LONDON – January is usually expected to be a good month for stock markets, with new money gushing into investment funds, while tax-related selling abates at the end of the year.	伦敦—通常，人们总是期待1月份股市会开门红，因为新资金涌入投资基金，而与纳税问题相关的年底卖潮已经消退。


Although the data on investment returns in the United States actually show that January profits have historically been on only slightly better than the monthly norm, the widespread belief in a bullish “January effect” has made the weakness of stock markets around the world this year all the more shocking.	尽管美国投资回报数据显示，从历史看，1月份的利润其实只略高于月度平均水平，但人们对向好的“一月效应”深信不疑，这让今年全球股市的疲软表现更加令人震惊。


But the pessimists have a point, even if they sometimes overstate the January magic.	但悲观派有很好的理由，虽然他们有时候会高估1月魔法。


According to statisticians at Reuters, this year started with Wall Street’s biggest first-week fall in over a century, and the 8% monthly decline in the MSCI world index made January’s performance worse than 96% of the months on record.	据路透社的一位统计学家的数据，华尔街在今年创出一个世纪以来的最大新年第一周跌幅，1月份MSCI世界指数下跌8%，表现比有记录的96%的月份更差。


So, just how worried about the world economy should we be?	那么，世界经济应该要多担心？


Three fears now seem to be influencing market psychology: China, oil and the fear of a US or global recession.	眼下，似乎有三大担忧正在影响市场心理：中国、石油以及担心美国或全球衰退。


China is surely a big enough problem to throw the world economy and equity markets off the rails for the rest of this decade.	中国问题足以让世界经济和股市在这个十年的剩余几年中一蹶不振。


We saw this in the first four days of the year, when the sudden fall in the Chinese stock market triggered January’s global financial mayhem.	这一点在今年开头四天尽显无疑，中国股市的暴跌引起了一场1月全球金融骚乱。


But the Chinese stock market is of little consequence for the rest of the world.	但中国股市对世界其他部分影响甚微。


The real fear is that the Chinese authorities will either act aggressively to devalue the renminbi or, more likely, lose control of it through accidental mismanagement, resulting in devastating capital flight.	真正的担忧之处是中国当局可能过于积极地让人民币贬值或者（更有可能）因为偶然的管理不善引起灾难性资本外逃，进而失去对人民币的控制。


Such a scenario seemed quite plausible for a few weeks last summer, and it reemerged as a threat in the first two weeks of this year.	这一情景在去年夏天的几周中曾经就在眼前，而在今年前两周，这一威胁再一次重现。


By the end of January, however, market sentiment had moved back in favor of stability in China.	但是，到1月底，市场情绪已经恢复，有利于中国的稳定。


This calm could be disrupted again if China’s foreign-exchange reserves show another huge monthly loss, and the authorities’ efforts to manage an orderly economic slowdown will remain the biggest source of legitimate concern for financial markets for many years ahead.	如果中国外汇储备再次发生巨量月度下降，这一平静就有可能被打破，当局管理有序经济减速的努力将仍然是未来多年金融市场最大的合理担忧原因。


But, judging by market behavior in the second half of January, the fear about China has subsided, at least for now.	但是，从1月份下半个月的市场行为看，对中国的担忧至少在目前已有所减小。


That cannot be said about the market’s second great worry: collapsing oil prices.	市场的第二大担忧——石油价格崩溃就不是这样了。


From the moment investors stopped panicking about China, in the second week of January, stock markets around the world started falling (and occasionally rebounding) in lockstep with the price of oil.	从投资者们不再担心中国的那一刻开始（在1月的第二周），全球股市便与石油价格同步下跌（偶尔还有反弹）。


Unlike the reasonable concern about China, market sentiment seems simply to have gotten the relationship between oil and the world economy wrong.	与对中国的合理担忧不同，市场情绪似乎完全搞错了石油和世界经济的关系。


In anything but the very short term, the correlation between oil prices and stock markets should be negative, not positive – and will almost certainly turn out that way in the years ahead.	除了极短期，石油价格和股市的相关性应该为负而非为正——并且在未来几年中几乎肯定还会如此。


When oil prices plunge by 10% daily, this is obviously disruptive in the short term: credit spreads in resources and related sectors explode, and leveraged investors are forced into asset fire sales to meet margin calls.	当石油价格在一天之内暴跌10%时，显然具有短期破坏性：不同资源和相关部门间信用利差暴增，杠杆投资者被迫甩卖资产以满足保证金要求。


Fortunately, market panic now seems to be subsiding, as oil prices reach the lower part of the $25-50 trading range that always seemed appropriate in today’s political and economic conditions.	幸运的是，现在市场恐慌似乎并不大，因为石油已经触及25—50美元交易区间的下沿（在当今政治和经济条件下，这一区间一直是合理区间）。


Now that oil prices are stabilizing at a reasonable long-term level, the world economy and non-commodity businesses should benefit.	现在，石油价格稳定在一个合理的长期水平上，世界经济和非大宗商品企业应能从中获益。


Low oil prices increase real incomes, stimulate spending on non-resource goods and services, and boost profits for energy-using businesses.	低油价增加了实际收入，刺激了非资源商品和服务的支出，也提振了企业能源用户的利润。


Yet, despite these obvious benefits, most investors now seem to believe that falling oil prices point to a collapse in economic activity, which brings us to the third fear haunting financial markets this winter: a recession in the global economy or the US.	但是，尽管有这些显而易见的益处，但如今大部分投资者似乎认为油价下跌会带来经济活动崩溃，这就引出了今年冬天困扰金融市场的第三个恐慌：全球经济或美国衰退。


Past experience suggests that oil prices are not a useful leading indicator of economic activity.	过去的经验表明，石油价格不是经济活动的有用先行指标。


In fact, if oil-price movements have any relevance at all in economic forecasting, it is as a contrary indicator.	事实上，如果说石油价格波动真的有什么经济预测意义的话，那么它可以作为反向指标。


Every global recession since 1970 has been preceded by a big increase in oil prices, while almost every decline greater than 30% has been followed by accelerating growth and higher equity prices.	自1970年以来，每一次全球衰退之前都会发生石油价格大幅攀升，而每次超过30%的油价下跌之后都会发生增长加速和股价上扬。


The widespread view that plunging oil prices augur recession is a clear case of the belief that this time is different – a belief that typically takes hold in financial markets at the peaks and troughs of boom-bust cycles.	油价暴跌预示衰退这一广泛存在的观点是“这次不一样”信念的显例——这一信念常常在金融市场枯荣循环的波峰和波谷时最为流行。


Finally, what about the falling stock market itself as an indicator of recession risks?	最后，股市下跌本身可以作为衰退风险的指标吗？


One could quote the great economist Paul Samuelson, who famously quipped in the 1960s that the stock market had “predicted nine of the last five recessions.”	你可能会引用著名经济学家保罗·萨缪尔逊（Paul Samuelson）20世纪60年代的著名的讽刺：股市“预测了过去五次衰退中的九次。


There is, however, a less reassuring answer.	”但是，这个答案并不靠谱。


While markets are often wrong in predicting economic events, financial expectations can sometimes influence those events.	市场在预测经济事件时常常犯错，但金融预期有时能够影响这些事件。


As a result, reality can sometimes be forced to converge towards market expectations, not vice versa.	因此，有时现实会被迫向市场预期趋近，而不是相反。


This process, known as “reflexivity,” is a powerful force in financial markets, especially during periods of instability or crisis.	这一过程便是“反身性”，它是金融市场中的一股强大的力量，特别是在动荡或危机期间。


To the extent that reflexivity works through consumer and business confidence, it should not be a problem now, because the oil-price collapse is a powerful antidote to the stock-market decline.	反身性通过消费和企业信心起作用，因此现在它还不是个问题，因为石油价格崩盘是股市下跌的强力解药。


Consumers are gaining more from cheap oil than they are losing from falling stock prices, so the net effect of recent financial turmoil on consumption should be positive – and stronger consumption should feed through to business revenues.	消费者从低价石油中获得的好处大于他们在股市下跌中的损失，因此当前金融动荡对消费的净影响应该为正——而消费的增强应该会反馈在企业收入中。


A greater worry is the workings of reflexivity within the financial system itself.	更大的担心是在反身性如何在金融体系本身内部起作用。


Bankruptcies among small energy-sector companies, which are of limited economic importance themselves, are creating pressures in global banking and reducing the availability of credit to healthy businesses and households that would otherwise be beneficiaries of cheaper oil.	能源业小公司的破产——本来从经济角度讲这没有什么重要性——正在给全球银行业造成压力，并降低了健康企业和家庭获得信用的能力（它们原本应该是低价石油的受益者）。


Fears of a Chinese devaluation that has not happened (and probably never will) are having the same chilling effect on credit in emerging markets.	中国贬值（尚未发生，可能永远不会发生）的担忧正在新兴市场造成同样的信用影响。


Meanwhile, banking regulators are continuing to tighten lending standards, even though economic conditions suggest they should be easing up.	与此同时，银行监管者仍在继续收紧贷款标准，虽然经济环境表明应该有所放松。


In short, nothing about the condition of the world economy suggests that a major slowdown or recession is inevitable or even likely.	简言之，世界经济情况并未表明必然会出现大减速或衰退，甚至可以说这种可能性非常低。


But a lethal combination of self-fulfilling expectations and policy errors could cause economic reality to bend to the dismal mood prevailing in financial markets.	但自我实现的预期和政策错误所形成的致命组合可能导致经济现实向弥漫在金融市场中的忧郁情绪靠拢。


Three Paths for Indebted Democracies	负债民主国家的三条道路


CHICAGO – Democratic governments are not incentivized to take decisions that have short-term costs but produce long-term gains, the typical pattern for any investment.	发自芝加哥——典型的投资手法讲究先在短期内支付一定成本，然后获取长期收益，但民主国家的政府往往都缺乏制定类似决策的动机。


Indeed, in order to make such investments, democracies require either brave leadership or an electorate that understands the costs of postponing hard choices.	倘若要在民主制度下实施这类投资行为的话，要么需要一位勇气可嘉的领导人，要么要求选民能明白回避这类痛苦决策所导致的弊端。


Brave leadership is rare. So, too, is an informed and engaged electorate, because the expert advice offered to voters is itself so confusing.	有勇气的领导人堪称凤毛麟角，而那些信息充分而且富有参与精神的选民也为数不多，因为那些提供给选民的所谓专家意见本身都模棱两可。


Economists of different persuasions find it difficult to reach a consensus about the necessity of any policy.	不同学派的经济学家都发现就任何政策的必要性达成共识非常艰难。


Consider, for example, the cacophony of arguments about government spending: is it the only thing keeping depression at bay, or is it moving us steadily down the road to perdition?	比如说关于政府支出的激烈争论：它究竟是唯一能将萧条拒之门外的手段，还是一条毁灭之路？


The debate does not lead to agreement, moderate voters do not know what to believe, and policy choices ultimately follow the path of least resistance – until they run into a brick wall.	最终这些争论无法达成任何共识，中间派选民根本不知道该选择哪一方，而政策选择最终往往会走上避重就轻的道路——直到碰壁了为止。


The build-up of public debt in industrial countries (which was rising briskly well before the Great Recession pushed it to near-unsustainable levels) reflects this kind of calculus.	发达国家逐渐堆积的债务（其实早就在迅速增长，只不过最近这场大萧条将其推到了几乎无法维持的境地）就反映了类似的算计。


The public rewards democratic governments for dealing with the downside risk caused by competitive markets – whether by spending to create jobs or by rescuing banks that have dodgy securities on their balance sheets.	民主政府着手应对由竞争性市场所引发的经济下跌风险，而公众也对此表示赞赏——不管它是通过支出来创造就业，还是拯救那些在资产负债表中拥有有毒债券的银行。


Even if inaction (or action oriented towards the longer term) is the best policy, it is not an option for democratically elected politicians, whom voters expect to govern, which inevitably means action with the potential for quick results.	就算不作为（或者是着眼于长远的行动）才是最佳政策，但对那些通过民主选举出来的政客来说这可不是一个选项，选民希望他们能有所行动，于是无法避免地意味着采取一些追求短期效应的行为。


A sympathetic press amplifies heart-rending stories of lost jobs and homes, making those counseling against intervention or advocating longer-term fixes appear callous.	同情心泛滥的媒体大肆渲染那些关于失业或者无家可归的心碎故事，使得那些反对政府干涉或者建议采取长期性措施的人看上去就像冷血动物。


Democracies are necessarily softhearted, whereas markets are not; government action has expanded to fill the gap.	民主制度一般都是温情脉脉的，而市场又总是残酷无情； 于是政府出现，填补了其中空白。


With governments in many developed countries now reaching the limits of their gap-filling capacity, three undesirable possibilities loom large (in addition to the desirable possibility that they will have no choice but to undertake long-postponed reforms that will create sustainable growth with less need for government buffers).	但如今许多发达国家的政府已经无力填补可以空白，因此出现三种负面请况的可能性正逐渐增加（除非各国最终走投无路只能实施那些被长期推迟的改革，创造需要更少政府缓冲作用的可持续增长，这是个积极的情况）。


One is that they intervene directly in markets, both domestic and across borders, to reduce competition and volatility while they rebuild their buffering capacity.	其一是政府直接干涉国内外市场以减少竞争和波动性，并借机重建自身的危机缓冲能力。


Another is that they muzzle democracy to suppress public anger.	另一个则是压制民主以抑制民众的愤怒。


A third is that they find scapegoats.	第三则是寻找替罪羊。


All three were tried during the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The results were not encouraging.	上述三个做法都在1930年代的大萧条中尝试过了，而结果也都不甚乐观。


One factor diminishing the likelihood of governments intervening more directly in markets is that the recent crisis seems to have discredited government as much as it discredited the financial sector.	一个减少政府更直接干预市场的因素是最近这场危机不但令民众丧失了对金融部门的信任，也极大打击了政府的威信。


During the Great Depression, matters were different.	但当年大萧条时情况可不是这样的。


As economic collapse caused the public to lose faith in the private sector and markets, faith in government grew.	经济崩溃使得民众对私人部门和市场失去了信心，但却令政府的号召力不断上升。


For example, in the United States, public support for President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal was broad-based throughout the 1930’s.	比如在1930年代的美国，罗斯福新政就是受到民众普遍欢迎的。


One possible reason for the difference in attitudes today is that bankers were visibly punished in the 1930’s.	造成新旧两种不同情况对比的一个可能原因就是1930年代的银行家们都在众目睽睽下受到了惩罚。


Legislation such as the US Glass-Steagall Act clipped their wings.	类似格拉斯-斯蒂高尔法案（Glass-Steagall Act）这样的立法断了他们后路。


Many bankers also suffered direct losses as their banks collapsed, or as investigations exposed them to public ridicule, and even jail.	许多银行家都在银行倒闭后受到了直接经济损失，或者相关调查使他们在公众面前蒙羞，甚至有些人被投进了监狱。


Today, by contrast, broad segments of the public see the big banks and big government as being run by the same elites who created the crisis, and then spent public money under one guise or another bailing the banks out.	但如今大部分公众看到的却是在同一批精英们掌控下的大银行和大国政府，是这些人制造了危机，却又巧立名目用纳税人的钱去拯救那些银行。


Even as bankers are back to reaping enormous bonuses, taxpayers have been left to foot the bill for the economic collapse.	一面是银行家们重新坐拥大笔花红，另一面却是纳税人苦苦支撑为经济崩溃买单。


Many workers are unemployed and in danger of being evicted from their homes, while no important banker has been put in jail.	许多劳动者都面临着失业以及被银行收回物业的危险，却没有一个大银行家获罪入狱。


The biggest banks now account for an even larger share of the financial sector after benefiting from a government rescue, while efforts like the Dodd-Frank Act to legislate more constraints on banks have been lobbied into shadows of their original selves.	在享受了政府的援助之后，那些大银行如今的市场份额反而还增加了，而类似《多德-弗兰克法案》（Dodd-Frank Act）这类试图对银行采取更多限制的法案则在国会游说者的影响下变了味。


The elite, whether in government or big business, seems to look after itself and no one else.	看上去那些精英，无论身处政府还是商界，都只管自己逍遥，不顾他人死活。


In the US, this sentiment has fueled the Tea Party, which coalesces around opposition to government expansion (and to elites more generally), even if that expansion is aimed at regulating big banks (presumably because government regulations tend to be shaped by the powerful among the regulated).	在美国，这种情绪鼓动了茶党运动，它们联合起来反对政府扩张（或者更普遍地反对精英政治），连那些旨在规管大型银行的政府扩张行为了不放过（大概是因为政府的监管条文往往都是那些被监��者中的大佬们制定的）。


Movements like the Tea Party have thus tended keep in check those who, after a crisis of the sort that America has had, typically want more government action, including curbing markets and competition.	像茶党这样的运动因此倾向于反对那些在经历了美国这么一场危机后希望有更多政府行动（包括限制市场和竞争）的人。


The US is not alone in having a discredited government.	失信的政府可不仅仅是美国一家。


In the eurozone, in addition to the perceived nexus between banks and governments, the governing elite’s willingness to embrace European integration, and taxpayer-financed cross-border financial support, without broad public consultation has generated a similar sentiment.	在欧元区，除了察觉到的政府和银行勾结之外，政府精英实现欧洲整合的愿望，以及用纳税人税款支付跨国财政援助——都是在没有事先咨询公众——也激发了类似的情绪。


In Japan, two decades of relentless economic malaise has decimated the public’s faith in politicians and the government bureaucracy.	在日本，持续20年的无情经济瘫痪已经使公众对政治家和政府完全失去了信心。


The second undesirable possibility – that governments with little spending capacity to assuage public anger turn against democracy and free expression – is also remote for now.	第二个负面情况——那些没有足够财力来花钱平息民众愤怒的政府转而开始压制民主和言论自由——出现的几率目前还很小。


Democratic institutions in industrial countries are stronger, and have deeper roots, than was the case in the 1930s.	相对与1930年代来说，发达国家的民主体制已经发展得相当根深蒂固了。


That leaves the third undesirable possibility, the search for unprotected scapegoats upon whom public anger can be dissipated.	这就剩下了第三个负面情况，那就是找一个容易欺负的替罪羊以便转移公众的愤怒情绪。


Unfortunately, several countries are taking this path, with undocumented immigrants and Muslims being the first targets.	不幸的是，许多国家都走上了这条道路，而非法移民和穆斯林则成为了首要受害者。


Politicians who seek scapegoats might argue that they mean no harm to their targets, and that they are helping their societies to avoid worse possibilities.	那些找提替罪羊的政客可能会辩解说他们其实不是想伤害这些人，而是在帮助他们的社会去避免出现更坏的情况。


But, as the 1930’s showed, it is hard to imagine any possibility worse than where this type of behavior can lead.	但1930年代的经验告诉我们，没有比这种行为所造成的后果更遭糕的情况了。


Which Way for US Foreign Policy?	美国外交政策走哪条路？


BANGALORE – When US President Barack Obama recently spoke at the United Nations about countering the Islamic State, many of his critics complained that he put too much emphasis on diplomacy and not enough on the use of force.	班加罗尔—美国总统奥巴马最近在联合国谈到了如何打击伊斯兰国，许多批评者抱怨他过于强调外交，而对使用武力强调不够。


Comparisons were made with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military intervention in Syria’s civil war; and, with the US presidential election campaign shifting into high gear, some Republican candidates accused Obama of isolationism.	人们将奥巴马的政策与俄罗斯总统普京最近对叙利亚内战的军事干预相比； 而随着美国总统大选进入关键阶段，一些共和党候选人也指责了奥巴马的孤立主义。


But such charges are partisan political rhetoric, with little basis in rigorous policy analysis.	但这些指责只是党派政治论调，并没有多少严格的政策分析基础。


It is more accurate to see the current mood as a swing of the US foreign policy pendulum between what Columbia University’s Stephen Sestanovich has called “maximalist” policies and “retrenchment” policies.	更准确地说，应该将当前情绪看作美国外交政策在哥伦比亚大学的史蒂芬·塞斯塔诺维奇（Stephen Sestanovich）所谓的“纲领”（maximalist）政策和“紧缩”（maximalist）政策之间的摇摆。


Retrenchment is not isolationism; it is an adjustment of strategic goals and means.	紧缩不是孤立主义； 只是对战略目标和手段的调整。


Presidents who followed policies of retrenchment since the end of World War II have included Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and now Obama.	二战以来采取紧缩政策的总统有艾森豪威尔、尼克松、卡特和现在的奥巴马。


No objective historian would call any of these men isolationists.	客观的历史学家都不会把他们称为孤立主义者。


Eisenhower ran for president in 1952 because he opposed the isolationism of Robert Taft, the leading Republican candidate.	艾森豪威尔1952年因反对共和党候选人塔夫特（Robert Taft）而当选美国总统。


While Nixon believed the US was in decline, the others did not.	尼克松认为美国在衰落，其他人则否。


All of them were strong internationalists when compared to the true isolationists of the 1930s, who bitterly opposed coming to the aid of Britain in WWII.	与20世纪30年代真正的孤立主义者（他们激烈反对在二战期间援助英国）相比，所有这些总统都是坚定的国际主义者。


Historians can make a credible case that periods of maximalist over-commitment have done more damage to America’s place in the world than periods of retrenchment.	历史学家可以令人信服地说明，纲领主义过度投入政策时期对美国世界地位的伤害比紧缩时期还要大。


Domestic political reaction to Woodrow Wilson’s global idealism produced the intense isolationism that delayed America’s response to Hitler.	对威尔逊的全球理想主义的国内政治反应形成了严重的孤立主义，延迟了美国对希特勒的反应。


The escalation of the war in Vietnam under Presidents John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson produced the inward-looking turn of the 1970s.	越南战争在肯尼迪和约翰逊总统期间的升级催生了20世纪90年代的向内转。


And George W. Bush’s misguided invasion of Iraq created the current mood of retrenchment.	小布什错误地入侵伊拉克形成了目前的紧缩情绪。


If that mood is to become an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, as early campaign rhetoric suggests, Americans should drop the false debate about isolationism and instead address three fundamental questions about the future of the country’s foreign policy: How much?	如果这一群情绪如早期选战论调显示的那样将成为2016年总统大选的一个话题，那么美国应该抛弃关于孤立主义的错误争论，转而解决三个关于国家外交政策的基本问题：多少钱？


How interventionist?	多少干预主义？


And how multilateral?	多少多边主义？


The first question is how much the US should spend on defense and foreign policy.	第一个问题是，美国应该在防务和外交政策上花多少钱。


Although some argue that America has no choice but to curtail its outlays in these areas, this is not the case.	尽管一些人认为美国别无选择，只能削减这方面的支出，但事实并非如此。


As a share of GDP, the US is spending less than half of what it did at the peak of the Cold War, when the century of American leadership was being consolidated.	按占GDP的比例衡量，美国的支出还不到冷战顶峰、美国领导的世纪得到巩固时期的一半。


The problem is not guns vs. butter, but guns vs. butter vs. taxes.	问题不在于枪炮还是黄油，而在于是枪炮，还是黄油，还是税收。


Without a willingness to raise revenues, defense expenditure is locked in a zero-sum tradeoff with important investments such as education, infrastructure, and research and development – all of which are crucial to America’s domestic strength and global position.	如果不愿提高税收收入，防务支出就会陷入零和权衡，与教育、基础设施和研发等重要投资争夺预算——而这些投资都是美国国内优势和全球地位的关键因素。


The second question concerns how and in what ways the US should become involved in other countries’ internal affairs.	第二个问题关注美国应该如何和以什么方式介入其他国家的内政。


Obama has said that America should use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when its security or that of its allies is threatened.	奥巴马说，美国应该使用武力，在必要时，即美国或其盟友的安全遇到威胁时，应该单方面使用武力。


When not, but conscience urges the country to act – against, say, a dictator killing a large number of his citizens – the US should not intervene alone and should use force only if there is a good prospect of success.	当不存在必要性但良心促使美国行动时——比如某位独裁者杀戮大量平民时——美国不应该单独干预，而应该只在有很好的成功机会时使用武力。


These are reasonable principles, but what are the thresholds?	这些都是合理的原则，但阈值在哪里？


The problem is not new.	这不是一个新问题。


Nearly two centuries ago, John Quincy Adams, America’s sixth president, was wrestling with domestic demands for intervention in the Greek war for independence when he famously said that the US “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”	近两个世纪前，美国第六任总统亚当斯与国内要求干预希腊独立战争的观点进行了角力，他说出了一番著名的话，美国“不主动出国寻找恶魔杀死它。


But what if forbearance in a civil war like Syria’s allows a terrorist group like the Islamic State to establish a safe haven?	”但如果像叙利亚内战这样的情况，克制导致伊斯兰国这样的恐怖集团能够建立安全港，又应该怎么样？


The US should stay out of the business of invasion and occupation.	美国应该避免侵略和占领。


In an age of nationalism and socially mobilized populations, foreign occupation, as Eisenhower wisely concluded in the 1950s, is bound to breed resentment.	在民族主义时代，面临全社会动员的人口，20世纪50年代由艾森豪威尔机智提出的外交占领必然会导致仇恨。


But what takes its place?	但用什么取代外交占领呢？


Is air power and the training of foreign forces enough?	空中力量和训练外国军队就足够了吗？


Particularly in the Middle East, where revolutions are likely to last for a generation, a smart combination of hard and soft power will be difficult to achieve.	特别是在中东，革命可能持续一代人之久，很难实现硬实力和软实力的明智结合。


Recent speeches by the US presidential candidates show that debate about the first two questions has already begun.	美国总统候选人们的最新演讲表明，关于前两个问题的争论已经开始。


But the US ignores the third question at its peril.	但美国忽视了第三个问题，这是很危险的。


How can America bolster institutions, create networks, and establish policies for managing transnational issues?	美国如何支持机构、建立网络、制定管理跨国问题的政策？


Leadership by the most powerful country is important for the production of global public goods.	由最强大的国家领导，这对于全球公共品的生产十分重要。


Unfortunately, America’s domestic political gridlock often blocks this.	不幸的是，美国的国内政治僵局常常对此形成掣肘。


For example, the US Senate has failed to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite its being in America’s national interest – indeed, the US needs the convention to support its position on how to resolve competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.	比如，美国参议院不批准联合国海洋法公约，尽管这符合美国的国家利益——事实上，美国需要该公约支持其在解决南海主权主张争议中的立场。


Similarly, Congress failed to fulfill an American commitment to support the reallocation of voting power within the International Monetary Fund to emerging-market countries, though doing so would cost very little.	类似地，国会让美国无法兑现支持国际货币基金组织有利于新兴市场国家的投票权重新配置，尽管这样做代价很小。


This paved the way for China to launch its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which the US then mistakenly tried to block, at considerable cost to its reputation.)	这给中国铺平了道路，促使它发起了亚洲基础设施投资银行（而美国随后又错误地进行了阻挠，给自己的名誉造成了极大影响）。


And there is strong Congressional resistance to setting limits on carbon emissions in the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December.	国会还极力阻止为即将召开的12月巴黎联合国气候变化会议制定碳排放上限。


How much to spend on foreign affairs and how to intervene in distant crises are important questions.	在外交事务上花多少钱以及如何干预遥远的危机，这些都是重要问题。


But Americans should be equally concerned that their country’s “exceptionalism” is degenerating into “exemptionalism.”	但美国人必须同样关注美国“例外论”正在退化为“豁免论”。


How can the US maintain global leadership if other countries see Congress constantly blocking international cooperation?	如果其他国家认为美国国会总是阻挠国际合作，美国还如何保持全球领导力？


That debate has yet to begin.	这一争论还尚未开始。


Three Strikes Against the Drug War	毒品战争的三个方向


MEXICO CITY – The last two months have witnessed more far-reaching changes on the drug-policy scene in Latin America and the United States than in all previous decades combined.	墨西哥城—过去两个月以来，拉美和美国的毒品政策格局变化之巨超过了此前十年的总和。


Three fundamental shifts have occurred, each of which would be important on its own; taken together, they may be a game-changer that finally ends the hemisphere’s failed war on drugs.	毒品政策发生了三大根本性变化，每一大变化都有其重要性； 合在一起更是可能起到扭转西半球毒品战争格局的作用。


First and foremost were the referenda on marijuana legalization in the US states of Colorado and Washington on November 6.	首先也是最重要的变化时美国科罗拉多州和华盛顿州在11月6日的大麻合法化公投。


For the first time, voters in the country that is the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs in general, and marijuana in particular, approved propositions legalizing possession, production, and distribution of cannabis – and by relatively broad margins.	美国公民——世界最大非法药物使用群体，尤其是大麻——以绝对优势投票批准了规定拥有、生产和销售大麻行为合法的草案。


While a similar initiative failed in Oregon, and Proposition 19 (which called for limited legalization of cannabis) was defeated in California in 2010 (by seven percentage points), the outcome in Colorado and Washington sent a powerful message to the rest of the US.	尽管类似的草案在俄勒冈州没有通过，2010年加州也以7个百分点的多数拒绝了19号提案（Proposition 19，要求给予大麻有限的合法地位），但科罗拉多州和华盛顿州的结果向美国其他州传递了有力的信号。


The results have not only created a conflict between US federal law and state legislation, but also signal a shift in attitudes not dissimilar to that concerning same-sex marriage.	这一结果不但造成了美国联邦法律和州法律之间的冲突，也表明美国人民的态度变化，就像同性恋婚姻问题一样。


Just as important, however, was President Barack Obama’s reaction to the Colorado and Washington votes – both states that he won easily in his re-election bid.	但是，同样重要的是总统奥巴马对科罗拉多州和华盛顿州投票的反应——在总统连任竞选过程中，奥巴马在这两个州中轻松获胜。


The legal and political challenges implied are no minor matter: marijuana remains an illicit substance under US federal law and international conventions that America has adopted.	其中所隐含的法律和政治挑战也不是小问题：根据美国联邦法律和美国所参加的国际会议，大麻仍是非法药物。


On other issues – notably immigration – Obama rejects claims of states’ rights and insists on federal authority.	在其他问题上——特别是移民问题——奥巴马拒绝了将权力下放给州，坚持联邦权威。


Moreover, the topic remains highly sensitive: while public-opinion polls in 2012 indicate for the first time a small majority in favor of legalization, opponents remain vehement.	此外，这个话题仍是高度敏感的：尽管2012年的民调第一次显示微弱多数支持合法化，但反对声音仍然很激烈。


Nonetheless, in an interview on December 14, Obama made three path-breaking statements.	尽管如此，在12月14日的采访中，奥巴马提出了三条突破之道。


First, he said that enforcing federal marijuana legislation in Colorado and Washington was not a priority of his administration; he had “other fish to fry.”	首先，他表示在科罗拉多州和华盛顿州强推联邦大麻相关法律并不是其政府的当务之急； 他“另有要事”要先办。


Second, he reiterated his own opposition to legalization, but then added: “at this point.”	其次，他重申了个人对大麻合法化立法的反对，但强调是“现在”。


For the first time, a sitting US president hinted at a possible, perhaps even likely, change of future policy.	这是第一次有在任美国总统暗示也许会——甚至是可以——改变未来政策。


Finally, Obama advocated holding a “national conversation” on the question of state versus federal legislation on such issues.	最后，奥巴马号召召开一次“全国会议”讨论这些在这些事物上州法和联邦法冲突的问题。


The importance of these statements cannot be overestimated.	这些态度的重要性不言而喻。


The third change in recent months occurred in one of the world’s largest drug-supplying countries: Mexico, through which practically all of the illegal drugs shipped to the US – cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines – must pass.	最近几个月来的第三大变化发生在全球最大毒品供应国——墨西哥，几乎所有运往美国的非法药品，包括可卡因、海洛因、大麻和甲基苯丙胺等都要经过墨西哥。


On December 1, Enrique Peña Nieto succeeded Felipe Calderón as President.	12月1日，涅托继任卡尔德隆的总统之职。


As happens almost everywhere, the transition became a moment to scrutinize the outgoing government’s policies, even if the new administration does not intend to modify those policies in the short term.	和其他国家一样，权力的交接是考验政府政策延续性的时刻，即使新政府短期内并不打算修改政策。


Fortunately for Mexico, history seems to be judging Calderón’s “war on drugs” severely.	对墨西哥来说，幸运的是历史似乎在严厉清算卡尔德隆的“毒品战争”。


Indeed, The Washington Post reported in late November that internal government documents, made available to its Mexico City correspondent, showed that more than 25,000 people disappeared during Calderón’s six-year term, in addition to the roughly 60,000 deaths directly linked to the drug war.	事实上，《华盛顿邮报》11月下旬报道说，据该报记者看到的政府内部文档��示，在卡尔德隆的六年任期内，约有60 000人直接因为毒品战争丧命，另有25 000多人失踪。


The advocacy group Human Rights Watch wrote a public letter to the new president, asking what he intends to do about the thousands of missing Mexicans.	人权观察组织（Human Rights Watch）给新总统写了一封公开信，询问他将对成千上万失踪墨西哥人做些什么。


Then, in a series of leaks and explicit statements, the new government pointed out the previous policies’ high legal, bureaucratic, and financial costs, and that many more crimes of all types were committed, despite sharply higher spending on law enforcement and security.	接着，在一系列泄露和明确表述中，新政府指出，尽管用于执法和安全的支出增加了，但前任政府政策的法律、官僚和财政成本高昂，各种的犯罪活动都大大增多了。


In short, the most recent emblem of the traditional, internationally imposed drug-enforcement approach, based on punitive and prohibitionist policies, is turning out to be a catastrophic failure, costing Mexico dearly while producing no results for the country, the rest of Latin America, or the US.	简言之，基于惩戒政策的传统国际缉毒执法方式的最新尝试以失败告终，给墨西哥造成了昂贵的代价却没有在墨西哥、拉美其他国家和美国形成任何成果。


Consequently, the main advocates of this approach (Calderón, former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, the current and former presidents of Brazil, and America’s conservatives and security establishment) are losing public support.	因此，该方式的主要支持者（卡尔德隆、前哥伦比亚总统乌里韦、前任和现任巴西总统以及美国保守派和安全机构）正在失去公众支持。


Proponents of a different strategy (Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Otto Peréz Molina of Colombia and Guatemala, respectively, among others), based on public-health premises and legalization, are gaining ground.	以公共卫生和立法为手段的不同战略的支持者（哥伦比亚总统桑托斯、危地马拉总统莫利纳和其他人）正在赢得支持。


Uruguay is expected to approve legislation fully legalizing marijuana in January; the Organization of American States is scheduled to deliver a report to the region’s heads of state at mid-year on alternative drug-enforcement strategies and existing “best practices” in other countries.	据预计，1月份乌拉圭将批准给予大麻完全合法地位的立法； 美洲国家组织也将在年中举行地区国家首脑会议，讨论缉毒执法新方针和其他国家的现行“最佳实践”。


And more US states will most likely either approve full-fledged marijuana legalization or its medicinal use (18 states already allow it).	而越来越多的美国州也将批准大麻的完全合法地位或其合法药用用途（已有18个州通过了这项立法）。


A sea change in drug policy seems to be in the making.	毒品政策正在发生突变。


It will not occur overnight, or everywhere, or in regard to all drugs.	它不会一夜之间发生，也不会立刻遍地开花，也不会打击所有药物。


But, after decades of bloodshed, repression, and criminalization, things have begun to move in the right direction.	但是，在经历了几十年的流血、压迫和犯罪之后，形势终于开始向正确的方向发展。


It’s a pity it took so long.	只可惜付出代价的时间太长了。


Thrifty China, Spendthrift America	节俭的中国，挥霍的美国


The saving rate in China is the highest of any major country.	中国的储蓄率是所有大国里最高的。


China’s gross saving rate (the percentage of GDP that is not consumed immediately), which includes both public and private saving, is around 50%.	中国的国民储蓄率（未被立即消费掉的国内产值百分比），包括公共储蓄和私人储蓄在内，大约是50%。


By contrast, the saving rate in the United States is the lowest of any major country – roughly 10% of GDP.	恰恰相反，美国的储蓄率是所有大国里最低的¾只占国内产值的约10%。


Almost all other countries fall between these two extremes.	其他所有国家几乎都处在这两极之间。


Differences in saving rates matter a lot, and must be a major reason that China’s annual economic growth rate is now a full six percentage points higher than in the US.	储蓄率的差异至关重要，而且毫无疑问是目前中国年经济增长高于美国整整六个百分点的主要原因。


If people are saving half their income, their investments in capital have the potential to propel the economy at a rapid pace.	如果人们把一半收入都用来储蓄，那么他们的资金投入就能够推动经济的快速发展。


Saving in China is in part a virtuous circle: rapid economic growth leads to high saving, which in turn sustains rapid growth.	中国的储蓄在很大程度上是良性循环：快速的经济增长带来了高额储蓄，而高额储蓄反过来又支持了快速发展。


The difference between Chinese and US saving rates has been growing for decades.	中美储蓄率的差距几十年来一直在拉大。


In the early 1980’s, China’s saving rate was twice as high.	20世纪80年代初，中国的储蓄率是美国的两倍。


Now it is five times higher.	而现在却是美国的5倍。


Why are these trajectories so different?	为什么会有这么大的差异呢？


Unfortunately, explaining saving rates is not an exact science. Some patterns across countries are obvious.	令人遗憾的是，对储蓄率的研究并不是一门精确的科学。


Oil-rich countries tend to save a lot.	有些国家的模式较为明显。


Countries with serious internal crises or conflicts tend to save little.	产油国一般都乐于储蓄，而危机或内乱严重的国家则相反。


But neither of these patterns tells us anything about the difference between the US and China.	但这两种模式都解释不了中美之间存在的差异。


Some part of the high saving rates in China since the early 1980’s might be due to the decline in public confidence about health care, retirement benefits, and education, and a weakened sense of job security.	20世纪80年代初民众对医疗、养老、教育的信心下降，以及就业安全感的减退可能是导致储蓄率居高不下的部分原因。


However, the same factors seem to be working in the same direction for saving in the US, too.	但上述这些因素在美国也同样存在。


Engrained habits probably exlain more about China’s saving rate.	中国的高额储蓄也许更应归结为一种根深蒂固的习惯。


When incomes are growing rapidly, as they are in China, it is easier to save because people are not yet accustomed to a higher standard of living and do not mind terribly much maintaining a lower one for a while longer.	随着中国民众收入的快速增长，人们更容易想到储蓄，这是因为他们还没有习惯于更高的生活水准，对再多过几年苦日子也并不那么介意。


They also tolerate enterprise or government policies that encourage high saving.	他们也愿意容忍鼓励储蓄的国家政策。


For example, the uptrend in saving in China began at around the same time as its one-child policy was implemented in 1979. This prevented the birth rate from rebounding after the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76.	举例来说讲，几乎在1979年实行独生子女政策的同时，中国的储蓄也开始增长，储蓄的增长防止了在1966－1976年文化大革命后人口的大幅反弹。


The late Nobel laureate economist Franco Modigliani, in his last major published paper in 2004 (co-authored with Shi Larry Cao), argued that this demographic change explains much of the increase in the saving rate, as Chinese substituted investment in capital for investment in children.	已故诺贝尔奖得主，经济学家弗兰科·莫迪利安尼（FRANCO MODIGLIANI）在发表于2004年的最后一篇重要论文（与Shi Larry Cao 合著）中认为上述人口变化在很大程度上造成了储蓄率的上升，原因是子女投资代替资本投资成了中国民众最主要的投资手段。


But income growth and demographics do not explain everything.	但收入增长和人口变化也并非全部因素。


After all, the virtuous circle of high savings and rapid growth operates more strongly in China than in other developing countries where incomes are rising and birth rates are falling.	归根结底，尽管收入增长、生育率下降是中国和很多发展中国家的共同特色，但高储蓄快增长的良性循环在中国的发展势头远比其他发展中国家更为强劲。


This suggests that there are other, deeper factors that underlie the differences in Chinese and US saving rates – factors that reflect different life experiences and how these experiences are filtered through the two countries’ cultures.	事实说明中美储蓄率的巨大差异背后隐藏着其他的深层原因¾它们反映了两国民众迥异的生活经历，以及这些经历对两国文化不同的渗透作用。


For one thing, although the Chinese don’t elect their leaders, they trust their government more.	首先，尽管中国民众并不选举领袖，却对本国政府有着更深的信任。


According to recent World Values Surveys, 96.7% of Chinese expressed confidence in their government, compared to only 37.3% of Americans.	不久前的世界价值观念调查项目（World Values Surveys）显示，96. 7%的中国民众信任自己的政府，而美国的比率仅为37.


Likewise, 83.5% of Chinese thought their country is run for all the people, rather than for a few big interest groups, whereas only 36.7% of Americans thought the same of their country.	同样，83. 5%的中国民众认为国家由全民、而不是少数大的利益集团管理，而持这样想法的美国人仅占人口总数的36.


With this relatively higher trust, China’s government and enterprises are better able to enact and implement strict policies that promote saving and growth.	7%。 有了较高的信任度，中国政府和企业就能更好地推行严格的政策，促进储蓄和经济的发展。


Moreover, while economic inequality is on the rise in both countries, Chinese and Americans comprehend this very differently.	不仅如此，尽管经济上的不平等在两国都呈上升之势，中国民众和美国民众的理解却截然不同。


In the US, widely called “the land of opportunity,” the shame of being poor is unbearable, and there are no cultural resources to enable such people to maintain self-esteem, especially when the country is so successful overall.	在被人们普遍誉为“机遇之国”的美国，人们无法忍受贫困所带来的耻辱，特别是当整个国家取得巨大成功的时候，却没有任何一种文化能使贫困人口保留一点自尊。


As inequality deepens, many who fall behind struggle to save face, consuming in order to maintain the appearance of success.	随着不平等现象的加剧，很多人为了保住脸面而消费，竭力维持着表面的成功。


At the same time, those who rise from low economic status revel in their newfound wealth by engaging in spectacular displays of personal spending.	不仅如此，摆脱了窘困经济状况的暴发户尽情享受着刚刚得到的财富，他们的个人消费着实令人目瞪口呆。


By contrast, poor people in China mostly view their personal situation as transitional.	恰恰相反，中国的贫困人口大多把目前的境遇看作一种过渡状况。


People still remember the Cultural Revolution and view themselves as survivors of a shared traumatic experience, underpinning a commitment to collective sacrifice in order to rebuild the country.	文化大革命让人们记忆犹新，民众把自己看作这次共同劫难的幸存者，愿意为国家重建集体做出牺牲。


There is no shame in being poor in China if one reflects that one’s children or grandchildren will be wealthy and successful.	只要想到子女或者孙辈能够成功和富裕，中国人就不会为自己的贫困而感到耻辱。


On the contrary, as in postwar Germany, it is a matter of pride that one is working hard through a difficult situation that will later be remembered as a historic transition.	恰恰相反，就像战后的德国一样，人们把在艰苦的环境中努力奋斗看成一种骄傲，因为历史的转折正是在他们的手中诞生。


In the US, one’s income is a dark secret that one might not reveal even to one’s own spouse.	在美国，个人收入被看作绝对隐私，即使配偶也未必知情。


In China, people tell each other how much they earn with relative ease.	而在中国，人们可以较为轻松地谈及自己的收入状况。


Especially in Chinese villages, people know how their neighbors are faring.	特别是在中国农村，人人都清楚邻居的经济状况。


Conspicuous consumption becomes less important when people already know your income.	如果人们已经知道你的收入状况，为了炫耀而大肆消费就显得没那么重要了。


Of course, Chinese increasingly consume fancy new cars and designer clothes. But there is relatively less pleasure in public displays of consumption at a time when the prevailing national story is one of triumph over adversity.	勿庸置疑，中国民众对高级轿车和品牌时装的消费日趋增长，但当在逆境中乐观向上、奋发图强的氛围还占据主流的时候，在公众面前炫耀高消费的乐趣会大打折扣。


More vivid in people’s minds are the stories they will one day tell their grandchildren about their travails and their economic heroism.	人们想得更多的是有朝一日要对儿孙们讲述当年的艰苦奋斗和在经济领域中的英雄故事。


China will most likely be saving more than the US for years to come.	中国储蓄超过美国的状况可能还要持续很多年。


But, as the next generation takes control in China, this will change.	但随着下一代接管对国家的控制，这种状况将会发生改变。


Today’s children will not view their own life stories from the perspective of the difficulties China has experienced.	今天的孩子不会让国家曾经的困难影响自己的生活态度。


As this change unfolds, the enormous willingness to save, and to tolerate high-saving government policies, will fade.	随着变化的出现，储蓄和容忍高储蓄政策的巨大意愿将会逐渐减退。


Tibet’s Peace of the Grave	西藏的坟墓和平


PRAGUE – The recent events in Tibet and adjoining provinces are causes for deep concern.	布拉格amp#45;amp#45;西藏及其临近省份最近的事态令人极为担忧。


Indeed, the dispersal of a peaceful protest march organized by Tibetan monks, which led to a wave of unrest that was brutally suppressed by the Chinese military and police, has caused indignation all over the democratic world.	确实，驱散西藏僧侣组织的和平抗议游行导致了动荡浪潮。 中国军队和警察残酷镇压让民主世界愤怒不已。


The reaction of the Chinese authorities to the Tibetan protests evokes echoes of the totalitarian practices that many of us remember from the days before communism in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989: harsh censorship of the domestic media, blackouts of reporting by foreign media from China, refusal of visas to foreign journalists, and blaming the unrest on the “Dalai Lama’s conspiratorial clique” and other unspecified dark forces supposedly manipulated from abroad.	中国当局对西藏抗议的反应让我们想起了1989年共产主义在中欧和东欧垮台之前的专制主义做法，也就是对国内媒体严厉审查，关闭外国媒体从中国的报导，拒绝向外国记者发放签证并且把动乱指责在“达赖喇嘛集团”和其他被指称受到外国操纵的没有具名的黑暗实力。


Indeed, the language used by some Chinese government representatives and the official Chinese media is a reminder of the worst of times during the Stalinist and Maoist eras.	实际上，中国政府某些代表和中国官方媒体使用的语言让人回忆起斯大林和毛泽东时代最为黑暗的时期。


But the most dangerous development of this unfortunate situation is the current attempt to seal off Tibet from the rest of the world.	但是这一不幸局面最为危险的进展就是当前企图把西藏从世界其他地方隔绝起来。


Even as we write, it is clear that China’s rulers are trying to reassure the world that peace, quiet, and “harmony” have again prevailed in Tibet.	即使在我们写这篇文章的时候，很明显中国的统治者正在试图让世界安心，那就是和平、安静和“和谐”已经再次回到了西藏。


We all know this kind of peace from what has happened in the past in Burma, Cuba, Belarus, and a few other countries – it is called the peace of the graveyard.	我们都知道这种过去缅甸、古巴、白俄罗斯以及其他几个国家的和平情况。 这是坟墓的和平。


Merely urging the Chinese government to exercise the “utmost restraint” in dealing with the Tibetan people, as governments around the world are doing, is far too weak a response.	正如各国政府目前所做的那样仅仅是敦促中国政府在处理西藏人民的时候保持“最大程度的克制”是极为软弱的反应，无济于事。


The international community, beginning with the United Nations and followed by the European Union, ASEAN, and other international organizations, as well as individual countries, should use every means possible to step up pressure on the Chinese government to	国际社会从联合国开始到欧盟、东盟以及其他国际组织同时各个国家应该使用所有可能的手段对中国政府施加压力以达到如下目的：


allow foreign media, as well as international fact-finding missions, into Tibet and adjoining provinces in order to enable objective investigations of what has been happening; release all those who only peacefully exercised their internationally guaranteed human rights, and guarantee that no one is subjected to torture and unfair trials; enter into a meaningful dialogue with the representatives of the Tibetan people.	允许外国媒体以及国际事实调查团进入西藏和临近省份来对发生的事件进行客观的调查； 释放所有以和平方式行使受到国际保证的人权的人，并且保证不对任何人实行酷刑和不公的审判；


Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the International Olympic Committee should seriously reconsider whether holding this summer’s Olympic Games in a country that includes a peaceful graveyard remains a good idea.	与西藏人民的代表进行有意义的对话。     除非这些条件得到满足，否则，国际奥委会应该认真考虑在一个包含和平墓地的国家举行奥运会是否还是可行。


Tiger Mothers or Elephant Mothers?	虎妈还是象妈？


MELBOURNE – Many years ago, my wife and I were driving somewhere with our three young daughters in the back, when one of them suddenly asked: “Would you rather that we were clever or that we were happy?”	发自墨尔本——许多年前，当我和太太开车载着三个年幼的女儿出行时，其中一个突然问了一句：“爸爸妈妈你们是希望我们聪明一点呢，还是快乐一点呢？ ”


I was reminded of that moment last month when I read Amy Chua’s Wall Street Journal article, “Why Chinese Mothers Are Superior,” which sparked more than 4,000 comments on wsj.com and over 100,000 comments on Facebook.	这一幕在上月我读到蔡美儿（Amy Chua）在华尔街日报上发表的文章《中国妈妈为何更卓越》时又浮现在了脑海。


The article was a promotional piece for Chua’s book, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother, which has become an instant bestseller.	这篇为她的新书《虎妈战歌》做宣传的文章一经发表就掀起了轩然大波，读者在华尔街日报网站上发表了4000多篇评论，Facebook上的回帖更是高达10万。 而该书也立刻跻身于畅销书之列。


Chua’s thesis is that, when compared to Americans, Chinese children tend to be successful because they have “tiger mothers,” whereas Western mothers are pussycats, or worse.	按照蔡美儿的理论，中国孩子之所以比美国孩子更成功，是因为他们背后都有一位“虎妈”，而西方母亲相比之下只能算是小猫，甚至什么都不是。


Chua’s daughters, Sophia and Louise, were never allowed to watch television, play computer games, sleep over at a friend’s home, or be in a school play. They had to spend hours every day practicing the piano or violin.	蔡美儿从不允许她的两个女儿索菲亚和路易斯看电视，打游戏，在同学家过夜或者参与学校活动，而是让她们每日苦练钢琴或小提琴。


They were expected to be the top student in every subject except gym and drama.	而这都是为了能让她们在除体操和戏剧之外的所有科目中名列前茅。


Chinese mothers, according to Chua, believe that children, once they get past the toddler stage, need to be told, in no uncertain terms, when they have not met the high standards their parents expect of them.	蔡美儿指出，中国妈妈相信孩子一旦度过了学步阶段就该受到父母的严格要求，稍有懈怠就应直截了当地提出批评。


(Chua says that she knows Korean, Indian, Jamaican, Irish, and Ghanaian mothers who are “Chinese” in their approach, as well as some ethnic-Chinese mothers who are not.)	（她还认识一些采取同样做法的韩国、印度、牙买加，爱尔兰和加纳妈妈，而有些华裔母亲则不以为然）。


Their egos should be strong enough to take it.	对此孩子也应当有足够的自我承受能力去满足这些要求。


But Chua, a professor at Yale Law School (as is her husband), lives in a culture in which a child’s self-esteem is considered so fragile that children’s sports teams give “Most Valuable Player” awards to every member. So it is not surprising that many Americans react with horror to her style of parenting.	但与丈夫同为耶鲁大学法学教授的蔡美儿却生活在美国社会里，那里的人们认为孩子的自尊心极端脆弱，甚至为了不伤害这些幼小的心灵，球队会给每一个队员都颁发“最有价值球员”奖章，也无怪乎许多美国人对她那套方法如此深恶痛绝了。


One problem in assessing the tiger-mothering approach is that we can’t separate its impact from that of the genes that the parents pass on to their children.	评估虎妈理论的其中一个问题就是我们无法将这个手段与父母传给儿女的基因分割开来。


If you want your children to be at the top of their class, it helps if you and your partner have the brains to become professors at elite universities.	如果你希望自己的孩子是优等生，而你们夫妇俩又是顶尖学府教授的话，那么这种方式确实大有裨益。


No matter how hard a tiger mom pushes, not every student can finish first (unless, of course, we make everyone “top of the class”).	除此之外就算虎妈如何严格管教，也不是每一个孩子都能成为班上头名的（除非把每个学生都选为“全班第一”）。


Tiger parenting aims at getting children to make the most of what abilities they have, and so seems to lean towards the “clever” side of the “clever or happy” choice.	虎妈式管教的目的在于挖掘出孩子的最大潜能，因此也似乎偏向于“聪明/快乐”选项的“聪明”一侧。


That’s also the view of Betty Ming Liu, who blogged in response to Chua’s article: “Parents like Amy Chua are the reason why Asian-Americans like me are in therapy.”	而这也是撰写博客回应蔡美儿文章的Betty Ming Liu的观点：“蔡美儿式的家长就是我这样的华裔美国人接受心理治疗的原因”。


Stanley Sue, a professor of psychology at the University of California, Davis, has studied suicide, which is particularly common among Asian-American women (in other ethnic groups, more males commit suicide than females).	美国加州大学戴维斯分校的心理学教授司徒永振（Stanley Sue）研究了亚裔美国妇女中尤其多发的自杀行为（其他族裔中男性自杀数目高于女性）。


He believes that family pressure is a significant factor.	他认为家庭压力是其中一个非常重要的因素。


Chua would reply that reaching a high level of achievement brings great satisfaction, and that the only way to do it is through hard work.	对此蔡美儿可以回应说要取得极高的成就自然需要更多的牺牲，而实现这一点的唯一方法就是苦练。


Perhaps, but can’t children be encouraged to do things because they are intrinsically worthwhile, rather than because of fear of parental disapproval?	这或许有她的道理，但孩子们难道就不能被鼓励去做一些本身就有价值的事情，而只能在被父母批评的恐惧中被迫行事？


I agree with Chua to this extent: a reluctance to tell a child what to do can go too far.	我同意蔡美儿的一个观点：不愿告诉孩子该干什么的做法是会犯错误的。


One of my daughters, who now has children of her own, tells me amazing stories about her friends’ parenting styles. One of them let her daughter drop out of three different kindergartens, because she didn’t want to go to them.	我的其中一个女儿如今已是几个孩子的妈妈，也跟我说了几件令人惊讶的育儿见闻：她某个朋友的女儿接连换了3个幼儿园，仅仅是因为孩子不喜欢去。


Another couple believes in “self-directed learning” to such an extent that one evening they went to bed at 11 p.m., leaving their five-year-old watching her ninth straight hour of Barbie videos.	另外一对夫妇则相信“自主学习”，以致他们自己晚上11点上床休息，留下5岁的女儿连续看了9个小时的芭比娃娃电视。


Tiger mothering might seem to be a useful counterbalance to such permissiveness, but both extremes leave something out.	或许虎妈式管教是对上述放任纵容的有效平衡，但这两种极端做法都会产生副作用。


Chua’s focus is unrelentingly on solitary activities in the home, with no encouragement of group activities, or of concern for others, either in school or in the wider community.	蔡美儿的焦点全部固定在家中的独自练习，不鼓励参加任何集体活动或者其他活动，不管是学校还是社区范围内的。


Thus, she appears to view school plays as a waste of time that could be better spent studying or practicing music.	她似乎认为学校活动就是浪费时间，不如花时间去学习或者练琴。


But to take part in a school play is to contribute to a community good.	但参加学校戏剧表演这类的活动其实是在为集体利益做贡献。


If talented children stay away, the quality of the production will suffer, to the detriment of the others who take part (and of the audience that will watch it).	如果好苗子都跑掉了，那么活动的质量自会下降，不但对剩下的参与者没有好处，连观众都索然无味。


And all children whose parents bar them from such activities miss the opportunity to develop social skills that are just as important and rewarding – and just as demanding to master – as those that monopolize Chua’s attention.	反过来那些被家长禁止参加此类活动的孩子则会失去发展社交技能的机会——而这种技能是极为重要且有价值的，只能去练习那些蔡美儿认为有用的东西。


We should aim for our children to be good people, and to live ethical lives that manifest concern for others as well as for themselves.	我们应当将自己的孩子塑造成一个道德高尚的好人，既关注自身也不忘关心他人。


This approach to child-rearing is not unrelated to happiness: there is abundant evidence that those who are generous and kind are more content with their lives than those who are not.	这种培养孩子的方式并非与快乐无关：大量的证据显示那些慷慨友善的人对自己的生活更加满意。


But it is also an important goal in its own right.	同时这也是一个非常重要的培养目标。


Tigers lead solitary lives, except for mothers with their cubs.	自然界的老虎独来独往，那些带着幼兽的雌虎尤其如此。


We, by contrast, are social animals.	但我们人类则是大象一类的社会动物。


So are elephants, and elephant mothers do not focus only on the well-being of their own offspring. Together, they protect and take care of all the young in their herd, running a kind of daycare center.	母象不仅关心自己的后代，还一同保护和照顾的象群中的所有小象，俨然是在操办一个幼儿园。


If we all think only of our own interests, we are headed for collective disaster – just look at what we are doing to our planet’s climate.	如果每个人都只盯着自己的利益，那我们就将面临集体性危机——看看当今应对全球气候问题时的乱象就知道了。


When it comes to raising our children, we need fewer tigers and more elephants.	可见在养育孩子的问题上，我们需要少一点虎妈，多一点象妈。


Time for a Carbon Tax	碳税正当时


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last few decades, oil prices have fluctuated widely – ranging from $10 to $140 a barrel – posing a challenge to producers and consumers alike.	发自华盛顿特区——在过去的几十年间，油价的大幅波动——高的时候140美元/桶，低的时候不过10美元——对生产者和消费者都构成了挑战。


For policymakers, however, these fluctuations present an opportunity to advance the key global objectives – reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals adopted last September and the climate agreement reached in Paris in December – of mitigating climate change and building a more sustainable economy.	然而对政策制定者来说，这些波动提供了一个机会——这在去年9月通过的可持续发展目标以及12月在巴黎达成的气候协议上有所体现——去实现延缓气候变化和建设更可持续的经济的全球核心政策目标。


Recent oil-price fluctuations resemble the classic cobweb model of microeconomic theory.	近期石油价格的波动类似于微观经济理论中的经典蛛网模型。


High prices spur increased investment in oil.	高油价会刺激石油投资。


But, given long lags between exploration and exploitation, by the time the new output capacity actually comes on stream, substitution has already taken place, and demand often no longer justifies the available supply.	但是由于勘探和开采之间的间隔较长，在新产能实际投产的时候其他产品的替代效应已经发生，而需求往往也无法证明现有供给量的合理性。


At that point, prices fall, and exploration and investment decline as well, including for oil substitutes.	在这个节点上油价开始回落，对此的勘探和投资，包括石油替代品的产量也随之下降。


When new shortages develop, prices begin rising again, and the cycle repeats.	一旦重新出现短缺，价格开始再度上涨，如此循环往复。


The cycle will continue, though other factors – such as the steadily declining costs of renewable energy and the shift toward less energy-intensive production processes – mean that it will probably spin within a lower range.	这一周期依然会持续存在，虽然其他因素——例如可再生能源成本的不断下降以及向低能源密集度生产流程的转变——意味着它可能会较窄范围内运行。


In any case, a price increase is inevitable.	在任何情况下，价格上涨都是必然的。


Against this background, today’s very low prices – below $35 a barrel at times since the beginning of this year – create a golden opportunity (which one of the authors has been recommending for over a year) to implement a variable carbon tax.	在此背景下，当前的超低油价——自今年年初以来的35美元/桶以下——就带来了一个千载难逢的机会（本栏目其中一位作者已经提出超过一年多了）去实施可变的碳税。


The idea is simple: The tax would decrease gradually as oil prices rise, and then increase again when prices eventually come back down.	这个理念很简单：该税率会随着油价上升而逐渐降低，然后随着油价最终回落而上调。


If the adjustments are asymmetric – larger increases when prices fall, and smaller decreases when prices rise – this system would gradually raise the overall carbon tax, even as it follows a counter-cyclical pattern.	如果调整是不对称的——在油价下跌时升幅更大，油价上升时削减较少——即便遵循一个反周期的模式，该系统将逐步提高碳税的整体水平。


Such an incremental increase is what most models for controlling climate change call for.	这种逐步性的提升也是大多数气候变化控制模型的要求。


Consider this scenario. Imagine that in December 2014, policymakers introduced a tax of $100 per metric ton of carbon (equivalent to a $27 tax on CO2).	我们可以假设一下：试想在2014年12月，决策者推出每吨100美元的碳税（相当于二氧化碳一公吨征税27美元）。


For American consumers, the immediate impact of this new tax – assuming its costs were passed fully onto consumers – would have been a $0.24 increase in the average national price of a gallon of gasoline, from $2.23 to $2.47, still far below the highs of 2007 and 2008.	对于美国消费者来说，这一新税的直接影响——假设其费用完全转嫁给消费者——将是在全国每一加仑汽油的平均价格上提价24美分，从2. 23美元变为2.


If, since then, each $5 increase in the oil price brought a $30 per ton decrease in the carbon tax, and each $5 decline brought a $45-per-ton increase, the result would be a $0.91 difference between the standard market price and the actual tax-inclusive consumer price last month [see figure].	如果从那时起，油价每上涨5美元意味着碳税将每吨降低30美元，每5美元的油价下跌引发碳税每吨增加45美元，其结果必然是标准市场价格和上月实际含税居民消费价格之间相差0. 91美元[如附图]。


That increase would have raised the carbon price substantially, providing governments with revenue – reaching $375 per ton of carbon today – to apply to meeting fiscal priorities, all while cushioning the fall in gasoline prices caused by the steep decline in the price of crude.	这一增长将会大幅度提高碳价格，并为政府提供收入——估计当前为每吨碳375美元——去应付财政上的各项优先事务，同时还能减缓了原油价格急降所引发的汽油价格下降。


While $375 per ton is a very high price, reflecting the particularly low price of oil today, even a lower carbon price – in the range of $150-250 per ton – would be sufficient to meet international climate goals over the next decade.	虽然每吨375美元是一个非常高的价格，反映了当前石油的极低价格，但即使是较低的碳价——每吨150~250美元的范围——都将足以满足未来十年的国际气候目标。


With this approach, policymakers could use the market to help propel their economies away from dependence on fossil fuels, redistributing producer surplus (profits) from oil producers to the treasuries of importing countries, without placing too large or sudden a burden on consumers.	通过这种方法，政策制定者可以利用市场来帮助推动本国经济摆脱对化石燃料的依赖，让盈余（利润）从石油生产国那里重新回归进口国的国库，同时不至于大幅或突然加重消费者的负担。


In fact, by stabilizing user costs, it would offer significant gains.	事实上，通过稳定用户的使用成本，它将产生显著的收益。


The key to this strategy’s political feasibility is to launch it while prices are very low.	这一战略在政治上的可行性在于关键要在油价极低的时候推出。


Once it is in place, it will become a little-noticed, politically uncontroversial part of pricing for gasoline (and other products) – one that produces far-reaching benefits.	一旦实施，它将成为为汽油（及其他产品）定价的一个不太引人注意的，政治上无争议的部分——也是一个将产生深远益处的部分。


Some of the revenue could be returned to the public in the form of tax cuts or research support.	一些收入还可能通过减税或研究支持的形式返还给公众。


Despite the obvious benefits of a variable carbon tax, no country has capitalized on today’s low oil prices to raise carbon prices in this or a similar form, though US President Barack Obama’s call for a tax on oil suggests that he recognizes the opening low prices represent.	尽管变量碳税拥有明显的好处，却没有一个国家利用当前的低油价来利用上文提到的或类似的形式去提高碳价格，虽然美国总统奥巴马呼吁的石油税表明他认识到了低油价所代表的机遇。


This should change.	这种情况需要改变。


The opportunity to implement a policy that is simultaneously sensible, flexible, gentle, and effective in advancing national and global goals does not arise very often.	一项在推进国家和全球目标上兼具明智，灵活，温和，有效的政策机会是不会经常出现的。


Policymakers must seize it when it does. The time for a variable stabilizing carbon tax is now.	决策者们必须在这个机会出现时尽快抓住，同时也是时候出台一项变动的稳定性碳税了。


Time for America to Turn South	到美国关注南美洲的时候了


Whatever John Kerry does about Latin America if he is elected President of the United States in November, the election could initiate a sea-change in US-Latin American relations - even or perhaps mainly if George W. Bush is reelected.	如果约翰·克里在今年11月份的选举中当选为美国总统，不管他会对拉丁美洲做什么，选举本身可能会开始改变美国和拉丁美洲的关系--即使很可能布什会当选。


Kerry has never shown much interest in the region, while Bush has largely ignored it since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.	克里从来没有对拉丁美洲这个地区表现出多大兴趣，而布什在911恐怖袭击事件之后更是完全忽略了这一地区。


But the unlikely nature of a shift in relations does not make it any less necessary.	但是，这种不自然的转变并没有使美国和拉丁美洲之间关系的重要性有任何减少。


The need for change in America's policy toward the rest of the hemisphere is two-fold.	美国对另一半球的政策需要改变有两个原因。


First, never in recent times has anti-American sentiment run so strong and deep in Latin America.	首先，拉丁美洲最近一段时间来的反美情绪前所未有的强烈。


Poll after poll shows that Latins feel more negatively about the US than at any time since the 1960's.	民意调查不断显示，拉丁美洲人比60年代以来的任何时候都要对美国持否定态度。


In contrast to that era, popular hostility is not really motivated by US actions in or toward Latin America; but today's anti-Americanism still complicates life greatly for democratic leaders in the hemisphere, and for America itself.	和那个年代形成对照的是，人们的敌意并不是因为美国在拉丁美洲的行为或针对拉丁美洲的行为而导致的。 今天的反美情绪使拉丁美洲国家那些追求民主的领导们的生活变得很复杂，美国的领导也同样如此。


Second, and more importantly, the substantive issues of conflict on the US-Latin American agenda are heating up.	第二，也是更重要的，美国-拉丁美洲冲突议程上的大量问题正在热化。


They will not go away by themselves, and failure to address them will probably only make them worse.	这些问题不会自己消失，而如果不解决这些问题，很可能只会使它们更加恶化。


The list of problems facing Latin America is long, but the salient themes are easily distinguishable.	拉丁美洲目前面临的问题很多，但一些最显著的问题很容易被区分开来。


First and foremost is economic growth, which for the past few years - indeed, for the past two decades - has been dismal.	第一也是最重要的是经济增长。 在过去几年里--应该说在过去20年里--拉丁美洲的经济增长十分低落。


In countries where trade and investment is concentrated in ties with the US, this is a central issue in the bilateral relationship.	在那些贸易和投资项目与美国紧密相连的国家里，经济增长是双边关系的中心议题。


At this stage, we know that free-trade agreements are useful, but are not silver bullets.	在这个问题上，我们知道自由贸易协定非常重要，但不是银色子弹。


The US has a much larger role to play than simply promoting trade liberalization in the region.	美国有比推动拉丁美洲地区的贸易自由更多的任务。


The US must help these countries build up their infrastructure, educational and legal systems, competitiveness, and transparency.	美国必须帮助这些国家增加基础设施建设，建立教育和司法体系，竞争机制，以及增加透明度。


In all these areas, a pro-active policy of American support is crucial.	在所有这些国家，一个美国支持的主动政策非常重要。


Why should the US bother?	为什么美国应该这么做呢？


Why should it care whether Latin American countries closely linked to it by trade, investment, tourism, and retirees do better or worse, grow or stagnate, become more competitive or lose ground globally?	为什么美国应该关心与它紧密相连的拉丁美洲国家的贸易、投资、旅游业、 以及退休人员现在是更好还是更糟，是发展还是停滞，变得更有竞争力还是在全球失去了地位？


There are many reasons for the US to pay greater attention to Latin America, but three stand out.	美国有很多理由应该更关注拉丁美洲，其中有三个理由最突出。


First, and perhaps least self-evident, is energy.	首先，也许是最不需要多说的，是能源。


Countries like Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia supply up to 40% of US oil imports, and could easily replace unstable suppliers in the Middle East.	墨西哥、委内瑞拉和哥伦比亚等国提供给美国的石油占到美国石油进口的近40%，能够很容易取代很不稳定的石油供应地区中东。


Second, America has a strong security interest in the region.	其次，美国很关心拉丁美洲地区的安全。


Access to the US from many countries in Latin America is much easier than from Europe or Asia, owing to the volume of traffic, the number of flights, the comparative laxity of exit controls, and the porousness of borders.	从拉丁美洲国家抵达美国要比从欧洲或亚洲抵达美国容易得多。 这得"感谢"拉丁美洲的运输量、航班数量、相对松弛的出关控制以及不够严密的边境。


If the US, as its leaders clearly believe, will be threatened for years to come by terrorist groups, the latter will inevitably conclude, as millions have done before, that the easiest way into the US is through Latin America.	如果美国如它的领导们深信的，会多年受到恐怖组织的威胁，那么后者将会不可避免地推断并决定--如上百万人以前做的那样--最容易进入美国的途径是通过拉丁美洲。


Cooperation on security matters is desirable for America, and indispensable for the countries of the region.	在安全事务上进行合作是美国渴望的，也是拉丁美洲国家所需要的。


The consequences of a new terrorist outrage originating from any nation south of the US-Mexican border would be devastating for that country, let alone for the victims of such an attack.	因为发生在美墨边境南部任何一个国家内的恐怖暴行都将毁坏那个国家，更不用说这样一个侵袭会造成多少人伤亡了。


But the most significant issue coming to the fore in hemispheric relations is immigration.	但是，在美国和拉丁美洲的关系中最重要的问题还在于移民问题。


Traditionally a Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean matter, it has now reached Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and beyond.	以往这个问题只牵扯到墨西哥，中美洲，和加勒比地区，现在已经扩展到了巴西、哥伦比亚、委内瑞拉、厄瓜多尔以及更远的地方。


Every flight from Sao Paulo to Mexico City carries dozens of low-income Brazilians, who have already paid their pollero , or "people-smuggler," to route them on from the Mexican capital to the northern border.	从圣保罗到墨西哥城的每一个航班都要运送几十个低收入的巴西人，这些巴西人早已经支付了"人头走私费"，以把他们从墨西哥首都运至北部边境。


The New York Times recently published an exceptional description of Ecuadorian polleros transporting their human cargo to the coasts of Guatemala and then onward through Mexico to the US.	纽约时报最近就报道了一起厄瓜多尔人头走私犯运送他们的人头货船到危地马拉海岸，然后通过墨西哥进入美国的事例。


Colombian displaced persons and Venezuela's middle class are fleeing to Miami.	哥伦比亚人开始转移，委内瑞拉的中产阶级逃到了迈阿密。


Most dramatically, more Mexicans than ever before are risking their lives and paying up to $3,000 to enter the "promised land."	最戏剧性的是，墨西哥人的生命比以往更处于危险之中，他们开始支付近3000美金，以便居住在"安全地带"。


Last year, I visited the main jumping-off point on the US-Mexican border: El Sasabe on the Sonora-Arizona border.	去年，我参观了美墨边境上一个主要的边防点--索诺拉-阿里桑那（Sonora-Arizona）边境上的El Sasabe。


In the month of May, before the summer's searing and deadly heat, local authorities estimated a daily average of 1,000 migrants attempting to cross.	当地政府估计在酷暑来临之前的五月份，这里平均每天有1000人试图偷越边境。


Another visit this year generated a new estimate: from 1,500 to 1,800 crossings every day.	今年我又参观了这个地方，试图偷越边境的人数估计已经增加到了每天1500至1800人。


America cannot stem this tide by closing its borders; but it can regulate the tide by legalizing and humanizing it, and by helping to create conditions in Latin America where life-threatening emigration is not the only way out.	美国不能用关闭边境的做法来阻止这个趋势，但美国可以通过一种合法又合情的手段、通过帮助拉丁美洲创造条件来控制这种趋势。 因为在拉丁美洲，冒着生命危险去移民不是唯一的出路。


A first-term Kerry administration or a second-term Bush presidency must make this a high foreign policy priority.	克里的第一任期或布什总统的第二任期都必须将这作为其外交政策的重点。


All of these issues are crucial to the US: jobs, immigration, security, energy.	所有这些问题对美国来说都至关重要：工作、移民、安全、能源。


But Latin America is deeply troubled; it needs decisive, bold leadership at home and imaginative, unwavering support abroad.	但拉丁美洲却深受困扰。 它在国内需要决定性的、大胆的领导层，在国外需要富有想象的、坚定的支持者。


Bush or Kerry - both can deliver the foreign support. It is in America's interest that they do.	布什或克里都能够给予这种外交支持，而且这种支持对美国也有利。


Time for China to Float	人民币升值的时期到了


China is being pressured to halt its interventions to prop up the US dollar in world currency markets, with opponents emphasizing how much harm the policy is causing to other countries.	中国正在受到停止在世界货币市场内支撑美元的干涉政策的压力，其反对者强调这样的政策正在给其他国家造成多大的伤害。


But China’s authorities might respond more favorably to an argument that points out how China’s own economic health might benefit from abandoning the current exchange-rate policy, which pegs the yuan to the dollar.	但是对于另外一种指出放弃当前把人民币与美元固定的汇率政策对中国自身的经济状况可能带来多少好处的看法，中国政府可能会做出更加积极的反应。


Such an argument is not difficult to make.	这样的看法不难理解。


China is currently pursuing a contradictory set of policies that paradoxically undermines its own economy while propping up America’s by accommodating pump-priming by the Federal Reserve.	中国目前正在实行一种自相矛盾的政策，在损害自身经济的同时通过适应联邦储蓄的泵水政策支撑美国的经济。


China and Hong Kong are the largest net purchasers of US Treasury securities.	中国和香港是美国国库证券最大的净购者。


Otherwise, Treasury bond yields would be far higher, thwarting monetary expansion by the Fed.	否则，国库债券收益率将比现在高得多，从而阻碍联邦储备的货币扩张。


Back in China, the dollar peg has led to large and growing foreign-exchange reserves, which are fueling domestic inflationary pressures and causing public-sector debt to balloon.	在中国国内，盯住美元的做法带来了大量的且仍在增长的外汇储备，从而刺激国内通货膨胀的压力，造成公共部门负债激增。


This is because official capital controls oblige exporters to deposit hard currencies with the People’s Bank of China in exchange for freshly printed yuan (usually as bank deposits) or government debt.	这是因为官方的资金控制强迫出口商将硬通货存入中国人民银行，兑换成新近印制的人民币（通常是作为银行存款）或政府债券。


Both arrangements will eventually become untenable, because they will generate either an intolerable rate of inflation or an unsustainable burden of public-sector debt.	这两种做法最终都将无以为继，因为这两种做法要不是产生无法忍受的通胀率，要不就会造成无法承受的公共部门债务负担。


These are high prices for China to pay to maintain its current policies, including the pegged exchange rate.	这就是中国维持包括固定汇率在内的当前政策所要付出的高额代价。


There is a great deal of volatility in foreign-exchange markets across the globe, mainly owing to the weakening of the dollar.	全球的外汇市场瞬息万变，主要是因为美元的疲软。


As such, China and other countries are holding a depreciating asset that should be managed to serve domestic interests rather than those of the US.	中国和其他国家手里握着的是一笔不断贬值的财产。 这笔财产应该用来实现本国的利益，而不是美国的利益。


Chinese policymakers should bear in mind that the value of the yuan is only one among many factors that affects the competitiveness of China’s economy.	中国的决策者们应该记住，人民币的价值只是众多影响中国经济竞争力的因素之一。


After all, a currency can appreciate while an economy is sluggish, or depreciate despite robust growth.	毕竟，货币可能在经济萧条时增值，也可能在经济健康增长时贬值。


As it is, the valuation of a country’s currency is not so much determined by the performance of its economy as by the forces of supply and demand on foreign-exchange markets.	其实，一个国家货币的价值与其说是由该国的经济状况决定的，还不如说是由外汇市场上的供求关系决定的。


For a given supply of money, an increase in the production of goods will increase the value of a currency, because each unit will buy more goods.	货币供应量固定，商品生产增加，则货币价值上升，因为单位货币能买到的商品更多。


Likewise, increasing the supply of money relative to a fixed amount of output will lead to a decline in the purchasing power of money, as each currency unit buys fewer goods.	同样，在产出固定的情况下增加货币供应会导致货币购买力下降，因为单位货币能买到的商品减少。


So it is nonsense to declare that China’s currency is currently undervalued.	因此，宣称中国的货币目前受到低估的说法是毫无道理的。


We can only know that once all economic players have the opportunity to decide freely on where they wish to place their financial assets.	只有在所有的经济参与者均有机会自由决定把财产放到什么地方时我们才可能知道中国的货币是否被低估。


Given the high rate of growth in China’s money supply, there could be considerable pressures for the yuan to actually depreciate, because a rate of monetary growth that exceeds the growth rate of economic activity tends to cause a currency’s exchange rate to fall.	考虑到中国货币供应的高速增长，实际上人民币贬值的压力非常大，因为货币增长速度超过经济活动增长速度通常会导致货币的货率下降。


If exchange rates were fixed but capital could move freely, capital flight from the country would generate pressures to end loose monetary policies.	如果汇率固定但资金可以自由流动，那么资金从该国外逃就会产生终止松散货币政策的压力。


The debate over how to value the yuan is at the heart of the two-year struggle by the country’s policymakers to slow down China’s overheating economy.	关于如何评估人民币价值的争论是该国政策制定者们两年来为缓解中国经济过热所作努力的核心。 对这个问题，一种回答是中国人民银行将一年期利率从5.


One response was the decision by the People’s Bank of China to increase the one-year interest rate from 5.31% to 5.58%– its first rate hike in over nine years – in an effort to curb fixed-investment growth, staunch increasing prices, and offset a worrying decline in savings.	31%调高到5. 58%的决定--该行九年多来首次调高利率--以限制固定投资的增长、遏止物价的上扬、挽回令人担忧的储蓄下降。


But such an insignificant rate hike will do little to relieve long-term pressures, because investors will expect more rate hikes and move money into China, increasing upward pressure on the yuan’s exchange rate.	但是这样小幅度地调高利率对缓解长期压力没有什么用处，因为投资者会期望见到更多调高利率的举动，把资金转入中国，从而增加人民币汇率的上升压力。


Indeed, the logic is self-fulfilling: as more foreign currency flows into the market, the economy will continue to overheat, necessitating further interest rate hikes.	的确，这里边的逻辑是不证自明的：随着更多的外汇流入这个市场，经济将继续过热，从而使进一步调高利率成为必然。


Meanwhile, the dollar’s falling value reflects the fact that the Fed is pumping more money into the system than are most of its trading partners.	同时，美元的贬值反映了这样一个事实，即美联储投入的货币比它的大多数贸易伙伴都多。


So, the dollar will continue to weaken until the rate of increase in new money into the US economy no longer exceeds that of domestic economic growth and corresponds to the pace of monetary expansion followed by central banks in the rest of the world.	因此，美元将继续疲软，直到美国经济中新货币的增加速度不再高于国内经济增长的速度，而与世界上其他央行的货币扩张速度相应。


China’s effort to hold down the value of the yuan vis-à-vis the dollar is thus a costly and pointless policy.	由此可见，中国抑制人民币相对于美元的价值的政策是费力不讨好的。


By delaying a decision to float the yuan, the authorities are merely contributing to greater instability in the Chinese economy.	中国政府迟迟不肯决定升值人民币，只会给中国经济带来进一步的不稳定。


Time for Debt Reduction in Greece	减少希腊债务正当时


WASHINGTON, DC – Once again, Greece is at an inflection point.	华盛顿—希腊再一次站在了拐点。


With its cash balances severely stressed, it seems unlikely to be able to pay the cascading debt payments that are falling due over the next few months.	其陷阱余额严重告急，看似已无望能够支付未来几个月内到期的一连串债务。


So yet another round of contentious and protracted discussions with its creditors is underway – one that may well produce yet another short-term solution.	因此它正在与债权人进行新一轮充满争吵、旷日持久的讨论——最后的结果极有可能又是一个短期解决方案。


Yet kicking the can down the road is hardly the negotiators’ only option.	但拖延并非谈判者的唯一选择。


Indeed, it is the wrong approach.	事实上，这也是错误的方针。


When facing severe payment problems, a country has five basic maneuvers at its disposal.	在面临严重的偿付问题时，一国有五个基本选择可用。


It can, first, draw down the monetary reserves and wealth it has built up during better times and, second, borrow externally to meet payments falling due in the short term.	首先，它可以消耗好光景时积累的货币储备和财富； 其次，它可以从外部借贷满足短期内到期的偿付。


Third, it can simultaneously or subsequently implement domestic austerity measures (such as higher taxes or spending cuts) that free up resources to make debt payments.	第三，它可以同时或随后实施国内紧缩措施（如提高税收或降低支出），以释放资源偿还债务。


Fourth, a cash-strapped country can also implement strategies to spur economic growth, thereby generating incremental income that can then be used for part of the payments.	第四，囿于现金的国家还可以实施经济增长刺激战略，从而产生可用于部分偿付债务的增量收入。


And, if none of this works, it can pursue a fifth option: allow market forces to implement the bulk of the adjustment, whether through very large movements in prices (including the exchange rate) or by forcing a default.	而如果所有这些都不管用，它可以追求第五选择：让市场力量施加大部分调整，不管是通过价格（包括汇率）大幅波动还是通过被迫违约。


Most economists agree on the ideal mix and sequencing of such maneuvers.	大部分经济学家对这些措施的理想组合和顺序都有一致意见。


A so-called “beautiful de-leveraging” entails a combination of internal reforms, financing, and judicious use of the market pricing mechanism.	所谓的“美丽的去杠杆”包括综合使用内部改革、融资和批判性地使用市场定价机制。


But what looks good in theory has proved difficult to implement in practice.	但漂亮的理论在实践中难以实施。


For one thing, politicians are more likely to continue increasing their countries’ reliance on financing, thereby heightening the risk of disorderly market adjustments, than they are to implement difficult structural reforms and fiscal adjustments.	一方面，政客更多可能继续加重国家队融资的依赖，从而突显无序市场调整的风险； 更少可能实施困难的结构改革和财政调整。


For this reason, many countries have endured painful disruptions that have aggravated possibly avoidable falls in output, caused unemployment to surge, and, in the worst cases, eroded potential growth.	出于这一原因，许多国家经历了痛苦的破坏期，它们放大了可能可以避免的产出下降、导致失业激增，在最糟糕的情况下，还破坏了潜在增长。


In any case, if a country is already too deeply indebted, it may find that no amount of realistic adjustment and financing is enough – the curse of what economists call the “debt overhang.”	无论如何，如果一国已经过度负债，那么可能发现无论多少实际调整和融资都不足够——这个诅咒被经济学家称为“债务积压”。


Under these circumstances, reliance on austerity to free up internal resources to service the debt chokes off economic growth.	在这样的环境下，依靠紧缩释放内部资源偿还债务会遏制经济增长。


And pro-growth supply-side reforms cannot yield results fast enough to offset this impact.	而促增长的供给侧改革无法以足够快的速度产生收益抵消这一影响。


External creditors, for their part, balk at the prospect of providing the financing the country needs to get back on track, with those that provided financing earlier often unwilling to accept losses.	至于外部债权人，他们对为该国提供重回正轨所需的融资的前景犹豫不决，早先提供融资的债权人常常不愿接受损失。


This leaves only one real option: a disorderly market adjustment.	这就只剩下一个现实选择：无序的市场调整。


Because such an adjustment is not much more appealing for creditors than it is for debtors, both parties engage in time-consuming rounds of “extend and pretend” negotiations, in the hope that some magical solution will emerge.	这种调整对于债权人的吸引力并不比债务人大多少，债权人和债务人都将卷入旷日持久的多轮“延期和假装”谈判，希望某种魔法会自动浮现。


Of course it doesn’t.	当然了，魔法不会出现。


On the contrary, during the time they waste, the debt grows heavier, not only weakening the debtor’s short-term prospects, but also discouraging inflows of new capital and investments that are critical to future growth.	相反，在他们所浪费掉的时间里，债务会进一步增加，不但削弱债务人的短期前景，还将阻止对于未来增长至关重要的新资本和投资的流入。


That, in a nutshell, is the story of Greece.	这就是希腊情况的概括。


By avoiding decisive action to address the debt overhang, the country and its creditors have contributed to a situation that is disappointing for everyone.	希腊没有采取果断措施解决债务积压，对于其令人失望的状况，它和它的债权人都负有责任。


Greece’s European partners have nothing substantive to show for the billions of euros they have lent the country.	希腊的欧洲伙伴国借给希腊数十亿欧元，这没有什么实质作用。


The International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, which have gone along with the extend-and-pretend approach, have placed their credibility at risk.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）和欧洲央行都采取了延期和假装方针，这是在拿信誉冒险。


But the biggest losers have been Greek citizens, who suffered through one of history’s most severe austerity programs but still cannot see light at the end of the tunnel.	但最大的输家是希腊公民，他们蒙受历史上最严重紧缩计划之一所带来的痛苦，至今仍未看到希望之光。


Indeed, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio today is considerably higher than it was when its austerity efforts began.	事实上，如今希腊债务-GDP比率显著高于紧缩措施开始时。


And youth and long-term unemployment have remained at extremely high levels for an alarmingly long time.	青年和长期失业在畸高水平上已经保持了令人警觉的很长一段时间。


Greece’s dismal growth performance over the last eight years contrasts sharply with the performance of the other eurozone members that faced crippling payment pressures.	过去八年希腊糟糕的增长表现与其他面临沉重偿付压力的欧元区成员国形成了鲜明对比。


Not having fallen as hard as Greece, Ireland and Portugal have bounced back to positive growth.	爱尔兰和葡萄牙都没有跌得像希腊那样惨，已经恢复正增长。


Even Cyprus has performed better, avoiding economic collapse and recapturing growth in the last two years, whereas Greece relapsed into recession.	即使是塞浦路斯表现也比希腊强，它在过去两年中避免了经济崩溃并恢复增长，而希腊却陷入了衰退。


The Greek economy’s performance also looks weak relative to that of Iceland, a country that, lacking the external support that Greece received, endured a vicious market adjustment.	希腊经济的表现也比冰岛相对更弱。 冰岛没有获得希腊所获得的外部支持，它经历了恶性市场调整。


While it faced a broadly similar economic contraction for a couple of years, growth has recovered robustly, and now far outpaces that of Greece.	尽管它在好几年的时间里面临大体相同的经济萎缩局面，但增长已经强劲恢复，现已超越希腊。


As Greece and its creditors (now mainly sovereign lenders and multilateral institutions) deliberate about how to address the country’s looming cash crunch, they should recognize these differences and learn from the mistakes of their past approach.	在希腊及其债权人（现在主要是主权贷款人和多边机构）思考如何解决即将到来的现金危机时，它们应该认识到这些区别，并从过去的方针的错误中汲取教训。


The longer they deny reality, the greater the damage will be – and the more it will cost to repair it.	它们越是否认现实，伤害就将越大——修复伤害的代价也越昂贵。


Kicking the can down the road is politically easier than reaching comprehensive and lasting solutions.	拖延在政治上比达成全面持续方案更加容易。


But it seldom works.	但拖延很少奏效。


Greece can overcome its economic troubles only if it modifies its approach.	希腊唯有改变方针才能克服经济困境。


Specifically, Greece and its creditors must agree to a credible debt-reduction program that would support the domestic reforms needed to re-invigorate Greece’s growth engines and place its internal obligations in line with its capabilities.	具体而言，希腊及其债权人必须在一套可信的减债计划上达成一致，该计划要支持重启希腊增长引擎、使其内部债务与其能力相符所需要的国内改革。


Such an approach, which is already favored by the IMF, would boost Greece’s future growth prospects considerably.	这一方针（IMF已经支持该方针）将大幅提振希腊未来增长前景。


If clear economic logic somehow does not provide sufficient motivation for Greece’s European partners to support debt reduction, surely Greece’s frontline role in Europe’s historic refugee crisis does.	如果明确的经济学逻辑不能为希腊的欧洲伙伴国提供足够的动机支持减债，那么希腊在欧洲的历史性难民危机中的前沿国地位应该足够提供动机。


After eight long years, it is time to give Greece the help it needs, in the form of a proper growth-oriented round of debt reduction.	在长长八年之后，应该给予希腊它所需要的帮助了——以合适的增长导向减债计划的形式。


It’s Time to Ban the Bomb	禁止核弹正当时


STOCKHOLM – The nuclear agreement between Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, and the EU, comes at a historically propitious moment.	斯托克霍姆—伊朗、联合国安理会五大常任理事国加德国以及欧盟之间的核协议在一个非常恰当的历史时刻达成了。


Seventy years ago next month, the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened the darkest chapter in the long history of humanity’s wartime horrors.	七十年前的下个月，在广岛和长崎落下的两颗核弹开启了人类战争恐怖的漫长历史的最黑暗的一章。


Fire, bullets, and bayonets were now joined by nuclear radiation – a silent, invisible killer like gas and biological agents.	现在，在火焰、子弹和刺刀之外又加上了核辐射——一个和毒气和生物武器一样的听不见看不着的杀手。


After World War I, the international community adopted the so-called Gas Protocol, to prohibit the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.	一战后，国际社会实施了所谓的《毒气协议》（Gas Protocol），禁止使用化学武器和生物武器。


Likewise, the demand to ban any use of nuclear weapons has been strong and persistent since the end of World War II.	类似地，禁止以任何方式使用核武器的需求自二战结束以来强烈而持久。


But the states possessing nuclear weapons have always opposed such a ban, arguing that it would not be credible.	但拥有核武器的国家总是反对这一禁令，指出它不可信。


Instead, they have recommended a step-by-step approach, eventually leading to a ban on the possession and production of nuclear weapons.	相反，它们建议采取逐步推进的方针，最终实现禁止拥有和生产核武器。


After all, the same approach brought about today’s strict limits on biological and chemical weapons.	毕竟，今天对生物和化学武器的严格限制也是通过同样的方针实现的。


Yet 70 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the gradualist approach has clearly failed.	但在广岛和长期70年后，这一渐进方针显然已经失败了。


During the Cold War, the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide climbed to more than 50,000.	冷战期间，全世界核武器总数量攀升至50,000以上。


Many, including hydrogen bombs, had explosive yields that were orders of magnitude higher than the bombs dropped on Japan.	其中许多（包括氢弹）的爆炸当量比日本所接受的炸弹高出数个数量级。


Some measures were agreed to reduce the nuclear danger: bilateral arms-control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, restrictions on the testing of new weapons, and – above all – the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	人们同意采取一切措施降低核威胁：美国和苏联的双边军备控制协议、限制新武器测试； 以及——最重要的——核不扩散条约。


The aim of the NPT, signed in 1968, is the universal elimination of nuclear weapons: non-nuclear-weapon states commit not to acquire them, and the five states that officially possess them (the US, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) commit to disarmament negotiations.	1968年签署的核不扩散条约的目标是彻底消除核武器：无核武器国家承诺不尝试获得核武器，而已经正式拥有核武器的五个国家（美国、英国、法国、中国和俄罗斯）承诺进行裁军谈判。


But the overall threat has never diminished much.	但总威胁并没有下降多少。


To be sure, the first part of the NPT has had some success: Since the treaty entered into force, only four states – India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan – have developed nuclear weapons.	诚然，核不扩散条约的第一部分取得了一些成功：自条约生效以来，只有四个国家——印度、以色列、朝鲜和巴基斯坦——开发出了核武器。


South Africa eliminated its nuclear weapons and became a party to the NPT, while Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan transferred their nuclear arsenals to Russia.	南非毁掉了核武器加入核不扩散条约，而乌克兰、白俄罗斯、和哈萨克斯坦将核武库移交给俄罗斯。


Two states – Iraq and Libya – were stopped from developing nuclear weapons, and now Iran, a party to the treaty, has committed to abide by important restrictions on its nuclear program.	两个国家——伊拉克和利比亚——“被”停止开发核武器，而如今的伊朗（它也是条约的签约国）承诺遵守对其核项目的重要限制。


And yet the commitment of the five nuclear-weapon states to disarm has had very limited results.	但五大有核国家的裁军承诺成果极为有限。


Nuclear stockpiles were reduced – mainly for economic reasons – following the Cold War, to less than 20,000 nuclear weapons worldwide (still enough to destroy humanity several times over).	冷战后，核武器库存有所减少（主要是出于经济原因），目前全世界还有不到20,000核武器（仍足以将全人类毁灭好几次）。


And the 2010 New START agreement brought welcome upper limits to the number of nuclear weapons deployed by the US and Russia.	而2010年的新削减战略核武器条约带来了值得欢迎的内容：给美国和俄罗斯的核武器部署量规定了上限。


But no serious disarmament negotiations have been pursued since.	但此后再无重要的裁军谈判。


Moreover, it was once hoped that NATO’s small number of non-strategic nuclear weapons sited in Europe could be withdrawn to the US, as they were widely considered militarily useless.	此外，曾经人们希望北约部署在欧洲、被广泛认为没有什么军事用途的为数不多的非战略性核武器可以撤回美国。


Doing so, it was suggested, could lead Russia to remove its own tactical nuclear weapons.	人们认为，这样做可以促使俄罗斯也撤掉它的战术核武器。


Neither action has been taken.	但这两件事都没有发生。


Likewise, the hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted in 1996, would become binding has not been realized.	类似地，人们希望1996年实施的全面禁止核试验条约（CTBT）将成为有约束力的条约，但这一愿望没有实现。


A moratorium on such tests exists, and an impressive monitoring machinery has been created, able to register not only weapons tests, but also earthquakes and tsunamis.	延期核试验有之，令人印象深刻的监督机制也建立起来，不但能够标定核试验，还能标定地震和海啸。


Yet, because eight countries, including the US and China, have failed to ratify it, the CTBT occupies a legal netherworld: it may be said to be in operation, but not in force.	但是，由于包括美国和中国在内的八国没有签署全面禁止核试验条约，该条约只是可有可无的法律：可以说它执行了，但没什么效力。


Rather than nuclear disarmament, the world is witnessing an upgrading – and, in some cases, expansion – of nuclear arsenals.	人们没有看到核裁军，倒是看到了核武库的升级——有时甚至是扩大。


There is little hope of any change for the better unless the Security Council’s permanent members conclude that their own security requires resuming détente among themselves and launching serious disarmament negotiations, as promised.	除非安理会常任理事国认为，为了它们自身的安全必须彼此达成妥协并如承诺的那样开启严肃的裁军谈判，否则看不到多少改善的希望。


They have shown their willingness to act to restrain other states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; now it is time for them to restrain themselves.	它们已经表现出愿意遏制其他国家获得大规模杀伤性武器，现在，它们应该遏制它们自己了。


Of course, just as some states refuse to join the conventions that ban cluster bombs and landmines, the nuclear-weapon states will not join a convention banning their arsenals.	当然，正如有的国家拒绝加入禁止集束炸弹和地雷的国际公约，有核国家也不会加入禁止它们的核武库的公约。


Yet the existence of such a treaty could serve as a constant reminder of what is expected of them.	但这样一个条约的存在可以作为永久的提醒，让它们知道人们的期望。


For that reason alone, it should become an international priority.	仅仅出于这一理由，就应该让这一条约成为国际当务之急。


During the Cold War, many people feared that mankind might commit suicide abruptly, by waging a nuclear war.	冷战期间，很多人担心人类会突然自杀——发动一场核战争。


Today, more people may worry that humanity will suffer a more prolonged death through global warming.	如今，也许更多的人担心的是人类将在全球变暖中慢慢死去。


But the nuclear peril is still there, and groups like Global Zero deserve our support in their efforts to raise public awareness.	但核风险仍然存在，全球零点（Global Zero）等组织理应因为提醒公共意识的努力而得到支持。


It has been said that Hiroshima and Nagasaki created a taboo against any further use of nuclear weapons.	有人说广岛和长崎给我们树立了进一步使用核武器的禁忌。


Let us hope so, but let us also demand that the taboo be made legally binding.	但愿如此，但我们仍必须要求让这一禁忌具有法律约束力。


Time to Bring Mahatma Gandhi Back	是将圣雄甘地请回来的时候了


NEW YORK – The Congress Party’s unexpected landslide in India’s general election was greeted with euphoria.	纽约——国大党在印度大选中出人意料地获得压倒性胜利，舆论普遍的持欢迎态度。


Many believe that Congress – with its commitment to secular values, economic growth, and helping the poor – now has a mandate to transform India into a great power.	很多人相信，国大党秉承了务实的价值观，采取有利于经济发展和帮助穷人的政策，如果这样走下去，印度就会变成一个伟大的国家。


Business and financial interests, in particular, are delighted with the outcome, crowing about the bonanza about to be unleashed as Congress liberalizes India’s economy further.	印度的商界金融界人士尤其感到欣慰，他们认为随着经济自由化的不断深入，国大党为他们打开了发财之门。


The Americans are happy that India’s pesky left, reduced to a paltry 24 seats, has been all but eliminated from national government.	美国人也有高兴的理由，麻烦不断的印度左派已经被完全清除出了现任政府，议会中的席位也缩减到了可怜的24席。


India’s Communists had tried to topple the Congress-led government last year in an attempt to scuttle the nuclear deal brokered by the United States, and had vowed to upend it.	去年，印度共产党试图杯葛国大党提议的美印核协议，结果没能得逞，现在他们又誓言要报复。


As for the threat from the right, anyone hoping for peace in the region and reduced tensions within India between religious communities is relieved by the defeat of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).	由于印度人民普遍希望地区和平和宗教和解，这样一来，代表印度教的人民党的失败也不足为奇了。 对国大党来说，来自右派势力的威胁也已解除。


The BJP’s strategy of painting the Congress as soft on terror and demonizing Muslims as an existential threat to India badly misfired.	人民党把国大党描述成在对待恐怖分子问题上立场上软弱，将穆斯林妖魔化，看来，他们的目的最终也没有达到达成。


Unfortunately, however, the economic trajectory that Congress is plotting, though it may well boost growth in the short term, is ultimately on a collision course with both equity and sustainability.	不幸地是，国大党领导的经济改革轨道也许会在短期内振兴经济，但最终的后果会导致社会的不稳定和贫富的不均。


Despite rhetoric about “inclusive growth,” India’s wealth gap has widened during the years of exceptionally rapid economic expansion.	虽然他们宣传的口号是“共同富裕”，但印度的贫富差距不断拉大是不争的事实。 特别是在近几年经济高速发展的阶段。


The majority of the world’s malnourished children live in India.	目前，印度拥有世界上最多的营养不良的孩子。


While private wealth management is a growth industry among India’s 200,000 or so nouveaux riches , 800 million Indians live on less than $2 per day.	在20万印度财富新贵享受着私人理财服务同时，8亿印度人却过着每天不到2美元的生活。


India’s water supply is stretched to the limit, even as global warming is fast melting the Himalayan glaciers on which millions depend for water.	尽管由于全球气候的变暖，导致喜马拉雅冰川的快速融化，但如今印度的可利用水资源也濒临枯竭。


Moreover, climate change threatens to reduce agricultural output by up to 40% by 2080, when India will have another 450 million people.	更为严重的是，到2080年，随着全球气候的变化，印度农业的产量将减少40%。 而到那时，还将有4亿5千万新增人口的出现。


At that point, the consultancy McKinsey & Company projects India’s middle-class consumer market will have hit 600 million people, twice the size of the current US population.	根据麦肯锡咨询公司的预测，印度的中产阶级人数将达到6亿，是当今美国人口的两倍。


That’s exciting news to retailers looking for new markets.	这对零售商来说应该是一个好消息。


But what about India’s other billion people?	但印度另外10亿人该怎么办呢？


And where will the resources come from to manufacture all the stuff these new consumers will buy?	为了满足新增用户的购买需求，到哪里去找那么多的资源呢？


The die was cast for India’s development path on July 22, 1947, when India’s Constituent Assembly resolved to replace Mahatma Gandhi’s spinning wheel, or charka , with the emperor Ashoka’s wheel of dharma on the Indian national flag. The move symbolically rejected what the incoming government abandoned upon assuming office: Gandhi’s vision of an equitable and sustainable agrarian society based on self-sufficient, pared-down consumption.	1947年7月22日对印度的发展来说是重要的一天，当时的国民代表大会决定把阿育王时代的达摩法轮放在国旗上，以取代圣雄甘地的转轮，即轻纺车，这是一个重要的信号，它标志着政府放弃了圣雄甘地一直倡导的理念：公平，持续性的农耕社会，自给自足，节制欲望的消费模式。


For Gandhi, the spinning wheel symbolized the need to assume personal responsibility for consumption as a first step toward achieving justice and freedom for all.	对甘地来说，转轮象征着个体对消费的负责任行为，这也是实现全民公平自由的前提条件。


But Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, believed in industrialization and urbanization, famously calling the new mega-dam projects his government underwrote the “temples of modern India.”	而印度第一任总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁则不以为然，他秉承着工业化和城市化的理念，他有一句著名的话，就是将政府正在进行的巨大工程称为“印度现代化的神殿”。


In his famous speech on India’s “tryst with destiny,” Nehru promised Indians that his government would seek to “bring freedom and opportunity to the common man, to the peasants and workers of India; to fight and end poverty and ignorance and disease;… to ensure justice and fullness of life to every man and woman.”	在他一次名为“和命运有约”著名的演讲中，尼赫鲁承诺他领导的政府将寻求“给普通人带来自由和机会，为印度的工农大众消除贫困，愚昧和疾病的困扰。 。


For 63 years, the vast majority of India’s people have waited for this promise to be fulfilled.	给每一位公民都带来正义和完美的生活。 ”时间已经过去了63年，绝大多数的印度人还在等待这个美好承诺的实现。


As Congress retakes power, it is Rahul Gandhi, the 39-year-old great-grandson of the man who made that promise, who is the heir-apparent to current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.	当国大党重新掌握政权之后，圣雄甘地的曾孙，39岁的拉乌尔·甘地将是现任总理曼莫汉·辛格的接班人选。


Observers expect the young Gandhi to become prime minister within two years.	观察人士认为，这位年轻的甘地将在2年内接任总理之职。


The essential challenge before him and his country is not transitioning from a more to a less state-directed economic system, as many of those cheering Congress’s electoral victory believe. While bureaucratic excess, entrenched corruption, and other inefficiencies beg remedy, the real challenge before India is its allegiance to a twentieth-century vision of modernity.	很多国大党的支持者认为，目前印度面临根本的问题在于，如何从国有经济向市场经济的转型，如何改革目前臃肿的官僚机构，消除腐败的顽疾和其他影响效率的行为，印度面临的真正挑战在于，如何坚定地实现对21世纪现代化目标的追求。


Former Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram has said that his dream is to see 85% of Indians living in cities and only 15%, as opposed to the current 60%, engaged in agriculture, because to be an agrarian society in the modern era is to be poor and powerless.	印度前财政部长帕拉尼亚潘•齐丹巴拉姆曾说，他的梦想是85%的印度人居住在城市里，剩余的15%人口从事农业。 在现代社会观点看来，农村是贫穷和落后的象征。


To be “developed” means to be industrialized and urbanized.	目前印度有60%的人口居住在农村。 如此看来，“发展”就意味着“工业化和城市化”。


But, for better or worse, we are no longer in the modern era.	不论怎么说，我们现在都不生活在一个现代社会中。


The post-modern realities of our grave present make a mockery of modernity.	我们所生活的后现代的社会现实就是对现代化一种无情的嘲弄。


When asked what he thought about Western civilization, Gandhi famously replied, “It would be a good idea.”	当被问及如何看待西方文明时，甘地答复如下：“这当然是一件好事。


He also said that “Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s need, but not every man’s greed.”	”他同是补充说：“地球只能给每个人提供了必要的需求，并不能满足他们的贪婪。


For Gandhi, greed led to violence, violence to militarism, militarism to war, and war to annihilation.	”在甘地看来，贪婪导致暴力，暴力导致黩武，黩武导致战争，战争就意味着毁灭。


His philosophy of non-violence was aimed at the most basic form of human aggression: the appetite for more than one’s share.	为了解决人类的侵略性，他的非暴力主义的哲学就是：约束自身的欲望。


India’s essential challenge is to take up Gandhi’s mantle and boldly imagine a future that is different from the West’s present.	印度目前的挑战是，如何重新继承甘地的衣钵，和目前的西方走一条完全不同的发展道路。


Of course, no one is under the illusion that India or any other country will abandon its cities for a life as simple as the one Gandhi strove to live; but that doesn’t mean that India can’t look to Gandhi’s core values for inspiration.	当然没有人让印度放弃城市的生活，毕竟，甘地生活的时代已经一去不复返。 但这并不表明我们不能继承甘地思想的核心价值。


Rahul Gandhi bears the name, if not the lineage, of the Mahatma (to whom he is not related).	拉乌尔•甘地不仅仅是一个代号，他应该是圣雄甘地的延续。


If India is lucky, when he assumes leadership of the Congress Party he will let himself be as inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s vision for India as by that of his great-grandfather.	如果印度有幸，在他曾祖父圣雄甘地的精神鼓舞下，他将获得国大党的领导权。


After all, it was out of their complicated marriage of ideas that independent India was born. Nehru’s vision has had a good run; now it is time to bring back Gandhi’s.	不管怎么说，有关印度独立运动的概念过于复杂，尼赫鲁的理想已经得到很好的实施，现在是将甘地的理念请回来的时候了。


Starving the Squid	饿死吸血鬼


BERKELEY – Is America’s financial sector slowly draining the lifeblood from its real economy?	伯克利—美国金融部门在慢慢地吸干美国实体经济的生命之血吗？


The journalist Matt Taibbi’s memorable description in 2009 of Goldman Sachs – “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money” – still resonates, and for good reason.	记者泰比（Matt Taibbi）2009年对高盛的描述令人难忘：“披着人皮的吸血鬼，无情地把吸血管插入任何飘着金钱味道的东西中。 ”至今，有充分的理由认为这段话仍然适用。


Back in 2011, I noted that finance and insurance in the United States accounted for 2.8% of GDP in 1950 compared to 8.4% of GDP three years after the worst financial crisis in almost 80 years.	回到2011年，我注意到美国的金融和保险占GDP的比重在1950年为2. 8%，而在近80年来最悲惨的金融危机过去三年后，这一比重为8.


“[I]f the US were getting good value from the extra…$750 billion diverted annually from paying people who make directly useful goods and provide directly useful services, it would be obvious in the statistics.”	4%。 “[若]美国为每年支付给直接生产有用商品和直接提供有用服务的人的钱中抠出来的额外的……7500亿美元创造了很好的价值，那么肯定会突出地显示在统计数字中。


Such a massive diversion of resources “away from goods and services directly useful this year,” I argued, “is a good bargain only if it boosts overall annual economic growth by 0.3% – or 6% per 25-year generation.”	资源“从有直接用途的当年商品和服务上”如此大规模的“转移”，我指出，“只有在它能提振年度总体经济增长0. 3%以上，或在25年时间里提振6%，它才是划算的买卖。


In other words, it is a good bargain only if it collectively has a substantial amount of what financiers call “alpha.”	”换句话说，只有在它整体而言具有相当大的金融业者所谓的“阿尔法”时，这才是一笔划算的买卖。


That had not happened, so I asked why so much financial skill and enterprise had not yielded “obvious economic dividends.”	这一幕并没有发生，因此我要问，为何如此多的金融技能和进取心没有产生“显而易见的经济红利”。


The reason, I proposed, was that “[t]here are two sustainable ways to make money in finance: find people with risks that need to be carried and match them with people with unused risk-bearing capacity, or find people with such risks and match them with people who are clueless but who have money.”	我认为，原因在于“金融业有两种可持续的方法可以创造金钱：找到一个有风险需要被承担的人，然后给他匹配一个有风险承担余力的人； 或者找到一个有这类风险的人，然后给他匹配一个人傻钱多的家伙。


Over the past year and a half, in the wake of Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef’s estimate that 2% of US GDP has been wasted in the pointless hypertrophy of the financial sector, evidence that America’s financial system is less a device for efficiently sharing risk and more a device for separating rich people from their money – a Las Vegas without the glitz – has mounted.	过去一年半中，菲利庞（Thomas Philippon）和雷谢夫（Ariell Reshef）估算美国GDP有2%被浪费在金融部门毫无意义的臃肿之中，此后，有如山积的证据表明美国金融体系与其说是有效分担风险的装置，不如说是将富人的钱隔离起来的装置——就像是不为人知的拉斯维加斯。


This is not a partisan view.	这不是屁股决定脑袋。


Bruce Bartlett, a senior official in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, recently pointed to research showing the sharp rise in the financialization of the US economy.	里根和老布什政府高级官员巴雷特（Bruce Bartlett）最近提到，研究表明，美国经济正在显著金融化。


He then cited empirical work suggesting that financial deepening is useful only in the early stages of economic development, evidence of a negative correlation between financial deepening and real investment, and the withering conclusion of Adair Turner, Britain’s former top financial regulator: “There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in the rich developed world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability.”	接着，他援引了证明金融深化只在经济发展的早期阶段有用的实证研究、关于金融深化和实体投资之间存在负相关的证据，以及前英国金融监管高层特纳（Adair Turner）的尖锐结论：“没有明确证据表明过去二三十年中发达国家金融体系规模和复杂程度的增加推动了增长和稳定。 ”


Four years ago, during the 2008-9 crisis, I was largely ambivalent about financialization.	四年前，在2008—2009年危机期间，我对金融化持有相当矛盾的看法。


It seemed to me that, yes, our modern sophisticated financial systems had created enormous macroeconomic risks.	对我来说，是的，我们的成熟的现代金融体系创造了数不清的宏观经济风险。


But it also seemed to me that a world short of risk-bearing capacity needed virtually anything that induced people to commit their money to long-term risky investments.	但我也认为，缺少风险承受能力的世界需要一切诱导人们将钱投入长期风险投资的机制。


In other words, such a world needed either the reality or the illusion that finance could, as John Maynard Keynes put it, “defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future.”	换句话说，这样一个世界需要一种现实或者幻觉——金融能像凯恩斯所说的那样“击败困扰着我们的未来的时间和无知的黑暗力量。


Most reforms that would guard against macroeconomic risk would also limit the ability of finance to persuade people to commit to long-term risky investments, and hence further lower the supply of finance willing to assume such undertakings.	”大部分预防宏观经济风险的改革也会限制金融说服人们进行长期风险投资的能力，从而进一步减少了愿意这样做的金融供给。


But events and economic research since the crisis have demonstrated three things.	但危机以来的事件和经济研究说明了三点。


First, modern finance is simply too politically powerful for legislatures or regulators to restrain its ability to create systemic macroeconomic risk.	首先，现代金融在政治上太强大，以至于立法者和监管者无法约束其制造系统性宏观经济风险的能力。


At the same time, it has not preserved its ability to entice customers with promises of safe, sophisticated money management.	与此同时，它丝毫不掩盖其用安全复杂的资金管理许诺引诱���户的能力。


Second, the correlations between economic growth and financial deepening on which I relied do indeed vanish when countries’ financial systems move beyond banks, electronic funds transfer, and bond markets to more sophisticated instruments.	其次，我所依赖的经济增长和金融深化之间的相关性在国家金融体系超越银行、电子转账和债券市场范畴、包括了复杂工具时确实消失了。


Finally, the social returns from investment in finance as the industry of the future have largely disappeared over the past generation.	最后，金融投资作为未来产业的社会回报在过去25年中基本消失了。


A back-of-the-envelope calculation of mine in 2007 suggested that the world paid financial institutions roughly $800 billion every year for mergers and acquisitions that yielded about $170 billion of real economic value.	2007年，我经过简单的计算就能得出，世界每年要付给金融机构大约8000亿美元用于并购，而这些并购活动只能产生1700亿美元的实际经济价值。


That rather poor cost-benefit ratio does not appear to be improving.	这一可怜的投入产出比并没有改善迹象。


Back in 2011, I should have read Keynes’s General Theory a little further, to where he suggests that “when the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”	回到2011年，我应该把凯恩斯的《通论》读得更透彻些，意识到他指出“当一国的资本发展沦为赌场活动的副产品时，那么肯定就有问题了。


At that point, it is time either for creative thinking about how funding can be channeled to the real economy in a way that bypasses modern finance, with its large negative alpha, or to risk being sucked dry.	”照此看，现在要么应该提出关于融资如何能绕过现代金融（及其负阿尔法值）疏通到实体经济的创造性思路，要么风险已经消失殆尽了。


Time to Get Back to Business on Doha	重返多哈


The suspension of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks since July is deeply disappointing.	世界贸易组织（WTO）多哈回合谈判自七月份以来的中断令人深感失望。


While the rhetoric of commitment to the round remains, in practice there has been a surrender to defensive lobbies clinging to the status quo.	虽然谈判中关于承诺的高谈阔论还让人记忆犹新，而实际上去却是谈判对现实情况下无所不在的防御性游说的妥协。


But the status quo is unacceptable.	但现实情况是不可接受的。


In agriculture, it protects the world’s rich farmers by stifling opportunity for the poor, at a cost of some $280 billion a year to taxpayers and consumers.	在农业方面，它以每年让纳税人和消费者付出2800亿美元的代价来扼杀穷人的机会，从而保护世界上富有的农场主。


In manufacturing, it deters poor countries from moving up the value chain as tariffs on their exports increase with the degree of processing.	在制造业方面，它为穷国提升自己在价值链上的地位设置重重障碍，因为出口关税随着加工程度的提高而提高。


Barriers among developing countries are also especially high, impeding rapid growth in trade between them.	发展中国家之间的关税壁垒也特别高，妨碍了贸易的快速增长。


In services, trade barriers stand in the way of improved quality and efficiency, slowing the growth of a sector that could make a huge contribution to competitiveness and employment.	在服务业方面，贸易壁垒阻碍了质量和效益的提升，减缓了这个本可以对竞争力和就业做出巨大贡献的产业部门的增长。


Delaying the conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations carries costs and risks for the entire world economy, rich and poor countries alike.	推迟结束多哈回合谈判会给整个世界经济带来成本和风险，对富国和穷国同样都有影响。


First, the delay implies a lost opportunity to raise global growth.	首先，推迟意味着失去了一次提升全球经济增长的机会。


With risks to the current global expansion increasing, this is the wrong time to let an obvious and sustained source of growth slip away.	随着全球经济扩张的风险越来越高，在此时让一个明显而又可持续的增长源白白溜走是错误的。


This is especially crucial for poor countries, where slower global growth means continuing hardship.	这对穷国更是至关重要，因为更慢的全球经济增长就意味着困境的继续。


Second, the perception of weakness and division in the WTO will make it far harder to resist protectionist pressures worldwide, especially if the global economy slows.	其次，WTO的软弱和意见不合将使其更难抵御世界范围内的保护主义压力，特别是在全球经济增长放缓的情况下。


We must not forget that the multilateral trading system – along with the Bretton Woods institutions – was originally created to avoid a repeat of the protectionism and competitive devaluations of the 1930’s that plunged the world into depression.	我们决不能忘记多边贸易体系—和布雷顿森林体系一道—诞生的最初目的就是避免重蹈1930年代的保护主义和竞争性货币贬值的覆辙。 而正是这些做法使当时的世界经济陷入萧条。


Third, trade reforms can help smooth international macroeconomic fluctuations and contribute to an orderly resolution of global imbalances.	再次，贸易改革能有助于消除国际宏观经济的波动，从而有利于全球经济发展不平衡的有序解决。


A successful Doha Round would thus complement the international collaborative efforts underway, with IMF involvement, to tackle external imbalances among the major economies.	因此，一个成功的多哈回合谈判将会是对现有国际合作努力的有力支持，在国际货币基金组织的参与下，还能应对世界主要经济体之间的外部不平衡。