Facing an external shock, the Chinese government should and can maintain a 7.5% growth rate by taking counter-cyclical and proactive fiscal-policy measures, while maintaining a prudent monetary policy.	面对外部冲击，中国政府应当且可以采取反周期和积极的财政政策措施以维持7. 5%的增长率，同时保持稳健的货币政策。


After all, China has high private and public savings, foreign reserves exceeding $3.3 trillion, and great potential for industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvement.	毕竟中国拥有很高的私人和公共储蓄，外汇储备超过3. 3万亿美元，并有实现产业升级和改善基础设施的巨大潜力。


Indeed, China can maintain an 8% annual GDP growth rate for many years to come, because modern economic growth is a process of continuous technological innovation and industrial upgrading.	事实上，由于现代经济增长的过程是一个不断的技术创新和产业升级的过程，中国依然能在未来许多年保持8%的年均GDP增长。


Of course, this is true for developed and developing countries alike.	当然，这对发达国家和发展中国家都同样有效。


But developed countries differ from developing countries in an important way. Since the Industrial Revolution, developed countries have always been on the global frontier of technologies and industries, which has required them to invest in costly and risky indigenous research and development.	但发达国家与发展中国家之间存在着一个重要的区别——自工业革命以来，发达国家一直在技术和产业领域走在全球前沿，而这需要他们投资于昂贵和高风险的本地研发工作。


By contrast, technologies and existing industries in developing countries are in general well within the global frontier.	相比之下，发展中国家的技术和现有的行业在全球前沿中总体还算不错。


As a result, they benefit from the “latecomer’s advantage”: technological innovation and industrial upgrading can be achieved by imitation, import, and/or integration of existing technologies and industries, all of which implies much lower R&D costs.	它们受益于“后发优势”：技术创新与产业升级可以通过模仿，进口来实现，以及/或者与现有的技术和产业整合，而所有这一切都意味着更低的研发费用。


In theory, any developing country that can harness its latecomer’s advantage to achieve technological and industrial upgrading can grow faster than developed countries.	理论上，任何发展中国家可以利用后发优势实现技术和产业升级从而实现比发达国家更快的增长。


How much faster is an empirical question.	而实践中的问题则在于能快多少。


According to the Growth Commission led by Nobel laureate Michael Spence, 13 economies took full advantage of their latecomer status after World War II and achieved annual GDP growth rates of 7% or higher – at least twice as high as developed countries’ growth rates – for 25 years or longer.	对此由诺贝尔奖得主迈克尔·斯彭斯（Michael Spence）所领导的发展委员会就指出，第二次世界大战后，13个充分利用自身后发地位的经济体在25年或更长的时间里实现了7%或更高的GDP年增长率——至少两倍于发达国家的增长率。


China became one of the 13 economies after 1979.	1979年后，中国成为这13个经济体之一。


Because the country’s latecomer status explains its 33 years of rapid economic growth, the key to understanding its potential for further rapid growth in the future lies in estimating how large those advantages still are.	而该国的后发地位正好解释了其33年的快速经济增长，所以要了解未来进一步快速增长潜力的关键就在于估算今后还能存在多大的后发优势。


Per capita GDP, which reflects a country’s average labor productivity and its overall technological and industrial achievement, is a useful proxy to estimate latecomer’s advantage.	以人均国内生产总值为例，其反映了一个国家的平均劳动生产率和整体工业技术成就，也是估算后发优势的一个有效标示物。


That is, the per capita GDP gap between China and developed countries essentially reflects the gap between them in terms of overall technological and industrial achievement.	也就是说，中国与发达国家之间的人均GDP差距集中反映了它们在总体技术和工业成就之间的差距。


According to the most up-to-date estimate by the late economic historian Angus Maddison, China’s per capita GDP in 2008 was $6,725 in 1990 dollars, which was 21% of per capita GDP in the United States.	根据已故的经济历史学家安古斯·麦迪逊（Angus Maddison）最近一次的估算，以1990年的美元价值计算，2008年中国的人均GDP为6725美元，相当于美国人均国内生产总值的21%。


That is roughly the same gap that existed between the US and Japan in 1951, Singapore in 1967, Taiwan in 1975, and South Korea in 1977 – four economies that are also among the 13 successful economies studied by the Growth Commission.	这差不多等于美国与1951年的日本，1967年的新加坡，1975年的台湾，1977年的韩国之间的差距——这四个国家正是发展委员会研究的13个成功的经济体中的4个。


Harnessing their latecomer’s advantage, Japan’s average annual growth rate soared to 9.2% over the subsequent 20 years, compared to 8.6% in Singapore, 8.3% in Taiwan, and 7.6% in South Korea.	利用后发优势，在20年间日本的平均年增长率飙升至9. 2%，新加坡8.


If the latecomer’s advantage implied by the income gap between the four NIEs and the US enabled the NIEs to realize average annual GDP growth rates of 7.6%-9.2% for 20 years, China’s annual growth potential should be a similar 8% for the 2008-2028 period.	如果说亚洲四小龙和美国之间的收入差距相对应的后发优势使得四国在20年间实现了7. 6%~9.


To realize its potential growth as a latecomer, China needs, above all, to deepen its market-oriented reforms, address various structural problems, and develop its economy according to its comparative advantages.	2%的GDP年增长，那么类似的，中国在2008-2028年间每年的增长潜力应该是8%。 而为了将自身的后发增长潜力变为现实，中国首先要深化市场化改革，解决各种结构性问题，并根据自身的比较优势来发展经济。


Globalization’s Last Gasp	全球化的最后关头


LONDON – Does Donald Trump’s election as United States president mean that globalization is dead, or are reports of the process’ demise greatly exaggerated?	伦敦—唐纳德·特朗普当选为美国总统是否意味着全球化已死？ 还是关于全球化进程行将就木的报道大大夸张了？


If globalization is only partly incapacitated, not terminally ill, should we worry?	如果全球化只是部分受阻，而不是病入膏肓，我们还需要担心吗？


How much will slower trade growth, now in the offing, matter for the global economy?	从目前看，贸易增长即将转衰，这对全球经济会造成多大的影响？


World trade growth would be slowing down, even without Trump in office.	即使特朗普不当总统，世界贸易增长也会放缓。


Its growth was already flat in the first quarter of 2016, and it fell by nearly 1% in the second quarter.	其增长在2016年一季度已经降低，二季度更是衰退了近1%。


This continues a prior trend: since 2010, global trade has grown at an annual rate of barely 2%.	这是此前趋势的延续：2010年，全球贸易平均年增长率只有2%。


Together with the fact that worldwide production of goods and services has been rising by more than 3%, this means that the trade-to-GDP ratio has been falling, in contrast to its steady upward march in earlier years.	再加上世界商品和服务产量增长率一直高于3%这一事实，这意味着贸易-GDP之比一直在下降，与前几年稳步上升之势截然相反。


This disturbing trajectory, argue the mavens of globalization, reflects the resurgent protectionism manifest in popular opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and now in Trump’s electoral victory.	全球化专家表示，这一令人不安的趋势反映了保护主义的复兴。 跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）所引起的群众反对以及刚刚发生的特朗普胜选都是明证。


It means that the benefits of openness and specialization are being squandered.	这意味着开放和专业化的收益正在被浪费。


Causality in economics may be elusive, but in this case it is clear.	经济学中的因果关系可能十分晦涩，但在这个例子中很清楚。


So far, slower trade growth has been the result of slower GDP growth, not the other way around.	目前，贸易增长的放缓一直是GDP增长放缓的结果，而不是相反。


This is particularly evident in the case of investment spending, which has fallen sharply since the global financial crisis.	这一点在投资支出上表现得尤为明确。 自全球金融危机以来，投资支出剧烈下降。


Investment spending is trade-intensive, because countries rely disproportionately on a relatively small handful of producers, like Germany, for technologically sophisticated capital goods.	投资支出具有贸易密集的特征，因为各国严重依赖一小撮生产国（如德国）获得技术先进的资本品。


In addition, slower trade growth reflects China’s economic deceleration.	此外，贸易增长放缓反映了中国经济减速。


Until 2011 China was growing at double-digit rates, and Chinese exports and imports were growing even faster.	2011年前，中国以两位数的速度增长，而中国进出口增长速度更快。


China’s growth has now slowed by a third, leading to slower growth of Chinese trade.	目前中国增长减慢了三分之一，导致中国贸易增长放缓。


China’s growth miracle, benefiting a fifth of the earth’s population, is the most important economic event of the last quarter-century.	中国的增长奇迹得益于占全球五分之一的人口，这也是过去四分之一世纪中最重要的经济事件。


But it can happen only once.	但这样的事件只会发生一次。


And now that the phase of catch-up growth is over for China, this engine of global trade will slow.	如今，中国的赶超增长阶段已经结束，全球贸易的引擎也将减速。


The other engine of world trade has been global supply chains.	世界贸易的另一个引擎是全球供给链。


Trade in parts and components has benefited from falling transport costs, reflecting containerization and related advances in logistics.	零部件贸易得益于运输成本的下降，体现了物流的集装箱化和相关进步。


But efficiency in shipping is unlikely to continue to improve faster than efficiency in the production of what is being shipped.	但船运效率的改进不可能一直快于装船货物的生产效率。


Already, motor-vehicle manufacturers ship an automotive transmission back and forth across the US-Mexican border several times in the course of production.	目前，汽车制造商在生产过程中要在美墨边境数次进出口变速装置。


At some point, unpacking that production process still further will reach the point of diminishing returns.	将这一生产过程进一步分解迟早会导致回报递减。


So should we worry that trade is growing more slowly?	那么，我们需要担心贸易增长变得更加缓慢吗？


Yes, but only in the sense that a doctor worries when a patient runs a fever.	是的，但这和医生担心患者发烧的道理一样。


Fever is rarely life-threatening; rather, it is a symptom of an underlying condition.	发烧很少威胁到生命； 相反，它是基础性病症的症候。


In this case, the condition is slow economic growth, also known as secular stagnation, caused by depressed investment, which in turn reflects financial problems and policy uncertainty.	在贸易的例子中，基础性病症是经济增长缓慢，也称为长期停滞，其原因是投资抑制，而投资抑制反过来反映了金融问题和政策不确定性。


This, then, is the underlying condition.	因此，这才是基础性病症。


Trade agreements like the TPP and TTIP address it only obliquely.	TPP和TTIP等贸易协定只是旁敲侧击。


Increased spending on infrastructure by governments, to boost investment and growth directly, is more to the point.	政府增加基础设施支出从而直接提振投资和增长才是正途。


But whether the Trump administration and the new US Congress can design and implement a program of productive infrastructure spending remains to be seen.	但特朗普政府和新一届美国国会是否能够制定和实施高效的基础设施支出计划仍有待观察。


More generally, a political consensus is needed on growth-promoting policies, so that investment is not held hostage to political infighting.	更一般地讲，需要形成增长促进政策方面的政治共识才能让投资免于沦为政治斗争的牺牲品。


Whether this will be possible under Trump’s administration is another open question.	特朗普政府能否让这一点成为可能则是另一个开放问题。


The story for cross-border flows of financial capital is even more dramatic.	金融资本的跨境流动的波动更加剧烈。


Gross capital flows – the sum of inflows and outflows – are not just growing more slowly; they are down significantly in absolute terms from 2009 levels.	跨境资本流——流入和流出之和——不仅仅是��长放缓的问题； 自2009年以来其绝对水平也大幅下降。


But dramatic is not the same as alarming.	但剧烈未必值得警惕。


In fact, it is mainly cross-border bank lending and borrowing that have fallen.	事实上，下降的主要是跨境银行借贷。


Foreign direct investment – financial flows to build foreign factories and acquire foreign companies – remains at pre-crisis levels.	外国直接投资——用于在海外设厂和并购外国公司的金融流——仍位于危机前的水平。


So do cross-border borrowing and lending through stock and bond markets.	通过股票和债券市场实现的跨境借贷亦然。


This difference reflects regulation.	这一差异体现了监管。


Having concluded, rightly, that cross-border bank lending is especially risky, regulators clamped down on banks’ international operations.	监管者正确地看出跨境银行贷款风险尤其巨大，因此开始抑制银行的国际经营。


In response, many banks curtailed their cross-border business.	许多银行的应对措施是裁减跨境业务。


But, rather than alarming anyone, this should be seen as reassuring, because the riskiest forms of international finance have been curtailed without disrupting more stable and productive forms of foreign investment.	但是，这不必引起警惕，而应该让人宽慰，因为国际金融风险最高的形式已经得到了削减，并且没有干扰到更加稳定和高效的外国投资形式。


We now face the prospect of the US government revoking the Dodd-Frank Act and rolling back the financial reforms of recent years.	如今，美国政府即将撤销多德-弗兰克法（Dodd-Frank Act），近几年来的金融改革将倒退。


Less stringent financial regulation may underpin a recovery in international capital flows.	不再严格的金融监管可能让国际资本流复苏。


But we should be careful what we wish for.	但我们对想要的东西应该保持谨慎。


Growth in a Buddhist Economy	一个佛教经济体的发展问题


NEW YORK – I have just returned from Bhutan, the Himalayan kingdom of unmatched natural beauty, cultural richness, and inspiring self-reflection.	发自纽约——我最近去了不丹，一个坐落于喜马拉雅上脚下，拥有绝美自然风光，丰富文化内涵以及振奋人心的反省精神的王国。


From the kingdom’s uniqueness now arises a set of economic and social questions that are of pressing interest for the entire world.	而它的独特性则引出了一系列全世界都感兴趣的经济和社会课题。


Bhutan’s rugged geography fostered the rise of a hardy population of farmers and herdsmen, and helped to foster a strong Buddhist culture, closely connected in history with Tibet.	不丹是一个山地国家，因此也孕育了吃苦耐劳的农牧民众，并拥有着深厚的藏传佛教文化。


The population is sparse – roughly 700,000 people on territory the size of France – with agricultural communities nestled in deep valleys and a few herdsmen in the high mountains.	人口稀少——国土面积近似于法国，却只居住了70万人——村落都选址在深谷当中，还有一部分牧民在高山上放牧。


Each valley is guarded by a dzong (fortress), which includes monasteries and temples, all dating back centuries and exhibiting a masterful combination of sophisticated architecture and fine arts.	每一个山谷都由一个“德崇”（城堡）来守卫着，“德崇”里有佛塔和寺庙，年代久远，而且每一座建筑都是高超建筑手段和精美艺术的完美结晶。


Bhutan’s economy of agriculture and monastic life remained self-sufficient, poor, and isolated until recent decades, when a series of remarkable monarchs began to guide the country toward technological modernization (roads, power, modern health care, and education), international trade (notably with neighboring India), and political democracy.  What is incredible is the thoughtfulness with which Bhutan is approaching this process of change, and how Buddhist thinking guides that thoughtfulness.	不丹的农业经济和宗教生活一直维持着一种自给自足，贫穷且与世隔绝的状态，直到近几十年来数位杰出的君主开始带领国家走向技术现代化（公路，电力，现代医疗卫生服务和教育），国际贸易（尤其是与邻国印度）以及政治民主，情况才有所改观。 不可思议的则是不丹在推行这一系列变革时所采用的思维方式，而佛教思维又是如何引导这种思维方式的。


Bhutan is asking itself the question that everyone must ask: how can economic modernization be combined with cultural robustness and social well-being?	不丹正在用每一个人都应该自问的问题扪心自问：经济现代化如何才能跟深厚文化和社会幸福结合在一起？


In Bhutan, the economic challenge is not growth in gross national product, but in gross national happiness (GNH).	在不丹，经济所面临的挑战不是GDP的增长，而是GNH（国民幸福总值）的增长。


I went to Bhutan to understand better how GNH is being applied.	我亲自到不丹去了解这个指标是如何实施的。


There is no formula, but, befitting the seriousness of the challenge and Bhutan’s deep tradition of Buddhist reflection, there is an active and important process of national deliberation.	事实上，这个指数不需要公式去计算，而是在应对挑战的严肃性和深厚的佛教自省传统两者的联合作用下，谨慎从容地推动着这个积极而重要的国家进程。


Therein lies the inspiration for all of us.	而这当中也蕴藏着足以触动我们每个人的深刻内涵。


Part of Bhutan’s GNH revolves, of course, around meeting basic needs – improved health care, reduced maternal and child mortality, greater educational attainment, and better infrastructure, especially electricity, water, and sanitation.	当然，不丹GNH的其中一部分也包括满足人们的基本需要——提高医疗水平，减少孕妇和儿童死亡率，提升教育层次，还有更完善的基础设施，尤其是水，电和公共卫生设施。


This focus on material improvement aimed at meeting basic needs makes sense for a country at Bhutan’s relatively low income level.	而考虑到不丹国内相对较低的收入水平，这类旨在满足基本需要的物质改善是切实可行的。


Yet GNH goes well beyond broad-based, pro-poor growth.	但GNH指标也完全超越了单纯的广义扶贫式增长。


Bhutan is also asking how economic growth can be combined with environmental sustainability – a question that it has answered in part through a massive effort to protect the country’s vast forest cover and its unique biodiversity.	不丹也在思考如何将经济发展与环境可持续性联系起来——该国在大规模森林保护和特有物种多样性保育方面的举措已经部分回答了这个问题。


It is asking how it can preserve its traditional equality and foster its unique cultural heritage. And it is asking how individuals can maintain their psychological stability in an era of rapid change, marked by urbanization and an onslaught of global communication in a society that had no televisions until a decade ago.	不丹也自问：如何在一个剧烈变革的时代维护本国的平等传统和独有文化遗产，而身处一个10年前才开始引进电话的社���中，个人又该如何在这个城市化和全球通讯急速袭来的时代保持一个稳定的心态？


I came to Bhutan after hearing an inspiring speech by Prime Minister Jigme Thinley at the 2010 Delhi Summit on Sustainable Development. Thinley had made two compelling points.	而我之所以决定前往这个国家，是因为聆听了不丹总理吉格梅·廷里在2010年德里峰会上那场激动人心的可持续发展演说。


The first concerned the environmental devastation that he could observe – including the retreat of glaciers and the loss of land cover – as he flew from Bhutan to India. The second was about the individual and the meaning of happiness.	廷里列出了两个非常有说服力的要点：首先是关注他在飞往印度的飞机上亲眼观测到的环境破坏，比如冰川融化以及植被减少，其次就是关于个人以及幸福的意义。


Thinley put it simply: We are each finite and fragile physical beings. How much “stuff” – fast foods, TV commercials, large cars, new gadgets, and latest fashions – can we stuff into ourselves without deranging our own psychological well-being?	他打了简单的比喻：我们都是有限而且脆弱的血肉之躯，究竟能把多少“东西”——快餐，电视广告，豪华轿车，新奇玩艺和时装——塞进自己的身体却又不致打乱心灵的平静呢？


For the world’s poorest countries, such questions are not the most pressing.	对那些世界上最贫穷的国家来说，上述问题都不是最紧迫的。


Their biggest and most compelling challenge is to meet citizens’ basic needs.	他们最大且最要紧的问题是如何满足民众的基本需要。


But, for more and more countries, Thinley’s reflection on the ultimate sources of well-being is not only timely, but urgent.	但对其他国家来说，不丹总理对于幸福最终源泉的反思不但非常及时，而且是异常紧迫的。


Everybody knows how American-style hyper-consumerism can destabilize social relations and lead to aggressiveness, loneliness, greed, and over-work to the point of exhaustion.	所有人都知道美国式的高消费是如何使整个社会陷入分裂，并引发一连串的野心、孤独，贪婪以及过度操劳。


What is perhaps less recognized is how those trends have accelerated in the United States itself in recent decades.	但或许更少人关注的则是这些趋势是如何在美国内部不断加速的。


This may be the result of, among other things, the increasing and now relentless onslaught of advertising and public relations.	除了其他原因之外，这可能来自于不断增长且极大地冲击着人们心灵的广告和公共关系。


The question of how to guide an economy to produce sustainable happiness – combining material well-being with human health, environmental conservation, and psychological and cultural resiliency – is one that needs addressing everywhere.	而对于全世界来说，问题就在于如何引导经济去创造出可持续的快乐——并与物质小享受和个人健康，环境保护，以及精神和文化的承受能力相结合。


Bhutan has many things going its way.	不丹正在多管齐下解决这些问题。


It will be able to increase exports of clean, run-of-the-river hydropower to India, thereby earning foreign exchange in a manner that is sustainable and that can fill government coffers to fund education, health care, and infrastructure.	它将为印度提供清洁且可持续的水电能源，并因此以一种可持续的方式来赚取外汇，让政府有钱去资助教育，卫生和基础设施建设。


The country is also intent on ensuring that the benefits of growth reach all of the population, regardless of region or income level.	该国同时还打算确保每人公民都能分享增长的红利，不管他们身处何处，收入多寡。


There are serious risks.	但不丹也面对某些严重的风险。


Global climate change threatens Bhutan’s ecology and economy.	全球气候变化正威胁着该国的生态和经济。


Incautious and expensive advice from McKinsey and other private consulting firms could help turn Bhutan into a degraded tourist zone.	麦卡锡和其他私人顾问企业那些昂贵却轻率的提议正将不丹降格为一个旅游区。


One must hope that the quest for GNH will help steer the country away from such temptations.	我们只能寄望于GNH能继续引导这个国家，令其不至于走上歪路。


The key for Bhutan is to regard GNH as an enduring quest, rather than as a simple checklist.	因此对不丹来说，最重要的就是将GNH变成一项持之以恒的探索，而不仅仅是一张简单的任务清单。


Bhutan’s Buddhist tradition understands happiness not as attachment to goods and services, but as the result of the serious work of inner reflection and compassion toward others.	不丹的佛教传统也使其意识到：快乐并不是某些商品和服务的附属品，而是内心自省和扶助他人所结下的善果。


Bhutan has embarked on such a serious journey. The rest of the world’s economies should do the same.	不丹已经走上这么一条艰难的探索之路，而世界其他国家，也当群起而效仿之。


Grumpy Old Men	糟老头


LONDON – Having reached pensionable age, I qualify to be a grumpy old man.	发自伦敦——已经到了退休年龄的我有足够的资格成为一个糟老头。


I should be boring my children, and the students at Oxford University where I am Chancellor, with grumbles about how everything is going to the dogs.	我应该会让我的孩子们以及由本人担任校长的牛津大学的学子们感到厌烦，因为糟老头对一切都看不顺眼，总有些人心不古之类的抱怨。


But that is not quite how I see things.	但我本人可不是这样看待这个世界的。


I went to university myself in 1962. My first term coincided with the Cuban missile crisis.	我是在1962年上的大学，而且在第一个学期就碰上了古巴导弹危机。


The world seemed to be teetering on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.	当时整个世界似乎就在一场核灾难的悬崖边缘走钢丝。


Those were the days when global peace was sustained by a concept known suitably enough by the acronym MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction.	在那些日子里，支撑全球和平只有一个众所周知的概念——“互相保证毁灭”（Mutually Assured Destruction，亦称共同毁灭原则）。


Was that world a worse and more dangerous one than today, where our main nuclear concerns are how to prevent proliferation and strengthen the treaty that has deterred it for the last generation?	那么在世人把核问题的焦点集中在防止核扩散，并把上一代人的核不扩散条约进一步加强完善的今天，难道不能说从前的世界比当今世界更糟糕，更危险吗？


At the end of my years at Oxford, I went as a student to the United States and visited Alabama.	当我在牛津读书的最后一年，我以学生身份访问美国并到了南部的阿拉巴马州。


You may recall the story of Richard Nixon attending the independence celebrations in Ghana.	在此你可以回想一下理查德·尼克松出席非洲国家加纳的独立庆典时发生的小插曲。


At a gala reception, he went up to one guest, mistaking him for a local, and asked what it felt like to be able to vote and enjoy freedom under the rule of law.	当时在典礼接待处尼克松把一位（黑人）嘉宾误认为加纳本地人，还走过去问他对能够投票并享受法治之下的自由感觉如何。


“I wouldn’t know,” the man replied, “I’m from Alabama.”	“我可不知道，”那人回答，“我是阿拉巴马人。 ”


Within my adult lifetime, we have moved from the murder of civil-rights campaigners in the US to the election of a black president.	在我成年之后，美国则经历了从刺杀民权领袖（马丁·路德·金）到选出一名黑人总统的过程。


Nothing to be grumpy about there.	这很好，没什么好抱怨的。


Elsewhere, some of our biggest problems have a sort of Hegelian quality. They are the result of solving past problems or of past success.	但在世界其他角落，一些当前最重大的问题则带有某种黑格尔哲学的意味——它们都是从前为解决某些问题或者某些成功事件所导致的结果。


Consider, for example, the biggest challenge facing us, which deserves to be called existential: global warming and climate change.	比如说我们目前所面对的最大，且足以被定义为事关生死存亡的挑战：全球变暖和气候变化。


In the last century, the world got richer; its population quadrupled; the number of people living in cities grew thirteen-fold; and we consumed more of everything.	在上个世纪，这个世界的腰包鼓了起来； 人口增加了4倍；


Water consumption rose nine-fold and energy use thirteen-fold.	城市人口也增加了13倍； 而我们对所有物质的消费都有增无减。


Industrial output soared to 40 times its level at the beginning of the twentieth century.	我们多用了9倍的水资源和13倍的能源。 工业生产也比世纪初跃升了40倍。


But – and here comes the real hit – carbon-dioxide emissions grew seventeen-fold.	但与此同时——真正的麻烦来了——二氧化碳的排放量也增加了17倍。


That is the biggest problem we face – the unforeseen result of increased economic activity and prosperity.	这就是我们面对的最严峻问题——也是逐渐增加的经济活动以及繁荣所带来的意想不到的后果。


Looking at preparations for the Copenhagen summit in December, when we will try to broker a new global agreement to combat climate change, does not make me grumpy.	纵观即将在12月召开，旨在撮合一个应对气候变化之新全球协定的哥本哈根峰会的准备工作，我没什么好抱怨的。


At last, the big players are taking the issues seriously.	那些大国终于都已经开始认真对待这个问题。


The US is no longer in denial on the question.	美国不再在这个问题上持否定态度。


President Barack Obama and his advisers do not deny the scientific evidence of what is happening to us all.	奥巴马总统和他的顾问们都没有对证明全人类遭遇的科学证据予以否定。


In China, political leaders seem genuine in their commitment to reduce the carbon content of their runaway economy.	在中国，领导人们似乎也诚心要在其失控的国内经济中减少炭的比重。


The big problems, of course, are how we take account of past responsibility for the carbon in the atmosphere, how we balance aggregate national emissions and per capita figures – China leads in the first category; the US, Australia, and Canada are the biggest culprits in the second – and how we manage technology transfer from developed to emerging and poor economies.	而其中很明显存在几个重大问题，包括探讨各国如何为过去排放到大气中的碳负责，还有如何在国家总排放量和人均排放量间取得平衡——中国在总排放量方面占的比重很大； 而美国，澳大利亚和加拿大则在人均排放量上成为了不好的榜样——以及如何去实现由发达国家向新兴及贫穷国家的技术转让。


There will be plenty to moan about if we don’t solve these problems sooner rather than later.	如果我们不尽快解决这些问题，那将来可就有足够多的东西要抱怨的了。


This is where old men seem past their political expiration dates.	而这就是老人们在政治上显得不合时宜的地方。


Let me explain. For all of our lives, my generation has defined success in terms of rising GDP growth: more money in more pockets, more resources for public programs, and more jobs.	容我解释一下，在老一辈人的一生中，成功地定义就是不断增长的GDP，更多的人能赚到更多的钱，更多的资源来资助公共项目，还有更多的工作机会。


None of these will necessarily be a measure of future success.	而上述这几点是不能用来衡量未来的成功的。


We need to talk more about the quality of growth.	我们必须更多地就增长的内在质量问题进行探讨。


French President Nicolas Sarkozy has raised this issue, and he is right to do so.	法国总统萨科奇提出了这个问题，而他无疑是明智的。


Try telling that to the poor. But what we should want to promote is the right sort of growth – growth that won’t ravage our future prospects.	听到这里可能有些贫困阶层会感到不高兴，但我并不是说增长就是不好的，而是应该提倡一种正确的增长方式——一种不至于以牺牲我们的未来作为代价的增长方式。


We have to define the sustainability of growth in ways that create an attractive narrative for our citizens.	我们必须用一种具有吸引力的呈现方式来向市民们解释可持续发展的定义。


At the moment, people applaud sustainable growth, but they don’t vote for what it means in practice.	因为现在的情况是人们一面对可持续发展大加赞赏，一面却对相关的实际政策投了反对票。


German voters balk at any suggestion that we should limit the environmental damage caused by big and expensive cars. British voters line up behind the truck drivers when protests are launched against hikes in the price of petrol, not least through the introduction of higher energy taxes.	当我们提议要限制那些大型名贵汽车对环境的破坏时，德国选民退缩了，而在抗议汽油涨价，尤其是反对执行更高能源税的游行中，卡车司机的背后都是英国选民的身影。


Ideas for carbon taxes run into resistance everywhere.	征收碳排放税的理念更在全球范围内遭到了抵抗。


I have five grandchildren below the age of four.	我有5个不足4岁的孙子辈。


By the time they qualify for pensions and the license to grumble, the century will be into its seventh or eighth decade.	当他们到了退休年龄并有资格去发牢骚的时候，大概已经是2070~80年了。


We hope!	这个世界还是充满希望的！


How much will they have to get angry about then because of the way that we are behaving today?	只是不知到时他们将有多少的牢骚，是由我们今天的所作所为引起的呢？


Guilty Democrats	犯罪的民主人士


LONDON – When former Czech President Václav Havel knocked on the door of the Chinese embassy in Prague to demand the release of the writer Liu Xiaobo, I had an eerie sense of déjà vu.	伦敦 —— 前捷克共和国总统 瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔登门拜访中国驻布拉格使馆要求释放作家刘晓波，这让我在似曾相识的同时又感到有些可怕。


Thirty-three years ago, Havel helped initiate Charter 77, the landmark document that crystallized the ideals of all the dissidents – and many others – trapped behind the Iron Curtain.	33 年前，在哈维尔的努力下，出台了代表所有持不同政见者及铁幕笼罩下其他民众理想的标志性文件《 77 宪章》。


Havel , of course, was rewarded with a long jail sentence for his efforts.	当然，哈维尔为此遭到了长期监禁。


Now Liu has been sentenced to 11 years imprisonment for much the same crime: initiating Charter 08, perhaps the bravest attempt yet to chart a peaceful way forward to freedom for China.	现在刘也因为大致同样的罪名被判处入狱 11 年：刘推出了或许迄今为止和平实现中国自由化的最勇敢的《 08 宪章》。


History is said to repeat itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.	有人说无论是悲剧还是闹剧，历史都会不断地自我重复。


And it is indeed farcical for China’s government to try to suppress the yearning for freedom in the same brutal ways that Soviet-era communists once did.	中国政府试图以苏共时代的行为方式残酷压抑人们对于自由的渴望实际就是一场闹剧。


For jailing Liu on the absurd charge of trying to overthrow the Chinese state is typical of the type of thinking found in the closed societies of twentieth-century communism, where the state asserted its absolute right to judge every thought and every thinker.	以妄图推翻中国政府的荒唐罪名监禁刘晓波代表了典型的二十世纪共产主义封闭社会的思维方式，即由国家行使绝对权利，评判所有的思想和思想家。


In such a state, the only way to survive was for everyone to become his or her own thought police: self-censoring and never daring to question.	在这样的国度里，审查自己的思想是每个人生存下来的唯一方式：自我审查，永远不敢提出质疑。


But to judge and imprison one’s own mind, or any other mind, is to criminalize civilization.	但评判和禁锢自己或他人的思想是对文明的犯罪。


In today’s Internet age, moreover, no prison or censorship can destroy an idea whose time has come.	此外，在当今的互联网时代，没有任何监狱或审查制度能够对思想造成破坏。


In its current fight with Google, for example, China’s government appears to think that its technologists can provide the means to maintain the old thought control.	比方说在与谷歌的冲突中，中国政府似乎认为国内的技术专家能够找到保持原有思想控制的方法。


But, thankfully, for anyone with persistence and a modicum of computer skill, the Internet leaks like a sieve.	但谢天谢地，对于任何坚忍不拔并粗通电脑技术的人来讲，互联网就像漏勺一样泄露着各式各样的信息。


The great progress of China’s economy over the past 30 years is something all Chinese celebrate.	中国经济过去 30 年来的巨大进步让所有中国人都感到欢欣鼓舞。


But the jailing of Liu also demonstrates in the starkest terms that China’s neglect of human rights is flowing to the rest of world alongside the mass of Chinese goods.	但刘晓波的入狱也毫不掩饰地表明随中国商品传播到世界各地的还有中国对人权的忽视。


Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that China opened its economy only to maintain the country’s over-mighty rulers in power, not to respect and enhance the lives of ordinary Chinese.	事实上，人们越来越清楚地认识到中国开放经济的目的不过是保持国内过度强大的执政统治，而并不是要尊重和改善普通中国人的生活。


Although China’s government does not keep any of its international commitments on economic, social, and cultural rights, the world’s democracies appear to have lost their willingness to stand up for their beliefs, as President Barack Obama’s kowtow to China during his November visit painfully demonstrated.	尽管中国政府并未信守在经济、社会和文化权利领域做出的国际承诺，但世界民主国家却似乎已不愿再为信仰而继续坚持，巴拉克·奥巴马总统 11 月访华时的唯唯诺诺已经令人痛苦地向所有人证明了这个事实。


But it was a refusal to buckle to the values of Nazism and Communism in the twentieth century that assured the success of freedom.	但 20 世纪是拒绝向纳粹主义和共产主义屈服最终确保了自由的成功。


Liberty today needs the same type of stalwart defense.	我们也需要同样坚定地捍卫当今世界的自由事业。


Yes, civilization seems to be on the defensive.	是的，文明似乎正在处于守势。


Though many people seem to be in denial about this, politics has retreated to a renewal of the last century’s long struggle for democracy and freedom.	尽管不少人似乎竭力否认，但政治局势已经退回到上个世纪为民主自由而展开的长期斗争。


China’s model of authoritarian capitalism appears triumphant, but there is nothing genuinely new about this model; like all dictatorships, it deprives people of political rights and freedom of speech.	中国的专制资本主义模式似乎大获全胜，但这种模式实际仍是换汤不换药。 和所有独裁制度一样，它剥夺了人们的政治权利和言论自由。


And Chinese intellectuals face the cruelest reality: harsh suppression and a popular audience devoted to mammon and materialism.	而中国知识分子不得不面对最残酷的现实：严酷的镇压和普通民众沉迷于财富和拜金主义。


But the globalization of commercial interests does retain some power to restrict Chinese authoritarianism – particularly its efforts to suppress the peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang – if only the world’s democracies will seize it. Weak states, of course, tend to be cynical about China’s growing might.	但只要世界民主国家懂得如何利用，商业利益全球化也确实保留了某些限制中国专制主义的权力


Democratic politicians must not surrender their consciences to woo either their own economically jittery citizens or the Chinese regime.	民主政治家们不应出卖自己的良心，以换取对经济状况忧心忡忡的本国民众或中国政府的支持。


That route will lead only to moral and political decay.	这种做法只能带来道德和政治上的堕落。


Havel captured this idea perfectly when he criticized Obama’s silence in Beijing on human rights.	当哈维尔批评奥巴马访问北京时在人权问题上的沉默，他恰恰抓住了问题的本质。


Such abasement will only lead people to begin to doubt whether democracy is a living social system.	如此的低三下四只能让人们开始怀疑民主这种社会制度在现实中究竟存在与否。


Fortunately, China’s jailing of Liu Xiaobo will not, as we Chinese say, succeed in its effort to frighten the monkey by killing a chicken.	幸运的是，中国监禁刘晓波将不会起到中国俗话所说的杀鸡儆猴的作用。


Liu is too invisible to ordinary Chinese for that to happen.	刘在普通民众中知名度太小，起不到这样的作用。


No, the incarceration of Liu is targeted at those who value democracy, both within China and abroad.	不，监禁刘晓波针对的是国内国外那些注重民主的人。


It is an effort to criminalize democratic ideas and force people to choose between them and business with China.	中国政府试图将民主问题刑事化，迫使人们在民主和对华贸易中做出选择。


That is a false choice.	这样的选择是毫无道理的。


China’s economy needs world markets as much as world markets need China, if not more.	中国经济需要世界市场，丝毫不亚于世界市场需要中国。


Moreover, the West’s inclination to appease China will gradually cause ordinary Chinese to lose confidence that economic modernization will ever set them free.	此外，西方对于中国的安抚态度将逐渐令普通中国民众失去信心，不再相信经济现代化能为他们带来自由。


So continued silence when poets, writers, or lawyers – people like Shi Tao, Yang Tianshui, and Tan Zuoren – are treated like criminals will only assure that China’s markets are eventually lost alongside Chinese freedoms.	因此在师涛、杨天水和谭作人等诗人、作家或���师遭到罪犯一般待遇时继续保持沉默将导致西方最终在失去中国市场的同时，也失去中国的自由。


A closed society will eventually return to a closed economy.	封闭的社会将最终退回到封闭的经济当中。


The real criminal in the Liu Xiaobo affair is, of course, the Chinese state.	刘晓波事件的真正罪犯是中国政府。


But those who think that China’s mutant political authoritarianism and mighty economy can long prevail are guilty as well.	但那些认为中国政治集权主义和强大经济能够长期持续的人同样也是帮凶。


Such a system is as unsuited to the future as Mao’s system was to the past.	正如毛的制度不适合于过去一样，这样的制度也与未来格格不入。


The Gulf States’ Expat Dividend	海湾国家的侨民红利


PARIS – How should policymakers in the Middle East’s Gulf States manage their countries’ large expatriate workforces?	巴黎—中东海湾国家决策者应该如何管理本国的大量侨民劳动力？


In Saudi Arabia, foreign nationals account for roughly one-third of the population.	在沙特阿拉伯，外国人大约占了人口的三分之一。


In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, nine out of every ten residents is an expatriate.	在卡塔尔和阿联酋，十分之九居住者是侨民。


Should these countries’ governments continue to invest heavily in developing indigenous labor forces, with the aim of decreasing dependency on foreign workers?	这些国家的政府应该继续大力投资于开发本国劳动力，从而降低对外国工人的依赖吗？


The extraordinarily high proportion of foreign labor within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is often considered problematic, because, as some see it, it threatens local cultures and national identities, holds down wages, and impedes the development of domestic skills and talent.	海湾合作委员会（GCC）国家超高的外国劳动力比例常常被认为是个问题，因为在一些人看来，这威胁到本地文化和国民身份、拉低了工资，并妨碍了国内技能和人才开发。


With so many trades and professions dominated by relatively cheap overseas labor, the indigenous population is often left with few occupational domains offering competitive wages.	如此多的贸易和职业被相对廉价的海外劳动力所主导，导致国内人口几乎找不到能提供有竞争力的工资的就业岗位。


These tend to be predominantly in the public sector, where oil revenues are used to maintain high pay and attractive working conditions.	这些岗位主要集中在公共部门，国家用石油收入维持高薪和有诱人的工作条件。


But an important dimension of the policy debate within the region risks being overlooked: The Gulf States’ large foreign populations are not just workers; they are also consumers.	但该地区的一个重要政策争论点有被忽视的风险：海湾国家庞大的外国人口不仅仅是工人； 他们也是消费者。


By inflating the population of the countries in which they live, expatriate workers are helping drive economic growth.	通过增加他们所居住的国家的人口，侨民工人帮助推动了经济增长。


In fact, the GCC benefits from a double expat dividend: not just a diverse consumer base on the demand side, but also a flexible, youthful workforce on the supply side.	事实上，GCC受益于双重侨民红利：不仅在需求端获得了多元化的消费者基础，还在供给端获得了灵活的年轻劳动力。


As a result, following the rapid decline in oil prices of recent years, companies could lay off thousands of workers without having to worry about raising the unemployment rate or putting a substantial burden on government coffers.	因此，在近几年来石油价格下跌的情况下，公司能够裁撤数千工人而不必担心失业率升高或给政府带来巨大的财政压力。


This unique feature of GCC labor markets enhances the region’s ability to adapt and adjust to fluctuating economic cycles.	GCC劳动力市场的这一独特特征加强了该地区适应经济周期波动并做出调整的能力。


Because GCC countries can afford to expand their workforces without running the risk that the share of their elderly population will increase over the long run, they enjoy constant young-to-old and consumer-to-producer “support ratios.”	由于GCC国家能够在不必担心老龄人口比例长期善生的情况下增加劳动力，因此能够获得恒定的年轻人-老年人和消费者-生产者“支持比”。


Moreover, public and private investment in the region – in infrastructure, education, health, and other services – has been geared toward the existing consumer base, inflated by the expat population.	此外，该地区公共和私人投资——包括基础设施、教育、卫生和其他服务——也是面向现有消费者基础，因为侨民而扩大。


Those inflows are now causing the GCC population to grow four times faster than in emerging markets and the United States, seven times faster than in China, and ten times faster than in the eurozone.	这些流入让GCC人口增长速度比新兴市场和美国快四倍，比中国快七倍，比欧元区快十倍。


This trend is expected to continue, with annual population growth in the GCC averaging 1.8% – twice the average for emerging markets.	这一趋势预计将持续，GCC年人口增长平均为1. 8%——两倍于新兴市场平均水平。


And, according to an IMF study, population growth in the Middle East and North Africa between 1970 and 2000 has raised the annual rate of growth of output per effective consumer by about 0.5-0.6 percentage points.	而据一项IMF研究，1970—2000年间中东和北非人口增长让每有效消费者产出年增长率增加了0. 5—0.


Larger consumer markets have sufficient economies of scale and diversity to make the introduction of new products and services into the region economically viable.	更大的消费者市场有足够的规模经济和多元化，使得在该地区引入新产品和服务在经济上可行。


They have the added benefit of generating what the economist Amar Bhidé calls venturesome consumption: demand-led entrepreneurship and innovation.	它们带来的好处是增加了经济学家艾马尔·拜德（Amar Bhidé）所谓的风险消费（venturesome consumption）：需求拉动的企业家精神和创新。


Economies of scale also allow the delivery of health, education, and other services, such as entertainment and leisure, at lower prices.	规模经济也使得卫生、教育和其他服务（如娱乐和休闲）能够以更低的价格实现。


And larger markets provide a greater incentive for investors and traders to enter, and for governments to provide new public goods.	而更大的市场为投资者和交易者提供了更大的进入激励，也给政府提供了更大的公共品供给激励。


If not for expat populations in rural and remote areas, there would have been little reason to invest in roads, schools, and hospitals – let alone parks, libraries, and theaters.	要不是农村和偏远地区的侨民人口，根本没有理由投资于道路、学校和医院——更不用说公园、图书馆和剧院了。


GCC countries have made such investments for the past four or five decades, and ongoing construction projects in the GCC are estimated to run in the trillions of dollars.	GCC国家在过去四五十年中进行了这些投资，而GCC在建项目价值据估计高达数万亿美元。


In education, enrollment in K-12 schools across the GCC rose from 2.7 million in 2003 to 10.7 million in 2012, a compound annual growth rate of 16.5%.	在教育方面，GCC国家K-12学校入学人数从2003年的270万增加到2012年的1,070万，年复合增长率为16.


Investment in this sector stands at around $150 billion.	5%。 该部门投资高达1,500亿美元.


In health care, total spending in the region is expected to increase to $133 billion per year by 2018.	。 在卫生方面，2018年地区总支出预计将增加到每年1,300亿美元。


The foreign population also provides a human-capital dividend to the local population, as talented expats introduce knowledge and innovation in sectors that the GCC wants to develop.	外国人口还给本地人口带来了人力资本红利，侨民人才为GCC想要发展的部门引入了知识和创新。


Research from MIT has shown that an increase in population size is an important driver of technological progress.	MIT的研究表明，人口规模的增加是技术进步的一个重要推动因素。


And studies in Japan indicate that higher population densities create stronger incentives for individuals to become entrepreneurs; a 10% increase in population density increases the share of people who wish to become entrepreneurs by approximately 1%.	日本的研究显示，提高人口密度能增加个人成为企业家的激励； 人口密度提高10%，想要成为企业家的人口比例就会提高大约1%。


The GCC’s expat dividend could grow much bigger – but only if governments in the region establish the necessary mechanisms.	GCC的侨民红利可以变得更大——但该地区的政府必须为此建设必要的机制。


Such mechanisms should be designed to maximize the benefits that foreign nationals provide.	这些机制的目的应该放在将外国人提供的好处最大化上。


Work-and-retire or invest-and-retire visas, for example, would encourage expats to save and accumulate pension funds – thereby enabling them to contribute even more significantly to the region’s rapid economic growth.	比如，工作-退休或投资-退休签证将鼓励侨民储蓄和积累退休金——从而使他们为该地区高速经济发展做出更大贡献。


Gunboat  Democracy?	炮舰下的民主


In one sense, Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were also weapons of mass distraction.	某种意义上，伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器也是大规模干扰性武器。


Without doubt, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair believed that Saddam Hussein either had, or had the wherewithal to produce, such weapons when they decided for pre-emptive war.	毫无疑问，乔治·W·布什总统和托尼·布莱尔首相确信萨达姆·侯赛因或者拥有、或者有钱制造这种武器，他们也因此决定要发动“先发制人”的战争。


In the case of Iraq, there was particular fear of chemical and biological weapons.	具体到伊拉克，他们尤其害怕化学和生物武器。


But WMD were not the only motive for war.	可大规模杀伤性武器不是战争的唯一动机。


Both leaders were outraged about a murderous dictator and hoped that toppling him would open the door for democracy in Iraq.	两位领导人都对杀人无数的独裁者感到愤慨，希望推翻他能打开伊拉克的民主之门。


This (they hoped) would automatically bring about a degree of stability that would help resolve other conflicts in the region, and also guarantee the uninterrupted flow of oil.	推翻萨达姆（至少他们曾经希望）会自然而然地带来某种程度的稳定，而稳定会有助于最终解决该地区的其它冲突，还能确保石油能够不受干扰地流动。


Mixed motives are not necessarily bad motives.	复杂的动机不一定就不好。


In fact, most human motives are mixed.	实际上，多数人类动机都非常复杂。


The real question is whether democracy could really have done the trick, and then, whether missiles and tanks are the right method to bring democracy to a country that has suffered dictatorial rule for a long period of time.	真正的问题在于民主是否真能达到目的，以及导弹和坦克是否真能把民主带到一个长期遭受独裁统治的国家。


Historical precedents played a part in the Iraq decision, not least because President Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, cited them often.	历史的先例在伊拉克问题的决策中起了很大作用，一个重要原因就是布什总统的国家安全顾问康多莉扎·赖斯不停地向人们灌输。


One example is Nazi Germany.	以纳粹德国为例。


To be sure, the Allies did not enter that war to bring democracy to Germany. In any case, Germany started the war.	可以肯定的是，盟国参战不是为了给德国民主，因为不管怎么说，战争都是德国挑起的。


The Allies defended those to whom they were bound by treaty, and then the integrity of their own countries.	盟国不过是保护了按条约规定应该保护的国家，还有它们自身的领土完整。


Perhaps the entry of the United States into the (European) war had something to do with the post-war order. But there were actually two views about that order.	也许美国参与（欧洲）战争与战后秩序有着某些联系，但人们对上述秩序有着两种不同的看法。


One was that Germany should be flattened and reduced to a pre-industrial society from which no effective aggression could ever emerge again.	一种观点是：应该把德国夷为平地，让它退回到工业社会以前的水平，这样它就再也无法发动大规模的战争。


The other was that Germany should be helped on the way to democracy.	另一种观点是：应该帮助德国走上民主之路。


As it happened, the protagonists of the first view were sidelined and the proponents of democratization prevailed.	后来，第一种观点的支持者被迫退出，而民主的支持者们取得了胜利。


Indeed, the US was effective in using its “soft power” to build democracy in post-war Germany, though Britain was better.	实际上，在利用“柔性力量”重建德国的战后民主时，美国是取得了一定的效果，但英国的成绩却更让人信服。


Democratic manners came more naturally to the British occupation forces.	英国占领军自然而然地采用了民主的行为方式。


The second example, the end of the Cold War in 1989, was also a success story.	第二个例子是1989年的冷战结束，这也可以算作是一个成功案例。


Of course, communism’s collapse was not the result of a pre-emptive strike by the West (though the arms race helped drive the system to implosion).	当然了，导致共产主义崩溃的不是西方所谓“先发制人”的战争(尽管军备竞赛在推动整个体系坍塌时起了一定的作用)。


After 1989, however, Western assistance, not least by the US and Britain, eased the transition to democracy, the rule of law, and market economies in most post-communist countries.	但1989年以后的西方援助，特别是美英两国的援助，降低了多数后共产主义国家向民主、法治和市场经济转型的难度。


So why does this not seem to work in Iraq?	那么为什么这些在伊拉克却不起作用？


Evidently, differences of culture and circumstances abound.	这显然是不同的文化和环境造成的。


Even so, why has so little come of the intention of the Iraq war’s leaders to give democracy a chance in that country?	即便如此，为什么伊拉克战争的领导人在那里实现民主的愿望几乎没取得什么成果？


One reason is that bringing democracy with missiles and tanks is almost a contradiction in terms.	原因之一是用导弹和坦克实现民主在基本意义上就互相矛盾。


Democracy is by definition a peaceful method of settling conflicts.	民主的定义是用和平的方式解决冲突。


Of course, the bombing of Dresden in 1945 was not exactly peaceful.	当然了，1945年轰炸德累斯顿也不是和平。


One must doubt whether it contributed anything to making democracy more acceptable after WWII.	人们肯定会质疑它对二战后民主的建立是否有什么益处。


Still, when the fighting was over, the bombing stopped for good, and out of the tanks came people who were intent on creating democratic conditions and capable of doing so.	但战争结束后，轰炸也永远停止了，从坦克里钻出来的人不仅抱着创造民主的决心，也拥有建设民主的能力。


There is much talk these days about “hard” and “soft power,” about America having one and Europe the other.	如今很多人都在谈论“硬性”和“软性”力量，说美国代表了其中一种，而欧洲则代表了另外一种。


In fact, the two belong together.	实际上，这两种力量是不可分割的。


Soft power without the backing of hard power changes little: witness Iran.	如果没有“硬性”力量作支撑，“软性”力量就起不了什么作用：看看伊朗的情况就知道了。


On the other hand, hard power without soft power means only destruction.	另一方面，如果没有软性力量的补充，硬性力量也只能意味着毁灭。


It is the greatest single weakness of the US forces that in 2004 – contrary to 1945 – they do not have the capacity to stop the bombing, get out of their tanks, and encourage indigenous democratic development from the bottom up.	2004年美国军队最致命的一个弱点是－我们没有能力停止轰炸、走出坦克、由下至上地推动当地的民主发展，这与1945年的情况形成了鲜明的对比。


Where such capacity exists, there would also be recognition of the fact that democracy does not mean the same institutions in all cultural contexts.	即便有了这种能力，我们也必须承认不是在所有的文化背景下，民主都拥有同样的内涵。


If there are elections in Iraq in January – and this is a very big “if” – they may not resolve much.	如果明年1月在伊拉克举行了选举－到现在为止选举能否举行还是个大大的问号－也不会真有什么实质性的帮助。


Involving the people and providing for peaceful conflict resolution may require institutions peculiar to the region and its history.	争取民众参与、和平解决冲突也许需要适应地区和历史特点的特殊制度。


It is a great shame that so many Europeans have steered clear of Iraq with a mixture of self-righteousness and anti-American Schadenfreude .	这么多欧洲人由于自以为是和对美国幸灾乐祸而远远地避开伊拉克，这真是一种莫大的耻辱。


Greater European input might have balanced the “hard power” of the US military machine with the “soft power” of Europe’s experience of diversity and of dealing with post-war situations.	如果欧洲能够更多地参与进来，他们就可以用“软性力量”来平衡美国军事机器的“硬性力量”，而这种软性力量来自他们的多样化及处理战后事务的丰富经验。


In fact, Europe’s failure is not just a shame, but a historic calamity.	实际上，欧洲袖手旁观不仅是一种耻辱，也是历史性的灾难。


Missiles and tanks alone cannot bring democracy, but coupled with the civil power of sensitive help for the defeated, democracy can be adapted to Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.	光有导弹和坦克不能带来和平，但如果再加上对战败者积极伸出援手的文明力量，就能在伊拉克和中东其它地区���现真正的民主。


Gross Domestic Wellbeing	国内幸福总值


LONDON – During a 2008 discussion of the global financial crisis at the London School of Economics, Queen Elizabeth II famously floored a room full of financial heavyweights by asking, “Why did no one see it coming?”	伦敦——在伦敦经济学院2008年一次针对全球金融危机的讨论中，英国女王伊丽莎白二世一句“为什么没人能预见这场灾难？ ”的提问难倒了满屋子的金融大鳄。


That question has been haunting economists ever since, as the recognition has slowly taken hold that, in the supposed “golden age” preceding the crisis, they were blind not only to the potential consequences of failure – but also to the true cost of “success.”	这个问题此后就一直困扰着经济学家，因为在危机爆发前那个所谓的 “黄金时代”，人们已经逐渐意识到我们不仅忽略了失败可能的后果、而且也忽略了“成功”真正的代价。


That period was, in many people’s view, tarnished by greed, with rapid GDP growth accompanied by increasing inequality of income and wellbeing.	在很多人看来贪婪为那个时代蒙上了阴影，在GDP快速增长的同时收入和幸福的差距却不断拉大。


Leaders in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States seem to understand this, as they call for a new, more comprehensive policy target to replace national output.	德国、法国、英国和美国的领导人似乎明白这一点，因为他们呼吁用新的更全面的政策目标来取代国内产值。


And such a target can be established.	我们的确能够设立这样的目标。


Indeed, a group of economists (including me) concluded in a report commissioned by the Legatum Institute that, despite its apparent subjectivity, “wellbeing” – or life satisfaction – can be measured robustly, compared internationally, and used to set policies and judge their success.	事实上，一群经济学家（包括我本人在内）在一份由列格坦研究所委托编制的报告中得出结论，尽管表面看去可能失于主观，实际我们却可以稳定地衡量“幸福感”——或对生活的满意程度，我们把衡量结果在国际上进行比较，并以此为依据来制定政策和判断是否成功。


The task for governments is to commit to putting this focus on wellbeing into practice.	把对幸福的目标付诸实施是各国政府的任务。


A few key insights should inform that process.	有几项关键见解应当成为追求幸福目标的前提和基础。


First, governments would be better served by focusing on stability, even if it means sacrificing some output.	首先，政府应当更加关注稳定，即使这样意味着要牺牲一些产出。


As Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have shown, financial crises are costly because recoveries from them are slow.	正如肯尼思·罗格夫和卡门·莱因哈特已经表明的那样，金融危机因为恢复缓慢而要付出昂贵的代价。


But wellbeing research yields a sharper insight: even if we could bounce back from a crash, the cost would be high.	但对幸福的研究能够让人更清晰地认识到：即便我们能从经济暴跌中复苏，也需要付出太过昂贵的代价。


Boom-and-bust destroy wellbeing, which is diminished far more by a fall in GDP than it is enhanced by an equal and opposite GDP increase.	周而复始的繁荣萧条循环摧毁了幸福感，GDP下降对幸福感的打击比同等的反向GDP增长要高得多。


Second, wellbeing – unlike GDP – is boosted more by increases in income among the poorer segments of the population than by increases among the wealthy.	其次，幸福感和GDP不一样，它更多由贫困而非富裕阶层的收入增长来推动。


That is why the richer European economies tend to have large automatic stabilizers built into their public finances.	这也解释了富裕的欧洲经济体为什么在公共财政领域往往自然而然就更加稳定。


However, the absence of redistributive mechanisms across countries within the eurozone clearly exacerbated the tensions during the recent crisis.	但欧洲区国家缺乏再分配机制显然加剧了最近这次危机所造成的紧张。


Third, the implementation of a wellbeing metric to guide policies would have the most rapid – and radical – effect at the national level.	第三，采用幸福指数来指导政策可能会在国家层面产生最快速——也最彻底的效果。


As a measure of policy success, GDP is particularly poorly suited to countries with large public sectors.	以GDP为政策成就的衡量标准对有着大型公共部门的国家效果尤其糟糕。


The crude output measures that are used, such as the number of medical procedures carried out or the number of fires extinguished, miss a crucial point: while responding to the need for such services is a good thing, reducing the need for them would be better.	GDP所采用的履行医疗程序或扑灭火灾数量等粗放的产出标准并未考虑到一个关键因素：虽然响应需求提供服务本身是件好事，但最好是能控制对于此类服务的需求。


And more efficient health services might spend less on hospitals and doctors and more on encouraging healthy lifestyles.	更为有效的医疗服务等原始产出标准可能会减少花在医院和医生身上的经费，而更注重鼓励健康的生活方式。


Societies would be better served by a policy focus on factors that have been shown to be critical to life satisfaction: relationships, community, security, and physical and mental health.	注重人际关系、社会因素、安全状况和身心健康等生活满意度关键要素的政策对于社会的作用更直接有效。


For example, while mental health is a key determinant of how people feel about their lives, it remains a low priority in most countries.	比方说，虽然心理健康是人们看待生活的关键决定要素，但多数国家对它的重视程度不高。


In the US, there were more suicides than road deaths last year, and there are three times more suicides than road deaths in Germany and the UK.	美国去年自杀的人数超过交通事故的死亡人数，而英国和德国的自杀人数是交通事故死亡人数的3倍还多。


In the UK, the vast majority of people diagnosed with mental illness go untreated, at a huge cost not only in wellbeing, but also in disability benefits and lost earning power.	英国绝大多数经过诊断的精神病患者都不接受治疗，这不仅摧毁了幸福感，而且要以支出大笔残疾补贴和损失赚钱能力为代价。


Targeted policies aimed at raising awareness of mental-health issues and improving access to treatment would help to kick-start a recovery in wellbeing.	旨在提高对精神卫生问题的认识和改进治疗状况的针对性政策会帮助人们找回失去的幸福。


Of course, specific priorities vary by country.	当然，具体的重点因国家而异。


For example, in aging societies, loneliness and long-term health become particularly important.	比方说，在老龄化国家，孤独和长期医疗的重要性就显得尤为突出。


The fourth key insight is that indicators of wellbeing interact.	第四项关键认识是幸福感的各项指标相互影响。


Volunteering does not only enhance the lives of those who are served; it also boosts the life satisfaction of the volunteers.	志愿服务不仅提升被服务者的生活质量； 对志愿者的生活满意度也有所提高。


Likewise, given that unemployment diminishes both wellbeing and national income, effective back-to-work policies score two goals, as do policies aimed at augmenting citizens’ life skills through improved parenting and education.	同样，鉴于失业同时影响幸福感和国民收入，有效的返岗政策和旨在改善民众育儿及教育能力的政策同样能够做到一箭双雕。


This has positive implications for funding wellbeing-enhancing programs.	这对资助幸福���提升计划将产生积极的影响。


After all, the goal is not to inflate budgets, but to reallocate resources in ways that will ultimately boost citizens’ satisfaction and prosperity.	毕竟我们的目标不是夸大预算，而是重新分配资源以期最终提高民众的满意度和物质繁荣。


Finally, reliable data will be critical to guiding efforts and evaluating progress.	最后，指导努力和评估进展需要可靠的数据支撑。


Fortunately, most developed countries – and an increasing number of developing countries – recognize the importance of collecting data on wellbeing.	幸运的是，多数发达国家和越来越多的发展中国家已经意识到搜集幸福数据的重要性。


Add to that the parameters for measurement set by the OECD, and international comparisons of wellbeing become possible.	如果再加上由经合组织制定的衡量标准，在国际上比较幸福感已经成为可能。


The world is ready for a new, comprehensive metric for national and global progress and prosperity, one that tells us whether people really are better off – and how to ensure that they are.	世界已经准备迎接新的、全面的国家和全球繁荣进步衡量标准，它能告诉我们人们是否真的过得更好——以及如何确保实现这一目标。


Hacking for Humanity	为人类而黑客


CAMBRIDGE – “Life,” Oscar Wilde famously said, “imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life.”	美国剑桥—“生活，”奥斯卡·王尔德（Oscar Wilde）有句名言，“模仿艺术远多于艺术模仿生活。


In the case of Sony Pictures’ movie The Interview, the world found itself confronted with a further iteration: life imitating art imitating life.	”在索尼影业（Sony Pictures）电影《采访》的例子中，世界面临着更深一步的迭代：生活模仿模仿生活的艺术。


The movie’s release sparked international intrigue, drama, and shadowy geopolitical power struggles.	本片的发行激起了国际阴谋、戏剧和影子地缘政治力量的明争暗斗。


It even prompted a grave US Presidential address – all for a simple case of hacking.	它甚至惊动美国总统放出重话——而所有这些都源于一次简单的黑客行为。


Hacking into information systems is nothing new; it goes hand in hand with the emergence of telecommunications.	入侵信息系统不是什么新鲜事，从通讯业出现的那一天起，黑客便已应运而生。


One of the first attacks struck Guglielmo Marconi’s demonstration of radio transmission in 1903, when he communicated from Cornwall to London, 300 miles away.	最早的袭击之一发生在1903年马可尼展示其无线电传输时。 当时，他要实现康沃尔（Cornwall）和300英里外的伦敦之间的通讯。


Nevil Maskelyne, a music-hall magician and would-be wireless tycoon, who had been frustrated by the Italian inventor’s patents, managed to take control of the system and broadcast obscene messages to the Royal Institution’s scandalized audience.	一位名叫内维尔·马斯基林（Nevil Maskelyne）的魔术师和未来无线电大亨因为不满于马可尼的专利，设法控制了他的系统，向此次通讯的皇家学院听众们播送了淫秽内容，令他们大为震惊。


Though hacking is as old as wireless itself, much has changed since Marconi’s time.	尽管黑客行为与无线通讯一样古老，但此马可尼的时代以来，发生了巨大的变化。


Information networks now blanket our planet, collecting and transferring immense amounts of data in real time.	如今，信息网络遍布整个地球，连接和传输数量巨大的实时数据。


They enable many familiar activities: instantaneous communications, social media, financial transactions, and logistics management.	它们让许多我们所熟悉的行为成为可能：即时通讯、社交媒体、金融交易和物流管理等。


Most important, information is no longer sequestered in a virtual realm, but permeates the environment in which we live.	最重要的是，信息不在局限于虚拟领域，而是渗透到我们的生活环境的每一个角落。


The physical, biological, and digital worlds have begun to converge – giving rise to what scientists refer to as “cyber-physical systems.”	物理、生物和数字世界已开始趋同——掀起了科学家称之为“网络-物理系统”（cyber-physical systems）的时代。


Automobiles, for example, have evolved from straightforward mechanical systems into veritable computers on wheels.	比如，汽车已经从完全的机械系统转变为名副其实的轮子上的电脑。


The same thing is happening to other consumer goods: We now have connected washing machines and learning thermostats, not to mention Bluetooth toothbrushes and computerized infant scales.	其他消费品也在发生同样的事情：如今我们将洗衣机和恒温器连接在一起，更不用说蓝牙牙刷和计算机化的婴儿称了。


Indeed, cyber-physical systems range from the macro level (think urban transport, like Uber) to the micro (say, the beating of a human heart).	事实上，网络-物理系统涵盖了宏观层面（想一想城市交通，比��Uber）和微观层面（比如人类心脏的跳动）。


Our very bodies, strapped with connected wearables, are today imbued with more computing power than all of NASA at the time of the Apollo missions.	如今，我们的身体——绑上各种联网的可穿戴设备——所具备的计算能力比阿波罗任务时期的整个美国宇航局（NASA）所拥有的计算能力还要强大。


All of this promises to revolutionize many aspects of human life – mobility, energy management, health care, and much more – and may point toward a greener and more efficient future.	所有这些意味着人类生活的诸多方面可能会迎来革命——比如移动性、能源管理、医疗，等等——并且走向更绿色、更高效的未来。


But cyber-physical systems also heighten our vulnerabilities to malicious hacking, an issue that is being discussed at the World Economic Forum in Davos.	但网络-物理系统也凸显出我们对恶意黑客行为的束手无策。 达沃斯世界经济论坛讨论了这一问题。


Far from being isolated in cyberspace, attacks can now have devastating consequences in the physical world.	如今，黑客攻击的影响绝不完全局限于网络空间，它们可以在物理世界中制造灾难性后果。


It is an annoyance when a software virus crashes our computers; but what if the virus crashes our cars?	软件病毒让我们的电脑崩溃着实令人恼怒； 但若病毒可以让我们撞车呢？


Malicious hackers are difficult to combat with traditional government and industry tools – the Sony Pictures case being a telling example.	恶意黑客难以用传统政府和行业工具与之斗争——索尼影业的案例就是很好的例子。


Hacking can be carried out anywhere and everywhere, potentially involving multiple networks in obscure locations.	黑客行为可以在任何地方实施，事实上包括隐藏很深的多个网络。


It defies conventional retaliation and protection strategies.	它能对抗传统反击和保护战略。


As then-US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned in 2012, given its current systems, the United States is vulnerable to a “cyber Pearl Harbor” that could derail trains, poison water supplies, and cripple power grids.	时任美国国防部长帕内塔（Leon Panetta）在2012年警告说，从当前系统看，美国难以防范能够颠覆火车、投毒于供水系统和破坏电网的“网络哈利·波特”。


So, how can such a scenario be prevented?	那么，如何防止这一情景发生？


One option, surprisingly, could be to promote widespread adoption of hacking itself.	意外的是，一个选择是推进黑客行为本身的广泛使用。


Familiarity with hackers’ tools and methods provides a powerful advantage in diagnosing the strength of existing systems, and even in designing tighter security from the bottom up – a practice known as “white hat” hacking.	熟悉黑客工具和方法能够有力地推进对现有系统强度的诊断，甚至可以推进自上而下的更严密的安全——这种做法被称为“白帽黑客”。


Ethical infiltration enables a security team to render digital networks more resistant to attack by identifying the flaws.	合乎道德的渗透可以让安全团队通过识别漏洞打造更难侵入的数字网络。


This may become routine practice – a kind of cyber fire drill – for governments and businesses, even as academic and industry research focuses in the coming years on the development of further technical safeguards.	这也许可以成为常规行为——一种网络消防演习——政府和企业都可以操作，即使未来几年中学术和产业研究的焦点集中在进一步的技术防卫的开放上。


In general, today’s defenses take the form of autonomous, constantly vigilant digital “supervisors” – computers and code that control other computers and code.	总体而言，今天的防卫手段采取了不断自动警惕的数字“监督者”的形式——控制其他计算机和代码的计算机和代码。


Similar to traditional military command-and-control protocols, they gain power in numbers and can quickly react to a broad array of attacks.	类似于传统的军事命令和控制（command-and-control）协议，它们以量取胜，可以快速响应各种攻击。


Such a digital ecosystem strengthens checks and balances, reducing the possibility of failure and mitigating the effects of an incursion.	这一数字生态系统强化了制衡，降低了失败可能性，并减小入侵的影响。


In such a future scenario, a Hollywood blockbuster might be about networks of computers fighting each other, while humans stand by.	在这一未来情境中，好莱坞大片也许会刻画计算机网络之间的互相战斗，而人类在一旁待命。


It would portray the broader idea of “singularity,” a hypothetical turning point when the artificial surpasses the human.	它将描绘更广义的“奇点”思想，即一个假设的人工智能超越人类的转折点。


Fortunately, in this case, life is still far from imitating art.	幸运的是，果真如此的话，生活仍然远不止于模仿艺术。


Hail to the Technocrats	拥抱技术官僚


COPENHAGEN – Is the European Union’s supposed “democratic deficit” now spreading to individual European countries in the wake of the sovereign-debt crisis?	发自哥本哈根——假设中的欧盟“民主赤字”问题是否正借主权债务危机之机向各成员国扩散？


The rise of unelected technocrats to political power in Greece and Italy suggests, at least superficially, that the old taboo against technocratic governments pursuing an EU-dictated agenda has been shattered.	至少在表面上，希腊和意大利国内非民选技术官僚在政治上的日益崛起已经暗示着：那条多年以来的禁忌——不能让技术官僚政府在政治议程上唯欧盟马首是瞻——已经被打破了。


Consider Italy. Most Italians breathed a collective sigh of relief that three-time Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is being replaced by a technocrat par excellence, former European Commissioner Mario Monti, a respected economist.	在意大利，曾三度担任总理的希尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼终于被一位出色的技术官僚，前欧盟委员会委员，著名经济学家马里奥·蒙蒂所取代，这让所有意大利人都松了一口气。


Greece, too, is turning over the reigns of government to an unelected, and supposedly apolitical, technocrat, Lucas Papademos, a former vice president of the European Central Bank.	而希腊在经历了前任政府辞职之后也转向了卢卡斯·巴帕德莫斯——这也是一位非民选，据说对政治也不太热心的技术官僚，曾任欧洲央行副行长。


Of course, there are many things wrong with the EU nowadays, but a widening of its so-called “democratic deficit” is not one of them.	当前的欧盟无疑存在诸多问题，但所谓“民主赤字”的日益扩散并不包括在内。


Indeed, that perceived deficit is something of a politically convenient canard.	这一赤字观念只不过是某种容易被政治借用的有意误导。


Scholars such as Princeton University’s Andrew Moravcsik have long argued that the EU’s legitimacy comes not from the ballot box, but from its ability to provide concrete benefits to citizens.	其实包括普林斯顿大学政治学教授安德鲁·莫拉夫契克（Andrew Moravcsik）在内的学者都一直强调，欧盟的合法性并非来自选举，而是源自其为欧洲人民传递切实利益的能力。


What the EU achieves through integrating markets – or even eliminating passport controls – underscores the benefits of its “delegated democracy.”	而欧盟通过统一市场——甚至取消护照管制——所取得的成就也突出了这种“委托民主”的优点。


Indeed, it is precisely the Eurocrats’ detachment from everyday politics that has enabled the EU to deliver.	事实上，正是欧盟官员与日常政治的脱节才使欧盟得以提供上述好处。


Contrary to the ranting of Euroskeptic politicians in Britain and, increasingly, in eurozone member countries, the growing disenchantment of voters with politics reflects the distance that has grown between promises and results, not the distance between EU officials and member states’ citizens.	与那些英国（和不断增加的其他欧盟成员国内部）政治家的欧盟怀疑论恰恰相反，选民政治意识的日益觉醒反映的是承诺与结果之间的落差，而非欧盟官员与成员国人民之间的鸿沟。


According to an alarming poll published recently by the leading Italian newspaper La Repubblica, more than 22% of Italians find no great differences between an authoritarian and a democratic system of government.	对此意大利主要报章《共和报》（La Repubblica）最近发布的一份民意调查则相当具有警示意义：有超过22%的意大利人认为独裁政权与民主政府没什么区别。


Another 10% believe that an authoritarian regime is better and more effective than a democratic political system.	而另外10%的人甚至认为独裁政权比民主政治系统更好也更有效率。


This disturbing decline of faith in democracy, which is not confined to Italy, brings us back to the powerful rationale underlying Europeans’ growing reliance on technocratic governance: security.	这种让人忧心的民主信念衰减迫使我们重新审视欧洲各国日益依赖技术官僚的背后逻辑：安全。


From the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union, what brought Europeans closer together was not the dream of a Europe-wide, democratic polity, but, above all, their desire to be safe and secure.	从二战结束至苏联解体，促使欧洲各国日益团结的动力不是扩大欧洲版图的梦想，也不是民主国家的理想，而是压倒一切的安全和防卫需要。


Throughout the post-war years, the narrative of European integration almost always focused on the quest for political, social, and economic security.	在战后这些年里，欧洲的整个整合过程几乎都是以政治，社会和经济安全为最终着眼点。


With violent demonstrations in the streets of Athens, Madrid, and Rome, it is not hard to understand why some people may once again choose to give priority to their security, particularly their economic security.	随着雅典、马德里和罗马街头暴力示威运动的增多，我们也不难理解为何有些人会再度优先考虑自己安全问题——特别是经济安全。


Europe’s technocrats worked in the service of security ahead of the EU’s enlargement in 2004 to the former communist states of Central Europe.	早在2004年欧盟扩大之前，其内部技术官僚就已经在为中欧前社会主义国家的安全问题出谋划策了。


The EU’s bureaucracy played a key part in helping those countries to navigate the complex transition from socialist autocracy to capitalist democracy.	在协助这些国家从社会主义独裁向资本主义民主制度转型的复杂过程中，欧盟机构扮演了重要的角色。


At the time, few people acknowledged this, because Eurocrats rarely make headlines.	但那个时候很少人认识到这一点，所以这些技术官员也无缘报章头条。


But their success in applying technical standards to countries seeking EU membership earned them huge legitimacy.	但这些官员在向欧盟成员资格申请国执行技术准入条件方面所取得的成功则为他们赢得了巨大的合法性。


The unwritten rule in Europe seems to be that, the more depoliticized the process, the more legitimacy technocrats can earn.	欧洲似乎有这么一条不成文的规则，过程越是去政治化，技术官僚越能获得合法性。


Conversely, whenever politics gets in the way of a decision, bureaucrats lose credibility.	相反，一旦决策参杂了政治因素，官僚都会失去信誉。


One objection to delegating political authority to technocrats is that such appointments amount to a humiliating constraint on sovereignty.	反对向技术官僚授予政治权力的其中一个理由就是此举对各国主权造成了一种堪比侮辱的限制。


In normal times, that is unacceptable to most citizens. But in times of crisis, the voice of the neutral technocrat gains greater legitimacy.	平时大部分欧盟成员国公民都无法接受这一点，但在危机时刻，技术官员的中立声音则获得了更多的合法性


Monti, for example, was among the first to sound the alarm about Italy’s dire finances.	例如，蒙蒂是首先对意大利财政危机发出警告的人之一。


But, attesting to the technocrat’s neutrality, back in August he also warned about the implications of demands by non-elected international institutions (in this case, the European Central Bank) for particular policies in exchange for support of Italian bonds in international markets.	但出于技术官僚的中立性，在8月的时候他也针对非选举产生的国际组织（这里指欧洲央行）要求意大利实施特殊政策来��取支持其国债的后果发出过相关警告。


Monti called this podestà forestiero, something of a foreign overlordship based in Brussels, Washington, and Frankfurt, as well as Berlin and Paris.	蒙蒂把这种做法称为podestà forestiero（意为“从外地来上任的市长”），也是就以布鲁塞尔，华盛顿，法兰克福，柏林和巴黎为核心的外国压迫。


The EU is a voluntary pooling of national sovereignty, but the demands now being made of Italy (and Greece) are the Diktat of other sovereign nations.	欧盟是主权国家的自愿联合，但如今它对意大利（和希腊）所提出的要求却是来自其他主权国家的强制命令。


A national-unity government run by a technocrat in place of an administration run by elected politicians does not qualitatively change the fact that outsiders are demanding reforms.	用技术官僚主导的国内联合政府取代由民选政治家主导的政府并不能从根本上改变国外要求意大利实施改革的事实。


But voters in a time of crisis may be wiser than most politicians: for the past two decades, Italy’s most popular statesman has consistently been Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, a former central banker called in to run an emergency interim government in the mid-1990’s.	不过在危急时刻选民或许比政治家更精明：在过去20年里，90年代中期受托掌管意大利紧急过渡政府的前意大利央行行长卡洛·阿泽利奥·钱皮一直是意大利最受欢迎的政治家。


Of course, a technocratic government is an anomaly to the extent that it constitutes a damning verdict on the performance of a country’s entire political class.	当然，技术官僚政府本身是一个反常的产物，因为它的出现在某种程度上等于全盘否定了一个国家整个政治阶层的作为。


But voters in the battered lands of the eurozone seem to have reached their own damning conclusions about their elected leaders months ago.	但欧元区这块动荡之地上的选民们似乎早在几个月前已经对他们的民选领导下了全盘否定的结论。


Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, wrote that “a leader is best when people barely know he exists.”	道教创始人老子曾提出”无为而治”的观点。


With Europe’s crisis-stricken governments increasingly turning to unelected technocrats, one can almost see citizens nodding in agreement.	而随着深受债务危机冲击的欧洲各国政府日益转向非民选技术官僚，人们会发现欧洲人也认同这一选择。


Hair of the Top Dog	大人物的发型


NEW YORK – Much has been written about Donald Trump’s peculiar hairstyle, the kind of puffy, dyed comb-over one would associate with a downmarket nightclub manager rather than a presidential candidate.	纽约——唐纳德·特朗普的独特发型引起了人们的热烈争论，那种染过色的用来遮盖秃顶的蓬松侧分发更像是一位低端夜总会经理，而不是一位总统候选人。


Is there really any more to be said?	谈论这个问题是否真有意义？


Actually, the question of hair in politics might not be as trivial as it seems.	事实上，政治领域的发型问题或许并不像看上去那样微不足道。


It is remarkable how many politicians, especially on the populist right, have sported heterodox hairdos.	值得注意的是有多少政治家，尤其是民粹主义右翼政治家，一直坚定地支持异端发型。


Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s former prime minister, used black pencil to fill in the patches not covered by his two hair transplants.	意大利前总理西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼用黑铅笔来填满两片移植发中间的空余地带。


The Dutch demagogue Geert Wilders dyes his Mozartian bouffant platinum blond.	荷兰煽动者威尔德斯将莫扎特式的蓬松头发染成淡银灰色。


Boris Johnson, the Brexit rabble-rouser, now UK foreign secretary, takes care to keep his straw-colored thatch in a permanent state of studied untidiness.	煽动英国退欧的鲍里斯·约翰逊现在当选英国外交大臣，他总是小心翼翼地将稻草色的头发永久保持在非常讲究的邋遢状态。


All have scored highly with voters filled with anger and resentment at polished urban elites.	这些政治家都得到了对优雅的城市精英充满愤怒和怨恨的选民们的喜爱。


Then there was the father of modern European populism, the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, who had no hair at all.	然后是现代欧洲民粹主义之父，已故的荷兰政治家皮姆·福图纳的秃头。


But his shiny, clean-shaven pate stood out as much among the neat gray coiffures of mainstream politicians as Johnson’s blond mop or Trump’s gilded comb-over (all these men, except Berlusconi, are blonds, by the way, or fake blonds; dark hair doesn’t seem to work so well with the populist mob).	但他刮得干干净净的发亮的秃顶就像主流政治家约翰逊的金色拖把头或特朗普精心修饰的侧分头一样引人注目（顺便提一句，除贝卢斯科尼外，这些人都是金发，或者染成金发； 深色头发似乎与民粹主义暴徒不那么相配）。


Standing out is of course the point.	这些人最主要的目的当然是吸引眼球。


The strange hair, or shaven head, makes the popular leader instantly recognizable.	奇怪的发型或光头能让人一眼认出民粹主义领袖。


This type of branding is common among dictators.	此类标志性打扮在独裁者中十分常见。


Hitler’s visual image could be reduced to a greasy cowlick and a toothbrush moustache.	希特勒的视觉形象可以抽象为油腻腻的卷发和牙刷般的一字胡。


The oddest-looking of all contemporary dictators must be North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, whose clean-shaven back and sides are cultivated as a deliberate imitation of his grandfather’s 1930s proletarian hairstyle.	现代独裁者中发型最奇怪的莫过于朝鲜的金正恩，他刮得光溜溜的侧面和背面有意模仿20世纪30年代他祖父的无产阶级发型。


His father, Kim Jong-il, tried – albeit with little success – to emulate Elvis Presley’s pompadour.	金正恩的父亲金正日曾试图模仿埃尔维斯·普雷斯利的蓬巴杜式背头，但他采用那种发型却不怎么成功。


But self-parody sometimes works in democracies too.	但自嘲有时在民主国家也能发挥作用。


Winston Churchill, who in many ways is Johnson’s model, always made sure to carry a big cigar, even when he had no intention of smoking it.	温斯顿·丘吉尔在诸多方面是约翰逊的榜样，即使在他不想抽烟的时候，也永远不忘叼着一根雪茄。


There was not much he could do about his sparse hair, but he certainly dressed differently than anyone else.	他稀疏的头发做不出什么花样，但他的穿着打扮肯定与众不同。


No other British politician, even during the war, wore the kind of zipped-up boilersuit Churchill adopted.	即使在战时，也没有其他英国政治家穿着丘吉尔那样带拉链的连衫裤工作服。


Studied nonchalance, or cultivated eccentricity, was a sign of the typical aristocrat who felt no need to conform to the boring standards of middle-class correctness.	精心设计的漠然、或故意显露的古怪，标志着典型的贵族阶级有意打破中产阶级沉闷的正确标准。


Churchill understood something that many mainstream politicians miss.	丘吉尔深谙许多主流政治家所无法理解的精髓。


The way to the masses’ hearts is not to pretend that you are just like them.	抓住人心的方法不是假装你是他们中的一份子。


On the contrary, if you are from the upper class, you lay it on thick, you turn yourself into a caricature of the higher born, like the old-fashioned aristocrat who despises the timid bourgeois, but gets on fine with his gamekeeper.	恰恰相反，如果你来自上层、造型古怪、把自己变成一幅上层人物的讽刺画，就像老式贵族藐视胆小的资产阶级，但却能与猎场看守人和谐地相处。


Johnson is not an aristocrat, but he went to Eton and can easily pose as one, a skill he uses to great effect.	约翰逊不是一名贵族，但他曾就读于伊顿公学并因此可以轻易假装贵族的样子，他利用这种能力取得了很好的效果。


The US does not have a formal aristocracy.	美国不存在正式的贵族阶级。


Status is more a question of money.	钱的多少决定了地位。


One of the secrets of Trump's popularity is that he flaunts his supposed great wealth.	特朗普受欢迎的秘诀在于他炫耀自己所谓的巨大财富。


He even exaggerates it, if necessary.	他甚至在必要的时候不惜加以吹嘘。


The absurd golden chairs in his pastiche Louis XIV homes are a coarse imitation of aristocratic style.	他仿路易十四豪宅里那把荒谬的金椅子无非是粗俗地模仿贵族的风格。


Fortuyn, on a more modest Dutch scale, and Berlusconi, on a more grandiose Italian stage, had similar tastes.	相对低调的荷兰式福图纳和更加高调的意大利式贝卢斯科尼品味非常类似。


People for whom this is the stuff of dreams admired them for it.	以物质为梦想的人们因此对他们倍加崇敬。


Affirming the dreams of people who have little is the key to successful populism.	肯定小人物的梦想是民粹主义成功的关键。


The main thing is that these politicians are not like the dull and moderate mainstream.	最主要的是这些政客与沉闷温和的主流有很大差别。


Even insiders have to pose as outsiders, who can stand with the common man against the political establishment.	就连圈内人都必须以圈外人的形象出现，与普通人一道对抗现行的政治体制。


Weirdness – peculiar upper-class mannerisms, ostentatious living, outrageous jokes, deliberate crassness, and mad hairstyles – is an asset.	怪异的举止——奇特的上流社会习性、财大气粗的生活、离谱的笑话、故意表现出的粗鲁和疯狂的发型——都能在政治上加分。


I am not sure that people, who rightly see Trump as a great danger to the US and the world, sufficiently appreciate this.	我不知道将特朗普看���美国和世界重大威胁的民众是否对此有充分的理解。


Much has been made of the reasonable and moderate tone of the Democratic National Convention, compared to the “dark,” snarling bombast of the Republicans’ event.	与共和党大会“黑暗”、扭曲的夸夸其谈相比，民主党全国大会以稳健、理性的基调取得了很大的成功。


President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and Hillary Clinton herself were paragons of dignity, compared to Trump’s Mussolini-like mannerisms and verbal aggression.	总统巴拉克·奥巴马、副总统乔·拜登和希拉里·克林顿本人都是尊严的典范，与特朗普墨索里尼似的举止和言语攻击有着很大的不同。


Clinton supporters, at the convention and elsewhere, tend to attack Trump with ridicule, the method once used by Voltaire against the dogmas of the Catholic Church.	克林顿的支持者，无论是在会场还是其他地方，往往以嘲讽的姿态攻击特朗普，伏尔泰曾经用这种方法来对抗天主教会的教条。


Ridicule can be an effective weapon.	嘲笑可以成为一种有力的武器。


In the 1920s, journalists like H.L. Mencken made Christian fundamentalists in the US look so foolish that they dropped out of politics for several generations.	20世纪20年代，像H·L·门肯这样的记者让美国基督教原教旨主义者看上去如此愚蠢，以至于在长达几代人的时期内基督教势力都在政界消失得无影无踪。


Trump’s mad and offensive braggadocio, his vulgar tastes, and his extraordinary looks are all eminently ripe for satire.	特朗普疯狂和富于侵略性的夸夸其谈、他的庸俗趣味和异乎寻常的外表都非常适合作为讽刺的对象。


Comedians like Jon Stewart have had merciless fun at his expense.	乔恩·斯图尔特等喜剧演员都对其进行过毫不留情的嘲笑。


But satire and ridicule will not work to persuade people who love Trump precisely because of his weirdness.	但讽刺和嘲笑对那些恰恰因为其怪异才喜爱特朗普的人不会产生作用。


It sets him apart from the establishment they despise.	怪异让他在人们鄙视的体制面前显得特立独行。


Charisma does not call for restraint in words, appearance, or manner.	魅力并不要求在语言、外表或行为举止方面有任何约束。


The weirder he gets, the more his supporters like him.	他越是与众不同，支持者就越喜欢他。


And the more that clever comedians in New York mock him, the more his fans will rally to his side.	纽约那位聪明的喜剧演员越是嘲笑他，他的粉丝就越会向他的身边集中。


This is the great perversity in our age of angry populism.	这是我们这个愤怒的民粹主义时代伟大的堕落。


Reasonable arguments and political optimism can now be turned into negative qualities, the typical marks of a complacent elite, oblivious to the concerns of people who feel that the joke has been on them.	理性争论和政治乐观现在可以被视为消极品质，成为自满精英的典型标签，不会引起自认为是被嘲笑对象的民众的关注。


Reasonable argument did not work to convince 51.9% of British voters to remain part of the EU.	理性辩论并没有让51. 9%的英国选民投票留在欧盟。


It may not work to keep an ignorant and dangerous buffoon – silly hairstyle and all – from becoming President of the US.	它同样可能无法阻止一个无知而且危险的小丑——梳着愚蠢的发型和其他一切的一切——成为美国总统。


Haiti and the Limits of Generosity	海地，以及慷慨的局限性


MELBOURNE – All over the world, people have responded generously to the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti.	发自墨尔本 —— 在世界各地，人们都对那场袭击海地的地震作出了慷慨的回应。


In just three days, more than a million Americans had donated $10 with the aid of text messages from their cellphones.	在三天之内就有超过 100 万美国人透过手机短信的方式每人捐出了 10 美元。


People with very little themselves, like Maria Pacheco, an unemployed single mother from Chicago, donated food and clothes.	即便是那些囊中羞涩的人们，比如玛丽亚·帕切克，一位来自芝加哥的失业单身母亲，也捐出了食品和衣物。


Others did whatever they could – from pedicures to washing cars – to raise money.	其他人也用尽一切方式 —— 不管是修指甲还是洗车 —— 来筹集善款。


On current indications, the amount Americans will give to relief efforts in Haiti could surpass the $1.9 billion they gave to assist victims of the 2004 Asian tsunami, which until now has stood as a record for donations to a disaster outside the United States.	根据最近所得到的数字，美国人对海地地震的捐助金额将超过其在 2004 年南亚海啸时援助受难者的 19 亿美元，而这 19 亿美元一直以来都是美国捐助国外灾害的一个纪录。


Given that the US is undergoing economic hard times, the size of the response has surprised many.	考虑到美国现在依然处于经济困局之中，这一回应的规模令许多人都感到吃惊。


Haiti ’s proximity, plus the fact that close to a million Haitians live in the US, goes some way towards explaining why Americans have responded so generously.	海地与美国在地缘上的亲近，加上有近 100 万海地人居住在美国的事实可以在某种程度上解释为什么美国人会如此慷慨。


But the response has been worldwide.	但这种回应也是世界性的。


In Melbourne for the Australian Open, Roger Federer, Serena Williams, and other stars held an exhibition match that led to donations of $600,000.	在墨尔本的澳大利亚网球公开赛赛场上，罗杰·费德勒，塞蕾娜·威廉姆斯等球星共同组织了一场表演赛，筹得了 60 万美元。


In Rwanda, a group of community health workers making less than $200 a month raised $7,000 for Haiti.	在卢旺达，一群每月只有不到 200 美元薪水的社区卫生工作者也贡献了 7000 美元。


All of this raises many questions about how we respond – and how we should respond – to such tragedies.	所有这一切都对我们如何回应 —— 以及应当如何回应 —— 这些灾难提出了许多问题。


The earthquake killed up to 200,000 people. Terrible as that is, it is fewer than the number of children who, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, die every 10 days from avoidable, poverty-related causes.	有 20 万人在这场地震中丧生，而即便伤亡如此重大，这个数字依然比联合国儿童基金会（ UNICEF ）统计的每 10 天中死于可以避免的，与贫困有关的儿童数量要少。


Moreover, as Elie Hassenfeld has argued on GiveWell.net, there are good grounds for thinking that disaster relief is less cost-effective than aid aimed at saving the lives of those who are risk from extreme poverty.	此外，正如埃丽尔·哈森菲尔德在网站 GiveWell. com 所指出的那样，有理由相信灾害救助要比旨在从极端贫困中拯救生命的援助行为的费效比更低。


Why do people give generously to earthquake victims, but not to prevent the much larger number of deaths brought about by extreme poverty, insufficient food, unsafe water, lack of sanitation, and the absence of even the most basic health care?	那么为什么人们会对地震受灾者慷慨解囊，却不去防止那些因为极端贫困，食物不足，不洁饮水，卫生设施不足以及缺乏最基本的医疗而导致的更大规模的死亡？


Media saturation obviously makes a critical difference.	很明显，媒体报道的饱和度导致了一个关键区别的形成。


Scenes from Hurricane Katrina, the Asian tsunami, and now the Haitian earthquake were shown over and over again on all television news broadcasts.	卡特里娜飓风，南亚海啸以及如今海地地震的画面不断在各电视台的新闻中反复播放。


An earthquake in a remote part of Pakistan that killed 80,000 people received relatively little television coverage, and a much less generous response.	而一场发生在巴基斯坦偏远地区，导致 8 万人丧生的地震获得的电视报道相对更少，得到的慷慨回应也更少。


The daily deaths of children in poor countries from diarrhea, measles, and malaria are part of the background of the world we live in, and so are not news at all.	而每天因为痢疾，麻疹和疟疾而丧生的贫穷国家儿童数量已经成为我们这个世界一道司空见惯的背景，一点新闻价值都没有。


Suppose that a million children all in one place seemed likely to be swept away and drowned by approaching floodwaters. The media coverage would be enormous.	试想有 100 万儿童正被困在一个将被洪水侵袭并淹没的地方，对此的新闻报道将铺天盖地。


Now imagine the jubilation if they were saved!	试想这 100 万儿童得救后的场景！


And imagine the acclaim for the heroes who had saved so many children.	再想象群众为那些拯救了这些儿童的英雄而欢呼的场面。


Yet when UNICEF announced, in September of last year, that the number of children dying each year from poverty-related causes had dropped by one million, as compared to two years earlier, the story got very little media attention.	而虽然联合国儿童基金会在去年九月宣布：相对于两年之前，每年由于贫困致死的儿童数量已经降到了 100 万以下，但这个消息却遭到了媒体的冷遇。


The people who contributed to this drop by delivering effective basic health care, building a supply of safe water, or immunizing children against measles remain largely unknown.	那些通过援助有效的卫生服务，建造干净饮用水设施，为儿童接种麻疹疫苗而实现了儿童死亡数目下降的人们却依然默默无闻。


Perhaps people respond more generously to the victims of natural disasters than they do to those in extreme poverty because, after a natural disaster, we tend not to blame the victims.	或许人们对天灾的回应比极端贫困更慷慨的原因，是在一场天灾以后，我们不会去责怪受害者。


We seem to accept that to be struck by an earthquake, a tidal wave, or a hurricane is just bad luck (unless, as the American evangelist Pat Robertson suggested after the Haitian earthquake, your ancestors made a pact with the devil in order to free themselves from colonial rule).	我们似乎觉得被一场地震，海啸或者飓风袭击就是因为运气不好（除非，正如美国传教士帕特·罗伯森在海地地震后所说，海地人的祖先为了把自己从殖民统治中解脱出来，与魔鬼作了个约定）。


Still, many people profess to believe that poverty is the result of not working hard enough, or of having too many children.	另外，许多人依然相信贫困是因为不努力工作，或者是过度生育。


But the circumstances that produce extreme poverty are not, except in rare cases, under the control of such poor people.	但那些导致了极端贫困的情况却不是随着贫穷者的意志而转移的（极少情况除外）。


They may be, to some extent, under the control of governments, and undoubtedly bad government is a major contributor to poverty. But then, bad government can also contribute to the toll exacted by a natural disaster.	在某种情况下，这些人民可能都处于政府的控制之下，而一个坏政府无疑是贫穷的主要原因，而即便伤亡是由天灾引起，一个坏政府也会令死亡人数有增无减。


Two years ago, a team of geophysicists led by Eric Calais of Purdue University predicted that the fault that produced the recent Haitian earthquake was at high risk of doing exactly what it did.	早在两年之前，一个由普渡大学埃里克·卡莱斯教授所率领的地球物理学团队就预测到海地发生地震并造成如此破坏的可能性很大。


They urged the Haitian government to take steps to strengthen critical buildings, including hospitals and schools.	他们敦促海地政府采取措施加固关键建筑，包括医院和学校。


Failure to do so contributed to the toll.	而政府的不作为则增加了伤亡。


What should we do?	那我们该怎么办？


Brian Tucker, founder of the non-profit organization Geohazards International, urges that 10% of the money raised by relief efforts should be set aside for mitigating damage from future earthquakes: training builders, improving engineering, and making the public more aware of the risks and how to reduce them.	非营利组织“地质灾害国际”的创立者布赖恩·塔克呼吁将地震捐款的 10% 用于防止未来地震所造成的破坏：训练施工人员，改善工程质量，以及令公众更加了解危险所在以及如何减灾。


He claims that every dollar invested in preparing for natural disasters saves ten dollars in future damage.	他指出，每在预防上投入 1 美元，就能在灾难来临时挽回 10 美元的损失。


Tucker’s proposal makes good sense, but it is difficult – and arguably unethical – for charities that raised money to help Haitians now to divert some of those funds to programs to mitigate the damage caused by future earthquakes.	塔克的提议非常合理。 但对于那些为海地救灾筹款的慈善团体来说，很难 —— 甚至也不道德 —— 去把这些援助金分出一部分来用到那些用于减少未来地震灾害的项目中去。


It would be excellent if the general public responded to an appeal for funds for mitigating future damage. But the prospects of that happening are slim, because such an appeal would lack the emotional pull of the desire to help immediate victims.	如果大众能对防止未来破坏而募捐的款项有所回应固然很好，但实现这件事的可能性也很小，因为这项提议缺乏那种援助突发事件受害者所具有的情感推动力。


Instead, governments that are pledging aid to Haiti now should ensure that part of their assistance goes to reducing the chances that such a disaster will affect Haiti so dramatically again.	反而是那些承诺要对海地进行援助的政府应当保证拿出援助的其中一部分，将其用于减低同类灾害再次严重破坏海地的可能性


Haiti’s State-Building Challenge	海地的建国挑战


SANTO DOMINGO -- The $5 billion in short-term aid for Haiti, and the $10 billion pledged for its long-term reconstruction at the International Donors’ Conference on March 31, is a vote of confidence in the potential of collective international action.	圣多明哥——对海地50亿美元的短期援助，以及3月31日国际捐助者会议承诺的100亿美元的长期建设资金是为世界各国可能采取的集体行动投下了信任票。


The question, however, is not only one of money; it is about whether Haiti’s agony is to be addressed as just one more humanitarian crisis or as a structural problem of state building – a long-term quest for institutional stability and sustainable development.	不过钱还并不是问题的全部，真正的问题在于是将海地的痛苦仅当作又一次人道主义危机还是国家建设的结构性问题——也就是追求体制稳定和可持续发展的长远目标。


Conspicuously, Haiti’s Dominican neighbors were the first to gauge the magnitude of the problem and the global nature of the required solution.	显而易见，海地的多米尼加邻国是最早认识到问题的严重性和解决方案全球性的国家。


The Dominican government’s decision to hold a summit on Haiti’s future has the objective of securing the international community’s ongoing commitment to Haiti, beyond the generous response to the catastrophe produced by the earthquake in January.	多米尼加政府决意召开有关海地未来前景的讨论会，会议目标是在1月震灾带来的慷慨解囊之外，寻求国际社会对海地问题的持续关注。


In addition to harmonizing the flow of donations and an agreed-upon list of development projects, Dominican President Leonel Fernandez seeks to make clear that the task is a long-term enterprise: re-founding the failing Haitian state.	除协调捐赠物流和各方认可的发展项目外，多米尼加总统莱昂内尔·费尔南德斯还力图表明重建失败的海地国家 是一项长期的任务。


A believer in the essentially political nature of Haiti’s tragedy, Fernandez rightly aspires to turn the current crisis into the lever for state-building, Haiti’s extraction from political isolation, and its maturation into an active member of the regional and world community.	费尔南德斯坚信本质上是政治原因造就了海地的悲剧，并且合理地期望利用建国、助海地摆脱政治孤立并积极融入地区和国际社会的方法来解决目前的危机。


It is to be hoped that the current global economic crisis does not undermine the reliability of the world’s commitments to Haiti.	希望目前的全球经济危机并没有破坏国际社会对于海地的关注。


After all, even in times of prosperity, the international community has been notorious for making grand pledges, only to renege when it comes to following through with the money.	毕竟即使在繁荣期间，国际社会也经常作出慷慨的承诺，结果却在兑现善款时背信弃义。


Keeping alive the international community’s commitment – that is, seeking an international solution to Haiti’s tragedy – is a vital necessity for the Dominicans.	保持国际社会对寻求海地悲剧国际解决方案的关注对多米尼加而言至关重要。


Their initiative is essentially driven by the fear that once Haiti’s immediate humanitarian crisis is addressed, the country’s underlying problems could be left at the door of the “prosperous” neighbors across the border.	他们的动力从本质上来自于担心一旦海地目前的人道主义危机得到缓解，与海地接壤的这些“繁荣”国家可能不得不独自解决这个国家存在的根本问题。


A case like the island of La Española (Hispaniola), where a simple border can reflect such vast differences, is not very common.	像拉埃斯帕诺拉岛那样一条边界线折射出两个截然不同世界的例子并非常规情况。


On one side of the border is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, a place where 56% of the population survives on less than one dollar a day.  On the other side of the island stands a stable democracy with a promising outlook for a reasonably prosperous future.	边境一侧是西半球最贫困的国家，那里56%的人口每天依靠不足1美元赖以维生。   而在小岛的另一侧则是一个稳定的民主政体，充满希望地迎接相对繁荣的未来。


For Dominicans, helping Haiti develop and become politically stable is the best way to safeguard their own stability.	对多米尼加人而言，帮助海地发展并实现政治稳定是捍卫自身稳定的最佳方式。


That was also the logic of the Barcelona Process in the late 1990’s, whereby the European Union worked to promote the development and democratization of the countries of the Maghreb as the best way to stem the uncontrolled tide of illegal immigration into Europe.	20世纪90年代末的巴塞罗那进程也信奉同样的逻辑，当时欧盟国家竭力推动马格里布国家的经济发展和政治民主化，因为这是阻止非法移民潮最好的方法。


But, unlike the EU, the Dominican Republic is not an economic giant that can assume exclusive responsibility for extracting Haiti from its Biblical destitution.	不过和欧盟不同，多米尼加共和国并不是一个经济巨人，没有能力独自承担起从圣经赤贫中挽救海地的责任。


The Dominicans are right to seek at least a more solid regional commitment.	多米尼加有权寻求至少更加可靠的地区承诺。


The Haitian refugee crisis in the early 1990’s tragically showed that no country in the region – including the United States, which either repatriated most illegal immigrants or confined them to the hardship of open camps in Guantánamo Bay – was ready to absorb the Haitians who fled their politically torn country.	20世纪90年代初的海地移民危机悲剧性地表明地区内没有任何一个国家准备接纳逃离政治上四分五裂国家的海地平民，其中也包括美国，美国遣返了多数非法移民，或者把他们送到关塔那摩湾条件恶劣的露天营地关押。


So long as the Haitian state remains fragile and the Haitian economy continues to decompose, the network of mafias living on illegal immigration into the Dominican Republic will continue to flourish.	只要海地政府依然脆弱、海地经济继续腐烂，依靠向多米尼加共和国非法移民为生的犯罪团伙就会继续繁荣。


About one million Haitians now live in the Dominican Republic, but only about 10% of the Haitian laborers in the country are there legally, a condition that invites their exploitation by greedy employers.	约有一百万海地民众现在生活在多米尼加，但只有约10%拥有合法的劳工资格，他们也因此成为贪婪雇主的剥削对象。


Cheap Haitian labor has become a substitute for less-skilled Dominican labor in a way that increases income inequalities, and puts a special burden on the country’s public finances and services, owing to lower tax revenues.	廉价的海地劳工已经取代了非技术型的多米尼加劳工，这在某种程度上扩大了收入不平等，降低了税收收入，致使国家公共财政和服务负担加重。


Though the Dominican Republic suffers from its own social and economic maladies – it is itself an exporter of emigrants to the US, Puerto Rico, and Spain – it certainly has a role to play in Haiti’s reconstruction.	尽管多米尼加共和国自身也存在社会和经济问题——这个国家自己也向美国、波多黎各和西班牙输出移民——但是它肯定可以在海地重建中发挥作用。


But it must supersede the exclusivist attitudes held by many members of its political class, particularly given that much of its economic growth in recent years reflects the contribution of Haitian immigration.	不过尤其考虑到多米尼加近年来的经济发展在很大程度上反映了海地移民的贡献，因此它必需摒弃政治阶层不少人持有的排外态度。


The two countries are condemned by history and geography to develop civilized neighborly relations.	历史渊源和地理位置决定这两个国家必需建设文明的邻国关系。


Haitians should not be encouraged to seek a solution to their tragic plight simply by crossing the border, but Dominicans should not demonize Haiti as the source of all their problems.	不���鼓励海地人仅靠跨越边境来摆脱自身的悲惨处境，但多米尼加人也不应妖魔化海地，将所有问题一股脑推到海地人身上。


Both sides need to engage in the vital enterprise of turning the border that separates them into a benign space of transnational development and stability.	双方需要共同努力，将两国边界区域建设成跨国发展和稳定的善意空间。


Precisely because developing a mutually beneficial border regime is, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rightly remarked in her 2009 visit to the island, a task that affects the two countries’ stability and well-being, it also needs to be part of the current international reconstruction effort.	恰恰因为正像希拉里·克林顿国务卿在2009年访问时评论的那样，建立互惠互利的边界制度是影响两国稳定和福祉的重要任务，因此这项任务必需进入当前的国际重建计划。


But Clinton should be reminded that every free industrial zone that was built along the Israeli-Palestinian border eventually fell victim to political instability.	但应当向克林顿指出一点，即沿以巴边境修建的所有自由产业区最终都沦为政治动荡的牺牲品。


Haiti’s transition to effective and sustainable statehood is therefore also vital for establishing a prosperous border regime.	因此海地获得持续有效的国家地位对制定繁荣的边境制度同样至关重要。


Hamas and Fatah at the Crossroads	处在十字路口的哈马斯和法塔赫


Palestinian politics is approaching the point of no return.	巴勒斯坦政治正在接近于无法逆转。


The power struggle between the Islamist Hamas and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and his secular/nationalist Fatah movement is intensifying, with tensions breaking into outright combat.	伊斯兰哈马斯和巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯及其世俗民族主义的法塔赫之间的权力斗争正在加剧，其紧张局势爆发为直接的冲突。


Since Hamas was founded in the early 1980’s, it has refused to come under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).	自二十世纪八十年代哈马斯成立以来，它拒绝接受巴解组织的领导。


Hamas’s victory in the parliamentary election earlier this year – a democratic watershed – demonstrated that it had come of age politically.	哈马斯去年在民主政治分水岭的议会选举中获胜，表明它已经在政治上成年了。


For the first time in Palestinian history, a religious party is dominant.	在巴勒斯坦历史上，一个宗教政党首次占据统治地位。


But Fatah has not accepted defeat, while Hamas is convinced that elements within Fatah agree with Israeli and American plans to topple the Hamas government.	但是，法塔赫并未接受失败，而哈马斯相信，法塔赫内部有人同意以色列和美国的推翻哈马斯政府的方案。


Abbas remains the Palestinian president, and the Basic Law makes him commander of all Palestinian security forces.	阿巴斯依然是巴勒斯坦总统，而且基本法规定他是所有巴勒斯坦安全部队的统帅。


However, while most official security forces remain loyal to him, over the past year Hamas has created an alternative security structure, built around a 4000-member “Operational Force.”	但是，尽管大多数的安全部队官员还是对他忠诚，去年以来，哈马斯建立了一支替代性的安全结构，组建了为数大约4,000人的“行动部队”。


Moreover, Hamas has announced plans to recruit 1,500 additional security personnel for the West Bank, Fatah’s stronghold.	而且，哈马斯宣布在西岸，也就是法塔赫的根据地招募1,500名额外的安全人员。


In recent weeks, the two sides have clashed frequently across the Gaza strip, heightening tensions further.	在最近数周内，双方在加沙地带经常爆发冲突，进一步突出了紧张局势。


The confrontations have come at a time when Abbas has been trying to persuade Hamas to moderate its anti-Israel stance and ally with Fatah in a national unity government.	这些对峙发生在阿巴斯试图劝说哈马斯温和其反以立场并且与法塔赫在民族团结政府中联合的时候。


Abbas believes that Hamas’s acceptance of negotiations with Israel is the only way to break the international sanctions that are devastating Palestinian society.	阿巴斯相信，哈马斯接受与以色列谈判是打破令巴勒斯坦社会瘫痪的国际制裁的唯一途径。


Despite this, both sides are building up their forces.	尽管如此，双方都在招兵买马。


Intelligence reports suggest that Hamas is smuggling weapons and explosives from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip at an accelerated pace.	情报报告表明，哈马斯正在加速从西奈走私武器和炸药到加沙地带。


The United States, Israel, and some Arab governments plan to arm and train forces loyal to Abbas, especially his presidential guard.	美国、以色列以及某些阿拉伯国家政府打算为忠于阿巴斯的部队，特别是总统卫队提供武装和培训。


They want to prepare Abbas’s forces in Gaza for a confrontation with Hamas, which they believe is inevitable.	它们想要让阿巴斯在加沙的部队为与哈马斯的冲突做好准备。 它们认为这一冲突不可避免。


Israel is considering Abbas’s request to transfer arms and ammunitions from Egypt and Jordan in hopes of bolstering his loyalist forces.	以色列正在考虑阿巴斯的请求，即从埃及和约旦转移武器和军火以图壮大其忠诚部队。


There is also an American proposal to allow the Badr Brigade – a wing of the Palestine Liberation Army that is currently stationed in Jordan – to relocate to the Palestinian territories as Abbas’s rapid reaction force in Gaza in anticipation of a feared civil war.	美国也提议允许目前部署在约旦的巴勒斯坦解放部队一翼的巴达尔旅作为阿巴斯在加沙的快速反应部队重新部署到巴勒斯坦领土上以防内战。


The Badr Brigade is composed of several thousand Palestinians, mostly long-time PLO activists.	巴达尔旅由数千名巴勒斯坦人组成，大多数都是巴解组织长期的活动份子。


As the maneuvering continues, Israel and Egypt find themselves working together to bolster Abbas and Fatah.	在部署继续之际，以色列和埃及正合作提升阿巴斯和法塔赫。


With the Gaza Strip in its backyard, Egypt has already mediated several times between Hamas and Fatah, and has been trying, so far unsuccessfully, to arrange a swap of prisoners with Israel following Hamas’s abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.	加沙地带处于埃及的后院，埃及已经几次在哈马斯和法塔赫之间调停，而且在哈马斯绑架以色列士兵沙利特之后一直试图安排和以色列交换战俘，但是没有成功。


But Egypt’s government is angry with Hamas for opposing the formation of a coalition government.	但是，哈马斯反对组建联合政府，埃及政府对此感到愤怒。


Indeed, the seizure of Shalit deepened the rift between Hamas and Fatah, which believes that the abduction was staged in order to sabotage discussions about a national unity government.	确实，绑架沙利特加深了哈马斯和法塔赫之间的不合。 法塔赫相信绑架士兵是为了破坏民族联合政府的讨论。


More generally, Egypt is concerned that Gaza is becoming politically radicalized and may be transformed into “Hamastan.”	在更为广泛的意义上，埃及担心加沙地带在政治上变得激进，而且有可能被转化为“哈马斯坦”。


This, Egypt fears, would give a boost to its own Islamic radicals, against which the government has long fought.	埃及担心这将会鼓动其伊斯兰极端份子。 埃及政府长久以来一直与其作战。


Egypt also worries about a possible Hamas-Fatah civil war.	埃及还担心可能发生的哈马斯与法塔赫的内战。


Although Hamas has ruled this out, it has shown no hesitation to use heavy force against its opponents.	尽管哈马斯排除了这一可能性，但是，它却毫不迟疑地对其反对者使用强力。


Likewise, Foreign Minister Mahmoud Al-Zahar of the Hamas-led government says that any dissolution of the government or call for early elections by Abbas would be a recipe for civil war.	同样，哈马斯领导的政府外交部长说，阿巴斯解散政府或提前举行选举就是内战。


Fear of major fighting has already sent many Palestinians into Egypt, leading to the deployment of Egyptian troops on the border to control any mass exodus.	许多巴勒斯坦人由于害怕大规模的作战而逃入埃及，迫使埃及在边境部署军队来控制大规模的逃难。


Israel, meanwhile, is worried that Hamas has strengthened its military grip on Gaza, in terms of both fortifications and networks capable of launching Qassam rockets into neighboring Israeli towns.	与此同时，以色列担心哈马斯已经加强了其在加沙的军事控制，这些包括工事以及能够将卡萨姆火箭发射到邻近的以色列城镇的网络。


Israel might not wait for Abbas and his forces, but rather launch a full-scale intervention to weaken Hamas.	以色列可能不会坐等阿巴斯及其部队，而是发动全面的干预行动来削弱哈马斯。


Can Hamas and Fatah put aside their differences and form a unity government?	哈马斯和法塔赫能否摈弃前嫌，组成团结政府呢？


Abbas says that if a coalition government is not agreed upon within the next two weeks, he will dissolve the current government, a move Hamas will not tolerate.	阿巴斯说，如果未来两周内无法就联合政府达成一致，他将解散当前的政府。 而这是哈马斯所不会容忍的。


But forming a coalition government is unlikely to ease the tension between Hamas and Fatah.	但是，组成联合政府不大会消除哈马斯和法塔赫之间的紧张关系。


New confrontations would likely emerge as soon as a new government was formed.	一旦新的政府组成，新的冲突就可能出现。


Ironically, the most likely way to avoid large-scale confrontation between Fatah and Hamas is through an Israeli incursion into Gaza.	具有讽刺意味的是，最有可能避免法塔赫和哈马斯之间全面冲突的途径就是以���列入侵加沙。


Facing the Israelis together is the only way that the rival Palestinian groups will postpone their own bloody showdown.	共同面对以色列是对峙的巴勒斯坦团体推迟其流血摊牌的唯一方式。


Hamas Comes in from the Cold	重新活跃的哈马斯


GAZA CITY – In the wake of revolutionary change in the Middle East, the forces of political Islam have scored one electoral victory after another.	发自加沙——在中东革命的政权更替之下，伊斯兰政治势力赢得了一个又一个的选举胜利。


As the West grapples with the rapid rise of moderate Islamists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, the issue of Hamas’s role in the Palestinian territories looms large.	当西方还在疲于应付突尼斯，摩洛哥以及埃及改革派伊斯兰主义者的迅速崛起之际，巴勒斯坦地区哈马斯的角色冲突问题也日渐升温。


The signing of a new unity deal between Hamas and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s secular Fatah party earlier this month has heightened an unprecedented struggle within Hamas over its future course as an Islamist movement.	本月初哈马斯与巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯所领导的世俗派法塔赫所签订了一份新的团结协定，并引发了哈马斯内部关于这个伊斯兰运动未来将如何走向的斗争。


How the West responds could very well influence the outcome.	而西方对此做出的反应也将极大影响事件最终的结果。


As events in recent weeks have proven, Hamas’s days of near-total isolation in the Middle East are over.	正如最近几周发生的事件所证明的那样，哈马斯几乎完全孤立于中东的日子已经走到了尽头。


While most Western governments continue to consider it a terrorist organization, in Arab capitals, political embargos have given way to engagement.	虽然大多数西方国家仍将其视为恐怖组织，但在阿拉伯各国，政治隔离已被接触所取代。


In December, Ismail Haniyeh, Prime Minister of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority in Gaza, embarked on a tour of the Mediterranean that included stops in Tunis, Cairo, and Istanbul.	在去年十二月，哈马斯领导的加沙巴勒斯坦政权总理伊斯玛尔·哈尼耶（Ismail Haniyeh）对地中海地区展开了访问，途径突尼斯，开罗和伊斯坦堡。


In mid-February, he was warmly received in Qatar, Bahrain, and Iran.	随后在今年二月中旬，他又在卡塔尔，巴林和伊朗受到了热情欢迎。


This political outreach, however, has not emanated solely from Gaza.	但这一政治橄榄枝并不仅仅是由加沙递出。


In January, Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas’s Damascus-based political bureau, embarked on a diplomatic initiative of his own, and was hosted by King Abdullah of Jordan – the first such visit in more than a decade. In February, Mashal crowned these efforts in Qatar with the signing of the new unity agreement with Fatah, which commits both Palestinian movements to a transitional government under Abbas’s leadership.	在一月，哈马斯驻叙利亚大马士革流亡分支机构领导人哈利德·玛沙尔（Khaled Mashal）动身启动外交访问，并受到了约旦国王阿卜杜拉的接待——这还是10多年以来的头一次，并促成了哈马斯和法塔赫二月在约旦签署的新团结协定，希望将两股巴勒斯坦运动团结在由阿巴斯领导的过渡政府之下。


Ever since, disagreements within Hamas have been escalating, pitting the movement’s Diaspora leadership against the Hamas-led Gaza administration, which has openly rejected the unity deal.	自那以后，哈马斯内部的反对之声就逐渐升级。 该运动的流亡领导人甚至不惜与公开反对团结协定的哈马斯加沙政权决裂。


While personal ambitions certainly play a role in the tensions, what lies at the core is a fundamental conflict over Hamas’s character.	虽然个人野心也是导致这一紧张态势的原因，但矛盾的核心其实构建在对哈马斯自身定义的根本冲突之上。


Haniyeh, who represents the conservative wing of Gaza’s Hamas leadership, has sought to cash in on regional changes.	作为加沙哈马斯领导层的保守派代表，哈尼耶试图借助区域变革的时机行事。


His long-boycotted government was thrown a lifeline by regime change in Egypt and the opening of the border with Gaza.	他的政府虽然饱受指责，但却趁埃及政权更替以及加沙边界的开放捡到了一条救命稻草。


Notably, Haniyeh’s recent diplomatic tour garnered not only symbolic recognition for Hamas, but also support for his uncompromising stance vis-à-vis Israel.	值得注意的是，哈尼耶最近的外交之旅不仅得到了哈马斯的象征性承认，也因为其对以色列毫不妥协的立场而获得了支持。


He missed no opportunity to criticize “futile” peace negotiations, and, in Tehran, he pledged that Hamas’s “resistance” would continue “until all Palestinian land has been liberated.”	他总是把对“无意义”和平谈判的批评挂在嘴边，在到访德黑兰时还许诺哈马斯的“抵抗”将持续到“所有巴勒斯坦土地都得到解放的那一天”。


What that means needs little clarification.	这些说辞的用意不言而喻。


In a further telling move, Haniyeh also recently suggested merging Hamas with the Islamic Jihad movement, which continues to target Israeli civilians with rockets fired from Gaza.	而一个更能说明问题的举动则是哈尼耶最近建议将哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战运动整合起来，继续从加沙向以色列平民目标发动火箭袭击。


Mashal, by contrast, has come to represent a force of change.	而玛沙尔则恰恰相反。


Last May, he signed an initial reconciliation agreement with Fatah in Cairo, which committed Hamas to a Palestinian unity government, called for a cessation of violence, and accepted the notion of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.	在去年五月，这位变革力量的代理人在开罗与法塔赫草签了一份和解协议，承诺要将哈马斯整合到一个巴勒斯坦联合政府之下，呼吁停止暴力行动，并接受在1967年边界基础上建立巴勒斯坦国的安排。


Mashal also offered Abbas a one-year mandate for negotiations with Israel, and, unlike Haniyeh, supported recent Israeli-Palestinian “exploratory talks” in Jordan.	玛沙尔同时还给予阿巴斯一年的授权去和以色列谈判，还与哈尼耶背道而驰，支持最近在约旦进行的以巴“探索性谈话”。


One reason for Mashal’s change of heart can be found in the ongoing popular revolt in Syria against President Bashar al-Assad.	玛沙尔之所以向往变革，其中一个原因可以在叙利亚反对总统阿萨德的人民起义中找到。


The leader of the Sunni Hamas can no longer support his Syrian host, who has cracked down on the Sunni-dominated opposition.	由于阿萨德对逊尼派为主的反对派大肆镇压，以致这位逊尼派哈马斯的领袖无法再继续支持他的叙利亚寄主。


Thus, Mashal has attempted to close ranks with Fatah, and is seeking to move Hamas’s Diaspora headquarters from Damascus – a powerful symbol of his efforts at re-invention.	于是玛沙尔转而与法塔赫靠拢，并试图将哈马斯的流亡总部搬出大马士革——这堪称其重整计划的一个有力证明。


But Mashal’s refusal to support Assad has not only forced him to re-locate.	但玛沙尔反对支持阿萨德的行为不但迫使他卷铺盖走人，还彻底激怒了叙利亚的盟友——伊朗。


It has also unleashed the wrath of Syria’s ally, Iran, which has responded by scaling down its financial support for Hamas – thus denying Mashal a key source of influence within the movement.	伊朗随即减少了对哈马斯的财政支持——并以此切断了玛沙尔在组织内部影响力的一个重要来源。


Indeed, Mashal’s decision has effectively ended his ties to his two most important allies, thereby not only weakening his position, but also increasing his readiness to embrace political moderation.	事实上，玛沙尔的这一决定彻底断绝了他本人与其两大重要盟友之间的联系，不但削弱了他的地位，也增加了其拥抱政治改革的决心。


Tensions increased dramatically when Mashal signed the unity agreement with Fatah, after stating his intention to resign as head of the political bureau.	而这一紧张态势在玛沙尔宣称有意辞去流亡分支领导人一职，随后又与法塔赫签订团结协定时达到了顶峰。


While that announcement may have been political blackmail aimed at forcing Gaza into line, it underscored Mashal’s confidence in his popularity, which has since been vindicated by expressions of support from both within and outside of the political bureau for him to remain in charge.	虽然这一宣言可能是为了要挟加沙加入其阵营，却也增强了玛沙尔在民意支持方面的自信，而流亡分支内外一致要求他留任的表态也正说明了这一点。