But those returns are not risk-adjusted, which means that when the economy slumps, big losses are allocated – as American homeowners learned in 2008, Korean conglomerates learned in 1997, and governments in emerging markets learn repeatedly.	但这些回报未经风险调整，这意味着当经济衰退时，会出现巨大的损失——2008年美国房主就领教了这一点。 韩国财团在1997年也领教过，而新兴市场政府更是反复领教这一点。


Policymakers know that excessive debt brings financial fragility, of course, and some efforts at reform over the past decade have aimed to scale back leverage.	决策者知道，过度负债当然会带来金融脆弱，而过去十年中也采取了一些旨在降低杠杆的改革尝试。


But financial reform is hard to do during a slump, when the main task is to revive growth.	但金融改革在衰退期间很难推行，这时的主要任务是重振增长。


Official intentions often remain just that; time and again, political leaders find it easier simply to keep in place the existing system of rules, incentives, and guarantees.	官方目标常常保持不变，而政治领导人往往发现保持现有规则、激励和担保体系不变更容易。


And, because large financial firms do very well with a great deal of leverage, they continue to devote abundant lobbying resources to resisting efforts to ensure that they are better capitalized (with more shareholder equity relative to their total balance sheets).	而由于大金融企业动用大量杠杆而表现非常出现，它们也一直投入充足的游说资源抵制确保它们资本更加充足（增加股本相对资产负债表总规模的比例）的政策。


Indeed, the largest banks in the US – but also in most other countries – are even bigger today than they were before 2008.	事实上，美国大银行——大部分其他国家也是如此——如今比2008年前 更大了。


All candid accounts indicate their internal incentives are not much changed, and restrictions on their activities are unlikely to prove effective as global growth picks up.	所有公开账户都表明它们的内部激励没有发生多少变化，而随着全球经济增长的恢复，对它们的行为的余数也不太可能有效。


In the US, officials hold out hope that the largest financial firms will eventually be forced to comply with a provision of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation requiring that they draw up credible “living wills.”	在美国，官员们希望大金融企业最终会被迫遵守2010年多德-弗兰克金融改革立法中订立可信的“生前遗嘱”的条款。


Yet most big banks have repeatedly failed to produce plausible plans explaining how they could fail in bankruptcy without any government assistance and without damaging the world economy, and none has faced meaningful consequences for noncompliance.	但大部分大银行一直没有给出可靠的计划解释它们如何在不接受政府援助、不伤害世界经济的情况下倒闭，并且没有一���银行因为不遵守立法而面临实质后果。


Growth will return.	增长会回来。


Entrepreneurs will start new companies, and they will fund their risk-taking with equity investments provided by venture capital funds.	企业家仍在创办新公司，它们将通过风险资本基金提供的股权投资为他们的冒险融资。


Established nonfinancial firms have learned the hard way that they need to be careful with leverage and keep large cash cushions.	老牌非金融企业已沉痛的教训领教了它们需要谨慎对待杠杆，保持大量现金缓冲。


It’s the big banks that continue to prefer being highly leveraged.	而大银行仍然偏好高杠杆。


And too many policymakers are deferring to them.	太多的决策者屈从于它们。


Like it or not, that means we are in line for another stomach-turning round on the global economy’s wild ride.	不管你喜不喜欢，这意味着我们正在走向另一场翻江倒海的全球经济波动。


Bankers without Borders	无国界银行家


FRANKFURT – At the height of the financial crisis in 2008-2009, it seemed as if Western banks would pull up their foreign stakes and go home, leaving financial markets much more fragmented along national lines.	法兰克福——在2008—2009金融危机顶峰时期，人们都以为西方银行要卷起海外股份回国了，金融市场要陷入各回各家之局了。


But, as a new report by Deutsche Bank Research shows, banks’ cross-border business – direct or via branches or subsidiaries – has now broadly stabilized.	但是，德意志银行研究所的一份最新报告显示，银行跨国业务（不管是直接业务还是通过分行和子公司进行的业务）大体上已经企稳了。


During the crisis, the level of banking activity fell particularly strongly in capital-intensive areas such as traditional lending to the private sector.	在危机中，传统私人部门贷款等资本密集型领域的银行活动积极度下降得最为厉害。


The effect was especially pronounced in lending to non-financial companies, whereas lending to households – an area with traditionally lower internationalization – remained more robust.	其中又以贷向非金融企业的贷款受创最重，而家庭贷款——传统上这一领域国际化程度较低——则依然活跃。


In part, the decline was due to increased holdings of foreign public debt relative to private debt.	银行活动积极度的下降部分要归因于外国公债持有量相对私人债务的上升。


Prior to the crisis, banks had often been net sellers of foreign government bonds, but they significantly increased their purchases during 2008-2009.	危机前，银行通常是外国国债的净卖方，但在2008—2009年却在大举买入。


With the onset of the European sovereign-debt crisis in 2010, banks’ appetite for public debt fell again.	2010年，随着欧洲主权债务危机开始发酵，银行对公债的兴趣再次减退。


In contrast to lending activities, banks’ commitment to foreign markets has remained virtually unaffected with respect to purely intermediary activities such as investment banking and asset management.	与贷款活动形成对比的是，就纯中介业务（比如投资银行业务和资产管理业务）而言，各大银行的外国市场动作基本上没有受到任何影响。


Interbank relationships, as well as investment-banking operations, are already highly international.	与投资银行业务一样，银行业的同业关系早已进入了高度国际化。


The deep cross-border links between financial institutions and the activity of globally active investment banks only took a brief hit from the crisis.	金融机构之间的深度跨国联系以及活跃投行在全球范围内的积极活动在金融危机中并未受到多大影响。


By contrast, the importance of foreign markets for asset managers remains very limited and has not changed significantly since 2007.	相比之下，外国市场对资产管理者的重要性依然相当有限，自2007年以来并无显著变化。


Despite the recent setback, banks’ presence in foreign markets today is much greater overall than it was a few years ago.	尽管最近遭遇了些许挫折，但如今银行在外国市场上的形象要比几年前更加高大。


One reason is that revenue growth usually goes hand-in-hand with macroeconomic growth, which increasingly is found in emerging-market countries, rather than in many banks’ mature Western home markets.	原因之一是宏观经济增长通常总会带来收入增长，而当前新兴市场国家经济涨势正盛，与许多银行的西方母国形成了鲜明对比。


Moreover, private and public-sector debt levels tend to be much lower in the emerging economies.	此外，新兴市场的私人和公共部门债务也显著低于西方国家。


At the same time, geographically diversified institutions outperformed even during the recent global crisis, because they were less vulnerable to downturns in individual regions.	与此同时，即使是在全球危机期间，布局多样化的机构也取得了卓越的表现，这是因为它们受单一地区衰退的影响很小。


And, at least until a certain stage of growth, economies of scale and scope beckon, with expansion abroad often the only way to increase size, given already-saturated domestic markets.	规模经济和范围经济至少在进入到某一增长阶段之前都会存在，而向外扩张通常是唯一的扩大规模之路——因为国内市场早已饱和了。


Of course, integrated financial markets also benefit banks’ clients by enabling institutions to provide broader and higher-quality financial services at lower prices.	当然，一体化的金融市场也会使银行客户受益，因为金融机构可以提供更全面、更优质、更廉价的金融服务。


Furthermore, strong international financial partners are indispensable to multinational corporations, which often need global cash management or support for large-scale transactions.	此外，牢固的国际金融伙伴关系对跨国公司来说是不可或缺的——它们通常需要全球化的现金管理和大规模交易支持。


Given these advantages, the pace of internationalization has been swift.	这些优势的存在使得银行业快速地实现了国际化。


As recently as 2001, Europe’s top 20 banks still generated more than half of their revenues at home.	2001年，欧洲最大20家银行的年营收额有一大半来自国内。


By 2010, this share had fallen by 10 percentage points, to 42% – a remarkable decline that was interrupted only briefly by the financial crisis.	到了2010年，这一比重下降了10个百分点，变为42%——降幅令人瞩目，金融危机也只是略微干扰了一下这一趋势。


Interestingly, most large European banks’ prime investment destination was other European markets, not other parts of the world, raising Europe’s contribution to total revenue to nearly 30%, from less than 20% a decade ago.	有趣的是，大多数欧洲大银行的主要投资目标是其他欧洲市场，而不是世界其他地区，这使得欧洲市场对总营收额的贡献达到了近30%，而十年前这一数字为20%。


There may be two explanations for this: for one thing, Asia’s share in European banks’ revenues has probably risen.	造成这一现象的原因有二。


But this may have been offset by a decline in the proportion of earnings coming from the US.	一方面，亚洲在欧洲银行营收额中所占的比重可能在上升，但被来自美国的收入的下降抵消了。


And, while this reflects changes in relative importance, European banks’ business volumes might have increased in absolute terms even in the US, though at a slower pace than elsewhere.	这一现象反映了相对重要性的变化，但欧洲银行美国业务量的绝对值仍然是上升的，只是幅度必其他地区低。


Overall, the outlook for post-crisis international banking has turned positive.	总的来说，后危机时代国际银行业的前景已变得较为乐观。


But regulation could change that.	但监管可能改变这一状况。


In the current environment, with a renewed focus on regulating markets, institutions, and financial instruments, some international differences in scale, scope, and application of the new rules may be inevitable.	在当前环境下，人们的关注点重新回到了对市场、机构和金融工具的监管上。 不同地区的监管规模、范围和新规则难免会有所不同。


But, without a broadly consistent approach, the authorities risk creating a legal patchwork that would make cross-border banking less efficient, more expensive, and more difficult to conduct.	但是，如果没有广泛的一致方法，可能会出现各国监管各自为政的局面，跨国银行业务将因此变得效率更低、价格更高、也更难以驾驭。


Apart from discouraging banks from investing abroad, outright restrictions on foreign banks’ market access cannot be ruled out, either.	除了限制银行对外投资之外，对外国银行的市场准入实行完全限制也不是不可能。


The rapid growth in intra-European banking relations in the past decade was made possible to a large extent by the abolition of formal and informal barriers to foreign service providers.	过去十年来，欧洲内部银行业关系的发展十分迅速，之所以如此，很大程度上要归功于废除了针对外国服务供应商的正式和非正式壁垒。


Though this environment may not be fundamentally at risk, the current trend towards increasing capital requirements for international banks – reflected, for example, in calls for the establishment of independent subsidiaries with autonomous capital and liquidity pools – is clearly worrisome.	从根本上说，这一环境暂时还安然无恙，但目前的趋势——提高国际银行的资本要求——反映出人们有意要求建立拥有自有资本和流动性池子的独立子公司，让人深感忧虑


Nonetheless, given the relatively favorable outlook for cross-border banking, Western banks’ presence in emerging markets could strengthen further, while banks domiciled in these regions might start looking beyond national borders.	尽管如此，跨国银行业的前景还是令人欣喜的，因此西方国家在新兴市场的形象或许会得到进一步巩固，而当地银行也许也可能会考虑走出国门。


Traditional lending and deposit-taking still offers much growth potential – and may become more attractive relative to investment banking or asset management as a result of new regulation.	传统贷款和存款业务仍然是增长的一大源泉，而且在新的监管制度下，存贷款业务或许比投资银行和资产管理更具吸引力。


In that case, banking will become more like other industries that have benefited themselves and their customers by evolving into truly global networks.	果真如此的话，银行业将变得与其他产业更为相似——通过打造真正意义上的全球网络实现自己和客户的双赢。


Banking on the IMF	看你的啦，IMF!


CHICAGO – The biggest financial nightmare looming over the world economy is the insolvency of a large international bank.	发自芝加哥——对于世界经济来说，最大的金融噩梦莫过于某家大型跨国银行的破产。


Be it because of a sovereign default or because of large losses accumulated under complacent accounting rules, the insolvency of a large bank (particularly a European bank) is far from a remote possibility.	只要爆发主权违约，又或是由于过度自信的会计规则而积累了大量的亏损，一家大型跨国银行（尤其是欧洲银行）出现资不抵债的状况是完全有可能的。


Even if it were a remote possibility, the 2008 financial crisis has taught us that rare events occur.	而即便这一可能性非常微小，但2008年的经济危机已经告诉我们：再微小的可能也不是没可能的。


What makes this possibility the financial nightmare of choice, worse than the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, is the fear that many sovereign states have already shot all their bullets and would thus be powerless to intervene.	而这一比2008年雷曼倒闭更糟的经济噩梦之所以成为可能，就是因为人们担心许多主权国家已经耗尽了所有的资源，因此无力再采取介入行动。


Credit default swaps (CDS) of major southern European banks trade slightly lower than the CDS of their sovereign states, indicating that the market does not perceive the latter as able to support the former.	我们看到南欧地区各主要银行的信用违约互换（Credit default swaps ，CDS）交易价格都比其所属国家的CDS价格还要稍低一点，意味着市场预期政府将无法对银行予以支撑。


Unfortunately, almost two years after Lehman’s collapse, little has been done to address this risk.	但不幸的是，在雷曼破产近两年后，在应对这些风险方面的措施依然很少。


The United States Congress is about to finalize a bill that will grant resolution authority over major US financial institutions to a newly formed systemic council.	美国国会即将起草完成一项法案，计划新组建一个涵盖整个金融系统的委员会，并授权其处理和美国各大财政机构有关的解救方案。


The procedures to trigger this intervention, however, are complex and the funding is sufficiently opaque that the bill will not eliminate collateral damage from a large bank failure even for US institutions, let alone for international ones, whose unwinding would require coordination by several states, with varying degree of solvency.	然而触发这一介入行动的程序如此复杂，而救助资金来源又如此模糊不清，以致这项法案不但无法消除大型银行破产（即便是美国国内的金融机构）所产生的间接破坏效应，更遑论那些涉及各国合作，且各国分支机构的偿付能力都不尽相同的跨国银行了。


To minimize the risk of an unruly collapse, it is necessary to approve an international resolution mechanism with authority over all major international financial institutions.	因此，为了尽量降低连锁崩溃所产生的风险，有必要去制定一个有权管辖所有大型国际金融机构的国际性救助机制。


The goal would not be to rescue banks and their creditors, but to minimize the disruption that an uncontrolled default might cause.	推行此举的目的不是要拯救银行及其债权人，而是要将一个失去控制的违约所造成的破坏降到最低。


This institution should be an international version of the US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code.	该机构应该是美国破产法第十一章的国际版本。


But, while the goal of Chapter 11 is to save the ongoing value of a firm, the goal of the international resolution mechanism should be to preserve the ongoing value of the counterparties of insolvent financial institutions.	但当第十一章立足于保存破产公司的现有价值之时，国际救助机制的目标则恰恰相反，是保存那些破产金融机构的相对方的现有价值。


The first problem to resolve in approving this mechanism is who should have this authority.	而要实施这一机制，首先要解决的问题就是应该授权给谁。


The obvious answer is the International Monetary Fund.	答案很明显——国际货币基金组织（IMF）。


Created after WWII to finance temporary imbalances of the members of a fixed-exchange rate system, the IMF has been in search of a cause since the demise of the dollar exchange-rate system in 1971.	作为一个二战后成立的组织，世界货币基金组织最初的作用是在一个固定汇率系统中资助各成员国之间的暂时不平衡，而自从1971年美元固定汇率系统终止之后，该组织也一直在找寻自身存在的意义。


More importantly, through its numerous rescues of sovereign states, the IMF has acquired expertise in debt restructuring, while developing a reputation for toughness and impartiality, which would be very useful in these situations.	更重要的是，在拯救过许多主权国家的过程中，世界货币基金组织在债务重组方面变得更加专业，同时也积攒了手段强硬，不偏不倚的好名声。


The IMF also has the unique advantage of being the only depositary of international reserves.	世界货币基金组织另一个独特的优势就是它是国际储备的唯一托管人。


In the absence of an international fiscal authority, the IMF is the organization that comes closest to being one.	在国际权威财政机构缺失的情况下，世界货币基金组织就是与其性质最相近的组织。


When a large financial institution is insolvent, the IMF should take it over, guaranteeing its short-term obligations, but wiping out the shareholders and repaying the long-term creditors only after all the other creditors (including the IMF itself) are repaid.	当一个大型金融机构陷入资不抵债的时候，世界货币基金组织应该接管该机构，保证履行其短期义务，并在该机构偿还了其他债权人（包括世界货币基金组织自身）之后才处理股东和长期债权人的问题。


Some people would scream that this is tantamount to nationalization, but it is no more a nationalization that the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy process is.	有些人会惊呼这等同于国有化，但要说国有化的话，没有任何行为能比美国破产法第十一章更加彻底。


Takeover by an international organization has three advantages over a domestic solution. First, it makes certain that the cost (if the losses exceed the combined value of equity and long-term debt) is shared by the international community and not only by the country where the institution is located, making the intervention credible even when the sovereign state is not.	而相对于一个国内解决方案来说，被一个国际组织接管至少有三个好处：首先，可以确保整个救援成本（如果亏损超出了权益加上长期债务的总量的话）由整个国际社会而不仅仅是机构所在国承担，因此在主权国家无能为力之时，介入行为将变得更加可靠。


Second, by removing decision-making power from the national government that hosts an insolvent institution, this solution minimizes the potential distortions created by the lobbying power of the incumbent bankers.	其二，通过将决策权从金融机构所在国剥离出来，可以避免银行当事人游说本国议会所造成的潜在的扭曲效应。


Would you trust the Greek government to run a Greek bank in a non-corrupt way after a government takeover?	你相信希腊政府在接管一间希腊银行后能杜绝腐败吗？


The IMF would be better.	在这方面，世界货币基金组织就能做得更好。


Finally, thanks to IMF involvement, even less advanced countries would be able to take advantage of the best international expertise to address the problem.	最后，有了世界货币基金组织的介入，即便是那些不怎么发达的国家都有机会借助国际智囊来解决问题。


If a major oil spill in Haiti were threatening the Gulf of Mexico, wouldn’t we want the best technology (and not just the technology available in Haiti) to try to contain it?	如果一场发生在海地的重大原油泄漏事故正在威胁墨西哥湾，我们难道不希望有最尖端的科技（而不仅仅是海地当地的技术）来尝试阻止泄漏？


Why should it be any different in financial markets?	为什么不能在金融市场上使用类似的手段呢？


The last problem to be resolved is the trigger.	最后要解决的问题则是介入行动的触发机制问题。


In the case of the US resolution authority, this has been a very controversial issue.	在美国拯救金融机构的案例中，这是一个非常有争议性的问题。


The fear was that powerful banks would exploit national government help, asking for intervention too soon.	人们担心那些权势巨大的银行将滥用本国政府的救助，过早地要求政府介入。


Two safeguards can avoid this problem in the international context.	在国际语境下，有两重保护来避免这个问题。


First, rigid rules that wipe out shareholders and penalize long-term creditors are a clear deterrent from bankers’ point of view.	首先，银行家最害怕的就是损害股东和长期债权人利益的严格管制政策。


Second, because IMF intervention would reduce the influence of powerful domestic insiders, early intervention would be less attractive to them.	第二，由于世界货币基金组织的介入将减少国内利益集团的影响力，因此这些集团都不欢迎过早的国际介入。


The trigger should be the domestic government itself. Refusing international help in such instances would mean electoral suicide for any government that faces a major bank collapse.	真正的触发点应该是当地政府本身，因为对于所有面临着大型银行崩溃的政府来说，在这些事件中拒绝国际救助无异于政治自杀。


There are few areas in which government intervention is known to create value: reducing the devastating effects of a bank run is one.	其实政府介入在某些领域还是有用的：比如减少银行挤提所造成的灾难性影响。


Only a government that is sufficiently powerful, in terms of legal authority and solvency, can do so.	但只有一个在管治权威和偿付能力方面足够强大的政府才能做到这一点。


Unfortunately, in the international arena these two conditions are almost never met.	不幸的是，世界上还几乎没有能满足这两点的国家。


Empowering the IMF to take over failed international banks would fill this gap – and chase away our worst nightmare.	因此授权世界货币基金组织去接管陷入困境的跨国银行可以满足这些条件——并且令这场最糟糕的噩梦离我们而去。


Winning the Too-Big-to-Fail Battle	赢得“太大而不能倒”之战


CAMBRIDGE – Headlines about banks’ risks to the financial system continue to dominate the financial news.	美国剑桥—关于银行给金融体系造成的风险的新闻继续占据着财经头条。


Bank of America performed poorly on the US Federal Reserve’s financial stress tests, and regulators criticized Goldman Sachs’ and JPMorgan Chase’s financing plans, leading both to lower their planned dividends and share buybacks.	美国银行在美联储金融压力测试中表现差劲，而监管者则在批评高盛和摩根大通的融资计划，导致两者调低了计划中的分红和股票回购。


And Citibank’s hefty buildup of its financial trading business raises doubts about whether it is controlling risk properly.	花旗银行大张旗鼓地建设期金融交易业务则激起了关于其风险控制是否得当的质疑。


These results suggest that some of the biggest banks remain at risk.	这些结果表明，某些大银行仍然存在风险。


And yet bankers are insisting that the post-crisis task of strengthening regulation and building a safer financial system has nearly been completed, with some citing recent studies of bank safety to support this argument.	但银行家坚持危机后加强监管、建立更安全的金融体系的任务已经接近完成，其中一些人援引最新银行安全性研究支持这一观点。


So which is it: Are banks still at risk?	那么，哪种说法才是正确的：银行仍然存在风险？


Or has post-crisis regulatory reform done its job?	还是危机后监管改革已经完成了使命？


The 2008 financial crisis highlighted two dangerous features of today’s financial system.	2008年金融危机凸显出当今金融体系的两大危险特征。


First, governments will bail out the largest banks rather than let them collapse and damage the economy.	首先，政府会出手援助大银行而不是让它们倒闭并伤害经济。


Second, and worse, being too big to fail helps large banks grow even larger, as creditors and trading partners prefer to work with banks that have an implicit government guarantee.	其次也是更糟糕的是，太大而不能倒让大银行变得更加庞大，而债权人和交易对手方更愿意与拥有隐性政府担保的银行打交道。


Too-big-to-fail banks enjoy lower interest rates on debt than their mid-size counterparts, because lenders know that the bonds or trading contracts that such banks issue will be paid, even if the bank itself fails.	太大而不能倒的银行享受着比中等规模银行更低的债务利率，因为贷款人相信这些银行的债券和交易合同能够获得偿付，哪怕银行本身倒闭。


Before, during, and just after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, this provided an advantage equivalent to more than one-third of the largest US banks’ equity value.	在2007—2008年金融危机之前、之中和刚刚结束阶段，这所带来的优势相当于美国大银行股本价值的三分之一强。


Bailouts of too-big-to-fail banks are unpopular among economists, policymakers, and taxpayers, who resent special deals for financial bigwigs.	经济学家、决策者和纳税人都不支持援助太大而不能倒的银行，他们对于与金融大亨做特殊交易深恶痛绝。


Public anger gave regulators in the United States and elsewhere widespread support after the financial crisis to set higher capital and other safety requirements.	金融危机后，公众愤怒让美国和其他地区的监管者的措施——提高资本和其他安全性要求获得了广泛的支持。


And more regulatory changes are in the works.	更多的监管改变也开始运作。


New studies, including important ones from the International Monetary Fund and the US Government Accountability Office, do indeed show that the long-term boost afforded to too-big-to-fail banks like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America is declining from its pre-crisis high.	新的研究，包括国际货币基金组织（IMF）和美国政府问责局（US Government Accountability Office）的中药研究，确实表明，花旗集团、摩根大通和美国银行等太大而不能倒的银行所获得的支持较危机前水平有所下降。


This is good news.	这是好消息。


The bad news is that US bank representatives cite these studies when claiming, in the financial media and presumably to their favorite members of Congress, that the too-big-to-fail phenomenon has been contained and that the time has come for regulators to back off.	坏消息则是美国银行代表在财经媒体、想必还有他们所中意的国会议员面前援引这些研究，论证太大而不能倒现象已经得到了遏制，监管者是时候收手了。


This is a dangerous idea, for several reasons.	这是一个危险的观点，原因不一而足。


For starters, the IMF’s research and similar studies show that the likelihood of a bailout over the life of the bonds already issued by banks is indeed now lower.	首先。 IMF的研究和类似研究表明，现在银行所发行的债券整个生命周期中获得援助的可能性确实更低了。


But the studies do not specify why.	但这些研究没有具体说明原因。


Lower bailout risk could reflect the perception that the regulation already in place is appropriate and complete.	援助风险的下降可能反映出人们认为现有监管已经到位并且完整。


Or bond-market participants may expect that new regulations, like the stress tests, will finish the job.	或者债券市场参与者预期新的监管手段，如压力测试，能够完成使命。


The studies could be telling us that investors believe that regulators are on the case and have enough political support to implement further safeguards.	研究可能告诉我们，投资者认为监管者已经插手，并且有足够的政治支持实施进一步安全措施。


Or they could think that the economy is currently strong enough that the banks will not fail before the bonds are paid off in a few years.	或者他们可能认为目前经济已足够强势，银行在几年后债券偿还之前不会有倒闭之虞。


The second reason why such studies should not deter regulators from continued intelligent action is that the research focuses on long-term debt.	研究不应该让监管者停止思考的第二个原因是这些研究集中在长期债券。


But that is not the right place to look nowadays, because regulators are positioning long-term debt to take the hit in a meltdown, while making banks’ extremely profitable – and far more volatile – short-term debt and trading operations more certain to be paid in full.	但在眼下这并非正确的着眼点，因为监管者让长期债券在危机中承受冲击，而让银行利润最高——波动性也远远更高——的短期债务和交易操作有更大的足额偿付把握。


As a result, traders choose too-big-to-fail banks, rather than mid-size institutions, as counter-parties for their short-term trades, causing the large banks’ trading books – and, hence, their profits – to surge.	结果，交易员们选择太大而不能倒的银行而非中等规模机构作为短期交易的对手方，这导致大银行交易规模急剧膨胀，利润也水涨船高。


Measuring the boost to short-term debt is not easy.	衡量短期债务增长并不容易。


But it is most likely quite large.	但数量很有可能非常大。


The major banks’ recent effort, led by Citigroup, to convince the US Congress to repeal a key provision of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that would have pushed much of their short-term trading to distant affiliates (which are not too big to fail) reinforces this interpretation.	最近，以花旗集团为首的大银行说服国会撤消了2010年多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法（Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act）的一项关键条款。 该条款要求银行将大量短期交易划归关系疏远的附属机构（不在“太大而不能倒”之列）。


The banks know that they will receive more business if they run their trading desks from the part of their corporate group that has the strongest government backing.	大银行的这一做法强化了这一解读。 银行知道，如果它们在受政府支持最大的公司集团中运营交易部门，将能够获得更多业务。


The third reason to be wary of bankers’ confidence that the regulatory job is complete is that once they believe it, they will behave accordingly – less frightened of failure and thus willing to take on more risk.	担心银行家信心满满地表示监管工作已经完成的第三个原因是一旦他们持有这一观点，就会据此行动——不再那么害怕倒闭，因此承担更多风险。


That seems to have been the case before the financial crisis, and there is no business or psychological reason to think that it will not happen again.	这似乎正是金融危机的覆辙，也没有商业或心理上的理由认为这不会再次发生。


Regulators must not be deterred by bank lobbying or studies that measure neither the short-term boost afforded by a bank’s too-big-to-fail status nor how much of the perception of increased safety can be attributed to the regulations in place and the expectation of additional good regulation.	监管者决不能屈从于银行游说，也不能被某些研究迷惑。 这些研究既没有衡量银行的太大而不能倒的地位给它们带来的短期提振作用，也没有衡量安全感的增加中有多少可以归因于已落实的监管措施和对增加良好监管的预期。


In the absence of such studies, regulators must use their own judgment and intelligence.	如果没有这些研究，监管者必须依靠自己的判断和知识。


If “too big to fail” also means “too big to regulate,” the perception of increased safety will not last long.	如果“太大而不能倒”也意味着“太大而不能监管”，那么安全感的增加不会维持多久。


Central Bank Confidential	中央银行机密


LONDON – In 1993, the economists Alberto Alesina and Larry Summers published a seminal paper that argued that central bank independence keeps inflation in check, with no adverse consequences for economic performance.	伦敦—1993年，经济学家阿尔贝托·阿莱西纳（Alberto Alesina）和拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）发表了一篇开创性论文，论文指出，央行独立让通胀得以控制，并且对经济表现没有消极影响。


Since then, countries around the world have made their central banks independent.	自此以后，全球各国纷纷让央行独立。


None has reversed course, and any hint that governments might reassert political control over interest rates, as happened recently in India, are met with alarm in financial markets and outrage among economists.	没有一个国家反其道而行之，而只要有政府表现出重新用政治控制利率的意图，比如最近的印度，就会引起金融市场的警报和经济学家的愤怒。


In truth, however, there are many degrees of independence, and not all nominally independent central banks operate in the same way.	但是，事实上，独立有许多种程度，并且并非所有名义独立的央行都以相同的方式运行。


Some monetary authorities, like the European Central Bank, set their own target.	一些货币当局，比如欧洲央行，制定它们自己的目标。


Others, like the Bank of England (BoE), have full instrument independence – control over short-term interest rates – but must meet an inflation target set by the government.	另一些，比如英格兰银行，拥有完全的工具独立性——控制短期利率，但需要满足政府制定的通胀目标。


There are differences, too, in how central banks are organized to deliver their objectives.	在如何组织央行以实现这些目标方面也存在不同。


In New Zealand, the bank’s governor is the sole decision-maker.	在新西兰，央行行长是唯一的决策者。


At the US Federal Reserve, decisions are made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), whose members – seven governors and five presidents of the Fed’s regional reserve banks – enjoy varying degrees of independence.	在美联储，决策由联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）做出，而FOMC成员——由七位理事和五位美联储地区储备银行行长组成——的独立程度各不相同。


The ECB does not publish voting records and seeks consensus at the meetings of its General Council.	欧洲央行不发布投票记录，并且在总理事会（General Council）会议上寻求达成共识。


By contrast, the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has nine members, four of whom are appointed from outside the bank, and all votes are individually recorded; nobody is allowed to hide behind an institutional view.	相反，英格兰银行货币政策委员会（MPC）有九名成员，其中四名在英格兰银行外部人士中任命，所有成员的投票都会必须个人做出，不得代表机构观点。


The Fed does not keep a voting record, but “dissents” from its major decisions are noted (these were almost unheard of when Alan Greenspan was Chairman, but have since become more common).	美联储不保留投票记录，但其主要决策的“持异见者”会被披露（在艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）任美联储主席期间几乎没有持异见者，而在最近持异见者变得普遍起来）。


There are differences, too, in the relationship between policymakers and their staff, which also influences a central bank’s independence.	决策者和他们的央行工作人员之间的关系也各不相同，这也影响着央行的独立性。


At the Fed, the staff present their own economic forecasts to the FOMC, without input from the policymakers who set the interest rate.	在美联储，工作人员向FOMC报告他们自己的经济预测，这些预测不采用制定利率的决策者的观点。


At the BoE, the MPC is responsible for official forecasts, which it publishes in its Inflation Reports.	在英格兰银行，MPC负责官方预测，并发表在其《通胀报告》（Inflation Reports）中。


That is helpful in influencing expectations, because a range of different views from the central bank could confuse the private sector; but it carries the risk of institutional groupthink.	这有助于影响预期，因为央行观点不同可能让私人部门产生困惑； 但风险是导致机构集体思维（groupthink）。


Groupthink can be particularly dangerous if the central bank is also the banking supervisor, as the 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated.	如果央行同时也是银行监督者，那么集体思维就特别危险，2008年全球金融危机证明了这一点。


In 2006, every central bank that published a financial stability report (in other words, most of them) concluded that their country’s banking system was in fine shape: well-capitalized and endowed with robust governance and strong risk management.	2006年，所有央行发布金融稳定性报告的央行（也就是说，大部分央行）认为它们的国家银行体系结构合理：资本充沛，治理强健，风险管理强大。


It seems unlikely that not a single central bank analyst was the least bit worried about the massive growth in credit and leverage at the time.	没有一位央行分析师对当时的信用和杠杆大幅增加的现象表示哪怕一丁点担忧，这看起来不可思议。


Economists at the Bank for International Settlements – an organization of central banks – were laying out the risks very starkly.	国际清算银行——央行的组织——的经济学家们非常尖锐地指出了风险。


And yet not a dissenting voice was heard from the world’s small army of central bank economists.	然而，全世界央行经济学家小分队却没有发出任何异见。


Central banks may have been independent vis-à-vis their countries’ governments, but internally it was very difficult to stray from the party line.	央行也许相对��家政府实现了独立，但其内部仍极难摆脱党派立场。


There is, of course, a balance to be struck between tight institutional discipline and letting a hundred intellectual flowers bloom.	当然，在严格的机构纪律和“百花齐放”之间需要达到平衡。


A central bank is not a university economics department, where diversity is almost invariably a source of strength.	央行不是大学经济学系，多样化并不总是优势来源。


External observers are bound to try to read policy messages between the lines of any publication, which may not always help the bank to achieve its objectives.	外部观察者必然会通过一切公开发布的字里行间解读政策信息，而这也许不利于央行实现目标。


That said, there is clearly room for allowing more heterodox thinking.	尽管如此，显然仍有空间容下另类思维（heterodox thinking）。


So it is encouraging that the BoE is experimenting with a platform that enables a wider variety of views to be heard: a blog called Bank Underground (a reference to the Tube station beneath the Bank’s headquarters) that publishes posts by junior staff challenging – or supporting – prevailing policy.	因此，英格兰银行正在试验一个让更广泛的观点发出声音的新平台，这值得鼓励。 这一平台是一个叫做“地下银行”（Bank Underground）的博客（这个名字来自银行总部地下的地铁站），供挑战——或支持——现行政策的初级员工发表观点。


In a matter of weeks, Bank Underground already has established itself as a fertile source of provocative ideas.	不出几周，地下银行便已成为煽动性观点的温床。


One post in the middle of August (when the Bank’s top cats were certainly away, allowing free rein to the mice) pointed to some of the weaknesses in banks’ internal capital models, which are at the heart of the Basel 3 capital-requirements regime.	8月中旬（当时英格兰银行的大佬们显然不知道到哪里去了，老虎不在，猴子便称王）发布的一篇帖子指出了英格兰银行内部资本模型的一些缺点，而这些模型是巴塞尔3资本要求制度的核心。


The author, a BoE employee named Tobias Neumann, argued that incorporating more data into the models could lead them to pick up noise and mistake it for an important signal.	帖子的作者是一位名叫托比亚斯·纽曼（Tobias Neumann）的英格兰银行员工，他认为，在模型中使用过多数据可能导致噪声增加，弄错重要的信号。


As a result, he concluded, highly complex models may regularly yield misleading information.	结果，他说，高度复杂的模型可能时常产生误导性信息。


Another post, published in July, explicitly challenged the BoE’s “official” view that as the economy recovers, we can expect non-financial companies to begin to run down their cash balances to fund investment.	7月份发布的另一篇帖子矛头直指英格兰银行的“官方”观点——随着经济的复苏，我们可以预期非金融公司开始削减现金余额，出资投资。


The authors, Katie Farrant and Magda Rutkowska, suggest that corporate behavior may have changed as a result of the financial crisis, as difficulties in accessing bank financing led them to increase their cash buffers permanently.	该帖子的作者凯迪·法兰特（Katie Farrant）和玛格达·鲁特科夫斯卡（Magda Rutkowska）认为，公司行为可能因为金融危机而已经发生了改变，难以获得银行融资导致他们永久性增加想现金缓冲。


If true, this has important implications for the financial system, and especially for banks.	果真如此的话，这将对金融体系特别是银行形成重大影响。


In its short life, Bank Underground has already proved its worth.	建立时间不长的地下银行已经证明了它的价值。


The BoE’s governor, Mark Carney, deserves great credit for allowing us to peer through a small crack in the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street’s façade (assuming, of course, that the blog is not a wholly unlicensed initiative!).	英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）让我们得以通过地下银行一窥针线大街老妪（Old Lady of Threadneedle Street），应该受到赞扬（当然，假设该博客并非完全是未经许可的自说自话！ ）。


Perhaps we will eventually see the emergence of a rival Fed Subway blog, though I am not optimistic about the prospects for an ECB U-Bahn blog anytime soon.	也许我们最终会看到与之对立的地铁美联储（Fed Subway）博客，尽管我对于很快出现地铁欧洲央行（ECB U-Bahn）并不乐观。


In the meantime, I plan to spend more time underground.	与此同时，我打算在地下花更多的时间。


The light seems to be better there.	看起来那里的光线更好。


Bankruptcy Comes to China	破产逼近中国


BEIJING – China’s businessmen have always needed resilience, but now they must become accustomed to the specter of bankruptcy.	发自北京 —— 中国的商人们从来都不缺乏卷土重来的能力，但如今他们必须开始习惯去面对破产的阴云了。


For China now has a bankruptcy code with teeth, and the country’s courts are beginning to enforce it with rigor.	因为中国已经拥有了一套行之有效的破产法，而法院正积极推进这一法律的实施。


Bankruptcy legislation in China started right after Deng Xiaoping launched his pro-market reforms three decades ago.	中国对破产的立法始于邓小平在 30 年前启动市场化改革之后。


The Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation), the first of its kind, was enacted in 1986.	而这部法律的第一个版本则是在 1986 年颁布实施的《企业破产法（试行）》。


Its execution, however, was crippled by its very narrow scope for application, the absence of corresponding laws governing corporate restructuring, excessive government intervention, incompatibility with the policy-based bankruptcy procedure then in place, technical errors, and a general inability to make the code operational.	但这部法律的执行却受制于种种原因，包括其过度狭窄的应用范围，指导企业重组的相关法律的缺失，政府的过度干预，与当时的政策性破产程序的冲突，技术上的失误，以及宏观上无法使法律具有可操作性。


So, in 2006, a revised version of the law was enacted, marking an important milestone in China’s efforts to build an effective legal system as it moves towards a market economy.	直到 2006 年这部法律的修订版面世，这在中国致力于建立一个有效的法律体系，从而向市场经济迈进的过程中具有历程碑的意义。


Compared with the original bankruptcy code, the 2006 code is firmly rooted in the needs of a market economy.	与最初版本的破产法相比较， 2006 年的法律是牢牢扎根于市场经济的。


First, it aims to ensure that obligations are fairly and regularly met when a debtor becomes financially insolvent.	首先，当债务人在财务上丧失债务偿付能力时，该法旨在确保相关的责任得到公平及平均地承担。


Thus, it seeks to protect the lawful rights of both creditors and debtors.	可见，它致力于保护债权人和债务人和双方的合法权利。


The legislation also imposed a deadline to abolish “policy-based bankruptcy” – the practice adopted by the State Council to liquidate loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and resettle laid-off employees. Unlike the Bankruptcy Law, the administrative procedure has a different hierarchy of liquidation priorities: what a bankrupt SOE owes to its employees and the resettlement charges must be covered first and foremost by its total assets, including the enterprise’s collateral, in order to reduce dependence on local governmental budgets.	同时，该法也为废除“政策性破产”


Yet this process leaves the rights of creditors undefended, eliciting widespread criticism.	然而，这一程序对债权人的权利毫无保障，从而受到了广泛批评。


The new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law redefines its scope of application to preclude overlap with other laws like the Social Security Law and the Labor Law.   Indeed, resettlement of laid-off SOE employees, and other social implications of layoffs, should now be addressed primarily by government through the social safety net, rather than as part of the bankruptcy process.	新《企业破产法》重新界定了其适用范围，从而消除了其与其他诸如《社会保障法》和《劳动法》相重叠的部分。 事实上，国企职工下岗的再安置，以及下岗带来的其他影响现在都主要由政府通过社会保障体系来处理，而不是作为破产程序的一部分来处理。


The new code also introduces the concept of “administrative receivership,” whereby lawyers, certified accountants, and other intermediaries act as managers of enterprises undergoing bankruptcy.	新的法律还引入了“管理接管”的概念，藉此，律师，注册会计师，和其他中介机构可以出任破产企业的管理人员。


The procedure abolishes the Liquidation Team, a long-standing regime that many alleged was unjust, aggressive in administrative intervention, unprofessional, and unaccountable.	这一程序废除了清盘小组这一历史悠久的组织，该组织以其无理，粗暴的行政干预，业余以及不可靠著称。


In order for this part of the law to go ahead, the Supreme People’s Court issued judicial interpretations that set out who can be designated a company receiver and the amount and type of compensation they can be paid.	为了促进这一部分法律的实施，最高人民法院对谁能成为一间公司的 破产案产业管理人 ，接管的程度以及他们可以获得的补偿发布了司法解释。


Up to now, some 2,520 agencies and 388 individuals have been included on the list of receivers.	直到目前为止，有 2520 间机构和 388 位个人拥有成为 破产案产业管理人的资格 。


Yet problems remain.	然而，问题仍然存在。


For example, receivers are paid unreasonably poorly in cases of limited assets; furthermore, the random, indiscriminate appointment of receivers sometimes leaves cases over- or understaffed.	例如，在有限资产公司的案例中，破产受益人只获得了很不合理的少量补偿。 而且，随意地，不加选择地任命破产案产业管理人造成了有时组织臃肿，有时又人手不足的困境。


Consequently, the job of receiver, though it carries strict liabilities, is highly risky in terms of reward.	结果是，尽管他们都承担了严格的责任，但相对其报酬来讲，破产案产业管理人工作的风险是很高的。


If no viable solution is found, no agency or individual will be willing to serve as the receiver in ordinary bankruptcy cases.	如果找不到可行的解决办法，没有机构或个人会愿意在一般的破产案中担任破产案产业管理人的角色。


Another important innovation is the adoption of restructuring procedures based on other countries’ experiences.	新版破产法的另一个重要创新是根据其他国家的经验引入了重组的程序。


The possibility of restructuring balances the interests of stakeholders and uses legal protections to help potentially risky enterprises prevent or avoid bankruptcy if a bailout is worthwhile or possible.	重组的可能使得各方的利益都得到了平衡，并且在存在或可能存在紧急援助的情况下，能够运用法律保护来帮助具有潜在风险的企业防止或避免破产。


But stricter and more reasonable standards should be established for courts’ approval of restructuring plans.	不过，法院需要建立更严格、更合理的标准以审批重组计划。


For example, if the required majority of shareholders adopts such a plan, the court should protect the rights of the minority of creditors who may have opposed it.	例如，如果法定多数的股东采纳了这样一个重组计划，那么法院即应该保护反对这一计划的少数债权人的权利。


And if the liquidation rate for creditors’ common claims is defined as no lower than that at the time the draft restructuring plan was submitted for approval, compensation must be considered in the event that payment is delayed.	而如果债权人一般要求的清盘赔偿率被界定为不低于重组计划初稿提交审批时的赔偿率的话，那么在支付延迟的情况下，就要考虑给予赔偿金了。


Moreover, the Bankruptcy Law, the Company Law, and the Securities Law should be well coordinated and mutually reinforcing.	进一步来说，破产法，公司法以及社会保障法应该要相互协调，相辅相成。


How can an enterprise being restructured, say, find a way to issue securities for financing if it cannot meet conventional standards such as profitability and net asset value, as required by the Company Law and the Securities Law?	比如说，在无法按照公司法和社会保障法的要求，满足诸如盈利和净资产值等传统标准时，一间正在重组的公司如何发行债券以融资呢？


The law must contain specific provisions regarding such matters in order to ensure successful listing of restructuring firms.	相关的法律必须包含有针对这类问题的具体安排，以确保上市公司重组成功。


To prevent fraud, an acute problem in the past, the new law established a “right of rescission,” whereby the receiver can ask courts to rescind any action by a debtor that involves fraud, evasion, or unfair liquidation in the prescribed period before a bankruptcy petition is accepted and assets recovered.	为避免欺诈这一过去敏感的问题，新法引入了“撤销权”，藉此，在破产申请被接受以及资产回收之前的规定期限内，破产案产业管理人可以要求法院撤销债务人任何牵涉到欺诈，逃避或不公平的清盘等的行为。


The system now holds the key to fairness liquidation.	可见，当前的法律系统强调公平清盘。


Moreover, the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China now includes bankruptcy fraud.	而且，现在破产欺诈是属于中华人民共和国刑法的范畴。


The successful implementation of China’s revised Bankruptcy Law hinges on its effective enforcement and abandonment of the mindset and practices shaped under the old version, especially in the era of policy-based bankruptcy.	中国重新修订后的破产法的成功实施取决于其有效的执行以及在以前版本下形成的思维模式和行为模式的废除，特别是在政策性破产时期形成的思维模式和行为模式的废除。


Despite the difficulties that remain, China’s bankruptcy legislation is increasingly adapted to the market economy; the trend is irreversible.	尽管困难重重，但中国的破产法正慢慢适应市场经济； 这一趋势是不可逆转的。


Ban the Bomb Tests	禁止炸弹试验


WASHINGTON, DC – The Nuclear Security Summit process, which concluded earlier this month in Washington, DC, shows what can be achieved when political leaders come together to concentrate on a global problem.	华盛顿—本月早些时候在华盛顿结束的核安全峰会过程表明了当政治领导人齐聚一堂关注一个全球问题是能够取得什么成果。


The six-year initiative, focused on preventing nuclear terrorism, produced important outcomes on eliminating, minimizing, and securing dangerous nuclear and radiological materials.	着重于防止核恐怖主义的六年计划在危险核与放射性材料的销毁、最少化和安全方面形成了重要结果。


Unfortunately, however, the nuclear threat is still far from being neutralized.	但是，不幸的是，核威胁仍然远远没有消除。


The dangers posed by terrorist groups are growing, as are the risks from competition and conflict between nuclear-armed states.	恐怖组织所带来的危险正在增加，源自有核国家之间的竞争和冲突的风险亦然。


Strong leadership and global cooperation must also be deployed to address other urgent nuclear dangers, particularly the threat of further testing and proliferation of weapons.	强大的领导力和全球合作还必须用于解决其他紧迫的核威胁上，特别是进一步试验和扩散核武器的威胁。


There are few bright signs on the horizon.	希望之光渺茫。


On the contrary, almost every nuclear-armed state is either expanding or upgrading its nuclear arsenal.	相反，几乎所有有核国家要么在扩张，要么在升级其核武库。


There are no active negotiations to regulate, cap, or further reduce nuclear stockpiles.	没有积极的谈判推动监管、限制或进一步减少核库存。


Russia and the United States have each deployed more than 1,800 strategic warheads on several hundred submarines, bombers, and missiles – far more than is necessary to deter a nuclear attack.	俄罗斯和美国各自通过数百部潜艇、轰炸机和导弹部署了超过1,800枚战略弹头——远远多于核打击威慑所需要的量。


Many of these weapons can be launched within minutes, increasing the risk of miscalculation.	这些武器中许多可以在几分钟内发射，这增加了误算的风险。


Meanwhile, North Korea could soon be able to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, a development that would pose a significant threat to all of Asia.	与此同时，朝鲜可能很快就能装备核弹头弹道导弹，这将给整个亚洲带来巨大的威胁。


Given the grave dangers, it is in every country’s interest to halt further nuclear competition and eliminate the risks associated with the world’s remaining stockpiles of some 15,000 nuclear weapons.	考虑到如此严重的危险，停止进一步核竞赛、消除全世界15,000发核武器存量所带来的风险符合所有国家的利益。


As US President Barack Obama and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev noted in separate statements during the Nuclear Security Summit, a key element of an effective global risk-reduction strategy must be to bring the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force.	美国总统奥巴马和哈萨克斯坦总统纳扎尔巴耶夫在核安全峰会补充声明中指出，有效的全球降低风险战略的一个关键要素是让1996年全面禁止核试验条约（CTBT）生效。


If existing nuclear powers cannot conduct tests, they will not be able to try out new, more sophisticated warhead designs.	如果现有核力量无法进行核试验，就无法测试新的、更先进的弹头设计。


Similarly, without test explosions, newer nuclear-armed states will have a far more difficult time developing and fielding smaller, more easily deliverable warheads.	类似地，如果不进行试爆，新有核国家开发测试更小型、更容易实现的弹头也会困难得多。


The CTBT has near-universal support.	CTBT获得了几乎一致的支持。


With 183 state signatories and a de facto test ban in place, the treaty is now a key component of the international nuclear nonproliferation system.	该条约共有183个签署国，并且实现了事实上的禁止核试验，是国际核不扩散体系的关键要素。


It has established a taboo against testing (violated since 1998 only by North Korea) and slowed the global arms race.	它建立了核试验禁区（只有朝鲜在1998年违反了CTBT），并延缓了全球军备竞赛。


And yet, nearly 20 years after its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, the CTBT is not valid international law – largely because the US has not ratified it.	但是，CTBT被联合国大会通过已经过去了近20年，却仍没有成为生效的国际法——主要是因为美国不批准它。


The US Senate’s rushed and highly partisan 1999 vote against ratification – and its failure to reconsider the treaty since then – has given the seven other states that must ratify the CTBT a reason for delay.	美国参议院在1999年草率地做出不予批准的带有浓重党派色彩的决定，并且此后一直没有重新考虑该条约，这给了其他七个必须批准CTBT的国家拖延的借口。


As a result, the door to further nuclear testing remains open.	结果，进一步核试验的大门仍然敞开着。


Last fall, US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and US Secretary of State John Kerry suggested that the Senate revisit the issue.	去年秋天，美国能源部长莫尼兹（Ernest Moniz）和美国国务卿克里表示参议院将再次讨论该问题。


Unfortunately, President Barack Obama does not have enough time left in office to launch the time-consuming education and outreach campaign needed before bringing the CTBT to the Senate for another vote.	不幸的是，总统奥巴马剩下的任期不足以启动让参议院重新对CTBT投票所需要进行的费时的教育和宣传运动。


But his administration could intensify the necessary preparatory work – for presenting new information, answering detailed questions, and dispelling old myths and misconceptions – before he leaves office.	但他的政府可以在他离任前加强必要的准备工作——展示新信息、回答具体问题，澄清旧神话和错误概念。


Even if the next US president and Senate do reconsider ratification of the CTBT, a vote may not happen for several years.	即使下一任美国总统和参议院果真重新��虑批准CTBT的问题，也需要好几年时间。


In the meantime, it is essential that world leaders seek ways to encourage ratification by other CTBT holdout states and to reinforce the de facto global moratorium on testing.	与此同时，世界领导人找到办法鼓励其他尚未批准CTBT的国家完成批准工作，并加强事实上已经存在的全球试验暂停至关重要。


The G-7 foreign ministers’ declaration on April 11 in Hiroshima – “No state should conduct a nuclear test explosion and all states should sign and ratify the CTBT without delay” – is a good start.	4月11日，G-7外长在广岛宣布“所有国家都不应该进行核试爆，所有国家都应该毫不迟疑地签署并批准CTBT”，这是一个良好的开端。


No one knows that better than Japan and Kazakhstan, which have suffered from the terrible effects of nuclear detonations.	日本和哈萨克斯坦最明白禁止核试验的重要性，它们经历过核爆炸的可怕影响。


As their respective foreign ministers, Fumio Kishida and Erlan Idrissov, warned in September, business as usual will not suffice.	两国外长岸田文雄和伊德里索夫（Erlan Idrissov）在9月份警告说，老方一帖是不够的。


Kishida and Idrissov have invited their counterparts to a ministerial-level meeting in Vienna on June 13 to explore options for bringing the CTBT into force.	岸田文雄和伊德里索夫邀请同侪在6月13日前往维也纳举行部长级会议探讨让CTBT生效的选择。


They will encourage key holdout states to reaffirm their support for the global testing taboo and to pledge that they will consider ratification “at the earliest possible time.”	他们将鼓励主要未签署国重申它们对全球禁止核试验的支持，并承诺将“尽可能早”地考虑批准CTBT。


As we approach the 20th anniversary of the CTBT, members of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly can take further steps to ensure that nuclear testing remains off-limits.	随着CTBT签署二十周年的临近，联合国安理会和联合国大会成员可以采取进一步措施确保禁止核试验。


For example, they could pursue the adoption of a new Security Council resolution and a parallel General Assembly measure calling on all states to refrain from testing and urging quick action on ratification.	比如，它们可以寻求实施新的安理会决议，同时联合国大会采取措施要求所有国家克制核试验，并敦促迅速采取行动批准CTBT。


Such an initiative would reinforce the global norm against testing and stimulate movement by holdout states.	这一行动将强化反对核试验的全球规范，刺激未签署CTBT国家的行动。


Just as leaders have cooperated at the Nuclear Security Summit to prevent nuclear terrorism, we need renewed cooperation and leadership to end nuclear testing once and for all.	正如领导人们在核安全峰会上合作防止核恐怖主义，我们需要全新的合作和领导力来一劳永逸地结束核试验。


Barack Obama and American Power	巴拉克·奥巴马和美国实力


CAMBRIDGE – One of the first challenges that President Barack Obama will face is the effects of the ongoing financial crisis, which has called into question the future of American power.	剑桥－巴拉克·奥巴马总统将要面临的首要挑战之一，是仍在持续过程中的金融危机所造成的后果，这场危机已经使人们对美国未来的实力产生了怀疑。


An article in The Far Eastern Economic Review proclaims that “Wall Street’s crack-up presages a global tectonic shift: the beginning of the decline of American power.”	《远东经济评论》上的一篇文章宣称，“华尔街的崩溃预示着一个全球性的结构变化：美国的实力开始衰落”。


Russian President Dmitri Medvedev sees the crisis as a sign that America’s global leadership is coming to an end, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has declared that Beijing is now much more relevant than New York.	俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫将危机看作是美国的全球领导地位终结的标志，委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯断言现在北京比纽约更为重要。


Yet the dollar, a symbol of American financial power, has surged rather than declined.	然而，作为美国金融实力象征的美元，在最近却上涨了，而不是下跌了。


As Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief economist of the IMF notes, “It is ironic, given that we just messed up big-time, that the response of foreigners is to pour more money into us.	像哈佛大学教授兼国际货币基金组织前首席经济学家肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）提到的那样，“考虑到我们刚刚将事情搞得一团糟，外国人将更多的钱投到我们这里的反应，是很讽刺的。


They’re not sure where else to go.	他们不知道钱还有什么其他地方可以去。


They seem to have more confidence in our ability to solve our problems than we do.”	他们似乎比我们自己对我们解决问题的能力更有信心。 ”


It used to be said that when America sneezed, the rest of the world caught a cold.	过去人们常说，美国打个喷嚏，世界其他地方就会感冒。


More recently, many claimed that with the rise of China and the petro-states, an American slowdown could be decoupled from the rest of the world.	最近，许多人声称，伴随着中国和石油国家的崛起，美国经济减速对世界其他地区的冲击可以被抵消。


But when the United States caught the financial flu, others followed.	但是，当美国得了金融感冒时，其他国家也得了。


Many foreign leaders quickly switched from schadenfreude to fear – and to the security of US treasury bills.	许多外国领导人迅速从幸灾乐祸转向担忧——以及对美国国库券安全的关注。


Crises often refute conventional wisdom, and this one reveals that the underlying strength of the American economy remains impressive.	危机经常驳倒了传统观点； 这场危机显示美国经济潜在的实力仍然很强。


The poor performance of Wall Street and America regulators has cost America a good deal in terms of the soft power of its economic model’s attractiveness, but the blow need not be fatal if, in contrast to Japan in the 1990’s, the US manages to absorb the losses and limit the damage.	华尔街和美国监管者的糟糕表现，已经给美国经济模式的吸引力这样的软实力造成了重大损失，如果美国和20世界90年代的日本相比，能够成功消化损失并降低危害，当前的金融危机的打击不一定是致命的。


The World Economic Forum still rates the American economy as the world’s most competitive, owing to its labor-market flexibility, higher education, political stability, and openness to innovation.	因为其劳动力市场的弹性，较高的教育水平，政治稳定以及对创新的接受能力，世界经济论坛仍然将美国经济评为世界上最有竞争力的经济体。


The larger question concerns the long-term future of American power.	更大的问题影响着将来很长时期内的美国实力。


A new forecast for 2025 being prepared by the US National Intelligence Council projects that American dominance will be “much diminished,” and that the one key area of continued American superiority – military power – will be less significant in the competitive world of the future.	美国国家情报委员会的一份新的对2025年的预测推断，美国的优势将会被极大的削弱，而且，美国持续具有优势的一个关键领域——军事实力——在将来的竞争社会中不如现在这么重要。


This is not so much a question of American decline as “the rise of the rest.”	这并不完全是一个“其他国家崛起”，美国衰落的问题。


Power always depends on context, and in today’s world, it is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game.	实力总是依赖于一定的环境，并且在当今的世界，实力是以一个与复杂的三维国际象棋比赛类似的模式分布的。


On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and likely to remain so for a while.	在顶端的棋盘上，世界军事实力在很大程度上是单极的，并且很可能在短期内继续如此。


But on the middle chessboard, economic power is already multi-polar, with the US, Europe, Japan and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance.	但是，在中间的棋盘上，世界经济实力已经多极化了，其中，美国、欧洲、日本和中国是主要的参与者，而其他国家的重要性正在增加。


The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control.	在底部的棋盘上，是在政府控制之外的跨越国界的跨国关系领域。


It includes actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets, as well as terrorists transferring weapons or hackers disrupting Internet operations.	这一领域包括了用电子转账转移比许多国家的预算还要多的钱的银行家，以及转移武器的恐怖分子或者破坏因特网运行的电脑黑客等各种各样的参与者。


It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change.	它也包括像流行疾病和气候变化这样的新挑战。


On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony.	在这个底部棋盘上，权力极度分散，谈论单极，多极或者霸权是没有意义的。


Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalization, but the political effects will be different for the world of nation-states and the world of non-state actors.	即使在金融危机发生之后，技术变化令人眼花缭乱的步伐很可能会继续驱动全球化向前发展，但是，对一个由国家组成的世界和一个由非国家参与者组成的世界来说，其政治影响将会是不同的。


In inter-state politics, the most important factor will be the continuing “return of Asia.”	在国家间政治中，最重要的因素将会是持续的“亚洲回归”。


In 1750, Asia had three-fifths of the world population and three-fifths of the world’s economic output.	在1750年，亚洲拥有世界五分之三的人口，经济产量占世界的五分之三。


By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America, Asia accounted for just one-fifth of world output.	到1900年，在欧洲和美国的工业革命后，亚洲只占世界经济产量的五分之一。


By 2040, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share.	到2040年，亚洲的经济产量将会再次占到世界的五分之三。


The rise of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how policies can affect the outcome.	中国和印度的崛起可能会带来不稳定，但是这是一个有先例的问题，并且我们可以从历史中学习政策能怎样影响结果。


A century ago, Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but the world’s failure to manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars.	一个世纪前，英国在没有爆发冲突的情况下应对了美国的崛起，但是，世界应对德国崛起的失败却导致了两场破坏性的世界战争。


The rise of non-state actors also must be managed.	国际社会也应该应对非国家势力的崛起。


In 2001, a non-state group killed more Americans than the government of Japan killed at Pearl Harbor.	在2001年，一个非国家团体杀死的美国人比日本政府在珍珠港杀死的美国人还要多。


A pandemic spread by birds or travelers on jet aircraft could kill more people than perished in World Wars I or II.	由鸟类或喷气式飞机上的旅客传播引起的一场流行疾病所造成的死亡人数，可能比第一次世界大战或者第二次世界大战中死亡的人数还要多。


The problems of the diffusion of power (away from states) may turn out to be more difficult than shifts in power between states.	权力分散（与国家无关）所带来的问题可能成为比权力在国家之间转移所引起的问题，更加难以解决。


The challenge for Barack Obama is that more and more issues and problems are outside the control of even the most powerful state.	巴拉克·奥巴马面临的挑战是，即使是最强大的国家，也有越来越多的问题处在其控制之外。


Although the US does well on the traditional measures of power, those measures increasingly fail to capture much of what defines world politics, which, owing to the information revolution and globalization, is changing in a way that prevents Americans from achieving all their international goals by acting alone.	虽然美国在传统的权力手段上表现不错，但是，由于信息革命和全球化，世界政治正在以一种阻止美国人通过单独行动达成他们的国际目标的方式，发生着变化，所以这些手段越来越无法掌握确定世界政治的许多因素。


For example, international financial stability is vital to American prosperity, but the US needs the cooperation of others to ensure it.	例如，国际金融稳定对美国的繁荣至关重要，但是，美国却需要其他国家的合作来保证金融稳定。


Global climate change, too, will affect the quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone.	全球气候变化也会影响生活质量，但是，美国却无法单独应对这个问题。


And, in a world where borders are becoming increasingly porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must mobilize international coalitions to address shared threats and challenges.	而且，在一个从毒品到传染病和恐怖主义等等越来越容易渗透过边界的世界里，美国必须动员国际合作来解决共同面对的威胁和挑战。


As the world’s largest economy, American leadership will remain crucial.	作为世界上最大的经济体，美国的领导仍然 至关重要。


The problem of American power in the wake of the financial crisis is not one of decline, but of a realization that even the most powerful country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.	金融危机之后的美国实力的问题，不是一个美国实力衰落的问题，而是认识到即使是最强大的国家，也不能在没有其他人的帮助下达成目标的问题。


Fortunately, Barack Obama understands that.	幸运的是，巴拉克·奥巴马明白这一点。


Barack Obama, Israel’s True Friend	巴拉克·奥巴马，以色列真正的朋友


HAIFA – How do you tell a true friend?	海法——怎样才能分辨真朋友？


By the fact that he believes and has confidence in you, cares about your true needs, and honestly tells you your mistakes, which he tries to help you correct.	真朋友信任你、对你有信心、注重你真实的需求、坦诚地指出你的错误、并帮助你改正。


That is the kind of friend I want at my side, not one who automatically approves of whatever I do, declares his love for me, and accepts me as I am.	这才是我想要的朋友，而不是我做什么都点头称是，到处告诉别人他爱我，并且接受我的错误。


Ever since its great military victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, when it repelled the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which had openly proclaimed their desire to destroy the Jewish state, Israel has been in the throes of an ideological and military confusion resulting from the conquests it made during that conflict.	自从1967年在六日战争中大获全胜，击退公然叫嚣要摧毁犹太国家的埃及、叙利亚和约旦联军后，以色列就陷入到一场由征服所引起的意识和军事紊乱的痛苦磨难之中。


Following the Six-Day War, Israel did not consider the conquered lands as something to be traded for peace, and thus induce the Arab world and the Palestinians to recognize its legitimacy and ensure the demilitarization of Palestinian territories after their restitution.	六日战争后，以色列并没有把被占领土作为筹码来换取和平，促使阿拉伯世界和巴勒斯坦人承认他们的合法地位，并在归还被占领土后实现巴勒斯坦领土的非军事化进程。


Instead, Israel – either because of its distrust of its enemies and of their commitment to respect any future peace agreement, or because of a desire to annex some of the territories – began to pursue a policy of settlements.	相反，因为对敌人及其尊重未来和平协议承诺的不信任，或者受到吞并某些领土的欲望的驱使——以色列开始推行所谓的定居点政策。


But, in doing so, it created a reality that is difficult to reverse.	但以色列的这种做法造成了难以改变的现实。


Israel’s non-military settlements are, and have always been, irrelevant to the country’s security.	以色列的非军事定居点过去和现在都与国家安全没有任何关系。


On the contrary, because the settlements are located in the heart of the Palestinian population, they are convenient targets for terrorist attacks and require special defensive measures, including the deployment of large military forces engaged in patrolling and surveillance.	相反，因为定居点处在巴勒斯坦人口的核心地带，反而成了恐怖袭击最便捷的目标，需要采取特别的防御措施加以保护，包括部署大批军力进行巡逻和监督。


Even on the Golan Heights, where there is no Syrian presence, the settlements, located only a few kilometers from enormous Syrian troop concentrations, create a heavy burden, because, in the event of war, the Israeli army would be forced to evacuate them quickly, as was the case during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973.	即使在没有叙利亚势力存在的格兰高地上，仅仅离开叙利亚兵营几公里远的定居点也造成了沉重的负担，因为在战争爆发的情况下，以色列军队不得不迅速将他们撤离，1973年10月爆发的赎罪日战争就是一例。


The settlements intensify Palestinian hatred toward Israel.	定居点激化了巴勒斯坦人对于以色列人的仇恨。


In addition to occupying Palestinians’ land, using their water, and imposing limits on their freedom of movement, the settlements symbolize Israel’s intention to remain, and thus its reluctance to concede independence to the Palestinian people, even if they were to recognize Israel’s legitimacy and show themselves disposed to peaceful coexistence.	除占领巴勒斯坦人土地、占用水资源、限制他们自由迁徙的权利外，建立定居点还象征着以色列留在当地的意愿，表明它不愿承认巴勒斯坦人独立的事实。 即使巴勒斯坦人承认以色列的合法地位，表明愿意与以色列和平共处也改变不了什么。


Israel has invested great financial resources in the settlements, often ignoring important needs in Israel proper.	以色列在定居点投入了大笔资金，这种投入通常是以忽视以色列国内需求为代价的。


The settlers, predominantly supporters of religious-nationalist movements and parties, often flaunt an attitude of superiority in their relations with Israeli authorities, pretending to have a special status with respect not only to Palestinians, but also to other Israeli citizens.	居住在定居点的主要是宗教民族运动支持者和相关党派，他们在与以色列当局的相处中常常标榜一种唯我独尊的态度，他们不仅装作在巴勒斯坦人面前有特殊地位，而且在其他以色列人面前也高人一筹。


Indeed, a substantial number of them don’t even recognize the Israeli state’s legal authority.	事实上，很多定居点里的以色列居民甚至对以色列国家的司法权威不予认可。


The greatest problem with the settlements is that if they continue to expand, the two-state solution will be compromised and, sooner or later, lead to a unitary state – one populated by two ethnic groups – between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.	定居点最大的问题是如果继续扩张下去，两国分治的解决方案迟早都会受到威胁，从而导致单一国家的既成事实——这个国家在约旦河和地中海之间存在着两大民族团体。


Because simple demographic implies that Palestinians would gradually come to constitute a majority, a unitary state is a recipe for the end of Israel.	因为单纯的人口统计方法说明巴勒斯坦人将逐渐占据多数，因此单一国家意味着以色列的末日。


The majority of Israelis understand this.	绝大多数以色列人都明白这个道理。


But, like an incorrigible drug addict, they are unable to say, “Enough. We have made a mistake, and we have to remedy it before it’s too late.”	但就像不可救药的吸毒者一样，他们不具备说出“够了，我们犯了错误，必须在还来得及的时候加以纠正”的能力。


To be sure, when a peace treaty was signed with Egypt, Jewish settlers were forcibly evacuated from the Sinai.	可以肯定，在与埃及签订和平条约的时候，犹太定居者不得不被迫撤离西奈。


Similarly, when Jewish communities in the Gaza Strip became unsupportable, the leader of the right, Ariel Sharon, forced out the 9,000 settlers who lived there among 1.5 million Palestinians – a dramatic event that has left deep scars on both sides.	同样，当没有办法为加沙地带的犹太人群体提供支持的时候，右翼党派领导人阿里埃勒·沙龙赶走了与150万巴勒斯坦人杂居的9，000名犹太定居者——这一戏剧性的事件在双方民众心里都留下了深深的创伤。


But there are 250,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank.	但西岸居住着250，000位以色列定居者。


Any attempt to evacuate them could escalate into a civil war.	任何迫使他们撤离的举动都可能升级为一场内战。


The world, including the United States, disapproves of the Israeli settlements.	全世界，包括美国在内，都不赞成以色列修建定居点的做法。


But, despite past US administrations’ opportunity to make their influence felt, they preferred to permit Israel, an allied, friendly state, to do what it wanted.	但是，尽管过去美国政府有过施加影响的机会，但他们更愿意让以色列这个友好盟国尽情地为所欲为。


So a moment of truth has arrived.	现在到了面对现实的时刻。


Barack Obama, a wise and courageous leader, is – I have no doubt about it – not merely interested in improving America’s image in the eyes of the Muslim world.	巴拉克·奥巴马这位智慧勇敢的领导人关注的不仅是改善美国在穆斯林世界的形象，我对这一点毫不怀疑。


He also seeks Israel’s welfare and security, and says to us, “Enough.	他还追求以色列的安全和福祉，并且大声疾呼，“够了。


Stop harming yourselves and your own future.	别再损害你们的未来和你们自己的利益。


Even if you don’t believe in Palestinians’ real desire for peace, their capacity to hold terrorist organizations at bay, or their renunciation of the alleged right of return, you can always protect your security with a military presence in Palestinian territories rather than prejudicing the future peace and the two-state solution by expanding useless settlements.”	即便你们不相信巴勒斯坦人渴望和平的真实愿望，不相信他们能够消灭恐怖组织，不相信他们放弃所谓回归权的承诺，你们也一定可以依靠在巴勒斯坦领地驻军来保卫自己的安全，而不是拓展毫无意义的移民定居点，对未来的和平以及两国分治的解决方案造成威胁。 ”


With such a clear and direct appeal to the Israeli government, America’s president not only expresses what a majority of Israelis know.	借助对以色列政府明确而直截了当的呼吁，美国总统不只是说出了一个多数以色列人知道的事实。


He also proves his profound friendship for the Jewish state.	他也向犹太国家奉献了自己意味深长的友谊。


Barack Obama’s American Revolution	巴拉克•奥巴马的美国革命


For eight years, George W. Bush has managed to incarnate and reinforce all the prejudices and negative stereotypes the world has of the US.	八年以来，乔治•W•布什成功地继承和强化了世界对美国的所有偏见和成见。


He has antagonized the world more than any other American president before him, seriously damaging America’s “soft” power by inefficient and excessive use of its “hard” power.	他比任何一位前任都更善于和世界对抗，以对“硬实力”的低效滥用，严重损害了美国的“软实力”。


Reconciling the United States with itself and the world should thus be the twin priorities for America’s next president.	因此让美国同自己并与世界和解应成为下一任美国总统的两项头等大事。


If there is one candidate who can accomplish this, who can contribute, in a split second, to restoring America’s international reputation, it is Barack Obama.	如果说有一位候选人能够做到这一点，能够在顷刻之间帮助美国重塑国际声誉，那么这个人就是巴拉克•奥巴马。


Exceptional periods sometimes create exceptional leaders.	时势造英雄。


Without the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte would have remained a gifted and frustrated junior military officer.	如果没有法国大革命，拿破仑•波拿巴将仍然是一位怀才不遇的初级军官。


Likewise, the current period in America and its relations with the world have been truly exceptional, requiring a leader who can fundamentally challenge a global majority’s view that America has become arrogant, impotent, and selfish.	同样，现在的美国及其与世界的关系正处在一个非常时期，需要一位领导人能从根本上挑战全球大多数人的观点，即美国已变得傲慢、无能和自私。


Of course, diehard anti-Americans will never be persuaded, but they remain a minority, with the possible exception of the Muslim world.	当然反美的死硬派永不会被说服，但可能除了在穆斯林世界，他们毕竟是少数。


The silent majority is ready to be convinced that there is life after Bush.	沉默的大多数都等待着布什之后仍有希望的证明。


Why is Obama so different from the other presidential candidates, and why could he make such a large difference internationally?	为什么说奥巴马与其他总统候选人如此不同？ 他如何能在国际上发挥不同凡响的作用呢？


After all, in foreign policy matters, the next president’s room for maneuver will be very small.	毕竟，在外交政策方面，下一任总统的发挥空间很小。


He (or she) will have to stay in Iraq, engage in the Israel-Palestine conflict on the side of Israel, confront a tougher Russia, deal with an ever more ambitious China, and face the challenge of global warming.	他（或她）将会继续留守伊拉克，继续以支持以色列的姿态介入以巴冲突，应对更为强悍的俄罗斯和更有雄心的中国，并面对全球变暖的挑战。


If Obama can make a difference, it is not because of his policy choices, but because of what he is.	如果奥巴马能有不同的作为，这不是因为他的政策选择，而是因为他的个人特质。


The very moment he appears on the world’s television screens, victorious and smiling, America’s image and soft power would experience something like a Copernican revolution.	当他面带微笑、展露荣光地出现在全世界的电视荧屏上的那一刻，美国的形象和软实力会如同经历一场哥白尼革命。


Think of the impression his election would make not only in Africa, but in Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe.	想象一下他当选会给非洲、亚洲、东方甚至欧洲带来什么样的印象。


With its rise to global supremacy, America had become the incarnation of the West, and the West was seen as “white.”	随着美国获得全球霸主地位，它也成为西方的化身，而西方被看作是“白”的。


Power in America shifted first from the East Coast to the West Coast, and then to the South.	美国权力的更替首先是从东海岸到西海岸，然后到达南方。


But if a shift across America’s racial divide is not truly revolutionary, then what is?	但如果这种跨越美国种族分割的变化还不具有真正的革命性，那什么才具有呢？


Of course, to reduce Obama to the color of his skin is a grave oversimplification, even if he has been keen to emphasize his “black roots.”	当然，将奥巴马的肤色作为他的最大优势是一种严重的简单化，即便他也竭力强调自己的“黑色之根”。


In fact, African-Americans do not fully support him.	事实上，非洲裔的美国人也不全都支持他。


With his white mother and his African father, he does not fit any African-American precedent.	有着白人母亲和黑人父亲的他不同于任何一位非洲裔美国人的先例。


But that is another reason why Obama is exceptional: the complexity of his identity makes him truly universal, a global candidate for a global age.	但这正是奥巴马的另一个非同寻常之处：他身份的复杂性使他具有真正的世界性，成为全球化时代的一位全球化候选人。


By virtue of his unique personal history, he can bridge Africa, America, and even Asia – where he studied as a young boy in a Muslim school – thereby reviving the universal image and message of America.	通过独特的个人经历，他能够沟通非洲、美洲，甚至亚洲—年幼时他曾在那里的一所穆斯林学校学习—从而重塑美国的世界形象和讯息。


But, above all, what makes Obama unique, given what the US has been through during the Bush years, is the nature of the message he embodies, which is best summed up in the title of his book The Audacity of Hope .	但有鉴于美国在布什年代的经历，使奥巴马与众不同的最重要原因是他所承载的讯息。 他的著述的书名是对这一讯息的最佳总结—《希望无惧》（ The Audacity of Hope ）。


If America can move from a culture of fear to one of hope – and again incarnate hope for the world – it will require a leader who embodies the American dream: modern and armed with a humanistic religious message, in contrast to the anxious irrationalism of the Christian conservative movement that fueled Bush’s political base.	如果美国能从恐惧的文化迈进到希望的文化—并再一次为世界而继承这种希望—这就需要一位承载着美国梦想的领导人：既现代而又深得人文主义的宗教真谛，这与充斥着布什执政基础的焦虑的非理性主义和基督教保守运动形成鲜明的对比。


Regardless of whether Obama can deliver on his promises, America will not regain the stature it had between 1941 and 2000.	不论奥巴马是否能够实现他的诺言，美国都不会重新获得其在1941-2000年间所拥有的地位。


With or without Obama, the “American century” will not be repeated.	不论有没有奥巴马，“美国世纪”都将不会重现。


But Obama can learn from the early mistakes made by Jimmy Carter in the mid-1970’s.	但奥巴马能够从吉米•卡特在1970年代中期所犯的早期错误中汲取教训。


Neo-isolationism is not an option, but restraint – based on confidence and wisdom – is.	新孤立主义不是出路，只有基于自信和智慧的克制才是。


The world needs a more modest and confident America.	世界需要一个更为谦逊和自信的美国。


For a European who has been deeply troubled and saddened by America’s evolution in the last decade, Obama, of all the declared presidential candidates, seems to come closest to incarnating such an America.	对我这样一个为美国在过去十年中的演变忧心忡忡、深感不安的欧���人而言，在所有已宣布的总统候选人当中，奥巴马似乎最能代言这样的美国。


Jimmy Carter Obama	吉米·卡特·奥巴马


PARIS – “How many divisions does the Pope have?”	巴黎—“教皇有几个分身？


Joseph Stalin famously quipped when told to be mindful of the Vatican.	”在被告知当心梵蒂冈时，斯大林讽刺道。


In an updated lesson in realpolitik, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently was happy to count Pope Francis as an ally in opposing American military intervention in Syria.	如今这一幕有了现实政治版，俄罗斯总理普京最近愉快地将教皇方济各视为共同反对美国军事干预叙利亚的盟友。


Presenting himself as the last pillar of respect for international law, Putin offered ethics lessons to the United States – and specifically to President Barack Obama.	普京摆出充当国际法最后支柱的姿态，给美国——特别是总统奥巴马——上了一堂伦理课。


With the US-Russian agreement, signed in Geneva on September 14, to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international control, Russia has returned to the global scene – and not only because of its nuisance value.	9月14日，美国和俄罗斯在日内瓦签订协议，将叙利亚化学武器问题置于国际控制之下，俄罗斯凭此重回国际舞台——这一回决不是仅仅作为反角。


Could Putin one day receive, like Obama before him, a Nobel Peace Prize?	普京有可能像奥巴马那样获得诺贝尔和平奖吗？


Has not Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who proposed the deal, already entered the pantheon of great Russian diplomats, as the successor of Karl Nesselrode, the Russian envoy to the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna and to the Congress of Paris in 1856?	促成该协议的俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫已经可以进入俄罗斯外交名人堂、与卡尔·内斯尔罗德（Karl NEsselrode，1814—1815年维也纳会议和1856年巴黎和会俄国全权公使）平起平坐了吗？


Of course, Russian diplomacy has performed extremely well recently, but it does not stand on its own merits alone.	当然，俄罗斯外交最近表现极为出色，但这并不是全由其自身优点带来的。


Russia’s diplomats would have gained little without America’s foreign-policy malaise – a victim of Obama’s vacillation and of Americans’ hostility to any new military adventure, however limited its scope – and Europe’s deep internal divisions.	要不是美国外交政策昏招频出（这是拜奥巴马的犹豫不决和美国人民不愿再牵涉任何军事行动所赐）、欧洲陷入了深度分裂，俄罗斯外交官原本也取得不了多少成就。


Yes, Russia is emerging from its humiliation following the collapse of the Soviet Union.	是的，俄罗斯正在从苏联解体后的耻辱中重新崛起。


Heir to an imperial tradition that has shaped its national identity, Russia is resuming in the Middle East a role and status more in tune with the one it had from the Czarist era to Soviet times.	继承了决定其国民性的帝国传统的俄罗斯正在重新树立其在中东的地位和作用，堪与帝俄时代和斯大林时代相媲美。


But Russia is no match for the US militarily and no match for China economically, and its soft power is virtually non-existent.	但俄罗斯军力不如美国，经济不如中国，软实力更是基本为零。


If Russia can provoke America – whether by granting political asylum to the “traitor” Edward Snowden, for example, or by resisting Western diplomacy in the Middle East – it is not because it has become a great power once again, but simply because America is no longer the great power that it once was.	如果说俄罗斯能够挑衅美国——比如，不管是授予“叛国者”斯诺登政治庇护，还是抵抗西方在中东的外交攻势——那也不是因为它重新成为超级大国，而仅仅是因为美国已不再是曾经的超级大国。


The Syrian crisis has made that plain.	叙利亚危机十分清楚地说明了这一点。


Recent US diplomacy has seemed amateurish and naive.	美国最近的外交举措非常业余而幼稚。


Obama’s handling of the Syrian crisis increasingly evokes Jimmy Carter’s handling of the Iranian hostage crisis 33 years ago, particularly the failed operation in 1980 to rescue the Americans abducted following the takeover of the US embassy in November 1979.	奥巴马对叙利亚危机的处理越来越像33年前吉米·卡特对伊朗人质危机的处理，尤其是1980年的拯救行动（1979年11月美国大使馆遭袭，美国人被劫为人质）。


Then, too, hesitation seemed to prevail over determination, contributing to the failure of the mission.	接着，犹豫胜过了决心，整个任务以失败告终。


Carter was a somewhat bland engineer, whereas Obama is a charismatic lawyer.	卡特是个无聊枯燥的工程师，而奥巴马是魅力超凡的律师。


Yet they seem to share a fundamental indecisiveness in their approach to world affairs.	但他们在对待全球事务方面表现出相似的根本性的犹豫。


Carter had difficulty choosing between the muscular line of his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the more moderate approach of his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance.	卡特难以在其国家安全顾问布热津斯基的强硬路线和国务卿万斯的温和路线之间做出抉择。


By contrast, there are no fundamental disagreements among Obama’s closest foreign-policy advisers – Susan Rice, the national security adviser, Samantha Power, who succeeded Rice as US Ambassador to the United Nations, and Secretary of State John Kerry.	相反，奥巴马的外交政策亲信——国家安全顾问苏珊·赖斯、接替赖斯出任美国驻联合国大使的萨曼莎·鲍威尔和国务卿约翰·克里之间并没有根本性分歧。


Instead, it is Obama himself who seems to be constantly hesitating.	相反，是奥巴马本人老是犹犹豫豫。


The divisions are not among his advisers, but within his own mind.	分歧不在于他的顾问，而在于他自己的思维。


As a good lawyer, Obama weighs the pros and cons, aware that it is impossible to do nothing in the Syrian crisis but remaining viscerally disinclined to leap into any foreign entanglement that would distract attention from his agenda of domestic reform.	作为一名优秀的律师，奥巴马权衡利弊，明白在叙利亚问题上无动于衷是不行的，但在内心深处，他有不愿意卷入对外纠缠，这会导致他无法专注于国内改革日程。


More important, he seems to lack a coherent long-term strategic vision of America’s role in the world.	更重要的是，他似乎对美国的全球角色缺少长期战略愿景。


Neither the currently fashionable “Asian pivot” nor the “Russian reset” four years ago constitute the beginning of a grand plan.	无论是眼下大热的“亚洲支点”还是四年前的“俄罗斯重启”都不足以作为宏大计划的开端。


In such a context, the return of global realpolitik can only benefit Russia and harm the US, despite America’s many advantages in terms of hard and soft power.	在这样的环境下，全球现实政治的回归只能有利于俄罗斯而有损于美国，尽管美国在硬实力和软实力方面拥有大量优势。


The agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons struck by Russia and the US could one day be remembered as a spectacular breakthrough in the field of arms control.	俄罗斯和美国就叙利亚���学武器问题达成的协议将来或许会作为在武器控制方面的重大突破而被人铭记。


But it is more likely to be perceived as a grand deception – remembered not for helping Syria’s people, but mainly as a sign of America’s growing international weakness.	但更有可能的情形是，它会被认为是一个大骗局——不是因为有助于叙利亚人民，而是作为美国国际地位日薄西山的信号而被记住。


In that case, the agreement will not only damage America’s reputation, but will also undermine global stability.	果真如此的话，该协议不但有损于美国的名誉，也破坏了全球稳定。


Weakness is weakness, whether one is in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, or Pyongyang.	弱点就是弱点，不管它在莫斯科、北京、德黑兰还是平壤身上。


Barack Obama’s Missing Freedom Agenda	巴拉克·奥巴马错失的自由议程


On his second full day in office, President Barack Obama made a major gesture toward restoring the Constitution and the rule of law by signing two executive orders: one closed the prison at Guantánamo Bay, and the other restored America to the company of civilized nations by closing so-called “black sites” that facilitated state-sanctioned torture.	在他就任的第二天，总统巴拉克·奥巴马为恢复宪法和法治做出了重要姿态：他签署了两道行政命令，一条关闭了关塔纳摩湾的监狱，另一条通过关闭所谓的“黑色据点”让美国重回到文明国家的行列中，这些据点促使国家批准的酷刑得以执行。


Nice start, and the credit goes both to Obama and to the millions of Americans who stood up and took risks to fight against gathering tyranny.	这是个好的开始，奥巴马和数百万冒着危险站出来反对集体暴行的美国人都获得了荣誉。


But it is not enough.	但是这还不够。


There is a speech that we still need to hear, detailing five tasks that, in order to repair the damage to liberty caused by the previous administration, he must pursue as quickly as he handled the first two executive orders.	我们需要听到这样一次演说，它将详述五项任务。 为了弥补前一任政府对自由造成的损失，奥巴马必须象他处理最先两条行政命令那样来迅速执行这五项任务。


Its substance should be something like the following:	它的本质应该象这个样子：


“My fellow Americans, the Founders had the wisdom to guarantee our freedoms in many ways.	我的美国民众们，开国先贤借助智慧利用许多方式来保证我们的自由。


They could not guarantee our souls.	但这些方式不能保证我们的灵魂。


That is up to us and how we act.	这取决于我们自己以及我们如何行事。


“In every major religion, a version of the following question is asked: what does it profit us to gain wealth and power if we lose our moral values?	在主要的每种宗教中，都问及了这样一个问题：如果我们丧失了道德价值，获得财富和权力又将如何造福我们呢？


In the past eight years, we have colluded with acts that jeopardized the very soul of our nation.	在过去八年中，我们已经和那些把我们的国家灵魂处于危险之中的行动勾结在一起。


The greatest crime we committed or tolerated was the savaging of our cherished Constitution.	我们犯下或是容忍的最大罪行就是粗暴对待我们所珍惜的宪法。


“Without our Constitution, America is just another world power made great by wealth and weapons instead of by values and convictions; so we are at risk of collapse when our wealth and weapons fail us.	没有我们的宪法，美国就是另外一个这样的世界大国，它之所以强大是因为财富和武器而不是因为价值和信念； 所以当我们缺乏财富和武器的时候，就处于崩溃的危险之中。


It is our Constitution that is our true wealth and the true guarantee of our nation’s endurance.	我们的宪法才是我们真正的财富，才能确保我们的国家得以持久。


“After closing Guantánamo Bay and forbidding torture, we must repeal the Patriot Act, thereby restoring the Constitution’s restraints against warrantless wiretapping and surveillance.	在关闭关塔纳摩，禁止酷刑之后，我们必须撤销《爱国者法案》，从而恢复宪法对于毫无法律根据的窃听和监视的约束力。


“Second, though we have closed the prisons, we must seek the forgiveness of our fellow nations for the horrors that we committed or with which we colluded by engaging in state-sanctioned torture and “extraordinary rendition” of detainees to countries that torture.	第二，尽管我们已经关闭了监狱，我们必须寻求我们的伙伴国家原谅我们所制造的或是我们与之串谋的恐惧，后者是通过执行国家批准的酷刑和将被拘押者“极端引渡”到折磨他们的国家得以实现的。


I am appointing a commission to establish a truth and reconciliation process to put the accounting of these horrors before our own consciences and before the world.	我将指派一个专门委员会来启动真相和和解进程，在我们的良知和世界面前来清算这些恐惧。


“Third, we must have a special prosecutor to prosecute the culpable.	第三，我们必须有一位特别公诉人来起诉那些该负责任的人。


Many in the military or the intelligence services now fear criminal liability for actions they took at the behest of those at the top of the chain of command.	许多服务于军界或情报界的人现在害怕要为采取的行动承担刑事责任，而这些行动是处于指挥链最上方的人命令他们采取的。


But the proper course of action is that taken in Nuremberg, The Hague, Sierra Leone, and after the Bosnian conflict: prosecute those who designed, approved, and implemented the policy of torture and rendition, however high the chain of commission goes – including the lawyers who justified legal perversions that led to torture and murder – rather than targeting those farther down the chain of command.	但是，行动的正确程序应该象纽伦堡，海牙，塞拉利昂和波斯利亚的冲突之后采取的那样：起诉那些设计，批准，实施虐待和引渡政策的人，无论涉及链条里面地位多高的人物—包括那些律师，他们为导致虐待和谋杀的法律滥用进行辩护； 而不是把目标对准那些处于命令链低端的人。


“Fourth, let us once again outlaw the presence of the military on our streets, as the Founders intended.	第四，让我们再次宣布军队出现在我们的街道上是非法的，就像开国先贤计划的那样。


On October 7, 2008, more than 3,000 American troops were deployed from Iraq to the United States, in violation of Posse Comitatus, which has protected us from military policing for a century, and in violation of the Insurrection Act, which protected us for the century before that.	在2008年10月7日，超过3000名美军从伊拉克撤出后被部署在美国，这违反了《地方保安队法》，这部法律一个世纪以来保护我们不受军队管理。 这些部署还违反了《叛乱条例》 ，它在《地方保安队法》施行的前一个世纪保护了我们。


Today, there are 20,000 soldiers – not accountable to the people, but only to the executive – on our streets.	今天，我们的街道上有20000名士兵，他们不是向民众负责而仅仅是向行政当局负责。


“The danger of that situation is why the Founders adopted the Second Amendment, which is meant to restrict domestic policing to militia – the National Guard and civilian police – that are answerable to the people.	这种局势的危害就是开国先贤采取第二修正案的原因。 第二修正案意味着把维持国内治安的责任局限在民兵身上：即国民警卫队和和民警，而民兵是向民众负责的。


America is neither a battlefield nor a police state, so we should send our soldiers to the actual front or else back home to their families.	美国既非战场也非警察国家，所以我们应该把我们的战士送回真正的前线，或者送回家里和他们家人团聚。


“Finally, we must ensure that this darkness never descends again.	最后，我们必须确保黑暗不会再次降临。


Half of American children grow up with no civic education.	美国有一半孩子成长的时候没有接受公民教育。


Half of states no longer teach civics – the study of our Republic and how it works – in middle school.	有一半的州在中学里不再教授公民学，这门学科研究我们的共和国以及它是如何运转的。


So half of incoming American college students don’t know what our democracy is, let alone how to defend it when it is threatened.	所以，美国有一半新晋的大学生不知道我们的民主是什么，更不用提当民主受到威胁的时候如何来保卫它。


I call on states throughout the land to re-institute the study of US civics so that we will produce citizens who understand our legacy and can defend liberty and the Constitution when it is threatened.	我号召全国各州重新开始美国公民学的研究，以便我们将培养出这样的公民：他们懂得我们的遗产，并能在宪法和自由受到威胁的时候保卫它们。


“Join me in accomplishing these next five tasks, and we can look at ourselves in the mirror again, recognizing ourselves as true Americans.”	加入我的行列来完成这五项任务。 我们能够在镜中再次看到自己，认识到我们自己是真正的美国人。


Qaddafi’s Long Shadow	卡扎菲的巨大阴影


ANTALYA – The recent coup attempt in Libya, led by General Khalifa Hiftar, has finally pierced the illusion that the country’s dysfunctional central government, whose power is limited to the capital, Tripoli, can rule effectively.	安塔利亚——最近由哈利法·塔希夫塔将军领导的利比亚政变终于彻底戳穿了该国政令出不了首都的黎波里的孱弱中央政府能够有效执政的幻觉。


But determining how to bring peace and stability to Libya’s deeply fragmented society will require more than an assessment of this government’s mistakes; it will demand careful consideration of former leader Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s failures – and his successes.	但确定如何为利比亚割裂极深的社会带去和平与稳定不仅需要评估本届政府的失误； 还需要思考前任领袖卡扎菲上校有哪些失败和成功之处。


Hiftar believes that the key to solving Libya’s myriad crises lies in establishing a strong national army capable of subduing the Islamists who are destabilizing the country.	塔希夫塔认为解决利比亚众多危机的关键在于建设一支有能力战胜破坏国家稳定的伊斯兰主义的强大军队。


Others continue to advocate for national reconciliation.	也有人继续宣传民族和解才能解决问题。


But neither solution addresses what is really driving events in Libya: the legacy of Qaddafism.	但这两种方法都没有解决驱动利比亚局势的卡扎菲主义这一真正问题。


Given that Qaddafi ruled Libya for more than four decades, his is a legacy that cannot simply be ignored.	鉴于卡扎菲统治利比亚超过四十年，他所留下的传统不能被简单忽略。


That means not only recognizing the vital link between his policies and today’s problems, but also ensuring that what should be preserved is not sacrificed in the rush to efface his memory.	这意味着不仅要承认卡扎菲政策及当前问题间有着重要的联系，而且还要确保不会在抹去卡扎菲记忆的仓促浪潮中牺牲本应被保留的东西。


Qaddafi used strong security services and paramilitary revolutionary committees to safeguard his rule, leaving state institutions dysfunctional and fragmented.	卡扎菲利用强大的安全机构及准军事革命委员会来捍卫自己的统治，致使国家机构在运行不畅的同时四分五裂。


Indeed, Qaddafi’s belief that the bureaucracy impeded the transmission of his message to the masses spurred him to dismantle ministries periodically and place privileged personal relationships above institutional hierarchies.	事实上，卡扎菲确信官僚主义阻碍其向民众传达讯息的想法促使他定期破坏部委，并把特权阶层的个人关系凌驾于地方机构之上。


Lacking unified leadership, Libyans reverted to tribal and regional allegiances, at the expense of a shared national identity.	由于缺乏统一领导，利比亚牺牲了民族认同感，恢复了部落和地区效忠制。


This atomization of the state and society continues to impede Libya’s ability to establish effective and credible government.	国家和社会的这种零散化继续破坏利比亚建立有效可信政府的能力。


With the right approach, however, there is hope.	但如果方法正确希望依然存在。


The problem is that Libya’s leaders have so far done more to perpetuate fragmentation and dysfunction than to ameliorate it.	问题是利比亚领导人迄今为止更多是去固化分裂和混乱状况，而不是去改善它。


In its two years in power, the parliament, known as the General National Congress (GNC), has empowered non-state actors, with ministries bypassing the army to task militias with security operations.	在执政两年间，利比亚国民议会（GNC）将权力交给国家以外的主体，各部委绕过军队委派民兵执行安全任务。 塔希夫塔意识到这种方法有问题。


Hiftar recognizes the problem with this approach – indeed, it spurred him to initiate the coup; but his proposed solution is equally flawed.	事实上，这是他发动本次政变的促成因素； 但他提出的解决方案同样有缺陷。


After all, Libya’s security forces have already proved to be more likely to facilitate than fight cronyism.	毕竟，事实已经证明利比亚安全部队更有可能助长而不是反对任人唯亲。


Moreover, instead of eliminating Qaddafi’s highly politicized judicial system – for example, separate courts, administered by the revolutionary committees, could try any Libyan without due process – his successors have embraced it.	不仅如此，卡扎菲的继任者不仅没有消灭、反而全盘继承了卡扎菲高度政治化的司法体制——比方说由革命委员会管辖的独立法院，有权不经正当程序对任何利比亚人进行审理。


In 2012, a United Nations report revealed that “the vast majority” of an estimated 8,000 conflict-related detainees were being held outside of the state’s purview.	2012年，联合国一份报告显示约8,000名与冲突有关的被拘留者绝大多数不属于国家的管辖范围。


Militias have taken advantage of this system to strong-arm prosecutors into issuing arrest warrants.	民兵利用上述体系迫使检察官签发逮捕令。


And militias based in the city of Zintan continue to refuse to hand over Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, to the central authorities.	驻扎在津坦市的民兵依然拒绝将卡扎菲的儿子赛义夫·伊斯兰移交给中央政府。


Finally, the corruption that was endemic in Qaddafi’s regime endures, with ministry officials accepting bribes, for example, in exchange for contracts.	最后，卡扎菲执政时期曾流行的腐败依然流行，政府官员依然在签订合同时收受贿赂。


For their part, the militias that overthrew Qaddafi have released prisoners in exchange for ransom payments.	推翻卡扎菲的民兵组织收取赎金释放囚犯。


If Libya is to escape its current predicament, its leaders must transform the governance structures that Qaddafi built to create a fair and credible system based on the rule of law.	如果想走出目前的困境，利比亚领导人就必须改变卡扎菲留下的治理结构，建设以法治为基础的公平可信的治理系统。


That requires, first and foremost, efforts to strengthen and modernize institutions, guided by Western examples.	这首先需要以西方为榜样增强机构实力并实现其现代化。


At the same time, Libya’s leaders must recognize and build upon the few positive aspects of Qaddafism.	与此同时，利比亚领导人也必须挖掘和借鉴卡扎菲主义有限的积极因素。


For starters, Qaddafi managed to unify a country that, since the Greek invasion in the seventh century BC, had been divided between a coastal strip linked to the larger Mediterranean basin and an isolated hinterland that even Benito Mussolini’s brutal regime could not secure.	首先，卡扎菲成功实现了自公元前七世纪希腊入侵以来一直处于分裂状态的国家的统一，统一与大片地中海盆地相连的狭长沿海地带和孤立腹地的丰功伟绩就连墨索里尼的残暴政权都没有做到。


Qaddafi thus took the first step – intentional or not – toward creating a modern nation-state.	卡扎菲借此有意无意地迈出了建设现代化民族国家的第一步。


The challenge now is to overcome the divisions that remain within the population – no easy task in a vast country with a sparsely inhabited interior populated mostly by ethnic minorities and reclusive tribes.	现在要做的是弥合民众间存在的分歧——这在像利比亚这样一个以少数民族和隐居部落为主要人口的地广人稀的国家并不容易做到。


The most important positive component of Qaddafi’s legacy, however, was the partial emancipation of women.	但卡扎菲传统最重要的积极因素是妇女的部分解放。


As a modernizer seeking to mobilize his entire population, Qaddafi promoted women’s social and economic inclusion by expanding education for girls, granting women the right to divorce, and appointing female judges and ministers.	身为设法动员所有民众的现代化主义者，卡扎菲通过实行扩大女童教育、赋���女性离婚权及任命女性法官部长等举措推动女性的社会及经济融入。


Though Qaddafi’s female guards were mocked as the trappings of his eccentricity, they actually represented his desire to liberate women.	虽然卡扎菲的女保镖被当作他古怪的证据而备受嘲笑，但她们却在事实上代表了他解放妇女的意愿。


Here, too, Qaddafi’s successors have failed.	卡扎菲的接班人在这个问题上也没有处理好。


Back in 2012, for example, the head of the interim government, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, declared his intention to lift restrictions against polygamy.	比方说早在2012年，临时政府领导人穆斯塔法·阿卜杜勒-贾利勒就宣布了取消限制反对一夫多妻制的意向。


Later, he ordered Sarah Elmesallati, the host of the ceremony at which power was transferred to the GNC, to leave the stage halfway through her presentation because she was not wearing a headscarf.	后来，他却仅仅因为国民议会权力移交仪式主持人Sarah Elmesallati没有戴头巾而命令她在讲话讲到一半时中途离场。


Ordinary Libyans have also advocated keeping women on a short leash.	普通利比亚人同样主张对女性进行束缚。


A college-age Libyan woman’s father recently denied her the opportunity to accept a scholarship from the US State Department to attend a training workshop in Washington, DC, because he could not accompany her overseas.	一名大学年纪的利比亚女性的父亲最近仅仅因为自己不能陪女儿出国，就剥夺了她接受美国国务院奖学金参加在华盛顿举办的培训班的机会。


Libya’s leaders – and their Western benefactors – have no choice but to consider and address the effects of Qaddafi’s legacy on public attitudes and official behavior.	利比亚领导人及其西方赞助者别无选择，只能思考卡扎菲传统对公众态度和官方行为有何种影响。


But they must also accept that only modernization of Libya’s state and society – the agenda that Qaddafi pursued, albeit in a perverted form – will ensure the country’s survival.	但他们也必须承认虽然卡扎菲的追求有些变态，但只有实现利比亚国家和社会的现代化才能确保国家生存下去。


Barbarians or Geniuses at the Gate?	移民是福是祸


MUNICH – Europe is currently experiencing a huge wave of migration between its east and west.	慕尼黑--欧洲东西部之间正在进行一场巨大的人口迁徙。


This movement resembles the Great Migrations (Völkerwanderung) that marked Europe between the fourth to sixth centuries.	这一人口移动足以与四世纪和六世纪间席卷欧洲的大迁徙相比。


Within the first year of Romania’s accession to the EU on January 1, 2007, for example, roughly a million Romanians migrated to Italy and Spain.	例如，2007年1月1日罗马尼亚加入欧盟后一年之内，大约一百万罗马尼亚人迁移到了意大利和西班牙。


More than 800,000 East Europeans have become workers in the United Kingdom over the past four years, most coming from Poland.	在过去四年多的时间里，八十多万东欧人在英国工作，他们大多数来自波兰。


Indeed, in the last two years alone, 1.5 million Poles emigrated, and overall probably more than two million have done so since Poland’s EU accession in 2004.	实际上，仅仅在过去两年中，一百五十万波兰人迁移外国。 自从波兰在2004年加入欧盟以来总共大约有两百万人移居国外。


On a smaller scale, the migration of Ukrainians to the Czech Republic, Bulgarians to Turkey, and British citizens to Spain is also noteworthy.	在比较小的程度内，乌克兰人移居到捷克，保加利亚人移居到土耳其，而英国人移居到西班牙这些现象也是引人瞩目的。


Because Germany still restricts the immigration of dependent workers from eastern EU countries, most of its immigrants come as self-employed or economically inactive people.	由于德国依旧限制东欧欧盟国家的养靠工人移民，其大多数移民都是自雇人士或者没有什么经济能力的人。


In Munich, the number of self-employed tilers increased in 2004 and 2005, the first two years after the first eastern enlargement wave, from 119 to 970.	在慕尼黑，自雇的瓦盖工人从2004年的119人增加到2005年的970人，这正好是首批欧盟东扩的头两年。


But despite restrictions, by 2005 Germany had absorbed 37% of all migrants from Eastern Europe that came before and after eastern EU enlargement, whereas Italy had absorbed 22%, Greece 11%, Switzerland 8%, and the UK only 3%.	但是尽管有限制，到了2005年，德国已经吸收了欧盟东扩前后来自东欧的所有移民的35%，而意大利吸纳22%，希腊11%，瑞士8%，而英国只有3%。


In the same year, 13% of the population living in Germany was foreign born, more than in Britain (10%), France (7%), Spain (5%), or Italy (3%).	同年，居住在德国的人口中的13%是在外国出生，超过英国的10%，法国的7%，西班牙的5%或者意大利的3%。


The immigration waves of the last two years to Britain, Spain, and Italy will have significantly changed these figures, but the information needed to update the statistics is not yet available.	过去两年前往英国、西班牙以及意大利的移民潮应当大幅度改变这些数据，但是更新统计数字的信息还不具备。


Nowadays, people move faster than statistical offices can count them.	现今，人们移动的速度要超过统计人员的工作速度。


Before the EU’s eastern enlargement, many studies predicted the likely migration waves.	在欧盟东扩以前，许多研究都预计到了可能随之而来的移民潮。


The forecasts of the proportion of East Europeans who were expected to move west within a 15 years ranged from 2.5% to 6%.	预计在15年内东欧人移民到西欧的比例是2. 5%到6%。


Given that about 5% of the Polish population has now emigrated within a period of only four years, despite immigration restrictions by important target countries, these estimates were much too cautious.	尽管吸纳移民主要国家采取限制移民措施，但是鉴于在仅仅4年之内波兰移民人口就达到大约5%，因此这些估计过于谨慎。


Before enlargement, it was politically incorrect to discuss possible waves of migration to the West, as EU politicians saw this as an obstacle to the enlargement process.	欧盟东扩前，谈论可能涌向西欧的移民潮在政治上是错误的，因为欧盟的政治人物认为这是对欧盟扩大进程的阻碍。


Now that enlargement has taken place, it is easier to discuss migration objectively.	现在东扩已经实现，客观地讨论移民问题就容易一点了。


This immigration is not an invasioni barbariche, as Italians refer to the Völkerwanderung, although the orders of magnitude are comparable.	尽管规模相当，但是意大利人把过去的大迁徙称为野蛮人入侵。


As migrants move between markets with well-defined property rights, immigration in principle is beneficial for both the immigrants and the target country.	由于移民在不同的市场之间移动并且拥有明确的产权，因此在原则上，移民现象对于移民本身以及接纳移民的国家都是有益的。


The immigrant receives a higher wage than at home, and the target country benefits from cheap labor, which creates more value than it costs.	移民要比在原籍国家得到更高的工资，接纳国家则从便宜的劳力获益，这样创造的价值就大于成本。


But in practice, immigration is often not as beneficial as it could be, because the target country has a rigid wage structure that prevents the additional jobs needed to employ the immigrants from being created.	但是实际上，移民并非如此有益，因为接收国家的工资体系僵硬，阻碍了创造让移民就业所需要的工作机会。


If, for example, a target country provides minimum wage guarantees and replacement incomes for the domestic unemployed, immigrants simply force domestic residents into the care of the welfare state.	比如，如果某一接收国家提供最低工资保障以及国内失业者的安置收入，移民就会迫使国内居民领取国家福利。


This is not a problem of immigration as such, but of poorly designed domestic social and labor market institutions.	这并非是移民本身的问题，而是国内社会和劳动力市场机构不合理造成的。


To be on the safe side, host countries often try to limit immigration to skilled workers, because they join segments of the labor market in which sufficient downward wage flexibility provides immigrants with additional jobs.	为了保险起见，接收国家经常试图把移民限制在具有一技之长的工人上，因为他们加入到劳动力市场部分之中，而这些部分中足够的压低工资灵活度给移民提供了额外的就业机会。


But countries have so far had mixed success in attracting skilled immigrants.	但是各国目前在吸引具有技能的移民上成效不一。


The most successful countries in this regard have been the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, Ireland, Australia, the United States, and the UK, in that order), as well as Denmark and Norway.	这一方面最为成功的都是盎格鲁撒克逊国家(按照顺序是加拿大、���尔兰、澳大利亚、美国以及英国)，还有丹麦和挪威。


More than one-third of immigrants to these countries have tertiary education, with Canada and Ireland at 45%.	这些国家的移民中超过三分之一的具有大学教育水平，加拿大和爱尔兰达到45%。


In the more unsuccessful countries – Italy, Austria, Germany, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands – the proportion of immigrants with a tertiary education is below a quarter.	在那些并不十分成功的国家中，也就是意大利、奥地利、德国、法国、葡萄牙和荷兰，具有大学教育水平的移民比例低于25%。


In Italy, the share is just 11% – the lowest in the available statistics.	在意大利，这一比例只有11%，是所有统计中最低的。


The brain drain to the Anglo-Saxon countries, the US in particular, is astounding.	流向盎格鲁萨克斯国家、特别是美国的人材令人惊讶。


The graduating classes of top American universities are packed with foreign students, and 27% of physicians practicing in the US today come from abroad.	美国顶尖大学毕业生中充满了外国学生，如今在美国行医的医生中有27%来自外国。


America’s postwar growth and dynamism largely resulted from skilled immigrants.	美国战后的增长和活力大多数来自具有一技之长的移民。


Before and after World War II, many skilled people came from Europe, Germany in particular; in recent decades, Asian immigrants dominate, with India, Pakistan, and the Philippines occupying the top ranks.	在第二次世界大战前后，许多有一技之长的人来自欧洲，特别是德国。 在最近几十年中，亚洲统领移民，以印度、巴基斯坦以及菲律宾居多。


Today’s brain drain is not only from emerging and developing countries to richer countries, but also from European countries to the US.	如今的人材外流并不仅仅是从新兴和发展中国家流向富裕国家，而且也从欧洲流向美国。


In most research disciplines, European-born “superstars” work and teach in the US rather than in Europe, and, according to a study by Gilles Saint-Paul, it is the superstars in particular who generate growth and prosperity for a country.	在大多数研究领域中，欧洲出生的“超级明星”们在美国工作和教书，而不是在欧洲。 吉列圣保罗的研究表明，正是那些超级明星为国家创造经济增长和繁荣。


Of course, people with a decent tertiary education are also important for a country’s economy, and here the loss of some European countries is substantial.	当然，拥有体面大学教育水平的人对于国家的经济也很重要。 在这一点上，某些欧洲国家的损失很严重。


While only 3% of Spanish and 4% of French people with tertiary education live abroad, 7% of Italians and 9% of Germans do.	西班牙和法国拥有大学教育水平的人分别只有3%和4%居住在国外，意大利和德国分别是7%以及9%。


Surprisingly, Ireland and the UK lead in this category, with 34% and 17%, respectively.	令人惊讶的是，爱尔兰和英国在这一点上居于领先地位，分别是34%和17%。


This may reflect the high interchange in both directions between the Anglo-Saxon countries, or replacement migration in which skilled people arrive from elsewhere as the domestic skilled migrate to other Anglo-Saxon countries.	这可能反映了盎格鲁撒克逊国家之间高度相互交流，或者国内具有技能人士移民前往其他盎格鲁萨克斯国家，而其他地方有一技之长的人又过来填充。


The European landscape will change as rapidly in the course of this century as it did at the time of the Völkerwanderung.	正如史上的大迁移时期一样，欧洲的景观在本世纪内将会快速变化。


History will have many tales to tell about what this really meant for the Continent.	历史将会留下许多故事来讲述这对欧洲大陆意味着什么。


At the moment, though, the casual observer is still rather clueless.	但是目前，不经意的观察人士还是不得其所。


Barrels, Bushels, and Bonds	桶、蒲式耳和债券


CAMBRIDGE – The prices of hydrocarbons, minerals, and agricultural commodities have been on a veritable roller coaster.	坎布里奇——碳氢化合物、原材料和农业商品的价格真称得上是大起大落。


While commodity prices are always more variable than those for manufactured goods and services, commodity markets over the last five years have seen extraordinary, almost unprecedented, volatility.	商品价格总是比制成品和服务价格波动更大，但过去五年的商品市场波动性之巨颇为反常，可谓前所未有。


Countries that specialize in the export of oil, copper, iron ore, wheat, coffee, or other commodities have been booming, but they are highly vulnerable.	专门从事原油、铜、铁矿石、小麦、咖啡和其他商品出口的国家获得了繁荣，但它们经不起折腾。


Dollar commodity prices could plunge at any time, as a result of a new recession, an increase in real interest rates in the United States, fluctuations in climate, or random sector-specific factors.	美元商品价格随时随地都可能因新衰退到来、美国真实利率上升、气候波动和随机部门因素而崩溃。


Countries that have outstanding debt in dollars or other foreign currencies are especially vulnerable.	有着未了结美元或其他外币债务的国家尤其脆弱。


If their export revenues were to plunge relative to their debt-service obligations, the result could be crises reminiscent of Latin America’s in 1982 or the Asian and Russian currency crises of 1997-1998.	如果它们的出口收入相对于债务维持成本发生崩溃，结果将是重演1982年的拉美悲剧或1997—1998年的亚洲和俄罗斯货币危机。


Many developing countries have made progress since the 1990’s in shifting from dollar-denominated debt toward foreign direct investment and other types of capital inflows, or in paying down their liabilities altogether.	20世纪90年代以来，许多发展中国家在将美元债务转换为外国直接投资和其他形式的资本流入或削减总债务方面取得了相当的进展。


But some commodity exporters still seek ways to borrow that won’t expose them to excessive risk.	但一些商品出口国仍在寻求不会让它们陷入过度风险的借款方式。


Commodity bonds may offer a neat way to circumvent these risks.	商品债券可以提供绕过这些风险的好办法。


Exporters of any particular commodity should issue debt that is denominated in terms of the price of that commodity, rather than in dollars or any other currency.	无论哪种商品，其出口国都可以发行以商品价格计价（而不是以美元或其他货币计价）的债务。 比如，牙买加可以发行铝债券；


Jamaica, for example, would issue aluminum bonds; Nigeria would issue oil bonds; Sierra Leone would issue iron-ore bonds; and Mongolia would issue copper bonds.	尼日利亚可以发行石油债券； 塞拉利昂可以发行铁矿石债券；


Investors would be able to buy Guatemala’s coffee bonds, Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa bonds, Liberia’s rubber bonds, Mali’s cotton bonds, and Ghana’s gold bonds.	蒙古可以发行铜债券。 投资者可以购买危地马拉的咖啡债券、科特迪瓦的可可债券、利比里亚的橡胶债券、马里的棉花债券和加纳的黄金债券。


The advantage of such bonds is that in the event of a decline in the world price of the underlying commodity, the debt-to-export ratio need not rise.	这些债券的好处在于，当基础商品的世界价格下跌时，债务-出口比率不一定会上升。


The cost of debt service adjusts automatically, without the severe disruption that results from loss of confidence, crisis, debt restructuring, and so forth.	债务维持成本可以自动调整而不会因失去信心、爆发危机和债务重组之类的事情产生重大后果。


The idea is not new.	这并非新思想。


So, why has it not been tried before?	但为什么以前没有尝试呢？


When one asks finance ministers in commodity-exporting debtor countries, they frequently reply that they fear insufficient demand for commodity bonds.	当你问及商品出口债务国财政部长时，他们总是会回答，他们担心商品债券需求不够。


That is a surprising proposition, given that commodity bonds have an obvious latent market, rooted in real economic fundamentals.	这个答案颇令人吃惊，因为商品债券显然拥有潜在市场，这是由实体经济基础决定的。


After all, steel companies have an inherent need to hedge against fluctuations in the price of iron ore, just as airlines and utilities have an inherent need to hedge against fluctuations in the price of oil.	说到底，钢铁公司天生需要对冲铁矿石价格的波动，而航空公司和公用事业公司天生需要对冲石油价格的波动。


Each of these commodities is an important input for major corporations.	对大公司来说，所有商品都是重要的投入品。


Surely there is at least as much natural demand for commodity bonds as there is for credit-default swaps and some of the bizarrely complicated derivatives that are currently traded!	毫无疑问，商品债券的天然需求绝不会亚于信用违约互换以及某些目前正在交易的奇特复杂的衍生品！


It takes liquidity to make a market successful, and it can be difficult to get a new one started until it achieves a certain critical mass.	流动性是市场成功必不可少的要素，一个市场要成功，就必须超过某个临界规模。


The problem may be that there are not many investors who want to take a long position on oil and Nigerian credit risk simultaneously.	问题可能在于，愿意同时持有原油和尼日利亚信用风险多头头寸的投资者不够多。


A multilateral agency such as the World Bank could play a critical role in launching a market in commodity bonds.	世界银行等多边机构可以在打造商品债券市场方面起到关键作用。


The fit would be particularly good in those countries where the Bank is already lending money.	那些已成为世界银行借款国的国家所出产的商品可以作为基础商品的合适候选。


Here is how it would work.	可以如此操作。


Instead of denominating a loan to Nigeria in terms of dollars, the Bank would denominate it in terms of the price of oil and lay off its exposure to the world oil price by issuing that same quantity of bonds denominated in oil.	世界银行不向尼日利亚发放美元贷款，而是用石油价格来为贷款标价，同时发行相同数量用石油计价的债券，以此消除世界石油价格波动的风险。


If the Bank lends to multiple oil-exporting countries, the market for oil bonds that it creates would be that much larger and more liquid.	如果世界银行向多个石油出口国发放贷款，它就能造成一个规模甚大、流动性甚好的石油债券市场。


This pooling function would be particularly important in cases where there are different grades or varieties of the product (as with oil or coffee), and where prices can diverge enough to make an important difference to the exporters.	有的商品（比如石油和咖啡）具有多种级别和种类，价格可能会趋异，从而造成出口国之间的重大差异。 对于这样的商品，这一汇集功能就显得尤其重要了。


An alternative for some commodity exporters is to hedge their risk by selling on the futures market.	对于某些商品出口国来说，替代方案是通过在期货市场上卖出来对冲风险。


But an important disadvantage of derivatives is their short maturity.	但衍生品有个重大缺陷：它们的存在期限太短了。