In fact, German reunification only provided the final impetus for a project conceived in the 1980s to resolve a longstanding dilemma.	事实上，德国重新统一只是20世纪80年代便已成型的、解决一个长期存在的难题的工程的最后一步。


European governments were both strongly averse to floating exchange rates, which they assumed would be incompatible with a single market, and unwilling to perpetuate a Bundesbank-dominated monetary regime.	欧洲政府强烈反对浮动汇率，认为这与单一市场不相容； 同时它们又不愿长期保留德国央行主导的货币机制。


A truly European currency built on German principles appeared to be the best way forward.	一个建立在德国原则基础上的真正的欧洲货币似乎是最佳解决之道。


In retrospect, German reunification was more a curse than a blessing.	事后看来，德国重新统一更多地是一个诅咒而非祝福。


When exchange rates were locked in 1999, Germany’s was overvalued, and its economy was struggling; France’s was undervalued, and its economy was booming.	当汇率在1999年被锁定时，德国处于高估状态，其经济十分困难； 法国处于低估状态，其经济正在繁荣。


During the ensuing decade, imbalances slowly grew between a resurgent Germany and countries where low interest rates had triggered credit booms.	在此后的十年中，失衡逐渐在重新崛起的德国与因为低利率而导致信贷繁荣的国家之间形成。


And when the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, conditions were ripe for a perfect storm.	而随着2008年全球金融危机的爆发，这些条件便成为完美风暴的温床。


No one can say how Europe would have evolved without the euro.	没人知道没有欧元欧洲会变成什么样。


Would the fixed-exchange-rate system have endured or collapsed?	固定汇率制度会延续还是崩溃？


Would the Deutschemark have been overvalued?	德国马克还会高估吗？


Would states have reintroduced trade barriers, ending the single market?	各国会重新引入贸易壁垒、结束单一市场吗？


Would a real-estate bubble have developed in Spain?	房地产泡沫会在西班牙兴起吗？


Would governments have reformed more or less?	政府改革会更多还是更少？


Establishing a counterfactual baseline against which the euro’s impact could be assessed is impossible.	建立反向分析基线评估欧元的影响是不可能的。


But that is no excuse for complacency.	但这绝不是自满的理由。


Over the last 15 years, the eurozone’s economic performance has been disappointing, and its policy system must answer for this.	在过去15年中，欧元区经济表现一直令人失望，其政治制度必须为此负责。


What really matters is whether a common European currency still makes sense for the future.	真正重要的是共同欧洲货币对未来是否仍然重要。


This question is often evaded, because the cost of exiting is deemed too high to consider it (and could be higher still if the break-up takes place in a crisis and sharpens reciprocal acrimony among participating countries).	这一问题常常被回避，因为退出欧元的成本高得无法想象（而如果欧元区解体发生在危机期间，并加剧参与国之间的互相倾轧，成本还会进一步提高）。


Moreover, pulling the plug on the euro could unleash the dark forces of nationalism and protectionism.	此外，废除欧元可能释放民族主义和保护主义的黑暗力量。


But, as Oxford’s Kevin O’Rourke recently argued, this is hardly a sufficient argument.	但是，牛津大学的凯文·奥洛克（Kevin O’Rourke）最近指出，这一观点并不充分。


It is the logical equivalent of advising a couple to remain married because divorce is too expensive.	在逻辑上，这等同于建议一对夫妇因为离婚成本太高昂而将婚姻保持下去。


So does the euro still make sense?	那么，欧元仍然有意义吗？


It was expected to deliver three economic benefits.	本来，人们期待欧元带来三大经济好处。


Monetary union, it was assumed, would foster economic integration, bolstering Europe’s long-term growth.	人们假设，货币联盟能促进经济一体化、巩固欧洲的长期增长。


Instead, intra-eurozone trade and investment have increased only modestly, and growth potential has actually weakened.	相反，欧元区内部贸易和投资增长平庸，而增长潜力事实上还有所削弱。


This is partly because national governments, rather than building on currency unification to turn the eurozone into an economic powerhouse, tried to hang onto their remaining power.	这部分是因为国家政府没有在货币统一的基础上更进一步，将欧元区建设成经济超级大国，而是试图保留它们剩下的权力。


This was perhaps logical politically, but it made no economic sense: Europe’s huge domestic market is one of its main assets, and opportunities to strengthen it should not be squandered.	这也许合乎��治逻辑，但在经济上一无是处：欧洲巨大的内部市场是其主要资产之一，因此决不能浪费加强内部市场的机会。


Second, it was hoped that the euro would become a major international currency (particularly given how few countries are equipped with the necessary legal, market, and policy institutions).	其次，人们希望欧元成为主要国际货币之一（特别是在考虑到极少有国家能满足必要的法律、市场和政策制度的情况下）。


And, according to recent ECB statistics, this hope has been largely fulfilled.	而根据最新的欧洲央行数据，这一希望已经基本实现。


With international use of the euro behind only the US dollar, this achievement can help Europe to continue shaping the global economic order, rather than sliding into irrelevance.	欧元的国际用途仅次于美元，这一成就有助于欧洲继续影响全球经济秩序而非沦为无关紧要的实体。


Third, it was (somewhat naively) believed that the institutions underpinning the euro would improve the overall quality of economic policy, as though Europe-wide policies would automatically be better than national ones.	第三，人们（不无天真地）认为作为欧元基础的机构能够改善经济政策的总体质量，好像欧洲整体政策水平天然就比国家政策水平高似的。


The acid test came in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis: because it overestimated the fiscal dimension of the crisis and underestimated its financial dimension, the eurozone performed worse than the United States and the United Kingdom.	2008年全球金融危机后，严峻的考验来临了：欧元区高估了危机的财政维度，低估了它的金融维度，因此其表现不如美国和英国。


If the euro is to create prosperity, further reforms of the policy system are therefore needed.	如果欧元要带来繁荣，就必须进一步采取政策制度改革。


But an agenda can be designed and implemented only if there is a broad consensus on the nature of the problem.	但制定和实施一套日程必须有对问题性质的广泛一致的认识。


And, as the ongoing dispute over Greece illustrates, agreement remains elusive: Participating countries have developed contradictory analyses of the causes of the debt crisis, from which they derive contradictory prescriptions.	而希腊问题上的持续争论表明，欧洲距离达成一致尚远：参与国对于债务危机的根源的分析彼此矛盾，于是开出的药方也彼此矛盾。


Richard Cooper of Harvard University once observed that in the early days of international public health cooperation, the fight against global diseases was hampered by countries’ adherence to different models of contagion.	哈佛大学的理查德·库珀（Richard Cooper）曾经观察到，在国际公共卫生合作的早期阶段，对全球疾病的治理因为各国存在不同的传染模式而大受掣肘。


They all favored joint action, but they could not agree on a plan, because they disagreed on how epidemics crossed borders.	各国都青睐联合行动，但无法形成一致计划，因为它们对于传染病如何从一国传染到另一国意见不一。


That is the problem the eurozone faces today.	这就是欧元区今天面临的问题。


Fortunately, it is not unsolvable, as significant reforms like the creation of the European Stability Mechanism and the launch of banking union show.	幸运的是，这个问题不是无法解决的，成立欧洲稳定性机制（European Stability Mechanism）、启动银行联盟等重大改革已经证明了这一点。


Disagreements also did not prevent the ECB from acting boldly, which illustrates that the governance of institutions does matter.	不一致也没有阻止欧洲央行采取果断行动，这表明机构治理确实很重要。


But the fact that reforms and actions were undertaken only lately, and under the pressure of acute crisis, is a sobering reminder of the difficulty of reaching consensus.	但改革和行动直到最近才开始，并且是在严重危机的压力下才实施，这一事实让问们清醒地认识到达成共识的困难性。


Europe cannot afford to procrastinate and pretend.	欧洲不能再拖延和装模作样了。


Either the eurozone’s members find agreement on an agenda of governance and political reforms that will turn the currency union into an engine of prosperity, or they will stumble repeatedly from dispute to crisis, until citizens lose patience or markets lose trust.	欧元区成员国必须形成一套关于治理和政治改革的一致日程，将货币联盟变成繁荣的引擎，否则就只能在反复的争论和危机中沉沦下去，直到公民失去耐心或市场失去信任。


Clarity is a prerequisite of serious discussion and ambitious reform.	明确性是严肃讨论和宏大改革的前提。


Each of the major participants now has an obligation to define what it regards as indispensable, what it considers unacceptable, and what it is ready to give in exchange for what it wants.	如今，所有主要参与方都有义务明确什么是它们看来不可缺少的，什么是它们不可接受的，什么是准备用来交换它们想要的东西的。


A New Approach to Eurozone Sovereign Debt	欧元区主权债务的新方法


ATHENS – Greece’s public debt has been put back on Europe’s agenda.	雅典—希腊公共债务又回到了欧洲日程上。


Indeed, this was perhaps the Greek government’s main achievement during its agonizing five-month standoff with its creditors.	事实上，这也许是希腊政府在与其债权人为期五个月的痛苦的僵局中所取得的主要成就。


After years of “extend and pretend,” today almost everyone agrees that debt restructuring is essential.	在多年的“延期和假装”后，今天，几乎所有人都同意债务重组必不可少。


Most important, this is true not just for Greece.	最重要的是，不仅仅希腊是如此。


In February, I presented to the Eurogroup (which convenes the finance ministers of eurozone member states) a menu of options, including GDP-indexed bonds, which Charles Goodhart recently endorsed in the Financial Times, perpetual bonds to settle the legacy debt on the European Central Bank’s books, and so forth.	2月，我想欧元集团（Eurogroup，由欧元区成员国财政部长组成）提出了一份选择清单，包括查尔斯·古德哈特（Charles Goodhart）最近在《金融时报》撰文支持的 GDP指数债券、清算欧洲央行账上遗留债务的永续债券等。


One hopes that the ground is now better prepared for such proposals to take root, before Greece sinks further into the quicksand of insolvency.	我们希望，如今，在希腊进一步滑向破产深渊之前，让这些方案站稳脚跟的基础已有所加强。


But the more interesting question is what all of this means for the eurozone as a whole.	但更有趣的问题是所有这些对作为整体的欧元区的意义。


The prescient calls from Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, and many others for a different approach to sovereign debt in general need to be modified to fit the particular characteristics of the eurozone’s crisis.	约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stigltiz）、杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）和其他许多人颇有先见之明地呼吁改良一个不同的针对一般需要的主权债务的方针，以适应欧元区危机的特殊性质。


The eurozone is unique among currency areas: Its central bank lacks a state to support its decisions, while its member states lack a central bank to support them in difficult times.	欧元区是一个独特的货币区：其央行缺少一个支持其决定的国家，而其成员国缺少一个在困难时期支持它们的央行。


Europe’s leaders have tried to fill this institutional lacuna with complex, non-credible rules that often fail to bind, and that, despite this failure, end up suffocating member states in need.	欧洲领导人试图用复杂而不可信的规则修补这一制度缺陷，这套规则常常无法形成约束力，而尽管存在这一缺陷，它最终仍对有需要的成员国形成了巨大的制约。


One such rule is the Maastricht Treaty’s cap on member states’ public debt at 60% of GDP.	规则之一是马斯特里赫特条约将成员国的公共债务水平限定在GDP的60%以下。


Another is the treaty’s “no bailout” clause.	另一个规则是马约的“无援助”条款。


Most member states, including Germany, have violated the first rule, surreptitiously or not, while for several the second rule has been overwhelmed by expensive financing packages.	大部分成员国，包括德国，都违反过第一个规则（不管是暗中还是明里），而第二个规则有好几次通过昂贵的融资方案得以维持。


The problem with debt restructuring in the eurozone is that it is essential and, at the same time, inconsistent with the implicit constitution underpinning the monetary union.	欧元区债务重组存在的问题是它很重要，与此同时，它与作为货币联盟基础的隐含宪法不一致。


When economics clashes with an institution’s rules, policymakers must either find creative ways to amend the rules or watch their creation collapse.	当经济考量与一套制度的规则冲突时，决策者必须要么找出创新方法修改规则，要么眼睁睁看着他们创造出来的东西轰然倒塌。


Here, then, is an idea (part of A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Euro Crisis, co-authored by Stuart Holland, and James K. Galbraith) aimed at re-calibrating the rules, enhancing their spirit, and addressing the underlying economic problem.	而关于重订规则、强化它们的精神以及解决其根本性经济问题，斯图尔特·荷兰（Stuart Holland）和詹姆斯·加尔布雷斯（James K. Galbraith）合著的《解决欧元危机的温和方案》（A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Euro Crisis）中提出了一个观点。


In brief, the ECB could announce tomorrow morning that, henceforth, it will undertake a debt-conversion program for any member state that wishes to participate.	简单说，欧洲央行可以在明天早上宣布，从今以后它将推出一个债务转换计划，任何成员国都可以参加。


The ECB will service (as opposed to purchase) a portion of every maturing government bond corresponding to the percentage of the member state’s public debt that is allowed by the Maastricht rules.	欧洲央行将为所有到期政府债券的一定比例（与马约规则所允许的成员国公共债务百分比一致）偿付利息（而不是购买）。


Thus, in the case of member states with debt-to-GDP ratios of, say, 120% and 90%, the ECB would service, respectively, 50% and 66.7% of every maturing government bond.	因此，对于（比如）债务-GDP比率为120%和90%的成员国，欧洲央行将分别为50%和66. 7%的所有到期政府债务付息。


To fund these redemptions on behalf of some member states, the ECB would issue bonds in its own name, guaranteed solely by the ECB, but repaid, in full, by the member state.	为了为一些成员国的赎回操作融资，欧洲央行将以自身名义发行债券，该债券完全由欧洲央行担保，但由该成员国负责足额偿付。


Upon the issue of such an ECB bond, the ECB would simultaneously open a debit account for the member state on whose behalf it issued the bond.	在发行这一欧洲央行债券时，欧洲央行同时将为其代为发行债券的成员国开立借方账户。


The member state would then be legally obliged to make deposits into that account to cover the ECB bonds’ coupons and principal.	该成员国将承担法律义务将存款存入该账户偿还欧洲央行债券的息票和本金。


Moreover, the member state’s liability to the ECB would enjoy super-seniority status and be insured by the European Stability Mechanism against the risk of a hard default.	此外，该成员国对欧洲央行的负债将享受超国家待遇，由欧洲稳定性机制（European Stability Mechanism）提供硬违约风险保险。


Such a debt-conversion program would offer five benefits.	这一债务转换计划能提供五个好处。


For starters, unlike the ECB’s current quantitative easing, it would involve no debt monetization.	首先，与欧洲央行目前的量化宽松不同，它没有将债务货币化。


Thus, it would run no risk of inflating asset price bubbles.	因此不存在导致资产价格泡沫的风险。


Second, the program would cause a large drop in the eurozone’s aggregate interest payments.	其次，该计划将大大降低欧元区总利息偿付。


The Maastricht-compliant part of its members’ sovereign debt would be restructured with longer maturities (equal to the maturity of the ECB bonds) and at the ultra-low interest rates that only the ECB can fetch in international capital markets.	欧元区成员国主权债务中与马约相符的部分将以更长的期限（等于欧洲央行债券期限）和只有欧洲央行可以在国际资本市场上获得的极低利率得到重组。


Third, Germany’s long-term interest rates would be unaffected, because Germany would neither be guaranteeing the debt-conversion scheme nor backing the ECB’s bond issues.	第三，德国的长期利率不会受到影响，因为德国既不需要担保该债务转换机制，也不需要支持欧洲央行的债券发行。


Fourth, the spirit of the Maastricht rule on public debt would be reinforced, and moral hazard would be reduced.	第四，关于公共债务的马约规则精神得到了执行，道德风险也得到了降低。


After all, the program would boost significantly the interest-rate spread between Maastricht-compliant debt and the debt that remains in the member states’ hands (which they previously were not permitted to accumulate).	毕竟，该计划将极大地增加与马约相容的债务和留在成员国手中的债务（此前这些债务是不允许积累的）之间的利率差。


Finally, GDP-indexed bonds and other tools for dealing sensibly with unsustainable debt could be applied exclusively to member states’ debt not covered by the program and in line with international best practices for sovereign-debt management.	最后，GDP指数债券和其他应对不可持续的债务的明智工具将只适用于成员国不受该计划覆盖的债务，并符合主权债务管理的国际最佳实践。


The obvious solution to the euro crisis would be a federal solution.	解决欧元危机最显而易见的方案是联邦方案。


But federation has been made less, not more, likely by a crisis that tragically set one proud nation against another.	但一场地让一个骄傲的国家与另一个骄傲的国家对立起来的悲剧让联邦方案的可能性变得更小而不是更大。


Indeed, any political union that the Eurogroup would endorse today would be disciplinarian and ineffective.	事实上，欧元集团今天可能支持的任何政治联盟必然是雷厉风行而效果甚微的。


Meanwhile, the debt restructuring for which the eurozone – not just Greece – is crying out is unlikely to be politically acceptable in the current climate.	与此同时，欧元区——而不仅仅是希腊——所迫切需要的债务重组在当前的气候下在政治上必然行不通。


But there are ways in which debt could be sensibly restructured without any cost to taxpayers and in a manner that brings Europeans closer together.	但有办法聪明地重组债务而不给纳税人造成任何负担，并且还能让欧洲更加团结。


One such step is the debt-conversion program proposed here.	一个步骤便是本文所提出的债务转换方案。


Taking it would help to heal Europe’s wounds and clear the ground for the debate that the European Union needs about the kind of political union that Europeans deserve.	实施这一方案有助于治疗欧洲的伤口，为欧盟所需要的关于欧洲人应该获得什么样的政治联盟的争论扫清道路。


The Threat That Will Save Europe	拯救欧洲的威胁


BRUSSELS – For the European Union, 2015 was another year of fundamental challenges.	布鲁塞尔—对欧盟来说，2015年又是一个根本变化之年。


Two key elements of European integration – the euro and border-free travel within the Schengen Area – were placed under severe strain.	欧洲一体化的两大关键要素——欧元和申根区无国界自由旅行——承受了巨大压力。


And neither is in the clear.	并且压力都没有减轻。


Nonetheless, one development in 2015 offers reason to hope that EU leaders will move beyond “muddling through” to implement bolder solutions in 2016: The threat of expulsion gained credibility.	尽管如此，2015年的一大发展趋势让我们有理由希望欧洲领导人能够超越“得过且过”，在2016年实施更加果断的方案。 这一趋势就是驱逐威胁日益可信。


The global economic crisis that began in 2008 exposed the deep flaws in Europe’s monetary union, though it took the near-death experience of the euro crisis of 2010-2012 to force Europe’s leaders to act, by creating a large fund to help struggling countries and establishing a banking union.	始于2008年的全球经济危机暴露出欧洲货币联盟的深刻缺陷，尽管2010—2012年欧元危机的濒死经验才迫使欧洲领导人有所反应，成立了一个巨型基金帮助受困国家，并建立了一个银行联盟。


Even so, more than three years later, that union – which entails supervision by the European Central Bank and the beginnings of a fund for restructuring failing banks, but lacks a common system for deposit insurance – is far from perfect.	尽管如此，三年多后，这一联盟——它包括欧洲央行的监督以及成立一个重组破产银行的激进，但缺少共同存款保险机制——仍然漏洞百出。


Despite its flaws, the banking union helped to keep financial markets calm in the first half of 2015, even as Greece’s new government, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, challenged a basic feature of Europe’s approach to national financial crises: that recipients of support must engage in belt-tightening.	尽管有各种缺陷，但银行联盟在2015年上半年帮助金融市场保持平稳，即使总理齐普拉斯领导的希腊新政府叫板欧洲处理国家金融危机的基本原则：接受支持的国家必须勒紧裤腰带。


In a July referendum, Greek voters delivered the outcome for which Tsipras campaigned, soundly rejecting the conditions – including strict austerity – which Greece’s creditors had demanded in exchange for a new bailout.	在7月份的全民公决中，希腊选民选择了齐普拉斯所想要的结果，决然地拒绝了希腊债权人所提出的新援助方案的交换条件——包括严厉紧缩。


A few weeks later, everything changed.	几周后，一切都变了。


Tsipras accepted a bailout program that was, in some ways, even tougher than the one that voters had rejected.	齐普拉斯接受了援助计划，从某些角度看，该计划甚至比希腊选民所拒绝的更加严厉。


An overwhelming majority of voters and members of parliament supported the move.	而压倒性多数的选民和议会成员都支持这一措施。


What triggered this about-face is obvious: After the referendum, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble suggested that Greece should be offered a “holiday” from the euro – a thinly veiled warning that exclusion from the eurozone was on the table.	什么促成了这一突然转变显而易见：全民公决后，德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）表示希腊应该从欧元区中“放假”——这无异于警告开除出欧元区的前景近在眼前。


Clearly, the threat worked.	显然，威胁起了作用。


The potential implications of this threat are disputed.	这一威胁的潜在影响存在争议。


Some interpret it to mean that the eurozone has de facto become a fixed exchange-rate system, where exit might actually be preferable for a struggling country and its more competitive partners.	一些人认为这意味着欧元区事实上已经变成了一个固定汇率体系，退出对于受困国及其竞争力更强的伙伴国来说也许是更值得做出的选择。


If this is the case, the eurozone’s days are numbered.	果真如此的话，欧元区的日子已经进入了倒计时。


It might be more accurate, however, to view this Greek episode as proof of the eurozone’s resilience, underpinned by its still-powerful allure.	但是，这出希腊闹剧更应该被视为欧元区恢复力的证明，其基础则是欧元区的诱惑力依然强大。


Even in the face of a GDP contraction larger than that of the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Greece preferred continued membership in the eurozone to a return to the drachma, which would have freed up some additional tools for regaining competitiveness and imposed asubstantial haircut on creditors.	即使面临比20世纪30年代大萧条期间的美国更大的GDP收缩，希腊仍更愿意保留欧元区成员资格，而不是回归德拉克马。 回归德拉克马能够解放更多的工具用于重获竞争力，并对债权人实施大规模“剃头”（haircut）。


If the latter interpretation is correct, Europe’s monetary union, though still deeply flawed, has become more cohesive.	如果后一种解读正确，那么欧洲货币联盟尽管漏洞百出，但比以前更有凝聚力了。


If eurozone membership cannot be taken for granted, if countries that do not abide by the common rules can simply be kicked out, countries will try harder to hold onto it.	如果欧元区成员资格不再稳固，如果不遵守共同规则的国家可以踢出了事，那么各国就会更加努力地保留这一资格。


The problems within the Schengen Area illustrate a similar evolution.	申根区的问题也体现出同样的演化趋势。


Like the eurozone, the Schengen Area is an incomplete structure, because it abolished internal borders without creating a common mechanism for policing the external border.	和欧元区一样，申根区是一个不完整的结构，因为它在放弃了内部边境的同时并没有建立维护外部边境的机制。


Until recently, this failing did not pose an acute problem, because dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and Africa controlled the migratory pressure resulting from wars and failing economies.	直到目前为止，这一缺陷并没有造成很尖锐的问题，因为中东和非洲极权政权能够控制战争和经济失败造成的移民压力。


But the recent surge in migration to Europe, driven largely by Syria’s intensifying civil war, has brought Schengen’s shortcomings to the fore.	但最近涌入欧洲的移民潮主要由叙利亚不断恶化的内战造成，它让申根区的缺陷尽显无疑。


By last summer, countries along the Balkan route – first Greece, then Hungary and Slovenia – buckled under the pressure of hundreds of thousands of refugees attempting to make their way to safety.	到去年夏天，巴尔干路径周边国家——首先是希腊，然后是匈牙利和斯洛文尼亚——面对数十万寻找安全之地的难民不堪重负。


Europe’s initial response was incoherent, with different EU member states taking radically different approaches to the influx.	欧洲一开始的反应毫无凝聚力可言，面对移民涌入，不同的欧盟成员国采取了完全不同的方针。


Still, checks are being reinstituted at an increasing number of internal borders – most recently, on Denmark’s border with Germany.	但是，越来越多的内部边境正在重启入境检查——最新的例子是丹麦的德国边境。


To many, Schengen appears to be in tatters.	对许多人来说，申根区已经支离破碎。


But the reinstatement of some border controls is merely a temporary measure.	但重启一些边境控制只是暂时措施。


Like the capital controls in Greece (and, until recently, in Cyprus), the purpose is to stem the crisis while better mechanisms are implemented.	和希腊（以及直到最近的塞浦路斯）的资本管制一样，其目的是阻止危机，同时实施更好的机制。


Moreover, internal border controls remain the exception, not the rule.	此外，内部边境控制仍然只是例外而非规则。


The Schengen countries know that reviving full controls across all internal borders would be extremely costly, forcing them to divert significant resources away from the primary objective of fighting crime and terrorism.	申根国家直到，重启所有内部边境的完全控制��本极其高昂，将迫使它们挪用大量本可用于打击犯罪和恐怖主义这些主要目标的资源。


That is why their leaders remain committed to preserving open internal borders, while maintaining a stronger external border – even if that means, as has been made clear to Greece, revoking the Schengen membership of a country deemed incapable of doing its part.	因此，这些国家的领导人依然承诺捍卫开放的内部边境，同时保持更强的外部边境控制——即使如希腊所表明的，这意味着剥夺被认为没有做好本职工作的国家的申根区成员资格。


Both the eurozone and the Schengen Area have survived the tough tests they have faced for one reason: They bring practical, tangible benefits to their members.	欧元区和申根区之所以能战胜严峻考验，是因为一个原因：它们为成员国带来了有形的实际好处。


Economists call this “revealed preference.”	经济学家称之为“显示偏好”。


The value added from European integration now extends beyond EU membership to include participation in sub-groups like the eurozone or the Schengen Area that have a more direct and tangible impact on daily life and key policy choices.	如今，来自欧洲一体化的新增价值不仅局限于欧盟成员资格，还包括参与欧元区或申根区等次一级国家集团，给日常生活和重要政策选择带来更加直接和看得见的影响。


In the real world, declarations of lofty principles mean a lot less than concrete actions.	在现实世界中，高喊崇高原则的意义远远比不过脚踏实地的行动。


And the concrete actions of the last year – notably, the warning that countries that do not follow the rules will be left out – suggest that 2016 will bring more progress, however piecemeal, toward a stronger eurozone and a real political union.	而去年的脚踏实地的行动——最主要的便是警告不遵守规则的国家可能被开除——表明2016年将带来通往更强大的欧元区和真正的政治联盟的更多进步，不管进步多么微小。


Money for Nothing	不用偿还的借贷


BRUSSELS – The developed world seems to be moving toward a long-term zero-interest-rate environment.	布鲁塞尔—发达世界似乎正在迎来长期零利率环境。


Though the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the eurozone have kept central-bank policy rates at zero for several years already, the perception that this was a temporary aberration meant that medium- to long-term rates remained substantial.	尽管美国、英国、日本和欧元区维持央行政策利率为零已有多年，但仍有许多人感觉这只是暂时的反常现象，这意味着中期到长期利率仍然坚挺。


But this may be changing, especially in the eurozone.	但这可能发生改变，特别是在欧元区。


Strictly speaking, zero rates are observed only for nominal, medium-term debt that is perceived to be riskless.	严格而言，零利率应该只存在于被认为无风险的中期债务的名义值。


But, throughout the eurozone, rates are close to zero – and negative for a substantial share of government debt – and are expected to remain low for quite some time.	但是，纵观欧元区，利率无不接近于零——并且有相当大部分的政府债务为负——预计将在相当长时间里保持低水平。


In Germany, for example, interest rates on public debt up to five years will be negative, and only slightly positive beyond that, producing a weighted average of zero.	比如，五年期德国公债利率将保持在负值，五年期以上公债也只是略高于零，加权平均则为零。


Clearly, Japan’s near-zero interest-rate environment is no longer unique.	显然，日本的近零利率环境已不再独特。


To be sure, the European Central Bank’s large-scale bond-buying program could be suppressing interest rates temporarily, and, once the purchases are halted next year, they will rise again.	诚然，欧洲央行的大规模债券购买计划也许正在暂时性抑制利率，而当明年购买操作中止时，利率会回升。


But investors do not seem to think so.	但投资者似乎并不认为如此。


Indeed, Germany’s 30-year bund yield is less than 0.7%, indicating that they expect ultra-low rates for a very long time.	事实上，德国30年期国债收益率还不到0. 7%，表明投资者认为极低利率会维持极长时间。


And many issuers are extending the maturity structure of their obligations to lock in current rates, which cannot go much lower (but could potentially increase a lot).	许多发行国正在延长债务的期限结构以锁定不可能再大幅降低（但可能大幅上升）的当前利率。


In any case, the eurozone seems stuck with near-zero rates at increasingly long maturities.	无论如何，欧元区的零利率期限正在不断延长。


What does this actually mean for its investors and debtors?	这对投资者和债务人实际意味着什么？


Here, one must consider not only the nominal interest rate, but also the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rate.	在这个问题上，你不但要考虑名义利率，还要考虑真实（经通胀调整的）利率。


A very low – or even negative – nominal interest rate could produce a positive real return for a saver, if prices fall sufficiently.	极低——甚至为负——的名义利率可以为储蓄者带来正的真实利率，如果价格降幅足够的话。


In fact, Japanese savers have been benefiting from this phenomenon for more than a decade, reaping higher real returns than their counterparts in the US, even though Japan’s near-zero nominal interest rates are much lower than America’s.	事实上，日本储蓄者十多年来一直从这一现象中获益，获得比美国储蓄者更高的真实回报，尽管日本的近零名义利率远低于美国。


Nonetheless, nominal rates do matter.	尽管如此，名义利率确实重要。


When they are negligible, they flatter profit statements, while balance-sheet problems slowly accumulate.	当名义利率低到可以忽略时，就会影响利润表，而资产负债表问题则逐渐累积。


Given that balance-sheet accounting is conducted according to a curious mix of nominal and market values, it can be opaque and easy to manipulate.	资产负债表簿记是根据奇特的名义和市场价值组合进行，因此可能恨不透明而容易操纵。


If prices – and thus average debt-service capacity – fall, the real burden of the debt increases.	如果价格——因而平均债务维持能力——下降，债务的真实负担就会增加。


But this becomes apparent only when the debt has to be refinanced or interest rates increase.	但只有当债务必须再融资或利率上升时，这些状况才会暴露。


In an environment of zero or near-zero interest rates, creditors have an incentive to “extend and pretend” – that is, roll over their maturing debt, so that they can keep their problems hidden for longer.	在零或近零利率环境中，债权人有动力“延期和假装”，即烟气到期债务以便在更长时间里隐瞒它们的问题。


Because the debt can be refinanced at such low rates, rollover risk is very low, allowing debtors who would be considered insolvent under normal circumstances to carry on much longer than they otherwise could.	由于债务可以以极低利率再融资，延期风险很低，这让在正常环境中将被认定为资不抵债的债务人可以维持更长时间。


After all, if debt can be rolled over forever at zero rates, it does not really matter – and nobody can be considered insolvent.	毕竟，如果债务以零利率不断延期直到永远，就不会出现真正的问题——也不会有债务人被认为资不抵债。


The debt becomes de facto perpetual.	债务实际上将成为无限期。


Japan’s experience illustrates this phenomenon perfectly.	日本的经验完美地说明了这一现象。


At more than 200% of GDP, the government’s mountain of debt seems unconquerable.	日本政府负债高达GDP的200%以上，看起来根本无力解决这一问题。


But that debt costs only 1-2% of GDP to service, allowing Japan to remain solvent.	但其债务维持成本只有GDP的1—2%，因此日本仍有偿债能力。


Likewise, Greece can now manage its public-debt burden, which stands at about 175% of GDP, thanks to the ultra-low interest rates and long maturities (longer than those on Japan’s debt) granted by its European partners.	类似地，希腊现在可以负担相当于GDP的175%左右的公债负担也是因为其欧洲伙伴国给予的极低利率和长期限（比日本债务期限更长）。


In short, with low enough interest rates, any debt-to-GDP ratio is manageable.	简言之，只要利率足够低，任何债务-GDP比率都是可管理的。


That is why, in the current interest-rate environment, the Maastricht Treaty’s requirement limiting public debt to 60% of GDP is meaningless – and why the so-called “fiscal compact” requiring countries to make continued progress toward that level should be reconsidered.	正因如此，在当前利率环境下，马斯特里赫特条约中公债不得高于GDP的60%的限制根本没有意义——所谓的“财政契约”要求各国不断朝这一水平靠近的条款也必须重新考虑。


In fact, near-zero interest rates undermine the very notion of a “debt overhang” in countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.	事实上，近零利率破坏了希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙等国家的“债务积压”的概念。


While these countries did accumulate a huge volume of debt during the credit boom that went bust in 2008, the cost of debt service is now too low to have the impact – reducing incomes, preventing a return to growth, and generating uncertainty among investors – that one would normally expect.	这些经济提确实在结束于2008年的信用繁荣期中积累了巨量债务，但现在的债务维持成本非常低，根本无法产生正常情况下所应该产生的影响——降低收入、阻碍增长回归、在投资者中间制造不确定性。


Today, these countries can simply refinance their obligations at longer maturities.	如今，这些国家只需要对其债务以更长期限进行再融资。


Countries’ debts undoubtedly play a vital role in the global financial system.	国家债务毫无疑问在全球金融体系中扮演关键角色。


But, in a zero interest-rate environment, that role must be reevaluated.	但是，在零利率环境中，这一角色必须重新评估。


A Strategic Rallying Cry for Europe	欧洲的战略集结号


MADRID – At the end of June, Greece was hurtling toward implosion and the European Union was consumed by an increasingly vicious internal debate over migration.	马德里——六月末，希腊疾速滑向内爆，而欧盟则被越来越汹涌的移民内部辩论所吞噬。


That might not sound like the most auspicious time for the European Council to give final approval for the preparation of a long-awaited new “global foreign and security strategy” for the EU.	这听上去或许不像欧洲理事会最终批准起草期待已久的欧盟新“全球外交及安全战略”的最佳时机。


But that is what happened, with the endorsement – complete with deliver-by date – buried in the conclusions of the Council’s June 25-26 meeting.	但事实却的确如此，理事会6月25-26日会议的决议当中就包含上述批准决定——还有明确的提交日期。


The initiative has the potential to revolutionize how Europe addresses the many challenges it now faces and, perhaps more important, to give the EU the sense of purpose that it so badly needs.	上述举措有可能彻底改变欧洲应对当前诸多挑战的解决办法，或许更重要的是，能为欧盟注入其迫切需要的目的性。


That the EU needs a new security strategy is clear.	欧盟显然需要新的安全战略。


The current one, created in 2003, is deeply outmoded, as epitomized by its opening line: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”	2003年出台的现行战略已经严重过时，这一点集中体现在其开篇的序言之中：“欧洲从来没有像现在这样繁荣、安全和自由。


This is clearly no longer the case today.	”今天显然已经不再如此。


The constant state of turmoil in which Europe has found itself is a result of the increasing complexity and intertwining of its internal and external realities – shaped, most notably, by four overlapping existential threats.	欧洲所处的长期混乱是其越来越复杂的内外部现实相互作用的结果——其中最值得注意的是四大相互关联交错的生存威胁。


First, Russia has revived a traditional security challenge that Europe had, it was thought, solved long ago.	首先，俄国已重新挑起欧洲本以为早已解决的传统安全威胁。


Second, transnational terrorism poses a multifaceted and fundamental danger.	其次，跨国恐怖主义带来了多方面的本质性危险。


Third, a burgeoning migration crisis is raising questions about European values and identity.	第三，正在兴起的移民危机就欧洲的价值观和身份提出了质疑。


And finally, a general lack of vision for the future of the European project has led to disaffection throughout the continent, undermining cohesion and, in turn, the EU’s capacity to address the trials it faces.	最后，普遍缺乏对未来远见的欧洲计划已经导致了欧洲各国的不满，进而破坏凝聚力并反过来影响了欧盟对所面临考验的解决。


These menaces exacerbate and intensify one another.	这些问题彼此激化加剧。


The activities of terrorist groups contribute to violence and instability in neighboring regions, driving an increasing number of migrants to the EU.	恐怖组织活动导致邻近地区暴力动荡，致使越来越多的人口选择向欧盟移民。


The difficulty of integrating immigrant communities into European societies has sometimes led to radicalization, providing ammunition to nationalist politicians and further fracturing Europe.	移民群体难以融入欧洲社会有时会导致激进运动，为民族主义政客提供口实并进一步分裂欧洲。


Russia’s leaders, too, have worked insidiously to break down solidarity, without which the EU is powerless to respond to the threats it faces.	俄国领导人也在暗中努力破坏团结，失去了团结的欧盟无力应对所面临的威胁。


All of this raises serious questions about the EU’s global role, while diminishing the viability of the European project itself.	所有这一切严重挑战了欧盟的全球作用，同时削弱了欧洲计划本身的可行性。


Given this interconnectedness, it is unsurprising that the EU’s compartmentalized responses – such as the European Agenda on Migration, the Eastern Partnership, and the Energy Security Strategy – while important, have proved inadequate.	鉴于这样一种相互关系，事实证明欧盟条块化对策——如欧洲移民议程、东部伙伴关系和能源安全战略——虽然重要，但远远跟不上形势发展其实并不出人意料。


What is needed is an overarching framework that not only underpins a self-reinforcing and coordinated response to core security threats, but also takes advantage of linkages and opportunities to buttress Europe’s capacity to act.	我们需要的是不仅能够支撑在核心安全威胁面前拿出自我强化、协调对策的总体框架，还需要利用形形色色的联系和机会优势巩固欧洲的行动能力。


Such a reconceptualization – not just revision – of Europe’s security strategy must account for the fact that the internal and external are becoming increasingly difficult to separate.	欧洲安全战略的上述重构——而不止是修补——必须考虑到内部和外部正变得越来越难以区分的事实。


Indeed, internally focused initiatives– the digital single market is one clear example – have significant international impacts, while external events shape life in the EU.	实际上，数字统一市场等着重于内部的计划产生了显著的国际影响，而外部事件也影响了欧盟的生活。


Given this, the new security strategy should account for the wider implications of domestic policies, leveraging the full array of tools that Europe has at its disposal.	有鉴于此，新安全战略应当考虑到内部政策更广泛的影响，充分利用欧洲可以利用的一切工具。


Of course, lofty rhetoric and ambitious intentions will mean little unless Europe’s leaders commit to the sustained implementation of concrete initiatives.	当然，除非欧洲领导人致力于长期推行具体计划，否则高谈阔论和宏伟的目标并没有太多实际意义。


This is why the drafting process itself is so important; it presents an opportunity for a serious discussion involving EU institutions and the wider European policy community, which has already spent considerable time reflecting on these issues.	这也解释了起草过程本身为什么非常重要； 它提供了一次让欧盟机构和更广泛的欧洲政界展开严肃讨论的机会，他们已经花了不少时间思考这些问题。


Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, is correct when she urges the close involvement of member states in the discussions, in order to give them a sense of ownership over whatever strategy emerges.	欧盟高级代表外交事务与安全政策代表兼欧洲委员会副主席莫盖里尼明智地敦促各成员国积极参与讨论，以便他们对最后制定的战略拥有主人翁意识。


The aim should be to produce viable ideas, build consensus, and find linkages – first and foremost within the EU, but without forgetting allies and partners.	我们的目标是在不忘记盟友和伙伴的前提下首先在欧盟内部拿出可行的想法，凝聚共识并且找到联系。


In fact, that external dimension is essential.	事实上，这样的外部视角至关重要。


The ongoing euro crisis has stripped away the rationale that undergirded the integration process for decades.	目前的欧元危机已经夺走了支撑一体化进程数十载的理由。


No longer able to point toward shared prosperity as its raison d'être, the EU is floundering in its search for a new narrative – one that convinces citizens and member states that European integration still has real value.	因为共同繁荣不能再作为存在价值，欧盟正在苦苦挣扎着寻找一种新的说法——以便说服民众和成员国欧洲一体化依然具有实际价值。


A strategy that focuses not only on how the world impacts the EU, but also on how European values and interests can and should be projected abroad would provide a rallying cry, a broader mission, and a clear purpose.	这项战略不仅关注世界如何影响欧盟，而且关注欧盟价值观和利益应当如何投射到海外，这将为欧盟吹响集结号，明确欧盟更广阔的使命以及明确的目标。


The European integration process has, at its core, always been values-driven and rules-based – two qualities that are on retreat in today’s world.	欧洲一体化进程就其核心而言始终坚持以价值为导向、以规则为基础——这两种属性在当今世界正在逐步退潮。


By carrying the banner of liberalism, good governance, and the rule of law internationally, the EU can reverse the centrifugal forces at home that have intensified during the crisis, thereby strengthening its capacity to respond to today’s challenges and securing its position in tomorrow’s world.	通过扛起自由主义、善政和国际法治的旗帜，欧盟就可以克服危机期间在内部不断加强的离心力，从而能更从容地面对今天所面临的挑战并确保自身在未来世界的地位。


This is an opportunity that we cannot afford to miss.	对我们而言这是一次不容错过的机会。


An EU-Turkey Reset	重建欧盟-土耳其关系


ROME – Later this year, Turkey will host the 2015 G-20 Leaders' Summit, the tenth annual meeting of the G-20 heads of government.	罗马—今年晚些时候，土耳其将承办2015年G-20领导人峰会，这也是G-20政府首脑第十届年度会议。


The country's prominence on the world stage comes at an odd time, when it finds itself surrounded by a widening arc of instability.	土耳其在世界舞台上出任主角的时机可谓怪异，因为它正在被日益扩大的动荡周边所包围。


Indeed, two geopolitical orders are unraveling in Turkey's immediate neighborhood: the post-Cold War entente with Russia, and the national borders in the Middle East defined by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and 1919 Treaty of Versailles.	事实上，两大地缘政治秩序正在土耳其的近邻分崩离析：后冷战时期与俄罗斯的和解，以及1916年赛克斯-皮科协定（ Sykes-Picot Agreement）和1919年凡尔赛和约（Treaty of Versailles）所确定的中东诸国边界线。


Never have the European Union and Turkey needed one another more, and yet rarely have they been so distant.	欧盟和土耳其从未如此需要对方，也很少想去如此遥远。


Turkey is no longer the rising regional star that it was during the first half of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 12 years in office.	土耳其已不再是其总统埃尔多安12年执政时期前半段的地区新星了。


Long gone are the days when the country was booming economically and advancing toward true democracy, a source of inspiration to many in the region.	土耳其经济繁荣、迈向真正民主国家、成为该地区许多人的希望源泉的日子早已不再。


Today, Turkey faces myriad challenges: growing authoritarianism, unimpressive growth, and a faltering Kurdish peace process.	如今，土耳其面临着多重挑战：日益加剧的极权主义、萎靡不振的经济增长，以及每况愈下的库尔德地区和平进程。


With a 900-kilometer border with Syria, it is hosting nearly two million Syrian refugees and is vulnerable to attacks and infiltration by the Islamic State.	土耳其与叙利亚有900公里的接壤边界，这让它成了 近两百万叙利亚难民的栖身之所，并极易受到伊斯兰国的攻击和渗透。


Tensions with both Iran and Israel have become deeply entrenched, and the country has become increasingly dependent on energy from a revanchist Russia.	与伊朗和以色列交恶已是根深蒂固，并且土耳其变得日益依赖来自觊觎重塑昔日辉煌的俄罗斯的能源。


Turkey cannot confront these challenges alone.	土耳其无法独力应对这些挑战。


The EU accounts for almost 40% of Turkish trade, 70% of its foreign direct investment, and more than 50% of its tourism industry.	欧盟贡献了土耳其近40%的贸易、70%的外国直接投资和50%多的旅游业收入。


Meanwhile, the country's economic ties with its southern neighbors have spiraled downward since the Arab Spring in 2011.	与此同时，自2011年阿拉伯之春以来，土耳其与其南方邻国的经济关系每况愈下。


This reality is reflected in Turkish public opinion, with support for the EU rising from a low of 34% in 2009 to 53% last year.	这一现实反映在土耳其的公共观点中，欧盟支持率从2009年的最低点34%增加到 去年的53%。


Simply put, Turkey is waking up to the reality that it has no attractive alternative to the EU and close cooperation with the transatlantic community.	简言之，土耳其正在意识到，除了欧盟以及与跨大西洋社会紧密合作，它别无选择。


The country's “EU Strategy" announced by European Affairs Minister Volkan Bozkir last fall can be read as an implicit recognition of this fact.	去年秋天土耳其欧洲事务部长沃尔干·博孜克尔（Volkan Bozkir）所宣布的“欧盟战略"可以解读为对这一事实的间接承认。


Meanwhile, Europe has never had a greater interest in a stable, democratic, and Western-oriented Turkey.	与此同时，欧洲从未如此需要一个稳定、民主、西方导向的土耳其。


Without Turkey's cooperation, Europe and the international community will struggle to confront the threat of foreign fighters, defeat the Islamic State, stabilize Iraq, and craft a political solution to the Syrian quagmire.	没有土耳其的合作，欧洲和国际社会就难以面临外国“斗士"的威胁、击败伊斯兰国、稳定伊拉克、制定叙利亚困局的政治解决方案。


The EU also needs a sound partnership with Turkey to achieve energy security through diversification.	欧盟还需要与土耳其构建可靠的伙伴关系，从而通过多样化实现能源安全。


And yet, rather than being drawn closer together, the EU and Turkey are drifting apart.	但是，欧盟和土耳其并没有走得更近，反而在渐行渐远。


Freedom of expression, the separation of powers, and the rule of law have been progressively eroded under Erdoğan.	在埃尔多安治下，言论自由、权力分隔以及法治被逐渐蚕食。


The country risks being sucked into the region's sectarian conflicts – and being tempted by the authoritarian sirens of Vladimir Putin's Russia.	土耳其有可能卷入地区宗派冲突——并可能受到普��的俄罗斯的极权诱惑。


The EU-Turkey relationship hit a new low at the close of last year, when Turkey increased its pressure on media close to the self-exiled Islamic leader Fethullah Gülen.	去年年底，土耳其加大了对于自我流亡的伊斯兰领袖葛兰（Fethullah Gülen）关系密切的媒体的压力，导致欧盟-土耳其关系降至新低点。


The clampdown triggered strong criticism by the EU, which Erdoğan, in turn, angrily rejected.	镇压行为引起了欧盟的强烈抨击，埃尔多安则愤怒地拒绝接受。


Some in Europe argue that the deterioration of rights and freedoms in Turkey is so serious that the already-moribund EU accession process should be suspended.	一些欧洲人认为土耳其权利和自由的恶化非常严重，因此已经陷入僵局的加入欧盟程序应该暂停。


Indeed, it would be difficult to make the case that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria.	事实上，土耳其很难满足哥本哈根政治标准。


For example, Turkey slid in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index to 154th place (out of 180 countries).	比如，土耳其在无国界记者（Reporters Without Borders）的世界言论自由指数上已滑落至第154位（总共180个国家）。


But it is unlikely that a formal suspension of accession negotiations would do anything other than remove the last incentive for Turkey to pursue democratization and EU harmonization.	但正式暂停入盟谈判的唯一效果只能是扼杀土耳其追求民主化和欧盟和谐的最后动力。


Instead, the EU should redouble its efforts, strengthening both its criticism of Turkey's democratic backsliding and the credibility of its accession process.	相反，欧盟应该加倍努力，加强对土耳其民主倒退的批评，同时也加强入盟程序的可信度。


Until now, Cyprus has posed the biggest obstacle to Turkish accession.	目前，塞浦路斯一直是土耳其加入欧盟的最大障碍。


EU member states should engage more actively with the Cypriot government to bring about the necessary change.	欧盟成员国应该积极劝说塞浦路斯政府，使其做出必要的改变。


This would enable the EU to open chapters 23 and 24 of the accession talks – those that deal with rights, fundamental freedoms, and the judiciary – as the European Parliament and the European Commission advocate.	这将让欧盟得以开启入盟谈判的第23章和24章——与权利、基本自由和司法有关的内容——就像 欧洲议会和欧盟委员会所宣扬的那样。


The EU would then be able to cast its criticism within the appropriate legal framework, while Turkish leaders would no longer be in a position to brush aside the EU's concerns.	然后，欧盟将能够在恰当的法律框架内进行批评，而土耳其领导人也决不能继续无视欧盟的关注点了。


Lifting its blockade on negotiations would benefit Cyprus as much as Europe.	移除谈判的障碍对塞浦路斯和对欧洲一样有利。


No country would gain more than Cyprus from stable democracy in Turkey, whereas a de-democratizing Turkey in an unraveling neighborhood seriously threatens Cypriot and European interests alike.	没有哪个国家能像塞浦路斯那样从土耳其实现稳定民主中获取那么大的好处，而在邻国分崩离析环境下的去民主化的土耳其将严重威胁塞浦路斯和欧洲的利益。


Beyond the EU accession process, other important measures should be taken to rebuild trust and deliver concrete benefits to both sides, thereby revitalizing an ailing and yet increasingly strategic relationship.	除了加入欧盟程序，还应该采取其他重要措施重塑信任和为双方制造切实利益，从而修复病态但日益具有战略意义的关系。


Such steps should include deepening EU-Turkey cooperation on counter-terrorism, Syrian refugees, and the multiple crises from Libya to Ukraine, as well as upgrading and modernizing the customs union agreement (as the World Bank recently advocated) and vigorously pursuing visa liberalization.	这些措施应该包括深化在反恐、叙利亚难民和从利比亚到乌克兰的多重危机等方面的欧盟-土耳其合作，以及升级和现代化关税联盟协议（像世界银行 最近建议的那样）、大力推动签证自由化。


Though these measures are not alternatives to a revamped accession process, they would help to revive it.	尽管这些措施并非修补入盟谈判的替代方案，但它们有助于振兴入盟谈判。


Above all, by embedding Turkey within the European family, such measures would counter the country's dangerous drift away from our common European values.	最重要的是，这些措施有望将土耳其纳入欧洲大家庭，从而阻止它朝远离我们的共同欧洲价值的方向越滑越远。


This commentary was also signed by Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference; Hans van den Broek, a former Dutch foreign minister and EU commissioner for external relations; Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, a former Spanish foreign minister; Michel Rocard, former French Prime Minister; and Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome.	本评论的联署者还包括慕尼黑安全会议主席Wolfgang Ischinger、荷兰外交部前部长、负责对外关系的前欧盟委员Hans van den Broek、西班牙外交部前部长Marcelino Oreja Aguirre、法国前总理Michel Rocard以及罗马国际关系学院副院长Nathalie Tocci。


Evading Tax Evasion	打击逃税现象


ALESSANDRIA, ITALY – Tax evasion is a global scourge.	意大利亚历山德里亚—逃税是一个全球性的问题。


The “black” economy has, by some estimates, reached 10% of GDP in advanced countries and can top 70% in developing countries. And it is getting worse.	根据某些估算，这种“黑色”经济占到发达国家国民生产总值的10%，而在发展中国家这一比例最高甚至达到70%，并且情况还在继续恶化。


Tax evasion is usually confronted in two ways: audits and harsh sanctions.	应对逃税通常有两种方式：审计和严厉的制裁。


But, as the rising tide of tax evasion suggests, these mechanisms amount only to a cat game of and mouse problem – and the mice, it seems, are winning.	但是，越来越猖獗的逃税现象表明这些机制充其量只是一种猫捉老鼠的游戏，而且看上去更多的时候老鼠是这场游戏的获胜者。


As tax evasion becomes more pervasive, whole networks to help hide incomes have appeared, making it far less likely that those who break the law are punished.	随着逃税行为的蔓延，出现了帮助隐瞒收入的完整的网络，使得那些违反法律的人受到惩罚的可能性变得更小。


Moreover, because more people are evading taxes, tax administrations are under increasing pressure to become more lenient or to accept bribes.	此外，因为越来越多的人在逃避纳税，税务机关面临着越来越大的压力对他们表现得很宽容，或者，接受贿赂。


One strategy for weakening ties among potential evaders is to introduce various conflicts of interests.	削弱潜在的逃税者之间的联系的一种策略是引进各种不同的利益冲突。


For example, value-added tax is designed to encourage firms to procure invoices for their inputs in order to reduce their own tax outlays.	比如，增值税就是被设计来鼓励公司为它们购买的东西索取发票，以便降低它们自己的税收支出。


But the results often fall short of the potential benefits, because VAT has helped inspire tax evaders to create even stronger networks that can hide an entire chain of transactions.	但是其结果通常低于潜在的利益，因为增值税帮助促使逃税者建立能够掩盖整个交易链的更强大的网络。


The Chinese have devised a novel solution.	中国人想出了一个新奇的解决方案。


To encourage customers to request official receipts as proof of payment, some local tax authorities issue a type of receipt that doubles as a lottery ticket.	为了鼓励消费者索取正式发票作为付款的证明，一些地方的税务机关发行了一种同时也是彩票的收据。


The receipts can be used as scratch cards to win small amounts of cash, but they also serve as lottery tickets for winning larger amounts.	这些收据可以被用作刮刮卡，赢得小额的现金； 但是同时它们也可以用作彩票，赢得更大数额的奖金。


To prevent forgery, businesses must purchase special, patented machines for printing these receipts.	为了防止造假，企业必须购买专门用于印制这些收据的专利机器。


Records of the printed receipts are automatically transmitted to the tax authorities and are used to calculate taxes.	印制收据的记录被自动传输到税务机关，用于计算税额。


Similar systems are in use in Taiwan and Latin America.	台湾和拉丁美洲也在使用类似的制度。


Another way to reward consumers for combating tax evasion is to offer subsidies.	另一种奖励消费者与逃税现象作斗争的方式是提供补贴。


Some developing countries have introduced a far-reaching VAT refund system for consumers who collect official receipts.	一些发展中国家为索取正式发票的消费者提供了一种广泛应用的增值税退款制度。


Northern Cyprus, like Turkey, offers a 2.5 percentage point refund on VAT, compared to the standard VAT rate of 13%.	北塞浦路斯，像土耳其一样，对于增值税给予2. 5个百分点的退款，而标准的增值税率是13%。


But such systems are burdened by large administration and compliance costs.	但是这种制度受到庞大的管理成本和合规成本的重压。


The process of collecting and verifying claims is time-consuming, and the net benefit for taxpayers is low.	收集和确认索取退款的要求需要耗费很长的时间，而纳税人能够获得的净利益非常低。


Moreover, the method is vulnerable to illicit practices, such as collecting receipts issued to foreigners and students, who cannot claim their own refunds.	此外，这种方法在防范非法行为方面显得非常脆弱，比如收集出具给那些外国人和学生的收据，因为他们无法收到应该退还给他们自己的钱。


Monetary subsidies to consumption are also often granted in developed countries for a variety of purposes, not least of which is fighting tax evasion.	发达国家也经常出于各种目的对消费提供现金补贴，其中很重要的一个目的就是打击逃税。


One such subsidy is permitting deduction of a fixed percentage of certain expenses from income tax.	一种这样的补贴是允许从所得税中扣除固定百分比的某些费用。


In Italy, expenditures for home improvements have been partly deductible for the past ten years, mainly to improve tax compliance by firms in the housing sector.	在意大利，过去十年改善房屋的费用部分是可以扣除的，这主要是为了提高房产业的企业在税收上的合规。


New regulations have recently been introduced with the specific aim of cracking down on moonlighting.	最近又出台了旨在打击夜间活动的新规定。


Under the 2007 financial law, those who claim the home improvement deduction must supply an invoice from the building contractor, which must specify the cost for labor.	根据2007年的金融法律，那些要求扣除改善房屋的费用的人必须出示由建筑承包商提供的发票，发票上应标明劳务费用的数额。


In terms of reducing tax evasion, the results have been mixed.	在减少逃税现象方面，各地的成效不尽相同。


The bulk of claims for the subsidy come from northern Italy, which is usually considered less prone to tax evasion to begin with.	大部分要求获得补贴的人来自意大利北部，而那里通常被认为逃税现象并没有那么普遍。


While some cases of illegitimate claims are under investigation, there is no black market for receipts; fraud seems to arise mainly through falsified invoices.	尽管有某些非法要求获得补贴的案例正在受到调查，但是并没有出现非法买卖收据的现象； 欺诈看上去主要来自伪造的收据。


While econometric studies are not available, raw data show an increase in reported income and in the number of firms and official workers.	尽管在这方面没有进行过经济研究，但是粗略的数据显示申报的收入和进行申报的企业和正式工的数量都出现了增长。


However, taxable income in the sector is still growing at a slower rate than gross income as measured by national accounts.	但是，该行业可税收入的增长率还是比国民总收入的增长率要低。


When tax evasion is extremely common, taxpayers are likely to experience high transaction and psychological costs in resorting to tax auditors to enforce the issuing of receipts.	尽管逃税现象现在非常普遍，但是纳税人在要求税收审计员强制开具发票时可能会承受很高的交易和心理成本。


But if consumers bear the brunt of costs for reporting violations to the authorities, subsidies may induce them to seek out vendors willing to offer legal transactions.	如果消费者承担了向行政机关报告违反法规的成本的冲击，那么补贴可能会诱使他们去寻找愿意提供合法交易的卖主。


Yet these efforts are also costly.	然而这些努力的成本同样也是极高的。


Whenever a firm chooses to evade, it becomes increasingly difficult to find a vendor willing to engage in legal transactions.	任何时候当一家企业选择逃税时，要找到一家愿意进行合法交易的卖主就会变得越来越困难。


When alternatives become difficult to find, the compensation requested for accepting an illegal transaction falls.	当替代的卖主越来越难寻找到时，对要求接受非法交易的补偿就会下降。


As typically happens in these cases, once a critical mass of tax evasion is reached, it can jump to much larger values.	在这些案例中，通常当逃税的群体达到一个关键的数量时，它的价值就会变得更高。


This process might also explain why, although many reward systems have proven successful at the beginning, their benefits quickly fade.	这一过程也许可以解释为什么许多在一开始被证明是奏效的奖励制度其成效会很快消失。


Of course, there is a risk that subsidies and lotteries may diminish the moral motivation of citizens to obey tax laws, because compliance becomes conditional on some form of compensation.	当然，补贴和彩票也许会有削弱公民遵守税收法律的道德动力的危险，因为合规变成是以某种形式的补偿为条件的。


But if lotteries, subsidies, and other devices fail to control tax evasion, the Chinese have another method: the death penalty.	不过如果彩票、补贴和其他方式都不能控制逃税现象，中国人还有另外一种方法：死刑。


Evidence-Based Economics	实证经济


There is a movement in medicine to require that applications for licenses to sell a new drug be “evidence-based.”	医药界发起行动，要求申请上市的新药必须经过“实证”。


By contrast, trained economists view their discipline as having already achieved this scientific standard.	与此形成对比的是，受过正规训练的经济学家人们却认为他们的学科已经达到了这个科学水准。


After all, they express their ideas with mathematics and arrive at quantitative estimates of implied relationships from empirical data.	毕竟，他们用数学数据阐述观点，根据实验数据对大量不明确关系做出估算。


But economics is not evidence-based in selecting its theoretical paradigms.	但是经济学家们在选择理论范式之时并没有抱着实证主义的态度。


Economic policy initiatives are often taken without all the empirical pre-testing that could have been done.	经济政策往往在应做的实验性预试没有完成时，就已经被制定好了。


A notorious example is postwar macroeconomic policymaking under the radical Keynesians.	一个有名的例子就是战后激进的凯恩斯学派领导下的宏观经济政策。


The radicals relied on Keynes’s untested theory that unemployment depended on “effective demand” in relation to the “money wage,” but their policy ignored the part about wages and sought to stabilize demand at a high enough level to ensure “full” employment.	激进派依赖于凯恩斯未经测试的理论，即失业率取决于“有效需求”，而非“货币工资”，但是他们的政策忽略了工资这个部分，并期望把需求稳定地保持在一个较高水平上以保证“充分”就业。


Cecil Pigou and Franco Modigliani objected that if demand were successfully increased, the money wage level would rise, catch up to demand, and thus push employment back down to its previous level.	塞希尔·皮古（Cecil Pigou）和弗兰科·莫迪利安尼（Franco Modigliani）对此表示反对，如果能够成功扩大需求，货币工资的水平将会随之上升，直达需求水平，然后就会将就业率重新推回到原来水平。


Employment cannot be sustained above its equilibrium path by inflating effective demand.	就业率无法通过扩大有效需求而维持在均衡路径水平之上。


Nevertheless, the radicals prevailed through what the economist Harry Johnson called “scorn and derision.”	然而，激进派在那个被经济学家哈利·约翰森 （Harry Johnson）“ 蔑视与嘲笑”的年代却盛极一时。


Postwar macroeconomic policies were dedicated to “full” employment, without any evidence that money wages would not get in the way.	在没有任何数据证明货币工资不会带来障碍的情况下，战后的宏观经济政策全盘奉献给了“充分”就业。


In the late 1950’s, neo-Keynesians finally conceded the point raised by Pigou and Modigliani.	直到1950年后期，新凯恩斯学派才最终同意皮古和莫迪利安尼提出的观点。


Will Phillips’s work on wages gave them no choice.	威尔·菲利普斯（Will Phillips）对工资的研究著作让他们无从选择。


But they still insisted that steady increases of demand at a fast enough rate would keep demand one step ahead of the money wage level, so that employment could be kept as high as desired, albeit at the cost of steady inflation.	但是他们仍然坚持，如果需求以一个足够快的速度保持稳健的增长势头，那将使需求水平始终领先于货币工资水平，因此就业率就能如希望的那样居高不下，尽管这得以持续的通货膨胀为代价。


In different ways, Milton Friedman and I objected, arguing that such a policy would require an ever-rising inflation rate.	米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）和我却提出了不同的反对意见，认为实行这样的政策必须得有一个持续上涨的通货膨胀率。


Money wages will lag behind demand, I argued, only as long as the representative firm is deterred from raising wages by the misperception that wages at other firms are already lower than its own – a disequilibrium that cannot last.	我认为，只有防止代表性公司不会因为误认为其他公司的工资已经低于他们时提高工资，货币工资才会滞后于需求水平，但是这种不平衡维持不了太久。


Like the radicals, the neo-Keynesians did not engage their challengers with empirical testing.	新凯恩斯学派像激进派一样并没有将他们面临的挑战与实验性测试联系起来。


The efficacy of high demand was a matter of faith.	高需求水平带来的效益与信心息息相关。


Yet events in the 1970’s put that faith to a cruel test.	然而1970年代发生的事件却把这种信心带入一个严峻的考验之中。


When supply shocks hit the US economy, the neo-Keynesians’ response was to pour on more demand, believing it would revive employment.	当供给冲击袭击美国经济时，新凯恩斯学派的反应是拉动更多的需求，他们相信这能恢复就业率。


There was little recovery – only faster inflation.	但是没有出现任何复苏迹象——只是加速了通货膨胀。


The current era offers a parallel.	当前时期也颇为相似。


Although policy has since shifted to reflect supply-side economics and real business-cycle theory, the new reigning paradigm’s builders and promoters display the same antipathy to checking data for serious error.	尽管政策自从转变后已经反映出供给方经济和真正的经济周期论，新统治模式的缔造者和推动者却也表现出对确认数据的憎恶，这是一个很严重的错误。


An earlier classroom lesson was well-founded: temporarily below-normal tax rates on labor this year, when merged with the prospect of reversion to normal rates next year, will encourage households to squeeze more work into this year and to work less in future years.	前车之鉴，后人之师：今年暂时低于正常的劳动力税率，与明年将重回正常税率的前景结合在一起，将促使许多家庭把更多的工作挤在今年，而在今后几年减少工作量。


This proposition was recently tested anew on Icelandic data and performed well.	这一观点最近已得到来自冰岛的数据的重新验证。


But the supply-siders jumped to the daring conclusion that a permanent cut in tax rates on labor would encourage more work permanently – with no diminution of effectiveness.	但是供应学派却又突然抛出了一个惊人的结论，持续降低劳动力税率将会持久性增加工作岗位——还不会降低效率。


Larry Summers and I both doubted that this could be generally true.	拉里·萨莫斯（Larry Summers）和我都对它的真实性表示怀疑。


If every increase in the after-tax wage rate gave a permanent boost to the amount of labor supplied, we reasoned, steeply rising after-tax wages since the mid-nineteenth century would have brought an extraordinary increase in the length of the workweek and in retirement ages.	如果每次税后工资率的上升都会增加现有劳动力数量，我们推理可得，自十九世纪中期后，税后工资率的急剧增长应该已使工作时间惊人延长，退休年龄大大推后。


But both have fallen, and in continental Europe unemployment is higher.	但是相反，工作时间却减少了，退休年龄也被提前，欧洲大陆的失业率反而更高了。


In my view, this core tenet of supply-side economics rests on a simple blunder.	在我看来，供应学派的中心观点建立在一个单纯的错误之上。


What matters for the amount of labor supplied is the after-tax wage rate relative to income from wealth.	决定可供劳动力数量的，是与收入财富相关的税后工资率。


While after-tax wage rates soared for more than a century, wealth and the income it brought grew just as fast.	当税后工资率已经猛涨了一个多世纪，它所带来的财富和收入也一起随之迅速增长。


To be sure, if tax rates were decreased permanently this year, there would initially be a strongly positive effect on labor supplied.	固然，若今年税率持续下降的话，那么一开始它将会对可供劳动力产生尤为积极的影响。


But there would also be a positive effect on saving and thus on wealth next year and beyond.	但是那也会对储蓄产生积极作用，到明年乃至今后，这种作用就会影响到财富积累。


In the long run, wealth could tend to increase in the same proportion as after-tax wages. The effect on work would vanish.	从长期来看，财富与税后工资有以相同比例增长的趋势，其对工作的影响将消失。


We must proceed cautiously, however.	然而，我们必须步步为营。


In standard analyses, the tax cut brings a reduction in government purchases of goods and services, like defense.	根据标准分析，减税会使政府削减财务和劳务购买，比如国防开支。


But a tax cut could instead contract the welfare state – social assistance and social insurance, which constitute social wealth.	但是，减税也会减少福利承诺——社会援助、社会保险，此两者是社会财富的组成部分。


In that case, the tax cut, while gradually increasing private wealth, would decrease social wealth.	从那个方面来说，减税虽然逐渐增加了个人财富，却会降低社会财富的数量。


The issue is an empirical one.	这是一个实验性的问题。


Research I did with Gylfi Zoega a decade ago confirmed that cuts in taxes on labor boost employment in the short run.	十年前Gylfi Zoega与我一同做的调查，肯定了劳力税的降低在短期内会促进就业。


But what about the long run?	但是长期呢？


Do large long-run effects of tax rates show up in international differences in employment?	税率对就业的长期影响有何国际性差异吗？


In 1998 we examined OECD data for a correlation between national unemployment rates in the mid-1990’s and current tax rates on labor.	1998年我们为研究1990年代中期国家失业率和当今劳动力税率之间的联系而检查了经济合作发展组织(OECD)的数据。


We found none.	结果一无所获。


In 2004, we looked at labor-force participation rates and again at unemployment.	2004年，我们研究了劳动力参与率，并再一次关注失业率。


Still no correlation.	仍然没有发现什么联系。


High-unemployment countries include high-tax Germany, France, and Italy, but also low-tax Japan and Spain.	失业率高的国家包括高税收的德国、法国和意大利，但也包括低税收的日本和西班牙。


Low-unemployment nations include low-tax Britain and the US, but also very high-tax Denmark and Sweden.	低失业率的国家包括低税收的英国和美国，但是也有税收很高的丹麦和瑞典。


Neoliberals are now telling continental Europe that tax cuts on labor can dissolve high unemployment.	当前，新自由主义学派告诉欧洲大陆，降低劳动税能够解决高失业率问题。


But the effectiveness of such tax cuts would be largely, if not wholly, transitory – especially if the welfare state was spared.	但是这样的降税所带来的效果，即使不是完全地，那也是在很大程度上转瞬即逝的——尤其是当福利承诺被节省了的时候。


In two decades’ time, high unemployment would creep back.	不出二十年，高失业率将重新悄悄潜回欧洲大���。


The false hopes raised by cutting taxes would have diverted policy makers away from fundamental reforms that are necessary if the Continent is to achieve the dynamism on which high rates of innovation, abundant job creation, and world-class productivity depend.	由于降税所引发的错误期待将使政策制定者把重心从基础改革移开，而那些改革正是欧洲大陆要再创繁荣所必不可少的，因为高革新率、充分的就业岗位以及国际级生产力都要借助于此项改革。


The Problem With Evidence-Based Policies	基于证据的政策的问题


CAMBRIDGE – Many organizations, from government agencies to philanthropic institutions and aid organizations, now require that programs and policies be “evidence-based.”	坎布里奇—从政府机构到慈善组织和援助组织，如今许多组织要求计划和政策必须“基于证据”。


It makes sense to demand that policies be based on evidence and that such evidence be as good as possible, within reasonable time and budgetary limits.	要求政策基于证据，并且证据要尽可能优良，还要符合合理的时间和预算条件，这是有意义的。


But the way this approach is being implemented may be doing a lot of harm, impairing our ability to learn and improve on what we do.	但是，这一方针的实施方法可能造成很多伤害，影响我们学习和改善我们的做法的能力。


The current so-called “gold standard” of what constitutes good evidence is the randomized control trial, or RCT, an idea that started in medicine two centuries ago, moved to agriculture, and became the rage in economics during the past two decades.	目前的优良证据“黄金标准”是随机控制实验，即RCT。 RCT的思想产生于两个世纪前的医学，然后应用到农业，过去二十年成为经济学的流行做法。


Its popularity is based on the fact that it addresses key problems in statistical inference.	其之所以如此普及，是基于一个事实：它解决了统计推断中的关键问题。


For example, rich people wear fancy clothes.	比如，富人衣锦。


Would distributing fancy clothes to poor people make them rich?	那么，让穷人也衣锦能让他们变富吗？


This is a case where correlation (between clothes and wealth) does not imply causation.	在这个例子中，相关性（衣与富）并不构成因果关系。


Harvard graduates get great jobs.	哈佛毕业生得到好工作。


Is Harvard good at teaching – or just at selecting smart people who would have done well in life anyway?	是哈佛擅长教学——还是只是选出了无论如何都能赢得好生活的聪明人？


This is the problem of selection bias.	这就是选择偏差的例子。


RCTs address these problems by randomly assigning those participating in the trial to receive either a “treatment” or a “placebo” (thereby creating a “control” group).	RCT通过随机地向参与试验者分配“治疗”和“安慰剂”（从而制造“控制”组）解决这些问题。


By observing how the two groups differ after the intervention, the effectiveness of the treatment can be assessed.	通过观察两组参与者在干预后的不同，治疗的效果就能得到评估。


RCTs have been conducted on drugs, micro-loans, training programs, educational tools, and myriad other interventions.	RCT在药品、小微贷款、培训项目、教育工具和其他多种干预中都有实施。


Suppose you are considering the introduction of tablets as a way to improve classroom learning.	设想你正在考虑用平板电脑改善在校学习。


An RCT would require that you choose some 300 schools to participate, 150 of which would be randomly assigned to the control group that receives no tablets.	RCT要求你选取300家左右的学校作为参与者，其中150家被随机指派为控制组，不获得平板电脑。


Prior to distributing the tablets, you would perform a so-called baseline survey to assess how much children are learning in school.	在分配平板电脑前，你应该做一番所谓的基线调查，评估有孩子们在学校的学习情况。


Then you give the tablets to the 150 “treatment” schools and wait.	然后，你向150家“治疗”学校分派平板电脑，静待效果。


After a period of time, you would carry out another survey to find out whether there is now a difference in learning between the schools that received tablets and those that did not.	一段时间后，你需要做另一个调查，看看现在收到平板电脑的学校和没有收到平板电脑的学校之间是否存在学习差异。


Suppose there are no significant differences, as has been the case with four RCTs that found that distributing books also had no effect.	假设没有发现显著差异，这一结果和四项发现分派书籍也根本没有效果的RCT一样。


It would be wrong to assume that you learned that tablets (or books) do not improve learning.	由此认为平板电脑（或书籍）没有改善学习是不正确的。


What you have shown is that that particular tablet, with that particular software, used in that particular pedagogical strategy, and teaching those particular concepts did not make a difference.	你只证明了装了某种软件、使用了某种教法进行某种概念教学的某种平板电脑没有产生差异。


But the real question we wanted to answer was how tablets should be used to maximize learning.	但我们想要回答的真正问题是如何使用平板电脑最大化学习效果。


Here the design space is truly huge, and RCTs do not permit testing of more than two or three designs at a time – and test them at a snail’s pace.	在这里，设计空间着实巨大，而RCT只能一次测试最多两三种设计——并且只能在很小的空间中测试。


Can we do better?	这可以改进吗？


Consider the following thought experiment: We include some mechanism in the tablet to inform the teacher in real time about how well his or her pupils are absorbing the material being taught.	设想以下思想实验：我们在平板电脑中嵌入某种机制，让教师实时了解他/她的学生在吸收教学材料方面做得如何。


We free all teachers to experiment with different software, different strategies, and different ways of using the new tool.	我们允许所有教师用不同软件、不同教法、不同的使用新工具的方式做实验。


The rapid feedback loop will make teachers adjust their strategies to maximize performance.	迅速的反馈环将让教师调整教法以实现表现最大化。


Over time, we will observe some teachers who have stumbled onto highly effective strategies.	一段时间后，我们将观察到一些教师发现了高效的教法。


We then share what they have done with other teachers.	我们将他们的做法与其他教师分享。


Notice how radically different this method is.	注意这一方法的截然不同之处。


Instead of testing the validity of one design by having 150 out of 300 schools implement the identical program, this method is “crawling” the design space by having each teacher search for results.	这一方法不是让300家学校中的150家实施相同的计划，以此测试一种设计的效果，而是让所有教师去寻找结果，以此实现设计空间的“蠕变”（crawling）。


Instead of having a baseline survey and then a final survey, it is constantly providing feedback about performance.	该方法不做基线调查和最终调查，而是持续提供表现反馈。


Instead of having an econometrician do the learning in a centralized manner and inform everybody about the results of the experiment, it is the teachers who are doing the learning in a decentralized manner and informing the center of what they found.	该方法不需要计量经济学家用集中化方法做研究然后向所有人公布实验结果，而是让教师以分散地方方式做研究，向中心报告他们的发现。


Clearly, teachers will be confusing correlation with causation when adjusting their strategies; but these errors will be revealed soon enough as their wrong assumptions do not yield better results.	显然，在调整教法时，教师会混淆相关性和因果关系； 但这些误差很快就会被发现，因为错误的假设不会带来更好的结果。


Likewise, selection bias may occur (some places may be doing better than others because they differ in other ways); but if different contexts require different strategies, the system will find them sooner or later.	类似地，选择偏差也会发生（某些地方因为其他方式不同而效果不如其他地方）； 但如果不同的环境要求不同的教法，那么系统迟早会找到这样的教法。


This strategy resembles more the social implementation of a machine-learning algorithm than a clinical trial.	这一策略更加类似于机器学习算法的社会实施，而不是临床试验。


In economics, RCTs have been all the rage, especially in the field of international development, despite critiques by the Nobel laureate Angus Deaton, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik, who have attacked the inflated claims of RCT’s proponents.	在经济学中，RCT可谓无处不在，特别是在国际发展领域，尽管诺贝尔奖获得者安格斯·迪顿（Angus Deaton）、兰特·普莱切特（Lant Pritchett）和丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）等人批评RCT支持者夸大其词。


One serious shortcoming is external validity.	一个严重的缺陷是外部有效性。


Lessons travel poorly: If an RCT finds out that giving micronutrients to children in Guatemala improves their learning, should you give micronutrients to Norwegian children?	教训很难推广：如果一项RCT发现，向危地马拉儿童提供微量元素改善了他们的学习，你会因此向挪威儿童提供微量元素吗？


My main problem with RCTs is that they make us think about interventions, policies, and organizations in the wrong way.	我认为RCT的主要问题是它让我们以错误的方式思考干预、政策和组织。


As opposed to the two or three designs that get tested slowly by RCTs (like putting tablets or flipcharts in schools), most social interventions have millions of design possibilities and outcomes depend on complex combinations between them.	与拿两三项设计供RCT慢慢测试（就像在学校里使用平板电脑或挂图）不同，大部分社会干预存在数百万种设计可能性，其结果取决于这些可能性之间的复杂组合。


This leads to what the complexity scientist Stuart Kauffman calls a “rugged fitness landscape.”	这导致了复杂科学家斯图尔特·考夫曼（Stuart Kauffman）所谓的“崎岖的拟合景观”。


Getting the right combination of parameters is critical.	正确组合参数至关重要。


This requires that organizations implement evolutionary strategies that are based on trying things out and learning quickly about performance through rapid feedback loops, as suggested by Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock at Harvard’s Center for International Development.	这需要组织实施哈佛大学国际发展中心（Center for International Development）的马特·安德鲁斯（Matt Andrews）、兰特·普莱切特和迈克尔·伍尔考克（Michael Woolcock）所提出的革命性策略，做各种尝试，通过快速反馈环迅速研究表现。


RCTs may be appropriate for clinical drug trials.	RCT也许适用于临床药物实验。


But for a remarkably broad array of policy areas, the RCT movement has had an impact equivalent to putting auditors in charge of the R&D department.	但对于范围极为宽泛的政策领域，RCT运动的影响相当于让审计师主管研发部门。


That is the wrong way to design things that work.	这绝非设计有用物品的正确方法。


Only by creating organizations that learn how to learn, as so-called lean manufacturing has done for industry, can we accelerate progress.	只有创造出学习如何学习的组织，如产业界所做的所谓的精益生产，我们才能加速进步。


Evil Personified	归咎于个人的罪恶


COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS – Equating war with individual evil has become ubiquitous – if not universal – in contemporary international politics.	德克萨斯州大学城——将战争和个人罪恶混为一谈如果不是现代国际政治中人们的共同选择，也无疑已经成为一种普遍现象。


Wars are fights against evil tyrants and the illegitimate governments they control.	战争被冠之以反对专制暴君及其治下非法政府的名号。


Such rhetoric makes wars easier to justify, easier to wage, and easier to support, especially for elected leaders who must respond directly to swings in public opinion.  Such language works equally well for any society in today’s media-obsessed age.	尤其对于那些必须直接对民意变化做出反应的当选领导人来讲，这样的花言巧语降低了发动和支持战争的难度，也让他们更容易为发动战争找到借口。 在当今这个被媒体所左右的时代，这样的说法在任何社会中都同样有效。


Little wonder, then, that political leaders consistently personalize international conflicts.	难怪政治领导人一直力图将国际冲突个人化。


Alas, such commonplace language also makes wars harder to avoid, harder to end, and arguably more deadly.	这样的陈词滥调还加大了避免和结束战争的难度，有人认为还使战争更加具有破坏性。


The rhetoric of personified evil is easily seen through American examples, but is hardly a uniquely American phenomenon.	将罪恶归咎于个人的花言巧语在美国的例子中很容易观察到，但这却绝不是美国所独有的现象。


Chinese leaders blame Taiwanese leaders for cross-straits tensions, and blame the Dalai Lama for all that ails Tibet.	中国领导人将台海关系的紧张状况归咎于台湾，将西藏问题归咎于达赖喇嘛。


So, too, have protestors around the world made George W. Bush resemble Hitler, and mullahs throughout the Islamic world ritualistically harangue US presidents as earthly Satans, simultaneously noting their basic affection for the American people.	同样，世界各地的抗议者将乔治·W·布什比作希特勒，而所有伊斯兰国家的毛拉则程式化地将美国总统称之为人间撒旦，并在同时重申对于美国人民的根本的喜爱。


Recent American leaders, for their part, find it nearly impossible to deploy military force without first employing such rhetoric as both mantra and crutch.	近代美国领袖们发现如果没有这些粉饰之辞的颂扬和支持作为铺垫，部署军队几乎是不可能的。


The most famous example came in 1917.	其中尤以1917年的例子最为著名。


Woodrow Wilson, asking for a declaration of war against Germany, said, “We have no quarrel with the German people.	伍德罗·威尔逊要求对德国宣战时说，“我们与德国人民无怨无仇。


We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship.	我们对他们的感情只有同情和友谊。


It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war.”	德国政府卷入这场战争并不是他们的本意。


Only the Kaiser and his evil henchmen were to blame.	”只有德皇及其罪恶的党羽需要为此负责。


In 1990, George H.W. Bush made the same plea: “We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people.”	1990年，乔治·H·W·布什又搬出了同样的理由：“我们与伊拉克人民无怨无仇。


His son said the same thing in 2003, adding, “they are the daily victims of Saddam Hussein’s oppression.”	”他的儿子在2003年也说过同样的话，并补充说“他们是萨达姆·侯赛因压迫的牺牲者。


George W. Bush had earlier noted that Americans “had no quarrel with the people of Afghanistan,” only with Al Queda and their Taliban supporters.	”乔治·W·布什早先还曾说过美国人民“与阿富汗人民无怨无仇”，我们所针对的只有基地组织及其塔利班支持者。


He even employed this phrase in his final State of the Union address in 2008, saying that “Our message to the people of Iran is clear: We have no quarrel with you….Our message to the leaders of Iran is also clear: Verifiably suspend your nuclear enrichment, so negotiations can begin.”	他甚至将这写进了2008年最后一次国情咨文讲话，称“我们对伊朗人民的态度非常明确：我们与你们无怨无仇…我们对伊朗领导人的态度也非常明确：在国际社会的监督下停止你们的铀浓缩活动，这样才能开始谈判。 ”


Every American president since Wilson has, at least once while in office, uttered the phrase “have no quarrel with” a foreign enemy.	伍德罗·威尔逊之后的历任美国总统在任期间，都曾不止一次地借用过与国外敌人“无怨无仇”这句话。


Such statements are typically made only days, sometimes hours, before the first American bombs fall.	通常在这样的声明发表几天、有时甚至是几小时后，美国就会投下第一枚炸弹。


Bill Clinton promised on the eve of the bombing of Serbia that “I cannot emphasize too strongly that the United States has no quarrel with the Serbian people.”	比尔·克林顿在轰炸塞尔维亚之前就曾承诺“无论我怎样强调美国与塞尔维亚人民无怨无仇都不过分。


Barack Obama promised from the campaign trail that “We have no quarrel with the Iranian people.	”巴拉克·奥巴马在竞选时曾经承诺“我们与伊朗人民无怨无仇。


They know that President Ahmadinejad is reckless, irresponsible, and inattentive to their day-to-day needs.”	伊朗人民清楚艾哈迈迪内贾德总统鲁莽、不负责任，不关心他们的日常需求。 ”


Presidents employ such language for good reason.	总统们这样说话自有其理由。


They know their public, a self-styled melting pot of peoples, would rather fight dictators than brothers and cousins abroad.	他们知道本国人民自视为全世界人民的熔炉，他们宁愿与独裁者交战而不愿侵犯国外的兄弟和同胞。


Indeed, Wilson’s initial formulation grew from a demographic and political quandary.	实际上，威尔逊最初的提法是人口和政治困境所造成的结果。


More than one-third of Americans in 1917 could trace their heritage back to Germany and its allies.	1917年超过三分之一的美国人都来自德国及其盟国。


Wilson could not implore his people to “kill the Krauts,” as British or French leaders frequently did, because so many of Wilson’s soldiers were, by ethnicity at least, Krauts themselves.	威尔逊无法像英法领导人常作的那样要求他的人民去“杀死德国佬”，因为威尔逊的太多战士至少从种族渊源上划分本身就来自德国。


He instead rhetorically transformed American soldiers from fratricidal killers into liberators of their ancient fatherland.	相反，他巧妙地将美国士兵从手足相残的杀人魔鬼变成了他们古老祖国的解放者。


Only when foreign enemies looked different from what Americans conceived themselves to be could presidents wage war against a people as a whole.	只有当外国敌人与美国人想象有出入的情况下美国总统才能对该国全体民众发动战争。


Thus, Franklin Roosevelt could simultaneously urge Americans to keep the world from being “dominated by Hitler and Mussolini ,” even as he told them that “we are now in the midst of a war against Japan .”	这样，富兰克林·罗斯福可以在敦促美国人不让世界“落入 希特勒 和 墨索里尼 主宰”的同时，告诉他们“我们正在对 日本 发动战争。


The war in Europe was a war to liberate oppressed peoples from tyrants. The war in the Pacific was a race war.	”欧洲的战争是要解放被专制暴君压迫的民众，而太平洋战争则是一场种族战争。


Such politically expedient language has a strategic downside.	像这样适应政治需要的语言自有其战略问题。


First, once you pin blame for a conflict on a single individual, a Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il, it is difficult to see a solution to international conflict that does not result from the tyrant’s downfall.	首先，一旦你将冲突的责任归咎于某一个人，比如萨达姆·侯赛因或金正日，那么就很难看到在专制暴君不垮台的情况下解决国际争端的希望。


Imagine Bush parlaying with Saddam Hussein in 2005 or 2006, if war had never come again to Iraq, after having called him this generation’s Hitler.	想象一下如果从未爆发过第二次伊拉克战争，那么布什在称萨达姆·侯赛因为当代的希特勒之后，该怎样在2005或2006年与萨达姆赌博。


More troubling is the identification of conflict with a single human source, which obscures the more systemic and insidious nature of international conflict.	更麻烦的是将冲突的原因与某个人划等号，这常常会掩盖国际冲突更潜在也更系统的性质。


Again, imagine if recent history had gone differently, and Saddam had in fact taken the Bush administration’s eleventh-hour offer of exile rather than war.	我们再想象一下，如果不久前那段历史以不同的方式发展，萨达姆·侯赛因实际上接受了布什政府11小时的逃亡建议而不是选择接受战争。


Or if the initial attempt made on Saddam’s life in the war’s first hours had been successful.	或者如果在战争爆发初期杀死萨达姆的最初努力取得了成功。


If Iraq indeed had weapons of mass destruction, as Bush believed, Hussein’s departure would have left such weapons in the hands of…whom exactly?	如果伊拉克真像布什所认为的那样拥有大规模杀伤性武器，那么侯赛因的逃离将会使这些武器落入谁的手中？


Equating war with a solitary tyrant thus imposes strategic limitations for policymakers.	将战争与某一个独裁者等同起来的做法因此会给决策者带来战略方面的限制。


It also leads, paradoxically, to a greater number of civilian deaths.	而且矛盾的是，这样做还会增加平民的伤亡人数。


Bombs aimed at foreign dictators or their security apparatus almost invariably kill individuals far from the corridors of power.	对准外国独裁者或其安全设施的炸弹几乎肯定会杀死远离权力走廊的民众。


Their deaths are easier to stomach, and to justify, so long as airmen and soldiers, and the public watching at home, believe the violence was at least directed against evil incarnate.	他们的死亡更容易为外界所容忍，也更容易找到借口，只要飞行员和士兵，还有在家观看电视转播的公众认为这种暴力至少针对的是邪恶的化身。


Such rhetoric clearly works.	这样的巧言令色显然非常有效。


It is global in nature.	它在世界各国都具有普遍性。


But it also helps make the world a more dangerous place by obscuring the real reasons for war, and by allowing peoples around the world to justify violence and conflict not as a means to an end, but rather as a holy mission of liberation, freedom, and the eradication of tyranny.	但它也掩盖了战争的真正理由，让世界各国民众找到不将暴力和冲突视作达到目的的一种手段，而将其视为神圣的解放、自由和消灭暴政目标的借口。


Until political leaders reject the rhetoric of evil as a justification for war, war itself is unlikely to disappear.	除非政治领袖拒绝以罪恶的花言巧语为由发动战争，否则战争本身不太可能消除。


Evolution’s New Frontiers	进化的新前沿


MISHIMA – Recent breakthroughs in our understanding of molecular mechanisms have revolutionized many fields of biology, including cell biology and developmental biology.	三岛——近期我们对分子机制理解的突破彻底改变了包括细胞生物学和发育生物学在内的众多生物学领域。


So it is no surprise that these advances are providing valuable insights into the field of evolutionary biology as well, including evidence supporting the nearly neutral theory of molecular evolution that I developed in 1973.	上述新技术同时顺理成章地为进化生物学提供了有价值的见解，包括用证据支持了我在1973年提出的近乎于中性的分子进化理论。


As is typical in science, each new discovery in evolutionary biology raises as many questions as it answers.	就像典型的科学一样，进化生物学的每一项新发现提出的问题都和回答的一样多。


Indeed, my field is now going through one of the most dynamic periods in its 150-year history.	事实上，我所研究的领域正在进入150年历史上活力最旺盛的时期之一。


For roughly a century after the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, scientists believed that genetic mutations were governed by a process similar to that described by the father of natural selection.	在查尔斯·达尔文的《物种起源》发表大约一个世纪后，科学家们认为类似自然选择之父所描述的程序管理着基因突变的整个过程。


The idea was that individuals with superior genetic variants would be more likely to survive, reproduce, and pass on their genes than those without them.	上述思想认为相比不具备优秀遗传变异的个体，那些具备优秀遗传变异的个体将更有可能生存、繁衍和传递他们的基因。


As a result, harmful mutations would quickly die out.	因此，有害的基因突变会迅速消亡。


Beneficial ones would spread until the entire species carried them.	而有益的则会扩散到整个种群。


Evolutionary changes, including morphological ones, were thought to be the result of the accumulation and distribution of beneficial mutations, and the genetic makeup of populations was believed to be close to homogeneous, with only a few rare, random mutations creating differences between one individual and another.	进化改变，包括形态上的改变被视为日积月累和有益突变不断扩散的结果，种群的基因构成被认为接近同质化，只有极少数随机突变成为造成个体差异的主因。


That view was challenged by the discovery of DNA.	脱氧核糖核酸（DNA）的发现挑战了上述观点的可信性。


As it became possible to analyze an individual’s genetic makeup, it become apparent that there was much more variation within populations than prevailing evolutionary theory predicted.	因为现在可以对个人基因组成进行分析，人们逐渐了解到种群中存在的基因变异比主流进化论所做的预测要多得多。


Indeed, individuals could have similar traits but very different gene sequences.	事实上，类似特征的人可以有完全不同的基因序列。


This appeared to contradict the principles of natural selection.	而这显然违背了所谓的自然选择法则。


One of the first attempts to square the theory with the evidence was proposed by my late colleague Motoo Kimura, who posited the existence of neutral mutations – gene variants that are neither advantageous nor harmful to an individual, and therefore not influenced by natural selection.	我已故的同事木村本雄最先提出了支撑上述理论的证据，他假定存在对个体既非有利亦非有害的中性基因突变，因此也不受自然选择的管辖。


Kimura examined the rate of evolutionary change of proteins and proposed the neutral theory of molecular evolution in 1968.	木村研究了蛋白质进化率，并于1968年提出了分子进化的中性学说。


His theory – which held that evolutionary changes at the molecular level are caused not by natural selection, but by random genetic drift – provided a good explanation for the genetic variation that researchers had discovered.	他的理论认为导致分子水平进化改变的不是自然选择而是随机的遗传漂变，他的理论很好地解释了研究人员发现的遗传变异现象。


Kimura’s theory was simple and elegant, but the classification of mutations into the distinct classes – beneficial, neutral, or harmful – seemed too simple to me.	木村的理论简单而优雅，但将突变分为有益、中性和有害的不同类别在我看来似乎太简单了。


My own work showed that borderline mutations, those with very small positive or negative effects, could be very important in driving evolutionary changes.	我本人的研究表明具有微小正面或负面影响的边缘突变可能在推动进化改变时意义重大。


This insight was the basis of the nearly neutral theory of molecular evolution.	近乎中性的分子进化论正是以这种假设为基础的。


The explosion of data on genomes and population genetics in the twenty-first century has not only lent new support to my 42-year-old theory; it has also uncovered broad new areas of research.	二十一世纪基因组和群体遗传学的数据爆炸在开拓全新研究领域的同时支持了我在42年前提出的理论。


Our knowledge of the structure and function of proteins, for example, has been greatly expanded through the discovery of dynamic folding processes.	比方说，动态折叠过程的发现大大拓宽了我们对蛋白质结构和功能的认识。


These are thought to provide flexibility in how proteins function, in a way that may be connected to nearly-neutral mutations.	人们认为上述过程提供了或许与近中性突变有关的蛋白质功能的灵活性。


Among the most interesting challenges in evolutionary biology is the attempt to identify the molecular mechanisms of gene expression that drive morphological evolution.	确定驱动形态进化的基因表达的分子机制堪称进化生物学最有趣的挑战。


The field is in the process of gaining a better understanding of a host of complex systems within individual cells.	上述研究领域试图更好地了解个体细胞内一系列复杂的系统过程。


These molecular-level systems are at the heart of epigenetics – the study of changes in genetic function that cannot be explained by differences in DNA sequences.	上述分子系统处在试验胚胎学的核心位置——DNA序列差异无法解释的基因功能改变是试验胚胎学的研究内容。


Epigenetics is crucial for comprehending the link between the genetic composition, or genotype, and the traits we can actually observe.	试验胚胎学的关键是要理解遗传组成、基因型和我们实际观察到的特征之间的联系。


In higher organisms – such as humans – epigenetic processes are controlled by chromatin, a complex of macromolecules inside cells consisting of DNA, protein, and RNA.	具体到人类等高等生物，细胞内由脱氧核糖核酸 、蛋白质和核糖核酸等组成的复合物大分子链（也叫核染色质）控制着试验胚胎学的进程。


The way chromatin works is, in turn, shaped by genetic and environmental factors, making their functioning difficult to grasp.	遗传和环境因素反过来又塑造了核染色质的运行方式，让人们很难把握它们的功能。


These rapidly evolving, highly variable macromolecules are well worth studying, however, as they may be the cause of some human diseases.	但因为能够造成某些人类疾病，这些快速进化、充满变数的大分子链非常值得研究。


Another factor in the relationship between genetic composition and observable traits is the way that proteins can sometimes be modified.	遗传组成和可观测性状间关系的另一要素是蛋白质有时是可以修改的。


For example, protein enzymes can be turned on and off, thereby altering their function and activity.	比方说，蛋白酶可以开启或关闭，并借此改变蛋白质的行为和功能。


This process, like other forms of genetic expression, seems to be driven by a combination of innate and environmental factors.	像其他形式的基因表达一样，貌似由一系列先天及环境因素的组合来驱动这一过程。


No single mechanism, it seems, can be studied in isolation; at a very basic level, factors like selection, drift, and epigenetics work together and become inseparable.	看起来不能孤立地研究某项单一结构； 选择、漂变和试验胚胎学等因素在非常基础的水平上共同作用、密不可分。


The deeper we dive into what we once thought were straight-forward evolutionary processes, the more wondrous and complex they are revealed to be.	我们对曾经认为的直接进化过程了解越深入，就越能发现它们的奇妙和复杂。


Evolutionary Theory’s Welcome Crisis	值得欢迎的进化论危机


EXETER – Those who believe that a supernatural being created the universe have never posed an intellectual challenge to evolutionary theory.	艾克赛特—那些相信宇宙由超自然生物所创的人从未对进化论构成过智识上的威胁。


But creationists, whether biblical fundamentalists or believers in “intelligent design,” do pose a threat to scientific thinking.	但是，神创论者，不论他是圣经原教旨主义者还是“智能设计”信徒，确实构成了对科学思维的威胁。


Indeed, creationism’s insidious genius lies in its ability to reinvent evolution in its own image as a dogmatic belief system – and thus the antithesis of science.	事实上，神创论的阴鸷之处在于它可以重新阐释进化论，将它嵌入自身的教条主义信仰体系（因此也是科学的对立面）中。


The creationists are right about one thing: contrary to the impression given by much popular writing on the subject, the theory of evolution is in crisis.	神创论者有一点是正确的：与该问题的流行观点给人的印象相反，进化论正处于危机之中。


But this is a positive development, because it reflects the non-linear progress of scientific knowledge, characterized by what Thomas Kuhn described in his influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as “paradigm shifts.”	但这是积极的发展态势，因为这反映了科学知识的非线性进步，托马斯·库恩在其名著《科学革命的结构》（The Structure of Scientific Revolutions）中将其称为“范式变迁”。


For the last 70 years, the dominant paradigm in evolutionary science has been the so-called “new synthesis.”	在过去70年中，进化论科学的主流范式是所谓的“新综合”（new synthesis）。


Widely publicized in recent years by Oxford evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, the new synthesis unites Darwin’s theory of natural selection with Mendelian genetics, which explains heredity.	牛津大学进化生物学家理查德·道金斯（Richard Dawkins）近年来做了大量推广新综合范式的工作。 新综合范式将他的自然选择理论与孟德尔遗传理论结合了起来。


The current crisis in evolutionary science does not imply complete rejection of this paradigm.	进化论科学的当前危机并不意味着这一范式是完全错误的。


Rather, it entails a major, progressive reorganization of existing knowledge, without undermining the fundamental tenets of evolutionary theory: organisms alive today developed from significantly different organisms in the distant past; dissimilar organisms may share common ancestors; and natural selection has played a crucial role in this process.	反之，这体现了对现有知识的大整合和进步性重组，并没有破坏进化论的基本原理：今天活在世上的生物体是由与之大相径庭的上古祖先发展而来； 不同生物体可能具有共同祖先；


Other assumptions, however, are under threat.	不过，其他假设则遇到了危机。


For example, in the traditional “tree of life” representation of evolution, the branches always move apart, never merging, implying that species’ ancestry follows a linear path, and that all evolutionary changes along this path occur within the lineage being traced.	比如，在代表进化的传统“生命树”上，枝干永远在分叉而不会汇合，这表明物种的血统发展遵循线性路径，所有沿着这条路径发生的进化变化都发生在世系追溯过程中。


But examination of genomes – particularly microbes – has shown that genes moving between distantly related organisms are an important catalyst of evolutionary change.	但对基因组的考察（特别是微生物基因组）表明，关系疏远的生物体之间的基因移动是进化的重要催化剂。


Moreover, the new synthesis assumes that the main drivers of evolution are small mutations generated by chance within a species.	此外，新综合范式假设进化的主要动力是物种内部随机产生的微小突变。


But recent evidence suggests that large changes, caused by the absorption of a chunk of alien genetic material, may be just as significant.	但最新的证据表明，由吸收大量外来基因物质引发的重大变化也许同样是进化的主要动力。


Indeed, the absorption of entire organisms – such as the two bacteria that formed the first eukaryotic cell (the more complex cell type found in multicellular animals) – can generate large and crucial evolutionary change.	事实上，吸收整个生命体——比如组成第一个真核细胞（通常发现于多细胞动物体内的较复杂的细胞类型）的两个细菌——可能造成重大且关键性的进化。


Further destabilizing evolutionary theory is the growing realization that many factors, not just the genome, determine an individual organism’s development.	进一步动摇进化论的是人们逐渐意识到，许多因素（而不仅仅是基因组）决定了个体生命的发展。


Ironically, as the discovery of DNA’s structure – initially lauded as the final act in the triumph of the new synthesis – led to a better understanding of genomes�� functioning, it ended up weakening belief in their unique role in directing biological development.	讽刺的是，DNA结构的发现——当初被称为新综合范式彻底胜利的最后一击——使人们更好地理解了基因组的功能，最终却削弱了人们关于它们单独决定了生物发展方向的观念。


Those who long deplored the omission of development from evolutionary models – a decades-old critique made under the scientific banner of evolutionary developmental biology (“evo-devo”) – together with the insistence that organisms’ development draws on a wide variety of resources, have been vindicated.	那些长期以来强烈抗议进化模型忽略发育过程的人——几十年来，这一批评被冠以进化发育生物学的名号——以及坚持生命体的发育需要利用各种资源的人被证明是正确的。


Recent developments in molecular biology have put the final nail in the coffin of traditional genetic determinism.	分子生物学的新发展为传统基因决定论钉上了最后一颗棺材钉。


For example, epigenetics – the study of heritable modifications of the genome that do not involve alterations to the genetic code – is on the rise.	比如，实验胚胎学——不改变基因编码的可遗传基因组修改——正在崛起。


And the many kinds of small RNA molecules are increasingly recognized as forming a regulatory layer above the genome.	许多种类的小RNA分子被逐渐认为能够充当高于基因组的决定因素。


Beyond undermining the gene-centered theories of evolution that have dominated public consciousness for several decades, these developments call for new philosophical frameworks.	除了推翻主宰公共观点数十年之久的以基因为中心的进化论，这些发展还表明需要有心的理论框架。


Traditional reductionist views of science, with their focus on “bottom-up” mechanisms, do not suffice in the quest to understand top-down and circular causality and a world of nested processes.	传统科学还原论者专注于“自下而上”机制，不足以理解自上而下和循环的因果关系，也不能理解嵌套过程的世界。


This brings us back to where we started.	这把我们带回了出发点。


Radically rethinking evolutionary theory invariably attracts the attention of creationists, who gleefully announce that if professional advocates of Darwinism cannot agree, the concept must be in retreat.	彻底反思进化论免不了要引起神创论者的注意，他们欢欣鼓舞地宣称，如果达尔文主义的专业支持者都不能形成一致，那么这个概念肯定在式微。


And, evolutionists, confronted with this response, tend to circle the wagons and insist that everyone is in agreement.	而面对如此反应，进化论者总是如临大敌般地宣称绝无异议。


But nothing more clearly demonstrates that science and creationism are polar opposites than the latter’s assumption that disagreement signals failure.	但是，没有比神创论者的“分歧等于失败”观点更能说明它与科学之间的极端对立的了。


In fact, disagreement – and the deeper insights that result from it – enables new approaches to scientific understanding.	事实上，正是分歧——以及由此产生的更深层次的洞见——让我们找到了更好地理解科学的方法。


For science, unlike for dogmatic belief systems, disagreement is to be encouraged.	科学不是教条主义信仰体系，分歧在科学中是值得鼓励的。


Evolutionary theory’s current contretemps – and our inability to predict where the field will be in 50 years – are a cause for celebration.	进化论当前的意外危机——以及我们的无力预测该领域50年后会怎样——是值得庆幸的。


We should leave the creationists to their hollow convictions and happily embrace the uncertainties inherent in a truly empirical approach to understanding the world.	让神创论者沉浸在自己的空洞信念中去吧，我们不妨愉快地拥抱理解世界的真正实证方法所固有的不确定性。


Evo Morales and the Populist Paradox	埃沃·莫拉莱斯和民粹主义悖论


LA PAZ – Evo Morales succeeded in amending the Bolivia’s constitution and being re-elected President.	拉巴斯——埃沃·莫拉莱斯成功修改了玻利维亚宪法，再次当选总统。


And, backed by his parliamentary majority, he was recently able to fill vacant judicial posts, making him the most powerful president in Bolivia’s contemporary history.	并且依靠在议会中的多数席位，日前又成功填补了司法职位的空缺，成为玻利维亚现代史上权力最大的总统。


According to his opponents, Morales is reproducing the tradition of caudillismo, concentrating power in his hands and turning government institutions into mere formalities.	反对势力认为莫拉莱斯正在恢复专制元首的传统，将大权独揽到自己一人手中，让政府机构仅仅剩下形式上的作用。


But his immense popularity over the past five years suggests that most Bolivians do not seem very worried in putting their country’s democracy at risk.	但五年来莫氏广受欢迎的事实表明多数玻利维亚人似乎并不为国家民主面临威胁而忧心忡忡。


Morales’s success rests largely on the paradox of populism.	民粹主义悖论在很大程度上造就了莫拉莱斯的成功。


Although he claims to oppose economic liberalism, he is a product of the political liberties that it promotes and feeds on the benefits generated by the market economy.	尽管他对外宣称反对经济自由主义，但他本人却是市场经济推动和造就的政治自由的产物。


Morales was born into a peasant household on the Andean altiplano and later established himself in Chapare at the beginning of the coca boom.	莫拉莱斯出身于安第斯高原的一个农民家庭，其后在古柯繁荣的开始阶段在查帕雷站住了脚跟。


His career as a union leader took him away from agriculture and into politics, where he stood out for his criticism of the United States, whose anti-drug crusade meant the eradication of a cash crop for poor peasants.	工会领袖的身份让他得以脱离土地，进入政界，后又因对美国的尖锐批评而获得了广泛的关注，美国长期坚定不移的反毒斗争意味着要彻底根除古柯这种贫苦农民赖以维生的经济作物。


By defending the coca leaf, consumed for centuries in the Andean world and the raw material for cocaine, Morales was able to link his opposition to America’s anti-drug policy with the defense of native cultural tradition and the economic rights of the poor.	通过为安第斯地区沿用长达几个世纪之久的可卡因原料古柯叶辩护，莫拉莱斯成功地将反对美国禁毒政策与捍卫本国文化传统和穷人的经济权利挂钩。


Thus, Morales’s leadership brought together three strongly symbolic dimensions: nationalist sentiment, concern for the poor, and emerging ethnic pride among Bolivia’s native peoples.	因此，莫拉莱斯的统治是三大标志性领域的成功融合：民族主义情绪、对穷人的关注和玻利维亚人越来越强烈的民族自豪感。


But the making of Morales as a leader able to combine these three dimensions reflects two institutional reforms in the 1990’s that expanded social participation and opened up opportunities for new leaders and political movements.	但莫拉莱斯之所以能够成为融合这三大标志领域的领袖确乎反映了这样一个事实：20世纪90年代的机构改革扩大了社会参与基础，为新兴领导人和政治运动带来了发展机遇。


The division of the country into municipalities transferred tax resources and decision-making capabilities to communities, thereby enabling agricultural unions to control several towns and assume management responsibilities.	玻利维亚国内的“自治市”区划致使税收资源和决策权力转移到民间团体手中，农业联合会也因此能够控制重要城镇的局势并承担相应的管理责任。


This led to the formation of new political parties, and the creation of regional councils in 1997 made it possible for leaders with strong local roots – like Morales – to reach Bolivia’s congress without any major party’s backing.	新的政党也由此出现，1997年成立的区域委员会使得像莫拉莱斯这样具有强大地方根基的政治领袖在没有任何主要政党支持的情况下成功跻身于玻利维亚议会。


Once situated at the center of the political scene, Congressman Morales took advantage of his constitutional immunity to intensify his union activities and his fight against anti-drug policies.	登上核心政治舞台的莫拉莱斯议员随即利用手中的宪法豁免权进一步强化工会活动并反对禁毒政策。


In the 2002 elections, Morales received an unexpected boost from the US ambassador, who, by declaring himself against Morales, stirred up nationalist sentiment.	2002年大选期间，莫拉莱斯意外得到了美国大使的强力推动，这位大使宣布自己反对莫拉莱斯当选，并由此激起了玻利维亚民众强烈的民族主义情绪。


Morales went on to win the 2005 presidential election with an absolute majority.	莫拉莱斯随即以绝对优势在2005年的总统选举中获胜。


The other parties made it easier for him by discrediting each other, failing even to defend their own achievements over the previous 20 years.	其他政党相互揭短让莫拉莱斯从中渔利，这些政党甚至捍卫不了20年来自己所取得的成就。


Two other factors that made Morales’s rise possible were the revival of Bolivia’s oil industry and the creation of mechanisms for distributing the income that oil produces.	让莫拉莱斯崛起成为可能的另外两个因素是玻利维亚石油工业的复兴和建立起石油收入的分配机制。


Both now sustain his rule.	这两大因素直到现在仍然是莫氏执政的支柱。


Private investment in the mid-1990’s, moreover, increased output of natural gas.	此外，20世纪90年代中期的私人投资提高了天然气的产量。


Soon gas was being exported – very profitably – to Brazil.	天然气很快就以利润丰厚的价格向巴西出口。


Thus, when Morales came to power, Bolivia’s economy was in a position to take advantage of the global price boom for raw materials.	因此，在莫拉莱斯执政期间，玻利维亚经济能够从原材料价格的全球繁荣中分得一杯羹。


As a result, revenues increased, despite his government’s nationalist and statist policies, which drove away investment and hindered access to new markets.	也正因为如此，虽然莫氏政府的民族主义和中央集权政策赶走了投资并阻碍了对新市场的进入，但是财政收入却依然持续飙升。


Since 2005, Bolivian exports have increased six-fold, along with fiscal revenue.	2005年来，玻利维亚的出口和财政收入已经是原来的6倍。


This money is distributed automatically to local governments, according to the model established by Morales’s predecessors, carrying resources to the farthest reaches of the country.	按照莫拉莱斯前任总统确立起来的模式，这笔财富被自动分配给地方政府，从而使国内最边远的地区都能享受到资源带来的好处。


But it is not only local governments that have benefited; through cash transfers created during the so called neo-liberal years, families have gained as well, most importantly through a universal and non-contributive old-age pension benefit given to persons over 60, which reaches slightly more than 30% of households.	但需要强调的是借助所谓“新自由主义”时代转移资金流获益的不仅是地方政府，普通的玻利维亚家庭也从中得到了好处，这种好处主要来自于无需缴费即自动向60岁以上公民发放的全民退休金，约有30%以上的家庭能够享受到全民退休金所带来的好处。


In recent years, aid for students at public schools and maternity assistance for pregnant women at health centers have been created, but these have a greater political than economic impact.	近年来政府又开始发放公立学校的学生补助和孕妇在医疗中心的分娩补助，但上述措施的政治意义远比其经济意义更为重要。


Indeed, Morales’s economic initiatives usually turn out to be empty, such as his deals with Venezuela for hydrocarbon supplies and with India for iron.	事实上，莫拉莱斯的经济计划常常事后被证实空洞无物，这方面的例子有与委内瑞拉签订的碳氢化合物供应协议和与印度签订的铁矿石供应合同。


His plan to exploit and industrialize the country’s gas fields remains just a promise.	莫氏工业化开发国内天然气田的计划到现在仍然停留在一句空洞的承诺。


The Bolivian economy has grown moderately under Morales’s management, owing to international demand and cash transfers from the state to local governments and individuals.	玻利维亚经济在莫氏治下温和增长，这主要归功于国际需求和从国家到地方政府及个���的转移现金流。


These not only increase household spending, but also offer opportunities for trade, in both the formal and informal sectors, making it the most successful policy in the fight against poverty.	这不仅拉动了家庭消费，而且也为正规和非正规部门提供了难得的贸易机会，并因此成为战胜贫困最成功的政策。


Thus, despite official speeches intended to support state intervention, Morales’s government benefits mainly from the workings of the market.	于是，尽管官方言论意在鼓吹国家干预，但莫拉莱斯政府却从市场机制中获得了大部分好处。


The failure of state plans and projects is overlooked because of the small but expanding internal market, which is invigorated by de facto economic liberalism involving the growth of smuggling and drug traffic.	人们并不十分在意国家计划和项目的失败，因为国内市场虽然规模不大，但却生机勃勃，而这股生机实际来自于包括走私和贩毒增长在内的经济自由化。


These illicit activities are not intended, but they increase the income of peasants, transporters, builders, and businessmen.	这些非法活动并非政府的本意，但却增加了农民、承运商、建筑工人和商人的收入。


This is the paradox of twenty-first-century socialism: economic liberalism is the foundation for a policy that aspires to replace it.	这就是21世纪社会主义的悖论：经济自由化恰恰为想要取代它的政策提供了基础。


This might also be its greatest limitation as a political project.	作为政治方案这种局限性同样是致命的。


A Hard Look at a Soft Global Economy	对全球软经济的硬审视


MILAN – The global economy is settling into a slow-growth rut, steered there by policymakers’ inability or unwillingness to address major impediments at a global level.	米兰—全球经济正在滑向低速增长轨道，这是拜决策者无能或不愿在全球水平上解决主要障碍所赐。


Indeed, even the current anemic pace of growth is probably unsustainable.	事实上，即使是当前低迷的增长速度，可能也是不可持续的。


The question is whether an honest assessment of the impediments to economic performance worldwide will spur policymakers into action.	问题在于对全球经济表现障碍的诚实评估是否能刺激决策者行动起来。


Since 2008, real (inflation-adjusted) cumulative growth in the developed economies has amounted to a mere 5-6%.	2008年以来，发达经济体真实（经通胀调整的）累计增长只有5—6%。


While China’s GDP has risen by about 70%, making it the largest contributor to global growth, this was aided substantially by debt-fueled investment.	中国GDP增长了70%左右，是全球增长的最大贡献者，但在很大程度上受到债务助长的投资的推动。


And, indeed, as that stimulus wanes, the impact of inadequate advanced-country demand on Chinese growth is becoming increasingly apparent.	而事实上，随着这一刺激因素的消失，发达国家需求不足对中国增长的影响已经越来越明显。


Growth is being undermined from all sides.	增长正在受到腹背夹击。


Leverage is increasing, with some $57 trillion having piled up worldwide since the global financial crisis began.	杠杆率正在上升，自全球金融危机爆发以来，全世界债务已高达57万亿美元。


And that leverage – much of it the result of monetary expansion in most of the world’s advanced economies – is not even serving the goal of boosting long-term aggregate demand.	这一杠杆——大多是大部分发达经济体货币扩张的结果——甚至连提振长期总需求这一目标都没有达到。


After all, accommodative monetary policies can, at best, merely buy time for more durable sources of demand to emerge.	毕竟，有利的货币政策充其量只能为更加持久的需求源的出现赢得时间。


Moreover, a protracted period of low interest rates has pushed up asset prices, causing them to diverge from underlying economic performance.	此外，长期保持低利率推高了资产价格，使它们背离基础经济表现。


But while interest rates are likely to remain low, their impact on asset prices probably will not persist.	但尽管利率可能继续保持低位，但它们对资产价格的影响可能已无法持久。


As a result, returns on assets are likely to decline compared to the recent past; with prices already widely believed to be in bubble territory, a downward correction seems likely.	因此，资产回报相较于不久前可能出现下滑； 资产价格已普遍认为存在泡沫，修正走势一触即发。


Whatever positive impact wealth effects have had on consumption and deleveraging cannot be expected to continue.	财富效应对消费和去杠杆化的积极作用也不太可能维持。


The world also faces a serious investment problem, which the low cost of capital has done virtually nothing to overcome.	世界还面临严重的投资问题，降低资本成本对于这个问题几乎毫无用处。


Public-sector investment is now below the level needed to sustain robust growth, owing to its insufficient contribution to aggregate demand and productivity gains.	目前，公共部门投资低于维持强劲增长所需要的水平，因为其规模不足以产生足够的总需求和生产率的提高。


The most likely explanation for this public investment shortfall is fiscal constraints.	这一公共投资短缺的最可靠的解释是财政约束。


And, indeed, debt and unfunded non-debt liabilities increasingly weigh down public-sector balance sheets and pension funds, eroding the foundations of resilient, sustainable growth.	的确，债务和存在资金缺口的非债务负债日益压迫着公共资产负债表和退休基金，破坏强力可持续增长的基础。


But if the best way to reduce sovereign over-indebtedness is to achieve higher nominal GDP growth (the combination of real growth and inflation), cutting investment – a key ingredient in a pro-growth-strategy – is not a sound approach.	但如果降低主权债务过重的最佳办法是实现更高的名义GDP增长（真实增长与通胀之和），那么减少投资——促增长战略的关键要素——绝非可靠方法。


Instead, budget rules should segregate public investment, thereby facilitating a differential response in fiscal consolidation.	相反，预算规则必须将公共投资排除在外，从而促进不同的财政整合应对措施。


Increased public-sector investment could help to spur private-sector investment, which is also severely depressed.	增加公共部门投资有助于刺激私人部门投资，而私人部门投资也承受着巨大的压力。


In the United States, investment barely exceeds pre-crisis levels, even though GDP has risen by 10%.	在美国，投资仍未超越危机前水平，尽管GDP增长了10%。


And the US is not alone.	而美国绝非个例。


Clearly, deficient aggregate demand has played a role by reducing the incentive to expand capacity.	显然，总需求不足通过降低扩大产能的激励起作用。


In some economies, structural rigidities adversely affect investment incentives and returns.	在一些国家，结构僵化造成了极大的消极投资激励，影响了投资回报。


Similarly, regulatory opacity – and, more broadly, uncertainty about the direction of economic policy – has discouraged investment.	类似地，监管不透明性——或更广义的经济政策方向的不确定性——也阻碍了投资。


And certain types of shareholder activism have bred short-termism on the part of firms.	而某些类型的股东积极主义造成了企业的短视。


There is also an intermediation problem.	还有一个中介问题。


Large pools of savings in sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and insurance companies could be used, for example, to meet emerging economies’ huge financing needs for infrastructure and urbanization.	主权财富基金、退休基金和保险公司集聚了巨量储蓄，这笔资金可用来（比如）满足新兴经济体巨大的举出设施和城市化融资需求。


But the channels for such investment – which could go a long way toward boosting global growth – are clogged.	但这些投资——能够极大地提振全球增长——的渠道被堵死了。