LAHORE – Pakistan has now joined the ranks of countries hit by one of US President Donald Trump’s characteristic tweet storms.	拉合尔——巴基斯坦现在也已成为了被美国总统唐纳德·特朗普标志性的推特风暴所席卷的国家。


In his first tweet of 2018, Trump declared that the United States has “foolishly” given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, while Pakistan had returned only “lies and deceit” and given safe haven to the terrorists America hunts in Afghanistan.	在2018年的新年第一推中，特朗普宣布美国过去15年来愚蠢地给予了巴基斯坦超过330亿美元的援助，而巴基斯坦却仅仅回馈了“谎言和欺骗”，并为美国在阿富汗地区追捕的恐怖分子提供了避风港。


“No more!”	“这种情况绝不能再继续下去！


Trump concluded.	”特朗普总结道。


And now the US is freezing its aid to the country.	而现在美国正在冻结对这个国家的援助。


Like his saber-rattling toward North Korea or his unilateral decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Trump’s attacks on Pakistan may play well with his base.	就像他对朝鲜的战争叫嚣和单方面承认耶路撒冷为以色列首都的决策一样，特朗普对巴基斯坦的攻击可能与其支持者的愿望相得益彰。


But it will also have serious repercussions for Pakistan, where a number of shocks in the second half of 2017 have destabilized the country politically.	但它对巴基斯坦却会产生严重的影响，2017年下半年巴基斯坦的一系列政治冲击已经导致该国的政局陷入了动荡。


And if Pakistan stumbles, the consequences will be felt across South Asia and in other parts of the Muslim world, where a functioning political system in Pakistan could serve as a valuable model.	而如果巴基斯坦陷入瘫痪，由此产生的后果将会波及整个南亚和穆斯林世界其他国家，巴基斯坦顺畅的政治制度本来可以成为这些国家争相效仿的有价值的榜样。


The roughly 50 Muslim-majority countries stretching from Bangladesh to Morocco have largely struggled to develop politically.	从孟加拉到摩洛哥的大约50个穆斯林多数国家一直在很大程度上努力发展政治制度。


Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey, which once boasted a functioning democratic system, has been slipping toward authoritarian rule.	雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安总统领导下的土耳其曾经为运行顺畅的民主制度感到骄傲，但现在也已滑向专制统治。


Bangladesh, too, seems to be turning into a one-party system, after having made notable headway, particularly on the economic front.	尤其在经济领域取得显著进展后，孟加拉国也似乎开始回到一党制。


Now Pakistan – in a sense, the region’s best remaining hope – is also facing potentially disruptive setbacks.	而现在巴基斯坦——从某种意义上说，该国是地区仅存的最好的希望——也正在面临破坏性挫折。


Contrary to Trump’s accusations, Pakistan has made steady, albeit slow, progress over the last decade, both in combating terrorism and in consolidating democratic institutions.	与特朗普的指责相反，过去十年来，巴基斯坦一直在反恐和巩固民主制度方面取得了尽管缓慢、但却稳健的进步。


That progress began in 2007, when a group of lawyers initiated a mass protest movement in response to an unconstitutional decision by Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s fourth military president, to suspend the chief justice of the Supreme Court.	进展开始于2007年，当时一批律师针对巴基斯坦第四任军人总统佩尔韦兹·穆沙拉夫撤职最高法院首席法官的违宪裁决发起了大规模抗议运动。


The movement, backed by several political parties, ultimately forced Musharraf to step down in 2008, to avoid impeachment.	那次运动在若干政党的支持下，最终迫使穆沙拉夫在2008年下台，以避免遭到弹劾。


In the subsequent general election, the Pakistan Peoples Party won enough seats in the national assembly to form a solid government.	在随后举行的大选中，巴基斯坦人民党在国民议会中取得了足够的席位组建一届牢固的政府。


The PPP’s political rival, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) won a majority of seats in the Punjab provincial assembly, giving it control of the country’s largest province.	巴基斯坦人民党的政治对手巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟（Nawaz）则在旁遮普省议会赢得了多数席位，进而控制了该国最大的省份。


Competitive politics had come to Pakistan.	巴基斯坦已经形成了政治竞争。


After the PPP’s five-year term, the PML(N), led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, won the next general election, while maintaining its hold over Punjab.	在巴基斯坦人民党执政五年后，由总理纳瓦兹·谢里夫领导的巴基斯坦解放运动赢得了下一届大选，同时继续控制旁遮普省。


The transfer of power occurred peacefully, with the PPP moving into opposition.	权利和平地进行了移交，巴基斯坦人民党扮演了反对党的角色。


Pakistan had passed another milestone.	巴基斯坦又一次取得了里程碑式的成功。


The still-powerful generals watched these developments from the barracks to which they had retreated.	仍然手握重权的将军们从撤回的营房里密切注视着事态的发展。


After more than 60 years of changes in military leadership coming only after coups, the civilian-led government replaced the commander of the armed forces at the end of his term.	在经历了60年只有通过政变才能实现军事领导权更迭后，由平民所领导的政府在军政府任期结束后取代了武装部队指挥官担任领导职务。


This was the third momentous achievement for the rule of law and democratic development in Pakistan, which now seemed to be in a strong position to continue strengthening its political system and institutions.	这是巴基斯坦法治和民主发展的第三个重大成就，现在的巴基斯坦似乎完全有能力继续强化其政治体制和机构。


Its fairly well-developed political parties competed on a level playing field, elections were held when the constitution so required, and transfers of power occurred without violence.	那里相对发达的政党按照宪法规定在公平的环境下展开竞争，而权力移交则从未引发暴力冲突。


Then, in 2016, the release of the Panama Papers exposed the extent of tax evasion by the world’s wealthy.	之后，在2016年，巴拿马文件的发布揭露了世界富豪们逃税的程度。


Members of the Sharif family, it was revealed, had illegally transferred huge amounts of money into numerous offshore companies, which had then invested in expensive properties in London and the Middle East.	据透露，谢里夫家族成员非法将巨额资金转移到为数众多的离岸企业，而后投资于伦敦和中东地区售价高昂的房地产。


These disclosures opened the way for Pakistan’s own “Arab Spring” moment, with young people rebelling against the elite-dominated political system.	上述披露内容为巴基斯坦国内的“阿拉伯之春”运动扫清了道路，年轻人因此反抗精英控制的政治系统。


Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf – a political party led by the former cricketer Imran Khan – provided just the platform for that rebellion.	由前板球运动员伊姆兰·汗所领导的政党巴基斯坦正义运动党恰好为那次反叛运动提供了场所。


Featuring a platform that includes a focus on justice and good governance, PTI had been gaining ground since the 2008 election, and received a new surge of support from urban youth demanding better services and less corruption.	正义运动党一直强调公平和善政，并在2008年选举后逐步扩大了影响力，并得到了要求提高服务质量和控制腐败的城市青年的新一轮支持。


That is no small cohort: some 75% of people in Pakistan’s large cities are below the age of 25.	这绝非是一个小规模群体：巴基斯坦大城市约75%的人口都在25岁以下。


Wielding its growing influence, the PTI threatened to call its young supporters into the streets if the Sharif family’s financial dealings were not properly investigated.	由于政治影响力持续扩大，正义运动党威胁如果谢里夫家族的财务交易没有得到切实的调查，就要呼吁年轻支持者上街游行。


Given Pakistan’s history of military intervention in politics – in 1958, 1969, and 1977 – in response to popular protest, the PTI’s threat had to be viewed very seriously.	鉴于巴基斯坦1958、1969和1977年一直有因为民众抗议而导致军队干政的历史，正义运动党的威胁必须引起真正的重视。


Pakistan avoided political escalation when the judiciary decided to investigate the Panama Papers’ revelations.	当时司法部门决定调查巴拿马文件所揭露的事实导致巴基斯坦避免了一次政治局势升级。


In July 2017, the Supreme Court announced its verdict: Sharif had acted improperly, and could not remain a member of the national assembly, let alone prime minister.	2017年7月，最高法院宣布了最终裁决：谢里夫行为不当，不能再担任国家议会议员，更不用说总理。


The PML(N) elected Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, a respected cabinet member, as Sharif’s successor as party leader and prime minister.	正义运动党选举内阁成员沙希德·卡坎·阿巴西作为谢里夫的继任者，并担任总理和党领导。


Military leaders expressed satisfaction at how the situation was handled.	军方领导人对问题的处理方式表示满意。


At the same time, given the fragility of its democratic institutions and the lingering threat of terrorism, the destabilizing potential of Sharif’s removal should not be underestimated.	与此同时，鉴于民主制度的脆弱性和长期存在的恐怖主义威胁，免除谢里夫职务潜在的破坏作用不应被低估。


Trump’s insistence on playing to his nationalist and xenophobic (and, specifically, anti-Muslim) base, instead of advancing the real national security interests of the US, heightens the risk.	特朗普坚持迎合民族主义和仇外（特别是反穆斯林）群体，而不是推进美国真正的国家安全利益，也将导致风险增加。


There is, however, some reason for hope.	但仍然存在某些希望的理由。


Pakistan’s response to its recent political challenges indicates a continued commitment to fight for democracy – a commitment that could serve as a badly needed model for many other Muslim-majority countries.	巴基斯坦对近期国内政治挑战的应对方式表明其继续致力于通过斗争实现民主——这样的目标或许会成为其他许多穆斯林多数国家所迫切需要的榜样。


Trump on the Warpath	战争路上的特朗普


NEW YORK – Fifteen years after George W. Bush declared that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea formed “an axis of evil,” Donald Trump, in his maiden address to the United Nations, denounced Iran and North Korea in similarly vitriolic terms.	纽约—十五年前，小布什宣布伊拉克、伊朗和朝鲜构成了“邪恶轴心”。 今天，特朗普在其联合国的第一次演讲中以同样的贬义词形容伊朗和朝鲜。


Words have consequences, and Trump’s constitute a dire and immediate threat to global peace, just as Bush’s words did in 2002.	言辞会带来后果，而特朗普的言辞是对全球和平的严重紧迫的威胁，一如2002年的小布什。


Back then, Bush was widely praised for his response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.	2002年，小布什因为其在2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后的反应而饱受赞誉。


It’s easy to rally the public to war, and that was especially true after 9/11.	要鼓动公众支持战争很容易，9/11发生之后尤其如此。


Yet, on every front – Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea – US militarism squandered global trust, lives, finances, and precious time.	但在所有战线上——阿富汗、伊拉克、伊朗和朝鲜——美国的军国主义白白消耗着全球信任、生命、金钱和宝贵的时间。


And Trump’s approach is far more belligerent – and dangerous – than Bush’s.	而特朗普的方针比小布什还要好斗，也更加危险。


For Trump, as for Bush, there is Good (America) and Evil (Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein).	和布什一样，对特朗普来说，有好人（美国）和邪人（塔利班统治下的阿富汗、伊朗、朝鲜和萨达姆统治下的伊拉克）。


America the Good makes demands on the evildoers.	好人美国要求邪人付出代价。


If the evildoers do not comply, America can exercise the “military option” or impose punitive sanctions to enforce “justice” as the United States defines it.	如果邪人不奉命，美国就会行使“军事选项”或采取惩罚性制裁以执行美国所定义的“正义”。


Bush applied the logic of force vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the “axis of evil,” with disastrous results.	布什将这逻辑用于阿富汗和“邪恶轴心”，结果带来了灾难性后果。


The US quickly overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002 but could not secure order.	2002年，美国很快就推翻了阿富汗的塔利班政权，但始终无法维持秩序。


Fifteen years on, the Taliban controls considerable territory, and Trump has just ordered an increase in troops.	十五年过去了，塔利班仍控制着大量林兔，特朗普刚刚下令增兵。


America has spent roughly $800 billion in direct military outlays in Afghanistan, and indeed has been at war there almost non-stop since the CIA covertly intervened in 1979, helping to provoke the Soviet invasion of that country.	美国已经在阿富汗投入了大约8,000亿美元直接军事支出，而事实上，自从1979年中央情报局秘密干预阿富汗，助其刺激苏联入侵以来，美国的阿富汗战争几乎从未停止。


The response to Iraq was even worse.	对伊拉克的反应甚至更加糟糕。


The US invaded in 2003 on false pretenses (Saddam’s alleged but nonexistent weapons of mass destruction), squandered another $800 billion in direct military outlays, destabilized the country, caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, and, contrary to stated US objectives, plunged the region into turmoil.	2003年，美国用子虚乌有的借口（萨达姆被控拥有根本不存在的大规模杀伤性武器）入侵了伊拉克，在伊拉克，美国也投入了8,000亿美元直接军事支出，结果是伊拉克沦为一片焦土，数十万人丧生，并且起到了和美国自称的目标完全相反的反作用，让整个地区陷入了动乱。


The indirect costs of the two wars (including the long-term costs of veterans’ disabilities) roughly equal the direct costs.	这两场战争的间接成本（包括老兵残疾带来的长期成本）和直接成本大致相当。


Bush’s hardline approach toward Iran also produced none of the envisioned results.	小布什对伊朗的强硬路线也导致结果没有任何远见可言。


Iran’s regional influence – particularly in Iraq, but also in Syria and Lebanon – is stronger today than 15 years ago.	如今，伊朗的地区影响力——在伊拉克尤其巨大，但在叙利亚和黎巴嫩同样存在——更大了。


Its ballistic missile development is much further advanced.	其弹道导弹开发大大进步了。


And the halt in its development of nuclear weapons is due entirely to President Barack Obama’s diplomacy, not Bush’s militarism and threats.	而其中止开发核武器要完全归功于奥巴马总统的外交努力，而不是小布什的军国主义和威胁。


Bush’s approach vis-à-vis North Korea was similarly unsuccessful.	小布什的朝鲜政策同样不成功。


At the start of 2002, a fragile 1994 agreement between the US and North Korea was still restraining the North’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, though the US had dragged its feet on several parts of the agreement.	2002年初，脆弱的1994年美朝协定仍能够约束朝鲜开发核武器的动作，尽管美国对协定内容的落实一直拖拖拉拉。


Scorned by Bush administration hardliners, the agreement collapsed in mutual recrimination in 2002.	小布什政府中的强硬派对该协定嗤之以鼻，结果，在互相指责之中，该协定在2002年崩溃了。


In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resumed full-scale weapons-development efforts.	2003年1月，朝鲜撤出核不扩散条约，重新启动了全面武器开发计划。


Now the country has thermonuclear bombs and ballistic missiles.	如今，朝鲜已经拥有热核炸弹和弹道导弹。


All four cases reflect the same US failing.	所有这四个例子都反映了美国的同一个失败。


The US has repeatedly disdained negotiation as a sign of weakness and appeasement.	美国总是看不上谈判，认为这是示弱和绥靖。


The hardline approach is initially popular with much of the US public, but invariably ends in grief.	强硬路线一开始总是深受美国公众支持，最后则总是以悲剧收场。


Trump is doubling down.	而特朗普正在加倍下注。


He has all but declared his intention to abandon the nuclear agreement with Iran, signed not only by the US but also by the other four permanent Security Council members (China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and Germany.	他一上来就宣布要抛弃与伊朗签订的核协议。 该协议不仅包括美国，也包括其他四个联合国安理会常任理事国（中国、法国、俄罗斯和英国）以及德国。


Abandoning the 2015 deal would parallel Bush’s abandonment of the nuclear agreement with North Korea.	抛弃2015年协议将与小布什抛弃与朝鲜的和协定等量齐观。


Israel and Saudi Arabia recklessly encourage Trump’s Iran policy, but both countries stand to lose grievously if the deal falls apart.	以色列和沙特阿拉伯都在不遗余力地鼓励特朗普的伊朗政策，但如果协议真的被取消，这两个国家都将蒙受巨大损失。


In the case of North Korea, Trump’s approach is even more reckless, threatening that the US will “totally destroy” the country if it does not agree to abandon its nuclear program.	在朝鲜问题上，特朗普的方针更加鲁莽，他威胁说，如果朝鲜不同意放弃核计划，美国将“彻底摧毁”这个国家。


The probability that North Korea will accede to the US demand is close to zero.	朝鲜屈服于美国的要求的概率接近于零。


The probability of provoking a nuclear war is high and rising.	引发核战争的概率倒是很高并且不断增加。


Indeed, North Korea has asserted that the US has effectively declared war, though the White House has denied that interpretation.	事实上，朝鲜已经宣布美国实际已经宣战，尽管白宫否认了这一解读。


Trump, like Bush, has turned President John F. Kennedy’s famous dictum on its head.	和小布什一样，特朗普彻底颠覆了肯尼迪总统的至理名言。


JFK told Americans that they should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.	肯尼迪告诉美国人，决不能因为害怕而谈判，但也决不能害怕谈判。


Trump, like Bush, rejects negotiations, for fear of appearing weak, in favor of unilateral demands backed by the threat or reality of force.	和小布什一样，特朗普拒绝谈判，因为他害怕示弱，相反，他凭借威胁或力量现实提出单方面要求。


With some vision, it would not be hard to see Iran and the US cooperating on many fronts, instead of facing off with threats of war.	只要略微具备远见卓识，就不难看到伊朗和美国能在许多方面进行合作，而不必彼此对峙甚至引发战争。


Achieving the two-state solution in Israel and Palestine would also help to defuse Iran’s anti-Israel stance.	实现以色列和巴勒斯坦的两国方案也有助于缓解伊朗的反以立场。


In the case of North Korea, the regime is seeking a nuclear arsenal to deter a US-led attempt at regime change.	在朝鲜问题上，金氏政权试图用核武器来威慑美国领导的颠覆行动。


Those fears are not completely misplaced.	这样的担忧并不完全没有道理。


The US has, after all, overthrown or at least tried to overthrow non-nuclear regimes that it opposes, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and (unsuccessfully) Syria.	毕竟，美国颠覆过，或者至少试图颠覆过它所反对的无核政权，包括阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亚和（未获成功的）叙利亚。


The North Korean regime has declared explicitly that it seeks “military equilibrium” with the US in order to avert a similar scenario.	朝鲜政权已经明确宣布，它要追求与美国的“军事对等”，以避免同样的结局。


The US suffers from an arrogance of military power disconnected from today’s geopolitical realities.	美国存在一种脱节于当今地缘政治现实的军事实力自大，这令美国常常讨不到好果子。


Militarism has failed time and again – and is more dangerous than ever.	军国主义屡试屡败，并且比以往任何时候都更加危险。


Trump, a malignant narcissist, is seeking instant gratification and a political “win.”	特朗普就像一位邪恶的自恋狂，他要获得的是即刻的满足和政治“胜利”。


America’s recent wars have provided such immediate gratification, before quickly giving way to grief – the ultimate quick high followed by a very deep low.	美国最近的战争提供了即刻的满足，但随后很快转变为悲剧——从波峰到波谷的转变只是一瞬间。


The US is on this path again, heading for a collision with a nuclear-armed adversary, and it will remain on it unless other countries, other American leaders, and public opinion block the way.	如今，美国又一次走上了这条路，将和一个拥有核武器的对手发生碰撞，这种状态将一直保持下去，直到其他国家、其他美国领导人以及公众观点把这条路堵死。


There is a better path: negotiations with Iran and North Korea over mutual security interests that are direct, transparent, objective, and free of US military threats.	有一条更好的路：与伊朗和朝鲜直接进行关于共同安全利益的直接的、透明的、客观的、不受美国军事威胁的谈判。


The same is true regarding the conflicts in Syria, Libya, Israel-Palestine, Yemen, and elsewhere.	叙利亚、利比亚、以色列-巴勒斯坦、也门和其他地区的冲突也是如此。


And there is a venue for this: the UN Security Council, created in 1945 to negotiate solutions when the world hovers between war and peace.	而谈判的场合也是现成的：1945年，为了给在战争与和平之间来回摇摆的世界谈判解决办法而成立的联合国安理会。


Donald Trump Meets Davos Man	特朗普与达沃斯众人


MOSCOW – “If the mountain will not come to Muhammad,” so the saying goes, “then Muhammad must go to the mountain.”	发自莫斯科——有句俗话说“如果山不到默罕默德这边来，默罕默德就到山那边去。


With his decision to attend this year’s World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, US President Donald Trump seems to be taking that message to heart (though he would undoubtedly recoil from any link between the Prophet Muhammad and himself).	”在决定出席今年的瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛会议后，美国总统特朗普似乎把这句话记在了心里（虽然他肯定不会让先知穆罕默德和他自己之间扯上任何联系）。


For the global business, financial, and political leaders who gather in Davos every January, the news that Trump would be joining them this year must have come as a shock, to say the least.	对于每年1月份齐聚达沃斯的全球商界、金融界和政界领袖来说，特朗普今年将加入他们的消息至少算是有点震惊。


Much of the global elite, exemplified by the Davos crowd, feel deep contempt for Trump, and their disdain has likely been deepened by Trump’s recent racist rants about “shithole countries.”	以达沃斯人群为代表的大多数全球精英都极为鄙视特朗普，而特朗普最近针对“粪坑国家”的种族主义咆哮可能令这种蔑视又加深了一点。


Yet the conference will undoubtedly have its share of obsequious displays designed to appeal to Trump’s vanity, with participants by turns fawning over him and propping him up as he clumsily attempts to defend the indefensible, starting with his “America First” approach.	然而本次会议无疑将推出一些旨在迎合特朗普虚荣心的谄媚表演，参与者争相对他大加奉承，在他以“美国优先”的手法开始拙劣地试图捍卫那些跛脚理论时纷纷点赞。


After all, this is the same crowd that kowtowed to Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, when he fraudulently positioned himself as the world’s new champion of globalization and the rules-based international order.	毕竟在去年中国国家主席习近平谎称自己是全球化和基于规则的国际秩序的新全球倡导者时，对着他点头哈腰的也是同一帮人。


Some of the world leaders at Davos have strong incentive to suck up to Trump.	莅临达沃斯的某些世界领导人特别有拍特朗普马屁的动力。


British Prime Minister Theresa May, in particular, may be eager to appease Trump, after the prospect of mass demonstrations kept him from attending the dedication ceremony for the new US embassy in London.	尤其是英国首相特蕾莎·梅特（Teresa May）在爆发大规模示威的可能性导致特朗普无法出席伦敦美国新大使馆的开馆典礼之后或许特别想要安抚特朗普。


With Brexit looming – and losing support at home – Britain can’t afford any further deterioration of its “special relationship” with the United States.	随着英国脱欧的临近——以及国内脱欧支持率不断走低——英国可再也承受不起与美国的“特殊关系”进一步恶化的后果。


May’s government is desperate to sustain the prospect, however deluded, that Trump will offer a good trade deal to the UK.	梅的政府急于维护一个特朗普会向英国提供有利贸易协议的预期，即便这只是自欺欺人。


But, as much as Trump craves a good sycophant, this does not seem a compelling reason for him to attend the WEF meeting in Davos.	但即便特朗普渴望有人拍他马屁，这也算不上是一个令他参加达沃斯世界经济论坛会议的可靠理由。


It is not as if there is any shortage of spineless bootlickers at home, both in Trump’s cabinet and in the Republican congressional leadership.	美国国内也不乏帮他提鞋的软骨头，在特朗普内阁和共和党国会领导层中比比皆是。


Earlier this month, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas and Senator David Perdue of Georgia both attempted to defend Trump’s blatantly racist comments by claiming, first, that they did not recall hearing him say “shithole” and, later, that he must have said “shithouse” instead. (Could one base a defense on a more meaningless distinction?)	本月早些时候，阿肯色州参议员汤姆·科顿（Tom Cotton）和乔治亚州参议员戴维·珀杜（David Perdue）都试图为特朗普的公然种族主义言论辩护，他们首先声称自己不记得听他说过“粪坑”（shithole），后来又宣称特朗普说的肯定是“茅房”（shithouse） ——根据这种毫无意义的差异来狡辩真的有意思吗？


Not everyone at Davos is prepared to take that approach.	但也不是每个来达沃斯的人都准备去采取这种做法。


French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel will probably make themselves scarce when Trump is around.	当特朗普出场时，法国总统马克龙和德国总理默克尔可能会使自己变得特立独行。


Macron has so far handled Trump cleverly: he appeased Trump’s inner martinet by inviting him to the Bastille Day military parade last summer, but he has also challenged Trump publicly, with everything from a bravura handshake at their first meeting to a defense of the Iran nuclear deal.	马克龙到目前为止都妥善料理着特朗普：他在去年夏天邀请后者出席了巴士底日阅兵仪式，以此平息了特朗普心里对他的苛责，但他也会公开挑战特朗普，从第一次会议上的大胆握手到对伊朗核协议的辩护上都是如此。


As for Merkel, her taut and anguished meetings with Trump are almost as legendary as her frosty encounters with Trump’s apparent hero, Russian President Vladimir Putin.	在默克尔方面，她与特朗普紧张和痛苦的会面几乎就跟她与特朗普心目中的英雄榜样——俄罗斯总统普京——的冷淡交锋一样传奇。


There is no telling how African leaders at Davos – many of whom have publicly denounced Trump’s comments, demanding apologies and retractions – will react to the man in the flesh.	没有人知道达沃斯的非洲领导人——他们中的许多人公开谴责特朗普的言论，要求道歉并撤回——在亲眼见到这人时会做出何种反应。


Likewise, it remains uncertain whether journalists will hold their tongues respectfully or give Trump the kind of shellacking that Peter Hoekstra, the new US ambassador to the Netherlands, has been getting from the Dutch press. (Hoekstra is being forced to answer for his 2015 lies that the “Islamic movement” had brought chaos to the country, that Dutch politicians were being burned by Islamists, and that Muslim-dominated “no-go zones” had emerged in the country.)	同样，记者是否会恭敬地闭上自己的嘴巴，还是给予特朗普一场新任美国驻荷兰大使彼得·霍克斯特拉（Peter Hoekstra）从荷兰媒体处遭遇的那种抨击，这一点仍不确定（霍克斯特拉被迫回应他2015年说出的谎言，即“伊斯兰运动”给荷兰全国带来了混乱，荷兰政治人物被伊斯兰主义者点火焚烧，穆斯林占主导的“禁区”已经在荷兰境内大量涌现。


Given the risk that Trump will face derision and even outright mockery from some quarters, why he has decided to attend Davos remains unclear.	鉴于特朗普会面临轻视甚至遭到直接嘲讽的风险，他为何决定参加达沃斯仍不清楚。


The only reason I can discern is that he plans to play to his domestic base, by putting his economic nationalism, xenophobic immigration policies, antipathy toward the press, and contempt for international institutions on full display.	我能看出的唯一原因是他打算把自己的经济民族主义，仇外移民政策，对新闻界的反感和对国际机构的蔑视彻底展现出来，好取悦自己的国内支持者。


If his comments are met with boos or silence, he will proudly tweet that it is because he – unlike his predecessor Barack Obama – is actually defending America’s interests.	如果他的言论碰到了嘘声或沉默，他会自鸣得意地说这是因为他跟前任奥巴马不一样，他实际上捍卫了美国的利益。


Last week, Republican Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona condemned Trump for using Joseph Stalin’s infamous phrase “enemies of the people” to describe the free press.	上周，亚利桑那州共和党参议员杰夫·弗莱克（Jeff Flake）谴责特朗普使用斯大林那个臭名昭著的“人民公敌”说法来形容自由媒体。


Flake (who, like many other Republicans, will retire from Congress this year) was, of course, being too literal.	但是像许多其他共和党人一样即将于今年退出国会的弗莱克还是过于文雅了。


Coming from Stalin’s lips, the phrase, backed by the full and fearsome force of the Soviet state’s internal security apparatus, was a death sentence for millions.	在苏维埃国家内部安全机构充分而可怕的支持下，斯大林口中的这个词等同于对数百万人的死刑判决。


When the same words are uttered by Trump, an object of suspicion for much of the US security apparatus, they become just another part of the narrative spectacle by which he channels the loyalties and antipathies of his supporters.	当同样的词从特朗普这个这本应是美国大部分安全机构怀疑对象的人嘴里蹦出来的时候，则成为了引导其支持者的忠诚和憎恶的述事表演的一部分。


For Trump, going to Davos amounts to no more – or less – than taking the show on the road.	对于特朗普来说，前往达沃斯的行程不过是一场竞选路演而已。


So, with apologies to Osip Mandelstam, I recommend to conference attendees an adaptation of “The Kremlin Mountaineer” (also known as “The Stalin Epigram”), the mocking poem that cost Mandelstam his life.	因此在向诗作者奥西普·曼德尔施塔姆（Osip Mandelstam）表示歉意的情况下，我建议与会者读一篇由《克里姆林宫登山家》（又名《斯大林讽刺诗》，曼德尔施塔姆正是因为这首嘲讽诗而惨遭放逐而死）改编的讽刺诗。


The White House Mountaineer	白宫登山家


Our lives no longer feel ground under them.	在他们手下，我们再无踏实的生活


At ten paces you can’t hear our words.	十步之外，你听不到我们的声音


But whenever there’s a snatch of talk or tweet	可哪怕有一丝的声响


it turns on the White House mountaineer.	都会触动白宫登山家的神经。


the ten tiny fingers on his pudgy hands,	他短胖双掌上十指纤细，


his words both cunning and weightless,	他的言语狡诈轻佻，


the huge snuggling fox covering his pate,	他头戴宽厚的狐皮帽，


the orange glitter of his skin colorizer.	身上涂抹的上色油闪烁着金光。


Ringed by a scum of chicken-necked advisers	在一堆唯唯诺诺顾问的簇拥之下，


he toys with the tributes of half-men.	他赏玩着阉人们的表演。


One salutes, another meows, a third snivels.	一人向他敬礼，另一个作势卖萌，还有一个痛哭流涕，


He pokes out his little finger and he alone goes boom.	他伸出一根小指，兀自兴奋了起来。


He spews incitements in a line like horseshoes,	他喷吐出一串煽动性语句，就像那马蹄印，


One for the groin, one the forehead, temple, eye.	一条关于私处，一条关于前额，一条关于太阳穴，一条关于眼睛


Trump’s Willing Accomplices	特朗普的自愿共犯


NEW YORK – On February 20, 1933, a secret meeting took place in Hermann Göring’s palatial residence in Berlin.	纽约—1933年2月20日，一场秘密会议在戈林的柏林庄园内举行。


More than 20 of Germany’s top industrialists, including Gustav Krupp, Friedrich Flick, and Fritz von Opel, listened to a speech by Hitler, who promised them that their assets would be safe under his rule.	包括古斯塔夫·克虏伯（Gustav Krupp）、弗雷德里希·弗里克（Friedrich Flick）、弗里茨·冯·欧宝（Fritz von Opel）在内的20多位德国顶级产业家听取了希特勒的演讲，他承诺他们的资产可以在他的统治下保全。


So they agreed to support the Nazi Party with over two million Reichsmark, an enormous sum that was almost enough to pay for the upcoming election campaign.	因此他们同意支持纳粹党两百万帝国马克，这是一笔巨款，几乎足以支付即将到来的竞选经费。


Few of these men, if any, were convinced Nazis.	他们中间几乎没有坚定的纳粹。


They were members of the German Herrenklub (Gentlemen’s Club), which was very conservative but not National Socialist.	他们是德国绅士俱乐部（Herrenklub）的成员，该俱乐部立场非常保守，但不属于国家社会党（National Socialist）。


But, acting from narrow self-interest, they became Hitler’s enablers.	但在狭隘私利的驱使下，他们成为希特勒的帮凶。


By doing so, they were accomplices in a criminal regime that was guilty of mass murder, and in the end the destruction of their country.	他们也因此成了犯有集体屠杀罪行并最终毁掉他们的祖国的犯罪集团的帮凶。


Their own companies benefited greatly from slave labor.	他们的公司本身从奴隶劳工中获得了巨大的收益。


Thomas Mann called the Herrenklub the “trendsetter of misery.”	托马斯·曼（Thomas Mann）称绅士俱乐部是“痛苦潮流的引领者”。


This didn’t prevent Flick and others from enjoying flourishing careers after the war, following light prison sentences.	但这并没有妨碍弗里克和其他人在战后短暂地服刑后再次兴旺发达。


US President Donald Trump is not a Nazi dictator (though some of his closest advisers admire some of the ideas that inspired fascism and Nazism in the past).	美国总统特朗普不是纳粹独裁者（尽管他的一些亲信幕僚对过去的法西斯和纳粹所提出的一些观点颇为敬仰）。


Yet he is a menace to the democracy he is supposed to protect.	但他对他理应保护的民主构成了威胁。


He continues to attack the free press and judicial independence, and encourages mob violence, including by neo-Nazis.	他不断地抨击新闻自由和司法独立，鼓励包括新纳粹在内的群众暴力。


Retweeting anti-Muslim videos posted by a British extremist is just the latest of his outrages.	转发英国极端分子发布的反穆斯林视频只是他的出格之举的最新例子。


Many leading Republican politicians who stand by Trump, and even the multi-billionaires who fund their campaigns, may have private misgivings about the dangerously erratic narcissist in the White House, just as the gentlemen of the Herrenklub probably once despised the vulgar upstart in his preposterous brown uniforms.	许多为特朗普“站台”的共和党政治领袖，甚至在竞选中为他提供资金支持的亿万富翁们，也许在私下里都有些担心白宫危险的反覆无常和自我陶醉，正如绅士俱乐部的绅士们可能也曾经对那位身穿滑稽可笑的棕色制服的暴发户嗤之以鼻。


But with only a few exceptions, the politicians continue to support him – and for a similar reason: their narrow self-interest in staying in power and making more money for their backers.	但除了极少数例外，政客们一直在支持他——出于相似的原因：掌权并给他们的支持者赚更多的钱符合他们的狭隘私利。


A prime example is the tax legislation recently rammed through the Senate.	一个显著的例子是最近被参议院通过的税收法案。


Once the bill is reconciled with the House version and Trump signs it into law, big business and the very rich will benefit at the expense of the poor and vulnerable.	一旦该法案被众议院通过并经特朗普签字正式成为法律，那么大企业和巨富们将大大获益，而穷人和弱势群体将受损。


And, according to the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office, America’s financial health will suffer as well, with an estimated $1.214 trillion added to the deficit by 2027.	据无党派立场的国会预算办公室（CBO）的测算，美国金融健康也会受到影响，到2027年将产生大约1. 214万亿美元的新增赤字。


This should be seen as a betrayal of many Trump voters in the rural areas of relatively poor states and the Rust Belt cities of the Midwest, where people most need the federal government’s help to remain solvent and healthy.	这应该视为特朗普对相对较穷的州的农村选民和中西部锈带城市选民的背叛，他们最需要联邦政府的帮助来免于破产和保持健康。


They are most likely to pay the price for enriching the very rich even further.	他们最有可能成为巨富们变得更加富有的垫脚石。


There are, of course, many differences between the US today and Germany in the 1930s.	当然，今天的美国和20世纪30年代的德国不尽相同。


Leftist thinkers have often claimed that fascism was the last stage of capitalism.	左翼思想家常说，法西斯是资本主义的最后阶段。


In fact, National Socialism and fascism were not especially friendly to liberal capitalism.	事实上，国家资本主义和法西斯对于自由资本主义都不十分友好。


Nor were Nazism and fascism designed to benefit only an oligarchy.	纳粹和法西斯也不是为了只让寡头受益。


Big business thrived under both systems, to be sure, especially corporations that profited from mining and military spending.	平心而论，大企业在这两套制度下都能兴旺发达，特别是从采矿和军事支出中盈利的公司。


But, apart from persecuted minorities and dissidents, many ordinary people gained from government programs (not to mention the looting of conquered countries).	但是，除了受到迫害的少数群体和异见分子，许多普通老百姓都能从政府计划中获益（更不用说对被征服的国家的洗劫了）。


The industrialists who gathered around Hitler and Göring in 1933 were bought off by a murderous gangster regime.	1933年团结在希特勒和戈林周围的产业家门被一个凶残的流氓政权收买了。


The same was true of the German officer corps.	德国军官团亦然。


This was not the last stage of capitalism; Hitler used the capitalists for his nefarious ends.	这不是资本主义的最后阶段； 希特勒利用资本家来达到他的邪恶的目的。


The situation in the US under Donald Trump looks rather different.	特朗普上台后的美国的情况看上去则大不相同。


Trump used populist language in his campaign, stoking up popular resentment against the educated urban elites, including capitalists on Wall Street.	特朗普在竞选中用了民粹主义叙事，煽动群众对受过良好教育的城市精英的怨恨，包括那些华尔街的资本家。


And he continues to pander to the emotions of ill-educated white racists and others who feel left behind in the modern world, and blame their problems on liberals and unpopular ethnic and religious minorities.	他还不断地迎合教育程度较低的白人种族主义者和其他感到被当代社会抛弃的人的情绪，将他们遇到的问题归咎于自由派和不受欢迎的种族和宗教少数群体。


But it is not yet clear who is using whom in Trump’s world.	但在特朗普的世界中，谁在利用谁还不好说。


In their obsession with low corporate and personal taxes, and their loathing of organized labor and the federal government, rich donors, such as the brothers Charles and David Koch, or the casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, appear to be manipulating Trump, rather than the other way around.	醉心于降低公司和个人税收和打压劳工组织和联邦政府的富豪捐助者们——比如查尔斯和大卫·科赫（Charles and David Koch）兄弟，或赌场大亨谢尔顿·阿德尔森（Sheldon Adelson）——似乎正在操纵特朗普，而不是反过来被特朗普操纵。


In a sense, they, as much as Krupp or Opel (if not more so), represent a type of capitalism that is being untethered from all necessary restraints.	从某种意义上说，他们就像是克虏伯和欧宝（甚至有过之），代表着一种摆脱了一切必要的约束的资本主义类型。


This began long before Trump appeared on the scene.	这在特朗普崭露头角之前很久便已经初具端倪。


The process goes back at least as far as Ronald Reagan’s era of “supply-side” tax cuts and deregulation.	整个过程至少可以追溯到里根的“供给侧”减税和去监管化时代。


In the short term, the wealthy and corporate America will probably do nicely.	在短期，富人和美国公司或许能够表现出色。


Stock markets may well continue their bull run for a while longer.	股市可能在一段时间里继续走牛。


But in the longer term, with deficits looming, international trade agreements torn up, and totally inadequate spending on vital infrastructure, education, and health care, things could turn out very badly.	但从长期看，在赤字阴影、国际贸易协议被撕毁和重要基础设施、教育和医疗支持全面不足的情况下，情况可能会变得非常糟糕。


Enabling a president who is clearly a danger to democracy for the sake of immediate financial gain is unpatriotic and morally reprehensible.	为了眼前的金融利益而充当显然是民主的威胁的总统的帮凶，这绝非爱国，并应受到道德的谴责。


But it makes no economic sense, either.	但在经济上，这也是毫无意义的。


Henry Ford was an anti-Semite who was happy to cooperate with Nazi Germany until 1942. He was also a leader of the America First Committee, which opposed going to war against Hitler.	亨利·福特是反犹主义者，他和纳粹的愉快合作一直持续到1942年，并领导着反对与希特勒开战的美国优先委员会（America First Committee）。


But he had one insight, which Trump’s business-first accomplices would do well to heed.	但他有一个洞见是特朗普的企业优先共犯们所不会遵循的。


“Fordism” meant that workers had to be rich enough to buy a car from his factories.	“福特主义”意味着工人足够富有，买得起他的工厂所生产的汽车。


Trump’s tax bill will leave millions of potential consumers far worse off.	特朗普的税收法案将让数百万潜在消费者变得更穷。


And that cannot be good for business.	这对企业可不是好事。


Truthiness on the March	大行其道的感实性


LONDON – The late US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously said, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts.” That may be true.	发自伦敦——美国已故参议员丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉（Daniel Patrick Moynihan）曾说过一句名言：“每个人都构建自身观点的权利，却无权去捏造自己所认为的事实。


But, entitled or not, politicians and electorates are constructing their own alternate realities – with far-reaching consequences.	”这句话有其道理，但无论有权与否，政治家和选民们依旧在各自构建属于自己的替代性现实——并产生了深远的后果。


Nowadays, facts and truth are becoming increasingly difficult to uphold in politics (and in business and even sports).	如今人们越来越难以在政治上（以及商业及体育领域）维护事实与真相。


They are being replaced with what the American comedian Stephen Colbert calls “truthiness”: the expression of gut feelings or opinions as valid statements of fact.	它们被美国喜剧演员斯蒂芬·科尔伯特（Stephen Colbert）所谓的“感实性”所替代：将直觉感受或观点的表达视为事实的有效呈现。


This year might be considered one of peak truthiness.	而今年则有可能是感实性不断涌现的其中一个高峰。


To make good decisions, voters need to assess reliable facts, from economic data to terrorism analysis, presented transparently and without bias.	为了做出正确的决定，选民需要对可靠的事实——涵盖从经济数据到恐怖主义活动分析的一系列透明且不带偏见的参数——进行评估。


But, today, talking heads on television would rather attack those with expertise in these areas.	但今时今日，那些媒体名嘴们更喜欢去攻击这些领域的专家学者们。


And ambitious political figures – from the leaders of the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom to US Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump – dismiss the facts altogether.	而那些雄心勃勃的政治人物——从英国脱欧公投的领袖到美国共和党总统候选人唐纳·德特朗普（Donald Trump）——则不约而同地选择去忽视事实。


The environment is ripe for such behavior.	这些行为的滋生是有其深厚土壤的。


Voters, particularly in the advanced economies, are jaded by years of broken political promises, revelations of cover-ups, and relentless political and media spin.	选民，尤其是身处发达经济体的人们，多年来一直被无法兑现的政治承诺，不断披露的黑幕，以及政界和媒体无休止的见风使舵弄得精疲力竭。


Opaque or dubious dealings have cast doubt on the integrity of organizations and institutions on which we should be able to rely.	不透明或可疑的交易使得我们对那些本可依赖的组织机构的诚信产生了怀疑。


For example, the New York Times recently published a series of articles on think tanks that highlighted the conflict of interest faced by those who operate as analysts, but are beholden to corporate funders and sometimes also act as lobbyists.	例如，纽约时报最近发表了一系列关于智库的评论文章，着重指出了这些机构的分析员所面临的利益冲突，他们一方面要做分析，同时又受资助企业所控制，有时还得充当说客。


As soon as a few experts are found to have been offering half-truths – or worse – the credibility of the entire field can be called into question.	当人们发现有这么几个专家一直在提供半真半假的信息——有些甚至更糟——整个领域的信誉都遭到质疑。


Christine Todd Whitman, who was Head of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on September 11, 2001, told residents of New York City that the air was safe to breathe and the water was safe to drink in the days after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.	比如在2001年9月11日世贸大厦遭受恐怖袭击后，时任美国环境保护署（EPA）负责人的克里斯蒂娜·托德·惠特曼（Christine Todd Whitman）告诉纽约市民说当地的空气和水质都是安全的。


But, as a 2003 EPA report noted, the agency “did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket statement” at that time.	但EPA在2003年的报告中指出该机构在那个时期“没有足够的数据和分析来做出这样的声明”。


With cases of severe respiratory illness piling up, Whitman now admits that the statement was wrong.	当严重呼吸疾病病例不断涌现之时，惠特曼如今转而承认说当时的说法是错误的。


Likewise, as the recently published Chilcot report showed, the Iraq War was launched in 2003 under false pretenses.	同样，日前公布的齐尔考特报告显示2003年发起的伊拉克战争也是蒙混过关的。


Intelligence reports had not established that there were weapons of mass destruction in the country, yet British Prime Minister Tony Blair dutifully followed US President George W. Bush in ordering his military to invade.	当时并未有足够情报确认伊拉克拥有大规模杀伤性武器，然而英国首相托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）依然顺从地追随美国总统乔治·布什（George W. Bush）进行军事入侵。


The consequences of that decision are still emerging.	而这一决策导致的后果至今还在不断涌现。


If our leaders can be so willfully wrong about such consequential matters, how can we believe anything they tell us?	如果我们的领导人能如此肆意地在这些导致严重后果的问题上犯错，我们又如何能相信他们所说的任何事情？


This question has opened the door for a new, more overt truthiness, espoused by the likes of Trump, who seems to introduce freshly invented “facts” on a daily basis.	这个问题开辟了一个崭新且更为明目张胆的感实性领域，而唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）这类人对此十分热衷，并且似乎每天都在推出新鲜发明的“事实”。


Trump’s surrogates, for their part, use television appearances and social media to restate the falsehoods, seemingly operating under the principle that if you repeat something often enough, it will become true.	对那些特朗普的代理人来说，在电视上和社交媒体面前不断重申谎言的行为看似在验证一个原则：只要你重复某些谎言的次数足够多，它就会变成事实。


And many voters seem willing to go along for the ride.	而许多选民似乎也愿意加入这个行列。


When 40 leading Republican foreign policymakers and national-security experts signed a letter expressing their opposition to Trump, whom they fear would be “the most reckless president in American history,” their concerns were largely disregarded.	当40位顶尖共和党外交政策和国家安全专家联名写信反对特朗普，担心此人会成为“美国史上最鲁莽总统”之时，他们的担心却在很大程度上被忽视了。


Trump’s response – that those leaders are the ones who made the world “such a dangerous place” – sounds just plausible enough to justify ignoring their warning.	特朗普对此的回应——认为正是这些人让世界变成“这么危险的一个地方”——听起来就足以说明为何要忽视专家们的警告。


Even outright lies spoken in a nationally broadcast interview go unchallenged, as if Trump were indeed entitled to his own facts.	此人即便在全国广播的采访中说弥天大谎也毫无顾忌，仿佛他确实有权去捏造自己所认定的事实。


The leaders of the UK’s campaign to withdraw from the European Union enjoyed a similar advantage in the run-up to June’s Brexit referendum.	英国脱欧联盟的领袖们在六月公投之前也享有同样的优势。


They painted a wholly false picture of the country’s circumstances – from its role in the EU to the impact of immigration – and knowingly made impossible promises about what would happen if the public voted “Leave.”	他们描绘了一幅完全虚假的国家状况图——从英国在欧盟的地位到欧盟移民的影响——并故意许下各种公众投票“脱欧”后无法兑现的承诺。


For example, leaders like Boris Johnson, now Britain’s foreign secretary, declared that the £350 million ($465 million) supposedly paid weekly to the EU (a deeply flawed figure that fails to take into account the benefits received) would be redirected to the National Health Services.	例如，像现任英国外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）这样的脱欧带头人宣称，要将英国每周支付给欧盟的3. 5亿欧元（ 折和4.


The Leave campaign even plastered the pledge onto the side of a campaign bus.	65亿美元）——该数据有严重缺陷，因没有考虑所收到的好处——重新分配给国家医疗服务体系。 脱欧联盟甚至将这一承诺贴满了一部竞选宣传大巴的侧面。


Now that the referendum is over, Johnson and others have backtracked, and the campaign has rebranded itself the “Change Britain” movement and promised to redirect EU funds to other areas instead.	如今公投结束，约翰逊等人却改口了，其竞选组织也更名为“改变英国”运动，并承诺将欧盟基金重新定向到其他领域。


This has infuriated many, especially given the recent warning by the body that represents hospitals across England that underfunding has pushed the NHS to the brink.	此举激怒了许多人，尤其是在代表英格兰地区各医院的组织警告说资金不足已经令英国国家医疗体系危如累卵的情况下。


Brexiteers have also walked back pledges to curb immigration, amid a sharp increase in hate crimes across the UK that their rhetoric helped to fuel.	脱欧支持者同时还撤回了遏制移民的承诺，但他们的言论早已使得英国各地因仇恨所引发的罪案大幅增加。


The downsides of Brexit should have been obvious to voters before the referendum – not least because so many economists, defense experts, and world leaders spelled them out during the campaign.	脱欧的负面效应本应在公投之前明确展现在选民面前—— 至少许多经济学家，防务专家和世界各国领导人都在选前极力阐述了。


But, as leading Brexiteer Michael Gove proudly observed, people in the UK had “had enough of experts.”	但脱欧领袖迈克·尔戈夫（Michael Gove）却得意地观察到英国人已经“受够了那些专家。 ”


In fact, it seems that some people voted for Brexit specifically because so many experts spoke out against it.	事实上，似乎有些人正是因为很多专家公开反对才投票选择脱欧的。


They seemed to believe Brexiteer MP Gisela Stuart: “the only expert that matters” is the voter.	他们似乎相信脱欧支持者吉塞拉·斯图尔特（Gisela Stuart）议员的话：“唯一重要的专家……是选民”。


It should be no surprise that the post-referendum reality is not what many Brexit voters expected.	但不出意外，公投后的现实可跟脱欧选民期望的相距甚远。


Yet the revelations of the falsehoods that propelled the Leave campaign to victory have hardly driven people back into the arms of experts.	然而，推动脱欧运动获得了胜利的谎言却并未驱动民众重投专家的怀抱。


Truthiness is on the march, particularly across Europe and the US – in large part because so many of the authorities who should be calling out the lies are tainted by truthiness themselves.	感实性正大行其道，特别是在整个欧洲和美国——在很大程度上是因为如此多本应揭露谎言的机构都受到感实性的玷污。


Turkey’s Quagmire	土耳其的沼泽


TEL AVIV – As the Islamic State militant group has advanced across Iraq and Syria, traditional regional alliances, long shaped by Western powers, have been upended.	特拉维夫—伊斯兰国军事集团正在伊拉克和叙利亚节节进逼，长期以来一直由西方列强维持的传统地区联盟被颠覆了。


Particularly consequential is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s struggle to reconcile his country’s relationship with NATO with its image as a leading protector of Sunni Islam.	特别严重的是，土耳其总统埃尔多安正以逊尼派伊斯兰教主要保护者的姿态协调土耳其与北约的关系。


The Turkish government’s reluctance to join the United States-led coalition against the Islamic State’s extremist Sunni fighters has isolated it from other Sunni Arab powers, such as Saudi Arabia, that have joined the coalition.	土耳其不愿加入美国领导的针对伊斯兰国的极端逊尼派，这使它孤立于加入联盟的其他逊尼派阿拉伯强国（如沙特阿拉伯）。


Moreover, it has further alienated Turkey’s Iranian allies, already estranged by Erdoğan’s obsession with toppling their man in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad.	此外，这也使土耳其更加远离其伊朗阵营盟国，——埃尔多安一根筋地要颠覆大马士革的巴沙尔·阿萨德令他们十分不满。


And it appears to vindicate European Union countries, such as France and Germany, that never trusted Turkey’s capacity to reconcile its Islamist vocation with its European aspirations.	而德国和法国等欧盟国家也发现永远不能相信土耳其可以将其伊斯兰教使命与其加入欧洲的愿望协调起来。


Indeed, a key NATO member state has become the paladin of radical Islam throughout the Middle East, led by a president whose core political constituency is ingrained with anti-Western sentiment.	事实上，一个重要北约国家成了中东极端伊斯兰圣骑士，它的总统选票主要来自带反西方情绪的选民。


Erdoğan’s supporters dismiss Western campaigns against Islamist terrorism as a ploy to repress Sunnis.	埃尔多安的支持者将西方针对伊斯兰教恐怖主义的运动称为压迫逊尼派的阴谋。


As one such supporter, Kenan Alpay, recently wrote, “Turkey cannot be a part of an international system that aims to dissolve all Islamic movements from the Muslim Brotherhood to…the Taliban in Afghanistan.”	其中一位支持者柯南·阿尔贝（Kenan Alpay）最近写道“土耳其不能成为旨在剿灭从穆斯林兄弟会到……阿富汗塔利班的一切伊斯兰运动的国际体系的一部分。 ”


A couple of weeks later, Erdoğan himself unleashed a furious anti-Western diatribe at Istanbul’s Marmara University. In his speech, he compared the West’s interference in the Middle East today with the British officer Lawrence of Arabia’s involvement in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans during World War I, and blasted the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which has since defined the Middle East’s political map.	几周后，埃尔多安本人在伊斯坦布尔马尔马拉大学（Marmara University）措辞严厉地抨击了西方，他将如今西方对中东的干预与一战期间英国军官“阿拉伯的劳伦斯”（Lawrence of Arabia）介入针对奥斯曼帝国的阿拉伯革命（Arab Revolt）相提并论，并谴责了决定了此后中东政治版图的赛克斯-皮科协定（Sykes-Picot Agreement）。


The similarities with the views of the Islamic State are glaring.	他的观点与伊斯兰国有着惊人的相似性。


In a video produced after the battle for the Mosul Dam in August, the group called for the “end of Sykes-Picot,” and proclaimed the need to redraw the Western-imposed political map of the Middle East.	在8月摩苏尔大坝（Mosul Dam）争夺战后，伊斯兰国在一份视频中呼吁“结束赛克斯-皮科”并声称有必要改划由西方强加给中东的政治版图。


Erdoğan’s ambition to restore Turkey’s primacy in the Sunni world is driving him to collude with this challenge to the Western-devised regional order.	埃尔多安重塑土耳其在逊尼派世界的主导地位的野心促使他将这一挑战与西方设计的地区秩序联系起来。


Indeed, Turkey has been offering logistical support to the Islamic State, even as it has enabled the group’s murderous members to massacre thousands of civilian Kurds and Yazidis in the Syrian town of Kobani on Turkey’s doorstep.	事实上，土耳其一直在为伊斯兰国提供物流支持，即使这导致后者的残忍成员在毗邻土耳其的叙利亚小城柯巴尼（Kobani）屠杀了数千库尔德和雅兹迪平民。


This highlights another issue on which Turkey and the Islamic State converge: the Kurds.	这凸显出另一个土耳其和伊斯兰国逐渐靠拢的问题：库尔德人。


Erdoğan seems to hope that, by degrading Kurdish military strength and territorial control, the Islamic State will help him to achieve his central goal of diminishing the Kurdish nationalist movement, which has long been a thorn in Turkey’s side.	埃尔多安似乎希望，通过削弱库尔德人的军事实力和领土控制，伊斯兰国能帮助他实现镇压库尔德民族主义运动的核心目标，这一直是土耳其的一块心病。


But, if anything, the war against the Islamic State has bolstered the Kurdish cause.	但是，与伊斯兰国的战争对让库尔德人变得更加强大。


The Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Iraq have already established a quasi-independent state along the border with Turkey.	伊拉克的库尔德自由斗士（Pshmerga）已经沿土耳其边境建立了准独立国家。


And the Democratic Union Party – the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been fighting a guerrilla war against the Turkish state for the last three decades – is on its way toward establishing a Kurdish autonomous region along Turkey’s Syrian border.	而民主联盟党（Democratic Union Party）——库尔德工人党（Kurdistan Workers’ Party，PKK）的叙利亚分支，过去三十年来一直在进行针对土耳其的游击战——正在迈向沿土耳其的叙利亚边境建立库尔德自治区。


Together, these groups have emerged as the most effective force in the war against the Islamic State.	总体而言，这些组织已崛起为与伊斯兰对抗的最有效的力量。


And there is more bad news for Erdoğan.	对埃尔多安来说还有其他坏消息。


The perception that his true objective in supporting the Islamic State is to stem the rise of the Kurds, bolstered by his apparent indifference to the agony in Kobani, has jeopardized one of his major legacies: peace talks with the PKK.	人们认为支持伊斯兰国的真正目的是崛起库尔德人崛起——他完全漠视柯巴尼的惨象就是明证——这破坏了他的一大招牌形象：与PKK进行和平谈判。


Erdoğan has even argued that, in Turkey’s view, the PKK and the Islamic State are the same – mirroring Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s statement that Hamas and the Islamic State were branches of the same tree.	埃尔多安甚至指出，在土耳其看来，PKK和伊斯兰国是一样的——这与以色列总理内塔尼亚胡声称哈马斯和伊斯兰国是同一棵树上的两根树枝的说法如出一辙。


With such desperate and unreasonable rhetoric, Erdoğan is lending credence to accusations that the entire “peace process” was simply a ploy to persuade the Kurdish members of Turkey’s parliament to support the constitutional changes that allowed him to move from Prime Minister to President.	埃尔多安如此不顾一切的无理言辞不禁让人们怀疑，整个“和平进程”只不过是说服土耳其议会中的库尔德议员支持让他从总理变为总统的宪法改革的伎俩。


That is an entirely plausible conclusion.	这个推论十分合理。


After all, Erdoğan’s anti-Kurdish sentiment also shaped his policy decisions concerning regime change in Syria.	毕竟，埃尔多安的反土耳其心理还左右着他在叙利亚政权更迭问题上的政策决定。


He has long insisted on the creation of a no-fly “buffer” zone on the Syrian side of the border, under the pretext that it would help to address the humanitarian crisis that the civil war has engendered.	长期以来，他一直坚持在土叙边境叙利亚一侧建立禁飞“缓冲”区，其理由是这有助于解决叙利亚内战带来的人道主义危机。


But his real objective is to forestall any Kurdish bid for autonomy in northern Syria.	但他的真正目的是抢先阻止库尔德人在叙利亚北部建立自治区的方案。


(Turkey’s Western allies continue to oppose the proposal, lest they be dragged into an all-out confrontation with the Syrian regime and its Russian and Chinese allies.)	（土耳其的西方盟友一直反对这一建议，唯恐被卷入与叙利亚政权及其俄罗斯和中国盟友的全面冲突。 ）


Erdoğan now finds himself in a strategic quagmire.	如今，埃尔多安陷入了战略沼泽。


If his position on the Islamic State continues to waver, he will only alienate the Kurds further, which means that when the jihadists decide to encroach on Turkish territory, Turkey will have to confront them without a Kurdish alliance.	如果他在伊斯兰国问题上的立场继续摇摆，将导致库尔德人的进一步离心离德，而这意味着当圣战主义者决定进犯土耳其领土时，土耳其将得不到库尔德人的支持。


But if he decides to support the Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State, he will undoubtedly enhance their national aspirations.	但如果他决定支持库尔德人与伊斯兰国战斗，又不然会主张库尔德人的民族雄心。


But stronger Kurdish nationalism might not be such a bad thing for Erdoğan, who has been a vociferous advocate of the right of national self-determination beyond Turkey’s immediate vicinity, such as in the case of Palestine.	但库尔德民族主义的增强并不一定是对埃尔多安的坏事。 埃尔多安一直大声支持土耳其周边近邻之外（如巴勒斯坦）的民族自治权利。


Indeed, such a move could be a welcome sign of political and moral consistency, possibly even boosting Erdoğan’s leverage in devising an arrangement with Turkey’s Kurds, including the PKK.	事实上，这一动作应该是受欢迎的政治和道德一致性信号，甚至可以增强埃尔多安促成与包括PKK在内的土耳其库尔德人的安排的筹码。


In any case, it is time for Erdoğan to make a choice.	无论如何，埃尔多安应该做出选择。


He has already led Turkey into a thicket of clashes among its vital interests: its Western alliance, its regional aspirations, and the Kurdish question.	他已经让土耳其深陷其各项关键利益的错综复杂的纠结之中：与西方盟友关系、地区雄心和库尔德问题。


Something will have to give – and soon.	他必须牺牲其中一些利益——并且必须尽快。


Turkey’s Baffling Coup	莫名其妙的土耳其政变


GRANADA – Military coups – successful or otherwise – follow a predictable pattern in Turkey.	格拉纳达—军事政变——不管成功与否——已经成为土耳其一个可预见的模式。


Political groups – typically Islamists – deemed by soldiers to be antagonistic to Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a secular Turkey gain increasing power.	被士兵认为与凯末尔的世俗土耳其愿景南辕北辙的政治集团——通常是伊斯兰教徒——权力越来越大。


Tensions rise, often accompanied by violence on the streets.	紧张局面出现，通常伴随着街头暴力。


Then the military steps in, exercising what the soldiers claim is their constitutional power to restore order and secular principles.	接着是军方介入，行使士兵所谓的重建秩序和世俗原则的宪法权力。


This time, it was very different.	这一回情况截然不同。


Thanks to a series of sham trials targeting secularist officers, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had managed to reconfigure the military hierarchy and place his own people at the top.	拜一系列针对世俗论官员的虚伪神牌所赐，土耳其总统埃尔多安成功地重塑了军队层级，将自己人安插在最高层。


While the country has been rocked by a series of terrorist attacks and faces a souring economy, there was no inkling of unrest in the military or opposition to Erdoğan.	尽管国家受到一系列恐怖主义袭击并面临经济萧条，但军方并未出现动乱或反对埃尔多安的迹象。


On the contrary, Erdoğan’s recent reconciliation with Russia and Israel, together with his apparent desire to pull back from an active role in the Syrian civil war, must have been a relief to Turkey’s top brass.	相反，埃尔多安最近对俄罗斯和以色列的妥协，及其显而易见意欲不再在叙利亚内战中扮演积极角色的姿态，必然让土耳其军队高层松了口气。


No less baffling was the almost amateurish behavior of the putschists, who managed to capture the chief of the general staff but apparently made no meaningful attempt to detain Erdoğan or any senior politicians.	同样令人莫名其妙的是政变者手段之业余。 他们成功俘虏了总参谋长，但显然没有采取有效行动囚禁埃尔多安或任何政治高层。


Major television channels were allowed to continue to operate for hours, and when soldiers showed up in the studios, their incompetence was almost comical.	各大电视频道继续播出长达数小时，而当士兵们出现在画面中时，表现出令人哭笑不得的低能。


Planes strafed civilians and attacked the parliament – very uncharacteristic behavior for the Turkish military outside areas of Kurdish insurgency.	飞机朝平民开火并袭击议会——这对于库尔德人起义地区之外的土耳其军方来说绝非典型举措。


Social media were full of pictures of hapless (and apparently clueless) soldiers being pulled out of tanks and disarmed (and sometimes much worse) by civilian crowds – scenes I never thought I would see in a country that has come to hate military coups but still loves its soldiers.	社交媒体充斥着倒霉（并且显然懵懂）的士兵从坦克中被平民群众拉出并解除武装（有时情况还要糟糕得多）——我实在难以想象这个虽然讨厌军事政变但士兵依然受到爱戴的国家会出现这样的画面。


Erdoğan was quick to blame his former ally and current nemesis, the exiled preacher Fethullah Gülen, who leads a large Islamic movement from outside of Philadelphia.	埃尔多安马上把矛头指向了他的前盟友和现敌人、流亡牧师、在费城城外领导一个规模浩大的伊斯兰运动的居伦。


There are obvious reasons for taking this with a grain of salt, but the claim is less outlandish than it may seem.	显然，我们有理由对此持保留态度，但埃尔多安的指责要比看上去有根据一些。


We know that there is a strong Gülenist presence in the military (without which the government’s earlier move against senior Turkish officers – the so-called Eregenekon and Sledgehammer cases – could not have been mounted).	我们知道，土耳其军中有着庞大的居伦派（否则早先政府针对土耳其高级官员的举动——所谓的艾尔格尼肯和铁锤案（Eregenekon and Sledgehammer cases）——也不会进行）。


In fact, the military was the last remaining Gülenist stronghold in Turkey, since Erdoğan had already purged the movement’s sympathizers in the police, judiciary, and media.	事实上，自埃尔多安清洗了警方、司法部门和媒体的同情者后，军方是居伦派在土耳其仅有的硬手。


We also know that Erdoğan was preparing to make a major move against the Gülenists in the military.	我们还知道，埃尔多安早已在准备对军中的居伦派采取行动。


A few officers had already been arrested for fabricating evidence in earlier trials, and it was rumored that a large-scale purge of Gülenist officers was in the works for next month’s meeting of the Supreme Military Council.	一些官员已经通过罗织证据被逮捕，有流言说下个月的最高军事委员会将讨论对居伦派军官进行大规模清洗。


So the Gülenists had a motive, and the timing of the attempt supports their involvement.	因此，居伦派存在政变动机，而起事时机也支持有他们的参与。


It is a supreme irony that the coup Erdoğan long feared from the secularists may have eventually come from his one-time allies – who themselves were responsible for fabricating myriad coup plots against Erdoğan.	埃尔多安一直担心的来自世俗派的政变最终由他曾经的盟友发起——他们本身便曾经负责罗织各种针对埃尔多安的政变罪名——这是个巨大的讽刺。


Yet a bloody military coup lies very much outside the traditional modus operandi of the Gülen movement, which tends to prefer behind-the-scenes machinations to armed action or explicit violence.	但流血军事政变绝非居伦运动的传统特色。 居伦运动更喜欢在幕后策划武装行动或赤裸裸的暴力。


The coup may have been a desperate last-ditch effort, given the prospect that they were about to lose their last stronghold in Turkey.	政变也许是绝望的孤注一掷，因为居伦派即将逝去在土耳其最后的硬手。


But, with so many unanswered questions about what took place, the emergence of many strange twists and turns in the coming weeks would be no surprise.	但是，所发生的事情存在如此多的问题有待查清，在接下来的几周内出现许多奇怪的转折也不足为奇。


There is less uncertainty about what is likely to happen next.	同样充满不确定性的是接下来会发生什么。


The coup attempt will add potency to Erdoğan’s venom and fuel a wider witch-hunt against the Gülen movement.	军事政变将在埃尔多安的阴毒手段上平添恨意，刺激针对居伦运动的全面搜捕。


Thousands will be sacked from their positions in the military and elsewhere, detained, and prosecuted with little regard for the rule of law or the presumption of innocence.	成千上万人将失去他们在军中和其他岗位的位置、被逮捕、被起诉，丝毫不顾法治或无罪推定原则。


There are already alarming calls to bring back the death penalty for putschists, which recent experience shows is a very broad category for Erdoğan.	已经出现了危险的针对政变者恢复死刑的要求，从最近的经验看，这相当具有埃尔多安风格。


Some of the mob violence against captured soldiers portends a Jacobinism that would jeopardize all remaining due-process protections in Turkey.	一些针对被捕士兵的群众暴力预示着雅各宾主义，这将破坏土耳其仅存的所有正当程序保护。


The coup attempt is bad news for the economy as well.	政变对经济来说也是坏消息。


Erdoğan’s recent, somewhat skin-deep reconciliation with Russia and Israel was likely motivated by a desire to restore flows of foreign capital and tourists.	埃尔多安最近略显表面功夫的对俄罗斯和以色列的妥协举动可能是为了恢复外国资本流和游客。


Such hopes are now unlikely to be realized.	这些希望现在是无从实现了。


The failed coup reveals that the country’s political divisions run deeper than even the most pessimistic observers believed.	失败的政变表明，土耳其政治分歧要比最悲观的观察者所认为的还要深刻。


This hardly makes for an attractive environment for investors or visitors.	这对于投资者和游客来说绝不是吸引人的环境。


But, politically, the failed coup is a boon for Erdoğan.	但是，在政治上，失败的政变是埃尔多安之福。


As he put it while it was still unclear if he was going to emerge on top, “this uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army.”	他在尚未确定能拨乱反正时说，“这场起义是来自上帝的礼物，因为这将是清洗我们的军队的理由。


Now that the coup has failed, he will have the political tailwind to make the constitutional changes he has long sought to strengthen the presidency and concentrate power in his own hands.	”如今，政变已经失败，他将拥有政治顺风实现他早有企图的宪法修订，强化总统权力，将权力都集中在自己手中。


The coup’s failure will thus bolster Erdoğan’s authoritarianism and do little good for Turkish democracy.	因此 ，政变的失败将加强埃尔多安的极权主义，对土耳其的民主毫无好处。


Had the coup succeeded, however, the blow to democratic prospects surely would have been more severe, with longer-term effects.	但是，如果政变成功，对民主前景的打击将更加糟糕，带来更加长期的影响。


That provides at least some reason to cheer.	从这个角度，我们到有理由为此庆祝。


Narrative Power in Turkey	土耳其的叙述能力


ISTANBUL – At the end of March, a retrial finally resulted in the acquittal of more than 200 Turkish military officers who had been convicted of plotting a coup in 2003 against the then-newly elected Islamist government.	伊斯坦布尔——3月底，200多名土耳其军官在重审时被无罪释放，这些人之前曾以2003年策划针对当时新当选伊斯兰政府政变的罪名被判决有罪。


The defendants had been given long prison sentences after the first trial concluded in September 2012, even though the evidence against them was clearly forged.	即使对他们不利的证据显系伪造，2012年9月结束的首审仍判处几位被告长期监禁。


By the time the retrial ended, most observers recognized that the original proceedings had been a sham.	到审判结束时，多数观察家认为原来的诉讼是一场骗局。


But, until recently, the “Sledgehammer” case – named after the fictitious coup plot – was widely viewed as heralding the long-overdue democratic subjugation of Turkey’s meddlesome military to its elected government.	但就在不久前，因这场无中生有的政变阴谋而得名的“大锤案”还被外界视为爱管闲事的土耳其军方终于向当选的民主政府低头。


Liberal intellectuals and Western observers applauded the prosecution and hailed it as one of the greatest achievements of the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had since come to power.	自由派知识分子和西方观察家称赞这次起诉是之后开始掌权的雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安总理政府最伟大的成就。


Now that the case has been shown for what it was – a thuggish government’s attempt to weaken its rivals and consolidate its hold on power – the question is why so many well-intentioned observers got their analysis so terribly wrong.	现在案情真相已经大白——凶残的政府试图借此机会巩固权力并削弱竞争对手。 问题在于这么多好心的观察家为什么在分析中犯了如此可怕的错误。


My father-in-law was the alleged mastermind of the Sledgehammer plot, so my wife and I found ourselves moonlighting as forensic detectives and political activists.	因为岳父被控为大锤案的主谋，我和夫人当上了兼职法医侦探和政治活动家。


In my five years investigating this bizarre saga, I learned to appreciate the power of narratives.	在调查这个离奇案件的长达5年中，我学会了如何领略讲故事的作用。


What proved most effective for the government was not brute force, but tales of nefarious activities by Turkey’s secular and military elites, which were contrasted to Erdoğan’s supposed commitment to establishing a democratic (albeit Islamist-tinged) state through a reconstituted judiciary.	事实证明对政府最有效的并非蛮力，而是编造土耳其世俗和军事精英的不法活动，这些活动恰恰与埃尔多安通过司法重组建立民主（尽管带有伊斯兰色彩）国家的承诺形成鲜明的对照。


Grotesque exaggerations based on half-truths, these tales gave Erdoğan and his allies the maneuvering room within which to make the political regime more, not less, authoritarian.	尽管只是半真半假的怪诞夸张，但这些故事却给了埃尔多安及其盟友强化政权专制统治的回旋余地。


One ally in particular was crucial.	其中一个盟友至关重要。


The Gülen movement – made up of the followers of the Pennsylvania-based Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen – did the heavy political lifting.	由宾夕法尼亚州土耳其阿訇法图拉·葛兰追随者组成的葛兰运动完成了这项艰巨的政治任务。


The Gülen movement oversaw Sledgehammer and similar trials via its followers in the police and the judiciary, and used its extensive media outlets to craft and disseminate the narrative – built from countless stories of military plots and other malfeasance – on which these cases rested.	葛兰运动通过其在警察和司法部门的追随者跟踪大锤案及类似案件，并利用广泛的媒体渠道来编造和传播故事——这些故事取材于案件背后难以计数的军事阴谋和其他违法活动。


Its representatives in the United States and Europe lobbied Western politicians and opinion leaders incessantly to vouch for Erdoğan’s democratic credentials.	葛兰运动在美国和欧洲的代表不断游说西方政客和舆论领袖为埃尔多安的民主行为担保。


At the same time, the Gülen movement invested heavily and shrewdly in cultivating Turkey’s Western-oriented intelligentsia.	与此同时，葛兰运动精明地投入巨资培养土耳其的西化知识分子。


Thus, despite Gülen’s own embarrassing history of anti-Semitic and anti-Western sermons, his followers managed to establish themselves by the 2000s as a civil-society movement that shared Turkish liberals’ values and aspirations.	因此，尽管有着反犹太和反西方布道的尴尬历史，但21世纪葛兰运动追随者仍成功树立了民间社会运动形象，与土耳其自由派有着共同的价值观和愿望。


Gülenists provided resources and networks to Turkey’s liberals, who then lent the movement legitimacy and credibility in the West.	葛兰分子为土耳其自由派提供资源和网络，以换取西方的合法地位和信誉。


When American and European politicians, reporters, and human rights specialists looked for insight on Turkey, they turned to the Gülenists’ liberal beneficiaries, who fed them the established narratives.	当美国和欧洲政客、记者和人权专家想了解土耳其问题时，他们找到葛兰分子的自由派受益者，听这些人讲述早已编好的故事。


What made these intellectuals willing allies of Erdoğan and the Gülenists was their view that the military’s control of state institutions – “military tutelage” – posed the greatest obstacle to democracy in Turkey.	知识分子之所以自愿与埃尔多安及葛兰分子联盟是因为相信由军队控制国家机构——“军事监护” ——是土耳其民主制度最大的威胁。


For Turkey’s liberals, the weakening of the military’s political influence became an end in itself.	在土耳其自由派看来，削弱军队的政治影响力本身就是一种目的。


It allowed them to overlook (or downplay) the growing list of rights violations and judicial manipulations.	他们因此不惜忽略（或淡化）越来越多的侵权和司法操纵。


And it allowed the Gülenists to play them – for example, by ensuring that damaging leaks from the military (the most egregious of which were fabricated) would be published in liberal outlets first.	葛兰分子也因此可以将其玩弄于股掌之上——比方说，保证军方有破坏力的泄密（其中最惊人的往往是捏造的）会在自由媒体首先发布。


The Erdoğan government adopted legislation that lent credence to its false narrative.	埃尔多安政府通过立法让人们相信其虚假陈述。


The European Commission looked with approval on a succession of initiatives – a new penal code adopting “modern European standards,” training programs on the European Convention of Human Rights, expert missions from the European Union, and constitutional amendments seemingly guaranteeing much greater judicial independence.	欧盟委员会对一系列举措深表赞许——包括采用“现代欧洲标准”的新刑法、欧洲人权公约培训计划、欧盟专家团和貌似能确保更大司法独立性的宪法修正案。


Unfortunately, as in development economics, mimicking advanced-country regulations and institutions rarely produces the desired results.	不幸的是，像发展经济学一样，照搬先进国家的法规和体制很少能产生预期的效果。


Form does not guarantee function.	形式和实际运作不是一回事。


But it can help obfuscate reality.	但形式却可以混淆现实。


So it was with the Erdoğan government’s “pro-European” reforms, which served mainly to provide political cover for strengthening the Gülenists’ hold over the judiciary.	这里不得不提到埃尔多安政府的“亲欧洲”的改革，主要为加强葛兰分子对司法的控制提供政治掩护。


Fooled by appearances, the European Commission continued to assert, year after year, that the military show trials were an opportunity to strengthen the rule of law.	欧盟委员会被表象所蒙蔽，认为应该抓住这次军方公开审判的机会加强法制建设。


Until recently, the military was widely regarded as Turkish society’s most powerful and cohesive institution.	直到不久前，军方还被公认为土耳其社会最强大、最有凝聚力的机构。


The generals had never been shy about intervening in politics when they felt it necessary.	将军们从未避讳干预政治，如果他们觉得有这个必要。


But a well-honed narrative can be mightier than the sword.	但编造得天衣无缝的故事可以比宝剑更强大。


The Sledgehammer case and other allegations, false as they were, immobilized the military.	虽然大锤案和其他指控纯属虚假，但军队却因此而动弹不得。


Under intense attack by pro-government media, the general staff failed to mount even the slightest public effort on the accused officers’ behalf, even refusing to release an internal report that left no doubt that the defendants had been framed.	在亲政府媒体的猛烈攻击下，总参谋部甚至未能做出哪怕是一丁点的公众努力，为被控军官讨回公道。 他们甚至拒绝公开一份结论是被告人罪名纯属诬陷的内部报告。


The top brass did not want to look like they were “aiding the putschists.”	高层不愿在公众面前貌似“为政变者提供帮助”。


Once the narrative was established, even its targets succumbed to it.	一旦故事流传开来，就连受害者也不得不向它屈服。


Western observers and the bulk of domestic liberals did not give up on Erdoğan until his government’s heavy-handed tactics during the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in the summer of 2013.	西方观察家和国内大部分自由主义者并没有放弃埃尔多安，直到其政府2013年夏对伊斯坦布尔加济公园的示威活动采取严厉镇压的举措。


He then broke clumsily with the Gülen movement after its acolytes in the judiciary launched a corruption probe against him and his inner circle.	其后他笨拙地与葛兰运动分道扬镳，起因是葛兰运动在司法界的追随者对他和他的亲信发起腐败调查。


Without his Gülenist allies, Erdoğan’s message has become oriented exclusively to a domestic audience, and features heavy doses of populist-religious-nationalist symbolism.	失去了葛兰盟友的支持，埃尔多安的宣传已经完全面向国内受众，并带有浓厚的民粹主义-宗教-民族主义象征色彩。


Meanwhile, the Gülenists, ever in search of the narrative upper hand, have been presenting themselves to Western audiences as Erdoğan’s victims rather than as his collaborators.	此外，永远寻求宣传上风的葛兰分子开始在西方受众面前扮演埃尔多安的受害者，而不是他的合作伙伴。


False narratives eventually become unsustainable (with the Internet and social media hastening their demise).	谎言终究会被戳穿（互联网和社交媒体加速了谎言的破灭）。


But, as in Turkey, a collapsed narrative can leave much debris.	但就像在土耳其一样，谎言的破灭可能留下一地碎片。


And, rather than helping to clear the rubble, Erdoğan and the Gülenists appear determined to use it to build their own new edifices of lies, magnifying the challenge of future political reconciliation.	并且，埃尔多安和葛兰分子不但拒绝清理这满地狼藉，反而决意用它来构建自己的谎言宫殿，放大未来政治和解所面临的挑战。


Erdoğan’s Pyrrhic Victory?	埃尔多安的得不偿失的胜利？


ISTANBUL – Turkish voters had a clear-cut choice when they cast ballots on Easter Sunday in a referendum on 18 constitutional amendments already approved by the National Assembly.	伊斯坦布尔—当土耳其选民在复活节走向第18次修宪公投的投票箱时，他们早已有了明确的选择。 此前，修宪方案已经获得国民大会批准。


A “Yes” vote would change their country’s political system and usher in a new era in Turkish history.	“赞成”的投票结果将改变土耳其政治制度，开启土耳其历史的新纪元。


More than a century of parliamentarianism would be replaced by an alla turca presidential system that is tailor-made for the current incumbent, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.	持续了一个多世纪的议会制将让位给为现任埃尔多安量身定制的土耳其特色的总统制。


Given Turkey’s considerable experience in writing constitutions, most legal experts deem the amendments, which voters endorsed by a razor-thin margin, regressive at best.	土耳其在修改宪法方面“经验”丰富，因此，大部分法律专家认为这次选民们以微弱多数支持的修宪绝对是一次倒退。


Those who drafted them seem to have ignored 150 years of Turkish history, not to mention the most fundamental lessons of liberal democracy.	这部宪法的起草者对150年以来的土耳其历史视而不见，更不用说自由民主的最基本的教训了。


The political system that will be operational in 2019, after parliamentary and presidential elections that year, will abolish the post of prime minister and concentrate executive power in the hands of a president who also leads a political party.	新制度将从2019年议会和总统选举后开始实行，它废除了总理，行政权力全部集中在同时身为政党领袖的总统手中。


The National Assembly – the Turkish Republic’s founding institution – will lose many of its powers, and its capacity to serve as a check on the president will be severely curtailed, because the president can dissolve it at any time.	国民大会——土耳其共和国的国体——将失去许多权力，其制衡总统的能力将严重削弱，因为总统可以随时解散国民大会。


Moreover, changes in how judges are appointed will give the president decisive power over the judiciary, too.	此外，法官任命制度的改变将让总统同时获得司法机关的决定权。


The judiciary’s already-fragile independence will be further weakened, and the separation of powers will become meaningless.	土耳其已然摇摇欲坠的司法独立将进一步被削弱，权力分割将变得毫无意义。


Despite the referendum’s high stakes – the abandonment of the Turkish Republic’s longstanding political framework – there was no serious or extended debate prior to the vote, which was held under the state of emergency imposed by Erdoğan in the wake of last July’s coup attempt.	尽管公投所涉意义巨大——它意味着抛弃土耳其共和国长期以来的政治框架——但在投票之前完全没有严肃或充分的争论，自去年7月的未遂政变以来，埃尔多安便一直宣布土耳其处于紧急状态。


And at the same time that Turkey undergoes far-reaching political change, Erdoğan will seek to advance a project of social transformation aimed at erasing a Westernizing legacy that dates back to the late-Ottoman era.	而在土耳其正在经历重大政治变革的同时，埃尔多安还将推动一场旨在清除可以追溯到奥斯曼帝国末期的西方化遗产的社会变革。


The amendments were approved after a relentless campaign of obfuscation, misrepresentation, and vilification.	修宪在经历了一系列昏聩、扭曲和诽谤的运作后得到批准。


Opponents were accused of associating with terrorists, and Western officials, particularly European Union leaders, were openly attacked.	反对者被控与恐怖分子勾结，西方官员（特别是欧盟领导人）被公开攻击。


But Erdoğan, who led the campaign, avoided any real discussion of what the constitutional-reform package would entail, instead merely promising that it would enhance Turkey’s greatness.	但领导这场运动的埃尔多安却对其修宪计划的细节避而不谈，只是承诺它将让土耳其更加伟大。


Erdoğan had almost the entire state apparatus – including provincial governors and much of the national and local bureaucracy – at his service during the campaign.	在修宪运作期间，埃尔多安几乎垄断了整个国家机器——包括各省首脑和大部分国家和地方官僚机构——让它们为自己服务。


The government lavished all segments of Turkish society with economic incentives and state largesse, and the pro-government media was thoroughly mobilized to support the “Yes” campaign with absurdly sensational, one-sided coverage.	政府用经济激励和国家补贴收买土耳其各界，亲政府媒体也被充分动员起来，用荒谬可笑的煽动性一边倒的报道支持修宪运动。


Most other media outlets chose, or were forced, to provide toothless coverage.	其他大部分媒体选择或被迫进行不痛不痒的报道。


In addition to this state-led campaign, “No” campaigners were subjected to at least 200 documented attacks, some of them violent.	除了这场国家领导的运动，“反对”阵营还至少受到了200次记录在案的攻击，其中不乏暴力攻击。


Members of the Kurdish-based Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – including its two co-chairs, other party officials, and various local administrators – have been in jail since November.	多名库尔德政党人民民主党（HDP）成员——包括两位联职主席、其他党干部和大量地方官员——在去年11月后被投入监狱。


On the day of the vote, a controversial decision by Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council concerning the acceptability of ballots that lacked the official stamps on the back heightened worries about voting irregularities and cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the result – which is now being strongly, albeit futilely, contested.	投票当天，土耳其最高选举委员会做出了一项争议裁决。 这项裁决——关于是否可以接受背面没有官方戳记的投票箱——突显出人们对投票合规性的质疑，也给投票结果的合法性蒙上了一层阴影。


All told, the campaign and vote fell far short of established international standards, as election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have pointed out.	对投票结果合法性存在强烈的质疑，但徒劳无用。 总而言之，欧安组织的选举观察员指出，这场修宪运动和投票从既有国际标准看，是远远不合格的。


Still, Erdoğan’s narrow win could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, given how bitterly divided the country has become.	尽管如此，埃尔多安的险胜可能得不偿失，因为土耳其已经几近分裂。


The no vote was concentrated in Turkey’s economic hubs, such as its western and southern coastal region, and the predominantly Kurdish southeast, as well as in its two largest cities, Istanbul and the capital, Ankara.	反对票集中在土耳其的经济枢纽地区（如西部和沿海地区）、以库尔德人为主的东南部，以及最大的两个城市伊斯坦布尔和首都安卡拉。


Of Turkey’s 20 most economically important cities, voters in 13, accounting for 62% of total national income, voted predominantly against the constitutional reforms.	在对土耳其经济最重要的20个城市中，有13个城市的选民（占总国民收入的62%）压倒性地反对宪法改革。


And, because these cities represent the bulk of Turkey’s economic and cultural output, they are host to the country’s most educated segments.	此外，这些城市贡献了土耳其经济和文化产出的大部分，因此他们也代表了土耳其教育程度最高的群体。


By contrast, the yes camp comprised all but a few of Turkey’s least educated, economically insignificant, rural, insular, and conservative provinces.	相反，支持阵营几乎全部是土耳其教育程度最低、经济上无关紧要的农村、狭隘和保守的省份。


This is not in keeping with the forward-looking agenda that has always brought Erdoğan political success in the past.	这与此前让埃尔多安取得巨大的政治成功的前瞻性日程截然相反。


It is telling – symbolically and politically – that the amendments’ opponents carried Istanbul, where Erdoğan came to the national stage as mayor-elect in 1994.	很有说明意义的是——不管在象征意义还是在经济意义上——修宪反对派控制着伊斯坦布尔，而埃尔多安正是凭借着1994年在该市市长选举中胜出步入全国政治舞台的。


Erdoğan was visibly shaken by the narrowness of the result – and the breakdown of support that underpinned it.	埃尔多安显然被如此接近的公投结果——及其背后的支持率崩溃——所震惊。


But, as the master of the political game in Ankara, he will try to shape the agenda, and remain on his current course, by relying on domestic polarization and, perhaps, daring foreign adventures.	但是，作为安卡拉政治游戏大师，埃尔多安将竭力掌控大局并坚持当前道路——依靠国内政治极化甚至大胆地出击境外。


He has given no indication that he will try to ameliorate the country’s tensions.	他没有表现出将尽力调和土耳其紧张局面的迹象。


On the contrary, he has suggested that he will reintroduce the death penalty – a move that would bar Turkey from joining the EU.	相反，他暗示他将重新引入死刑——这一举动将让土耳其无法加入欧盟。


The referendum’s outcome is almost certain to aggravate Turkey’s domestic and international challenges, which have been mounting since the July coup attempt.	公投的结果几乎肯定将加剧自7月未遂政变以来土耳其所面临的国内和国际挑战。


The good news is that the strong showing by the amendments’ opponents, and their ability to mobilize through alternative media and micro-organizations, even while under duress, has shown that Turkish civil society remains vibrant.	好消息是修宪反对派所表现出来的强势，以及他们通过非常规媒体（alternative media）和微组织（micro-organizations）——即使承受着胁迫的压力——进行动员的能力，表明土耳其公民社会仍然生机勃勃。


But this is just the beginning.	但这只是开始。


Those who want to prevent Turkey from falling into the trap of electoral authoritarianism must now form a new political space and furnish leadership alternatives.	希望阻止土耳其跌入民选极权主义陷阱的人必须从现在开始打造新的政治空间和其他领导选择。


If they do not, Erdoğan will win the 2019 presidential election – and move quickly to use his newly expanded power in ways that will be far more difficult to combat.	若非如此，埃尔多安将赢得2019年总统选举——并迅速地使用他新扩张的权力，使自己更加难以挑战。


Two Myths About Automation	关于自动化的两大误区


BERKELEY – Robots, machine learning, and artificial intelligence promise to change fundamentally the nature of work.	发自伯克利——机器人、机器学习和人工智能有望从根本上改变工作的本质。


Everyone knows this. Or at least they think they do.	每个人都知道这一点，或至少他们觉得自己是知道的。


Specifically, they think they know two things.	具体地说，他们认为自己知道两件事。


First, more jobs than ever are threatened. “Forrester Predicts that AI-enabled Automation will Eliminate 9% of US Jobs in 2018,” declares one headline.	首先，受威胁的工作岗位要比以往任何时候更多，正如一则新闻头条所写“福瑞斯特研究公司（Forrester Research） 预计人工智能自动化将在2018年消灭9% 的美国就业岗位”；


“McKinsey: One-third of US workers could be jobless by 2030 due to automation,” seconds another.	而另一条则写道“麦肯锡：在 2030年1/3 的美国工人可能会因自动化失业”。


Reports like these leave the impression that technological progress and job destruction are accelerating dramatically.	这类报导给人留下了这样的印象，即技术进步和工作消减正双双急剧加速。


But there is no evidence of either trend.	但没有证据表明这两种趋势确实存在。


In reality, total factor productivity, the best summary measure of the pace of technical change, has been stagnating since 2005 in the United States and across the advanced-country world.	事实上在美国和整个发达世界中，作为技术变革速度最佳概括性指标的全要素生产率自2005年以来就已经陷入停滞了。


Moreover, as the economist Timothy Taylor recently pointed out, the rate of change of the occupational structure, defined as the absolute value of jobs added in growing occupations and jobs lost in declining occupations, has been slowing, not accelerating, since the 1980s.	此外，正如经济学家蒂莫西·泰勒（Timothy Taylor）最近指出的那样，就业结构变化率（通过计算朝阳行业中所增加的就业和夕阳行业所流失就业的绝对值得出）自1980年代以来也一直在放慢而非加速。


This is not to deny that the occupational structure is changing. But it calls into question the widely held view that the pace of change is quickening.	这不是要去否认职业结构正在发生改变，只是对人们普遍持有的那种改变步伐正在加快的观点表示质疑。


The second thing everyone thinks they know is that previously safe jobs are now at risk.	第二件每个人都自认为知道的事是以前那种安稳工作现在也岌岌可危。


Once upon a time, it was possible to argue that robots would displace workers engaged in routine tasks, but not the highly skilled and educated – not the doctors, lawyers and, dare one say, professors. In particular, machines, it was said, are not capable of tasks in which empathy, compassion, intuition, interpersonal interaction, and communication are central.	以前大家会同意机器人会取代那些从事常规作业的工人，但不会影响到那些高技能和受过高等教育的人，比如医生，律师或是教授，尤其认为机器不会有能力去完成那些以共鸣、同情心、直觉，人际交往和沟通为核心的任务。


Now, however, these distinctions are breaking down.	但如今这些差异都逐渐不复存在。


Amazon’s Alexa can communicate.	亚马逊的Alexa语音助手系统已经实现了人机沟通。


Crowd-sourcing, together with one’s digital history, can intuit buying habits.	借助众包（crowd-sourcing）以及一个人的数字历史就可以估测出购买习惯。


Artificial intelligence can be used to read x-rays and diagnose medical conditions.	人工智能可以用来读取X光和诊断医疗状况。


As a result, all jobs, even those of doctors, lawyers, and professors, are being transformed.	可见所有的工作——甚至是医生、律师和教授——都在发生转变。


But transformed is not the same as threatened.	但转变与威胁是不一样的。


Machines, it is true, are already more efficient than legal associates at searching for precedents.	机器无疑在查找过往法院判例时比律所工作人员更高效。


But an attorney attuned to the personality of her client still plays an indispensable role in advising someone contemplating a messy divorce whether to negotiate, mediate, or go to court.	但是在建议那些考虑离婚的人究竟是该谈判，调解还是上法庭的问题上，一个与自身委托人性格相合的律师仍然扮演着一个不可缺少的角色。


Likewise, an attorney’s knowledge of the personalities of the principals in a civil suit or a criminal case can be combined with big data and analytics when the time comes for jury selection.	同样在选择陪审团成员的时候，律师在民事诉讼或刑事案件中对主要涉事人员性格的了解可以与大数据和分析相结合。


The job is changing, not disappearing.	可见改变的是工作的内容，而不是工作本身的存续。


These observations point to what is really happening in the labor market.	这些观察道出了劳动力市场的真正现状。


It’s not that nurses’ aides are being replaced by health-care robots; rather, what nurses’ aides do is being redefined.	不是护士护理的工作正在被医疗机器人所取代； 相反，护士护理的内容正在被重新定义。


And what they do will continue to be redefined as those robots’ capabilities evolve from getting patients out of bed to giving physical therapy sessions and providing emotional succor to the depressed and disabled.	随着这些机器人的能力不断进化——从协助病人下床到为残疾和抑郁人士提供理疗疗程和情感救助——他们所做的将会继续被重新定义，


At one level, this is good news for those concerned about the prospects of incumbent workers: there will continue to be demand for workers in existing occupations.	在某种程度上，对于那些关心在职劳动者就业前景的人来说，这是个好消息：现有职位的用人需求将继续存在。


Not all nurses’ aides will have to become software engineers.	并非所有的护士助理都得成为软件工程师。


The knowledge they acquire on the job – of how one interacts with patients, how one recognizes their moods, and how one acknowledges their needs – will remain pertinent and valued.	她们在工作中获得的知识——如何与病人互动，如何识别病人的情绪和需求——依然是与这份工作密切相关且有价值的。


They will use that knowledge to guide and cooperate with their robotic colleagues.	她们将利用这些知识来对机器人同事进行指导与合作。


Thus, the coming technological transformation won’t entail occupational shifts on the scale of the Industrial Revolution, with its wholesale redistribution of labor between the agricultural and industrial sectors.	因此，即将到来的技术转型并不意味着会有一场工业革命式的大规模农业和工业部门之间劳动力整体再分配。


After all, the vast majority of Americans already work in the service sector.	毕竟绝大多数美国人都已经在服务行业工作了。


But it will be more important than ever for people of all ages to update their skills and renew their training continuously, given how their occupations will continue to be reshaped by technology.	比以往任何时候都更重要的一点在于，考虑到各年龄层人士的职业都会持续被技术所重塑，他们都得不断更新自身技能并反复接受培训。


In countries like Germany, workers in a variety of sectors receive training as apprentices and then over the course of their working lives.	在像德国这样的国家，各行各业的劳动者都接受学徒培训，然后在工作过程中完成整个课程。


Companies invest and reinvest in their workers, because the latter can insist on it, possessing as they do a seat in the boardroom as a result of the 1951 Codetermination Law.	企业会持续对自己的工人进行投资和再投资，因为1951年制定的《共同决定法》（Codetermination Law）规定后者在董事会中占有一个席位，令工人可以坚持要求企业这样做。


Employers’ associations join with strong trade unions to organize and run training schemes at the sectoral level.	雇主协会与强大的工会一道在部门一级组织和开办培训计划。


The schemes are effective, in part, because the federal government sets standards for training programs and issues uniform curricula for trainees.	而这些计划之所以有效的，部分原因是由于德国联邦政府制定了培训计划的标准，并为受训人员制定了统一的课程。


In the US, board membership for workers’ representatives, strong unions, and government regulation of private-sector training are not part of the prevailing institutional formula.	在美国，工人代表的董事会成员资格，强大的工会和政府对私营部门培训的监管都不是现行体制模板的一部分。


As a result firms treat their workers as disposable parts, rather than investing in them. And government does nothing about it.	因此企业把员工视为用后即弃的一次性部件，从不在他们身上投资，而政府对此也无动于衷。


So here’s an idea.	因此我有一个想法。


Instead of a “tax reform” that allows firms to expense their capital outlays immediately, why not give companies tax credits for the cost of providing lifelong learning to their employees?	与其实施允许企业立即列支其资本支出“税收改革”，为什么不对企业为属下员工提供终生学习所产生的费用进行税务抵免呢？


A Better British Story	一个更好的英国故事


LONDON – Nowadays, there are hazards to looking for signs of hope in the British economy.	伦敦—如今，寻找英国经济的希望之光危险重重。


As the latest OECD forecast for 2018 and beyond shows, a cloud of gloom has descended on the United Kingdom.	最近的2018年及以后经合组织预测表明，一片阴云笼罩在英国上空。


The primary source of pessimism is, of course, Brexit, and the fear that withdrawing from the European Union will hurt British consumers through higher import prices and weak business investment.	当然，悲观的主要原因还是退欧，以及关于退出欧盟将导致进口价格上涨和商业投资疲软、进而伤及英国消费者的担忧。


And, making matters worse, the British government’s independent Office of Budget Responsibility has now lowered its expectations for economic growth, owing to persistently weak productivity performance in the UK.	此外，更糟糕的是，英国政府的独立预算责任办公室（Office of Budget Responsibility）因为英国生产率表现持续低迷而调低了经济增长预期。


Against this economic backdrop, British politics are in a state of chaos, with Prime Minister Theresa May seemingly presiding over an increasingly weak government.	在这一经济背景下，英国政治陷入了混乱，首相梅主持着一个日益虚弱的政府。


At this point, the only thing stopping a Conservative Party putsch against May is the fear of losing a fresh election, which would bring a far-left government to power for the first time in many years.	目前，唯一能够阻挡保守党“反戈”梅的东西只剩下输掉新大选的担忧，如果保守党败北，将产生多年来首个极左翼政府。


Meanwhile, the rest of the world economy appears to be strengthening, and indicators that I consider to be reliable have been accelerating as we approach 2018.	与此同时，世界其他地区的经济正在走强，行将进入2018年之际，我认为可靠的指标纷纷加速。


One area that is particularly relevant to the UK is the eurozone, where the manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) rose above 60 in November – its highest level since 2000.	一个对英国特别重要的地区是欧元区，其制造业采购经理人指数（PMI）在11月份站上了60——为2000年以来的最高水平。


Despite the UK’s best attempts to declare economic independence, its fortunes will continue to depend more on its closest geographic neighbors than on any other country or region.	尽管英国竭尽全力宣扬其经济独立性，但这些地理上最接近的邻居英国运势的影响仍将大于任何其他国家或地区。


Elsewhere, almost all of the ten largest economies’ performance has been strengthening in recent months.	除了英国，最近几个月中十最大经济体的表现几乎都在走强。


In the US, that was true even before Congress started writing corporate-tax-cut legislation, which now seems likely to be enacted.	在美国，经济在国会开始起草公司税减税立法之前就已经好转，目前，该立法眼看就要落实了。


So, where does this leave the UK?	那么，这对英国意味着什么？


It may come as a surprise to hear that the UK’s own PMI is now at its highest level in four years, suggesting that businesses are becoming more willing to make new investments.	有些惊喜的是，英国自身的PMI正处于四年来的最高水平，这表明企业变得更加愿意进行新投资。


If official data in the coming months support this finding, it will represent a significant positive development indeed.	如果未来几个月的正式数据支持这一现象，那么确实是一个重大的积极趋势。


Moreover, there are some early signs of improvement outside of London and the southeast, which is particularly relevant for some of the UK’s most deep-seated economic weaknesses.	此外，在伦敦之外和东南部，出现了一些早期的改善信号，对于英国的一些最根深蒂固的经济弱点而言，这个信号尤其重要。


As of October, monthly regional PMIs, which lag one month behind the national PMI, show a persistent positive trend that economic observers and policymakers will need to reckon with if it continues.	10月份，月度地区PMI（较全国PMI落后一个月）显示出持续的积极趋势，如果能够得到维持，经济观察者和决策应该注意。


It has been a number of months since London was the UK’s top-performing region.	伦敦不再是英国表现最好的地区已经好几个月了。


In October, that honor belonged to Wales.	10月份，表现最好地区头衔归属威尔士。


And, just within England, parts of the so-called northern powerhouse have been outperforming London throughout 2017.	而在英格兰，所谓的北方经济引擎也在整个2017年都压伦敦一头。


The northwest PMI is at its highest level in months, and indicates a stronger absolute performance than that of London.	西北部PMI位于几个月来的最高水平，其绝对表现也强于伦敦。


Even more heartening, Yorkshire and the northeast are also showing signs of renewed strength.	更鼓舞人心的是，约克夏和东北部也表现出新的活力。


Whether this newfound economic vigor will prove sustainable remains to be seen.	这一新兴经济复苏是否可持续仍有待观察。


But, for now, it is a highly welcome development, and may indicate that policies aimed at boosting the northern economy have had some effect.	但就目前而言，这一发展趋势令人鼓舞，并可能表明了旨在提振北部经济的政策产生了一些效果。


Moreover, PMIs are not the only evidence of improving conditions in the north.	此外，除了地区PMI，还有其他证据证明北部经济环境的改善。


Employment is increasing in some of these areas, notably the northwest.	一些北部地区的就业数量在增长，特别是西北部。


And weaknesses in the London housing market do not appear to have spread elsewhere.	而伦敦住房市场的弱势并没有蔓延到其他地区。


In fact, in the northwest, residential real-estate prices are showing signs of accelerating upward.	事实上，西北部居民不动产价格表现出加速上扬的迹象。


If this trend does endure, it would have far-reaching implications for the UK economy.	如果这一趋势得到保持，将对英国经济产生深远影响。


Strengthening housing markets in the north could do wonders to reverse the disturbing regional inequalities that have emerged in recent decades.	北方住房市场的走强大大有利于扭转近几十年来所出现的地区不平等性。


One thing we can be absolutely certain about is that the government should continue pursuing policies to engage with the northern powerhouse, and perhaps with the “Midlands engine,” too.	一件绝对确定的事情是政府应该继续采取配合北方经济引擎的政策，也许还要纳入“中部经济引擎”。


That means keeping its commitment to improve transportation infrastructure in the region.	这意味着继续保持其对改善地区交通设施的投入。


At the same time, the government should be pursuing further initiatives to boost education and skills-training in the north, while also devolving more decision-making authority to regional and local governments.	与此同时，政府应该采取进一步措施提振北部的教育和技能培训，同时也要授予地区和地方政府更大的决策自主权。


Greater Manchester is at the geographic heart of the northern powerhouse, and its leaders have been spearheading the push for greater devolution of authority.	大曼彻斯特是北方经济引擎的地理中心，其领导人一直引领着加大授权运动。


It cannot be a mere coincidence that the area is enjoying a stronger economy.	该地区经济能够比较强势绝非巧合。


Britain needs more such efforts.	英国需要更多这样的措施。


In 2018, there will continue to be plenty of drama surrounding Brexit and the future of the May government.	2018年，围绕英国退欧和梅政府的大戏仍将继续上演。


But, regardless of whether Britain manages to forge a productive new relationship with the EU, at least it has started to address longstanding challenges that have held too many regions back for too long.	但不论英国是否能够与欧盟构建积极的新关系，至少它已经开始解决长期以来让大量地区无法取得进步的存在已久的挑战。


Given that those problems are of the UK’s own making, policymakers, in this case, are right to look for solutions from within.	这些问题都是英国自己造成的，因此，决策者从内部寻找解决方案是正确的。


The Last Hurdle for Ukraine’s Recovery	乌克兰复苏的最后障碍


KYIV – Ukraine’s capital abounds with signs of hope and anarchy.	发自基辅——这个乌克兰首都充斥着希望和失序的迹象。


The country has experienced an impressive economic turnaround, but corruption remains rife.	这个国家经历了令人印象深刻的经济转型，但依然腐败丛生。


President Petro Poroshenko’s administration has stabilized public finances, but failed to rein in clientelism.	彼得·波罗申科总统（ Petro Poroshenko）的政府稳定了公共财政，但却未能遏制住裙带关系的横行。


The question now is whether any judicial and legal reforms that Poroshenko undertakes can establish the conditions for strong, sustained economic growth.	现在的问题在于，波罗申科实施的任何司法和法律改革能否为强劲、持续的经济增长创造条件。


Since concluding a loan agreement with the government in March 2015, the International Monetary Fund has followed through with four substantial disbursements.	自从2015年3月与乌克兰政府签订贷款协议以来，国际货币基金组织已经划拨了四笔大额款项。


But on a recent visit, IMF First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton warned that there are risks of Ukraine “going backwards.”	但最近访问时，国际货币基金组织第一副总裁大卫·利普顿（David Lipton）就警告说乌克兰存在“倒退”的风险。


Ukraine’s problems are not macroeconomic.	乌克兰的问题并不是宏观经济层面上的。


The government’s current finance minister, Oleksandr Danyliuk, is an avowed free marketeer with a strong record of economic management, as was his predecessor, Natalie Jaresko.	政府现任财政部长奥莱克桑德尔·丹尼尔克（Oleksandr Danyliuk）是一位拥有丰富经济管理经验的，公认的自由市场主义者，而他的前任娜塔莉·杰里斯科（Natalie Jaresko）也是如此。


According to the IMF, Ukraine’s public expenditures in 2014 totaled 53% of GDP, but had fallen to 40% of GDP by 2016.	据国际货币基金组织统计，2014年乌克兰的公共开支合共相当于GDP的53％，到而在2016年却下降到了40％。


And in just one year, from 2014 to 2015, Ukraine slashed its budget deficit from 10% of GDP to a mere 2%. It is now on track to maintain a deficit of around 3% of GDP in the coming years.	而在从2014年到2015短短一年内，乌克兰将预算赤字从相当于GDP的10％削减到只有2％，并在未来几年内继续保持约3％的赤字比率。


Moreover, thanks to improvements in the tax system, state revenues increased by 30% year on year in the first half of 2017, outpacing growth in expenditures. As a result, the government had a balanced budget in January-June.	此外得益于税制体系改善，国家收入在2017年上半年同比增长了30％，超过了支出的增长，政府也因此在1至6月实现了预算平衡。


In April, the IMF projected that Ukraine’s public debt would stand at 91% of GDP at the end of 2017; but the government has already brought its debt down to 81% of GDP.	4月份，国际货币基金组织预计，到2017年底乌克兰的公共债务将相当于GDP的91％。 但政府已将债务降至81％的水平。


This progress will likely continue as growth strengthens and Ukraine’s currency, the hryvnia, appreciates.	随着经济增长的强化以及乌克兰货币格里夫纳的升值，这一进步将可能得以持续。


Ukraine owes much of its economic strength today to Valeriya Hontareva, the former chair of the central bank who cleaned up the banking sector over the past three years.	乌克兰今天的经济实力大部分有赖于瓦蕾里亚·亨塔雷娃（Valeriya Hontareva）这位过去三年来整肃银行部门的前乌克兰央行主席。


Under Hontareva, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) shut down half of the country’s 180 banks, most of which were corrupt – if not outright criminal – operations.	在亨塔雷娃领导下，乌克兰国家银行关闭了该国180家银行的一半，其中大部分都牵涉腐败（甚至是彻底的犯罪）行为。


And now that the restructuring is almost complete, lending is set to take off.	而今重组几乎完成，银行贷款也要放开了。


Typically, when a country gets its domestic finances in order, its external finances improve, too.	通常情况下，一个国家一旦实现了国内财政的有序运行，其外部财政状况也会有所改善。


Ukraine’s foreign-exchange reserves have been a major cause of concern since 2014; but today, they stand at a reassuring $18 billion – equal to about 3.5 months of current imports.	自2014年以来乌克兰的外汇储备一直是外界忧虑的主要来源。 而目前乌克兰拥有令人放心的180亿美元储备——可以将当前每月进口额维持大约3个半月。


Better still, the hryvnia has strengthened by 6% against the dollar this year.	另一个好迹象是，格里夫纳今年相对美元升值了6％。


This has boosted GDP and reduced the public debt, which is predominantly held in international currencies.	这提升了GDP并减少了主要以国际货币发行的公共债务。


At the same time, Ukraine is undergoing a relatively fast “de-dollarization,” such that hryvnia-denominated bank deposits are now growing faster than those in foreign currencies.	与此同时乌克兰正在经历一个相对较快的“去美元化”过程，使得目前以格里夫纳存入的银行存款增长速度要高于外币。


Ukraine has the three essential ingredients for strong, sound growth.	乌克兰有实现强大健康增长的三个基本要素。


In the first half of 2017, the European Union-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area took effect, and Ukraine’s exports skyrocketed by 25%, far outpacing import growth.	2017年上半年欧盟-乌克兰《深度综合自由贸易区（协议）》生效，乌克兰出口大幅上涨25％，远高于进口增长。


Moreover, Ukraine has strong investment and consumption growth.	此外，乌克兰投资和消费增长强劲。


In the first half of this year, construction surged by 24%, and retail sales increased by 8%.	今年上半年，建筑业飙升24％，零售额增长了8％。


But while the IMF has projected 2.9% GDP growth for 2017 – and annual growth of 4% by 2020 – annualized growth in the first half of this year was just 2.5%.	但虽然国际货币基金组织预计2017年乌克兰GDP将实现2. 9％的增长（至2020年将达到4％），今年上半年的年增长率仅为2.


There are a few reasons why Ukraine’s newfound financial stability hasn’t yet led to a stronger growth takeoff.	5％。 而乌克兰最近实现的金融稳定之所以未能带领增长起飞，原因如下：


For starters, the fighting in eastern Ukraine has disrupted the agricultural sector, the leading source of growth for the last decade.	首先，乌克兰东部的战乱扰乱了农业部门这个过去十年的主要增长来源。


But, more important, Ukraine’s “animal spirits” may be suppressed, because its entrepreneurs see little point in trying to compete with oligarchs who remain able to rig the economy in their favor.	但更为重要的是，乌克兰人的“动物精神”可能遭到压制，因为该国的企业家看不到任何值得去和寡头竞争的意义——后者依然能够随心所欲地操纵着国家经济。


Over the past three years, the government has started (with a shove from the IMF) to combat corruption in a systematic way, including by unifying energy prices and introducing a transparent electronic procurement system for most public purchases.	过去三年来，政府开始（在国际货币基金组织的共同推动下）系统地打击腐败，包括统一能源价格，为大多数公共采购引入透明的电子采购系统。


And so far, more than 100,000 public officials have publicly disclosed their incomes and assets in a display of transparency that rivals Scandinavian countries.	到目前为止，已有十万多名公职人员公开披露其收入和资产，展现出与斯堪的纳维亚半岛各国相当的透明度。


But the government’s failure to uphold the rule of law remains a serious problem.	但政府不遵守法治仍然是一个严重的问题。


Previously, domestic businesses and foreign investors worried that the tax authorities were abusing their power.	从前国内企业和外国投资者担心税务机关滥用权力。


But in March, Ukraine’s anticorruption bureau arrested the country’s tax chief, Roman Nasirov.	但今年3月乌克兰反腐败局逮捕了国家税务总监罗曼·纳西罗夫（Roman Nasirov）。


Now, the biggest cause for concern is the Prosecutor General’s office and the security services. Both are under the president’s control, and both have come to be widely regarded as predatory state agencies.	现在最大的担心来自于检察长办公室和安全部门，两者都处于总统的控制之下，都被广泛认为是掠夺性的国家机构。


It is hoped that judicial reforms currently in the works will check executive authority, secure property rights, and thus encourage growth.	人们希望目前正在进行的司法改革将监督行政权力并保护产权，从而鼓励增长。


But it is already clear that more will be needed.	但很显然在这方面还有很多工作要做。


In July, Poroshenko stripped the citizenship of Mikhail Saakashvili, the former President of Georgia whom Poroshenko invited to Ukraine and appointed governor of Odessa in 2015.	7月，波罗申科剥夺了格鲁吉亚前总统米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利（Mikhail Saakashvili）的乌克兰公民身份，而后者正是由波洛申科邀请到乌克兰并于2015年被任命为敖德萨省长的。


Poroshenko’s decision, carried out by decree and without due process, is legally dubious, and Saakashvili, rather than accepting his fate, has used his denationalization to galvanize Ukrainian civil society.	波洛申科的这一决定是通过法令下达，缺乏正当程序，在法律上也站不住脚，另一方面萨卡什维利也不愿屈从于这一决定，用自己的国家化来激励乌克兰的民间社会。


This month, he and the Ukrainian opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko entered Ukraine from Poland without going through passport control.	本月，他和乌克兰的反对派领袖尤利亚·季莫申科（Yuliya Tymoshenko）从波兰进入乌克兰，不经过护照管制。


By inviting prosecution, Saakashvili has gained a platform from which he can criticize Ukraine’s justice system and Poroshenko’s neglect of the rule of law.	萨卡什维利通过起诉，获得了一个平台，可以批评乌克兰的司法制度和波洛申科忽视法治。


The IMF’s demand that the Ukrainian government establish an independent anticorruption court to investigate, prosecute, and punish dishonest public officials remains unfulfilled.	国际货币基金组织要求乌政府建立独立的反腐败法庭来调查，起诉和惩罚不诚实的公职人员依然没有实现。


But if Ukraine is to continue on the road to recovery, it will have to demonstrate that no one – not even the president – is above the law.	但是，如果乌克兰继续走上复苏的道路，就必须证明没有人 - 甚至总统 - 都不在法律之上。


An Inclusive Ukrainian Education	一个包容性的乌克兰教育体系


KYIV – Education is one of the few areas nowadays that is still considered a purely sovereign matter, an issue over which national governments – and, in many countries, even local authorities – should have control.	发自基辅——教育是当今仍被视为纯粹主权国家内部事务的少数几个领域之一，也是一个各国政府——在许多国家甚至是地方当局——都应当有所掌控的事务。


But, in today’s world, it seems that no issue is immune to political manipulation.	但在当今世界上似乎没有什么事务可以免遭政治的操弄。


That is the case with Ukraine’s new framework law on education, which has become the target of harsh opposition not so much from within the country, but rather from some neighboring countries.	乌克兰新的教育法律框架就是这么一个例子：该部法律遭到了激烈的反对，但这些声音极少来自国内，而是来自邻近各国。


The law, adopted last month by Ukraine’s parliament, reflected a long and inclusive policymaking process.	这部乌克兰议会上个月通过的法律经历了漫长而具备包容性的决策程序。


Among its provisions is Article 7, which specifies that students in schools and universities should study in the national language.	其中第七条规定，学校和大学的学生应以本国语言学习。


Article 7 seems to be in accord with European norms.	这条规定似乎和欧洲的规范没什么冲突。


Perhaps more important, it will benefit all Ukrainian citizens, including minority-language speakers, who will be better equipped to integrate fully into Ukrainian society.	也许更重要的是，这将有利于所有的乌克兰公民——包括那些持少数族裔语言的人们——更加具备完全融入乌克兰社会的能力。


Under the previous education system, some students would receive their entire 11 years of schooling (to be raised to 12 under the new law) in a minority language, mostly Russian, but sometimes Hungarian and Romanian.	在以前的教育体系下，一些学生将以少数族裔语言（大多是俄语，但有时是匈牙利语和罗马尼亚语）完成整整11年的学业（新法将增加到12年）。


About 400,000 students are currently on such a track, which has usually ended with students graduating high school lacking even a working knowledge of Ukrainian – the language in which the country conducts its business.	约有40万名学生目前处于这类学习轨道上，而这类人往往高中毕业都无法用乌克兰语来工作交流——而乌克兰语则是该国企业所使用的语言。


In fact, just this year, more than half of all graduates of Hungarian-language schools failed tests of Ukrainian.	事实上，仅仅是今年，就有一半以上的匈牙利语学校毕业生未能通过乌克兰语考试。


Unable to attend a Ukrainian university, these students have little choice but to find local work in Hungarian that requires only a secondary-school education, or move to Hungary.	由于无法继续升读乌克兰的大学，这些学生别无选择，只能去匈牙利找一些只需中学文凭的工作或者移居匈牙利。


The education reform will change this.	本次教育改革将会改变这一现状。


From 2020, after a three-year transitional period, a minority language can be used as the main teaching language only in kindergarten and elementary school, from which point (after the fourth year of school) most instruction should be in Ukrainian.	在三年的过渡期后，从2020年开始少数族裔语言只会作为幼儿园和小学的主要教学语言，在第四学年后大多数科目都会以乌克兰语教授。


Some schools for indigenous people, such as Crimean Tartars, will be allowed to keep the old system, but for the most part, graduates of Ukrainian high schools will, under the new system, be adept in the Ukrainian language.	一些原住民学校（如克里米亚鞑靼人）可以保留旧制，但在大多数情况下，乌克兰的高中毕业生将在新体制下熟练掌握乌克兰语。


This change will help to eliminate de facto segregation of minority-language speakers, thereby unifying Ukrainian society – critical to a strong and vibrant democracy.	这种变化将有助于消除持少数族裔语言者的事实性隔离状态，从而整合乌克兰社会——这对实现强大且充满活力的民主至关重要。


It will also equip all students, including ethnic and linguistic minorities, not just to thrive in the labor market, but also to participate more fully in Ukrainian democracy, potentially securing government positions that enable them to advance further the interests of their fellow ethnic minorities.	它还将为包括种族和语言上的少数族裔在内的所有学生带来好处，让他们不仅在劳动力市场上变得吃香，同时使之能全面参与到乌克兰民主事务中去，可以在政府谋得职位，进而促进所属少数族裔的利益。


It should also be noted that, while the rule will lead to less minority-language instruction, it does not preclude it.	此外应该指出的是，虽然新规则将令少数族裔语言的教学量有所减少，但并未完全将其抹杀。


Education in minority languages will be provided through separate classes and groups, with some programs allowing for instruction in multiple languages.	少数族裔语言教育将通过不同的课堂和学习小组来提供，有些课程将允许以多种语言进行教学。


For example, if a Hungarian speaker were studying Hungarian literature, they would be able to do so in their native tongue.	比如一位讲匈牙利语的人如果要研究匈牙利文学，那么他们就可以用自己的母语来学习。


All in all, the case for Ukraine’s new education law could not be stronger.	总而言之，乌克兰新教育法的出台是极为必要的。


Yet neighboring countries are deliberately distorting the legislation’s significance, claiming that it is somehow a threat to ethnic minority groups. And they are prepared to punish Ukraine for it.	然而一众邻国却故意歪曲本次立法的意义，声称这是对少数族裔群体的某种威胁，并准备为此惩罚乌克兰。


Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has declared that, if the law is not changed, his country will block further Ukrainian integration into Europe.	匈牙利外交大臣皮特·塞齐亚罗特（Péter Szijjártó）就宣称如果乌克兰不修订该法律，他的国家将阻止乌克兰进一步融入欧洲。


“We can guarantee that all this will be painful for Ukraine in future,” he added.	他补充说：“我们保证未来不会令乌克兰好过。


Szijjarto, along with his counterparts from Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, also voiced opposition to the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.	”为此塞齐亚罗特，以及来自罗马尼亚，保加利亚和希腊的政治人物都向欧洲委员会和欧洲安全与合作组织提出了抗议。


Moreover, Romania’s president canceled a visit to Ukraine scheduled for this month, and withdrew an invitation for the speaker of Ukraine’s parliament to visit Bucharest.	此外罗马尼亚总统也于本月份取消了对乌克兰的访问，并撤回了乌克兰议会议长访问布加勒斯特的邀请。


And, perhaps most ominous, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Ukraine of trying to “Ukrainize” the education system, in violation of the country’s constitution and international agreements.	而也许最恶劣的是，俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫（Russi Lavrov）指责乌克兰试图将教育体制“乌克兰化”，违反了该国宪法和国际协议。


Beyond being a gross misrepresentation, this approach is blatantly hypocritical, as the countries that are complaining about Ukraine’s new language rules have similar systems in place.	但上述伎俩不但完全歪曲事实，而且显然极为虚伪，因为那些抱怨乌克兰新教学语言规定的国家也拥有类似的制度。


Though Hungary is home to some 8,000 Ukrainians, there is not a single Ukrainian-language school in the country.	虽然匈牙利有8000名乌克兰人，但该国却没有一所乌克兰语学校。


The same is true for Russia, with its Ukrainian minority of over two million.	拥有200多万乌克兰少数族裔的俄罗斯也是如此。


In Romania, with its roughly 50,000 Ukrainians, there is only one Ukrainian-language school.	在罗马尼亚大约有5万乌克兰人，却只有一所乌克兰语学校。


The Ukrainian government has said that it will submit the law to the Council of Europe, allowing the Venice Commission to determine whether it meets CoE standards.	乌克兰政府表示将向欧盟理事会提交法律文本，由威尼斯委员会审定它是否符合欧盟理事会的标准。


President Petro Poroshenko has promised to consider changing the law, depending on the Commission’s conclusions.	波罗申科总统也承诺会根据委员会的结论去考虑对法律进行修订。


But, judging by Article 8 of the CoE’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Ukraine has ratified, it seems reasonable to expect that changes won’t be needed.	但是，根据乌克兰已经批准了的欧盟理事会《欧洲区域性或少数民族语言宪章》第8条，这一法律规定照理无需更改。


That provision states that a system that guarantees sufficient minority-language learning in ordinary schools (in separate classes) is just as acceptable as one that ensures minority education through separate minority-language schools.	该条款规定，一个在普通学校中（借助单独课程）保证充分少数族裔语言学习的体制与一个通过设立单独的少数族裔语言学校来确保少数族裔教育的体制都是可以接受的。


Moreover, the charter states that, in secondary education, it is sufficient to guarantee “the teaching of the relevant regional or minority languages” – not necessarily other subjects – “as an integral part of the curriculum.”	此外章程也指出，在中等教育中，保证“相关区域或少数族裔语言的教授”——不一定非得设立其他科目——“作为课程的组成部分”就足够了。