Such loans, of course, would require a major global initiative, at a time when even blue-chip companies cannot borrow overnight, much less for 25 years!	当然，在即使是蓝筹公司都不能隔夜借款，更不用说贷款期限长达25年的时候，这样的贷款需要重大的全球行动。


In typical business cycles, countries are usually left to manage the recovery largely on their own.	在典型的商业周期中，国家通常主要是独自处理经济复苏问题。


This time we will need global cooperation.	这次我们需要全球合作。


Recovery will require major shifts in trade imbalances, technologies, and public budgets.	经济复苏需要在贸易不均衡、技术以及公共预算方面进行重大的改变。


These large-scale changes will have to be coordinated, at least informally if not tightly, among the major economies.	这些大规模的改变需要在主要经济体中协调起来，这样的协调即使是不紧密的，至少也要是非正式的。


Each should understand the basic directions of change that will be required at the national level and globally, and all nations must share in the deployment of new sustainable technologies and in the co-financing of global responsibilities, such as increased investments in African infrastructure.	每个经济体都应该明白在国内层面和国际层面需要的变化的基本方向，所有的国家都应该分享新型可持续 技术的应用，以及分担在诸如增加非洲基础设施投资的全球责任中的共同出资。


We have arrived at a moment in history when cooperative global political leadership is more important than ever.	我们已经身处历史上一个合作全球政治领导比任何时候都要重要的时刻。


Fortunately, the US has taken a huge step forward with Obama’s election.	幸运的是，伴随着奥巴马的当选，美国已经向前迈出了巨大的一步。


Now to action.	现在是要采取行动的时候了。


A Tale of Two American Economies	美国经济的罗生门


NEW YORK – While the United States recently reported 3.5% GDP growth in the third quarter, suggesting that the most severe recession since the Great Depression is over, the American economy is actually much weaker than official data suggest.	纽约 ——最新报告显示，美国第三季度GDP增长3. 5%，说明自大萧条以来最严重的衰退已经结束，尽管如此，美国经济实际上比数据所显示的情况差得多。


But official measures of GDP may grossly overstate growth in the economy as they don't capture the fact that business sentiment among small firms is abysmal and their output is still falling sharply.	官方的统计数字很可能高估了经济增长水平，因为该统计忽略了一些重要事实，即小企业的经营情绪（business sentiment）极其低落，它们的产出仍在急剧下滑。


Third quarter GDP - properly corrected for these factors - may have been 2% rather than 3.5%.	如果根据这些因素加以修正，第三季度GDP增长本应只有2%，而不是3. 5%。


The story of the US is, indeed, one of two economies.  There is a smaller one that is slowly recovering and a larger one that is still in a deep and persistent downturn.	说真的，美国经济说起来是一个经济，其实是两个经济。 其中一个比较小的经济是在慢慢复苏，而另一个较大的经济则仍在低谷中徘徊。


Consider the following facts.	举两个例子就明白了。 美国的官方失业率为10.


While America’s official unemployment rate is already 10.2%, the figure jumps to a whopping 17.5% when discouraged workers and partially employed workers are included.	但若把就业意愿丧失者（discouraged workers）和非全日制雇工也计算在内，该数字将跃升至17. 5%，可以说高得吓人。


And, while data from firms suggest that job losses in the last three months were about 600,000, household surveys, which include self-employed workers and small entrepreneurs, suggest that those losses were above two million.	来自企业方面的调查数据显示，近三个月流失的工作岗位约有60万个； 而来自家庭方面——其中包括自由职业者和小企业主——的调查结果则表明，工作岗位流失的数量超过200万。


Moreover, the total effect on labor income – the product of jobs times hours worked times average hourly wages – has been more severe than that implied by the job losses alone, because many firms are cutting their workers’ hours, placing them on furlough, or lowering their wages as a way to share the pain.	此外，劳动收入（工作岗位数乘以平均小时工资）所受到的总体影响比工作岗位流失还要来得严重，很多企业靠缩短工时，批准休假或削减薪水把痛苦转嫁给员工。


Many of the lost jobs – in construction, finance, and outsourced manufacturing and services – are gone forever, and recent studies suggest that a quarter of US jobs can be fully outsourced over time to other countries.	建筑业、金融业和外包制造与服务业中所流失的许多工作岗位是永久性丧失，最近的一些研究显示，随着时间的推移，美国有四分之一的工作岗位可能会完全转移到国外。


Thus, a growing proportion of the workforce – often below the radar screen of official statistics – is losing hope of finding gainful employment, while the unemployment rate (especially for poor, unskilled workers) will remain high for a much longer period of time than in previous recessions.	这样一来，劳动大军中就会有越来越多的人再也无法找到收入较高的工作，失业率（尤其是贫困、无技能的劳动者的失业率）将居高不下，比从前历次衰退都拖得久——而这一部分人往往是被官方统计口径忽略掉的。


Consider also the credit markets.	再想想信贷市场。


Prime borrowers with good credit scores and investment-grade firms are not experiencing a credit crunch at this point, as the former have access to mortgages and consumer credit while the latter have access to bond and equity markets.	拥有良好信用记录的优质借款人和被评为投资级的公司眼下没有信贷枯竭之虞，前者可以获得按揭贷款和消费贷款，后者可以在债券和股权市场上融资。


But non-prime borrowers – about one-third of US households – do not have much access to mortgages and credit cards.	可是涵盖三分之一美国家庭的非优质借款人没有太多机会获得按揭和信用卡贷款。


They live from paycheck to paycheck – often a shrinking paycheck, owing to the decline in hourly wages and hours worked.	他们只能靠工资来艰难度日，而且因为小时工资水平降低和工作时间缩短，那工资也会日益缩水。


And the credit crunch for non-investment-grade firms and smaller firms, which rely mostly on access to bank loans rather than capital markets, is still severe.	而被评为非投资级的公司和小公司，其融资通常是靠银行贷款而不是资本市场，它们仍然面临严峻的信贷枯竭形势。


Or consider bankruptcies and defaults by households and firms.	或者再想想家庭部门和企业部门的破产和违约情况。


Larger firms – even those with large debt problems – can refinance their excessive liabilities in court or out of court; but an unprecedented number of small businesses are going bankrupt.	大公司，即便它们债台高筑，仍然能公开地或在私下里寻求到债务重组的方案。 但小企业正在以前所未有的数量走向破产。


The same holds for households, with millions of weaker and poorer borrowers defaulting on mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and other forms of consumer credit.	家庭部门也一样，数以百万计的弱势、贫��借款人只能终止偿还其按揭贷款、信用卡贷款、汽车贷款、助学贷款以及其他形式的消费信贷。


Consider also what is happening to private consumption and retail sales.	还可以想想个人消费和零售业的处境。


Recent monthly figures suggest a pick-up in retail sales.	最近的月度数据显示，零售业的销售额有所回升。


But, because the official statistics capture mostly sales by larger retailers and exclude the fall in sales by hundreds of thousands of smaller stores and businesses that have failed, consumption looks better than it really is.	但官方统计通常只考虑大零售商的销售额而排除数十万小商店和小买卖那不断下滑的销售额，所以销售的实际情况远不如表面显示的好。


And, while higher-income and wealthier households have a buffer of savings to smooth consumption and avoid having to increase savings, most lower-income households must save more, as banks and other lenders cut back on home-equity loans and lower limits on credit cards.	尽管高收入和富裕家庭的储蓄可以起到缓冲消费下滑的作用，它们也无须被迫进行储蓄，但低收入家庭则必须增加储蓄，因为银行和其他放贷人削减了房屋净值贷款，调低了信用卡额度。


As a result, the household savings rate has risen from zero to 4% of disposable income.	这就导致美国家庭部门的储蓄率由先前的零储蓄上升到可支配收入的4%。


But it must rise further, to 8%, in order to reduce the high leverage of household sector.	但该比率肯定还会继续上升，估计会上升至8%，以降低家庭部门的高杠杆率。


To be sure, the US government is increasing its budget deficits to put a floor under demand.	美国政府固然在增加预算赤字，以支撑需求。


But most state and local governments that have experienced a collapse in tax revenues must sharply retrench spending by firing policemen, teachers, and firefighters while also cutting welfare benefits and social services for the poor.	但大多数州政府和地方政府的税收收入都遭遇暴跌，所以它们不得不大幅收缩开支，辞退警察、教师、消防队员，削减穷人的福利和社会服务。


Many state and local governments in poorer regions of the country are at risk of bankruptcy unless the federal government undertakes a massive bailout of their finances.	许多不那么富裕的州和地方的政府面临破产风险，除非联邦政府向提供大规模财政援助。


Moreover, income and wealth inequality is rising again: poorer households are at greater risk of unemployment, falling wages, or reductions in hours worked, all leading to lower labor income, whereas on Wall Street outrageous bonuses have returned with a vengeance.	此外，收入和财富不平等也再度扩大：贫困家庭面临更大的风险，失业、工资下降、工时削减都会造成劳动收入缩水； 而华尔街那骇人听闻的奖金不但卷土重来，而且变本加厉。


With the stock market rising while home prices are still falling, the wealthy are becoming richer, while the middle class and the poor – whose main wealth is a home rather than equities – are becoming poorer and being saddled with an unsustainable debt burden.	股价涨了，楼价还在跌； 富人变得更富，中产阶级和贫困者则变得更穷，而且还被债务压得喘不过气来，因为他们的主要财富是房子而不是股票。


So, while the US may technically be close to the end of a severe recession, most of America is facing a near-depression.	所以说，尽管美国经济的严重衰退从技术上说已接近尾声，但大多数美国人面临的是一个近乎萧条的悲观前景。


Little wonder, then, that few Americans believe that what walks like a duck and quacks like a duck is actually the phoenix of recovery.	在大多数美国人看来，当前美国经济是一只步履蹒跚的跛鸭，难怪很少有人会相信它是一只浴火重生的凤凰。


A Tale of Two Elections	关于两场选举的故事


LONDON – Individual elections do not always enhance democracy – a useful reminder that the ballot box is only one part, albeit a central one, in any free, plural society.	伦敦——个人参与投票的选举不一定就是代表着民主，所以说在一个自由多元的社会里，投票箱虽然很重要，但也不能代表全部的民意。


Of course, there are also magnificent examples of elections that strengthen both the stability and the institutions of a community.	当然，也有一些有关选举正面的例子，淫威对社会的稳定和种族的和谐都有好处。


We have just witnessed an example of the second kind in India, the world’s largest and greatest democracy, where 420 million voters there returned a Congress-led government with a solid majority.	我们刚刚见证了一个不一样的印度，作为世界上最大的和最伟大的民主体，国大党领导的政府赢得了由4亿2千万选民参加的选举，获得了压倒性的胜利。


It was in many respects a personal triumph for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.	从某些意义上来说，这也是印度总理曼莫汉·辛格的个人胜利。


His victory shows that it is possible to succeed in politics through decency, honesty, and high intelligence.	他的胜利表明，选举也可以通过有尊严，诚实和高智商地方式获得。


Sonia Gandhi and her family should also take credit for putting at the forefront of their campaign a vision of an inclusive society, which rejects divisions on the basis of caste, ethnicity, language, and religion.	为了推进在一个相互包容的多元社会的文明选举，而不是一个以阶层，种族，语言和宗教来分裂人群的选举，索尼娅·甘地和她的家族也有一定的贡献。


The result should help India to continue – not without occasional turbulence – its journey toward becoming a high-growth economy that raises the standard and quality of life for the poor.	这次选举的结果表明，印度经济发展将不受干扰，继续保持已有高成长性，它将为改善贫穷人口的生活水准质量继续努力。


I wish we could look forward in Europe to a similarly healthy democratic experience next month when voters throughout the European Union elect new members of the European Parliament.	我希望在下个月举行的欧盟新一轮欧洲议员的选举中，能够有类似的良好局面出现。


Since 1979, these MEPs have been elected direct rather than indirectly from national parliaments.	自从1979年以来，欧洲议会的议员都是由各国的议会中直接而非间接选举产生。


But turnout for these elections has been falling in several countries.	但目前在一些欧盟国家中，此项选举投票率一直在下滑。


There is a danger that the number voting in June will be lower than ever before.	6月的选举的投票率有可能是有史以来最低的一次。


Moreover, in the current grim economic conditions across Europe, voters who do turn out are all too likely to take the opportunity to punish the major parties and vote for fringe and even extremist politicians.	更有甚之，由于目前欧洲经济形势低迷，选民可能因此会放弃主流的执政党，而将手中的选票投给那些极端和非主流的政客。


There are particular circumstances that may encourage this electoral response.	这里有一些潜在的思潮会影响到这次选举的结果。


First, everywhere there is a sense of disgust at the way the recent boom seemed to privatize gains while the subsequent bust socialized losses.	首先，目前大家普遍的感觉是近期的经济增长只是少数个人从中受益，而随着经济泡沫的破灭，绝大多数人却为此买单。


A few rich individuals appeared to gain and all taxpayers to lose.	也就是说极少数富豪受益，而所有纳税人都受损。


This has spread a sense of unfairness.	这就让人感到社会的不公平。


Second, globalization has been the target for populist criticism.	第二，全球化也成了目前一些人批评的靶子。


It is usually defined to mean everything we dislike – from changes to our traditional way of life to loss of jobs.	这些不满包括——传统生活方式被改变，工作机会的丧失等。


It is a brave politician who points out how much liberalizing trade and opening up markets have increased our overall prosperity.	这就更需要有勇气的政治家站出来指出，我们从自由贸易和开放市场中所获得的收益远远大于损失。


Third, in Britain at least, the entire political class has been discredited by a sleazy scandal about the expenses that many parliamentarians have paid themselves.	第三，至少在英国，目前的政坛正受到一连串丑闻的困扰。 许多议员涉嫌滥用公务报销的权利。


Analogies with pigs, snouts, and troughs fill the pages of British newspapers.	有关此类新闻的负面报道充斥着英国报纸的 各个版面。


But there is another reason for the lack of interest in the EU elections.	还有一些其他因素会导致对欧盟选举的漠视。


The European Parliament has power, but it deals with issues that, while important to voters, do not top their list of concerns.	例如，欧洲议会的议员们在处理有关选民的重大问题时，往往没有实际的权力。


The EU’s member states retain power over the most sensitive political issues, including taxes, health, education, pensions, the labor market, and foreign policy.	欧盟各成员国在一些敏感的政治议题，例如税收，健康教育，养老金，就业市场以及外交政策等方面，都有自己的决定权。


So the questions that dominate national campaigns have little impact on European elections.	各自国家的选举和欧洲议会选举似乎没什么关联


The European Parliament deals with the important areas where individual countries have pooled their sovereignty, like trade, the creation of a pan-European market, and the biggest environmental issues.	在欧洲议会关心的重要问题上，例如贸易，泛欧洲共同市场的建立，以及重大的环境问题等议题上，各自的成员国也有权自行处置。


But these are not often the questions that trigger the most passionate interest.	这些议题也都没有引起大家什么热烈的反响。


In addition, the European Parliament’s detachment from national political debates means that it has less political legitimacy than is desirable.	另外，欧洲议会和各国议会的政治背离意味着其政治合法性的丧失。


Indeed, those who worry about the creation of a European superstate can rest easy.	那些担忧会出现欧洲大联盟国家的人可以休息了。


There will be no such entity, because there is no European electorate; the electorate remains French, Belgian, Latvian, Greek, and so on.	因为这里没有这样一个主体，也就没有一个欧洲选民的概念，只有法国选民，比利时选民，拉托维亚选民，希腊选民等。


They all vote at the same time, for the same institution. But what does an Italian know – or care, for that matter – about British politics?	他们都在同时投票，而且只选举自己的政府，例如，意大利人怎么会了解，或是会对英国的政治感兴趣么？


Look at our television programs. We know far more about Europe’s football than we do about Europe’s politics.	看看电视节目，我们对欧洲足球要比对欧洲政治的了解要多。


“The beautiful game” brings people together more effectively and reliably than the European Parliament is able to do.	这些精彩的比赛相比欧洲议会来说，更能把人们吸引到一起，更能让大家感到可以信赖。


That is no criticism of those who work – often very hard – in the European Parliament.	当然，我们不能否认欧洲议会已经和正在作出的努力，他们也非常辛苦。


We have created a political body that has power to hold European institutions to account but has no obvious European electorate to which it can itself be held accountable.	我们创造了一个单一的欧洲政体模式，但是目前还没有一个让欧洲选民可以信赖的欧洲政体。


A parliament without a people inevitably increases the sense of frustration that many European voters feel about the process of making Europe-wide policy choices in their name.	在有关整个欧洲范围的议题上，很多欧洲选民对欧洲议会能否反映他们的呼声��感怀疑。


If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified later this year, one of the changes should result in national parliaments becoming more involved in European decision-making.	今年晚一些时候，里斯本协定将被重新修订，我们应该增加各国议会参与欧洲事务决定权的比重。


But we need to look country-by-country at what else we can do to tie Europe’s own parliament into national politics.	应该根据各国的国情具体分析，如何将各自国家的议会和欧洲议会联系起来。


Unless we do that better, fewer people will vote for MEPs, more of them will be elected simply on a protest vote and represent Europe’s murky extremes, and the whole practice and principle of European democracy will be discredited.	只有我们作出成绩出来，大家才会对欧盟选举感兴趣。 如果被选举出来的人只是来投反对票或是代表着欧洲黑暗势力的极端分子，那么整个欧洲民主的精神和进程都会蒙上阴影。


A Tale of Two Terminals	双楼记


BEIJING – Ever since it opened recently, Terminal 5 of London’s Heathrow Airport has been plagued with failures.	北京——自从不久前启用以后，伦敦希斯罗机场5号航站楼就与失败结下了不解之缘。


On the other side of the globe, Terminal 3 in Beijing, which opened for full operations just one day before Terminal 5, has been operating almost without a glitch.	而在地球的另一端，比伦敦5号航站楼早一天全面启用的北京3号航站楼，运营情况几乎完美无瑕。


The media, unsurprisingly, have feasted upon the failures of T5 in London, while neglecting the successes of T3 in Beijing.	不出所料，媒体对伦敦T5航站楼的失败大书特书，似乎已经无暇顾及北京T3航站楼的巨大成功。


By all measures, Beijing’s T3 surpasses London’s T5.	无论以何种标准来衡量，北京T3航站楼与伦敦T5相比都有过之而无不及。


Whereas T5 can handle only 12,000 bags an hour (when it handles them at all) and 30 million passengers per year, T3 can handle 20,000 bags an hour and 50 million passengers.	伦敦T5每小时包裹处理能力可达12，000件（如果T5还能够处理包裹的话），每年旅客吞吐量可达3000万人，而北京T3每小时包裹处理能力达到20，000件，旅客吞吐能力达到5000万人。


While T5 will mostly service British Airways, T3 will service Air China and two dozen other airlines.	伦敦T5主要为英航提供服务，而北京T3除了中国国航之外，还服务于其他二十几家航空公司。


At one million square meters, T3 in Beijing is the largest terminal in the world, but was much less costly to build than T5 in London.	北京T3总面积达100万平米，为世界上最大的航站楼，但是建筑费用却远低于伦敦T5。


Using the most recent exchange rates, T3 cost only $3.86 billion compared with $8.6 billion for London’s T5.	如果以最新汇率折算， 北京T3的总费用只有38. 6亿美元，而伦敦T5却高达86亿美元之巨。


Furthermore, T3 took less than four years to complete, whereas T5 took almost 20 years.	不仅如此，北京T3从开工到完成只用了不到4年时间，而伦敦T5则耗用了几乎20年之久。


But to call T3 a success for socialism and T5 a failure of capitalism would be to miss a fundamental point.	但是如果简单地把北京T3称之为社会主义的成功、而把伦敦T5称之为资本主义的失败，恐怕失之偏颇。


After all, if China’s political system can still be called socialism, it is at best “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which embodies an increasing amount of market-oriented economic activity and greater economic openness and transparency.	归根结底，中国的政治制度已经是“有中国特色的社会主义”，包含着越来越多的市场经济的成分，经济开放和透明度也在日益增加。


It would be similarly misleading to attribute T3’s success to China alone.	如果单纯把北京T3的成功仅仅归功于中国也同样误人视听。


After all, T3 was designed by a Briton, and has incorporated the most recent architectural and operational trends, styles, and standards in the world.	归根结底，北京T3的设计师有一位英国人，整个T3融入了世界最新的建筑和运营潮流、模式和标准。


T3 in Beijing is just one of many projects China has recently built to improve its transportation infrastructure.	北京T3不过是中国近年来为改善交通基础设施而修建的众多项目中的一个。


In addition to having become the world’s industrial park, China now has more mobile phone subscribers than the combined populations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the number of Internet users has just surpassed that in the US.	中国不仅已成为世界工厂，中国的手机用户数已经超过了美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰人口总和，中国互联网用户数也已经超过了美国。


All of this development raises a fundamental question: how should we make sense of the explosive productivity growth that has become China’s new hallmark?	所有这些都提出了一个根本性的问题：那就是我们应该如何解读已经成为中国新特色的爆炸式的生产率增长？


Those who cling to old ideological stereotypes face an almost impossible task in reconciling China’s rapid growth with what they condemn as China’s failing system.	那些死抱着旧的意识形态不放的人们根本无法胜任这项工作，因为他们一方面声称中国的体制是失败的体制，另一方面却无法解释为什么中国能够取得如此快速的增长。


The truth is that ever since the end of the 1970’s, China has become convinced that peace and stability are the most important preconditions for its development.	事实上，自从20世纪70年代末以后，中国一直坚信和平与稳定是发展的最重要的前提。


Thus, anything that may distract China from its focus on peace, stability, and development has been strongly resisted.	因此，任何可能打扰中国聚精会神推动和平、稳定和发展的事情，都会受到了中国的强烈抵制。


This may help explain why T3 in Beijing is such a success, and why Chinese are now more united than ever before in condemning attempts to hijack or sully the Olympics for ulterior motives.	这或许可以有助于说明为什么北京T3航站楼是如此的成功，也有助于解释为什么中国目前空前团结，同声谴责任何出于某种不可告人的目的而挟持或者玷污奥运的企图


I hope that when millions of overseas passengers pass through T3, including those who do so during the Beijing Olympics, they will pause and reflect upon the distance China has traveled over the past three decades in its reform and opening to the outside world.  Granted, China still has further to go, and many people may find fault with much in the country.	我希望当千百万海外旅客路过北京T3航站楼的时候，包括北京奥运会期间路过此地的海外旅客，能够稍事停顿，思考一下中国改革开放三十年所走过的路程。 诚然，中国要走的路还很漫长，许多人还也会对这个国家的现状说三道四。


But they should not refuse to acknowledge that China’s mission to turn a nation of 1.3 billion poor people into a developed country through peace and free trade is one of the great, honorable, and most difficult sagas in human history.	可是他们不应该拒绝承认，中国通过和平与自由贸易把一个拥有13亿人口的贫困国家转变成发达国家的努力是人类历史上一部伟大、光荣而又艰巨的史诗。


Following the disturbances in Tibet and the troubles affecting the Olympic torch’s progress around the world, some voices abroad are showing a greater inclination to dismiss, vilify, humiliate, or even split China.	自从西藏骚乱和各地奥运火炬传递受扰事件以后，某些海外势力表现出一些漠视、诽谤、侮辱甚至试图分裂中国的情绪。


But it would be best for all to pause a moment, contemplate T3 in Beijing, consider what it represents, and reflect on what an accomplishment the quick completion of such an iconic structure is for an emerging country like China.	但是最好所有人都能够稍事停顿，思考一下北京T3航站楼究竟意味着什么，思考一下这样一栋标志性建筑的迅速完工对于中国这样的新兴国家是什么样的成就。


A Thai Spring?	泰国之春?


BANGKOK – The thunderous results of Thailand’s general election on July 3 will seem familiar to anyone attuned to the political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa.	发自曼谷——对那些关注中东北非政治动荡的人来说，7月3日泰国大选所产生的震撼结果仿佛似曾相识。


Entrenched incumbent regimes everywhere are under severe stress from advances in information technology, shifts in demographics, rising expectations, and the obsolescence of Cold War exigencies.	随着信息技术进步、人口结构转换，人民期望上升以及冷战理念的逐渐淡化，世界上那些看似无法撼动的政权纷纷摇摇欲坠。


In the absence of a willingness and ability to use violent repression, regime survival can be achieved only through concessions, accommodation, and periodic reinvention.	同时由于本身不具备使用暴力镇压的意愿和能力，这些政权只能依靠妥协，调整和周期性重塑自身来赢得生存。


With 47 million voters and turnout at 75%, Thailand’s latest election results pose a decisive challenge to the country’s long-established regime.	泰国近4700万选民中有3/4在本次选举中投下了选票，而选举的结果则对这个国家的古老政权提出了决定性的挑战。


The Pheu Thai party, led by Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of exiled fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, secured a resounding triumph, winning 265 seats in the 500-member assembly, while the ruling Democrat Party mustered just 159.	由流亡前总理他信最小的妹妹英拉·西那瓦领导的为泰党大胜，一举夺得下议院500个议席中的265席，反之目前执政的民主党只拿下159席。


The return to power of Pheu Thai is extraordinary – and not only because Yingluck will be Thailand’s first female prime minister.	为泰党重夺政权的意义非常重大——这不仅因为英拉将成为泰国第一位女总理。


The establishment-aligned courts dissolved the party’s two previous governments, and banned scores of its leading politicians from office for five years.	须知与泰国王室等保守势力结盟的法庭曾两次解散了由该派系所组建的政府，并判处大批领导人5年之内不得从政。


Pheu Thai’s victory thus suggests that a previously marginalized electorate has been permanently awakened.	为泰党的胜利意味着一批原本被边缘化的选民如今已经完全觉醒。


A similar majority of the Thai electorate voted for Thaksin’s parties and their pro-poor populist platforms in January 2001, February 2005, April 2006, and December 2007, defying a military coup, a coup-induced constitution, judicial interventions, and army coercion and repression.	与他们类似的一大批人虽然历经一系列军事政变，政变宪法，司法干涉以及军队镇压，却依然在2001年1月，2005年2月，2005年4月和2007年12月为他信的政党及其维护穷人利益的平民主义政纲投下了赞成票。


The recent election marked a profound break from the past.	最近这场选举也意味着与过去那种政治状态的深刻决裂。


In the second half of the twentieth century, Thai elections seemed to alternate with military coups.	在20世纪下半叶，泰国大选似乎总与军事政变交替出场。


Voters were bought and sold like commodities. After elections, voters hardly ever saw or heard from their MPs, who typically went on to engage in corruption and graft in Bangkok – eventually losing legitimacy and paving the way for military coups.	选民像商品一样被肆意买卖，在选后也基本见不到议员的影子，因为后者都跑到曼谷贪污行贿去了——自然会导致政府丧失合法性以及随后的军事政变。


A new constitution and elections invariably ensued. This vicious cycle of coups, constitutions, and elections defined Thai politics for decades.	在随后颁布的新宪法及大选中种种乱象又会卷土重来，以致数十年来泰国政治就沉沦在这个政变，宪法和选举构成的邪恶轮回之中。


That pattern reflected Cold War imperatives.	上述模式其实反映了冷战时期的诉求。


The pillars of the Thai state – nation, religion, and the king – struck a unifying, collective chord, and the resulting stability enabled economic development. While growth was so concentrated that popular resentment simmered, communism was kept at bay.	泰国的支柱——民族，宗教和国王——支撑起一个联合统一的和谐状态，并带来有利于经济发展的稳定局面，同时还能在过于关注发展而导致民怨不断积聚时将共产主义拒之门外。


Challenges to the established order, with the military-monarchy-bureaucracy triumvirate as its anchor, were repeatedly put down.	这个现行体制以军队-王室-官僚机构的三方联合体为根本，而对它的挑战则被一再遭到压制。


Back then, Thai schoolchildren sang martial songs each morning, and Thais knew their place in the rigidly elitist pecking order, which was reinforced by socialization and indoctrination in classrooms and living rooms, where only state-controlled media could enter.	在那时候，学生们每天早上都要唱军歌，泰国人也都知道自己在这个僵硬的精英主义阶级社会中所处的地位，而这种意识又不断被学校和家庭中的社会宣传和理念灌输所强化（所有媒体都是国营的）。


Thais were more like obedient subjects than informed citizens.	因此与其说泰国人是知情的公民，倒不如说是些服从的物体。


Dissenting views found little traction.	而那些与体制不满的观点也很少有人响应。


The rise of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party in 2001 changed all that.	但他信的泰爱泰党在2001年的崛起挑战了这一切。


The party pursued a scientific approach to elections, relied on expensive polling by foreign experts, and offered a clear agenda and strong leadership. It was the first post-Cold War party to capture Thais’ collective imagination.	该党采用了一种科学的选举策略，花巨资聘请国外专家收集民意信息，并提供了清晰的政策议程和强势领导，同时也是战后第一个俘获了泰国人集体愿景的党派。


The voices of neglected swaths of the electorate, particularly in the rural north and northeast of the country, began to count.	那些以往被无视的选民（尤其是北部和东北部农民）的呼声开始发挥威力。


Vote-buying became increasingly insufficient. A bond between party and voters – a bond based on policy – took root.	贿选行为日渐式微，而选民和政党之间的联系——某种基于政策认同的联系——则开始扎根。


By 2001, the Cold War was long over. Political leaders who dissented from the status quo could no longer easily be jailed on communism-related charges.	2001年时冷战已经变得遥远，因此当局再也无法借从事共产主义之名关押那些反对派政治领袖。


The advent of the Internet had made it harder for the authorities to shape Thai minds, as media sources multiplied and the resulting diffusion of information undermined the effectiveness of state propaganda.	互联网的发展扩大了信息来源也稀释了信息，使得政府宣传的效力大减，思想控制越发困难。


Moreover, new international norms had come to the fore: external powers that previously turned a blind eye to coups, military dictatorships, and repression now rallied around democracy and human rights.	此外新的国际准则也日渐通行，那么原本对政变，军事独裁和镇压睁一只眼闭一只眼的外部势力也加入了民主和人权的行列。


Thailand’s demographics also changed.	泰国的人口结构同时也发生了改变。


The Cold War curriculum of induced unity and stability has no relevance for today’s schoolchildren; indeed, most university students nowadays were born after the Cold War ended.	冷战时那套号召团结与稳定的教条对孩子们已经不起作用，事实上如今许多大学生都是在冷战后出生的。


These factors fostered a new political environment, and Thaksin, who was a telecommunications tycoon at the time, was well positioned to seize the opportunity.	这些因素共同孕育了一个新的政治环境，而当时身为电信业大亨的他信则敏锐地抓住了这个机会。


He overhauled the bureaucracy, delivered on his promises to the poor, mapped out an industrial strategy, and re-designed an overstretched foreign policy agenda, among other innovative measures.	他大胆创新，整肃官僚机构，向穷人传达自己的竞选承诺，制定国家工业战略，还重新设计了一个长期外交政策议程。


Of course, Thaksin’s rule had a dark underside: corruption, legislated conflicts of interest, cronyism, human rights violations, and abuse of power, among other evidence of misrule.	当然，他信的统治也有其肮脏的一面：腐败、利益冲突、裙带关系，侵犯人权和滥用权力。


Such is Thaksin’s mixed legacy.	但这就是他信留下的复杂遗产。


The opportunities, hopes, and dreams delivered to the downtrodden and the vision and plans for Thailand’s future were enmeshed with his own venality.	向劳苦大众传递的机遇，希望和梦想以及对泰国未来的愿景和规划都与其自身的腐败纠缠不清。


But, while Thaksin committed many infractions, his gravest “sin” was to have changed the way Thais think and behave.	但即便他信罪行累累，���最大的“善”就是改变了泰国人的思维和行为模式。


Some see this change as usurpation; others view it as Thailand’s deliverance into the twenty-first century.	有些人将这种改变视为篡夺王权，而其他人则认为这是为泰国迈向21世纪挣脱了枷锁。


Thaksin’s adversaries in Thailand’s entrenched regime were unwilling to accede to his policy innovations and populism.	根深蒂固的统治当局当然不愿意接受他信的那套政策创新和民粹主义。


For them, doing so would be tantamount to admitting that most people in this hospitable, well-endowed kingdom had been kept poor by design all along.	对他们来说这等于承认在泰国这个王道乐土中的大多数人之所以长期陷于贫困，原来是他人背后操纵的结果。


For his part, Thaksin has sought to portray the recent election results as being all about him.	他信试图将最近选举的胜利全部归功于自己。


But he is best viewed as a self-serving, unwitting agent of political modernization.	但我们最好将他视为一个怀着自利动机却无意中将泰国带入政治现代化的中间角色。


It is these twenty-first-century dynamics and changes, underpinned by an increasingly assertive citizenry, with which the Thai establishment must come to terms if the country is to move forward.	而如果泰国要继续前进的话，当局就必须对这种构筑在日益自信的公民精神之上的二十一世纪动力和变革做出妥协和让步。


A “Third Way” for Confronting Russia	对抗俄罗斯的“第三种途径”


PARIS – “Let’s engage Russia if we can, but contain it if we must.”	巴黎－“让我们和俄罗斯接触如果可以，但是牵制它如果必须这样。


These two alternatives already defined Western strategy toward Russia in the mid-1990’s.	” 在20世纪90年代中期，这两种选择已经定义了西方对俄罗斯的策略。


Since then, Russia may have changed dramatically, but not our questions about it.	从那以后，俄罗斯可能已经发生了巨大的变化，但是这不是我们关注的问题。


What do you do when your big neighbor widens the gap that exists between its culture, which is European, and its political system, which is becoming increasingly “Asian,” at least in the bad old sense of “Oriental despotism”?	当你强大的邻居加大了存在在其欧洲文化和其变得越来越“亚洲”的政治体系——至少在糟糕的“东方专制”的旧观念上如此——之间的距离的时候，你会怎么做呢？


Should the best answer to the return of Russia’s imperial ambitions be a modern version of a Holy Alliance of stability designed to contain the world’s new maverick?	对俄罗斯帝王野心回归的最好回答，应该是一个现代版的用于牵制世界新的叛逆者的稳定神圣同盟吗？


Or is a latter-day Yalta Conference, aimed at redrawing the political boundaries of Europe, necessary?	或者，一个目的是为了重新划定欧洲政治边界的现代雅尔塔会议，必要吗？


Could the answer be a bit of both?	答案可能是两者兼而有之吗？


If Russia is becoming what revolutionary France was under Napoleon, or reverting to Soviet form – shorn of a totalitarian ideology but with an appetite for conquest and re-conquest – what is needed is not the “league of democracies” advocated by some conservatives in America.	如果俄罗斯正变成像拿破仑统治下的革命法国那样，或者回归到苏维埃的形态——虽然被剥夺了极权主义的意识形态，但是具有征服和再征服的欲望——需要的东西不是一些美国保守分子支持的“民主联盟”。


What is needed, instead, is a “stability league” that includes prominent actors like China, India, and other countries that are more interested in economic growth than in “rocking the boat” of the international system.	相反，需要的是包括像中国、印度这样的重要国家以及其他对经济增长要比对“破坏”国际体系更感兴趣的国家的“稳定联盟”。


Such a strategy implies, first of all, a solid partnership with China, not because it is evolving in the direction of democracy, but because it is a status-quo power.	这样的策略意味着，首先，要和中国建立稳固的伙伴关系，这不是因为它正在向民主的方向发展，而是因为它是一个现存的强国。


Such a strategy could lead to the opening of negotiations with Iran, and of course to a further closing of ranks within NATO.	这样的策略可以打开与伊朗的谈判之门，以及当然的北约内部的进一步团结。


The message to the Kremlin here would be crystal clear. “Do not fool yourself.	在这里向克里姆林宫传达的讯息是非常清楚的，“不要自欺欺人，民族主义和帝国主义不会有任何结果；


Nationalism and imperialism will lead you nowhere; you cannot expand geographically without serious costs to your economic growth and your personal enrichment.	你不可能在没有付出对你的经济增长和个人财富的严重损失的代价的情况下，进行领土扩展。


Europe may be weak and divided, America may no longer be what it was, but with your falling population and the sad state of your economy beyond oil and gas, you simply are not equipped to be in the league of great global powers.	欧洲可能很虚弱并且很分裂，美国可能不再是从前的美国，但是随着人口的下降以及除了石油和天然气之外的可悲的经济状况，你就是不具备成为全球强国联盟的成员的资格。


China is; you are not.”	中国具备这样的资格，你不具备。 ”


But the containment argument fails, because the Kremlin can still make mischief around the world by acting with Syria or Venezuela in an irresponsible manner.	但是，牵制政策的观点失败了，因为克里姆林宫仍然可以通过和叙利亚或委内瑞拉以不负责任的态度行为的方式，在世界范围内挑拨离间。


More importantly, rallying the world solely against Russia would mean taking Russia’s great power pretensions too seriously.	更重要的是，号召全世界来对抗俄罗斯意味着将俄罗斯自命为强国太当回事了。


For example, many Asians believe that Russia is a problem for Europe, but no longer for the world.	例如，许多亚洲人认为俄罗斯问题是欧洲的问题，不再是世界的问题。


At the Cold War’s end, Japan remained obsessed with Russia as the heir to the Soviet Union.	在冷战结束时，日本仍然被俄罗斯作为苏联的继承人的事实所困扰。


Today, the Japanese are so concerned with China that they have little time for fears about Russia.	现在，日本人是如此的关心中国以至于几乎没有时间来担心俄罗斯。


The other alternative to a rebirth of “containment” would consist in accepting the Russian argument, or more precisely, Russian “emotions.”	对“牵制政策”复兴的另一个选择可能存在于接受俄罗斯的观点，或更准确地说，俄罗斯的“情感”。


It would mean saying, in effect, “We have unnecessarily humiliated you over the last ten years.	实际上，这可能意味着这样说，“我们在过去十年里不必要地羞辱了你。


From NATO enlargement to the grant of independence to Kosovo, we have deliberately ignored your sensitivities and your interests.	从北约的扩张到承认科索沃的独立，我们已经故意忽略了你的敏感和利益。


Let’s sit down together like Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta and redesign a twenty-first-century map of Europe.	让我们像丘吉尔、罗斯福和斯大林在雅尔塔那样坐下来，重新设计欧洲二十一世纪的版图。


What do you want back?	你想要回什么？


What do we keep?”	我们保留什么？ ”


This approach might recognize Russia’s droit de regard on the future evolution of the Caucasus.	这个途径可能会承认俄罗斯对高加索未来发展的监督权。


Indeed, while talking tough under the guidance of Nicolas Sarkozy’s France, which currently holds the EU presidency, Europe has de facto resigned itself to Georgia’s dismemberment.	确实，在当前担任欧盟主席国的尼科拉斯·萨尔科奇法国政府的指导下，在口气强硬的同时，欧洲事实上已经听任了格鲁吉亚的被分割。


Russian troops are to remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.	俄罗斯军队会继续保留在南奧塞梯和阿布哈兹。


The West is not about to declare war on Russia for the sake of a Georgia whose credibility has been greatly eroded by its president’s irresponsible behavior.	西方也不打算为了格鲁吉亚向俄罗斯宣战，而格鲁吉亚的信誉因其总统不负责任的行为受到极大的侵蚀。


As for Ukraine, it may one day become part of the European Union, but its future is not in NATO.	对乌克兰来说，它可能有一天会成为欧盟的一部分，但是其未来不是北约。


Yet, between all-out containment, which is very unlikely and not necessarily desirable or realistic, and accommodation which borders on appeasement, which would be dangerous for Europe’s future, a third way, based on a few firm principles, must be found.	然而，在竭力牵制政策——这一政策是不大可能，不够吸引人以及不现实的——以及与会对欧洲的将来带来危险的与缓和相邻的迁就融合之间，必须找到建立在一些坚定的原则的基础上的第三种途径。


These principles are clear.	这些原则是很清楚的。


First, Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not negotiable.	首先，对乌克兰的领土完整是不能讨价还价的。


This has been said many times, but repetition does not diminish its importance.	这已经被说了很多次了，但是重复并不减弱其重要性。


Russia without Ukraine is a manageable nation-state; Russia with Ukraine is an unmanageable empire.	没有乌克兰的俄罗斯是一个可以控制的民族国家； 拥有乌克兰的俄罗斯是一个无法控制的帝国。


Second, even if the West condemns Georgia’s irresponsibility and incorporates into its policy Russia’s sensitivities on the complex historical feelings related to its ex-imperial territories, the Kremlin’s shameless brutality is unacceptable.	其次，即使西方谴责格鲁吉亚的不负责任，以及在其政策中考虑俄罗斯对其与前帝国领土有关的复杂的历史情感的敏感性，克里姆林宫无耻的野蛮行为也是不可接受的。


After all, this is Europe more than six decades after World War II, and nearly 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.	毕竟，现在的欧洲是二战后 过了六十年多年以及苏联垮台接近20年后的欧洲。


The use of force to settle scores and impose one nation’s will upon another cannot be accepted passively.	使用武力清算旧怨并将一个国家的意志凌驾于另一个国家之上，是不能被顺从地接受的。


In the short term, time may be on Russia’s side.	在短期来看，时间可能对俄罗斯有利。


In the long run – economically, demographically, politically, strategically – time is on “our” side, if we stick to our values and our principles.	从长期来看，如果我们坚持我们的价值和原则，从经济、人口、政治和战略上来说，时间是对我们有利的。


At Home in Guantánamo Bay	在关塔纳摩湾监狱


GUANTÁNAMO BAY – I write this from the United States Detention Center at Guantánamo Bay, where I have been held without charge for almost seven years.	关塔纳摩湾－这篇文章，是我在在没有遭到任何指控的情况下，却几乎把我关押了七年时间的关塔纳摩湾美国拘留中心，写下的。


My detention here is the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.	我被关押在关塔那摩是我在一个错误的时间出现在一个错误的地点的结果。


More than two years ago, I was notified that I was cleared for release.	在两年多前，有人告诉我，美国已经批准释放我了。


I would have been happy about this news if I did not come from Uzbekistan, a country with one of the worst human rights records in the world.	如果我不是来自乌兹别克斯坦——世界上人权记录最糟糕的国家之一，我可能会对这个消息感到高兴。


It is not safe for me to go home.	然而事实是，我却高兴不起来，因为对我来说，回到自己的祖国并不安全。


My journey to Guantánamo began in December 1998, after I finished my mandatory service in the Uzbek army.	在我结束了在乌兹别克斯坦军队里的强制服役之后，在1998年12月份，我就开始了走向关塔纳摩的旅途了。


Uzbekistan, a former Soviet Republic, is a poor country without many employment opportunities.	曾是前苏联加盟共和国的乌兹别克斯坦，是一个贫穷的没有多少工作机会的国家。


After several months of job hunting, I joined my brother in a business venture buying and selling apples, honey, and other goods in neighboring Tajikistan.	我结束了在乌兹别克斯坦军队的服役之后，花了几个月的时间找工作，最后，我和我的兄弟一起，在邻国塔吉克斯坦做起了买卖苹果、蜂蜜和其他货物的生意。


I lived in a community of Uzbeks, and met my wife, Fatima, another Uzbek, while living there.	我住在塔吉克斯坦的一个乌兹别克人居住区，在此期间，遇到了我的妻子法第玛，她也是一个乌孜别克人 。


We had a child, and my mother came from Uzbekistan to join us.	不久之后，我们有了一个孩子，我的母亲也从乌兹别克斯坦来到了塔吉克斯坦，和我们一起生活。


Unfortunately, there were some in Tajikistan who didn’t like having a bunch of Uzbeks living in their country.	不幸的是，有些塔吉克斯坦人不喜欢有许多乌兹别克人生活在他们的国家。


So, one day, in November 1999, the Tajik authorities rounded up 200-300 Uzbeks and said they were taking us back to Uzbekistan.	所以，在1999年11月的一天，塔吉克斯坦当局将200到300名乌兹别克人赶到了一起，说要将我们送回乌兹别克斯坦。


Instead, they dumped us in Afghanistan.	事实上，他们将我们扔在阿富汗就不管了。


There, we met a group of Afghan Uzbeks who helped us to settle in Mazar-i-Sharif.	在阿富汗，我们遇到了一群阿富汗乌兹别克人，他们帮助我们在马扎里沙里夫安顿下来。


I began working as a traveling salesman, selling goat’s milk, hens, roosters, and sheep.	我开始成为一个走街串巷的生意人，卖羊奶、鸡和羊。


In the fall of 2001, when fighting broke out between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, I could not travel and was stranded at a roadside teahouse for several weeks.	在2001年秋天，当塔利班和北方联盟爆发战争的时候，我不能到处卖东西了，有一天还被困在了一个路边茶室里几个星期。


One day, Northern Alliance soldiers came to the teahouse and offered to give me a ride to Mazar-i-Sharif. Instead, they drove me to Bagram Air Base and handed me over to the Americans stationed there.	一天，北方联盟的士兵来到茶室，提出要用车将我送到马扎里沙里夫，但是事实上，他们将我送到了巴格拉姆空军基地，交给了驻扎在那里的美国人。


I found out later that the Americans were offering bounties of several thousand dollars for Taliban and “foreign fighters.”	我后来知道，美国人会给那些抓获塔利班和“外国武装分子”的人几千美元的奖励。


At first, I was happy to be in American hands.	开始，我还比较高兴，因为我落到了美国人手里。


I held the US in high regard and figured that it would be only a matter of time before they realized that I was innocent and let me go.	我非常尊敬美国这个国家，认为美国人认识到我是无辜的并将我释放，是迟早的事情。


But they didn’t.	但是，他们并没有将我释放。


They held me in Bagram, then Khandahar, and eventually Guantánamo Bay.	他们开始将我关在巴格拉姆，然后转移到坎大哈，最后将我关到了关塔那摩湾。


The Americans now realize that I ended up here by mistake and have told me that they want to let me go.	现在，美国人意识到我被关错了，告诉我他们要将我释放了。


But where can I go?	但是，我能去哪里呢？


Members of the Uzbek security service visited me here at Guantánamo and accused me of being a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.	乌兹别克斯坦安全部门的人来关塔那摩看过我，他们指控我是乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动的成员。


When I told them that I didn’t know anything about this group, they warned that once I was back in their custody, they would make me cooperate.	当我告诉他们我根本不知道与乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动有关的任何事情的时候，他们警告我说，一旦我落到了他们的手中，他们就会让我合作的。


It is not hard to imagine what those ways are.	对他们让我合作的方法，并不难想象。


Torture, beating, and other mistreatment of Uzbek detainees are widespread.	在乌兹别克斯坦，对被关押的人的折磨、拷打和其他的虐待行为非常普遍。


Sometimes people who are taken into Uzbek custody are never heard from again.	有时候，有些人在乌兹别克斯坦被关押后，就音信全无了。


I am not alone.	在关塔那摩，并不是只有我一个人的情况是这样的。


I am one of several dozen of the Guantánamo who cannot return to our native countries because we would likely be tortured and abused.	因为从关塔那摩释放后回国可能遭受拷问和虐待，有几十个被关押在关塔那摩的人不能回到自己的国家，我就是他们中的一员。


Our only hope of getting out of this prison is that another country decides to provide safe haven to men like us – men who did nothing wrong and never should have been detained here in the first place.	我们走出这个监狱后的唯一希望是，有另一个国家决定为像我们这样的人——我们这些没有做错任何事情，一开始就不应该被关押在这里的人——提供安全的栖身之地。


A Time to Build	建设正当时


Any good international investment banker knows that the end of April is a bad time to come peddling his services, for that is when the world’s finance ministers return home from the IMF meetings in Washington, chastened that risks to the global economy could spill over into their own backyards.	任何一个优秀的国际投资银行家都知道四月底不是一个叫卖服务的好时候。 因为这时正好是世界各国的财长们结束了在华盛顿举行的国际货币基金组织的各项会议返回本国的时候。


Ministers are too busy recovering from their trauma to think about paying fat fees for big new international bond issues.	此时的他们都对全球经济的风险可能蔓延到自家后院而忧心忡忡，正忙着抚慰自己备受折磨的心灵，所以无暇考虑为新的国际债券发行而付出巨额的费用。


Who wants to build up debt if there might be a financial crisis around the corner?	谁愿意在一场金融危机迫在眉睫的情况下举债呢？


Better to keep socking away US Treasury bills, even if the return is far lower than on most other investments.	还不如继续囤积短期美国国库券，尽管其回报远低于其他大多数的投资项目。


Or is it?	果真如此吗？


With today’s global economy in the middle of a sustained and increasingly balanced expansion, has the time come to start considering upside risks?	随着当今的全球经济进入中可持续和愈渐平衡的增长态势，是不是到了考虑上升风险的时候了？


In particular, should governments, especially those that are endlessly building up dollar reserves, instead start thinking about how to build up their roads, bridges, ports, electric grids, and other infrastructure?	具体而言，各国政府，特别是那些正在无休止地增加美元储备的政府是否应该转而考虑如何修建道路、桥梁、港口、电网和其他基础设施了？


Has the time come to start laying the groundwork to sustain future growth, especially in poorer regions that have not yet shared in today’s prosperity?	尤其对于那些还没有分享到当今经济繁荣的较贫困地区，是否到了应该为未来的可持续发展奠定基础的时候了？


Don’t get me wrong, I am not arguing for fiscal profligacy.	不要误解我的意思，我并不是在提倡财政挥霍。


But the balance of risks has shifted over the past few years.	但过去几年以来，风险的平衡发生了转变。


Yes, within the next three to five years, there will probably be another global recession.	是的，在未来的三至五年内，很可能会发生另一次全球性的经济衰退。


And, yes, there will probably be another rash of financial crises – perhaps in Central Europe, which now looks like Asia did before its 1997 crisis.	对，很可能还会有一场金融危机在中欧突然爆发。 中欧现在的情形和1997年金融危机前的亚洲非常相似。


Recent jitters about Iceland’s gaping trade deficit and Brazil’s new finance minister rippled around the world, reminding global investors that while many emerging markets are gradually moving towards investment-grade status, most are not there yet.	最近冰岛的巨额贸易赤字和巴西新任财政部长所引发的波澜，触动了世界的敏感神经，并提醒全球投资家们：虽然有很多新兴市场正逐渐向投资级的地位迈进，但大多数却仍然长路漫漫。


But the risks are two-sided, and sound economic policy is just as much about capitalizing on good times as avoiding bad ones.	但这些风险具有两面性。 健全的经济政策在利用繁荣时期和规避萧条时期方面因该双管齐下。


Economic gurus at places like the World Bank have developed a ridiculously long list of steps that countries should take to raise their growth rates (the so-called “extended Washington Consensus”).	身处世界银行等机构的经济巨擘们为各国提高经济增长率开出了一张冗长得可笑的方案清单（即所谓“延伸的华盛顿共识”）。


Like maintaining good health, it is not enough to concentrate on a single component.	就像要保持身体健康，仅注重某一方面是不够的。


But if there is one area where obvious opportunities exist, and where policy can really make a difference, it would have to be infrastructure investment.	但如果说在某一方面的确存在明显的机遇，并且政策真的能够有所作为，那么这一定就是基础设施投资了。


India’s infrastructure problems are legendary, with airports and railroads that are comically inadequate.	印度的基础设施问题几乎具有传奇色彩，其机场和铁路等设施严重不足。


However, aside from a few countries – including China, of course, but also Spain – low infrastructure spending is epidemic.	然而，除了少数几个国家—包括中国，当然还有西班牙—基础设施投资不足的问题普遍存在。


Even the United States has infrastructure that is hobbled by neglect, with collapsing bridges and a dangerously overburdened electrical grid.	甚至美国的某些基础设施也在被忽视状态中步履蹒跚：摇摇欲坠的桥梁和不堪负荷的电网。


Land-rich Brazil, too, is a case study in the consequences of under-investment.	土地广袤的巴西也是研究投资不足的后果的案例。


Its infrastructure systems might be adequate to support the country’s tepid 3-4% growth rates, but they are hardly adequate to support the 6-7% rates that it ought to be enjoying amidst the current global boom.	它的基础设施体系可能足以支持其3-4%的温和经济增长率，但对于其在目前的全球性经济繁荣的大环境下能达到的6-7%的增速则爱莫能助。


Russia, despite Siberia’s massive oil and gas riches, isn’t even investing enough to support healthy growth in its energy industries, much less human development in the country’s impoverished areas (including hapless Siberia).	俄罗斯尽管有着西伯利亚的巨大石油和天然气储量，却连支撑其能源工业健康发展的投资水平也保证不了，更别说在该国贫困地区（包括不幸的西伯利亚）的人力资源发展上的投资了。


True, government infrastructure spending is often wasted.	的确，政府在基础设施方面的支出时常被浪费。


My hometown of Boston recently managed to spend an astounding $15 billion dollars to move a few highways underground.	我的家乡波士顿最近花了令人叹为观止的150亿美金将几条公路移到地下。


And that so-called “Big Dig” looks like a model of efficiency next to many of Japan’s infamous bridges to nowhere.	这场所谓的“大开掘”在经济效益上的示范作用似乎可以与日本那几座大而无当的桥梁媲美。


But there are ways to waste less.	但我们可以有减少浪费的方法。


Transparency in procurement works wonders.	确保采购过程的透明度就十分奏效。


So, too, does private sector involvement.	同样有效的还有私营部门的介入。


The Nobel laureate economist William Vickrey argued tirelessly in favor of privately financed toll roads.	诺贝尔奖得主，经济学家William Vickery就不屈不挠地提倡私人投资修建收费公路。


Private oversight can often produce better and more efficient construction, and, in theory, toll roads help alleviate traffic congestion.	私人监督的结果通常是更好和更有效率的工程建设，并且在理论上讲收费道路有助于减缓交通阻塞。


(Ironically, Vickery died while sitting in a traffic jam.)	（具有讽刺意味的是Vickery去世时正身陷交通堵塞之中。


Even China, which has added more than 50,000 kilometers of roads and dozens of airports over the past five years, makes use of private financing.	）甚至在过去五年里新修了五万多公里的道路和数十个机场的中国也采用了向私人融资的方式。


True, countries that have not cleaned up their fiscal act, such as India, must not recklessly plunge ahead with big government projects without counterbalancing reforms to ensure sustainability.	确实，那些还没有清理过财政行为的国家，比如印度，决不能在没有实施确保可持续性的配套改革的情况下就轻率地投入到大型政府工程之中。


Fiscal prudence and stable inflation rates are cornerstones of today’s relatively healthy global economic environment.	审慎的财政和稳定的通胀是当今相对健康的全球经济环境的基石。


But for countries that have scope to invest more, particularly those that are holding a surfeit of precious development dollars in idle US Treasury bills, the time may be ripe to reassess the balance of risks.	但对于那些有能力扩大投资的国家，特别是那些以毫无价值的短期美国国库券的形式持有过量的、可用于发展的宝贵美元的国家，是时候重新评估风险平衡了。


The IMF is absolutely right to remind ministers each April of downside risks.	国际货币基金组织每年四月提醒各国财长们下降风险是绝对正确的。


Countries’ need for better infrastructure is no license to throw prudence out the window.	需要更好基础设施的国家也不能将审慎抛诸脑后。


But when the world’s finance ministers recover from their April shock therapy, they also need to look at the opportunities.	但当世界各地的财长们从休克治疗中缓过劲来以后，还是需要多看看机遇。


A Time to Dare	一个敢作敢为的时刻


NEW YORK – The upcoming G-20 meeting is a make-or-break event.	纽约——即将到来的G-20峰会是一个不成功则成仁性质的大会。


Unless it introduces practical measures to support the countries at the periphery of the global financial system, global markets will suffer another round of decline, just as they did after United States Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s failure in February to produce practical measures to recapitalize America’s banking system.	如果它不能为支援处于全球金融系统边缘的国家提出实际的解决方案，全球金融市场将会遭受另一轮的衰退，就像美国财政部长蒂莫西·盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）二月没有提出实际的措施来调整美国银行系统的资本结构导致的结果一样。


The current financial crisis is different from all the others we have experienced since World War II.	当前的金融危机不同于自二战以来我们经历过的所有金融危机。


On previous occasions, whenever the financial system came to the brink of a breakdown, the authorities got their act together and pulled it back from the brink.	以前的金融危机，金融系统无论何时濒临崩溃，政府都会齐心协力，把它从崩溃的边缘挽救回来。


This time the system actually broke down in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse last September, and it had to be put on artificial life support.	这次，在去年9月莱曼兄弟投资公司倒闭之后，金融系统实际上已经崩盘，并且不得不借助人为的支持。


Among other measures, both Europe and the US have effectively guaranteed that no other important financial institution will be allowed to fail.	在其他措施中，欧洲和美国双方都曾有力地保证不再允许其他金融机构破产。


This step was necessary, but it produced unintended adverse consequences: many other countries, from Eastern Europe to Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, could not offer similarly convincing guarantees.	此项措施是必要的，但它却无意造成了不利后果：从东欧到拉丁美洲、非洲以及东南亚，许多国家无法同样提供令人信服的担保。


Abetted by the determination of national financial authorities at the center of the world economy to protect their own institutions, capital fled from the periphery. Currencies fell, interest rates rose, and credit default swaps soared.	由于受到世界经济中心各国金融机构决定保护自己的金融机构、资本领地免遭外围损害的怂恿，货币贬值，利率上升，信贷违约互换飙升。


When the history of this crisis is written, it will be recorded that – in contrast to the Great Depression – protectionism first prevailed in finance rather than trade.	当这次金融危机被编入史册时，它将被如此记录下来：与大萧条期形成鲜明对比，保护主义首先在金融领域盛行，而不是贸易领域。


The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are now faced with a novel task: to protect the periphery countries from a storm that emanated from the center.	国际金融机构（IFIs）现在面临一项不同寻常的任务：保护外围国家免遭源自世界经济中心的金融风暴的损害。


They are used to dealing with governments; now they must learn to deal with the collapse of the private sector.	他们习惯了和各国政府打交道； 现在他们必须学着处理私营部门的金融危机。


If they fail to do so, the periphery economies will suffer even more than those at the center.	如果他们失败了，外围的经济系统将比身处世界经济中心的国家遭受更多的损害。


Countries on the periphery tend to be poorer and more dependent on commodities than the more developed world, and they must repay more than $1.4 trillion in bank loans in 2009 alone.  These loans cannot be rolled over without international assistance.	处于世界经济中心外围的国家与更为发达的国家相比往往更加贫穷，并比他们更加依赖商品贸易，而且他们单独2009年就必须偿还超过1. 4万亿美元的银行贷款。


British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recognized the problem and placed it on the G-20’s agenda.	英国首相戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）已经认识到这一问题，并把该问题提到G-20峰会议事日程上来。


But, in the course of preparations, profound attitudinal differences have surfaced, particularly between the US and Germany.	但在准备的过程中，各国，尤其是美国与德国之间深刻的态度差异已经显现出来。


The US has recognized that only using the credit of the state to the fullest extent possible can reverse the collapse of credit in the private sector.	美国已经承认，尽可能只使用国家信用就能逆转私营部门的信用危机。


Germany, traumatized by the memory of hyperinflation in the 1920’s and the consequent rise of Hitler in the 1930’s, is reluctant to sow the seeds of future inflation by incurring too much debt.	德国因无法忘记20世纪20年代恶性通货膨胀及以随之发生的希特勒独裁统治的创伤，不愿承受太多的债务导致播下未来通货膨胀的种子。


Both positions are firmly held and can be buttressed by arguments that are valid from the point of view of the country concerned. But the controversy threatens to disrupt the April 2 meeting.	两国所持立场坚定，并且都可以获得从国家立场考虑这一正当理由的支持。


It should be possible for each side to respect the other’s position without abandoning its own	在不放弃自己立场的前提下，各国尊敬别国的立场并找到一个共同点应该是能做得到的。 放弃为经济刺激计划而设定的各国拿出2%的GDP目标，就外围国家需要国家援助保护他们的金融系统和参与反周期的各项政策达成共识���足可实现的。


As things stand now, the G-20 meeting will produce some concrete results: the resources of the International Monetary Fund are likely to be effectively doubled, mainly by using the mechanism of the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB), which can be activated without resolving the vexing question of reapportioning voting rights in the IFIs.	照目前情况看，G-20峰会将会产生一些具体的结果：通过利用新借贷协议（NAB）的机制（如果没有解决国际金融机构重新分配投票权这一烦恼的问题，该协议可能会被激活），国际货币基金组织的财力很可能会有效加倍。


This will be sufficient to enable the IMF to come to the aid of specific countries in trouble, but it will not provide a systemic solution without conditionality.	这将足以促使国际货币基金组织对身处困境的特别国家伸出援助之手，但如果没有制约，它将不会提供一个系统性的解决方案。


Such a solution is readily available in the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).	这样的解决方案以特别提款权（SDR）的形式是可用的。


The mechanism exists and has already been used on a small scale.	这种机制早已存在，并已经被小规模的使用。


SDRs are highly complicated and difficult to grasp, but they boil down to the international creation of money.	特别提款权高度复杂并难以掌握，但他们都属于国际货币扩张行为。


Countries that are in a position to create their own money do not need them, but the periphery countries do.	能够自己制造货币的国家不需要特别提款权，但边缘国家需要。


Rich countries should therefore lend their allocations to the countries in need.	因而，富有的国家就应该把他们的货币配给量借给有需要的国家。


This would not create a budget deficit for rich countries.	这不会给富有的国家造成财政赤字。


Recipient countries would have to pay the IMF a very low interest rate: the composite average treasury bill rate of all convertible currencies.	接受贷款的国家必须付给国际货币基金组织非常低的利息：所有可自由兑换货币的复合平均财政汇率。


They would have free use of their own allocations, but the IFIs would supervise how the borrowed allocations are used to ensure that the borrowed funds are well spent. It is difficult to think of a scheme where the cost/benefit ratio is so favorable.	他们可自由使用自己的货币配给量，但是国际金融机构会监督借来的配给量作何用处，以保证这些借来的资金得到有效利用。


In addition to the one-time increase in the IMF’s resources, there ought to be substantial annual SDR issues, say, $250 billion, as long as the global recession lasts.	国际货币基金组织财力除了过去的增长之外，只要全球经济衰退持续下去，就应该有大量的年度特别提款权收益，大约2500亿美元。


To make the scheme counter-cyclical, the SDR issues could be callable in tranches when the global economy overheats.	当全球经济过热时，为了实施反周期计划，特别提款权收益就可以部分随时支取。


It is too late to agree on issuing SDRs at the upcoming G-20 meeting, but if it were proposed by President Barack Obama and endorsed in principle by the majority of participants, it would be sufficient to give heart to the markets and make the meeting a resounding success.	在即将来临的G-20峰会上就发行特别提款权达成共识已经太迟，但如果能获得总统巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）的提议，以及大体上获得多数参会国的赞同，就能给市场带来足够鼓舞，就足以使得这次大会获得圆满成功。


A Time to Spend	增加支出的时机


BERKELEY – The central insight of macroeconomics is a fact that was known to John Stuart Mill in the first third of the nineteenth century: there can be a large gap between supply and demand for pretty much all currently produced goods and services and types of labor if there is an equally large excess demand for financial assets. And this fundamental fact is a source of big trouble.	发自伯克利——英国经济学家约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒（John Stuart Mill）早在十九世纪初就道出了宏观经济的核心本质：一旦社会产生对金融资产的庞大需求，那么市面上几乎所有商品，服务和劳动力的供需都会由此产生巨大缺口，而这一基本事实则是大灾难的根源。


A normal gap between supply and demand for some subset of currently produced commodities is not a serious problem, because it is balanced by excess demand for other currently produced commodities.	某一小类商品出现正常的供需缺口并不是什么大问题，因为其他商品的超量生产足以填补这一缺口。


As industries suffering from insufficient demand shed workers, industries benefiting from surplus demand hire them.	那些需求不足的行业削减员工，而那些供不应求的行业则雇佣他们。


The economy rapidly rebalances itself and thus returns to full employment – and does so with a configuration of employment and production that is better adapted to current consumer preferences.	因此经济很快会再度恢复平衡，同时就业也全面复苏——并最终使就业和生产都朝着更适应消费者需要的方向发展。


By contrast, a gap between supply and demand when the corresponding excess demand is for financial assets is a recipe for economic meltdown.	与此相反，由当前对金融资产过度需求所引发的供需缺口则是经济衰退之源。


There is, after all, no easy way that unemployed workers can start producing the assets – money and bonds that not only are rated investment-grade, but really are – that financial markets are not adequately supplying.	毕竟那些失业工人无法轻易生产出那些金融市场无法足量提供的资产——须知货币和债券都需要专业投资级别的知识。


The flow of workers out of employment exceeds the flow back into employment.	因此失业者的数量要多于重新就业的劳动者数量。


And, as employment and incomes drop, spending on currently produced commodities drops further, and the economy spirals down into depression.	而随着就业和收入下降，对商品的消费也进一步下跌，整个经济随之逐步陷入萧条。


Thus, the first principle of macroeconomic policy is that because only the government can create the investment-grade financial assets that are in short supply in a depression, it is the government’s task to do so.	因此可以归纳出宏观经济政策的第一条原则：因为只有政府才能生产出萧条中紧缺的投资级别金融资产，所以它必须承担这一责任。


The government must ensure that the money supply matches the full-employment level of money demand, and that the supply of safe savings vehicles in which investors can park their wealth also meets demand.	政府可以确保货币供应与充分就业所需的货币量相符合，并提供足够的安全储蓄工具以供投资者们安置他们的财富。


How well have the world’s governments performed this task over the past three years?	那么这三年以来，世界各国的政府在这方面的表现又如何呢？


In East Asia (minus Japan), governments appear to have been doing rather well.	东亚地区（日本除外）的各国政府似乎都干得不错。


Shortage of demand for currently produced goods and services and mass unemployment no longer loom as the region’s biggest macroeconomic problems.	商品/服务需求短缺和大规模失业已不再是该地区最大的宏观经济问题。


Flooding their economies with liquidity, maintaining export-friendly exchange rates, and spending to employ workers directly and boost the supply of safe savings vehicles have made the Great Recession in East Asia less dire than it has been elsewhere.	通过提高经济体内部的流动性，维持有利于出口的汇率，直接出钱雇佣工人并供应足量安全储蓄工具等手段，东亚地区的大萧条状况比世界其他地区都更为轻微。


In North America, governments appear to have muddled through.	而北美地区的政府则属于侥幸蒙混过关的那类。


They have not provided enough bank guarantees, forced enough mortgage renegotiations, increased spending enough, or financed enough employment to rebalance financial markets, return asset prices to normal configurations, and facilitate a rapid return to full employment.	他们未能为银行提供足够的担保，在抵押贷款重新谈判方面也做得不够，也没能增加足够的政府支出或是资助足够的就业来实现金融市场的重新平衡，资产价格回复正常以及充分就业的迅速回归。


But unemployment has not climbed far above 10%, either.	所幸当前的失业率依然只比10%高一点而已。


The most serious problems right now are in Europe.	当前问题最严重的地方则是欧洲。


Uncertainty about how, exactly, the liabilities of highly leveraged banks and over-leveraged peripheral governments are to be guaranteed is shrinking the supply of safe savings vehicles at a time when macroeconomic rebalancing calls for it to be rising.	宏观经济的重新平衡需要增加安全储蓄工具的供应，但如何为那些高杠杆银行和过度杠杆的小国政府提供担保的不确定性却导致该工具供应量不断下降。


And the rapid reductions in budget deficits that European governments are now pledged to undertake can only increase the likelihood of a full double-dip recession.	此外各国政府当前承诺的迅速削减预算赤字方案只会增加经济二次探底的可能性。


The broad pattern is clear: the more that governments have worried about enabling future moral hazard by excessive bailouts and sought to stem the rise in public debt, the worse their countries’ economies have performed.	上述事例所体现出的基本规律其实很简单：政府越是担心过度援助所引发的未来违约风险并试图遏制债务上升，经济的表现越差。


The more that they have focused on policies to put people back to work in the short run, the better their economies have done.	政府越是推出能在短期内促进就业的政策，经济的表现越好。


This pattern would not have surprised nineteenth-century economists like Mill or Walter Bagehot, who understood the financial-sector origins of industrial depression.	估计穆勒和沃尔特·白芝浩��Walter Bagehot）这些十九世纪的经济学家也不会对这一规律感到惊讶，因为他们深知衰退的根源就是在财政部门。


But it does seem to surprise not only a great many observers today, but also a large number of policymakers.	但令人震惊的是，当今许多观察家和政策制定者却对此一无所知。


A Nuclear South Korea?	韩国成为有核国？


SEOUL – South Korean officials have recently realized that the United States is likely to try to forbid them from enriching uranium and expanding their country’s missile range, rather than leave these issues on the diplomatic back burner.	首尔——韩国官员近来发现美国很可能设法阻止其搞铀浓缩及扩大导弹射程，而不是对上述问题进行外交搁置。


Indeed, recent discreet talks, in which the US has disregarded South Korean efforts to supplement the controversial US-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which expires in March 2014, suggest that there are reasons to be deeply worried about the alliance’s future.	其实，美国在前不久的谨慎谈判中忽略了韩国对将于2014年3月到期的引发争议的美韩核合作协议进行补充的意愿，这表明对联盟未来的担心确有道理。


American negotiators – the reluctant midwives of South Korea’s increasing responsibility in the field of atomic energy – remain steadfast in their opposition to South Korea’s drive for improved defensive capabilities and a more advanced energy policy, despite the potential strategic benefits.	美国谈判代表并不乐于促成韩国在原子能领域承担更多责任，尽管确实存在潜在的战略利益，但他们依然坚定地反对韩国提升防御能力和能源政策。


But American nonproliferation experts do not anticipate progress on South Korea’s efforts to win support for its preferred policies until the US gains more leverage.	但在美国拿到更多筹码之前，美国的防扩散专家并不看好韩国能够为其优先政策赢取支持。


Such a stalemate is not new.	这样的僵局已经算不上新鲜事。


Nuclear talks between the two countries have often been characterized by poor communication and a lack of understanding.	韩美两国核谈判的特点往往是沟通不畅和缺乏了解。


While South Korean officials rarely say in public what they really think, it is widely believed that US policymakers have little motivation to reconcile with South Korea’s government right now – they would prefer to stifle South Korea’s increasingly loud demands.	虽然韩国官员很少在公开场合明确自己的想法，但人们普遍认为美国的决策者目前缺乏与韩国政府和解的动力——他们宁可扼杀韩国人越来越迫切的呼吁。


In the US-South Korea relationship’s heyday, American politicians considered the country an “extended arm of America.”	在美韩关系的全盛时期，美国政客曾把韩国形容为“美国伸出的手臂”。


Such condescension may have been defensible when South Korea’s military dictatorship needed America’s political protection and security guarantee, but now the country is a beacon of democracy in East Asia.	如此屈尊俯就的姿态在韩国军事独裁政权需要美国给予政治保护及安全保障时或许还勉强站得住脚，可现在韩国已经成为了东亚地区的民主范例。


So, while South Koreans understand the need for compromise and cooperation, they believe that the time is right for a more balanced partnership.	因此尽管韩国人理解妥协与合作的重要性，但他们仍然相信现在是时候建立更加平衡的伙伴关系。


This belief does not imply South Korean cynicism about nonproliferation.	这样的看法并不代表韩国对不扩散问题抱有玩世不恭的态度。


Rather, it reflects concern about a nuclear North Korea, compounded by anxiety over the recent US-Japan missile-defense accord.	相反，它反映出韩国对于朝鲜核问题的担忧，以及对近来美日导弹防御协议的关注。


Given that the US and South Korea have the same assessment of the intelligence regarding North Korea’s nuclear progress, not to mention South Korea’s vulnerability, their failure to reach a practical agreement is troubling.	鉴于美韩两国对反映朝鲜核进展的情报做出了相同的评估，更不用说韩国在面临核威胁时表现出来的脆弱性，两国未能达成实际协议的确是非常令人不安的结果。


Former Deputy Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo warned an American official in 2010 that revising the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement could soon become a “defining issue” in South Korea-US relations, and that it was already attracting “significant amounts of negative press attention.”	前外交部副部长千英宇曾在2010年警告美国官员，修改核合作协议或许很快会成为韩美关系中的“决定性要素”，并且正在吸引“大量的负面媒体关注”。


Given South Korea’s status as one of the world’s top five nuclear-power producers, Chun argued, the South Korean public would not tolerate the perception that Japan was receiving preferential treatment.	千英宇认为因为韩国位列世界前五大核电生产国，韩国公众无法容忍日本得到优惠待遇。


Indeed, right-wing leaders like Representative Chung Mong-joon of the governing Saenuri Party have been vocal in expressing their doubts about South Korea’s current denuclearization policy, suggesting that a nuclear weapons program could prevent a second war on the peninsula.	其实，以执政新国家党郑梦准议员为代表的右翼领导人已经明确表达了对韩国现行无核化政策的疑虑，提出核武计划或许能够防止朝鲜半岛再次爆发战争。


The conservatives seem to believe that American nuclear protection for South Korea is a thing of the past.	保守派似乎认为美国对韩国的核保护已经成为过去式。


Despite their hawkish approach to North Korea’s nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing remains only a distant possibility.	尽管面对朝鲜核威胁表现出强硬的态度，但韩国官员知道铀浓缩和乏燃料处理仍然只是遥不可及的可能性。


As a result, they are approaching negotiations skeptically, rather than emphasizing the sense of mutual obligation that should characterize the alliance.	因此，他们对谈判抱有怀疑的态度，对本应成为联盟标志的相互义务并不怎样看重。


But their pessimism is hardly groundless, given that the United Arab Emirates has already signed a similar agreement with the US declaring that it would not produce nuclear fuel.	但他们的悲观情绪并非毫无依据，因为阿拉伯联合酋长国已经与美国签署了类似协议，声明不会生产核燃料。


Indeed, South Korean negotiators appear convinced that they will not be able to make any headway with the US on the issue.	其实，韩国谈判代表似乎相信他们无法与美国就此问题取得任何进展。


(To be sure, this failure may not matter much, given South Korean scientists’ past declaration that they will not contribute to any nuclear program that could be used for military purposes.)	（可以肯定这一失败带来的问题不会太大，因为韩国科学家已经发表声明不会参与任何可用于军事目标的核计划。 ）


The US-South Korea debate over nuclear weapons should show both sides that their 59-year-old alliance urgently needs to be updated.	美韩在核武器问题上的争议应该向双方表明他们长达59年的联盟政策迫切需要修正。


Together, the allies can improve global prospects for nuclear nonproliferation, but only if they hammer out a grand bargain that accounts for South Korea’s current – and future – security concerns.	韩美联盟可以共同改善全球核不扩散前景，但前提是他们先要达成解决韩国现有及未来安全问题的大规模妥协。


A Tribute to Evil	向罪恶献贡


In May, the world will mark the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe.	今年五月，全世界将在欧洲纪念二战结束60周年。


But instead of happily preparing for that occasion, the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – which scarcely 15 years ago regained the independence they lost in WWII – are uneasy.	但在喜庆地为此典礼筹划准备之时，15年前才刚刚重获二战中失去的主权的波罗的海三国：爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛，却颇为不安。


The heads of state of all three countries have been invited to participate in the parades to be held in Moscow to celebrate the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany.	这三国首脑已被邀请参加即将在莫斯科举行的游行，庆祝苏联红军战胜德国纳粹。


But the host of the celebration, Russia, in the guise of the Soviet Union, itself caused the war – the bloodiest in European history – whose end is being commemorated.	但是，正是这场庆典的东道主，俄罗斯，在苏联的名义下，发动了欧洲历史上最为血腥的战争，现在纪念的正是这场战争的结束。


Of course, the USSR instigated the war in tandem with Adolf Hitler, but its responsibility is undeniable.	当然，苏联与阿道夫·希特勒一前一后发动战争，但是它的责任无法推卸。


By holding these celebrations in Red Square, and thus highlighting the Soviet victory, today’s Russia is also celebrating its gains in that war.	今日的俄罗斯通过在红场举行庆典，强调突出苏联的胜利，来庆祝他们在那场战争中的战利品。


One of those gains was my country, Lithuania, whose incorporation into Stalin’s empire was accompanied by countless tragedies.	其中之一就是我的祖国，立陶宛。 在被吞并入斯大林帝国的过程中，伴随着她的是无数的人间悲剧。


Unlike Germany, Russia has never recognized its responsibility for the war and the mass graves of the innocent.	与德国不同，俄罗斯从未承认过它对战争以及无数无辜平民的墓冢所应负的责任。


Thus, a former captive nation is now being invited to celebrate its captivity.	就这样，一个曾被侵略国家现在被邀请去庆贺它的被侵历史。


This is why almost all Lithuanians – indeed, most residents of the Baltic countries – feel queasy at the prospect of their leaders marking this anniversary in Moscow.	这就是为什么所有的立陶宛人——事实上大部分波罗的海国家的居民——都对他们的国家领导人前去莫斯科参加这场纪念活动颇感不适。


But Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are not the only Europeans who should feel this way.	但是欧洲内有相同感受的还不止爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛人。


When Stalin offered Hitler his friendship in the spring of 1939 – formally concluded that summer in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – Nazi aggression was assured of not being knifed in the back from the East and so was left with free hands to do as Hitler pleased in the West.	斯大林在1939年春天为了向希特勒示好（原本根据Molotov-Ribbentrop秘密协定是在夏天），保证在纳粹对西欧进攻中，其后方将不会受到东面攻击，也就是说将西欧完全留给希特勒为所欲为。


The Pact came after the pogroms of “Kristallnacht” in Germany, so its Soviet initiators knew pretty well to what destiny they were consigning the Jews of Poland and Lithuania, which, in accord with the first secret Protocol signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov on August 23, 1939, were to go to Hitler.	该协定是在德国“水晶之夜”屠杀后制定的，所以该协议的苏联起草者非常清楚，根据1939年8月23日纳粹德国外交部长Ribbentrop和苏联外务委员会委员莫洛托夫Molotov签订的第一个秘密协议，他们把波兰和立陶宛的犹太人的命运交付给了希特勒。


A month later, in equal secrecy, Hitler sold Lithuania to Stalin.	一个月后，同样也是秘密地，希特勒将立陶宛卖给了斯大林。


The other countries situated between Germany and the USSR were similarly sentenced to disappear as nations – sooner or later.	地处德国与苏联之间的其他国家也相同地被判了亡国的死刑——只是时间早晚的问题。


Their peoples were treated practically as though they did not exist; the aggressors’ only concern was territory.	他们的民族被当作几乎不存在一样对待，入侵者唯一关心的就是领土。


The death sentences and torturing that were then imposed on almost entire nations and millions of people are, it now appears, to be silently accepted and noisily celebrated on May 9 in Moscow.	当时被强加于整个国家和几百万人民身上的死刑和折磨，现在看来，即将在今年5月9号在莫斯科再次被默默忍受并大张旗鼓地庆贺。


Some Russian officials want to unveil a monument Stalin to crown the festivities.	一些俄罗斯官员还要揭幕一座斯大林纪念碑来庆贺这个盛典。


When Hitler’s Wehrmacht struck West, the USSR duly supported Germany in its war against Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom.	当希特勒的纳粹德国国防军进攻西欧时，苏联不失时机地支持德国对波兰、法国、比利时、荷兰、卢森堡、丹麦、挪威和英国发动战争。


As a result, cities in those countries were flattened and people killed not only by the Nazis, but also by their Soviet ally, which invaded Poland and supplied the Wehrmacht with the material it needed for its war against the West.	结果，这些国家中的城市被一一铲平，杀害平民的不仅有纳粹，还有入侵波兰为纳粹德国国防军提供西线战争所需物资的苏联军队。


In return, Stalin’s USSR was given a free hand to attack Finland and to occupy Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as a part of Romania.	作为回报，斯大林的苏联得以全举进攻芬兰，占领爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛，以及罗马尼亚一部分地区。


In law, when two criminals seal a contract with the blood of their victims, that act remains a crime, even if the two criminals later have a falling out and spray bullets at one another.	在法律中，当两个罪犯用受害人的鲜血密封一份契约时，这种行为已经构成犯罪，即使那两个罪犯后来发生争执举枪射杀彼此。


The same applies to the two greatest European criminals of the twentieth century.	这也适用于二十世纪欧洲的两大罪人。


We must not forget the crimes that Hitler and Stalin committed together as de facto allies only because they later turned on each other.	我们决不能仅仅因为希特勒和斯大林后来反目成仇就忘记他们结成同盟时共同犯下的罪行。


The blood of WWII’s victims calls for justice and fairness, but most of all it demands honesty about who and what caused their tragic fate.	二战受害者的鲜血要求得到正义和公平，但是最重要的是要诚实以对这个问题：究竟是谁、什么导致了他们的悲惨命运。


If those who gather in Moscow on May 9 do anything to validate Soviet war crimes, they will show themselves insensitive to the silent cries of WWII’s tens of millions of dead innocents.	如果那些5月9日聚集在莫斯科的人们作了任何认可苏联战争罪行的事情，那么他们就是对二战中千百万的无辜亡灵沉默的呼喊声无动于衷。


The only real winner would be the spirit of that evil.	真正的唯一的赢家将会是那场罪恶背后的幽灵。


A Tribute to James Wolfensohn	感谢詹姆斯•沃尔芬森


Over the past decade, the global economy has achieved unprecedented prosperity built on trade, international capital flows, and technological innovation.	过去十年间，全球经济因为贸易发展、国际资金流动以及技术革新达到空前繁荣。


Amidst this undeniable progress, however, remain widespread poverty, disease, and illiteracy.	然而，在不容否认的进步中，仍旧普遍存在着贫穷、疾病和文盲。


In a world made smaller by modern telecommunications, satellite TV, and the Internet, the vast challenges of development that we continue to face confront us everyday.	在被现代通讯、卫星电视、和因特网逐渐缩小的世界里，我们每天都将面临着发展的巨大挑战。


Perhaps no individual has done more to raise the alarm – earning deserved credit for many successes and understanding all too clearly the remaining shortcomings – than James Wolfensohn, the outgoing President of the World Bank.	可能没有谁像即将离任的世界银行行长詹姆斯·沃尔芬森这样发出警告：他一方面由于众多的成功而声名雀起，另一方面又对尚未解决的问题了如指掌。


As Managing Director of the IMF, I have had the privilege of working closely with Jim Wolfensohn, seeing up close a man with an extraordinary mission: the sustainable reduction of global poverty.	作为国际货币基金组织的常务理事，我有幸和吉姆·沃尔芬森在工作上保持密切联系，从而得以近距离了解这个肩负着不断减少全球贫困的特殊使命的人。


Wolfensohn left a successful business career to lead the global campaign against poverty.	沃尔芬森放弃了辉煌的商业生涯，转而领导这场对抗贫困的全球性战役。


It is perhaps the ultimate tribute to his commitment and tenacity that his efforts over the past 10 years have attracted criticism as well as praise, for he has stood at the center of every major campaign aimed at alleviating the economic ills of our generation.	在过去十年间，他的努力曾遭遇批评，但也受到过赞扬，这大概是体现他忠诚敬业和坚韧性情的最好证明。 因为在每次主要战役中，他都坚守在战场的中心，力图缓解我们这一代面临的每一次经济困境。


Wolfensohn led the World Bank onto the cutting edge of every important development debate, and was at the forefront of the effort to combat HIV/AIDS, as well as other deadly diseases that threaten so many impoverished countries.	针对每次重要发展而展开的讨论中，沃尔芬森都带领世界银行走在最先面，在抗击艾滋病及其它威胁贫困国家的重大疾病的战斗中他也始终走在最前面。


He has been a forthright spokesman for women’s rights and a champion of environmental concerns, as well as a formidable advocate in arguing for debt reduction for the most heavily indebted nations.	他曾是妇女权利的代言人，环境保护的支持者，也是不屈不挠为最大的负债国争取减免债务的倡导者。


He also has placed the World Bank at the center of the effort to help rebuild nations emerging from devastating civil conflict, from Bosnia to Sierra Leone to East Timor.	他还带领世界银行付出了巨大的努力，帮助从波斯尼亚、塞拉里昂到东帝汶这些从内战中苏醒过来的国家进行重建。


As World Bank president, Wolfensohn argued consistently that the world cannot be divided into “haves” and “have-nots.”	作为世界银行行长，沃尔芬森始终坚持：世界不应该被分成“富国”和“穷国”。


Poverty anywhere means poverty everywhere, and equitable growth is needed for the stability and security of all.	一个地区出现贫穷，就意味着到处都是贫穷。 任何国家的稳定和安全都需要发展平衡。


Indeed, that is the true meaning of globalization.	的确，这才是“全球化”的内涵所在。


At the same time, Wolfensohn made a big contribution to development work by arguing that poverty must be treated as a multidimensional problem.	同时，沃尔芬森为发展问题做出了巨大贡献，他认为：我们必须把贫穷当作一个多维问题看待。


It is now widely accepted that financial assistance alone will not bring about effective poverty reduction.	现在被普遍接受的观点是：单纯的经济援助并不能有效遏制贫困。


Rather, sustainable, pro-poor growth is the key, requiring political stability – that is, peace and security for individuals – good governance, and ownership of policies by all stakeholders.	可持续的、有利于穷人的经济增长才是关键。 而这需要政治稳定¾即对个体而言的和平与安定¾推行善政以及利益各方对政策的共同参与。


Under Wolfensohn, the World Bank followed through on this comprehensive and coordinated approach in a concrete fashion, making significant inroads into global poverty.	在沃尔芬森的领导下，世界银行以具体行动坚持行进在这条全面与协作的道路上，有力打击了全球性贫困。


In the last 10 years, the Bank was the largest external financier of primary education, basic health care, HIV/AIDS programs, and programs aimed at protecting the environment and biodiversity. This agenda goes to the heart of improving human dignity and maintaining sustainable development.	在过去十年间，世界银行一直是初级教育、基础卫生保健、抗击艾滋病计划以及保护环境和生态多样化最大的外部资助者。


Wolfensohn’s insistence that corruption be confronted as part of the development process was another valuable step forward. It used to be that even mentioning corruption in some official circles was considered taboo.	沃尔芬森认为腐败是发展进程的组成部分，又向前迈出了有价值的一步，因为过去在某些官僚圈子里，即使提一下“腐败”这个词似乎都是很忌讳的。


But corruption poses the single largest obstacle to growth and development in many countries, especially as it diverts resources from the poor.	但在许多国家，腐败成了阻碍发展唯一最大的障碍，尤其因为它侵占穷人的资源。


The World Bank insisted that corruption be seen as a cancer, and that fighting it be made synonymous with fighting poverty.	世界银行坚持认为：腐败就像癌症，反对腐败就如同对抗贫困。


Indeed, outspokenness was a hallmark of Wolfensohn’s tenure.	的确，直言不讳似乎是沃尔芬森任期期间的一大特点。


Many a government minister, Bank officer and NGO representative has experienced his blunt criticism, as well as his effusive praise. The IMF has not been immune to this treatment.	许多政府部长、银行官员和非政府组织代表既遭遇过他生硬的批评，也受到过他慷慨的赞誉，国际货币基金组织自然也不例外。


The strength of the Bretton Woods institutions lies in intellectual diversity, and the Fund benefited from Wolfensohn’s honesty, as well as from his commitment to Bank-Fund cooperation, which progressively deepened during the past decade.	布雷顿森林体系的力量来源于理念的多样化，另外沃尔芬森的正直以及他不懈推行银行资金合作的努力，也为基金组织提供了资金帮助。 这一合作正在过去的十年间日益深化。


The work of our two institutions — in areas as diverse as poverty reduction strategies, debt relief, and the unheralded joint program to analyze financial sectors in our member countries — strengthened the global economy.	我们两大机构的工作¾涉及减少贫困、免除债务、以及前所未有的对成员国金融部门进行分析的合作项目¾巩固了全球经济发展。


Ultimately, development is about people.	从根本上说，发展是人的发展。


Jim Wolfensohn’s greatest strength has been his genuine caring for the world’s poor. His legacy will include a World Bank that is firmly committed to a world free of poverty.	吉姆·沃尔芬森最强大的力量体现在他对世界贫穷人口的关注，他留给我们的是致力于消除世界贫困的世界银行。


The poor around the world may feel poorer from losing him as their champion and advocate.	全世界的穷人会因为失去他而愈加困窘，因为沃尔芬森是他们的拥护者和支持者。


In fact, their prospects are brighter because of his work over the past decade.	实际上，正是由于他过去十年的工作，他们的前景才变得明亮起来。


A Triumph for “Old Europe”	“老欧洲”的胜利


Italy may have defeated France to win the World Cup, but the real winner was the “Old Europe” that Donald Rumsfeld once derided.	意大利可能击败了法国获得了世界杯，但是真正的赢家是曾经被拉姆斯菲尔德所诟病的“老欧洲”。


After all, who would have predicted a World Cup final between France and Italy?	毕竟，谁会预料到世界杯冠军决赛在法国和意大利之间进行呢？


It looks as if the national teams of the two “sick men of Europe,” felt obliged to change their countries’ images in the world.	这看起来好像是两个“欧洲病夫”的国家队觉得有义务改变它们国家在世界上的形象。


In the Italian case, following the corruption scandals that have nearly sunk Il Calcio, Italy’s premier football league, the national team had to rehabilitate the game in the eyes of their fellow citizens.	对于意大利而言，在几乎将意大利超级足球联赛毁于一旦的腐败丑闻之后，意大利国家队不得不在同胞们的心目中为这一运动平反。


More globally, however, it is as if “Old Europe” had decided that it was time to set the record straight and prove more dynamic than the world’s emerging forces.	但是，就更为全球化的范围而言，这好像是“老欧洲”决定现在是拨乱反正、证明自己比世界上的新兴力量更为富有活力的时候了。


Indeed, in the new global balance, where football has become much more than sport, Europe is back with a vengeance.	确实，在新的全球平衡中，足球已经成为超越体育的项目，欧洲卷土重来，咄咄逼人。


What has been unfolding in front of our eyes in the last four weeks has been a modern and reduced version of the balance-of-power system that dominated Europe and the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.	过去四周以来在我们眼前所展现的是一个现代和简化了的力量平衡体系版本。 这一体系在十八世纪和十九世纪统治着欧洲和世界。


If football and its culminating moment, the World Cup, has become the universal religion of the global age, this is above all because it fulfills, in a non-spiritual way, contradictory instincts in human nature.	如果足球及其顶峰时刻的世界杯已经成为全球化时代的大一统的宗教，那么，这一宗教尤其如此，因为它以一种非精神的方式满足了人类本性中矛盾的本能。


Football magnifies the cult of the individual and the glorification of the hero, but it is also a celebration of the cooperative team spirit.	足球渲染了个人崇拜以及对英雄的颂扬，但是，它同时又是对集体合作精神的赞美。


More than any other collective activity, it channels the search for identity and identification that dominates our age.	足球要比其他任何集体活动更能够引导寻求占据当今时代的身份特征。


Thanks to the World Cup, one is a citizen of the world, enjoying a spectacle together with billions of others on “Planet Soccer.”	由于世界杯，人们成为了世界公民，和“足球星球”的其他几十亿人一同观赏壮观的比赛。


Even in Washington, where I arrived at the beginning of the tournament, I was greeted at the airport by television screens showing the game.	甚至当我在世界杯赛开始之际抵达华盛顿的时候，我在机场看到电视屏幕在转播比赛。


The program was in English, but the advertisements were in Spanish.	这是一个英语节目，但是广告却是西班牙语。


In terms of football at least, the Hispanic community’s influence has brought the United States closer to Europe (though not, of course, in its team’s performance on the pitch).	至少对于足球而言，西班牙裔社区的影响力把美国拉近了欧洲（当然，尽管不是美国队在足球场上的成绩）。


At the same time, during the World Cup, fans are not only universal; they are also unique, and they can express their difference with impunity, sometimes in the most assertive, aggressive, and, unfortunately, occasionally racist manner.	与此同时，球迷们在世界杯期间不仅是全球一家，而且是独一无二。 他们可以无所顾忌地表达他们的不同，有时候以最为外露、攻击性以及有时不幸的是种族主义的方式进行。


In a world of “multiple identities,” to choose one’s team is in part to decide who one is.	在一个“多元身份”的世界里，选择自己的球队在某种部分上就是选择自己是谁。


From this standpoint, this year’s World Cup has not only witnessed the triumph of European nations – all semi-finalists were European for the first time since 1982 – but also the absence of even a glimmer of European emotions.	根据这一观点，今年的世界杯不仅见证了欧洲国家的胜利，因为自从1982年以来第一次欧洲国家包揽全部半决赛队伍，而且，也没有哪怕一丝欧洲情感。


In my country, France, most supporters were clearly motivated more by post-colonial references than by European allegiance.	在我的国家法国，大多数支持者们很明显更多地是受到后殖民因素、而非对欧洲的效忠的鼓动。


African teams, except when they were playing against France, were favored over those from the European Union.	除了对手是法国队的情况下，球迷们比来自欧盟国家的队伍更偏好非洲球队。


As I watched the Croatia-Australia match early in the tournament, I surprised myself, too, as I realized that my emotions were with the Australian team, whatever that could mean, given that there were so many Croatians playing for Australia.	当我在大赛初期观看克罗地亚对澳大利亚比赛的时候，我也对自己感到惊奇，因为我意识到我的情绪在澳大利亚一边。 由于有如此多的克罗地亚人为澳大利亚队效力，这一感觉意味着很多事情。


This deep search for identification should not be confused with a simple surge of nationalism.	这一对身份的深刻的寻求不应当与简单的民族主义高涨相混淆。


Reality is more complex.	现实更为复杂。


And this is not only because many coaches of the national teams are, like in the good old days, “foreign mercenaries,” with this Cup’s Swiss guards including the Brazilian coaches of Japan and Portugal, the Swedish coach of England, and the French coach of Tunisia.	而且，这并不仅仅因为许多国家队的教练用美好的老时光的话来讲是“外国雇佣军”，包括日本和葡萄牙队的巴西教练、英格兰的瑞典教练以及突尼斯的法国教练。


The Cup’s explosions of proud nationalism hide more tortured realities.	本届世界杯中民族主义爆发隐藏了更为残酷的现实。


Nostalgia is not what it used to be.	怀旧已经不再是以前的东西了。


In 1998, when France won the Cup for the first time, the three colors of the French flag (blue, white, and red) were celebrated alongside with the three colors (“black, white, and	当法国队在1998年第一次赢得世界杯的时候，人们连同法国国旗三色（蓝色、白色和红色）和另外三种法国队队员的颜色（黑色、白色以及出生在法国的北非移民后代的皮肤颜色）一同欢庆。 但是，由于现在再也不可能颂扬法国融入模式的胜利，因此，这一纯真已经丧失了。


Indeed, after the violent episodes of the last year, France’s immigrant communities have a very different message to deliver: “Without us, you would not have had this World Cup success.	的确，经过了去年的暴力事件，法国的移民社区有了一个大不相同的信息要传达给人们，那就是：“没有我们，你们不会有这次世界杯的成功。


Do you believe you can continue to ostracize the communities from which your soccer heroes come?”	你们还相信你们可以继续孤立产生你们的足球英雄的社区吗？ ”


From ping-pong diplomacy with China to the united German Olympic team that competed in 1990 before actual reunification, sport has prefigured political developments, and politicians everywhere have seized on the importance of the World Cup.	从与中国的乒乓外交一直到德国队在1990年实际统一的比赛之前，体育成为政治发展进程的先兆，而各地的政治家们则抓住了世界杯的重要性。


Football success has become part of countries’ “soft power.”	足球的成功已经成为各国“柔性力量”的一部分。


France may not have the military might of the US or the growth rate of China and India, but its team reached the World Cup championship, raising its standing in the eyes of billions of people – and perhaps giving a reprieve to its unpopular government.	法国不一定具备美国的军事力量或者中印两国的经济增长率，但是它的足球队却进入世界杯决赛，从而在几十亿人的眼中提升了它的地位，也暂时解救了不受欢迎的法国政府。


But sport can also become a kind of gigantic, distracting screen behind which nasty regimes do outrageous things – the very opposite of the Olympic and World Cup spirit.	但是，体育也有可能成为一种巨大的分散注意的幕帐，恶劣的政权在这一幕帐后面从事令人发指的事情。 这是与奥林匹克和世界杯精神背道而驰的。


As the world was watching the football games in Germany, North Korea was testing long-range missiles and Palestinians in the governing Hamas launched attacks on Israel that prompted a bloody invasion of Gaza.	正当全世界都在观看德国世界杯足球赛的时候，北韩却在试射远程导弹，而哈马斯政府的巴勒斯坦人对以色列发动攻击，促使了以色列对加沙地带的流血性入侵。


The World Cup is drama, excitement, a dream, but it is also a form of “global escapism.”	世界杯是戏剧、激愤以及梦想，但是它又是“全球性逃避现实”的一种形式。


Football may explain the world, but it does not improve it.	足球可能可以解释这个世界，但是并无法改良世界。


And now we are back to reality.	现在我们又回到了现实。


Attacking French Hopelessness	如何医治法国的无可救药


As French cities have burned, other countries have been very severe in judging France.	当骚乱席卷法国城市时，其他国家对法国的评价十分严厉。


Embassies have issued warnings to tourists and their citizens living in France; television news programs have shown hours of footage of burning cars.	各国使馆向旅游者和居住在法国的本国公民发出了警告； 电视新闻节目连续数小时播放汽车燃烧的画面。


Other countries’ governments, it seems, have been trying to distance themselves from the problem, fearing a contagion that they know is likely to spread.	其他国家政府由于担心这一问题会波及到本国而看起来已经在同这一问题拉开距离。


Mayors across Europe, however, have responded more moderately, feeling and showing solidarity with the plight of their French colleagues.	但是，欧洲各国的市长们则对此作出了更为温和的反应，并同他们深受骚乱之苦的法国同行们团结一致。


They know that their cities are also vulnerable to urban violence, in so far as they have pockets of social inequality, including marginalized and excluded young people.	他们知道，只要存在社会不平等的问题，包括边缘化和受到排挤的年轻人，他们的城市也有可能遭受城市暴力袭击。


The specificity of the French situation is that the revolt is targeted against the state, and more precisely against the police forces.	而法国的情况的特殊性在于，骚乱针对的是国家，更为准确地说是针对警察。


Unlike recent riots in the United Kingdom, which were inter-ethnic, the confrontations in France put their participants face to face with the police.	英国最近的骚乱发生在种族之间，与此不同，在法国的对抗中，骚乱参与者与警察针锋相对。


Indeed, there is no specific religious or ethnic character to these riots, in so far as youth from various ethnic backgrounds have taken part.	实际上，尽管不同种族背景的年轻人参与了骚乱，这些骚乱中并没有特别的宗教或种族特征。


Minority youth are, to be sure, over-represented among those involved.	的确，在骚乱份子中，少数族裔的青年占据大多数。


This is easily explained by their geographic segregation, higher levels of unemployment, higher school dropout rates, and disproportionately frequent interactions with the criminal justice system.	他们在地理上隔离，失业率和辍学率高于他人，而且经常落入犯罪司法体系，其比例奇高无比。


But, in view of the diversity of the young people convicted so far, it would be a mistake to say that these riots are the result of Muslim radicalization.	但是，被判刑的年轻人目前为止成份多样。 有鉴于此，断言这些骚乱是穆斯林极端主义的结果是错误的。


There is absolutely no indication so far that organized networks or religious groups are manipulating these youth.	目前为止，绝对没有迹象表明有组织的网络或宗教团体在操纵这些年轻人。


Of course, this is not to say that Muslim radicals will not exploit the disarray if a satisfying resolution is not found rapidly.	当然，这并不是说，如果无法迅速找到满意的解决办法，穆斯林极端份子就不会混水摸鱼。


The rioting may not be organized - no clear leaders or political demands have emerged.	由于没有出现明显的领导人或政治要求，这场骚乱可能是没有组织的。


Yet these violent acts can be viewed as a political conflict in the sense that young people are directly challenging the state by attacking its representatives.	但是，这些暴力行为可以被视做政治冲突，因为，年轻人通过袭击国家的代表直接挑战国家。


The violence seems to be proportional to these disenfranchised young people’s sense of perceived injustice and the lack of opportunities for them to express themselves.	这些被剥夺权利的年轻人感觉社会不公，缺乏机会表达心声。 这场暴力活动似乎与他们的感受成比例。


In this sense, France is paying the price for the lack of continuity, coherence, and appropriate funding given to social development policies over the past 30 years.	在这一含义上，法国正在为它过去30年来的社会发展政策缺乏连续、协调一致以及适当的资助而付出代价。


Although these policies have undoubtedly helped residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods, they have not been sufficiently ambitious to dampen resentment.	尽管这些政策无疑帮助了处于不利地位的社区居民，但是，它们仍然雄心不足来抑制仇视。


One example of overly timid policies involves policing.	过度软弱的政策的例子之一是有关警力问题。


In the last few years, France has distinguished itself from other European nations by gradually abandoning community-based policing, which the government considers too “social” and prevention-oriented.	在过去几年中，法国因逐步放弃社区警力而与其他欧洲国家有所区别。 法国政府认为社区警力过于“社会化”而且注重防治。


While European police forces place prevention at the top of their agendas, France has chosen to treat it as a marginal goal.	欧洲其他国家的警察把防治作为第一要务，法国却把它作为边缘目标。


As a result, tensions between the police, who are increasingly perceived as “outsiders,” and residents have grown to all-time highs.	结果，警察日益被视为“外地局外人”，警察与居民之间的紧张关系达到前所未有的高度。


In the absence of a community-based approach, interactions with law-enforcement authorities are now limited to tense, conflict-ridden situations, reinforcing the confrontational atmosphere between rebellious youth and the police.	由于没有立足社区的解决办法，同执法机关的交往也就局限于紧张的、充满冲突的情况，进而加剧了反叛的年轻人和警察之间的对抗性气氛。


At the same time, the fact that police agents must intervene in places with which they are not familiar severely impedes their effectiveness.	与此同时，警察必须干预他们所不熟悉的地方，严重阻碍了他们的效力。


In the current violence, the police have unfortunately been placed in the position of sole representative of the state.	在当前的暴力事件中，警察不幸被置于国家的唯一代表的地位。


But all public actors, not just the police, must respond to urban problems.	但是，不仅仅是警察，而且是所有的公共机关都必须对城市问题作出反应。


First and foremost, mayors should be mobilized as mediators, because they are on the front line in implementing urban policy.	首先，也是最为重要的是，应当调动起市长作为调解人，因为他们处于实施城市政策的第一线。


When these policies fail, citizens hold mayors responsible.	当这些警察无计可施的时候，公民们也就拿市长们试问。


But mayors are also the most knowledgeable about communication links within their communities, and are thus the most capable of organizing effective partnerships to address and resolve local issues.	但是，市长们也对其社区内的沟通管道最为了解，因此也就最为有力地组织有效的合作伙伴来处理和解决当地的问题。


The events in France also point to the need, at the European level, to reinforce policies against discrimination and that promote social equality.	法国的事件还表明，必须在欧洲的层面上加强反对歧视、促进社会平等的政策。


Although these policies must be implemented at a local level, they should be catalyzed and supported by European institutions.	尽管这些政策必须在地方层面实施，但必须由欧洲机构来加以促进和支持。


Efforts in this area already exist, but it has become increasingly urgent that these efforts be strengthened.	已经有这一方面的尝试，但是扔亟待加强。


Equality and social cohesion form the backbone of liberty, justice, and security for European cities.	平等和社会协调构成欧洲城市的自由、正义和安全的基础。


This is why Europe’s mayors call upon European institutions to focus on social cohesion with the same commitment that has been invested until now in asylum and border controls.	这也就是为什么欧洲的市长们呼吁欧洲机构用目前为止处理难民和边境检查一样的承诺来集中处理社会协调问题。


Xi in Russia	习近平在俄罗斯


MOSCOW – The atmospherics surrounding Xi Jinping’s coming trip to Russia – his first visit to a foreign country as China’s new president – remind me of a slogan from my early childhood in the late 1950’s: “Russia-China, Friendship Forever.”	莫斯科—习近平来俄罗斯访问——这是他成为中国新主席后第一次出访——所带来的热氛让我想起了20世纪50年代末儿提时代的口号：“中苏友谊世代相传”。


The irony is that, even in that slogan’s heyday, Sino-Russian relations were deteriorating fast, culminating in spasms of combat along the Amur River in Siberia less than a decade later.	讽刺的是，即使在口号漫天的时代，中苏关系也很快地恶化了，不到十年，西伯利亚黑龙江地区就交上了火。


Is that slogan more valid now?	今天的口号会比当时更加真实吗？


After China opened up its economy and Russia emerged from the Soviet Union, bilateral relations entered a new stage.	中国经济开放以及苏联解体、俄罗斯诞生后，双边关系进入了新阶段。


Goodwill now prevails, but some of the old suspicions linger – and some new ones have emerged.	如今双方都带着良好的意愿，但昔日的怀疑仍然存在，新的怀疑也在滋生。


Xi’s visit is not expected to usher in any breakthroughs.	习近平的访问不会带来任何突破。


A few deals to export Russian hydrocarbons to China can be expected, but not much more.	可以期待会有一些向中国出口石油产品的新合同，但不会有大惊喜。


Nonetheless, the visit will highlight several important features of the bilateral relationship.	尽管如此，此次访问仍然彰显出双边关系的一些重要特点。


For starters, both the Russian and Chinese governments can afford to downplay the significance of their ties with the United States.	首先，俄罗斯和中国政府都有资本淡化它们与美国关系的重要性。


China views Russia as its strategic rear – and perhaps a base – in its escalating rivalry with the US (though not yet as an ally).	在与美国（尽管目前尚是盟友）日益升级的对峙中，中国将俄罗斯视为其战略后方甚至基地。


Russia’s leaders view Sino-American competition as a welcome addition to their country’s strategic weight, which, unlike China’s, is not being augmented by robust economic growth.	俄罗斯领导人将中美竞争视为增加俄罗斯战略分量的良机，与中国不同，俄罗斯的地位并没有因经济增长而增加。


The more the US challenges the inevitable expansion of China’s “security perimeter,” the better for Russia, or so the Kremlin’s strategists appear to believe.	美国越是挑战中国“安全边界”不可避免的扩张，对俄罗斯就越有利，至少克里姆林宫战略家是这样想的。


Meanwhile, the Sino-Russian relationship has achieved an unprecedented degree of warmth.	与此同时，中俄关系进入了前所未有的紧密期。


The Chinese are doing almost everything possible to placate Russian concerns.	中国人几乎在竭尽所能缓解俄罗斯的顾虑。


The old border disputes have been silenced.	昔日的边界争端已经平息。


The volume of trade is growing rapidly.	贸易量在快速增长。


Moreover, there has been no Chinese demographic expansion into Siberia, though many journalists and pundits have been peddling that story.	此外，中国也没有对西伯利亚实施人口侵略，尽管许多记者和专家一直在宣扬这个计划。


The number of Chinese residing in Russia – whether officially or clandestinely – amounts to 300,000.	居住在俄罗斯的中国人——包括合法和非法情况——大约在30万人。


Many more Chinese lived in the Russian Empire before the 1917 revolution.	1917年革命前居住在俄国的中国人要比这个数字多得多。


But, beneath the surface, unease in the bilateral relationship persists, partly for historical reasons.	但是，在表面之下，双边关系存在着隐忧，这部分是拜历史因素所赐。


Nationalist Chinese remember imperial Russia’s conquests, while many Russians have a morbid fear of the “yellow peril,” even though the Mongols conquered and reigned in China, while they were eventually repelled from Russia (not to mention that the Chinese never invaded Russia).	中国的民族主义者一直铭记着帝俄的侵略，而许多俄罗斯人则有着病态的“黄祸”恐惧，尽管蒙古人征服并统治的是中国，而在俄罗斯，他们最终被驱赶出境了（更不用说中国人从未入侵过俄罗斯）。


The more important reasons for the unease are the negative demographic trends in Russia’s far-eastern Trans-Baikal region, and the fear – shared by all of China’s neighbors – of overweening Chinese power.	隐忧更重要的原因是俄罗斯远东外贝加尔地区的人口负增长趋势以及对中国实力膨胀的担忧（这一点中国的所有邻国都感受得到）。


Indeed, the pundits have a point: if the current economic near-stagnation in Siberia persists, the world will witness a second, epic edition of Finlandization, this time in the east.	事实上，专家认为，如果西伯利亚维持当前近于停顿的经济趋势，那么世界将再一次经历大规模的芬兰化，这一次将发生在东方。


That might not be the worst scenario a country could face, but it is not the most pleasant prospect for Russians, given their deeply ingrained sense of their status as a great power.	这或许并非一国所能遇到的最坏情形，但也不是俄罗斯��所面临的最乐观情景，因为俄罗斯人自视为超级大国的观念早已根深蒂固。


This scenario is not inevitable, and it certainly will not be on the minds of Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin when they meet in Moscow.	这一情景并不是不可避免的，也必然不是习近平和俄罗斯总统普京在莫斯科会晤时的心中所愿。


China is in the throes of an identity crisis as it faces an almost inevitable economic slowdown and the need to implement a new growth model.	中国正面临着几乎不可避免的经济减速，经历着身份危机，需要实现新的增长模式。


Russia, meanwhile, is clearly suffering from an even deeper identity crisis.	与此同时，俄罗斯显然正陷入更深刻的身份危机。


It somehow survived the post-Soviet shock, and has now recovered.	俄罗斯从后苏联时代的冲击中活了下来，现在已经复苏。


Yet, for the last six years or so, Russia has been in a kind of limbo, with no strategy, no goals, and no elite consensus on a vision for the future.	但是，过去六年来，俄罗斯一直处于混乱状态，没有战略，没有目标，精英阶层对未来也没有形成一致愿景。


For Sino-Russian relations, such fundamental uncertainties may be a blessing.	对中俄关系来说，这一根本性不确定性或许是个好消息。


Both leaders can count on the other not to create additional problems, and even to help passively on geopolitical questions.	双方领导人可以预期对方不会制造新问题，甚至可以给地缘政治问题带来消极支持。


On Syria, for example, the two countries have shown that we are indeed living in a multipolar world.	比如，在叙利亚问题上，两国都向世界证明，我们生活在一个多极世界。


And those new oil and gas deals will buttress both economies.	新的油气合同也有助于两国经济。


In the long term, Sino-Russian relations will depend largely on whether Russia overcomes its current stagnation and, among other steps, starts to develop the vast water and other resources of the Trans-Baikal region.	从长期看，中俄关系在很大程度上取决于俄罗斯能否走出当前僵局并（通过其他措施）开始开发外贝加尔地区的丰富水资源和其他资源。


To do so, capital and technology will be needed not only from China, but also from Japan, South Korea, the US, and Southeast Asian countries.	果真如此的话，俄罗斯将不仅需要中国的资本和技术，也需要日本、韩国、美国和东南亚国家的资本和技术。


The Trans-Baikal region could relatively easily expand ties with the resource-hungry Asian economies, to the benefit of all.	相对而言，外贝加尔地区很容易发展与资源匮乏的亚洲经济体之间的关系，让所有各方都受益。


Even the labor problem is solvable, with millions of workers from former Soviet Central Asia – and perhaps from a gradually liberalizing North Korea – able to take part in the ambitious development that will be needed.	即便是劳动力问题也是可以解决的，只要来自前苏联中亚地区——甚至可能逐渐自由化的朝鲜——的工人能够参与地区开发所需要的雄心勃勃的项目。


But the first step is to start to create conditions in the region that make living and working there attractive to Russians.	但第一步是开始在该地区创造条件，生活和工作对俄罗斯人产生吸引力。


The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok last year created a mere enclave of development.	今年的符拉迪沃斯托克亚太经济合作峰会只创造了一块发展飞地。


A growth strategy for the whole region is yet to come.	全地区增长战略还没有出台。


If it does not, the current Sino-Russian entente cordiale is almost certain to sour.	如果这一情况继续，当前的中俄互相谅解局面几乎肯定会变质。


Russia will start to feel vulnerable, and will be pushed toward either geopolitical brinkmanship or submission to China’s will.	俄罗斯将产生脆弱感，对于中国的图谋，要么陷入地缘政治冒险主义，要么陷入投降主义。


At this point, however, relations between China and Russia appear to be far better than the mythical friendship of my childhood.	但是，此时此刻，中俄关系似乎比我儿提时代的虚幻友谊好得多。


Putin and Xi will do everything to emphasize that.	普京和习近平将竭尽全力强调这一点。


Audit the Fed?	审计美联储？


BERKELEY – The party platform adopted at the Republican National Convention includes a number of remarkable planks.	发自伯克利——本次共和党全国代表大会上通过的党纲中包含了若干引人注目的条款。


To a monetary economist, for example, the party’s proposal to restore some kind of metallic monetary standard is so outlandish as to be an almost irresistible target.	例如在一个货币经济学家看来，该党关于恢复某种金属货币本位制度的提议就诡异得就像一个几乎无法抗拒的（批判）目标。


More serious is the Republicans’ proposal for an annual audit of the United States Federal Reserve.	更严重的是共和党人还提议对美联储进行年度审计。


This, like the gold-standard plank, is partly designed to appeal to the libertarian followers of Ron Paul, the Texas congressman and perennial presidential candidate who is hugely popular with the Republicans’ “Tea Party” wing.	这跟重回金本位的条款一样，在某种程度上是为了吸引罗恩·保罗（Ron Paul）的自由论追随者——这位德克萨斯州参议员以及多年总统候选人如今成为了共和党“茶党”系的宠儿。


While Paul would go further, and abolish the Fed altogether, several bills in the US Congress have mandated an annual audit; earlier this year, one such bill was passed by the House of Representatives (but not the Senate).	虽然保罗可能会更进一步完全撤销美联储，但美国国会已经有几个法案对年度审计给予了授权； 今年早些时候，众议院就通过了这样一个法案（但并未获参议院批准）。


The Republicans’ embrace of the audit idea taps into libertarians’ general distrust of government.	共和党人对这个审计理念的采纳其实源自于自由论者对政府总体上的不信任。


But there is also distrust of the Fed on more specific grounds – distrust that extends well beyond the ranks of the Tea Party.	但对美联储的不信任还基于某些更具体的原因——这种不信任远远超越茶党的层次。


The Fed, its critics complain, has used its expansive powers to engage in a range of unprecedented interventions that have propped up large financial institutions.	美联储的批评者抱怨它利用其巨大的权力实施一系列史无前例的经济干预来支持大型金融机构。


So the monetary authorities, they argue, must be in the pockets of powerful bankers.	因此他们认定金融当局必定是银行界权贵的囊中之物。


To be sure, central bankers should be democratically accountable for their actions.	无可否认，中央银行家们的行为应当接受民主问责。


But accountability by audit would carry significant risks.	但通过审计来问责的做法可能存在巨大的风险。


Undertaken by politicians, an audit might be viewed as an opportunity to score political points or steer policy in self-serving directions, with delicate information leaked in order to pressure policymakers.	因为这些由政客承担的审计可能会被他们视为赚取政治分数或让政策为自身利益服务的机会，其手段则是刻意泄露信息来向政策制定者施压。


While monetary policy conducted by independent bureaucrats is imperfect, handing over effective control to congressmen with one eye on the next election would be infinitely worse.	既然由独立官员来执行货币政策都难言完美，那么把实际控制交付给总想着下届选举的议员肯定会极其糟糕。


The Republican platform notes that the audit would have to be “carefully implemented” to ensure that the Fed remains insulated from political pressures.	共和党党纲提到说审计要“谨慎实施”以确保美联储不会受到政治压力影响。


Indeed, it would.	但事实上，影响肯定会有的。


An audit would also reveal more details about financial-market interventions like those in 2008, when the Fed purchased mortgage securities from Bear Stearns and AIG.	审计也会揭露更多关于金融市场干预行动的细节，比如2008年美联储从贝尔斯登公司和美国国际集团（AIG）处购买抵押贷款证券的情况。


The risk here is that providing too much information in real time about the securities that the Fed is buying and the institutions that it is helping could destabilize markets.	此处的风险在于实时提供过多关于美联储购买受助机构证券的信息会影响市场稳定。


This danger is not hypothetical.	这种危险并不是凭空想象的。


We saw an example of it the last time there were massive government interventions in US financial markets – namely, during the Great Depression.	上一次政府大规模干预美国金融市场时——换句话说就是大萧条的时候——就能发现这样的例子。


In 1932, the Fed was unwilling to help stabilize a collapsing banking system.	1932年，美联储不愿出手稳定即将崩溃的银行系统。


But someone had to do something.	但总得有人出来做点什么。


So President Herbert Hoover created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an independent government agency, to aid illiquid but fundamentally sound banks.	所以时任总统的赫伯特·胡佛（Herbert Hoover）创立了一个名为复兴金融公司（Reconstruction Finance Corporation）的独立政府机构，用以援助缺乏流动资金但基础良好的银行。


The RFC’s largest loan in the summer of 1932 was to a bank run by former Vice President Charles Dawes.	1932年夏复兴金融公司数额最大的一笔贷款就是给前副总统查尔斯·道斯（Charles Dawes）经营的银行。


Not only was Dawes, like Hoover, a prominent Republican; he was also an ex-RFC official.	但道斯不仅和胡佛一样是名杰出的共和党人； 他还是复兴金融公司的前任官员。


Although Dawes refused to make use of his political connections when his bank was pushed to the brink, the RFC nonetheless faced accusations of favoritism.	即使道斯在自家银行濒临绝境时仍然拒绝利用其政治人脉，复兴金融公司依然遭到了偏袒的指控。


Populist members of Congress, predictably outraged, demanded an audit and insisted on publication of a list of all banks that the RFC had aided.	国会的民粹派议员不出所料地暴跳如雷，要求实施审计，并坚持要该公司公布所有受援银行名录。


Publication of that list in January 1933 led to a crisis of confidence in banks that were revealed to have borrowed from the government.	这份名单在1933年1月一经发布，公众立刻对那些被披露曾向政府借款的银行爆发了信任危机。


Bank runs started almost immediately and quickly engulfed the country, resulting in the Bank Holiday of 1933 – that is, in the forced closure of the entire US banking system.	各银行当即出现挤兑并顷刻席卷全国，结果出现了1933年的银行休假日——也就是强制关闭整个美国银行系统。


So it is not just political pressure that an audit must avoid. It must also avoid destabilizing financial markets and institutions.	因此审计不仅仅要避免政治压力，还必须避免影响金融市场和机构的稳定。


That requires aggregating information and allowing for suitable delay before publishing it.	这就要求能将信息汇总起来综合处理并允许在发布前存在适当的延迟。


Can we trust politicians to understand and respect this, especially in an election year?	我们能够相信政治家们（尤其是在选举年）去理解并遵守这一点吗？