To help achieve our climate objectives, we need to promote dialogue about the necessary policy measures before and beyond the climate-change conference in Paris.	为了帮助实现我们的气候目标，我们需要在巴黎气候变化前后促进关于必要政策措施的对话。


That is why we are announcing a “Carbon Pricing Panel,” which will bring together heads of state, city and state leaders, and representatives of top companies to urge countries and businesses around the world to put a price on carbon.	因此，我们成立了一个“碳定价委员会”，委员会将由各国首脑、城市和州省领导人以及来自顶尖公司的代表组成，敦促世界各国和企业为碳制定一个价格。


These leaders have taken steps to price carbon pollution and catalyze greener investment in their own countries and regions.	这些领导人已开始采取行动为所在国家和地区的碳污染定价和推动更加绿色的投资。


They include German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, French President François Hollande, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Philippines President Benigno Aquino III, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, Governor Jerry Brown of California, and Mayor Eduardo Paes of Rio de Janeiro.	他们包括德国总理默克尔、智利总统巴切莱特、法国总统奥朗德、埃塞俄比亚总理德萨莱尼、菲律宾总统阿基诺三世、墨西哥总统涅托、加利福尼亚州长杰里·布朗（Jerry Brown）和里约热内卢市长爱德华多·佩耶斯（Eduardo Paes）。


Carbon pricing policies are already being implemented by some 40 national governments, including that of China, the world’s largest emitter, and 23 cities, states, and regions that are putting a price on carbon.	碳定价政策已开始在大约40个国家（包括世界最大排放国中国）实施，更有23个城市、州省和地区的政府正在制定碳价格。


Many other governments also are reforming energy prices, and more than 400 companies report using a voluntary, internal carbon price.	其他许多政府也在改革能源价格，400多家公司报告正在采用自愿的内部碳定价。


That makes sense.	这些政策很有意义。


Top companies must effectively manage exposure to climate risk in order to generate higher profits and ensure more stable earnings.	顶尖公司必须有效管理气候风险的风险敞口，这样才能获得更高的利润和确保更稳定的收益。


All of these actions are welcome; but we view them as being only initial steps.	所有这些行动都是值得欢迎的； 但我们认为它们只是最初的步骤。


Together with the leaders of the Carbon Pricing Panel, we call on governments to seize the moment – for the sake of the planet and future generations – to put a price on carbon pollution that reflects the environmental damage it causes.	与碳定价委员会一起，我们呼吁各国政府抓住时机——为了地球和子孙后代的命运——为碳污染制定一个反映它们所造成的环境伤害的价格。


We stand ready to support governments that act.	我们已经做好准备支持政府行动。


The longer we wait, the costlier and more difficult it will be for us – and our children and grandchildren – to protect the planet.	我们等待得越久，我们——以及我们的子辈和孙辈——保护地球的成本和困难就越大。


Care-Giving and the Moral Impoverishment of Medicine	病人照护和药物的道德贫困


CAMBRIDGE – Care-giving is understood by economists as a “burden,” by clinical psychologists as a “coping process,” by health-services researchers in terms of health-care costs, and by physicians as a matter of clinical competency.	剑桥－对病人照护，经济学家认为是一种“负担”，临床心理学家认为是一个“因应过程”，医疗卫生服务研究人员认为是一种医疗成本，而医生认为是一种临床能力。


But, for many people, care-giving is a foundational component of moral experience.	然而，对许多人来说，病人照护是道德体验的一个基本要素。


It is a practice of acknowledgement, empathic imagination, witnessing, responsibility, solidarity, and the most concrete forms of assistance.	它是一种承认、移情想象、见证、责任、团结和最具体的帮助行为。


It is this moral aspect that makes care-givers, and at times even care-receivers, feel more “present” – and thus more fully human.	正是病人照护的这些道德方面，让照护人，有时候甚至是接受照护的人，感受到了更多的“存在”——并因而成为更完整的人。


But, aside from skilled nursing, rehabilitation efforts by occupational and physical therapists, and the practical assistance of social workers and home health aides, care-giving, especially for victims of health catastrophes and end-stage conditions, has relatively little to do with the contemporary practice of medicine.	但是，除了熟练的护理之外，职业治疗和理疗师进行的康复活动，社会工作者的实际帮助以及家庭健康护理和照护，特别是对健康严重受损和处于疾病晚期的病人的健康护理和照护，与当代的医学实践几乎没有什么关系。


To illustrate this point, I draw on my personal experience as the care-giver for my wife, who suffers from a severe neurodegenerative disorder that has impaired her memory and motor functions, restricting her independence.	为了阐明上述观点，我用我自己照护妻子的个人经历来加以说明——我妻子罹患严重的神经退变性疾病，这种疾病损害了她的记忆力和运动机能，使她独立生活的能力受到了影响。


I wake her up in the morning, assist her in toileting, bathing, and dressing, make us breakfast, and help her feed herself.	每天早晨，我将妻子叫醒，帮助她上厕所，洗澡，穿衣服，准备我们的早餐并帮她进餐。


I assist her in walking, placing her in a chair, and getting into our car.	我扶着她走路，将她抱到椅子里，并放进我们的车里。


I am with her nearly all the time to protect her from injuring herself, because she can neither see nor navigate safely on the street or in our own home.	我几乎一直和她在一起，以免她伤害自己，因为不管是在街上还是在我们家里，她都是既看不见东西也不能安全地行动。


It is disturbing to witness the deterioration of a once elegant, intellectually lively, and highly independent companion of more than four decades.	看着四十多年的伴侣——一个曾经优雅、知性活泼并且非常独立的人——病情恶化，是令人困扰的。


But our emotional reactions, from frustration and anger to sadness, have been cushioned and sublimated by our work, the long rhythm of our days together, and, above all, by the support of family and close friends.	但是，由于我们的努力和长期一起的共同生活，最重要的是，由于家人和好友的支持，我们从沮丧、愤怒到悲伤的情绪反应得到了缓解和升华。


That concern and responsibility for us is as much a part of care-giving as all the mundane practices I have listed, and amounts to moral solidarity with our struggle.	家人和朋友对我们的这种关心和责任，和我前面列出的日常行为一样，是对我妻子的照护的一个重要组成部分，也是对我们努力的道德上的支持。


I give you this personal sketch because it is the best I can do to illustrate what care-giving entails, and why it is so crucial to everyone’s life – and to the human condition more generally.	我举出这个个人例子，是因为这是我能用来说明病人照护包含什么以及它对每个人的生活——更通常地说，对人的境况——如此重要的原因的最好途径。


Care-giving, as illustrated by our case, includes what happens when hope and consolation are abandoned, when theodicy ends, and when all there is to do is to be present with the sufferer, sharing his or her suffering by simply – and usually silently – being there.	正如我们的情况所表明的那样，病人照护包括，在希望和安慰都被放弃，神正论也结束了的时候，人们要做的事情就是和饱受疾病煎熬的人在一起，在他们身边——通常是安静地陪在他们身边——分担他或她的痛苦。


In medical schools, however, the curriculum in both the basic science and clinical apprenticeship years places the greatest emphasis on understanding the biology of disease processes and high-technology treatments.	但是，在医学院，基础学科和临床实习阶段的课程最关注的都是对疾病的生物学过程和高科技治疗手段的理解。


The illness experience gets less and less pedagogic attention as the student progresses from classroom to inpatient ward and clinic.	在医学院的学生从教室走向病房和临床的过程中，医学院教学对疾病体验的关注也越来越少。


In the broader system of healthcare, students can readily discern that medicine largely leaves the practical and emotional tasks of care-giving to nurses, social workers, and the patient and his or her network of support.	在更广泛的医疗保健体系内，医学院的学生们会很容易地认为，药物在很大程度上将病人照护的实际工作和情感工作留给了护士、社会工作者、病人以及病人的支持网络。


The structure of service delivery and the funding of health services work to discourage professionals from the art of care-giving, and can, in fact, undermine the practitioner’s efforts.	医疗服务的提供结构和资金投入，使专业人员远离了病人照护的艺术，并在实际上削弱了医生的治疗。


The result is moral impoverishment of the practice of medicine.	其结果就是医学实践的道德贫困。


For medical anthropologists, people everywhere live in the flow of interpersonal interactions in local worlds – social networks, families, institutions, and communities.	对医学人类学家来说，任何地方的人都生活在当地（即社交网络、家人、机构以及社区）的人际互动之中。


That is to say, experience, viewed as the flow of words, movements, and emotions between us, is not only local, but also inherently moral, because living our lives is about animating and enacting values.	也就是说，被认为是人们相互间的语言、行动以及情感流动的体验，不仅是本地的，而且具有内在的道德性，因为我们的生活就是有关赋予价值和表现价值的。


For patients and families faced with health catastrophes and serious chronic medical conditions, the experience of suffering is not just a personal one, but is strongly influenced by cultural and historical changes in the processes that contribute to moral life being distinctive in different eras and societies.	对面临严重健康问题和严重慢性疾病治疗过程的病人和家庭来说，遭受疾病折磨的经历不只是一个个人体验，还是一种会受到形成道德生活过程中的文化和历史变化极大影响的体验，而道德生活在不同时代和社会是不同的。


Faced with a threat of pain, disfigurement, loss of function, and serious disability, individuals and families reframe the experience of suffering within their local moral world by remaking meanings, emotions, and values via ethical, religious, and aesthetic activities.	面对痛苦、畸形、机能丧失以及严重残疾的威胁，个人和家庭通过用伦理、宗教和美学活动来重塑意义、情感和价值，��而在本地的道德世界里重新定义痛苦的体验。


Doctors are no different from laypersons in drawing on personal and cultural resources –involving imagination, responsibility, sensibility, insight, and communication – to accomplish their care-giving.	在利用个人和文化资源（包括想象力、责任感、感受力、洞察力以及交流）来完成病人照护方面，医生和外行没有什么不同。


And what they engage in is an amalgam of ethical, aesthetic, religious, and practical action.	而且，他们从事的是一个综合了伦理、美学、宗教和实际行动的行为。


The physician’s art – now so circumscribed by bureaucratic, political, and economic forces – turns on both the professionalization of these inherently human resources and the impact of their routine use on the doctor’s own moral life.	医生的技巧——这种技巧现在受到了官僚主义、政治和经济力量的极大限制，开始了这些固有的人类资源的专业化过程，并对在医生自身的道德生活上的一般使用产生影响。


To prepare for a career of care-giving, medical students and young doctors clearly require something besides scientific and technological training.	显然，为了为病人照护的职业生涯做准备，医学院的学生和年青的医生需要除了科学和技术训练之外的东西。


Indeed, current professional education can even be seen as enabling the physician as a technical expert, while disabling him or her as a care-giver.	事实上，我们甚至可以认为，当前的医学职业教育在使医生成为技术专家的同时，也使他们失去了成为病人照护者的能力。


To overcome this trend, we must incorporate the humanities into medical training as a means of rekindling and deepening those human experiences of imagination and commitment that are essential for care-giving, and resisting the bureaucratization of values and emotional responses that causes failure in the physician’s art.	要克服这种趋势，我们必须将把人文科学纳入医学训练作为重新点燃和强化想象力和信念这样的人类体验的途径； 这些人类体验对病人照护和抵制导致医生技术失败的情感反应和价值官僚化，至关重要。


In essence, the practitioner must come to feel that the art of care-giving is as much at stake as the science and technology of diagnosis and treatment.	实质上，医生必须逐渐认识到，病人照护的艺术和疾病的诊断和治疗科学技术一样重要。


In my view, what is needed is reform of the very culture of contemporary biomedicine.	我认为，现在我们要做的就是对当代生物医学文化进行改革。 我们必须对医学院的学生和医生进行训练：训练他们对是什么限制了他们的病人照护进行批判性的反思；


We must train students and practitioners in critical self-reflection on that which limits their care-giving; in strategies and techniques aimed at opening a space for the moral acts of care-giving; and in the most concrete and practical acts of assistance, so that they never forget what care-giving actually means.	训练他们为病人照护的道德行为打开空间的策略和技巧； 训练他们最具体和实际的帮助行为，以使他们永远不会忘记病人照护的实际意义。


The Road to Car Safety	汽车安全之路


TOKYO – The automobile – long a symbol of freedom, status, and success – is at a crossroads.	东京—汽车——自由、地位和成功的老牌象征——正站在十字路口。


For more than a century, cars have enabled billions of people to travel farther, faster, and more efficiently than ever before.	一个多世纪以来，汽车让数十亿人得以旅行得更远、更快、更高效。


They have helped power the world’s great economies and shaped our modern social and cultural landscape.	汽车帮助提高了世界经济大国的实力，决定了现代社会和文化轮廓。


But all of this has come at a price: accidents, congestion, pollution, and an uneasy dependence on oil, among other costs.	但所有这些都是有代价的：事故、拥堵、污染、难以摆脱的石油依赖，以及其他。


Our challenge, therefore, is to boost the benefits and reduce (and eventually eliminate) the harm done by our cars, so that the future of motor travel is clean, efficient, safe, and accessible to all.	因此，我们的挑战是增加汽车带来的好处，降低（并最终消除）汽车带来的伤害，从而让未来乘车旅行变得清洁、高效、安全且人人可行。


For our industry to remain an instrument of progress, we must therefore work closely with our peers from other industries and government in three major areas: safety, the environment, and affordability.	因此若要让汽车产业依然是进步的工具，我们必须与其他产业的同道以及政府在三分方面展开精诚合作：安全、环境和价格。


Road safety is a grave concern.	道路安全是一个大问题。


More than 3,000 people die in auto-related accidents every day.	每天都有3,000多人因为与汽车有关的事故身亡。


Lower-income countries account for only half of all vehicles on the road but suffer more than 90% of the fatalities.	低收入国家拥有全世界的一半汽车，但却占据了致死交通事故的90%以上。


India has four times fewer cars than France, though it suffers 20 times more road-related deaths – that is, 80 times more accidents per car.	印度的汽车数量比法国少四倍，道路相关死亡案例却要多20倍——也就是说，平均每辆车造成的事故数高80倍。


But safety is improving.	但安全性正在改善。


In Europe, even as the number of vehicles has doubled, the number of road deaths has been halved.	在欧洲，虽然汽车数量翻番，但道路死亡降低了一半。


One reason for this is the introduction of technologies such as anti-lock brakes, airbags, and electronic stability control.	一个原因是引入了防抱死制动、安全气囊和电力稳定性控制等技术。


Technologies now in development could even eliminate auto-related fatalities altogether.	目前正在开发阶段的技术甚至可以根除与汽车相关的死亡事故。


One such innovation is autonomous driving.	这一方面的一个创新是自动驾驶。


Renault and Nissan are currently working on complementary technologies that can predict, detect, and prevent collisions.	雷诺和日产目前正在合作研发互补性技术，可用于预测、侦测和防止碰撞。


By reducing the stresses of driving in heavy traffic and unfamiliar locations, this technology promises greater protection for both drivers and pedestrians.	通过减少在交通拥堵和不熟悉地段驾驶带来的压力，这一技术能更好地保护司机和行人。


It is especially valuable to people with restricted mobility, such as elderly or disabled drivers.	这对于行动不便的人来说价值更大，如老年或残疾司机。


But such breakthrough technologies are not simply invented and then implemented – they need government support in the form of a coherent set of laws and regulations covering their use.	但这类技术突破不能简单地发明和使用，它们需要政府的支持——如规定它们的使用范围的一致的法律和规则。


Policymakers must therefore be involved at an early development stage if we are to reach the goal of “zero fatality” roads within our lifetimes.	因此，要想在我们的有生之年实现道路“零致死”的目标，决策者必须在研发的早期阶段就参与进来。


The auto industry can also make a vital contribution to the environment.	汽车业还能为环境做出重要贡献。


Fifteen years ago, the Renault-Nissan Alliance evaluated the environmental impact of its vehicles over their life cycle.	十五年前，雷诺-日产联合公司（Renault-Nissan Alliance）便在全生命周期的基础上评估了旗下汽车的环境影响。


The study examined the effect of our raw-material usage; the impact of car exhaust on public health, especially in congested urban areas; and the contribution to overall greenhouse-gas emissions – 23% of which come from the auto industry worldwide.	这项研究考察了我们的原材料使用的影响、汽车尾气对公共健康的影响（特别是在拥堵的城市地区）以及对总体温室气体排放的影响——全世界有23%的温室气体来自汽车业。


As a result of that evaluation, the Alliance invested more than €4 billion ($5.5 billion) in zero-emission technologies.	这份评估带来的结果是雷诺-日产投资了40多亿欧元用于零排放技术。


Today, ours is the only auto group that mass-produces a full line of zero-emission cars and light commercial vehicles.	如今，我们是唯一一家大规模生产全系列零排放汽车和轻型商务车的汽车集团。


Renault and Nissan together have sold more than 100,000 such vehicles worldwide – more than all of the other major carmakers combined.	雷诺和日产加起来在全球售出了10万多部此类汽车——比其他所有主要汽车生产商的总和还要多。


The broader task is to integrate these vehicles into a more efficient and cleaner power grid – for example, by replacing aging coal-fired power plants with hydroelectric power.	更大的任务是让这些汽车融入效率更高、更清洁的电网——比如用水电代替老旧的火电厂。


Moreover, local and national governments should work with the automobile industry to integrate zero-emission vehicles into national transport infrastructure.	此外，地方和国家政府应该与汽车业合作，让零排放汽车融入国家交通基础设施。


If this is achieved, we believe it will be possible for cars to have zero impact on the environment in the foreseeable future.	如果实现了这一点，我们相信汽车有望在可预见的未来实现对环境的零影响。


Greater health and safety, however, should not (and need not) come at the expense of developing countries, whose citizens want the fruits of prosperity that developed countries’ citizens have long enjoyed.	但是，更好的健康性和安全性不能（也不必）要以牺牲发展中国家为代价。 发展中国家的人民也希望享受到发达国家人民享受已久的繁荣果实。


In 1999, Brazil, Russia, India, and China accounted for a mere 8% of vehicle sales worldwide; by 2012, their combined sales had reached a staggering 35% of the global total.	1999年，巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国只占全球汽车销量的8%； 到2012年，这四个国家总销量已经达到了全球总量的35%。


And this proportion is sure to rise.	并且这一比例肯定还将进一步上升。


One reason for this extraordinary growth is that carmakers have developed more affordable cars for a new, cost-conscious middle class.	如此卓越的增长的一个原因是汽车生产商为注重成本的新兴中产阶级开发了更廉价的汽车。


The Alliance’s CMF-A platform, created and manufactured in India, will pave the way for many more affordable vehicles throughout the developing world.	在印度设计和制造的雷诺-日产的CMF-A平台将为在所有发展中国家推广廉价汽车扫清障碍。


These advances are at the forefront of a growing trend toward “frugal innovation” that is increasingly being adopted in developed markets, too.	这些进步站在日益明显的通往“朴素创新”的趋势的前沿，而发达国家市场也越来越接受这一趋势。


It is hard to overestimate the impact that the automobile has had on our political, economic, social, and cultural life over the past century.	汽车在过去一个世纪中对我们的政治、经济、社会和文化生活所造成的影响怎么强调都不过分。


The industry’s global sales are greater than the GDP of all but the five largest economies, and it employs more than 50 million people worldwide.	汽车业的全球销售额比第六大经济体的GDP还要高，并为全世界5,000多万人提供了工作岗位。


Its future is bound up with that of the world economy.	汽车业的未来与世界经济的未来息息相关。


The challenge now is to reinvent the car so that it remains a proud totem of freedom and safety in the decades ahead.	现在的挑战是发明一种新汽车，让它能够在未来几十年中依然是自由和安全的骄傲图腾。


The Case Against Helicopter Money	驳直升机撒钱


MUNICH – Despite years of expansionary monetary policy, the European Central Bank has failed to push inflation back up to its target of “below but close to 2%.”	慕尼黑—欧洲央行实施扩张性货币政策已经多年，但仍没能让通胀回到其“低于但接近2%”的目标水平。


The latest measures – a zero interest rate on the ECB’s main refinancing operations, an increase in monthly asset purchases from €60 billion ($67 billion) to €80 billion, and an even lower deposit rate of -0.40% – are unlikely to change this.	最新措施——对欧洲央行主要再融资操作实施零利率、月度资产购买量从600亿欧元增加到800亿欧元，以及进一步将存款利率下调到-0. 4%——也无法改变局面。


That is why some economists are urging the ECB to go even further, with so-called “helicopter drops” – that is, financing private consumption by printing money.	因此，一些经济学家正在敦促欧洲央行更进一步，采取所谓的“直升机撒钱”——即通过印钞来为私人消费融资。


The idea of helicopter money dates back to the monetarism debates of the 1960s.	直升机撒钱的思想可以追溯到20世纪60年代的货币主义争论。


A central bank, it was argued, never runs out of options for stimulating aggregate demand and stoking inflation, provided it is willing to resort to radical measures.	该思想认为，央行永远不会计穷于刺激总需求和抬高通胀，只要它愿意采取极端措施。


But what was once a theoretical notion now seems to be a concrete possibility.	但这个曾经的理论概念现在看上去颇有切实可能性。


In practice, helicopter drops would arrive in the form of lump-sum payments to households or consumption vouchers for everybody, funded exclusively by central banks.	在实践中，直升机撒钱的形式将是一次性一家庭为单位支付或全民发放消费券，钱全部由央行出。


Governments or commercial banks distributing the money would be credited with a deposit or be given cash, but no claim would be created on the left-hand side of the central bank’s balance sheet.	分配钱的政府或商业银行资获得一笔存款信用或得到一笔现金，但央行资产负债表的资产栏不会出现债权。


This type of single accounting would reduce the central bank’s equity capital, unless it realized (sold) valuation reserves on its balance sheet.	这种单式记账（single accounting）将降低央行股本，除非它实现（卖出）其资产负债表上的价值准备金（valuation reserves）。


Proponents defend this approach by claiming that central banks are subject to special accounting rules that could be adjusted as needed.	该方针的支持者认为央行受可以按需调整的特殊会计规则的约束。


The proponents of helicopter drops today include some eminent figures, including former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke and Adair Turner, former head of the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority.	如今，直升机撒钱的支持者包括一些要人，包括美联储前主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）、英国金融服务局前局长阿代尔·特纳（Adair Turner）等。


And while ECB President Mario Draghi has highlighted the technical, legal, and accounting obstacles that stand in the way of helicopter drops by his institution, he has not ruled them out.	而尽管欧洲央行行长德拉吉强调欧洲央行采取直升机撒钱面临技术、法律和会计方面的障碍，但并没有将它排除在外。


The question now is: Is such an extreme step really justified?	现在的问题是：如此极端的措施真的可行吗？


The answer is no.	答案是否定的。


While helicopter drops are a viable policy option if deflation is spiraling downward, as it was in the late 1920s and early 1930s, that is not the case today – neither in the eurozone nor in the global economy.	当通缩日益恶化时，如20世纪20年代末到30年代初，直升机撒钱确实是可行的政策选项，但如今并非如此——不管是欧元区还是全球经济。


True, demand growth is subdued, reflecting the lingering fallout from the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008.	诚然，需求增长萎靡不振，这反映出2008年爆发的全球金融危机的漫长后遗症。


Banks, firms, and households are still cleaning up their balance sheets and working off the heaps of debt they amassed during the credit boom that preceded the bust.	银行、企业和家庭仍然在清理资产负债表，消化他们在泡沫破裂前的信用繁荣期所累积的债务。


But they have already made significant progress, meaning that the drag on growth is set to diminish.	但他们已经取得了重大进展，这意味着对增长的拖累即将结束。


Consumers today are not holding back on spending because they expect goods and services to become cheaper, as one would expect during a period of deflation.	今天的消费者并没有因为预期商品和服务会变得更便宜（通缩时期的预期）而抑制支出。


Instead, they are gradually increasing their spending, taking advantage of restored income growth and large gains in purchasing power caused by collapsing oil and commodity prices.	相反，他们正在逐渐增加支出，以利用恢复的收入增长和因石油和大宗商品价格大跌而大大增加的购买力。


As a result, most advanced economies are once again producing at close to capacity.	因此，大部分发达国家再一次以接近产能的水平生产。


Data on corporate profits also contradict the view that we are mired in deflation.	公司利润数据也不支持我们正陷入通缩的观点。


Price stability has not put profit margins under pressure.	物价稳定没有让利润边际承压。


On the contrary, in many advanced economies, profits are high – even reaching record levels – owing partly to lower input costs.	相反，在许多发达经济体，部分拜投入品成本下降所赐，利润相当高——甚至达到了创纪录的高位。


In this environment, distributing largesse financed by the central bank would have dangerous systemic consequences in the long run, because it would create perverse incentives for everyone involved.	在这样的环境下，康央行之慨分钱将造成十分危险的长期系统性后果，因为它会给所有参与者带来不当激励。


Policymakers would be tempted to resort to helicopter money whenever growth was not as strong as they would like, instead of implementing difficult structural reforms that address the underlying causes of weak economic performance.	只要增长不如达不到希望的强度，决策者就会想到动用直升机撒钱，而不是去实施解决经济表现萎靡的根本原因的困难的结构改革。


All of this would raise expectations among financial-market actors that central banks and governments would always step in to smooth out credit bubbles and mitigate their consequences, even if that meant accumulating more debt.	所有这些将在金融市场参与者中间引起一个预期，即央行和政府永远会出手干预平稳地消灭信用泡沫，减轻信用泡沫的后果，即使这意味着积累更多债务。


These actors’ risk perception would thus be distorted, and the role of risk premiums would be diminished.	这些参与者的风险感知也因此会被扭曲，而风险溢价的作用将被遏制。


Add to that the impact of the depletion of valuation reserves and the risk of negative equity –developments that could undermine the credibility of central banks and thus of currencies – and it seems clear that helicopter drops should, at least for now, remain firmly in the realm of academic debate.	此外还需要面临价值准备金耗尽的影响和负权益（negative equity）的风险 ——这些情况可能破坏央行信誉，进而破坏货币信誉——看起来，显然至少目前直升机撒钱仍应该稳稳地留在学术争论领域。


The Case for UK Import Substitution	英国的进口替代问题


LONDON – The most dramatic economic effect of the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote has been the collapse of sterling.	发自伦敦——英国脱欧公投所带来的最显著经济效应莫过于英镑的崩溃。


Since June, the pound has fallen by 16% against a basket of currencies.	自6月以来，英镑相对一篮子货币的汇率下跌了16％。


Mervyn King, the previous governor of the Bank of England, hailed the lower exchange rate as a “welcome change.”	对此英格兰银行前行长梅尔文·金（Mervyn King）表示较低的汇率是个“受欢迎的变化”。


Indeed, with Britain’s current-account deficit running at over 7% of GDP – by far the largest since data started being collected in 1955 – depreciation could be regarded as a boon.	事实上由于英国当前的经常项目赤字与GDP的比率超过了7％——也是自1955年开始统计该数据以来的最高值——贬值似乎是好事。


But is it?	但真相果真如此吗？


Economists would typically argue that the way to balance a country’s external accounts is through a fall in its currency, which would make imports more expensive and exports cheaper, causing the former to fall and the latter to rise.	通常来说，经济学家会将货币贬值视为平衡一个国家外部账户的有效手段，因为这会提高进口成本而拉低出口成本，进而令前者下降而后者上升。


Higher import prices – a net loss for the country – would be offset by the higher employment and wages generated by the more competitive position of the country’s exports.	较高的进口价格——相当于该国的净损失——将被该国出口竞争力更强的就业和工资所抵消。


But in order for currency depreciation to work its magic, more demand for exports must be forthcoming when the exchange rate falls (or, as economists say, the price elasticity of demand for exports must be high).	但为了使货币贬值发挥作用，当汇率下降时就立刻得涌现出更多的出口需求（或者用经济学术语说，出口需求的价格弹性必须较高）。


But various studies have shown that the price elasticity of demand for UK exports is low.	但多项研究表明，英国出口需求的价格弹性较低。


For example, a recent paper by Francesco Aiello, Graziella Bonanno, and Alessia Via of the European Trade Study Group finds that “the long-run level of exports appears to be unrelated to the real exchange rate for the UK.”	例如最近由智库机构欧洲贸易研究组（European Trade Study Group）研究员法兰切斯科·埃罗（Francesco Aiello），格兹埃拉·布南诺（Graziella Bonanno）和阿列西亚·维阿（Alessia Via）共同发表的一篇论文就显示“长期出口水平似乎与英国的实际汇率无关”。


This means that British consumers and producers will have to bear the entire brunt of devaluation: their import consumption will be rationed through a sharp rise in price inflation, with no offsetting gain for exports. This is by no means merely a theoretical proposition.	这意味着英国消费者和生产者将不得不全盘承受贬值的冲击：它们的进口商品消费将因价格通胀的急剧上升而遭到遏制，而且无法通过出口来抵消。


In 2008-09, when the rest of the world was on the verge of deflation, the UK was enduring an inflationary recession, with GDP contracting at a top rate of 6.1% annually, while inflation reached some 5.1%.	这可绝不仅仅是一个理论推算： 2008~09年，当世界其他地区都处于通缩边缘时，英国却在经历通胀型衰退，一方面是高达6. 1％的GDP年收缩率，一方面确是5.


This occurred because sterling fell more than 21%, peak to trough, from 2007 to 2008.	1％左右的通胀率。 这是因为从2007~08年间，英镑汇率从顶部下跌了超过21％。


Moreover, although the current-account deficit narrowed to around 1.7% of GDP in 2011, the improvement was only temporary.	此外，尽管2011年的经常项目赤字缩小到相当于GDP的1. 7％左右，但改善只是暂时的。


After 2011, the current account deficit started to widen once more, even though the pound never clawed back its losses.	2011年以后，尽管英镑汇率依旧不振，但经常项目赤字却再次开始扩大。


In economics jargon, the UK seems to be suffering from an extreme variant of the Houthakker-Magee effect – named after two economists who discovered in 1969 that price elasticities for imports and exports could diverge substantially, giving rise to a permanent tendency toward current-account imbalance.	在经济学术语中，英国似乎沦为了一个胡萨克-马格效应（Houthakker-Magee effect）的极端范例——该效应以在1969年发现进口和出口的价格弹性可能大幅度分化，导致出现长期性经常账户不平衡趋势的两位经济学家的名字命名。


The reason appears to be the massive contraction of the UK manufacturing sector – from around 28% of gross value added in 1978 to less than 10% today.	出现这一状况的原因似乎是英国制造业的大规模收缩——从1978年占总增加值约28％到今天的不足10％。


As the economist Nicholas Kaldor pointed out long ago, because manufacturing has higher returns to scale than services, manufacturing exporters tend to beat service exporters.	正如经济学家尼古拉斯·卡尔多（Nicholas Kaldor）在很早以前指出的那样，由于制造业比服务业的规模收益更高，制造业出口商往往会比服务出口商表现更佳。


In addition, structural reforms since the mid-1990s have ensured that British exporters are deeply integrated within global supply chains.	此外，自1990年代中期以来的结构性改革完成了英国出口商与全球供应链的深度融合，令英国的许多出口产品的生产需要进口各类原料零件；


As a result, many of Britain’s exports require imported inputs; so when sterling depreciates and import prices rise, the knock-on effect on export prices renders them less competitive.	因此英镑贬值和进口价格上涨时也会对出口价格产生连锁效应，使其竞争力降低。


The most recent OECD data show that the import content of UK exports is around 23%, compared to around 15% for US and Japanese exports.	最近的经合组织数据显示，英国出口商品中的进口原料零件比例约为23％，而美国和日本则为15％左右。


For now, the UK is relying on capital inflows into the City of London to limit sterling’s fall.	如今英国只能依靠指向伦敦金融城的资本流入来限制英镑的跌幅。


But, as the exchange-rate collapse of 2008 showed, this source of foreign demand for sterling is highly unstable.	但正如2008年汇率崩溃所显示的那样，外国对英镑的需求是非常不稳定的。


When the worm inevitably turns and these flows reverse, both sterling and exports will take another hit.	当趋势不可避免地逆转且资金流向改变时，英镑汇率和出口将再次���压。


The worst-case scenario would involve a sharp fall in the value of sterling, followed by sticky inflation that reinforced the rise in British export prices, fueling further currency depreciation.	对此最坏的情况是英镑价值大幅下跌，随后大幅通胀导致英国出口价格居高不下，加剧货币贬值。


This doom loop would stop only when British consumers suffered a fall in real income of a magnitude not typically seen outside developing countries.	这种恶性循环只有当英国消费者遭受实际收入下降时才会停止——其下降幅度之大，在发达国家范围内都是罕见的。


The more likely outcome is a sort of slow rotting effect, with periodic depreciations gradually driving down living standards for all who earn their living in sterling.	更可能的出现结果是一种缓慢的腐烂效应，定期贬值逐渐降低了所有赚取英镑生活的人的生活水平。


What is to be done?	对此我们该如何应对？


Only rapid government action to substitute goods currently imported with domestically produced goods will do the trick.	只有政府迅速采取行动来用国产货物替代进口的货物才会奏效。


The classic solution is import controls. But other measures that are less damaging to trade rules and international amity are available.	经典的解决方案是进口管制，还可以采取一些对贸易规则和国际友好关系破坏性较轻微的其他措施。


The national investment bank which the Labour Party is now advocating could be given a mandate to invest in industries with a high import substitution potential.	工党现在倡导的国家投资银行可以被授权对具备高进口替代潜力的行业进行投资。


An alternative would be to subsidize such industries directly from the Exchequer, with subsidies tied to the quality-adjusted price of the import being substituted.	另一种方法是直接从财政部门补贴这些行业，补贴额参照被替代进口商品的性价指标。


As the domestically produced goods became competitive with the foreign goods, the subsidies would gradually be removed and the industry allowed stand on its own two feet.	随着国内商品相对外国商品的竞争力逐步提升，补贴将逐渐消除，让行业自主运行。


Ideally, the British government should aim to bring down imports as a percentage of GDP from the current high of around 30% to pre-1974 levels of around 20%.	理想的情况是，英国政府应该把进口相对GDP的比率从目前约30％的高点降至1974年以前的20％左右。


This may prove too ambitious, and the UK may have to settle for somewhere around 25% of GDP.	这一想法可能过于乐观，而英国最终可能停留在25％的点位上。


But if something is not done, Britain risks permanent impairment of prosperity.	但如果未能做到这一点，英国就会面临长期性的繁荣流失。


A depressed economy can be reflated, and an inflationary economy can be depressed.	经济萧条卷土重来，而通胀型经济也将加剧事态。


But losing access to crucial foreign markets as a result of currency movements outside the country’s control is largely irreversible.	但由于国家对货币汇率动向失去了控制，英国在很大程度上都将无法避免地丧失那些进入国外关键市场的渠道。


Cash Aid for Africa	给非洲现金援助


STOCKHOLM – Europe has made an ambitious commitment to scale up its aid to Africa, and Africa’s challenges call for that greater engagement.	斯德哥尔摩--欧洲已经做出重大承诺来提高对非洲的援助，而非洲面临的挑战则要求更大的参与。


But boosting aid to countries that are already aid-dependent requires clearer delivery mechanisms and a degree of budgetary predictability.	但是，对已经依赖援助的国家大幅度提高援助就要求具有更为明晰的提供机制以及一定程度的预算可预见性。


Something new is called for, and cash transfers directly to poor people could be an alternative − but only as a part of a longer-term vision of partner countries’ welfare systems.	人们要求有新的东西，而向贫困人们直接转移现金可以成为一种选择。 但是这一做法只能是伙伴国家福利制度长久愿景的一部分。


The European Union has committed itself and its member states to increase aid flows to 0.56% of GDP by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015 − with a big focus on Africa.	欧盟已经承诺其与成员国将援助在2010年增加到GDP的0. 56%以及在2015年增加到0.


The combined aid commitments of OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries would mean a doubling of official development assistance to Africa between 2004 and 2010 – that is, if they are honored.	把经和组织发展援助委员会成员国的援助承诺加在一起，向非洲的正式发展援助将会在2004年到2010年期间翻倍。 但是前提条件是它们遵守承诺。


It is, after all, fair to question whether donor countries will stick to these commitments and, indeed, whether conditions in partner countries will permit them to.	毕竟，人们对援助国家是否遵守承诺以及伙伴国家的条件是否允许援助国这样做提出疑问是公平合理的。


But a theoretical doubling of African aid by 2010 − with the possibility of even more after that − offers a huge opportunity to combat poverty.	但是在理论上把非援到2010年增加一倍、并且可能在此之后增加更多提供了战胜贫困的巨大机遇。


So tackling any obstacles that could inhibit the effective application of these additional resources is a priority.	因此，消除有可能阻碍这些额外资源有效应用的障碍就是当务之急。


While Africa’s needs are relatively well known, there are challenges in scaling up aid to tackle them.	人们通常比较熟悉非洲的需求，但是增加援助解决这些需求还存在挑战。 这反映在宏观经济管理、依赖援助综合症、吸收能力以及交易成本等问题上。


This reflects such problems as macroeconomic management, aid-dependency syndromes, absorption capacity, transaction costs, and − related to all of it − the risk of decreasing returns as aid levels rise.	而且，与这些问题相关的是，随着援助水平上升存在回报下降的风险。 目前萨哈拉沙漠以南非洲国家外援和GDP的比例很高。


Given the current aid-to-GDP ratios in sub-Saharan Africa − with approximately half of countries yielding ratios of above 10% even before future increases in aid are taken into account − these challenges must be taken seriously.	即使在未来提高援助之前，大约半数国家的比例已经高于10%。 有鉴于此，人们必需重视这些挑战。


Donors and their partners agree on a way forward that could, in theory, tackle these challenges.	援助国家以及伙伴国家就前进道路达成一致意见，这样就会在理论上处理这些挑战。


The agreement is contained in the so-called Paris Agenda, which defines principles of ownership, alignment, and harmonization.	巴黎议程中包含了这一一致意见。 这一巴黎议程确定了所有权的原则、调整以及协调。


It calls for the improved predictability of aid flows, with budget support and program-based aid as the preferred means of delivering support.	它要求改善援助的可预见性，并且把预算支持和基于项目基础上的援助列为优先的提供支持方式。


It is an agenda for improved partnerships, reduced transaction costs, and increased efficiency.	这一议程改进了伙伴关系，减少了交易成本并且提高了效率。


It is when the Paris Agenda leaves theory and confronts reality that problems emerge.	巴黎议程在脱离理论和面对现实的时候就出现了问题。


Budget support suffers from low credibility, not only among donor taxpayers, but also among citizens in recipient countries.	预算支持由于信用度低而受到影响，而低信用度不仅来自援助国家的纳税人，也来自受援国家的人民。


While it assumes predictable financial flows, such predictability can be spurious.	尽管可预见的假定财政流向可以预见，但是这一可预见性还是可能虚假。


After all, neither donor countries nor their partners are exempt from such problems as corruption, political crises, armed conflicts, human rights abuses, vested interests, or international power politics.	毕竟，援助国家及其伙伴国家都不会免于腐败、政治危机、武装冲突、违反人权、既得利益或者国际大国政治等等问题。


As a result, placing so many eggs in one basket leaves the business of aid provision looking increasingly risky.	结果，把过多的鸡蛋放在一个篮子里就让提供援助工作看上去越发具有风险。


Furthermore, budget support that’s linked to national poverty-reduction strategies also rests on the questionable assumption that the political economy of a partner country works to the benefit of the poorest.	而且，与各国减少贫困战略相关的预算支持也建立在这一令人怀疑的假定基础之上，也就是伙伴国家的政治经济是为了最为贫困人民服务的。


Politics on the donor side is no less complicated, with growing aid budgets often viewed by taxpayers as excessive at a time when the anti-aid lobby is becoming more vocal.	在援助国家方面，政治也绝不简单。 在反对援助游说变得越发响亮之时，纳税人经常把不断增加的援助预算视为过份。


When donors finance 50% or more of a country's national budget, they may sometimes find intervention unavoidable − donors certainly have the power to intervene.	在提供援助者提供某一国家全国预算的一半或者更多的时候，他们就会发现有时候干预是不可避免的，因为援助者当然有实力进行干预。


That could mean more conditions being placed on aid, not fewer − even if the rhetoric sometimes appears to suggest the opposite.	这就会意味着对援助施加更多的条件，而不是减少附加条件，即使论调有时候好像相反也一样。


Would dispensing aid by making cash transfers directly to the poorest work better?	直接向最贫困人口发钱来提供援助是否更好呢？


Experimental schemes have been implemented in Latin America in which child allowances are conditional on school attendance and vaccination.	在拉丁美洲国家已经进行了试验，也就是把上学和接种疫苗作为儿童津贴的条件。 在人道主义危机发生的时候，有时候就用现金援助取代食品援助。


Cash aid has sometimes replaced food aid in humanitarian crisis situations, and there have been targeted social protection schemes in Zambia, as well as incipient welfare schemes for the elderly in India, South Africa, and Lesotho.	在赞比亚有具有针对性的社会保险。 在印度、南非和莱索托等国家将会为老年人提供福利。


The results so far are very promising.	目前为止，成效尚难以令人满意。


Poor people spend money reasonably effectively on investment as well as on consumption.	穷人在投资和消费上的花费一半比较有效。


Food and other basic goods are bought – benefiting the local economy – nutrition improves, and kids attend school for longer.	在购买了食品和其他基本物品后，地方经济获得了收益，而营养也得到了改善，孩子上学时间也更长。 南非有一项没有附加条件的儿童赠款，其收款人是孩子的母亲。


An unconditional child grant scheme in South Africa − with mothers as recipients − even demonstrated the impact in centimeters, because the height-for-age index among children improved in relation to control groups.	这一项目甚至提高了儿童的身高。 与对照组同龄儿童相比，这些孩子的身高指数得到了提高。


Affordability does not appear to be a big hurdle.	提供能力并非是一个主要障碍。


Assume, for example, that an annual universal grant of $50 is given to all children below 10 years of age in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia − covering roughly 10 million children.	例如设想一下，给莫桑比克、马拉维和赞比亚所有10岁以下儿童提供每年50美元的赠款，大约可以照顾到一千万儿童。


These are three low-income countries with HIV prevalence rates of roughly 15%.	这三个低收入国家的艾滋病发病率都是大约15%。


Further assuming a relatively generous 20% administration overhead, the total cost of the scheme would be approximately $600 million – equivalent to a fifth of the reported aid flow to these countries in 2004 and to 3.5-4% of their combined GDP.	再进一步假定相对宽松的20%的行政人头支出，这一项目的总体成本大约是六亿美元，相当于2004年记录给予这些国家援助的五分之一及其GDP总和的3. 5%到4%。


It would certainly be costly, but not out of reach if African aid is doubled.	这无疑是成本很高，但是如果非援增加一倍并非遥不可及。


For cash-transfer schemes to work, they must be regular, predictable, and long term.	这些现金转移项目要成功，它们就必须定期、可以预计以及长久。


But, while donors and their taxpayers might be willing to make long-term commitments for such a purpose, there is likely to be rather less appetite for making commitments which would seem to be never-ending.	但是，尽管援助国家及其纳税人或许愿意为这一承诺做出长期性的承诺，但是他们看来并没有多大胃口做出无休止的承诺。


A formula for burden sharing would be needed that gradually increases domestic financing.	需���分担责任的模式，从而逐渐增加国内提供资金。


But under no circumstances should these schemes be established as purely donor-driven mechanisms that bypass local budgets and institutions.	但是在任何情况下这些项目都不应该仅仅是完全由援助国家驱动，而绕过地方预算以及机构。


Partner countries must be ready to invest in their institutions and develop their own vision of how they want to organize their welfare systems.	伙伴国家必须准备好在自己的机构上投资并且自己给如何安排自身的福利体系制定计划。


Would African partners want this?	非洲伙伴们是否想要这样呢？


Maybe.	或许是这样。


In any case, the cash-transfer debate is no longer limited to those in northern development circles.	在任何情况下，有关现金转移的辩论不再局限于那些北方发展循环。


It has now reached the agenda of some African governments and the African Union.	现在，它已经被提到了某些非洲国家政府和非盟的议事日程上来。


Catalyzing Consumption and Balancing Growth	催化消费


WASHINGTON , DC – China has weathered the Great Recession well.	中国已经平稳地度过了大萧条。


The world now waits to see if last year’s impressive domestic demand growth can be sustained, and if China can, in the words of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, “give full play to the leading role of…consumer demand in driving economic growth.”	现在，让世界翘首以望的是，中国去年令人印象深刻的内需表现能否持续，以及能否“充分发挥…消费需求在促进经济增长方面的主导作用” [1] 。


The Chinese consumer has been held back for too long, and now must be put front and center in China’s growth model.	中国的消费市场被忽视得太久了，现在是时候把消费者放在增长模式中最前线的位置上。


China’s government is already moving ahead on multiple fronts to attain this goal as was clear from announcements at this week’s National People’s Congress.	中国政府在许多领域上已经采取不同措施，并在现正举行的全国人民代表大会上公布。


Of the many factors that have decreased the share of consumption in China’s economy, declining household disposable income has been central.	在造成消费市场在中国经济增长比例下降的诸多因素中，家庭可支配收入长期下降是一个主要因素。


That, in turn, has reflected the fall in labor income as a share of the economy, owing in part to structural changes that have moved workers out of agriculture (where the labor share of income is high) and into manufacturing (where capital commands a larger share of income).	劳动收入占经济的比重出现下降的部分原因是结构性变化，包括工人从农业（劳动收入比例高）转入制造业（资本占收入的比例较高）。


Concurrent with diminishing labor income, government-imposed ceilings on bank deposits – the primary savings vehicle for most households – have held down household capital income.	在劳动收入下降的同时，政府对存款利率设置了上限，而是银行存款是大部分家庭的主要储蓄方式，导致家庭的资本收入偏低。


This fall in income has been magnified by rising household savings rates, driven by insufficient insurance for health care and old age, the high cost of education, growing income inequality, and demographic trends.	由于医疗和养老保障不充分，教育成本高企，收入不平等加剧以及人口趋势等因素，家庭储蓄率一直在上升，这进一步加剧了收入的下降。


So what to do?	那么，怎么办呢？


Recently, I attended an IMF-organized workshop in Beijing that brought together Chinese officials, academics, international analysts, and IMF staff to discuss how best to catalyze household consumption in China.	月前，我参加了基金组织在北京举办的研讨会，与会人士包括中国政府官员、专家学者、国际分析人员和基金组织的人员。


Participants emphasized that changes would be needed in multiple areas, including improving the system of taxation and social insurance, further developing housing and the service economy, and eliminating a range of relative price distortions.	该研讨会正正讨论这个问题：如何最大催化中国的家庭消费？ 与会人员强调，这需要在多个领域进行变革，包括：改善税收制度和社会保障，进一步发展住房经济和服务经济，并消除各种的比价扭曲。


One key idea was to lighten the tax burden on labor . Taking into account the personal-income tax and various social contributions, taxation of labor income in China is too high . To be sure, taxes are needed to finance social spending, but revenue sources other than taxes on labor income could do the job.	其中一个方法是减轻劳动者的税收负担。 个人所得税加上各种社会保障缴纳金使得中国的劳动收入课税太高。


China could usefully explore shifting part of the burden from labor toward property, capital gains, and inheritance taxes.	诚然，社会开支需要税收来支付，但是，劳动收入税以外的收入来源也能够做到这一点。


Larger dividends paid to the budget from the highly profitable state-enterprise sector could also provide an alternative source of funds.	中国可以探索将税收从劳动收入税部分转向物业税、资本利得税和遗产税。 让高利润的国企向政府预算支付更多的红利也是一个替代性的收入来源。


Another route to improve consumption could be to offer households greater support . The global crisis has prompted China’s government to push ahead with its social-reform program.	改善消费的另外一个途径是 给家庭提供更多的支持。 全球危机已经促使政府加速推进其社会改革计划。


Important improvements have been made over the past year to expand the pension system’s coverage, move toward universal health care, and provide public funding for basic education.	过去一年来在扩大养老金覆盖范围、实行普遍医保和为基础教育提供财政资金方面取得了重大进展。


But more can be done to speed up the existing reform package, find ways to develop full coverage for catastrophic health events, and develop government-backed financing of tertiary education.	但是，还有更多可以做的，如加快实施现有的一揽子改革计划，设法对严重疫疾实行全额覆盖，并对高等教育设立政府支助。


Fixing the housing market could also help spur consumption .	整顿住房市场亦有助于刺激消费。


Distortions in the real-estate market are a powerful motivation for saving, particularly among young people who struggle to meet the high down-payment needed to buy a first home.	房地产市场的扭曲是促使人们增加储蓄的又一个重大因素，特别是对那些努力凑钱支付首套房高额首付的年轻人来说更是如此。 落后的金融体系是导致高房价的原因之一，它使得住房成为银行存款保值的极少几个替代选择之一。


Part of the high cost of housing arises from an underdeveloped financial system, which makes housing one of the few alternatives to bank deposits as a store of value.	物业税或资本利得税有助于抑制投资性住房买卖。 此外，中国亟需一个全面及全国性的住房政策来确保住房价格在用家可以支付得起的水平，特别是对那些收入有限的家庭。


Property or capital-gains taxes could help curb demand for housing as an investment vehicle.	改善金融体系也是相关的一環。


In addition, a comprehensive nationwide housing policy is urgently needed to ensure that housing remains affordable, particularly for those on limited incomes.	发展私人养老金、商业医保和年金 (annuities) 市场将有助政府扩大社会保障范围，并减少预防性高储蓄的诱因。


Related to this is the need for improvements in the overall financial system .	增加不同的储蓄产品种类也会提高家庭可支配收入并增加消费。


By developing markets for private pensions, commercial health insurance, and annuities, China could complement expanded government provision of social insurance and weaken the incentives that underlie high precautionary saving.	一个更为发达的金融体系将提供不动产以外的替代性保值工具，从而将使人们更容易拥有房屋。 随着基金组织展开对中国的“金融部门评估” (Financial Sector Assessment Program) ，基金组织与中国政府在今年里将对这些问题进行更深入的研究。


Similarly, broadening the range of available savings instruments could raise household disposable income and increase consumption.	培育有活力的服务业经济也会带动消费。


A more developed financial system would provide alternatives to real estate as a store of value, thereby making home ownership more accessible. These issues will be examined carefully during the course of this year as the Chinese government and the IMF collaborate on a Financial Sector Assessment Program for China.	今后几年，更充分发展服务业经济将是增加就业并减少对制造业依赖的关键之一。


Fostering a dynamic service economy will invariably boost consumption as well .	入场门槛必须减少，特别是在那些国营寡头占支配地位的服务行业。 透过提高土地、能源、水和资金等的成本，解决资本密集型制造业的主要价格扭曲问题。


In the coming years, a more fully-fledged service economy will be an essential ingredient to increase employment and lessen China’s reliance on manufacturing.	改变税收结构也会有帮助。 目前，工业是政府的主要税收来源，尤其是在地方一级，国家就没有什么动力来发展服务业经济。


But spurring faster growth in services is a complex undertaking. Entry barriers, particularly in service industries dominated by state-owned oligopolies, need to be lowered.	最后，更加坚挺的人民币应是一揽子提高消费的改革措施的不可分割的一部分。


Distortions in key prices that favor capital-intensive manufacturing need to be removed by raising the cost of land, energy, water, and capital.	更坚挺的货币将会增加家庭收入。


Changing the tax structure will also help. At present, industry is the primary source of tax revenue for the government, particularly at the local level, giving the state too little incentive to foster a service economy.	它也将有力地激励企业发展服务业经济，并为中国消费者提供更多的工作岗位和更多的选择。


A stronger currency would increase household income. It would also create a powerful incentive for companies to expand into the service economy, providing more jobs and more choices for Chinese consumers.	我相信，中国如果能够成功地和可持续性地提高消费，她的发展道路定将进入一个新的时代 -- 中国的经济将继续快速增长，创造更多的就业，增加社会福利，对自然资源的需求更少，最终达到大大提高的经济增长质量，并支持更平衡的全球经济增长。


If consumption can be successfully and sustainably boosted, I believe that China’s development will enter a new era, one in which economic growth continues at a rapid pace, generates higher employment, increases social welfare, places less demand on natural resources, and, ultimately, is of a much higher quality thereby underpinning more balanced global growth.	Anoop Singh 是国际货币基金组织亚洲及太平洋部主任 .


Puerto Rico in Crisis	危机中的波多黎各


WASHINGTON, DC – Puerto Rico ought to be the jewel of the Caribbean. It is not.	发自华盛顿区——波多黎各本应是加勒比海的瑰宝，但事实却并非如此。


Tourism has been stagnant for decades, even as travelers have flocked to other Caribbean destinations.	纵使游客蜂拥至加勒比海其他各大旅游胜地，但这里的旅游业却已停滞了数十年。


European firms doing business in North and South America locate their corporate headquarters in Miami, Panama City, and elsewhere, with almost none choosing Puerto Rico.	在北美和南美做生意的欧洲企业会把总部设在迈阿密、巴拿马城和其他地方，但鲜有选择波多黎各的。


And now the island’s economy, after a decade of torpor, is declining at an accelerating rate as people leave for the US mainland.	经历十年的沉寂之后，这个小岛的经济现正加速下降，因为人们离开这里前往美国大陆。


Public debt has soared, and the government says it cannot pay.	公共债务激增，当地政府表示无力承担。


Nor is it a US state. Yet it has features of both: Although it has its own constitution, it is a United States territory, Puerto Ricans are US citizens, and the island is subject to US federal law, except as otherwise stipulated.	与希腊不同的是，波多黎各既不是一个独立国家（这意味着它不能从国际货币基金组织获得融资），但它同时也不是美国的一个州，然而却具有两者的特点：虽然它是美国的领土，但它有自己的宪法，波多黎各人是美国公民，除非另有规定，这个岛受美国联邦法律约束。


The advantages of this hybrid status include the security and predictability of America’s rule of law, eligibility for federal transfer payments, and favorable tax treatment.	这种混合状态的优点包括安全性和美国法治的可预见性，以及联邦转移支付和税收优惠资格。


Puerto Ricans who are not US government employees do not pay federal income tax, and the island’s bonds are “triple tax-exempt” (free of federal, state, and local taxes).	非美国政府雇员的波多黎各人不需要缴纳联邦所得税，岛上发行的债券是“三重免税”的（免除联邦、州和地方税收）。


But there are also disadvantages to this arrangement.	但这样的安排也有缺点。


For example, Puerto Rico is subject to the Jones Act, which requires using very costly US-built ships and crews for all sea transport to and from the mainland.	例如波多黎各是受《琼斯法案》管辖的，所有在本岛与美国大陆之间的海运都必须使用美制船只和美国船员，成本高昂。


The island must also comply with the federally mandated minimum wage, despite an income level about half that of the poorest US state.	此外尽管收入水平只是美国最贫穷州的大概一半，岛上还是必须遵守联邦法律规定的最低工资。


And municipalities cannot benefit from Chapter 9 of the US bankruptcy code.	同时这类自由邦不能享受美国破产法第9章所载明的权益。


Puerto Rico’s current troubles trace their origin to the gradual withdrawal, starting in 1996, of earlier exemptions from US corporate taxes for companies located on the island.	波多黎各当前的问题可以追溯到1996年，从那时开始原本在岛上注册以获得美国企业税豁免的企业逐渐从岛上退出。


Capital-intensive companies, especially pharmaceutical firms, began leaving.	资本密集型的企业，特别是制药公司开始撤离。


Puerto Rico’s economy recorded little growth after 1996, and real (inflation-adjusted) GDP has been falling for the past decade.	波多黎各的经济自1996年后只录得微量增长，同时实际国内生产总值（经通胀因素调整后）在过去十年则有所下跌。


Many Puerto Ricans, unable to find jobs on the island, have migrated to the mainland, with the population and labor force estimated to be shrinking at a rate of 1.5% this year.	许多波多黎各人无法在岛上找到工作，只得移居美国大陆，今年人口和劳动力数量估计又会减少1. 5%。


Moreover, Puerto Rico’s labor force participation rate is under 40%, compared to 62% on the mainland.	此外，波多黎各的劳动力参与率只有不到40%，而在美国大陆的则为62%。


There is plenty of blame to go around for these failures. Puerto Rico and the US government each bear responsibility.	对这一败局的责难多如牛毛，而波多黎各和美国政府都得对此负责。


Successive Puerto Rican governments thought that the island’s economy was in “recession” and attempted to spur activity by increasing government spending.	历届波多黎各政府都认为小岛经济陷入“衰退”并试图通过增加政府支出刺激活力。


Low interest rates meant that deficits could be financed by floating bonds.	低利率意味着赤字要由不断增发的债券支持。


Debt mounted, and markets are now almost entirely closed to more.	债务日益累积，如今市场却几乎对新债券关上了大门。


Despite efforts to cut expenditures and boost tax receipts, current and prospective obligations (including pension liabilities) far exceed any feasible increase in government revenues.	尽管努力削减支出和提高税收收入，当前和未来的义务(包括养老金债务)远远超过任何可行的政府收入增长。


Given the ease with which Puerto Ricans move to the mainland, raising taxes is unlikely to increase revenues.	鉴于波多黎各人可以随意移居美国大陆，也不太可能靠加税来增加当地收入。


The US government also is culpable.	对此美国政府也有责任。


The inapplicability of Chapter 9 makes orderly debt restructuring very difficult.	第9章的不适用导致有序的债务重组非常困难。


Moreover, Puerto Rico is covered by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and must pay accordingly, even though the island’s doctors are compensated at a lower rate than those on the mainland (and the Puerto Rican government must bear much of the cost). The same is true of some other welfare payments.	此外，即使岛上的医生相比美国大陆需要补贴的费率更低（波多黎各政府必须承担大部分的成本)，波多黎各处于可承受医疗法案的覆盖之下并必须支付相应的费用，其他福利也是如此。


Low labor force participation is a result of the relatively low productivity of Puerto Rico’s unskilled workers.	劳动力参与度低是波多黎各非熟练工人生产力相对较低的后果。


Companies cannot compete with firms that pay much lower wage rates on neighboring islands.	这里的企业无法与在邻近岛屿工资水平要低得多的公司竞争。


A rule of thumb is that a minimum wage that is above 55% of the median wage will impede job creation (and economic growth); Puerto Rico’s minimum wage is 77% of the median, owing to the federal mandate.	经验显示当最低工资标准相当于实际工资中位线的55%时就将阻碍创造就业（以及经济增长），而根据联邦政府规定，波多黎各的最低工资相当于中位线的77%。


A family of three with one wage earner at the minimum wage can take home about $1,100 per month, while it could get about $1,700 on welfare.	一个有一位最低收入雇佣劳动者的三口之家，每月可以收入约1100美元工资，同时却可得到大约1700美元的福利。


No surprise, then, that people either leave the island or go on welfare and work in the informal economy.	不出所料，人们要么选择离开这个岛，要么继续领取福利并在这一不正规的经济体中工作。


Overcoming Puerto Rico’s crisis will require restoring growth, implementing a sustainable fiscal policy, and debt restructuring.	克服波多黎各的危机需要恢复经济增长，实现可持续的财政政策，以及进行债务重组。


Accomplishing the first of these would, together with reduction of excessive government expenditures, help to achieve the second.	实现第一点会同时减少政府过度支出，有助于实现第二点。


For the Puerto Rican authorities, this means making the island friendlier to business, including by removing onerous labor-market regulations.	对波多黎各的当局来说，这意味着使这个岛屿对商业更加友好，包括消除繁重的劳动力市场法规。


Meanwhile, the US government could exempt Puerto Rico from the Jones Act, extend to it Chapter 9 bankruptcy coverage, and align the island’s welfare and labor requirements with its productivity level.	与此同时，美国政府可以让波多黎各免受《琼斯法案》管辖，纳入第9章破产法规的覆盖范围，并使岛上的福利和劳动需求跟上生产力水平。


Each of these policy actions requires political will.	这些政策措施需要政治意愿。


Puerto Rico’s governor, Alejandro García Padilla, has appointed a working group to produce a five-year program to restore growth and fiscal sustainability.	波多黎各州长阿列加德罗·加西亚·帕迪拉（Alejandro García Padilla）已经任命了一个工作组来制定一个恢复增长和实现财政可持续性的五年计划。


Bills to make Puerto Rico eligible for Chapter 9 are being introduced in Congress.	让波多黎各纳入第9章资格的报告已经提交国会。


These and other measures now under consideration promise to improve Puerto Rico’s economic prospects. But they will require concerted and determined action on all fronts.	现在进行研究考虑的这些和其他措施将能改善波多黎各的经济前景，但是需要以协调和执行为前提。


Puerto Rico is not Greece; successive governors of the island have introduced budgets they thought were balanced, only to find that inadequate growth led to lower revenues and higher expenditures than had been projected.	波多黎各不是希腊，历届岛上政府都推介他们认为是平衡的预算，却发现增长不足导致较低的收入和支出高于预期。


But it is a US territory. The US government should do its part to improve the island’s prospects.	但这毕竟是美国领土，美国政府应该尽力改善岛屿的前景。


Can Minsk 2.0 Save Ukraine?	明斯克2. 0能否拯救乌克兰？


KYIV – The new ceasefire agreement for Ukraine was signed in Minsk almost one year to the day after Russian troops – their faces masked, their military insignias removed – invaded Crimea.	基辅—俄罗斯部队——他们蒙面并且去除了肩章——入侵克里米亚近一年后，乌克兰签署了一份新的停火协议。


In the interim, thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, and hundreds of thousands more have been turned into refugees in their own country.	在此期间，数千乌克兰人被杀，数十万乌克兰人在自己的祖国沦为难民。


Russian President Vladimir Putin, determined to restore by force the sphere of influence once held by the Russian/Soviet empire, has shredded the rules that have ensured peace in Europe – indeed, in much of the world – for three generations.	俄罗斯总统普京想用武力重建沙俄/苏联帝国曾经拥有的势力范围，为此他践踏了三代人以来保证欧洲——事实上，是保证世界大部——和平的规则。


While Russia was launching its bid to subordinate Ukraine, I was in prison, with scant hope of ever regaining my freedom.	当俄罗斯开出条件要乌克兰屈服时，我正身陷囹圄，自由已看似可望而不可及。


The regime of former President Viktor Yanukovych was dancing to the Kremlin's tune, and my confinement ended only because of the courage of the millions of Ukrainians who demanded its ouster.	前总统亚努科维奇（Viktor Yanukovych）政权唯克里姆林宫马首是瞻，感谢数百万乌克兰人的勇气，他们推翻了亚努科维奇，把我放了出来。


Yet my freedom has left a bitter aftertaste, because my imprisonment ended only as the war against my country began.	但我的自由仍有一丝苦涩的余味，因为我的囹圄生涯直到祖国陷入战争后才结束。


Now, after a year of savagery, sabotage, and mendacity on a scale unseen since Nazi rule in Europe, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine have agreed on a new road map to peace for our country.	如今，在经历了一年的野蛮、破坏和谎言之后——其规模之大为纳粹统治以来欧洲所未见——法国、德国、俄罗斯和乌克兰领导人同意为我的祖国采取新的和平路线图。


I must hope against hope that the agreement reached in Minsk, unlike the accord signed there in September 2014, succeeds.	我必须希望，在明斯克所形成的协议与2014年9月在此签订的协议不同，它将会成功。


The people of Donbas, still bombarded and besieged by Russian troops and their local accomplices, deserve a return to normalcy.	依然在经受俄罗斯军队及其地方合谋者轰炸和包围的顿巴斯人民理应回归正常生活。


Equally important, our prisoners of war and hostages deserve to be returned to their families.	同样重要的是，我们的战争罪犯和人质理应回到家人的怀抱。


An early test of the extent of the Kremlin's commitment to the Minsk agreement should be whether it frees Nadiya Savchenko, Ukraine's first woman fighter pilot.	克里姆林宫对明斯克协议有多重视，一个早期测试便是其是否会释放乌克兰首位女飞行员萨维琴科（Nadiya Savchenko）。


Savchenko has been on a hunger strike in Russia for more than two months to protest her patently illegal incarceration on charges even more ludicrous than those for which I was imprisoned.	萨维琴科在俄罗斯进行绝食抗议已逾两个月，以抗议对她的显而易见的非法关押。 她面临的指控甚至比把我关进监狱的理由还要荒谬可笑。


Of course I hope that the new agreement will last, finally bringing peace to Ukraine.	当然，我希望新协议能持续下去，最终给乌克兰带来和平。


But such an outcome is unlikely, given that the agreement lacks any enforcement mechanism, such as the automatic eviction of Russia from the SWIFT financial transfer system should it renege on any aspect of the agreement.	但这一结果看起来不太可能，因为协议缺少执行机制，如在其违反协议的任何条款时自动将俄罗斯逐出SWIFT金融转移支付系统。


Simply trusting the Kremlin's “goodwill" would be reckless.	单纯依靠相信克里姆林宫的“好意”有失谨慎。


Ukraine and its partners need to develop a clear strategy and action plan, in case the latest Minsk agreement is torpedoed.	乌克兰及其伙伴需要制定明确的战略和行动计划，以防最近的明斯克协议遭到破坏。


This should include the provision of defensive lethal assistance to Ukrainian forces; after all, strength deters and weakness provokes.	这应该包括向乌克兰部队提供致命性防御支持； 毕竟，强大产生威慑，弱小就要挨打。


More broadly, despite the highly charged situation in our country, Ukraine deserves a clear road map out of its current security “grey zone" and toward a Euro-Atlantic future.	从更广的角度，尽管我的祖国身处千钧一发之势，但乌克兰应该获得清晰的路线图走出当前的安全“灰色地带”，走向欧洲-大西洋未来。


We have already paid a high price for our European ambitions; we should not be turned away now.	我们已经为我们的欧洲雄心付出了很多； 我们不应该在现在转变方向。


Moreover, if Ukraine's partners are serious about upholding the rule of law, charges should be filed against Kremlin leaders at the International Criminal Court in The Hague for the numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity that its forces have committed in Ukraine.	此外，如果乌克兰伙伴国真的希望坚守法治精神，就应该在海牙国际刑事法院和起诉克里姆林宫领导人——俄军在乌克兰犯下了数不尽的战争罪行和反人类罪行。


Since its invasion of Crimea a year ago, Russia has continuously and gravely violated the United Nations Charter, numerous international treaties, and international humanitarian norms.	自一年前入侵克里米亚以来，俄罗斯一直在严重违反联合国宪章、各种国际条约和国际人权规范。


We in Ukraine have learned much about ourselves – and about Russia and Europe – during this year of savagery.	在这一年的野蛮经历中，我们乌克兰人大大地认清了我们自己，也认清了俄罗斯和欧洲。


We have found in our country's suffering a new and unbreakable national unity, as well as a new determination to embrace root-and-branch reform of our economy, government, and society, because our very independence, not just our European future, depends on it.	我们从祖国的苦难中找到了新的坚不可摧的国家团结，以及采取从头到脚焕然一新的经济、政府和社会改革的决心，因为我们的国家独立——而不仅仅是我们的欧洲未来——取决于此。


If we do not reform, we will be enslaved.	如果我们不改革，我们就会被奴役。


But the earthquake that Russia triggered in Ukraine has also exposed dangerous fault lines across Europe.	但俄罗斯在乌克兰引起的地震也在暴露了欧洲的危险的断层线。


Putin has found in Ukraine the perfect tool with which to confound and divide the West.	普京把乌克兰当作困惑和分裂西方的理想工具。 他的政治教条很简单；


And his political credo is simple: what he can divide, he can rule.	能被他所分裂，就能被他所统治。


Indeed, over the past year, we in Ukraine often have watched in disbelief as Europe struggled to confront so clear an act of aggression.	事实上，在过去一年中，我们乌克兰人常常带着不可思议的表情目睹欧洲如何应对如此明目张胆的请略行为。


Without the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over rebel-held territory (an act that killed all 298 people aboard), it seems doubtful that the United States and the European Union would ever have agreed on the current program of economic sanctions imposed on Russia.	要不是马来西亚航空17号航班在叛乱地区被击落（造成机上298人死亡），美国和欧盟说不定还不会同意目前对俄罗斯实施的经济制裁。


The first fault line that Russia has exposed can be found among Europe's former Soviet bloc countries.	俄罗斯所暴露的第一条断层线在欧洲的前苏联阵营国家。


Some, like Poland and the Baltic states, have consistently denounced Russia's actions and have demanded a firm response.	一些国家，如波兰和波罗的海国家，一直在谴责俄罗斯的行为并要求予以强硬应对。


But, elsewhere in the region, leaders were quick to excuse Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea, or to argue that Russia is simply too powerful to confront.	但是，在该地区的其他国家，领导人马上开始为俄罗斯入侵和吞并克里米亚开脱，或指出俄罗斯太强大，无法应对。


Appeasement, it seems, is alive and well in countries that should know better.	看起来绥靖心态相当活跃，并在理应对形势心知肚明的国家十分普遍。


And then there has been the creation of something akin to a political fifth column across Europe.	然后是欧洲遍地开花的政治第五纵队。


The continent's Euroskeptic political parties, on both the left and the right, are holding up Putin's authoritarian nationalism as a model for the type of illiberal regime they would seek to establish should the EU dissolve.	欧洲大陆的欧洲怀疑派政党，不论左翼还是右翼，都把普京的集权民族主义视为他们寻求在欧盟解体后建立的不自由政权的榜样。


In fact, the Kremlin is financing many of these parties.	事实上，克里姆林宫为许多这些政党提供金融支持。


Lenin once said that capitalists would sell the ropes with which they would be hanged.	列宁曾说，资本家被绞死的绳索也将是他自己出售的。


Today, European governments appear willing to allow Putin to buy the votes with which he will destroy the EU.	如今，欧洲政府似乎乐于让普京收买他将用来摧毁欧盟的选票。


There are other Kremlin supporters as well, including corporate leaders who want to return to business as usual with Russia, and academic apologists for the Soviet Union who, 25 years after its collapse, see a chance for vindication.	还有其他克里姆林宫支持者，包括那些想照旧与俄罗斯做生意的公司领袖以及那些为苏联做辩护的学者，在苏联解体25年后，他们终于看到了正名的机会。


And, with public opinion polls revealing that a significant minority of Europeans are falling in line with Putin's rhetoric, his strategy of dividing the EU and NATO seems to be making real headway.	此外，民调表明，大量欧洲少数群体说辞与普京一致，普京分裂欧盟和北欧的战略似乎将得到真正的顺风。


Let us be clear.	让我们认清形势。


What happens in Ukraine – not the financial standoff with Greece – will be the ultimate test of whether European and transatlantic unity endure.	乌克兰发生的情况——不是希腊的金融僵局——将是欧洲和跨大西洋联盟能否生存的终极考验。


The fault lines extending from Ukraine are undermining the fundamental values that have underpinned Europe's postwar peace and prosperity.	源自乌克兰的断层线正在破坏作为欧洲战后和平与繁荣基础的基本价值。


Failure to defend those values in Ukraine will cause them to unravel far beyond our borders.	在这场危机中分裂的西方无法经受这一考验。


A West that is divided in this crisis cannot stand. It is time to act.	必须采取行动了。


Celebrating the German Model	欢庆德国模式的胜利


Princeton -- If anyone wanted evidence that we are not in the mental and political world of the interwar Great Depression, the German election result and its outcome – a stable government of the center-right - should be a clincher.  In interwar Germany, the Depression destroyed German democracy and led to the rise to power of Hitler and the National Socialists; in today’s Germany, the most severe economic crisis since the Second World War produced the reelection of Frau Merkel.	发自普林斯顿——如果有人想找证据证明我们不是身陷两次世界大战之间大萧条时期的精神和政治世界的话，那么德国大选及其成果——一个稳固的中右翼政府——就是铁证。 在两次大战间隙期的德国，大萧条破坏了德国民主并导致了希特勒及其纳粹党徒的上台；


Conventional wisdom claims that incumbent parties and politicians are punished by voters in times of economic distress.  Throughout the campaign there was never any doubt about the position or tpopularity of Chancellor Angela Merkel.	传统思维总认为当经济危机来临时，当权的政党和政治家都会遭到选民的惩罚。 但在整个大选过程中，安吉拉·默克尔总理的地位和受欢迎程度却是无可置疑的。


The interwar Depression led to the disintegration of liberal economic and political values.  In Germany in 2009 not only was there was no swing to political extremism of the right: there was no sign of any support for a radical right.  In the elections for regional parliaments, the small radical right parties (which have never been a feature of national politics) simply disappeared.	但在2009年德国大选中不但没有出现倒向右翼政治极端主义的倾向，也没看到对极端右翼的任何支持。 在地区议会的选举中，那些极端右翼小党派（它们从来都没有在国家政治层面露过脸）直接就消失得无影无踪了。


The real victor of the campaign, with a vote that jumped up to 14.5% and a position in parliament that will determine the shape of the new coalition government, was the heir of classic German liberalism, the FDP.  It campaigned on a promise of tax reduction and of deregulation in order to stimulate the economic growth that Germany needs to get out of the economic crisis.	5%，巩固了议会中的地位，并将左右新联合政府的形态。 作为经典德国自由主义的代表，该党在大选中承诺减税并减少国家对经济的干预，以刺激经济增长并帮助德国走出经济危机的漩涡。


The real losers of the election were the Social Democrats, with a drop in support of 11% that is without precedent in the very stable history of German electoral behavior.  Some on the left claim that the SPD’s catastrophic result was the product of too close an engagement with liberalism and deregulation.  According to this view, the party is now paying the price for Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s successful attempts at economic reform in the early 2000’s.  It seems more likely that the party was punished for its lackluster electoral campaign, and for the negativity with which it tried to present the outcome of the election (the center-right coalition) as a threat to social peace in Germany.	根据这个观点，该党正在为2000年早期格哈特·施罗德总理在经济改革方面的成功尝试买单。 但失败的原因似乎是由于社会民主党拙劣的选举策略，以及当他们试图把选举结果（中右翼联盟）的出现形容为对德国社会安定的威胁时，选民根本不买账。


In the interwar crisis of democracy, participation in elections surged as voters tried to protest against what the radical parties denounced as “the system”.  In Germany in 2009, electoral participation fell by 5%, to 72.5%.  Those voters who were disillusioned by politics simply thought that there was no point in voting.	在两次世界大战间隙的民主危机中，投票率大幅下滑，因为选民们希望对极端党派所谓的“制度”进行抗争。 在2009年的德国，选举参与率下滑了5%，达到72.


The only point in common with the interwar results seems to be that economic crisis then as now strengthened the radical left.	但本次选举和两次大战期间结果的唯一共同点似乎是经济危机都增强了极端左翼的力量。 然而情况早已发生了剧变！


But what a difference!  Then there was a powerful communist party, closely aligned with the interests and policies of the Soviet Union.  Now the party of protest is unambiguously the party of historical losers: in the East, of Germans who are nostalgic for the planned economy and society of state socialism; in the West, of critics of the SPD who lost a power struggle with Gerhard Schroeder.	当年德国共产党势力极其强大，而且与苏联在利益和政策方面都保持一致。 如今反对党则无疑就是那个是遭遇历史性大败的党派：无论是在人民怀念计划经济和国家社会主义的东德地区，还是在社会民主党党内反对派在与格哈特·施罗德的权力斗争中失利的西德地区，社会民主党都一败涂地。


It is a party with no coherent program, but rather a compendium of popular and nationalist slogans.	实际上，社会民主党就是一个没有连贯性政策，只有一些充斥着民粹主义和国家主义口号的纲领的政党。


It is a testimony of the responsibility and maturity of the German people that this miscellaneous alliance of the disaffected only attracted 12% of the vote.	而这也是德国人民责任感和成熟程度的最佳证明，因为这个东拉西凑的反对党联盟只吸引了12%的选票


If the election is clearly not a victory for political and economic radicalism, it would be equally misleading to interpret it as the triumph of the free market.  Throughout the campaign, there was an eerie degree of consensus about the desirability of central features of a distinctly European and more specifically German system of values.	如果本次大选很明显不是一场政治和经济极端主义的胜利，那么也可能同样被误读成自由市场理论的胜利。 在选举的全过程中产生了一种特殊的共识，希望在有欧洲特色或者更加德国化的价值观系统中扮演核心角色。


What are those values?	一个建立在庞大和革新性制造业基础上的出口型经济； 一个面向世界经济的，由中小型（通常是家族式）企业组成的庞大网络；


A social market economy, rather than unbridled market capitalism; an export economy built on a large and technically innovative manufacturing base; a large network of small and medium sized enterprise, often family-owned, that is open to the global economy; a sense of environmental responsibility; and a suspicion of financially driven Anglo-Saxon style globalization and corporate capitalism.  Indeed the sense that Germany had the opportunity to show off the unique strengths of the “German model” was a key to Merkel’s appeal, and she repeatedly noted what a tough line she had taken against the position of banks.	一种对环境负责任的态度，以及对英美式全球化和企业资本主义的怀疑态度。 而事实上默克尔拥有如此大感染力的关键就是因为德国有机会去展示“德国模式”的特殊力量，而且她也不断强调她在与银行的斗争中所采取的强硬路线。


In coming years, the German government is likely to be more vocal in European and global debates.  It is likely to present the German model as something that corresponds more closely to what the world needs in the aftermath of the financial crisis.	在未来的几年中，德国政府将在欧洲和全球议题中获得更多发言权。 而这可能将德国模式推广成为一种与后金融危机时代全世界的真正需求相一致的模式。


Financial activity was concentrated largely in what the Europeans termed “Anglo-Saxon” economies: above all the United States and the United Kingdom, and a few small countries that tried, disastrously, to replicate a model of free-for-all finance such as Iceland and Ireland.  But the emerging markets that drive globalization in the early twenty-first century have a similar mix of export orientation and a prominent industrial base of small and medium-sized and frequently family-owned enterprises.  They have the problem today of trying to reconcile dynamic growth and social cohesion that was the problem of Germany in the past, and to which the German social model was and is held up as the answer.	金融活动高度集中在欧洲人所谓的“盎格鲁-撒克逊”经济体，总的来说就是英美两国��加上冰岛和爱尔兰这些尝试复制无监管自由经济制度，但却下场惨淡的小国。 但在21世纪初促进了全球化进程的新兴市场也拥有一个出口导向和由中小型家族企业构成的优质经济基础的混合体。


Merkel’s new coalition will sit neatly alongside the new Japanese government of Yukio Hatoyama, which is also dedicated to finding a new and peculiarly Japanese model of economic growth.	默克尔的新执政联盟将与由鸠山由纪夫领导的日本新政府并驾齐驱，而后者也正试图找寻一条拥有日本特色的新经济增长模式。


These new national visions of economics in the twenty-first century are not simply turning in on themselves, or embarking on aggressive campaigns driven by xenophobic and racial nationalism – that was the world of the twentieth century.  In the world of the twenty-first century, models of social organization have to persuade rather than conquer.  The world looks for local or national solutions to global problems.  Frau Merkel won the election because she formulated a clear answer.	21世纪的新国家经济视野将不仅仅是对自身的简单重复，或者附生于由仇外或者种族国家主义驱动的野心勃勃的选举行策略——这些都是20世纪的做法了。 在21世纪的世界，社会组织的行为模式应该更多的采取说服而不是征服的策略。


Censor and Sensibility	审查和敏感性


Most Western journalists fight back when governments threaten their ability to gather the information they need.	大多数西方记者在收集信息的能力遭到政府的威胁时会进行抵抗和反击。


Some have gone to jail to protect the identities of anonymous sources and whistleblowers, or have sued governments that deny them access to crucial documents.	有些记者为了保护匿名信息提供者和爆料者的身份而坐牢，有些记者起诉政府拒绝他们接触关键材料。


Alas, many journalists seem far more willing to fight over their right to gather news than to battle for their right to publish and broadcast the results of their reporting freely.	唉，他们为保护自己采集新闻的权利而战的意愿似乎远远超过为保护他们自由出版和广播报道结果的权利而战的意愿。


Indeed, Western journalists and news organizations seem to accept as a fact of life censorship within countries that routinely control the media.	事实上，西方记者和新闻机构好像认为在一个例行控制传媒的国家中审查制度不可避免。


Acquiescing to such censorship might have been necessary when printing presses, delivery trucks, news kiosks, or transmission towers were the only way to get printed publications or broadcast programs to news consumers.	在印刷机、送货卡车、报刊亭或转播塔是将印刷出版物或广播节目送到新闻消费者手中的唯一方式的时候，默认这种审查制度可能是必要的。


But Internet publishing offers a new – and potentially lucrative – opportunity for the distribution of uncensored information.	但是互联网出版业为发布未经审查的信息提供了一种新的并且有潜在利润可图的机会。


Such freedom is not automatic, because even the Internet’s inherent openness can be largely defeated by assiduous government filtering and surveillance.	这种自由不是自动到来的，因为即使是互联网与生俱来的开放性也可能因苛刻的政府过滤和监视而遭到极大的损害。


However, in recent years, sustained research into countermeasures against such third-party interference in Internet communications has begun to add a new factor.	然而，近年来，持续的反第三方干预互联网通讯的对策研究已经开始增加新的因素。


The bulk of this research has not been conducted in university labs or corporate R&D facilities, but spontaneously by teenagers, who use it to share copyrighted music with one another without paying for it.	这项研究的大量工作不是在大学实验室或公司研发机构进行的，而是一帮十几岁的青少年同时进行的，他们运用这种技术相互之间免费分享受到版权保护的音乐。


Western media outlets have covered this story with great interest, yet apparently without realizing that these peer-to-peer technologies have the potential to de-censor the news for more people in countries like China, where any online content that runs counter to the Chinese Communist Party’s current line risks falling victim to the “Great Firewall” of censorship.	西方传媒界以极大的兴趣报道了这个故事，但是明显没有意识到这些对等网络技术对于更多人而言具有反新闻审查的潜力，特别是对于中国来说尤其如此。 在中国，任何与中共当前路线不一致的在线内容都面临着成为审查制度“金盾工程”牺牲品的风险。


Peer-to-peer technologies make filtering more difficult, because they put nearly any consumer of information into the process of transmitting it.	对等网络技术使得过滤变得更加困难，因为这些技术几乎把所有信息消费者都放置在传输过程之中。


For example, without endangering those in China, news organizations could conclude deals with other companies to ensure that uncensored reports are echoed from one free server to the next, thereby defying China to filter the entire Internet if it wishes to eliminate content.	例如，新闻机构可以在不危及生活在中国的那些人的条件下与其它公司达成协议确保未经审查的报道从一台自由的服务器传输到另一台，从而使得中国难以过滤整个互联网，如果它想要删除这些内容的话。


Of course, news organizations operate as businesses, and defying powerful governments can be a bad business strategy.	当然，新闻机构都是商业运作，挑战强大的政府是一种不好的商业战略。


That is why there has been so little rebellion, or even remonstration, among media companies when authoritarian governments threaten journalists, editors, and publishers.	这就是当独裁政府威胁新闻记者、编辑和出版者时传媒公司几乎没有什么反抗或者甚至是抗议的原因。


It also explains why journalists in those countries have so often bent over backwards to apologize for individual transgressions, rather than stand in defiance.	这也就解释了为什么那些国家的新闻记者如此经常地屈从后退，为个别的违规而道歉，而不是奋起抗争。


But news organizations could reach many more people if they worked to circumvent Internet filtering instead of passively relying on those inside the firewall to figure out how to reach beyond blocked sites on their own.	但是如果新闻机构主动努力避开互联网过滤，而不是被动地依赖防火墙里面的那些人自己寻找突破被封锁的网站的方法，那么新闻的受众可能将会比现在多的多。


Doing so might even make good business sense.	这样做甚至可能对促进商业发展也有帮助。


Building a creative digital distribution system that eludes government censors would help news organizations establish and enlarge their markets.	建立一个能够躲避政府审查的创造性的数字发行系统将有助于新闻机构建立并扩大它们的市场。


Indeed, it is not implausible that when a government’s repressive policies diminish, or end through regime change, media outlets that were present and government-approved will fare poorly vis-à-vis offshore counterparts that stayed away and conveyed the truth.	实际上，当政府的压制政策有所缓和或通过政权更迭而终结时，已经存在并且得到政府首肯的的媒体在面对一直置身事外并讲述真相的离岸竞争对手时将变得举步维艰，这种情况并不是难以置信的。


If news outlets in physically remote open societies meet consumers in countries like China halfway, the benefits for both the Chinese and the bottom line could be enormous.	如果处于真正偏远开放社会的新闻传媒中途遇到像中国这种国家的消费者，满足他们的要求，那么无论是中国人还是商业状况都会获得巨大的益处。


Along with the enterprising teenagers who built Napster, academics like Lorrie Faith Cranor at Carnegie Mellon mapped out the shape of potential new networks with lofty names like “Publius,” through which unpopular views could be circulated outside of easy governmental control.	在Napster文件共享程序开发出来之前，像卡内基·梅隆大学的洛丽·费思·科拉娜这样的大学生制订出了潜在的新网络形式，并为之准备了像“Publius”这样高贵的名字。 通过这种新网络，不受欢迎的观点能够摆脱政府的控制传播开来。


A team of computer scientists at Stanford and elsewhere created a project called “LOCKSS,” which retains decentralized mirrored copies of documents, and detects corruption or forgery among them, to preserve the integrity of our written histories forever.	斯坦福大学和其它地方的另一个计算机科学家小组创造了一个名为“LOCKSS”的程序，它能够保留分散的镜像文件并检测文件中的更改和伪造，从而保证我们书面历史的永久完整。


Those who consider themselves members of the global free press should collectively strive to construct similar networks over which news and reporting can run free and be available to anyone with an Internet connection.	那些认为自己是全球自由新闻人员中的一员的人应共同努力建设相似的网络，通过它新闻报道能够自由的传播，任何人只要联通互联网都可以接触到。


Building such a network would be far cheaper than constructing even a single new printing plant – and it would be far more effective.	建设这样一个网络将远远便宜于建设甚至是一个单纯的新印刷厂并且要有效的多。


We should consider the front pages of every free nation’s newspapers as a precious set of documents, to be replicated and shared openly throughout the world, especially in countries where heavy state censorship exists.	我们应该把每个自由国家的报纸的头版当作珍贵的文件，进行复制并在全世界公开分享，特别是在那些政府审查制度严酷的国家。


Thanks to the Internet, the risks in realizing these new distribution networks are really only business risks – and thus are quantifiable and manageable.	由于互联网，实现这种新的发行网的风险真的是只有商业风险，从而是可计可控的。


They pale in comparison to the risks taken by dissidents in closed societies.	与封闭社会中持不同政见者面临的风险相比，这些风险不足为道。


Putting those front pages on a filtered Web site should be only a beginning.	把这些头版放于经过过滤的网站应该仅仅是一个开始。


It’s time find a way to circulate those front pages everywhere.	找到一种可以到处传播这些头版的方式的时间到了。


It makes good political sense; it could make good business sense as well.	它具有重要的政治意义； 它也可能有重要的商业价值。


Eastern Europe’s 25 Years of Transition	东欧转型25年


WASHINGTON, DC – What a difference 25 years can make.	华盛顿—25年，天翻地覆。


In 1989, Central and Eastern Europe embarked upon a historic transformation, from authoritarian communism to democratic capitalism.	1989年，中欧和东欧开始了历史性转型，从极权共产主义转向民主资本主义。


With memories of the old system already beginning to fade, it seems fitting to look back at the region’s achievements, review the lessons learned, and examine the challenges ahead.	关于旧制度的记忆已经开始消逝，似乎应该回顾一下该地区的成就、总结一下教训，并考察一下未来面临的挑战。


It would be a mistake to assume that the success of the region’s transformation was inevitable.	认为该地区转型的成功属于必然是错误的。


At the close of the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe’s economies were burdened by pervasive state ownership and concentrated investments in heavy industry.	冷战结束时，中欧和东欧经济背负着沉重的国家所有制和集中投资于重工业的负担。


Fiscal and monetary policies had focused on boosting industrial growth, without regard to macroeconomic balance, resulting in chronically excessive demand and widespread shortages.	财政和货币政策集中在提振工业增长上而不考虑宏观经济平衡，导致长期过度需求和普遍短缺。


To make matters worse, most of the region – Czechoslovakia being a notable exception – was plagued by unsustainable external debt and soaring inflation.	更糟糕的是，给地区大部分国家——捷克斯洛伐克是个显著的例外——饱受不可持续的外债和高企的通胀的困扰。


Meanwhile, few economists or policymakers had the background needed to tackle the complex tasks ahead.	与此同时，极少数经济学家或决策者具有处理复杂未来任务所需要的背景。


Such was the scale of the necessary transition that neither modern macroeconomics, nor the International Monetary Fund’s nearly 50 years of experience, offered much guidance.	必要的转型规模庞大，不管是现代经济学还是国际货币基金组织（IMF）近50年的经验都无法提供多少指导。


The challenges to be overcome were daunting, and many thought it would be impossible.	需要克服的挑战令人畏缩，许多人认为这是不可能的任务。


Instead, four key ingredients contributed to successful transitions.	但是，四大因素促成了转型的成功。


First, courageous politicians and policymakers took on the challenge of designing crucial reforms and explaining their consequences to a public that was understandably wary.	首先，勇气十足的政治家和决策者承担了设计关键改革并向难免担忧的公众解释其后果的挑战。


They understood the historic nature of the task and embraced the challenge.	他们明白这一任务的历史性之，坦然接受了挑战。


Second, the reform strategies focused squarely on the essential: the liberalization of prices to reflect scarcity and facilitate the allocation of resources; stabilization of finances to end shortages and inflation; and privatization of state-owned companies and assets in order to improve corporate governance and performance.	其次，改革战略直击要害：价格自由化以反映稀缺性并让资源配置更加便利； 稳定金融以结束短缺和通胀；


Countries that implemented these policies generally made the quickest and most complete progress.	私有化国有公司和资产以改善公司治理和绩效。 实施了这些政策的国家总体上都实现了快速而完整的进步。


Third, the allure of rejoining Europe after years of isolation, together with the European Union’s commitment to enlargement, provided a gravitational pull – and a legislative template – that helped policymakers justify and implement difficult reforms.	第三，多年孤立之后重新加入欧洲的诱惑力加上欧盟的扩张承诺提供了向心力和立法榜样，帮助决策者论证和实施艰难的改革。


Unpopular laws sometimes brought down governments, but the ultimate litmus test for any new policy remained: “Will it lead us back to Europe?”	有时不受欢迎的法律会导致政府下台，但对任何新政策来说，终极大考仍然是“它能让我们回归欧洲吗？ ”


Finally, external support helped the region’s heavily indebted countries face the twin tasks of implementing structural reforms and coping with financial instability.	最后，外部支持帮助该地区重债国直面实施结构性改革和处理金融动荡的双重挑战。


Financing from the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and bilateral lenders, along with debt relief from official and commercial bank creditors, helped relieve the pressure.	来自IMF、世界银行、欧洲复兴开发银行和双边贷款人的资金以及来自官方和商业银行债权人的债务豁免帮助该地区缓解了压力。


Technical assistance, capacity building, and support for privatization – of banks, in particular – further smoothed the way.	技术援助、能力建设以及对（特别是银行的）私有化的支持进一步铺平了道路。


Overall, the progress has been impressive.	总体而言，进步令人瞩目。


Several Central European countries have achieved per capita GDP levels (measured in terms of purchasing power parity) that place them on the lower rungs of the eurozone’s income ladder.	一些中欧国家的人居GDP水平（用购买力平价衡量）已经达到欧元区收入阶梯的下限。


Standards of living in the region have improved dramatically – even if full convergence with Western Europe is far from achieved.	该地区生活水平大幅改善——尽管还远远不能与西欧看齐。


Unsurprisingly, however, the picture is far from rosy everywhere.	但是，不难理解，并非处处开花。


Some countries, especially in the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States, are far from completing the transition and have gone through repeated cycles of hope and crisis.	一些国家，特别是巴尔干地区国家和独联体国家，还远远没有完成转型，陷入了希望和危机的循环之中。


As elsewhere in the world, growth in the region has slowed sharply since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008.	和世界其他地区一样，该地区的增长在2008年全球金融危机爆发后大幅放缓。


The pace of reform has slowed in many countries – and reversed in a few.	许多国家放慢了改革的速度，此后几乎再也没有恢复。


Geopolitical considerations have complicated matters further, as the conflict in Ukraine demonstrates.	地缘政治考虑让问题进一步复杂化，乌克兰冲突就是明证。


Looking ahead, one can envision two broad scenarios.	放眼未来，我们可以看到两种总体前景。


In the first, the region risks a cycle of weak growth, retreat from market-oriented policies, and increasing disillusionment.	第一种，该地区面临增长萎靡周期，市场政策出现呢倒退，幻想日益破灭。


As a result, convergence with Western Europe could slow, with many countries lagging far behind – a far different outcome from that envisioned during the boom of the mid-2000s, when convergence within a generation seemed almost like a birthright.	结果，与西欧的趋同之路有所放缓，许多国家将远远落后——这一结果与2005年左右时所构想的愿景截然不同，当时，在一代人的时间里实现趋同看起来大有希望。


In the second, brighter scenario, rapid convergence to advanced-economy income levels continues, supported by a focus on two priorities, detailed in a new IMF report.	第二种前景更加光明，迅速朝发达经济收入水平的趋同之势会继续下去，并受到专注于新IMF报告详细讨论的两大当务之急的支持。


A renewed commitment to macroeconomic and financial stability allows governments to rein in persistent deficits and growing debts and address their economies’ increasing volume of bad loans.	新的宏观经济和金融稳定承诺让政府能够治理持续赤字和日益增加的债务，并解决经济中坏账日益增加的问题。


Meanwhile, deeper structural reforms improve the business and investment climate, strengthen corporate governance, expand access to credit, free up labor markets, control public expenditure, and bolster tax administration – all of which puts their economies on track for sustained rapid growth.	与此同时，更深的结构性改革将改善商业和投资气候，强化公司治理，扩大信用渠道，解放劳动力市场，控制公共支出，并支持税收管理——所有这些都能让这些经济体走上持续快速增长轨迹。


The IMF, for its part, has been a committed partner to Central and Eastern Europe and its transformation throughout the past 25 years.	过去25年来，IMF一直是中欧和东欧及其转型的坚定伙伴。


It stands ready to help countries in the region make the next quarter-century just as impressive.	它已经做好了帮助该地区国家在未来25年取得同样令人瞩目的成就的准备。


Central Asia’s Other Turkmenbashis	中亚的其他“土库曼领袖”


A dictator’s sudden death almost always triggers political instability.	独裁者的猝死几乎无一例外地会引发政治动荡。


But it is doubly dangerous when it poses a risk of region-wide destabilization and a scramble for influence among the world’s greatest military powers – the United States, Russia, and China.	但威胁到整个地区的稳定并引发美、俄、中等世界军事大国争夺影响力之战的独裁者之死将会带来双倍的危险。


The sudden death in late December of Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s authoritarian president-for-life who declared himself “Turkmenbashi” (Leader of all Turkmens), jeopardizes stability in a country that is an increasingly important supplier of energy to Europe.	自封为“土库曼人领袖”的土库曼斯坦终身独裁总统萨帕尔穆拉特·尼亚佐夫（Saparmurat Niyazov）12月下旬的突然去世威胁到了整个国家的稳定，而现在的土库曼斯坦已经日益成为欧洲重要的能源供应商。


Worse, given the absence of a clearly designated successor and the weakness of civil society and other political institutions, his death could have repercussions across Central Asia.	更为糟糕的是，由于没有明确指定继承人，公民社会和其他政治组织又十分虚弱，尼亚佐夫的猝死可能会给整个中亚地区带来影响。


Indeed, Niyazov’s demise highlights the broader problems of Central Asia’s post-Soviet regimes, which, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, are run by Soviet-era bosses who, while not nearly as eccentric or egomaniacal as Niyazov, tolerate little dissent or opposition.	实际上，尼亚佐夫之死暴露出中亚后苏联政权所面临的普遍问题，这些国家除了吉尔吉斯斯坦之外，无一例外地由前苏联时代的老板掌握政权，而这些当权者尽管不像尼亚佐夫那样极端自私和古怪，但也无法容忍任何的异议或反对意见。


Most of them are old, some of them are unwell.	这些国家的当权者大多已经年迈，有些人的健康状况还很糟糕。


So, in the next few years, Central Asia will face leadership change on many fronts, with security apparatuses – which, as in Turkmenistan, have been crucial to buttressing these countries’ regimes – likely to be important players.	因此，在未来若干年内，中亚将在很多领域面临领导权力的更替，而像土库曼那样在支撑国家政权时一直扮演重要角色的安全机构将很可能发挥重要的政治作用。


How these transitions turn out will matter for several reasons.	过渡的结果如何至关重要，究其原因有以下几点。


First, Central Asia is an important source of energy.	首先，中亚地区是重要的能源来源。


The Caspian region accounts for 2% to 3% of the world’s known oil resources – about equal to that of North Sea oil.	与北海地区的油储量一样，里海地区的石油储量占世界总储量的2%到3%。


While far smaller than the deposits in Saudi Arabia or Iran, Caspian oil could prove important if oil production falls or is reduced for political reasons elsewhere.	尽管与沙特阿拉伯或伊朗相比不可同日而语，但在其他地方石油产量下降或受到政治因素影响的情况下，里海地区石油资源的重要性就能够充分地显现出来。


Much of this Caspian oil is in Kazakhstan, giving that country a critical role in the regional energy market.	里海的油储量大多集中在哈萨克斯坦，这个国家在地区能源市场上所占据的位置至关重要。


Moreover, Kazakhstan’s strategic importance has increased as a result of recent revelations that the country’s Kashagan oil field will produce 25% more than initially expected at peak production.	不仅如此，最近发现哈萨克斯坦卡什干油田（Kashagan oil field）的最高产油量比原先预计的要高出25%，这使得哈萨克斯坦的战略重要性进一步增加。


Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are also major exporters of natural gas.	哈萨克斯坦和土库曼斯坦也是天然气的重要出口国。


Russia depends heavily on Turkmen gas for domestic consumption and export abroad, which could prove vital as demand rises over the next decade.	俄国在天然气的国内消费和出口领域非常依赖土库曼斯坦，而俄土关系也会由于今后10年俄对天然气需求的不断上涨而获得更高的地位。


Second, Central Asia’s leadership transitions could tempt outside powers to exploit the resulting instability and spark a struggle for influence.	其次，中亚的领导权力过渡可能导致外来力量利用由此而生的混乱局面，从而引发一场影响力之争。


Because the region was part of both the Soviet Union and the Russian empire, President Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin regards it as part of Russia’s natural sphere of influence.	因为这一地区曾几何时是苏联和俄帝国的领土，因此普京总统领导的克里姆林自然而然地将其划进了俄国的势力范围。


Putin’s efforts to transform Russia into a major energy power and use energy as a tool of Russian foreign policy make the region all the more strategically significant.	普京将俄国打造成能源大国并将能源作为外交武器的努力使得这一地区在战略上的重要性进一步增加。


Moreover, China has sought to improve trade and transit ties with Central Asia over the last decade, reflecting its growing interests there.	不仅如此，中国在过去10年间一直试图改善与中亚的贸易和运输关系，这反映出中国在该地区日益增加的利益。


Not only is the region important for meeting China’s growing energy needs, but the Chinese authorities also are concerned about separatist pressures among the Uighur population in Xinjiang province and the impact of ties with Uighurs in neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.	这一地区不仅对满足中国日益增长的能源需求至关重要，而且中国政府还十分关注新疆维吾尔族的分离主义势力，以及邻近的哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦与维吾尔族关系的影响。


Like Russia, China wants a reduction of the US military presence in Central Asia.	与俄国一样，中国也希望削弱美国在中亚地区的军事实力。


Both powers have sought to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a regional grouping that includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – as a vehicle to pressure the US to withdraw its military forces from the region.	中俄两国都试图利用上海合作组织（包括俄国、中国、乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦在内的地区性组织）来向美国施压，要求美国撤出其在中亚的军事力量。


However, this cooperation represents a short-term, tactical marriage of convenience rather than a budding new strategic alliance.	但这种合作与其说是一种正在萌芽的全新战略联盟，还不如说是一种技术上短期的权宜之计。


In the long run, Russia and China are likely to be rivals for power and influence in Central Asia.	从长远来看，俄国和中国很可能成为在中亚地区争夺权力和影响力的竞争对手。


Iran could also view the transitions in Central Asia as an opportunity to expand its regional influence, particularly given its close ethnic and cultural ties with Tajikistan and its long border with Turkmenistan.	伊朗也可能把中亚地区的权力过渡作为扩大其地区影响力的一次机会，特别是考虑到它与塔吉克斯坦间密切的种族文化联系和与土库曼斯坦间漫长的边境线就更是如此。


And, like China and Russia, Iran has no desire to see the US fill any security vacuum that could emerge as a result of leadership changes in Central Asia.	而且与中国和俄国一样，伊朗也不希望看到由美国来填补由中亚领导权力更迭所造成的安全真空。


Pakistan and India – especially the latter – will also watch carefully how the transitions play out.	巴基斯坦和印度¾尤其是印度¾也将密切关注着权力更迭所带来的结果。


Both countries have growing strategic interests in the region.	上述两国都在中亚地区有着日益增加的战略利益。


Like China, India views Central Asia as an important future energy supplier.	和中国一样，印度也把中亚看成是未来重要的一个能源供应基地。


As a result, India has quietly begun to strengthen its military ties to countries in the region, particularly Tajikistan, where it has a small base.	基于这种考���，印度已经开始悄悄开始与该地区各国增强军事联系，特别是塔吉克斯坦，因为印度已经在那里建立了一个小规模的军事基地。


Finally, the transitions in Central Asia could have a strong impact on US interests.	最终，中亚转型会严重影响到美国的利益。


As long as the US remains involved militarily in Afghanistan, access to facilities in Central Asia will remain important.	只要美国继续在阿富汗保留军事力量，中亚军事设施的使用对美国来讲就有着至关重要的意义。


With the loss of the use of the base at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan, access to Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan has become the main means of re-supplying US troops in Afghanistan from Central Asia.	撤出乌兹别克斯坦的喀什－迦拿巴（Karshi-Khanabad）空军基地后，使用吉尔吉斯斯坦的玛纳斯（Manas）空军基地已经成了从中亚地区为美国在阿富汗驻军补充给养的主要方法。


However, the political situation in Kyrgyzstan is far from stable.	但吉尔吉斯斯坦的政治局势还远远说不上稳定。


Discontent with President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s rule is rising.	对库尔曼别克·巴基耶夫（Kurmanbek Bakiyev）总统执政的不满情绪日益加剧。


A leadership change or increased Russian and Chinese pressure on Kyrgyz leaders could precipitate calls for a renegotiation of the agreement regarding access to Manas – or even demands for its termination altogether.	政权的更迭或俄中两国对吉尔吉斯领导人日益加大的压力可能会导致人们呼吁就玛纳斯（Manas）空军基地重新进行谈判，甚至可能有人要求停止将基地供给美国使用。


In the nineteenth century, the struggle for mastery in Central Asia between the Russian and British empires was called “The Great Game.”	19世纪，英俄帝国对中亚控制权的争夺战曾被称之为“大博弈”。


Today, there are many more players involved, and the stakes – energy security, above all – are far higher now.	而今天，这场博弈参与的国家更多，而且赌注¾首先是能源安全¾也远比过去更大。


America, India, Europe, and Japan will face increasing tension between their short-term military needs in the region and their long-term goal of promoting political reform in order to create more stable and reliable partners.	美国、印度、欧洲和日本将不得不在满足本国短期军事需求和促进中亚地区政治改革、以建立更加稳定可靠的伙伴关系的长期目标之间面对越来越多的激烈冲突。


Indeed, the key challenge in the years ahead will be to find the proper balance between these two objectives.	实际上，今后几年的关键挑战是在上述两个目标之间找到平衡。


Given the prospect of further leadership changes and increasing instability, meeting that challenge has never been more important.	考虑到领导权进一步变更和局势越来越不稳定的总体展趋势，迎接这一挑战从来没有今天这样重要。


Central Banks and the Bottom Line	中央银行和利润


MUNICH – Around the world, central banks' balance sheets are becoming an increasingly serious concern – most notably for monetary policymakers themselves.	慕尼黑—放眼世界，中央银行的资产负债表正在日益成为严重问题——特别是对货币决策者本身而言。


When the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned its exchange-rate peg last month, causing the franc to soar by a nosebleed-inducing 20%, it seemed to be acting out of fear that it would suffer balance-sheet losses if it kept purchasing euros and other foreign currencies.	上个月，瑞士国民银行（SNB）放弃了盯住汇率政策，导致瑞郎大幅升值20%，这似乎表明SNB担心如果继续买入欧元和其他外国货币将导致资产负债表损失。


Similarly, critics of the decision to embark on quantitative easing in the eurozone worry that the European Central Bank is dangerously exposed to losses on the southern eurozone members' government bonds.	类似地，对在欧元区采取量化宽松的决定的批评者担心欧洲央行将危险地暴露于欧元区南部成员国政府债券的损失中。


This prompted the ECB Council to leave 80% of those bond purchases on the balance sheets of national central banks, where they will be the responsibility of national governments.	这促使欧洲央行执委会将80%的债券购买留在了国家央行的资产负债表上，由国家政府负责。


In the United States, meanwhile, the "Audit the Fed" movement is back.	与此同时，在美国，“审计美联储”运动卷土重来。


Motivated by growth in the Federal Reserve's assets and liabilities, Republicans are introducing bills in both chambers of Congress to require the Fed to reveal more information about its monetary and financial operations.	共和党担心美联储资产和负债增加，正在国会两院引入立法要求美联储披露更多关于其货币和金融操作的信息。


But should central banks really worry so much about balance-sheet profits and losses?	但央行果真应该如此担心资产负债表利润和损失吗？


The answer, to put it bluntly, is no.	可以断言，答案是否定的。


To be sure, central bankers, like other bankers, do not like losses.	诚然，央行官员就像银行家，不喜欢损失。


But central banks are not like other banks.	但央行和其他银行不同。


They are not profit-oriented businesses.	它们不是利润导向的企业。


Rather, they are agencies for pursuing the public good.	相反，它们是追求公共福利的机构。


Their first responsibility is hitting their inflation target.	它们的首要责任是达到通胀目标。


Their second responsibility is to help close the output gap.	它们的次要责任是帮助弥合产出缺口。


Their third responsibility is to ensure financial stability.	它们的第三责任是保证金融稳定。


Balance-sheet considerations rank, at best, a distant fourth on the list of worthy monetary-policy goals.	资产负债表状况最多只能在货币政策目标排行表上位列远远落后的第四。


Equally important, central banks have limited tools with which to pursue these objectives.	同样重要的是，央行没有多少工具可以用来追求这些目标。


It follows that a consideration that ranks only fourth in terms of priorities should not be allowed to dictate policy.	因此，在优先级排名中仅仅位列第四的目标不应该左右政策。


Indeed, a clear understanding of their priorities has often led central banks to incur losses when doing so is the price of avoiding deflation or preventing the exchange rate from becoming dangerously overvalued.	事实上，清楚地理解优先级常常让央行承担损失，如果这样做是为了避免通缩或阻止汇率升值到危险高估水平的话。


The Chilean, Czech, and Israeli central banks, for example, have operated with negative net capital for extended periods without damaging their policies.	比如，智利、捷克和以色列央行长期在负净资本状态下运转，而并没有对政策产生不利影响。


The reason why adverse consequences need not follow is that the central bank can simply ask the government to replenish its capital, much like when a government covers the losses of its national post office.	消极结果并未尾随而至，其原因是央行只能要求政府补充其资本，就像政府填补国家邮政系统的亏空那样。


Everyone is happier when transfers flow the other way.	当转移支付向相反方向流动时，每个人都会更高兴。


But the role of the central bank is not to be a profit center, especially when those profits come at the cost of other, more important policy objectives.	但中央银行的角色不是成为利润中心，特别是在这些利润需要以其他更重要的政策目标为代价的情况下。


All of this makes it hard to fathom what the SNB was thinking.	所有这些让人们难以捉摸SNB的想法。


The sharp appreciation of the franc threatens to plunge the Swiss economy into deflation and recession.	瑞郎的急剧升值有可能让瑞士经济陷入通缩和衰退。


The risk of balance-sheet losses for the SNB, with its euro-heavy portfolio, may be greater now that the ECB has embarked on quantitative easing.	持有大量欧元的SNB可能出现资产负债表损失，这一风险在欧洲央行采取量化宽松的情况下也许更大。


But this is no justification for abandoning its mandate to pursue price and financial stability.	但这并不是放弃其追求���价和金融稳定职责的理由。


The SNB's motive, it appears, was entirely political.	SNB的动机似乎完全是出于政治。


Last year, the SNB was dragged into the highly charged debate surrounding a referendum on a “gold initiative" that would have required it to increase its gold reserves to 20%, and limited its ability to conduct monetary policy.	去年，SNB卷入了一场围绕“黄金计划”（gold initiative）公投的激烈争论。 黄金计划将要求SNB增加黄金储备至20%，限制其实施货币政策的能力。


One rationale for the initiative was to bullet-proof the SNB's balance sheet against losses.	该计划的一个理由是武装SNB的资产负债表以抵御损失。


This goal was especially dear to the cantons, the states of the Swiss Confederation, which rely on transfers from the SNB for a significant share of their budgets.	这一目标对瑞士联邦各州来说尤其代价高昂，它们的预算有很大一部分依赖来自SNB的转移支付。


The “gold initiative" was voted down, but the political debate was traumatic.	“黄金计划”被公投所否定，但政治争论极其激烈。


In January, with the accelerating depreciation of the euro, the debate flared up again.	1月，面临加速贬值的欧元，这场争论再度变得热门起来。


The fear was that the SNB's balance-sheet losses might anger cantonal leaders to such a degree that the central bank's independence would be threatened.	人们担心SNB的资产负债表损失可能激怒州领导人，导致SNB的独立性受到威胁。


Whether true or not, the political salience of the issue underscores the dangers of an arrangement that precludes the SNB from focusing fully on economic and price stability.	不管真假，这一问题的政治突出性意味着让SNB无法完全专注于经济和物价稳定的安排十分危险。


The obvious solution is not to abandon the franc's euro peg, but to change the cantonal financing mechanism.	显而易见的解决办法不是放弃瑞郎盯住欧元，而是改变州融资机制。


And, to those who are concerned for the SNB's independence, one might ask a fundamental question: What is independence for if not to ignore those who complain that the central bank is insufficiently profit-oriented?	此外，担心SNB独立性的人也许会问一个根本性问题：如果不忽视那些抱怨央行不够利润导向的人，独立性有什么意义？


The same criticism applies to the loss-sharing arrangements that the ECB attached to its quantitative easing.	相同的批评也适用于欧洲央行为其量化宽松设计的损失共担安排。


The ECB's priority should be to avoid deflation, not shield its shareholders from losses.	欧洲央行的当务之急应该是避免通缩，而不是保护股东免受损失。


The 80/20 loss-sharing arrangement with the national central banks may have made quantitative easing more palatable in Germany, but it casts doubt on the unity of the eurozone's monetary policy.	与国家央行进行80/20的风险共担的安排让德国更乐于接受量化宽松，但也产生了关于欧元区货币政策统一性的担忧。


In a context in which the ECB is seeking to “do whatever it takes" to vanquish deflation, this is an unhelpful complication.	在欧洲央行寻求“不惜一切代价”消灭通缩的背景下，这是毫无帮助的复杂化。


Central bankers are praised softly when they make profits and criticized loudly when they incur losses.	央行官员在赢得利润时只能获得一点点赞扬，但当他们遭受损失时将遭到大加鞭挞。


They should have the good sense to ignore both the criticism and the praise.	他们应该有宠辱不惊的定力。


Particularly now, the world's monetary policymakers have far more important problems to address.	特别是现在，世界货币决策者有重要得多的问题需要解决。


Celebrity Central Bankers	中央银行家的明星效应


CAMBRIDGE – Why do the comments of major economies’ central bankers command outsize attention nowadays?	发自剑桥——为何当今主要经济体中央银行家们的言论都能获得超出应有范围的关注？


It is not as if they change interest rates all of the time. Nor have they developed new, more robust models for analyzing the economy.	这可不是因为他们一直在改变利率，也并非由于他们研究出了更有效的新经济分析模式。


On the contrary, major central banks’ growth and inflation forecasts in the years since the financial crisis have consistently overestimated both growth and inflation – and by wide margins.	相反，自金融危机以来，各大央行对增长和通胀的预测都持续偏高——且偏离幅度极大。


There are many good reasons for the attention lavished on monetary policymakers, including the rise of central-bank independence, public acceptance of the need to appoint highly competent technocrats to oversee the money supply, and the deepening of financial markets.	而之所以对货币政策制定者有过多的关注其实有许多理由：包括中央银行独立性的风险。 公众对于指派精明强干的技术官僚去监管货币供应的接受度，以及金融市场的不断深化。


And many central bankers have been rightly lauded for their role in preventing a global meltdown during the financial crisis.	许多中央银行家也因为自身在金融危机中为防止全球崩溃而扮演的角色得到了公正的赞誉。


Even so, given the numerous uncertainties surrounding macroeconomic forecasts and the effects of policy instruments (not least quantitative easing), many academics find it puzzling that central bankers’ speeches and statements generate so much fanfare.	即便如此，考虑到围绕着宏观经济预测的极大不确定性，以及政策工具（不仅是量化宽松）的效果，许多学者也对中央银行家的言论和声明引发过多喧嚣而感到困惑。


And for all of their heroics during the financial crisis, many central bankers have been far too inflexible in the aftermath, worrying too much about overshooting inflation targets, and too little about deflationary dynamics.	而虽然在金融危机的爆发过程中有许多壮举，但许多中央银行家在危机的余波中却表现得过度僵化。 一方面过于担心将通胀目标定得过高，另一方面又对通缩的动力估计不足。


Moreover, central bankers bear a share of the blame for the crisis in the first place, mainly owing to lax regulatory policy.	此外中央银行家们也应该首先为整场危机承担罪责，因为正是这些人采取了过度宽松的监管政策。


Many central bankers portray former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (who served from August 1987 until January 2006) as the culprit, saying that he projected an image of central-bank omnipotence that is not warranted in theory or practice.	许多中央银行家将美联储前主席阿兰·格林斯潘（1987年8月至2006年1月在任）视为始作俑者，认为是他创造了一个中央银行万能的假象，而这个假象在理论或者实际上都是站不住脚的。


But this critique is overblown: Greenspan is long gone, but the focus on central-bank pronouncements is greater than ever.	但这种批评也有失偏颇：格林斯潘退位已久，而对中央银行声明的关注度则比以往更高。


What, then, is going on?	那么究竟发生了什么事？


I would argue that, in addition to all of the factors listed above, three further considerations should be noted.	我会认为除了上面所提到的所有因素之外。 还必须注意三个更深层次的考虑因素。


For starters, the public perception that central bankers are omniscient makes them an attractive whipping boy for politicians.	首先公众认为中央银行家们万能的观念使后者成为了政客最引人注目的替罪羊。