The 2004 reforms, with their elimination of restrictions on access to foreign exchange and reduction of import tariffs, gradually improved the business and investment climate.	2004年的改革消除了外汇管制、降低了进口关税，逐渐地改善了商业和投资环境。


Coupled with favorable international conditions, Egypt’s annual GDP growth rate rose to 7.2% in 2008, from 4.1% in 2004, and remained at 5% in 2009-2010, despite the global recession.	在有利国际条件的助推下，埃及年GDP增长率从2004年的4. 1%提高到2008年的7.


The new measures also helped to attract large capital inflows and foreign direct investment, underpinning a dramatic rise in foreign-currency reserves, from $14.8 billion in 2004 to more than $36 billion by the end of 2010.	2%，2009—2010年全球衰退期间也维持在5%。 这些新措施还有助于吸引大量资本流入和外国直接投资，从而使埃及外汇储备大幅增加，从2004年的148亿美元提高到2010年末的360亿美元。


In 2011, the situation worsened on virtually all fronts.	2011年，经济状况几乎全面倒退了。


Annual growth fell to about 0.5%, and inflation remained in double digits.	年GDP增长率下降为越0. 5%，而通胀率维持在两位数。


The unemployment rate reached 12.4% in the fourth quarter, up from 8.9% in the same period of 2010.	失业率在第四季度达到了12. 4%，2010年同期水平为8.


The current-account balance deteriorated rapidly, owing to the loss of more than $4 billion in tourism revenues and a sharp fall in remittances by Egyptian workers abroad.	9%。 由于旅游业收入缩水40亿美元以及来自在外工作埃及人的海外侨汇急剧减少，经常项目收支迅速恶化。


The fiscal deficit widened to 10% of GDP, causing government debt (including external debt), which had been falling steadily, to rise to 76% of GDP.	财政赤字增加为GDP的10%，这导致前几年一直在下降的政府债务（包括外债）水平提高到GDP的76%。


The most striking development, however, was the loss of international reserves in the year following the Tahrir Square revolution.	但是，最令人担心的发展趋势是解放广场革命成功后一年来国际储备的减少。


The International Monetary Fund estimates that foreign-currency reserves fell by half, to $18 billion, by December 2011, owing partly to the worsening current-account balance, but, more importantly, to withdrawal from Egypt by foreign and domestic investors alike.	IMF估计，截至2011年12月，埃及外汇储备大约减少了一半，下降至180亿美元，部分原因是经常项目收支恶化，但更重要的原因在于国内外投资者从埃及收回投资。


In the face of large and growing external imbalances, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) chose to defend the Egyptian pound during last year’s political and economic turmoil.	面临重大且不断恶化的外部失衡的埃及中央银行选择在去年的政治和经济动荡时捍卫埃及镑。


The CBE allowed the exchange rate, which is formally defined as a “managed float,” to depreciate by only 3%.	埃及央行只让汇率——按官方定义，埃及镑是“管理浮动”的——贬值了3%。


Keeping the currency relatively stable was considered a higher priority than preventing the loss of foreign reserves.	保持汇率稳定被视为比防止外汇储备减少更重要的事情。


Today, Egypt not only remains vulnerable to unstable domestic politics; owing to the depletion of its international reserves – at a rate of roughly $2 billion a month since last October – the country now also faces the threat of a currency crisis.	如今，埃及不仅面临着国内政治动荡，还面临着货币危机的风险——这主要是拜国际储备不断消耗所赐，自去年10月以来，每个月大概都要减少20亿美元。


Moreover, this almost certainly underestimates the extent of the losses, because it does not exclude inflows of $3.5 billion since November of last year from auctions of US-dollar-denominated treasury bills.	更坏的是，这一数字几乎肯定低估了储备减少问题的严重性，因为其中并未剔除去年11月以来拍卖美元国债所获得的35亿美元流入。


In addition, the Egyptian military gave a $1 billion loan to the government, and another $1 billion was received through grants from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, bringing the loss of reserves since December 2010 closer to $22 billion.	此外，埃及军方给了政府10亿美元贷款，沙特和卡塔尔也提供了10亿美元赞助，这表明自2010年12月以来的外汇储备损失达到了近22亿美元。


The other source of international reserves, tourism, brought in only $8 billion, down sharply from $12 billion in 2010.	另一大国际储备来源旅游业大概只产生了80亿美元收入，较2010年的120亿美元显著下降。


Egypt continues to import almost double what it exports, resulting in a trade deficit of over $10 billion by the end of 2011.	埃及的进口依然比其出口高出近一倍，导致其2011年底的贸易赤字超过了100亿美元。


As a result, Egypt’s financing must continue to grow: the country now needs to borrow about $14-15 billion to plug its estimated financing gap of $24 billion.	因此，埃及的融资必须持续增加：该国目前需要借入140—150亿美元以填补其240亿美元的融资空白。


Much depends on when, or whether, external aid materializes, which is contingent on approval of Egypt’s renegotiated $3.2 billion IMF loan.	这在很大程度上取决于外部援助何时或是否能落实，而后者又取决于埃及32亿美元IMF贷款谈判能否获得批准。


If finalized, the IMF program could trigger further aid packages by the World Bank and other international donors.	如果IMF谈判取得结果，则可以进一步引来世界银行和其他国际机构的援助项目。


If the aid arrives, Egypt could begin to address some of its financing problems, but it is still in need of a long-term strategy to spur sustainable growth.	有了援助，埃及就可以开始修正一些融资问题，但仍需要长期战略来刺激可持续增长。


Egypt’s economy is facing continued risks, owing to capital flight, rising inflation, unemployment, and populist policies.	埃及经济面临着持续的风险，这是由资本外逃、通胀高企、失业以及民粹主义政策决定的。


Even with the availability of external finance, Egyptian leaders must look for ways to engage the private sector in reviving the country’s economy.	即使可以获得外部融资，埃及领导人仍须找出依靠私人部门来振兴国民经济的办法。


Unfortunately, the latest political incident involving the democracy-promoting activities of American NGOs has cooled bilateral relations and threatens the $1.3 billion in military assistance that Egypt receives annually from the United States.	不幸的是，最近的政治事件与促进民主活动的美国非政府组织有涉，这使得两国关系降了温，也威胁到了埃及每年从美国那里获得的13亿美元军事援助。


This may have an impact on other donors, as well as the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF and the World Bank.	这可能还会影响到其他援助者和国际金融机构，特别是IMF和世界银行。


Egypt’s transition from populist economic policies to anti-American populism exemplifies the impact that political uncertainty can have on economic developments.	埃及从民粹主义经济政策到反美民粹主义的过渡说明，政治不稳定性可以对经济发展形成重大影响。


The upcoming presidential election in May and the formation of a democratically elected government, one hopes, will calm the political turmoil and lead to economic stabilization and revival.	我们希望，即将于5月举行的总统大选以及国内民选政府的组成能够平息政治动荡，引导经济走向稳定和复兴。


Otherwise, Egyptians’ hard-won political gains may well be lost.	否则的话，埃及人民好不容易获得的政治胜利将有可能付诸东流。


Egypt the Peacemaker?	和平制造者埃及？


TEL AVIV – Before the current fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza escalates further, a ceasefire must be negotiated.	特拉维夫—在以色列和加沙哈马斯战斗升级之前，必须进行停火谈判。


Of course, like previous ceasefires, any truce is likely to be temporary, inevitably undermined by the forces that perpetuate Israel’s armed conflict with Hamas.	当然，与前几次停火一样，休战总是暂时的，免不了会受到让以色列和哈马斯武装冲突维持下去的势力的破坏。


Nonetheless, with Syria consumed in civil war and the wider Middle East already unsteady, a ceasefire is essential both for saving lives and preserving today’s uneasy regional peace.	尽管如此，在叙利亚陷入内战、大中东仍不稳定的情况下，双方都需要停火拯救生命、维持眼下得之不易的地区和平。


Much depends on Egypt, which is best placed to broker an agreement.	这在很大程度上取决于埃及，该国是最佳的协议调停人选。


But assessing the prospects of any diplomatic effort requires understanding the protagonists’ perspectives and agendas.	但评估外交努力的前景需要理解当事人的看法和安排。


Israel does not have a comprehensive policy toward Gaza.	以色列并没有针对加沙的完整计划。


Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon took a courageous step by withdrawing unilaterally from Gaza and dismantling the Israeli settlements there.	前总理沙龙采取了颇有魄力的措施：单方面从加沙撤军，并解散那里的以色列定居点。


But he fell ill before these measures could be fitted into a larger effort to address the Palestinian issue.	但他在将这些措施纳入解决巴勒斯坦问题的更大一盘棋之前就病倒了。


His successor, Ehud Olmert, began negotiating a final-status agreement with the Palestinian Authority’s president, Mahmoud Abbas.	他的继任者奥尔默特开始与巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯展开最终地位谈判。


But this did nothing to end the violence emanating from Gaza, which has effectively seceded from the Palestinian Authority and become a Hamas-controlled proto-state.	但这并没有结束源自加沙的暴力——该地区事实上已经脱离了巴勒斯坦权力机构，成为哈马斯控制的原型国家。


Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in the winter of 2008-2009 re-established deterrence and brought a period of relative calm; but it has been clear since the start of 2012 that the parties were once again on a collision course.	2008—2009年冬，以色列用铸铅行动（Operation Cast Lead）再次形成威慑并带来了一段时间的相对和平； 但自2012年以来，显而易见各方又进入了冲突模式。


During his first term as Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu refused to continue to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority on Olmert’s terms, and never considered holding talks with Hamas.	在其第一个以色列总理任期内，内塔尼亚胡继续奥尔默特与巴勒斯坦权力机构的谈判，也从未考虑过和哈马斯展开对话。


He agreed to swap Palestinian prisoners for an abducted soldier, Gilad Shalit; but, for Netanyahu, as for most Israelis, negotiating with an organization whose blatantly anti-Semitic charter rejects Israel’s right to exist is pointless.	他同意用巴勒斯坦囚犯交换被俘士兵吉拉德·沙利特（Gilad Shalit）； 但是，对内塔尼亚胡以及大部分以色列人来说，与公然反对闪米特人、拒绝承认以色列权利的组织谈判是徒劳的。


From Netanyahu’s point of view, the Gaza problem has no satisfactory solution.	在内塔尼亚胡看来，加沙问题不存在令人满意的解决方案。


His aim is to obtain and maintain calm along the border.	他的目标是获得并维持边境和平。


Israel provides electricity, water, and passage to Gaza, but also maintains a siege intended to prevent imports of larger, more lethal weapons.	以色列向加沙提供电力、水和通道，但也维持包围之势，组织更大型、更致命的武器进入。


Israeli leaders were aware of Hamas’s buildup of medium-range missiles, mostly smuggled through Sinai in underground tunnels, but continue to argue that, absent the siege, Iran and others would supply more (and more sophisticated) weapons.	以色列领导人知道哈马斯有中程导弹（主要通过西奈地下渠道走私进入），但他们仍然指出，不对加沙进行包围，伊朗和其他国家就会提供更多更先进的武器。


In fact, Israel discovered over the last few years that Gaza contained enough rockets and missiles to paralyze its south.	事实上，在过去几年中，以色列发现加沙拥有足以让其南部陷入瘫痪的火箭和导弹。


Major Israeli cities were hit several times.	以色列各大城市已数度遭袭。


During Operation Cast Lead, rockets struck perilously close to Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport.	在铸铅行动期间，火箭弹距离特拉维夫和本古里安机场只有一步之遥。


For Israeli leaders, it was only a matter of time before Tel Aviv could and would be hit.	对以色列领导人来说，特拉维夫进入火箭弹打击范围只是时间问题。


For its part, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, seeks to consolidate its control over Gaza and use it as a base from which to take control of the West Bank and the Palestinian national movement.	在穆斯林兄弟会巴勒斯坦分支机构哈马斯则在寻求巩固其对加沙的控制，并将其用作控制约旦河西岸和巴勒斯坦民族运动的基地。


This outcome would be comparable to the Brotherhood’s takeover in Egypt, further establishing its ascendancy in the region.	这一结果可以和穆斯林兄弟会在埃及掌权相比，能够进一步建立其地区支配地位。


Recent events appear to have emboldened Hamas.	最近发生的一系列事件助长了哈马斯的气势。


Although the conflict between Iran and its Sunni rivals and the Syrian civil war forced it to loosen ties with Iran and Syria and move into the Sunni fold, in many respects this has been a comfortable shift.	尽管伊朗与其逊尼派对手的冲突以及叙利亚内战迫使它放松了与伊朗和叙利亚的关系，投入逊尼派阵营，但从诸多方面看，这都是令人满意的变化。


Hamas feels more confident next to an Egypt dominated by its parent movement.	埃及落入了其母运动之手，这让哈马斯感到信心更足了。


The Emir of Qatar paid a visit to Gaza as a reward for Hamas’s break with Iran and left a check.	卡塔尔埃米尔也访问了加沙，以表彰哈马斯与伊朗的决裂，并留下了一大笔资金。


But Hamas is not alone in Gaza.	但哈马斯在加沙并不是孤家寡人。


Its hegemony is challenged by the more radical Islamic Jihad (which remains allied with Iran) and a host of Salafi and jihadi groups, some connected to radical elements in Sinai, which complicates Hamas’s relations with Egypt.	其霸权受到了更激进的伊斯兰圣战组织（Islamic Jihad，仍是伊朗的盟友）和其他一系列沙拉菲派和其他圣战组织的挑战，其中一些与西奈的激进分子有关联，这使得哈马斯与埃及的关系复杂化了。


Moreover, these groups have frequently initiated attacks on Israel from Gaza or through Sinai, generating cycles of violence that have embarrassed Hamas.	此外，这些组织频繁地策动从加沙或经过西奈对以色列发动攻击，制造让哈马斯尴尬不已的暴力循环。


At the same time, pressure from these more radical groups may have forced Hamas itself to become more aggressive in recent months, perhaps bolstered by the knowledge that its arsenal of dozens of Fajr-5 rockets could hit the Tel Aviv area should Israel retaliate on a larger scale.	与此同时，来自这些更为激进的组织的压力可能已经迫使哈马斯自身在最近几个月变得更加激进，其底气大概来自手中的Fajr-5型火箭，如果以色列采取更大规模的报复，这批火箭可以打到特拉维夫地区。


The change in Egypt’s politics and policies had a similar effect: Hamas calculated that Israel would not jeopardize its fragile relationship with Egypt by launching another ground operation in Gaza.	埃及政治和政策的变化也具有相同效果：哈马斯断定以色列不会因为发动新一轮加沙地面攻势破坏其与埃及的脆弱关系。


Hamas was taken by surprise when Israel attacked, killing its military leader, Ahmed al-Jabari, and destroying most of its Fajr-5 arsenal.	当以色列发动进攻，除掉了其军事领袖艾哈迈德·贾巴里（Ahmed al-Jabari）并摧毁了其Fajr-5军火库时，哈马斯大为震惊。


It responded with massive shelling of southern Israel, and managed to send several missiles toward Tel Aviv and one toward Jerusalem.	其反应措施是对以色列南部进行大举炮轰，并设法向特拉维夫发射了几枚导弹，对耶路撒冷也发射了一枚导弹。


Air raid sirens were finally heard in Israel’s two largest cities.	以色列最大两个城市上空终于响起了防空警报。


In response, Israel is visibly preparing for a large-scale ground operation.	以色列的回应是公开进行大规模地面军事调动。


There is no appetite in Israel for a second Operation Cast Lead; but nothing less than a stable, long-lasting ceasefire is acceptable.	以色列无意发动第二次铸铅行动； 但完全的稳定、长期停火是可接受的。


Such a truce is possible.	这样的停火是可能的。


Israel’s assault scored impressive initial successes, while Hamas can take pride in having reached Tel Aviv with its missiles, an achievement that eluded Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War.	以色列的袭击获得了开门红，而哈马斯也因成功地用导弹袭击了特拉维夫感到欢欣鼓舞，这一成就让真主党在2006年黎巴嫩战争中的成果相形见绌。


Moreover, Egypt, Hamas’s patron and senior ally, maintains a relationship and channels of communication with Israel, and does not want to sever all ties – not least because to do so would provoke a confrontation with the United States, which underwrites the Egyptian army.	此外，埃及——哈马斯的赞助人和坚定盟友——仍然维持着与以色列的关系和沟通渠道，并无意切断一切联系，因为这样做会与支持埃及军队的美国形成冲突。


In fact, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi is seeking more financial aid from the US and the International Monetary Fund, and wants his coming visit to Washington, DC, to be a success.	事实上，埃及总统穆尔西正在寻求从美国和IMF获得更多的财政援助，希望其对华盛顿的访问获得成功。


He also wants to restore Egypt’s position as a major regional force.	他还希望重塑埃及作为重要地区力量的地位。


Playing the peacemaker would serve him well on all counts.	成为和平制造者能够让他一举多得。


So Morsi is juggling.	因此，穆尔西需要长袖善舞。


He has denounced and warned Israel, recalled Egypt’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, and sent his prime minister to Gaza.	他谴责并警告以色列，召回了埃及驻特拉维夫大使，并将总理派往加沙。


But, so far, he has not crossed a single red line.	但是，到目前为止，他一直没有跨越任何红线。


There is little time to act.	采取行动的时间已经不多了。


More fighting will bring additional actors into the picture (including Turkey).	更多的斗争会将更多的方面（包括土耳其）拖入战局。


If the US and Europe choose to remain inactive, they must at least encourage Egypt to play its role.	如果美国和欧洲选择静观其变，它们至少不得不鼓励埃及承担这一角色。


Egypt’s major obstacle is Hamas’s insistence on an end to the Israeli siege and targeted killings as part of a ceasefire agreement.	埃及的主要障碍是哈马斯坚持要求以色列解除包围和定点清除，以此作为停火协议的一部分。


The challenge for Egyptian leaders is to persuade Hamas to settle on lesser terms without further fighting.	埃及领导人的挑战是说服哈马斯在掀起未来战斗的情况下降低条件。


Egypt’s Innocent Murderers	埃及的逍遥杀人犯


CAIRO – “Bashar should abandon power and retire safely in Egypt.	开罗—“巴沙尔应该放下权力，到埃及来安全地退休。


The general-prosecutor is murder-friendly,” a friend, referring to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, told me as we watched former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trial in the Police Academy’s criminal court.	埃及最高检察官对杀人犯可好了，”一位朋友在和我一起观看前埃及总统穆巴拉克在警察学院刑事法庭受审时这样向我评价叙利亚总统。


Although Mubarak and his interior (security) minister, Habib al-Adly, were handed life sentences at the conclusion of their trials, the generals who ran Egypt’s apparatus of repression as deputy interior ministers were acquitted.	尽管穆巴拉克及其内政（安全）部长阿德利（Habib al-Adly）在定罪后被判终身监禁，但以内政部副部长之名操作埃及镇压机器的诸位将军被判无罪。


Hasan Abd al-Rahman, head of the notorious, Stasi-like State Security Investigations (SSI); Ahmad Ramzi, head of the Central Security Forces (CSF); Adly Fayyid, the head of Public Security; Ismail al-Shaer, who led the Cairo Security Directorate (CSD); Osama Youssef, the head of the Giza Security Directorate; and Omar Faramawy, who oversaw of the 6th of October Security Directorate, were all cleared of any wrongdoing.	拉赫曼（Hasan Abd al-Rahman），如斯塔西一般臭名昭著的国家安全调查局（SSI）局长、拉姆齐（Ahmad Ramzi），中央安全部队（CSF）司令、法伊德（Adly Fayyid），公共安全首脑、谢尔（Ismail al-Shaer），开罗安全理事会（CSD）会长、尤塞夫（Osama Youssef），吉萨（Gisa）安全理事会会长、还有法拉马维（Omar Faramawy）10·6安全理事会会长，这些人都逃脱了罪名。


Lawyers for Mubarak and al-Adly will appeal their life-sentences, and many Egyptians believe that they will receive lighter sentences.	穆巴拉克和阿德利的律师会就终身监禁提起上诉，许多埃及人认为他们会得到减刑。


The verdicts sent an unmistakable message, one with serious consequences for Egypt’s political transition.	对穆巴拉克的裁决传递了一个明确的信号，将对埃及政治过渡形成重大影响。


A spontaneous cry was heard from the lawyers and the families of victims when they were announced: “The people want to cleanse the judiciary.”	当判决宣布时，受害者家庭及其律师们情不自禁地流下了眼泪：“人民恨不得清洗司法部。 ”


Indeed, many Egyptians – including senior judges – do not view the judiciary as an independent institution.	事实上，许多埃及人——包括资深法官——认为司法部并不是一个独立机构。 “这是一个重大专业错误。


“This is a major professional mistake.	那些将军应该和穆巴拉克一样被判终身监禁。


Those generals should have been handed life-sentences like Mubarak,” said Zakaria Abd al-Aziz, the former elected head of the Judges Club. “The killing went on for days, and they did not order anyone to stop it.	”前当选法官俱乐部（Judges Club）主席阿齐兹（Zakaria Abd al-Aziz）说，“杀戮维持了好几天，他们没有派任何人去阻止杀戮。


The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is not the only place that should be cleansed.	内政部（MOI）并不是唯一应该清洗的部门。


The judiciary needs that” as well.	司法部也应该清洗一番。 ”


The verdicts certainly reinforce a culture of impunity within the security services.	毫无疑问，这样的裁决在增强了安全事务免于刑罚的文化。


The SSI and its departments were responsible for many human-rights violations, including mass-torture and extra-judicial killings, throughout Mubarak’s 30-year rule.	在穆巴拉克30年的统治时期里，SSI及其下属部门犯有诸多侵犯人权的罪行，包括酷刑和法外处决。


When protestors stormed the SSI headquarters and other governorates in March 2011, torture rooms and equipment were found in every building.	当3月11日示威者横扫SSI总部和其他行政部门时，刑讯室和刑具随处可见。


Unlawful detentions, kidnappings, disappearances, systematic torture, rape, and inhuman prison conditions have all been documented since the 1980’s by human-rights organizations and a few Egyptian courts.	非法监禁、绑架、失踪、虐待、强奸和非人道关押自从20世纪80年代以来便不绝于人权组织和少数埃及法庭记录中。


Acquitting the heads of the SSI and the CSF (the 300,000-strong institution that acted as the “muscle” of Mubarak’s regime), after a revolution sparked by police brutality, led directly to renewed protests in Tahrir Square.	在由警察暴行引发的革命后赦免SSI和CSF（拥有30万成员的穆巴拉克“爪牙”机构）首脑直接再次点燃了解放广场示威之火。


“We either get the rights of the martyrs, or die like them,” chanted hundreds of thousands in Tahrir and other Egyptian squares.	“要么为烈士争取权利，要么和烈士一样死去，”解放广场和其他埃及广场上成千上万的示威者喊道。


Sit-ins, reminiscent of the 18 days of January and February 2011 that ended Mubarak’s rule, have already started.	为纪念推翻穆巴拉克统治的2011年1—2月的18天而进行的静坐示威活动已经开始。


A third consequence of the verdicts concerns the empowerment of an anti-reform faction within the MOI.	这些裁决的第三大后果是MOI内部的反改革集团获得了权力。


Based on my year-long research on Egyptian security-sector reform, this faction is already the most powerful.	从我对埃及安全部门改革一年来的研究看，该集团已然成为最有权势的群体。


Following the revolution, factional struggle within the MOI became public.	革命之后，MOI的内部斗争就公开花了。


“We have to save face,” said General Abd al-Latif Badiny, a deputy interior minister who was fired under al-Adly.	“我们得保存颜面，”内政部副部长、被阿德利解职的巴迪尼（Abd al-Latif Badiny）将军说。


“[M]any officers and commanders refused to torture detainees and were against corruption, but we need a revolutionary president to empower us and clean the ministry.”	“许多军官和指挥官拒绝严刑拷问犯人、反对腐败，但我们需要具有革命精神的总统赋予我们全力清洗内政部。 ”


Badiny was reappointed after the revolution, but then reprimanded in November 2011, following clashes between demonstrators and police that left more than 40 protesters dead.	巴迪尼在革命之后重新获得了任命，但在2011年11月造成40名示威者死亡的游行者和警方的冲突后再次受到斥责。


“He was advocating dialogue with protesters, whereas al-Adly’s men wanted a harsh crackdown.	“他鼓吹应该和示威者展开对话，而阿德利的人认为应该严厉镇压。 最后，阿德利派获胜了。


They got their way in the end,” says Major Ahmad Ragab, the spokesperson of the reformist General Coalition of Police Officers (GCPO), which seeks to establish an official police syndicate and reform the security services along apolitical, professional lines.	”支持改革的尽管大联盟（GCPO）发言人拉加比（Ahmad Ragab）少校说。 GCPO寻求成立正是的警察联合会，以非政治的职业方向改革安全系统。


The verdicts will significantly affect two other processes: revolutionary forces’ capacity to mobilize, and thus to place pressure on the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), and the presidential elections.	这些裁决会对其他两大进程产生重要影响：革命军的动员能力以及基于这种动员能力的对执政的武装部队最高委员会（SCAF）的施压能力。 解放广场和其他官场上反对此次裁决的示威者的目标则包括：清洗司法部；


The objectives of those protesting the verdicts in Tahrir and other squares include: a judicial purge; a law that would ban Mubarak’s senior officials from holding political posts for ten years; new trials for al-Aldy’s generals; and removal of the general prosecutor (who was appointed by Mubarak).	禁止穆巴拉克手下高级官员十年内担任政治要职； 对阿德利手下的将军进行重新审判；


There are also calls, still undeveloped, for greater unity ahead of the presidential run-off election on June 16-17.	也有人呼吁在6月16—17日总统大选决胜轮之前保持更大的团结，但尚未形成气候。


Such appeals range from demanding an immediate transfer of power to a coalition of revolutionary presidential candidates (although the mechanism is vague) to the formation of a united presidential front in the runoff, with Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brothers (MB) as President and left-leaning Nasserist Hamadin Sabahi and liberal-leaning moderate-Islamist Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as Vice-Presidents.	这类吁求包括要求立即将权力移交给革命派总统候选人联盟（尽管其中的机制非常模糊）以及组成联合总统阵线参选，由穆斯林兄弟会（MB）的摩西（Mohamed Morsi）担任总统，左倾的纳赛尔主义者萨巴希（Hamadin Sabahi）和自由派温和伊斯兰主义者福特乌（Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh）担任副总统。


MPs have already called on the three figures to come to the parliament and negotiate a coalition.	MP已经号召三人进入议会商谈结盟问题。


The verdicts are likely to boost support in the runoff for Morsi, who split the Islamist vote with two other candidates in the election’s first round.	这些裁决或许有助于增加摩西的支持率，在首轮选举中，摩西和其他两位候选人分散了伊斯兰主义者的选票。


Moreover, a significant share of the non-Islamist revolutionary vote will go to Morsi, owing to the absence of other revolutionary alternatives.	此外，非伊斯兰革命派选票的大部也将投向摩西，因为除了他之外再无其他革命派候选人。


The common saying in Tahrir is: “We’ve got differences with Morsi, but we’ve got blood with [Ahmed] Shafiq,” Mubarak’s last prime minister and Morsi’s opponent in the runoff.	解放广场的共声是“我们与摩西有分歧，但与沙非齐（Ahmed Shafiq）有血仇。 ”沙非齐是穆巴拉克时代最后一任总理，也是摩西在决胜轮的竞选对手。


Pro-revolution, non-Islamist, and non-MB candidates received almost 9.7 million votes in the first round of the presidential election.	革命派非伊斯兰非MB候选人在第一轮总统选举中赢得了970万张选票。


The majority of these voters will probably now support Morsi, as opposed to staying home (the general drift before the verdicts).	其中的绝大部分选民现在很有可能会支持摩西，而不是坐山观虎斗（裁决出台前的主流想法）。


The MB must still decide for inclusiveness if it wants to attract the support of Aboul Fotouh and Sabahi voters in the runoff against Shafiq.	如果MB想让福特乌和萨巴希的支持者在选举中抛弃沙非齐，就需要更加包容。


But, for now, Tahrir and other squares are once again uniting the pro-change forces, whether Islamist or not.	但是，眼下，解放广场和其他广场再次形成了支持变革的团结力量（不管是不是伊斯兰主义的）。


The key challenge for Egyptian revolutionaries is to sustain that unity, establish a leadership coalition, translate their chants into concrete demands, and maintain the pressure during implementation.	埃及革命派的主要挑战是保持团结之势，组成一个领导联盟，将赞歌转化为实在的要求，并在实施过程中持续施加压力。


Egypt’s revolution continues.	埃及的革命还在继续。


Egypt’s New Old Government	埃及新组建的旧政府


CAIRO – Egypt’s first-ever freely elected president, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, has appointed his first cabinet, and guess what?	开罗——埃及有史以来的首位自由选举总统，穆斯林兄弟会的穆罕默德·穆尔西已经完成了首届内阁任命，你猜怎么样？


It is crammed with officials from the old regime.	旧的政府官员充斥着新内阁。


Morsi’s government clearly reflects the balance of power between the president and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). But it also reflects the strategy of the Muslim Brothers to shift that balance.	穆尔西政府显然是总统和武装部队最高委员会（SCAF）权力平衡的产物，但也反映了穆斯林兄弟会寻找新平衡的战略。


Thirty-five ministers were chosen by the new prime minister, Hisham Qandil, seven of whom (including Qandil) were ministers in the previous SCAF-appointed government.	新任总理希沙姆·甘迪勒任命了35位部长，其中7位（包括甘迪勒本人）均曾在此前武装部队最高委员会任命的政府中担任过部长职务。


Five ministries – information, higher education, youth, labor, and housing – were given to the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).	信息、高等教育、青年、劳工和住房建设部等五部部长由穆斯林兄弟会自由与公正党（FJP）占据。


Other pro-revolution figures secured several cabinet portfolios as well: education, legal and parliamentary affairs, industry and foreign trade, and most importantly, the justice ministry.	其他支持革命的人士也占据了内阁组合中教育、法律及议会事务、工业及外贸，以及最重要的司法部等若干部长职务。


The “power” ministries – interior and defense – were kept under the control of figures associated with the former regime.	内政和国防部等“实权”部委仍由与前政权相关的人士掌控。


Field Marshal (and SCAF leader) Hussein Tantawy retained his post as Defense Minister, and General Ahmed Gamal al-Din was appointed to head the interior ministry, whose brutal behavior sparked the revolution.	侯赛因·坦塔维元帅（兼武装部队最高委员会领袖）仍留任国防部长，而曾因暴行引发这场革命的阿尔丁将军则受命统帅内政部。


Gamal al-Din’s uncle, Abd al-Ahad Gamal al-Din, was the ruling National Democratic Party’s parliamentary majority leader during the 2000’s.	阿尔丁的叔叔阿卜杜勒 - 阿哈德·贾迈勒·阿尔丁2000年间曾任执政民族民主党的议会多数党领袖。


His nephew was a hardliner during negotiations to release political prisoners, as well as during talks to end the street clashes of November 2011.	其侄在释放政治犯谈判中充当强硬派，且在2011年11月结束街头冲突的谈判中也同样扮演强硬派的角色。


He was also a witness in the “Giza Officers Trial,” in which 17 policemen were accused of killing and injuring protesters in January 2011.	他还在“吉萨警官案”的审判过程中出庭作证，此次审判中有17名警官被控于2011年1月打死打伤示威群众。


He defended the policemen, claiming that the victims had been killed in “self-defense.”	他为这些警官出庭辩护，声称警方出于“自卫”目的才杀死被害人。


Nonetheless, Ashraf al-Banna, a co-founder of the reformist General Coalition for Police Officers (GCPO), remains hopeful: “He was an effective deputy [minister of interior]...[so] we expect some reforms.	尽管凡此种种，持改革态度的警务人员联盟（GCPO）创始人阿什拉夫·阿巴纳仍然抱有希望：“他出任内政部副[部长]时曾十分高效…[因此]我们有理由期待某种改革。


The situation in the ministry is unsustainable.”	内政部目前的状况已经难以为继。


But others, like the members of the more revolutionary Officers but Honorable Coalition, accuse Gamal al-Din of being a member of a powerful anti-reform faction in the ministry, dubbed “al-Adly’s men” (after former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly).	”。 但也有人，比如德高望重的革命官员联盟参与者指责阿尔丁是内政部强势反改革派系成员，并将其划归为追随前内政部长阿德利的“阿德利手下” 。


As for the pro-change forces, Minister of Information Salah Abd al-Maqsud, a leading figure in the Muslim Brothers’ media wing, will control a sector that continues to attack the group and Morsi, even after his electoral victory.	支持改革的势力方面，穆斯林兄弟会的媒介部领军人物信息部长萨拉赫·阿卜杜勒·马苏德即便在穆尔西选举获胜后，仍将控制其所属部门继续攻击穆尔西及其组织。


The new youth minister, Osama Yassin, another leading Muslim Brother, was the de facto “security chief” in Tahrir Square during the 18 days that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak.	另一位主要穆斯林兄弟会成员新任青年部长乌萨马·亚辛在推翻前总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克的为期18天的塔里尔广场革命中实际担任了“保安队长”的角色。


He belongs to the so-called “iron organization,” a strong, committed faction led by Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood’s first deputy chairman (deputy general guide).	乌萨马·亚辛隶属于由兄弟会第一副主席（副总干事）沙特尔统帅的强势坚定派别“铁腕组织”。


Likewise, higher education went to Mostafa Mossad, an FJP member who was in charge of the education portfolio during Morsi’s campaign.	同样，高等教育部部长职务归属在穆尔西竞选期间掌管教育事务的自由公正党党员穆斯塔法·摩萨德。


The labor ministry went to Khaled al-Azhary, a Brother who was deputy head of the Workers Union and a victim of police brutality in 2010.	劳工部部长职务则归属另一名兄弟会成员，此人既是阿萨利工会副会长也是警方暴行的受害者。


For the Brothers, of course, everything could change if the government is dissolved after the upcoming parliamentary election.	当然，对兄弟会而言，如果政府在即将举行的议会选举后解散一切都会发生改变。


But, even if that happens, the experience, data, and knowledge gained will be of immense value to the Brotherhood.	但即便这种情况真的出现，这次任职所积累起来的经验、数据和知识都将是一笔可观的财富。


Four other ministries went to pro-revolution and Islamist figures.	其他四部委的部长职务被革命派人士及伊斯兰人士收入囊中。


Mohamed Mahsoob, a leading figure in the moderate Islamist al-Wasat Party who campaigned against the return of Mubarak-era officials, became Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.	在竞选中反对穆巴拉克时任官员回归政府的温和派伊斯兰瓦萨特党代表人物穆罕默德·马素布当选法律及议会事务部部长。


Hatem Saleh, the deputy chairman of the Civilization Party, which joined the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral coalition in the last parliamentary election, was named Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade.	上次议会选举中曾加入穆斯林兄弟会选举联盟的文化党副主席哈特姆·萨利赫被任命为工业及外贸部部长。


The religious endowment ministry, which influences the country’s main Islamic institution, al-Azhar, went to another of the Brothers’ allies, Talaat Afifi, the deputy head of the Islamic Legal Body for Rights and Reform, which comprises more than a hundred of Egypt’s leading Islamist scholars and activists.	影响埃及主要伊斯兰团体阿兹哈尔的宗教捐助部归属于伊斯兰权利及改革法律机构副所长塔拉特·阿菲菲（Talaat Afifi），阿菲菲也是一位兄弟会盟友，其统帅的机构由一百多名埃及著名的伊斯兰学者和活动家组成。


Finally, Ahmed Mekki, the former deputy head of the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest appeals court, will lead the justice ministry, which is in need of real change.	最后，曾出任埃及最高上诉法院副院长的Ahmed Mekki将统领拯待改革的司法部。


Mekki is a strong proponent of judicial independence, and was dubbed “the revolution’s representative” in Qandil’s government.	Mekki是司法独立的坚定支持者，被誉为甘迪勒政府中“革命人士的代表”。


Overall, only ten of the 35 ministries went to pro-change forces, with the other ministers a combination of old-regime figures and technocrats without any publicly declared political affiliation.	总体而言，35个部长席位中改革派力量仅占10个左右，余下的则是旧政权人物和并未公开宣布政治背景的技术专家的组合。


But the choice of the ten ministries was strategically clever, given the Muslim Brotherhood’s coming battles with SCAF.	但鉴于穆斯林兄弟会和武装部队最高委员会不可避免的斗争，这10位部长的选择在战略安排上是颇为明智的。


All of these ministries represent low-cost, soft power: official institutions that can enhance pro-change forces’ capacity to mobilize, give them religious legitimacy, and remove the threat of judicial repression as they strengthen unofficial networks on the ground.	所有部长都是低成本、软实力的代表性人物：这些人来自能加强革命派动员力量的官方机构、为革命派争取宗教合法性、并在革命派加强基层非官方网络的同时消除司法镇压的威胁。


But the SCAF side is applying a similar strategy: strengthening its hold over the key power ministries.	但武装部队最高委员会也运用了类似的策略：即加强对关键实权部委的控制力度。


For example, in last week’s annual personnel changes at the interior ministry, many of those expected to be removed, owing to accusations of corruption, complicity in repression, or both, were not.	比如，在内政部上周进行的年度人员调整中，很多因腐败、参与镇压或两项指控兼有而预计将被免职的人却仍继续留任。


A few were even promoted.	有几位甚至反而得到了重用。


The struggle for Egypt thus continues.	因此埃及的斗争还在进行中。


The “Second Republic” is yet to be born.	“第二共和国”依然没有诞生。


Egypt and Tunisia’s Divergent Paths	埃及和突尼斯不同的道路


CAMBRIDGE – It has been five years since Egypt and Tunisia underwent regime change, and both countries are still suffering from low economic growth, large fiscal deficits, high unemployment, and rising public debts.	坎布里奇——埃及和突尼斯政权更迭后五年过去了，两国仍然遭受着经济增长低迷、财政赤字沉重、失业率高企和公共债务上升的威胁。


Having failed to institute reforms on their own, both have turned to the International Monetary Fund, which entered into an arrangement with Tunisia in 2013 and has just approved a $12 billion loan program for Egypt – the country’s first since 1991, and the largest ever for a Middle Eastern country.	因为未能凭借自身力量实施改革，两国都不约而同求助于国际货币基金组织，该组织2013年与突尼斯达成协议，并刚刚批准了埃及价值120亿美元的贷款项目——这是该国1991年后首个贷款项目，也创下了中东国家有史以来贷款项目的最大金额。


On the face of it, countries moving toward democracy seem as likely to experience poor economic performance as countries moving toward renewed dictatorship, because political instability and uncertainty of any kind naturally hurt investment and growth.	从表面看，国家走向民主似乎与走向独裁在经济上经历了同样糟糕的表现，因为无论何种类型的政治动荡和不确定性都会自然而然地损害经济发展和投资。


But Tunisia has embraced political inclusion, and could soon find itself back on the path toward healthy economic growth, while Egypt’s closing society positions its economy for a downward spiral.	但突尼斯已经接受了政治包容性理念，而且或许很快就会回到经济健康增长的轨道，而埃及与世隔绝的封闭社会则导致国内经济陷入下降螺旋。


Until recently, both countries’ governments showed a surprising lack of interest in economic reform.	直到不久前，两国政府还表现得对经济改革惊人地缺乏兴趣。


Instead, they engaged with identity issues and security challenges in ways that reflect their diverging political paths.	相反，他们以反映各自政治道路的方式应对生存问题和安全挑战。


In Tunisia, electoral contests between the Islamist Ennahda Party and the secular Nidaa Tounes Party have allowed for a productive debate about the role of religion in politics and society; in Egypt, by contrast, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s autocratic government has violently repressed the Muslim Brotherhood.	在突尼斯，伊斯兰安纳达党和代表世俗的突尼斯呼声党（ Nidaa Tounes Party）之间的选举竞争已经创造环境就宗教在政治和社会中的作用进行了卓有成效的辩论； 而在埃及，情况却恰恰相反，阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西总统的专制政府对穆斯林兄弟会进行了猛烈的镇压。


Meanwhile, governments in both countries could not resist increasing public spending.	此外，两国政府都无法抵制增加公共支出。


In Egypt, subsidies were still above 10% of GDP in mid-2016, suggesting a return to the old authoritarian bargain whereby citizens abstain from political participation in exchange for government economic support.	在埃及，截止2016年中各项补贴仍占到GDP总量的10%以上，表明该国再次回到旧有的专制主义制度，即民众用放弃政治参与来换取政府的经济支持。


Now, to qualify for the IMF’s assistance, Egypt has committed to reducing its subsidies and instituting a value-added tax.	现在，为达到国际货币基金组织的援助条件，埃及已经承诺减少补贴并实行增值税。


In Tunisia, labor unions have managed to push civil-servant wages – which now equal 15% of GDP, up from 10% of GDP in 2011 – well above IMF targets.	在突尼斯，工会想方设法推高公务员工资至国际货币基金组织规定的目标之上——已从2011年占国内GDP的10%增加到现在的15%。


And macroeconomic instability has impeded growth in both countries.	而宏观经济动荡也已对两国经济增长起到了阻碍作用。


Egypt’s low credit rating has forced the government to borrow domestically, which has crowded out other borrowers to the point that private investment amounts to just 11% of GDP.	埃及信用评级低迫使政府在国内借款，从而挤出其他借款人，导致私人投资仅占GDP的11%。


Tunisia’s external state borrowing has not crowded out the private sector; nonetheless, private investment has fallen to 18% of GDP.	突尼斯的对外国家借款并没有挤出私人部门； 但即便如此，私人投资也已降至GDP的18%。


Both countries’ current-account deficits have widened as a result of falling tourism revenues and disrupted export activities, and neither country has taken measures to improve private-sector competitiveness.	旅游收入下降和出口活动中断导致两国经常账户赤字均有所扩大，而且两国均未采取措施提高私营部门的竞争力。


Sisi, like former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, is wary of allowing private-sector players to gain political clout, and has instead propped up cronies whom he can trust, such as army corporations and some of the firms previously connected to the Mubarak regime.	塞西和埃及前总统穆巴拉克一样，对私人部门参与者获得政治影响力持谨慎态度，而是反过来支持他可以信任的密友，如军队企业和曾与穆巴拉克政权有过联系的某些公司。


In Tunisia, the state bureaucracy has hindered private-sector activity, and there are reports of increased corruption by politically connected firms since the Nidaa Tounes government assumed power in 2015.	在突尼斯，国家官僚制度拖累了私营部门活动，而且自从突尼斯呼声党政府2015年接管政权以来不断有报告显示政治关联企业的腐败状况恶化。


Tunisia has allowed its currency to adjust over time, and the dinar has lost a third of its value against the US dollar since 2014.	突尼斯允许国内货币随时间推移进行调整，2014年来第纳尔已经兑美元贬值了1/3。


Egypt, for its part, has disastrously mismanaged its exchange rate.	而埃及方面则灾难性地错误管理了国内汇率。


With the exception of one minor adjustment in 2013, it has stuck to a fixed rate since 2011, even after its currency became massively overvalued and started to create imported-goods shortages.	除2013年进行过一次不太重要的调整外，2011年后埃及一直实行固定汇率，即使在其国内货币大幅高估并开始造成进口商品短缺时也依然如此。


When Egypt complied with IMF conditions and floated its currency on November 1st, the exchange rate weakened from 8.5 to 15.5 pounds to the dollar; soon, imported goods will likely cost 40-60% more than they do now.	当埃及遵守国际货币基金组织条件并于11月1日实行浮动汇率时，汇率从8. 5磅兑一美元贬值至15.


The Egyptian and Tunisian people are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their respective countries’ economic performance.	埃及和突尼斯民众正在对各自国家的经济表现越来越不满意。


But over time, this frustration will probably help Tunisia’s economy, while hurting Egypt’s.	但随着时间的推移，这样的不满情绪很可能帮助突尼斯经济而损害埃及。


For starters, political inclusiveness in Tunisia fosters healthy dialogue about potential solutions.	首先，突尼斯的政治包容性促进有关潜在解决方案的健康对话。


For example, the new Tunisian cabinet formed in August includes ex-union leaders, who can now shape broad economic policies, not just press for higher wages.	举例而言，8月成立新一届突尼斯内阁吸纳了前工会领袖，他们现在可以参与制定宏观经济政策，而不仅只是要求提高工资。


This has already made public-policy debates more constructive, because policymakers are focusing on how labor and business can fairly share the burden of economic adjustment.	这已经导致政策辩论更有建设性，因为决策者正在关注劳工和企业如何公平分担经济调整的负担问题。


Egypt’s closed political system, by contrast, has left the government constantly in fear of the street.	相比之下，埃及封闭的政治体制让政府不断担心底层民众的反对。


With no channels for constructive political debate, the government’s best option has been to postpone necessary economic adjustments until they become unavoidable.	由于缺少建设性的政治辩论渠道，政府的最佳选择一直是推迟必要的经济调整，直到调整变得无可躲避。


This is not only economically inefficient (reflected in the absence of net foreign portfolio investment in Egypt in recent years); it is also politically risky.	这种做法不仅在经济领域效率低下（具体体现在埃及近年来没有外国证券组合净投资）； 而且还有政治危险性。


Egyptian politicians can do little but cross their fingers and hope that the street does not rise up in response to the recent currency devaluation.	埃及政治家除祈祷底层民众不因最近的货币贬值而揭竿而起之外几乎没有其他事情可做。


Political inclusiveness creates a more informed – and possibly more forgiving – public.	政治包容性创造出更明智——或许也更宽容的——公众氛围。


In Tunisia, members of civil society and the media may freely scrutinize the government and call for change.	在突尼斯，民间团体成员和媒介可以自由审视政府及呼吁改革。


While reforms have been slow in coming, the government cannot ignore growing public criticism forever.	虽然改革进展缓慢，但日益增长的公众批评令政府不可能永远忽视下去。


In fact, the 2017 draft budget law already includes urgent measures to fight corruption, trim the bureaucracy, and reduce tax evasion.	事实上，2017年预算法草案已经囊括了打击腐败、整顿官僚机构和减少逃税等紧急措施。


In Egypt, on the other hand, the currency devaluation has come as a shock to ordinary citizens.	另一方面，埃及的货币贬值震惊了普通民众。


There was very little public understanding about the state of the economy, because the mainstream media, having become a regime mouthpiece, has been painting a rosy picture of Egypt’s return to glory.	公众对国家经济状况的了解少之又少，因为主流媒体已经成为政府喉舌，一直在向民众灌输埃及重返荣耀之巅的美好画面。


At the same time, freedom of expression and association are severely limited; criticizing government policies is deemed tantamount to high treason.	与此同时，言论和结社自由受到严重限制； 批评政府政策被认为和叛国是一回事。


Tunisia has made political progress by shoring up its democratic processes, creating institutional space for all stakeholders, and allowing for free expression and assembly.	突尼斯已通过巩固民主进程取得了政治进步，为所有利益相关者创造了制度空间，并允许自由表达和举行集会。


This bodes well for the Tunisian economy’s long-term prospects.	这对突尼斯经济的长期前景无疑是好兆头。


Egypt, for its part, may benefit from short-term gains as a result of the IMF package.	埃及方面可能因货币基金组织的一揽子援助计划而短期受益。


Its “fierce but weak” rulers, however, cannot hope to make long-term progress by doubling down on despotism.	但其国内“凶狠但虚弱”的统治阶级不能指望通过专制主义变本加厉来取得长期进步。


If they do not take the long and winding road toward political inclusion, sooner or later they will face the wrath of those they have excluded.	如果他们不选择漫长而曲折的政治包容转型之路，那么迟早他们必将面对那些遭到他们排斥的民众的怒火。


One Hundred Years of Relativity	相对论一百年


STOCKHOLM – This year marks the centenary of Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity, his masterwork describing gravity as the curvature of space and time.	斯托克霍姆—今年是爱因斯坦广义相对论诞生一百周年。 这个伟大理论把引力描述为空间和时间的弯曲。


Yet, as is often true in science, Einstein's insights have provided physicists with as many questions as they have answered.	但是，科学界总是发现，爱因斯坦的洞见给物理学家带来的问题与答案一样多。


Finding solutions that fulfill Einstein's equations – space-times that describe the curvature of our universe – is difficult, so his theory was slow to catch on.	寻找符合爱因斯坦方程的解——描述宇宙曲率的时空——十分困难，因此他的理论进展缓慢。


Scientists carrying out early studies and the first crucial tests were forced to use approximations.	进行早期研究和第一批决定性测试的科学家不得不使用逼近技术。


It took decades to develop techniques to classify and derive new solutions.	科学界花了几十年时间才发展出归类和推导新解的技术。


Today, however, many solutions are known, and other thorny problems, such as the gravitational field of two colliding stars, can be explored using computers to carry out the numerical calculations.	但是，如今我们已经知道了许多解，其他棘手问题，如两颗碰撞恒星的引力场问题，可以用计算机求得数值解来探索。


Einstein's theory not only describes our universe, from the Big Bang to black holes; it has also taught physicists the relevance of geometry and symmetry – lessons that spread from particle physics to crystallography.	爱因斯坦的理论不但描述了从我们的宇宙——从大爆炸到黑洞； 它也教会了物理学家几何与对称的重要性——从粒子物理到晶体学都获益良多。


But, despite the similarities that Einstein's theory has with other theories in physics, it stands apart by its refusal to fit together with quantum mechanics, the theory that explains the dominant behavior of matter at the atomic and subatomic scale.	但是，尽管爱因斯坦的理论与其他物理学理论有诸多相似之处，但它与解释原子和次原子级别物质的主要行为的量子力学格格不入。


According to Einstein's theory, gravity, unlike all other physical forces known to man, is not quantized.	根据爱因斯坦的理论，引力与其他为人类所知的物理力不同，它不是量子化的。


It is not subject to Heisenberg's famed uncertainty principle.	它不受海森堡著名的不确定性原理的约束。


The electromagnetic field of a particle that passes through a double slit can pass through both slits at once.	穿越双缝的粒子的电磁场可以同时穿越两条缝。


Its gravitational equivalent cannot.	其引力等价物则不能。


This mismatch between our understanding of gravity and the quantum theories of matter poses a huge conundrum for theoretical physicists, because it leads to mathematical contradictions.	这一我们对引力的理解和物质的量子理论之间的不匹配给理论物理学家带来了极大的难题，因为这导致了数学上的矛盾。


Clearly, there is something about the combination of quantum theory and gravity that remains unknown, and our understanding of space, time, and matter hinges on unraveling this connection.	显然，某些能够将量子理论与引力联系起来的知识我们仍然不知道，并且我们队空间、时间和物质的理解取决于这一联系。


Finding a description of gravity that is compatible with our understanding of quantum physics would revolutionize cosmology, yield new insights into the first moments of our universe, and provide a deeper understanding of the theories on which all of modern physics is based.	寻找一种与我们对量子物理学的理解相容的引力的描述方法将带来宇宙学革命，形成关于宇宙最初时刻的新的洞见，并提供作为所有现代物理学基础的理论的更深层次的理解。


But, despite the enormous potential impact of such a breakthrough and the efforts of generations of physicists to achieve it, we still do not know which theory is the right one.	但是，尽管这一突破潜在影响无穷，并且一代又一代物理学家为此殚精竭虑，我们仍然不知道那种理论才是正确的。


Contrary to how it may feel when you try to get out of bed in the morning, gravity is by far the weakest fundamental force of all we have identified.	与你在早晨起床时的感觉相反，引力是我们目前所定义的所有基本力中最弱的一种。


It takes only the static repulsion of a few electrons to make your hair stand up, overcoming the gravitational pull of the entire planet.	让你的头发竖起来只需要几个电子的静电斥力，这样就能克服整个地球向你的头发施加的地心引力。


In the atomic and subatomic world, gravity is irrelevant compared to what else is going on, all of which can be described by quantum theories.	在原子和次元子世界，引力与其他力比起来显得无关紧要。 其他力都可以用量子理论来描述。


Gravity's weakness makes it very difficult to measure its quantum effects; as a result, we have no experimental data to guide theoretical physicists in the development of the missing theory.	引力的弱性质导致我们很难测量它的量子效应； 因此，我们无法获得实验数据指导物理学家研究这一迷失的理论。


Detecting a “graviton" – the hypothetical particle making up part of a gravitational field – would require a particle collider the size of the Milky Way or a detector with a mass of the planet Jupiter.	检测“引力子”——形成部分引力场的假象粒子——需要银河系那么大的粒子对撞机或质量与木星相当的检测器。


These experiments are so detached from our technological capabilities that physicists have focused on trying to remove the mathematical contradictions first, developing approaches like string theory, loop quantum gravity, and asymptotically safe gravity.	这些实验目前仍远远脱离我们的技术能力，因此物理学家不得不首先解决数学矛盾，发展出弦论、圈量子引力和渐进安全引力等方法。


But to know which theory describes physical reality, experimental tests must eventually be developed.	但要想知道哪种理论描述了物理实际，最终要需要实验检验。


That is why, over the last decade, physicists have begun to look for indirect evidence of quantum gravity.	就这样，在过去十年中，物理学家已开始寻找量子引力的间接证据。


Rather than seeking to detect a quantum of the gravitational field, researchers are looking for other effects that would imply that gravity is quantized.	研究者没有去试图检测引力场的量子，而是寻找其他表明引力被量子化的效应。


These tests work much like those that use the stability of atoms as indirect evidence for the quantization of the electromagnetic force.	这些测试工作很像是利用原子的稳定性作为间接证据证明电磁力的量子化。


For example, some scientists are searching for evidence of quantum fluctuations of space-time that could blur images of distant stars or lead to systematic distortions.	比如，一些科学家在寻找能模糊遥远星系影像或导致系统性扭曲的时空的量子波动的证据。


Others are looking for violations of certain symmetries that could enable normally forbidden particle decays, unexplained noise in gravitational wave detectors, or inexplicable loss of quantum coherence.	另一些科学家在寻找对违反某些对称性的现象，这一现象让正常情况下不会发生的粒子衰减能够发生。 其他科学家在寻找引力波检测器中的噪声或难以解释的量子相干性的丧失。


So far, these attempts have failed to detect the sought-after evidence.	目前，这些尝试都没有发现想要的证据。


Nonetheless, they have led to important developments, because the negative results have ruled out some plausible hypotheses.	尽管如此，它们还是带来了重要的发展，因为消极结果排除了一些似是而非的假说。


And, though researchers may not have found results supporting any one theory, they have advanced the cause of science by better defining the observational criteria any quantum theory of gravity will have to take into account.	此外，尽管研究者尚未发现支持任何一种理论的结果，但他们通过更好地定义任何引力的量子理论都必须考虑的观察标准推动的科学进步。


As we commemorate Einstein's achievement, we should also seize the opportunity to celebrate the unrelenting spirit of those who are pushing ahead and trying to answer the questions his theory left us.	在我们纪念爱因斯坦的成就的同时，我们也应该抓住这一机会赞美奋勇向前、试图回答爱因斯坦理论留给我们的问题的人的不屈不挠的精神。


That quest has blossomed into astonishingly fruitful research areas like cosmology, numerical general relativity, and quantum gravity.	这一追求过程产生了硕果累累的研究领域，如宇宙学、数值广义相对论和量子引力。 广义相对论给我们带来了虫洞、蒸发黑洞和大爆炸理论；


General Relativity has brought us wormholes, evaporating black holes, and the Big Bang theory; it underlies the discovery that the universe is expanding and that so-called exoplanets are much more common than anybody thought; and it has utterly redefined the way we think of our own place in the universe, ultimately even calling into question whether this universe is the only one.	它打下的基础让我们发现宇宙正��扩张并且所谓的系外行星远比所有人想象的都更常见； 它彻底改写了我们对地球和宇宙的看法，甚至带来了宇宙到底是否唯一的问题。


None of these advances would have been possible had researchers been operating according to the three-year plans that characterize much of current academia.	如果研究者一直根据当前学术界通行的三年计划进行研究，所有这些进步都不会发生。


So this year is perhaps a good moment to appreciate the visionaries who have understood that sustainable progress relies on the development of new and better theories whose impact may not be fully grasped for decades – indeed, that may continue to ramify 100 years later.	因此，今年也许是一次感谢空想家的良机，他们知道，可持续进步取决于更好更新理论的发展，这些新理论的影响也许需要几十年才能了解——事实上，有可能继续分叉发展100年才行。


Einstein the Realist	现实主义者爱因斯坦


OXFORD – It was recently discovered that the universe’s expansion is accelerating, not slowing, as was previously thought.	发自牛津——最近有研究发现宇宙的膨胀速度并未减缓，而是如原先推导的那样逐渐加速。


Light from distant exploding stars revealed that an unknown force (dubbed “dark energy”) more than outweighs gravity on cosmological scales.	来自远方恒星爆炸所产生的光揭示出在宇宙学范畴内存在一种比引力更加强大的未知力量（人们称之为“暗能量”）。


Unexpected by researchers, such a force had nevertheless been predicted in 1915 by a modification that Albert Einstein proposed to his own theory of gravity, the general theory of relativity.	但出乎研究者意料的是，阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦在1915年修正自身引力理论时就已经预判了这一力量的存在。


But he later dropped the modification, known as the “cosmological term,” calling it the “biggest blunder” of his life.	但他随后却放弃了这一名为“宇宙项”的修正，并将其称之为一生中“最严重的失误”。


So the headlines proclaim: “Einstein was right after all,” as though scientists should be compared as one would clairvoyants: Who is distinguished from the common herd by knowing the unknowable – such as the outcome of experiments that have yet to be conceived, let alone conducted?	于是各大报章头条都惊呼：“爱因斯坦最后还是对的！ ”仿佛科学家们都是一帮拥有千里眼顺风耳，洞察不可知事物的特异人士——而这些不可知事物包括一些尚未进行，甚至还未构想出来的实验所得出的结果。


Who, with hindsight, has prophesied correctly?	试问这些擅长马后炮的人中又有谁曾经做出过准确预测？


But science is not a competition between scientists; it is a contest of ideas – namely, explanations of what is out there in reality, how it behaves, and why.	但科学并不是科学家之间的竞争； 而是一场理念的竞技——所谓理念，也就是解释现实存在的究竟是何种事物，而这种事物又是为何以及如何运动。


These explanations are initially tested not by experiment but by criteria of reason, logic, applicability, and uniqueness at solving the mysteries of nature that they address.	这些解释最初往往都无法通过实验来验证，只能通过用以解开自然之迷的推理，逻辑，适用性以及独特性等条件来检测。


Predictions are used to test only the tiny minority of explanations that survive these criteria.	而预测只是用来验证能通过上述条件考验的很小一部分解释。


The story of whyEinstein proposed the cosmological term, whyhe dropped it, and whycosmologists today have reintroduced it illustrates this process.	而爱因斯坦为何提出宇宙常数，随后又放弃，如今又被宇宙学家重新引入的经历恰好展示了这一过程。


Einstein sought to avoid the implication of unmodified general relativity that the universe cannot be static – that it can expand (slowing down, against its own gravity), collapse, or be instantaneously at rest, but that it cannot hang unsupported.	爱因斯坦尝试避免未修正前的广义相对论所引出的结论：宇宙不可能是静态的——这意味着宇宙可以膨胀（在自身引力影响下逐渐放缓），坍塌或者突然进入静止状态，但它不能在没有支撑的情况下存在。


This particular prediction cannot be tested (no observation could establish that the universe isat rest, even if it were), but it is impossible to change the equations of general relativity arbitrarily. They are tightly constrained by the explanatory substance of Einstein’s theory, which holds that gravity is due to the curvature of spacetime, that light has the same speed for all observers, and so on.	这一特定推测无法得到验证（即便宇宙真的陷入静止，也没有任何观测手段能确认这一点），但同时又不可能随意改动广义相对论的相关方程，因为它们都受到爱因斯坦理论中某些基本解释的限制，比如引力来源于时空的弯曲，对于所有观测者来说光速都是相等的等解释。


But Einstein realized that it is possible to add one particular term – the cosmological term – and adjust its magnitude to predict a static universe, without spoiling any other explanation.	但爱因斯坦意识到有可能在不破坏其他解释的情况下添加一个特殊项——即宇宙项——并调整其数量来推测一个静态的宇宙。


All other predictions based on the previous theory of gravity – that of Isaac Newton – that were testable at the time were good approximations to those of unmodified general relativity, with that single exception: Newton’s space was an unmoving background against which objects move.	其他所有基于原有牛顿引力理论的预测当时都可以得到验证，而且都与未修正的广义相对论的推测极为相近，只有一个例外：牛顿的空间是一个相对于运动物体的不运动背景。


There was no evidence yet, contradicting Newton’s view – no mystery of expansion to explain.	当时没有任何证据能反对牛顿的观点——也没有未知的膨胀需要解释。


Moreover, anything beyond that traditional conception of space required a considerable conceptual leap, while the cosmological term made no measurable difference to other predictions.	此外任何脱离这一传统空间概念的理论都需要实现相当大的观念跳跃，而宇宙项并未对其他预测造成可测量的差异。


So Einstein added it.	因此爱因斯坦把它添加了进来。


Then, in 1929, Edwin Hubble discovered that the universe is expanding, consistently (within the observational accuracy of the day) with unmodified general relativity.	随后在1929年，埃德温·哈勃发现宇宙正在不断膨胀，而且以当时的观测精度看来该发现与修正前的广义相对论相一致。


So Einstein dropped the cosmological term.	于是爱因斯坦又舍弃了宇宙项。


His doing so had nothing to do with Hubble being less blunder-prone; nor was Einstein deferring to Hubble’s superior prophetic abilities.	他这样做并非因为哈勃以甚少犯错著称；


It was just that the problem that the term was intended to solve no longer existed.	也并非臣服于哈勃的超凡预测能力，只不过因为这一宇宙项所试图解决的问题已经不存在了。


The new observations did not refute the existence of a cosmological term. They merely made it a bad explanation.	当时那些新观测结果也并未否定宇宙项的存在，仅仅是说明该项是一个不太好的解释罢了。


Then, in 1998, came those new observations of a universe whose expansion is accelerating.	结果1998年的更新观测结果发现宇宙正在加速膨胀。


As a result, the cosmological term that has been “reinstated” to account for the new observations is not quite the one that Einstein proposed and retracted.	结果“重新引入”来解释这些新观测的宇宙项已经与爱因斯坦当年提出又撤销的那个有所不同了。


It is larger, for it now has to explain not just why the universe isn’t collapsing, but why its expansion is accelerating.	它变得更加宏大，因为不仅要解释为何宇宙没有坍塌，还要说明为何在加速膨胀。


Einstein’s remark about having “blundered” is as misleading as the idea that he is “right after all.”	而爱因斯坦所谓“犯了大错”的评论也跟如今“终于胜利”的说法一样具有误导性。


The cosmological term is not something that should never have been proposed.	宇宙项不是一个永远不应被提出的东西。


Its introduction represented progress in understanding reality – as did its abandonment in light of Hubble’s discovery and its reinstatement in revised form to account for the new observations.	它的引入代表了人们在认识现实的过程中所取得的进步——而它在哈勃观测结果公布后的被舍弃，以及在新发现后以一种修正后的新形式被重新引入都同样说明了这一点。


Likewise, the mid-twentieth century “Bohr-Einstein debate” about quantum theory is often misinterpreted as a personal clash between wizards.	同样，上世纪中叶的“波尔-爱因斯坦量子理论之辩”往往被误读为是一场天才人物之间的冲突。


So counter-intuitive are quantum theory’s predictions that, under the leadership of one of its pioneers, Neils Bohr, a myth grew that there is no underlying reality that explains them.	在该领域其中一个领军人物尼尔斯·波尔的带动下量子理论的推测是如此的违反直觉，以致人们认为根本没有任何基本现实能解释这些推测。


Particles get from A to B without passing through the intervening space, where they have insufficient energy to exist; they briefly “borrow” the energy, because we are “uncertain” about what their energy is.	从A点向B点运动的粒子不需要穿过中间的空间，在这个空间中粒子并没有足够的能量来维持其存在； 它们只是暂时“借用”能量，因为我们“不确定”究竟它们的能量来自何处。


Information gets from A to B without anything passing in between – what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance.”	信息从A点到B点无需穿过任何东西——爱因斯坦称之为“幽靈般的超距作用”。


And so on.	相似的例子还有很多。


What these paradoxical interpretations have in common is that they abandon realism, the doctrine that a physical world, existing in reality, accounts for all of our experience.	而这类自相矛盾的解释的共同点就是都抛弃了现实主义，而现实主义这一基本信条认为存在于现实中的物理世界解释了我们的所有经验认识。


Anti-realism remains popular and appears in various guises in textbooks and popular accounts of quantum theory.	当今量子理论中的反现实主义依然流行，并以各种面目跻身于教科书和流行解释之中。


But Einstein insisted that physical phenomena have explanations in terms of what he called “elements of reality.”	但爱因斯坦坚持物理现象必须可以用他所谓的“实体要素”来解释。


Fortunately, a minority of physicists, myself included, likewise side unequivocally with realism, by adopting Hugh Everett’s multiple-universes interpretation of quantum theory.	幸运的是，包括笔者在内的一小部分物理学家都采纳量子物理学家休·艾弗雷特的多世界诠释，并明确地站在了现实主义一边。


According to this view, no particles exist where they have insufficient energy to be; it is simply that in some universes they have more energy than average, and in others, less.	根据这一诠释，在没有足够能量的情况下粒子是不存在的； 在某些宇宙中它们拥有比平均水平更多的能量，而在其他宇宙中则较少。


All alleged “paradoxes” of quantum theory are similarly resolved.	至此量子理论中的所有所谓“矛盾”都迎刃而解。


So, while most accounts say that Bohr won the debate, my view is that Einstein, as usual, was seeking an explanation of reality, while his rivals were advocating nonsense.	因此当大多数解释认为波尔赢得了论战之时，我的看法则是当爱因斯坦一如既往地寻找一个实体解释之时，他的对手却在鼓吹虚无。


Everett’s interpretation doesn’t make Einstein a demigod. But it does make him right.	而艾弗雷特的解释也并不是将爱因斯坦神化，只是再次证明了后者的正确而已。


Diagnostics for Global Health	诊断学和全球健康


CORVALLIS, OREGON – In developed countries, most people take for granted that when they are sick, they will have access to timely diagnosis and treatment.	科瓦利斯，俄勒冈州—在发达国家，大部分人认为得病时获得及时诊断和治疗乃是理所应当之事。


Indeed, while the diagnostic process – which typically involves sending a sample of blood, urine, or tissue to a laboratory for analysis – may be cumbersome and expensive, health-care providers and sophisticated laboratories remain widely available.	事实上，尽管诊断过程——通常情况下包括递交血液、尿液或组织样本进行实验室分析——可能繁琐而昂贵，医疗提供者和高精尖实验室往往门可罗雀。


As a result, the disease burden in the developed world has declined substantially.	因此，发达国家的疾病负担可以大大下降。


By contrast, in the developing world, millions of people die each year from treatable diseases like malaria, owing to the lack of sophisticated laboratories and alternative diagnostic tests.	相反，在发展中世界，每年有数百万人死于疟疾等可治疾病，原因是缺乏先进实验室和其他诊断测试。


But there is reason for hope: Advances in the field of microfluidics have the potential to transform health care by allowing “gold standard” laboratory-based testing to be transferred to the point of care (POC).	但希望仍在：微流控领域的进步有望通过允许基于实验室的检测这一“金本位”变为“床旁检测”（point of care，POC）改变医疗。


A POC test that provides an accurate and timely result would provide diagnostic access to underserved populations, enabling earlier treatment and helping to avoid mistreatment (treating another disease with similar symptoms).	提供及时准确结果的床旁检测可以为得不到充分服务的人群提供诊断，让他们更早得到治疗并避免误治（当成另一种症状相似的疾病来治）。


In order to meet their potential, however, POC tests must account for the wide range of factors affecting health-care applications.	但是，为了实现这一潜力，床旁检测必须考虑影响医疗应用的诸多影响因素。


First, a POC test must meet the particular environmental and operating constraints of where it will be used.	首先，床旁检测必须面对特定的环境和操作约束。


These may include an unreliable power supply, harsh or unpredictable environmental conditions, limited contact time between the health-care provider and patient, lack of user training, severe price constraints, and inadequate local infrastructure, which can impede the maintenance and repair of relevant instruments.	这些约束可能包括供电不稳、恶劣或不可预知的环境状况、医疗服务提供者和病患之间联系时间太少、用户缺少培训、服务价格约束和地方基础设施不足等，这些因素可能制约相关��器的维护和维修。


Indeed, POC settings can vary from a semi-trained health-care provider working in a clinic with electricity and access to refrigeration to an untrained individual in an environment with no mechanism for controlling temperature or humidity.	事实上，床旁测试的环境可能是略经训练的医疗服务提供者在有电和制冷设备的诊所中进行，也可能是未受过训练的个人在无温度和湿度控制装置的环境中进行。


In order to ensure the broadest coverage possible, POC tests should be designed to work in the settings with the fewest resources.	为了确保尽可能广泛的覆盖，床旁测试应该被设计成在最简陋环境中进行。


Likewise, POC tests must account for different tests’ requirements for clinical utility.	类似地，床畔测试必须考虑不同测试对联创效果的要求。


While diagnosing malaria requires only a positive or negative result, an HIV viral-load test would need to provide a graded output indicating the amount of virus detected.	尽管诊断疟疾只需要阴性或阳性的结果，但艾滋病毒载量测试需要提供表示测出病毒数量的评分输出（graded output）。


One of the most successful POC test formats is that of the well-known pregnancy test, which requires only the user’s urine and takes roughly 15 minutes to deliver the result.	最成功的床旁测试格式之一是妊娠测试，只需要用户的尿液，15分钟就可以得到结果。


This class of “rapid diagnostic tests” (RDTs), which are also used for infectious diseases like malaria and HIV, satisfy many of the key requirements for global health applications: they are fast and inexpensive, can be conducted easily by an untrained user, and do not require refrigeration.	这类“快速诊断测试”（rapid diagnostic test，RDT）也被用于疟疾和艾滋病等传染病，它满足全球医疗应用的多个关键要求：快速而廉价，可以轻易地通过未受训练的用户进行，并且不需要冷藏。


But they lack the sensitivity to provide adequate diagnostic information for many health conditions.	但它缺少敏感性，无法提供许多健康状况的足够的诊断信息。


Given this, researchers are working to develop more sophisticated paper-based tests.	基于此，研究者正致力于开发更先进的床旁测试。


For example, a new class of device, about the size of a postage stamp, that splits a sample into multiple zones with different detection chemistries has been used to test multiple conditions associated with liver failure in HIV and tuberculosis patients.	比如，一种邮票大小、可将样本分成多个区域进行不同检测化学反应的新装置已经被用于检测与艾滋病毒导致的肝衰竭和肺结核有关的多种状况。


And “paper network” devices include built-in timing mechanisms to enable automated multi-step tests like those used in laboratories, but in a disposable format.	此外，“纸网”（paper network）装置含有内置计时装置，能够进行类似于实验室测试的自动多步测试，但为一次性格式。


Another mechanism for expanding the capabilities of diagnostic testing would take advantage of the penetration of mobile-phone networks in developing countries.	另一种用于扩展诊断测试能力的装置利用了发展中国家手机网络的渗透度。


RDTs are largely limited to applications that require visual interpretation.	快速诊断测试往往局限于要求目视判读的应用。


A non-dedicated mobile phone could be used to capture and send image data from an RDT to a remote site, where a health-care provider would provide feedback on the results.	非专用手机可以被用于捕获和传送来自快速诊断测试的影像数据至远程站点，由位于远程站点的医疗服务提供者提供结果反馈。


But implementing such a program raises a new set of challenges.	但事实这一计划带来了新挑战。


In order to ensure accurate test results, the variability of camera positioning by the user and lighting conditions in different test environments must be addressed.	为了确保准确的测试结果，必须规定不同测试环境中的用户相机拍摄角度和灯光条件。


(One promising approach under development would use an adapter to connect the non-dedicated mobile phone to the RDT.)	（一个发展中的颇有希望的方法用适配器实现非专用手机与快速诊断测试的连接。 ）


Moreover, a phone-based test would require software infrastructure, such as communication protocols and prioritization procedures, to coalesce with the health-care system.	此外，基于手机的测试需要软件基础设施的支持——如通信协议和优先级程序——来与医疗系统结合。


And the compatibility issues raised by the wide variety of mobile-phone handsets would need to be addressed.	手机的多样性所带来的兼容性问题也需要解决。


Finally, the successful deployment of non-dedicated phone-based testing would require acceptance from the medical establishment.	最后，成功部署基于非专用手机的测试需要医疗界的接受。


The US Food and Drug Administration’s recent approval of several medical devices supported by dedicated phone-based readers is a promising step.	美国食品和药品管理局最近批准了几个受专用手机阅读器支持的医疗设备，这是令人欣喜的一步。


Effective POC tests are being developed; the proliferation of mobile phones will further augment the capabilities of these tests.	有效的床旁测试正在开发中； 手机的普及将进一步扩大这类测试的能力。


These emergent capabilities promise to extend the reach of high-quality diagnostics to remote populations, improve health management, and reduce health-care costs everywhere.	这类应急能力有助于让偏远地区的人民获得高质量诊断、改善健康管理以及降低各国的医疗成本。


Elected Dirty Dealers	民选的肮脏交易者


CHICAGO – Imagine that you are an elected member of the United States House of Representatives in the middle of the debate on the health-care reform act that was passed in 2010.	发自芝加哥——试想现在是2010年，你是个选举上台的美国众议院议员，而且正在对即将通过的医疗改革法案进行激烈辩论。


In a House committee meeting, you learn before anyone else that a proposed public-insurance option – a program that would compete with private insurance – will not be included.	先前提交审议的某个公共保险选项将对私人保险公司构成竞争，而在众议院委员会会议上，你比其他人早一步得知该选项将被排除在议程之外。


This information will have a large impact on health-care companies’ stock prices. Can you trade these companies’ shares before it is made public?	在知道这条消息将对医疗企业股价造成极大影响的情况下，你是否可以在消息公布之前买卖这些公司的股票？


Morally, it is difficult to separate this example from traditional cases of corporate insider trading. Yet no law prohibits the practice.	在道德层面，上述例子跟传统企业内幕交易案件非常相似，但却没有相关法律可以禁止上述行为。


The US Congress – the legislative branch of the country’s government – effectively exempts itself from the normal rules of insider trading.	作为美国政府立法机关的国会实际上让自己逍遥于内部交易法规的管辖之外。


Congress and the US Supreme Court are the only federal agencies whose employees may, without restrictions, trade stocks based on non-public information. All other US government employees who traded on privileged information of the type described above would be acting illegally.	在众多联邦机构中，只有美国国会和最高法院的成员可以不受限制地利用非公开信息进行股票交易，而同样的行为放在其他政府机构雇员身上都是违法的。


Not only can members of Congress legally trade on confidential information; they do, despite the potential cost to their reputations.	而国会成员不仅可以合法地利用机密信息进行交易，他们也确实这样做了，连这些行为对自身名誉造成损害的在所不惜。


The US television program 60 Minutes recently reported that several current members of Congress allegedly used confidential information that they acquired on the job for personal gain.	美国电视栏目《60分钟时事杂志（60 minutes）》最近报道了数名国会议员利用议员身份所接触到的机密信息牟取私利。


While the nexus between the privileged information and the trading is difficult to prove (as it is in most insider trading cases), the timing is highly suspicious.	虽然这些机密信息和交易之间的关联难以确证——正如大多数内部交易案件一样，但这些行为发生的时机却非常可疑。


But it is difficult to challenge this congressional “privilege” in the US, in part because insider trading is an ambiguous concept under US law, with no statutory definitions of the terms “insider,” “inside information,” or “insider trading.”	但要在美国挑战这个国会“特权”却相当困难，这在某种程度上是因为内幕交易在美国法律中是个模糊概念，同时对“内幕交易者”，“内部信息”或者“内幕交易”都缺乏法律定义。


In contrast, the European Union has tried to define these terms in directives aimed at prohibiting the practice.	相比之下，欧盟则尝试在打击内部交易的相关文件中对这些词汇予以明确定义。


According to a directive issued in 1989, “An insider is one who, due to his relationship to the company as manager, director, employee, or major shareholder, possesses inside information (material non-public facts) and knowingly uses such inside information to acquire or dispose of securities to which the information relates for his own account or another.”	根据一个在1989年颁布的法令“内幕交易者是指以公司经理，董事，雇员或者主要股东身份掌握内部信息（指意义重大的非公开事实），在知情的情况下，利用这些相关内部信息购买或者抛售相关联的证券，以此为自身或他人谋取利益的人”。


But this definition, while forthright, leaves a large loophole for legislators.	但这个定义虽然明确，却给立法者留下了一个巨大的后门。


For example, it creates the possibility that, say, British MPs could legally trade shares on information acquired in the course of normal business, because they do not qualify as “insiders.”	因为它忽视了一种可能性，比如英国议员们可以利用在自己日常工作中所获取的信息进行股票交易，因为他们显然不符合“内幕交易者”的定义。


In 2004, a paper published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis showed that US senators who traded stocks beat the market by 12% per year.	在2004年，一篇发表在《金融和统计分析学报》上的论文显示那些投资股票的美国参议员年回报率都比市场高12%。


Since even the best hedge-fund managers find it hard to achieve comparable results, we must conclude that these senators either are better than hedge-fund managers, or that they benefit from privileged information.	既然连最好的对冲基金经理都只能望其项背，我们只能得出两个结论：要么这些参议员比对冲基金经理更高明，要么这些人都从机密信息中捞到了好处。


Even more worrying than insider trading by elected representatives is the political-intelligence industry that now flourishes in Washington, Brussels, and other major global capitals.	而比民选代表内幕交易更令人担忧的则是当前在华盛顿，布鲁塞尔和各大国首都大行其道的政治情报行业。


In the US, former US congressmen and their staffers collect privileged information and sell it to hedge-fund managers, raking in $100 million annually.	在美国，前议员及其下属收集相关机密信息卖给基金经理，年交易金额竟达千万美元之巨。


A proposal to ban insider trading by US congressmen has languished in Congress since 2006.	一项旨在防止美国议员实施内幕交易的提案自2006年至今都未获国会关注。


But it appears that the 60 Minutes program generated some attention; within four days of the broadcast, the number of cosponsors of the proposal increased from nine to 57, and a session was called to discuss the legislation next month.	但《60分钟时事杂志》的播出似乎已经引起了一些注意； 在节目播出后的4天内，该提案的联名推荐人数量就从9个提高到54个，并决定在下月召开相关会议讨论相关立法问题。


Yet the problem is not simply Congress’s exemption from insider-trading law. The real issue is that the US Congress – like many countries’ legislatures – lives by rules that are very different from those imposed on ordinary citizens.	但这个问题并不仅限于国会不受内幕交易法案管辖的问题，真正的要害其实是美国国会（跟许多其他国家的立法机构一样）并非基于那些适用于普通公民的法规而运作。


In particular, the accounting, transparency, and fraud rules that govern businesses do not apply to elected representatives.	尤其是那些适用于企业的会计，信息透明和欺诈行为的法规都无法应用在民选代表身上。


It is a problem that goes well beyond insider trading.	这是个远超出内幕交易范围之外的问题。


If corporate executives lie during a conference call, they can be sued.	如果企业主管人员在议会聆讯中撒谎，那么等待他的将是法律的制裁。


Politicians, on the other hand, lie during electoral campaigns and once in office, with few or no consequences.	与此相反，政治家即使在竞选活动或者当选后撒谎也不会遭遇什么后果。


If the US government had been compelled to abide by the same accounting rules as the private sector does, it would have been forced to consolidate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – the giant government-backed mortgage companies at the heart of the recent financial crisis – and to report all contingent liabilities at market value.	如果美国政府也要遵守与私人部门同样的会计监管法律，它��被迫将房地美和房利美这两个身处当前金融危机核心的巨型政府背景抵押贷款企业进行合并，并按市场价格公布所有可能产生的负债。


Rather than just extending insider-trading law to the US Congress (or to other legislatures), citizens should demand that all restrictions and reporting requirements imposed on the private sector apply automatically to elected representatives as well.	因此对美国公民来说，要求可不仅仅是让内幕交易法律覆盖国会（或者其他立法机关），而是所有适用于私人部门的限制性规章和信息披露要求都应自动适用于民选代表。


This would make these legislatures more credible, and their laws more just.	这将令这些立法机构变得更加可信，也使它们制订的法律更加公正。


Elections are Not Enough	只有选举是不够的


There can be no liberal order without political democracy, but today we are frequently reminded that political democracy alone does not guarantee a liberal order.	没有政治民主就谈不上自由秩序，但今天的事实却常常让我们警醒：单纯的政治民主也并非自由秩序的保证。


Free and fair elections may lead to the ascendancy of a president of Iran who wants to “wipe Israel off the map of the Middle East.” Or to a president of Venezuela whose intolerance of the business class causes jubilation in the streets, but emigration by those whose initiative is crucial for the welfare of the people.	自由和公正的选举可能使想要“把以色列从中东版图上抹去”的伊朗总统登上宝座，也可能让嫌恶商人的委内瑞拉总统上台，虽然街上的人们对此欢呼雀跃，却导致身负人民福利重任的商人们仓惶出逃。


Less damaging, yet problematic, is the election – as in Poland – of a minority government that ruthlessly pursues its members’ personal interests and breaks all promises of cooperation made before the polls.	在波兰举行的选举虽然危害较小，但却同样问题丛生，当选的少数族裔政府不计后果地维护本民族的成员利益，撕毁了投票前所做的一切合作诺言。


In other words, elections are not enough if one wants to bring democracy to the world.	换句话讲，只有选举还远远不能实现世界民主。


Elections can lead to illiberal democracies and worse.	选举会带来非自由民主，甚至更坏的结果。


They must be embedded in a much more complex institutional framework, which I would describe as the liberal order.	因此必须把它们纳入更为复杂的制度框架，我把这称之为自由秩序。


The first feature of the liberal order is that democracies must not tolerate those who set out to destroy democracy.	自由秩序的首要特点是民主绝不能容忍那些蓄意破坏民主的人。


Some countries, like Germany, have laws that make it possible to ban political parties whose programs are recognizably anti-democratic.	德国等一些国家的法律明文规定：如果政党的纲领明显违反民主，那么国家有权对这些政党加以封杀。


In the past, the law has been used to curb parties of both the extreme left and the extreme right.	多年以来，这部法律在抑制极左和极右政党时都发挥了巨大的作用。


This has clearly contributed to preventing any sign of a possible return to the totalitarian ways of the twentieth century.	显而易见，它有助于遏止任何向20世纪集权统治回归的企图。


However, it is not always evident when people and parties stand for election what they are going to do if they win.	但个人和政党参选时，我们并不总能了解他们获胜后会采取哪些措施。


This is where rules that impose term limits on officeholders, such as the Twenty-Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, have their place.	这也解释了为什么像美国宪法修正案第二十二条这样限制执政者任期的规定很有必要。


Many constitutions contain such a rule, and even President Vladimir Putin of Russia has stated that he will abide by it.	很多宪法都有类似的规定，就连俄国总统普京都明确表示他一定会严格遵守。


Let us hope that this will in fact be the case.	我们真心希望他能够兑现自己的诺言。


Elsewhere, notably in many of the Soviet Union’s other successor states and in Latin America, those in power have often simply changed the constitution – including rules on term limits – to their advantage.	在其它国家，特别是前苏联的加盟共和国和拉美国家，大权在握的人干脆按自己的意愿修改宪法¾其中就包括限制任期的规定。


This is where the second pillar of a liberal order comes into play: the rule of law.	这就需要自由秩序的第二根支柱发挥作用：这根支柱就是法治。


It cannot be said too often that democracy and the rule of law are not the same thing.	这里一定要强调民主和法治并不是一个概念。


There are lawless democracies and undemocratic “states of law” (Rechtsstaat).	这个世界既有无法无天的民主也有缺乏民主的“法治”。


The constitution of liberty requires both, and the rule of law is the more difficult of the two to establish and maintain, for it requires not just a constitution but, almost more importantly, an independent judiciary that is sensitive to violations of constitutional and other legitimate rules.	这两种因素在自由的宪法中缺一不可，而两者之中建立和维护法治则更有难度，因为它所需要的不仅仅是一部宪法，它更需要能对违反宪法和其它法律规定的行为做出发应的独立的司法体系。


It is extremely important that Iraq held elections to a constitutional assembly.	伊拉克制宪会议的选举至关重要。


This has produced – albeit with a certain amount of external pressure notably on behalf of the Sunnis – a document that may provide the basis for the rule of law.	尽管过程中明显不乏支持逊尼派的外来压力，但法治的基础却也由此而生。


But the task of finding, appointing, and accepting independent judges remains. It will be particularly difficult in an environment in which the sharia – that is, Islamic religious law administered not by judges but by priests – is never far away.	但寻找、委任和接受独立法官的过程仍然困难重重、任重道远，特别是当执行伊斯兰教教法的权力仍旧归属教士而不是法官时更是如此。


The rule of secular law is the most delicate prerequisite of a liberal order.	世俗权力至上构成了自由秩序最为微妙的前提。


Even then, we know from history that it takes but one Enabling Law to unhinge the rule of law and replace it by an ideological tyranny, as happened when Hitler came to power in Germany.	即便如此，历史的教训也告诉我们：仅仅需要一部授权法就能够动摇法治，并代之以意识形态上的独裁，希特勒在德国掌权就是最好的例子。


This is where the third element of a liberal order comes into play: civil society.	这里就需要自由秩序的第三个因素发挥作用：那就是民主社会。


A plurality of civic associations and activities – regulated but not controlled by the state, and free to express its views and even to demonstrate its (diverse) sentiments publicly – is the most powerful pillar of a liberal order.	民主社会包括国家只能调节却无法控制的多种多样的公民团体和活动，以及自由表述观点直至当众示威游行的权力，正是上述因素构成了自由秩序最为有力的支柱。


A vibrant civil society will mobilize when the rule of law is violated, and it can also check the illiberal inclinations of democratic majorities.	活跃的民主社会在法治遭到破坏的情况下会迅速采取行动，并且遏制民主多数推行不符合民主精神的企图。


The near-universal availability of information makes it much easier than it was in earlier times for the voluntary non-governmental organizations that form civil society to emerge.	与过去相比，信息的无处不在使得建立构成民主社会的志愿非政府组织变得更加容易。


However, there is no ultimate guarantee against the abuse of power, especially if that power is democratically gained.	尽管如此，我们并不能确保防止权力被滥用，当权力通过民主选举获得时就更是如此。


The international community must therefore recognize that it is not enough to promote, organize, or monitor elections in hitherto undemocratic countries.	因此，国际社会必须意识到仅仅在今天的非民主国家中推动、组织或监督选举还远远不够。


The program of spreading the liberal order requires a much more sophisticated approach. Above all, it requires international agencies and groupings that remain alert to the risks of illiberal democracies.	推动自由秩序的计划需要更为精密的方法，其中对非自由民主危险时刻保持警惕的国际机构和团体最为重要。


Elections Without Winners	没有胜利者的选举


When football matches – at least those that must produce a winner – end in a draw, a penalty shoot-out must resolve the matter, as this World Cup has demonstrated so dramatically.	当足球比赛¾至少是那些必须决出胜负的比赛¾在120分钟内踢成平局的时候，必须依靠互罚点球来决定胜负，本届世界杯让我们见识了点球大战的戏剧性。


The shoot-out’s individual competition for heroism or misery is really alien to such a team game as football, but it is accepted as a necessary way to resolve the stalemate.	点球决胜靠的是单个球员之间的竞争，罚进点球的人成为英雄，罚失点球的人则陷入痛苦，虽然这与足球项目的集体性质有些格格不入，但却被公认为打破僵局不可或缺的方法。


But when it comes to elections – which ideally should always produce a winner – there is no such device.	但是在理想状况下本应 总能 分出胜负的选举，却根本不存在这样的一种机制。


Yet quite a few recent elections have ended in at least a near-stalemate.	近年来为数不少的选举都以接近僵局的结果而告终。


Mexico’s presidential election is only the latest example.	墨西哥总统大选不过是最近的一个例子。


Several weeks ago, the general election in the Czech Republic yielded a total impasse, with the left and right each gaining 100 lower-house seats and no resolution in sight.	就在几周前，捷克共和国大选彻底走进了死胡同，左翼和右翼各获得了下议院的100个席位，谁都不知应当如何解决。


In Italy, a curious rule that provides for the grouping which has a handful of votes more than the other to get a bonus of several dozen seats in the lower house.	在意大利，一条奇怪的规则规定比对方多得几票的群体可以额外得到下议院几十个议席的奖励。


Romano Prodi’s government must operate on a razor’s edge in the Senate.	罗马诺·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)的政府必须在参议院表演尖刀上的舞蹈。


There are other recent examples, including, perhaps most notoriously, the 2000 presidential election in the United States.	近期还有很多其他例子，其中最臭名昭著的也许就是2000年美国的总统选举。


Why are we suddenly experiencing so many close results in democratic elections?	为什么突然之间，我们在民主选举中的结果变得如此相近？


How should we best deal with them?	我们又该如何面对这样的情况？


And what do they do to the legitimacy of the governments that result from them?	如此相近的结果对政府的合法性又将产生怎样的影响？


The first question is the hardest to answer.	回答第一个问题最为困难。


To the committed observer, it does not appear that democratic countries’ electorates are so evenly divided along class or similar lines as to cause political stalemate.	在职业观察家看来，民主国家的选民在各阶层或其他类似群体中的分布还远没有均匀到导致政治僵局的地步。


On the contrary, electorates everywhere seem more volatile than anything else, with voters prepared to change their preferences from one poll to the next.	恰恰相反，选民比其他任何事物更加变化无常，选民们的偏好总是随着一次次民意调查不断发生变化。


Often, they want change – just that.	当然，变化是他们所期望的¾如此而已。


Nor is there any sign that political ideology has made a return among ordinary people.	也没有任何迹象表明，与政治有关的意识形态在普通民众中发生了回潮。


Yet nowadays divisions between candidates for office are deeper than ever – and are even sharper among party activists.	但今天，候选人在执政方式上的分歧比以往任何时候都更为剧烈¾各党派积极分子的矛盾变得更加不可调和。


This is certainly true in Latin America, where a wave of leftist populism has swept many countries.	拉丁美洲显然属于这样的情况，左翼民粹主义风潮席卷了那里的许多国家。


Several Europe countries, too, have revealed a less dramatic left-right split, with Spain and Italy – though not Poland and the Czech Republic – moving somewhat to the left.	欧洲几个国家的左翼和右翼同样泾渭分明，尽管还没有发展到像拉美国家那样相互格格不入的地步。 在这样的大背景下，西班牙和意大利¾尽管不是波兰和捷克¾某种程度上正在向左翼靠拢。


But the real issue is not so simple.	但真正的问题却没有那么简单。


Increasingly, the divisiveness of democratic polities reflects a combination of undecided voters, motivated by ephemeral sentiments, and the emergence of political activists, often focused on narrow issues, who exploit electoral volatility for their purposes.	民主政体日益严重的四分五裂既反映出选民群体在稍纵即逝的情感驱使下的困惑不解，又反映出政治积极分子的存在越来越成为一种潮流，这些人通常只关注一些狭隘的事务，利用选民的变化无常来达到自己所设定的目标。


So what can be done in practical terms when division leads to stalemate?	那么当分裂演变成僵局的时候，我们能够采取哪些实际的措施？


One solution is to form a grand coalition, as in today’s Germany.	方案之一是像当今德国一样组成大联合政府。


It is amazing to watch how quickly Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have forgotten their electoral promises and agreed on a program of higher taxation.	基督教民主联盟(Christian Democrats)和社会民主党如此迅速地(Social Democratic party)摒弃了各自在选举中的承诺，一致通过了增税计划，这着实令人感到惊诧不已。


One may doubt whether this will increase popular confidence in the political class, but for now, at least, the arrangement is working.	你可以质疑这样能否提高公众对于政治的信任度，但至少从目前的情况看，这样的举措已经奏效。


Another possibility is to turn razor-thin majorities into one-sided governments that remain centrist in policy.	另外一种可能性是把获得险胜的多数派转化为单方面执政的政府，并确保其奉行温和主义的政策。


This is what has happened in Italy, and it may well occur in the Czech Republic.	这样的一幕在意大利已经上演，捷克共和国也有可能走上同样的道路。


In Latin American countries, on the other hand, an all-or-nothing attitude seems to prevail, with 50.1% of the popular vote regarded as being sufficient to stage a revolution of sentiment, if not of policy.	另一方面，拉美国家中流行着一种非此即彼的态度，只要取得50. 1%的公众选票，那么即便无法发起一场翻天覆地的政策革命，一场情感上的革命恐怕也在所难免。


What does this do to the legitimacy of governments, and of political institutions in general?	这样做会给政府和政治机构的合法性带来什么影响？


As long as winners with razor-thin majorities, once in office, steer a middle course, they are more likely to remain acceptable to an electorate that is more volatile than divided.	只要涉险过关的多数党派掌权后奉行温和主义的政策，其合法性就可能受到变幻无常、而非四分五裂的选民们的欣然认可。


By contrast, grand coalitions are, in the long term, likely to raise doubts about the system and encourage radical groups.	恰恰相反，大联盟政府从长远的角度看很容易引发对体制的疑虑，为极端主义团体的不断发展制造温床。


The same may also be true if narrow winners adopt a radical agenda, as some think George W. Bush has done in America and many feared Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador would do in Mexico.	取得险胜的执政者上台后奉行极端主义政策也会造成类似的后果。 有人说乔治·W·布什在美国已经贯彻了这样的做法，很多人害怕奥夫拉多尔（Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador）会领导墨西哥追随布什的后尘。


Yet, as long as such leaders respect the democratic constitution, they are not likely to get very far; the next election will dislodge them.	但只要这些领导人尊重民主宪法制度，他们就不会走得太远，下一届选举会把他们赶下宝座。


Playing divisive games with an electorate that is not deeply divided never succeeds for long.	在并未四分五裂的选民中大耍分离主义的把戏不可能取得永久的成功。


The real question is whether an uncertain electorate is prepared to defend democratic constitutions if an extremist who wins by a hair tries to overturn it and usher in a new era of tyranny.	真正的问题是，如果以微弱优势获胜的极端主义分子妄图颠覆民主宪法，创造新的独裁时代，举棋不定的选民是否能够奋起反击。


There is currently no such risk in Europe.	欧洲目前还不存在这样的风险。


However reluctantly, Silvio Berlusconi accepted in the end that he had lost, if just by a whisker, as did Viktor Orban in Hungary.	无论是多么心不甘情不愿，西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)最终还是承认了自己差之毫厘的失利，匈牙利的欧邦(Viktor ORBAN) 也最终接受了失败的命运。


But one conclusion is perhaps more compelling than ever.	但有一种结论可能比以往更具说服力。


Britain’s last election also produced a narrow outcome.	英国的上一次选举结果也十分接近。


However, seats in parliament, not percentages of the vote are what matters, owing to Britain’s winner-take-all electoral system based on single-member constituencies, which encourages political parties to gravitate to the center.	但真正重要的却是在议会中占据的席位，而不是赢得选票的比例，因为英国实行以单议席选区为基础的赢家通吃的选举制度，这种制度鼓励政党奉行中间主义的政策。


A volatile electorate can replace last time’s winner, but both can try to persuade voters and govern without having to go to extremes to gain a majority.	变幻无常的选民可以更换上次的获胜者，但参选双方都可以说服选民，而不必非要依靠极端手段获得多数后才能执政。


The first-past-the-post system is still the most effective method of ensuring orderly change.	简单多数票当选制度今天仍然是确保变革秩序的一种最为有效的手段。


Ending the War Against Women	结束针对妇女的战争


ATHENS – On Valentine’s Day, countless couples will celebrate romance by candlelight.	雅典—情人节，无数情侣会在烛光中度过浪漫时光。


On the same day, one billion women and men worldwide will stand up to shine a light on the darker side of gender relations.	这一天，全世界10亿男女会让性别关系的阴暗面表露无遗。


According to the United Nations, one in three women worldwide will be raped or beaten in her lifetime.	据联合国的数据，全世界三分之一的妇女一生中一定会遭受强暴或殴打。


In some countries, up to seven in ten women will be beaten, raped, abused, or mutilated.	在一些国家，七成妇女会遭到殴打、强暴、虐待或致残。


Often, the victims of such abuses are treated as criminals – dishonored, brutalized, ostracized, imprisoned, and even executed – while perpetrators remain free.	通常，这些暴行的受害者被视为罪犯——被侮辱，被虐待，被排斥，被关押，甚至被处死，而施暴者逍遥法外。


Millions of women suffer in this way, but their stories remain untold.	数百万妇女遭受着如此虐待，但没人知道她们的遭遇。


Last December, the brutal gang rape and murder of a 23-year-old woman in India – two months after Pakistan’s Taliban shot 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai for advocating education – triggered large-scale public protests.	去年12月，一位23岁的印度女性被残忍的轮奸夺取了生命，此前2个月，巴基斯坦塔利班枪击了争取教育权的14岁女孩马拉拉（Malala Yousafzai），两起事件引起了大规模公众抗议。


This outcry should mark the start of a global movement to lift the veil of silence that shrouds violence against women – which often begins at home – and protects the perpetrators.	抗议应该成为打破虐待妇女暴力——通常发生在家庭中、保护施暴者的沉默的全球运动的先声


From honor killings to child marriages, from date rape to sex slavery, crimes against women are prevalent in every society. But, when women are courageous enough to report abuse, doctors are often unhelpful, police are hostile, and the justice system fails them.	从私刑“荣誉处决”到童婚，从约会强暴到性奴役，针对妇女的犯罪在所有社会都大量存在。 但当妇女鼓起勇气报告暴行时，医生通常爱莫能助，警察通常怀有敌意，司法体系则会判她们败诉。


For example, one in three women in the United States military is sexually assaulted, usually by a colleague, yet very few attackers are convicted.	比如，在美国军队中，三分之一的女兵被性侵犯，施暴者通常是战友，但只有极少数会被定罪。


Likewise, in the United Kingdom, 473,000 sexual offenses are reported annually, 60,000-95,000 of which are classified as rape.	类似地，在英国，每年报告性侵害案件多达473 000起，其中60 000—95 000起可归为强奸。


But, in each of the last three years, only slightly more than 1,000 offenders were convicted of rape.	但是，在过去三年中，每年都只有1 000出头的施暴者被定为强奸罪。


In the 1970’s, feminists identified the connection between rape, male privilege, and female sexual vilification. Today, readily accessible Internet pornography is teaching boys and men that sexual acts involving degradation and even violent abuse of women are acceptable.	20世纪70年代，女权运动者指出强奸、男权和妇女性别诽谤之间存在关系。 如今，现成的互联网色情文学让男孩和男人知道，歧视妇女甚至对其施加暴力的性行为是可接受的。


Meanwhile, many privileged women, instilled with a strong sense of entitlement, dismiss feminism as passé.	与此同时，许多富贵出身的妇女在强烈的权利意识灌输下，对女权运动不屑一顾。


But gender discrimination continues to pervade all aspects of society, with most social and political institutions continuing to foster “glass ceilings,” if not outright female subordination.	但性别歧视仍充斥着整个社会，大部分社会和政治机构仍存在“玻璃天花板”（如果不是赤裸裸地抑制妇女升迁的话）。


Women receive equal pay and equal opportunities in very few countries.	只有少数国家的妇女能获得同等的薪酬和机会。


Feminism thus has a crucial role to play in the twenty-first century.	因此，女权运动在21世纪将起到关键作用。


After all, as Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet has put it, “violence against women is…a threat to democracy, a barrier to lasting peace, a burden on national economies, and an appalling human-rights violation.”	毕竟，如联合国妇女署执行董事米歇尔·巴切莱特（Michelle Bachelet）所指出的，“针对妇女的暴力是……对民主的威胁，是维持和平的障碍，是国民经济的负担，也是可怕的人权暴行。


Governments must continue to advance women’s rights through legislation, while civil society must promote a cultural shift that rejects women’s marginalization or mistreatment.	”政府应该继续通过立法加强妇女权利，同时公民社会必须加快文化变迁，拒绝边缘化和虐待女性。


Only by enabling women to realize their potential can countries ensure economic and social progress.	只有让妇女实现潜能，国家才能确保经济和社会进步。


This potential was evident during the Arab Spring uprisings, when women, empowered by recent advances in literacy and education, organized and led demonstrations that toppled decades-old regimes.	这一潜能在阿拉伯之春中显露无疑，经最新的扫盲和教育运动武装的妇女组织并领导了颠覆数十年政权的游行。


In Egypt, even as female political activists and reporters were being sexually harassed in Tahrir Square, they continued to contribute to the revolution.	在埃及，尽管女性政治活动家和记者在解放广场遭受了性骚扰，但她们仍继续为革命出力。


But gender equality remains a distant goal in the region, with women being left out of the political process, exerting little influence in governing bodies or in drafting new constitutions.	但性别平等仍是该地区的一个遥远目标，妇女被排除在政治程序之外，在治理机构和新宪法起草中声音甚微。


In fact, on the Egyptian revolution’s two-year anniversary last week, when thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, at least nine female protesters were sexually assaulted in Tahrir Square.	事实上，在上周埃及革命迎来两周年之际，成千上万示威者走上街头反对总统穆尔西和穆斯林兄弟会，在此过程中，至少九名女性示威者在解放广场遭到了性侵害。


In March, government and civil-society leaders will gather in New York for a meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women to agree on a plan to eliminate violence against women.	3月，政府和公民社会领导人将齐聚纽约，参加联合国妇女地位委员会会议，以形成一项旨在消除针对妇女的暴力的协议计划。


Global leaders should take this opportunity to pledge to adopt the policies and devote the resources needed to end pervasive violations of women’s human rights.	全球领导人应该抓住这次机会，承诺实施相关政策，并为终结无处不在的侵犯妇女人权行为提供资源。


But, without the political will to enact legislation and enforce it effectively, promises are meaningless.	但是，如果没有实施立法并有效执法的政治意愿，光有承诺毫无意义。


Although 187 countries have signed the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women, statistics show little progress.	尽管187个国家签署了1970年联合国消除一切形式针对妇女暴力公约（United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women），但数据表明进步极其有限。


Consider Afghanistan, which ratified the convention in 2009.	就拿阿富汗来说吧，它在2009年加入了这一公约。


A 2012 Action Aid survey found that violence against women has never been more prevalent, with 87% of women suffering domestic abuse.	2012年行动援助（Action Aid）调查发现，针对妇女的暴力变得更加普遍了，87%的妇女遭受着家庭暴力。


In the same year, President Hamid Karzai’s government upheld a husband’s legal right to beat his wife.	同一年，总统卡尔扎伊的政府支持丈夫殴打妻子的法律权利。


If an Afghan man murders his wife, he can expect to pay a fine.	如果阿富汗男性杀了妻子，他只需要支付罚款就可以了。


Change is possible, but it requires collective action by the international community to challenge the attitudes that lead to violence, oppression, and inequality.	改变是可能的，但需要国际社会的集体行动挑战导致暴力、压迫和不平等的态度。


Five steps are particularly important: 	五个步骤特别重要：


·         Ratify and enforce all relevant regional and international treaties, and implement laws that prohibit violence against women and ensure effective punishment of offenses. 	·         批准并实施所有相关地区和国际条约，并实施禁止针对妇女的暴力的法律，确保暴力行为的有效惩罚。


·         Enhance women’s economic and political empowerment, including by directing international aid toward their health, education, and welfare.	·         加强妇女的经济和政治实力，包括引导针对妇女健康、教育和福利的国际援助。


·         Increase public awareness of the problem through traditional media, as well as through social media and other electronic channels.	·         通过传统媒体、社交媒体和其他电子渠道增加公众对这一问题的认识。


·         Mobilize men and boys against violence through educational programs. 	·         通过教育计划动员男性和男孩反对暴力。


·         Improve support for survivors of violence and their families, including legal assistance, psychological counseling, and health care.	·         改善对暴力幸存者及其家庭的支持，包括法律援助、心理辅导和医疗。


Many international movements and organizations – such as Women Under Siege, V-Day, and Stop Violence Against Women – are already working to deliver justice and security to women.	许多国际运动和组织——比如受困的妇女（Women Under Siege）、V-Day和停止针对妇女暴力（Stop Violence Against Women）——已开始致力于为妇女赢得公平与安全。


Governments and political parties should support such initiatives.	政府和政党应该支持这些努力。


All people deserve justice, equality, and freedom from violence.	人人都应获得公正、平等，免于暴力。


On February 14, women and men worldwide should support One Billion Rising, a global call for people to show their support for the one billion women who have survived violence and abuse.	2月14日，全世界男女应该支持十亿人站出来（One Billion Rising）活动，该活动号召人们支持从暴力和虐待中幸存的十亿妇女。


Whether you choose to strike, dance, speak out, or simply stand up, your involvement will bring the world closer to ending this deadly war against women.	不管你选择斗争、跳舞、疾呼还仅仅是站出来，你的参与都会让世界更加接近终结这场针对妇女的致命战争。


Empty Promises and Dead Children	空头承诺和死去的儿童


LONDON – Buried among the 169 targets contained in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – adopted by the United Nations last September amid a blaze of glitzy events, celebrity endorsements, and back-slapping by world leaders, aid donors, and non-governmental organizations – was the vital pledge to eliminate “preventable child deaths” by 2030.	伦敦—2030年根除“可预防的儿童死亡”的承诺被淹没在可持续发展目标（SDG）的169个小目标（target）中。 可持续发展目标于去年9月由联合国实施，当时可谓人人关注，获得诸多名流支持和世界领导人、援助机构和非政府组织背书。


It is a cause for our generation – but one that will take a lot more than UN communiqués to advance.	这是我们这一代人的事业——但要推进它，光有联合国公报是远远不够的。


The last set of international development targets, the Millennium Development Goals, certainly brought about important progress; the number of children who died before reaching their fifth birthday dropped from ten million in 2000, when the MDGs were adopted, to 5.9 million in 2015.	上一批国际发展小目标，即千年发展目标（MDG），显然带来了重大进步； 五岁前夭折的儿童数量从2000年MDG开始实施的一千万下降到2015年的590万。


Some of the world’s poorest countries have registered some of the most significant gains.	世界上一些最贫穷国家取得了最显著的进步。


This progress was driven by several factors, including falling poverty and heavy investment in community-based health systems.	这一进步受到诸多因素推动，包括贫困的下降和大量基于社区的卫生系统投资。


By deploying nurses, midwives, and other health workers, these systems extended the availability of prenatal care, simple obstetric interventions, clean cord cutting, and post-natal care.	通过部署护士、助产士和其他卫生工作者，这些系统增加了产前保健、简单产科干预、清洁线路切割和缠手保健的易得性。


Ethiopia, for example, has deployed a small army of some 38,000 health workers over the last decade.	比如，埃塞俄比亚在过去十年部署了一支38,000人的卫生工作者大军。


International cooperation was also crucial.	国际合作也很重要。


Aid for child and maternal health has grown dramatically since 2000, and now stands at some $12 billion annually.	母婴健康援助自2000年以来大幅增加，现在每年高达120美元。


Development assistance has enabled the creation of community-based health programs, and played a key role in supporting the development and deployment of the vaccines, mosquito nets, and medical treatments that have cut child deaths from the major killer infectious diseases – pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, and measles – by some 70% since 2000.	发展援助促进了基于社区的卫生项目的建立，并在开发和推广疫苗、蚊帐和治疗方案中起到了关键作用。 2000年以来，其所支持开发的治疗方案让儿童因主要致死传染病——肺炎、腹泻、疟疾和麻疹——而夭折的数量下降了70%左右。


Now for the bad news.	再来看坏消息。


In the time it takes you to read this article, more than 30 children will die from causes that could have been prevented or treated.	在你阅读本文的时候，有30多个儿童因为可防可治的原因而死去。


Every year, more than one million children die the day they are born, and another million die within their first week of life.	每年都有一百万以上儿童在出生当天死去，另有一百万儿童活不过生命的第一周。


Almost half of all child deaths occur in the neo-natal period (the first 28 days) – and the share is rising.	新生儿阶段（最初28天）夭折占所有儿童死亡的近一半——并且这一比例仍在上升。


The vast majority of these deaths could be averted.	这些死亡绝大部分可以避免。


Yet, if progress continues at its current rate, there will still be some 3.6 million such deaths per year by 2030.	但是，按照现在的进展速度，到2030年每年仍会有360万左右儿童死亡。


To jump-start progress, we must develop health-care and other interventions that address the poverty, vulnerability, and inequality that place so many children, and their mothers, at risk.	为了加快进展，我们必须制定医疗和其他干预解决让如此多的儿童和他们的母亲身处危机的贫困、脆弱和不平等性。


Making health services more widely available is a starting point.	增强卫生服务的易得性是一个起点。


But, all too often, the poor are excluded, even when the clinics exist.	但是，穷人往往受到排斥，即使有诊所存在。


Consider India, which accounts for one-fifth of child deaths worldwide.	以印度为例，全世界五分之一的儿童死亡发生在印度。


Nearly all women from the richest 20% of households enjoy prenatal care and skilled attendants at delivery; coverage rates for the poorest are less than 10% – worse than in much of sub-Saharan Africa.	几乎所有来自最富裕的20%的家庭的妇女都能享受到产检和高质量分娩服��； 而最贫困人口的覆盖率还不到10%——比许多撒哈拉以南非洲地区还要糟糕。


Surging economic growth has done nothing to reduce the disparity.	奔腾的经济增长并没有缩小差异。


And India is just one example.	而印度只是一个例子。


Each year, some 36 million women in low- and middle-income countries give birth without a skilled attendant.	每年，中低收入国家有3,600万妇女在分娩时得不到熟练助产士的帮助。


An even greater number of children do not receive a post-natal health check.	更大数量的儿童得不到产后体检。


The vast majority of these women and children have one thing in common: they are poor.	绝大部分这些妇女和儿童有一个共同点：穷。


Indeed, being born to a low-income mother raises the risk of child mortality by a factor of 2-3 in much of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.	事实上，在南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲大部，生在低收入母亲肚子里会让儿童致死率增加2—3倍。


Wealth-based disparities in health outcomes extend far beyond pregnancy and birth.	基于财富的健康状况差异绝不仅限于妊娠期和出生。


Children born to poor mothers are less likely to be immunized or taken to clinics for treatment of potentially fatal diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrhea.	贫穷母亲的孩子获得足够营养和获得可致命疾病（如肺炎和腹泻）的治疗的可能性也更低。


Survey evidence points to cost as a major barrier excluding poor women and children from health care.	调查证据表明成本是将贫穷妇女和儿童排斥在医疗服务之外的主要障碍。


Forcing desperately poor women to pay for maternal and child health care is a prescription for inequality, inefficiency, and child deaths.	强迫赤贫妇女掏钱购买母婴看护服务只能加剧不平等性、低效性和儿童死亡。


Publicly financed universal health coverage is the proven antidote.	公共融资的全民医疗覆盖是获得证明的有效之道。


Yet political elites in high-mortality countries like India, Pakistan, and Nigeria – the same elites who have signed up to the SDGs – have conspicuously failed to deliver.	但印度、巴基斯坦和尼日利亚等高致死率国家的政治精英——也就是在SDG上签字的那些人——显然没能兑现承诺。


If governments are sincere about delivering on the SDGs’ promise on child mortality, they must get serious about ensuring equity in health care.	如果政府认真对待它们在儿童致死率方面的承诺，它们就必须认真确保医疗平等。


They could start by introducing national targets to halve the difference in death rates between the richest 20% and poorest 20% over the next seven years.	一开始，它们可以制定七年后将最富裕20%和最贫穷20%人口之间的死亡率差距缩小一半的国家小目标。


But targets not backed by finance aren’t worth the communiqué paper they’re printed on.	但没有资金支持的小目标只是一纸空文。


Developing-country governments should be spending at least 5% of GDP on health, eliminating charges on child and maternal health care, and ensuring that financial resources – and health workers – are allocated in a way that reduces inequalities in care.	发展中国家政府应该至少将 5% 的 GDP用于卫生，取消母婴看护收费，并确保金融资源——以及卫生工作者——得到合理配置以降低医疗不平等。


Foreign aid also has a vital role to play.	外国援助也有重要作用。


Here, the emphasis should be shifted from delivering disease-specific interventions to building up health-care systems.	在这方面，重点应该从按病干预转向构建医疗体系。


We need a global social compact on health to close the financing gap – around $30 billion – for achieving universal health coverage, which requires linking populations to skilled health workers equipped to provide effective care.	我们需要全球卫生社会契约来填补实现全民医疗覆盖的融资空白——大约300亿美元。 全民医疗覆盖要求所有人口都能获得熟练卫生工作者所提供的有效的看护。


Sub-Saharan Africa alone will need to recruit and train another one million community health workers to deliver universal coverage.	光是撒哈拉以南非洲就需要再招募和培训一百万社区卫生工作者以实现全民覆盖。


Any strategy for achieving the 2030 target for child mortality must go beyond the health sector and focus on the wider inequalities – for example, in nutrition, education, and access to clean water and sanitation – that fuel child mortality.	任何实现2030年儿童死亡率目标的战略都必须超越卫生界，关注引起儿童致死率高企的更广泛的不平等性——如营养、教育、获得清洁水和卫生设施等方面。


Girls will need added protection, so that they are not forced into early marriage and child bearing.	女孩需要倍加呵护，以使她们免于被迫接受早婚和童婚。


Children worldwide face a lethal combination of inequality, injustice, and gender discrimination.	全世界儿童面临不平等性、不公和性别歧视的致命组合。


They deserve better.	他们理应活得更好。


The promise to eliminate preventable child deaths by 2030 is our chance to ensure they get it.	2030年根除可预防儿童死亡的承诺是我们确保实现这一点的机会。


The Political Importance of Elizabeth Warren	伊丽莎白·沃伦的政治重要性


WASHINGTON, DC – Financial reform in the United States and worldwide hangs in the balance.	华盛顿—美国和全世界的金融改革前途未卜。


The problems that brought us the terrible crisis of 2007-08 have not been fixed.	带来可怕的2007—08危机的问题还没有得到纠正。


Some underlying weaknesses are actually worse than they were a decade ago, including the problem of “too big to fail” global megabanks.	一些根本性弱点实际上比十年前有过之而无不及，其中就包括全球大银行“太大而不能倒”的问题。


Europe is backtracking on financial reform issues; its policymakers are too preoccupied with holding the eurozone together.	欧洲还顾不上金融改革问题：其决策者正在焦头烂额地设法维持欧元区的完整。


In the US, there will be no new legislation under the current Congress – and probably not for a long while to come.	在美国，本届国会是不可能产生新立法了——可能在很长时间内都不可能会有。


The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 may turn out to be a framework for effective regulation, or it might become another set of empty promises.	2010年多德-弗兰克法案可能会成为有效监管的框架，也有可能沦为空头承诺。


So far, implementation has been slow.	到目前为止，实施情况相当迟缓。


Implementation depends on regulators – some of whom are very good, while others remain in thrall to the big Wall Street banks.	实施要取决于监管者——他们中有些非常优秀，但有的仍受华尔街银行摆布。


The issues are detailed and technical, and the financial lobby has deployed a small army of highly paid experts on a mission of delay, dilution, and diversion.	问题是琐碎而技术性的，金融游说集团以高薪豢养着一小撮专家，旨在推延、弱化该法案和转移公众注意力。


The process is still subject to political supervision, but many politicians are easily bamboozled when the conversation really gets into the weeds.	这个过程仍受政治监督约束，但当对话真正进入复杂阶段时，许多政客很容易就会陷入云里雾里。


This is why newly elected Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts is already proving so effective.	这就是为何新当选的马萨诸塞州参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）是如此高效。


Warren has worked hard on financial-sector issues over many years.	沃伦在金融部门上鞠躬尽瘁多年。


She had the key ideas that led to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and she helped get that agency on its feet.	消费金融保护局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）便是基于她的思想组建的，并在她的帮助下站稳了脚跟。


But she has also been engaged with all of the other practical details of financial reform for as long as anyone – in part due to her experience as chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).	但她对金融改革其他实践性细节的了解也不亚于任何人——这部分是因为她曾是问题资产救助计划（TARP）国会监督委员会主席。


Warren is now bringing this expertise to bear where it is needed most – directly on senior regulators.	如今，沃伦正在用这一专业知识厘清当务之急——直指高级监管官员。


In her most high-profile intervention to date, she castigated leading officials at a Senate Banking Committee hearing on February 14, beginning with a simple question: When was the last time you took a big bank to trial?	到目前为止，她所做过的最高规格的干预是2月14日严厉批评参议院银行委员会领导官员。 她以一个问题开头：你上一次把大银行诉诸法庭是什么时候？