The other term that suddenly became prominent around 1937 was “underconsumptionism” – the theory that fearful people may want to save too much for difficult times ahead.	1937年另一个一夜风靡的词汇是“消费不足论”（underconsumption）。 该理论认为，恐慌的人们会为过多储蓄以应对未来艰难时世。


Moreover, the amount of saving that people desire exceeds the available investment opportunities.	此外，人们所渴望的储蓄规模超过了可行的投资机会。


As a result, the desire to save will not add to aggregate saving to start new businesses, construct and sell new buildings, and so forth.	结果，储蓄渴望不会带来创办新企业、建造和出售新建筑等活动的总储蓄的增加。


Though investors may bid up prices of existing capital assets, their attempts to save only slow down the economy.	尽管投资者可能会提高对现有资本资产的出价，但他们的储蓄努力只能让经济减速。


“Secular stagnation” and “underconsumptionism” are terms that betray an underlying pessimism, which, by discouraging spending, not only reinforces a weak economy, but also generates anger, intolerance, and a potential for violence.	“长期停滞”和“消费不足论”这些词汇泄露出一种根本性的悲观情绪，这一情绪抑制了支出，不但强化了经济的弱势，也制造了愤怒、偏狭和暴力潜质。


In his magnum opus The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Benjamin M. Friedman showed many examples of declining economic growth giving rise – with variable and sometimes long lags – to intolerance, aggressive nationalism, and war.	在其杰作《经济增长的道德后果》（The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth）中，本杰明·弗里德曼（Benjamin M. Friedman）举了很多例子说明经济增长萎靡会导致偏狭、激进民族主义和战争——尽管种类各异，并且有的要等很长时间后才会出现。


He concluded that, “The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improvements it brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political, and ultimately the moral character of a people.”	他总结道，“生活水平提高的价值不仅在于其所带来的个体生活的物质改善，也在于它决定了一个民族的社会、政治以及最终的道德特征。 ”


Some will doubt the importance of economic growth.	有人会质疑经济增长的重要性。


Maybe, many say, we are too ambitious and ought to enjoy a higher quality of life with more leisure.	很多人说，也许我们过于上进了，应该享受更多闲暇带来的更高生活质量。


Maybe they are right.	也许他们是对的。


But the real issue is self-esteem and the social-comparison processes that psychologist Leon Festinger observed as a universal human trait.	但真正的问题是自尊和社会比较过程。 据心理学家莱昂·费斯廷格（Leon Festinger）观察，这是普遍的人类心理。


Though many will deny it, we are always comparing ourselves with others, and hoping to climb the social ladder.	尽管许多人会否认，但我们总是在拿自己和别人比较，希望能够在社会阶梯上往上爬。


People will never be happy with newfound opportunities for leisure if it seems to signal their failure relative to others.	如果闲暇看起来意味着他们相对于其他人来说更加失败，那么他们就不会因为新的闲暇机会而快乐。


The hope that economic growth promotes peace and tolerance is based on people’s tendency to compare themselves not just to others in the present, but also to what they remember of people – including themselves – in the past.	经济增长促进和平和包容的基础是人们不但拿自己和当下的其他人比较，也要和他们印象中的过去的人们——包括他们自己比较。


According to Friedman, “Obviously nothing can enable the majority of the population to be better off than everyone else.	弗里德曼说，“显然，没有哪种东西能让大部分人口都相比其他所有人有所改善。


But not only is it possible for most people to be better off than they used to be, that is precisely what economic growth means.”	但让大部分人较自己的过去有所改善不但是可能的，也正是经济增长的含义。 ”


The downside of the sanctions imposed against Russia for its behavior in eastern Ukraine is that they may produce a recession throughout Europe and beyond.	因为俄罗斯在东乌克兰的行为而对其实施制裁的不利之处在于这可能会给欧洲内外带来衰退。


That will leave the world with unhappy Russians, unhappy Ukrainians, and unhappy Europeans whose sense of confidence and support for peaceful democratic institutions will weaken.	这会导致不开心的俄罗斯人、不开心的乌克兰人和不开心的欧洲人，他们的信心和对和平民主制度的支持会有所削弱。


While some kinds of sanctions against international aggression appear to be necessary, we must remain mindful of the risks associated with extreme or punishing measures.	尽管某些针对国际侵略的制裁是必要的，但我们必须认识到极端或惩罚性措施所伴随的风险。


It would be highly desirable to come to an agreement to end the sanctions; to integrate Russia (and Ukraine) more fully into the world economy; and to couple these steps with expansionary economic policies.	值得追求的策略是形成结束制裁的协议、让俄罗斯（和乌克兰）更加充分地融入世界经济，并在此基础上采取扩张性经济政策。


A satisfactory resolution of the current conflict requires nothing less.	这些都是解决当前冲突的令人满意的方案所不可或缺的。


A Requiem for Technocracy	技术官僚安魂曲


STONY BROOK – In 2010, when Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal unveiled a $220 million scheme to use sand berms to block the oil spewing into the Gulf of Mexico from a British Petroleum oilrig, scientists opposed the plan, stating that it would do little more than harm local ecosystems.	石溪—2010年，路易斯安那州州长鲍比·金达尔（Bobby Jindal）发起了一项2. 2亿美元的计划，用沙堤阻挡英国石油公司油井中的原油流入墨西哥湾。


Even after the national commission investigating the spill declared the initiative a failure for having captured only 1,000 of the nearly five million barrels of oil believed to have gushed into the Gulf, Jindal did not relent, calling the statements “partisan revisionist history at taxpayer expense.”	科学家们反对这一计划，指出这样做只会伤害当地生态系统。 即在使全国委员会调查了漏油情况并宣布该计划失败、只拦截到漏入墨西哥湾的五百万桶原油中的1,000桶后，金达尔仍拒绝妥协，声称委员会的陈述“康纳税人之慨行党派修正主义之实。


Jindal’s response reflects an ongoing – and potentially catastrophic – shift away from science-based policymaking.	金达尔的反应体现了一种让决策原理科学基础的倾向，这种倾向可谓方兴未艾，并且有可能带来灾难。


This is not how I imagined twenty-first-century politics would be.	但我认为二十一世纪的政治不会如此。


When I was a graduate student in the humanities in the 1970s, my mentors thundered against the coming technocratic state.	20世纪70年代，当我还是文科研究生时，我的导师猛烈抨击即将到来的技术官僚国家。


Politicians, I was told, would soon listen only to experts who would sacrifice human values for the sake of efficiency, while ordinary citizens’ voices would be drowned out.	他们告诉我，政客很快就将只听命于让人本价值为效率让路的专家，普通公民的声音将被淹没。


If only more of that scenario were true.	要是这一情景真的发生就好了。


Today, issues about which facts really matter – for example, the safety of genetically modified foods, the hazards of extracting shale oil and gas, and the impact of global warming – are debated without regard for scientific evidence or in ways that use distorted and cherry-picked information to promote a chosen position.	如今，在什么才是真正重要的事实这一问题上——比如，转基因食品的安全性、提炼页岩油气的风险性以及全球变暖的影响等——争论完全不顾科学证据，或使用扭曲、偏颇的信息论证预先选定的立场。


Politicians and activists portray these issues as social struggles or morality plays: big businesses against small farmers, oppressors versus liberators, or conspirators seeking to deceive innocent citizens.	政客和活动家将这些问题包装成社会斗争或道德表演：大公司与小农民之争、镇压者与解放者之争，或者用阴谋论蒙骗天真的公民。


For example, after a recent World Health Organization report warned that the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan had only slightly increased local residents’ risk of developing certain kinds of cancers, the environmental organization Greenpeace, deeming the figures too low, denounced the report as “a political statement to protect the nuclear industry.”	比如，最新的世界卫生组织报告警告说，日本福岛核电站灾难只是轻微提高了当地居民罹患某些癌症的风险，这招致认定报告数字太低的环保组织绿色和平组织（Greenpeace）抨击报告是“保护核工业的一份政治声明”。 类似地，美国环保活动家小罗伯特·肯尼迪（Robert F.


Similarly, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., an American environmental activist, has accused the United States government and the drug industry of conspiring to obscure the link between childhood vaccines and autism – a link for which there is no scientific evidence.	Kennedy, Jr. ）指责美国政府和制药业串通掩盖儿童疫苗和孤独症之间的联系——没有任何科学证据表明两者存在关联。


Likewise, US Representative Paul Ryan, a Republican and former vice-presidential candidate, accused leading climatologists of conspiracy for arguing that climate change was real, and voted to undo climate-protection plans and eliminate White House climate advisers.	类似地，美国共和党众议员、前副总统候选人保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）指责大牌气候学家共谋指出气候变化的真实性，并支持取消气候保护计划、解雇白宫气候顾问。


And, despite the absence of evidence that mobile phones pose any kind of danger, former Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich, alleging that officials were suppressing information, introduced the “Cell Phone Right to Know Act” to require radiation warnings on the devices.	此外，尽管没有证据表明移动电话未造成任何危险，前民主党众议员丹尼斯·库奇尼奇（Dennis Kucinich）仍指控政府隐瞒信息，提出了要求在移动设备上表明辐射警告的《手机知情权法》（“Cell Phone Right to Know Act”）。


Pseudoscience and scientific illiteracy used to be the domain of astrologers, quacks, and other charlatans who lacked the influence to be a major social threat.	伪科学和科学盲向来是占星家、庸医和其他没有多少社会危害力的江湖骗子的高发领域。


Today, acting against scientific evidence is politically expedient: it offers left-wing and right-wing politicians alike an opportunity to court an anti-elite, populist image.	如今，与科学证据作对成为一种政治手段：左翼和右翼政客通过这样做来营造反精英的民粹主义形象。


But this approach endangers public health and the planet, and some scientists are beginning to worry about the possibility of a new “dark age of political feudalism.”	但这一方法有害于公共健康和地球，一些科学家已经开始担心有可能产生新的“科学封建主义黑暗时代”。


What happened to the science-based technocratic state that my humanities professors feared?	我的文科教授们所担心的基于科学的技术官僚国家究竟发生了什么？


The truth is that hard facts and scientific evidence never had any special authority in shaping policy in the first place; to political leaders, a scientist’s view is just another opinion.	真相是，硬事实和科学证据从一开始就从未获得过左右政策的特殊权威； 对政治领导人来说，科学家的观点只不过提供了多一种意见。


My humanities professors came of age in the aftermath of World War II – won with radar and ended with the atomic bomb – when the scientific perspective needed no proselytizing to guarantee its authority.	我的文科教授们是二战后成长起来的——二战的胜利来自雷达，而其结束更是依靠了原子弹——当时，科学不需要劝服就能保证权威地位。


But this reflected less a rational belief in deferring to science in decision-making than an enthusiastic response to the role science had played during the war.	但这与其说是在决策中服从科学的理性信念，不如说是因为对科学在二战中所起到的作用的热烈反应。


Such enthusiasm raised fears of what the political scientist Roger Pielke, Jr. has called the transformation of “abortion politics” into “tornado politics.”	这一热烈反应招致了对政治学家小罗杰·皮尔克（Roger Pielke, Jr. ）所谓的从“堕胎政治”（abortion politics）到“龙卷风政治”（tornado politics）的转型的恐慌。


The debate preceding a collective decision about abortion is about values – there is no shared goal, and scientific information is all but irrelevant.	关于堕胎的集体决策前的争论是关于价值的——没有共同目标，并且与科学信息完全无关。


But when deciding collectively on how to confront an approaching tornado, there is an indisputable shared goal, and ignoring the experts would be wholly irrational.	但当关于如何面临即将到来的龙卷风的集体决策中，存在明白无误的目标，忽略专家是完全非理性的。


A technocratic culture in which scientific voices dominate, Pielke warns, tempts politicians to use expert advice on technical questions (“Does X meet safety standards?”) to disguise political agendas (“X is the right thing to do.”).	皮尔克警告说，一个科学的声音占主导地位的技术官僚文化会让政客用技术问题（“X是否符合安全标准？ ”）上的专家意见误导政治日程（“X是正确的待办事项。


Now that science’s post-WWII charisma has faded, politicians are taking the opposite tack.	如今，二战后的科学热情已经减退，政客们采取了相反的策略。


They are increasingly tempted to ignore scientific findings altogether, and make values the center of all public-policy debates.	他们日益被诱惑完全忽视科学发现，让价值成为公共政策争论的核心。


In short, they are turning tornado politics into abortion politics.	简言之，他们正在从龙卷风政治转向堕胎政治。


Science is far from perfect.	科学绝非完美。


Its practitioners are no more innately virtuous than anyone else, and their work is no less vulnerable to error and misuse.	科学实践者并不生而比任何人更高尚，他们的工作也不比其他工作更能免疫于错误和误用。


The difference is that scientists have struggled to institutionalize a process that involves extensive observation, experimentation, and independent review that, in the long run, provides a firmer purchase on the world than intuition and political posturing.	区别在于科学家致力于将包含大量观察、实验和独立评估的过程制度化，以便在长期提供比直觉和政治姿态更可靠的决策。


I am glad that we do not live in a technocracy, ruled by experts who decide our social goals rather than advancing the goals that society establishes.	对于没有生活在由决定我们的社会目标而不是改进社会所设立的目标的专家所统治的技术官僚制度中，我感到十分欣慰。


But I am beginning to fear that I am living in a state whose politicians are more interested in proclaiming the nobility of goals that cannot be achieved.	但我开始担心，我生活在一个政客更喜欢宣扬根本无从实现的目标的高尚性的国家中。


With no route from here to there, we are guaranteed to get lost.	没有从此到彼的途径，我们注定要失败。


The Road to Full Investment	通向充分投资之路


LONDON – A specter is haunting the treasuries and central banks of the West – the specter of secular stagnation.	伦敦—一个幽灵，长期停滞的幽灵，萦绕在西方财政部和中央银行头顶。


What if there is no sustainable recovery from the economic slump of 2008-2013?	如果无法从2008—2013年的严重衰退中可持续地复苏会如何？


What if the sources of economic growth have dried up – not temporarily, but permanently?	如果经济增长资源耗竭——不是暂时耗竭，而是永久耗竭会如何？


The new pessimism comes not from Marxists, who have always looked for telltale signs of capitalism’s collapse, but from the heart of the policymaking establishment: Larry Summers, former US President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury, and chief economist of almost everything at one time or another.	新的怀疑不是来自时刻紧盯着资本主义崩溃蛛丝马迹的马克思主义者，而是来自决策机制的核心：前美国总统克林顿的财政部长、几乎无时无刻不身为各种首席经济学家的拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）。


Summers’s argument, in a nutshell, is that if the expected profitability of investment is falling, interest rates need to fall to the same extent.	概而言之，萨默斯的观点是，如果投资的预期盈利能力下降，利率就必须下降同等幅度。


But interest rates cannot fall below zero (in fact, they may be stuck above zero if there is a strong desire to build up cash balances).	但利率无法降至零以下（事实上，如果存在强烈的构筑现金余额的渴望，利率可能一直维持在零以上）。


This could result in profit expectations falling below the cost of borrowing.	这可能导致利润预期降至融资成本以下。


Most people agree that this could happen at the depth of a slump.	大部分人都同意，深度衰退时可能发生这一幕。


It was to avert this possibility that central banks began pumping money into the economy after 2008.	为了避免这种可能性的发生，央行在2008年后开始为经济注入资金。


The novelty of Summers’s argument is the claim that “secular stagnation” began 15-20 years before the crash.	萨默斯的观点的新意在于认为“长期停滞”在经济危机爆发前10—15年便已经开始。


True enough, interest rates were falling, though not as fast as the fall in expected profit on new investment.	诚然，利率在下降，尽管不如新投资预期利润下降得那么快。


So, even in the so-called boom years, most Western economies were kept afloat not by new investment, but by asset bubbles based on increasingly unsustainable leverage.	因此，即使在所谓的繁荣年份，大部分西方经济体的增长并不是新投资支撑的，而是基于日益不可持续的杠杆的资产泡沫支撑的。


The generalized version of this proposition is that secular stagnation – the persistent underuse of potential resources – is the fate of all economies that rely on private investment to fill the gap between income and consumption.	将这一观点推而广之，长期停滞——即潜在资源的持久的使用不足——是一切依赖私人投资填补收入和消费之间的空白的经济的必然命运。


As capital becomes more abundant, the expected return on new investment, allowing for risk, falls toward zero.	随着资本的日益过剩，新投资的预期回报（考虑风险因素后）下降至零。


But this does not mean that all investment should come to an end.	但这并不意味着投资的末日。


If the risk can be eliminated, the investment engine can be kept going, at least temporarily.	如果可以消除风险，投资引擎仍会转动，至少暂时如此。


This is where public investment comes in.	公共投资的用武之地正在于此。


Certain classes of investment may not earn the risk-adjusted returns that private investors demand.	某些类型的投资可能无法获得私人投资者所要求的风险调整回报。


But, provided that the returns are positive, such investments are still worth making.	但是，只要回报为正，这些投资就仍值得进行。


Given near-zero interest rates and idle workers, it is time for the state to undertake the rebuilding of infrastructure.	在利率近零并且存在闲置工人的条件下，应该由国家承担基础设施的重建。


Those who know their history will recognize that Summers is reviving an argument advanced by the American economist Alvin Hansen in 1938.	熟悉历史的人能够看出，萨默斯是在重申美国经济学家阿尔文·汉森（Alvin Hansen）1938年提出的观点。


Owing to a slowdown in population growth, and thus lower “demand for capital,” the world, Hansen claimed, faced a problem of “secular, or structural, unemployment…in the decades before us.”	汉森指出，随着“资本需求”因人口增长下降而下降，“在我们之后几十年……”世界面临着“长期或机构性的失业”的问题。


The prolonged boom that followed World War II falsified Hansen’s projection.	二战后的长期繁荣证明汉森的预言是错误的。


But his argument was not foolish; it was the assumptions underlying it that turned out to be wrong.	但他的观点并不愚蠢； 出错的是其基础假设。


Hansen did not anticipate the war’s huge capital-consuming effect, and that of many smaller wars, plus the long Cold War, in keeping capital scarce.	汉森没有预计到二战巨大的资本消耗效应以及众多小规模战争和长期冷战导致资本持续稀缺。


In the United States, military spending averaged 10% of GDP in the 1950’s and 1960’s.	在20世纪五六十年代，美国军事支出平均占GDP的10%。


Population growth was boosted by a war-induced baby boom and mass immigration into the US and Western Europe.	人口增长因为战争带来的婴儿潮和大量西欧人移民美国而得到了提振。


New export markets and private investment opportunities opened up in developing countries.	发展中国家带来了新的出口市场和私人投资机会。


Most Western governments pursued large-scale civilian investment programs: think of the US interstate highway system built under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950’s.	许多西方政府追求大规模土木工程投资项目：20世纪50年代艾森豪威尔总统领导的美国州际高速公路体统便是明证。


This mixture of stimulating events and policies enabled Western economies to maintain high investment ratios in the post-WWII years.	这一刺激性事件和政策的结合让西方经济体得以在后二战时期保持很高的投资比率。


But it is possible to argue that all of this merely postponed the day when the expected rate of return to capital would fall below the minimum rate of interest acceptable to savers, which would happen as capital became more abundant relative to population.	但需要指出的是，所有这些只是推迟了预期资本回报率下降至储户可接受的最低利率以下的时间，一旦资本相对人口变得充裕就会发生这一现象。


Hansen thought that new inventions would require less capital than in the past.	汉森认为新发明所要求的资本比从前更少。


This has now come to pass in what the MIT economists Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee call The Second Machine Age.	这一幕在麻省理工学院经济学家埃里克·布莱恩约尔弗森（Erik Brynjolfsson）和安德鲁·麦克菲（Andrew McAfee）所谓的《第二机器时代》（The Second Machine Age）中已经发生。


A company like Kodak needed and built vastly more infrastructure than its digital successors Instagram and Facebook – and (of course) employed many more workers.	与其数字时代的继任者Instagram和Facebook相比，柯达（Kodak）等公司所需的基础设施建设规模要巨大得多，（当然）也雇用了多得多的员工。


The inventions of the future may well consume even less capital (and labor).	未来的发明所需要的资本（和劳动力）可能更少。


What follows from this?	可以从中得出什么呢？


The human race has proved very successful in the past at keeping capital scarce – mainly by engaging in destructive wars.	过去，人类在维持资本稀缺性方面十分成功——主要形式是通过破坏性战争。


One cannot exclude recourse to this solution in the future.	未来也无法排除这一可能。


Apart from this, it is surely premature to believe that the West has run out of investment opportunities.	除此之外，认定西方再无投资机会可寻显然也是不恰当的。


Some new inventions, like self-driving car systems, will require heavy capital investment in new kinds of roads.	一些新发明，如自动驾驶系统，要求新型道路等方面的巨额资本投资。


And one can think of many others.	你还可以举出许多其他例子。


It is probable, though, that most of the new investment will have to be carried out with state subsidies.	但是，很有可能大部分新投资都必须得到国家补贴的支持。


But beyond this, one should view secular stagnation as an opportunity rather than a threat.	但除此之外，你应该将长期停滞视为机会而不是威胁。


The classical economists of the nineteenth century looked forward to what they called a “stationary state,” when, in the words of John Stuart Mill, the life of “struggling to get on…trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels” would no longer be needed.	十九世纪的古典经济学家看到了他们所谓的“稳态”（stationary state），即——用约翰·穆勒的话说，“争相……踩踏、冲撞、推挤和掣肘”的生活将不复存在。


If a point of true “full investment” – that is, a situation when the supply of capital increased to the point at which it would yield no net return above its replacement cost – were ever reached, it would signify that the human race had solved its economic problem.	如果真正的“充分投资”点——即资本供给状态已经提高到无法产生高于重置成本的回报的程度——达到了，那就表明人类已经解决了其经济问题。


The challenge then would be to convert capital abundance into more leisure and balanced consumption.	接下来的挑战是如何将资本过剩转化为更多的闲暇和平衡消费。


Should that happen, we would be at the threshold of a new world – some would say a heaven on earth.	果真如此的话，我们就将站在新世界的门槛上——有人会称它为人间天堂。


We can be tolerably certain of one thing: our leaders will do their best to make sure we never get there.	我们可以相当笃定地预测一件事：我们的领导人会尽其所能确保我们永远达不到这一步。


Endgame for Putin in Ukraine?	普京的乌克兰末日？


LONDON – Vladimir Putin may (or may not) enjoy 80% public support in Russia for his Ukraine policy; but it has become increasingly clear that he has bitten off more than he can chew.	伦敦—弗拉基米尔·普京因其乌克兰政策而在俄罗斯拥有80%的公共支持率（也有可能没有）； 但日益清楚的是，他这次有可能是人心不足蛇吞象了。


The question is: At what point will his position as President become untenable?	问题在于：到何种程度才会动摇他的总统地位？


Leave to one side the moral and geopolitical background of the Ukraine imbroglio.	暂且把乌克兰乱象的道德和地缘政治背景放在一边。


Russians are justified, I believe, in their view that the West took advantage of Russia’s post-communist weakness to encroach on their country’s historic space.	我相信，俄罗斯人的理由是西方利用后共产主义时期俄罗斯的弱势蚕食俄罗斯的历史势力范围。


The Monroe Doctrine may be incompatible with contemporary international law; but all powers strong enough to enforce a strategic sphere of interest do so.	门罗主义（Monroe Doctrine）也许与当代国际法不相容； 但所有强大到能够强行划定战略利益圈的国家都会这样做。


There is merit, I also believe, in Putin’s contention that a multipolar world is better than a unipolar world for advancing the cause of human flourishing.	我还相信，普京争辩说多极世界比单极世界更有利于推动人类繁荣进程不无道理。


No single power or coalition is wise or disinterested enough to claim universal sovereignty.	没有哪个列强或联盟明智到或无私到能够主张普世主权。


So it should be no surprise that Russia and other countries have started to build an institutional structure for multi-polarity.	因此，俄罗斯和其他国家开始为多极世界构建制度架构并不令人奇怪。


The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, China, and four ex-Soviet Central Asian states, was established in 2001.	包括俄罗斯、中国和四个前苏联中亚国家的上海合作组织于2001年成立。


Last month, the five BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – established the New Development Bank and a contingent reserve fund to diversify sources of official lending to developing countries.	上个月，金砖五国——巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非成立了新开发银行和应急储备基金以实现发展中国家官方融资源的多元化。


The BRICS’ “no strings” policy explicitly challenges the conditionality imposed on borrowers by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, though the policy remains untested.	金砖国家的“无附带条件”政策显然是针对世界银行和国际货币基金组织对借款人的条件而推出的，尽管该政策尚未经历检验。


Indeed, it is impossible to imagine China’s leaders approving a loan to a country that, say, recognizes Taiwan or accepts Tibetan claims to independence.	事实上，很难想象中国领导人批准向一个（比如）承认台湾或接受西藏独立的国家贷款。


But the fact remains that Russia is too weak to challenge the West further, at least in the way that it did in Ukraine.	但事实是俄罗斯没有强到可以进一步挑战西方，至少无法以在乌克兰的方式这样做。


Russia’s GDP is around $2 trillion, and its population of 143 million is falling fast.	俄罗斯GDP大约为2万亿美元，人口为1. 43亿并在迅速下降。


The United States and the European Union have a combined GDP of about $34 trillion and a population of 822 million, with the US population growing rapidly.	美国和欧盟GDP之和达到了34万亿美元左右，人口8. 22亿，美国人口还在迅速增加。


This means that the West can inflict much more damage on Russia than Russia can inflict on the West.	这意味着西方能够给俄罗斯造成的伤害远大于俄罗斯能给西方造成的伤害。


Even in its heyday, the Soviet Union was a one-track superpower.	即使在全盛期，苏联也不过是瘸腿的超级大国。


With an economy about a quarter of the size of America’s, it was able to maintain rough military parity by spending four times as much of its national income on defense as the US did – to the detriment of the living standards of ordinary citizens.	其经济只有美国的四分之一左右，依靠比美国高四倍的军事支出/国民收入比维持双方军事实力平衡，而普通公民的生活水准因此饱受压抑。


Today the balance of power is even more unfavorable.	如今的实力平衡甚至更加不利。


Russia’s economy is weaker, and its armaments are rusty.	俄罗斯经济比以前更弱，军备也相当陈旧。


It retains a formidable nuclear capacity, but it is inconceivable that Russia would use it to secure its aims in Ukraine.	它仍保有可怕的核实力，但很难相信俄罗斯会动用核力量保证其在乌克兰的目标。


So we are left with a looming endgame in which Putin can neither retain his spoils – Crimea and control of Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine – nor back down.	因此，我们已经隐约看到了结局——普京既无法留住战利品（克里米亚和控制说俄语的东乌克兰），也无法全身而退。


Russia will be required to disgorge these acquisitions as a condition of normalizing its relations with the West.	俄罗斯将要求吐出已经获得的东西，作为与西方关系正常化的条件。


But Putin will most likely try to prop up eastern Ukraine’s separatists as long as he can – perhaps with military assistance disguised as humanitarian aid – and will absolutely refuse to give up Crimea.	但只要有可能，普京就会挑动东乌克兰分裂分子——也许是以打着人道主义援助旗号进行的军事支持进行——也决不会放弃克里米亚。


This will lead to a further escalation of Western sanctions: restrictions on gas exports, general export restrictions, suspension from the World Trade Organization, withdrawal of the FIFA 2018 World Cup soccer tournament, and so on.	这将导致西方制裁的进一步扩大：限制天然气出口、一般出口限制、中止世贸组织资格、收回2018年世界杯足球赛主办权，等等。


This, in conjunction with the tightening of current sanctions, including the exclusion of Russian banks from Western capital markets, is bound to cause serious shortages, declining living standards, and major problems for Russia’s ownership class.	这与加强现有制裁（包括阻止俄罗斯银行进入西方资本体系）一起，必然会在俄罗斯造成严重短缺，降低生活水平，给俄罗斯有产阶级带来严重问题。


The Russian public’s natural reaction will be to rally to their leader.	俄罗斯公众的自然反应是团结在领袖周围。


But support for Putin, though broad, may not be deep.	但对普京的支持虽然普遍，根基并不牢固。


It is support before, not after, the debate about the costs of Putin’s policy has taken place.	这是关于普京政策的代价的争论开始之前而不是之后的支持。


And that debate is being silenced by state control of the media and the suppression of opposition.	这一争论因为国家队媒体的控制和对反对声音的镇压而没有什么动静。


It is natural and right to think of possible compromises: Ukraine’s guaranteed neutrality, greater regional autonomy within a federal Ukraine, an interim international administration in Crimea to supervise a referendum on its future, and the like.	认为可能达成妥协是自然而正确的。 这些妥协包括保证乌克兰中立、成为地方自治权更大的联邦政体、克里米亚建立过渡性国际政府以监督决定其未来的公投，等等。


The question is not how much of this kind of package Putin would accept, but whether any of it will be offered to him.	问题不在于普京在多大程度上接受这一揽子方案，而在于他是否能获得任何选择的机会。


The West no longer believes anything he says.	西方已不再相信他所说的一切。


US President Barack Obama has publicly accused him of lying.	美国总统奥巴马公开指责他撒谎。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel, formerly Putin’s strongest backer in Europe, is reported to have described him as delusional.	德国总理默克尔，普京在欧洲最强大的正式支持者，据说也称其为妄想狂。


(The last straw for her apparently was his attempt to blame the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on the Ukrainian government.)	（令默克尔对普京彻底失望的显然是后者试图将马来西亚航空公司MH17航班的坠毁归咎于乌克兰政府。 ）


All leaders lie and dissemble to some extent; but the scale of disinformation coming from the Kremlin has been epic.	从某种程度上或，所有领袖都会撒谎和掩饰； 但克里姆林在这方面可谓无所不用其极。


So the question must be asked: Will the West be prepared to make peace with Putin?	因此，有一个问题必须问问：西方准备好与普京和解了吗？


Leaders whose foreign-policy adventures end in defeat do not usually survive long in office.	外交政策以失败告终的领导人此后通常都无法在位很久。


Either formal mechanisms are used to dethrone them – as occurred, for example, in the Soviet Union, when the Central Committee forced Nikita Khrushchev out of power in 1964 – or informal mechanisms come into play.	要么通过正式制度将他们赶下台——如1964年苏共中央委员会迫使赫鲁晓夫交出权力——要么通过非正式机制。


Putin’s power elite will start fracturing – indeed, that process may have begun already.	普京的权力精英集团将开始出现裂缝——事实上，这一过程已经开始了。


Pressure will grow for him to step aside.	他将承受日益增加的下台压力。


There is no need, it will be said, for his country to go down with him.	人们会认为，不可能让国家和他一起失败。


Such a scenario, unimaginable a few months ago, may already be shaping up as the Ukraine drama moves to its endgame.	随着乌克兰闹剧走向结局，这一几个月前还无法想象的情景或许已在酝酿。


The Putin era may be over sooner than we think.	普京时代或许会比我们想象的更早结束。


Post-Crash Economics	崩溃后经济学


LONDON – In last month’s European Parliament election, euroskeptic and extremist parties won 25% of the popular vote, with the biggest gains chalked up in France, the United Kingdom, and Greece.	伦敦—在上个月的欧洲议会选举中，欧洲怀疑派和极端主义政党赢得 25%的群众选票，其中最大的胜利来自法国、英国和希腊。


These results were widely, and correctly, interpreted as showing the degree of disconnect between an arrogant European elite and ordinary citizens.	这些结果被广泛认为表明了傲慢的欧洲精英与普通公民之间的脱节程度。 确实如此。


Less noticed, because less obviously political, are today’s intellectual rumblings, of which French economist Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, a withering indictment of growing inequality, is the latest manifestation.	较少被关注到——因为政治性不那么明显——的是如今的思想碰撞，在这方面，法国经济学家托马斯·皮克提（Thomas Piketty）的《二十一世纪资本论》（Capital in the Twenty-First Century）便是这一问题的最新明证。


We may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the neoliberal capitalist consensus that has prevailed throughout the West since the 1980s – and that many claim led to the economic disaster of 2008-2009.	《二十一世纪资本论》尖锐抨击了日益严重的不平等性问题。 我们或许正在目睹新自由派资本主义共识终结的开端，在西方，这一共识主宰了整个20世纪80年代，并被许多人认为是2008—2009年经济灾难的源头。


Particularly important is the growing discontent of economics students with the university curriculum.	特别重要的是经济学学生对大学课程越来越不满。


Undergraduates’ discontent matters, because economics has long been the West’s political lodestar.	本科生的不满十分重要，因为经济学长期以来一直是西方的政治标杆。


This discontent was born in the “post-autistic economics movement,” which started in Paris in 2000, and spread to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.	这一不满产生自“自闭后经济学运动”（“post autistic economics movement”），始于2000年的巴黎并传播到美国、澳大利亚和新西兰。


Its adherents’ main complaint was that the mainstream economics taught to students had become a branch of mathematics, disconnected from reality.	这一运动的追随者的主要不满在于，教授给学生的主流经济学成了数学的分支，与现实脱节。


The revolt made little progress in the years of the “Great Moderation” of the 2000s, but was revived following the 2008 crisis.	这场反抗在21世纪初的“大稳健”（Great Moderation）年代里没有多少市场，但在2008年危机后开始勃兴。


Two important links with the earlier network are US economist James Galbraith, the son of John Kenneth Galbraith, and British economist Ha-Joon Chang, author of the best-selling 23 Things They Don’t Tell You about Capitalism.	两位重要先驱是美国经济学家、约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）之子詹姆斯·加尔布雷斯（James Galbraith）以及畅销书《资本主义没告诉你的23件事》（23 Things They Don’t Tell You about Capitalism）作者、英国经济学家张夏准（Ha-Joon Chang）。


In a manifesto published in April, economics students at the University of Manchester advocated an approach “that begins with economic phenomena and then gives students a toolkit to evaluate how well different perspectives can explain it,” rather than with mathematical models based on unreal assumptions.	在4月发布的一份声明中，曼彻斯特大学经济学学生提出了“从经济现象开始，然后向学生传授如何评估不同的解释角度的工具”，而不要讲那些基于不现实假设的数学模型的观点。


Significantly, Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, wrote the introduction.	重要的是，声明的引言部分是由英格兰银行金融稳定执行委员安德鲁·哈尔丹（Andrew Haldane）撰写的。


The Manchester students argue that “the mainstream within the discipline (neoclassical theory) has excluded all dissenting opinion, and the crisis is arguably the ultimate price of this exclusion.	曼彻斯特大学学生指出“该学科（新古典理论）主流排斥所有异见，危机便是这一排斥的最终代价。


Alternative approaches such as Post-Keynesian, Marxist, and Austrian economics (as well as many others) have been marginalized.	其他方法，如后凯恩斯主义、马克思主义和奥地利学派（还有其他许多方法）都被边缘化了。


The same can be said of the history of the discipline.”	该学科的历史也是如此。


As a result, students have little awareness of neoclassical theory’s limits, much less alternatives to it.	”结果，学生们根本不了解新古典理论的局限性，更不用说其他学说了。


The aim, according to the students, should be to “bridge disciplines within and outside of economics.”	学生们表示，他们的目的是“打通经济学内部和外部的联系”。


Economics should not be divorced from psychology, politics, history, philosophy, and so on.	经济学不应该与心理学、政治学、历史学、哲学等学科分离。


Students are especially keen to study issues like inequality, the role of ethics and fairness in economics (as opposed to the prevailing focus on profit maximization), and the economic consequences of climate change.	学生特别热衷于研究不平等性、道德和公平在经济学中的角色（而不是主流关注点利润最大化）以及气候变化的经济后果等问题。


The idea is that such intellectual cross-fertilization would help students understand recent economic phenomena better and improve economic theory.	他们的观点是，这些“他山之石”有助于帮助学生更好地理解最新的经济现象，改进经济学理论。


From this point of view, everyone stands to benefit from curriculum reform.	从这一观点看，每个人都可以从课程改革中获益。


The deeper message is that mainstream economics is in fact an ideology – the ideology of the free market.	更深层次的信息是主流经济学实际上是一种意识形态——关于自由市场的意识形态。


Its tools and assumptions define its topics.	它的工具和假设定义了它的主题。


If we assume perfect rationality and complete markets, we are debarred from exploring the causes of large-scale economic failures.	如果我们假设完美理性和完全市场，我们就不会去探索大规模经济失灵的原因。


Unfortunately, such assumptions have a profound influence on policy.	不幸的是，这些假设对政策影响巨大。


The efficient-market hypothesis – the belief that financial markets price risks correctly on average – provided the intellectual argument for extensive deregulation of banking in the 1980s and 1990s.	有效市场假说——认为平均而言金融市场对风险正确地进行了定价——为20世纪八九十年代银行监管的大规模放松提供了理论基础。


Similarly, the austerity policies that Europe used to fight the recession from 2010 on were based on the belief that there was no recession to fight.	类似地，欧洲从2010年以来为了战胜衰退而采用的紧缩政策乃是基于根本没有衰退需要战胜这一思想。


These ideas were tailored to the views of the financial oligarchy.	这些思想都是为金融寡头论量身定做的。


But the tools of economics, as currently taught, provide little scope for investigating the links between economists’ ideas and the structures of power.	但目前所教授的经济学工具无力研究经济学家观点与权力结构之间的联系。


Today’s “post-crash” students are right.	今天的“崩溃后”（post-crash）学生是正确的。


So what is keeping the mainstream’s intellectual apparatus going?	那么，是什么让主流思想机器得以运转的呢？


For starters, economics teaching and research is deeply embedded in an institutional structure that, as with any ideological movement, rewards orthodoxy and penalizes heresy.	首先，经济学教学与研究被建立在奖励正统、惩罚异类的制度结构基础上——这与许多意识形态运动十分相似。


The great classics of economics, from Smith to Ricardo to Veblen, go untaught.	经济学名著，从斯密到李嘉图和凡伯伦，都不会被教授。


Research funding is allocated on the basis of publication in academic journals that espouse the neoclassical perspective.	研究资金的分配基础是你在支持新古典理论的学术期刊上发表过多少文章。


Publication in such journals is also the basis of promotion.	迁升也凭借这一点。


Moreover, it has become an article of faith that any move toward a more open or “pluralist” approach to economics portends regression to “pre-scientific” modes of thought, just as the results of the European Parliament election threaten to revive a more primitive mode of politics.	此外，任何通向更开放或“多元”的经济学运动都预示着向“前科学”思维模式的回归已经成为一种信条，正如欧洲议会选举结果可能让更原始的政治学模式复苏。


Yet institutions and ideologies cannot survive by mere incantation or reminders of past horrors.	但制度和意识形态不会仅仅因为咒语或对过去的恐怖的回忆而存在。


They have to address and account for the contemporary world of lived experience.	它们必须解决和解释由活的经验组成的当代世界问题。


For now, the best that curriculum reform can do is to remind students that economics is not a science like physics, and that it has a much richer history than is to be found in the standard textbooks.	目前，课程改革可以做的最佳事情是提醒学生，经济学不是像物理学那样的科学，它的历史远远比标准教科书上的说法悠久。


In his book Economics of Good and Evil, the Czech economist Tomáš Sedláček shows that what we call “economics” is only a formalized fragment of a much wider range of thinking about economic life, stretching from the Sumerian epic of Gilgamesh to the meta-mathematics of today.	在《经济学的善与恶》（Economics of Good and Evil）一书中，捷克经济学家托马斯·赛德拉希克（Tomáš Sedláček）指出，我们所谓的“经济学”只不过是关于经济生活的一系列思想中的一个正规化的细小分支，广义的经济学应该是从苏美尔史诗吉尔美伽什（Gilgamesh）到今天的元数学无所不包的。


Indeed, mainstream economics is a pitifully thin distillation of historical wisdom on the topics that it addresses.	事实上，主流经济学家无非是将历史知识一点点地输入它所欲解决的问题中。


It should be applied to whatever practical problems it can solve; but its tools and assumptions should always be in creative tension with other beliefs concerning human wellbeing and flourishing.	它应该被用于它所能解决的所有实践问题； 但它的工具和假设永远应该与关于人类福祉与繁荣的其他观念保持创造性对立。


What students are taught today certainly does not deserve its imperial status in social thought.	今天的学生所学习的理论不应该获得其在社会思想中的实际地位。


Shale Gas to the Rescue?	大救星页岩气？


LONDON – The developed world is slowly emerging from the Great Recession, but a question lingers: How fast and how far will the recovery go?	伦敦—发达世界正缓缓地从大衰退中走出，但有一个问题仍然存在：复苏会有多快？


One big source of pessimism has been the idea that we are running out of investment opportunities – and have been since before the 2008 crash.	持续多久？ 悲观派的主要论点之一是我们缺少投资机会——自2008年大崩盘发生之前便是如此。


But is that true?	真是这样吗？


The last big surge of innovation was the Internet revolution, whose products came onstream in the 1990’s.	上一个大创新潮是兴盛于20世纪90年代的互联网革命。


Following the dot-com collapse of the early 2000’s, speculation in real estate and financial assets – enabled by cheap money – kept Western economies going.	21世纪初“点com”大崩盘后，房地产和金融资产投机——拜廉价资金所赐——维持了西方经济体的增长。


The post-2008 slump merely exposed the unsoundness of the preceding boom; the mediocrity of the recovery reflects the mediocrity of previous prospects, coolly considered.	冷静地看，2008年崩盘后，人们看到此前的繁荣根本不可靠； 复苏不力反映了此前的前景黯淡。


The risk now is that a debt-fueled asset spike merely perpetuates the boom-bust cycle.	如今的风险是债务带来的资产繁荣只是让枯荣循环永久化了。


The economist Larry Summers has reintroduced the term “secular stagnation” to describe what awaits us.	经济学家萨默斯（Larry Summers）再次用“长期停滞”一词来形容等待我们的前景。


By the mid-2000’s, Summers argued at a recent International Monetary Fund conference, the average prospective return on new investment in the United States had fallen below any feasible reduction in the Federal Reserve’s benchmark interest rate.	萨默斯在最近的国际货币基金组织（IMF）会议上指出，到2005年左右，美国新投资的平均预期回报比可以预见的所有美联储基准利率降息都要低。


That remains true today.	今天也是如此。


We may be in a permanent liquidity trap, in which nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero, but the expected rate of return to investment remains negative.	我们可能陷入了持久的流动性陷阱，名义利率不可能降到零以下，但投资预期回报率可以是负数。


Unconventional monetary policies like quantitative easing may inflate a new generation of asset bubbles, but the underlying problem – negative returns to new investment – will not have been solved by the time the next crash comes.	量化宽松等非常规货币政策可能带来新一波资产泡沫，但根本问题——新投资的负回报——无法在下一次大崩盘前得到解决。


So the problem is poor investment prospects.	因此，问题在于投资前景低迷。


Why?	此话怎讲？


In the 1930’s, the economist Alvin Hansen argued that opportunities for new investment in already-rich countries were drying up.	在20世纪30年代，经济学家汉森（Alvin Hanson）指出，已经致富的国家的信投资机会正在告竭。


Investment growth had depended on population growth, technological innovation, and westward expansion.	投资增长已开始依赖人口增长、技术创新和西进运动。


With the closing of the frontier and static populations, growth would depend on innovation; but future innovation would require smaller inputs of capital and labor than in the past.	随着西进空间的缩减和人口趋势的稳定，增长将依赖创新； 但未来创新所需要的资本和劳动力投入比过去要小。


In other words, the returns to capital were bound to fall as it became more abundant relative to population.	换句话说，随着资本相对人口变得富于，资本回报必然会下降。


In this situation, full employment could be maintained only by running continuous fiscal deficits.	在这样的环境下，充分就业唯有通过持续的财政赤字才能维持。


John Maynard Keynes held a different view.	凯恩斯对此持不同看法。 1945年，他在致艾略特（T.


In 1945, he wrote to T.S. Eliot: “[T]he full employment policy by means of investment is only one particular application of an intellectual theorem.	S. Eliot）的信中写到：“以投资作为手段实现充分就业的政策只是理论定理的一项具体应用。


You can produce the result just as well by consuming more or working less.	只要消费更多或工作更少，也可以产生同样的效果。


Personally, I regard the investment policy as first aid.…Less work is the ultimate solution.”	就个人而言，我认为投资就好比是急救……而减少工作则是最后手段。 ”


Developed countries’ strong postwar investment performance dispelled fear of secular stagnation.	发达国家强劲的战后投资表现打消了人们对长期停滞的担忧。


But this occurred after a world war that had created huge pent-up demand for new equipment, transport infrastructure, and household appliances, together with a military-industrial complex that armed the West during the Cold War.	但当时世界大战创造了对新设备、交通基础设施和家用电器的巨大需求，而在冷战期间，西方需要强大的军工业来武装自己。


The real rate of return to capital may have started to decline by the early 1970’s; productivity growth certainly has slowed since then.	资本的实际回报大概从20世纪70年代初便开始下降； 此后，生产率增长显然放缓了。


Some crucial changes in the political economy of Western capitalism in the 1980’s can also be viewed in this light: the rise of neoliberal ideology, the growing inequality of wealth and incomes, the increase in structural unemployment, the growth of financial services, globalization, the invention of post-Cold War threats to sustain military spending, and so on.	对于西方资本主义政治经济学在20世纪80年代所发生的一些关键变化，如新自由主义思潮的崛起、财富和收入不平等性的增加、结构性失业的抬头、金融服务业的成长、全球化、后冷战时期的到来让军费支出难以为继等，只能从这个角度来解释。


The question today is whether a new upsurge of investment will come to our rescue.	今天的问题是是否有新的投资潮来挽救我们。


Optimists point to the shale-energy revolution in the US.	乐观者指向了美国的页岩能源革命。


The McKinsey Global Institute has identified shale energy as a “game changer” for the world economy, estimatingthat it could boost America’s GDP by as much as 4% ($690 billion) per year and add 1.7 million permanent jobs to the labor market by 2020.	麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinney Global Institute）将页岩能源称为世界经济的“局面改变因素”，并测算出到2020年，页岩能源能让美国GDP每年增加4%（6 900亿美元），让劳动力市场的永久工作岗位增加170万个。


From 2007 to 2012, North American shale-gas production grew at an average annual rate of more than 50%.	从2007年到2012年，北美页岩气产量以平均每年50%以上的速度增长着。


As a result, the share of shale gas in America’s overall gas production rose from just 5% in 2007 to 36% in 2012.	结果，页岩气在美国天然气总产量中所占比重从2007年的5%上升到2012年的36%。


With the share of imports in US natural-gas consumption dropping from 16.5% in 2007 to 11% in 2010, America is on the path to energy self-sufficiency.	美国天然气消费进口比例从2007年的16. 5%下降到2010年的11%，美国正在向能源自给靠拢。


Likewise, a September 2013 report by IHS concludes that midstream industries like transportation and downstream industries like manufacturing and chemicals are also receiving a massive stimulus.	类似地，2013年9月的一份HIS报告指出，运输等中游行业和制造和化工等下游行业也得到了巨大的提振。


As a result of the shale-energy boom, “over $216 billion in total will be invested in the midstream and downstream oil and gas industries” from 2012 to 2025.	拜页岩能源繁荣所赐，从2012年到2025年，“中游和下游油气行业投资总量将超过2 160亿美元”。


Nearly 380,000 of the 2.1 million jobs that shale-related industries generated in the US in 2012 , were created in these areas.	2012年，美国页岩相关行业共创造了210万个工作岗位，其中有近380 000个来自中下游行业。


Beyond this, the most dramatic impact of shale oil and gas on the economy has been the fall in energy prices.	除此之外，页岩油气对经济的最大影响是能源价格的下降。


In the US, the price of natural gas has fallen to $4 per MMBtu, from $13 in 2008, boosting household purchasing power.	在美国，天然气价格从2008年的13美元/百万英热降至4美元/百万英热，这提振了家庭购买力。


IHS estimates that in 2012, developments in the shale-energy industry increased households’ real disposable income by more than $1,200.	HIS测算，在2012年，页岩能源业的发展让每户家庭增加了1 200多美元实际可支配收入。


Thus the shale revolution represents a huge stimulus for America, in terms of investment, exports, and a reduction in energy costs.	因此，从投资、出口和降低能源成本角度讲，页岩革命堪称美国的巨大刺激。


I am not in a position either to judge the quantitative impact of shale energy on the US economy and, via growth there, on the rest of the world, or to comment on its geopolitical consequences or net effect on carbon emissions.	我既不想对页岩能源对美国经济的影响（以及通过美国的增长对全世界造成的影响）下定量判断，也无意评论其地缘政治影响或对碳排放的净效应。


But it does seem to me that contemporary apostles of secular stagnation like Summers and Paul Krugman at least ought to be taking the shale-energy revolution into account.	但在我看来，萨默斯和克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）等长期停滞说的当代信徒至少应该考虑一下页岩革命。


Death to Machines?	死于机器？


LONDON – At the start of the Industrial Revolution, textile workers in the Midlands and the North of England, mainly weavers, staged a spontaneous revolt, smashing machinery and burning factories.	伦敦—工业革命伊始，英格兰中部和北部的纺织工人（以织布工为主）发动了一场自发的抵抗运动，砸毁机器、烧毁工厂。


Their complaint was that the newfangled machines were robbing them of their wages and jobs.	他们的怨气在于新出现的机器抢走了他们的工资和饭碗。


The rebels took their name, and inspiration, from the apocryphal Ned Ludd, supposedly an apprentice weaver who smashed two knitting frames in 1779 in a “fit of passion.”	叛乱的名字和源头来自内德·勒德（Ned Ludd），据说他是一位纺织学徒工，在1779年的一次“狂躁发作”中砸毁了两台针织机。 这个人物很可能是杜撰的。


Robert Calvert wrote a ballad about him in 1985: “They said Ned Ludd was an idiot boy/ That all he could do was wreck and destroy,” the song begins.	罗伯特·卡尔维特（Robert Calvert）在1985年为勒德写了一曲民谣，开头是这样的：“人们说内德·勒德是个熊孩子/因为他所能做的一切无非是破坏和毁灭。


And then: “He turned to his workmates and said: ‘Death to Machines’/They tread on our future and stamp on our dreams.”	”接着是这样的：“他来到工友们中间，说：‘死于机器’/它们践踏了我们的未来，碾碎了我们的梦想。 ”


The Luddites’ rampage was at its height in 1811-12.	勒德分子之怒在1811—1812年达到了顶峰。


An alarmed government sent in more troops to garrison the disturbed areas than were then available to Wellington in the Peninsular War against Napoleon.	警觉的政府派遣大军驻守骚乱区，调动规模比惠灵顿在与拿破仑的半岛战争中动员的数量还要多。


More than a hundred Luddites were hanged or transported to Australia.	一百多名勒德分子被处以绞刑或流放澳大利亚。


These measures restored peace.	这些措施重塑了和平。


The machines won: the Luddites are a footnote in the history of the Industrial Revolution.	机器获得了胜利：勒德分子只不过是工业革命史的一个注脚。


Historians tell us that the Luddites were victims of a temporary conjuncture of rising prices and falling wages that threatened them with starvation in a society with minimal welfare provision.	历史学家告诉我们，勒德分子是暂时性的价格上涨和工资下降的受害者，两面夹击让他们在福利政策不利的社会里有挨饿的危险。


The Luddites, however, blamed their misfortune on the machines themselves.	但是，勒德分子却把自己的不幸归咎于机器本身。


The new knitting frames and power looms could weave yarn into cloth much faster than the most skilled artisan weaver working in his own cottage.	新型针织机和动力织机纺纱成布的速度远远快于最熟练的家庭作坊纺织工。


Caught between fixed costs (the hire and upkeep of their domestic appliances) and falling prices for their products, tens of thousands of families were doomed to become paupers.	在固定成本（购置和维持工作设备）和产品价格下跌的双重挤压下，数万家庭被迫沦为乞丐。


Their plight evoked some sympathy (Lord Byron made a brilliant speech in their defense in the House of Lords); their arguments, however, did not.	他们的不幸引来了一些同情（拜伦勋爵（Lord Byron）在上议院为他们做过出色的演讲）； 但他们的诉求并不值得同情。


There could be no rejecting progress: the future lay with machine production, not with old-fashioned handicrafts.	进步是不可阻挡的：未来是属于机器生产的，而不是属于老式手工作业的。


Trying to regulate trade, Adam Smith taught, was like trying to “regulate the wind.”	亚当·斯密告诉我们，试图管制贸易就像试图“管制风”一样愚蠢。


Thomas Paine spoke for middle-class radicalism when he said, “We know that every machine for the abridgment of labor is a blessing to the great family of which we are part.”	托马斯·潘恩曾经为中产阶级激进主义（middle-class radicalism）说话，他说：“我们知道，节约劳动力的每一台机器都是我们身为一份子的大家庭的福祉。


There would, of course, be some temporary unemployment in the technologically advancing sectors; but, in the long run, machine-assisted production, by increasing the real wealth of the community, would enable full employment at higher wages.	”当然，在技术先进部门会有一些暂时性的失业； 但是，长期来看，机器生产可以增加社会的真实财富，从而实现更高工资水平上的充分就业。


That was the initial view of David Ricardo, the most influential economist of the nineteenth century.	这就是十九世纪最有影响力的经济学家大卫·李嘉图的最初看法。


But in the third edition of his Principles of Political Economy (1817), he inserted a chapter on machinery that changed tack.	但在其《政治经济学》第三版（1817年）中，他加入了一章关于机器的内容，改变了看法。


He was now “convinced that the substitution of machines for human labor is often very injurious to the class of laborers,” that the “same cause which may increase the net revenue of the country, may at the same time render the population redundant.”	他“认为机器取代人力劳动往往会给劳动阶级造成伤害”，“在国家净收入获得提高的同时，可能造成人口过剩。


As a result, “the opinion entertained by the laboring class, that the employment of machinery is frequently detrimental to their interests, is not founded on prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of political economy.”	”因此，“劳动阶级所持有的观点，即机器的使用往往不利于他们的利益，并不是建立在偏见和错误的基础之上，反而十分符合政治经济学的正确原理。 ”


Just consider: machinery “may render the population redundant”!	想一想：机器“可能造成人口过剩”！


A bleaker prospect is not to be found in economics.	在经济学中没有比这个更令人沮丧的前景了。


Ricardo’s orthodox followers took no notice of it, assuming it to be a rare lapse by the Master.	李嘉图的正统追随者都无视这一观点，认为这是导师偶尔的无心之失。


But was it?	果真如此吗？


The pessimistic argument is as follows: If machines costing $5 an hour can produce the same amount as workers costing $10 an hour, employers have an incentive to substitute machines for labor up to the point that the costs are equal – that is, when the wages of the workers have fallen to $5 an hour.	悲观论是这样的：如果机器能以每小时5美元的成本生产和成本每小时10美元的工人同样多的产品，厂商就有激励用机器代替人力，直到两者的成本相等为止——也就是说，直到工人工资降到每小时5美元为止。


As machines become ever more productive, so wages tend to fall even more, toward zero, and the population becomes redundant.	随着机器生产率的不断提高，工资将不断下降，趋近于零，人口就会变得过剩。


Now, it did not work out like that.	事实并非如此。


Labor’s share of GDP remained constant throughout the Industrial Age.	劳动力占GDP的比重在整个工业时代保持稳定。


The pessimistic argument ignored the fact that by lowering the cost of goods, machines increased workers’ real wages – enabling them to buy more – and that the rise in labor productivity enabled employers (often under pressure from trade unions) to pay more per worker.	悲观论忽略了一个事实，即机器通过降低商品成本提高了工人的真实工资——让他们能够买更多的东西——并且劳动生产率的提高让厂商（通常需要承受来自工会的压力）向每位员工提供更高的薪酬。


It also assumed that machines and workers were close substitutes, whereas more often than not workers could still do things that machines could not.	悲观论还认为机器和工人之间具有高替代性，但实际情况是工人仍然可以做机器做不了的事情。


However, over the last 30 years, the share of wages in national income has been falling, owing to what MIT professors Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee call the “second machine age.”	尽管如此，在过去30年中，工资占国民收入比重在下降，MIT教授埃里克·布莱恩约尔弗森（Erik Brynjolfsson）和安德鲁·麦克菲（Andrew McAfee）认为原因在于“第二机器时代”。


Computerized technology has penetrated deeply into the service sector, taking over jobs for which the human factor and “cognitive functions” were hitherto deemed indispensable.	计算机化科技深深地渗透到了服务部门，正在霸占迄今人力因素和“认知功能”仍不可或缺的工作岗位。


In retail, for example, Walmart and Amazon are prime examples of new technology driving down workers’ wages.	比如，零售业的沃尔玛和亚马逊便是新技术拉低工人工资的显例。


Because computer programs and humans are close substitutes for such jobs, and given the predictable improvement in computing power, there seems to be no technical obstacle to the redundancy of workers across much of the service economy.	对于这类工作，计算机程序和人之间具有高度替代性，并且计算能力的改善是意料中事，因此整个服务经济出现工人过剩似乎不存在技术障碍。


Yes, there will still be activities that require human skills, and these skills can be improved.	是的，仍然有些活动需要人力技能，并且这些技能可以改善。


But it is broadly true that the more computers can do, the less humans need to do.	但更广泛的事实是计算机能做的越多，人力需要做的就越少。


The prospect of the “abridgment of labor” should fill us with hope rather than foreboding.	“节约人力”的前景应该带给我们希望而不是恶兆。


But, in our kind of society, there are no mechanisms for converting redundancy into leisure.	但是，在我们的社会中，尚不存在将过剩转化为闲暇的机制。


That brings me back to the Luddites.	这就把我带回了勒德分子。


They claimed that because machines were cheaper than labor, their introduction would depress wages.	勒德分子宣称，由于机器比劳动力便宜，它们的使用便会抑制工资。


They argued the case for skill against cheapness.	他们的论点是有利于技能，不利于工资。


The most thoughtful of them understood that consumption depends on real income, and that depressing real income destroys businesses.	他们中思想最深刻者明白，消费取决于真实收入，抑制真实收入将毁掉企业。


Above all, they understood that the solution to the problems created by machines would not be found in laissez-faire nostrums.	最重要的是，他们理解机器带来的问题解决方案不可能在自由放任的秘方中出现。


The Luddites were wrong on many points; but perhaps they deserve more than a footnote.	勒德分子在很多方面都是错的； 但也许他们并不只是一个注脚而已。


Vanguard Scotland?	先锋苏格兰？


LONDON – Since I believe that the Scots are sensible, I think that they will vote “no” this week to independence.	伦敦—我相信苏格兰人是明智的，因此我认为他们会在本周的独立公投中说“不”。


But, whichever way the vote goes, the spectacular rise of nationalism, in Scotland and elsewhere in Europe, is a symptom of a diseased political mainstream.	但是，不管公投结果如何，民族主义的崛起已成为苏格兰和欧洲其他地区的一个壮观景象，这是政治主流有恙的一个病症。


Many are now convinced that the current way of organizing our affairs does not deserve such unquestioning allegiance; that the political system has closed down serious debate on economic and social alternatives; that banks and oligarchs rule; and that democracy is a sham.	许多人现在认为，组织我们的事务的当前方式不值得绝对的忠诚； 政治制度导致关于经济和社会替代方案的严肃讨论无从进行；


Nationalism promises an escape from the discipline of “sensible” alternatives that turn out to offer no alternative.	民主只是挂羊头卖狗肉。 民族主义许下一个摆脱根本不是替代方案的“明智”替代方案的办法。


Nationalists can be divided into two main groups: those who genuinely believe that independence provides an exit from a blocked political system, and those who use the threat of it to force concessions from the political establishment.	民主主义者可以分为两大类：真正相信独立能摆脱行不通的政治制度的人； 以及利用独立威胁迫使现有政治体制让步的人。


Either way, nationalist politicians enjoy the huge advantage of not requiring a practical program: all good things will flow from sovereignty.	无论如何，民族主义政客都有一个巨大的优势，他们必须要务实的计划：所有好东西都会随着主权的到来而到来。


Though nationalist politics was long suppressed after World War II by economic prosperity and memories of pre-war horrors, Europe offers fertile ground for its revival.	尽管自二战以来，民族主义政治就一直被经济繁荣和战前恐怖的记忆所抑制，但欧洲为其复苏提供了温床。


This is not just because of Europe’s prolonged economic malaise.	这不仅是因为欧洲经济的长期萎靡。


It is because practically all of Europe’s existing nation-states contain geographically concentrated ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities.	这是因为，几乎所有现有欧洲民族国家都有在地理上集中分布的种族、宗教或语言少数群体。


Moreover, these states’ incorporation into the European Union – a kind of voluntary empire – challenges their citizens’ allegiance.	此外，这些国家融入欧盟——一种自愿加入的帝国——这对其公民的忠诚构成了挑战。


Thus, nationalists can look either to Europe to protect them against their own states or to their states to protect them against the European empire.	因此，民族主义者要么打着欧洲的旗号反对祖国，要么打着祖国的旗号反对欧洲帝国。


That is why Britain has spawned two nationalisms simultaneously.	英国也因此同时产生了两种民族主义。


The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), led by populist Nigel Farage, looks to London to protect British independence against the EU bureaucracy.	民粹主义者尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）领导的联合王国独立党（United Kingdom Independence Party，UKIP）要求伦敦保护英国独立于欧盟官僚体制。


The Scottish National Party (SNP), led by the astute Alex Salmond, looks to Brussels to protect Scotland against the “imperial” parliament in Westminster.	诡计多端的阿莱士·萨尔蒙德（Alex Salmond）领导的苏格兰国家党（Scottish National Party，SNP）要求布鲁塞尔保护苏格兰独立于西敏寺的“帝国”议会。


Given the right conditions, nationalism will always discover an “other” against which to define itself.	在条件合适时，民族主义总是能找到“其他人”，而他们本身的意义，就是作为“其他人”的对立面。


Scottish nationalism was not created by the recent economic crisis, but the Scottish referendum was.	苏格兰民族主义不是由最近的经济危机带来的，但苏格兰公投是。


Scotland convened its first devolved parliament in 1999, giving the SNP a political platform in Edinburgh from which to campaign for independence.	1999年，苏格兰首次召开了下放议会（devolved parliament），SNP因此有了在爱丁堡的政治平台，宣传其独立运动。


The removal of the Labour government in London in 2010 was the voters’ way of punishing the Labour Party for the economic collapse of 2008-2009.	2010年伦敦工党政府的下台是选民惩罚其在2008—2009年经济崩溃中的责任的方式。


But, while Labour’s punishment delivered a Conservative government in London, it produced a majority victory for the SNP in Edinburgh in 2011.	但是，尽管工党受到惩罚让保守党在伦敦上台，但也导致2011年SNP在爱丁堡赢得��数胜利。


To maintain governability in Scotland, British Prime Minister David Cameron was forced to permit a referendum on independence.	为了维持在苏格兰的执政地位，英国首相卡梅伦被迫允许独立公投。


An independent Scottish government would face huge economic costs.	独立的苏格兰政府将面临巨大的经济成本。


It would inherit its share of UK public-sector debt and future liabilities without the benefit of the substantial subsidy that it currently receives from the British Treasury.	它将继承其在英国公共部门债务的相应部分以及未来负债，并且再也不能获得目前英国财政部所给予的巨额补贴。


The SNP claims that additional revenues from North Sea oil would offset the subsidy.	SNP宣称北海石油所带来的额外收入将能抵消补贴减少。


But these revenues are naturally time-limited, and the SNP has failed to mention the large decommissioning costs that will be incurred when the oil runs out.	但这些收入天然具有时间局限性，SNP也没有提到石油开采殆尽时的巨大报废成本。


So, almost certainly, Scottish taxes would have to be higher than UK taxes.	因此，几乎可以肯定地说，苏格兰税收负担将会高于英国。


In addition, leading Scottish-based banks and many large businesses have said they would relocate some of their operations to London.	此外，位于苏格兰的主要银行和许多大企业都表示它们会将一些业务迁移到伦敦。


Scotland would also be threatened with the loss of British defense contracts.	苏格兰还将遭到英国防务合同的损失。


According to the SNP, an independent Scotland would not cause fragmentation of the UK internal market, because it would maintain a currency union with Britain.	根据SNP的说法，独立的苏格兰不会导致英国内部市场分裂，因为它将维持与英国的货币联盟。


But the three main British political parties, and the Bank of England, have rejected this.	但英国三大政党和英格兰银行都拒绝了这一点。


If the Scots want sovereignty, they will need their own currency – and their own central bank: no British lender of last resort would be available to Scotland’s banks.	如果苏格兰人希望获得主权，他们就需要自己的货币——以及自己的中央银行：苏格兰银行将无法求助于英国最后贷款人。


Scotland might try to keep its currency at par with sterling, but this would require larger reserves than a Scottish central bank could command, at least at the outset.	苏格兰也许会试图保持其自身货币与英镑的平价，但这需要比苏格兰中央银行所能拥有的更大的储备量，至少在一开始是如此。


And a Scottish currency that floats against the British pound would mean large transaction costs and reduced trade between the two countries.	而浮动于英镑的苏格兰货币意味着巨大的交易成本，将制约两国之间的贸易。


Nor is there any easy escape, at least in the short run, by joining the EU, which may well require an independent Scotland to apply for membership.	至少从短期看，加入欧盟也不是容易的办法，这要求独立的苏格兰申请入盟资格。


In short, the SNP’s dream of social democracy in one country would fall afoul of the larger interdependencies that bind together the components of the UK, and that tie the UK to the EU and the EU to the rest of the globalized world.	简言之，SNP的一国社会民主之梦与将英国的各部分、英国与欧盟、以及欧盟与全球化世界的其他部分联系起来的互相依存性相冲突。


None of this fazes the Scottish nationalists.	所有这些都没有让苏格兰民族主义者退缩。


In nationalism’s forward march in post-crash Europe, its standard-bearers often use immigration to exploit pre-crash resentment against globalization, notably the erosion of cultures and identities, declining sense of community, wage stagnation, rising inequality, uncontrolled banks, and high unemployment.	在后崩溃时代欧洲民族主义的发展中，其标准制定者常常利用移民激发危机前针对全球化的不满情绪——尤其是文化与身份的丧失、社会意识的下降、工资停滞、不平等性加剧、不受控制的银行以及高失业。


They question whether people can enjoy the benefits of globalization while being sheltered from its costs – and what alternatives there are to the “market fundamentalism” that has defined capitalism since the late twentieth century.	他们质疑承担了全球化成本的穷人是否能从中获益——以及有什么“市场原教旨主义”（二十世纪末以来资本主义的写照）的替代方案。


In this mood, people are more willing to discount nationalism’s costs, because they have come to doubt the benefits of its liberal capitalist rival.	在这样的情绪下，人们更愿意将民族主义的成本打折扣，因为他们已开始怀疑自由资本主义对手的好处。


Ordinary Russians, for example, refuse to face the costs of their government’s Ukraine policy, not just because they underestimate them, but because they somehow seem unimportant relative to the huge psychological boost the policy brings.	比如，俄罗斯老百姓拒绝面对俄政府乌克兰政策的成本，这不仅是因为他们低估了这一成本，也是因为与该政策所带来的巨大的心理提振作用相比，这一成本显得不再重要。


Nationalism today is not nearly as virulent as it was in the 1930s, because economic distress is much less pronounced.	今天的民族主义没有20世纪30年代那么危险，因为经济困境远没有当时严峻。


But its revival is a portent of what happens when a form of politics claims to satisfy every human need except the coziness of communal belonging – and then lets the people down.	但民族主义的复苏是一个征兆，预示着某种政治形式宣称能满足除集体归属的安逸感之外的所有人类需要——然后让人民失望时会发生什么。


Free Trade and Costly Love	自由贸易和昂贵爱情


LONDON – The World Trade Organization’s ministerial conference in Bali in December produced a modest package of encouragements to global trade.	伦敦—12月的世界贸易组织巴里部长级会议非全球贸易带来了些许鼓励。


More broadly, the WTO’s multilateral approach has shown its worth by preventing a massive increase in trade barriers, unlike in 1929-1930, when protectionism helped deepen and broaden the Great Depression.	世贸组织的多边方针开始显现其广泛价值，防止了贸易壁垒的激增，没有走1929—1930年保护主义加深和扩大了大萧条的老路。


But the main question – whether globalization is a good thing, and for whom – remains unanswered.	但主要问题——全球化是好是坏、对谁好对谁坏——仍有待回答。


The essence of globalization – free trade – rests on the theory of comparative advantage, which views international trade as profitable even for a country that can produce every commodity more cheaply (in terms of labor or all resources) than any other country.	全球化的本质——自由贸易——建立在比较优势理论上，比较优势理论认为，即使对于可以比其他所有国家都较为廉价地生产所有商品的国家（以劳动力或全资源角度衡量），国际贸易仍然是有利可图的。


The textbook example given by the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson is that of a town’s best lawyer who is also its best typist.	诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson）的教科书给出的例子是同时身为镇上最佳律师和最佳打字员的人。


Provided that he is better at law than at typing, he should specialize in law and leave his secretary to do the typing.	假设他擅长法律胜过擅长打字，那么他应该专注于当律师，让秘书去干打字工作。


That way, both of their earnings will be higher.	这样能让两个人的收入都有所提高。


The same logic applies to countries.	同样的逻辑也适用于国家。


Each country should specialize in producing those things that it produces most efficiently, rather than producing a bit of everything, because that way its income will be higher.	各国都应该专注于生产它们生产效率最高的产品，而不是所有东西都生产一些，因为这样能让该国的收入有所提高。


Economists regard understanding the theory of comparative advantage as a test of professional competence.	经济学家认为，理解比较优势理论是专业能力的一项考验。


But are the incompetents – say, the average person who believes that buying cheap imports from China destroys Western jobs – always wrong?	但没有专业能力的人，比如认为购买来自中国的便宜进口品伤害了西方就业的普通人永远都是错的吗？


Samuelson, who called the theory of comparative advantage the most beautiful thing in economics, changed his tune a bit at the end of his life.	萨缪尔森把比较优势理论称为经济学中最美丽的部分，但他晚年的思想也有了一点变化。


Free trade, he said, works fine with unchanging technology.	他说，自由贸易完美适用于固定不变的技术。


But if countries like China can combine Western technology with low wages, then trade with China will lower Western wages.	但如果像中国这样的国家可以将西方技术与低工资相结合，那么与中国进行贸易会拉低西方工资。


True, the West will be able to get its goods more cheaply; but, as Samuelson put it, “being able to purchase groceries 20% cheaper at Wal-Mart does not necessarily make up for the wage losses.”	诚然，西方将能够以更低的价格获得商品； 但是，萨缪尔森指出，“能在沃尔玛买到八折商品并不一定能够弥补工资损失。


Nor, he might have added, would being able to buy goods more cheaply compensate for many other good things in life that are sacrificed to efficiency.	他或许还要加上，能以更低廉的价格买到商品并不一定能够弥补因追求效率而牺牲掉的生活乐趣。


The argument for free trade is an argument for welfare, but welfare defined exclusively in terms of money.	自由贸易的支持者的理论点是福利，但福利完全用金钱来衡量。


Time is money: the more money you can squeeze out of an hour’s work, the better off you are.	时间就是金钱：你可以从一个小时工作中赚到的钱越多，你的生活就越好。


But what about all of the things that you enjoy doing, or that you think of as valuable, that do not maximize your earnings?	但对那些你很喜欢做、认为很有价值、但又不符合收入最大化原则的东西怎么办？


The economist responds that the more efficient you are at your work, the more time you will have for those other things.	经济学家的反应是，你工作的效率越高，你就有越多的时间可用于其他事情。


The trouble is that the more you start to think of your welfare in terms of money, the more likely you are to regard spending time with your friends or making love as an “opportunity cost” – the loss of money you would have made by working instead – rather than a benefit.	这一理论的麻烦在于，你越是用金钱来衡量你的福利，你就越可能认为你花在朋友和做爱上的时间是一种“机会成本”——你损失了原本可以用在工作上赚到的钱——而不是一项福利。


The goal of squeezing as much money as possible out of time makes a great deal of sense in poor countries, where inefficient use of time can lead to starvation.	尽可能地从时间中挤出金钱的目标对穷国来说十分合理，在那里，时间使用效率低下可能导致饥饿。


The whole point of economic development is, surely, to reduce the cost of inefficiency.	毫无疑问，经济发展的全部意义就在于降低无效率的成本。


Yet economists, not noticing that their logic is less applicable to rich countries, continue trying to extend it to more and more areas of life.	但经济学家并未意识到他们的逻辑并不那么适用于发达国家，而是试图把这一理论扩展到生活中的方方面面。


A newly luxuriant research area is “life outsourcing.”	一个新兴研究领域是“生活外包”。


Paying someone else to fold your socks is a way to maximize your own earnings and those of the sock folder.	花钱雇人帮你叠袜子是实现你自身和叠袜子者收入最大化的一个办法。


Even as penniless graduate students, the economists Jon Steinsson and Emi Nakamura borrowed money to pay people to do their household chores, calculating that “spending an extra hour working on a paper was better for their lifetime expected earnings than spending that same hour vacuuming.”	在生活拮据的研究生阶段，经济学家琼·斯坦森（Jon Steinsson）和艾米·纳卡穆拉（Emi Nakamura）就借钱雇人负责家务活，认为“在论文上多花一小时带来的终身预期收入比花在吸尘器上更大。 ”


Likewise, the economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, pioneers of “lovenomics,” cite the tax code as a reason for not marrying.	类似地，“爱情经济学”先驱贝西·史蒂文森（Betsey Stevenson）和贾斯汀·沃尔夫斯（Justin Wolfers）把税法当作不结婚的理由。


They also conducted a cost/benefit analysis before having a child.	他们在要孩子之前也做了成本/效益分析。


As Wolfers explains,	沃尔夫斯解释说：


“The principle of comparative advantage tells us that gains from trade are largest when your trading partner has skills and endowments that are quite different from yours.	“比较优势原理告诉我们，在你的贸易伙伴所拥有的技能和禀赋与你的非常不同时，贸易会带来最大好处。


I’m an impractical bookish Harvard-trained empirical labor economist, while Betsey is an impractical and bookish Harvard-trained empirical labor economist.	我是个两耳不闻窗外事的哈佛实证劳动经济学家，而贝西也是两耳不闻窗外事的哈佛实证劳动经济学家。


When your skills are so similar, the gains from trade aren’t so large.	当你们的技能是如此相似时，贸易的好处就不那么大了。


Except when it comes to bringing up our baby.	有了孩子就不一样了。


There, Betsey has a pair of, um, endowments that mean that she’s better at inputs.	这样一来，贝西就有了新的禀赋，这一禀赋意味着她更适合投入。


And that means that I’m left to deal with outputs.”	这也意味着产出的责任就由我来承担。 ”


As Stevenson helpfully clarifies, “it turns out that fathers can be pretty good at dealing with diapers.”	史蒂文森又做了有益的补充：“事实证明，父亲在换尿布方面很有天赋。 ”


At this point, those untutored in economics are likely to start gnashing their teeth.	看到这里，没学过经济学的人大概要咬牙切齿了。


“I enjoy doing lots of things that do not maximize my earning power,” they might protest.	“我就喜欢干很多不能让我的赚钱能力最大化的事情，”他们也许会如此抗议。


But as soon as we accept the premise that to be rational is to seek to maximize one’s utility – defined in terms of consumption, with money the way to maximize it – the economist’s logic wins.	但只要他们接受一个前提，即理性是为了最大化你的效用——用消费衡量，而金钱则是消费最大化的手段，那么经济学家的逻辑就会胜出。


At that point, we must admit that it is irrational to spend time on long conversations with friends if it is time stolen from inventing, say, new software (unless the conversation helps the invention).	在这一点上，我们必须承认把发明（比如）新软件的时间用于和朋友们摆龙门阵是不理性（除非你们的谈资有利于发明）。


For Wolfers, it is a coincidence that what earns him the most money, economics, is also what he most enjoys doing.	对沃尔夫斯来说，给他带来最多金钱的活动——经济学研究恰巧也是他最喜欢做的事情。


Such reasoning crystallizes opposing views of the world, one in which time is a cost, and the other in which it is a benefit.	这套理论形成了相反的世界观，一方认为时间是一种成本，另一方认为时间是一种效益。


The first sees time spent on enjoyment as a missed opportunity; the second as part of the good life.	前一方认为把时间花在享受上等于是放弃机会； 后一方认为这是美好生活的一部分。


We should be clear about what is at stake in the choice between the two.	我们需要弄清楚这一选择所造成的后果。


The Rights of Digital Man	数字时代人的权利


ABU DHABI – We have created an online world whose vastness exceeds our comprehension.	阿布扎比——我们已经建立了一个浩瀚程度超乎我们理解的网络世界。


As a measure of its magnitude, consider this: In 2012, the new Internet address system, IPv6, created more than 340 trillion trillion trillion (3.4 x 1038) addresses – that is, around 4.8 x 1028 addresses for every person on earth.	可以这样来形容它的大小：2012年，新的互联网地址系统IPv6创建了超过340兆兆兆（3. 4×1038）个地址——折合地球上每个人的地址约为4.


That should be sufficient to service the five billion devices that currently connect to the internet, and the 22 billion devices forecast to be in use by 2020.	8×1028个。 新系统不但可以为目前联网的五十亿台设备提供服务，此外也能满足到2020年预计220亿台设备的联网需要。


The hard part of the connectivity explosion is not building capacity, but how it should be managed.	联网爆炸的难度不在于能力建设，而在于管理事务。


We must answer profound questions about the way we live.	我们必须回答有关生活方式的深层次疑问。


Should everyone be permanently connected to everything?	是不是所有人和事之间都要建立永久性的连接？


Who owns which data, and how should information be made public?	谁拥有哪些信息，信息公开应该遵循哪些原则？


Can and should data use be regulated, and, if so, how?	能否进行数据管理，如果可以，该从哪里着手？


And what role should government, business, and ordinary Internet users play in addressing these issues?	政府、企业和普通网民在解决上述问题时应该发挥什么样的作用？


Such questions can no longer be ignored.	我们不能对上述问题继续视而不见。


As the virtual world expands, so, too, do breaches of trust and misuse of personal data.	随着虚拟世界的不断拓展，破坏信任和滥用个人资料的情况也越来越严重。


Surveillance has increased public unease – and even paranoia – about state agencies.	监控已经加剧了公众对国家机构的不安、甚至是妄想。


Private companies that trade in personal data have incited the launch of a “reclaim privacy” movement.	交易个人资料的私人公司激起了“隐私恢复”运动。


As one delegate at a recent World Economic Forum debate, noted: “The more connected we have become, the more privacy we have given up.”	正如一位代表在最近的世界经济论坛辩论中所言：“我们联网越多，剩下的隐私就越少。 ”


But we can shape our future cyber-world in a way that keeps our data safe, reestablishes trust online, and welcomes in billions of new participants.	但我们可以用保障数据安全、重塑网络信任和欢迎数十亿新用户的方式塑造未来的网络世界。


Ensuring security will require that the Internet’s many stakeholders establish some kind of governance system.	保证安全需要众多互联网利益相关者建立起管理制度。


Organizations such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) will need to become much more global in scope.	互联网名称和数字地址分配等机构（ICANN）需要变得越来越全球化。


At the same time, we must guard against over-regulation or government control.	同时，我们必须防范过度监管或政府掌控。


This might require us to phase out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority to prevent it from falling under the control of an inter-governmental body, as some states have demanded.	我们可能需要逐步淘汰互联网编号分配机构来防止其像某些国家所要求的那样落入政府间机构的控制之下。


Governments certainly have an important part to play.	政府肯定要发挥重要作用。


But too much control would almost certainly stifle innovation, increase costs, and probably exclude important anti-establishment voices.	但控制过严几乎肯定会扼杀创新、增加成本、并且可能排除反体制要求。


A better approach, and one that would enhance public trust in the system, would be to establish diversified stewardship with multiple stakeholders.	提高公众对体制信任的更好方法是建立多利益方多元化的管理制度。


One such stakeholder group is business.	这样的相关利益群体其中也包括企业。


Now that our personal data have become such a valuable asset, companies are coming under increasing pressure to develop online business models that protect rather than exploit users’ private information.	现在个人数据已经成为如此宝贵的资产，以致于企业创建保护而非利用用户私人信息的压力越来越大。


In particular, Internet users want to stop companies befuddling their customers with convoluted and legalistic service agreements in order to extract and sell their data.	尤其值得一提的是，网民要求企业停止再用令人费解且墨守成规的服务协议迷惑用户，以便对个人数据进行提取和销售。


This type of abuse could be limited by creating legal and social contracts to govern the authorization of data use.	此类滥用行为可以通过制定法律及社会契约管理数据使用授权来加以限制。


One idea, proposed by the information scientist Marc Davis, is to draw up a standard, readable seven-point “Terms of Service” agreement that empowers people’s control of the uses of their personal data.	信息学家马克•戴维斯提出的一种想法是起草可读性强的标准七点“服务条款”协议，让民众自己控制如何使用个人资料。


Another is to allow users themselves to decide from a preset menu how much personal information they are prepared to share.	还有一种方案是让用户从预置菜单中自行选择愿意分享多少个人资料。


But the trust issue goes beyond just regulation.	但信任问题不是单靠监管就能解决的。


Companies must find ways to introduce new technologies and do business that are popular with their customers and retain their trust.	企业必须想方设法引进新技术、开展受客户欢迎的业务以保持他们的信任。


(Indeed, in a world of human-robot interfaces, 3D printing, nanotechnology, and shale-gas extraction, any innovative company must ask itself this basic question.)	（其实，在人机互动、3D打印、纳米技术和页岩气开采的世界里，任何创新企业都必须找到这个基本问题的答案。 ）


Finally, we must consider the human dimension of our virtual world.	最后，我们必须考虑虚拟世界中人的因素。


Hyper-connectivity not only creates new commercial opportunities; it also changes the way ordinary people think about their lives.	超链接不仅创造了新的商业机会； 也改变了普通人对生活的看法。


The so-called FoMo (fear of missing out) syndrome reflects the anxieties of a younger generation whose members feel compelled to capture instantly everything they do and see.	所谓的FoMo（错失机会恐惧）综合症反应了年轻一代迫切想要即刻抓住眼前一切的担忧。


Ironically, this hyper-connectivity has increased our insularity, as we increasingly live through our electronic devices.	颇具讽刺意味的是，这种超链接状况随着越来越多地依赖电子设备，反而加剧了人类与外界的隔阂。


Neuroscientists believe that this may even have altered how we now relate to one another in the real world.	神经学家甚至认为这可能改变了现实世界的联系方式。


At the heart of this debate is the need to ensure that in a world where many, if not all, of the important details of our lives – including our relationships – exist in cyber-perpetuity, people retain, or reclaim, some level of control over their online selves.	辩论的核心是确保在众多（若非所有）重要生活细节——包括人际关系——皆存在于网络永恒世界的情况下，人类能够保护、或者收回某种程度的网络自我控制。


While the world of forgetting may have vanished, we can reshape the new one in a way that benefits rather than overwhelms us.	虽然遗忘的世界或许已经一去不返，但我们仍可以惠及、而不是吞没我们的方式重塑新的秩序。


Our overriding task is to construct a digital way of life that reinforces our existing sense of ethics and values, with security, trust, and fairness at its heart.	我们的首要任务是构建强化现有道德和价值观的数字化生活方式，确保安全、信任和公平是其中的核心因素。


But the experiences are related.	但它们��体验是有关系的。


Rolling the Dice in Cyprus	塞浦路斯的掷骰子决策


PRINCETON – The task was never going to be an easy one: impose losses worth about €5.8 billion ($7.5 billion) on lenders to the Cypriot government and depositors with the country’s banks.	普林斯顿—任务从来不容易：让塞浦路斯政府债权人和银行储户承受约58亿欧元的损失。


And now that effort has led Europe to its latest impasse.	现在，这一任务让欧洲再一次走入了僵局。


In marathon negotiations, the Cypriot government, under the supervision of the troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), agreed to a one-time “tax” on bank deposits.	在马拉松式的谈判中，塞浦路斯政府在三驾马车（欧洲委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）的监督下同意实施银行存款的一次性“税收”。


But, despite an amendment to exempt accounts containing less than €20,000, the Cypriot parliament overwhelmingly rejected the plan, leaving Cyprus – and Europe – in limbo.	但是，尽管这一方案带有20000欧元以下存款豁免的修正案，塞浦路斯议会仍以压倒性优势否决了它，让塞浦路斯——以及欧洲——陷入乱局。


In fact, large depositors are not unlike senior bondholders, and the proposed haircut was a small but welcome step forward.	事实上，大储户和大债权人并无区别，计划中的“剃头”也是一个小规模但受欢迎的进步。


But, because it did not go far enough, a hole remained.	但是，由于这一步走得不够远，仍有漏洞。


There were other options.	还有其他选择。


Lee Buchheit, the veteran sovereign-debt attorney who should have been in the negotiating room, and Mitu Gulati of Duke University have proposed an elegant “reprofiling” of Cyprus’s €15 billion sovereign debt that would instantly reduce the financing pressure on the country.	应该身处谈判桌的资深主权债务律师巴克海特（Lee Buchheit）以及杜克大学的古拉提（Mitu Gulati）建议对塞浦路斯的150亿欧元主权债务来一个漂亮的“修饰”，这能马上减轻该国的融资压力。


But such considerations were off the table well before the deliberations began.	但在谈判开始前，这一方案就被否决了。


Instead, the initial decision was to confiscate just under €3 billion from accounts containing less than €100,000 – the cutoff for deposit insurance.	相反，最初的决定是充公不到10万欧元账户中的接近30亿欧元——切断存款保险。


Make no mistake: this would have been the greatest policy error since the start of the financial crisis five years ago.	不要搞错，这将是五年前金融危机爆发以来最严重的政策错误。


Indeed, the proposal amounted to a rupture with the near-universal agreement that small depositors should be considered sacrosanct.	事实上，这一方案与几乎人人同意的小储户神圣不可侵犯的一致观点南辕北辙。


After all, televised news footage of panicked depositors in long lines outside banks and at ATMs can cause immeasurable financial damage far beyond a country’s borders.	毕竟，电视新闻中恐慌的储户在银行门外和ATM机前大排长龙的画面可能引起远超国界的不可估量的金融伤害。


Historians will argue whether forcing Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy in September 2008 precipitated the subsequent global financial crisis.	历史学家会争论2008年9月的雷曼兄弟被迫破产事件是否是随后全球金融危机的滥觞。


Vincent Reinhart, formerly of the US Federal Reserve and now at Morgan Stanley, has argued that the Lehman decision was correct (the error came earlier, with the bailout of Bear Stearns, which created an expectation that all banks would be bailed out).	前美联储官员、现为摩根士丹利服务的莱因哈特（Vincent Reinhart）指出，雷曼的决定是正确的（之前救援贝尔斯登的决定是错误的，这形成了所有银行都会被救的预期）。


Private risks must be privately borne.	私人风险必须由私人来承担。


By contrast, the proposal to impose losses on small Cypriot depositors had no redeeming justification whatsoever.	相反，让塞浦路斯小储户承受损失的方案没有任何补偿性的理由。


As in Ireland, the most vulnerable were being asked to take the hit, while large depositors were let off lightly and other lenders were to be spared.	正如爱尔兰，最脆弱的群体被要求承受打击，而大储户受损颇轻，债权人则毫发无伤。


But it gets worse.	但这只能让情况恶化。


There has never been an official explanation of why lenders to a sovereign should not share the pain, despite the “no bailout” principle on which the eurozone was founded.	从来没有任何官方解释说明为何主权债务债权人不应该分担痛苦，尽管“无救援”正是欧元区建立原则之一。


Most observers cite the authorities’ concern that if any sovereign does not honor its debts, all sovereign borrowers will be penalized.	大部分观察者认为这是因为当局担心一个主权债务人违约将导致所有主权债务人被惩罚。


But such contagion risk is trivial compared to the wildfire that could be ignited by imposing losses on small depositors.	但这一传染风险与让小储户承受损失所可能引起的燎原大火比起来根本不值一提。


In mid-2007, Cyprus qualified for eurozone membership by meeting the stringent Maastricht criteria, intended to ensure that new entrants would behave responsibly and flourish in the secure environment provided by the currency union.	2007年年中，塞浦路斯因满足了严苛的马斯特里赫特标准而进入了欧元区——该标准旨在确保新成员行为负责并在货币联盟提供的安全环境中实现繁荣。


In the months leading up to the decision, the IMF urged Cyprus to take all necessary steps to ensure a favorable outcome.	在接受塞浦路斯决定作出前的几个月中，IMF敦促塞浦路斯采取一切手段确保有利结果。


The benefits of Cyprus’s adoption of the euro may never be clear.	塞浦路斯使用欧元到底有什么好处，一直让人迷糊。


By 2009, the IMF’s Article IV Staff Report was already ringing the alarm bells.	2009年，IMF章程第四条核评报告便已经敲响了警钟。 公债水平虽然较低，但增长很快；


Public debt was still low, but growing rapidly; the current-account deficit was ballooning (reaching 15% of GDP in 2008); and the banks had gone Icelandic, with assets worth more than three times Cyprus’s GDP.	经常项目赤字激增（2008年达到了GDP的15%）； 银行冰岛化，资产价值相当于塞浦路斯GDP的三倍多。


As the report noted, the huge and highly concentrated banking sector’s problems could “quickly escalate to systemic proportions with serious economic repercussions.”	报告指出，高度集中的巨额银行部门问题可能“很快上升为系统性问题，造成严重的经济反应。


And so they have.	”果真如此。


This is a remarkable outcome, given that the risks have been so well known and understood.	这是一个值得注意的结果，因为风险早已被明白和了解。


Indeed, the Cypriot authorities have been engaged in ongoing discussions with the troika for the past year.	事实上，去年塞浦路斯当局一直在与三驾马车谈判。


And yet, despite all of the preparation, a night of closed-door negotiations led to a stunningly elementary error.	但是，尽管做了所有这些准备，一夜的闭门谈判就能产生令人震惊的低级错误。


Compounding that error was the absence of any substantive decision concerning how to extricate Cyprus from its downward spiral.	让这一错误雪上加霜的是没有任何让塞浦路斯走出下降螺旋的真正决策。


Cypriot debt, we are told, will rise to 140% of GDP, but will fall to about 100% of GDP in less than a decade.	我们被告知，塞浦路斯债务将升至GDP的140%，但会在十年内降至GDP的100%。


This appears to be another replay of the Greek scenario, with targets for reducing the debt burden repeatedly missed, until more drastic steps become inevitable.	这几乎是希腊情形的翻版，降低债务负担的目标一再无法达到，直到不得不施以猛药。


Most important, no restructuring of Cypriot banks appears imminent; on the contrary, the intent seems to be to keep large depositors from fleeing and preserve the highly risky system.	最重要的是，塞浦路斯银行并没有马上重组的计划； 相反，当前的形势似乎表明大储户将逃脱升天，而高风险系统将继续维持。


The Central Bank of Cyprus has provided large loans to Cypriot banks under the Emergency Liquidity Assistance arrangement, implying that the collateral offered did not meet the standards of the ECB.	塞浦路斯央行通过紧急流动性支持（Emergency Liquidity Assistance）向塞浦路斯银行提供大量贷款，这意味着抵押品达不到欧洲央行的标准。


More train wrecks are in the making.	塞浦路斯正在制造更多的出轨事故。


The problems in Cyprus now threaten international financial stability.	如今，塞浦路斯的问题正威胁着国际金融稳定。


If the idea of a European banking union is serious, now is the moment to advance it.	如果欧洲银行联盟的方案是认真的，那么现在就是推进它的时候。


That means reaffirming the commitment to deposit insurance, closing unviable banks, and recapitalizing the rest with European (not Cypriot) funds.	这意味着重申存款保险承诺、关闭无力生存的银行并用欧洲（而不是塞浦路斯）资金对剩余银行予以重组。


The troika’s decision on Cyprus was akin to policymaking by rolling the dice.	三驾马车的塞浦路斯决定类似于用只骰子决策。


The coming days will reveal the extent of the immediate damage that it has caused.	未来几天将让我们明白这所造成的即刻伤害。


But, with another display of reactive and ad hoc decision-making, we are no wiser about how Europe intends to resolve its dilemmas.	但是，在新的应急性临时决策面前，我们并不了解欧洲想如何解决两难。


Could the Cypriot setback catalyze a fresh start?	塞浦路斯会成为新开始的催化剂吗？


Romney versus Obama	罗姆尼决战奥巴马


CAMBRIDGE – While the presidential primary elections in the United States are not over, Mitt Romney is now almost certain to be the party’s nominee to face Democratic President Barack Obama in November.	发自剑桥——尽管美国民主党党内初选尚未落幕，但米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）几乎已经被确定为今年11月迎战民主党总统奥巴马的提名人了。


As Governor of Massachusetts, Romney built a record as a competent and moderate conservative, a political profile that suited him to the state’s electorate.	作为马萨诸塞州州长，罗姆尼展示了其身为保守派的温和强干一面，也有着一份广受该州选民认可的政治履历。


But the Republican Party’s far right wing dominates the primaries, so Romney has worked hard to escape the “moderate” label by staking out very conservative positions.	但由于共和党极右翼势力主导了整场初选，以致他只能努力通过持有极端保守立场来摆脱自身的“温和”标签。


Now, as the party’s presumptive nominee, he must move back toward the political center, where the majority of voters are to be found.	而如今作为预料中的本党提名人，他又必须重新回归到大部分选民所在的中间路线。


So which is the real Mitt Romney?	那么这两副面孔中哪个才是真正的罗姆尼？


And how can voters judge the two candidates?	选民们又该如何对这两位总统候选人下判断？


Obama has a proven track record, albeit one that has disappointed many who voted for him in 2008.	当年的奥巴马也有一份很有说服力的履历，但却让许多在2008年投他一票的人大失所望。


Of course, his supporters argue that he had to adapt to two ongoing wars and the worst recession since the 1930’s.	当然，其支持者们会辩解说他必须同时应付两场战争以及自1930年代以来最严重的衰退。


Moreover, after the 2010 mid-term elections, a hostile Republican-controlled House of Representatives blocked his initiatives.	此外在2010年中期选举之后共和党主导下了众议院，对他充满敌意的同时也束缚住了他的手脚。


Romney, for his part, will hold up Obama’s early, still-unmet promises, while Obama will call Romney a “flip-flopper” who changes his positions to suit the moment (and the audience).	而罗姆尼则会重拾奥巴马早年许下的那些尚未兑现的承诺，虽然奥巴马会将罗姆尼称为一个见风使舵的“骑墙派”。


In fact, the difficulty of predicting the eventual winner’s performance in office is not new.	但事实上，预测最终获胜者当选后的表现历来都是非常困难的。


In his 2000 presidential bid, George W. Bush famously promised “compassionate conservatism” and a humble foreign policy, but governed very differently, as when he decided to invade Iraq.	在2000年竞逐总统之位时，小布什曾许下诺言要走“富有同情心的保守主义”路线并推行一套谦和的外交政策，但当他决定入侵伊拉克时却换了另一套执政方式。


Likewise, Woodrow Wilson and Lyndon Johnson campaigned on promises of peace, but each took America to war shortly after being elected.	与之类似的还有伍德罗·威尔逊（Woodrow Wilson）和林登·约翰逊（Lyndon Johnson），两人在竞选时都大打和平牌，但却不约而同地在当选不久后把美国拖入了战争漩涡。


Do such post-election changes in direction make a mockery of democracy?	那么这些当选后的行为转向是否恰恰体现了民主制度的讽刺性？


How can voters make intelligent judgments when campaigns are so carefully scripted and slickly promoted?	当竞选者都被精心包装且小心兜售时，选民们又该如何做出明智的选择？


Leadership theorists suggest that we should pay less attention to leaders’ policy promises than to their emotional intelligence – their self-mastery and ability to reach out to others.	领导学理论家建议我们把注意力更多地放在候选人的情商而不是其政治承诺上。


Contrary to the view that emotions interfere with clear thinking, the ability to understand and regulate emotions can result in more effective thinking.	与情绪影响清晰思维的说法相反，理解和控制情绪的能力能使思维变得更加高效。


As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reputedly quipped after meeting Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Second-class intellect, but first-class temperament.”	正如最高法庭法官奥利佛·文德尔·赫尔姆斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes）在与富兰克林·D·罗斯福（Franklin D. Roosevelt）会面后那句著名的玩笑：“二流的智力，一流的脾气”。


Most historians would agree that Roosevelt’s success as a leader rested more on his good nature than on his analytical skills.	大多数历史学家也会同意罗斯福作为领导人所取得的成功更多取决于其良好的性格而非分析能力。


The energy and optimism that he unleashed in his administration’s first hundred days did not reflect concrete policy proposals in his campaign.	虽然他在竞选时并未提出切实的政策建议，但却在上台100天内所释放出了活力和乐观主义。


Psychologists have wrestled with the concept of intelligence, and how to assess it, for more than a century.	心理学家在智力的概念以及如何评估上等问题上已经争论了超过一个世纪。


General IQ tests measure dimensions of intelligence such as verbal and spatial dexterity, but IQ scores generally predict only about 10-20% of success in life.	一般的智商测试会依据语言和三维空间敏捷性等某些智力维度来得出结果。 但智商分数一般只能预示人生中10~20%的成功。


And, while experts disagree about how much of the other 80% is attributable to emotional intelligence, they generally agree that it is an important and learnable skill that increases with age and experience, and that individuals possess it to varying degrees.	而当专家们争论其他80%的成功中究竟有多少是归因于情商之时，他们一般都同意情商是一个随着年龄和经验不断增长而增加的重要且可习得的技巧，每个人对情商的掌握程度也所有不同。


Leaders work hard to manage their public images, which requires some of the same emotional discipline and skill that successful actors possess.	领袖们都会努力维护自身公共形象，而这同样需要一个成功演员所具备的情绪控制能力和相关技能。


Ronald Reagan’s experience in Hollywood served him well in this regard, and Roosevelt was a master at image management. Despite his pain and difficulty in moving on legs crippled by polio, he maintained a cheery exterior and avoided being photographed in a wheelchair.	在这方面罗纳德·里根在好莱坞的演艺经验在对他大有裨益，而罗斯福也是个形象管理的大师，尽管他因为小儿麻痹症而忍受着痛苦和行动不便，他却总能保持着一个精神饱满的外观形象，同时也避免坐在轮椅上供人拍照。


Whether they realize it or not, leaders always convey signals.	不管他们是否意识到这一点，领袖们经常会传达一些信号。


Emotional intelligence involves the awareness and control of such signals, and the self-discipline that prevents personal psychological needs from distorting policy.	而情商就包含了这些对信号的理解和控制，还有防止因为个人心理需要而影响政策的自制力。


If emotional intelligence is inauthentic, others will likely find out in the long run.	如果情商只是一时装扮出来的，就可能在长期内被人们逐渐发觉。


Richard Nixon, for example, was strong on cognitive skills, but weak on emotional intelligence.	例如理查德·尼克松（Richard Nixon）就拥有非常强的认知能力，但在情商上却有所欠缺。


He was able to strategize effectively on foreign policy, but was less able to control the personal insecurities that eventually led to his downfall – a shortcoming that emerged only over time.	他能在外交政策上有效地制定策略，但却无法控制自身的不安全感，并最终导致了他的倒台——这是一个经过一段时间之后才会浮现的弱点。


Indeed, it was not until well into his presidency that the public learned of his infamous “enemies list.”	事实上，直到他当选总统好久之后公众才发现了他著名的“政敌名单”。


Bush showed emotional intelligence in midlife by mastering his problems with alcohol, and in displaying the courage to persevere with unpopular policies.	而在这方面，小布什在中年时通过对抗酗酒问题显示了自身的情商，在坚持某些不受欢迎的政策时也展示出了勇气。


But, at some point, perseverance becomes emotional stubbornness.	但在某些时候，坚持不懈也会成为情绪上的顽冥不化。


Like Wilson, Bush had an obstinate commitment to his vision that inhibited learning and adjustment.	就跟威尔逊一样，布什有一种遏制了其自身继续学习和调整的固执信仰。


Perhaps the flexibility that Obama and Romney have shown is not such a bad quality for a president after all.	如此看来或许奥巴马和罗姆尼所表现出来的灵活性对一个总统来说倒不算是一种坏品质。


The rigors of the prolonged campaign provide voters with some clues about stamina and self-discipline.	此外漫长竞选过程的艰苦历练也能为选民们提供了一些关于耐力和自律的线索。


Each of the Republican candidates took a turn as front-runner in this race, and the rigors of the primary season exposed the flaws in some, like Texas Governor Rick Perry, who were initially attractive.	每个共和党参选者在竞逐过程中都曾经领先过，而初选时节的艰难困苦会使那些原本看上去富有吸引力的人——比如德克萨斯州州长里克·佩里（Rick Perry）——露出了马脚。


Now, in the general election, how Romney, in particular, relates to his party’s platform will tell us something about the strength of his independence and future cabinet appointments.	而在未来的总统大选中，两位候选人——尤其是罗姆尼——将如何与其政党的政纲进行协调的状况将告诉我们一些关于其独立自主以及委任未来执政班子方面的能力。


But the most important variable for voters to examine is the candidate’s biography.	但选民可以检验的最重要变量就是候选人的传记。


I do not mean the slick books and television advertisements that are produced for their campaigns.	我指的不是那些在竞选期间诞生的粉饰书籍和电视广告。


While image consultants and acting ability can mask a candidate’s character, an integrated life over time is the best basis to judge the authenticity of the next president’s temperament and how he will govern.	虽然形象顾问和表演能力可以装扮一位候选人的品性，但一个长期的生活面貌则是判断下一任总统真实脾气及其管治能力的最佳依据。


Above all, sophisticated voters will themselves be emotionally intelligent enough to be prepared for surprises.	但最重要的是，成熟的选民首先要拥有足够的情商去应付一切意外情况。


When their candidate disappoints them – as he inevitably will, regardless of the election’s outcome – they will bear in mind that democracy is the worst system, except for all of the others.	当候选人令他们失望的时候——这种情况照例都会发生，不管选举的最终结果如何——他们都会知道，排开其他政治制度不谈，民主其实是最坏的制度。


Coase’s Chinese Legacy	科斯与中国


HONG KONG – The recent death of Ronald H. Coase, the founding father of new institutional economics, is a great loss to Chinese economists who are seeking an effective framework for understanding China’s ongoing economic transformation.	香港—最近，新制度经济学之父罗纳德·科斯（Ronald H. Coase）逝世了。


His legacy – insights into the role of firms, financial institutions, and the state in shaping the market and driving economic development – will prove crucial as China works to achieve high-income status.	对于探索有效框架以理解中国正在发生经济转型的中国经济学家来说，这是一个重大损失。 随着中国不断迈向高收入水平，科斯的遗产将十分关键——即他关于企业、金融机构和政府在塑造市场和推动经济发展方面作用与见解。


With two seminal papers, Coase changed the way economists view institutions’ impact on an economy.	科斯以其两篇开创性的论文改变了经济学家关于制度对经济影响的看法。


His 1937 paper “The Nature of the Firm” introduced the concept of transaction costs into discussions of a firm’s structure, function, and limitations.	他1937年写的《企业的性质》一文将交易成本的概念引入了对企业结构、功能和边界的讨论。


And his 1960 paper “The Problem of Social Cost” proposed that the state could manage the negative externalities, such as pollution or traffic, of economic activities through well-defined property rights.	1960年他撰写《社会成本问题》，指出政府可以通过明晰产权来治理经济活动的负外部性，如交通拥堵及污染。


In his final years, Coase shifted his focus to the emergence of capitalism and the creation of markets in China.	晚年的科斯关注点转移到资本主义和市场制度在中国的兴起与形成。


According to Coase, since the period of reform and opening up began in 1979, China has been a living experiment in institutional evolution, shaped simultaneously by the central government and by local governments and enterprises.	在科斯看来，自1979年改革开放以来，中国就开始了由中央政府和地方政府与企业共同塑造影响的制度演进试验。


This evolution is at the center of a case study of Foshan – a city of seven million people located near Guangzhou, at the heart of the Pearl River Delta – launched last year by a team of Chinese researchers (of which we were a part).	这一制度演进正是一组中国学者（包括我们）去年发起的一项佛山案例研究的核心。 佛山临近广州，位于珠三角中心，人口700万。


As it turns out, Foshan may well be the ideal example to test Coase’s views.	我们发现，佛山很可能是检验科斯观点的一个理想案例。


Given Foshan’s proximity to Hong Kong, it is firmly embedded in global supply chains – a fact that has helped to drive rapid nominal GDP growth, from roughly ¥1.3 billion in 1978 to ¥670.9 billion ($109.7 billion) last year.	佛山毗邻香港，并借助这一优势稳固地嵌入全球供应链中——驱动其名义GDP的快速增长，从1978年的约13亿人民币增加到去年的6709亿人民币。


The private sector – focused on the production of home appliances, machinery equipment, construction materials, textiles, and food – accounts for more than 60% of Foshan’s GDP.	私营部门贡献了佛山GDP的60%以上，主要生产家用电器、机械设备、建筑材料、纺织品和食品。


Foshan is also home to the world’s largest wholesale lighting and furniture markets, and its products are exported internationally.	佛山拥有世界最大的灯具和家具批发市场，并出口到世界各地。


According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Foshan is China’s most competitive prefecture-level city, and its eighth most competitive city overall, owing partly to institutional innovations by local governments at the township, district, and prefecture levels.	根据中国社科院的研究，佛山是中国最具竞争力的地级市，在全国所有城市竞争力排行榜中位居第八（包括直辖市及省会城市等）。 这一成绩部分要归功于佛山地方政府在市、镇、区等各层级进行的制度创新。


These innovations enabled Foshan to create markets that were largely defunct before 1979, while coping with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and globalization.	这些创新使佛山从1979年之前市场几乎消失的状态快速成长而进入了城市化、工业化和全球化的轨道。


Foshan’s development offers important insight into the core problem that China is now facing: how to transform a low value-added, manufacturing-based economy into a high value-added, innovation-fueled economy.	佛山的发展为中国如今面临的核心挑战提供了重要思路：如何将基于制造业的低附加值经济转变为由创新推动的高附加值经济。


While the previous model brought 30 years of success in terms of GDP growth, it generated considerable risks and imbalances – including environmental degradation, social inequities, excessive debt, industrial over-capacity, and a bloated state sector.	尽管此前的发展模式带来了前30年的成功（从GDP增长的角度），但也产生了大量风险和失衡，包括环境恶化、社会不平等、债务过度、工业产能过剩和国有部门臃肿等。


As Foshan’s experience demonstrates, cities can play a pivotal role in correcting these imbalances and driving China’s economic transition.	佛山的经验表明，城市可以在纠正这些失衡、推动中国经济转型方面起到关键作用。


The Chinese city evolved as a walled-in seat of power centered around a marketplace.	传统上，中国的城市是环绕城墙的集市及乡土社会的权力中心。


Indeed, the two characters that comprise the Chinese word for city (城市) mean “castle” (城) and “market” (市) – an apt juxtaposition, which endures today in the form of the relationship between collective state-led action to build strong markets and private-sector competition within and among cities.	事实上，“城市”这个词由“城”和“市”两个字构成，不愧为一个贴切的词组。 如今，“城市”体现着政府主导为建立强大市场而采取的集体行为（城）与私营部门在城市内和城市间为盈利而竞争的个体行为（市）这两个层面的活动及其互动。


In terms of physical infrastructure, China’s most dynamic cities – such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Foshan – already resemble Western metropolises like Paris and Chicago.	从硬件基础设施角度看，中国最有活力的城市，如北京、上海和佛山，已可以与巴黎和芝加哥等西方大都市媲美。


But this “hardware” is inefficient without the “software” needed to manage it – namely, as Coase suggested, an efficient property-rights infrastructure (the laws, procedures, and administrative capacity needed to support efficient, fair, and innovative markets).	但因缺乏管理“硬件”所需的“软件”，其硬件的效率难以充分发挥。 在科斯看来，这里的软件就是有效的产权基础设施（支持高效、公平和创新性市场所需要的法律、程序和行政管理能力）。


The convergence of consumer lifestyles and preferences driven by globalization has enabled the world’s major cities to specialize production for global markets.	市场的全球化所导致的消费者生活方式和偏好及劳动生产力的趋同使世界主要城市能够为全球市场进行专业化生产。


But, given regional differences in political, social, and economic arrangements – often reflecting the particularities of local history and culture – significant divergences in citizens’ attitudes remain.	但是，由于政治、社会和经济体制的地区差异——这些差异通常体现在本土历史和文化的特殊性中——市民行为及态度仍存在很大区别。


Responsibility for ensuring the smooth functioning of markets despite these disparities falls to the state.	在存在差异的情况下如何确保市场平稳运行的责任落到了政府头上。


In other words, markets are global networks, which depend on cities to serve as hubs; cities, in turn, require state coordination of supply chains to deliver market-enabling public goods effectively.	换言之，市场是全球网络，需要本土化的城市作为枢纽； 而城市则需要政府来协调全球化的供应链及有效提供市场运行所需的公共产品。


China’s growth story has entailed the orchestration of at least four supply chains: a global production supply chain, run largely by the private sector; a logistics supply chain, run by state-owned enterprises; a finance supply chain, mainly comprising state-owned banks; and a government-services supply chain.	中国经济的高增长过程包括了至少四大供应链的重建：全球制造供应链（主要由私营部门运作）、基础设施供应链（主要由国有企业运作）、金融供应链（主要由国有银行组成）以及政府服务供应链。


Cities like Foshan have benefited substantially from the effective coordination of these networks.	佛山这样的城市正是从这些供应链网络之间的有效协调中受益及成长起来的。


But a fifth supply chain – that of human talent – has largely been neglected, and cities cannot achieve their potential unless they can attract the best human talent.	但还有第五个重要的供应链——人才供应链——在中国仍处于被忽视的状态。 佛山的经验表明， 除非吸引到最优秀的人才，城市无法发挥它们的潜力。


A Coasian analysis of China’s development would center on the complex interaction between the locally minded state and the globally minded market, with the key lesson being that, contrary to free-market ideology, less government does not necessarily mean more market.	根据科斯的思路，对中国发展的分析需要聚焦在本土思维的政府与全球思维的市场之间的复杂互动。 一个重要的教训是，与单纯的自由市场思想相反，减少政府并非意味着增加市场。


Rather, an expanding market needs a strong government, but with a more targeted approach that emphasizes, for example, developing the property-rights infrastructure, building the human talent pool, and implementing macroeconomic policies that support high-quality growth.	扩张的市场恰恰需要强有力的政府，但政府的目标应更明确，例如，着重于发展产权基础设施、投资及培育人才市场、并实施可支持高质量增长秩序的宏观经济政策等。


Neither capitalism nor socialism has fully revealed how to achieve efficient GDP growth, an inclusive society, and ecological sustainability simultaneously.	资本主义和社会主义至今都还没有充分揭示如何同时实现高效GDP增长、包容性社会和生态可持续性。


If China applies Coase’s institutional insights to develop an effective development framework, it may well manage to strike this crucial balance.	如果中国能够有效利用科斯的制度经济学思路来构建有效的经济、社会、生态发展框架及秩序，将有望实现这三者之间的重要平衡。


China’s Currency Conundrum	中国的货币难题


PALO ALTO – The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), it seems, cannot win.	帕洛阿尔托—中国人民银行看起来是不可能赢了。


In late February, the gradual appreciation of the renminbi was interrupted by a 1% depreciation (to $1:¥6.12).	2月末，人民币的渐进升值之路被1%的贬值（至1美元兑6. 12元人民币）打断。


Though insignificant in overall trade terms, especially when compared with the volatility of floating exchange-rate regimes, the renminbi’s unexpected weakening sparked a global furor.	尽管这对于贸易条件来说无关紧要，特别是与浮动汇率机制的波动相比就更是如此了，但人民币出人意料的贬值激起了一阵全球骚动。


The uproar was not surprising.	掀起如此骚动并不令人惊奇。


After all, China has been under constant pressure from foreign governments to revalue, in the mistaken belief that a stronger currency would reduce China’s large trade surplus.	毕竟，中国一直饱受外国政府的升值压力——后者错误地认为人民币走强有助于减少中国巨大的贸易盈余。 自2008年7月以来（当时的汇率是1美元兑8.


And, since July 2008, when the exchange rate was $1:¥8.28 (and had been held constant for ten years), the PBOC has more or less complied, with appreciations approximating 3% per year through 2012.	28人民币，这一兑换比率已经维持了十年不变），人行或多或少地屈服于这一压力，到2012年为止，每年都保持3%左右的升值幅度。


However, the international outcry obscured an unintended but perhaps more troubling feature of China’s exchange-rate policy: the tendency for sporadic renminbi appreciation (even small movements) to trigger speculative inflows of “hot” money.	但是，国际呼声掩盖了未受关注但可能麻烦更大的中国货币政策特征：人民币的零星升值（即使是小幅波动）导致“热钱”的投机性流入。


With short-term interest rates in the United States near zero, and the “natural” interbank interest rate in faster-growing China at near 4%, an expected 3% appreciation, for example, translates into an “effective” interest-rate differential of 7%.	在美国短期利率接近于零以及增长更快的中国银行间“自然”利率接近4%的情况下，（比如）3%的与其升值会导致7%的“有效”利差。


This is an enticing spread for currency speculators who borrow in dollars and circumvent China’s capital controls to buy renminbi assets.	这令货币投机者垂涎三尺，他们借入美元，绕过中国的资本管制购买人民币资产。


The hot-money problem is only made worse by the ongoing international pressure for further renminbi revaluation, usually from Western economists and politicians who blame the exchange rate for China’s current-account surplus with the US and other developed economies.	热钱问题的恶化不但来自国际上对人民币升值的压力一直存在（通常是来自西方经济学家和政客，他们指责汇率造成了中国对美国和其他发达经济体的经常项目盈余）。


In reality, the trade imbalance reflects the difference between China’s large savings surplus and the even bigger US saving deficiency (largely explained by the US fiscal deficit).	在现实中，贸易失衡反映了中国巨大的储蓄盈余和美国更大的储蓄赤字（大部分可用美国的财政赤字解释）之间的差异。


Indeed, the wholesale price index – the best measure of tradable-goods prices in China – has been falling by about 1.5% annually, which suggests that the renminbi may even be slightly overvalued.	事实上，批批发价格指数——衡量中国可贸易商品价格的最佳指标——一直在以么年约1. 5%的幅度下降，这表明人民币甚至有可能略微高估了。


Simply put, exchange-rate movements do not properly correct net trade (saving) imbalances between open economies; but they can increase hot money flows.	简言之，汇率运动并不是纠正开放经济体间净贸易（储蓄）失衡的合适办法。


So the PBOC tried to keep speculators off guard by introducing more uncertainty into the exchange-rate system, as occurred with February’s surprise devaluation.	因此人行试图通过向汇率机制引入更多的不确定性给投机者一个措手不及的打击，于是2月份人民币出人意料地出现了贬值。


In mid-March, the PBOC announced that the daily movement in the renminbi/dollar rate would be increased from ±1% to ±2%, to further dampen hot-money speculators’ enthusiasm.	3月中旬，人行宣布人民币/美元汇率日间运动区间幅度从±1%扩大到±2%，以进一步打击热钱投机者的积极性。


While this is all well and good, speculative inflows would be further dampened if today’s central rate, say, $1:¥6.1, was stabilized into the indefinite future.	尽管这一招很漂亮，但如果在未来无限期保持当前核心汇率（如1美元兑6. 1元人民币），对投机性流入的打击效果会更好。


There is another, less-discussed justification for holding the currency at a stable rate.	保持货币汇率稳定还有一个较少被讨论到的理由。


The adjustment mechanism usually provided by exchange-rate movements could instead be delivered by wage changes.	通常由汇率运动提供的机制调整可以用工资变化来推动。


It is only in more sluggish industrial economies, where wages are assumed to be inflexible, that policymakers advocate exchange-rate movements as a means to overcome wage stickiness.	只有在更僵化的工业经济体——那里的工资总是缺乏灵活性——决策者才会把汇率运动用作克服工资刚性的手段。