If Franco-German rivalry shaped the era between 1870 and 1920, it was the conflict with Russia that defined the next 70 years.	如果说法德对峙决定了1870—1920年，那么与俄罗斯的冲突就决定了此后的70年。


That conflict was forgotten for two decades after the end of the Cold War, because Russia’s internal travails and Germany’s desire to demonstrate its post-unification harmlessness kept both powers from flexing their muscles.	冷战结束后，这一冲突被忘记了二十年，因为俄罗斯出现了内部问题，而德国渴望证明它重新统一后不会构成威胁，这让两大列强有所收敛。


Now that Putin has made muscle-flexing his main form of diplomacy – not merely in Ukraine and the Baltic states, but also in the Balkans and the North Sea – it has fallen to Germany to shape Europe’s response.	如今，普京把耀武扬威作为其主要外交手段——不仅是在乌克兰和波罗的海国家，也包括巴尔干和北海——德国必须站出来领导欧洲的反应。


The motive today is not to defend ethnic Germans abroad – their expulsion in the millions in the 1940s ended that particular concern – so much as the more laudable desire to preserve the values of a democratic EU against the new authoritarianism from the East.	今天的动机不是捍卫海外日耳曼人——数百万日耳曼人在20世纪40年代遭到驱逐，这一担忧如今已不复存在——而是更有理有利的目的——面对来自东方的新集权主义，捍��民主欧盟的价值。


Whether Germany can continue to perform this role, however, will depend on what kind of EU emerges over the next few years.	但是，德国是否能够继续担任这一角色将取决于未来几年欧盟会变成怎样。


In particular, if Europe is to succeed with Germany at the helm, Germans and everyone else will have to break more decisively with the past than they have managed to do so far.	特别是，如果欧洲想要实现以德国为首的成功，德国人和其他人就必须远比现在更加果断地与历史决裂。


Europe Needs a Plan B	欧洲需要B计划


NEW YORK – The European Union was brought into existence by what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering.	纽约——欧盟是在卡尔·波普尔所谓的“零碎社会工程”（piecemeal social engineering）的思想下产生的。


A group of farsighted statesmen, inspired by the vision of a United States of Europe, recognized that this ideal could be approached only gradually, by setting limited objectives, mobilizing the political will needed to achieve them, and concluding treaties that required states to surrender only as much sovereignty as they could bear politically.	一群具有远见卓识的政治家在“欧洲合众国”思想的启发下认定，通过设定有限目标、动员达到这些目标所需的政治意愿并最终缔结要求各国牺牲在政治上能够容忍的最大限度的主权的条约，这一目的可以逐步达到。


That is how the post-war Coal and Steel Community was transformed into the EU – one step at a time, understanding that each step was incomplete and would require further steps in due course.	战后的煤钢共同体就是这样最终转型为欧盟的——每次都踏进一步，并且知道每一步都是不完善的、需要在适当的时候再向前迈进下一步。


The EU’s architects generated the necessary political will by drawing on the memory of World War II, the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the economic benefits of greater integration.	二战殷鉴、苏联的威胁、以及深度一体化的经济利益给了欧盟缔造者必须的政治意愿。


The process fed on its own success, and, as the Soviet Union crumbled, it received a powerful boost from the prospect of German reunification.	这一过程为其自身的成功奠定了基础，而苏联的解体和德国的重新统一让这一过程看上去有了非常美好的前景。


Germany recognized that it could be reunified only in the context of greater European unification, and it was willing to pay the price.	德国人认为，更加深入的欧洲一体化是德国重新统一的必要条件，德国愿意为此付出代价。


With the Germans helping to reconcile conflicting national interests by putting a little extra on the table, the process of European integration reached its apogee with the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro.	德国人通过把蛋糕做大来调解国家间利益冲突，在德国的帮助下，欧洲一体化在马斯特里赫特条约的签署和欧元的诞生中达到了高峰。


But the euro was an incomplete currency: it had a central bank but no central treasury.	但欧元是一种不完全货币：只有中央银行，没有中央财政。


Its architects were fully aware of this deficiency, but believed that when the need arose, the political will could be summoned to take the next step forward.	欧元缔造者对这一缺陷心知肚明，但他们认为，随着需求的出现，更进一步所需要的政治意愿自然而然就会产生。


That is not what happened, because the euro had other deficiencies of which its architects were unaware.	但事实并非如此，因为欧元还具有其缔造者所未察觉的缺陷。


They labored under the misconception that financial markets can correct their own excesses, so the rules were designed to rein in only public-sector excesses.	他们是在一个错误的观念下徒劳地工作着——金融市场能够纠正其自身的过剩，因此只需设计解决公共部门过剩问题的规则就行了。


And, even there, they relied too heavily on self-policing by sovereign states.	而即使在公共部门问题上，他们也过度地依赖于主权国家的自主决策。


But the excesses were mainly in the private sector, as interest-rate convergence generated economic divergence: lower interest rates in the weaker countries fueled housing bubbles, while the strongest country, Germany, had to tighten its belt in order to cope with the burden of reunification.	但过剩主要出现在私人部门，因为利率趋同造成了经济趋异：低利率在疲软国家吹起了房地产泡沫，而最强劲的国家德国却不得不勒紧裤腰带，以应对重新统一带来的负担。


Meanwhile, the financial sector was thoroughly compromised by the spread of unsound financial instruments and poor lending practices.	与此同时，普遍使用的不健全金融工具和欠审慎的贷款行为严重拖累了金融部门。


With Germany’s reunification, the main impetus behind the integration process was removed, the financial crisis unleashed a process of disintegration.	随着德国的重新统一，欧洲一体化进程的主要推动力已经不复存在，金融危机则拉开了欧洲分裂的序幕。


The decisive moment came after Lehman Brothers collapsed, and authorities had to guarantee that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail.	决定性的时刻发生在雷曼兄弟公司倒闭后，各国必须保证不会再有具系统重要性的金融机构破产。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that there should be no joint EU guarantee; each country would have to take care of its own institutions.	德国总理默克尔坚持认为不应该实行欧盟联合担保，各国必须自己打扫自己的后院。


That was the root cause of today’s euro crisis.	这就是今日欧元危机的根源。


The financial crisis forced sovereign states to substitute their own credit for the credit that had collapsed, and in Europe each state had to do so on its own, calling into question the creditworthiness of European government bonds.	金融危机迫使主权国家用其自身信用来取代破产信用，欧洲也不例外，每个国家必须各扫门前雪，这就使人们对欧洲政府债券的可信度产生了怀疑。


Risk premiums widened, and the eurozone was divided into creditor and debtor countries.	风险溢价扩大了，欧元区被分解为债权国和债务国。


Germany had changed course 180 degrees from the main driver of integration was to the main opponent of a “transfer union.”	德国的角色出现了180度大转弯：从欧洲一体化的主要推动者变成了“转移联盟”的主要反对者。


This created a two-speed Europe, with debtor countries sinking under the weight of their liabilities, and surplus countries forging ahead.	这就造成了速度不一的两个欧洲，债务国在债务重压逐渐沉没，而盈余国则在大步向前。


As the largest creditor, Germany could dictate the terms of assistance, which were punitive and pushed debtor countries towards insolvency.	最大债权国德国可以对援助计划指手画脚——这一计划带有惩罚性质，可能使债务国走向破产。


Meanwhile, Germany benefited from the euro crisis, which depressed the exchange rate and boosted its competitiveness further.	与此同时，德国是欧元危机的受益者，因为这压低了汇率，进一步提振了德国的竞争力。


As integration has turned into disintegration, the role of the European political establishment has also reversed, from spearheading further unification to defending the status quo.	随着一体化转变为分裂，欧盟上层建筑的作用也发生了逆转，从走向统一的先锋队变为了捍卫现状的保守派。


As a result, anyone who considers the status quo undesirable, unacceptable, or unsustainable has had to take an anti-European stance.	结果，任何人只要认为现状不合意、不可接受、不可持续，他就必须加入反欧洲立场联盟。


And, as heavily indebted countries are pushed towards insolvency, nationalist political parties – for example, Finland’s True Finns – have grown stronger, alongside more established counterparts elsewhere in Europe.	而随着债务国逐渐走向破产，民族主义政党（比如芬兰的真正芬兰人党及其他同类欧洲政党）开始逐渐强势。


Yet Europe’s political establishment continues to argue that there is no alternative to the status quo.	但欧洲上层建筑仍在辩解称，现状不可替代。


Financial authorities resort to increasingly desperate measures in order to buy time.	金融当局为了赢得时间不惜饮鸩止渴。


But time is working against them: two-speed Europe is driving member countries further apart.	但时间并不与他们站在同一条战壕里：两种速度的欧洲正在使成员之间的距离国越拉越大。


Greece is heading towards disorderly default and/or devaluation with incalculable consequences.	希腊正在迈向无序违约和/或货币贬值，其后果难以预料。


If this seemingly inexorable process is to be arrested and reversed, both Greece and the eurozone must urgently adopt a Plan B. A Greek default may be inevitable, but it need not be disorderly.	要遏制甚至逆转这一不可避免的进程，希腊和欧元区均必须采取B计划。 希腊违约已成无可不免之势，但可以以有序的方式发生。


And, while some contagion will be unavoidable – whatever happens to Greece is likely to spread to Portugal, and Ireland’s financial position, too, could become unsustainable – the rest of the eurozone needs to be ring-fenced.	希腊违约必然会造成某种程度的传染——希腊发生的一切都可能在葡萄牙再度出现，和爱尔兰的财政状况也可能变得不可持续——因此其他欧元区国家必须筑起高墙。


That means strengthening the eurozone, which would probably require wider use of Eurobonds and a eurozone-wide deposit-insurance scheme of some kind.	这意味着欧元走强，而后者又可能要求欧元债券的更广泛的使用以及某种意义上的泛欧元区存款保险机制。


Generating the political will would require a Plan B for the EU itself.	要产生政治意愿要求欧盟本身也采取B计划。


The European elite needs to revert to the principles that guided the Union’s creation, recognizing that our understanding of reality is inherently imperfect, and that perceptions are bound to be biased and institutions flawed.	欧洲精英必须还原欧盟创立的指导原则，认识到我们对现实的理解具有先天性的不完美，而观念注定是有偏颇的，机构注定是有缺陷的。


An open society does not treat prevailing arrangements as sacrosanct; it allows for alternatives when those arrangements fail.	开放社会从不将现行安排视为神圣不可侵犯，当先行安排失灵的时候，开放社会并不排斥替代方案。


It should be possible to mobilize a pro-European silent majority behind the idea that when the status quo becomes untenable, we should look for a European solution rather than national ones.	用“当现状已不再能够持续时，我们应该寻求欧洲解决方案，而不是各国各自为政”这一思想将亲欧洲的沉默的大多数动员起来并非不可能。


“True Europeans” ought to outnumber true Finns and other anti-Europeans in Germany and elsewhere.	“欧洲人”的数量肯定要多于真正的芬兰人和德国和其他地方的反欧人士。


Necessary Migrants	必要的移民


BERLIN – How heartwarming it is to land in Germany, where football fans hold up banners welcoming refugees from the war-ravaged Middle East.	柏林——球迷高举横幅欢迎饱受战争蹂躏的中东难民，踏上德国的土地是如此感人至深。


Germany is the new Promised Land for the desperate and downtrodden, the survivors of war and pillage.	德国是绝望及受压迫者、战争和掠夺幸存者崭新的乐土。


Even the popular German tabloids, not normally of a do-gooding disposition, are promoting a willingness to help.	就连德国不常做好事的流行小报都表示愿意帮助难民。


While politicians in the United Kingdom and other countries wring their hands and explain why even a relatively minor influx of Syrians, Libyans, Iraqis, or Eritreans constitutes a lethal danger to the social fabric of their societies, “Mama Merkel” promised that Germany would not reject any genuine refugee.	当英国和其他国家的政客撮着手解释为什么就连数量相对较少的叙利亚、利比亚和伊拉克或厄立特里亚难民都对其社会结构构成致命威胁的时候，“默克尔妈妈”却承诺德国不会拒绝任何真正的难民。


Some 800,000 refugees are expected to enter Germany this year, whereas British Prime Minister David Cameron is making a fuss about fewer than 30,000 asylum applications and warning darkly about “swarms of people” crossing the North Sea.	预计今年将有约800,000名难民进入到德国境内，而英国首相戴维·卡梅伦却为不到 30,000份庇护申请大惊小怪，不怀好意地警告穿越北海的“大批人群”。


And, unlike Merkel, Cameron was partly responsible for stoking one of the wars (Libya) that made life intolerable for millions.	而且和默克尔不同的是，卡梅伦要为煽动利比亚战争，导致数百人民众生活无法忍受承担一定的责任。


No wonder Merkel wants other European countries to take in more refugees under a mandatory quota system.	难怪默克尔希望其他欧洲国家在强制配额制度下接收更多的难民。


In fact, despite its politicians’ anxious rhetoric, the United Kingdom is a more ethnically mixed, and in some ways more open, society than Germany.	事实上，尽管政客们说得吓人，但与德国相比英国多民族杂居度更高，某些方面开放度也更大。


London is incomparably more cosmopolitan than Berlin or Frankfurt.	伦敦的国际化程度远超柏林或法兰克福。


And, on the whole, Britain has greatly benefited from immigration.	而且从总体上看，英国已大大受益于移民潮。


Indeed, the National Health Service has warned that accepting fewer immigrants would be catastrophic, leaving British hospitals seriously understaffed.	事实上，国家卫生局已经警告减少移民接收人数将导致英国医院严重人手不足，并将带来灾难性的后果。


The mood in contemporary Germany may be exceptional.	当今德国的心态可能绝无仅有。


Taking in refugees, or any immigrants, has never been an easy political sell.	接收难民或任何移民从来就不是轻而易举的政治推销。


In the late 1930s, when Jews in Germany and Austria were in mortal danger, few countries, including the wealthy United States, were prepared to take in more than a handful of refugees.	20世纪30年代末，当德国和奥地利犹太人遭受致命威胁时，没有几个国家（包括富裕的美国在内）愿意接收超过少量的难民。


Britain allowed about 10,000 Jewish children to come in 1939, at the very last minute, but only if they had local sponsors and left their parents behind.	1939年最后时刻英国允许约10，000名犹太儿童前来英国，但前提是他们在当地要有人抚养，并且离开自己的父母。


To say that the generous mood in Germany today has much to do with the murderous behavior of Germans in the past is not to make light of it.	将德国今天的慷慨姿态与过去的残暴行为相联系无助于理解这一问题。


The Japanese, too, carry a burden of historical crimes, but their attitude to foreigners in distress is far less welcoming.	日本人也背负着历史罪行，但他们对外国人的态度却远没有那么友好。


Even though few Germans have any personal memories of the Third Reich, many still feel the need to prove that they have learned from their country’s history.	尽管鲜有德国人留有对第三帝国的亲身记忆，但很多人仍然感到有必要证明他们已经从国家历史中吸取了教训。


But the almost exclusive focus by politicians and the media on the current refugee crisis conceals wider immigration issues.	但政治家和媒体对当前难民危机全心全意的关注掩盖了更广泛的移民问题。


Images of miserable refugee families drifting in the sea, at the mercy of rapacious smugglers and gangsters, can easily inspire feelings of pity and compassion (and not just in Germany).	可怜的难民家庭在贪婪的走私者和歹徒支配下在海上漂流的图片很容易激发怜悯和同情（而且不只是在德国）。


Even Cameron has had to soften his tone, promising to accept a few thousand refugees, because he was moved “as a father” by the picture of a drowned Syrian boy.	但跨越欧洲边境找工作和建立新生活的多数都不是难民。


But most people crossing European borders to find work and build new lives are not refugees. When British officials said that it was “clearly disappointing” that about 300,000 more people came to Britain than left in 2014, they were not mainly talking about asylum-seekers.	当英国官员说2014年抵达和离开英国者相差300，000人“显然令人失望”，他们所指的主要不是寻求庇护的难民。


The majority of these newcomers are from other European Union countries, such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.	新入境者大多来自波兰、罗马尼亚和保加利亚等其他欧盟成员国。


Some enter as students, and some come to find jobs.	有人前来求学，也有人来找工作。


They do not come to save their lives, but to improve them.	他们来不是为了活命，而是为了改善生活。


By lumping asylum-seekers together with economic migrants, the latter are discredited, as though they were trying to squeeze in under false pretenses.	将庇护寻求者和经济移民混为一谈损害了难民的信誉，仿佛他们为了挤进边界而蒙混过关。


It is widely assumed that economic migrants, from inside or outside the EU, are mainly poor people out to live off the tax money of the relatively rich.	人们普遍认为来自欧盟内外的经济移民主要靠相对富裕阶层的税收生活。


In fact, most of them are not spongers.	其实他们多数人不是寄生虫。


They want to work.	他们想要工作。


The benefits to the host countries are easy to see: Economic migrants often work harder for less money than locals.	对宗主国的好处很容易看得到：经济移民往往工作更卖力，挣的钱还更少。


This is not in everyone’s interest, to be sure: Pointing out the benefits of cheap labor will not persuade people whose wages might be undercut.	这肯定不符合所有人的利益：指出廉价劳动力的好处不会说服那些工资受影响者。


It is, in any case, easier to appeal to compassion for refugees than to the acceptance of economic migrants. Even in Germany.	无论如何，即使在德国，接受经济移民总比争取对难民的同情难度要大。


In 2000, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder wanted to issue work visas to about 20,000 foreign high-tech experts, many of them from India.	2000年，德国总理施罗德想为约2，000名外国高科技专家颁发工作签证，其中有不少人来自印度。


Germany needed them badly, but Schröder met swift opposition.	德国非常需要他们，但施罗德迅速激起了抵制力量。


One politician coined the slogan “Kinder statt Inder” (children instead of Indians).	一位政客专门发明了标语 “Kinder statt Inder” （要孩子不要印度佬）。


But Germans, like many other rich countries’ citizens, are not producing enough children.	但德国人像其他富国民众一样，并未生育足够的儿童。


These countries need immigrants with youthful energy and skills to fill jobs that locals, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to take.	上述国家需要有活力有技能的年轻移民，填补当地人无论出于何种原因不能或不愿接受的工作。


This does not mean that all borders must be opened to everyone.	这并不意味着必须向所有人开放边界。


Merkel’s idea of quotas on refugees should be applied to economic migrants, too.	默克尔的难民配额理念对经济移民也应该适用。


So far, however, the EU has not come up with a coherent policy on migration.	但迄今为止，欧盟还没有制定出统一的移民政策。


Citizens of the EU can move freely within the Union (Britain wants to stop this, too, though it is unlikely to succeed).	欧盟民众在欧盟内部可以自由迁徙（英国也想阻止这一点，但却不太可能成功）。


But economic migration from non-EU countries, under carefully managed conditions, is both legitimate and imperative.	但在审慎监管下从非欧盟国家引进经济移民既合理合法也十分必要。


This is not because the migrants deserve Europeans’ sympathy, but because Europe needs them.	这绝非因为移民应该得到欧洲人的同情，而是因为欧洲自身的需要。


It will not be easy.	这绝非轻而易举的过程。


Most people appear to be more easily swayed by emotions – which can lead them to mass murder or warm compassion, depending on the circumstances – than by the cool calculus of rational self-interest.	多数民众较之冷静的利益考量似乎更容易受情绪支配——这在特定条件下会导致大规模屠杀或温暖的同情。


Europe needs to make up its mind	欧洲的愿景赤字


The celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome this month come at an opportune moment.	本月罗马条约50周年的庆祝来得正是时候。


For now is the time for the European Union to call an end to its self-imposed “reflection period” following the rejection of the European Constitution by the French and the Dutch, and make up its mind about the future.	因为，现在是欧盟结束其在法国和荷兰拒绝欧盟宪法后自我实行的“反思阶段”，并且重新开始50年前在罗马开始的联合进程的时候了。


The reflection period has been mostly devoid of actual reflection, and Europe’s leaders have failed to offer Europe’s citizens any new, fundamental vision.	这一反思阶段毫无实际反思，而欧洲领导人并未向欧洲公民提出任何新的根本性愿景。


So how should a “refounding” (Neubegründung) of Europe – as called for by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her first parliamentary statement on European policy – be accomplished?	那么，德国总理默克尔在其有关欧洲政策的首次议会声明中所称的欧洲“重建”又如何实现呢？


In theory, there are three competing, fundamentally different visions of the EU’s future.	在理论上，在欧盟的未来上存在三种相互竞争、根本不同的愿景。


Some still take the form of a “state of nation states.”	有些依旧采取“民族国家的国家”形式。


These thinkers – often imprecisely called “Federalists” – refer to the Constitution as a necessary step towards a European federation.	这些思想家经常被错误地称为“联邦主义者”。 他们把欧盟宪法称为朝向欧洲联邦的必要一步。


Such a federal state can be justified by claiming that the moral substance of traditional nation states has been deeply compromised by past belligerence, or as a practical preventive measure to keep the potential of new nationalist passions in check.	人们宣称民族国家的道义实质被过往的敌对所大幅削弱而给这样一种联邦提供理由，或者联邦可以作为限制潜在的新冲突的切实的预防性措施。


Moreover, the British political scientist Glyn Morgan has argued that a robust concept of pan-European security also requires a pan-European state, and that it is irresponsible on the part of Europe’s elites to maintain a permanent position of strategic dependency on the United States.	而且，英国政治学家摩根曾经说，一个强有力的泛欧身份认同概念同样要求泛欧国家，欧洲的精英们如果维持对美国的永久性战略依赖立场是不负责任的。


Related to this is the idea that only a strong EU can save the “European social model.”	与这一观念有关的是，只有一个强大的欧洲才能够挽救“欧洲社会模式”。


But the last few years have made clear the absence of majority support for a European federation by the states that make up Europe, a point underscored by the debate surrounding the failed Constitutional Treaty.	但是，过去几年已经表明，组成欧洲的国家大多数并不支持联邦，有关被否决的欧盟宪法的辩论强调了这一点。


In fact, many of the “federalist” arguments look dubious: in particular, there is no single European social model.	实际上，许多“联邦主义者”的论点看起来是可疑的。 特别是，不存在单一的欧洲社会模式。


The differences for instance between the Scandinavian countries, the Mediterranean countries, and the “liberal Atlantic countries” like Ireland and the UK are sometimes more pronounced than those between Europe as a whole and the US.	举例来说，斯堪的那维亚国家、地中海国家以及像爱尔兰和英国那样的“自由的大西洋国家”之间的差别在某些时候要比欧洲整体和美国之间的差别还要大。


In recent years, an alternative view of the EU that can be described as “supra-national multiculturalism” has taken root.	近年来，有关欧盟的另一个观点已经植根，那就是所谓的“超国家多元文化主义”。


This view entails a Union whose main function is to allow – and to maintain – diversity and difference.	这一观点要求欧盟的主要功用是允许并维护多样性和差别。


Instead of traditional homogeneous states, this Europe seeks to be a “Community of Difference,” a kind of “People of Others,” to borrow a phrase from the jurist Joseph Weiler.	这一欧洲并不是寻求成为传统单一同质国家，而是“多元化的社区”。 借用法学家维勒的词语来说就是一种“你中有我，我中有你”。


Tolerance becomes the cardinal European virtue in this vision, and the EU’s character as an entity with federal law but without federal statehood is viewed as a strength, not a weakness.	在这一愿景中，宽容成为基本的欧洲美德，而欧盟的特性作为具有联邦法律而无联邦国体的实体被认为是一种优势，而非弱点。


The prophets of supra-national multiculturalism thus reject a federal democracy.	因此，超国家多元文化主义也就拒绝联邦民主。


What is feasible is, they believe, at best a so-called “demoi-cracy” -- that is, the rule not of one people or “demos,” but of many peoples or “demoi” who deliberately assure and seek to maintain their diversity.	他们相信，可行的情况最多是所谓的“多民民主”，也就是，不是单个民族的统治，而是多个民族的统治。 这些多个民族有意确保并寻求维持他们的多样性。


Elements of this vision sound attractive.	这一愿景的要素看似引人入胜。


It is questionable, though, how credible European heads of government are who promote such pan-European multiculturalism and at the same time emphatically denounce alleged “multiculturalist” illusions at home – as has by now become standard political rhetoric in almost all countries.	但是，欧洲各国领导人促进这种泛欧多元文化主义，同时又极力谴责国内被指称的“多元文化主义者”幻觉。 这已经在几乎所有国家成为标准的政治说教。


The third vision is essentially no vision at all, but a justification of the Brussels bureaucracy as it currently exists.	第三个愿景基本上是根本没有愿景，而是为如今存在的欧盟官僚体制辩解。


From this technocratic perspective, Brussels today maintains functions that even within nation states are often delegated to institutions that are not democratically elected.	从这一技术官僚观点来看，今天的布鲁塞尔维持了某些功能，而即使在某些民族国家内部，这些功能都经常被分派到不是民主选举产生的机构中。


Central banks are the classic example.	中央银行是一个经典的例子。


Those policy areas that citizens consider the most significant – in particular welfare and education – remain under the direction of member states.	公民们认为最为重要的政策领域，特别是社会政策和教育，依旧在欧盟成员国的指导之下。


Consequently Brussels is no government to be, but a regulatory authority – and this often to the benefit of European consumers.	结果，布鲁塞尔不再是一个政府，而是一个管理当局，而这经常对欧洲消费者有利。


This authority, the technocrats claim, in turn is part of a system of national and supra-national checks and balances which, while not resembling a national democracy, would reliably prevent despotism from taking root in Brussels.	技术官僚们宣称，这一当局反过来是国家内部和超国家制衡制度的一部分。 这一制度尽管并不像国内民主，但可以可靠地防止专制主义在布鲁塞尔生根。


None of these three visions entirely misses the EU’s current reality or its future possibilities.	这三个愿景并不完全偏离欧盟的现实或者其未来可能。


The federation has become a distant prospect, but still receives homage in politicians’ speeches, as if a different end result was inconceivable.	联邦已经遥不可及，但依旧在政客们的讲话中获得敬意，好像不同的结局是不可思议的那样。


The demoi-crats win support because their vision tends to reinforce the status quo and leaves nearly all options open.	多民民主派赢得支持，是因为他们的愿景趋向于强化现实状况并且让几乎所有的选择都有可能。


The technocrats in turn see their position confirmed with every passing day that the alleged crisis of legitimacy fails to appear.	技术官僚们反过来认为他们的立场随着时间的推移得到确定，以至于被指称的合法性危机没有显现。


But is there any kind of pan-European consensus on where Europe should go next, whether federal state, demoi-cracy or status quo?	但是是否存在一个泛欧洲的政治理解，可以就此达成共识，或者实现多数呢？


If the answer is no, adhering to a pragmatic approach to the Union as a kind of continuously expanding “Commonwealth” is the most honest alternative to any high-minded visions.	如果答案是否定的话，那么，坚持以现实主义的做法处理欧盟，将其作为“联邦体”则可以替代高瞻远瞩的愿景。 经典的论点是，欧盟就像是一辆自行车，必须总是向前以避免倒下。


The classic argument that the EU, like a bicycle, must always keep moving forward to avoid falling over, is simply not true: the reflection period may be frustrating for federalists, but it also proves that, even at a standstill, the EU continues.	这一论点根本是不正确的。 反思阶段对于联邦主义者而言可能是沮丧的，但是它同时也证明，欧盟即使在停滞阶段依旧继续。


The Brussels elites are not likely to admit this fact without further ado: their rhetoric still oscillates between doom-and-gloom pessimism and a kind of pro-European PR that is concerned only with how best to “sell” the Union to Europe’s citizens.	布鲁塞尔的精英们不大可能不再骚扰就承认这一事实。 他们的高谈阔论依旧在极度悲观主义和某种亲欧洲的公共关系之间摇摆不定。


But PR won’t work unless there is a vision that ultimately sells itself.	这一亲欧洲的公关只是关心如何最好地向欧洲公民“兜售”欧盟。 但是，如果没有能够兜售自己的愿景，那时不可能的。


Europe’s Refugee Amnesia	欧洲的难民健忘症


BARCELONA – After World War I, when millions of European civilians were made refugees, forced out of their homelands by enemy occupation or deportation, an international regime was developed to coordinate effective responses and ease the suffering of those who had been uprooted.	巴塞罗那—第一次世界大战后，数百万欧洲公民沦为难民，因为敌军的占领或驱逐而流离失所，为此，一套国际机制发展起来以协调有效应对和改善流离失所者的境况。


A century later, another refugee crisis is underway, and this time, it is Europe that has the power to provide safe haven to desperate people.	一个世纪后，另一场移民危机正在上演，而这一回，欧洲有能力为绝望的人们提供安全港。


Yet it has not risen to the occasion, with many of its responses failing to match the urgency of the situation.	但它没有响应起来，它的许多应对措施与情况的紧迫性不匹配。


In just the first few months of 2015, more than 38,000 people have attempted to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean from North Africa.	2015年才过去几个月，但已有38,000多人试图供北非渡过地中海来到欧洲。


Some 1,800 people have died as a result – more than twice the number of such deaths in all of 2013.	大约1,800人在途中丧生——是2013年全年因此死亡的人数的两倍多。


Disappointingly, many Europeans have responded to this humanitarian crisis, which closely resembles the one that Europe endured a century ago, by opposing their countries’ acceptance of any more refugees.	令人失望的是，许多欧洲人对于这场与一个世纪前欧洲所遭遇的情况十分相似的人道危机的反应是反对国家接受更多难民。


How quickly we forget our past.	他们忘记过去的速度真是迅速。


Worse, some Europeans want us to forget.	更糟糕的是，一些欧洲人希望我们忘记。


Today’s sentiment has been fueled by populist parties positioning themselves as guardians of national identity.	今天的情绪受自我定位为民族身份捍卫者的民粹主义政党的煽动。


Europe, they argue, faces a mass influx that threatens to place even greater strain on its economies, labor markets, and cultures.	他们认为，欧洲面临巨大的人口流入，这会给其经济、劳动力市场和文化带来更大的制约。


One does not have to look back a century to see how dangerous the consequences of such rhetoric can be.	只要稍稍回顾一个世纪前的情况，你就能发现这一论调的后果有多严重。


But the populists’ narrative is not just inflammatory; it is false.	但民粹主义论调不但具有煽动性； 它根本是无中生有。


Although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the drivers of displacement, data from the United Nations refugee agency show that at least half of those trying to reach Europe from North Africa are fleeing from war and persecution.	尽管有时难以区分流离失所的原因，但联合国难民署的数据的数据表明，至少一半试图从北非来到欧洲的人是为了逃避战火和迫害。


The International Organization for Migration, together with Italy’s navy, has determined that this year’s migrants hail mainly from Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria ‒ countries where conditions entitle their citizens to request asylum.	国际移民组织（International Organization for Migration）与意大利海军的合作研究表明，今年的移民主要来自厄立特里亚、冈比亚、尼日利亚、索马里和叙利亚——这些国家的状况足以让其公民获得庇护身份。


In short, this is a crisis not of immigrants, but of refugees – and it is showing no sign of slowing.	简言之，这不是一场移民危机，而是一场难民危机——并且尚未表现出缓解的迹象。


Indeed, with instability and violence plaguing much of North Africa and the Middle East, the decline in armed conflict since World War II seems to have slowed – and could even reverse.	事实上，北非和中东大部饱受动荡和暴力困扰，这或许意味着二战以来武装冲突趋缓之势已经开始式微——甚至开始反转。


The international community is legally bound to protect those who are being forced to flee their homes by conflict and persecution.	国际社会有法律义务保护因为冲突和迫害而被迫离开家园的人。


Given Europe’s history and values – not to mention its proximity to some of the beleaguered populations – it has a special obligation to contribute to this effort.	从欧洲的历史和价值观看——更不用说其毗邻受困人口的地理位置了——它有着为此做出贡献的特殊责任。


But Europe is not the only region that has been burdened by today’s migration flows – or even the most affected.	但欧洲并非唯一一个需要承担当今移民流的地区——甚至不是受影响最大的地区。


Nine out of ten refugees do not leave their region, fleeing to countries very close to or bordering their own.	十分之九的难民没有离开地区，只是从本国逃往紧邻或接壤的国家。


The Jordanian refugee camp Zaatari alone shelters more than 82,000 people; if it were an official city, it would be among the country’s most populous.	约旦难民营Zaatari一处就收容了82,000多人； 如果这是一个正式城市，则可以位列约旦人口最多的城市之一。


Lebanon, a country of just 4.5 million people, has taken in an estimated 1,116,000 refugees – roughly equivalent to the population of Brussels.	黎巴嫩全国人口只有450万，却收容了大约1,116,000名难民——与布鲁塞尔人口相当。


Given this, it is difficult to justify Europe’s failure to agree on a system of relocation and resettlement for a total of, say, 20,000 refugees this year, distributed among 28 countries according to individual quotas.	考虑到这一点，很难为欧洲辩护——欧洲拒绝在今年为总共（比如）20,000难民提供安置和收容，根据28个国家的配额进行分配。


Indeed, many European countries have accepted very few refugees so far, making their inaction even more difficult to comprehend.	事实上，到目前为止许多欧洲国家接受的难民数量极少，这让人们更加难以理解它们为何不作为。


Spain and Greece, for example, have each accepted only about 4,000 – a meager amount, when compared to Jordan or Lebanon.	比如，西班牙和希腊各自只接受了4,000人左右）——和约旦和黎巴嫩相比实在不值一提。


A quota-based agreement could help to disperse the burden across European countries.	基于配额的协议也有助于在欧洲国家间分散负担。


As it stands, major differences among countries’ asylum policies have meant major disparities in refugee numbers.	目前，各国庇护政策的巨大不同意味着在难民数量上的巨大分歧。


Indeed, just four countries – France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden – accounted for two-thirds of all refugees accepted in Europe last year.	事实上，四个国家——法国、德国、意大利和瑞典——占了欧洲去年接受难民总数的三分之二。


When a network of human traffickers turns the Mediterranean into a mass grave, Europe cannot simply turn away.	当蛇头网络让地中海沦为坟场时，欧洲决不能束手旁观。


Instead of succumbing to destructive populism and dishonorable isolationism, Europe’s leaders must commit to fulfilling their legal and moral responsibility to help the refugees – and, of course, to explain to their citizens why this is so important.	欧洲领导人不应该受制于破坏性民粹主义和无耻的孤立主义，而必须致力于兑现他们帮助难民的法律和道德义务——当然，也必须向公民解释这样做的重要性。


Such an effort would require every European country – not just those situated on the Mediterranean – to contribute resources to support large-scale search-and-rescue operations.	这一努力要求所有欧洲国家——而不仅是地中海沿岸国家——提供资源支持大规模搜救行动。


Border control cannot be the only – or even the primary – objective.	边境控制不可作为唯一目标——甚至不可作为主要目标。


Beyond helping to manage the crisis today, Europe must commit to helping fragile and conflict-affected countries overcome the challenges they face, improve their citizens’ wellbeing, and build thriving economies.	除了帮助遏制当前危机，欧洲还必须致力于帮助脆弱的冲突影响国克服它们所面临的挑战，改善公民福祉，建设繁荣经济。


To retain its moral and political authority, the European Union – perhaps the most compelling example of how cooperation can support peace and prosperity – must implicate itself beyond its frontiers in a sincere and determined way, reaching mutually beneficial agreements with its southern neighbors.	要维持其道德和政治权威，欧盟——其本身也许正是合作如何支持和平与繁荣的最佳案例——必须带着诚意和决心超越边界，与其南部邻邦达成共同受益的协议。


Behind almost every request for asylum that an EU country receives is a human tragedy – a micro-history of violence, fear, and loss.	在欧盟国家收到的每一分庇护申请背后都有一出人间悲剧——一出暴力、恐惧和损失的微历史。


The goal of the asylum-seekers is not to reach Europe; it is simply to escape conflict and persecution.	寻求庇护者的目标不是到达欧洲； 而只是逃脱冲突和迫害。


And they should be able to.	他们应该获得这一权利。


Last century – in both world wars – Europeans were the ones fleeing from persecution.	上个世纪——在两次世界大战中——欧洲人都曾逃离迫害。


With the number of displaced people now at levels unseen since World War II, Europe has a responsibility to recall its history.	如今，流离失所的人数之众为二战以来所未见，欧洲有责任回忆自己的历史。


And it should take the opportunity to respond to today’s refugee crisis as it would have liked the world to respond to its suffering – and to prove that the EU’s value extends far beyond its borders.	它应该承担责任，像希望世界如何应对它的苦难那样应对今天的难民危机——并证明欧盟价值观远远不局限于它的边界之内。


Why Europe Backs Obama on Iran	为何欧洲在伊朗问题上支持奥巴马


PARMA – Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seems close to ordering a general mobilization of his country’s military, and Republicans in the United States are preparing for a ferocious battle with President Barack Obama’s administration, in the wake of the framework nuclear agreement with Iran.	帕尔马—以色列总理内塔尼亚胡眼看着快要下令以军总动员了，而美国的共和党也在准备与总统奥巴马的政府决一死战，只待与伊朗达成架性核协议。


And yet the framework deal has been almost universally welcomed in Europe.	然而这一框架性协议在欧洲受到了几乎一致的欢迎。


What accounts for this disconnect within the West over a key regional and global threat?	是什么导致了西方内部对一个至关重要的地区和全球威胁态度如此不同？


Several factors are at work.	许多因素都在起作用。


One, certainly, is that Europe – or, more precisely, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – has been engaged in the talks with Iran for more than a decade.	当然，其中之一是欧洲——或者准确地说是英国、德国和法国——与伊朗谈判已逾十年。


Even as former President George W. Bush branded Iran a part of an “axis of evil,” the key European Union members insisted that diplomacy was better than war.	在小布什总统将伊朗列为“邪恶轴心”之前，欧洲关键成员国便已认定外交是比战争更好的办法。


And, step by step, the European approach has been vindicated.	欧洲的方针一步一步地得到了证实。


Critical to that outcome, of course, was the US intelligence community’s reports that all the evidence pointed to Iran having long ago – in 2003 – abandoned concrete plans to develop a nuclear weapon.	当然，形成如此结果的关键是美国情报部门报告说所有证据表明伊朗很久以前——2003年——就放弃了发展核武器的实质计划。


It is easy to see why the Iranians would have done so.	伊朗这样做不难理解。


So long as Saddam Hussein, who had launched a brutal eight-year war against Iran in the 1980s, and whom influential Westerners openly accused of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, remained in power, the Iranian government’s plan to develop nuclear weapons followed a certain realist logic.	只要在20世纪80年代悍然发动持续了八年的对伊朗战争、西方影响力人士公开指责寻求拥有核武器的萨达姆仍在掌权，伊朗政府发展核武器的计划就有一定的现实逻辑。


Once the US military ousted Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iran’s most acute security threat vanished.	而在2003年美军推翻萨达姆政权后，伊朗最紧迫的安全威胁已经解除。


Moreover, there has long been a tactical difference between US and European policies toward Iran’s nuclear program.	此外，美国和欧洲的对伊朗核计划政策一直有一个战术性区别。


At times, the US seemingly sought to eradicate any knowledge of nuclear technology from a country of which it is deeply suspicious, whereas the European approach was to seek reliable assurances that Iran would never develop a nuclear weapon.	美国多次想要根除它深度怀疑的国家的一切核技术知识，而欧洲的方针是寻求伊朗不会发展核武器的可靠保证。


At the end of the day, the US recognized that any realistic policy needed European support, while Europeans saw preventing a rush to war by the US or Israel as a central policy objective.	最终，美国认识到任何现实政策都需要欧洲的支持，而欧洲将阻止美国货以色列发动战争作为关键政策目标。


It should also be said that Europeans have never been overly impressed with America’s hardline approach toward that other charter member of the axis of evil, North Korea, and its nuclear ambitions.	还应该指出，欧洲从未过度沉迷于美国针对邪恶轴心的另一个关键成员——朝鲜及其核野心的强硬方针。


Refusing to negotiate with the North Korean regime, and imposing the most stringent sanctions on it, has not stopped it from either acquiring nuclear weapons or accelerating its development of both nuclear and missile technologies.	拒绝与朝鲜政权谈判并对其实施最严厉制裁并没有阻止朝鲜获得核武器，也没有阻止它加速核技术和弹道技术的发展。


Among the significant issues that need to be sorted out before the end-of-June deadline for reaching a final deal with Iran is to agree on the details of the gradual suspension, and eventual repeal, of economic and diplomatic sanctions against the country.	在6月底与伊朗达成最终协议的截止期前，有一些重要问题需要解决，其中之一是就逐渐停止并最终取消对伊朗的经济和外交制裁的细节形成一致。


While this will be the subject of a fierce political battle in the US, it is likely that the European Union will be far more willing to move ahead.	这将是美国激烈政治斗争的主题，而欧盟很可能远比美国更愿意在这方面取得进展。


Indeed, Europe has sound reasons to lift the restrictions on Iranian oil exports.	事实上，欧洲有充分的理由解除对伊朗的石油出口限制。


Additional supplies of oil to global markets will keep prices down or depress them further.	增加全球石油市场供给将进一步压低价格。


Apart from the economic gain for Europe’s economies, low oil prices yield important strategic benefits – particularly with respect to constraining Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revisionist ambitions in Ukraine and elsewhere.	除了欧洲经济所能获得的经济利益外，低油价还能产生重要的战略利益——特别是遏制俄罗斯总统普京对乌克兰和其他地区的修正主义野心。


Needless to say, the US and Europe should stick to a common approach on the sanctions issue.	不消说，美国和欧洲应该在制裁问题上坚持共同方针。


But were a more militant policy approach by the Republican-controlled US Congress to prevail, America might well find that it loses the ally that makes the key difference for the sanctions’ success.	但如果共和党控制的美国国会的更加军事化的政策方针胜出，美国极有可能会丧失对制裁成功至关重要的盟友。


Indeed, on this issue, the US might rapidly find itself isolated from all other global actors.	事实上，在这个问题上，美国也许很快就会发现自己已经被其他国际行动方所孤立。


Europe is certainly not naive about the nature of the Iranian regime.	显然，欧洲在伊朗政权的性质问题上并不天真。


France, with its historically strong convictions on issues concerning nuclear proliferation, has taken a particularly firm stance during the talks.	历史上，法国在核扩散问题上信念坚定，在谈判期间的立场特别坚定。


But Europe is also acutely aware of the consequences of the rapid increase in violent conflict and suffering in its immediate neighborhood; indeed, Europeans see those consequences daily in the flood of refugees trying to reach its shores.	但欧洲也清醒地认识到暴力冲突的迅速升级及其近邻苦难迅速增加的后果；


Another war in the Middle East is clearly not in its interest.	事实上，欧洲人每天都能看到这些后果——试图抵达欧洲海岸的难民如潮水般汹涌。


Finally, Israel is a key factor underlying the differences between the US and Europe when it comes to Iran.	最后，以色列是美国和欧洲在伊朗问题上方针不同的主要因素。


Though Netanyahu’s shrill words still have an attentive audience in the US, most of Europe regards his position as being only a little short of ridiculous.	尽管内塔尼亚胡刺耳声音在美国很有些拥趸，但大部分欧洲人认为他的立场荒谬可笑。


Thus, it is nearly certain that, assuming a final agreement with Iran is reached in June, Europe’s backing for it will be unanimous – or close to it – and that it will be eager to support Obama in his battle with opponents of the deal at home.	因此，几乎肯定地说，假设6月与伊朗达成最终协议，欧洲对该协议的支持将是一边倒的，并且欧洲很希望支持奥巴马在国内就该协议与反对者所展开的斗争。


The framework agreement has vindicated Europe’s approach to resolving the nuclear dispute.	该框架协议证明了欧洲解决和纠纷的方针是正确的。


The West has every reason to maintain that approach in the months ahead.	西方有充分的理由在未来几个月中保持这一方针。


Europe on Holiday	假日中的欧洲


Currently, the average number of hours worked per person aged 15 to 25 each year in France and Germany is about 50% lower than in the United States.	目前，法德两国15到25岁年龄段员工的平均工作时间与美国相比约低50%。


Other European countries (for example, Italy and Spain) fall somewhere between these poles.	其它欧洲国家（如意大利和西班牙）则处于两者之间。


Although some Americans always like to boast about their superior work ethic, this disparity in working hours between the US and Europe has not always existed.	尽管有些美国人总喜欢吹嘘自己工作理念如何出众，美欧之间工作时数的差异并非向来如此。


Indeed, until the mid-1970's, the number of hours worked on either side of the Atlantic was roughly the same.	实际上，20世纪70年代为止，大西洋两岸劳工的工作时数还大体相同。


From the mid-1970's on, however, Americans continued working more or less the same number of hours, while Western Europeans began working less and less each year.	但从20世纪70年代开始，美国人的工作时数基本不变，而西欧人却开始逐年减少。


If Western Europe needs an explanation as to why its rate of economic growth is lagging behind the US, it need look no further.	如果西欧想解释为什么经济增长率赶不上美国，根本不需要另找其它原因。


The average number of working hours per person depends on a variety of factors:	人均工作时数的多少取决于很多因素：


• the level of participation in the labor force;	•就业参与程度的高低；


• the number of vacation days workers have;	•工人们享受的假期天数；


• the number of hours worked in a "normal" week, i.e., with no vacation.	•不受假期干扰的"正常"周工作时数。


Virtually all the difference between the US on one side and France and Germany on the other are due to the first two factors, each with roughly equal weight.	实际上美国和法德两国的差别主要源自前两个因素，这两者几乎同等重要。


So, lower participation in the labor force explains half of the difference, and longer vacations for those who do work accounts for the other half.	因此，就业参与程度低解释了其中的一半原因，而实际就业者享受长假则解释了原因的另外一半。


The importance of vacation time should come as no surprise to anyone who has experienced Europe's deserted cities in August, the three-week vacation "bridges" in April and May in France and Italy, the "rush hours" that take place every Friday at 2 PM in German cities, and crowded ski slopes in February due to winter school vacations.	这样的解释对亲身经历过8月欧洲倾城出动、4月欧洲和5月法意三周长假，德国城市周五午后2点"堵车高峰"和学校2月寒假期间滑雪圣地拥挤不堪的人们来说，一点也不会感到意外。


But knowing "how" Europeans work less is one thing; knowing "why" Europeans work less than Americans is another.	但了解欧洲人如何工作得少是一方面，"为什么"工作得少是另一方面。


One view is that Americans are perceived (and like to see themselves) as Calvinist workaholics, whereas Europeans like to think that they know how to enjoy life's pleasures.	观点之一是美国人被视作（他们自己也喜欢这样）加尔文主义工作狂，而欧洲人则认为自己了解如何享受生活。


As a European working in the US, I admit that I do take many more vacations than my American colleagues.	作为在美国工作的欧洲人，我承认我比美国同事们休假更多。


So there may be something in this "cultural" explanation.	因此这种"文化"解释也许包含了部分原因。


But why did this start around 1973?	但为什么始于1973年呢？


A second argument attributes the difference to income taxes, which, in fact, have increased significantly in Europe since the 1970's, while in the US income taxes fell from the early 1980's onward.	另一种观点把差别归咎于所得税。 实际上，20世纪70年代起欧洲所得税就快速增长，而美国的所得税却从20世纪80年代开始下降。


Income taxes certainly must affect willingness to work.	所得税当然会影响到工作的积极性。


They may not change by much the number of hours worked by the main breadwinner in a family (typically a man), but they do influence the participation of women in the labor force.	它对家庭中主要的经济来源（通常是男主人）或许影响有限，但却能影响女性参与到就业中来。


After all, why work, when your after-tax salary barely pays for childcare and household help?	毕竟，如果税后收入只够看孩子和雇保姆的花销，人们为什么要出去工作？


But even this is not a sufficient explanation, because studies of how the supply of labor responds to tax changes suggest that something else must explain the enormous gap between US and Europe, especially France and Germany.	但即便如此理由也不够充分，因为对劳动力供应与税收变化关系的研究表明：美国和欧洲，特别是英法两国之间的巨大差距一定另有原因。


For the age group over 50, the structure of pension systems is clearly a major factor.	很明显，对50岁以上的人群来说，养老金体系结构是非常重要的因素。


It was and remains much more profitable to retire earlier in Europe than in the US.	无论过去或者现在，在欧洲提前退休都比在美国来得划算。


Why should a Frenchman or Italian in his early sixties work today, when in the 1990's he could have retired in his mid-fifties with 80% or more of his last working-age salary?	如果法国或意大利人20世纪90年代50多岁时就可以退休，享受最终薪水的80%甚至更多，那他们又为什么要在60多岁时继续工作？


For women, the retirement age in the mid-1990's was even lower.	对女性来讲，20世纪90年代中的退休年龄更趋于年轻化。


Public sector employees had even more advantages.	公共部门的员工好处更多。


Nor is that all.	这也还不是全部。


In the 1980's and 1990's, many European labor unions, in response to rising unemployment, adopted the policy of "work less, work all."	20世纪的八九十年代，很多欧洲劳工组织面对日益上升的失业率，采取了"全体工作，减少时数"的应对方法。


In other words, they obtained shorter hours (i.e., more vacations) in order to keep employment up.	换句话讲，他们争取减少工作时间（也就是更多休假），目的在于维持较高的就业率。


The problem is that total compensation did not go down in proportion to the shorter hours, thus leading to an increase in pay per hour.	问题在于相对于缩短的工作时数，工资并没有按比例减少，导致单位时间的劳动报酬提高。


Lower productivity and higher unit labor costs eroded firms' willingness to hire, leaving Europe with chronically higher unemployment than in the US.	下降的生产率和升高的单位劳动成本损害了公司的用人积极性，使欧洲的失业率长期高于美国。


Today's debates about growth in Europe are full of buzz words like "knowledge-based society," "technological progress," and "investment in education."	今天有关欧洲增长的辩论充满了"知识社会""技术进步"和"投资教育"这样的华丽字眼。


Europeans certainly need something to compensate for a short working life with many vacations.	欧洲人当然要为充满假期的短暂职业生涯付出代价。


But much of this discussion is merely a form of "political correctness." It is more reassuring - and "feels better" - to tell Europeans that growth is sluggish because society is not sufficiently knowledge-based, rather than pointing to the trade-off between vacations and growth.	但这样的争论大都只停留在"政治上正确与否"的简单层面，毕竟，让欧洲人认为增长缓慢的原因是社会知识不够丰富比直接指出假期和增长的反比例关系更令人安心，"感觉也更好"。


Europeans tend to prefer vacations over growth.	与增长相比，欧洲人更喜欢休假。


Personally, I love taking more and more vacations. But I cannot (and do not) then complain if my income does not grow faster and faster.	就个人而言，我喜欢休假的时间越来越长，但却不能（也不会）抱怨工资增长越来越慢。


How EU Overreach Pushed Britain Out	欧洲的雄心是如何吓跑英国的


CAMBRIDGE – A thoughtful British friend of mine said to me a few days before the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” referendum that he would vote for Remain because of his concern about the economic uncertainty that would follow if the UK left the European Union.	发自剑桥——就在英国举行“脱欧”公投的前几天，我的一位极为睿智的英国朋友说他将投票支持留欧，因为他担心英国脱离欧盟会带来经济上的不确定性。


But he added that he would not have favored Britain’s decision to join the EU back in 1973 had he known then how the EU would evolve.	但他又补了一句，说如果他早知道欧盟会演变成今天这个样子，就不会赞成英国于1973年加入欧盟。


While voters chose Leave for a variety of reasons, many were concerned with the extent to which EU leaders have exceeded their original mandate, creating an ever larger and more invasive organization.	虽然投票脱欧者的原因各异，但许多人都注意到欧盟领导人们已经僭越了他们最初的领受的任务，创造了一个更庞大且更具侵入性的组织。


Jean Monnet’s dream of a United States of Europe was not what the British wanted when they joined the EU 40 years ago. Nor were they seeking a European counterweight to the United States, as Konrad Adenauer, Germany’s first post-war chancellor, had once advocated.	欧盟缔造者让·莫内（Jean Monnet）建立欧洲合众国的梦想可不是英国人在40年前加入欧盟时想得到的东西，他们也不想如德国战后第一任总理康拉德·阿登纳（Konrad Adenauer）曾一度鼓吹的那样借欧洲抗衡美国。


Britain simply wanted the advantages of increased trade and labor-market integration with countries across the English Channel.	英国只是想通过促进与英吉利海峡对面的国家的贸易，并从劳动力市场一体化中得益。


The EU began as an agreement among six countries to achieve free trade in goods and capital and to eliminate barriers to labor mobility.	欧盟始于六国之间为实现商品和资本的自由贸易并消除劳动力流动障碍的一份协议。


When EU leaders sought to reinforce a sense of European solidarity by establishing a monetary union, Britain was fortunately able to opt out and keep the pound – and control over its monetary policy.	当欧盟领导人试图通过建立一个货币联盟以加强欧洲团结感的时候，英国很幸运地选择了退出并继续使用英磅——并得以继续掌控控制自身货币政策。


But the opt-out has left Britain a relative outsider within the EU.	但是退出这一步已经让英国成为了欧盟中的相对局外人。


As the EU expanded from six countries to 28, Britain could not permanently limit entry to its labor market by workers from the new member states.	随着欧盟从6国扩展到28国，英国无法长期限制来自新成员国的劳动者进入本国劳动力市场。


As a result, the number of foreign-born workers in Britain has doubled since 1993, to more than six million, or 10% of the labor force, with most now coming from low-wage countries that were not among the EU’s other original members.	结果英国本土的外国劳工数量自1993年以来翻了一番，达到600余万，相当于总劳动力的10％，如今大部分都来自非欧盟其他原始成员国的低工资国家。


Although pro-Brexit voters worry about the resulting pressure on UK wages, they generally do not reject the original goals of increased trade and capital flows that are the essence of globalization.	虽然脱欧派选民担心这会导致英国工资压力上升，但他们一般不会反对增加贸易和资本流动的最初目标，因为那就是全球化的本质。


Some Brexit defenders could point to the example of the successful US free-trade agreement with Canada and Mexico, which contains no provision for labor mobility.	有些脱欧捍卫者可能会引用加拿大和墨西哥两国与美国达成自由贸易协议的正面例子，其中并未限制劳动力流动。


Unlike Britain, the other EU countries, led by France and Germany, wanted more than free trade and an enlarged labor market.	但与英国不同的是，以法德为首的其他欧盟国家的野心比自由贸易和扩大劳动力市场更大。


From the start, European leaders were determined to expand the “European project” to achieve what the Treaty of Rome called an “ever closer union.”	从一开始，欧洲领导人就决定扩大“欧洲计划”来构建一个《罗马条约》称之为“不断紧固的联盟”。


Advocates of shifting authority to EU institutions have justified this with the notion of “shared sovereignty,” according to which British sovereignty could be eroded by EU decisions, without any formal agreement from the UK’s government or people.	那些向欧盟机构移交主权的拥护者用“共享主权”这个理念来论证这一举动的正当性，照此执行的话，英国的主权就会欧盟决策的侵蚀，完全无需征得英国政府或人民的正式同意。


The “Stability and Growth Pact” of 1998 imposed a limit on member countries’ annual deficits and required that debt-to-GDP ratios shrink toward a maximum of 60%.	1998年签署的《稳定与增长公约》向各成员国强加了年度赤字限制，要求各国债务与GDP的比例不得超过60％。


When the global financial crisis began in 2008, German Chancellor Angela Merkel saw an opportunity to strengthen the EU even further, by enforcing a new “fiscal compact” authorizing the European Commission to oversee members’ annual budgets and impose fines for violating budget and debt targets (though no fines have been levied).	当全球金融危机于2008年爆发后，德国总理默克尔看到了进一步加强欧盟的机会，通过实施新的“财政紧固”政策授权欧盟委员会去监督成员的年度预算，并对违反预算和债务目标的成员课以罚款（虽然并未以此收到任何款项）。


Germany also led the move to establish a European “banking union” with a single regulatory framework and a binding resolution mechanism for troubled financial institutions.	德国还带头着手建立一个欧洲“银行业联盟”，设立一个单一监管框架以及对陷入困境的金融机构具有约束力的解决方案机制。


Not all of these policies directly affected the UK; nonetheless, they widened the intellectual and political gap between Britain and the EU’s eurozone members.	虽然不是所有这些政策都对英国产生了直接影响； 但它们扩大了英国和欧盟欧元区成员之间的理念和政治差距。


That reinforced the fundamental difference between market-oriented British governments and those of many EU countries, with their traditions of socialism, government planning, and heavy regulation.	这强化了英国政府以及许多欧盟国家之间的根本性区别：前者以市场为导向，后者则有着社会主义，政府规划和严格监管的传统。


The division of powers between the EU bureaucracy and member states is governed by the ambiguous principle – borrowed from Catholic social teaching – of “subsidiarity”: decisions should be made at the “lowest” or least centralized level of “competent authority.”	欧盟官僚机构和成员国之间权力的划分原则也是极为模糊——这是从天主教社会教学经验中借鉴而来——的“权力下放”：决策本应在的“最低”或集权程度最小层面上的 “主管当局”中作出。


In practice, that did not limit the rulemaking in Brussels and Strasbourg.	在实践中这却并未限制布鲁塞尔和斯特拉斯堡欧盟机构的规则制定权。


Subsidiarity provides much less protection for EU member governments than the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution – which denies to the federal government any powers not delegated to it by the Constitution – does for US states.	权力下放原则对欧盟各成员国政府的保障远远低于美国宪法第十修正案对联邦各州的保障，因为后者认定联邦政府不能拥有任何未获宪法授予的权力。


The British public is of course not alone in its discomfort with the EU.	对欧盟感到不满的当然不仅仅是英国民众。


A recent poll conducted in EU countries by the Pew Foundation found that a majority of voters in three of the largest countries – Britain, France, and Spain – view the EU unfavorably.	皮尤基金会最近在欧盟国家进行的一项民调显示，三个最大欧盟国家——英国，法国和西班牙——的多数选民都对欧盟持负面态度；


In Germany, the public was split 50-50.	在德国正负双方各半；


In Italy, a clear majority say that they have benefited from EU membership; and yet the populist Five Star Movement, which recently won mayoral elections in 19 of the 20 cities it contested (including 70% of the vote in Rome), has promised a referendum on leaving the eurozone if it wins the parliamentary election later this year.	在意大利，虽然大多数人都表示他们从欧盟中受益； 然而民粹主义的五星运��党（Five Star Movement）最近却在其参选的20个城市赢下了19场市长选举（包括夺得首都罗马市长选举的70％选票），并承诺如果能赢得今年晚些时候的议会选举，就举行公投决定是否离开欧元区。


Although many officials and experts predict that Brexit will have dire economic consequences, this certainly is not inevitable. Much now depends on the terms of the future relationship between the EU and Britain.	尽管许多官员和专家都预测英国脱欧将带来可怕的经济后果，当然这也不是不可避免的，其中很大程度取决于欧盟和英国之间构建未来关系的条款。


The UK is also now in a better position to negotiate a more favorable trade and investment treaty with the US.	英国现在也处于更有利的地位，可以与美国展开更优惠的贸易和投资协定谈判。


Although the proposed US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is bogged down, a British government outside the EU could negotiate a deal with the US far more easily.	尽管目前构建美欧跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系的提案停滞不前，位处欧盟之外的英国政府与美国达成交易的容易程度大大提升。


The US would be negotiating with one country, not 28 — many of which do not share Britain’s pro-market policies.	美国将与一国而非28国进行谈判，况且其中很多国家不同意英国的市场导向政策。


The question of Britain’s EU membership has been decided.	英国欧盟成员资格的问题已经尘埃落定。


Now its economic future depends on what it does with its new independence.	现在，该国经济的未来则取决于它将如何运用自己的新独立地位。


Responding to Europe’s Political Polarization	应对欧洲的政治极化


PARIS – In Europe, 2015 began with the far-left Syriza party’s election victory in Greece. It ended with another three elections that attested to increasing political polarization.	巴黎—欧洲的2015年始于极左翼的左翼联盟党（Syriza）赢得希腊选举，终于另外三场证明了政治极化日益兴盛的选举。


In Portugal, the Socialist Party formed an alliance with its former archenemy, the Communists.	在葡萄牙，社会党（Socialist Party）与此前的死对头共产党结成同盟。


In Poland, the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party won enough support to govern on its own.	在波兰，民主主义的劳动与正义党（PiS）赢得了足够的支持，能够独立组阁。


And in Spain, the emergence of Podemos, another new left-wing party, has ended the traditional hegemony of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party on the center left and the Partido Popular on the center right.	而在西班牙，另一个极左翼政党社会民主党（Podemos）的崛起终结了中左翼的西班牙社会工人党（Socialist Workers’ Party）和中右翼的人民党（Partido Popular）的传统霸权。


(In France, moreover, the far-right National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, showed its strength in the first round of December’s regional elections, though it eventually failed to win any).	（此外，在法国，由马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）领导的极右翼政党国民阵线（National Front）也在今年12月的第一轮选举中尽显强势，尽管最后没有赢得胜利。 ）


The message is impossible to miss: Increasingly, voters are deeply dissatisfied with mainstream parties and are willing to give a chance to those proposing radical alternatives.	个中意义显而易见：选民日益对主流政党深感失望，并愿意给主张激进替代方案的政党一个机会。


They are lending support to parties that, though very different from one another, all blame the European Union for the sorry state of their countries’ economies and labor markets.	他们给予支持的政党尽管彼此之间十分不同，但都指责欧盟应该为本国经济和劳动力市场的糟糕状况负责。


To be sure, radicalization is not limited to Europe nowadays.	诚然，如今激进化并不是欧洲的特有现象。


As I have argued elsewhere, American presidential candidate Donald Trump owes his rise to many of the same factors that are driving Le Pen’s growing popularity.	我在其他文章中指出，美国总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）之所以能崛起，背后的许多因素与勒庞越来越受到欢迎是一样的。


What is particularly problematic in the EU is the clash between radical politics and mainstream governance.	欧洲问题的严重之处在于激进政治与主流治理之间的碰撞。


For 30 years, center-right or center-left parties with a broadly shared vision of Europe have governed most EU countries.	30年来，在大部分欧盟国家执政的中右翼或中左翼政党都持有广泛取得共识的欧洲观。


Despite their policy disagreements, they jointly embodied the ideological consensus – and formed the political coalition – that built the single market, the euro, and the enlarged EU.	尽管政策上存在分歧，但在思想上是一致的，思想上的一致造就了单一市场、欧元和扩大的欧盟——并形成了政治联盟。


But many voters now feel that mainstream policies have failed.	但如今，许多选民感到主流政策是失败的。


Governments have proved unable to protect unskilled and semi-skilled employees from the consequences of globalization and technological change.	政府证明了它无法保护无技能和低技能员工不受全球化和技术变革冲击。


Mass education, progressive taxation, and social-welfare benefits have not prevented increasing inequality.	大众教育、累进税制和社会福利没能阻止不平等性加剧。


And the euro has failed to engineer prosperity and stability.	欧元也没有带来繁荣与稳定。


Those (like me) who think that specific policy errors and institutional flaws are more to blame than European integration itself are being drowned out.	认为具体的政策错误和制度缺陷，而非欧洲一体化才是罪魁的人（包括我）的声音根本没人去听。


Political realignments are to be expected in democracies; indeed, democratic institutions are designed to make them possible.	在民主国家，政治调整是件常事； 事实上，民主制度就是为了让这种调整成为可能。


Generally, the constitution does not change, or changes only slowly, whereas a new party or coalition redefines the policy agenda and reforms the legislation.	一般而言，宪法不会改变，或改变缓慢，而新的政党或政党联盟会重新制定政策日程、改革立法。


This combination of rigidity and plasticity enables democratic regimes to adapt to shifts in citizens’ preferences.	这一刚性和弹性的组合让民主制度能够适应公民偏好的变迁。


The same does not apply to Europe, however.	但欧洲已不再如此。


First, political change is not synchronized.	首先，政治变化并不同步。


At any given moment, some countries may have voted for radical parties, while others have not (or simply have not held elections).	在任一给定时刻，一些国家可能投票给激进政党，而其他国家则否（或根本没有举行选举）。


This clash of legitimacy is what the Greek government initially failed to understand last spring when it sought to ease austerity measures: Syriza had received a mandate for change from Greek voters, but other countries’ representatives had not received such a mandate.	去年春天，当希腊政府寻求放松紧缩措施时，它一开始没能理解这一合法性的冲突：左翼联盟获得了希腊选民授予的变革使命，但其他国家的代表并没有收到这一使命。


Second, unlike national democracies, the EU does not derive its legitimacy from the process through which political choices are made, but mainly from the output it can deliver.	其次，与国家民主不同，欧盟的合法性不是来自决定政治选择的程序，而是主要来自它的输出。


This is not to say that there is no democratic process: the elected European Parliament is a serious legislative body, and its vetting of European commissioners is often more thorough than personnel selection at the national level.	这并不是说没有民主程序：选举产生的欧洲议会是一个严肃的立法机构，其对欧盟委员的审批常常比国家层面的人事遴选更加严格。


But it has no visibility, because major decisions are negotiated between national governments.	但你看不到这一点，因为重大决定都由国家政府间的谈���确定。


Third, the boundary between constitutional and legislative matters is peculiar in the EU.	第三，欧盟的宪法和立法问题的界线十分古怪。


All treaty provisions have constitutional status; indeed, they can be changed only by unanimous agreement.	所有条约条款都具有宪法地位； 事实上，只有全体一致同意才能修改。


Furthermore, because governments did not trust one another, they insisted on including in treaties what would normally belong in ordinary legislation.	此外，由于政府之间彼此不信任，因此它们坚持在条约中包括正常情况下属于一般立法的内容。


The many rules that govern economic life in the EU are therefore much more difficult to amend than are similar domestic provisions.	因此，在欧盟，许多经济规则远比类似的本国规则更加难以修改。


In other words, the scope for redefining the rules is exceedingly narrow, even though they reflect a policy consensus that is no longer widely shared.	换句话说，修订规则的空间过于狭窄，即便它们所体现的政策一致早已不复存在。


What options does this leave the EU for responding to political polarization and the concomitant demands for more policy leeway at the national level?	这意味着欧盟还有哪些选择可以应对政治极化以及随之而来的增加国家层面政策自由度的要求？


Of course, the EU could simply ignore these changes, and hope that radicalism will wane once its bearers are confronted with the responsibility of governing.	当然，欧盟可以一概忽视这些变化，寄希望于极端化在其始作俑者面临治理责任后烟消云散。


But that would be foolish.	但这样的希望是愚蠢的。


Syriza was forced to accept tough choices because Greece depends on external financial assistance.	左翼联盟被迫接受了艰难的选择，因为希腊需要仰仗外部金融支持。


No other country is in the same situation.	其他国家的情况都与此不同。


Ignoring demands for change would ultimately deepen popular hostility toward the EU.	忽视变革要求最终将深化对欧盟的群众敌对情绪。


Another possibility would be to exploit, on an ad hoc basis, the existing flexibility in EU treaty provisions.	另一个可能性是临时利用现有欧盟条约条款的灵活性。


Pragmatism can indeed be helpful, and the European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker is willing to embrace it.	务实主义确实能够有所助益，而以容克为首的欧盟委员会也愿意务实。


But it would be dangerous to turn the EU framework into a thicket of country-specific political bargains.	但让欧盟框架沦为各国各自为政的政治讨价还价场所是危险的。


Those for whom the rule of law and the enforcement of fundamental principles are serious matters – not just Germany – would soon object.	对于将法治和基本原则的执行看作大事的国家——不仅仅是德国——很快就会反对。


The last solution would be to make the EU more amenable to political change.	最后的方案是让欧盟变得更加便于政治变化。


This would require explicitly changing the balance between constitutional and legislative matters, so that principles are preserved, but policies can be responsive to politics.	这需要明确改变宪法和立法之间的平衡。 从而在保护原则的同时让政策能够响应政治。


Moreover, the EU should be able to legislate on a wider array of policies, including, for example, taxation.	此外，欧盟应该获得更广泛的政策立法权，比如税收。


This would end its awkward impotence on – and apparent indifference to – inequality.	这将让欧盟不再对不平等性问题束手无策——也显然漠不关心。


At the same time, the European Parliament should be given a higher profile, as in a truly federal system, so that governments at the national and European level are perceived as equally legitimate.	与此同时，欧洲议会应该获得更高的规格（如同真正的联邦制度那样），从而让国家和欧洲层面的政府拥有平等的合法性。


With such federalization in the EU or, more likely, the smaller eurozone (within which the degree of integration is higher), policy conflicts would place elected national governments in opposition not to an opaque system, but to a politically legitimate federal institution.	如果欧盟——或更小的规模的欧元区（可能性更大，因为一体化程度更高）——能够联邦化，政策冲突将不会让民选的国家政府面对一个不透明的制度，而是面对一个政治上合法的联邦制度。


This approach confronts formidable obstacles.	这一方针面临着巨大的障碍。


An attempt to write an EU constitution was made in the early 2000s.	起草欧盟宪法的尝试在21世纪初就已开始。


It failed.	结果失败了。


Germany and other countries where mainstream policies still command wide support would vehemently oppose any perceived softening of the common rules and principles.	主流政策仍然广受支持的德国和其他国家将强烈反对任何被认为是软化共同规则和原则的改变。


It will be hard, to say the least, to agree on additional competences and a stronger European Parliament at a time when so many in Europe, starting with the radicals, consider the EU the main culprit for their current woes.	如今，从激进派开始，大量欧洲人认为欧盟是本国当前乱象的罪魁祸首，再这样的情况下，同意加强能力、强化欧洲议会是非常困难的。


Yet ultimately, the construction of a transnational democracy is the most viable response to political polarization in Europe.	但最终，构建一个跨国民主政体是应对欧洲政治极化的最可行的办法。


A Five-Step Plan for European Prosperity	欧洲繁荣的五步计划


WASHINGTON, DC – Though the Greek crisis has been placed on pause, the economic situation in Europe remains bleak.	华盛顿—尽管希腊危机大有停止迹象，但欧洲经济局面依然不容乐观。


Eurozone growth is up slightly from its near-recession levels of a few months ago, but projections by the International Monetary Fund for 2015 and 2016 barely exceed 1%.	欧元区增长较几个月前接近衰退的水平略有提高，但IMF的2015年和2016年预测都没有超过1%。


Unemployment remains above 11% – and twice that among the young (and doubled again in countries like Greece and Spain).	失业率仍高达11%以上——年轻人失业率比这个数字还要高一倍（希腊和西班牙则需要再翻一番）。


Greece's exit from the eurozone would likely be less disruptive now than it would have been a few years ago.	如今，希腊退出欧元区的破坏性也许么有几年前那么大了。 在市场眼中，传染风险最大的国家——葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利——现在不再那么脆弱了；


The countries most at risk of contagion – Portugal, Spain, and Italy – are less vulnerable now in the eyes of the markets; the European Union has established a bailout fund; and the European Central Bank has launched a large bond-buying program.	欧盟也成立了援助基金； 欧洲央行更是启动了大规模债券购买计划。


The real challenge in Europe is continued stagnation and rising public-sector fiscal pressures in bloated welfare states with rapidly aging populations.	欧洲的真正挑战是继续停止和公共部门财政压力继续因为福利国家人口不断老龄化而上升。


Restoring growth, opportunity, prosperity, and financial stability will require bold solutions to five inter-related problems.	重塑增长、机会、繁荣和金融稳定需要在五个相互关联的问题上采取果断动作。


The first problem is fiscal.	第一个问题是财政。


The math is simple.	算术很简单。


The tax rate necessary to fund social spending must equal the ratio of the number of people receiving benefits to the number of taxpayers (the dependency ratio), multiplied by the average benefit relative to the income being taxed (the replacement rate).	覆盖社会支出所需要的税率必须等于接受福利的人数与纳税人人数之比（供养比）乘以相对于应税收入的平均福利水平（替代率）。


It was this math that led Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, to declare that, “The European social model has already gone."	欧洲央行行长德拉吉正是基于这一算术宣布“欧洲社会模式已是明日黄花。


Too many Europeans are collecting too many benefits, but so far governments have mostly ducked the issue, taking on massive debt in order to postpone the reckoning.	”太多欧洲人吃掉了太多福利； 但目前政府大多在回避问题，大量举债以延长清算日。


Reform that targets social spending at true need is long overdue.	真正需要的以社会支出为目标的改革长期缺位。


The second problem is economic: growth in Europe has fallen far short of that in the United States, decade after decade.	第二个问题是经济：十年复十年，欧洲的增长已经远远落后于美国。


Though economic theory predicts convergence in standards of living, Europe lags behind the US by 30% or more.	尽管经济学理论认为生活水平会趋同，但欧洲已经落后美国30%有余。


High taxes and burdensome regulations stifle the labor market and potential new businesses.	高税收和过度监管阻碍了劳动力市场和潜在的新企业。


Overgenerous social-welfare payments create disincentives to work, hire, invest, and grow.	过于慷慨的社会福利不利于人们参与工作、雇用、投资和增长的意愿。


Chronic sluggish growth is insufficient to create opportunities for the continent's masses of unemployed and underemployed young people.	长期缓慢的增长不足以为欧洲大陆的大量失业和半失业年轻人创造机会。


The third problem is the banking crisis.	第三个问题是银行危机。


In Europe, banks supply roughly 70% of the credit to European economies, compared to 30% in the US.	在欧洲，银行提供了欧洲经济70%左右的信用，而美国只有30%。


But many European banks are over-leveraged zombies, kept alive by emergency public infusions of liquidity.	但许多欧洲银行都是过度负债的僵尸银行，依靠紧急公共流动性注入维持生命。


Fourth, there is the currency crisis.	第四是货币危机。


The euro's many benefits – cross-border pricing transparency, lower transaction costs, and inflation credibility – required surrendering independent monetary policies and flexible exchange rates.	欧元的诸多好处——跨境定价透明性、更低的交易成本和通胀信誉——需要牺牲独立货币政策和浮动汇率来换取。


But, given limited interregional transfers and labor mobility, this means that the continent has far less ability to absorb disparate shocks through the operation of so-called automatic stabilizers.	但是，由于跨地区转移和劳动力流动性有限，这意味着欧洲大陆远远不能通过所谓的自动稳定器吸收不相关的冲击。


In the US, by contrast, people in high-unemployment Michigan move to, say, Texas, where jobs are plentiful, even as the federal tax and transfer system automatically shifts money in the opposite direction, cushioning the local downturn.	相反，在美国，高失业的密歇根州居民可以迁往（比如）就业岗位充裕的德克萨斯州，即使联邦税收和转移系统自动向反方向引导资金，缓冲地方衰退。


Finally, Europe faces a severe governance deficit.	最后，欧洲面临严重的治理赤字。


Citizens are becoming increasingly disenchanted with European elites and supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, which impose rules and regulations that conflict with their countries' economic interests and sovereignty.	公民对欧洲精英和超国家机构（如欧盟委员会）越来越不信任，因为它们所实施的规则和监管与其国家的经济利益和主权相冲突。


Voters are restless, as the Greek election result demonstrated.	选民焦躁不安，希腊选举结果就是明证。


Nationalist sentiment is rising, and demagogic parties of the far right and left are gaining in every poll.	民族主义情绪在日益高涨，极右翼和极左翼煽动性政党在选举中纷纷得势。


Addressing these problems will be difficult, but not impossible.	解决这些问题是困难的，但并非不可能。


The core challenge is fiscal; Europe cannot escape the need to scale back its sclerotic welfare states.	核心挑战是财政； 欧洲必须缩小僵化的福利国家的规模。


By recognizing that, and implementing the following series of mutually reinforcing policies, the continent can move beyond its current torpor.	认识到这一点并实施下列互相强化的政策可以让欧洲大陆走出当前的困局。


Gradual fiscal consolidation – reducing the projected future size of government spending, and hence future tax rates – will have to be at the center of the effort.	逐步财政整合——降低未来政府支出规模预期，从而降低税率——必须成为核心措施。


This should be combined with the mutualization of some portion of the liabilities of highly indebted countries – defined as a debt-to-GDP ratio above, say, 60% or 70% – and modest write-downs in exchange for long-term zero-coupon bonds.	除此之外，应该辅之以高负债国家——可��义为债务-GDP之比高于（比如）60%或70%的国家——一定比例负债的共同化和温和减记，替之以长期零息债券。


The “Brady bonds" that the US used to help resolve the Latin American debt crisis in the 1990s could serve as a model.	20世纪90年代美国用来帮助解决拉丁美洲解决债务危机的“布雷迪债券”可以作为模板。


Meanwhile, Europe's zombie banks will have to be rapidly resolved by acquisition or temporary takeover, cleanup, and asset sale, as was done by the Resolution Trust Corporation during the US savings and loan crisis in the 1980s.	与此同时，欧洲的僵尸银行必须通过兼并或暂时接管、清算和资产甩卖予以快速消化，如重组信托公司（Resolution Trust Corporation）在20世纪80年代美国储贷危机中做的那样。


Structural reforms that increase labor-market flexibility and reduce red tape and related obstacles to new business formation must also be implemented.	此外还必须实施增加劳动力市场灵活性、减少官样文章和新企业成立的相关障碍的结构改革。


Finally, the eurozone should adopt a two-track euro with a fluctuating exchange rate – an idea championed by the American economist Allan Meltzer.	最后，欧元区应该采取汇率浮动的“双轨欧元”。 这一思想由美国经济学家艾伦·梅尔策（Allan Meltzer）提出。


Systematic rules would have to be developed to determine when members of the eurozone are demoted to “euro B" or promoted to “euro A."	必须制定系统新规则决定哪些欧元区成员国降级使用“B级欧元”或可升级为“A级欧元”。


Such a halfway house – call it “depreciation without departure" – would avoid some (but not all) of the problems of a country's complete withdrawal from the eurozone.	这一过渡制度——可称之为“不脱离的贬值”——可以避免一国完全退出欧元区所带来的一些（但非全部）问题。


It would create its own set of incentives, which, on balance, would pressure individual countries to avoid demotion, just as top-tier football (soccer) teams seek to avoid relegation to the minor leagues.	这一制度可以造成一系列激励，从整体上向个体国家施压使其避免降级，一如顶级联赛的足球俱乐部寻求避免降至低级别联赛。


Together, these policies would reduce sovereign debt, lower interest rates, ameliorate tax pressures, enable countries to increase competitiveness with fewer sacrifices to living standards, and provide Europe with a road map to prosperity.	综合起来，这些措施能减少主权债务、降低利率、减小税收压力、让各国能够以较小的生活水平损失实现竞争力的提升、为欧洲提供繁荣路线图。


Until now, the EU's leaders have followed the easiest, but least productive path, patching temporary, partial fixes on problems as they erupt.	到目前为止，欧盟领导人一直在走最容易但生产率最低的道路，在问题爆发时进行一些局部的临时性修补。


The possibility of a brighter economic future should be a prize large enough to evoke the same type of leadership through which Europe rose from the ashes of World War II.	更光明的经济未来前景应该足以刺激欧洲产生让其在二战废墟中重新崛起的领导力。


A Safer Path to Asylum	安全的庇护之路


LONDON – In 2014, more than 190,000 people risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Europe.	伦敦—2014年，190,000多人冒着生命危险从北非渡过地中海前往欧洲。


Some 3,500 lost the gamble, dying as they tried to traverse what has become the world's deadliest frontier.	大约3,500人输掉了这场豪赌，在穿越已成为世界最致命的前线时失去了生命。


There can be no doubting that some who undertook the perilous journey did so simply to search for better-paying jobs.	毫无疑问，一些人之所以走上如此危险的旅程，只是为了寻找收入更好的工作。


But the origins of those attempting the trip indicate that many are political refugees, not economic migrants.	但这些人的偷渡原因表明其中许多人是政治难民而非经济移民。


The majority of those who crossed the Mediterranean last year come from Eritrea and Syria.	去年，偷渡地中海的大部分人来自厄立特里亚和叙利亚。


Many have been formally recognized as refugees by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in the countries to which they initially fled.	许多人在逃出国已获得联合国难民署（UNHCR）的正式难民身份。


Some 90% of those who apply for asylum in Europe are granted some sort of protection – a further testament to their status as bona fide refugees.	90%的欧洲庇护申请者获得了某种程度的保护——这进一步表明他们拥有真正的难民身份。


It is time for the European Union to separate the discussion of the crisis in the Mediterranean from its broader immigration debate.	欧盟应该将地中海危机的讨论与广义的移民争论区分开来。


The policies, language, and response to the events unfolding on the EU's southern border must be different from those concerning the voluntary movement of job seekers from one safe country to another.	对于欧盟以南邻近地区的事件的政策、用语和反应必须与对于为了找工作而自愿从一个安全国家迁往另一个安全国家的事件有所区别。


Indeed, the proper context of the discussion is European countries' obligations under international refugee law.	事实上，合适的讨论背景应该是欧洲国家根据国际难民法的义务。


The policies put in place by the EU and its member states are directly responsible for the plight of those who die attempting to cross the Mediterranean.	欧盟及其成员国所实施的政策与在穿越地中海时所发生的死亡直接相关。


Efforts to discourage refugees from arriving have not diminished the number of people who are granted asylum in Europe; they have merely made the process of being granted refugee status more random and dangerous.	阻止难民到达的措施并没有减少获得欧洲庇护的人的数量； 只是让授予难民身份的过程变得更加随机、更加危险。


Every country in Europe is party to international treaties that recognize the rights of refugees to seek asylum and not be forcibly returned to countries where they will be unsafe.	每个欧洲国家都加入了承认难民有寻求庇护、不可强迫他们回到已不再安全的国家的国际条约。


And yet, despite calls by frontline Mediterranean states to establish systems to improve the handling of the crisis and share the burden, little is being done to make things safer for refugees or more manageable for the countries in which they arrive.	此外，尽管有人呼吁地中海沿岸国家建立制度以改善危机处理、共同承担难民负担，但让难民更加安全、在接受国中更加易于管理的措施极少。


The countries neighboring Syria and Iraq are facing the largest inflows of refugees fleeing the violence there, and the UNHCR has appealed for assistance in resettling a limited number of the neediest.	叙利亚和伊拉克周边国家面临着逃离上述两国暴力的最大量的难民涌入，UNHCR 呼吁协助安置有限数量的最需要群体。


So far, however, the response from the countries that can most easily afford to take in refugees has been pathetic.	但是，到目前为止，最有能力接收难民的国家反应冷淡。


Even worse, many people who, as recently as a few years ago, would have easily obtained permission to study, work, or visit relatives in Europe are being denied visas simply because of their refugee status.	更糟糕的是，近几年来，许多此前可以轻松获得赴欧学习、工作和探亲许可的人如今仅仅因为难民身份而无法获得签证。


There is no reason to require people seeking an asylum hearing to run a gamut of desert crossings, abuse by smugglers, beatings, extortion, rape, and exploitation – or to have them experience the trauma of watching their friends and family die along the way.	没有理由要求寻求庇护的人穿越整个沙漠，饱受蛇头虐待，遭遇殴打、勒索、强奸和剥削——或要求他们在路上体验目睹亲朋好友的死亡带来的创伤。


Doing so is cruel and inhumane, and it violates the spirit of all refugee, human rights, and immigration laws.	这样做是残忍的、不合人道的，并且违反了所有难民、人权和移民法的精神。


In the past, resettlement programs in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East screened people to establish their status as refugees; assessed their education, skills, and family relations to determine where they might be integrated most easily; and worked with European, North American, and Australian governments to find them new homes.	在过去，非洲、亚洲和中东的安置措施会审查相关人员以确定他们的难民身份； 评估他们的教育、技能和家庭关系以确定他们在哪里最有可能实现融入；


In the 1980s, such programs helped thousands of Ethiopians, Vietnamese, and Argentines, and a look at the communities in which the beneficiaries were resettled reveals that the vast majority have become self-reliant taxpayers.	20世纪80年代，这些措施帮助了成千上万埃塞俄比亚人、越南人和阿根廷人。 看看那些安置受益者的社区就能发现，绝大多数已成为自食其力的纳税人。


There is no reason that something similar cannot be done for those fleeing violence and persecution today.	没有理由认为今天逃离暴力和迫害的人不能获得同样的待遇。


If asylum seekers were provided with opportunities to present their claims in the countries where they currently find themselves, they would not be forced to risk their lives at sea to reach Italy or Greece.	寻求庇护者如果可以有机会再当地获得表达诉求的机会，他们就不会被迫冒着生命危险渡海前往意大利或希腊。


Eritreans could file applications in Khartoum for asylum in Sweden, Germany, or the United Kingdom.	厄立特里亚人将会在喀土穆申请瑞典、德国或英国庇护。


Syrians in Cairo or Beirut could do the same.	开罗或贝鲁特的叙利亚人也可以这样做。


The claims could be prioritized and processed in a regular manner, and the refugees could arrive in Europe healthy and ready to work or study.	这些诉求可以按照规定方式予以优先处理，这样难民就可以健康地到达欧洲并随时开始工作或学习。


The crisis in the Mediterranean cannot be managed in a piecemeal manner.	地中海危机无法通过零敲碎打的措施管理。


The financial costs of patrolling its waters and rescuing those adrift are exorbitant.	搜寻水域、拯救漂流者的财务成本非常高。


The loss of lives is inexcusable.	生命的损失是不可挽回的。


But we do not have to wait until the root causes of displacement – state failure and civil war – are addressed.	但我们不必坐等流离失所的根源——国家失败和内战——得到纠正。


We need only to find the courage to create a system in which desperate people do not have to risk their lives to apply for asylum and resettlement.	我们只需要找到勇气建立一套制度，让绝望的人不再需要拿生命冒险以求庇护和安置。


Clarifying Europe’s Refugee Problem	厘清欧洲的难民危机


MADRID – Even by European Union standards, the response to the so-called refugee crisis is a mess.	马德里—即使从欧盟标准看，对所谓的难民危机的响应也堪称一团糟。


This seems to defy logic: While the crisis is certainly a challenge, human rights – and, indeed, refugee protection – are embedded in Europe’s DNA.	这似乎不合逻辑：尽管这场危机毫无疑问是一个挑战，但人权——事实上，也包括难民保护——深深地印在欧洲的DNA上。


Moreover, the EU’s aging and demographically challenged member states need immigrants.	此外，日益老龄化、人口挑战日益严峻的欧盟成员国也需要移民。


Yet, instead of spurring solutions, the current crisis has been bringing out all that is ugly, feckless, and dysfunctional about the European project.	但是，目前的危机并没有刺激解决方案的出现，反而暴露了欧洲工程丑陋、恶劣、失调的一面。


What happened?	到底发生了什么？


As is so often the case with the EU, the problem is a lack of clarity.	和欧盟通常的情况一样，问题在于缺乏明确性。


The blurring of the lines between refugee and immigrant has made it virtually impossible to make compelling arguments in favor of proper refugee protection or more effective immigration policy.	难民和移民之间界限模糊，这导致几乎不可能出现令人信服的支持合理难民保护或更有效的移民政策的观点。


This has thwarted honest and constructive discussion, allowing those who peddle fear and nativism to gain ground.	这困扰着诚心诚意的建设性对话，让宣扬恐惧和本土论者占了上风。


The conflation of immigrants and refugees was probably not the result of malicious intent.	移民和难民混为一谈也许并非恶意为之。


Following the introduction of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s open-door policy toward refugees last September, a raft of reports emerged offering economic and demographic arguments within which her decision could be framed.	去年9月，德国总理对难民采取了打开大门的政策，此后出现了大量报告，为她的决定提供经济和人口支持。


But such arguments actually poisoned the idea of refugee protection: The focus on the potential economic role of refugees inadvertently reinforced the view that they were, in fact, economic migrants.	但这些支持实际上有损于难民保护的概念：着重于难民的潜在经济作用在不经意间强化了他们其实是经济移民的观点。


Populist parties, which had already gained a foothold by playing on people’s fears of and frustrations with globalization, seized on this notion.	民粹主义政党紧紧抓住了这一概念。 它们通过利用人民的恐惧和对全球化的不满，已经站稳了脚跟。


At a time of high long-term unemployment and heavy public-debt burdens, they declared that the refugees would take jobs from Europeans or, worse, drain European taxpayer-funded social benefits.	在长期失业高企、公共债务负担沉重的背景下，它们宣称难民将从欧洲人手中夺走工作岗位，甚至更糟糕地，将耗尽欧洲纳税人供养的社会福利。


Some European populations, frustrated with the EU’s handling of past crises, had already begun to fall prey to nationalist sentiment; so it was not difficult for populists to portray the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into European countries as a new threat to national identity.	一些欧洲人对欧盟处理过去的危机的表现十分不满，沦为民族主义情绪的附庸； 因此，民粹主义者不难将数十万涌入欧洲各国的难民描述为对民族身份的新威胁。


Chaotic border scenes from Calais, Macedonia, and Kos reinforced the image of disorder.	加莱、马其顿和科斯（Kos）边境的乱象加剧了失序的印象。


Finally, the horrific terror attacks in Paris and Brussels, though carried out by European nationals, infused a profound sense of insecurity into the discussion.	最后，骇人听闻的巴黎和布鲁塞尔恐怖袭击为这一讨论注入了影响深远的不安全感，尽管这两次袭击是欧洲人实施的。


When all of these challenges are lumped together, the problem seems intractable, creating the impression that an isolationist response is EU countries’ only hope for protecting themselves.	当所有这些挑战汇聚在一起时，问题就变得十分棘手，产生了一种孤立主义应对措施是欧盟各国保护自己的唯一希望的印象。


But what Europe actually faces is three distinct challenges: protecting refugees, as required by European and international law; developing an effective and sustainable immigration policy that will benefit the EU; and responding to the discontent of second- and third-generation immigrant communities in Europe.	但欧洲实际上面临的是三个不同的挑战：保护难民，这是欧洲和国际法律的要求； 制定有效、可持续的移民政策以惠及欧盟；


When considered separately, effective solutions begin to emerge.	以及响应第二代和第三代欧洲移民的不满情绪。 只要分开考虑，有效解决方案就会浮现出来。


In terms of radicalization among communities already living in Europe, much has been said, particularly following the attacks in March in Brussels.	对于已经在欧洲生活的移民的激进化问题，已经有了大量讨论，特别是在3月布鲁塞尔袭击之后。


What too few have pointed out is that these are Europeans.	很少被提到的是这些人是欧洲人。


Dealing with their restlessness and frustration within the context of immigration will only alienate them further.	以移民标准处理他们的不安定和不满只能进一步疏离他们。


As for the refugee challenge, the solution must begin with clarity about Europe’s actual responsibilities.	至于难民挑战，解决方案必须从厘清欧洲的实际责任开始。


The duty to provide protection to those with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is contained in the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon.	为有“理由充分的受迫害恐惧”的人提供保护被写入了联合国公约中有关难民地位的内容，并由里斯本条约执行。


In other words, the EU must protect those who face imminent danger if returned to their home country, not everyone arriving at its borders.	换句话说，欧盟必须保护那些一旦回国就将立刻遭遇危险的人，而不是所有抵达欧洲边境的人。


Moreover, that protection is not supposed to be permanent.	此外，这一保护并非永久性。


When it is safe to return home, those who have not obtained permanent residency or citizenship should do so.	如果回国已经安全，那些尚未获得永久居留权或公民权的人就应该回国。


Everyone must understand that the obligation to protect people fleeing persecution has its limits.	所有人都必须明白，保护逃离迫害的人的义务是有边界的。


To be sure, Europe should not be shouldering this burden alone.	平心而论，不应该让欧洲独自承担这一负担。


The entire international community should be doing its part.	全体国际社会也应该贡献力量。


In 1979, an international conference was held to respond to the refugee crisis that arose from the end of the Vietnam War and the mayhem of the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia; over the next two years, more than 620,000 refugees were resettled in 20 countries.	1979年举行了一次国际会议讨论应对越南战争结束和柬埔寨红色高棉种族灭绝所产生的难民危机问题； 在接下来的两年中，620,000 多难民被20个国家收容。


Such cooperative action is badly needed today.	今天也急需这样的合作行动。


As long as the rest of the international community fails to fulfill its responsibilities toward the refugees, it will remain difficult to convince a skeptical European public to do so.	只要国际社会不兑现其对难民的责任，就无法说服狐疑的欧洲公众这样���。


Clarity is similarly vital in addressing immigration.	明确性在解决移民问题上也同样重要。


Welcoming immigrants is in Europe’s interest.	欢迎移民符合欧洲的利益。


But precisely which immigrants should be up to Europe.	但欢迎什么样的移民应该由欧洲决定。


Yet neither the EU nor any of its member states has a coherent immigration policy with this end in mind.	但无论是欧盟还是任何一个成员国，移民政策都与这一思维不符。


This must change, with the EU demonstrating its capacity to attract the talent and labor needed to ensure economic growth and competitiveness.	这必须做出改变，欧盟要拿出吸引确保经济增长和竞争力所需要的人才和劳动力的能力证明。


Beyond appropriate refugee and immigration policy, Europe needs proper tools for implementation.	除了合适的难民和移民政策，欧洲还需要合适的实施工具。


No amount of messaging and incentives will work if the borders are not secure or immigration rules are not being applied effectively.	如果边境不安全，或移民规则得不到有效应用，那么信号和激励就不会起作用。


It has been said that differentiating between refugees and immigrants is code for excluding everyone.	有人说，区分难民和移民等于排斥所有人。


That is not the case.	绝非如此。


A more precise understanding of the distinct problems facing Europe is vital to resolving them.	更准确地理解欧洲所面临的不同问题对于解决这些问题至关重要。


If we are to address the discontent of marginalized communities within Europe, we need to understand the factors underlying it.	如果我们要解决欧洲内部边缘化群体的不满，就需要理解他们的不满背后的因素。


If we are to meet our international obligations toward refugees, we need to know what those responsibilities are.	如果我们要履行我们的国际难民义务，就需要明白我们的责任在哪里。


If we are to ensure that immigration benefits both the newcomers and their host communities, we need to identify what benefits we are seeking.	如果我们要确保移民能够让新来者和东道主都受益，就需要明白我们在寻求哪些好处。


Without such clarity, populists seeking to tear us apart with their simplistic xenophobic propaganda will thrive.	缺少这样的明确性，试图通过简单的仇外宣传分裂我们的民粹主义者就会得逞。


Europe’s Refugee Problem, Then and Now	欧洲的难民问题：过去和现在


NEW YORK – Earlier this spring, I drove to a beautiful spot on the southern bank of Lake Geneva.	纽约—今年春天早些时候，我驾车来到日内瓦湖南岸的一处美丽风景。


My destination was the Hotel Royale in Évian-les-Bains.	我的目的地是埃维昂莱班（Évian-les-Bains）的皇家酒店（Hotel Royale）。


It was there, in July 1938, that 32 nations met for a shameful discussion that has been virtually airbrushed from our memory.	1938年，就是在这里，32个国家进行了可耻的讨论，这段历史已经基本上从我们的记忆中抹去了。


Convened by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in response to the massive refugee crisis triggered by Hitler’s virulent anti-Semitism, the Évian conference was a catastrophe.	埃维昂会议由美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福召集，目的是为了应对希特勒残暴的反犹主义所造成的大规模难民危机。 这次会议是一场灾难。


And its disastrous outcome needs to be recalled in the light of Europe’s current migration crisis.	在今天的欧洲移民危机的衬托下，我们应该再次铭记起它的可怕后果。


The Évian conference was supposed to address the plight of hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian Jews who were desperate for refuge.	埃维昂会议原本是为了解决急于逃难的数十万德国和奥地利犹太人的困境。


Roosevelt believed that only a collective solution could meet the challenge.	罗斯福认为唯有集体方案能够应对这一挑战。


Hitler, too, hoped that other countries would accept them.	希特勒也希望其他国家可以接受他们。


In a speech in Königsberg that March, he jeered, “I can only hope and expect that the other world which has felt such deep sympathy for these criminals will be generous enough to transform this pity into practical aid.	在那年3月的柯尼斯堡（Königsberg）讲话中，他揶揄道：“我只能希望和期待另一个世界对这些罪犯怀有深刻的同情，能够慷慨地将它们的怜悯之情转化为实际援助。


As far as I am concerned we are ready to place our luxury ships at the disposal of these countries for the transportation of these criminals.”	就我个人而言，我准备随时将我们的豪华船只提供给这些国家调遣，用于运送这些罪犯。


He had already begun to expel Jews, including by placing them forcibly on ships and sending them to various destinations in the Mediterranean and across the Atlantic.	”他已经开始驱逐犹太人，手段包括强行把他们驱赶上船，运往地中海和大西洋的各个目的地。


But, throughout Europe, the refugees faced rejection.	但是，难民在整个欧洲都面临被拒绝的局面。


On June 6, 1938, as preparations for the conference were underway, the US State Department received a letter concerning 51 Austrian Jewish refugees stranded on a small boat in the international waters of the Danube.	1938年6月6日，埃维昂会议筹备期间，美国国务院收到了一封信，上面说，51名奥地利犹太难民被困在了多瑙河国际水域中的一条小船上。


The writer recalled seeing: “the heartrending fate of 51 human beings driven from one frontier to the other.	写信者回忆他看到的情景：“51个人在边界上被推来推去，令人揪心。


We have gained personal knowledge of the unspeakable misery that has innocently befallen 100,000 inhabitants of Austria.”	我们感受到了无辜降临在100,000奥地利居民头上的莫可名状的痛苦。 ”


And yet in Évian the following month, although many European delegations voiced eloquent dismay over the torment experienced by the Jews of Germany and Austria, they were unprepared to take concrete action.	但接下来，在埃维昂的那个月中，尽管许多欧洲代表团对于德国和奥地利犹太人所经受的折磨表示诚挚的哀悼，但并不准备采取实质行动。


The outcome of the meeting was clear: Europe, North America, and Australia would not accept significant numbers of these refugees.	会议的结果是清楚的：欧洲、北美和澳大利亚不会接受大量这样的难民。


In the verbatim record, two words were uttered repeatedly: “density” and “saturation.”	在会议报告的用语中，有两个词频繁出现：“密度”（density）和“饱和”（saturation）。


The European countries were already beset with population “density” and had reached a point of “saturation” – in other words, there was simply no more room at the European inn.	欧洲国家已经饱受人口“密度”困扰，达到了“饱和”点——换句话说，欧洲已经没有更多的空间。


It was an absurd thing to say, of course, in 1938, given the size of Europe’s populations today.	当然，从当今欧洲人口规模看，1938年说出这样的话简直可笑。


And it would be an equally ridiculous thing to say now, too.	而现在说这样的话也同样荒谬。


To be sure, the participants in Évian could not have foreseen the Holocaust, or that Europe was being drawn into another devastating war; nonetheless, their lack of moral conscience was breathtaking.	平心而论，埃维昂会议的参与者不可能预见到大屠杀或欧洲将发生又一场灾难性大战； 尽管如此，他们的缺少良知仍然令人心碎。


Many of the countries that refused to take in suffering refugees were themselves, in due course, occupied and brutalized by the Nazis – and desperate for the compassion that they denied the Jews in July 1938.	许多拒绝接受蒙难难民的国家后来纷纷被纳粹占领和蹂躏——急切地需要它们在1938年拒绝了犹太人的同情心。


The Nazis must have reveled in the knowledge that their virulent anti-Semitism found an echo – sometimes not so faint – in the rest of Europe.	残暴的反犹主义在欧洲其他地区取得了回音——有时还相当有力——这一定让纳粹欣喜不已。


They also came to realize that if expulsion was not possible, extermination eventually would be.	它们还开始意识到，如果驱逐无从实现，最终就必须进行种族灭绝。


Today, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia, and anti-migrant sentiment are again rising across Europe, and we must stop now and reassess precisely where we are.	如今，反犹主义、伊斯兰恐惧症、种族主义、仇外主义和反移民情绪再次在欧洲横行，如今，我们必须停下来准确地评估一下我们身在何处。


A major British tabloid newspaper recently felt it acceptable to allow one of its columnists to call immigrants “cockroaches.”	一家著名英国小报最近认为，让其专栏作家将移民称为“蟑螂”也是可以接受的。


Rwanda’s Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines used the same word to describe Tutsis in the run-up to the 1994 genocide, as did Julius Streicher’s Nazi newspaper Der Stürmer to describe Jews.	1994年种族灭绝前夕，卢旺达米勒·柯林斯自由广播电视台（Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines）用同样的词汇描述图西族人��一如当年朱利乌斯·施特赖歇尔（Julius Streicher）的纳粹报纸《先锋报》（Der Stürmer）描述犹太人。


Political leaders across Europe regularly – and shamefully – blame migrants for their national woes.	全欧洲的政治领袖时不时可耻地指责移民需要为国家乱象负责。


Attacking migrants or minorities – whether crudely, through language, or more subtly, through policy – is unacceptable everywhere, full stop.	攻击移民或少数群体——不管是通过言语赤裸裸地攻击还是通过政策更加巧妙地攻击——在无论什么地方都是不可接受的。


When words are formulated with the clear intention of causing harm and violence on national, racial or religious grounds, freedom of expression becomes incitement to hatred, which is prohibited by law.	当人们带着明确的目的性使用导致民族、种族和宗教伤害和暴力的词汇时，言论自由就成了仇恨的催化剂，而这是法律不允许的。


Countries that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which includes all European Union members, are bound to uphold it.	签署了国际公民权利和政治权利公约（International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights）的国家（包括所有欧盟成员国）都有法律义务捍卫它。


And yet Europe’s current proposals on migration leave much to be desired.	但目前的欧洲移民提案大有改进必要。


The continent needs to recall its past more sensitively, and be more generous to the desperate people crossing the Mediterranean.	欧洲大陆需要更加细致地回顾它的过去，更佳慷慨地对待穿越地中海的绝望的人民。


François Crépeau, the United Nations special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, observed in a recent interview that Europe, Australia, and Canada could easily resettle one million Syrian refugees over the next five years, and they could add Eritreans to that list and extend this policy to seven years.	移民人权特别调查员弗朗西斯·克雷皮欧（François Crépeau）在最新的采访中观察道，欧洲、澳大利亚和加拿大可以轻松地在未来五年中收容一百万叙利亚难民，并且可以将厄立特里亚人也包括进来并把该政策延长到七年。


So why is Europe proposing to accept a paltry 20,000-40,000 people annually for resettlement?	既然如此，为何欧洲仅仅提出每年收容20,000—40,000人？


To the European politician strongly opposed to migration, I suggest that the next time you need hospital treatment, take a look around you: many of the people caring for you have a migrant’s tale.	对于强烈反对移民的欧洲政客，我建议下一次当你们需要医院治疗时，看一看周围的人：许多照看你的人都是移民。


And should you quench your thirst with the famous water drawn from Évian-les-Bains, you may wish to reflect on the craven failure of a conference that could have saved so many lives – and on what it can still teach us today.	而当你们打开来自埃维昂莱班的依云矿泉水解渴时，你们应该想一想，这里曾经举行过一次可耻地失败的会议，这个会议原本可以拯救无数人的生命，它能给今天的我们带来什么教训？


Europe\u0027s Refugee Opportunity	欧洲的难民机会


ROME – Europe’s so-called refugee crisis should never have become an emergency.	罗马—欧洲的所谓难民危机原本绝不应该成为一种紧急状况。


Accommodating one million asylum-seekers should not be a huge challenge for the European Union – an area with 500 million citizens that welcomes more than three million immigrants every year.	安置一百万寻求庇护者不应该成为欧盟的艰巨挑战——欧盟拥有5亿公民，每年都要迎来三百多万移民。


Unfortunately, the lack of a coordinated response is transforming a manageable problem into an acute political crisis – one that, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel has rightly warned, could destroy the EU.	不幸的是，缺乏协作应对措施正在将这个可管理的问题变为一场尖锐的政治危机——如德国总理默克尔所正确地警告的，这场危机可能毁掉欧盟。


Most EU member states are selfishly focusing on their own interests.	大部分欧盟成员国都自私地只关注自身利益。


This pits them against one another and has precipitated panic, putting refugees in even greater peril.	这让它们彼此对立，也制造了恐慌，让难民的境况更加危险。


A smart, comprehensive plan would calm the fears.	明智的全面计划可以平息恐慌。


Instead, Europe has preferred to search for scapegoats – and Greece is the latest to be targeted for blame.	相反，欧盟却偏好于寻找替罪羊——而希腊则是最新的指责对象。


Greece has been accused of not doing enough to process and house refugees.	希腊被指责在处理和安置移民方面做得不够。


And yet, even if the country were not crippled by economic crisis, it would be unreasonable to expect a single small country to bear the burden alone – especially in a year when more than 800,000 refugees are expected to pass through its territory.	然而，即使希腊没有受到经济危机影响，要求像它这样的小国独自承担这一负担也是不合理的——特别是面临一年800,000多难民过境的情况。


This is a European and global problem, not solely a Greek problem.	这是一个欧洲和全球问题，而不仅仅是希腊的问题。


There is plenty of blame to go around.	应该负责的对象有很多。


In Greece, George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, acting in partnership with European Economic Area and Norway Grants, anticipated the problems that the lack of a serious European asylum policy would create.	在希腊，乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）的开放社会基金会（Open Society Foundations）与欧洲经济区（European Economic Area）和挪威捐赠基金（Norway Grants）合作行动，预见到欧洲高层避难政策缺位可能带来的问题。


In 2013, the partnership established an organization, Solidarity Now, run by the cream of Greek civil society.	2013年，它们合作成立了一个叫作“立刻团结”（Solidarity Now）的组织，由希腊公民社会精英运营。


Solidarity Now needs just €62 million ($67 million) to care for 15,000 of the 50,000 refugees who need to be housed in Greece next year.	立刻团结组织只需要6,200万欧元就可以为明年需要住在希腊的50,000难民中的15,000人提供照顾。


And yet, though the EU has promised to spend €500 million to help Greece manage the crisis, some member states have failed to pay their share.	但是，尽管欧洲承诺拿出5亿欧元帮助希腊管理这场危机，但一些成员国并没有拿出应当的份额。


In addition to supporting Greece, the EU needs a comprehensive plan for managing the arrival of asylum-seekers in a safe, orderly way.	除了支持希腊，欧盟还需要一个全面的计划让寻求庇护者以安全有序的方式到来。


That means operating beyond Europe’s borders, as, from the donors’ perspective, it is much less disruptive and expensive to maintain asylum-seekers close to their present locations.	这意味着在欧洲边界之外展开工作，从出资者的角度看，让寻求庇护者保持在现在所处的位置附近要安全得多，成本也低得多。


For starters, the EU should commit to absorbing at least 500,000 asylum-seekers a year, while working to convince the rest of the world to accept an equal number.	首先，欧盟应该承诺每年至少吸收500,000寻求庇护者，同时努力说服世界其他地区也接收相同数量的难民。


A public commitment of this magnitude should help calm the disorderly scramble for Europe.	公开承诺接收那么多难民有助于平息无序蜂拥进入欧洲的状况。


Asylum-seekers provided with a clear status and promises of safety could be induced to wait in Turkey and other frontline countries, rather than risk a dangerous Mediterranean crossing.	获得明确的地位和安全承诺的寻求庇护者可以引导到土耳其和其他前沿国家等待，而不必冒险穿越危险的地中海。


Second, formal gateways should be established, first in Turkey, and then in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco.	其次，应该建立正式的“边关”，首先是土耳其，然后是黎巴嫩、约旦、突尼斯和摩洛哥。


Gateway countries would establish, in close cooperation with the United Nations Refugee Agency and the EU, processing centers to register asylum-seekers and assess their applications.	边关国家应该与联合国难民署和欧盟紧密合作，成立寻求庇护者注册处理中心并评估他们的庇护申请。


Accepted asylum-seekers would then be placed in a queue and required to remain in the gateway country until an EU country accepts them.	获得接受的寻求庇护者可以排队在边关国家等候欧盟国家接受他们。


A safe, deliberate process of vetting refugees would quell security concerns in the aftermath of the Paris attacks.	安全成熟的难民检查程序能够平息巴黎恐怖袭击所带来的安全担忧。


Gateway countries would have to improve reception, asylum, and integration standards.	边关国家必须改进接待、庇护和融合标准。


In exchange, these countries should be helped financially and provided with other incentives – for example, easier access to the EU for their citizens.	作为交换，这些国家应该获得金融支持和其他激励——如公民更容易进入欧盟。


Indeed, the EU should establish or expand programs that allow entry to non-asylum-seekers.	事实上，欧盟应该成立或扩大允许非寻求庇护者进入的计划。


Third, political, financial, and technical support must be provided to frontline countries.	第三，必须为前沿国家提供政治、金融和技术支持。


Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, which have borne most of the burden of the crisis, host more than four million Syrian refugees.	土耳其、黎巴嫩和约旦目前承担着大部分危机负担，接受了四百多万叙利亚难民。 土耳其说，它已经花费了78亿美元用于照顾两百多万难民；


Turkey says it has spent $7.8 billion to care for more than two million refugees; thus far, it has received only $415 million from others (though the EU has promised another €3 billion).	而到目前为止，土耳其只获得了4. 15亿美元来自其他国家的资金（尽管欧盟已承诺再支持30亿欧元）。


Full support for refugees in frontline countries is estimated to cost at least €20 billion per year.	充分支持前沿国家的难民估计每年至少要花费200亿欧元。


The EU should commit at least half of this, with the balance coming from the rest of the international community.	欧盟至少应该承担其中的一半，其余部分由国际社会承担。


Special economic zones that benefit from preferred trade status with the EU and the United States should be created, in order to generate investment, economic opportunities, and jobs for refugees and locals alike.	应该建立获得欧盟和美国最惠贸易待遇的特别经济区，为难民和本地居民形成投资、经济机会和就业岗位。


These zones should be established in both frontline and transit countries.	特别经济区应该在前沿国家和过境国家建立。


Fourth, the EU needs a truly common asylum and border-guard system.	第四，欧盟需要真正的共同庇护和边防体系。


The patchwork of 28 separate asylum systems is expensive and inefficient, and it produces wildly uneven results in terms of the reception, status determination, and integration of new arrivals.	目前欧盟存在28套各自为政的庇护体系，可谓事倍功半，在接受新来者、地位确认和融合等方面产生了严重的不平等结果。


The EU should establish a single European Border Guard and a single Asylum and Migration Agency.	欧盟应该建立单一的欧洲边防局（European Border Guard）和单一的庇护和移民署（Asylum and Migration Agency）


Fifth, a global response to the crisis, coordinated by the UN, must accompany the EU’s plan.	第五，必须有联合国协调的全球危机响应方案配合欧盟的计划。


This would distribute the responsibility for addressing the refugee crisis over a larger number of states, while helping establish global standards for dealing with the challenge of forced migration.	这将把解决难民危机的责任分散给更多国家，同时也有助于建立处理被迫移民挑战的全球标准。


Finally, to finance the plan, the EU could use its AAA borrowing capacity to issue long-term bonds.	最后，为了筹集计划资金，欧盟应该利用其AAA级借贷能力发行长期债券。


The burden of servicing the bonds would be assigned to member states in inverse proportion to the number of asylum-seekers they accept.	维持债券的负担应该按与接受寻求庇护者数量的反比关系分配给各成员国。


Those countries that can successfully integrate refugees would reap an economic advantage; already, the German economy is growing significantly faster as a result of its willingness to accept Syrian refugees.	成功融合难民的国家将获得经济优势； 德国经济之所以增长速度显著更快，便是因为它愿意接受叙利亚难民。


The ongoing exodus from Syria and other war-torn countries was long in the making, easy to foresee, and eminently manageable.	逃脱叙利亚和其他饱受战争摧残国家的难民潮酝酿时间漫长，很容易预见，也绝对是可以管理的。


Fear-mongering nativists are taking advantage of the lack of a coordinated response to peddle a vision that runs counter to the values upon which the EU was built.	炮制恐慌的本土论者利用协作应对方案缺失的机会鼓吹有悖于作为欧盟立盟价值观的愿景。


Their vision, if realized, would violate European law; already, it threatens to divide and destroy the EU.	它们的愿景如果实现，将违反欧洲法； 如今，这一愿景眼看就要令欧盟分裂和毁灭。


For this reason, it is all the more urgent that the EU backs a comprehensive strategy to end the panic and stop the unnecessary human suffering.	因此，欧盟支持全面战略结束恐慌、停止不必要的人道灾难迫在眉睫。


Depression’s Advocates	大萧条的支持者


BERKELEY – Back in the early days of the ongoing economic crisis, I had a line in my talks that sometimes got applause, usually got a laugh, and always gave people a reason for optimism.	伯克利—在至今仍未结束的此次经济危机爆发早期，我曾经说过一些话，它们赢得过喝彩，常常招来笑声，并且永远给人们乐观的理由。


Given the experience of Europe and the United States in the 1930s, I would say, policymakers would not make the same mistakes as their predecessors did during the Great Depression.	我说，从欧洲和美国在20世纪30年代的经验看，决策者不会重蹈他们的前辈在大萧条期间的覆辙。


This time, we would make new, different, and, one hoped, lesser mistakes.	这一回，他们会犯下新的、不同的、但愿程度更小的错误。


Unfortunately, that prediction turned out to be wrong.	不幸的是，这一预言看来是错误的。


Not only have policymakers in the eurozone insisted on repeating the blunders of the 1930s; they are poised to repeat them in a more brutal, more exaggerated, and more extended fashion.	欧元区的决策者不但铁心重蹈20世纪30年代覆辙，还要以更残酷、更激烈、规模更大地重蹈覆辙。


I did not see that coming.	我没有料到会这样。


When the Greek debt crisis erupted in 2010, it seemed to me that the lessons of history were so obvious that the path to a resolution would be straightforward.	2010年希腊债务危机爆发时，我认为历史教训是如此显而易见，解决方案应该非常直观。


The logic was clear.	逻辑十分清楚。


Had Greece not been a member of the eurozone, its best option would have been to default, restructure its debt, and depreciate its currency.	如果希腊不是欧元区成员，其最好的选择将是违约、重组债务和货币贬值。


But, because the European Union did not want Greece to exit the eurozone (which would have been a major setback for Europe as a political project), Greece would be offered enough aid, support, debt forgiveness, and assistance with payments to offset any advantages it might gain by exiting the monetary union.	但是，由于欧盟不希望希腊退出欧元区（这将是作为政治工程的欧盟的一次重大挫折），希腊本应该获得足够的援助、支持、债务豁免和偿付协助，以抵消任何它可能从退出货币联盟中获得的好处。


Instead, Greece’s creditors chose to tighten the screws.	相反，希腊债权人选择收紧束缚。


As a result, Greece is likely much worse off today than it would have been had it abandoned the euro in 2010.	结果，要是它在2010年就放弃欧元，今天的状况或许会好得多。


Iceland, which was hit by a financial crisis in 2008, provides the counterfactual.	2008年，爱尔兰也受到了金融危机冲击，它提供了一个反例。


Whereas Greece remains mired in depression, Iceland – which is not in the eurozone – has essentially recovered.	希腊在萧条中泥足深陷，而爱尔兰——它不在欧元区中——已经基本实现复苏。


To be sure, as the American economist Barry Eichengreen argued in 2007, technical considerations make exiting the eurozone difficult, expensive, and dangerous.	诚然，正如美国经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）在2007年所指出的，技术考虑让退出欧元区变得十分艰难、昂贵和危险。


But that is just one side of the ledger.	但这只是硬币的一面。


Using Iceland as our measuring stick, the cost to Greece of not exiting the eurozone is equivalent to 75% of a year’s GDP – and counting.	如果用爱尔兰作为衡量标杆，那么希腊不退出欧元区的代价是一年GDP的75%。