To be fully French, it seems, women must, like Marianne, bare their breasts.	似乎要充分发扬法国精神，女性必须像玛丽安那样袒露自己的乳房。


Yet, in the nineteenth century, when Marianne became a symbol of the French Republic, nudity was acceptable only in an idealized form, in paintings or sculptures of Greek deities and other mythical heroines.	但在十九世纪，当玛丽安成为法兰西共和国标志的时候，只有希腊诸神和其他神话女主人公的绘画或雕塑等理想形式的裸体才可以被公众接受。


It was fine to gaze at the breasts of a painted nude Marianne or Venus; but for a real, living woman to expose even part of her ankle was considered highly improper.	盯着画作中裸体的玛利安或维纳斯的乳房看完全合法； 但真正活生生的女性即使裸露部分脚踝都被认为是非常不合适的。


Of course, nowadays, these attitudes are rare in the Western world.	当然时至今日，这样的观点在西方世界非常罕见了。


So even though Valls’s version of history is skewed, one might argue that European Muslims who insist that women of their faith should be covered up are out of step – especially given that women sometimes have little choice in the matter.	因此，即使瓦尔斯版的法国史严重歪曲，人们也可以认为欧洲穆斯林坚持让同教女性遮住全身太落后了——尤其考虑到有时女性本身在这个问题上几乎没有什么选择。


Indeed, in some immigrant areas, Muslim women feel obliged to cover their heads, lest Muslim men see them as prostitutes, who may be molested with impunity.	事实上，在某些移民区域，穆斯林女性觉得一定要遮住头部，不然唯恐穆斯林男性将她们视为妓女，从而可以调戏她们而不受惩罚。


But this is not always the case.	但这并不能代表所有情况。


Some Muslim women actually choose to wear a hijab and, in rare cases, a burkini.	有些穆斯林女性事实上自愿选择佩戴头巾，并在极少数情况下选择布基尼这样的穿着。


The question is whether the state should be determining what citizens should or should not wear.	问题在于国家是否有权决定民众应当或不应当穿着什么。


The French republican answer is that people may wear whatever they like in private, but must conform to secular rules in public.	法兰西共和国的答案是人们在私人场合可以随心所欲，但在公共场合则必须遵守世俗规则。


In recent years, however, those rules have been applied more strictly to Muslims than to members of any other faith.	但近年来，这些规则在穆斯林群体中的执行比其他宗教群体都要严格。


I have not heard of policemen forcing orthodox Jewish women to bare their heads by ripping off their wigs.	我从未听说过警察撕下正统犹太妇女的假发强迫她们露出头部。


Well, some might argue, orthodox Jews are not responsible for massacres in the name of their religion.	有人可能认为，正统犹太教徒从未以宗教的名义进行过屠杀。


And that is true.	这的确是事实。


But the assumption that women in burkinis are all potential terrorists is farfetched.	但假设穿着布基尼的妇女都是潜在的恐怖分子恐怕过于牵强了。


A woman lying on a beach in a body-covering swimsuit is probably the least likely person to start shooting or bombing.	身着布基尼泳装躺在沙滩上的女性也许是最不可能开枪或引爆炸弹的。


As for the argument that Muslim women need the state to free them from Muslim men who force them to wrap their heads in scarves or cover up their bodies, the question is whether this is worth depriving other women of their choice to appear in public in these ways.	至于穆斯林女性需要国家将她们从逼迫她们包裹头巾或遮挡全身的穆斯林男性魔爪中解放出来的说法，问题在于剥夺其他女性自愿以这种装扮在人前出现的权利是否值得。


I am inclined to doubt that it is.	我个人认为这种做法是值得怀疑的。


The best way to help women escape from domestic authoritarianism is to encourage them to lead public lives as well, in schools, in offices, and on beaches.	帮助女性逃离家庭专制的最好方式是鼓励她们以上学、工作和在海滩休闲等方式参与公众生活。


It is better for a woman to be educated in a headscarf than not to be educated at all.	女性戴着头巾受教育总比不受教育强。


For certain public functions, it is perfectly legitimate to ask people to show their faces.	在履行特定公共职能时，要求人们露出脸部完全合理合法。


Some jobs come with certain dress codes.	某些岗位有着特定的着装规则。


Private companies can insist on their own rules; there is no need for national legislation.	私人企业有权制定自己的规则； 制定全国性法规没有必要。


The excessive imposition of conformity by the state can actually have the opposite effect than what is intended.	国家过度要求一致实际可能产生与其本意截然相反的效果。


Forcing people to adhere to a common identity fosters a rebellious insistence on difference.	迫使人们采用共同的身份会导致人们反叛性地坚持不同的做法。


It is no good telling people named Fatima or Mohammed that they are French and must adhere to the norms laid down by Sarkozy or Valls, if they are not treated as equals by people called Nicolas or Marianne.	如果尼古拉斯或玛丽安不能对他们平等相待，告诉法蒂玛或穆罕默德他们是法国人，因此必须遵守萨科齐或瓦尔斯制定的规则没有任何益处。


Wearing a headscarf, beard, or bodysuit can be a harmless way for humiliated people to defend their pride.	佩戴头巾、留胡子或穿着布基尼可能是遭到羞辱的人们捍卫其尊严的无害的方法。


Take away that pride, and defensiveness can swiftly become less harmless.	剥夺那份尊严，他们的防御手段就可能迅速变得不那么无害了。


A Progressive Political Alliance for Europe	欧洲的进步政治联盟


WASHINGTON, DC – In less than three weeks, we will know who will be the next president of the United States.	发自华盛顿特区——只需再等不到三个星期，我们就会知道谁是美国的下一任总统。


What kind of partner that president finds in Europe will depend substantially on the outcome of two elections in 2017: France’s presidential election in early May and Germany’s federal election by the end of October.	而这位总统在欧洲的合作伙伴人选将在很大程度上取决于2017年两次选举的结果：5月初的法国总统选举和10月底的德国联邦选举。


Of course, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union will have an impact on the future shape of Europe.	当然，英国脱欧将对欧洲的未来形态产生影响。


The “hard Brexit” option that has gotten a lot of attention lately – particularly since British Prime Minister Theresa May announced her intention to focus on limiting immigration, even if it means losing access to the single market – would by itself change the way Europe functions.	而“硬脱欧”选项最近获得了极大关注——尤其是自英国首相特雷莎·梅（Theresa May）宣布打算集中力量限制移民，即便这意味着失去进入单一市场的资格——其本身也将改变欧洲的运作方式。


As French Prime Minister Manuel Valls recently wrote, the key question facing Europe’s leaders is whether to “give up and leave the European project to a slow but certain death” or to “transform the EU.”	正如法国总理曼努埃尔·瓦尔斯（Manuel Valls）最近撰文指出，欧洲领导人面临的关键问题是“放弃并坐视欧洲项目走向缓慢但必然的终结”还是“实现欧盟的转型”。


Such a transformation would be no easy feat.	这种转变可不是件容易的事。


It would require not only a new institutional vision for Europe, but also a major political restructuring, not least in France and Germany.	它不仅需要为欧洲规划一个新的制度性远景，而且需要重大的政治重组，特别是在法国和德国。


A viable institutional vision, which I described well before the Brexit vote, is to establish “two Europes in one.”	一个笔者在脱欧投票之前就详细描述过的可行制度性远景，是建立“两个欧洲合一体”。


The eurozone countries would form a more deeply integrated “Europe A,” while another group of countries would comprise a more diverse and loosely connected “Europe B.”	欧元区国家将形成一个更深入一体化的“欧洲A”，而另一个国家集团将涵盖那些更为多样化和松散联结的“欧洲B”。


The two Europes would be strongly linked, with some arrangements differing among the various members of Europe B. Together, the two Europes would be part of the post-Brexit “continental partnership,” which might eventually even replace the EU altogether.	两个欧洲将紧密联系相连，并针对情况各不相同的欧洲B国家分别订立一些协约。 两个欧洲将一起构成后脱欧时代“大陆伙伴关系”的一部分，甚至可能最终取代欧盟。


It is a somewhat radical vision, one that can be fulfilled only if political forces are willing to embrace it, not least in France and Germany.	这个想法有点激进，只有在各大政治力量（尤其是在法国和德国）都愿意接受的情况下才能实现。


Each country’s political leadership would need to be guided – indeed, energized – by the objective of saving “Europe.”	每个国家的政治领导层都需要以拯救“欧洲”的目标来指导——实际上是推动——自身的行为。


Specifically, that means pursuing an economic policy that balances competitive markets and social solidarity, with substantial space for local diversity.	具体来说这意味着实现一种经济政策来平衡市场竞争和社会团结，并为各地的特异性留出空间。


In both France and Germany, such a political dynamic would depend on an alliance of center-right and center-left pro-Europe forces – one that could overcome and ultimately dissipate each camp’s more extremist elements, thereby ensuring that anti-European political tendencies cannot block progress.	在法国和德国，这种政治动力将取决于中右翼和中左翼亲欧洲势力的联盟——这一联盟可以压制并最终消解各自阵营的极端主义派别，从而确保反欧洲政治趋势不会阻碍人们向前迈进。


To give a concrete – and provocative – example of what such a realignment might look like in France: a center-right President Alain Juppé could cooperate with a Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron trying to develop a “beyond the past” young center-left movement.	举出一个具体——甚至会引发争议——的例子，在法国这样的重新调整可能意味着：选出中右派的阿兰·朱佩（Alain Juppé）担任总统，然后与一个总理伊曼纽尔·马孔（Emmanuel Macron）合作，发展出一个“超越过去”青年中左派运动势力。


As for Germany, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is, on the whole, insufficiently pro-European.	至于德国，中右派的基督教民主联盟总体上还不够亲欧。


Internally, it is limited by a conservative wing defined by views that are not compatible with long-term progress in Europe.	其内部受制于一个政治观点与欧洲长期进步不兼容的保守派别；


Externally, it is limited by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has lately grown in popularity.	在外部又受到最近声势日隆的极右翼德国新选择党（Alternative for Germany）制肘。


In this context, even if Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU does emerge with the most votes next year, it will need help to build a new Europe, with more joint responsibilities for countries in Europe A and flexible arrangements with countries in Europe B. Specifically, the pro-European elements of the CDU must work with allies on the left – namely, most of the Social Democrats and the Greens.	在这种情况下，即使安吉拉·默克尔总理领导的基民盟明年能拿到最多票，它也将需要别人的帮助才能建立一个新的欧洲，对此欧洲A集团的国家将负有更多的联合责任，而欧洲B集团国家将实施灵活安排。 具体来说，基民盟的亲欧派成员必须与左翼盟友——即大多数社会民主党和绿党人——通力合作。


Such an informal coalition has often allowed pro-Merkel projects to win support in Parliament, despite opposition from right-wing elements of the CDU.	那么即使遭到基民盟内部右翼势力的反对，这样一个非正式联盟依然能令默克尔项目在议会中获得经常性的支持。


But, to save Europe, it must become deeper and more reliable, with common goals dominating a shared agenda.	然而为了拯救欧洲，它必须变得更加深入和可靠，以统一的目标来主导共同的议程。


The need for a realignment of political forces is not unique to France and Germany.	重整政治势力的需求不是法国和德国所特有的。


There is a broad need for reformist and realistic globalizers to join forces to take on populist movements seeking to twist nostalgia into extreme nationalism, built almost exclusively on identity politics.	改革派和现实主义全球化者都有着许多理由去联合起来，对抗那股试图将怀旧理想转变为极端民族主义的，几乎完全建立在身份政治之上的民粹主义运动。


The world has changed substantially in recent decades, and Europe is no exception.	我们的世界在近几十年来已经发生了巨大变化，欧洲也不例外。


It makes little sense to expect the old alignments to be able to respond adequately to today’s policy needs or political dynamics.	寄望旧的安排能够对当前政策需求或政治动态作出充分反应是没有意义的。


Consider how difficult it has been for Spain to find a new majority – a two-year-long process that has yet to end.	试看西班牙要建立一个新的多数派政府是何其艰难——这个过程迄今已达两年，而且还未到头。


Against this background, a political reshuffling is almost inevitable; the party shifts and conflicts that have characterized the ongoing US presidential election exemplify this.	在这一背景下，政治改组几乎是不可避免的； 正在进行的美国总统选举所表现出的党派转变和冲突就是明证。


But that reshuffling could lead to a number of outcomes.	然而改组可能会产生一系列结果。


To secure a positive, open, and prosperous future for Europe, it is critical that the forces that come out on top are those that recognize the huge benefits of politically and economically open societies, as well as the need for national and global public policies to promote more inclusion.	为了确保欧洲能拥有一个积极，开放和繁荣的未来，就必须确保上台执政的势力这么一批人：既认识到政治上和经济上开放的社会所带来的巨大利益，又明白我们急需能够推动更多包容性的国家和全球公共政策。


But even if progressive center-right and center-left forces manage to overcome their backward-looking counterparts, it will not be enough.	但就算进步的中右翼和中左翼势力击败了那些开倒车的对手，也还是不够的。


The traditional political structure always risks being taken hostage or outflanked by identity-focused populists.	传统的政治架构总是冒着被强调身份认同的民粹主义所劫持和垄断的风险。


That is why forward-thinking political groups must overcome their differences in a more structural manner to advance a new institutional vision of Europe.	这就是为什么具有前瞻性政治团体必须以更具结构性的方式克服互相之间的分歧，以推进欧洲的新制度愿景。


Such a deep political restructuring aimed at building new progressive majorities will be difficult, and it will not happen overnight.	这种旨在建立新进步多数派的深刻政治改革将是相当艰难，而且无法一蹴而就。


But it is Europe’s only option.	但它是欧洲唯一的选择。


Without it, “Europe” will die, and the assault on economic openness and democratic values will continue to gain traction around the world – with potentially devastating consequences.	没有它，“欧洲”就会凋零，对经济开放和民主价值观的攻击将继续在世界各地引起关注——并引发潜在的破坏性后果。


A European Plan for France and Germany	为了法国和德国的欧洲计划


PARIS – Europe is falling into a stagnation trap.	巴黎—欧洲正在陷入停滞陷阱。


With growth barely visible, and dangerously low inflation causing real interest rates to rise, the weight of public and private debt has grown very heavy, and many fear that another lost decade is at hand.	增长几乎看不见，危险的低通胀导致实际利率攀升，公共和私人债务负担已经相当沉重，许多人担心有一个失去的十年就在眼前。


And, though the threat of eurozone fragmentation has receded, it has not disappeared.	此外，尽管欧元区分裂的担忧有所消退，但从未消失。


Given all of this, Europe is losing relevance internally and externally.	考虑到所有这些因素，欧洲正在失去对内和对外的重要性。


France and Germany – which largely drove European integration for more than six decades – must not resign themselves to this state of affairs.	法国和德国——六十多年来，主要是这两个国家推动了欧洲一体化——决不能对这一状态坐视不理。


They urgently need a common plan, not mutual recrimination by German supply-siders and French demand-siders.	它们急切地需要一个共同计划，而不是德国供给派和法国需求派之间的相互指责。


We find such controversies pointless.	我们发现，这样的争论完全没有意义。


Lackluster productivity growth is prima facie evidence of a supply deficiency.	生产率低迷乍看上去证明了供给不振。


The combination of high unemployment and falling inflation is prima facie evidence of a demand shortfall.	高失业和低通胀乍看上去证明了需求不足。


Interest-rate differentials within the same currency area are prima facie evidence of fragmentation.	同意货币区内部的利率差乍看上去证明了欧元区的分裂。


The truth is that Europe suffers from multiple ills.	事实是欧洲得了多种疾病。


So action is needed on all three fronts.	因此必须在所有三个方向上多管齐下。


The question is how to carry it out.	问题是如何做。


If Europe were a single country with a single government, it would adopt a two-handed strategy, combining ambitious pro-growth reforms with fiscal-policy support.	如果欧洲是一个国家、一个政府，就可以采取两手抓战略，以宏大的促增长改革结合财政政策支持。


The central bank would make it clear that it stands ready – provided that the reforms are real and the commitment to subsequent fiscal consolidation is credible – to serve as a “backstop for government funding” (as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi put it in August).	中央银行应该明确表示时刻准备着——只要改革动真格并且后续财政整合承诺可信——充当“政府融资后盾”（就像欧洲央行行长德拉吉在8月做出的表态）。


Europe can do none of this, and no easy solutions are available.	这些措施欧洲一个也完成不了，也没有容易的解决方案可行。


Some say that Germany should stimulate demand while other countries, including France, implement supply-side reforms.	有人说德国应该刺激需求，同时包括法国在内的其他国家应该实施供给端改革。


But an increase in debt in one country beyond what is desirable from a national perspective cannot be traded for the benefits of pro-growth reform in other countries.	但一国债务水平超出国家层面的合理程度是无法用其他国家促增长改革的好处来抵销的。


One solution would be to establish a fiscal capacity at the eurozone level, or, in plain words, a eurozone budget, including the ability to borrow.	一个解决办法是建立欧元区层面的财政能力，或者通俗地说，建立包括借贷能力在内的欧元区预算。


But, though that is certainly desirable in the long term, currently there are no revenue flows into such a budget, and there is no governance structure to execute it.	但是，尽管从长期看这显然是值得追求的政策，但目前这一预算尚无收入源，也没有治理结构来执行。


In this context, investment has emerged as everybody’s favorite response.	在这样的情况下，投资就成为所有人最喜欢的应对措施。


The European Commission has proposed a plan to stimulate investment spending through a new financing scheme, one that we hope will succeed.	欧盟委员会提出了一个计划 ，通过新的融资机制刺激投资支出，我们希望能够成功。


But solving Europe’s growth problem requires more than just throwing money at it.	但解决欧洲的增长问题需要的不仅仅是扔钱。


In a recent report to the French and German economy ministers, we propose a pragmatic agenda that accounts for the fact that, while both France and Germany need reforms, they face different challenges and must focus their policies accordingly.	在给法国和德国经济部长的最新报告中，我们提出了一个务实日程，这一日程承认一个现实：尽管法国和德国都需要改革，但它们面临的挑战不同，并且必须根据具体情况集中政策。


In France, short-term uncertainties are reducing confidence, but the longer-term outlook looks promising.	在法国，短期不确定性正在破坏信心，但长期前景看起来很有希望。


In Germany, longer-term uncertainties are reducing confidence, but short-term prospects look good.	在德国，长期不确定性正在破坏信心，但短期前景很棒。


In France, we fear a lack of boldness; in Germany, we fear complacency.	在法国，我们担心果断不足； 在德国，我们担心自鸣得意。


French policymakers should give priority to a new growth model, based on greater flexibility and security for employees, and a leaner, more effective state.	法国决策者应该讲重点放在心的增长模式上，这一模式应该以提高雇员安全和灵活性以及国家的减员增效上。


Germany, meanwhile, must address its demographic challenges, in particular by preparing German society for increased immigration, and promote the transition to an inclusive growth model based on improved demand and a better balance of saving and investment.	与此同时，德国必须解决其人口挑战，特别是德国社会必须准备好迎接更多的移民并促进朝基于改善的需求和更好的储蓄和投资平衡的包容性增长模式的转型。


We also call for a clearer regulatory environment.	我们还呼吁建设更清楚的监管环境。


Private investment is a judgment about the future.	私人投资是对未来的判断。


In energy, transport, and the digital sector, to name just a few, regulators must set the right parameters and ensure predictability.	随便举几个例子，在能源、交通和数字领域，监管者必须设置正确的界限，确保可预测性。


Investors need to know with certainty that Europe is committed to accelerating its transition to a low-carbon, knowledge-based economy.	投资者需要确定地了解欧洲决心加快向低碳、基于知识的经济转型。


This requires eliminating uncertainty about the future price of carbon and the future regime for data protection.	这需要消除关于未来碳排放价格和未来数据保护制度的不确定性。


France and Germany should also promote a “borderless sector” model in a few strategically important industries, which means common legislation, common regulation, and even a common regulator.	法国和德国还应该在一些具战略重要性的行业促进“无国界部门”模式，这意味着共同立法、共同监管甚至成立共同监管机构。


We think that energy and the digital economy are such sectors, and we propose a similar initiative to ensure the full portability of skills and social benefits.	我们认为，能源和数字经济就属于这类部门，并且建议采取类似措施确保技能和社会福利的完全可移动性。


Moreover, like the European Commission, we believe that higher investment is a big part of the answer to Europe’s growth question.	此外，和欧盟委员会一样，我们认为提高投资是欧洲增长问题答案的很大一部分。


Germany’s public-finance framework rightly attributes constitutional status to keeping debt under control, but it neglects investment promotion within the remaining fiscal space.	德国公共财政框架正确地赋予保持债务可控以宪法地位，但它忽视了在保持财政空间内促进投资。


Leaving a worn-out house to future generations to repair is not a responsible way to manage wealth.	把报废的房子留给子孙后代区修理不是负责的财富管理之道。


The German government can and should increase public investment.	德国政府可以也应该增加公共投资。


At the same time, while authorities are asking banks to assume less risk, they also must prevent pervasive risk aversion in the financial system.	与此同时，尽管当局正在要求银行降低风险承担，但它们还必须预防风险厌恶情绪席卷金融系统。


We propose injecting new European public money into the development of risk-sharing instruments and vehicles that support equity investment.	我们建议注入新欧洲公共资金用于支持股权投资的风险分担工具和载体的开发。


We also propose creating a European grant fund to support public investment in the eurozone that advances common aims, strengthens solidarity, and promotes excellence.	我们还建议成立欧洲援助基金支持有利于共同目标、增强团结、精益求精的欧元区公共投资。


Europe is more than a market, a currency, or a budget.	欧洲不仅仅是一个市场、一种货币或一个预算。


It was built around a set of shared values.	它建立在一组共同价值之上。


To uphold those values, France and Germany must join forces to rediscover and reinvent Europe’s social model, starting with concrete initiatives in the fields of minimum-wage standards, labor-market policies, retirement, and education.	要捍卫这些价值，法国和德国必须合力重新发现和重新发明欧洲社会模式，起点就是最低工资标准、劳动力市场政策、退休和教育等领域的具体措施。


For decades, the Franco-German alliance bound Europe together and drove it forward.	几十年来，法国-德国联盟把欧洲绑在了一起并推动它前进。


Today, French and German officials issue joint declarations and exchange accusations.	如今，法国和德国官员发表联合声明，互相指责。


But the time for bickering is over.	但争吵的时间已经过去了。


Europe needs action.	欧洲需要的是行动。


France Goes to Hollande	奥朗德入驻爱丽舍宫


PARIS – France has now conducted its ninth presidential election under direct universal suffrage.	巴黎--这是法国第九次采用直接普选的方式来进行总统大选。


And, for the first time in 17 years, after three consecutive defeats, the left – embodied in the Socialist candidate, François Hollande – will return to Élysée Palace.	十七年来，社会党候选人奥朗德连续三次落选，此次胜选也是左派17年来首次重新入驻法国爱丽舍宫。


Indeed, the first implication of this unquestionably significant election is that it confirms a return to stability.	毫无疑问，此次选举意义重大，第一就是法国重新归于稳定。


France is the largest country in Europe to have so much trouble finding its balance.	欧洲许多国家都在寻求平衡的过程中遇到大量困难，法国是其中最大的国家。


Its revolution in 1789 initiated a long period of profound instability, featuring two empires, three monarchies, and five republics.	1789年的法国大革命首次使法国深陷长期的动荡之中，一直贯穿于两个帝国，三个君主国以及五个共和国。


The French have gone through 13 constitutions in less than 200 years.	在不到200年的时间中，法国先后制定了13部宪法。


At 54 years old, the current Fifth Republic is the second longest-lasting regime since the revolution.	当前的第五共和国已经历时54年，是法国大革命以来持续时间第二长的政权。


At times, there has been talk of a Sixth Republic, which would address limited but real concerns and difficulties.	有时候，他们也会讨论建立第六共和国，来解决这些有限的但实实在在的困难。


But voter turnout in the latest presidential election (80% in the first round, and 81% in the second round) leaves no doubt: our current system is strong, and we French are attached to it.	然而最近的一次总统选举结果显示（第一轮80%，第二轮81%),毫无疑问当前的制度势力依然很强大，法国人依然钟爱于它。


But the primary importance of the election result is the left’s return to power for only the second time in 31 years. In fact, when François Mitterand was elected in 1981, the left had been out of power since 1957.	但是此次选举的重大意义在于，31年来左派第二次再度执权，事实上，密特朗于1981年当选，而左派已于1957年成为在野党。


Back then, the Communist Party was still powerful, and maintained close ties with the Soviet Union.	当时，共产党仍然很强大，并且与前苏联保持着密切的联系。


The prospect that the Party could come to power in an electoral alliance with the Socialists struck fear in opponents.	在一次与社会党人联盟的选举中，对手很担心共产党获胜可能会胜出。


The Socialists, for their part, had not yet shed their intellectual skin.	社会党人依然没有摆脱他们的思想。


Mitterand’s political program was a hymn to economic planning, and the free market was still, for him, synonymous with oppression.	密特朗的政治纲要赞美了经济规划，在他看来，自由市场等同于经济压制。


Today, there is no longer international communism, or, for that matter, French communism.	如今，已经不存在国际共产主义或者说不存在法国共产主义。


We remember having seen the left govern without drama.	我们记得左派曾经的统治。


Its two passages to power – ten years under Mitterand and five years with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin – forced the left to reconcile with reality.	密特朗统治了十年，利昂内尔. 若斯潘担任五年总理，这两条个阶段的统治迫使左派必需与现实相符合。


France’s international reputation was not damaged, and, at home, the left’s performance, especially concerning unemployment, compared well with that of other governments.	法国的名声在国际上并没有受到破坏，在国内，左派的的做法，尤其是失业方面，比其他的政府都做的要好。


So, there will be no panic this time.	所以，此次左派获胜一点也不震惊。


On the contrary, the left’s return to power appears to be an entirely normal, almost trivial, example of alternation in government.	相反，左派再度执权是政府轮流执政中在平凡不过，在正常不过的事了。


In fact, Hollande’s victory was underpinned not by a leftward shift among the electorate, but by voters’ rejection of Nicolas Sarkozy.	事实上，奥朗德大选获胜并不是由于选民倾向于左派，而是因为选民反对尼古拉. 萨科齐。


Indeed, the result represents a stunning and historic defeat: during the Fifth Republic, three sitting presidents – Charles de Gaulle, Mitterrand, and Jacques Chirac – have been reelected after their first term in office.	诚然，此结果代表着一个既震惊又历史性的失败：在第五共和国时期，戴高乐，密特朗，雅克. 希拉克这三位在任总统都连任两届。


Only Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, weakened by the long decline of Gaullism, was not.  	只有吉斯卡尔·德斯坦 没有连任，原因是戴高乐主义衰退削弱了他的势力。


The rejection of Sarkozy is very different; above all, it is a matter of style.	人们反对萨科奇的原因纷纭复杂，最重要的就是作风的问题。


There remains a type of royalism among the French, and our constitution has many features of an elective monarchy.	法国仍然存在着一种保皇主意，认为他们的政体中有许多选举君主的特点。


With his over-familiarity, simplicity, and occasional vulgarity, Sarkozy undermined the dignity of his sacred function.	萨科奇对此过于熟悉，认为这很简单而且偶尔还很粗俗，他破坏了此神圣职责的尊严。


This was not forgiven, and was judged more severely than the shortcomings of his presidential record, which was not significantly worse than that of his predecessors.	这是不可原谅的，而且这比他总统期间的缺点更起决定性作用，因为和前任的其他几位总统相比，他的缺点也不是很严重。


Moreover, in substantive terms, Sarkozy’s tax policies, in particular, favored the upper classes and the wealthy.	此外，大量的条款，尤其是税收政策方面的，都是利于上层阶级和富人的。


So a powerful combination of social and economic anger emerged, particularly given the perception that the excessive greed of financiers and bankers was the primary cause of the crisis that erupted in 2008, and that still menaces us today.	尤其是这样一种观念：金融家们和银行家们过度贪婪是导致2008年金融危机爆发的主要原因，而且至今还威胁着我们，所以法国人在社会和经济方面对他都很恼怒。


A social and political correction was necessary, and it has occurred with a vengeance unique to France.	因此，有必要进行社会和政治修正，而且这在法国尤其的明显。


But the state’s coffers are dangerously depleted, and France now finds itself among the many countries whose debt burden compromises the eurozone’s existence.	但是如今国库的资金正在减少，此速度让人感到危机重重。 法国发现，它和其他许多的欧洲国家一样，债务已经危及到欧元区的存在。


Thus, it is now subject to the discourse of economic orthodoxy, which, in insisting that all debts be paid to the penny, ignores that public spending is also an engine of growth.	因此，他们又转向了正���的经济学，该经济学坚信所有的债务都必须还清，而忽视了公共事业支出也是经济增长的引擎。


Just how much will actually have to be repaid?	但是实际上有多少需要偿还呢？


With Germany as the primary exponent of orthodoxy, the debate has raged on.	德国作为最主要的正统经济倡导者，争论变得越来越激烈。


But now we see that austerity has plunged Greece, Portugal, and especially Spain and Italy deeply into recession.	但是如今，我们看到紧缩使得希腊，葡萄牙深深地陷入了经济衰退，尤其是在西班牙和意大利更为突出。


The president of the European Central Bank, as well as the International Monetary Fund, acknowledge the gravity of the problem.	欧洲中央银行行长，国际货币基金组织承认问题的严重性。


But what happens if we refuse to accept Germany’s position?	但是如果我们不接受德国立场的话，结果会怎样呢？


The victory of Hollande, who has said that he wants to “renegotiate” the European Union’s new, German-backed “fiscal compact,” will weigh heavily in this debate.	欧盟这项新的“财政紧凑”政策得到了德国的支持，奥朗德说他想重新协商该政策，他的胜选在此项争论中意义重大。


Furthermore, the Socialists now control not only the presidency and the government, but also a majority in the Senate, all of the regional presidencies, 55% of the country’s departments, and most major cities’ town halls.	此外，社会党人不但控制着总统的职位和政府，而且在国会中占大部分席位，所有的区域性领导人，50%的国家部门以及大部分主要城市的市政府。


In less than two months, they may control a majority of the National Assembly as well, implying a concentration of power that has never before been seen in modern France.	在不到两个月的时间内，他们可能会控制大部分的国会，暗示着权力的集中，这在现代法国史上是前所未有的。


The Socialists can govern without limits, so it is up to them to govern well.	社会党人可以无限制的进行统治，所以应该由他们来进行统治。


It is this uncertainty that hovers over the future of France, if not that of Europe.	正是这种不确定性威胁着他们的未来，如果说不是整个欧洲的话，那至少在法国是这样。


France in Search of Europe	寻找欧洲的法国


With its ten new members, the European Union comprises 25 countries and 453 million citizens.	随着新十名成员国的加入，欧盟现在拥有25个国家和4. 53亿公民。


In light of the fact that during the past millennium the EU’s members fought countless wars with each other, and that for forty five years a cold war split the continent into two hostile blocs, today’s Europe is a success of monumental historical significance.	鉴于过去一千年中欧盟成员国之间发生的无数次战争，以及一场将欧洲大陆分为两个相互敌视的集团、长达四十五年的冷战，今天的欧洲可以说是极具历史意义值得纪念的一个成功。


Indeed, the EU represents many things simultaneously.	事实上，欧盟同时象征了多种意义。


First, it is a guarantee of peace: war is now technically impossible between the Union’s interlinked member countries.	首先，它是和平的保证：现在从技术角度而言，关系紧密的欧盟成员国之间已经不可能发生战争。


Moreover, the EU is a majestic instrument for international reconciliation.	此外，欧盟是一个解决国际争端的重要手段。


The Germans and the French, who 60 years ago loved each other about as much as Serbs and Bosnians do today, are now a married couple.	六十年前宛如今天的塞尔维亚人和波斯尼亚人一样彼此恩爱的德国人和法国人，如今已经结为连理。


Catholics and Protestants in Ireland were killing each other for a century, but now that they are in the EU, they have recognized the idiocy of their conflict and the inevitability of reconciliation.	爱尔兰的天主教徒和新教徒一个世纪以来相互残杀，但是他们现在同在欧盟，并已经意识到彼此间争端冲突的愚蠢性以及和解的必然性。


Hungarians and Romanians, after nine centuries of hatred and wars, are embarking on the same process.	匈牙利人和罗马尼亚人在历经了长达九个世纪的仇恨和战争后，也开启了同样的历程。


Greece has just decided to support the opening of negotiations for Turkey’s entry into the EU in the next twelve years.	希腊人也已经决定在今后十二年内帮助土耳其打开加入欧盟谈判的局面。


The Union has also been a bearer of prosperity, because it is an effective mechanism for lagging members to surmount long-standing barriers to development.	欧盟已经成为了繁荣富裕的传达者，因为它是帮助落后成员国克服发展过程中长期障碍的一个有效机制。


Ireland and Greece, once the two poorest countries of Europe have surged economically, with Greece coming close to the European average and Ireland having already taken its place among the richest.	爱尔兰和希腊，这两个曾经欧洲最为贫穷的国家，现在经济却已经急速增长。 希腊已经接近于欧洲的平均水平，并且爱尔兰也已经在最富有国家中占有一席之地。


It is for these reasons that countries outside the EU want to join.	欧盟外的国家正是基于这些原因想要加入欧盟。


In less than two years, this will become a reality for Bulgaria and Romania, while negotiations are beginning with Croatia and Turkey. There is also talk about membership for Serbia and Ukraine.	在今后不到两年的时间内，保加利亚和罗马尼亚将使之变为现实，同时克罗地亚和土耳其的入盟谈判，以及塞尔维亚和乌克兰的入盟资格讨论也将开始。


For each of these countries, membership will mean a stable peace with its neighbors and reconciliation at home, as well as accelerated economic growth.	对所有这些国家而言，加入欧盟意味着与他们的邻国稳定和平地共处于一国中，同时也意味着经济增长加速。


All of this entails a certain amount of instability, particularly if expansion is driven by negotiations among governments, rather than by democratic choices.	所有这些包含着一定的不稳定性，尤其如果欧盟扩张是由政府之间的谈判而非民主选择所驱使。


The project of the new European Constitution was devised to remedy this problem.	新欧盟宪法方案正是为了解决这个问题而设计。


And, lo and behold, France, which is scheduled to ratify the Constitution by a referendum on May 29, gives the impression of wanting to vote against it.	然而，出乎意料地是，原本按计划5月29号举行全民公投来批准宪法的法国，现在却给人印象以他们要投票反对宪法。


If it does, the result will be an earthquake.	如果它这么做的话，结果将是一场大地震。


Although every member nation has played its part in integrating Europe, France has without doubt been the country that provided most of the ideas and master builders.	尽管每个成员国在欧洲整合过程中都发挥了一定作用，无疑法国提出了最多建议和想法，是欧盟的主要建设者。


So what is going on?	那么现在究竟发生了什么呢？


In France, as elsewhere in Europe, there have always existed unbridled nationalists, the “sovereignists” who say no to Europe in the name of defending the nation.	在法国以及欧洲其他地方，总是存在着一些肆无忌惮的民族主义者，即那些打着保卫国家的名号反对欧洲的“主权主义者”。


But whether they belong to the extreme right or the communist left, they represent barely 20% of the electorate.	但是无论他们属于极端右翼分子还是共产主义左翼分子，他们仅代表了20%不到的选民。


Over and above that, two factors explain the bizarre phenomenon captured by recent opinion polls in France.	除此之外，有两个因素可以解释最近出现在法国民意测验中的古怪现象。


The first is that the French have accounts to settle with their president and the government.	首先，法国人和他们的总统以及政府有账要算。


Jacques Chirac was re-elected president with 82% of the vote because of the menace from the extreme right.	雅克·希拉克（Jacques Chirac）以82%的支持票二度当选是因为法国当时正受到极端右翼的威胁。


According to all evidence, half of his votes came from the left.	所有证据表明，他的支持选票一般来自左翼。


But Chirac acted as if his mandate had been unequivocal and put in place one of the most conservative governments France has seen for half a century.	但是希拉克表现得好似他的受命毫无可疑之处，并建立了半个世纪以来最为保守的法国政府。


“Let’s make the poor pay” is his fiscal order of the day.	“让我们降低工资”是他当时的财政命令。


It smacks of usurpation and is inciting many of the French to vote their anger.	这话带有侵犯之意，引得许多法国人把愤怒发泄在投票上。


The other factor is that France, like the rest of the world, suffers from an ill-managed form of globalization.	另外一个因素是，法国正如世界其他地方一样，遭受着管理乏善的全球化之害。


As a result, France suffers from growing inequality, high and still-rising unemployment, constant corporate restructurings entailing layoffs, threats to public services and social welfare programs, and a general feeling of insecurity.	这些后果包括：日益加剧的不平等，居高不下还在上升的失业率，伴随失业的经常性公司结构重组、公共服务和社会福利项目所面临的威胁，以及一种普遍的不安全感。


The world has undergone massive economic deregulation, prescribed by the monetarist doctrine supported by the conservative forces dominant in the developed countries of North America, Europe, and the Far East.	全世界已经根据北美、欧洲和远东地区的发达国家中占主导地位的保守力量所支持的货币主义理论进行了大规模经济管制放松。


This economic tsunami has come to us from the United States – there is nothing in it for Europe, but the right-wing forces in all our countries, which have coalesced into the majority that governs Europe, have rallied to its support.	这场向我们呼啸而来的经济海啸发源于美国——虽然与欧洲无关，但是我们这些国家中的右翼力量已经和控制欧洲的主要力量达成一致，对其表示支持。


It is the desire to reject this state of affairs that, above all else, explains the “No” many French people want to shout.	正是反对这种状态的意愿成为许多法国人要大声说“不”的主要原因。


But to do so would be a big mistake.	但是如果这么做的话，就会铸成大错。


Only Europe as a whole, focused politically on the idea of better regulation, is big enough to block the neo-liberal tsunami.	只有当欧洲作为一个整体，把政治重心放在更好的管理之上，欧��才足够强大以阻止新自由主义的海啸。


But it needs great doctrinal clarity, a firm political will, and a constitution.	但是这需要明确的规则，坚定的政治意愿，以及一部宪法。


Indeed, rejection of the EU Constitution is a sure way to kill European dynamism and weaken Europe’s ability to defend itself.	事实上，反对欧盟宪法肯定会扼杀欧洲的繁荣，削弱欧洲保卫自身的能力。


The debate in France is still raging, and nothing is yet lost.	法国内的辩论依然唇枪舌剑，好在还未有任何损失。


The French people still have time to pull themselves together – and opinion polls suggest that they are beginning to do it.	法国人民还有时间让他们自己团结一心——民意测验显示他们已经开始这么做了。


Europe deserves it.	欧洲值得他们这么做。


France is Not Working	法国难以为继


France’s chronic malaise is marked by periodic explosions of protest.	周期性的爆发抗议是法国痼疾的标志。


The two most recent episodes – the rioting and arson in French cities last autumn and the successful student campaign earlier this year against a new law governing young labor-market entrants – seem to have little in common.	最近发生的两次事件¾¾去年秋天发生在法国城市的暴乱与纵火，以及今年初对管理新加入劳动力市场的青年劳动者的新法律进行抗议的成功的学生运动¾¾这两者乍看上去好像并没有什么共同之处。


But their unifying thread is youth, unemployment, and uncertainty about the future, as well as the suffocating state paternalism that underlies the wider malaise itself.	但青年、失业、对未来的迷茫，以及造成全国性痼疾泛滥的令人窒息的国家温情主义，却像线索一样把它们紧紧地联系在一起。


Take, for example, the desirable goal of job security.	仅以就业安全这一诱人的前景为例。


French governments have sought it in the only way they know – by ever more regulation.	法国政府为实现这一目标采取了它们唯一熟悉的方式¾¾那就是不断地加强管理。


Unsurprisingly, rules that make it difficult to fire established workers discourage employers from hiring new ones.	结果不出所料，令解雇现有员工变得困难重重的规定使得雇主们不敢轻易尝试雇佣新人。


Insiders enjoy lavish protections, while entry barriers to the millions left outside are insurmountable.	于是，在现有就业员工享受慷慨保障的同时，也为尚在就业体系之外的成百上千万人设置了不可逾越的就业障碍。


As a result, unemployment is averaging 10% this decade and has not been below 8% for 20 years.	其结果是，近10年来的平均失业率达到了10%，而且已经有20年在8%以上徘徊。


And, while the overall level of unemployment has remained stable – albeit at a shockingly high level – the unemployment rate among young men (in the 16-24 age group) jumped from 15.3% in 1990 to 21.4% in 2005.	更有甚者，尽管总体失业率一直在一个令人震惊的基数上保持稳定，但是在16到24岁年龄段的青年人当中，失业率已经从1990年的15. 3%跃升至2005年的21.


France’s benevolent paternalism penalizes the young beyond the labor market as well.	法国充满仁爱的政治温情主义给青年人造成的损害还远远不限于劳动力市场。


On paper, wealth redistribution through high taxes and state transfers, reflecting Republican ideals of equality and social cohesion ( fraternité ), has brought good results.	从统计数据上看，通过高税收和国家调剂实现的财富再分配体现了共和党平等与社会团结（友善）的美好理想，产生了良好的社会效果。


Unlike most other OECD countries, where inequalities have increased over the last 30 years, in France pre-tax income inequality decreased slightly, or at worst remained stable, from 1970 to 2000.	从1970到2000这三十年来，与不平等现象日益加剧的其他经合组织成员国相比，法国的税前收入差距还略有下降，或者至少也基本持平。


But this aggregate stability masks shifts in income distribution that have favored older age cohorts.	但总体稳定后面所掩盖的是收入分配越来越向老龄群体倾斜。


Those around retirement age (51-65) saw their share in total income rise by three percentage points in the last ten years, while younger groups, particularly those aged 18-25, lost ground, with their income share falling by five percentage points.	过去10年来，接近退休年龄的人（51到65）看到自己在总体收入增长中所占的份额提高了百分之三，而年轻人，特别是18到25岁的年轻人，在总体收入增长中所占的份额却下降了百分之五。


By 1995, relative poverty was increasing sharply for young adults, while the opposite trend occurred among the elderly.	到1995年，青年成人中相对贫困的比率大幅增长，而在老年群体中这一趋势却恰恰相反。


In 1970, a quarter of all pensioners lived in poverty; today, the figure is only 4%.	1970年，四分之一的养老金领取者生活贫困，而今天，养老金领取人口的贫困比率却只有4%。


Joblessness is the main cause of poverty, and the best protection against it is earned income, for which even France’s generous welfare payments are an inadequate substitute.	造成贫困的主要原因是失业，预防贫困的最好办法则是领取工资，而工资的作用即便是法国慷慨的福利支付也不足以替代。


Moreover, the high payroll taxes needed to finance these benefits constitute another deterrent to hiring, as does the high minimum wage, which tends to price unskilled labor above its potential productivity.	不仅如此，支持福利支付所需的高额工资税和高额最低工资保障结合在一起，构成了两大就业障碍，这两项规定使非熟练工种领取的报酬甚至超过了其自身的潜在生产力。


The relatively generous dole and the prospect of high taxes once in work merely reduces the incentive to take low-paid jobs.	相对优厚的失业救济和工作后高额的税收前景只能降低人们接受低薪工作的积极性。


As a result, 40% of all transfers go to poor but able-bodied people of working age.	其结果是，有40%的救济发放给了那些虽然贫困但却身强力壮的盛年劳力。


The full extent of the French system’s pathology becomes fully clear in the light of successive governments’ attempts at reform, with piecemeal measures the norm – and thus proving counter-productive on balance, or failing altogether.	历届政府的改革努力令法国痼疾的严重程度暴露无遗，那就是以局部利益作为衡量工作的标准¾¾这样从总体局面上看或者作用相反，或者干脆彻底失败。


Minimum-wage increases, for example, counteract income-tax credits and lower payroll taxes aimed at encouraging youth employment.	例如提高最低工资就抵消了旨在鼓励年轻人就业的所得税减免和工资税降低。


The unspoken premise is that there must be no losers, not even in the short term.	一个没有说出口的前提就是不能损害任何人的利益，即便是短期的影响也不能容许。


The logical answer would be to reduce equally the degree of job security enjoyed by the entire labor force.	合理的解决方案是一视同仁地降低所有就业群体所享受的就业保障。


But no French government in recent decades has been remotely strong enough to face down opposition – often involving illegal action that goes unpunished – to any reduction in entrenched privileges.	但几十年来，没有任何一届法国政府有力量压制对抗削减福利的势力¾¾违法活动得不到惩治成了家常便饭。


Perhaps the only way out of France’s current impasse is the no-less traditional French route of revolution.	摆脱现有困境的唯一方法也许就是采取传统的法国革命路线。


According to this view, the system is unreformable, and real change will be possible only after it finally collapses, perhaps owing to fiscal weakness, since the combination of deficit-financed transfers, low growth, and low labor-market participation may prove unsustainable.	按照这种看法，也许由于财政领域的缺陷，也就是靠赤字支持的救济、缓慢的经济增长和劳务市场就业率低迷的状况无法永远继续下去，由此得出结论：即制度是无法改革的，只有在其彻底崩溃后才有可能产生真正意义的变化。


After all, whatever the deeper causes of the French Revolution of 1789, the immediate trigger was a public-finance crisis.	归根结底，无论1789年法国大革命的深层原因是什么，它直接的导火线都是公共财政危机。


The social strains of high unemployment – especially among young people – may force decisive change even before any fiscal meltdown.	高失业，特别是年轻人高失业所造成的社会压力可能会迫使人们在财政彻底垮塌之前就做出决定性的变化。


But evolutionary progress is always preferable to revolutionary upheaval, and, despite all the difficulties of genuine incremental reform, the prospects are not absolutely hopeless.	但进化的过程总比革命的剧变更容易接受，而且尽管真正的渐进性改革存在各种各样的困难，改革的前景也并非毫无希望。


This is clear from the remarkable recent experience of “Sciences Po,” one of the elite  grandes écoles in the center of Paris.	位于巴黎市中心培养精英人才的高等学院之一“巴黎政治学院”不久前令人称道的做法也证明了这一点。


An ostensibly meritocratic competitive admission system to the  grandes écoles is in fact monopolized by the socially privileged, who accounted for 81% of students admitted to Sciences Po in 1998 (compared to the roughly 60% of students at Oxford and Cambridge who come from fee-paying private schools).	这座高等学院表面看来竞争性的招生体制实际上被享有社会特权的阶层所垄断，拥有特权的学生占到了1998年入学新生总数的81%（而牛津和剑桥来自收费私立学校的学生比例大约为60%）。


The head of Sciences Po, Richard Descoings, implemented a program of positive discrimination that favors disadvantaged candidates, such as those from immigrant suburbs and rural areas, and charges increased fees to wealthier students.	巴黎政治学院的院长���查·戴斯库安（Richard Descoings）实行向贫困学生倾斜的入学政策，来自移民聚居区和乡村地区的学生可以在入学时享受优惠，而有钱的学生则必须缴纳更高的学费。


Descoings faced strong – and often cogent – opposition.	戴斯库安的这一举措引来了强劲的反抗。


But the dynamic of all reform is clinched when even weighty arguments succumb to the urgency of change.	但如果再重要的理由都要屈服于变革的紧迫性，那么就会失去所有的改革动力。


For France as a whole, the long-term cost of withholding tough medicine will ultimately be much higher than the short-term pain of reforming the country’s fiscally unsustainable and spiritually impoverishing welfare state.	从法国的整体利益考虑，不下猛药的长期代价最终将大大超过改革目前国内不可持续而且有损向上精神的福利国家所带来的短期痛苦。


Young people in France will rediscover trust and hope when they can be shown a world where fairness consists not just in egalitarian and unconditional redistribution, but also in hard work and good behavior.	如果能让法国的年轻人看到这个世界不仅通过平等主义和无条件的重新分配、而且通过辛勤劳动和文明举止来体现公平，他们就能够重拾信任与希望。


Change for the better will be founded on the basic conviction that one should get what one deserves and deserve what one gets.	只有当所有人都坚信种瓜得瓜、种豆得豆的基本法则，我们的生活才能越变越好。


France à la Sarkozy	萨尔科奇的法国


Eight months into his presidency, is Nicolas Sarkozy delivering the “rupture” from 30 years of French immobility that he promised?	    萨尔科奇就任法国总统已经八个月了，他是否正在实现许诺的与法国社会长达30年的万马齐喑局面“决裂”呢？


Dubbed the “hyper-president” by bewildered media, he has launched a vast number of reforms, many of which were once considered political suicide.	迷惑不解的媒体把他称为“超级总统”，他发起了一大堆改革，其中有许多都曾经被认为是政治上的自杀。


He has targeted many areas – including universities, the judiciary, foreign policy, immigration, taxation, and the environment – but it is the economy that will prove to be the make-or-break issue.	他把目标锁定在许多领域，包括大学、司法、外交政策、移民、税收以及环境，但是只有经济问题才将会是成功与否的问题。


Sarkozy’s slogan “work more to earn more” has won him considerable support.	    萨尔科奇“多劳多得”的口号为他赢得了巨大的支持。


The crucial test will be his ability to reform the labor market, whose rigidities are widely seen as the main cause of France’s relatively poor economic performance, with an unemployment rate that has never dipped below 8% over the last 25 years.	关键的考验在于他改革劳动力市场的能力，而劳动力市场僵化被广泛认为是法国经济表现相对落后的主要原因。 在过去25年时间里，法国的失业率从来就没有低于8%。


While the government has begun many projects, with few exceptions, including tax breaks for the wealthy, most are still in the making.	    政府开始了许多项目，但是除了几个例外，例如给富人的税收减免，大多数还没有落实。


The most important concern public employment, pensions, labor legislation, and the length of the workweek, all of which generate fierce resistance.	最为重要的涉及到公共就业、养老金、劳动立法以及每周工作长度。 所有的这些都产生了强烈的抵抗。


The main reason for the slow pace – noting that previous presidents had no pace at all – is a 2005 law that requires that all measures affecting the labor market first be negotiated in good faith with the trade unions.	    步伐缓慢的主要原因(请注意过去的总统根本就没有什么步伐)是2005年的一部法律。 该法律规定，所有影响劳动力市场的法律首先必须与工会进行有诚意的谈判。


Naturally, the unions impede negotiations as much as possible.	很自然，工会尽量阻碍谈判。


As a result, France is likely soon to surpass Sweden as the world’s highest public spender.	    结果，法国有可能马上就会超越瑞典成为世界上最大的公共开支国家。


All French finance ministers lament that they had very little room for cutting costs, given the scope of entitlements, particularly civil servants’ salaries and pensions.	所有的法国财政部长都抱怨说，由于各种应得款项的规模，特别是公务员的工资和养老金，他们在削减开支上没有什么回旋余地。


With half of all current civil servants set to retire over the next ten years, Sarkozy has pledged to replace only one of every two.	    当前一半的公务员将会在未来十年中退休，萨尔科奇已经保证只会在每两个人中补充一个人。


In 2007, the attrition rate was one out of three – short of the pledge, but a sharp reversal from previous decades, in which the ranks of civil servants grew significantly faster than private-sector employment.	在2007年，减员率是三分之一，低于保证的比率，但还是与过去几十年大不相同。 在那些时候，公务员的晋级要比私营企业的快很多。


Sarkozy believes that he has a popular mandate to push his labor-market reforms through parliament, where he controls a large majority.	    萨尔科奇相信他得到大众的支持来通过议会推动他的劳动力市场改革，而他控制了议会的大多数。 与此相比，工会则认为它们具有“社会合法性”。


By contrast, the unions argue that they have “social legitimacy,” a claim that may surprise many outside France, but that holds considerable sway in a country where large-scale demonstrations or drawn-out strikes are interpreted as a valid representation of popular will.	这一主张会让许多法国以外的人士感到惊讶，但是却在法国更有巨大的实力。 在法国，大规模的抗议和拖延罢工被解释成为是大众意志的合理体现。


From the outset, both sides expected a defining fight, which occurred last November, after the government decided to align the retirement age in the public sector with that of the private sector.	    从一开始，两方面都预期会有一场决定性的斗争。 这一斗争发生在去年十一月、政府决定把公务员的退休年龄与私有企业拉齐之后。


When President Jacques Chirac’s first government attempted such a reform in 1995, railroad workers, who can retire at age 50 or 55, spearheaded the resistance.	当希拉克总统的第一届政府在1995年尝试这一改革的时候，可以在50或55岁退休的铁路工人带头抵制。


After nearly three weeks of complete stoppage of trains, the government caved in, and soon thereafter lost a general election.	在几乎三个星期铁路几乎完全停运之后，政府屈服了，随后马上就在大选中败北。


The 1995 strike became an icon of “social legitimacy,” instilling fear in all succeeding governments.	    1995年的罢工成为了“社会合法性”的标志，令随后的各届政府都不寒而栗。


But this time around, the unions caved in after nine days, largely because the reform had been explained and promised to the public during the presidential campaign.	但是这一次，工会在九天以后就屈服了，主要是因为在总统大选期间已经向各种解释了这一改革并且做出了许诺。


Democratic legitimacy won a major battle over social legitimacy.	民主合法性击败社会合法性，赢得了一场主要战役的胜利。


This opens the way to more and deeper reforms.	    这就为更多更深刻的改革开启了道路。


A law restricting transport strikes took effect on January 1, and Sarkozy intends to break the 35-hour workweek, albeit indirectly.	一部限制交通运输罢工的法律在元旦生效，而且尽管间接地，萨尔科奇也打算打破每周35小时工作时间的规定。


Instead of repealing the law, overtime work is to become easy and relatively cheap.	并不是要撤销这一法律，而是让加班变得容易和相对便宜。


He is also preparing to raise the retirement age to 61, from 60.	他还准备把退休年龄从60岁提高到61岁。


Even more provocative are the next steps: a plan to revamp the standard work contract and to require that all workers be invited to vote after eight days of a strike.	    接下来的步骤更为具有挑衅性。 这包括修改标准工作合同以及要求邀请所有的工人在罢工八天以后都参加投票。


Indeed, probably the most fundamental measure is to transform radically the way trade unions operate.	实际上，大概最为根本的措施就是剧烈地改革工会的运作方式。


Their role is currently codified by a post-1945 law that gives them enormous influence, even though their membership has dwindled to a mere 8% of employees.	工会的作用目前是由一部二战后制定的法律规定的。 尽管工会成员已经下降到了雇员人数的仅仅8%，但是这一法律给了工会巨大的影响力。


The plan, yet to be fully articulated, is to make them accountable to all workers, not just to their membership – another way of promoting democratic legitimacy, but this time at the heart of the social system.	这一计划尚有待完整提出，其目的是让工会向所有的工人负责，而不是仅仅对工会成员负责。 这就是另一个促进民主合法性的方式，但是这却是社会制度的核心问题。


One reason why Sarkozy could succeed where previous governments have never dreamt to venture, aside from his popular mandate for reform, is a “win-win” strategy, whereby victory for reform implies substantial compensation.	    萨尔科奇可以在前任政府从来没有梦想尝试的地方取得成功的一个原因就是除了民众对其改革的授权外，就是一个“双赢”战略。 根据这一战略，改革的胜利意味着实质性的补偿。


For example, Sarkozy has promised that half of the savings from the reduction in public employment will go to higher pay – possibly based on merit, another red line for the trade unions.	例如，萨尔科奇保证，减少公务员节省下来的钱的一半将会用于提高工资，而涨工资有可能根据业绩才能，这对于工会而言又是一条红线。


But Sarkozy is not quite turning France, long a country hostile to supply-side reform, into what many would consider a normal economy.	    但是萨尔科奇并不是把法国转变称为许多人认为的一个正常国家。 法国长久以来对供应派改革充满敌意。


While he has the right instincts concerning labor markets, he is very French on other issues.	尽管在劳动力市场问题上萨尔科奇具有正确的本能，但是在其他问题上他却很法国化。


He is a staunch advocate of industrial policies, which will lead him into sharp confrontation with the European Commission and many of his colleagues.	    他是产业政策的坚定鼓吹者，这将会让他与欧盟委员会和其他许多领导人产生巨大的对立。 他还深深地不信任金融市场，还经常主张更多的监管。


He also harbors a deep distrust of financial markets and often advocates more regulation, and sees the strong euro as a threat to French industry and the result of speculation, which has already provoked serious clashes with the European Central Bank.	他认为强势欧元是法国产业的威胁和投机的结果。 这已经促发了与欧洲央行的严重冲突。


On all these issues, much of the decision-making power has been transferred to the European Union, which dramatically reduces Sarkozy’s room for maneuver.	    在所有这些问题上，大部分决策权都已经转移到了欧盟，这就大幅度减少了萨尔科奇周旋的余地。


But France will hold the EU’s rotating presidency in the second half of 2008.	但是法国将会在2008年下半年担任欧盟的轮值主席国。


Nobody’s perfect, least of all Sarkozy, so we should expect some infuriating initiatives.	人无完人，更何况萨尔科奇，所以我们应该会看到某些激烈的措施。


France’s Broken Dream	破碎的法国之梦


CAMBRIDGE – The crisis in the eurozone is the result of France’s persistent pursuit of the “European project,” the goal of political unification that began after World War II when two leading French politicians, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, proposed the creation of a United States of Europe.	美国剑桥—欧元区危机源自法国对“欧洲工程”的不懈追求。 二战结束后，法国两位政治领袖莫内和舒曼建议成立欧罗巴合众国，以实现政治统一，是为“欧洲工程”之始。


Monnet and Schuman argued that a political union similar to America’s would prevent the types of conflict that had caused three major European wars – an appealing idea, but one that overlooked America’s horrific Civil War.	莫内和舒曼指出，一个类似于美国的政治联盟能够避免导致三场欧洲大战的冲突，这一观点着实诱人，但却忽略了可怕的美国南北战争。


A European political union could also make Europe a power comparable to the United States, and thereby give France, with its sophisticated foreign service, an important role in European and world affairs.	欧洲政治联盟还能够将欧洲打造成能与美国分庭抗礼的一极，从而让外交网络的法国在欧洲和世界事务上扮演重要角色。


The Monnet-Schuman dream led to the 1956 Treaty of Rome, which established a small free-trade area that was later expanded to form the European Economic Community.	1956年，在莫内-舒曼设想的推动下，《罗马条约》诞生了。 罗马条约成立了一个小型自由贸易区，并在日后扩展为欧洲经济共同体。


Establishing the EEC had favorable economic effects, but, like the North American Free Trade Area, it did not reduce national identification or create a sense of political unity.	欧洲经济共同体的成立形成了积极的经济效果，但与北美自由贸易区一样，它并没有削弱国家身份，也没有造成政治统一的氛围。


That was the purpose of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union.	而这便是1992年《马斯特里赫特条约》的目的，欧盟便诞生于马约中。


The influential report “One market, one money,” issued in 1990 under the leadership of the former French Finance Minister Jacques Delors, called for the creation of a single currency, relying on the specious argument that the single market could not function well otherwise.	1990年，在前法国财政部长德洛尔的领导下，著名报告《一个市场，一种货币》（One market, one money）发布了。 该报告呼吁创造一种单一货币，其立论基础似是而非：没有单一货币，单一市场就无法良好运行。


More realistically, advocates of a single currency reasoned that it would cause people to identify as Europeans, and that the shift to a single European Central Bank would herald a shift of power away from national governments.	其支持者所提出的更现实的理由包括这会激起人们对欧洲身份的认同感、成立单一欧洲央行可以作为各国政府移交权力的先声等。


Germany resisted the euro, arguing that full political union should come first.	德国坚决反对欧元，指出必须政治联盟先行。


Since there was no chance that the other countries would accept political union, Germany’s position seemed like a technical maneuver to prevent the establishment of the single currency.	由于没有其他国家会接受政治联盟，因此德国的立场似乎是阻止成立单一货币区的技术借口。


Germany was reluctant to give up the Deutsche Mark, a symbol of its economic power and commitment to price stability.	德国人不愿放弃马克，此乃其经济实力和物价稳定承诺的象征。


Germany eventually agreed to the creation of the euro only when French President François Mitterrand made it a condition of France’s support for German reunification.	直到法国总统密特朗提出以法国支持德国重新统一为条件，德国人才最终同意创造欧元。


Moreover, under pressure from France, the Maastricht Treaty’s requirement that countries could introduce the euro only if their national debt was less than 60% of GDP was relaxed in order to admit countries that were seen to be “evolving” toward that goal.	此外，在法国的压力下，马约放松了只有国民债务水平低于GDP的60%的国家才能使用欧元的要求，以接纳似乎正在朝这一目标“前进”的国家。


That modification allowed Greece, Spain, and Italy to be admitted.	该标准的改变让希腊、西班牙和意大利得以使用欧元。


The pro-euro politicians ignored economists’ warnings that imposing a single currency on a dozen heterogeneous countries was bound to create serious economic problems.	支持欧元的政客忽视了经济学家的警告：让十多个情况各异的国家使用单一货币会造成严重的经济问题。


They regarded the economic risks as unimportant relative to their agenda of political unification.	他们认为，与政治统日程相比，经济风险乃小菜一碟。


But the creation of the euro caused a sharp fall in interest rates in the peripheral countries, leading to debt-financed housing bubbles and encouraging their governments to borrow to finance increased government spending.	但欧元的使用使得外围国家利率骤降，导致了债务驱动的房地产繁荣，也鼓励了这些国家政府用借贷来为增长的政府支出融资。


Amazingly, global financial markets ignored the credit risks of this sovereign debt, requiring only very small differences between interest rates on German bonds and those of Greece and other peripheral countries.	令人惊奇的是，全球金融市场完全无视这类主权债务的信用风险，希腊和其他外围国债券的利率与德国债券差别极小。


That ended in 2010, after Greece admitted that it had lied about its budget deficits and debt.	这种情况一直持续到2010年希腊承认在预算赤字和债务方面存在造假为止。


Financial markets responded by demanding much higher rates on the bonds of countries with high government debt ratios and banking systems weakened by excessive mortgage debt.	金融市场的反应是大大提高了政府债务比率高企国家的债券利率，银行系统也被过多的按揭债务拖垮了。


Three small countries (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) have been forced to accept help from the International Monetary Fund, and to enact painful contractionary fiscal cuts.	三个小国（希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙）已被迫接受来自IMF的援助，实施痛苦的收缩性财政削减。


The conditions in Greece are now hopeless, and are likely to lead to further defaults and a withdrawal from the eurozone.	希腊则完全看不到希望，可能会出现进一步违约甚至退出欧元区。


Spain, too, is in serious trouble, owing to the budget deficits of its traditionally independent regional governments, the weakness of its banks, and its need to roll over large sovereign-debt balances each year.	西班牙也陷入了严重的麻烦，因为其传统上拥有自主权的地方政府预算赤字太大、其银行太过疲软、其主权债务余额每年都必须大量展期。


It is already clear that the EU’s recently agreed “fiscal compact” will not constrain budget deficits or reduce national debts.	情况已经很清楚，欧盟最近通过的“财政协定”不会约束预算赤字和削减国民债务。


Spain was the first to insist that it could not meet the conditions to which it had just agreed, and other countries will soon follow.	西班牙是第一个坚持自己无法满足自己刚刚同意的条件的国家，其他国家也将很快步其后尘。


French President François Hollande has proposed balancing deficit limits with growth initiatives, just as France had earlier forced the EU’s Stability Pact to become the Stability and Growth Pact.	法国总统奥朗德提出了以增长计划平衡预算限制的办法，这一办法很像当年法国迫使欧盟稳定公约变身为稳定和增长公约。


The fiscal compact is an empty gesture that may be the last attempt to pretend that EU members are moving toward political unification.	财政协定只是一个表面姿态，也许将成为假装欧盟成员国正在朝政治联盟方向前进的最后努力。


The European project has clearly failed to achieve what French political leaders have wanted from the beginning.	欧洲计划显然没有达到法国政治领袖一开始的预期。


Instead of the amity and sense of purpose of which Monnet and Schuman dreamed, there is conflict and disarray.	莫内和舒曼所梦想的友好和认同并没有实现，出现的是冲突和无序。


Europe’s international role is shrinking, with the old G-5 having evolved into the G-20.	欧洲的国际作用在减小，当年的G5如今已经变成了G20。


And, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel setting conditions for the eurozone, France’s ambition to dominate European policy has been thwarted.	而随着德国总理默克尔对欧元区的指手画脚，法国人主导欧洲政策的雄心也受到了打击。


Even if most eurozone countries retain the single currency, it will be because abandoning the euro would be financially painful.	即使大多是欧元区国家保留了单一货币，其原因也是放弃欧元在财政上太过痛苦。


Now that its weaknesses are clear, the euro will remain a source of trouble rather than a path to political power.	欧元的弱点已是昭然若揭，它只能是麻烦之源，而不是通往政治一极之路。


France’s Fourth Moment	法国的第四个历史时刻


KYIV – Since World War II’s end, France has consistently risen to the challenge of restructuring Europe in times of crisis.	基辅——第二次世界大战结束后，法国一直在危机期间面对着欧洲重组所带来的挑战。


In doing so, France became the catalyst not only for building European unity, but also for creating the prosperity that marked Europe’s post-war decades – a prosperity now under threat because of the global financial and economic crisis.	因此，法国不仅扮演了建设欧洲团结的催化剂，也协助创造了欧洲战后年代标志性的繁荣——这样的繁荣目前正处在全球金融和经济危机的威胁之中。


If we are to see a stronger Europe emerge from today’s challenges, visionary French leadership is needed again.	如果我们希望看到当前的危机过去之后欧洲更为强大，那么我们就再一次需要法国远见卓识的引领。


The first moment when decisive French leadership began to unify Europe came when Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer created the European Coal and Steel Community.	当罗伯特·舒曼和康拉德·阿登纳创立欧洲煤钢共同体的时候，决定性的法国领导开始实现欧洲统一的第一个历史时刻来临了。


By rooting the then West Germany in the political, economic, and social fabric of the West, that step heralded the start of Germany’s rebirth and economic miracle.	通过让当时的西德植根于西方的政治、经济和社会框架，这样的步骤启动了德国的经济奇迹和重生。


The second time that France consolidated Europe’s internal architecture came in 1983, during the debates over the stationing of American cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany to counter the deployment of SS20 missiles by the Soviet Union.	法国第二次巩固欧洲的内部架构是在1983年，当时人们正热烈讨论在德国部署美国巡航和潘兴导弹防御苏联SS20导弹的事情。


France’s resolve to stand with Germany helped prevent Germany from drifting into a dangerous neutrality that would have shaken the European community to its core.	法国下定决心与德国站在一起防止了德国滑向危险的中立境地，如果德国真这么做，将会动摇欧洲共同体的核心。


The third moment came after the Berlin Wall fell, and it was feared that an enlarged Germany might destabilize Europe.	第三个历史时刻出现在柏林墙倒塌之后，人们恐惧扩张的德国可能威胁到欧洲的稳定。


After initially trying to delay reunification, France embraced it, in exchange for Germany’s reaffirming its commitment to European unity and Franco-German leadership of the European community.	尽管开始时试图延缓德国的统一进程，但法国最终还是接受了德国的统一，条件是德国重申支持欧洲团结和法德两国在欧共体领导地位的态度。


As a result, Germany bound itself to the idea of “ever closer union” even more definitively by pledging to join the common European currency, the euro.	结果，德国通过承诺加入欧洲共同货币欧元更为明确地将自己和“更密切联盟”的理念联系在一起。


It is now urgent that the insights that have animated Franco-German relations be applied to all of Central and Eastern Europe.	现在迫切需要将激活法德关系的那种洞察力推广到中东欧所有国家当中。


Only by securing the European identity of this entire region, and by anchoring the growing Russo-German relationship in a European context, can the European Union continue on its path of stability and prosperity.	只有在整个地区实现欧洲同一性，让不断发展的俄德关系融入到欧洲的整体背景，欧盟才能继续拥有稳定和繁荣。


Only by reinforcing open trading and financial relations across Europe can we hope to subdue today’s crisis.	只有在全欧洲加强开放贸易以及金融关系，我们才有希望战胜今天的危机。


For it is in no European country’s interest, or in the interest of the EU as a whole, that Central and Eastern Europe feel that they have been cast adrift or that Germany and Russia fixate on each other in this time of crisis.	这是因为让中东欧国家自生自灭，或者让德俄两国在危机期间相互仇视不符合任何一个欧洲国家的利益，对欧盟整体而言也不会带来任何好处。


As with Germany in the 1950’s, the nature of Russia’s links with its immediate neighbors is turning out to be the defining factor in shaping the country’s international image.	正如20世纪50年代的德国一样，俄国与其临近国家关系的性质正在成为塑造该国国际形象的决定性因素。


Many observers regard these relations as a signal not just to the region, but to the rest of the world, of the sort of power that Russia wishes to be.	在许多观察家看来，这些关系不仅向区域各国、而且也向世界其他国家发出信号，表明俄罗斯希望成为什么样的力量。


The issue is partly one of “internationalism” itself.	部分问题在于“国际主义”本身。


In contrast to Europe – with its close-knit network of multilateral organizations through which states formulate and conduct much of their foreign policies – Russia is not accustomed to intensively cooperative international procedures.	与欧洲形成鲜明对照——欧盟拥有联系紧密的多边机构网络，国家通过这样的网络制定并推行大部分外交政策——俄国并不习惯于合作性极强的国际流程。


But keeping Russia at arm’s length from Europe has only strengthened the sense of isolation that many Russians feel, tempting them to define the country’s interests in ways that are irreconcilable with those of Europe.	但是欧洲国家的刻意疏远只不过进一步增强了许多俄国人的孤独感，促使他们在界定国家利益的时候不与欧洲国家相调和。


It has also heightened Russia’s desire to construct a special, bilateral Russo-German relationship heedless of the context of the EU.	这样做还增强了俄罗斯建设双边特殊俄德关系的愿望，这种特殊关系丝毫不考虑欧盟国家的全局状况。


European history during the past 60 years makes clear that the most promising approach to meeting the challenge of national reconciliation and stability is not to focus on specific contingencies, but to establish procedures that encourage orderly change.	过去60年的欧洲历史表明，迎接民族和解与稳定挑战最有希望的方法不是关注具体的意外事件，而是制定并执行鼓励有序变化的政策。


A singular vision has always animated this process: animosity between neighbors must not be allowed to fester, and the rule of law must reign not just within countries, but also between them.	一种普遍的看法总能为上述过程注入生机：不能允许邻国之间的仇恨肆意发展，法治不仅要在国内、同样也要在国与国之间发挥主导作用。


To believe that such a vision can work for Russia, Ukraine, and Europe is not wishful thinking, but rests on the successful experience of France and Germany in promoting amity.	相信俄罗斯、乌克兰和欧洲能够实现这一愿望并非痴心妄想，而是基于法德推动友好关系的成功经历。


Indeed, the existence or absence of a framework of cooperation often determines whether a dispute mutates into a crisis.	事实上，合作框架的存在与否往往决定着纠纷是否会演化成一场危机。


Such cooperative frameworks seek to reconcile national independence with regional interdependence, focusing political leaders’ minds on prosperity for their people rather than on gaining unilateral advantages that ultimately impoverish and unsettle everyone.	这样的合作框架试图调和民族独立和地区依赖，让政治领袖关注本国民众的福祉而不是力图谋求单方面的优势，贫穷和动荡将是这种单方面优势最终的必然结果。


The first lesson of European unity is that times of crisis must draw the continent closer together, not divide it through protectionism, competitive devaluations, and expulsions of immigrants.	欧洲团结的首要一课是欧洲大陆必须在危机时期密切合作，而不是被保护主义、竞相贬值和驱逐移民搞得四分五裂。


Similarly, the euro must not be allowed to become an Iron Curtain that consigns non-members to a high-risk zone where investors dare not venture.	同样，不能允许欧元成为一块铁幕，致使没有加入欧元体系的国家成为投资者不敢涉足的高风险地区。


For Ukraine, Europe can help by embracing the free-trade agreement that we are now negotiating.	欧洲可以接纳我们正在谈判的自由贸易协定来对乌克兰给予帮助。


Coupled with our successful membership in the World Trade Organization, Ukraine would stand to benefit when world and European trade begins to recover.	再加上成功加入世界贸易组织，乌克兰将在欧洲贸易开始复苏的时候从中获得好处。


Europe can also consider using various stabilization funds to help our economy through the crisis that we are all enduring.	欧洲还可以考虑使用各式稳定基金帮助我们的经济度过这场共同的危机。


I do not ask for these things out of a narrow concern for my country’s health.	我提出上述建议并非只是为了狭隘的国家利益。


Just as the US Federal Reserve has engaged in credit and currency swaps with Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and South Korea and other countries to ease their access to the dollars they need, the European Central Bank must offer such swap arrangements to Europe’s non-euro countries in order for trade and production processes to continue.	就像美联储与巴西、墨西哥、新加坡、南韩以及其他国家进行信贷和货币兑换来满足他们对美元的需求一样，欧洲央行也必须为欧洲的非欧元国家提供这样的兑换选择，以确保贸易和生产程序能够继续下去。


Yes, these are dark times, and all politicians want to protect their voters.	是的，在目前这样的黑暗时刻，所有政治家都希望保护本国投票者。


But Europe’s greatest postwar leaders understood that keeping the wider view of Europe in mind is the best way to achieve this goal.	但欧洲最伟大的战后领袖理解时刻不能忘记，欧洲的整体利益是实现上述目标的最佳方法。


As at so many times before, now – with all of our economies in peril – is a moment for decisive French leadership.	就像以前曾多次出现过的情形一样，现在——当我们所有的国家全部陷入危难——正是需要法国挺身而出、果断领导的时刻。


France’s Identity Politics	法国的身份政治


One big surprise of the current presidential campaign in France is how “national identity” has surged to the forefront of the political debate.	目前正在法国进行的总统竞选中的一大意外是“民族身份”如何进入了政治辩论的最前沿。


During the 1995 presidential campaign, the main issues were unemployment and social divisions.	在1995年的总统竞选中，主要论题是失业和社会分化。


In 2002, the priority was security.	在2002年，安全则是重中之重。


But the three main candidates this time around – Nicolas Sarkozy, Ségolène Royal, and François Bayrou – have given an entirely different shape to this campaign.	但这一届的三位总统候选人—尼古拉•塞尔科奇, 赛格琳•罗亚尔, 和弗朗索瓦•贝鲁—却令竞选活动呈现出全然不同的情况。


Sarkozy, for example, proposes to establish a ministry of immigration and national identity.	比如，塞尔科奇就提议组建一个“移民与民族身份部”。


Likewise, while Royal carefully maintains the distinction between nation and nationalism, she is drifting away from the Socialist Party’s old embrace of The Internationale , instead defending La Marseillaise and suggesting that all citizens should display a French flag on the National Day.	同样，虽然罗亚尔谨慎地保持着民族和民族主义之间的泾渭分明，但她也正与社会党唱诵的“国际歌”渐行渐远，反而捍卫起“马赛曲”，并建议所有的公民都应该在国庆日悬挂法国国旗。


Bayrou criticizes the “nationalist obsession” of his competitors, but he supports abrogating the jus soli (the right to obtain French nationality by birth) for people from the French island of Mayotte, owing to massive inflows of pregnant women to the island.	贝鲁虽然批评其竞争对手的“民族主义痴迷”，但却支持取消法属Mayotte岛居民的 jus soli （即通过出生获得法国国籍的权利）。 其原因是大量的外籍孕妇涌入该岛。


For his part, the far-right leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, says that he is very happy with this evolution.	极右派领导人Jean-Marie Le Pen则表示对这种变化感到高兴。


Indeed, the debate over national identity is nothing new.	的确，关于民族身份的辩论并不新鲜了。


The problem is that French identity has always been made up of contradictory and sometimes adversarial elements, such as France’s Catholic and secular traditions, its revolutionary ideology and conservative inclinations, and the cultural outlooks of its rural and working-class citizens.	问题是法国身份从来就是由相互矛盾、甚至有时相互敌对的元素构成的，比如法国的天主教和世俗传统、它的革命意识形态和保守倾向，以及关于农村和工人阶级公民的文化观点。


The historian Ernest Renan, who pondered about national identity after France’s 1871 defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, has defined the nation as a “soul” made up of two parts.	法国在普法战争中落败后，历史学家Ernest Renan对（法国人的）民族身份进行了反思。 他将这个民族定义为由两部分组成的“灵魂”。


One part, the “rich inheritance of memories,” is rooted in the past, while the other, related to the present and opening the way to the future, consists in the common will of citizens to build their public life together.	一部分，“记忆的丰富遗产”是植根于过去。 而另一部分，与现在相关并通往未来，是以公民共同建造公共生活的普遍意愿为构成要素的。


Renan gave priority to this will for a common life over any ethnic definition and set the French idea of the nation in direct contrast to the almost racial notion of people (Volk) that dominates the German tradition.	Renan将这种共同生活的意愿置于一切族性定义之上，并将法国的民族理念与主导德国传统的近乎种族主义的民族 (Volk) 概念进行直接的对比。


In this view, national identity, is a “spiritual concept” based on a common history and set of values.	在这种观点看来，民族身份是一个基于共同历史和一套价值观的“精神概念”。


Some of these values are rooted in a kind of secular Christianity, and others in the Enlightenment’s revolutionary beliefs about human rights, equality, the French language, secular schooling, and the idea that the state is responsible for the common interest and application of republican principles.	有些价值观是植根于一种世俗的基督教，而其它的则源自启蒙运动中关于人权、平等、法语、世俗教育以及国家要对共同利益及共和原则的实施负责的理念的革命信仰。


It is this view of national identity – one that transcends race, color, origin and religion – that is now disputed.	现今引发争议的正是这个超越了种族、肤色、原籍和宗教的民族身份观点。


The identity crisis now roiling France is fueled by the conjunction of many factors: globalization, which produces uncertainty, the European Union, which curtails the freedom of national leaders, American strategic dominance, which has reduced France’s position in the world, and the rising Asian powers.	还有很多其它的因素为法国这场涌动的身份认同危机火上浇油：制造不明确因素的全球化，剥夺国家领导人自由的欧盟，削弱了法国在世界上的地位的美国战略优势和亚洲强国的崛起。


This represents a serious challenge to thinkers who sometimes ridicule the idea of the nation itself, arguing that we now inhabit a “post-national” world.	这代表着一种对于一部分思想家的严肃挑战。 他们有时嘲讽民族的概念本身，认为我们现在生活在一个“后民族”的世界。


For them, national identity should be abandoned in favor of a European identity, even if the feeling of belonging to Europe is not deeply held among the peoples of the EU.	对于他们而言，即便欧盟的各民族并没有形成对欧洲的强烈归属感，民族身份也应该被摒弃从而有利于欧洲身份的确立。


Instead, the link between identity and immigration, an old refrain of the far right, remains strong, and the issue has grown more heated because of France’s inability to develop an effective policy to integrate immigrants from Africa.	相反，作为极右派一直固守的观点，身份与移民之间仍然有很强的联系。 由于法国未能出台一套行之有效的融合非洲移民的政策，使得这一问题更趋白热化。


Making matters worse, while religion and culture have traditionally been restricted to the personal sphere in France, some religious demands have intruded into public life, as demonstrated by the disputes over Muslim girls’ wearing of veils in schools.	更有甚者，虽然宗教和文化在法国传统上被限制在个人范畴里，但正如关于穆斯林女孩在学校佩戴面纱的争议所反映出的那样，一些宗教要求也已经侵入了公共生活。


The problem of the link between national identity and cultural pluralism is now surfacing in nearly the same way in the United Kingdom, Holland, and Denmark – countries that, contrary to France, long ago chose a policy of multiculturalism.	民族身份与文化多元论之间的联系问题现在也几乎正以同样的方式在英国、荷兰和丹麦出现—与法国相反，这些国家长久以来就选择了多元文化主义的政策。


In the United States, a country of huge immigration, communities can bring together a strong cultural identity and a deeply engrained patriotism.	在美国这样一个移民众多的国家，族群能聚集起一种强大的文化认同和根深蒂固的爱国主义。


It has been the same in France, which has been built by successive waves of immigrants.	在由一波又一波的移民浪潮建立起来的法国，情况也是如此。


But, contrary to the US, integration in France is not based on assimilation, but on a desire to promote homogeneity – the nation unified as “one and indivisible.”	但与美国相反，法国的一体化不是基于归化，而是基于促进同一性（homogeneity）的愿望—这个国家以“一个不可分割”的方式统一起来。


Today, in a world changed by globalization, France must face the difficult challenge posed by its new immigrants: maintaining the principles at the core of French identity while meeting the desire of some of its new citizens to maintain their own identity, which may in fact oppose some of those principles.	当今，在这个被全球化改变的世界，法国必须面对新移民带来的严峻挑战：坚持法兰西身份核心的原则同时满足一部分新公民保持自己身份的愿望，而这种愿望实际上可能与某些原则背道而驰。


Today’s debate over national identity arises from this tension, so it’s not surprising that it has become a central issue of the presidential campaign.	当今关于民族��份的辩论来自于这种压力，所以它成为总统竞选的中心议题也就不足为奇了。


But what is at stake in that debate are values that not only built France, but that also have built and will continue to build Europe.	但在这场辩论中岌岌可危的，是那些不仅建立了法国，还已经建立了并将继续打造欧洲的价值观。


France’s Judicial Revolution	法国的司法革命


PARIS – A new and important acronym has entered the French political lexicon: QPC, which stands for the rather austere-sounding “Priority preliminary ruling on the question of constitutionality.”	巴黎——QPC作为一个重要而崭新的缩写已经被收录进法国的政治词汇，它所代表的涵义是相当严肃的“优先初步裁决合宪性问题”。


Under QPC, which was part of the constitutional reforms that France implemented in July 2008, any citizen involved in legal proceedings can now contest the constitutionality of a legislative provision.	QPC是2008年7月法国宪政改革的组成部分，按照它的规定，参与法律诉讼的任何公民现在都有权就某项法律规定的合宪性提出质疑。


This is a far-reaching innovation.	这是一项影响深远的创举。


France has long been characterized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s philosophy, which placed the law – the expression of the General Will – at the absolute top of the hierarchy of judicial norms.	法国很久以来以让·雅克·卢梭的哲学体系为特色，一直把公意的代表，也就是法律尊奉为最高等级的司法规范。


As a result, a veritable allergy to assessing the constitutionality of any law has long held sway.	因此，对评估法律合宪与否的敏感性一直主导着法国人的思维。


Not until Charles de Gaulle’s 1958 Constitution was even a limited assessment of a law by the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) allowed, and then only with extensive precautions.	1958年查尔斯·戴高乐版宪法之前甚至连宪政委员会对法律进行有限度的评估都不被允许，这之后对法律合宪性的评估也只能小心翼翼。


Indeed, the Constitutional Council made its assessments a priori, one month after adoption of the law, and only four officials could initiate a review: the president, the prime minister, and the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate.	事实上，宪政委员会的评估是一种预先评估，时间就选择在法律通过后的一个月，而且只有总统、总理、国民议会和参议院主席等四名官员有权发起审阅。


This list was broadened in 1974 to include any 60 members of the National Assembly or the Senate, thus allowing the opposition to submit the laws adopted through parliamentary majority to some examination of their constitutionality.	有权审阅者的名单在1974年扩展到国民议会或者参议院的60位议员，反对派也由此获准将议会多数票通过的法律提交合宪性验证。


But the idea that any citizen could challenge the constitutionality of legislation, as is possible in many European countries and the United States, was inconceivable.	虽然在欧洲很多国家和美国任何公民都有权对法律的合宪性提出疑问，但这在法国却的确有些匪夷所思。


The 2008 constitutional reform finally recognized this possibility.	2008年的宪政改革最终承认了这种可能性。


But a double filter of safeguards was established: the jurisdiction before which the matter is brought, and the competent Supreme Court – either the Council of State [Conseil d’État] or the Final Court of Appeal – which has three months to decide whether to refer a case to the Constitutional Council.	但也为此设置了双重保障性过滤：提交合宪调查的司法辖区，和具备管辖权的最高法院——国务委员会[行政法院]或终审法院——它们有三个月时间决定是否向宪政委员会提交相关案例。


One year after its implementation in March 2010, the reform has shown impressive results.	自2010年3月实施一年后，改革取得了引人瞩目的成果。


Of the 400 cases examined by both Supreme Courts, 120 were referred to the Constitutional Council, which has issued 102 rulings, including 22 striking down the challenged legislation.	在最高法院审查的400起案例中，有120起被提交到宪政委员会，委员会共发布102次裁决，其中有22次推翻了受到质疑的法律。


The reform has allowed the Constitutional Council to reconsider a whole set of laws that had never before been submitted for constitutional review, mainly because they were drafted prior to 1958.	改革授权宪政委员会重新审议一系列从未进行过合宪性审议的法律，主要原因是这些法律都是1958年之前通过的。


One of the most emblematic decisions concerned the code of criminal procedure, with the Council repealing several articles concerning the legal custody of defendants inside police stations.	其中最具代表性的决定涉及到刑事诉讼法，具体地讲是委员会撤销了在警署内合法羁押被告的几项规定。


Other decisions have dealt with taxation, social legislation, or electoral laws.	其他决定涉及税收、社会立法或选举法等领域。


But nothing has done as much to cement the QPC’s standing as the recent motion submitted by a lawyer in the ongoing criminal proceedings against former President Jacques Chirac, who is charged with having created fictitious jobs at the Paris City Council when he was mayor.	但最能巩固QPC地位的是一位律师在最近一起刑事诉讼中针对前总统雅克·希拉克所提出的动议，希拉克被控在担任市长期间在巴黎市议会凭空捏造虚拟的工作机会。


The Court’s President complied with the lawyer’s motion to adjourn the proceedings until the Constitutional Council ruled on the constitutionality of the laws under which Chirac is charged.	法院院长支持由该律师提出的动议，即在宪政委员会就涉及希拉克被控法律的合宪性做出裁决之前暂停进行诉讼程序。


We will find out in the coming weeks whether the Cour de Cassation (Court of Final Appeal) will agree to refer the matter to the Council.	我们将在今后几周看到法国最高法院（终审法院）就是否将此案提交委员会做出的裁决。


France is thus joining the cohort of countries that, over the past half-century or so, have developed within their legal culture a judicial form of constitutional review of legislation.	有些国家在过去半个世纪时间里，已经成功地在其法律文化内部建立起对法律合宪性进行审查的司法形式，法国也幸运地位列其中之一。


Indeed, in June 2009, Germany’s Constitutional Court strengthened its political role by demanding that ratification of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty be accompanied by a law warranting powers of co-decision to the German Parliament.	事实上，在2009年6月，德国宪法法院要求批准《欧盟里斯本条约》的条件是出台授予德国议会共同决策权的法律，德国宪法法院的政治属性也由此得以强化。


More recently, in October 2009, the United Kingdom, despite having no written constitution, replaced its supreme judicial body, which sat in the House of Lords, with a Supreme Court.	其后的2009年10月，虽然英国并不存在成文宪法，但仍然用最高法院取代了设在上议院的最高司法机构。


The recent legal revolution in France is no less important, even if it is still in a transitional phase.	即使仍处在过渡阶段，但法国近来的法律革命有着丝毫不亚于前者的重要意义。


With the QPC, the entire process of assessing the constitutionality of legislation has gained greater acceptance in French legal practice.	有了QPC制度，法国在法律实践上已基本承认了评估法律合宪性的完整程序。


It is no longer the privilege of the political class: testing a law for its constitutionality has become a right of all citizens.	检验法律合宪与否的权利已不再专属于政界，而是全体民众所共有的权利。


At the same time, after one year of implementation, the Constitutional Council has avoided a drift toward a “government of judges,” instead indicating a genuine desire for dialogue with other institutions, notably policymakers.	同时在政策执行一年后，宪政委员会已成功避免了走向“法官政府”，而是表达了与其他机构，特别是决策者共同探讨的真诚希冀。


For example, when answering a request to deal with marriage and the right of homosexual couples regarding adoption, the Council refused to substitute itself for the legislature, which it considered the only competent body to rule on the matter.	比方说在答复婚姻和涉及同性恋夫妇收养权问题的申诉时，委员会拒绝代替立法机构做出决定，因为在它看来后者才真正有权就此事做出裁决。


And when the Constitutional Council does censure a law, it leaves Parliament the time it needs to review the decision and bring the law into compliance with the Constitution.	当宪政委员会实际审核法律时，它会给议会留下足够的时间来审核决策，并让法律合乎宪法的规定。


Thus, an equilibrium of sorts between constitutional review and a concern not to cause excessive legal instability has been found.	这样，我们就在合宪性审议和避免法律过度动荡之间达到了平衡。


As the Constitutional Council gets closer to functioning like a Supreme Court, its membership, still heavily influenced by politics, will need to be reassessed.	随着宪政委员会的作用越来越贴近最高法院，我们要重新评估仍受政治显著影响的委员会成员的资质。


But a huge step has now been taken towards anchoring all laws in the Constitution, which will strengthen the protection of all citizens’ rights.	但我们已经向将所有法律纳入宪法体系迈出了重要的一步，而这样做可以更好地保护所有公民的权利。


France’s Path Not Taken	走不通的法国道路


The new president of France, be it Nicolas Sarkozy or Ségolène Royal, will face a tough challenge when it comes to putting the French economy back on its feet.	无论是萨尔科奇还是罗亚尔当选法国总统在让法国经济重振雄风上都将会面对严峻的挑战。


While the world economy is booming for the fourth consecutive year, with a historically unprecedented growth rate of about 5%, the French economy is limping.	世界经济连续第四年蓬勃发展，增长率达到历史上前所未有的5％，而法国经济却举步维艰。 2006年，法国经济只增长了2.


In 2006, it grew by only 2.2%, while growth rates of only 2.1% and 1.9% can be expected for 2007 and 2008, respectively, according to a recent forecast by the German Economic Research Institutes.	2％，而根据德国经济研究所所做的最新预测，预计2007年和2008年的增长率相应只有2. 1％和1.


This is significantly below the average of the old EU countries for these three years – 2.7%, 2.6%, and 2.4%, respectively.	这些要比老欧盟国家这三年的平均水平低很多，它们的增长率相应为2. 7％、2.


France is currently one of Europe’s laggards, only slightly ahead of Italy and Portugal.	法国目前是欧洲的落后者，只比意大利和葡萄牙略微靠前一点。 即使是德国也表现更好。


Even Germany is performing better.	德国经济的增长率为2.


With a growth rate of 2.7%, the German economy clawed its way back to the average of the old EU countries in 2006, and it can be expected to grow at 2.4% in 2007 and 2008, far faster than France.	7％，在2006年回到了老欧盟国家的平均水平，而且预计可以在2007年和2008年增长2. 4％，远远快于法国。


France’s meager growth is surprising.	法国微弱的增长令人吃惊。


Until recently, the economy was doing fairly well, outperforming many EU countries.	直到最近，法国经济还是表现良好，超出许多欧盟国家。


While Germany grew by only 14% in the ten years from 1995 to 2005, ranking as Europe’s “vice-laggard” next to Italy, France grew by 23.6%, which was nearly the old EU countries’ average of 24.3%.	德国经济从1995年到2005年只增长14％，成为意大利之后的欧洲“第二落后者”。 法国经济则增长23.


In 2001, France’s gross national income per capita overtook that of Germany, and is now 4% higher.	6％，接近老欧盟国家平均水平24. 3％。


And yet recent growth figures seem to have reversed this trend for the time being.	在2001年，法国的人均国民收入毛值超越德国，现在则超过4％。 但是最近的增长数字目前看起来扭转了这一趋势。


French employment data has been worrisome for even longer.	法国的就业数据在甚至更长的一段时间里都令人担忧。


In 2006, France’s unemployment rate was 9.4%, a full percentage point higher than Germany’s.	在2006年，法国的失业率是9. 4％，要比德国的高出整整一个百分点。


By 2008, the French rate can be expected to decline only to 8.2%, while German unemployment is anticipated to fall to 6.3%.	到2008年，法国的失业率预计只会下降到8. 2％，而德国的失业率预计会下降到6.


A similar pattern holds for public debt.	公共债务方面模式也是如此。


While Germany has resolved its debt problem insofar as it no longer violates the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact and can be expected to have a balanced budget in 2008, the forecasts for France imply deficits of 2.6% and 2.3% of GDP for this year and 2008.	德国解决了它的债务问题，从而不再违反欧盟稳定和增长公约，预计可以在2008年实现预算平衡，而对法国的预测则为今年会有相当于GDP2. 6％的赤字，2008年为2.


If the boom in the world economy falters, France will again violate the Stability and Growth Pact, as it did in 2002, 2003, and 2004.	3％。 如果世界经济繁荣终结，法国将会像2002年、2003年以及2004年那样再一次违反稳定和增长公约。


Why are France and Germany behaving so differently during this global boom?	为何法国和德国在这一次全球繁荣中的表现如此迥异呢？


Among the potential explanations, the dissimilar specializations of each country stand out.	在可能的解释当中，各国不同的专业分工比较突出。


While France has specialized in consumer goods such as food and pharmaceutical products, Germany is a leading exporter of investment goods.	法国专长于类似食品和医药产品等消费品，德国则是投资产品的主要出口国。


As the current boom in the world economy is largely fueled by investment demand rather consumption demand, only Germany profits from it to full measure.	由于当前世界经济繁荣主要是由投资需求而不是消费需求推动，因此只有德国在最大程度上获益。


Germany is the tool-shop of the world, with 450 world market leaders in niche products and another 500 companies in the top-three category.	德国是世界工具店。 它有450家领先全球的公司以及500家处于世界前三位的公司。


Fifteen of the world’s 20 biggest trade fairs (measured by indoor exhibition space) are held in Germany, and the country tops the list in world commodity exports.	全世界最大的20个交易会（由室内展出面积衡量）有25个在德国举办，而且德国也在自然资源出口商位居首位。


Small wonder, then, that Germany’s economy rockets when the world’s demand for capital goods soars.	难怪德国经济在世界对资本产品需求猛增的情况下大幅上升。


True, Germany has its share of problems.	当然，德国也有其自身的问题。


The country is gradually turning into an industrial bazaar that is relocating its workbench to low-wage ex-communist countries.	这个国家正在逐步转变为一个产业集市，将其生产转向低工资的前共产主义国家。


This is one of the reasons why the boom of 2006 was incapable of creating additional jobs in German manufacturing; why Germany still has the OECD’s highest unemployment among low-skilled workers; and why aggregate full-time employment has not yet returned to its level in 2000.	这也是为何2006年的经济繁荣并没有在德国的制造业创造新的就业岗位、为何德国还是在经合组织中低技能工人的失业率最高以及为何总体全职就业率还没有恢复到其2000年水平的原因之一。


The French economy could be slightly more stable in the medium term insofar as it seems to have more solid internal sectors.	法国经济在中期内有可能会稍微更为稳定，因为它的国内部门更为坚实。


But Germany definitely is partaking more of the current boom than France does.	但是德国无疑要比法国从当前的繁荣中获益更多。


Perhaps one French mistake was to neglect its small and medium-size firms and specialize too much on state-controlled mega-companies.	也许，法国的错误之一就是忽视了其中小型企业，并且过于专注于国家控制的巨型公司。


Airbus, Renault, Crédit Lyonnais, and Alstom are well-known examples of a mistaken industrial policy that has wasted French taxpayers’ money – and that is partly connected with the name Sarkozy.	空中客车、雷诺、里昂信贷以及阿尔斯托姆是错误的产业政策中著名的例子。 这一政策浪费了法国纳税人的金钱，而且部分地与萨尔科奇的名字有关联。


The true problem for France is the huge chunk of state-owned companies that go through the motions without being particularly successful in the market.	法国的实际问题是占据大量份额的国有公司。 这些公司仅仅是走过场而并没有在市场上取得特别的成功。


In France, 25% of dependent employees work in the government sector, compared with 19% in the old EU and 12% in Germany.	在法国，25％的雇员在政府部门工作，与此相比，老欧盟的比例是19％，德国为12％。


The French government share in GDP is 54%, while Germany’s is only 47%.	法国政府在GDP中的份额是54％，而德国只有47％。


In France, more than 7% of voters cast their ballots for Trotskyite and Communist candidates in the first round of the presidential election, while the Socialists, who received 27% of the votes, are much more left-leaning than Germany’s Social Democrats.	在法国的第一轮总统选举投票中，超过7％的选民投票给托洛斯基派和共产党候选人，社会党获得27％的选票，而该党要比德国的社民党远远更为偏左。


Dirigiste attitudes are more popular in France than in most other European countries.	国家指导的态度在法国要比绝大多数其他欧洲国家更为受到欢迎。


To the extent that these attitudes may have led to a political system in which small and medium-size firms find it difficult to flourish, they may have contributed to France’s problems.	只要这些态度可能导致一种使得中小企业难以繁荣发展的政治制度，它们就可能导致法国的问题。


It remains to be seen whether the new French president will be able to embark on a more promising course.	法国新总统是否能够走上一条更为有前途的道路还需拭目以待。


The odds are not good.	前景并不看好。


Royal will do nothing to increase the flexibility of the French labor market so as to facilitate structural change and enable new firms to be created, while Sarkozy is likely to continue to support France’s lumbering giants, as he as done so frequently in the past.	罗亚尔不会为增加法国的劳动力市场的灵活性以便促进结构性变革以及开创新的公司作社麽事，而萨尔科奇则有可能继续支持法国迟缓的巨型企业，正如他过去经常所做的那样。


Sound policy aimed at reviving the economy seems beyond the grasp of both candidates.	这两名候选人好像都没有掌握目的在于重振经济的有效政策。


France’s Presidential Reality Show	法国的总统真人秀


The Socialists’ anointment of Ségolène Royal’s as their presidential candidate is an important step on the road to the Fifth Republic’s eighth presidential election, which is set for April 22, 2007, with a second-round runoff two weeks later.	社会党把赛格莱娜·罗亚尔（Ségolène Royal）推举为总统候选人是第五共和国第八届总统选举中的一个重要步骤，竞选时间定于2007年4月22日，并将在两个星期后举行第二轮决选。


All candidates should be known by the end of January – the deadline for printing the ballots.	候选人报名将截止到1月底，那也是选票印刷的最后期限。


So, by that point, France’s four main political parties, two on the left and two on the right, must prepare their party manifestoes and choose candidates.	因此，到那个时候，法国四个主要政党，包括两个左翼党派和两个右翼党派，必须发表各自的党派宣言并推举候选人。


That, at least, is how the system is supposed to work in theory.	至少在理论上，竞选体系是这样运作的。


In practice, while the official campaign is supposed to last only two months (long enough in a democracy, in which candidates have to endure an unrelenting media barrage), the jockeying of potential candidates, together with the media’s appetite for a horse race, helped kick off the real campaign nearly a year and a half ago.	而实际上，尽管官方竞选活动本应只持续两个月（两个月的时间在民主社会里已经足够，因为候选人无一例外地需要面对媒体毫不留情的诘难），但在潜在候选者的操纵和媒体观看赛马般的浓厚兴趣的驱动下，真正的竞选序幕早在一年半以前就已经拉开。


So today’s public debates have a somewhat surreal character, because the programs on which the candidates will stake their campaigns are still not developed.	因此今天的公众辩论就有些超现实主义的味道，因为支撑候选人竞选的计划至今还没有成型。


In their absence, personality and style, not political programs, have proven decisive.	没有了竞选计划，起决定作用的就不是政治纲领，而是个性和为人处世的方式。


I am not sure this is good for democracy, but that’s the way it is.	我不知道这对民主是否有利，但这的确是事实。


Two such stylish personalities have so far commandeered the public opinion polls, and appear destined to meet in the second round.	迄今为止，两位这样的时髦人物雄踞民意调查榜首，他们似乎注定要在第二轮选举中相遇。


On the right is Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister (and briefly the economy minister), whose political rise took place within the grab-bag framework of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP).	代表右翼的是尼古拉·萨尔科奇（Nicolas Sarkozy），尼古拉曾经担任过内政部长（还曾在短期内担任过经济部长），他是在法国人民运动联盟(UMP)各色人物混杂的构架中获得了政治上的晋升。


The UMP is the political heir of Gaullism, but its ideological inconsistency is legendary – and reflected in party name changes every eight to ten years.	法国人民运动联盟在政治上继承了戴高乐主义的衣钵，但在意识形态上的不同却显而易见¾这从该党每隔8到10年要更改一次党名即可见一斑。


Sarkozy is philosophically a conservative, but an ultra-liberal on economic issues, making him totally foreign to the Gaullist tradition.	萨尔科奇是保守主义哲学的忠实追随者，在经济问题上却信奉极端自由主义，这使他的观点与传统的戴高乐主义格格不入。


Preaching privatization and social repression, he has placed himself to the right of the right, hoping to take back the votes that the mainstream right has been losing to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s “fascistoid” National Front for the past 20 years.	鼓吹私有化和社会镇压的他比右派分子还右派分子，盼望着能够借此赢回主流右翼势力近20年来在让·马利·勒庞（Jean-Marie Le Pen）领导的国民阵线（National Front）手中所失去的选票。


Sarkozy imposed himself on the Gaullist movement against the will of President Jacques Chirac; indeed, he snatched the presidency of the UMP despite Chirac’s active opposition.	萨尔科奇不顾雅克·希拉克总统的意愿自诩为戴高乐运动的一员，实际上，他在希拉克的强烈反对下攫取了法国人民运动联盟的领袖地位。


Much of the public likes his raw language and harsh criticism of the rest of the right, notably of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, but above all of Chirac.	多数公众喜欢他用粗俗而尖刻的语言抨击包括法国总理多米尼克·德维尔潘（Dominique de Villepin）在内的其他右派人士，尤其喜欢听他攻击希拉克。


He knows nothing about international affairs, but no one seems to hold it against him.	他对国际事务一无所知，但这似乎并未影响民众对他的好感。


On the left, Royal, the Socialist president of the region of Poitou-Charentes, has scant government experience, serving brief stints as environment minister, family minister, and education minister.	左派方面，普瓦图·夏朗德省的社会党领袖罗亚尔没有多少从政经验，只是临时就任过环境、家庭和教育部长。


The anger of the Socialist Party’s barons at Royal’s rise was amusing to observe.	体味社会党权力人物对罗亚尔崛起的愤怒是一件有趣的事情。


She has yet to deal with the major problems of the day – financial instability, Europe’s sluggish growth, the Middle East – and she cannot avoid them during her campaign.	她还没有正面接触到当今的主要问题¾金融动荡、欧洲经济发展迟缓、中东冲突¾这些问题她在竞选中将不可避免地要一一面对。


But, full of elegance and charm, and treating social problems with good sense and energy, she has topped public opinion polls for over a year.	但凭借着自身的优雅和魅力，以及对待社会问题的积极和睿智，一年以来她一直在民意测验中遥遥领先。


So Sarkozy and Royal are universally expected to be the two leading candidates heading into the “High Noon” encounter of the second round.	因此，人们普遍看好萨尔科奇和罗亚尔将蟾宫折桂，进入第二轮竞选的“正午”对决。


But, judging from the past, this is not how French politics works.	但过去的经验告诉我们，这并不是法国政治所遵循的运行轨迹。


Ever since de Gaulle, all candidates for the French presidency who started too early have lost.	从戴高乐开始，过早发力的法国总统候选人无不功败垂成。


Poher, Chaban-Delmas, Barre, Balladur, and I were picked out by the media and treated as candidates for more than two years before the election, whether declared or not, and we were all eventually beaten.	波厄（Poher）、沙邦·戴尔马（Chaban-Delmas）、巴利（Barre）、巴拉迪尔（Balladur）还有我本人都在选举开始前两年就被媒体或明或暗地定为夺标热门，但我们最终都逃脱不了失败的厄运。


My own feeling is that the bombardment by the media is of such violence that the credibility of a candidate cannot endure for more than a few weeks.	我本人的感觉是：媒体的轮番轰炸太过血腥，任何候选人的可信度在这样密集的攻势下都坚持不了几个星期就会变得千疮百孔。


Overexposure hurts.	过度曝光会毁掉你的政治前途。


So in this bizarre dance, where the big parties and important candidates know that it is better to start later, the real beneficiaries of today’s media circus are the candidates without any real chance of winning: a fascist, another extreme rightist, a communist, two Trotskyites, and a few other marginal personalities.	于是在这个奇特的舞台上，大党派和重要候选人都知道应该晚点上场，那些本来没有获胜希望的人就成了今天媒体把戏的真正受益者：一个法西斯分子，一个极右分子、一个共产主义分子、两个托洛茨基分子，还有其他几个边缘人物。


They are candidates only in order to benefit from two years of free publicity.	他们是从两年的自由宣传中坐收渔翁之利的典型代表。


But those minor candidates underscore a deeper problem.	但那些次要参选者突出了一个深层次问题。


To be elected President of France, one needs more than charisma, a good program, and a strong political party.	为了当选法国总统，你需要的不只是感召力、周密的计划和强有力的党派支持。


One also must avoid the fragmentation that doomed the left in 2002, when none of its six candidates qualified for the second round, leaving Jacques Chirac, who had received 19% of the vote in the first round – a record low for a final winner – to defeat Jean-Marie Le Pen in the runoff with 82% of the vote.	你还必须避免2002年左派那样的分裂，当时6位左派候选人全军覆没，没有一个进入到第二轮，从而使在首轮选举中只赢得19%选票的希拉克在决选阶段以82%的得票击败了让·马利·勒庞，这创下了最终获胜者在首轮选举中最低的得票记录。


The most openly conservative French government of the past decade was essentially elected by the left.	左翼党派实际上选出了近10年来最为保守的法国政府。


A repeat of this scenario seems possible: on the left, outside of the Socialist Party, there are already four announced candidates, and a fifth is likely.	这种情况可能再次发生：左翼方面，除社会党之外，已经有四名候选人公开参选，并且还可能继续增加。


On the right, Chirac’s antagonism toward Sarkozy makes it that another candidate will appear at some point, either Michele Alliot-Marie, the defense minister, or Chirac himself.	而右翼方面，希拉克对萨尔科奇的敌意会在一定阶段导致另一位候选人的出现，这个人可能是国防部长米谢勒·阿利奥·马里（Michele Alliot-Marie），也可能就是希拉克本人。


At this point, the main point to remember is that all of France’s last seven presidential elections have sprung a surprise.	此时人们要记住一点：那就是过去的七次法国总统选举结果都出人意外。


The final result was never discernible in the polls more than six weeks in advance.	大选六个星期以前进行的民意测验永远不能代表最终的结果。


So, for the moment, the election is too far off to know or predict anything with certainty.	因此从目前看，对选举做出任何肯定的预测还为时尚早。


What we hear is idle speculation.	我们听到的预测都毫无意义。


But at least the media are doing brisk business, and we are being entertained.	不过至少媒体的生意红红火火，人们从铺天盖地的报导中得到了乐趣。


France’s Royal Visage	法国的罗雅尔面庞


Ségolenè Royal has surged to the front of the pack of Socialists who aim to succeed Jacques Chirac as President of France.	在一大群打算接替希拉克成为法国总统的社会党人士中，罗雅尔已经一马当先。


Nobody would have bet a single euro on such a prospect a few months ago.	几个月前，没有人会给这样的一个局面投下一欧元的赌注。


Until recently, Royal – who now is merely the head of one France’s 22 regional governments – was best known as the non-married partner of François Hollande, the Socialist Party leader.	罗雅尔只不过是法国22个行政区政府首领。 知道最近，人们还是只是知道她是社会党领导人奥朗德的非婚伴侣。


Yet, according to the polls, she is the only left-leaning candidate who looks able to defeat Nicolas Sarkozy, the current Interior Minister and odds-on favorite to be the center-right’s standard bearer in the presidential election next May.	但是民意调查显示，她是左翼候选人中唯一能够击败现任内政部长以及明年五月总统大选中右翼有望获胜的旗手萨尔科奇的左翼候选人。


How did Royal rise so far and so fast?	罗雅尔为何上升如此之高，如此之快？


One reason is that she is the only fresh face among those Socialists vying for the party nomination.	一个原因是她是那些竞争党内提名的社会党人中唯一的新面孔。


Laurent Fabius, Martine Aubry, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Jack Lang, and even Hollande are all former senior ministers who neutralized each other, while Lionel Jospin, the former Prime Minister, decided to put an end to his political career after his defeat in 2002.	法比尤斯、奥布雷、斯特劳斯卡恩、雅克朗甚至是奥朗德都是前任资深部长，相互中和； 而若斯潘则在2002年竞选失败后决定结束其政治生涯。


Each of them has strengths and weaknesses, but none seems able to challenge Sarkozy.	他们每个人均各有千秋，但是没有人可以和萨尔科奇势均力敌。


Indeed, confronted with her lead, both Jospin and Hollande have dropped out of the race.	实际上，在她的领先面前，若斯潘和奥朗德都推出了竞选。


So there was a vacuum to fill, accompanied by a strong desire among the party faithful for revival.	因此就出现了一个需要填补的真空，与此同时，社会党信徒强烈要求洗心革面。


Royal’s chief virtue is that she has not taken part in the numerous internal battles that infuriate socialist militants and voters, and her lack of direct association with the party’s leadership has enabled her to avoid blame for its mistakes.	罗雅尔的主要优点是她没有参与到难以计数的内部纷争之中，这些纷争激怒了社会党强硬派和选民。 她与该党领导人之间没有直接的联系也可以使她避免为其错误受到指责。


That is why, far from being a disadvantage, her peripheral position is one of her main assets.	这就是为什么她的边缘立场不仅不是弱点，反而是其主要优势之一。


She has slim and politically minor ministerial experience – Environment Minister in 1992-1993, Deputy Minister for Secondary Education in 1997-2000, and Minister for Family Affairs in 2000-2002 – and has drawn attention mainly for her work on subjects related to daily problems, such as kids’ TV programs and mistreatment in schools.	她的政府部长经历并不多，而且在政治上也并不关键。 她在1992年至1993年任环境部长，1997年至2000年任中等教育副部长，2000年至2002年任家庭事务部部长。


But, while other politicians do not regard these matters as politically important, they mean a lot to most ordinary citizens.	这些经历让人们关注于其在日常生活问题的工作，例如儿童电视节目以及学校里的不良待遇问题。


That is why people tend to view her as a sincere politician, rather than one concerned only about personal ambition.	尽管其他政客并不认为这些事情在政治上是重要的，但是，它们对于普通民众而言却很重要。 这就是为什么人们趋向于把她视为一个真诚的、而不是只关心个人野心的政治家。


On security issues and education, Royal differs from the classical left, being something of a hardliner.	在安全和教育问题上，罗雅尔与传统的左派不同，略有强硬。


This, too, is an advantage in a country where security is the top priority for most people nowadays.	这在一个对于大多数人来说安全是首要问题的国家来说是一个优势。


A mother of four children who proclaims to believe in traditional family values, she is attractive to right-wing voters, while her non-matrimonial relationship with Hollande makes her seem a quintessentially modern woman.	她是四个孩子的母亲，宣传相信传统家庭价值观，对于右翼选民很有吸引力； 而其与奥朗德的非婚关系则让她显得是一个典型的现代女性。


Moreover, being a woman is a great asset.	而且，作为一个女人是一大优势。 当有人给她提出难堪的问题时，她会回答说：“你会问一个男人同样的问题吗？


When disturbed by a question, she usually replies, “Would you have asked the same question to a man?”	”法比尤斯挖苦地问她说：“孩子们谁来照顾？ ”法比尤斯由此在民意中大跌。


Ever since Laurent Fabius took a hit in the polls when he mocked her candidacy by asking, “Who will mind the children?”, her opponents have feared appearing misogynous when attacking her, and when they do criticize her, she immediately assumes the pose of innocent victim, unfairly bashed by schoolboy bullies.	从此，她的对手们在攻击她的时候就害怕显得是厌恶女人的人。 而当他们确实批评她的时候，她就马上显得是一个无辜的受害者，被学校男孩子不公平地欺负。


As a political tactician, she has also been innovative, organizing her campaign on the Internet with a plan to write her program from the responses of users.	作为一名政治战术家，她也很有创新，在互联网上组织其竞选行动，并且根据使用者的答复来撰写其纲领。


Her motto, “My program is yours,” could prove popular with citizens who, as in many other democracies, do not trust their political elite.	她的口号“你的纲领就是我的纲领”对于不信任政治精英的公民而言(正如其他民主国家一样)很有感召力。


Even though, like the majority of France’s political class, she was educated at Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), she spurns the language and habits of this elite factory.	即使她如同大多数法国的政治阶层一样在国家行政学院接受教育，她摈弃了这一精英工厂的语言和习惯。


Last but not least, she is attractive.	最后、而且也不是最为次要的一点是，她很诱人。


Photos of her in a swimming suit, taken by paparazzi during the summer, triggered much discussion across France.	夏天，狗仔队拍摄了她身著泳装的照片，引发了全国的议论。


But the game is not over.	但是，大局还没有确定。


The Socialist will decide on November 17th who will be their candidate.	社会党将会在11月7日初决定该党的候选人。


Trailing her in opinion polls, the other contenders cite her lack of credibility on economic policy and international relations.	其他竞争者在民意上落后于她，就提及她在经济政策和国际事务方面缺乏可信度。


No one knows her opinion on the Middle East, terrorism, nuclear deterrence, and international security.	无人知道她对中东问题、恐怖主义、核子威摄以及国际安全方面的看法。


During the recent Lebanon war, she called for Bill Clinton’s intervention – an insufficient answer for many people.	在最近的黎巴嫩战争期间，她呼吁克林顿来进行干预。 这一回答对于许多人来说是不够的。


Royal’s lack of program has been her strength, but it could yet be her undoing.	罗雅尔没有纲领一度是她的优势，但是也可能成为其败选的因素。


Eventually, she will be obliged to abandon her studied ambiguity, and she will probably pay a price for doing so.	最终，她将不得不放弃其深谋远虑的模棱两可，而且有可能为此付出代价。


Few voters will support someone whose political program is based only on education and defense of the family.	很少会有选民支持其政治纲领仅仅建立在教育和维护家庭基础之上的候选人。


Some Socialists fear that, once nominated, she would not be able to confront Sarkozy in direct debates.	某些社会党人担心，一旦获得提名，她将无法在直接辩论中直面萨尔科奇。


Moreover, opinion polls in France are fickle omens.	而且，法国的民意调查是变化无常的征兆。


Since 1981, no poll favorite has won the presidency.	自从1981年以来，民意调查的宠儿从未赢得总统宝座。


According to the polls, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, not François Mitterrand, should have been elected in 1981.	根据民调，应当是德斯坦而非密特朗在1981年当选。


In 1988, just months before the election, Raymond Barre (a former Prime Minister) was the arch-favorite, but did not even qualify for the second-round run-off.	1988年，在大选前几个月，前总理巴尔是大热门，但是连第二轮都没有进入。


A few weeks before the election in 1995, Jacques Chirac looked so weak that a journalist bluntly asked him on live TV whether it would not be better for him to give up.	1995年选举前几个星期，希拉克看起来不堪一击，有的记者甚至在电视直播中直截了当地问他退出竞选是否更好。


And Jospin was considered the only possible winner in 2002, before finishing third, behind Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen.	若斯潘在2002年被认为是唯一可能的胜利者，结果名列第三，排在希拉克和勒庞之后。


But Royal is confident in her fate.	但是罗雅尔对她的命运有信心。


She is far from being a weak contender, and she is a fast learner with a strong campaign team.	她远远不是弱小的竞选人，而且她善于学习，竞选班子雄厚。


If she can strengthen her program on foreign policy, she may yet open a new chapter in French political history.	如果她能够加强外交纲领，就可能在法国的政治历史上翻开新的一章。


France’s Third Man	法国的第三人


Should we be watching the French presidential campaign with admiration or alarm?	我们应该以崇拜还是惊讶的态度来观察法国的总统大选？


Or perhaps a bit of both?	或者二者兼而有之？


It is undeniably a great “show” with all the ingredients of a Hollywood blockbuster, including a surprising plot twist: the emergence of a “Third Man,” François Bayrou.	毫无疑问，这场大选是包含了好莱坞大片所有成分的大“秀”，包括令人惊讶的惊险情节，那就是佛朗索瓦贝鲁。


Even if his victory remains unlikely, Bayrou must now be taken seriously.	即使贝鲁不大可能获胜，但是人们还是不能对他等闲视之。


First and foremost, he has found in Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy two remarkable spokespersons for his candidacy.	首先最为重要的是，罗雅尔和萨尔科奇成为了他引人注目的发言人。


The more Royal returns to the “classics” of the Socialist Party, and the more Sarkozy openly courts the extreme right, the more Bayrou’s popularity rises.	罗雅尔越发回归社会党的“经典”，萨尔科奇越发公开寻求极右翼的支持，贝鲁的受欢迎程度就越发高涨。


Indeed, persistent doubts among the French about Royal’s competence and Sarkozy’s character are the primary reasons for his dramatic rise in public opinion polls, from 7% support at the start of the campaign to 22% now.	实际上，法国民众对于罗雅尔的能力和萨尔科奇的本性一直抱有疑虑是他在民意调查中大幅上升的原因。 他的支持率从竞选之初的7%上升到了现在的22%。


The second reason for Bayrou’s spectacular rise has less to do with personalities and more with France’s national mood.	贝鲁大幅上升的第二个原因与个性联系不大，而与法国当前的情绪更为有关。


The very reason that led a majority of the French to say “no” to the referendum on the European Union’s draft Constitutional Treaty in May 2005 may lead them to vote for Bayrou, the most pro-European of all candidates.	2005年5月大部分法国人在全民公决中否决欧盟宪法草案的原因可能致使他们把票投给在所有候选人中最为亲欧洲的贝鲁。