Ideally, other, more efficient means of supporting incomes at the bottom will be instituted at the same time that food and energy subsidies are cut.	在理想情况下，在裁减食品和能源补贴的同时，应该采取其他更高效的支持底层收入的措施。


Developing countries have learned a lot about efficient transfer mechanisms, from policy innovations, such as the conditional cash transfers of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades program or Brazil’s Bolsa Família, and from technological innovations such as India’s Unique Identification system.	发展中国家在有效转移机制方面已颇有学习经验，如墨西哥的进步-机会计划（Progresa-Oportunidades）和巴西的家庭补助金计划（Bolsa Família）等有条件现金转移支付政策创新，以及印度的唯一标识（Unique Identification）系统等技术创新。


But in countries where the adjustment does not come until a budget crisis forces it, there may be no money for transfers to cushion the pain.	但有的国家在预算危机来临是才被迫调整，它们也许没有钱可用于转移支付以将对痛苦。


The savvy politician should probably announce the unpleasant adjustment as soon as he takes office.	精明政客或许应该在执政伊始实施不受欢迎的调整。


Jokowi and Sisi seem to have adopted this approach.	佐科维和西西都采取了这一方针。


Modi, despite his huge electoral mandate and hype about market reforms, has fallen short.	而以市场改革为口号在选举中大获全胜的莫迪已经落后了。


Why the ECB Should Buy American	欧洲银行应该买美国


CAMBRIDGE – The European Central Bank needs to ease monetary policy further.	美国剑桥—欧洲央行需要进一步宽松货币政策。


Eurozone-wide inflation, at 0.8%, is below the target of “close to 2%,” and unemployment in most countries remains high.	泛欧元区通胀（0. 8%）低于“近2%”的目标，大部分国家的失业率也依然高企。


Under current conditions, it is hard for the periphery countries to reduce their costs to internationally competitive levels, as they need to do.	在当前环境下，外围国很难让成本降至具有所需的国际竞争力的水平。


If inflation in the eurozone as a whole is below 1%, the periphery countries are condemned to suffer painful deflation.	如果欧元区整体通胀低于1%，则外围国必将遭遇痛苦的通缩。


The question is how the ECB can ease policy, given that short-term interest rates are already close to zero. Most of the talk in Europe concerns proposals to undertake quantitative easing (QE), following the path taken by the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan.	问题在于，在短期利率已经接近于零的情况下，欧洲央行该如何放松货币政策，欧洲的大部分观点提出应该步美联储和日本银行的后尘采取量化宽松（QE）。


This would mean expanding the money supply by buying member countries’ government bonds – a realization of ECB President Mario Draghi’s “outright monetary transactions” scheme, announced in August 2012 in the midst of growing uncertainty about the euro’s future (but never used since then).	这意味着购买成员国政府债券以扩大货币供给，即实现欧洲央行行长德拉吉2012年8月在欧元区未来不确定性日增背景下提出（但从未真正动用过）的“直接货币交易”机制。


But QE would present a problem for the ECB that the Fed and other central banks do not face.	但QE会给欧洲央行带来美联储和其他央行不会面临的问题。


The eurozone has no centrally issued and traded Eurobond that the central bank could buy.	欧元区没有集中发行和交易的欧元债券可供欧洲央行购买。


(And the time to create such a bond has not yet come.)	（并且这种债券何时能成为现实还是未知数。


By purchasing bonds of member countries, the ECB would be taking implicit positions on their individual creditworthiness.	）如若购买成员国债券，欧洲央行就相当于间接肯定或否定了个别国家的信用。


That idea is not popular with the eurozone’s creditor countries.	这一方案在欧元区债权国并不受支持。


In Germany, ECB purchases of bonds issued by Greece and other periphery countries are widely thought to constitute monetary financing of profligate governments, in violation of the treaty under which the ECB was established.	在德国，欧洲央行购买希腊和其他外围国发行的债券的操作被广泛认为是向放纵政府提供货币融资，违反了欧洲央行据以建立的条约。


The German Constitutional Court believes that the OMT scheme exceeds the ECB’s mandate, though it has temporarily tossed that political hot potato to the European Court of Justice.	德国宪法法院认为，直接货币交易超越了欧洲央行的权限范围，尽管它暂时地把这个烫手的政治山芋抛给了欧洲法院。


The legal obstacle is not merely an inconvenience; it also represents a valid economic concern about the moral hazard that ECB bailouts present for members’ fiscal policies in the long term.	政治障碍不仅在于不方便，也彰显出一个合理的经济担忧，即欧洲央行的援助会造成成员国长期财政政策的道德风险。


That moral hazard – a subsidy for fiscal irresponsibility – was among the origins of the Greek crisis in the first place.	这一道德风险——对不负责任的财政的补贴——正是当初希腊危机的根源。


Fortunately, interest rates on Greek and other periphery-country debt have fallen sharply over the last two years.	幸运的是，希腊和其他外围国债务的利率在过去两年里有了大幅下降。


Since he took the helm at the ECB, Draghi has brilliantly walked the fine line required to “do whatever it takes” to keep the eurozone intact.	自德拉吉入主欧洲央行以来，他起到好处地“竭尽全力”保持着欧元区的完整。


(After all, there would be little point in upholding pristine principles if doing so resulted in a breakup, and fiscal austerity alone was never going to return the periphery countries to sustainable debt paths.)	（毕竟，如果坚持最初的原则造成欧元区解体，那么坚持也就毫无意义了，而财政紧缩决不可能让外围国重回可持续增长之路。


At the moment, there is no need to support periphery-country bonds, especially if it would flirt with illegality.	）现阶段，没有必要支持外围国债券，特别是这样做有违规之嫌时。


What, then, should the ECB buy if it is to expand the monetary base?	那么，如果欧洲央行想要扩张货币基础，应该买什么呢？


For several reasons, it should buy US treasury securities.	出于多条理由，它应该买美国国债。


In other words, it should go back to intervening in the foreign-exchange market.	换句话说，它应该回归干预外汇市场。


For starters, there would be no legal obstacles.	首先，这样做不存在法律障碍。


Operations in the foreign-exchange market are well within the ECB’s remit.	外汇市场操作在欧洲央行的权限范围内。


Moreover, they do not pose moral-hazard issues (unless one thinks of the long-term moral hazard that the “exorbitant privilege” of printing the world’s international currency creates for US fiscal policy).	此外，这样做也不会有道德风险（除非你考虑印刷世界国际储备货币的“过度特权”给美国财政政策造成的长期道德风险。


Finally, ECB purchases of dollars would help push down the euro’s exchange rate against the dollar.	）最后，欧洲央行购买美元有助于欧元对美元贬值。


Such foreign-exchange operations among G-7 central banks have fallen into disuse in recent years, partly owing to the theory that they do not affect exchange rates except when they change money supplies.	近几年来，G-7央行之间再也没有进行过此类外汇操作，部分是因为，在理论上，除非汇率改变了货币供给，否则它们不会干预汇率。


But in this case we are talking about an ECB purchase of dollars that would change the euro money supply.	但在这里，我们讨论的是欧洲央行购买可以改变欧元货币供给的美元。


The increase in the supply of euros would naturally lower their price.	欧元供给的增加自然会拉低欧元的价格。


Monetary expansion that depreciates the currency is more effective than monetary expansion that does not, especially when, as is the case now, there is very little scope for pushing short-term interest rates much lower.	促使汇率贬值的货币扩张比没有这一效果的货币扩张更加有效，特别是在无法进一步降低短期利率的情况下（目前就是如此）。


Depreciation of the euro would be the best medicine for restoring international price competitiveness to the periphery countries and reviving their export sectors.	欧元的贬值是重塑外围国国际价格竞争力和振兴它们的出口部门的最佳办法。


Of course, they would devalue on their own had they not given up their currencies for the euro ten years before the crisis (and if it were not for their euro-denominated debt).	当然，如果在危机发生十年前它们没有为了使用欧元而放弃本国货币（并且它们的债务也不是用欧元计价），那么它们还可以自主贬值。


If abandoning the euro is not the answer, depreciation by the entire eurozone is.	如果无法放弃欧元，那么只好让整个欧元区一起贬值。


The euro’s exchange rate has held up remarkably during the four years of crisis.	欧元汇率在危机的四年中令人注目地保持着坚挺。


Indeed, the currency appreciated further when the ECB declined to undertake any monetary stimulus at its March 6 meeting.	事实上，在欧洲央行在3月6日的会议上拒绝采取货币刺激后，欧元还有所升值。


Thus, the euro could afford to weaken substantially.	因此，欧元担得起大幅贬值。


Even Germans might warm up to easy money if it meant more exports.	即使德国也有可能给货币宽松开绿灯，如果这意味着增加出口的话。


Central banks should and do choose their monetary policies primarily to serve their own economies’ interests.	央行应该也确实主要根据自身经济利益选择货币政策。


But proposals to coordinate policies internationally for mutual benefit are fair.	但为了共同利益进行国际政策协调的方案也是公平的。


Raghuram Rajan, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India, has recently called for the advanced economies’ central banks to take emerging-market countries’ interests into account via international cooperation.	印度储备银行行长拉古兰·拉詹（Raghuram Rajan）最近呼吁发达经济体央行通过国际合作顾及新兴市场国家的利益。


ECB foreign-exchange intervention would fare well in this regard.	从这个角度讲，欧洲央行的汇率干预能起到很好的作用。


This year, the emerging economies are worried about a tightening of global monetary policy, not the policy loosening that three years ago fueled talk of “currency wars.”	今年，新兴经济体担心的是全球货币政策的紧缩，而不是三年前助长“货币战争”论的政策宽松。


As the Fed tapers its purchases of long-term assets, including US treasury securities, it is a perfect time for the ECB to step in and buy some itself.	随着美联储逐渐退出其长期资产（包括美国国债）买入计划，欧洲央行站出来购买美国国债正当其时。


Britain’s Populist Fantasies	英国的民粹主义幻想


LONDON – The election of Jeremy Corbyn as the new leader of the British Labour Party is a reminder that life is rich with paradox.	伦敦——杰瑞米·柯比当选为英国工党新领袖提醒我们生活到处充满了悖论。


Globalization – the web of travel, technology, trade, and information that binds the world ever more closely together – is hardly a new phenomenon.	全球化——即旅行、技术、贸易和信息网络使世界更加紧密地联系在一起——已经不再是什么新闻。


But politics in many developed democracies has lately been disrupted by populist insurgencies seeking to exit this shared reality.	但不少发达民主国家政治近来都遭到拒绝承认这一共同现实的民粹主义叛乱分子的破坏。


What these groups do not seem to recognize is that the alternative they wish for is a fantasy.	上述群体似乎并未意识到他们所心仪的选择仅仅是个幻觉。


From Syriza in Greece to the National Front in France, voters across Europe are being encouraged to believe in a virtual reality shaped by prejudice and uninformed nostalgia.	从希腊激进左翼联盟到法国国民阵线，民粹主义者鼓励欧洲选民相信由偏见和无知的留恋构成的一个虚拟现实。


In the United States, this mood first emerged several years ago, fueling the rise of the Tea Party and now enabling the splenetic presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and other Republican candidates who promise to seal America off from the twenty-first century.	几年前这种情绪在美国的首次出现助长了茶党崛起，现在又导致了唐纳德·特朗普和承诺将美国与21世纪隔绝的其他共和党候选人怨气冲天的总统竞选。


(The promise is to some extent literal: By building walls along the country’s northern and southern borders, the candidates would defend the American dream from outside contamination.)	（某种程度上这是个实际承诺：通过在美国南北边境线上修建隔离墙，候选人将捍卫美国梦想不受外来污染。 ）


The United Kingdom is the latest victim of this fantasy-driven populism.	英国是上述幻想民粹主义的最新受害者。


On the right, we have already suffered the rise of the anti-European, anti-immigrant UK Independence Party, led by the cigarette-smoking, beer-swilling joker Nigel Farage, in whom Britain has found its own version of Silvio Berlusconi, if you can imagine such a thing.	英国现在已经被迫面对反欧洲、反移民的英国独立党的崛起，想象一下，该党领导人是英国版的西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼，也就是抽着烟卷、喝着啤酒的小丑奈杰尔·法拉奇。


Now the British left has embraced a similar folly.	现在英国左翼也已经出现了类似的愚蠢行为。


The Labour Party’s defeat in May’s general election brought about the resignation of its leader, Ed Miliband, a courteous and intelligent figure who, having abandoned the middle ground once controlled by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, had failed to convince even his own party that he could run the country.	工党五月大选失败导致其领导人、聪明知礼的米利班德辞职，米利班德放弃了前首相布莱尔把持的中立地带，甚至无法说服所在政党自己具备管理国家的能力。


The campaign to choose his successor proceeded throughout the summer.	整个夏天都在竞选其继任者。


On the whole, the search was a pretty dismal business.	总体而言，寻找候选人的过程非常痛苦。


Three respectable, if uninspiring, former ministers vied for the position, but struggled to find a compelling message that connected the party of the left with modern Britain.	三名德高望重却缺乏亮点的前部长争夺这一职位，但却很难找到令人信任的口号把左翼党派和现代英国联系在一起。


Unsure of the right approach, they wavered somewhere between moderation and left-wing nonsense.	因为拿不准正确道路，他们在中庸和左翼胡言乱语间来回摇摆。


Such indecisiveness was not a problem for Corbyn, whose principal distinction in more than three decades in parliament has been voting against his own party more than 500 times on the grounds that its proposals were not socialist enough.	对柯比来说优柔寡断不是问题，他30多年议会生涯最主要的与众不同之处就在于因为提案不够社会化而投票反对自己的政党。


In fact, Corbyn made it onto the ballot only because a few MPs wanted to show that the Labour Party welcomed debate.	事实上，柯比进入表决阶段仅仅因为少数几位议员想向外界表明工党对争论持欢迎态度。


But his passionate advocacy of old-fashioned socialism quickly caught on, breathing new life – and drawing tens of thousands of new members – into a party that had been losing adherents in droves.	但他对老式社会主义的狂热宣传却迅速流行——令成千上万新党员对已失去众多追随者的政党趋之若鹜。


So what exactly are Corbyn’s proposals?	那么柯比的建议究竟是什么？


At home, he would nationalize industries, especially in energy, and raise taxes, especially on business and the wealthy.	他在国内提倡尤其是能源等行业国有化和对企业和富裕群体提高税收。


Any semblance of fiscal prudence would go out the window, with cuts in health, welfare, and education spending being reversed.	任何形式的财政审慎都会被彻底抛弃，并且逆转削减医疗、福利和教育支出。


Trade unions would regain the power they enjoyed before Margaret Thatcher’s reforms in the 1980s.	工会将得到20世纪80年代玛格丽特-撒切尔改革之前曾经有过的权力。


And public-sector workers would become the principal beneficiaries of the country’s spending programs.	而且公共部门从业人员将成为国内支出计划的主要受益者。


In foreign policy, Corbyn would slash defense spending and abandon the UK’s nuclear deterrent.	外交政策方面，柯比将削减国防开支和放弃英国核威慑。


He would blame virtually anything that went wrong in the world on America, which is, in his view, morally equivalent to Russia.	他会将世界上发生的一切问题都归咎于在他看来在道德上可与俄罗斯等量齐观的美国。


If a leader like the late Hugo Chávez, the architect of Venezuela’s “socialist revolution,” emerges, Corbyn would probably be on the next plane to meet him.	如果像已故的委内瑞拉“社会主义革命”设计者雨果·查韦斯那样的领导人出现，柯比很可能会登上下一班飞机去会见他。


Despite his radical views, Corbyn won the battle to lead Labour – and hence Britain’s parliamentary opposition, with nearly 60% of the vote.	尽管观点激进，但柯比赢得了工党领导权——也因此拥有了英国议会反对党近60%的选票。


But Labour will not win a general election under Corbyn – a reality that has caused some Conservatives to respond to his victory as though they had won the lottery.	但工党不会在柯比的领导下赢得大选——某些保守党人也因此在他获胜后表现得像是中了彩票。


In my view, however, no good will come from this insurrection for anyone.	但在我看来，这样的混乱对任何人都没有好处。


First, Corbyn will not be swept out of his job by an early display of public distaste and hostility.	首先，柯比不会因为刚开始出现的公众厌恶和敌意就丢掉工作。


On the contrary, at the outset, he may be able to galvanize many alienated young voters against a government that has earned wary respect but is not much liked.	相反，从一开始他就可能鼓动很多难以融入社会的年轻选民反对赢得了谨慎尊重但却不为人喜爱的政府。


Second, without effective and responsible opposition, governments can become arrogant, careless, and too focused on their own supporters.	其次，如果缺少负责有效的反对势力，政府可能变得傲慢、粗心和过度关注自己的支持者。


In this case, leaders of the Conservative Party’s far-right component are likely to think that they can dispense with offering disciplined support to Prime Minister David Cameron and his policies, because Labour can never win under Corbyn, anyway.	如果是这样，保守党极右翼部分领导人可能认为可以无需为首相戴维·卡梅伦及其政策提供无条件的支持，因为反正工党也不可能在柯比的领导下胜出。


Third, at some time over the next year, the UK will face a referendum over its membership in the European Union.	第三，明年某个时候，英国将为是否保留欧盟成员国资格进行全民公投。


While no one knows the position Corbyn will take on this issue, one can speculate that he, like some of the trade-union bosses who support him, might decide that the EU is a rich man’s club, thereby precluding the much-needed cross-party consensus in favor of continued membership.	虽然没人知道柯比在这个问题上的立场，但却可以推测他像支持他的某些工会老板一样，或许会将欧盟视为富人俱乐部，从而破坏保留欧盟成员国资格所迫切需要的跨党派的共识。


Fourth, Corbyn, who shares many of the political views of the Scottish nationalists, will make it more difficult to manage the question of Scotland’s place in the UK.	第四，与许多苏格兰民族主义者有着相同政治观点的柯比将加大英格兰管理苏格兰地位问题的难度。


Making common cause with the nationalists in policy matters will complicate the question of how best to deal with their constitutional aspirations.	在政策问题上与民族主义者站在一起将使处理其宪法诉求的问题进一步复杂化。


Fifth, there is a danger that the Conservative government, faced with irrational populist forces on both the left and the right, will shrink from its duty to stand up for good values and good sense.	第五，保守党政府面对荒谬的左右翼民粹主义势力从原来的行使职能退而坚持正确价值观的危险性始终存在。


But it is vital that, amid all the make-believe, there are still those who hammer home the simple truth that, no matter how much people wish for it, a country cannot decide simply to stop the world and get off.	但在一切乱象之下，重要的是仍有人坚持一个最简单的真理：即无论人们抱有多么迫切的愿望，一个国家也无法决定让世界停止运转，让自己下车。


Corbyn’s election underscores how many Britons are refusing to accept reality.	柯比的当选表明有太多英国人拒绝接受现实。


It is up to Cameron to end their dangerous reverie.	卡梅伦必须结束他们危险的遐想。


Taking Corbynomics Seriously	严肃对待科尔宾经济学


LONDON – Fiscal austerity has become such a staple of conventional wisdom in the United Kingdom that anyone in public life who challenges it is written off as a dangerous leftist.	伦敦—在英国，财政紧缩已成为传统智慧的一大标志，任何敢于在公开挑战这一智慧的人都会被扣上危险的左派的帽子。


Jeremy Corbyn, the current favorite to become the next leader of Britain’s Labour Party, is the latest victim of this chorus of disparagement.	目前最有希望成为英国工党下一任领导人的杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）便是这一“全民鄙视链”的最新受害者。


Some of his positions are untenable.	他的一些立场确实站不住脚。


But his remarks on economic policy are not foolish, and deserve proper scrutiny.	但他对经济政策的评论并不愚蠢，应该引起恰当的仔细思考。


Corbyn has proposed two alternatives to the UK’s current policy of austerity: a National Investment Bank, to be capitalized by canceling private-sector tax relief and subsidies; and what he calls “people’s quantitative easing” – in a nutshell, an infrastructure program that the government finances by borrowing money from the Bank of England.	科尔宾提出了两个取代英国当前紧缩政策的方案：一是成立一家国家投资银行，通过取消私人部门税收优惠和补贴筹集资本； 二是实施他所谓的“人民的量化宽松”——概而言之，即政府从英格兰银行借钱进行基础设施建设。


The first idea is neither extreme nor new.	第一个方案既不极端，也不新鲜。


There is a European Investment Bank, a Nordic Investment Bank, and many others, all capitalized by states or groups of states for the purpose of financing mandated projects by borrowing in the capital markets.	目前我们已经有了欧洲投资银行、挪威投资银行和其他许多投资银行，它们的资本来自国家或国家集团，目的是通过从资本市场借钱为指定项目融资。


The rationale for this type of institution derives from what that great socialist theorist Adam Smith called the state’s responsibility for the “erection and maintenance” of those “public works and institutions,” which, while of great advantage to society, would not profit private enterprise.	成立这类机构的理由可以追溯到伟大的社会主义理论家亚当·斯密所谓的国家有对那些“公共工程和机构”负有“兴建和维护”的责任，这些公共工程对社会非常有利，但无法令私人企业盈利。


In other words, the state should always have an investment function.	换句话说，国家永远都应该承担投资功能。


Delegating that function to a dedicated institution may have advantages for the presentation of the public accounts.	将这一功能委托给专门的机构有利于在公共账户上有所体现。


Today’s particular economic circumstances provide a second reason for establishing a National Investment Bank.	今天特殊的经济环境为成立国家投资银行提供了第二个理由。


In slump or even semi-slump conditions, a higher-than-normal proportion of private savings are held in cash or its nearest equivalent (short-term treasury bills).	在萧条或近乎萧条的环境下，比平常时期更高比例的私人存款亿现金或现金等价物（短期国债）持有。


A National Investment Bank could draw out these “idle savings” by issuing bonds for infrastructure development.	国家投资银行可以通过发行基础设施开发债券利用这些“闲置存款”。


Offering a small premium on government securities, such bonds would likely attract long-term investors like pension funds, which otherwise face zero or even negative real returns.	相对政府债券，这类债券提供较小的溢价，有望吸引退休基金等长期投资者，否则这类投资者将面临零甚至负实际回报。


For example, with a fiscal outlay of €21 billion ($23.3 billion), the European Investment Bank is set to finance investments worth at least €315 billion by 2017.	比如，在财政支出只有210亿欧元的情况下，到2017年，欧洲投资银行需要为至少3,150亿欧元的投资项目融资。


“People’s quantitative easing” is a more unorthodox – and a more interesting – version of this idea.	“人民的量化宽松”是比较非正统——也比较有趣——的观点。


Under conventional quantitative easing (QE), the central bank buys government securities from banks or corporations and relies on the extra cash that it “prints” to stimulate private spending.	在传统量化宽松下，央行从银行或公司买入政府债券，并依靠它所“印”的新增现金刺激私人支出。


But studies suggest that much of this money goes into speculative activity, risking asset bubbles, rather than being channeled into productive investment.	但研究表明这笔资金大量流入了投机活动，有可能引起资产泡沫，而没有被引入生产性投资。


An alternative would be to distribute the central bank’s newly issued money directly to housing associations, local councils, or national or regional investment banks – any organization that could carry out infrastructure projects.	一个替代方案是直接将央行新发货币分配给住房协会、地方委员会或国家或地区投资银行——只要是能进行基础设施投资的组织。


This is what Corbyn proposes.	这就是科尔宾的方案。


This idea of monetary financing of fiscal deficits (borrowing from the central bank, rather than from the bond markets) has a reputable pedigree.	这一用货币给财政赤字融资的想法（从央行而不是债券市场借钱）由来已久。


In a lecture to the Cass Business School in February 2012, Adair Turner, former Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, proposed it as an option if further borrowing from the markets were politically or financially impossible.	2012年2月，在卡斯商学院（Cass Business School）的演讲中，英国金融服务局前主席阿代尔·特纳（Adair Turner）指出，如果进一步从市场借钱在政治或金融上不可行，那么这也不失为一个选择。


Corbyn’s proposal, unlike orthodox monetary financing, would not add to the national debt – a major advantage.	科尔宾的方案不同于正统货币融资，它不会增加国民债务——这是其主要优点。


Orthodox QE – let’s call it “monetization one” – is intended to be reversed, with taxation used to raise the money to redeem the government bonds held by the central bank.	正统量化宽松——让我们称之为“货币化一号”——是有逆���操作的打算的，用税收筹集资金回购央行所持有的政府债券。


The expectation of future tax hikes could drive people to save part of the new money, rather than spend it.	未来税收增加的预期可能导致人们将一部分新增资金储蓄起来而不是花掉。


Unorthodox QE (“monetization two”) avoids this problem, because the central bank’s borrowing will not be repaid; central-bank assets net out against government liabilities.	非正统量化宽松（“货币化二号”）能避免这一问题，因为央行的借款不需要偿付； 央行资产冲抵政府负债。


That is why it should not be excluded a priori.	因此不应该先验地将它排除在外。


There is a strong case for monetization two in the eurozone, which faces zero growth and deflation.	有很好的理由认为面临零增长和通货紧缩的欧元区应该实施货币化二号。


Indeed, while the QE program unveiled by the European Central Bank in January consists mainly of sovereign-debt purchases, the ECB will also buy debt issued by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank – key elements of monetization two.	事实上，尽管欧洲央行在1月所实施的量化宽松计划主要是买入主权债务，但欧洲央行也会购买欧盟委员会和欧洲投资银行发行的债务——这正是货币化二号的关键要素。


It will thus help to finance infrastructure investment.	因此，这有助于为基础设施融资。


But it is hardly the case that the UK economy, currently growing at close to 3% a year, needs a further QE program of any kind right now.	但英国经济并非如此，目前英国经济增长率每年不到3%，需要立刻采取任何形式的进一步量化宽松。


The government can borrow all it wants from the bond markets at near-zero interest rates.	政府可以以近零利率从债券市场借到任何它想借的资金。


Outsourcing such borrowing power to a National Investment Bank is merely a way to signal that any additional borrowing will be used for investment, not for current spending.	将这一借款权外包给国家投资银行只是一个释放信号的办法，表明任何新增借款都会被用于投资，而不会被用于当前支出。


There are two solid arguments for activating such an institution in the UK today.	有两个有根据的理由应该在英国成立这样一个机构。


First, the share of private investment in GDP is still below its pre-crash level of around 11% of GDP.	首先，私人投资占GDP的比重仍低于危机前水平（约为11%）。


This suggests that investors lack confidence in the durability of the recovery.	这表明投资者对于复苏能否持续缺少信心。


Second, depending on the institution’s mandate, a state-led investment program offers a way to rebalance the British economy away from private speculative activity to long-term investment in sustainable growth, and away from the south-east to the midlands and the north of England.	其次，依托该机构取得的权限，国家领导的投资项目提供了一条英国经济再平衡之路，从私人投机性活动向可持续增长的长期投资转型； 从东南向中部和北英格兰转型。


In short, it offers a way to address the problem of “private affluence and public squalor” that John Kenneth Galbraith identified in the 1950s.	简言之，它提供了一个办法解决约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）在20世纪50年代所发现的 “私人丰裕而公共穷酸”的问题。


Corbyn should be praised, not castigated, for bringing to public attention these serious issues concerning the role of the state and the best ways to finance its activities.	科尔宾将这些事关国家角色以及国家行为最佳融资办法的严肃的问题摆在了公共面前，他应该因此受到赞扬而不是苛责。


The fact that he is dismissed for doing so illustrates the dangerous complacency of today’s political elites.	他为此去职，这一事实表明了当今政治精英的危险的自负。


Millions in Europe rightly feel that the current economic order fails to serve their interests.	数百万欧洲人正确地感觉到当前经济秩序已不再符合他们的利益。


What will they do if their protests are simply ignored?	如果反对被完全忽视，他们会怎么做？


Jeremy Lin and the Political Economy of Superstars	林书豪与超级巨星的政治经济学


CAMBRIDGE – The biggest news around Cambridge in recent weeks has been Jeremy Lin, the Harvard economics graduate who has shocked the National Basketball Association by rising overnight from “nowhere” to become a genuine star, leading a losing New York Knicks team to an unlikely string of victories.	发自剑桥——剑桥这几个星期的大新闻都是关于林书豪的，这位哈佛经济学毕业生仿佛在一夜之间从无名小卒崛起成为真正的超级巨星，不但令整个美国国家篮球联盟（NBA）为之一振，也为弱旅纽约尼克斯队带来了一连串的胜利。


Lin’s success is delicious, partly because it contradicts so many cultural prejudices about Asian-American athletes.	林书豪的成功之所以如此令人刮目相看，在很大程度上是因为他打破了人们对亚裔美籍运动员的文化偏见。


Flabbergasted experts who overlooked Lin have been saying things like “he just didn’t look the part.”	那些原本忽视林书豪的专家们纷纷说“他看上去不像那种（能成名的）人。


Lin’s obvious integrity and graciousness has won him fans outside the sport as well.	”而林书豪那种溢于言表的诚恳谦和也为他赢得了许多赛场之外的粉丝。


The whole world has taken note, with Lin being featured on the cover of Sports Illustrated for two consecutive issues. The NBA, which has been trying to build brand recognition and interest in China, is thrilled.	当他连续两期登上《体育画报》的封面时，全世界也为之瞩目，也令致力于在中国树立品牌形象以及关注度的NBA大喜过望。


I confess to being a huge Lin fan.	坦白说，我也是林书豪的粉丝。


Indeed, my teenage son has been idolizing Lin’s skills and work ethic ever since Lin starred on the Harvard team.	事实上，我儿子早在林书豪为哈佛大学队打球的时候就对他的球技和职业道德崇拜不已。


But, as an economist observing the public’s seething anger over the “one percenters,” or individuals with exceptionally high incomes, I also see a different, overlooked facet of the story.	但在以一个经济学家身份观察公众对那“1%的富人”或是收入极高者不断升温的愤怒之时，我也发现了这个成功故事中某些与众不同且被忽视的事实。


What amazes me is the public’s blasé acceptance of the salaries of sports stars, compared to its low regard for superstars in business and finance.	令我吃惊的是公众对体育明星的高昂薪水具有某种近乎漠不关心的认同，却对那些商业或者金融界翘楚评价很低。


Half of all NBA players’ annual salaries exceed $2 million, more than five times the threshold for the top 1% of household incomes in the United States.	大多数NBA篮球名星的年薪都超过200万美元，比进入那1%高收入美国家庭的门槛值还高5倍。


Because long-time superstars like Kobe Bryant earn upwards of $25 million a year, the average annual NBA salary is more than $5 million.	由于象科比·布莱恩特这样的超级明星每年都有近2500万美元进账，因此NBA球员的平均年薪已经超过500万美元。


Indeed, Lin’s salary, at $800,000, is the NBA’s “minimum wage” for a second-season player.	相比之下林书豪的年薪只有80万美元，对于一个第二年打NBA的球员来说只算是“最低工资”。


Presumably, Lin will soon be earning much more, and fans will applaud.	不难想象，林书豪的工资肯定会大涨，而粉丝们也会对此大加赞许。


Yet many of these same fans would almost surely argue that CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, whose median compensation is around $10 million, are ridiculously overpaid.	但这些粉丝中的许多人都肯定会质疑那些花红中位数在1000万美元左右的世界五百强企业CEO们，认为他们收取了极不合理的报酬。


If a star basketball player reacts a split-second faster than his competitors, no one has a problem with his earning more for every game than five factory workers do in a year.	如果一名篮球运动员的动作能比他的对手快那么零点几秒，没人会质疑他打一场球的收入比5名工厂工人的年薪还多。


But if, say, a financial trader or a corporate executive is paid a fortune for being a shade faster than competitors, the public suspects that he or she is undeserving or, worse, a thief.	但如果一个金融交易员或者一个企业主管能令自己的企业比竞争者领先一步，公众却怀疑他/她根本不够格领这份高薪，甚至将其视为小偷。


Economists have long studied the economics of superstars in fields where a company can lever enormously the decisions of a small number of individuals, making them valuable in a way that someone who can, say, chop down trees like the legendary Paul Bunyan, is not.	经济学家们一直都在研究那些经济界巨子，在某些领域中一个企业可以将一小批人的决策极度放大，并使之取得一种即便是传说中的伐木巨人保罗·班扬（Paul Bunyan）这样的个体都无法实现的价值。


But the political economy of what levels of income differences countries will tolerate remains uncharted territory.	但对各国究竟可以容忍何种程度的收入差距的政治经济学研究却依然是一片空白。


Of course, there is a certain logic to the public’s disdain for superstar compensation outside of professional sports and entertainment.	当然，公众对体育娱乐之外的高收入者巨额花红的鄙视背后也有一个较为确定的逻辑。


This is especially the case in some areas of finance that are essentially zero-sum games, in which one person’s gain is another’s loss.	尤其是在某些本质上是零和博弈，一个人赚的钱必定来自他人损失的金融领域。


There are other areas, such as technology, in which someone like Apple’s late founder, Steve Jobs, arguably delivers real innovation and quality, rather than just employing lawyers and lobbyists to maintain a monopoly position.	还有其他领域也是例外，比如科技，就像苹果公司已故的创立者史蒂夫·乔布斯那样能为公众传递货真价实的创新和高质量，而不是雇佣一帮律师和国会游说者来维持自己的垄断地位。


As a basketball fan, I would not describe the sport as a zero-sum game, even though one team wins and one team loses. The best players have huge creative flair.	作为一个篮球迷，我不会将这项运动视为一种零和博弈，即便某一支队的赢球必然是构筑在另一支队的输球之上的。


But so do some “street ball” players who excel in slam-dunk theatrics; perhaps because they are not tall enough to compete, they make almost nothing.	那些最顶尖的球员确实拥有极大的创造性天赋，但其实一些擅长扣篮表演的“街球”运动员也有； 或许他们的身高无法跟他人竞争，所以也赚不到什么钱。


Do fans tolerate outsize sports incomes because players are role models?	那么粉丝们是否因为球员所起到的模范作用而容忍他们的巨额收入？


Many certainly are, but not all high-paid sports celebrities are exemplary citizens.	在这方面当然有许多球员以身作则，但不是所有高薪体育明星都是模范公民。


Michael Vick, a star quarterback in the US National Football League, served time in prison for running a vicious dog-fighting operation, and arrests of players on charges ranging from illegal possession of drugs and weapons to domestic battery have been a regular occurrence.	比如美国国家橄榄球联盟（NFL）的明星四分卫迈克尔·维克就由于组织残忍的斗狗比赛而入狱，还经常有一些球员因非法持有毒品/武器或者家庭暴力而被捕。


And, back on the field or court, serious infractions occur all the time.	此外某些严重犯规事件在运动场上也时有发生。


Think of Zinedine Zidane’s infamous head butt in the 2006 football World Cup.	回想2006年世界杯上齐达内对对手的那一记著名的冲顶。


In the NBA itself, a star player, Ron Artest, was suspended for the remainder of the 2004 season after going into the stands and brawling with heckling fans during a game. (Artest has now changed his name to Metta World Peace, perhaps in response.)	还有NBA自己的明星球员罗恩·阿泰斯特（Ron Artest）曾因在2004赛季的一场比赛中冲上观众席与球迷扭打而遭停赛——他如今将自己的名字改成爱·世界和平（Metta World Peace），或许是为了改过自新吧。


Moreover, sports teams surely lobby governments as aggressively as any big business.	此外，体育运动队对政府的游说肯定跟任何大企业一样无所不用其极。


Professional sport is a legislated monopoly in most countries, with top teams extracting free stadiums and other privileges from host cities.	在大多数国家职业体育都是一个合法垄断的行业，那些著名球队都能从所在城市得到免费运动场或者其他特权。


Indeed, Lin’s story, it should be remembered, grew out of a huge labor dispute between the NBA’s billionaire owners and its millionaire players over division of the league’s nearly $4 billion in annual revenues – more than many countries’ national income.	事实上，请一定要记住林书豪的故事是在NBA亿万富翁球队老板和百万富翁球员之间关于如何分配每年40亿美元收入的争端中凸显出来的——这笔钱可比许多国家的年度GDP还要高。


As the late University of Chicago economist Sherwin Rosen postulated, globalization and changing communication technologies have increasingly made the economics of superstars important in a variety of fields.	正如已故芝加哥大学经济学家舍温·罗森（Sherwin Rosen）所假设的那样，全球化和信息交流技术的变革逐渐令明星经济在许多领域变得重要。


That is certainly true in sports and entertainment, but it is also the case in business and finance.	这在体育和娱乐方面肯定是没错的，但在商业和金融方面其实也是如此。


I wish Lin a long and successful career as a superstar, though he will have already had a huge cultural impact even if his success proves meteoric.	我希望林书豪能有一个持久而光辉的职业生涯，虽然他的迅速串红已经带来了巨大的文化冲击。


One can hope that, as Asian-Americans continue to break barriers in other arenas – they remain under-represented among corporate CEOs, for example – these rising superstars will be greeted with similar acclaim.	我们可以预计，随着亚裔美国人继续在其他竞技场上冲破重重障碍——比如担任企业CEO方面——这些崛起的超级巨星们也会的到同样的赞誉。


If the public is not happy about high superstar incomes, the obvious remedy is to improve the tax system, including for powerful sports-team owners, many of whom benefit from huge tax breaks in their day jobs. Who knows?	如果公众对这些超级明星的高收入感到不满意，最明显的应对方法就是改善税务系统，其中包括许多财鸿势大的运动队老板，谁知道他们中的许多人每天从巨额逃税中赚取了多少好处呢？


With a more level playing field, superstars outside sports and entertainment might find themselves a bit better appreciated.	可见如果能建立一个更公正平等的赛场，体育和娱乐界之外的明星都会发现自己得到了更多的赞赏。


Jihad or Murder?	圣战还是谋杀？


It is remarkable that some of the most critical concepts of Muslim religious terminology have now become part of the international language of current affairs.	穆斯林宗教词汇中一些最关键的概念成为国际时事的常用词是一个令人瞩目的现象。


Questions drawn from Islamic theology are discussed freely by the world public, engaging specialists and non-specialists, Muslims and non-Muslims.	从伊斯兰神学中抽出的问题在世界公众中被广泛讨论，吸引了专家和大众，穆斯林和非穆斯林。


Theological disputation has moved far from Islam’s religious academies.	神学的争论早已不局限在伊斯兰宗教学府之中。


For example, the term jihad, commonly translated as “holy war,” has become nearly ubiquitous.	例如，“jihad”一词，通常被译作“圣战”，现在已经可说是无处不在了。


Though conceived in early Muslim history as a means of spreading God’s word, Muslim scholars today distinguish between two kinds of jihad – one being an internal struggle against temptation, and the other a physical conflict against an aggressor who threatens the survival or the fundamental rights of a Muslim community.	虽然在它最早出现在穆斯林历史上时，意指一种传播神谕的方式。 当今的穆斯林学者们将两种“jihad”区分开来—一种是抗拒诱惑的内心斗争，而另一种则是针对威胁穆斯林社会的生存或根本权利的入侵者的斗争。


In this context, there is widespread rejection of the fundamentalists’ use of the term.	在这种情况下，原教旨主义者对该词的使用普遍不被认同。


Numerous Muslim scholars have raised their voices to challenge the terrorists’ defense of suicide bombings or attacks on civilians, offering long citations from centuries of religious jurisprudence.	无数的穆斯林学者都从几个世纪以来的宗教法律中引经据典，高声质问恐怖分子对其自杀式炸弹和对平民的攻击的辩护。


In itself, this approach represents a worthy expression of collective conscience in opposition to the terrorists.	这种质问本身就是反对恐怖分子的集体良知的可贵表现。


But many among the public and in the media want more.	但公众和媒体要求的还要更多。


Muslim intellectuals are being encouraged to press the religious argument against fundamentalist violence in order to deprive the terrorists of their most fearsome and potent arguments.	穆斯林知识分子们被鼓励以宗教理论来驳斥原教旨主义的暴力，从而使恐怖分子失去最可怕和有力的理论支持。


If Muslim scholars can somehow disprove these arguments, it is thought, then the terrorists’ ability to sustain their violent underground will be reduced.	人们认为如果穆斯林的学者能够推翻他们的论点，那么恐怖分子们维持其暴力地下活动的能力就会减弱。


Is this right?	果真如此吗？


A quick survey of the history of religious conflict shows that theological controversies have never been resolved by theological arguments.	对宗教冲突的历史进行一个快速的调查就会发现神学争论从来就不是神学争端的解决之道。


Looking more closely, one finds that while these controversies were often framed in religious terms, they were not at all about religion.	进一步仔细考察，我们会发现这些以宗教语汇表达的争议其实与宗教根本没有关系。


The range of opposing interpretations of religious texts is virtually unlimited, and disputes are seldom resolved by rational argument.	对宗教经典相互矛盾的诠释可以是无休止的，而这些争端极少能通过理性辩论来解决。


In earlier times, such controversies were decided by political authorities, which used military force to impose one particular point of view at the expense of all others.	在早期，这样的争议要由政治权威来评判。 当权者使用武力，以压制其他观点为代价来树立某种观点。


Muslim history is full of such cases.	穆斯林的历史中，这样的例子不胜枚举。


Recently, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he found scholars who raised theological arguments on his behalf.	当萨达姆·侯赛因最近一次入侵科威特时，他御用了一些提出神学观点为他代言的学者。


The coalition confronting him had no difficulty finding religious arguments that led to precisely the opposite conclusion.	与他对抗的联军也毫不费力地找到了相应的神学论点，从而得出正好相反的结论。


Today, it is clear that fundamentalists and their supporters are completely closed off to even the most elaborate theological refutation of their views, even when produced by distinguished religious authorities.	当今，非常清楚的一点就是原教旨主义者及其支持者们对驳斥他们观点的，哪怕是最详尽的神学论述也完全充耳不闻。 即便是这些驳斥来自于德高望重的宗教权威，情况也是如此。


The first reflex of the fundamentalists is to withdraw from the mainstream, to build around themselves a shell that is impervious to any logic other than their own.	原教旨主义者们的第一反应就是从主流退却，并将自己包裹在一层外壳当中，使任何与己相左的逻辑都无法穿透。


The most essential questions that humans face today – those that engender the deepest conflicts – have nothing to do with theology.	人类当今面临的最本质的一些问题—那些引发最深层次冲突的问题—都与神学无关。


They concern disputes over territory, political power, definitions of rights, and distribution of wealth.	与之相关的是领土争端、政治权力、权力定义和财富分配。


The means of discussing these questions is known to all and is expressed in all religions and all languages.	探讨这些问题的方式人尽皆知，在所有的宗教和语言中也有所表达。


The evils most deeply resented – in all societies – are injustice, despotism, corruption, and poverty.	最令人痛恨的邪恶—在任何社会之中—都是不公正、专制、腐败和贫困。


We all understand what these mean, and how certain people must live with them on a daily basis.	我们都明白这些意味着什么，也知道人们如何在日常生活中免不了要为其所困。


Why, then, do we follow the fundamentalists to the very heart of their madness?	那么，为什么我们还要跟随原教旨主义者到他们疯狂的根源呢？


Allowing them to frame these problems in religious terms legitimizes the perspective that they are attempting to impose, particularly in their own societies.It also allows them to camouflage their very worldly thirst for power.	允许他们将这些问题宗教化，就使那些他们一直企图强加于人的观点合法化了。 这在他们各自的社会中更是如此。


Repeatedly, the Muslim religious establishment has been urged to issue statements denying fundamentalists the right to use religious terms like jihad.	国际社会反复敦促穆斯林宗教组织发布声明，剥夺原教旨主义者使用“圣战”一类宗教词汇的权利。


But experience has proven that this approach leads nowhere.	但经验告诉我们这样的做法不会有结果。


In fact, debates about the use of religious terms lend credibility to fundamentalist efforts to apply these ideas to conditions in the modern world.	事实上，关于使用宗教词汇的辩论反倒为原教旨主义者们在现代世界的条件下使用这些理念提供了可信度。


Such debates concede that these religious concepts are generally valid, even when, as in the fundamentalists’ case, they simply do not apply.	这样的辩论承认即便是在不适用于原教旨主义者的情况下，这些宗教理念通常还是有效的。


As a result, the entire discussion could easily backfire.	最终，整场讨论的结果很可能会适得其反。


Invariably, fundamentalists dismiss religious critiques of their views as evidence that religious authorities have been corrupted by hostile influences.	原教旨主义者总是将对他们观点的批评作为宗教权威被敌对势力腐化的证据而置之不理。


In this way, the terrorists oppose the “purity” and “authenticity” of their arguments to the compromises presumably forced upon religious establishments.	如此一来，恐怖分子们就能将自己观点的“纯粹”和“真实”作为反驳被认为是强加于宗教组织的妥协的论点。


Speaking to Muslims exclusively in their own religious terms also excludes them from broad ethical frameworks that defend essential human values, most notably the protection of innocent civilians.	仅用穆斯林自己的宗教语汇和他们沟通还会将他们从更广泛的道德伦理框架中排除出去。 这些框架捍卫着基本的人类价值观，其中最明显的就是保护无辜平民。


These values are the foundation upon which all religious and cultural traditions rest.	这些价值观是所有宗教和文化传统的立身之本。


To be sure, it is important to understand the discourse of those who are making war on societies – their own societies first and foremost.	为了确认一点，了解那些向社会宣战的人的观点就尤为重要。 他们身处的社会总是首当其冲。


But adopting the terrorists’ interpretation of events conceals the reality of this conflict.	但接受恐怖分子对这些事件的诠释就会掩饰这场冲突的真相。


Instead of fighting on behalf of political and religious liberty, we risk engaging in a conflict with the false images that the terrorists have created.	我们会冒在恐怖分子制造的假象影响下，卷入这场冲突的风险，而不会为政治和宗教自由而战。


Worse still, we would bring this conflict into our own societies, where different religious and cultural traditions are now inextricably mingled.	更糟糕的是，我们会将这场冲突带���我们自己的社会当中，而在我们的社会里，不同宗教以及文化传统已经不可分离地混合了。


There is simply no need to look to theology to call a crime by its proper name.	我们完全没有必要为了给某种罪行定名而求助于神学。


The revulsion provoked by the murder of innocents is deeply felt by all, and it is reprehensible by any standard, religious or not.	所有人对谋杀无辜者的行为都深恶痛绝。 这样的行为不论是以宗教还是非宗教的标准来看，都应受到谴责。


It may even be that religious language does not adequately express the repulsion we all feel toward the terrorists’ actions.	宗教词汇甚至还不足以表达我们对恐怖主义行径的厌恶。


No feeling of victimhood can justify, under any conditions, such crimes against innocents, and no theology can accept the negation of the human essence that we all share.	在任何情况下，任何受害者的情感也不能成为对无辜者施暴的借口。 任何的神学都不能接受对我们共有的人性本质的否定。


Big Data for Poor Students	穷学生的大数据


WASHINGTON, DC – Countries need skilled and talented people to generate the innovations that underpin long-term economic growth.	华盛顿—国家需要高技能人才产生推动长期经济增长的创新。


This is as true in developed as it is in developing economies.	发达国家和发展中国家莫不如此。


But it will not happen without investment in education and training.	但这只有通过教育和培训投资才能实现。


If we are to end poverty, reduce unemployment, and stem rising economic inequality, we must find new, better, and cheaper ways to teach – and on a vast scale.	如果我们想终结贫困、减少失业、阻止经济不平等性升高，我们就需要找到更新、更好、更便宜并且是大规模庞的教学方式。


This goal may seem to be beyond even wealthier countries’ means; but the intelligent collection, analysis, and use of educational data could make a big difference.	这一目标或许连富国都难以实现； 但聪明地收集、分析和利用教育数据可以带来大不同。


And, fortunately, we live in an age in which information technology gives us the right tools to broaden access to high-quality, affordable education.	此外，幸运的是，在我们生活的时代，信息科技给了我们合适的工具拓展了获得高质量、可负担教育的途径。


Big data – high-volume, complex data sets that businesses use to analyze and predict consumer behavior – can provide teachers and companies with unprecedented amounts of information about student learning patterns, helping schools to personalize instruction in increasingly sophisticated ways.	大数据——企业用来分析和预测消费者行为的大量复杂数据集——可以为教师和公司提供前所未有的关于学生学习方式的信息，帮助学校以日渐成熟的方式实现个性化教学。


The World Bank Group and its private-sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), are trying to harness this potential to support national education systems.	世界银行集团及其私人贷款部门国际金融公司（IFC）正在试图将这一潜能用于支持国民教育体系。


A recently launched initiative, called the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER), collects and shares comparative data on educational policies and institutions from countries around the world.	最新推出的改善教育的系统方法（Systems Approach for Better Education Results ，SABER）计划收集和共享各国教育政策和机构的可比数据。


In the private sector, the ability to collect information about teacher-student interaction, and interaction between students and learning systems, can have a profound impact.	在私人部门，收集师生互动和学生-学习系统互动信息的能力能带来深远影响。


In Kenya, for example, Bridge International Academies is using adaptive learning on a large scale.	比如，在肯尼亚，布里奇国际研究院（Bridge International Academies，BIA）正在大规模使用适应性学习。


An IFC client founded by three American entrepreneurs, Bridge runs 259 nursery and primary schools, with monthly tuition averaging $6.	BIA是一家由三家美国企业建立的IFC客户机构，运营着259家幼儿园和小学，平均月度学费为6美元。


It is a massive learning laboratory for students and educators alike.	这是面向学生和教育者的大规模学习实验。


Bridge tests different approaches to teaching standard skills and concepts by deploying two versions of a lesson at the same time in a large number of classrooms.	BIA测试教授标准技能和概念的不同方法。 它在大量班级同时部署两个版本的课程。


The lessons are delivered by teachers from standardized, scripted plans, via tablets that also track how long the teachers spend on each lesson.	课程由教师根据标准��书面教案讲授，并通过平板电脑追踪教师每个版本的授课时间。


Exam results are recorded on the teacher’s tablet, with more than 250,000 scores logged every 21 days.	考试结果保存在教师的平板电脑中，每21天会录入250,000多项分数。


From these data, Bridge’s evaluation team determines which lesson is most effective and distributes that lesson throughout the rest of the Academy’s network.	从这些数据中，BIA评估团队分析出哪个版本的课程最有效，并在BIA网络中的其他学校推广这个版本的课程。


We know that a host of issues can cause a student’s performance to decline – scorching summer heat in classrooms without air conditioning, problems at home, or poor-quality teachers, to name a few.	我们知道，一系列问题可能造成学生表现下降——夏季无空调教室的高温、家庭问题、教师质量欠佳，等等。


But when one gathers results on a large scale, variables flatten out, and the important differences emerge.	但当你大规模收集结果时，变量就会扁平化，重要的区别会浮现出来。


That is the great value of big data.	这就是大数据的重大意义。


Another case is SABIS, a provider of K-12 education in the United States, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.	另一个例子是SABIS。 SABIS在美国、欧洲、亚洲、中东和北非提供K-12教育。


SABIS mines large data sets to ensure high standards and enhance academic performance for more than 63,000 students.	SABIS挖掘大数据以确保高标准，增进63,000多名学生的学习成绩。


Continuous tracking of annual student academic performance yields more than 14 million data points that are used to shape instruction, achieve learning objectives, and ensure consistency across the company’s network of schools in 15 countries.	对学生年度学习成绩的持续追踪产生了1,400多万个数据点，这些数据点被用来确定教学方案、实现学习目标以及确保公司分布在15个国家的学校网络的一致性。


Knewton, an adaptive learning platform that personalizes digital courses using predictive analytics, is another company at the forefront of the data revolution.	Knewton公司是另一家居于数据革命前列的公司。 该公司是一家适应性学习平台，用预测分析实现数字资源的个性化。


With tailored content and instruction, even classrooms without private-school resources can provide individual learning.	有了量身定做的内容和说明，即便不具备私立学校资源的学校也可以提供个体学习。


As a result, teachers spend their time in the most effective way possible – solving problems with students – instead of delivering undifferentiated lessons.	结果，教师可以将时间用在效果最好的方式上——与学生一起解题——而不是无差别地授课。


These benefits do not come without risk.	这些好处并不是没有风险的。


We are only beginning to grapple with how big data’s tremendous potential for learning can be harnessed while protecting students’ privacy.	我们才刚刚开始领会大数据可以在保护学生隐私的基础上提供多么大的学习潜力。


In some cases, data-collection technology is outpacing our ability to decide how it should be collected, stored, and shared.	在一些情形中，数据收集技术已经超越了我们确定数据应该如何收集、储存和共享的能力。


No matter how rigorously data are secured, there is still a need for a clear licensing structure for its use.	无论数据保护的力度多大，我们都需要明确的许可制度规范数据的使用。


In many developing countries, there are no regulations for data privacy at all.	在许多发展中国家，根本没有关于数据隐私方面的监管措施。


The interface between data and education holds the promise of new educational products for improved learning, with large potential benefits, especially for the poor.	数据和教育之间的接口是新教育产品的关键，这些新教育产品可以改善学习效果，带来巨大的好处，特别是对穷国来说。


To realize those benefits – and to do so responsibly – we must ensure that data collection is neither excessive nor inappropriate, and that it supports learning.	要实现这些好处——并且以负责任的方式实现——我们必须确保数据收集恰到好处并且支持学习。


The private sector, governments, and institutions such as the World Bank Group need to formulate rules for how critical information on student performance is gathered, shared, and used.	私人部门、政府和世界银行集团等机构需要制定关于如何收集、共享和使用学生表现方面的关键数据的规则。


Parents and students deserve no less.	这是家长和学生应得的。


From War to Work	从战争到就业


OXFORD – There is no denying that conflict has far-reaching negative effects, including on employment.	牛津——不可否认冲突对包括就业形势在内的方方面面都能产生深远的负面影响。


But the prevailing understanding of the relationship between conflict and employment does not fully recognize the complexity of this relationship – a shortcoming that undermines effective employment policies in fragile states.	但对冲突和就业关系的普遍理解却并未充分体现其中的复杂性——这样的缺陷阻碍了脆弱国家制定有效的就业政策。


The conventional wisdom is that conflict destroys jobs.	传统观点是冲突对就业起损害作用。


Moreover, because unemployment can spur more conflict, as unemployed young people find validation and economic rewards in violent movements, job creation should be a central part of post-conflict policy.	不仅如此，失业年轻人在暴力活动中寻找自我价值和经济回报可能使失业引发进一步冲突，因此创造就业机会应当是后冲突期的核心政策。


But, while this certainly sounds logical, these assumptions, as I detailed in a 2015 paper, are not necessarily entirely accurate.	尽管这听上去完全合乎逻辑，但我在2015年一篇论文中提到这些假设并不一定是完全准确的。


The first assumption – that violent conflicts destroy jobs – ignores the fact that every conflict is unique.	第一种假设——即暴力冲突破坏就业——忽略了每一次冲突都各有特色。


Some, like the 2008-2009 Sri Lankan civil war, are concentrated in a relatively small area, leaving much of the country – and thus the economy – unaffected.	有些，比如2008到2009年的斯里兰卡内战集中在相对较小的区域，从而导致该国大部分地区（以及经济）并未受到影响。


Even endemic conflicts, like the recurrent conflicts in the Congo, might not have a major impact on net employment.	就连刚果那样不间断的地方性冲突也有可能不对就业状况造成重要影响。


After all, the jobs that are lost in, say, the public sector or among commodity exporters may be largely offset by new jobs in government and rebel armed forces, informal production substituting for imports, and illegal activities like drug production and smuggling.	毕竟，在公共部门或产品出口商那里丧失的工作机会可以很大程度上在政府及反叛力量的新增就业机会那里得到补偿。 非正规生产代替进口，此外，新增就业机会还部分来源于毒品生产和走私等非法活动。


Likewise, the second assumption – that unemployment is a major cause of violent conflict – misses crucial nuances.	同样，第二种假设——即失业是暴力冲突的主要原因——并没有考虑到关键的微妙之处。


For starters, the formal sector accounts for just a fraction of total employment in most conflict-affected countries.	首先，正规行业在绝大多数受冲突影响的国家仅占就业总体份额的一小部分。


The majority of working people are in the informal sector, often engaged in low-status, low-productivity, and low-incomes activities that can, just like unemployment, generate dissatisfaction and potentially motivate young people to join violent movements.	绝大多数就业人口都集中在非正规行业，往往从事低社会地位、低生产率和低收入的工作。 这样的工作就像失业一样，可以带来不满并有可能促使年轻人参加暴力活动。


Given this, simply expanding formal-sector employment is not enough, unless it also improves the situation of young people in low-income informal-sector jobs.	有鉴于此，除非同时改善在低收入非正规行业就业的年轻人处境，否则仅仅扩大正规行业就业还远远不够。


Yet post-conflict employment policies almost invariably neglect the informal sector.	但后冲突时期，就业政策几乎无一例外地忽视非正规行业的作用。


Worse, new regulations – such as the ban on commercial biking in Freetown, Sierra Leone – sometimes block productive informal activities undertaken by youth.	更糟的是，新出台法规——如塞拉利昂禁止在弗里敦开展商业自行车业务——有时还会对年轻人在非正规行业的有效就业起阻碍作用。


But even a focus on the informal sector is insufficient, as research has shown that poverty and marginalization are not, on their own, enough to cause conflict.	但即使关注非正规行业也还远远不够，因为研究表明贫困和边缘化本身并不足以引发冲突。


If they were, most poor countries would be in conflict most of the time.	如果贫困和边缘化是冲突的充分条件，那么多数贫困国家绝大部分时间都将在冲突中度过。


And that is not even remotely the case.	但实际情况却远不是这样的。


Violent conflict occurs when leaders are motivated to mobilize their followers for it.	只有领袖鼓励追随者诉诸武力才会引发暴力冲突。


That motivation can stem from a variety of sources, among the most common being exclusion from power.	上层动机可能来源于方方面面，其中最常见的莫过于统治权被剥夺。


In that case, leaders will appeal to a common identity – for example, religion in the case of contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, or ethnicity in many African conflicts – to mobilize followers.	在那种情况下，领导层会利用某种共同身份来动员追随者——如中东地区现代冲突中这种共同身份是宗教、而非洲许多冲突的共同身份则是种族。


Of course, more than a shared identity alone is needed for mobilization to occur.	当然，需要比共同身份更多的因素才能成功地动员冲突。


People will generally respond only if they already have grievances – in particular, if they feel that their group faces discrimination in access to resources and jobs.	人们一般在已经心存怨愤的情况下才会去响应武力号召——尤其当他们感觉所属团体在资源和就业方面面临被歧视的状况。


In this sense, employment is relevant, but what matters is not the absolute level of employment so much as the distribution of good jobs among religious or ethnic groups.	从这个意义上讲，就业与冲突具有相关性，但重要的却不是绝对的就业水平，而是好工作在不同宗教或种族团体之间的分配状况。


In other words, simply creating more jobs, without regard to their allocation, may not ease tensions; if imbalances persist, job creation may even make things worse.	换句话说，仅仅创造更多就业机会而不考虑机会的分配或许对缓解紧张局势没有帮助； 如果不平衡局面持续存在，就业机会的创造本身甚至可能使情况更糟。


Yet post-conflict employment policies almost always neglect so-called “horizontal inequalities.”	但后冲突阶段的就业政策几乎总是忽视所谓的“横向不平等”。


For example, employment policies did little to reduce the strong regional imbalances and discrimination within regions that persisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war there in the 1990s.	举例来说，20世纪90年代波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的战后就业政策在减少地区严重不平衡和歧视方面并未发挥多大作用。


Given these failings, it is not surprising that employment policies’ net effects are often very small relative to the size of the problem.	鉴于存在上述缺陷，就业政策的净影响相对问题而言往往规模较小也就不足为怪了。


In both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, job creation was thought to be central to post-conflict peacekeeping efforts.	在科索沃、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那，后冲突维和工作的核心都是创造就业机会。


Yet, in Kosovo, unemployment stood at 45% six years after its war ended.	但在科索沃，战争结束6年后失业率仍高达45%。


In Bosnia, new programs generated just 8,300 jobs, while 450,000 people were demobilized; 20 years after the end of the conflict, the unemployment rate stood at 44%.	而在波斯尼亚，新计划仅仅创造了8，300个就业机会，而复原人数则高达450，000之多； 冲突结束20年后，失业率仍在44%的位置居高不下。


There is one example of a successful post-crisis employment policy.	后危机就业政策有一个成功的例子。


Nepal’s government sought to expand opportunities in the informal sector after the country’s civil war, implementing programs focused on building infrastructure, issuing micro-credit, and providing technology assistance, targeting the most deprived regions and castes.	即尼泊尔政府在内战结束后曾寻求拓展非正式行业机会，并全力落实针对最贫困地区和阶层的以建设基础设施、发放小额贷款和提供技术援助为重点的政策。


Recognizing the role that caste and ethnic tensions and discrimination played in fueling the conflict, the government designed employment schemes specifically for rural areas, along the same lines as India’s employment scheme, with 100 days of work per household guaranteed.	出于对阶层、种族紧张和歧视在助长冲突方面所起作用的认识，尼泊尔政府专门为农村地区设计了就业计划，该计划借鉴了印度计划的成功经验，保证为每户提供100天的工作量。


The programs were supported by the Nepalese government and external donors, and focused on poorer regions and villages (and, within them, on the poorest castes).	上述计划得到尼泊尔政府和国外捐助者的支持，重点保障贫困地区和村庄（以及其中最贫困阶层）的实施工作。


The period immediately following a conflict is a delicate one.	冲突刚刚结束的这段时期非常微妙。


Leaders must make the most of that time, ensuring that every policy they pursue is as effective as possible.	领导人必须充分利用这段时间，确保实施的每项政策都尽可能有效。


When it comes to employment, that means designing programs that reflect how people actually spend their working lives, as well as addressing the real grievances generating tensions.	具体到就业问题，这意味着设计出反映人们实际工作生活的就业计划，并解决造成紧张关系的现实不满因素。


Otherwise, they risk allowing, if not encouraging, a relapse into organized violence.	否则，他们即使没有鼓励、也是在默许国家重新陷入到有组织的暴力当中。


Jobless Recoveries and Manic Policies	失业性复苏和政策狂躁症


CHICAGO – Monetary and fiscal policies in the United States, both in this recession and the recession of 2001, have been among the most accommodating in the industrial world.  As I write, Congress is working on yet another “jobs” bill.  Indeed, John Taylor of Stanford University attributes the recent financial crisis to excessively stimulatory monetary policy towards the end of Alan Greenspan’s tenure as head of the US Federal Reserve.	就在本文落笔之时，国会还在制定另外一份“就业”法案。 事实上，斯坦福大学经济学教授约翰·泰勒教授将最近这场经济危机归因于艾伦·格林斯潘作为美联储主席任期即将届满而推行的过度刺激性货币政策。


Why is US policy so accommodating?	那美国的政策为何会如此宽松呢？


A central reason is that the nature of US economic recoveries has changed.	这主要是因为美国经济的本质已经发生了转变。


From 1960 until 1991, US recoveries were typically rapid. From the trough of recessions, recovery to pre-recession output levels took less than two quarters on average, and employment recovered within eight months.	在1960年到1991年间美国的经济复苏速度都相当快，那时从衰退的最低点恢复到衰退前产出水平平均只要不到2个季度，而就业在八个月以内就恢复到原来水平了。


But the recoveries from the recessions of 1991 and 2001 were different.	但1991年和2001年的复苏则截然不同。


For example, in 2001, it took just one quarter for output to recover, but 38 months for jobs to come back. The current recovery appears to be similarly slow in creating jobs.	在2001年，产出水平只花了1个季度就恢复原状，但就业率却整整拖了38个月才回到原点，而当前的复苏在恢复就业方面似乎也同样缓慢无比。


Some economists argue that, unlike past recoveries, when workers who were temporarily laid off were rehired, job losses starting in 1991 were more permanent.	有些经济学家认为，在以往的复苏中工人只是临时退出工作岗位，而现今职位的流失则是长期性的。


Unemployed workers had to find jobs in new industries, which took more time and training.	失业的工人必须在新的行业找工作，而这也要耗费更多时间和培训。


Others suggest that the Internet has made it easier for firms to hire quickly.	另一些经济学家则认为互联网使得企业的招聘变得更容易了。


So, rather than hire in panic at the first sign of a recovery for fear that they will be unable to do so later and lose sales, firms would rather make sure that the recovery is well established before adding workers.	因此与其在复苏初露端倪之时因为害怕以后招不到人影响销售而一窝蜂地去抢人，倒不如在确认真正复苏之后再增加人手。


Regardless of the true explanation, the US is singularly unprepared for jobless recoveries.	但不管真正的解释究竟是什么，奇怪的是，美国似乎没有还准备好如何应对这种失业性复苏。


Typically, unemployment benefits last only six months.	政府一般只发放6个月的失业补助。


Moreover, because health-care benefits are often tied to jobs, an unemployed worker also risks losing access to affordable health care.	此外，由于健康医疗补助往往都是跟就业联系在一起的，因此一个失业工人同时也面对着承担不起医疗保障费用的风险。


Short-duration benefits may have been appropriate when recoveries were fast and jobs plentiful, because the fear of losing benefits before finding a job may have given workers an incentive to look harder.	在复苏迅速而且职位充足的情况下，短期的补贴是很管用的，因为那种在找到工作前失去补助金的恐惧将促使工人努力去找工作。


But, with few jobs being created, a positive incentive has turned into a source of great anxiety.	但在只有少量职位产生的情况下，这种正面激励将摇身一变成为极大的焦虑。


Even those who have jobs fear that they could lose them and be cast adrift.	即便是那些在职的人也会担心因为失去工作而生活无着。


Politicians ignore popular anxiety at their peril.	政客们往往会忽略了公众这种担忧对他们的危害。


President George H.W. Bush is widely believed to have lost his re-election bid, despite winning a popular war in Iraq, because he seemed out of touch with public hardship following the 1991 recession.	许多人认为美国前总统老布什之所以在赢得了一场人气极高的伊拉克战争之后还输掉了连任，就是因为他似乎对1991年衰退中民众的苦况麻木不仁。


That lesson has been fully internalized.	这个教训也被很多人记住了。


Economic recovery is all about jobs, not output, and politicians are willing to push for economic stimulus, both fiscal (tax cuts or government spending) and monetary (lower short-term interest rates), until jobs start reappearing.	经济复苏说的是就业，而不是产出，因此政客们都愿意推行经济刺激政策，不管是财政上的（比如减税或者是政府支出）还是货币上的（调低短期利率），直到职位又重新出现了为止。


In theory, this is what democracy is all about – policy responding to the needs of the people.	理论上，这就是民主的真谛——政策是以民众的需要为指向的。


In practice, though, public pressure to do something quickly enables politicians to run roughshod over the usual checks and balances on government policy making.	不过在实践上来说，公众那种要求立刻见效的压力令到政客可以罔顾政府政策制定中的利益制衡原则来推行政策。


Long-term spending and tax policies are enacted under the shadow of an emergency, with the party that happens to be in power at the time of the downturn getting to push its pet agenda.	长期的政府支出和税收政策常常以救火的名义出台，那些恰好在衰退时期执政的政党则借机夹带私货。


Much of what is enacted as stimulus has little immediate effect on job creation, but does have an adverse long-term effect on government finances.	许多以刺激名义推出的政策其实并不能立刻产生职位，却对政府财政有着长期的负面作用。


For example, the 2009 stimulus package enacted by the Obama administration had many billions of dollars devoted to cancer research, though such research employs few people directly and is spent over a long time horizon – far beyond that of even a prolonged recovery.	比如奥巴马政府在2009年推出的一揽子刺激计划将数百亿美元投向了癌症研究计划，即便这些研究根本雇用不了多少人，且财政支付的时间跨度很长——甚至比一个长期复苏所持续的时间还要长。


Equally deleterious to economic health is the recent vogue of cutting interest rates to near zero and holding them there for a sustained period.	此外同样对经济有害的还有最近流行的所谓将利率降到接近零并维持一段时期的呼声。


It is far from clear that near-zero short-term interest rates (as compared to just low interest rates) have much additional effect in encouraging firms to create jobs when powerful economic forces make them reluctant to hire.	而接近零的短期利率（相对于仅仅是低利率）究竟在强大的经济力量迫使企业踌躇于招工之时能起到多少激励作用还是一笔糊涂帐。


But prolonged near-zero rates can foster the wrong kinds of activities.	但长期施行近于零的利率将催生错误的行为。


For example, households and investment managers, reluctant to keep money in safe money-market funds, instead seek to invest in securities with longer maturities and higher credit risk, so long as they offer extra yield.	比如家庭主妇和投资经理都会不愿意将钱放在安全的货币市场基金上，转而投资于到期日更长且信用风险更高的证券上，只要这些东西能提供更高的回报就行。


Likewise, money fleeing low US interest rates (and, more generally, industrial countries) has pushed up emerging-market equity and real-estate prices, setting them up for a fall (as we witnessed recently with the flight to safety following Europe’s financial turmoil).	同样，因低美元利率（以及总体上各工业国家）出逃的货币将推高新兴市场的股市和楼市，最终引发暴跌（正如我们最近看见的欧洲金融动荡中的资金避险行为那样）。


Moreover, even if corporations in the US are not hiring, corporations elsewhere are.	此外，即便美国本土的公司没有动静，其他地区的企业却在招人。


Brazil’s unemployment rate, for example, is at lows not seen for decades.	巴西的失业率目前正维持在数十年以来的最低水平。


If the Fed were to accept the responsibilities of its de facto role as the world’s central banker, it would have to admit that its policy rates are not conducive to stable world growth.	如果美联储想要承担自己事实上作为世界央行所负有的责任的话，那它也就必须承认自己的政策利率是无助于世界稳定增长的。


Policy would still be accommodative if the Fed maintained low interest rates rather than the zero level that was appropriate for a panic.	而如果美联储放弃更适用于恐慌时期的近零利率而选择维持一个低利率的话，政策依然是属于宽松的。


And this would give savers less of an incentive to search for yield, thus avoiding financial instability.	但这将减少储户将钱取出来追求回报的冲动，从而避免金融不稳定。


Politicians will not sit quietly, however, if the Fed attempts to raise rates.	美联储想提高利率的话，政客们可不会坐以待毙的。


Their thinking – and the Fed’s – follows the misguided calculus that if low rates are good for jobs, ultra-low rates must be even better.	他们的思维——以及美联储的——遵循一条错误的计算方式，那就是如果低利率有利于刺激就业的话，更低的利率就能刺激更多就业。


Emerging studies on the risk-taking and asset-price inflation engendered by ultra-low policy rates will eventually convince Fed policymakers to change their stance.	在由极低政策利率所引发的高风险行为和资产价格通胀方面不断涌现的研究将最终说服美联储的政策制定者去改变他们的立场。


But, if politicians are to become less anxious about jobs, perhaps we need to start discussing whether jobless recoveries are here to stay, and whether the US safety net, devised for a different era, needs to be modified.	但如果政客们能对就业问题不那么急功近利的话，或者就是我们开始讨论失业性复苏会否持续，而只为过去某个特定时期所设计的美国社会安全网是否需要改革的时候了。


The Mosquito Menace	蚊子的威胁


STANFORD – Mosquito-borne diseases kill millions of people annually, and cause suffering for many more.	斯坦福—蚊子传播的疾病每年要多走数百万人的生命，因此受苦的人数更要多得多。


In 2012, there were an estimated 207 million cases of malaria, leading to some 627,000 deaths.	2012年，据估计有2. 07亿人罹患疟疾，其中造成627,000人死亡。


Dengue fever is a leading cause of illness and death in the tropics and subtropics, with as many as 100 million people infected each year.	登革热是热带和亚热带的主要致死病因，每年感染的人数更是高达1亿人。


And there are an estimated 200,000 cases of yellow fever annually, leading to 30,000 deaths worldwide.	此外，每年还有约200,000人罹患黄热病，造成全球30,000人死亡。


It takes only one bite from a disease-carrying mosquito to transmit a debilitating or deadly infection – and mosquitoes breed and multiply with astonishing speed.	染上令人痛苦甚至致命的疾病只需要被携带病菌的蚊子叮上一口，而蚊子以令人咋舌的速度繁殖和增加着。


Given that there are no vaccines or drug treatments for illnesses like dengue fever and West Nile virus, and that treatments for diseases like malaria are difficult to access in many at-risk areas, more effective mechanisms for controlling mosquito populations are desperately needed.	对于登革热等疾病和西尼罗河病毒，目前还没有疫苗或药物可以治疗，而对疟疾等疾病的治疗在许多高风险地区也难以获得，因此我们急需更有效的措施控制蚊子数量。


The good news is that a promising new technology is ready for field-testing.	好消息是，一项极有希望的新技术已经进入了实地测试。


It is now up to government agencies to facilitate its development.	现在，需要政府机构促进它的发展。


Today, the dominant method for reducing insect populations – the so-called “sterile insect technique” (SIT) – relies on radiation to sterilize males, which are then released into infested areas to mate.	如今，减少昆虫数量的主要手段——所谓的“不育昆虫技术”（SIT）主要依靠射线让雄性昆虫不育，然后将它们放回昆虫滋生区域和雌性昆虫交配。


But this approach, which has been used since the middle of the last century, has not been effective with mosquitoes, owing to their fragility.	但这一自上个世纪中叶以来就开始使用的办法对蚊子不管用，因为雄蚊子生命力太差。


Advances in molecular biology offer analogous – but far more sophisticated – solutions.	分子生物学的进步提供了类似——但远为成熟——的办法。


Using molecular genetic-engineering techniques, the British company Oxitec has created a new way to control the mosquito species that transmits dengue fever.	英国的Oxitec公司通过分子基因工程技术创造了控制传播登革热的蚊子种群的新方法。


Male mosquitoes are bred in the laboratory with a specific genetic mutation.	雄蚊在实验室中繁殖，它们带有一个特别的基因突变。


As a result, their offspring produce high levels of a protein that prevents their cells from functioning normally, causing them to die before reaching maturity.	于是它们的后代会大量产生一种让其细胞无法正常运转的蛋白质，使它们在成熟之前就死去。


Male mosquitoes do not bite, so their release presents no health risk, and, because their progeny die, no genetically engineered mosquitoes persist in the environment.	雄蚊不会咬人，因此释放它们不会造成健康风险，而由于它们不会有子孙后代，大自然中也不会有转基因蚊子出现。


If the males are released over a period of several months, this would, in theory, result in a marked reduction in the mosquito population.	理论上，如果在为期几个月的时间里持续释放雄蚊，蚊子数量就会大量降低。


All that is needed now is to determine whether it works in practice.	现在需要知道的是在实践中这是否管用。


Scientific research to develop products like irradiated sterile insects or the Oxitec mosquitoes proceeds progressively from more to less contained conditions – from the laboratory to confined trials to limited field trials.	开发受辐射因而不育的蚊子或Oxitec蚊子这样的产品的科学研究是在限制越来越少的环境中推进的——从实验室到限制测试再到有限实地测试。


Now that Oxitec has conducted promising field trials in the Cayman Islands, Malaysia, and Brazil, it is preparing to conduct trials in other countries, including the United States.	现在，Oxitec已在开曼群岛、马来西亚和巴西进行了令人振奋的实地测试，准备在包括美国在内的其他国家展开测试。


Such trials are always appropriately controlled and monitored to ensure that they are safe and effective, with government regulation providing an extra safeguard.	这些测试会一直受到适当的控制和监控，以确保安全性和有效性，政府监管则提供了进一步的保障。


In order to determine the appropriate level of oversight, government bodies would presumably conduct a science-based risk analysis.	为了确定监督的适当水平，政府机构会预先进行基于科学的风险分析。


When it comes to genetic engineering, however, science seems to matter less than politics.	但是，对于基因工程，这与其说是科学问题，不如说是政治问题。


The fact is that molecular genetic engineering is more precise and predictable than older, cruder techniques like irradiation.	事实上，分子基因工程比更陈旧、更粗糙的技术（比如辐射）更精确、更可预测。


But, while SIT remains unregulated in most places, the regulatory reviews of genetically engineered living organisms have tended to be drawn out and excessive worldwide, with politics delaying – and sometimes even preventing – approvals.	但是，尽管SIT在许多地区不受管制，但对基因工程活体实验的监管审查总是有过度之嫌，全世界都是如此，政治拖延——有时甚至是阻碍——了批准。


As a result, research and development in genetic engineering is more expensive, discouraging investment and hampering innovation.	因此，基因工程的研发总是更昂贵，阻碍了投资和创新。


This is all the more problematic in the case of mosquito control, given the urgency of the problem.	在蚊子控制问题上尤其如此，而这一问题又是十万火急。


The World Health Organization’s Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases has called upon regulatory agencies to emphasize “science-based, case-by-case targeted requirements with a degree of practical parsimony,” instead of relying on “a precautionary approach that can require data to address all theoretical risks.”	世界卫生组织热带疾病研究和培训计划要求监管机构强调“基于科学的、具体案例具体分析的、带有一定程度实践谨慎性的定向要求”取代依赖“需要数据解决所有理论风险的预防性方法”。


In other words, regulators should consider these innovations’ public-health costs and benefits, and expedite their review.	换句话说，监管者应该考虑创新的公共卫生成本和效益，并加快审查。


Given the degree of suffering caused by mosquito-borne diseases, government leaders must not subject genetic-engineering solutions for controlling them to the same kinds of political and populist headwinds that have impeded the approval of genetically engineered agricultural products.	蚊子传播的疾病造成着巨大的痛苦，政府领导人决不能让基因工程解决办法如同转基因农产品那样陷入政治和民粹主义阻力。


Only with pragmatic, fact-based regulation can the world realize genetic engineering’s full disease-fighting potential.	只有务实的、基于事实的监管才能让世界认识到基因工程在疾病控制方面的全部潜力。


Israel’s Neglected Peace Dividend	以色列忽视的和平红利


TEL AVIV – Twenty years after the Oslo Accords, the prospects for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace deal are dimmer than ever.	特拉维夫—奥斯陆协定距今已有二十年，全面的以色列-巴勒斯坦和平协定前景从未如此暗淡过。


Indeed, roughly a half-million Israeli settlers in the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem) make the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state an almost impossible mission.	事实上，约五十万占领区（包括东耶路撒冷）以色列定居者意味着建立相邻的巴勒斯坦国几乎是个不可能的任务。


So, is the renewed vigor of US President Barack Obama’s administration in the quest for peace too little, too late?	因此，美国总统奥巴马政府的重新要求和平看来是太晚、太微不足道了？


Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu claims that his government has no preconditions for resuming negotiations with the Palestinians.	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡声称，他的政府没有为重启与巴谈判设置先决条件。


Meanwhile, his housing minister, Uri Ariel (himself a settler and a member of the annexationist Jewish Home party), unleashes a new wave of settlement expansion that threatens to link the 1967 border with the Jordan Valley, thus bisecting Palestinian territory.	与此同时，他的住房部长艾利尔（Uri Ariel，他本人也是占领区定居者，也是兼并主义政党犹太家园党（Jewish Home）党员）发动了新一轮定居扩张潮，骎骎然欲将1967年边境与约旦河谷连接起来，从而将巴勒斯坦领土一分为二。


Netanyahu’s own insistence on “ironclad” security arrangements is a euphemism for an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley – and no return to the “Auschwitz borders” of 1967.	内塔尼亚胡自己也坚持“坚不可摧”的安全安排，这无非是以色列出现在约旦河谷——并且再也不回1967年“奥斯维辛边界”的委婉说法。


Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is too weak and too burdened by his rivalry with the hard-line Islamist Hamas – which rules in Gaza – to allow himself the political luxury of departing from the core demands of Palestinian nationalism.	巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯太弱、受到太多的掣肘——来自他的竞争对手和走强硬路线的加沙地带控制着哈马斯——因此没有政治上的空间置巴勒斯坦民族主义的核心要求于不顾。


Nor does Netanyahu, an ideologue who is visibly uncomfortable with his forced support of the two-state idea, truly have a governing coalition for peace.	内塔尼亚胡也是如此，作为显而易见不满于被迫支持两国方案的空想家，他其实并没有追求和平的执政联盟。


Thus, US Secretary of State John Kerry will require great deal of creativity to reconcile Netanyahu’s position and the Palestinian precondition, recently reiterated by Abbas’s close associate Nabil Shaath, that Israel must agree to negotiate on the basis of the 1967 borders.	因此，美国国务卿科里将要求拿出大量创造性调和内塔尼亚胡的立场和巴勒斯坦的先决条件——阿巴斯的亲信沙斯（Nabil Shaath）最近重申，以色列必须同意在1967年边界基础上的谈判。


Mahmoud Al-Habbash, the Palestinian minister of religious affairs, even went so far as to demand “assurances that the talks won’t fail,” because if they do, a new intifada would surely erupt.	巴勒斯坦宗教事务部长哈巴什（Mahmoud Al-Habbash）甚至要求“保证谈判不会失败”，因为如若谈判失败，几乎肯定将导致新一轮动乱爆发。


Moreover, Kerry’s peace drive is taking place in a regional environment that is not amenable to a negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	此外，科里推动和平的努力所处的地区环境并非以巴冲突的谈判解决方案所能稳定。


The Arab Spring has turned bloody and unpredictably turbulent, further diminishing the odds for peace in Palestine.	阿拉伯之春演变成了流血和未曾预料到的混乱，这进一步降低了巴勒斯坦和平的可能。


Nor does the election of Hassan Rowhani, a relative moderate, to Iran’s presidency improve Kerry’s chances.	相对温和的鲁哈尼当选伊朗总统也无助于增加科里的胜机。


Rowhani’s victory is certainly good news for Iranians, and it may lead to a more civilized dialogue between the Islamic Republic and the international community.	鲁哈尼的胜利对伊朗人来说显然是个好消息，也有可能引出伊朗和国际社会的更加文明的对话。


But Rowhani’s presidency can hardly be expected to change Iran’s strategic objectives.	但鲁哈尼的总统任期几乎无望改变伊朗的战略目标。


Iran will continue its nuclear program, fight for the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, seek to maintain its vital alliance with key regional proxies such as Hezbollah, and defend Palestine and al-Quds (Jerusalem).	伊朗将继续其核计划，为巴沙尔·阿萨德的叙利亚政权而斗争，寻求维持与真主党等关键地区代理人的联盟，并捍卫巴勒斯坦和圣城（耶路撒冷）。


If Assad defeats his opponents with the help of Hezbollah and Iran, his survival is bound to be perceived as a victory for the regional “axis of resistance” to Israel.	如若巴沙尔在真主党的帮助下打败反对者，他的转危为安将注定成为该地区“反以轴心”的胜利。


And a permanent Iranian presence in Syria would make a war between Israel and Iran practically unavoidable.	伊朗在叙利亚的持久身影也将使以色列和伊朗之间的战争变得实际不可避免。


Palestine would then be relegated to an obscure corner of the international agenda.	届时，巴勒斯坦将被沦为该地区的一个不起眼的角落。


Complicating matters further, America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have limited its regional clout.	让局面更急复杂的事，美国的伊拉克和阿富汗战争限制了其地区实力。


The US now faces an unpredictable Middle East that is writing its own history as well – or as badly – as it can.	美国目前面对这一个不可预测的中东，后者正在尽力打造其自身历史上最好——或者最坏——的时代。


Syria’s internal conflict has now become a Sunni-Shia sectarian war that is spreading across the region.	叙利亚内战已成为逊尼派-什叶派之间的宗派之战，并在全地区蔓延。


The Sunni clerics who have just declared a jihad against “the Iranian regime, Hezbollah, and its sectarian allies” are the voice of millions across the Muslim world.	逊尼派神职人员刚刚宣布要对“伊朗政权、真主党及其宗派盟军”开战圣战，这是穆斯林世界几百万人民的声音。


Furthermore, waves of Syrian refugees are threatening the sustainability of the Jordanian monarchy, already roiled by profound internal cleavages.	此外，大批叙利亚难民正在威胁约旦��主制的可持续性，目前约旦已然在深刻的内部冲突中摇摇欲坠。


Hezbollah has drawn Lebanon into the Syrian conflict, setting up a showdown between Shia and Sunni at home.	真主党将黎巴嫩拖入了叙利亚冲突，在自家后院掀起了什叶派和逊尼派的大决斗。


A similar scenario is already unfolding in Iraq.	伊拉克也在出现类似的情景。


Turkey, a responsible regional power, has so far resisted being drawn into the Syrian quagmire, but its effects can be seen in the rising tensions between the country’s Sunni majority and the Shia Alevi sect.	而土耳其作为负责任的地区大国，到目前为止顶住了压力，没有卷入叙利亚乱局，但叙利亚冲突的影响可以在该国逊尼派多数人口和什叶派阿拉维派冲日益激烈的紧张中一窥端倪。


Inertia is not an adequate response in an era of revolutionary change.	对于这个革命性变化的时代，光靠惯性是不够的。


Unfortunately, Israel is missing a coherent regional strategy.	不幸的是，以色列正在错失一贯的地区战略。


Netanyahu, always on the defensive, does not view Middle East turmoil as a trigger for a proactive strategy that would use a solution to the Palestinian problem as leverage for broader positive change in the region.	内塔尼亚胡从不采取攻势，他不认为中东乱局是前瞻性战略的触发器，借助形成巴勒斯坦问题的解决方案为该地区带来更广泛的积极变化。


America, burdened by the cost of its Middle East troubles, eager to refocus on Asia, and no longer in need of Arab oil, can allow itself to leave the region to its destiny.	被中东羁绊甚深的美国急切地意欲将注意力转向亚洲，也不再需要阿拉伯的石油，它大可以脱身于中东地区之外，让后者自己决定命运。


Israel is part of the region and has a strong interest in helping to shape its future.	以色列是中东地区的一部分，也有强大的利益帮助决定中东的未来。


Israel has traditionally strived to forge alliances with the region’s minorities – Kurds, Persians, Maronites, and others.	传统上，以色列致力于与地区少数派结盟——库尔德人、波斯人、马龙派（Maronite）等。


Now is the time for a major shift to an alliance with the region’s overwhelming Sunni majority.	如今，以色列应该转变方向与在中东占压倒多数的逊尼派结盟。


Israel should follow Obama, whose recent decision to arm the Syrian rebels, though belated and still ill-defined, is a choice for the Sunni alliance.	以色列应该追随奥巴马——后者最近决定武装叙利亚反对派，尽管这姗姗来迟且没有成熟计划，但算得上是在选择与逊尼派结盟。


Israel should play an active role in the fall of Assad as a way to undermine the region’s “Shia crescent” and isolate its leader, Iran.	以色列应该在推翻巴沙尔、打破中东地区的“什叶新月”并鼓励其领袖伊朗的过程中扮演积极角色。


Assad’s defeat would break the “axis of resistance,” choke off Hezbollah’s arms supplies, and drive a permanent wedge between Turkey and Iran.	巴沙尔的倒台将打破“反以轴心”，切断真主党的武器供应，并在土耳其和伊朗之间打入一枚永久的楔子。


A solution to the Palestinian problem would serve such a strategy.	巴勒斯坦问题的解决方案可以充当这一战略。


It would strengthen Israel’s relations with Egypt, help to stabilize Jordan (a vital and friendly buffer state), and remove a major source of tension with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist government.	它能强化以色列与埃及的关系，帮助稳定约旦（关键的、友好的缓冲国），并移除与土耳其总理埃尔多安的伊斯兰政府的一大主要冲突源。


Most important, it would undermine Iran’s efforts to make inroads into the Arab world under the pretext of defending Palestine and Holy Jerusalem.	最重要的是，它能破坏伊朗打着捍卫巴勒斯坦和圣城耶路撒冷的旗号作恶阿拉伯世界的图谋。


What Good Is an Arab Military Alliance?	阿拉伯军事同盟有什么益处？


LONDON – The framework nuclear agreement that Iran and the P-5 (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany recently reached represents progress on one major security challenge in the Middle East.	伦敦——不久前达成的伊朗和P-5（中、英、法、俄、美）集团加德国的核框架协议代表我们在中东主要安全问题上取得了进步。


But, as some Arab countries move to establish a joint military force, another security question is emerging: Will such an alliance leave the region better or worse off, particularly given today’s growing Sunni-Shia divide?	但阿拉伯国家组建联合军队又带来另一个安全隐患：这样的联盟将对地区产生何种影响，尤其考虑到今天不断加剧的逊尼-什叶派分裂？


A nine-country Saudi-led coalition, which includes Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, is already carrying out airstrikes against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen – an effort that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently declared will end with the Saudis’ “noses [being] rubbed to the soil.”	以沙特为首的九国联军，包括埃及、阿联酋、科威特和约旦已经在对伊朗支持的也门胡塞叛军发动空袭——伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊日前宣称沙特将在这场行动中“摔个狗啃泥”。


Yet Egypt’s president, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has indicated that the coalition’s mandate may be extended beyond Yemen.	但埃及总统阿卜杜勒 - 法塔赫·塞西将军已经表示联军的授权可能不仅局限在也门境内。


But what is that mandate?	但授权内容究竟是什么？


A few objectives can be excluded from the start.	某些目标可以在一开始就可以排除。


For example, post-conflict democratization cannot be the goal, given that Arab regimes lack the credentials or knowhow to craft democracies, and their militaries are neither willing nor able to assist in the process.	比方说目标不会是战后民主化，因为阿拉伯政权不具备建设民主政权的资质或知识，且军队既不能也不愿从旁协助。


Similarly, humanitarian intervention can be ruled out, owing not only to most Arab regimes’ lack of experience and inglorious human-rights records, but also because none of the official statements related to the founding of the joint force have remotely suggested that upholding human rights was ever a concern.	此外，人道主义干预也可以排除，因为多数阿拉伯政权不仅缺乏经验且有不光彩的人权纪录，还因为与组建联军相关的官方声明丝毫没有提及捍卫人权是他们所关注的问题。


Stabilization might be an objective, but only if the relevant governments can agree on shared threats and how to address them.	稳定局势或许是目的之一，但前提是相关政府能就共同威胁和应对方式达成一致。


They could, for example, take the classic “balance of power/terror” approach, by intervening to undermine the more powerful actor in a conflict, force it to the negotiating table, and dictate the terms of any compromise, thereby ensuring that they benefit from the newly created status quo.	比方说，他们可以采用经典的“权力/恐怖均势”之道，通过干预破坏冲突中较强一方的实力，迫使其坐到谈判桌前，并且制定妥协条件，从而确保他们能从最新形成的现状中受益。


But the rise of Arab military coalitions raises serious concerns, not least because the history of Arab-led military interventions – unlike those carried out by the West in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Libya – does not contain any promising precedent.	但阿拉伯军事联盟的崛起引发了严重关切，这不仅因为以阿拉伯为首的军事干预史从未有过成功的先例——不像西方在波斯尼亚、科索沃甚至利比亚等地进行的军事干预。


Such interventions were usually aimed at empowering a proxy political force over its military and political rivals, instead of averting humanitarian disaster or institutionalizing a non-violent conflict-resolution mechanism following a war.	上述干预措施通常目的是协助代理政治势力战胜其军事政治对手，而不是为避免人道主义灾难或在战后建设非暴力的冲突解决机制。


Egypt’s military intervention in Yemen in the 1960s is a case in point.	20世纪60年代埃及军事干预也门就是一个很好的例子。


By late 1965, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser had sent 70,000 troops in Yemen to support a republican coup against royalist forces.	到1965年末，埃及总统纳赛尔派遣70，000部队到也门支持反对皇家军队的共和党政变。


Despite using prohibited chemical weapons against Yemeni guerillas from 1963 to 1967 – a first in an intra-Arab conflict – Egypt failed to achieve its objectives.	尽管从1963到1967年对也门游击队使用了违禁的化学武器——这是阿拉伯内部冲突中首次使用化学武器——埃及依然未能达到自己的目的。


On top of its military humiliation, Egypt’s international reputation suffered, with the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Egyptian forces’ use of banned chemical weapons against villages that supported the monarchy.	埃及不仅在军事上遭受屈辱，国际声誉也同样遭受损害，联合国大会谴责埃及军队使用违禁化学武器对付那些支持君主制的村落。 此次冒险行动也付出了沉重的经济代价；


The adventure also took a heavy economic toll; by 1965, Egypt had run up a foreign debt of nearly $3 billion, forcing it to add a “defense tax” to finance the Yemen war.	到1965年，埃及所借外债已接近30亿美元，迫使其出台所谓“国防税”来为也门战争筹集经费。


The Syria-dominated “Arab Deterrent Force” did not fare much better when it intervened in Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s, failing either to end the brutal fighting or to secure vulnerable Palestinian refugees.	20世纪80年代叙利亚主导“阿拉伯威慑部队”干预黎巴嫩内战的情况也并未好到哪去，既未能结束那场残酷的战争，也未能保护弱势的巴勒斯坦难民群体。


After 1982, when the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF’s mandate, it turned into a purely Syrian military force – one that ended up committing some of the worst atrocities against Palestinian factions and refugees in the so-called “War of the Camps” in 1985.	1982年黎巴嫩政府未能延续“阿拉伯威慑部队”授权后，该部队演变成一支纯粹的叙利亚部队——这支部队随后在1985年所谓“难民营战争”中上演了针对巴勒斯坦派别和难民的最恐怖的屠杀行为。


Brief and less complex interventions were also unsuccessful in ending violent crises – and in some cases even exacerbated them.	时间较短且不那么复杂的干预也未能成功结束暴力危机——在某些情况下甚至令危机进一步加剧。


A clear example is the recent Egyptian airstrikes in Libya, which have not only undermined the UN-led peace process in a deeply divided country, but have also empowered the most extreme elements.	最近埃及空袭利比亚就是明显的实例，埃及的空袭不仅破坏了这个严重分裂国家由联合国主导的和平进程，并且使某些最极端份子借此扩充势力。


Of course, history is not a definitive guide to the future; an Arab-led intervention today could turn out very differently.	当然，单凭历史并不能确定未来的走势； 今天由阿拉伯主导的干预可能取得不同的效果。


But there is little to indicate that it will; indeed, despite hundreds of Saudi airstrikes on Houthi-controlled military bases and seaports, the rebels continue to advance.	但事情向这个方向发展的证据并不充分； 事实上，尽管沙特对胡塞控制的军事基地和港口进行了数百次空袭，但叛军推进的势��并未得到遏制。


If emerging Arab military coalitions are to avoid the mistakes of past interventions, their members must reconsider their approach, including the structural deficiencies that contributed to past failures.	如果新成立的阿拉伯军事联盟想要避免过去干预行动的错误，各成员国必须重新思考自己的做法，包括哪些结构性缺陷曾经导致失利。


Many factors affect the outcome of a military intervention in a civil war, especially if it involves a ground offensive.	尤其当涉及地面进攻时，将有诸多因素影响对内战的军事干预。


In particular, Arab leaders should focus on revising the processes by which national-security policy is formulated, improving civil-military relations, providing the relevant training in peacekeeping and peace-building, reforming the political culture, and addressing socio-psychological complexes.	阿拉伯国家领导人尤其应注重修改国家安全政策的制定程序、改善军民关系、提供维和及和平建设等相关培训、改革政治文化并解决社会心理层面的复杂问题。


If Arab leaders fail to overcome these deficiencies, the latest Arab force could become the Middle East’s newest source of anti-democratic, sectarian-based instability, potentially intensifying the Sunni-Shia conflict.	如果阿拉伯领导人未能克服上述缺陷，新组建的阿拉伯联军可能演变为加剧逊尼什叶派冲突的中东最新的反民主宗派势力。


That is the last thing the region needs.	中东地区最不希望看到这样的结果。


Joking about Science	科学的玩笑


ITHACA, NEW YORK – An apocryphal story sometimes heard among physicists concerns a toast, proposed by his Cambridge University colleagues, to J. J. Thomson’s discovery of the electron in 1897: “To the electron: may it never be of use to anyone!”	纽约伊萨卡——在自然科学家中间有时会听到一则杜撰的故事，讲的是剑桥大学同事在举杯祝贺1897年J. J.


Pure mathematicians supposedly tell a similar joke about their profession.	汤姆生发现电子时说：“为电子干杯：预祝它永远不会对任何人有用！ ”据说纯数学家也经常对自己的职业开同样的玩笑。


Why should it be considered witty to celebrate the uselessness of knowledge?	为什么人们会把庆祝知识无用看作一种诙谐的态度？


I witnessed a similar attitude from a cosmologist when I participated in a radio show a few years ago: the host remarked to him that his research “has virtually no practical applicability,” to which he quickly replied, “I’m proud of that, yes.”	几年前，我在参与一档广播节目时曾亲眼目睹一位宇宙学家抱有同样的态度：当主持人说他的研究“几乎没有任何实际用处”时，他很快回答说，“是这样，我感到非常骄傲。 ”


These jokes all seem to rely on the same assumption: everyone thinks that knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, should be useful.	这些玩笑似乎有赖于同样一种假设：所有人都认为知识，特别是科学知识，应该有某种用处。


So it’s funny to boast that one’s own brand of knowledge, whether experimental physics, mathematics, or cosmology, is useless.	因此不管是实验物理学、数学或宇宙学，吹嘘自己的知识无用显得非常好笑。


But the joke wouldn’t work if there were not at the same time another widely shared assumption that scientific knowledge has a value independent of any practical use.	但如果不是同时有另外一种假设公认科学知识的价值不依赖于任何实际用途的话，这样的玩笑恐怕也站不住脚。


After all, it would not be funny if a charity dedicated to famine relief celebrated its own ineffectiveness; practical value in that case would be paramount, because it would be the only real reason for the charity to exist.	毕竟，如果某家致力于赈济饥荒的慈善机构庆贺自己效率低下，将不会有人因此感到好笑。 那种情况下实际价值是重中之重，因为它是慈善机构存在的唯一真正理由。


So, even though potential usefulness is the reason why governments devote so much money to scientific research, people really expect more from science than that.	因此，就算潜在的实用性是政府投入巨资进行科研的原因所在，人们对科学的实际期待却有所不同。


On this view, science also has a quite different, higher aim: understanding the natural world. 	从这个角度看，科学还有理解自然世界这样一个截然不同的更高目标。


Einstein may have drawn US President Franklin Roosevelt’s attention to the possibility of making nuclear weapons, but he is chiefly remembered for his profound ideas about the nature of the universe.	爱因斯坦用来吸引美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福的或许是制造核武器的可能性，但他为世人所铭记还是因为有关宇宙自然的深邃理念。


More recent scientific gurus, such as Carl Sagan and Stephen Hawking, have presented a similar image to the public.	更近的科学权威，比如卡尔·萨根和斯蒂芬•霍金，也有着与爱因斯坦相似的公众形象。


Science from this perspective is about natural philosophy, an enterprise that seeks to acquire deep understanding of the world regardless of whether that knowledge can be put to use.	从这个角度看，科学也就是自然哲学，它追求对世界更深刻的理解，而不关心这些知识能否付诸应用。


Jokes also betray a certain uneasiness about the apparent contradictions that they reveal.  In this case, the uneasiness derives from a fundamental uncertainty about which of the two faces of science, natural philosophy or instrumentality, represents its true character.  Is science really about understanding the world, with instrumentality being a matter of fortuitous spin-offs?	这样的玩笑也在某种程度上暴露出对显而易见矛盾的不安和局促。 此时此地，这种不安来源于人们对于自然哲学和功用性这两个侧面究竟哪一面能代表科学真正属性的疑惑。


Or is it really about putting the natural world to human uses, with natural philosophy being little more than a language to account for why certain techniques work?	科学难道真是为了理解世界，而实用性不过是一条偶然的岔路？ 还是科学的真正含义是让自然世界为人类所用，而自然哲学则不过是一种语言，可以解释为什么某些技术能够发挥作用？


The nineteenth century invented the familiar terms “pure” and “applied” science as a way of reconciling these alternative understandings.	“纯科学”和“应用科学”这两个耳熟能详的名词出现在19世纪，上述两种不同的理解也因此实现了统一。


Pure science, as the name suggests, is presented as the “real thing,” untainted by practical considerations and rooted in properly conducted empirical and theoretical investigation of nature.	纯科学就像这个名称所表现的那样，被人们理解为“核心问题”，它没有被有关实际的考量所沾染，以来自自然的正确的经验和理论调查为根基。


Applied science takes the knowledge provided by pure science and puts it to work.	应用科学则是把纯科学提供的知识运用到实践中去。


But that straightforward picture bears little resemblance to the complexities of real scientific activity: if applied science involved nothing more than the application of the results of pure science, there would be no need for “research and development” departments in manufacturing corporations, or research laboratories at chemical or electronics companies.	但这种直截了当的描述并不能表现出实际科学活动的复杂性：如果应用科学仅限于把纯科学的成果付诸应用，那么制造企业就没有必要设立“研究与发展部”，化工或电子企业也没有必要设立科研实验室。


The instrumental achievements of science would depend solely on the scraps falling from the pure scientist’s table.	科学的实用成就将完全取决于从纯科学家桌上漏下的碎屑。


In fact, the two faces of science are much more intimately interwoven – less like faces than like two ingredients of a thoroughly stirred mixture.	实际上，科学的两个侧面关系更加紧密——与其说是它们是不同的侧面还不如说是彻底混合在一起的两种成份更妥当。


“Truth and utility,” wrote Francis Bacon, the early seventeenth-century English philosopher and statesman, “are the very same things.”	十七世纪早期英国哲人兼政治家弗兰西斯·培根写道，“求真和致用其实是一回事。


In other words, the truth of beliefs about the world is guaranteed only by the capacity of those beliefs to be turned into actions that produce the practical outcomes that human beings desire.	”换句话讲，只有有能力将信仰转化为人类所期望的实际结果才能保障与世界相关的信仰的真实。


What we understand as the instrumentality of science was, for Bacon, nothing but the other side of the scientific coin.	在培根看来，我们心目中的科学的实用性不过是硬币的另外一面而已。


Where the poet John Keats wrote “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” Bacon might have said, “Utility is truth, truth utility”—as long as we take “utility” in a very broad sense.	诗人约翰·济慈曾经写道“美即是真，真即是美，”而只要我们从广义的角度理解“致用”，培根或许会说“致用即求真，求真即致用”。


But we don’t believe Bacon, either.	但我们也不能盲从培根。


Like Bacon, we value utility because it seems to lend credibility to the claims that science makes about the nature of the world – science is true because it works.	像培根一样，我们因致用能增加科学的可信度而看重致用——科学因致用而真实。


But, at the same time, we won’t allow science to be reduced to practical utility, because that would destroy its intellectual status, as well as the intellectual status of scientists themselves, and would prevent science from giving explanations.	但与此同时，我们又不能允许将科学等同于实际应用，因为这样就破坏了科学和科学家们的思想地位，从而妨碍科学对自然现象做出解释。


So science must retain its claim to being natural philosophy, too.	因此科学仍必须保持其自然哲学的本来面目。


Sometimes we believe that science is natural philosophy, and sometimes we believe that science is instrumentality.	有时我们认为科学是一种自然哲学，有时又认为科学即应用。


But in fact it’s both simultaneously, neither “pure” nor “applied.”	但实际上科学同时兼具两者的特性，既非“纯粹”又非“应用”。


If we could acknowledge that, we wouldn’t be joking about it.	如果我们认识到这一点，就不会再开这样的玩笑了。


Deconstructing the Euro	解构欧元


PARIS – In January, Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at the economics research firm Markit, called France “the new sick man of Europe.”	巴黎—1月，经济研究公司Markit首席经济学家克里斯·威廉森（Chris Williamson）将法国称为“欧洲新病夫”。


With near-zero GDP growth, rising unemployment, and mounting public debt – not to mention counter-productive austerity policies – it is difficult to argue otherwise.	法国GDP增长几乎为零，失业不断增加，公债水平节节攀升——更不用说反生产性的紧缩政策了——这让你很难反驳他的观点。


Given France’s profound importance to Europe’s economic and political stability, this poses a major threat to the entire European project.	由于法国对欧洲经济和政治稳定具有很重要的作用，因此这对整个欧洲工程来说都是个重大威胁。


Recent developments confirm Williamson’s diagnosis.	最新发展态势验证了威廉森的论断。


French business activity sank to a seven-month low in December.	12月，法国商业活动降至七个月低点。


While tax revenues increased by €32 billion ($44 billion) last year, the government deficit fell by a mere €8 billion and public debt increased from 89% of GDP to more than 93%.	尽管去年税收收入增加了320亿欧元，但政府赤字只减少了80亿欧元，公债水平从占GDP的89%上升到93%。 与此同时，失业率从9.


Meanwhile, unemployment rose from 9.5% to 10.5%.	5%增加到10. 5%。


The obvious conclusion is that austerity is not the answer.	显而易见，紧缩不是答案。


Indeed, France must abandon its current policies, for its own – and the rest of Europe’s – sake.	事实上，法国必须放弃现有政策，这对它自己和对欧洲其他国家都好。


France’s problems, like those of the eurozone’s other troubled economies, stem from the fact that the euro’s exchange rate does not align with member countries’ economic positions.	和其他欧元区麻烦经济体一样，法国的问题来源于欧元汇率与成员国的经济状况不相符这一事实。


As a result, these countries’ virtual exchange rates vis-à-vis Germany are critically overvalued, inasmuch as wages in these countries have risen more quickly, and labor productivity more slowly, than in Germany.	结果是这些国家的实际对德国汇率被大大高估，因为这些国家工资增长更快而劳动生产率增长更慢。


Given that the implicit nominal exchange rates are fixed “forever” within the euro, these countries have accumulated major deficits relative to Germany.	由于隐含名义利率通过欧元被“永远”固定了，因此这些国家积累起相对德国的巨大赤字。


Likewise, the deficit countries’ exchange rates are overvalued relative to third countries like the United States and Japan, while Germany’s currency is undervalued, because the euro’s exchange rate is determined by the balance of payments of the eurozone as a whole, which Germany’s massive surplus distorts.	类似地，赤字国的汇率相对第三国（如美国和日本）也处于高估状态，而德国货币则处于低估状态，因为欧元汇率由欧元区总体收支平衡决定，而欧元区总体收支平衡因为德国的巨大盈余而存在扭曲。


In short, the euro exchange rate is too weak for equilibrium in Germany and too strong for equilibrium in France and the other less competitive eurozone economies.	简言之，欧元汇率对德国来说低于均衡水平，而对法国和其他竞争力较弱的欧元区经济体来说则高于均衡水平。


The eurozone’s weaker economies thus face a dilemma: either expand in line with productive potential, thereby incurring external deficits, or enforce austerity, eliminating external deficits by squeezing imports.	因此，欧元区疲软经济体面临一个两难：要么按生产潜力水平扩张，这意味着外部赤字； 要么加强紧缩，通过挤出进口消除外部赤字。


Under pressure from Germany, they have so far pursued the latter option.	在德国的压力下，它们选择了后者。


The current “competitive austerity” trend is irrational, first and foremost, because, by undermining domestic demand, it directly controverts the currency union’s fundamental principle that a large domestic market should act as a buffer against external demand shocks.	当前的“竞争性紧缩”趋势是不理性的，首先，这破坏了内需，直接与货币联盟的基本原则——庞大的国内市场应该成为抵御外部需求冲击的缓冲相悖。


This is causing everyone to suffer – even Germany.	这造成了所有国家的损失，包括德国。


Indeed, from 2007 to 2012, Germany’s exports to other eurozone countries declined by 9%, from €432 billion to €393 billion.	事实上，从2007年到2012年，德国对其他欧元区国家出口下降了9%，从4,320亿欧元减少到3,930亿欧元。


But this is not the only threat that austerity poses to Germany’s hard-won prosperity.	但紧缩给德国好不容易赢得的繁荣所造成的威胁不止于此。


The euro has also caused Germany’s business cycle to diverge from those of the less competitive economies, while prohibiting customized monetary policies.	欧元还造成德国商业周期与竞争力较低经济体的脱节，并且让合适的货币政策无从实施。


And the common monetary policy that all are being forced to pursue is intensifying deflationary pressures in the weaker countries, while increasing inflationary pressures in Germany.	而被迫采取的共同货币政策加剧了疲软国的通缩压力，同时也增加了德国的通胀压力。


Furthermore, populations in the eurozone’s stagnant economies are increasingly demanding that Germany change its policies, increasing wages and implementing measures aimed at boosting consumption and discouraging savings.	此外，欧元区停滞经济体的人民日益需要德国改变其政策，提高工资并实施旨在提振消费、抑制储蓄的过时。


While responding to such demands would help to ease political tensions across the eurozone, they would face strong opposition within Germany.	尽管响应这一需要有助于缓解整个欧元区的政治紧张，但在德国国内会引起强烈反对。


Similarly, resolving the crises that will inevitably emerge from the current rigid exchange-rate system will ultimately require Germany to agree either to debt write-offs or to large-scale government-bond purchases by the European Central Bank, which would flood the eurozone with liquidity.	类似地，要解决当前的僵化汇率体系所必然会导致的危机，最终需要德国同意债务减记或欧洲央行大量买入政府债券（这会向欧元区注入大量流动性）。


Either outcome would run contrary to Germany’s interests and preferences, making it as unfair an approach as austerity.	这两个结果都与德国的利益和偏好相悖，因此和紧缩一样有失公允。


What the eurozone needs is a solution that does not force any one country or group of countries to bear the brunt of the adjustment – and that means a controlled segmentation of the currency union.	欧元区需要这样的解决方案：它不会强迫任何一个或一些国家承受调整的主要成本。 这意味着对货币联盟做有控制的分割。


Contrary to popular belief, this could be done in a way that reinvigorates the European ideal, rather than reviving the parochial nationalism of the past.	与流行的见解不同，这可以通过一种刺激欧洲理想而不会让过去的狭隘民族主义死灰复燃的方式实现。


The key is to ensure that it arises from the European Union’s economic and political core.	关键在于它来自欧盟经济和政治核心。


Specifically, Germany, Europe’s greatest economic power, and France, the intellectual progenitor of European unification, should announce their simultaneous exit from the euro and re-adoption of the Deutsche Mark and the franc.	具体而言，欧洲最强大的经济体德国和欧洲统一思想的发源地法国应该同时宣布退出欧元区，从新采用德国马克和法郎。


This would trigger the immediate revaluation of the Deutsche Mark – and possibly of the franc – relative to the euro.	这会立刻导致德国马克（可能还包括法郎）对欧元的升值。


For their part, other EU member countries would have to decide whether to retain the euro in its truncated form or revert to their own national currencies, possibly pegging them to the revived Deutsche Mark or franc.	其他欧盟成员国则需要决定留在缩编后的欧元区还是重新采用其自身的国家货币，并可能盯住重新启用的德国马克或法郎。


Regardless of their decision, the price competitiveness of the eurozone’s weaker economies would improve considerably.	无论做出什么选择，欧元区疲软经济体的价格竞争力都会得到极大改善。


Of course, France and Germany would need to implement interim arrangements to safeguard their banking systems’ stability.	当然，法国和德国需要实施过渡性安排以保证银行系统的稳定。


Moreover, they would have to negotiate with the ECB and other European governments a plan for managing euro-denominated debts.	此外，它们还需要和欧洲央行和其他欧洲政府谈判，制定管理欧元计价债务的计划。


A period of monetary uncertainty, as European economies adjusted to the new environment, would be unavoidable.	在欧洲经济体适应性环境的过程中，一定时期的货币不确定性是不可避免的。


But that would be far better than the economic and political impasse in which the eurozone is now trapped.	但这也比欧元区目前所身处的经济和政治僵局强得多。


Latin America’s Ukraine	拉丁美洲的乌克兰


MEXICO CITY – By all indications, the international community has resigned itself to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Crimean “land grab,” as US Vice-President Joe Biden has called it.	墨西哥城—从各种指标看，国际社会已经顺从于俄罗斯总统普京的“土地掠夺”（美国副总统拜登语）。


Once Putin decided he wanted to assume the consequences of his acts, there was very little the United States, the European Union, or the United Nations could do.	一旦普京决定采取行动，美国、欧盟或联合国便束手无策。


Latin America, meanwhile, is experiencing the opposite problem.	与此同时，拉丁美洲正在经历相反的问题。


Though the region’s countries have the means to stop the growing political, economic, and human-rights catastrophe in Venezuela, they lack the will, while the rest of the world’s attention to Ukraine has removed any pressure on them to act.	尽管该地区各国有办法阻止委内瑞拉的政治、经济和人权状况继续恶化，但却缺乏意愿，，而世界其他地区的目光纷纷对准了乌克兰，这也让它们没有压力采取行动。


In Ukraine, the US and the EU seem to have decided on a sensible course of action – or, rather, on a realistic two-track response – that is unlikely to produce spectacular results, but is certainly preferable to passivity.	在乌克兰，美国和欧盟似乎决定采取明智动作——或者说基于现实考虑的两手准备——这一动作不可能产生令人瞩目的结果，但显然比不作为更好。


First, the sanctions imposed so far – visa cancellations, asset seizures or freezes, and the like – will not give Sevastopol back to Ukraine, but they will eventually bite, at least in certain Russian business sectors.	首先，目前所采取的制裁措施——取消签证、资产没收或冻结等——并不能让塞瓦斯托波尔回归乌克兰，但终究会起到作用，至少对俄罗斯的某些商业部门会起到作用。


Whether this unites the oligarchs, or divides them, and whether it forces them to take their money out of Russia, or bring it back home, cannot be predicted.	这些制裁会团结还是分裂寡头、会迫使他们将资金转出还是转回俄罗斯都无法预料。


But uncertainty is far better than knowing acquiescence.	但不确定性总比明知故犯的缄默好得多。


There are simply no alternatives right now, and applying the entire gamut of sanctions from the outset would leave the EU and the US without further options.	目前并无其他替代方案可用，而从外部全方位开启制裁也让欧盟和美国没有了进一步的选择。


Second, and much more important, a tacit anti-appeasement ultimatum has been issued to the Kremlin: additional expansion in Ukraine will lead to much stronger and more painful sanctions.	其次也是更重要的是，美国和欧盟向克里姆林宫发出了无声的反绥靖最后通牒：继续在乌克兰扩张将导致更强更痛苦的制裁。


This may or may not work, but the decisions and announcements at least have the merit of existing, thereby demonstrating the willingness of the G-7 and others to uphold principles and values to which Russia is, in theory, also committed.	这也许能奏效，也许不能，但这些决定和声明至少有其价值，从而说明了七国集团和其他国家愿意捍卫理论上俄罗斯也做出过承诺的原则和价值。


Clearly, the world’s democracies lack perfect options, given everyone’s eminently reasonable reluctance to resort to force.	显然，世界民主国家没有完美选择，因为每个国家都有充分的理由不寻求诉诸武力。


Given Ukraine’s location, history, and the potential for trouble, the international community’s greater attention to the crisis there than to the disaster unfolding in Venezuela is not surprising.	从乌克兰的区位、历史和造成麻烦的潜力看，国际社会更多地关注那里而不是正在委内瑞拉展开的灾难并不令人奇怪。


But it is not appropriate, either.	但对于后者的关注实在太少。


Recent events in Venezuela imply as many perils and unforeseen, perverse consequences as in Ukraine, and the international community, as well as most Latin American democracies, should be paying much more attention.	委内瑞拉最近发生的事件的风险性、不可预见性和严重性不亚于乌克兰，而国际社会（以及大部分拉丁美洲民主国家）应该给予更多关注。


For starters, there is energy security.	首先，这事关能源安全。


Venezuela has some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, and is a major exporter (though smaller than ten years ago).	委内瑞拉拥有世界最大石油和天然气储量之一，也是主要油气出口国（尽管出口规模较十年前有所下降）。


And, for better or for worse, it is a key supplier to certain countries.	此外，不论好坏，它是一些国家的关键能源供给国。


Nearly all of the Caribbean, Central America, and some Gulf ports in the United States depend on Venezuelan low-sulfur crude oil for their power plants, refineries, and balance-of-payments positions.	几乎所有加勒比地区和中美洲以及部分美国墨西哥湾区港口依赖委内瑞拉低硫原油用于发电、精炼和实现收支平衡。


Cuba is the most dramatic case of dependence: Without subsidized Venezuelan petroleum and the enormous sums paid for the Castros’ doctors – some excellent, some fraudulent – the island’s economy would sink, causing a wave of Cubans to leave, as has occurred repeatedly over the past half-century.	古巴对委内瑞拉的依赖最大：如若没有受补贴的委内瑞拉汽油和给卡斯特罗医生（有些是名医，有些则是骗子）的巨额医疗费，古巴经济就将陷入萧条，促使一大批古巴人逃离，这在过去五十年中发生过多次。


This time, though, the consequences for Florida and Mexico could be graver than before.	但这一次，佛罗里达和墨西哥将受到比以往更大的影响。


But what happens in Venezuela matters for other reasons as well.	但委内瑞拉形势之所以重要，还有其他原因。


Targeted repression, imprisonment of opposition leaders, press censorship, shortages, inflation, and wanton violence – Caracas is one the world’s most dangerous cities – have created a situation that appears untenable in the medium term.	定向压迫、关押反对派领导人、新闻审查、短缺、通货膨胀和暴力肆虐——加拉加斯已成为世界上最危险的城市之一——从中期看，局面已难以为继。