But the gambit didn’t work, and there was clearly a behind-the-scenes power struggle between different parts of the regime.	但是这些精心策划的行动并没有产生作用，并且显然统治集团内部不同的派别正在进行一场幕后的权力斗争。


Ahmedinejad was supposed to give a major speech to a huge rally in Teheran, which he cancelled at the last moment, and when he did speak, it was to announce that the captives would soon be released.	内贾德本来准备在德黑兰的一次大型集会上发表一场重要演讲，但是他在最后一刻取消了演讲。 而当他出来说话时，却是宣布这些俘虏很快将被释放。


The IRGC prisoners in Iraq were released, but Britain did not apologize or admit wrong-doing in return.	伊斯兰革命卫队在关在伊拉克的囚犯也被释放了，但是英国并没有道歉，或者承认自己有过错来作为回报。


So it would appear that it was the Iranians who blinked first, before the incident could spiral into a genuine 1979-style hostage crisis.	所以看上去是伊朗人在这起事件逐渐升级为真正像1979年那样的人质危机之前先示弱了。


All of this does not mean that there are necessarily “radicals” and “moderates” within the clerical regime in Teheran.	所有这些并不意味着德黑兰的教权主义统治集团内部就一定有什么“激进派”和“温和派”。


Those pulling the IRGC’s chain are themselves committed to a revolutionary agenda, and doubtless want a nuclear weapon as badly as the Pasdaran commanders.	那些约束伊斯兰革命卫队行动的人也是忠于革命的，并且毫无疑问像革命卫队的指挥官们一样极度渴望拥有核武器。


One of the alleged reasons Khamenei didn’t want Rafsanjani as president was because he was not keen enough on the nuclear program.	许多人认为最高领袖哈梅内伊不想让拉夫桑贾尼当总统的原因之一就是他对核计划不够热心。


The Iranian regime is not, however, a totalitarian juggernaut; there are important splits within the leadership and there is an important faction that does not want Iran to be isolated.	但是，伊朗的统治集团并不完全都是顽固的极权主义者； 领导层中间都严重的分歧，并且有很多人不想看到伊朗被国际孤立。


The IRGC has evolved into something like a mafia organization, with extensive economic interests that lead both to corruption and potential vulnerability to sanctions imposed by the international community.	伊斯兰革命卫队已经越来越变得像一个黑社会组织，它的经济利益非常广泛，在产生腐败的同时，也使它面对国际社会的制裁又可能会变得非常脆弱。


It is important to remember: those who were responsible for taking the British Marines captive wanted an escalation of the confrontation, both to improve their domestic standing, and to punch back for sanctions that were beginning to bite.	我们一定要记住：不管是谁作出了抓捕英国水兵的决定，他都是为了让冲突升级，以便既巩固其国内地位，同时也是对已经开始对其产生严重影响的国际制裁的回击。


This suggests that what the Bush administration has been doing – slowly ratcheting up the pressure through the use of diplomacy to create an international coalition that now includes the Russians – is the proper course to be on.	这表明布什政府所采取的对策，即运用外交手段来使国际上（现在俄罗斯也参与了进来）联合起来对其施加越来越大的压力，完全是一个正确的途径。


Iraq and Japanese Isolation	伊拉克和日本孤立


Every country that has sent troops to aid America's efforts in Iraq is under pressure, as the decision by the Philippines to withdraw its small contingent shows.	每一个派兵前往伊拉克以支持美国的国家其实都是迫于压力，这从菲律宾决定从伊拉克撤军上就可见一斑。


But for Japan, the question of whether to continue to aid in Iraq's reconstruction extends beyond the merits of this particular policy and goes to the heart of Japanese notions of security and what constitutes the national interest.	但对日本来说，是否继续支持伊拉克重建已经不仅仅是这一特殊政策能带来多少好处，而是它关系到日本人的安全理念，以及什么才是日本国的利益。


Throughout the Cold War, Japan's national security policy appeared to waver between "UN-first-ism" and an "Alliance-first" principle.	从冷战开始，日本的安全政策就一直在"联合国第一主义"和"联军第一"原则间摇摆不定。


In essence, however, fostering alliance with the United States dominated Japan's course. That tendency remains dominant.	但从本质上来说，是"促进和美国的联盟"主导着日本的政策，这种倾向一直保持至今。


But the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 pressed Japan to recognize that it must begin to exercise greater autonomy and independent judgment in formulating and implementing its national security policies.	但是，发生在2001年的911恐怖袭击事件使日本意识到，日本已经到了必须提高国家自主，并对制定和实施国家安全政策作出独立判断的时候了。


The paradigm of international security that had long dominated Japan's defense thinking had shifted and policymakers realized that they had to shift with it.	长期以来主导日本国防理念的国际安全模式发生了动摇，政策制定者们意识到他们必须改变它。


For Japan nowadays, security policy must satisfy a trinity of criteria: "national interests," "alliance," and "international cooperation."	对于今天的日本来说，安全政策必须符合三大标准："国家利益"、"结盟"和"国际合作"。


This trinity is not something new for Japan, but has deep historical roots.	这三条标准其实对日本来说并不新，相反它有着很深的历史根源。


It may be helpful to look back, in particular, to Japanese actions at the time of the Boxer Rebellion (1900), as well as during World War I. Of course, there are huge differences between the situation then and what Japan faces now.	如果我们回顾以往，尤其是1900年义和团起义、以及第一次世界大战期间日本的表现，不难看出这一点。 当然，日本当时的处境和现在的处境有着很大不同。


But those historic contexts shed light on Japan's response to events in Iraq and the wider world today.	但那些历史教材可以为日本今天如何面对伊拉克事件以及其它国际事件提供参考。


At the time of the Boxer Rebellion, Japan responded to requests for help from the international community and won world trust through the sacrifices it made.	在义和团起义期间，日本响应了国际社会提出的援助请求，虽然有牺牲，但赢得了世界的信任。


As a consequence, and despite the anti-Japanese "yellow peril" propaganda then raging in Europe, Japan entered an alliance with the most sought-after partner of the time, Great Britain.	结果是，虽然当时反对日本人的"黄祸"宣传正在欧洲蔓延，但日本还是加入了盟军，和大英帝国战斗在一起。


That alliance enabled Japan to help defeat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).	那次结盟使日本在随后的日俄战争（1904-1905）中打败了俄国人。


During the First World War, however, Japan was reluctant to send troops to Europe despite repeated requests from the Allies.	但在第一次世界大战期间，尽管联军向日本不断发出援助请求，但日本就是不愿向欧洲派兵。


Although Japan did receive some appreciation for its dispatch of naval squadrons to the Mediterranean, it endured wide criticism for its refusal to send ground troops.	虽然后来日本因为向地中海地区派遣了海军中队而得到一些赞美，但它拒绝派兵前往欧洲的做法还是受到了广泛的批评。


As a consequence, after the war Japan lost Britain's confidence, which eventually resulted in the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.	结果是，战争结束后，日本失去了英国的信任，英日联盟也就此告破。


From that time on, Japan trod a lonely path that ended with its defeat in World War II.	从那时起，日本只能孤军作战，最终在第二次世界大战中成为战败国。


At the time of the Boxer Rebellion, Japan fully understood that to contribute to the world for the "emergency protection of foreign residents" was a "matter of national importance."	在义和团起义期间，日本深刻领悟了和世界一起"紧急保护外国公民"是"一件国家大事"。


During World War I, on the other hand, Japan was blinded by its eagerness to protect small but immediate benefits, and failed to appreciate what a true "matter of national importance" was.	而在第一次世界大战期间，日本被一些渺小但能立即兑现的利益所蒙蔽，忘了什么是真正的"国家大事"。


Its passivity cost Japan the trust of the international community.	代价便是，日本失去了国际社会的信任。


In the light of this history, how should Japan's stance in Iraq be viewed?	从历史的角度来看，这一次日本在伊拉克的态度又会被如何评价呢？


Will Japan's humanitarian and restoration aid in Iraq secure a long-term national interest?	日本的人道主义和重建伊拉克的目的能否保证日本的长期利益？


With the exception of international terrorists and remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, almost everyone, including Iraqis who eye America's occupying forces with suspicion, wish to see the task of rebuilding Iraq, both politically and materially, fulfilled.	除了国际恐怖分子和萨达姆政权的残余势力，几乎每一个人，包括对美国占领军持怀疑态度的伊拉克人，都希望看到伊拉克被重建，不管是在政治上还是物质上。


For Japan, too, there is justification in responding to such global expectations.	日本也是如此，没有理由不对这样一个全球期待做出响应。


Of course, restoring peace and security is taking much more time than expected.	当然，重建和平和安全所花费的时间比期望的要多得多。


With almost daily terrorist attacks, ordinary citizens victimized by shell and gunfire or misconceived bombing, the abuses of Iraqi prisoners, and the hostility of Iraq's Shiites - on whom the US had pinned high hopes for the peace process - American policy is in jeopardy of failure.	在几乎每天都有恐怖袭击，普通公民不断成为炮弹炮火或误弹袭击的受害者、以及虐俘事件曝光和伊拉克什叶派对抗的情况下，美国对和平进程的高希望正遭受挫折，美国政策处于失败的危险境地。


The question for Japan is this: what will happen, both in Iraq and in the world, if America withdraws in failure?	日本面临的问题是：如果美国最终失败退出，伊拉克和世界将发生什么变化？


It is in recognition of the possible consequences - a return of US isolationism, the emboldening of terrorists - that many countries sent and retain troops in Iraq.	一个可能的结果是：美国孤立主义重新抬头，恐怖分子得到壮胆，许多国家派兵前往伊拉克并驻守在那里。


Indeed, Russia, France, and Germany, which confronted the US and Britain at the UN over the Iraq war, and the UN itself, which withdrew early in the occupation, are all now searching for a way to assist in Iraq's rehabilitation.	事实上，俄罗斯、法国和德国这些曾经在伊拉克战争问题上与美国和英国持对立态度的国家，以及早就从伊拉克撤退的联合国本身，现在都在寻求帮助伊拉克重建的方法。


In the end, they agreed on international efforts under UN Security Council Resolution 1546.	他们最后一致通过了联合国安理会第1546文件。


France and Germany will now participate directly by helping to train Iraqi security forces.	法国和德国现在将直接参与到伊拉克安全警卫的培训工作中。


Considering all this, Iraq represents a decisive moment and a "matter of national importance" for Japan.	考虑到以上这些，伊拉克对日本来说，正意味着一个决定性的时刻和有关"国家前途的大事"。


Thus, its Self Defense Forces must continue fulfilling their duties of "humanitarian and restoration efforts," while cooperating with Japan's key ally, the US, as a member of an integrated multinational force under UN leadership.	所以，日本自卫队必须继续忠于他们的"人道主义和重建努力"职责，同时在联合国框架下，与日本的核心盟军--美国一起合作战斗。


Even if dangerous situations arise, the Self-Defense Forces, and Japan itself, must not flinch.	即使危险系数增加，自卫队以及日本本国，都不能退缩。


Only by demonstrating dignified resolve will Japan's true national interests be defended.	只有通过抗议来增强决心，日本真正的国家利益才能得到保卫。


True autonomy for Japan, as in the past, depends once more on active and cooperative engagement in containing a world crisis.	日本真正的自主，就象过去那样，取决于是否在世界危机中采取积极行动，与国际合作。


Iraqi Libya	伊拉克式利比亚


GENEVA – As post-revolution Libya looks ahead, Iraq looms as a perilous example.	日内瓦—当革命成功的利比亚展望未来的时候，伊拉克是一个危险的先例。


After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya, like Iraq in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein, needs more than wishful thinking to become a vibrant democracy.	结束了42年独裁统治的利比亚正如2003年萨达姆倒台后的伊拉克，要将它建设为生机勃勃的民主之邦，光有美好愿景是断然不行的。


It needs organized state-building in Tripoli – and realistic policymaking in Western capitals.	利比亚需要有组织的建国计划，西方各国也要拿出现实的决策。


Successful transitions depend from the start on factors that are still crucially missing in Libya – a relatively cohesive leadership, an active civil society, and national unity.	从一开始，利比亚就缺少过渡所必须的要素——相对团结的领导层、活跃的公民社会以及民族团结。


Without these, Libya will most likely fail to find its footing and, much like post-Saddam Iraq, suffer from persistent political division and volatile civil disorder, in addition to a multifaceted array of geopolitical pressures.	没有这些要素，利比亚就找不到自己的根，与后萨达姆时代的伊拉克相似，利比亚也将遭受旷日持久的政治分裂和动荡的社会失序，还有多层次的地缘政治危机。


Avoiding that outcome presupposes a strong political center.	要避免这些结果，首先需要一个强大的政治中心。


But, from the start of the uprising in February 2011, Libya has been politically atomized.	但是，从2011年2月起义爆发以来，利比亚就一直处于政治分散状态。


It lacks the sort of civil society that could have led the uprising and planted the seeds for post-authoritarian politics, as was the case in Tunisia and (more problematically) Egypt.	利比亚缺少能够担起起义领导重任、种下后独裁时期政治根基的公民社会，这一问题在突尼斯和埃及（更加严重）也出现过。


Libya’s transition was arguably further impeded by NATO’s intervention, as the rapid shift from a spontaneous popular uprising to an elite-led and externally supported movement prevented the revolution from following the linear course seen in Tunisia and Egypt.	显然，利比亚的过渡因为北约的干预而遭到了进一步的妨碍，北约的干预使得利比亚的群众起义迅速地演变为精英领导的、受外部势力支持的运动，而没有发展为突尼斯和埃及这样的线性革命过程。


Thus, despite substantial international support, the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) still lacks the level of consensus needed to form a viable government.	因此，尽管受到了大量的国际支持，利比亚全国过渡委员会（NTC）仍然缺乏形成可靠政府的一致。


The NTC has suffered regular internal disputes, and its membership and functioning are shrouded in secrecy.	NTC出现了常见的内部分歧，其成员和运转状况一直是个迷。


Last July, the Council’s military leader, Abdul Fatah Younis al-Obeidi, was assassinated under ambiguous circumstances.	去年7月，NTC军队领导人阿尔-欧贝迪（Abdul Fatah Younis al-Obeidi）在一团迷雾中遇刺。


Then, in November, the NTC’s military prosecutor named its own former deputy prime minister, Ali al-Issawi, as the prime suspect.	接着，11月，NTC军事检察院起诉其前副总理阿尔-伊萨维（Ali al-Issawi）为主要嫌疑人。


The conflict and opacity surrounding the case are telling signs of the country’s political fragility since Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s demise.	该案的前后矛盾和波诡云谲之处表明，卡扎菲倒台后，利比亚的政治状况一直相当脆弱。


Libya should take note of how Iraq’s post-Saddam transition has featured ceaseless power struggles and infighting.	利比亚应该引起警惕：伊拉克在萨达姆倒台后的过渡期出现了没完没了的权力斗争。


In 2010, Iraqi political leaders’ machinations – personal, as well as tribal and sectarian – left the country without a government for 249 days.	2010年，由于政治领导人之间的勾心斗角——既有个人方面的，也有部落和宗派方面的——伊拉克经历了249天的无政府时期。


Today, Libya appears set to undergo similar struggles, owing mostly to the presence of powerful political actors outside the NTC.	如今，利比亚似乎也注定将出现类似的斗争，这主要是由于NTC之外的权势政治活动家掀起的。


The 20,000-strong Tripoli Military Council, for example, which controls the capital, has been consistently independent of the NTC, and forced out its first foreign minister, Mahmoud Jibril.	比如，控制着首都、拥有20 000成员的的黎波里军事委员会（Tripoli Military Council）一直独立于NTC，还将NTC选出的首任外交部长吉布利勒（Mahmoud Jibril）赶下了台。


The rival Tripoli’s Revolutionists Council, meanwhile, has warned that it would unseat any incoming government should its demands for representation not be met.	与此同时，与之对立的的黎波里革命者委员会（Tripoli’s Revolutionists Council）警告说，如果其代表要求得不到满足，它将把任何未来政府赶下台。


The NTC also faces pressure from Libya’s Berbers, who comprise 10% of the population and have already taken to the streets to denounce the new political arrangements and to reject any system that does not accommodate theirculture andlanguage.	NTC还面临柏柏尔人（Berber）的压力。 柏柏尔人占利比亚总人口数的10%，且已经组织起来走上街头谴责新签订的政治协定，拒绝接受任何与其文化和语言不相容的制度。


This dissension may well be compounded by two additional factors.	利比亚的纠纷倾轧还受到两大附加因素的强化。


The first is major cities’ competing sense of entitlement to the fruits of the revolution: Misurata, where Qaddafi’s body was displayed; Tripoli, which hosted the liberation ceremony; and Zintan, which is holding Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, prisoner.	首先，利比亚各大城市都在争夺革命首功：米苏拉塔是卡扎菲尸体的陈列地； 的黎波里是革命成功庆典的举行地；


And all of them, like most Libyans, share the unrealistic expectation that their newfound freedom will somehow solve their socio-economic woes.	津坦则是卡扎菲之子赛义夫·伊斯兰·卡扎菲的囚禁地。 这几个城市与大部分利比亚人一样，都抱有不切实际的预期，希望新获得的自由能够在一定程度上解决其社会经济乱象。


The second complicating factor is that political power now lies in the hands of competing militias.	其次，政治权力目前还掌握在相互竞争的几个军事阵营中。


The internecine rivalries that began in earnest last November between fighters from Zawiya and Warshefana, and among Tripoli’s various factions, will be difficult to defuse, as the thowar (revolutionaries) have refused repeated calls by the NTC to disarm.	去年11月扎维耶和沃尔舍法纳（Warshefana）爆发的冲突以及的黎波里诸多派系间的倾轧便是内讧的最佳写照，内讧问题很难解决，因为“索瓦”（即革命者）拒绝响应NTC放下武器的主张。


Tripoli is in danger of becoming like Baghdad circa 2005, with different groups controlling turf and instituting a clientelist neighborhood political economy.	的黎波里的危险程度一点都不亚于2005年时的巴格达，不同的阵营各有各的地盘，并发展出了一套侍从主义社区政治经济。


Inter-urban competition and the militias’ defiant independence are all the more worrisome because Libya is awash in weapons, with unguarded caches, abandoned stockpiles, looted ammunition depots, and thousands of shoulder-fired heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles.	城市间的竞争以及各军阀肆无忌惮的闹独立令人极其担忧，因为利比亚随处都能找到武器、无人看守的武库、被弃的军需、被洗劫一空的弹药库以及成千上万肩扛式红外线地对空导弹。


Last November, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the commander of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), confirmed that AQIM seized the opportunity to secure some of this arsenal when the revolution started.	去年11月，伊斯兰北非基地组织（AQIM）指挥官贝尔莫赫塔��Mokhtar Belmokhtar）证实，革命爆发时，AQIM曾抓住机会弄到了这批军火中的一部分。


Meanwhile, the aims of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Arab League, NATO, and Qatar, all of which have played a role in Libya’s transformation, are unlikely to be the same.	与此同时，法国、英国、美国、阿盟、北约和卡塔尔的利益均在影响利比亚的转型，而它们彼此之间也不可能没有利益冲突。


In other words, external pressures, too, are likely to pull Libya in several different directions, which will only further delay an autonomous and sustainable state-building process.	换句话说，外部压力同样在将利比亚拉向不同的方向，这只能进一步拖累自主的、可持续的建国过程。


Qaddafi left behind a booby-trap.	卡扎菲身后是一个烂摊子。


The collapse of authoritarian rule created a security vacuum with no functioning state apparatus, making Libya highly exposed to international influence, often in the service of corporate interests.	独裁的倒台造成了安全的真空，利比亚缺少正常国家机器的所有部件，这使得该国极易受国际势力左右，而国际势力通常受集团利益的指挥。


To avoid repetition of the costly mistakes made in Iraq, Libya will require adroit leadership that can elaborate a compelling new national vision with which to unify competing authorities, rein in undisciplined militias, and minimize the country’s strategic vulnerability.	为了避免重蹈代价昂贵的伊拉克覆辙，利比亚需要灵巧的领导层。 该领导层需要给出令人眼前一亮的新民族愿景，团结互相竞争的势力，驯服散漫恣睢的军阀，尽力降低利比亚的战略颓势。


Iraq, Katrina, Iraq	伊拉克、卡特里娜、伊拉克


Four years ago, President George W. Bush was on shaky political ground.	四年前，乔治·W·布什总统的政治前途摇摇欲坠。


He had barely won the controversial 2000 election, and polls showed the American people remained doubtful about him.	他刚刚在充满争议的2000年大选中险胜，民意调查显示美国人对他能否胜任还疑虑重重。


After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush found his voice and the American people rallied around his presidency.	2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击发生以后，布什巩固了自己的地位，美国人都聚集到他的周围。


Thanks to Osama Bin Laden, Bush’s popularity soared, and while his ratings had diminished by the 2004 election, his “war on terrorism” helped him win a second term.	多亏了奥萨马·本·拉登，布什的支持率迅速飙升，而尽管到2004年选举时人们对他的评价已经有所下降，“对恐怖主义的战争”还是帮助他再次成功当选。


In September 2005, another crisis, Hurricane Katrina, probably killed at least as many Americans as the terrorist attacks in 2001, but it had the opposite effect on Bush’s poll numbers, which dropped to an all-time low.	2005年9月，在另一场危机卡特里娜飓风中丧生的美国人少说也与2001年恐怖袭击的死亡人数相当，但却对布什的民意支持数字产生了截然相反的影响，致使布什的支持率跌入了谷底。


Why the startling difference?	为什么差别会如此令人震惊？


For one thing, the September 11 attacks were by a human enemy, and despite inadequate domestic preparations for such an event, Americans’ anger was directed outward.	原因之一是，9月11日袭击的制造者是人类中的敌人，尽管国内对这样的紧急状况准备不足，但美国人把愤怒都指向了国外的强敌。


Katrina, on the other hand, was a terrible act of nature, but one that was predicted by the national weather service with impressive accuracy.	恰恰相反，卡特里娜是自然力量的可怕展示，而国家气象局已经对这次灾害做出了准确的预报。


The inadequate preparation and slow response by the Bush administration meant that anger was directed at the president.	布什政府的准备不足和反应迟缓意味着人们会把愤怒发泄到总统身上。


To be sure, some of the blame for poor preparation belongs to state and local officials.	可以肯定的是，国家和当地的官员应该为准备不足承担部分责任。


But the Bush administration bears a significant share of the responsibility.	但布什政府应该承担的责任也不容小觑。


In the 2000 election campaign, Bush praised Bill Clinton’s Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) for its effectiveness.	2000年竞选活动中，布什赞扬了比尔·克林顿联邦紧急措施署的高效工作。


As president, he treated it as a source of patronage, replacing its top officials with political cronies who had little experience in managing emergencies.	而作为总统，他却把联邦紧急措施署当作了论功行赏的工具，任命缺乏灾难管理经验的政治亲信担任紧急措施署的高官。


To make matters worse, the administration shoehorned FEMA into its massive new bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security.	更糟糕的是，布什政府把联邦紧急措施署硬塞进了新建立的庞大官僚机构，国土安全部。


During the 2004 election campaign, Bush claimed that the new department had made Americans safer.	2004年的竞选活动中，布什宣称新的机构捍卫了美国的安全。


But the halting and weak response to Katrina has called this into question.	但对卡特里娜飓风救援的停滞和迟缓使人们开始提出疑问。


If it was difficult to evacuate and supply a small city like New Orleans, how would New York or Los Angeles fare?	如果像新奥尔良这样的区区小城都存在撤离和补给上的重重困难，那么纽约或洛杉矶这样的大城市该怎么办？


Katrina has also raised questions about other items on the president’s agenda.	卡特里娜也使人们对总统其它任务的完成状况提出了质疑。


One of the top priorities had been the Republican plan to complete the repeal of the estate tax on the richest Americans.	其中最重要的是共和党取消对最富有的美国人征收财产税的计划。


But, as the costs of responding to Katrina mount, adding to the federal deficit, it seems difficult to proceed as planned.	而随着卡特里娜飓风救援开支的增加，政府财政的赤字压力越来越大，从而使这项计划的执行变得越来越困难。


Moreover, rising gasoline prices have called attention to the shortcomings of the Bush administration’s energy policy, which includes recently passed legislation that contains inadequate requirements for energy conservation.  The press, meanwhile, has reported on speculation about the relationship between warmer ocean waters and the frequency of severe hurricanes, thus highlighting the low priority that the administration has given to environmental problems in general and global climate change in particular.	不仅如此，汽油价格的飙升使人们注意到布什政府能源政策的缺陷，其中包括最近通过的法案，它在能源保护方面的规定还非常欠缺。 与此同时，媒体报导了对海水变暖和严重飓风灾害间关系的推测，使人们认识到政府对环境问题，特别是全球气候变化总的来讲缺乏重视。


But Bush will survive Katrina.	但布什会躲过此劫。


The floodwaters will recede in New Orleans and reconstruction will begin.	新奥尔良的洪水终会退去，重建工作即将开始。


Already the scenes of looters exploiting the chaos in the early aftermath of the storm have been replaced with stories of charitable contributions from other parts of the country, of children being accepted into schools outside the city, and of families being helped by strangers.	飓风刚刚过后抢劫者趁乱掠夺的镜头已经被美国其它州慈善捐助、受灾儿童被城外学校接收和受灾家庭得到陌生人救助的消息所取代。


On the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, a unit of the New York City Police Department was helping out in New Orleans, and the city returned a fire engine that New Orleans had earlier donated as a symbol of solidarity.	在九一一袭击的周年纪念日，纽约警察署派出所属部队到新奥尔良帮助赈灾，纽约城还归还了新奥尔良以前捐献的一辆消防车，并把它作为团结的象征。


Katrina is thus likely to be a footnote in the history of the Bush presidency.	卡特里娜因此也可能成为布什总统任期中的一个注脚。


The real question for Bush’s role in history remains Iraq.	布什历史作用的最终界定还是要看伊拉克问题。


The short-term effect of Katrina was to drive stories about Iraq off of television screens and newspaper front pages.	卡特里娜飓风的近期效果是把有关伊拉克的新闻报导赶下了电视屏幕和报纸头条。


But the news from Iraq before the storm was bad and hasn’t gotten better.	但飓风发生前伊拉克的状况非常不好，而且丝毫没有好转的迹象。


The majority Shia and their Kurdish allies rejected Bush’s plea to Iraqi politicians to modify the new draft constitution to attract disgruntled Sunni Arabs.	多数什叶派及其库尔德盟友拒绝了布什要求伊拉克政治家修改新的宪法草案，从而吸引心怀不满的逊尼派穆斯林参与的请求。


Given that the insurgency is centered among the Sunnis, this refusal is likely to make it more difficult to establish the security that is necessary for democratic government to work.	由于叛乱主要由逊尼派发起，上述拒绝很可能会进一步加大建立民主政府正常工作所需安全环境的难度。


Of course, the Sunnis comprise a minority in Iraq, so insurgents have little prospect of “winning” control of the country the way North Vietnam was able to win control of South Vietnam.	当然，逊尼派在伊拉克只是少数，因此他们的叛乱像北越控制南越一样“控制”全国的可能性微乎其微。


But that is little consolation, because they can still disrupt progress toward a stable constitutional government.	但这却不能给我们带来多少安慰，因为它仍然能够阻碍稳定宪法政府的形成。


At worst, they may be able to foment a civil war.	在最坏的情况下，它还有可能引发全国性内战。


Despite claims by the extreme left and right around the world, America is not an imperial nation.	尽管全球的极左和极右势力大肆宣扬，但美国却并非帝国主义国家。


Domestic public opinion will support the use of force if people feel threatened or believe that the cause is just, but Americans have little interest in ruling over other nations.	如果人们觉得受到威胁或相信某项事业的正确，国内的公众舆论会支持使用武力。 但美国对统治其它国家的兴趣的确微乎其微。


Neo-conservative appeals to the example of the British Empire are far-fetched.	新保守主义分子将美国与大英帝国的类比似乎过于牵强。


The idea that American troops will stay in Iraq indefinitely – or even “just as long as necessary and not one day more,” in the clichéd language of Donald Rumsfeld – is implausible.	美国军队会永远待在伊拉克的提法¾甚至是拉姆斯菲尔德“只做必要的停留，一天也不会多待”的陈词滥调，都似乎不合情理。


This means that Bush has only a relatively short time to achieve his goals in Iraq.	这意味着布什只有很短的时间在伊拉克实现自己的目标。


If he is able to produce a stable constitution, a political compromise among the contesting parties, and successful elections, he may be able to declare victory.	如果他能够制定出稳定的宪法，在对抗派别之间实现政治妥协，并成功地促成选举，他也许就有资格宣告胜利。


But right now, the prospects look dubious.	但就目前的状况来看，前景令人堪虞。


Even before the floodwaters of Katrina recede, Bush will need to focus on his Iraq conundrum, because long after Katrina has been forgotten, history will judge his presidency by how he resolves it.	在卡特里娜引发的潮水退却之前，布什就需要把注意力重新转回伊拉克难题，因为在卡特里娜被遗忘很久以后，历史仍会以此作为判断他总统任期成功与否的标准。


Iraq: More than an American Problem	伊拉克不仅仅是美国的问题


Many people around the world are indulging in what the Germans call “schadenfreude”: pleasure at the suffering of others.	世界上许多人都在沉迷于德国人所说的“幸灾乐祸”，也就是对他人的痛苦感到高兴。


The pleasure appears to be derived from the suffering the United States is enduring after four years of efforts to stabilize Iraq.	他们好像取悦于美国历经四年试图稳定伊拉克局势而正在经受的痛苦。


On one level, that reaction is predictable.	在某一层面上，这一反应是可以预料的。


Resentment of the wealthy and powerful is hardly new.	对于财富和强大实力的仇恨并非新鲜。


But the US in the last few years has compounded this reaction by what it has done and how it has done it.	但是美国却因为它的所作所为以及做事的方式而在过去几年中加剧了这一反应。


For some, it was the decision to go to war in Iraq; for others, it was Guantánamo and the perceived double standards of American justice.	对于某些人而言，这是由于出兵伊拉克的决定； 对于另一些人而言，这是由于关塔纳摩监狱以及人们所感受的美国司法制度的双重标准。


For still others, it was the lack of sustained effort to bring about peace between Israelis and Palestinians or US opposition to the International Criminal Court and to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.	而对于另外一些人而言，这是由于缺少建立巴以和平的持续努力或美国反对国际刑事法庭以及有关气候变化的京都议定书。


The result is that anti-Americanism has grown in both reach and intensity.	结果就是反美情绪在广度和深度上都有所增加。


Still, any satisfaction at the problems the US is undergoing in Iraq is shortsighted and sure to be short-lived.	然而，任何对于美国在伊拉克经历的问题的幸灾乐祸都是短视的，而且注定是短命的。


Every government in the world has a stake in the future of Iraq and the stability of the Middle East.	世界各国对于伊拉克的未来以及中东的稳定都有利害关系。


Terrorism bred in Iraq will not stay there.	在伊拉克境内培育的恐怖主义不会局限在那里。


Those men and women who learn to make and detonate roadside bombs on the streets of Baghdad will ply their trade elsewhere in the region and beyond.	那些在巴格达街头学习制造和引爆路边炸弹的人将会在中东内外的其他地方一显身手。


Terrorists who have tasted success in Iraq will increasingly turn on others.	那些在伊拉克品尝到成功的恐怖份子将会越来越多地对其他人下手。


Expressions of anti-Americanism will provide no protection or immunity to governments or individuals who for good reason are not prepared to endorse the terrorists’ radical agendas.	对于出于正当理由而并不支持恐怖份子激进主张的各国政府和个人而言，表示反美并不提供保护或者让他们能够幸免。


War in Iraq will only exacerbate frictions between the country’s Sunni minority and Shia majority, and such frictions could well be replicated elsewhere where Sunnis and Shia live side by side.	伊拉克战争将会激化该国逊尼少数派和什叶多数派之间的摩擦，而这种摩擦在其他什叶派和逊尼派共同生活的地方很有可能重演。


Even if not, the flight of millions of Sunni refugees will weaken the foundations of neighboring states, including Jordan.	即使不是这样，数以百万计的逊尼派难民将会削弱包括约旦在内的邻国的根基。


Continued fighting in Iraq could also lead to regional war.	伊拉克的持续战斗也有可能导致地区性战争。


Turkey, for example, is poised to attack the Kurdish enclave in Iraq’s north.	例如，土耳其就做好准备攻击伊拉克北部的库尔德飞地。


It is also possible that resistance to Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq could lead to a wider conflict that draws in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others.	抵制伊朗控制伊拉克的努力也有可能导致更大范围的冲突，将沙特、埃及以及其他国家卷入其中。


Such a conflict would threaten the vital flow of oil from the Middle East to the rest of the world.	这样的一场冲突将会威胁到中东向世界其他地区关键性的石油输出。


Even without such a wider conflict, what happens in Iraq will affect the price of oil.	即使没有这样一场更大范围的冲突，在伊拉克所发生的事情将会影响石油价格。


Iraq is producing oil at levels below what it produced under Saddam Hussein, and has the potential to double or even triple output.	伊拉克现在的石油产量低于萨达姆统治时期的产量，而且有潜力翻两番或者翻三番。


Doing so would require significant investment, which in turn would require international confidence in Iraq’s future stability.	这要求巨额投资，而这反过来要求国际社会对伊拉克未来的稳定抱有信心。


Absent such confidence, Iraq’s oil output will not approach its potential, which will only widen the gap between global supply and demand.	没有这样的信心，伊拉克的石油产量就无法接近其潜力，这就会扩大全球供应和需求之间的差距。


Costly oil is a tax on the poor in developing countries and a source of inflation for the developed countries.	高价的石油对于发展中国家的穷人来说不堪重负，而且也是发达国家通货膨胀的诱因。


It also provides resources to governments that in many cases are promoting foreign policies that are contrary to the interests of most other countries.	这也会给那些外交政策与其他大多数国家的利益背道而驰的国家政府提供资源。


The rest of the world also has a stake in how the US emerges from Iraq.	世界各国���于美国如何在伊拉克脱身都存在利害关系。


There is a real danger that a widely-perceived failure in Iraq could lead to a serious weakening of American domestic political support for an active international role, particularly difficult but necessary deployments of military force.	如果人们广泛认为伊拉克政策失败，那么就切实存在这样一种风险，那就是，美国国内对于美国发挥积极的国际作用、特别是困难而又必须的军事部署的政治支持就会削弱。


The alternative to a world shaped by a strong, confident, and engaged US is not likely to be a world that is peaceful, prosperous, and free.	不是由一个强大、自信而又积极参与其中的美国所塑造的世界不大可能会是和平、繁荣和自由的世界。


In strategic terms, no other country or group of countries has the capacity to replace the US.	在战略意义上，没有其他国家或者国家集团具有取代美国的能力。


The alternative to a US-led global order is disorder, in which terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and economic protectionism are increasingly the norm.	由美国主导的全球秩序的替代品就是混乱，在这一混乱中，恐怖主义、核子扩散以及经济保护主义越发当道。


This suggests, first, that governments should avoid public comments describing the American presence as an occupation or as lacking legitimacy, lest they make it more likely that the US departs Iraq entirely and leaves the country and its people to a terrible fate.	这就表明，首先，各国政府应当避免公开评论，将美国的存在描述为占领或者缺乏合法性，否则，就会更有可能让美国完全撤离伊拉克，并让这一国家及其人民听任悲惨命运的摆布。


Second, countries should support Iraq’s government, despite its shortcomings.	第二，尽管伊拉克政府存在缺点，但是各国还是应当予以支持。


This means extending diplomatic recognition, including opening and maintaining embassies.	这就意味着予以外交承认，包括开设和维持大使馆。


It also requires providing financial help, ranging from debt forgiveness to investment, loans, and other forms of aid.	这还要求提供财政援助，包括免除债务、投资、贷款以及其他形式的援助。


There is also a moral and practical case for doing more to ease the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons.	而且，减轻难民和在国内流离失所的人的苦难也有道义和实际上的理由。


Third, terrorism needs to be checked.	第三，应当遏制恐怖主义。


This means doing everything possible to stop infiltration of terrorists into Iraq and rethinking support for militias.	这就意味着竭尽全力阻止恐怖份子渗入伊拉克并且重新考虑支持民兵。


None of Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran, would benefit from sectarian conflict that grows into a regional war.	伊拉克的邻国们，包括伊朗，没有一个将会从演变成为地区战争的教派冲突中获益。


Finally, governments should consider contributing troops to help establish order, train the Iraqi police and military, and help Iraq guard its borders.	最后，各国政府应当考虑派遣士兵来帮助建立秩序，训练伊拉克警察和民兵，并且帮助伊拉克守卫其边境。


As the US inevitably reduces its role, others should be prepared to step up, lest Iraq’s government falls and the Iraqi state fails.	随着美国不可避免地减少其作用，其他国家应当准备发挥更大作用，否则伊拉克政府就会垮台，伊拉克国家就会崩溃。


The reality is that Iraq’s future is not assured even if these and similar measures are taken.	现实是，即使采取了这些措施和其他类似的措施也无法保证伊拉克的未来。


Still, there is a big difference between an Iraq that struggles and one that implodes; between an Iraq that contributes to global energy security rather than undermining it; between a civil war and a regional war.	然而，伊拉克苦苦挣扎和内爆、为全球能源安全作出贡献而不是予以破坏以及内战和地区性战争之间还是有天壤之别。


It may be too late for the US to succeed in Iraq, but it is not too late for others to increase the odds that the US does not fail.	美国在伊拉克获得成功可能为时已晚，但是，其他国家增加美国并不失败的机率还是尚有时机。


Iraq’s Bullets and Ballots	伊拉克的子弹和投票


When the Iraq war started in 2003, the Bush administration had very ambitious plans: as in post-1945 Germany and Japan, a long and peaceful occupation was envisaged, during which expanding oil production would assure rising prosperity as democratic structures were built piece by piece.	当伊拉克战争在2003年爆发时，布什政府制定了一个雄心勃勃的计划：正如在1945年后的德国和日本一样，美国会（对伊拉克）实施长期的和平占领。 在此期间，在逐步构筑民主架构的同时，扩大石油生产会确保繁荣水平的不断提高。


The foundation was to be a liberal, even post-modern constitution, complete with a guarantee of 25% of parliamentary seats for women.	这一架构的基础是一部自由主义，甚至是后现代的宪法，以保证妇女在议会占有25%的席位为一个完美的结果。


In today’s Iraq, there is no peace and no prosperity.	在今天的伊拉克，没有和平，也没有繁荣。


The constitution that will be voted on October 15th includes that 25% rule, but otherwise is far from liberal.	将于10月15日进行公决的宪法提案中包括了那个25%的规定，但除此之外根本谈不上自由。


The key provision (article 2) that no law may contradict “the undisputed rules of Islam” violates the basic principle of parliamentary sovereignty, and will prevent legislation from meeting international standards.	关于没有任何法律能够与“无可争议的伊斯兰法规”相抵触的重要规定（第二条），违反了议会主权论的基本原则，并妨碍立法与国际标准接轨。


For example, the age of sexual consent for girls cannot be set above nine, because Muhhamad himself had a nine-year-old wife.	例如，女孩进行自愿性行为的年龄不能提高到9岁以上，因为穆罕默德本人就曾有一个年仅9岁的妻子。


It follows that nine-year-old girls are also adults in criminal law, and subject to capital punishment for, say, converting to another religion.	接下来还规定9岁的女孩在刑法中被认定为成年人，因而，如果她皈依另外一种宗教的话，就可能被判死刑。


More broadly, the Shias can use this provision to place their ayatollahs over the elected parliament, as in Iran, because they alone are authorized to determine the “rules” of Islam.	更广义而言，什叶派穆斯林可以利用这一规定，像伊朗那样，将他们的宗教领袖，阿亚图拉们置于民选的议会之上。 因为他们被授权可以独立决定伊斯兰的“法规”。


Outsiders and the few Iraqi liberals worry mainly about this Islamic provision, but the widespread Sunni opposition to the constitution is aimed at other provisions: the exclusion of the “Saddamist Ba’ath Party” from political life and government, and the federalist provisions that grant autonomy to the 18 Iraqi provinces and allow them to combine into regional governments.	外部人士和伊拉克为数不多的自由派人士主要担心这一伊斯兰条规，但广大的逊尼派对宪法的反对则是集中在其他的规定上：将“萨达姆社会党”（ Saddamist Ba’ath Party）排除在政府和政治生活之外； 以及赋予伊拉克的18个省自治权并允许它们建立地方政府的封建规定。


The exclusion rule is a personal issue for elite Sunnis – including thousands of businessmen, professionals, even artists – because, with few exceptions, they were all Ba’ath members.	这条排除性的规定事关逊尼派精英们的个人利益—他们中包括了成千上万的商人、专业人士、甚至艺术工作者—因为除了少数的例外，他们都是社会党党员。


In theory, the constitutional prohibition could be interpreted as applying only to the future.	从理论上讲，宪法的禁令可以被解释为只适用未来；


But in practice administrative rules are now being applied to exclude so-called “high-ranking” Ba’ath members from any form of government employment, and thousands are affected.	但实际上，现行的行政法规已经将所谓“高阶”社会党党员排除在任何形式的政府雇员体系之外，该规定影响了成千上万的人。


The Sunnis would probably accept the federalist provisions if they applied only to the Kurds.	如果该封建规定只适用于库尔德人，那么逊尼派也许还会接受它。


They know that the alternative is not a return to centralism, but secession by the three Kurdish-majority provinces of Dahuk, Arbil, and As Sulaymaniyah to form an independent Kurdistan, with its own treasury, army (the Pesh Merga), and oil production around Kirkuk – the second-largest reserves in Iraq.	他们知道另一种选择不是重返中央集权制，而是杜胡克、埃尔比勒和苏莱曼尼亚这三个主要的库尔省脱离出来，并组成一个独立的库尔德斯坦。 这个国家将会拥有自己的国库、军队（the Pesh Merga）和在伊拉克第二大油田—基尔库克周边的石油生产。


Sunnis reject the same federalism for the Shias because they view them as fellow Arabs who have always accepted Sunni rule in the past, and will do so again – unless they have their own government.	逊尼派也拒绝将同样的封建主义法规用于什叶派，因为他们一直将后者视为阿拉伯兄弟，并曾经接受过逊尼派的统治，而将来也还会重归正道—除非他们有了自己的政府。


That is what the new constitution would allow, because the Shia-majority provinces in the south – which contain the greater part of Iraq’s oil reserves – could form their own regional government.	这正是被新宪法所允许的，因为南部以什叶派为主的省份—伊拉克的大部分油田也位于其中—可以组成他们自己的地方政府。


In the usual style of the Middle East, disappointed Sunni leaders, unhappy with the constitution, now threaten violence.	按照中东的惯例，失望的逊尼派领袖由于对宪法不满，现在发出了暴力威胁。


But federalism is not the reason why Sunni supremacists and Islamists launch deadly attacks.	但封建主义并不是逊尼派至上主义者和伊斯兰主义者发动致命攻击的原因。


Their opposition is more elemental: they do not accept the principle of democratic majority rule. Instead, they seek to restore Sunni minority rule.	他们的反对有更根本的原因：他们不接受民主多数统治的原则，反而寻求重建逊尼“少数派”的统治。


For the Islamists, all Shias deserve death anyway, as apostates.	对伊斯兰主义者而言，所有的什叶派作为变节者本来就死有余辜。


One Shia leader, Moqtada Sadr, also vehemently opposes federalism.	一位什叶派领袖，Moqtada Sadr 激烈地反对封建主义。


His followers are the largely illiterate, poorest, and most violent Shias of the slums of Baghdad and beyond, whose “Mahdi militia” fought American troops in 2004, even while the Americans were protecting Shias from Sunni attackers.	他的追随者们大多是文盲、赤贫者和巴格达及以远地贫民窟里最暴力的什叶派分子。 他的“救世主民兵” （Mahdi militia）在2004年曾对战美军，甚至就在美国人保护什叶派免受逊尼派进攻者袭击的时候。


As a very junior priest who derives his authority from his dead Ayatollah father – himself a populist – Sadr is opposed by Iraq’s living Ayatollahs, who despise his ignorance and violence.	作为一个从自己去世的阿亚图拉父亲那里获得权威的低级神职人员—本人又是民粹主义者—Sadr受到伊拉克在世的所有阿亚图拉的反对，他们蔑视他的无知和暴力。


Sadr cannot possibly compete with them in religious authority, so he takes an Arab-nationalist stance against them, often recalling that the highest Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sistani, is a Persian, not an Arab.	Sadr不可能在宗教权威方面与他们抗衡，于是就站在阿拉伯民族主义的立场上反对他们，经常旧事重提，说什叶派最高级的教士阿亚图拉西斯坦尼是波斯人而非阿拉伯人。


Similarly, he reminds his followers that the El Hakims, who head the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and their “Badr” militia were subsidized exiles in Iran – many fighting for Iran in the long and bitter Iran-Iraq war – until the Americans “brought them back.”	同样，他还提醒他的追随者们说伊拉克伊斯兰革命最高委员会(SCIRI)的领导人El Hakims和他们的“Badr”民兵曾是在伊朗受人资助的流放分子—许多人在漫长的两伊战争中为伊朗作战—直到美国人“将他们带回”。


Sadr opposes federalism because a Shia regional government would obey his enemies, Sistani and the SCIRI, and, he says, fall under Iranian influence.	Sadr反对封建主义是因为一个什叶派的地方政府会听命于他的敌人，西斯坦尼和SCIRI，并因此（按他的说法）被置于伊朗的影响之下。 为了强调他的讯息，Sadr让他的民兵去攻击Badr民兵。


To underline his message, Sadr sent his men to attack the Badr militia, succeeding in Baghdad, where the Mahdis are numerous, but failing in Najaf, where Sadr is hated after the destruction caused last year – until his men were massacred by the Americans.	但在纳贾夫却失败了。 由于去年造成的破坏，使Sadr在当地激起了民愤—直到美国人对他的民兵进行了屠杀。


It was bad enough to deal with Sadr as a bandit; simple political arithmetic now dictates that he will likely be the central figure deciding the outcome of October’s vote on the constitution.	将Sadr作为强盗来处理实在棋输一着； 现在简单的政治计算就表明他很可能成为决定十月宪法投票结果的中心人物。


To reject the constitution and force new elections for a constitutional assembly, opponents need a two-thirds majority in at least three provinces.	要拒绝这部宪法并强行推动制宪会议的新选举，反对派需要至少在三个省获得三分之二的多数支持。


The Sunnis are only likely to win in two provinces, but if Sadr orders his followers in Baghdad’s slums to vote “no” alongside local Sunnis, that would probably flip the capital to the constitution’s opponents, ensuring its defeat.	逊尼派只在两个省有胜算，但如果Sadr命令其巴格达贫民窟里的追随者和当地的逊尼派一起投反对票的话，就可能将首都变成反宪地区，从而使宪法注定不能通过。


As a political thug, Sadr is, of course, willing to be bought.	作为一个政治暴徒，Sadr当然愿意被收买。


Last year he was wanted for murder.	去年他因为谋杀被通缉。


Now he wants recognition as a statesman, money, and, at least implicitly, Sistani’s and the SCIRI’s humiliation.	现在他想要作为政治家和财阀得到承认。 或者至少被含蓄地承认为让西斯坦尼和SCIRI羞耻的人。


He might receive offers, and perhaps the bargaining has already started.	可能会有人向他出价，很可能讨价还价的游戏已经开始了。


But some of the Shias whom he attacks with words and bullets have thousands under arms, and think that he should be offered only bullets.	但是一些被他用语言和子弹攻击过的，成千上万的什叶派正在备战。 他们认为Sadr只应该得到一颗子弹。


From War of Choice to War Without End	从选择的战争到无尽的战争


WASHINGTON, DC – When the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1815, the French diplomat Talleyrand is reported to have said of the Bourbons: “They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.”	华盛顿—1815年波旁王朝复辟时，据说法国外交官塔列兰（Talleyrand）这样评论波旁家族：“他们什么也没有学会，什么也没有忘记。


Ten years after the start of the Iraq War, the question is whether anyone – Americans, Iraqis, Iranians, other Arab states – has learned anything from this terrible experience.	”伊拉克战争爆发十年后，问题变成了有没有人——美国人、伊拉克人、伊朗人和其他阿拉伯国家的人——从这一可怕的经验中学到了任何东西。


By the standards of modern warfare, America’s losses were much lower than they were in other recent conflicts – more than 12 times as many American soldiers were killed in Vietnam.	从现代战争的标准看，美国的损失比其他最新冲突低得多——在越南战场上丧生的美国士兵数量比伊拉克多12倍。


Yet the Iraq war has scarred America in many ways.	但伊拉克战争从很多方面让美国深受伤害。


It was, as many have pointed out, a war of “choice,” a formulation rarely, if ever, used to describe America’s previous wars.	正如许多人所指出的，这是一场“选择”之战，此前很少有（如果不是没有的话）美国的战争被人如此描述。


In a certain way, Iraq was the first think-tank war.	从某些方面讲，伊拉克是第一场智库战。


To be sure, in the early 1960’s, members of President John F. Kennedy’s administration intellectualized war and debated the merits of strategies, including counterinsurgency.	诚然，早在20世纪60年代初，肯尼迪政府成员就开始了战争的理智化，争论战略（包括反动乱战略）的合理性。


But there can be no comparison to the cerebral mud wrestling that played out in Washington over Iraq.	但从来没有哪次华盛顿脑力角逐像伊拉克战争那样激烈。


This partly reflected the existential threat that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, represented in so many people’s minds.	这部分地反映了一个存在的威胁，即2001年9月11日恐怖袭击向大量人民所展示的那个。


The United States, it was argued, needed to begin to think about war differently.	人们相信，美国必须开始以不同的思维思考战争。


Former US diplomat George F. Kennan famously said that “democracy fights in anger.”	前美国外交官凯南（George F. Kennan）将其称为“愤怒的民主战斗”。


But the new strategic doctrine of “preemption,” which many argued would define war-making in the twenty-first century, suggests that democracies also fight in dread.	但“先发制人”的新战略思想——许多人认为这正是21世纪的战争思维——表明民主国家也会因恐惧而战斗。


Indeed, another reason for the war was America’s internal divisions over what it represents as a nation – its purpose and meaning to the rest of the world.	事实上，伊拉克战争的另一个原因是美国内部就什么代表了一个国家——它的目的和对世界其他部分的意义——产生了分歧。


The war did not resolve such questions.	伊拉克战争没有解决这些问题。


On the contrary, in some ways, the US emerged from Iraq even more divided than it was when it entered.	相反，从某些方面看，伊拉克战争让美国的分歧进一步加大了。


For Iraq, the complexities and contradictions of the war were even more pronounced.	对伊拉克来说，战争的复杂性和矛盾性更加显著。


No one can visit Iraq and talk to Iraqis without coming away with the sense that ridding the world of Saddam Hussein was an important – even noble – accomplishment.	访问伊拉克、与伊拉克人民对话者无不认为摆脱萨达姆·侯赛因是一个重要——甚至高尚——的成就。


His tyranny rivaled the worst of the twentieth century.	他的苛政堪称是20世纪暴虐之最。


Yet, in liberating Iraq, the US failed to ask how the tyrant gained power in the first place, and what, therefore, the challenges in replacing him would be.	但是，在解放伊拉克的过程中，美国并没有质问暴君一开始是如何上台的，以及（因此引出的）推翻他的挑战又是哪些。


For some, sectarianism in Iraq appeared like a summer storm, which quickly passed once the “surge” of US troops became American strategy in 2007.	有人认为，伊拉克的宗派主义就像是夏季风暴，随着美军“涌入”在2007年成为美国的战略，这场风暴很快就会过去。


But even the colossal mistakes of “de-Baathification” (the dismissal of all Iraqi officials who had been members of Saddam’s Baath Party) and the decommissioning of the Iraqi army – measures so foolish that nobody now admits to ordering them – cannot fully explain Iraq’s continuing political crisis.	但即使是“去社会复兴党化”（将曾是萨达姆的社会复兴党党员的伊拉克官员解职）和强迫取消伊拉克军队的巨大错误——没有人愿意承认下达了这些愚蠢的命令——也无法解释伊拉克的后续政治危机。


To believe that sectarian fighting started because of a foolish US decision, and ended because of a subsequent wise one, is to ignore the role of sectarianism in a country that straddles the Sunni and Shia worlds and the Turkic and Arab worlds.	认为宗派斗争起源于美国的愚蠢决策，终结于后来的明智决策忽视了宗派主义在伊拉克这样一个囊括逊尼派和什叶派、横跨库尔德人和阿拉伯人地盘的国家的作用。


These divisions, obscured by Saddam’s totalitarianism, never went away.	这些裂痕虽因萨达姆的集权主义而受到了遏制，但从未消失。


Indeed, the Sunni-Shia divide exists in many parts of the Arab world.	事实上，阿拉伯世界的很多地区都存在逊尼派-什叶派分歧。


While Americans saw in Bahrain’s protests in 2011 a people’s democratic aspirations, no one in the region doubted that the real source of the troubles was a restive Shia majority (perhaps inspired by Iraq, or even, as Sunni Arabs claimed, Iran) trying to remove a Sunni monarchy.	美国人将2011年巴林示威游行视为一个民族的民主觉醒，但在阿拉伯地区，没人怀疑麻烦的真正原因是桀骜难驯的什叶派多数（也许是受了伊拉克的启发，甚至有可能如逊尼派阿拉伯人说的那样，是受了伊朗的教唆）试图推翻逊尼派君主。


Those who argue that the surge (and its close companion, new and improved “counterinsurgency”) overcame Iraq’s sectarian fault line suggest that Iraq’s ongoing political problems are the result of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s poor governance.	认为起义（及其对立面——新出现的改良版“反暴动”）克服了伊拉克宗派主义断层线的看法指出，伊拉克持续的政治问题是总理马利基治国无方造成的。


If only he were more democratically minded, or would reach out to the Sunni community – perhaps offering another ministerial portfolio – suicide bombings of Shia religious festivals by Sunni extremist would end.	如果他的观念更加民主一些，或能够更加深入地接触逊尼派社会——或许组建一个不同的内阁——那么逊尼派在什叶派宗教节日发动极端主义自杀式炸弹袭击就不会出现。


In fact, the Middle East – buffeted by the Iraq War, the Arab Spring, and the sectarian showdown in Syria – is unsure where to go next: liberal democracy and the rule of law, or Islamist rule?	事实上，中东——饱受伊拉克��争、阿拉伯之春和叙利亚宗派大决战摧残——并不知道未来向何处去：是自由民主和法治精神，还是伊斯兰教规？


Yet, for the Sunni world, Iraq is the mistake that not only must not be repeated, but also must be reversed.	但是，对逊尼派来说，伊拉克是一个错误，不仅不能重蹈覆辙，而且必须反其道而行之。


Thus, Sunni Arabs and Shia Persians alike view Iraq as still up for grabs, a question rather than a country, a “great game” of the kind with which the world is very familiar.	于是，逊尼派阿拉伯人和什叶派波斯人仍把伊拉克视为争地，视为问题而不是国家，视为世界所熟知的“大博弈”。


The Saudis and other Sunni Arab states have shown little inclination to bring Iraq into the Arab fold, leaving it to find its own way in the world.	沙特和其他逊尼派阿拉伯国家并未显示出将伊拉克纳入阿拉伯世界的倾向，而是让它自行寻找融入世界的方式。


These states contribute enormously – as they did in the 2010 national elections – to what they hope will be a Sunni restoration, when the Americans’ great error is corrected and the Arab world is made whole.	在美国的大错被纠正、阿拉伯世界正在走向完整时，这些国家为它们所想见到的逊尼派重握政权投入了巨大的代价——2010年国民选举就是明证。


Ten years after Saddam’s removal, Iraq’s future remains where it always has been: in the hands of Iraqis, who will have to rise to the occasion.	萨达姆倒台已经十年，伊拉克的仍掌握在伊拉克人民手中，他们将不得不随机应变。 没人能够为他们营造稳定的政治秩序；


No one can create a stable political order for them; with the Americans gone, meddlesome Arab neighbors and anxious Iranians can only lose by dooming Iraq to remain a tinderbox.	而随着美国人的离开，爱管闲事的阿拉伯邻国和焦躁不安的伊朗人若想让伊拉克继续充当火药桶，等待它们的将注定是失败。


As for Americans, we need to learn from what happened in Iraq, lest our hubris doom us to similar ventures.	对美国人来说，我们需要从伊拉克汲取教训，以免妄尊自大让我们陷入同样的覆辙。


And, when it comes to the vision that sent us there, that means that we must also forget.	此外，如果出现了我们陷入同样覆辙的迹象，那么我们还必须忘记它。


Iraq’s Critical Election	伊拉克的关键性选举


BLOOMINGTON – Iraqis go to the polls on March 7 to elect a new Parliament for the second time under the country’s permanent constitution of 2006.	发自巴格达 —— 伊拉克民众将于 3 月 7 日奔赴各投票点，在 2006 年制定的永久宪法框架下第二度选举出自己的议会。


Many scholars believe that it is the second general election, not the first, which is the most important test of any new democracy.	而许多学者都认为，倘若要对一个新生民主政权进行检验的话，第二次大选要比首次大选意义更重大。


If so, these elections appear to foreshadow ominous times ahead.	如果此话当真，这几场选举似乎正预示着一个不祥的未来。


The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated dramatically over the past six months.	伊拉克的安全形势在过去 6 个月以来急剧恶化。


Though much of the violence in Iraq over the past six years has been random, aimed at soft targets such as markets and restaurants, its nature changed last summer.	虽然在这一时期内发生的绝大多数暴力行为都是随机的，只针对一些类似市场和餐馆这样的“软目标”，但这些暴力行为的性质早在去年夏天时就已经发生了根本性的转变。


On August 19, 2009, the sixth anniversary of the bombing that killed the United Nations representative in Baghdad, a series of spectacular attacks were carried out.	在 2009 年 8 月 19 日，也就是联合国驻伊拉克代表被炸身亡整整 6 年之后，又发生了一系列大规模袭击。


These bombings, and others since, have targeted the Iraqi state and its infrastructure, including the ministries of finance and foreign affairs and municipal and judicial offices.	这些爆炸，以及自从此之后的其他爆炸都直指伊拉克国家机关及其相关设施，包括财政部，外交部，还有市政以及司法部门办公室。


Moreover, as United States troops have lowered their profile, daily violence of the more random variety has increased.	此外随着美军防务的逐渐收缩，各种形式的日常暴力行为也随之增加。


Equally ominous, the banning of hundreds of candidates for alleged ties to the Baath Party signals a return to sectarian politics, which could reignite a sectarian civil war.	同样不祥的是，以牵涉阿拉伯复兴社会党（前总统萨达姆所在政党，已被取缔）为由禁止数百名候选人参选则预示着派系政治的死灰复燃，而此举可能令各派系再次爆发内战。


The individuals banned include the current defense minister and several members of parliament.	连现任国防部长以及数名议会议员都在遭禁之列。


The message from Iran’s allies in Iraq, who control the de-Baathification process, is clear.	那些由掌管全国“肃清阿拉伯复兴社会党影响”（ de-Baathification ）进程，同时也是伊朗的伊拉克代理人的人究竟想传达什么样的信息，堪称路人皆知了。


While some Shia who were prominent allies of the Baathist regime hold positions of great influence in the “new” Iraq, Sunnis will never know when they will be shut out of the process, especially if they become too powerful.	当那些曾经长期与复兴党政权勾结的什叶派在“新”伊拉克占据了显要的位置之后，逊尼派将不知道自己什么时候会被踢出这个进程，尤其是当他们自己也逐渐壮大之时。


Some of Iraq’s Sunni leaders might thus conclude that permanent armed opposition is their only viable strategy.	有些伊拉克逊尼派领袖可能会由此得出结论：长期的武装对抗才是唯一可行的策略。


True, they might not be able to topple the new regime, but they will be able to de-stabilize Iraq over the long term, in the hope of forcing a negotiated settlement of their grievances.	毫无疑问，这些领袖们可能无力推翻新政权，但是他们也有办法让政府长期不得安宁，以便最终能通过谈判来为自己申冤。


The new Shia elites who control Iraq have emulated their allies in Iran, creating a system that effectively chooses which of their rivals may constitute a “legitimate” opposition and which may not participate in the political process.	而另一方面，控制了伊拉克的新什叶派精英也在从自己的伊朗盟友处取经，力图构建出一个既能有效地选择究竟他们的哪些对手能组成一个“合法”的反对派，又能确定哪些对手不能参与到政治进程当中的政治系统。


The struggle of Iraq’s Kurds should be instructive.	对此伊拉克库尔德人的抗争是有借鉴意义的。


As the Iraqi political scientist Ghassan Atiyyah, has noted, the Kurds, even without regional allies, have been able to de-stabilize Iraq for 80 years.	正如伊拉克政治学家加桑·阿提亚（ Ghassan Atiyyah ）所言，连一个地区盟友也没有的库尔德人都能在伊拉克闹了 80 年。


How much more will the Sunnis be able to de-stabilize the country, he asked, enjoying as they do the support of most of the regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and potentially Turkey?	更何况逊尼派背后还有沙特阿拉伯，叙利亚以及潜在的土耳其等地区性力量撑腰，那就更不知道要在伊拉克兴风作浪多久了。


Politics aside, the long-term damage to Iraq’s legal institutions caused by these maneuverings should not be underestimated.	姑且抛开政治不谈，这些手段给伊拉克司法体制所造成的长期伤害也不应低估。


After the de-Baathification order was issued (by a commission that does not actually have any sitting members) a panel of the Iraqi Court of Appeal essentially invalidated it.	在肃清阿拉伯复兴社会党影响的命令（由一个甚至连一名选举产生的成员都没有的委员会下达）出台之后，一个伊拉克上诉法院的审判小组又宣布其无效。


The prime minister then met with Iraq’s chief justice, following which the court’s decision was reversed.	谁知在总理和国家首席大法官碰头之后，法庭的判决立刻又发生了 180 度的大逆转。


There will be several ways to gauge the election’s relative success.	有很多方法可以去衡量这场选举的相对成功。


The first of these will be the length of time that it takes the victors to form a new government.	第一种方法就是获胜者组建一个新政府所需要的时间。


If, as occurred after the last elections, months go by without the formation of a government, this will be confirmation that Iraq’s political elites will continue to subordinate the desperate needs of the country – for security, electricity, water, and basic services – to their political futures as they haggle over positions.	如果还是像上次那样几个月都看不见新政府的影子，那就只能说伊拉克的政治精英将照样把国家所急需的一切 —— 治安，供电，供水以及基础服务 —— 放在一边，而继续埋头为自己的政治前途讨价还价。


Whether competent technocrats, or as has happened in the past, party hacks are appointed to the ministries will be a telling sign.	而究竟被委任到政府部门的是有能力的技术官僚，还是正如过去曾经发生过的那样，只是些政党鹰犬，将是一个有说服力的信号。


Another sign will be the extent to which the newly elected leadership, which is likely to be largely the same as the current leadership, reaches out to real Sunni leaders.	另外一个信号则是新选举出来的领导层（可能大多都跟目前的是同一班人马）究竟会在什么程度上接触那些逊尼派领导人。


Doing so might well mean a retreat from the pre-election banning of candidates, and would demonstrate a maturity among the Shia political elites that they have not yet shown.	这样做可能意味着在为选举前查禁候选人的行为作出补偿，并显示出一种目前什叶派政治精英所尚未显示出的政治成熟度。


Finally, the reaction of the election’s losers will be key.	最后，选举失利方的反应将是最关键的。


That includes not only those who have been banned from running for office, but others as well.	这不但包括那些被禁止参选的候选人，还包括其他一切候选人。


For example, it is likely that the current prime minister will not be able to form a new government.	比如现任总理就很可能无力组建一个新政府。


Even the principal Kurdish parties are facing a challenge from an independent party, Goran, and are likely to incur some losses to it.	而即便各主要库尔德政党也都面对着一个独立政党戈兰党（ Goran , 库尔德语意为“改变”）的挑战并将会在政治上蒙受损失。


If these losers engage in post-election jockeying to cheat opponents of their fair allotment of seats, that will tell much about the future.	如果这些失利者在选举后转而争相搞小动作想把对手从合法获得的席位上拉下马的话，就很能说明一些问题了。


Whether Iraq achieves stability or is once again ripped apart by sectarian violence now depends, as it always has, on the new political elites.	伊拉克究竟能实现稳定，还是再度被派系暴力行动所撕裂，将一如既往地取决于新的政治精英。


If the past is an indication of their future performance, there is reason for deep concern.	如果他们的行为还是老一套的话，那就真是值得忧心了。


Iraq’s Economic Divide	伊拉克的贫富分化


Everyone who looks at Iraq sees a nation divided between Shia, Sunni, and Kurd communities.	所有观察伊拉克的人都会认为这个国家分化为什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人派社区。


But an equally fundamental division – one that has contributed as much to the ongoing insurrection as sectarian strife and opposition to the American-led military occupation – is the widening gap between Iraq’s rich and poor.	但是，同样根本性的分化却发生在伊拉克的富人和穷人之间。 这一分化造成的暴乱如同因种族矛盾以及反抗美军率领的军事占领所造成的一样巨大。


When Iraq was liberated, most people, especially the poor, began to hope for a charismatic leader who would save them from the bitter reality of daily life.	在伊拉克得到解放之时，大多数人，特别是穷人，开始盼望出现一位具魅力的领导人，把他们从日常生活困苦之中解救出来。


Raised in fear, they had no idea how democracy could apply to their society, or how human-rights groups and other civic organizations could help shape the future.	他们从小在恐惧中长大，不知道民主如何在他们的社会中实施，也不知道人权组织以及其他民间组织如何可以帮助建设未来。


Soon enough, Iraq was faced with a new social divide.	很快，伊拉克面临一个新的社会分化。


On one side stood people who understood how to operate in a democracy, attain power, and realize their ambitions.	一方面是理解如何在民主国家中运作、获得权力并且实现雄心的人们。


They learned to speak the language of democracy, gaining money and influence in the process and enlisting independent organizations to defend their rights and privileges.	他们学习说民主的语言，在进程中获得金钱和影响力，并取得独立组织的帮助来维护他们的权利和特权。


On the other side, however, remains the vast population of powerless Iraqis, including widows and divorced or abandoned women with no one to provide for them and their children.	但是，在另一方面却是大量无助的伊拉克人，包括那些寡妇、离婚或者遭到抛弃的妇女。 没有人帮助她们和她们的孩子。


For these people, democracy and human rights mean nothing.	对于这些人，民主和人权毫无意义。


They are ignorant, poor, and sick.	他们无知、贫穷并且多病。


Victimized by an educational system that collapsed over a decade ago, they have few skills that can help them find employment in Iraq’s blighted economy.	伊拉克的教育体系十几年前就崩溃了，他们是受害者，没有什么技能来帮助他们在伊拉克破败的经济中找到工作。


During Saddam’s reign, no effort was made to raise living standards for the poor.	在萨达姆统治时期，根本没有做什么工作来提高穷人的生活水平。


I have visited the huge slums of Iraq and found families living in homes with barely a roof to cover them, with infestations of insects everywhere, and with raw sewage seeping under their doors.	我访问了大量的伊拉克贫民窟，那里家徒四壁，飞虫满地，污水四溢。


Day or night, they live in darkness.	无论是白天还是夜晚，他们都生活在黑暗之中。


Needing nothing more than food, decent housing, and the possibility of a job, these families wait for death, dreading the cries of their starving children.	这些家庭需要的只不过是食物、适当的住房以及一份工作。 他们等待死亡，害怕听到饥饿孩子的啼哭。


When I met the women who live in those houses, they showered me with questions: will democracy give us food and houses?	当我遇到那里的妇女时，她们都问我：民主会给我们吃的和住的吗？


Will democracy stop men from beating their wives?	民主会让男人不打老婆吗？


Will it give citizenship to our children?	它会给我们的孩子公民资格吗？


Will it give us the right to divorce the husbands who abandon us?	它会给我们和抛弃我们的丈夫离婚的权利吗？


My answer to all of these questions was “yes.”	我都回答说“是的”。


Yes, democracy will give you the right to live in a decent house, the right to learn and work, and it will give citizenship to your children and make you equal with your men.	是的，民主会给你们权利住在体面的房子里，学习和工作，而且也会给你们的孩子公民资格并且让你们和男人平等。


But you have to work hard and make every possible effort in demanding your rights.	但是你们必须尽最大努力争取你们的权利。


They replied: “Saddam taught us for 35 years how to be jobless, silent, and fearful.	他们回答说：“萨达姆35年来教我们如何失业，保持沉没和恐惧。


What can we do now?”	我们现在有什么可做？ ”


In these destitute areas, where most Iraqis live, people are prey to bitter temptations.	在这些大多数伊拉克人居住的贫困地区，人们很容易接受仇恨的诱惑。


Many are beyond the reach of political or government leaders.	政治领导人或政府领导人根本无法接触到他们中的许多人。


They fall easily into violence, theft, and sabotage.	他们轻易地陷入暴力、盗窃和破坏之途。


Poverty drives some to take money in exchange for acts of violence, abetted by the lure of a false heroism that they were not able to act upon during Saddam’s long reign.	一些人受到虚伪的英雄主义的教唆，贫穷让他们为了钱而从事在萨达姆长期统治时期所不敢从事的暴力活动。


Poverty has exacerbated the trauma of Iraq’s violent history of wars and atrocities, which has desensitized people to killing.	贫穷加剧了伊拉克战争和残暴历史的痛苦，使得人们杀人不眨眼。


Though conditions in Iraq today are drawing many young men toward violence, I am convinced that we need only to provide decent jobs and housing to save them.	尽管当今伊拉克的形势让很多年轻人趋向暴力，但是我坚信，只要提供体面的工作和住房就可以挽救他们。


Jobs, in particular, will help young people to create new lives through serious work.	特别是工作可以帮助年轻人通过认真劳动创造新生活。


We must not use no-work jobs to disguise an army of unemployed.	我们不能用无事可做的工作来掩盖大量失业者。


We must give people jobs that allow them to make a contribution to rebuilding the country.	我们必须为人们提供工作来让他们为建设国家贡献力量。


By nature, every individual seeks to prove himself as a useful person in his or her society.	本质上而言，每个人都寻求证明自己是社会上的有用之人。


But the culture that Saddam created convinced Iraqis that political connections are the only way to gain authority, money, and knowledge.	但是，萨达姆所营建的文化却让伊拉克人相信政治关系是获得权势、金钱和知识的唯一途径。


Overcoming such sentiments will take time and a vibrant economy, which means that a new Iraqi government must have limited power, allowing the private sector to grow while encouraging widespread understanding of democracy and human rights.	克服这些情绪需要时间以及活跃的经济，这也就意味着新的伊拉克政府的权力必须受到节制，允许私营部门成长，与此同时，鼓励大众理解民主和人权。


Religious groups are ready to contribute to this process.	宗教团体已经准备好为此进程作出贡献。


We can also rehabilitate the technocrats who served under Saddam, so that they, too, have a chance to serve their country.	我们还可以为萨达姆统治时期的技术官员平反，这样他们也可以有机会为国效力。


Last but not least, we must provide loans to poor families to help them build a respectable life.	最后，但并非最不重要的是，我们必须向贫穷家庭提供贷款来帮助它们建设受人尊敬的生活。


Above all, the government must spare no effort in convincing poor Iraqis of the value of democracy and freedom, and how important the constitution is in realizing their aspirations for a better life.	最为重要的是，政府必须不遗余力地说服贫困的伊拉克人民主和自由的价值，以及宪法在实现他们的更好生活的愿望的重要性。


This will not be easy to achieve in a country where many people consider breaking the law an act of heroism.	对于一个许多人认为违法是英雄主义行为的国家来说，这不是一件容易的事。


But we Iraqis have also learned that power should not be concentrated in a few hands, and that establishing justice requires fighting all forms of corruption.	但是，我们伊拉克人还知道，权力不应当集中在少数人手中，而且，建立正义要求同各种形式的腐败做斗争。


If the constitution is to operate as the guarantee of democracy, freedom, and security, poor Iraqis must learn to make that fight their own.	如果宪法保证民主、自由以及安全而得以实施，贫苦的伊拉克人必须为此自我争取。


Defending a Divided Iraq	捍卫分裂的伊拉克


OXFORD – The United States and its allies are facing another major policy challenge in Iraq.	牛津—美国及其盟友正面临伊拉克的又一重大政策挑战。


Airstrikes against the Islamic State might unseat the group’s fighters in critical areas; but, as things stand, troops will be needed to hold and govern liberated territory.	针对伊斯兰国的空袭也许将该集团的斗士们赶出了关键区域，但是，事实表明，需要派遣军队保卫和治理解放区。


Securing Iraq therefore requires a formidable force to be in place, which is why US President Barack Obama’s strategy includes rebuilding the Iraqi army.	因此，维持伊拉克安全需要强大的力量，因此，美国总统奥巴马的战略中包括了重建伊拉克军队。


But doing so will require overcoming three related obstacles: Iraqi leaders’ military inexperience; corruption and cronyism; and ambiguity regarding the extent of external support.	但这样做需要克服三个相关障碍：伊拉克领导人的军事经验、腐败和裙带，以及外部支持力度的不确定性。


When states collapse, their constituent parts sometimes inherit armed forces that are competent enough to maintain minimal levels of governance.	当国家崩溃时，其组成部分有时会继承足以维持最低程度治理的武装力量。


This is more often the case when a state breaks up as a result of armed conflict, in which case stability depends on whether the best military leaders are allowed to remain in place.	在国家因为武装冲突而分裂时，这种可能性更大，在这种情况中，稳定取决于最优秀的军事领导人能否就位。


But states often collapse as an unintended consequence of the presence of a supporting external force.	但国家常常因为外部支持力量的意料外后果而崩溃。


For example, following Vietnam’s partition in the wake of France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam’s last non-Communist president, was able to turn to the US military for support.	比如，越南因为1954年法国在奠边府战败而分裂，随后，越南最后一任非共产党总统吴庭艳求助于美国的军事支持。


However, staggering levels of corruption under Diem and his US-backed successors, and the replacement of the military’s most competent commanders with Diem’s cronies, ultimately led to the rout of the South Vietnamese Army.	但是，吴庭艳及其得到美国支持的继任者十分腐败，有能力的指挥官又纷纷被吴庭艳的亲信所替换，这最终导致了南越军队的叛乱。


A similar situation is evident in Iraq today.	今天的伊拉克也表现出同样的局面。


Divided by sectarianism, Iraq’s armed forces have become unable and unwilling to fight.	因宗派主义而分裂的伊拉克武装部队已无力也不愿战斗。


In the two years following the withdrawal of US troops, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, like Diem four decades earlier, set about consolidating political power through patronage.	在美军撤出后的两年里，时任总理马利基和四十年前的吴庭艳一样，通过裙带主义巩固政治权力。


Al-Maliki sought to protect the interests of Iraq’s Shia at the expense of its Sunni citizens, appointing military leaders based on their tribal and sectarian affiliations rather than their merit.	马利基不惜牺牲逊尼派公民保护什叶派的利益，根据部落和宗派背景而不是能力任命军官。


One might expect a leader who faces internal armed opposition to avoid doing anything that might weaken the military.	你也许一位，面临国内武装反对的领导人会避免做出任何削弱军队的决定。


But al-Maliki seems to have assumed that external forces would simply come to his aid should he run into trouble.	但马利基似乎认定，只要他陷入麻烦，外部力量支持就会源源而至。


With his lack of a military background, he seems not to have understood that external forces need to work closely with the local army, and that a sophisticated support network must be in place to avoid logistical disruptions resulting from enemy action or corruption.	由于缺乏军方背景，他似乎不明白外部力量需要与本地军队密切合作，而且必须有成熟的支持网络以避免地方行动或腐败干扰物流。


Viewing the situation from the ground – which is essential if security is to be restored and economic recovery is to be achieved – local militias must be able to defend themselves against rivals or criminal gangs.	从地面情形看——若要重建安全、重振经济，这一点至关重要——地方军队必须能够自卫，战胜敌对势力和犯罪团伙。


This means that the central government’s role should be to provide more advanced security assets such as fixed or rotary air support, intelligence, and logistical and communications support.	这意味着中央政府的角色应该是提供更先进的安全资产——如固定或轮转的空中支持、情报以及物流和通讯支持。


Yet the top priority for the leader of a fragmented state is to gain and consolidate a monopoly on the legitimate use of lethal force.	但分裂国家领导人的最重要当务之急是获得并巩固合法使用致命武器的垄断权。


And donor countries tend to support the leader, because doing so allows them to standardize and simplify assistance.	援助国总是支持领导人，因为这样做能够使援助标准化和简单化。


Unfortunately, this approach seldom works.	不幸的是，这一政策总是适得其反。


Instead, security experts should consider how best to manage the potential for violence among and within the various factions vying for local control.	反之，安全专家应该考虑如何最好地管住争夺地方控制权的诸派系之间和内部暴力相向的可能。


Strikingly, the reconfiguration of the security forces is usually ignored in post-war political settlements (though this has been changing since Iraq’s implosion).	令人震惊的是，安全力量的重排通常无视战后政治和议（尽管这一点在伊拉克分裂以来以有所改变）。


Indeed, though ethnic divisions can undermine military cohesion, a full appreciation of them can lead to a more robust and stable security environment.	事实上，尽管种族分裂可能破坏军事团结，但充分认识这一点可以形成更强健、更稳定的安全环境。


Kurds in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region, for example, certainly feel more secure having their own soldiers, the Peshmerga, and have proven to be a better fighting force as a result.	比如，伊拉克库尔德自治区的库尔德人显然会在拥有本民族战士——Peshmerga的情况下感到更加安全，事实也证明库尔德人更能打仗。


By contrast, the weak national Iraqi defense forces are believed to be doing the bidding of the Shia majority.	相反，不堪一击的伊拉克国民卫队被认为是应什叶派多数要求而生。


Contested state breakups create tough policy problems, and there are no ideal outcomes.	斗争国的分裂创造出棘手的政治问题，没有理想的结局。


But if foreign powers wish to engage constructively, they must understand a country’s internal politics and demographics, and address all affected groups’ security concerns equally and fairly.	但如果外部力量想建设性地参与，就必须理解一国内部的政治和人口状况，并平等公平地解决所有受影响群体的安全忧虑。


Failure to do so leaves everyone weak and vulnerable.	无法实现这一点让所有人都无法强大。


Iraq’s Half Step	伊拉克的半步之举


The relatively successful election in Iraq is a major victory for democracy, but not necessarily for liberal reform in the Middle East.	伊拉克相对成功的大选是民主进程中的一个伟大胜利，但对中东的自由改革而言却非必然之步。


This is an important distinction.	这是一个显著区别。


The anti-democratic forces who tried to stop people from voting there were Sunni Muslim Arab terror groups, ranging from supporters of Saddam Hussein’s deposed dictatorship to followers of Osama bin Ladin’s extremist Islamism.	作为伊拉克境内的反民主力量的阿拉伯穆斯林逊尼派恐怖集团，包括垮台的萨达姆·侯赛因政权的支持者和乌萨马·本拉登极端伊斯兰主义的追从者，都试图阻止人们前去投票。


Because Sunni Arabs, comprising less than 25% of the population, knew that they could not win a democratic election, many of their leaders urged a boycott.	因为占人口总数不到25%的阿拉伯逊尼派知道，他们无法赢得一场民主的选举。 许多逊尼派领导人还鼓励联合抵制选举。


By contrast, 75% of Iraq’s population is composed of Shi’a Muslim Arabs, who know that they will control the new regime, and Kurds, who want local autonomy.	相比之下，伊拉克人口总数的75%由什叶派穆斯林和库尔德派穆斯林构成。 什叶派非常清楚自己将掌控新政权，而库尔德派则要求获得地区自治。


Thus, a vast majority of the population were sure that a democratically elected government would serve their interests and eagerly participated at the polls.	因此，大部分伊拉克人确信，一个由民主选举产生的政府将为他们的利益服务，因而对参与投票热情高涨。


Indeed, Shi’a Muslim clerics ordered their people – including women – to vote, warning that to stay home on Election Day was a sin.	什叶派的宗教领袖甚至发布宗教命令，规定包括妇女在内的所有人都要参与投票，选举日那天谁若呆在家里将被视作犯罪。


But if high turnout, albeit based more on communal self-interest than belief in democracy, was the good news from Iraq’s election, the bad news is the leadership they chose, which is not democratically minded.	但是，如果说投票人数之多是来自此次伊拉克大选的好消息（虽然与其说是对民主持有信念，还不如说是基于公利与私利的考虑），那么坏消息就是，他们所选择的这个政权，也并非具有民主思想的政权。


Liberal reform parties that tried to transcend communal identities and appeal to all Iraqis did not do well.	试图超越群族认同吸引所有伊拉克人的自由改革党派做的并不尽人意。


The victorious coalition follows Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who can be described as a moderate Islamist, but many of its members are extreme.	获胜的什叶派联盟追随着被形容为一个温和伊斯兰教主义者的西斯塔尼（Ayatollah Ali Sistani），但是该联盟的多数成员却是极端主义分子。


In the future, especially without Sistani, who is 74 years old, the new regime could turn into a dictatorship.	西斯塔尼已经七十四岁高龄，将来，尤其是在他不在的情况下，新政权很有可能会转变成为专政政权。


This ambiguity in Iraq is a good example of the problem faced by Arab democratic reformers elsewhere.	目前伊拉克的不明朗形势也正是其他地方的阿拉伯民主革命者们面临的典型问题。


They have compelling arguments, but they lack large numbers of followers.	他们的政治观点引人注目，但是他们没有众多追随者。


Already, the reform movement has changed the debate in the Arab world, but it still faces a long road ahead.	改革运动已经改变了阿拉伯世界中的论战主题，但是他们前面的路途依旧漫长。


For a half-century, reformers explain, Arab nationalist regimes have been a disaster, creating societies and economies that rank low by every statistical measure of development, while leading their countries into countless costly but fruitless wars and crises.	改革者们解释说，半个多世纪以来，阿拉伯民族主义政权已经成为一个灾难，无论用哪一种统计方法，阿拉伯的社会和经济状况排名都处于垫底位置。 民族主义带领着他们的国家陷入无数损失惨重但是毫无结果的战争和危机之中。


At a time when democracy is spreading, they remain dictatorships.	当民主之风呈现蔓延之势时，民族主义依旧保持着专政政权。


But the most powerful alternative to the status quo are powerful Islamist opposition movements that have no real answers for these ailments and merely seek to impose another flavor of dictatorship.	但是最能改变现状的就是强大的伊斯兰抵抗运动。 他们无法解决这些弊病，只是在寻找另外一种强加于社会的专政独裁。


The terrorism generated by many of these groups is an increasingly large domestic threat that only further disrupts society.	这些组织大多使用恐怖主义，这正成为伊拉克国内日益凸现的一个威胁。 从长远来看恐怖主义只会使社会陷于混乱不堪的局面。


Besides battling these more powerful Arab nationalists and Islamists, Arab liberals must deal with a wide range of issues, including the modernization or moderation of Islam, relations with the United States, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and women’s rights.	除了要与逐渐强大的阿拉伯民族主义者和伊斯兰主义者们周旋，阿拉伯的自由主义者们还必须处理各方面的问题，包括伊斯兰教的现代化和温和化、伊斯兰与美国的关系、巴以冲突以及妇女权利。


In each case, they must decide whether to confront or endorse the sacred cows of nationalist and Islamist ideology.	无论是哪一件，他们必须决定到底是公然面对还是赞同民族主义者的“圣牛”和伊斯兰意识形态。


There are no easy answers.	这谈何容易！


Consider Islam. Proposing secularism – the historic approach of Western liberals – is political suicide.	拿伊斯兰来说，提倡世俗主义——西方自由主义者曾经运用过的方法——无异于政治自杀。


Calling for the modernization of Islam by permitting clerics to reinterpret its laws in light of contemporary conditions is more acceptable.	允许宗教领导根据当前条件重新解释法律以呼吁支持伊斯兰教的现代化进程或许更能让人接受。


But this also has a potentially dangerous drawback, too.	但这也有一个潜在的弊端。


After all, this is precisely what the radical Islamists have done by, for example, reversing the traditional Islamic opposition to suicide bombing.	毕竟，这正是伊斯兰教极端分子通过将传统伊斯兰抵抗运动退回到自杀性爆炸的手法而已经达成的。


The easiest strategy for liberals is to side with conservative Muslims who reject not only radical Islamism, but also political reform.	对自由主义者来说，最简单的策略就是与反对极端伊斯兰主义和政治改革的穆斯林保守派统一战线。


In addition, many liberals, notably in Saudi Arabia, offer to work with the current regimes against the radical Islamist revolutionaries – an understandable response, but one that strengthens the authoritarian status quo.	此外，许多自由主义者，尤其是沙特阿拉伯的，愿意与当前政府合作抵抗伊斯兰激进革命分子——这是一个完全可以理解的反应，但却巩固了当前的独裁现状。


There are few role models for a more moderate, contemporary-minded interpretation of Islam.	现在几乎没有什么定义模式能适合一个更为温和、更具现代思想的伊斯兰教。


Perhaps the most important is Tunisia’s educational system.	也许最合适的就是突尼斯的教育体系。


There, students in the Islamic university also study the Bible, and the curriculum puts an emphasis on the most tolerant interpretation of Islam.	在那里，伊斯兰教大学的学生们也要学习圣经，课程安排十分重视最能被大众所接受的对伊斯兰教的诠释定义。


For example, one final exam is built around having students use Islamic texts to write an essay showing that non-Muslims living under Muslim rule should be treated fairly.	比如，一次期末考试的题目就是要学生用伊斯兰文写一篇关于生活在穆斯林法律下的非穆斯林应当受到公正对待的论文。


In promoting democracy, liberals reject the argument used by today’s rulers that the first free election would be the last, because Islamists would win and establish theocratic regimes.	在推动民主的过程中，今日统治者的这一言论遭到自由主义者的反对：第一届自由选举也将是最后一次，因为伊斯兰教主义者们将会赢得胜利并建立一个神权政体。


Reformers insist that the vast majority of people support moderate solutions, or at least that radical Islamist groups would have to become pragmatic in order to compete for power and govern.	改革者们坚持认为，大部分人民支持温和稳健的解决方案，或者，伊斯兰激进团体为了争取权力和统治权至少得变得更为务实。


That case is not yet proven.	这种说法还未得到证实。


January’s Palestinian elections were won by a relatively moderate leader because he was put forward by the ruling Fatah movement and Islamists boycotted the election.	一个相对温和的领导人赢得了巴勒斯坦一月的大选，因为他受到的是处于统治地位的法塔赫运动的推选，尽管该选举受到了伊斯兰主义者的集体抵制。


But in the Gaza Strip local elections soon afterward, radical Islamists who use terrorism won seven of the ten municipal councils.	但是就在加沙地带当地选举过后不久，使用恐怖主义的伊斯兰激进分子赢得了当地十个地方性议会中的七个。


What happens in Iraq will show how an elected Islamist-type government wields power.	发生在伊拉克的事件展现了一个选举产生的伊斯兰主义政府是如何掌握大权的。


But the new liberal wave in the Arab world is reflected in media coverage that praised Iraq’s election and suggested that it might make a good model for other Arab countries.	但是，各大媒体对伊拉克选举的褒扬之辞反映出阿拉伯世界内的新自由主义浪潮，并暗示这也许会为其他阿拉伯国家树立一个好榜样。


There are many other small signs that change might be possible.	还有诸多微弱信号也表明这种改变或许可行。


All the Arab entries in an annual essay contest run by a Western agency used to focus on Israel’s alleged responsibility for all the region’s problems.	在由一家西方机构组织的年度论文大赛中，以往所有的阿拉伯参赛者们都关注着以色列所声称的对全地区问题解决的责任。


This year, the writers unanimously made their theme the need to reform their own societies.	但是今年，作者们不约而同地将主题定为改革阿拉伯社会的必要性。


The liberal, democratic reformist movement among Arabs is here to stay.	自由主义、民主主义改革运动就在这里、在阿拉伯世界内扎根了。


The battle will be long and difficult, and victory is not assured.	这场战争将持久艰难，胜利也难以确保。


But these groups have already become a major contender in the Arab world’s battle of ideas.	但是这些组织已经成为阿拉伯世界观念之战的主力选手。


Now they hope to become a factor in bringing about real change.	现在他们希望自己能在实现真正改变的过程中产生影响。


The Iraqi election was an important half-step in that direction.	伊拉克的此次选举正是这一进程中的半步之举。


Iraq’s Jobs-for-Peace Mirage	伊拉克就业换和平的幻影


As the wisdom of President Bush’s proposed “surge” of US troops is debated across the US and around the world, another question about the US President’s new policy to avert all-out civil war there is coming to the fore.	当布什总统大幅度增兵的首批部队进入伊拉克之际，有关美国总统为避免全面内战制定的伊拉克新政策的另外一个问题出现在前台。


Can using US funding to reopen Iraqi state-owned enterprises get young men to abandon the insurgency and sectarian militias?	那就是，能否使用美国的资金来重新开启伊拉克国营企业，从而让伊拉克的年轻人放弃叛乱以及教派民兵组织呢？


The idea sounds logical: a man with a good job that enables him to build a decent life won’t want to fight Americans or his fellow Iraqis, right?	这个想法听起来合乎逻辑，因为有一个可以让他安居乐业的好工作，人是不会与美国人或者他的伊拉克同胞交战的，对不对？


Unfortunately, that jobs strategy is unlikely to reduce the violence.	不幸的是，这一就业战略不大可能减少暴力。


Iraq’s state-owned enterprises were the cornerstone of Saddam Hussein’s economic policy.	伊拉克的国营企业曾经是萨达姆经济政策的基石。


But, propped up by military contracts, those state companies were never well run or efficient; greatly overstaffed, they produced little, similar to the failed state-owned enterprises of the old Soviet Union.	但是，这些公司是由军工合同来支撑，从来就没有管理得当或者有过效率。 它们人浮于事，产量低下，类似于前苏联倒闭的国营企业。


Moreover, outside of the oil and electric power sectors, state-owned enterprises in Iraq have never been major employers.	而且，除了石油和电气动力部门，伊拉克的国营企业从来都不是主要的就业单位。


For example, the roughly 180 enterprises in the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, which controls all state-owned manufacturing companies, never employed much more than 100,000 workers in a nation of roughly 27 million people.	例如，工业和矿产部的大约180个企业控制着所有的国营制造业公司，但是它们在伊拉克这样一个2700万人口的国家中，从来就没有雇用过超过10万名工人。


The employees of the state-owned enterprises still receive paychecks, even though about a third of their workplaces have been destroyed.	尽管国营单位的三分之一已经被毁，但是，其雇员依然在领工资。


For example, the Sulaymaniyah Sugar Mill was bombed during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s, but its employees have been paid ever since, though only rats and pigeons now report for work there.	例如，苏莱马尼亚糖厂在八十年代的两伊战争期间遭到轰炸，但是该单位的员工从那时以来一直领取工资，尽管现在只有老鼠和鸽子在那里报到上班。


Indeed, many employees of state-owned enterprises show little interest in returning to work.	确实，许多国营企业的员工没有兴趣返回工作岗位。


When the Coalition Provisional Authority asked the employees of the Mishraq Sulfur Company to go back on the job in 2004, some of the workers lit $40 million worth of sulfur on fire and destroyed the facility.	当联合部队临时权力机构在2004年要求米士拉硫公司的员工返回单位上班的时候，有些工人把价值4000万美元的硫付之一炬，并且捣毁了工厂。


They preferred to be paid without working.	他们更愿意不劳而获。


There is little to resuscitate among the state-owned enterprises.	伊拉克的国营企业已经无可救药了。


A third are damaged beyond repair, another third are hopelessly unprofitable, and the rest are a mismanaged assortment of plants, a few of which could potentially produce something of value, but only with proper management and incentives.	三分之一被毁，无以修复，另外三分之一毫无利润，无可救药，剩下的管理混乱，有几个有潜力生产有价值的产品，但是只有妥善管理辅之以激励方可。


Trying to give these hopelessly inefficient enterprises a new lease on life would make Iraqis poorer without reducing the violence.	试图让这些毫无希望、没有效率的企业起死回生将会让伊拉克人更加贫穷又并不减少暴力。


Yet beneath Iraq’s chaos and the rubble, a rough and tumble private sector has been expanding since the US invasion, benefiting from higher oil revenues and more liberal economic policies.	但是，在伊拉克的混乱和废墟之下，一个粗糙而又跌跌撞撞的私营部门从美国入侵以来就一直在扩大，并且获益于高昂的石油收入以及更为自由化的经济政策。


As a result, government expenditures and household incomes are up substantially since Saddam Hussein’s last years in power.	结果，从萨达姆统治的末日以来，政府开支和家庭收入有了实质性增长。


Despite the violence, commercial activity has also risen, because Iraqis are now free to import the equipment and goods they need to build homes, run stores, and operate trucking companies.	尽管暴力不断，商业活动也上升，因为伊拉克人现在可以自由地进口他们所需要的设备和产品来建造房屋、经营商店和运输公司。


If the US wants to increase jobs, it should intensify efforts to work with these private Iraqi companies to bid on contracts.	如果美国想要增加就业，它就应该加大力度，与这些私营部门的伊拉克公司合作来竞标合同。


State-owned enterprises should also be free to bid, but they should receive no favors.	国营企业也应当自由竞标，但是它们不应当得到优待。


The fundamental problem in Iraq is not jobs.	伊拉克的根本问题不是就业。


In contrast to the Mexican, Chinese, or Russian revolutions, economic disenfranchisement is not driving the current conflict.	与墨西哥、中国或者俄国革命不同的是，驱动当前冲突的并不是经济剥夺。


This is a struggle for power, not for economic justice or a better life.	这是一场权力斗争，而非为了经济正义或者更好的生活。


The root causes are political, sectarian, and personal.	根本原因是政治、教派以及个人上的。


Suicide bombers and death squads are not seeking shorter working hours, higher salaries, or better pension plans.	人肉炸弹以及死亡行刑队并非寻求更短的工作小时、更高的工资或者更好的养老金计划。


All credible economic indicators show employment prospects in Iraq improving since the end of the invasion.	所有值得信赖的经济数据都表明，伊拉克的就业前景从美国入侵结束以来一直在改善。


Daily wages for laborers in Baghdad have doubled in the last three years – hardly a sign of rising unemployment.	巴格达的劳工每日工资在过去三年中翻了一番，这就根本不是什么失业上升的迹象。


The only decent survey of employment in Iraq, the United Nations Development Program’s Iraq Living Standards Survey of 2004 , measured unemployment at 10.5%.	联合国开发计划署的2004年度伊拉克生活水平调查是有关伊拉克就业情况的唯一的可信的调查。 该调查表明伊拉克的失业率为10.


Iraqi statistics, which define unemployment more expansively, show rates in percent declining from the mid-twenties to the teens in the past two years.	伊拉克的统计数字有关失业的定义更为宽泛。 它们表明，伊拉克的失业率在过去两年中从百分之二十五左右下降到百分之十左右。


Many young Iraqis join militias because that is where the money is.	许多伊拉克年轻人加入民兵是因为那里有钱。


They can earn more hanging around with a gun in their hands than by working in construction or trade.	他们手持枪支游逛要比在工地打工或者做手艺挣得多。


Supporters of the insurgency are happy to plant a roadside bomb in exchange for extra cash.	叛乱的支持者们乐意埋设路旁炸弹来换取更多的现金。


Instead of focusing on a large jobs program, the US could do more to bring peace to Iraq by reducing the money from Iraqi government coffers and smuggling activities that funds the payrolls of the insurgents and militias.	美国不应当在大型的就业计划上花费精力。 它可以通过减少从伊拉克政府的国库的金钱以及资助叛乱份子和民兵的走私活动来给伊拉克带来和平，这样反到可以事半功倍。


How then should foreign assistance to Iraq be spent?	那么，给伊拉克的外国援助应当如何花费呢？


The US should increase spending on programs to improve the police.	美国应当增加改善警力的项目开支。


Currently, many police devote their energies to shaking down citizens for bribes, and some moonlight in death squads.	目前，许多警察投入精力对民众敲诈勒索，有些人还在死亡行刑队里挣取外快。


As long as Iraqis face daily threats of larceny, kidnapping, and murder – particularly from those who are supposed to protect them – they will seek security from neighborhood gangs and militias.	只要伊拉���人每天还面临盗窃、绑架和谋杀的威胁，特别是来自那些本应当保护他们的人的威胁，他们就会从邻近的团伙以及民兵中寻求安全。


The key to improving police operations is to embed more US and allied police officers in the police force to mentor Iraqi officers.	改善警察的关键是在警察队伍中搀入更多的美国和盟国警官来训导伊拉克警官。


Mentors provide on-the-job training.	训导员提供在职培训。


They also identify good officers and those who are corrupt or participating in death squads or sectarian militias.	他们还要识别优秀警官以及那些腐败或者参与死亡行刑队以及教派民兵的份子。


More funds for equipment, improved facilities, and training would also help.	在购买设备、改善设施以及培训上提供更多的资金将会有所帮助。


Funding and support to assist Iraqi courts and prisons to function more effectively and in accordance with international standards is also essential.	为帮助伊拉克法院和监狱提供资金和支持以便更为有效地运作、符合国际标准也是关键。


Without progress in this area, improvements in the Iraqi police will have little effect.	在这一方面没有进展，那么，伊拉克警察的改进就没有什么效果。


Throwing more money at Iraq won’t buy peace.	在伊拉克甩入更多的钱不会买来和平。


Iraq is already one of the largest recipients of US assistance ever.	伊拉克已经是有史以来美国外援最大的接受国之一了。


But a targeted assistance designed to improve the operations of Iraq’s police and government could help reduce violence.	但是，有的放矢地改善伊拉克警察和政府的运作将会可能减少暴力。


Iraq’s Potemkin Government	伊拉克的波坦金式政府


With the votes in Iraq’s election in December now counted, attempts to form a new government are set to move into high gear.	随着伊拉克去年12月大选选票统计结果的公布，建立新政府的企图正蓄势提速。


Encouragingly, all sides appear to accept the results.	令人振奋的是，相关各方似乎都接受了大选的结果。


But the key question concerning the future of the country remains: will Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds will unite behind a functioning central authority?	但关乎这个国家未来的核心问题仍然是：什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人是否能够联合起来组建一个能发挥作用的中央政权?


In the short term, there are good reasons to believe that the most powerful among Iraq’s three main groups will do so.	就短期来看，我们有理由相信伊拉克的三大主要集团中最强有力的（派系）将会这样做。


But can any such government administer the country as a whole?	但是任何一个这样的政府都能够将该国作为一个整体来治理吗？


The answer to that question is likely to be no, which is why Iraq probably will be a much less stable place a year from now.	这个问题的答案很可能是否定的，这就是为什么伊拉克的局势在一年之后很可能远不如现在稳定的原因。


The new Iraqi government, when it is formed, will have at least the appearance of viability for the immediate future.	新的伊拉克政府建成后至少表面上在不远的将来有一定的生命力。


Shia have an interest in supporting the central government because they believe that their demographic weight (60% of Iraq’s population) means that representative democracy will guarantee them the right to rule and protect them from Sunni demands and attacks.	什叶派愿意支持中央政府，因为他们相信其人口优势（占伊拉克总人口的60%）意味着代议式民主将保证他们的统治权，保护他们抵御逊尼派的要求和攻击。


Sunnis also will support the government, at least initially, because it represents their only opportunity to win what they consider their share of power, resources, and revenues.	逊尼派也会支持政府，至少在刚开始的时候，因为这是他们赢取在他们看来自己应得的权力、资源和收入的唯一机会。


Kurds will accept the arrangement because they believe that the new constitution guarantees their right to control most of the oil wealth that lies beneath their territory, and because they don’t want the blame should Baghdad descend into chaos.	库尔德人会接受这样的安排，因为他们相信新的宪法会保证他们控制其领地下大多数石油财富的权利，同时也因为他们不想被人指责是使巴格达陷入混乱的罪魁祸首。


There is another reason Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds won’t move immediately to undermine federal authority: the central government in Baghdad won’t have the legal or economic means to challenge their local power.	什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人不会立即破坏联邦政权还有另外一个原因：巴格达的中央政府不会拥有足以挑战其地方权力的法律或经济能力。


In essence, while all of Iraq’s factions have a strong interest in promoting a central government that appears fully functional, that government’s powers will in fact be limited.	本质上，虽然伊拉克的所有政治派别都非常有兴趣建立一个表面上拥有全部职能的中央政府，这样的政府实际上权力有限。


But, in the longer term, those limits on federal power will push Iraq toward a sectarian scramble for power and revenue.	但是，较长期地看，这些对联邦政权的限制将把伊拉克推入宗派主义的权力和利益争夺。


Article 11 of the new constitution declares that “All that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions.”	新宪法的第11节宣布，“所有没有写入联邦政权专属权力的都属于地方政权”。


That formulation all but pits the central government and regions against one another in a battle for political supremacy.	这样的表述基本上是把中央政府和地方推入了对政治至高权的争夺战。


Similarly, under current law, soldiers will answer not to Baghdad but to regional powerbrokers, while the Iraqi constitution guarantees local governments the right to pocket the revenue that flows from new oil fields within their jurisdiction.	同样，根据现行法律，士兵不是对巴格达的政府负责，而是对地方的权力玩家负责，另外伊拉克的宪法还保障了地方政府保留辖区内新油田产生的收益的权利。


In fact, although the central government has the authority to collect the revenues generated by existing fields, there is no law to prevent local officials from modernizing old sites and claiming that they are new.	实际上，尽管中央政府有权征收现有油田产生的收益，但是法律并不禁止地方官员将旧油田现代化，然后声称这些是新油田。


The impact of this state of affairs can hardly be overestimated.	这样的事态带来的影响绝对不能低估。


Oil accounts for about 98% of Iraq’s current export revenue. It is the lifeblood of Iraq's economy and the source of the money that the central government will need to build durable institutions.	石油占伊拉克当前出口收入的98%左右，是伊拉克的经济命脉，也是中央政府将来建立稳定制度的资金来源。


Although inflows of international financial assistance remain substantial, reconstruction money from abroad will begin to dry up as Iraq puts its central government in place.	尽管国际经济援助的数量仍然巨大，但随着伊拉克的中央政府建立起来，来自海外的重建资金就会开始枯竭。


In sum, the national government will lack both the authority and the means to govern Iraq.	总之，国家政府将既没有权威也没有能力来统治伊拉克。


Indeed, with Shiite-Sunni violence already intensifying, the Iraqi government may not be able to maintain even the appearance of effectiveness for very long.	的确，随着什叶派和逊尼派之间的暴力争斗愈演愈烈，伊拉克政府可能来有效政府的皮相也不能维持多久。


Moreover, the Kurds are the proverbial dog that hasn’t yet barked.	除此之外，库尔德人就像寓言里那只尚未出声的狗一样。


They enjoy relative economic prosperity, and their political institutions are growing more effective and efficient.	他们享受着相对的经济繁荣，他们的政治制度的效力和效率越来越高。


Thus, for the moment, they have no reason to challenge the status quo.	因此，目前他们还没有理由挑战现状。


But this stability will face new challenges in 2006.	不过这样的稳定将在2006年受到新的挑战。


Gubernatorial elections this November will force Kurdish political contenders to offer opposing programs, and some candidates will seek electoral advantage via populist calls for independence.	今年11月的地方长官选举将迫使库尔德政治竞争者抛出对立的计划，某些候选人会通过要求独立的民粹主义口号寻求竞选优势。


At the same time, cooler heads will struggle to postpone a potentially divisive 2007 referendum on the final status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.	与此同时，头脑比较冷静的人会尽力推迟2007年对石油富城基尔库克最终态势的公民投票，因为这样的投票可能导致分裂。


In fact, the friction generated by electoral politics is likely to stoke resentments within Shia and Sunni communities as well.	实际上，选举政治产生的摩擦大概也会对什叶派和逊尼派内部的愤恨情绪起到推波助澜的作用。


There is a great danger that the new Iraq’s sectarian politics will benefit those who promise their constituents the most – at the expense of the central government and the country’s other factions.	有一个巨大的危险就是伊拉克新的宗派主义政治会使那些以中央政府和国内其他派别为代价给与选民最多承诺的人获益。


Debates over possible constitutional amendments intended to pacify angry Sunnis and to de-fang the insurgency are likely to incite factional hostility as well.	对于旨在安抚愤怒的逊尼派教众和削弱叛乱力量的宪法修正案的争论也可能引起派别之间的敌意。


More worryingly, when Shia, Sunnis, and/or Kurds decide that their elected officials are not delivering the promised perks and protections, they are likely to look beyond politics to advance their individual interests.	更让人担心的是，如果什叶派、逊尼派和/或库尔德人认定他们选举的官员没有实现其承诺的振兴和保护，他们很可能会寻求政治以外的手段来实现个人的利益。


Some Shia may turn to militia leaders, Sunnis to insurgents, and Kurds to leaders demanding independence.	某些什叶派教徒可能会转而投向民兵领导人，逊尼派教徒可能会投向叛乱分子，而库尔德人则可能投向要求独立的领导人。


At that point, the future of an independent Iraq itself will be called into question.	届时，伊拉克将来的独立本身将会受到质疑。


Any separatist moves by Kurdish leaders would bring Turkey into Iraqi politics.	库尔德领导人的任何分裂主义行动都会把土耳其带入伊拉克的政治中来。


At the same time, the protection that American forces offer Iraqi officials will diminish as troops are gradually withdrawn, and Iran will race to fill the security vacuum.	同时，美国给与伊拉克官员的保护将随着军队的逐渐撤退而削弱，而伊朗将会迅速填补这个安全真空。


In sum, the Iraqi government may appear effective for much of 2006, but it will be committed to trying to serve the competing interests of sharply divided constituencies.	总而言之，伊拉克政府表面上可能在2006年的大部分时候都发挥着作用，但是它要服务的是泾渭分明的选民之间相互对立的利益。


The central government’s weakness, continued insurgent violence, growing Iranian influence in Baghdad and with Shiite powerbrokers in the south, and the natural progression of sectarian politics suggest that the new Iraq will be markedly less stable as the year draws to a close.	中央政府的虚弱、持续的暴力叛乱、伊朗对巴格达和南部什叶派权力玩家越来越大的影响力、以及宗派主义政治的自然发展都暗示，随着这一年渐渐过去，新的伊拉克将明显地越来越不稳定。


Iraq’s Refugee Crisis	伊拉克的难民危机


Among the many humanitarian disasters produced by the civil war now raging in Iraq is one that is almost invisible.	在伊拉克激烈的内战所造成的人道主义灾难中，有一种灾难几乎是无形的。


Only rarely do scenes of massive displacement of the civilian population make it onto our television screens, because, unlike bombs and suicide attacks, displacement does not generate the blood, fire, or screams that constitutes compelling footage.	平民大规模流离失所的镜头很少出现在电视荧屏上，因为与炸弹和自杀式袭击不同，流离失所不会带来鲜血、火焰或哀嚎等抓人眼球的画面。


Yet the numbers are staggering: each month, some 40,000 Iraqis flee their homes because of the war.	然而实际的数字却是惊人的：每月有4万左右的伊拉克人由于战争而逃离家园。


Half of them go to other parts of Iraq; the rest go abroad.	其中一半的人流落到伊拉克的其它地方； 剩下的人则逃到国外。


Iraq’s population, frankly, is bleeding away.	事实上伊拉克的人口正在流失。


This devastation is even more dramatic because, since the invasion four years ago, only 3,183 Iraqis have been resettled in third countries.	这种毁坏的程度甚至更剧烈，因为自从四年前被入侵以来，只有3183名伊拉克人在第三国得到重新安置。


According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, all countries combined have offered a chance to start a new life to approximately the same number of Iraqi refugees as flee the country in just five days.	据联合国难民事务高级专员称，所有国家所愿意接纳的伊拉克难民人数总和只约等于五天之内逃离伊拉克的人口总和。


This exodus is not new, but since the increased violence that followed the bombing of the Shiite Golden mosque in Samarra in February 2006, the pace of the displacement has accelerated.	这样的流离失所并非一朝一夕，但自从暴力活动在2006年二月萨马拉的什叶派金色清真寺爆炸后升级以来，流离失所的规模和速度也随之升级。


Indeed, this is the largest population displacement in the Middle East since 1948.	的确，这是自1948年以来中东地区最大规模的人口迁移。


Two million Iraqi refugees are scattered around the region, the great majority of them in Jordan and Syria, with smaller numbers in Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt.	200万伊拉克难民分散到中东各地，大部分人在约旦和叙利亚，少部分人在土耳其、黎巴嫩和埃及。


Because they are urban refugees – not housed in tents, but rather blending in with the local population in the host countries – they are easily ignored.	因为他们是城市难民—没有被收容在帐篷里，而是与所在国的当地人口混居在一起—所以很容易被忽略。


For Iraq, this is a brain drain that will be hard to repair.	对伊拉克而言，这种人口流失很难恢复。


The country had a total population of 26.8 million, and now nearly 13% of them are displaced; many may never return.	该国总人口一度为2680万，而现在有近13%的人口已迁移了； 许多人不会再回来。


But what happens to them?	但他们的未来又会如何呢？


Last month, I traveled to four countries in the Middle East to meet refugees and learn about their stories and options.	上个月我去了中东地区的四个国家与难民碰面，了解他们的经历和选择。


In Amman, Damascus, Istanbul, and Beirut I met dozens of people who have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country.	在安曼、大马士革、伊斯坦布尔和贝鲁特，我碰到的许多人都非常害怕回到祖国会遭受迫害。


I spoke to a hairdresser who was raped because she is Christian.	我与一个由于是基督徒而被强暴的女理发师交谈。


I heard the story of a liquor store owner whose one-year old son was kidnapped and beheaded.	我听人讲述了一个酒品店老板的一岁大的儿子被人绑架并斩首的故事。


I met with a Shiite taxi driver whose father was killed in Najaf just a few days before.	我遇到了一个什叶派出租车司机，他的父亲几天之前在纳贾夫被杀。


I listened to a Sunni engineer whose association with an American construction company makes him a target for extremists, and to a translator of the Christian Mandaean minority who narrowly escaped death when the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was bombed in August 2003.	我听一个逊尼派工程师讲述自己由于和一家美国建筑公司的联系而成为极端分子的目标，以及一位为信奉基督教的曼达派少数民族担任翻译伊拉克人如何在2003年八月联合国驻巴格达总部被炸时侥幸逃生。


Most of those to whom I spoke were poor and without hope for the future.	与我交谈的大多数人都是对未来失去希望的贫民。


None wanted me to use their names.	他们都不想用真名接受采访。


Refugees who are in the country of first asylum usually face three possible choices: return to their homeland, try to integrate in the host country, or be resettled to a third country.	身在第一避难国的难民通常面临三种可能的选择：重回祖国、融入所在国或被重新安置到第三国。


But do the Iraqis really have these three choices?	但伊拉克人真的有这样的选择吗？


Can anyone watching reports of the daily carnage in Iraq envision Iraqis going back?	每天收看伊拉克流血屠杀报道的人们能够憧憬伊拉克人重返故里的情景吗？


The answer is no.	答案是否定的。


If the Parliament in Baghdad, one of the best protected buildings in the country, can be attacked from within, then no Zone in Iraq is Green; they are all Red.	如果巴格达的议会，作为该国最受保护的建筑之一，都会从内部遭受攻击，那么伊拉克就没有绿色安全区了； 所有地区都是红色警戒区；


Repatriation of Iraqis is unrealistic and definitely out of question for any foreseeable future.	伊拉克人重归祖国是不现实的，即便在可预见的将来也是不可能的。


Most Iraqis cannot opt for local integration, either.	大多数伊拉克人也不能期望融入当地社会。


True, Jordan and Syria let most Iraqis in, but they do not offer a possibility of durable local absorption.	的确，约旦和叙利亚收容了大多数伊拉克人，但它们却没有为其提供长期融入本地的可能性。


Iraqis cannot become permanent residents, and they do not have work permits or access to public health services.	伊拉克人不能成为永久居民，也得不到工作许可和公共医疗服务。


In Jordan, Iraqi children cannot go to public schools.	在约旦，伊拉克儿童不能在公立学校就读。


It is not a matter of ill will on the part of these countries; they simply cannot afford to extend these services.	并不是这些国家有恶意，而是它们根本没有能力延伸这些公共服务。


Helping them to cope with the influx of refugees is necessary, but it is not a durable solution.	帮助它们应对不断涌入的难民是必需的，但这并非长久之计。


This leaves the third possibility – that of resettlement.	这就只剩下第三种可能性—重新安置了。


But for this to happen, countries with traditionally generous refugee programs should come forward and offer more places to receive Iraqis.	但为了实现这一点，在传统上都有慷慨的难民计划的国家都应该挺身而出，提供更多的地方接纳伊拉克人。


The United States is a bad example: only 692 refugees have been accepted since the invasion – roughly the number of Iraqis who are killed every week.	美国是一个糟糕的例子：从入侵开始，它只接纳了692名伊拉克难民—约等于每周被杀的伊拉克人数。


In February, the Bush administration announced that it will offer resettlement this year to 7,000 Iraqi refugees.	在二月份，布什政府宣布今年将会为7000名伊拉克难民提供重新安置。


If America makes good on this promise, it would be a big step forward, but the US, which led the intervention in Iraq, should now lead in attending to the victims.	如果美国兑现这一承诺，它就前进了一大步。 但领导干预伊拉克的美国现在应该带头应对受害者的问题。


Should the US not take the lead, the only hope is that other countries will be more generous.	如果美国不带这个头，那么唯一的希望就是其它的国家会更为慷慨。


The Iraqi refugees are a crisis that cannot be ignored: the international community must alleviate the burden on the countries in the region, while offering resettlement opportunities to many more of the most vulnerable Iraqis.	伊拉克难民是一场不容忽视的危机：国际社会必须为该地区的国家减轻负担，同时为更多的最无助的伊拉克人提供重新安置的机会。


Iraq’s Silent Dead	沉默的伊拉克死难者


Evidence is mounting that America’s war in Iraq has killed tens of thousands of civilian Iraqis, and perhaps well over one hundred thousand.	最近不断有证据表明，成千上百名无辜伊拉克平民在美国发动的对伊战争中死亡，可能还远远不止十万。


Yet this carnage is systematically ignored in the United States, where the media and government portray a war in which there are no civilian deaths, because there are no Iraqi civilians, only insurgents.	不过，这个数字却在美国媒体和政府一致宣称的“无平民伤亡战争”的说法中被策略性地忽略了。 因为他们眼里没有无辜百姓，只有伊拉克叛军士兵。


American behavior and self-perceptions reveal the ease with which a civilized country can engage in large-scale killing of civilians without public discussion.	美国的这种行为与意识证明了一点，在没有公众舆论的环境里，即使是一个文明国家也很容易对平民大开杀戒。 十月下旬，英国医学杂志《Lancet》刊登了一篇关于美国发动战争以来伊拉克平民死亡的调查研究。


In late October, the British medical journal Lancet published a study of civilian deaths in Iraq since the US-led invasion began.	抽样调查显示，与一年前萨达姆·侯赛因当权时的死亡率相比，今年伊拉克的死亡人数多出了10万。


The sample survey documented an extra 100,000 Iraqi civilian deaths compared to the death rate in the preceding year, when Saddam Hussein was still in power – and this estimate did not even count excess deaths in Falluja, which was deemed too dangerous to include.	而这个估计数字还没有把费卢杰之战中的死亡人数包括进去。 算进去的话，这个数字肯定会更加可怕。


The study also noted that the majority of deaths resulted from violence, and that a high proportion of the violent deaths were due to US aerial bombing.	该研究还指出，由暴力冲突导致的死亡占了多数，其中绝大部分是由于美军的空袭。


The epidemiologists acknowledged the uncertainties of these estimates, but presented enough data to warrant an urgent follow-up investigation and reconsideration by the Bush administration and the US military of aerial bombing of Iraq’s urban areas.	流行病学家承认这一结果还有待考证，但同时也拿出了足够的数据来证明有必要立即进行进一步调查，并希望布什政府和美军能慎重考虑在平民区空袭的作战方案。


America’s public reaction has been as remarkable as the Lancet study, for the reaction has been no reaction.	而美国社会淡然置之的冷漠反应与《Lancet》的调查结果一样令人震惊。


The vaunted New York Times ran a single story of 770 words on page 8 of the paper (October 29). The Times reporter apparently did not interview a single Bush administration or US military official.	一向饱受赞誉的《纽约时报》仅在第八版上刊登了一篇770字的文章（10月29日），显然，该报记者没有采访过任何一名布什政府或是美军官员。


No follow-up stories or editorials appeared, and no New York Times reporters assessed the story on the ground.	没有后续报道，没有社论点评，更没有一名《纽约时报》记者去实地考证过这篇报道。


Coverage in other US papers was similarly frivolous. The Washington Post (October 29) carried a single 758-word story on page 16.	而美国其他媒体上的报道也都是草草了事。 10月29日的《华盛顿邮报》在第16版上发表了一篇758字的报道就再无下文。


Recent reporting on the bombing of Falluja has also been an exercise in self-denial. The New York Times (November 6) wrote that “warplanes pounded rebel positions” in Falluja, without noting that “rebel positions” are actually in civilian neighborhoods.	最近对费卢杰之战的报道也宛如掩耳盗铃之举。 《纽约时报》（11月6日）写到，在费卢杰“美军战机轰炸了抵抗分子的据点”，却绝口不提所谓的“抵抗分子据点”正处平民区。


Another New York Times story (November 12), citing “military officials,” dutifully reported that, “Since the assault began on Monday, about 600 rebels have been killed, along with 18 American and 5 Iraqi soldiers.”	11月12日《纽约时报》的另一篇报道则恪尽职守地引用了军方发言人的话，“自周一发动攻势以来，约600名抵抗分子被击毙，美军阵亡18人，伊拉克士兵死亡5人。


The issue of civilian deaths was not even raised.	”对于平民的伤亡情况甚至连提也不提。


Violence is only one reason for the increase in civilian deaths in Iraq.	导致平民死亡率激增的原因只有一个，那就是暴力冲突。


Children in urban war zones die in vast numbers from diarrhea, respiratory infections, and other causes, owing to unsafe drinking water, lack of refrigerated foods, and acute shortages of blood and basic medicines at clinics and hospitals (that is, if civilians even dare to leave their houses for medical care). Yet the Red Crescent and other relief agencies have been unable to relieve Falluja’s civilian population.	处于巷战地带的儿童由于食用污染饮用水，缺乏冷藏食物，加之当地医疗机构和医院（如果百姓敢把自己的屋子留做医院的话）紧缺血液和基本医药，而患上了霍乱、呼吸道传染，或由于其他原因，大批死亡。


On November 14, the front page of The New York Times led with the following description: “Army tanks and fighting vehicles blasted their way into the last main rebel stronghold in Falluja at sundown on Saturday after American warplanes and artillery prepared the way with a savage barrage on the district.	11月14日，《纽约时报》头版以这样的描述开头，“美军坦克和战车一路呼啸而过，在周六傍晚驶向费卢杰最后一个抵抗分子的主要根据地。 在此之前，美军的战斗机和炮弹已经对这一地区进行了猛烈的轰炸，铺平了道路。


Earlier in the afternoon, 10 separate plumes of smoke rose from Southern Falluja, as it etched against the desert sky, and probably exclaimed catastrophe for the insurgents.”	下午早些时候，从费卢杰南部先后升起10团烟雾，直冲沙漠天空，宛如在宣告叛军的末日。 ”


There is, once again, virtually no mention of the catastrophe for civilians etched against that desert sky.	真是故伎重演，对于这片沙漠天空下发生的无辜平民的惨剧，美国媒体再次避而不谈。


There is a hint, though, in a brief mention in the middle of the story of a father looking over his wounded sons in a hospital and declaring that, “Now Americans are shooting randomly at anything that moves.”	文中只有一处暗示，简短地引用了一位父亲的话，“只要是会动的，美军就会开枪扫射。 ”当时，这位父亲正在医院看望他受伤的儿子。


A few days later, a US television film crew was in a bombed-out mosque with US troops. While the cameras were rolling, a US marine turned to an unarmed and wounded Iraqi lying on the ground and murdered the man with gunshots to the head.	几天后，和美军一起的一个美国电视台摄制组用摄像机在一个遭轰炸的清真寺里记录了这样一段景象，一名美国海军陆战队士兵转向了一名躺在地上、身受重伤、手无寸铁的伊拉克人，用枪对准他的头部并开枪射杀（据报道，还有几起这样的当场枪杀事件）。


(Reportedly, there were a few other such cases of outright murder.)	但是美国媒体却对这一事件多少有些漠然置之。


But the American media more or less brushed aside this shocking incident, too. The Wall Street Journal actually wrote an editorial on November 18 that criticized the critics, noting as usual that whatever the US does, its enemies in Iraq do worse, as if this excuses American abuses.	11月18日《华尔街时报》终于在其一篇社论中批评了某些评论家，因为这些评论家们似乎总在为美国的���端做法找借口，宣称无论美国做什么，都不可能比他们在伊拉克的敌人做的更糟。


It does not.	事实却相反。


The US is killing massive numbers of Iraqi civilians, embittering the population and the Islamic world, and laying the ground for escalating violence and death.	美国给伊斯兰民族和伊斯兰世界带来了深重灾难，大量伊拉克平民在这场美国发动的对伊战争中被打死，并且暴力活动还将进一步升级，死亡人数持续上升。