This is a new challenge for a new generation, and will require all of the imagination and skill that you can bring to bear.	这是新一代所面临的新挑战，需要你们充分开动想象力和所学技能。


Good luck in reinventing finance.	祝你们在改造金融业的过程中好运。


The world needs you to succeed.	世界需要你们的成功。


The Continuing Mystery of Life’s Building Blocks	持续未解的生命构建之谜


GARRISON, NEW YORK – Imagine for a moment that you have come across a trove of marvelous devices left by an ancient civilization.	纽约加里森——想象一下你发现了一座古老文明遗留下来的神奇设备宝库。


These mysterious instruments vary widely in size and complexity, but they all share a few wondrous capabilities.	这些神秘的设备大小及精密程度各异，但他们共有一些神奇的功能。


If you want to understand how they work, it makes sense to start with the simplest and smallest device, then systematically carve off pieces until it stops working.	如果你想了解他们的运作方式，合理的方法是从简单的小型设备着手，而后对其进行系统性分拆直到它不再履行任何功能。


Eventually, everything that is inessential will be gone, and you will be left with only the components necessary for it to perform its basic functions.	最终，一切无关紧要的部分将会消失，只剩下履行基本功能所必须的部分。


And then, once you figure out what each of those pieces does, you will have your answer.	而后，一旦你想明白这些部分起什么作用，答案就已经在你的手中。


This is roughly the journey of discovery that the American biotechnologist J. Craig Venter and his colleagues have been taking for the past two decades – only their marvelous devices are not archeological remains, but living organisms.	这就是过去20年来美国生物技术学家克雷格·文特尔及其同事所走过的发现之旅——不过他们的神奇设备并非某种古代遗迹，而是活的生物体。


And the pieces they are trying to understand are the genes that we share with all other forms of autonomous, reproductive life.	而他们想要了解的是我们和其他一切形式的自主生殖生命所共有的基因。


In a recent paper in the journal Science, Venter and his colleagues announced that they had created the smallest living and reproducing organism.	在《科学》杂志最近的一篇论文中，文特尔及其同事宣布他们已经创造了有生殖功能的最小的活的有机体。 这个称之为JCVI-syn3.


Their creation – called JCVI-syn3.0 – is a simple cell, with only the genes that are essential for life; it has a smaller genome than any autonomously replicating organism found in nature, larger only than those found in viruses and other entities that rely on hosts for essential functions.	0的发明是个单细胞，仅具备生命所必需的基因； 它比自然中所有自主繁殖生物体的基因组规模都小，仅略大于病毒和依赖宿主完成关键功能的其他实体。


Venter and his team created their organism through a process of trial and error.	文特尔的团队通过一系列试错过程创造了这一生物体。


They began by using their knowledge of biology to deduce the minimum set of genes that would be required for life.	开始时他们利用生物知识推断出生命所需的最小的基因集合。


That approach failed.	这种方式失败了。


So, instead, they took an existing organism and began to whittle it down.	因此，他们开始逐步拆解这个现存的有机体。


They started with the genome of Mycoplasma mycoides, a parasitic bacteria that infects cattle and goats, and also a close relative of Mycoplasma genitalium, which has the fewest genes – just 525 – known among free-living bacteria.	他们最先拆解的是丝状支原体，这既是一种能感染牛羊的寄生菌同时又是生殖支原体的近亲，其在独立存活细菌中拥有的基因数量最少——仅有525个基因。


The team broke the M.mycoides genome into eight fragments and began deleting genes one by one.	文特尔团队将丝状支原体基因拆解成八块，之后开始一块接一块地卸除。


If the reconstructed organism failed to thrive, the gene was left in. If it did not appear to matter, it stayed out.	如果重构的有机体不能健康生长，则将基因还原回去，否则就卸下来。


In the end, 473 genes were required for the organism to thrive.	最后，该有机体的健康生长需要473个基因。


(Humans, by comparison, have roughly 20,000 genes.)	（相比之下，人类大约有2万个基因。 ）


The most important result of the Venter team’s work was to reveal how little we know about the basic biology of life.	文特尔团队最重要的成果是揭示了人类对生命体基本生物学的理解是多么稀少。


Most of the 473 genes take care of housekeeping: They make proteins, keep DNA in good repair, and are responsible for the cell’s membrane and cytoplasm.	这473个基因中的绝大部分负责家务整理：他们制造蛋白质、修复DNA，并负责维护细胞的细胞膜和细胞质。


But there are 149 genes whose function is unknown.	但其中149个基因的功能尚不明确。


In other words, the purpose of nearly one-third of the genes needed to keep the organism alive, well, and reproducing remains a mystery.	换言之，近1/3让生物体保持鲜活、健康和繁殖的基因仍然是个谜。


Of the 149 genes with unknown functions, 70 have a structure that at least hints at their role in the cell.	在这些功能未知的149个基因中，有70个的结构提示了它们在细胞中的作用。


But we know nothing about the other 79, except that in these organisms, in this environment, life is impossible without them.	但我们对其他79个一无所知，除了在这些生物体中，在这样的环境下，没有它们就不可能有生命。


Moreover, as Venter and his colleagues acknowledge, if the team began with a different microbe, or grew it in a different environment, the set of necessary genes would be different.	此外，文特尔及其同事承认如果研究团队一开始研究的是另一种微生物，或者换一种培养环境，必须的基因组将会有所不同。


So their genome is a minimal genome, not the minimal genome.	因此他们的基因组是最小基因组之一，而不是唯一的最小基因组。


All of this implies many exciting discoveries ahead.	所有这些都意味着将来更多振奋人心的发现。


And yet, when it comes to practical, commercial objectives, the news is considerably more sobering.	但涉及到实际的商业目标时，这个问题远没有那么令人振奋。


One of the primary goals of synthetic biology has been to create a platform, or chassis, to use as a foundation for building organisms designed for specific tasks.	合成生物学的主要目标是创造一个平台或底盘，并以此为构建完成特定任务的生物体的基础。


Just as Volkswagen uses its A5 platform to build 19 different vehicles, from luxury Audi A3s to small SUVs and budget models, a biological chassis would be a minimal microbial platform onto which could be bolted genetic instructions to make drugs, biofuels, cosmetics, or whatever one desires.	就像大众公司利用A5平台生产从豪华奥迪A3s到小型SUV和经济型汽车等19款不同的产品一样，生物底盘应当是最低限度的微生物平台，我们可以在其上嫁接制造药品、生物燃料、化妆品或所希望的任何东西的基因指令。


With the publication of the Science paper, two challenges become evident.	随着科学论文的发表，两大问题开始浮出水面。


The first is that biology is complicated.	首先是生物学非常复杂。


As Venter’s work shows, we do not yet have a sufficient grasp of the essentials of basic biology to design and build a cell.	文特尔的成果显示我们尚不具备对基础生物核心因素的充分把握，来设计和构建细胞单元。


Genes do not function like fenders or brakes; they cannot be mounted on a chassis to perform a function independently of other components.	基因所起的作用不像挡泥板或刹车； 不能将它们安装在底盘上独立于其他部件来履行功能。


Genes interact – amplifying, dampening, or even silencing one another.	不同的基因之间不断互动——相互放大、衰减甚至让彼此失去效用。


And those effects, in turn, influence still other genes.	而上述效果反过来又影响其他基因。


Genomes, it turns out, function less like machines than like ecosystems with multitudinous relationships and complex feedback loops.	结果是基因组的功能不像机械而更像生态系统，具有千头万绪的联系和复杂的反馈循环。


Adding genomic parts to a synthetic organism in order to achieve a predictable result may be far more difficult than proponents of the chassis model have assumed.	在合成生物体上添加基因组实现可预测结果其难度远远大于底盘模型支持者所提出的假设理论。


The second challenge regards the competition.	还有一个问题关乎竞争。


When Venter and his team began their effort, genetic engineers had tools that were powerful but, by modern standards, crude.	当文特尔及团队开始项目时，基因工程师们掌握强大、但按照现代标准却相对粗糙的工具。


In recent years, scientists have found ways to edit genes with far greater precision.	近年来，科学家们已经找到方法以更精确的方式来编辑基因。


The most prominent, known as CRISPR Cas9, cuts DNA with remarkable (though not perfect) accuracy.	最著名的CRISPR Cas9能以令人赞叹的准确度（尽管还不完美）来切割DNA。


As a result, gene editing has emerged as an alternative strategy to the chassis model for tailoring microbes to make useful products.	结果是基因编辑已逐渐成为底盘模式的替代策略，以便将微生物裁剪成各种有用的产品。


It is impossible to know whether synthetic organisms like Venter’s JCVI-syn 3.0 or gene-editing techniques will prove to be commercially dominant in biotechnology – or indeed whether some other method will supplant both.	现在还不太可能知道像文特尔的JCVI-syn 3. 0这样的合成有机物还是基因编辑技术将主导生物技术的商业应用——或者实质上这两种方法都将被其他某种方法所取代。


We can be confident, however, that our knowledge of basic biology will deepen, and that our growing ability to manipulate living organisms will confront us with increasingly serious ethical considerations.	但我们有信心将深入了解基础生物学领域的知识，我们控制鲜活有机体生长的能力将对我们的伦理原则构成越来越严重的挑战。


Carbon Majors and Climate Justice	碳排大户与气候公正


BONN – A groundbreaking study published last November revealed that the activities of a mere 90 producers of coal, oil and gas, and cement – dubbed the “carbon majors” – have led to 63% of all CO2 emissions since the Industrial Revolution.	波恩—去年11月发表的一份突破性研究表明，区区90家煤炭、石油和天然气以及水泥生产商——被称为“碳排大户”——的活动就产生了工业革命以来二氧化碳总排放量的63%。


The report was released just weeks after Typhoon Haiyan (or Yolanda as it was known locally) tore through the Tacloban region in the Philippines.	这份报告发表两周前，台风海燕（当地称之为Yolanda）摧毁了菲律宾独鲁万（Tacloban）地区。


With unprecedented wind speeds of 315 kilometers (196 miles) per hour, the storm killed 6,300 people, left four million homeless, and caused more than $2 billion of damage.	这场风暴以315公里的前所未见的风速卷走了6,300人的生命，让四百万人无家可归，造成超过20亿美元的损失。


Haiyan and its devastation became a rallying cry for delegates at the subsequent United Nations climate-change conference in Warsaw.	海燕及其所造成的伤害不啻于对随后召开的华沙联合国气候变化会议代表的哭诉。


In response, they agreed to establish an international mechanism to address climate-change-related “loss and damage,” to be applied in countries that are unable to adapt or protect themselves from the worst effects of global warming.	代表们的回应是同意建立解决与气候变化相关的“损失与伤害”的国际机制，适用于无力应对和摆脱全球变暖最坏影响伤害的国家。


Those most vulnerable to climate change are often least responsible for its causes, and have the fewest resources to deal with its consequences.	面对气候变化最束手无策的国家往往也是对气候变化责任最小的国家，也是最无力应对气候变化后果的国家。


Contrast this with the carbon majors, which have made huge fortunes from the fossil fuels that are largely responsible for climate change.	与它们形成鲜明对比的是，碳排大户从化石燃料中攫取了巨额财富，并且需要为气候变化负主要责任。


In 2013, the combined profits of just four majors – Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell – topped $94 billion.	2013年，四家碳排大户——雪佛龙、埃克森美孚、英国石油和壳牌——利润总额达到了940亿美元。


This colossal return was possible only because these companies externalize their products’ highest cost – the climate devastation borne by the poor and vulnerable.	如此巨大的回报只有在这些公司将其产品的最大成本——由穷人和弱势群体承受的气候灾难——外部化后才能实现。


It seems only fair and reasonable, therefore, that all fossil-fuel entities, but especially the carbon majors, pay a levy on each ton of coal, barrel of oil, or cubic meter of gas they produce to a new International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, which would help to fund efforts to address the worst effects of climate change.	因此，让所有化石燃料实体，特别是碳排大户，为它们所生产的每一吨煤炭、每一桶石油、每一立方米天然气根据新的国际损失和伤害机制（International Mechanism for Loss and Damage）纳税以资助解决气候变化最坏影响的措施既公平又合理。


Furthermore, given that the effects of climate change today are the result of past emissions, the carbon majors should pay a historical levy, too.	此外，考虑到当今气候变化的影响乃是过去的排放的结果，碳排大户还应该被追溯历史税款。


If set initially at a relatively low $2 per ton of carbon, these levies could raise $50 billion annually, though the rate should increase each year.	若在最初将税率定在较低的每吨碳2美元的水平，则该税每年可筹集500亿美元，但税率可以逐年增加。


The revenues could support vulnerable countries’ efforts to develop long term plans to deal with climate change, as well as finance pilot projects aimed at minimizing loss and damage, sharing information, and replicating best practices.	获得的收入可以支持脆弱国发展应对气候变化的长期计划，并为旨在最小化损失和伤害、共享信息和模仿最佳实践的实验项目提供融资。


They could fund the monitoring and forecasting of slow-onset and extreme-weather events, enabling authorities and the public to prepare more effectively for an impending disaster.	这笔钱还可以用来资助监控和预测开始缓慢的极端天气事件，让当局和公众能够更有效地准备应对大灾难。


And the money could cover loss-and-damage risk premiums on individual, local, national, regional, or international insurance policies.	这笔钱还可以覆盖个人、地方、国家、地区或国际损失和伤害保险的保费。


Governments would collect the levies from the carbon majors, perhaps when they collect royalties and other extraction-related fees, and deposit the money with the international mechanism.	政府将从碳排大户身上抽取这笔税金，比如在收取特许费和其他开采相关费用时抽取，并根据国际机制使用这笔资金。


If the new levy were added to existing fees, it would strengthen the price signal driving a shift away from fossil fuels and toward renewables.	如果将新税和已有费用加在一起，将能够强化价格信号，推动从化石燃料到可再生能源的转型。


This fossil-fuel levy would be entirely compatible with the norms established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and with the “polluter pays” and “do no harm” principles of international law, according to which organizations are required to pay for the damage that they cause.	这一化石燃料税与联合国气候变化框架公约（United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change）所制定的规范完全相容，也与国际法的“谁污染谁承担”和“无伤害”原则相符，根据国际法原则，组织需要赔偿其所造成的伤害。


Indeed, the arrangement would be similar to existing regimes, such as those covering oil-spill compensation or nuclear damage.	事实上，这一安排类似于已有的机制，如漏油赔偿和核伤害赔偿。


But paying the cost of one’s damage, though necessary, is far from sufficient.	但赔偿伤害损失尽管必要，远不足够。


After all, a compensation levy should not imply that the carbon majors have effectively bought a right to pollute.	毕竟，补偿税并不意味着碳排大户在事实上买下了污染权。


We must also work to stop inflicting harm on the most vulnerable people (and on ourselves).	我们还必须致力于阻止给最脆弱人群（以及他们本身）造成伤害的行为。


When the world’s governments meet at the UN climate-change conference in Paris in 2015, they must agree on ways to phase out net greenhouse-gas emissions and stop burning fossil fuels by mid-century.	当世界各国政府在2015年的巴黎联合国气候变化会议上会面时，必须形成关于如何在本世纪中叶停止温室气体净排放和燃烧化石燃料方面的一致。


According to Carbon Tracker, 80% of fossil-fuel reserves must remain in the ground if we are to avoid catastrophic climate change.	根据碳追踪系统（Carbon Tracker）的数据，要想避免灾难性气候变化，就必须将80%的化石燃料储备留在地下。


Even at today’s “low” level of climate change, the devastation is already all too real.	即使以当今“较低”水平的气候变化水平，气候灾难也是实实在在的威胁。


It is real for the Philippines citizens mourning relatives and trying to rebuild homes and lives; for the Pacific Islanders growing crops in containers, importing drinking water, and building sea walls to protect their islands from the encroaching ocean; and for hungry farmers in the Sahel.	对痛失亲人、忙于重建家人和生活的菲律宾公民，对于在容器中种植农作物、依赖进口饮用水和建造海堤捍卫土地不被海洋吞没的太平洋岛民，对于萨赫勒地区的饥饿农民来说，气候变化的灾难是实实在在的。


And it is a growing reality for millions of other vulnerable people worldwide.	对于世界上其他数百万脆弱人民来说，气候变化的灾难也在日益成为现实。


These people deserve the world’s support – not just moral support, but genuine help in the form of effective, properly funded mechanisms designed to prevent, or at least alleviate, the climate-related hardships inflicted upon them by past and present industrialization.	这些人应该获得世界的支持——不仅是道德支持，而是真正的帮助——防止（至少是减轻）过去和当前的工业化所施加给他们的与气候有关的困境的高效恰当的融资机制。


For the carbon majors, the time to pay up has arrived.	对碳排大户来说，掏腰包的时候到了。


The Next Trade Breakthroughs	下一个贸易突破


STANFORD – Economic news is grim all around the world.	斯坦福—放眼全球，看不到经济方面的好消息。


This year’s output growth has been disappointing, and the International Monetary Fund expects only a slight improvement in 2015.	今年的产出增长令人失望，国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测2015年也只能由略微的改善。


Europe may be sliding back into recession, with even the once-robust German economy teetering on the brink.	欧洲也许正在滑向衰退，就连曾经坚挺的德国经济也在悬崖边上摇摇欲坠。


China is downshifting, and Brazil, Russia, and India are struggling to avoid a stall.	中国在走下坡路，巴西、俄罗斯和印度也在竭力避免停滞。


So it is a pity that three important opportunities for growth from trade liberalization – the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and Europe – are being neglected.	因此，三个来自贸易自由化的增长机会被忽视着实令人遗憾。 这三个机会是世界贸易组织多哈发展回合、亚太地区的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TTP）以及美国和欧洲之间的跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴关系（TTIP）。


If designed properly, all three have the potential to spur global growth.	如果设计合理，所有这三个机会都有可能刺激全球增长。


Through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the protection of intellectual property, and the harmonization of regulations, hundreds of billions of dollars of output – and millions of better-paying jobs – could be generated.	通过降低关税和非关税壁垒、知识产权保护和监管协调，讲能产生数千亿美元的产出——外加数百万收入更高的工作。


This is the lesson of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which celebrates its 20th birthday this year.	这是今年迎来20周年纪念的北美自由贸易协定（North American Free Trade Agreement，NAFTA）给我们的教训。


In NAFTA at 20, a book that I edited, policymakers and scholars explain how the landmark trade treaty exemplifies the benefits of trade liberalization – and why political leaders should pursue it.	在我所编辑的《北美自由贸易协定而十年》（NAFTA at 20）一书中，决策者和学者解释了这一里程碑式的贸易条约如何为我们示范了贸易自由的好处——以及为何政治领袖应该追求贸易自由。


The elimination of tariffs among Canada, Mexico, and the US was innovative, risky, and controversial.	加拿大、墨西哥和美国之间免除关税是一项创新性、高风险、争议性的举措。


NAFTA became a lightning rod for complaints about globalization, capitalism, and the decline of organized labor.	NAFTA成为面对全球化、资本主义和劳工组织衰落的抱怨的挡箭牌。


Many claimed that the treaty would depress wages, destroy jobs, and ravage the agricultural industry in the US.	许多人称该条约会压低工资、破坏就业岗位、摧毁美国的农业。


Instead, NAFTA boosted all three signatories’ economies and became the template for hundreds of subsequent free-trade agreements.	相反，NAFTA提振了所有三个签署国的经济，并且成为数以百计的后续自由贸易协定的样板。


NAFTA helped open what former Mexican Trade Minister Jaime Serra Puche says had been “a highly protectionist economy for five or six decades.”	NAFTA帮助开放了前墨西哥贸易部长杰米·塞拉·蒲彻（Jaime Serra Puche）所谓的“五六十年来处于高度保护主义状态下的经济”。


US agricultural exports threatened some Mexican farmers, but others were able to boost their exports – and profits – to the US.	美国农业出口确实威胁到了一些墨西哥农民 ，但其他人也得以增加了对美国的出口和利润。


Meanwhile, the country’s consumers, especially the urban poor, benefited from lower food prices.	与此同时，墨西哥消费者，特别是城市穷人，从食品价格的下降中得到了裨益。


According to Stephen Haber, my colleague at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, “After, and to a considerable extent because of, NAFTA, the Mexican economy and political process became far more competitive.”	我的斯坦福大学胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）同事史蒂芬·哈勃（Stephen Haber）指出，“在NAFTA之后，也在很大程度上拜其所赐，墨西哥经济和政治过程竞争力大大增加了。 ”


Canada also benefited.	加拿大也从中获益。


The country’s firms and workers saw their productivity rise by 14%, leading to what the University of Toronto economist Daniel Trefler estimates is the equivalent of a decade’s improvement in living standards.	加拿大企业和工人，的生产率上升了14%，多伦多大学经济学家丹尼尔·特雷富勒（Daniel Trefler）估计，这带来的好处相当于十年的生活水平改善。


“Canada…is a much more modern economy today than it would have been,” says the country’s former finance minister, Michael Wilson.	“加拿大……要比没有NAFTA的情况现代化很多，”前财政部长迈克尔·威尔逊（Michael Wilson）说。


Meanwhile, Canada and Mexico have become the United States’ top two export markets, accounting for a combined $625 billion in 2013, more than the next ten largest export markets combined.	与此同时，加拿大和墨西哥也成为美国最重要的两个出口市场，2013年总规模达到了6,250亿美元。


Prior to NAFTA, exports to Mexico roughly equaled those to the United Kingdom and about half of what was going to Japan.	在NAFTA签署之前，对墨西哥出口与对英国出口大致相当，只有对日本出口的一半左右。


Moreover, this surge in trade has created myriad well-paying jobs.	此外，这一贸易量的剧增也创造大量高薪岗位。


NAFTA produced something far different from the outsourcing its opponents predicted.	NAFTA所形成的外包与其反对者所预测的截然不同。


Some 40% of what the US imports from Mexico actually originates in the US.	40%左右的美国自墨西哥进口实际上源自美国。


For Canada, the figure is 25%.	加拿大的这一数字为25%。


For China, by contrast, the share is just 4%.	相反，中国的这一比例只有4%。


“We’re not just selling things to each other,” explains Serra Puche.	“我们不仅仅是互相卖东西，”塞拉·蒲彻说，“��在，我们也一起生产东西。


“Now, we’re producing things jointly.”	”


According to Lorenzo Caliendo, an economist at the Yale School of Management, a surge in cross-border trade and increases in real (inflation-adjusted) wages in all three countries can be attributed to NAFTA – even once other factors, like the opening of China, the peso crisis, the dot-com bubble, and the Great Recession, are taken into account.	耶鲁商学院经济学家洛伦佐·卡里安多（Lorenzo Caliendo）指出，这三个国家的跨境贸易的激增和实际（经通胀调整的）工资增长都可以归因于NAFTA——即使考虑到其他因素（如中国的开放、比索危机、互联网泡沫和大衰退）是也是如此。


In short, as former US Secretary of State George Shultz has noted, “NAFTA has transformed the region.”	简言之，正如前美国国务卿乔治·舒尔茨（George Shultz）所指出的，“NAFTA改变了整个地区。 ”


Today, NAFTA can continue to serve as a model for ongoing trade negotiations.	如今，NAFTA可以继续成为进行中的贸易谈判的样板。


A NAFTA 2.0 could focus on areas that were originally excluded, such as labor mobility and energy.	NAFTA 2. 0可以专注于此前没有注意到的领域，如劳动力流动性和能源。


The development of Canadian oil sands, the shale-energy revolution in the US, and the opening of Mexico’s oil sector to foreign investment imply the biggest geopolitical shift since the collapse of communism.	加拿大油砂的开发、美国的页岩能源革命和墨西哥石油部门向外国投资开放代表着共产主义崩溃以来的最大地缘政治变化。


Moreover, the finalization of either the TPP or the TTIP could spur progress in the WTO’s Doha Round.	此外，TPP或者TTIP的最终完成可能促进世贸组织的多哈回合进展。


“There is no question that a high quality major agreement today, as the NAFTA was in 1994, could cause multilateralism to take a giant leap forward,” says former US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills.	“毫无疑问，今天的高质量主要协定可以与1994年的NAFTA一样让多边主义向前迈进一大步，”前美国贸易代表卡拉·希尔斯（Carla A. Hills）说。


Trade liberalization has been stalled for too long.	贸易自由化被停止了太长时间。


Since the end of World War II, American presidents, Democrat and Republican alike, have promoted free trade as a key pillar of growth.	自第二次世界大战结束以来，美国诸任总统，不管是民主党还是共和党，都将促进自由贸易视为增长的关键支柱。


John F. Kennedy launched what became the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and Bill Clinton helped secure congressional passage of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of trade talks, which had been initiated and negotiated under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan.	肯尼迪启动了日后的关贸总协定肯尼迪回合，克林顿帮助确保了NAFTA和乌拉圭回合贸易谈判在国会得到通过，而启动和谈判过程是在老布什和里根任上进行的。


President Barack Obama has promoted the TPP in Asia, but he only recently asked Congress for fast-track negotiating authority (the ability to request an up-or-down congressional vote without amendments).	奥巴马总统在亚洲推进了TPP，但知道最近才要求国会授予便宜行事谈判权（即要求国会进行投票表决并且不对方案进行修订）。


Obama’s request was rebuffed by the US Senate’s Democratic majority leader, Harry Reid.	奥巴马的要求被美国参议院民主党多数派领袖哈里·里德（Harry Reid）断然绝。


The new Republican-controlled Senate should act quickly to approve it.	新的共和党控制的参议院可能很快批准这一要求。


“There is no way we would have completed the NAFTA negotiation without fast track,” according to Hills.	“没有便宜行事，我们就完成不了NAFTA谈判，”希尔斯说。


Nobody will negotiate seriously with the US if Congress can cherry-pick amendments. Former US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor recalls Clinton’s horse-trading with congressional Democrats to persuade them to join Republicans in passing NAFTA, overcoming both parties’ protectionist wings.	如果国会可以挑肥拣瘦，就不会有人与美国进行严肃的谈判。 钱美国贸易代表米奇·坎托（Mickey Kantor）还记得克林顿与国会民主党讨价还价、说服他们加入共和党的行列通过NAFTA、克服两大政党的保护主义的情景。


Obama and the new Republican majority must now decide if they will follow in their predecessors’ footsteps and spark a new era of economic growth.	如今，奥巴马和信共和党多数必须决定是否效仿先例，开启新的经济增长时代。


Two Lessons for the Next US President	下任美国总统的两个教训


NAGASAKI – Looking out of my window across the harbor of the remarkable city of Nagasaki, Japan, two thoughts of considerable relevance to the next American president come to mind.	长崎—从我的窗外远眺日本名城长崎的港口，关于下任美国总统的两个相当重要的想法涌上心头。


Nagasaki has endured the worst of humanity.	长崎承受过最惨烈的人道灾难。


In August 1945, a plutonium bomb decimated the city, causing massive physical damage and untold human suffering.	1945年8月，一颗钚弹将长崎夷为平地，造成巨大的人财损失和不可名状的人间惨剧。


Since then, however, the city has exemplified the best of human achievement, rising from the rubble thanks to the spirit and enterprise of Japanese men and women, who trade the things that they build – for example, at the Mitsubishi shipyards – with the rest of the world.	但是，至此以后，长崎成为人类最高成就的榜样，在一片废墟中重生，其背后是日本人民的精神和冒险，他们制造各种东西——比如三菱的船——并与世界做交易。


But Nagasaki – and Japan, more broadly – has not always been open to the world, reaching across the ocean to connect with other countries, from near neighbors like China to faraway allies like the United States.	但长崎——更广义地说，也包括日本——并不总是向世界开放，通过海洋与中国这样的近邻和美国这样的远邻连为一体。


For centuries, Japanese minds, and Japanese borders, were distinctly closed.	几百年来，日本人的思想，以及日本的国界都是断然封闭的。


On a hillside in Nagasaki, there is a stark reminder of this radical closed-mindedness.	在长崎的一座小山坡上，有一样东西醒目地提醒我们这一极端封闭的思想。


A monument commemorates the martyrdom of 26 Roman Catholics, who were crucified at the end of the sixteenth century as part of the effort to stamp out the growth of Christianity in Japan.	一座纪念碑纪念着26位殉教的罗马天主教徒，十六世纪末，日本掀起了一场清除基督信仰的运动，这26人被钉在十字架上处死。


The American film director Martin Scorsese is now completing an adaptation of these events, based on Shusaku Endo’s novel Silence.	美国电影导演马丁·斯科塞斯（Martin Scorsese）正在构思基于远藤周作（Shusaku Endo）的小说《沉默》（Silence）改编这些事件。


Japan’s embrace of modernity came centuries later, with the decades-long Meiji restoration that began in the late 1860s.	日本接受现代性还要过几百年，直到始于19世纪60年代末的明治维新。


Rather than losing touch with its own culture and traditions, however, Japan merged the two, moving forward without losing sight of the past.	但是，日本并没有失去自己的文化和传统，而是将两者合并，在前进的同时亦不忘过去。


This balance is reflected in Japanese architecture, which is thoroughly modern, yet steeped in tradition.	这一平衡反映在日本建筑中，它们往往彻底地现代化，担忧洋溢着传统。


So what does all this have to do with the US election?	那么，所有这些和美国选举有什么关系？


For one thing, the US, like some parts of Europe, is now at risk of entering its own period of closed minds and closed borders.	一方面，和欧洲的一些国家一样，美国目前也有不如封闭思想和封闭国界的危险。


While the more moderate Hillary Clinton is likely to defeat the recklessly isolationist Donald Trump, the backlash against openness that has fueled Trump’s rise will not dissipate on its own.	尽管较为温和的希拉里·克林顿有望击败鲁莽的孤立主义者唐纳德·特朗普，但支持特朗普崛起的对开放的抵制不会凭空消散。


Of course, a President Clinton, along with other policymakers, would do well to underscore the leading role that diversity has played in driving America’s success.	当然，如果克林顿当选总统，那么她与其他决策者一起，将出色地证明多样性在推动美国成功方面所起到的领导作用。


Providing a haven for people from all over the world, where all people are subject to the same rules and laws, has been a key strength of the US for most of its history.	美国为全世界人民提供避风港，规则和法律面前人人平等，这是美国在其大部分历史中的一个关键优势。


This idea is reflected in the words on the country’s seal: E Pluribus Unum (from many, one).	这一思想体现在美国的国徽上：合众为一。


But Clinton will also have to address some of the real grievances that spurred the backlash against economic openness.	但克林顿还必须解决一些真正的仇恨，这些仇恨刺激了对经济开放的抵制。


An infrastructure program, by creating huge numbers of productive jobs and distributed wealth, would be a good start – one that would be far easier to achieve if her Democratic Party also won the Senate.	基础设施计划可以创造大量生产性工作岗位并分配财富，它是一个良好的起点——如果她的民主党能够同时赢得参议院，推行这一计划就将容易得多。


With such an approach, the US could revive its reputation as the “land of opportunity,” which has been so critical to US soft power in the past.	通过这一方针，美国可以重振其“机会之地”的名声，这是过去美国软实力的关键。


As she works to overcome rifts at home, Clinton will also have plenty of work to do abroad.	在克服国内分裂的同时，克林顿在国际层面也有很多事情要做。


Herein lies the second lesson of Nagasaki’s history: the overwhelming threat posed by nuclear weapons.	这就引出了长崎历史的第二个教训：核武器带来的巨大威胁。


Today, it is North Korea that embodies that threat most acutely.	今天带来这一威胁的最主要是朝鲜。


That country’s volatile regime, led by the world’s most powerful juvenile delinquent, Kim Jong-un, not only possesses nuclear weapons, but is also working to develop long-range delivery capacity.	喜怒无常的朝鲜政权在全世界最有权力的少年犯金正恩的领导下，不但拥有核武器，还在致力于研发远程输送能力。


Recent tests of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles – including the country’s most powerful nuclear test ever, carried out last month – show just how close the Hermit Kingdom is to achieving its goals.	最新的核武器和远程导弹测试——包括上个月进行的朝鲜历史上最强力的核试验——表明这个隐秘王国距离实现目标已经非常接近。


Even if Clinton takes a restrained approach to the use of force in international disputes, as President Barack Obama has over the last eight years, she would not be able to stand by idly if North Korea had the capacity to launch a long-range nuclear strike.	即使克林顿在动用武力解决国际纠纷方面采取克制方针，一如过去八年中的奥巴马总统，她也无法在朝鲜拥有发射远程核打击能力的情况下袖手旁观。


America would have to protect its Asian allies (not to mention its own citizens, were the North able to strike the US mainland).	美国将不得不保护期亚洲盟友（更不用说本国公民了，如果朝鲜有能力打击美国本土的话）。


But unilateral action would certainly not be the best option.	但单方面行动显然不是最佳选择。


It would be far better to persuade China to intervene to bring Kim’s regime to heel.	更好的办法是说服中国干预，让金氏王朝屈服。


That would demand some deft diplomacy.	这需要高超的外交技巧。


Chinese officials still insist that they cannot control North Korea.	中国官员仍坚称他们无法控制朝鲜。


That may be true, up to a point.	从某种程度上说，这也许是真的。


Yet it is clear that no one has as much clout in Pyongyang as China’s Communist Party bosses.	但显然，没有人能像中共高层那样对平壤有如此影响力。


And it is very possible that, behind closed doors, Chinese officials are already testing their ability to manipulate some of the shadowy figures surrounding Kim, who appears increasingly paranoid about the possibility of a coup.	很有可能，中国官员已经通过秘密渠道检验了他们控制某些金正恩身边影子人物的能力，而金正恩似乎越来越偏执地认定随时可能发生政变。


But China would be unlikely to agree to more direct intervention in North Korea without some quid pro quo.	但如果没有交换条件，中国不会同意更多地直接干预朝鲜。


Perhaps America, with its Asian allies, could make some modest shift in their approach to China’s illegal pursuit of territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.	也许美国及其亚洲盟友能够在对待中国对南海和东海的非法领土主张的方针上做出一些温和调整。


This would, to be sure, be unpopular, particularly among China’s neighbors.	当然，这样做必然不受欢迎，特别是在中国周边国家。


But it might also be necessary to quell the North Korean nuclear threat.	但这也许也是平息朝鲜核威胁的必要条件。


Defusing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions would be worth the sacrifice.	为了打消朝鲜的核野心值得做出这一牺牲。


When viewing the world from the perspective of Nagasaki, the need to preserve plurality and openness, while advancing America’s strategic pivot to Asia, becomes starkly clear.	从长崎的角度看世界，保持多样性和开放性，同时推动美国战略性转向亚洲，其必要性变得显而易见。


It is a perspective that the next US president should embrace.	这是一个下任美国总统应该持有的角度。


Learning from Namibia	向纳米比亚学习


WINDHOEK – Sandwiched between Angola and South Africa, Namibia suffered mightily during the long struggle against apartheid.	温得和克—纳米比亚夹在安哥拉和南非之间，在漫长的反种族主义斗争期间，纳米比亚损失惨重。


Yet, since winning independence from South Africa in 1990, this country of 2.4 million people has achieved enormous gains, especially in the last couple of years.	但是，自1990年脱离南非独立以来，2,400万纳米比亚人取得了巨大的进步，特别是在最近的几年中。


A big reason for Namibia’s success has been the government’s focus on education.	纳米比亚取得成功的一大原因是政府注重教育。


While people in advanced countries take for granted free primary and secondary education, in many poor countries, secondary education, and even primary schools, require tuition.	发达国家人民对免费小学和中学教育早已习以为常，但在许多穷国，中学甚至小学教育都要交学费。


Indeed, governments are often advised to impose tuition as a form of “cost recovery.”	事实上，政府常常被建议收学费作为“成本覆盖”的一种形式。


In Namibia, however, public primary education is free; and, as of the current school year, so is public secondary education.	但在纳米比亚，公立小学是免费的； 并且本学年公立中学也免费。


Namibia’s government is also proactive in other important ways.	纳米比亚政府在其他重要领域也表现积极。


Malaria eradication efforts have reduced annual cases by 97% in about a decade.	在防止疟疾方面，十年内年发病率降低了97%。


Bucking the global trend of increasing inequality, Namibia’s Gini coefficient (the standard measure of inequality in an income distribution) has fallen by some 15 points since 1993 (admittedly from one of the highest levels in the world).	逆全球不平等性加剧的潮流，纳米比亚基尼系数（衡量收入分配不平等程度的标准手段）自1993年以来下降了15点（不过是从全世界最高之一的水平上降下来的）。


And the poverty rate has been more than halved, from 69% in 1993 to under 30%, with extreme poverty (the number of people living on less than $1.90 a day) falling by a similar margin, from just under 53% to less than 23%.	贫困率也下降了一大半，从1993年的69%降低到不到30%，极端贫困（每天生活费不足1. 90美元的人数）也减少了一大半，从略低于53%下降到不到23%。


Namibia also has Africa’s highest ranking for press freedom from Reporters Without Borders – well ahead of the United States and other wealthy economies.	纳米比亚的无国家记者组Reporters Without Borders）新闻自由指数也位列非洲最高——大大高于美国和其他富裕国家。


The country also has favorable ratings – among the highest in Africa – on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.	纳米比亚在透明国际（Transparency International）清廉指数中亦表现出色，名列非洲前茅。


Even as commodity prices have been falling, Namibia has managed to maintain strong GDP growth – an estimated 4.5% in 2015, following average growth of nearly 4.2% from 1991-2014.	虽然大宗商品价格节节下跌，但纳米比亚仍成功维持了强劲的GDP增长——2015年预计可达4. 5%，而1991—2014年平均年增长率接近4.


At the same time, its debt-to-GDP ratio, at around 25%, is less than a third of the debt ratio in Europe or the US.	2%。 与此同时，债务-GDP比保持在25%左右，还不到欧洲或美国债务比的三分之一。


Of course, Namibia has its problems.	当然，纳米比亚也有问题。


The unemployment rate, at least as conventionally measured, remains stubbornly high, at nearly 28%.	至少从常规指标看，失业率仍然非常高，达到了近28%。


And, like other countries in the region, it faces a high level of HIV/AIDS – nearly 17% of the population are HIV-positive.	此外，和地区内的其他国家一样，艾滋病水平也很高——近17%的人口艾滋病检查呈阳性。


The World Bank classifies Namibia as upper middle income, but the authorities insist that theirs is in fact a developing country.	世界银行将纳米比亚归为中高收入国家，但当局仍坚持纳米比亚实际为发展中国家。


Namibia certainly has some of the difficulties we associate with less-developed economies.	纳米比亚显然存在一些我们认为与欠发达经济体相关的困难。


It has to develop a very large and arid country with a small population.	这是一个干燥而广袤，但人口稀少的国家。


This includes isolated desert communities of nomadic hunter-gatherers, who somehow must be integrated into a modern society without losing their identity.	其国内存在与世隔绝的沙漠游猎采集社区，他们必须设法在不是去身份的情况下融入现代社会。


Integrating people who a quarter-century ago were on the fringes of the global economy would be an enormous task for any country.	让四分之一个世纪前仍处于全球经济最边缘的人融入现代社会对于任何国家来说都是一个艰巨的任务。


For Namibia, it is even harder: as much as any country in the world, it is confronting head-on the effects of climate change.	对纳米比亚来说，它尤其艰巨：和世界上所有国家一样，纳米比亚面临气候变化的正面影响。


Nonetheless, Namibia has taken these problems in stride as it creates a diversified economy and cohesive society.	尽管如此，纳米比亚从容面对这些问题，建设了一个多元化的经济和团结的社会。


Remarkably, rival political factions of the country’s freedom struggle have come together to work for the common good.	令人瞩目的是，纳米比亚自由解放斗争的对立政治派系为了共同目标而齐心协力。


Indeed, Namibia provides low-cost health care not only for its own citizens, but also for its neighbors.	事实上，纳米比亚不但为本国公民，还为邻国提供了低成本医疗服务。


Some 15-20% of health-care visits in the north of Namibia are Angolan citizens.	在纳米比亚北方，15—20%的医疗旅客为安哥拉公民。


The manager of the hotel where we stayed, just across the border, regularly sends a little boat across the crocodile-infested river to bring over Angolans who want to buy provisions at the hotel canteen or see the visiting Namibian health-care workers.	我们下榻的饭店位于边境，经理经常派一艘小船穿过鳄鱼出没的河流，接送想购买饭店餐厅食物或来看来访纳米比亚医疗工作者的安哥拉人。


No one in Namibia talks about building a wall between their country and its poor and corrupt neighbors.	在纳米比亚，没人提出要在本国和贫穷又腐败的邻国之间建设一道墙。


Rather, the Namibians we met understand that you can’t pick your neighbors, so it’s best to work with them by sharing scarce water resources, cooperating on regional health efforts, encouraging investment, and exchanging students.	相反，我们所遇见的纳米比亚人明白你不能挑选你的邻居，因此最好通过分享稀缺水资源、进行地区医疗措施合作、鼓励投资和交换学生等方式与邻为善。


Moreover, Namibia’s government has wisely understood that abundant natural resources can easily become a curse, enriching a few at the expense of the many.	此外，纳米比亚政府明智地认识到，充裕的自然资源很可能成为诅咒，富了一小撮人而害了大部分人。


The authorities know that unless Namibia’s natural wealth is invested in infrastructure and its people’s productive capacities, resource exhaustion will leave the country poorer, not richer.	当局明白，除非将纳米比亚自然财富投资于基础设施和人民的生产力，否则资源耗竭将让国家致贫而非致富。


They also know that it would be irresponsible not to garner for Namibians the most possible from the country’s resources, and are rethinking investment laws and revisiting mining contracts to ensure that that is the case.	他们还明白，不从国家资源中尽可能地位纳米比亚人积累财富是不负责任的，并正在反思投资法和重新审定矿业合同以确保这一点。


Transparency is crucial to this process, which is why the government’s strong support of press freedom is so important.	对这一过程来说，透明度至关重要，这也是纳米比亚政府大力支持新闻自由如此重要的原因。


As President Hage Geingob told us, the press often says things that he doesn’t like.	总统根哥布告诉我们，新闻媒体经常说一些他不喜欢的东西。


But, having fought for freedom from apartheid South Africa, Geingob says, Namibia must defend the freedoms it won.	但根哥布说，纳米比亚曾经为了从种族主义的南非手中获得解放而斗争，必须捍卫它所赢得的自由。


Besides, Geingob recognizes how transparency protects him from demands for favors from corporate and other interest groups.	此外，根哥布还认识到透明度帮他抵挡住了来自公司和其他利益集团的要求。


Not all of Namibia’s key resources are finite.	并非所有纳米比亚的重要资源都是无限的。


Some – like fisheries – are renewable, and the government is working hard to preserve and enhance them.	一些资源——如渔业——可再生，政府也正在努力保护和增强它们。


Most important, unlike most other resource-dependent economies, it has succeeded in diversifying the economy – to the point that services account for more than 60% of its GDP, with tourism leading the way.	最重要的是，和大部分资源依赖型经济体不同，纳米比亚成功地实现了经济多元化——服务业已占GDP的60%以上，其中旅游业是排头兵。


Every year, more than a million foreign tourists visit the country.	每年都有超过一百万外国游客来到纳米比亚。


That is not surprising.	这并不令人奇怪。


Namibia is one of the most beautiful places in the world, and its people cultivate its environment and protect its animals.	纳米比亚是世界上最美丽的地方之一，其人民培育了环境，保护了动物。


About 100 years ago, the colonialists – the “1%” of their time – enjoyed hunting for sport and decimated the rhino and elephant population.	大约100年前，殖民者——当时的“1%”——享受狩猎的乐趣，导致犀牛和大象数量骤减。


Now local scientists are bringing animals back to the Skeleton Coast and other parts of the country.	如今，本地科学家站在让动物回到骷髅海岸（Skeleton Coast）和纳米比亚的其他部分。


Ironically, some funding for this comes from today’s 1%, who donate to the cause.	缝隙的是，其中部分资金来自今天的1%，而他们正是始作俑者。


Namibia shows that even countries that start with serious disadvantages – extremes of racism, colonialism, inequality, and underdevelopment – can chart a path toward shared prosperity.	纳米比亚证明了，即使从严重的劣势起步的国家——极端种族主义、殖民主义、不平等和欠发达——也可以走向共同繁荣。


Its achievement deserves international recognition – and emulation.	纳米比亚的成就理应获得国际承认——以及效仿。


NAM in Tehran	不结盟运动在伊朗


NEW DELHI – Nowadays, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is no longer much of a movement.	新德里——如今的不结盟运动（NAM）已经算不上一个真正意义上的运动。


Since the Cold War’s end, it has fractured into a far more heterodox grouping whose members range from leftist regimes, as in Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela, to the conservative monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar) of the Persian Gulf.	冷战结束后，不结盟运动已经分裂成由古巴、朝鲜、委内瑞拉等国的左派政权，以及波斯湾的沙特阿拉伯、巴林、卡塔尔等保守君主制国家组成的更加异端的组织。


So it should be no surprise that ideological cacophony has severely diluted the group’s founding impulse of avoiding entanglement in the disputes of the world’s superpowers.	因此难怪意识形态领域的不和谐言论严重破坏了该组织不卷入世界超级大国纷争的初衷。


Thus, today’s NAM finds itself as a group in search of purpose and principle.	于是今天的不结盟运动还没有找到确定的宗旨和原则。


Its sole comfort, it seems, is that it has not yet withered away.	现在看来，没有彻底瓦解已经是它唯一的安慰了。


But, despite its diminished status, the recent NAM summit in Tehran was able to claim the world’s attention.	尽管地位已经大不如前，但最近在德黑兰举行的不结盟运动首脑会议却吸引了世人的关注。


Why hold the summit in Tehran, some members asked?	有人质问为什么要在德黑兰举行首脑会议？


This, however, only raised heckles from those who still see the group as a means to stare down the superpowers.	但这种质问只招来了仍利用组织俯视超级大国者的反驳。 “为什么德黑兰就不行？


Their retort – “Why not in Tehran?” – angered more than it soothed.	”他们的反唇相讥非但没能安抚那些质问者，反而激起了他们的怒火。


The dispute over the wisdom of holding the summit in Iran’s capital revived the core debate about what “non-aligned” means in the post-Cold War world.	在伊朗首都举行首脑会议是否明智的争议重新激发了有关冷战后世界“不结盟”涵义的核心辩论。


Why keep such an anachronistic construct alive when the world is no longer frozen into two ideologically antagonistic blocs?	如果世界已经不再被僵化地割裂为意识形态对立的两大军事集团，为什么还要延续这样一种不合时宜的结构？


Furthermore, given the proliferation of strategic partnerships that claim many NAM members (India, for example, has strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Brazil), are the non-aligned really still non-aligned?	此外，鉴于越来越多的不结盟成员国已经建立了战略伙伴关系（比方说印度与美国、日本与巴西已经建立了战略伙伴关系），不结盟运动是否还是真正意义上的不结盟？


To this, the movement’s defenders ask: “Why persist with NATO and expand it ever eastward, until its troops now sit almost on the banks of the Indus, and in the foothills of the Hindu Kush?”	面对诘问，不结盟运动的捍卫者说：“那为什么还要坚持北约东扩，把军队一直部署到兴都库什山麓和印度河沿岸？


The Cold War has ended, they argue, but that only means that the world is divided in many more ways than before.	”他们争辩说冷战已经结束，但这只意味着世界比以前更加四分五裂。


So maintaining NAM is not some nostalgic longing for an influential past; rather, it is a means for countries to maintain as much international influence as possible in our globalized world.	因此延续不结盟运动并不是对过去辉煌的缅怀，相反是成员国在全球化世界里尽可能保持国际影响力的现实需要。


But how can NAM help its members when nothing else unites them?	可如果成员国之间没有其他任何联系，不结盟运动怎样才能提供协助？


According to Kanwal Sibal, a former head of India’s foreign service, “India’s own experience of NAM in areas of its core national interest has been most unsatisfactory, which is enough reason to shed any undue sentimental or ideological attachment to the movement.”	在前印度外交负责人坎瓦尔·西巴尔看来，“印度借助不结盟运动维护其核心国家利益的经验一直很不理想， 因此为摆脱任何不必要的感伤或思想牵绊提供了充分的理由。 ”


Indeed, as Sibal points out, NAM did not protect India from decades of “US/Western technology-related sanctions,” even when it was the movement’s leader.	其实正如西巴尔所说，即使在印度领导不结盟运动期间，该运动对长达数十年的“美国/西方技术制裁”也没有提供任何帮助。


Likewise, “in the 1962 conflict with China, NAM did not back India’s position.”	同样在1962年与中国的冲突中，不结盟运动也没有支持印度的立场。


The same is true, Sibal continues, of Kashmir and India’s nuclear tests.	类似的例子还有克什米尔及印度核试验。


As a result, India, he argues, owes NAM’s other members nothing, and should act only according to what is “best for its own interests.”	因此西巴尔认为印度不欠不结盟运动成员国任何人情，因此应该仅从“保护自身利益”的角度出发。


And yet India, like so many other countries, maintains its NAM membership, because NAM does provide an additional platform, which India needs and treats as one tool among others in its diplomatic toolkit.	但印度像其他国家一样仍然是不结盟运动成员，因为不结盟运动为印度提供了其他必要的外交工具和舞台。


Occasionally, NAM provides a useful counterweight to Western pressure – say, regarding Iran, with which India remains eager to build trade and energy relationships.	有时不结盟运动能提供抵抗西方压力的有效的砝码，比如在伊朗问题上，印度仍然迫切希望与伊朗建立贸易和能源关系。


So, to be blunt, NAM survives because of America’s recent global domination and its efforts to impose its policies globally.	因此坦率地说，不结盟运动存在是因为美国近来推行的全球统治和全球政策。


And, with a rising China seeking to do much the same in its immediate neighborhood (and perhaps farther afield in the future), the movement has a second reason for surviving as a check on the super-powerful.	而且面对崛起的中国试图在周边（今后还可能在更远地区）寻求霸权，不结盟运动又有了牵制超级大国的又一个存在理由。


In a recent article, Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace bemoans that, “India’s foreign-policy establishment is in the process of disinterring a long-dead grand strategy from its Cold War grave.”	近来一篇文章中，卡内基国际和平基金会的阿什利·特利斯感叹“印度外交政策正把早已死去的宏大战略从冷战的坟墓中掘出。


He cites a recent report, “Nonalignment 2.0,” that promotes non-alignment – a “doctrine that calls upon India to refuse staunchly any strategic alliances with other actors” – in order to ensure the country’s “strategic autonomy.”	”他援引近来宣扬不结盟思想的一份报告“不结盟2. 0”，称其“为确保国家的战略自主性号召印度坚决拒绝与其他任何力量建立战略联盟”。


At first glance, nonalignment looks like an attractive option for still-emerging countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil, and others, because it promises freedom from the insidious grip of entangling alliances.	乍看之下，因为有望摆脱纠缠不清的盟国的阴险控制，不结盟貌似印度、印尼、巴西等新兴国家颇具诱惑力的选择。


But, more important, it holds out the prospect that a people can chart its own path, free from external pressure – a particularly attractive proposition for countries that remain scarred by their colonial pasts.	但更重要的是它描绘了一个民族在挣脱外来压力的情况下选择自身道路的前景，而这在仍试图走出过去殖民阴影的国家看来是特别有诱惑力的选择。


But how can these impulses be reconciled with the strategic partnerships that India, Brazil, and others are currently forming, or with those – like the US-Saudi relationship – that have lasted for decades?	但怎样才能让这些冲动与延续数十年的美沙（沙特）关系以及印度巴西等国正在形成战略伙伴关系相互调和？


The answer is simple: International order does not adhere to a logically consistent code.	答案很简单：国际秩序并不遵循逻辑上成立的法则。


In the harsh light of realpolitik, only power and influence matter.	在严酷的现实政治面前只有权力和影响力才真正重要。


If NAM enhances a country’s power and influence, it will maintain its membership.	如果不结盟运动能够增强国家的权力和影响力，那就应该继续保留不结盟成员资格。


Of course, the bothersome aspect of NAM’s Tehran summit is that Iran will head the movement for the next three years.	当然不结盟运动德黑兰首脑会议带来的麻烦是伊朗将在今后三年领导不结盟运动。


But that could well divide NAM even further: Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, invited to sit next to Iran’s leadership, used the occasion to denounce publicly his hosts’ policy in Syria.	但这可能促成不结盟运动进一步分裂：应邀在伊朗领导人身边落座的埃及总统穆罕默德·穆尔西利用这次机会公开谴责东道主的叙利亚政策。


India’s participation in the Tehran summit should not strain its ties with the US.	印度参加德黑兰首脑会议不应导致印美关系紧张。


Just because the US continues to pursue its sterile policy of not speaking with Iran, India – with its own strategic, geopolitical, and energy-related interests to protect – does not need to tag along.	只因美国继续推行不与伊朗对话的无果政策并不意味着拥有自身战略、地缘政治和能源利益的印度应该惟命是从。


Neither strategic partnership with the US, nor membership in NAM, will divert India from safeguarding those interests.	与美国的战略伙伴关系和不结盟运动成员身份都不能妨碍印度捍卫这些利益。


America’s Neglected Financial Children	美国被忽视的金融孩子


WASHINGTON, DC – This week, the US Congress again failed to approve a modest appropriation that would have shored up financing for the International Monetary Fund and given China and other emerging economies greater responsibility there.	华盛顿—本周，美国国会再一次没能批准适度拨款补充国际货币基金组织（IMF）资金并增加中国和其他新兴经济体在IMF的责任。


Support for the IMF may seem arcane, but it has important implications for America’s global role – and the signs are not good.	支持IMF似乎难以理解，但这对美国的全球角色具有重要影响——而目前的信号很不乐观。


Indeed, if there was ever a moment for Congressional approval of the IMF reform package, this was it: the measure would have greatly increased the IMF’s ability to support Ukraine, a key American objective, at a much lower cost than the alternative of a US bilateral credit guarantee.	事实上，如果说国会曾经批准过IMF的改革方案，那么肯定是下面这个时刻：这一措施能极大地增强IMF支持美国的关键目标——乌克兰的能力，并且成本要远远低于美国的双边信用担保。


The failed measure involved only a transfer of previous US commitments from a supplementary account to the IMF’s core funding source, at virtually no cost to taxpayers.	没有获得批准的措施只不过是把此前美国的承诺从补充性账户转移到IMF的核心融资源，几乎不会给纳税人造成任何成本。


Congressional approval would have implemented a deal, concluded at the G-20’s Seoul Summit in 2010, to double the Fund’s lending capacity.	国会的批准本可以完成在2010年首尔二十国峰会上达成的协议——将IMF的贷款能力扩大一倍。


Under the agreement, which US President Barack Obama’s administration shepherded through tough negotiations, America would remain the IMF’s largest single shareholder, retaining its veto over major decisions.	根据这一奥巴马政府好不容易才牵头谈成的协议，美国将仍是IMF最大的单一股东，仍保有重大决策的一票否决权。


But, fearing a backlash, the Obama administration tried to gain Congressional backing only at the last minute – and as quietly as possible.	但是，由于担��国内的反对，奥巴马政府在最后时刻才试图赢得国会支持——并且尽力不弄出动静来。


A few years ago, the US displayed a similar lack of commitment to another US-dominated international institution: the World Bank.	几年前，美国在另一家美国主导的国际机构——世界银行中也显示出同样的无担当。


After the global financial crisis, the Bank lacked enough capital to boost lending beyond pre-crisis levels.	全球金融危机爆发后，世行缺少足够的资本将贷款规模增加到危机前水平。


But the US was not particularly interested in a larger World Bank; instead of using its considerable influence – reflected in its power to appoint the Bank’s president – to create a stronger institution capable of responding to new demands, it went along with what became a modest Bank recapitalization.	但美国对扩大世界银行并没有特别大的兴趣，它并没有利用其巨大的影响力——表现在其任命世行行长的权力上——建立更强大、有能力响应新需求的机构，结果世行只是进行了少许资本结构调整。


In fact, the US and its European allies are rumored to have rejected several major emerging economies’ quiet offers to provide additional funding, possibly to avoid diluting their own capital.	事实上，据说美国及其欧洲盟国还拒绝了一些主要新兴经济体悄悄提出的提供新资金的提议，也许是为了避免稀释它们自身的资本。


This contrasts sharply with the experience of two large regional multilateral lenders: the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank.	这与两家大型地区多边贷款机构——反美开发银行和非洲开发银行的遭遇形成了鲜明对比。


Whereas wealthy countries hold the most World Bank shares, borrowing countries hold a slight majority of the shares (and the presidency) at the regional banks.	富国把持着世界银行的大部分股份，但借款国在地区性开发银行占据略微多数（以及行长职位）。


Their leaders pressed hard – and successfully – for substantial capital increases.	它们的领导人大量——并成功地——施压大幅提高资本。


America’s recent failure to champion the international financial institutions represents a reversal of its approach during the latter half of the twentieth century, when it invested heavily in securing and maintaining their effectiveness.	美国最近在捍卫国际金融机构方面的失败体现了其二十世纪下半叶以来的方针转变。 此前，美国投入重金确保和维持这些金融机构的效率。


US leaders understood that these institutions enabled America to pursue its own foreign-policy preferences and commercial interests in a more open and stable global economy.	美国领导人知道，这些机构让美国得以在更开放、更稳定的全球经济中追求其自身的外交政策选择和商业利益。


The end of the Cold War undercut the foreign-policy logic behind America’s backing, as increasing globalization of trade and investment made economic support for developing countries seem less necessary as a way to expand markets.	冷战的结束也终结了美国支持背后的外交政策逻辑，而贸易和投资的日益全球化让支持发展中国家不再是扩大市场的必要手段。


Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, made non-state actors and so-called “failing” states with troubling sectarian and ethnic conflicts a new security concern.	此外，2001年9·11恐怖袭击让非国家行动方和存在麻烦的宗派和种族冲突的所谓“失败”国家成为新的安全隐患。


In those settings, the US, reasonably enough, did not view traditional investment support from the IMF and World Bank as a high priority.	在这样的环境下，美国颇为理性地不再将来自IMF和世行的传统投资支持视为高级别优先事项。


Finally, the global financial crisis put considerable strain on the US economy, intensifying pressure on lawmakers to undertake policies aimed at boosting domestic GDP growth and creating jobs.	最后，全球金融危机给美国经济造成了严重掣肘，加剧了立法者采取旨在提振国内GDP增长和创造就业岗位的政策的压力。


To this end, the White House is investing enormous effort and political capital in two major trade deals – the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership – despite domestic opposition.	在这方面，白宫顶着国内反对花大力气、投入大量政治资本推出了两个主要贸易协定——跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴以及跨太平洋合作伙伴。


But, while America’s economic woes and hyper-polarized political climate have undoubtedly contributed to the decision to favor controversial trade deals over international financial institutions that the US created and nurtured, what is really driving the policy shift are fundamental geopolitical changes.	但是，尽管美国的经济不景气和政治气候的高度极端化毫无疑问促使美国的决定偏袒于存在争议的贸易协定而非由美国创造并支持的国际金融机构，但政策变化的真正推动力是基础性地缘政治变化。


In short, an internationally diminished US is loath to relinquish its dominance of global institutions, yet unwilling to shoulder the associated financial and political costs.	简言之，国际地位日趋衰落的美国不愿撒手其在全球机构的主宰地位，但又不愿承担相应的金融和政治成本。


By contrast, the US market’s enduring weight amplifies America’s bargaining power in plurilateral trade agreements, which also serve the country’s immediate commercial interests.	相反，美国市场的持久地位增加了美国在多边贸易协定中的议价能力，也符合美国的眼前商业利益。


Indeed, such deals offer the promise of new export markets, “good” jobs, and rules that lock in US competitive advantages.	事实上，这些协定都承诺了新的出口市场、“好”工作岗位以及锁定美国竞争优势的规则。


At the same time, they can help to contain China’s economic power and strategic influence in Asia.	与此同时，这些协定也有助于遏制中国在亚洲的经济实力和战略影响力。


As the issuer of the world’s dominant reserve currency, the US can manage without the IMF in the short run, using the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to countries where it has core political interests, as it did after the 2008 crisis.	作为世界主要储备货币的发行者，美国可以在短期抛开IMF，通过美联储向其核心政治利益所在国家提供流动性，就像它在2008年危机后做的那样。


And World Bank lending is helping the middle-income countries that are increasingly competing with the US in global trade, while boosting demand for private – that is, American – capital.	而世行贷款有助于在全球贸易中日益与美国竞争的中等收入国家，同时增加私人——即美国资本的需求。


The US is like an aging parent; it is no longer willing to invest much in the family business, but remains averse to ceding control to its increasingly mature children.	美国就像是年迈的家长； 不再愿意大量投资于家族企业，但又不愿意将控制权让给日益成熟的孩子们。


Resentful and restless, the children are seeking opportunities elsewhere – to the detriment of the family firm.	心怀不满又焦虑不安的孩子们则纷纷另辟蹊径——以不利于家族企业的方式。


China has nearly two dozen currency-swap arrangements, which serve as an alternative to IMF liquidity support.	中国已经签订了二十多宗货币互换协议，作为IMF流动性支持的替代品。


India just signed a $50 billion swap deal with Japan.	印度刚刚与日本签订了500亿美元的互换协议。


Over time, these arrangements will erode the US dollar’s role as the world’s leading reserve currency.	假以时日，这些安排将削弱美元作为世界主要储备货币的地位。


Furthermore, the major emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – plan to establish their own development bank, and many African countries now count on China to fund infrastructure investments.	此外，主要新兴国家——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非——计划成立它们自己的开发银行，许多非洲国家现在也求助于中国为其基础设施投资提供融资。


In Latin America, the Andean Development Bank lends more to its members for infrastructure projects than the World Bank – at higher cost, but with less hassle.	在拉丁美洲，安第斯山开发银行向其成员国发放的基础设施项目贷款超过了世界银行——虽然成本更高一些，但麻烦更少。


The World Bank’s diminished role will ultimately undermine America’s ability to advance its view that development is a function of open markets and democratic accountability.	美国一直在宣传发展是开放市场和民主问责的产物，而世界银行作用的日渐萎缩最终会削弱美国推广这一观点的能力。


Strong and effective global financial institutions are still very much in America’s interest.	强劲而有效的全球金融机构仍符合美国的利益。


But, without US leadership, the global role of the IMF and the World Bank will erode gradually – as will their usefulness to the US.	但是，没有美国的领导，IMF和世界银行的全球作用将被日益削弱——它们对美国的用处亦然。


In Defense of World Government	为世界政府辩护


WASHINGTON, DC – Unlike in the past, there probably will not be large protests at the upcoming Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, or at the subsequent World Trade Organization meeting of trade ministers in Bali.	发自华盛顿特区——跟过去不同，在即将召开的国际货币基金组织和世界银行年会，或者是巴厘岛世界贸易组织贸易部长会议期间或许不会出现大规模抗议行动。


But that is not because these international institutions are perceived as effective and legitimate.	但这并不是因为人们觉得这些国际机构变得更高效或者更具合法性了。


It is because, compared to a decade ago, they are seen as too small and impotent in the face of larger market forces to bother about.	其真正的原因是相对于十年之前，在更为庞大的市场力量面前它们看上去更加渺小而虚弱，根本不值一提了。


The 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath have caused a loss of faith not only in markets, but also in the ability of democratic governments to ensure that the benefits of market-led growth are widely shared.	2008年全球金融危机及其余震不但令人们对市场失去了信心，也让民主政府失去了确保市场带动型增长的成果能被大多数人分享的能力。


On economic, financial, tax, trade, and climate issues, many people around the world are fearful or angry, believing  that a worldwide cabal of bankers, corporations, and G-20 elites uses insider deals to monopolize the benefits of globalization.	许多人在经济、金融、税制，贸易以及气候事务上满怀恐惧和愤怒，认定是银行家，大企业和G20精英结成的阴谋集团利用内部交易独霸了全球化的成果。


But few people – whether ordinary citizens or internationally oriented economists – recognize that our seemingly weak and ineffectual multilateral institutions are the world’s best hope for managing and democratizing the global market.	但一些人——不管是普通市民还是放眼国际的经济学家——把我们这些看似虚弱低效的多边组织视为全世界管理和民主化全球市场的最大希望。


Only these institutions are capable of preventing the elite capture and insider rents that are putting global prosperity at long-term risk.	在他们看来，只有这些组织有能力去阻止那些为全球繁荣埋下长期隐患的精英掠夺和内部寻租。


To be sure, a growing number of mainstream economists are paying attention to the costs of unfettered global markets.	可以认定的是，越来越多的主流经济学家都开始注意到不受限制的全球市场所带来的成本。


There is greater concern that cross-border capital mobility makes it harder to collect taxes and enforce financial regulations at home; and that trade agreements, combined with global supply chains, are exacerbating job losses in developed economies.	人们也更多关注到跨境资本流动令国内的征税和金融管制变得更加困难； 此外贸易协定和全球供应链的出现也使得发达国家的就业岗位不断流失。


Likewise, global integration means that eurozone distress threatens the US economy, while the US debt-ceiling standoff threatens financial markets everywhere.	同样，全球一体化意味着欧元区的困境同样会威胁到美国经济，而美国的债务上限僵局又会影响到全球各国金融市场。


Yet many economists are as ambivalent about “global” rules and institutions as ordinary people are.	但许多经济学家也和普通民众一样对“全球”规则和机构又爱又恨。


They worry that international bodies, lacking democratic oversight, make it easier for the rich, powerful, and well connected to run things to their own advantage.	恨的是这些缺乏民主监督的国际机构容易被那些有权势者利用来为自身利益服务。


Dani Rodrik’s 2011 book The Globalization Paradox criticizes globalization enthusiasts for wanting full liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements; he argues that when democratically established social arrangements clash with the demands of globalization, national priorities should take precedence.	丹尼·罗德里克2011年出版的著作《全球化悖论》就批评那些全球化狂热者妄图实现对外贸易和资本流动的全球自由化； 他认为当民主制度下的社会安排与全球化的需求相冲突时，国家利益应该被摆在首位。


True, global “government” can go too far – for example, when WTO rules conflict with sensible local environmental safeguards, or when IMF requirements for developing-country borrowers narrow the scope for creative heterodoxy in growth and poverty-reducing policies.	确实，全球“政府”有时可能会做得太过出格——比如当WTO规则与较严格的本地环境保护措施相冲突，或者当国际货币基金组织对发展中国家贷款者的要求限制了在发展和减少贫困政策方面的创新性尝试。


It is also true that countries dependent on official aid and IMF loans can face unwarranted pressure to conform to outsiders’ wrongheaded policy views – from premature opening of capital markets in Asia in the 1990’s to force-fed austerity in Greece and Spain today.	同时，那些依赖官方援助和国际货币基金组织的国家也要面对莫名其妙的压力去遵从别国的错误政策观点——从1990年代亚洲不成熟资本市场的贸然放开到当今对希腊和西班牙的强制紧缩都是如此。


But there is a more positive way to look at the issue.	但我们也可以用一个更积极的角度去看待这个问题。


Sometimes, even powerful sovereign states use global commitments to help them lock in sensible policies that might otherwise be difficult to initiate and sustain.	有时即便那些强大的主权国家也会利用全球承诺去帮助自身去维持一些原本可能难以启动或持续的合理政策。


A 2009 G-20 agreement to refrain from protectionism in the aftermath of the global financial crisis helped to fend off protectionism.	2009年G20峰会关于防止在全球金融危机后滋生保护主义的协议就有助于遏制这种现象的���生。


Today, a G-8 or G-20 agreement on exchanges of tax information could help to shore up national revenue bases and the reputations of governments for tax fairness.	今时今日，G8或者G20关于纳税信息互换的协议也可以巩固各国的税基以及政府在税收公平方面的声誉。


Less obviously, when governments provide funding for the IMF, they can side-step domestic political resistance to assisting countries in trouble and to rules that yield benefits only in the long term.	而不那么显著的是，当各国政府为国际货币基金组织提供资助时，它们可以避开国内的政治反抗而去协助那些陷入困境的国家以及维护那些只有长期执行才能得取得成果的规则。


Indeed, embedding fair rules on trade, finance, development, climate change, and other issues in the major global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank is more important than ever, given the rise of China and other emerging-market economies.	事实上，鉴于中国以及其他新兴市场经济体的崛起，在国际货币基金组织和世界银行这类主要全球机构运作的贸易、金融、发展，气候变化以及其他事务中植入公平规则的重要性已经变得比以往更为显著。


With these new powers seeking a place at the geopolitical table, they and the older powers can benefit from mutually agreed global “containment” of their domestic parochialism and short-sightedness.	随着这些新势力在地缘政治版图上寻找自身的位置，它们以及其他旧势力可以互相达成一致，在全球范围内“遏制”自身地方保护主义和短视行为的行为中获益。


In other words, global rules and institutions can make it easier and more likely that all involved will hew to their own citizens’ broader interests – and thus to the global commonweal as well.	换句话说，全球规则和机构令所有各方都可以更容易也更乐意去维护本国公民的更广泛利益——以及因此产生的全球福利。


For example, pledges to cut carbon emissions, while lacking any enforcement mechanism, may be helping countries to do the right thing for their own citizens’ children and grandchildren.	例如削减碳排放的承诺虽然缺乏任何强制执行机制，却可能有助于让各国为自己的子孙后代做出正确的行动。


Moreover, fair global rules can help to “democratize” the global market, especially if they are embedded in institutions with a degree of autonomy for highly professional staff who can act with some independence from short-term political pressures.	此外，公平的全球规则可以帮助实现全球市场的“民主化”，尤其是当这些规则存在于一些拥有一定自治权的机构中，而机构内部的高度专业化人员又可以在短期政治压力下独立行动之时。


It should come as no surprise that the anti-globalists’ erstwhile punching bags – the World Bank and, increasingly, the IMF and the WTO – are more open and transparent than many of their member states.	这也解释了反全球化主义者一直攻击的对象——世界银行，国际货币基金组织和世贸组织——为何变得比起许多会员国更加开放和透明。


They thus provide a vehicle for ordinary people to lobby for fairer rules and policies, not only in their own countries but also in others.	它们因此也为普通民众提供了一个呼吁更公平规则以及政策的载体，无论在本国还是他国都是如此。


One example of this was the citizen-based movement that fought WTO intellectual-property rules, adopted at the behest of the US and other rich countries, that were sustaining high prices for anti-AIDS drugs in Africa.	其中一个例子就是一项公民运动，该运动反对美国以及其他富裕国家所制定的WTO知识产权规则，因为这一规则令非洲地区的抗艾滋病药物价格高昂。


The campaign succeeded, resulting in changes that dramatically increased poor countries’ access to such drugs.	最终运动促成了重大变革，令贫苦国家更容易获得这类药物。


Ultimately, as I argue in greater detail in a paper for the Global Citizens Foundation, ordinary people are better off with global institutions, notwithstanding their weakness relative to their most powerful sovereign members and their lack of legitimacy relative to their democratic members.	最终，正如笔者在一篇全球公民基金的论文中深入阐述的那样，虽然这些全球机构因为其强大主权国家成员国的存在而变得弱势，又因其民主国家成员国的阻挠而缺乏合法性，但普通人的境遇依然因机构的存在而得到了改善，


Of course, a world “government” could never have democratic legitimacy; for this reason, it is a scary idea.	当然，一个世界“政府”永远不可能有民主合法性； 基于这一原因，这是一个可怕的想法。


But, like a socialist utopia or pure libertarianism, the idea of world government can illuminate a sensible path for capturing the benefits of a more effective global polity.	但正如一个社会主义乌托邦或者纯自由主义主义，世界政府的理念可以照亮一个从更有效全球政治中得益的合理路径。


Given a fully interdependent global market, we should worry less about the risk of bad rules and policies from imperfect global institutions and more about how to exploit these institutions’ potential to lock in policies at home and abroad that minimize risks and maximize opportunities for people everywhere.	在一个完全独立的全球市场的存在下，我们应该少担心一些不完美全球机构的错误规则和政策所带来的风险，而更关注于如何开发这些机构的潜力去执行一些可以在国内外为民众最小化风险并最大化机遇的政策。


India’s Fiscal Fortune	印度的财政幸运


CAMBRIDGE – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government must be feeling lucky.	美国剑桥—印度总理莫迪的政府一定感到十分幸运。


The decline in world commodity prices, led by crude oil, has made managing the national budget easier.	以原油为首的世界大宗商品价格下跌让国民预算的管理变得更加容易了。


And now, after the Central Statistics Office revised its methodology for calculating GDP data, that task has become easier still.	而如今，在中央统计办公室（Central Statistics Office，SCO）修正了GDP数据统计方法后，这一任务又容易了一分。


According to the CSO, as a result of the methodological change, annual output growth in the second quarter of 2014 stood at 8.2%, up sharply from the original estimate of 5.3%.	根据SCO，拜方法变更所赐，2014年第二季度年产出增长为8. 2%，比初始估计值5.


Based on the revised GDP figures, India is expected to average 7.4% growth in the fiscal year ending March 2015.	基于修订后的GDP数字，预计印度将在2015年3月结束的财年中获得平均7.


Moreover, the country is projected to grow at an 8-8.5% rate in the next fiscal year.	4%的增长。 此外，下一财年印度预期增长率为8—8.


No budget changes could generate such a marked, cost-free acceleration in growth.	5%。 没有哪种预算改变能产生如此显著又免费的增长加速。


It is fair to say that the usually staid statistics department stole the thunder from this year's budget.	公平地说，以往相当呆板的统计部门让今年的预算大大地松了一口气。


Nonetheless, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley's budget succeeds on several fronts – not least in its alignment of vision and implementation.	尽管如此，财政部长贾特雷（Arun Jaitley）的预算仍然取得了多方面的成功——特别是在规划和实施的一致性方面。


Specifically, it advances the government's vision of a pro-growth agenda that enhances the ease of doing business in India, while targeting better delivery mechanisms for welfare schemes.	具体而言，它推进了政府对增强在印营商便利性的亲增长日程的规划，同时还将目标定在了更好的福利制度实施机制上。


On the expenditure side, the budget is expansionary, scaling up investment spending dramatically, introducing new welfare programs, and increasing credit for various sectors.	在支出端，预算属于扩张性，大幅提高了投资支出，引入了新福利计划，并增加了诸多行业的信用。


While there is no significant effort to cap spending on some of the largest fiscal programs, including the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (which guarantees 100 days of wages to rural households) or the fertilizer subsidy, measures to improve implementation and reduce leakage are being put in place.	尽管它并没有大幅限制某些最大规模财政项目的支出——包括全国农村就业保障法（National Rural Employment Guarantee Act，保障农村家庭100天的工资）和肥料补贴——但推行了改善实施、填补漏洞的措施。


Though the budget mentions disinvestment in loss-making public-sector units, the budget conveys no sense of urgency on this front.	尽管预算提到要减少亏损的公共部门单位的投资，但并没有把这方面作为紧迫任务。


With private investment remaining weak, owing to the corporate sector's heavy debt burden and banks' huge volume of bad assets, the government has clearly decided to jumpstart the process through infrastructure spending.	由于公司部门负债累累而银行不良资产规模巨大，私人投资依然萎靡，在此情况下，政府明确决定要通过基础设施投资扩大支出。


But India's infrastructure needs far exceed what the government can spend.	但印度的基础设施需求大大超过了政府的支出能力。


In this sense, the new “plug and play" scheme for public-private partnerships, whereby “all clearances and linkages will be in place before the project is awarded," is a major improvement over the previous PPP model.	从这个角度讲，新的“即插即用”（plug and play）公私合作（PPP）机制——让“所有清理和联系都在项目授予前就位”——是对此前PPP模式的重大改进。


The budget's success will be determined by how these public-sector investments play out, which in turn will depend on other policies, especially the Land Acquisition Bill (designed to enable industrial development in rural areas), which has already run into trouble.	预算的成功将取决于这些公共部门投资表现如何，而这又取决于其他政策，特别是已经陷入麻烦的土地兼并法（Land Acquisition Bill，意在让工业开发农村地区成为可能）。


Moreover, government investment and allocation of resources has long been tainted by corruption, and Modi's government has yet to show that it can implement the budget's promises in a transparent and sustainable manner.	此外，政府投资和资源配置一直深受腐败困扰，莫迪政府也没有证明其能够以透明、可持续的方式实施预算的承诺。


On the tax side, there is one major announcement: a reduction of the corporate-tax rate from 30% to 25% over the next four years, thereby encouraging private-sector investment.	在税收端，有一个重大事项：在未来四年内将公司税率从30%下降到25%，从而鼓励私人部门投资。


The implementation of the Goods and Services Tax – a form of value-added tax on which the government has made admirable progress – would be a major accomplishment and a huge boost for the economy.	商品和服务税——一种政府已经取得意中进展的增值税——的实施将是一项重大成就，也是对经济的巨大提振。


Despite raising expenditure substantially, however, the budget relies mainly on growth and improved tax collection to keep the country's fiscal deficit within reasonable limits.	但是，尽管支出大幅增加，预算仍主要依赖增长和改善征税以使印度财政赤字保持在合理限度内。


Of the budget's many proposed measures to boost inflows of foreign investment, one appears risky from a macro-prudential perspective.	在印度预算的众多增加外国投资流入的建议措施中，有一项从宏观审慎角度看风险较大。


The government would “do away with the distinction between different types of foreign investments, especially between foreign portfolio investments and foreign direct investments, and replace them with composite caps."	政府将“去除不同外国投资类型之间的区别，特别是外国组合投资和外国直接投资的区别，而对他们采取综合上限管理。 ”


There are many reasons to treat the two types of investment differently.	有诸多理由表明应该将这两类投资区别对待。


Portfolio investment, often called “hot money" because of its volatile nature, can increase the economy's vulnerability to the vagaries of international finance.	组合投资常常被称为“热钱”，因为它具有波动性，导致经济更加容易受到国际金融异常的影响。


Foreign direct investment, on the other hand, is far more stable and driven by domestic fundamentals.	另一方面，��国直接投资要稳定得多，并且由国内基本面决定。


With interest rates set to rise in the United States this year, volatility in international capital markets can be expected to increase.	考虑到今年美国极有可能升息，国际资本市场波动预计将有所增加。


In this context, it would be prudent to maintain the distinction between portfolio and FDI.	在这样的背景下，保持组合投资和外国直接投资之间的区别才是审慎的做法。


In general, the budget plan addresses the major issues facing India's economy.	总体而言，印度的预算计划解决了其经济所面临的重大问题。


But translating good intentions into desired outcomes will depend crucially on the government's ability to push through complementary and urgently needed reforms on hot-button regulatory issues like land, labor, and the environment.	但把良好的意图转化为渴望的结果最主要将取决于政府推行土地、劳动力和环境等热点监管问题上迫切需要的全面改革的能力。


In any case, the budget sends a clear signal about the Modi government's intentions.	无论如何，该预算释放出明确的信号，表明了莫迪政府的意图。


At least in the near term, it is shifting its practice of “minimal government and maximum governance" to one of “moderate government and maximum governance."	至少在近期，莫迪政府正在从“最小政府、最大治理”转变为“温和政府、最大治理”。


The French Rally to the Republic	法国人回归共和


PARIS – Before the second round of France’s regional elections on Sunday, most predictions suggested that five, perhaps six, of the country’s regional governments would fall into the hands of the National Front (FN).	巴黎—星期日法国第二轮地区选举之前，大部分预测都表明法国五到六个地区政府将落入国民阵线之手。


But the French people pulled themselves together and turned out to vote in much greater numbers than anyone expected.	但法国人民齐心协力，投票率远高于任何人的预期。


The result is that a xenophobic, racist party, one hostile to everything essential to the spirit and greatness of France, was defeated in all of the contests that it was supposed to win.	结果是，这个仇外的种族主义政党，与伟大的法国的一切品质格格不入的政党，在所有志在必得的选区中都被击败了。


Some will express surprise at this strange country, which is never so great as when it is on the edge of a cliff.	有些人会对这个奇怪的国家感到惊奇，这个国家不到最危险的时候就表现不出它的伟大。


They will worry – and they are right to worry – that a situation of extreme peril, a veritable threat to the nation, was required before the French recovered their senses and took the path of reason.	他们会担心——应该担心——法国人非要等到极端危险情形、不折不扣的国家威胁来临时才会恢复理智，选择理性之路。


And they will regret that the French are not the prosaic sort of people who know how to be themselves at normal cruising speed, without having to hear a cannonball whistle past.	他们会感到遗憾，法国人是“不走寻常路”的民族，在一帆风顺、炮火声平息时他们便不认识自己。


But that is how it is.	但法国人就是如此。


And I, like many others, will not try to hide my satisfaction at seeing the smug scoundrels of the FN break down and resume speaking in their historic register, with their authentic voice, which is one of hatred and mob rage.	而我和其他许多人一样，不会掩饰我的满意：国民阵线这群自以为是的混蛋一败涂地，恢复了他们的历史嘴脸，大放仇恨和煽动的厥词。


This, truly, was a victory for the republic – a triumph of popular resistance.	这绝对是共和的胜利——群众反对的胜利。


The French turned out, en masse, to say that they did not want to see the Le Pen gang take possession of their regions.	法国人一致表示，他们不想看到勒庞（Le Pen）匪帮在他们所属地区掌权。


That is the most important lesson from Sunday’s vote, and it is a reassuring one.	这是星期日选举最重要的教训，它令人放心。


But what caused the nation to right itself?	但是什么让法兰西民族纠正了自己？


Obviously, nothing happened between the elections’ first and second rounds that addressed the “malaise” of the French people.	显然，在第一轮和第二轮选举之间，并没有发生什么事情改变法国人的“不爽”。


Nor was any particular promise made in response to the “hard questions” raised by FN voters just a week earlier.	对于国民阵线选民一周前所提出的“难题”，也没有人提出任何特别的承诺。


No.	没有。


What we saw, instead, was a moral surge among the French – an act of self-defense by the body politic.	相反，我们看到的是法国人的道德崛起——全体人民的自我防卫行动。


Between the two rounds, the following simple idea sank in among the electorate: The National Front can revamp its façade all it wants, but it has never been, is not, and can never be a normal party.	在两轮选举之间，下列简单思想深入选民之心：国民阵线可以随心所欲地改变它的面貌，但它从未成为、现在不是、将来也不可能变成正常的政党。


For how long have France’s moral and political authorities been telling us that “stigmatization” of the National Front doesn’t work, that it strengthens the party instead of weakening it?	法国道德和政治权威一直在告诫我们，对国民阵线的“玷污”（stigmatization）不起作用，这只能增强而不是削弱它。 这一情况已经持续了多久了？


Well, that was wrong 20 years ago, and it is still wrong.	呃，20年前它是错的，现在它仍是错的。


It cannot be repeated often enough that when the moral left and right have been strong, when groups like SOS Racisme set boundaries that are bright and clear, the FN has been contained electorally.	当道德左翼和右翼十分强大，当反种族主义紧急救援组织（SOS Racisme）等团体设立明确的界限时，国民阵线就能通过选举得到遏制。


But when those boundary lines are blurred, when the dikes crumble and the antiracist watchdogs allow themselves to be intimidated or lower their guard, the FN tries to make itself at home.	但当这些界限模糊不清，当堤防崩溃、反种族主义看门人怯懦或放松警惕时，国民阵线就会试图当家作主。


The same is true today.	今天也是如此。


The happy surprise of the regional vote owes absolutely nothing to accommodations with the FN by major parties that supposedly “heard the message” of “angry” voters (rhetoric that they relentlessly drummed into us).	地区选举的意外之喜绝对和应该“倾听愤怒的”选民的“声音”（他们反复向我们灌输的辞令）的主要政党对国民阵线的绥靖无关。


On the contrary, a sufficient number of voters came to understand that in that very anger – in its spokespeople and in the words used to express it – lurked a threat to the republic, to democracy, and to the nation’s fundamental values.	相反，足够多的选民开始理解，在这个愤怒中——在其发言人及其表达愤怒的用词中——隐含着对共和，对民主，对民族基本价值的威胁。


That is the second lesson.	这是此次选举的第二个教训。


What awaits us tomorrow?	明天会怎样？


How can we be sure that the FN wave, having receded, will not regain strength and break with even greater destructive force in the upcoming presidential election?	我们如何确保被遏制的国民阵线浪潮不会卷土重来，在即将到来的总统选举中形成更大的破坏性力量？


Better “unemployment figures” will be required, no doubt.	毫无疑问，更漂亮的“失业数据”是必要的。


Faster “growth,” certainly.	当然，还得有更快的“增长”。


We will also need “efforts” and “gestures” directed toward the one-third of people under 30 and the nearly one-half of industrial and service workers who are said to have expressed their “frustration” and “anxiety” by voting for the FN.	我们还需要“措施”和“姿态”引导三分���一30岁以下人民和近一半的工业和服务业工人，据说他们通过给国民阵线投票来表达“沮丧”和“焦虑”。


Fine.	很好。


But none of that will ever be a substitute for leaders taking the moral high ground and restoring to our public discourse its lost luster.	但这些都不能代替领导人占据道德制高点，重焕公共演讲的光芒。


No strategy will work if it is implemented by mediocrities who, in a political comedy as dishonorable as it is vain, rush to the television studios to declare, hand over heart, that they have heard the voters “loud and clear.”	任何政策，如果由平庸之辈来实施，都无法奏效。 平庸之辈只能上演可耻徒劳的政治闹剧，来到电视台，把手放在心上宣称他们已经听到了选民“响亮清晰”的声音。


The key will be for French leaders to say – as loudly as possible and as often as necessary – that there is no answer to the “hard questions” as the FN poses them.	关键在于法国领导人要说出——尽可能大声、尽可能频繁地说出——国民阵线所提出的“难题”没有答案。


And, like it or not, it must be said not only to the FN’s leaders, but also to its voters.	不管你喜不喜欢，不仅必须对国民阵线领导人这样说，还必须对国民阵线的选民这样说。


There have been other times in France’s history when entire segments of the electorate have ejected themselves from the game, without the rest of the players rushing over to beg them to get back on the field.	法国历史上不乏这样的情况，某个细分选民集体全体退出选举，而其他参与者也不上前恳请他们回到选举中来。


Georges Clémenceau, Jean Jaurès, and Raymond Poincaré, at the outset of the twentieth century, did not pander to the nearly half of the electorate that, during the Dreyfus Affair, had exiled themselves from the republic.	二十世纪初，克莱蒙梭、饶勒斯、庞加莱都没有迎合在德雷福斯事件期间自绝于共和国的近一半选民。


Nor did Charles de Gaulle have any qualms about telling the proponents of French Algeria that, in the end, he did not understand them.	戴高乐也毫不担心告诉法国阿尔及利亚支持者，最后他还是不理解他们。


Nor did Pierre Mendès France in the 1950s hesitate to tell the Communists that he didn’t want their votes to support his government.	20世纪50年代，法朗仕毫不犹豫地告诉共产党，他不想要他们的选票支持自己的政府。


France must now recall these great moments in its republican tradition and hold them up as a model for today’s leaders.	现在，法国必须回忆一下这些共和传统的伟大的时刻，将他们作为今日领导人的榜样。


For what will be needed to hold the territory that the republic nearly lost to the FN is political courage of a sort that, for the moment, is in short supply.	捍卫共和体制最近丢给国民阵线的领土，需要的是一种当下缩短却的政治勇气。


Nationalism and Terrorism	民族主义和恐怖主义


BOSTON – September 11, 2001, may – at least at first – seem like an inappropriate addition to the history of nationalism, given Al Qaeda’s explicitly stated global pretensions.	波士顿—乍一看，说2011年9月11日写下了民族主义历史新的一笔不太合适，因为基地组织明白无误地自我标榜着它的全球特征。


In fact, now that the initial shock and confusion have given way to a more sober perspective, the terrorist attacks of that awful day are increasingly seen – as they should be – as one among numerous other nationalist milestones.	事实上，随着最初的袭击和困惑已被更加冷静的审视所取代，在那个可怕的日子所发生的恐怖袭击正在日渐被认为是民族主义众多里程碑中的一个，确实应该如此。


From this perspective, the attacks no longer appear, as they did to so many immediately afterwards, to reflect an incomprehensible, irrational, and uncivilized mentality, or a different civilization altogether – pre-modern, unenlightened, and fundamentally “traditional” (in other words, undeveloped).	这种观点看来，这样的袭击不会再发生了，因为它们产生了如此众多的即时反响，反映了一种不可思议的非理性野蛮思维或者一种完全不同的文明——未现代化的、待启蒙的、从根本上说尚处于“传统”（换句话说，即尚未开发的）文明。


It is in this unflattering sense that Islam, the dominant religion of an economically backward part of the world, was said to have motivated the attacks of September 11, 2001.	在这一简明直白的观点看来，伊斯兰教——在世界经济落后地区的主宰性宗教——是2001年9月11日袭击背后的驱动力。


And, because those who believed this (virtually everyone whose voices were heard) belatedly perceived its insulting connotation, discussing the matter has caused considerable anguish in the years since.	而由于信奉伊斯兰教的人（几乎所有发出声音者都是如此）终于感受到伊斯兰教的伤害性内涵，因此多年来讨论此事引起了他们极大的痛苦。


There are no euphemisms that can inoffensively imply that one of the great world religions is a murderous, irrational ideology, unacceptable for modern, civilized human beings.	没有什么说法可以委婉暗示这个世界上最大宗教之一是一种凶残的非理性的意识形态，不为现代文明人类社会所容。


And yet two different American administrations have implied – and consistently acted upon – this assumption.	但两届美国政府都没有意识到这一点并据此行动。


But, once we place the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and the broader political phenomenon of international terrorism, in the context of other historical tragedies in the past century, religion becomes an unlikely explanation.	但是，如果我们将2001年9月11日的悲剧以及更广泛的国际恐怖主义政治氛围放在上个世纪的其他历史悲剧的环境中去考察，那么宗教将不再是一个解释性因素。


It is here where the influence of nationalism becomes obvious.	正是在这里，民族主义的影响力是显而易见的。


Nationalism has been the major motive force in the West since the beginning of the modern period.	进入现代以来，民族主义就一直是西方的主要推动力。


Historians have noted its influence in Elizabethan England (which produced the spirit animating the Puritan Rebellion and migration to America), and increasingly recognize it as the motive force behind the French and the Russian Revolutions.	历史学家已经注意到民族主义在伊丽莎白英国（清教徒叛乱和移民美洲的精神动力便源于此），也日渐认识到它也是法国和俄国革命背后的推动力。


Meanwhile, Chinese scholars are beginning to view it as the inspiration for Mao Zedong’s struggle against the Kuomintang (the openly self-named “Nationalist Movement”) and the policies of the People’s Republic.	与此同时，中国学者开始认为毛泽东对抗国民党（英文直译是中国民族主义党）以及中华人民共和国诸项政策也受到了民族主义的启发。


And no historical acumen is needed to understand that nationalism was the source of Hitler’s National Socialism and, therefore, World War II.	你不需要有多少历史嗅觉就能明白，希特勒的国家社会主义的根源也在民族主义，二战亦然。


In fact, it would be puzzling if this were not the case, given that nationalism is the cultural foundation of modernity – the framework of its social consciousness.	事实上，如果事情不是这样，那倒反而令人奇怪了。 这是因为民族主义是现代性的文化基础，社会意识的框架。


And, precisely because nationalism shapes the way we think, its role in phenomena that do not trumpet their nationalist motivation – like Al Qaeda’s attacks in 2001 – can easily be overlooked.	而正是因为民族主义决定了我们的思维，因此它在民族主义动机不太明显的现象中——比如2001年的基地组织袭击——很容易被忽视。


As a rule, most nationalists do not call themselves nationalists.	有一条规律，大部分民族主义者不称自己是民族主义者。


Like the rest of us, they believe that their nationalism is natural and does not have to be emphasized.	和我们其他人一样，他们认为民族主义是很自然的情感，不用刻意强调。


But a little self-examination should lead any thinking person to recognize that we all are nationalists – we feel, think, and react to the world as nationalism prescribes.	但只要你还有点思考力，稍稍自我审视一下就能发现我们所有人都是民族主义者——我们像民族主义所描述的那样感受和思考世界并对世界做出反应。


Nationalism is a temporal vision (and thus secular, even when using religion in its rhetoric) that divides people into sovereign communities of equal members.	民族主义是一种当代思维（因此也是世俗的，即使在它自称具有宗教性的时候），它将人们分裂为诸多由平等成员组成的主权社区。


The equality of national membership (which, at the same time, may be exclusively defined) elevates every member’s status to that of the elite, making it dependent on the dignity of the nation as a whole.	民族身份的平等性（与此同时，这一特性可能是排他的）让所有成员都具有了精英身份，其命运也与民族的整体��运融为一体。


As a result, those who possess national consciousness become committed to and defensive of the dignity of the nation – measured by its standing, or prestige, vis-à-vis other nations.	结果，那些具有民族认同感的人将献身于捍卫民族命运，而民族命运体现在与其他民族相比的地位和声望中。


That is why competition for national prestige has been the main motive in international politics since the beginning of the twentieth century.	这就是为什么自20世纪初以来民族声望之争便成为国际政治的主要动机。


Specifically, the aggressor in many international conflicts in this period has been motivated by perceived injury to national dignity.	特别地，在这一时期的众多国际冲突中，入侵方的动机均是他们感到民族尊严受到了伤害。


Actual injury is not necessary: the perceived superiority of another nation is enough.	这种伤害并不一定是实际伤害：感觉地其他民族一等已经足够。


In an advanced modern society, such as Germany, intellectuals have no difficulty using openly nationalist language to convince a nationally conscious populace of threats to national prestige.	在发达的现代社会（如德国）里，知识分子可以毫无困难地使用明白无误的民族主义语言让具有民族意识的大众相信其民族地位受到了威胁。


By contrast, in a society where national consciousness is limited to the better educated (for example, the Arab Middle East), they must resort to traditional means of mobilization.	相反，在一个民族意识只局限于受过良好教育人群的社会（如阿拉伯中东），就必须通过传统的动员手段。


In the case of the Middle East, that traditional mobilizer is Islam, and so threats to national prestige are presented as threats to Islam.	在中东，传统的动员力量就是伊斯兰教，因此对民族地位的威胁就会以对伊斯兰教的威胁出现。


Some nations do not feel threatened by imaginary insults to national dignity – for various historical reasons, they believe themselves to be superior to others.	一些国家不会因想象民族尊严受到侵害而感到威胁——处于种种历史原因，它们认为自己高其他民族一等。


But, if their prestige is in fact at stake, the perception of a threat becomes decisive.	但是，如果它们的民族地位真的受到了威胁，那么这种危机感就会起到决定性作用。


Why else would citizens across the developed world be so preoccupied with their economic competitiveness?	若非如此，为什么发达世界公民如此纠结于他们的经济竞争力？


Is it not enough for us to be well off?	我们越过越好还不够吗？


Why do we need to be better off than others?	为什么我们非得比别人过得更好才行？


Why, for example, do Americans feel so threatened by the peaceful economic rise of China (as they did by Japan’s economic success in the 1980’s)?	比如，为什么美国人会因中国的和平经济崛起（正如日本在20世纪80年代的经济成功）而感到大受威胁？


To no longer be “Number One” would offend America’s sense of dignity.	不再是“世界第一”会损害美国人的自尊感。


There is no more to it than that.	就这么简单。


China is now also motivated by nationalism, and it will rise as high as a motivated population of 1.3 billion people can.	中国也在受民族主义推动，13亿人的动力有多大，它就将走得多高。


The threat to America’s international standing is real; but, blinded by it, Americans believe that they are still in a position to condescend to China as they would to an inferior power.	美国国际地位的威胁是实实在在的； 但是，美国人被这蒙蔽了双眼，认为屈尊于中国无异于屈尊于劣等强国。


For the time being, the Chinese may be too preoccupied with their own backyard to pay attention to such insults, but it is foolish to offend them deliberately.	目前，中国人或许因埋头于自身发展而忽略了美国的屈辱感，但故意冒犯他们是很愚蠢的。


Because Americans misunderstood the motives behind the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States fought two costly wars, which did not defeat its enemies and have left the Middle East more volatile than ever.	由于美国人误解了2001年9月11日袭击背后的动机，因此美国掀起了两场昂贵的战争，结果敌人没有打败，而中东变得比以往更加动荡了。


Being blind to the connection between nationalism and dignity in China – and in America’s own conduct when dealing with China – may cost the US even more.	对民族主义和中国的自尊——以及美国自身在处理对华关系时的指导思想——之间的关系视而不见将让美国付出更加沉重的代价。


The Paradox of Identity Politics	身份政治的悖论


BARCELONA – The United Kingdom’s recent general election provided a clear example of how the question of national identity is reshaping Europe’s political landscape.	巴塞罗那—最近的英国大选是一个显著的例子，表明了民族身份问题如何左右着欧洲政治格局。


The Scottish National Party, embodying a left-wing version of identity politics, wiped out Labour in Scotland, allowing the Conservatives to gain an absolute majority in Parliament.	持有左倾身份政治观的苏格兰民族党（Scottish National Party）在苏格兰重挫工党，让保守党赢得议会绝对多数。


The government of Prime Minister David Cameron – who has focused on British identity, rather than the UK’s common destiny with Europe – will undoubtedly hold a referendum on the UK’s continued membership in the European Union, with unpredictable consequences.	首相卡梅伦的政府——卡梅伦一直关注英国身份而非英国和欧洲的共同身份——将毫不迟疑地举行关于英国是否继续留在欧盟内的结果难料的公投。


For decades, political debate in Europe focused largely on economic institutions and policies.	几十年来，欧洲政治争论大多集中在经济制度和政策上。


Conservatives argued for a private sector-driven economy, unfettered markets, low taxes, reduced government spending, and limited public goods.	保守派支持通过私人部门驱动的经济、自由市场、低税收、削减政府支出和限制公共品。


Liberals and social democrats supported a private-ownership economy, markets, European integration, and increased trade, tempered by substantially redistributive taxes and transfers, a strong social safety net, and some public ownership in areas such as infrastructure and finance.	自由派和社会民主派支持私人所有权经济、市场、欧洲一体化和增加贸易，辅之以带巨大的再分配性质的税收和转移支付、强大的社会安全网以及基础设施和金融领域的某种程度的公共所有权。


In this bi-polar system, the parties differed on the nuances of economic policy, but broadly agreed on democratic values, the European project, and the need to adapt to and manage globalization, rather than reject it wholesale.	在这个两极分化的体系中，政党在经济政策的细节上有分歧，但总体上都认同民主价值、欧洲工程以及适应和管理全球化的需要，而不是全盘否定。


But, with the growing success of appeals to identity and renewed ethnic or religious nationalism, that is changing.	但是，随着身份吁求的日渐成功和种族和宗教民族主义的复兴，局面正在改变。


Are the ghosts of the early and mid-twentieth century returning?	二十世纪中早期的幽灵正在死灰复燃吗？


The question is particularly relevant for Europe, but it also has global significance.	该问题对欧洲特别重要，但从全球范围看亦不可等闲视之。


In the Middle East, for example, identity politics is manifesting itself in its most sinister form: a chaotic and violent clash between Sunni and Shia Muslims, exemplified by the rise of the Islamic State.	比如，在中东，身份政治正在以最邪恶的形式展现：逊尼派和什叶派之间的混乱而暴力的冲突，伊斯兰国的崛起就是明证。


Loyalty to a perceived identity can have innocuous and enriching components, such as, say, the promotion of a regional language.	忠于观念身份（perceived identity）可以包括丰富的无害内容，比如推动地区语言。


The problem with identity politics is that it places the “in” group at odds with the perceived “other” – an approach that can easily foster chauvinism, invidious discrimination, and open antagonism.	身份政治的问题在于它将“我”族和观念上的“他”族对立起来——这一方法很容易导致沙文主义、不公平歧视和公开对抗。


One major reason for the resurgence of identity politics in Europe is globalization, which has limited the capacity of countries or peoples to control their economies.	欧洲身份政治死灰复燃的一个主要原因是全球化，全球化限制了国家或民主的经济控制力。


Indeed, the global economy has become so interconnected, and world markets so powerful, that there appears to be little scope for national policies to disrupt hyper-mobile capital flows.	事实上，全球经济深度互联，世界市场强大无比，国家政策破坏高度流动的资本流的空间非常小。


While globalization has helped to boost overall prosperity, it has been most beneficial for those who form the new global elite.	全球化帮助推动了总体繁荣，但获益最多的是新全球精英。


Meanwhile, many people in Europe face greater economic insecurity, owing to new technologies or competition from lower-cost workers elsewhere.	与此同时，拜新技术或来自其他地区的更低成本工人的竞争所赐，许多欧洲人面临着更大的经济不安全。


Unless they can upgrade their knowledge and skills – and, in some cases, move to a new industry or location – they face constrained economic opportunities.	除非他们能够升级自己的知识和技能——在某些情况中，还要进入新的行业和地区——否则他们的经济机会将受到限制。


These disadvantaged groups are particularly large in the countries that were hit hardest by the recent global financial crisis and now struggle with high unemployment.	在最近的全球金融危机中受冲击最大、目前陷入高失业的国家，这些劣势群体的规模特别巨大。


But even people who are relatively prosperous are frustrated by some features of globalization.	但即使相对较繁荣的人群，也对全球化的某些特征十分不满。


They may oppose the use of their taxes to “subsidize” poorer people who do not share their identity, such as immigrants, French-speaking Belgians, southern Italians, or Greeks.	他们可能反对用他们的税收“补贴”与他们身份不同的穷人，比如移民、操法语的比利时人、南法意大利人或希腊人。


When it comes to trade protectionism, European integration, and economic globalization, those on the far right and the far left often share the same views.	当问题来到贸易保护主义、欧洲一体化和经济全球化时，极右翼和极左翼持有相同的观点。


In France, for example, many supporters of the National Front voted communist 30 years ago.	比如，在法国，许多国民阵线（National Front）支持者是30年前共产主义的支持者。


And, indeed, the National Front’s economic program is rather similar to that of the Left Front (an electoral bloc comprising the French Communist Party and the Left Party).	此外，国民阵线的经济计划也确实和左翼阵线（Left Front，由法国共产党和左翼党组成的选举联盟）十分相似。


Of course, when it comes to immigration and human rights, the internationalist ideological tradition of socialism prevents extreme nationalist and racist discourse on the far left.	当然，对于移民和人权问题，社会主义的国际主义意识形态传统阻止了极左翼的极端民族主义和种族主义倾向。


But, given that these parties are competing with the far right for the same disenchanted voters, their humanism on these issues has become a severe political handicap, which may explain why the extreme right has lately been more successful electorally.	但是，考虑到这些政党正在与极右翼争夺同一批幻想破灭的选民，它们在这些问题上的人道主义已经成为严重的政治阻碍，这也许解释了极右翼最近在选举方面更加成功的原因。


Meanwhile, the rise of identity-driven political movements presents a huge challenge for Europe’s traditional political parties.	与此同时，身份驱动的政治运动的兴起对欧洲传统政党形成了巨大的挑战。


Mainstream conservatives, widely perceived as being in thrall to the economic interests of the wealthy, must find ways to appear populist – but without sounding too much like their far-right competitors on immigration and human rights.	主流保守派——他们普遍被认为是富人经济利益的奴隶——必须设法表现出民粹主义，但在移民和人权问题上又不能太像他们的极右翼竞争对手。


Cameron has succeeded in this delicate balancing act – and has been rewarded by voters.	卡梅伦成功地取得了这一精妙的平衡，因此得到了选民的奖赏。


Mainstream Republicans in the United States, pressured by the more extreme forces within their party, face a similar challenge.	美国的主流共和党饱受党内极端力量的压力，也面临着类似的挑战。


For center-left parties, the task is even more daunting.	至于中左翼政党，任务更加艰巨。


They must offer voters a realistic economic program that is market-friendly and open to international trade, while promising tangible benefits to the poorer 60-70% of the population who are understandably frustrated with their lack of economic progress.	它们必须向选民勾勒现实的经济计划——对市场友好，对国际贸易持开放方针——同时承诺人口中60—70%的较贫困人群获得实在好处——不难理解，他们因为无法取得经济进步而感到不满。


If a left party’s economic policy is perceived as a weak copy of the right’s agenda, the poorest segments of the population will gravitate to chauvinist forces and their false promises of protection from the consequences of globalization.	如果左翼政党的经济政策被认为只是右翼日程的减弱版抄袭，较贫困人群就会倒向沙文主义力量及其保护他们免受全球化后果的虚假承诺。


The upcoming elections in Spain, Turkey, Denmark, and Portugal – not to mention next year’s US presidential election – will present their own versions of these challenges.	即将到来的西班牙、土耳其、丹麦和葡萄牙选举——更不用说明年的美国总统选举了——将让上述各国面临自身的这些挑战。


The left, in particular, will have to defend the principles of equality and democracy, while finding ways to manage irreversible globalization, including through international cooperation.	特别是，左翼必须捍卫平等和民主原则，同时找到办法管理不可逆转的全球化——包括通过国际合作。


The great paradox is that if the rise of identity politics continues, governments will be even less able to address the problems that are fueling it.	一个大悖论是，如果身份政治继续崛起，政府将更加无法解决助长身份政治崛起的问题。


Europe’s Dangerous Nostalgia	欧洲危险的怀旧


MADRID – The European Union has a dangerous case of nostalgia.	马德里—欧盟有一种危险的怀旧。


Not only is a yearning for the “good old days” – before the EU supposedly impinged on national sovereignty – fueling the rise of nationalist political parties; European leaders continue to try to apply yesterday’s solutions to today’s problems.	对“过去的好日子”——在感到欧盟对国家主权形成冲击之前——的渴望助长了民族主义政党的崛起； 欧洲领导人仍然试图用昨天的办法解决今天的问题。


Everyone was supposed to benefit from European integration.	所有人都应该从欧洲一体化中获得好处。


Whenever a new country joined, it received financial aid, while existing members gained access to a new market.	一个新国家不论何时加入，都能得到金融援助，同时已有成员国能够获得一个新市场。


The advantages, it was expected, would be apparent not just from aggregate data, but also from individual citizens’ own experience.	人们预期，其优势不光显而易见地体现在加总数据上，也体现在个体公民的自身体验中。


But reality has been less clear-cut.	但现实并不那么显而易见。


In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the EU’s weaker economies faced skyrocketing unemployment, especially among young people, while its stronger economies felt pressure to “show solidarity” by bailing out countries in distress.	2008年全球金融危机爆发后，欧盟较疲软的经济体失业特别是年轻人失业飙升，而较坚挺的经济体感到了救疲软国于水火之中的“表现凝聚力”的压力。


When the stronger economies provided those bailouts, they included demands for austerity that impeded the recipients’ economic recovery.	当较坚挺经济体提供援助时，它们要求受助国采取妨碍经济复苏的紧缩。


Few were satisfied, and many blamed European integration.	没有人感到满意，许多人更是将矛头指向了欧洲一体化。


In this context, political parties and movements criticizing or opposing the EU have gained considerable traction, particularly in Western Europe.	在这样的背景下，批评或反对欧盟的政党和运动获得了极大的推动力，特别是在西欧。


While these movements are nothing new, support for them has grown at alarming rates during the crisis-induced turmoil.	这些运动一点都不新鲜，但在危机所带来的动荡中，它们的支持度以令人警惕的速度增加。


Indeed, with every failed policy to aid economic recovery, Europeans have felt increasingly disenchanted, fueling populist sentiment and demands for a return to national sovereignty.	事实上，在支持经济复苏的政策纷纷失败的情况下，欧洲人越来越不再抱有幻想，这助长了民粹主义情绪和回归国家主权的要求。


The political leaders channeling these demands do not just want to reassert national control in all areas; they are also spreading a message of indifference to ‒ and even outright rejection of ‒ foreigners, reflected in their response to Europe’s influx of refugees.	引导这些要求的政治领导人不但希望在所有领域都重新实现国家控制； 他们还传播要冷漠地对待外国人，甚至一概拒之门外，他们对大量涌入欧洲的难民的反应就是明证。


According to them, each country should defend its own by any means, even if the rule of law is tested along the way.	根据他们的说法，每个国家都应该采取一切办法保护自己，即使这样会令法治受到考验。


But, while the economic pain that many Europeans feel is certainly real, the nationalists’ diagnosis of its source is false.	但是，尽管许多欧洲人所感到的经济痛苦是实实在在的，但民族主义者对这一痛苦来源的判断却是错误的。


The reality is that the EU can be criticized for the way it handled the crisis; but it cannot be blamed for the global economic imbalances that have fueled economic strife since 2008.	现实是，欧盟可以因为其处理危机的方式而被批评； 但你不能指责它造成了助长2008年以来的经济灾难的全球经济失衡。


Those imbalances reflect a much broader phenomenon: globalization.	这些失衡反映的是更加广泛的现象：全球化。


This does not mean that globalization is a bad thing.	这并不意味着全球化是坏东西。


Opening up societies and economies to the world obviously entails significant uncertainty; but it also provides abundant opportunities.	向世界开放社会和经济显然意味着巨大的不确定性，但也提供了数不尽的机会。


Not long ago, Europe was the world leader in openness.	不久前，欧洲还是世界开放的领袖。


In fact, the European project is, at its core, a mirror of the opening that is an inextricable consequence of living in today’s globalized world.	事实上，欧洲工程的核心便是开放的一面镜子，而开放是生活在当今全球化世界中的不可避免的结果。


In 2004, when the EU formally welcomed eight formerly communist countries as member states, European openness reached its pinnacle.	2004年，欧盟正式接纳八个前共产主义国家为成员国，欧洲的开放也达到了顶点。


A new age seemed to be dawning in Europe, in which the rule of law, democracy, and individual rights were unassailable.	欧洲似乎迎来了一个法治、民主和个人权利毋庸置疑的新时代。


Yet, just as West European countries have begun to resist openness, so have their Central and East European counterparts.	但是，正如西欧国家开始抵制开放，中欧和东欧国家亦是如此。


Indeed, in some countries – particularly Poland and Hungary – nationalism and anti-EU sentiment have surged.	事实上，在一些国家——特别是波兰和匈牙利——民族主义和反欧盟情绪大幅增长。


Unfortunately, this has led to erosion of the rule of law.	不幸的是，这导致了法治受到侵害。


Poland is the largest recipient of European funds and the only EU country that avoided recession during the crisis; indeed, it has experienced 23 years of uninterrupted growth.	波兰是欧洲资金的最大接收国，也是唯一一个在危机中避免了衰退的欧盟国家； 事实上，它已经实现连续23年增长。


Moreover, the Polish public has been broadly supportive of the EU since becoming members.	此外，自入盟以来，波兰公众普遍支持欧盟。


Even the latest Eurobarometer indicates that 55% of Poles view the EU positively.	即便在最新的欧洲民意调查中也有55%的波兰人对欧盟持正面态度。


Yet Poland’s government, led by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, is aiming to change that, by portraying European policies as a threat to Polish national identity.	但由极右翼的法律与正义党（PiS）领导的波兰政府想要改变这一点。 他们将欧洲政策描述为对波兰民族身份的威胁。


Instead of discussing how to adapt specific policies to Poland’s national interests or amplify the country’s voice at the European level, PiS writes off all European measures and decisions as a direct challenge to what makes Poland Poland.	PiS没有讨论如何调整具体的政策使之与波兰国家利益相符，或增强波兰在欧洲层面的声音，而是将一切欧洲措施和决定贬斥为对波兰性的直接挑战。


These claims, to some extent, echo those of the Hungarian government, led by the right-wing Fidesz party.	从某种程度上讲，这些主张与右翼的青年民主党（Fidesz）领导的匈牙利政府的主张遥相呼应。


The constitutional reforms implemented in 2013, among other things, expanded the executive’s authority and created a new state council, stacked with Fidesz members, to regulate the media.	2013年所实施的宪法改革以及其他政策扩大了行政机关的权力，并成立了一个由青年民主党党员把持的新的国家委员会来监管媒体。


Some say that if Hungary sought admission to the EU today, it would be refused entry.	有人说，如果匈牙利今天才寻求加入欧盟，将被拒绝。


As for Poland, the European Commission has launched an unprecedented inquiry in response to recent legislation that, under the pretense of “protecting national sovereignty,” concentrates more power in the government’s hands.	至于波兰，欧盟委员会就其最新的立法——以“保护国家主权”的名号将权力集中在政府手里——启动了前所未有的调查。


This represents a disappointing reversal.	这是令人失望的反转。


In my former professional roles, I witnessed as few others did the entry of Poland and Hungary into the Euroatlantic institutions.	在我从前的职业生涯中，我很少看见波兰和匈牙利加入欧洲大西洋机构这样的事件。


I saw firsthand the eagerness and hope of their peoples at that momentous time.	我在第一线目睹了在这一历史性时刻，这些国家的人民所表现出来的渴望和希望。


That is why it is so hard for me to understand their position today.	因此，我非常难以理解他们今天的立场。


Of course, it is not unreasonable that Poland and Hungary, whose sovereignty was largely usurped by the Soviet Union, are particularly sensitive to external efforts to shape their decision-making and have a stronger sense of national identity than other EU countries.	当然，波兰和匈牙利的主权曾经被苏联大量侵害，因此它们特别敏感于外部行动左右它们的决策、比其他欧盟国家具备更强烈的民族身份感不可谓不合理。


But rejecting the EU will not insulate them from the uncertainty resulting from globalization.	但拒绝欧盟无法让它们将来自全球化的不确定性隔离。


On the contrary, it will leave them far more vulnerable to the phenomenon’s myriad risks.	相反，这将导致它们更加容易受到全球化的各种风险的影响。


Some have used disenchanting experiences with globalization as an excuse for a return to protectionism and the supposedly halcyon days of strong national borders.	一些人用对全球化不再抱有幻想的体验作为回归保护主义和强力控制国家边境的好日子的借口。


Others, wistfully recalling a nation-state that never really existed, cling to national sovereignty as a reason to refuse further European integration.	还有一些人哀怨地回忆着从未真实存在过的民族国家，坚持将国家主权作为拒绝进一步欧洲一体化的理由。


Both groups question the foundations of the European project.	这两类人都质疑欧洲工程的基础。


But their memory fails them, and their yearnings mislead them.	但他们的记忆让他们失败，他们的渴望将他们误导。


Donald Trump and the New Economic Order	特朗普和新经济秩序


HONG KONG – Since the end of World War II, the hierarchy of economic priorities has been relatively clear.	发自香港——自二战结束以来，经济事务上的优先次序都相对清晰。


At the top was creating an open, innovative, and dynamic market-driven global economy, in which all countries can (in principal) thrive and grow.	最顶端是创造一个开放、创新和充满活力的以市场为导向的全球经济，（原则上）所有国家都可以茁壮成长。


Coming in second – one might even say a distant second – was generating vigorous, sustainable, and inclusive national growth patterns.	第二层——有人可能会说这个比较遥远——则是产生充满活力、可持续和包容性的国家增长模式。


No more.	除此之外就没有其它了。


In fact, a reversal seems to be underway.	事实上，一个逆转似乎正在进行。


Achieving strong inclusive national-level growth to revive a declining middle class, kick-start stagnant incomes, and curtail high youth unemployment is now taking precedence.	实现强大的包容性国家级增长以复苏陷入衰退的中产阶级，重启停滞的收入，以及遏制高青年失业水平等事项如今被置顶。


Mutually beneficial international arrangements governing flows of goods, capital, technology, and people (the four key flows in the global economy) are appropriate only when they reinforce – or, at least, don’t undermine – progress on meeting the highest priority.	那些关于商品、资本、技术和人员流动（全球经济中的四个关键性流动因素）的国际互利协议只有在它们能加强（或至少不破坏）推动最高优先级事务的进展时才算是合理的。