In response to this apparent resilience, the International Monetary Fund, which in recent years had characterized global growth as the “new mediocre,” recently upgraded its World Economic Outlook.	面对如此显而易见的恢复力，在近几年中将全球增长描述为“新平庸”（new mediocre）的国际货币基金组织（IMF），最近修正了其世界经济展望。


Will the recent growth spurt continue over the next few years?	当前增长强势能够在未来几年得到保持吗？


Or is the world experiencing a temporary cyclical upswing that will soon be subdued by new tail risks, like those that have triggered other slowdowns in recent years?	还是世界只是在经历一场短暂的周期性上扬，很快就会被新的尾部风险所压制，重蹈最最近几年的覆辙？


It is enough to recall the summer of 2015 and early 2016, when investor fears of a Chinese hard landing, an excessively fast exit from zero policy rates by the US Federal Reserve, a stall in US GDP growth, and low oil prices conspired to undercut growth.	想想2015年夏和2016年初，投资者担心中国硬着陆、美联储过快退出零政策利率、美国GDP增长停滞和低油价将共同削弱增长。


One can envision three possible scenarios for the global economy in the next three years or so.	可以为未来三年左右的全球经济构想出三种可能的情景。


In the bullish scenario, the world’s four largest, systemically important economies – China, the eurozone, Japan, and the United States – implement structural reforms that boost potential growth and address financial vulnerabilities.	在利好情景中，全球四大具系统重要性的经济体：中国、欧元区、日本和美国——都将实施提振潜在增长、解决金融弱点的结构性改革。


By ensuring that the cyclical upswing is associated with stronger potential and actual growth, such efforts would produce robust GDP growth, low but moderately rising inflation, and relative financial stability for many more years.	这些措施将保证周期性上扬与更强的潜在和实际增长相关，从而产生稳健的GDP增长、低但温和上升的通胀，以及未来多年的相对金融稳定。


US and global equity markets would reach new heights, justified by stronger fundamentals.	美国和全球股市将创出新高，证实基本面的好转。


In the bearish scenario, the opposite happens: the world’s major economies fail to implement structural reforms that boost potential growth.	在利空情景中，情况完全相反：世界主要经济体没有实施提振潜在增长的结构性改革。


Rather than using this month’s National Congress of the Communist Party as a catalyst for reform, China kicks the can down the road, continuing on a path of excessive leverage and overcapacity.	中国没有利用本月的中共党代会作为改革催化剂，而是选择回避问题，继续走过度负债和产能过剩之路。


The eurozone fails to achieve greater integration, while political constraints limit national policymakers’ ability to implement growth-enhancing structural reforms.	欧元区没有实现更大程度的一体化，同时政治约束限制了国家决策者实施提振增长的结构性改革的能力。


And Japan remains stuck on its low-growth trajectory, as supply-side reforms and trade liberalization – the third “arrow” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic strategy – fizzle out.	日本仍然陷在其低增长轨迹中难以自拔，供给侧改革和贸易自由化——首相安倍晋三的经济战略的第三支“箭”——宣布失败。


As for the US, the Trump administration, in this scenario, continues to pursue a policy approach – including a tax cut that overwhelmingly favors the rich, trade protectionism, and migration restrictions – that may well reduce potential growth.	至于美国，在这一情景中，特朗普政府继续追求大大削弱潜在增长的贸易方针——包括一边倒地有利于富人的减税、贸易保护主义和移民限制。


Excessive fiscal stimulus leads to runaway deficits and debt, which results in higher interest rates and a stronger dollar, further weakening growth.	过度财政刺激导致赤字和债务失控，从而带来更高的利率和美元升值，进一步制约增长。


Trigger-happy Trump could even end up in a military conflict with North Korea – and, later, Iran – diminishing America’s economic prospects further.	好斗的特朗普甚至有可能与朝鲜——随后还有伊朗——开启军事冲突，进一步恶化美国的经济前景。


In this scenario, the lack of reform in major economies will leave the cyclical upswing constrained by low trend growth.	在这一情景中，主要经济体改革缺位将让周期性上扬受制于低趋势增长率。


If potential growth remains low, easy monetary and credit policies could eventually lead to goods and/or asset inflation, eventually causing an economic slowdown – and possibly an outright recession and financial crisis – when asset bubbles burst or inflation rises.	如果潜在增长保持低迷，宽松的货币和信用政策最终将推高商品和/或资产通胀，最终造成经济减速——有可能还会带来全面衰退和金融危机——如果泡沫破裂或通胀上扬的话。


The third – and, in my view, most likely – scenario lies somewhere between the first two.	第三种——在我看来，也是最有可能的一种——情景介于前两者之间。


The cyclical upswing, in both growth and equity markets, continues for a while, driven by the remaining tailwinds.	周期性上扬——不论是增长还是股市——将在顺风的推动下持续一段时间。


Yet, while major economies pursue some structural reforms to improve potential growth, the pace of change is much slower, and its scope more modest, than is needed to maximize potential.	但是，尽管主要经济体采取了一些结构性改革以改善潜在增长，变化的速度远远赶不上潜力最大化的要求，规模也过于温和。


In China, this muddle-through scenario means doing just enough to avoid a hard landing, but not enough to achieve a truly soft one; with financial vulnerabilities left unaddressed, distress becomes all but inevitable over time.	在中国，这一差强人意的前景意味着改革堪堪避免硬着陆，但不足以实现真正的软着陆； 金融弱点没能得到解决，随着时间的推移，险情不可避免。


In the eurozone, this scenario would entail only nominal progress toward greater integration, with Germany’s continued rejection of true risk-sharing or fiscal union weakening incentives for struggling member countries to undertake tough reforms.	在欧元区，这一情景包括仅仅在名义上实现了更进一步的一体化，德国仍然拒绝真正的风险共担和财政联盟，这使得受困成员国没有什么动力采取艰难的改革。


In Japan, an increasingly ineffective Abe administration would implement minimal reforms, leaving potential growth stuck below 1%.	在日本，效率日益低下的安倍政府将实施最低限度改革，潜在增长难以超过1%。


In the US, Trump’s presidency would remain volatile and ineffective, with a growing number of Americans realizing that, despite his populist pretense, Trump is merely a plutocrat protecting the interests of the rich.	在美国，特朗普的总统任期将继续摇摆而低效，越来越多的美国人将意识到，尽管摆出一副十足的民粹主义模样，但特朗普其实只是个保护富人利益的财阀。 不平等性愈演愈烈；


Inequality rises; the middle class stagnates; wages barely grow; and consumption and growth remain anemic, at barely close to 2%.	工资鲜有增长； 消费和投资继续低迷，难以接近2%。


But the risks of muddling through extend far beyond mediocre economic performance.	但差强人意的风险远远不止于平庸的经济表现。


This scenario represents not a stable equilibrium, but an unstable disequilibrium, vulnerable to economic, financial, and geopolitical shocks.	这一情景不是稳定的均衡，而只是不稳定的均衡，很容易受到经济、金融和地缘政治冲击。


When such shocks eventually emerge, the economy will be tipped into a slowdown or, if the shock is large enough, even recession and financial crisis.	当这些冲击最终发生时，经济将陷入减速，而如果冲击足够大的话，甚至有可能出现衰退和金融危机。


In other words, if the world does simply muddle through, as seems likely, it could, within three or four years, face a more bearish outlook.	换句话说，如果世界只能做到差强人意——看起来可能性相当大——不出三四年也许就得面临利空情景。


The lesson is clear: either political leaders and policymakers demonstrate the leadership needed to secure a better medium-term outlook, or downside risks will materialize before long – and do serious damage to the global economy.	教训是明确的：要么政治领袖和决策者拿出确保更好的中期前景所需要的领导力，要么下行风险不久之后就成为现实——并给全球经济造成严重危害。


Good Times at Last?	终于迎来了好时光？


LONDON – In February 2017, I wrote an optimistic commentary called “The Global Economy’s Surprising Resilience.”	伦敦 – 2017年2月，我写了一则乐观的评论，题目是《令人惊喜的全球经济恢复力》（The Global Economy’s Surprising Resilience）。


The piece came as a surprise to those who saw only bleak prospects for Western countries, not least the United States, where US President Donald Trump had just been inaugurated.	这篇评论令那些只看到西方国家——包括特朗普刚刚发表了就职演说的美国——阴暗面的人感到震惊。


Now, nearly a year later, my three decades of experience in global financial markets leads me to believe that the economic situation is not quite as straightforward.	如今，近一年过去了，以我三十年的全球金融市场经验，我认为经济状况并不那么明白。


On the positive side, the half-dozen cyclical indicators I listed last February remain strong, and some have even strengthened further.	从积极的一面说，我在去年2月所列出的六个周期性指标仍然保持强劲，其中一些甚至比当时还要好。


One key indicator is South Korea’s monthly trade data.	一项关键指标是韩国月度贸易数据。


The country’s exports grew by 15.8% in 2017, the largest increase since 1956, when it began reporting these data.	2017年，韩国出口增长了15. 8%，为1956年有数据以来的最大涨幅。


Moreover, export growth occurred even as Trump threatened to withdraw from the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement and stoked tensions with North Korea – a powerful rebuke to those who have predicted retrenchment of global trade.	此外，出口增长是在特朗普威胁要退出美韩自由贸易协定并挑动与朝鲜的对峙的情况下实现的——对预测全球贸易萎缩的人来说，这是一记重创。


As I suspected a year ago, the slowdown in global trade in past years probably stemmed from the euro crisis and falling commodity prices, and would thus prove temporary.	我在一年前怀疑，过去几年的全球贸易减速可能是因为欧元危机和商品价格下跌导致的，因此是暂时性现象。


Now that those two events are behind us, global trade appears to have picked up.	如今，这两件事都已经成为过去，全球贸易似乎也已经重拾升势。


Of course, much will depend on whether trade momentum can be maintained.	当然，很多事情将取决于贸易势头能否得到保持。


Although South Korea’s export performance in December was impressive, it fell slightly short of forecasters’ expectations.	尽管韩国12月贸易表现令人印象深刻，但仍与预期略有差距。


We will have to wait and see if it remains strong in 2018.	我们需要观察2018年能否保持强势。


Another key cyclical indicator is reflected in monthly Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) surveys for manufacturing and services, which include underlying sub-indices for inventories and sales.	另一个关键性周期指标是制造业和服务业月度采购经理人指数（PMI）调查，包括存货和销售的基础次级指数。


Here, the news is remarkable: PMI survey results in many countries around the world are the strongest they have been in years.	这方面的表现也令人瞩目：全球许多国家PMI调查结果为多年来最好。


That includes the US, where I have found the Institute of Supply Management’s manufacturing index to be consistently accurate and indicative of underlying realities.	这其中包括美国，我认为其供给管理协会（Institute of Supply Management）的制造业指数一贯准确并可以作为基本现实的表征。


It also includes the eurozone, where PMI-survey data have reached their highest levels since before 2000.	这其中也包括欧元区，欧元区PMI调查数据为2000年以来最高值。


Even the United Kingdom’s monthly PMI surveys are showing momentum, though not as much as in other Western countries, most likely owing to the Brexit effect.	就连英国月度PMI调查也表现得动力十足，尽管与其他西方国家仍有差距，这最有可能是英国退欧的影响。


If the global economic environment continues to improve, the UK might luck out in its timing for withdrawing from the European Union, notwithstanding the growth-weakening effects that Brexit will surely have.	如果全球经济环境持续改善，那么英国可能选择了退出欧盟的最佳时机，尽管退欧必然会带来一些遏制增长的副作用。


Crucially, key indicators for China are looking good, too, particularly in terms of long-term growth in services and domestic consumption.	至关重要的是，中国的关键数据也表现向好，特别是服务业和国内消费的长期增长。


I continue to believe that these two factors will prove immensely consequential not just for China, but for the rest of the world as well.	我仍然相信，这两个因素不但将给中国带来巨大影响，也会给全世界造成很大的不同。


Many countries want to export more than just commodities and manufacturing inputs to China, and companies around the world are jockeying for access to China’s massive domestic market.	许多国家希望不仅仅向中国出口大宗商品和制造业投入品，世界各地的公司也在努力进入中国巨大的国内市场。


All told, forecasts projecting global GDP growth of 4% or more for 2018 seem credible.	总而言之，预测2018年全球GDP增长将达到或超过4%是可信的。


I would not be surprised to see sell-side forecasters lifting their numbers even further in the next two months.	如果卖方预测者在未来两个月中进一步提高预测数字我也不会感到意外。


The International Monetary Fund almost certainly will at its annual spring meeting, if not sooner.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）几乎肯定会在春季年会（如果不是更早的话）上调高预测。


So, what’s not to like in the global economic picture for 2018?	那么，我们有什么理由不对2018年全球经济局势感到乐观呢？


For starters, as a veteran of financial markets, I am usually wary of a strong consensus.	首先，作为金融市场“老兵”，我常常会担心强烈的共识。


While many oft-cited concerns in 2017 turned out to be unwarranted, that doesn’t mean economic risks have disappeared.	尽管许多2017年的老生常谈担忧最终证明只是无稽之谈，但这并不意味着经济风险已经消失。


In contrast to a year ago, people are increasingly acknowledging that the global economy is stronger than they had thought.	和一年前相反，人们日益接受全球经济比他们曾经设想的更强的现实。


But if growth continues to accelerate, the US Federal Reserve might end up hiking interest rates more than markets anticipated.	但如果增长继续加速，美联储可能会比市场预期更快地提高利率。


And the other major central banks, particularly the People’s Bank of China, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan, might reverse their exceptionally loose monetary policies.	其他主要央行，特别是中国人民银行、欧洲中央银行以及日本银行，也可能会扭转无与伦比的宽松货币政策。


To be sure, if the global economy is truly returning to relatively high and stable growth, monetary-policy tightening need not be harmful – and may even be less harmful than waiting for stronger evidence of inflation to emerge.	平心而论，如果全球经济真的正在回归相对高而稳定的增长，那么货币政策紧缩未必是有害的——甚至可能比等待更强烈的通胀信号出现危害更小。


Nevertheless, the world’s major economies have enjoyed remarkably generous monetary policies for a decade – and for far longer in Japan’s case.	尽管如此，世界主要经济体享受异常慷慨的货币政策已经十年之久——日本则要更久。


At the end of the day, no one really knows what the consequences of higher interest rates will be.	最终，没人真的知道提高利率会有什么后果。


For my part, I suspect that productivity growth will accelerate in a number of places, which would justify monetary-policy adjustments and make rising interest rates more tolerable.	对我来说，我怀疑生产率增长会在不少国家加速，这将证实货币政策调整的合理性，也让升息变得更加能够容忍。


But that is just a hunch, based on my reading of tentative wage and productivity data in the UK and the US, among other places.	但这只是一个预感，基于我对英国、美国和其他国家的暂时工资和生产率数据的解读。


One final concern is that, while not having gone full circle, the global mood has shifted from fear about political risks to obliviousness, even though many such risks still loom large.	最后的担忧是，尽管尚未完成整个周期，全球情绪已经从担忧政治风险转变为忘记，尽管许多政治风险仍然相当巨大。


The potential fallout from poor US leadership in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula cannot be ignored; nor can the long-term challenges still confronting Europe.	美国在中东和朝鲜半岛的拙劣领导力所可能造成的后果不容忽视； 而欧洲则仍然面临着长期挑战。


I have long believed that, at least for financial investors, it is better for everyone to be worried about everything than for a small minority to be worried on everyone else’s behalf.	我一贯相信，至少对于金融投资者，所有人担心所有事要比少数人替所有其他人担心要好。


Still, and more important, as long as financial conditions don’t tighten excessively as a result of today’s cyclical strengthening, global economic performance for the rest of this decade could end up being more robust than anyone would have imagined just a few years ago.	尽管如此——也更重要的是——只要金融条件不因为今天的周期性强势而变得过度紧缩，这个十年剩余时间中的全球经济表现有望比几年前所有人认为的更加强劲。


The Economic View from the Alps	阿尔卑斯山上的经济景观


LONDON – I recently took a trip to Switzerland – a remarkable country that I have been fortunate to visit many times over the past 40 years.	发自伦敦——我最近去了一趟瑞士，这是一个我有幸在过去40年中多次访问的伟大国家。


In addition to having a good time, I found a Swiss perspective useful to reflect on the state of the world and its economic vitality.	除了安享好时光之外，我还在这里发现了一个有助于反思全球状况及其经济活力的瑞士视角。


Aside from its wealth – or perhaps because of it – Switzerland has always struck me as a happy country.	在其财富之外——又或许是由于它的富庶——瑞士在我心目中一直是个幸福的国家。


While spending some time in Zurich in 1994, I first experienced the joy of swimming in the city’s river and lake.	在1994年留居苏黎世期间，我首先体验了在这座城市的河流和湖泊里游泳的乐趣。


And nowadays, it is common to see people doing this in many other urban areas, including Basel, where contented souls enjoy the mighty Rhine.	到如今在许多其他瑞士城市（包括巴塞尔）也能找到同样的乐趣，随处都是享受着宽广莱茵河的惬意灵魂。


I recently overheard two Swiss speakers teasing each other about whether the swimming is better in Zurich, Basel, or the capital, Bern, with its fast-flowing white waters.	我最近无意中听到两个瑞士人互相打趣，讨论究竟是苏黎世，巴塞尔还是水流湍急的首都伯尔尼更适合游泳。


Where else in the developed world can one enjoy such accessible pleasures?	试问哪些发达国家里可以享受到这样唾手可得的快乐呢？


I used to find it amusing that so many Germans regard Switzerland as their ideal country; as I have grown older, I have come to understand what they mean.	我以前不太理解为何许多德国人将瑞士视为自己的理想之国； 如今年岁渐长，我也明白了他们话中的含义。


Another reason to admire Switzerland is its astonishing railway system, which crisscrosses every nook and cranny of the country.	欣赏瑞士的另一个原因是其令人赞叹的铁路系统，基本覆盖了这个国家的角角落落。


On this occasion, we traveled by train to the Bernese Highlands (Berner Oberland), just as I had done nearly 40 years ago.	在这次旅途中我们乘坐火车前往伯尔尼高地（正如我30多年前一样）。


As we made our precisely timed connections with ease, I wondered why so many other Western governments have deemed the public sector to be incapable of running an efficient railway system. The Swiss system is a testament to how public expenditures and administration can benefit all of a country’s citizens.	当我们轻松实现准点换乘时，我就奇怪为什么其他诸多西方国家政府会认定公共部门无法运行有效的铁路系统，而瑞士制度恰恰证明了公共支出和行政管理是可以惠及本国所有民众的。


As someone who was deeply involved in the British government’s “northern powerhouse” project, I take the Swiss example to heart.	作为英国政府“北部强势经济带”项目的深度参与者，我真心将瑞士视为榜样。


It further bolsters my belief that the United Kingdom should make state-of-the-art railways a priority, especially in the north, to connect Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Sheffield, Newcastle, and their surrounding areas.	这个国家进一步巩固了我的信念，即英国应该把最先进的铁路作为首要任务，特别是在北部，将曼彻斯特，利兹，利物浦，谢菲尔德，纽卡斯尔及其周边地区连接起来。


Of course, in other ways, Swiss and British economic experience is nothing alike.	当然，另一方面瑞士和英国近年的经济走势也不尽相同。


In recent years, the Swiss franc has appreciated significantly against almost every other currency.	这几年瑞士法郎基本上对比各个货币都大幅升值。


For Britons, there are better ways to pass the time than to calculate the pittance that a pound now buys in Switzerland, and I was not surprised to see so few others on my trip.	对于英国人来说，与其计算现在一个英镑在瑞士能买些啥，不如找点其他事做，而不出所料，我在旅途中也没看见过几个同胞。


I did, however, see plenty of visitors from Asian countries at some of the Alps’ most beautiful sites.	不过在阿尔卑斯山最美丽的景点，我看到了很多亚洲游客。


This reminded me of my very first trip to Switzerland, as a student traveling on an Interrail card, when I saw Japanese tourists lined up to board the mountain train at Kleine Scheidegg. They were making the exciting climb up to the Jungfrau and the highest mountain station in Europe, and I seem to remember that they had their own carriage, perhaps to aid with translation.	这让我想起了自己第一次前往瑞士，作为一名持铁路通票的学生我看到日本游客排队登上小沙伊得克（Kleine Scheidegg）的山地火车，展开向少女峰和欧洲最高山地火车站攀登的惊喜之旅，我记得他们好像还有自己的一节车厢，或许是为了方便提供翻译服务。


Back then, Japan was supposedly about to overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy.	当时据说日本即将超越美国成为世界上最大的经济体。


But within a decade, its asset-price bubble had burst, and its economy had essentially flat-lined in nominal terms.	然而不过十年，其资产价格泡沫就宣告爆破，其名义经济增长基本上如一潭死水。


These days, it is China that will supposedly overtake the US; and, as it happens, that same Kleine Scheidegg station platform now has a carriage reserved for Chinese tourists.	如今据信要超过美国的又变成了中国； 在这个情况下，同样的小沙伊得克车站月台又为中国游客留下了一节车厢。


And yet there are still plenty of Japanese tourists in Switzerland, too; and in Grindelwald, one of the Bernese Highlands’s many picturesque villages, there is even a Japanese-language information center.	但仍然有大量的日本游客到访瑞士，在伯尔尼高地其中一个景区格林德瓦尔德（Grindelwald）甚至还有一个日语旅游信息中心。


This reveals a less-appreciated side of the Japanese economic story.	这揭示了日本经济故事中不太为人知的一面。


Adjusting for Japan’s declining workforce shows that in terms of per capita GDP, Japan has actually performed just as well as many other advanced economies in recent years.	如果考虑到日本劳动力下降的情况，日本在人均国内生产总值上的表现实际上与其他许多发达经济体相当。


Moreover, recent data indicate that Japan may be embarking on a strong, domestically driven economic expansion.	此外，最近的数据显示日本可能正在展开强劲的国内驱动型经济扩张。


In the second quarter of this year, its growth rate was among the best in the G7.	今年第二季度，其增长率位居G7国家之首。


Given these trends, I suspect that Switzerland will continue to host plenty of Japanese tourists in the coming years.	鉴于这一趋势，我想瑞士在未来几年将继续接待大量日本游客。


And if China, with its population of 1.4 billion people, maintains its economic trajectory of the last 20 years, the Swiss will probably have to build a new, much larger station at Kleine Scheidegg.	而如果拥有14亿人口的中国能维持过去二十年的经济轨迹，那么瑞士可能得在小沙伊得克兴建一个更大的新火车站。


Of course, China could also fall short of its aspirations, as its persistently bearish skeptics have predicted.	当然正如那些持续看空的怀疑论者所预料的那样，中国也可能会辜负这一愿景。


But while in Switzerland, I couldn’t help but think that the constant talk of China exaggerating its official economic data has become a farce.	但在瑞士，我不禁想到，关于中国夸大其官方经济数据的持续讨论已经沦为了一场闹剧。


To appreciate China’s rise, one need only look at all the Chinese tourists in the Bernese Highlands and many other places.	要检验中国的崛起，只需看看所有在伯尔尼高地和许多其他地方的中国游客就行了。


To be sure, the Chinese economic miracle will end at some point. But that time has not yet come.	可以肯定的是，中国的经济奇迹将会在某个时候结束，但那个时点还未到来。


On the contrary, my trip provided ample anecdotal evidence in support of the data showing a strong global recovery in 2017.	相反，我的旅行提供了充足的事实证据来支持那些反映2017年全球强劲复苏的数据。


That recovery is real, and it will most likely continue to broaden and include more countries – at least for now.	这种复苏是真实的，也很有可能继续扩大并涵盖更多的国家——至少是现在看来。


The West’s Broken Promises on Education Aid	言而无信的西方教育援助


NEW YORK – The Global Partnership for Education, a worthy and capable initiative to promote education in 65 low-income countries, is having what the jargon of development assistance calls a “replenishment round,” meaning that it is asking donor governments to refill its coffers.	发自纽约——全球教育伙伴关系计划这项旨在促进65个低收入国家教育状况的高价值高实现能力倡议正在进行发展援助界行话中所谓的“补给回合”，意味着它要求捐助国政府重新注资。


Yet the fact that the GPE is begging for mere crumbs – a mere $1 billion per year – exposes the charade of Western governments’ commitment to the global Education for All agenda.	然而该计划苦苦哀求的一点施舍——每年10亿美元——则暴露了西方政府对全球全民普及教育议程的虚伪承诺。


The United States and the European Union have never cared that much about that agenda.	美国和欧盟从未怎么关心过这一议程。


When it comes to disease, they have at times been willing to invest to slow or stop epidemics like AIDS, malaria, and Ebola, both to save lives and to prevent the diseases from coming to their own countries.	在疾病方面比，它们有时愿意拿钱出来减缓或遏制艾滋病、疟疾和埃博拉等流行病的传播，这样既可拯救生命又能防止疾病扩撒到自己的国家。


But when it comes to education, many countries in the West are more interested in building walls and detention camps than schools.	但在教育方面，西方许多国家对修建围墙和收容所的兴致可比学校要高。


The GPE does excellent work promoting primary education around the world.	全球教育伙伴计划在促进世界各地的初等教育方面做了出色的工作。


Donor countries, all of which long ago signed on to Education for All, should be clamoring to help one of the world’s most effective organizations to achieve that goal.	所有这些早已签署了全民普及教育议程的捐助国都应当争相帮助这个世界上其中一个最高效的组织去实现这一目标。


Yet generous donors are few and far between.	然而慷慨的捐助者却寥寥无几。


This reality extends back to imperial times.	这一现实可以上溯到帝国时代。


When most of Africa and much of Asia were under European rule, the colonizers invested little in basic education.	当大多数非洲国家和亚洲大部分地区都处于欧洲统治之下时，殖民者对基础教育的投入就很少。


As late as 1950, according to United Nations data, illiteracy was pervasive in Europe’s African and Asian colonies.	根据联合国的数据，截至 1950年文盲依然在欧洲的非洲和亚洲殖民地普遍存在。


At the time of independence from Britain, India’s illiteracy rate stood at 80-85%, roughly the same as Indonesia’s illiteracy rate at the time of independence from the Netherlands.	在从英国统治下独立出来的时候，印度的文盲率是 80~85%，与脱离荷兰统治时的印尼文盲率大致相同。


In French West Africa, the illiteracy rate in 1950 stood at 95-99%.	在法属西非地区，文盲率在1950年还停留在95~99% 的水平。


After independence, African and Asian countries pursued massive and largely successful initiatives to raise basic education and literacy.	在独立之后，非洲和亚洲国家采取了大规模和大体上成功的方案以提高基础教育和识字率。


Yet, far from seizing this opportunity to make up for lost time, Europe and the US have provided consistently meager assistance for primary and secondary education, even as they have made high-profile commitments such as Education for All and Sustainable Development Goal 4, which calls for universal access to pre-primary through secondary school.	然而欧美国家尽管对诸如全民普及教育和可持续发展目标 4这类呼吁全民普及学前到中学教育的议程做出了高调承诺，却远没有抓住这个机会来弥补失去的时机，只是为中小学教育提供了一贯微薄的援助。


Consider the grim data on development aid for education, which has stagnated for years – and actually declined between 2010 and 2015.	以多年来一直停滞不前的教育发展援助数据为例——实际上在2010~2015间下降了。


According to the most recent OECD data, total donor aid for primary and secondary education in Africa amounted to just $1.3 billion in 2016.	根据经合组织的最新数据，2016年各国对非洲中小学教育的援助总额仅为13亿美元，须知美国五角大楼的预算大约是每天20亿美元。


To put that figure in perspective, the US Pentagon budget is roughly $2 billion per day.	如果平摊在大约4.


With around 420 million African kids of school age, total aid amounted to roughly $3 per child per year.	2亿非洲学龄儿童身上的话，总援助大约相当于大约每个孩子每年3美元。


It’s not as if Western governments don’t know that far more is needed. Several detailed recent calculations provide credible estimates of how much external financing developing countries will need to achieve SDG 4.	我们不能说西方政府没意识到存在那么大个缺口，因为最近几项详细计算都提供了可靠的估算来说明发展中国家需要多少外部资金才能实现可持续发展目标4订立的目标。


A UNESCO study puts the total at $39.5 billion per year.	联合国教科文组织的一项研究认为每年的援助总量应为395亿美元。


A report by the International Commission on Financing Education Opportunity, led by former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, similarly put developing countries’ external financing needs at tens of billions of dollars per year.	由英国前首相戈登·布朗领导的国际教育融资机会委员会发布的一份报告也同样把发展中国家的外部融资需求提高到每年数百亿美元。


Here is the reason why aid is needed.	需要援助的原因如下。


A year of education in Africa requires at least $300 per student. (Note that the rich countries spend several thousand dollars per student per year.)	每一名非洲学生需要一年至少300美元的经费(请留意富国每年在每个本国学生身上花费几千美元)。


With Africa’s school-age population accounting for roughly one-third of the total, the per capita financing requirement is about $100.	由于非洲的学龄人口约占总人口的 1/3，因此人均融资需求约为100美元。


Yet for a typical African country, that’s about 10% of per capita national income – far more than the education budget can cover.	然而对于一个典型的非洲国家来说，这已经相当于人均国民收入的 10%，也远远超过了教育预算所能覆盖的范围。


External aid can and should cover the financing gap so that all children can attend school.	外援可以也应当被用于弥补这一资金缺口以令所有儿童都能上得起学。


That’s not happening.	但这一切都并未发生。


Annual spending per school-aged child in Sub-Saharan Africa is roughly one-third of the minimum needed.	撒哈拉以南非洲地区每个学龄儿童每年的支出大约只有最低需求标准的1/3。


As a result, most kids don’t come anywhere close to finishing secondary school.	结果大多数的孩子都无法完成中学教育。


They are forced to drop out early, because there are no openings in public schools and tuition for private school is far too high for most families.	他们被迫提早辍学，因为公立学校缺乏学位而对于大多数家庭来说私立学校的学费又太高了。


Girls are especially likely to leave school early, though parents know that all of their children need and deserve a quality education.	尽管父母知道自己所有的孩子都需要且应该接受高质量的教育，但女孩尤其有可能提早辍学。


Without the skills that a secondary education provides, the children who leave school early are condemned to poverty.	如果缺乏中等教育所提供的技能，过早辍学的儿童就会被贫穷所困。


Many eventually try to migrate to Europe in desperate search of a livelihood.	许多走投无路的人最终只能尝试偷渡欧洲谋生。


Some drown on the way; others are caught by European patrols and returned to Africa.	有人淹死在海上； 其他则被欧洲各国的巡逻队抓获并遣返。


So now comes the GPE’s replenishment round, scheduled for early February in Senegal.	如今全球教育伙伴计划的补给回合将于2月初在塞内加尔召开。


The GPE should be receiving at least $10 billion a year (about four days’ military spending by the NATO countries) to put Africa on a path toward universal secondary education.	该计划每年至少应该获得100亿美元（相当于北约国家大约四天的军费开支）来将非洲推上普及中等教育的道路。


Instead, the GPE is reportedly still begging donors for less than $1 billion per year to cover GPE programs all over the world.	相反，据报该计划仍在乞求捐助者每年不到10亿美元的援助以覆盖全世界的各个项目。


Instead of actually solving the education crisis, rich-country leaders go from speech to speech, meeting to meeting, proclaiming their ardent love of education for all.	富裕国家的领导人四处演讲出席会议以宣示他们对普及教育的热爱，却并未真正着手解决教育危机。


Across Africa, political, religious, and civil-society leaders are doing what they can.	在非洲，政治、宗教和民间社会领袖正在尽其所能。


Ghana has recently announced free upper-secondary education for all, setting the pace for the continent.	加纳最近宣布为所有人提供免费的高中教育，这为非洲大陆的发展设定了新的发展速度。


As African countries struggle to fund their ambitious commitments, new partners, including private companies and high-net-worth individuals, should step forward to help them.	鉴于非洲国家正奋力为其雄心勃勃的承诺筹集资金，包括私营企业和高净值个人在内的新伙伴都应该挺身相助。


Traditional donors, for their part, have decades of lost time to make up for.	而那些传统的捐赠者则有几十年的空缺要去弥补。


The quest for education will not be stopped, but history will judge harshly those who turn their backs on children in need.	对教育的追求永不停步，但历史终将严厉批判那些对急需帮助的孩子置之不理的人。


Financial Investors’ Wish List for 2018	金融投资者的2018心愿单


NEWPORT BEACH – If financial investors were to write letters to Santa Claus this Christmas, they would probably be tempted to ask for the continuation of the unusual combination of factors that has dominated over the last year: ultra-low market volatility, booming financial-asset values, correlations that lower the cost of portfolio risk mitigation, and promising new opportunities (such as Bitcoin).	发自纽波特滩——如果金融投资者今年圣诞节要给圣诞老人写信，他们很可能会祈求延续主导了过去一年的不寻常因素组合：超低的市场波动性，不断膨胀的金融资产价值，降低投资组合风险缓解成本的相关性状况，以及前途无量的新投资机遇（例如比特币）。


But before making their wish list, investors should consider the longer-term risks associated with the decoupling of financial markets from economic and policy fundamentals.	但在写下心愿单之前，他们也应该考虑一下因金融市场与经济和政策基本面脱钩而产生的更长期风险。


Investors could be forgiven for hoping for more of the same.	投资者发出这样的宏愿也是无可指摘的。


After all, with less than a month to go, 2017 is on course to be a hugely, if not historically rewarding year for them.	毕竟还剩不到一个月的2017年对他们来说堪称回报丰厚的一年——甚至有点历史性大丰收的意思。


As of December 12, global stock markets, and in particular the S&P index, had returned around 20% for the year – and this on top of an already-strong multi-year run.	截至 12月12日，全球股市，特别是标普指数，在今年已经上涨了约 20%——而且是在连续多年强劲上行的基础上。


Add to that unusually low volatility – in the US, 2017 so far has shown the lowest daily loss in the entire history of the S&P 500 index – and there has been little to keep investors up at night.	再加上异乎寻常的低波动性——在美国，标普500指数在2017年（至当日为止）呈现了历史上的最低单日损失——让投资者几乎可以在夜里睡个好觉了。


Usually, such strong stock returns are accompanied by lower prices for government bonds – the so-called negative correlation between risky and safe assets.	通常，这种强劲的股票回报率会伴随着政府债券价格的走低——也就是风险和安全资产之间的所谓负相关性。


Not so in 2017.	但在2017年可不是这样。


Despite the impressive equity rally, the price of longer-term US Treasury bills was higher at the beginning of December than at the start of the year.	尽管股市经历了令人印象深刻的上涨，但更长期美国国债的价格在12月初时可比年初更高。


And then there is the precipitous rise of the crypto-currency Bitcoin.	还有就是比特币这一加密货币的价格暴涨。


With its price having surged by an eye-popping amount this year (from around $1,000 to over $16,000 as of December 12), even a small allocation of Bitcoin has made a material difference in investors’ portfolios.	随着该币种在2017年出现了让人两眼发直的飙升（从约1000美元涨到12月12日的1. 6万美元以上)，就算是少量配置了比特币也会令投资组合回报产生巨大差异。


Five main factors have enabled this unusual situation.	五个主要因素造就了这种不寻常的状况：


·         A synchronized pickup in global economic growth, which continues to strengthen.	·         全球经济增长同步回升并继续走强。


·         Progress in the United States on pro-growth policies.	·         美国在促增长政策方面取得进展。


·         Skillful normalization of monetary policy (which is still ongoing) by the US Federal Reserve.	·         美联储精心策划的货币政策正常化（目前仍在进行）。


·         Passive investment products attracting large inflows.	·         被动投资产品吸引大量资金流入。


·         Continued large liquidity injections from three big central banks – the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) – which, together with cash-rich corporate balance sheets, have served to lower funding costs for a significant set of households and corporates.	·         来自三大央行——日本央行，欧洲央行和中国人民银行——的巨额流动性注入，连同现金充裕的企业资产负债表，令大量家庭和企业的融资成本进一步降低。


Now for the less exuberant news: without continued economic and policy improvements, the factors that have delighted investors in 2017 risk generating an unpleasant reversal of fortune.	此外还有一些不那么令人兴奋的消息：如果缺乏持续的经济和政策改善，这些在2017年令投资者欢欣不已的因素就会引发不愉快的财富逆转。


This year’s strong performance has, after all, been buoyed significantly by “borrowed” returns from future years.	毕竟今年的强劲表现其实在很大程度上是从未来几年“借来”的回报所支撑起来的。


With regard to mitigating portfolio risk, the increase in government bond prices leaves little room for this traditionally safe asset to compensate for a possible decline in stocks.	在降低投资组合风险方面，政府债券价格的上涨减少了这一传统安全资产弥补股价潜在下跌的空间。


Given how many value-at-risk-based models work, the persistence of low volatility has resulted in a crowded trade in a number of areas, which could turn out to be technically fragile.	鉴于有大量基于风险价值的模型在运行，持续的低波动性导致了一些领域的密集交易，进而产生了技术上的脆弱性。


As for Bitcoin, its vertiginous rise – fueled in part by the growing participation of institutional investors – may imply that it is on the path toward broad acceptance.	至于比特币，其令人眩目的上涨——部分得益于机构投资者的逐步进场——可能意味着它会逐渐被广泛接受。


But it may also turn out to be little more than a large financial bubble, implying serious damage when it inevitably collapses.	但它也可能只是一个巨大的金融泡沫，意味着在其不可避免地崩溃时会造成严重破坏。


What, then, should investors really be hoping for in the coming year?	这么说来投资者在未来一年还能寄望些什么呢？


In general, the top priority must be improvement in economic and policy fundamentals to the point that they better validate existing elevated asset prices, while laying a foundation for greater gains over time.	总的来说，首要事项必须是改善经济和政策基本面，以便更好地验证现有的高资产价格，同时为更大的收益打下基础。


Achieving this would require, in the US, the expansion of pro-growth policies, which, as recently announced by Donald Trump’s administration, would include adding an infrastructure plan to deregulation and tax measures.	实现这一目标需要美国扩大促增长政策的范围，正如特朗普政府最近宣布的那样将包括在放松管制和税收措施之外增加一项基础设施兴建计划。


European countries should also pursue more focused pro-growth measures at the national level, while supporting stronger regional efforts, facilitated by a reinvigorated reform-minded Franco-German leadership and a relatively orderly Brexit process.	欧洲国家还应在国家一级实施更为聚焦的促进增长措施，同时支持更强有力的区域性举措，这得由心怀重振改革思想的法德领导层和相对有序的英国脱欧进程来推动。


As for Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should take advantage of his commanding majority in the Diet, won in October’s snap general election, to implement the third “arrow” of Abenomics: pro-growth structural reforms.	至于日本，首相安倍晋三应该利用他在10月大选中赢得的国会决定性优势去实施安倍经济学的第三个“箭头”：有利于增长的结构性改革。


Finally, to promote stable growth, all of the world’s systemically important central banks – notably, the Fed, the BOJ, the ECB, and the PBOC – would need to continue coordinating their strategies, with a view to ensuring consistent monetary-policy stances.	最后，为了促进稳定增长，世界上所有具备系统重要性的央行——特别是美联储、日本央行，欧洲央行和中国人民银行——都需要继续协调其战略以确保货币政策立场一致。


Only with such efforts can the current pickup in global growth develop the structural roots that are needed to make it durable, balanced, and inclusive over the medium term.	只有通过这样的努力，目前全球增长的回升才能扎下必要的结构性根源，使其在中期内保持持久、平衡和包容性。


This is all the more critical at a time of fluid geopolitical risk and uncertain productivity, wage, and inflation dynamics.	这对于一个面对不稳定地缘政治风险以及不确定生产率、工资和通货膨胀动态的时代尤为关键。


However tempting it may be to focus our holiday wishes on our own immediate desires, it is imperative this year that investors’ wish lists take into account the big economic and policy picture.	不管我们的节日愿望对于我们的眼前欲望来说有多诱人，但在2018年，投资者的心愿单都必须跟经济和政策的大图景结合起来。


A Year of Successes in Global Health	公共卫生的成功的一年


BANGKOK – In the field of human development, the year that just ended was better than many predicted it would be.	曼谷—在人类发展领域，刚刚结束的一年比许多人预测得更好。


A decade after the Great Recession began, economic recovery continued in 2017, and progress was made on issues like poverty, education, and global warming.	大衰退爆发十年后，经济复苏在2017年得到了持续，贫困、教育和全球变暖等问题都取得了进展。


But perhaps the most significant achievements of the last 12 months were in global health.	但也许过去12个月来最大的成就发生在全球卫生领域。


I count 18 unique successes in 2017, many of which will help sow the seeds of progress for the months and years ahead.	我在2017年记录到18项独一无二的成功，其中许多有助于为未来几个月到几年的进展奠定基础。


The first notable success occurred early in the year, when a Guinness World Record was set for the most donations of medication made during a 24-hour period.	第一项令人瞩目的成功发生在年初，吉尼斯世界纪录为24小时最大规模药物捐赠设立了一条记录。


On January 30, more than 207 million drug doses were donated to treat neglected tropical diseases including guinea-worm disease, leprosy, and trachoma.	1月30日，全球共捐赠超过2. 07亿剂用于治疗被忽视的热带疾病的药物，包括麦地那龙线虫病、麻风病和砂眼。


This extraordinary feat was made possible by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and by pharmaceutical firms including Bayer, Novartis, Pfizer, and my company, Sanofi Pasteur.	这一非凡的成就是在比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会和包括拜耳、诺华、辉瑞我的公司诺斯菲巴斯德在内的制药企业的共同帮助下实现的。


India’s elimination of active trachoma was another milestone, as it marked an important turning point in the global fight against a leading infectious cause of blindness.	印度消灭砂眼活跃病例是另一个里程碑，它标志着全球对抗第一致盲因素的斗争迎来了重要的转折点。


Last year, trachoma was also eliminated in Mexico, Cambodia, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.	去年，阿曼、摩洛哥和墨西哥也消灭了砂眼。


A third key health trend in 2017 was further progress toward the elimination of human onchocerciasis, which causes blindness, impaired vision, and skin infections.	2017年的第三项关键性卫生趋势是消灭人类盘尾丝虫病的进程也实现了新的进展，人类盘尾丝虫病会造成失明、视力下降和皮肤感染。


Fourth on my list is a dramatic drop in the number of guinea-worm disease infections.	我名单上的第四项成功是麦地那龙线虫病感染病例大幅下降。


A mere 26 cases were recorded worldwide in 2017, down from 3.5 million cases in 1986.	2017年全世界只报告了26例病例，而1986年有350万例。


Efforts to eradicate leprosy earned the fifth spot on my list, while vaccine advances in general were sixth.	消灭麻风病的努力在我的名单中名列第五，总体疫苗进步则名列第六。


Highlights included a new typhoid vaccine, shown to improve protection for infants and young children, and a new shingles vaccine.	亮点包括一种新型伤寒疫苗，它能够改善对婴儿和幼童的防护。 此外还有一种新型带状疱疹疫苗。


Number seven is the dramatic progress made in eliminating measles.	第七项成功是消灭麻疹方面的巨大进步。


Four countries – Bhutan, the Maldives, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom – were all declared measles-free last year.	四个国家——不丹、马尔代夫、新西兰和英国都在去年宣布消灭了麻疹。


The war on Zika is number eight on my list of health achievements in 2017.	我的2017年卫生成就名单上的第八项是寨卡战争。


Thanks to coordinated global efforts, most people in Latin America and the Caribbean are now immune to the mosquito-borne virus, and experts believe transmission will continue to slow.	由于全球的协作努力，拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区大部分人民已经能够对这种蚊子传播的病毒免疫，专家相信其传播将继续放慢。


Number nine is polio eradication.	第九项成功是消灭脊髓灰质炎。


Fewer than 20 new cases were reported globally, a 99% reduction since 1988.	去年全球报告新病例不到20例，自1988年以来下降了99%。


Although the year ended with reports of cases in Pakistan, health experts remain optimistic that polio can be fully eradicated in 2018.	尽管年底发生了巴基斯坦报告病例，但卫生专家对2018年完全消灭脊髓灰质炎仍然保持乐观。


Rounding out my top ten was the creation of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), which was established to develop vaccines for infectious disease threats.	前十名的最后一项是传染病防疫创新联盟（CEPI）的成立。 其目的是开发传染病疫苗。


Launched with nearly $600 million in funding from Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK charity Wellcome Trust, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, CEPI aims to reduce sharply the time it takes to develop and produce vaccines.	德国、日本、挪威、英国慈善机构惠康基金会（Wellcome Trust）以及比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会共同出资近6亿美元成立的CEPI旨在大幅缩小开发和生产疫苗所需要的时间。


Huge gains in disease control and prevention were made last year, and the next few items on my list (11 through 16) reflect progress on specific illnesses.	去年，我们在疾病控制和预防方面取得了巨大的进步，我名单上接下来的几项（第11至第16）则代表了在具体疾病上所取得的进展。


For example, rates of premature death fell for non-communicable diseases like cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, and chronic respiratory conditions.	比如，非传染性疾病，如心血管疾病、癌症、糖尿病和慢性呼吸道疾病所造成的过早死亡率有所下降。


Another highlight was the historic approval of a sophisticated cancer treatment, CAR T-cell therapy, which uses a patient’s own immune cells to attack tumors.	另一个亮点是复杂癌症疗法CAR T细胞疗法历史性获批，这种疗法利用患者自身的免疫细胞去攻击肿瘤。


Improvements were also made in treating HIV.	在治疗艾滋病方面，我们也取得了进步。


Clinical trials for an HIV vaccine started at the end of 2017, while doctors in South Africa reported curing a young boy of the disease after he received treatments as an infant.	艾滋病毒疫苗临床试验在2017年年底启动，南非医生报告治愈了一位男幼童的艾滋病。 他从婴儿阶段接受治疗。


These and other initiatives give new hope to the many who are still suffering from this chronic condition.	这些和其他方案给了许多仍在遭受这一慢性疾病折磨的人新的希望。


Advances in treating gonorrhea, a common sexually transmitted infection that has become increasingly resistant to antibiotics, are also worthy of mention.	淋病治疗方面所取得的进步同样值得一提。 淋病是一种常见的性传播疾病，它对抗生素的耐药性日益提高。


Wrapping up my list of disease-specific gains of 2017 is the renewed commitment made by global health ministers to eradicate tuberculosis by 2030.	在我的2017年具体疾病进步名单上海包括全球卫生当局所做出的最新承诺——到2030年消灭结核病。


The final two successes are reminders of how much work remains.	最后两项成功提醒我们还有多少工作要做。


In August, the fast food giant McDonald’s unveiled a Global Vision for Antimicrobial Stewardship in Food Animals.	8月，快餐巨头麦当劳发布了食用动物抗生素管理全球愿景。


Although recognition of the food industry’s ethical responsibilities for public health is to be welcomed, the pledge also represents a cautionary note about how closely connected food and health really are.	尽管承认食品业对公共卫生负有道德上的责任值得欢迎，但这项承诺也是一个警告，揭示了食品和健康的紧密关系。


Finally, rounding out my list was the historic Universal Health Coverage Forum held in Tokyo, where global leaders gathered to discuss how to improve health-care access.	最后，我的名单上还列出了东京举行的历史性的全民健康覆盖论坛（Universal Health Coverage Forum），全球领导人齐聚一堂讨论如何改善医疗普及。


The World Bank and the WHO note that half of the world’s population still cannot obtain essential health services.	世界银行和世卫组织指出，全世界仍有一半人口无法获得基本卫生服务。


I therefore count the December meeting as a “success” not for its achievements, but because it was a reminder to the international community that improving health-care access remains a long-term endeavor.	我也将12月的这次会议列为“成功”，不是因为其成就，而是因为它提醒国际社会，改善医疗普及仍然是一项长期事业。


As the global health community resets its annual clock – and I begin cataloguing the big health stories of 2018 – we should take a moment to reflect on the 12 months recently ended.	在全球卫生界重启年度钟之际——也在我开始归类2018年卫生大事之际——我们应该花一些时间仔细思考刚刚结束的12个月。


Even in a mediocre year, the global health community saved millions of lives.	即使这是平凡的一年，全球卫生界仍然拯救了数百万生命。


Imagine what we will achieve in an extraordinary year.	想象一下，我们能够在杰出的一年会取得什么成就。


The Two Backlashes Against Globalization	全球化的两大反对力量


NEW DELHI – When I left India for graduate school in the United States in 1975, the word “globalization” was not in use anywhere in the world.	新德里—1975年我离开印度去美国读研究生时，全世界还没有人使用“全球化”一词。


Back then, crossing borders was still a big deal, and getting a US visa was no easy feat.	当是时，出国还是一件大事，获得美国签证绝非易事。


When I did arrive in America, to be an Indian still carried a whiff of the exotic and the unfamiliar.	当我真的到了美国，身为印度人还是能感受到一丝身在异乡为异客的味道。


Nowadays, globalization is inescapable.	如今，全球化已经是人人都逃脱不了的现象。


Over the course of less than three decades, trade barriers came down, and the combination of accessible airplane travel, satellite television, and the Internet has created a kind of interconnected “global village.”	不出三十年，贸易壁垒就被打破，说走就走的坐飞机旅行、卫星电视和互联网的合力形成了一个联动的“地球村”。


But two types of backlash are now casting doubt on globalization’s future.	但如今，两类反对力量正在给全球化的未来制造阴影。


The 2008 economic crisis seems to have been the turning point in public perception.	2008年经济危机似乎成为公共观点的转折点。


In the years leading up to the crisis, millions of people rose out of poverty, and democracy became more widespread than ever, creating the general sense that a golden age had begun.	在危机前的几年里，数百万人摆脱了贫困，民主比以往任何时候传播得都更加广泛，人们普遍认为我们已经进入了一个黄金时代。


Francis Fukuyama famously argued that in the grand global struggle over the future of human political and economic organization, the forces of democracy and liberal capitalism had won a definitive victory.	弗朗斯西·福山（Francis Fukuyama）提出了一个著名的论断，认为在关于人类政治和经济组织未来的全球大斗争中，民主和自由资本主义的力量已经赢得了彻底的胜利。


Then crisis struck, and the hubris of that era was quickly discredited.	接着，危机爆发，这一时代的狂妄很快便信誉扫地。


People began to note a distinct and deepening disparity between globalization’s winners and losers, with weak wage growth accompanied by robust returns for the wealthy.	人们开始注意到全球化赢家和输家之间巨大且不断深化的差距，伴随工资增长萎靡一起出现的是富人财富的高额回报。


In the United Kingdom, for example, wages have grown by only 13% since 2008, but the stock market is up by 115%.	比如，英国工资水平自2008年以来只增长了13%，但股市上涨了115%。


According to an annual Credit Suisse report, wealth inequality is now growing sharply in 35 of 46 major economies, compared to just 12 before 2007.	据瑞士信贷（Credit Suisse）的一份年度报告，46个主要经济体中有35个财富不平等性正在急剧恶化，而2007年之前只有12个。


In the developed world, the poor and the unemployed began to feel that they had no stake in the globalized system.	在发达世界，穷人和失业者开始觉得全球化体系没有给他们带来任何好处。


They condemned the political establishment for pursuing policies that sent their jobs to faraway lands like China and India.	他们谴责政治建制派所采取的政策把他们的岗位拱手让给了遥远的中国和印度等国家。


And they demanded a return to the old economic order, and thus to the promise that each new generation would earn more and live better than the last.	他们要求回归旧经济秩序，亦即每一代人都可以比上一代人赚得更多、获得更好的承诺。


But the backlash against economic globalization is only half of the story.	但经济全球化的反对力量只是故事的一半。 还有一股文化全球化的反对力量。


There has also been a backlash against cultural globalization – encompassing cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and secularism – driven by those who seek the comforts of traditional ethnic, religious, or national identity.	文化全球化包括世界主义、多边主义和世俗主义。 反对文化全球化的力量背后是那些从传统种族、宗教和民族身份中寻找安慰的人。


This identity-focused backlash is exemplified by US President Donald Trump, whose slogan, “Make America Great Again,” was code for “Make America White Again” – a message that appealed to the unemployed, bitter, and increasingly xenophobic white blue-collar voters that formed the core of Trump’s base.	这一以身份为中心的反对力量的显著例子是美国总统特朗普，他的口号——“让美国再次伟大”实质是“让美国再次变白”，它对失业、愤怒、越来越仇外的白人蓝领选民充满了号召力，他们也构成了特朗普的核心票仓。


But the America that Trump promised isn’t coming back: by 2030, a majority of the American labor force will be non-white.	但特朗普所承诺的美国并没有回来：到2030年，美国劳动力中非白人将占据多数。


While Trump is often viewed as a uniquely American phenomenon, he is actually just one part of a broader revolt by nationalists and traditionalists against a liberal globalist and cosmopolitan elite, in the name of a more religiously and culturally rooted identity.	尽管特朗普常常被视为美国特有的现象，但其实他只是民族主义者和传统主义者，打着更加强调宗教和文化根基的身份的旗号，反对自由派全球主义者和世界主义者精英的更广泛的反动的一部分。


Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and, in his own way, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are all capitalizing on this trend.	匈牙利总理欧尔班、土耳其总统埃尔多安，以及某种程度上的印度总理莫迪，都在利用这一趋势。


Even in places where far-right, xenophobic, and nationalist parties and politicians have not won power, they have made strides, as the Alternative für Deutschland did in Germany’s recent federal election.	即使在极右翼仇外民族主义政党和政客没能赢得权力的国家，他们也在赢得选民，德国另类选择党在最近的德国联邦选举中的表现就是明证。


Yet the resentment toward the so-called elites into which such leaders have tapped can be seen on the left as well.	但这些领导人所利用的对所谓的精英的怨恨，在左翼也能看到。


Consider the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US, which comprised young people claiming to represent the 99% who were left behind as the 1% continued to thrive.	以美国的占领华尔街（Occupy Wall Street）运动为例，参加这一运动的年轻人宣称他们代表被1%的享受继续繁荣的人抛在身后的99%。


The Democratic Party insurgency, led by Senator Bernie Sanders, opposed Hillary Clinton for much the same reason their right-wing counterparts did: with her well-paid speeches at Goldman Sachs, she was viewed as a representative of the Wall Street-linked globalized elite.	以参议员伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）为首的民主党叛逆者以和右翼分子同样的理由反对希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）：她在高盛的演讲让她赚得盆满钵满，因此她是与华尔街勾结在一起的全球化精英的代表。


Similar anti-elite sentiment, fueled partly by working-class resentment of cosmopolitanism and economic inequality, underpinned the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union.	类似的反精英情绪——部分受工人阶级对世界主义和经济不平等的怨恨的推动——支持了英国的脱欧运动。


There are now 1,800 billionaires globally, 70 of whom live in wealthy and cosmopolitan London, where residents overwhelmingly opposed Brexit.	如今，全世界有1,800名十亿美元级富翁，其中70人生活在富有的世界大都市伦敦，而伦敦居民一边倒地反对英国退欧。


But opposition to the EU was compounded by more fundamental issues of nationalism and identity, including citizens’ distaste for the large numbers of non-English-speaking immigrants from other member countries.	但反对欧盟的情绪与更为根本性的民族主义和身份问题混在在一起，包括英国公民对大量来自其他成员国的非英语移民的厌恶。


The economic and cultural backlashes against globalization do not always overlap.	反对全球化的经济和文化力量并不总是冲合在一起。


While Erdoğan and Modi, like Xi Jinping in China, promise national reassertion, they are still economic globalizers – the “Davos Man” who has come to represent the global elite.	埃尔多安和莫迪和中国的习近平一样，都承诺民族救赎（national reassertion），但他们仍然是经济全球化主义者——前来代表全球精英的“达沃斯人”（Davos Man）。


But the current specter of economic uncertainty is now reinforcing their nativism and chauvinism, just when similar tendencies are on the rise in the West.	但最近的经济不确定性幽灵正在强化他们的排外主义和沙文主义，与此同时，类似的潮流也在西方兴起。


Taken together, the two types of backlash against globalization explain why protectionist barriers to the free flow of goods, capital, and labor have been erected even in developed Western countries that long advocated greater openness.	合在一起，这两种全球化反对力量解释了为何即使在长期以来一直鼓吹加强开放的西方发达国家，阻碍商品、资本和劳动力自由流动的保护主义壁垒也一直存在。


In 2007, global capital flows reached a record high of $12.4 trillion, or 21% of the global economy.	2007年，全球资本流动达到了创纪录的高峰12. 4万亿美元，或全球经济的21%。


By 2016 the annual total had plummeted to $4.3 trillion, or 6% of the global economy – a lower share than in 1980.	到了2016年，年资本流动总量下降到4. 3万亿美元，或全球经济的6%——比1980年的比例还要低。


With total economic growth outpacing world trade growth of less than 2.5%, globalization has been rolled back decades.	在全球经济总增长率快于全球贸易增长率（不到2. 5%）的情况下，全球化倒退了几十年。


Yet, while globalization isn’t perfect, it has pulled millions out of poverty in developing countries like China and India, created new markets for goods made by poor countries, and reduced prices for rich-country consumers.	尽管如此，虽然全球化并不完美，但它仍让中国和印度等发展中国家的数百万人摆脱了贫困，为穷国制造的商品创造了新市场，也降低了富裕国家消费者面临的价格。


The economic and cultural backlash must be resisted, and the promise of global integration realized for all.	经济和文化反对力量必须克服，全球一体化的憧憬必须实现。


The Globalization of Our Discontent	不满情绪的全球化


NEW YORK – Fifteen years ago, I published Globalization and Its Discontents, a book that sought to explain why there was so much dissatisfaction with globalization within the developing countries.	发自纽约——十五年前，我出版了《全球化及其不满情绪》一书，试图解释发展中国家为何会对全球化如此不满。


Quite simply, many believed that the system was “rigged” against them, and global trade agreements were singled out for being particularly unfair.	很简单，许多国家认为这个制度是被“操纵”来对付它们的，而且还把全球贸易协定专门提出来作为体现特别不公平状况的事例。


Now discontent with globalization has fueled a wave of populism in the United States and other advanced economies, led by politicians who claim that the system is unfair to their countries.	如今对全球化的不满在美国和其他发达经济体激起了一股民粹主义浪潮，而那些引领这一浪潮的政客也声称这个体制对自己的国家不公平。


In the US, President Donald Trump insists that America’s trade negotiators were snookered by those from Mexico and China.	比如美国总统特朗普就认定美国的贸易谈判者当年肯定是中了墨西哥人和中国人的圈套。


So how could something that was supposed to benefit all, in developed and developing countries alike, now be reviled almost everywhere?	试问一个本应为发达国家及发展中国家所有民众造福的体制为何会沦落到四处人人喊打？


How can a trade agreement be unfair to all parties?	怎么可能出现一份对各方都不公平的贸易协议？


To those in developing countries, Trump’s claims – like Trump himself – are laughable.	对于发展中国家的人来说，特朗普的主张就像特朗普本人一样可笑。


The US basically wrote the rules and created the institutions of globalization.	撰写全球化规则和创建全球化机构都是美国人。


In some of these institutions – for example, the International Monetary Fund – the US still has veto power, despite America’s diminished role in the global economy (a role which Trump seems determined to diminish still further).	尽管美国在全球经济中的作用有所减弱（对特朗普来说似乎还不够弱），但在其中一些机构中——例如国际货币基金组织——仍然拥有否决权。


To someone like me, who has watched trade negotiations closely for more than a quarter-century, it is clear that US trade negotiators got most of what they wanted.	对于像我这样一个在超过1/4个世纪以来密切关注贸易谈判的人来说，很显然美国的贸易谈判者已经获得了大部分他们想要的东西。


The problem was with what they wanted.	而问题则在于他们究竟想要什么。


Their agenda was set, behind closed doors, by corporations.	他们的议程是由大企业闭门捣鼓出来的。


It was an agenda written by and for large multinational companies, at the expense of workers and ordinary citizens everywhere.	这是一个由大型跨国公司撰写的议程，而付出代价的则是全世界的劳动者和普通公民。


Indeed, it often seems that workers, who have seen their wages fall and jobs disappear, are just collateral damage – innocent but unavoidable victims in the inexorable march of economic progress.	事实上，我们经常会觉得那些遭遇工资下调和岗位撤销的劳动者只是受到了间接伤害——他们只是无情的经济发展进程巨轮下的一群无辜且无从躲避的受害者。


But there is another interpretation of what has happened: one of the objectives of globalization was to weaken workers’ bargaining power.	然而对依然发生的一切还存在另一种解释：全球化的目标之一就是削弱工人的议价能力。


What corporations wanted was cheaper labor, however they could get it.	企业想要的是更便宜的劳动力，而它们也已经得到了。


This interpretation helps explain some puzzling aspects of trade agreements.	这一解释有助于解释贸易协定中某些令人费解的方面。


Why is it, for example, that advanced countries gave away one of their biggest advantages, the rule of law?	比如为何发达国家会放弃了它们其中一项最大的优势——法治呢？


Indeed, provisions embedded in most recent trade agreements give foreign investors more rights than are provided to investors in the US.	事实上，最近几项贸易协议中所包含的条款给予了外国投资者比美国投资者更多的权利。


They are compensated, for example, should the government adopt a regulation that hurts their bottom line, no matter how desirable the regulation or how great the harm caused by the corporation in its absence.	比如说如果政府实施了一个伤害到这些企业最终盈利状况的规定，那么无论这个规定多么令人满意，或者无论企业会在规定缺失的情况下会造成多大危害，它们都会得到补偿。


There are three responses to globalized discontent with globalization.	对于全球化的全球性不满情绪有三种反应。


The first – call it the Las Vegas strategy – is to double down on the bet on globalization as it has been managed for the past quarter-century.	第一种可称之为拉斯维加斯的策略是把过去二十五年来那套全球化赌注翻倍。


This bet, like all bets on proven policy failures (such as trickle-down economics) is based on the hope that somehow it will succeed in the future.	这个赌注，就像所有对业已证明的失败政策（例如滴流经济学）的赌注一样，是基于一种或许未来某个时候就能取得成功的寄望。


The second response is Trumpism: cut oneself off from globalization, in the hope that doing so will somehow bring back a bygone world.	第二种回应是特朗普主义：脱离全球化，希望这样做能以某种方式回到过去的那个世界。


But protectionism won’t work. Globally, manufacturing jobs are on the decline, simply because productivity growth has outpaced growth in demand.	但是贸易保护主义是行不通的，因为在全球范围内制造业就业人数正在下降，原因很简单：生产率增长超过了需求增长。


Even if manufacturing were to come back, the jobs won’t.	即使制造业能回归，就业机会也不会随之而来。


Advanced manufacturing technology, including robots, means that the few jobs created will require higher skills and will be placed at different locations than the jobs that were lost.	包括机器人在内的先进制造技术意味着创造出的少数工作将需要更高的技能，将被安置在那些与流失就业岗位所在地不同的地点。


Like doubling down, this approach is doomed to fail, further increasing the discontent felt by those left behind.	然而就像前面的双倍下注一样，这种做法注定失败，还会进一步激发那些感觉被抛弃者的不满。


Trump will fail even in his proclaimed goal of reducing the trade deficit, which is determined by the disparity between domestic savings and investment.	特朗普甚至在他所宣称的减少贸易赤字目标上也将遭遇失败，这是由国内储蓄和投资之间的差距所决定的。


Now that the Republicans have gotten their way and enacted a tax cut for billionaires, national savings will fall and the trade deficit will rise, owing to an increase in the value of the dollar. (Fiscal deficits and trade deficits normally move so closely together that they are called “twin” deficits.)	现在共和党已经在为亿万富豪实行减税问题上得偿所愿，但由于美元升值，国民储蓄将会下降而贸易赤字将会上升（财政赤字和贸易赤字通常紧密地联系在一起，以至于被称为“双胞胎”赤字）。


Trump may not like it, but as he is slowly finding out, there are some things that even a person in the most powerful position in the world cannot control.	特朗普可能不喜欢这一点，但正如他即将逐渐意识到的那样，就算你是一个全球最有权势的人，有些事情也是无法控制的。


There is a third approach: social protection without protectionism, the kind of approach that the small Nordic countries took. They knew that as small countries they had to remain open.	还有第三种方法：无保护主义政策下的社会保护，也是各个北欧小国的做法。


But they also knew that remaining open would expose workers to risk. Thus, they had to have a social contract that helped workers move from old jobs to new and provide some help in the interim.	它们知道自己作为小国必须保持开放，但也知道保持开放会使劳动者面临风险，因此必须订立一个社会契约去帮助劳动者从旧工作转向新工作，并在此期间提供一些帮助。


The Nordic countries are deeply democratic societies, so they knew that unless most workers regarded globalization as benefiting them, it wouldn’t be sustained.	北欧国家是非常民主的社会，所以它们知道除非能让大多数劳动者将全球化视为有利因素，否则就无法持续下去。


And the wealthy in these countries recognized that if globalization worked as it should, there would be enough benefits to go around.	而这些国家的富人也认识到，如果让全球化以其应有的状态去运作，那么就有足够的好处去腾挪转移。


American capitalism in recent years has been marked by unbridled greed – the 2008 financial crisis provides ample confirmation of that.	美式资本主义近年来被打上了贪婪无止境的烙印——2008年金融危机就是充分的证据。


But, as some countries have shown, a market economy can take forms that temper the excesses of both capitalism and globalization, and deliver more sustainable growth and higher standards of living for most citizens.	但正如一些国家所表明的那样，市场经济可以采取某些可以缓和过度资本主义和全球化的形式，为大多数公民提供更可持续的增长和更高的生活水平。


We can learn from such successes what to do, just as we can learn from past mistakes what not to do.	我们可以从这样的成功中得到教益，正如我们可以从过去的错误中学到什么不该做的那样。


As has become evident, if we do not manage globalization so that it benefits all, the backlash – from the New Discontents in the North and the Old Discontents in the South – is at risk of intensifying.	显而易见的是，如果我们不能管理好全球化让其能造福于全球，那么来自北半球的新不满者和南半球的旧不满者的反弹就有可能加剧。


Globalization’s Political Fault Lines	全球化的政治断层


NEW YORK – The United Kingdom’s narrow vote to leave the European Union had specific British causes.	发自纽约——英国民众以微弱多数投票脱离欧盟的举动虽然是英国人自己的事。


And yet it is also the proverbial canary in the coalmine, signaling a broad populist/nationalist backlash – at least in advanced economies – against globalization, free trade, offshoring, labor migration, market-oriented policies, supranational authorities, and even technological change.	然而大家也都知道，这就如同煤矿里的那只金丝雀（注：用来提早预警瓦斯泄露，比喻出现坏事的最初征兆），预示了大规模民粹主义/民族主义对全球化、自由贸易、业务外包、劳动力流动、市场导向政策、超国家机构，甚至是技术变革的反向冲击——至少在发达经济体就是如此。


All of these trends reduce wages and employment for low-skill workers in labor-scarce and capital-rich advanced economies, and raise them in labor-abundant emerging economies.	上述这些趋势令低技能工人的工资和就业在劳动力短缺但资本充足的发达经济体和劳动力充裕的新兴经济体中此消彼长。


Consumers in advanced economies benefit from the reduction in prices of traded goods; but low and even some medium-skill workers lose income as their equilibrium wages fall and their jobs are threatened.	发达经济体的消费者从商品价格下降中受益； 但低端甚至一些中等技术工人则因为均衡工资下降且工作机会受威胁而减少了收入。


In the “Brexit” vote, the fault lines were clear: rich versus poor, gainers versus losers from trade/globalization, skilled versus unskilled, educated versus less educated, young versus old, urban versus rural, and diverse versus more homogenous communities.	在“脱欧”投票中也展现出了明显的断层：富人/穷人，贸易及全球化的赢家/输家，高技能/低技能劳动者，受过良好教育/低教育程度，年轻人/老年人，城市/农村，多样性/单一型社区。


The same fault lines are appearing in other advanced economies, including the United States and continental Europe.	而在其他发达经济体，包括美国和欧洲大陆，都出现了类似的断层。


With their more flexible economies and labor markets, the US and the UK have recovered more strongly than continental Europe in terms of GDP and employment since the 2008 global financial crisis.	凭借更为灵活的经济和劳动力市场，2008年全球金融危机后的美英两国在GDP和就业方面实现了比欧洲大陆更强劲的复苏。


Job creation has been robust, with the unemployment rate falling below 5%, even if real wages are not growing much.	虽然实际工资并未增长多少，但就业岗位数量增长迅猛，失业率也下降到5％以下。


Yet in the US, Donald Trump has become the hero of angry workers threatened by trade, migration, and technological change.	而在美国，唐纳德·特朗普俨然成为了那些惨遭贸易，移民和技术变革排挤的愤怒劳工的救世主。


In the UK, the Brexit vote was heavily influenced by fear that immigrants from low-wage EU countries (the proverbial “Polish plumber”) were taking citizens’ jobs and public services.	在英国，脱欧表决则被一种低工资欧盟国家（大家所谓的“波兰管道工”）将侵占本地公民就业机会和公共服务的恐惧所深刻左右着。


In continental Europe and the eurozone, however, economic conditions are much worse.	而欧洲大陆和欧元区的经济状况则差得多。


The average unemployment rate hovers above 10% (and much higher in the eurozone periphery – more than 20% in Greece and Spain) with youth unemployment over 30%.	平均失业率徘徊在10％（在欧元区外围国家更高——在希腊和西班牙超过20％），年轻人失业率超过30％。


In most of these countries, job creation is anemic, real wages are falling, and dual labor markets mean that formal-sector, unionized workers have good wages and benefits, while younger workers have precarious jobs that pay lower wages, provide no employment security, and offer low or no benefits.	大多数国家几乎创造不出什么就业，实际工资一路下跌，双轨制的劳动力市场意味着服务于正规部门的工会工人坐拥良好工资和福利，而年轻劳动者则只能取得工资更低且不稳定的工作，没什么就业保障，津贴也时有时无。


Politically, the strains of globalization are twofold.	全球化进程在政治上则面对着双重压力。


First, establishment parties of the right and the left, which for more than a generation have supported free trade and globalization, are being challenged by populist, nativist/nationalist anti-establishment parties.	首先，那些几十年来都支持自由贸易和全球化的老牌政党，无论左派右派，都遭到了民粹主义和本土/民族反建制政党的挑战。


Second, establishment parties are being disrupted – if not destroyed – from within, as champions of anti-globalization emerge and challenge the mainstream orthodoxy.	其次，随着反全球化的主角们纷纷涌现并质疑主流正统政治观念，老牌政党都从内部产生了分化——如果不能称之为破坏的话。


Establishment parties were once controlled by globalization’s beneficiaries: capital owners; skilled, educated, and digitally savvy workers; urban and cosmopolitan elites; and unionized white- and blue-collar employees.	那些老牌政党以往都处于全球化受益者——资本家； 高技术，高教育程度，熟练掌握数字技术的劳动者；


But they also included workers – both blue- and white-collar – who were among the losers from globalization, but who nonetheless remained loyal, either because they were socially and religiously conservative, or because center-left parties were formally supporters of unions, workers’ rights, and entitlement programs.	加入工会的白领和蓝领员工——的控制之下。 但这些政党里也包括了一些沦为全球化输家的蓝领和白领劳动者，但这些人仍然保持忠诚，要么是因为他们在社会和宗教上较为保守，要么是因为左翼政党一直都是工会，工人权益与福利项目的正式支持者。


After the 2008 financial crisis, globalization’s losers started to organize and find anti-establishment champions on both the left and the right.	2008年金融危机之后，全球化的输家开始组织起来并在左右两派中寻找反建制领袖。


On the left, the losers in the UK and the US, especially young people, found champions in traditional center-left parties: Jeremy Corbyn in the UK’s Labour Party, and Bernie Sanders in America’s Democratic Party.	在左派方面，在英美两国的输家，尤其是年轻人，在传统的中间偏左政党中找到了人选：英国工党的杰里米·科宾（Jeremy Corbyn）和美国民主党的伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）。


The deepest fault lines emerged among center-right parties.	而最深的断层则出现在中右翼政党之中。


These parties – the Republicans in the US, the Tories in the UK, and center-right parties across continental Europe – confronted an internal revolt against their own leaders.	这些政党——美国共和党，英国保守党以及整个欧洲大陆的中间偏右政党——都遭遇了反对本党领袖的内部叛乱。


The rise of Donald Trump – anti-trade, anti-migration, anti-Muslim, and nativist – is a reflection of an uncomfortable fact for the Republican establishment: the party’s median voter is closer to those who have lost from globalization.	唐纳德·特朗普的崛起——反贸易，反移民，反穆斯林和本土主义——对共和党的体制来说是一个令人不安的事实：本党的中间选民正在向那些全球化的输家靠拢。


A similar revolt took place in the UK’s Conservative Party, with globalization’s losers coalescing around the party’s “Leave” campaign or shifting allegiance to the populist anti-EU UK Independence Party.	类似的哗变也发生英国的保守党身上，那些全球化的输家们逐渐聚集在本党的“脱欧”运动旗帜下，或直接投奔了民粹主义反欧盟的英国独立党。


In continental Europe, where multi-party parliamentary systems are prevalent, political fragmentation and disintegration are even more severe than in the UK and the US.	在普遍实行多党议会制度的欧洲大陆，政治上的分裂和瓦解比英美更严重。


On the EU’s periphery, anti-establishment parties tend to be on the left: Syriza in Greece, Italy’s Five Star Movement, Spain’s Podemos, leftist parties in Portugal.	在欧盟外围国家，反建制的政党往往属于左派：希腊的激进左翼联盟，意大利的五星运动党，西班牙的“我们能”党（Podemos），葡萄牙的几个左翼政党。


In the EU core, such parties tend to be on the right: Alternative for Germany, France’s National Front, and similar far-right parties in Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and elsewhere.	而在欧盟核心区，这类党派往往是右派：德国的另一道路党（Alternative），法国的国民阵线，以及奥地利，荷兰，丹麦，芬兰，瑞典和其他国家的类似极右政党。


But, despite the growing number, organization, and mobilization of globalization’s losers, globalization itself is not necessarily doomed.	但尽管全球化输家的数量，组织和动员能力都不断增强，全球化本身也并不一定在劫难逃。


For starters, it continues to yield net benefits for advanced and emerging markets alike, which is why the losers still tend to be a minority in most advanced economies, while those who benefit from globalization are a large – if at times silent – majority.	首先，它依然在为发达国家和新兴市场带来净收益，这也是为何输家依然是大多数发达经济体中的少数派，而那些受益于全球化的人则是大多数——不过有时有点沉默罢了。


In fact, even the “losers” benefit from the lower prices of goods and services brought about by globalization and technological innovation.	事实上，即使是“输家”也享受到了全球化和技术创新所带来的廉价商品和服务。


This also why populist and anti-establishment parties are still a political minority.	这也就是为什么民粹主义和反建制政党在政治上依然是少数的原因。


Even Syriza, once in power, backpedaled and had to accept austerity, as an EU exit would have been much costlier.	即使如希腊激进左翼联盟这样的政党，一朝上台，也只能背弃选举承诺并不得不接受紧缩政策，因为知道退出欧盟代价更高。


And Spain’s recent general election, held three days after the Brexit referendum, suggests that, despite high unemployment, austerity, and painful structural reforms, moderate, pro-European forces remain a majority.	和西班牙最近的大选中——就在英国脱欧公投三天后举行——也表明即便遭遇失业率高企，财政紧缩和痛苦的结构改革，温和派亲欧洲势力依然占多数。


Even in the US, Trump’s appeal is limited, owing to the demographic narrowness of his electoral base. Whether he can win the presidential election in November is highly doubtful.	即使在美国，由于特朗普选民基础的人口构成相当狭窄，因此他的吸引力也相当有限，此人是否能赢得11月的总统大选也非常值得怀疑。


This is also why pro-European center-right and center-left coalitions remain in power in most of the EU.	这也是为何大多数欧盟国家依然由亲欧洲的中右和中左联盟掌权。


The risk that anti-EU parties may come to power in Italy, France, and the Netherlands – among others – is rising, but still remains a distant possibility.	在一众欧盟国家中，反欧盟政党在意大利，法国和荷兰上台的可能性正在上升，但依然较为渺茫。


Finally, economic theory suggests that globalization can be made to benefit all as long as the winners compensate the losers.	最后，经济理论认为只要全球化的赢家可以对输家做出适当的补充，就可以惠及全民。


This can take the form of direct compensation or greater provision of free or semi-free public goods (for example, education, retraining, health care, unemployment benefits, and portable pensions).	这可能需要的直接补偿或提供更多免费或半免费的公共产品（例如教育、培训、医疗，失业福利以及可以四处迁移的养老金）。


For workers to accept more labor mobility and flexibility as creative destruction eliminates some jobs and creates others, appropriate schemes are needed to replace income lost as a result of transitional unemployment.	由于创造性破坏消灭了一些工作也催生了一些新的工作，劳动者也得接受更多的劳动力流动性和灵活性，也需要实施适当的政策项目来替代因过渡性失业导致的收入损失。


In the continental EU, establishment parties remain in power partly because their countries maintain extensive social welfare systems.	在欧洲大陆上的欧盟各国，老派政党得以继续掌权的部分原因也是因为他们的国家维持了全面的社会福利制度。


The backlash against globalization is real and growing. But it can be contained and managed through policies that compensate workers for its collateral damage and costs.	无可否认，这股反全球化的浪潮确实存在且不断滋长，但可以通过补偿工人因全球化而遭遇的间接损害和成本的政策来加以遏制和管理。


Only by enacting such policies will globalization’s losers begin to think that they may eventually join the ranks of its winners.	只有通过制定这样的政策，那些全球化的输家们才会最终加入得益者的行列。


Does Trade Fuel Inequality?	贸易会促进不平等吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Inequality has become a major political preoccupation in the advanced economies – and for good reason.	发自剑桥——不平等状况已经成为了发达经济体的主要政治焦点，而且有着充分的理由。


In the United States, according to the recently released World Inequality Report 2018, the share of national income claimed by the top 1% of the population rose from 11% in 1980 to 20% in 2014, compared to just 13% for the entire bottom half of the population.	在美国，根据最近发布的《2018年世界不平等状况报告》，最顶层那1％的人口占国民收入的份额从1980年的11％上升到了2014年的20％，而位于社会收入层级底部那50%的人口只得到了总收入的13%。


Qualitatively similar, though less pronounced, trends characterize other major countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.	该状况在法国，德国和英国等其他主要国家虽然不太明显，但其性质也极为类似。


To explain the rise in inequality that began in the 1980s and has accelerated since the turn of the century, many have pointed out that indicators of globalization, such as the trade-to-GDP ratio, have also risen since 1980.	为了解释发端于1980年代并从世纪之交以来不断加速的不平等状况，许多人都指出这是因为自1980年以来类似贸易相对GDP比率这类全球化指标有所上升。


But does that correlation imply a causal link between trade and inequality?	但这种相关性是否就意味着贸易与不平等之间存在因果关系？


There are certainly reasons to doubt it.	我们显然有诸多理由怀疑去怀疑这一点。


The global trade-to-GDP ratio peaked in 2008 at 61%, after a 35-year climb, falling back to 56% by 2016 – at precisely the time when fear of globalization reached political fever pitch.	全球的贸易相对GDP比率在经历了35年的攀升之后于2008年达到61%的峰值，随后在2016年回落到56％——这也正是对全球化的恐慌上升为政治狂热之时。


What if we look at the world as a whole, rather than individual countries?	但如果我们把整个世界视为一个整体，而不是个别国家呢？


As Columbia’s Xavier Sala-i-Martin pointed out in 2002 and 2006, even as inequality has risen in nearly every country, inequality across countries has decreased, owing largely to the success of developing countries like China and India in raising their per capita incomes since the 1980s.	正如哥伦比亚大学经济学教授萨维亚·萨拉-伊-马丁（Xavier Sala-i-Martin）在2002年和2006年分别指出的那样，虽然几乎每个国家的不平等现象都在增加，但由于中国和印度这样的发展中国家自1980年代以来成功地提高了其人均收入，国家之间的不平等状况却有所收窄。


Multiple factors, including urbanization, high savings rates, and improved access to education, undoubtedly underlie these countries’ impressive performance.	包括城市化，高储蓄率和受教育渠道扩大等多重因素无疑是这些国家令人刮目相看的基础。


But, if one uses geography to isolate exogenous determinants of trade, it becomes apparent that trade has been among the most powerful drivers of Asia’s economic success, and thus the convergence between the developed and developing worlds.	但如果我们用地理学来隔离外生性的贸易决定因素，贸易很显然就成为创造亚洲经济成就的最强大驱动力之一，也因此成为发达世界和发展中世界之间差距的弥合因素。


For someone like US President Donald Trump, this would indicate that Asia’s success has come at America’s expense.	对于美国总统特朗普这类人来说，这表明亚洲的成功是以美国为代价的。


This view of trade as a zero-sum game was a feature of the mercantilist theory that reigned three centuries ago, before Adam Smith and David Ricardo made the case that trade would normally benefit both partners, by enabling each to take advantage of their comparative advantages.	三个世纪前占统治地位的重商主义理论的一个特征就是将贸易视为一场零和博弈，但随后亚当·斯密和大卫·李嘉图都证明贸易其实对双方都有所裨益，因为每一方都可以发挥自身的比较优势。


But the Smith-Ricardo theory has a key limitation: it does not distinguish among a country’s citizens, and therefore cannot address the question of income distribution within a country.	但斯密-李嘉图理论存在一个关键的局限性：它不会对一个国家的公民进行分类，因此也无法解答一个国家内部的收入分配问题。


Given this, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson model may be more useful, as it distinguishes between workers and owners of physical, financial, or human (skills) capital.	有鉴于此，赫克歇尔-奥林-斯托波尔-萨缪尔森模型（Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson model，简称HO-SS）可能为更有效，因为它将劳动者和物质，金融或人力（技能）资本的所有者区分了开来。


The HO-SS theory, which dominated international economic thinking from the 1950s through 1970s, predicted that international trade would benefit the abundant factor of production (in rich countries, the owners of capital) and hurt the scarce factor of production (in rich countries, unskilled labor).	在1950~70年代占据国际经济思想主流的HO-SS理论预测国际贸易将有利于丰裕的生产要素（在富裕国家就是资本的所有者），并损害稀缺的生产要素（在富裕国家就是低技能劳动者）。


Workers could command higher wages if they did not have to compete against abundant labor in poorer countries.	这些工人本可以拿到更高的工资，但在较贫穷国家庞大劳动力大军的竞争之下却无法如愿。


Then came the post-1980 revolutions in trade theory.	随之而来就是1980年后的几大贸易理论革命。


Paul Krugman and Elhanan Helpman introduced the previously neglected elements of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale.	保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）和伊尔哈南·赫普曼（Elhanan Helpman）引入了以往被忽视的不完全竞争和规模随回报提升等因素。


Later, in 2003, Marc Melitz showed how trade could shift resources from low-productivity to high-productivity firms.	后来在2003年，马克·梅里茨（Marc Melitz）展示了贸易如何将资源从低生产率转移到高生产率企业。


Critics of globalization latched onto these newer economic theories, claiming that they demanded a rethinking of the traditional case for free trade.	全球化的批评者抓住这些新经济理论不放，声称他们要求重新思考传统的自由贸易状况。


It was precisely at that time, however, that the HO-SS trade theory’s prediction that free trade would hurt lower-skill workers in rich countries apparently began to materialize.	也正是在那个时候，HO-SS贸易理论对自由贸易会伤害富裕国家低技能工人的预测开始成为了现实。


Yet not all of the HO-SS theory’s predictions have come true.	然而并非所有的HO-SS理论的预测都已经实现。


As Pinelopi Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik reported in 2007, the expectation that trade would reduce inequality in the countries with the most unskilled workers, because their services are in greater demand in an integrated world market, has not been borne out.	正如佩内洛佩·葛尔贝格（Pinelopi Goldberg）和尼娜·帕维尼克（Nina Pavcnik）在2007年所发表的报告指出，一般人们会认为一体化的全球市场上对低技能劳动者的需求更大，因此贸易能够减少这类工人占多数国家的不平等状况，但情况并非如此。


“There is overwhelming evidence,” they write, “that less-skilled workers in developing countries “are generally not better off, at least not relative to workers with higher skill or education levels.”	她们写道：“有大量的证据表明发展中国家低技能劳动者的状况总体并未改善，或至少并未获得与高技能高教育水平劳动者同样的改善。


In the same year, Branko Milanović and Lyn Squire also found that tariff reduction is associated with higher inequality in poor countries.	”同一年，布兰科·米兰诺维奇（Branko Milanović）和林恩·斯夸尔（Lyn Squire）也发现关税削减与贫穷国家更高的不平等程度相关。


Ten years later, inequality continues to worsen within developing countries, including the so-called BRICS emerging economies.	十年后，包括所谓的“金砖五国”新兴经济体在内的发展中国家的不平等继续恶化。


In Brazil, the top 1% accounts for 25% of national income.	在巴西，前1％的人得到了国民收入的25％。


In Russia, the income share of the top 1% of the population increased from 4% in 1980 to 20% in 2015.	在俄罗斯该份额从1980年的4％上升到2015年的20％。


Likewise, in India, that figure rose from 6% in 1982 to 22% in 2013.	而印度的这个数字从1982年的6％上升到了2013年的22％。


In China, it surged from 6% in 1978 to 14% in 2015.	中国则从1978年的6％上升到2015年的14％。


And, in South Africa, it rose from 9% in 1987 to 19% in 2012.	而在南非，这一数字从1987年的9％上升到了2012年的19％。


A look at the top 10% of earners shows similar trends.	最顶层那10％人的收入状况也呈现出类似的趋势。


This does not mean that the forces described by the HO-SS theory are irrelevant. But there is clearly more to current inequality trends than trade.	这并不意味着HO-SS理论所描述的力量是无关紧要的，但其与当前不平等趋势的关系显然比贸易更多。


Technological progress – which has raised demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, at a time when the supply of skilled graduates lags – seems to be a major factor everywhere.	技术进步——在熟练毕业生供应滞后的情况下，对熟练工人的需求相对于非熟练工人更多——似乎在各国都是一个主要因素。


The growing tendency of many professions to produce winner-take-all outcomes may play a role as well.	许多职业中产生的赢家通吃趋势也可能起了一些作用。


A lack of redistribution through taxes in a country like the US (compared to major countries in Europe) does not help matters.	而像美国这样缺乏税收再分配的国家（与欧洲主要国家相比）则无力控制事态的发展。


Inequality is clearly a serious problem that merits political attention. But focusing on trade is not the way to resolve it.	不平等状况显然是值得在政治上关注的严重问题，但着眼于贸易可不是解决问题的方法。


World Order 2.0	世界秩序2. 0


NEW YORK – For nearly four centuries, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, the concept of sovereignty – the right of countries to an independent existence and autonomy – has formed the core of the international order.	纽约——近四个世纪以来，自从1648年的威斯特伐利亚和平结束了长达三十年的欧洲战争，主权的概念——即国家享有独立存在和自治权的概念——已经构成了国际秩序的核心。


And for good reason: as we have seen in century after century, including the current one, a world in which borders are forcibly violated is a world of instability and conflict.	而且形成这种局面的理由非常充分：我们在一个又一个的世纪，包括当前这个世纪中亲眼目睹了国家遭受武力侵犯的世界充满了冲突和不稳定。


But, in a globalized world, a global operating system premised solely on respect for sovereignty – call it World Order 1.0 – has become increasingly inadequate.	但在一个全球化的世界里，完全以尊重主权为前提的全球运作体系——我们称之为世界秩序1. 0——已经越来越无法让民众满足。


Little stays local anymore.	很少有问题能在当地解决。


Just about anyone and anything, from tourists, terrorists, and refugees to e-mails, diseases, dollars, and greenhouse gases, can reach almost anywhere.	几乎任何人和任何事，从游客、恐怖分子、难民到电子邮件、传染病，美元和温室气体，都可以到达世界各个角落。


The result is that what goes on inside a country can no longer be the concern of that country alone.	结果是一个国家内部发生的事务不再仅限于该国自身需要关注的问题。


Today’s realities call for an updated operating system—World Order 2.0 – based on “sovereign obligation,” the notion that sovereign states have not just rights but also obligations to others.	今天的现实需要基于“主权义务”升级运行系统——世界秩序2. 0，这种理念强调主权国家不仅享有权利，而且还要对其他国家承担义务。


A new international order will also require an expanded set of norms and arrangements, beginning with an agreed-upon basis for statehood.	新的国际秩序还需要拓展一系列规范和安排，而上述规范必须从协商一致的国家地位开始。


Existing governments would agree to consider bids for statehood only in cases where there was a historical justification, a compelling rationale, and popular support, and where the proposed new entity is viable.	现有政府只有在历史理由充分、证据确凿且拥有民众广泛支持的情况下才能同意考虑建国要求，而且拟议中的新实体必须具有可行性。


World Order 2.0 must also include prohibitions on carrying out or in any way supporting terrorism.	世界秩序2. 0还必须包括禁止以任何形式开展或支持恐怖主义。


More controversially, it must include strengthened norms proscribing the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction.	更具争议的是，它还必须强化规范禁止扩散或使用大规模杀伤性武器。


As it stands, while the world tends to agree on constraining proliferation by limiting countries’ access to the relevant technology and material, the consensus often breaks down once proliferation has occurred.	就目前情况而言，尽管世界各国倾向于通过限制国家主体获得相关技术和材料来约束核扩散，但一旦扩散发生达成的共识往往就土崩瓦解。


This should become a topic of discussion at bilateral and multilateral meetings, not because it would lead to a formal agreement, but because it would focus attention on applying stringent sanctions or undertaking military action, which could then reduce the odds of proliferation.	我们应当在双边和多边会议上探讨这个议题，这不是因为这样做可以签署正式协议，而是因为可以吸引各国的注意力，实施严格的制裁或采取军事行动，并借此来降低扩散的几率。


Another essential element of a new international order is cooperation on climate change, which may be the quintessential manifestation of globalization, because all countries are exposed to its effects, regardless of their contribution to it.	全新国际秩序另一个基本要素是气候变化合作，这或许是全球化的典型体现，因为无论是否承担责任，所有国家都无法避开气候变化所造成的后果。


The 2015 Paris climate agreement – in which governments agreed to limit their emissions and to provide resources to help poorer countries adapt – was a step in the right direction.	2015年的巴黎气候协议——各国政府同意限制排放并提供资源帮助较为贫困的国家适应气候变化——是朝正确方向迈出的一步。


Progress on this front must continue.	这方面的进展必须继续下去。


Cyberspace is the newest domain of international activity characterized by both cooperation and conflict.	网络空间是以合作和冲突为标志的最新国际活动领域。


The goal in this area should be to create international arrangements that encourage benign uses of cyberspace and discourage malign uses.	该领域的目标应当是创设 国际协议鼓励对网络空间的良性利用并阻止恶性利用。


Governments would have to act consistently within this regime as part of their sovereign obligations – or face sanctions or retaliation.	政府必须一贯行使在上述制度内的主权义务——或者面临制裁或报复的威胁。


Global health presents a different set of challenges.	全球卫生代表着完全不同的挑战。


In a globalized world, an outbreak of infectious disease in one country could quickly evolve into a serious threat to health elsewhere, as has happened in recent years with SARS, Ebola, and Zika.	在全球化的世界里，就像近年来爆发的SARS、埃博拉和寨卡病毒一样，一个国家的传染病暴发可能迅速演变成对其他地方卫生的严重威胁。


Fortunately, the notion of sovereign obligation is already advanced in this sphere: countries are responsible for trying to detect infectious disease outbreaks, responding appropriately, and notifying others around the world.	幸运的是，上述领域的主权义务理念已经取得进展：各国都有责任及时发现传染病的暴发、采取相应对策并向世界其他国家发出通知。


When it comes to refugees, there is no substitute for effective local action aimed at preventing situations that generate large refugee flows in the first place.	涉及到难民问题上，没有任何办法能够取代有效的地方行动，上述行动旨在从一开始就防止大量难民潮产生。


In principle, this is an argument for humanitarian intervention in selective situations.	原则上，有理由在特定情况下进行人道主义干预。


But translating this principle into practice will remain difficult, given divergent political agendas and the high costs of effective intervention.	但将这一原则转化为实践仍然非常困难，这主要归咎于政治议程不同以及有效干预行动的高成本。


Even without a consensus, however, there is a strong case for increasing funding for refugees, ensuring their humane treatment, and setting fair quotas for their resettlement.	但即使尚未达成一致意见，仍然有必要增加对难民的投资，以确保他们受到人道主义待遇以及设定公平的配额用于安置难民。


Trade agreements are, by definition, pacts of reciprocal sovereign obligations regarding tariff and nontariff barriers.	从定义上看，贸易协定是有关关税及非关税壁垒的互惠互利的主权义务条约。


When a party believes that obligations are not being met, it has recourse to arbitration through the World Trade Organization.	如果其中一方认为对方没有履行义务，它可以向世贸组织申请仲裁。


But things are less clear when it comes to government subsidies or currency manipulation.	但如果涉及政府补贴或货币操纵问题事情可能不会那么明确。


The challenge, therefore, is to define appropriate sovereign obligations in these areas in future trade pacts, and to create mechanisms to hold governments accountable.	因此，难点是在今后贸易协定中规定这些领域的合理主权义务，并建立相关机制让政府负起责任。


Establishing the concept of sovereign obligations as a pillar of the international order will take decades of consultations and negotiations – and even then, its acceptance and impact will be uneven.	将主权义务概念确立为国际秩序的支柱将需要数十年的协商和谈判——而且即便如此，其接受程度和影响也很可能并不完全均衡。


Progress will come only voluntarily, from countries themselves, rather than from any top-down edict.	进步只能采取国家自愿的方式，而不能通过自上而下地颁布法令。


Realistically, it will be difficult to forge agreement on what specific sovereign obligations states have and how they should be enforced.	实际上，各国很难达成一致国家具有哪些具体的主权义务及其该以什么样的方式加以执行。


Complicating matters further, US President Donald Trump’s administration has espoused an “America first” doctrine that is largely inconsistent with what is being suggested here.	让局面更为复杂的是，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普政府已经对与本文理念基本相悖的“美国第一”原则表示了支持。


If this remains the US approach, progress toward building the sort of order that today’s interconnected world demands will come about only if other major powers push it – or it will have to wait for Trump’s successor.	如果这仍然是美国的态度，那么建立今天互联世界所需要的秩序就只有在其他主要国家的推动下——或者被迫等待特朗普的继任者——才能产生。


Such an approach, however, would be second best, and it would leave the United States and the rest of the world worse off.	但这种做法绝不是首选，而且可能导致美国和世界其他国家陷入更加被动的局面当中。


Now is the time to begin the necessary conversations.	开始必要对话的时机目前已经成熟。


Globalization is here to stay.	全球化必须持续下去。


Moving toward a new international order that incorporates sovereign obligation is the best way to cope.	走向融合主权义务的全新国际秩序才是最好的应对之策。 以主权义务为前提的世界秩序2.


World Order 2.0, predicated on sovereign obligation, is certainly an ambitious project – but one born of realism, not idealism.	0无疑是一个雄心勃勃的计划——但这一计划是出于现实的需要，而不是理想主义。


Who Will Fill America’s Shoes?	谁会取代美国？


NEW YORK – It is increasingly clear that US President Donald Trump represents a departure when it comes to America’s global outlook and behavior.	纽约—越来越清楚，美国总统特朗普在美国的世界观和行为方面代表着与过去决裂。


As a result, the United States will no longer play the leading international role that has defined its foreign policy for three quarters of a century, under Democratic and Republican presidents alike.	结果是美国不会再承担过去四分之三个世纪以来民主党和共和党总统一贯秉承的外交政策——国际领导角色。


We have already seen many examples of this change.	这一变化已经有了许多例子。


The traditional US commitment to global organizations has been superseded by the idea of “America first.”	美国对全球组织的传统承诺被“美国优先”的思想所压制。


Alliances and security guarantees once regarded as a given are increasingly conditioned on how much allies spend on defense and whether they are seen to derive unfair advantage from trade with the US.	曾几何时被视为理所当然的结盟和安全保证，开始日益取决于盟友出多少防务费用以及它们是否被视为从对美贸易中取得不公平的优势。


More broadly, foreign trade is viewed with suspicion – supposedly a source of job loss rather than an engine of investment, job creation, growth, and stability.	更广泛地说，对外贸易现在颇受怀疑——它被视为是就业损失之源，而不是投资、就业创造和稳定的引擎。


Immigration and refugee policies have become more restrictive.	移民和难民政策也变得更加严格。


Less emphasis is being placed on promoting democracy and human rights.	推动民主和人权也不再向过去那样受到强调。


More dollars are going to defense, but fewer resources are being devoted to supporting global health or development.	更多的钱用在了防务上，但支持全球卫生与发展的资源日益减少。


This is not to be confused with isolationism.	不可将此与孤立主义搞混。


Even Trump’s America will continue to play a meaningful role in the world.	即使是特朗普的美国，也将继续在全球扮演有意义的角色。


It is using military force in the Middle East and Afghanistan, increasing diplomatic pressure on North Korea to rein in its nuclear and missile programs, and renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico.	美国正在中东和阿富汗动武，对朝鲜施加压力迫使其克制核和导弹计划，也在与加拿大和墨西哥重新谈判北美自由贸易协定。


And the policies of states, cities, and companies will translate into an American commitment to climate change, despite Trump’s decision to abandon the Paris agreement.	州、市和企业政策也将体现美国对气候变化的承诺，尽管特朗普决定背弃巴黎协定。


Still, a shift away from a US-dominated world of structured relationships and standing institutions and toward something else is under way.	但是，转变正在进行——从美国主导的结构性关系（structured relationships）和常设机构的世界转变为另外一个世界。


What this alternative will be, however, remains largely unknowable.	但是，会变成怎样，仍然远未可知。


What we do know is that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what had been the US role.	我们知道的是，并没有其他超级大国愿意或能够站出来填补美国曾经扮演的角色。


China is a frequently mentioned candidate, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high economic-growth rates to stave off popular unrest.	中国是常常被提到的候选者，但其领导层主要关注于巩固国内秩序、保持人为的高增长率以安抚群众不满。


China’s interest in regional and global institutions seems designed mostly to bolster its economy and geopolitical influence, rather than to help set rules and create broadly beneficial arrangements.	中国在地区和全球机构中的利益似乎主要是为了加强其经济和全球影响力，而不是帮助我们建立广泛受益的安排。


Likewise, Russia is a country with a narrowly-based economy led by a government focused on retaining power at home and re-establishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe.	类似地，俄罗斯也是一个狭隘的经济体，执政的政府专注于保把持国内权力和重建俄罗斯在中东和欧洲的影响力。


India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan.	印度纠结于经济发展挑战，也受到与巴基斯坦关系不睦的拖累。


Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic political and economic constraints, and its neighbors’ suspicions.	日本则因为人口下降、国内政治和经济约束以及邻国的怀疑而难以施展。


Europe, for its part, is distracted by questions surrounding the relationship between member states and the European Union.	至于欧洲，它需要处理围绕成员国与欧盟之间的关系所产生的问题。


As a result, the whole of the continent is less than the sum of its parts – none of which is large enough to succeed America on the world stage.	结果是欧洲呈现出总体小于部分之和的局面——而没有一个部分足够大道能继承美国在世界舞台上的角色。


But the absence of a single successor to the US does not mean that what awaits is chaos.	但缺少能单枪匹马继承美国的国家并不意味着我们必须面临混乱。


At least in principle, the world’s most powerful countries could come together to fill America’s shoes.	至少在理论上，全世界最强大的国家可以合作填补美国留下的空缺。


In practice, though, this will not happen, as these countries lack the capabilities, experience, and, above all, a consensus on what needs doing and who needs to do it.	但在实践中，这不会发生，因为这些国家缺少能力、经验，最重要的是缺少关于需要做什么、由谁去做的共识。


A more likely development is the emergence of a mix of order and disorder at both the regional and global level.	更有可能的发展趋势是在地区和全球层面出现秩序和失序的混合。


China will promote various trade, infrastructure, and security mechanisms in Asia.	中国将继续在亚洲推进各种贸易、基础设施和安全机制。


The 11 remaining members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership may launch their trade pact without the US.	跨太平洋合作伙伴关系的其他11个成员可能结成不包含美国的贸易契约。


Less clear is whether China is prepared to use its influence to restrain North Korea, how India and Pakistan will avoid conflict, and the resolution of Asia’s many territorial disputes.	不太清楚的是中国是否准备用它的影响力遏制朝鲜； 印度和巴基斯坦如何避免冲突；


It is all too easy to imagine an Asian and Pacific future characterized by higher spending on arms of all types – and thus more susceptible to violent conflict.	以及如何解决亚洲的大量领土纠纷。 亚太的未来将出现各种类型的军备竞赛，因此也更容易发生暴力冲突——这样的情景很容易想象。


The Middle East is already suffering unprecedented instability, the result of local rivalries and realities, and of 15 years during which the US arguably first did too much and then too little to shape the region’s future.	中东已经陷入了前所未有的动荡，这是地方叛乱和现实的结果，也是15年来美国为了影响中东的未来一开始用力过猛，随后又做得太少的结果。


The immediate danger is not just further deterioration in failed states such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but also direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.	最紧迫的危险不仅仅包括也门、叙利亚和利比亚等失败国家的进一步恶化，也包括沙特阿拉伯和伊朗之间爆发直接冲突。


Europe may be something of an exception to such trends, as the election of President Emmanuel Macron in France has given rise to a government that is committed to reforming the EU.	欧洲也许是这一趋势的例外，马克龙当选法国总统，并将组建致力于改革欧盟的政府。


But the EU itself faces an uncertain future, given Brexit and slow-motion crises in Italy and Greece, not to mention the potential for additional Russian mischief or worse.	但欧盟本身也面临着不确定的未来，英国脱欧、意大利和希腊危机进展缓慢、俄罗斯可能继续乃至加剧为害都是欧盟所要应对的局面。


To all of this, one could add the meltdown in Venezuela and the all-too-familiar horrors in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.	其他情况还包括委内瑞拉的崩溃和我们已经耳熟能详的南苏丹和民主刚果大恐慌。


And then there is the growing gap between global challenges such as how to govern cyberspace, and the willingness of governments to work together to address them.	而在如何治理网络空间等挑战以及政府合作解决这些挑战的意愿之间，差距也越来越大。


There is no little irony in this global turn of events.	这一全球形势的反转不乏讽刺之处。


For decades, many countries criticized US policy, both for what it was and what it was not.	几十年来，许多国家批评美国的政策，美国做也不是，不做也不是。


These same countries now face the prospect of a world in which American leadership is likely to be less of a factor.	而同样是这些国家，现在面临着美国领导力不再像过去那样重要的世界新局面。


It is far from clear that they are prepared for such a world, or that they will find themselves better off in it.	它们是否为这样一个新世界做好了准备，以及他们是否会在这样一个世界中过得更好，还远未可知。


From the Front Lines of Climate Change	来自抗击气候变化前线的信息


MANILA/SAN JOSÉ – On April 22, dignitaries representing no fewer than 175 parties signed the global climate change agreement concluded in Paris in December, setting a record for the adoption of an international accord.	发自马尼拉/圣何塞——截至4月22日，已经有代表不下175个缔约方的政要签署了去年十二月在巴黎完稿的全球气候变化协议，创下了一项国际协定的签约纪录。


The show of support is heartening.	他们对此展现出来支持令人振奋。


It provides hope that the momentum that led to the breakthrough deal in December remains undiminished.	它令我们相信创造了去年十二月这一突破性协议的前进势头至今依然未减。


But securing an agreement in Paris was just the first step on a long road towards protecting the global climate and the world’s most vulnerable countries.	但巴黎达成协议只不过是保护全球气候和世界上最易受该变化侵袭的国家的漫长道路的第一步，签字仪式则是第二步。


The signing ceremony was the second.	接下来是批准程序；


Next comes the ratification process; 55 countries, representing at least 55% of global emissions, will need to ratify the agreement to enable it to enter into force.	至少需要占全球排放量55％以上的55个国家批准该协议方能使其生效。


The good news is that the process is already underway.	好消息是，这一进程已经展开。


In February, Fiji became the first nation to ratify the treaty, followed by three other small island states.	今年二月，斐济成为批准该条约的第一个国家，随后是其他三个小型岛屿国家。


All four are members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, a group of 43 countries – including Costa Rica and the Philippines, which we represent – on the front lines of climate change.	这四个国家都是拥有43个成员国，站在气候变化最前线的气候脆弱国家论坛组织（Climate Vulnerable Forum）的成员——其中包括笔者所代表的哥斯达黎加和菲律宾。


Members of the forum fought tirelessly for an agreement in Paris, and we will do everything within our power to speed up its entry into force.	论坛各成员国为能在巴黎达成协议而不懈争取，也将在能力范围内尽一切努力加快其生效进程。


The Paris agreement offers the world its best hope of slowing and ultimately stopping changes to our climate.	巴黎协定为全世界提供了减缓并最终停止气候变化的最佳愿景。


Left unchecked, global warming will threaten the health and safety of our people, damage the ecosystems on which we all depend, and – through rising sea levels – put the very existence of some countries in jeopardy.	因为如果放任其发展的话，全球变暖将威胁我国民众的健康和安全，破坏对我们赖以生存的生态系统，同时——通过海平面的提升——令一些国家的生存岌岌可危。


And yet, if the battle against climate change is to be won, the Paris agreement will not be sufficient.	但如果我们要赢得这场应对气候变化的战斗，光靠巴黎协定还是不够的。


The voluntary emission-reduction commitments contained in the so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), submitted by 187 countries by the end of the talks, will not be enough to prevent dangerous climate change.	在会谈结束时由187个国家提交的，包含在国家自主贡献预案（Intended Nationally Determined Contributions）内的自愿减排承诺，将不足以阻止危险的气候变化。


And for those countries that are most vulnerable to the harmful effects of global warming, far more needs to be done if catastrophic effects are to be avoided.	而对于那些最易于受全球变暖侵害的国家来说，还需要付出更多的努力才能最终避免爆发灾难性的后果。


Early calculations have suggested that if all of the INDCs were fully implemented, average global temperatures would still rise by the end of the century to 2.7 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.	早期的计算表明，如果所有的贡献预案都能得到全盘实施，全球平均气温将仍然会在本世纪末相对工业革命前水平上升2.


That is considerably beyond the already dangerous ceiling of two degrees set in Copenhagen in 2009 and included in the Paris agreement.	7摄氏度以上，也大大超出在2009年于哥本哈根其后峰会上订立并列入巴黎协定的的2摄氏度危险上限。


New research, from Climate Interactive and MIT Sloan, suggests that temperatures could rise even higher – by 3.5 degrees Celsius.	由气候互动组织（Climate Interactive）和麻省理工学院斯隆商学院的新研究表明，温度可能升得更高——达3.


The Climate Vulnerable Forum has long argued that even two degrees of warming risks creating unbearable conditions for some countries.	5摄氏度。 气候脆弱国家论坛组织一直认为，即使只存在升温2摄氏度的风险，一些国家可能也难以承受。


That is why it has fought to limit the rise in temperature to 1.5 degrees – an ambition that was included, thanks to the forum’s efforts, in the Paris agreement.	这就是为何它努力要将温度上升幅度限制在1. 5摄氏度——得益于论坛的努力，在这项内容也被涵盖于巴黎协定内。


That seemingly small difference matters.	这一看似很小的差异其实极为重要。


As the latest research shows, it would have a dramatic and measurable impact on extreme weather events, water availability, crop yields, coral-reef degradation, and sea-level rise.	最新研究显示这会对极端气候事件，水供应，作物产量，珊瑚礁退化，以及海平面上升产生极大且可以测量的影响。


And it will be the most vulnerable people – rural women, the sick, the old, and the very young – who are most at risk.	而风险最大的则是那些最脆弱的人——农村妇女，病人，长者以及婴幼儿。 对于世界上那些最脆弱的国家而言，限制温度上升1.


For the world’s most vulnerable countries, limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees is not just an aspiration; it is a matter of survival.	5摄氏度可不只是一种美好的愿望； 而是个生存问题。


The goal is an ambitious one. But vulnerable developing countries are committed to helping achieve it.	这一目标是雄心勃勃的，而正是这些脆弱的发展中国家在致力实现这一目标。


The V-20 group of finance ministers of vulnerable nations recently committed to introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms across 43 markets within ten years.	V-20脆弱国家组织的财长日前就承诺在十年内向43个市场引入碳定价机制。


We have also pledged to improve financial accounting, so that the costs of climate change and the benefits of climate action are incorporated into economic policymaking.	我们还承诺改善财务核算机制，将气候变化的成本与气候行动的效益纳入经济决策考虑条件。


Costa Rica has just approved a law promoting electric trains, and legislators are debating a bill to provide incentives for electric vehicles and buses.	哥斯达黎加刚刚批准了一项推广电动火车的法律，立法者也正在讨论鼓励电动汽车和公交车的法案。


Such initiatives are more commonly associated with advanced economies than with developing countries.	这些举措从前往往是发达经济体（而非发展中国家）的事。


And the rich world does have a moral obligation to move first and faster – with policies, technologies, and finance – to reduce the emissions that cause global warming.	而富裕国家确实有道义上的责任去带头和更快地行动起来——利用其政策，科技和金融——以减少导致全球变暖的排放量。


But we also recognize that developing countries have a responsibility to act and that doing so can generate immense economic, social, and public health advantages for their citizens.	但我们也认识到，发展中国家也有责任采取行动，同时这样做可以为本国民众带来巨大的经济，社会和公共卫生利益。


We cannot succeed on our own; this much is certain.	可以肯定的是：我们无法仅靠自身去实现目标。


The Climate Vulnerable Forum represents a tiny share of global emissions.	气候脆弱国家论坛仅代表了全球排放量的很小份额。


We need the industrialized countries and the giants of the developing world to redouble their efforts to reduce their emissions, so that global warming can be limited to 1.5 degrees.	我们需要工业化国家和发展中国家的巨头加倍努力减少排放量，使全球变暖可以限制在1. 5摄氏度。


Only then can disaster be averted.	只有这样，才可以避免灾难的降临。


The Scarecrow of National Debt	国债纸老虎


CAMBRIDGE – Most people are more worried by government debt than about taxation.	发自剑桥——大多数人对政府债务的忧心程度都比税负要高。


“But it’s trillions” a friend of mine recently expostulated about the United Kingdom’s national debt.	“几万亿可不是个小数目啊！ ”这句话形象地体现了我的一位朋友对英国国债的观感。


He exaggerated a bit: it is £1.7 trillion ($2.2 trillion).	不过他也有点夸大了：债务总额只有1. 7万亿英镑（约合2.


But one website features a clock showing the debt growing at a rate of £5,170 per second.	2万亿美元）。 为此还有个网站专门搞了个债务时钟，显示国债正以每秒5170英镑的速度累加。


Although the tax take is far less, the UK government still collected a hefty £750 billion in taxes in the last fiscal year.	虽然税收收入的规模远不及国债，但上一财政年度英国政府依然收到了7500亿英镑的巨额税金。


The tax base grows by the second, too, but no clock shows that.	税基也每分每秒在增长，只是没人有兴趣搞个时钟来记录罢了。


Many people think that, however depressing heavy taxes are, it is more honest for governments to raise them to pay for their spending than it is to incur debt.	很多人认为，不管重税如何令人沮丧，政府收税来支付开支总要比借债来得更诚实一点。


Borrowing strikes them as a way of taxing by stealth.	在他们看来借款形同于偷偷征税。


“How are they going to pay it back?” my friend asked.	“这么大笔钱该如何去偿还啊？


“Think of the burden on our children and grandchildren.”	”朋友问，“想想我们的孩子和孙子们吧。 ”


I should say that my friend is extremely old.	应该指出的是我的这位朋友年事已高了。


Horror of debt is particularly marked in the elderly, perhaps out of an ancient feeling that one should not meet one’s maker with a negative balance sheet.	老年人对债务尤其恐惧，也许是出于一种古老的观念，认为一个人是不该拿着负数资产负债表去见上帝的。


I should also add that my friend is extremely well educated, and had, in fact, played a prominent role in public life.	还要补充的是这位老友受过顶尖的教育，也曾在公共生活中扮演过极为重要的角色。


But public finance is a mystery to him: he just had the gut feeling that a national debt in the trillions and growing by £5,170 a second was a very bad thing.	但对他来说公共财政仍是一个不解之谜：他在直觉上认为规模达万亿且每秒增加5170英镑的国债是一件非常糟糕的事情。


One should not attribute this gut feeling to financial illiteracy. It has been receiving strong support from those supposedly well-versed in public finance, particularly since the economic collapse of 2008.	我们不应把这直觉视同金融文盲，因为很多理应精通公共财政的人也深有同感，特别是当经济在2008年崩溃之后。


Britain’s national debt currently stands at 84% of GDP.	目前英国的国债总额相当于GDP的84％。


This is dangerously near the threshold of 90% identified by Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff (together with Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart), beyond which economic growth stalls.	这非常接近由哈佛大学经济学家肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）设定的90%危险门槛，据说一旦超过这一门槛经济增长就会陷入停滞。 不过这个数字的神奇特性从未被妥善阐明过，而支撑这一结论的数据也遭到了质疑。


In the face of criticism of the data underlying this threshold Rogoff has held firm, and he now gives a reason for his alarm.	但罗格夫至今没有收回这一判断，如今又为这一警报找了个理由。


With US government debt running at 82% of GDP, the danger is of a “fast upward shift in interest rates.” The “potentially massive” fiscal costs of this could well require “significant tax and spending adjustments” (economist’s code for increasing taxes and reducing public spending), which would increase unemployment.	在美国政府债务总额相当于GDP82%的情况下，危险在于“利率的快速上升”导致的“庞大潜在”财政成本很可能会引发“大规模的税收和支出调整”（这句经济学行话就是说要加税和削减公共开支），并增加失业。


This is the financial leg of the familiar “crowding out” argument.	这就是大家熟悉的“挤出效应”论的金融注脚。


The higher the national debt, according to this view, the greater the risk of government default – and therefore the higher the cost of fresh government borrowing.	按照这一观点，更庞大的国家债务额意味着更大的政府违约风险——以及更高的继续借贷成本。


This in turn will raise the cost of new private-sector borrowing.	这反过来会导致私营部门的新贷款成本上升。


(That is why Rogoff wants the US government to “lock in” currently low rates by issuing much longer-term debt to fund public infrastructure).	（这就是为何罗格夫希望美国政府通过发行更长期限的公共基础设施建设债来“锁定”当前的低利率水平）。


Maintaining low interest rates for private bank loans has been one of the main arguments for reducing budget deficits.	因此为了让私人银行贷款得以维持低利率一直是预算赤字削减学说的主要论据之一。


But this argument – or set of arguments (there are different strands) – for fiscal austerity is invalid.	但这种财政紧缩论据——或这类论据（下分不同流派）——是无意义的。


A government that can issue debt in its own currency can easily keep interest rates low.	一个可以用本国货币发行债务的政府也可以轻易保持低利率。


The rates are bounded by concerns about inflation, over-expansion of the state sector, and the central bank’s independence; but, with our relatively low levels of debt (Japan’s debt amounts to over 230% of its GDP) and depressed output and inflation, these limits are quite distant in the UK and the US.	该利率由通胀，国营部门的过度扩张程度和中央银行的独立性等因素所决定； 但由于债务水平相对较低（日本的债务相当于其GDP的230％）以及产出和通货膨胀率较低，英美两国还远未达到这一限度。