The kingmakers in the event of parity – the smaller parties and electoral lists in the center of the political spectrum – have lost most of their bargaining power.	在势均力敌情况下左右结果的力量——小政党和政治中间派选民——丧失了大部分讨价还价力。


It was a crucial election in two respects: The outcome reflected the Israeli electorate’s sharp turn to the right and has reinforced Netanyahu’s political dominance.	从两个角度讲，这是一次关键的选举：结果反映出以色列选民急剧向右转并强化了内塔尼亚胡的政治主宰力。


As recently as 2006, Ehud Olmert had won an election in Israel on a dovish platform, pledging to extend Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza to the West Bank.	在2006年时，奥尔默特（Ehud Olmert）以鸽派主张——承诺扩大沙龙（Ariel Sharon）单方面从加沙撤回约旦河西岸的政策——赢得以色列选举。


In the 2009 election, the Kadima party, under his successor, Tzipi Livni, received one seat more than Likud, but was unable to form a government coalition.	在2009年的选举中，前进党（Kadima party）在奥尔默特的继任者利夫尼（Tzipi Livni）的领导下比利库德集团多赢得一个席位，但无法组建联合俄政府。


Netanyahu did, and went on to win the 2013 election.	内塔尼亚胡做到了，并且继续赢得了2013年选举。


Now he has won yet again.	如今，他再次在选举中获胜。


The turn to the right derives from both structural and circumstantial factors.	向右转既有结构性因素，也有环境因素。


Israel’s right-wing parties draw support from the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities, West Bank settlers, and a large part of the Sephardic and Russian communities.	以色列的右翼政党获得了来自正统派（Orthodox）和极端正统派社区、约旦河西岸定居者以及大量西班牙裔和俄罗斯裔犹太人的支持。


When the center left won elections in the past two decades, it did so under a powerful security-oriented leader: Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Sharon (after his conversion), and Sharon’s successor, Olmert.	过去二十年中，中左翼在选举中获胜时都拥有强大的安全导向的领袖：拉宾（Yitzhak Rabin）、巴拉克（Ehud Barak）、沙龙（转换立场后），以及沙龙的继任者奥尔默特。


Though Herzog and Livni – who formed the Zionist Union by merging Herzog’s Labor party and Livni’s Hatnuah party – possess several attractive qualities, they do not match the prototype preferred by today’s average voter.	尽管赫尔佐格和利夫尼——他们通过合并赫尔佐格的工党（Labor party）和利夫尼的潮流党（Hatnuah party）组建了犹太复国主义联盟——也拥有不少有吸引力的特质，但他们没有树立起合乎当代普通选民偏好的形象。


These structural elements have been reinforced by developments in the region, which have reinforced the sense among Israeli voters that they are threatened by numerous enemies: Iran and its nuclear ambitions; Hezbollah and Hamas and their missiles; the rise of ISIS amid state failure in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere.	这些结构性要素因为地区局势的发展而强化——以色列选民越来越感到受到多方面敌人的威胁：伊朗及其核野心； 真主党和哈马斯以及他们的导弹；


Against this backdrop, it is easier to defend the status quo than to advocate accommodation involving territorial concessions.	伊拉克、叙利亚和其他国家的失败所导致的伊斯兰国的崛起。 在此背景下，捍卫现状要比号召包括领土让步在内的妥协更容易。


Netanyahu’s victory was clearly an impressive personal comeback.	内塔尼亚胡的胜利显然是令人印象深刻的个人逆袭。


In the weeks leading up to the elections, it seemed that the public had grown weary of a prime minister who had been in office long enough to be corrupted by the arrogance of power and tainted by a raft of petty scandals.	在选举前几周，公众似乎已经对他感到疲倦——他执政已久，也许已被权力的傲慢所侵蚀，被众多琐碎的丑闻所缠身。


He conducted a campaign that relied on his eloquence and charisma, as well as on scare tactics.	他的选战依赖于他个人的雄辩和魅力，以及恐吓策略。


Most significantly, he swung sharply to the right, out-flanking his rivals.	最重要的是，他急剧右转，实现了对对手的侧面超车。


Thus, two days prior to the election, he rescinded his formal acceptance, in 2009, of a two-state solution, vowing that his government would never allow Palestinian statehood.	因此，在选举前两天，他废除了他在2009年正式接受的两国方案，宣布他的政府永远不会允许巴勒斯坦建国。


The formation of a right-wing government will have a profound impact on the country’s foreign and domestic policies.	右翼政府的组成将对以色列外交和国内政策产生深远影响。


Netanyahu has already destroyed his relationship with US President Barack Obama, and Israel’s relationship with the European Union is not much better.	内塔尼亚胡已经与美国总统奥巴马撕破脸，以色列与欧盟的关系也好不到哪里去。


A government that continues to settle the West Bank and refuses to negotiate with the Palestinians will face erosion of its international legitimacy, boycotts, and sanctions.	一个继续在约旦河西岸建立定居点并拒绝与巴勒斯坦谈判的政府将面临国际合法性的丧失、抵制和制裁。


Relations with Egypt and Jordan will also be affected, and hopes of collaboration with the moderate Arab camp will be frustrated.	与埃及的约旦的关系也会受到影响，与阿拉伯温和阵营合作的希望也会受到打击。


On the home front, attempts by Likud and its right-wing allies to tamper with the legal system, the press, and other institutions identified with the “old elite” are likely to gain momentum.	在国内，利库德集团及其右翼盟友对干预司法体系、媒体和其他认同“旧精英”的制度的尝试将获得加强。


Netanyahu knows how risky this course will be at home and abroad, which is why he is likely to invite Herzog to join the government as a junior partner.	内塔尼亚胡知道这样做的国内和国外风险，因此，他有可能邀请赫尔佐格作为次要伙伴加入政府。


Herzog would then confront the same dilemma that his predecessors faced in 2009 and 2013.	赫尔佐格将面临他的前任在2009年和2013年所面临的难题。


The arguments for and against joining the government are well known.	加入政府的支持和反对意见早已众所周知。


Doing so is the responsible thing to do, offering the opportunity to moderate the government’s policies and reduce the danger of a disaster.	加入政府是负责任的表现，提供了让政府政策温和化、降低灾难风险的机会。


And, by holding a major portfolio, a junior partner can avoid marginalization and strengthen its position for the next election.	此外，起着主要作用的次要伙伴可以避免边缘化，强化���在下一次选举时的地位。


But, as Livni and Barak know, a junior partner more often ends up having no real impact on the core issues, merely providing window dressing for the status quo.	但是，利夫尼和巴拉克知道，次要伙伴常常在核心问题上毫无真正影响力可言，而只是提供了对现状的粉饰。


Nor are Herzog and Livni free to make that choice on their own.	赫尔佐格和利夫尼也无法完全自主地做出选择。


Some party members are eager for cabinet portfolios and the other trappings of power; but many more would rather stay out and fight.	一些党内成员迫切地希望入阁和其他形式的权力； 但更多成员宁愿在政府之外战斗。


When Netanyahu traveled to Washington, DC, to deliver his controversial speech on Iran to the US Congress, he was described by his American supporters as “Churchillian,” the lonely courageous voice warning a complacent world against an evil force.	当内塔尼亚胡前往华盛顿，在美国国会上做关于伊朗的争议演说时，他被他的美国支持者称为“丘吉尔式”的人物，孤独地发声警告踌躇满志的世界警惕邪恶力量。


One can only hope that now Netanyahu will be Churchillian in a more profound sense, by using his empowered position to make the bold decisions needed to lead his country out of its current predicament and paralysis.	我们只能希望内塔尼亚胡比丘吉尔还要丘吉尔，用其权力地位做出果断决定，让他的国家走出当前的困境和僵局。


Isolating Israel	孤立以色列


RAMALLAH – Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu certainly has reason to celebrate.	拉马拉—以色列总理内塔尼亚胡显然有理由于大肆庆祝。


He surprised nearly everyone by securing a decisive electoral victory, winning a third consecutive term in office after his right-wing Likud party gained a five-seat advantage in the Knesset over its main rival, the center-left Zionist Union.	他获得了决定性选举胜利，连续第三次出任总理，他的右翼利库德集团在以色列议会中获得比主要对手、中左翼的犹太复国主义联盟（Zionist Union）多五个的席位，这几乎让所有人大跌眼镜。


But the celebration is likely to be short.	但高兴也许并不长久。


The way Netanyahu finagled this outcome – renouncing his commitment to a two-state solution with Palestine and pledging to continue building settlements on occupied land – will almost certainly have serious political and diplomatic consequences for Israel.	内塔尼亚胡靠欺骗赢得这一结果——推翻他对巴勒斯坦的两国解决方案承诺并声称继续在侵占地区建设定居点——这显然将给以色列带来严重的政治和外交后果。


In recent years, Netanyahu’s hardline stance has increasingly undermined Israel’s international credibility, while convincing the Palestinians living in the occupied territories that a genuine agreement with Israel is impossible.	近几年来，内塔尼亚胡的强硬立场日益破坏着以色列的国际信誉，也让生活在占领区的巴勒斯坦人相信不可能与以色列达成真正的协议。


(Indeed, Palestinians showed little interest in the outcome of this election.)	（事实上，巴勒斯坦人对此次选举的结果基本上没有任何兴趣。 ）


Now that Netanyahu has intensified his right-wing rhetoric – and been rewarded with another term in power – the international movement to isolate Israel will only gain momentum.	如今，内塔尼亚胡升级了其右翼语调——并因此获得又一个执政期——国际社会孤立以色列的运动也将更加热烈。


After all, support for direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine no longer makes sense, even for Israel’s main ally, the United States, because the assumptions underlying this approach have been demolished.	毕竟，支持引导以色列和巴勒斯坦谈判已不再有意义，即使是以色列的主要盟友美国也是如此，因为这一方针的基本前提已经被破坏。


The first such assumption was that both parties accepted the two-state solution as the general basis for a compromise agreement.	前提之一是双方都接受两国方案为妥协性协议的根本基础。


And, indeed, at Bar Ilan University in 2009, Netanyahu declared his willingness to accept the creation of a Palestinian state, on the condition that it be demilitarized and that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.	此外，事实上内塔尼亚胡2009年在巴伊兰大学（Bar Ilan University）的演讲中曾宣称他愿意接受巴勒斯坦建国，条件是巴勒斯坦去军事化并且承认以色列为犹太人的故乡。


This is no longer the case: two days before the election, Netanyahu explicitly vowed that his government would never allow Palestinian statehood.	如今已不再如此：选举前两天，内塔尼亚胡信誓旦旦地宣称他的政府决不允许巴勒斯坦建国。


The second key assumption underlying peace negotiations was that Israel, as a democratic country, would not want to rule another people through military occupation – thereby denying them their basic human right of self-determination – in perpetuity.	和平谈判的第二个关键前提是，作为民主国家，以色列不会想通过军事占领永远统治另一个民族——这等于剥夺了巴勒斯坦人自治（self-determination）这一基本人权。


But Netanyahu has now shown that Israel is a democracy only for its Jewish citizens, dismissing Israel’s Arab citizens, who comprise 20% of the country’s population, in blatantly racist terms.	但如今内塔尼亚胡证明了以色列只是犹太公民的民主国家，公然用种族主义用词侮辱占以色列全国人口20%的阿拉伯公民。


In the last hours of the election, Netanyahu called on Jewish Israelis to turn out, because “the Arabs are voting in droves.”	在选举的最后几小时，内塔尼亚胡号召以色列犹太人站出来，因为“阿拉伯人正在成群结队地投票。 ”


By eliminating the two assumptions critical to negotiations with the Palestinians, Israel’s current leadership – and, indirectly, the majority of Israelis – has destroyed the thin veneer of legitimacy that the international community had erected around a country that has been occupying another people for nearly five decades.	以色列的当前领导层——间接地说，是以色列大多数人——打破了与巴勒斯坦谈判的两大关键前提，也摧毁了国际社会给这个侵占另一个民族近五十年的国家所编织的可怜的合法性外衣。


The justification for not censoring Israel too harshly in international institutions or using boycotts to punish Israel for war crimes is no longer valid.	不再有合理理由要求不要在国际机构中对以色列太为难或不要使用抵制以惩罚以色列的战争罪行。


Obviously, some groups have long recognized the need for sterner measures.	显然，一些团体早就认识到采取严厉措施的必要性。


Most notably, in 2005 Palestinians living in the diaspora and others launched the international boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement, with the goal of compelling Israel to stop violating international law, particularly with its settlement policies.	最令人关注的是，2005年，生活在流离状态的巴勒斯坦人发动了国际抵制、撤资和制裁（BDS）运动，目标就是迫使以色列停止违反国际法，特别是其定居点政策。


The BDS movement has met significant resistance in many parts of the world, owing to the belief that its tactics are unnecessary and unhelpful.	BDS运动在世界许多地区遭到了强烈反对，因为人们认为这一策略既不必要，也无助益。


That will now change.	如今这一点将有所改变。


Similarly, the US opposed the move by Palestine – a United Nations-recognized non-member observer state – to join the International Criminal Court (ICC).	类似地，美国反对巴勒斯坦——联合国承认的非成员观察员国——巴勒斯坦加入国际刑事法院（ICC）的运动。


Despite the lack of progress in peace negotiations, American leaders continued to believe in Israel’s democracy and willingness to pursue a two-state solution.	尽管和平进程毫无进展，但美国领导人仍然相信以色列的民主和追求两国方案的意愿。


That, too, will change.	这一点也将有所改变。


Simply put, now that Israel’s leaders have renounced their commitment to a negotiated peace with Palestine, the international community can no longer justify the prevailing approach.	简言之，如今，以色列领导人推翻了他们与巴勒斯坦人进行和平谈判的承诺，国际社会也无法在认为这一普通方针仍然可行了。


Instead, it must live up to its professed values by isolating Israel politically and economically.	反之，国际社会必须通过在政治和经济上孤立以色列捍卫其所宣扬的价值。


Moreover, world leaders should support Palestine’s efforts to resolve its conflicts with Israel through neutral international agencies like the ICC.	此外，世界领导人应该支持巴勒斯坦通过中立国际机构（如ICC等）解决与以色列的冲突的努力。


And international forums like the United Nations Security Council must condemn Israel’s refusal to end its 47-year occupation, making it clear that the country will no longer benefit from a diplomatic double standard.	联合国安理会等国际论坛必须谴责以色列拒绝结束为期47年的占领，明确以色列无法在从其外交双重标准中获益。


In 1990, when Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi forces to occupy Kuwait, claiming that he was retaking lost territory, the UN Security Council voted, based on chapter seven of the UN charter, to punish Iraq by imposing a strict financial and trade embargo.	1990年，萨达姆用伊拉克军队占领科威特。 他声称这是收复故土，但联合国安理会根据联合国宪章第七章，投票通过以严厉的金融和贸易禁运惩罚伊拉克。


Likewise, when apartheid South Africa refused to provide its black majority with their fundamental human rights, the international community supported a major campaign of divestment and sanctions.	类似地，当种族隔离的南非拒绝为其占多数的黑人提供基本人权时，国际社会也支持了轰轰烈烈的撤资和制裁运动。


Today, Israel is relying on historical claims to occupy another people.	如今，以色列正在依据历史借口侵占另一个民族。


Its government, which has revealed its racist underpinnings, is denying four million Palestinians basic rights, and even using military force against them.	以色列政府的种族主义本质已经昭然若揭，它否认四百万巴勒斯坦人的基本人权，甚至使用武力对付他们。


The international community needs to respond accordingly, intensifying boycotts, divestments, and sanctions, until Palestinians are allowed to live freely in a truly independent state alongside Israel.	国际社会需要据此行动起来，加紧抵制、撤资和制裁，直到巴勒斯坦人可以在真正独立的国家中自由地与以色列共存。


Israel Unbound	没有约束的以色列


TEL AVIV – Israel’s persistent occupation of Palestinian lands is irreparably damaging its international standing – or so the conventional wisdom goes.	特拉维夫—以色列长期占领巴勒斯坦领土正在给其国际地位造成不可挽回的伤害——或者传统智慧这样认为。


In fact, Israel currently enjoys a degree of global influence unprecedented in its history, as a slew of new international challenges give its foreign policy, long held hostage by the single issue of Palestine, significantly more room for maneuver.	事实上，以色列目前拥有历史上从未有过的全球影响力，诸多新的国际挑战让传统上被巴勒斯坦问题所“劫持”的以色列外交政策赢得了大量回旋余地。


Recognizing mounting popular opposition to unequivocal support for Israel in the West, Israel has been looking elsewhere for economic, and ultimately political, partners.	以色列认识到西方一边倒支持以色列的做法引起了巨大的群众反对，它一直在其他地方寻找经济以及最终的政治伙伴。


From 2004 to 2014, Israeli exports to Asia tripled, reaching $16.7 billion last year – one-fifth of total exports.	从2004年到2014年，以色列对亚洲出口增长两倍，去年达到了167亿美元——占其总出口的五分之一。


Israel now trades more with the once implacably hostile Asian giants – China, India, and Japan – than it does with its leading global ally, the United States.	如今，以色列与曾经不可调和的敌对亚洲巨人——中国、印度和日本——的贸易量比其主要全球盟友美国还要大。


Neither Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who visited Israel a few weeks after his reelection in December 2014, nor the leaders of China, now Israel’s third-largest trading partner, bother to link their economic ties with Israel to the success of peace talks with the Palestinians.	2014年12月重新当选后几周就访问以色列的本首相安倍晋三在，和以色列现在的第三大贸易伙伴中国的领导人都不会把各自国家与以色列的经济关系与巴勒斯坦和平谈判的成功相挂钩。


With India, defense cooperation is the order of the day.	至于印度，防务合作是当今主旋律。


Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon visited India in February last year, and Indian President Pranab Mukherjee reciprocated with a historic visit to Israel in October.	去年2月，以色列国防部长亚龙（Moshe Ya’alon），而印度总统慕克吉也在10月份对以色列进行了历史性访问。


The election of the Hindu nationalist Narendra Modi as Prime Minister in May 2014 may be accelerating cooperation.	2014年5月，印度教民族主义者莫迪当选印度总理，这有可能加速合作。


Already, Israel is India’s second-largest supplier of military technology.	目前，以色列已经是印度第二大军事科技供应国。


Beyond Asia, Israel is cozying up to Russia, purely on the basis of strategic considerations.	除了亚洲，以色列还在迎合俄罗斯，这纯粹是基于战略考虑。


With Russia now setting the geostrategic tone in the Middle East through a show of nineteenth-century-style power diplomacy, Israel has pursued an understanding with the Kremlin concerning the lines that must not be crossed in Syria.	现在，俄罗斯通过十九世纪风格的实力外交决定着中东地缘战略局面，以色列追求与克里姆林宫就叙利亚问题不可逾越的红线问题达成谅解。


(That understanding was undoubtedly facilitated by Israel’s neutrality on Russia’s annexation of Crimea and arming of separatists in Ukraine.)	（这一谅解毫无疑问因为以色列在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚以及武装乌克兰分裂分子的问题上保持中立而推进顺利。


Earlier this month, speaking before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Israel’s ambassador to Moscow praised the “flourishing in an unprecedented manner” of the bilateral relationship.	）本月早些时候，以色列驻莫斯科大使在以色列议会外交事务和防务委员会的讲话中赞扬了双边关系“以前所未见的方式蓬勃发展。 ”


Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, an irascible interlocutor in the past, is now seeking reconciliation.	就连土耳其总统埃尔多安，曾经动辄发怒的对话者，现在也在追求妥协。


Turkey – locked in conflict with Russia, estranged from Egypt and Iran, and pursuing policies on Syria, the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Kurds that clash with those of its NATO allies – has lately found itself increasingly isolated in a sea of chaos.	土耳其陷入了与俄罗斯的冲突，与埃及和伊朗对立，在叙利亚、伊斯兰国和库尔德人等问题上的政策又与其北约盟国相悖，正在日益被孤立于一片混乱之中。


Having drawn no strategic benefits from the Palestinian cause, Erdoğan finally admitted in January that Turkey needs “a country like Israel.”	埃尔多安在巴勒斯坦问题上没有任何战略利益，1月份，埃尔多安终于承认需要与“像以色列这样的国家”。


Interestingly, that statement came upon Erdoğan’s return from a visit to Saudi Arabia, another key regional actor that maintains discreet security links with Israel on the basis of a similar logic.	有趣的是，这番话是在埃尔多安访问沙特阿拉伯途中说的。 沙特是另一个重要地区行动方，出于相同的逻辑，它与以色列也保持着谨慎的安全联系。


For Saudi Arabia, Iran’s escape from global isolation, losses in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen, the specter of an ISIS onslaught, and America’s non-committal regional policies are far higher priorities than the Palestinians.	伊朗从国际孤立中摆脱出来，在叙利亚和也门的代理战争中的损失，伊斯兰国攻击的幽灵，以及美国地区政策态度不明，这些问题都比巴勒斯坦重要得多。


Other Sunni Gulf monarchies and Egypt are also cooperating with Israel to contain Islamist terrorism and Iran’s regional rise.	其他逊尼派海湾君主国家和埃及也在与以色列合作以遏制伊斯兰教恐怖主义和伊朗的地区崛起。


Even European countries have found new reasons to engage with Israel.	就连欧洲国家也找到了与以色列合作的心里有。


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who was fiercely hostile to Israel while in opposition, has become a close ally, having visited the country twice within three months in 2015.	希腊总理齐普拉斯身为反对派时强烈反对以色列，如今他成了土耳其的紧密盟友，2015年曾经三个月两次访问以色列。


In exchange for gas, defense technology, and military intelligence, Greece is now offering its airspace for Israeli air force training.	为了换取石油、国防科技和军事情报。 如今希腊正在向以色列战斗机训练开放空域。


Moreover, Greece and Israel are cooperating with Cyprus in creating a geostrategic counterweight to Turkey.	此外，希腊和以色列正在与塞浦路斯合作，打造针对土耳其的地缘战略制衡。


So strong is Greece’s interest in building its relationship with Israel that Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias has declared that the country will not honor the European Union’s latest guidelines regulating the labeling of goods produced by Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.	希腊对于构建对以关系的兴趣如此强烈，其外交部长科奇阿斯（Nikos Kotzias）宣布希腊不会遵守欧盟最近关于标注由被占领区以色列定居点生产的产品的监管指引。


No wonder Nabil Shaath, a former Palestinian foreign minister, complained to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in January about Greece’s “betrayal of Palestine.”	毫不奇怪，巴勒斯坦前外交部长沙斯（Nabil Shaath）1月份向以色列《国土报》（Haaretz）抱怨希腊“背叛了巴勒斯坦”。


But Greece is not alone in opposing the EU’s new labeling guidelines: Hungary, too, has come out against them.	但希腊绝非唯一一个反对欧盟新产品标注指引的国家：匈牙利也反对这一指引。


And, in fact, as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu edges Israel toward illiberal democracy, he is counting on Eastern Europe’s increasingly illiberal governments to help shield Israel from adverse EU initiatives.	事实上，随着总理内塔尼亚胡将以色列推向���自由的民主，他也在依靠东欧日益不自由的政府帮助以色列抵挡不利的欧盟政策。


Clearly, Israel faces a multitude of new foreign-policy opportunities, which offer far-reaching potential benefits.	显然，以色列面临着诸多新的外交政策机会，它们带来了巨大的潜在好处。


But Israel’s new friends simply cannot replace its Western allies.	但是以色列的新朋友无法取代西方盟友。


With the Asian giants, Israel lacks the shared global outlook that is essential for a true strategic alliance.	对于亚洲大国，以色列缺少作为真正的战略盟友的必要条件的共同的全球前景。


As for the Palestinian question, Israel’s new alliances surely will not help advance a resolution.	至于巴勒斯坦问题，以色列的新盟友显然无助于推动解决方案。


On the contrary, they reflect a changing global political agenda that has relegated the question to a lower tier of importance, which is likely to weaken Israel’s incentive to rethink its suppression of Palestine.	相反，它们反映了变化的全球政治日程，在这个日程中，巴勒斯坦问题的重要性已经推举次席，这可能削弱以色列反思其镇压巴勒斯坦的行为的激励。


As a result, the possibility of a two-state solution is more remote today than at any time since the start of the peace process 25 years ago.	因此，如今两国方案的可能性处于25年前和平进程开始以来的最低水平。


This is no reason for Israel to rejoice.	以色列完全没有高兴的理由。


After all, the suppression of Palestine has, and will continue to have, fatally corrosive effects on Israeli society.	毕竟，镇压巴勒斯坦已经给、并且还将继续给以色列社会造成破坏作用。


Insofar as Israel’s new foreign-policy opportunities allow for the continuation of that suppression, they are not good for Palestine or Israel.	如今，以色列的新外交政策机会有望使镇压继续，这绝不是巴勒斯坦和以色列的福音。


Israel’s Election in a Bubble	泡沫中的以色列选举


TEL AVIV – Forty-five years into Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, and four years after Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government became the undertaker of the two-state solution, an electoral campaign run in utter denial of Israel’s Palestinian conundrum has just ended with yet another Netanyahu government in office.	特拉维夫—以色列占领巴勒斯坦领土45年后，内塔尼亚胡政府宣布两国方案死刑4年后，彻底否决以色列的巴勒斯坦问题的选举最近结束了，内塔尼亚胡政府没能赢得新一届任期。


Yes, Netanyahu was humbled by the electorate, but his loss of support was not a victory for the peace camp.	是的，内塔尼亚胡在选举中败落，但他失去支持并非和平阵营的胜利。


The victors were an amorphous political center, focused on domestic issues, and the annexationist religious right.	胜利者是专注于国内事务的无形的政治中间派，以及合并主义的宗教右派。


A country whose modern economy is fully integrated into the global system and whose conflict with the Palestinians has for decades drawn the attention of the global media and the major world powers has gone to the polls as if it were a separate, secluded planet.	以色列的现代经济完全融入全球体系，其与巴勒斯坦的冲突几十年来都在吸引着全世界媒体的目光，世界主要大国纷纷站队，好像它是一个独立的隐蔽星球似的。


Parties in the center campaigned for “social justice,” for ultra-religious students to “share the burden” of military service (from which they have been exempt since Israel’s founding), and in defense of the country’s struggling middle class.	中间派政党的竞选口号是“社会公正”，极端宗教学生应该“共同分担”军事任务（自以色列建国以来，他们就免于服役），以色列苦苦挣扎的中产阶级也应该得到保护。


With opinion polls indicating that only 18% of the electorate was concerned with the Palestinian problem, Labor, the party of Yitzhak Rabin and the Oslo Accords, refrained from even mentioning the peace process, lest it alienate potential voters.	民调显示，只有18%的选民担心巴勒斯坦问题，但拉宾所属、签署了奥斯陆协议的工党仍保持着克制，甚至没有提出和平进程，唯恐影响选情。


Labor’s current leader, Shelly Yachimovich, superseded the fatalism of her predecessor, Ehud Barak, who maintained that the Palestinian conflict has no solution, with the politics of denial; she refused even to acknowledge that there is a problem.	工党现任领导人亚基莫维奇（Shelly Yachimovich）以否定的政治抛弃了其前任巴拉克（Ehud Barak）的宿命论（认为巴勒斯坦冲突不存在解决方案），她甚至拒绝承认存在巴勒斯坦问题。


Israel’s life in a bubble was also exemplified by the two major religious parties in the elections.	以色列生活在泡沫中，这也能从大选中的两大宗教政党中一窥端倪。


Shas, led by a 92-year-old rabbi, combined its traditional defense of the have-nots with its fight for stricter rules for conversion to Judaism, an undisguised allusion to Israel’s masses of Russian immigrants with doubtful Jewish credentials.	以一位92岁的高龄拉比为首的沙斯党（Shas）将其传统的无产者保护着形象与其收紧皈依犹太教规则的斗争结合起来，这不啻公开暗示以色列的大量俄罗斯移民犹太教证明存疑。


Meanwhile, Jewish Home, a party linked to fanatical, messianic rabbis for whom Zionism should now be imbued with eschatological meaning, challenged Netanyahu to adopt a more resolute expansionist policy in Palestinian territories.	与此同时，犹太之家党（Jewish Home，该党与狂热的救世主义拉比关系密切，对他们来说，犹太复国主义必须与末世论一起灌输）对内塔尼亚胡发起了挑战，他们对巴勒斯坦领土采取激进得多的扩张主义政策。


Demographers warn that the Jewish and Arab populations between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean will reach parity this year.	人口学家警告说，约旦河两岸和地中海的犹太人和阿拉伯人口将在今年持平。


From that point on, the specter of a Jewish minority ruling over an Arab majority in an apartheid state is bound to become a reality, turning Israel into an international pariah, unless a more sober coalition replaces Netanyahu’s suicidal alliance with religious fundamentalists and extreme nationalists.	从此以后，种族隔离国家少数犹太人统治多数阿拉伯人的状态将成为现实，这将导致以色列成为国际贱民，除非更加清醒的联盟取代内塔尼亚胡与原教旨主义者和极端民族主义者的自杀式联盟。


The good news is that these elections make such a change of alliances politically inevitable.	好消息是选举已让这一联盟的改变在政治上成为不可避免之事。


Always a politician in search of a platform to sustain his lust for power, Netanyahu is now forced to change course and form a centrist government.	内塔尼亚胡一直都在寻求保持其权力欲望的平台，如今，他被迫改变策略，成立中间派政府。


The remarkable success of Yair Lapid’s new centrist party, Yesh Atid (“there is a future”), makes it practically impossible for Netanyahu to form a right-wing coalition with his traditional allies from the lunatic fringe.	拉皮德（Yair Lapid）的新中间派党未来党（Yesh Atid）取得了令人瞩目的成功，这让内塔尼亚胡与其传统极端主义盟友组成右翼联盟的希望渺茫。


Will this be enough to revitalize the moribund peace process and reach a settlement with the Palestinians?	这足以让濒临绝境的和平进程起死回生，与巴勒斯坦达成和解吗？


Not really.	不。


The “Tea Party” radicalization of Netanyahu’s Likud party does not augur well for the chances of a robust peace process.	内塔尼亚胡的利库德党的“茶党”化（激进化）并不构成和平进程稳步向前的预兆。


Those prospects will diminish further if the annexationist Jewish Home, with whose domestic platform (a liberal economy, a better deal for the middle classes, and military service for the Orthodox) Lapid fully concurs, joins a Likud-Yesh Atid government.	如果合并主义的犹太人之家党的国内平台（自由经济，中产阶级状况改善，以及正统教徒服兵役）与拉皮德充分合作，加入利库德-未来党政府，那么这一可能还会进一步徐降低。


Moreover, Lapid himself is far from being an especially forthcoming peacemaker.	此外，拉皮德本人也远非未来和平制造者。


Yes, he believes that Israel should end its policy of confrontation with the international community, and he truly wants a two-state solution.	是的，他认为以色列应该结束与国际社会对抗的政策，也真心实意希望形成两国方案。


But he remains in a fantasy world in which peace with the Palestinians can be achieved for less than what previous left-wing governments offered.	但他生活在对巴和平可以以少于前左翼政府的付出达到的幻想世界。


To make his point, Lapid even launched his electoral campaign in Ariel, an Israeli city built in the heartland of the Palestinian West bank.	为了支持自己的观点，拉皮德甚至将自己的选举大本营设在艾里尔（Ariel），一座位于巴勒斯坦约旦河西岸中心地带的城市。


Sadly, the so-called peace camp, now in opposition, is in complete disarray.	不幸的是，所谓的和平阵营（现在的反对党）完全是一盘散沙。


Faithless and wavering, it has been defeated by the unswerving conviction of the right.	它们没有坚定信念，犹豫不决，已被右派所表现出的坚定不移的问罪态度击败。


Its demise reflects the destructive power of the narrative about the peace process that the right succeeded in persuading many Israelis to accept.	和平阵营的坠落表明，右派成功地说服许多以色列人接受了其关于和平进程的看法，右派的说辞极具破坏力。


The right’s narrative is simple.	右派的说辞很简单。


The Oslo Accords ushered in an era of bus explosions in Israel’s main cities.	奥斯陆协议引来了以色列各大城市的汽车炸弹时代。


The Second Intifada, with its waves of suicide terrorist attacks that slaughtered hundreds of innocent civilians, followed the Israeli concessions offered at the 2000 Camp David Summit.	第二次巴勒斯坦大起义（Second Intifada）伴随着自杀式恐怖袭击潮，数以百计的无辜公民因此丧生，随后以色列早2000年戴维营峰会中做出了让步。


And the withdrawal from Gaza ushered in a Hamas government that has overseen routine missile attacks on Israel.	而从加沙的撤出导致了哈马斯政府的上台，将常规导弹对准了以色列。


Little wonder that, once most Israelis accepted this narrative, the “peace process” became a repulsive, discredited expression, and its advocates on the left came to be perceived at best as innocents detached from the real world.	毫不奇怪，一旦大部分以色列人接受了这一说辞，“和平进程”就沦为了招人厌恶、毫无可信度的观点，其左派支持者（说得好听些）是脱离了真实世界的无辜者。


Indeed, instead of facing the region’s changing realities with a new approach to peace in Palestine and beyond – endorsing the Arab peace initiative, for example – the Israeli left and center retreated either to worn-out slogans or to the safety of domestic agendas.	事实上，以色列左派和中间派并没有以新的对巴勒斯坦及其他地区和平方案直面该地区变幻莫测的现实（比如支持阿拉伯和平措施），他们不是倒退回过时可口号，就是倒退回国内日程以求安全。


These parties made no effort to reach out to the new regimes and the rising new generations in the public squares of the Arab world.	这些党派都没有致力于迈出一步，接触阿拉伯世界的新政权和新世代。


The bottom line, however, is that even the domestic issues that loomed so large in the election can never be addressed effectively without regard for the colossal sums that Netanyahu and his allies have been pouring into the occupation system in Palestinian lands.	不过，最根本的问题在于即使国内问题，对选举的影响也很大，且无法在不考虑内塔尼亚胡及其盟友为巴勒斯坦土地占领体系的巨额投入的情况下得到解决。


Nor should Israelis ignore what former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described as “megalomaniacal preparations” for an attack on Iran “that would never happen.”	以色列也不应该忽视前总理奥尔默特所谓的对“永远不可能发生”的打击伊朗的“远大准备”。


Israelis now seem to believe that their politicians can choose which problems should be solved and which should be ignored.	如今，以色列似乎认为其政客可以选择解决什么问题，忽视什么问题。


As a result, they are bound to be disappointed.	因此他们将注定失望。


Israeli leaders have never had that choice.	以色列领导人从来没有这样的选择余地。


The Israel Lobby’s Gay-Rights Hypocrisy	以色列游说团体的同性恋权利伪善


LONDON – One of the few liberal victories in a conservative age in the United States has been the formal acceptance of homosexuality.	伦敦——正式接纳同性恋是美国在这个保守时代为数不多的几项自由主义胜利之一。


Same-sex marriage is now recognized by the federal government and is legal in 35 out of 50 states.	联邦政府和美国50个州中的35个现在已承认同性婚姻的合法性。


The US is not alone.	美国并非一枝独秀。


Nineteen other countries (or regions of countries) – mostly in Europe and North and South America – now allow gay couples to marry legally.	还有19个国家（或国家地区）——其中多数来自欧洲和南北美——制定了允许同性恋伴侣结婚的法律。


South Africa is the only African country where same-sex marriage is permitted, and it is not legal anywhere in Asia or the Middle East, where to be openly gay can still be extremely dangerous.	南非是唯一一个许可同性婚姻的非洲国家，除此之外同性婚姻在亚洲或中东任何地区均为非法，在这些地区公开同性恋身份仍然伴随着极大的危险性。


Last year, Uganda enacted a law – attributed partly to the influence of well-funded evangelical missionaries from the US – mandating a life sentence for people caught in homosexual acts.	去年，乌干达颁布了一项法律——部分因为美国资金雄厚的福音派传教士的影响——宣布对被抓住的同性性行为者判处无期。


In Iran, sodomy can lead to a death sentence, as is true in Saudi Arabia, Hamas-controlled Gaza, and, of course, under the lash of militant groups like the Islamic State.	在伊朗，鸡奸罪最高可以判处死刑，刑罚同样严酷的还有沙特阿拉伯、哈马斯控制的加沙地带，当然还有伊斯兰国等激进团体的势力范围。


So there is nothing untrue about the headline of a paid advertisement that ran in the New York Times on December 23.	因此《纽约时报》12月23日刊登的一则付费广告的标题并无任何不实之处。


Placed beneath a picture of a vulnerable-looking young American male, it read: “Hamas, ISIS and Iran kill gays like me.”	在一幅可怜巴巴的美国男青年的照片下写着这样的广告语：“哈马斯，伊斯兰国和伊朗杀死像我这样的同性恋者。


And the last line of the advertisement is at least fairly true: “In Israel, I am free.”	”广告的最后一行至少也基本算是事实：“在以色列，我是自由的。


That he is – but not to get married, owing to the opposition of Israel’s powerful Orthodox community.	”事实的确如此——但是由于以色列强大正统社会的反对，同性恋者在以色列还不能结婚。


There is something not quite right about this ad.	但这则广告还是有地方不太对劲。


It was paid for by the Orthodox Rabbi Shmuel “Shmuley” Boteach, a popular media performer also known as “America’s Rabbi,” who presides over an advocacy group called This World, which promotes Israel and “Jewish values.”	付钱刊登这则广告的是正统犹太教士Shmuel “Shmuley” Boteach，一位被戏称为“美国拉比”的颇受欢迎的媒体从业者，经营着一家名叫这个世界的以色列和“犹太价值观”宣传组织。


Another major figure in the group is Sheldon Adelson, a Las Vegas casino magnate who donates millions of dollars to Republican politicians who most actively support Israel.	该组织另一位重要人物是谢尔登·阿德尔森，这位拉斯维加斯的赌场大亨为积极支持以色列的共和党政客捐赠了成百上千万美金。


Favored speakers at This World galas include the right-wing Republican former governor of Texas, Rick Perry, who once compared homosexuality to alcoholism.	这个世界晚宴上最受青睐的演讲嘉宾包括右翼共和党人士德克萨斯前州长里克·佩里，佩里曾经把同性恋和酗酒相提并论。


Neither traditional “Jewish values,” nor Perry, are naturally friendly to gays.	无论传统的“犹太价值观”还是佩里究其本心都不是同性恋的盟友。


Homosexuality is considered an abomination in Jewish law, and Texas tried to ban gay marriage.	同性恋被犹太法律视为丑行，德克萨斯州也曾试图禁止同性恋婚姻。


Still, gay people are not executed in Israel or Texas, and it is good to be reminded of such horrors where they exist.	但以色列或德克萨斯均未对同性恋执行死刑，时刻提醒人们如此惨状的存在其实也并不过分。


But hypocrisy is not what is most disturbing about this particular campaign.	但此次宣传活动中伪善还不是最令人担心的成分。


It is the insinuation that people who criticize the Israeli government are therefore guilty of condoning violence against homosexuals in other parts of the Middle East.	真正令人不安的是影射以色列政府的批评者因此是在纵容中东其他地区针对同性恋的暴力活动。


A snippet from the ad: “To those who scapegoat Israel...yet remain silent about the oppression and violence Hamas, Iran and other countries inflict on the gay community: Shame on you.	. 同时却对哈马斯、伊朗和其他国家加诸在同性恋身上的压迫和暴力保持沉默者：你们应当感到羞耻。


You are letting them murder us, literally.”	你们实际正在坐视他们对我们进行谋杀。 ”


First of all, not all people who criticize, say, Israel’s treatment of Palestinians are indifferent to violence against gays or anyone else.	首先，并非所有批评以色列对巴勒斯坦人待遇者都对针对同性恋或其他群体的暴力活动漠不关心。


Moreover, the two problems are hardly related.	此外，这两个问题几乎毫不相关。


The Israeli government is not driving Arabs off their land on the West Bank to protect gay people in Palestine, let alone in Iran.	以色列政府并非为了保护巴勒斯坦（更不要说伊朗的）同性恋才将阿拉伯人赶出西岸。


And no one is criticizing Israel for its treatment of gays.	也没有人批评以色列如何对待同性恋。


By stressing real human-rights abuses in Iran and Arab countries, this lobby group for Israel is suggesting that criticism (“scapegoating”) of Israel is not only wrong but immoral: “Your misguided actions ensure that LGBT people in the Middle East continue to live in hiding under constant threat of death.”	通过强调伊朗和阿拉伯国家实际存在的践踏人权，该游说团体是在暗示对以色���的批评（“当替罪羊”）不仅错误而且不道德：“你们的错误举动确保了中东同性恋者继续生活在持续的死亡威胁之中。 ”


If the lobbyists had simply wished to point out that Western critics often consider Israel more harshly than its Middle Eastern enemies, they would be right.	如果说客只是单纯想指出西方批评者往往对以色列比对中东国家更为严厉，那么他们说得没错。


But their ad wrongly implies that those double standards lead to the oppression of Arab and Iranian gays.	但他们这则广告却错误地暗示上述双重标准导致对阿拉伯和伊朗同性恋者的压迫。


Calling on people to pay more attention to such oppression is no reason to pay less attention to problems in Israel/Palestine.	呼吁人们对上述压迫给予更多关注绝不是不重视以色列/巴勒斯坦问题的理由。


Abuses in one place, no matter how grotesque, should not be used to stifle criticism in another.	某个领域对人权的践踏无论多么怪诞，都不应以此为借口扼杀对另一个问题的批评。


The ad shows the extent to which the language of human rights has become politicized.	这则广告显示了人权语言已经在多大程度上遭到政治化。


As was true of religious zealotry in the past, the ideology of human rights is being invoked to defend or obscure the oppression of others.	就像过去的宗教狂热一样，今天有人正借助人权理念辩解或掩饰对其他人的压迫。


Right-wing populist parties in Europe regularly whip up popular sentiment against Muslim minorities by condemning their treatment of women.	欧洲右翼民粹主义政党经常借谴责穆斯林歧视妇女煽动公众对穆斯林少数族裔的仇恨。


There is no doubt that many Muslim men treat women in ways that most modern people in the West would no longer condone.	许多穆斯林男性对待妇女的方式无疑不再为最现代的西方人所接受。


(The same is true of men in ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities.)	（同样的问题也存在于极端正统犹太社会的男性之中。


But this is no reason to exclude them as fellow citizens.	）但不能以此为由剥夺他们的公民权。


More serious in terms of its consequences is the way in which human rights have been used to promote wars.	以人权为由发动战争产生的后果更加严重。


The idea, now accepted by the United Nations, of “humanitarian intervention” to save people from extreme human-rights abuses, sounds moral and high-minded.	人权理念现在已经被联合国接纳为通过“人道主义干预”保护民众人权免遭践踏的貌似道德而高尚的借口。


And there may indeed be cases where armed intervention is the only way to stop mass murder.	的确有可能在某些情况下，只有依靠武装干预才能阻止大规模屠杀。


But most “humanitarian” wars make things worse for the people they are supposed to be saving.	但多数“人道主义”战争导致本该被拯救的民众进一步雪上加霜。


They tear societies apart, destroy the livelihoods of millions, and cause even greater conflicts, as we have seen in Iraq.	战争导致社会分裂、毁掉数百万人的生计，并像在伊拉克那样导致更大规模的冲突。


This is why, until recently, wars could be justified only if they were fought in self-defense, or in defense of allied nations.	这就是为什么直到不久前只有自卫或保卫盟国才是打仗的理由。


The temptation to embark on wars that cause more harm than good is not the only danger of using the language of human rights to justify military intervention in political conflicts (which usually involve many other interests that have nothing to do with human rights).	发动弊大于利的战争的诱惑并不是在政治冲突（往往涉及许多与人权完全无关的其他利益）中将人权语言作为军事干预借口所带来的唯一的危险因素。


Those who invoke human rights to promote wars or, as with This World, to make political propaganda, degrade the very ideals for which they claim to be fighting.	那些借助人权来宣扬战争或者像这个世界那样借助人权来开展政治宣传者恰恰对他们声称捍卫的理想是一种侮辱。


The New Middle East’s New Problems	新中东的新问题


BERLIN – When hostilities flared in Gaza last month, it seemed like the same old story was repeating itself.	柏林—上个月，加沙的敌对爆发，老故事似乎又开始复制自己了。


The world again witnessed a bloody and senseless surge of violence between Israel and Hamas, in which the main victims were innocent civilians maimed and killed on both sides.	世界再次看到了以色列和哈马斯之间无谓的流血暴力激增，主要受害者是双方致死致残的无辜平民。


This time, however, things were not what they seemed, because the Middle East has undergone a significant change in the past two years.	但是，这一回，事情不像表面上那么简单，因为中东在过去两年里发生了重要的变化。


The political epicenter of this troubled region has shifted from the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians toward the Persian Gulf and the struggle for regional mastery between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and now Egypt on the other.	这一麻烦地区的政治震中已从巴以冲突转向波斯湾和地区霸权之争，这场争夺的一方是伊朗，另一方是沙特、土耳其和现在的埃及。


In the emerging struggle between the region’s Shia and Sunni powers, the old Middle East conflict has become a sideshow.	在该地区新出现的什叶派和逊尼派势力的斗争中，老中东冲突已不再是大事了。


Today, the key confrontation in this power struggle is Syria’s civil war, where all of the region’s major players are represented either directly or indirectly, because that is where the battle for regional hegemony will largely be decided.	如今，这一势力斗争的关键冲突是叙利亚内战，中东地区的主要大国都直接或间接地牵涉其中，因为这是一场事关地区领导权归属的战斗。


This much is clear: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite/Shia power base will not be able to maintain control against the Sunni majority in the country and the region as a whole.	显而易见，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德及其阿拉维派/什叶派实力基础无法完整地控制这个逊尼派占多数的国家。


The only question is when the regime will fall.	唯一的问题是阿萨德什么时候倒台。


When it does, it will be a major defeat for Iran, not only entailing the loss of its main Arab ally, but also jeopardizing the position of its client, Hezbollah, in Lebanon.	巴沙尔的倒台将是对伊朗的重大打击，这不但意味着其主要阿拉伯盟友倒台，也将极大地削弱其代理人黎巴嫩真主党。


At the same time, a variant of the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power in Syria, as has been or will be the case almost everywhere in the Middle East as a result of the “Arab Awakening.”	与此同时，各种穆斯林兄弟会将在叙利亚掌权，就像“阿拉伯觉醒”在中东各地正在造成或将要造成的局面一样。


From Israel’s viewpoint, the rise to power of Sunni political Islam throughout the region over the past two years will lead to an ambivalent outcome.	从以色列的角度讲，过去两年来逊尼派伊斯兰政治力量在整个地区的崛起将产生矛盾的结果。


While the weakening and rollback of Iran serves Israeli strategic interests, Israel will have to reckon with Sunni Islamist power everywhere in its vicinity, leading directly to a strengthening of Hamas.	伊朗的削弱和萎靡符合以色列的战略利益，但以色列也将不得不陷入逊尼派伊斯兰力量的重重包围，这将直接导致哈马斯实力的增强。


The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots has come at the expense of secular Arab nationalism and the military dictatorships that supported it.	穆斯林兄弟会及其衍生组织的崛起是以世俗阿拉伯民族主义及其支持力量军事独裁的削弱为代价的。


Thus, the Brothers’ rise has de facto also decided the internal Palestinian power struggle.	因此，兄弟会的崛起实际上也决定着巴勒斯坦内部权力斗争。


With the recent war in Gaza, the Palestinian national movement will align itself, under Hamas’s leadership, with this regional development.	在最近的加沙战争中，巴勒斯坦建国运动将在哈马斯的领导下凝聚起来。


Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party will be unable to offer much opposition – all the more so in view of Hamas’s break with Iran (despite ongoing arms deliveries) a year ago.	巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯及其法塔赫党将无法与之对抗——特别是考虑到一年前哈马斯与伊朗的决裂（尽管仍进行着大规模武器贸易）。


This development most likely means the end of prospects for a two-state solution, because neither Israel nor Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood has any interest in it.	如此发展态势极有可能意味着两国方案前景的终结，因为不管是以色列还是哈马斯和穆斯林兄弟会都不会因此获得好处。


Hamas and the Brothers reject territorial compromise, because, for them, a Palestinian state means a Palestine that incorporates all of Israel.	哈马斯和兄弟会拒绝在领土问题上妥协，因为对他们来说，巴勒斯坦国应该包含全部以色列领土。


This is by no means a tactical position or an expression of political naiveté.	这显然不是一种策略立场，也不是政治天真。


On the contrary, the territorial question has morphed into a religious one, and has thus fundamentally redefined the conflict.	相反，领土问题已演变为宗教问题，从而从根本上改变了这场冲突。


Hamas is playing a long game.	哈马斯在打持久战。


As long as it lacks the strength to achieve its more ambitious objectives, its intransigence in no way precludes negotiations with Israel or even peace treaties, as long as such agreements advance its long-term goals.	只要其实力不足以强到完成其更具野心的目标，其强硬姿态就不会排斥与以色列谈判甚至和平条约，只要这类协议有利于其长期目标。


But such agreements will produce only truces of shorter or longer duration, not a comprehensive settlement that ends the conflict.	但这类协议只能造成或长或短的停战期，而无法造成全面的冲突和解和结束。


The recent success of Abbas in the United Nations General Assembly – securing observer-state status for Palestine – will not alter the basic aspects of this trend.	阿巴斯最近在联合国大会上的成功——为巴勒斯坦争得观察国地位——并不能从根本上改变这一趋势。


Palestine’s promotion is an alarming diplomatic defeat for Israel and a demonstration of its growing international isolation, but it does not imply a return to a two-state solution.	巴勒斯坦地位的提升是以色列的外交失败，以色列将对此引起警觉； 这也说明以色列在国际上越来越孤立，但这并不意味这会回到两国方案上去。


Paradoxically, the position of Hamas fits the political right in Israel, because it, too, puts little stock in a two-state solution.	矛盾的是，哈马斯的立场正契合以色列的政治右翼，因为它也不屑于两国方案。


And neither the Israeli left (of which little remains) nor Fatah is strong enough to maintain the two-state option.	而以色列左翼（这类人所剩无多）和法塔赫都不够强大到维持两国方案。


For Israel, a future as a bi-national state entails a high long-term risk, unless the option of a West Bank-Jordan confederation, lost in the 1980’s, is rediscovered.	对以色列来说，两国状态意味着长期高风险，除非在20世纪80年代失去的约旦河西岸联邦选择权能够重新恢复。


This is again a possibility.	而这只是一种可能而已。


Indeed, after the Assad regime falls, Jordan could prove to be the next crisis hotspot, which might revive the debate over Jordan as the “real” Palestinian state.	事实上，在阿萨德政权倒台后，约旦可能成为下一个危机热点，关于约旦是“真正”巴勒斯坦国的争论将死灰复燃。


Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank would then have a different foundation and take on new political significance.	以色列的约旦河西岸定居政策将因此获得不同的基础，拥有新的政治重要性。


While I do not believe that a West Bank-Jordan confederation could ever be a viable option, it might be the last nail in the coffin of a two-state solution.	我不认为约旦河西岸联邦可以成为可行的选择，但这可能会成为两国方案棺材上的最后一枚钉子。


Along with Syria, two issues will determine this new Middle East’s future: Egypt’s path under the Muslim Brotherhood, and the outcome of confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program and regional role.	除了叙利亚，两大问题将决定新中东的未来：穆斯林兄弟会治下的埃及的道路以及伊朗核计划和地区角色图谋冲突的结果。


The Egyptian question is already high on the agenda; indeed, it spilled into the streets after President Mohamed Morsi’s non-violent coup attempt.	埃及问题已然白热化了； 事实上，在总统穆尔西的非暴力政变后，埃及人民再次涌上了街头。


Morsi’s timing was remarkable: the day after winning international acclaim for his successful efforts to broker a truce in Gaza, he staged a frontal assault on Egypt’s nascent democracy.	穆尔西选择的时机颇值一提：在因牵线加沙停战协议而赢得国际喝彩后的那一天，他正面袭击了襁褓中的埃及民主。


The question now is whether the Brothers will prevail, both in the streets and by means of Egypt’s new constitution (which they largely wrote).	现在的问题是，穆斯林兄弟会能不能在街头和埃及新宪法（大部分已经写好）中获胜。


If they do, will the West withdraw its support for Egyptian democracy in the name of “stability”?	如果他们获胜，则西方会不会以“稳定”的名义撤回其对埃及民主的支持？


It would be a bad mistake.	这将使一个大错误。


The question of what to do about Iran’s nuclear program will also return with a vengeance in January, after US President Barack Obama’s second inauguration and Israel’s general election, and will demand an answer within a few months.	怎样针对伊朗核计划的问题也将在1月份美国总统奥巴马再次履新以及以色列大选结束后强势回归，并且将在几个月内给出答案。


The new Middle East bodes poorly for the coming year.	新中东为明年开了个恶兆。


But one thing has not changed: it is still the Middle East, where it is nearly impossible to know what might be waiting around the corner.	但有一样东西并未改变：它仍是中东，角落里等着什么你永远无法知道。


The Fall of Netanyahu?	内塔尼亚胡的垮台?


JERUSALEM – The dissolution of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, just a day after Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu sacked two senior cabinet ministers, marks a surprising turnabout.	耶路撒冷——就在内塔尼亚胡总理解雇两名资深内阁部长短短一天后，以色列议会的解散标志着一个出人意料的转机。


Indeed, when Israelis vote again in March, more than two years ahead of schedule, Netanyahu could be voted out of office, with important implications not only for Israel, but also for the wider Middle East.	事实上，当以色列民众提前原计划超过两年于三月再次投票表决时，内塔尼亚胡可能的落选不仅对以色列意义重大，而且影响着整个中东地区。


Until last summer, Netanyahu appeared politically unassailable.	直到去年夏天，内塔尼亚胡似乎还在政治上无懈可击。


His coalition government, despite some internal bickering, was expected to serve out its term.	其联合政府尽管不乏内部矛盾，但在民众眼中却应该能终其任期。


Not even 10% of Israelis would have preferred the opposition leader, the Labor Party’s Yitzhak Herzog, as Prime Minister.	支持反对党领袖工党的伊扎克·赫尔佐克担任总理的以色列人还不到10%。


Things began to unravel when two cabinet ministers abruptly resigned, citing family commitments or policy disagreements.	局势四分五裂始于两名内阁大臣以家庭和政策分歧为由突然辞职。


Then came the inconclusive war in Gaza, which, given Netanyahu’s unfulfilled pledge to “crush Hamas,” undermined his credibility, especially when ministers like Naftali Bennett, the leader of the nationalist-religious Jewish Home party, openly challenged his policies.	之后是加沙战争久拖不决表明内塔尼亚胡未能兑现“粉碎哈马斯”的承诺、特别是以民族主义宗教犹太家园党领袖纳夫塔利·贝内特为首的数名部长公开质疑其政策损害了内塔尼亚胡的信誉。


When some European parliaments voted in 2014 to recognize Palestine as an independent state, many Israelis, who had long blamed the Palestinians for the continued failure of peace talks, began to worry.	欧洲议会于2014年投票承认巴勒斯坦的独立国家地位，导致许多长期指责巴勒斯坦人要为和谈失败负责的以色列人开始忧虑。


More significant, Netanyahu’s public clashes with US President Barack Obama fueled concerns among Israelis – including supporters of Netanyahu’s Likud party – that their government’s policies were deepening Israel’s isolation and thus undermining its security.	更重要的是内塔尼亚胡与美国总统奥巴马的公开冲突加深了以色列民众（包括内塔尼亚胡所在利库德党支持者）的忧虑，他们担心内氏政策将进一步加剧以色列的孤立并对国家安全构成威胁。


The domestic situation is not much better.	国内的局面也没有好到哪去。


Netanyahu has failed to fulfill his promises since the massive demonstrations of 2011 to address prohibitively high living costs, especially for young couples.	内塔尼亚胡未能履行2011年大规模示威游行后做出的承诺，降低民众过高的生活成本，特别是针对年轻夫妇。


On the contrary, housing prices have continued to rise.	相反，住房价格一直在持续攀升。


When Yair Lapid – the ambitious but inept finance minister, who leads the centrist Yesh Atid party – proposed waiving the value-added tax on first apartment purchases by young couples, Netanyahu failed to respond decisively, giving the impression that he lacked control over his own cabinet.	当无能而又雄心勃勃的财政部长、中间派未来党领袖亚伊尔·拉皮德提出要免去购买首套房的年轻夫妇缴纳增值税时，内塔尼亚胡未能做出决断，给人的印象是他对自己的内阁都缺乏控制。


But it was Netanyahu’s support for draft legislation seeking to constitutionalize Israel’s identity as the Jewish people’s nation-state – to the detriment of Israel’s Muslim, Christian, and Druze citizens – that brought the situation to a head.	但是造成目前危急形势的是内塔尼亚胡支持立法草案，谋求将以色列犹太民族的国家地位载入宪法的努力。 这一举动损害了以色列境内穆斯林、基督徒和德鲁兹人的利益。


The bill, which emphasizes Israel’s Jewish identity above its democratic principles, has caused deep divisions not only among the electorate, but also within the government coalition.	该法案强调以色列犹太身份高于民主原则，不仅在选民、也在政府联盟中引发了深刻的分歧。


Netanyahu, with his weak and vacillating leadership exposed, sacked his opponents, Lapid and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni (who also denounced Netanyahu’s settlement-construction plans), and called for new elections.	内塔尼亚胡在其领导地位的脆弱和摇摆性暴露之后，解雇了自己的竞争对手拉皮德和司法部部长利夫尼（后者同样谴责内塔尼亚胡的定居点建设计划），并要求举行新一轮选举。


But the real game changer was the declaration by Herzog and Livni, who leads the small centrist Hatnuah party, that their parties would run jointly in the elections.	但真正改变局面的却是赫尔佐格和中间派小党潮流党领袖利夫尼的声明，他们宣布其所属政党将联合参加选举。


If they win, they will rotate in the prime minister’s post.	如果获胜，两人将轮流担任总理。


This changed Israeli political discourse almost overnight.	这几乎在一夜间改变了以色列的政治局势。


Far from invincible, Netanyahu is now viewed as a failed prime minister, confronted by a center-left bloc that may well become the most powerful voice in the Knesset.	内塔尼亚胡本来就远非不可战胜，现在面对议会中势力最强的中左翼联盟阵营已经被外界视为一位失败的总理。


Yesh Atid voters, who have been disappointed by Lapid’s failure to deliver the “new politics” of efficiency and transparency that he promised, may supply the Herzog-Livni alliance with the necessary votes.	已经对拉皮德未能实现其所承诺的注重效率和透明度的“新政治”倍感失望的未来党选民可能将所需选票投给赫尔佐格 - 利夫尼联盟。


Some of the moderate orthodox parties, which have been undergoing their own internal splits, have also signaled their willingness to work with a center-left bloc that might enable Israel to make real progress.	某些温和的传统党派虽然其自身内部不乏分歧，但已经表明愿意与能让以色列实现真正进步的中左翼联盟合作。


Even Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman, head of the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, is now criticizing Netanyahu for alienating the US and has suggested that he would not rule out joining a centrist government.	就连右翼政党以色列家园党领袖外长阿维格多·利伯曼也在批评内塔尼亚胡疏远美国，并表示自己不排除加入中间派政府。


All of this bodes well for the Herzog-Livni alliance.	这一切全部利好赫尔佐格 - 利夫尼联盟。


But three months is a long time in politics.	但三个月是很长的政治周期。


Netanyahu may be a dismal prime minister; but he is also a formidable campaigner.	内塔尼亚胡或许是个乏味的总理； 但同时也是令人敬畏的活动家。


And if the centrist alliance finishes first in the election, it will still need coalition partners to form a majority in the Knesset.	而且就算中间联盟以第一的身份结束选举，还需要联盟伙伴才能在议会形成多数。


Gaining fewer than 30 of its 120 seats might drive it to seek potential partners among the orthodox – an approach that could alienate moderate secular voters.	在全部120个议会席位中所获席位少于30个可能迫使其在传统党派中寻求联盟——而上述举措可能疏远温和的世俗选民。


Moreover, once in power, the Herzog-Livni alliance would be met with serious challenges – beginning with reaching an agreement with the Palestinians.	此外，一旦掌权，赫尔佐格 - 利夫尼联盟将会面临严峻的挑战——首先就是要与巴勒斯坦人达成协议。


Given that the Palestinians’ political leadership is divided between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, and Hamas, which has established an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Gaza, a deal between Israel and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas would mean little.	鉴于巴��斯坦政治领导机构分为实际控制西岸的法塔赫领导的巴勒斯坦民族权力机构和在加沙建立伊斯兰原教旨主义政权的哈马斯，以色列和巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯之间达成协议并没有多少实际意义。


Nonetheless, a Herzog-Livni government would bring significant change, particularly in terms of relations with Europe and the US.	尽管如此，赫尔佐格 - 利夫尼政府仍将带来显著变化，尤其在与欧洲和美国关系方面更是如此。


Netanyahu’s provocative policies and statements, which have undermined support for Israel among even its closest allies, would be supplanted by a willingness to negotiate in earnest and make genuine concessions.	内塔尼亚胡的挑衅政策和言论破坏了哪怕最亲密盟友对以色列的支持，选举后可能被一个愿意认真协商并作出真正让步的新政府所代替。


Such a shift would reinvigorate hope among Israelis – and not a moment too soon.	这样的改变将重新点燃以色列人的希望，这一时刻其实早已姗姗来迟。


There is a growing realization in Israel that it is time to chart a new path.	越来越多的以色列人正在就是时候开辟新思路达成共识。


Netanyahu, always eager to impress upon the Israeli public the impossibility of making peace with the Palestinians, failed to address the question of what kind of country Israel will become if it continues to rule millions of people against their will.	内塔尼亚胡一直急于告诉以色列公众不可能与巴勒斯坦人和平共处，但却无法回答什么样的国家才会持续违背数百万人的意志实行统治。


This is what has turned so many people in the West against Israel, leading some to question its very legitimacy.	这已经导致太多西方人反对以色列，其中不少人甚至对这个国家的合法性提出了质疑。


If Zionism means eternal dominion over the Palestinians, is it really worthy of support?	意味着对巴勒斯坦人永久统治的犹太复国主义是不是真的值得支持？


The Herzog-Livni alliance has tentatively named itself the “Zionist Camp.”	赫尔佐格 - 利夫尼联盟已初步定名为“犹太复国主义阵营”。


It may not be catchy (and it is likely to be changed), but it expresses an essential truth: Zionism is about the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, not about the permanent domination of another people.	这个名字或许不太上口（今后也有可能改名），但它却告诉人们一个最基本的事实：犹太复国主义旨在掌握犹太人民的自决权利，而不是对其他民族实行永久的统治。


One hopes that Israeli voters recognize this in March.	我们希望3月以色列选民对此能有所认识。


The Return of the Jordanian Option	约旦方案回归


TEL AVIV – France’s initiative to hold an international conference to re-launch direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians, aimed at the ever elusive “two-state solution,” is the child of a resilient fantasy.	特拉维夫—法国计划举行一场国际会议重启以巴直接对话，目标直指万难的“两国方案”，这是对一个坚强的幻想的幼稚尝试。


But after decades of failed negotiations, it’s time to start thinking like adults.	但在几十年的失败谈判后，现在应该开始进行成熟的思考了。


Neither Israeli nor Palestinian society is primed for compromise.	以色列和巴勒斯坦社会都不愿妥协。


On the contrary, in Israel, surging nationalism has become a major obstacle to any negotiation.	相反，在以色列，高涨的民族主义已经成为任何谈判的主要障碍。


With Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu catering to ultra-nationalist elements, there is no possibility that he will produce the kinds of peace proposals pursued by his predecessors, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert.	总理内塔尼亚胡表现出极端民族主义要素，要他完成其前任巴拉克和奥尔默特所追求的和平方案绝无可能。


As for Palestine, its fragmented polity undermines any possibility of effective negotiation.	至于巴勒斯坦，其支离破碎的政治局面遏制了任何可能的有效谈判。


But even beyond the current circumstances, there are more fundamental reasons why the Israel-Palestine peace process has never worked.	但即使不考虑当前的环境，也有更为根本性的理由认为以巴和平进程从未产生效果。


The role of history and religion in the conflict, together with the small size of territory over which the parties are fighting, leaves too little room for accommodation.	历史和宗教在冲突中的角色，以及双方争夺领土范围之小决定了几乎没有协调的可能。


There is another vital reason: The Palestinian interlocutor is not a state, but an unpredictable movement.	还有一个重要原因：巴勒斯坦谈判方不是国家，而是一个不可预测的运动。


It is a movement that is institutionally invertebrate and split between Islamists, who dream of a borderless Arab nation, and ineffective secular nationalists who four times (1937, 1947, 2000, and 2008) rejected offers for the creation of a Palestinian state.	这个运动缺少制度主心骨，分裂为两端，一端是各个梦想建立一个无边界阿拉伯国家的伊斯兰派系，另一端是四度（1937年、1947年、2000年和2008年）拒绝建立巴勒斯坦国机会的无能的世俗民族主义者。


When negotiating with Arab states, Israel was far more forthcoming than it ever was in the case of the Palestinian national movement.	在与阿拉伯国家进行谈判时，以色列对巴勒斯坦民族运动的态度最为强硬。


In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin promised Syria’s then-president, Hafez al-Assad, a return to the 1967 borders without so much as a meeting.	20世纪90年代初，以色列总理拉宾向时任叙利亚总理哈菲兹·阿萨德承诺退回1967年边界，根本不需要如此多的会晤。


In 1979, Egypt got back 100% of the land that Israel captured from it in the 1967 Six Day War.	1979年，埃及获还以色列从1967年六日战争中夺走的全部领土。


Of course, Israel also began as a movement.	当然，以色列也是以一场运动起步的。


But almost from its inception, the Zionist project was driven by a unifying sense of purpose in building an independent nation-state.	但几乎从开始的那一刻起，锡安运动背后的推动力一直是统一的建立独立民族国家的使命感。


At every crossroads throughout the years leading to Israel’s creation, the movement’s leaders made the pragmatic, rather than the fanciful, choice.	在通往以色列建国的历程的几乎每一个十字路口，锡安运动领导人都做出了务实而非理想的选择。


Palestinian nationalism, by contrast, was never focused on state-building.	相反，巴勒斯坦民族主义从未聚焦于建国。


Fueled by the tragedy of expulsion and disinheritance, it focused on the dream of restitution.	拜遭驱逐和剥夺继承权利的悲剧所赐，巴勒斯坦民族主义的重点是补偿。


The failure and eventual sacking in 2013 of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad – whose professed intention was to emulate Zionism through a laborious policy of state-building – is revealing.	2013年巴勒斯坦总理法雅德（Salam Fayyad）的失败和最终下台便是明证——他坦言意欲通过艰苦的建国政策效仿锡安主义。


But there is an alternative to the two-state solution that accounts for these factors: The West Bank could revert to Jordan, which would then become a kind of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.	但有一个两国方案的替代品可以兼顾这些因素：约旦河西岸可以归属约旦，然后再建立约旦-巴勒斯坦邦联。


In essence, this option represents a return to the parameters of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, at which a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation represented the Palestinian cause.	从本质上，这一选择代表着对1991年马德里和平会议方案的回归。 在马德里会议上，巴勒斯坦由约旦-巴勒斯坦联合代表团代表。


Israel, in this scenario, would benefit from gaining an interlocutor that is an orderly state with a tradition of – and interest in – negotiation and compliance with agreements.	在这一情形中，以色列的好处是有了一个作为有序国家、具备谈判和遵守协定传统——以及利益——的谈判方。


This should be enough to impel Israeli leaders at least to consider the option, and behave less deceitfully than they have in direct negotiations with the Palestinians.	这应该足以促使以色列领导人至少考虑这一选项，也不会像与巴勒斯坦的直接谈判那样极尽诡谲之能事。


With Israel no longer able to use Palestinian institutional weakness as a justification for its continued occupation of the West Bank, Palestine would stand to benefit.	当以色列不再能够借口巴勒斯坦的制度缺陷继续占领约旦河西岸时，巴勒斯坦也会受益。


Moreover, Israel could not, as it attempted to do in the past, annex strategic areas of the West Bank and return the rest to Jordan; instead, it would have to withdraw to the 1967 borders, with agreed modifications and land swaps.	此外，以色列无法像过去所尝试的那样吞并约旦河西岸的战略性地区而将其余部分返还约旦； 相反，它必须以一致的修约和土地交换为条件退回1967年边界。


Palestinians seem to recognize these benefits.	巴勒斯坦人似乎认识到了这些好处。


In 2013, according to polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 55% of Palestinians supported the Jordanian option – a 10% increase from five years earlier.	2013年，巴勒斯坦政策和调查中心进行的民调显示，55%的巴勒斯坦人支持约旦选项——比五年前增加了10%。


Perhaps the biggest obstacle is Jordan, which currently is not interested in getting involved.	也许最大的障碍是约旦，目前它已经不再有兴趣卷入其中。


That will change only if it faces a threat to its own security, stemming, say, from the spillover of Palestinian instability from the West Bank.	只有当它面临自身威胁，比如来自约旦河西岸巴勒斯坦动荡的溢出效应时才可能改变局面。


Paradoxically, one potential trigger of such a security risk could be apparent progress toward a two-state solution.	矛盾的是，一个这一安全风险的潜在触发因素可能正是两国方案取得巨大进展。


The late King Hussein feared that an independent Palestinian state could become a radical irredentist entity, and his own 1988 decision to waive Jordan’s claim on the West Bank, taken under pressure from the Arab League, was never ratified in parliament, and is still regarded by many as unconstitutional.	已故的约旦国王侯赛因担心独立的巴勒斯坦国可能成为激进的恢复故土主义（irredentist）实体，而他本人1988年决定放弃约旦在约旦河西岸的主张因为来自阿拉伯联盟的压力而从未获得议会批准，至今仍被许多人视为违宪。


Fear of Palestinian instability also drove two former Jordanian prime ministers, Abdel Salam Majali and Taher al-Masri, to advocate a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.	担心巴勒斯坦动荡也促使两���约旦前总理——马贾利（Abdel Salam Majali）和马斯里（Taher al-Masri）支持约旦-巴勒斯坦邦联。


Majali remains a staunch champion of the idea, as he made clear in a recent meeting in Amman with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.	马贾利仍然是该方案的忠实拥趸，他最近在阿曼与巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯的会晤中清楚地透露了这一点。


His elaborate 2007 plan, undoubtedly shared with King Abdullah’s consent, was spurred by the prospect of chaos should an Israeli government decide to secure Israel’s survival as a Jewish state through unilateral withdrawal from much of the West Bank.	2007年他曾提出过一个详细方案，该方案显然与阿卜杜勒国王有异曲同工之妙，其背景是，如果以色列政府决定通过单边撤出约旦河西岸大部保证以色列作为犹太国家的存在，将造成混乱的局面。


That chaos, Jordan’s government feared, could spread to the East Bank, potentially dealing a fatal blow to the Kingdom.	约旦政府担心，这种混乱可能蔓延到约旦河东岸，给约旦国王造成致命打击。


The international community is about to embark, yet again, on a peace process aimed at creating an orderly and viable independent Palestinian state in the West Bank.	国际社会即将启动又一场旨在约旦河西岸建立有序可行的独立巴勒斯坦国的和平进程。


That would be the most just outcome.	这是最正义的结果。


Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely, leaving a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation as the last remaining hope for Palestinian statehood.	不幸的是，这个结果可能性渺茫，而约旦-巴勒斯坦邦联是巴勒斯坦立国的最后希望。


Israel’s Centrist Victory	以色列的中间派胜利


JERUSALEM – Israel’s election is a victory for centrism and national consensus.	耶路撒冷-以色列的选举是中间主义和国民意见的胜利。


Indeed, that is the key to understanding not only the vote count, but also Israeli public opinion, the next government, and its policies.	事实上，这不仅是解释票数多寡的钥匙，也是理解以色列公众舆论、下届政府及其政策的关键。


From experience, most Israelis have developed a worldview that combines traditional left-wing and right-wing thinking.	源于经验，大多数以色列人都已经发展出一套融合了传统左翼和右翼思想的世界观。


On one hand, they want to achieve a comprehensive political solution with the Palestinians based on creating a Palestinian state, in exchange for real, lasting peace.	一方面，他们想在建立巴勒斯坦国的基础上与巴勒斯坦人达成全面的政治解决方案，以此交换真正的持久和平。


On the other hand, they understand that there is no Palestinian leadership strong or moderate enough to bring it about.	另一方面，他们知道没有巴勒斯坦领袖足以强硬或温和到促成此事发生。


Both the left and the right have been proven wrong.	左翼和右翼都已经被证明是错误的了。


The left offered big concessions and was ready to take high risks for the sake of peace.	左翼做出大幅度退让，为了和平甘冒巨险。


Yet there is no credible way to achieve an agreement with such radical forces as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah, all of whom seek Israel’s destruction.	但是它没有可靠方法来与伊朗，叙利亚，哈马斯和黎巴嫩真主党等激进势力达成一致，所有这些势力都谋求摧毁以色列。


The Palestinian Authority (PA) is less extreme, but its leadership is weak, doesn’t control Gaza, and is still full of hard-line elements.	巴勒斯坦民族权力机构(PA）没有这么极端，但是它的领导力量薄弱，没有控制加沙，而且仍然充斥着了强硬原素。


This approach also lost credibility as a result of the rise of Hamas and its determination to wage permanent war on Israel; Iran’s expanding influence and nuclear weapons’ program; and the high – even rising – levels of hatred against Israel among Arabs and Muslims.	由于哈马斯兴起并决心向以色列发动持久战争，伊朗影响力扩大又发展了核武器项目，阿拉伯人和穆斯林则对以色列怀有强烈的憎恨，而且仇恨还在加剧，这条道路也无法走通。


In addition, the world didn’t reward Israel for making concessions and taking risks.	此外，世界并没有因为以色列作出让步和冒了风险就给出回报。


Indeed, the more Israel gave, the more slander and hostility it faced in many sectors.	事实上，以色列付出的越多，它在许多领域面临的诋毁和敌意就越是沸沸扬扬。


At the same time, the right-wing mantra – victory – failed to offer a credible way to replace the Iranian and Syrian governments, or to destroy Hamas and Hezbollah.	与此同时，右翼的口头禅“胜利”也没能就替换伊朗和叙利亚政府，或是摧毁哈马斯和真主党提出可靠办法。


There is neither the illusion nor the desire to hold onto captured territories permanently, or to build Jewish settlements, and Israel has virtually no international support for any of these goals.	没有人幻想或渴望要永久性地保有被占领土，或是建立犹太定居点。 以色列事实上也不会因为上述目标赢得任何国际支持。


With alternatives to the status quo constrained, it has become clear that Israel is in a long transitional period in which old ideas don’t work and a new approach is needed.	由于现状之外的其他选择寥寥无几，很明显以色列正处在一个漫长的转折阶段，此时旧观点不再有效，需要新方法。


Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s Kadima party, opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s Labor party all fall – with only secondary variations – within a centrist consensus, which also reflects a popular national consensus.	外交部长齐皮·利夫尼的前进党、反对派领袖本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的利库德集团、国防部长埃胡德·巴拉克的工党在中立派的民意里相差无几，全部失利。 这也反映了广泛的国民意见。


Thus, regardless of who becomes prime minister, the next government will not commit to real concessions to the Palestinians in exchange for a two-state solution unless the result will be an end to the conflict and a long, stable peace.	因此，无论谁担任总理，下届政府都不会为了解决两国之间的问题而向巴勒斯坦人做出真正的让步，除非结果是终止冲突，获得长期稳定的和平。


Few believe that the PA and Hamas’s main rival, Fatah, will be willing or able to make such an agreement for decades.	很少有人相信，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构和哈马斯的主要对手 — 法塔赫—愿意或是能够在数十年内就此达成协议。


The same applies to Syria.	对叙利亚也是如此。


As a result, any real changes affecting the status of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights or West Bank settlements are a long way off.	所以，期待发生真正的改变来影响耶路撒冷、戈兰高地或西岸定居点的局势，可谓是长路漫漫。


Moreover, no deal can be made with Hamas.	而且哈马斯是不会达成协议的。


But, since Hamas will not simply disappear – nor will Hezbollah – so the key point is to defend Israel and its citizens as they pursue their normal lives.	但因为哈马斯并不会消失了事，真主党也是如此，所以关键问题是当以色列人追求他们的正常生活时，保卫这个国家和它的人民。


This also means that at some point a big decision may have to be made on attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.	这也意味着某个时刻可能不得不就攻击伊朗的核设施做出重大决定。


As a result of this national consensus – accepted by Labor, Likud, and Kadima, along with many others – the next government will most likely be a national unity government consisting of this trio. Its policy guidelines are already clear:	由于工党、利库德集团和前进党以及许多其他党派都已经接受了这一次的全民共识，下一届政府极有可能是由这三派组成的联合政府。 它的政策纲领已经清晰出台：


·        To stress Israel’s willingness to make peace, its readiness to agree to the creation of a Palestinian state, and its refusal to bear responsibility for the continuing conflict and violence;	·    为了加强以色列谋求和平的意愿，它愿意同意巴勒斯坦国建国，拒绝为继续的冲突和暴力承担责任；


·        To maintain deterrence and defend Israel and its citizens from cross-border attacks;	·    保持威慑，保护以色列和它的民众免受跨越边界的攻击；


·        To preserve the best possible relations with the United States, Europe, and other countries, as long as this does not involve risks to Israel’s national interests or its citizens;	·    只要不把以色列的国家利益或是它的民众卷入危险，就尽可能保持与美国，欧洲和其他国家之间的最佳关系；


·        Security cooperation with the PA to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel, in exchange for economic aid and assistance to prevent a Hamas takeover;	·    与巴勒斯坦民族权力机构进行安全合作，防止对以色列的恐怖袭击，以此来交换经济援助，并协助防止哈马斯接掌政权；


·        To strike back at Hamas – and potentially Hezbollah – based on any attacks against Israel, with the precise response to depend on timing, opportunity, and these groups’ behavior;	·    还击哈马斯—可能还有真主党—针对以色列的任何袭击，依靠时间、机会和这些团体的行为做出准确反映；


·        To work for the international isolation of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas;	·    致力于在国际社会中孤立伊朗，真主党和哈马斯；


·        To negotiate with Syria for peace, though without illusions as to the probability of success.	·    和叙利亚就和平展开谈判，虽然不去幻想可能成功。


The main differences between the leading Israeli parties are more atmospheric than real, mainly concerning how much to concede and how much to demand.	以色列重要党派之间的主要分歧更多是一种氛围而非真实存在。 这种分歧主要是关于让步多少和要求多少。


Even so, Netanyahu will not embark on a settlement-building campaign, and Livni is not about to give away east Jerusalem.	尽管如此，内塔尼亚胡不会开展修建定居点的运动，利夫尼也不会放弃东耶路撒冷。


The most important decision that Israel’s new government is likely to face, when the time comes, is whether the country’s well being and even survival requires acting decisively against Iran’s nuclear facilities.	当时机来临时，以色列新政���可能要做出的最重要决定是：为了这个国家的幸福甚至是生存，是否需要针对伊朗的核设施采取决定性的行动。


Which path will be chosen is not clear, but it is far better that a broad coalition be responsible for making such a vital, even existential decision.	选择哪条道路还不明朗，但是好在这个如此重要，甚至生死攸关的决定将由一个广泛的联盟来负责做出。


Israel’s Dangerous Political System	危险的以色列政治系统


PARIS – What is wrong with Israel?	发自巴黎——以色列究竟出了什么问题？


In the last few years, the Jewish state seems to have done more than all of its combined enemies to delegitimize itself in the eyes of the world.	在过去的几年间，这个犹太国家抹杀自身合法性的行径似乎比它所有敌人加起来都更多。


Its leaders’ apparent inability to think in strategic terms, and their indifference to the tribunal of global public opinion, is resulting in growing frustration among its citizens and, what may be more dangerous, deepening international isolation.	该国领导人战略思维的缺失以及对全球舆论的漠不关心不但引发了民众内部不断累积的失望情绪，而更危险的，则是一再恶化的国际孤立状况。


Where should one look for an explanation for this tragic evolution?	那我们究竟应该从何处着眼来解释这一悲剧性的发展？


Was it simply inevitable for a people who, deprived of a state for more than 2,000 years, may have lost the ability to act collectively in a “raison d’état” manner?	是否对于一个近2000年以来都没能建立自己的国家的民族来说，失去为了“国家利益”而集体行动的能力是无法避免的？


Or perhaps the weight of Holocaust remembrance has blinded Israel’s leaders and distorted their thinking – in ways that, at the time the State of Israel was created, the Holocaust itself almost miraculously did not.	是否是因为大屠杀的记忆蒙蔽了以色列领导人的视野并扰乱了他们的思维——那为什么在以色列建国之初大屠杀的影响却微乎其微？


Certainly, the failure of the peace process in the 1990’s, followed by the coming of the second Intifada, appears to have encouraged the radicalization of Israel’s extremes while discouraging moderates.	当然，1990年代和平进程的失败，以及随后发生的第二次占领区巴勒斯坦人暴动似乎都加剧了以色列内部激进派的极端程度并打击了温和派。


And the revival of religious parties – in a country created by avowed secularists – opened the way for a more politically powerful but also more nationalistic and intolerant setting.	而在一个由世俗主义者创建的国家里，宗教党派的复兴也为一个政治上更加强大，但更民族主义，更狭隘的政治现状埋下了伏笔。


One could also ask whether the arrival of one million “Russians,” regardless of their actual ties to Judaism, had a negative effect on Israeli society, by encouraging ideological rigidity and a disdain for democracy that did not prevail before.	有人也会问：是否是因为那100万“俄国犹太人”（无论其是否笃信犹太教）的到来对以色列社会产生了负面影响？ 因为这些人在意识形态方面极端固执，而且对从来没有在他们身上成功运作过的民主体制嗤之以鼻。


Or is the explanation for Israel’s current predicament to be found on the more prosaic terrain of the country’s dysfunctional democracy?	又或者以色列目前的困境来源于该国的民主体制已经失去了其应有的作用？ 这可是一个乏味的解释。


In reality, all these explanations are largely complementary; none is in contradiction with the others. But the most important cause, the one that should be addressed before all others because it is eroding Israel’s very viability, is the near paralysis of the political system.	其实，所有这些解释都是相互呼应的，但最重要且必须首先应对的因素则是以色列国家政治系统的近乎瘫痪状态，因为这腐蚀了以色列最基本的生存能力。


Italy can survive being badly governed and with a high level of corruption because it is surrounded by the peaceful environment of the European Union.	意大利能从极为差劲的政府治理和极端腐败中存在下来的原因就是因为它被欧盟所创造的安定和平环境围绕着。


This is not true of Israel. Protected by a “security wall” on one side and the sea on the other, Israeli citizens may enjoy the feeling of living on an artificial island from which they can connect directly to the areas of modernity and prosperity in Asia and the West.	但以色列却没有这样的福分，在西面的大海和东面的“安全围墙”保护下，以色列人可以享受居住在一个人造岛屿上，却直接与亚欧大陆那些和平繁荣的区域联系在一起的感觉。


Yet they are surrounded by a sea of angry and frustrated people, and cannot escape the logic of the region they inhabit.	但他们依然被无数愤怒而沮丧的人们所包围着，也逃不出这个他们所处的这个区域的行为逻辑。


Israel’s political system, through its complex mechanisms of rigged party selection and absolute proportionality, condemns the country to weak coalition governments and escalating corruption. It must be reformed urgently.	而以色列的政治系统，通过其复杂且容易被操纵的政党选择机制以及完全比例代表制，使得国家不断产生弱势联合政府，腐败情况也不断升级，因此这个系统必须立刻进行改革。


Government leaders in Israel cannot afford to spend 90% of their time thinking about how to survive politically at a time when the state’s right to exist is being challenged.	甚至在这个国家的生存权受到挑战时，那些以色列领导人都还要把90%的精力放在该如何保住个人政治生命的思考上面。


To make of their country a pariah is a political, strategic, and moral failure for the leaders of Israel.	将自己的国家变成国际社会的弃儿是以色列领导人在政治，战略和道义上的失败。


Those leaders’ strategic decisions over the last few years, if not longer, have been rather consistently poor, or at least imprudent.	那些领导人在过去那些年间所作的战略决策一直都很低劣，至少是不明智的。


This systematic miscalculation can be explained as follows.	下面这些事例可以解释那种系统性的政治失算。


From the 2006 war in Lebanon to the recent deadly raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla, Israeli leaders have badly appreciated the ratio between military gains and political risks, and the necessary proportionality between the two.	从2006年的黎巴嫩战争到最近对加沙附近海域的船队进行造成人员伤亡的抄查。 以色列领导人都错误地衡量了军事胜利和政治风险之间的比例，以及两者之间的必要权衡。


This is all the more dangerous for Israel in view of the apparent decline in its operational military capabilities.	加上近年来以色列军事行动能力的进一步下降，这令以色利陷入了更大的危险之中。


Even the operation in Gaza in 2008-2009, despite its apparent military success, was highly damaging for Israel in political terms.	即便是2008~2009年在加沙地区的军事行动，虽然取得了明显的军事胜利，却在政治上极大地削弱了以色列。


As Israel’s political center of gravity has shifted to the right, if not the extreme right, one consequence whose long-term effects are not sufficiently appreciated is the growing alienation of Arab citizens, who represent 20% of the population.	随着以色利的政治重心逐渐右倾（如果不是极端右倾的话），一个长期来说可能没什么好影响的后果就是占国内人口20%的阿拉伯公民将被逐渐梳理。


Yesterday, they felt discriminated against.	过去这些人觉得受了歧视。


Today, they feel “occupied” by a nation of which they can never be a part, and by a state that they perceive as “democratic” for its Jewish citizens only and “Jewish” for its Arab citizens.	如今他们觉得自己是被一个自己永远都无法成为一分子的国家“占领”了，一个只对犹太人实行“民主”，却对阿拉伯人实施“犹太专制”统治的国家


The process of isolation of Israel starts in the heads of its citizens, and is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.	以色列的孤立进程在其民众的脑中开始萌发，如今正在变成一个自我应验的预言。


History has taught the Jewish people that they can count only on themselves for protection and survival.	历史已经教会了犹太民族单靠自身的力量是无法保护自己和生存下去的。


Yesterday, intelligence without power led to immense suffering.	过去，掌握了智慧却没有权力的犹太人遭受了极大的苦难。


But today, power without intelligence creates immense dangers not only for the Israel, but for the Jewish people at large.	如今手握权力却丧失了智慧不但将为以色列带来极大的风险，也将危及这个世界上所有的犹太人。


Israel is too small to act foolishly.	以色列是聪明反被聪明误。


It desperately needs allies whose populations accept what it is and respect what it does. There will come a moment when Israel’s actions will incite people – not only the most fanatical of the country’s foes, but also the most generously inclined of its supporters – to question Israel’s essence.	它迫切地需要盟国的支持，需要那些国家的民众接受这个自己并支持其所作所为，但最终到某个时候，以色列的行为将激怒人们——不但是那些最狂热的敌对者，还有最宽容的支持者——去质疑以色列的本质。


Whether or not this moment has already come, Israel cannot continue to be misgoverned in the way that it is.	无论如何，这个时刻已经到来了，以色列不能继续用现在这种方式错下去。


Reform of the country’s political system has simply become a matter of life and death.	国家的政治系统是否能够改革，已经成了一个关乎死存亡的问题。


Israel’s Lonely Prosperity	以色列的孤立繁荣


PARIS – It is difficult not to be struck by the contrast between the “Asian”-like energy of Israel’s economy and civil society and the purely defensive nature of its approach to political change, both within and outside the country.	发自巴黎——以色列给人的印象总带有某种强烈的反差：一方面是“亚洲式”生机勃勃的经济和公民社会，另一方面却是对政治改革发自本能的抵制，无论在国内外都是如此。


A recent law bars Israeli citizens from supporting Western boycotts aimed at reversing the country’s settlement policies and at backing an independent Palestinian state.	该国最近还通过一项法律，禁止人民支持任何旨在推翻犹太人定居点政策或建立独立巴勒斯坦国的西方抗议行动。


While Israel has never been so affluent, dynamic, and confident, it also has never been so isolated internationally.	虽然以色列的富裕，活力和自信都如日中天，但其国际地位却也从未如此孤家寡人。


Israel could have embraced the Arab Spring as an opportunity, rather than as a profound risk.	以色列本可以将“阿拉伯春天”视为一个契机，而非某种深不可测的风险。


If Arab citizens could transform their culture of humiliation into a culture of hope, perhaps they would be able to reconcile themselves with Israel’s existence.	试想如果阿拉伯人民能把自身从那种受侮辱受压迫者的心态中解脱出来，转变成一种充满希望的开放思维，那么就完全有可能接受以色列的存在。


But Israeli leaders reacted purely negatively to the Arab upheavals.	但以色列领导人却对这场阿拉伯革命做出了完全负面的回应。


In their estimation, a complex regional environment has now become even more dangerous, making prudence even more urgent.	在这些领导人眼中，一个本已复杂的区域态势如今变得更加危机四伏，只能更加谨小慎微。


For Israel, yesterday’s despots, like Egypt’s former president, Hosni Mubarak, were much more predictable than the “Arab masses.”	对以色列来说，“阿拉伯民众”显然比像埃及前总统穆巴拉克这样的独裁者更加难以捉摸。


While some of the demonstrators might be inspired by democratic ideals, let’s have no illusions, the Israelis seem to be saying: Islamist forces will emerge as the only winners, and they are much more hostile to Israel and the West than their predecessors were.	虽然其中一些阿拉伯示威民众可能是受到了民主思想的感召，但坦白说，以色列人似乎都认为极端伊斯兰势力将最终得势，而且会比前任更加仇视以色列和西方。


Of course, with the Syrian regime’s massacres of its own citizens, some in Israel say that the suffering of Gaza’s inhabitants pales in comparison, and thus fails to attract the same sympathy as it did last year.	当然，相对于叙利亚当局对本国民众大开杀戒，某些以色列人会认为加沙地区巴勒斯坦人所受的苦难根本不值一提，也无法像去年那样吸引国际社会的同情和关注。


But this should not obscure the overall diplomatic picture for Israel, which remains essentially negative.	但这种对比不应扰乱了以色列的整体外交战略——况且这一战略在很大程度上还是负面的。


One of the more ironic results of the region’s changing political configuration is that Israel now perceives a strategic convergence with Saudi Arabia.	而中东政治格局变动所引发的其中一个讽刺性后果就是以色列如今试图与沙特建立一个战略性联盟。


Despite their political systems’ deep differences, they both favor the regional status quo, and they share an obsessive suspicion of Iran.	虽然两国政治体制千差万别，但他们都更加喜欢维持现状，也都坚持对伊朗的成见。


But why not dream of a new strategic triangle comprising Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, just as Israelis once dreamed of a non-Arab triangle between Israel, Turkey, and the Shah’s Iran?	但既然以色列曾经梦想建立一个涵盖以色列，土耳其和（伊斯兰革命前）伊朗的非阿拉伯战略三角，如今又为何不能设想一个包括以色列，沙特和土耳其在内的战略三角关系呢？


The Turks’ appalled reaction to the Syrian regime’s brutal behavior creates an opportunity that Israel should use to try to restore the privileged relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government that existed before the Gaza blockade.	土耳其人对叙利亚当局暴行的强烈反应其实就为以色列提供了一个机会，让它借机修复在封锁加沙前与土耳其总理埃尔多安的特殊关系。


But that would presuppose a small gesture towards the Palestinians, whom Israelis regard as being so deeply divided among themselves that no progress toward a peace settlement seems possible.	但这意味着要向巴勒斯坦人做出某些微小的让步，而在以色列人眼中这些巴勒斯坦人不过是些内部严重分裂以致无法达成任何和平协议的人群罢了。


Israel’s leaders seem intent on gaining time both tactically, by resisting the soft pressure of US President Barack Obama’s administration, and strategically, by preparing the country for a new world in which emerging powers such as China play an increasingly important role.	以色列领导人似乎同时想在战术和战略上拖延时间：前者是通过抵制美国总统奥巴马施加的软压力，后者则是准备迎接一个类似中国这些新兴势力日渐得势的新世界。


That world, however, will be one in which Israel can no longer count on feelings of Holocaust guilt to influence major powers.	然而这么一个世界意味着以色列无法再利用对纳粹大屠杀的愧疚感来影响那些主要势力。


It is a world in which monotheistic rivalries will be diluted in an ocean of polytheist faiths, and in which Israel will be able to depend only on its comparative merits in the eyes of cynical, realistic actors who will judge it solely on the basis of their own national interests.	那是一个一神论宗教之间的敌意逐渐被多元信仰的汪洋大海所稀释的世界，而在那些仅仅以自身国家利益作为评判标准的，多疑且现实的大国眼中，以色列只能依靠其比较竞争优势来赢得青睐。


Israel may be “of Europe,” and its main ally may well remain the United States for many years to come, but Israeli leaders must start thinking of how their country can thrive in a post-Western world.	以色列可能会成为“欧洲”的一部份，而在未来一段时间内其主要盟友依然会是美国，但以色列领导人必须着手思考究竟如何在一个后西方时代挣扎求存。


The most recent “President’s Conference,” held in June in Jerusalem under the patronage of Israeli President Shimon Peres, was highly symbolic of this evolution.	今年6月由以色列总理佩雷斯召集的耶路撒冷“总统会议”正是这一形势转变的高度体现。


In the opening session, Obama’s special envoy, Denis Ross, was greeted with resounding silence when he conveyed to the participants his boss’s warm wishes.	在公开会议环节，奥巴马总统特使丹尼斯·罗斯在向与会代表传达总统本人的致意时竟然遭遇了冷场。


By contrast, China’s culture minister was welcomed very warmly when he spoke, in typical fashion, of the growing need for global “harmony.”	相比之下中国文化部长则在就全球“和谐”这一流行议题发表演讲时受到了热烈回应。


In the minds of a few Israeli strategic thinkers, Israel must resist firmly for two or three more generations in order to become an irreversible reality in the region and a legitimate “accomplished fact” of the international system.	在一些以色列战略学者的思维中，以色列还必须继续坚持两三代人的时间，使这个国家变成该区域的一个不可更改的存在以及国际体系中一个合法的“既成事实”。


At that point, who would want to boycott a country whose technological prowess is needed all over the world?	到了那个时候，又有谁会抵制一个技术实力享誉世界的国家呢？


In this context, the idea of a peace settlement with the Palestinians seems more abstract than ever.	在这个背景下，与巴勒斯坦人达成和平协议的理念将变得比以往更加飘渺。


Indeed, it makes the current status quo seem comfortable.	事实上它也使得当今的现状似乎更能令人接受。


The gap between Israel’s rich and poor nowadays may recall Brazil, but who remembers the original Zionists’ social-democratic ideals?	当前以色列的贫富分化会令人想起巴西，而谁又曾记得最早那批犹太建国者的社会民主理念？


The country’s prosperity is simply overwhelming. From Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, luxurious penthouses are multiplying.	这个国家的繁荣压倒了一切。


Are we in Singapore, Hong Kong, or São Paulo? Why challenge the certainties of the present with the uncertainties of the future?	从特拉维夫到耶路撒冷放眼尽是豪华住宅，令人仿佛置身于新加坡，香港和圣保罗，那么为何要用未知的未��去挑战无比确定的现在呢？


Moreover, Israel has not only become much more prosperous; it has also moved decisively to the right.	此外，以色列不仅变得更繁荣； 同时也更向右翼靠拢。


The second Intifada may very well have proven fatal to the Israeli left.	第二次巴勒斯坦人暴动对以色列的左派构成了致命打击。


Triumphant capitalism, idolatry of the land, and the comforts of the status quo produce a heady cocktail.	资本主义的胜利，对土地的崇拜以及对现状的满足共同勾兑成一杯令人陶醉的鸡尾酒。


But, high on the benefits of globalization, and waiting with a mixture of excitement and apprehension for the coming of a new post-Western world order, Israelis are dancing on the rim of a volcano.	但对在全球化中大获其利，并以一种兴奋和担心交织的心态期待一个新后西方世界秩序到来的以色列来说，他们其实正在在火山口边跳舞。


Israel’s Mission	以色列的使命


JERUSALEM – Israel is one of the biggest success stories of modern times.	耶路撒冷-以色列是现代社会最成功的故事之一，这是一个由大屠杀的幸存者和流离失所的犹太人群体重新组成的国家。


A nation was reborn out of Holocaust survivors and uprooted Jewish communities who, mostly through the quality of their human capital, built a booming economy, created one of the world’s most innovative agricultures, and revived a dead language.	这些人依靠他们的才干成就了繁荣的经济，创造了世界上最富创造力的农业并且恢复了一门几乎濒临灭绝的语言。


They also sustained, against all odds, a democracy that, however imperfect and dysfunctional, is nonetheless amazingly vibrant.	尽管有着极大的困难，他们还维持了一套尽管不太完美并且有些功能障碍，然而却令人惊讶地充满活力的民主机制。


And yet, at its 60th anniversary, Israel stands at a crossroads.	然而现在，在它建国60年之际，以色列正站在十字路口。


Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has warned of “the end of the Jewish state” if the country remains bogged down in the occupied territories and a Palestinian state is not established.	事实上，以色列总理奥尔默特曾经警告说，如果这个国家继续陷入侵占领土的泥沼并且巴勒斯坦国无法建立的话，那么“这个犹太国家将走向灭亡”。


Israel’s internal challenges are no less demanding.	以色列所面临的国内挑战同样也迫切需要得到解决。


The relatively homogeneous society envisaged by its founders has fragmented into a tense multi-ethnic tapestry comprising secular Jews, an alienated Arab minority, a prolific ultra-orthodox community living on state allowances, religious nationalists bent on a Messianic brand of Zionism, immigrants from the former Soviet Union, marginalized Ethiopians, and Oriental Jews still struggling to join the middle class.	它的开国元勋们所设想的相对同种族的社会如今已经分裂成了相互关系比较紧张的多种族社会，其中包括了世俗犹太人、被疏远的阿拉伯少数民族、依靠国家救济生活的数量庞大的超正统群体、犹太复国主义中主张弥赛亚思想的宗教民族主义者、来自前苏联国家的移民、被边缘化的埃塞俄比亚人以及依然在努力进入中产阶层的东方犹太人。


Moreover, Israel has failed to redress a dangerous imbalance: however creative its economy may be, the burden of military expenditure is undermining its investment in education and scientific research.	此外，以色列没有能够调整一个非常危险的不平衡因素，即不管它的经济多么具有创造力，军费开支的沉重负担正在削弱它对教育和科研的投资。


Metaphorically, Israel’s national psyche oscillates between “Tel Aviv” and “Jerusalem.”	用比喻的话来说，以色列的民族心理在“特拉维夫”和“耶路撒冷”之间摇摆者。


“Tel Aviv” embraces secularism, hedonism, and economic growth, and views the State of Israel as a legal entity, in contrast to the dangerous, faith-driven “Jerusalemite” concept of “Eretz Israel.”	“特拉维夫”派信奉世俗主义、享乐主义和经济的增长，并且把以色列国看成是一个合法的实体，而不是“耶路撒冷”派心目中危险的、为宗教信仰所驱动的“以色列的土地”。


It has replaced Israel’s early pioneering ethos with the temptations of modernity, liberalism, and “normalcy.”	它已经摒弃了以色列早期的开拓精神，代之以对现代化、自由主义和“正常化”的向往。


It aspires to be part of the “global village,” not an isolated, parochial Jewish outpost.	它渴望成为“地球村”的一分子，而不是一个被孤立的、本位主义的犹太前哨。


By contrast, “Jerusalem” regards “Tel Aviv’s” drive for “normalcy” as a shallow affair, one that is almost criminally indifferent to Jewish memory and the lessons of Jewish history.	相比而言，“耶路撒冷”派认为“特拉维夫”派对“正常化”的追求是肤浅的，是对犹太人的记忆和犹太人的历史教训近乎犯罪地漠视。


The Israel of “Jerusalem” is one of yearning for Jewish roots, a deep-seated fear of “the Arabs,” and an unyielding distrust of “Gentiles” and their “international community.”	“耶路撒冷”派的以色列人渴望犹太人能够在此生根，对“阿拉伯人”抱有根深蒂固的恐惧，并且从来不信任“非犹太教徒”和他们的“国际群体”。


Israel was born in war and has lived by the sword ever since.	以色列诞生于战火中，并且在后来的岁月中一直伴随着刀光剑影。


Rarely in history has a national movement marched to its Promised Land with such a brilliant display of diplomatic savoir-faire and military skill as the Zionists did on their way to statehood.	在历史上很少有一个国家在迈向它的迦南之地时像犹太复国主义者在他们的建国路程中那样杰出地展示了外交手腕和军事才能。


But Israel’s breathtaking victory against three Arab armies in 1967 brought it not only grandeur, but also moral and political decay.	但是以色列在1967年对三支阿拉伯军队所取得的令人惊叹的胜利给它带来的不仅仅是荣耀，还有道义和政治上的腐朽。


Forty-one years later, Israel is still incapable of extricating itself from the corrupting occupation of Palestinian lands, and from the folly of settlements.	41年后的今天，以色列依然无法从对巴勒斯坦领土邪恶的占领和建立定居点的错误中摆脱出来。


This is the paradox of Israel’s existence: a sense of power combined with an ever-present apocalyptic fear of annihilation, reflected in its hostile reaction to any initiative that touches its physical security.	这正是以色列的生存所面临的一个自相矛盾的地方：一方面有一种强权的感觉，但同时却总是挥之不去对被消灭的可怕的恐惧，反映在它对触及它的自身安全的任何倡议都做出敌对的反应。


Of course, Jews’ historical experience is not conducive to easy conciliation.	当然，犹太人的历史经验也使他们不太容易达成和解。


The crisis of the Jewish conscience in the traumatic transition from Holocaust to statehood has not yet been fully overcome.	犹太人从大屠杀到建国这个令人痛苦的转变中所产生的危机意识还没有完全从他们的头脑中抹去。


Israel always, it seems, opts for a fatalistic interpretation of regional challenges, and its agonizing task today is to adopt a radical change of strategy by overcoming its leaders’ traditional tendency to make decisions only on the basis of worst-case scenarios.	以色列似乎总是倾向于对宗教挑战做出宿命论的解释，今天它需要完成的令人痛苦的事情就是要克服它的领导人总是基于最坏的状况而做出决策的传统倾向，而做出战略上的根本转变。


It has been a sadly recurrent condition of the Arab-Israeli conflict that no war lost by a humiliated Arab side has ever ushered in a peace settlement, just as no war overwhelmingly won by Israel has ever led its leaders to be magnanimous in victory.	阿以冲突一个令人伤心的不断发生的状况就是受到羞辱的阿拉伯一方并没有因为任何一次战争的失败而达成和平协议，正如以色列所取得的任何压倒性胜利并没有使它的领导表现出胜利者的大度。


Peace efforts began almost invariably thanks to Arab, not Israeli, moves.	和平的努力几乎总是由阿拉伯人而不是以色列人首先做出的。


Such was the case of the 1973 war, which was started by President Anwar Sadat with the aim of forcing the United States to broker an Egyptian-Israeli peace.	就像1973年战争后，是萨达特总统首先提出了和解的愿望，以便促使苏联能从中调解使埃及和以色列实现和平。


Likewise, the Palestinian Intifada of 1987 forced Israel to abandon the politics of inertia and engage in a process that culminated in the Oslo accords.	同样地，1987年的巴勒斯坦起义迫使以色列放弃了它迟钝的政治倾向而努力参与到和平进程中来，最终达成了奥斯陆协议。


Zionism’s unique combination of democracy and utopianism enabled the Jews to recover their birthright and gave them a key to the future.	犹太复国主义兼具民主和乌托邦的思想使犹太人使他们重新获得了对耶路撒冷的继承权，并且使他们拥有通向未来的钥匙。


The same tools must be used to end the conflict with the Arab world, in particular with the Palestinians.	同样的工具也必须被运用到结束与阿拉伯世界，尤其是与耶路撒冷的冲突中去。


The Jews did not survive extermination only to entrench themselves behind walls of their own making. They survived in order to resolve what for too long has looked like an insoluble conundrum: legitimizing Jewish statehood in the eyes of those who consider themselves its victims.	仅仅依靠躲在自己建造的隔离墙后面，犹太人是无法做到不被消灭的，他们只有解决一直以来被认为是一个无法解决的难题：即让犹太国家在那些认为自己是它的牺牲��的人眼中是合法的，才能最终避免被消灭的命运。


Obama in Israel’s New World	奥巴马在以色列新世界中的作用


PARIS – Now that Binyamin Netanyahu has formed a new Israeli government out of a dizzying kaleidoscope of possible post-election permutations, has the country’s politics moved to the center?	巴黎——内塔尼亚胡现在已经在令人目眩的后选举时代组建了以色列新政府，那么国内政治是否走上了中间道路？


US President Barack Obama would be wrong to think so as he prepares for his first official visit.	忙于准备首次正式出访的奥巴马总统这样想难免会误入歧途。


The unexpected second-place finish of Yair Lapid’s new Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) party in the recent election has certainly changed the complexion of the government: the two leading Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, are out, while two smaller centrist parties, Kadima and Hatnua, are in.	亚伊尔·拉皮德新组建的未来党（Yesh Atid）在选举中出人意料地位居第二无疑改变了原有的政府构成：两大传统政党沙斯党和托拉统一党在大选中出局，代之以规模较小的中间派前进党和Hatnua党。


But those who breathed a sigh of relief at the weakening of Netanyahu’s Likud and the country’s extreme right-wing parties should be as anxious as ever.	但因内塔尼亚胡的利库德集团和国内极右翼政党势力弱化而长舒一口气的人现在高兴还为时过早。


The political horse-trading is over for the time being, and the outcome seems assured.	政治领域的讨价还价暂告一段落，最终结果似乎并不出人意料。


Netanyahu will return as Prime Minister, and every party – in power or not – is ready to block, dilute, or paper over whatever policies the new government manages to adopt.	内塔尼亚胡将再次出任总理，而一切掌权抑或在野的政党都将虎视眈眈地准备阻止、削弱或粉饰新政府通过的一切政策。


In Israel, the question nowadays is not whether the center will hold, but whether it matters.	如今以色列的问题不在于中间势力能否保住地位，而在于他们说话还是否算数。


In both domestic and in international terms, Israel has not so much moved to the center as it has embraced a new type of national consensus that began to emerge in 2011.	从国内和国际角度，与其说以色列中间派当道，还不如说2011年兴起的全新国家共识已经为人所接受。


In May-June of that year, while the international community was still mooting potential land swaps for an increasingly distant peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israelis were focusing on a domestic battle over the regulation of cottage cheese.	那年5到6月，当国际社会仍在讨论以土地向巴勒斯坦人换取越来越遥远的和平时，以色列人却将注意力放在了如何监管国内的农家奶酪。


The new consensus was best symbolized by the massive popular protests that erupted two months later, bringing together young, economically frustrated, mainly middle-class Israelis who might once have been politically divided by their allegiance to either the center-left Labor party or Netanyahu’s Likud.	两个月后爆发的大规模民众抗议是新共识的最好体现，之前效忠于中左劳动党或内塔尼亚胡利库德集团的经济窘迫且政治观点相左的以色列中产阶级年轻人因此聚拢到新共识的旗帜下。 无论当时还是现在都没有涉及和平计划的必要性；


No mention was made, then or now, of the need for peace initiatives; of the state of mind of the now-invisible (to Israeli eyes) Palestinians, now relegated to their side of the security wall; or of the growing inequalities that separate Israel’s Arab citizens from their Jewish counterparts.	（以色列人同样视而不见的）还有安全墙一侧巴勒斯坦人的精神状态； 以及将以色列的阿拉伯与犹太民众隔开的愈演愈烈的不平等状况。


By representing the aspirations of middle class Israelis seeking a better economic deal, Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett of the nationalist Jewish Home party became the two sides of a newly minted political coin, one backed by an inward-looking ethnic and national identity in a country that sees itself as alone in the world.	在自诩独立于世界的内向民族情绪支配下，亚伊尔·拉皮德和民族主义犹太之家党的纳夫塔利·贝内特已经成为全新政治硬币的正反两面，并体现了以色列中产阶级改善经济待遇的愿望。


This identity may be secular or religious; it may seek middle-class normality or proclaim an Israeli version of manifest destiny – the two are not incompatible.	相关人员背景既可以出自世俗也可以来源宗教； 既可以追求中产阶级正常生活也可以信奉以色列版天命——这两者似乎水火不容。


Either way, the country no longer resonates with the expectations, hopes, and fears of a world still focused (ever more dimly) on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	但无论如何，以色列与国际社会的期待、希望和恐惧已经没有交集，因为虽然希望越来越渺茫，但国际社会仍然希望解决以巴冲突。


Nor does Israel listen to the anguish of its own Ciceronian Zionists, perhaps best represented by the novelist Amos Oz.	以色列也不再倾听西塞罗犹太复国主义者的痛苦，小说家阿摩司·奥兹也许是这些人中最杰出的代表。


Israel has simply stopped seeking to reconcile its Jewish identity with its commitment to democracy, for it has stopped addressing the contradiction that the Israeli-Palestinian question represents.	因为不再解决以巴问题所代表的矛盾，以色列已完全停止了其犹太身份与民主理想之间的调和。


Simply put, that contradiction is no longer relevant to the new Israel.	总之，上述矛盾已不再得到新以色列的关注。


Despite the deep economic frustrations of many of its middle-class citizens (the truly indigent did not protest), Israel has become a global economic and military powerhouse.	尽管中产阶级民众在经济领域仍有诸多不满（真正的穷人并没有抗议），但以色列已经成为全球经济和军事强国。


The country increasingly lives in its own virtual reality, simultaneously proximate to and far removed from the revolutionary pre-modernity of most of its neighbors.	这个国家越来越沉浸于自我营造的虚幻世界，多数邻国的前现代革命虽然近在咫尺，却似乎和它有万里之遥。


Indeed, Israel is now on an equal footing with all of the rising new powers of an increasingly globalized world.	事实上，以色列现在已经与全球化世界所有的新兴势力平起平坐。


Few of them are democracies, and not one of them holds Israel to task for its settlement policies in the West Bank or cares, like the United States, about Middle East peace.	绝大多数新兴势力都并非民主国家，他们既不关心以色列的西岸定居点政策，也不像美国那样关注中东和平。


Why should Israel continue to focus on a weakened West that is constantly reprimanding it when the rest of the world beckons?	当世界其他国家都在热情地招手，只有实力削弱的西方还在不断谴责时，以色列为什么还要继续理会？


Nor does the old secular/religious divide have much salience anymore.	原有的世俗/宗教分歧也变得不那么显著。


Israel has become post-modern, producing new – and sometimes startling – synergies among its avant-garde high-tech sensibility, its secular and ever more orthodox religious identities, and its overall ethno-nationalist outlook.	以色列已经进入后现代时期，在前卫派高科技感性、世俗和越来越正统的宗教身份以及整体民族主义观念方面产生全新、有时甚至是惊人的协同作用。


Its ancient biblical past can now coexist seamlessly with its ultra-modern present.	圣经记载的古老过去如今可以和超现代主义现实完美融合。


Israel’s new millionaires can easily live in far-flung settlements in “Judea and Samaria” and commute daily to their coastal startups.	以色列新生的百万富翁可以轻松住在遥远“朱迪亚和撒马利亚”定居点，每天到沿海的初创企业去工作。


And the army has already become the purview of nationalistic and religious cadres, even without conscription of the ultra-orthodox – one of the centrist camp’s demands in pressing for fairer national burden-sharing.	即使不像中间派要求的那样为公平分配国家负担征召极端正统人士入伍，军队也已经处于民族和宗教干部的控制之下。


As a result, the Israeli state seems to be moving closer to its Asian counterparts, with their emphasis on economic innovation and their indifference to universal values or, for that matter, peace.	结果是以色列政权与亚洲国家越来越相似，即在看重经济创新的同时漠视普世价值（和平就是以色列的普世价值）。


Israel is now proud to be in a world of its own, in which it feels free to act unilaterally and scoff at toothless criticism from Europe (and now partly from the US).	以色列骄傲地开创了自己的世界。 它可以在这个世界中随心所欲地单方面采取行动，并对来自欧洲（现在部分来自美国）的批评采取一笑了之的态度。


There is no reason to believe that Netanyahu’s new government will seek to revive the increasingly feeble and moribund peace process, beyond offering verbal promises and inconsequential half-measures.	除口头承诺和不疼不痒的措施外，没有理由认为内塔尼亚胡新政府会努力恢复奄奄一息的和平进程。


Nor should anyone expect a moratorium on settlement expansion.	谁也不应该幻想停建定居点。


On the contrary, the settlements offer cheaper housing than is available in Israel, and thus resolve one of the main economic problems of the country’s middle class.	相反，定居点的住宅比以色列国内便宜，国内中产阶级的主要经济问题也因此迎刃而解。


“Red lines” in Israel have a way of mutating into lines drawn in the sand, which are then rendered invisible at the slightest wind.	以色列的“红线”往往与沙滩上画的线混为一谈，一有风吹草动就消失得无影无踪。


The new government’s fragile equilibrium only reinforces this sober interpretation.	新政府的脆弱平衡只是再次凸显了上述清醒的说法。


In Israel, Obama will encounter a country that has indeed moved, but not toward a missing center. It has moved into its own orbit.	奥巴马所面临的问题是以色列正沿着自身的轨道运行，并且离中间路线越来越远。


Israel’s New Realism	以色列的新现实主义


Kadima’s victory in Israel’s elections is the country’s most important political turning point in 30 years, if not longer.	前进党在以色列大选中获胜是这个国家30年，甚至是更长时间来最重大的政治转折点。


The new party—barely six months old—has realigned Israeli politics by transforming the entire framework of ideological assumptions underpinning the country’s security strategy.	新成立还不到6个月的政党重新整合了以色列的政治局势，改变了支撑该国安全策略的整个意识形态构架。


Everyone knew that Kadima would win and form a coalition with the moderate left Labor party, which managed a respectable second-place finish.	人人都知道前进党将会获胜，与奉行缓和路线的左派工党组成执政联盟，后者在选举中紧随前进党之后获得次席。


As a result, some Kadima voters stayed home, while other potential supporters voted for Labor to strengthen its hand in pushing social and economic issues in Kadima-led coalition.	结果是有些前进党的支持者待在家里，而另外一些人去为工党投票，以增强后者与前进党联盟处理社会和经济事务的能力。


On the right, the Likud party, which Sharon abandoned to establish Kadima, did very poorly, partly because many conservative voters also deserted it for religious, immigrant, and other parties.	右派方面，沙龙从中退出创立前进党的利库德集团在选举中遭到惨败，部分原因是很多保守派选民也弃之而去，把票投给了宗教、移民和其它政党。


In fact, a wide variety of small political groups, including three Jewish religious parties, Arab parties, and a pensioners’ party won seats.	实际上，很多小型政治团体，包括3个犹太宗教政党、阿拉伯政党和一个退休人员政党都在选举中获得了席位。


Since Kadima and Labor will not have a majority even as coalition partners, they will have to bring in some of these groups.	由于前进党和工党即便联合组阁也无法占到多数，它们还必须获得这些组织的支持。


But the importance of the distribution of seats pales in comparison to that of the longer-term changes in Israeli politics implied by Kadima’s victory.	与前进党获胜所隐含的以色列长期政局变化比较起来，席位分散的重要性就显得微不足道了。


Indeed, having attracted leading figures from both Labor and Likud, Kadima is now established as the most successful centrist party in Israel’s history.	实际上，前进党吸引了工党和利库德集团两大党派的领袖，目前已经成了以色列历史上最成功的中立党派。


With few political stars left in either Labour or Likud, Kadima may become the country’s dominant party for many years to come.	由于工党和利库德党目前所剩的政治人物寥寥无几，前进党可能在今后很长时间内成为势力最强的以色列党派。


Ehud Olmert, the party’s leader and now elected prime minister, has been a maverick of the center since his student days – a fitting symbol for the rapprochement of left and right.	新当选的以色列总理、前进党领袖埃胡德·奥尔默特（Ehud Olmert）从学生时代起就是持不同政见者¾这是对持中间立场者的特定称呼。


But the rapprochement itself is, of course, mainly the work of Ariel Sharon, whose influence is by no means diminished because he is in a coma.	然而调和左右两派当然主要靠阿里埃勒·沙龙（Ariel Sharon）的力量，虽然仍处在昏迷状态，但沙龙的崇高威望却丝毫没有受到影响。


Kadima is built on Sharon’s charisma and program, which reversed the most basic Israeli strategic thinking of the last half-century.	沙龙的魅力和远见是前进党赖以存在的基础，他扭转了过去半个世纪以来以色列最基本的战略构想。


For 30 years after the 1967 war, Israelis agreed on the need to keep control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip unless or until there was a comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinians and the Arab states.	在1967年巴以战争结束后长达30年的时间里，以色列民众的观点惊人地一致：那就是必须控制西岸和加沙地带，直到与巴勒斯坦和其它阿拉伯国家达成全面的和平协议。


From a security standpoint, the occupied territories constituted critical terrain for defending Israel against an attack on its borders by Arab states’ armies.	从安全的角度讲，被占领土在防止阿拉伯国家对以色列本土发动袭击时起着至关重要的作用。


Moreover, from a diplomatic standpoint, the territories were regarded as bargaining chips (“land for peace”) to be used in achieving a negotiated solution.	这还不算，从外交的角度看，被占领土还可以作为讨价还价的砝码（“以土地换和平”），在谈判方案时起到非常关键的作用。


The Oslo agreement in 1993 and the ensuing peace process embodied that expectation.	1993年的《奥斯陆协议》和随之而来的和平进程就是上述理念的真实反映。


The strategy ran aground in 2000, when Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to give up almost all the occupied territories and accept a Palestinian state in exchange for real peace.	这项战略在2000年搁浅，当时的以色列总理胡德·巴拉克（Ehud Barak）主动提出放弃几乎所有的被占领土、并承认巴勒斯坦国以换取真正的和平。


The Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat turned him down flat and instead returned to a massive campaign of terrorism against Israel.	当时的巴勒斯坦领袖亚西尔·阿拉法特（Yasir Arafat）干净利索地拒绝了这一提议，并向以色列发动了大规模的恐怖战争。


The entire Israeli political spectrum was thrown into confusion.	以色列政局由此陷入了彻底的混乱。


The left had maintained that Arafat would make a deal and honor it; the right claimed that Arafat would make a deal and violate it.	左派坚持说阿拉法特能够达成协议并严格遵守，而右派却说所谓协议在阿拉法特眼中根本无足轻重。


Everyone was wrong: there would be no deal to honor or violate.	他们都错了：如果根本达不成协议，又何谈遵守还是违背？


With the collapse of the strategy’s most basic premises, what should Israel do?	随着这项战略根基的轰然崩溃，以色列又该何去何从？


Sharon formulated the answer in 2004, concluding that Israel did not need the territories.	沙龙在2004年给出了答案，认为实现巴以和平无需依赖被占领土的作用。


They were no good as bargaining chips, because there was no one with whom to bargain.	这些领土作为谈判筹码的确毫无用处，因为没有谁去跟以色列讨价还价。


Nor could they be annexed to Israel, owing to the demographic problem implied by continued control over so many Palestinians.	它们也无法并入以色列领土，因为长时间控制这么多巴勒斯坦人会带来数不清的问题。


Finally, with the USSR gone and the United States the world’s sole superpower, the geostrategic situation had changed entirely.	最后，随着苏联解体和美国成为世界上唯一的超级大国，地理战略形势发生了彻底的变化。


Arab states, preoccupied with other issues in the post-Cold War era, were less interested in the conflict, while the security situation in the territories themselves had become a problem.	阿拉伯国家被冷战后的其它事务所困扰，对巴以冲突不再抱有多大兴趣，而被占领土本身的安全形势也成了很大的问题。


Sharon’s solution was unilateral withdrawal and the idea that Israel would decide on its own interim boundaries with a view to what it would claim if there was ever a negotiated agreement.	沙龙的方案是单方面撤军，由以色列根据自己在谈判中的期望单方面划定临时边界。


Moreover, Sharon now agreed that a security fence, which historically was favored by the Israeli left, would enhance Israel’s defenses.	不仅如此，沙龙还赞成设立由左派率先提出的安全屏障，认为设立屏障会改善国家的安全。


The country would then focus on domestic issues such as economic development, improving its public institutions, and raising living standards.	有了安全屏障，以色列就可以花更大力气促进经济发展、改善公共设施和提高人民生活水平。


This approach appealed to the vast majority of Israelis, regardless of their political loyalties, and the victory in January’s Palestinian election by Hamas, which extols terrorism and demands Israel’s extinction, only reinforced the new strategic consensus.	这样的方案能够被绝大多数以色列人所接受，无论他们持有何种政治信仰。 赞美恐怖主义、旨在把以色列从地球上消灭的哈马斯在1月巴勒斯坦大选中获胜只不过再次肯定了的新的战略共识。