Over the last 18 months, the first and second arrows of Abenomics – consisting of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies – have achieved considerable success in spurring Japan’s economic renewal.	在过去18个月中，安倍经济学的第一支和第二支箭——扩张性货币和财政政策组合——在刺激日本经济复兴方面取得了巨大的成功。


For starters, they have fueled price growth, with the GDP price deflator declining from 3% to nearly zero.	首先，它们推高了物价，GDP价格平减指数从3%下降到接近于零。


Moreover, the ratio of job openings to applicants, which fell to 0.4 under Japan’s last government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, is now approaching 1.1.	此外，开放申请就业岗位比例曾经在上届民主党政府执政时期下降到0. 4，如今已接近1.


Indeed, Japan is beginning to show signs of a labor shortage.	1。 事实上，日本一开始呈现出劳动力短缺之势。


But the limits of Abenomics’ first two arrows will soon be reached.	但安倍经济学的前两支箭很快就将形成强弩之末之势。


With employment rising as Japan’s economy moves toward realizing potential output, monetary stimulus will create inflationary pressures and public expenditure will yield sharply diminishing returns.	随着日本经济回归潜在产出，就业也在增长，与此同时，货币刺激将形成通胀压力，公共支出回报将急剧下降。


At that point, significant growth can be achieved only by increasing the economy’s real productive capacity. That is what Abe’s new growth strategy aims to achieve.	到那时，只有通过增加经济的实际生产力才能实现漂亮的增长。


At the strategy’s core is the removal of obstacles to growth for businesses, particularly the elimination or easing of regulatory barriers.	安倍战略的核心是消除企业成长的壁垒，特别是取消或放松监管壁垒。


Deregulation promises to bolster the ability of Japan’s private sector, which already excels in high-technology industries, to innovate and compete globally.	去监管化有望提振日本私人部门的创新和全球竞争实力（目前日本企业在高科技产业已经具备出色表现）。


While some officials, who may benefit from business regulations, may resist this initiative, its economic benefits, together with Abe’s determination, are compelling.	尽管一些从商业监管中获益的官员可能会抵制这一政策，但经济方面的裨益加上安倍的决心使得这一政策已势不可挡。


At the same time, Japan will undergo sweeping labor-market reforms, open designated industries to foreign workers, and create “special economic zones” within which officials will have the authority that they need to reduce red tape in areas like agricultural land management.	与此同时，日本将有全面的劳动力市场改革，向外国工人开放指定行业，并成立“特别经济区”。 在特别经济区中，官员将获得减少农地管理等领域的繁文缛节的权力。


If concluded, the Trans-Pacific Partnership – a mega-regional 12-country free-trade agreement – will provide an additional boost to Japan’s economy.	而如果有12个国家参与的大型自由贸易协定——跨太平洋合作伙伴（Trans-Pacific Partnership）获得通过，将给日本经济带来额外的提振。


Perhaps the most promising reform is corporate-tax reduction, which will help Japan boost both foreign and domestic investment.	也许意义最大的改革是公司税的降低，这有助于日本提振外国和国内投资。


By spurring increased business activity, it will actually increase Japan’s corporate-tax revenue.	事实上，通过刺激商业活动，这能够增加日本的公司税收入。


By global standards, Japan’s current corporate-tax rate of 35% is quite high.	用全球标准衡量，日本当前35%的公司税率非常高。


Indeed, while it remains lower than in some US states (California’s rate, for example, stands at 40%), it exceeds the rates applied in Germany (25%), China (24%), South Korea (24%), the United Kingdom (24%), and Singapore (17%).	事实上，尽管比一些美国州低（如加州的公司税率高达40%），但日本公司税率高于德国（25%）、中国（24%）、韩国（24%）、英国（24%）和新加坡（17%）。


A quarter-century ago, the UK and Germany had higher corporate-tax rates than Japan.	四分之一世纪前，英国和德国的公司税都高于日本。


But they have since recognized the value of reduced rates.	但此后它们认识到了降低税率的价值。


The UK practically waged a tax war against other countries to attract investment.	英国事实上掀起了一场吸引投资的税收战争。


Both countries’ experiences have demonstrated that substantial reductions over a short period are far more effective than a gradual, drawn-out process.	两国经验表明短期大幅降低税率远比长期缓慢下调更为有效。


Fortunately, Abe plans to follow suit.	幸运的是，安倍准备效仿英德先例。


The impact of this approach may be even more pronounced in Japan, where only a small share of firms currently pay corporate tax.	这一方针的影响在日本可能更为显著，因为目前只有一小部分企业缴纳公司税。


One reason for this is the contractionary monetary policy pursued by former Bank of Japan Governor Masaaki Shirakawa, which prevented the economy from reaching its growth potential for more than 15 years, until Haruhiko Kuroda took over the position.	一个原因是前任日本银行行长白川方明（Masaaki Shirakawa）所实施的紧缩货币政策导致日本经济在15年的时间里都没能实现其增长潜力，直到黑田东彦（Haruhiko Kuroda）上任才有所改观。


Japan’s so-called “special measures for corporate tax” – ad hoc provisions that reduce or waive certain taxes for firms at particular times – have also contributed to sustaining the economy’s output gap.	日本的所谓“公司税特别措施”——即在特殊时期降低或免除某些税收的特别条款——也是日本经济出现产出缺口的原因之一。


These measures not only distort resource allocation; they also often lead to collusion between businesses and government officials seeking opportunities to enter the private sector upon retirement.	这些措施不但扭曲了资源配置； 还往往导致企业与寻求在退休后进入私人部门的政府官员的冲突。


Eliminating them would go a long way toward increasing corporate-tax revenue, without stifling growth.	取消这些措施极有利于增加公司税收入，并且不会拖累增长。


Abe’s growth strategy has the potential to bring massive benefits to Japan.	安倍的增长战略有可能给日本带来巨大的好处。


But it will also demand sacrifices.	但也需要做出牺牲。


Consumption-tax hikes will be borne by consumers; the TPP will create new challenges for farmers; and deregulation will run counter to some bureaucrats’ interests.	消费税提高的负担将由消费者承担； 跨太平洋合作伙伴将给农民带来新挑战；


In this context, it is reasonable to expect businesses to relinquish some of their tax exemptions.	去监管化不利于某些官僚的利益。 在这样的环境下，让企业放弃一些免税优惠也是合理的。


The Abe government has presented a set of forward-looking reforms – and appears determined to follow through on implementing them, even if doing so means confronting those with a vested interest in their failure.	安倍政府提出了一系列前瞻性改革——并表现出不惜对抗既得利益坚定实施改革的决心。


If the third arrow succeeds in sustaining Japan’s economic revival, there will no longer be any room to doubt the merits of Abenomics.	如果第三支箭成功维持了日本经济的复苏，那么安倍经济学的是非也就再无争议之处了。


Is Abenomics Working?	安倍经济学有作用吗？


TOKYO – Last April, Japan’s government implemented a long-planned consumption-tax hike, from 5% to 8%, the first in a two-step increase that is expected to bring the rate to 10% by 2015.	东京—去年4月，日本政府实施了计划已久政策，将消费税从5%提高到8%，这是到2015年将该税率提高到10%的两步计划的第一步。


The hike – a key feature of “Abenomics,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three-pronged strategy to revive Japan’s economy – signals the government’s long-term commitment to fiscal consolidation.	此次增税是首相安倍晋三为重振日本经济而提出的三管齐下战略—— “安倍经济学”的关键部分，表明了政府对财政整合的长期承诺。


But it has also dealt Japan a heavy macroeconomic blow.	但它也给日本宏观经济带来了重创。


Preliminary GDP data show a 6.8% contraction year-on-year in the second quarter of this year – the largest since the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that devastated the country.	初步GDP数据显示，今年二季度日本经济同比收缩6. 8%——为2011年地震和海啸摧毁日本以来的最大降幅。


Moreover, consumer spending fell by a record amount, contributing to a total real (inflation-adjusted) decline of 5.9% from last July.	此外，消费支出下降创出了历史记录，导致去年7月以来实际（经通胀调整）下降5. 9%。


But it is not all bad news.	但这并不是坏消息的全部。


Expansionary monetary policy – the second of three so-called “arrows” of Abenomics, after fiscal stimulus – has brought down the unemployment rate to just 3.8%.	扩张性货币政策——安倍经济学所谓三支“箭”中次于财政刺激的第二支——令失业率只有3. 8%。


The ratio of job openings to applicants has exceeded parity, and the GDP deflator narrowed to close to zero.	可申请岗位数/申请人数比超过1:1，而GDP 平减指数也收窄到接近于零。


Such data have given rise to two opposing views.	如此数据导致了相反的两种观点。


Some economists worry that negative second-quarter data will dampen inflation expectations, thereby undermining Abe’s plan for boosting growth.	有些经济学家担心第二季度的不利数据将抑制通胀预期，从而不利于安倍的提振增长计划。


Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is emphasizing the positive outcomes of its monetary policy – and is hesitating to continue its expansionary measures.	与此同时，日本银行强调其货币政策的积极结果——在犹豫是否继续扩张性措施。


If the first view proves correct, the BOJ will need to ease monetary policy further to counter falling inflation.	如果第一种观点正确，那么日本银行需要进一步放松货币政策以对抗通胀下降。


If the BOJ is right, it should maintain its current approach, while the government should either postpone the next consumption-tax increase or implement it in two 1% increments, instead of a single 2% hike.	如果日本银行正确，那么它应该维持现有方针，同时政府应该中止下一步消费税提高或将其分解为两次1%的提升而不是一次性提高2%。


Of course, the second-quarter GDP data show the economy’s immediate response to the hike.	当然，二季度GDP数据表明了经济对消费税提高的最初反应。


But no decision should be made until the third-quarter results are released, providing a clearer picture of what will happen to Japan’s economy after it absorbs the first rate increase.	但在三季度结果发布、搞清楚日本经济在承受了消费税率第一次调高后发生了什么之前，不应该做出任何决定。


Fortunately, that is precisely what Abe intends to do.	幸运的是，安倍正打算这样做。


In any case, the success of monetary policy is difficult to deny.	无论如何，你很难否认货币政策的成功。


As the deflation gap narrows, however, the overall impact of monetary policy will weaken, as it increasingly influences prices more than output.	但是，随着通缩缺口的收窄货币政策的总体影响会下降，因为其对价格而非产出的影响更大。


That is why it is time for Japan’s leaders to shift their focus from the demand-focused first and second arrows to the supply-oriented third arrow: a new growth strategy.	因此，日本领导人应该将注意力从聚焦于需求的第一和第二支箭转向供给导向的第三支箭：新的增长战略。


When there is sufficient excess supply in the economy, promoting supply-side productivity is practically useless without efforts to boost demand.	当经济出现充分多的过度供给时，如果不进行需求刺激，改进供给端生产率是无济于事的。


That implies that it was not appropriate to focus on growth until the deflation gap narrowed considerably – that is, until now.	这意味着，直到通缩缺口大幅收窄后——也就是说，从现在开始——将注意力集中于增长才是合适的。


The third arrow is not a traditional industrial-policy-based approach.	第三支箭不是传统的基于产业政策的方针。


On the contrary, it emphasizes reform of the labor market, deregulation, and a reduction in the corporate-tax rate.	相反，它强调劳动力市场改革、去监管和降低公司税。


A key component of Abe’s growth strategy is to expand the workforce – a major challenge, given that Japanese society is aging rapidly.	安倍增长战略的一个关键部分是扩大劳动力——这是一个大挑战，因为日本社会正在迅速老龄化。


One logical solution would be to integrate more foreign labor into the Japanese economy.	一个自然而然的解决办法是让跟多的外国劳动力融入日本经济。


But efforts to promote immigration face considerable social and cultural barriers.	但促进移民的政策面临着巨大的社会和文化障碍。


A simpler solution would be to mobilize working-age women who already – or plan to – stay at home.	更简单的解决方案是动员居家（或计划居家）的工作年龄女性。


By removing the barriers to employment that women face – whether practical obstacles, like insufficient childcare services, or social constraints – Japan could substantially increase women’s workforce-participation rate, creating an invaluable buffer against the growing labor shortage.	通过打消女性所面临的的就业壁垒——不管是实际障碍（如育儿服务不足）还是社会约束——日本能够极大地提高女性劳动力参与率，为日益短缺的劳动力建立重要缓冲。


The second imperative for boosting growth is the removal of excessively cumbersome government regulations.	提振增长的第二个当务之急是取消过于繁琐的政府监管。


Under the current system, it took 34 years to approve the establishment of a new medical school – the result of collusion between government officials and doctors.	在当前制度下，成立新医学院需要花34年的批准流程——这是政府官员和医生对着干带来的后果。


Abe’s plan calls for introducing a series of less strictly regulated special economic zones, each with a specific objective – for example, adopting new medical technologies or attracting foreign businesses.	安倍的计划要求建立一系列监管较松的特别经济区，各特别经济区都有各自的目标——如采用新医学技术或吸引外国企业。


Such a move promises to help prevent damaging obstructionism by the authorities.	这样做能有助于预防有关部门的从中作梗。


At the same time, the government should work with the country’s trade unions to boost the flexibility and efficiency of the labor market.	预提同时，政府应该与日本工会合作提高劳动力市场的灵活性和效率。


Finally, Abe’s growth strategy demands a corporate-tax reduction – a powerful tool for increasing the tax base in a world in which countries are competing to attract multinational companies.	最后，安倍的增长战略需要降低公司税——在各国竞相吸引跨国公司的背景下，这是扩大税基的有力武器。


Indeed, lower taxes are vital to increase foreign and domestic investment in Japan.	事实上，降低税收对于日本吸引外国和国内投资来说至关重要。


Some of these initiatives, particularly deregulation, will undoubtedly face resistance from bureaucrats concerned about losing their influence.	一些政策，特别是去监管，毫无疑问将面临担心失去影响力的官僚的抵制。


But, as long as Abe, backed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, remains committed to his stated objectives, Japan’s economic future will remain bright.	但是，只要获得内阁官房长官菅义伟支持的安倍能够继续着力于他所提出的目标，日本经济的未来仍然是光明的。


The Ukrainian Revolution’s Jewish Question	乌克兰革命的犹太问题


WARSAW – “And from a Jewish perspective?”	华沙—“那么从犹太角度呢？


I asked Josef Zissels.	”我问约瑟夫•吉赛尔斯（Josef Zissels）。


The veteran Ukrainian dissident, Jewish activist, and passionate advocate of Ukraine’s “Maidan” movement, had just finished briefing a Warsaw audience about the movement’s spectacular victory and President Viktor Yanukovych’s fall from power.	这位乌克兰老牌持异见者、犹太活动家、乌克兰“迈丹”（Maidan）运动的强烈支持者刚刚向华沙群众传递了运动大获全胜、总统给亚努科维奇被推翻的消息。


“There is no Jewish perspective,” he answered.	“没有犹太角度，”他回答说，“分裂两边都有犹太人。


“There are Jews on both sides of the divide.”	”


That is certainly true.	这太对了。


For example, Aleksander Feldman, the chairman of the Jewish Fund for Ukraine, is a prominent parliamentarian for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions – though he condemned the deposed president after his fall.	比如，乌克兰犹太人基金会（Jewish Fund for Ukraine）主席亚历山大•费尔德曼（Aleksander Feldman）就是著名的支持亚努科维奇的地区党（Party of Regions）的国会议员——尽管他在亚努科维奇被推翻后也开始谴责他。


And several Jewish oligarchs were close to Yanukovych until the very end.	另有一些犹太寡头政治家在亚努科维奇倒台前一直和他走得很近。


But support by Jews for the Maidan movement was much more salient.	但犹太人对迈丹运动的支持更加突出。


Four of the 82 protesters killed in Kyiv’s Independence Square were Jewish, and a Jewish sotnia, or “hundred” – a term, ironically, associated with Cossack pogromists – defended the square against Yanukovych’s uniformed goons.	基辅独立广场上被杀的82名反对者中有四人是犹太人，另有一个犹太“索特尼亚”（sotnia，即“百人队”，这个词十分讽刺地来自哥萨克大屠杀）在广场上抵抗亚努科维奇爪牙的进攻。


And yet, alongside Jews at the Maidan were Ukrainian nationalists, with their long history of anti-Semitism.	但是，在迈丹运动中与犹太人并肩作战的乌克兰民族主义者有着长期的反犹太史。


That history is important, not only because it justifies treating them with suspicion.	这段历史很重要，不仅是因为这是带着狐疑眼光对待他们的原因。


More important, it animates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated denunciations of “neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites” allegedly running rampant in the streets of Kyiv, forcing a reluctant Russia to protect Jews, Russians, and any decent Ukrainians who remain.	更重要的是，这支持了俄罗斯普京一再重复的所谓“新纳粹、仇俄分子和反犹主义”在基辅街头肆虐、迫使不情愿的俄罗斯保护犹太人、俄罗斯人和所有留在那里的正派乌克兰人。


What are we to make of such claims?	我们对此能说些什么呢？


In recent weeks, violence targeting Jews has indeed occurred, including the stabbing of a rabbi in Kyiv and the firebombing of a synagogue in Zaporizhia.	近几周来，以犹太人为目标的暴力确实发生了，比如一位基辅拉比被刺身亡，扎波罗杰（Zaporizhia）的一间犹太教堂也遭到了燃烧弹的袭击。


But it is impossible to ascertain the perpetrators, and the Maidan nationalists – the Svoboda party, which has five members in the new government and idolizes wartime leader Stepan Bandera, and the even more extreme Right Sector – have taken pains to stress that anti-Semitism is not part of their program today.	但行凶者已无法查明，而迈丹民主主义者——斯沃博达党（Svoboda，该党有五人进入了新政府，并以战时领袖班代拉（Stepan Bandera）为偶像）甚至更极端的右派党（Right Sector）——大力强调反犹主义不是他们现今的打算。


Such disavowals should not be discounted as mere window dressing.	这些否定犹太人的行为不能只视为摆姿态。


After all, one dresses windows with what one knows the customer wants to see.	毕竟，摆姿态也要摆出你认为别人想看的姿态。


And the customer of the Maidan is the Ukrainian people, not The New York Times.	而这个“别人”是迈丹运动者，而不是《纽约时报》。


If nationalists believe that they will not curry favor with Ukrainians by Jew-baiting, that is a welcome development.	如果民族主义者认为他们不会用激怒犹太人来讨好乌克兰人，那么这是值得欢迎的趋势。


Still, though Ukraine’s chief rabbis and Jewish leaders have emphatically rejected Putin’s claims of anti-Semitic excesses, there is enough hatred and blood in Ukraine’s recent history to make one worry.	但是，尽管乌克兰大拉比和犹太领袖强烈反对普京关于反犹太过度的主张，但在乌克兰现代史上充满了令人担忧的憎恨和流血。


Anti-Semitism was an integral part of European twentieth-century nationalisms, and Bandera’s Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was no exception.	反犹主义是欧洲二十世纪民族主义的一部分，班代拉的乌克兰民族主义组织（Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists，OUN）也不例外。


The OUN conducted terrorist attacks in pre-war Poland, was persecuted by the Soviets after they occupied Eastern Poland in 1939, allied itself with the Nazis after they invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, and slaughtered thousands of Poles and Jews in a drive to “purify” Ukraine.	OUN在战前的波兰就组织过恐怖袭击，1939年占领东波兰后遭到苏联人迫害，1941年纳粹德国入侵苏联后，OUN与纳粹勾结，以“净化”乌克兰为名屠杀了数千波兰人和犹太人。


But Bandera’s men were nationalists with no allies.	但班代拉的人是没有盟友的民族主义者。


The OUN broke with the Nazis after they denied Ukraine independence, and finally fought the Soviets and both the army of Communist Poland and the anticommunist Polish underground after the Germans were routed.	OUN在纳粹拒绝乌克兰独立后便与之决裂，最终与苏联人以及德国人被赶走后的波兰共产主义和反共产主义地下运动武装都有斗争。


In western Ukraine, they remain the incarnation of a heroic myth.	在西乌克兰，他们仍是英雄史诗的化身。


In eastern Ukraine, with its large Russian population, they are widely seen as traitors to the Soviet motherland.	在俄罗斯族人口甚众的东乌克兰，他们大多被视为苏联祖国的叛徒。


So it is no surprise that Putin is trying to place the Maidan movement beyond the pale by emphasizing the OUN’s passing, if bloody, alliance with the Nazis.	因此，普金试图将迈丹运动扩大化，强调OUN与纳粹的（血腥）结盟史并不令人奇怪。


But the “Great Russia” nationalism that he has stirred up to mobilize popular support for his Ukraine policy is hardly more appealing.	但他所鼓吹用于动员群众支持其乌克兰政策的“大俄罗斯”民族主义也并不更加诱人。


It is true that 70 years ago Russian nationalism served Stalin’s totalitarianism in the righteous cause of defeating Hitler’s totalitarianism.	70年前俄罗斯民族主义支持斯大林集权主义抵抗希特勒集权主义的正义行动，这是事实。


It is also true that Russia today is as free of overt manifestations of anti-Semitism as Ukraine is, largely because Putin’s hostility to Jew-baiting is well known and duly noted.	今天的俄罗斯语乌克兰一样公然表现出反犹主义，这也是事实，因为普京对讨好犹太人十分反感，这是众所周知的。


But Putin’s implied argument that in Ukraine he is refighting WWII, with Russia once again rescuing Jews and the world from nationalist pogromists and their European (read: German/ Nazi) sponsors is simply not credible.	但普京的隐含意思——他正在乌克兰重打二战，俄罗斯将再次拯救犹太人和世界于民族主义迫害者及其欧洲（读作：德国/纳粹）赞助人之手——是决不可信的。


On the contrary, his justification for seizing and occupying Crimea – the need to defend ethnic kin from a nonexistent threat – was precisely Hitler’s justification for annexing the Sudetenland.	相反，他为侵略和占领克里米亚的辩护——为了救民族同胞于子虚乌有的威胁——与希特勒吞并苏台德地区的借口如出一辙。


Observers would do well, therefore, not to dredge up the past while ignoring the present.	因此，观察者应该不拘泥于过去、不忽略现在。


The Maidan movement, for all of the nasty antecedents of some of its participants, began as a true popular uprising against a corrupt and despotic regime supported by an expansionist Russia.	迈丹运动——尽管一些参与者此前有过不良案底——是真正的反对腐败残暴政权的群众起义，其背后有扩张主义俄罗斯的支持。


Illiberal nationalism is one of the movement’s driving elements, owing to its widely shared and understandable anti-Russia appeal.	狭隘民族主义是这场运动背后的推动力之一，因为这场运动有人所共有、亦不难理解的反俄诉求。


And, though that nationalism may yet be directed against Ukraine’s Russians, Poles, and Jews, as it was in the past, the rest of the movement would resist such a turn (which may well explain why it has not happened).	此外，尽管民族主义可能如过去一样被引导为反对乌克兰的俄罗斯人、波兰人和犹太人，但迈丹运动的其他部分将能抵制这一转变（这也很好地解释了为什么没有变成这样）。


Putin’s claim that fascists have taken control in Kyiv is fundamentally bogus, while Russia’s despicable actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are all too real.	普京的主张——法西斯主义者控制了基辅——是彻头彻尾的谎言，而俄罗斯在克里米亚和东乌克兰的卑劣行动则是铁一样的事实。


Russia does retain some support among Russophone Ukrainians of all ethnicities, including some Jews.	俄罗斯确实拥有来自各民族俄罗斯裔乌克兰人的支持，包括一些犹太人。


But Zissels is right: The battle is not about them; it is about the survival of a fledgling democratic nation-state.	但吉赛尔斯是对的：这场战争和他们无关； 这场战争和刚刚起步的民主民族国家的生死存亡有关。


Kosovo’s Original Sin	科索沃的原罪


PRISTINA – Hundreds of people disappeared ten years ago in Kosovo, the former Serbian province that is now the world’s newest state.	普里什蒂纳——10年前有数百人在科索沃失踪，这个曾经的塞尔维亚省已经是全世界最新成立的一个国家。


These are not missing persons like the Albanians whom Serbian police executed and buried in secret graves during the Kosovo conflict of 1999.	这些人不同于1999年科索沃战争期间被塞尔维亚警察枪决后掩埋在秘密坟墓中的阿尔巴尼亚失踪者。


These missing persons disappeared after the conflict, on NATO’s and the United Nations’ watch.	这些失踪人员的失踪时间是在 战后 ，在北约和联合国的众目睽睽之下。


Most were Serb civilians.	其中多数人是塞族平民。


Relatives of most report that they were abducted.	多数失踪者的亲属报告他们被人绑架。


Kosovo, to a significant degree, owes its independence to a NATO military intervention undertaken in the name of human rights.	很大程度上科索沃独立应归功于北约以人道主义为名发起的军事干预行动。


And in the name of human rights, it is time for the truth to come out about the people who went missing after the conflict, and about why, for a decade, UN officials ignored appeals by the victims’ families and launched no criminal investigation.	以人权的名义，现在是时候揭开战后人员失踪真相，以及为什么在10年时间里，联合国官员不理睬受害者家属提出的申诉，没有进行任何刑事调查。


Kosovo’s Albanian authorities have for years made no significant decision without receiving the imprimatur of the European Union and, especially, the United States.	多年以来，科索沃阿尔巴尼亚当局未获欧盟、特别是美国的批准没有做出任何重要的决策。


They should urge the Kosovo government to mount a credible investigation, for the sake of the victims and people in Kosovo who want their state to be ruled by law.	看在受害者和希望实现法治的科索沃民众份上，他们应当敦促科索沃政府进行令人信服的调查。


In 1999, the US led NATO into war against Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia to end gross violations of the rights of Kosovo’s majority Albanians.	1999年，以美国为首的北约向斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇的塞尔维亚宣战，以结束对科索沃多数阿尔巴尼亚人权利的严重侵犯。


Serb nationalists had quashed Kosovo’s autonomy.	塞尔维亚民族主义者不承认科索沃自治。


Serb troops beat, killed, and jailed Albanians, whose leaders, following cues from Western embassies, urged nonviolence.	塞族军队殴打、杀戮和关押阿尔巴尼亚人，而阿族领袖在西方各国使馆的暗示下，敦促非暴力解决争端。


After the rise of an Albanian insurgency, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), Milosevic launched a violent, all-out campaign to expel Kosovo’s Albanians.	在阿尔巴尼亚叛军科索沃解放军（UCK）成立之后，米洛舍维奇发起了一场暴力行动，全力驱赶科索沃的阿尔巴尼亚人。


Villages were burned.	村庄被焚毁。


Serbian police forces killed Albanian civilians and cast out hundreds of thousands.	塞族警察部队杀害阿尔巴尼亚平民，驱逐了数十万人。


(The authorities in Belgrade have yet to come clean on the Albanians civilians executed and buried on police and military bases in Serbia.)	（贝尔格莱德当局至今尚未就塞尔维亚军警基地中处决和掩埋的阿尔巴尼亚平民全盘招供）。


NATO forced Serb forces to withdraw in June 1999, and international peacekeepers, under NATO’s leadership, occupied Kosovo.	北约军队迫使塞族军队于1999年6月撤军，以北约为首的国际维和部队随之占领科索沃。


The UN sent a mission to help establish local institutions.	联合国派遣使团协助重建当地机构。


The US and West European countries began shepherding Kosovo’s new Albanian authorities toward statehood.	美欧国家开始指导科索沃新的阿尔巴尼亚政权建国。


Last year, Kosovo gained independence.	去年，科索沃宣布独立。


Sixty countries, including the US and most EU states, have recognized it.	包括美国和欧盟国家在内的60个国家承认科索沃建国。


According to a recent BBC news investigation, however, UCK members abducted Serbs, Albanians, Roma, and others after NATO’s arrival.	但据不久前BBC新闻调查报道，科索沃解放军在北约进驻后绑架塞族、阿族、罗马族和其他民族群众。


UN missing-persons researchers – not criminal investigators – searched for them for years and found no trace of them in Kosovo.	联合国失踪研究员（而非刑事调查员）调查了几年时间，在科索沃没有找到任何线索。


They did, however, find Albanian witnesses who asserted that UCK members took captured Serbs, Albanians, and Roma into Albania, where they were killed.	但他们确实发现了阿族目击者指称科索沃解放军将被俘的塞尔维亚人、阿尔巴尼亚人和罗马人带到阿尔巴尼亚，并在阿境内将他们杀害。


Now the BBC has broadcast interviews with Albanians who were imprisoned in secret UCK camps in Albania.	BBC播出了对关押在科索沃解放军阿尔巴尼亚秘密集中营的阿尔巴尼亚人的采访录像。


These witnesses confirmed that the camps also held Serbs, Roma, and others.	这些目击者证实集中营也关押塞族、罗马族和其他民族群众。


The BBC located graves of some of the missing in Albania.	BBC在阿尔巴尼亚找到了一些失踪者的坟墓。


There have been leaks of UN documents citing Albanian sources who name people involved.	传闻一份泄露的联合国文件列出了参与人员名单等情报。


From June 1999, the UN and NATO contingents in Kosovo clearly calculated that stability trumped justice.	从1999年6月开始，科索沃的联合国及北约分遣队明确认为稳定压倒了公正。


Despite the urging of staff members, leaders of these missions avoided launching criminal investigations into the missing.	各分遣队领袖不顾工作人员的一再敦促，拒绝对失踪事件进行刑事调查。


Some UCK leaders, lionized by the local Albanian population as the victors of 1999, are now running Kosovo’s government.	被当地阿尔巴尼亚人视为1999年胜利者而与之结交的某些科索沃解放军领袖现在掌管着科索沃政府。


Their blanket denials are no longer credible.	他们空洞的否认无法再让人信服。


Kosovo will not convince many more countries to recognize its independence unless it investigates these disappearances and demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law.	除非调查失踪事件，显示实现法治的决心，否则科索沃将无法说服更多国家承认它的独立。


(Likewise, no one should forget the Albanian dead that Serbia has not returned.)	（同样，人们也不该忘记塞尔维亚尚未归还的阿尔巴尼亚遇难者。


A credible investigation requires full backing from the authorities in Albania and from the newly established EU mission in Kosovo.	）需要有阿尔巴尼亚当局和新成立的欧盟科索沃行动小组的全力支持才能开战令人信服的调查。


On the record, leaders of this mission say that they are interested in investigating.	在公开场合，行动小组领导人说愿意展开调查。


Diplomats speaking off the record, however, tell a different tale, even as some Albanian political leaders, including some former UCK officials, call for an inquiry.	但就算包括某些前科索沃解放军军官在内的阿尔巴尼亚政治领袖呼吁展开调查行动，私下谈话的外交官态度却截然不同。


The US should use its political clout with Albania and Kosovo to press for a thorough investigation, and for criminal proceedings against anyone who is implicated.	美国应当利用对阿尔巴尼亚和科索沃的政治影响促成全面彻底的调查，并对涉案人员提起刑事起���。


Albanians are outraged at the allegations that UCK members engaged in war crimes and other criminal behavior.	科索沃解放军参与战争和其他刑事犯罪的指控让阿尔巴尼亚人愤怒。


Some Albanians claim that these allegations are Serbian propaganda.	一些阿尔巴尼亚人宣称这种指控是塞族人的烟幕。


But there are many Albanians who know differently, and believe that Kosovo is failing to come to terms with the acts of a few rogue fighters.	但也有很多阿尔巴尼亚人知道事实真相，相信科索沃由于极少数流氓战士的行为未能实现目标。


These Albanians fear that, in the absence of the rule of law, Kosovo will become a mafia state.	这些阿尔巴尼亚人担心没有了法治，科索沃将成为一个黑手党国家。


Kosovo’s Albanians do not want a state tainted by such allegations.	科索沃的阿尔巴尼亚人要的不是被指控污染的国家。


They want a state that respects human rights for everyone.	他们希望国家尊重每个人的人权。


And they want answers about the fate of hundreds of people who have been missing for a decade.	他们也想找到数百位长达10年的失踪者命运的答案。


India’s Deadly Entrance Exams	印度的夺命高考


NEW DELHI – In late April, a 17-year-old girl named Kriti Tripathi leaped to her death in Kota, India, shortly after passing the country’s examination for admission to the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT).	新德里—4月底，17岁的女孩克里提·特立帕提（Kriti Tripathi）在印度科塔（Kota）跳楼身亡。


A week later, another Kota student, Preeti Singh, hanged herself, succumbing to her injuries after a few days.	她刚刚通过印度理工 学院（IIT）入学考试。


Singh’s was the ninth suicide by a student in Kota this year alone, and the 56th in the last five.	一周后，另一位科塔学生普利提·辛格（Preeti Singh）自缢，几天后身亡。


All attended Kota’s “coaching institutes,” whose sole purpose is to prepare high-school students for the IIT Joint Entrance Examination (JEE).	她们都参加了科塔“补习班”，这些补习班的唯一目的是帮助高中生准备IIT入学联考。


In a five-page suicide note, Tripathi expressed her frustration at having been compelled to study engineering, when her real ambition was to become a NASA scientist.	在五页长的遗书中，特立帕提表示对于自己被迫学习工科感到沮丧，她真正的志向是成为一名美国宇航局（NASA）科学家。


She also described the pressure she had faced at the coaching institution.	她还描述了自己在补习班所遇到的压力。


Tripathi implored the Human Resource Development Ministry to shut down such institutes, which force their students to endure unbearable stress and depression.	特立帕提恳请人力资源部关闭这些强迫学生忍受不可承受的压力和抑郁的补习班。


The story is all too common, but should the blame really be laid on the coaching institutes?	她的故事太平常了，但矛头真的应该指向补习班吗？


In fact, Kota’s coaching institutes are a symptom of a larger problem, hinted at by the city’s senior administrator, District Collector Ravi Kumar Surpur, in an emotional letter he wrote in response to the latest deaths.	事实上，科塔的补习班只是一个更大的问题的症候。 该市高级官员、区税务官拉维·库马尔·苏尔珀尔（Ravi Kumar Surpur）在一封回应最近的死亡事件的充满感情色彩的信中提到了这一问题。


Addressing parents directly, Surpur pleaded with them not to subject their children to excessive stress in an attempt to live vicariously through them.	苏尔珀尔将矛头直指家长，恳请他们不要让孩子承受过度压力，替自己完成心愿。


Indian parents are known for demanding academic excellence from their children.	印度家长以对孩子成绩要求严格闻名。


They know that a professional degree in the right field is a passport to social and economic advancement, so they push hard to ensure that their children get one – something that India’s higher-education system does not make easy.	他们知道，在正确专业取得专业学位有助于社会和经济成就，因此他们竭尽全力确保孩子能获得一个这样的学位——而在印度高等教育体系中，获得这一学位绝不容易。


Given this deeply entrenched culture of academic ambition, the planned administrative inquiry into conditions at the Kota coaching institutes is unlikely to result in remedial action.	在这一根深蒂固的成绩文化影响下，计划对科塔补习班环境进行行政调查不可能形成纠正措施。


The toll this culture takes on young people is obvious.	这种文化对年轻人造成的伤害是显而易见的。


Students are forced to pass brutally difficult examinations – only about 10,000 of the 500,000 who take the IIT-JEE each year score high enough to be admitted – in subjects they often detest.	学生们被迫参加难道变态的考试——每年参加IIT联考的人数有500,000，只有大约10,000能上线——而他们往往很讨厌这些考试科目。


And Indian students are far more likely to push themselves until they crack than to drop out.	印度学生常常把自己逼到崩溃也不肯放弃。


Engineering and medicine remain the subjects of choice for middle-class Indian parents.	工科和医科仍是印度中产阶级家长的科目选择。


The country graduates a half-million engineers every year, some 80% of whom end up in jobs that do not require an engineering degree.	每年印度有五十万工程师毕业，其中80%的人从事不需要工科学位的工作。


But, in a throwback to the mid-twentieth century, Indian parents view engineering as the gateway to modernity, and continue pressing their children to study it.	但是，印度家长的观念还停留在二十世纪中叶，认为工科是现代化的敲门砖，继续强迫孩子学工科。


Students who do not make it to an IIT end up in institutions of varying quality, many of which do not equip their graduates for today’s labor market.	考不上ITT最后会进入水平参差不齐的各种院校，其中许多院校的无法让毕业生具备当今劳动力市场所需要的技能。


But at least there are enough engineering colleges in India to meet demand.	但至少印度有足够的工学院满足需求。


Medicine, by contrast, is a frustratingly crowded field – and for no good reason.	相反，医科的拥挤程度令人丧气——并且有些“无厘头”。


India’s medical profession is controlled by the Medical Council of India, an opaque and self-serving cabal that has intentionally limited the supply of available medical college seats.	印度医学界由印度医学委员会把持，这是一个不透明的自利组织，刻意限制医学院学位供给。


Medical colleges must be recognized by the MCI, which has seen fit to permit only 381 to exist.	医学院必须获得印度医学委员会承认，而该委员会只承认381家医学院。


That leaves only 63,800 slots each year in a country of 1.2 billion people – enough space for fewer than 1% of Indian students aspiring to attend medical school.	这意味着12亿印度人每年只有638,000个医学学位——只占想读医科的印度学生的不到1%。


As if that were not bad enough, some of the seats are awarded against “donations,” with the wealthy essentially purchasing positions that their marks do not merit.	雪上加霜的是，其中一些学位还要为“捐赠”保留，即有钱人分不够可以花钱上学。


Meanwhile, high-achieving students who just barely missed the cutoff have to find alternatives – or pursue another field altogether.	与此同时，恰好被卡的优秀学生则必须另寻出路——或者换一个专业。


Those whose families can afford it often end up studying medicine abroad.	负担得起的家庭的孩子常常出国去读医科。


Many do not return to India, depriving the country of their much-needed expertise.	许多不再回到印度，导致印度无法获得急需的 医学专家。


Some return after having attended obscure colleges in countries like Georgia or China, only to have the MCI refuse to recognize their degrees and block them from practicing.	一些人在格鲁吉亚或中国的严苛医学院学成归国，学位却得不到医学委员会的承认，无法行医。


For those who cannot afford to go abroad – even bright students who barely missed the cutoff for a spot at an Indian university – studying medicine is no longer an option.	对于无力出国留学的人来说——即使他是非常聪明的学生，只不过恰好考不上某个印度大学——学医医科就此梦断。


Yet India desperately needs doctors.	但印度急需医生。


According to the World Health Organization, the country has just 0.7 doctors per 1,000 people.	据世界卫生组织的数据，印度每1,000人只有0. 7名医生。


In the United States and the United Kingdom – two countries to which Indian doctors often emigrate – the rate is 2.5 per 1,000 and 2.8 per 1,000, respectively.	在常常作为印度医生移民目的地的美国和英国，这一比例分别为2. 5和2.


The crippling lack of capacity means that lives are lost every day – particularly in rural areas – for want of medical attention.	8。 医务人员严重不足意味着每天都会发生因为缺医少药而导致的生命损失——特别是在农村地区。


India could be graduating four or five times as many capable doctors as it does each year.	印度有能力每年培养比现在多三四倍的医学毕业生。


Yet the MCI has been allowed to pursue its restrictive approach, depriving poor Indians of adequate health care, while augmenting the already-huge pressure on students to gain a seat in a medical college.	但印度放任医学委员会严格控制医学生人数，导致印度穷人无法获得充足的医疗服务，同时也进一步增加了压力已然非常巨大的学生考取医学院的压力。


It is in this context – with a huge population competing for a tiny number of seats in professional colleges – that coaching institutes like those in Kota thrive.	正是在这样的背景下——巨大的人口竞争极少数专业学院学位——科塔补习班这样的机构得以兴盛。


When succeeding in tough entrance examinations is the only way to fulfill one’s educational goals, test preparation becomes the be-all and end-all of schooling.	当“千军万马过独木桥”成为实现教育目标的唯一途径时，复习就成为教育的一切和终极目标。


Eager to satisfy pushy parents, young people sacrifice their own interests at the altar of a false god.	为了满足家长的“进取心”，印度年轻人为了这个伪神坛而牲了自己的兴趣。


The 56 pyres lit in Kota over the last five years are a tragic testament to how damaging this conception of academic excellence can be.	过去五年，科塔有56名学生自杀，这便是应试教育危害的悲剧写照。


The Kremlin and the US Election	克里姆林宫与美国大选


CAMBRIDGE – In early November, US President Barack Obama reportedly contacted Russian President Vladimir Putin personally to warn against cyber attacks aimed at the American presidential election.	发自剑桥——据报道，11月初美国总统奥巴马曾亲自致电与俄罗斯总统普京，警告其不要针对美国总统大选发动网络袭击。


The previous month, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, and Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security, publicly accused Russia’s most senior officials of using cyber attacks to “interfere with the US election process.”	而上个月，美国国家情报局局长詹姆斯·克莱珀（James Clapper）和国土安全部长杰·约翰逊（Jeh Johnson）则公开指责某些俄罗斯最高级别官员利用网络攻击来“干扰美国大选进程”。


In the aftermath of the November 8 election, no firm evidence has emerged that hacking interfered with voting machines or other electoral machinery.	在回顾11月8日大选的过程中，并无确切证据表明黑客曾入侵投票机或其他选举机制。


But in an election that turned on 100,000 votes in three key states, some observers argue that Russian cyber interference in the political process may have had a significant impact.	但是在涉及100万票的三个关键州投票中，一些观察家认为俄罗斯对该政治程序的网络干预可能已经产生了重大影响。


Can such Russian behavior be deterred in the future?	俄罗斯的这种行为在将来能否被遏制？


Deterrence always depends on who and what one is trying to deter.	这取决于由谁出手，以及遏制的对象是什么。


Ironically, deterring states from using force may be easier than deterring them from actions that do not rise to that level.	讽刺的是，阻止各国发动网络行动甚至比阻止它们使用更高级别的武力更困难。


The threat of a surprise attack such as a “cyber Pearl Harbor” has probably been exaggerated.	但遭到“网络珍珠港”这类突袭的威胁或许是被夸大了。


Critical infrastructures such as electricity or communications are vulnerable, but major state actors are likely to be constrained by interdependence.	虽然电力或通信等关键基础设施相对脆弱，但各主要国家都会受到相互依存关系的制肘。


And the United States has made clear that deterrence is not limited to cyber retaliation (though that is possible), but can target other sectors with any tools it chooses, ranging from naming and shaming and economic sanctions to nuclear weapons.	而美国也已明确表示，遏制行动不仅限于网络报复（尽管这是可能的），还可能选择任何工具——从公开指责羞辱到经济制裁，再到核武器——来打击其他部门。


The US and others, including Russia, have agreed that the laws of armed conflict apply in cyberspace.	美国以及包括俄罗斯在内的其他国家都已同意将武装冲突的相关法则适用于网络空间。


Whether a cyber operation is treated as an armed attack depends on its consequences, rather than on the instruments used.	一场网络行动是否被视为武装攻击并非取决于使用何种工具，而是其所造成的后果。


It would have to result in destruction of property or injury or death to individuals.	它必须导致财产损失或人员伤亡。


But what about deterring operations that are not equivalent to an armed attack?	但如何阻止那些不等同于武装进攻的行动呢？


There are gray areas in which important targets (say, a free political process) are not strategically vital in the same way as the electrical grid or the financial system.	其中存在一些灰色地带，比如某些目标（例如自由的政治程序）虽然重要，但其战略重要性的表现方式却与电网或金融系统不一样。


Destroying the latter could damage lives and property; interference with the former threatens deeply held political values.	摧毁后者可能会破坏生命财产； 对前者的干涉则威胁着深层次的政治价值观。


In 2015, a United Nations Group of Government Experts (including the US, Russia, China, and most states with significant cyber capabilities) agreed to a norm of not targeting civilian facilities in peacetime.	2015年，一个联合国政府专家组（包括美国，俄罗斯，中国和大多数具备强大网络实力的国家）就一个在和平时期不得攻击民用设施的规范上达成了一致。


This agreement was endorsed by the G20 countries at their summit in Turkey in November 2015.	这个协议随后在2015年11月G20土耳其峰会上被签署通过。


When an anonymous cyber attack interfered with the Ukrainian electric grid the following month, some analysts suspected the Russian government of using cyber weapons in its continuing hybrid warfare against Ukraine.	谁知刚过一个月，乌克兰电网就遭到了一个匿名网络攻击，一些分析师怀疑俄罗斯政府针对乌克兰的合成战争中使用了网络武器。


If true, it would mean that Russia had violated the agreement it had just signed.	如果此事属实，就意味着俄罗斯违反了自身刚刚签署的协议。


But how should one interpret Russian behavior in regard to the American election?	但是如何解释俄罗斯在美国大选中的行为呢？


According to US officials, Russian intelligence agencies hacked into the email accounts of important Democratic Party officials and provided the materials to WikiLeaks to dribble out over the course of the campaign, thereby ensuring a continuous steam of news stories that were unfavorable to Hillary Clinton.	据美国官员说，俄罗斯情报机构入侵了民主党官员的电子邮���帐户，并在整个选举进程中持续透露材料给维基解密网站，从而确保不断有关于希拉里的负面新闻曝光。


This alleged Russian disruption of the Democratic presidential campaign fell into a gray area that could be interpreted as a propaganda response to Clinton’s 2010 proclamation of a “freedom agenda” for the Internet or retaliation for what Russian officials saw as her critical comments about Putin’s election in 2012.	这种所谓俄罗斯对民主党总统大选的破坏行动落入一个灰色地带，可以解释为针对希拉里2010年提出的互联网“自由议程”所发动的宣传战，或是俄罗斯官员为她抨击普京2012年竞选总统的言论而做出报复。


Whatever the motive, it looked like an effort to skew the US political process – precisely the type of nonlethal political threat that one would want to deter in the future.	但无论动机为何，这看起来像一种扭曲美国政治进程的行动 ——也正是在人们未来想要遏制的那种非致命性政治威胁。


The Obama administration had previously made efforts to rank the seriousness of cyber attacks, but without sorting out the ambiguities of these gray areas.	奥巴马政府曾试图于将网络攻击按照其严重性划分等级，但依然未能理清这些这些模糊的灰色地带。


In 2016, Obama faced difficult choices in estimating the escalatory potential of responding with cyber measures or with a cross-sector response such as sanctions.	今年奥巴马有点手足无措，不知道应该更多地考虑利用网络手段，还是采取类似制裁等跨部门应对措施。


The administration did not want to take steps that might themselves disrupt the election.	但政府担心这些措施本身可能就会对选举造成干扰。


So, eight days before the vote, the US sent Russia a warning about election meddling over a hotline – created three years earlier to deal with major cyber incidents – that connects the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in both countries.	因此在投票前八天，美国通过三年前建立的一条连接了两国减少核风险中心（Nuclear Risk Reduction Center）的热线——专责处理重大网络事件——向俄罗斯发出了停止干涉选举的警告。


Because Russian hacking activity seemed to slow or halt, the Obama administration cited the warning as a successful exercise in deterrence.	因为俄罗斯黑客活动似乎已经减少或停止，奥巴马政府将该警告视为一次成功的威慑行动。


But some critics say the Russians had already achieved their main goals.	但一些批评者则认为俄罗斯人已经实现了其主要目的。


Three weeks after the election, the administration said that it remained confident in the overall integrity of America’s electoral infrastructure, and that the election was free and fair from a cyber-security perspective.	大选结束后三个星期，政府表示对美国选举基础架构的整体完整性依然充满信心，从网络安全的角度看，选举是自由和公平的。


But intelligence officials continued to investigate the impact of a broader Russian information-warfare campaign, in which fake stories about Clinton appeared intended to influence voters.	但美国情报官员依然在调查更宏观的俄罗斯信息战的影响，其中关于希拉里的虚假报道似乎试图左右选民。


Many of the false reports originated from RT News and Sputnik, two state-funded Russian outlets.	同时许多假新闻都始发于今日俄罗斯（RT News）和俄罗斯卫星网（Sputnik）这两家受政府资助的俄罗斯媒体。


Should this be treated as traditional propaganda or something new?	那么这应该被视为传统宣传战还是某些新生事物？


A number of critics believe that the level of official Russian state involvement in the 2016 US election process crossed a line and should not be dismissed as a form of tolerable gray-area behavior.	一些评论家认为，俄罗斯官方对2016年美国大选进程的介入程度相当过分，不应被视为一种可容忍的灰色地带行为。


These critics have urged the Obama administration to go further in naming and shaming, by providing a fuller public description of what US intelligence knows about Russia’s behavior, and by imposing financial and travel sanctions against high-level Russian officials who are identified.	这些批评者敦促奥巴马政府进一步指明始作俑者，更充分地公开披露美国情报部门掌握的俄罗斯行动情况，并对确认涉事的高级俄罗斯官员实施财务和旅行制裁。


Other US officials, however, are reluctant to jeopardize the intelligence means used for attribution, and are wary of escalation.	然而其他美国官员却不愿意披露用于收集这些情况的情报手段，并担心冲突升级。


Russia’s involvement in the 2016 US election was a watershed.	俄罗斯对2016年美国大选的介入是一个分水岭。


With important elections coming in a number of Western democracies, analysts will be watching closely to see what lessons the Kremlin draws from it.	鉴于一些西方民主国家也即将举行重要选举，分析人士将密切关注克里姆林宫会从中吸取什么样的经验教训。


Kremlin Musical Chairs	克里姆林宫的换椅子游戏


It’s that time again – Russia’s pre-election season when prime ministers are changed as in a game of musical chairs.	在俄罗斯又一次面临大选的时候，总理宝座像换椅子游戏那样不断地变换着人选。


The last one seated, it is supposed, will become Russia’s next president.	而最后一个坐上这个位置的人被认为会成为俄罗斯的下一任总统。


As the end of his rule approached, Boris Yeltsin went through at least a half-dozen prime ministers, looking for the one who would ensure the security not only of Russia’s new democracy and market economy, but also of his “family” and the wealth that it had accumulated during his rule.	在任期行将结束前，叶利钦换了至少六个总理，以寻找到一个不但能保证俄罗斯的新民主和市场经济的安全，同时更能保证他的“家族”以及在他的执政期间累积起来的巨大财富的安全的人选。


The last man seated then was, of course, Vladimir Putin.	当然，最后一个坐上这个位置的人就是普京。


Now it is Putin’s turn to call the tune, dismissing Mikhail Fradkov and dissolving the government that had served him throughout his second term in order to prepare for the parliamentary elections looming in December and the presidential ballot in March 2008.	现在轮到普京来做这场游戏了，将一直在他的第二任期内担任总理的弗拉德科夫解职以及解散政府正是在为将于11月份进行的议会选举和2008年3月份进行的总统选举做准备。


In 1999, Yeltsin picked Putin, who was then the little-known head of the FSB (formerly the KGB).	1999年的时候，叶利钦挑选了当时不太为人所知的联邦安全局（前克格勃）的局长普京。


Putin chose to elevate the equally mysterious Victor Zubkov, head of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (also known as the “finance espionage” agency).	而现在普京选择提拔同样神秘的祖布科夫，联邦金融监测局（也被称为“金融间谍”机构）局长。


Despite that similarity, the reasoning behind these choices appears to be somewhat different.	尽管有这种相似性，在这些选择背后的原因却似乎有所不同。


Yeltsin’s choice of Putin – encouraged, ironically, by Boris Berezovsky, the prominent Russian oligarch and Yeltsin advisor who is now exiled in London as Putin’s mortal enemy – was based on his belief that the quiet apparatchik, even if a former KGB spy, was a democrat at heart.	具有讽刺意味的是，叶利钦选择普京是受到别列佐夫斯基的鼓动，他是俄罗斯寡头统治集团的重要成员以及叶利钦的顾问，现在流亡在伦敦，成了普京不共戴天的敌人。 叶利钦是因为他相信这一寡言少语的党政官员，即便是一个前克格勃的间谍，在本质上也是一个民主主义者。


After all, Putin had been a protegé of Anatoly Sobchak, the liberal mayor of St. Petersburg as communism collapsed.	不管怎样，普京曾是索布恰克，这一在共产主义倒台后担任彼得堡市市长的自由主义者的门徒。


A security services insider, Putin was seen as well placed to protect Yeltsin and his oligarchic allies.	作为一个在安全部门局内人，挑选普京还被认为可以保护叶利钦和他的寡头统治集团成员。


Indeed, Berezovsky intended to continue ruling the country from behind the scenes, first as Yeltsin’s health failed in the final months of his presidency, and then by controlling the successor he had helped to choose.	事实上，别列佐夫斯基希望能够继续在幕后操纵这个国家，开始在叶利钦总统任期的最后几个月当他健康情况恶化的时候，然后可以通过控制他帮助挑选的继任者来达到这一目的。


In Russia, however, the KGB is famous for turning the tables in any struggle with the Kremlin apparat.	然而，在俄罗斯，克格勃一向以其在与克里姆林宫的任何斗争最终总能转败为胜而著称。


So no one but Yeltsin and Berezovsky was surprised when Putin, their supposed marionette, began pulling the strings.	所以当普京这个他们想象中的提线木偶人开始操纵局势时，大概除了叶利钦和别列佐夫斯基之外没有人会感到惊讶。


And pull them he did, turning Berezovsky into an international villain, exiling former media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky, jailing the oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and eventually imposing a new authoritarian regime behind the façade of Yeltsin’s democratic institutions.	在他的操纵下，别列佐夫斯基被化身成了一个国际上的恶棍，前传媒巨头古辛斯基流亡国外，石油寡头霍多尔科夫斯基被送进了监狱，最后是在叶利钦建立起来的民主机构的外表下建立起了一个新的专制政权。


Putin’s own game of prime ministerial “musical chairs” does not reflect a desire to secure for himself a quiet position behind the scenes while someone else rules, for he knows all too well that the path from the Kremlin leads only to inner exile and the grave.	普京自己所玩的这个总理宝座的“换椅子游戏”并不是想要在别人当政的时候自己能够悄悄地躲在幕后，因为他非常清楚从克里姆林宫出来后的路只会通向在国内流放以及墓地。


Stalin replaced the dying Lenin, Khrushchev denounced Stalin, Brezhnev banished Khrushchev to his dacha, and Gorbachev buried Chernenko.	斯大林替代了行将死亡的列宁，赫鲁晓夫公然抨击了斯大林，勃列日涅夫将赫鲁晓夫流放到他的乡间别墅，而戈尔巴乔夫埋葬了契尔年科。


Only Yeltsin did things differently.	只有叶利钦的做法有所不同。


He disliked his predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev, as much his predecessors disliked their predecessors.	他讨厌他的前任戈尔巴乔夫一如他的前任者不喜欢他们各自的前任者一样。


But all the same he treated Gorbachev in a more decent manner because Yeltsin fundamentally believed in democracy.	然后他还是以一种更加体面的方式对待戈尔巴乔夫，因为叶利钦在本质上相信民主。


So he left Gorbachev a private life that could also be lived in public.	所以他允许戈尔巴乔夫过他自己私人的生活，并且还可以出现在公众中。


Putin, of course, did not accost the retired Yeltsin, but he didn’t have to.	当然，普京并没有与退休的叶利钦搭话，但是他并不必要这样做。


He simply ignored him while reversing his achievements in building a free Russia.	他只是把他晾在一边，而在叶利钦建立自由俄罗斯的成就上开倒车。


Before Zubkov’s nomination, reports swirled that the next prime minister would become Putin’s presidential successor, with Sergei Ivanov, a current deputy prime minister, dubbed the most likely candidate.	在祖布科夫被提名前，媒体纷纷流传下一任总理会成为普京的总统继承人，而现任副总理伊万诺夫是最有可能的候选人。


But Ivanov, who is perceived as “strong,” would provide unwelcome competition to Putin, who, after all, remains a “strong” president.	但是伊万诺夫被认为很“强势”的人，会给普京带来令人不快的竞争，因为后者不管怎样依然是一位“强势”的总统。


Had he anointed Ivanov now, Putin’s power would already begin seeping away.	如果他现在就提名伊万诺夫，那么普京的权力现在就会开始被慢慢地蚕食。


The outgoing Fradkov, surprisingly, put the matter best when he explained why he had resigned: with elections approaching, Putin needed a free hand.	走下总理宝座的弗拉德科夫在解释他为什么辞职时令人惊讶地最恰如其分地解释了事情的原由。 也就是，随着大选的临近，普京需要完全自由地做出各种决定。


So Zubkov’s nomination allows Putin to continue to keep his cards – and thus ultimate power in Russia – close to his chest.	所以提名祖布科夫可以让普京继续对他的计划秘而不���，同时也可以维持他在俄罗斯的最高权力。


Of course, Zubkov will continue Fradkov’s “Yes, whatever you say Mr. President” management style.	当然，祖布科夫会继续弗拉德科夫的管理方式，“是的，总统先生，一切都按你的意思办”。


Moreover, his former position as head of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service will allow him to draw on a wealth of information to keep tabs on all possible enemies and competitors, perhaps turning them into new model Berezovsky’s, Gusinsky’s and Khodorkovsky’s, if necessary.	此外，他曾担任过联邦金融监测局局长的经历，也使他掌握了对所有可能的敌人和竞争对手进行监视的丰富信息，如果需要的话，也许会把他们变成新的别列佐夫斯基、古辛斯基和霍多尔科夫斯基。


The only question now is whether Zubkov, or his successor, will eventually succeed in turning Czar Vladimir into the same sort of non-person that Putin’s rivals have become.	现在唯一的问题就是祖布科夫或者他的继任者是否会最终成功地把弗拉基米尔沙皇也变成像普京的对手已经变成的同样的那种“非人”。


Paul Krugman and the Obama Recovery	保罗·克鲁格曼和奥巴马复苏


NEW YORK – For several years, and often several times a month, the Nobel laureate economist and New York Times columnist and blogger Paul Krugman has delivered one main message to his loyal readers: deficit-cutting “austerians” (as he calls advocates of fiscal austerity) are deluded.	纽约—几年以来，常常每个月都有几次，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、《纽约时报》专栏作家兼博客写手保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）都会向他的忠实读者发布一条重要信息：削减赤字的“紧缩派”（他对支持财政紧缩者的称呼）被骗了。


Fiscal retrenchment amid weak private demand would lead to chronically high unemployment.	事实上，赤字削减将让1937年重现。


Indeed, deficit cuts would court a reprise of 1937, when Franklin D. Roosevelt prematurely reduced the New Deal stimulus and thereby threw the United States back into recession.	当时，富兰克林·罗斯福过早地缩减新政刺激，导致美国再次滑入衰退。


Well, Congress and the White House did indeed play the austerian card from mid-2011 onward.	好吧，自2011年年中以来，国会和白宫确实实施了紧缩。 联邦预算赤字占GDP之比从2011年的8.


The federal budget deficit has declined from 8.4% of GDP in 2011 to a predicted 2.9% of GDP for all of 2014.	4%下降到2014年的2. 9%（预计值）。


And, according to the International Monetary Fund, the structural deficit (sometimes called the “full-employment deficit”), a measure of fiscal stimulus, has fallen from 7.8% of potential GDP to 4% of potential GDP from 2011 to 2014.	此外，根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，衡量财政刺激的指标结构性赤字（有时称为“充分就业赤字”）从2011年占潜在GDP的7. 8%下降到2014年的4%。


Krugman has vigorously protested that deficit reduction has prolonged and even intensified what he repeatedly calls a “depression” (or sometimes a “low-grade depression”).	克鲁格曼强烈反对削减赤字延长甚至加剧了他反复所谓的“萧条”（有时也称为“低度萧条”）的观点。


Only fools like the United Kingdom’s leaders (who reminded him of the Three Stooges) could believe otherwise.	只有英国领导人这样的蠢货（让他想起了“三傻”（Three Stooges））才会相信这样的观点。


Yet, rather than a new recession, or an ongoing depression, the US unemployment rate has fallen from 8.6% in November 2011 to 5.8% in November 2014.	但是，美国并没有迎来新衰退，也没有继续萧条，失业率从2011年11月的8. 6%下降至2014年11月的5.


Real economic growth in 2011 stood at 1.6%, and the IMF expects it to be 2.2% for 2014 as a whole.	2011年真实经济增长只有1. 6%，而IMF预计2014年全年可达2.


GDP in the third quarter of 2014 grew at a vigorous 5% annual rate, suggesting that aggregate growth for all of 2015 will be above 3%.	2%。 2014年三季度GDP增长年率达到了强劲的5%，这意味着2015年全年总增长将高于3%。


So much for Krugman’s predictions.	克鲁格曼的预测就是如此。


Not one of his New York Times commentaries in the first half of 2013, when “austerian” deficit cutting was taking effect, forecast a major reduction in unemployment or that economic growth would recover to brisk rates.	他在2013年上半年的所有《纽约时报》评论中——当时“紧缩派”赤字削减措施正在开始见效——都没有预见到失业的大幅下降，也没有预见到经济增长能恢复活力。


On the contrary, “the disastrous turn toward austerity has destroyed millions of jobs and ruined many lives,” he argued, with the US Congress exposing Americans to “the imminent threat of severe economic damage from short-term spending cuts.”	相反，“可怕的转向紧缩摧毁了数百万个就业岗位，也破坏了无数人的生活，” 他说，而美国国会让美国人暴露在“来自短期支出削减的严重经济伤害的巨大威胁之下”。


As a result, “Full recovery still looks a very long way off,” he warned. “And I’m beginning to worry that it may never happen.”	因此，“充分复苏仍然十分遥远，”他警告说，“我甚至担心它到底能不能实现��”


I raise all of this because Krugman took a victory lap in his end-of-2014 column on “The Obama Recovery.”	我罗列这些是因为克鲁格曼在他的2014年年底专栏《奥巴马复苏》（The Obama Recovery）中俨然一副胜利者的姿态。


The recovery, according to Krugman, has come not despite the austerity he railed against for years, but because we “seem to have stopped tightening the screws: Public spending isn’t surging, but at least it has stopped falling.	按他的说法，复苏并不是来自他多年来一直反对的紧缩，而是因为我们“似乎已经停止拧紧螺丝：公共支出没有大幅增加，但至少也不再下降。


And the economy is doing much better as a result.”	经济也因此大有起色。 ”


That is an incredible claim.	这真是令人难以置信的观点。


The budget deficit has been brought down sharply, and unemployment has declined.	预算赤字大幅减少，失业也有所下降。


Yet Krugman now says that everything has turned out just as he predicted.	但现在克鲁格曼却说所有事情都和他预料的完全一样。


In fact, Krugman has been conflating two distinct ideas as if both were components of “progressive” thinking.	事实上，克鲁格曼聚合了两种不同观点，让它们看起来都像是“进步”思维的要素。


On one hand, he has been the “conscience of a liberal,” rightly focusing on how government can combat poverty, poor health, environmental degradation, rising inequality, and other social ills.	一方面，他是“自由派的良心”，正确地将注意力集中在政府如何减少贫困、解决穷人的医疗问题、阻止环境破坏、遏制不平等性加剧和治理其他社会问题上。


I admire that side of Krugman’s writing, and, as I wrote in my book The Price of Civilization, I agree with him.	我仰慕克鲁格曼在这方面的工作，并且如我在《文明的代价》（The Price of Civilization）一书中所言，我同意他的观点。


On the other hand, Krugman has inexplicably taken up the mantle of crude aggregate-demand management, making it seem that favoring large budget deficits in recent years is also part of progressive economics.	另一方面，克鲁格曼令人费解地举起了粗犷总需求管理的大旗，将近几年对大规模预算赤字的支持也说成是进步经济学的一部分。


(Krugman’s position is sometimes called Keynesianism, but John Maynard Keynes knew much better than Krugman that we should not depend on mechanistic “demand multipliers” to set the unemployment rate.)	（克鲁格曼的立场有时被称为凯恩斯主义，但凯恩斯远比克鲁格曼清楚，我们不应该依赖机械的“需求乘数”来决定失业率。


Deficits were not increased enough in 2009 to escape from high unemployment, he insisted, and were falling dangerously fast after 2010.	）他坚持认为，2009年赤字增加的不够，因此无法降低高失业； 而2010年以降，赤字更是出现了危险的快速减少之势。


Obviously, recent trends – a significant decline in the unemployment rate and a reasonably high and accelerating rate of economic growth – cast doubt on Krugman’s macroeconomic diagnosis (though not on his progressive politics).	显然，近期趋势——失业率的大幅下降以及相当漂亮并且还在加速的经济增长——让克鲁格曼的宏观经济诊断令人质疑（但他的进步政治学除外）。 而相同的趋势在英国也显而易见，首相卡梅伦政府将结构性预算赤字从2010年占潜在GDP的8.


And the same trends have been apparent in the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister David Cameron’s government has cut the structural budget deficit from 8.4% of potential GDP in 2010 to 4.1% in 2014, while the unemployment rate has fallen from 7.9% when Cameron took office to 6%, according to the most recent data for the fall of 2014.	1%，而失业率则从卡梅伦执政初期的7. 9%下降至6%（2014年秋季最新数据）。


To be clear, I believe that we do need more government spending as a share of GDP – for education, infrastructure, low-carbon energy, research and development, and family benefits for low-income families.	坦白说，我认为我们确实需要提高政府支出占GDP的比例——将钱花在教育、基础设施、低碳能源、研发活动和低收入家庭福利上。


But we should pay for this through higher taxes on high incomes and high net worth, a carbon tax, and future tolls collected on new infrastructure.	但我们应该通过增加高收入和高净财富者的税率、提高碳税和提高新基础设施的未来费用来筹集资金。


We need the liberal conscience, but without the chronic budget deficits.	我们需要自由派的良心，但不要顽固的预算赤字。


There is nothing progressive about large budget deficits and a rising debt-to-GDP ratio.	巨大的预算赤字和不断上升的债务-GDP比率绝不具有进步性质。


After all, large deficits have no reliable effect on reducing unemployment, and deficit reduction can be consistent with falling unemployment.	毕竟，巨额赤字对于降低失业并没有可靠影响，而赤字削减倒是与失业下降一致。


Krugman is a great economic theorist – and a great polemicist.	克鲁格曼是伟大的经济理论家——也是伟大的辩论家。


But he should replace his polemical hat with his analytical one and reflect more deeply on recent experience: deficit-cutting accompanied by recovery, job creation, and lower unemployment.	但他应该甩掉辩论家的帽子，树立分析家的招牌，深刻思考最新的经验：赤字削减与复苏、就业创造和失业下降同时出现。


This should be an occasion for him to rethink his long-standing macroeconomic mantra, rather than claiming vindication for ideas that recent trends seem to contradict.	这应该成为一次让他反思其长期坚持的宏观经济咒语的机会，而不是为已被最新趋势证明存在矛盾的观点辩护。


Krugman’s Anti-Cameron Contradiction	克鲁格曼的反卡梅伦矛盾


NEW YORK – It is truly odd to read Paul Krugman rail, time and again, against the British government.	纽约—保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）反复抨击英国政府，这着实令人奇怪。


His latest screed begins with the claim that “Britain’s economic performance since the financial crisis struck has been startlingly bad.”	他最近的长文在一开始就指出“自金融危机以来，英国经济表现令人难以置信地糟糕。


He excoriates Prime Minister David Cameron’s government for its “poor economic record,” and wonders how he and his cabinet can possibly pose “as the guardians of prosperity.”	”他批评首相卡梅伦政府需要为“糟糕的经济记录”负责，并质疑卡梅伦及其内阁是否能够担当“繁荣卫士”。


Hmm.	恩。


In recent months, Krugman has repeatedly praised the US economic recovery under President Barack Obama, while attacking the United Kingdom’s record.	最近几个月来，克鲁格曼一再赞扬美国经济在总统奥巴马治下的复苏势头，而攻击英国的经济表现。


But when we compare the two economies side by side, their trajectories are broadly similar, with the UK outperforming the United States on certain indicators.	但我们背靠背比较这两大经济体就可以发现，它们的运行轨迹大体相当，英国在一些指标上表现还强于美国。


Consider, first, the unemployment rate.	首先来看失业率。 2007年四季度，英国失业率为5.


In the fourth quarter of 2007, the UK’s rate was 5.2%.	2%。 卡梅伦政府2010年5月上台时，失业率是7.


When Cameron’s government took office in May 2010, it was 7.9%.	9%。 而在最近的报告期（2014年11月—2015年1月），失业率是5.


In the most recent reporting period (November 2014-January 2015), it was 5.7%.	7%。 在美国，2007年四季度失业率为4.


In the US, the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2007 was 4.8%, 9.8% in March-May 2010, and 5.7% in November 2014-January 2015.	8%，2010年3—5月为9. 8%，2014年11月—2015年1月为5.


In both countries, the unemployment rate is therefore slightly above the pre-crisis (end-2007) level, with no significant net difference over the business cycle from the end of 2007 until now.	7%。 因此，两个国家的失业率均略高于危机前（2007年底）水平，在2007年底至今的商业周期中没有出现较大净差异。


Next, let’s look at the employment rate, which in the UK stood at 72.9% of the population aged 16-64 at the end of 2007.	然后我们来看看就业率。 2007年，英国16—24岁年龄段人口就业率为72.


It fell to 70.4% by the time the Cameron government came to power, but since then has risen strongly, to 73.3% in November 2014-January 2015, an all-time high.	卡梅伦政府开始执政时这一就业率下跌至70. 4%，此后强劲反弹，2014年11月—2015年1月达到了历史最高水平73.


In the US, by contrast, the employment rate was 62.8% at the end of 2007, 58.6% in March-May 2010, and then only slightly higher, at 59.2%, during November 2014-January 2015 – still below the pre-crisis level.	8%，2010年3—5月为58. 6%，然后略有上升，2014年11月—2015年1月为59.


This suggests that there are more discouraged workers in the US than in the UK.	2%——仍低于危机前水平。 这表明美国的失望工人比英国更多。


Finally, there is output growth.	最后来看看产出增长。


In the UK, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP fell by 3.8% from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2010.	在英国，真实（经通胀调整的）GDP在2007年四季度至2010年二季度间下降了3. 8%。


It then rose by 8.1% from that point until the fourth quarter of 2014.	此后直至2014年四季度上升了8. 1%。


In the US, real GDP fell by 1.6% from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2010, and then rose by 10.5% from then until the fourth quarter of 2014.	在美国，2007年四季度到2010年二季度真实GDP下降1. 6%，此后直至2014年四季度增加10.


Thus, both countries have experienced moderately high and broadly similar growth rates since May 2010, when Cameron’s government took power.	5%。 因此，2010年5月卡梅伦政府开始执政以来，两国的增长率都比较高且大致相当。


Yes, UK growth has been slightly slower, but the British economy has also faced, among other factors, the headwind of sharply falling North Sea oil production during this period, whereas the US benefited from a shale-oil boom.	诚然，英国增长率要略低一些，但在此期间英国经济面临着北海石油产量急剧下滑等不利因素，而美国则得益于页岩油繁荣。 显然，这些长期趋势都不能完全归因于现任政府。


Obviously, neither of these long-term trends can be fairly attributed to the governments currently in office.	无论如何，从2012年四季度到2014年四季度的两年中，美国经济累计增长5.


In any case, during the past two years, from the fourth quarter of 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2014, the US economy grew by a cumulative 5.6% while the UK economy grew by 5.4%, essentially the same as the US.	6%，而英国增长5. 4%，与美国旗鼓相当。


Krugman seems to make much of the fact that the UK did not bounce back even more strongly from a larger output decline between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2010 – a fall that occurred before the Cameron government took office.	克鲁格曼大做文章的一个事实是英国没有从2007年四季度到2010年四季度之间更大规模的产出下降的基础上实现更强劲的反弹——这一产出下降发生在卡梅伦政府上台之前。


That is true, and measured UK productivity growth has remained low, but nobody can be sure why.	诚然，并且英国测得生产率增长也仍然很低，但没人知道确切原因。


Perhaps the unsustainable pre-2008 bubble was larger in the UK; perhaps the UK’s structure (particularly the larger share of finance in its GDP and the continued decline in energy output) made the initial downturn less reversible.	也许2008年前的不可持续的泡沫在英国规模更大一些； 也许英国的结构（特别是金融占GDP比重更大以及能源产出持续下降）使其最初的衰退更加难以扭转。


The UK has been more vulnerable than the US to the eurozone’s prolonged crisis.	英国比美国更容易受到漫长的欧元区危机的影响。


Moreover, subtle differences between the US and UK in national income accounting should be taken into account in comparing productivity trends.	此外，美国和英国在国民收入记录方法上的微妙差异也应该在比较生产率趋势时有所考虑。


The International Monetary Fund’s estimate of the output gap (see its World Economic Outlook database) for both countries does not suggest that, as of 2014, the UK is more cyclically depressed than the US.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）对两国的产出缺口（见IMF世界经济展望数据库）估计并不表明（如2014年）英国的周期性萧条比美国严重。


Indeed, in the IMF’s estimates at least, the opposite is the case.	事实上，至少在IMF的估计中，情况正好相反。


The IMF puts the UK output gap (as a percent of potential GDP) at 1.2%, compared to 3.5% in the US.	IMF认为英国产出缺口（占潜在GDP的百分比）为1. 2%，而美国为3.


Of course, both estimates are subject to questions of interpretation; the IMF assumes, for example, that the UK was operating well above potential GDP in 2006-8.	当然，这两个估计值都要受到解释问题的影响； 比如IMF假设英国在2006—2008年期间以远高于潜在GDP的水平运行。


The fact is that the US and UK economies look rather alike in their overall cyclical patterns, with sharp downturns from 2007 to 2010 followed by recoveries in both jobs and GDP since then, and with a fairly rapid pace of recovery in the past two years.	事实上，美国和英国经济的总体周期模式十分相似，2007年至2010年大幅衰退，接着就业和GDP都有所复苏，并且过去两年复苏速度相当快。


So, if Krugman praises the Obama recovery, he should also praise the Cameron recovery.	因此，如果克鲁格曼对奥巴马复苏大加赞赏，那么他同样应该赞赏卡梅伦复苏。


They are very similar.	它们差不多。


Perhaps more notable is that both the US and UK economies have cast considerable doubt on Krugman’s oft-repeated view that a robust recovery would require further fiscal stimulus, a position that he maintained at least until 2013.	也许更加引人关注的是美国和英国经济严重质疑了克鲁格曼时常挂在嘴边的观点——强健复苏需要更多财政刺激。 至少在2013年之前，他一直持有这一立场。


The post-2010 recoveries in both countries came despite significant cuts in the structural (cyclically adjusted) budget deficit, suggesting that both recoveries occurred in the face of fiscal contraction.	2010年后的英国和美国复苏是在结构性（经周期调整的）预算赤字大幅削减的情况下实现的，这表明两国的复苏都发生于财政收缩环境中。


According to the IMF estimates, the structural budget deficit was cut from 8.4% of potential GDP in 2010 to 4.1% in 2014 in the UK, and from 9.1% to 4% in the US during the same period.	据IMF估计，英国结构性预算赤字从2010年占潜在GDP的8. 4%削减至2014年的4.


Rather than lambasting Cameron while lauding Obama, Krugman should be praising both countries for their recoveries.	克鲁格曼不应该抨击卡梅伦而赞扬奥巴马，而应该赞美两国的复苏。


The truth is that – barring another Greek tragedy – both the UK and US are finally out of the post-2008 crisis.	真相是英国和美国阻止了又一场希腊悲剧，最终走出了2008年后危机。


It is time for both countries to move beyond short-term macroeconomic policy and turn their attention to the challenges of long-term sustainable development.	两国应该超越短期宏观经济政策，将注意力转向长期可持续发展挑战。


Kuwaiti Democracy in Action	科威特民主方兴未艾


Kuwait has just held its eleventh parliamentary election since independence in 1961.	科威特刚刚举行了自1961年独立以来的第11次议会选举。


Though Kuwait is a monarchy, its parliamentary history has not been placid, and the election campaign reflected ongoing tensions between the royal family and segments of the electorate.	虽然科威特实行的是君主政体，但是其议会历史也并非波澜不惊。 此次选举竞选活动反映出了当前王室与部分选区之间一直存在的紧张关系。


Originally scheduled for October 2007, the election was brought forward to break a deadlock between the parliament and the government over the number of electoral districts in the country.	此次选举原计划于2007年10月举行，之所以提前是为了打破议会与政府因全国选区数量问题而陷入的僵局。


Currently, there are 25 constituencies nationwide, but reformers have long argued that a smaller number – each with a larger number of voters – would be less susceptible to manipulation by the political elite.	目前全国有25个选区，但是改革派长期以来坚持认为，减少选区数量、扩大选区选民数量可以降低选举被政治精英操纵的风险。


The 29 members of parliament who support a reduced number of constituencies were unable to agree with the government on a new number.	议会当中支持减少选区数量的29名议员无法与政府就新的选区数量达成协议。 结果，不满的科威特人发起的一场声势浩大的运动。


As a result, the issue became the focus of a vigorous campaign by discontented Kuwaitis, who gathered in front of the National Assembly building and in universities to voice their criticisms.	他们在国民大会大厦和大学集会表达他们的不满。 这个问题成为了这场运动的焦点。


In response, the government removed the redistricting issue from parliament to the constitutional court – an attempt, reformers argued, to hold back change.	作为回应，政府将重新划分选区的问题从议会转移到宪法法院处理。 改革派指出这是试图阻止变革的举措。


When three members of parliament sought to question the Prime Minister – their right, under the Kuwaiti constitution – the parliament was dissolved and elections called.	当三名议会议员按照科威特宪法赋予他们的权利就此向总理质询时，议会被解散并宣布举行大选。


The rules of political life in Kuwait have been worked out over 300 years – since this small area emerged as a self-contained polity.	早在300多年前这个狭小的地区成为一个自治体的时候，科威特政治生活的法则就制定好了。


The royal family is empowered to administer the country, but through consultation with different sectors, like tribal leaders or merchant groups.	皇室被授权管理国家，但是应与不同的群体，如部落领袖或商人团体进行协商。


With independence in 1961, these rules were codified in a constitution.	1961年独立后，这些法则写进了宪法。


Compared to other Gulf monarchies, the Kuwaiti royal family has limited powers, though constitutional rules have frequently been ignored—charges of vote-rigging marred the 1967 election, and parliamentary dissolution has dotted the country’s history.	与海湾地区其它君主制国家相比，科威特皇室的权力受到限制。 虽然宪法规定常常形同虚设，例如，选票统计争议破坏了1967年的选举，解散议会在这个国家的历史上屡见不鲜。


Nevertheless, since the liberation of Kuwait following the Iraqi occupation in August 1990, the parliament has gained both stability and respect.	然而，自从1990年科威特从伊拉克的占领中获得解放以来，议会赢得了稳定和尊重。


The dissolutions of parliament in 1999 and 2006 were carried out according to the law, and elections were called in a timely fashion.	1999年和2006年议会解散都完全符合法律，选举也得以及时进行。


Parliament retains the right to interrogate cabinet members, including the Prime Minister, on financial and administrative questions and has frequently passed motions of no confidence in government.	议会保有就财政和行政问题向内阁成员包括总理进行质询的权利，并且多次通过了对政府的不信任案。


More recently, with the death last December of the Emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad, parliamentary approval was exercised a key role in resolving succession debates among factions of the royal family.	最近，在去年12月埃米尔贾巴尔·埃哈麦德酋长去世以后，议会的批准在解决皇室各派继任争端方面发挥了重要的作用。


Overall, Kuwait has always had a lively political life, with freedom of expression and less political repression than is common in neighboring countries.	总体而言，科威特的政治生活一直充满活力，公民享有言论自由，政治压制比邻国习以为常的状况要好一些。


Political violence has been rare.	政治暴力更是罕见。


Though political parties have not been legalized, they are nonetheless active in parliament and public life.	虽然政治党派还没有合法化，但是在议会和公众的生活中都相当活跃。


Kuwaiti life reflects the many and varied political trends throughout the Arab world, as the country’s open society and economic opportunities have made it a powerful magnet and regional safety valve since the 1950’s.	科威特人的生活反映出了整个阿拉伯世界形形色色的政治趋向，因为自从20世纪50年代以来这个国家开放社会和经济机会已经使之成为了一个强力磁体和地区安全阀。


With this election, Kuwaiti women participated in choosing the parliament for the first time.	通过此次选举，科威特妇女首次参加了议会选举。


Though women have long been active in Kuwaiti public life, they were enfranchised only last year, after a long and difficult campaign, by a parliamentary vote, and accounted for just 28 of the 249 candidates.	尽管妇女长久以来活跃在科威特的公众生活，但是经过长期艰苦的努力，直到去年才通过议会的投票表决才获得了选举权，249名候选人中女性只有28名。


The voting population is 57% female, and commentators speculated on the likely impact of women voters.	57%的选民是女性，评论员对女性选民可能的影响做出了种种推测。


Would they follow the voting patterns of their husbands?	她们会追随丈夫的投票模式吗？


Clearly, women demonstrated tremendous enthusiasm for the political process, taking part in large numbers in political rallies, and as campaign workers in a range of election activities.	很明显，妇女展现出了参与政治进程的巨大热情，大量女性参加政治集会，充当各种选举活动的竞选工作人员。


In the end, while a loose opposition coalition of pro-reform ex-MP’s, Islamists, and liberals gained a majority of the National Assembly’s 50 seats, no woman won.	最终，随着支持改革的前总理、伊斯兰教派和自由派结成的松散联盟赢得了国民大会50席位中的大多数，没有一名妇女当选。


The electorate focused almost entirely on the question of electoral districts.	选民几乎全都非常关注选区问题。


Most Kuwaitis see this very technical issue as a way of pressing for reform.	大多数科威特人将这个技术性非常强的问题看作是促进改革之路。


Major regional issues, like the war in Iraq or Iran’s nuclear program, were barely mentioned.	而地区性问题如伊拉克战争或伊朗核项目却很少被提及。


Islamist candidates were in an awkward position, seeking support from women voters, whose participation they opposed.	伊斯兰教派候选人处境尴尬。 他们一方面寻求女性选民的支持，却又反对女性参加选举。


However, Islamists were among the 29 parliamentary deputies pushing for constituency reform, a fact that eased their dilemma.	然而，29名支持选区改革的议员中有一部分是伊斯兰教派代表，这缓解了他们的窘境。


Support for reform comes from across the political spectrum, whereas opponents of reform paid a high price.	各派政治力量都支持改革，因此反对改革者付出高昂的代价。


Indeed, three members of the outgoing parliament who supported the government were not candidates, having lost in their tribal primaries.	事实上，本届即将解散的议会中三名站在政府一边的议员没有成为候选人，在其部落初选中落选。


With pro-reform forces strengthening their position in the new parliament, the government has two choices. It can go along with electoral reform, or it can find an opportunity to dissolve the new parliament.	随着改革派的力量在新议会中在所加强，政府有两种选择，也就是配合进行选举改革或者寻找机会解散新议会。


Already, commentators are speculating on how long the new parliament will survive.	评论员已经开始预测这届新议会将会维持多长时间。


Whatever the immediate outcome, the Kuwaiti government is facing a new political horizon.	无论出现什么直接结果，科���特政府都面临一个新的政治环境。


Women are now the majority of voters, and young people have taken up the reform banner.	妇女成为了选民的主体，年轻人扛起了改革的大旗。


Democracy will push the ruling family forward.	民主将推动统治皇室向前进。


Kuwait’s Parliamentary Revolution	科威特的议会革命


The world has been transfixed by the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election.	哈马斯在巴勒斯坦选举中获胜，世界为之震惊。


But a different assertion of democratic and parliamentary power, this time in the Gulf sheikdom of Kuwait, which possesses 10% of world oil reserves, may prove to be equally important.	但是，占全球石油储量10％的海湾酋长国科威特再一次显现了民主和议会权力可能会同样重要。


Every sign indicates that the wave of democratization in Kuwait is irreversible, and the impact of these changes extends beyond Kuwait to all the other oil-rich Gulf countries, which are also ruled by emirs and sheikhs.	所有的迹象都表明，科威特的民主浪潮不可逆转，而且这些变革的影响超出科威特本国，远达其他石油储量丰富、同样被埃米尔和酋长统治的海湾国家。


Indeed, these rulers now have much to ponder.	的确，这些统治者有很多事情需要考虑。


The death of Kuwait’s ruler, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah, on January 15, 2006, was followed by unprecedented national disquiet, which led to the rapid abdication of his designated successor, Saad Al Sabah.	2006年1月15日科威特统治者贾比尔去世，国家史无前例地陷于动乱，迫使其指定继承人萨巴赫退位。


Nothing like this had ever hit the Al Sabah family, which has ruled Kuwait for two centuries.	萨巴赫家族统治科威特两个世纪，以前从来遭受过这样的事件打击。


Traditionally, the role of ruling Emir alternated (according to a tacit agreement) between two rival branches of the Al Sabah family – the Al Jaber and the Al Salem.  The succession was always strictly a family affair, and any disputes remained behind closed doors.	传统上，统治地位的埃米尔的角色根据不成文的协议在萨巴赫家族的两大对立分支，也就是贾比尔和萨利姆之间轮流担任。 继位总是一件严格的家族事务，所有的争端都不为外人知晓。


However, with Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah’s death, the succession was not only subjected to feverish public debate, but the Kuwaiti press and Parliament were key actors in determining the outcome.	但是，随着萨巴赫的死亡，继位问题不仅成为激烈公开辩论话题，而且科威特的报纸和议会也是决定结果的关键角色。


Kuwait’s political system is considered the most modern among the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms and monarchies, because all citizens – men and women alike – elect its parliament.	科威特的政治制度被认为是阿拉伯湾酋长国和君主国中最为现代化的。 这是因为所有的公民无论男女都选举其议会成员。


Elections with universal suffrage, combined with a relatively free press, meant that the succession became a public issue, debated in the media and by academics for months as Sheikh Jaber was dying.	普选加之相对自由的报纸意味着继位成为一件公共事务，在贾比尔临死前几个月内媒体和学术界都为此争论不休。


With the taboo on discussing the succession broken, talk about the physical and mental fitness of the likely successor became commonplace, and members of the ruling family who objected to the prospect of being ruled by a severely incapacitated crown prince came to enjoy broad support.	随着讨论继位问题的禁忌被打破，谈论可能的继任人的生理和心理是否适合变得平常，反对将国家交由一个严重残疾的王储统治的统治家族成员得到了广泛支持。


Thus, immediately after Jaber al-Sabah’s death, the succession became a national concern.	这样，贾比尔死后不久，继位问题成了全国关心的问题。


What in the past would have been a straightforward palace coup spilled out onto the pages of newspapers and into the corridors of Parliament.	在过去是一个直接了当的宫廷政变被报纸所报道，又在议会走廊内被谈论。


The Crown Prince’s abdication became inevitable.	王储的退位不可避免。


The cabinet of ministers affirmed the succession of Sabah al-Sabah as the new ruler, which was then ratified by Parliament.	内阁确定了萨巴赫为新的统治者，随即又得到议会的批准。


For the region, this was an historic moment.	对于海湾地区而言，这是一个历史性的时刻。


For the first time, an Arab parliament had voted a head of state out of office and asserted its will in choosing the successor.	一个阿拉伯国家的议会第一次投票将一名国家元首赶出王位并表明了选择继任人的愿望。


Parliamentary supremacy, one of the key issues in any country’s democratization, appears to be at hand in Kuwait.	议会的最高地位是任何国家民主化中的关键问题，看起来在科威特实现了。


Of course, Kuwait will now experience enormous tensions between the transparent rule of a true parliamentary government and the still powerful legacy of a hidden family-run state.	当然，科威特现在将经历切实的议会政府的透明统治以及幕后家族管理国家的强大遗产之间巨大的紧张关系。 但是，旧的强力统治以及其他海湾国家统治者所被罢黜的阴谋被一项现代原则所取代。


But the old rule of force and intrigue by which other Gulf rulers have been deposed has been replaced by a modern principle – the Al Sabah have surrendered their exclusive control over the succession to the will of Parliament, which alone could provide the legitimacy that the new Emir needs.	萨巴赫家族将继任问题独有的控制权交与了议会的意志。 议会可以单独提供新的埃米尔需要的合法性。


The consequences of this assertion of parliamentary authority will be enormous.  Parliamentary ratification did not simply provide a rubber stamp to a palace coup; its approval was conditional.	议会表明其权威的结果将会是巨大的。 议会批准不仅仅是给一场宫廷政变提供一个橡皮图章；


Emirs who need parliamentary approval to secure popular legitimacy must now reckon with the need to share power.	其批准是有条件的。 需要议会批准来确保大众合法性的埃米尔现在必须考虑分权的需要。


In exchange for voting to pass over the unfit Crown Prince, Kuwait’s parliament is now demanding even more political and economic reforms, including the formal legalization of political parties, the separation of the position of prime minister from that of crown prince, and even for the prime minister to be chosen from outside the Al Sabah family.	为了换取投票废黜不适宜的王储，科威特议会现在要求甚至更大的政治和经济改革，包括政治党派的正式合法化、首相职位与王储职位的分离，甚至是让首相从萨巴赫家族以外的人中挑选。


This was a true parliamentary revolution.	这是一场真正的议会革命。


According to Kuwait’s constitution, the new ruler has one year to appoint a crown prince, but he has to appoint a prime minister immediately.	根据科威特宪法，新统治者有一年的时间来任命王储，但是他必须立即任命一位首相。


The delay is significant, because Kuwaitis are unaccustomed to this kind of parliamentary influence.	耽搁是显而易见的，因为科威特人不习惯于这种议会影响力。


The new Emir will now need to navigate skillfully between the Al Sabah family’s factions and a newly empowered parliament.	新的埃米尔现在必须在萨巴赫家族不同派别以及新近获得权力的议会之间灵巧地周旋。


The victory of Parliament in Kuwait’s succession crisis is likely to lead some of Kuwait’s neighboring autocracies to stiffen their resolve against modernity and democracy.	科威特继任危机中议会的胜利又可能引导该国邻近的某些独裁政体强化他们反抗现代化和民主的决心。


But Kuwait shows that there will invariably come a moment when holding onto feudal ways is no longer an option.	但是，科威特事件表明，总有一天，抓住封建体制不放不再是一个选择。


The Kuwaiti model may be risky, but the alternative – simply ignoring the need for change – could prove fatal.	科威特模式可能有风险，但是替代的做法，也就是无视变革的需要可能是致命性的。


Kyoto’s Misplaced Priorities	京都的主次不分


When the Kyoto treaty enters into force on February 16, the global warming community will undoubtedly congratulate itself: to do good they have secured the most expensive worldwide treaty ever.	当京都议定书在2月16日生效时，全球变暖的社团无疑会自我庆贺一番：为了（全人类的）福祉，他们签订了这个迄今为止最为昂贵的全球性公约。


They have succeeded in making global warming a central moral test of our time.	他们成功地使全球变暖成为我们这个时代的中心道德议题。


They were wrong to do so.	但他们这样做是错误的。


Global warming is real and is caused by emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2).	全球变暖是真实的威胁，并且是由二氧化碳的排放造成的。


But existing climate models show we can do little about it.	但现有的气候模式表明我们对此却几乎无能为力。


Even if everyone (including the United States) applied the Kyoto rules and stuck to them throughout the century, the change would be almost immeasurable, postponing warming for a mere six years in 2100 while costing at least $150 billion a year.	即便所有国家（包括美国）都遵守京都议定书的相关规定并在这个世纪严格执行，其所带来的气候改变也微乎其微，到2100年时也只是以每年1500亿美元的代价将变暖推迟了6年而已。


Global warming will mainly harm developing countries, because they are poorer and therefore less able to handle climate changes.	全球变暖将会主要危害发展中国家，因为他们更为贫困因而应对气候变化的能力更弱。


However, by 2100, even the most pessimistic forecasts from the UN expect the average person in the developing countries to be richer than now, and thus better able to cope.	然而，即使是来自联合国的最悲观的预测也预期发展中国家的普通民众在2100年时会比现在更富裕，也因此能更好的应对这一挑战。


So Kyoto is basically a costly way of doing little for much richer people far in the future.	因此京都（议定书）也只不过是以一种昂贵方式为遥远的将来更为富裕的人类提供杯水车薪的帮助。


We need to ask ourselves if this should be our first priority.	我们要扪心自问这是否应该成为我们的当务之急。


Of course, in the best of all worlds, we would not need to choose our priorities.	当然，在理想状态下，我们不需要决定事务的优先次序。


We could do all good things.	我们可以做一切有益的事。


We could win the war against hunger, end conflicts, stop communicable diseases, provide clean drinking water, improve education and halt climate change.	我们能够战胜贫困，解决争端，根除传染性疾病，提供清洁的饮水，改善教育并防止气候变化。


But we can’t do everything.	但我们却并不能面面俱到。


So we must ask the hard question: what should we do first?	因此我们必须问一个难以回答的问题：什么是当务之急？


Some of the world’s top economists – including three Nobel Laureates – answered this question at the Copenhagen Consensus last May.	一些世界顶尖的经济学家—包括诺贝尔奖获得者—在去年5月的“哥本哈根共识”（Copenhagen Consensus）上回答了这一问题。


They found that dealing with HIV/AIDS, hunger, free trade, and malaria were the world’s top priorities, where we could do the most good for our money.	他们发现HIV/艾滋病、饥饿、自由贸易和疟疾是人类的当务之急。 我们在这些事务方面的投入会取得最佳效果。


Moreover, they put urgent responses to climate change at the bottom of the list.	另外，他们将对气候变化的应急反应放在这一清单的最末。


In fact, the panel called these ventures – including Kyoto – “bad projects,” because they cost more than the good they do.	事实上，与会的经济学家们将这些冒险行为—包括京都（议定书）--称为“不良项目”，因为它们事倍功半。


As the economics of climate change has become ever clearer, warnings from the global warming community have become shriller.	随着气候变化的经济影响变得前所未有的明晰，来自全球变暖社团的警告声也变得更为尖利。


For example, the head of the UN Climate Panel says, “We are risking the ability of the human race to survive.”	例如，联合国气候委员会的主席就警告说：“我们正在拿人类的生存能力冒险。 ”


Such statements make headlines, but they are nonsense.	这些声明虽然会成为报纸的头条新闻，但确是无稽之谈。


For example:	例如：


· At a recent meeting at Exeter in the UK, some participants warned of a 50-50 chance that the Gulf Stream winds could collapse within a century.	l 在英国埃克塞特举行的一次会议上，有些与会者警告说北大西洋暖流在这个世纪内停滞的几率有50%。


Such a scenario looks great in the movie “The Day After Tomorrow,” but it is unsubstantiated.	这样的情形非常适合《后天》这样的灾难片，但实际上却是天方夜谭。


As one presenter at the conference summarized: “No models have shown a complete shutdown, or a net cooling over land areas.	正如与会的一位发言者所总结的那样：“没有任何一种模拟的结果显示（北大西洋暖流的）完全停滞，或是陆地区域的净降温。


Hence a shutdown during the twenty-first century is regarded as unlikely.”	因此，（北大西洋暖流）在21世纪的停滞看来不会发生。 ”


· Recently, a coalition of prominent environmental and development organizations claimed that malaria would increase in a warmer world.	l 最近，一个由重要的环境和发展组织组成的联盟宣称疟疾会由于全球变得更暖而横行。


This has some theoretical validity, but ignores malaria’s dependence on poor infrastructure and health care.	这一说法有一定的理论基础，但却忽略了落后的基础设施和医疗保健也是该病肆虐的重要原因。


Indeed, throughout the cold 1500-1800’s, malaria was a major disease in Europe, the US, and far into the Arctic Circle.	的确，在气候寒冷的1500-1800年间，疟疾是横行欧洲、美国甚至远至北极圈内的主要疾病。


Malaria infections didn’t end because it got colder (it actually got warmer), but because Europe and the US got rich and dealt with the problem.	疟疾传染的终止并不是因为气候变冷（事实上气候是变暖了），而是因为欧洲和美国变得富裕并应对了这一问题。


With developing countries getting richer over the century, malaria is similarly likely to decrease rather than increase.	随着发展中国家在这个世纪变得更为富强，疟疾的危害也同样会被降低而不是增加。


· We are told that sea levels will rise – by roughly 50 centimeters by 2100 in some scenarios.	l 我们被告知海平面会上升—在某些情况下，海平面在2100年时会升高约50厘米。


This is correct, and it will clearly cause problems in low-lying countries like Bangladesh.	确有此事，这显��会给如孟加拉国这样地势低凹的国家造成问题。


But the alarmists neglect to mention that sea levels rose through the twentieth century by 10-25 centimeters.	但警告者们却忘了提及海平面在20世纪上升了10-25厘米的事实。


Did anyone notice?	有人注意到吗？


The rise in the twenty-first century will be worse and should not be trivialized, but the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that the total cost of adaptation will be around 0.1% of GDP.	21世纪的海平面上升幅度会更大且不容忽视。 但据“政府间气候变化专门委员会”的预测，我们应对这一问题的总成本只会占到GDP的约0.


The “end-of-civilization” argument is counterproductive to serious public debate.	“文明终结”的观点只会对严肃的公众辩论起到反作用。


It makes us believe that we only have one choice.	它使我们相信我们别无选择。


Yet the reality is that we can choose to make climate change our first priority, or we can choose to do a lot more good first.	而事实是我们既可以将应对气候变化作为我们的当务之急，也可以优先应对许多其它的事情。


To say this is not to suggest laissez faire.	这并不意味着我们要听之任之。


Far from it.	恰恰相反。


Thousands died in Haiti during recent hurricanes, but not in Florida, because Haitians are poor and cannot take preventive measures.	最近的飓风袭击海地造成好几千人死亡，而同样受袭的佛罗里达却无人死亡，原因是穷国海地无法采取防范措施。


Breaking the circle of poverty by addressing the most pressing issues of disease, hunger, and polluted water will not only do obvious good; it will also make people less vulnerable to the effects of climate change.	通过解决疾病、饥饿和水污染等燃眉之急来打破贫困的循环不仅会明显地改善民生； 它还能够增强人们对气候变化的应对能力。


We live in a world with limited resources, so caring more about some issues means caring less about others.	我们生活在一个资源有限的世界，因此更多地关注某些事务就意味着较少地关注另一些事务。


If we have a moral obligation, it is to spend each dollar doing the most good that we possibly can.	如果说我们有道德义务的话，那就是让每一分钱都尽可能地发挥最大的价值。


With Kyoto, the world will spend $150 billion a year on doing little good a century from now.	在京都议定书的框架下，我们会以每年1500亿美元的代价在未来的一个世纪里事倍功半。


In comparison, the UN estimates that half that amount could buy clean drinking water, sanitation, basic health care, and education for every single person in the world.	相形之下，联合国预测说以一半的代价我们就能为世界上的每一个人支付清洁的饮水、卫生设施、基本医疗保健和教育。


Which is better?	何去何从？


Global warming really is the moral test of our time, but not in the way its proponents imagine.	全球变暖的确是我们这个时代的一个道德议题，但它却并不是以其倡导者们所想象的方式出现的。


We need to stop our obsession with global warming and start dealing with more pressing and tractable problems first.	我们应该停止对全球变暖的痴迷并开始应对一些更为急迫却更容易驾驭的问题。


Labor in a World of Financial Capitalism	金融资本主义世界的劳工问题


The traditional hostility between labor unions and the world of finance should not obscure their common interest in using financial tools in an expansive and creative way.	工会同金融世界的纷战由来已久，但这种敌对不应该影响到他们之间的共同利益，即广泛地以及创造性地使用金融工具。


We live in an age of financial capitalism, and the only intelligent way forward – for unions and other workers’ associations – is for these bodies to help their members make increasingly sophisticated use of the tools of risk management.	我们生活在一个金融资本主义世界，对于工会以及其他代表劳方的团体来说，唯一明智的方法是帮助他们的会员充分利用日益成熟的风险管理工具。


The traditional boundaries between labor and capital are becoming blurred.	传统意义上的劳方和资方之间的分界线正变得模糊。


For example, companies increasingly augment standard wage packages with stock options, even for rank-and-file employees.	举例来说，公司会把股票期权纳入报酬计划中，借此逐步增长员工的工资，即便是普通员工也不例外。


In the United States, the Labor Department reports that in 2003, 14% of US workers in firms with 100 or more employees were offered stock options.	据美国的劳工部2003年的报告，14%受雇于拥有百人以上的美国公司的雇员被提供股票期权作为薪金的一部分。


Expect more such packages in the future.	将来这种报酬计划将变得更为普遍。


The problem is, most employees do not fully understand options or stocks and do not know how to evaluate them.	问题在于，大多数雇员并不充分理解股票期权的概念，而且不知道如何评估手中的股票。


A recent paper by MIT Professors Nittai Bergman and Derk Jenter suggests that management tends to award employee options when employees are excessively optimistic about the outlook for company stock – thereby in effect opportunistically substituting overpriced options for full pay.	麻省理工大学教授尼泰·伯格曼和德克·简特最近共同发布的一个报告显示，当雇员对公司股票的前景极其乐观的时候，公司管理层就会倾向于向员工提供股票期权，借机有效地用标价过高的股票期权取代全薪。


Unions and workers associations are the natural vehicles to monitor such behavior, but they must invest in the expertise to do so effectively.	工会以及劳方团体应该当仁不让地监控此类行为，但是他们必须请专业人士以进行有效的监控 。


They should not stand in the way of compensation that includes stock options, or that otherwise create financial risks for their employees.	他们不应该一味反对公司用股票期权或其它方式来补偿雇员工资这种行为，否则反而会为雇员造成金融风险。


But they should make sure that such programs are administered in employees’ interest, because companies that encourage their employees to hold options or to invest directly in the company’s stock are asking them to take on some of the company’s risks.	他们必须保证此类计划在有利于员工的前提下执行，因为当公司鼓励员工持有公司的股票期权或者直接投资公司的股票的时候，也就是要求他们承担起公司的一部分风险。


To be sure, sharing ownership can help employee morale. But it also creates an unhealthy concentration of risks: not only the employee’s job, but also his assets now depend on the company’s fate.	让员工共享公司股票期权固然能够鼓舞士气，但是这种做法会引起风险极不健康的集中化：此时不仅雇员的工作依赖于公司的存亡，连他的资产也与之紧密相连。


The scandal at Enron, in its final days, was that management prevented employees from selling their Enron shares while executives unloaded their own shares.	安然的丑闻就是在它垮台的最后几天，公司管理层阻止雇员们出售他们手中的安然股票，与此同时经理主管们却将自己的股票抛得一干二净。


Obviously, unions need to be alert to such bad behavior.	很明显，工会需要对此类恶性事件保持警惕。


More generally, they must examine employee ownership programs both sympathetically and analytically, in order to suggest ways to hedge the risks they create.	更具普遍意义的是，为了避免风险，他们必须满怀同情，对雇员股票期权计划进行分析性的调查。


The same is true of other financial tools.	其他金融工具也有相同的情况发生。


Labor unions have long pointed with satisfaction at hard-won contracts that specified a defined-benefit pension for their members.	工会早就为会员争取获得了一个详细的固定养老金计划的合同，从此心满意足。


But these unions were often without the financial sophistication to judge whether the firm set aside sufficient capital to meet its commitments decades later.	但正是这些工会通常会缺乏相应的金融知识来判断公司是否留出足够的资金来实现几十年后的承诺。


In the US, union failure to represent members’ interests adequately contributed to a major pension default at the Studebaker Corporation in 1963.	在美国，1963年斯图德贝克公司拖欠员工养老金这一重大事件充分说明了有时工会不能代表会员的利益。


The AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers and the United Steel Workers then petitioned Congress – against strong opposition from business interests – to establish the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in 1974 to insure private pensions against companies’ failure to honor them.	于是，美国汽车业工人联合会和钢铁工人联合会不顾企业利益集团的强烈反对，向国会请愿，要求建立退休基金保险公司，以确保当公司不能履行承诺的时候个人的养老金计划得以实现。


Gradually, many countries, with prodding from their trade unions, now have some form of benefit protection plan for private pensions.	在工会组织的敦促下，许多国家逐步地制定了一些个人的养老金保护计划。


The latest example is the United Kingdom, where trade unions have spurred the creation of the Pension Protection Fund, which will begin operating next year.	最近一个例子是英国，它的工会鞭策政府建立了养��金保护基金，明年起这一基金就将开始运作。


But it is not clear that these plans will succeed fully.	但是这些计划是否能够充分获得成功，前景还不是很明朗。


Declining stock markets and low interest rates, have left private pensions around the world more vulnerable than was expected.	低迷的股票市场以及不断被调低的银行利息，使得全世界的个人养老金基金的状况比人们预计的还要岌岌可危。


Moreover, the risks to pension funds may correlate with risks to other economic factors affecting specific groups of workers.	此外，养老金基金的风险还可能同其他经济因素相关联，正是这些经济因素影响着某些特定的就业团体。


This means that unions should not leave the complex financial problems of designing pensions entirely to governments.	这就意味着工会不应该将设计养老金计划这一复杂的金融问题完全交给政府处理。


Local unions need to be involved, for the issues involved are specific to companies and workers, and cannot be resolved by governments alone.	如果牵涉到一些特定的公司和工人，地方工会就需要参与进去，而不能由政府单独解决。


Indeed, the essence of labor unions is that they know the unique problems of a distinct group of workers, bring focused expertise on these problems, and thus intelligently represent their interests.	的确，工会的本职工作就在于他们了解一个确定的劳方群体特殊问题，为解决这些问题提供专家的意见，并通过这种方法来代表劳方的利益。


In today’s complex financial economies, representing workers’ interests is not so simple as battling with management for a bigger share of the pie.	在当今这个复杂的金融经济社会中，劳方利益的体现不再是同管理层争夺更多的好处那么简单。


Unions should instead negotiate with management the same way top executives do with their boards of directors when their complex compensation packages are worked out.	在制定补偿计划的时候，工会应该同管理层谈判，就像公司最高主管同董事会斡旋那样。


Unfortunately, instead of learning how to think in financially sophisticated ways, we still see labor unions in Europe and elsewhere dwelling too much on job security for working people.	不幸的是，我们仍然看到欧洲和其他地方的工会组织在劳方的工作保障问题上耗费了太多的精力，而不是学会如何深层次地考虑金融问题。


But making it difficult for firms to lay off workers provides only an illusory benefit for workers, for it compromises companies’ ability to compete, and weakens their incentive to create jobs.	为公司裁员设置层层阻力只能为员工提供一种虚幻的表面利益，因为这种做法牺牲的是公司的竞争力，并且削弱了他们创造就业机会的动力。


The alignment of incentives lies at the heart of modern financial theory.	激励机制是现代金融理论的核心部分。


Labor unions should negotiate with management about providing appropriate risk management to their employees in financial forms: the right kinds of insurance, options, and other investments to protect them realistically without guaranteeing their employment and without jeopardizing the productivity of the firm.	工会应该同管理层磋商，通过一些金融形式为员工提供适当的风险管理：适当的保险，分得股票期权以及做一些其他的投资来实际地保障员工利益，而不是为了保证他们不失业不顾危害到公司的生产力。


Complex financial capitalism is here to stay, and we all have to learn to live with it.	复杂的金融资本主义就在我们面前，我们每个人都不得不学会与之共生存。


Union leaders must study finance rather than condemn it as evil.	工会领袖必须学习金融财政而不是声讨它，认为这是邪恶的东西。


They must develop a cadre of professionals with a sophisticated understanding of risk management, and must work to educate their members in the financial subtleties of their specific circumstances.	他们必须发展一支经验丰富的了解风险管理运作的专业队伍，必须培训工会会员遇到具体的金融问题时懂得如何处置。


Labor in the Age of Robots	机器人时代的劳动力


DAVOS – Fears about the impact of technology on the labor market are nothing new.	达沃斯—关于技术对劳动力市场的影响的担忧不是什么新鲜事。


In the early nineteenth century, a group of English textile workers known as the Luddites worried that new technologies like power looms and spinning frames would cost them their jobs.	十九世纪初，一群被称为卢德派（Luddites）的英格兰纺织工人动力织机和精纺机等技术会夺走他们的饭碗。


They protested by smashing the machines.	他们以砸毁机器的方式表示反对。


Today, anxiety that new technologies could destroy millions of jobs is as high as ever.	如今，对新技术可能摧毁数百万工作岗位的焦虑不亚于十九世纪初。


In the midst of a major employment crisis, technology continues to reduce the labor needed for mass production, while the automation of routine legal and accounting tasks is hollowing out that sector of the job market as well.	在大规模就业危机期间，技术依然在减少大规模生产所需要的劳动力数量，与此同时，常规法律和会计工作的自动化也在各自行业挤出就业岗位。


The science of robotics is revolutionizing manufacturing; every year, an additional 200,000 industrial robots come into use.	机器人科学正在掀起制造革命； 每一年，都有200 000个新增工业机器人投入使用。


In 2015, the total is expected to reach 1.5 million.	2015年，工业机器人总数预计将突破150万。


Adapting the labor market to a world of increasingly automated workplaces will be one of the defining challenges of our era.	调整劳动力市场以适应日益自动化的工作场所将是现时代的一个关键挑战。


Yet no country can afford to ignore the transformation.	但没有一个国家可以忽视这一转变。


Globally, some 200 million people are unemployed, up 27 million since 2008.	全球而言，约有2亿人没有工作，2008年以来增加了2 700万。


There is a critical need to anticipate coming technological changes and provide the global workforce with the education and skills needed to participate in the modern labor market.	预测未来技术变革、为全球劳动力大军提供参与现代劳动力市场所需要的教育和技能是一个关键需要。


Worldwide, one-third of employers surveyed complain that they are unable to find workers with the right skills for existing vacancies.	放眼全世界，三分之一的受调查雇主无法找到拥有可以填补当前空缺岗位的合适技能的工人。


Efficient paths from training and education programs to the world of work must be built, so that skills can be matched to market demand.	我们必须建立从培训和教育通往职场的有效路径，以便技能与市场需求匹配。


Government programs must be strengthened, and employers and trade unions must assume greater responsibility for investing in skills.	政府计划必须强化，雇主和工会必须承担更大的技能投资的责任。


They also must consult more closely with educators and policymakers – discussions that should be informed by labor-market information, performance reviews, and the availability of employment services.	它们还必须更紧密地与教育者和决策者协商——他们的讨论应该有充分的劳动力市场信息、表现评估和就业服务普及为基础。


Whatever a country’s development level, investment in education and skills will increase the ability of its workforce to innovate and adapt to new technologies.	不论一个国家发展水平如何，教育和技能投资能够增加劳动力的创新能力和适应新技术的能力。


Such investment can determine whether a country’s economic growth is broadly inclusive or leaves large segments of society behind.	这些投资可以决定一国的经济增长是否具有广泛的包容性，是否把大量社会群体抛在了身后。


An abundant supply of workers who have been appropriately trained and can continue to learn boosts investor confidence and thus job growth.	而足够多的得到合适训练并能继续学习的工人的攻击能够提振投资者信心，最终刺激就业增长。


In addition to training the labor force for an age of further automation, sustainable economies must offer protections for workers in good times and bad.	除了培训劳动力以适应更深度的自动化时代，可持续经济还必须不论好坏光景都能为工人提供保护。


The nature of a worker’s relationship with his or her employer is changing.	工人与其雇主的关系的性质正在变化。


People entering the labor market are increasingly finding only short-term or temporary contracts; often, they are forced to take informal work or emigrate for a job.	进入劳动力市场的人们日益发现自己只能获得短期或临时合同； 他们往往被迫从事非正式工作，或为了工作而搬家。


These trends are exacerbating income inequality.	这些趋势正在恶化收入不平等。


As a result, mitigation policies are necessary.	因此，移民政策是必不可少的。


Along with a robust system of unemployment benefits, social protections such as healthcare and pensions are essential for overall worker security and to ensure a healthy economy.	医疗和退休金等社会保障与鲁棒的失业救济制度都是工人总体安全状况的关键，也是经济健康的关键。


And yet only 20% of the world’s population has adequate social-security coverage; more than half lack any coverage at all.	而全世界只有20%的人口得到了充足的社会安全覆盖； 超过一半人口没有任何社会保障。


That is why the work of the International Labor Organization, which was established in 1919, is still relevant today.	因此，成立于1919年的国际劳工组织的工作在今天仍然至关重要。


In a world of increasingly automated workplaces and eroding employee-employer relationships, the values encoded in the ILO’s labor standards are more necessary than ever.	在工作场所日益自动化、劳资关系日益恶化的今天，国际劳动组织劳动标准所包含的价值比以往任何时候都更加不可或缺。


The complex challenges facing workers worldwide will require complex solutions.	全世界工人所面临的复杂条件需要复杂的解决办法。


In 2013, the ILO launched its Future of Work initiative, which seeks to identify and analyze incipient trends and provide a forum for discussion about what must be done to adapt to rapidly changing labor-market conditions.	2013年，国际劳工组织启动了其首个工作的未来（Future of Work）项目，该项目旨在识别和分析初期趋势，并提供论坛讨论关于必须如何做以适应快速变化的劳动力市场条件。


Our world has changed vastly over the past century – and not only because of technology.	在过去的一个世纪中，我们的世界发生了翻天覆地的变化——技术是其中的重要原因。


By 2050, the global population will surpass nine billion.	到2050年，全球人口将超过九十亿。


The number of people aged 60 years and over will have tripled.	六十岁及以上人口数量将增加两倍。


Three-quarters of the elderly will be living in what are now developing countries, and the majority of them will be women.	四分之三的老年人将生活在今天的发展中国家，其中大部分是女性。


These demographic shifts will further revolutionize the labor market, social-security systems, economic development, and the world of employment.	这些人口变化趋势将进一步变革劳动力市场、社会安全体系、经济发展和��业情况。


For all of the progress human society has made since the era of the Luddites, a simple truth persists: machines must strengthen, not weaken, our prospects for inclusive growth and broadly shared prosperity.	自卢德派的时代以来，人类社会取得了长足进步，但一个简单的事实仍然成立：机器必须增强而不是削弱包容增长和广泛共享繁荣的前景。


We must ensure that the modern economy is a sustainable one, built on the principles of human dignity and the opportunity for decent work.	我们必须确保现代经济是可持续经济，建立在人类尊严原则和体面工作机会的基础上。


Counting Africa’s Invisible Workers	清点非洲的隐形工人


YAMOUSSOUKRO – The billions of dollars in aid delivered to Africa annually may do the continent much good, but it cannot deliver a solution to poverty.	亚穆苏克罗——每年用于非洲援助的数十亿美元或许能给非洲大陆带来很多好处，但却无法彻底解决贫困问题。


Only creating more high-quality jobs can do that.	只有创造更多优质就业机会能够达到这一目的。


The question is how.	问题是以何种方式。


Africa boasts a large and creative labor pool, buttressed by a youth population that is expected to double, to over 830 million, by 2050.	非洲拥有富于创造力的大量劳动力资源，其背后起支撑作用的是到2050年有望翻番至8. 3亿以上的青年人口。


That should be a boon for economies across the continent.	这对非洲大陆的所有经济体都应当是一种恩赐。


But African policymakers confront a serious problem: they do not know how many people they are dealing with, where they live, or how they earn a living. Simply put, they don’t have enough data.	但非洲决策者却面临着严重的问题：他们不知道自己究竟面对多少人、这些人住在哪里、以及他们如何解决生计问题。


In 46 of 54 African countries, official tracking of vital statistics such as birth, marriage, and death is limited.	非洲54个国家中有46个跟踪出生、结婚和死亡等关键数据的官方能力相当低下。


As the Mo Ibrahim Foundation reports, only “a third of all Africans live in a country where a census has been conducted since 2010,” and the census programs that do exist are often underfunded and unreliable.	据易卜拉欣基金会报告，“仅有1/3的非洲民众生活的国家在2010年后曾经进行过人口普查，”而且即使已经进行的人口普查项目也往往受制于资金短缺和结果不准确。


More than half of all Africans live in countries that have not conducted a labor-force survey in at least a decade.	超过半数的非洲人所生活的国家至少在10年内从未进行过任何形式的劳动力普查。


Meanwhile, young Africans are largely working in the informal economy, where they enter into ad hoc arrangements that lie beyond the purview of government regulation and taxation.	此外，绝大部分非洲年轻人在非正规部门工作，政府的法律和税收无力监管他们所签署的临时性工作安排。


They may be doing productive work, but in economies where informality is effectively institutionalized, owing to a lack of data-collection mechanisms.	他们可能从事着卓有成效的工作，但由于缺乏数据搜集机制，他们所从事工作的非正规性质被有效制度化。


Without an accurate picture of the state of the labor market, governments are hamstrung in their ability to respond to the challenges afflicting it.	由于不掌握劳动力市场的准确状况，政府应对挑战的监管能力非常疲弱。


Initiatives aimed at reducing youth unemployment, while numerous, can only be so effective if we don’t know which types of jobs already exist and which are needed.	虽然已经实施了一些旨在减少青年人失业的相关计划，但不了解哪些岗位已经存在而哪些依然短缺却严重制约着计划的效果。


With an estimated 122 million people expected to join the African workforce by 2022, keeping up with labor trends – and delivering enough good jobs – will only become more difficult.	由于截止2022年估计将有1. 22亿人加入非洲劳动力队伍，因此把握劳动力市场动态——并提供足够数量的优质岗位——难度只会越来越大。


Bringing the picture into sharper focus through improved data collection does not mean simply imitating the labor-tracking methods used in OECD countries, where the informal economy does not account for such a high share of employment.	通过改善数据搜集更清楚地了解非洲就业情况并不意味着简单模仿经合组织国家所采用的劳动力跟踪方法，因为在那些国家中非正式经济所占的就业比重远没有那么大。


Instead, African governments, with the help of private-sector actors, must develop methods for understanding how the informal economy works and how it can be improved.	相反，非洲政府必须在私营部门经营者的协助下找到了解非正式经济运作以及如何对其进行改良的准确方法。


Only then will it be possible to address unemployment and poverty effectively and unlock the potential of Africa’s youth.	只有这样才能有效解决失业及贫困问题并完成非洲年轻人的潜能开发。


To be sure, some high-potential approaches are already apparent.	可以肯定，我们已经找到了某些潜力巨大的方法。


The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa reports that, though the continent boasts 60% of the world’s uncultivated land, it spends $60 billion per year on food imports.	据非洲绿色革命联盟报告，尽管非洲大陆占全球未开垦土地的60%，但每年却耗资600亿美元用于粮食进口。


Investing in the development of Africa’s agricultural resources is thus a no-brainer.	因此投资非洲农业资源开发是显而易见的选择。


Young people could play a central role in that effort.	年轻人可以在这项工作中扮演核心角色。


By identifying and investing in those parts of agricultural value chains where young people can contribute, African leaders can create decent formal job opportunities in, say, light manufacturing for relatively low-skill workers.	非洲领导人可以通过找到年轻人能做出贡献的农业价值链领域并对其进行投资，从而在轻工制造等领域为相对低技术的工人创造体面的正式工作。


Only a small amount of skills training would be required to lift workers – such as the 120 now employed at a tomato paste factory in Nigeria – from the bottom of the value chain.	只需进行极少量技能培训就能让尼日利亚番茄酱生产厂目前雇用的120名工人摆脱价值链的底部。