No governing party can afford such woefully incompetent ministers and leadership; Merkel had merely to stand back and watch the liberals’ public suicide over the last four years.	没有哪个执政党能容忍如此无能的部长和领导； 过去四年中，默克尔站在一旁冷眼目睹自由派在公众面前自寻死路。


The opposition parties, too, paid the price for their failure to come to grips with reality.	反对党也为自己没有抓住现实而付出了代价。


The economy is humming, unemployment is low, and most Germans are better off than ever before.	经济在繁荣，失业率很低，大部分德国人境况比以前更好。


But, rather than focusing on the government’s weaknesses – energy, Europe, education, and family policy – they bet their political fortunes on social justice.	但是，反对党并没有专注于政府的弱点——能源、欧洲、教育和家庭政策，而是把政治赌注押在了社会公平上。


Merkel’s Panglossian campaign was much more in tune with the sentiment of the German electorate than the opposing parties’ tristesse about working-class distress, which was rightly seen as a ploy for raising taxes.	默克尔的选战主题——乐观更符合德国选民的情绪，而反对党却选择了对工作阶级饱受压抑表示悲愤，这被正确地视作是为了增税造势。


Governing majorities (and therefore elections) in Germany are always won in the center.	德国的执政多数（从而也是选举多数）向来赢在中间道路上。


Merkel’s predecessor, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Gerhard Schröder, knew this well.	默克尔的前任、社会民主党（SPD）领导人施罗德对此点有深刻的领会。


But this time her opponents – the SPD, Die Linke (The Left), and the Greens – cleared the center and cannibalized each other on the left.	但这一回，她的对手——SPD、左翼党（Die Linke）和绿党——让出了中间道路，而在左倾道路上互相倾轧。


The leadership issue made matters worse – the SPD’s Peer Steinbrück and the Greens’ Jürgen Trittin never had the slightest chance against Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.	领导问题让情况更加恶化了——SPD的斯坦布鲁克（Peer Steinbrück）和绿党的特里丁（Jürgen Trittin）从未对默克尔和财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）构成过挑战。


The only new factor that could bring about a structural change in German politics is the rise of the new Alternative for Germany (AfD).	唯一可能给德国政治带来结构性变化的是新因素是德国新选择党（AfD）的崛起。


Though its share of the popular vote fell just below the 5% threshold required to enter the Bundestag, the party performed surprisingly well.	尽管其选票略低于5%的门槛而没能在联邦议院获得席位，但该党的表现令人意外地出色。


If its leadership can build on this success, the AfD will make news in next spring’s European Parliament elections.	如果其领导人能很好地利用这次的成功，AfD将能成为明年春天的欧洲议会选举上的一匹黑马。


Indeed, the AfD scored well in eastern Germany – where three state elections will be held in 2014 – by gaining many votes from The Left.	事实上，AfD在东德表现出色，从左翼党手中夺下了很多选票（2014年东德有三个州将举行选举）。


This implies that the AfD could establish itself on the German political landscape permanently, which would make a comeback for the FDP all the more difficult.	这意味着AfD将建立起其在德国政坛的永久地位，FDP要想卷土重来将难上加难。


Still, despite the FDP’s implosion and the opposition parties’ disastrous electoral strategy, Merkel needs a coalition partner.	不过，尽管FDP崩溃、反对党选举战略一团糟，但默克尔仍需要联盟伙伴。


The Left is not an option, and any attempt at building a coalition with the Greens – a party that will be reeling from the shock of its poor performance for quite some time – would court instability.	左翼党绝非上选，而与需要很长时间才能从大选惨败中恢复的绿党构建联盟只能造成不稳定。


So Germany will be left with a grand coalition – just as the German electorate wanted.	因此，德国只能选择大联盟——而这正是德国选民希望看到的。


The SPD will recoil at the prospect, sit on the fence, and finally give in, because Merkel has a powerful disciplinary instrument: she could call a new election, in which the CDU would probably win an outright majority.	SPD根据形势反弹，采取骑墙态度，并最终让步，因为默克尔手握有力的规训工具：她可以要求举行新选举，CDU可能获得全面胜利。


A grand coalition is not the worst option.	大联盟并不是最坏的选择。


Nothing fades as quickly as the glow of an election victory, and the German idyll will soon be disturbed by harsh reality – the European Union’s simmering crisis, Syria, Iran, and energy policy.	没有什么比选举获胜的光环消退得更快了，而德国田园诗也很快就会被严峻的现实打破——随时都可能爆发的欧盟危机���叙利亚、伊朗、以及能源政策等。


The need for consensus is especially acute with respect to the difficult decisions concerning Europe that the German government now faces.	考虑到德国政府必须为欧洲问题作出艰难决定，共识的必要性就更加紧迫了。


Greece needs more debt relief.	希腊需要更多地债务纾困。


A European banking union with joint liability cannot be put off much longer.	债务共担的欧洲银行联盟事宜不可能拖得太久。


The same is true of many other issues.	其他问题也是如此。


A winter of discontent awaits Merkel, followed by a European election campaign that is likely to bring the CDU back down to earth.	等待默克尔的是一个怨念四起的冬天，接着则是可能把CDU打回原形的欧洲选战。


But no one should expect a significant change in Merkel’s EU policy or her approach to foreign affairs and security questions.	但你不必期待默克尔的欧盟政策或她对外交事务和安全问题的方针出现重大改变。


Her positions on these issues have now been endorsed by a huge portion of the German electorate; and, from a certain age, most people – including those in high office – do not change easily.	如今，她在这些问题上的立场获得了大多数德国选民的支持； 此外，到了一定的年纪，大部分人——包括身居高位者——不会轻易做出改变。


Besides, in these matters, there is no longer much difference between the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD.	此外，在浙西问题上，中右翼的CDU和中左翼的SPD之间也不再有很大的分歧。


A grand coalition could show greater flexibility in addressing the euro crisis, but less on questions of foreign and security policy.	大联盟能在解决欧元危机中表现出更大的灵活性，但在外交和安全政策上则否。 但是，在这方面，德国可以抓住机会在西方联盟的框架下形成合适的外交政策并获得好处。


In this respect, however, Germany would gain much from the opportunity to craft a proper foreign policy in the framework of the EU and the Western alliance that in recent years has had a dangerous void where Germany used to be – though this is more a vague hope than a concrete expectation.	近几年来，西方联盟框架出现了此前由德国填补的危险的真空。 但这与其说是实在的期望，不如说是模糊的愿望。


It will also be interesting to see if and how Merkel tackles Germany’s muddled Energiewende (energy turnaround) – the move to a low-carbon economy that is the most important domestic project of her tenure.	另一个颇有意思的地方是看默克尔如何处理德国陷入乱象的能源转型，即向低碳经济的转变，这是她任上最重要的国内工程。


Either she will succeed with it, or it will become a monumental disgrace for Germany and a disaster for the German economy.	这项工程不成功便成仁——让德国遗臭万年，给德国经济带来灾难。


The decisive questions now are whether she musters the courage to concentrate all the necessary responsibilities for this mega-project in the energy ministry, and whom she entrusts with overseeing this Herculean task.	如今的决定性问题是她能否拿出勇气将这一巨大工程所必须的所有责任集中到能源部，以及她信任谁来负责这一艰巨的任务。


The late editor of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel, Rudolf Augstein, who never liked former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, titled his commentary about German reunification “Congratulations, Chancellor!”	已故的《明镜》周刊编辑奥古斯坦（Rudolf Augstein，他一直反对前总理科勒）用《祝贺你，总理！ 》作为评论德国统一的文章的标题。


For Merkel, Sunday’s election has opened a door, especially with respect to overcoming the euro crisis and to deepening European integration.	对默克尔来说，星期天的大选开启了一扇门，特别是从克服欧元危机和深化欧洲一体化的角度看。


But, until she walks through it, I will refrain from congratulating her.	但是，在默克尔取得成功后，我才会祝贺她。


The Human Stew	人种大杂烩


LONDON – What defines a modern human?	伦敦—如何定义现代人？


The biological answer is simple: a member of the species Homo sapiens that is characterized by such features as a relatively large brain set in a globular braincase, small brow ridges over the eyes, a small retracted face, a chin on the lower jaw, and a lightly built skeleton.	生物学答案很简单：智人的一员，并具有相对较大的脑组织和容纳脑组织的球状脑壳，眼睛上方有较小的眉骨，较小的可伸缩的面部，下颚处有下巴，骨骼较轻。


Many of modern humans’ biological traits – at least those that can be preserved as fossils – were already present in Africa and Israel more than 100,000 years ago.	许多现代人的生物学特征——至少从保留下来的化石看——至少在10万多年前便已出现于非洲和以色列。


But other factors – such as complex societies, ceremonies, spiritual beliefs, art, music, technology, and language – also characterize modern human populations.	但其他要素——比如复杂的社会、礼仪、精神信仰、艺术、音乐、技术和语言——也是现代人类种群的特征。


Which traits are crucial to the definition of a “modern human,” and how far back can the classification be applied?	什么特征是定义“现代人”的关键要素，这一分类可以追溯到多远？


Given that humans’ morphological and behavioral characteristics evolved at different rates, this question is a source of controversy.	人的形态和行为特征的进化速度各有不同，因此这一问题颇具争议。


Indeed, paleontologists studying the physical origins of Homo sapiens will inevitably differ from archaeologists reconstructing ancient behavior over what constitutes an early modern human.	事实上，研究智人生理起源的古生物学家必然会与重构构成早期现代人的远古行为的考古学家有所不同。


Recent discoveries in paleontology, archaeology, and especially genetics of striking similarities between extant humans and some ancient populations are further complicating assessments of modern humans’ origins.	古生物学、考古学以及（尤其是）遗传学的最新发现表明，现在的人类和一些古代人具有惊人的相似之处，这让评估现代人起源的工作更加复杂了。


One leading idea was that modern humans’ primitive ancestor Homo erectus left Africa nearly two million years ago, and dispersed into other areas of the world.	一个主流观点是现代人的远古祖先直立人在近200万年前离开非洲，散向世界各地。


Regional populations then steadily evolved into Homo sapiens, with modern human behaviors first emerging in Europe roughly 40,000 years ago.	的地区的人中又逐渐地进化为智人，首批现代人行为大约出现在40 000年前的欧洲。


But new evidence suggests that modern humans evolved relatively recently in Africa – and that the transformation that they underwent after their departure some 60,000 years ago was far from seamless.	但新证据表明，现代人进化于相对晚近的非洲——且他们在约60 000年前分化之后所经历的改变并非连续。


Specifically, studies of Homo sapiens’ close but extinct relatives, the Neanderthals, are revealing new facets of modern human development, while intensifying the long-running debate over the differences between the two species’ behavioral capabilities.	具体地说，对智人已灭绝的近属尼安德特人的研究正在揭示关于现代人类发展的新剖面，进一步加剧了关于这两个物种行为能力差异的由来已久的争论。


Growing archaeological evidence of key elements associated with Homo sapiens is emerging at sites in Africa that are more than 60,000 years old.	越来越多的有关智人的关键要素的考古学证据正在距今60 000多年的非洲浮出水面。


These include complex tools (which require several stages of manufacture), symbolism (for example, red hematite pigments for notation and beads for display, made from sea shells and ostrich eggshells), and long-distance networks of contact and exchange.	这些证据包括复杂的工具（其制作过程需要好几个阶段）、符号（比如用于标注记号的红色赤铁矿颜料和用于展示的用贝壳和鸵鸟蛋壳制成的珠子）以及长距离联络和交换网络。


These discoveries support some archaeologists’ view that only Homo sapiens was advanced enough to be considered truly modern humans, while non-modern groups like the Neanderthals displayed, at best, only incipient signs of such complexity.	这些发现支持只有智人才有资格被认为是真正现代人的考古学观点，而尼安德特人等非现代人群体的复杂程度充其量只能称为雏形。


Moreover, genetic evidence, based on distinct DNA coding that is known to be related to brain functions in modern humans, suggests at least some cognitive contrasts between Neanderthals and Homo sapiens.	此外，基于已知的与现代人大脑功能有关的不同的DNA编码的遗传学证据表明，尼安德特人和智人之间至少存在一定程度的认知差异。


And demographic differences (small, low-density populations) may have hindered Neanderthals’ cultural evolution, compared with the wider networks established by early modern human groups, initially in Africa, and subsequently worldwide.	而人口分布差异（人口少、密度低）大概是制约尼安德特人文化进步的原因，与之相比，早期现代人群体——最初是在非洲，随后在全世界——建立了更广的网络。


But evidence also suggests that some Neanderthals buried their dead with grave goods (items presumably intended to help the deceased in the afterlife), produced complex tools (such as stone armatures mounted with mastics), and developed personal symbols (including manganese oxide pigments and pendants made from animal teeth).	但证据还表明，一些尼安德特人已开始使用陪葬品（用来帮助死者在阴间使用的物品）、制造复杂工具（如用乳膏安装起来的石头支架），并发展出了个人符号（包括氧化锰颜料和用动物牙齿做的饰物）。


They apparently also used plants with medicinal properties.	他们显然还使用草药。


Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated DNA studies of extinct populations have shown that, despite their general classification as the distinct species Homo neanderthalensis, Neanderthals interbred with modern human groups as they dispersed out of Africa.	此外，越来越复杂的灭绝人种DNA研究表明，尽管“尼安德特人”是一个不同的物种，但他们也与走出非洲的现代人杂交。


As a result, many people’s genomes contain roughly 1% Neanderthal DNA.	结果，许多人基因组中包含大约1%的尼安德特DNA。


Given this hybridization, some researchers argue that the species boundary between modern humans and Neanderthals should be reconsidered, and that both should be classified as Homo sapiens. But I believe that a morphology-based species distinction is still warranted.	一些研究者根据这一混血情况认为现代人和尼安德特人之间的物种界线应该重新划定，两种人都应该被归类为智人，但我认为基于形态学的物种分类应该被保留。


In fact, the scientific dispute reflects the real-world limitations of the concept of distinct biological species, which does not allow for interbreeding.	事实上，科学争论反映的是真实世界中关于不同生物物种概念的局限性，其标准要求生殖隔离。


The situation is further complicated by additional instances of ancient interbreeding among native populations in Africa and Australasia (for example, Australia, New Guinea, and Bougainville).	更多的关于早期非洲土著和澳大拉西亚（如澳大利亚、新几内亚和布干维尔）的杂交例子让情况进一步复杂化了。


In the latter case, the interbreeding derived from a population known so far from only one site – Denisova cave in southern Siberia.	在后一个例子中，杂交来源于目前只被一个考古点——南西伯利亚的德尼索瓦（Denisova）山洞——的人种。


Fossils from there contain DNA related to, but distinct from, that of the Neanderthals.	那里发���的化石含有与尼安德特人有关但不同的DNA。


Today, remnants of this DNA – amounting to roughly 3% of some people’s genomes – are present in Australasia.	如今，这一DNA残留——在某些人的基因组中大约占3%的比重——在澳大拉西亚也存在。


This indicates that the “Denisovans” must have existed not just in Siberia, but also along the southeast Asian route that early modern humans used to reach Australasia, where the hypothesized hybridization occurred.	这表明“德尼索瓦人”一定不仅仅存在于西伯利亚，也存在于东南亚路径上，早期现代人经此路径抵达假想的杂交发生地——澳大拉西亚。


Even Sub-Saharan Africans of today show traces of a distinct episode of interbreeding within the last 50,000 years.	即使在今天的撒哈拉以南非洲，也有过去50 000年中杂交的明显痕迹。


In this case, the source may have been as-yet-unknown remnants of the ancient species Homo heidelbergensis – a direct ancestor of both Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis – surviving somewhere in southern Africa.	在这里，杂交来源也许是目前尚不为人知的存活在非洲南部的远古人种、智人和尼安德特人的直接祖先——海德堡人。


But the real-world implications of the persistence of DNA from such interbreeding should not be misconstrued.	但这类杂交的DNA残留对真实世界的影响不应该曲解。


The fact that paleoanthropologists commonly refer to the Neanderthals as “archaic” humans, owing to their primitive features, could lead to the semantic trap of regarding living humans with greater inputs of DNA from ancient interbreeding as somehow less “evolved” than the rest of humanity.	古人类学家因其原始特征一致地将尼安德特人称为“古代”人，这一事实可能导致语义陷阱——将带有更多杂交祖先DNA的活着的人种视为“进化”不全者。


In reality, given that most human DNA shares recent African origins, all living humans should be considered equally “modern.”	在现实中，由于大部分人类DNA都有着共同的晚近非洲起源，因此所有的活着的人类可以视为同等“现代”。


But the recent discoveries cannot be ignored.	但最新发现也不能忽视。


The availability of commercial genetic tests that reveal roughly how much Neanderthal DNA an individual possesses provides an opportunity to appreciate the complex origins of modern humans.	现在可以做商业基因测试，在大致上揭示有你拥有多少尼安德特DNA，这是认识现代人复杂起源的机会。


While continuing to highlight humankind’s shared modernity and African origins, we must also begin to accept and understand the emerging patchwork nature of our biological history.	尽管我们要坚持强调人类共有的现代性和非洲起源，但也必须开始接受和理解逐步浮现的关于我们的生物学历史的拼接性质。


The Confidence Game	信心游戏


Confidence is a vital element of life, for nations and civilizations as much as for individuals.	对于国家、文明乃至个人而言，信心是生活的关键因素。


Confidence is the ingredient of hope.	信心是希望的要素。


It allows you to project yourself into the future, to fulfill or even transcend your capabilities.	信心让你展望未来，实现甚至超越你的能力。


It comes from within, but can be reinforced or weakened by the way others perceive you.	信心来自自我内部，但却可以通过别人感觉你的方式得到强化或者削弱。


But confidence, like blood pressure, must be balanced: the problem starts when you have too much or too little of it.	但是，信心正像是血压一样必须得到平衡。 信心太多或者太少，问题就开始了。


Overconfidence tends to be as destabilizing as a lack of it.	过度自信有可能会像是缺乏自信一样有破坏作用。


Consider, for example, America in Iraq.	让我们看一下美国身陷伊拉克的例子。


The Bush administration’s overconfidence in the validity of its objectives – democratizing the Middle East – much more than implementation failures, was the key factor behind the unfolding catastrophe there.	布什政府对于其目标，也就是将中东民主化的合理性过分自信正是那里层出不穷的灾祸背后的关键因素。


I recently debated one of the key thinkers behind the decision to “liberate” Iraq from Saddam Hussein.	最近，我同做出从萨达姆手中“解放”伊拉克决定的关键人物之一进行了辩论。


A prominent neo-conservative, he seemed to me something of a Bolshevik of democracy, owing to his unshakeable confidence in the validity of his vision.	他是一位知名的新保守派人物，对于其远景设计合理性具有坚定不移的信心，在我看来就像是一个民主的布尔什维克。


According to him, the status quo in the Middle East was untenable and dangerous.	在他看来，中东目前的局势无以为继，充满危险。


Democracy in Iraq would not only bring peace in Jerusalem, but also a new, safer, and better equilibrium in the entire Arab world.	伊拉克的民主不仅会在耶路撒冷带来和平，而且会在整个阿拉伯世界带来更好的平衡。


Because the United States is the most powerful and wisest of nations, it has a unique role to play, and the world should rally behind it in courageously tackling this challenge.	由于美国在各国最为强大、最为明智，因此美国可以发挥独特的作用，而全世界应该团结在美国身后勇敢地迎接这一挑战。


In other words, even as late as the early summer of 2007, he was, like the Bush administration, in a state of denial.	换言之，即使到了2007年夏初，他还是像布什政府一样处于否认的状态。


For him, things were going well in Iraq, and a new balance of forces was being established – one that would benefit Iraq’s Shia majority, but not necessarily Iran.	对于他来说，伊拉克局势不错，而且建立了各个实力的新的平衡。 这一局势将会有利于伊拉克什叶派多数人口，但是不一定是伊朗。


The courage and audacity of the US government and its army was finally “paying off.”	美国政府及其军队的果敢和勇气最后终于有所“收获”。


Daily violence should not be allowed to hide deeper strategic realities: victory was around the corner, and soon, the world – despite all the anti-Bush propaganda – would recognize it.	人们不应当让每日的暴力事件掩盖更为深刻的战略现实。 那就是，胜利即将来到，而且，不管反布什的宣传如何，整个世界都将认识到这一点。


At such a level, overconfidence is generally the product of an excessive assessment of one’s capabilities and an insufficient appreciation of the capabilities of one’s adversary.	在这样一个层面上，过度自信通常是对某人能力过分评估以及对对手能力评估不足的产物。


Both are the product of an ideological reading of the world that bears little connection with reality.	二者都是对世界意识形态化的理解的产物，与现实没有什么联系。


In invading Russia in 1941, Hitler, like Napoleon, demonstrated a military overconfidence that resulted in catastrophe.	希特勒1941年入侵俄国的时候如同拿破仑一样表现出了军事上的过度自信，造成灾难。


Saddam himself fatally overplayed his cards, convinced as he was that America would not dare to attack him.	萨达姆自己致命性地过度嚣张，确信美国不敢攻击他。


At the same time, lack of confidence on the part of a country, a culture, or a civilization can be just as dangerous.	与此同时，一个国家、文化或者文明缺乏自信也会同样危险。


The deep conviction that reform can only lead to revolution and chaos results in a stultification of reality that can lead to immobility and despair – and thus become a dangerous and self-fulfilling prophecy.	深信改革只会导致革命和混乱造成对现实愚蠢的理解，导致万马齐喑和绝望，因而成为一个危险而又自我实现的预言。


For example, in Egypt, which is highly representative of the prevailing political situation in the Middle East, the status quo is the result of the regime’s absolute lack of confidence in its ability to open up and reform.	例如，埃及高度代表了中东的主流政治局势。 该国政权对于自身改革开放的能力绝对缺乏信心造成了目前的局面。


This same lack of confidence is behind the potentially explosive situations in Algeria, Tunisia, and even Morocco.	这种缺乏自信也是阿尔吉利亚、突尼斯甚至是摩洛哥潜在的爆炸性局势的原因。


Because their legitimacy does not rest upon the support of their people, these non-democratic regimes consider the risk of opening themselves greater than the cost of maintaining the status quo.	由于它们的并不取决于人们的支持，因此这些非民主国家的政权认为自我开放的危险要大于维持现状的成本。


Of course, confidence and self-doubt are not mutually exclusive.	当然，自信和自我疑惑并不相互排斥。


A country like Israel booms with economic confidence, but is full of self-doubt when it comes to strategic and political considerations.	像以色列这样的国家随着经济自信而蓬勃发展，但是在战略和政治考虑的时候却又充满自我怀疑。


Can the right amount of confidence be instilled in countries or groups that badly need it?	能否在急需自信的国家或者团体中注入剂量适当的自信呢？


And if overconfidence is so dangerous, can restraint and modesty be taught to those who do not have it?	而如果过度自信如此危险，那么，能不能教给没有克制和谦虚的人这些东西呢？


Strangely, it may be easier to gain confidence than to restrain it.	奇怪的是，人们获得自信要比节制自信更为容易。


Confidence can come from three things: hope, pride, and progress.	信心可以来自三个方面：希望、自豪和进步。


Success breeds confidence, and confidence brings progress.	成功培育信心，而信心又带来进步。


Today’s Chinese and Indians are now convinced that they are succeeding.	如今的印度和中国相信它们正在取得成功。


They see in the West a mixture of respect for their achievements and apprehension for the challenge they now pose, and that fills them with pride.	它们发现西方既对于它们的成就尊敬，而又对于它们带来的挑战感到害怕，因而它们充满自豪。


Attempting to impose democracy on others is an act of unbounded arrogance.	试图给其他国家强加民主是一种毫无节制的傲慢行为。


But democracy is also the best remedy against overconfidence, because it allows ordinary people to decide whether their leaders are behaving arrogantly or responsibly.	但是民主又是对付过度自信的最佳药方，因为民主让普通人可以决定是否他们的领导人行为傲慢或负责。


Only the self-correcting mechanisms of truly democratic regimes can ensure the right balance.	只有真正民主政权自我调整的机制才能够确保正确的平衡。


The Consequences of Angela Merkel	默克尔抉择的后果


LONDON – Germany has been leading the opposition in the European Union to any write-down of troubled eurozone members’ sovereign debt.	伦敦—— 对于欧盟减记受困欧元区成员国主权债务的方案，德国一直是反对阵营的领导者。


Instead, it has agreed to establish bailout mechanisms such as the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, which can lend up to €500 billion ($680 billion) combined, with the International Monetary Fund providing an additional €250 billion.	与此相对的是，德国同意成立援助机构，比如欧洲金融稳定基金和欧洲金融稳定机构，这两大机构加起来有5 000亿欧元的贷款额度，另外，IMF也提供了2 500亿欧元。


These are essentially refinancing mechanisms.	这些机构从本质上说就是再融资机制。


Heavily indebted eurozone members can apply to borrow from them at less than the commercial rate, conditional on their committing to ever more drastic fiscal austerity.	债务深重的欧元区成员国可以申请以低于商业贷款的利率从这些机构贷款，但要以实施更彻底的财政紧缩为条件。


Principal and interest on outstanding debt have been left intact.	现有债务的本金和利息将维持原状。


Thus, creditors – mainly German and French banks – are not expected to suffer losses on their existing loans, while borrowers gain more time to “put their houses in order.”	于是，债权人——主要是德国和法国银行——将不会在现有贷款上发生损失，同时债务人赢得了更多的事件来“打扫房子”。


That, at least, is the theory.	至少在理论上是这样的。


So far, three countries – Greece, Ireland, and Portugal – have availed themselves of this facility.	到目前为止，有三个国家——希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙——向这一安排求助了。


In mid-July 2011, Greece’s sovereign debt stood at €350 billion (160% of GDP).	2011年7月中旬，希腊主权债务规模为3 500亿欧元（相当于其GDP的160%）。


The Greek government currently must pay 25% for its ten-year bonds, which are trading at a 50% discount in the secondary market.	目前，希腊政府必须为其10年期债券付出25%的利率，这些债券在二级市场上已经出现了五成的折价。


In other words, investors are expecting to receive only about half of what they are owed.	换句话说，投资者预期，债务人只能偿还一半的债务。


The hope is that the reduction in borrowing costs on new loans, plus the austerity programs promised by governments, will enable bond prices to recover to par without the need for the creditor banks to take a hit.	投资者的希望是，新贷款借贷成本的下降加上政府承诺的财政紧缩计划能够让债券价格重新回到面值，债权人银行不会受到损失。


This is pie in the sky.	这简直是在指望天上掉馅饼。


Unless a large part of its debt is forgiven, Greece will not regain creditworthiness.	除非一大块债务得到豁免，否则希腊绝无重塑信誉的希望。


(Indeed, by most accounts, it is about to default.)	（事实上，从许多方面看，希腊都快要违约了。


And the same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, for other heavily indebted sovereigns.	）对于其他重债国来说，情况也是一样的，只不过程度上稍轻点罢了。


Any credible bailout plan must require creditor banks to accept that they will lose at least half of their money.	任何可信的援助计划都必须要求债权人银行接受至少损失一半的现实。


In the United States’ successful Brady Bond plan in 1989, the debtors – Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil – agreed to pay what they could.	1989年，美国曾成功地实施了布雷迪债券（Brady Bond）计划，债务人——墨西哥、阿根廷和巴西——同意竭尽所能偿还债务。


The banks that had loaned them the money replaced the old debt with new bonds at par value, which averaged 50% of the old bonds, and the US government provided some sweeteners.	借钱给它们的银行用新债代替旧债，新债的面值平均只有旧债的50%，而美国政府也替银行分担了一些损失。


It was write-offs and devaluations, not austerity programs, that allowed bond prices to recover.	减记和贬值，而不是紧缩计划，才能让债券价格复苏。


In the Greek case, creditors have yet to accept the need for write-offs, and European governments have provided them with no incentives to do so.	对��腊而言，债权人至今仍不能接受需要减记的事实，欧洲各国政府也没有给出这样做的激励。


Germany’s opposition to debt forgiveness is thus bad economics, bad politics (except at home), and bad history.	因此，德国对债务豁免的反对不可不谓是坏买卖、坏政策（对德国人除外），是在重蹈历史覆辙。


The Germans should remember the reparations fiasco of the 1920’s.	德国人应该牢记20世纪20年代的赔款闹剧。


In the Treaty of Versailles, the victorious Allies insisted that Germany should pay for “the cost of the war.”	在《凡尔赛和约》中，获胜的协约国坚持，德国应该偿付“战争成本”。


They added up the figures, and in 1921 they presented the bill: Germany “owed” the victors £6.6 billion (85% of its GDP), payable in 30 annual installments.	他们把数字做了加总，并于1921年给出了账单：德国“欠”战胜国66亿英镑（相当于其GDP的85%），将分30年偿清。


This amounted to transferring annually 8-10% of Germany’s national income, or 65-76% of its exports.	这一数字相当于德国年国民收入的8—10%（或其年出口额的65—76%）得拿出来还债。


Within a year, Germany had asked for, and obtained, a moratorium.	但不出一年，德国就要求暂缓偿付并获得了同意。


New bond issues, following a big debt write-down in 1924 (the Dawes Plan), enabled Germany to borrow the money to resume payments.	在1924年进行了大规模债务减记后（即道威斯计划），德国通过发行新债券融资偿还战争赔款。


There then followed a crazy system:  Germany borrowed money from the US in order to repay Britain, France, and Belgium, while France and Belgium used a bit of it to pay back Britain, and Britain used more of it to pay back the US.	接着就形成疯狂的体系：德国从美国那里借钱，目的是赔付英国、法国和比利时，而法国和比利时用部分德国赔款偿付英国，英国用更多的赔款偿付美国。


This whole tangle of debts was finally de facto written off in 1932 in the middle of the global slump.	1932年，在全球崩盘中，这一整条三角债链条事实上已经名存实亡。


But, until 1980, Germany continued repaying the loans that it had incurred to pay the reparations.	但是，直到1980年，德国还在为战争赔款偿还贷款。


From the start, the economist John Maynard Keynes had been a fierce critic of the reparations policy imposed on Germany.	一开始，经济学家凯恩斯就猛烈抨击强加给德国的赔款。 他提出了三个论点：德国不具备偿还能力，除非它愿意牺牲正常的生活水平；


He made three main points: Germany didn’t have the capacity to pay were it to regain anything like a normal standard of living; any attempt to force it to reduce its standard of living would produce revolution; and to the extent that Germany was able to increase its exports to pay reparations, this would be at the expense of the recipients’ exports.	任何强迫德国牺牲正常生活水平的举动都会造成革命； 同时，由于德国可以通过增加出口来偿还赔款，因此让德国赔款将牺牲被偿付国的利益。


What was needed was cancelation of reparations and inter-Allied war debts as a whole, together with a big reconstruction loan to put the shattered European economies back on their feet.	协约国需要做的是将德国赔款和协约国内部债务一笔勾销，同时发放大手笔重建贷款，让满目疮痍的欧洲经济重新站稳脚跟。


In 1919, Keynes produced a grand plan for comprehensive debt cancellation, plus a new bond issue, guaranteed by the Allied powers, whose proceeds would go to victors and vanquished alike.	1919年，凯恩斯提出了一项完整的债务豁免大计划，连新债券的发行计划都一并想好了——该债券将由协约国的实力来担保，其收入将分给战胜国和战败国。


The Americans, who would have had to provide most of the money, vetoed the plan.	结果这笔贷款的主要资金提供者美国投了否决票。


The point to which Keynes kept returning was that the attempt to extract debt payments over many years would have disastrous social consequences.	凯恩斯所欲纠正的是，试图在多年内收取过度债务还款的举措会造成灾难性的社会后果。


“The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable,” he wrote, “even if it does not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe.”	“抑制德国，让一整代德国人陷入奴役、让几百万人类丧失体生活、让一个国家被剥夺快乐的权利的政策必然是可恶可憎的，”他写道，“就算它不会让整个欧洲的文明进程倒退。 ”


History never repeats itself exactly, but there are lessons to be learned from that episode.	历史从来不会简单地重复，但以史为鉴可以学到很多东西。


Germans today would say that, unlike reparations, the Greek and Mediterranean debts were voluntarily incurred, not coerced.	如今，德国人会说，与战争赔款不同，希腊和地中海国家债务是自愿发生的，不是强迫的。


This raises the question of justice, but not the economic consequences of insisting on payment.	这样一来，坚持要求偿付就是公平问题，而不涉及经济后果。


Moreover, there is a fallacy of composition: if there are too many debt collectors, they will impoverish the very people on whom their own prosperity depends.	此外，还存在一种合成谬误：如果负债者太多，那么各国的自身繁荣就与债务束缚在了一起。


In the 1920’s, Germany ended up having to pay only a small fraction of its reparation bill, but the long time it took to get to that point prevented the full recovery of Europe, made Germany itself the most conspicuous victim of the Great Depression, and bred widespread resentment, with dire political consequences.	在20世纪20年代，最终的结果是德国只偿还了战争赔款的一小部分，但由于达到这一点耗费了太长的时间，欧洲的完全复苏不得不推迟，这使得德国成为大萧条最显而易见的受害者，其国内出现了大规模不满，最终造成了灾难性的整治后果。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel would do well to ponder that history.	德国总理默克尔应该好好反思一下历史。


Abenomics and Asia	安倍经济学和亚洲


SEOUL – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic agenda – dubbed “Abenomics” – seems to be working for his country.	首尔—日本首相安倍晋三的经济日程——即所谓的“安倍经济学”——似乎会在日本起效。


Expansionary monetary policy is expected to inject liquidity into the Japanese economy until inflation hits the Bank of Japan’s 2% target, while expansionary fiscal policy is expected to continue until economic recovery takes hold.	人们预计扩张的货币政策会一直向日本经济注入流动性，直到通胀达到日本银行2%的目标，而扩张的财政政策也会持续，直到经济复苏站稳脚跟。


As a result, consumer and investor confidence is returning.	结果，消费者和投资者信心在恢复。


The Japanese stock market has soared more than 40% since November of last year, when it became clear that Abe would form the next government, and exports and growth are also picking up.	去年11月确定将由安倍组建下一届政府以来，日本股市反弹40%，出口和增长也有所抬头。


With a large output gap and low inflationary pressure, expansionary policies show great potential for reviving economic activity.	在出口缺口大而通胀压力小的情况下，扩张性政策显示出重振经济活动的巨大潜力。


But other countries – including neighboring Asian economies – fear that Japan is devaluing the yen to bolster exports and growth at their expense.	但其他国家——包括亚洲邻国——担心日本在贬值日圆，以它们为代价提振出口和增长。


Some have accused Japan of fueling a global “currency war.”	有人指责日本助长了全球“货币战争”。


Anticipation of aggressive monetary expansion has sharply weakened the yen, which has fallen by almost 20% against the dollar in just over four months.	对激进货币扩张的预测使日元大幅贬值，在短短四个月内对美元贬值近20%。


Of course, Japan’s escape from its 15-year deflationary trap and two decades of economic stagnation would be good for the world.	当然，日本的走出15年通缩陷阱和20年经济停滞对于世界来说是个好消息。


Japan remains the world’s third-largest economy, the fourth-largest trader, and the third-largest export market for neighboring China and South Korea, which thus stand to benefit if “Abenomics” revitalizes Japanese domestic demand.	日本仍是世界第三大经济体，第四大贸易体，和邻国中国和韩国的第三大出口市场，中韩两国都将因“安倍经济学”重振日本内需而获益。


More broadly, given Europe’s slide into recession and only a slow rise in world trade volume, renewed growth and stronger import demand in Japan would support global recovery.	更广泛地说，由于欧洲滑向衰退以及世界贸易量增长缓慢，日本重回增长、出口需求走强有助于支持全球复苏。


The question now is whether Abenomics can achieve its goals without destabilizing the world economy, especially neighboring Asian economies.	问题在于安倍经济学是否能够达到目标，同时又不动摇世界经济，特别是亚洲邻邦。


Doing so requires Japanese policymakers to focus on more sustainable growth while averting a vicious cycle of competitive devaluation and protectionism with Japan’s trade partners.	要达到这样的效果，日本决策者必须专注于更加可持续的增长，同时避免陷入与贸易伙伴国竞相贬值和保护主义的恶性循环。


In particular, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies – which are helpful in the short term – must be accompanied by fundamental structural reforms.	特别是，扩张性货币和财政政策——从短期看是有利的——必须辅之以基本结构性改革。


Japan’s deflation and economic stagnation over the last two decades stemmed largely from a dysfunctional financial system and a lack of private demand.	过去20年中，日本的通缩和经济停滞的主要原因是金融系统功能失调以及私人需求不足。


The collapse of asset bubbles in the 1990’s left Japan’s financial system and private sector saddled with a huge debt overhang.	20世纪90年代的资产泡沫破裂让日本金融提醒和私人部门背上了沉重的债务负担步履蹒跚。


Recovery began only after the balance-sheet weaknesses in the financial, household, and corporate sectors were addressed.	在金融业、家庭和公司部门资产负债表不振问题解决后，复苏才开始出现。


Sustainable growth requires sustained private-sector demand.	可持续增长要求持续的私人部门需求。


Monetary easing and fiscal stimulus, combined with structural measures to restore private firms to financial health, would stimulate household expenditure and business investment.	货币宽松和财政刺激，加上重塑私人企业财务健康的结构性措施，能够刺激家庭支出和企业投资。


Indeed, the impact of real exchange-rate depreciation on growth is likely to be short-lived unless increased corporate profits in the export sector lead to higher household consumption and investment.	事实上，真实汇率贬值对增长的影响是短期的，除非出口部门公司利润的增加能提高家庭消费和投资。


And yet risks to financial and fiscal stability could arise if higher inflation and currency depreciation were to spoil investors’ appetite for Japanese government bonds, thereby pushing up nominal interest rates.	但如果更高的通胀和货币贬值抑制了投资者对日本政府债券的胃口，从而推高了名义利率，那么金融和财政不稳定的风险也会升高。


That is why the success of “Abenomics” hinges not on the short-term stimulus provided by aggressive monetary expansion and fiscal policies, but on a program of structural reform that increases competition and innovation, and that combats the adverse effects of an aging population.	这就是为何“安倍经济学”的成功不取决于激进货币扩张和财政政策所提供的短期刺激，而取决于提振竞争力和创新并战胜人口老龄化的消极影响的结构性改革计划。


Japan, of course, is not alone in using exchange-rate policies to keep exports competitive.	当然，日本并不是唯一一个用汇率政策保持出口竞争力的国家。


Many emerging economies’ authorities intervene in currency markets to prevent exchange-rate appreciation and a loss of export competitiveness.	许多发展中经济��当局都实施了货币市场干预以阻止汇率升值和出口竞争力损失。


But if Japan starts to intervene directly in global currency markets to ensure a weaker yen, neighboring competitors will respond in kind.	但如果日本开始直接干预全球货币市场以确保弱势日元，邻国竞争者也会以同样的政策作为回应。


The danger of a currency war and protectionism should not be underestimated.	货币战争和保护主义的危险不容低估。


In South Korea, the government and business leaders worry that a stronger won, which recently rose to its highest level against the yen since August 2011, will hurt key export sectors, including automobiles, machinery, and electronics.	最近，韩元对日元汇率升至2011年8月以来的最高水平，韩国政府和商界领袖担心韩元的走强会伤害重要出口部门，包括汽车、机械和电子产品。


One report by a Korean research institute shows that the Korean economy will slip into recession if the yen-dollar exchange rate nears 118, its average level back in 2007.	韩国某研究所的一份报告显示，如果日元-美元汇率达到2007年的平均水平118附近，韩国经济将陷入衰退。


Moreover, unlimited quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank also increases the risk of volatile capital flows and asset bubbles in Asian emerging economies.	此外，日本银行、美联储和欧洲央行的无限制量化宽松也增加了资本流波动性升高和亚洲新兴市场资产泡沫的风险。


Chinese policymakers have raised serious concerns about the growing risks of inflation and property bubbles.	中国决策者对通胀和房地产泡沫风险的增长表示了严重关切。


This delicate situation could escalate into further currency intervention, trade protectionism, and capital controls.	当前微妙的局面可能升级为进一步的货币干预、贸易保护主义和资本管制。


Beggar-thy-neighbor policies could lower total trade volume – a zero-sum game from which no one would benefit.	以邻为壑政策会导致总贸易量的下降，产生一场无人捞得到好处的零和博弈。


After all, Japanese exports rely on emerging and developing markets, with East Asia alone accounting for nearly half of Japan’s foreign sales.	毕竟，日本出口依赖于新兴和发展中市场，光是东亚就占了日本海外销售的近半壁江山。


The regional economy would benefit from closer coordination of exchange-rate and monetary policies.	地区经济将从更紧密的汇率和货币政策合作中获益。


Mechanisms like the G-20 and ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, with China, Japan, and South Korea) should be used more actively for policy dialogue and surveillance.	应该更加积极地利用G20和东盟+3（东盟国家加上中日韩）等机制进行政策对话和监督。


East Asian economies could then, over time, cooperate to enhance regional exchange-rate stability, thereby creating a more conducive environment for intra-regional trade.	这样，假以时日，东亚经济体能够相互合作增强地区汇率稳定，从而创造更有利于地区内贸易的环境。


Japan’s economy is moving at last, which bodes well for Asia and the world.	日本经济终于开始启动了，这对亚洲和世界来说都是件好事。


But, despite its new vigor, the benefits of recovery could prove to be short-lived unless a sustainable and cooperative growth path is found.	但是，尽管日本活力有所恢复，但复苏的好处极有可能是短暂的，除非找到一条可持续的合作增长之路。


The Consequences of Korean Extremism	朝鲜族极端主义的后果


SEOUL – Once again, the Korean peninsula is experiencing one of its periodic bouts of extremism, this time marked by the suicide on May 22 of former president, Roh Moo-hyun, and North Korea’s second test of a nuclear device.	首尔－朝鲜半岛又一次遭受周期性极端主义浪潮的冲击，本次的标志性事件是5月22日韩国前总统卢武铉的自杀和朝鲜的第二次核试验。


Roh’s suicide is a disaster for his family and a national shame, while North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s nuclear blast is something of a temper tantrum, but one which may have dire consequences for the two Koreas and the world.	卢的自杀对其家庭是个灾难，对其国家是个耻辱，而朝鲜核爆炸则是领导人金正日火爆脾气的某种体现，以上事件是对于两个朝鲜族国家，乃至整个世界来说都有很严重的后果。


The North Korean bomb, estimated at four kilotons, does not come anywhere near the magnitude of the atomic bombs of 15-21 kilotons that America dropped on Japan 64 years ago.	朝鲜的核弹据估测有4千吨TNT当量，无论在哪方面都不能与美国在64年前投下的约15-21千吨TNT当量的核弹相提并论。


Indeed, this vainglorious attempt by Kim Jong-il reminds Koreans of the mother bullfrog in Aesop’s Fables who puffed herself out to imitate an ox.	其实，这只是金正日的自吹自擂，就像《伊索寓言》里的将自己吹大以冒充公牛的母牛蛙一样。


Yet North Korea’s world-defying belligerency is not utter madness.	然而朝鲜向世界挑衅的状态并非极度疯狂的行为。


Rather, it is a by-product of its own acute fears of regime collapse.	相反，这只是其严重担忧政权垮台的副产品而已。


As a Korean, I am always puzzled by Korean extremism.	作为一个朝鲜族人，我常常为朝鲜族人的极端主义而困惑。


Where in the world can you find a more isolated, regimented and militarized dynastic mutation of a communist totalitarian system than in North Korea?	你还能在世界上哪个地方找到一个比朝鲜更加孤立的共产主义军事化编制管理的制度体系？


Where on earth can you see a nuclear-armed, missile-shooting panhandler such as Kim Jong-il?	你在哪里还能找到一个像金正日一样有着核武器和导弹发射系统的乞丐 ？


Is there another country where only a father and his son have ruled like demigods for the last 61 years?	还有哪个国家被近乎神话的而顶礼膜拜的父子俩统治61年？


Likewise, where else but in South Korea can you find a Christian church whose registered membership runs upwards of 800,000, and where nearly 100,000 adherents attend each of the three Sunday services every week?	同样的，除了韩国外，你还能在哪个地方能找到拥有超过80万信徒的单个基督教会，在哪能找到每周约有10万信徒参加三次的礼拜？


Where else can you witness an ex-president commit suicide by jumping off a cliff near his residence?	在哪个国家你还能找到其前总统在他住处附近跳崖自尽？


And this in a country that had an estimated per capita income of $40 in the 1940’s but has now become the world’s 12th or 13th largest economy.	这是一个在1940年人均收入只有40美元，而现在已是世界第12或13大经济体的国家。


Cornelius Osgood, an American anthropologist, attributed Korean extremism to the peninsula’s weather.	美国人类学者奥斯古德将朝鲜族人的极端主义归因于半岛气候。


He observed that the Korean temperament is a product of long, harsh Siberian winters and hot, humid summers, with only short springs and autumns.	他观察朝鲜族人的性格气质是朝鲜半岛漫长而难受的西伯利亚冬天、炎热潮湿的夏天加上春秋都很短暂的气候所致。


I believe, however, that Korean extremism stems from the country’s geography and history.	然而，我认为朝鲜族极端主义源于这个国家的地理和历史。


Surrounded by hostile neighbors, such as Chinese, Mongols, and Manchus in the north and Japanese across the sea, Koreans have struggle tooth and nail for thousands of years to retain their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political identity.	北边面临中国、蒙古、满洲及隔海相望的日本等敌对邻居所包围，数千年来，朝鲜人一直为保持其自身的种族、语言、文化和政体而努力奋斗。


Setting the blame game aside, what can be done with North Korea?	对于朝鲜，我们除了谴责外，还有什么可做呢？


Unfortunately, putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle is next to impossible.	非常不幸的是，将核武器这个恐怖的魔鬼再装回瓶子已经几乎不可能了。


The effectiveness of available options is limited, and all of them are pregnant with unpredictable political and military consequences.	可用的有效选项不多，而且这些选项都含有无法预估的政治和军事后果。


“Economic strangulation” of North Korea appears to be the fallback option.	对朝鲜的“经济制裁”好像是个不错的选项。


Strengthening and tightening United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, crafted in the wake of North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, should be the immediate task.	强化和收紧联合国安理会1718号决议（在朝鲜2006年10月第一次核试验之后出台的决议）是最直接的行动措施。


The Security Council is already at work drafting a new resolution.	安理会正在研究出台一项新的决议。


But, to make the new resolution effective, China’s full and unwavering participation – which has not yet been the case – is critical.	但是，要想新的决议有实质性效果，中国完全坚定的参与（现在尚不明确）尤为重要。


Any unilateral measures against North Korea by individual countries must be executed within the broader framework of the new resolution.	任何单个国家对于朝鲜的制裁措施必须在新决议的框架之下。


And, even if new sanctions are imposed, the door to the Six-Party Talks must be left open for Kim Jong-il.	而且，即使新的制裁措施被执行，留给金正日重返六方会谈的大门仍需打开。


In this eyeball-to-eyeball situation, the other five parties in the talks – China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and South Korea – must not give in first to North Korea.	在此次对峙中，六方会谈的其它参与国——中日俄美韩——都不能首先屈服于朝鲜。


At present, public opinion worldwide, particularly in South Korea and Japan, is highly volatile.	现在，全球特别是韩日的公众意见处于高度的不稳定状态。


A cooling-off period is necessary.	给予双方的冷静期就十分有必要。


Seeking dialogue with North Korea immediately after its missile tantrum and nuclear brinkmanship is unwise and impractical.	在导弹实验和核爆炸之后，寻求于朝鲜对话是不明智也是不切实际的。


After tough and effective UN-led sanctions are imposed, the concerned parties must wait until North Korea feels the pain of the economic squeeze.	在联合国牵头的严厉和有效的制裁被实施后，具体效果可能要等到朝鲜感受到经济制裁的痛楚为止。


But, as North Korea is one of the world’s poorest and least globalized states, the effectiveness of sanctions will be limited.	但是，由于朝鲜是世界上最贫穷和最封闭的国家，所以制裁效果有限。


At the same time, the nuclear threat is not the most immediate danger.	与此同时，核威胁并不是最迫切的威胁。


The bigger threat today is actual combat, for, the day after North Korea’s nuclear test, South Korea announced its full participation in the US-led Proliferation Strategic Initiative, which seeks to intercept ships that may be involved in illegally transporting nuclear technology.	今天，更大的威胁是实际的武装冲突。 由于韩国在朝鲜核试验后宣布加入美国领导的“防扩散安全倡议”——旨在拦截可能涉及非法运输核技术的船只。


North Korea blasted this South Korean decision as a “declaration of war.”	朝鲜痛斥韩国这是“宣战”。


So great care and cool heads will be needed in the seas around Korea in the days and weeks to come.	因此在朝鲜外围海域，在接下来的几天和几周内需要巨大���谨慎和冷静的头脑。


Rising tension on the Korean Peninsula is shattering fast the glimmers of hope for re-unity that followed ten years of progress under the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments.	最近朝鲜半岛的紧张局势迅速将金大中和卢武铉政府所做的半岛统一的努力彻底打破。


South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, through his flip-flops, and Kim Jong Il, with his renewed nuclear blackmail, both seem determined to see relations deteriorate.	韩国总统李明博接连的逆转行为，加上金正日重拾核讹诈，两国关系由此恶化。


The two current leaders in Korea must not repeat the mistake of their predecessors in the latter part of the nineteenth century.	朝鲜半岛现在的两位领袖不能在重蹈其前任在十九世纪末所犯的覆辙。


Blinded by internecine domestic power struggles, they failed to see the great powers’ strategic gambits in the region.	由于国内政治势力的互相搏杀，从而未能在此区域建立强大的战略力量。


That failure led directly to the colonization of Korea by Japan.	这些最终导致韩国成为日本的殖民地。


Worsening inter-Korean relations will certainly make both sides less secure and stable politically, economically, and militarily.	朝鲜半岛两个国家间的关系恶化肯定会威胁该区域的政治、经济、军事的安全和稳定。


Caught in this vicious spiral, North and South Korea will become far more vulnerable to neighboring powers’ strategic maneuvers.	如果这样恶性循环下去，朝韩两国很容易被周边大国的战略行为所左右。


As a result, growing inter-Korean hostility may ultimately prove far more lethal to the well-being of all Koreans than Roh Moo-hyun’s tragic suicide and Kim Jong-il’s futile fireworks.	结果就是，不仅仅是卢武铉悲剧性的自杀和金正日无用的炮火。 日益增长的朝鲜族内部国家的对立斗争会最终危及整个朝鲜族人民的安全。


The Syria Lessons	叙利亚的教训


PRINCETON – As the United States and Russia try to broker a conference that can bring the various sides in the Syrian conflict to the negotiating table, potential Western participants, at least, should be thinking about the larger implications of the Syrian conflict for dictators and democracies around the world.	普林斯顿——在美俄试图促成会谈让叙利亚冲突各方重回谈判桌的同时，至少潜在的西方参与者应当思考叙利亚冲突对全球独裁和民主政体可能造成的宏观影响。


Here are the lessons thus far:	迄今为止应该吸取的教训如下：


Bad guys help their friends.	坏人总是不遗余力地互相维护。


The Russians and Iranians are willing to do whatever it takes to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power.	俄国和伊朗愿意不惜一切代价让巴沙尔·阿萨德总统继续执政。


Hezbollah, supplied by Iran, has now moved openly onto the battlefield in support of the Assad regime.	伊朗支持的真主党现在已公然走上战场支持阿萨德政权。


Russia and Iran have kept the Syrian government supplied with heavy weapons and other military assistance, including a Russian shipment of sophisticated anti-ship missiles with advanced radar systems.	俄伊两国源源不断地为叙利亚政府提供重型武器和其他军事援助，其中包括俄罗斯先进的反舰导弹及雷达系统。


These will help Assad hunker down and fend off all comers in an Alawite mini-state that will include the Russian-leased port facility at Tartus.	阿萨德可以借此机会站稳脚跟，以包括被俄罗斯租用的塔尔图斯港在内的阿拉维派迷你国家为后盾抵御所有侵入者。


Diplomacy without a credible threat of force is empty talk.	没有靠得住的武力威胁外交就是一句空话。


“Speak softly and carry a big stick,” Theodore Roosevelt counseled.	“柔声细语但是手持大棒”是西奥多·罗斯福的忠告。


President Barack Obama rightly wants to lead in global affairs through civilian more than military power; he understands that military solutions to foreign-policy problems are hugely expensive and often counter-productive in terms of advancing US security and prosperity over the long term.	奥巴马总统当然希望通过民众而非军事力量来领导世界； 他清楚以军事手段解决外交政策问题代价极为昂贵，而且在推动美国长期安全和繁荣方面往往起到适得其反的效果。


But Obama’s strategy in Syria seems to be “speak loudly and throw away your stick.”	但“扔掉棍棒大声说话”似乎更能概括奥巴马的叙利亚战略。


Obama has made it clear over and over (as has NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen) that he has no interest in intervening militarily in Syria.	奥巴马（和北约秘书长拉斯穆森）反复表态他们没有兴趣军事干预叙利亚。


And the US response to the latest Russian missile shipment?	你想问美国对最近俄国运送导弹做出的反应？


Secretary of State John Kerry said: “I think we’ve made it crystal clear we would prefer that Russia was not supplying assistance.”	国务卿约翰•克里说：“我们已经说得非常清楚，我们希望俄国不要提供援助。 ”


The US has cast aside one of its most important foreign policy tools, creating an incentive for the Syrian government and its supporters to keep fighting until they are in the most advantageous position possible to negotiate a settlement – that is, if they have any incentive to negotiate at all.	美国已经摒弃了一项最重要的外交政策工具，并促使叙利亚政府及其支持者为在谈判中占据有利位置而继续战斗——这还要在他们有谈判意愿的情况下。


If you are a dictator facing sustained political protests, be as brutal as possible and incite sectarian killing.	如果你是面对持续政治抗议的独裁统治者，那么记住越残忍越好，一定要不宜一切余力挑起宗派杀戮。


Part of Syria’s agony is the self-fulfilling nature of the conflict.	冲突不断自我应验成为叙利亚最大的痛苦。


From March to December 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrians marched every Friday, seeking the same political liberalization that Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, Bahrainis, Jordanians, and others across the Middle East and North Africa sought in what was optimistically called “the Arab Spring.”	从2011年3月至12月，成千上万的叙利亚民众每到周五就上街游行，像突尼斯人、埃及人、也门人、巴林人、约旦人和中东北非地区的其他民众一样寻求被乐观派称为“阿拉伯春天”的那场革命所带来的政治解放。


Unarmed, they were shot in the streets by riot police and government snipers, until they finally started forming small local militias for self-protection – militias that gradually grew into the loose federation of forces now known as the Free Syrian Army.	手无寸铁的民众在街头被防暴警察和政府狙击手开枪射杀，直到他们最终成立了以自我保护为目的的小型地方民兵联盟——该联盟逐渐演变为现在被称为“叙利亚自由军”的松散的联邦部队。


All the while, Assad was describing the violence as the product of terrorists and Sunni extremists seeking dominion over minority Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians, and other groups.	与此同时，阿萨德将暴力活动描绘成想要统治阿拉维派少数族裔、德鲁兹人、库尔德人、基督徒和其他团体的恐怖份子和逊尼派极端份子制造的产物。


He worked assiduously to fan the flames of sectarian civil war, succeeding to the extent that now the chief reason for not intervening to stop the killing is the impossibility of doing so effectively in an environment of sectarian violence.	他不遗余力地煽动宗派内战，他的策略如此成功，以致于不干预阻止杀戮的主要原因是在宗派暴力环境下根本不可能实现这一目标。


Regional organizations are still unable to solve regional problems without great-power leadership.	没有大国的领导地区组织仍然无法化解地区冲突。


Turkey has been threatening and calling for military action for 18 months, but US officials say that the Turks are not in fact ready to do anything beyond providing support for refugees and opposition fighters.	过去18个月来土耳其一直威胁并呼吁采取军事行动，但美国官员称土耳其人其实还没有做好准备采取支持难民和反对派武装以外的举措。


Qatar and Saudi Arabia are also sending arms to Syrian opposition groups, but the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council are paralyzed.	卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯也为叙利亚反对派团体运送武器，但阿拉伯联盟和海湾合作委员会都陷入到瘫痪境地而无法自拔。


Without a great power that is willing both to share the lead and to push from behind, regional organizations cannot take charge in their own neighborhood.	没有愿意共同领导和全力推进的大国的力量，地区组织根本无法对自己家门口的事件负责。


Human suffering, even on a massive and destabilizing scale, will not move the world to action.	即使是令人震惊的大规模人类苦难也不足以让世界采取行动。


In a recent conversation about Syria with a couple of well-known foreign policy experts, one participant suggested that the Middle East’s current borders, drawn in colonial times, cannot last and must be redrawn.	在不久前同几位知名外交政策专家就叙利亚问题展开的对话里，一名与会者认为当前绘制于殖民地时期的中东边界无法持久，必须重新规划。


I pointed out the possibility of a Middle East conflagration equivalent to the Thirty Years War in Europe, which is estimated to have killed between half and three-quarters of the population of some of the participating states.	我指出中东战火可能升级为欧洲三十年战争，那场战争曾经杀害了某些参战国约半数到四分之三的人口。


One of my interlocutors agreed, but said that we could do nothing to stop it, because “that’s the period of history we’re in.”	一名与会者同意我的观点，但他说“我们处在这样一个历史时代”，因此我们束手无策。


For all the world’s pious proclamations about “never again,” a mantra arising from the Holocaust, mass murder almost never motivates foreign intervention.	尽管全世界都在虔诚地大喊“让悲剧不再重演”，但这一源自大屠杀的口头禅却几乎从未在外国干预方面起到实际效果。


It is astounding to think that the world mobilized immediately to push Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, but has dithered for more than two years as tens of thousands of Syrians have been killed, and their country, a cradle of civilization, laid waste.	每每想到这一点都令人情不自禁地感到震惊：世界在1991年即刻动员将伊拉克赶出科威特，但却在面对成千上万叙利亚人被打死、他们曾经是文明摇篮的国家成为一片废墟时犹豫两年仍未采取任何举措。


“Humanitarian” intervention – action that is motivated by our concern for the fate of fellow human beings – is often described as reflecting “moral concern.”	 “人道主义”干预——出于关注人类同胞命运所采取的行动——往往被说成是反映“道德关切”。


But how many wars does it take for us to understand that killing always begets more killing?	但究竟多少场战争才能让我们明白杀戮只能招致更多杀戮？


People who watch the butchering of their children and parents, the rape of their wives, daughters, and sisters, and the wanton destruction of their homes and livelihoods do not forget.	亲眼目睹屠杀自己的父母和子女、强奸自己妻子、女儿、姐妹，肆意破坏自己家园和生活的人永远也不会忘记。


They carry vengeance in their hearts from generation to generation, until a measure of justice is done, nursing their enmity in frozen conflicts that block economic growth, prevent the formation of social capital, and paralyze political institutions.	复仇的欲望望在他们心中代代相传，直到最终在某种程度上伸张正义。 他们用阻碍经济发展、妨碍社会资本形成和导致政治制度瘫痪的“冰冻冲突”来滋养心中的敌意。


When no side in a war has a reason to stop fighting, a peace conference cannot succeed.	战争任何一方都没有理由停战的情况下根本不可能有和平会议。


In Syria, the moral, strategic, and political arguments all converge in favor of decisive action to stop the killing, if not forever, at least for now, to create a space for peace.	在叙利亚，道德、战略和政治现状共同指向果断采取行动制止杀戮，就算不能实现永久和平，至少也要在当前为和平创造一点余地。


But if the lessons of the past two years are any guide, the wheels of violence will keep on turning.	但如果说两年来的教训有什么指导意义，那就是暴力的车轮恐怕将难以停下。


Will Europe End in Croatia?	欧洲会在克罗地亚终结吗？


MAYNOOTH, IRELAND – Despite its many woes, the European Union remains a lodestar for poorer states outside its borders.	梅努斯，爱尔兰—尽管乱象丛生，但欧盟仍是欧盟外穷国的指路明灯。


Indeed, the gravitational pull of the EU’s enlargement process has been the most important factor in the reconstitution of economic, political, and civic life in the western Balkans since the end of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990’s.	事实上，欧盟扩容过程的引力作用乃是巴尔干半岛西部自20世纪90年代后南斯拉夫战争结束以来实现经济、政治和公民生活复兴的最重要因素。


Croatia’s accession to the EU on July 1 provides a welcome boost to a region that has been placed on the back burner as a result of “enlargement fatigue” and the EU’s crisis-induced introspection.	克罗地亚7月1日被吸纳而欧盟成员国对该地区来说试一次值得欢迎的提振，该地区一直因“扩张疲劳”和危机所导致的欧盟反省而沦为次等地区。


Enlargement advocates also point to the deal signed by Kosovo and Serbia in April as another key development in unlocking the Balkans’ European future.	扩张支持者还指出，4月份科索沃和塞尔维亚所签订的协议是解放巴尔干的欧洲未来的又一关键发展。


The decisive break with more than a decade of war and confrontation came in December 2012, when Kosovo and Serbia began to implement an agreement on border control.	与十多年来的战争和冲突的决定性告别发生于2012年12月。 当时，科索沃和塞尔维亚开始执行边境控制协议。


The April agreement goes further by establishing a power-sharing arrangement in northern Kosovo that is designed to bolster local self-government through an association of Serb-majority municipalities while providing new arrangements for policing and the judiciary.	4月协议更进一步，建立了科索沃北部的权力共享安排，该安排的初衷是为了通过塞族多数城市联合体增强地方自治，同时提供新的治理和司法安排。


The just-concluded meeting of the European Council acknowledged the progress made by both Serbia and Kosovo, with the Serbs being given a (somewhat conditional) start date for accession negotiations and Kosovo to begin a “pre-screening” process.	刚刚结束的欧盟理事会承认了塞尔维也和科索沃所取得的进步，塞尔维亚获得了开始（带一定条件的）入盟谈判的机会，科索沃则进入了“与筛选”程序。


The EU bet here is that, on the back of Croatia’s accession, the enlargement logjam in the western Balkans will finally be broken.	欧盟的打算是，有了克罗地亚入盟的先例，欧盟在西巴尔干的扩张僵局将最终取得突破。


But enlargement fatigue among the member states continues to muddy this optimistic forecast.	但成员国的扩张疲劳仍在影响这一乐观前景。


Although more than three-quarters of the EU’s member states are former enlargement countries, the Union’s expansion is no longer viewed as an unalloyed success story.	尽管超过四分之三的欧盟成员国都是经扩张加入欧盟的，但欧盟的扩张已不再被视为无可辩驳的成功。


On the contrary, it is often presented as a bridge too far.	相反，欧盟扩张常常被认为过犹不及。


In fact, enlargement fatigue has been the dominant feature of EU relations with the western Balkan states and explains why the accession process has been flat-lining along a path of frozen negotiations and mutual mistrust toward an increasingly uncertain destination.	事实上，扩张疲劳已成为欧盟与西巴尔干国家关系的主要特征，也解释了入盟程序为何不见起色，谈判总是难有进展，互不信任正在朝日益不确定的结局迈进。


This remains the case even after Croatia’s accession.	这在克罗地亚入盟之后仍然存在。


Enlargement fatigue entered the European political lexicon in the wake of the dramatic failures of the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005.	扩张疲劳始于2005年法国和荷兰关于欧盟宪法条约公投的戏剧性失败。


The seismic shock of the treaty’s rejection by two original EU members cried out for a scapegoat, and the “big bang” enlargement completed the previous year – in which eight post-communist countries (along with Cyprus and Malta) joined simultaneously – seemed a good place to put the blame.	两个欧盟初始成员国拒绝了欧盟宪法条约，这一令人震惊的事件需要找到替罪羊，而前一年的“大爆炸”式扩张——八个后共产主义国家（以及塞浦路斯和马耳他）同时加入欧盟——堪称理想的替罪羊之选。


Suddenly, Polish plumbers were inundating the “old” member states.	一夜之间，波兰水管工蜂拥进入“旧”成员国。


The western Balkan applicants have thus had to contend with a process that is now managed on a more intergovernmental basis than was the big bang of 2004, and which has, at times, been held hostage to member states’ selfish bilateral demands.	于是，西巴尔干申请入盟的国家不得不与新的程序纠缠。 与2004年的大爆炸相比，如今的入盟程序更多地建立在政府间的基础上，常常沦为成员国自私的双边要挟物。


Enlargement was traditionally viewed as an area where national interests would be more readily set aside than in conventional EU settings: the normative dimension of the process seemed to demand a more community-oriented approach to decision-making.	传统上，扩张被视为比常规欧盟条约更能超越国家利益的领域：入盟程序的常规内容要求决策方式更加社会导向。


But that has changed fundamentally.	但这已经发生了根本性改变。


Enlargement is now more easily politicized in individual member states, and this is especially the case where there is a groundswell of Euro-skepticism upon which to draw.	如今，扩张在个体成员国更容易政治化，特别是在容易被欧元怀疑派抓住把柄的国家。


The European Council, rather than the European Commission, is increasingly setting the benchmarks for delineating progress in accession talks, thus largely determining the pace at which negotiations proceed.	欧盟理事会（而不是欧盟委员会）开始越来越多地决定入盟谈判程序，从而在很大程度上决定谈判的节奏。


This intergovernmental mode of enlargement decision-making was evident as Slovenia made significant maritime territorial demands of Croatia.	凸显这一扩张决策的政府间模式的是斯洛文尼亚向克罗地亚提出了大面积的领海要求。


It can also be seen in the continuing Greek objections to Macedonia’s name and the Bundestag’s insistence on approving the progress of individual applicant states – a demand that has complicated relations with Turkey enormously.	可一窥端倪的例子还包括希腊拒绝马其顿的名字以及德国联邦议会坚持要批准个别申请国家的进展——这一要求极大地复杂化了与土耳其的关系。


There is ample evidence from earlier enlargement rounds of the transformative power of the EU to democratize and “Europeanize” states in advance of their accessions.	早先的数论扩张中充满了证据，欧盟的改革力量在如梦之前实现国家的民主化和“欧洲化”。


But the EU will succeed in transposing its laws, norms, and values to accession candidates only if applicant governments take its promises seriously.	但只有申请国政府认真履行承诺，欧盟才能在将其法律、规范和价值转移给入盟候选国方面取得成功。


They must be willing to bear the costs of implementation because they believe that the benefits to their countries as EU members (or to themselves as political actors) will be realized.	它们必须愿意承担实施风险，因为它们认为作为欧盟成员国（或者它们本身作为政治行动国），它们可以实现好处。


So the EU’s promise of membership simply has to be credible if accession-driven reforms are to succeed and EU norms internalized in applicant states.	因此欧盟成员资格承诺必须是可信的，如果入盟推动的改革想要成功、欧盟规范想要在申请国内部化的话。


The EU’s real problem in the western Balkans is that the promise (of membership) made to aspiring states in 2003 is no longer sufficient to counter the currents of enlargement fatigue, which has led to reform fatigue, slowing the progress of the region’s applicants to a virtual standstill.	欧盟在西巴尔干真正的问题是在2003年诱导诸国的（成员资格）承诺已不再足以抵消目前的扩张疲劳，而扩张疲劳导致了改革疲劳，让该地区的申请国陷入了进步停顿的状态。


Indeed, unlike in previous accession rounds, the EU has provided no concrete timetable for achieving the promise of membership made in Thessaloniki ten years ago.	事实上，与前几次入盟轮次不同，欧盟并未就兑现十年前塞萨洛尼基所作的成员资格承诺提供具体的时间表。


Rather, the process remains open and indeterminate.	整个程序仍是开放的、不确定的。


EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle insists that enlargement is progressing, but the western Balkans remains a fragile region, defined by mutually antagonistic nationalisms, incomplete state formation, deep and pervasive patterns of corruption, and endemic economic mismanagement.	负责扩张和欧洲邻国政策的欧盟委员富勒（Štefan Füle）坚持认为扩张在进步，但西巴尔干是个不稳定的地区，存在相互敌对的民族主义，国家形式不完全，腐败程度深、范围广，且充满了经济治理不当。


As the EU celebrates the accession of Croatia – which will undoubtedly provide a short-term boost to the reform process throughout the western Balkans – it faces a profound choice in its engagement with the region.	欧盟在庆祝克罗地亚入盟——这毫无疑问会给整个西巴尔干地区的改革过程带来短期提振——但其进入该地区面临着重大抉择。


It can reinvigorate the spirit of earlier enlargement rounds, or it can succumb to enlargement fatigue.	它可以重振此前数论扩张的精神，也可以屈从于扩张疲劳。


Either way, the region’s future hangs in the balance.	无论如何，该地区的未来凶吉难卜。


The Latin Difference	拉丁区别


PRINCETON – It is increasingly popular to think of Europe in binary terms.	普林斯顿—越来越多的人用两分法看待欧洲。


French President François Hollande is constantly flirting with the idea of building a new Latin bloc, in which Spain and Italy would join France in the struggle against fiscal austerity.	法国总统奥朗德一直在挤眉弄眼地意欲建立新的拉丁区，让西班牙和意大利加入法国的反对财政紧缩阵营。


In this vision, Latin superiority consists in a more expansive view of the state’s capacity to secure incomes and create wealth, and less of the “Protestant” obsession with the individual’s work.	在这一点上，拉丁优势形成了一个更广的关于国家确保收入和创造财富、更少地沉迷于个人工作的“新教主义”的观点。


The proposal is not altogether new.	这一方案一点都不新奇。


As the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben recently emphasized, it appeared at the beginning of the postwar era.	正如意大利哲学家阿加姆本（Giorgio Agamben）最近所强调的，这从战后伊始就开始了。


In August 1945, a French intellectual, Alexandre Kojève, submitted to General Charles de Gaulle a sketch for a new foreign policy, based on a Latin “third way” between Anglo-American capitalism and Soviet-Slavic Marxism.	1945年8月，法国知识分子科耶夫（Alexandre Kojève）向戴高乐将军建言新外交政策，提出要以介于盎格鲁-美利坚资本主义和苏维埃-斯拉夫马克思主义之间的“第三条道路”为基础。


But there are even older variants of the French vision of Europe.	但这并不是最老旧的法国欧洲观。


In the middle of the nineteenth century, the French Emperor Napoleon III actually created a Latin Monetary Union, which included Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland.	19世纪中叶，拿破仑三世实际上建立了一个拉丁货币联盟，它包括比利时、意大利和瑞士。


Napoleon saw the scheme as a potential basis for a single world currency.	拿破仑把这视为单一世界货币的潜在基础。


The British economist Walter Bagehot replied at the time that there would probably be two competing world currencies, which he termed Latin and Teutonic.	英国经济学家白芝浩（Walter Bagehot）在当时回应说，大概会存在两大相互竞争的世界货币，他称之为拉丁和条顿。


By Teutonic, Bagehot seemed to mean the Protestant world: the United States, recovering from the Civil War, Germany, and Britain.	白芝浩所说的条顿似乎是指新教世界：从内战恢复元气的美国、德国和英国。


He had no doubt about which vision would win out: “Yearly one nation after another would drop into the union which best suited it; and looking to the commercial activity of the Teutonic races, and the comparative torpor of the Latin races, no doubt the Teutonic money would be most frequently preferred.”	他对哪种货币会胜出坚信不疑：“假以时日，一个有一个国家会进入最适合它的联盟； 看看条顿竞赛中的商业活动，再看看拉丁竞赛中的死气沉沉，毫无疑问条顿货币将是最受欢迎的。


The modern tendency to regard economic differences in terms of religion was stimulated by Max Weber’s reflections on the Protestant work ethic.	以宗教区分经济的现代趋势受马克斯·韦伯对新教工作伦理的深思的刺激。


But that interpretation is clearly unsatisfactory, and cannot account for the dynamism of the deeply Catholic world of Renaissance Italy and Flanders.	但这一解读显然不能令人满意，也无法解释文艺复兴时期意大利和弗兰德斯等彻头彻尾的天主教地区的活力。


A better way to understand economic differences is to view them as a reflection of alternative institutional and constitutional arrangements.	一个更好地理解经济差异的方法是把它们看做不同制度和宪政安排的产物。


In Europe, that difference stems from two revolutions, one peaceful and wealth-enhancing (1688 in England), and the other violent and destructive (1789 in France).	在欧洲，这一差异产生于两次革命，一次是和平而促进财富的（1688年的英国），另一次是暴力而毁灭性的（1789年的法国）。


In the late seventeenth century, in the wake of Britain’s Glorious Revolution, when Britain revolted against the spendthrift and autocratic Stuart dynasty, the British government that was formed after William and Mary assumed the throne adopted a new approach to debt.	17世纪末，英国爆发了光荣革命，革了挥霍无度的专制的斯图亚特王朝的命，威廉和玛丽获得王冠后成立的英国政府采取了新的债务措施。


Voting budgets in parliament – a representative institution – ensured that the people as a whole were liable for the obligations incurred by their government.	议会——代议制机构——对预算进行投票，这保证了作为一个整体的人民需要为其政府产生的债务承担责任。


They would thus have a powerful incentive to impose controls on spending to insure that their claims could be met.	因此，他们有了强大的激励对支出予以控制，以确保他们的债务可以偿付。


This constitutional approach limited the scope for wasteful spending on luxurious court life (as well as on military adventure), which had been the hallmark of early modern autocratic monarchy.	这一宪政安排限制了追求侈靡生活（和军事扩张）的挥霍性开支，而这正是早期现代独裁君主体制的特征。


The result was a dramatic reduction in the British state’s borrowing costs and the emergence of a well-functioning capital market, which caused private borrowing costs to fall as well.	其结果是英国国家借贷成本的大幅下降和功能良好的资本市场的产生，从而让私人借贷成本也跟着下降。


Representative government, and its logical outgrowth, the democratic principle, became part of the classic model of good debt management.	代议制政府及其逻辑产物——民主原则成为良好债务管理的经典模式。


The alternative model to British constitutionalism was ancien régime France.	与英国宪政主义不同的模式是旧制度法国。


Official bankruptcy, a regular occurrence, required prolonging maturities on state debt and reducing interest payments.	时不时出现的官方破产要求延长国债到期日、降低利息支付。


But this solution raised the cost of new borrowing, so France began to consider the British model.	但这一解决方案提高了新债的借贷成本，因此法国开始考虑英国模式。


The problem was that the imitation was imperfect.	问题在于他们的模仿颇为拙劣。


After the conclusion of the American War of Independence, instead of returning to the old model of default, which had been applied as recently as 1770, the French elite did everything it could to avoid that outcome.	美国独立战争大局已定后，法国精英并没有回到违约的老路上去——最近一次是1770年——而是竭尽全力避免这一结果。


Fearing that the system was fragile, the government opened its coffers in 1787, bailing out private investors who had lost in an immense speculative scheme to corner shares in a reorganized East India Company.	由于担心系统太过脆弱，政府在1787年打开了金库，援助在操纵重组的东印度公司股价的投机风潮中损失惨重的私人投资者。


But there was an immediate problem: the existing tax system had reached its limits, and no more revenue could be raised without ending time-honored privileges and immunities.	但这立刻带来了问题：现有税收制度已经达到了极限，除非结束长期存在的特权和免税，否则就不可能在增加收入。


In the end, the only viable course was massive confiscation – the creation of biens nationaux as the basis for the issuance of state debt.	最后，大面积充公成为唯一的可行方案——以创造国家财产作为发行国家债务的基础。


But that measure, instead of restoring financial calm, led to an escalation of expectations regarding what the state could and should do, and exacerbated social tensions.	但这一手段并没有让财政恢复平静，而是导致了对国家可以和应该做什么的进一步猜测，加剧了社会紧张。


Adherence to the principle of non-default produced the French Revolution, the lesson being that political systems will collapse if they take on too much debt and try to pay at any cost.	坚持不违约原则催生了法国大革命，其教训是如果债务太重或不惜一切代价偿还债务，政治制度就会崩溃。


The situation was the reverse of Britain.	这与英国的局面正好相反。


In France, there was no adequately functioning market that differentiated among risks.	在法国，不存在运转充分良好的市场可以区分不同的风险。


The state’s commitments became incredible as it absorbed losses produced in the non-functioning market.	国家吸收了运转不良的市场产生的损失，从而失去了信誉。


The French experience exacted a high long-term price: French society was poorer relative to Britain in the century after the Revolution.	法国的经历带来了高昂的长期带价：法国社会在大革命后的一个世纪里一直比英国更穷。


But the French Revolution also produced a powerful and attractive myth of social transformation.	但法国革命也创造了强大而具有吸引力的社会转型神话。


Far from discrediting the flawed approach to debt management, the “nation,” which succeeded absolutist monarchy as the basis of political authority, remained wedded to statist solutions.	继专制君主之后成为政治威权的“国家”（nation）并没有抛弃有缺陷的债务管理方法，而是仍停留在专制解决方案。


John Kerry’s Tricky Bid	克里的机智条件


LONDON – In Why You Lose at Bridge (the funniest book about bridge ever written), my uncle, S. J. Simon, advised players to aim “not for the best possible result, but the best result possible” with the partner you have.	伦敦—在《为什么你打桥牌赢不了》（Why You Lose at Bridge，这是最有趣的关于桥牌的书）中，我舅父西蒙（S. J.


This advice applies to the long-stalled Israel-Palestine peace process, newly revived by US Secretary of State John Kerry.	Simon）建议选手和他的对家“不要追求最好的可能结果，最好结果的可能”。 这一建议适用于长期停滞的以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程，最近，美国国务卿克里再次重启了这一进程。


The United Nations spelled out the “best possible result” in 1947: Palestine – then a British mandate – was to be partitioned into two states of approximately equal size.	联合国在1947年就提出了“最好的可能结果”：巴勒斯坦——当时由英国托管——将分成两个规模大致相当的国家。


Israel accepted this, but the Palestinians did not, so the Palestinian state was never established.	以色列接受了这一方案，但巴勒斯坦人拒绝了，于是巴勒斯坦国从未建立。


In successive wars, Israel seized all the land allocated to Palestine, mainly the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza, now swarming with millions of Palestinian refugees.	在后来的多次战争中，以色列夺走了所有分配给巴勒斯坦的土地——主要是现在布满了几百万巴勒斯坦难民的约旦河西岸和加沙地带。


Since the Oslo Accords of 1993, which envisaged a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza, “facts on the ground” have whittled down the putative Palestinian state still further.	自1993年签订奥斯陆协定（设想在约旦河西岸和加沙建立巴勒斯坦国）以来，“既成事实”是假定的巴勒斯坦国国土越缩越小。


Part of the West Bank has been annexed outright by Israel or seized by Israeli settlers.	约旦河西岸的一部分要么被以色列彻底吞并，要么被以色列定居点占领。


The Palestinian Authority has been given limited autonomy over 25% of it, in non-contiguous parcels.	巴勒斯坦权力机构只在25%左右的互不相邻的土地上拥有自治权。


Kerry’s formidable task is to persuade the Palestinians to accept a smaller state than they want and the Israelis to accept a smaller state than they have.	克里的艰巨任务是让巴勒斯坦人接受比其所愿更小的国家，让以色列接受比其所有更小的国家。


But, with the security situation in the “occupied territories” under control, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government is content with the status quo.	但是，在“占领区”安全局势尽在掌握的情况下，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡政府对现状十分满意。


So Kerry’s blandishments are directed toward the Palestinians.	因此克里只能哄哄巴勒斯坦人。


His strategy seems to be to bribe them with $4 billion to accept a (temporary) “bantustan” solution (so named for the nominally autonomous states to which South Africa’s apartheid regime confined most of the country’s black majority).	他的战略是用40亿美元换取他们（暂时）接受“班图斯坦”（bantustan）解决方案（这个名字来源于南非种族隔离政府用于限制占人口多数的黑人的名义自治州）。


It just might work.	这或许可以奏效。


Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas might be attracted by the money if it is accompanied by the trappings and symbols of statehood.	巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯或许会被这笔钱吸引，如果再辅之以建国的礼仪和符号的话。


At 78, he is a president in urgent need of a state.	作为总统，78岁的阿巴斯急切地需要巴勒斯坦国。


The Netanyahu government, too, might conceivably agree to a Palestinian “entity” on 75% of the West Bank, provided that Israel remained in overall control.	内塔尼亚胡政府据信也可能同意占约旦河西岸75%土地的巴勒斯坦“实体”，只要以色列仍拥有总体控制权。


Kerry’s initiative would have a greater chance of success were more money on the table.	如果把更多的钱摆上台面，克里的方案成功的机会也会更大。


One way to increase it would be to convert the Palestinian demand for a “right of return” (to Israeli lands from which they fled in 1947-1948) into a right to compensation.	一个增加机会的办法是把巴勒斯坦对“回归权”（回到他们在1947—1948年被以色列夺走的土地上）的要求转换为补偿权。


At the failed Camp David summit in 2000, Israeli negotiators suggested a $30 billion international fund that would make payments to genuine refugees.	在2000年以失败告终的戴维营峰会上，以色列谈判员提出成立一个300亿美元规模的国际基金，为真正的难民提供补偿。


By revisiting the Israeli offer, Kerry could neatly combine economic stimulus with fulfillment of a key Palestinian demand.	克里重新提及以色列的方案可以把经济刺激与满足巴勒斯坦关键要求巧妙地结合起来。


Nevertheless, even with the extra cash, neither side would be likely to accept such a simulacrum of the two-state solution.	尽管如此，即便有更多的钱，巴以双方也不可能接受这一影子版两国方案。


Although such a deal might satisfy Israel’s security needs, it would mean abandoning the Greater Israel project championed by hardline Zionists and religious extremists.	尽管这样的交易能满足以色列安全需要，但这意味着放弃强硬���犹太复国主义者和宗教极端分子的大以色列计划。


And, although Abbas might be tempted by cosmetic changes to the status quo, most Palestinians probably would reject them as fraudulent.	此外，尽管阿巴斯或许会被粉饰现状的方案诱惑，但大部分巴勒斯坦人也许会认为这是赤裸裸的欺骗，断然拒绝。


A peace settlement should not be impossible.	和平和解似乎是不可能的。


There would need to be agreement on the amount of territory reserved for the Palestinian state.	需要达成关于巴勒斯坦国可以保有多大领土的一致。


Since no Israeli government would surrender the West Bank border areas that have the thickest settlements, land in Israel would need to be offered as compensation.	以色列政府绝不可能牺牲定居点最多的约旦河西岸边界地带，因此以色列就必须用以色列境内的土地作为补偿。


Jerusalem would have to be divided, with UN administration of holy sites, and an agreement would be needed to police the porous frontier with Jordan.	耶路撒冷不得不一分为二，圣址由联合国接管，如何治理漏洞百出的约旦河边界也需要达成一致。


But there is little chance that such an agreement will emerge from the current round of talks.	但在最近的谈判中形成这样的一致希望渺茫。


Most Israelis – certainly the current government – are convinced that Palestinians must be prevented by force from killing Jews.	大部分以色列人——现任政府显然也包括在内——认定必须用武力防止巴勒斯坦人杀戮犹太人。


“How do we resolve the contradiction between our extreme morality and our blatantly immoral circumstances?” asks the writer Uri Avnery.	“我们如何解决我们的极端道德和我们所处环境的极端不道德之间的矛盾？ ”作家阿文内里（Uri Avnery）问道。


“Simple: we go into denial.”	“很简单：我们拒绝接受它。 ”


The desire for peace is more urgent in Ramallah than in Tel Aviv.	和平的渴望在拉马拉比在特拉维夫更迫切。


But Abbas has his own intransigents in the form of Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since 2006, and whose commitment to violence is a mirror image of Netanyahu’s “peace through strength.”	但阿巴斯还面临着哈马斯的拒不让步，自2006年以来，哈马斯一直控制着加沙，其对暴力的坚持堪称内塔尼亚胡“通过强大实现和平”理念的镜像。


A genuine two-state solution thus requires a change of heart – and leadership – on both sides.	因此，真正的两国方案需要双方观念和领导层的改变。


On the Israeli side, this means a less paranoid view of the Palestinians, coupled with a recognition that Israel’s behavior runs contrary to modern ethics.	在以色列方，这意味着不要对巴勒斯坦人采取偏执态度，并且要意识到以色列的行为与现代道德不符。


Past conquest cannot be a legitimate basis for current rule.	过去的征服不能作为现在统治的合法性基础。


That is why all civilized countries have given up the claim to rule by force.	这就是为何所有文明国家都放弃了武力统治的观念。


The Palestinian side, for its part, must accept that Israel is here to stay, and that huge benefits can be reaped from economic cooperation.	在巴勒斯坦方，必须接受以色列已在这里定居的现实，并意识到经济合作可以带来巨大的好处。


Both sides need political leaders willing to take real risks for peace, including the risk of being killed.	双方都需要愿意承担和平的实际风险（包括被杀的风险）的政治领导人。


After all, ordinary soldiers take this risk, so why should political leaders – who can do much greater good or ill – be immune to it?	毕竟，普通士兵承担着这一风险，为何政治领袖——其善恶的作用远胜于士兵——可以免于承担这一风险？


But external pressure may create new facts.	但外部压力可以造成新的实际。


Hamas has always believed that only violence can achieve a genuine Palestinian state, so the Israelis must fear a third intifada if Abbas cannot deliver.	哈马斯一直相信，只有暴力可以实现真正的巴勒斯坦国，因此，如果阿巴斯实现不了这一点，以色列人就必须做好迎接第三次起义的准备。


Such a popular uprising would be brutally suppressed, strengthening both sides’ intransigents in the short run and undermining America’s automatic support for Israel in the long term.	这样一次群众暴动将被严厉镇压，从短期看这会增加双方的互不相让程度，从长期看会削弱美国对以色列的自动支持。


Pressure for change may also come from unfolding events in the Middle East, with regional turmoil bound to affect the West Bank and Gaza.	改变的压力也许还将来自中东局势的展开，地区动荡必将影响约旦河西岸和加沙。


Increasingly unstable Arab neighbors might give the Israelis a motive to make peace in a small area and thereby hold at bay the chaos outside.	以色列的阿拉伯邻国越来越不稳定，以色列或许将因此产生在小区域实现和平从而将外部动荡拒之门外的动力。


The likeliest outcome of the current flurry of diplomacy will be a fudge, which both sides will present as the “best result possible.”	当前外交风暴最有可能的结果是顽固不化，双方都将此作为“最好结果的可能”。


There will be another roadmap to final two-state status, with some timetable for Palestinian statehood, conditional on Hamas’s renunciation of violence.	将出现新的两国地位最终路线图，巴勒斯坦建国将有时间表，条件是哈马斯放弃暴力。


The Israelis will claim to have conceded nothing essential; Abbas’s Fatah will claim to have secured a road paved with gold.	以色列将宣布它实际上一点让步也没有做出； 阿巴斯的法塔赫将宣布找到了一条笃定的黄金之路。


And the peace process will creep forward – more process than peace – until it encounters the next roadblock.	而和平进程将蹒跚向前——“进程”多于“和平”——直到遇上下一个路障。


Syria’s Hijacked Struggle	叙利亚被挟持的斗争


LONDON – As Syria’s civil war has progressed, the West’s views on arming the opposition have become increasingly confused, which reflects the growing muddle on the ground.	伦敦—随着叙利亚内战的推进，西方对于武装反对派的态度变得日益不知所从，这反映出局势的混乱。


While President Bashar al-Assad’s regime remains vicious and tyrannical, and some of its opponents’ motives remain altruistic, the conflict can no longer be defined simply as one of good versus evil.	总统巴沙尔的政权仍然恶毒而残暴，反对派中不乏以人民利益为动机者，尽管如此，这场冲突不能简单地定义为善与恶的交锋。


No unified, patriotic Syrian opposition has existed since extremists hijacked the peaceful protests in 2011.	叙利亚爱国反对派自2011年极端主义者操纵和平示威以来便一直存在，但从未联合。


Indeed, some opposition tactics are as brutal as those of the Syrian regime.	事实上，一些反对派的做法与叙利亚政权一样野蛮。


The United Nations estimates that security forces have suffered 15,000 fatalities, and the opposition 10,000, and that 45,000 civilians have died in the last two years of fighting.	联合国估计，在过去两年的战斗中，叙安全部队已有15 000人死亡，反对派则有10 000人丧命，平民丧生人数则在45 000人。


And the UN has condemned militant groups – which now form the majority of fighters in Syria – for murder, kidnap, torture, assault, corruption, and reliance on child soldiers.	联合国谴责军事集团——目前叙利亚的主要战斗者——犯有谋杀、绑架、虐待、攻击、腐败和使用童兵等罪行。


With Syria engulfed by chaos, the world does not know what to think.	叙利亚一片混乱，而世界不知道该作如何观。


Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has admitted that the United States lacks a clear picture of the situation in Syria.	美国参谋长联席会议主席邓普希（Martin Dempsey）承认，对于叙利亚局势，美国缺少明确的路线图。


Moreover, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN and Arab League special envoy for Syria, reports that opposition forces include 38 nationalities.	此外，联合国和阿盟叙利亚事务特使布拉西米（Lakhdar Brahimi）报告说，反对派武装包括38国人。


Jihadi fighters connected to Al Qaeda are now in the majority.	与基地组织有关联的圣战分子目前占据多数。


The United Kingdom’s Home Office has warned that hundreds of British and other European Muslims fighting in Syria alongside Al Qaeda-linked rebel groups could return home to carry out terrorist attacks.	英国内政部警告说，数百名英国和欧洲穆斯林在叙利亚和与基地组织有关的叛军共同作战，他们可能回国谋划恐怖袭击。


In February, Syria’s state news agency accused jihadi rebels of firing a rocket containing chemical materials in Khan al-Assal – an allegation that the British television outlet Channel Four backs.	2月，叙利亚国家通讯社指责圣战叛军在汉阿萨尔（Khan al-Assal）发射了含有化学成分的火箭——英国电视四频道支持了这一说法。


The rebels, however, blame the government for the attack (which neither side has been able to prove involved chemical weapons).	但是，叛军指责是政府发动了袭击（目前双方都无法被证明使用了化学武器）。


The Free Syrian Army (FSA), which the US, the UK, and France support, has denied involvement in the alleged chemical attacks, but has not condemned the rebels’ brutal campaigns.	受美国、英国和法国支持的自由叙利亚军（FSA）否认与被控的化学袭击有关，但没有谴责叛军的野蛮行动。


Puzzlingly, US Secretary of State John Kerry, justifying plans to provide the FSA’s Supreme Military Council with additional assistance, has cited the danger of “letting this country, the heart of the Middle East … [become] hijacked by extremists.”	奇怪的是，美国国务卿克里在证明向FSA最高军事委会追加援助的计划的合理性时，提到了“让这个位于中东心脏地带的国家……被极端主义挟持”的危险。


But to oppose extremism and support the FSA is a blatant contradiction.	但反对极端主义和支持FSA是极其矛盾的。


Even the US Department of Justice has stated categorically that most of the FSA adhere to Al Qaeda’s ideology.	就连美国司法部也直接了当地宣称大部分FSA与基地组织的思想一脉相承。


The Supreme Military Council is overwhelmingly Islamist, with rebel-controlled areas of Syria already practicing sharia (Islamic law).	伊斯兰教徒占据了最高军事委员会的巨大多数，而叙利亚叛军控制地区已经开始推行伊斯兰法律。


Salim Idris, the council’s chief of staff, has expressed a willingness to fight alongside extremist groups that refuse to accept the unified command.	参谋长艾德里斯（Salim Idris）表示愿意与拒绝接受统一指挥的极端分子集团共同作战。


He has labeled only the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra as extremist (though he rejects America’s branding of the group as a “foreign terrorist organization.”)	他只把与基地组织有关的Jabhat al-Nusra称为极端主义者（尽管他拒绝接受美国的说法，称该集团为“外国恐怖主组织”）。


In this context, the West’s belief that it can channel assistance to certain elements of the opposition is absurd, as is the concept of “non-lethal” aid, such as night-vision goggles, medical equipment, and armor, given the conventionally “lethal” aid that is already pouring in from the Gulf states.	在这样的环境下，西方的观点——可以向反对派的部分成员提供帮助——是荒谬的，“非致命”援助的概念——比如夜视仪、医疗设备、盔甲——亦然，因为常规“致命”援助已经大量从波斯湾国家涌入。


The Guardianrecently reported that Jordan is accepting Saudi money to supply arms directly to Syrian rebels.	《卫报》最近报道说约旦接受了沙特的资金直接向叙利亚叛军提供军火。


Western proponents of such aid, such as Kerry and UK Foreign Minister William Hague, must recognize that these supply channels do not discriminate between opposition groups.	这些支持的西方支持者，比如克里和英��外相黑格，必须认识到这种供应渠道无法区分不同的反对派集团。


More important, Western leaders must comprehend the danger of picking sides.	更重要的是，西方领导人必须理解站边的危险。


And that means that they must stop ignoring the lessons of the campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, which facilitated the Taliban’s rise to power, and the intervention in Libya in 2011, which produced a weak and divided government that remains locked in a power struggle with Islamist militias.	这意味着他们不能再忽视20世纪80年代阿富汗的教训了，当年的错误导致塔利班力量的崛起； 还有2011年对利比亚的干预，其结果是产生了孱弱而分裂的政府，至今仍被各伊斯兰军事势力玩弄于鼓掌之间。


France, the US, the UK, and Turkey have recognized the Syrian National Coalition as Syria’s future interim government, despite reports that two-thirds of the SNC’s 263 founders are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.	法国、美国、英国和土耳其已将叙利亚国民联盟（SNC）承认为未来过渡政府，尽管报告显示SNC的263位创始者中有三分之二与穆斯林兄弟会有关。


The SNC’s outgoing leader, Moaz Al-Khatib, has publicly criticized America’s decision to blacklist Jabhat al-Nusra – as has the SNC’s key backer, Turkey.	SNC的流亡领袖卡提布（Moaz Al-Khatib）公开批评美国以及SNC的主要支持者土耳其将Jabhat al-Nusra纳入黑名单的决定。


It is ironic, to say the least, that the West’s democratically elected governments happily engage with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but refuse to work with more liberal groups.	至少有一点很讽刺，西方民选政府愉快地与穆斯林兄弟会打成一片，却拒绝与更自由的集团合作。


Our views are much too liberal for the SNC, and its key backer, Turkey, whose foreign minister has said that jihad in Syria is not related to terrorism.	我们的观点对于SNC及其主要支持者土耳其来说显得太过自由化了，土耳其外交部长声称叙利亚的圣战分子与恐怖主义没有关系。


They disregard the warnings of people like Alain Chouet, the former chief officer of the French General Directorate for External Security in Damascus, who recently denounced France’s provision of weapons to the rebels as “completely illegal” and described how “the jihadi militias have taken precedence over the others.”	他们忽视了前法国大马士革外部安全主管乔恩特（Alain Chouet）等人的警告。 乔恩特最近批评了法国向叛军提供武器的做法，称其“完全是非法的”，并说“圣战分子已经领先于其他各方”。


The repercussions of mishandling Syria will extend far beyond the country’s borders.	在叙利亚事务上的举措失当的影响范围远远不止于叙利亚一国。


After all, Syria is situated on a national, sectarian, regional, and geopolitical fault line, where the strategic interests of Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon confront those of NATO, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.	毕竟，叙利亚位于民族、宗派、地区和地缘政治断层线上，俄罗斯、中国、伊朗、伊拉克和黎巴嫩的战略利益在这里与北约、土耳其、沙特、卡塔尔、科威特和约旦针锋相对。


And regional tensions are running high.	且地区紧张局势相当严峻。


Improving Syria’s prospects for peace and democracy must begin with diplomacy.	提振叙利亚的和平和民主前景必须从外交开始。


Democracy is about representation, and that should cover the full mosaic of Syria’s people.	民主事关代表，而代表应该覆盖全部叙利亚人民。


Every group with an interest in the country’s future – including the government, domestic opposition groups, and those in exile – should be invited to participate in official talks.	与该国未来息息相关的每一个群体——包括政府、国内反对派和流亡者——都应该获邀参加正式谈判。


And, in order to create a level playing field, it is essential to recognize that the Arab League (which has already given Syria’s seat to the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled SNC) represents the autocratic states that are encouraging sectarianism and extremism in Syria.	为了创造公平的竞争环境，认识到阿盟（已将叙利亚的成员资格给了穆斯林兄弟会控制的SNC）代表鼓励叙利亚宗派主义和极端主义的专制国家是至关重要的。


During this process, Western governments must stop providing money or other kinds of aid to opposition groups in Syria, and put pressure on Turkey and the Gulf countries to stop supporting extremists.	在此过程中，西方政府必须停止向叙利亚反对派提供资金和其他种类的援助，并向土耳其和波斯湾国家施压让其停止支持极端主义。


Any financial aid should be channeled through organizations like the Red Cross and UNICEF to supply medical care to civilians, or allocated to a fund for post-war reconstruction.	任何金融援助都必须通过红十字会和联合国儿童基金会等组织进行，提供面向平民的医疗卫生支持，或将资金配置给战后重建。


Some leaders may be starting to recognize the need for a new narrative.	一些领导人也许已经开始认识到新气象的需要。


The UN Security Council has condemned the opposition’s recent attack on a mosque in Damascus, which killed a senior pro-government Muslim cleric.	联合国安理会谴责反对派最近针对大马士革某清真寺的袭击，该袭击杀害了一名亲政府的高级穆斯林牧师。


US President Barack Obama recently expressed concern about Syria “becoming an enclave for extremism, because extremists thrive in chaos.”	美国总统奥巴马最近表示担心叙利亚“沦为极端主义的飞地，因为极端主义者滋生于混乱中。 ”


But, in reality, Syria has already become an enclave for extremism.	但是，在现实中，叙利亚已经成了极端主义的飞地。


Responding with military aid will simply turn a catastrophe into an apocalypse.	以军事援助为反应只能让灾难变成毁灭。


The New-Model Nomad	新型游牧民


MOGADISHU – One of my earliest childhood memories is of swimming in a small gully near my grandmother’s home in Yaaq Bari Wayne, a dusty collection of tin-roofed adobe buildings huddled together in the plains of southern Somalia’s Bay region.	摩加迪休—我关于童年的最早记忆之一是在Yaaq Bari Wayne我祖母家附近的小水沟里游泳的情景。 Yaaq Bari Wayne是索马里湾地区南部平原一个满是铁皮顶土坯房的脏乱差的居民区。


After the Gu rains, the gully became a deep triangular cleft cut into the ground, filled with muddy water.	每逢大雨过后，这条小沟就会成为一个很深的三角形地裂，里面全是浑浊的雨水。


Children gathered like ants to spilled sugar, jumping off ledges and diving into its murky depths with screams and whoops of excitement.	孩子们趋之若鹜，从岸边跳入沟中，在浑水中潜泳，兴奋地大喊大叫。


Many were children of nomadic herders, who moved south in May and June in search of better pastures.	其中许多都是游牧牧民的孩子，每年5月到7月，他们会南迁寻找更好的牧草。


When they arrived, brown domes made of crisscrossed branches and layers of multicolored mats would appear like crowds of dappled beetles on the outskirts of town.	他们来的时候，用交错的树枝和五颜六色的幡子做成的棕色圆顶帐篷就会在城镇外围出现，活像成群结队的斑纹甲虫。


For me, the nomad was a romantic figure, akin to the American cowboy of the Wild West.	对我来说，游牧事件浪漫的事情，就像是美国狂野西部的牛仔。


In the world’s harshest environment, they trekked hundreds of kilometers, surviving on camel milk and dried meat, with all of their possessions strapped to a camel’s back.	他们在地球最艰难的环境中跋涉数百公里，以骆驼奶和肉干为生，所有家当都在骆驼背上驮着。


But, in the last two decades, the story of the Somali nomad has become far less romantic – and far more complex.	但是，在过去二十年中，索马里牧民故事的浪漫色彩越来越少——复杂程度越来越大。


Nomads have been victims of famine, violent conflict, and circumstance, accounting for a significant share of the deaths – as many as one million – caused by 22 years of civil war, and of the 260,000 Somalis who died of starvation in 2010-2012.	牧民是饥馑、暴力冲突和环境的受害者，他们占据了22年内战数百万丧生者和2010—2012年大饥荒中丧命的26万索马里人的大部分。


At the same time, nomads have been perpetrators of violence and terrorism.	与此同时，牧民也是暴力和恐怖主义的实施者。


And yet there is another way to view nomads: as survivors, entrepreneurs, providers, and agents of transformation.	但我们也可以换个角度看待牧民，他们是幸存者、创业家、提供者和交通先锋。


With global problems like food insecurity and climate change threatening livelihoods around the world, nomadic and pastoral lifestyles have the potential to protect and sustain millions of people.	食品不安全和气候变化等全球问题威胁着全世界人民的生活，游牧的生活方式具有保护和拯救数百万人生命的潜力。


In fact, it was cataclysmic climate change – which transformed a lush, green Sahara into a harsh desert – that triggered the emergence of such lifestyles in East Africa 5,000 years ago.	事实上，巨大的气候变化——将富饶绿色撒哈拉变成了荒芜的沙漠——在5000年前开启了东非的这一生活方式。


Cattle herding allowed nomads to create livelihoods in an increasingly unpredictable and challenging environment, characterized by an arid climate and scarce resources.	放牧家畜让牧民得以在日益难以预测和具有挑战性的环境——气候干旱、资源匮乏——中创造生活。


Today, there are some 50 million nomadic herders in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as many as 150 million agro-pastoralists, who combine traditional nomadic animal-rearing with some form of agriculture.	如今，撒哈拉以南非洲有大约5000万游牧民，和1. 5亿农牧民，后者过着传统家畜放牧和某种形式的农业相结合的生活。


Policymakers often view nomadic pastoralism as an archaic and unproductive way of life, with little economic benefit.	决策者常常将游牧视为过时的、不利于生产的生活方式，无法产生经济效益。


But the opposite is true.	但���实正好相反。


Pastoralist systems are 20% more productive than traditional ranching methods.	游牧比传统牧场的生产率高20%。


And pastoralists are more market-savvy than many believe; the Horn of Africa’s pastoral livestock and meat trade is estimated to be worth $1 billion.	游牧民的市场精明程度也超出许多人的想象，据估计，非洲之角的活畜和肉类贸易规模可达10亿美元。


Using land that cannot support conventional agriculture, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists produce meat, milk, and livestock products that sustain millions.	游牧民和农牧民用无法支撑传统农业的土地创造了肉、奶和活畜产品，养活了数百万人。


Indeed, according to an OECD study, they are responsible for 10% of the world’s meat production; in some regions, they supply as much as 60% of the beef and 70% of the milk consumed.	事实上，根据经合组织的研究，他们产出了世界10%的肉产品； 在一些地区，他们供应了60%的牛肉和70%的牛奶。


Pastoralism is thus an essential livelihood system, with the potential to help overcome food insecurity – particularly in Somalia, where more than 50% of the population are nomadic herders.	因此，游牧是一种基本生活方式，能够有助于人们克服粮食不安全——特别是在50%以上人口是游牧民的索马里。


In order to unleash this potential, a strong support system that improves pastoralists’ access to capital and markets, while bolstering human-resource development and capacity-building, is needed.	为了释放这一潜力，我们需要改善牧民获得市场资本、同时提振人力资源开发和产能建设的支持系统。


Following the example of Mongolia, where pastoralists can purchase private insurance to protect against the loss of herds from drought, microcredit programs could be established to insure pastoralists against similar risks and thus provide funds for restocking after a disaster.	该国的游牧民可以购买私人保险保护因干旱受到的家畜损失。 类似地，可以通过建设微金融确保游牧民抵抗这类风险，从而提供资金实施灾后重建。


In order to enhance their livelihoods’ stability and profitability further, pastoralists need to be integrated into the formal economy.	为了进一步加强他们生活方式的稳定性和盈利能力，游牧民需要融入正式经济。


Effective trade networks and access to livestock markets would enable them to increase sales substantially.	有效的贸易网和进入牲畜市场将极大地提高他们的销量。


Increased access to technology is also crucial to improving nomads’ economic prospects.	更便利地获得技术也是改善牧民经济前景的关键。


In Niger, pastoralists use mobile phones to keep abreast of commodity prices in regional markets, which enables them to sell their camels where prices are highest and purchase grains where prices are lowest.	在尼日尔，游牧民使用移动电话了解地区市场的最新商品价格，这使得他们可以在价格最高的市场卖掉骆驼，然后再价格最低的市场买谷物。


In Kenya, veterinarians send text-message alerts to warn pastoralists of disease outbreaks and provide vaccination information.	在肯尼亚，兽医通过短信向游牧民发送疾病爆发预警，提供疫苗接种信息。


Providing such support systems for pastoralists could prove to be an effective strategy for advancing economic development, enhancing food security, and reducing dependence on food aid in Somalia and elsewhere.	向游牧民提供这类支持系统将是推进经济发展、增强粮食安全、减少索马里和其他地区粮食援助依赖的有效战略。


Indeed, for many countries, nomads – recast as intrepid entrepreneurs – could be the key to securing a prosperous future.	事实上，对许多国家来说，游牧民——焕然一新的无畏创业家——可以成为确保繁荣未来的关键力量。


The Conundrum of Scientific Fraud	学术欺骗之谜


Science, and the behavior of scientists, has never been perfect.	科学及科学工作者的行为从来就不是完美的。


Consider the Korean scientist Hwang Woo-suk, whose claim to have extracted stem cells from human embryos that he cloned turned out to be based on phony research.	想想韩国科学家黄禹锡吧，他声称已从他克隆的人体胚胎中提取干细胞，结果却是这项研究却根本就是欺世盗名。


Hwang has just been fired by Seoul National University, and six of his co-workers have been suspended or had their pay cut.	黄刚被汉城国立大学解雇，他的六位合作者要么被停职要么被削减工资。


Hwang and his colleagues are hardly alone.	黄及其同事绝非仅有。


In response to the recurrence of well-publicized and highly damaging scandals in recent years, many universities and some entire national research funding agencies now convene “institutional review boards” to deal with breaches of what has come to be known as “research ethics.”	近些年为了回应大肆宣扬和极尽诽谤之能事的丑闻，许多大学和一些国家级研究供资机构成立了“机构审查委员会”来处理违反所谓“研究伦理学”的行为。


But are such boards necessary?	可是，需要那些委员会吗？


If so, in what spirit should they conduct their work?	如果需要，他们应以怎样的态度开展工作？


From artists to scientists, all intellectual workers are preoccupied with the giving and taking of credit.	从艺术家到科学家，所有脑力劳动者均过分关注荣誉的取舍。


Hiring, promoting, and rewarding academic staff is increasingly based on “citation counts” – the number of times someone receives credit in peer-approved publications.	雇用、提升和奖励学术人员越来越依据“被引用的次数”—也就是在业界认可的出版物得到认可的次数。


Even if someone’s work is criticized, it must be credited properly.	即便某人的作品受到批评，也会得到适当的加分。


Credit is often given simply because someone has produced a creditable work.	只有当某人的工作值得称道时才会得到加分。


But, increasingly, the fixation on credit reflects the work’s potential monetary value.	但是，对加分的关注日益反映了这项工作的潜在经济价值。


And, however one defines the creditworthiness of intellectual work, one thing is clear: reported cases of fraud are on the rise.	并且，无论人们如何界定脑力工作的卓著荣誉，有一件事是显而易见的，即曝光的欺骗案例不断上升。


Sometimes fraud consists in plagiarism: the culprit takes credit for someone else’s work.	有时，欺骗包括剽窃：肇事者将别人的工作据为己有。


However, especially in the most competitive scientific fields, fraud often takes the form of forgery: the culprit fabricates data.	然而，特别是在最具竞争力的科学领域，欺骗往往表现为伪造：肇事者捏造数据。


Plagiarism is the sin of the classroom; forgery is the sin of the laboratory.	剽窃是讲堂之罪； 伪造是实验室之罪。


But in neither case has a standard method emerged for ensuring the integrity of research – or of the scientists who carry it out.	但两种情况下均未制定标准方法来确保科研诚信—或从事科研的科学工作者的正直。


A useful simplification in addressing the potential work of research ethics panels is to consider two models of review: “inquisitorial” and “accusatorial.”	对研究伦理小组潜在工作的处理进行有效简化需要考虑两种审查模式：“调查”模式和“问责”模式。


Whereas the inquisitorial model presumes that fraud is rampant, but often undetected, the accusatorial model adopts a less paranoid stance, presuming that researchers are innocent until proven otherwise.	调查模式假定欺骗毫无节制却往往不被人觉察，而问责模式则采用较为温和的姿态，即假定研究人员是无辜的，除非证实其确实曾有过欺骗的行为。


The natural context for an inquisitorial system is a field where scientific integrity is regularly under threat because research is entangled with political or financial interests.	调查制度不可避免的结果是科学诚信因科研与政治和经济利益纠缠在一起而经常遭到威胁。


Often, these entanglements are unavoidable, especially in the case of biomedical research.	这种纠缠往往难以避免，特别是在生物医学研究方面。


Here the inquisitors are part cost accountant, part thought police.	这样一来，调查者既是成本会计又是思想警察。


They conduct spot-checks on labs to ensure that the various constituencies for scientific research are getting their money’s worth.	他们对实验室进行抽样调查，以确保各种科研赞助者得到其应得报偿。


Inquisitors must be invested with the power to cut off funding to transgressors, perhaps even excommunicating them, by barring a scientist from practicing or publishing in the future.	必须赋予调查者权力，可以切断对违规者的供资，也许甚至将其开除，即禁止该科学工作者将来从事诸如此类的工作或发表论文。


Hwang, for example, has lost his research license and has been banned from assuming another public post for five years.	例如，黄已丧失其研究许可，并且已被勒令五年内不可担任其他任何公职。


However, the credibility of such a system relies on the inquisitors’ ability to uphold standards of science that are genuinely independent from special interests both inside and outside the research community.	然而，这种制度的可靠性取决于调查者坚持科学标准的能力，这些标准真正独立于科研界内外的特殊利益。


Otherwise, inquisitorial ethics reviews could come to be regarded as nothing more than intellectual vigilantism.	另外，调查伦理审查终于可以视为不过是学术警戒。


Consider the Danish Research Council’s ominously named “Committee on Scientific Dishonesty,” which was convened in 2002 following complaints raised against the political scientist Bjørn Lomborg, whose book The Skeptical Environmentalist purported to demonstrate that ecologists systematically biased their interpretation of data to support their political objectives.	想想丹麦研究委员会被命名为“科学不诚实委员会”就是一个不详的预兆，该委员会是在2002年针对政治科学家布若恩·隆姆博格提出指控后成立的，隆姆博格的作品《怀疑的环境主义者》意图论证，生态学者对数据的解释进行系统歪曲，以支持其政治目的。


The Committee initially found Lomborg guilty of much the same error that he had alleged of the ecologists.	委员会最初认定隆姆博格犯有同样的错误，他曾经指控生态学者犯有这样的过错。


However, the Committee refused to comment on whether his behavior was normal or deviant for the field in question.	然而，委员会拒绝对他的行为是遵循还是偏离所讨论领域发表意见。


This enabled Lomborg to appeal the verdict, successfully, claiming that the Committee had victimized him for political reasons, given his recent appointment as director of a major national institute for environmental research.	这使隆姆博格能够成功地对裁定进行申诉，声称委员会因政治原因迫害他，因为他最近被任命为一家大型国家环境研究所的所长。


In the end, the Committee on Scientific Dishonesty was itself reorganized.	最后，科学不诚实委员会本身被重组。


In retrospect, the Committee probably should have refused the case, given that Lomborg’s book was subject to intense public scrutiny, often by experts writing (favorably) in The Economist and (unfavorably) in Scientific American.	回想起来，因为隆姆博格的作品受到了集中的公开审查，往往由专家在《经济学家》和《科学美国人》分别表示支持或反对，委员会可能本应拒绝这一案例。


His was a genuine case in which intellectual work was given a fair trial in the proverbial “court of public opinion” and required no further oversight.	这起案例是智力成果在众所周知的“公众舆论法庭”得到公正审理并要求绝无疏漏的真正案例。


Indeed, Lomborg’s case would seem to support the accusatorial model of ethics review, which assumes that scientists adequately regulate their own affairs through normal peer-review procedures.	确实，隆姆博格案似乎支持了伦理审查的问责模式，该模式假定科学家通过正规的同行审查程序充分规范其自身事务。


Here, scientific integrity is understood not as a duty to stakeholders—funders, companies, or, as with Hwang, politicians concerned about national prestige—but as a collective responsibility that is upheld by identifying and correcting errors before they cause substantial harm.	这样，科学诚信不是理解为对利益相关者（供资者、公司，或在黄案中为国家的名望声威担忧的政客）的责任，而是一种集体负责制，通过识别错误和在造成重大伤害之前纠正错误来予以维持。


The accusatorial system is designed for those relatively rare cases when error slips through the peer-review net, resulting in some concrete damage to health or the environment, or causing the corruption of later research that assumes the validity of fraudulent work.	问责制度是为相对罕见的案例设置的，在这种情况下，错误不知不觉地逃过了同行审查网络，对健康或环境造成一些具体损害，或造成随后认定欺骗工作有效的科研腐败。


To lodge an accusation, the accuser must establish that some harm has been committed, which is then shown to have been the fault of the accused.	为了进行问责，问责者必须确定已造成一些损害，而且证明是由于被告人犯下过失所致。


The countervailing assumptions of the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems reflect the ambiguity of the concept of scientific fraud.	对调查和问责制度的抵消假设反映了学术欺骗概念的模糊性。


Many so-called frauds are cases in which researchers claimed credit for work they have not really carried out, but that pointed in the right direction and was eventually completed by others.	许多所谓的欺骗是研究人员利用他们并未实施的工作沽名钓誉，但这些工作方向正确并且最终由他人完成。


Strictly speaking, they are guilty more of confusing the potential and the actual than the true and the false.	严格说来，他们错在混淆了潜在和实际而不是真实与虚假。


Indeed, by today’s standards, Galileo and Mendel committed fraud, since they likely massaged their data to fit a neat mathematical formula.	确实，按今天的标准来看，伽利略和孟德尔实施了欺骗，因为他们很可能窜改数据，以满足数学公式。


However, they remain scientific visionaries because others built so effectively on their “work.”	然而，他们依然是科学幻想家，因为其他人在其“工作”的基础上进行了有效发展。


Of course, in their cases, no money changed hands and no one’s life was jeopardized.	诚然，在他们的事例中，没有金钱的交易，也没有生命受到威胁。


Perhaps, from the point of view of research ethics, that makes all the difference.	或许，从研究伦理的角度来看，这就是差异之所在。


The Cooperative Alternative	另类合作社


WASHINGTON, DC – In an era in which conventional models of finance, corporate governance, and corporate responsibility are increasingly debated, if not called into question, it may be time to revisit the alternative approach taken by economic cooperatives.	华盛顿-------如今，传统的金融模式，企业管理方式和企业责任制虽未遭到质疑，但是人们对此的探讨却越来越多。 或许是时候再看看以往经济合作社所采取的另一种运作方式。


The foundational values of cooperatives embody not only a humane vision, but also a pragmatic approach to production that has enabled the successful ones to thrive – and to spur economic growth in countries that desperately need it.	合作社最根本的价值在于，它不仅是一种人文愿景，也是一种可以使成功的合作社更加繁荣的务实的生产方式，也可以刺激极需这种务实生产方式的地方发展其经济。


Cooperative movements took shape in the Americas, Europe, Australia, and Japan in the 1800’s.	1800年，合作社运动在美洲国家，欧洲国家，澳大利亚和日本开始形成。


Many grew from the simple proposition that ordinary people could overcome adversity in the marketplace by banding together to buy and sell goods at reasonable prices, and quickly realized the added benefits of sharing knowledge among members, promoting inclusion, and building social capital.	其中很多运动都是基于这一简单的设想，即，如果普通人联合起来，以一个合理的价格买卖商品，快速实现成员间知识共享带来的附加收益，促进开放包容，建立社会资本，这样就可以应对市场中的逆境。


Today, cooperatives cover a range of activities and come in a variety of shapes and sizes, from small-scale agricultural and consumer organizations in Africa to some of the leading agricultural brands and largest financial-service providers in North America and Europe.   	如今，合作社形式多样，规模不一，涵盖许多方面，从非洲的小型农业和消费者组织到北美洲和欧洲的一些主要农业品牌和最大金融服务提供商。


According to the International Cooperative Alliance, a cooperative is a “jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.”	国际合作联盟将合作社定义为“共同经营，民主管理的企业”。


But, beneath this definition lie rich notions of voluntary association, accountability for strategic decisions, and concern for the communities that cooperatives serve.	但是，在这个定义下还隐含着这些理念，自愿联合并且承担战略决策责任，关心合作社所服务的社区。


Cooperatives have helped to bring information and services to far flung rural communities, empower workers, and expand financial services, healthcare, education, and housing.	合作社给偏远农村社区带来带信息和服务，提升工人技术水平，扩大金融，医疗保健，教育和住房服务。


In doing so, they have transformed the economic and social landscape in countless communities.	合作社已经改变了无数社区的经济社会环境。


The International Cooperative Alliance reports that more than 800 million people are members of cooperatives worldwide.	据国际合作联盟披露，全球合作社成员已超过800,000,000人。