This holding pattern is particularly harmful because profound transformation will surely depend on financing from a sound sovereign bond market, which cannot function properly until uncertainty related to the government’s contingent liabilities – all those implicit guarantees – has been resolved.	这一既定模式为害尤甚，因为深刻的转型显然需要依靠来自可靠的主权债券市场的融资，而如果关于政府或有负债——一切隐性担保——的不确定性得不到解决，主权债券市场就无法合理地起作用。


China has it within its power to stabilize its exchange rate via credible reforms, particularly policies that redirect resources to invigorate domestic demand and pull resources toward the newer high-value sectors.	中国拥有通过可信改革稳定汇率的能力，特别是重新引导资源提振内需、让资源流向更新的高价值部门的政策。


The reforms China needs cannot be accomplished in a slump, or by a large exchange-rate depreciation that deflates the world in a vain effort to turn back the clock to an era of export-led growth that stagnant demand in the West has rendered nonviable.	中国所需要的改革无法在经济低迷中完成，也无法通过大规模汇率贬值完成。 大规模汇率贬值将让中国退回出口拉动型增长时代，而西方需求的停滞意味着这根本不可行，只能徒劳地让世界陷入通缩。


China, Inc. Goes Global	走向全球的中国公司


NEW YORK – China’s economy is now taking its next great leap forward: parts of its manufacturing sector are now moving up the value-added chain and out of the country.  The China challenge is now a global one.	纽约——中国经济正在迈出又一大步：其制造部门的一部分正在朝增值链的高端转移，并在走出国门。 中国挑战如今已成为全球挑战。


The reasons are not difficult to fathom.	个中原因不难看穿。


Production costs (wages, office rents, land, capital, etc.) in China’s coastal provinces – where most of the country’s manufacturing and service production, as well as foreign direct investment, are located – have been rising fast.	中国沿海省份（该国大部分制造和服务产品的生产和外国直接投资坐落于此）的生产成本（工资、租金、土地、资本等）已出现快速上升。


Since last year alone, minimum wages in nine of twelve coastal provinces (including Beijing) rose by an average of more than 21%.	去年一年，12个沿海省份（包括北京）的最低工资平均上升了21%。


At the same time, the renminbi is appreciating, making domestic production of export-oriented goods and services even more expensive.	与此同时，人民币也在升值，这使得国内出口导向产品和服务的生产变得更贵了。


This matters, especially for labor-intensive activities (ranging from toy manufacturing to data-entry services), whether by affiliates of foreign multinational enterprises (which account for more than half of China’s exports) or by local firms, which are losing competitiveness in international markets.	这绝非小事，特别是对于劳动密集型活动（从玩具制造到数据输入服务）来说尤其如此，不管是外国跨国公司（占中国出口的二分之一强）分公司还是国内公司，都在失去国际市场上的竞争力。


To maintain its export-oriented production base, output must move up the value-added chain, toward more sophisticated products.	为了维持其出口导向生产基础，产出必须向增值链上端转移，转向更精致成熟的产品。


Multinational enterprises can do that within their integrated global production networks, which allow them to organize an international intra-firm division of labor.	跨国公司可以在其一体化的全球生产网络中做到这一点——其生产网络使其能够组织起公司内部的国际劳动分工。


Any part of these production chains can be located wherever it suits the firms’ international competitiveness best.	其生产链的任何部分都可以部署在最有利于公司国际竞争力的地区。


And such firms have the experience to scout the globe for the right investment locations.	此外，这类公司拥有在全球寻找正确投资地的经验。


Domestic Chinese firms, too, need to respond to these pressures.	中国国内公司也必须面对这一压力。


They are helped in this effort by the rapid deepening of China’s skills and technology base.	这方面，中国迅速深化的技能和技术帮了大忙。


This partly reflects training in foreign affiliates, but the main reason has been the Chinese government’s sustained effort to foster education and training, encourage technology transfers from foreign to domestic firms, and, in particular, to build up research and development capabilities.	这部分地反映了外国子公司的培训成果，但主要原因还是中国政府在不懈地推进教育和培训，鼓励从外国公司向国内公司的技术转移，特别是培育自身的研发实力。


In short, producers of more sophisticated goods and services in developed and emerging-market countries need to be prepared for growing competition from China.	简言之，生产更成熟商品和服务的发达和新兴市场国家生产者需要做好面临与日俱增的来自中国的竞争的准备。


At the same time, China’s labor-intensive production will increasingly move to countries with lower labor costs – including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and neighboring Vietnam (where Chinese firms have already established about 1,000 affiliates), as well as various African countries.	与此同时，中国的劳动密集型生产将迅速地向劳动成本更低的国家转移，包括孟加拉国、印度、印尼、相邻的越南（在越南，中国公司已经设立了大约1000家子公司）以及众多非洲国家。


This process has already begun, and has been supported since the beginning of the last decade by the government’s “Going Global” policy, through which it encourages outward FDI from China.	这一过程已经开始了，并从本世纪初就开始得到政府“走出去”政策的支持（通过鼓励中国企业进行对外直接投资）。


The data bear this out: FDI outflows more than doubled in 2008, to $52 billion, from $23 billion in 2007, and rose even further in 2009 (when world FDI flows collapsed by about 50%, owing to the Western financial and economic crisis), before reaching $68 billion in 2010.  Not counting Hong Kong, this made China the world’s fifth largest outward investor that year.	数据说明了一切：2008年，外国直接投资流出额在2007年230亿美元的基础上翻了一番多，达到了520亿美元，2009年又更上一层楼（同一年，由于西方金融和经济危机，世界外国直接投资流暴跌50%），并于2010年达到680亿美元。 这使得中国成为世界第五大对外投资国（不计香港）。


This development creates new opportunities for other developing countries to reap the trade benefits of inserting themselves into the international division of labor.	这一发展态势为其他发展中国家创造了通过参与国际劳动分工攫取贸易收益的新机会。


These countries’ investment-promotion agencies – indeed, those of all countries, including developed ones – should increasingly target firms in China to lure them to their shores.	这些国家的投资促进机构——事实上是所有国家，包括发达国家在内——应该更多地将目标投向中国公司，吸引它们前来投资。


In so doing, they should aim not only for big state-owned companies, but also for the rising number of vibrant, private small and medium-size enterprises in China that can be found in all sectors of the economy.	在这样做的时候不应该把目标局限于国有企业，中国还有越来越多的活跃中小私人企业，范围涉及经济的所有部门。


But an important caveat is in order: China has a vast interior that is far less developed than the coastal provinces.	但有一点必须注意：中国有着广袤的远不及沿海省份发达的内陆地区。


The government is making special efforts to develop these areas in the framework of its “Great Western Development Strategy,” including by building modern infrastructure, promoting high-quality education, supporting science and technology (all key determinants of the location of production), and encouraging investment there.	中国政府正在“西部大开发战略”的框架下推出特别措施开发这些地区，包括建设现代基础设施、推进高质量教育、支持科学技术（均为生产区位的关键决定因素）以及鼓励投资。


As a result, firms based in the coastal provinces that have to move their production (and see no need to diversify away from China) can choose to relocate to China’s interior, rather than going abroad.	结果，需要迁移生产线、又不想通过“走出去”实现多元化的沿海省份公司可以选择迁往中国内陆。


The pattern is clear: this sort of transition away from labor-intensive manufacturing happened before in today’s developed countries, when firms headquartered in Europe, Japan, and the United States moved production to developing countries.	其中的模式是显而易见的：当今的发达国家以前也发生过迁离劳动密集型制造业的情况，总部设在欧洲、日本和美国的公司将生产线迁往发展中国家。


In Asia, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan were (and have been) among the beneficiaries.	在亚洲，香港、韩国、新加坡和台湾便曾是受益者。


When costs for labor-intensive goods and services became too high in these countries, production was shifted elsewhere.	当劳动密集型产品和服务的成本在这些国家变得太高时，生产便转移到了别处。


This relocation of manufacturing has since been accompanied by the off-shoring of services whose information-intensive components have become tradable.	这种制造的迁移一直伴随着信息密集部分变得可贸易的服务的离岸化。


China itself has benefited from today’s open international trade and investment regime, which allows firms to locate production where it is most beneficial for their international competitiveness – and is now beginning to shed labor-intensive industries itself.	如今的开放国际贸易和投资体系使得公司能够把生产放在最有利于其国际竞争力的地方，中国本身也从中获益良多，现在，中国也开始转移劳动密集型产业了。


Governments need policies to adapt to this global shift in production.	政府��要调整政策以适应生产的全球迁移。


They should help their countries’ firms to adapt to the departure of some producers by establishing training programs, stimulating innovation, and maintaining or creating a competitive environment that encourages “creative destruction” while providing for a social safety net.	它们应该通过建立培训项目、刺激创新、在提供社会安全网的同时维持或创造鼓励“创造性破坏”的竞争性环境等办法帮助本国公司适应生产者的离去。


Likewise, governments that attract the production that was shed elsewhere need to have policies in place that enable them to benefit as much as possible from this global shift, thereby furthering their own economic development.	类似地，吸引从其他地方流出的生产线的政府需要出台能让它们获得全球生产迁移最大好处的政策，从而进一步发展本国经济。


China’s Incomplete Contracts	中国的不完全契约


HONG KONG – This year’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences went to Harvard’s Oliver Hart and MIT’s Bengt Holmström for their pioneering work on the economics of property rights and contracts.	香港—今年诺贝尔经济学奖被授予哈佛大学的奥利佛·哈特（Oliver Hart）和麻省理工学院的本特·霍尔姆斯特罗姆（Bengt Holmström），以表彰他们在产权和契约经济学方面的开创性工作。


At a time when China is attempting the difficult transition from a system of incomplete contracts to a strong property-rights regime, the real-world importance of these contributions could not be clearer.	如今，中国正在尝试艰难的转型——从不完全契约系统转向更成熟完善的产权体制与市场，哈特和霍尔斯特罗姆的理论贡献在真实世界中的重要性从未如此清晰。


No contract can specify every eventuality.	不论什么契约，都无法具体规定一切可能性。


So contracts must, instead, spell out the allocation of “control” rights – who can make decisions in which circumstances.	因此，契约必须转而规定“剩余控制权及剩余收益权”的配置——谁可以在怎样的环境下做决定及谁可以获得相应的收益。


For a centrally planned economy attempting to allocate more authority to the market, such contracts are invaluable – at least at first.	对于一个尝试逐渐增加市场力量的中央计划经济而言，这样的具体但不完全的契约是无比宝贵的——至少在一开始是这样。


This has not been lost on Chinese reformers.	中国改革者并没有忽视不完全契约的重要性。


From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, they introduced both the “rural household responsibility system” and the “enterprise contract responsibility system” for state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	20世纪80年代中期到90年代初，他们引入了“农村家庭联产承包责任制”和国企的“企业承包责任制”。


Those systems essentially delegated more decision-making rights, as well as certain profits, to farmers and workers, so that they had a stronger incentive to work more efficiently within state-owned communes and firms.	这些制度本质上是将更多的决策权利和一定的利润以不完全契约的方式委托给了农民和工人，因此给了他们更大的激励在集体所有制的土地上和国有制企业中更加高效地工作。


A similar approach was adopted in China’s 1994 fiscal reform to handle tax-sharing between the central and local governments, with control rights relating to land and local economic development delegated to local officials, particularly at the municipal and county levels.	1994年，中国以类似的方法进行了财政改革，解决中央和地方政府的税收分配问题，与土地和地方经济发展有关的控制权利被委托给地方官员，特别是在市和县的层面。


This helped to advance development, though it also created space for local officials to take advantage of fringe benefits – a practice that later morphed into outright corruption.	这有助于推进地方发展，尽管也为地方官员制造了攫取利益的空间——后来演变成一些赤裸裸的腐败。


More recently, the incomplete contract approach has also been used in the area of shadow banking.	接着，不完全契约方法又被用到了影子银行领域。


Regulators allowed innovations in incomplete contract-based financial intermediations, such as trust companies and Internet-based platforms, while maintaining tight control over the formal banking sector.	监管者允许基于不完全契约的金融中介的创新，如信托公司和互联网金融平台，同时对正规银行部门施加了严格的控制。


By defining partial rights to both decision-making and benefits, China’s leaders gave stakeholders incentives to compete efficiently with their peers, without giving up full authority.	中国领导人通过界定部分决策权和收益权，让利益相关方有激励与同一层面的企业及地方对手进行高效竞争，同时又不必完全放弃中央权威及国家对资产终极拥有与控制。


In that sense, these incomplete contracts laid the foundation for market-oriented competition in China, before it was possible – owing to institutional and ideological barriers – to achieve clearly defined private property rights.	正是这些不完全契约构成了中国过去三十多年市场竞争不断加强的基础。 而在制度和意识形态逐渐变化后，许多不完全契约就顺利过渡到了有明确私有产权的民营企业及上市公司。


But while the incomplete-contract approach was necessary during the transition to a market economy, it is not a long-term solution.	尽管不完全契约的改革策略在向市场经济转型期间是不可或缺的，它并不是长期解决方案。


More clearly defined and securely protected property rights, underpinned by an effective legal and judicial framework, are still needed.	以有效的法律和司法框架为基础，更清晰地定义和更安全地保护产权及履行合约仍然十分必要。


In fact, the loopholes in the incomplete contracts are undermining progress.	事实上，不完全契约的漏洞正在阻挠中国改革的进程。


One of the lingering issues of the rural household responsibility system, for example, was unclear property rights relating to farm land, which is still legally owned collectively by local farmers, even though land-use rights were contracted to the individual households for 30 years.	比如，农村家庭联产承包责任制的一个长期遗留问题是农地产权不清晰。 目前，法律上农地仍归本地农民集体所有，尽管土地使用权利以30年的合约期承包给了个体家庭。


Without privatization, the farmers could not sell their land at market value for urban development, creating space for abuse and corruption, as well as social instability, particularly because urban and rural land values widened substantially during China’s high-growth period.	如果不进行土地的私有化，农民就无法以市场价格出售土地用于城市开发，这给滥权和腐败创造了空间，也为社会动荡埋下了祸根，特别是因为在中国高速增长时期，城市和农村土地价值差距迅速拉大。


Likewise, the enterprise contract system failed to move the SOEs to sustained profitability.	类似地，企业承包制也没有让国有企业走上持续盈利之路。


Unlike farmers, who did not borrow at all, SOEs borrowed heavily from state-owned banks.	和没有借贷的农民不同，国企从国有银行大量借贷。


When they generated profits, the proceeds were shared with managers and employees.	当国企产生利润时，其收益由管理者和员工分享。


But when they generated losses – for example, in the 1990s – the banks were left with huge amounts of non-performing loans.	但当国企产生亏损时——比如20世纪90年代——银行就不得不背上巨量不良贷款。


China’s government under Premier Zhu Rongji attempted to resolve the debt problem by putting the SOEs’ bad loans into four state-owned asset-management companies, and most of the small and medium-size loss-making SOEs were privatized.	当年朱镕基总理通过将国企坏账转移给四大国有资产管理公司的办法解决了当时的国企坏账问题，并将大部分亏损的中小国企民营化。


The remaining large state-owned banks and enterprises then became profitable, thanks largely to their monopolistic positions, which allowed them to be listed on the Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen stock exchanges. In the ensuing years, they made critical contributions to China’s massive public infrastructure.	剩下的大型国有银行和企业由于其垄断地位而能够盈利，从而能够在香港、上海和深圳证券交易所上市，并在此后的多年中为中国大规模公共基础设施建设做出了关键贡献。


But the SOEs have also been the source of serious problems.	但国企也是许多严重问题的根源。


They use both financial and human capital far less efficiently than their private-sector counterparts, and they have become key sources of both corruption and distortions in energy and natural-resource prices.	它们在财务和人力资本方面的效率远远比不上民营企业，并且也是一些腐败案件和能源及资源价格扭曲的源头。


Moreover, their stock-market dominance has hindered the healthy development of China’s capital market; they not only crowd out scarce resources for equity capital, but also complicate the normal operation of the market for mergers and acquisitions.	此外，由国企主导的股市也逐渐开始阻碍中国资本市场的进一步健康发展； 它们不但霸占非常稀缺的股本资源，也让兼并与收购市场的正常操作变得十分复杂。


Nowadays, it is very difficult to undertake market-oriented changes in corporate ownership and control for the listed SOEs.	如今，上市国企的公司所有权和控制权已经变得非常复杂而难以适应市场化的变更重组。


Yet such changes are critical to improve governance and competitiveness, especially in the service, knowledge, and innovation-driven sectors that will underpin future economic growth.	但企业控制权市场对于改善企业治理和竞争力至关重要，特别是在未来经济增长的基础行业，如服务、知识和创新驱动行业。


To be sure, President Xi Jinping has taken some steps to rein in the state sector. Since 2012, his government has engaged in a massive anti-corruption drive, aimed at controlling the inefficiencies and abuses that have arisen from a lack of appropriate checks on delegated authority.	习近平主席领导的中国政府从2012年以来采取了一些列措施治理国有部门，包括发动了大规模反腐运动，目标是提高政府及国企效率及限制因权力下放缺少制衡而导致的滥权。


But it has not been enough to root out corruption fully, and problems with pollution, overcapacity, and debt remain, which can be addressed only through a major supply-side structural-reform program.	但彻底解决腐败、污染、产能过剩和债务还需要靠大手笔供给侧结构性改革，特别是与完善产权及契约制度相关的改革。


In short, China’s incomplete contracts need to be completed.	简言之，中国的不完全契约体制亟待完善。


The key is judicial reform and the development of an orderly and institutionalized process for resolving property-rights and contractual disputes.	关键是通过司法改革来制定有序的、制度化的流程来解决产权和契约纠纷。


Stronger bankruptcy laws, for example, would enable Chinese banks and state authorities to enforce credit discipline, pushing weak or failed borrowers out of the system.	比如，更强大的破产法能让银行和监管部门执行信用纪律，将薄弱或破产的借款人踢出金融系统以提高其效率与竞争力及降低系统风险。


China’s continued progress toward high-income status requires it to develop a strong and comprehensive property-rights system based on more complete contracts.	中国朝向高收入国家的进步之路需要制定基于更完全契约及更完整产权的市场制度。


Its leaders should look to the work of Hart and Holmström for guidance.	或许中国决策部门可以从哈特和霍尔姆斯特罗姆的研究得到启发及指引。


China’s Incomplete Growth Strategy	不完整的中国增长战略


BEIJING – China’s economic growth has been slowing for six years – far longer than expected.	北京—中国增长放缓已经六年——远远长于预期。


Eager to stem the slide, Chinese government officials and economists have desperately sought a clear explanation pointing toward an effective policy response.	渴望遏制颓势的中国政府官员和经济学家急切地试图进行明确的解释，从而找到有效政策应对。


And, last November, they officially placed the blame on long-term supply-side shortcomings, which they pledged to address with far-reaching structural reforms.	去年11月，他们正式将矛头指向了长期供给端缺陷，并承诺用深刻的结构改革解决这些缺陷。


But, although Chinese officials should be applauded for their commitment to implementing painful – and badly needed – structural reforms, the supply-side focus largely ignores the present.	但是，尽管中国官员承诺实施痛苦——也是急需——的结构改革值得赞赏，但聚焦于供给端在很大程度上忽略了当下。


China faces two separate challenges: the long-term issue of a declining potential growth rate and the immediate problem of below-potential actual growth.	中国面临两个不同的挑战：潜在增长率下滑的长期问题和实际增长低于潜在水平的当务之急。


Among the long-term factors undermining potential growth are diminishing returns to scale, a widening income gap, and a narrowing scope for technological catch-up through imitation.	制约潜在增长的长期因素是规模回报递减、收入差距扩大和通过模仿进行技术赶超的空间缩小。


Moreover, even as the country’s demographic dividend dissolves, its carrying capacity (the size of the population the environment can sustain) is being exhausted – a situation that high levels of pollution are certainly not helping.	此外，即使人口红利消失，其承载力（环境可以维持的人口规模）正在耗竭——显然高污染进一步加剧了这一状况。


Finally, and most important, the country is suffering from inadequate progress on market-orientated reform.	最后也是最重要的，中国正饱受市场改革进展不足之苦。


While some of these factors are irreversible, others can be addressed effectively.	在这些因素中，有一些是不可逆转的，但另外一些可以有效解决。


And, indeed, the government’s supply-side reform strategy will go a long way toward doing just that, ultimately stabilizing and even raising China’s growth potential.	而事实上，中国政府的供给端改革战略将大大有助于解决这些因素，最终稳定甚至提高中国的增长潜力。


But, contrary to popular belief, they will not boost China’s actual growth rate today.	但是，与流行的信念相反，该战略无法提振中国当下的实际增长率。


Why are so many economists convinced that a long-term reform strategy is all China needs?	为何有如此多的经济学家相信长期改革战略是中国唯一需要的东西？


One reason is the widely held notion that today’s overcapacity reflects supply-side problems, not insufficient demand.	一个原因在于一个被广泛接受的概念，即当下的产能过剩反映的是供给端问题，而不是需求不足。


According to this view, China should implement policies like tax cuts to encourage companies to produce products for which there is genuine demand.	据此观点，中国应该实施减税等政策鼓励公司生产存在真实需求的产品。


That way, the government would not inadvertently sustain “zombie enterprises” that cannot survive without bank loans and support from local governments.	如此，政府不会再维持没了银行贷款和地方政府支持就无法生存的“僵尸企业”。


But only some of China’s overcapacity can be attributed to bad investment decisions. A large share has emerged because of a lack of effective demand.	但中国产能过剩只能局部归因于坏的投资决策，而有很大一部分源自有效需求不足。


And that is, at least partly, a result of the government’s effort to moderate real-estate investment, which has caused the sector’s annual growth to tank, plunging from 38% in 2010 to 1% at the end of 2015.	而这又至少部分源自政府给房地产投资降温的措施，这些措施导致房地产业年增长暴跌，从2010年的38%降低到2015年底的1%。


With real-estate investment still accounting for more than 14% of GDP last year, plummeting growth in the sector has put considerable downward pressure on the economy as a whole, helping to push China into a debt-deflation spiral.	去年，房地产投资仍占中国GDP的14%以上，房地产业增长暴跌给整体经济带来巨大的下行压力，将中国推向了债务-通缩螺旋。


As overcapacity drives down the producer price index – which has now been falling for 51 consecutive months – real debt rises.	随着产能过剩拉低生产物价指数（PPI，现已连续51个月下跌），真实债务在增加。


This is undermining corporate profitability, spurring companies to deleverage and reduce investment, and fueling further declines in PPI.	这破坏了公司盈利能力，刺激公司去杠杆和减少投资，从而导致PPI进一步下跌。


The enduring importance of real-estate investment to China’s economic growth is reflected in trends from the first quarter of this year.	房地产投资对中国经济增长有着持久的重要性，这反映在今年一季度的趋势中。


Annual GDP growth of 6.7%, despite being the slowest rate for any quarter in seven years, exceeded market expectations.	年GDP增长为6. 7%，为七年来最低季度数字，但仍高于市场预期。


And it was driven partly by an unforeseen increase in real-estate investment growth, to 6%.	而其背后部分原因就在于房地产投资增长出人意料地增加到6%。


This is not to say that what China needs is more real-estate investment.	这并不是说中国需要更多的房地产投资。


According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China had 718 million square meters of unsold commercial and residential floor space at the end of 2015; when space under construction is factored in, inventory expands to more than five billion square meters.	据国家统计局的数字，到2015年底，中国为出售商业和住宅楼面面积高达7. 18亿平方米；


With an average of only 1.2 billion square meters of housing being sold each year, the best way to reduce this supply glut is clear: limit future construction.	若考虑在建项目，房地产库存将超过五十亿平方米。 每年平均住房销售面积只有12亿平方米，降低房地产供给过剩的最佳方法已经呼之欲出：限制未来建设。


One of the most important reasons for the recent investment surge was abundant liquidity driving speculative demand – and that is hardly sustainable.	当前投资激增的最重要的原因之一是充足的流动性刺激了投机性需求——而这是很难维持的。


But not all investment is created equal.	但并非所有投资都是一样的。


Infrastructure investment, in particular, may well be the key to tackling China’s economic woes.	特别是基础设施投资或是解决中国经济萎靡的关键。


After all, such investment, which grew at 19.6% in the first quarter of 2016, has already proved to be a critical driver of economic growth – and, unlike real-estate investment, it has not worsened China’s resource allocation or set the stage for major imbalances.	毕竟，基础设施投资在2016年一季度增长率为19. 6%，已证明是经济增长的关键动力——并且，与房地产投资不同，基础设施投资不会恶化中国的资源配置或为重大失衡创造条件。


When there is slack in the economy, the only way to escape the debt-deflation trap is to grow strongly.	当经济有所松弛时，摆脱债务-通缩陷阱的唯一办法是强劲的增长。


Given that China is saddled with large local-government and corporate debts, but also enjoys large domestic savings and a strong fiscal position, this message could not be more pertinent.	由于中国存在为数巨大的地方政府和公司债务，但同时也存在为数巨大的国内储蓄和坚挺的财政状况，情况就变得非常重要。


In an ideal world, domestic consumption would serve as the main engine of growth; under current circumstances, infrastructure investment is the most reliable option.	在理想状况中，国内消费将成为增长的主要引擎； 在当前环境下，基础设施投资是更可靠的选择。


In the short term, when overcapacity and deflation are the main obstacles, infrastructure investment boosts growth through the economy’s demand side.	在短期，产能过剩和通缩是主要问题，基础设施投资通过经济的需求端提振增长。


In the long run, it operates through the supply side to boost productivity and thus raise growth potential.	在长期，它通过供给端刺激生产率从而提高增长潜力。


China can fund such investment with fiscal deficits, given strong demand for government bonds.	中国可以用财政赤字为这些投资融资，因为对政府债券的需求十分强劲。


And, with China’s major banks still state-owned, and capital controls still in place, the risk of an imminent financial crisis is very low.	而中国主要银行仍为国有，资本管制也仍然存在，因此立刻发生金融危机的风险很小。


Of course, China’s government must uphold its commitment to implement structural reforms.	当然，中国政府必须坚守实施结构改革的承诺。


But infrastructure investment is also badly needed, not just to prevent the economy from sliding further, but also to enable China to generate the sustained long-term growth that it requires to achieve developed-country status.	但基础设施投资也非常需要，不仅是为了防止经济进一步下滑，也是为了让中国能够保持实现跨越发达国家门槛所需要的长期增长。


The Renewable Energy Revolution	可再生能源革命


SYDNEY – In the United States and Europe, the benefits of renewable energy are predominantly seen as environmental.	悉尼——在美国和欧洲，人们认为可再生能源主要可以带来环境方面的好处。


Energy from the wind and sun can offset the need to burn fossil fuels, helping to mitigate climate change.	风能和太阳能可以抵消燃烧化石燃料的需求，从而有助于缓解气候变化。


In China and India, however, renewable energy is viewed in a remarkably different fashion.	但在中国和印度，人们看待可再生能源的方式截然不同。


The relatively rapid transition away from fossil fuels in both countries is driven not so much by concerns about climate change as by the economic benefits renewable energy sources are perceived as conveying.	中印两国以较快的速度摆脱化石燃料并不是因为担心气候变化，而是因为可再生能源可以带来经济上的好处。


Indeed, while the economic benefits of renewables can be attractive to advanced economies such as Germany or Japan (both of which are rapidly moving away from fossil fuels), the advantages for emerging industrial giants are overwhelming.	事实上，可再生能源的经济效益既可以吸引德日等发达经济体（上述两国都在迅速摆脱化石燃料），更可以为新兴工业巨人带来好处。


For India and China, an economic trajectory based on fossil fuels could spell catastrophe, as efforts to secure enough for their immense populations ratchet up geopolitical tensions.	对印度和中国而言，基于化石燃料的经济发展轨迹可能会带来灾难，因为其庞大人口的巨额需求可能激化地缘政治紧张。


Aside from increased energy security, a low-carbon economy would promote domestic manufacturing and improve local environmental quality by, for example, reducing urban smog.	除强化能源安全外，低碳经济还能促进国内生产，并通过减少城市雾霾等方式改善当地的环境质量。


To be sure, fossil fuels conferred enormous benefits on the Western world as it industrialized over the past 200 years.	当然，在西方世界过去200年的工业化进程中化石燃料发挥了巨大作用。


The transition to a carbon-based economy liberated economies from age-old Malthusian constraints.	向以碳为基础的经济转型让西方经济摆脱了古老的马尔萨斯约束。


For a group of select countries representing a small slice of the global population, burning fossil fuels enabled an era of explosive growth, ushering in dramatic improvements in productivity, income, wealth, and standards of living.	对一小撮代表少部分全球人口的特定国家而言，燃烧化石燃料开启了爆炸式的增长时代，显著改善了生产力、收入、财富和生活水平。


For much of the past 20 years, China and India led the charge in claiming the benefits of fossil fuels for the rest of the world.	过去20年来，中国和印度带头宣传化石燃料对世界其他国家的好处。


Recently, however, they have begun to moderate their approach.	但近来他们开始缓和自己的态度。


As their use of fossil fuels brushes up against geopolitical and environmental limits, they have been forced to invest seriously in alternatives – most notably, renewables.	随着化石燃料使用接近了地缘政治和环境上限，他们被迫对替代品——其中最明显的是可再生能源进行认真的投资。


In doing so, they have put themselves in the vanguard of a planetary transition that in a few short decades could eliminate the use of fossil fuels altogether.	这样做的同时他们正在引领一波全球性的过渡，在短短几十年内可能彻底淘汰化石燃料。


The economic arguments advanced against renewable sources of energy – that they can be expensive, intermittent, or not sufficiently concentrated – are easily rebutted.	昂贵、不连续或不够集中等反对可再生能源的经济论据很容易驳斥。


And while renewables’ opponents are legion, they are motivated more by interest in preserving the status quo of fossil fuels and nuclear energy than by worries that wind turbines or solar farms will blot the landscape.	虽然可再生能源的反对者众多，但驱动他们的更多是保持化石燃料和核能现状的利益因素，而不是担心风力涡轮机和太阳能发电厂会破坏景色。


In any case, those wishing to halt the expansion of renewables are unlikely to triumph over simple economics.	无论如何，阻止可再生能源扩张者不太可能战胜简单的经济学。


The renewable energy revolution is not being driven by a tax on carbon emissions or subsidies for clean energy; it is the result of reductions in the cost of manufacturing that will soon make it more cost-effective to generate power from water, wind, and the sun than from burning coal.	可再生能源革命并非由碳排放税或清洁能源补贴推动； 而是不久就会使水力、风力和太阳能发电成本低于燃煤发电的制造成本降低的结果。


Countries can build their way to energy security by investing in the industrial capacity needed to produce wind turbines, solar cells, and other sources of renewable energy at scale.	国家可以通过大规模投资制造风力涡轮机、太阳能电池和其他可再生能源所需的生产能力来确保能源安全。


As China and India throw their economic weight into the renewables industrial revolution, they are triggering a global chain reaction known as “circular and cumulative causation.”	随着中印两国加入可再生工业革命，所谓“循环和积累因果关系”的全球连锁反应正在形成。


Unlike, mining, drilling, or extraction, manufacturers benefit from learning curves that make production increasingly efficient – and cheaper.	与采矿、钻探或萃取不同的是，制造企业遵循学习曲线，其制造过程越来越廉价和高效。


Investments in renewable energy drive down the cost of their production, expanding the market for their adoption and making further investment more attractive.	可再生能源投资降低其生产成本并扩大市场，使得进一步投资更具诱惑性。


From 2009 to 2014, these mechanisms drove down the cost of solar photovoltaic energy by 80% and reduced the cost of land-based wind power by 60%, according to Lazard’s Power, Energy & Infrastructure Group.	从2009到2014年，上述机制使得太阳能光伏发电成本降低了80%，陆上风力发电成本降低60%，上述结论来自拉扎德动力、能源与基础设施集团的统计结果。


The impact of the rapid uptake in renewable energy could have consequences as profound as those unleashed by the Industrial Revolution.	可再生能源快速发展可能会产生与工业革命同样深远的影响。


In the eighteenth century, the economies of Europe and the United States initiated the transition to an energy system based on fossil fuels without fully understanding what was happening.	十八世纪，欧美经济在不完全了��个中含义的情况下开始了向化石燃料能源体系的过渡。


This time, we can see the way things are changing and prepare for the implications.	但这一次，我们完全了解事情的改变，并做好准备面对可能造成的影响。


For the moment, the outlook appears promising.	目前来看，前景似乎是乐观的。


Efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions may not be the prime driver of the renewable energy revolution; but it is very possible that without the revolution, efforts to minimize the impact of climate change would never succeed.	二氧化碳减排或许不是可再生能源革命的主要动力； 但很可能如果没有这次革命，控制气候变化的努力将永远不会成功。


If we are able to avoid the worst dangers of a warming planet, we may have India and China to thank for it.	如果我们能够避免最严重的全球变暖危险，我们可能要感谢印度和中国。


A Good Economy for China	中国好经济


NEW YORK – Decades of plodding growth together with the 2008 financial crisis have prompted a seismic shift in economic thinking in much of the world.	纽约—几十年老牛拉破车式的经济增长，再加上2008年金融危机，促使世界大部分地区经济思想发生了剧烈转变。


There is talk of moving resources from investment to consumption, from heavy industry to “services,” and from private sector to public sector.	有人说要将资源从投资转向消费，从重工业转向“服务”，从私人部门转向公共部门。


But what strikes me is that these arguments focus only on improving the mix of outputs within an economy, with no attention paid to labor.	但令我震惊的是这些观点只专注于改善经济内部的产出组合，丝毫不关注劳动力。


This is obvious in the case of China, now the world’s biggest economy by some measures.	中国的这一现象特别明显。 从某些指标看，中国目前已是世界第一大经济体。


No doubt, China must reject further investment in hulking steel mills and empty apartment buildings.	毫无疑问，中国必须抵制继续在笨重的轧钢厂和空置的公寓楼上进行投资。


At the same time, however, it must focus on workers and elevating the experience of their work, which economists from Adam Smith to Karl Marx and Alfred Marshall placed at the center of their concerns.	但是，与此同时，中国必须关注工人，提升他们的工作体验——从亚当·斯密到艾尔弗雷德·马歇尔的大批经济学家无不把这作为经济思想的核心。


Not everyone agrees.	并非所有人都同意这一点。


When it comes to the experience of work, many – especially in continental Europe – believe that optimal allocation (entailing well-functioning institutions), if accompanied by investment in education, is all that is needed.	在工作体验这个问题上，许多人——特别是欧洲大陆人——认为最优配置（带来运转良好的机构）如能加上教育投资便已足够。


After all, the Italians, Germans, and French work hard and well over a relatively small number of hours, resulting in high hourly productivity and wages – higher than in the United States and the United Kingdom.	毕竟，意大利人、德国人和法国人工作时间相对较短，但工作努力且出色，因此拥有很高的单位时间生产率和工资——比美国和英国都要高。


Yet continental Europeans do not seem particularly happy with their work.	但欧洲大陆人似乎工作得并不十分快乐。


Circumstantial evidence is their preference for record-setting vacations – and relatively low labor-force participation.	间接的证据是他们爱好创纪录的休假——以及相对较低的劳动力参与度。


And data on job satisfaction provide direct evidence: among large Western countries, workers in continental Europe report the lowest levels.	而职业满意度数据提供了直接证据：在西方大国中，欧洲大陆工人报告的职业满意度最低。


That is not surprising.	这并不令人奇怪。


Europe’s companies are generally no longer places where new stimuli and new challenges engage workers’ minds.	欧洲公司总体而言已不再是工人的思维接受新刺激和新挑战的场所。


But if China should avoid the efficiency-seeking European model, which model should it embrace?	但如果中国避免追求效率的欧洲模式，又应该追求什么模式？


I argue in my book Mass Flourishing that the right model is the good economy, which is an economy that offers the good life.	我在我的书《大繁荣》（Mass Flourishing）中指出，正确的模式是好经济（good economy）。


Optimal resource allocation (of which efficiency is a part) is a necessary but not sufficient feature of a good economy.	好经济是提供好生活（good life）的经济。 最优资源配置（效率是其中一部分）是好经济的必要但非充分条件。


Indeed, the single-minded focus on raising domestic consumption is likely to distract China’s leaders from other policies needed for a good economy.	事实上，一根筋地专注于提高国内消费可能导致中国领导人不再关注好经济所需要的其他政策。


Here I differ with many economists – including my dear friends Joseph Stiglitz, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, and Vladimir Kvint – whose preferred standard is the quality of life.	在这里，我不同于其他许多经济学家，包括我的好朋友约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）、让-保罗·费托西（Jean-Paul Fitoussi）和弗拉基米尔·柯文特（Vladimir Kvint）——他们喜欢使用生活质量标准。


By this they mean mainly ample consumption and ample leisure, together with public goods – for example, clean air, safe food, and safe streets – and civic amenities such as municipal parks and sports stadiums.	但他们所谓的生活质量主要是指充足的消费和充足的闲暇，以及公共品——比如清洁的空气、安全的食物和安全的街道——和市政公园和体育场的文娱设施。


This is a fleshed-out version of an ideal traceable to antiquity.	这是自古有之的理想的详细版本。


I don’t oppose these services or their provision by the state; but they do not add up to philosophers’ concept of the “good life.”	我不反对这些服务或由国家来提供这些服务； 但它们并不添加在哲学家的“好生活”概念中。


(Aristotle joked that we need these services to recover for the next day’s work.)	（亚里士多德打趣说，我们需要这些服务来恢复，从而能够在第二天工作。 ）


Another dear friend, Amartya Sen, points out that economists’ focus on consumption leaves out people’s need to “do things.”	另一位好朋友阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）指出，经济学家对消费的关注忽视了人们“做事”的需要。


But he does not go far enough.	但他走得还不够远。


People want out of programs of work in which they have no autonomy.	人们不想呆在他们没有自主权的工作项目中。


For a good life, people need a degree of agency in their work.	为了得到好生活，人们需要在工作中获得一定程度的领导。


They want to be able to take the initiative and do work that is engaging.	他们希望能够领衔和做令人愉快的工作。


People value room to express themselves– to voice their thoughts or show their talents.	人们珍惜表达自己的空间——即说出他们的想法和展示他们的才华。


In other words, people value attainment through their own efforts.	换句话说，人们珍视凭自身努力取得的成就。


I have used the word “prospering” (from the Old Latin prospere, meaning “as hoped, or expected”) to refer to the experience of succeeding in one’s work: a craftsman’s gratification at seeing his skills valued by others, a merchant’s satisfaction at seeing his “ships come in,” or a scholar’s sense of validation from an honorary professorship.	我用“事成”（prospering，来自拉丁语prospere，意思是“如希望或期望的”）来描述一个人工作中的成功体验：手艺人看到自己的技能获得其他人的高评价而得到满足，商人看到自己的“船靠岸”而得到的满足，或学者从荣誉教职中所获得的价值感。


People also value the personal growth that may come from their career.	人们还珍视可能来自其职业生涯的个人成长。


I use the word “flourishing”to refer to the satisfaction from a journey into the unknown – the excitement of the challenges and the appeal of overcoming obstacles.	我用“繁荣”（flourishing）来描述进入未知领域的旅途所带来的满足感——即挑战和克服障碍的诉求带来的激动感。


Indeed, attaining, prospering, and flourishing all refer to experiential rewards, not to money.	事实上，成就、事成和繁荣都是指体验性奖赏，无关金钱。


What sort of economy would offer this good life?	那种经济能带来这种好生活？


History suggests that it would be one of entrepreneurial people (alert to unnoticed opportunities, and exercising their initiative to try out new things) and innovative people (imagining new things, developing new concepts into commercial products and methods, and marketing them to potential).	历史表明是企业家民族（敏锐于不受关注的机会，并采取行动尝试新事物）和创新型民族（想象新事物，发展新概念以形成商业产品和方法，并把它们兜售给潜在客户）。


The participants in such a good economy would range from the grassroots of society to the most advantaged.	这样的好经济的参与者包括从草根到社会最顶层的所有人。


This is the kind of economy I hope China will develop.	我希望中国能发展出这样的经济。


Of course, in a time of hardship, a country may not immediately be able to afford a good economy; its people will first want clean air and safe food.	当然，在艰难时世，一国也许无法立即实现好经济； 其人民首先希望获得清洁的空气和安全的食物。


The risk is that fully satisfying all the myriad demands for public services would require a public sector so big that it might well crowd out innovative activities in the private sector.	风险在于充分满足所有各种各样的公共服务需求需要一个异常庞大的公共部门，以致于极大地挤出私人部门创新活动。


China must keep in mind that the private sector can match – or surpass – the public sector in supplying many services now provided by the public sector.	中国必须认识到，在许多目前由公共部门供给的服务方面，私人部门完全可以赶上——或超过——公共部门。


Underground railways were once the creation of private entrepreneurs.	地铁曾经是私人企业家所创造的产物。


Today, the most radical step in urban transportation is Uber, and the most radical change in the near future is probably the self-driving car – both creations of the private sector.	如今，最具革命性的城市交通措施是优步，而在近期未来，最具革命性的变化可能是���动驾驶汽车——它们都是私人部门的产物。


Of course, some cynics say that the Chinese possess neither the sophistication nor the temperament to be innovators.	当然，一些犬儒主义者认为，中国不具备作为创新者的成熟性和气质。


Yet estimates of indigenous innovation in China and the G7 countries show that China already ranked fourth in the 1990s; and in the next decade, when the UK and Canada fell back, China moved up to second place – not very far behind the US.	但对中国和G7国家自主创新的估计表明，中国在20世纪90年代已经名列第四； 而在此后十年，英国和加拿大逐渐掉队，中国已经跃居第二——并且距离美国已经不远。


The fact is that there is much less innovation coming out of America than there once was – and hardly any coming out of Europe.	事实是，美国的创新数量已经大不如前——而欧洲的创新更是凤毛麟角。


So China could become a major source of innovation for the global economy, equaling or exceeding America.	因此，中国完全可能成为全球经济主要创新源之一，赶上或超过美国。


To my mind, this is an invaluable opportunity for China – and a development to be welcomed in the rest of the world.	在我看来，这是中国无比宝贵的机会——也是值得世界其他国家欢迎的发展趋势。


Innovation with Chinese Characteristics	中国特色创新


SHANGHAI – China’s slowing growth has dominated global economic news this year – and for good reason.	上海—今年，中国增长放缓主宰了全球经济新闻头条——不无道理。


Beyond being the world’s second-largest economy, China is the largest manufacturer and consumer of raw materials; so any sign of weakening there is bad news for the global economy.	除了是世界第二大经济体之外，中国还是第一大制造国和原材料消费国； 因此，任何中国开始疲软的信号对全球经济体来说都是坏消息。


But, while concerns about growth certainly merit attention, they should be viewed in the context of China’s longer-term economic trajectory, especially its emergence as a global hub of innovation.	但是，关于增长的担忧当然值得关注，但应该把它们放在中国的长期经济轨道上去审视，特别是中国崛起成为全球创新枢纽这一趋势。


China is not given enough credit for how far it has come as an innovator.	作为创新国度的中国没有得到相衬的承认。


And yet, over the next decade, China could become not only the place where global companies conduct research and launch new products, but also the source of a low-cost and nimble approach to innovation that affects competition everywhere.	但是，在未来十年，中国不仅可能成为全球各大公司研究和新产品发布地点，还可能成为影响世界各地竞争的低成本灵活创新的源头。


This conclusion is based on an in-depth research project by the McKinsey Global Institute, which aimed to gauge where China stands in terms of innovation, by measuring innovation’s true impact – that is, how commercialized ideas actually fare in markets worldwide.	这一结论是根据麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）的一项深度研究计划做出的。 该计划旨在研究中国在创新方面的地位，其方法是测量创新的真正影响——即商业化概念在真实的世界市场中表现如何。


Using a database of 20,000 public companies representing about 30% of global GDP, we looked at global revenue in industries that fit four innovative “archetypes”: customer-focused, efficiency-driven, engineering-based, and science-based.	我们利用一个涵盖占全球GDP三成左右的20,000家上市公司的数据库，研究符合四大创新“原型”——专注客户、效率驱动、基于工程和基于科学——的产业的全球收入。


A Chinese industry was classed as strong in innovation if Chinese players were capturing more than 12% of global revenue, the equivalent of China’s share of global GDP, in that sector.	中国的某产业被归为擅长创新，如果中国企业占据该行业全球收入的12%（等于中国GDP占全球GDP的比重）以上的话。


The data show that China has built considerable strengths in industries fitting two of these archetypes: customer-focused and efficiency-driven.	数据表明，中国在符合其中两个原型的产业中构建了强大的优势：专注客户和效率驱动。


The first category includes industries like appliances, in which China has captured 36% of global revenues, and Internet services and software, where China accounts for 15% of global revenues.	第一类包括电器和互联网服务与软件等行业，前者中国占行业全球收入的36%，后者占15%。


The second includes the solar-panel industry, where Chinese players have 51% of global revenue, and the textile industry, in which Chinese companies claim 20% of global revenue.	第二类包括太阳能面板行业和纺织业，前者中国占行业全球总收入的51%，后者占20%。


Chinese companies have prospered in customer-focused industries because they have learned to tailor their goods to the needs of their country’s emerging consumer class.	中国公司在专注客户的产业繁荣壮大是因为它们学会了根据中国新兴消费阶级的需要打造产品。


Whereas Chinese companies used to focus on designing products that were “good enough” – not quite matching the standard of Western products, but offering huge cost savings – they are now out to create products that are cheaper and better, in order to satisfy wealthier consumers.	中国公司过去专注于设计“足够好”的产品——未必赶得上西方产品的质量，但能节约很多成本——而如今，它们制造价更廉并且物更美的产品。


The sheer size of China’s market – comprising more than 100 million mainstream consumer households – also helps, as it enables companies to commercialize new ideas rapidly and on a large scale.	中国市场的巨大规模——由超过1亿的主流消费家庭组成——也有所助益，如此大的市场让公司能够迅速且大规模地将新概念商业化。


In efficiency-based industries, China’s prowess is rooted in its role as the “world’s factory.”	在基于效率的产业，中国力量来自其“世界工厂”的角色。


The country’s massive manufacturing ecosystem – 150 million factory workers, five times the supplier base of Japan, and modern infrastructure – enables process innovations that cut costs, raise quality, and shorten time to market.	中国庞大的制造业生态系统——1. 5亿工厂工人、五倍于日本的供应商基础以及现代基础设施——让削减成本、提高质量、缩短上市时间的工艺创新容易实现。


Chinese manufacturers are also moving up the value chain, building more “knowledge-intensive” products (for example, communications equipment) and developing flexible approaches to automation that blend labor and machinery to maintain responsiveness, while reducing cost.	中国制造商还在朝价值链的更高端攀升，打造更多的“知识密集型”产品（如通讯设备）、开发灵活的自动化方法将劳动力和机器相结合，在保持灵敏度的同时降低成本。


As for the other innovation archetypes, China has some work to do.	对于其他创新原型，中国也取得了一些成果。


To be sure, in engineering-based industries, Chinese companies have had some success.	毫无疑问，在基于工程的产业，中国公司已经取得一些成功。


Indeed, while it takes time to build up a base of knowledge and experience strong enough to thrive in this area, some Chinese industries have learned fast, partly owing to the government’s efforts to facilitate technology transfer with global partners.	事实上，打造足够强大的知识和经验基础实现这一领域的繁荣需要时间，而一些中国产业学习过程非常迅速，这部分是因为政府采取措施方便全球合作伙伴间的技术转移。


Examples include high-speed trains (41% of global revenue), wind turbines (20%), and communications equipment (18%).	这方面的例子包括高铁（站全球收入的41%）、风涡轮（20%）和通讯设备（18%）。


But plenty of industries have not fared so well.	但大量产业过得并不好。


China’s auto industry, for example, commands just 8% of global revenue, which largely reflects limited learning opportunities.	比如，中国汽车业只占全球收入的8%，这主要是拜学习机会有限所赐。


China has the most catching up to do in science-based innovation, which includes industries like specialty chemicals, semiconductor design, and branded pharmaceuticals.	中国在基于科学的创新方面最需要赶超，这方面的产业包括特殊品化工、半导体设计和专利药等。


In fact, despite significant investment in technical capabilities – the country spends more than $200 billion annually on research and development (second only to the US) – no Chinese industry in this area has captured more than 12% of global revenues.	事实上，尽管中国在科技能力方面投资巨大——其每年的研发支出高达2,000亿美元以上，仅次于美国——在这方面尚无任何中国产业能获得全球收入的12%以上。


One key problem for China’s science-based industries is the long time horizon for new discoveries to be perfected and commercialized.	中国基于科学的产业的一个关键问题是新发现的打磨和商业化需要极长时间。


So companies are developing uniquely Chinese approaches to such innovation.	因此各大公司正在开发独特的中国创新法。


For example, to speed up the 15-year process of taking a new drug from the lab to market, Chinese pharmaceutical companies are implementing industrial-style approaches.	比如，为了加快需要15年之久的新药上市过程，中国制药公司正在实施工业风格（industrial-style）方法。


Over the next ten years, China has a chance to move beyond merely absorbing and adapting global technologies to become a true innovation leader.	在未来十年，中国有机会超越仅仅作为全球科技的吸收者和改造者的角色，成为真正的创新领导者。


If it succeeds, fears of a prolonged slowdown that hampers global growth will prove unwarranted.	如果中国获得成功，关于其长期放缓拖累全球增长的担忧将不攻自破。


We estimate that innovation in China’s service industries, where productivity lags far behind that of developed economies, could create anywhere from $500 billion to $1.4 trillion in economic value per year by 2025.	我们估计，到2025年，中国服务业的创新——该行业生产率远远落后于发达国家——将带来每年5,000亿到14,000亿美元的经济价值。


In manufacturing, where China can use its vast resources to lead the world in an era of digitized manufacturing, innovation can add $450-$780 billion in value each year.	在制造业，中国可以利用其巨大的资源在数字化制造时代独领风骚，该行业的创新每年可以增加4,500—7,800亿美元经济价值。


This would go a long way toward raising productivity enough to offset challenges like population aging.	这将是通过提高生产率应对人口老龄化等挑战道路上的巨大进步。


Most important, China’s emergence as a true innovator could turn it into a global R&D hub.	最重要的是，中国崛起成为真正的创新者能够让它成为全球研发枢纽。


After all, unlike today’s leading innovators like the US, China offers low costs and proximity to large – and largely untapped – markets, including its own, which enables the rapid deployment of new products.	毕竟，与美国等今天的创新领导者不同，中国可以提供低成本和紧邻巨大（可以说是取之不竭的）市场（包括它自己在内）的便利，便于迅速部署新产品。


Even with rising wages, Chinese researchers – not to mention other kinds of labor – receive only 10-20% of what their advanced-country counterparts earn.	即使工资有所增加，中国研究者——更不用说其他类型的劳动者了——所获得的报酬也只是发达国家同行的10—20%。


With a combination of a massive market, low costs, flexibility, and ambition, China offers innovative companies from all over the world the chance to transform their ideas into commercial products more quickly and at lower cost than ever.	中国拥有巨大的市场、低廉的成本、灵活性和雄心，它可以为全世界创新公司提供前所未有地更快、成本更低地将概念转化为商业产品的机会。


As more of them recognize this, and move their operations to China, all sorts of markets could be disrupted.	随着越来越多的创新公司认识到这一点并将业务迁往中国，所有市场都可能被破坏。


And, eventually, the Chinese model of innovation could become the global standard.	而最终，中国创新模式可能成为全球标准。


China’s Institutional Challenge	中国的制度改革挑战


HONG KONG – Last month, the Nobel laureate economist Douglass North, who applied economic theory to history to gain insight into institutional and social change, died at his home in Michigan.	香港—上个月，一位将经济理论应用于历史分析并提供了制度和社会变迁宝贵洞见的教授、诺贝尔经济学奖获得者道格拉斯·诺斯（Douglass North）在密歇根州的家中去世。


But his ideas will live on, particularly in China.	但他的思想是不朽的，特别是在中国。


Though North never focused explicitly on China’s institutional development, his theoretical framework could prove invaluable to the country’s leaders as they navigate the next phase of institutional change.	诺斯从未专研中国的制度发展，但他的理论框架却能够让中国领导人在引领中国下一阶段制度变迁时获得宝贵的启发。


In his Nobel lecture in 1993, North identified three lessons that policymakers should draw from his research.	在1993年的诺贝尔奖演讲中，诺斯提出了决策者可以从他的研究中汲取的三个教训。


First, what determines economic performance is the mix of “formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics.”	首先，决定经济表现的是“正式规则、潜规则和执法特征”的结合。


Second, polities have a major impact on economic performance, because they “define and enforce the economic rules.”	其次，政治对经济表现具有强烈影响，因为政治“决定并执行经济规则”。


And, finally, adaptive efficiency (how the rules are changed), not allocative efficiency (the most effective rules right now), is the key to long-term growth.	最后，适应效率（adaptive efficiency，即规则如何变化），而不是配置效率（allocative efficiency，当下的规则是否最有效），是长期增长的关键。


These lessons are reflected in North’s assessment of Western Europe’s institutional and economic development, in which he attributed the Industrial Revolution to two key factors: varying belief systems and intense competition between and within the emerging sovereign powers.	这些教训与启发来自诺斯对西欧制度和经济发展的研究及评估。 他将欧洲的工业革命归因于两个关键因素：一个是为数众多的不同信仰体系的存在，另一个是新兴主权力量之间和内部的激烈竞争。


Specifically, the English and the Dutch created diverse political/economic units that evolved institutions nurturing specialization and division of labor.	具体而言，英国人和荷兰人创造了多样化的政治/经济单位，这些经济单位演化为促成专业化和劳动分工的经济制度。


These institutions delivered superior economic and political outcomes through lower transaction costs, clear and enforceable property rights, and other shared rules and norms.	这些经济制度通过更低的交易成本、明晰且可执法的产权以及其他公共领域的规则和规范带来了超凡的经济和政治表现。


North observed that institutional change is extremely difficult, as it requires overcoming not only vested interests, but also outdated belief systems and mental models.	诺斯观察到，制度变化是非常困难的，因为这不但要克服既得利益，还必须克服陈旧的信仰体系和思维模式。


The breakthrough, he noted, comes when institutions go beyond trade within local communities to permit anonymous and impersonal exchange across time and space.	他指出，制度的突破关键在于贸易规则应超越本地社区内的贸易，从而让匿名的不带个人色彩的交易可以跨空间和时间进行。


Sustainable institutions are those that learn and adapt, overcoming their own biases and limitations.	有生命力的制度需要学习和适应，克服其制度体系自身的历史偏见和局限。


North’s work goes a long way toward explaining the dramatic institutional and economic changes that have occurred in China over the last three decades, as well as illuminating the challenges that it will face over the next decade.	诺斯的工作有助于解释中国过去三十年来所发生的剧烈的制度变迁和经济成就，并对中国在未来十年将遇到的改革挑战有重要的启发。


In fact, it should temper the pessimism that pervades most current discussion of China’s prospects.	事实上，他的贡献有助于缓和最近在讨论中国前途的场合所弥漫的悲观情绪。


For starters, intense competition is alive and well in China.	首先，目前的中国经济存在大量的激烈竞争。


Its major cities (including Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, and Xiamen) are still competing vigorously with one another, and a new breed of technologically innovative companies (such as Huawei, Tencent, and Alibaba) are battling to open up new markets in goods, services, talent, capital, and knowledge.	中国的大城市（特别是最近提出的在上海、广东、天津和厦门设立的自贸区）相互竞争激烈。 而新一波科技创新公司（如华为、腾讯和阿里巴巴）正在竞相开启新的商品、服务、人才、资本和知识市场。


The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has dedicated itself to creating a more efficient, services-driven economy, subject to the market and the rule of law.	执政的中国共产党致力于构建一个更高效的、越来越多由服务业推动，并更受市场和法治约束的经济。


For example, it has committed to ease market access by loosening entry requirements for both domestic and foreign investors.	中国最近不断承诺放松国内和国外投资者准入要求，加大市场开放度，并不断在强化土地、劳动力、资本和知识的产权；


It has also strengthened property rights relating to land, labor, capital, and knowledge; this, together with advances in digital and robot technology, has brought down Chinese transaction costs.	这些制度层面的变化与数字和机器人技术的进步互相作用，正不断降低中国经济的交易成本。


Moreover, having built the needed physical infrastructure in the last decade (perhaps to excess), China is now emphasizing the software infrastructure needed to sustain the growth of its burgeoning services sector.	此外，过去十年中国建设了许多必须的硬件基础设施（也许有些领域有过量之嫌），现在中国政府开始强调建软件基础设施，包括为促进市场发展的法律、会计、金融、及互联网等服务行业。


In 2014, services’ share of GDP already exceeded 50%, more than the manufacturing and primary sectors combined.	2015年，中国的服务业占GDP之比已经超过制造业和第一产业之和。


While the government has not pursued adequate reform of state-owned enterprises, it has deliberately allowed new, largely private-owned technology giants to compete against state-owned banks and financial institutions.	中国的国有企业改革还是任重道远，但政府已开始有意地允许一些民营新技术企业巨头与国有金融机构竞争。


And no one predicted the intensity of the CCP’s campaign to root out corruption, including in the military, the financial sector, and the highest levels of the party itself.	而几年前没人预料到中国共产党铲除腐败，包括军队、金融业和党内最高层的腐败，的力度会如此之大。


China’s market-oriented shift will be reinforced by the commitments that its leaders made to the International Monetary Fund when the renminbi was added to the basket of currencies that determine the value of the Fund’s unit of account, Special Drawing Rights.	中国政府在促成人民币���纳入国际货币基金组织（IMF）储备资金账户货币篮子（即特别提款权SDR）时向后者做出了一系列承诺，这些承诺有助于强化中国的市场化制度转型。


The need to cope with trade pressures after the Trans-Pacific Partnership encompasses most of China’s neighbors will have a similar disciplining effect.	另外，由美国主导的涵盖了中国大部分邻国，但还没有包括中国的，跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）的建立也将对中国走向更市场化的制度产生类似的约束效应。


The CCP is judging itself not against the Western benchmark of liberal democratic governance, but against the ancient Chinese legalist tradition of strong, central authority that maintains legitimacy by upholding meritocratic standards of accountability.	中国共产党并不以西方自由民主治理模式为基准来考评自己的制度建设，而更多的是受到中国古代法家传统的影响。 法家传统强调强大的中央威权，并通过坚持任人唯贤的问责标准维持其合法性。


Perhaps more important, it has relied on seasoned intellectuals and policymakers – not Party ideologues – to design its development roadmap.	也许更重要的是，中国当局目前更依赖有丰富实践经验的一批体制内智囊及中央与地方干部来设计其国家发展路线图，而不是靠传统的党内意识形态理论家。


This approach was fortified last summer, when despite serious market turmoil, the CCP upheld its commitment to allow the market to play a “decisive role in resource allocation.”	这一方针在今年夏天以来得到了强化，尽管当时遇到了严重的股票市场动荡，但中国决策层之后仍坚守其让市场在“资源配置中起决定性作用”的承诺，不断推出更市场化的改革。


There could be no clearer indication that China is willing to upgrade its belief systems and mental models in order to achieve high-income status.	这清楚地表明，为提高收入及实现小康社会目标，中国决策层有意识改变及升级其经济、社会、政治发展理念和思维方式 。


Nonetheless, China still has rivers to cross, particularly when it comes to adaptive efficiency.	尽管如此，中国仍需要克服许多制度改革困难，特别是在制度的适应效率方面。


Here, it is important to note that whereas formal rules can be altered quickly, informal cultural norms are difficult to change in the short run.	其中的一个关键是需要清楚地认识到：正式规则容易迅速改变，但文化与潜规则往往难以在短期改变。


New formal rules can conflict with established norms, causing bureaucratic incentives to become distorted, with adverse effects on institutional behavior and performance.	新的正式规则可能与现存的非正式规范相冲突，导致官僚体系的激励机制被扭曲，对官员及国有企业的负责人的行为和表现造成消极影响。


China’s leaders must cope with an asymmetry between what they can deliver and what consumers demand.	中国决策层必须面对的一个艰巨市场挑战是：由于中国在制度方面的一些短板，中国经济能提供的产品及服务与消费者需要的产品与服务之间的不匹配。


According to North, institutional under-capacity is a short-term allocative problem, or sunk cost, for which the state can compensate with greater adaptive efficiency, or better mechanisms for bringing about the exit of less efficient institutions.	根据诺斯的观点，国家制度能力不足是一个短期配置效率问题或一个历史积累的沉淀成本，可以用提高制度的适应效率来补偿，也就是找到更好的改革机制，让效率更高的制度不断代替效率低下的制度。


North’s theoretical legacy could prove vital for China’s policymakers in the coming years, because it gives them specific guidance about how to cross the river of rapid institutional change.	诺斯的理论遗产对于未来几年中国决策者应对制度改革挑战至关重要，因为它给出了关于如何应对快速制度变化的实用指引。


The alternative is to continue relying on what Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s institutional breakthrough more than three decades ago, called “feeling the stones.” That, as North would put it, may not be the most efficient way to get to the other side.	如果希望对中国制度变革之父邓小平在三十多年前所提出的“摸着石头过河”的策略有所提升与改进，以便更快达到河对岸，中国需要重视诺斯给出的有关制度变迁的启示 。


China’s International Growth Agenda	中国的国际增长日程


MILAN – For most of the past 35 years, China’s policymakers have set their focus on the domestic economy, with reforms designed to allow the market to provide efficiency and accurate price signals.	米兰—在过去35年的大部分时间里，中国决策者的焦点一直集中在国内经济上，改革也是为了让市场提供效率和准确的价格信号。


Though they had to be increasingly aware of their country’s growing impact on the global economy, they had no strategy to ensure that China’s neighbors gained from its economic transformation.	尽管他们必须日益认识到中国对全球经济影响越来越大，但他们并没有确保中国邻国从中国经济转型中获益的战略。


But now China does have such a strategy, or at least is rapidly developing one.	但如今中国有了这一战略，或者正在快速制定这一战略。


Moreover, it extends well beyond Asia, embracing Eastern Europe and the east coast of Africa.	此外，这一战略远远超出了亚洲，也包括了东欧和非洲东海岸。


A key element of China’s strategy is the recently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and to some extent the BRICS’ New Development Bank, established last year by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.	中国战略的一大关键要素是最新成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），在某种程度上，去年由巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非共同建立的金砖国家新开发银行也可以算上。


Both banks are obvious alternatives – and so rivals – to the Western-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund.	这两家银行显然是西方主导的世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的替代者——或竞争对手。


Also vital to the new strategy are two prospective modern-day Silk Roads: an overland route through Central Asia to the Black Sea and a “Maritime Silk Road” by which shipping will pass from the South China Sea, through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean to East Africa, and from there through the Red Sea into the eastern Mediterranean.	对这一新战略来说，同样重要的是两条当代丝绸之路：经过中亚抵达黑海的陆路和穿越南海、途经马六甲海峡、渡过印度洋抵达东非，然后经过红海进入东地中海的“海上丝绸之路”。


Economists sometimes portray the global economy as a huge bazaar.	经济学家有时把全球经济描述成一个大集市。


But it is not.	但并非如此。


It is a network, in which the links are built by expanding the flows of goods, services, people, capital, and – importantly – information.	全球经济是一张网，其联系通过扩大商品、服务、人力、资本以及——极其重要的——信息流构建。


China’s goal is to create these links, and it has plenty of assets that will allow it to act as a catalyst of global growth and development.	中国的目标是制造这些联系，并且它拥有足够的资产让它作为全球增长和发展的催化剂。


The most obvious asset is China’s large and growing domestic market, to which other economies can gain access via trade and investment.	最显而易见的资产是中国规模巨大、蒸蒸日上的国内市场，其他经济体可以通过贸易和投资进入这一市场。


China will thus be joining the ranks of the advanced countries in providing an export market (and jobs) for countries at earlier stages of economic development.	中国将为处于经济发展更早期阶段的国家提供出口市场（和就业），在此过程中跻身发达国家行列。


In addition, because China has built up a capacity to invest that is far larger than its domestic economy can now absorb, it will inevitably seek opportunities abroad, both public and private.	此外，由于中国所构建的投资能力远远超过其国内经济目前的吸收能力，因此必须寻找海外机会——不论是公共还是私人机会。


Chinese companies, in particular, will increasingly want to establish their brands internationally.	特别是中国公司将日益渴望建立国际品牌。


With the involvement of the AIIB and the New Development Bank, China has developed what amounts to a multinational development strategy.	在亚投行和新开发银行的参与下，中国已经有了跨国发展战略。


While there are skeptics, broad support for the AIIB suggests that the benefits outweigh the risks, and that China’s initiatives may help build a network that is open to everyone.	尽管存在质疑者，但对亚投行的普遍支持表明收益大于风险，并且中国的措施有助于构建一个向所有人开放的网络。


After all, the trade and investment that will follow could not possibly all flow through China.	毕竟，随之而来的贸易和投资不可能都流经中国。


Meanwhile, by virtue of more than 30 swap arrangements with other central banks (the first was with South Korea in December 2008), China is using its foreign-exchange reserves to help its neighbors and others defend themselves against volatile international capital flows.	与此同时，中国与30多家外国央行签订了互换协议（其中第一家央行是2008年9月的韩国央行），利用其外汇储备帮助邻国和其他国家抵御国际资本流的波动。


This is in tandem with the authorities’ efforts to promote the internationalization of the renminbi, which is rapidly expanding its role in trade settlement.	这与当局促进人民币国际化的方向一致。 人民币正在迅速扩大其在贸易结算中的作用。


There are significant efficiency gains to be had by settling transactions in trading partners’ currencies, without the intermediation of, say, the US dollar.	用贸易伙伴国的货币结算交易而不通过（比如）美元作为中介可以大大提高效率。


Of course, there is much more to the internationalization of a currency, not least large and liquid domestic financial markets and the establishment of trust and confidence.	当然，货币国际化有许多条件，包括庞大的高流动性国内金融市场和建立信任和信心。


This takes time, but China is already applying to the IMF to have the renminbi included in the basket of currencies that determines the value of the Fund’s unit of account, Special Drawing Rights, with a decision likely in late 2015.	这需要时间，但中国已经向IMF申请将人民币纳入决定其账户单位——特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子中。 2015年底或能见分晓。


Joining the US dollar, the British pound, the euro, and the Japanese yen in the SDR club would be symbolically significant.	加入美元、英镑、欧元和日元的行列成为SDR俱乐部的一员具有象征性重要意义。


More important, as with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which required substantial reforms, fulfilling the conditions for joining the SDR promises to speed progress toward full capital-account liberalization – and thus toward a fully convertible renminbi.	更重要的是，就像2001年中国加入世贸组织需要其做出重大改革一样，满足加入SDR的条件意味着中国必须加快走向资本账户完全自由化——从而实现人民币的完全可兑换。


China’s policymakers have long time horizons.	中国决策者的眼光十分长远。


Their strategy will doubtless face obstacles in the coming years.	毫无疑问，他们的战略在未来几年中将面临阻碍。


The question is whether the strategy is worth pursuing now.	问题在于是否值得从现在开始追求这一战略。


The answer almost certainly is yes.	答案几乎斩钉截铁：是的。


The overland “silk road,” for example, will reduce China’s reliance on sea-lanes, which can be blocked or disrupted, especially at the Strait of Malacca.	比如，陆上“丝绸之路”将减少中国对海路的依赖——海路容易遭到阻碍和干扰，特别是在马六甲海峡。


More generally, Chinese investment will ease the constraints on the silk road economies caused partly by slow growth and investment shortfalls in advanced economies.	从更大范围来说，中国的投资将环节丝绸之路上的经济体因为发达经济体增长放缓和投资不足导致的困难。


Ultimately, vibrant growing economies in the region will benefit China’s economy and its stature.	最终，该地区有活力的增长经济体也将给中国的经济和地位带来好处。


Many believe that public-sector investment is a good way (perhaps the best way) to use the global economy’s productive resources and increase its efficiency and growth potential.	许多人认为公共部门投资是很好（也许是最好）的使用全球经济生产性资源、提高效率和增长潜力的办法。


But this requires a multinational effort.	但这需要跨国努力。


China’s leaders surely want international recognition of their country’s global stature.	中国领导人当然希望中国的全球地位获得国际承认。


But they also want China’s rise to high-income status to occur in a way that is – and that is perceived to be – beneficial to its neighbors and the world.	但他们也希望中国跻身高收入国家的过程可以通过有利于邻邦和世界的方式实现——并获得邻邦和世界的承认。


The new external focus of China’s growth and development strategy seems to be intended to make that vision a reality.	中国增长和发展战略的新的外部重点似乎是为了让这一愿景变得现实。


China in the Eye of the Beholder	旁观者眼中的中国


CLAREMONT – One of the most glaring, if unremarked, oddities concerning China nowadays is how perceptions of its leaders diverge depending on the observer.	发自克劳尔蒙特—当前与中国有关的其中一个显而易见却未能引起足够注意的怪异现象，就是对其领导者的看法是如何随着观察者不同而产生分歧的。


In the eyes of the Chinese public, government officials are venal, incompetent, and interested solely in getting lucrative appointments.	中国公众眼中的政府官员腐败无能，一心只想利用职位捞钱。


But Western executives invariably describe Chinese officials as smart, decisive, knowledgeable, and far-sighted – roughly the same adjectives that they once used to describe Bo Xilai, the disgraced Communist Party boss of Chongqing, before he was purged.	而西方企业高管人员却总是认为中国官员聪明、果断、知识渊博、富有远见——大致相同的形容词也曾被他们用来形容倒台之前的薄熙来，那个颜面扫地的前重庆党委书记。


It is impossible to reconcile these views.	调和这些不同的观点是不可能的。


Either the Chinese public is impossible to please, or Western executives are hopelessly wrong.	这既不是因为中国公众尖酸刻薄，也并非西方高管冥顽不化。


But, given that daily experience places Chinese citizens in an infinitely better position than Western executives to evaluate Chinese officials and their conduct, one would have to conclude that they are almost certainly right.	但由于日常体验把中国公民置于一个相比西方高管绝对有利的位置去评估中国官员及其行为，因此人们必然得出结论说前者基本上是完全正确的。


And that means that Westerners who have spent considerable time in China and consider themselves seasoned “China hands” need to ask why they have gotten it so wrong.	这意味着那些花了相当长的时间了解中国并以经验老到的“中国通”自居的西方人需要思考一下：自己为什么会得出如此错误的结论。


One obvious explanation is that Chinese officials are extremely good at seducing Western businessmen with friendly gestures and generous promises.	一个显而易见的解释是，中国的官员非常善于利用友好的姿态以及慷慨的承诺去迷惑西方商人。


The same officials who lord it over ordinary Chinese people often summon irresistible charm to woo Western investors.	一名官员可以一面对普通中国百姓作威作福，转身却展现出不可抗拒的魅力去吸引西方投资者。


Another selling point for Western executives is that many Chinese officials have engineering backgrounds, in contrast to their Western counterparts, most of whom are lawyers.	西方高管的另一个论据是许多中国官员都拥有工程学背景，相比之下西方官员大多数都是律师出身。


To businessmen, engineers are practical problem solvers, whereas lawyers are obsessed with procedural complexities and intent on exploiting contractual loopholes.	在商人看来，工程师是实际问题的解决者，而律师们则痴迷于研究程序的复杂性并热衷于寻找合同漏洞。


Moreover, most Chinese officials have learned the jargon of Western business, and can speak intelligently about the problems that companies need to solve.	此外大多数中国官员已经学会了西方商业术语，可以针对企业需要解决的问题发表睿智的意见。


A more subtle reason for Western executives’ perceptions is their subconscious frame of reference when assessing Chinese officials.	西方高管产生这些看法的另一个更微妙原因，是他们在评估中国官员时心里存在着一个潜意识的参照框架。


Senior executives of multinational companies tend to have pre-conceived notions of China as just another developing country, and thus evaluate Chinese officials by comparing them with those in other developing countries.	跨国公司的高级管理人员往往有先入为主的观念，他们仅仅把中国看作其中一个发展中国家，因此评估中国官员时也与其他发展中国家的官员相比较。


This unwitting comparison usually comes out in favor of Chinese officials, who are, as a group, better educated, more cosmopolitan, and more focused on business (because the ruling Communist Party uses economic growth and foreign investment as criteria for promoting officials).	这种无意中的比较通常是对中国官员有利的。 作为一个群体，中国官员受教育程度更高、更国际化、更专注于商业（因为执政的共产党利用经济增长和国外投资来作为官员升迁的标准）。


And, as an organization, the Chinese state is far stronger and more purposive than states are in more typical developing countries.	同时作为一个国家组织，中国远比其他典型发展中国家更加强大也更具有目的性。


But, while it may be natural for Western businessmen to compare China with other developing countries, Chinese citizens have much higher standards, because they do not regard theirs as just another developing country.	虽然西方商人把中国与其他发展中国家相比较是很自然的事情，但是中国公民有着更高的标准，因为他们没有把中国仅仅当做一个发展中国家。


They view China as special, a re-emerging great power bound to join the ranks of the world’s most advanced countries, and the governance practices that their newspapers cite as models are invariably those of rich societies, not developing ones.	他们认为中国是一个特别的，重新崛起的大国，必然会加入世界上最先进国家的行列，并且报纸上总是引用富裕社会而非发展中国家的治理实践作为样板。


Indeed, one sure way to insult the Chinese is to tell them they should feel lucky, because they have a better government than the Indians or Brazilians.	事实上，侮辱中国人的一个最有效方法就是告诉他们，他们应该感到幸运，因为他们比印度人或巴西人拥有一个更好的政府。


A third reason why Western businessmen get China wrong is that their admiration of the Chinese government is a reflection of their frustrations with their own governments.	西方商人对中国产生误解的第三个原因是，他们对中国政府的赞美其实是对本国政府感到失望的反映。


They have grown impatient with the messiness of the democratic process, stifling regulations, high taxes, and media scrutiny.	他们逐渐对杂乱的民主进程、令人窒息的条例、高税收和媒体监督感到不耐烦。


By contrast, in China’s one-party state, they find it is easier to do business with officials who can make quick decisions and implement them almost instantly.	与此相反，在中国这样的一党制国家中，他们发现与官员做生意更容易，因为官员们可以迅速做出决定并且在同一时间执行。


Of course, sometimes these executives do miss the rule of law that prevails in the West.	当然，有时这些高管们也会怀念西方通行的法治。


But, compared with Chinese private entrepreneurs, representatives of large Western firms are a privileged group, and are not victimized as frequently by official corruption.	但与中国民营企业家相比这些西方大型企业的代理人就是一个特权集体，甚少成为官员腐败行为的受害者。


As a result, they have little direct appreciation of the worst aspect of one-party rule: a rapacious, legally unrestrained elite.	因此他们很少能直接评价一党统治最糟糕的一面：一个贪婪的，逍遥法外的精英集团。


The most regrettable aspect of Western executives’ misconceptions of the Chinese government is that they are likely to persist, at least among those who have no direct experience with the dark side of the Chinese state.	最令人遗憾的是，西方高管对中国政府的误解很可能持续下去，至少在那些没有直接经历中国国家组织黑暗面的人还会坚持这些观点。


They are successful, intelligent, and have a high degree of confidence in their political judgment.	这些人往往都成功、睿智，同时在政治判断上都极其自信。


Moreover, Western corporations are hierarchical and autocratic, similar to the Chinese one-party state, so senior executives’ errors of judgment are rarely challenged directly by their underlings.	此外西方企业是等级独裁制也与中国的一党专政相类似，因此高级管理人员的错误判断很少能直接遭到下属的质疑。


That is a real pity.	这是一个真正的遗憾。


Few Western executives understand the political consequences of their misperceptions.	很少西方高管能明白他们这些误解的政治后果。


Their praise of Chinese officials’ quality and effectiveness is often held up by the Communist Party as an international endorsement of its policies and legitimacy – even if ordinary Chinese know otherwise.	他们对中国官员素质和效率的称赞往往被共产党当成对其政策和合法性的国际认可四处炫耀—— 即使普通中国人知道实情根本不是这个样子的。


China is Okay	中国没问题


NEW HAVEN – Concern is growing that China’s economy could be headed for a hard landing.	纽黑文—对中国经济可能出现硬着陆的担忧一日深过一日。


The Chinese stock market has fallen 20% over the past year, to levels last seen in 2009.	在过去一年中，中国股市下跌了20%，下探2009年以来的低点。


Continued softness in recent data – from purchasing managers’ sentiment and industrial output to retail sales and exports – has heightened the anxiety.	最新数据的持续疲软——不管是采购经理人情绪指标还是工业产出、零售额和出口——更是让不安显露无疑。


Long the global economy’s most powerful engine, China, many now fear, is running out of fuel.	许多人担心，长期以来一直是全球经济最有力引擎的中国正在失去燃料。


These worries are overblown.	这样的担心有些过了。


Yes, China’s economy has slowed.	是的，中国经济有所放缓。


But the slowdown has been contained, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.	但这种放缓已经被消化了，并且极有可能是在可预见的未来的最低点。


The case for a soft landing remains solid.	软着陆的基本面依然十分坚挺。


The characteristics of a Chinese hard landing are well known from the Great Recession of 2008-2009.	中国硬着陆的特征因2008—2009年大衰退期间而众人皆知。


China’s annual GDP growth decelerated sharply from its 14.8% peak in the second quarter of 2007 to 6.6% in the first quarter of 2009.	当是时，中国年GDP增长率出现了大幅下滑，从2007年二季度14. 8%的峰值下落至2009年一季度的6.


Hit by a monstrous external demand shock that sent world trade tumbling by a record 10.5% in 2009, China’s export-led growth quickly went from boom to bust.	2009年令全球贸易量创出历史跌幅记录（10. 5%）的可怕外部需求冲击导致中国的出口导向型经济迅速地从繁荣走向了破灭。


The rest of an unbalanced Chinese economy followed – especially the labor market, which shed more than 20 million jobs in Guangdong Province alone.	随后，中国失衡经济中的其他部门也受到了打击，特别是劳动力市场，光是广东省就减少了2000万个工作岗位。


This time, the descent has been far milder.	这一回，经济下滑要温和得多。 中国的年GDP增长率从2010年一季度的峰值11.


From a peak of 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010, China’s annual GDP growth slowed to 7.6% in the second quarter of 2012 – only about half the outsize 8.2-percentage-point deceleration experienced during the Great Recession.	9%下降至2012年二季度的7. 6%，降幅只有大衰退期间8.


Barring a disorderly breakup of the eurozone, which seems unlikely, the International Monetary Fund’s baseline forecast of 4% annual growth in world trade for 2012 seems reasonable.	在排除了欧元区发生无序解体的情形后（可能性极低），IMF对2012年全球贸易的基线预测是全年增长4%，这一预测颇为合理。


That would be subpar relative to the 6.4% growth trend from 1994 to 2011, but nowhere near the collapse recorded during 2008-2009.	该数字要低于1994—2011年间的趋势增长率6. 4%，但仍比2008—2009年的崩盘水平高出不少。


With the Chinese economy far less threatened by export-led weakening than it was three and a half years ago, a hard landing is unlikely.	而中国经济对出口导向部门危险的抵御力远高于两三年前，因此硬着陆不会发生。


To be sure, the economy faces other headwinds, especially from the policy-induced cooling of an overheated housing market.	实事求是地说，中国经济还面临其他难题，特别是对过热房地产市场的政策降温。


But construction of so-called social housing for lower-income families, reinforced by recent investment announcements in key metropolitan areas such as Tianjin, Chongqing, and Changsha, as well as in Guizhou and Guangdong Provinces, should more than offset the decline.	但所谓的社会保障房的建设——受益者为低收入家庭，最近天津、重庆、长沙等大城市以及贵州和广东等省份都宣布了保障房投资计划——足以抵消跌势。


Moreover, unlike the bank-funded initiatives of 3-4 years ago, which led to a worrisome overhang of local-government debt, the central government seems likely to play a much greater role in financing the current round of projects.	此外，与三四年前的各项计划都需要依赖银行融资因而导致了令人担忧的地方政府债务过重的忧虑不同，中央政府将在本轮项目融资中扮演更重要角色。


Reports of ghost cities, bridges to nowhere, and empty new airports are fueling concern among Western analysts that an unbalanced Chinese economy cannot rebound as it did in the second half of 2009.	关于空城、空桥和空机场的报道使得西方分析师担心失衡中国经济将卷土重来，重蹈2009年上半年覆辙。


With fixed investment nearing the unprecedented threshold of 50% of GDP, they fear that another investment-led fiscal stimulus will only hasten the inevitable China-collapse scenario.	中国固定资产投资占GDP的比重正在接近前无古人的50%，因此西方分析师担心新的投资导向的财政刺激只能让中国加速迈向崩溃的宿命。


But the pessimists’ hype overlooks one of the most important drivers of China’s modernization: the greatest urbanization story the world has ever seen.	但悲观派忽视了中国现代化最重要的推动力之一：世界历史上前所未见的城市化进程。


In 2011, the urban share of the Chinese population surpassed 50% for the first time, reaching 51.3%, compared to less than 20% in 1980.	2011年，城镇人口占总人口比例第一次跨过了50%，达到了51. 3%，而1980年时还不到20%。


Moreover, according to OECD projections, China’s already burgeoning urban population should expand by more than 300 million by 2030 – an increment almost equal to the current population of the United States.	此外，根据OECD的预测，中国早已形成快速增长之势的城镇人口将在2030年时再增加3亿——增量相当于当前美国总人口。


With rural-to-urban migration averaging 15 to 20 million people per year, today’s so-called ghost cities quickly become tomorrow’s thriving metropolitan areas.	每年将有1500—2000万人从农村走入城市，当下的所谓鬼城将很快变成明天的繁荣大都市。


Shanghai Pudong is the classic example of how an “empty” urban construction project in the late 1990’s quickly became a fully occupied urban center, with a population today of roughly 5.5 million.	上海浦东便是一个经典例子，说明了20世纪90年代末的“空”城建设项目是如何变成拥挤的城市中心地带的。 如今，浦东人口已经达到了550万。


A McKinsey study estimates that by 2025 China will have more than 220 cities with populations in excess of one million, versus 125 in 2010, and that 23 mega-cities will have a population of at least five million.	麦肯锡的一项研究估计，到2025年，中国将至少有220个人口超百万的城市，而2010年只有125个； 更有23个大城市人口将突破500万。


China cannot afford to wait to build its new cities.	建设新城市对中国来说刻不容缓。


Instead, investment and construction must be aligned with the future influx of urban dwellers.	投资和建设必须跟上未来城市居民大增的趋势。


The “ghost city” critique misses this point entirely.	“鬼城”论完全站不住脚。


All of this is part of China’s grand plan.	所有这些都只是中国宏伟蓝图的一部分。


The producer model, which worked brilliantly for 30 years, cannot take China to the promised land of prosperity.	30年来颇为有效的生产者模式不可能将中国带入繁荣的乐土。


The Chinese leadership has long known this, as Premier Wen Jiabao signaled with his famous 2007 “Four ‘Uns’” critique – warning of an “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable” economy.	中国领导人早就知道了这一点，这一点通过温家宝总理2007年著名的“四不”批评就可一窥端倪——温家宝警告说，要警惕“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、说到底不可持续”的经济。


Two external shocks – first from the US, and now from Europe – have transformed the Four Uns into an action plan.	两大外部冲击——首先是美国，现在是欧洲——已将四不警告转变为行动。


Overly dependent on external demand from crisis-battered developed economies, China has adopted the pro-consumption 12th Five-Year Plan, which lays out a powerful rebalancing strategy that should drive development for decades.	从前，中国过度依赖来自被危机重创的发达国家的外部需求，如今，中国已开始实施刺激消费的十二五规划，其中包括一个能够提供数十年发展动力的再平衡战略。


The investment and construction requirements of large-scale urbanization are a key pillar of this strategy.	大规模城市化所需要的投资和建设是这一战略的关键支柱。


Urban per capita income is more than triple the average in rural areas.	目前，城镇人均收入是农村水平的三倍。


As long as urbanization is coupled with job creation – a strategy underscored by China’s concomitant push into services-led development – labor income and consumer purchasing power will benefit.	只要城市化能够伴随就业创造——该战略有中国大力推进服务导向型发展的政策支持——劳动收入和消费者购买力水平就能得到改善。


Contrary to the China doubters, urbanization is not phony growth. It is an essential ingredient of the “next China,” for it provides China with both cyclical and structural options.	与中国怀疑论者认为的相反，城市化绝非伪增长，而是“下一个中国”的关键组成部分，因为这能丰富中国的周期性和结构性选择。


When faced with a shortfall of demand – whether owing to an external shock or to an internal adjustment, such as the housing-market correction – China can tweak its urbanization-led investment requirements accordingly.	当面临需求短缺时——不管原因是外部需求冲击还是内部调整，比如房地产价格的修正——中国可以相应地加大城市化导向的投资力度。


With a large reservoir of surplus savings and a budget deficit of less than 2% of GDP, it has the wherewithal to fund such efforts.	中国拥有巨大的剩余储蓄量，预算赤字不到GDP的2%，因此有充足的资金来做这些事情。


There is also ample scope for monetary easing; unlike central banks in the West, the People’s Bank of China has plenty of ammunition in reserve.	货币宽松的空间也很充足：与西方央行不同，中国人民银行的弹药库相当充盈。


A growth slowdown is hardly shocking for an export-led economy.	对出口导向型经济来说，减速并不令人震惊。


But China is in much better shape than the rest of the world.	但中国比世界其他国家的境况要好得多。


A powerful rebalancing strategy offers the structural and cyclical support that will allow it to avoid a hard landing.	有力的再平衡战略提供了避免硬着陆所需要的结构性和周期性支持。


China’s Jobless Growth Miracle	中国的无就业增长之谜


BEIJING – Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang recently cited job creation as vital to his country’s “ultimate goal of stability in growth.”	发自北京——中国国家总理李克强最近指出创造就业是实现本国“稳定增长最终目标”的关键因素。


His observation could not be more accurate.	而他的这一论断也是极为正确的。


In fact, one of the most baffling features of China’s economic rise is that, even amid double-digit GDP growth, employment grew at a measly 1.8% average annual rate from 1978 to 2004.	事实上，中国经济崛起的其中一个最令人困惑的特征就是，即便在实现两位数增长率的时期，1978年~2004年间的年均就业增长率也仅为1. 8%。


Households, it seems, have largely missed out on the benefits of economic development in China.	这似乎表明，普通中国家庭在很大程度上未能分享中国经济增长的成果。


The superficial explanation of the discrepancy between GDP growth and job gains attributes the gap to the restructuring of inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which caused public-sector employment to plummet, from 112.6 million to 67 million, from 1995 to 2004.	导致GDP增长与就业增长之间差距的表面因素是对低效率国有企业的整改，导致公共部门就业数量大幅下跌，1995年至2004年间，就业人口从1. 126亿下降至6700万。


But there is a more fundamental cause: China’s bias toward industrialization.	但是，还有一个更深层次的原因：中国的工业化倾向。


China’s government has long viewed industrialization as the key to modernization.	中国政府一直认为工业化是现代化的关键。


During Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward, scrap metals were melted to meet wildly optimistic steel-production targets and thus to propel rapid industrial development.	在毛泽东的大跃进时期甚至大量收集废旧金属进行冶炼以满足过分乐观的钢铁产量目标，从而推动工业快速发展。


Today, the government promotes industrial and infrastructure projects that, by encouraging investment and generating tax revenues, enable the economy to meet ambitious – though no longer harebrained – growth targets.	如今政府则推动工业和基础设施项目，通过鼓励投资和增加税收，让经济满足雄心勃勃——但不再轻率——的增长目标。


The problem is that the manufacturing sector does little to create jobs, largely because relatively high productivity growth in the sector – averaging more than 10% annually over the last two decades – constrains demand for more workers.	问题是，制造业在创造就业机会方面贡献甚小，主要是因为该行业生产率增长较快——过去二十年间年均10％以上——因而限制更多的劳动力需求。


By contrast, China’s services sector has registered only about 5% annual productivity growth, and thus is a much more effective engine of job creation.	相比之下，中国服务业的年生产率增长只有大约5％，也是创造就业机会的更有效引擎。


In fact, services are responsible for the lion’s share of employment in most advanced economies.	事实上，服务业在大多数发达经济体中的就业中占了最大的份额。


But, whereas 80% of the American labor force was employed in service industries in 2012, only 36% of China’s workers worked in the sector.	但在2012年，当美国80％的劳动力受雇于服务业时，中国只有36％的劳动力在这个部门工作。


To bolster employment in services, China’s government must loosen its regulatory grip, ease barriers to entry in branches like telecommunications, and encourage labor mobility.	要强化服务业的就业，中国政府必须放松监管，减少例如电信业所存在的行业壁垒，鼓励劳动力流动。


China’s focus on industrial production is problematic in another respect: it is extremely capital-intensive, owing largely to the distortions wrought by government policies.	中国把重点放在工业生产带来了另一个问题：这是一个高度资本密集型部门，而原因主要是政府政策造成的扭曲。


Beyond keeping interest rates below market levels, the government offered the automobile, machinery, and steel industries, among others, preferential access to cheap credit, favorable tax treatment, and public investment support.	除了维持利率低于市场水平之外，政府还为汽车、机械以及钢铁等几个行业提供优先廉价信贷渠道，优惠税收待遇和公共投资支持。


Such policies spurred firms to adopt capital-intensive technologies, obscuring labor’s natural comparative advantages.	这些政策促使企业采用资本密集型技术，进一步淡化了劳动力的自然比较优势。


At the same time, the government’s interventions have limited the growth of private-sector firms by impeding their access to finance.	与此同时，政府借助限制融资渠道的干预手段来限制民营企业的发展。


Though SOEs employ only 13% of the total workforce, and contribute about 30% of GDP, they absorb half of all investment.	虽然国有企业只雇佣了占劳动力总量13％的人口，只贡献了约30％的GDP，但它们吸收了投资总额的一半。


Together, banks and the government provide about 35% of investment in SOEs, but only 10% of investment in private companies.	总之，银行和政府把手中资金的35％投资给国有企业，但只有10％投资于私人公司。


But private firms are significantly more labor-intensive than SOEs – which use almost four times as much capital – and thus have been responsible for most of China’s job creation in recent decades.	但是，民营企业的劳动密集程度明显高于国有企业—— 而国有企业占用的资本是民营企业的几乎四倍之多—— 因此近十年来一直担负着中国大部分的就业机会。


With average employment growth of 10.4% per year, the formal private sector partly compensated for the SOE layoffs from 1995 to 2004.	随着每年10. 4％的平均就业增长，正规私营部门在1995年至2004年间一定程度上弥补了国有企业裁员。


The informal sector grew even faster, at an annual rate of 24%, albeit from a low base.	非正规私营部门增长更快，年增长率达24％，但这是建立在基数较低的基础上的。


Given the obvious benefits of a flourishing and rapidly expanding private sector, China’s government should take steps to ensure that such firms – especially the small and medium-size enterprises that so often are crowded out of credit markets – can access the capital they need to expand.	鉴于私营部门的蓬勃发展和迅速扩大带来了极大的好处，中国政府应采取措施，以确保这些公司——尤其是常常被挡在信贷市场门外的中小规模企业—— 能够获得扩张所需的资本。


This would inevitably lead to a surge in job creation.	这将必然带来就业机会的激增。


The uncomfortable truth is that Chinese households have benefited far too little from the country’s economic-growth miracle.	但令人感到难受的事实是，中国家庭从这个国家的经济增长奇迹中获益太少。


Indeed, households’ share of national income has declined considerably in the last decade, in sharp contrast to the advanced economies, where households’ share is consistently high.	实际上，在过去十年中家庭收入占国民收入的比例大幅下降，与发达经济体形成鲜明对比，在那些国家家庭收入的占比一直很高。


By allowing the private sector to flourish, and encouraging the shift toward a services-oriented economy, China’s government could bolster employment growth and, in turn, domestic consumption.	通过允许私营企业蓬勃发展，并鼓励向以服务为导向的经济结构转变，中国政府可能会加强就业增长，继而增加国内消费。


As Li seems to recognize, structural rebalancing is needed not only to improve Chinese citizens’ wellbeing, but also to bolster economic and social stability at a time of profound global uncertainty.	李克强似乎认识到，经济结构再平衡不仅可以提高中国公民的福祉，更是在漫长的全球不确定性时期促进经济和社会稳定的保障。


Fairness and Free Trade	公平和自由贸易


CAMBRIDGE – The global trade system faces an important turning point at the end of this year, one that was postponed when China joined the World Trade Organization almost 15 years ago.	坎布里奇—今年年底，世界贸易体系将面临重要转折点，这个转折点因为近15年前中国加入世贸组织而延迟到现在。


The United States and the European Union must decide whether they will begin to treat China as a “market economy” in their trade policies.	美国和欧盟必须决定是否在贸易政策中开始将中国作为“市场经济”对待。


Unfortunately, even as the battle escalates over the course of this year, the terms of the choice ensure that nothing will be done to address the global trade regime’s deeper flaws.	不幸的是，虽然这场战争随着今年的深入而逐渐升级，但选择的条件决定了不会对全球贸易机制更深层次的缺陷做出任何修补。


China’s WTO accession agreement, signed in December 2001, permitted the country’s trade partners to deal with China as a “non-market economy” (NME) for a period of up to 15 years.	2001年12月签署的中国加入世贸组织协定允许贸易伙伴在最长15年的时间里将中国视为“非市场经济”（NME）。


NME status made it a lot easier for importing countries to impose special tariffs on Chinese exports, in the form of antidumping duties.	非市场经济地位让进口国更容易以反倾销税的形式对中国出口商品施加特别关税。


In particular, they could use production costs in more expensive countries as a proxy for true Chinese costs, increasing both the likelihood of a dumping finding and the estimated margin of dumping.	特别是，它们可以用比较昂贵的国家的生产成本作为中国真正成本的标准，这样就提高了发现倾销的可能性和倾销利润估计。


Today, though many countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and South Korea, have already rewarded China with market-economy status, the world’s two biggest economies, the US and the EU, have not.	如今，尽管阿根廷、巴西、智利和韩国等许多国家已经给予中国市场经济地位，但世界最大的两个经济体——美国和欧盟——并未这样做。


But, regardless of whether they do, antidumping measures are ill-suited to the task of addressing concerns about unfair trade – not because such concerns are ungrounded, but because they go well beyond dumping.	但是，不论它们是否这样做，反倾销手段都不适合作为解决不公平贸易问题的手段——不是因为这些问题没有真凭实据，而是因为它们远远超过了倾销范畴。


Antidumping facilitates protectionism of the worst kind, while doing nothing for countries that need legitimate policy space.	反倾销给最恶劣的保护主义打开了方便之门，同时对需要合法政策空间的国家没有任何益处。


Economists have never been fond of the WTO’s antidumping rules.	经济学家从未对世贸组织的反倾销规则感兴趣。


From a strictly economic standpoint, pricing below costs is not a problem for the importing economy as long as the firms that engage in the strategy have little prospect of monopolizing the market.	从严格的经济学角度，定价低于成本对进口经济体来说不是问题，只要参与这一策略的企业没有垄断市场的可能。


That is why domestic competition policies typically require evidence of anti-competitive practices or the likelihood of successful predation.	因此，国内竞争政策常常要求拿出反竞争行为证据或成功掠夺的可能性证据。


Under WTO rules, however, pricing below costs on the part of exporters is sufficient for imposing import duties, even when it is standard competitive practice – such as during economic downturns.	但是，根据世贸组织规则，出口国定价低于成本足以成为施加进口关税的理由，即使这只不过是标准的竞争行为——如在经济衰退期间。


This and other procedural considerations make antidumping the preferred route for firms to obtain protection from their foreign rivals when times are tough.	这和其他程序方面的考虑让反倾销成为企业在光景困难时寻求免受外来对手竞争的保护的比较喜欢的图景。


The WTO does have a specific “safeguard” mechanism that enables countries to raise tariffs temporarily when imports cause “serious injury” to domestic firms.	世贸组织确实有一个具体的“保护”机制，允许各国在进口导致本国企业“严重受伤”时临时施加关税。


But the procedural hurdles are higher for safeguards, and countries that use them have to compensate adversely affected exporters.	但该机制的程序性障碍较大，使用它的国家必须补偿受到不利影响的出口国。


The numbers speak for themselves.	数字证明了一切。


Since the WTO was established in 1995, more than 3,000 antidumping duties have been put in place (with India, the US, and the EU being the heaviest users).	1995年世贸组织成立以来，共实施过3,000多项反倾销税（印度、美国和欧盟最常使用这一手段）。


The corresponding number for safeguard measures is a mere 155 (with developing countries being the heaviest users).	相应地，保护措施只是用了155次（发展中国家最常用）。


Clearly, antidumping is the trade remedy of choice.	显然，反倾销贸易救济的主力之选。


But the global trade regime has to address issues of fairness, in addition to economic efficiency.	但除了经济效率，全球贸易机制还必须解决公平问题。


When domestic firms must compete with, say, Chinese firms that are financially supported by a government with deep pockets, the playing field becomes tilted in ways that most people would consider unacceptable.	当国内企业必须与受到财大气粗的政府的金融支持的（比如）中国企业竞争时，大部分人都会认为此时的竞争环境是不可接受的。


Certain types of competitive advantage undermine the legitimacy of international trade, even when (as with this example) they may imply aggregate economic benefits for the importing country.	某种类型的竞争优势破坏了国际贸易的合法性，即使（如本例中）它们对进口国产生了总体经济收益。


So the antidumping regime has a political logic.	因此，反倾销机制属于政治逻辑。


Trade policymakers are deeply familiar with this logic, which is why the antidumping regime exists in its current form, enabling relatively easy protection.	贸易决策者对这一逻辑耳熟能详，这也是反倾销机制之所以以现在的形式出现、促成相对容易的保护的原因。


What trade officials have never taken on board is that the fairness argument extends beyond the dumping arena.	贸易官员从来不明说的是，公平问题超越了倾销的范畴。


If it is unfair for domestic firms to compete with foreign entities that are subsidized or propped up by their governments, is it not similarly unfair for domestic workers to compete with foreign workers who lack fundamental rights such as collective bargaining or protections against workplace abuse?	如果国内企业与受到政府补贴或支持的外国单位竞争是不公平的，那么国内工人与缺少集体讨价还价权利或职场体罚保护的外国工人竞争难道就公平吗？


Aren’t firms that despoil the environment, use child labor, or provide hazardous employment conditions also a source of unfair competition?	掠夺环境、使用童工或就业环境危险的企业难道不也是不公平竞争��来源吗？


Such concerns about unfair trade lie at the heart of the anti-globalization backlash.	这些关于不公平贸易的问题是反全球化抵制的核心。


Yet legal trade remedies permit little room for them beyond the narrow commercial realm of below-cost pricing.	但合法贸易救济让它们只能存在于定价低于成本的狭隘范畴之内。


Labor unions, human rights NGOs, consumer groups, or environmental organizations do not have direct access to protection in the way that firms do.	工会、人权非政府组织、消费者组织或环保组织无法获得企业所获得的直接保护。


Trade experts have long been wary of opening up the WTO regime to questions about labor and environmental standards or human rights, fearing the slippery slope of protectionism.	贸易专家长期以来一直担忧向劳动和环境标准或人权等问题开放世贸组织机制，害怕贸易主义的滑坡谬误。


But it is becoming increasingly clear that excluding these issues does greater damage.	但日益明确的是，将这些问题排除在外造成了更大的伤害。


Trade with countries that have very different economic, social, and political models raises genuine concerns about legitimacy.	与经济、社会和政治模式截然不同的国家做贸易确实会引起合法性问题。


Refusal to acknowledge such concerns not only undermines these trade relationships; it also jeopardizes the legitimacy of the entire global trade regime.	拒绝承认这些问题只能破坏贸易关系； 也有害于整个全球贸易机制的合法性。


None of this implies that democracies should not trade with non-democracies.	所有这些都不意味着民主国家不应该与非民主国家做贸易。


The point is that commercial logic is not the only consideration that should govern their economic relationships.	要点在于商业逻辑不是决定它们的经济关系的唯一考虑因素。


We cannot escape – and therefore must confront – the dilemma that gains from trade sometimes come at the expense of strains on domestic social arrangements.	我们可以摆脱——因而必须面对——得自贸易的收益有时需要以国内社会安排的牺牲为代价的困境。


Public discussion and deliberation are the only way that democracies can sort out the contending values and tradeoffs at stake.	公共讨论和协商是民主国家掂量矛盾价值和做出权衡的唯一办法。


Trade disputes with China and other countries are an opportunity for airing – rather than repressing – these issues, and thus taking an important step toward democratizing the world’s trade regime.	与中国和其他国家的贸易纠纷是晾出——而不是镇压——这些问题、进而向世界贸易机制民主化卖出重要一步的机会。


Xi’s Reform Gambit	习近平的改革序幕


HONG KONG – When Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s market-oriented reforms 35 years ago, he – and the Chinese Communist Party – was taking the biggest political risk since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.	香港—35年前，当邓小平开启中国的市场经济改革时，他和中国共产党承担了自1949年人民共和国成立以来最大的政治风险。


When President Xi Jinping unveiled his own reform agenda at last year’s Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Congress, he was taking an equally large risk.	当习近平主席在去年的中共十八大三中全会上启动他的改革日程时，他也承担了同样巨大的风险。


Will his strategy pay off?	他的改革战略会带来成果吗？


In 1979, Deng was in a difficult situation.	1979年，邓小平处于十分困难的境地。


He knew that the shift from centrally planned egalitarian socialism toward market-oriented capitalism could destabilize the CCP’s rule, and the unequal accumulation of wealth in the short term could cause significant social and political division.	他知道从中央计划的平均社会主义向市场经济的资本主义的转变可能会动摇中共的统治，而短期内财富的不平等积累也可能引发巨大的社会和政治动荡。


But, with China on the verge of economic and social collapse, following the decade-long chaos of the Cultural Revolution, he had to take action – and there were few, if any, alternatives available.	但是，在经历了文革十年动乱后，当时的中国已经站在了经济和社会崩溃的边缘，他必须采取行动，因为除此之外别无选择。


The reforms turned out to be extremely rewarding: more than three decades of double-digit economic growth followed their implementation.	邓小平的改革最终收到了巨大成效：三十多年两位数字的经济增长。


Moreover, they allowed the CCP to retain its hold on power. But they benefited some people and regions much more quickly than others – a problem that was tougher to address than Deng had anticipated.	此外，邓小平的改革也让中共巩固了政权， 但给不同的人和地区带来了贫富不均，而这一问题比邓小平所预想的还要难以解决。


Xi’s reforms, like Deng’s, reflect the absence of alternatives.	习近平的改革和邓小平当初的改革类似，是别无选择的选择。


Not only has China’s labor-intensive, investment-led growth model run out of steam; bureaucratic inefficiencies and pervasive corruption – not to mention severe and worsening pollution – are also damaging China’s long-term prospects.	不但中国的劳动密集、出口及投资拉动型增长模式已经失去动力； 低效的官僚主义、无处不在的腐败、严重的贫富差距、 不断恶化的污染等问题正在损害着中国的长期发展前景。


Only by addressing these weaknesses and shifting to an innovation-based, environmentally sustainable growth model can the country continue to prosper – and ultimately achieve high-income status.	只有解决这些问题并转向基于创新、包容、及环境可持续的增长模式，中国才能继续繁荣， 并最终步入高收入行列。


The difference between the two reform efforts is that Xi must also address the shortcomings of Deng’s work.	两人改革的不同之处在于，习近平必须处理邓小平改革初期没有预料到的新问题 。


Deng mistakenly believed that the state, which retained its central role in the economy, would be able to use new market-generated resources to correct the short-run inequalities created by his reforms.	邓小平认为，仍在经济中扮演核心角色的政府，能够使用市场所产生的新资源来纠正他的改革所引发的短期不平等。


But the bureaucracy and its privileged networks benefited most, and a second, non-market source of inequality – endemic official corruption – became entrenched.	但现实是官僚体系及其特权网在改革过程中不仅成了最大的既得利益，而大量的官员腐败还形成了非源于市场的第二种不平等。


That is why Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was a critical precursor to reform.	因此，习近平的反腐运动成为改革的关键前奏。


In other words, beyond completing China’s transformation into an open, market-based economy, Xi must establish a strong rule of law that applies to all, while addressing acute inequality of income, opportunity, wealth, and wellbeing.	除了完成中国向更开放、更市场化的经济转型，习近平还必须建立适用于所有人的法治精神，同时解决尖锐的机会、收入、 财富和福利不平等的矛盾。


For this reason, Xi must pursue reforms that allow people, money, resources, information, and companies to move more freely across sectors, regions, and national borders.	习近平所追求的改革必须能让人、资金、自然资源、信息和企业更加自由地在部门、地区和国家间流动。


The resulting convergence of wealth and opportunities would generate massive economic and social gains.	由此带来的财富和机会的趋同将产生巨大的经济与社会效益，并将改变中国、亚洲和世界的经济地理。 这种改头换面的变革必然会伴随巨大的创造性破坏。


But, by effectively transforming the economic geography of China, Asia, and the world, liberalization would also lead to significant creative destruction.	此外，只有在中国的当权者能够容忍各种短期及局部价格波动时，包括住房、股票、劳动力、自然资源和货币等要素价格的波动， 市场的力量才能通过市场规律的自然实现过程来降低长期的扭曲及不平等。


Furthermore, market forces could reduce inequality in the longer term only if China’s authorities tolerated the short-term inequalities created by fluctuations in prices for housing, stocks, labor, natural resources, and currency.	在市场规律下，短期的价格扭曲正是套利的机会，而短期套利的行动也是导致长期价格趋同及收入平等的动力。


The problem is that the Chinese bureaucracy prefers stability, and it has strong incentives to strengthen its own position relative to the market, thereby exacerbating power inequalities and dampening innovation and growth.	问题在于中国的官员更偏好短期稳定，且相信政府比市场更有能力调控短期经济波动，他们往往将调控短期经济波动的权利保留给政府及市场监管者。 而这往往导致政府宏观调控权力的扩大及市场自然调节过程的弱化，结果往往是阻碍了创新和增长。


Yet the bureaucracy remains integral to the implementation of any policy that promotes social cohesion.	另一方面，中国的大量未完成的改革任务仍然需要依靠政府官员领头来实施，特别是需要他们的努力来提出可以凝聚社会共识的改革政策 。


To mitigate the serious systemic risks stemming from the power of China’s overweening, corrupt mandarins, Xi must rebalance their incentives.	要想遏制由一些自负且腐败的官员导致的滥用权利的系统性风险，习近平必须在制度方面重新平衡官员的激励机制。


He is already working to eliminate graft, restrict the scope of administrative approvals, reduce the state-owned sector’s advantages, clarify property rights in land, and simplify welfare, tax, and financial regulations.	他已开始着手根除贪污、限制行政审批权、削减国有部门的权力、明确土地的产权、提升福利、税收和金融监管的透明度及公平性等改革。


Beyond reducing systemic risks, these efforts – if they are sustained – could generate “reform dividends” over time.	这些结构性的制度改革不仅可以降低系统性风险，如果新的制度成功建立并可以保持，还能形成正真的“改革红利”。


But the incentive problem is not confined to the bureaucracy.	但制度性的激励问题并不局限于官员。


Systemic reform requires recognizing and atoning for two original sins: not only that of bureaucrats who made money by abusing their power, but also that of capitalists who made money by breaking the rules.	系统性制度改革需要承认和弥补两类原罪：一类是官员的以权谋利； 另一类是资本家及既得利益团体通过违反、破坏、或改变公平规则来谋利 。


This challenge is best illustrated in the competition between state-owned enterprises and private firms.	最能说明这一挑战的莫过于国有企业和民营企业之间的竞争。


The failure of private firms that lack access to subsidies or affordable financing deters others from innovating and challenging the status quo.	民营企业无法获得补贴和低成本融资，它们的失败让其他人不敢从事创新和富有挑战的领域。


Meanwhile, SOEs – which can invest in excess capacity, record net losses (often through corruption and incompetence), and count on government subsidies – never face a reckoning.	与此同时，有些国有企业可能因为腐败和能力欠缺而投资过剩产能并产生净损失，可还是可以获得政府补贴而不必面临破产。


The implication is that macroeconomic policies like low interest rates and easy access to credit should be used to ensure equal access to credit for all qualified companies, based on their competitiveness, not their ownership.	好的激励机制应该确保宏观经济政策，如低利率和宽松的信贷，适用所有合格公司，而不是以所有权性质、企业大小、地区等歧视性条款来分配。 而是否合格应由企业的竞争力决定，并通过平等竞争获得融资机会。


Unfortunately, implementing such measures would entail micro-level bureaucratic intervention, leading to further expansion of state powers.	不幸的是，实施这些措施有时需要包含微观层面的政府各个部门的干预，往往导致政府权力的进一步扩大。


That is why the bureaucracy must be given incentives – higher salaries, clear performance indicators, and awareness that abuses of power will not be tolerated – to abandon the micro-management of market activities.	正因如此，不仅需要严惩腐败官员，让他们明白滥用权力是不可容忍的并放弃对市场行为的不合理的干预，也需要给予努力工作的官员恰当的激励，如更高的薪水及明确的业绩指标和奖励。


China’s recent relaxation of macroeconomic policy, despite ongoing market volatility, is an important step toward breaking unnecessary barriers to implementing the reforms needed to mitigate systemic risks.	最近，尽管金融市场持续波动，但中国经济金融的决策部门仍放宽了宏观经济政策，这为明年落实大量制度性改革奠定了基础。 制度性改革是为了降低系统性风险，是确保中国未来可持续发展所必须做的。


Now that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has taken down some of the CCP’s biggest “tigers,” it is time to focus on structural reform.	但大部分的制度性改革在短期往往会导致宏观紧缩及波动，需要较为宽松的宏观环境来缓解短期实体经济面临的困难。 习近平的反腐运动已经扳倒了中共内部的一些大“老虎”，大大降低了中国可持续增长的系统性风险，现在是专注于制度性结构改革的时候了。


With the right approach and sustained political will, Xi’s risk-taking can bring China the kind of returns that Deng’s did – and more.	如能具备正确的方针和持续的政治愿景，习近平的改革可以给中国带来比邓小平的改革有过之而无不及的回报。


The New Normal in China’s Cities	中国城市的新常态


HONG KONG – For decades, rapid urbanization in China created clusters of knowledge, manufacturing, and distribution in areas that benefited from well-established connections to the global economy.	香港—几十年来，城市化的快速发展使中国出现了一批知识和制造业集中的大都会，它们大多坐落在能很好地与全球经济相连的区域。


But that growth model has reached its end.	但这一增长模式已经达到了极限。


With the share of people living in cities rising to 53% in 2013, from 20% in 1981, China is shifting to a “new normal.”	2013年中国城市居民人口比例达到了53%，而1981年仅为20%，这表明中国正在进入一个城市化、工业化、信息化、现代化市场经济的“新常态”。


According to President Xi Jinping, the aim is to ensure annual economic growth of around 7%, driven by new opportunities in value-added manufacturing, information technologies, and modernized agricultural production.	国家主席习近平指出，新常态的目标是确保年经济增长在7%左右，以高附加值制造、信息技术和现代化农业生产的新机遇为增长驱动力。


In moving toward this goal, however, China will face difficult balance-sheet adjustments that cannot easily be managed by conventional fiscal and monetary policies.	但是，在向这一目标迈进的过程中，中国将面临困难的资产负债表的结构调整，这一调整无法仅仅依靠传统财政和货币政策来轻松解决。


A new Deutsche Bank study reports that, last year, China’s 300 cities faced a 37% drop in their land-sale revenues – a major setback, given that land sales accounted for 35% of total local-government revenues.	德意志银行（Deutsche Bank）新的研究报告指出，去年中国300个城市土地出让金收入下降了37%——相当大的降幅，而土地出售占地方政府收入的比例占35%。


Such revenues had risen at an average annual rate of 24% from 2009 to 2013.	更重要的是，2009—2013年间，土地出让金收入以平均每年24%的超高速度增长。


Moreover, annual consumer and producer inflation dropped to 1.5% and -3.3%, respectively, last December, owing partly to the sharp decline in world oil prices.	此外，去年12月年度消费者和生产者通胀率分别下降到1. 5%和-3.


China now faces deflation and an inhospitable external economic environment, and its urban centers are struggling with the complex interaction of solvency, liquidity, and structural issues.	3%，部分原因是全球油价暴跌。 如今，中国面临着通缩和不利的外部经济环境，其以城市为中心的经济也在偿债能力、流动性和结构调整等复杂的挑战中互动与挣扎。


But some cities are better equipped than others to weather these challenges.	但一些城市比另一些更能抵御挑战。


China’s first- and second-tier cities are very wealthy, benefiting from high property values and the continuous inflow of talent, capital, companies, and investment projects.	中国的一二线城市十分富有，这是得益于高房价和人才、资本、公司以及投资项目的持续流入。


Despite a property-market slowdown, Beijing’s recent land auction concluded with record-breaking prices of about CN¥38,000 ($6,200) per square meter.	尽管房地产市场有所减速，但最近北京土地拍卖仍创出了每平方米38,000元人民币的历史记录。