The hope was that the Chinese leadership would finally do something – preferably something bold – to forestall further decline in the country’s major economic indicators.	人们对此次会议抱有的希望是，中国领导层最终会采取一些措施——最好是大胆的措施——来阻止中国主要经济指标的进一步下滑。


Growth has slowed, exports have plummeted, and unemployment has jumped, and the prevailing view has been that a “blame America first” strategy makes the most sense.	中国经济增长已经放缓，出口急剧回落，失业率大幅上升，而且其主流的观点认为，“先责怪美国”的策略是很有道理的。


Analysts kept waiting for Chinese officials to salvage capitalism by spelling out a plan to save its economy first.	分析人士一直在等待中国官员先提出挽救中国经济的详细计划，并借此来挽救资本主义。


The danger is that this is exactly what China’s leaders did.	此次会议中存在的危险是，中国领导人正是这样做的。


China’s government is divided on a number of matters, but there is a strong, sharp-edged consensus that social stability is at risk unless a robust stimulus package emerges to stave off further job loss.	中国政府官员在许多问题上存在分歧，但是，他们强烈而且观点鲜明的一致认为，中国必须要有一个强有力的刺激经济一揽子计划来防止更多的人失去工作，否则，中国的社会稳定就会处于危险之中。


(Never mind that Chinese history lacks evidence of a clear, causal connection between unemployment and national unrest.)	（尽管中国缺乏失业和社会动荡之间存在明确的因果关系的历史证据）。


Premier Wen Jiabao confirmed that a major effort was being made to extend and implement the previously announced four-trillion-yuan plan, and that more funds were available if conditions worsened.	中国总理温家宝证实，为了推广和实施以前宣布的四万亿人民币的经济刺激计划，中国政府作出了重大的努力，而且，如果中国的经济形势进一步恶化，中国政府会投入更多的资金来经济刺激。


Data on the scope of the stimulus package – for example, investment per province or the number of new projects versus those that more cash would restart or reinvigorate (and these projects versus those that would be shut down) – are difficult to determine.	有关中国刺激经济一揽子计划的范围的数据——例如，每个省的投资数量，新项目的数量与那些追加资金就可以重新启动或振兴的项目的数量的对比（以及这些项目和那些会关停的项目的数量的对比）——很难确定。


The transparency and consistency of official figures lags well behind the authorities’ hyped promises about government reform, streamlining of the bureaucracy, and the retreat of the Party apparatus.	中国官方数据的透明度和连续性，远远滞后于中国政府对改革政府、简化官僚机构以及收缩中国共产党政党机构所作的夸大的承诺。


Still, it is not what we don’t know about the stimulus plan that is troublesome.	而且，现在不是我们对中国经济刺激计划 不 知情的东西让人感觉棘手，而是我们已经知道了的东西令人觉得如此。


China’s government, as prone to political maneuvering and policy gridlock as any, appears to agree that immediate economic growth is crucial and that an 8% annual rate is essential.	中国政府和任何其他政府一样，容易受到政治操纵和政策僵局的影响，它似乎认为立即见效的经济增长至关重要，而且8%的年经济增长率对中国来说非常关键。


Many officials (and the analysts and advisers who support them) assumed that this magic number represents the minimum rate needed to provide jobs to workers and managers and absorb the more than six million new graduates who spill out of China’s campuses each year in search of employment.	许多中国官员（以及支持他们的分析人士和顾问）认为，8%这一神奇的数字代表了为中国的工人和管理人员提供工作机会、吸收每年从中国校园进入社会的超过6百万寻找工作的应届毕业生所需的最低比率。


That 8% target will be met, because in China directed objectives are always attained, and often exceeded.	中国8%的经济增长目标肯定会实现，因为在中国，政府确定的目标总是实现了，并且经常是超额完成。


After all, political careers depend on acceding to the demands of the central government.	毕竟，中国官员的政治前途是建立在认同中央政府的要求上的。


And yet China’s reliance on economic policies that require the heavy hand of the state to achieve officially decreed targets had been fading.	虽然中国对需要国家强力推行以达到官方确定的目标的经济政策的依赖程度，已经减弱了。


The government’s renewed focus on such a target is thus another indication that the global economic crisis has strengthened those Chinese officials and intellectuals who advocate a socialist system.	但是，中国政府对政府确定经济增长率这样的目标的重新关注，是全球经济危机加强了那些支持社会主义制度的中国官员和知识分子的地位的又一证据。


After all, it is much more difficult to make an argument for market economies when they are under siege.	毕竟，在市场经济处于困境的时候，在中国支持市场经济的人要为它说话更加困难。


The real danger of the new stimulus package is not ideological but environmental.	中国新推出的刺激经济一揽子计划的真正危险不是意识形态方面的，而是环境方面的。


What the figure of 8% signals to provincial officials and industrial managers is that the emerging promise of green GDP – wherein a local government had to show not only growth, but also clean and energy-efficient growth – has been abandoned.	中国8%的经济增长率向各省官员和工业管理人员传递的信号是，中国政府新兴的绿色GDP承诺——为此，地方政府不仅要显示经济有增长，还要显示是清洁节能的增长——已经被抛弃了。


Few Party officials really wanted to be troubled by the complexities of such calculations anyway, but either abided by them or paid them lip service, for the sake of maintaining patronage and seeking promotion.	然而，在中国共产党党的干部中，很少有人真正想为这样复杂的计划劳神费力，但是，为了保住职位和寻求升迁，他们对此要么予以遵守，要么给予口头支持。


Now, with the Party’s ability to manage the economy seemingly at stake, its stimulus package implies a green light to bypass environmental regulations if jobs or growth targets are in jeopardy.	现在，在中国共产党管理经济的能力似乎在经受考验的时候，它的一揽子经济刺激计划意味着，在人们的工作机会或经济增长目标受到威胁的时候，中国可以为绕开环境保护开绿灯。


A big loser here is energy efficiency.	中国政府的节能承诺在这里是更大的输家。


The proportion of new outlays devoted to energy conservation and reduction have been cut almost in half, just when reforms in the price structure of energy use were beginning to kick in.  Some measures aimed at redistributing the energy load – such as solar and wind power – have been retained.	正当中国的能源消费价格结构改革开始启动的时候，它用于节能降耗的新确定的经费的比例，却已经几乎减少了一般。


But the funding for expanding these efforts will rest largely on provincial officials, who will be reluctant to compel local cadres to disrupt production and lay off even more workers.	中国有些为了重新分配能源负荷的措施——例如太阳能和风能——得到了保留，但是，扩大这些能源措施的资金主要要依靠地方官员，而这些官员是不会愿意为此而强迫当地的工厂中断生产和解雇更多的工人的。


Much of politics in China is local, but little of environmental protection is.	在中国，政治大部分是地方性的，但是环境保护则很少如此。


There is worse news elsewhere in the new plan.	在中国新推出的刺激经济一揽子计划中，还有更坏的讯息。


Nearly every industrial sector that, according to the stimulus package, deserves direct and immediate government support is energy-intensive and polluting (cement and steel, for example) or heavily managed by the state sector, and therefore missing incentives to balance growth with environmental protection (as is the case with the oil industry).	根据中国新的刺激经济一揽子计划，几乎每一个应该得到直接和快速的政府支持的工业部门，都是能源密集型和污染型的（例如，水泥和钢铁），或者是由国有企业严格控制的，因此，它们失去了平衡经济增长和环境保护的动力（像中国石油工业的情形那样）。


Political lobbies that oversee these sectors and overlap with certain factions in the Party are simply too powerful for nascent interests in society and the bureaucracy to parry.	对中国社会中的新生利益群体和官僚来说，控制这些部门以及和中国共产党中的某些派别重合的政治游说力量，已经强大到了他们无力抵挡的地步。


The recent signal being sent from China’s leadership is that economic revival rests on decreased regard for the environment.  This retreat also illustrates how little consensus there is among high-level government officials for making China green.  The danger of the current crisis is not that China’s government is not doing something, but that what it is doing undermines recent hope that China could help to save itself by saving the environment.	中国的这一退步也说明，在中国的政府高官中，保护环境的共识是多么得少。 对中国来说，当前经济危机的危险不是政府没有采取措施，而是它采取的措施破坏了人们最近对其可以通过保护环境来帮助其自身的希望。


China’s Victimization Syndrome	中国的受害综合症


A contest for China’s soul is now underway in that giant country, pitting two powerful forces and two very different stances toward the outside world against each other.	在中国那个巨大的国家，现在正进行着一场关于中国精神的辩论。 两种强大的力量和对待外部世界两种截然不同的态度互相对抗。


The outcome will have a major impact on whether China succeeds in becoming a nation capable of having truly constructive and durable relations with the outside world.	结果必然会对中国能否成功地与外部世界建立真正具有建设性的持久关系产生巨大冲击。


On one hand, China’s economic revolution has helped position it in the world as a confident powerhouse of trade, a more responsible global powerbroker, and even as a reassuring military presence.	一方面，中国的经济革命帮助中国找到了自己在世界上的位置：可靠的贸易强国，更有责任感的全球权力代理，甚至是令人放心的军事力量。


On the other hand, China remains trapped by a past and a mindset steeped in a sense of victimization, which tempts it to export blame for internal problems.	但另一方面，中国依然为过去所困，其思维方式充满了受害意识，诱使其将内部问题归咎于外部责任。


The main question is whether China can escape the pull of this old psychological syndrome – which kept it preoccupied throughout the twentieth century with debilitating sentiments of weakness, insecurity, and humiliation – and allow itself to be guided by a new outlook on the world, and even on old enemies.	最主要的问题是，中国能否逃出这种古老的心理综合症的束缚（在整个20世纪，这种综合症使中国沉浸于感伤之中，认为自己弱小、不安全、受人羞辱，这种多愁善感削弱了中国的力量），重新看待整个世界，甚至自己的宿敌，并以此来引导自己的发展？


The anti-Japanese demonstrations are a symptom of the old syndrome, fueled by grievances born at a time when China was, indeed, aggrieved and humiliated.	反日游行便是这一古老综合症的症状之一。 引发这些游行的怨恨产生于多年以前，那时中国确实遭到了伤害，饱受了屈辱。


With China’s growing economic clout, rising standard of living, and increasingly respected place in the world, one would hope that the Chinese and their leaders would find a way to let go of the dead.	随着中国经济实力的增长，生活水平的提高，在世界上享有越来越受尊敬的地位，人们希望中国民众和他们的领袖能找到某种途径，放开过去死亡的记忆。


Yet, even as the luster of the “China miracle” dazzles the world, the Chinese seem loath leave behind their dark feelings of victimization.	但即使在“中国奇迹”的光辉让世界眼花缭乱之时，中国人好像依然不愿意放下他们受害者的阴暗情绪。


Instead of assuming a new national paradigm based on the reality of their accomplishments (national unity, robust international trade, and growing global influence), China’s leaders cling to the old paradigm of their country as victim, the “sick man of Asia” being “cut up like a melon” by predatory imperial and colonial powers like Japan.	中国已经取得了种种成绩：国家统一，国际贸易蓬勃发展、全球影响日益增强。 但中国领导人却未能基于这一现实，确立一种新的国家范式，而是抱住中国的旧有形象不放，依然把中国当成受害者、当成是被日本这样掠夺成性的帝国主义、殖民主义国家瓜分的“东亚病夫”。


That bitter memory of oppression and exploitation lingers in the minds of too many Chinese like the afterimage of a bright light long after it has been turned off.	那些被压迫、被剥削的惨痛回忆在很多中国人的头脑之中挥之不去，就像强烈的灯光关掉以后留下的影像久久不散一样。


The Japanese occupation of China was a particularly galling and humiliating period because Japan was an Asian, not a Western, power.	日本对中国的占领是一段尤其让中国人觉得痛恨和屈辱的岁月，因为日本不是西方霸权，而是亚洲国家。


Moreover, like China, Japan was a society steeped in Confucian culture, which many Chinese reformers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries blamed as a critical impediment to their own country’s development and modernization.	此外，日本和中国一样，深受儒家文化影响。 19世纪、20世纪中国很多改革者都怪罪儒家文化，认为是这种文化严重阻碍了他们自己国家的发展和现代化进程。


Of course, Japan did occupy China, committed unimaginable savagery, and has since paid no reparations or apologized in a convincing way.	当然，日本确实占领过中国，犯下过难以想象的暴行，而且此后也没有进行赔款，没有以令人信服的方式道过歉。


Nevertheless, what benefit does China gain by continuing to raise these issues 60 years later?	但不管怎样，60年后，中国再旧事重提，又有什么好处呢？


What is worth the risk of alienating the world’s second largest economy and one of China’s most important trade partners?	日本是世界上第二大经济强国，也是中国最重要的贸易伙伴之一，冒着疏远它的风险，这值得吗？


First and foremost, aiding and inciting the expression of popular anger against Japan gives China’s Communist Party leaders a powerful and readily available vehicle for rallying domestic support, thereby legitimizing their own power.	第一点，也是最重要的一点，助长和煽动民众表达对日本的愤怒是中国共产党领导人随时可用的有力工具。 利用这种情绪，共产党领导人可以重新集结国内支持，以合法化自己的权力。


At the same time, the demonstrations represent China’s experience of the world as an unequal place where the weak are inevitably bullied, exploited, and humiliated.	同时，这些游行反映了中国对世界的感受：这个世界是个不公平的地方，弱者总是被凌辱，被剥削，被羞辱。


This mindset suggests that, despite the panoramic city skylines, the billboards, and the flashy five-star hotels say otherwise, China has a long way to go before it truly comes to understand and appreciate its actual accomplishments and status.	这种思维方式意味着，尽管城市里连绵不断的空中轮廓线，广告牌和华丽的五星级酒店诉说着中国的变化与发展，但要真正理解并珍惜其实际的成就和地位，中国还有很长一段路要走。


Indeed, surges of organized anger when China is attacked or insulted are hardly new.	事实上，中国在受到攻击或侮辱时爆发出来的有组织的愤怒并不让人觉得新鲜。


The reaction of China’s leaders to the America’s accidental attack on China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1998, and to the collision of an American spy plane with a Chinese plane over the Pacific, was to permit, if not foment, large anti-foreign demonstrations.	从1998年，美国误炸中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆，到美国侦察机与中国飞机在太平洋上空相撞事件，中国领导人的反应如果算不上煽动，至少也是允许了大规模的反外游行。


In keeping with this syndrome, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has accused Japan of having “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” by not apologizing for their crimes, as if he were Minister of Psychology, rather than foreign affairs.	外交部长李肇星对日本的指责也是这一综合症的体现，他说日本不为自己犯下的罪行道歉，已经“伤害了中国人民的感情”，好像他是心理部部长，而不是外交部部长一样。


Of course, China’s wounded psyche and the desire for restitution from its former tormentors deserve sympathy.	当然，中国的心灵受到过创伤，希望从以前给他们带来过痛苦的人那儿获得补偿，这一点值得同情。


In this sense, China, like many countries, could be said to have something of a bi-polar personality.	从这个意义上来说，中国和其他很多国家一样，可以说多少具有两种截然不同的性格。


Much of the emotional force of Mao’s revolution derived from the widespread sense of unequal treatment and humiliation by foreign powers, and this revolutionary fervor has never been properly interred.	在民众中，受到外国不平等待遇和羞辱的感觉普遍存在，毛泽东革命的感情力量大半来源于此。 这种革命的狂热从来就没有完全消逝过。


Just as Mao’s portrait has never been taken down from The Gate of Heavenly Peace, so whole elements of his revolution continue to survive in China’s institutions, ways of thinking, and modes of interacting with the world.	就如毛泽东的画像从来没有从天安门上取下来过一样，毛泽东革命的所有元素也一直存留于中国的制度、思维方式以及与世界的互动模式中。


Like recessive genes, they sometimes suddenly re-express themselves.	这些元素就象隐性基因一样，有时会忽然重新表达出来。


The role of victim is all too familiar to the Chinese, perhaps even somewhat comforting, for it provides a way to explain (and explain away) China’s problems.	对中国人来说，受害者的角色是再熟悉不过了，甚至可以说，或许这种角色或多或少都会让人感到安慰，因为它为解释（和搪塞）中国问题提供了一种途径。


But it is also dangerous, because it derives from China’s old weaknesses rather than its new strengths.	但同时，这一角色也是危险的，因为其来源于中国旧有的弱点而非新的实力。


The era of Japanese militaristic and imperialist power has long gone, and the world is beating a path to China’s door.	日本军国主义、帝国主义的时代早已经过去了，世界正在争先恐后地拜访登门中国。


The last thing the country needs is to remain trapped in the past.	中国最不必做的事就是继续陷在过去之中。


A Chinese Dinner for Two	两个人的中国晚宴


LONDON – A great deal of water has flowed through the Taiwan Strait in the 70 years since the leader of China’s Communists, Mao Zedong, met the leader of his nationalist opponents, Chiang Kai-shek.	伦敦—自70年前中国共产党领袖毛泽东与他的国民党对手蒋介石会面以来，台湾海峡便成为一道不可逾越的海峡。


So the recent meeting in Singapore between their heirs, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic and his Taiwanese counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, could legitimately be described as historic.	因此，他们的后继者，中华人民共和国主席习近平及其台湾同道马英九最近在新加坡的碰面称为历史性可谓实至名归。


The diplomatic negotiation that preceded the meeting was exquisitely complex, even covering who should pay for dinner (they split the bill).	会面前的外交谈判复杂又细致，甚至涵盖了应该由谁来为晚宴买单的内容（最后决定各付各的）。


But, after a brief exchange of views behind closed doors, no joint statement was issued and only a heavily sanitized account of the meeting was made available to China’s state media.	但是，在闭门会面简单交换了看法后，双方并没有发表联合声明，中国国家媒体对会面内容报道也是遮遮掩掩。


So why did the meeting happen, and what does it portend?	那么，这次会面为什么要进行，又预示着什么？


Ever since Mao’s Communists won the civil war (which the last meeting between the parties, in 1945, had been called to try to avert) and Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang forces withdrew to Taiwan, relations between the two sides have smoldered without ever really catching fire.	自毛泽东的共产党赢得内战、蒋介石的国民党力量退入台湾以来（1945年上一次两党会晤便是为了避免内战），双方的关系一直在“焖烧”从未真正走火。


While there was no love lost between the United States and the Kuomintang leadership, the US gave Taiwan assurances of military protection, which deterred China from trying to unify the island with the mainland by force.	美国和国民党之间的关系并不好，但美国仍向台湾提供军事保护承诺，这威慑了中国，后者没有尝试用武力统一两岸。


Mao’s adventures on the Korean peninsula, supporting the North against the South and its Western allies, helped to cement the Washington-Taipei axis, which, thanks to some nifty diplomatic footwork, survived President Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China in the early 1970s.	毛泽东在朝鲜半岛的冒险——支持朝鲜对抗韩国及其西方盟友——帮助巩固了华盛顿-台北轴心，这一轴心在巧妙的外交运作下，在20世纪70年代初尼克松与中国恢复邦交后得以保存。


America recognized the communists in Beijing as China’s legitimate government, while helping to sustain Taiwan in a limbo between sovereignty and the practical exercise of statehood.	美国承认北京的中共为中国合法政府，同时帮助台湾游走在主权实体和实际存在的国家之间。


The island ran its own affairs, becoming a rambunctious democracy in the 1980s, but never insisted on international recognition as a full-fledged sovereign state.	台湾自为其政，在20世纪80年代变成了一个欢闹的民主政体，但从未在国际上获得完全主权国家地位的承认。


For China’s rulers, Taiwan was a “renegade province,” and it steadily picked off members of the international community who tried to treat it as anything more than this.	对中国统治者来说，台湾是一个“反叛的省”，任何国际社会的成员只要试图对待台湾高于这一规格，就会成为中国攻讦的目标。


But there has also been a recognition of reality – especially economic reality – along the way.	但与此同时，中国也承认现实——特别是经济现实。


People remember 1989 for the Tiananmen Square killings.	人们都记得1989年天安门杀人事件。


But that May and June, ministers like me flew to Beijing for what seemed to us all to be a positive and truly historic occasion.	但在当年5月和6月，包括我在内的部长官员飞往北京见证一个在我们所有人看来都具有积极意义的真正的历史时刻。


China allowed Taiwan to attend the Asian Development Bank’s annual board meeting for the first time, provided it was called “Taipei, China.”	中国首次接受台湾出席亚洲开发银行理事会年会，提出的要求是以“中国台北”名义出席。


Some years later, when I was a European Union commissioner, after we had negotiated World Trade Organization membership with both the People’s Republic and Taiwan, we wanted to set up an EU office in Taipei to monitor the island’s compliance with the WTO’s rules.	几年后我担任欧盟委员期间，在分别与中华人民共和国和台湾进行世界贸易组织成员资格谈判后，我们希望在台北开设一个欧盟办事处，监督台湾遵守世贸组织规则的情况。


Before doing so, I made a point of telling the Chinese government what we were doing – opening a commercial regulator, not an embassy.	在此之前，我向中国政府告知我们正在做什么——我们开设的是一个商业监管机构，不是大使馆。


Money of course talks for both China and Taiwan, and their economies are now closely linked, with large numbers of Taiwanese living and working in China (especially in the Shanghai area) and huge Taiwanese investments in Chinese manufacturing.	当然，中国和台湾都不会拒绝钱，如今它们的经济关系也十分密切，许多台湾人在中国生活和工作（特别是在上海地区），台湾在中国也有着为数巨大的制造业投资。


Taiwan’s Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics manufacturer (including Blackberries, iPhones, and Kindles), has 12 factories in China, including one in Shenzhen that employs hundreds of thousands of workers.	台湾的富士康公司是世界第一大电子产品制造商（包括黑莓、苹果和Kindle），它在中国有12家工厂，其中深圳工厂雇用工人多达数十万人。


But, though Taiwanese politics is naturally dominated by the island’s relationship with the mainland, the reality of deep commercial ties between China and Taiwan has had no diplomatic equivalent.	但是，尽管台湾政治自然而然地被台湾与大陆的关系所主导，但中国和台湾之间深刻的经济关系没有与之匹配的外交关系。


The Kuomintang (also called the Chinese Nationalist Party) wants to improve relations without surrendering Taiwan’s independence.	国民党希望在不牺牲台湾独立性的情况下改善关系。


Its opponent, the Democratic Progressive Party, wants to strike a more autonomous posture, though whether it would ever really go for anything more substantial than tweaking China’s nose is doubtful.	其反对派民进党希望采取更加自主的姿态，尽管这一姿态是否会达到触及中国底线的程度还未可知。


A survey three years ago suggested that 80% of Taiwan’s 25 million people would support a formal declaration of independence, provided that it did not prompt a Chinese invasion.	三年前的一份调查表明，2,500万台湾人民中有80%支持正式宣布独立，只要这不会导致中国入侵。


That is a rather large caveat.	这是相当大的警告。


China regularly warns Taiwan against any such reckless action, and the US puts the squeeze on the island’s leaders whenever they seem to be getting too uppity with the mainland.	中国常常警告台湾不要做这样鲁莽的事情，美国也会在台湾领导人对大陆过于傲慢时提醒台湾。


There appear to be two reasons why Xi and Ma met.	习近平和马英九的会面似乎有两个原因。


First, they are clearly worried that the Kuomintang, which lost last year’s local elections in a landslide, will lose the general election in January as well.	首先，他们显然担心在去年的地方选举中一败涂地的国民党将在1月的大选中也败下阵来。


Both hope that showing that China and Taiwan can get along without too much trouble will bring electoral benefits for the Nationalists.	双方都希望，表明中国和台湾能够不太麻烦地携手共进能够为国民党增加选票。


In addition, at a time when the Chinese economy is slowing and regional tensions are rising because of China’s muscle flexing in the South and East China Seas, Xi seems eager to radiate peace-loving ambitions.	此外，中国经济正在减速，而因为中国在东海和南海的耀武扬威，地区紧张态势也在升级，因此，习近平似乎急切地想释放热爱和平的宏愿。


Having unsettled many of his neighbors, not just the Americans, his upcoming visit to Vietnam, and his prime minister Li Keqiang’s visit to South Korea, are of a piece with his dinner-hour diplomacy with Ma.	在许多邻国（不仅仅是美国）深感不安的情况下，习近平访问越南和总理李克强访问韩国都是与习马会类似的外交手段。


China’s real, long-term intentions are not entirely obvious, and maybe that’s part of its strategy: ambiguous signals play an important role in diplomacy.	中国真正的长期意图并不显而易见，也许这是其战略的一部分：模棱两可在外交中扮演着重要角色。


But two things are clear.	但有两点是清楚的。


First, Xi’s initiative shows the extent to which he dominates Chinese politics.	首先，习近平的做法表明了他在中国政坛的主导地位。


A weaker leader could not have taken such an ambitious step, which represents a real break with past Communist orthodoxy.	弱势领导人不可能采取这样宏大的步骤，这是与过去的中共正统的真正决裂。


Second, peaceful reunification of the mainland and Taiwan remains unlikely, unless it takes place – as China continues to promise – on the basis of “one country, two systems.”	其次，大陆和台湾的和平统一仍然是不可能的，除非——如中国继续承诺的——在“一国两制”的基础上。


But the Taiwanese cannot be very reassured by what they see happening today in Hong Kong, which was promised the same thing before its return to China in 1997.	但台湾人并不那么笃定——他们看着现在的香港正在发生什么。 1997年回归中国前，香港也得到了同样的承诺。


Taiwan’s system is democratic; China’s is not.	台湾是民主制度，中国不是。


What the example of Hong Kong suggests is that China would have to force Taiwan to give up democracy and the rule of law – or embrace both itself – before it could welcome its “renegade province” back into the fold.	香港的例子表明，中国必须迫使台湾放弃民主和法治——或两者都放弃——然后再欢迎它的“反叛的省”回到怀抱。


A New Playbook for China and ASEAN	中国和东盟：换个剧本重来？


KUALA LUMPUR – The ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea is a watershed moment for international law and an unmistakable warning to China about its strategic assertiveness in Southeast Asia.	吉隆坡—海牙常设仲裁法院（PCA）就中国南海领土主张所作出的裁决，是国际法的一个分水岭，也是中国近年来在东南亚的强势战略主张的一次挫折。


China says that it does not recognize the PCA ruling; but that doesn’t mean it is undisturbed by it.	中国宣称不承认仲裁院的裁决，但并不等于中国可以泰然自若。


The question now is how China will respond.	现在的问题是，中国要如何回应。


Will it change its often-aggressive behavior in the region, or will it continue to view the South China Sea mainly in terms of US-China competition?	中国会减缓在东南亚的强势战略吗？


If China assumes that a war-weary and risk-averse US will avoid conflict, it could simply assert its South China Sea claims by force.	或者继续把南中国海问题当作中美竞争的其中一个题目：即假使中国判定美国没有政治意愿卷入冲突与风险，就大可通过武力执行其在南中国海的声索。


But belligerence could backfire in several ways.	但中国如果在南中国海延续强势策略，可能只会适得其反。


First, it would force the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to choose between China and the US, a decision that all of them would prefer to avoid.	首先，东盟成员国被迫在中国和美国之间做出抉择。 东盟国都希望避开在中美之间做出零和的抉择。


Whereas ASEAN member states – particularly the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia – generally have deep military ties with the US, they also value their economic ties with China.	东盟成员国——特别是菲律宾、新加坡、泰国和印度尼西亚——大多与美国有着深切的军事关系，但也非常重视与中国的经济关系。


The reality is that ASEAN states could choose to become independent players, rather than pawns in the US-China competition, implying that it is in China’s interest to maintain ambiguity in US-ASEAN relations.	事实上，东盟国希望被当做独立的政治单位，而不是中美竞争的棋子。 中国为东盟国保留越大的模糊策略空间，越符合中国在东南亚的长远利益。


Second, by militarizing outcroppings and artificial islands in the South China Sea, China is unwittingly strengthening ultra-nationalist groups in the ASEAN states.	其次，中国军事化南中国海的焦岩和人工岛，在不经意间也助长了东盟各国国内的极端民族主义势力。


This development forces moderate leaders in these countries to adopt a tougher stance toward China than they otherwise would, in order to preempt attacks from the ultra-right and assuage their generals.	为了避免被右翼夺取话语权，也为了安抚躁动的军队和将领，东盟国本来相对温和领导人就被迫对中国采取更加强硬的立场。


A case in point is Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s recent visit to the Natuna Islands on a warship, a show of force in response to incursions there by Chinese fishermen and navy vessels.	例如，印尼总统佐科威最近乘军舰访巡视纳土纳群岛宣示主权，对中国渔民和海军舰只入侵海域做出反应。


China must know that the material advantages from closer ASEAN-China economic relations will not be enough to guarantee smooth diplomatic relations.	中国应该要清楚，东盟与中国经济关系所带来的物质和利益输送，不足以保证平稳的外交关系。


Most ASEAN member states are middle-income countries with educated elites who hold diverse views.	大部分东盟成员国是中等收入国家，也有持多元观点、受过高深教育的精英群，不是纯粹靠经济利益输送就能说服。


And even extremely poor and politically illiberal Myanmar has reduced its dependence on China in response to active wooing by the US.	即便是极端贫困且政治不自由的缅甸在美国的积极示好下，也减低了对中国的依赖。


China should rethink its insistence that negotiations over its territorial claims could be conducted only with individual ASEAN states, and not with ASEAN as a bloc – a stance that creates the impression that China is committed to bringing about the group’s breakup.	中国也应该反思坚持与个别东盟国进行国与国谈判而非与东盟整体谈判的立场。 这样会让东盟国认为中国有心“逐个击破”东盟国。


But China should not encourage ASEAN’s demise, because that would drive several now-neutral ASEAN states further toward the US.	中国不应该有意无意推动东盟机制的解体，因为这只会驱使一些目前保持中立的东盟国家进一步靠向美国。


Moreover, because ASEAN must represent ten countries with one voice, and must reach a consensus before it speaks, China has little reason to fear that a common ASEAN negotiating position would be totally unacceptable – particularly given recent history.	此外，由于东盟的“共识”机制要求发表立场前达成一致的看法，因此中国没有理由担心东盟立场与中国的看法相去太远。


For example, a 2012 meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers failed to produce a joint statement, because Cambodia, a Chinese ally, would not agree to mentioning the South China Sea.	晚近的一些事例可以作为参考：2012年东盟峰会首次没有发表联合声明，因为中国的盟友柬埔寨不同意关于南中国海的议案；


And in a meeting of the same group in Kunming, China, in June 2016, ASEAN had to withdraw a joint statement critical of China’s actions in the South China Sea when China, again, pressured Cambodia, as well as Laos, to object.	2016年6月在昆明举行的东盟外长会议上，东盟因为柬埔寨与寮国的反对，不得不撤回批评中国在南中国海的行为的联合声明。


What this shows is that, in dealing with ASEAN, China gets to negotiate twice – first, through its closest allies within ASEAN in the formulation of common ASEAN positions, and then directly with an ASEAN team that could include one of its allies.	换句话说，在与东盟打交道时，中国有谈判两次的权利——首先在东盟共同立场形成过程中通过其在东盟的最紧密盟友进行，然后再与所有东盟国谈判。


Certain ASEAN countries clearly value their relationships with China more than their relationships with other ASEAN countries; so, unless China has already ruled out any negotiation on the South China Sea, it should not rule out meeting ASEAN as a bloc.	某些东盟国显然重视对华关系甚于对其他东盟国家的关系； 因此，除非中国已经不准备就南中国海问题进行谈判，否则不应该排除与东盟作为一个整体进行谈判。


The irony in China’s South China Sea claim is that the Communist Party has fallen into a trap set unintentionally by the Kuomintang, which it defeated in 1949.	中国的南中国海声索的吊诡之处是，中共陷入了其于1949年打败的国民党不经意间布下的陷阱。


It was the crumbling Kuomintang that in 1947 drew and promulgated the original “11-dash line” map – subsequently reduced to nine dashes by Mao Zedong, in a fraternal gesture to Vietnam – in a futile effort to rally the population to its side via imperial ambition.	1947年，国民党政府试图在国共内战期间操弄民族主义换取支持，划定最初的“十一段线”，随后毛泽东为了表示与越南的友好关系，减为“九段线”。


There is no need for the winner of China’s civil war to follow the path of the loser.	中国内战的胜利者没有必要重走失败者的老路。


And if China has to press this claim in order to appease ultra-nationalist elements, it should do so by deploying diplomats, rather than its military.	如果中国真的要延续在南中国海的声索以安抚国内民族主义势力，也应该通过外交手段，而不是军事手段。


Of course, a win-win outcome from The Hague decision will also depend on ASEAN and US actions.	当然，海牙仲裁最后是否可以形成双赢的结果，也取决于东盟和美国的行动。


ASEAN and the US are highly skeptical of China’s repeated public promises of a non-hegemonic mode of international relations; but they should not be blind to China’s legitimate security concerns, which it will never neglect.	东盟和美国对于中国一再强调的不称霸的说法抱持怀疑的态度； 但却也不能罔顾中国的合理安全顾虑。


Both ASEAN and China must now exercise self-restraint and start negotiating in good faith to resolve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea in a way that addresses these concerns.	东盟和中国必须克制，并以良善意图开启谈判，正视和解决双方的顾虑，换个剧本重来。


China’s Monetary-Policy Choice	中国的货币政策选择


SHANGHAI – China’s economy has followed a remarkable course in recent years: from record-breaking powerhouse to major global risk, at least in the eyes of some.	上海—近几年来，中国经济的运行轨迹不可不谓引人注目：从打破纪录的增长发动机沦为了重大全球风险，至少在某些人眼里是如此。


Indeed, with GDP growth this year almost certain not to reach the authorities’ 7% target, the world is now watching closely for signs of crisis and a much sharper slowdown.	事实上，今年GDP增长几乎肯定无法达到当局7%的目标，目前，全世界都在密切关注危机和急剧减速的信号。


How did China get here, and can it put its economic growth back on track?	中国是如何走到这一步的？ 它能够让经济增长重回正轨吗？


China’s growth has been unsustainable for a while.	中国增长不可持续已经有一段时间了。


A stimulus package of less-than-prudent fixed-asset investment, adopted in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, sustained 9% GDP growth for two years.	2008年，为了应对全球金融危机，中国实施了有欠审慎的固定资产投资刺激计划，保持了两年9%的GDP增长。


But, after 2011, stimulus turned to macroeconomic tightening, causing investment growth to plummet from a nominal rate of over 30% to about 10% recently.	但是，2011年后，刺激转变为宏观经济紧缩，导致投资增长从30%以上的名义增长率下降到最近的10%左右。


This prevents full utilization of production capacity and resources, and explains why GDP growth above 7% is simply not possible.	这阻止了产能和资源的充分利用，也解释了为何GDP增长不可能超过7%。


Excess capacity and falling growth are mutually reinforcing.	产能过剩和增长下降是互相强化的。


Not only does excess capacity have a negative impact on growth; perhaps more important, sharply declining growth also contributes to massive redundancy in some industries (especially resources and the heavy and chemical industries).	不仅产能过剩对增长具有消极影响，也许更重要的是，急剧下降的增长也会导致某些行业的大规模冗余（特别是资源业、重工业和化工业）。


The question is why growth continues to slow.	问题在于为何增长持续低迷。


One popular line of thinking focuses on long-term structural factors, such as demographic transition.	流行的思维关注人口变化等长期结构性因素。


But, so far, few studies have indicated that structural factors are adequate to explain the extent of the decline in China’s potential growth rate over the last couple of years.	但是，到目前为止，很少有研究表明结构性因素足以解释过去几年来中国潜在增长率下降的幅度。


A more convincing answer lies in China’s monetary-policy stance.	更有说服力的答案在于中国的货币政策立场。


Since assuming office in 2013, Premier Li Keqiang’s government has chosen not to loosen the previous government’s rigorous macro policies, instead hoping that the resulting pressure on existing industries might help to stimulate the authorities’ sought-after structural shift toward household consumption and services.	自2013年上任以来，李克强总理的政府没有选择放松前任政府的严厉宏观政策，而是希望由此产生的对现有行业的压力能有助于刺激当局所追求的向家庭消费和服务业的转型。


Economists welcomed this ostensibly reasonable approach, which would slow the expansion of credit that had enabled a massive debt build-up in 2008-2010.	经济学家对这一看似合理的方针十分欢迎， 该方针将减缓导致2008—2010年间债务大规模累积的信用扩张。


China’s lower growth trajectory was dubbed the “new normal.”	中国的较低增长轨迹被称为“新常态”。


But, for this approach to work, GDP growth would have had to remain steady, rather than decline sharply.	但是，这一方针要想起效，就必须保持GDP增长稳定，而不是让它急剧放缓。


And that is not what has happened.	而事实并非如此。


Indeed, although structural adjustment continues in China, the economy is facing an increasingly serious contraction in demand and continued deflation.	事实上，尽管中国继续进行着结构调整，但经济正在面临日益严重的需求萎缩和持续通缩。


The consumer price index (CPI) has remained below 2%, and the producer price index (PPI) has been negative, for 44 months.	消费物价指数（CPI）保持在2%以下，生产物价指数（PPI）已经44个月为负。


In a country with a huge amount of liquidity – M2 (a common measure of the money supply) amounts to double China’s GDP – and still-rising borrowing costs, this makes little sense.	中国有着巨量的流动性——M2（货币供应量的常用指标）达到了中国GDP的两倍——而借贷成本仍在升高，这毫无意义。


The problem is that the government has maintained a PPI-adjusted benchmark interest rate that exceeds 11%.	问题在于政府将经PPI调整的基准利率保持在11%以上。


Interest rates reach a ludicrous 20% in the shadow banking sector, and run even higher for some private lending.	影子银行部门的利率达到了令人咋舌的20%，一些民间借贷比20%还要高。


The result is excessively high financing costs, which have made it impossible for firms in many manufacturing industries to maintain marginal profitability.	结果是过高的融资成本，这让许多制造业的企业无法维持边际利润率。


Moreover, the closure of local-government financing platforms, together with the credit ceiling imposed by the central government, has caused local capital spending on investment in infrastructure to drop to a historic low.	此外，地方政府融资平台的关闭，加上中央政府施加的信贷上限，导致地方基础设施投资资本支出下降到历史最低水平。


And tightening financial constraints have weakened growth in the real-estate sector considerably.	而收紧的金融约束也大大削弱了房地产部门的增长。


With local governments and companies struggling to make interest payments, they are forced into a vicious cycle, borrowing from the shadow banking sector to meet their obligations, thereby raising the risk-free interest rate further.	地方政府和公司难于支付利息，被迫进入了一个恶性循环，从影子银行部门借钱偿还债务，从而进一步推高了无风险利率。


If excessively high real interest rates are undermining the domestic demand that China needs to reverse the economic slowdown, one naturally wonders why the government does not take steps to lower them.	如果过高利率破坏了中国扭转经济放缓势头所需要的内需，那么一个自然而然的疑问是为何政府不采取措施降低利率。


The apparent answer is the government’s overriding commitment to shifting the economy away from investment- and export-led growth.	显而易见的答案是，实现经济从投资和出口拉动型增长的转型才是政府压倒一切的重点。


But it is doubtful that China can achieve the consumption-driven rebalancing that it seeks.	但中国能否实现它所追求的消费驱动的再平衡十分可疑。


After all, no high-performing East Asian economy has achieved such a rebalancing in the past, and China has a similar growth model.	毕竟，没有一个表现抢眼的东亚经济体曾经实现过这样的再平衡，而中国也有类似的增长模式。


Given this, China’s current deflation should motivate its policymakers to pursue monetary easing, reducing real interest rates to a much lower level, even zero.	基于此，中国当前的紧缩应该驱使决策者追求货币宽松，将真实利率下降到显著更低的水平甚至零水平。


Such a move – for which China has plenty of room – would not only enable the reduction of existing debt burdens; perhaps more important, it would also allow for the rollover of debt as the economy accelerates.	这一动作——中国有足够的空间这样做——不但能够降低现有债务负担； 也许更重要的是，它还能让债务在经济加速时得以展期。


Indeed, because most bank loans in China – unlike, say, in Europe – are now locked up in infrastructure and other physical assets, boosting demand is preferable to deleveraging.	事实上，由于中国——与（比如）欧洲不同——大部分银行贷款现在锁定在基础设施和其他实体资产中，因此刺激需求比去杠杆化更好。


The key is to lower interest rates enough to mitigate the financial risks of high leverage and enable the restructuring of local-government debts.	关键在于将利率降低足够的程度，以减少高杠杆的金融风险并使地方政府债务能够重组。


Lower borrowing costs would also boost China’s capital market, which is critical to provide equity financing to innovative small and medium-size businesses.	降低借贷成本还能刺激中国的资本市场，它是为创新性中小企业提供股权融资的关键。


Of course, China needs to continue debt write-offs and swaps, and it must remain on the path of gradual structural reform.	当然，中国需要继续进行债务减记和互换，并且必须保持渐进的结构改革。


But policymakers must recognize the damage being done by excessively high real interest rates.	但决策者必须认识到过高真实利率正在造成什么风险。


Monetary loosening is vital to prevent growth from slowing further, and thus to ensure economic stability at home and maintain the momentum of recovery worldwide.	货币宽松是阻止增长进一步放缓的关键，因此也是确保国内经济稳定、保持全球复苏动能的关键。


China’s Two-Child Consumption Engine	中国的二孩消费引擎


LONDON – The announcement in October that China is terminating its one-child policy marks the end of a 37-year historical aberration that has accelerated the country’s demographic aging by decades.	伦敦——去年10月中国终止实施独生子女政策标志着37年偏离历史轨道的结束，上述偏离导致该国的人口老龄化进程提前了数十年。


The social and economic consequences of the authorities’ drastic population controls, which reduced the average fertility rate in urban households from about three in 1970 to just over one by 1982, have been dramatic.	政府严格控制人口的社会和经济影响导致城市家庭平均生育率从20世纪70年代的户均三个下降到1982年的一个多一点，并造成了引人注目的经济后果。


The question now is whether, and to what extent, the country’s new two-child policy will mitigate those consequences.	现在的问题是国家新的二胎政策能否、以及能在多大程度上缓解这样的后果。


In fact, the impact of the two-child policy is likely to be just as far-reaching – and, overall, much more positive – than that of the one-child rule.	事实上，二孩政策的影响可能同样深远——而且总体而言其积极影响可能远超独生子女政策。


This is especially true in the long term, but the effects will become apparent even in the relatively shorter term.	长远来看影响尤其如此，但即使在较短期限内其影响也是显而易见的。


One key reason for this is that an increase in the number of children per household will force a reduction in the aggregate savings rate, fulfilling a long-standing macroeconomic goal.	关键原因之一是单个家庭子女数量的增加将迫使民众降低总体储蓄率，从而实现长期的宏观经济目标。


China’s current saving rate is so high that it is often blamed for fueling global imbalances and driving down interest rates worldwide.	中国目前储蓄率高到常被指造成全球失衡及拉低全球利率的后果。


Moreover, it is a major obstacle in China’s ongoing transition from an export-led growth model to one based on domestic consumption and services.	此外，高储蓄率还阻碍了中国完成从出口导向型增长模式向以国内消费服务为主模式的过渡。


The two-child policy may prove indispensable in propelling this transition – a process that will begin sooner than most observers anticipate.	二孩政策在推动上述转型方面或许必不可少——上述进程的开始可能比多数观察家的预测更为迅速。


So far, economists have focused largely on the impending shifts in China’s demographic structure.	迄今为止，经济学家主要研究中国人口结构即将发生的变化。


Driven by the one-child policy, the share of China’s population under the age of 20 fell from 51% in 1970 to 27% by 2010, while the share of people aged 60 and up rose from 7% to 14%.	在独生子女政策驱动下，20岁以下中国人口比例从1970年的51%下降到2010年的27%，与此同时60岁及以上人口比例从7%上升到14%。


As a result, the median age increased from about 20 to 35.	结果导致年龄中位数从20岁左右上升到35岁。


As retirees increasingly outnumber working-age people, the pressure on today’s younger generation will intensify.	随着退休人员占工作人口比例不断提高，今天的年轻一代所面临的压力越来越大。


Indeed, in the coming years, each member of the post-1980s one-child generation will need to support two older people, on average.	事实上，未来80后独生子女一代每人平均需要赡养两位老人。


Of course, when the two-child generation becomes middle-aged, its members will each have to support only one elderly person, on average, alleviating the economic pressure associated with such a high old-age dependency ratio.	当然，当二孩一代步入中年，他们人均只需供养一位老人，从而缓解如此之高的老年赡养比所带来的经济压力。


But that will take a few decades.	但这要等到数十年之后。


In the meantime, the post-1980s one-child generation will be supporting not only the elderly, but also a higher number of young people.	在此期间，80后独生子女一代将不光要赡养老人，还要抚养更多子女。


Although this will undoubtedly be tough for the one-child generation, an unintended side effect will be a surge in consumption, as its members will have little choice but to spend a lot more.	虽然这对独生子女一代而言无疑困难重重，但因80后一代将别无选择只能加大消费，一个意想不到的副作用将是消费量激增。


A comparison of families that had twins under the one-child policy and those that had just one child offers an indication of the scale of the change in consumption (though, of course, the inability of twins’ parents to spread out consumption spending over time means that it is not a perfect representation).	比较独生子女政策下双胞胎家庭和独生子女家庭的消费可以表明消费变化的规模（当然双胞胎父母无法在较长期间内平摊消费意味着这并非是一种完美的模型）。


In terms of saving, urban households with two children saved 12.8% of their incomes, on average, in 2009, compared to 21.3% in families with an only child.	具体到储蓄方面，两个孩子的城镇居民家庭2009年平均存款占其收入的12. 8%，而独生子女家庭存款收入比则为21.


The difference is large across all income groups.	3%。 上述差别在所有收入群体中都非常显著。


The child-fueled boost in household consumption will undoubtedly affect some sectors more than others.	因子女提振的家庭消费无疑对某些行业的贡献会比其他行业更大。


At first, the surge in the number of children will boost the performance of stocks in children’s books, toys, and bicycles.	首先，儿童激增将提振儿童书籍、玩具和自行车企业的股价。


As that generation ages, demand for housing, life insurance, and pharmaceuticals will increase substantially.	随着那代人年龄的增加，对住房、寿险和药品的需求也将大幅增加。


One of the biggest differences will be expenditure on education.	最大的差异将来源于教育支出。


According to the 2009 urban household survey, a one-child household in China spends an average of 10.6% of its total income on education, whereas a household with twins spends 17.3%.	2009年城镇住户调查显示，中国独生子女家庭教育费用占其总收入的比例平均为10. 6%，而双胞胎家庭为17.


As the number of households with two children increases, this change alone could cause the aggregate saving rate in China to drop by as much as 7-10 percentage points, from 30% today to about 22% over the next ten years.	3%。 随着二孩家庭数量的增加，仅这一项变化就能导致中国总储蓄率降低7-10个百分点，从今天的30%下降到今后10年的22%左右。


There is, however, a caveat.	但还有一个警告。


More children also mean less education investment per child, which could lead to lower human-capital attainment.	子女数量增多意味着单个子女教育投资减少，导致人力资本成就下降。


Indeed, the average twin receives far less support after age 15 than the average only child, creating large differences in education outcomes.	事实上，双胞胎在15岁以后得到的平均支持远小于独子，导致教育结果大不相同。


Twins are 40% more likely to go to a vocational high school than only children.	双胞胎上职高的几率比独子高出40%。


Nonetheless, China’s shift to a two-child policy is badly needed – and not just because it will achieve the intended long-term goal of balancing the country’s demographic structure.	尽管如此，中国仍迫切需要过渡到二孩政策——而且不完全因为这样做能够实现平衡该国人口结构的长期目标。


While there are certainly pitfalls, including a difficult transition period, the policy could prove to be a boon to China’s efforts to put its economy on a more stable long-term growth path.	虽然无疑会遇到困难，包括过渡期所遭遇到的困难，事实将证明这项政策可能会使中国经济走上更稳定的长期发展轨道。


American Leadership in a Multipolar World	多极世界中的美国领导


LONDON – Giving up the spotlight is never easy.	伦敦—放弃闪光灯向来不易。


The United States, like many aging celebrities, is struggling to share the stage with new faces, especially China.	美国和许多上了年纪的名人一样，正在与新面孔争夺舞台，特别是中国。


The upcoming meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – two institutions dominated by the US and its Western allies – provide an ideal opportunity to change that.	即将到来的两大由美国及其西方盟友主导的机构——国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行会议是一次改变这一局面的理想机会。


The US must come to terms with the reality that the world has changed.	美国必须面对世界已经改变的事实。


The longer the US remains in a state of denial, the more damage it will do to its interests and its global influence, which remains substantial, if more constrained than before.	美国越是否认这一点，对其利益以及全球影响力的伤害就越大。 目前美国的全球影响力依然强大，尽管受到了前所未有的制约。


The world no longer adheres to the static Cold War order, with two blocs locked in open but guarded confrontation.	世界不再遵从静态的冷战秩序，即两大阵营公开而克制地针锋相对。


Nor does it work according to the Pax Americana that dominated in the decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse, when the US briefly emerged as the sole superpower.	世界也不再遵从苏联解体后的十年中成为主导的“美式和平”（Pax Americana），即美国成为唯一的超级大国。


Today’s world is underpinned by a multipolar order, which emerged from the rise of developing economies – most notably China – as major actors in trade and finance.	当今世界的基础是多极秩序，这一秩序来自发展中经济体——其中最令人瞩目的是中国——崛起为贸易和金融的重要行动方。


The US – not to mention the other G-7 countries – now must compete and cooperate not only with China, but also with India, Brazil, and others through expanded forums like the G-20.	美国——以及其他G-7国家——不但必须与中国竞争和合作，也必须通过G-20等扩大论坛与印度、巴西和其他国家竞争和合作。


To this end, the US must show leadership and adaptability.	在这方面，美国必须表现出领导力和适应力。


It cannot refuse to support China’s efforts to expand its role in global governance.	美国不可拒绝支持中国扩大其在全球治理中的作用的努力。


Nor should it issue harsh rebukes to its allies when they do not follow suit, as it did when the United Kingdom announced its intention to join the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	美国也不应该因为盟友不对其言听计从而猛烈抨击，比如在英国宣布准备加入中国领导的新亚洲基础设施投资银行的时候。


The US seems to be stuck in the Bretton Woods system, the rules-based order – underpinned by the IMF and the World Bank, with the US dollar at its heart – that emerged after World War II.	美国似乎沉迷于布雷顿森林体系无法自拔。 布雷顿森林体系是一套基于规则的秩序，其基础是以美元为核心的IMF和世界银行，出现于二战后。


The Bretton Woods system institutionalized America’s geopolitical supremacy, leaving the old imperial power, the UK, to step aside – a step that it took graciously, if a little desperately, given its grave postwar economic situation.	布雷顿斯林体系将美国的地缘政治霸主地位制度化，而旧帝国力量英国只能靠边站——姿态还算体面，虽然从其糟糕的战后经济状况看也带着一丝绝望。


Over the years, however, the Bretton Woods system, with its mix of liberal multilateralism and market-oriented economic policies, has come to symbolize the Anglo-American dominance of the global economy that much of the world now criticizes, especially since the global financial crisis.	但是，随着时间的推移，布雷顿森林体系及其自由多边主义和市场经济政策相结合的特征已成为盎格鲁-美利坚主宰的全球经济的象征，如今受到了世界许多国家的批评，特别是在全球金融危机爆发后。


In particular, the Washington Consensus – the set of free-market principles that influences the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, the US, and the UK – has generated considerable resentment, especially after the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s.	尤其是华盛顿共识——影响IMF、世界银行、美国和英国政策的自由市场原则——制造了大量不满，特别是在20世纪90年代亚洲金融危机后。


Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that China has been using its growing global influence to help engineer a new economic order – one in which the US dollar does not reign supreme.	在这一背景下，中国利用其不断增长的全球影响力引导新经济秩序——一个美元不再拥有霸主地位的秩序——不足为奇。


Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, has repeatedly called for a shift toward an international monetary system that allows for the use of multiple currencies for payments and investment.	中国人民银行行长周小川一再呼吁国际货币体系允许多重货币进行支付和投资。


Such an approach would reduce the risk and impact of liquidity crises, while decoupling the international monetary system from the “economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country.”	这一方针将降低流动性危机风险和影响，同时让国际货币体系不再与“单一国家的经济状况和主权利益”挂钩。


Of course, China believes that its own currency, the renminbi, should eventually play a central role in this new monetary system, so that it reflects China’s role not only as a leading engine of global economic growth, but also as the world’s largest creditor.	当然，中国认为它的人民币最终应该在新货币体系中起关键作用，以反映中国不但是全球经济增长引擎、也是世界最大债权国的地位。


Indeed, together with the other systemically important economies (the US, the UK, Japan, and the eurozone) China drives trends that, for better or worse, extend far beyond its borders.	事实上，中国与其他具系统重要性经济体（美国、英国、日本和欧元区）一道，驱动着远超其国界线的趋势（不论好坏）��


Since 2009, China’s leadership has been pursuing a set of policies that encourage the use of the renminbi in regional trade and reduce its dependence on the dollar in international payments.	2009年以来，中国领导力一直在追求鼓励在地区贸易中使用人民币、降低其在国际支付中对美元的依赖的政策。


But expanding the renminbi’s role in the international monetary system is just the first step toward institutionalizing a multipolar world order.	但扩大人民币在国际货币体系中的角色只是通往多极世界秩序制度化的第一步。


China has also spearheaded the establishment of new multilateral institutions, with AIIB following on the heels of the New Development Bank, created with other major emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa).	中国还牵头成立了新的多边机构，在亚投行之前还有其与其他主要新兴经济体（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和南非）共同建立的新开发银行。


By taking these steps, China’s leaders have called attention to the inadequacy of the existing international monetary system, and its institutional framework, in today’s complex, multipolar world economy.	中国领导人通过实施这些步骤激发了人们对现有国际货币体系及其机构框架在当今复杂的多极世界经济中的不足之处的关注。


In particular, China’s agenda highlights questions about America’s capacity to provide the needed liquidity to support international trade and finance.	特别是中国的日程凸显出对美国是否有能力提供必要的流动性以支持国际贸易和金融的质疑。


To be sure, the US is right to wonder whether the new order that China hopes to build will be as open and rules-based as the American-led order – the one that gave China the market access it needed to achieve its spectacular economic rise.	平心而论，美国质疑中国希望构建的新秩序是否能与美国所领导的秩序一样公开并以规则为基础——从而让中国获得实现其壮观经济崛起所需要的市场——这是正确的。


But the answer to that question can be found only by engaging China on the issue of reform of global governance – not by denying that change is needed at all.	但这一质疑的答案只能通过将中国纳入全球治理改革等问题来寻找，否认必要的改变无助于事。


As the US stubbornly pursues a policy of containment toward China – exemplified in its fight against the AIIB’s establishment, its relentless accusations of currency manipulation, and its refusal to ratify IMF reforms that would increase China’s influence – it risks losing its ability to shape what comes next.	美国顽固地追求遏制中国——其最近在亚投行的成立过程中从中作梗、其坚持不懈地指责中国货币操纵、其拒绝批准增加中国影响力的IMF都是明证——这有可能使其丧失影响未来世界的能力。


The result could be a world of fragmented blocs – an outcome that would undermine not only global prosperity, but also cooperation on shared challenges.	其结果可能是一个四分五裂的世界——这一结果不但会破坏全球繁荣，也会破坏面对共同挑战的合作。


The Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank offer an important opportunity to signal a new approach toward China.	IMF和世界银行春季会议是一次表现新对华方针的重要机会。


And there could be no more credible signal than US support for the renminbi’s addition to the basket of currencies that the IMF uses to value its international reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right.	而最令人信服的喜好莫过于美国支持人民币加入IMF用于为其国际储备资产特别提款权计价的货币篮子。


America will be in the spotlight once again.	美国将再一次站在聚光灯下。


But how will it perform?	但它会如何表现？


Why China’s Cities Will Drive Global Growth	为何中国城市将驱动全球增长


SHANGHAI – For 15 years, China has been a key engine of global growth.	上海—15年来，中国一直是全球增长的关键引擎。


But now that China’s investment-led boom has run its course, continued economic growth – in China and globally – will depend on urban Chinese consumers.	但随着中国的投资拉动繁荣动力告罄，后续经济增长——不管是中国还是全世界——将取决于中国消费者。


By 2030, people living in cities will drive 91% of global growth in consumption, and China is emphasizing both urbanization and a consumer-led growth model.	到2030年，生活在城市中的居民将贡献91%的全球消费增长，而中国正在同时强调城镇化和消费拉动的增长模式。


The McKinsey Global Institute’s latest research is optimistic that China’s strategy will succeed.	麦肯锡全球研究所（MGI）的最新研究对于中国战略能取得成功十分乐观。


MGI (where one of us is a partner) foresees continued growth in the number and income of urban consumers, and predicts that 700 Chinese cities will generate $7 trillion, or 30%, of global urban consumption growth between now and 2030.	MGI（我们其中之一是其合伙人）预测城市消费者数量和收入将继续增长，从现在到2030年，700座中国城市将产生7万亿美元或30%的全球城市消费增长。


Today, China’s urban working-age consumers number 521 million; in just 15 years, their ranks will have swollen to 628 million.	如今，中国城镇工作年龄消费者数量为5. 21亿；


Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen will each add more than one million households with annual income above $70,000 – the number of Hong Kong households in that income bracket today.	28亿。 北京、广州、上海和深圳将各自增加一百万以上年收入超70,000美元的家庭——相当于目前达到这一收入水平的香港家庭总数。


Per capita spending is set to jump from $4,800 to $10,700 by 2030, at which point this group will spend 12 cents of every $1 of urban consumption worldwide.	2030年人均支出预计将从4,800美元猛增至10,700美元，届时，该群体将贡献全世界城市消费总额的12%。


Urban incomes in China are now reaching a threshold where spending on both goods and services accelerates rapidly.	如今，中国城镇收入正接近商品和服务支出迅速加速的阈值。


Annual household spending on personal products and on dining out will more than double, to $770 and $720, respectively.	用于个人产品和“下馆子”的年家庭支出将增长一倍以上， 分别达到770美元和720美元。


Chinese consumers are also traveling more, with the China Outbound Tourism Research Institute predicting that more than 100 million Chinese will travel abroad by 2020.	中国消费者也将更多地参与旅游活动，中国出境游研究所预测，到2020年，将有1亿多中国人出国旅游。


China’s new consumer army will have the means and, more important, the willingness to spend its higher earnings.	中国的新消费大军有花钱的途径，更重要的是，他们也有意愿把提高的收入花掉。


According to McKinsey’s 2016 Global Sentiment Survey of more than 22,000 consumers in 26 countries, China’s working-age population has the world’s highest propensity to spend additional income, rather than save it or use it to pay off debt.	麦肯锡2016年全球情绪调查表明，在26个国家的22,000多民给消费者中，中国工作年龄人口的收入增量消费倾向——而非储蓄或用于偿还债务——为全球最高。


Just like Western baby boomers, Chinese urban consumers – who have grown up in post-reform China and have different views from their parents about saving versus spending – will make a generational break from the past.	正如西方的婴儿潮一代，中国城镇消费者——他们生长于改革年代，与父辈有着不同的储蓄和消费观——与过去有着代际差异。


That shift in mindset will fuel China’s transition to a consumer-led economy.	这一思维的变化将推动中国向消费拉动型经济转变。


China’s working-age consumers, as children of the digital age, are driving innovation by interacting directly with companies to help reinvent products and services.	中国的工作年龄消费者是数字时代的孩子，他们通过直接与公司互动助其重新发明产品和服务来推动创新。


In a McKinsey survey, 55% of them said that they would be willing to recommend a product, service, or company to their friends or family on the social network WeChat.	在麦肯锡的调查中，55%的这一群体表示愿意通过微信向朋友或家人推荐产品、服务或公司。


Xiaomi, the Chinese smartphone company, conducts direct online polling of consumers to find out what innovations they would like to see.	中国智能手机厂商小米直接利用消费者在线调查来研究他们希望看到怎样的创新。


The company has more than ten million “fans” on Weibo, the microblogging platform.	该公司在微博上拥有数千万“粉丝”。


And now Western companies are following suit.	现在，西方公司也开始跟进。


Volkswagen’s China operation engages with potential customers directly online, rather than relying solely on traditional dealerships.	大众汽车公司与潜在客户进行在线直接互动，而不只是单纯地依靠经销商。


The Fung Group (where one of us is a managing director), in partnership with IBM and Pico, has set up a “retail laboratory” in Shanghai to provide a controlled setting for businesses to observe – in real time – how consumers react to new technologies and products.	冯氏集团（我们其中之一为其常务董事）与IBM和Pico合作，在上海成立了“零售实验室”，为企业提供可控设置实时观察消费者如何响应新技术和产品。


In addition to driving further innovation, Chinese consumers – even those with relatively low incomes – are also investing heavily in the next generation, with 12.5% of overall consumption growth expected to go to education between 2015 and 2030.	除了推动进一步创新，中国消费者——即使收入相对较低——对于投资下一代也毫不含糊，预计在2015到2030年间，12. 5%的总消费增长将用于教育。


That’s the second-highest rate of any country MGI examined, behind only Sweden (12.6%).	这在MGI所调查的所有国家中名列第二，仅次于瑞典（12. 6%）。


By investing in the skills and capacity of the next generation now, Chinese consumers are building a strong foundation for continued growth and innovation in the future.	通过从现在开始投资于下一代的技能和能力，中国消费者正在为未来持续增长和创新构建强大的基础。


That continued growth will require China to shift its economic model further from production to consumption.	这一持续增长需要中国经济模式进一步从生产转向消费。


No pivot of this kind is easy, and many challenges lie ahead.	这样的转型向来不易，前途挑战重重。


But China’s increasingly prosperous, educated, and confident consumers have the clout – and the numbers – to transform the way the world spends, possibly even more than Western baby boomers did in their prime.	但中国日益兴旺、教育程度日益提高、信心日益高涨的消费者有实力——也具备足够大的数量——改变全世界花钱的方式，也许比西方婴儿潮一代年轻时还要强大。


Their mobile-first shopping habits, openness to travel and new experiences, and rising purchasing power suggest that the products and services they buy will influence consumer markets worldwide, fueling global economic growth.	他们的网购第一的购物习惯、对旅游和新体验的开放态度以及不断提升的购买力表明，他们所购买的产品和服务将影响全世界的消费市场，助推全球经济增长。


The world economy needs them – and no consumer-facing company can afford to ignore them.	世界经济需要他们——任何面向消费者的公司可以忽视他们。


Asian Games Are Not Zero-Sum	亚洲博弈非零和


CAMBRIDGE – Two society hostesses are rivals.	美国剑桥—两个贵妇彼此为敌。


Both guard their social standing jealously – and may even punish a guest who attends the other’s party by withholding future invitations.	她们都激烈地捍卫自己的社会地位——甚至以不再邀请作为对出席另一位女主人的派对的客人的威胁。


China and the United States seem to regard Asia-Pacific relations similarly: as a zero-sum game.	中国和美国看待亚太关系就是如此：零和博弈。


Are countries signing up for China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or for America’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?	各国要在中国的亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）还是美国的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）上签字？


Will China be welcomed, or humiliatingly rebuffed, in its effort to persuade the International Monetary Fund to include the renminbi in its unit of account, Special Drawing Rights (SDR)?	中国说服国际货币基金组织（IMF）将人民币纳入其账户单位——特别提款权（SDR）的尝试会获得欢迎，还是被耻辱性地拒绝？


Is the US still the world’s largest economy, or did China surpass it in 2014?	美国还是世界最大经济体地位吗？ 2014年中国到底有没有超过它？


However tempting it may be to focus on such questions, they are the wrong way to think about the global economy.	关注这些问题很有诱惑力，但这些都是思考全球经济的错误思路。


There is no reason why some countries should not join both China’s AIIB and America’s TPP, or why overlapping memberships should not expand over time – or, indeed, why the hostesses should not eventually attend each other’s parties.	没有理由认为某些国家不应该同时加入中国的亚投行和美国的TPP，也没有理由认为成员资格的重合现象不应该随时间的推移而扩大——或者说，事实上，没有理由认为女主人应该永不参加彼此的派对。


Unfortunately, that is not how current issues of global economic governance are being framed.	不幸的是，当前的全球经济治理问题并不是这样推进的。


When the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea, Australia, and others unexpectedly decided in March to join the AIIB, it was widely reported (partly because of missteps by US policymakers) as a mass defection of US allies to a rival’s party.	3月份，英国、德国、韩国、澳大利亚和其他国家出人意料地决定加入亚投行，这让很多媒体将此报道为（部分拜美国决策者的失策所赐）美国盟友集体投敌。


But there is nothing wrong with joining the AIIB.	但加入亚投行一点都没错。 亚洲需要比世界银行和亚洲开发银行所能提供的更多的基础设施投资帮助；


Asia needs more help with infrastructure investment than the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank can provide; China can play a useful leadership role; and the participation of countries with high governance standards can help prevent the cronyism, corruption, and environmental damage to which large-scale infrastructure projects are prone.	中国可以起到有用的领导作用； 而高治理水平国家的参与有助于防止大规模基础设施工程容易产生的裙带、腐败和环境破坏问题。


Likewise, the TPP negotiations are sometimes characterized as a US attempt to isolate China.	类似地，TPP谈判有时被认为是美国孤立中国的尝试。


But, given the Asia-Pacific region’s high trade volumes, and its dense set of trading arrangements running in every direction, no one, including China, is about to be isolated.	但是，考虑到亚太地区巨大的贸易量以及各个方向上的为数众多的贸易协议，没有一个国家（包括中国）可以被孤立。


And, with World Trade Organization negotiations, in which all countries could participate, stalled for years, the TPP and other regional initiatives (like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and various intra-Asia free-trade areas) are better than nothing.	此外，所有国家都可以参与的世界贸易组织谈判已经停滞了多年，因此TPP和其他地区协议（如亚太经合组织和各种内亚自由贸易区）至少聊胜于无。


Exchange rates are another area where zero-sum thinking prevails.	汇率是另一个零和思维盛行的领域。


On April 9, the US Treasury released the biannual report mandated by Congress to identify countries engaging in “currency manipulation.”	4月9日，美国财政部发布了国会授权的双年报，报告中列出了参与“货币操纵”的国家名单。


Neither China nor anyone else was found guilty this time.	这一次，中国和其他任何国家都未被认定“有罪”。


But Treasury officials believe that they must keep up the pressure, lest Congress follow through on threats to punish supposed currency manipulators, derailing the TPP and other trade agreements.	但财政部官员认为他们必须保持压力，唯恐国会坚持要惩罚被认定实施货币操纵的国家，导致TPP和其他贸易协议破产。


Then there is the SDR.	然后是SDR问题。


Every five years, the IMF reconsiders its composition, which currently is defined in terms of the dollar, euro, yen, and pound.	每五年，IMF都会修订SDR成分，目前SDR由美元、欧元、日元和英镑组成。


China’s renminbi is unlikely to be included in the basket now, because it is not “freely usable.”	眼下人民币不可能被纳入SDR货币篮子，因为它无法“自由使用”。


And, though this will likely be reported as a defeat for China, it should not be.	此外，尽管这可能被认为是对中国的一次打击，但并非如此。


The issue is of little importance.	这个问题根本无关紧要。


It might seem that all of this could be shrugged off as a harmless media spectator sport.	看起来，所有这些都可以一笑了之，把它们当做无害媒体的夸张报道。


But, to the extent that a misplaced focus on country rankings becomes a barrier to sensible policy, it can do real damage.	但是，由于错误地把注意力放在国家排名上已成为明智决策的一大障碍，这完全可能造成真正的伤害。


Such is the case with the stalled IMF quota reform, an issue where the rankings in fact are of some importance, but not in a zero-sum way.	IMF配额改革就是这样一个排名确实有一定重要性，但并非一定零和的问题。


By any measure of economic importance, China and other major emerging economies have long since merited much larger IMF quota shares, implying greater financial contributions and greater voting weights.	不管用何种经济重要性衡量标准，中国和其他主要新兴经济体都早已应该获得更大的IMF配额比例，即更大的融资贡献和更大的投票比重。


But their increase in shares need not come at the expense of the US.	但它们的比例的增加并不一定需要以美国为代价。


It is the European countries that are greatly over-represented.	代表权大大过高的是欧洲国家。


Despite European reluctance to cede ground, US President Barack Obama succeeded in brokering such a reallocation of IMF quota shares at the G-20 summit in Seoul in November 2010.	尽管欧洲不愿让步，但美国总统成功地在2010年11月G-20首尔峰会上促成了IMF配额比例的再分配。


Five years later, the US Congress is still holding up IMF quota reform – not because it would imply any loss of power or cost to US taxpayers, but because many members do not want to give Obama anything he asks for.	五年后，美国国会仍拒不批准IMF配额改革——不是因为这意味着权力损失或美国纳税人损失，而是因为许多议员不愿意让奥巴马得偿所愿。


Thirty years ago, the West wanted nothing more than for China to become a capitalist economy.	三十年前，西方最大的愿望就是中国变成资本主义经济。


It has done so, with spectacular success.	中国已经变成了资本主义经济，并且取得了极大的成功。


The rules of the game now require that China be given a bigger share in the governance of international institutions.	如今，游戏规则要求中国在国际机构治理上获得更大的比例。


Making room at the table will help the rest of us in the “game” that matters most: world peace and prosperity.	营造谈判空间有利于在最重要的“博弈”——世界和平与繁荣中的其他人。


If the Congress does not pass the IMF quota reform, the US can hardly blame the Chinese for undertaking initiatives such as the AIIB on their own.	如果国会不通过IMF配额改革，美国将难以指责中国另起炉灶建立亚投行等机构。


We often hear about hard power (military) and soft power (the attractiveness of a country’s ideas, culture, economic system, and so forth).	我们常常耳闻硬实力（军事）和软实力（一国思想、文化、经济制度等方面的吸引力）。


But there is another kind of power.	但还有另一种实力。


Ever since Bretton Woods, the US has had the power of global leadership.	自布雷顿森林以来，美国一直拥有全球领导实力。


During the interwar period (1919-1939), Americans were unprepared to assume that mantle; but World War II taught them the cost of isolationism, and they rose to the challenge in 1944.	在两次大战期间（1919—1939年），美国人还没有做好承担责任的准备； 但二战让他们领略了孤立主义的代价，1944年，他们终于迎难而上。


Seventy years later, even after America’s massive foreign-policy mistakes in Iraq and elsewhere, and even after Chinese GDP has supposedly caught up with America’s (at least in terms of purchasing power parity), the world remains ready to be led by the US, including on the crucial subjects of trade and IMF reform.	七十年后，即使美国在伊拉克和其他地区犯下了严重的外交政策错误，即使中国GDP据称已经赶上美国（至少从购买力平价角度是如此），世界仍准备接受美国的领导，包括在贸易和IMF改革等关键问题上。


If those who insist on scorekeeping have their way, the US will be unable to exercise the leadership that the world needs.	如果热衷计分派得势，美国将无法行使世界所需要的领导力。


And the world will look elsewhere.	而世界将把目光转下他处。


Last Chance for Japan?	日本的最后机会？


NEW HAVEN – Japan is the petri dish for the struggle against the secular stagnation that is now gripping most major developed economies.	纽黑文—日本是目前令大部分主要发达国家心弦紧绷的长期停滞斗争的老根据地。


And, notwithstanding all of the fanfare surrounding “Abenomics,” Japan’s economy remains moribund.	而尽管围绕“安倍经济学”的标榜不绝于耳，但日本经济依然毫无活力。


In the six quarters of Shinzo Abe’s latest stint as prime minister, annualized real GDP growth has averaged just 1.4% – up only slightly from the anemic post-1992 average of 1%.	在安倍最新首相任期的前六个季度里，年化真实GDP增长平均只有1. 4%——只比1992年以来长期低迷的总平均水平1%略高。


Abenomics, with its potentially powerful combination of monetary and fiscal stimulus, coupled with a wide array of structural reforms, was supposed to end Japan’s “lost decades.”	安倍结合了潜力巨大的货币和财政刺激，并辅之以范围广泛的结构性改革，理应结束日本“失去的几十年”。


All three “arrows” of the strategy were to be aimed at freeing the economy from a 15-year deflationary quagmire.	安倍战略的所有三支“箭”都指向一个目标——让日本经济从15年的通缩泥淖中解脱出来。


Unfortunately, not all of the arrows have been soaring in flight.	不幸的是，并非三支箭都能飞起来。


The Bank of Japan seems well on its way to delivering on the first one – embracing what it calls quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE).	日本银行的第一支箭射得还不错——采取了它所谓的量化和定性宽松（QQE）。


Relative to GDP, the BOJ’s monetary-policy gambit could actually far outstrip the efforts of America’s Federal Reserve.	相对于GDP而言，日本银行的货币政策头炮可以说打得比美联储还要响。


But the flight of the other two arrows is shaky, at best.	但其他两支箭射得摇摇摆摆。


In recent days, Abe has raised serious questions about proceeding with the second phase of a previously legislated consumer-tax hike that has long been viewed as the linchpin of Japan’s debt-consolidation strategy.	最近，安倍严重质疑此前已获立法通过的提高消费税措施的第二阶段，提高消费税一直被视为日本债务重组战略的关键。


Abe has flinched because the economy remains weak, posing renewed risks of a deflationary relapse.	安倍之所以退缩，是因为经济仍然十分疲软，有可能导致通缩卷土重来。


Meanwhile, the third arrow of structural reforms – especially tax, education, and immigration reforms – is nowhere near its target.	与此同时，第三支箭——结构性改革，特别是税收、教育和移民改革——距离目标也还相去甚远。


Abenomics, one might conclude, is basically a Japanese version of the failed policy combination deployed in the United States and Europe: massive unconventional liquidity injections by central banks (with the European Central Bank apparently now poised to follow the Fed), but little in the way of fundamental fiscal and structural reforms.	有人也许会下结论说，安倍经济学本质上是美国和欧洲所实施的失败的政策组合在日本的尝试：中央银行大规模非常规地注入流动性（欧洲央行现在显然要步美联储后尘了），但基本财政和结构性改革几乎没有。


The political expedience of the short-term monetary fix has triumphed once again.	短期货币解决方案的政治便利性再一次取得了胜利。


Such a gamble is especially problematic for Japan.	如此赌博对日本来说问题尤其严重。


With an aging – and now declining – working-age population, it has limited scope for reviving growth.	日本工作年龄人口正在老化和下降，因此重振增长空间有限。


Japan must either squeeze more out of its existing workforce by boosting productivity, or uncover new sources of demand at home or abroad.	日本要么通过提高生产率取代更多的现有劳动力，要么寻找新的国内外需求源。


At home, that could mean adding workers, either by boosting female participation in the work force, which, at 63%, is among the lowest in the developed world, or relaxing immigration restrictions.	在国内，这意味着增加工人数量，要么通过提高女性劳动力参与率（目前为63%，在发达国家中垫底），要么通过放松移民限制。


Unfortunately, there has been little progress on either front.	不幸的是，这两个方面都没有什么进步。


Moreover, even if the political will to launch third-arrow structural reforms were suddenly to strengthen – a dubious proposition – any productivity payback would most likely take a long time to materialize.	此外，即使发射第三支箭——结构性改革的政治意愿突然增强（这一前提能不能实现还大有问题），任何生产率方面的回报也极有可能需要很长时间才会显现。


That leaves external demand, which underscores what is perhaps Abenomics’ most serious strategic flaw: It does not take into consideration some of the biggest changes that are likely to occur in the global economy.	于是只剩下了外部需求，而这也许代表了安倍经济学中最严重的战略缺陷：它没有考虑某些全球经济中有可能发生的最大变化。


That is a great pity, because Japan is well positioned to take advantage of one of the most powerful global trends – the coming rebalancing of the Chinese and US economies.	这是一个巨大遗憾，因为日本有很大的优势利用最强大的全球趋势之一——即将到来的中国和美国经济再平衡。


China appears to be more committed to restructuring than the US – at least for the foreseeable future.	中国似乎比美国更加致力于重组——至少在可预见的未来是如此。


Its Third Plenum reforms provide a cohesive framework for a pro-consumption transformation.	十八大三中全会改革给出了严密的支持转型的框架。


Though America currently remains intent on resurrecting a tired growth model, there is good reason to hope that it, too, will eventually rebalance.	尽管美国目前仍倾向于复兴已经衰竭的增长模式，但有理由相信它最终也会实现再平衡。


Japan cannot afford to squander these opportunities.	日本绝对不能浪费这些机会。


As the main driver of Chinese growth shifts from external to domestic demand, who could benefit more than Japanese exporters?	作为中国增长从外需转向内需的主要推动力，谁能比日本出口商获得更大的好处？


China is already Japan’s largest export market, leaving it ideally situated to capture additional market share in the coming surge of Chinese demand for consumer products and services.	中国已经成为日本最大的出口市场，中国对消费品和服务的需求即将井喷，这意味着日本占据着争夺新增市场份额的理想身位。


Likewise, Japan stands to benefit from its technological prowess in environmental remediation – an urgent priority for China in the years ahead.	类似地，日本可以从其环境修复的技术实力中获益。 环境修复是未来几年中国的一项当务之急。


Japan already has great expertise in many of the solutions to some of China’s toughest problems.	日本在一些中国所面临的最严峻问题上拥有众多解决方案专家。


Japan is also likely to gain from a long-overdue rebalancing of the US economy.	日本也可以从姗姗来迟的美国经济再平衡中获益。


A shift in the US – from excessive consumption of goods largely sourced in low-wage developing countries to the capital equipment that an increasingly investment-led economy will require – would play to Japan’s greatest strengths.	美国的变化——从过度消费大部分外包给低工资发展中国家的商品转向投资拉动型因素日益重要的经济所需要的资本设备——将有利于日本最大的优势。


As a global leader in sophisticated machinery and the earth-moving equipment needed for infrastructure investment, Japan should be able to to seize these opportunities.	作为基础设施投资所需要的复杂机械和挖掘机的全球领先者，日本应该能够抓住这些机会。


In looking to external demand, Japan should not lose sight of its earlier achievements.	在寻找外需时，日本不应该忽视其早期成就。


In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was the envy of the world, owing to an all-powerful export machine that tapped the demand of a rapidly growing global economy.	在20世纪七八十年代，日本是全世界艳羡的对象——其无比强大的需求机器在快速增长的全球经济所带来的需求中如鱼得水。


“Japan, Inc.” still has a good institutional memory of what it takes to draw support from external demand.	“日本公司”依然是关于怎样吸引外需支持的美好制度记忆（institutional memory）。


It is time to recapture that memory.	是时候重温这一记忆了。


Failure to do so would leave Japan, the world’s third largest economy, at risk of being further marginalized by transformations in the world’s two largest, the US and China.	否则身为世界第三大经济体的日本就有可能被世界前两大经济体——中国和美国的转型进一步边缘化。


There is one obvious and important caveat: Poor Sino-Japanese relations, owing to unresolved historical grievances, could prevent Japan from realizing the economic benefits implied by China’s economic rebalancing.	一个显而易见的重要警示信号是中日关系。 拜历史恩怨所赐，两国关系可能阻止日本实现中国经济再平衡所带来的经济好处。


The interplay between economics and politics lies at the heart of the rise and fall of great powers.	经济和政治关系的相互作用是大国兴衰的关键要素。


In a rapidly changing world, underscored by likely shifts in the economic structure of China and the US, Japan cannot afford to lose sight of that fact.	在快速变化、以中国和美国的潜在经济结构变化为突出特征的世界中，日本决不能无视这一事实。


Just as the US and China have much to gain by transforming their economies, Japan is running out of time.	美国和中国可以从它们的经济转型中获得巨大好处，而留给日本的时间正在流失。


In the grip of two lost decades and counting, this could be Japan’s last chance.	站在失去的二十年的基础上推算，这也许是日本最后的机会。


How China Views Trump	中国如何看待特朗普


LONDON – Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the US presidential election has shaken the world.	伦敦—唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统竞选中大获全胜，这震惊了全世界。


From Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s conspicuous silence to French President Francois Hollande’s statement that it opens up a “period of uncertainty” to the Kremlin’s barely concealed giddiness, Trump has not been received internationally like past US presidents.	墨西哥总统涅托引人注目地保持沉默，而法国总统奥朗德则说这开启了一个“不确定性时代”，克里姆林宫要得意忘形了。 这说明特朗普不像过去的美国总统那样在国际上受欢迎。


But one country has remained largely unmoved: China.	但有一个国家基本不为所动：中国。


Trump’s stance on China is well known: he has blamed the country for everything from hacks on his opponent (thought by the US government to be the work of Russia) to climate change (which he has called a hoax cooked up by China to undermine US competitiveness).	特朗普对中国的立场是众所周知的：他什么事都要指责中国，不管是对他的对手的攻击（美国政府认为这是俄罗斯杰作），还是气候变化（他说这是中国为了破坏美国的竞争力而布下的骗局）。


And he has promised to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese goods.	他还承诺对中国商品征收45%的关税。


Yet prudence flows through China’s Confucian veins.	但中国流淌着儒家的中庸血液。


Rather than jumping to conclusions about future US policies, much less taking premature action, China’s leaders have remained neutral in their response to Trump’s victory.	中国领导人没有急着判断美国的未来政策，更没有采取过早的行动，而是对特朗普胜选保持中立态度。


They seem confident that, though the bilateral relationship will change somewhat, it will not be fundamentally transformed.	他们似乎坚信，尽管双边关系会有所变化，但不会发生根本性转变。


It will still be neither very good nor very bad.	特朗普当选既不会特别好，也不会特别坏。


It helps that Trump has all but ceased China-bashing since the election.	一个有利的变化是当选以后的特朗普就停止了攻击中国。


Instead, he posted on Twitter a video of his granddaughter reciting a poem in Mandarin – an instant hit in China.	相反，他在Twitter上发布了一则视频，由他的外孙女用普通话朗诵中国古诗——此举立刻打动了中国。


Whether intended explicitly as a message to China or not, the move highlighted the possibility of a gulf between Trump’s campaign rhetoric and his actual positions and plans.	不管是不是在向中国传递明确信息，这一举动强调了特朗普的竞选纲领与他的实际立场和计划也许并不相同。


Some in the West might think that the rhetoric alone would be enough to incense China’s leaders.	一些西方人可能认为仅仅凭着竞选纲领就足以激怒中国领导人。


But the truth is that the Chinese are far more offended by national leaders meeting with the Dalai Lama, as President Barack Obama did in June.	但事实上，国家领导人会见达赖喇嘛的情形对中国人的冒犯远甚于此——而奥巴马总统在6月份就这么做了。


And, as past US elections have made clear, rhetoric may well bear little relation to reality.	此外，此前的美国选举清楚地表明，竞选纲领与现实之间基本上毫无关系。


That is all the more true when the rhetoric in question includes promises that would harm everyone involved, as Trump’s proposed tariffs would.	特朗普的竞选纲领包括了一些一损俱损的承诺——比如他征收关税的承诺，这进一步表明他未必会认真对待竞选纲领。


The availability of inexpensive products from China has long placed downward pressure on prices even of non-Chinese goods in the US market.	长期以来，能够获得来自中国的廉价产品使得即便是美国市场上的非中国商品也承受降价压力。


For low-income households, which are the most likely to consume inexpensive imported goods, this has been a godsend, as it has effectively raised their purchasing power.	对最有可能消费廉价进口商品的低收入家庭来说，这简直是及时雨，因为他们的购买力大大提高了。


If Chinese imports were blocked, prices would rise, undermining consumption, impeding economic growth, and exacerbating inequality.	如果中国进口品被阻挠，物价将会上涨，从而遏制消费，阻碍经济增长，加剧不平等性。


And the US would not even be protected from manufacturing employment losses; the jobs would just go to Vietnam or Bangladesh, where labor costs are even lower than in China nowadays.	并且美国甚至仍然无法避免制造业就业的流失； 就业岗位将流向越南或孟加拉国等劳动力成本比今天的中国还要低的国家。


The same goes for investment flows – the second engine of globalization – which are often conveniently forgotten in discussions of the US-China economic relationship.	投资流亦然。 作为全球化的第二引擎，它在关于中美经济关系的讨论被理所当然地忽视了。


China is one of the biggest purchasers of US Treasuries, and continues to finance US consumption and investment.	中国是美国国债的最大买家之一，并且一直在为美国消费和投资提供融资。


China may even help to finance the large infrastructure projects that Trump has promised, thereby reducing pressure on the US budget.	中国甚至可以帮助特朗普所承诺的大型基础设施项目融资，从而减小美国预算的压力。


So Trump is unlikely to change much in terms of US economic policy, at least if he knows what’s good for him.	因此，特朗普不可能大幅改变美国经济政策，至少如果他知道怎样对自己最有利的话是如此。


Where he might make some changes is in foreign policy; but those changes may be more likely to please China than to aggravate it.	他可能在外交政策方面做出一些改变； 但这些变化更有可能是为了取悦而不是刺激中国。


The Obama administration has for years been engaged in a strategic rebalancing toward Asia.	多年来，奥巴马政府一直在亚洲搞战略再平衡。


At a time when China was rapidly accumulating both economic and military strength, Obama seemed committed to containing its rise as best he could, including by involving the US in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.	在中国快速积累经济和军事优势的同时，奥巴马似乎在竭尽全力遏制中国崛起，其手段包括让美国介入南海领土纠纷。


By contrast, Trump, with his “America first” approach to foreign policy, has paid little attention to the South China Sea dispute.	相反，特朗普在外交政策上提出了“美国第一”的方针，不太关注南海纠纷。


That works just fine for China, which would welcome less US involvement in Asia – in particular, in the South China Sea, as well as in Taiwan.	这对中国来说当然是件好事。 中国欢迎美国减少涉足亚洲——特别是南海和台湾。


But here, too, there is a gap between rhetoric and reality, and no radical change should be expected.	但这里也存在纲领和现实的差异，我们不应该期待会出现巨大的变化。


Soon after the election, Trump assured the leaders of Japan and South Korea of America’s commitment to their countries’ security, despite a campaign vow to demand more payment for US protection.	当选后不久，特朗普就像日本和韩国领导人重申了美国对两国安全的承诺，尽管在竞选时他承诺要提高美国的“保护费”。


Add to that the threat posed by North Korea, and a destabilizing US strategic retreat from Asia remains highly unlikely.	除此之外还有朝鲜的威胁，因此美国从亚洲战略性撤退（这可能引起动荡）的可能性很小。


If Trump follows through on his pledge to mend fences with Russia, the odds that China will escape US pressure would lengthen further.	如果特朗普兑现其改善对俄关系的承诺，则中国摆脱美国压力的可能性又小了一分。


Without Russia to deal with, the US would have even more time to dedicate to Asian affairs.	不再需要应对俄罗斯的美国将由更多时间用于亚洲事务。


Moreover, a warming of the Russia-US relationship could lead to subtle changes in the Russia-China relationship, which has deepened since Russia’s annexation of Crimea wrecked its relations with the West.	此外，俄美关系回暖也可能导致中俄关系出现微妙变化，自俄罗斯因为吞并克里米亚与西方闹僵以来，中俄关系大大地深化了。


Trump’s victory is far from inconsequential.	特朗普的胜选绝非不重要。


He is no ordinary US president, and he must be taken seriously, though not literally, to borrow a phrase from The Atlantic’s Salena Zito.	他不是普通的美国总统，并且，借用《大西洋》（The Atlantic）的塞伦娜·齐拓（Salena Zito）的话，必须认真对待特朗普，但不要从字面上理解他。


But, as China’s leaders seem to recognize, he will have little choice but to color mostly inside the lines as president.	但是，中国领导人似乎认识到，他几乎别无选择，只能在身为总统的有限空间内施展腾挪。


Even if he wants to deviate more from the foreign-policy consensus, the US system limits his ability to do so.	即使他想偏离外交政策共识，美国的制度也会限制他这样做的能力。


So, rather than worrying about Trump’s personal predilections or trying to predict the unpredictable, China’s leaders are remaining focused on what is really important: the need for a cooperative bilateral relationship.	因此，中国领导人不担心特朗普的个人偏好，也不去试图预测不可预测的东西，而是保持专注于真正重要的东西：合作性双边关系的需要。


Other world powers should do the same.	其他世界强国也应该这样做。


The Non-Problem of Chinese Currency Manipulation	中国货币操纵不是问题


CAMBRIDGE – America's two political parties rarely agree, but one thing that unites them is their anger about “currency manipulation," especially by China.	美国剑桥—美国两大政党很少形成一致，但有一件事让它们团结起来——那就是对“货币操纵”，尤其是中国的货币操纵的愤怒。


Perhaps spurred by the recent appreciation of the dollar and the first signs that it is eroding net exports, congressional Democrats and Republicans are once again considering legislation to counter what they view as unfair currency undervaluation.	也许是受最近美元升值及其影响净出口的首批信号的刺激，国会中的民主党和共和党正在再次考虑采取立法对付它们眼中的不公平货币贬值。


The proposed measures include countervailing duties against imports from offending countries, even though this would conflict with international trade rules.	计划措施包括针对贬值国的惩罚性关税，即使这可能违反国际贸易规则。


This is the wrong approach.	这是错误的方针。


Even if one accepts that it is possible to identify currency manipulation, China no longer qualifies.	即使你认为可以识别货币操纵，中国也不符合标准。


Under recent conditions, if China allowed the renminbi to float freely, without intervention, it would be more likely to depreciate than rise against the dollar, making it harder for US producers to compete in international markets.	在现有条件下，如果中国允许人民币自由浮动而不加干预，人民币兑美元贬值的可能性更大，美国生产者将更加难以在国际市场上竞争。


But there is a more fundamental point: From an economic viewpoint, currency manipulation or unfair undervaluation are exceedingly hard to pin down conceptually.	但还有一个更加基本的问题：从经济学角度讲，货币操纵或不公平贬值的概念很难界定。


The renminbi's slight depreciation against the dollar in 2014 is not evidence of it; many other currencies, most notably the yen and the euro, depreciated by far more last year.	2014年人民币兑美元的略微贬值并非货币操纵的证据； 其他许多货币——最值得关注的包括日元和欧元——去年贬值幅度大得多。


As a result, the overall value of the renminbi was actually up slightly on an average basis.	因此，平均而言人民币总体价值实际略有上升。


The sine qua non of manipulation is currency-market intervention: selling the domestic currency and buying foreign currencies to keep the foreign-exchange value lower than it would otherwise be.	操纵的必要条件是货币市场干预：出售本币、买进外币以维持汇率低于不干预的水平。


To be sure, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) did a lot of this over the last ten years.	平心而论，中国人民银行在过去十年中经常这样做。


Capital inflows contributed to a large balance-of-payments surplus, and the authorities bought US dollars, thereby resisting upward pressure on the renminbi.	资本流入带来了巨大的国际收支盈余，当局买进美元，以此阻止人民币升值压力。


The result was as an all-time record level of foreign exchange reserves, reaching $3.99 trillion by July 2014.	结果是床下历史记录的外汇储备，2014年7月已达到了3. 99万亿美元。


But the situation has recently changed.	但最近情况有所变化。


In 2014, China's capital flows reversed direction, showing substantial net capital outflows.	2014年，中国资本流发生逆转，表现出巨大的净资本流出。


As a result, the overall balance of payments turned negative in the second half of the year, and the PBOC actually intervened to dampen the renminbi's depreciation.	结果，今年下半年总体国际收支呈现出赤字，中国人民银行的干预实际上是为了阻止人民币贬值。


Foreign-exchange reserves fell to $3.84 trillion by January 2015.	2015年外汇储备降至3. 84万亿美元。


There is no reason to think that this recent trend will reverse in the near future.	没有理由认为这一当前趋势会很快逆转。


The downward pressure on the renminbi relative to the dollar reflects the US economy's relatively strong recovery, which has prompted the Federal Reserve to end a long period of monetary easing, and China's economic slowdown, which has prompted the PBOC to start a new period of monetary stimulus.	人民币相对美元的贬值压力反映出美国经济复苏相对强势和中国经济的减速，这也是美联储结束长期货币放松和人民银行开始新一轮货币刺激的原因。


Similar economic fundamentals are also at work in other countries.	相似的经济基本面也在其他国家起着作用。


Congressional proposals to include currency provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the mega-regional free-trade agreement currently in the final stage of negotiations, presumably target Japan (as China is not included in the TPP).	国会建议在跨太平洋伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，简称TTP，目前已进入最后谈判阶段的大型地区自由贸易协定）中加入货币条款，目标显然是日本（因为中国不在TTP中）。


Congress may also want to target the eurozone in coming negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.	国会也许还会在跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership）的后续谈判中对准欧元区。


But it has been years since the Bank of Japan or the European Central Bank intervened in the foreign-exchange market.	但日本银行和欧洲央行干预外汇市场已有多年。


Indeed, at an unheralded G-7 ministers' meeting two years ago, they agreed to a US Treasury proposal to refrain from unilateral foreign-exchange intervention.	事实上，在两年前一次不为人所注意的G-7部长会议中，它们同意了美国财政部关于不要单方面进行外汇干预的提议。


Those who charge Japan or the eurozone with pursuing currency wars have in mind the renewed monetary stimulus implied by their central banks' recent quantitative easing programs.	指责日本或欧盟追求货币战争的人心里想的是，两大央行最近采取的量化宽松计划意味着重启货币刺激。


But, as the US government knows well, countries with faltering economies cannot be asked to refrain from lowering interest rates just because the likely effects include currency depreciation.	但是，美国政府十分清楚，不可能仅仅因为会造成货币贬值而要求经济萎靡的国家不降低利率。


Indeed, it was the US that had to explain to the world that monetary stimulus is not currency manipulation when it undertook quantitative easing in 2010.	事实上，美国才需要在2010年采取量化宽松时向全世界解释货币刺激不是货币操纵。


At the time, Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega coined the phrase “currency wars" and accused the US of being the main aggressor.	当时，巴西财政部长曼特加（Guido Mantega）创造了“货币战争”一词，指责美国是主要侵略者。


In fact, the US has not intervened in a major way in the currency market to sell dollars since the coordinated interventions associated with the Plaza Accord in 1985.	事实上，自1985年广场协定后的合作干预以来，美国从未大幅干预货币市场出售美元。


Other criteria besides currency-market intervention are used to ascertain whether a currency is deliberately undervalued or, in the words of the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement, “manipulated" for “unfair competitive advantage."	除了货币市场干预，其他标准包括确定货币是否有意低估或用国际货币基金组织（IMF）协定条款说，为了“不公平的竞争优势”而“进行干预”。


One criterion is an inappropriately large trade or current-account surplus.	一个标准是异常大的贸易和经常项目赤字。


Another is an inappropriately low real (inflation-adjusted) foreign-exchange value.	另一个标准是异常低（经通胀调整）的外汇价值。


But many countries have large trade surpluses or weak currencies.	但许多国家都存在巨大的贸易赤字或弱势货币。


Usually it is difficult to say whether they are appropriate.	通常很难说这些情况是否属于异常。


Ten years ago, the renminbi did seem to meet all of the criteria for undervaluation.	十年前，人民币确实似乎满足低估的所有标准。


But this is no longer the case.	但今非昔比 。


The renminbi's real value rose from 2006 to 2013.	2006至2013年间，人民币实际价值一直在上升。


The most recent purchasing power statistics show the currency to be in a range that is normal for a country with per capita real income of around $10,000.	最近的购买力统计表明人民币币值已处于人均实际收入10,000美元左右国家的正常范围。


By contrast, the criterion on which the US Congress focuses – the bilateral trade balance – is irrelevant to economists (and to the IMF rules).	相反，美国国会所关注的标准——双边贸易余额——与经济学家（以及IMF规则）的标准无关。


It is true that China's bilateral trade surplus with the US is as big as ever.	诚然，中国对美国的双边贸易盈余无比巨大。


But China also runs bilateral deficits with Saudi Arabia, Australia, and other exporters of oil and minerals, and with South Korea, from which it imports components that go into its manufactured exports.	但中国同时也存在对沙特阿拉伯、澳大利亚和其他石油和矿产出口国的双边赤字，对韩国也是如此（中国从韩国进口元件然后组装成制造品出口）。


Indeed, imported inputs account for roughly 95% of the value of a “Chinese" smartphone exported to the US; only 5% is Chinese value added.	事实上，进口投入品占出口至美国的“中国”智能手机价值的95%左右； 而只有5%是中国的增加值。


The point is that bilateral trade balances have little meaning.	这里的重点是双边贸易余额根本说明不了什么问题。


Congress requires by law that the US Treasury report to it twice a year which countries are guilty of currency manipulation, with the bilateral trade balance specified as one of the criteria.	根据法律，国会要求美国财政部每年两次向其报告哪些国家在货币操纵方面行为不端，双边贸易余额被指定为标准之一。


But Congress should be careful what it wishes for.	但对于想要的结果，国会应该保持谨慎。


It would be ironic if China agreed to US demands to float the renminbi and the result was a depreciation that boosted its exporters' international competitiveness.	如果中国同意美国的要求让人民币自由浮动，结果人民币出现有利于其出口商国际竞争力的贬值，这将十分讽刺。


China’s Last Soft Landing?	中国经济最后一次软着陆？


NEW HAVEN – Once again, China has defied the naysayers.	发自纽黑文市——中国又一次藐视了它的反对者们。


Economic growth picked up in the final quarter of 2012 to 7.9% – half a percentage point faster than the 7.4% increase in GDP in the third quarter.	其经济增长在2012年最后一个季度提速至7. 9%——比第三季度7.


This was a meaningful increase after ten consecutive quarters of deceleration, and it marks the Chinese economy’s second soft landing in slightly less than four years.	4%的GDP增长速度高出半个百分点。 在经历了连续十个季度的减速后，这次提速意义非凡，它标志着中国经济在略短于4年的时间内第二次实现了软着陆。


Despite all the talk about the coming shift to internal demand, China remains heavily dependent on exports and external demand as major drivers of economic growth.	尽管有很多关于中国将来会转向内需导向的说法，中国现在依然严重依赖出口和外部需求——这是其经济增长的主要动力。


It is not a coincidence that its last two slowdowns followed closely on the heels of growth slumps in its two largest foreign markets, Europe and the United States.	中国最近两次经济减速都紧随其最大的两个国外市场——欧洲和美国——的经济衰退之后，这可并不是巧合。


Just as the soft landing in early 2009 occurred in the aftermath of a horrific American-made crisis, this latest one followed the European sovereign-debt crisis.	就像2009年初的软着陆发生在美国引发的可怕危机后那样，最近一次的软着陆则紧跟在欧洲主权债务危机之后。


China has several sources of strength that have enabled it to withstand the tough external shocks of the last four years.	中国有几个力量来源，使其能够在过去四年里承受艰难的外部冲击。


Large buffers of saving (53% of GDP) and foreign-exchange reserves ($3.3 trillion) are at the top of the list.	大量储蓄（GDP的53%）所构成的缓冲区以及外汇储备（3. 3万亿美元）是其最重要的力量来源。


Moreover, unlike the West, which has used up most of its traditional countercyclical policy ammunition, China has maintained ample scope for fiscal and monetary-policy adjustments as circumstances dictate.	此外，不像西方国家已经用光了大部分的传统逆周期政策，如果形势需要，中国还保持着财政及货币政策调整的巨大空间。


Likewise, a powerful urbanization dynamic continues to deliver solid support for China’s high-investment economy, while enabling relatively poor rural workers to raise their incomes by finding higher-paying jobs in the cities.	同样地，强大的城市化动力继续为中国的高投资经济提供坚固的支持，同时让相对贫穷的农民工能够通过在城市找到收入更高的工作来增加自身的收入。


Nonetheless, this may be the last time that China can escape an external shock with its growth intact.	然而，这也许是中国最后一次能够在其发展不受影响的情况下避免外部冲击。


Premier Wen Jiabao addressed this possibility nearly six years ago, arguing in March 2007 that the seemingly spectacular Chinese economy had become “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable.”	其总理温家宝早在六年多之前就提出了这种可能性，他在2007年3月指出：看似辉煌的中国经济已经变得“不稳定、不平衡、不协调、并最终不可持续”了。


Since then, many of China’s inherent strengths have been sapped by all-too-frequent external shocks.	自那时起，中国的许多固有优势被不断的外部冲击削弱了。


The banking sector is still digging out from the bad loans extended in the aftermath of the global meltdown in 2008.	银行业仍在清理2008年全球危机后遗留下来的不良债务。


Finding affordable housing has become an increasingly serious problem for those relocating to cities for the first time.	对那些第一次移居到城市的人来说，要找到负担得起的房子已经成为一个日益严重的问题。


And corruption scandals and the related risks of political turmoil were unsettling, to say the least, in the months prior to last year’s Communist Party leadership transition.	腐败丑闻和政治动乱风险导致人心骚动——至少在去年共产党领导层权力交接之前的几个月是这样的。


In other words, the vulnerability implied by Wen’s “Four Uns” has increased significantly.	换句话说，温家宝的“四不”所指的经济弱点已经显著加剧了。


China’s economy has certainly become more unstable, with major slowdowns in real GDP growth in 2009 and again in 2012.	中国经济确实变得更不稳定，它的实际GDP增长于2009年大幅放缓，2012年也是如此。


Its imbalances have gotten worse as well, with the investment share of GDP approaching 50% and private consumption falling below 35% of GDP.	其发展不平衡也变得更严重——投资占GDP的比重接近50%，而私人消费占GDP的比重还不到35%。


Similarly, China has become more uncoordinated, or fragmented, as its income disparities have continued to widen.	同样地，中国也变得更加不协调，或者说碎片化，这是因为其收入差距一直在扩大。


And sustainability is being jeopardized by environmental degradation and pollution, which pose a growing threat to the country’s atmosphere and water supply.	而发展的可持续性正被环境退化和污染所破坏，这对中国的大气和水供应构成了越来越大的威胁。


In short, China’s growth model has been stretched as never before.	简而言之，中国的增长模式被史无前例地扩张。


And, like a piece of fabric, the longer it remains stretched, the longer it will take to return to its former resilient state – and the greater the possibility that it will not spring back the next time something goes wrong.	而且，就像一块布料，它被拉伸的时间越长，要回到原来有弹性的状态的所需的时间就越长——而且越有可能下一次出了什么差错，它再也恢复不到有弹性的状态。


The message to China’s new leadership is unmistakable: There has never been a more urgent time to get on with the heavy lifting of rebalancing and reform.	这给新一届中国领导人传递的信息是很明显的：历史上从来没有像现在一样迫切需要进行经济发展的再平衡和改革。


Now is the time to implement the measures that will accelerate the transition to a more consumer-led economy.	现在是时候要实施这些措施了，以加速向更为消费者导向的经济过渡的进程。


The agenda is long, but it is hardly a secret.	进程是很漫��的，但它已经不是一个秘密了。


It includes developing the services sector, funding the social safety net, liberalizing an antiquated residential-permit system (hukou), reforming state-owned enterprises, and ending financial repression on households by lifting artificially low interest rates on savings.	它包括发展服务业、资助社会保障、放宽过时的户口政策、改革国有企业并通过提高被人为刻意降低的储蓄利率来结束对家庭的金融压迫。


Failure to act quickly on this program would leave China far too vulnerable to the inevitable next shock in a crisis-battered world.	如果不能迅速地在实施这个计划，在这个饱受危机冲击的世界，中国将会很容易受到下一次不可避免的冲击。 没有进行重新平衡的调整，这几个潜在临界点中的任何一个都会严重危害该经济体完成另一次软着陆的能力：银行体系信贷质量的恶化；


In the absence of rebalancing, any one of several potential tipping points could seriously compromise the economy’s ability to pull off another soft landing: deteriorating credit quality in the banking system; weakening export competitiveness as wages rise; key environmental, governance, and social problems (namely, pollution, corruption, and inequality); and, of course, foreign-policy missteps, as suggested by escalating problems with Japan.	重要的环境、治理和社会问题（也就是，污染、腐败和贫富差距的问题）； 当然，还有外交政策失误，正如与日本之间不断升级的问题所显示出来的一样。


The Chinese economy has come through two major global crises in the past four years.	中国经济在过去四年里已经安然度过了两个重要的全球危机。


On the surface, its resilience has been impressive – the first to recover, as Chinese leaders always want to remind the rest of the world.	表面上，中国的经济韧性令人印象深刻——正如中国领导人一直对全世界强调的一样，它是第一个复苏的国家。


But, beneath the surface, an unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable economy risks losing its capacity for resilience.	然而，表面之下，这个不平衡、不稳定、不协调、无法持续发展的经济体可能会失去复原能力。


Without rebalancing and reforms, the days of the automatic Chinese soft landing may be over.	如果不进行再平衡和改革，中国自动软着陆的好日子也许就再也不会有了。


I have been an optimist about China for 15 years.	对中国的经济我已经乐观了15年。


I still am.	现在我仍然持乐观的态度。


But the clock is ticking.	但时间不等人。


Wen Jiabao’s critique six years ago was a powerful diagnosis of the Old China’s flaws that pointed to the Next China’s hopes and dreams.	温家宝六年前的评论是对过去中国缺陷强有力的诊断，并指出了未来中国的希望和梦想所在。


It remains a blueprint that China’s new leadership cannot ignore.	它仍然是中国新一代领导人不能忽视的蓝图。


Time is no longer on China’s side. It must act now.	时间已经对中国来说已经很紧迫了，它必须马上采取行动。


The Chinese Economy and Fed Policy	中国经济和美联储政策


CAMBRIDGE – Janet Yellen’s speech on September 24 at the University of Massachusetts clearly indicated that she and the majority of the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee intend to raise the short-term interest rate by the end of 2015.	美国剑桥—9月24日耶伦在马萨诸塞州大学发表的讲话清楚地表明，她和美联储联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）大部分成员倾向于在2015年底提高短期利率。


It was particularly important that she explicitly included her own view, unlike when she spoke on behalf of the entire FOMC after its September meeting.	尤其重要的是，她明确包括了她自己的观点，这与她在FOMC9月会议后代表全体成员的讲话不同。


Nonetheless, given the Fed’s recent history of revising its policy position, markets remain skeptical about the likelihood of a rate increase this year.	尽管如此，由于美联储最近频繁修正其政策立场，市场对今年会否升息仍抱怀疑态度。


The Fed had been saying for several months that it would raise the federal funds rate when the labor market approached full employment and when FOMC members could anticipate that annual inflation would reach 2%.	几个月来，美联储一直在说，它将在劳动力市场趋于充分就业、FOMC成员能够确定年通货膨胀达到2%时升高联邦基金利率。


But, although both conditions were met earlier in September, the FOMC decided to leave the rate unchanged, explaining that it was concerned about global economic conditions and about events in China in particular.	但是，尽管这两个条件在9月初都已实现，FOMC仍决定保持利率不变，给出的解释是其担忧全球经济环境，特别是中国的情况。


I was unconvinced.	我对此不敢苟同。


I have believed for some months that the Fed should start tightening monetary policy to reduce the risks of financial instability caused by the behavior of investors and lenders in response to the prolonged period of exceptionally low interest rates since the 2008 financial crisis.	几个月来，我认为美联储应该开始收紧货币政策，以降低投资者和贷款人的行为导致金融不稳定的风险。 投资者和贷款人的高风险行为是对2008年金融危机以来长时间超低利率的反应。


Events in China are no reason for further delay.	中国的情况不是进一步延迟升息的理由。


Consider, first, domestic economic conditions, starting with the employment picture.	首先，我们看看国内经济情况，从就业状况开始。


By the time the FOMC met on September 16, the unemployment rate had fallen to 5.1%, the level that the Fed had earlier identified as full employment.	9月16日FOMC会议举行时，失业率已下降至5. 1%，这是美联储此前定义为充分就业的水平。


Although there are still people who cannot find full-time jobs, driving the unemployment rate below 5.1% would, according to the Fed, eventually lead to unwanted increases in inflation.	尽管仍有人无法找到全职工作，但按照美联储的说法，让失业率下降到5. 1%以下最终会导致有害的通胀升高。


The current inflation picture is more confusing.	当前通胀状况比较令人难以厘清。


The annual headline rate over the past 12 months was only 0.2%, far short of the Fed’s 2% target.	过去12个月的年标题通胀率（headline rate）只有0. 2%，远低于美联储2%的目标。


This reflected the dramatic fall in energy prices during the previous year, with the energy component of the consumer price index down 13%.	这反映出此前一年中能源价格的大幅下跌，消费物价指数中的能源价格下降了13%。


The rate of so-called core inflation (which excludes energy purchases) was 1.8%.	所谓的核心通胀率（剔除能源成本）为1. 8%。


Even that understates the impact of energy on measured inflation, because lower gasoline prices reduce shipping costs, lowering a wide range of prices.	即使这个数字也低估了能源对测得通胀率的影响，因为汽油价格的下降降低了运输成本，从而降低了各种价格。


The point is simple: When energy prices stop falling, the overall price index will rise close to 2%.	要点一目了然：当能源价格停止下降时，总体物价指数将升至2%附近。


And the FOMC members’ own median forecast puts inflation at 1.8% in 2017 and 2% in 2018.	FOMC成员的中位通胀预测值为2017年1. 8%，2018年2%。


So if the Fed, for whatever reason, wanted to leave the interest rate unchanged, it needed an explanation that went beyond economic conditions in the United States.	因此，如果美联储出于某种原因想保持利率不变，它需要美国经济状况之外的解释。


It turned to China, which had been much in the news in recent weeks.	美联储转向了最近几周频频登上新闻的中国。


China was reducing its global imports, potentially reducing demand for exports from the US.	中国正在降低其全球进口，有可能削弱对美国出口的需求。


The Chinese stock market had fallen sharply, declining some 40% from its recent high.	中国股市大幅下跌，从最近的高点跌去40%。


And China had abruptly devalued the renminbi, potentially contributing to lower import prices – and therefore lower inflation – for the US.	中国还突然降低了人民币汇率，有可能导致美国进口品价格下降——从而拉低通胀。


But when it comes to the impact of China’s troubles on the US economy, there is less than meets the eye.	但对于中国的麻烦给美国经济造成什么影响这一问题，并没有乍看上去那么复杂。


China’s import demand is slowing in line with its economic structure’s shift away from industry and toward services and household consumption.	中国的进口需求放缓是因为其经济结构从倚重工业转向倚重服务业和家庭消费。


This means that China needs less of the iron ore and other raw materials that it imports from Australia and South America and less of the specialized manufacturing equipment that it imports from Germany and Japan.	这意味着中国不再需要那么多从澳大利亚和南美进口的铁矿石和其他原材料以及那么多从德国和日本进口的专业制造设备。


The US accounts for only 8% of China’s imports, and its exports to China represent less than 1% of its GDP.	美国只占中国进口额的8%，而其对华出口只占其GDP的不到1%。


So China’s cut in imports could not shave more than a few tenths of a percentage point from US GDP, and even that would be spread over several years.	因此中国削减出口对美国GDP的影响最多只有零点几个百分点，并且这一影响也需要好几年才会充分显现。


As for the stock market – widely viewed as a kind of casino for a small fraction of Chinese households – only about 6% of China’s population own shares.	至于股市——一小部分中国家庭把中国股市看成是赌场——只有6%的中国人拥有股票。


The Shanghai stock market index soared from 2,200 a year ago to a peak of 5,100 in mid-summer and then dropped sharply, to about 3,000 now.	上证指数从一年前的2,200点飙升至今年仲夏的5,100点，然后又暴跌至现在的3,000点上下。


So, despite the sharp drop that made headlines recently, Chinese shares are up more than 30% from a year ago.	因此，尽管最近股市暴跌是热门新闻，但中国股市仍比一年前上涨了30%以上。


More important, wealth and consumption in China are closely related to real-estate values, not equity values.	更重要的是，中国的财富和消费与房地产价值而非股票价值密切相关。


Finally, the renminbi’s recent decline against the dollar was only 2.5%, from CN¥6.2 to CN¥6.35 – far below the double-digit declines of the Japanese yen, the euro, and the British pound.	最后，最近人民币兑美元贬值幅度只有2. 5%，从6.


So, on an overall trade-weighted basis, the renminbi is substantially higher relative to the currencies with which it competes.	35元兑1美元——远远比不上日元、欧元和英镑两位数的贬值幅度。 因此，从总贸易加权角度看，人民币价值相对其竞争对手货币来说要高得多。


Even more relevant, the decline of the renminbi and other currencies in the past year has had very little impact on US import prices, because Chinese and other exporters price their goods in dollars and do not adjust them when the exchange rate changes.	更重要的是，人民币和其他货币在过去一年中的贬值对美国进口价格影响甚微，因为中国和其他出口国的商品以美元定价，不会因为汇率变化而调整价格。


While official US data show overall import prices down 11% in the 12 months through August, this is almost entirely due to lower energy costs.	美国官方数据显示，在截至今年8月的12个月中，总体进口物价下降了11%，但这几乎完全是因为能源成本下降所致。


When energy products are excluded, import prices are down only 3%.	剔除能源产品后，进口物价只下降了3%。


So the Fed is right to say that inflation is low because of the sharp drop in energy prices; but it need not worry about the effect of major trading partners’ lower currency values.	因此，美联储说能源价格暴跌引起了通胀低迷是正确的； 但它不必担心主要贸易伙伴货币贬值的影响。


And, again, when the price of energy stops declining, the inflation rate will rise close to the core rate of 1.8%.	重申一次，当能源价格停止下跌时，通胀率会上升至接近核心通胀率的1. 8%。


So, unless there are surprising changes in the US economy, we can expect the Fed to start raising interest rates later this year, as Janet Yellen has proposed, and to continue raising them in 2016 and beyond.	因此，除非美国经济发生出人意料的变化，我们可以预期美联储将如耶伦所提出的那样在今年晚些时候开始升息，并在2016年及以后持续升息。


I only hope that it raises them enough over the next 18 months to avoid the financial instability and longer-term inflation that could result from the long era of excessively easy monetary policy.	我只希望美联储在未来18个月中将利息升高足够多，以避免长时间过度宽松货币政策可能导致的金融不稳定和长期通胀。


China’s Financial Floodgates	中国的金融防洪闸


NEW YORK – As China’s economy starts to slow, following decades of spectacular growth, the government will increasingly be exposed to the siren song of capital-account liberalization.	发自纽约——在经历了数十年波澜壮阔的增长后，中国经济的增速开始下降，而这也令其政府日渐处于资本账户自由化的诱惑之下。


This option might initially appear attractive, particularly given the Chinese government’s desire to internationalize the renminbi.	考虑到中国政府实现人民币国际化的意愿，这一选项或许咋一看上去极为诱人。


But appearances can deceive.	但这却是容易让人误入歧途的表象。