利用来落实这一承诺的其他部分。


Multilateral lenders have long understood the importance of debt relief to poverty reduction.	多边贷款方长久以来理解债务减免对于减少贫困的重要性。


Indeed, the joint IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched in 1996 to coordinate efforts by multilateral organizations and governments to reduce poor countries’ debt burdens to sustainable levels.	实际上，国际货币基金组织和世界银行于1996年联合发起重债负贫穷国减债计划（HIPC）来协调多边组织以及各国政府将穷国债务负担减少到可持续水平。


So far, the results are encouraging.	目前为止，成果是令人鼓舞的。


Before the HIPC Initiative, eligible countries spent, on average, slightly more on debt service than on health and education combined.	在HIPC之前，平均而言，符合资格的国家在还债上花费的要略为大于医疗和教育费用的总和。


Now, debt in the 28 countries for which relief has been approved has declined by an average of two-thirds, while their expenditures on health, education, and other social services have risen to almost four times the amount of debt-service payments.	现在，获得批准的28个国家的债务已经平均下降三分之二，而其在医疗、教育以及其他社会服务上的开支则几乎上升到还债的四倍。


In 2005, the international community went further, agreeing on the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which will write off 100% of many poor countries’ debts to the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.	2005年，国际社会更进一步，达成多边债务减免动议（MDRI）。 这一动议将完全消除许多穷国所欠国际货币基金组织、世界银行以及非洲发展银行的债务。


As a result, just this past December, the IMF approved immediate, full relief for 19 countries – including 13 in Africa, four in Latin America, and two in Asia – on all outstanding debt to the Fund disbursed before January 1, 2005.	因此，仅仅在刚刚过去的去年12月，国际货币基金组织完全立即免除了向19个国家在2005年1月1日前分发的所欠该基金组织的债务，包括13个非洲国家、4个拉美国家以及2个亚洲国家。


Other countries are eligible, and the IMF is helping these states make rapid progress to qualify, with total debt relief expected to be more than $5 billion.	其他国家也符合资格，而且国际货币基金组织正在帮助这些国家作出迅速进展以符合条件。 预计消除债务的总额会超出50亿美元。


As with the HIPC Initiative of which it is a part, the MDRI will do more than reduce debt: it will free up resources that can be devoted to poverty reduction and economic development.	作为HIPC的一部分，MDRI所作的不仅仅是削减债务。 它还将释放出可以用于减少贫困以及经济发展的各种资源。


In 2006, for example, Zambia will see its debt fall by almost 10% of GDP, leaving more resources available for development.	例如，2006年，津巴布韦的债务将下降几乎相当于国民生产总值的10％，而将更多的资源用于发展。


Similarly, Guyana will have its debt reduced by more than 8% of GDP.	同样，圭亚那的债务将下降超过国民生产总值的8％。


The level of debt relief will be even greater once the World Bank and the African Development Bank finalize their own programs in the months ahead.	一旦世界银行和非洲发展银行在未来几个月内完成其规划，债务减免的水平将更大。


Nevertheless, the debt relief now being implemented will only provide a small part of the assistance, both financial and technical, that low-income countries need to meet the MDG’s.	但是，目前的债务减免仅仅是低收入国家满足千年发展目标所需要的财政和技术援助的一小部分。


If they are to be met, donors must also deliver on their commitments for significant increases in aid.	为了实现千年发展目标，各捐助方必须还要履行其大幅增加援助的承诺。


The IMF has long called on donors to meet the internationally accepted target for overseas development assistance of 0.7% of GDP.	国际货币基金组织长久以来呼吁各捐助方实现为国际社会所接受的、海外发展援助占国民生产总值7％的目标。


Some donors have now promised to do so, though only over time; others are not ready to go that far, but have promised more aid than they currently give.	某些捐助方已经保证在一定时间内这样做； 另一些则还未准备好这样做，但是已经保证提供比现在更多的援助。


The international community must show that it will follow through on these promises.	国际社会必须表明将落实这些保证。


Donors must provide the help that developing countries urgently need.	捐助方必须提供发展中国家所急需的帮助。


At the same time, we must ensure that low-income countries use debt relief and aid efficiently.	与此同时，我们必须保证低收入国家有效地利用债务减免以及援助。


One priority is to ensure that large, new infusions of aid do not produce unintended economic outcomes, such as rapid currency appreciation or inflation, which would make recipient countries’ exports less competitive.	其中一个重点是确保新的大规模援助并不产生料想不到的经济后果，例如快速货币升值或者通货膨胀。 这些都会使接受国的出口减少竞争力。


Another priority is to ensure that low-income countries that are striving to meet the MDG’s, and which have large financing requirements, avoid a new spiral of indebtedness.	另一项重点是确保努力实现千年发展目标以及需要大量资助的低收入国家避免新的债务急剧攀升。


The gains from MDRI debt relief will amount to precious little if low-income countries emerge from their debt burdens only to start the cycle anew by amassing fresh debt.	如果低收入国家消除债务负担伊始就又堆积新的债务从而循环往复，MDRI债务减免所带来的收效就微乎其微。


But recipient countries must complement donor efforts, and continue to do their part as well, by maintaining a track record of reform and sound macroeconomic policies, and by making the best possible use of the higher levels of assistance.	但是，受援国必须通过继续改革和良好的宏观经济政策以及最合理地利用更高水平的援助来配合捐助方的努力，并且同时继续做好它们自身的工作。


Outside efforts can help reduce poverty, but it is, ultimately, the efforts of low-income countries themselves to sustain strong economic performance, improve governance, and develop stable and effective institutions that will have the most important impact on reducing poverty.	外界的努力可以帮助减少贫困，但是归根到底，低收入国家自身维持强劲��济表现、改善管理以及发展稳定和有效的机制才能对减少贫困产生最重要的影响。


Low-income countries can also improve their prospects by strengthening their fiscal management, fostering private-sector development, and liberalizing trade.	低收入国家还可以通过加强财政管理、培育私营部门发展以及贸易自由化来改善其前途。


If we keep our promises, 2006 can be a year of hope for those who have little else than the dream of a better life.	如果我们遵守诺言，2006年将成为那些除了对较好生活报有梦想外别无其他的人的希望之年。


Getting Serious in Russia\u0027s War on Terror	严肃对待俄罗斯的反恐战争


Russia's decision to spend an extra 157 billion rubles (over $5 billion) to fight terrorism is a more impressive response than all the Kremlin's recent tough talk, including President Vladimir Putin's demand that more power be centralized in his hands.	俄罗斯追加1570亿卢布（50多亿美金）用于打击恐怖主义的决定给人的印象，比克里姆林宫最近所有的强硬言论都要深刻得多。 这其中也包括总统弗拉基米尔普京要求把更多的权力集中在自己手上。


Indeed, after the hostage crisis in the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in 2002, the same sort of harsh words flowed, but no extra money was spent.	的确，在2002年莫斯科Dubrovka 剧院人质危机之后，俄国内充斥着同样的强硬言论，但却没有追加资金。


These new billions do seem to demonstrate renewed government resolve, but is throwing money at the war on terror enough?	这笔新的巨款似乎表示政府重拾反恐的决心，但仅仅把钱砸进反恐战争就万事大吉了吗？


The Kremlin refuses to publicly admit that today's terrorism has its roots predominantly in the Chechen war, which is now metastasizing throughout the Northern Caucasus.	克里姆林宫拒绝公开承认今天的恐怖主义首先是植根于车臣战争。 这场战争现在正蔓延到整个北高加索地区。


Chechen fighters and their supporters demonstrate almost daily that the war continues, and countless bold pronouncements, like newly elected Chechen president Alu Alkhanov's recent assertion that "effective measures" have been found to combat terror, look like mere bloviation.	车臣武装分子和他们的支持者们几乎每天都在证明着战争还在继续。 无数的严正声明似乎仅仅是纸上谈兵-正如新当选的车臣总统阿鲁·阿勒哈诺夫最近表示已经找到了对付恐怖主义的"有效方法"。


According to Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, huge amounts of money are needed to resolve the Chechen problem.	据财政部长阿勒克谢·库德林称，解决车臣问题需要巨额的资金投入。


But financial inflows into Chechnya are often more destabilizing than helpful.	但流向车臣的财政支出往往起到火上浇油的作用。


President Akhmat Kadyrov, the murdered Chechen president, was right to suggest that 80% of this money ends up in the pockets of Moscow and regional firms who benefit from the Chechen conflict continuing.	遇刺身亡的车臣前总统卡德罗夫曾不无理由地暗示说这些资金中的80%最后都被莫斯科和当地的企业揣进了腰包。 这些企业从持续的车臣冲突中谋利。


So neither money nor military power alone can end the bloodshed, and diplomacy with the less militant Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov seems unlikely, for three reasons.	因此，仅靠金钱和武力都不能停止流血冲突。 而由于3点原因，与较温和的车臣领导人马斯卡多夫进行外交斡旋也不大现实。


First, contacts between Maskhadov and a few Russian politicians haven't - at least as of yet - influenced the Kremlin's position.	首先，马斯卡多夫与少数几位俄罗斯政客的接触-至少现在还没有-影响克里姆林宫的立场。


Second, the subject for negotiations is unclear, because Putin has ruled out Chechen independence, and surrender by the separatists is just as unlikely.	其次，因为普京排除了车臣独立的可能性，而让分裂分子投降也同样不现实，所以谈判的主题还不明确。


Third, even if negotiations with less militant Chechens occur and succeed, terrorism will continue under the leadership of the religious fanatic Shamil Basaev.	再者，即便与温和派的车臣领导人的谈判取得了成功，恐怖主义也会在宗教狂热分子巴萨耶夫的领导下继续存在。


The result of all this is spreading hopelessness.	其结果是绝望正四处蔓延。


The thirst for vengeance after the Beslan school massacre makes confrontation between Chechens and Ingushis increasingly possible.	在别斯兰学校屠杀之后的复仇之心更加大了车臣和印古什人之间正面冲突的可能性。


Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, is witnessing increasing confrontations between radical and traditional Islamic groups, something now also seen in Kabardino-Balkaria.	在与车臣相邻的达吉斯坦共和国，激进和传统伊斯兰集团之间的冲突正日益增加。 同样的情况现在也出现在Kabardino-Balkaria。


Unless the Russian state develops a viable policy, fast, all of these areas threaten to become safe havens for terrorists.	除非俄罗斯尽快制定出切实可行的政策，否则所有这些地区都有可能成为恐怖分子的避风港。


What Russia needs is a political response to terror that takes into account its international dimension.	俄罗斯所要做的就是在充分考虑到国际形势的前提下的一种政治回应。


In the last four years, radical Islam has established itself in the Northern Caucasus.	在过去的4年中，激进的伊斯兰教在北高加索抬头。


This doesn't mean that all local Muslims have become jihadis.	但这并不意味着当地所有的穆斯林都成为了圣战分子。


In fact, the latter are a tiny minority.	实际上后者只是少数。


But they are energetic, mobilized, and experienced fighters.	但他们是精力旺盛、神出鬼没且经验丰富的战士。


These people increasingly identify themselves with the global jihad, and have forged firm links with Muslim radicals in the Middle East, Southern Asia and Europe.	这些人越来越认同全球的圣战运动，并已和中东、南亚及欧洲的穆斯林激进分子建立了密切的联系。


Russia must now follow America's lead in how to fight terror.	俄罗斯必须向美国学习打击恐怖主义的经验。


Since the attacks of September 2001, the United States has managed to avoid further attacks on its land.	自2001年9月的恐怖袭击之后，美国已经成功地避免了在其本土发生进一步的袭击。


True, the news coming from Iraq is horrible, but the US is fighting a full-blown war in Iraq; it is not engaged in a counterterrorist operation.	来自伊拉克的消息确实是可怕的，但美国正在伊拉克进行一场全方位的战争； 而不是一场反恐行动。


Russia's power structures, like those of America, must now be readied to conduct a very long struggle, entirely different from the old Soviet KGB way of suppressing dissent.	俄罗斯的权力架构与美国的一样，必须进行调整以便进行一场长期的斗争。 这与老一套的苏联克格勃压制不同政见的方式完全不同。


Russia's security forces need to learn to be pro-active, because the terrorists consistently seek to perfect their deadly methods.	由于恐怖分子会一如既往的改进他们致命打击的方式，俄罗斯的安全部队必须学会未雨绸缪。


The fight against terror turns on who will strike first; so far, the terrorists have been faster and more professional than the Russian state.	反恐的关键在于谁先发动攻击； 到目前为止，恐怖分子的行动比俄罗斯国家更为迅速和专业。


To conduct this struggle effectively, Russia must abandon two hoary stereotypes: that all terrorists are bandits, and that they somehow are acting under some Western intelligence supervision to weaken Russia.	为了更有效地进行这场斗争，俄罗斯必须摒弃两种长期形成的思维定式：即所有的恐怖分子都是强盗，且他们往往在西方情报部门的监督下行动以削弱俄罗斯。


The base of world terrorism consists of daring fanatics who believe in a sacred, fiery destiny.	世界恐怖主义的基础包括信仰神圣和壮烈的宿命的，胆大妄为的狂热分子。


Osama bin Laden doesn't work for money and wants to destroy the entire West, not weaken Russia in particular.	拉登并不是为钱而工作。 他想要摧毁整个西方世界，而不是特别要削弱俄罗斯。


But the greatest obstacle that must be confronted if Russia is to wage war on terror effectively is the rampant corruption in the security forces.	但俄罗斯要有效发动反恐战争必须克服的最大障碍就是安全部队之中的腐败泛滥。


It is well known, for example, that Basaev's fanatical killers paid off Russian militia to enter Budeonovsk in 1995 and kill hospital patients.	例如，众所周知，巴戴夫（Badaev）手下的杀手们通过收买俄罗斯民兵从而在1995年潜入Budeonovsk，并杀害了医院的病人。


Yet nothing has been done to root out this tool of terror.	然而俄罗斯至今没有采取任何铲除这种恐怖主义工具的措施。


It is all too easy to reduce the fight against terrorism to tightening the political screws, to a strengthening of Putin's power, to restricting the movement of people within the country.	将反恐斗争简化为拧紧政治螺丝，加强普京的权力和限制人们在国内的行动是件轻而易举的事。


But none of these measures will frighten extremists in the Northern Caucasus or their al Qaeda allies.	但这些举措中没有哪一项能够震慑北高加索的极端主义分子或他们的"基地"同盟。


The Kremlin must know this already.	克里姆林宫肯定已经明白了这一点。


Even Putin's predictable presidential rhetoric reveals a desire to initiate a real fight against terrorism.	就连普京在其毫无新意的总统式言论中也表达了发动一场真正的反恐战争的愿望。


But waging a serious war requires a serious reorganization of Russia's power structures, which will be very painful.	但要发动一场严肃的战争就需要对俄罗斯的权力架构进行严肃的重组。 而这将会是一个痛苦的过程。


Despite Putin's so far unsuccessful fight against terrorism, his popularity remains high, so he has the political capital to make tough internal reforms.	尽管普京的反恐战争现在还没有取得成功，但他的声望依然高涨，因此它拥有进行强硬的内部改革的政治资本。


But he must act now, for public support can be no substitute for resolute and effective action.	但他必须立刻行动，因为公众支持绝不可能替代坚决有效的行动。


Getting to Yes (Again) with Germany	让德国人（再次）点头


GENEVA – Europe’s slow-motion sovereign-debt crisis may appear unique, but it is not.	发自日内瓦——欧洲缓慢发酵的主权债务危机看似特殊，其实却早有先例。


Just a few decades ago, Europe had the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which collapsed during a crisis very much akin to the one afflicting Europe today.	早在数十年前欧洲就曾建立过一项“汇率机制协议”，随后却在一场与当前类似的危机中灰飞烟灭。


Will the outcome this time be different?	那么此次危机的后果又会与往年不同吗？


The ERM was an arrangement that pegged most European currencies’ exchange-rate movements within limited bands.	当时的汇率机制协议力图将欧洲大部分国家货币的汇率变动限制在一定范围之内。


But ERM members’ monetary policies remained home-grown, which, no surprise, occasionally led to fiscal imbalances.	然而其成员国的货币政策却依然由本国制定，既然如此，偶尔的财政失衡当然也在所难免。


When capital markets smelled a problem among ERM members, they invariably shorted the most vulnerable currency and pushed that country’s authorities to devalue.	一旦资本市场察觉到某些成员国出现了问题，他们必定做空其中最脆弱国家的货币并逼迫该国政府贬值。


Authorities resisted, blamed speculators, and then, usually over a frantic few days, gave in.	而政府一般不肯就范，还指责投机者，但在匆忙抵挡了几天之后必定败下阵来。


Markets also tested the resolve of policymakers in otherwise sound ERM countries, particularly when there were big strikes or important elections.	对于那些经济健全的汇率机制成员国，市场也会检验其政策制定者的决心，尤其是在突发重大事件或是大选之时。


In those cases, even a government with the proper economic fundamentals and its financial house in order could still run into trouble.	在某些案例中，即便是一个经济基础稳固，金融运作有序的政府也可能陷入麻烦。