And, if it is successful, the reactor will produce half a gigawatt of fusion power and open the way for commercial reactors.	如果项目取得成功，该反应堆将产生五亿瓦的聚变电能，从而为商业反应堆的应用开辟道路。


But the tokamak is not the only game in town.	但托卡马克并不是唯一的聚变项目。


Other designs are emerging to join the race for fusion power.	其他设计正源源不断加入到聚变能的竞争队伍之中。


Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s National Ignition Facility in California is getting impressive results by firing high-powered lasers at capsules of fuel, crushing the particles together to trigger fusion reactions.	位于加利福尼亚州的劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室的国家点火装置向燃料舱发射高能激光粒子、通过粒子挤压诱发聚变反应也取得了不俗的成果。


Elsewhere, particularly in the US, privately funded fusion ventures are springing up like mushrooms, each with its own concept for what some call the Holy Grail of energy.	其他地方，尤其是在美国，私人资助的聚变研究如雨后春笋般不断涌出。 这些项目各有被誉为“能量圣杯”的独特理念。


As the most advanced design, the tokamak still looks like the safest bet, but the competition from its rivals can only spur further innovation and progress.	但作为最先进的设计，托卡马克仍貌似最安全的赌注，但来自其对手的竞争只能刺激进一步的创新和进步。


Some discourage investment in nuclear fusion, claiming that, given how far from being market-ready the technology is, our financial resources are better allocated to tried and tested energy options.	有些人不赞成投资核聚变，称鉴于该技术离进入市场依然遥远，将财政资源配置到久经考验的能源项目才是最佳选择。


The critics have a point: given that fusion can be carried out only on a large scale, its investment requirements are considerable.	批评人士的话有一定道理：鉴于聚变只能大规模进行，需要满足的投资需求相当巨大。


In the 1970s, American researchers estimated that getting fusion power on the grid would demand investment of $2-3 billion annually in research and development until anywhere from 1990 to 2005 (depending on the amount of effort applied).	20世纪70年代，美国研究人员曾预计实现核聚变发电并网需要在1990到2005年间每年20-30亿美元的研发投入（具体投资规模取决于工作量情况）。


They also estimated a minimum level of investment, below which funding would never be sufficient to build a fusion power plant.	他们还估算了最低投资水平（低于该水平永远不可能建立聚变电厂）。


Nuclear fusion research budgets have remained below that line for 30 years.	30年来核聚变研究预算一直处于该水平之下。


But fusion’s potential is simply too great to give up.	但核聚变的潜力大到令人无法放弃的地步。


And, in fact, the progress that has been made in recent years – despite the lack of adequate investment – belies the naysayers.	事实上，近年来已经取得的进展——尽管在投资严重不足的情况下——依然证实了反对者的错误。


Machines all over the world are reaching fusion temperatures and extending our technological capabilities.	世界各地的设备都已经达到核聚变的温度要求，拓展了我们的技术能力。


The ITER experiment, when it starts up in the early 2020s, will embody those advances, achieving the long-awaited fusion burn – and place us just one step away from the ultimate goal of getting fusion power on the grid in an affordable manner.	21世纪20年代初ITER试验真正开始时将体现上述进步，实现我们期待已久的核聚变燃烧——届时我们距离将廉价核聚变电能并网的终极目标将只差一步。


Without nuclear fusion, future generations’ energy options will be severely limited – creating a serious problem for developed and developing countries alike.	如果没有核聚变，子孙后代的能源选择将会受限严重——由此为发达及发展中国家带来的问题都非常严重。


Lev Artsimovich, the tokamak’s inventor, said that “fusion will be ready when society needs it.”	托卡马克的发明者阿基莫维奇曾说“社会需要时核聚变将应运而生。


One hopes that he is right.	”希望他说得是对的。


But, rather than depending on fusion researchers to defy the odds, the world should step up investment in the technology.	但与其依赖研究人员挑战自身命运，世界各国应该加大投资核聚变技术。


Our future may depend on it.	这将决定我们的未来。


Reviving the Non-proliferation Agenda	重振可不扩散日程


MADRID – US President Barack Obama’s recent visit to Hiroshima was no typical diplomatic stop.	马德里—美国总统奥巴马最近对广岛的访问绝非普通的外交停留。


Not only did it mark the first visit by a sitting US president to that city, which was destroyed by an American nuclear bomb in 1945; it also drew attention to Obama’s record on non-proliferation.	这不但是在任美国总统首次访问1945年毁于美国核弹的广岛； 也吸引了人们对奥巴马在核不扩散问题上的记录的关注。


In a 2009 speech in Prague, Obama identified nuclear weapons as “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security,” owing to their potential to fall into the hands of terrorists or other rogue elements, and committed to reducing their role in America’s national security strategy.	在2009年布拉格的演讲中，奥巴马把核武器称为“全球安全最紧迫、最极端的威胁”，因为核武器可能落入恐怖分子或其他流氓之手； 他还承诺降低核武器在美国国家安全战略中的作用。


In his moving Hiroshima address, Obama again emphasized the need to pursue a world without nuclear weapons.	在他感人的广岛演说中，奥巴马在其强调追求无核世界的需要。


He described the “moral revolution” that must accompany technological progress, with societies resisting the “logic of fear” that compels them to cling to their nuclear arsenals.	他提出必须以“道德革命”辅助技术进步，社会要抵制促使它们维持核武库“恐惧逻辑”。


But, though both speeches expressed similar ideas, they were delivered against very different policy backdrops.	但是，尽管两次演讲都表达出类似的想法，它们的政策背景却非常不同。


Indeed, the Obama administration’s nuclear policy has changed substantially since 2009, when containing nuclear proliferation was among its central foreign-policy concerns.	事实上，奥巴马政府的核政策自2009年以来发生了重大转变，2009年之前，遏制核扩散是其核心外交政策关注点之一。


In 2010, Obama brought world leaders together for the first-ever Nuclear Security Summit, which focused on keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists – a focus that has since proved to be justified.	2010年，奥巴马召集全世界领导人举行了首届核安全峰会，峰会的关注焦点是不让核材料落入恐怖分子之手——这一焦点后来被证明是明智的。


Though the initial aim of freezing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium was not achieved, the four summits held since then have brought about a reduction in other sources of radioactive material, and safety measures have been improved.	尽管冻结钚和高浓缩铀存量的最初目标没有实现，但此后的四次峰会降低了其他放射性材料资源，安全措施业得到了改善。


The 2010 summit came just days after another apparent victory for non-proliferation: Obama and then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which committed them to halve their stores of strategic nuclear missile launchers.	2010年峰会局限前几天，核不扩散刚刚取得另一场大胜：奥巴马和时任俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫签署了新战略核武器销毁条约（New START），双方承诺削减一半的战略导弹发射架。


Just a year earlier, then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced a “reset” in bilateral relations.	此前一年，时任美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿和而俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫宣布双边关系“重启”。


Since then, however, the relationship has deteriorated, taking with it hope for further cooperation.	但此后，俄美关系有所倒退，进一步合作的希望也随之渺茫。


In fact, Obama’s entire non-proliferation agenda has lost considerable momentum.	事实上，奥巴马的整套核不扩散日程已经失去了大量动力。


Russia chose not to attend the latest Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, DC, earlier this year.	今年早些时候，俄罗斯选择不参加在华盛顿举行的最新核安全峰会。


And not only has the US not proposed any new international non-proliferation initiatives; at a 2015 conference to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it moved to avoid a conference on a nuclear weapons ban for the Middle East, in order to avoid increasing tensions with Israel.	而美国不但没有提出任何新的国际核不扩散方案； 在2015年的一次评估核不扩散条约的会议上，美国还回避了一场中东禁核的讨论会，以避免增加与以色列的紧张。


Moreover, the Obama administration has reduced America’s own nuclear arsenal more slowly than any US administration since the end of the Cold War, instead promoting its modernization – an effort that will require an estimated $1 trillion in investment over the next three decades.	从外，奥巴马政府削减美国自身核武器的速度比二战结束以来其他各届美国政府都要慢，反之要促进其现代化——据估计此项计划在未来三十年需要1万亿美元投资。


Though the program is technically aimed at improving existing weapons’ reliability – and thereby allowing future reductions – critics emphasize that as more small, high-precision nuclear arms are developed, the likelihood that they will be used increases.	尽管该计划在技术上是为了改善现有核武器的可靠性——从而为未来裁军创造条件——但批评者强调，随着更小型、精确度更高的核武器被研发出来，使用它们的可能性也会增加。


Obama has, however, secured one major victory for non-proliferation: helping to close a long-awaited international deal with Iran to prevent it from using its civilian nuclear program to develop weapons.	但是，奥巴马仍确保了核不扩散方面的一项重大胜利：帮助完成了期待已久的伊朗核协议，以防止其利用民用核计划发展核武器。


After years of sclerotic negotiations, domestic developments in Iran – namely, the 2013 election of the more moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani – provided a critical diplomatic opening, which Obama seized.	经历了多年僵持不下的谈判后，伊朗国内的发展形势——2013年温和派的鲁哈尼当选总统——提供了关键的外交机会，而奥巴马抓住了这个机会。


The breakthrough provided clear evidence that while institutions are very important in world affairs, individuals can sometimes be decisive.	伊朗核问题的突破清楚地证明，尽管机构在国际事务中十分重要，但有时个体才具有决定性作用。


The Iran deal was a major achievement, and not just because it should help to mitigate the risks arising from that country.	伊朗核协议是一个重大成就，不仅是因为它有助于减轻伊朗所造成的风险。


Because just one nuclear-armed country can make achieving regional stability a near-impossible task, stopping Iran had far-reaching regional implications.	只需要出现一个有核国家，就能让实现地区稳定成为几乎不可能完成的任务，因此阻止伊朗有着深远的地区影响。


By easing the fears of Iran’s regional rivals, the deal created some space for the potential development of a Middle Eastern security structure.	通过缓解伊朗的地区对手的恐惧，该协议为潜在中东安全结构的发展创造了空间。


It even provides a model for future multilateral agreements on thorny security-related topics.	它甚至还为未来棘手安全相关问题的多边协议提供了一个样板。


But this triumph should not invite complacency.	但绝不能因为这一胜利而自满。


Nuclear weapons remain a deep and urgent threat to security and stability worldwide.	核武器仍然是对世界安全与稳定的深刻而紧迫的��胁。


Only nuclear weapons can turn a small confrontation into a catastrophe on the scale of the one Obama commemorated in Hiroshima.	只有核武器可以将一场小规模冲突演化为一场灾难，规模与奥巴马在广岛所纪念的那场灾难等量齐观。


Given this, the drive to eliminate nuclear weapons must be revived with all of the vigor of Obama’s first years in office.	基于这一点，奥巴马执政后的前几年必须全力复振销毁核武器的动力。


That drive should take us, first and foremost, to North Korea, which, despite severely limited means, continues to invest heavily in advancing its nuclear program.	这一动力首先应该指向朝鲜。 尽管采取了严厉的限制措施，但朝鲜仍然投入巨资推进核计划。


The international community’s best option for influencing North Korea is China, which has long had close relations with – and strong economic influence over – the Hermit Kingdom.	国际社会影响朝鲜的最佳选择是中国。 长期以来，中国与隐秘王国的关系一直十分密切，并对它有着强大的经济影响力。


And China’s approach toward North Korea seems to be changing, spurred by the nuclear issue.	而中国对朝方针似乎正在核问题的刺激下发生改变。


Earlier this year, China decided not to use its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to block a tough new round of sanctions on North Korea in response to its latest round of nuclear tests.	今年早些时候，中国决定不在联合国安理会上使用否决权阻碍新一轮对朝严厉制裁，以应对朝鲜最新核试验。


Yet a visiting North Korean delegation recently announced that the country was committed to continuing its nuclear program.	但一个朝鲜访问团最近宣称该国决心继续其核计划。


Given that there can be no security in East Asia – especially for South Korea and Japan – without a nuclear deal, strong international action is crucial.	没有核协议，东亚就不可能有安全——特别是对韩国和日本，因此，强大的国际行动至关重要。


Specifically, the international community must escalate its response to North Korea’s increasingly unruly behavior, by compelling the country’s leaders to engage in negotiations with world powers regarding its nuclear program.	具体而言，国际社会必须加强对日益不受控制的朝鲜的行为的反应，迫使朝鲜领导人与世界诸强就其核计划进行谈判。


For talks to be successful, however, China and the US – which have plenty of disagreements of their own – must work together, and the other members of the UN Security Council must facilitate such cooperation.	但是，要成功地进行对话，中国和美国——它们自身仍然存在诸多分歧——必须精诚合作，安理会的其他成员国也必须协助这一合作。


Obama’s address in Hiroshima carried huge symbolic significance.	奥巴马的广岛演说具有巨大的象征意义。


But, with more than 15,000 nuclear weapons still in the world, symbolism is not enough.	但是，全世界仍有超过15,000枚核武器，光有象征意义是不够的。


It is time to take action to advance non-proliferation.	应该采取行动推动核不扩散。


From Nuclear Safety to Nuclear Security	从核安全到核安保


WASHINGTON, DC/MOSCOW – Four years ago, a devastating tsunami crashed into the coast of Japan.	华盛顿/莫斯科—四年前，一场灾难性海啸蹂躏了日本海岸。


Fifty-foot waves breached the seawall of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, cutting off its emergency power supply and disabling its cooling systems.	五十英尺高的巨浪击溃了福岛第一核电站的防波堤，破坏了发电能力，摧毁了冷却系统。


The nuclear accident was the worst since the meltdown of the Chernobyl power plant in 1986.	这场核事故是1986年切尔诺核电站爆炸以来最严重的事故。


Investigators concluded that one of the underlying causes was complacency: those in charge of the facility believed that their safety systems were robust, and there was no effective independent oversight.	调查者认为，一个根本原因是自满：核电站的管理者认为他们的安全系统是鲁棒的，并且不存在有效的独立监督。


The disaster in Japan has spurred reforms in the field of nuclear safety.	日本的灾难激发了核安全（nuclear safety）领域的改革。


But when it comes to nuclear security, complacency remains a major problem.	但在核安保（nuclear security）问题上，自满也是个大问题。


We must not wait until tragedy strikes to do something about it.	我们决不能等到发生了悲剧之后才开始行动。


Today, well over 1.5 million kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium – key ingredients for nuclear weapons – are dispersed across hundreds of facilities in 25 countries.	如今，有远超150万公斤的高纯度铀和钚（核武器的核心原料）散布在25个国家的数百个核设施中。


Some are poorly secured.	其中一些安保薄弱。


Yet enough nuclear material to fill a small bag of sugar is all it takes to construct a device with the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of people and inflict billions of dollars in damage.	但只要有一小包糖那么多的核原料，就足以制造出能够杀死数十万人、造成数十亿美元破坏的设备。


Much has been done to improve security at nuclear facilities in recent years, but governments must do more to protect their citizens from the risks of catastrophic nuclear terrorism.	在核设施安保方面，近几年来取得了长足进步，但政府必须花更大力气保护公民免受灾难性核恐怖主义的威胁。


The lessons from the Fukushima crisis can serve as a useful guide for reform.	福岛危机的教训可以为改革提供有用的指引。


For starters, governments and industry must treat nuclear security as a process of continuous improvement and work to keep pace with evolving threats and challenges.	首先，政府和业界必须将核安保作为一个持续改进的过程，并随着威胁和挑战的发展而发展。


A facility considered secure 20 years ago might now be vulnerable to a cyber attack that bypasses its security systems or confounds efforts to keep track of its nuclear material.	20年前认为安保程度足够的设施，如今也许极易受到绕过其安保系统或打乱核材料跟踪记录的网络打击。


Well-organized and well-financed non-state groups, like the Islamic State, may employ new tactics, technologies, and capabilities to steal nuclear materials.	组织发达、资金雄厚的非国家集团（如伊斯兰国）可能采用新战术、技术和能力窃取核材料。


Governments must therefore consistently evaluate evolving technologies and threats so that security systems designed to protect nuclear materials stay ahead of the capabilities of those who would seek to steal them.	因此，政府必须持续评估技术和威胁的变化，以使其安保系统可以领先窃贼一步，保护核材料。


Second, governments and industry should make sure that security culture, like safety culture, becomes an integral part of every nuclear facility’s operations.	其次，政府和业界应该确保安保文化与安全文化一样成为每一项核设施操作的组成部分。


As General Eugene Habiger, a former commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command who was the US Department of Energy’s “security czar,” once put it: “Good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”	前美国战略司令部司令员、美国能源部“安保沙皇”尤金·哈比格（Eugene Habiger）曾说：“好的安保是20%的设备加上80%的人员。 ”


Governments and industry should work together to nurture a strong culture of security.	政府和业界应该合作培养强大的安保文化。


Each and every employee at a nuclear facility – from guards to scientists to senior staff – must view the security of nuclear materials as an essential part of their jobs.	每一位核设施工作人员——从警卫到科学家和高层管理人员——都必须将核材料的安保问题作为工作的核心之一。


Third, governments must regularly review security systems at nuclear facilities.	第三年，政府必须定期评估核设施的安保系统。


It is not sufficient for nuclear operators to say that the state of security in their facilities is “good enough.”	核设施运营方声称设施的安保状态“足够好”是不够的。


Effective oversight can root out complacency.	有效的监督可以根除自满。


Fukushima exposed the need for regulators to perform regular stress tests, evaluating the ability of nuclear facilities to stand up to various contingencies affecting their safety.	福岛危机暴露出我们需要监管者定期进行压力测试，评估核设施应对各种或有安全事件的能力。


Regulators should conduct similar evaluations aimed specifically at assessing facilities’ ability to withstand security threats, including theft by knowledgeable insiders.	监管者还应该采取具体的评估，检验核设施抵御安保威胁的能力，包括被聪明的内幕人士偷窃的威胁。


Finally, world leaders should seek to establish closer forms of international cooperation on nuclear security.	最后，世界领导人应该建立更加密切的核安保问题国际合作形式。


As Chernobyl and Fukushima demonstrated, nuclear safety vulnerabilities in one country can have profound consequences for the rest of the world.	切尔诺贝利和福岛危机表明，一国的核安全脆弱性可能给世界其他地区带来深远影响。


The same can be said of nuclear security risks.	核安保风险也是如此。


We share a political – and moral – responsibility to ensure that terrorists never get their hands on the world’s most dangerous materials.	我们都有确保恐怖分子永远无法染指世界上最危险材料的政治和道德责任。


Countries should draw on the example of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a successful program of collaboration on nuclear security among the United States, Russia, and ex-Soviet states.	各国应该以成功的美国、俄罗斯和前苏联之间的核安保合作项目——纳恩-卢格减少威胁合作计划（Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction）为榜样。


Countries with nuclear materials should exchange information on how best to bolster security, increase intelligence-sharing on common nuclear-security challenges, and explore the possibility of conducting peer reviews.	拥有核材料的国家应该交换关于如何最好地促进安保的情报，增加共同核安保挑战的情报共享，探索实施同行评议的可能性。


Our friend and colleague Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, often warns that we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.	我们的朋友和同事、核威胁倡议（Nuclear Threat Initiative）的联职主席山姆·纳恩（Sam Nunn）常常警告，我们在进行一场合作与灾难之间的竞赛。


It is important that we learn the lessons of Fukushima and incorporate them into our strategy to combat nuclear terrorism.	我们必须从福岛危机中汲取教训，并据此制定打击核恐怖主义的战略中。


This is one race in which we cannot afford to fall behind.	这是一场我们非赢不可的竞赛。


Nuclear Steps Undermine Peace	核策略危及和平


By abandoning many of the nuclear arms agreements negotiated in the last 50 years, the United States has been sending mixed signals to North Korea, Iran, and other nations with the technical knowledge to create nuclear weapons.	摒弃许多在过去50年里通过谈判达成的核武器协议的做法，使美国向北朝鲜、伊朗和其他拥有发展核武器的技术知识的国家发出了含混不清的信号。


Currently proposed agreements with India compound this quagmire and further undermine the global pact for peace represented by the nuclear nonproliferation regime.	目前与印度的协议提案也陷入了这一窠臼并会进一步危害由核不扩散体系提出的全球和平协定。


At the same time, no significant steps are being taken to reduce the worldwide arsenal of almost 30,000 nuclear weapons now possessed by the US, Russia, China, France, Israel, Britain, India, Pakistan, and perhaps North Korea.	同时，在削减由美国、俄罗斯、中国、法国、以色列、英国、印度、巴基斯坦、也许还有北朝鲜等国家拥有的30000多枚核武器方面也没有采取切实有效的步骤。


A global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the Cold War.	当前，由于错误或判断失误而发生全球性核屠杀的可能性比起冷战时代毫不逊色。


The key restraining commitment among the five original nuclear powers and more than 180 other nations is the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).	在原来的五个核大国和180多个国家之间的关键性遏制机制就是1970年代的《核不扩散条约》（NPT）。


Its key objective is “to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology...and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.”	其主要目的是“防止核武器及其技术的传播……并推动实现解除核军备的目标。


In the last five-year review conference at the United Nations in 2005, only Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea were not participating – the first three have nuclear arsenals that are advanced, and the fourth’s is embryonic.	”在2005年联合国召开的上一次“五年评估大会”上，只有以色列、印度、巴基斯坦和北朝鲜没有出席—前三个国家拥有先进的核武库，而第四个则正在成形中。


The American government has not set a good example, having already abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, binding limitations on testing nuclear weapons and developing new ones, and a long-standing policy of foregoing threats of “first use” of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.	美国政府由于摒弃限制核武器实验和发展新型核武器的《反弹道导弹公约》和长期坚持威胁对无核国家“首先使用”核武器的政策，因而没有起到表率作用。


These recent decisions have encouraged China, Russia, and other NPT signatories to respond with similar actions.	最近的这些决策更是引得中国、俄罗斯等其他NPT的缔约国也纷纷效仿。


Knowing since 1974 of India’s nuclear ambitions, I and other American presidents imposed a consistent policy: no sales of nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to India or any other country that refused to sign the NPT.	自从1974年得知了印度的核野心以来，我和其他的美国总统都实行了连续性的政策：不向印度和其他任何拒绝签署NPT的国家出售核技术或不受控制的燃料。


Today, these restraints are in the process of being abandoned.	而现在，这些限制政策也正被摒弃。


I have no doubt that India’s political leaders are just as responsible in handling their country’s arsenal as leaders of the five original nuclear powers.	我毫不怀疑印度的政治领导人们在管理该国的核武库方面和五个核大国一样负责任。


But there is a significant difference: the original five have signed the NPT, and have stopped producing fissile material for weapons.	但这其中也有很大的不同：五个核大国已经签署了NPT，并停止了用于核武器的可裂变燃料的生产。


India’s leaders should make the same pledges, and should also join other nuclear powers in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.	印度的领导人本应该做出同样的承诺，并且还应该和其他的核国家一起签署《全面禁止核试验条约》。


Instead, they have rejected these steps and insist on unrestricted access to international assistance in producing enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be India’s current capacity.	然而，他们却反其道而行之，坚持在生产可裂变燃料方面不受限制地得到国际援助。 这些燃料每年足够生产50枚核武器，这远远高出外界公认的印度现有生产能力。


If India��s demand is acceptable, why should other technologically advanced NPT signatories, such as Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Japan – to say nothing of less responsible nations – continue to restrain themselves?	如果印度的要求可以接受，那么为什么其他拥有先进技术的NPT缔约国，如巴西、埃及、沙特阿拉伯和日本—更别提那些较为不负责任的国家—还要继续限制自己呢？


Having received at least tentative approval from the US for its policy, India still faces two further obstacles: an acceptable agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 45-nation body that – until now – has barred nuclear trade with any nation that refuses to accept international nuclear standards.	在至少从美国方面获得了对其政策的试探性支持之后，印度仍然面临两方面的障碍：与国际原子能机构(IAEA)达成一项可接受的协议并获得核供应国集团(NSG)的特许。 该集团是一个由45个国家组成的组织，到现在为止一直禁止成员国与任何拒绝接受国际核标准的国家进行核贸易。


The non-nuclear NSG members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.	NSG成员国中的无核国家有：阿根廷、澳大利亚、白俄罗斯、比利时、巴西、保加利亚、加拿大、克罗地亚、塞浦路斯、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、芬兰、德国、希腊、匈牙利、爱尔兰、意大利、日本、哈萨克斯坦、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、卢森堡、马耳他、荷兰、新西兰、挪威、波兰、葡萄牙、罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、南非、南韩、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、土耳其和乌克兰。


The role of these nations and the IAEA is not to prevent India’s development of nuclear power or even nuclear weapons, but rather to assure that it proceeds as almost all other responsible nations on earth do, by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting other reasonable restraints.	这些国家和IAEA的作用不在于制止印度发展核能力或核武器，���是确保该国和其他几乎所有地球上负责任的国家一同签署《核不扩散条约》并接受其他合理的限制机制。


Nuclear powers must show leadership, by restraining themselves and by curtailing further departures from the NPT's international restraints.	核大国们必须通过自我克制和遏制对NPT的国际限制机制的进一步背离来显示领导力。


One-by-one, the choices they make today will create a legacy -- deadly or peaceful -- for the future.	他们今天逐个的抉择会给未来留下一份致命或是和平的遗策。


Nuclear Vigilantes	核警察


LOS ANGELES – Forty years ago this month, more than 50 nations gathered in the East Room of the White House to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.	洛杉矶－四十年前的本月，50多个国家聚集在白宫东厅签署了《不扩散核武器条约》。


In his memoirs, US President Lyndon B. Johnson called it “the most significant step we had yet taken to reduce the possibility of nuclear war.”	在其论文集中，美国总统林德·B·约翰逊把该条约称作“至今为止我们采取的降低核战争可能性的最重要的措施”。


Today, with the benefit of time, we can evaluate whether the accord truly marks the “historic turning point” President Johnson hoped for.	现在，随着时间的推移，我们可以评估这个条约是否真地标志着约翰逊总统所希望的“历史性的转折点”。


The evidence suggests that while the pact’s dikes have largely held, serious leaks have developed, prompting nuclear vigilantes to apply force when they have concluded that diplomacy would fail to halt the Bomb’s spread.	证据显示，虽然该条约的堤防大部分被守住了，但是，也产生了严重的漏洞，促使核警察在当他们断定外交不能停止核扩散的时候使用武力。


Whether this behavior is a harbinger for the future remains unclear, but it raises a continuing specter given the failure of the NPT to include an effective enforcement mechanism.	这种行为是否是未来行为的先驱尚不清楚，但是，鉴于《不扩散核武器条约》没有包含一个有效的执行机制，它增强了持续萦绕在人们心头的担忧。


One fact is not in doubt: the NPT is the legal linchpin for the nuclear nonproliferation regime now signed and ratified by all but three nations – India, Pakistan, and Israel – and one drop-out, North Korea.	有一个事实是毫无疑问的：除了三个国家——印度、巴基斯坦和以色列——以及一个退出的国家，北朝鲜之外，《不扩散核武器条约》是签署并核准它的国家的核不扩散制度的法律支柱。


The Treaty’s principles remain bold: the pact’s five acknowledged nuclear weapons states – the US, Britain, France, Russia, and China – promise to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and the remaining parties commit not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for the right to develop civil nuclear power, with international assistance, subject to binding safeguards.	该条约的原则仍然很坚决：条约公认的五个拥有核武器的国家——美国、英国、法国、俄罗斯和中国——承诺清除他们的核设施，其他缔约国承诺不取得核武器，并以此交换在遵守有约束力的安全保障制度的情况下，在国际力量的支持下发展民用核能的权利。


While the NPT is not entirely responsible for the absence of dozens of nuclear-armed states that many people once feared would emerge, it generated a standard of behavior that continues to guide most countries.	虽然《不扩散核武器条约》对没有出现许多人担心的要出现许多拥有核武器的国家的情况起到全部的作用，但是，它产生了一个持续指导大多数国家的行为准则。


Still, the accord never fulfilled its disarmament objective.	还有，该条约从来没有实现其裁军目标。


The five nuclear powers continue to hang on to their weapons, giving mere lip service to their elimination.	五个核国家继续紧紧握住它们的核武器，仅仅在口头上说要清除它们。


More disturbing for international calm, a handful of non-nuclear signatories have secretly flouted the agreement.	更扰乱国际宁静的是，一些没有核武器的缔约国已经秘密地对该条约阳奉阴违了。


Eventually exposed, their perfidy demonstrated the NPT’s imperfect ability to deter, catch, and reverse nuclear cheats.	这些行为最终被暴露，它们的不诚实行为证明了《不扩散核武器条约》在阻止、发现和改变核欺骗上的能力是有缺陷的。


Six cases mark the most egregious cheating.	有六个事件显示了最惊人的欺骗。


Twice, Iraq bucked safeguards – first when it built the Osirak reactor and failed to provide inspectors full transparency and convincing assurance it would not use the plant to produce plutonium for weapons, and, second, when it nearly completed its secret enrichment program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.	伊拉克两次反对安全保障制度——第一次是它建造了奥西拉克核反应堆（Osirak reactor），没有向检查人员提供完全透明的信息和令人信服地保证它不会将电站用于生产制造核武器的钚的时候，第二次是当它在1991年的波斯湾战争之前几乎完成了其秘密的铀浓缩计划的时候。


North Korea proved more successful, becoming the eighth country to detonate a nuclear weapon.  At least two other NPT parties – Libya and Syria – engaged in significant nuclear subterfuge but failed.	北朝鲜事实上走得更远，成为第八个引爆核武器的国家。 至少还有两个《不扩散核武器条约》的缔约国——利比亚和叙利亚——从事过重要的核活动，但是最后都失败了。


And then there is Iran.	此外还有伊朗。


Equally disturbing has been the failure of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to catch such violations.	同样令人困惑的还有国际原子能机构的安全保障机制没有发觉这样的违反条约的行为。


In only one case, North Korea, did the IAEA succeed.	只有在北朝鲜事件中，国际原子能机构成功了。


In Iran, a dissident group, not the IAEA, blew the whistle.	在伊朗，是一个持不同政见的团体踢爆了这件事情，而不是国际原子能机构。


Lack of confidence in Treaty enforcement inspired three instances of military vigilantism: Israel’s strike on Osirak in 1981, its attack on Syria’s suspect site in 2007, and Washington’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. Mixed results followed.	对条约的执行缺乏信心激起了三次自发维护安全的军事行动：以色列在1981年对奥西拉克的军事打击，在2007年对叙利亚的可疑地点的袭击以及2003年华盛顿对伊拉克的入侵。


Osirak’s destruction inspired Saddam to try again.	这些行动产生了不同的结果。


The US became mired in Iraq. And, for the moment, Israel’s Syrian strike appears to have eliminated a potential threat.	奥西拉克的毁灭促使萨达姆再次试验，美国陷入了伊拉克战争的泥潭，以及到目前为止，以色列对叙利亚的军事打击似乎已经清除了一个潜在的威胁。


For the Jewish state, military strikes have suggested another lesson.	对于这个犹太国家，军事打击暗示了另一个内容。


A nuclear vigilante could apply force with impunity.	自发地维护核安全的国家可以不受惩罚地使用武力。


No retaliation followed.	接下来也没有遭到报复。


In other instances when countries contemplated the same thing, they were not as sanguine.	在其他的情形中，当各国考虑同样的事情的时候，它们不会如此的乐观。


Hence, the Soviet Union, the US, Egypt, and India decided that it is better to live with a nuclear-armed China, North Korea, Israel, and Pakistan, respectively, than risk war.	因此，苏联、美国、埃及以及印度决定比起冒着战争的风险，分别和拥有核武器的中国、北朝鲜、以色列以及巴基斯坦和平共处更好。


The United Nations Security Council, which remains the NPT’s enforcer, could better address proliferation breakouts and the compulsion of some to take matters into their own hands were it to grant itself predetermined authority to promptly stop cheaters by any and all means.	仍然是《不扩散核武器条约》执行机构的联合国安理会，可以更好的关注扩散突破以及对一些国家采取强制措施从而使问题处于自己的控制中，如果它打算授予自己先决权来通过任何方式迅速阻止缔约国的违约行为的话。


The result would make the prospective treaty violator think twice.	其结果是使可能违反条约的国家三思而行。


But political divisions among the Council’s permanent members make achieving this goal unlikely.	但是，安理会常任理事国之间的政治分歧导致不太可能取得这个目标。


This leaves only two options to buttress the NPT’s objectives.	只留下两种选择来支撑《不扩散核武器条约》的目标。


First, there is ad hoc diplomacy, which succeeded in eliminating Libya’s nuclear program and closing North Korea’s nuclear weapons production reactor.	首先，特别外交，它成功地清除了利比亚的核计划并关闭了北朝鲜的核武器生产反应堆。


But diplomacy takes time – a lot of time – and there is no guarantee that it will succeed.	但是，外交需要时间——非常多的时间——并且不能保证它一定会成功。


For states that believe that time will merely enhance a lethal adversary’s ability to get the Bomb – Israel’s concern about Iran today – only vigilantism remains.	对那些认为时间只会增强致命的对手获得核威慑能力的国家——例如现在以色列对伊朗的担心——只剩下自发的维护核安全的措施了。


Rebooting Nuclear Security	重启核安全


VIENNA – In these days of economic woe, potential pandemic disease, and widespread civil unrest, it may come as a surprise that so many people around the world still view nuclear conflict as the greatest threat facing humanity.	维也纳—如今，经济萧条，传染病随时爆发，社会动乱频仍，而全世界仍有很多人把核冲突视为人类所面临的最大威胁，你也许会感到奇怪。


They do so with good reason.	他们之所以如此，有很好的理由。


Consider the potential effects of a 50-megaton nuclear explosion, similar to the Tsar Bomba, detonated in October 1961, which shattered windows 900 kilometers (560 miles) away and sent a mushroom cloud rising above the stratosphere.	想象一下， 50百万吨当量的核弹（类似于1961年10月引爆的沙皇炸弹（Tsar Bomba））能将900公里之外的窗户震碎，产生的蘑菇云可以达到平流层。


Global agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), along with the general sense of goodwill immediately following the Cold War, may have led to the perception that such a weapon would never be used in combat.	核不扩散条约（Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty，NPT）等全球协议以及冷战结束以来的总体友好氛围也许让你认为这种武器永远不会用于战争。


But there is an increasing realization that we cannot breathe easy just yet.	但我们日益认识到，不要高兴得那么早。


In considering the risks, the emphasis has shifted over the last decade from preventing additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons to preventing terrorist groups and other non-state actors from acquiring them (or critical components).	过去十年来，考虑风险时的重点从阻止新的国家获得核武器转变为阻止恐怖组织和其他非国家行动方获得核武器（或其关键成分）。


The stakes are high and the threat is real.	兹事体大，威胁也是实实在在的。


The danger of nuclear terrorism constitutes one of the gravest threats to our collective security.	核恐怖主义的危险构成了对集体安全的最大威胁之一。


Even a small amount of nuclear material could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people.	即使是微量的核材料，也可以伤害数十万计的无辜民众。


Terrorist networks could acquire the materials to assemble a nuclear weapon, wreaking havoc on global peace and stability, with the possibility of extraordinary loss of life and economic damage.	恐怖网络可以获得材料并组装成核武器，严重破坏全球和平与稳定，可能造成极其巨大的生命和经济破坏。


This has been the main focus of the biennial Nuclear Security Summit, which began in 2010 with 47 countries and three international organizations.	这就是两年一度的核安全峰会（Nuclear Security Summit）的主要关注点。 核安全峰会始于2010年，有47个国家和三个国际组织参与。


But the NSS has so far restricted its scope to protecting nuclear infrastructure and material from active misuse.	但到目前为止核安全峰会一直将其范畴限定在保护核基础设施和材料免受活跃的滥用（active misuse）。


We should be wary about defining nuclear security so narrowly.	将核安全定义得如此狭窄是值得担忧的。


We do not have the luxury of approaching the linked issues of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation separately.	我们不必奢望触及军备控制、武器销毁和分别不扩散等相关问题。


In today’s highly complex, interconnected world, we must consider all nuclear threats in a holistic way.	在高度复杂和互联的当今世界中，我们必须全盘考虑所有核威胁。


A good starting point is to consider how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is contributing to nuclear security.	一个合适的起点是考虑全面禁止核试验条约（Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty）是如何有利于核安全的。


By banning all nuclear explosions, the CTBT hampers both first-time development of nuclear weapons and substantial improvements to them.	该条约禁止一切核爆炸，切断了核武器的初次研发和大幅改进之路。


In the last 15 years, only one country – North Korea – has tested a nuclear weapon.	在过去15年中，只有一个国家——朝鲜试验了核武器。


And, by doing so, it has cemented its status as a rogue state.	而这样做也让朝鲜坐实了流氓国家的位子。


It is clear that the NPT and the CTBT have reinforced nuclear security.	核不扩散条约和全面禁止核试验条约促进了核安全。


Only a handful of countries have developed nuclear weapons outside of the NPT, and the CTBT has reduced the number of nuclear tests from an average of 500 per decade to a mere trickle.	只有少数国家在核不扩散条约框架外开发核武器，而全面禁止核试验条约让核试验的数量从十年平均500起下降到几乎为零。


Yet the failure of eight countries to ratify the CTBT has prevented it from entering into force, and its contribution to global security has so far not been included on the NSS agenda.	但仍有八个国家没有签署全面禁止核试验条约，这使该条约无法产生效力，其对全球安全的作用也没有纳入核安全峰会的日程。


Given the existence of a technologically advanced verification regime that can detect even small underground nuclear tests – what US Secretary of State John Kerry recently called “one of the great accomplishments of the modern world” – this is especially disappointing.	考虑到存在一个技术先进的核查机制，即使是微型地下核试验也可以检测到——美国国务卿克里最近称之为“现代世界最伟大的成就之一”——这一点尤其令人失望。


The international community’s failure to bring the CTBT into force is one of the reasons why the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ iconic Doomsday Clock remains poised at five minutes to midnight – the closest it has been to midnight since the height of the Cold War.	国际社会没能让全面禁止核试验条约产生效力是原子科学家公报（Bulletin of Atomic Scientists）标志性的末日钟（Doomsday Clock）仍指向午夜前五分钟——只有冷战高峰时期达到过比现在更接近午夜的程度。


But, while there clearly is cause for concern, there is no reason to lose hope.	但是，尽管显然值得担忧，但也不必失去希望。


With the next Nuclear Security Summit to take place in the United States in 2016, a window of opportunity will be opened by next year’s NPT Review Conference, which will allow the world to address the issue of nuclear security in a long-term, inclusive manner.	下一届核安全峰会将于2016年在美国召开，明年的核不扩散条约评估会议（NPT Review Conference）将是一次机会窗口，世界可以借此找到和安全问题的长期的、包容性的解决之道。


What is most needed in the run-up to the 2016 NSS is a process that advances global action to address the nuclear threat comprehensively, including by ensuring that the CTBT enters into force.	在2016年核安全峰会召开之前，我们最需要的是有一套程序促进全面解决核威胁的全球行动，确保全面禁止核试验条约生效就是其中之一。


We owe it to ourselves and to future generations to use all opportunities to create the conditions for increased trust and mutual understanding that are needed to free the world of the nuclear threat.	我们必须为了我们自己和子孙后代实现这一目标，以充分利用一切机会创造条件增进信任和相互理解——这是让世界免受核威胁的必要条件。


Broadening our understanding of that threat, and devising a comprehensive approach to nuclear security does not mean diluting efforts or losing focus.	扩大我们对这一威胁的认识、摸索全面的核安全方针并不意味着分散措施或失去重点。


On the contrary, it means taking care not to exclude any significant advocate or useful tool in reducing the risk of the unthinkable becoming reality.	相反，这意味着小心谨慎，在降低不可想象的情况称为现实的问题上不要将任何重大倡议或有用工具遗漏。


Nuclear Weapons in Civil War Zones	内战战区的核武器


LOS ANGELES – The recent failed military coup in Turkey has produced instability, paranoia, and a crackdown on the regime’s perceived opponents, including many journalists.	洛杉矶——近期失败的土耳其军事政变造成动荡、偏执和对现政权认定反对派人士的镇压，其中也包括很多记者。


Luckily, it did not end with rebel forces seizing some of the dozens of US nuclear weapons stored at Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, from which rebel aircraft departed.	幸运的是，虽然叛军飞机从因吉尔利空军基地起飞，但政变并没有导致美国储存在该基地的数十件核武器落入叛军之手。


But what about next time?	但下次能否还这么幸运呢？


The world’s nine nuclear powers claim that there is little to worry about.	全世界九大拥核国家对外宣称没什么可以担心的。


They argue that the combination of physical protection and, in most cases, electronic safeguards (permissive action links, or PALs) means that their arsenals would remain secure, even if countries where they are stored or deployed were engulfed by violence.	他们认为多数情况下电子保障装置（许可操作链接，缩写PAL）和物理保障相结合意味着即使核武器的储存或部署国真的被暴力活动所吞没，他们的武器也仍然是安全的。


Robert Peurifoy, a former senior weapons engineer at Sandia National Laboratories, disagrees.	曾在桑迪亚国家实验室担任高级武器工程师的罗伯特·普里福伊对此提出质疑。


He recently told the Los Angeles Times that such safeguards – earlier versions of which he helped to design – may only delay terrorists in using seized nuclear weapons.	他最近告诉《洛杉矶时报》曾由他参与设计的上述保障装置的早期版本或许只能延缓恐怖分子使用核武器。


“Either you keep custody or you should expect a mushroom cloud.”	“要么将核武器控制在自己手中，否则就会看到蘑菇云升腾而起。 ”


Peurifoy’s statements have rightly raised concerns about the security of nuclear weapons stockpiled in insecure regions.	普里福伊的言论理所当然地引发了人们对非安全区存储核武器安全问题的忧虑。


Consider Pakistan, which has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and suffers relentless jihadi terrorism and separatist violence.	比如巴基斯坦拥有全世界增长速度最快的核武库，并同时饱受无情的圣战恐怖主义和分离主义暴力活动威胁。


Attacks have already been carried out on Pakistani military installations reportedly housing nuclear components.	据悉储存核部件的巴基斯坦军事设施已经遭受过恐怖分子的袭击。


The country’s new mobile “battlefield nuclear weapons” – easier to purloin – augment current fears.	该国全新的移动型“战场核武器”——降低了盗取难度——放大了现有的恐惧。


North Korea, with its volatile and mercurial regime, is another source of concern.	政权动荡善变的朝鲜是另一个忧虑情绪的策源地。


Suspicious of the military, Kim Jong-un’s government has repeatedly purged senior officers, which has surely stoked opposition that someday could spark serious civil strife.	因为怀疑军方的忠诚，金正恩政府已经多次清洗高级军官，从而不可避免地激起了可能在某天酿成严重内乱的国内反对情绪。


Adding nuclear weapons to that mix would be highly dangerous.	在如此纷繁复杂的格局下再加上核武器无疑非常危险。


While other nuclear powers appear stable, countries like China and Russia, which rely increasingly on authoritarianism, could face their own risks, should political cohesion fray.	尽管其他有核国目前看似稳定，但中俄等有核国依赖专制的程度越来越高，一旦政治凝聚力逐渐消散，就有可能面临着国内危机。


Of course, there are plenty of examples of security enduring strife.	当然，也不乏大量冲突爆发后保持安全的例子。


The 1961 revolt of the generals in French Algeria, which placed a nuclear test device in the Sahara at risk, produced no dangerous incidents.	1961年法属阿尔及利亚将军起义威胁到撒哈拉核试验装置的安全，但最终并未爆发危险的事故。


In China, the government effectively protected nuclear weapons sites threatened by Revolutionary Guards during the Cultural Revolution.	在中国，政府在文化大革命期间有效保护了核武器基地免受红卫兵的冲击。


And neither the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev nor the Soviet collapse resulted in a loss of control over the country’s nuclear arsenal.	而反对戈尔巴乔夫的政变和苏联解体都没有导致国家对核武器失去控制。


But it is a leap to presume that these precedents mean that nuclear weapons will remain safe, especially in unstable countries like Pakistan and North Korea.	但不能据此认定上述先例意味着核武器将是安全的，在巴基斯坦和朝鲜等动荡国家更是如此。


Nuclear bombs or materials risk being controlled by rebels, terrorist groups, or even failing and desperate governments.	核弹或核材料有可能被叛军、恐怖团体甚至是失败、绝望的政府所控制。


And, in those cases, the international community has few options for mitigating the threat.	而且在上述情况下，国际社会几乎没有办法能够缓和危机。


External powers can, for example, launch a targeted attack, like the one that Israel carried out on suspected reactors under construction in Iraq and Syria.	比如，就像以色列袭击伊拉克和叙利亚疑似修建的核反应堆一样，外部力量可以发起有针对性的袭击。


Those strikes would not have succeeded had Israel not been able to identify the targets accurately.	如果以色列未能准确识别目标，那些袭击就不可能成功达到目的。


Indeed, though the existence of Iraq’s Osirak plant was public knowledge, uncovering Syria’s Al Kibar plant was an intelligence coup.	事实上，虽然伊拉克奥西拉克反应堆的存在尽人皆知，但发现叙利亚的Al Kibar核反应堆却堪称一场情报政变。


Carrying out such a strike on North Korean or Pakistani nuclear sites in a time of crisis would require a similar breakthrough – one that may be even more difficult to achieve, given extensive concealment efforts.	危机时刻发动对朝鲜或巴基斯坦核设施的袭击需要取得同样的突破——鉴于全面细致的隐藏工作，这样的突破更加难以取得。


Stealthy movement of bombs or materials amid the unrest would further complicate targeting.	在动乱过程中偷偷转移核弹及材料将进一步加大袭击难度。


Another option – invasion and occupation – avoids the challenge of identifying nuclear sites.	还有一种选择——入侵和占领——避开了精准定位核设施的难题。


The defeat of Nazi Germany permitted the Allies to find and destroy the country’s nascent nuclear program.	纳粹德国的战败致使盟国得以找到并摧毁该国新生的核项目。


The 2003 invasion of Iraq granted the US unfettered access to all possible sites where weapons of mass destruction could be stored.	2003年入侵伊拉克让美国拥有了不受限制地进入可能存储大规模杀伤性武器的所有基地的权利。


But the costs were huge.	但为此付出了巨大的代价。


Likewise, invasion and occupation of either North Korea or Pakistan would require massive armies risking a bitter conventional war and possible use of the weapons against the invaders.	同样，入侵和占领无论朝鲜还是巴基斯坦都需要动用数量庞大的军队，有可能引发痛苦的常规战争，也有可能导致抵抗力量利用核武器来抗击侵略者。


A third option is nuclear containment, which relies on several measures.	第三种选择是核遏制，以此为方案必须采取若干措施。


First, in order to prevent nuclear migration, all land, sea, and air routes out of the country in question would have to be controlled, and homeland security near and far would have to be strengthened.	首先，为预防核转移起见，我们必须对出入目标国的所有陆地、海洋和空中航线加以控制，并着力强化远近国土安全措施。


While the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is already in place to stop the smuggling of nuclear contraband worldwide, the International Atomic Energy Agency reports continued trafficking of small amounts of nuclear material.	尽管阻止全球违禁核材料的防扩散安全倡议（PSI）已经生效，但据国际原子能机构报告仍存在少量的核材料走私。


An increase in monitoring may reduce, but still not eliminate the problem.	加强监管可以缓和、但无法彻底解决问题。


Containment also requires nuclear custodians be persuaded to risk their lives to defend nuclear sites against terrorists or rebels.	遏制战略还需要说服核托管者冒着生命危险抵制恐怖分子或叛乱分子进入核设施。


And it demands that states neighboring the country in question put ballistic missile defenses on alert.	它要求相关国家的邻国时刻准备进行弹道导弹防御。


While India, South Korea, and Japan continue to modernize such systems, no missile defense is perfect.	虽然印度、韩国和日本持续进行此类系统的现代化，但没有任何导弹防御系统能够做到无懈可击。


In a time of crisis, when the facts on the ground change fast and fear clouds thinking, mitigating the nuclear threat is no easy feat.	当危机爆发时，地面情况瞬息万变、恐惧的阴云不断聚集，在此时刻缓解核威胁绝非易事。


While concerned governments do have confidential contingency planning in place, such planning has a mixed record when it comes to responding to recent international upsets in the Middle East.	尽管相关政府的确制定了秘密应急计划，但上述计划过往应对近期中东国际局势动荡的效果参差不齐。


And simply hoping that things will go according to plan, and nuclear command and control will stick, remains a gamble.	仅仅希望局势将按计划发展、从而导致核命令和控制得以保持是一次冒险的赌局。


The time has come to discuss new ideas, with the United States – still the global leader in combating proliferation – taking the lead.	现在带头与依然身为反扩散事业全球领袖的美国探讨全新理念恰恰是时机。


A public discussion with input from the executive branch, Congress, think tanks, investigative journalists, and scholars should lay a foundation for policy.	听取行政部门、国会、智库、调查记者和学者建议的公共讨论应当奠定政策的根基。


We cannot allow ourselves to stand on the precipice of catastrophe without a well-considered and broadly supported plan in place.	我们不能允许自己站在灾难的悬崖边时，还没有赢得广泛支持的周全的计划来加以应对。


The lesson from Turkey is not that the bombs of Incirlik – not to mention other nuclear weapons in unstable regions – are safe.	我们从土耳其政变汲取的教训不是因吉尔利克的炸弹——更不用说动荡地区的其他核武器——是安全的。


Rather, it is that our most deadly weapons could be compromised in an instant.	相反，我们必须明白我们最致命的武器完全可能在一瞬间遭到破坏。


It ought to be a wake-up call for all of us.	这应当为我们所有人敲响了警钟。


Obama Across the Pacific	跨越太平洋的奥巴马


MANILA – Unlike his predecessor, US President Barack Obama is popular from the Atlantic to the Pacific.	马尼拉-与他的前任不同，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马从大西洋到太平洋都深受欢迎。


He has reached out to the Muslim world and pledged to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without delay.	他已向穆斯林世界伸出双手并承诺立即着手解决巴以冲突。


The nations of Asia have a particular affection for him, owing to the years he spent as a child in Indonesia.	由于他孩提时代有几年是在印度尼西亚度过的，亚洲国家对他也怀有特别的感情。


If Obama improves America’s global standing with support from political heavyweights such as Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Bob Gates, National Security Adviser James Jones (a former NATO Supreme Commander), and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki (a former United States Army Chief), he should be able to ask more from America’s allies, particularly for NATO to send more troops to Afghanistan.	如果奥巴马在政治重量级人物的支持下改善美国的全球地位，这些人物包括副总统乔·拜登、国务卿希拉里·克林顿、国防部长鲍勃·盖茨、国家安全顾问詹姆斯·琼斯（前北约最高指挥官）和退伍军人事务部长埃里克·辛塞奇（美国前陆军参谋长），他应该能对美国的盟国提出更多的要求，特别是对北约提出增派部队前往阿富汗的要求。


He will also be able to push Israel to reinvigorate the derailed Middle East peace process.	他也将能够推动以色列重新将中东和平进程的谈判重新带入轨道。


Although his national security team consists of people who largely supported the war in Iraq, Obama has made it clear that his agenda includes withdrawing troops from that country.	虽然他的国家安全班子组成的人员大部分支持伊拉克战争，但奥巴马已经明确表示，他的议程包括从伊拉克撤军。


International goodwill will probably be the key to his success, if not in re-establishing American hegemony, then at least in making America the “indispensable nation” once more.	而国际上的善意的支持可能是他是否能取得成功的关键，这种成功如果不是在重新建立美国霸权方面，那么至少是在使美国重新成为一个“不可或缺的国家”。


Although Obama is likely to give priority in his diplomacy to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he cannot take the Asia-Pacific region’s stability for granted.	虽然奥巴马在外交方面可能把解决伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争放在首要位置，但他不能对亚太地区的局势稳定高枕无忧。


The sources of uncertainty are many: tension between South and North Korea; anxiety over nuclear proliferation posed by cooperation between North Korea and Iran; managing the rise of China and India; and continued Islamist extremism on the Indian sub-continent, particularly Pakistan, as well as in Southeast Asia, where Al-Qaeda has established a second front through Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah .	不确定性的来源有很多：紧张的南北韩关系，伊朗和朝鲜的合作而引起的对核扩散的忧虑，怎样应对中国和印度的崛起，印度次大陆上继续存在的伊斯兰极端主义，特别是巴基斯坦以及基地组织已经通过印尼的伊斯兰祈祷团建立了第二战线的东南亚地区。


Vast changes in America’s presence across the Asia-Pacific region are underway and are likely to continue.	美国在整个亚太地区的存在正发生着巨大的变化，并可能继续下去。


So far, none of these changes have unsettled the region.	迄今为止，所有这些变化还没有引起该地区的不稳定。


Substantial redeployments of US military forces and assets, triggered by the need for additional troops in Afghanistan and ongoing problems over the US-Japan status-of-forces agreement, are already taking place.	由于需要在阿富汗增兵以及有关美日的部队地位协议的旷日持久的问题，已经引发了美国大规模对其军队和资产的重新部署。


Media reports indicate, for example, that nearly 25,000 US marines, soldiers, family members, and civilian employees are to descend on the tiny island of Guam in the next five years to ease the overconcentration of US forces on the Japanese island of Okinawa without pulling back too far from the flashpoints of Taiwan and North Korea.	例如，有媒体报道显示，在未来五年内近有二万五千名美国海军陆战队士兵及其家属和文职雇员会派到关岛这个小岛上，以减轻美军在日本冲绳岛上过于集中的问题，但又要离开台湾和朝鲜这样的多事的热点地区不算太远。


But the future of security in the Pacific should not be left to US decision-makers alone.	但是，未来安全太平洋地区的安全不应全都托付给美国决策者们。


Regional leaders must now develop their own strategy to transform Asia’s many challenges into opportunities, with Obama playing the role of “good neighbor” who expects other peoples to help themselves and put their own houses in order before turning to the US for assistance.	该地区的领导人现在必须发展自己的战略，把亚洲的许多挑战化为机遇，而奥巴马要扮演“好邻居”的角色，他希望其他国家的人民在向美国求援之前，能够先自力更生把他们把自己的国家搞好。


The Philippines is in an advantageous position to take advantage of the many diplomatic opportunities that will be generated by Obama’s potential activism in the Pacific.	菲律宾处于比较有利的地位来利用奥巴马可能在太平洋地区采取的积极政策所产生的许多外交机会。


To be sure, the country’s “America” card – the result of the two countries’ longstanding strategic relationship (I myself was educated at West Point and fought alongside US troops in the Korean War) – must be played carefully and not be taken for granted.	可以肯定的是，菲律宾不能把“美国”牌视为理所当然，而是必须谨慎地打这张牌-这是两国长期战略合作关系的结果（我本人就是在西点军校受的教育，并和美国军队在朝鲜战争中并肩作战过） 。


But it offers the potential for a relationship of the sort that arises only between countries with deep and many-layered ties.	但是，它提供了提升国家关系的潜力，只有相互间有着深刻的多层次的联系的国家才有可能有这样的潜力。


By strategizing “out of the box” and finding ways to link Obama’s Asian agenda with that of their own nations, Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and other Asian leaders will be able to truly make the Pacific the central focus of the Obama administration’s diplomacy.	菲律宾总统格洛丽亚·马卡帕加尔·阿罗约和其它亚洲国家领导人通过“创新”地制定战略并设法把奥巴马的亚洲议程与他们的国家的议程联系到一起，将能够真正使太平洋地区成为奥巴马政府外交的中央重点。


Obama and Asia’s Two Futures	奥巴马与亚洲的两个走向


TOKYO – Despite the relentless shift of global economic might to Asia, and China’s rise as a great power – the central historical events of our time, which will drive world affairs for the foreseeable future – America’s focus has been elsewhere.	发自东京——无论是全球经济向亚洲倾斜的不断倾斜，还是中国作为一个超级大国的日益崛起——这可是我们时代的核心历史事件，将带领全球事务走向可见的未来——都没能吸引美国的目光。


The terrorist attacks of 2001, followed by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Great Contraction of 2008, the Arab Spring, and Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, all diverted the United States from helping to create a lasting structure of peace to accommodate today’s resurgent Asia.	2001年的恐怖袭击与紧随其后的阿富汗和伊拉克战争，2008年的大萧条，“阿拉伯之春”以及欧洲主权债务危机等一系列问题使得美国无暇他顾，无法协助复兴中的亚洲构建一个长久区域和平架构。


In November, US President Barack Obama can begin to redress this imbalance when he hosts the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in his native state of Hawaii.	今年11月，亚太经济合作组织首脑会议将在美国总统奥巴马的家乡夏威夷举办，届时，他将可以借主持会议之机着手纠正当前这种不平衡状态。


The meeting’s timing is fortunate, because a number of critical Asian issues are coming to a boil.	这次会议的时间可谓天赐良辰，因为亚洲的一系列问题正逐渐浮出水面。


The South China Sea, for example, is now churning with competing claims to its islands, atolls, and sea bed, including China’s bold assertion that all of it is Chinese sovereign territory.	比如，各国正为争夺南中国的岛屿，环礁和海床而争吵不休，中国更是明目张胆地宣布整个南中海都是自己的主权领土。


At this year’s ASEAN summit in Bali, it was agreed that these territorial disputes be settled through bilateral negotiations.	今年在巴厘岛上举行的东盟首脑会议本已达成协议，采用双边协商来解决这一区域的领土纷争，无奈中国的霸道声明从一开始就决定了这个协议的悲剧命运。


But the scope of Chinese claims doomed that agreement from the start; indeed, China now insists that the sea constitutes a core national interest, on a level with Taiwan and Tibet, for which it is prepared to fight.	事实上中国目前强调该海域与台湾和西藏一样属于自身国家核心利益的组成部分，并为此不惜一战。


China’s willingness to throw its weight around amplifies the grave imbalance in size, and leverage, between it and the other countries bordering the South China Sea.	中国的耀武扬威使其与南中国海周边其他国家的国土面积和实力不平衡状况进一步恶化。


This has made bilateral negotiations to settle these disputes unviable.	这使得双边协商解决争端成为一纸空文。


Vietnam and the Philippines have been bullied in this way recently, with both pushing back rather than submit to Chinese imposed terms.	而越南和菲律宾则拒绝中国的霸王条款，并因此就受到了中国的欺压。


The presidential elections scheduled for next year in two of Asia’s strongest democracies – South Korea and Taiwan – are also likely to cause diplomatic temperatures to rise in the months ahead. The risk stems not from the conduct of the South Koreans or the Taiwanese, but from the democratic choices that they make, which may offend two of Asia’s last dictatorships.	亚洲最强大的两个民主政体——韩国和台湾——在明年举行的总统大选也可能导致未来几个月的区域内外交冲突升温，而原因并不是韩国人或台湾人做了什么特别的事，而是他们的民主选择触痛了亚洲仅存的两个独裁国家的神经。


In South Korea, the remarkable Park Guen-hye’s bid to become her country’s first woman president may provide an excuse – as if any were needed – for North Korean mischief-making.	在韩国，朴槿惠作为第一位女性总统竞选人或许会为朝鲜的恶作剧提供一个借口——如果需要借口的话。


The regime in Pyongyang is seeking to ensure that power passes to a third generation of Kims, represented by the pudgy and well-fed “Dear Young General,” Kim Jong-un, and appears to believe that provocations such as its bombardment of a South Korean island earlier this year are the way to secure the succession.	当前，平壤政府正竭力确保政权能顺利移交给金氏家族的第三代——以那位脑满肠肥，被称为“敬爱的年轻将军”的金正银为核心的一代。 朝鲜方面似乎认为挑衅示威就是确保权力顺利交接的最有效办法，就像今年早些时候他们对韩国某小岛的狂轰滥炸那样。


Taiwan, too, may elect a woman president, Tsai Ing-wen, the leader of the opposition Democratic Peoples’ Party, next year.	台湾明年也可能选出第一位女总统，蔡英文，反对派台湾民主进步党的领袖。


That outcome would stoke Chinese ire, not because of Tsai’s gender, but owing to her politics.	而让中国怒火中烧不是蔡英文的性别，而是她的政治立场。


The DPP has long been the Taiwanese party keenest on securing independence for the country.	因为民进党一直以来的都是主张台独的积极分子。


A third Asian issue with combustible potential is Burma, where another unique woman, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, is at the heart of events.	亚洲第三个蕴藏无限可能的事务则与身在缅甸的另一位奇女子，诺贝尔和平奖得主昂山素季有关。


The elections earlier this year, which many at first assumed were a sham, now appear to have produced changes to which Asia’s countries will need to collectively and individually respond.	许多人都认为今年早些时候的那场选举是在做秀，但如今看来，这场选举产生的一些变化理应得到亚洲各国无论是整体还是单独的回应。


The government not only freed Suu Kyi after two decades of house arrest, but has even begun a dialogue with her – talks for which the meticulous opposition leader has expressed real hope.	缅甸政府不但释放了被软禁长达20年的素季，甚至还与她展开对话——连这位素来谨慎的反对派领袖似乎都看到了曙光。


Indeed, President Thein Sein’s government has begun to release thousands of political prisoners, including the monk who led the massive street protests of 2007.	实际上，吴登盛总统的政府早已经开始释放数以千计的政治犯，包括那位领导了2007年大规模街头游行示威的僧侣。


Sein’s government has also listened to Burmese public disquiet at China’s massive influence in the country, and has canceled a huge $3.6 billion dam that Chinese firms were building.	此外，吴登盛当局还听取了缅甸民众对中国影响力日渐膨胀的担忧，叫停了中国公司在缅甸境内的一个耗资3. 6亿美元的大坝工程。


China, it is plain to see, is at the root of most of the disputes troubling Asia.	显而易见，中国是当前亚洲诸多争端的核心所在。


Two main issues must be managed – one philosophical, the other structural – in seeking to ameliorate the problems caused by China’s unconstrained rise.	为了改善这一系列由中国无法遏制的崛起所引发的问题，我们必须先解决两个关键的问题——一个是理念上的，另一个则是结构上的。


Only by resolving the structural issue will Asia succeed in overcoming the philosophical problem.	而亚洲只有先解决了结构上的问题才能解决理念上的问题。


The philosophical problem concerns China’s renewed conception of itself as the “Middle Kingdom,” a state with no sovereign equal.	理念上的问题可以归纳为中国的“中央王国”理念——即一个主权高于他国的国家——正在死灰复燃。


Throughout its history, China has sought to treat its neighbors as vassals – a mindset currently reflected in the way that it has approached negotiations with Vietnam and the Philippines over the South China Sea.	中国历史以来都致力于把邻国变成自己的附庸——这种心态在它与越南、菲律宾就南中国海问题进行协商时就已暴露无遗了。


China’s free-floating rise, unanchored in any regional structure or settlement, makes this mindset particularly worrying.	中国随心所欲的崛起，不服从于任何的区域框架或协议，使得这种心态格外令人担忧。


At the Hawaii summit, Obama must orchestrate the first steps toward constructing an effective multilateral framework within which the complications posed by China’s rise can be addressed.	在夏威夷的峰会上，奥巴马必须就构建有效的多边框架做出初步的安排，好让中国崛起所引发的各种复杂问题能够在这个框架内得到解决。


The absence of such a structure of peace has been obscured, to some extent, by America’s dominant role in Asia since the Pacific War.	由于美国在太平洋战争后一直主导亚洲，所以上述和平结构的缺失在某种程度上是不十分明显的。


But China’s rise and America’s other global and domestic concerns have left many Asians wondering just how enduring those commitments will be in the future.	但是随着中国崛起以及美国注意力更多地转向其他国际国内事务，许多亚洲国家开始担心那些曾经的承诺究竟还能持续多久。


Nevertheless, China’s recent strategic assertiveness has led many Asian democracies to seek to deepen their ties with the US, as South Korea has done with a bilateral free-trade agreement. The US is reciprocating by pledging not to cut Asia-related defense spending, despite the big reduction in overall US defense spending that lies ahead.	而中国近期的战略压迫则迫使许多亚洲民主国家寻求加深与美国的关系，比如韩国就已经与美国签订了一份双边自由贸易协议，美国也投桃报李，在其国防支出大幅度消减的情况下承诺不减少与亚洲相关的防务支出。


What Asia most needs today is a well-conceived regional system, embedded in binding multilateral institutions.	当前亚洲急需一个构建在有约束力的多边体制之上，能令各方安心的区域体制。


A “Trans-Pacific Partnership” between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam to govern supply-chain management, intellectual-property protection, investment, rules on state-owned firms, and other trade issues – likely to be announced in Hawaii – is a good start in the economic sphere. But much more is needed.	而由澳洲，文莱，智利，马来西亚，新西兰，秘鲁，新加坡，美国和越南等国构建，致力于供应链管理，知识产权保护，投资，国有企业管理和其他贸易议题的“泛太平洋伙伴关系”可能会在夏威夷会议上宣布设立——这在经济方面开了一个好头，但这只是我们迈出的第一步。


Ultimately, the best way for peace to prevail in the region is for the US and China to share responsibility for a regional order with Asia’s other powers, particularly India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea.	归根结底，为促进区域和平，最佳的办法是美国、中国与亚洲其他国家，尤其是印度，印尼，日本和韩国，共同承担维护区域秩序的责任。


Asia’s choice is clear: either the region embraces a multilateral structure of peace, or it will find itself constrained by a system of strategic military alliances.	亚洲所面临的选择是一清二楚的：要么就是构建一个和平的多边架构，要么被限制在一个战略军事同盟内部。


In Hawaii, Obama and the other assembled Asian leaders – particularly the Chinese – must begin to choose between these two Asian futures.	在夏威夷会议上，奥巴马和其他与会的亚洲领导人——特别是中国领导人——必须在这两个选项中做出选择。


Obama and Global Warming	奥巴马和全球变暖


COPENHAGEN – In one of his first public policy statements as America’s president-elect, Barack Obama focused on climate change, and clearly stated both his priorities and the facts on which these priorities rest.	哥本哈根-奥巴马当选美国下届总统后，在他最先发表的一些公共政策的声明中，有一次是专注与气候变化的问题上，他明确地陈述了他优先考虑的事项和这些优先考虑所依据的事实。


Unfortunately, both are weak, or even wrong.	可不幸的是，这两者都缺乏说服力，甚至是错误的。


Obama’s policy outline was presented via video to California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Governors’ Global Warming Summit, and has again been shown in Poznan, Poland, to leaders assembled to flesh out a global warming roadmap.	奥巴马的政策大纲通过视频在加州州长阿诺德·施瓦辛格召集的全球变暖问题峰会上进行了传达，此后也向为制定解决全球变暖问题路线图而聚集在波兰波兹南的各国领导人展示过。


According to Obama, “few challenges facing America and the world are more urgent than combating climate change.”	据奥巴马说， “美国和世界所面临的挑战很少有比应付气候变化的挑战更加迫切的。 ”


Such a statement is now commonplace for most political leaders around the world, even though it neglects to address the question of how much we can do to help America and the world through climate policies versus other policies.	现在，这种说法对于世界各地的政治领袖已经屡见不鲜了，但它却忽视了以下这个问题：相对于其它政策, 我们通过气候政策能够帮助美国和世界各地解决多少问题?


Consider, for example, hurricanes in America.	例如，让我们思考一下美国的飓风问题。


Clearly, a policy of reducing CO2 emissions would have had zero consequence on Katrina’s devastating impact on New Orleans, where such a disaster was long expected.	很显然，减少二氧化碳排放量的政策不会降低一丁点的卡特里娜飓风对新奥尔良的破坏力，人们对那里发生这样的自然灾害早有预期。


Over the next half-century, even large reductions in CO2 emissions would have only a negligible impact.	在今后五十年中，即使大幅降低二氧化碳的排放量也只会起微不足道的影响。


Instead, direct policies to address New Orleans’ vulnerabilities could have avoided the huge and unnecessary cost in human misery and economic loss.	相反，如果早就采取直接的政策来解决新奥尔良在抗击飓风方面的脆弱性，那就会避免人们的痛苦和经济的损失方面巨大和不必要的损失。


These should have included stricter building codes, smarter evacuation policies, and better preservation of wetlands (which could have reduced the ferociousness of the hurricane).	这些政策理应包括更加严格的建筑法规、更聪明的疏散政策以及对湿地（可减少飓风的威力）更好的保护 。


Most importantly, a greater focus on upkeep and restoration of the levees could have spared the city entirely.	最重要的是，假如我们过去能更多地着眼于维护和修复堤坝，那就能使这个城市完全幸免于这场飓风灾难。


Perhaps these types of preventive actions should be Obama’s priority.	也许此类的预防行为应列入奥巴马的优先事项中。


Likewise, consider world hunger.	同样，让我们再思考一下世界饥荒的问题。


Pleas for action on climate change reflect fears that global warming might undermine agricultural production, especially in the developing world.	呼吁对气候变化采取行动，反映了人们对全球变暖可能会破坏农业生产的担心，特别是对发展中国家的农业。


But global agricultural/economic models indicate that even under the most pessimistic assumptions, global warming would reduce agricultural production by just 1.4% by the end of the century.	但是，全球的农业/经济模式表明，即使按照最悲观的假设，到本世纪末全球变暖也只会给农业生产的带来1. 4 ％的减量 。


Because agricultural output will more than double over this period, climate change would at worst cause global food production to double not in 2080 but in 2081.	由于在此期间农业产量将增加一倍以上，气候变化所带来的最坏的影响也不过是导致全球粮食产量翻一番不是在2080年而是延后到2081年实现。


Moreover, by implementing the Kyoto Protocol at a cost of $180 billion annually would keep two million people from going hungry only by the end of the century.	此外，通过实施每年要花费1800亿美元的京都议定书，只能在本世纪末让200万人免于挨饿。


Yet by spending just $10 billion annually, the United Nations estimates that we could help 229 million hungry people today .	然而，据联合国估计，每年仅花费100亿美元就可以立刻帮到2. 29亿的饥饿人口。


Every time spending on climate policies saves one person from hunger in a hundred years, the same amount could have saved 5,000 people now.	每笔为在一百年后让一个人免于饥饿而花费在气候政策上的开支，以同样的开支就可以立即挽救5000个人。


Arguably, this should be among Obama’s top priorities.	也许，这才是奥巴马的最优先的事项。


Obama went on to say why he wants to prioritize global warming policies: “The science is beyond dispute and the facts are clear.	奥巴马接着说，为什么他要把应对全球变暖的政策放在首位： “科学是不容争议的而事实是一清二楚的。


Sea levels are rising.	海平面正在上升。


Coastlines are shrinking.	海岸线正在萎缩。


We’ve seen record drought, spreading famine, and storms that are growing stronger with each passing hurricane season.”	我们已目睹创纪录的干旱、饥荒的蔓延以及在飓风季节中的暴风雨一次比一次更厉害。 ”


Yes, global warming is happening, and mankind is partly responsible, but these statements are – however eloquent – seriously wrong or misleading.	是的，全球变暖正在发生，而人类是要承担部分责任，但上述的声明-不管再怎么雄辩-也存在着严重的错误或误导性。


Sea levels are rising, but they have been rising at least since the early 1800’s.	海平面是在上升，但自从十九世纪初以来海平面一直是在上升。


In the era of satellite measurements, the rise has not accelerated (actually we’ve seen a sea-level fall over the past two years).	在卫星测量的时代，这个上升速度并没有加快（其实在过去两年中，我们看到了海平面有所下降） 。


The UN expects about a 30-centimeter sea-level rise over this century – about what we saw over the past 150 years.	据联合国���计，本世纪内海平面将会上升约30厘米，这个上升度和我们在过去的150年中看到的一样大。


In that period, many coastlines increased , most obviously in Holland, because rich countries can easily protect and even expand their territory.	在上述期间，很多海岸线的扩大了，最明显的是在荷兰。 因为富裕国家可以很容易地保护甚至扩大其领土。


But even for oft-cited Bangladesh, scientists just this year showed that the country grows by 20 square kilometers each year, because river sedimentation win out over rising sea levels.	但即使是被经常提及的孟加拉国，科学家们今年刚刚告诉我们，该国的面积每年增长二十平方公里，这是因为河流淤积超过了海平面的上升。


Obama’s claim about record droughts similarly fails even on a cursory level – the United States has in all academic estimates been getting wetter over the century (with the 1930’s “dust bowl” setting the drought high point).	奥巴马所声称的出现创记录的旱情，是同样地错误，甚至错在知识浅薄的层次上 – 根据所有的学术估算，美国在一个世纪中已经变得越来越多雨（将1930年代的“尘碗”设置为干旱高点） 。


This is even true globally over the past half-century, as one of the most recent scientific studies of actual soil moisture shows: “there is an overall small wetting trend in global soil moisture.”	即使在全球范围内，这种情况在过去的半个世纪中也是如此，就如最近的一项针对实际土壤湿度的科学研究所显示的那样： “全球范围内的土壤水分的总体趋势是小幅度上升了。 ”


Furthermore, famine has rapidly declined over the past half century.	此外，过去的半个世纪中，饥荒已迅速减轻。


The main deviation has been the past two years of record-high food prices, caused not by climate change but by the policies designed to combat it: the dash for ethanol, which put food into cars and thus upward pressure on food prices.	过去两年创纪录的粮食高价是对这个趋势的主要偏离，而这不是由气候变化造成的，而是由旨在与气候变化对抗的政策所造成的：对酒精的大量快速的需求，用食品制造汽车燃料而造成了粮食价格上行的压力。


The World Bank estimates that this policy has driven at least 30 million more people into hunger.	据世界银行估计，这一政策至少多增加了30万的饥荒人口。


To cite policy-driven famine as an argument for more of the same policy seems unreasonable, to say the least.	以由此政策驱动的饥荒为论据来呼吁加大同样的政策的力度，至少可以说是不合理的。


Finally, it is simply wrong to say that storms are growing stronger every hurricane season.	最后，说暴风的威力随每个飓风季节而不断增强是完全错误的。


Even for the Atlantic hurricane basin, which we tend to hear about the most, the total hurricane energy (ACE) as measured by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has declined by two-thirds since the record was set in 2005.	即使是在我们听说得最多的大西洋飓风盆地，由美国国家海洋和大气管理局测量的飓风总能（ ACE ），自从2005年达到最高纪录以来已下降了三分之二。


For the world, this trend has been more decisive: maximum ACE was reached in 1994, and has plummeted for the past three years, while hurricanes around the world have for the past year been about as inactive as at any time since records began being kept.	对全世界来说，以下这个趋势已是更具决定性的：ACE在1994年达到了最大值，并已在过去三年里大幅下降，而自从有记录以来，世界各地的飓风在过去的一年中几乎可以说是没有动静。


Global warming should be tackled, but smartly through research and development of low-carbon alternatives.	全球气候变暖的问题应该得以解决，但要聪明地解决，要通过研究和发展低碳替代品的途径来解决。


If we are to get our policies right, it is crucial that we get our facts right.	如果我们要把政策制定得正确，那么至关重要的是，我们要把事实弄明白。


Obama and Iran	奥巴马和伊朗


NEW YORK – While talking to an Iranian official in Tehran earlier this year, he reminded me of Ayatollah Khomeini’s fondness for comparing the relationship between the United States and Iran to that between a wolf and a lamb.	纽约--今年早些时候我同一名伊朗外交官在德黑兰进行过一次交谈。 他提醒我说霍梅尼喜欢把美伊关系比成狼和羊的关系。


But the official went on to add his own twist, “Nearly 30 years have passed, and we are not that lamb anymore, and maybe the US is not the same wolf it once was.”	但是他接着又指出了他自己的不同意见。 他说：“时间已经过了将近三十年，我们已经不再是一只绵羊，而美国也已经不再是以前的豺狼了”。


His point was that Iran no longer feels the deep inequality with the US that it did in the past, and that it may be time to try engagement.	他的观点就是，伊朗与美国相比不再像以前过去那样感觉深深的不平等，而且现在应该接触了。


Over the past three decades, five American presidents have struggled to figure out what to do about Iran.	在过去三十年时间里，五位美国总统力图寻求处理伊朗问题的途经。


All five failed.	他们全部失败了。


As US President-elect Barack Obama and his advisers assess their foreign-policy priorities, they will encounter the immediate challenge of addressing Iran’s nuclear program and the country’s growing strategic importance in the Middle East and South Asia.	当美国当选总统奥巴马和他的顾问们评估其外交政策重点之际，他们将会马上遇到处理伊朗核子计划问题以及该国在中东以及南亚地区日益增长的战略重要性的挑战。


They will need quickly to face up to the reality that in order to pursue US interests in the region, including stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, the current standoff with Iran cannot continue, and that a greater degree of cooperation is unavoidable.	他们将会很快地面对这样一个现实，那就是，为了寻求美国在该地区的利益、包括稳定伊拉克和阿富汗局势，目前与伊朗的对峙局面无法维系，而且更大程度上的合作无法回避。


If they do not want to repeat the failures of past administrations, they will be well advised to do what none of Obama’s predecessors have tried.	如果他们不想重复以前美国政府的失败，他们就非常应该做那些奥巴马的前任们所没有尝试过的东西。


They should make a strategic decision to engage Iran – without any pre-conditions – in discussions on a broad range of issues of significance to both sides. During his candidacy, Obama said of Iran that, “For us not to be in a conversation with them doesn’t make sense.”	他们应该做出战略决定，在没有任何先觉条件的前提下与伊朗接触，同它讨论对于双方而言都是重要的广泛议题。 奥巴马在竞选的时候谈到伊朗的时候说：“我们不同伊朗对话是没有道理的”。


Now, he has the opportunity to follow through.	现在，他有机会实现这一点了。


Such an approach does not mean having Obama sit down with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad anytime soon.	这一对策并不意味者马上就让奥巴马和伊朗最高领导人哈梅内伊或者总统内贾德坐下来会谈。 首先要进行大量的准备工作。


A great deal of preparatory work will be required first.	一个精干的小组可以进行这一工作。


This can be carried out by a small team, which would hammer out the details of a mutually acceptable framework for a wide-ranging and unconditional dialogue that enables both governments to produce some modest initial successes, and gradually build the confidence and trust required to imagine solutions to larger problems.	他们将制定出双方都可以接受的框架细节以便进行大范围和无条件对话。 这一对话将会让两国政府实现某些最初细小的成功，并且逐步建立信任和信心从而构想更为重要问题的解决途经。


The process could include appointing a US envoy to Iran.	这一进程可以包含任命美国驻伊朗特使。


Ultimately, direct dialogue at the highest levels should be a key objective.	最终，最高层的直接对话应该是关键目标。


This will not be easy.	这并非轻而易举之事。


At the heart of the American-Iranian conflict is a deep mistrust about each nation’s readiness to tolerate the presence of the other on the world stage.	美伊冲突的核心是双方互相猜疑对方是否容忍各自在世界舞台上的存在。


Each nation feels that it has been humiliated and demonized by the other.	每个国家都感到被对方羞辱和歪曲。


What is needed is a process that rebuilds trust and communication so that the give-and-take of negotiation is perceived as serving mutual interests rather than serving up insults to national dignity or identity.	现在所需要的是重建信任和沟通的进程，这样就可以把相互讨价还价的谈判视为服务于双方利益而非羞辱国家尊严或身份。


Although it is far from an exact precedent, the historic 1972 Shanghai Communiqué signed by China and the US, which allowed both governments to “agree to disagree” on many issues while committing themselves to dialogue at the highest levels, offers a promising model. This far-sighted framework’s effectiveness has been well proven over time.	中美两国1972年签署的具有历史意义的上海公报让两国政府可以在许多问题上都“同意见解不同”，同时双方都承诺在最高级别对话。 尽管这远非具体的先例，但是，它却提供了一个具有前途的模式。


Dialogue with Iran will inevitably be frustrating and difficult, but it offers the only way to lay out possible grounds for constructive engagement and to devise a strategy for heading off a potentially disastrous confrontation.	与伊朗的对话不可避免地困难和令人沮丧，但是这却是唯一可为建设性接触奠定基础以及制定避免可能是灾难性对抗的战略的唯一途经。


Dialogue focused on Iran’s nuclear program or on Iraq alone will not work.	只是针对伊朗核子规划或者伊拉克问题的对话无法奏效。


Instead, the full range of issues that are significant to US-Iran relationship must be on the table.	相反，应该把美伊关系中所有重要问题都摆在桌面上来。


Such an approach will require that each side exercise broad restraint and live with the ambiguity of working with a strong adversary to manage profound differences.	这一对策要求各方都尽力克制，并且接受与强敌合作处理巨大分歧的扑朔迷离的局面。


Distrust will continue, signals will be confused, setbacks will be frequent, but the results could well lead over time to greater mutual understanding and a learned capacity to work on some of the most pressing problems, just as the US learned to do with the Soviet Union and China.	不信任将会继续，信号将会令人捉摸不定，挫折将会时常出现，但是长久以往，其结果将会最终导向相互理解以及学会处理某些最为迫切问题的能力，正如美国学会处理苏联和中国问题一样。


Direct diplomatic and strategic engagement between the US and Iran at the highest levels is a proposition yet to be tested.	美伊之间最高层的直接外交和战略接触是个有待考验的议题。


By pursuing this route after he takes office, Obama will force Iran to make a choice: does it want to be a state that is fully integrated into the global economy, or does it want to be an “ideology” with rogue status?	但是奥巴马在就职后追寻这一路线将会迫使伊朗做出决定，那就是，它是否想要成为一个完全融入全球经济的国家，还是想成为一个流氓国家的“意识形态”？


It is time that the world found out.	现在世界就会找到答案了。


Obama and the Rise of the Rest	奥巴马和其它国家的崛起


NEW YORK – American elections usually produce a brief euphoria; the public sense of renewal, of future possibilities, acts as a shot of adrenaline.	纽约——美国大选总能创造出一种短暂的欣快情绪，一种公众新鲜感、一种对未来机会的期盼，作用有点类似于注射肾上腺素。


This year, however, the palpable relief and celebration will be tempered by the widely shared sense that all is not well in America.	可是今年，人们所能感受到的轻松和祝贺将不再那么强烈，因为人们普遍认为美国的各个领域都出现了问题。


The economic data are almost uniformly bleak and will not improve soon, and, while national security issues appear less pressing because of the financial crisis, they have hardly disappeared, given the tenuous situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the unresolved problems in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.	经济数据几乎清一色地非常黯淡，而且要想好转也绝不可能只需一朝一夕，同时尽管国家安全问题在金融危机的衬托下显得不那么紧迫，但考虑到阿富汗和巴基斯坦的微妙局势和伊拉克及北朝鲜悬而未决的问题，这些棘手的困难也都没有消失。


Moreover, the power of America’s presidency, and of the United States, has undergone dramatic shifts in recent years, making our era unlike earlier periods when the world was in flux and a new American president faced deep challenges.	此外，美国总统和国家权力近些年来发生了戏剧性的变化，我们的时代已经与早年的形势迥异，目前的世界变化不断，而新一任的美国总统面临着深重的危机。


Until recently, it was possible to speak of “the rise of the rest” without forecasting a decrease in American power.	直到不久前，我们还有可能在谈论“其它国家的崛起”时不预测美国实力将会降低。


Now, with the US military at its limit in Iraq and Afghanistan and the US fiscal position weakening, America is confronted with stark choices.	而现在，随着美国在伊拉克和阿富汗触到了军事行动极限以及美国财政地位的逐步衰落，我们现在已经不得不面对真正的选择。


That is an unfamiliar position for a new US president.	新一届美国总统对这样一种状况并不熟悉。


Even in the dark years after Vietnam in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, there was a sense that America could still make its economic choices without much reference to the wider world.	即便在20世纪70年代末和80年代初越战之后的黑暗年代，人们仍然感到美国不需要征求世界其它国家的意见就可以在经济上做出选择。


That was the privilege of having the largest, most dynamic economy – and one that acted as a world creditor.	这就是拥有规模最大、活力最旺盛的经济所带来的特权——美国当时扮演了全世界债主的角色。


No more.	但这种情况已经一去不复返了。


There is no small irony in the fact that on November 15, America’s lame duck president, the unilateralist George W. Bush, is hosting a multilateral conference to discuss reshaping the global economic system.	11月15日，美国的瘸鸭总统，单边主义的信奉者乔治·W·布什将主持一次多边会议，探讨重塑全球经济体系的问题，这实在是个天大的讽刺。


It also speaks to America’s relative position that even the less-than-organized ministers of the European Union acted more quickly to create a floor for the financial crisis than did the US president and congress.	还有一点可以证明美国所处的相对位置，那就是就连关系松散的欧盟各国部长都比美国总统和国会更快采取行动，让金融危机见底。


And it speaks volumes to the changing world that, as panic recedes and the wreckage is revealed, Asia in general and China in particular are emerging as clear winners.	这对处在变化中的世界意义重大，随着恐慌平息、危机所造成的破坏慢慢浮出水面，亚洲国家特别是中国显然成为这次的赢家。


The credit crisis exposed the flimsy foundations of the sustained growth that the US and Europe enjoyed during the past four to five years.	这次信贷危机暴露了过去四五年间美国和欧洲持续性增长的薄弱基础。


While many had noted the extraordinary wealth transfer to oil-producing states and China, the implications of this were not fully appreciated.	虽然很多人已经注意到面向产油国和中国那种异乎寻常的财富转移，但人们并没有完全理解这种现象背后的含意。


It is not just that the US has become a debtor nation; it is that large pools of capital and liquidity now reside in places like the Gulf region and China, with no sign of that trend reversing.	问题不只是美国已经成为债务国，而是大量的资金和流动性目前集中在海湾和中国等地区，而且这一趋势目前看不到任何扭转的迹象。


In fact, the current crisis has even put Japan, which has spent nearly two decades in the doldrums, in a position of relative strength, given its large currency reserves and the clean-up of its major banks’ balance sheets.	事实上，目前这次危机甚至使经济已经衰退了近二十年的日本显得相对强势，因为日本拥有大量的货币储备并已经完成了主要银行资产负债表的清理。


There was a brief period in the 1970’s when a similar transfer took place.	20世纪70年代曾经有过发生类似转移的短暂时期。


But, unlike then, the countries that are accumulating the capital today are not spending it on consumption – remember the endless pictures of Saudi princes buying up real estate on the French Riviera – but on investment, infrastructure, and education.	但和当时不同的是，今天那些积聚资本的国家并没有把这些钱投入消费领域——还记得沙特王子在法国里维埃拉没完没了购买不动产的画面——而今天这些钱却流入了投资、基本建设和教育等领域。


Yes, there are bubbles here and there, whether it is real estate in Shanghai and Dubai or stocks in Mumbai, but there has also been serious long-range planning that is likely to give these countries a strong position for years to come.	是的，许多地方都有泡沫，无论是上海和迪拜的房产还是孟买的股票，但同时也有严肃认真的长期计划，可能使这些国家在未来若干年内都处于强势。


Even China, which is trying to shift its economy more toward consumption in order to reduce its dependence on capital spending, has put in place an infrastructure of roads, power grids, ports, and railways that will serve its domestic economy for decades.	就连正在试图实现经济向消费领域转变，以减少对资本支出依赖的中国，也已经建好了由道路、电网、港口和铁路组成的可以满足未来几十年国内经济需求的基础设施。


Meanwhile, it can use its $2 trillion of reserves as a cushion when the US and global economy sag.	同时，中国还可以利用高达两万亿美元的外汇储备，作为美国和全球经济低迷的缓冲器。


China’s economic growth may slow as its exports to the US and Europe weaken, but it is less dependent on these markets than most people assume.	中国的经济或许会随着向美国和欧盟出口的减少而放缓，但它对这些市场的依赖程度远远小于多数人的预期。


The talk now is of a global recession that will be steep and prolonged.	现在人们都在谈论全球陷入长期深度衰退的话题。


Perhaps, but the more likely scenario is continued stagnation in the US and Europe and a more accelerated shift in economic power toward Asia.	情况或许的确是这样，但更有可能的情况是美国和欧洲的经济继续陷入停滞，而经济实力会加速朝着亚洲转移。


Few parts of Asia are structurally exposed to the credit implosion, and the balance sheets of Asian banks and companies are on the whole cleaner than their counterparts elsewhere.	亚洲只有少数地方同样遭遇了信贷爆炸，而亚洲银行的资产负债表总���来讲比其它国家银行的更加干净。


Yes, many companies took on too much debt, and some countries, such as Korea, are more compromised than others.	的确，许多公司欠下了过多债务，而有些国家，比如韩国，相比之下遭受了更为严重的损失。


But China, which is Asia’s anchor, is not, and in a world where everyone else is falling down, the one left standing is that much taller.	可是充当亚洲经济稳定器的中国并没有出现这样的状况，在一个所有人都陆续倒下的世界里，最后仍然站着的那个就比别人高出很多。


The US will remain a powerful part of the global system, but the task of the new president is to recognize lasting strengths and accept new limits.	美国仍将是全球体系强有力的组成部分，可是新总统面临的任务是认清哪些实力能够持续存在下去，并接受新的限制。


President-elect Obama has shown pragmatism and realism, and seems to understand that accepting limitations is not weakness; refusal to acknowledge reality is.	当选总统奥巴马已经表现出求真和务实的作风，他看起来似乎明白：在行为方面接受限制并不是软弱的表现，拒绝接受现实才是。


Obama Versus Obamacare	奥巴马对抗奥巴马医改


NEW YORK – The US Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Barack Obama’s signature 2010 health-care reform, has succeeded in extending insurance coverage to millions of Americans who would not otherwise have it.	奥巴马总统推行的标志性2010年医改，美国患者保护与平价医疗法案已经将本来无法享受医保的数以百万计的美国人成功纳入到医保范畴。


And, contrary to critics’ warnings, it has not pushed up health-care costs; in fact, there is some hope that the cost curve may finally be bending downward.	���且，医改并没有像批评者警告的那样推高医疗费用； 事实上，医改甚至有望使成本曲线向下掉头。


But whether “Obamacare” succeeds in curbing excessively high health-care costs is not assured.	但“奥巴马医改”能否成功遏制过高的医疗保健费用依然存在变数。


That will depend on the Obama administration’s other policies, particularly in an area that might seem unrelated: the United States’ ongoing discussions with India over intellectual property.	这取决于奥巴马政府其他政策是否配合，尤其是美印知识产权这一看似无关领域的谈判结果。


And here, Obama appears determined to undermine his own signature reform, owing to pressure from the powerful US pharmaceutical lobby.	但这次，奥巴马似乎屈从于来自美国制药公司的强大游说压力，决意要破坏自己的标志性改革。


Pharmaceutical costs account for an increasingly large component of US health-care spending.	药品费用在美国医疗开支中所占的比重越来越大。


Indeed, outlays for prescription drugs, as a share of GDP, have nearly tripled in just 20 years.	事实上，处方药支出占GDP的比重在短短20年内已增长近两倍。


Lowering health-care costs thus requires greater competition in the pharmaceutical industry – and that means allowing the manufacture and distribution of generic drugs.	因此要靠推动制药行业竞争来降低医疗费用——也就是说要允许仿制药的生产和销售。


Instead, the Obama administration is seeking a trade deal with India that would weaken competition from generics, thereby making lifesaving drugs unaffordable for billions of people – in India and elsewhere.	相反，奥巴马政府与印度谈判的贸易协议将削弱仿制药竞争，从而导致印度和其他国家数十亿人负担不起救命的药物。


This is not an unintended consequence of an otherwise well-intentioned policy; it is the explicit goal of US trade policy.	而且这并非原本善意政策的意外后果； 而是美国贸易政策的明确目标。


Major multinational pharmaceutical companies have long been working to block competition from generics.	各大跨国药企一直竭力阻止来自仿制药的竞争。


But the multilateral approach, using the World Trade Organization, has proved less effective than they hoped, so now they are attempting to achieve this goal through bilateral and regional agreements.	但事实证明利用世贸组织等多边形式并不像他们所希望的那样有效，因此他们现在正试图借助双边和区域协定来实现这一目标。


The latest negotiations with India – the leading source of generic drugs for developing countries – are a key part of this strategy.	印度是发展中国家仿制药的主要来源，与印度的最新谈判关系到他们的策略成功与否。


In the 1970s, India abolished pharmaceutical patents, creating an advanced and efficient generics industry capable of providing affordable medicines to people throughout the developing world.	20世纪70年代，印度取消了药品专利，逐步形成了能为发展中国家民众提供平价药品的先进、高效的仿制药行业。


That changed in 2005, when the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) forced India to allow drug patents.	上述状况在2005年发生了改变，世贸组织与贸易相关的知识产权协定（TRIPS）迫使印度建立了药品专利制度。


But, in the view of America’s pharmaceutical industry, TRIPS did not go far enough.	但在美国制药业看来，TRIPS所提供的保护还远远不够。


The Indian government’s desire to enhance its trade relations with the US thus provides the industry an ideal opportunity to pick up where TRIPS left off, by compelling India to make patents easier to obtain and to reduce the availability of low-cost generics.	于是制药业抓住了印度政府想加强印美贸易关系这一理想机会，通过逼迫印度降低专利门槛并减少仿制药供应，促使在TRIPS基础上对药品提供更深层次的垄断保护。


So far, the plan seems to be working.	这项计划到目前为止取得了不错的效果。


Last fall, during his visit to the US, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to establish a working group to reevaluate the country’s patent policy.	去年秋，印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪在访美期间同意成立工作小组，重新评估该国的专利政策。


The US participants in the group will be led by the Office of the US Trade Representative, which serves the pharmaceutical companies’ interests, rather than, say, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, or the National Institutes of Health.	美国方面将由美国贸易代表办公室负责领导，该办公室并不代表美国国家科学院、美国国家科学基金会或美国国立卫生研究院，而主要为制药公司的利益服务。


How might India tighten its patent system?	印度可以怎样收紧专利制度？


For starters, it could lower its standards for what is considered a “novel” product, and thus one that merits intellectual-property protection.	首先，它可以降低所谓“新”产品标准，只有“新”产品才有资格享受知识产权保护。


As it stands, India sets the bar quite high, resulting in its refusal to grant patents for new combinations of existing drugs.	目前印度制定的标准很高，并以此拒绝将专利授予创新组合的现有药物。


India could also stop issuing compulsory licenses to allow other companies to produce a patent holder’s drug, in exchange for a fee – an arrangement permitted under TRIPS, but anathema to the drug industry.	另一种方式是停止在收取一定费用后向其他企业发放生产专利所有者药物的强制许可证——上述做法符合TRIPS的规定，但制药行业却拒绝接受。


India’s current policies allow drugs to be sold at a small fraction of the monopoly prices commanded by patent holders.	印度的现行政策允许药物以专利所有者所要求垄断价格的一小部分进行销售。


For example, the Hepatitis-C drug Sovaldi is sold for $84,000 per treatment in the US; Indian manufacturers are able to sell the generic version profitably for less than $1,000 per treatment.	例如，丙肝药物 Sovaldi 在美国每次治疗价格为84,000 美元； 而印度药企的仿制药每次治疗价格不到1，000美元就有利可图。


The generic price is still a huge expense for people living on a few dollars a day; but, unlike the US price, it is manageable for many governments and aid organizations.	仿制药价格对每天仅靠数美元为生的人依然是巨大的负担； 但如此价格对很多政府和援助机构而言已经可以承受。


This is hardly an isolated example.	这个例子并不是绝无仅有。


Low-cost generics have made it possible to treat tens of millions of HIV/AIDS patients in the developing world.	低成本仿制药已经有可能治疗发展中国家数以千万计的HIV/ 艾滋病患者。


In fact, the threat of competition from Indian generics is partly responsible for major pharmaceutical companies’ decision to make some of their drugs available to the world’s poor at low prices.	事实上，来自印度仿制药的竞争威胁已部分迫使大型制企决定向全世界穷人低价销售某些种类的药物。


If the US compels India to tighten its patent rules substantially, so that they resemble US rules more closely, this outcome could be jeopardized.	如果美国迫使印度比照美国规定大幅收紧其专利规则，就有可能影响到这样的结果。


Of course, if America’s strong patent regime were, as its proponents claim, the best way to foster innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, the Obama administration’s policy toward India could perhaps be justified.	当然，如果美国的强势专利制度的确像其拥护者所说的那样是推动医药行业创新的最佳途径，那么奥巴马政府的对印政策或许是有道理的。


But that is not the case.	但事实却并非如此。


Because patents are essentially government-granted monopolies, they lead to the same inefficiencies and rent-seeking behavior as any other such market distortion.	由于专利本质上属于政府授权垄断，因此会像其他类似的市场扭曲因素一样带来低效和寻租。


A patent that raises the price of a drug a hundred-fold has the same effect on the market as a 10,000% tariff.	导致药价上涨百倍的专利和对市场征收10,000％的关税可以实现基本相同的效果。


In such cases, drug companies gain a powerful incentive to mislead doctors and the public about their products’ safety and effectiveness, and even to promote their drugs for inappropriate uses, often using innovative side-payments to persuade doctors to prescribe them.	在这种情况下，制药公司有很强的动机误导医生和公众对产品安全性和有效性的认识，甚至往往采用 创新性的补偿支付手段来鼓励医生开药，以此来推广药物的不当使用。


Furthermore, patent-supported research encourages secrecy, as companies disclose only the information needed to acquire patents.	此外，以专利为目的的研究鼓励保密行为，企业除与专利获取有关的信息外概不透露。


Yet openness is crucial for efficient scientific progress.	然而，开放是高效科学进步的关键因素。


Many economists, including the authors, have suggested a variety of alternatives to patent-supported R&D and testing that avoid these problems.	许多经济学家，包括本文作者，已经提出了多种备选方案，以取代以专利为目的的研发和试验程序。


If the Obama administration succeeds in forcing India to strengthen its patent laws, the change would harm not only India and other developing countries; it would also enshrine a grossly corrupt and inefficient patent system in the US, in which companies increase their profits by driving out the competition – both at home and abroad.	如果奥巴马政府成功迫使印度收紧其专利法，受害的将不仅是印度和其他发展中国家； 它还会进一步固化美国严重腐败和低效的专利制度，鼓励企业在国内外以消灭竞争为手段来谋取高额利润。


After all, generic drugs from India often provide the lowest-cost option in the US market once patent terms have expired.	毕竟，专利有效期一过，来自印度的仿制药往往提供了美国市场上最廉价的选择。


Obama was right to push for a health-care reform that would increase the sector’s efficiency and accessibility.	奥巴马推动医改，提高行业效率和服务普及度是明智之举。


In its dealings with India, the Obama administration is pursuing a policy that flouts these goals, with consequences not just for India and the US, but for the entire world.	但在与印度的交往中，奥巴马政府正在推行的政策违反了这些目标，其后果不仅有损于印度和美国，甚至整个世界都会因此受到影响。


The Unmaking of the President	走下神坛的总统


WASHINGTON, DC – Barack Obama was widely considered an exciting new figure when he was first elected President of the United States in 2008.	华盛顿—当2008年奥巴马第一次当选美国总统时，他被广泛认为是令人振奋的新面孔。


His increasing unpopularity and virtual abandonment by his own party in his second term in 2014 stems largely from that fact: Expectations exceeded reality.	2014年第二任期期间，他的支持率日益下滑，并且被所在政党事实抛弃，这主要是拜一个事实所赐：预期高于实际。


But, more important, reality changed – in several ways.	但是，更重要的是，实际发生了变化——以多种方式。


Obama is not a failed president.	奥巴马不是一个失败的总统。


He has in fact accomplished much in nearly impossible circumstances.	事实上，他在几乎不可能的环境中取得了成功。


In his first two years in office, when his Democratic Party controlled both houses of Congress, he took numerous steps to stem the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.	在担任总统的前两年，他的民主党控制着国会两院，他也采取了众多步骤阻止了大萧条以来最严重的经济下滑。


Likewise, he got his landmark health-care reform, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed.	类似地，他的标志性医疗改革——患者保护和平价医疗法（Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act）也获得了通过。


Even now, despite opposition from Republican politicians and major interest groups, he has begun to turn energy policy toward dealing with climate change and curbing greenhouse gases.	即便是现在，尽管有来自共和党政客和大利益集团的反对，但他仍然开始让能源政策朝遏制气候变化和温室气体排放的方向转型。


He has also taken significant steps to uphold the rights of women and sexual minorities, and has used his executive power to loosen immigration restrictions on families amid congressional paralysis.	他还采取了重要步骤保护妇女和性少数派权利，并通过行政权力在国会瘫痪的情况下放松了对移民家庭的限制。


An assessment of Obama’s presidency must focus not just on him, but also on the Republicans’ unprecedented hostility.	对奥巴马总统任期的评估不能只关注他，也要关注共和党前所未有的敌意。


Even before Obama took office, Republican leaders were plotting to oppose his every proposal, so he could not claim bipartisan support.	在奥巴马入主白宫前，共和党领导人便已计划好要反对他提出的每一项议案，因此他无法获得跨党派支持。


No Republican voted for Obama’s health-care legislation, even though it was modeled on schemes backed by some Republican officials and prominent think tanks.	没有一位共和党投票支持奥巴马的医疗立法，即使该立法建立在一些共和党官员和著名智库所支持的机制模式基础上。


The Republicans’ most ingenious trick was to use procedural measures to keep bills from being brought to a vote in the Senate, so that the public would ultimately blame “the stalemate in Washington” on Obama.	共和党最巧妙的伎俩是利用程序手段让法案无法进入参议院投票，因此公众最终会把“华盛顿僵局”的责任加给奥巴马。


As his poll ratings began to drop, reaching the low forties, Democrats made the tactical error of running away from him.	当他的支持率开始下降、朝40%退缩时，民主党又犯了远离他的策略性错误。


Voters concluded that even his own party no longer supported him, and his popularity fell further.	选民认为，就连他自己的政党都不再支持他了，于是他的支持率进一步下降。


As a result, in November’s midterm congressional election, the Democrats, unwilling to support any Obama-associated policy, waged a campaign about nothing, contributing to low turnout among their party’s voters.	结果，在11月的中期国会选举中，不愿支持任何与奥巴马有关的政策的民主党打了一场无目的选战，该党支持者投票率很低。


Republican candidates, running highly charged anti-Obama campaigns, trounced their opponents.	共和党候选人高举反奥巴马的大旗，大获全胜。


Of course, no honest discussion of Obama’s presidency can ignore the role of his race.	当然，若要诚实讨论奥巴马的总统任期，就不能忽视他的种族角色。


America, it turned out, was far less ready for a black president than his supporters expected (or hoped), exemplified in virulent attacks that exceed the norm for a president.	事实表明，美国远远不像奥巴马的支持者预期（或希望）的那样做好了迎接黑人总统的准备，奥巴马受到了超过总统正常范围的恶毒攻击就是明证。


Moreover, Obama’s approach to issues involving race has been fettered by his fear, expressed in his early memoir Dreams From My Father, of being perceived (even by his white mother) as an “angry black.”	此外，奥巴马对于种族相关的问题的方针也因为他担心被人（甚至包括他的白人母亲在内）认为是“愤怒的黑人”而饱受掣，他在早期回忆录《我父亲的梦想》（Dreams From My Father）中表达了这一点。


To his credit, however, he has been effective in navigating the racial thicket of Ferguson, Missouri, by turning the killing of an unarmed teenager into a focal point for national action to improve police methods.	但是，他能游刃有余地驾驭密苏里州弗格森（Ferguson）的种族冲突，将一名手无寸铁的十几岁青年被杀事件转化为对改善警察执法方式的全国行动的关注。


Obama’s personality has also contributed to his problems.	奥巴马的个性也是他的问题原因。


In his astonishingly swift rise, he was virtually alone – a Democrat, but not a creature of the Democratic Party, a politician of progressive instincts, but not an ideologue.	在他的急速窜升时期，他几乎是单枪匹马——作为一位民主党员而不是民主党人物，作为有进步本能的政客而不是思想家。


His tendency toward solitude, however, left him disinclined to build new ties and allies in Washington, leaning instead on his family and close friends from Chicago.	但是，他的孤僻倾向使他不愿再华盛顿构建新关系和结盟，而是关注家庭和芝加哥的密友。


Moreover, he has little use for small talk or the grubbier side of politics, and his overweening pride in his exceptional intelligence makes him impatient with others’ ideas.	此外，他很少采取闲聊或政治的阴暗手段，而他对自己卓越智商的自负使他不太听得进他人的观点。


As a result, members of Congress, business figures, and others have felt put off in his presence – even insulted by his remoteness.	结果，只要有他在场，国会议员、商业人物和其他人就会感到不自在——甚至因为他的疏远感到羞辱。


More broadly, Obama’s approach to governing has run counter to his early claim that he wanted to create a “team of rivals” that would offer competing views.	更广泛地说，奥巴马的治国之道与他早期的说辞——他想创造能提供竞争意见的“对手团队”——背道而驰。


His preference for surrounding himself with people who have proved their loyalty has produced a White House staff that is widely considered, even by some cabinet officials, to be less than stellar.	他更愿意让自己处于宣誓效忠的人群的簇拥之中，这导致他的白宫团队被广泛认为星光暗淡——即使一些内阁官员也这样看。


It is also a staff that has exercised tight control over policy.	他的白宫团队还紧紧地控制着政策。


Cabinet members have chafed at their proposals being subjected to lengthy review by White House committees, whose reports are often opaque.	内阁成员因为方案需要接受白宫委员会——他们的报告往往恨不透明——的冗长审核而光火。


The emphasis on loyalty is particularly glaring on the national-security front.	对效忠的强调在国家安全方面最为明显。


National Security Adviser Susan Rice, who has been with Obama since 2008, is said to be intelligent but lacking in strategic vision.	国家安全顾问苏珊·赖斯（Susan Rice）自2008年其一直与奥巴马共事，据说她智力超群，但缺乏战略眼光。


That, together with her avowed combativeness, has impaired coherent policymaking on critical issues like the Syrian crisis.	再加上她公开的好斗个性，导致叙利亚危机等关键问题上无法形成一致决策。


Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel could not penetrate the bastion around Rice, and his dissent on policy toward Syria, which he often took directly to Obama, was not appreciated.	国防部长哈格尔无法穿透赖斯周围的堡垒，他对叙利亚政策的不满——他常常向奥巴马直陈观点——也得不到尊重。


After the midterm elections, Hagel – Obama’s third defense secretary in six years – became the floundering administration’s sacrificial lamb.	中期选举后，哈格尔——奥巴马六年任期中的第三任国防部长——成了风雨飘摇的奥巴马政府的替罪羊。


He was not even afforded the dignity of a simple resignation, untainted by leaked statements from White House officials that he “wasn’t up to the job.”	他甚至无法获得递交辞呈的尊严，据白宫官员漏出的陈述，他“不能胜任这一工作。


Given Hagel’s good standing in Washington, the move reflected poorly on the administration.	”哈格尔在华盛顿口碑甚佳，这一做法对奥巴马政府影响颇大。


Obama is unlikely to find much refuge from domestic struggles in the last redoubt of previous lame-duck presidents: foreign policy.	奥巴马 不可能从此前的“跛脚鸭总统”（lame-duck presidents）的最后避风港——外交政策中找到国内斗争避难所。


Obama should not be blamed for the foreign-policy challenges that the US now faces.	奥巴马不应该为美国目前所面临的外交政策挑战负责。


He did not create the messes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is not his fault that conducting foreign policy is far more difficult in today’s fragmented world than it was during the Cold War.	伊拉克和阿富汗乱局不是他造成的，在当今分裂的世界中实施外交政策远比冷战期间更困难也不是他的错。


It would be a tough time for any US president to try to assert global leadership – a fact that the Republicans choose to overlook.	不管谁当美国总统，这都是行使全球领导力的艰难时期——而共和党总是忽视这一事实。


But, brilliant as Obama is, he has been prone to making odd mistakes.	但是，睿智如奥巴马，仍然免不了犯下奇怪的错误。


With a seemingly out-of-control John McCain taking over as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the situation is likely to become even more complicated.	他让眼看失控的约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）担任参议院军事委员会主席，这让情况有可能变得更加复杂。


As American politics becomes more polarized, and as Obama struggles to manage the challenges posed by epochal global developments, large domestic programs to address rising income inequality are probably beyond his administration’s reach.	美国政治正变得日益极化，奥巴马正在竭尽全力对付全球发展新纪元带来的挑战，在这一环境下，采取大手笔国内政策解决收入不平等恶化也许超过了他的政府的能力范围。


And, though there is no shortage of candidates lining up to succeed him in 2016, one might wonder, after his experience, why anyone would want the job.	而尽管等待在2016年取代他的候选者不乏其人，但我们不禁要问，看到奥巴马的经历，为何还有人想做美国总统。


Obama Joins the Greek Chorus	奥巴马加入希腊合唱队


PRINCETON – US President Barack Obama’s recent call to ease the austerity imposed on Greece is remarkable – and not only for his endorsement of the newly elected Greek government’s negotiating position in the face of its official creditors.	普林斯顿—美国总统奥巴马最近呼吁放松施加给希腊的紧缩，这是个引人注目的举动——不仅仅是因为他对新当选希腊政府对其官方债权人的谈判立场的支持。


Obama’s comments represent a break with the long-standing tradition of official American silence on European monetary affairs.	奥巴马的评论是对美国长期以来官方不评论欧洲货币事务的传统的决裂。


While scholars in the United States have frequently denounced the policies of Europe’s monetary union, their government has looked the other way.	尽管美国学者频繁指摘欧洲货币联盟的政策，但美国政府一直作壁上观。


Those who criticize the euro or how it is managed have long run the risk of being dismissed as Anglo-Saxons or, worse, anti-Europeans.	长期以来，批评欧元或欧元的管理情况的人随时有可能被扣上盎格鲁-撒克逊或更糟糕的反欧洲的帽子。


British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher accurately foresaw the folly of a European monetary union.	英国首相撒切尔夫人准确地预见到欧洲货币联盟的荒谬。


Gordon Brown, as British Chancellor of the Exchequer, followed in Thatcher’s footsteps.	英国财政大臣戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）也步了撒切尔夫人的后尘。


When his staff presented carefully researched reasons for not joining the euro, many Europeans sneered.	当布朗团队拿出经仔细研究的理由拒绝加入欧元区时，许多欧洲人对他们嗤之以鼻。


And that is why Obama’s statement was such a breath of fresh air.	因此，奥巴马的评论可谓令人耳目一新。


It came a day after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Greece should not expect more debt relief and must maintain austerity.	奥巴马是在德国总理默克尔说希腊不必指望更多债务纾困、必须保持紧缩之后一天做出这一评论的。


Meanwhile, after days of not-so-veiled threats, the European Central Bank is on the verge of cutting funding to Greek banks.	与此同时，在做出多日的并不掩饰的威胁后，欧洲央行即将要切断希腊银行的资金了。


The guardians of financial stability are amplifying a destabilizing bank run.	金融稳定的捍卫者正在放大一个破坏性的银行挤兑。


Obama’s breach of Europe’s intellectual insularity is all the more remarkable because even the International Monetary Fund has acquiesced in German-imposed orthodoxy.	考虑到即使是国际货币基金组织（IMF）也没有跳出德国认定的正统的窠臼，奥巴马对欧洲的思想偏隘（intellectual insularity）的决裂就更加引人注目了。


As IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde told the Irish Times: “A debt is a debt, and it is a contract.	IMF总裁拉加德（Christine Lagarde）对《爱尔兰时报》（Irish Times）表示：“债务就是债务，它是契约。


Defaulting, restructuring, changing the terms has consequences.”	违约、重组、改变条款是有后果的。 ”


The Fund stood by in the 1990s, when the eurozone misadventure was concocted.	20世纪90年代，当欧元区的不幸事件还在酝酿期时，IMF袖手旁观。


In 2002, the director of the IMF’s European Department described the fiscal rules that institutionalized the culture of persistent austerity as a “sound framework.”	2002年，IMF欧洲部门主管把将持久紧缩文化制度化的财政规则描述为“可靠框架”。


And, in May 2010, the IMF endorsed the European authorities’ decision not to impose losses on Greece’s private creditors – a move that was reversed only after unprecedented fiscal belt-tightening sent the Greek economy into a tailspin.	2010年5月，IMF支持欧洲当局不要求希腊私人债权人承担损失的决定——这一决定直到前所未有的财政紧缩将希腊经济推下悬崖后才被改变。


The delays and errors in managing the Greek crisis started early.	管理希腊危机的拖延和错误很早就开始了。


In July 2010, Lagarde, who was France’s finance minister at the time, recognized the damage incurred by those initial delays, “If we had been able to address [Greece’s debt] right from the start, say in February, I think we would have been able to prevent it from snowballing the way that it did.”	2010年7月，还在法国财政部长任上的拉加德承认了最初的拖延造成的伤害：“如果我们选择从一开始，比如2月，就正确处置[希腊的债务]，我想我们就能够防止它像现在那样一路越滚越大。


Even the IMF acknowledged that it had been a mistake not to impose losses on private creditors preemptively; it finally did so only in June 2013, when the damage had already been done.	”就连IMF也承认，不先发制人地要求私人债权人承担损失是一个错误； 2013年，它最终还是这样做了，但此时伤害已经造成。


There is plenty of blame to go around.	指责对象还可以有一大群。


Former US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner championed a hardline stance against debt restructuring during a crisis.	危机期间，前美国财政部长盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）对债务重组持强硬反对立场。


As a result, despite warnings by several IMF Directors in May 2010 that restructuring was inevitable, the US supported the European position that private creditors needed to be paid in full.  	结果，尽管2010年5月一些IMF董事警告债务重组不可避免，但美国仍支持欧洲关于私人债权人需要获得十足偿付的立场。


Lee Buchheit, a leading sovereign-debt attorney and the man who managed the eventual Greek debt restructuring in 2012, was harshly critical of the authorities’ failure to face up to reality.	主权债务主要律师之一、2012年希腊最终债务重组的管理者巴赫海特（Lee Buchheit）对当局没有直面现实提出了严厉批评。


As he put it, “I find it hard to imagine they will now man up to the proposition that they delayed – at appalling cost to Greece, its creditors, and its official-sector sponsors – an essential debt restructuring.”	他说：“我发现难以想象他们会像爷们一样采取被他们拖延的动作——实质债务重组，这将给希腊、希腊债权人和官方自助者造成了极其巨大的代价。 ”


Obama may have arrived late to the right conclusion, but he expressed what should be an obvious truth: “You cannot keep on squeezing countries that are in the midst of depression.”	奥巴马姗姗来迟地站在了正确结论的一方，但他说出了理应是显而易见的事实的东西：“你不可以继续榨取已经处于萧条的国家。 ”


If Obama’s words are to count, he must continue to push for the kind of deal Greece needs – one that errs on the side of too much debt forgiveness, rather than too little.	奥巴马的话要想管用，他必须继续推动希腊所需要的协议——宁愿债务豁免过多也要避免过少。


Recent analysis shows that forgiveness of Greece’s official debt is unambiguously desirable, as another bogus deal will keep the Greek economy depressed, ensuring that the problem soon recurs.	最新研究表明豁免希腊的官方债务毫无疑问是值得追求的，而再来一个假协议将让希腊经济继续陷于萧条，问题在不久后必将复发。


If European sensitivities must be assuaged, Greece’s debt repayment could be drawn out over 100 years.	如果非要满足欧洲的敏感神经，那么希腊的债务偿还可能需要100年以上的时间。


At the end of the day, debt forgiveness benefits creditors as much as it helps debtors.	最终，债务豁免既能帮助债务人，也对债权人有益。


Creditors have known this since at least the sixteenth century, when Spain’s King Philip II became the world’s first known serial sovereign defaulter.	债权人至少在六百年前就已经知道哦这一点。 当时，西班牙国王菲利普二世成为世界上首位已知的系列主权违约者。


As Jesus put it, “It is more blessed to give than to receive.”	耶稣有云：“施比受更有福。 ”


European authorities must come to understand that the next act of the Greek tragedy will not be confined to Greece.	欧洲当局必须明白，希腊悲剧的下一出不会局限于希腊。


If relief fails to materialize, political discontent will spread, extremist forces will gain strength, and the survival of the European Union itself could be endangered.	如果纾困无法实现，政治不满就会蔓延，极端力量将赢得上风，欧盟本身的生存也将可能受到威胁。


Obama Steps Up	站出来的奥巴马


WASHINGTON, DC – For the past six years, US President Barack Obama's administration has, more often than not, sided with the interests of big banks on financial-sector policy.	华盛顿—过去六年中，美国总统奥巴马政府的金融业政策往往与大银行利益站在一起。