The Commission (or Treasury) would then decide how many additional Eurobonds to issue and on whose behalf.	委员会（或财政部）将随后决定需要额外发行多少欧洲债券以及代表谁来发行。


Finally, political union means transferring the prerogatives of national legislatures to the European Parliament, which would then decide how to structure Europe’s fiscal, banking, and monetary union.	最后，政治联盟意味着将国家立法机构的法权移交给欧洲议会，由后者来决定如何构建欧洲的财政，银行和货币联盟。


Those responsible for the EU’s day-to-day operations, including the Board of the European Central Bank, would be accountable to the Parliament, which could dismiss them for failing to carry out their mandates.	那些负责欧洲日常运作的人，包括欧洲中央银行的委员会，将对欧洲议会负责，而议会也可以因为他们失职而罢免他们。


Vision aplenty.	人们总是不缺乏愿景。


The problem is that there are two diametrically opposed approaches to implementing it.	问题是有两个南辕北辙的方式去实现这些愿景。


One strategy assumes that Europe desperately needs the policies of this deeper union now. It cannot wait to inject capital into the banks.	一个策略假设欧洲现在急需这一更深入联盟所推行的政策，根本无法再等待时间去向银行注入资本。


It must take immediate steps toward debt mutualization. It needs either the ECB or an expanded European Stability Mechanism to purchase distressed governments’ bonds today.   	必须迅速推进债务重组，并需要欧洲央行或是扩大化的欧洲稳定机制去购买当前那些危机政府的债务。


Over time, according to this view, Europe could build the institutions needed to complement these policies.	根据这一愿景，随着时间推移，欧洲将建立补充着些政策所需的体制架构。


It could create a single bank supervisor, enhance the European Commission’s powers, or create a European Treasury.	它可以创立一个单一的银行监管者，增强欧洲委员会的权力，或者创建一个欧洲财政部。


Likewise, it could strengthen the European Parliament.	同样的，它还能强化欧洲议会。


But building institutions takes time, which is in dangerously short supply, given the risk of bank runs, sovereign-debt crises, and the collapse of the single currency.	但建立机制需要时间，而考虑到银行挤兑，主权债务和单一货币崩溃的风险，时间又紧迫到了火烧眉毛的程度。


That is why the new policies must come first.	这也是新政策必须首先出台的原因。


The other view is that to proceed with the new policies before the new institutions are in place would be reckless.	另一个观点则认为在新体制建立之前推动新政策是卤莽之举。


Mutualizing debts before European institutions have a veto over fiscal policies would only encourage more reckless behavior by national governments.	在欧洲相关体制拥有对财政政策的否决权之前重组债务只会刺激各国政府采取更多的贸然行为。


Proceeding with capital injections before the single supervisor is in place would only encourage more risk taking.	在单一监管机构到位之前注入资本只能激发更多冒险行动。


And allowing the ECB to supervise the banks before the European Parliament acquires the power to hold it accountable would only deepen the EU’s democratic deficit and provoke a backlash.	允许欧洲央行在欧洲议会得到使前者为其后者负责的权力之前监管银行只能加深欧盟的民主缺失并引发对抗反应。


Europe has been here before – in the 1990’s, when the decision was taken to establish the euro.	欧洲不是没有经历过这一局面——在1990年代决定要建立欧元的时候。


At that time, there were two schools of thought.	那时候有两个思想流派。


One camp argued that it would be reckless to create a monetary union before economic policies had converged and institutional reforms were complete.	一个阵营认为在经济政策趋向一致以及体制改革完成之前建立一个货币联盟是过于仓促的。


The other school, by contrast, worried that the existing monetary system was rigid, brittle, and prone to crisis.	而另一流派的观点则截然相反，他们担心现有的货币制度僵硬，脆弱而且容易出现危机。


Europe could not wait to complete the institution-building process.	欧洲已经没有时间去等待体制构建程序一步步推进。


It was better to create the euro sooner rather than later, with the relevant reforms and institutions to follow.	最好是尽快创立欧元，然后相关的改革和体制继续跟进。


At the slight risk of overgeneralization, one can say that the first camp was made up mainly of northern Europeans, while the second was dominated by the south.	如果冒着过度概括的微小风险的话，我们可以说第一个阵营主要由北欧人组成，而第二个阵营则是南欧人做主角。


The 1992 exchange-rate crisis then tipped the balance.	1992年的汇率危机随后打破了两派的平衡。


Once Europe’s exchange-rate system blew up, the southerners’ argument that Europe could not afford to postpone creating the euro carried the day.	一旦欧洲的汇率系统出了麻烦，南欧人那些认为欧洲无法推迟创立欧元的观点就占了上风。


The consequences have not been happy.	随之产生后果也令人不甚满意。


Monetary union without banking, fiscal, and political union has been a disaster.	一个没有银行，财政和政治联盟的货币联盟已经成为了一场灾难。


But not proceeding would also have been a disaster.	但不推行这一进程也会带来一场灾难。


The 1992 crisis proved that the existing system was unstable.	1992年危机证明现有的系统是不稳定的。


Not moving forward to the euro would have set up Europe for even more disruptive crises.	不向欧元推进可能为欧洲带来更多破坏性的危机。


That is why European leaders took the ambitious steps that they did.	这也是为何欧洲领导人们迈出了如此富有野心的一步。


Not proceeding now with bank recapitalization and government bond purchases would similarly lead to disaster.	如今不进行银行资本再注入以及政府债券购买同样也会导致一场灾难。


Europe thus finds itself in a familiar bind.	欧洲也因此发现自己处于一个曾经熟悉的困局当中。


The only way out is to accelerate the institution-building process significantly.	唯一的出路就是大大加速体制构建进程。


Doing so will not be easy.	做到这一点并不容易。


But disaster does not wait.	但危机可不会等人。


Europe’s Dominos of Doom	欧洲的噩运多米诺骨牌


BRUSSELS – The fear of contagion has spread over Europe. Many see Greece as the potential first domino to fall in a scenario that runs as follows: the Greek austerity measures do not suffice, the debt crisis deepens, and the risk of a sovereign default spreads to other European economies.	发自布鲁塞尔——对连锁崩溃的恐惧已经弥漫了整个欧洲，而许多人则将希腊视为整个多米诺骨牌效应的起点，并假设出如下情景：首先，希腊的开支缩减措施未能凑效，接着债务危机不断深入，随后主权违约风险扩散到了欧洲其他国家。


As the Greek domino falls, countries like Portugal, Spain, or Italy start tumbling, and a small economy’s crisis turns into a major European calamity.	在希腊这块骨牌轰然倒塌之后，葡萄牙，西班牙或者意大利等也开始摇摇欲坠，一个小国的危机至此将演变成一场席卷全欧的巨大灾难。


This view suggests that other countries might be forced to rush and help their European “brothers in arms” – whether or not Berlin or other capitals want to.	这种观点意味着其它国家可能要被迫立刻去拯救他们的“欧洲兄弟”——不管柏林当局或者其它政府是否乐意。


Eventually, the sovereign debt crisis might hit the real economy, with Europe ending up in a vicious circle of even higher deficits, lower growth rates, exploding unemployment, and decreasing competitiveness.	最终，主权债务危机将波及实体经济，而整个欧洲则陷入一个悲剧性的死循环之中：赤字持续升高，增长率低迷，失业率激增，竞争力却不断下滑。


Obviously, this is the scenario that everyone – with the possible exception of some speculators – wants to avoid.	很显然，这个情景是每个人都不愿意看到的（当然某些投机者除外）。


And, after the recent EU summit agreed on an “ultima ratio” rescue plan for eurozone countries facing the danger of default, chances are high that it will not materialize.	而虽然最近欧洲峰会表决通过了一项针对那些面临主权违约的欧元区国家的“最终比率”拯救计划，但该计划很可能将无法付诸实施。


But the prevailing domino theory is incomplete. The crisis could have social and the political spillover effects that go well beyond the economic realm.	但当前流行的多米诺理论还未能涵盖全部问题，因为这场危机所产生的溢出效应是必然会超出经济领域之外的。


For the sake of illustration, let us stick to the Greek case.	为方便阐述，让我们回到希腊这个事情上。


The economic situation in Greece is deteriorating quickly.	希腊的经济状况正在迅速恶化。


Some analysts have even predicted a “slow death” of the Greek economy.	有些分析家甚至预测希腊经济将走向“慢性死亡”。


Citizens themselves sense that the situation will most likely get (much) worse before it improves.	而希腊人自己则感觉情况会在时来运转之前变得非常糟糕。


Most Greeks are aware that the country needs to be radically transformed.	大多数希腊人都意识到这个国家需要推行一场彻底的改革。


But reforms will be painful, and it might take years before the country shows first signs of recovery.	但改革必然会带来阵痛，而且这种阵痛将持续很多年才能迎来复苏。


In the meantime, Greek society will suffer from budgetary austerity, cuts in social expenditure, and an overall economic downturn.	与此同时，希腊社会将遭受预算紧缩之苦，公共开支遭到削减，整体经济下滑。


Despite this bleak picture, Prime Minister George Papandreou’s Socialist government still enjoys support. At this stage, most Greeks do not believe that any other political party could manage the crisis more effectively.	虽然事已至此，但总理乔治·帕潘德里欧所领导的泛希腊社会主义运动党（简称：泛希社运）政府却依然会得到民众的支持，因为眼下大多数希腊人已经不相信任何政党能更有效地应对这场危机了。


But at the same time frustration is mounting in Greece.	但与此同时笼罩希腊的挫折感却不断上升。


In the absence of hope, the country seems to be falling into a collective depression.	没有了希望，这个国家似乎陷入到了一种集体的沮丧当中。


Will this eventually lead to collective social unrest?	那么这会否最终引发群体性骚乱？


The country has already witnessed outbreaks of violence in its recent history.	须知这个国家在历史上可不乏类似的暴力事件。


Although Greece is still far from a radical outburst, one cannot exclude the possibility of fierce reactions on the streets of Athens or other major cities.	虽然希腊离全面暴动的情况还很远，人们却无法排除可能在雅典或其它主要城市街头爆发的过激行动。


It can be argued that such a contingency is something that Greece – or any other country in a similar situation – should cope with on its own.	有人会说这种突发事件是应该由希腊——或者其它面对类似情况的国家——独自处理的问题。


But this line of thinking is short-sighted.	但这种想法是极为短视的。


A major outbreak of social unrest in Greece or elsewhere could affect the wider EU public in various and unforeseeable ways.	一场发生在希腊或者其它国家的大型骚乱将以各种各样无法预见的方式影响整个欧洲社会。


Some “friends of Greece” will decide to show active, though peaceful, solidarity with their European compatriots.	有些“希腊之友”会决心积极但平静地与他们的欧洲同胞团结一致。


Others might follow the Greek example and go into the streets, not out of solidarity but out of frustration with conditions in their home country.	其它人则可能将希腊视为样板并走上街头，这些人虽然不乏团结之心，却已经对国家目前的状况出离愤怒了。


In the worst case, images of violent protests in one EU country might incite others to violence.	在最坏的情况下，在某一个欧盟国家发生的暴力抗议将刺激其它国家爆发类似事件。


Some will hold the EU and the measures “imposed by Brussels” responsible for the outbreaks of social unrest.	有些人会认为欧盟和“由布鲁塞尔”执行的措施必须为社会动乱负责。


In such a situation, the crisis will have triggered a social rather than an economic domino effect, which is no less worrisome.	在这个层面上，本次危机所触发的将是一场社会层面上的多米诺效应而非不是经济上的，而这也更令人担忧。


The crisis and the reactions to it already have led to misunderstandings and bad feelings throughout the EU, doing more harm than expected.	这场危机及其引发的反应已经在欧盟内引起了诸多误解和厌恶情绪，因此也产生了比预期更多的危害。


Old stereotypes and inappropriate historical memories have reappeared. The confrontation between Greece and Germany has been particularly nasty.	那些陈词滥调和负面的历史记忆又重新浮现，而希腊和德国之间的冲突尤其激烈。


Mutual accusations reached a level unworthy of the common history and the close personal, cultural and economic ties between both countries.	以致于过度的互相指责已经损害了两国共同的历史以及原本紧密无间的人民，文化和经济联系。


Indeed, it can be argued that the political dominos are already falling.	事实上，可以说政治的多米诺骨牌其实已经开始倒塌了。


The crisis, and reactions to it, widened old cracks and opened new ones.	这场危机及其反应不但扩大了原有的裂痕，还制造了新的分裂。


Distrust between EU countries seems widespread. All sides blame others for a lack of solidarity – openly or behind closed doors.	欧洲国家之间的不信任情绪似乎正不断扩大，各方都在公开或私下抱怨其它国家缺乏团结之心。


Those who suffer most from the crisis claim that the recent rescue plan should have come much earlier, and that economic imbalances in the EU have contributed to the debt crisis in some member states.	那些遭受危机的国家都声称最近出台的拯救方案应该来得更早，而欧盟内部的经济不平衡助长了则某些成员国的债务危机。


Others cannot understand why they should “bail out” countries whose irresponsible misconduct put not only themselves, but also the common currency, under strain.	而其它国家则不明白为什么他们应该“保释”那些用不负责任的行为不但导致自身乃至整个欧盟货币遭受重压的国家。


Decision-makers and commentators need to take into account not only the economic but also the social and political consequences of certain policy responses or the transnational costs of not taking swift and decisive decisions.	对此政策制定者和时事评论员不但要考虑经济方面的，还必须考虑特定的政策反应或者不采取迅速果断决策所导致的跨国成本所造成的社会和政治影响。


If Europeans disregard Kant’s categorical imperative – i.e., don’t do to others what you don’t want others to do to you – they should not be astonished if the European Union comes to a standstill or even implodes.	如果欧洲人把康德的“绝对命令”——比如“己所不欲勿施于人”——置诸脑后，那么他们在发现欧盟陷入停滞或者内部分裂之时就别那么大惊小怪了。


It is up to European citizens and elites to avoid the worst.	要避免最坏的情况发生，还得靠欧洲人民和精英的共同努��。


Otherwise, future historians will ask why Europeans at the beginning of the twenty-first century chose division and international marginalization rather than unity and global relevance.	否则，未来的历史学家就会疑惑为什么欧洲人会在21世纪初选择了分裂和自我边缘化，而非投身于团结和全球参与的洪流之中。


Europe’s Doubting Generation	欧洲怀疑的一代


PARIS – The contrast between the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, which launched the European unification project through the Coal and Steel Community, and the fearful bid to save Greece and rescue the euro of May 9, 2010, could not be more stark.	巴黎——看看1950年5月9日通过欧洲煤钢共同体启动欧洲统一计划的《舒曼宣言》，再看看2010年5月9日在拯救希腊和欧元问题上战战兢兢的提案，两者间的对比真是判若云泥。


Of course, in 1950 the Cold War was raging and recovery from World War II concentrated European minds.	当然，1950年的时候冷战还在肆虐，欧洲人的心思都在如何从二战中恢复过来。


It was urgent to be imaginative – and the right people were in the right positions.	当时对创造性的想象有着迫切的需要——而且在适当的岗位上有着适当的人选。


Jean Monnet, who inspired the project, was pragmatic and daring.	欧洲统一运动的总设计师让·莫内具有务实和勇敢的精神。


Robert Schuman, who presented the idea of unification to Europe’s leaders, was animated by a deep Christian faith that helped create miracles.	向欧洲的领导者们提出统一概念的罗伯特·舒曼拥有坚定的基督教信念，正是这种信念帮助他创造了奇迹。


Different times, different people, different spirit.	时代变了，人变了，精神也变了。


The seat of the College of Europe in Natolin, near Warsaw, is a near perfect barometer to test the morale of Europe.	坐落在华沙附近纳托兰的欧洲学院是检测欧洲人信念的最好的晴雨表。


If the young European elites being trained there to occupy positions within the European Union’s institutions no longer believe in the EU’s future, something is really wrong.	如果在这里受训、准备接任欧盟各机构内部职位的年轻精英们都不再相信欧洲的未来，那么问题就严重了。


For if they don’t believe in Europe, who will?	因为，如果连他们都对欧洲没有信心，谁还会有呢？


On the Natolin campus, post-graduate students, representing more than thirty nationalities, live in what they themselves often describe as a “golden cage.”	在纳托兰的校园里生活着来自30多个国家的研究生，他们把这里称为“金笼子”。


They interact (or should) to become what many may already have been prior to their arrival: “Europeans.”	他们通过（或应该通过）相互交流，成为许多人可能在入校前已经成为的人：“欧洲人”。


At least, this is the way things were and should be.	至少，过去是这样的，也应该如此。


But, even in this uniquely protected environment, Europe is no longer the cause that it once was.	但是，即使在这个受到特别保护的环境里，欧洲也不再是过去那样所有人为之奋斗的事业。


Students tend to group themselves by nationalities more than they did in the past, as if they want familiar reassurances against the uncertainties of the present and the future.	学生比过去更喜欢按国籍结成团体，似乎希望通过熟人间的慰藉来抵御当前和未来的不确定性。


When I started teaching International Relations in Natolin in 2002, all the college’s students were infused with the hopes stemming from the EU’s enlargement to Eastern Europe.	2002年我刚到纳托兰来教国际关系的时候，整个学院的学生都因为欧盟东扩而充满希望。


They prepared for inclusion of eight former Communist countries (as well Cyprus and Malta) with almost quasi-religious fervor.	他们以近乎宗教般的热情为八个前共产主义国家（以及塞浦路斯和马耳他）的加入做着准备。


Students from “Old Europe” were energized by the idealism and confidence emanating from their Polish, Czech, Estonian, and other compatriots.	来自波兰、捷克、爱沙尼亚和其他国家的同胞的理想主义和自信感染了“老欧洲”的学生。


They all seemed full of optimism about their political and economic future.	大家似乎都对自己将来的政治生涯和经济状况非常乐观。


The will to transcend the murderous trauma in the Balkans was also present.	当时的学生也愿意放开巴尔干半岛的惨剧带来的伤痛。


Watching students from Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia confront their memories of the Balkan wars, “European students” had first-hand experience of what true “reconciliation” meant and what the rules of the game were in the greatest success the EU had known – transcending the Cold War and nationalist animosities.	看着来自叙利亚、克罗地亚和波斯尼亚的学生努力忘却巴尔干战争的记忆，“欧洲学生”真切地领会到“和解”的真正含义，以及欧盟有史以来最伟大的成就——超越冷战和民族仇恨——中的游戏规则。


On May 1, 2004, I celebrated EU enlargement with my students.	2004年5月1日，我和学生庆祝了欧盟新成员的加入。


We embraced each other under the blue flag with its 12 yellow stars.	我们在点缀着12颗黄色星星的蓝色旗帜下拥抱。


Of course, not everyone beyond the College of Europe’s campus shared this enthusiasm, especially not everyone in Old Europe, which often seemed to be accomplishing its “historical duty” with considerable reluctance.	当然，在欧洲学院之外，并非所有人都拥有这样的热情，特别是在老欧洲，那里的人似乎只是在完成他们的“历史责任”，而且相当地不情愿。


Today, in fact, as the financial and economic crisis unfolds before our eyes, it is ironic to compare the relative strength of Central Europe, behind a strong Poland, to the extreme vulnerability of Southern Europe, behind Greece.	然而今天，随着金融危机和经济危机在我们面前展开，对比生机勃勃的波兰背后拥有相对优势的中欧，和希腊背后极端脆弱的南欧，真让人啼笑皆非。


Nowadays at the College of Europe, the “culture of doubt” among students from Old Europe seems to prevail over what was once the pragmatic confidence of students from New Europe.	如今，在欧洲学院，老欧洲学生之间“怀疑的文化”似乎已经压倒了新欧洲学生曾经务实和自信的风气。


It is no longer the “good wind” from the East, but the “bad wind” from the EU’s South and parts of its West that carries the day.	现在，空气中流动的不再是东边吹来的“好风”，而是欧盟南部和部分西欧地区吹来的“坏风”。


Many students, if not the majority, are no longer on campus because they “believe” in Europe, but because they are full of doubts as to their capacity to find a job in their respective countries.	就算不是大多数，也有许多学生入读的原因不再是因为他们“相信”欧洲，而是因为他们对自己在各自国家找工作的能力缺乏信心。


They wish to acquire an additional diploma, even though they are already overqualified.	他们希望多拿一个文凭，尽管他们的资历已经过高。


They hope for an upturn in the economic climate, or to get a comparative advantage in the ferocious competition for first jobs.	他们期待经济气候转暖，或者在寻找第一个工作的激烈竞争中取得相对优势。


They are, above all, gaining time.	总的来说，他们在拖时间。


Asked not about their motivations, but about their identities, the students from the College – with the exception of the Germans – do not naturally and spontaneously perceive themselves as Europeans first.	如果不问动机，只问身份，学院的学生——德国人除外——不会发自内心地首先将自己当作欧洲人。


They listen with sympathy, and sometimes even emotion, to the testimonies of the generation for whom Europe was synonymous with the ideal of reconciliation and reconstruction. But they desperately need a new narrative.	听到将欧洲视为和解和重建的典范的那一代人的叙述时，他们也会产生共鸣，甚至感到振奋，但他们却迫切地需要一个新的故事。


The Union’s founding story is not their story, but the story of their parents or grandparents.	欧盟成立的故事不是他们的故事，而是他们的父母或祖父母的故事。


They do not ask themselves what they can do for Europe, but what Europe can do for them in terms of jobs and salaries.	他们不会问自己可以为欧洲做什么，而是问欧洲在求职和薪水方面可以为他们做什么。


And they are more dubious than confident.	他们充满疑虑，不再自信。


Europe’s Empty Fiscal Compact	欧洲的空头财政契约


CAMBRIDGE – The driving force of Europe’s economic policy is the “European project” of political integration.	美国剑桥—欧洲经济政策的推动力是政治统一的“欧洲工程”。


That goal is reflected in the European Union’s current focus on creating a “fiscal compact,” which would constitutionalize member states’ commitment to supposedly inviolable deficit ceilings.	这一目标体现于欧盟最近所致力甚深的“财政契约”上，根据该契约，成员国对不可违背的赤字上限的承诺将写入宪法。


Unfortunately, the compact is likely to be another example of Europe’s subordination of economic reality to politicians’ desire for bragging rights about progress toward “ever closer union.”	不幸的是，这份契约可能沦为欧洲经济现实屈从于迈向“前所未有的紧密联盟”的浮夸宣言的又一例证。


The plans for a fiscal compact have evolved rapidly in recent months, shifting from a politically unpopular “transfer union” to a dangerous plan for fiscal austerity and, finally, to a modified version of the defunct Stability and Growth Pact of 1997.	财政契约计划在最近几个月来进展神速，从政治上不受欢迎的“转移联盟”演变为危险的财政紧缩计划，最终将成为名存实亡的1997年增长与稳定公约修订版。


In the end, the agreement that will emerge later this year will do little, if anything, to change economic conditions in Europe.	看吧，今年晚些时候出台的协定根本无法改变欧洲的经济形势。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel initially proposed the “transfer union,” in which Germany and other strong eurozone economies would transfer funds year after year to Greece and other needy countries, in exchange for the authority to regulate and supervise the recipient countries’ budgets and tax collections.	德国总理默克尔最开始提出的是“转移联盟”，德国和其他强劲欧元区经济体将逐年向希腊和其他困难经济体转移资金，作为交换，受助国的预算和税收将受到援助国的监督和管理。


The German public rejected the idea of permanent transfers from German taxpayers to Greece, while Greek officials and the Greek public rejected the idea of German control over their country’s fiscal policy.	德国公众拒绝了这一德国纳税人向希腊的永久性转移支付计划，而希腊官员和希腊公众也拒绝由德国控制他们的财政政策。


The next step was the fiscal plan that was agreed in Brussels at the end of last year, which completely abandoned the idea of a transfer union in favor of an agreement that each eurozone country would balance its budget.	接着出现的是去年年底在布鲁塞尔达成一致的财政计划，该计划完全抛弃了转移联盟的观点，转而支持所有欧元区国家都必须平衡预算。


Under this scheme, a financial penalty would “automatically” be imposed on any country that violated that obligation.	在该安排下，财政惩罚将“自动地”施加于违反平衡预算义务的国家。


With balanced budgets everywhere, there would be no need for fiscal transfers.	只要每个国家都实现平衡预算，就没有必要实行财政转移了。


But how, exactly, should the balanced budget requirement be defined?	然而，现在的问题是，应该给平衡预算要求下个定义吗？


In a letter to the officials negotiating the formal agreement, Jorg Asmussen, the German member of the European Central Bank’s Executive Council, stressed that a balanced budget meant just that.	在给讨论正式协定的官员的信中，欧洲央行执行委员会的德国委员艾斯缪森（Jorg Asmussen）强调，平衡预算就是平衡预算。


Even if a country ran budget deficit because a cyclical downturn caused a fall in tax revenue and an increase in social transfers, it should be required to raise taxes or cut spending to restore a balanced budget.	即使一国因为周期性衰退导致税收收入下降、社会转移支付增加而出现财政赤字，该国也应该白要求增税或减支以重回预算平衡。


If this proposal were actually implemented, it would have the effect of turning small recessions into major economic downturns.	如果这一建议被实际执行，那么将会让轻度衰退演变为严重衰退。


Fortunately, this recipe for creating future European depressions was rapidly dropped.	幸运的是，这一有可能制造未来欧洲萧条的药方很快就被否决了。


The most likely form of the fiscal compact now seems to be a very mild agreement requiring each country to “balance its budgets over the business cycle.”	目前，财政契约的最有可能形式是一份折中协议，要求各国“在商业周期内平衡预算”。


Although failure to comply would in principle lead to automatic financial penalties, it is difficult to imagine how such failure could be determined in a country like Spain.	尽管违反这一规定在原则上会引发自动财政惩罚，但你很难想象在西班牙这样的国家如何定义“违反”。


At what future point would Spain, with a persistent unemployment rate of more than 15%, be required to raise taxes and cut social transfers?	西班牙的失业率持久地超过15%，应该在什么时候要求它增加税收、削减社会转移支付？


Ordering Spain to do so might rest with the European Commission, making it a political decision, rather than the “automatic” technical requirement that its proponents promise.	是否强制西班牙这样做取决于欧洲委员会，因此这是一项政治决定，而不是契约支持者所宣称的是一项“自动的”技术要求。


If this is the essence of the fiscal compact that is eventually agreed, it will have no predictable effect on eurozone countries’ behavior.	如果这正是最终通过的财政契约的核心，那么该契约将不会对欧元区国家行为产生可预测的效果。


Its only effect will be to allow the eurozone’s political leaders to claim that they have created a fiscal union, and thus that they have moved Europe closer to the political union that is their ultimate goal.	其唯一的效果将是欧元区政治领导人可以宣称财政联盟已经建成，欧洲距离迈向终极目标——政治联盟又近了一步。


But a fiscal union conceived in this way is completely different from how most people understand the term.	但如此方式的财政联盟与大部分人所理解的财政联盟大相径庭。


In the United States, for example, the central government collects about 20% of the country’s GDP and pays out a similar amount.	比如，在美国，中央政府大约能征收美国GDP的20%，支出规模也与此相仿。


That centralization of taxes and spending creates an automatic stabilizer for any region that experiences an economic downturn: the affected region’s residents send less money to Washington and receive more in transfers.	如此集中的税收和支出创造了一个自动稳定器，能在任何地区发生经济衰退时起作用：衰退地区居民向华盛顿交的钱更少了，而收到的转移支付更多了。


There is no similar process in the eurozone, where taxes and spending occur at the national level.	而在欧元区就没有类似的过程，因为税收和支出是在国家层面发生的。


The centralized fiscal role in the US also allows all of the individual states to operate with true balanced budgets, modified only by relatively small “rainy day” funds.	美国的集中财政也使得各州得以在真正的预算平衡状态下运转，只消有相对较小的“雨天”基金予以调节就行了。


But, although the current European political process will not create strong fiscal discipline, financial markets are likely to force eurozone governments to reduce their sovereign debts and limit their fiscal deficits.	不过，尽管当前欧洲政治进程不会创造出严格的财政纪律，但金融市场或许能够迫使欧元区政府削减主权债务、限制财政赤字。


During the single currency’s first decade, private investors’ belief in the equality of all eurozone sovereign bonds kept interest rates low in the peripheral countries, even as their governments ran up large deficits and accumulated massive debt.	在单一货币实施的第一个十年里，私人投资者相信所有欧元区主权债券一样安全，这使得外围国的利率也十分低，尽管其政府存在巨大的赤字，积累了巨额债务。


Investors will not repeat that mistake: once bitten, twice shy.	所谓吃一堑长一智，投资者不会再重复这一错误了。


For eurozone governments, that means that financial markets will now enforce what the political process cannot achieve.	对欧元区政府来说，这意味着政治进程无法达到的高度如今将由金融市场来推动达到。


The EU’s fiscal compact, whatever its final form, will be little more than a sideshow.	欧盟的财政契约不论最终形式为何，都将只是一个小插曲。


Europe’s English-Speaking Peoples	欧洲的英语民族


The European Union has a single currency, but what about a single language?	欧盟有了单一的货币，但是否要有单一的语言呢？


Since its inception, the EU has made each member state’s language one of its official tongues.	自建立以来，欧盟就将每一位成员国的语言作为其官方语言的一种。


Recently, even Irish, spoken at home by only a tiny minority, was granted full official status.	最近，就连只被本国的极少数人使用的爱尔兰语也被赋予了正式官方语言的地位。


Treating all EU languages on the same footing is a direct consequence of the formal equality of member states under the founding treaties.	将欧盟的所有语言同等对待是在立盟的条约中所规定的，各成员国正式平等地位的直接结果。


It is also a matter of democratic principle that laws are written in the language of every land where they apply.	这同样也事关所有法律都应该用其适用的每一个国家的语言来书写的民主原则。


But the EU’s posture as a protector of linguistic diversity cannot hide the stampede toward English that is underway.	但欧盟作为语言多样性保护者的姿态也不能掩盖英语正迅速成为强势通用语言的趋势。


The more languages, it seems, the more English.	似乎语言越多，人们也就越多地使用英语。


Yet, the European Commission still encourages young Europeans to learn as many different languages as possible.	然而，欧盟委员会仍然鼓励年轻人尽可能学习更多的欧洲语言。


It would be politically lethal to acknowledge the real state of affairs, even if the official policy merely increases the chances that Europeans, after all their efforts, still may not understand each other.	承认形势发展的真实情况在政治上将是致命的，就算官方的政策只会让欧洲人在费尽力气之后可能仍是鸡同鸭讲。


Such an outcome is unlikely, but only because Europe’s language problem is well on its way to solving itself.	这样的结果不太会出现，但这只是因为欧洲的语言问题正在自我解决的过程中。


Throughout the EU, as in much of the world, from the Indian subcontinent to large parts of Africa, English increasingly functions as the language of international communication.	在整个欧洲，就像从印度次大陆到非洲大部分地区的世界许多地方，英语正日渐成为国际交流的功能性语言。


To be sure, in EU institutions’ public and ceremonial meetings, interpretation and translation must be equally available, at least in principle, from every language into every other.	确切而言，在欧盟机构的公众或礼仪性会议上，从每一种语言到其他所有语言的口译和笔译至少在原则上都是必须具备的。


Each day, hundreds of interpreters literally pay lip service to this lofty precept, and millions of pages are translated annually so that citizens may consult EU law in their own language.	每天都有数百名口译员本着这一原则提供语言服务。 每年有上百万页的文件被翻译出来，以便公民们能够以他们自己的语言查阅欧盟的法律。


The EU initially invested heavily in the development of machine translation, but has essentially abandoned the project.	欧盟起初在机器翻译上投入巨资，但最终放弃了这一计划。


As a result, translation and interpretation increasingly proceed in two steps, from a lesser-used language to half a dozen “relay” languages, and from those into other, smaller languages.	其结果是笔译和口译越来越倾向于以“两步走”的方式进行。 先从一种较为不常用的语言翻译成十数种“接力”语言，然后再以此为基础，翻译成更小的语种。


This saves resources, but it also implies a considerable loss of meaning.	这能够节省资源，但它也意味着信息的大量流失。


Moreover, fewer languages are used in the EU’s smokeless backrooms when meetings are less formal and the participants not all that prestigious.	另外，在欧盟的禁烟小会议室里，当会议比较不正式或参与者并非重量级人物时，用到的语言也向对较少。


When EU officials meet together or draft internal documents, they use only the “working languages”: French and, more often, English.	但欧盟的官员碰头或起草内部文件时，他们只使用“工作语言”：法语，和更常用的英语。


German, the EU’s most widely spoken native language, hardly makes a dent.	德语，这一在欧盟使用最广泛的母语，却几乎不在这种场合使用。


Representatives may demand interpretation into their home language, but a proposal to limit each country’s translation budget is likely to be accepted soon.	与会代表可以要求将会议内容口译成他们的母语，但一个限制每个国家翻译预算的提议可能很快就能获得通过。


The predominance of English is even more pronounced in communications among the EU’s citizens, where it is the first foreign language in all countries of the “old” Europe.	英语在欧盟公民的交流中更是显现出其强势地位。 在“旧”欧洲的所有国家，它都是第一外语。


Among the EU’s new members, English is rapidly replacing Russian as the most widely used foreign language.	在欧盟的新成员国中，英语也正迅速取代俄语，成为最广泛使用的外语。


Indeed, nine out of ten schoolchildren in the EU now learn English.	的确，欧盟的每十个学童中，有九个现在都在学习英语。


Roughly half as many learn French, a quarter German and an eighth Spanish, and these numbers are falling, despite the Commission’s efforts, because people tend to choose the foreign language that they believe is spoken and studied the most by others.	大体上讲，学法语的人数只有学英语的一半，学德语的是它的四分之一，学西班牙语的是它的八分之一。 而且尽管有了欧盟委员会的努力，这些数字还是在不断下降，因为人们总是会选择那些他们认为被使用和学习得最多的语言。


The process resembles the selection of a standard in, say, consumer electronics.	这一过程与电子消费品标准的选择相似。


People tend to opt for the standard (VHS, Windows, DVD) that they believe will come out on top, and thus contribute to that victory.	人们会选择那些他们认为会拔得头筹的标准(VHS, Windows, DVD)，如此一来也就为这些标准的成功出了一臂之力。


English now seems to have reached the point of no return in its accelerating global expansion, competing with national languages in such diverse fields as popular music, transport, the Internet, banking, cinema and television, science, and sports.	英语在全球的扩张似乎已经不可逆转。 它在流行音乐、交通、因特网、银行、影视、科学和体育等众多领域和各国的语言展开竞争。


But, while the presence and pressure of English has a striking impact on the vocabulary of the home language, it leaves the syntax, grammar, and pronunciation almost entirely unaffected.	虽然英语的强势和压力对其他国家语言的词汇有着明显的影响，但对它们的语义、语法和语音却几乎没有产生影响。


Unlike the indigenous languages that were pushed aside by the languages of the European colonizers, the official languages of the EU are “robust”: they are equipped with grammars, dictionaries, archives, libraries, and linguistics faculties.	和被欧洲殖民者的语言边缘化的许多土语不同，欧盟的官方语言是“健壮”的：他们都拥有语法、词典、资料库、图书馆和语言学设施。


They have a centuries-old printed literature, and, above all, they are closely guarded by strong states.	他们都有数百年历史的印刷文献，最重要的是，它们都被强大的国家守护着。


As a result, English will not so easily marginalize European languages, even after a large majority of the population has learned it.	其结果是，即便在欧盟大多数人口都学习了英语的情况下，英语也不会轻易地使欧洲的其他语言边缘化。


But English and national languages can co-exist only if the state protects the indigenous language and citizens do not allow English to take over all prestigious domains.	但只有在各国都保护其母语并且公民们不让英语占领所有重要领域的前提下，英语和其他国家的语言才能够共存。


The diversity of Europe is indeed innate, but its unity is yet to be achieved.	欧洲的多样性是与生俱来的，但它的统一却仍在实现之中。


The commitment to European integration requires a common vernacular, and that is English.	对欧洲一体化的承诺需要一种共同的语言，那就是英语。


The challenge for Europe is to use English as such an instrument, while avoiding submersion in American and British culture.	欧洲���应对的挑战是将英语作为这样的一种工具，同时又要避免被英美文化淹没。


Europe’s Ethical Eggs	有道德的欧洲鸡蛋


PRINCETON – Forty years ago, I stood with a few other students in a busy Oxford street handing out leaflets protesting the use of battery cages to hold hens.	发自普林斯顿——40年前我和另外几个学生在英国牛津市一条繁忙的街道上散发传单，抗议用密集式笼箱养鸡的行为。


Most of those who took the leaflets did not know that their eggs came from hens kept in cages so small that even one bird – the cages normally housed four – would be unable to fully stretch and flap her wings.	大多数接过传单的人都不知道自己吃的鸡蛋原来来自于那些极为窄小，以致连一只鸟都无法完全伸展双翼的笼子——而常规操作中这么一个笼子要装下四只母鸡。


The hens could never walk around freely, or lay eggs in a nest.	而那些母鸡根本不能随意走动或是在窝里生蛋。


Many people applauded our youthful idealism, but told us that we had no hope of ever changing a major industry.	许多人都为我们这帮年轻人的理想主义叫好，却也告诉我们说想要这样的大型行业发生变革是不可能的。


They were wrong.	但他们错了。


On the first day of 2012, keeping hens in such cages became illegal, not only in the United Kingdom, but in all 27 countries of the European Union.	从2012年1月1日起，在这种笼子里饲养母鸡就是违法行为，不仅在英国，还包括全部27个欧盟国家。


Hens can still be kept in cages, but they must have more space, and the cages must have nest boxes and a scratching post.	你依然可以把母鸡养在笼子里，但必须提供更多的空间，而且笼子内必须配备鸡窝盒以及磨爪柱。


Last month, members of the British Hen Welfare Trust provided a new home for a hen they named “Liberty.”	上个月，英国母鸡福利信托基金的成员向一只名为“解放”的母鸡提供了一个新家。


She was, they said, among the last hens in Britain still living in the type of cages we had opposed.	而据他们所说，这只母鸡是英国最后一批还住在密集笼箱里的母鸡之一。


In the early 1970’s, when the modern animal-liberation movement began, no major organization was campaigning against the battery cage.	在1970年代早期，当现代动物解放运动发端之时，没有任何大型组织发起抗议密集笼箱养鸡的行为。


The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the mother of all animal-protection organizations, had lost its early radicalism long before.	英国防止虐待动物协会——也是所有动物保护组织的始祖——早已失去了成立之初的锐气。


It focused on isolated cases of abuse, and failed to challenge well-established ways of mistreating animals on farms or in laboratories.	该协会把焦点放在了某些单独的虐待个案之上，却不去质疑那些在已经在农场和实验室中形成常规的虐待动物行为。


It took a concerted effort by the new animal radicals of the 1970’s to stir the RSPCA from its complacency towards the battery cage and other forms of intensive animal rearing.	最终新一代动物保护分子成功联合起来，才使英国防止虐待动物协会走出这种自以为是的状态，投入到反对密集笼箱养鸡以及其他集中饲喂动物的运动当中。


Eventually, the new animal-rights movement managed to reach the broader public.	最终，新的动物权利运动成功接触到了更广大的公众。


Consumers responded by buying eggs from free-ranging hens. Some supermarket chains even ceased to carry eggs from battery hens.	作为回应，消费者们开始选择购买那些来自放养鸡的鸡蛋，而一些超连锁级市场甚至停止从密集笼箱养鸡厂采购鸡蛋。


In Britain and some European countries, animal welfare became politically salient, and pressure on parliamentary representatives mounted.	在英国以及某些欧洲国家，动物福利已经成为了重要的政治议题，民意代表所承受的压力也不断增大。


The European Union established a scientific committee to investigate animal-welfare issues on farms, and the committee recommended banning the battery cage, along with some other forms of close confinement of pigs and calves.	欧盟设立了一个科学委员会来对农场中存在的动物福利状况进行调查，而该委员会则建议禁止密集笼箱养鸡以及其他某些形式的监禁式猪/牛饲养方式。


A ban on battery cages in the EU was eventually adopted in 1999, but, to ensure that producers would have plenty of time to phase out the equipment in which they had invested, its implementation was delayed until January 1, 2012.	最终欧盟在1999年通过了禁止密集笼箱养鸡的禁令，但为了让禽蛋生产商们能有足够的时间来逐步淘汰这些设备，最后的生效日期被推迟到了今年1月1日。


To its credit, the British egg industry accepted the situation, and developed new and less cruel methods of keeping hens.	值得赞扬的是，英国禽蛋行业接受了这个现实并发展出了不那么残酷的新型养鸡方式。


Not all countries are equally ready, however, and it has been estimated that up to 80 million hens may still be in illegal battery cages.	但并不是所有国家都做好了准备，因为估计还有8000万只母鸡被饲养在密集式笼箱里。


But at least 300 million hens who would have lived miserable lives in standard battery cages are now in significantly better conditions, and there is great pressure on the EU bureaucracy to enforce the ban everywhere – not least from egg producers who are already complying with it.	但至少已经有3亿只母鸡因此成功摆脱了原本悲惨的处境并显著改善了生存状况，同时欧盟的相关机构也承受了强大压力要求在所有地方执行这一禁令——而不仅仅局限于那些已经接受了这一禁令的禽蛋生产商身上。


With the ban on battery cages, Europe confirms its place as the world leader in animal welfare, a position also reflected in its restrictions on the use of animals to test cosmetics.	禁止密集式养鸡的禁令以及禁止使用动物测试化妆品的法规都使欧盟确立了其全球动物福利领导者的地位。


But why is Europe so far ahead of other countries in its concern for animals?	但为何欧洲可以在关注动物方面领先全球其他地区如此之多呢？


In the United States, there are no federal laws about how egg producers house their hens.	在美国，没有任何联邦法律规定禽蛋生产商应该如何饲养母鸡。


But, when the issue was put to California voters in 2008, they overwhelmingly supported a proposition requiring that all farm animals have room to stretch their limbs fully and turn around without touching other animals or the sides of their cage.	但当这一事务在2008年摆在加利福尼亚州选民面前时，他们一面倒地支持一个立场：农场饲养的所有动物都应当拥有可以充分伸展四肢羽翼并在转身时不致碰到其他动物或者笼壁的空间。


That suggests that the problem may not be with US citizens’ attitudes, but rather that, at the federal level, the US political system allows industries with large campaign chests too much power to thwart the wishes of popular majorities.	这意味着并不是美国民众的态度有问题，而是在联邦层级上，美国的政治系统给予了那些拥有巨额选举资金的行业过分巨大的力量，足以将大多数民众的意愿置诸脑后。


In China, which, along with the US, confines the largest number of hens in cages, an animal welfare movement is only just beginning to emerge.	在中国这个和美国相当的全球母鸡存栏量最大的国家，动物福利运动堪称小荷刚露尖尖角。


For the sake of the welfare of billions of farmed animals, we should wish it rapid growth and success.	为了数百亿只农场动物的利益，我们也希望这些运动能迅速壮大并取得成功。


The start of this year is a moment to celebrate a major advance in animal welfare, and, therefore, for Europe, a step towards becoming a more civilized and humane society – one that shows its concern for all beings capable of suffering.	今年的开端是一个庆祝动物福利事业重大进步的时刻，而对欧洲来说也是向一个更文明也更人性化的社会——对所有能感受痛苦的生物表达关注的社会——所迈出的一步。


It is also an occasion for celebrating the effectiveness of democracy, and the power of an ethical idea.	同时这也是个庆贺民主制度的有效性，以及一个道德理念所产生的力量的时候。


The anthropologist Margaret Mead is reported to have said: “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world.	美国人类学家玛格丽特·米德曾说：“毫无疑问，一小批有思想且意志坚定的公民是能够改变世界的。


Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”	事实上，这也是变革发生的唯一方式。


The last part may not be true, but the first part surely is.	”后面那半句或许有争议，但前面半句则确凿无疑。


The end of the battery cage in Europe is a less dramatic development than the Arab Spring, but, like that popular uprising, it began with a small group of thoughtful and committed people.	密集笼箱在欧洲的终结所带来的进步或许比不上阿拉伯之春，但正如那场民众起义一样，发起这一事件的正是一小批有思想且意志坚定的公民。


Europe’s Fight Against Terrorism	欧洲的反恐斗争


Three years ago this month, international terrorism struck Europe.	三年前的这个月，国际恐怖主义打击了欧洲。


In simultaneous bomb attacks on trains in Madrid, Islamist terrorists killed 191 people and wounded over 2,000.	在马德里火车站的一连串炸弹攻击中，伊斯兰恐怖份子杀害了191人，2000多人受伤。


Last month the suspects went on trial in a Spanish court.	上个月，这一袭击的嫌疑犯在西班牙的法庭出庭受审。


Violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam have hit many countries around the world, before and after the attacks on America of September 11, 2001.	宣称以伊斯兰的名义行动的暴力极端份子在2001年9月11日对美国的恐怖攻击之前和之后袭击了全世界的许多国家。


But the attacks in Madrid – and in London in July 2005 – showed that Europe is one of their prime targets, prompting European governments to respond by bolstering their defenses, including at the level of the European Union.	但是对马德里的袭击以及2005年7月对伦敦的袭击表明，欧洲是他们的主要目标之一，从而促使欧洲国家政府通过包括在欧盟的层面上加强防备予以应对。


In the past three years, security standards at European ports and airports have been strengthened, biometric passports have been introduced, and terrorist financing targeted.	在过去的三年中，欧洲的港口和机场的安全标准得到了加强，使用了生物护照，而且锁定了恐怖份子的资金。


More than 2,000 terrorism suspects and those suspected of other major forms of crime have been arrested and extradited on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant.	2000多名恐怖嫌疑犯以及其他主要犯罪嫌疑犯被捕并且根据欧洲逮捕令予以引渡。


Similarly, European security and intelligence services have pooled resources in a common center for threat analysis in Brussels.	同样，欧洲安全和情报机关把资源集中到了位于布鲁塞尔的共同中心用于威胁分析。


Through Europol and Eurojust, European police forces and judicial authorities have intensified cooperation, and ministers are preparing to grant law enforcement agencies of other EU countries access to national databases of DNA and fingerprints.	通过欧洲刑警组织以及欧洲司法组织，欧洲的警察和司法机关加强了合作，而各国部长们准备允许其他欧盟国家的执法机构接触各国的DNA和指纹数据库。


For the first time, security-related research figures prominently in the EU budget, with €1.4 billion earmarked for this purpose.	有史以来，与安全有关的研究第一次在欧盟预算中占据突出位置，共有14亿欧元用于这一目的。


European police and security agencies have prevented many terrorist attacks.	欧洲的警察和安全机构已经阻止了众多的恐怖攻击事件。


But, while Europe’s defenses have been considerably strengthened, the threat of terrorism has not diminished.	但是，尽管欧洲的防卫得到了极大加强，但是，恐怖主义的威胁并未减少。


The risk of new attacks in Europe and worldwide is serious and will remain so for the foreseeable future.	欧洲以及世界范围内新的袭击的风险是严重的，而且在可以预计的将来依旧如此。


To face this global threat, international cooperation must be improved.	为了应对这一全球性的威胁，国际合作必须改进。


In particular, Muslims and non-Muslims need to combine their efforts to defend the sanctity of human life.	特别是，穆斯林和非穆斯林需要齐心协力来防卫大众生命的安全。


First, the world must work from common standards.	首先，全世界必须在共同的标准上工作。


Many countries still need to improve their defenses and implement the 16 counter-terrorism instruments established by the United Nations, including the convention against terrorist financing.	许多国家仍然需要改善防卫并且落实联合国制定的16项有关反恐的文书，包括反对资助恐怖份子的公约。


Reducing the risk of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction equally requires stronger international cooperation.	减少恐怖份子获得大规模杀伤性武器的风险同样要求更为强有力的国际合作。


To this end, the EU is working closely with its partners, from Morocco and Indonesia to Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf states.	为此，欧盟正同其伙伴密切合作，其范围从摩洛哥到印尼、沙特阿拉伯以及其他海湾国家。


The EU will extend support to the African Union’s Center for Counter-Terrorism in Algiers.	欧盟将会支持设在阿尔吉尔的非洲联盟反恐中心。


Cooperation with India, Pakistan, and Russia has also been strengthened, and the Union will continue to work closely with the US, Japan, and Australia.	与印度、巴基斯坦和俄国的合作也得到了加强，欧盟将继续同美国、日本以及澳大利亚密切合作。


Second, more must be done to address the international conflicts that terrorists seek to exploit.	第二，必须做更多的工作来处理恐怖份子试图加以利用的国际冲突。


Afghanistan remains a critical front-line state in the fight against terrorism.	阿富汗依旧是反恐斗争中重要的前线国家。


The Taliban must not be allowed to bomb Afghanistan back in time.	不得允许塔利班轰炸阿富汗到落后时代。


The EU will increase its aid, notably in support of the Afghan police.	欧盟将增加援助，特别是支持阿富汗警察。


Likewise, efforts to bring peace to the Middle East remain essential.	同样，给中东带来和平的努力依旧是关键的。


While progress on the road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians would not by itself stop terrorism, it would deal a powerful blow to terrorist incitement and propaganda.	虽然巴以和平道路上的进展本身并不会制止恐怖主义，但是它将会沉重打击恐怖份子的煽动和宣传。


Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, will continue to press for results.	欧盟共同外交和安全政策高级代表索拉纳将会继续促成结果。


Third, we must counter the ideology of the terrorists.	第三，我们必须反击恐怖份子的意识形态。


Very few Muslims want to live under a seventh century-style caliphate.	很少有穆斯林愿意生活在十七世纪的哈里法国度。


They prefer to live in freedom and in parliamentary democracies.	他们更愿意生活在自由以及议会民主之中。


What unites Muslims and non-Muslims is a commitment to basic human rights.	团结穆斯林和非穆斯林的力量是对基本人权的承诺。


To respect and promote human rights is critical to winning the battle for hearts and minds, including in Europe.	尊重和促进人权对于赢得人心和思想的战斗至关重要，包括在欧洲。


This means that governments need to practice what they preach.	这就意味着各国政府需要言行一致。


Detention without trial is counterproductive in the fight against terrorism.	未经审判拘禁在反恐斗争中是适得其反的。


So is torture.	酷刑也是一样。


To defeat the terrorists we must offer a vision of a more just and equitable world and act accordingly, at home and abroad.	为了击败恐怖份子，我们必须提供一个更为正义和平等的世界的愿景并且在国内和国外都如此行动。


Ultimately, the values of liberty and justice are our best defense.	最终，自由和正义的价值是我们最好的防卫。


Europe’s Financial Alchemy	欧洲的金融魔术


CHICAGO – It is universally recognized that a key factor underlying the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the diffusion of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the infamous special-purpose vehicles that transformed lower-rated debt into highly rated debt.	芝加哥——债务抵押债券（CDOs）是将低评级债务转化为高评级债务的臭名昭著的专用工具，人们普遍认为，债务抵押债券是诱发2007－2008年金融危机的重要因素。


As these structures lost popularity on Wall Street, however, they gained popularity on the other side of the Atlantic.	这项业务在华尔街失宠的同时，却在大西洋彼岸迅速普及。


After all, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created by the eurozone countries last May, is the largest CDO ever created.	归根结底，欧元区国家去年五月成立的欧洲金融市场稳定基金（EFSF）是有史以来规模最大的债务抵押债券组织。


As with CDOs, the EFSF was marketed as a way to reduce risk.	和债务抵押债券一样，欧洲金融市场稳定基金也被作为一种能降低风险的机制。


Unfortunately, the outcome could be similar: the entire banking system sent into a tailspin.	不幸的是结果可能重蹈覆辙： 整个银行系统可能因此陷入一片狼藉。


CDOs are a form of financial alchemy: special-purpose vehicles that buy the financial equivalent of lead (low-rated mortgaged-backed securities) and finance themselves mostly with the financial equivalent of gold (highly sought-after AAA bonds).	债务抵押债券是一种金融魔术： 这种专用融资工具购入铅的等价物（即低评级的抵押担保债券），包装成黄金等价物（备受追捧的AAA级债券）之后再转售出去。


This transformation is based on one sound principle and two shaky ones.	上述转变所遵循的原则有一项合理，另外两项不合理。


The sound principle is excess collateral.	其中合理的原则是担保品的超额供给。


If there is $120 of collateral guaranteeing a $100 bond, the bond is safer, no doubt.	如果用价值120美元的抵押品担保面值100美元的债券，则该债券毫无疑问更具安全性。


How much safer, however, depends upon the returns on the pool of bonds that compose the CDO.	但实际的安全程度还取决于构成债务抵押债券的债券组合收益。


The first shaky principle is that if the return on these bonds is highly correlated, so that they all default at the same time, overcollateralization is not much help.	首项不合理原则是如果债券收益高度相关并同时出现违约，则超额抵押不会产生多大益处。


By contrast, if the returns are uncorrelated, it is extremely unlikely that they will all default at the same time, making overcollateralization sufficient to guarantee a safer return.	相反，如果各项收益互不相关，那么同时违约的可能性就很低，在这种情况下，超额担保足以保证更安全的收益。


Unfortunately, no precise mathematical model can determine correlation across securities, which is always an educated guess based mostly (sometimes entirely) on past behavior.	遗憾的是，不存在哪种精确的数学模型可以确定不同证券的关联性，过往表现一直是确定证券关联性最可靠（有时甚至是唯一）的依据。


Thus, the explosion of CDOs in the United States during the housing boom was predicated upon the shaky assumption that house prices never fall nationwide.	因此，美国房地产市场繁荣阶段债务抵押债券的迅猛发展是以“房地产价格不会在全国范围内出现下降”这一靠不住的假设为前提。


The second shaky principle is that, in order to validate these instruments, issuers of CDOs relied on credit-rating agencies.	另一个不合理原则是债务抵押债券的发行人要靠信用评级机构来批准发行相关融资工具。


Historically, these agencies had been reliable in predicting the risk of corporate defaults.	过往记录显示这些机构曾经对企业违约风险做出过有效的预测。


Much of their credibility, however, depended on a fragile balance of power.	但他们这种可信度必须以脆弱的权力平衡为前提。


Since each issuer represented a small fraction of their revenues, rating agencies were unwilling to compromise their reputation for the sake of any single issuer.	因为各发行方只占评级机构收入的一小部分，因此信用评级机构不愿为迁就某个发行方而有损自己的信誉。


The CDO market, however, was concentrated: six or seven issuers controlled most of the market, and this market ended up representing 50% of the entire revenues to be gained through ratings.	而债务抵押债券市场的特点是高度集中： 绝大部分市场份额由六七家发行机构控制，而债务抵押债券市场能带来评级收入总额的50%。


All of a sudden, issuers had much more influence on the rating agencies, which, like any good seller, were ready to bend a little not to alienate important customers.	因此突然之间，发行方对评级机构的影响力大增，而后者则像任何好的销售主体一样，愿意为留住重要客户牺牲一点原则。


As a result, the CDO market did not so much spread risk as it shifted and hid it.	因此，债务抵押债券市场没有对风险进行公开，而是进行了隐藏和转嫁。


When the US housing market started to turn south, the biggest underwriters (such as Countrywide) did not go bankrupt right away, because they had sold the vast majority of their loans to the CDO market.	当美国房地产市场开始转向的时候，规模最大的承销商美国国家金融服务公司（Countrywide）并没有立即破产，因为其绝大部分贷款已经向债务抵押债券市场进行了出售。


Eventually, however, the uncertainty created by these CDOs nearly brought down the entire US banking system.	但是最终，这些债务抵押债券所造成的不确定性几乎拖垮了整个银行体系。


Europe is following a similar path.	欧洲所走的道路大同小异。


The EFSF, created to assist countries facing “illiquidity,” is designed exactly like a CDO.	旨在帮助面临流动性问题国家的欧洲金融市场稳定基金，它所发挥的作用与债务抵押债券组织完全相似。


The EFSF buys the bonds of the countries which find it difficult to finance themselves in the marketplace (for example, Ireland) and issues bonds that are AAA rated.	欧洲金融市场稳定基金购买难以在市场实现融资国家（如爱尔兰）的债券，重新打包成AAA级的债券发行出去。


How is this alchemy possible?	为什么能变这样的魔术？


Once again, it relies on overcollateralization, an assumption on the joint distribution of possible outcomes, and the inevitable seal of approval of the three major credit rating agencies.	它所依靠的仍然是超额抵押，对可能结果联合分布的假设，以及三大评级机构无可避免的审批。


With the EFSF, the overcollateralization takes the form of guarantees by other eurozone countries.	具体到欧洲金融市场稳定基金，超额抵押采取了由其他欧元区国家出面担保的形式。


Among the major countries, however, only France and Germany have an AAA rating.	但在主要国家中，只有法国和德国拥有AAA评级。


How can a bond guaranteed in large part by countries such as Italy and Spain (likely candidates for a fiscal crisis) provide AAA status to Irish bonds?	由意大利和西班牙等国（财政危机的潜在对象）提供担保的债券怎能使爱尔兰债券获得AAA评级？


According to Standard and Poor’s, for example, “The rating on EFSF reflects our view that guarantees by ‘AAA’ rated sovereigns and freely available liquidity reserves invested in ‘AAA’ securities will, between them, cover all of EFSF’s liabilities.”	打个比方，按照标准普尔的说法，“对欧洲金融市场稳定基金的评级反应了我们的看法，即‘AAA’评级的主权国家和投资于‘AAA’证券的自由提供的流动资金储备可以覆盖所有的欧洲金融市场稳定基金债务。 ”


But the value of the guarantees depends on the situation.	可是这种担保的价值也要视情况而定。


As long as the only country to be rescued is Ireland, there is no problem.	如果唯一需要救助的国家是爱尔兰，那么担保当然没有问题。


But if the EFSF has to guarantee Spain, would Germany really be willing to step in and use its taxpayers’ money to cover Spanish banks’ losses?	可如果欧洲金融市场稳定基金要为西班牙提供担保，德国是否真的愿意伸出援手，用本国纳税人的税金弥补西班牙银行的损失？


And how compromised might French and German banks become – and thus how much more fiscal strain is in store for France and Germany?	这种情况下，法德两国银行愿意妥协到何种程度——它们又因此需要面对多大的财务压力？


Here, too, no mathematical formula can help, because what we need to test is the reasonableness of our assumptions.	解决这个问题也没有任何数学公式，因为我们需要考验的是假设的合理性。


This is why rating agencies’ opinions are so valuable.	评级机构的意见也因此凸显其价值。


Unfortunately, one must wonder to what extent these ratings are distorted by the eurozone countries’ political power.	但不幸的是，人们可能质疑上述评级结果在多大程度上遭到欧元区国家政权的扭曲。


Since the crisis, rating agencies have been under attack, and major regulation, which could severely affect their business, has been discussed on both sides of the Atlantic.	危机爆发后，评级机构已成为众矢之的，大西洋两岸都在讨论能严重影响其业务开展的重要监管措施。


Given this, how free are credit rating agencies to express their opinion on the very institutions that will regulate them?	在这种情况下，信用评级机构有多大自由对自己的监管机构说三道四？


We will have to await the pricing of the credit-default swaps on EFSF debt, which will be issued in January, to see whether markets believe the ratings.	我们需要等待一月份公布的欧洲金融市场稳定基金债务信用违约掉期定价，以了解市场是否相信这些评级。


Independent of this test, however, Germany seems to have squared the circle: it helped the countries in trouble, without coughing up (for the moment) any euros.	除这项考验外，德国似乎已经完成了不可能完成的任务： 它既为困难国家提供了帮助，又没往外掏一个子。


As with CDOs, however, this might be a Pyrrhic victory.	但这可能和债务抵押债券一样，是一场得不偿失的胜利。


The EFSF has bought short-term gain in exchange for much larger losses if the situation deteriorates: a fiscal crisis in Spain could bring down the entire edifice.	如果局势恶化，欧洲金融市场稳定基金已经用巨大的损失换取了短期收益： 西班牙的一场财政危机会动摇整座大厦的根基。


After the sub-prime mortgage crisis, politicians alleged that the market was short-sighted and irrational, and rushed to propose new regulations.	次贷危机爆发后，政治家们声称市场既鼠目寸光又缺乏理智，并迫不及待地制定新的调控措施。


While some of the criticism might have merit, what gives politicians the moral authority to criticize?	虽然有些批评有一定道理，但政治家凭什么掌握批评的道德权力？


After all, as the EFSF shows, their orientation can be more short term and irrational than the market’s, repeating the same mistakes because they seem not to have learned from them.	归根结底，就像欧洲金融市场稳定基金表明的那样，他们的取向可能比市场更加疯狂短视，并重复与市场同样的错误，因为他们并没有从中吸取教训。


The market’s verdict is likely to be uncompromising.	而市场则将做出无情的裁决。


As Oscar Wilde said: “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”	正如奥斯卡王尔德所言： “第一次受骗，是骗人者的耻辱； 第二次受骗，是被骗者的悲哀。


Europe\u0027s Financial Vulnerability	欧洲的金融弱点


VIENNA – The most notable innovations of the past two decades have been financial.	维也纳—在过去20年里最引人注目的创新是金融创新。


Like technological innovation, financial innovation is concerned with the perpetual search for greater efficiency – in this case, reducing the cost of transferring funds from savers to investors.	像技术创新那样，金融创新关注的也是对更高效率的永远的探求—在金融创新的情况中，就是降低资金从持有人手中转移到投资者手中的成本。


Cost reductions that represent a net benefit to society should be regarded favorably.	代表社会获得净收益的成本降低应该得到支持。


But as the current financial crisis demonstrates, where financial innovation is designed to circumvent regulation or taxation, we need to be more circumspect.	但是，像当前的金融危机显示的那样，当金融创新是为了逃避监管或税收的时候，我们要对此更加慎重。


Sadly, the financial revolution has been mostly rent-seeking rather than welfare-enhancing in character.	可悲的是，金融革命在本质上主要是为了寻租而不是提升社会福利。


It has been based on eliminating, or at least reducing, two key elements of banking costs closely associated with prudential arrangements.	它建立在消除，或者至少是降低银行成本中两个与审慎安排有紧密关系的关键因素的基础上。


One is the need for banks and other financial institutions to hold liquid reserves.	 一个因素是银行和其他金融机构需要保留流动准备金。


The less liquid a bank’s assets, the greater the need for such reserves.	银行资产的流动性越不足，银行就越需要这种准备金。


But the yield on such reserves is small, so economizing on them is profitable.	但是，这种准备金的收益很小，所以减少它们是有利可图的。


Last year’s Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom will long remain an example of how not to manage such risk.	去年英国罗森若克（Northern Rock）银行的倒闭将会在很长时间内作为一个不要怎样管理这种风险的例子。


Moreover, increasing a bank’s leverage can be very profitable when returns on investments exceed the cost of funding.	而且，当投资收益超过资金的成本时，提高银行的杠杆是非常有利可图的。


Reckless balance-sheet expansion in pursuit of profit is kept in check if financial companies adhere to statutory capital requirements, which mandate a capital-asset ratio of about 8%.	如果金融公司遵守法定的资本要求——这些要求要求金融公司资本－资产率保持在8%左右——为了追求利润的轻率的资产负债表扩张就会得到抑制。


But many have sought to ignore this restriction, to their cost: the Carlyle Capital Corporation, a subsidiary of the United States-based Carlyle Group, was leveraged up to 32 times – it held one dollar of capital for every 32 dollars of assets – before adverse market developments wiped out the company.	但是，许多银行试图忽略这一限制，其后果是：美国凯雷集团的子公司凯雷资本公司在市场情形恶化将其击垮之前，杠杆达到了32倍—它持有的每一美元的资本代表32美元的资产。


Avoidance of prudential requirements is at the core of today’s financial crisis, exacerbated by the collapse of confidence in a system based on trust.	规避审慎要求是引发现在的金融危机的核心原因，而危机又因为对这个建立在信任基础上的金融体系的信心的崩溃而进一步恶化。


This has exposed the fragility of the banking system, including quasi-banking institutions, as revealed by Bears Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and other US investment banks, and in Europe by Northern Rock, UBS, WestLB, and many more.	这暴露了银行系统包括准银行机构的脆弱性，正像贝尔斯登、雷曼兄弟以及其他美国投资银行和欧洲的罗森若克银行（Northern Rock）、瑞银集团、西德意志银行以及其他许多机构暴露的情形那样。


Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this story is the exploitation of low-income families involved in the so-called sub-prime mortgage crisis, whereby variable-rate mortgages were offered to customers with a low credit rating.	或许这个事件最悲惨的方面是对卷入所谓的次级抵押贷款危机的低收入家庭的剥削。 在次级抵押贷款中，费率不等的抵押贷款被提供给信用评级很低的顾客。


In fact, “variable rate” is a misnomer, since these mortgages’ artificially low initial interest rates were pre-programmed to include a big rate hike after a couple of years.	事实上，“可变费率”是一个用词不当，因为这些抵押贷款表面上很低的初始利率，被预先设定为在几年后，会有很大的提高。


Thereafter, rates would rise with market rates, but never fall when market rates declined.	在几年之后，抵押贷款利率会随着市场利率上升，但是当市场利率下降时，抵押贷款利率却从来不会伴随其下降。


This structure could only have been devised to suck in as many customers as possible with scant regard for long-term consequences.	设计这种结构的唯一目的，就是在对长期的后果缺乏考虑的情况下去吸收尽可能多的贷款人。


With the property market booming, prospective capital gains promised untold wealth.	随着房地产市场的蓬勃发展，预期的资本收益预示着数不清的财富。


And most mortgage holders probably expected to refinance their mortgages before their rising interest-rate trebled or quadrupled monthly repayments.	并且许多抵押贷款持有人或许期望，在他们的利息达到月还款额的三倍或四倍之前，为他们的抵押贷款再次贷款。


Another hoped-for benefit was that capital gains could be converted into home equity loans, boosting homeowners’ living standards.	另一个人们期望的好处是，资本收益可以被转化为房屋净值贷款，从而提升房屋所有人的生活水平。


The rude awakening came when property values began to decline.	当房地产价格开始下降的时候，人们突然惊醒了。


For those without an equity cushion, refinancing was not a possibility, and rising interest rates have led to default, foreclosure, and homelessness.	对那些没有资产净值作为缓冲的人来说，再贷款是不可能的，而不断上升的抵押贷款利率已经导致了违约、丧失抵押品赎回权以及无家可归。


Now we hear that sub-prime mortgage holders have only themselves to blame.	现在，我们听到次级抵押贷款持有人只能责怪自己的说法。


No one talks of the bank manager, under pressure to sell “financial products” and eager to sign up customers, even if the products were not in a customer’s best interest.	没人提到在压力下出售“金融产品”——即使这些产品并不符合贷款人的最佳利益——并急于和贷款人签约的银行经理。


The banker did not question a bonus system that favors one year of super profits, followed by bankruptcy, over two years of moderate, but stable, results.	银行家没有质疑一个比起在两年里有适度但是稳定的结果，更支持银行头一年获得巨额利润但是接下来就会破产的奖金体系。


It is astonishing that sub-prime mortgages and their like were repackaged and resold in securitized form.	次级抵押贷款及其类似产品被重新包装并以证券的形式再次出售，这是令人震惊的。


That these collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs, or bonds backed by a pool of mortgages) found a ready market, both in the US and abroad, reflects failure on several fronts.	这些抵押担保债券(CMOs，即以一系列抵押贷款支持的债券)既在美国也在美国国外找到了一个现成的市场，这反映了几个方面的��灵。


The nature of these CMOs should have been apparent to risk managers.	 这些抵押担保债券的性质对风险经理应该是透明的。


Any financially literate fund manager knows that risk and return are positively correlated.	任何对金融有所了解的基金经理都知道风险和收益是正相关的。


Any fund manager who claims to have been deluded by the apparently favorable risk-yield characteristics of CMOs or related credit instruments can be accused of having fallen for Milton Friedman’s “free lunch.” Risk models do not justify abandoning one’s natural sense of incredulity.	任何声称为抵押担保债券或相关的信用工具的明显有利的风险－收益特征所迷惑的基金经理，都可以因上了密尔顿·弗里德曼“免费午餐”的当而受到谴责。


In a world where capital is free to flow across international boundaries, the crisis in the US has spread to Europe.	在一个资本可以自由在各国之间流动的世界里，在美国发生的危机已经蔓延到了欧洲。


This is a new form of contagion, which transcends national boundaries and is amplified by an international crisis of confidence.	这是一个新型传染病，它超越了国家边界并被国际信任危机放大。


This is why the global problem today is many times greater than the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s, which cost American taxpayers an estimated $150 billion to clean up.	这就是现在的全球金融危机比20世纪80年代和90年代的储贷危机要严重许多倍的原因，这个储贷危机花费了美国纳税人约1500亿美元才 收拾完毕。


Today, the global integration of financial markets means that problems can pop up anywhere, at any time.	现在，全球金融市场的一体化意味着问题可以在任何时候任何地方出现。


Central banks are currently attempting to plug one leak as the next appears.	中央银行现在都试图在下一个漏洞出现的时候，堵住当前的漏洞。


But if the financial system’s dykes collapse, we may be headed for a decade of severe deflation, rendering expansionary stimulus useless.	但是，如果金融体系的堤坝倒塌了，我们可能会经受十年严重的通货紧缩，并使扩张性的经济刺激措施起不到任何作用。


When the US Federal Reserve was created in 1913, its most important function was to serve as a lender of last resort to troubled banks, providing emergency liquidity via the discount facility.	当1931年建立美国联邦储备系统的时候，它最重要的作用是作为陷入困境的银行的最后贷款人，通过贴现工具为这些银行提供紧急流动性。


The current crisis suggests that this is no longer enough.	当前的危机显示，中央银行的这一作用已经不能满足需求了。


Central banks worldwide are being forced to act as market makers of last resort in securities markets.	全球中央银行都被迫在证券市场作为最终做市商。


The signs are already visible.	这种迹象已经很明显了。


The European Central Bank has also failed to tackle local bubbles in Europe. The justification was that the ECB is concerned with inflation, not relative price adjustments.	欧洲中央银行也没能在欧洲遏制本地的泡沫，其辩解理由是欧洲中央银行考虑通货膨胀，不考虑相对价格调整。


This means that monetary policy is geared towards the needs of large countries, like Germany, not to those of, say, Belgium.	这意味着货币政策适应了像德国这样的大国的需求，而不是像比利时这样的小国的需求。


But, given the scale of the threat to Europe’s economy from a full-blown financial crisis, this apologia for inactivity has outlived its usefulness.	但是，考虑到来自一场来势汹汹的金融危机对欧洲经济造成的威胁的程度，对欧洲不采取行动的辩解已经失去意义了。


Europe’s Financial Wasteland	欧洲的财政荒原


PARIS – “April is the cruelest month,” wrote T.S. Eliot at the beginning of his great poem, “The Waste Land.”	巴黎——“四月是残酷之月”艾略特在其著名长诗《荒原》的开头如是写道。


But, if Eliot had been a professional investor who had observed European financial markets over the last few years, I am quite certain that his choice would have been August.	但是，如果艾略特是为职业投资家，目睹了欧洲金融市场过去几年的发展，我敢肯定他会把四月改成八月。


In August 2007, the decision by BNP Paribas to close two of its hedge funds exposed to the subprime sector precipitated a liquidity crisis for all European banks during that summer.	2007年8月，巴黎银行决定关闭旗下两只与次贷部门有染的对冲基金，此举最后演变成一场流动性危机，在那个夏天席卷了所有欧洲银行。


This year, BNP’s great rival, Société Générale, has been in the spotlight.	今年被曝光的则是巴黎银行的主要竞争对手法国兴业银行。


Its stock fell by more than 14% in one day in mid-August, plumbing depths not seen for two and a half years.	8月中旬，其股票在一天之内下跌了14%，这是两年半以来不曾有过的现象。


Rumors have swirled about a possible downgrade of France’s sovereign debt, accompanied by speculation about the consequences for French banks.	市场上流言四起，说法国可能遭遇主权债务降级，关于法国银行的猜测也一下子多了起来。


Since the French, of all continental Europeans, most respect the convention that no useful work should be done in the month of August, this is harsh treatment for their bankers.	在所有欧洲大陆国家中，法国人最尊重传统——八月份一般不会做什么有意义的工作。 因此，今年八月对于法国银行业来说可谓灾难深重。


They have not been slow to claim that they are being singled out unfairly.	法国银行纷纷忙不迭宣布，它们正在受到不公正待遇。


They have a point.	它们自有它们的道理。


France is not the epicenter of the eurozone crisis.	法国并不是欧元区危机的震中。


There is much – too much – competition for that position.	比法国更够得上这一称号的国家多得是。


Greece was an early favorite in the race to claim it, but faced a stiff challenge for a time from Ireland.	一开始，希腊是这一称号的不二之选，但很快就受到了爱尔兰的挑战。


Portugal made a sprint towards the front, but is now falling back a little, with Spain and Italy moving up.	接着，葡萄牙站到了前台，但现在要被西班牙和意大利赶上了。


France likes to think that it is at the back of the field, strolling leisurely in lockstep with Germany.	法国人大概还满以为自己在这场竞赛中大大落后着，悠然自得地与德国人一起躲在后面看热闹呢。


The evolution of the crisis has, however, thrown European banks’ balance sheets into sharp focus.	然而，随着危机的发展，欧洲银行的资产负债表受到了人们的严重关注。


Eurozone governments have proven unwilling, or unable, to produce a solution that persuades markets that they are on top of the problem.	欧元区各国政府要么不愿，要么不能抛出一项能令市场相信它们并无大碍的解决方案。


It seems inevitable now that either the eurozone will have to contract, with parts of the uncompetitive periphery dropping out, at least for a time, or that member countries’ debts will have to be collectively guaranteed, which implies some form of fiscal union.	从目前的情况看，要么欧元区将被迫缩小，部分无竞争力的外围国家将（至少是暂时地）退出； 要么成员国的债务将获得共同担保，这意味着某种形式的财政联盟，没有第三种选择。


Nothing less will persuade investors to go near debt issues from the eurozone’s fiscally challenged members.	要不然的话，投资者是断然不会理睬欧元区财政疲软成员国所发行的债券的。


The political problem is that the second solution cannot yet be sold to German voters, let alone to nationalist fringe parties like France’s National Front and Finland’s True Finns.	政治上的问题在于，第二种解决方案尚得不到德国选民的支持，更不用说法国国民阵线和芬兰纯正芬兰人党（True Finns）这样的民族主义党派了。


Perhaps it will be possible to persuade the Germans if the alternative is eurozone collapse, which would put the Deutschemark, or a Northern Euro, in the uncomfortable position that the Swiss franc occupies today – too strong for its own good.	也许人们可以用欧元区分崩离析的危险来说服德国人，因为德国人是不会坐视德国马克（或者北欧欧元）沦落到如今瑞士法郎所面临的境地的——太强势以至于危害到国家利益。


But things might have to get worse before the political mood swings.	但在政治情绪改变之前，情况或许会进一步恶化。


In the meantime, the European Council continues, as the Americans would put it, to “kick the can down the road.”	与此同时，欧洲委员会将继续如美国形容的那样“扫清路障”。


Of course, the can is not in the road; it is in the banking parlors.	当然，其实“障”并不在“路”上； 而是在银行营业大厅里。


EU banks are holding sovereign debt that clearly is not worth 100 cents on the euro.	欧盟银行持有着大量主权债务，而这些债务价值显然已经缩水了。


But even the financial “stress tests” conducted by regulators did not require the banks to acknowledge that inconvenient truth.	但即使是监管者所组织的财务“压力测试”也没有要求银行承认这一令人不安的事实。


Many eurozone banks have made far less progress in strengthening their capital adequacy and liquidity than have American and British banks since the financial crisis erupted.	自金融危机爆发以来，许多欧元区银行在改善资本充足率和流动性方面所取得的进步远不如美国和英国银行。


The disparities were exposed in the IMF’s last Global Financial Stability Report, published in April, which contains a striking analysis that shows the changes in tangible common equity over the last two years, and the degree to which banks are reliant on wholesale funding.	4月出版的最新IMF《全球金融稳定性报告》就说明了这一点，这份报告中包含着一项令人瞩目的分析，披露了两年来的有形普通股权益以及银行对批发融资的依赖程度。


One EU central banker described this to me as the “killer chart.”	一位欧盟央行行长对我说，这项分析简直是“要命的”。


What it shows is that banks in the United States have increased their equity from about 5.5% to about 7.5%, and have reduced their reliance on wholesale funding from 30% to 25%.	这项分析表明，美资银行的权益比重从5. 5%提高到了7.


British banks have made less progress with tangible common equity, rising from just under 3% to a little over 4%, but they have significantly reduced their reliance on wholesale funding, from almost 45% in 2008 to less than 35% now.	5%，对批发融资的依赖从30%降到了25%。 英国银行在有形普通股权益方面稍差，从近3%提高到4%多，但对批发融资的依赖大大下降了，从2008年的近45%降到了现在的不到35%。


By contrast, eurozone banks have almost stood still on both indicators.	与此相反，欧元区在这两项指标上都没有改善。


Their capital has risen a little, but remains below that of banks in the United Kingdom (and well below that of US banks), and they continue to depend on the wholesale markets for almost 45% of their total funding.	其资本充足率略有上升，但仍比英国银行低（于美资银行相比更是相差甚远），而且对批发市��的依赖度仍然很高，有接近45%。


That is why continuing uncertainty about the integrity of the eurozone, and the value of its members’ sovereign debt, is proving so damaging to its banks.	这就是欧元区的完整性及其成员国主权债务的价值始终充满不确定性给欧元区银行造成如此伤害的原因。


Will it be possible for them to rollover their market funding in these circumstances?	在这样的环境下，欧元区银行还有可能对其市场融资进行展期吗？


Already, the Greeks and the other countries subject to special measures have been shut out of the wholesale markets, and are reliant almost entirely on the European Central Bank.	希腊和其他难逃特别措施的国家已经被批发市场拒之门外了，欧洲央行已经成了它们唯一的救命稻草。


Might that happen to banks elsewhere?	其他地区的银行会步后尘吗？


In 2007-2008, the sins of the bankers were visited on the politicians; now the reverse is true.	2007—2008年，政客替银行家担了骂名； 现在的情况正好相反。


Perhaps there is a difference: the bankers’ sins were sins of commission, while the politicians’ sins – repeated failed efforts to produce a solution to match the scale of the problem – are sins of omission.	也许有一点不同：银行家的罪名是做得太过火，而政客的罪名是做得不到位——总是不能给出与问题规模相匹配的解决方案。


But the consequences are equally grave.	但后果一样严重。


I have always assumed that the Germans would eventually recognize that their interests lie in preserving the eurozone intact.	我一直认为，德国人最终会意识到，他们的利益就在于保持欧元区的完整性。


As Churchill said of the Americans, “you can always rely on them to do the right thing... once they have exhausted all possible alternatives.”	正如丘吉尔论美国人时所说的：“你可以随时依靠他们做出正确的事……只要他们已用尽了所有可能的其他办法。


The Germans have now almost run out of alternatives.	”德国人现在已经几乎别无选择了。


If they do not do the right thing soon, there will be some banking casualties, and European governments will once again be obliged to put in public money.	如果他们再不立刻做出正确的选择，那么银行倒闭就在所难免了，而欧洲各国将再次被迫注入公共资金。


That will be just as unpopular as bailing out the Greeks, and probably much more expensive.	这和援助希腊一样不受欢迎，而且代价可能会大得多。


Europe’s Free Riders	欧洲的免费搭车者


In the United States, individual states that follow unsound fiscal policies face a penalty.	在美国，每个奉行不完善的财政政策的州都不免领受处罚。


Their bonds sell at a discount relative to those of better-managed individual states. The higher debt service they must pay serves – to some degree – as a form of discipline against the temptation to spend now and pay later.	相对于那些管理较好的州，这些州的债券须打折出售，而它们要偿付的债务也更多，这在某种程度上对于现在开销、今后还债的行为是一种惩罚。


Of course, the discipline of the market is not perfect: the bond market does not “see” implicit future liabilities (like promised pension payments) to any great degree.	诚然，市场控制尚不完善：债券市场未“预见”大量的隐性远期负债（如承诺支付退休金）。


Nevertheless, this enforced fiscal discipline, combined with individual states’ own internal budgetary procedures, has prevented a large scale state-level fiscal crisis from occurring in the US since the Great Depression.	然而，结合各州自己的内部预算程序，这一强化的财政纪律已防止美国出现大萧条以来大规模的州级财政危机。


Let us now turn to Europe.	我们回头看看欧洲吧。


Before the advent of the euro, there were many fiscal crises in individual nation-states in southern Europe, which produced waves of high inflation.	欧元启用前，南部欧洲各国多次发生财政危机，导致高通胀一波接一波。


But, with the single currency in place, the road to solving a fiscal crisis through inflation has been closed, as the European Central Bank (ECB) now stands watch over monetary policy.	但是，施行单一货币之后，通过通货膨胀解决财政危机的路子被堵死了，因为现在由欧洲中央银行（ECB）统一监督货币政策。


Nevertheless, even with nation-states no longer able to rely on inflation to solve their unbalanced finances, the single currency allows them to use the debt capacity properly belonging to other members of the European Union to extend their spending sprees and postpone political accountability for periods of laissez les bons temps roulés.	然而，即便各国无法再依赖通货膨胀来解决其资金不平衡的问题，单一货币使它们能够使用应当属于欧洲联盟其他成员的借债能力，来推动其采购热潮，并延迟“及时行乐”期间的政治问责。


To head off this possibility, the EU created the Stability and Growth Pact: government deficits had to be less than 3% of GDP.	为了阻止这种可能性，欧盟制定了《稳定和增长协定》，规定政府赤字必须低于国内生产总值（GDP）的3%。


Last week, the government of Germany – once the most fiscally prudent and disciplined EU country – broke the pact’s rules for fiscal discipline for the fifth consecutive year, and did so without (much) apology.	上周，德国政府，曾经是财政上最为审慎和自律的欧盟成员国，连续第五年打破了有关财政纪律的协定规则，并且未对其行为表示（多大）歉意。


Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck signaled that he expected the European Commission to apply some sanctions to Germany: the credibility of the pact would, he said, be at stake if no action were taken.	财政部长史坦布律克（Steinbrueck）表示，他预料到欧盟委员会对德国采取制裁措施：他说，如果不采取任何行动，协定的可信性将受到威胁。


Thus, Germany would not block sanctions this time, as it did two and a half years ago.	因此，德国这次不会像两年半以前那样抵制制裁。


But Steinbrueck also made it clear that he expects any sanctions in response to Germany’s predicted 3.4%-of-GDP fiscal deficit to be largely symbolic, not penalties that would cost its government or economy anything of significance.	但史坦布律克也明确表示，在他看来，针对德国预计占到GDP 3. 4%的财政赤字的任何制裁在很大程度上会是象征性的，而不是令其政府或经济付出重大代价的处罚。


The Stability and Growth Pact is not – or is not yet – working anywhere near the way it was intended to work.	《稳定和增长协定》不能—至少现在还不能—起到人们预期中应有的作用。


What about market discipline?	市场规范怎样呢？


Is the German government’s willingness to issue more debt and run bigger deficits limited because the market recognizes and penalizes nation states that allow their fiscal positions to weaken?	因为市场确认和处罚允许其财政状况下滑的国家，德国政府发行更多债务和加大赤字的意愿就会受到限制吗？


In a word, no.	一句话，不。


The interest rates on the euro-denominated sovereign debt of the twelve euro-zone governments are all very similar. So the market does not seem to care that countries have different potentials to generate exports to fund the financial flows needed for debt repayments, or different current and projected debt-to-GDP ratios.	欧元区12国政府以欧元表示的主权债务其利率都非常相似，所以，市场似乎并不关心各国有着不同的出口潜力，来创造偿还债务所需的资金流量，也不关心各国当前和预计的债务与国内生产总值比率不同的问题。


Willem Buiter of the University of Amsterdam and Anne Sibert of the University of London believe that it is the ECB’s willingness to, in effect, accept all euro-zone debt as collateral that has undermined the market’s willingness to be an enforcer of fiscal prudence.	阿姆斯特丹大学的Willem Buiter和伦敦大学的Anne Sibert认为，事实上，正是ECB对所有欧元区债务一视同仁的做法破坏了市场执行审慎财政政策的意愿。


As long as the marginal piece of German debt is used as collateral for a short-term loan or as the centerpiece of a repurchase agreement to gain liquidity, its value is much more likely to be determined by the terms on which the ECB accepts it as collateral than by its fundamentals.	只要德国的一项边际债务被用作短期贷款的抵押，或用作回购协议的核心来获得变现，那么决定其价值的就很可能是ECB接受债务抵押的条件，而不是债务本身的基本要素。


The ECB’s treatment of all such debt as equally powerful sources of back-up liquidity now trumps any analysis of differences in long-term sovereign risk.	ECB将所有这些债务视为具有同等权力的备用清偿来源，这在效力上已经胜过了对长期主权风险差异的任何分析。


In the long run, this is dangerous.	从长远来看，这是很危险的。


Both market discipline and sound fiscal management are needed to create a reasonable chance of long-run price stability.	为了创造长期价格稳定的合理机会，市场纪律和完善的财政管理均必不可少。


Omit either a market penalty now for behavior that may become reckless or the institutional levers that give a voice to future generations, and you run grave risks – perhaps not today or tomorrow, but someday, and for the rest of your life.	忽略目前对可能不计后果行为的市场处罚或为后代着想的制度杠杆，就必定要承担巨大的风险，或许不是今天或明天，但总有一天，你的余生会为此受到威胁。


As time passes, the coming of the single currency and the way that the euro has been implemented is generating more and more unease.	随着时间的推移，单一货币的实施和欧元使用的方式带来了越来越多的不安定因素。


Policy as a whole over the entire euro zone is too deflationary.	整个欧元区的总体政策过于通货紧缩。


The necessary transfers are not being made to make the common currency bearable to regions that lose out and are already in recession when the ECB tightens policy.	也没有进行必要的转让，以便使统一的货币能够在ECB执行紧缩政策时遭受损失、并已经陷入衰退的那些地区获得支持。


The institutional foundations of stable long-run fiscal policy are being eroded.	稳定的长期财政政策的制度基础正在被侵蚀。


And now, Buiter and Sibert argue convincingly, the ECB is giving the market less scope to reward the thrifty and penalize the profligate than it should.	目前，Buiter和Sibert令人信服地提出，ECB赋予市场奖励节约和处罚浪费的权力还远远不够。


There is no movement of the soil yet, and there will not be for some time.	根基还没有发生动摇，并且在一段时间内也不会动摇。


But the ground under the euro may well begin to shift if things don’t change.	但是，如果不改变目前的做法，欧元的根基可能就不会那么稳固了。


Europe\u0027s Groucho Problem	欧洲的格罗克问题


Groucho Marx once famously quipped that he did not want to join any club that would have him as a member.	格罗克•马尔克斯（1890-1977，美国著名喜剧演员-译者）曾有一句嘲讽的名言说他不愿意加入任何一家愿意吸收他为会员的俱乐部。


But in today's European Union, Groucho need not apply.	但在今天的欧盟，格罗克不需要申请。


The Union now does not want to accept  anybody who applies for membership, because the countries queuing up to join are too big or too poor, or both.	该联盟现在不想接受 任何国家 的会员申请，因为急于加盟的申请国要么太大，要么太穷，要么又大又穷。


On May 1, the EU formally admits ten new members, eight from central Europe.	在五月一日，欧盟将正式接纳10个新成员国，其中有8个来自中欧。


All are far poorer than the EU average.	所有这些国家都比欧盟的平均水平要贫穷得多。


Bulgaria, Romania, and possibly Croatia are supposed to join in 2007.	保加利亚、罗马尼亚，还可能有克罗地亚原定于2007年加入欧盟。


By the end of this year, the EU is to decide whether to open membership talks with Turkey - a country that is not only poor and big, but Muslim.	在今年年底，欧盟会决定是否与土耳其展开成员国资格谈判。 而土耳其既大且穷，还是个穆斯林国家。


If the EU is to talk about membership with Turkey, there is no legitimate reason for keeping out my country, Ukraine?	如果欧盟将会和土耳其展开谈判，那么它有什么理由将我的国家乌克兰拒之门外呢？


Current EU thinking, however, holds that Ukraine should be placed in the same framework as countries in North Africa and the Middle East.	但欧盟目前却认为应该把乌克兰和北非及中东国家放在同一个框架内。


The EU's "Wider Europe" strategy does call for closer ties to Ukraine, and for allowing us increased access to the EU's "single market."	欧盟的"更广泛的欧洲"战略呼吁与乌克兰更紧密的联系，也允许我们更大程度地进入欧盟"单一市场"。


But it does not view Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership, at least not in the foreseeable future.	但该战略却没有把乌克兰作为欧盟成员的候选国，至少没有在可以预见的将来。


One reason for this is that the EU does not want to pick a fight with Russia, which still sees us as its close ally, natural business partner, and as members of an enlarging Russian-led economic zone.	欧盟这样做的一个原因是不愿和俄罗斯发生争端。 俄罗斯仍将我们视为其紧密的盟友、自然的贸易伙伴和其领导下的不断扩大的经济区的成员。


Indeed, last week Ukraine's parliament ratified a treaty creating "a single economic space" with Russia.	的确，上周乌克兰国会还批准了一个旨在与俄罗斯创建"一个单一经济空间"的条约。


But this supposed free-trade zone seems more like a recipe to enrich oligarchs and stifle competition, not promote trade.	但这个所谓的自由贸易区似乎更像为政治寡头们增富和压制竞争的一剂良方，而并非意在促进贸易。


Of course, Russia won't look on happily if the EU tries to lure Ukraine.	当然，如果欧盟企图诱使乌克兰加盟，俄罗斯绝不会袖手旁观。


But membership in the EU does not mean estrangement from Russia.	但欧盟的成员资格并不意味着对俄罗斯的疏远。


Besides, excluding Ukraine from eventual EU membership will encourage Russia's imperial ambitions.	更何况将乌克兰排除在最终的欧盟成员资格之外只会怂恿俄罗斯的帝国主义野心。


This will diminish Russia's chances of ever becoming a full democracy, for it can rule an empire only as a militarized state.	这还会减少俄罗斯成为一个完全的民主国家的机会，因为它只会将一个帝国作为一个军事化的国家来统治。


It is the mark of a good club that people clamor to become members.	吸引人们踊跃加入的成功的俱乐部总有某种标志。


An ever-larger EU including Ukraine would create a political unit with a huge population, furthering the Union's ambitions to be a global power.	包括乌克兰在内的一个空前壮大的欧盟能够创造一个人口众多的政治实体从而扩展欧盟成为全球性强权的雄心。


As the latest round of enlargement proves, the EU is very effective at molding the governance and behavior of would-be members.	最新一轮的欧盟扩大证明其在塑造准成员国的治理和行为模式方面非常有效。


Preparations for EU entry strongly motivated the eight former communist Central European states to entrench or restore democratic institutions and market economies.	加入欧盟的准备极大地推动了8个前共产主义中欧国家巩固或重建其民主体制和市场经济。


The further Europe export its laws and values, the more it expands a zone committed to peaceful, democratic, and prosperous co-existence.	如果欧洲进一步地输出其法律和价值体系，就会进一步扩大一个致力于和平、民主和繁荣的和平共处的区域。


A country equipped to join the EU is a country equipped to make its way in the world peacefully, if it chooses to do so.	如果一个国家决意做好准备加入欧盟，也就做好了准备和平地融入世界。


Europe needs such countries on its border.	欧洲需要与这样的国家为邻。


So far, the Union's actions have achieved the opposite.	但目前为止，欧盟的行动却适得其反。


For example, three years ago Ukrainians crossed the border with Poland six million times.	例如，3年前乌克兰人穿越波兰边界六百万次。


Most were small traders buying goods for resale at home, boosting the economy of eastern Poland, the poorest part of that country.	这些人多数是小商贩，从波兰买回商品到国内销售。 这就促进了波兰最贫穷的东部地区的经济发展。


Others worked cheaply in Poland as cleaners and building workers.	其他克兰人在波兰从事清洁工和建筑工一类的廉价工作。


As a step towards imposing EU border controls and visa rules, Poland began demanding visas from its neighbors.	为进一步加强欧盟的边界控制和签证规定，波兰开始要求其邻国公民申请入境签证。


Crossings at Polish border stations quickly fell by over two thirds.	于是跨越波兰边境的人流量骤减，减幅超过2/3。


Thus the new EU border with Ukraine is making its presence felt in the most negative way imaginable - by hurting business on both sides of the border.	于是欧盟与乌克兰的新边界让人以能相像得到的最消极的方式感受到了-通过损害乌波双方的贸易往来。


In the EU, only Poland seems to want Ukraine as a prosperous, stable, and accessible neighbor, not as a poor and rickety one with a dodgy democracy and even dodgier nuclear power stations.	在欧盟，似乎只有波兰希望与一个繁荣、稳定和易进入的乌克兰为邻，而不愿其是一个贫穷、动荡，有着不稳定的民主和更不稳定的核电站的邻国。


Poland worries that the more Ukraine is shut off from the Union, the more it will fall behind, economically and politically.	波兰担心越是将乌克兰排除在欧盟之外，该国在政治和经济上就越会落后。


But today's other EU members view the prospect of an ever-expanding Union to include Ukraine with fatalism and dread, for several reasons.	但现今其他的欧盟成员国由于某些原因却带着宿命和恐惧来看待一个不断扩张的欧盟将乌克兰纳入麾下的前景。


The first, inevitably, is money.	第一个原因不可避免的是金钱。


The EU redistributes billions of euros from rich to poor members: more poor members mean more claimants on that purse.	欧盟将数以亿万计的欧元从富有的成员国再分配到贫穷的成员国：这意味着越穷的国家就需要越多的份额。


A second is immigration.	第二个原因是移民。


One of the Union's fundamental principles is that there should be freedom to move from one member country to another.	欧盟的根本原则之一就是其公民可以在各成员国间自由流动。


But anti-immigration parties are gaining ground across western Europe; they could make huge political capital out of potential Ukrainian membership.	但反对移民的政党在整个西欧正日渐强势； 它们可能将乌克兰潜在的成员资格作为巨大的政治资本。


There is also a feeling that a larger EU might simply be unable to function.	有一种观点还认为更扩大的欧盟只会大而无当。


Manufacturing plausible-sounding objections to Ukrainian membership is easy.	要炮制似是而非的障碍阻挠乌克兰的加盟很容易。


We are not really European, we are too poor, we are too different.	如我们并不是真正意义上的欧洲国家，我们太贫穷，也太不同了。


But the Union has consistently rejected the idea of insisting on a minimum income level for members.	但欧盟一直拒绝为成员国设立最低收入标准的提议。


Its only serious economic demand - rightly so - is that members should have a "functioning market economy."	它唯一严肃的经济要求-颇为正当的要求-是成员国必须有"健全的市场经济。


As for whether we are European, I submit that Balzac would never have asked that question during the years he lived here.	"至于我们是否是欧洲国家，我想指出的是在巴尔扎克生活在乌克兰的岁月里，他绝不会提出这样一个问题。


Where Europe, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus rub up against one another, an economic fault line is forming.	欧洲、俄罗斯、乌克兰、摩尔多瓦和白俄罗斯唇齿相依的地方正在形成一个经济断层。


What the EU does now to bridge this fault line will determine whether these countries westernize or stagnate.	欧盟现在如何作为以弥合断层将会决定这些国家究竟是西方化还是停滞不前。


The dream of a Europe free and whole, from the Atlantic to the Urals, remains to be completed.	一个从大西洋到乌拉尔山的自由完整的欧洲的梦想仍有待实现。


Europe’s Harmony Overdose	过犹不及的欧洲统一性


PRAGUE – One pillar of the European Union’s single market is harmonization.	发自布拉格——承载着欧盟单一市场的其中一块基石就是统一性。


At first sight, that makes a lot of sense. Harmonized systems of rules make it easier for capital and labor to move around in search of their best use.	这上看去非常合理，因为一个统一的规则之下，资本和劳动力都能自由流动并实现最优配置。


Alas, some Europhiles’ unifying zeal has all too often spilled beyond the bounds of economic reason, even common sense.	但遗憾的是，许多欧盟鼓吹者对这种一致性的狂热常常会超越经济理性，甚至违背常识。


More unification and harmonization does not necessarily lead to effective – or even reasonable – solutions to the EU’s troubles.	事实上更多的“一致”或者“统一”并不意味着就能提供有效——甚至合理的——欧盟问题应对方案。


The main point of the new European regulatory measures under consideration (apart from the so-called new Basel III rules) is to bring more stability to the financial system.	目前正研究制定的新欧洲监管措施（除所谓的《巴塞尔协议III》以外）的重点就是要令金融系统更加稳定。


The indirect effect will be to reduce the financial sector’s size – in absolute terms and relative to the economy – and to hinder its growth in the future.	而其间接的效应则是削减了金融部门的规模——按绝对价值计算，并与经济总量相比——并阻碍了其未来的发展。


But these effects will also occur in EU countries whose financial sectors have maintained a high degree of stability in the current crisis.	但这些措施同时也将波及到那些在危机中保持高度稳定的欧盟国家及其金融部门。


Delivery of financial services will be made more difficult and expensive everywhere, even though some countries’ banks are financed by stable long-term deposits rather than short-term interbank loans, with few toxic assets and local loans that are more than comfortably covered by local deposits.	即便其中一些欧盟国家的银行是由稳定长期存款（而不是短期银行同业拆借）来维持经营，仅仅沾染少量有毒资产却拥有以巨额本地存款做后盾的本地贷款，却无法独善其身，最终整个欧盟地区的金融服务都将因这些措施而变得更加烦琐和昂贵。


This is why one can hear many voices opposing the idea of a harmonized EU-wide bank levy or tax.	这也是为什么许多人反对征收一项统一的欧盟银行税的原因。


This levy, strongly backed by those countries whose financial sectors are in tatters after the crisis, is hard to swallow for EU states that did not intervene to bail out their banks.	虽然那些金融部门在危机中惨遭重创的国家极力推崇该税项，但对那些根本无需援助本国银行的欧盟成员国来说，却是难以接受的。


The levy is an easy way to spread the political and financial costs of the crisis from some to all EU members.	这个银行税是一种将危机的政治和金融成本摊派到所有欧盟成员头上的简单方法。


If applied, bank capital will be scarcer, the flow of credit slower, and bank fees higher in countries with pretty stable financial sectors, simply because others have spent a fortune to support their financial systems – and because the European Commission never misses an opportunity to unify rules across the EU.	如果开征的话，银行资本就将缩水，信贷流动速度减慢，即便是那些金融部门相对稳定的国家，银行费率也将水涨船高，但原因却是其他一些国家在援助本国金融系统上花费了巨资——另外也因为欧盟委员会从来都不会错过任何一个在全欧推行某种一致性政策的机会。


The same is true, for instance, for the derivatives trading system.	同样的情况也将发生在金融衍生品交易系统上。


The post-crisis harmonization fervor in this area means that it will now be more costly everywhere in the EU to insure against currency volatility or unexpected changes in interest.	在如今这个后危机时代，弥漫在该领域的一致性狂热意味着各国要花费更大的成本来防止货币币值蒸发或者利率突变。


But such harmonization is neither necessary nor justified in every EU country.	但在所有欧洲国家统一推行这种措施的做法既没必要，也不合理。


We are also soon likely to have a unified, harmonized, and enforced-from-above system for euro payments, be they intrastate or interstate.	此外，我们估计很快会碰到另一个统一，一致并且由上至下推动执行的国内或国家间欧元支付系统。


The Commission reckons that it is rather suspicious that every country currently has its own system, and that these national systems are used by more customers and for more transactions than the harmonized Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) system of payments.	欧盟委员的考虑是各国没必要各自使用一套独立的系统，更何况这些系统比一致的单一欧元支付区系统拥有更多顾客，交易量也更大。


The irony here is that, at its beginning, participation by private banks in SEPA was strictly voluntary. But many of the national systems have been evolving for many years.	但讽刺的是，在支付区刚开始建立的时候，许多私有银行自愿将自己的系统整合进支付区，但许多国有银行系统却是苦心经营了多年。


Millions of customers have willingly relied on them for their debit and credit payments, and simply have not found reason to switch to the SEPA system, with its different codes, abbreviations, and symbols.	数百万消费者依然依靠这些系统来进行借记卡或信用开支付，同时也没有什么好的理由能说服他们转向这个代码不同，缩写不同，连标记也不同的支付区系统。


This is the system that the Commission wants to prescribe for the whole Union, while banning all SEPA-incompatible products.	而这就是欧盟委员会要在全欧洲推广的系统——为此他们禁止了一切与支付区系统相冲突的金融产品。


Customers will have to change their payment orders and habits just because harmonization has become an end in itself for many in the EU.	消费者必须改变自己的付款委托方式以及使用习惯，仅仅是为了在全欧盟达到一致。


One simple rule should be applied as rigorously in this sensitive area as anywhere else: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.	而与这一敏感领域类似的其他领域其实都适用一个简单的法则：人家用得好好的，你又何苦要改变之？


Dubious harmonization and unification is in the pipeline in another area as well: macroeconomic performance.	与此同时，某个风险极大的协调一致性措施也正在另一个领域酝酿：宏观经济表现。


Over the last decade, we have watched as the Stability and Growth Pact (in which EU countries pledge to keep their public debts and deficits low) has dissipated in a mist of permissiveness.	在过去十年，我们已经见证了《稳定与增长公约》（在公约中欧盟各国宣誓保持较低的公共债务和财政赤字水平）在过度宽松的财政政策下名存实亡。


Recently, it almost looked as if the EU had finally come to understand that, given a lack of will, no pact – however commendable its purpose – can ensure sound fiscal policies.	而就在最近，似乎欧盟也最终意识到（因为他们似乎无意推动）没有任何一个公约——无论其出发点是多么值得称赞——都不能保证能各国一定会出台良好的财政政策。


But European institutions are now not only trying to repair the Pact, but are looking for ways to broaden its scope, making it possible to punish EU countries for “macroeconomic imbalances.”	但欧盟机构如今不仅尝试修补这个公约，还想方设法去扩大其影响范围，使之可以惩罚那些“宏观经济不平衡的”欧盟国家。


Just look at some of the proposals of EU President Herman Van Rompuy’s task force on economic governance. For example, if a poorer member country undergoes a period of real convergence and has a temporary current-account deficit – as is usual in such cases – it may be punished for not being sufficiently “harmonized.”	比如说，如果一个比较贫穷的成员国正经历一个人民收入差距缩小的实质趋同时期，同时却遭遇临时性的经常账户赤字——这种情况屡见不鲜——该国就将因为“不够一致”而受到惩罚。


The same is true of a country that undergoes a period of strong productivity growth because it has reformed its labor market or kept real wages low and has a current-account surplus.	同样，如果一个国家通过对革新劳动市场或者保持较低的实质工资水平而实现��产力强劲增长，估计也会面临惩罚。


Being too innovative, too competitive, too flexible, growing too much, and exporting too much might become “a problem” in this perverted logic of harmonization.	太过创新，太有竞争力，太快增长，太多出口都会在这个不正当的一致性理论下成为一大“罪状”。


So, Germans and others, are you listening carefully to these voices? Aren’t you afraid?	那么对于在这方面尤为突出的德国人或其他人来说，难道不应感到汗颜吗？


There are many areas of economic life in the EU where harmonization does help. But not every aspect of financial regulation and macroeconomic performance necessarily belongs in this category.	虽然协调一致确实能在欧盟的许多经济领域发挥作用，但不应将所有的金融管制和宏观经济表现都归于这一门类。


We praise competition, not monopolies, in economic life. Competition in the rules that govern it might serve us better as well.	在经济生活中我们鼓励竞争，反对垄断，而各国政府之间的制度竞争或许能为我们带来更多好处。


Europe’s High Court Confronts Racism	欧洲高等法院面临种族歧视


The European Court of Human Rights is hearing oral arguments in two of the most important cases in its history.	欧洲人权法院有史以来最重要的两起案件正在进行口头辩论。


As in Brown v. Board of Education , the case that ultimately broke the back of racial segregation in America half a century ago, the European Court is being asked to give meaning to the fundamental principle of equality.	和半个世纪前最终压垮美国种族隔离制度的布朗诉教育局案一样，民众要求欧洲法庭界定平等的根本原则。


The resulting decisions could establish clear ground rules to guide future policy toward Europe’s increasingly numerous ethnic and religious minorities.	其结果可能会诞生明确的章程，指导针对欧洲日益增多的种族和宗教少数族裔的未来政策。


The plaintiffs are members of Europe’s poorest and largest minority group – the Roma, or Gypsies, whose ancestors are believed to have migrated from India centuries ago.	原告是欧洲最大、也最贫困的少数族裔成员－罗马人、或吉普赛人，据传他们的祖先是几个世纪前的印度移民。


One case concerns 18 Roma children from the northeastern city of Ostrava in the Czech Republic who were placed in “special” schools for those deemed mentally deficient, where they receive a markedly inferior education.	案件之一涉及到捷克共和国东北部城市俄斯特拉发的18名罗马族儿童，他们被指派到接收智障儿童的一所“特种”学校，在那里接受明显低劣的教育。


The children argue that such schools are a barrier to social and economic progress.	孩子们说这种学校是他们在社会和经济领域进步的障碍。


Many Roma are sent to special schools even though they show no sign of mental disability.	很多罗马人即便在智力上没有障碍，也被送进了这样的特种学校。


Few go on to finish high school or attend university.	能够完成高中学业或者上大学的人可谓凤毛麟角。


As a result, Roma unemployment rates in the Czech Republic, as in much of Europe, far exceed those for the rest of the population.	因此，捷克共和国罗马族人的失业率和欧洲很多国家一样，远远超过了其它所有族裔。


Evidence before the Court indicates that, in some Czech communities, Roma children are 27 times more likely to be sent to special schools than non-Roma children.	呈送法院的证据表明：在某些捷克社区里，罗马族儿童被送往特种学校的几率比非罗马儿童高27倍。


The plaintiffs suggest that this amounts to racial segregation. The government vigorously denies this.	原告方认为这构成了种族歧视，但遭到了政府的强烈否认。


The Court’s hearing is set for March 1.	法庭定于3月1日进行听证。


The second case comes from Bulgaria.	第二起案件来自保加利亚。


In 1996, military police shot and killed two Roma conscripts.	1996年，军队警察射杀了两名罗马族应召士兵。


The victims, who had recently absconded from a military construction crew, were known to be unarmed and not dangerous.	被害者不久前曾从军队施工建制中私自脱逃，据了解他们没有携带武器，也不会构成危险。


The shooting, by automatic weapon fire, took place in broad daylight in a largely Roma neighborhood, where the grandmother of one of the victims lived.	射击所用的是自动武器，行凶地点就在光天化日之下的罗马族聚居区，其中一名受害者的祖母就住在这里。


Immediately after the killing, a military police officer allegedly yelled at one of the town residents, “You damned Gypsies!” while pointing a gun at him.	凶杀发生后，一名军队警察被控用枪指着一位社区居民并向他大喊，“你们这些该死的吉普赛人！ ”


Last year, one panel of the Court found that both the shootings and a subsequent investigation that upheld their lawfulness were tainted by racial animus.	去年，一位法庭陪审员发现这起枪杀事件和后来的证明其合法性的调查都搀杂了种族敌视的因素。


At the request of the Bulgarian government, the Court’s Grand Chamber agreed to review the matter before the end of February.	应保加利亚政府的要求，法庭的高级理事会同意在2月底以前重审这个案件。


Though the facts of both cases are heart wrenching, their importance extends beyond the courtroom.	尽管这两起案件的事实都令人心痛，但它们的意义却超越了庭审的范畴。


At a time of rising concern about immigration, religious extremism, and ethnic violence, what must government do to secure the promise of equal opportunity for all?	当移民问题、宗教极端主义和种族暴力引起人们越来越深忧虑的时候，政府必须做些什么才能兑现所有人机会平等的承诺？


Over the past decade, the European Union has grown more ethnically diverse.	过去10年来，欧盟内部种族越来越丰富。


Immigration to Spain, Italy, and Greece has surged, adding to longstanding immigrant populations in northern Europe and to the number of so-called “guest workers” in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg.	西班牙、意大利和希腊等国的移民数量激增，使北欧地区长久存在的移民和奥地利、德国和卢森堡所谓“交流工人”大大增加。


The most recent stage of EU enlargement last May added millions of Roma from the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe.	去年5月最新一次的欧盟东扩纳入了中东欧新成员国内成百上千万的罗马族劳工。


Just as Europe’s ethnic makeup has been changing, so have its laws.	随着欧洲的种族构成悄然发生变化，这里的法律也做出了相应的调整。


In 2000, the EU’s executive arm – responding in part to the growing popularity of anti-immigrant and neo-Nazi political parties – enacted the most far-reaching anti-discrimination legislation in the world.	2000年，欧盟的执行部门为了对日益抬头的反移民和新纳粹党势力做出反应，颁布了全世界意义最为深远的反歧视法案。


To date, however, this legislation has lain dormant.	但迄今为止，这项法案还处在休眠状态。


In many countries, lawyers and judges lack familiarity with legal concepts of discrimination.	在很多国家，律师和法官都不熟悉歧视的法律定义。


Perhaps not surprisingly, acts of exclusion, segregation, and violence often go unpunished.	因此排外、隔离和种族暴力行为时常逍遥法外也许并不奇怪。


The two cases soon to be heard in Strasbourg provide an opportunity to change this.	即将在斯特拉斯堡举行听证的这两起案件提供了改变现状的机会。


A finding of discrimination would establish a landmark legal precedent, putting core values of non-discrimination and equal justice beyond dispute at a time when Europe’s politicians consider how best to absorb millions of new immigrants and minority members.	种族歧视的判决会开创里程碑式的法律先例，在欧洲政治家考虑如何才能最好地吸纳成百上千万新移民和少数族裔的时候，使反对歧视和平等公正的核心价值观深入人心。


Just as importantly, such a ruling would send a powerful signal that racism and xenophobia have no place in the new Europe.	同样重要的是，这样的裁决能发出强有力的信号：种族歧视和排外主义在新欧洲没有容身之地。


But perhaps the greatest significance of these cases lies in their very presence on the docket of Europe’s highest rights tribunal.	但这两起案件能够在欧洲最高权利法院进行审理，这本身就是它们最深刻的意义所在。


A decade ago, few minority victims would have been inclined or able to seek legal remedies for discrimination.	10年前，很少有人会同情少数族裔的受害者，他们也很少能为自己受到的歧视寻求法律上的赔偿。


The success of some in having their claims heard is testimony to the growing power of law as a force for positive change in Europe.	某些受害者的呼声能引起人们的关注，���表明日益扩大的法律权力已经在欧洲成了积极变革的力量。


Europe’s High-Risk Gamble	欧洲的高危赌博


CAMBRIDGE – The Greek government needs to escape from an otherwise impossible situation.	发自剑桥——希腊政府需要摆脱的是一个完全没有其他活路可走的困境。


It has an unmanageable level of government debt (150% of GDP, rising this year by ten percentage points), a collapsing economy (with GDP down by more than 7% this year, pushing the unemployment rate up to 16%), a chronic balance-of-payments deficit (now at 8% of GDP), and insolvent banks that are rapidly losing deposits.	它拥有一个棘手的政府负债（相当于GDP的150%，今年内已经递增了10%），一个陷入崩溃的经济（随着GDP下跌了7%，失业率上升到16%），一个长期存在的政府收支赤字（目前相当于GDP的8%），以及一批资不抵债且在迅速流失存款的银行。


The only way out is for Greece to default on its sovereign debt.	而希腊唯一的活路就是实施主权债务违约。


When it does, it must write down the principal value of that debt by at least 50%.	一旦采取该行动，它必须将全部债务的本金削减至少50%。


The current plan to reduce the present value of privately held bonds by 20% is just a first small step toward this outcome.	而目前试图将私人持有债券现值削减20%的计划只是为实现这一目标而首先迈出的一小步而已。


If Greece leaves the euro after it defaults, it can devalue its new currency, thereby stimulating demand and shifting eventually to a trade surplus.	如果希腊在违约之后脱离了欧元区，它就可以把自己的新货币贬值，从而刺激需求并最终转变为贸易顺差。


Such a strategy of “default and devalue” has been standard fare for countries in other parts of the world when they were faced with unmanageably large government debt and a chronic current-account deficit.	这么一个“违约并贬值”的策略对于世界其他国家来说已经是标准动作了，一旦遭遇无法偿还的巨额政府债务以及长期经常账户逆差，他们就会照此办理。


It hasn’t happened in Greece only because Greece is trapped in the single currency.	而这个情况之所以没有在希腊身上发生就是因为希腊被单一货币捆住了手脚。


The markets are fully aware that Greece, being insolvent, will eventually default.	市场已经清楚地意识到失去偿还能力的希腊将最终违约。


That’s why the interest rate on Greek three-year government debt recently soared past 100% and the yield on ten-year bonds is 22%, implying that a €100 principal payable in ten years is worth less than €14 today.	这也是三年期希腊政府债券利率最近攀升超过100%而十年期债券收益率高达22%的原因，意味着一张十年后面值为100欧元的债券还不值当今的14欧元。


Why, then, are political leaders in France and Germany trying so hard to prevent – or, more accurately, to postpone – the inevitable?	那么，法国和德国的领导人们又为何如此奋力去阻止——或者更精确地说，拖延——这件必将发生的事件？


There are two reasons.	在此有两个原因可供解答。


First, the banks and other financial institutions in Germany and France have large exposures to Greek government debt, both directly and through the credit that they have extended to Greek and other eurozone banks.	首先，德法两国的银行以及其他金融机构都持有大量希腊政府债务，或者是直接持有，或者是通过自身在希腊以及其他欧元区银行的信贷持有。


Postponing a default gives the French and German financial institutions time to build up their capital, reduce their exposure to Greek banks by not renewing credit when loans come due, and sell Greek bonds to the European Central Bank.	推迟违约意味着为两国金融机构赢得时间去注入资本，使之能在贷款到期后不再继续借贷从而减少与希腊各银行的关联，并将希腊债券出售给欧洲央行。


The second, and more important, reason for the Franco-German struggle to postpone a Greek default is the risk that a Greek default would induce sovereign defaults in other countries and runs on other banking systems, particularly in Spain and Italy.	而法德两国奋力推迟违约的第二个（也是更重要的）原因就是希腊违约将引发其他国家（尤其是西班牙和意大利）的主权债务违约以及银行系统危机。


This risk was highlighted by the recent downgrade of Italy’s credit rating by Standard & Poor’s.	而这一风险在标准普尔最近调低意大利主权评级一事中可见一斑。


A default by either of those large countries would have disastrous implications for the banks and other financial institutions in France and Germany.	如果西班牙和意大利这两个大国发生违约，法德两国的银行以及金融机构都将承受灾难性后果。


The European Financial Stability Fund is large enough to cover Greece’s financing needs but not large enough to finance Italy and Spain if they lose access to private markets.	欧洲金融稳定基金有足够能力去满足希腊的融资需求，而一旦西班牙和意大利无法从私人市场融资的话就爱莫能助了。


So European politicians hope that by showing that even Greece can avoid default, private markets will gain enough confidence in the viability of Italy and Spain to continue lending to their governments at reasonable rates and financing their banks.	因此欧洲政治家们希望通过向外界展示即使希腊也能免于违约，使私人市场对意西两国的生存能力重拾信心，并因此继续以合理的利率贷款给两国政府并向各银行注资。


If Greece is allowed to default in the coming weeks, financial markets will indeed regard defaults by Spain and Italy as much more likely.	如果放任希腊在未来几个星期内发生违约，那么金融市场实质上将认定西班牙和意大利也将很快违约。


That could cause their interest rates to spike upward and their national debts to rise rapidly, thus making them effectively insolvent.	这将导致市场向两国贷款的利率飙升，国家债务总额迅速上涨，因此实质上剥夺其还债能力。


By postponing a Greek default for two years, Europe’s politicians hope to give Spain and Italy time to prove that they are financially viable.	反过来欧洲政治家们认为如能将希腊违约推后两年时间的话，或许西意两国能证明自己在金融上还是有偿还能力的。


Two years could allow markets to see whether Spain’s banks can handle the decline of local real-estate prices, or whether mortgage defaults will lead to widespread bank failures, requiring the Spanish government to finance large deposit guarantees.	两年时间能使市场看清西班牙银行是否有能力应对地产价格下滑的问题，或者抵押贷款违约是否会导致银行大规模破产，迫使西班牙政府注入巨额存款保证金。


The next two years would also disclose the financial conditions of Spain’s regional governments, which have incurred debts that are ultimately guaranteed by the central government.	同时这两年也将暴露出西班牙地方政府的财政状况，而这些政府无法偿还的债务最终也要由中央政府来担保。


Likewise, two years could provide time for Italy to demonstrate whether it can achieve a balanced budget.	同样，两年时间能让意大利政府表明其是否能实现财政收支平衡。


The Berlusconi government recently passed a budget bill designed to raise tax revenue and to bring the economy to a balanced budget by 2013.	贝卢斯科尼政府最近通过了一项旨在增加税收并在2013年达到收支平衡的预算法案。


That will be hard to achieve, because fiscal tightening will reduce Italian GDP, which is now barely growing, in turn shrinking tax revenue.	这目标将很难实现， 因为财政紧缩将减少意大利目前仅在缓慢增长的GDP，并导致税收减少。


So, in two years, we can expect a debate about whether budget balance has then been achieved on a cyclically adjusted basis.	因此在两年时间内，我们将看到一场关于预算平衡是否在循环调整的基础上最终实现的辩论。


Those two years would also indicate whether Italian banks are in better shape than many now fear.	这两年也将展现出意大利的银行是否比外界想象的要强健。


If Spain and Italy do look sound enough at the end of two years, European political leaders can allow Greece to default without fear of dangerous contagion.	如果西班牙和意大利在两年后表现良好的话，欧洲的政治家们就能在没有危机传导之忧的情况下放任希腊违约。


Portugal might follow Greece in a sovereign default and in leaving the eurozone.	葡萄牙或许会步希腊的后尘并退出欧元区。


But the larger countries would be able to fund themselves at reasonable interest rates, and the current eurozone system could continue.	但那些较大的国家将能以合理的利率借到资金，而目前的欧元区系统也将继续运作下去。


If, however, Spain or Italy does not persuade markets over the next two years that they are financially sound, interest rates for their governments and banks will rise sharply, and it will be clear that they are insolvent.	但如果西班牙和意大利无法在未来两年内用自己的财务���况说服市场的话，向其政府和银行的贷款利率将显著上升，并使两国陷入明确无误的破产境地。


At that point, they will default.	而在这一点上他们已经违约了。


They would also be at least temporarily unable to borrow and would be strongly tempted to leave the single currency.	结果它们至少在短期内无法在市场上融资，并强烈要求退出单一货币体系。