The ruling coalitions were reconstructed, with new faces at the helm. The main objective of the new prime ministers and cabinet members is to regain popularity for their parties.	执政联合以新的面目被重建，新任总理们和内阁的主要任务是为他们的政党重新获取名声。


The ruling coalitions can finally afford, at least temporarily, "the luxury" of populism that opposition parties used as their main weapon in the last few years.	执政联合最终将能够承担起--至少暂时可以--奢侈的在过去几年反对党一直用作主要的攻击武器的平民主义。


Those who hope for further progress on economic reforms in Central Europe will have to wait.	那些希望中欧的经济改革能够有更好发展的人们还必须等待。


Post-National Football?	后民族主义时代的足球？


NEW YORK – Some of the more hysterical German newspapers blamed Germany’s defeat against Italy in the semi-finals of the European championship on the fact that few players bothered to sing the national anthem.	纽约——某些神经质的德国报纸把德国在欧锦赛半决赛中对阵意大利的失利归咎于没有几个球员屑于唱自己的国歌。


Contrast that with the Italian players, all of whom belted out the words of Il Canto degli Italiani (The Song of the Italians).	而意大利球员却恰恰相反，所有人都大声唱出Il Canto degli Italiani（意大利之歌）的歌词。


Indeed, the captain, Gigi Buffon, sang with his eyes closed, as though in prayer.	事实上，意大利队的队长布冯唱歌时还如祈祷时那样紧闭双眼。


But the Italians had no chance in the final against Spain, the best team in the world, none of whose players opened their mouths during the Spanish anthem, Marcha Real – which stands to reason, given that the “Royal March” has no lyrics.	但意大利在决赛对阵全球最佳球队西班牙时却丝毫没有机会，虽然西班牙队球员在演奏西班牙国歌《皇家进行曲》时没有一个人张嘴。 这也并非全无道理，因为《皇家进行曲》这首歌根本没有歌词。


And, besides, the Catalonian players feel uncomfortable with the national anthem, which was much promoted under the late dictator Francisco Franco, who hated Catalan nationalism.	此外，加泰罗尼亚籍球员对这首国歌并不感冒，因为这首歌在已故独裁者弗朗西斯科·佛朗哥治下曾经被广为传唱，而佛朗哥则仇恨加泰罗尼亚民族主义。


We know that in football, the most successful teams are not always those with the greatest stars.	我们知道在足球场上，最成功的球队并不总是明星云集。


Champions operate as teams – cohesive, untroubled by the egotism of prima donnas, each player prepared to work for the others.	冠军队往往在整体上强大——有凝聚力、不受制于妄自尊大者的自我中心意识、每名球员都愿意与他人合作。


Is patriotism really the key to this kind of spirit for national teams, as the German critics of their team believe?	爱国主义是否真像德国队批评者们所认为的那样，是国家队精神的关键所在？


Football has often been called a substitute for war – a symbolic, more or less peaceful, way to fight out international rivalries.	足球常被称为战争的替代品——是一种战胜国际对手的比较和平的象征性方式。


The fans of national sides are actors in a kind of patriotic carnival, dressed in the costumes of their national stereotypes: English fans as medieval knights, the Dutch in clogs, the Spanish as bullfighters.	对阵双方球迷是爱国狂欢节上的演出者，身着本民族特有的传统服饰：英国球迷打扮成中世纪的骑士，荷兰球迷脚上穿着木屐，西班牙球迷则扮作斗牛士。


Germans, understandably, have a problem with national symbolism, but I spotted a few fans in quasi-Bavarian dress.	不难理解的是，德国球迷在民族象征主义方面有一些问题，但我看到有几位德国球迷身着准巴伐利亚式的礼服。


The prize for the most humorous masquerade must go to the Italians dressed as popes and cardinals.	最幽默化妆奖必须颁给身着教皇和红衣主教服饰的意大利球迷。


In the past, English fans – but they were not the only ones – took the war metaphor too far and acted more like invading armies on the continent of Europe, terrorizing towns unlucky enough to stage an England game.	过去英格兰球迷太过痴迷于战争的比喻，行为举止简直就像欧洲大陆上的侵略军，因此吓坏了不幸举办英格兰队比赛的城市。


But players, too, sometimes have failed to conceal national animosities: when Holland beat Germany in a memorable European semi-final in 1988, one of the Dutch players ostentatiously wiped his bottom with a German shirt.	但球员有时也并不隐藏自己的民族仇恨：当荷兰在令人难忘的1988年欧洲杯半决赛上击败德国后，一名荷兰球员夸张地用一件德国队球衣去擦自己的屁股。


Given the strength of national feeling in these contests, it is not surprising that people like to project national characteristics onto the style of play.	鉴于民族感情在这些赛事中的力量，人们喜欢将民族性格与球队打法联系在一起的确是正常之举。


On the rare occasion that England wins a big match these days, victory is attributed to a “typically” English fighting spirit, coupled with “fair play.”	今天如果英格兰队偶尔赢得一场重大比赛的胜利，人们就将其归功于一种“典型的”英格兰式的斗志和“公平竞赛”精神。


The Germans play with “discipline,” the Italians with the defensive strength of Roman warriors, the Dutch with free-spirited individualism, the Spanish with the elegance of toreadors, and so on.	德国赢得比赛靠的是“纪律”，意大利靠的是罗马斗士的防御力量，荷兰靠的是自由奔放的个人主义，而西班牙靠的则是斗牛士的优雅和舒展，如此等等不一而足。


When the French won the World Cup in 1998, they ascribed it to their team’s multi-ethnicity – the embodiment of France’s commitment to liberté, égalité, fraternité.	法国在1998年赢得世界杯后，他们把这归功于自己球队的多元化民族——这是法国自由、平等和博爱信仰的化身。


But, when teams lose, these stereotypical virtues are damned with equal conviction as characteristic defects: German lack of imagination, Italian fear of attack, Dutch selfishness, the absence of national feeling among ethnic minorities in France, and so on.	但是如果球队输球，这些一成不变的美德就会成为民族固有缺陷的证据：德国的缺乏想象力，意大利对于进攻的畏惧，荷兰的自私，法国少数族裔间欠缺民族情绪等等。


In fact, the reality of football styles is rather more complicated.	其实现实的足球风格相对更为复杂。


The provenance of the great Spanish game of today is not the bullring, but the Barcelona team built by Johan Cruyff in the 1970’s and 1980’s.	今天西班牙伟大赛事的源产地不再是斗牛场，而是由克鲁伊夫组建于1970和80年代的巴塞罗那队。


The origin of his “total football” philosophy of keeping possession of the ball with quick, short passes and lightning switches from defense to offense was Ajax, Amsterdam, in the late 1960’s.	所有这些都源于60年代末阿姆斯特丹阿贾克斯队的“整体足球”理念，即保持控球、快速短传、和闪电般快速的攻防转换。


As often happens with innovative models, others adopt them, and, as in the Spanish case, improve and refine them.	就像某种创新模式时常发生的那样，它们也会被其他人采用，而且就像继承者就像西班牙人那样，针对这种模式加以改进和完善。


Now everyone tries to play “total football” – except the English, who “typically” remain aloof from foreign ideas.	现在每个人都试图采用“整体足球”——只有英格兰人除外，英格兰人一般对来自国外的理念视而不见。


Italians have abandoned their defensive tactics.	意大利人已经放弃了他们的防守战术。


Even the Germans play the passing game with flair and imagination.	就连德国也加入了依靠天赋和想象力的传球比赛。


The difference between Spain and the others is that the Spaniards do it better.	西班牙人则棋高一着，这就是他们与其他人之间的区别。


Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Franco-German former student leader of 1968 and Green member of the European parliament, argued in a recent article that modern football stars don’t really play for their countries.	1968年法德前学生领袖和欧洲议会绿党成员丹尼尔·科恩－邦迪最近在一篇文章中指出���代足球明星们并不真正为自己的国家而比赛。


As hardened professionals, they primarily play for themselves.	作为感情淡漠的专业人士，他们主要为自己而比赛。


They are, to use his phrase, “mercenaries.”	用他的话来形容，他们是“雇佣军”。


That is perhaps a little too cynical.	这或许有点过于愤世嫉俗之嫌。


The tears streaming down the cheeks of Andrea Pirlo and Mario Balotelli after Italy’s defeat were not those of hardened pros.	意大利战败后皮尔洛和巴洛特利脸上流下的泪水与感情淡漠的专业人士无关。


They wanted to win, not just for the money or for the sake of their careers, but for the glory.	他们希望获胜，不仅是为了金钱或者自己的事业，同时也是为了荣誉而战。


It still must feel good to be a national hero, hailed in the streets of Rome, Madrid, London, or Berlin as a returning warrior from a successful campaign.	成为民族英雄肯定感觉很好，在一次成功的战役后返回罗马、马德里、伦敦和柏林的街道接受万众的欢呼。


And yet Cohn-Bendit is not entirely wrong.	但科恩－邦迪并没有完全说错。


What was striking during this European championship was the intimate collegiality between opposing players.	令人印象深刻的是此次欧锦赛上敌对球员间的亲密共事。


They consoled and congratulated each other, embracing like the old friends and colleagues that they often are.	他们相互安慰、相互祝贺，像老朋友和同事那样相互拥抱。


Most of the top players play for the same clubs in Spain, Germany, England, or Italy.	多数顶级球员都加盟了西班牙、德国、英格兰和意大利等国相同的俱乐部。


Many speak several European languages with the fluency of the international businessmen that they also are.	很多人就像国际商人那样能熟练地运用数种欧洲语言。


The best European clubs are all multinational now.	欧洲顶级俱乐部现在都是跨国公司。


Players follow the money.	球员逐资金而动。


And the top clubs also happen to be the richest: Real Madrid, Chelsea, Barcelona, Manchester City, Bayern Munich, etc.	顶级俱乐部也恰好最财力雄厚：皇马、切尔西、巴萨、曼城和拜仁慕尼黑。


Some of the most difficult and demanding prima donnas often cause less friction in these multinational outfits than they do on their national teams.	某些最挑剔苛刻的足球大腕在这些跨国机构中挑起的摩擦往往比在各自的国家队要少得多。


If there is a moral to this story, it is this: a common flag, language, or national history can certainly help to induce people to work together in harmony for a shared cause.	如果这篇文章有什么寓意，那就是：共同的旗帜、语言或民族历史当然能有助于人们齐心协力追求共同的目标。


But so can enlightened self-interest.	但开明的自我利益也能起到同样的作用。


At the highest levels of human achievement – whether in art, science, or football – it might actually be the more important factor.	而在人类成就达到最高水准的今天——无论是艺术、科学还是足球——它甚至可能都将是更重要的因素。


Post-Uribe Colombia	后乌里韦时代的哥伦比亚


BUENOS AIRES – Colombia’s presidential election at the end of May will be unique in many ways.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——定于五月末举行的哥伦比亚总统大选在很多方面都独具特色。


Álvaro Uribe’s plans for a third term were dashed in March by the Constitutional Court, which, despite massive pressure, upheld the constitutional prohibition on serving more than two consecutive terms.	宪法法院在巨大的压力面前仍坚持执行禁止两次以上连任的宪法禁令，于三月否决了阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦的第三次连任计划。


Uribe’s absence has opened the election in unforeseen ways.	乌里韦的缺席以不可预见的方式为总统选举打开了空间。


Although Uribe is now technically a “lame duck” president, he does retain considerable influence, and is trying hard to keep the issue of internal security – the central focus of his presidency – at the heart of the electoral battle.	尽管如今的乌里韦从技术上讲已成“瘸鸭”总统，但仍然拥有巨大的影响力，他正在竭尽全力使其作为总统任期核心的国内安全问题成为总统选举中的核心问题。


He has also sought to benefit from ratcheting up tensions with neighboring Venezuela, and counts on his dauphin, former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, to unite the country’s right-wing forces in order to ensure continuity with his policies.	他还力图与邻国委内瑞拉激化矛盾，希望借此来浑水摸鱼。 他寄希望于自己选定的继承人前国防部长胡安·曼努埃尔·桑托斯联合国内的右翼势力，以确保他的政策能够继续实施。


But Colombia does not seem to want continuity at any price; instead it now appears to favor moderate revision of what Uribe has built over the past decade.	但哥伦比亚似乎并非不计代价希望延续目前的政策，恰恰相反，这个国家现在似乎想对乌里韦过去10年的政策进行适度的改革。


This renovation comes in a form that is unusual in contemporary Colombian history.	这种改革所采取的方式在哥伦比亚现代史上非常罕见。


The alliance between presidential candidate Antanas Mockus and vice-presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo offers the possibility of a real break, because neither man comes from the currently weakened traditional liberal-conservative political milieu.	总统候选人安塔纳斯·莫卡斯和副总统候选人塞尔吉奥·法哈多的统一战线有可能带来真正的突破，因为这两位候选人均非出自已经遭到削弱的传统自由保守政治联盟。


Instead, each comes from the world of academia (both hold doctorates in mathematics).	相反，两人都拥有学术背景（他们都拥有数学博士学位）。


Their principal – and successful – experience is in local politics.	他们的主要成功经历都来自地方政治领域。


Mockus was mayor of Bogota and Fajardo mayor of Medellin, and both want to shift the government’s main priority from internal security to strengthening the rule of law, education, science and technology, productivity, and SOUND public finances.	莫卡斯曾任波哥大市市长，法哈多也曾掌管麦德林市。 他们两人都希望将政府的执政重点从国内安全转向增强法治、教育、科技、生产率，以及改善公共财政。


Neither is backed by urban political machines or shady armed organizations in rural areas, but by independent groups, non-ideologically inclined citizens, and new voters keen to cast their ballots for unconventional candidates.	两人背后都没有城市政治机器和农村非法武装组织，支持他们的是独立团体、无意识形态倾向的民众，以及渴望将选票投给非传统候选人的新选民。


Both have ingeniously mobilized young people and made innovative use of online social networks.	两人都巧妙发动了年轻群众，创造性利用了在线社交网络。


The Mockus-Fajardo ticket proudly portrays the two men as political outsiders, with all the attendant risks and benefits.	莫卡斯法哈多组合骄傲地将两人描绘成政界的局外人，他们的当选会带来相应的收益和风险。


Their electoral platform – which also promotes a sense of generational change – is centered on their rejection of illegality and corruption, two issues that galvanize broad popular support.	他们的竞选纲领宣扬世代更替，重点打击非法行为和腐败现象，上述两个主张为他们赢得了广泛的群众支持。


Indeed, this yearning for change is why Mockus, the son of Lithuanian immigrants, may reach the presidency in a country that experienced only a scant influx of foreigners in the twentieth century.	事实上，正是这种求变心理导致莫卡斯这个立陶宛移民的儿子在哥伦比亚这样一个二十世纪移民寥寥无几的国家能够争夺总统宝座。


The Mockus phenomenon is in many ways the Colombian analog of the rise of “alternative” presidents across Latin America in recent years: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, José Mujica in Uruguay, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.	莫卡斯现象在很多方面都与近年来遍布拉美的“另类”总统崛起非常相似。 巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦、智利总统米歇尔·巴切莱特、玻利维亚总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯、萨尔瓦多总统毛里西奥·富内斯、尼加拉瓜总统丹尼尔·奥尔特加、乌拉圭总统何塞·穆希卡、厄瓜多尔总统拉斐尔·科雷亚、巴拉圭总统费尔南多·卢戈和委内瑞拉总统乌戈·查韦斯。


But Mockus is different.	但莫卡斯更加与众不同。


In contrast to men like Funes, Ortega, Mujica, and Chávez, whose careers began in guerrilla movements or failed coups, Mockus’s past is irreproachable.	与出身游击运动或失败政变的富内斯、奥尔特加、穆希卡和查韦斯等人相比，莫卡斯的过去几乎无可指责。


He has never been co-opted by private interests, be they political, economic, or criminal.	他从未接受过政治、经济或犯罪等私有利益集团的笼络。


He trusts his instincts and likes imaginative public policies, though this worries those who fear another messianic leader at the head of the government.	他相信自己的直觉并钟情于富有想象力公共政策，尽管有人对由一个救世主式的领袖来担任政府首脑表示担忧。


Moreover, Mockus’s sensitivity towards human-rights concerns distinguishes him from Uribe, who leaves behind a deplorable legacy in this regard.	此外，莫卡斯对人权问题的关注也与乌里韦截然不同，后者留下了可悲的人权纪录。


Obviously the FARC guerrillas – much diminished by Uribe, but still violently opposed to Colombian democracy – remain a source of concern for many Colombians.	显而易见，在乌里韦治下遭到沉重打击但仍坚持疯狂反对哥伦比亚民主的哥伦比亚武装力量游击队仍然让很多哥伦比亚人忧心忡忡。


But, because the Mockus-Fajardo ticket is truly centrist, the risk of serious missteps in this area seems minimal.	但莫卡斯法哈多组合是真正的中间力量，因此在这方面犯下严重错误的可能性似乎微乎其微。


Moreover, the shadow over the election campaign does not come from the FARC, but from the right – the Uribist candidate Santos and the conservative Noemí Sanin.	此外，为选举蒙上阴影的并不是哥伦比亚武装力量游击队，而是由乌里韦候选人桑托斯和保守派候选人诺埃米·萨宁组成的右翼势力。


The Liberal Party, a coalition comprising a cross-section of the center-left, and the leftist Polo Democrático have no chance of victory, although their support for a Mockus government would be important in forging a stable parliamentary majority.	由中左翼和左翼民主变革中心党组成的自由党竞选联盟几乎没有获胜的希望，但他们对莫卡斯政府的支持对于获取稳定的议会多数席位至关重要。


Conversely, legislative elections in March gave the Mockus-Fajardo ticket only minimal representation in the two chambers of Congress, implying that any government that they form would need all the legislative allies that it can find in order to enact its agenda.	相反，莫卡斯法哈多组合在三月举行的立法会选举中仅获得最低的议会两院代表席位，这意味着他们成立的任何政府都需要获得所有可能的立法盟友的支持，才能推行相关政策。


If, as appears increasingly likely, Mockus becomes president, his agenda promises to be prudent – neither a leap into the void nor immobilized by the need for profound changes.	如果局势发展真如人们所料般由莫卡斯当选总统，他的执政日程应当明智而慎重，既不会虚度光阴无所事事，也不会因为采取过激的改革措施而无法正常运作。


Three issues will hold his attention initially: the potent mafia subculture that has arisen over the last decade, the need to redirect a development model marked by extensive inequality, and avoidance of isolation and overreaction in the country’s foreign relations.	他需要优先关注三个问题：十年来逐渐形成的强劲的黑手党亚文化、改革不平等问题严重的发展模式、以及避免在哥伦比亚外交问题上陷入孤立或采取过激政策。


Colombia may be on the cusp of achieving a long-cherished but oft-postponed dream: domestic peace and diminishing tension with its neighbors.	哥伦比亚或许正处在实现长期而渺茫梦想的出发点上：实现国内和平，缓和与邻国的紧张关���。


Antanas Mockus looks like the figure best suited to realizing these possibilities.	安塔纳斯·莫卡斯似乎是实现这一目标最适合的候选人。


Unnecessary Instability	毫无必要的不稳定


PARIS – In normal life, technicalities are better left to technicians.	巴黎—在平常生活中，技术问题最好留给技术人员解决。


A car owner does not need – or usually want – to bother to find out what exactly goes on under the hood.	车主没必要——通常也不愿意——花时间去搞清楚车头盖下面到底是怎么一副模样。


But when the car breaks down, he or she often has no choice.	但当汽车罢工时，他常常别无选择。


What is true of cars applies to the economy: arcane issues are for specialists.	车的比方也可以用在经济上：难题应该由专家解决。


Yet in recent years, topics about which most people had never heard or cared – for example, securitization, credit default swaps, and the European payment system known as Target 2 – have imposed themselves on public debate, forcing ordinary people to grapple with their intricacies.	但近几年来，大部分人从未听说或关注过的话题——比如证券化、信用违约互换和被称为Target 2的欧洲支付系统——进入了公共讨论的范围，迫使普通人绞尽脑汁要弄懂其中的难解之处。


The same has started to happen with the notion of “potential output growth.”	“潜在产出增长”的概念也是如此。


Originally a concept created by economists for economists, its use for determining when, and by how much, a public deficit must be corrected is becoming a matter for wider discussion.	这个概念原本是经济学家制造出来便于经济学家使用的，但其用途——决定何时公共赤字必须纠正、就挣多少——正在成为广泛讨论的话题。


Indeed, its unreliability is seriously weakening the EU’s fiscal pact – which makes it necessary to open the hood and look inside.	事实上，这一概念的不可靠性严重削弱了欧盟财政契约——也使我们不得不揭开车头盖看看里面到底是怎么回事。


The aim of the concept of potential – as opposed to actual – GDP is to take into account that, like an engine, an economy often operates below or above potential.	潜在GDP——相对于实际GDP——的概念是为了考虑经济就像是发动机，常常出现低负荷或超负荷运转的情况。


In a demand-driven recession, actual output falls below potential, which results in a rise in unemployment.	在需求导致的衰退中，实际产出低于潜在产出，导致失业增加。


Similarly, a credit-fueled construction boom drives output above potential, resulting in inflation.	类似地，在信用助长的建筑业繁荣中，产出会高于潜在水平，导致通货膨胀。


The gap between actual and potential GDP is thus a gauge of an economy’s spare capacity.	因此，实际和潜在GDP之差就成为经济闲置产能的指标。


The distinction is also useful for policy purposes: weak potential growth cannot be addressed by demand-side initiatives; supply-side measures are needed.	这个差额还可用于政策目的：低迷的潜在增长更无法通过需求端措施解决，而是需要供给端措施。


But potential GDP can be only estimated, not observed.	但潜在GDP只能靠估算，无法观察得到。


Estimates are based on the amount of labor and capital available for production and an assessment of their joint productivity.	估算基于可用于生产的劳动力和资本数量以及对劳动力和资本的联合生产率的评估。


And, because estimates differ, depending on the data and methods used, the concept is clear whereas its value is imprecise.	不同的数据和方法会导致估算的不同，因此潜在GDP的概念虽然清楚，但其数值未必准确。


Moreover, the global financial crisis has created new puzzles.	此外，全球金融危机又造成了新的谜题。


GDP in nearly all advanced economies is currently far below pre-crisis projections, yet few expect the gap ever to be bridged.	目前，几乎所有发达经济的GDP都低于危机前预测水平，并且几乎没有人预期缺口能填补。


Policymakers struggle to get their assessment right.	决策者忙于寻找正确的评估。


Some wonder what is left of the notion of potential output.	一些人开始质疑潜在产出的概念到底还剩下什么。


The European Union has an additional problem: in response to the sovereign crisis, most of its members agreed in 2011 to a “fiscal compact” requiring them to keep their structural budget deficit – the one they would record were output equal to potential – below 0.5% of GDP.	欧盟还有另一个问题：在应对主权危机时，大部分成员国在2011年同意了一份“财政契约”，该契约要求它们把结构性预算赤字——让产出等于潜在水平所需要的赤字——限制在GDP的0.


Failure to converge on this target may open the door to financial penalties.	5%以下。 无法达到这一要求可能导致金融惩罚。


The virtue of such a framework is to take into account the impact of temporarily weaker output on fiscal outcomes.	这一框架的优点是考虑了暂时性产出萎靡对财政结果的影响。


Thus, a deficit is acceptable when it results from abnormally low tax revenues, but not when revenues are at their normal level.	因此，如果赤字来自反常低的税收收入，那么它是可接受的，但如果收入属于正常水平，那么赤字是不可接受的。


Indeed, a major flaw in the initial European Stability and Growth Pact was that it did not include such corrections (I was among those advocating its reform in a 2003 report to the president of the European Commission).	事实上，最初的欧洲稳定与增长公约（European Stability and Growth Pact）的一大漏洞是它没有包括这些纠正措施（包括我在内的一些人在一份给欧盟委员会主席的2003的报告中提出对其进行改革）。


The 2011 treaty actually built on a series of previous reforms that put increasing emphasis on potential-output-based assessments of the fiscal situation.	2011年条约实际建立在此前一系列改革上，更加强调基于潜在产出的财政状况评估。


The problem is that an unobservable and imprecise variable – whose estimates are too inexact and volatile to provide more than a rough roadmap for a country’s journey toward fiscal rectitude – has become part of an international treaty and the national rules (sometimes of constitutional status) through which it is implemented.	问题在于，一个不可观察又不准确的变量——其估算既不严格，又容易波动，甚至无法提供粗略的迈向财政诚实之路——成了国际条约和国家规则（有时甚至拥有宪法地位）的一部分，并得到了实施。


Estimates of short-term or current potential output are also constantly reworked, implying continuous change in the assessment of the underlying fiscal situation.	短期或当前潜在产出估算总是处于修订状态，这意味着基本财政状况的评估也总是在改变。


For example, the European Commission’s projection of the Netherlands’ potential growth for 2013 was 0.9% in spring 2012, when the government started preparing its budget.	比如，2012年春，当荷兰开始制定预算时，欧盟委员会预测其2013年潜在增长为0. 9%。


By that autumn, when a real-time assessment of fiscal performance was carried out, it had been revised sharply downward, by 0.2%.	但到了2012年秋，实时财政表现评估完成后，这一预测值被大幅调低了0. 2%。


For France, the estimate fell from 1.2% to 0.9%, and for Italy it went from -0.1% to -0.4%.	4%。 西班牙潜在增长率估算从-1.


The estimate of Spain’s potential growth rate fell from -1.2% to -1.4%, but the Commission later changed its mind and now says it was -0.7%.	2%降为-1. 4%，但欧盟委员会随后改变了主意，现在的结论是应该为-0.


These are not exceptions.	7%。 这些情况都不是例外。


For actual GDP, such frequent and large forecast revisions are inevitable.	对实际GDP来说，如此频繁和大幅度的预测修正是难免的。


Potential GDP, however, is supposed to be more stable, as it does not depend on demand-side developments.	但是，潜在GDP应该更加稳定，因为它不依赖需求端发展趋势。


True, there are reasons to reassess a country’s potential growth in line with new information on labor-market conditions, investment, and productivity.	诚然，有理由应该根据新的劳动力市场状况、投资和生产率信息重估一国的潜在增长。


But relentless attempts at accuracy easily result in noise.	但在精度方面的不断尝试很容易产生噪声。


Furthermore, instability confuses the policymaking process.	此外，不稳定还容易困惑决策过程。 即使只对GDP做出0.


Even a downward revision by 0.2% of GDP is meaningful: it implies a deterioration of the structural deficit by about 0.1% of GDP – not a trivial number in a fiscally constrained environment.	2%的向下修正，也会产生有意义的影响：这意味着结构性赤字出现了相当于GDP的0. 1%左右的恶化——对于财政饱受掣肘的环境而言，这不是一个小数字。


Members of parliament – who are not technicians – are understandably disturbed when they are asked to pass a revised budget in response to an updated estimate.	当议员——他们并非专业人员——被要求根据估算结果更新批准预算修改时，不难理解他们会感到不安。


Not knowing the whys and wherefores, they end up perceiving such revisions as a source of artificial instability.	他们不知所以然，最终会认为这样的修订带来了人为不稳定。


The purpose of the European fiscal framework is to lengthen the time horizon of policy and to make decision-makers more aware of the debt-sustainability challenges that they face.	欧洲财政框架的目的是延长政策的时间周期，让决策者更清楚地认识他们所面临的债务可持续性挑战。


This requires consistency.	这需要一致性。


Yet volatility in the assessment of potential growth prevents politicians from “owning” the already abstruse structural deficit and causes volatility in the policies based on this assessment, paradoxically resulting in a shortening of decision-makers’ time horizon.	但潜在增长估算值的波动导致政客无法“拥有”本身已十分深奥难懂的结构性债务，也让基于这一估算值的政策频繁变动，反而导致决策过程时间周期的缩短。


The focus of policy discussions should not be the latest potential GDP revision, but whether a country is on track to ensure public finance sustainability.	政策讨论的重点不应该放在最新的潜在GDP修订上，而应该放在一国是否走在保证公共财政可持续的道路上。


Too often, the European fiscal pact is perceived by national policymakers as an external constraint, not as a framework conducive to better decisions.	欧洲财政契约常常被国家决策者看成是外部约束，而不是有利于改善决策的框架。


A greater degree of stability in the assessment of an economy’s potential would strengthen decision-makers’ awareness and appreciation of longer-term challenges, thereby putting policymaking on a sounder footing.	增加经济潜在水平评估的稳定程度能够强化决策者对长期挑战的认识和理解，从而有助于让决策过程更加可靠。


A World of Vulnerability	脆弱的世界


ROME – In 2010, global leaders achieved the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing the share of the world’s poor to half of its 1990 level – five years ahead of schedule.	罗马—2010年，全球领导人实现了将世界贫困人口比例在1990年基础上减少一半的千年发展目标（MDG），比时间表领先了五年。


But rising unemployment and falling incomes underscore the enduring threat of poverty worldwide.	但上升的失业和下降的收入让贫困阴影在全世界挥之不去。


After all, poverty is not an unchanging attribute of a fixed group; it is a condition that threatens billions of vulnerable people.	毕竟，贫困并不是固定群体挥之不去的标签； 它是一种威胁着数十亿脆弱（vulnerable）人民的状况。


Despite their shortcomings, income measures are useful in gaining a better understanding of the extent of poverty and vulnerability worldwide.	尽管存在缺陷，但收入指标更有利于理解全世界的贫困和脆弱程度。


But the World Bank’s poverty line of $1.25 per day (in purchasing-power-parity terms), which is used in measuring progress toward the MDGs’ poverty-reduction target, is not the only relevant threshold.	但衡量MDG减贫目标进展情况的世界银行贫困线——每天1. 25美元（以购买力平价衡量）——并不是唯一一个相关阈值。


When the poverty line is raised to per capita daily spending of $2, the global poverty rate rises from 18% to roughly 40%, suggesting that many people are living just above the established poverty line, vulnerable to external shocks or changes in personal circumstances, such as price increases or income losses.	当贫困线提高到每天人均支出2美元时，全球贫困率将从18%提高到约40%，这表明大量人口生活在现有贫困线附近，在外部冲击和个人环境变化（比如价格上涨和收入下降）面前不堪一击。


Three-quarters of the world’s poor live in rural areas, where agricultural workers suffer the highest incidence of poverty, largely owing to low productivity, seasonal unemployment, and the low wages paid by most rural employers.	四分之三的世界穷人生活在农村地区，其中农业工人的贫困发生率最高，这主要是拜低生产率、季节性失业和大部分农业雇主给的工资水平较低所赐。


In recent decades, vulnerability and economic insecurity have increased with the rise of transient, casual, and precarious employment, including self-employment, and part-time, fixed-term, temporary, and on-call jobs.	近几十年来，脆弱和经济不安全随短暂、临时、无保障的就业（包括自由职业、兼职工、短工、临时工和随叫随到工作）的增加而增加。


At-home positions, frequently filled by women, are also on the rise.	在家工作的情况（通常是女性从事的工作）也在上升。


Labor-market liberalization, globalization, and unions’ declining influence have exacerbated these employment trends.	劳动力市场的自由化、全球化以及工会影响力日衰放大了这一就业趋势。


At the same time, macroeconomic policies have focused on achieving and maintaining low-single-digit inflation, rather than full employment, while limited social protection has heightened economic insecurity and vulnerability.	与此同时，宏观经济政策专注于实现和维持低通胀，而不是充分就业，而有限的社会保障更加凸显了经济不安全和脆弱性问题。


During the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998, poverty rose sharply.	在1997—1998年东亚危机期间，贫困率急剧上升。


For example, Indonesia’s poverty rate soared from roughly 11% to 37% during the crisis, mainly owing to the massive depreciation of the rupiah.	比如，印尼的贫困率在危机期间从约11%飙升至37%，主要原因是印尼盾的大幅贬值。


Likewise, following the 2008 global economic crisis, food-price spikes and recession caused the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization to revise its hunger estimates upward, to more than one billion people.	类似地，2008年全球经济危机爆发后，食品价格暴涨和衰退导致联合国粮农组织（FAO）调高了饥饿人口估计调高了10亿多人。


Considering the FAO’s conservative definition of chronic severe hunger, this is a serious indictment of global poverty-reduction efforts.	FAO对长期严重饥饿的定义是十分保守的，因此，这不啻一份针对全球减贫工作的严厉批评书。


Most poor adults in developing countries have to work, if only to survive.	大部分发展中国家的贫困成年人必须工作，否则无法活下去。


Aside from the working poor, an additional 215 million workers worldwide slipped below the poverty line in 2008-2009, owing to the Great Recession.	除了有工作的贫困人口之外，全世界还有2. 15亿工人在2008—2009年间因为大衰退而被打到了贫困线之下。


Another 5.9%, or 185 million workers, were living on less than $2 per day.	9%或1. 85亿工人每天生活费不到2美元。


The estimated 330 million working women who lived below the poverty line in 2008-2009 accounted for roughly 60% of the 550 million working poor worldwide.	据估计，2008—2009年生活在贫困线以下的女性为3. 3亿，占5.


New estimates by the International Labor Organization (ILO), based on a different methodology from that used by the World Bank, demonstrate that, while the number of those classified as working poor worldwide declined by 158 million from 2000 to 2011 (from 25.4% of workers to 14.8%), progress has slowed markedly since 2008.	基于与世界银行不同的方法的国际劳工组织（ILO）的新估计表明，尽管全世界被归入贫困工作人口的人数在2000—2011年间减少了1. 58亿（从占工人比例的25.


Indeed, only 15% of workers, or 24 million people, managed to rise above the poverty line in 2007-2011.	4%降至14. 8%），但自2008年以来，进步大为放缓。


The other 134 million workers who escaped poverty did so earlier, in 2000-2007.	事实上，只有15%的工人，或2400万人，设法在2007—2011年间成功脱贫。 另有1.


As a result, there were 50 million more working poor in 2011 than projected by pre-crisis trends for 2002-2007.	34亿工人在2000—2007年间完成了脱贫。 因此，与基于2002—2007年的危机前趋势的预测值的相比，2011年贫困工作人口多出了5000万。


The lack of basic social protection in most countries exacerbates vulnerability.	大部分国家都缺少基本社会保障，这加剧了脆弱性。


The ILO World Social Security Report found high or very high vulnerability, in terms of poverty and labor-market informality, in 58 countries, mainly in Africa and Asia. Most such countries do not provide unemployment insurance, while more than 80% of their populations lack social-security coverage and access to basic health services.	ILO《世界社会安全报告》（World Social Security Report）发现，若以贫困和劳动力市场的不规范程度衡量，58个国家存在高度或极高度的脆弱性问题，与此同时，这些国家80%以上的人口缺少社会保障覆盖，得不到基本卫生服务。


Indeed, few countries currently provide comprehensive social protection, as defined by ILO Convention 102 (the instrument establishing internationally-agreed minimum social-security standards).	事实上，目前很少有国家提供ILO公约102（规定国际一致同意的最低限度社会安全标准的条款）所定义的全面的社会保障。


According to the ILO, only one-third of countries worldwide – accounting for roughly 28% of the global population – provide all nine types of protection, meaning that only about 20% of the world’s working-age population (and their families) enjoys comprehensive coverage.	根据ILO的数据，全世界只有三分之一的国家——人口大约占全球总数的28%——提供所有九种社会保障，这意味着全世界只有约20%的工作年龄人口（及其家庭）享受得到全面覆盖。


Although all countries offer some kind of social protection or security, in most countries, coverage is severely limited and targeted at specific groups.	尽管所有国家都提供某些种类的社会保障，但在大部分国家，覆盖率相当有限，且只面对特定群体。


As a result, only a small minority of the global population has full, legally guaranteed access to existing social-protection schemes – leaving roughly 5.6 billion people worldwide vulnerable to various degrees.	结果，全球人口只有很小一部分能获得完全的、受法律保障的社会保障机制——56亿人或多或少地存在脆弱性。


Vulnerability exists at levels far above the World Bank’s $1.25/day poverty threshold, especially given rising job insecurity and inadequate social protection worldwide.	脆弱性的下限远远高于世界银行1. 25美元/天的贫困线标准，特别是考虑到全世界工作不稳定性和社会保障不足问题日益严重的情况下。


To address global poverty effectively, global leaders must take a more comprehensive approach that focuses on reducing citizens’ vulnerability.	为了有效地减少全球贫困，全球领袖必须采取更全面的方法，专注于降低人民的脆弱性。


Pragmatism or Perdition	务实，或者灭亡


BERKELEY – It is almost impossible to assess the progress of the United States economy over the past four decades without feeling disappointed.	伯克利—评估美国经济在过去四十年的进步，结果几乎不可能令你满意。


From the perspective of the typical American, nearly one-third of the country’s productive potential has been thrown away on spending that adds nothing to real wealth or destroyed by the 2008 financial crisis.	从普通美国人的角度看，这个国家近三分之一的生产潜力浪费在了完全没有增加真实财富或被2008年金融危机毁掉的东西上。


Since the mid-1970s, the US has ramped up spending on health-care administration by about 4% of GDP and increased expenditure on overtreatment by about 2% of GDP.	自20世纪70年代中期以来，美国的医疗管理支出增加了大约GDP的4%，过度医疗支出增加了大约GDP的2%。


Countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, and France have not followed suit, and yet they do just as well – if not better – at ensuring that their citizens stay healthy.	加拿大、英国和法国等国家并没有步这一后尘，但在保证国民健康方面，它们与美国相比有过之而无不及。


Meanwhile, over the same period, the US has redirected spending away from education, public infrastructure, and manufacturing toward providing incentives for the rich – mostly in the form of tax cuts.	与此同时，在这段时间内，美国的支出方向从教育、公共基础设施和制造业转向为富人提供激励——大多是以减税的形式。


The US spends 10% more than it used to on making it easier for the rich to accumulate wealth, but it has cut public investment in physical and human capital by roughly 4% of GDP, compared to what would have been expected if spending patterns had followed historic trends.	与支出模式遵循历史趋势的情景相比，美国花在让富人更容易积累财富上的钱比以前多10%，但将实体和人力资本方面的公共支出削减了GDP的近4%。


Forty years ago, for example, the US spent roughly 4% of its GDP on finance.	比如，四十年前，美国将其大约4%的GDP花在了金融上。


Today, it spends twice that.	如今，这一比例增加了一倍。


And the results have been catastrophic.	结果是灾难性的。


Despite the plutocracy’s claims that the heads of financial companies and other CEOs deserve their increasingly outsized compensation packages, there is no evidence that they are doing a better job than they used to at running their companies or allocating capital more efficiently.	尽管财阀大言不惭地认为金融公司主管和其他CEO们薪酬日益膨胀理所应当，但没有证据表明他们在经营公司或配置资本方面比从前更有效率。


On the contrary, the lion’s share of the responsibility for the economy’s continuing struggles can be comfortably laid at the feet of America’s hypertrophied, dysfunctional financial sector.	相反，经济持续挣扎的大部分责任倒是可以心安理得地加在美国规模不断膨胀、功能不断失调的金融部门头上。


This reallocation of investment is usually attributed to efforts to boost growth.	投资的重新配置常常是提振增长的措施的结果。


And yet, regardless of how much one tortures the baselines or massages the benchmarks, it is clear that it has failed.	但是，不管你怎样扭曲基线或在基准上做文章，显然提振增长失败了。


Indeed, it is difficult to see the decisions of the past 40 years as anything other than a profound failure on the part of the public institutions responsible for shaping the country’s economic progress.	事实上，对于负责决定美国经济进步的公共机构，过去40年的决策是不折不扣的巨大的失败。


This is a surprising development.	这是一个令人震惊的现象。


Until around 1980, these institutions were clearly world-class.	直到1980年前后，这些机构显然都是世界级的。


For more than 200 years, the US government was highly successful at expanding opportunity and nurturing economic growth.	200多年来，美国政府在扩大机会和培养经济增长方面获得了极大的成功。


From Alexander Hamilton’s insistence on promoting industry and finance, to the construction of continent-spanning infrastructure and the introduction of public education, the government’s investments paid off handsomely.	从亚历山大·汉密尔顿坚持推进工业和金融，到横跨东西海岸的基础设施建设和公共教育的引入，美国政府的投资收到了极大的成效。


Indeed, the government repeatedly pushed the economy into what were thought to be the industries of the future, resulting in economic expansion and a larger, wealthier middle class.	事实上，美国政府多次将美国经济带向人们心目中的未来产业，带来经济扩张和更大更富裕的中产阶级。


It is only relatively recently that the bets have started being misplaced.	直到相对较晚近的时候，情况才开始出现问题。


The past 40 years of policies have failed to produce a richer society; they have produced only a richer elite.	过去40年中的政策没有带来更加富裕的社会，只是造就了更加富裕的精英。


Not surprisingly, ideologues of the left and the right disagree over what went wrong.	毫不奇怪，左翼和右翼意识形态对于是什么出了问题意见不一。


The left, quite credibly, blames the idea that the free market is always right and needs to be unchained, and that those it rewards are always deserving.	左翼相当可信地批判了自由市场永远正确、决不能对它加以限制、其所奖励的永远受之无愧的思想。


Those on the right, less credibly, attribute the decline to the survival and expansion of America’s (comparatively meager) social-welfare system.	右翼不那么可信地将美国的衰落归因于美国（相对粗糙的）社会福利制度的存在和扩张。


Programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, the Earned Income Tax Credit, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance, they argue, have turned the US into a country of takers, not makers.	他们认为，医疗保险（Medicare）、医疗补助（Medicaid）、社会安全（Social Security）、低收入家庭所得税减免（Earned Income Tax Credit）、失业保险和残疾保险等计划让美国成为一个坐享其成而不是努力奋斗的国家。


In a new book, Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy, my co-author Steve Cohen and I show that the problem is even more fundamental.	在新书《实在经济学：经济增长和政策的汉密尔顿方法》（Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy）中，我和我的合著者史蒂夫·科恩（Steve Cohen）证明了这一问题甚至更加基本。


Poor US economic performance is not the result of any particular ideology, but of allowing ideologues to guide public policy.	美国经济表现拙劣不是拜某种意识形态所赐，而是因为让意识形态左右了公共政策。


The real-world purpose of an ideology is not to provide understanding, but to offer its adherents a sense of certainty as they navigate a complex world.	意识形态的真实世界目的不是提供理解，而是向其信徒提供一种面对复杂世界时的确定性。


An ideology becomes successful not by suggesting policies that work, but by helping people feel comfortable, happy, and sure of what they are doing.	意识形态的成功不是因为给出有用的政策，而是因为让人们感觉舒服、幸福、笃定。


Cohen and I argue that there is a better alternative to the ideological approach: pragmatism.	科恩和我指出，对于意识形态方法，有一种更好的替代方案：务实主义。


Rather than searching for overarching rules or a grand theory, look instead for what is likely to work – and make policy accordingly.	不要寻找压倒一切的规则或宏大的理论，而是要寻找可能起作用的东西——并据此制定政策。


We have named this approach after the US founder who was most adept at adjusting his policy prescriptions to reality.	我们用美国最根据现实调整政策药方的开国元勋的姓氏命名这一方法。


But it is a method of decision-making that has had numerous champions throughout the country’s history; US Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln all placed pragmatism ahead of ideology.	但在美国历史上，很多巨擘都采取国这一决策方法呢； 艾森豪威尔、泰迪·罗斯福、富兰克林·罗斯福、林肯等美国总统都将务实主义置于意识形态之前。


As a contribution to popular culture, Concrete Economics is sure to prove less popular than the hip-hop musical Hamilton.	作为对流行文化的贡献，《实在经济学》显然不及嘻哈音乐剧《汉密尔顿》流行。


But for policymakers seeking to turn around the American economy, we hope it will offer some much-needed guidance when approaching the challenges facing the country.	但对于志在扭转美国经济的决策者而言，我们希望本书在应对美国所面临的挑战方面提供了急需的指导。


Precautionary Absurdity	盲目预防的谬论


PRINCETON – Many people who advocate draconian measures to counteract climate change base their argument on the so-called “precautionary principle,” which holds that when a possible future disaster would be unacceptably severe, action to prevent it is imperative.	发自普林斯顿——许多鼓吹采取严厉措施抵御气候变化的人都将他们的观点建立在所谓“预防性原则”的基础上，即当未来可能发生无比严重的灾难时，采取行动阻止是首位的。


Cost-benefit analysis – balancing the cost of remedial action against the benefit of avoiding disaster – is no longer permissible.	而关于成本和收益的分析——如何平衡补救措施所耗费的成本同避免灾害所获得的收益——却变得无关紧要。


Action to counter the disaster must be taken, regardless of the cost.	必须采取措施来抵御灾难，不惜一切代价。


This principle leads people to advocate enormously costly actions to prevent disasters that are even more enormous but whose likelihood highly uncertain.	在此原则的指导下，人们倾向于采取大规模而且代价高昂的行动来阻止那些更加巨大，但爆发的可能性也不甚确定的灾难。


If a disaster is unacceptable, then, no matter how uncertain the likelihood of its occurrence, it must be prevented.	如果一场灾难非常巨大，那么无论其发生的可能性有多么不确定，都必须被阻止。


As a result of widespread reliance on the precautionary principle, doomsday scenarios have come to dominate discussion of climate change.	由于人们对“预防性原则”的普遍依赖，世界末日的假想情节已经占据了气候变化议题的所有内容。


It is easy to imagine disasters so severe that drastic action to prevent them would be reasonable, and advocates of drastic action can easily scare the public with imagined disasters.	人们可以轻易地想象出气候灾难是如此严酷，因此采取激进行动来阻止它们也是合情合理的，而激进行动的鼓吹者仅靠假象的灾难就能够轻易地对公众加以恐吓。


Nobody knows enough about the causes of climate change to prove that an imagined disaster is impossible.	因为没有人对引起气候变化的原因有足够了解，并进一步证明假想中的灾难根本不可能发生。


What is wrong with the precautionary principle?	那么这个预防性原则究竟存在什么问题？


It appears to be a statement of the obvious: unacceptable disasters require extraordinary counter-measures.	这个原则似乎是理所当然的：大灾当前自然要有特殊对策。


The problem is that the principle cannot be applied consistently.	然而问题就出在这一原则是不能被长期采用的。


The world in which we live is a small garden of well-explored territory surrounded by a dim and dark forest of disasters.	我们所在的这个世界好比一座建立在仔细探索过的领地上的小花园，然而环绕花园四周的却是幽暗森林般无边无际的灾难。 这些潜伏在不远处的灾难数量众多，不胜枚举：太空中的小行星和彗星；


Disasters lurking in the distance are legion: asteroids and comets; world-wide pandemics and plagues; nuclear and non-nuclear wars; droughts, famines, and floods; volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis; human over-population and extinction of non-humans; rising temperatures and sea-levels; falling temperatures and spreading ice ages; exhaustion of clean air and water; disappearance of forests, farms, and fish.	人口过量以及众多物种的灭绝； 地球温度升高时有海平面上升的灾难，地球温度下降时又害怕冰川时代不断蔓延；


All these disasters – and many others still to be imagined – are possible, and many of them are unacceptable.	上述所有灾难，以及那些连我们都想象不出的灾难都是有可能发生的，而且其中大多数都十分严重。


The precautionary principle prescribes action, regardless of cost, to prevent all of them.	预防性原则命令我们不顾代价地采取行动来防止所有的灾难。


But this is impossible. There is no future free of risk.	但这是不可能的，因为人类的未来永远都会与灾难相伴相生。


No matter what we do or fail to do, the risk of unacceptable disasters will persist.	成也好败也罢，不论我们做什么，那些巨大灾难的威胁都将一直存在。


Our resources are limited, and so are the costs we can pay for remedial actions.	我们的资源有限，因此能够为补救性行动付出的代价也有限。


There is no escape from balancing costs and benefits. There is no way we can avoid making difficult choices.	现实情况不允许我们逃避对成本和收益的衡量，除了做出艰难抉择之外别无出路。


Some disasters are less likely than others, and some remedies are more costly than others.	有些灾难比起其他灾难发生的可能性也许并没那么高，而有些补救措施则比其他措施的代价来得更昂贵。


These are the facts of life that the precautionary principle tells us to ignore.	这就是生活中的现实，然而预防性原则却要我们对这些视而不见。


It sometimes happens that a drastic action designed to prevent an unacceptable disaster may make the disaster worse.	有时某个事先设计好用于阻止一场灾难的激进措施可能会使灾难变得更加可怕。


Catastrophic disasters associated with climate change are easy to invent, but the effects of remedial actions may be difficult to predict.	想要臆造一场与气候变化有关的悲惨灾难非常容易，但想要预测某些补救措施的效果则非常困难。


For example, one of the most immediate and severe consequences of climate change could be a rapid rise in sea level.	举个例子，气候变化所带来的最直接而严重的后果之一将是海平面的迅速抬升。


It is generally believed that the appropriate preventive measure is to stop burning fossil fuels and reduce the abundance of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.	人们大多相信合理的预防措施应当是停止燃烧化石燃料，减少大气中富集二氧化碳的状况。


But the preventive measure is extremely costly, and it might have an effect opposite to our intention.	但对此的预防措施的成本异常昂贵，并且其后果可能会违背我们的本意。


We know that the sea level rose by roughly 100 meters during the last 12,000 years.	众所周知，海平面在近12000年以来上升了大概100米。


This rise was clearly connected with the melting of the continental ice sheets at the end of the last ice age – that is, it had nothing to do with human activities.	因此海平面上升显然同上个冰川时代末期大型陆上冰原的融化有关——那就意味着，海平面上升同人类活动无关。


During the last 200 years, a period when we have had accurate measurements from tide gauges, the sea level has continued to rise slowly.	在过去200年间，人类发明了检潮仪这种紧密测量工具，而海平面依然在继续缓慢升高。


We do not know how much of the recent rise is caused by human activities.	究竟有多少最近海平面的上升是因为人类活动引起，我们无从得知。


Some of the recent rise, associated with the shrinking of glaciers, is not caused by human activities, since the glaciers have been shrinking for hundreds of years while human activities became significant only in the last century.	有些近期的升高同冰川萎缩有关，并非由人类活动引起。 毕竟冰川融化的过程已经持续好几百年了，而人类活动产生的效应仅仅于上世纪才变得显著起来。


The air surrounding Greenland and Antarctica has recently become warmer and more humid. Warm and humid air will increase melting of ice in low regions at the edges of the ice sheets while boosting snowfall over cold high regions in the interior.	最近，环绕格陵兰岛和南极洲的大气日益变得温暖而潮湿，暖湿空气会加大冰川边缘低地内覆盖冰雪的融化速度，并且在内陆高寒地区刺激降雪量上升。


The melting causes the sea level to rise, whereas the snow causes it to fall.	冰川融化导致海平面上升，然而降雪将使其降低。


We do not know which of the two effects predominates.	我们尚不清楚哪一个效应更占优势。


If the Arctic Ocean becomes ice-free in summer, the melting and the snowfall will probably increase sharply.	如果北冰洋在夏季成为不冻海，冰川融化和高海拔降雪都会急剧增加。


At that point, the precautionary principle might suggest that we take drastic action to stop burning fossil fuels.	到那时，预防性原则大概会建议我们采取紧急措施，停止燃烧矿物燃料。


But we had better know for sure which way the response will go before we apply the remedy.	但我们还是最好在实施补救性措施之前搞清楚，这样的应对方案将会把���们带向何处。


It would be unfortunate if China and India were to impoverish themselves by ceasing to burn coal, only to have the resulting decrease of snowfall over Greenland and Antarctica cause sea levels to rise faster.	如果中国和印度在停止燃烧煤炭导致自身贫困的同时，却降低了格陵兰和南极上空的降雪量并引发了更快速的海平面上升，那么这一切就太糟糕了。


The precautionary principle is not a useful substitute for scientific understanding.	由此可见，预防性原则并不是科学认知的有用替代品。


Predatory Competition Policy	掠夺性竞争政策


The recent decision by the European Court of First Instance to uphold the fine and sanctions the European Commission imposed upon Microsoft in 2004 appears to have justified the Commission’s interventionist approach to competition policy.	欧洲初审法院最近裁定维持欧盟委员会在2004年对微软公司实施罚款和惩罚措施的决定，似乎是在表明欧盟委员会对竞争政策进行干涉的做法是正当的。


A five-year investigation of Intel may also end with severe penalties.	对于英特尔公司为时5年的调查可能也会以处以高额罚款而告终。


But the EU should not rejoice at this seeming triumph over American “big business.”	但是欧盟不应该对这种对美国“大公司”表面上的胜利而欢呼雀跃。


Instead, it should ponder if its policies actually make Europe hospitable for innovating enterprises.	事实上，它应该深思它的政策是否真的能让欧洲成为对有创造力的企业持欢迎态度的地方。


Italy’s Minister for Trade and Europe, Emma Bonino, commenting upon the Microsoft ruling, observed that the very name Microsoft evokes “what the US is capable of doing.”	意大利贸易和欧洲事务部长博尼诺在评价对微软的裁决时认为单单是微软这个名字就代表了“美国能够做到的事情”。


To Bonino, if a company of comparable significance isn’t being born in Europe, it is because “we haven’t been able to set up a favorable climate for it to flourish.”	在博尼诺看来，如果一家有相当重要性的公司不是出自欧洲，那是因为“我们没有能够提供一个让它繁衍壮大的有利的气候环境”。


The European Commission’s approach to competition policy won’t move Europe toward that better climate.	欧盟委员会在竞争政策上的做法不会推动欧洲去改善这种气候。


Indeed, high-tech companies like Microsoft and Intel are particularly unsuitable targets for antitrust policing, because regulators cannot possibly move at the speed of ‘Internet time.’	事实上，将微软和英特尔这样的高科技公司作为反垄断政策制裁的目标是尤其不恰当的，因为监管者行动的速度是绝对赶不上“因特网时间”的。


Consider computer operating systems, business accounting software, databases, Internet search engines, silicone chips, broadband services, cable, and cellular telephony. All are examples of fast-moving industries in which competition is fierce and great wealth is created.	看一看电脑操作系统、业务核算软件、数据库、因特网搜索引擎、硅芯片、宽带服务、光缆还有蜂窝电话，所有这些都是竞争异常激烈同时又创造了巨大财富的那些快速发展的产业的例子。


Industries and firms, like people, have their own life cycles, and the pace of change in high-tech industries is unprecedented.	产业和公司像人一样有它们自己的生命循环，而高科技产业变革的步伐是前所未有的。


Remember IBM?	还记得IBM吗？


Only a few years ago, antitrust authorities in the US were convinced that IBM was locking up the computer industry for generations to come.	只是在几年前，美国的反垄断监管机构确信IBM在以后几代时间内都将牢牢控制计算机产业。


Since then firms like Microsoft and Intel exploited software and hardware revolutions that IBM and others had missed, and left IBM in the dust.	从那时起，像微软和英特尔这样的公司在IBM和其他公司所忽略的软件和硬件上发起革命，从而把IBM远远地抛在了身后。


And just as competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have been losing sleep over the Windows monopoly, Microsoft’s desktop model is threatened today by handheld devices and Google’s dispersed online computing model.	而当大西洋两岸的竞争监管机构正在为微软的垄断而难以入眠时，微软的桌面模式今天受到了手提设备和谷歌的分散网上计算机模式的威胁。


Intel is subject to parallel threats from a myriad of chip and hardware makers.	英特尔也面临着无数芯片和硬件制造商的双重威胁。


Regulators contribute no value to this high speed evolutionary process.	监管者根本不重视这一高速的发展进程。


Rather than preventing monopolization and restraint of trade, as the theory goes, antitrust regulation in the “new economy” is a new face of the old “industrial policy,” allowing bureaucrats to manipulate economic outcomes and favor companies dearer to them than the consumers’ choice.	“新经济”下的反垄断监管并不是像理论上要求的那样防止垄断和限制贸易情况的出现，而更多地是旧的“产业政策”的翻版而已，官僚机构操纵经济结果并且让那些它们而不是消费者更珍视的公司受益。


The only beneficiaries of government officials’ telling Microsoft how to make computer software are Microsoft’s competitors -- and not competition.	政府官员告诉微软怎样制作计算机软件所带来的唯一受益者是微软的竞争对手而不是竞争本身。


Yet regulators persist in trying to inject themselves into these fields, with antitrust authorities claiming that they are ripe with anti-competitive practices and exercises of “undue market power" by the most successful market participants.	然而监管者坚持要干涉这些领域，并且反垄断机构声称它们在抑制最最成功的市场参与者反竞争的行为以及发挥“不恰当的市场力量”上有成熟的经验。


European competition law in particular allows policymakers to intervene at will, increasing uncertainty, damaging wealth creation and consumer well-being.	欧洲的竞争法尤其允许政策制定者随意干涉，从而增加了不确定性，破坏了财富的创造并且损害了消费者的利益。


Efficient companies are punished for their success by being held to a special standard that expects them to cuddle their competitors, instead of continuing to out-price and outsell them, to the benefit of consumers.	富有成效的公司因为它们的成功而受到惩罚，它们被设定了一个特殊标准以期望它们能培育它们的竞争对手，而不是让广大消费者受益，在价格和销量上继续击败这些竞争对手。


What is presented as a defense of competition results in advancing politically connected special interests and imposing unnecessary costs on innovation.	表面上的保护竞争实际上却是促进了与政治有关联的特殊利益集团的利益，并且给创新附加了不必要的成本。


Even if Microsoft on occasion may have engaged in some sharp competitive practices, the EU’s competition authorities have not been content with slapping its wrists, but got involved in deeply intrusive remedies, including the unbundling of a media player from Microsoft’s operating system and mandating disclosure of industrial secrets embodied in Microsoft’s server software.	即便微软有时确实有一些严厉的竞争做法，欧盟的竞争监管机构并没有满足于仅仅处以较轻的惩罚，而是采取了深度侵入的补救措施，包括要求微软的操作系统不得再捆绑销售媒体播放器，并且强制要求公开微软服务器软件里所包含的产业秘密。


Not surprisingly, Microsoft’s competitors cheered the Commission throughout the entire investigation and appeal.	一点也不奇怪，微软的竞争对手们在整个调查和上诉过程中都一直站在欧盟委员会这一面。


The Commission is thus establishing itself as a friendly venue for businesses that cannot overcome competitors in the market, and seek a second chance in court.	欧盟委员会由此把它自己树立为那些在市场上无法战胜其竞争对手而试图在法庭上获得第二次机会的企业的一个好帮手。


The new European Commission’s action against the chipmaker Intel is a good example.	欧盟委员会最近对芯片制造商英特尔所采取的行动就是一个很好的例子。


Intel is charged with “abusing” its dominant market position by so called “predatory pricing” (selling below cost) and offering substantial rebates to retain market share and undermine its arch-rival Advanced Micro Devices.	英特尔被指控通过所谓的“掠夺性定价”（以低于成本的价格销售产品）以及提供高额的回扣以维护市场份额并且削弱其主要竞争对手先进微器件公司而在“滥用”其占主导的市场地位。


“Predatory pricing” is an old scarecrow of antitrust enforcement.	“掠夺性定价”是反垄断法下一个旧的令人无端恐惧的事物。


The idea that it is rational for a company to incur enormous losses by selling below cost in order to achieve or maintain a monopoly position has been roundly criticized by economists who argue that situations in which such losses can be recouped by subsequent monopoly profits are extremely rare.	那种认为一家公司通过以低于成本的价格销售产品以试图获得或者维持垄断地位而产生巨额亏损是理性的观念遭到认为这种亏损极少能够被后来的垄断利益所弥补的经济学家的严厉批评。


Indeed, empirical research has shown that, throughout history, as far back as the Standard Oil case in the early 20th century, most instances of alleged “predatory pricing” have in fact been cases of superior efficiency.	事实上，实证研究显示在整个历史过程中，最早可追溯到20世��初标准油公司的案例，绝大多数被指控实施“掠夺性定价”的公司实际上都是那些拥有最高效率的公司。


In the last couple of decades, US courts have made proving price predation next to impossible.	在过去20年里，美国的法院证明了价格掠夺几乎是不可能实现的。


Yet the EU’s competition authorities persist in accusing Intel of exactly this form of irrational behavior.	然而欧盟的竞争监管机构还是坚持指控英特尔存在这种不理性的行为。


The problem with “predatory pricing” is that the courts are very unlikely to be able to distinguish “unfair” prices from effective competition that is a boon to consumers.	“掠夺性定价”的问题在于法庭不太可能把“不公平的”价格与让消费者受益的高效竞争区分开。


It is the less efficient competitors, and not consumers, that are the most likely to benefit from punishing Intel for lowering its prices.	是那些缺乏效率的竞争者，而不是消费者，最有可能从因为英特尔降低价格而对其实施的惩罚中受益。


Reforms are needed if Europe really wants to become a competitive, knowledge-based economy, and not merely the most regulated one.	如果欧洲真的希望成为一个有竞争力的知识经济体，而不仅仅是监管最严厉的经济体，那它就需要实施变革。


Imposing billions of dollars of fines on the most conspicuous wealth creators is not the way to go.	对最可观财富的创造者处以几十亿美元的罚款不是我们应该采取的办法。


Europe needs to make the likes of Microsoft and Intel feel at home in Brussels, Paris, or Berlin, not to become a political market leader in supplying sympathetic verdicts to market losers.	欧洲需要让微软和英特尔这样的公司在布鲁塞尔、巴黎或者柏林都有一种在家里的感觉，而不是成为向市场竞争中的失败者提供富有同情心的裁决的一个政治市场领导者。


Sizing Up the US Election’s Opening Round	美国大选首轮选举形势预估


WASHINGTON, DC – If you find America’s presidential election campaign puzzling, you probably have a better grasp of it than those who are willing to predict an outcome.	华盛顿——如果你对美国总统竞选感到不解，你对选情的理解可能比预测结果者更加深入。


At this point, with both major parties set to choose their nominees in state-level primary elections or caucuses, there can be no predictions, only informed (or uninformed) guesses.	值此两党即将召开国家级初选或预选会议之际，任何预测都不可靠，只能根据实际情况（也有可能不根据实际情况）做出猜测。


The first major contest, in Iowa on February 1, is usually tricky to forecast, because the outcome relies more on organizational prowess than on popularity.	因为更多取决于组织实力而非知名度，2月1日即将在爱荷华州举行的首轮重要选举结果往往很难预测。


The main question, in both the Republican and Democratic races, is whether the candidates can get enough of their supporters to the caucuses – relatively small gatherings held in the evening in wintry conditions.	在共和及民主两党的竞选活动中，主要问题在于候选人能否让足够数量的支持者参加预选——即在寒冷冬夜举行的相对小规模的聚会活动。


On the Republican side, Ted Cruz and Donald Trump are within the margin of polling error of each other in both Iowa and New Hampshire, which votes eight days later.	共和党方面，特德·克鲁兹和唐纳德·特朗普在爱荷华和新罕布什尔两州的支持率均在民意调查允许的误差范围以内，其中新罕布什尔州的投票安排在爱荷华州投票8天以后。


Although Trump leads by an enormous margin in national polls, the strength of his Iowa organization is unknown, and what matters are the state-level results as the nominating process moves ahead.	尽管特朗普在全国民调中支持率遥遥领先，但他在爱荷华的组织力量如何尚不明确，而且随着提名活动的进行要靠州一级别的结果来决定胜负。


His challenge is that many of his supporters have never actually participated in an election.	他的问题是他的许多支持者从未真正参加过选举活动。


Trump’s success so far reflects his shrewdness at reading the times and pleasing a crowd.	特朗普迄今为止的成功反应了他精于把握时机、取悦民众。


(His reality television show, The Apprentice, gave him plenty of practice.)	（他的电视真人秀《学徒》让他在这方面拥有充分的锻炼机会。


The electorate is angrier and more fearful than in recent presidential contests, and both he and Cruz are capitalizing on it.	）与前几次总统选举时相比选民更加愤怒和可怕，特朗普和克鲁兹都在力争让这种情况为自己所用。


That sentiment – a product of slow economic recovery, ever-widening wealth and income inequality, and a racially infused sense of insecurity (particularly among white men) – makes for volatile politics.	这种由经济复苏缓慢、财富收入不平等日益扩大和种族因素导致的不安全感增加（尤其在白人男性中）所带来的负面情绪因此造成了政治动荡。


Trump, in particular, is channeling the same populist anger on the right that fueled the rise in 2010 of the Tea Party, which opposed both the government’s bailout of the banks that had caused the 2008 financial crisis and President Barack Obama’s health-care program.	尤其特朗普正在利用促成2010年茶党崛起的同样的右翼民粹主义怒火，这股右翼势力既反对政府救助导致2008年金融危机的银行也反对奥巴马总统的医疗保健计划。


But the Tea Party candidates who swept into Congress in 2010 failed to deliver on their promises to repeal “Obamacare” and substantially cut federal spending, further inflaming much of the Republican base.	但2010年以压倒性优势进入国会的茶党候选人未能兑现其废除“奥巴马医改”和大幅削减联邦开支的承诺，于是进一步加剧了共和党基地选民的怒火。


So the preference of the possible Republican voters has been for someone who hasn’t been “tainted” by “Washington.”	因此可能的共和党选民倾向于为没有被“华盛顿”“污染”的候选人投票。


Trump – roughly half of whose supporters have only a high school education or less – is especially deft at pandering to racial prejudices and hostility toward immigration.	约半数特朗普的支持者仅有不到高中学历，因为他特别善于迎合种族偏见和对移民的愤怒。


And his supposed success in business (his record is actually mixed) convinces his followers that he knows how to get things done, while his enormous personal wealth is seen as making him incorruptible.	同时其所谓的商业成功（其经商记录其实喜忧参半）让追随者相信他清楚怎样把事情办成，而他巨大的个人财富则让支持者相信他不会贪腐。


An important consideration to bear in mind, though, is that Trump has been benefiting from the fact that the field is so large.	但不能忘记初选的分散性非常有利于特朗普。


When other candidates drop out, the picture could be quite different.	当其他候选人逐渐退出竞选，局势可能会出现很大的不同。


Whether an “establishment” figure – one backed by the party leadership, such as former Florida Governor Jeb Bush or New Jersey Governor Chris Christie – can catch on with voters will become clearer only after Iowa and New Hampshire have voted.	前佛罗里达州州长杰布·布什和新泽西州州长克里斯·克里斯蒂等“体制内”（即得到共和党领袖支持的）候选人能否赢得选民的欢心只有在爱荷华和新罕布什尔州投票后才会明朗。


Conservative fundamentalist Christians – traditionally a powerful force in the Iowa Republican caucus – had been largely backing another anti-establishment candidate, the noted neurosurgeon Ben Carson.	传统上作为爱荷华州共和党预选一支强大力量的保守基督教原教旨主义者一直主要支持另一位体制外候选人，著名神经外科医生本·卡森。


But, as Carson’s campaign has collapsed under the weight of his obliviousness to policy, Cruz has emerged as the greatest threat to Trump in the early contests.	但随着卡森的竞选在其不熟悉政治的重压下濒于崩溃，克鲁兹已经成为竞选早期特朗普主要的竞争对手。


A first-term senator from Texas, Cruz is smart, serious, and nasty.	来自得克萨斯州的首任参议员克鲁兹精明、严肃、很难相处。


In the current political climate, he wears the scorn of his Senate colleagues – he’s detested by almost all of them – as a badge of honor.	在目前的政治气候中，他把来自参议院同仁的嘲笑当作某种荣誉徽章。


That approach, along with his record as Obamacare’s greatest congressional foe and his displays of religiosity, is clearly working for him.	这样的做法，加之其奥巴马医改国会最强对手的名誉和对宗教的虔诚态度，显然成为他竞选的推动力量。


Those who assumed – as many did – that Bush would walk away with the Republican nomination were misreading the political barometer.	那些认为布什能获得共和党候选提名的人误读了政治晴雨表。


The Bush name is no longer magic, and Jeb had been out of politics for eight years when he entered the race.	布什的名字不再无所不能，而杰布加入选战时已退出政坛达8年之久。


Moreover, the pressures facing a national candidate are quite different – both more magnified and more diffuse – from those facing a governor.	此外，全国性候选人所面临的压力在更加剧烈的同时也更加分散，这与州长所面临的压力完全不同。


Yet some believe that it’s too soon to write Bush off.	但仍有人相信现在就宣告布什的失败为时尚早。


Senator Marco Rubio of Florida – a supposedly “establishment” candidate who has been moving up in the polls – is arguably the exception to the pattern so far.	在民调中维持升势的所谓“体制内”候选人佛罗里达参议员马可·卢比奥可以说迄今为止与模式不符。


But, based on his record in the Senate, the “establishment” label is debatable.	但就其在参议院的记录而言，“体制内”的标签准确与否仍值得商榷。


Rubio, the epitome of a young man in a hurry, has taken positions – for example, on the Iran nuclear deal – that have incensed the Senate Republican leadership.	卢比奥是个典型的风风火火的年轻人，他在伊朗核协议等领域已经激怒了参议院的共和党领袖。


Rubio’s slick speaking style and Hispanic heritage make Democrats nervous.	卢比奥华而不实的演讲风格及其西班牙移民身份令民主党人感到紧张。


But he is now being tested as never before, and he’s made some mistakes (including something as silly as turning up in boots with “Cuban” heels that made him look faintly ridiculous).	但现在他所经受的考验前所未有，而且他已经开始犯错（包括蠢到穿着“古巴”跟的靴子露面，让他的整体形象显得有些可笑）。


On the Democratic side, the huge crowds turning up for the self-described Democratic Socialist Bernie Sanders are also motivated largely by perceived economic injustice (creating a possible overlap – which Sanders has noted – with Trump supporters).	民主党方面，支持自称为民主社会主义者的伯尼·桑德斯的大批人群同样主要受到所谓经济不公的驱动（桑德斯已经注意到这群人中可能同时有特朗普的支持者）。


It should be no surprise that Sanders – substantive, authentic, and uninhibited by the need to placate the party’s various interest groups – is posing such a strong challenge to Hillary Clinton, the long-presumed Democratic nominee.	真实、且不受各种党派利益集团羁绊的桑德斯给外界一直认定的民主党候选人希拉里·克林顿造成强劲挑战应当并不意外。


He leads most polls in New Hampshire, which neighbors his home state of Vermont, but also some in Iowa.	他主要在临近其家乡佛蒙特的新罕布什尔州民调领先， 同时也领先某些爱荷华州民调。


Nonetheless, given Clinton’s organizational advantages (particularly the overwhelming support of other Democratic officeholders), only some dramatic and unforeseeable development could block her path to the party’s nomination.	但鉴于克林顿拥有极强的组织优势（尤其是其他民主党公职人员的压倒性支持），只有出现某些戏剧性和不可预见的进展才可能阻挡其民主党提名之路。


Her greatest challenge, in the primaries if not in the general election, is likely to be an enthusiasm gap: Support for her candidacy, while broad, is not deep.	她在初选乃至大选阶段的最大挑战很可能是热情不足：因为她欠缺鼓励选民参与激烈选战所需的坚强联系，对其选战的支持虽然范围很广但却并不深入。


Indeed, because she lacks the intense connection with voters needed to encourage them to turn out in a close race, her frontrunner status could, paradoxically, become her greatest weakness.	矛盾的是，她的领先者地位很可能同时是其最大的弱点所在。


Preempting Home-Grown Terrorists	遏制本土恐怖主义


BERLIN – Islamist terrorism has in recent years become central to security policy in Germany and many other Western countries.	柏林 —— 伊斯兰恐怖主义近年来已成为德国和欧洲其他国家安全政策的核心议题。


The terrorists’ intention is to sow mistrust and stoke fears; their aim is to weaken the democratic rule of law and to shatter citizens’ confidence in public institutions.	恐怖份子企图挑起猜忌和恐惧； 他们妄图达到削弱民主法治、摧毁民众对公共机构信心的目的。


Governments are determined to prevent this, but the reality is that frequent terror alerts tend to increase rather than reduce insecurity among our people.	政府下定决心不让他们得逞，但事实却是频繁的恐怖警报不仅没有减轻民众的不安全感，反而加深了他们的恐惧。


The debates across Europe on new security laws to fight terrorism have sometimes created the false image that states threaten rather than protect their citizens’ freedom.	欧洲各国就新出台的反恐怖安全法展开的辩论有时会给人造成国家威胁、而不是保护民众自由的错觉。


In fact, the often-assumed conflict between freedom and public security does not exist.	事实上并不存在人们假想中的自由和公共安全的对立。


Freedom and public security are not irreconcilable opposites.	自由和公共安全之间的矛盾并非不可调和。


They complement and even depend on each other.	它们互相依赖，互为补充。


Public security is a pre-requisite for freedom, and protecting freedom is at the core of a democratic state’s responsibility for public security.	公共安全是自由的前提条件，而保障自由则是民众国家公共安全的核心问题。


A state’s monopoly on the use of force is justified if citizens can rely on it to ensure their security.	如果能够确保民众的安全，武力使用权由国家全权掌握就合情合理。


The prevention of threats, along with law enforcement that involves prosecuting offenders, are crucial responsibilities, but they do not require, as a matter of principle, ever-newer security laws.	预防安全威胁和恐怖诉讼执法都是至关重要的责任，但履行这些责任从原则上讲并不需要频繁出台新的安全法律。


Of course, security authorities need suitable tools to fight terrorism.	当然，安全机构需要战胜恐怖主义的恰当武器。


As terrorists take advantage of new technologies, the legal and technical means used by security authorities must adapt accordingly.	随着恐怖份子对于新技术的运用，安全机构所采用的法律和技术手段也必需与时俱进。


But terrorism cannot be fought by the security authorities alone.	但仅仅依靠安全机构无法应对恐怖主义。


Prevention is better than repression.	预防比镇压更加有效。


We should do everything in our power to avoid radicalization, to interrupt radicalization processes early, and to guide radicalized individuals back into our society and to acceptance of our values.	我们应该竭尽全力避免极端化，对极端化倾向实施早期干预，并引导极端个体回归社会，接受我们的价值观。


Yet, in facing a worsening problem of home-grown terrorism, Western countries are often unaware of this radicalization process.	但面对着本土恐怖主义的日益恶化，西方国家通常对这种极端化过程并没有清醒的认识。


To intervene effectively, we need to find answers to three questions: Where and how do people radicalize?	实施有效的干预必需先回答三个问题：人们极端化的地点和方式？


Why are they attracted to radical ideas?	他们为什么会接受极端思想？


What can we do to counteract it?	我们能采取哪些措施来加以制止？


In Germany, radicalization takes place largely through radical mosque communities or private prayer rooms, as well as through the Internet.	德国的极端化思想大都发源于极端清真寺街区或私人祷告室，此外互联网也是源头之一。


State surveillance is used as a counter-measure, but it is just as important to work closely with the Muslim population.	国家监管是一种有效的应对方法，但与穆斯林民众密切合作同样具有重要意义。


Parents, friends, and imams can spot signs of radicalization earlier than security officials can, and they act responsibly by contacting the relevant state agencies in such cases.	父母、朋友和教长能够比安全官员更早地察觉到极端化迹象，此时他们可以采取负责任的行动，与相关国家机构取得联系。


Security authorities are responsible for monitoring the more visible signs of radicalization, and other state agencies can help potential terrorism recruits to leave extremist environments and become reintegrated into society.	安全机构负责对更明显的极端化迹象实施监控，同时其他国家机构可以帮助潜在的新增恐怖主义人员脱离极端主义环境并重新融入社会。


Nothing, though, can replace support and help within these young peoples’ immediate environment.	但什么也无法取代这些年轻人身边的帮助和支持。


The second question – why are some people attracted to radical ideas? – has been explored by researchers and security practitioners, who generally agree that people are more inclined to accept radical ideologies if they feel alienated.	第二个问题是人们为什么会接受极端思想？ 研究和安全人员对此进行了探索，并一致认为感觉受到排斥的人接受极端思想的可能性更大。


This is especially true of young people who have experienced real or even imagined discrimination.	切实或自认受到歧视的年轻人尤其如此。


Lacking attractive social or professional prospects, such young people often seek a new and more welcoming home within a radical group.	缺乏具有吸引力的社会或职业前景，导致这些年轻人通常会在极端组织中寻找温暖的一席之地。


Society’s task is to give them a feeling of belonging.	让他们找到归属感是社会的任务。


That means a new sense of commitment by civil society as a whole.	这意味着民间团体必需具备新的责任感。


Our societies need to engender greater respect and acknowledgement of others, and to acquire more knowledge about different cultures and religions.	我们的社会需要培养更多的尊重和认同感，还需要了解不同文化和宗教的更多知识。


We need to create tightly knit networks of personal relations between the members of different social and religious groups.	我们需要在不同的社会和宗教团体间创造出紧密联系的私人关系。


It is equally important that citizens should consider it their duty to commit themselves to the principles of liberal democracy.	民众将为自由民主献身视为己任同样重要。


It is everyone’s task to counter extremism actively and speak out about radical statements, in public and in private.	在公开和私人场合积极与极端主义斗争并在极端言论面前敢于挺身而出是每个公民的义务。


Muslims have a particular responsibility here.	穆斯林对此负有特别的义务。


Within their communities, or in social frameworks, they have an opportunity that others do not.	在社区内部，或者在社会架构中，他们的机会是其他人所不具备的。


Non-Muslims rarely have much contact with Muslims who are in the process of becoming radicalized, and in any case their arguments would not be well received.	非穆斯林民众很少与走向极端的穆斯林民众有多少联系，因此无论他们的看法如何都影响不大。


The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in particular, have notched up a number of positive civic-engagement projects involving Muslims.	英国和荷兰成功实施了几项由穆斯林民众参与的积极的计划。


In Germany, we intend to facilitate and support similar contacts with Muslim groups.	在德国，我们愿意支持并推动与穆斯林团体的类似接触。


But Europe and the Western world must also cooperate more closely with key Muslim countries.	但欧洲和西方世界还必须与重要的穆斯林国家开展更为密切的合作。


We need Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Maghreb countries as partners in the fight against Islamist terrorism, and that means improved operational cooperation between security authorities.	在战胜伊斯兰恐怖主义的事业中我们需要土耳其、沙特阿拉伯、阿富汗、巴基斯坦和马格里布联盟国家的支持，这也意味着要巩固安全机构间的合作。


These countries have a clear interest in maintaining their stability.	保持局势稳定显然符合上述国家的利益。


They should be anxious to allow terrorist groups as little room for development as possible.	压缩恐怖分子的生存空间应当是他们迫切的需要。


At the same time, it is in our interest to obtain from them as much important information about terrorist structures and activities as we can.	与此同时，从他们那里尽可能地获取有关恐怖架构及活动的信息符合我们的需要。


Improved cooperation should not stop there.	改进合作不应当就此止步。


We need to establish an extended dialogue with Muslim countries, particularly those from which immigrants come, and convince them to accept that their own Islamic authorities have a special responsibility in fighting radicalization.	我们需要扩大与穆斯林国家、特别是移民输出国的对话，说服他们承认国内的伊斯兰政府在战胜极端行为方面负有特殊的责任。


We need each other, and in many areas we can make a difference only if we act together.	我们相互需要，而且只有通过密切合作才能在许多领域中取得进展。


Greece’s Bogus Debt Deal	希腊的虚假债务方案


PRINCETON – The process of official forgiveness of Greek debt has begun.	普林斯顿—希腊债务的正式豁免已经开始。


Referred to as “official sector involvement” (OSI), it includes several initiatives aimed at reducing Greece’s debt/GDP ratio to 124% in 2020, from roughly 200% today.	这个被称为“正式部门参与”（official sector involvement，OSI）的项目包括数项旨在让希腊债务/GDP比率在2020年降至124%的计划，如今这一比例大约为200%。


Even as the deal was announced, however, newspaper reports suggested that officials recognized that the measures would be insufficient to meet the target; further negotiations on additional steps would be needed at a politically more convenient moment.	但是，虽然宣布了该计划，但报纸报道显示，官员认为其中的措施不足以达到这一目标； 在政治上更合适的时候，还将就进一步动作展开后续谈判。


The economist Larry Summers has invoked the analogy of the Vietnam War to describe European decision-making.	经济学家拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）将欧洲决策比作越南战争。


“At every juncture they made the minimum commitments necessary to avoid imminent disaster – offering optimistic rhetoric, but never taking the steps that even they believed could offer the prospect of decisive victory.”	“每当关键时刻，他们总是做出避免眼前灾难所需的最低程度承诺——用乐观的语调发言，但从来不拿出真刀真枪，即使他们能够通过这样取得决定性胜利。 ”


This strategy needs to be inverted – and Greece offers a real opportunity to get ahead of the curve.	这样的策略必须改变——而希腊提供了先发制人的现实机会。


Instead of driblets of relief, a sizeable package, composed of two elements, is the way forward.	摆在人们面前的前途不是少许债务豁免，而是由两个方面组成的大计划。


First, as Lee Buchheit, the attorney who oversaw the Greek private restructuring, has proposed, maturities on official Greek debt could be greatly extended.	首先，正如处理希腊私人重组事宜的律师李·布克海特（Lee Buchheit）所指出的，希腊正式债务的到期日将被大大延长。


A simple structure would be to make all debt payable over 40 years, carrying an interest rate of 2%.	将出现一个简单的框架，让所有债务都延长至40年后偿付，利率在2%。


This would move Greece and its official creditors beyond the continuous angst that now prevails.	这将让希腊及其正式债权人摆脱当前挥之不去的焦虑。


The second element of the debt-relief package would be more innovative: If Greece’s economy performs well, the generous extension of maturities can be clawed back or the interest rate raised.	债务豁免大计划的第二个方面更具创新性：如果希腊经济表现出色，慷慨的债务到期日延长计划可以缩短，或者将利率提升。


A formula for this could be linked to the debt/GDP ratio – a scheme with advantages that transcend the Greek case.	该方面的一个参数可以是债务/GDP比率，该机制的实施的好处远远超过了希腊。


The idea of linking debt relief to a country’s debt/GDP ratio has been around for a while, but has never gained significant acceptance.	将债务豁免和一国债务/GDP比率挂钩的思想由来已久，但一直没有得到足够的接受。


Applying it in Greece would be a highly visible test; if successful, it would set a valuable precedent.	在希腊身上试水将是一次可观察的试验； 如果成功，将成为极有价值的先例。


Why bother?	为什么不这么做？


Because the very premise of the current deal and the expectations it sets out are wrong.	因为当前方案的前提及其所形成的预期是错误的。


First, the notion that there is a smooth transition path for the debt/GDP ratio from 200% to 124% is fanciful.	首先，认为债务/GDP比率可以从200%平滑下降至124%完全是出于想象。


Second, even if, by some miracle, Greece did reach the 124% mark by 2020, the claim that its debt will then be “sustainable” is absurd.	其次，即使发生了奇迹，希腊真的在2020年达到了124%的目标，认为其时其债务将变得“可持续”也是荒谬的。


Thus, continuing down this path will further erode policymakers’ credibility – not that they seem to care – while imposing on the rest of the world a persistent sense of crisis and uncertainty, with real financial and economic costs.	因此，沿着这条路走下去将进一步降低决策者的信誉——不过他们似乎并不在乎——而世界其他地区则将继续感受危机和不确定性，造成实实在在的金融和经济成本。


Make no mistake: policymakers’ track record on forecasting Greek economic performance during the crisis has been an embarrassment.	别弄错了：决策者在预测危机期间希腊经济表现的历史记录可谓尴尬。


In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected – presumably in concurrence with its European partners – that Greece’s annual GDP growth would exceed 1% in 2012.	2010年5月，IMF预测——大概是在赞同其欧洲伙伴的观点——2012年希腊年GDP增长将在1%以上。


Instead, the Greek economy will shrink by 6%.	结果，今年希腊经济将收缩6%。


The unemployment rate, expected to peak this year at 15%, is now above 25% – and is still rising.	对失业率的预测是今年达到15%的峰值，但如今在25%以上，而且仍在上升。


The debt/GDP ratio was expected to top out at 150%; absent the substantial write-down of privately held debt, which was deemed unnecessary, the ratio would have been close to 250%.	债务/GDP被预测将在150%的水平见顶； 扣掉私人持有债务的大规模减记（当时认为并无必要），该比率接近250%。


In September 2010, four months after the official Greek bailout was put in place, the IMF issued a pamphlet asserting that “default in today’s advanced economies is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.”	2010年9月，希腊正式援助推出4个月后，IMF发布了一份报告，评估“现有发达经济体的违约无必要、不可取，也不可能。


The conclusion was that official financing would carry Greece past its short-term liquidity problems.	”该报告的结论是，正式融资将解决希腊的短期流动性问题。


Calls for immediate debt restructuring went unheeded.	立刻进行债务重组的呼声被忽视了。


Six months later, after substantial official funds had been used to pay private creditors, the outstanding private debt was substantially restructured.	6个月后，在花了大量正式资金用于偿付私人债权人之后，未��还私人债务还是进行了大规模重组。


Such were the errors committed over short time horizons.	这就是短期内所犯下的错误。


Relatively speaking, 2020 is an eternity away.	相对而言，2020年可谓来日方长。


Even assuming better forecasts, the projection of 124% could be a gross underestimate.	即使我们认为预测会有所进步，但124%的预测值仍显得大大低估了。


The precision of the numbers underpinning the deal is a façade, if not a reflection of an alternate reality.	作为该方案基础的数字的准确度和拍脑袋无异，要么反映的是异次元空间的状况。


And, again, even if Greece somehow did achieve the 124% milestone, its debt would still not be sustainable.	而即使希腊用某种方法达到了124%的里程碑，其债务也不是可持续的。


At that point, Greece would merely be where it started in May 2010.	那时，希腊充其量也只是回到了2010年5月的起点。


The most reasonable comparison is with Latin American countries during their debt crises in the 1980’s and 1990’s.	最合理的比较是20世纪八九十年代债务危机中的拉美国家。


Despite significantly lower debt/GDP ratios and continuous debt restructuring, they eventually needed the large debt reduction that came with the issuance of Brady bonds to achieve some breathing room.	尽管它们的债务/GDP比率低得多，也进行了持续不断的债务重组，但最终仍需要债务减免——布雷迪债券的发行给了它们呼吸空间。


Getting ahead of the curve will give Greece a realistic chance of controlling its own destiny.	先发制人能给希腊掌握自身命运的现实机会。


It will also be a reminder of the dangers of rushing in with official money where private debts have become unsustainable.	这也能提醒人们，在私人债务已变得不可持续的时候匆忙注入正式资金是很危险的。


Staying the course, as Summers warns, will lead only to “needless suffering” before that course inevitably collapses, bringing Greece – and much else – crashing down.	正如萨默斯所警告的，坚持这样做只能在不可避免的失败前造成“不必要的痛苦”，让希腊（其实远不止希腊）崩溃。


Premature Virtue	操之过急


The United States is not one of Europe’s heavily indebted countries, which must pay hefty premiums over the price at which Germany can borrow. Interest rates on US government bonds have been falling and are near record lows, which means that financial markets anticipate deflation, not inflation.	纽约——


Nevertheless, Obama is under political pressure.	奥巴马政府在财政问题上一直端正无瑕，不过这并非出于财政需要，而是出于政治考虑。


The US public is deeply troubled by the accumulation of public debt, and the Republican opposition has been extremely successful in blaming the Crash of 2008 – and the subsequent recession and high unemployment – on government ineptitude, as well as in claiming that the stimulus package was largely wasted.	美国与欧洲那些债务深重的国家不同。 欧洲债务国必须支付比德国高得多的溢价，而美国国债的利率一直在不断下滑，现在已接近历史最低点，这意味着金融市场认为会发生通缩，而不是通胀。


There is an element of truth in this, but it is one-sided.	然而奥巴马一直面临着不小的政治压力。


The Crash of 2008 was primarily a market failure, for which US (and other) regulators should be faulted for failing to regulate.	美国公众对不断累积的公共债务忧心忡忡，反对党——共和党人极尽口舌之利，将2008年金融危机及随后的经济衰退和失业率高企归咎于政府举措失当，又声称刺激方案在很大程度上纯粹是在浪费钱。


But, without a bailout, the financial system would have remained paralyzed, making the subsequent recession much deeper and longer.	这些说法不无道理，但有失偏颇。 2008年金融危机首先是市场失灵，美国（及其他国家）监管者的失职要负很大责任。


True, the US stimulus package was largely wasted, but that was because most of it went to sustaining consumption rather than to correcting the underlying imbalances.	但是，如果没有救援计划的话，金融体系绝对不会自动恢复，这将使随后的衰退程度更深，持续时间更长。 诚然，美国刺激计划很大程度上是在浪费钱，但这主要是因为大部分钱被用于维持消费，而不是纠正经济基本面的失衡。


Where the Obama administration went wrong was in how it bailed out the banking system: it helped banks earn their way out of a hole by purchasing some of their bad assets and supplying them with cheap money.	奥巴马政府错在救援银行体系的方式上。 它所采取的措施是买入银行的一部分不良资产，同时向它们提供低成本资金。


This, too, was guided by political considerations: it would have been more efficient to inject new equity into the banks, but Obama feared accusations of nationalization and socialism.	这一措施也是出于政治考虑：向银行注入新股本应是更加有效之法，但奥巴马担忧此举会招致国有化和社会主义化的谴责。


That decision backfired, with serious political repercussions.	这一决定的效果适得其反，掀起了不小的政治波澜。


The public, facing a jump in credit card charges from 8% to nearly 30%, saw banks earning bumper profits and paying large bonuses.	信用卡费用飙涨（从8%升至近30%），而公众却目睹着银行赚取大把利润、派发丰厚奖金。


The Tea Party movement exploited this resentment, and Obama is now on the defensive.	茶党（Tea Party）运动充分利用了公众的这种情绪，而奥巴马成了众矢之的。


The Republicans campaign against any further stimulus, and the administration now pays lip service to fiscal rectitude, even if it recognizes that deficit reduction may be premature.	共和党人游说群众反对任何进一步的刺激计划，声称政府的财政整合只是画饼充饥——它们明知削减债务时机远未成熟。


I believe that there is a strong case for further stimulus.	我认为进一步刺激计划将会是一个大问题。


Admittedly, consumption cannot be sustained indefinitely by running up the national debt; the imbalance between consumption and investment must be corrected.	实事求是地讲，消费不可能被不断增长的国债规模无限支持，消费与投资间的失衡迟早要被纠正。


But to cut government spending at a time of large-scale unemployment would be to ignore the lessons of history.	但在失业率高企的当口削减政府支出则属于无视历史教训。


The obvious solution is to distinguish between investments and current consumption, and increase the former while reducing the latter.	显而易见的解决方式是分清投资和现在的消费，增加前者，抑制后者。


But that seems politically untenable.	但这一做法似乎不具有政治可行性。


Most Americans are convinced that government is incapable of efficiently managing investments aimed at improving the country’s physical and human capital.	大多数美国人都坚信政府靠不住，不可能有效地管理投资，使美国的实物和人力资本状况有所改善。


Again, this belief is not without justification: a quarter-century of calling the government bad has resulted in bad government.	这一信条亦可谓不无道理。 25年来，人们一直说政府是个扶不起的阿斗，结果，政府真的成了扶不起的阿斗。


But the argument that stimulus spending is inevitably wasted is patently false: the New Deal produced the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Triborough Bridge in New York, and many other public utilities still in use today.	但要说刺激计划支出免不了要沦为浪费还是言过其实了：罗斯福新政就创造了田纳西河流域管理局（Tennessee Valley Authority）、纽约三区大桥（Triborough Bridge）等许多使用至今的公共设施。


Moreover, the simple truth is that the private sector is not employing available resources.	除此之外，私人不能没能充分利用可得资源，此乃无可辩驳的事实。


Obama has been very friendly to business, and corporations are operating very profitably.	奥巴马对商业不可谓不友善，这使得企业利润极为丰厚。


But, instead of investing, they are building up liquidity.	但企业并未加大投资，而是在囤积流动性。


Perhaps a Republican victory will boost their confidence, but in the meantime investment and employment require fiscal stimulus (monetary stimulus, by contrast, would be more likely to stimulate corporations to devour each other than to hire workers).	共和党人的胜利或许会增强他们的信心，但在此期间，投资和就业仍需要财政刺激的推动（货币刺激只能适得其反，促进企业相互吞并，而不会有利于就业改善）。


How much government debt is too much is an open question, because tolerance for public debt is highly dependent on prevailing perceptions.	政府债务是否���多，这是个开放性问题。 公众对公债的忍受力取决于他们的感觉。


The risk premium attached to the interest rate is the critical variable: once it starts rising, the existing rate of deficit financing becomes unsustainable.	利率中所包含的风险溢价是其中的关键变量：如果风险溢价上升，那就意味着现有赤字融资率是不可持续的。


But the tipping point is indeterminate.	但引爆点具体在哪里却是不确定的。


Consider Japan, with a debt-to-GDP ratio approaching 200% – one of the highest in the world.	看看日本吧。 该国债务对GDP之比高达200%，堪称世界之最。


Yet ten-year bonds yield little more than 1%.	但其十年期收益率只有1%上下。


Japan once had a high savings rate, but its current savings rate is about the same as in the US, thanks to an aging and shrinking population.	日本曾经拥有超高的储蓄率，但由于老龄化和人口减少，现在已下降到与美国相仿的水平。


The big difference – that Japan has a trade surplus and the US has a deficit – is not important as long as China’s currency policy obliges it to accumulate dollar assets in one form or another.	美日之间的差别——贸易赤字对贸易盈余——已不再重要，因为中国的货币政策使其不断地积累着美元资产。


The real reason why Japanese interest rates are so low is that Japan’s private sector has little appetite for investing abroad and prefers ten-year government bonds at 1% to cash at 0%.	日本利率如此低下的真实原因是日本私人部门不愿意出国投资，而十年期国债的收益率（1%）也要好过持有现金（零收益）。


With the price level falling and the population aging, the Japanese consider the real return attractive.	日本的物价在不断下降，人口在日益老化，这使得日本人觉得真实回报率相当可观。


As long as US banks can borrow at near zero and buy government bonds without having to commit equity, and the dollar does not depreciate against the renminbi, interest rates on US government bonds may well be heading in the same direction.	只要美国的银行能够以接近零利率借款并买入美国国债而不是增发股本，而美元又能不对人民币贬值，美国国债利率也将像日本那样维持在很低的水平。


That does not mean that the US should maintain the discount rate close to zero and run up government debt indefinitely.	这并不意味着美国应该维持接近于零的贴现率并无限制增加政府债务。


Once the economy starts growing again, interest rates will rise – perhaps precipitously, if the accumulated debt is too large.	一旦经济开始重新增长，利率就会升高——如果累积债务太大的话，甚至可能会陡然增加。


But, while that would choke off the recovery, premature fiscal tightening would do so sooner.	但是，就算利率上升会对经济复苏不利，效应也要比财政紧随温和得多。


The right policy is to reduce imbalances as quickly as possible while minimizing the increase in the debt burden.	正确的措施是尽快消除不平衡，同时尽量抑制债务增量。


This can be done in several ways, but the Obama administration’s stated goal – halving the budget deficit by 2013 while the economy is operating far below capacity – is not one of them.	达到这一效果的方法很多，但奥巴马政府所陈述的目标——在产能大量闲置的情况下到2013年使预算赤字减半——并不在其列。


Investing in infrastructure and education makes more sense.	加大基础设施和教育投资要比这有用得多。


So does engineering a moderate rate of inflation by depreciating the dollar against the renminbi.	同理，引导温和的通胀也要比美元对人民币贬值有用得多。


What stands in the way of this agenda is not economics, but misconceptions about budget deficits that are being exploited for partisan and ideological purposes.	什么政策可以被提上政府日程并非由经济学决定，但在预算赤字问题上的误解正在被人向党派和意识形态之争引导。


Preparing for President Trump	准备由特朗普担任总统


LONDON – As America’s friends and allies look on in astonishment at the all-but-certain prospect of a contest between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in November’s US presidential election, they need to do more than just wring their hands.	伦敦——在美国的友邦和盟国惊讶地注视着希拉里·克林顿和唐纳德·特朗普11月美国总统大选扑朔迷离的前景的时候，他们不能仅仅满足于束手无措。


They must hope for the best but prepare for the worst.	他们必须怀着最好的希望，但同时也要做好最坏的打算。


The crucial point about the 2016 election is not just that a reality-TV star and property magnate who has never held elected office has emerged as the presumptive Republican candidate.	2016年大选的关键点不仅是一位从未担任过公职的电视真人秀明星兼地产大亨已成为共和党总统候选人。


It is the enormous difference that a victory by Trump would make for the rest of the world compared with a victory by Clinton.	而是与克林顿获胜相比，特朗普获胜将使世界其他国家感受到巨大的变化。


In every US presidential election in modern times, America’s friends and allies have had their private preferences.	近代历次美国总统选举，美国的友邦和盟国都有其自身的偏好。


But never before have the Democratic and Republican candidates been as different as chalk and cheese.	但民主和共和两党候选人此前从未像现在这样截然不同。


There was no unbridgeable gulf between Reagan and Carter, or Clinton and Bush, or Bush and Gore, or Obama and McCain.	里根和卡特、克林顿和布什、布什和戈尔、奥巴马和麦凯恩之间并没有不可逾越的鸿沟。


There is between Trump and Clinton.	但特朗普和克林顿却有。


To the rest of the world, Clinton represents continuity, and Trump means dramatic change.	在外界看来，克林顿代表连续性，而特朗普则代表戏剧性的改革。


Just how dramatic cannot be known, but the normal assumption that candidates play to their party’s core supporters during the primary season but then tack to the center for the general election cannot be relied on in Trump’s case.	究竟有多戏剧性现在还无从得知，但候选人在初选期间讨好党内核心支持者而在大选期间转向中立的一般假设很可能对特朗普并不适用。


His is an abnormal candidacy.	他的候选人资格异乎寻常。


That is why preparation makes sense.	因此我们需要做好准备。


Trump confirmed in his speech on foreign policy to the Center for the National Interest in Washington, DC, on April 27 that “America First” would be the overriding theme of his administration.	特朗普在4月27日对华盛顿国家利益中心的外交政策讲话中再次强调“美国第一”将成为其内阁的首要原则。


He would reject multilateral trade deals and institutions, take a much tougher line on illegal immigration, and forge a new approach to defense and security alliances.	他将拒绝接受多边贸易协议和体系，对非法移民采取更为强硬的措施并与国防和安全盟国建立全新的关系。


Trump declared in that speech that he wants the United States to be “predictably unpredictable,” but he also made it clear that he won’t abandon his basic position.	在那次讲话中特朗普强调他希望美国实现“可预见的不可预见”，但同时也明确表示不会放弃自己的基本立场。


Allies will have to pay more for their defense.	盟国将需要为国防支付更多费用。


And they can expect tough measures by his administration if they have an enduringly large bilateral trade surplus with the US.	如果与美国长期存在大规模贸易顺差，特朗普内阁将对其采取强硬举措。


Regional deals, such as the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Mexico, and Canada, are a “total disaster” that have tied America’s hands.	美国、墨西哥和加拿大等国签订的1994年北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）等地区协定是一场“彻头彻尾的灾难”，彻底缚住了美国的手脚。


So the best assumption is that they would be scrapped.	那么最好的假设是这些协议将会失效。


So how can friends and allies prepare for a President Trump?	那么友邦和盟国将如何应对特朗普总统？


Discreetly, of course.	当然要谨慎对待。


But the author of the 1987 bestseller The Art of the Deal would surely agree that sound preparation is the essence of striking a good bargain.	但1987年畅销书《交易的艺术》一书的作者肯定会同意充分准备是达成良好交易的核心因素。


If Trump finds evidence of it after having won the White House, he would likely admire his counterparts for it, even if secretly.	如果特朗普在入主白宫后能证实这种观点，他很可能会佩服自己的同行，即便这种佩服不能明说。


There are two sorts of things that friends and allies can and should do to prepare for the worst.	友邦和盟国可以且应当做好两类最坏的打算。


One is to make themselves stronger and thus better able to stand up to a bully.	其一是让自己更加强大，从而能更好的抵抗外力的欺侮。


The other is to shore up their alliances and friendships with one another, in anticipation of an “America First” rupture with old partnerships and the liberal international order that has prevailed since the 1940s.	还有一种是加强彼此之间的联盟和友谊，准备面对原有伙伴和20世纪40年代后一直奉行的自由主义国际秩序因“美国第一”原则而被打破。


A weak Japan and a fractious collection of 28 countries in the European Union would be a tempting target for President Trump.	特朗普总统将希望看到日本疲弱和欧盟28国分裂的结果。


A Japan that had, over the next 12 months, truly embraced the growth-enhancing strategy of liberalization that has often been promised by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would be in a stronger position.	如果日本在过去12个月真正实行了安倍晋三首相一直承诺的自由化促增长策略就能够取得更稳固的立场。


So would European countries that dropped their obsession with fiscal austerity and used public-investment programs to kick-start growth and reduce unemployment.	如果欧盟国家放弃对财政紧缩的痴迷并利用公共投资项目来启动增长和降低失业，那么他们的地位也能够更加巩固。


Such moves, which are needed in any event, would make it easier to start on the task of building stronger alliances – which may well become essential.	无论如何都需要采取上述举措，并由此启动建设更强大联盟的任务——这很可能成为未来的关键因素。


If a Trump administration seeks to scrap NAFTA, Canada and Mexico will need to make common cause.	如果特朗普内阁寻求废除北美贸易协定，那么加拿大和墨西哥将需要加强联合。


If it chooses to discard the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement negotiated by the Obama administration with 12 Asia-Pacific economies, those countries, perhaps led by Japan or Australia, must be ready to carry on the deal, or something like it, among themselves.	如果他选择放弃由奥巴马内阁与亚太12经济体谈成的跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）协议，那么这些国家，或许在日本或澳大利亚的领导下，必须准备在它们之间落实TPP协议，或与TPP协议相似的替代物。


(Clinton has also turned against the TPP, but this can be assumed to be merely tactical; in Trump’s case, no such assumption is warranted.)	（克林顿也表态反对TPP，但这种反对或许仅仅是战术性的； 但就特朗普而言，没有任何证据能支撑这种假设。


A similar story applies in Europe.	同样的举措也适用于��洲。


To avoid being pushed around by Trump over trade or security, members of the EU and NATO must be prepared to stick together.	为避免在贸易或安全问题上被特朗普牵着鼻子走，欧盟及北约成员国必须互相团结。


That may mean being ready to spend more on their own defense – a demand by Trump that is not unreasonable.	这可能意味着要为国防追加更多预算——特朗普提出这样的要求也并非毫无理由。


It will also mean being sufficiently united to avoid being picked off singly by an American bully.	此外还意味着欧洲各国要充分团结，这样才能避免被仗势欺人的美国单挑出来各个击破。


And yet European solidarity is fraying, to say the least, thanks to the migrant crisis and the economic aftermath of the 2008 financial crash.	但至少可以说欧洲的团结并不稳定，这在某种程度上归咎于移民危机和2008年金融危机经济后果的影响。


On June 23, British voters could make the situation far worse if they vote in their referendum to leave the EU.	6月23日，英国选民如果在全民公决中投票离开欧盟，将会使局势进一步恶化。


To strengthen Britain, and the EU itself, in anticipation of Trump, they would be well advised to vote to stay in.	面对特朗普，要想强化英国和欧盟自身的实力，告诫英国选民投票留在欧盟将是明智的选择。


Asia has not been known for its solidarity.	亚洲从来就不是以团结闻名的。


It has depended, perhaps excessively, on American influence to balance its rivalries.	它或许过于依赖美国的势力来平衡对手。


Japan, for example, has close ties with Southeast Asian countries but no formal security relationships with them.	比如日本与东南亚国家关系密切，但却从未建立正式的安全关系。


Both Japan and its nearest neighbor, South Korea, have longstanding security treaties with the US, but are hostile to each other.	日本及其最近的邻国韩国都与美国签署了长期安全条约，但这两国之间却是敌对的。


Given the possibility of trade wars, currency wars, and a renunciation of long-held security alliances within the next 9-12 months, it is time to put regional solidarity ahead of old enmities and the forces of fragmentation.	鉴于未来9到12个月可能发生的贸易战、货币战和长期安全联盟的解体，将地区团结的重要性置于旧恨及分裂势力之上的时机已经成熟。


America’s friends and allies need to start preparing for a less friendly America.	美国的友邦和盟国需要准备面对一个不那么友好的美国。


Prescription Financial Products	“处方”金融产品


NEW DELHI – One positive fallout of the financial crisis of 2007-201? is our realization that financial products can be as complex and dangerous as drugs.	发自新德里——2007-2010年金融危机的其中一个正面效应就是让我们认识到：金融产品可以像药品一样复杂而危险。


This realization has led to innovative ideas and experimentation with new laws, regulations, and institutions around the world.	也正是这种认识引发了世界各国对于新监管法规以及监管体制的创新及实验。


In India, the government has announced the establishment of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) to address inter-regulatory coordination issues and provide macro-prudential supervision.	印度政府宣布成立了金融稳定和发展委员会，来协调各监管部门之间的合作并进行宏观监管。


In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and new initiatives to monitor the safety of financial products, could alter the architecture of finance.	而最近在美国颁布的“Dodd-Frank华尔街改革和消费者保护法案”以及多部监控金融产品安全性的新提案都将改变整个金融架构。


Several proponents of these new ideas have openly used the analogy with drugs.	一些新理念的拥护者会将金融产品比作药品。


It has been argued that if, in 2007, the US had a Financial Products Safety Commission akin to its Food and Drugs Administration, the market would not have been flooded with “teaser” mortgages that entangled millions of households in chains of predatory credit.	有人说如果2007年时美国能有一个与食品药品管理局(FDA)类似的金融产品安全委员会的话，那些“钓鱼式”的抵押贷款（利率可调的抵押贷款）就不会泛滥市场，并使数百万家庭被卷入掠夺性的信用漩涡中。


What is especially sophisticated about the new ideas cropping up in the US, Europe, India, China and elsewhere is the recognition that, as with drugs and toys, it is impossible to say in advance which financial products we should allow and which we should not, because we cannot conceive of all the products that can and will come to market.	而对于那些在美国，欧洲，印度，中国以及世界各地不断涌现的新理念来说，尤其复杂的地方则在于人们认识到正如药品和玩具一样，我们不可能事先察觉到哪些金融产品是可以通行的，因为我们不可能预想出所有可以或将要进入市场的产品。


Hence, the need for a judgmental body that can look at a new product and form an opinion about its desirability.	因此，我们需要建立一个实体来审查每一个新的金融产品，并对其设立的目的做出某种判断。


Indeed, there is a worrying aspect to the new plans: they must tread a narrow path between reckless freedom for financial institutions, which contributed to the recent global financial crisis, and over-caution, which can suffocate innovation and create inefficiencies.	事实上，这些新方案都有一个令人担心的地方：如果对金融机构太过放任，那么金融危机就是前车之鉴，如果监管过度，又会扼杀创新并导致低效率，而这些方案则必须在两者之间寻求一种狭窄的平衡。


Consider a teaser loan, which initially charges low or even no interest, with much higher rates kicking in at a later date.	试想有一个“钓鱼”贷款，在起始期间利息非常低甚至为零，到后期却收取高额利息。


To be sure, this is a dangerous product, and it did cause many families to fall into an unsustainable debt trap.	这显然是一个危险的产品，也一定会令许多家庭陷入不可持续的债务陷阱当中。


But such loans can be of great value to sophisticated firms and households that may have good reason to believe that their future earnings will be higher than their current earnings. Such entities would be able to make investments that would not be possible otherwise.	但对于那些有足够理由确信自己的未来收入将远高于当前收入的企业和家庭来说，这类贷款却是有益的，而这类经济实体将能产生其他方面所无法产生的投资。


This is just one example.	这只是其中一个例子。


It is impossible to anticipate the numerous financial products that human ingenuity can create, and that can be dangerous to use but of great value to some.	我们不可能预先估计到人类智慧究竟能创造出多少金融产品，而其中哪种产品对某些人有害却对另一批人有利。


The risk created by many of the regulatory measures under consideration in today’s crisis-scarred world is that they may end up over-regulating our markets to the point of blocking the emergence of valuable new products.	在这个对危机依然心有余悸的世界，许多监管方式所引发的风险就是对市场的过度监管，以至于许多有价值的新产品都胎死腹中。


But there is a way out of this conundrum. In creating new financial regulations, we need to take the medical analogy one step further – by creating the equivalent of the prescription.	但有一个方法可以解决这个难题，在制定新的金融监管措施之时，我们必须首先像对待药品那样实施进一步动作——通过创设对应的“处方”。


Instead of banning or freely allowing all dangerous products, we need to identify products that are valuable to some customers but not all – call them “prescription financial products” – and create a body of registered finance professionals (RFPs) who are empowered to certify the purchase of these products by individuals.	我们不应当禁止或者放任所有危险的金融产品，相反，我们应当定义这些产品适用于某些客户但不是全部——把它们定名为“处方金融产品”——并建立一个注册金融专业人士的实体，授权他们来决定这些产品应该销售给谁。


For example, you are planning to buy a house.	比如说，你正准备买一栋住宅。


Your local bank offers you what is certified to be a teaser loan – a prescription product.	当地银行向你推销某个被定义为“钓鱼”（利率增长型）贷款的金融产品——一个处方产品。


You can take such a loan provided that an RFP approves such a contract.	而你则要在一个注册金融产品专业人士人批准了这个合同之后才能办理贷款。


In brief, just as we do not ban steroids because they are dangerous, but require that buyers have a valid prescription, we should institutionalize caution in how financial products can be used – and by whom.	简而言之，正如我们不会因为激素类药物有危险而彻底禁止之，但要求购买者持有一个有效的处方，我们应当将金融产品如何使用（以及适用于何人）的警告制度化。


This option could vastly shorten the list of products that will need to be banned outright.	而这个选项则能令需要彻底禁止的金融产品数量大大减少。


We should, however, avoid the medical convention whereby each product is either over-the-counter or prescription, regardless of who is buying the product.	然而我们也应当避免将金融产品像药品那样简单分为“非处方”或者“处方”的做法，不管购买者是谁。


In order to keep the system lean, there should be a provision for exempting some individuals and firms – those sophisticated enough to handle their own affairs, or well off enough to deal with financial failure – from the requirement of an RFP’s approval before buying a prescription financial product.	但为了维持系统的效率，也可以在请求专业人士批准之前对某些个人或者企业——只要他们有足够的应对能力来处理自身事务，有足够的财力来承担金融风险——予以豁免


The reason I argue for this provision is my positive experience in India, having recently moved here from the US.	我提出这类豁免的理由源自于最近从美国返回印度之后的经历。


A few months ago, I went to meet the owner of our local drugstore.	几个月前我找到了当地药店。


Without encumbering him with any prescription, I told him somewhat sheepishly that I was going on an extended foreign trip and wanted to keep a precautionary strip of antibiotic tablets with me.	我没有任何处方，因此只能尴尬地告诉老板说我的旅行日程忽然延长，因此想买一盒抗生素以备不时之需。


He looked me up and down, sized me up, and then said, “Since you are going for so long, I would suggest you keep two strips.”	他上下打量了我一下，想了想，然后说：“既然你要出差那么长时间，我建议你买两盒”。


President Bush Goes Soft	布什总统与软权力


The first term of George W. Bush’s presidency was marked by unilateralism and military power.	乔治· · W· · 布什的第一届总统任期是以单边主义和武力为特点的。


The United States was the world’s only superpower, so others had to follow.	美国是世界上唯一的超级大国，所以其他国家不得不言听计从。


The result was a dramatic decline in America’s “soft” or attractive power.	其结果是美国的“软”权力或者说是吸引性的权力被大为削弱了。


Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not know what soft power was.	国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德曾说他不知软权力为何物。


Now it is back in fashion in Washington.	而现在软权力又成为华盛顿的流行词汇。


Bush’s second inaugural address was devoted to the power of liberty and democracy.	布什第二篇就职演说的主题是自由和民主的力量。


Such rhetoric is not new to American presidents.	这样的言辞对美国总统来讲也并非新鲜。


Harry Truman spoke of defending free people everywhere, and Woodrow Wilson spoke of promoting democracy.	哈瑞·杜鲁门提到了捍卫全世界的自由民族，而伍德罗·威尔逊则宣扬推进民主。


The neo-conservatives in Bush’s first administration were in that tradition, but ignored the fact that both Wilson and Truman were also institution-builders who consulted other countries.	布什第一届任期内的新保守主义与这两者一脉相承，但却忽略了威尔逊和杜鲁门都是与他国协商的制度建立者这一事实。


In dropping that half of Wilson’s approach, they stepped on their own message, reducing its effectiveness.	在摒弃了威尔逊的这一半方略后，布什们在一定程度上践踏了自己的主张，使其效果大打折扣。


The tone at the beginning of the second Bush administration is different.	布什连任之初的执政基调有所不同。


As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said recently in Paris: “I use the word ‘power’ broadly, because even more important than military and indeed economic power is the power of ideas, the power of compassion, and the power of hope.”	正如国务卿赖斯最近在巴黎表示的：“我所说的‘权力’是广义的，因为往往比武力和经济实力更为重要的，是理念、同情和希望的力量。


Bush not only chose to visit Brussels, the capital of the European Union, on his February trip to Europe, but stated that what “we seek to achieve in the world requires that America and Europe remain close partners.”	”布什不仅选择在其二月份的欧洲之行中访问欧盟总部布鲁塞尔，他还声称“要达成我们在世界上所寻求的目标需要美国和欧洲保持紧密的伙伴关系”。


Even Rumsfeld is trying to be conciliatory!	就连拉姆斯菲尔德也努力表现出温和的一面！


Will Bush’s new approach succeed?	布什的新方略会成功吗？


On a recent trip to Europe, I encountered both encouragement and skepticism.	在最近的一次欧洲之行中，我遭遇了鼓励和怀疑两种态度。


Many people welcomed the new tone, but wondered if it was simply sugarcoated cynicism.	许多人对这种新基调表示欢迎，但又搞不清这是不是裹着糖衣的信口开河。


Words must be matched by deeds before people are convinced.	只有言行一致才能令人信服。


One place to look to see if deeds are forthcoming is in Bush’s latest budget.	布什是否光说不练，通过其最近的预算可见一斑。


The budget cuts discretionary spending (other than defense and homeland security) by nearly 1%, and slashes as many as 150 domestic programs.	预算将可自由支配的支出（而不是国防和国土安全方面的支出）削减了近百分之一，并砍掉了多达150个国内项目。


Yet, in this climate of fiscal stringency, he calls for increased contributions to international organizations, the Millennium Challenge Account to provide assistance to countries with a commitment to making progress in poverty reduction, and the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative.	然而，在这种财政紧缩的大气候中，他却呼吁增加对国际组织、和世纪挑战账户（Millennium Challenge Account）的投入，对承诺竭力扶助贫困的国家和全球HIV/艾滋项目提供援助。


Bush’s new budget also includes an increase in funding for public diplomacy.	布什的新预算还包括增加对民间外交的资助。


The allocation for the State Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs, including overseas research centers, libraries, and visitor programs, is boosted by nearly 25%.	对包括海外研究中心、图书馆和访问者项目在内的国务院教育和文化交流项目的拨款增加了近25%。


As Bush’s budget request to Congress puts it, “Rarely has the need for a sustained effort to ensure foreign understanding for our country and society been so clearly evident.”	正如布什在给国会的预算请求中所称“通过持续努力保证他国对我们国家和社会的谅解的需要从未如此清晰。


This comes after a first term in which public diplomacy was a neglected stepchild, and a Pentagon advisory panel summed up the situation as a “crisis.”	”这一切都是在布什第一届任期内公共外交沦为被人忽视的“拖油瓶”，以至于五角大楼的顾问委员会将这种情况归结为一场“危机”之后发生的。


Even with these increases, there is a long way to go to improve America’s standing.	即便有了这样的预算增长，美国要改善其目前的状况还是任重道远。


A recent non-partisan report by the Public Diplomacy Council called for a new Agency for Public Diplomacy within the State Department, 24-hour English-language broadcasts by the Voice of America, and a fourfold budget increase over the next five years.	最近由“公共外交协会”发表的一份非党派的报告呼吁在国务院内设立一个负责公共外交的新机构，“美国之音”开辟24小时的英语广播，及未来五年预算增长四倍。


The Bush administration still has much to do in promoting ideas, but early indications suggest a change from the neglect of the first term.	布什政府还需要花大力气推广其理念，但其第二任初期的变化表明上一任期的疏忽得到改善。


But it will not be enough for Bush to start his second term with grand rhetoric about values and increased investment in public diplomacy.	但布什仅以关于价值的高谈阔论和对公共外交的投入来开始第二任期是不够的。


A country’s attractiveness or soft power stems partly from its culture and values (where they are attractive to others), but it also grows out of a country’s policies when they are seen as legitimate, consultative, and inclusive of the interests of others.	一个国家的吸引力或软权力一部分来自他的文化和价值观（这些因素对他人的吸引力），但它同样也来源于一个国家公认合法的，协商性的，及包括他国利益的政策。


Unless the policies fit the values, the discrepancy will give rise to charges of hypocrisy.	政策必须与其价值观一致，否则任何的出入都会被人斥为伪善。


At a minimum, Bush will need to pursue policies – in a more consultative manner – that seek a political solution in Iraq and progress in the Israel-Palestine peace process.	布什至少需要以一种更具协商性的方式来寻求政治解决伊拉克问题和巴以和平进程的政策。


Here too, the early signs are encouraging.	初期的迹象令人鼓舞。