In the same way, EUFOR military commanders regularly and frequently exchange information with the heads of such EU civil missions as the EUPOL police mission, the EUSEC security reform mission, the EUJUST justice mission, and so on, including, if present, the European Commission’s own representatives.	同样，欧洲联合部队的军事指挥官定期经常与欧盟民间组织的领袖交换信息，参与信息交换的包括欧盟警察行动（EUPOL）、欧盟安保改革援助团(EUSEC)安全改革计划和欧盟正义行动司法计划等，在适当的情况下，参与信息交换的也包括欧盟委员会自身的代表。


Being able to act militarily requires capable, flexible forces that are suited to their mission.	采取军事行动需要有战斗力的灵活部队，他们必需具备完成任务的能力。


Their essential tasks should be movement, information gathering, and, if necessary, combat.	最核心的任务包括军队调动、信息收集和在必要情况下的战斗能力。


Moreover, their main qualities should be resistance – the ability to hold out – and the psychological resilience to deal successfully with an “intense” situation and to respond to it by exerting the best possible control.	不仅如此，他们还应具备防御的主要品质——在逆境中的坚持能力——以及成功化解“紧张局势”的心理弹性和在可能的条件下最卓越的控制能力。


This implies a high level of cohesion, which in the case of multinational forces is not guaranteed.	达到目的需要很强的凝聚力，而多国部队同样并不具备这样的能力。


But the EU’s “Battlegroups” are a first response to this requirement.	但欧盟的“战斗集群”就是为满足这项要求的创新之举。


As multinational forces that are built either on regional affiliations or strong bilateral relations, they bestow a “European” label on military resources while guaranteeing efficiency in the field.	因为多国部队通常以地区联系或强大的双边关系为基础，他们为军事资源打上“欧洲”的印记，同时又可以确保战场效率。


Where necessary, they can be supported by air and maritime rapid response assets, and thus constitute a fully-fledged military resource for armed intervention.	在必要的情况下，他们能够得到海空快速反应能力的支持，因此就具备了武装干涉所需的全面军事能力。


However, although about 15 Battlegroups have been created – two of which are, at any time, on permanent call for six months – none has actually been deployed since the Artemis “prototype” mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. As time passes, a concept without real commitment in the field may eventually raise suspicions about its relevance.	可是，尽管约15个战斗集群已经建立，而且其中两个在六个月中随时随地处于备战状态，但自从2003年民主刚果共和国的阿蒂米斯（Artemis）榜样任务结束后，一个在战场上没有实际用武之地的空洞概念可能最终招致对其存在价值的质疑。


The EU also suffers from a well-known lack of capacity in strategic air transport, in-theater air transport, and combat support.	众所周知，欧盟缺乏空中战略运输、战区空中运输和作战支持能力，这也成为欧盟备受诟病的原因之一。


The European Defense Agency has a very important role to play in proposing and running programs to address these shortfalls.	欧洲防务局在制定和执行计划，弥补这些不足方面所发挥的作用不容小觑。


The Capability Development Plan, which the EDA is developing in close collaboration with the EU Military Committee, aims to foster and improve solidarity in terms of capability, which is what Europe needs.	欧洲防务局正在与欧盟军事委员会合作制定能力发展计划，其目标是培养和改善欧洲所需要的团结统一的军事能力。


There are other areas in which we must make progress if the EU’s military resources are to be brought into line with its political ambitions.	要想使欧洲的军事资源与它的政治抱负成正比，我们还必须在其他领域取得成绩。


One urgent need is simplification of our operational planning and the manner in which we conduct operations.	一个迫切的需要就是简化我们的行动计划和我们具体的行动方式。


Finally, as all of the EU’s 27 member states are now trying to reduce public spending in sustainable ways, financing for military operations, without which nothing is possible, requires a new approach.	最后，由于欧盟的全部27个成员国目前都在竭力将公共开支削减到可以持续的水平，军事行动的资金筹集需要一种全新的方式。


Those member states that are most heavily involved in an operation, in terms of both human resources and military equipment, are penalized by the financial burden that this commitment places on their national budgets.	如果资金筹集不到，军事行动根本就不可能继续下去。 那些积极参与军事行动的成员国在人力资源和军事设备两方面都受到军事目标对其国内财政预算所造成负担的压制。


Political solidarity must be underpinned by effective financial solidarity.	政治上的团结一致必须先得到有效的财政团结的支持。


As an integral part of the CFSP, today’s ESDP and tomorrow’s Common Security and Defense Policy will work only if the member states responsible for implementing them allocate the resources that they need.	作为共同外交与安全政策不可或缺的组成部分，今天的欧洲安全与防务政策和明天的共同安全防务政策只有在负责执行的成员国拿出所需资源的前提下才能发挥效力。


This implies a Europe-based approach that takes precedence over national considerations once national and European-level foreign policies are unified.	这就需要在国家和欧洲级别的外交政策实现统一后，统一的欧洲模式能够先于国家利益而发挥作用。


Making Europe Work	让欧洲运转起来


PARIS – Some economists believe that this summer could mark the moment when some of the eurozone’s peripheral members may begin to be forced out; others think that such a scenario is inconceivable.	巴黎— 一些经济学家认为，这个夏天将因某些欧元区外围成员国踏上被迫离开之路而被铭记； 其他经济学家则认为发生这种情况的可能性极小。


All agree that, at least in the short term, a eurozone breakup would be disastrous for jobs and growth.	他们都同意，至少是在短期，欧元区解体将对就业和增长形成灾难性影响。


But, because the outcome is unknowable, and depends on politics as much as on economics, let us leave that frightening prospect to one side and look instead at what we know about the underlying performance of the European Union economy.	但是，由于结果不可知，且取决于政治不亚于取决于经济，因此我们姑且将耸人听闻的前景放一放，看看我们究竟对欧盟经济基本表现知道多少。


In short, how competitive is Europe in the summer of 2012?	简言之，在2012年夏天，欧洲竞争力如何？


If we compare the EU-15 (the membership before the enlargements of 2004 and 2007) with the US, the most obvious point is that GDP per capita in Europe is almost 25% lower, a difference of around $11,000 a year.	如果我们比较一下欧盟15国（EU-15，2004和2007年两次扩大之前的欧盟国家）美国，最显而易见的一点是欧洲人均GDP比美国要低近25%，即每年11 000美元。


Furthermore, per capita EU productivity, which had been converging on the US level for 20 years up to 1995, when Europe was only about 5% below the US, lost ten percentage points in relative terms in the decade preceding the eurozone crisis.	此外，人均欧盟生产率——在1995年之前的20年中，欧洲的这一指标一直在向美国靠拢，到1995年时只比美国低5%——在欧元区危机前的十年中相对美国下降了10个百分点。


Europe was unable to match America’s significant productivity boost from the information-technology revolution.	欧洲无法赶上美国从信息技术革命中获得的生产率大跃迁。


But Europe managed to hold its share of global exports during that period more effectively than did the US.	但在同期，欧洲在保持全球出口份额方面做得比美国更好。


European companies have been more successful, on average, at maintaining their share of emerging-market demand than have US companies.	平均而言，欧洲公司在维持新兴市场份额方面比美国公司更成功。


Moreover, European job creation has not been as bad as many think.	此外，欧洲就业创造也要比许多人想象的更好。


An analysis by McKinsey & Company of new jobs in the US and the EU from 1995 to 2008 suggests that, while the US created 20 million new jobs, 19 million of them were attributable to population growth.	麦肯锡公司分析了美国和欧盟1995—2008年的就业创造情况，结果表明，美国创造了2 000万个新岗位，其中1 900万个可以归因于人口增加。


The EU-15 created about 24 million new jobs during the same period, with only nine million due to rising population.	同期EU-15创造了2 400万个新岗位，只有900万个来自新增人口。


This job creation was not evenly spread across Europe, but it happened.	就业岗位的创造在欧洲并不是均匀分布的，但它确实发生了。


That means that the EU now has successful employment models that can be emulated.	这意味着欧盟是可供模仿的最成功的就业模式。


There is also solid evidence that Europe’s big companies have been competing relatively well globally.	此外，扎实的证据表明，欧洲大公司在全球竞争中相对表现较好。


The number of Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the EU has grown over the last decade, while the number of those based in the US has fallen.	过去十年来，财富500强公司中将总部设在欧洲者有所增加，而设在美国者有所减少。


Moreover, big European companies’ profits have grown 50% more rapidly than those of their American counterparts.	此外，欧洲大公司的利润增长要比美国同行快50%。


Few deny the need for fiscal consolidation in many EU countries, especially in the south (and including France).	不可否认，许多欧盟国家需要财政整合，特别是南欧国家（也包括法国）。


But fiscal adjustment must be accompanied by structural reform.	但财政调整必须辅之以结构性改革。


It is clear that the labor-market reforms undertaken by Germany a decade ago, painful as they were, have put the German economy in a far stronger position to compete globally.	显然，德国十年前所经历的劳动力市场尽管非常痛苦，却使得德国经济在全球竞争中获得了一个极强有力的位置。


Similar reforms are urgently needed in countries like Italy and Spain.	类似的改革在意大利和西班牙等国家也刻不容缓。


Service-sector reform is vital as well.	服务业改革同样重要。


Manufacturing productivity per hour in Europe compares quite well with the US, but Europeans work significantly fewer hours per year, which explains the annual per capita difference.	欧洲制造业小时生产率较美国有较大优势，但欧洲人每年工作时间要少得多，这就是双方年人均差异出现的原因。


But European countries lag badly in services, where restrictive practices, protectionism, and inefficiency hold them back.	但欧洲国家的服务业非常落后，主要拖后腿因素是限制性竞争协议、保护主义和低效率。


Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti seem to understand these points, but the reform programs that they have unveiled are not adequate to the challenge.	西班牙首相拉霍伊和意大利总理蒙蒂似乎已经理解列这一点，但他们所给出的改革计划并不足以应对挑战。


Although Italian employers have dismissed the proposed employment-law reform as far too modest, Monti’s government has retreated in the face of trade-union opposition and protests from assorted interest groups (like taxi drivers) eager to defend their privileges.	尽管意大利雇主们抛弃了计划中的就业法改革，认为该法无关痛痒，但蒙蒂政府还是在急于捍卫自身特权的工会和各种利益集团（如出租车司机）的反对和抗议下退缩了。


Governments are inhibited by the knowledge that labor-market reform may well result in a short-term increase in unemployment (and thus further fiscal deterioration), because employers will find it cheaper to fire personnel.	政府被劳动力市场改革可能会造成短期失业剧增（从而导致财政进一步恶化）的观念束缚住了，因为这样一来雇主解雇工人成本会更低。


The hope is that greater flexibility would also translate into a greater willingness to hire in an economic upturn.	希望在于，提高劳动力市场灵活性可以形成经济景气时更大的招聘意愿。


For EU politicians, however, the long term will be reached only after a series of short-term electoral challenges, so pro-reform governments may well not survive to reap the benefits.	不过，对欧盟政客来说，长期是遥远的，中间隔着好几个短期选举挑战，因此支持改革的政府可能撑不到改革效果显现的那一刻。


As Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker remarked, all EU governments know what must be done; what they don’t know is how to get re-elected once they have done it.	正如卢森堡总理容克所说的，所有欧盟国家政府都知道必须做什么，它们不知道的是一旦做了，怎样才能赢得连任。


Is there a way out of this dilemma?	有办法走出这一困境吗？


Countries like Germany are adamantly opposed to a fiscal union, with a central EU budget for responding to asymmetric shocks, because they would be the chief contributors.	德国等国顽固地反对财政联盟（即应对不对称冲击的中央欧盟预算），因为它们将成为财政联盟的主要出资人。


But a variant that might elicit greater support would link fiscal support to labor-market reform.	但该方案存在一个支持度更大的变体，把财政支持和劳动力市场改革相联系。


If Italy or Spain introduced changes that led to a short-term increase in joblessness, the fiscal costs would be met from a central EU budget to ease the pain.	如果意大利或西班牙实施的变革措施导致短期失业上升，则其财政成本将由中央欧盟预算承担，以此减轻它们的痛苦。


This “investment” by wealthier countries should pay off if it leads to more flexible labor markets and higher productivity in the recipient countries.	这一由富裕国家进行的“投资”将收到成效，如果它能在受助国促成更灵活的劳动力市场和更高的生产率的话。


Another proposal is a central-budget subsidy to reduce employment taxes in the EU’s most economically challenged countries.	另一个方案是提供中央预算补助，以减少欧盟经济挑战最严峻国家的就业税。


The logic is that a country like Greece needs devaluation to enhance its competitiveness, but that leaving the euro would pose major problems.	该方案的逻辑是，向希腊这样的国家需要贬值来增强竞争力，但脱离欧元区会引起严重的问题。


The alternative would be to cut nominal wages (“internal” devaluation), which is hard to do (though it has been achieved in Latvia and Ireland).	替代方案是削减名义工资（“内部”贬值），而这很难办到（尽管拉脱维亚和爱尔兰做到了）。


Reducing taxes on labor, perhaps for a defined period, would have a similar effect.	（在规定时期内）减少劳动税也有类似的效果。


That would be costly for governments in the short term, though an increase in output and employment might well justify the “tax expenditure” involved; here, too, an EU subsidy might be a worthwhile investment.	从短期看，这会给政府带来成本，尽管产出和就业的增长将会证明“税收支出”是值得的； 在这方面，欧盟补贴也许又是值得的投资。


If Europe wants to revive sustainable growth and high employment, it must replicate what has worked in those countries that have performed successfully.	如果欧洲想要恢复可持续增长和高就业，那就必须复制表现成功的国家的经验。


Doing so will cost money.	这样做要求资金投入。


Governments must be prepared to persuade their electorates that it would be money well spent.	政府必须做好准备，说服选民，这样花钱是值得的。


Making Globalization Work for All	让全球化为每个人服务


We are now in a one-year countdown to establish a new approach to globalization.	我们现在离建立全球化的新手段还有一年的倒计时间。


In September 2005, world leaders will meet at the UN to review the progress made since the Millennium Assembly in September 2000, when they pledged to support a set of ambitious objectives - the Millennium Development Goals - to help the world's poorest people escape poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy.	事实上，世界首脑们此刻正聚集在联合国，讨论自2000年9月召开的联合国千禧发展大会以来所取得的成就。 在那次大会上他们承诺将扶持一组野心勃勃的计划--千禧发展计划--以帮助世界上最贫穷的人们摆脱贫困、饥饿、疾病和文盲。


Setting goals was the easy part.	制定目标是一件容易的事。


When they return next fall, world leaders must decide on how to achieve them.	但接下来，世界首脑们就必须考虑如何来实现这些目标。


Fortunately, a proposal by UK Chancellor Gordon Brown might provide the needed global breakthrough.	幸运的是，由英财政大臣戈登·布朗起草的一项计划可能会带来全球性的突破。


Here is the problem: globalization offers people everywhere the chance to escape extreme poverty, but it is not working in many parts of the developing world.	这是问题所在：全球化让任何地方的人们都有机会逃避极端贫困，但它在发展中国家的很多地方都不起作用。


While China and India grow rapidly, most of Africa is stagnating.	中国、印度发展迅速，但大多数非洲国家却停滞不前。


Similarly, large parts of Latin America and Central Asia are experiencing rising, not falling, rates of poverty.	同样，拉丁美洲和亚洲中部的大部分地区的贫困比例正在上升，而不是下降。


In most cases, geography plays an important role in success or failure.	在大多数情况下，地理位置扮演了一个重要角色，直接决定了成功还是失败。


The big development success stories are places like Shanghai, port cities with ready access to world markets.	那些大的成功发展的故事都发生在如上海、以及其他可以直通世界市场的港口城市。


The biggest development failures tend to be in rural areas far from the coast.	而发展失败的例子则倾向于那些远离海岸线的乡下地区。


Communities living in mountainous areas, such as in the Andes, or Central Asia, or the highlands of East Africa, are especially isolated.	山区如安弟斯山区，亚洲中部，或东非高地尤其孤立。


Geographical isolation is even more extreme if the country is landlocked, like Bolivia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, or Burkina Faso.	如果一个国家是内陆国，如玻利维亚、阿富汗、埃塞俄比亚、布基纳罚索，地理隔绝甚至更加严重。


In addition to isolation, other problems include droughts in Africa, where farmers depend on rainfall rather than irrigation, and high disease burdens in tropical countries suffering from malaria, dengue fever, and other killer diseases.	除了隔绝，其他问题还有如非洲的干旱（那里的农民依赖于降雨超过灌溉），热带国家遭遇疟疾、登革热以及其它致命疾病的疾病负担。


All of these problems are solvable, but they are not being solved in many places.	所有这些问题都是可以解决的，但在很多地方它们都得不到解决。


Instead of hearing more lectures from the IMF about cutting budgets, poor countries need larger budgets to pay for the required investments - roads, power supplies, ports, schools, and health clinics - to jump-start economic growth.	贫穷国家需要听到的不是国际货币基金会关于降低预算的报告，而是更大的预算以完成那些必要的投资--道路建设、电力供应、港口、学校，医疗诊所--来促进经济腾飞。


The IMF should spend less time telling the poorest of the poor to cut their spending, and more time telling rich countries to give more money to help the poor meet their investment needs.	国际货币基金会应该少花一点时间告诉穷人减少开支，而应该多花一点时间告诉富人拿出更多的钱来帮助穷人完成他们的投资需求。


Rich countries have promised more help for years, but continue to renege.	富裕国家答应给予帮助已经很多年了，但一直在食言。


Thirty-five years ago, they promised to give 0.7% of their GNP to poor countries as development aid.	35年前，他们答应拿出他们国民生产总值的0. 7%，作为发展基金支援那些穷国。


Instead they give 0.25% - a shortfall that amounts to $120 billion per year.	但实际上他们只拿出了0. 25%，这意味着每年减少了1200亿美元。


The United States causes half the total shortfall.	美国在这笔短缺中占了其中的一半。 如果美国拿出他们国民生产总值的0.


If the US lived up to its pledge of 0.7% of GNP in donor aid, it would be giving $75 billion per year. Instead, it gives around $15 billion.	7%来支援穷国， 那将是每年750亿美元，而事实上它每年只拿出了大约150亿美元。


The US could easily afford to do more.	美国完全可以拿出更多。


The Bush administration gave $250 billion per year in tax cuts to the richest Americans, raised military spending by $150 billion per year, and then turned to the poorest people of the world and told them that there is no money available to meet America's promise.	布什政府每年对那些最富有美国人降低的税收达2500亿美元，军事支出则提高到了每年1500亿美元，然后他转向世界最贫穷的人们，对他们说，美国已经没有钱来实现它曾做出的承诺了。


None of this makes sense for global security, or even for the financial interests of donor countries.	这对全球的安全，甚至这些捐赠国家本身的经济利益都并无好处。


The failures of economic development in the Andes, Central Asia, and Africa contribute to global instability, local insurrections and violence, drug trafficking, and bases for terrorism.	安弟斯山区，亚洲中部和非洲的经济萧条会导致全球的不稳定、地区反抗和暴力事件、毒品走私、以及成为恐怖分子的基地。


Military approaches alone will not work, because the root of the problem is the vulnerability of poor, hungry people to the prophets of hate.	军事手段不会单独起作用，因为问题的根源是：穷人容易受伤、挨饿的人们易产生恨。


If donors keep giving only a little bit of help, but not enough to solve the problems of the poorest countries, these countries will never escape poverty's grip.	如果这些富裕国家继续只给予那些最贫穷国家一点点的、不足以解决问题的帮助，那么这些最贫穷国家将永远不会摆脱贫困。


By financing a much higher level of investment in the next few years, rich countries would give poor countries the chance to achieve economic growth - promising an eventual end to further aid.	但如果富裕国家能在未来几年内给予这些最贫穷国家更多一点的财政投资，那么这些贫穷国家将有机会获得经济发展--最终将不再需要帮助。


Chancellor Brown's proposal - an initiative called the International Finance Facility (IFF) - does precisely this.	布朗的计划--一个称为"国际金融战略"的主动行为--目的正是这个。


The idea of the IFF is to guarantee that donor countries double their aid levels during the next decade, so that well-governed poor countries can make the investments they need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.	"国际金融战略"将保证那些捐赠国家在未来十年内把对贫穷国家的援助金额翻一倍，以便那些管理良好的贫穷国家开展必要的投资项目，达到"千禧发展计划"制定的目标。


Brown is exactly right: let's put Africa and other impoverished regions on a path of sustained economic growth by frontloading the aid during the period until 2015.	布朗在这一点上非常正确：在2015年前，通过加大援助，让非洲以及其它贫穷地区走上经济发展道路。


Great Britain has made the Millennium Development Goals, and hence the IFF, the centerpiece of the G-8 Summit, which will be held in Scotland next July.	大英帝国制定了"千禧发展计划"以及"国际金融战略"。 "国际金融战略"将是明年7月于苏格兰召开的8国峰会讨论的中心议题。


French President Jacques Chirac has joined Blair and Brown in a bold call for rich countries to honor their promises to the poor.	法国总统希拉克已经加入了布莱尔和布朗的队伍，大胆呼吁富裕国家兑现对贫穷国家的承诺。


The richest countries - the US, Germany, and Japan - must join this vital initiative.	最富裕国家--美国、德国和日本--必须加入这个重要的行动。


Building a more peaceful and prosperous world is in everyone's best interest.	建立一个更加和平和繁荣的世界是每个人的良好愿望。


Making Growth Green	实现绿色增长


When the world's leaders met at the Millennium Summit four years ago, they agreed on a set of goals aimed at cutting global poverty in half by 2015.	当世界各国的领导人们在四年前的"千年峰会"上会晤时，他们就一系列旨在到2015年将全球贫困减少一半的远期目标达成共识。


They also set targets for the environment, because they understood its centrality to long-term economic growth, human development, and the stability of the planet.	因为深知环境问题是长期经济增长、人类发展和全球稳定的核心，他们也制定了一系列环境目标。


The problem is that today, ten years shy of when the 2015 goals are to be met, progress on the environment is alarmingly slow.	问题是直至今日，距2015年还有十年而这些目标仍未实现，解决环境问题的进程极度缓慢。


So much more is possible.	我们仍然任重而道远。


The phase-out of ozone depleting substances through the Montreal Protocol, for instance, shows what can be done when the international community works together.	例如，通过《蒙特利尔协议》逐步淘汰破坏大气臭氧层的物质就显示了国际社会同心协力的作用。


Thanks to the protocol, it is estimated that up to 20 million cases of skin cancer, and 130 million eye cataracts, will be avoided.	据估计，该协议的签定会减少2000万皮肤癌和1. 3亿白内障病例。


This kind of success should encourage us.	这样的成功应是对我们的鼓励。


But now we need to match our action with the scale of the challenge.	但现在我们应该根据所面临挑战的程度调整应对措施。


Our world is not only unbalanced, but endangered.	我们这个世界非但不平衡，而且还处在危险之中。


Deforestation is increasing, with almost 100 million hectares lost in the last decade alone - much of it due to millions of poor farmers in Africa and Latin America being forced to cut down trees because they have no other access to land or energy sources.	滥砍滥伐的现象日益严重，仅在过去十年里我们就失去了近1亿公顷的森林-这些损失大部分是由非洲和拉美的贫困农民造成的。 由于没有其它办法获得土地和能源，他们被迫砍伐树木。


At the same time, carbon dioxide emissions are rising: the European Union's target is to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by 2010; but with current policies, only 0.5% will be achieved.	同时，二氧化碳的排放量还在上升：欧盟的目标是在2010年将温室气体的排放量减少8%； 但在现行政策下，只能实现0.


Of the world's species, 12% of birds, 24% of mammals, and 30% of fish are either vulnerable or in immediate danger of extinction.	5%的目标。 全球的物种当中，12%的鸟类，24%的哺乳动物和30%的鱼类或已非常脆弱，或已濒临绝种。


The environmental challenge is even more stark in developing countries, where five billion of the earth's six billion people live.	全球60亿人口中有50亿生活在发展中国家。 而这些国家所面临的环境挑战更为艰巨。


In these nations, the environment is linked directly to human development - and to poverty.	在这些国家，环境直接与人类发展-及贫困相连。


More than a billion people in developing countries lack access to clean water; more than two billion have no access to basic sanitation.	有10亿多的发展中国家人口缺乏清洁的水源； 20多亿人口没有基本的卫生设施。


Five to six million people, mostly children, die every year due to waterborne diseases, such as diarrhea, and air pollution.	每年有5至6百万人，多数是儿童，死于诸如痢疾一类的水传播疾病和空气污染。


On current trends, the millennium targets for the environment will not be met.	按照目前的趋势，环境发展的千年目标不会实现。


What needs to be done?	我们应该如何应对呢？


As a starting point, we must recognize the fundamental imbalance in the global environmental equation.	首先，我们必须承认全球环境状况根本性的不平衡。


Richer countries do much of the environmental damage.	较富有的国家造成了大量的环境破坏。


Accounting for only 15% of the world's population, they cause 50% of global carbon dioxide emissions - with all their implications for climate change.	它们只有全世界15%的人口但却排放着全球50%的二氧化碳-深刻地影响着气候变化。


But the poorer countries pay much of the "costs" - losing up to 8% of their GDP per year due to environmental degradation, as well as suffering devastating effects on health and human welfare.	但较贫穷的国家却承担着大量的"成本"-每年由于环境退化损失高达8%的GDP，还要承受随之而来的对人类健康和福利的破坏性后果。


Rich countries' larger contribution to environmental damage means that they must shoulder greater responsibility for fixing the problem.	富国对环境造成的更大程度的破坏意味着它们在解决环境问题时必须担负更多的责任。


That means changing the way they produce and consume energy - reducing subsidies, ensuring appropriate pricing, and adequately taxing environmentally damaging products.	也就是说改变它们生产和消费能源的方式-减少补贴，确保合理定价及对于破坏环境的产品征收足够的税。


It also means providing more resources to developing countries for environmental conservation.	这也意味着为发展中国家的环境保护提供更多的资源。


Between 1990 and 2000, financing for environmental concerns followed roughly the same path as overall development assistance flows: it stagnated.	在1990至2000年间，用于环境方面的资金情况与整个发展援助的资金情况大体相当：陷于停滞。


Aid for the environment averaged about $2 billion per year - far short of what the international community, first at the Rio Summit in 1992 and then at the Johannesburg Summit ten years later, said was needed.	环境援助资金的年平均数额约为20亿美金-远低于国际社会首先在1992年的"里约峰会"及后在2002年的"约翰内斯堡峰会"上声明的数额。


In terms of global priorities, this figure compares with the $900 billion that the world currently commits to military expenditures each year.	就全球优先权来说，这一数字可以和目前全世界每年9000亿美金的军费开支形成鲜明对比。


If the war on environmental degradation is to be won, we need a major turnaround.	遏制环境退化的战役如果要取得胜利，我们就需要重大的转变。


Three areas can help speed progress:	我们可以从三方面努力以加速解决环境问题的进程：


· Developed countries must set the example by moving toward environmentally friendly production and consumption patterns, including more control of greenhouse gas emissions and use of innovative mechanisms such as Carbon Funds to buy offsets (reductions in greenhouse gases) from developing countries.	发达国家必须以身作则向有利于环境的生产和消费方式转变，这包括更多地控制温室气体的排放和采用碳能源基金一类的创新机制从发展中国家购买排放补偿（温室气体的缩减量）。


Richer countries must also increase bilateral and multilateral aid commitments.	较富有的国家还必须增加双边和多边的援助承诺。


Reversing the declining trend in contributions to the Global Environment Facility would be a good start.	扭转它们对全球环境基金的贡献下降的趋势就是一个良好的开端。


Since its inception in 1991, GEF funding has declined by almost 10 % as a share of the combined GDP of the 38 contributing nations;	自1991年成立以来，该基金的总量以其占38个参与国GDP总量的份额计算下降了10%。


· Developing countries must improve their policies governing the critical sectors of water, energy, transport and trade, including pricing policies.	发展中国家必须改善它们在供水、能源、交通和贸易等关键产业部门的政策，包括价格政策。


This would help reduce consumption of scarce natural resources.	这样有助于减少对稀缺自然资源的消耗。


Beyond this, environmental concerns must be integrated more fully into development policymaking.	除此之外，对环境的关注必须更完全地与发展政策的制定结合起来。


· The international community must make a much more serious commitment to renewable energy, efficiency, and other environmentally friendly energy sources.	国际社会必须在可再生能源、能效、和其它有利于环境的能源方面做出更严肃的承诺。


A business-as-usual approach would mean that by 2030 carbon dioxide emissions would be 70 % higher than today, and renewable energy would account for a mere 4% of total energy usage, up from 2% now.	现今这种我行我素的状态如果继续下去就意味着到2030年二氧化碳的排放量会比现在高出70%，而可再生能源占能源使用总量的比例则仅从现在的2%增加到4%。


We need the kind of common effort launched a generation ago in agriculture that led to the Green Revolution.	我们需要有一种上一代人在农业发展上所表现的，最终带来"绿色革命"的共同努力。


Another two billion people will be added to global population over the next 25 years - the vast majority in poorer nations - with huge demands for energy and economic growth.	世界的人口在未来的25年会增加20亿-绝大多数出生在较穷的国家-这些国家拥有巨大的能源和经济增长需求。


If that growth is not achieved in an environmentally sustainable way, its effects on poverty and human well-being will be disastrous.	如果这种增长不能在可持续发展的环境中实现，那么它就会给贫困和人类福祉带来灾难性的影响。


It will be too late 25 years from now to make the right choices.	如果我们在25年之后再做出抉择就为时已晚。


For the sake of our children and our children's children, we must act now.	为了我们的子孙后代，我们必须立刻行动起来。


Making Old Age Less Safe	使老年生活更缺安全感


It is almost an optical illusion: looming on Japan’s horizon, and on Europe’s and on America’s, is a pensions crisis.	这几乎是一种错觉：养老金危机正隐约浮现于日本、欧洲、美国的地平线上。


The problem is real, though exaggerated.	尽管有些夸大，但这个问题真实存在。


The illusion is in some of the plans being devised to deal with it.	目前解决这一问题的计划已在制定之中。


The main question is whether privatizing pension systems, as President George W. Bush has proposed for Social Security in the United States, would solve the problem or merely make matters worse.	问题关键在于，美国总统乔治W·布什提议为本国社会保障体系建立的养老金私有化制度，究竟能否解决该问题还是反而使它雪上加霜。


With many countries pondering whether to adopt variants of the Bush plan, the question requires careful examination.	由于许多国家目前正考虑是否也采纳布什的该项计划，这个问题需要仔细研究。


By itself, privatization is clearly not the solution.	明显，私有化本身不是解决方案。


America’s troubled private pension system – now several hundred billion dollars in debt – already appears headed for a government bailout.	美国养老金私有化制度磕磕碰碰一路，现已背负了几千亿美元的债务，亟待政府援助。


There was a time when privatization – allowing individuals to set up individual savings accounts – seemed better than Social Security, which invests in lower-yielding Treasury bills.	私有化允许个人设立私人储蓄账户，而社会保障制度投资低回报率的国库券。 曾有一度，前者看起来优于后者。


Advocates of privatization argued that funds would do much better if invested in stocks, predicting a return of 9%.	私有化的拥护者们宣称，基金投资于股票将会获得更丰厚的回报，还预测了高达9%的回报率。


But the stock market does not guarantee returns; it does not even guarantee that the stock values will keep up with inflation – and there have been periods in which they have not.	但是股票市场并不能保证这种回报，甚至不能保证股票价值跟上通货膨胀——也确实曾有过这样的时期。


America’s Social Security system insulates individuals against the vagaries of the market and inflation, providing a form of insurance that the private market does not offer.	但是美国的社会保障体系却能提供一种私有化无法提供的保险形式，保证个人不受市场和通货膨胀各种风险的影响。


It does so with remarkable efficiency.	社会保障体系的效率惊人。


The costs of managing the Social Security system are far smaller than those likely to be associated with privatized accounts.	管理社会保障体系的成本远远比那些管理私人账户所需的管理成本来的低。


This is understandable: private investment firms spend an enormous amount on marketing and salaries.	这是可以理解的：私人投资公司要花大笔资金在市场营销和工资开销上面。


It is possible that to reduce these transactions costs, Bush will propose restricting choice, which was the main argument for privatization in the first place.	为了降低这些交易成本，布什将很有可能建议限制选择范围，这就是私有化讨论的首要争论点。


But these limited kinds of choices – for example, a T-bill fund with 90% in T-bills and 10% in an indexed stock fund – could easily be introduced into the public social security system.	但是，诸如一个90%资金在国库券、10%在指数股票基金的国库券这样限制种类的选择，是易于被引进公共社会保障体系的。


Bush says that reform is urgently needed, because the system will be insolvent in about a quarter-century.	布什说，由于社会保障体系将在25年内濒临崩溃，因此改革迫在眉睫。


But the problem depends on America’s growth rate: if the growth rates of the late 1990’s return, there is no problem.	但是这个问题取决于美国的经济增长率。 如果经济增长重回1990年代后期的水平，那就毫无问题。


Even if there is a problem, it can easily be fixed; spending a fraction of the money that went into Bush’s two tax cuts would have fixed Social Security for 75 years; slight benefit cuts, adjusting the age of retirement, or minor adjustments in the level of contributions could fix the system permanently.	即使有，也能轻而易举地解决，只要动用一小部分布什在两次降税方案中所得的钱就足以维持社会保障体系75年； 微调下降福利，调整退休年龄，或者小幅度调整捐款标准就能永久性保持该体系。


Moreover, Bush’s proposals won’t fix social security – unless they are accompanied by drastic benefit cuts.	此外，除非同步大幅降低福利，否则，布什的提议也不能解决社会保障问题。


For how could they?	为什么呢？


He proposes diverting almost a third of the Social Security tax to private accounts.	他建议将几乎三分之一的社会保障税转移到私人账户。


That means less money coming in.	那意味着入帐资金越发减少。


If benefits are not reduced, the gap between receipts and expenditures will increase.	如果不降低福利，收入与开销之间的差距将越拉越大。


One doesn’t need a Nobel Prize to figure that out.	就算没有拿过诺贝尔奖的人也能明白这其中的道理。


So privatization would not protect retirees against the Social Security system’s insolvency; it would merely add enormously to today’s fiscal deficit, because partial privatization entails diverting money to private funds that would have been used to close the gap between government expenditures and revenue.	因此，私有化并不能保护退休者们不受社会保障体系功能恶化的影响，它只会为如今的财政赤字再添一笔巨大的负担，因为一部分私有化牵涉到资金到私人基金的转移，而这笔资金正是原本用以填平政府开销和国家收入之间的鸿沟的。


The anticipated increase in the fiscal deficit is striking: the central plan discussed by Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers would – according to the Council’s own estimates – increase America’s fiscal deficit by $2 trillion over the next decade.	财政赤字的预期增长是惊人的：根据布什的经济顾问委员会估计，他们所讨论的中心计划将在今后十年中增加2万亿美元财政赤字。


Advocates of privatization claim to believe in markets, but they are proposing budget gimmickry that would move those losses off the books, as if markets could be easily fooled.	私有化的拥护者们宣称他们相信市场，但是他们却提议使用可以移走账面损失的预算伎俩，似乎市场可以就这样被容易地愚弄。


America and the world should remember: Argentina’s privatization of its pension system was at the center of its recent fiscal woes.	美国和全世界都应该记得：阿根廷的养老金体系私有化是导致其近期财政恶化的核心。


Had Argentina not privatized, its budget would have been roughly in balance.	要是阿根廷没有进行私有化，它的预算还能大致持平。


The US is starting on its privatization venture with a fiscal deficit of 4% of GDP.	美国正在以占GDP4%的财政赤字开始了私有化冒险之举。


Privatization advocates insist, however, that investments in stocks would yield sufficiently higher returns to provide individuals the same retirement income as before, with the surplus used to fill the gap.	然而，私有化拥护者们坚持，投资股票将会产生更高效率的回报，为个人提供与以前一样数目的退休工资，还有盈余可以填补开销与预算差距。


But if markets are working well, then returns will be higher only because risk is higher.	但是如果市场行情看好，那么回报就会更高。 但这只是因为风险更高了。


There is still no free lunch in economics.	在经济中，依然没有免费午餐。


With higher risk, there is a chance that, 40 years from now, many individuals will find themselves with less than they need to retire.	随着风险加剧，在今后的40年中，许多人有可能将会发现他们退休时所拥有的将少于退休所必需的。


But if one really thinks that free lunches exist, there is still no reason to privatize: government could get the additional returns by investing in the stock market itself.	但若有人真的相信免费午餐的存在，仍然没有私有化的理由：政府可以通过自己在股票市场投资来获取额外回报。


Indeed, President Clinton proposed doing just that.	事实上，克林顿总统提议的正是这个。


With increased transaction costs, worsening solvency for the system, increased budget deficits, and decreasing benefits and security for retirees, why the drive for privatization?	随着交易成本上升，体系偿付能力恶化，预算赤字增加，以及退休者福利保障不断下降，为什么还要实施私有化呢？


One reason is the interest financial markets have in grabbing a piece of all those transactions costs.	原因之一是金融市场能在这些交易成本中攫取一份利益。


A second is the Bush administration’s ideological hostility to the modest amount of wealth redistribution implied by the public system.	原因之二是布什政府对公共体系所包含的财富重新分配充满意识形态上的敌意，尽管这笔财富数目平平。


America’s Social Security program has been so successful in reducing poverty because the poor get back a little more than they contribute, and the rich get back a little less.	美国的社会保障计划已经成功减少了贫穷人数，因为贫穷人口的所得多于付出，而富人所得却减少了一点。


Even with Social Security’s mildly redistributive effect, poverty and inequality in America are increasing. Privatization will only make matters worse.	即使在社会保障体系温和的再分配的效果下，美国的贫穷和不平等正在加剧，私有化只会令其雪上加霜。


Bush has tried to scare America about the magnitude of the problem, and he has tried to fool America about how privatization would solve it.	布什曾试图以该问题的严重性来威吓美国公民，也曾试图用私有化如何解决该问题来愚弄美国公民。


The Social Security deficit pales by comparison with the deficits created by Bush’s huge tax cuts for upper-income Americans or in comparison with the deficit in Medicare, which provides health care for the aged.	与布什为美国高收入阶层制定的大幅减税方案造成的赤字以及为老年人提供健康医疗的医疗保险赤字相比，社会保障体系赤字可谓是相形见拙。


Why has he ignored these problems?	他为什么忽略了这些问题？


Is there another agenda?	难道还有其他打算？


Making Sense of the Climate Impasse	理解气候僵局


NEW YORK – All signs suggest that the planet is still hurtling headlong toward climatic disaster.	纽约——所有迹象都表明我们这个星球仍在鲁莽地向着气候灾难猛冲。


The United States’ National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration has issued its “State of the Climate Report” covering January-May.	美国国家海洋和大气管理局已经发布1月到5月的气候状况报告。


The first five months of this year were the warmest on record going back to 1880. May was the warmest month ever.	今年头五个月是1880年以来记录温度最高的，而五月是有史以来最热的月份。


Intense heat waves are currently hitting many parts of the world.	强烈的热浪正在席卷世界很多地方。


Yet still we fail to act.	但我们仍然没有采取行动。


There are several reasons for this, and we should understand them in order to break today’s deadlock.	造成今天局面的原因有几个，我们应该先真正理解它们才能打破僵局。


First, the economic challenge of controlling human-induced climate change is truly complex.	首先，控制由人类活动引发气候变化的经济挑战的确非常复杂。


Human-induced climate change stems from two principal sources of emissions of greenhouse gases (mainly carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide): fossil-fuel use for energy and agriculture (including deforestation to create new farmland and pastureland).	由人类活动引发的气候变化来自两大温室气体（主要是指二氧化碳、甲烷和一氧化二氮）的主要排放源、 以及用于能源和农业的化石燃料（包括砍伐森林修建新的农场和牧场）。


Changing the world’s energy and agricultural systems is no small matter.	改变世界的能源和农业系统绝非小事。


It is not enough to just wave our hands and declare that climate change is an emergency.	仅靠挥手宣布气候变化是紧急状况还远远不够。


We need a practical strategy for overhauling two economic sectors that stand at the center of the global economy and involve the entire world’s population.	我们需要制定切实可行的战略，对处于全球经济核心且涉及全球所有人口的两大经济部门进行改造。


The second major challenge in addressing climate change is the complexity of the science itself.	应对气候变化的第二大挑战是科学本身的复杂性。


Today’s understanding of Earth’s climate and the human-induced component of climate change is the result of extremely difficult scientific work involving many thousands of scientists in all parts of the world.	今天人们对地球气候和人类活动引发气候变化的理解是世界各地成千上万名科学家历尽艰苦得来的科学工作成果。


This scientific understanding is incomplete, and there remain significant uncertainties about the precise magnitudes, timing, and dangers of climate change.	这种科学理解还很不完善，在气候变化的确切程度、时间和危险性方面还存在着极大的不确定性。


The general public naturally has a hard time grappling with this complexity and uncertainty, especially since the changes in climate are occurring over a timetable of decades and centuries, rather than months and years.	特别是气候变化的时间周期是几十甚至数百年，而不是几个月或者几年，因此公众自然在理解这种复杂性和不确定性方面遇到很大的困难。


Moreover, year-to-year and even decade-to-decade natural variations in climate are intermixed with human-induced climate change, making it even more difficult to target damaging behavior.	此外，每年甚至每几十年发生的自然气候变化与人类活动引发的气候变化杂糅在一起，进一步加大了确定损害行为的难度。


This has given rise to a third problem in addressing climate change, which stems from a combination of the economic implications of the issue and the uncertainty that surrounds it.	这也就引发了应对气候变化的第三个问题，问题的根源在于经济影响和相关不确定性的共同作用。


This is reflected in the brutal, destructive campaign against climate science by powerful vested interests and ideologues, apparently aimed at creating an atmosphere of ignorance and confusion.	这一点在强大的既得利益集团和理论家攻讦气候科学的残酷的、毁灭性的运动中得到充分的体现，制造混乱和无知的氛围显然是他们的目的。


The Wall Street Journal, for example, America’s leading business newspaper, has run an aggressive editorial campaign against climate science for decades.	美国主要商业媒体《华尔街日报》近几十年来就一直积极开展反对气候科学的社论运动。


The individuals involved in this campaign are not only scientifically uninformed, but show absolutely no interest in becoming better informed.	这项运动的参与者不仅缺乏科学知识，而且对掌握科学知识根本没有任何兴趣。


They have turned down repeated offers by climate scientists to meet and conduct serious discussions about the issues.	他们屡次拒绝气候科学家举行会晤和严肃讨论问题的提议。


Major oil companies and other big corporate interests also are playing this game, and have financed disreputable public-relations campaigns against climate science.	主要石油公司和其他大的企业利益集团也在耍同样的把戏，他们出资举办了针对气候科学的不光彩的公关运动。


Their general approach is to exaggerate the uncertainties of climate science and to leave the impression that climate scientists are engaged in some kind of conspiracy to frighten the public.	他们的主要方法是夸大气候科学的不确定性，给人留下气候科学家阴谋恐吓公众的印象。


It is an absurd charge, but absurd charges can curry public support if presented in a slick, well-funded format.	这样的指控非常荒谬，但荒谬的指控如果在充足的资金支持下巧妙圆滑地进行，也有可能骗取公众的支持。


If we add up these three factors – the enormous economic challenge of reducing greenhouse gases, the complexity of climate science, and deliberate campaigns to confuse the public and discredit the science – we arrive at the fourth and over-arching problem: US politicians’ unwillingness or inability to formulate a sensible climate-change policy.	如果我们综合上述三个因素——减少温室气体排放的重大经济挑战、气候科学的复杂性、以及有意发起运动混淆视听败坏气候科学的名誉——我们就能得出第四个也是涉及面最广的问题： 美国政治家既不能也不愿制定切合实际的气候变化政策。


The US bears disproportionate responsibility for inaction on climate change, because it was long the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, until last year, when China overtook it.	美国在对气候变化无动于衷的问题上需要承担极大比例的责任，因为它长期以来一直是世界最大的温室气体排放者，而且直到去年才被中国超过。


Even today, per capita US emissions are more than four times higher than China’s.	但即便是今天，美国人均排放量仍然是中国的四倍还多。


Yet, despite America’s central role in global emissions, the US Senate has done nothing about climate change since ratifying the United Nations climate change treaty 16 years ago.	但尽管美国在全球排放中处于核心地位，美国参议院从16年前正式批准联合国气候变化公约后就一直毫无动作。


When Barack Obama was elected US president, there was hope for progress.	巴拉克·奥巴马当选美国总统时，人们曾经希望取得进步。


Yet, while it is clear that Obama would like to move forward on the issue, so far he has pursued a failed strategy of negotiating with senators and key industries to try to forge an agreement.	但尽管奥巴马显然希望在这个问题上取得进展，但到目前为止他一直采取一种与参议员和重要行业谈判以求签订协议的无效的政策。


Yet the special interest groups have dominated the process, and Obama has failed to make any headway.	但特殊利益群体一直主导着谈判进程，而奥巴马则未能取得任何进展。


The Obama administration should have tried – and should still try – an alternative approach.	奥巴马政府本应尝试——现在仍应尝试——另外一种方法。


Instead of negotiating with vested interests in the backrooms of the White House and Congress, Obama should present a coherent plan to the American people.	奥巴马不应与既得利益集团在白宫和国会的密室中反复谈判，而应向美国人民提交一份完整连贯的计划。


He should propose a sound strategy over the next 20 years for reducing America’s dependence on fossil fuels, converting to electric vehicles, and expanding non-carbon energy sources such as solar and wind power.	他应当提出一项有效的政策，在今后二十年中降低美国对化石燃料的依赖、推广使用电动车、并拓展太阳能和风能等非碳能源的应用。


He could then present an estimated price tag for phasing in these changes over time, and demonstrate that the costs would be modest compared to the enormous benefits.	而后他应当公布在今后一段时期内逐步引入上述变化所需要的预算，并告诉人们与巨大的收益相比耗费的成本并不算高。


Strangely, despite being a candidate of change, Obama has not taken the approach of presenting real plans of action for change.	令人感到奇怪的是，尽管是变化的拥护者，奥巴马还一直没有采取措施提出真正的行动计划。


His administration is trapped more and more in the paralyzing grip of special-interest groups.	他的政府越来越多地陷于特殊利益群体的掌控之中而无法自拔。


Whether this is an intended outcome, so that Obama and his party can continue to mobilize large campaign contributions, or the result of poor decision-making is difficult to determine – and may reflect a bit of both.	这种结果或许是有意为之，这样奥巴马和他的政党就能继续得到大笔的捐赠费用，又或许是因为决策不善，究竟为何的确很难确定——又或者两者兼有。


What is clear is that we are courting disaster as a result.	但显而易见的是，我们正在放任灾难的发生。


Nature doesn’t care about our political machinations.	大自然不会在意我们的政治阴谋。


And nature is telling us that our current economic model is dangerous and self-defeating.	而自然恰恰告诉我们目前的经济模式既危险又弄巧成拙。


Unless we find some real global leadership in the next few years, we will learn that lesson in the hardest ways possible.	除非我们在今后几年内找到真正的全球领袖，否则可能会接受最惨痛的教训。


Making the Euro Whole	锻造一个完美的欧元


NEW YORK – The architects of the euro knew that it was incomplete when they designed it.	发自纽约——那些欧元的缔造者们都知道，自己设计出来的欧元其实是不完美的。


The euro had a common central bank but no common treasury.	欧元拥有一个共同的中央银行，但却缺乏共同的储备机构。


This was unavoidable, because the Maastricht Treaty was meant to bring about a monetary union without a political union.	这点是无法避免的，因为《马斯特里赫特条约》原本就是为了缔造一个货币联盟而非政治联盟。


European authorities were confident, however, that if and when the euro ran into a crisis, they would be able to overcome it.	不过欧洲各国对此却信心满满，自认能克服所有的欧元危机。


After all, that is how the European Union was created, taking one step at a time, knowing full well that additional steps would be required.	毕竟欧盟也是如此形成的：先迈出一步，弄清楚周边情况，然后再进行下一步。


With hindsight, one can identify other deficiencies in the euro of which its architects were unaware.	在金融危机事后看来，欧元其实还存在着其缔造者未能察觉的某些短处。


The euro was supposed to bring about economic convergence, but it produced divergences instead, because its architects did not realize that imbalances may emerge not only in the public sector, but in the private sector as well.	欧元本应实现经济的集约效应，但它却反过来造成了割裂，因为它的设计者们并未意识到不仅公共部门会出现不平衡，连私人部门也无法置身事外。


After the euro came into force, commercial banks could refinance their holdings of government bonds at the discount window of the European Central Bank, and regulators treated government bonds as riskless.	自欧元开始流通之后，各国商业银行都可以在欧洲中央银行的贴现窗口将自己持有的政府债券换成现金，而监管者则政府债券视作零风险证券。


This caused interest-rate differentials between various countries to shrink, which generated real-estate booms in the weaker economies and reduced their competitiveness.	这导致不同国家的利率差距进一步缩小，推高了那些弱国的地产泡沫，还拉低了它们的国际竞争力。


At the same time, Germany, suffering from the after-effects of reunification, had to tighten its belt.	而与此同时，尚未摆脱统一副作用的德国却必须勒紧裤带。


Trade unions agreed to concessions on wages and working conditions in exchange for job security.	公会组织被迫在薪资和工作条件方面作出让步以换取不裁员的承诺。


That is how the divergences emerged.	这就是割裂产生之处。


Yet the banks continued to load up on the government bonds of the weaker countries in order to benefit from the minuscule interest-rate differentials that still remained.	而银行则继续购入弱国的政府债券，利用那点依然存在的微小利率差来渔利。


The consequences of the lack of a common treasury first became apparent after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, when governments, in order to prevent financial markets from collapsing, had to guarantee that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail.	缺乏共同储备的后果在2008年雷曼兄弟破产之后初次显现，当时政府为了防止金融市场最终崩溃，必须保证不会再有其他系统性金融机构倒闭。


At that time, Angela Merkel rejected a Europe-wide guarantee, insisting that each country should guarantee its own institutions.	当时德国总理默克尔拒绝为全欧洲的金融机构担保，声称各国的烂摊子该由各国自己内部处理。


Interestingly, interest-rate differentials widened only in 2010, when the newly elected Greek government announced that the previous government had vastly understated the true fiscal deficit.	但有趣的是各国之间的利率差却雷打不动，只是在2010年新上台的希腊政府宣布其前任严重隐瞒了财政赤字之后才被拉大。


That was the start of the euro crisis.	那就是欧元危机的开始。


The lack of a common treasury is now in the process of being remedied, first by a rescue package for Greece, then by creating a temporary emergency facility, and – the financial authorities being a little bit pregnant – eventually by establishing some permanent institution.	缺乏共同储备的状况现在正在逐步修正当中：首先是救助希腊，接着设立一个临时应变架构，最终在金融管理部门酝酿了一段时间之后成立了一系列永久性机构。


Unfortunately, it is equally certain that the new arrangements will also be flawed.	但不幸的是，新方案也同样存在着缺陷。


Besides the lack of a common treasury, the euro suffers from other shortcomings, which the authorities do not seem to have fully understood.	除了缺乏共同储备之外，欧元还存在着其他弱点，而相关机构似乎还没认识到这一点。


This complicates matters enormously.	这令问题变得越来越复杂了。


The authorities are confronted by not only a currency crisis, but also a banking crisis and a crisis in macroeconomic theory.	事实上，欧盟机构所面对的不仅仅是一场货币危机，还有一场银行危机以及宏观经济理论的危机。


The authorities are committing at least two mistakes.	欧盟金融管理机构至少犯下了两个错误。


One is that the bondholders of insolvent banks are being protected at the expense of taxpayers for fear of provoking a financial crisis.	其一是那些银行既已资不抵债，却要由纳税人出钱来来保护银行股份持有者的利益。


This is politically unacceptable.	这在政治上是无法让人接受的。


The Irish government elected next spring is bound to repudiate the current arrangements. Markets recognize this, which is why the Irish rescue brought no relief.	明年春天选出的新一届爱尔兰政府势必要推翻目前的解决方案，市场早就意识到了这一点，而这也是为何爱尔兰拯救方案依然无法缓解问题的原因。


Second, high interest rates charged on rescue packages make it impossible for weaker countries to improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis stronger ones. Divergences will continue to widen, and weaker countries will continue to weaken indefinitely.	其二，拯救方案所要求的高利率使得弱国无法提升自己的竞争力，结果导致与强国之间的差距继续加大，强国恒强，弱国愈弱。


Mutual resentment between creditors and debtors is liable to grow, and there is a real danger that the euro may destroy the EU’s political and social cohesion.	借贷者和放贷者之间的矛盾也会逐渐加剧，最危险的情况则是欧元反过来损害了欧盟的政治和社会凝聚力。


Both mistakes can be corrected.	这些错误都是可以纠正的。


With regard to the first, emergency funds ought to be used to recapitalize the banking systems, as well as to provide loans to sovereign states.	对第一个问题，应该使用紧急救助基金来向银行系统注入资金，或是为主权国家提供贷款。


The former would be a more efficient use of funds than the latter. Properly capitalizing the banking system would leave countries with smaller deficits, enabling them to regain access to capital markets sooner.	前一种手段相对后一种手段会更有效，因为对银行系统的适当外部资金注入能避免被救助国承担更多赤字，让它们能尽快恢复与资本市场的对接。


It is better to inject equity into the banks now rather than later, and it is better to do it on a Europe-wide basis than leave each country to act on its own.	向银行注入平衡的措施宜早不宜迟。 而且更应该在欧洲层面展开而不是由各国自行解决。


This would create a European regulatory regime.	这将催生出一个欧洲监管系统。


Europe-wide regulation of banks encroaches on national sovereignty less than European control over fiscal policy. And European control over banks is less amenable to political abuse than national control.	而相对于由欧洲控制所有财政政策的举动，对全欧洲银行进行监管的举措对各国主权的侵犯更少，而此举也比各国家自行控制更能减少政治权力的滥用。


With regard to the second problem, the interest rate on rescue packages should be reduced to the rate at which the EU itself can borrow on the market.	对第二个问题，拯救方案所包含的利率应该降到与欧盟自身的市场借款利率同一水平。


This would have the advantage of developing an active Eurobond market.	这将有利于发展一个活跃的欧洲债券市场。


These two structural changes may not be sufficient to provide the eurozone countries in need of rescue an escape route from their predicament.	这两大结构性改变可能并不足以帮助���些欧元区国家摆脱目前的困境。


Additional measures, such as “haircuts” for holders of sovereign debt, may be needed.	还需要另外的一些手段，比如对减少主权债务持有者的数量。


Having been properly recapitalized, banks could absorb this, and two obvious mistakes that condemn the EU to a bleak future would be remedied.	在获得充足资本后，银行可以吸收这些债务，而将把欧盟引向绝路的两大明显错误也将得到纠正。


Making the IMF and World Bank Work for the Poor	让世界银行和国际货币基金组织为穷人服务


The World Bank has long proclaimed its dream of “a world free from poverty.”	世界银行一直宣扬其“脱贫世界”之梦。


Likewise, the International Monetary Fund may arguably desire “a world free from financial crisis.”	同样，国际货币基金组织也可以说想要“一个摆脱金融危机的世界”。


These are crucial and daunting objectives, but they are too narrow for the twenty-first century.	这些都是重要而又艰巨的目标，但是对于二十一世纪而言它们又太过狭隘。


To remain relevant, the Bretton Woods institutions must fully adapt to the needs of the world’s rapidly emerging countries, and they can begin that process at this spring’s IMF-World Bank meetings in Washington.	布雷顿森林体系如果想要维持实际价值，就必须完全适应于世界快速兴起国家的需求。 它们可以从今年春天世界银行和国际货币基金组织华盛顿会议上开始这一进程。


As many now acknowledge, the IMF should look beyond managing financial crises and start addressing non-cooperative economic behaviors – notably in the monetary field.	正如许多人现在所承认的那样，国际货币基金组织应当放眼管理金融危机之外，开始处理非合作的经济行为，特别是在货币领域。


The international community would gain from the IMF’s becoming a center of joint-monitoring and permanent dialogue among the world’s rich, poor and emerging nations.	国际货币基金组织成为联合监管中心和世界富国、穷国以及新兴国家的常设对话中心，国际社会将会因此受益匪浅。


But for that to happen, the latter two need a greater say.	但是为实现这一目标，后面的二者必须要有更大的发言权。


Fortunately, such reform is at last on the agenda.	幸运的是，这样的改革最终被提上议事日程。


Last autumn’s IMF-World Bank meetings approved an increase in voting quotas for some of the most under-represented emerging economies: China, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.	去年秋天国际货币基金组织和世界银行会议批准提高某些最没有代表权的新兴经济体的投票配额，它们是中国、墨西哥、韩国以及土耳其。


A second round of adjustment will need to involve other fast-paced economies without crushing the voice of the poorest.	第二轮调整将需要其他快速发展的经济体参与其中，同时又不压制最贫穷国家的声音。


As for the World Bank, it does not need to “reposition” itself so much as to root itself in emerging countries, as does the development aid industry in general.	对于世界银行而言，它并不需要自我“重新定位”才像一般意义上的发展援助产业那样将自身扎根于新兴国家之中。


The international community must resist shortsighted calls to withdraw from middle-income nations on the ground that they could now “go it alone.”	国际社会必须抵制撤出中等收入国家的短视呼吁。 这些呼吁的理由是它们现在可以“单干”。


When it comes to global governance, communicable diseases, climate change, or threats to biodiversity, these countries’ importance speaks for itself.	在全球管治、传染性疾病、气候变化或者生物多样性的威胁等问题上，这些国家的重要性不言自喻。


They account for 44% of people living with HIV/AIDS, 47% of global CO2 emissions, and 52% of the planet’s protected natural areas.	它们有44%携带艾滋病毒的人口，47%的二氧化碳排放量以及全球52%的受保护的自然区域。


The international community simply cannot leave them to their own devices on such crucial issues without jeopardizing its own future.	国际社会根本无法在不威胁自身未来的情况下让它们在这些关键性问题上自我承担。


Fighting poverty is a non-negotiable objective.	与贫困斗争是一项没有商量余地的目标。


But it cannot be the sole purpose of international aid, nor of the World Bank.	但是它并不能成为国际援助和世界银行的唯一目标。


In fact, a genuine commitment to poverty reduction implies working with these countries.	实际上，切实致力于减低贫困意味着与这些国家合作。


They are home to 70% of the population that lives on less than $2 a day, facing massive unemployment, gross inequalities, lack of infrastructure, regional imbalances, and a litany of other challenges.	它们拥有70%每天靠不到两美元生活的人口，这些人面临大量的失业、急剧的不平等、缺乏基础设施、地区不平衡以及一大堆其他挑战。


Some critics argue that lending public money to middle-income countries is no longer necessary, due to their access to financial markets.	某些评论家说，中等收入国家由于可以在金融市场筹款，因此把钱借给它们已经不再必要。


True, private capital flows have surged in the wake of global liberalization and these countries’ privatization schemes.	确实，在全球自由化以及这些国家的私有化规划浪潮后，私有资本流动大幅度上升。


But private capital flows have proven to be volatile and prone to sudden interruptions, as exemplified by the Asian and Russian financial crises of the late 1990’s, or more recently by investors pulling out from infrastructure sectors.	但是，正如九十年代末期亚洲和俄国的金融危机以及最近投资者从基础设施部门抽身等事件所展示的那样，私有资本流动波动巨大，而且容易突然间中断。


Another line of suspicion against public lending is that it crowds out private investment.	反对公共借款的另一个怀疑理由是，这会排挤私人投资。


However, an increasing body of evidence documents the positive impact of public investment on productivity and economic growth.	但是，越来越多的证据表明了公共投资对于生产率和经济增长的正面影响。


It suggests complementarity rather than substitutability between private and public funds.	这表明，私人投资和公共投资之间是互通有无而非相互取代的关系。


Detractors ultimately fall back on the argument that multilateral lending to middle-income countries is waning along with demand.	抨击者们最终回到这一说法，就是向中等收入国家提供多边贷款随着需求的降低而降低。


But, while loan volumes have decreased by a third since the last financial crisis, this is only a return to normalcy.	但是，尽管从上一次金融危机以来贷款数量下降了三分之一，这只不过是回归正常水平。


After an all-time high due to emergency aid to countries like South Korea or Argentina, lending is back to its trend line of around $25 billion a year.	在对像韩国或阿根廷等国创记录的紧急援助后，贷款回到了正常的250亿美元左右。


While lending by the World Bank did fall below its mid-1990’s level, it is growing again, reflecting the expansion of regional multilateral banks and a policy pendulum that is swinging back to publicly-financed infrastructure projects.	尽管世界银行的贷款下降到九十年代中期水平以下，现在又开始增长，反映出地区性多边银行的扩张以及政策钟摆正在摇回到公众融资的基础设施项目上。


This does not mean that business as usual should be good enough for the World Bank.	这并不意味着一切正常对于世界银行来说就是很好。


Its products need to be adapted.	其产品应当适应形势。


With decentralization taking place in many emerging economies, sub-national authorities are taking on more responsibilities.	许多新兴经济体正在非集权化，非中央当局正在承担越来越多的责任。


The Bank should be able to work with them in the absence of sovereign guarantees, and increase its loan offerings in local currencies, since these partners cannot afford currency risk.	世界银行应当能够在没有中央政权担保的情况下与它们合作，并增加用当地货币提供的贷款，这是因为这些合作伙伴无法承受货币风险。


To further “crowd in ” the private sector, insurance and guarantees can help.	为了进一步让私营部门挤身其中，保险和担保可以提供帮助。


Beyond this, more financial engineering is needed to draw upon the creativity of financial markets.	除了这些，还需要更多的金融工程来发挥金融市场的创造力。


Finally, as David de Ferranti, a former World Bank vice-president, has pointed out, the Bank should expand its intellectual partnerships and engage with the highly trained professionals, consulting firms, and research institutions that emerging countries now boast.	最后，正如世界银行前任副总裁德菲朗迪所言，世界银行应当扩大其知识界的合作伙伴关系，接触受过高等培训的专业人士、咨询公司以及新兴国家中拥有的研究机构。


The Bank must be open to local invention if it is to be accepted by and relevant to middle-income nations.	世界银行如果想要被中等收入国家所接受并有所实际价值，就必须对当地的发明开放。


In terms of purchasing power parity, per capita income in middle-income countries is still about 15% of that of developed nations.	在购买力水平上，中等收入国家的人均收入依然只是发达国家的15%。


The time has not yet come to shake hands and part company.	现在还不是握手道别的时候。


Convergence is on the way, but minimizing its global costs requires redesigning the Bretton Woods institutions to meet the challenges faced by emerging countries.	汇聚正在发生，但是将其全球性代价降低到最低要求重新设计布雷顿森林体系来满足新兴国家面临的挑战。


Reinvigorating the US-Japan Alliance	重振美日同盟


NEW YORK – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s current visit to the United States provides an ideal opportunity to reinvigorate the long-standing US-Japan bilateral alliance in the face of an increasingly aggressive China and persistent tensions on the Korean Peninsula.	纽约——面对越来越高调的中国和朝鲜半岛的持续紧张局势，日本首相安倍晋三此次访美提供了重振美日长期双边同盟的一个绝好机会。


For a half-century, the US-Japan alliance has been a cornerstone of Asian and global peace, security, and stability – and Japan has been an outstanding global citizen.	半个世纪以来，美日同盟一直是亚洲及世界和平、安全和稳定的基石，日本也一直是全球公民的表率。 其他亚洲国家成功仿效了由日本开创的经济增长模式；


Japan developed the economic-growth model that other Asian countries later emulated so successfully; actively contributed to global economic development; participated in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions (including paying a disproportionately high percentage of UN costs); and has helped to set a global standard for environmental protection and sustainable development.	日本还积极参与全球经济发展并参与联合国和其他多边机构（包括拨付远超其所应承担比例的联合国经费）； 并参与环保及可持续发展全球标准的制定工作。


As Abe arrives in Washington, DC, Japan and the US are both facing significant internal and external challenges, including rising tensions in Asia.	安倍抵达华盛顿之际，日美两国都面临亚洲紧张局势升温等重大的国内和国际挑战。


In recent months, Chinese aircraft have repeatedly violated Japanese airspace over the East China Sea, and a Chinese naval vessel locked its weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter.	中国飞机近几个月多次侵犯东海的日本领空，而且中国海军舰艇曾对日本驱逐舰和直升机锁定武器定位雷达。


Likewise, a Chinese military intelligence unit in Shanghai has reportedly hacked – and stolen from – a multitude of US businesses.	同样，据悉中国上海的军事情报单位针对众多美国企业进行了黑客攻击和盗窃。


And North Korea conducted its third nuclear test earlier this month, sending shock waves through the region.	本月初朝鲜举行的第三次核试验震惊了整个亚太。


Tackling these challenges will require strong US-Japanese cooperation.	应对上述挑战需要强化美日合作。


But, to enhance the alliance’s impact, both countries must first focus on reinvigorating their own societies and economies.	但两国必先重振本国的社会经济活力，才能强化联盟的影响力。


For the US, that requires overcoming a political culture characterized by polarization and crisis in order to develop effective policies aimed at boosting economic competitiveness.	对美国而言，这意味着克服以分化和危机为代表的政治文化特征，并制定有效政策增强经济竞争力。


In some ways, Japan’s domestic challenges are even more daunting, given that its political system has produced six prime ministers in as many years, none of whom managed to address effectively Japan’s stagnant economy, decade-long deflation, and shrinking workforce.	鉴于现行政治制度在同期产生了六任首相，但没有一任能有效解决日本经济停滞、十年通缩及劳动人口不断锐减等严重问题，因此在某些方面，日本的国内挑战甚至更为艰巨。


Japan should move to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations – aimed at creating a free-trade zone in the Asia-Pacific region – which could help to open up Japan’s overprotected and under-competitive economy, just as accession to the World Trade Organization did for China.	日本应力求加入以创建亚太自贸区为目的的泛太平洋伙伴关系谈判，这可能像加入世贸对中国那样放开过度保护且缺乏竞争力的日本经济。


To stem the contraction of its workforce, Japan should launch a major initiative to enhance female employment – and women’s role at all levels of the economy and society.	日本应推出鼓励女性就业的重大举措，全面改善妇女在经济社会中所处的地位，以防止劳动力人数进一步降低。


By implementing measures to improve citizens’ proficiency in English and promoting study abroad, Japan’s leaders can tackle the rising insularity, cultural isolation, and inadequate foreign-language skills that are stifling its social and economic development.	日本领导人应着力提升民众的英语能力及推动出国留学，并借此解决与外界隔离不断加剧、文化孤立和外语能力不足扼杀经济社会发展等问题。


Beyond strengthening the economy and bolstering its partnership with the US, Japan must address the enduring suspicions of countries that were brutalized by Japan’s occupation before and during World War II.	除强化经济及日美合作伙伴关系外，日本必须正视二战爆发前及进行中日本野蛮占领给其他国家造成的持久的怀疑。


Although previous Japanese governments have issued apologies for the country’s past behavior, Japan, unlike Germany, has not fully faced its history.	尽管之前的日本政府已经为国家过去的行为进行过道歉， 但与德国不同，日本始终未能彻底地直面历史。


During his election campaign, Abe, a self-declared nationalist, expressed a desire to revise Japan’s 1995 apology for its occupation and war record.	自称民族主义者的安倍在竞选时曾表示要修改1995年日本对占领及战争记录的道歉。


But he did so while visiting – and voicing his wish to return to – Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, a nationalist pilgrimage site that commemorates, among others, 14 Class A and more than 1,000 Class B and C war criminals.	但安倍同时参观、并表示希望回到被视为民族主义圣地的东京靖国神社，那里供奉着14名甲级战犯，所供奉的乙级和丙级战犯数更是超过1，000人。


With Japan’s security in jeopardy, its leaders can no longer afford to be vague about the country’s past.	在安全受到威胁的情况下，日本领导人再也不能对国家的历史表态模糊不清。


Rather, Abe should reaffirm the country’s 1995 statement; apologize again, even more firmly; and revise or close the Yūshūkanmilitary and war museum at Yasukuni, which glorifies Japan’s militarist past while ignoring its concomitant atrocities.	相反，安倍应重申该国1995年发表的声明并再次致歉，并且此次致歉的态度应当更加坚决； 此外还应改造或关闭靖国神社军事战争博物馆游就馆，停止美化日本军国主义过去并无视因此而造成的暴行。


Japan should also reach out to South Korea, America’s other ally in the region, and demonstrate greater flexibility in an effort to resolve the two countries’ long-standing maritime border dispute.	日本还应主动与韩国等美国区域盟友改善关系，并在解决两国为时已久的海上边境争端中表现出更大的灵活性。


The US and Japan must make clear that China’s provocative behavior in the East China Sea over the last six months is unacceptable, while highlighting China’s obligation to help to rein in North Korea’s nuclear program.	美日必须明确指出过去6个月中国在东海的挑衅行为不可接受，并强调中国在遏制朝鲜核计划中应当承担的责任。


If this demonstration of shared values and resolve does not alter China’s behavior, a wider conversation would inevitably begin in Japan about the potential revision of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, which essentially denies Japan the ability to maintain armed forces like most other “normal” countries.	如果中国的所作所为并未因明确共同价值观和决心而有所改变，那么修订1947年宪法第9条的潜在对话将不可避免地在日本国内大规模展开，从根本上允许日本向其他多数“正常”国家那样保有军队。


This week, US President Barack Obama and Abe should reinvigorate the bilateral alliance, reaffirming the principles on which it is based and committing to ever-closer military and strategic collaboration.	本周，美国总统奥巴马和安倍晋三应重振美日双边同盟的活力，重申美日同盟原则并前所未有地强化军事和战略合作。


If the two countries work to tackle problems in their own societies, and to strengthen the alliance that binds them, the partnership could be as significant in the future as it has ever been in the past.	如果两国携手在解决国内社会问题的同时加强美日联盟力量，美日伙伴关系将在未来继续发挥重大作用。


What to Do with Doing Business?	怎样使用《营商环境报告》？


CAMBRIDGE – Under pressure from China and other governments, the World Bank is considering discontinuing its Doing Business report.	美国剑桥—在中国和其他政府的压力下，世界银行正在考虑中止《营商环境报告》（Doing Business）。


It has asked Trevor Manuel, a long-time South African cabinet minister, to lead a commission to look into the matter.	世行要求南非资深内阁部长曼努埃尔（Trevor Manuel）领衔的委员会研究这方面的事宜。


Doing Business – the brainchild of, among others, my Harvard colleague Andrei Shleifer and Simeon Djankov, a World Bank staffer who later became Bulgaria’s finance minister – measures such indicators as the time and cost required to register a business, pay taxes, trade across borders, obtain a loan, get a construction license, or enforce a contract.	《营商环境报告》是我的哈佛同事施莱弗（Andrei Shleifer）和徳扬科夫（Simeon Djankov）提出的，后者曾是世界银行职员，后来成为保加利亚财政部长。 该报告衡量一系列指标，比如注册企业、纳税、跨境贸易、获得贷款、获得建筑执照和执行合同等行为所需要的时间和成本。


The data are provided by law firms, which complete a questionnaire about the legal and administrative requirements of performing these tasks.	数据由律师事务所提供，后者填写关于完成这些任务所需满足的法律和行政要求的调查问卷。


The project emerged from a research question that goes to the heart of the debate on the proper role and actual motivations of the state in regulating markets: Does regulation exist to achieve some laudable social goal or mainly to extract rents?	该项目来自一个直指国家在监管市场方面所应该扮演的合适角色及其实际动机的争论的焦点的研究问题：监管的存在有助于实现值得追求的社会目标还是纯属攫取租金？


This question has long divided economists along a right-left axis, at least since University of Chicago economists George Stigler and Milton Friedman argued that many, if not most, regulations were motivated by rent-seeking among bureaucrats and business incumbents.	长期以来，这一问题把经济学家分为左右两派，其历史可以追溯到芝加哥大学经济学家施蒂格勒（George Stigler）和弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）指出许多（如果不是全部的话）监管的动机是官僚和现有企业的寻租。


The Doing Business project calculates dozens of separate indicators that are then averaged into a single number.	《营商环境报告》项目计算众多独立制表，然后将其平均化成为一个单一数字。


As with all numerical indicators that try to express a very complex reality, there is always room for improvement.	由于这是试图描述非常复杂的现实的数字指标，因此总是存在改善空间。


I, for one, find the underlying indicators more informative than the average.	包括我在内的一批人发现基础指标比平均指标包含的信息量更大。


Averaging the numbers assumes that all components are substitutes: if you cannot improve on one, you can compensate by improving on another.	数字平均化假设所有成分都是替代性的：如果你无法改善甲数字，你可以通过改善乙数字作为补偿。


But I think of them as complements: if you cannot build your plant, you do not benefit from more accommodating trade rules.	但我认为这些指标是互补性的：如果你无法建立你的工厂，就无法通过调整贸易规则获益。


A single problem can be fatal, even if other indicators are strong.	一个问题就可以是致命的，即使其他指标十分强大。


Moreover, Doing Business measures the burden of compliance with regulations, not their effectiveness.	此外，《营商环境报告》用规则而不是其有效性衡量合规的负担。


The indicators do not penalize a country that cheaply and expeditiously authorizes shoddy construction projects, dangerous imports, or abusive labor practices.	这些指标并不惩罚廉价而迅速地批准劣质建设项目、危险进口品和虐待劳动力的国家。


Nevertheless, the burdens in some countries are so obvious that they could hardly be explained as the consequence of anything other than ineptitude or predation.	尽管如此，一些国家的负担太明显，除了用失职和掠夺之外无法解释。


By making visible some government inefficiencies, the report has galvanized pressure to streamline procedures, with many countries adopting policies to reduce the burden that their regulations place on their citizens.	该报告将一些政府无效性可视化，形成了简化程序的压力，许多国家采取了减轻规则给公民造成的负担的政策。


The indices name and shame poor performers, so it is no surprise that these countries – like China, which is ranked 91st – object to Doing Business.	指数给出表现不佳的国家，让它们蒙羞，因此，无怪乎这些国家——比如中国，它排名第91——反对反对《营商环境报告》。


This should be reason enough to continue the report; indeed, the fact that China has the world’s highest investment rate suggests that, despite the Doing Business indicators, it is possible to do business there.	这应该足以成为继续发布报告的理由； 事实上，中国投资率世界第一这一事实表明，尽管在《营商环境报告》中成绩不佳，仍然可以在那里做生意。


The idea of creating and publishing an index with country rankings is a strategy adopted by many organizations and social movements to raise awareness about issues such as corruption, governance, freedom, gender equality, competitiveness, productive knowhow, and the investment climate, among others.	构造并发布国家排名指数是许多组织和社会运动采取的策略，这样可以提高人们对问题的认识，比如腐败、治理、自由、 性别平等、竞争力、生产技术和投资环境等。


The main problem with these indices is not so much how they are calculated as how they are used.	这些指数的主要问题主要在于如何使用，而不在于如何计算。


In general, such indices work best as a catalyst for debate about an issue.	总的来说，这些指数的最佳用途是作为问题争论的催化剂。


By contrast, they work very badly when viewed as a policy framework.	而作为政策框架则效果最差。


It is common – but almost never wise – to think that the goal of policy should be to improve countries’ rankings.	认为政策目标应该是改善一国排名的想法是很不明智的（但最为普遍）。


For example, in a recent paper, Shleifer and his co-authors measured government effectiveness by mailing letters to non-existent business addresses in 159 countries and measuring how long it took for the letters to be returned – or whether they were returned at all.	比如，在最新论文中，施莱弗及其合作者测量了政府效率。 他们向159个国家的不存在的地址投递信件，测量信件被退回（或是否会被退回）需要多长时间。


They found that this indicator correlated very well with many other governance indicators.	他们发现，该指标与其他治理指标之间的相关性相当好。


Typically, countries that are bad at running a post office are also bad at running other organizations.	通常，在邮政系统低劣的国家其他组织也低劣。


But it does not follow that if a country wants to improve government effectiveness it should focus on returning wrongly addressed letters promptly.	但这并不是说，如果一国向盖上政府效率，就应该专注于迅速地退回地址错误的信件。


This point applies to the Doing Business report.	这一点也适用于《营商环境报告》。


For example, to measure the difficulty of dealing with licenses, Doing Business’s indicators examine the burden of obtaining a permit to build a warehouse.	比如，在衡量处理执照方面，《营商环境报告》的指标考察获得建造仓库的许可的负担。


But firms must deal with licenses in many areas – such as medical devices and drugs, radio stations, mines, bars, banks, insurance companies, airlines, and taxis – that are not included in the report’s indicators, even though they may be major obstacles to doing business.	但企业需要在诸多方面面临执照问题，比如医疗设备和药品、无线电站、矿产、酒吧、银行、保险公司、航空公司和出租车等——这些都没有包括在《营商环境报告》指标中，尽管它们可能是做生意的主要障碍。


Countries that regard raising their ranking as a policy goal have no incentive to improve licensing procedures in any of these other areas.	将提升排名作为政策目标的国家没有动力改善这些领域的执照发放程序。


Moreover, in the Atlas of Economic Complexity, my co-authors and I show that these indicators are weakly related, if at all, to economic growth.	此外，在《经济复杂性地图集》（Atlas of Economic Complexity）中，我与我的合作者证明了这些指标与经济增长的相关性很弱（如果存在相关性的话）。


Improving on them does not foretell more economic dynamism.	改善它们并不意味着经济更有活力。


Many countries – including Colombia, Liberia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia – have at some point made improvement in the Doing Business ranking, or that of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, a policy goal.	许多国家——包括哥伦比亚、利比里亚、墨西哥和沙特——在某种程度上将改善《营商环境报告》和《全球竞争力报告》（Global Competitiveness Report，世界经济论坛的项目）排名作为政策目标之一。


This distracted them from focusing on what is important rather than on what was included in the index.	这导致它们专注于指数所包括对内容，而不是真正重要的内容。


Countries should, instead, focus on the ultimate goal: generating a rapid increase in the number of productive jobs.	各国应该专注于终极目标：创造生产性就业岗位的快速增长。


The challenge consists in finding ways to get there, and is best addressed through rich and deep interactions between government and society.	这一挑战包括寻找达到目标的办法，其最佳解决方式是政府和社会的大规模深度互动。


International benchmarks may be useful for getting an idea of achievable performance in a particular area; the more, the better.	国际基准可以用于确定在某一领域的可实现表现； 越多越好。


But the key is to improve on the areas that matter, regardless of whether existing global indicators cover them.	但关键在于改善真正有用的领域，不管现有国际指标是否覆盖它。


Malaria’s Deadly Comeback	疟疾的致命反击


SINGAPORE – The dramatic drop in malaria deaths since the beginning of the century is one of the great public-health success stories of recent years.	新加坡—本世纪初以来疟疾病情的显著减少是近几年来公共卫生事业的重大成就之一。


Thanks to concerted investments in prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, the number of people killed by the disease each year has declined 60% since 2000, saving more than six million lives.	归功于预防、诊断和治疗投资的多管齐下，因疟疾而死亡的人数自2000年以来减少了 60%，拯救了超过六百万人的生命。


And yet, even as the dream of eliminating malaria seems closer to becoming reality, growing drug resistance is threatening these remarkable gains.	但是，尽管根除疟疾的梦想似乎越来越接近于现实，抗药性的增强却正在威胁这些令人瞩目的成就。


Resistance to the most effective antimalarial medicine, artemisinin, has emerged in Cambodia and is spreading across the Mekong Delta region.	柬埔寨已经出现最有效的抗疟疾药物青蒿素的抗药性，并在湄公河三角洲地区蔓延。


Without effective and timely action, this new, resistant form of malaria will become widespread – a pattern that has already occurred twice with older malaria medicines.	如果不采取及时有效的行动，这一新型抗药疟疾将广泛蔓延——这此前的疟疾治疗史上曾经发生过两次。


Governments, international organizations, civil-society groups, and companies must take urgent steps to prevent an epidemic of resistant malaria and stop a painful episode from recurring.	政府、国际组织、公民社会团体和公司必须采取紧急措施防止抗药性疟疾的传染，防止重蹈覆辙。


In order to delay the spread of resistance long enough to allow new drugs to come onstream, an urgent short-term objective must be achieved: preventing resistance from taking hold in South and Southeast Asia and spreading elsewhere.	为了延缓抗药性的蔓延，争取足够的时间让新药投入生产，必须实现一个紧迫的短期目标：阻止抗药性占领南亚和东南亚并向其他地区蔓延。


If history is any guide, artemisinin resistance could move into India and onward to Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, putting millions of lives at risk and jeopardizing decades of progress.	从历史上看，青蒿素抗药性可能进入印度，然后向撒哈拉以南非洲和世界其他地区扩展，威胁数百万人的生命，让数十年的进步毁于一旦。


In the 1950s, resistance to another medicine, chloroquine, emerged along the Thai-Cambodia border.	20世纪50年代，对另一种药物氯喹的抗药性开始沿泰国-柬埔寨边境出现。


The same thing then happened in the 1970s with sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP).	20世纪70年代，同样的情况发生在SP（sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine）身上。


From Southeast Asia, resistance to chloroquine and SP spread to India, and from there to Africa and much of the rest of the world.	从东南亚开始，氯喹和SP抗药性蔓延到印度，再从印度蔓延到非洲和其他许多地区。


Millions have died as a result, most of them young African children.	数百万人因此丧生，其中大部分是非洲儿童。


The consequences of widespread artemisinin resistance would be similarly devastating.	普遍的青蒿素抗药性的后果可能不遑多让。


Even the most conservative estimates paint a grim picture.	即使是最保守的估计也相当惨淡。


One study found that its spread could result in more than 116,000 additional deaths each year and roughly $417 million in associated medical costs and productivity losses – above and beyond the $12 billion in productivity losses malaria already costs Sub-Saharan Africa each year.	一项研究发现青蒿素抗药性的蔓延可能导致每年增加116,000人死亡，带来大约4. 17亿美元的医疗成本和生产率损失——这些还没有包括目前疟疾给撒哈拉以南非洲带来的每年120亿美元的生产率损失。


Despite broad-based concern over the past eight years, artemisinin resistance has not been contained.	尽管过去八年已经引起了广泛的关注，但青蒿素抗药性尚未得到遏制。


On the contrary, it has now been detected in Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar, on India’s eastern border.	相反，目前它已在柬埔寨、越南、老挝、泰国和缅甸（印度东境）等地被发现。


There has been a welcome increase in donor support, notably the Regional Artemisinin-resistance Initiative, funded by a $100-million grant from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.	赞助支持的增加值得欢迎，主要包括全球抗艾滋病、结核病和疟疾基金提供1亿美元资金支持的地区青蒿素抗药性项目。


But the slow strengthening of conventional control interventions is not proving capable of outpacing the spread of resistance.	但常规控制干预手段的缓慢强化无法超过抗药性蔓延的速度。


To end malaria, we need a united global front against the drivers of resistance.	要根除疟疾，我们需要全球合作解决抗药性的推进因素。


In addition to efforts to contain artemisinin resistance in the Greater Mekong sub-region, action is needed farther afield.	除了在大湄公河次区域开展遏制青蒿素抗药性的努力，还需要采取进一步行动。


According to the World Health Organization, as of November 2015, national health authorities in six African countries and Colombia had not yet withdrawn their marketing authorizations for oral artemisinin monotherapies – an important driver of resistance.	据世界卫生组织数据，到2015年11月，六个非洲国家和柬埔寨国家卫生部门仍未取消口服青蒿素单一疗法的上市许可。 而该疗法是抗药性的重要推动因素。


Stronger commitments from the private sector will be needed as well.	还需要来自私人部门的更强的承诺。


As of December 2015, 21 drug manufacturers contacted by the WHO had not yet agreed to stop producing oral artemisinin monotherapies.	到2015年12月，世界卫生组织所联系的21家药品制造商仍未同意停止生产口服青蒿素单一疗法药物。


More than two-thirds of these companies are located in Asia.	这些公司中有三分之二位于亚洲。


Research-based pharmaceutical companies must also invest in the next generation of antimalarial medicines.	基于研究的制药公司还必须投资于下一代抗疟疾药物。


While many artemisinin-based treatments remain effective, at some point they will need to be replaced – or risk becoming part of the problem.	尽管许多基于青蒿素的疗法仍然有效，但迟早它们需要被取代——否则有可能成为问题的一部分。


Through a public-private partnership with the Singapore Economic Development Board, the Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases has led the formation of a research consortium with this precise aim.	诺华热带疾病研究所（Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases）与新加坡经济发展局进行了公私合作，领衔成立了目标明确的研究联盟。


The effort has already yielded two promising new antimalarial drug candidates currently in Phase 2 clinical trials – new classes of compounds that treat malaria in different ways from current therapies and thus have the potential to combat emerging drug resistance.	我们的努力已经产生了两种非常有希望的新抗疟疾候选药物，目前正在进行第2阶段临床试验——这两种药物采用新的化合物治疗疟疾，药理不同于现有疗法，因此有望战胜新出现的抗药性。


More broadly, product development partnerships, such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative and the Medicines for Malaria Venture, are bringing together academic, pharmaceutical, and funding partners to deliver potential new treatments for neglected diseases.	更广泛地看，产品开发合作，如被忽略疾病药品（Drugs for Neglected Diseases）计划和疟疾风险治疗（Medicines for Malaria Venture），正在促进学术、制药和资金合作方合作为被忽略疾病研发潜在新疗法。


These collaborations can shepherd promising compounds through the lengthy and expensive process of drug development and approval.	这些合作能够让大有希望的合成药通过漫长而昂贵的药物开发和批准流程。


Two other antimalarial compounds in Phase 2 clinical trials are currently being developed with support from Medicines for Malaria Venture – one with Takeda Pharmaceuticals and the US National Institutes of Health, and another with the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi.	另外两种处于第2阶段临床试验的抗疟疾合成药目前正在疟疾风险治疗的支持下进行开发——其中之一与武田制药（Takeda Pharmaceuticals）和美国国家卫生研究所（National Institutes of Health），另一种药物与法国赛诺菲制药公司合作。


We may be winning many battles against malaria, but familiar warning signs indicate we could lose the war.	我们也许正在赢得与疟疾的多场战斗，但熟悉的警告信号表明我们可能输掉这场战争。


The spread of artemisinin resistance in Asia today threatens the lives of children in Africa tomorrow.	今天在亚洲蔓延的青蒿素抗药性明天将威胁到非洲儿童的生命。


That’s why we need effective action to prevent the spread of artemisinin resistance, including urgent investments in the next generation of antimalarial treatments.	因此，我们需要拿出有效的行动防止青蒿素抗药性蔓延，包括紧急投资于下一代抗疟疾疗法。


If we do not heed the history of malaria, we may be doomed to repeat it.	如果我们不留心疟疾的历史，就必然会重蹈历史的覆辙。


Malaya and Sri Lanka: Communal Politics or Communal War?	马来亚和斯里兰卡：种族政治还是种族战争？


Sri Lanka's bitter war of terror - one that practically invented the infamy of the suicide bomber - had been showing signs of abating of late.	斯里兰卡惨烈的恐怖战争-自杀式炸弹袭击的始作俑者-近来有趋于缓和的迹象。


But a bitter power struggle between Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, and a schism among the rebel Tamil tigers, now threatens to reignite the violence.	但其总统库马拉通加和总理维克勒马哈辛之间激烈的权力斗争和泰米尔猛虎组织间的派系分裂又使该国处于战火重燃的边缘。


Their political duel was aggravated recently when the President, wary that her prime ministerial rival was "too soft" in dealing with the rebel Tamil Tigers, sacked three ministers and took over their portfolios.	他们之间的政治斗争最近激化了。 矛盾的导火线是总统以其首相政敌在对付泰米尔猛虎叛军的问题上"太软弱"为由罢免了三位部长并接管其职务。


Now she has dissolved parliament and set new elections for April, three years before they are due.	现在她已经解散了议会并将新的大选定在今年4月份举行，足足提前了三年。


Having lived through the Malayan war of 1947-1960, I often wonder why Sri Lanka's war has been so much more difficult to end.	亲身经历了1947-1960的马来战争，我时常困惑于斯里兰卡的战事为何更难结束。


On the surface, much about those two wars seem similar.	从表面上看，两次战争有许多共同点。


In Malaya, ethnic Chinese fought British and Malay regiments and police, which is roughly comparable to the Tamils' fight against the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.	在马来亚，华裔反抗英国和马来政权及警察的情况大致可以与泰米尔人在斯里兰卡反抗僧迦罗人相比。


Like the Tamil Tigers, the Malayan Communists were also damned as terrorists, but the casualties they inflicted were small compared to the mass killings caused by both sides in Sri Lanka's war.	与泰米尔猛虎组织一样，马来共产党也被谴责为恐怖分子，但他们引发的伤亡较之斯里兰卡战争双方所施行的大规模屠杀要小得多。


Back then, Malaysia's ethnic tensions produced communal riots in which both Chinese and Malays were killed.	在那个年代，马来西亚紧张的种族关系造成了种族骚乱。


These, however, were never allowed to degenerate into the outright communal slaughter that the war in Sri Lanka has often produced.	在骚乱中，华人和马来人都有伤亡。 但这些冲突从未蜕化为在斯里兰卡经常出现的那种彻底的种族屠杀。


Could Sri Lanka have learned anything from the Malayan experience?	斯里兰卡本可以吸取马来亚的前车之鉴吗？


Could the Malayan military strategy to contain the rebellion have been imported?	马来亚遏制叛乱的军事战略本可以从别国舶来吗？


British experts from the Malayan emergency tried to help the Americans in Vietnam - obviously without success.	经历过马来亚紧急状态的英国专家曾试图帮助身陷越南的美国人-结果无功而返。


Of course, one reason for that failure is that the South Vietnamese were not different enough from the North Vietnamese for the Malayan formula of identifying and isolating rebel communities by race to work.	当然，导致失败的一个原因是马来亚通过种族差异识别和孤立叛乱群体的公式在越南不管用，因为南越人和北越人并没有足够大的差别。


But Sri Lanka's war, with its ethnic origins, is closer to the Malayan experience and so this strategy could, perhaps, have been tested.	但源于种族矛盾的斯里兰卡战争更接近于马来亚的情况，因此这一战略本应该被试验过吧。


A second similarity comes from the fact that the British were the imperial power in both countries.	另一个相似点是英国人在两国都代表了宗主国势力。


At independence, national leaders in both countries inherited similar sets of laws and administrative practices.	在独立之际，两国的国家领导人都继承了相似的法律和行政体系。


Indeed, at the time Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) achieved independence, it was far more committed to democracy and the common-law legal system than Malaya.	确实，当锡兰（现称斯里兰卡）赢得独立时，它比马来亚更坚定地实行民主和习惯法法律体系。


So why did multi-communal politics ultimately work in Malaya, and then in both Malaysia and Singapore, and fail so badly in Ceylon?	那么为什么多种族政治最终能在马来亚实行并随后在马来西亚和新加坡取得成功，但却在锡兰一败涂地呢？


One key reason must be the historical experience of the Sinhalese.	一个关键原因一定是僧迦罗人的历史经历。


For two thousand years, they had to defend themselves against attacks by expansionist Tamil kingdoms from the Indian mainland.	两千年来，他们不得不抵御来自印度大陆的泰米尔王国的扩张和侵略。


As I traveled around the island admiring its ancient capitals, notably the ones sacked by Tamil kings, and Buddhist shrines set up to counter the impact of Hinduism, I began to understand the traumas endured by the Sinhalese.	当我在这个岛国游历，景仰其被泰米尔国王们遗弃的废都和为对抗印度教的影响而建的佛教寺庙时，才开始了解僧迦罗人所忍受的精神创伤。


Sadly, the Tamils now living in the Jaffna districts in the northern and eastern parts of the island are probably descended from Tamils who were also victims of the same external attacks.	同样不幸的是现在生活在斯里兰卡岛北部和东部的贾夫纳地区的泰米尔人后裔。 他们的祖辈可能也是同样的外来侵略的受害者。


Another factor arose from the fact that Tamils, on the whole, had been open to a succession of Portuguese, Dutch, and British administrations from the 16th century onwards, while most Sinhalese lived under their own king in the Kandyan kingdom until the 19th century.	另一个因素是源自这样一个事实：从16世纪以来，泰米尔人总体上陆续接受葡萄牙人、荷兰人和英国人的政权。 而大多数僧迦罗人直到19世纪都处于其自己的坎迪王国国王的统治之下。


In particular, the Buddhist priests, who are the guardians of the faith and have wielded much influence in Sri Lanka politics since the mid-1950's, were the least touched by foreign rule.	特别是佛教僧人作为宗教信仰的守护者最少被外来统治触及。 他们自20世纪50年代中期以来一直在斯里兰卡政治中发挥着重要影响。


They are determined to limit Hindu Tamil power in Sri Lankan affairs and encourage the country's leaders to make few concessions to Tamil autonomy.	他们坚决地在斯里兰卡的事务中限制印度教泰米尔人的势力，并鼓励该国领导人不在泰米尔自治问题上让步。


Furthermore, the degree of rigidity in inter-ethnic negotiations since the rise to power of the Bandaranaike family (of which the current President is a member) was accompanied by a series of ideological struggles among Sinhalese politicians, not least those led by various socialist and communist parties.	另外，自班达拉奈克家族（现任总统也是其中一员）掌权以来，部族间的谈判就裹足不前，随之而来的还有一系列僧迦罗政治家之间，特别是那些接受不同社会主义和共产主义党派领导的政治家之间的意识形态斗争。


This ongoing disunity among the Sinhalese contributed to making Sri Lanka's governments much more fragile than those that succeeded the British in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.	僧迦罗人之间这种一盘散沙的状况使得斯里兰卡政府比那些接替英国统治的吉隆坡和新加坡的政府更为脆弱。


What was decisively different between Ceylon and Malaya, however, is found in the fact that, in Ceylon, both major communities consider themselves to be natives, having both lived on the land they hold for over twenty centuries.	然而锡兰和马来亚之间具有决定性的不同点是：在锡兰，两个主要种族群体都认为自己是在这片土地上生活了两千多年的原住民。


In contrast, the Malay Peninsula, including the island of Singapore, was the land of the Malays (Tanah Melayu) before the first Chinese and Indian immigrants came and settled there.	相形之下，包括新加坡岛在内的马来半岛在最早的华人和印度移民到来之前一直是马来人的国家（Tanah Melayu）。


The British, who did not depose the Malay rulers as they did the Singhalese king in Kandy, made sure that the native position of the Malays was constitutionally secure from the start.	英国人没有像他们对僧迦罗人的坎迪国王那样废黜马来的统治者，从而一开始就在宪法上确保了马来人的原住民地位。


Once the Chinese recognized their place as newcomers, they had to accept that becoming full nationals of the new nation state was a status that needed to be earned.	一旦华人承认了自己新来者的身份，他们就不得不接受这样一个事实：即成为这个新国家的完全国民是必须通过争取才能得到的地位。


Although most Chinese in Malaysia now feel that they deserve the full rights of citizenship, they have not insisted on absolute equality.	虽然现在的马来西亚华人认为他们理应获得全权公民的地位，但他们并不坚持绝对的平等。


In any case, they never claim to be indigenous to any particular locale, not even in Singapore, where ethnic Chinese make up three-quarters of the population.	他们从未在任何情况下宣称自己是某一地区的原住民，甚至没有在华人占总人口７５％的新加坡。


Sri Lanka's tragedy reminds us how many things can go wrong when old Asian polities seek to establish modern nation states.	斯里兰卡的悲剧提醒我们古老的亚洲政体寻求建立现代民族国家的过程是多么的艰辛。


It becomes even more difficult when the complex historical baggage calls for sensitivity and tolerance while the protagonists are determined to see every concession as surrender.	当复杂的历史包袱需要以敏感和容忍来应对而领导者们却将每一次让步都当作屈服时，这一进程就变得更加艰难。


Malaysia’s Opposition Reborn	马来西亚反对派的重生


In Malaysia’s recent elections, opposition parties managed their strongest showing since the country gained its independence from Britain in 1957, cutting the ruling coalition’s parliamentary majority to below two-thirds.	在马来西亚最近的选举中，反对党派表现出了自该国于1957年摆脱英国统治获得独立以来最强的态势，将执政联盟的议会多数席位削减到了不足三分之二。


Where the country’s newly invigorated democracy goes from here rests with one man, Anwar Ibrahim, the deputy prime minister sacked by former premier Mahathir Mohamad and later jailed.	该国重获新生的民主何去何从还要看Anwar Ibrahim的作为。 曾任副总理的他被前总理马哈蒂尔解职后又投入监狱。


Anwar can finally make the opposition a credible check on the National Front ruling coalition, but knows that he will never become prime minister this way.  No one, after all, expects the opposition to win enough seats to form a government in the conceivable future.	Anwar最终能使反对派成为对民族阵线执政联盟的有效制衡，但他也明白这样做他永远当不了总理。 毕竟，没有人期望反对派能够在可以预见的将来赢得足够席位组建政府。


He can allow himself to be wooed back by his former party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the National Front’s leading member.	他可以让自己被所属的前党派，民族阵线的主导成员—联合马来民族组织(UMNO)重新招至麾下。


UMNO is widely believed to have held talks with Anwar before.	舆论界广泛认为UMNO此前曾与Anwar会谈。


Now, more than ever, it needs Anwar to reestablish its credibility.	现在，它比以前的任何时候都更需要Anwar为其重塑公信力。


And, to become prime minister, Anwar needs UMNO.	而为了成为总理，Anwar也需要UMNO。


Arguably, being inside UMNO and the government would allow Anwar to better institute the reforms he has so ardently advocated.	或许在其重返UMNO之后，政府会让Anwar 更好地实施他一直大力提倡的改革。


But, before all that, Anwar needs to get himself elected to parliament again.	但在此之前，他需要再一次被选入议会。


Because of his prison term, Anwar was not able to run in the latest election.	由于刑期未满，Anwar不能参加最近的选举。


Instead, he acted as the de facto leader of a loose alliance between the three leading opposition forces – the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Justice Party, and the Islamist PAS.	因此他就扮演了三个主要反对党派—民主行动党(DAP)、正义党和伊斯兰主义者的PAS所组成的松散联盟的实际领导人的角色。


Political restrictions on Anwar, however, end next month, and an MP from his Justice Party – probably his wife – is expected to step aside to allow him to run in a by-election.	但对Anwar的政治制约到下个月就终止了。 他所在的正义党的一位议员—很可能是他的妻子—会让位从而使他能参加补缺选举。


If Anwar were to marry his leadership and charisma to the opposition’s newfound heft in the federal legislature – 82 MPs, compared with 20 in the last parliament – serious policy alternatives to the government’s might be expected.	如果Anwar能将自己的领导力与个人魅力和反对派新获得的在联邦立法机构中实力—82名议员，较之上一届议会的20名—结合起来，就完全有可能推动与政府不同的政策主张。


Until now, the opposition has chiefly acted as an irritant, and voters viewed debates as entertainment, rather than as exchanges that informed policy.	可直到现在反对派还主要作为执政联盟的刺激物，选民们将辩论看作娱乐，而不是有利于政策制定的思想交锋。


For the same reason, policy platforms have never been important for the opposition in elections.	出于同样的原因，政策平台对反对派而言在竞选中从来没有什么重要作用。


Many who voted for the DAP on Saturday, for example, are unlikely to have known or cared about what the party stood for.	比如很多在星期天给DAP投了票的人很可能对该党的政治主张全然不知或毫不关心。


Traditionally, people voted for the DAP or the Justice Party to show their displeasure with the National Front.	在传统上，人们给DAP或正义党投票是为了表示对民族阵线的不满。


Indeed, if ideas were important, a leftist party like the DAP would have found it difficult to cooperate with the PAS.	的确，如果政治理念重要的话，像DAP这样一个左翼政党会发现自己很难和PAS合作。


But cooperate they did.	但现实中它们却是合作关系。


All this changes now that the National Front no longer has a two-thirds majority – which had allowed it to amend the constitution 40 times in 50 years.	所有的这些变化使得民族阵线不再拥有三分之二的议会多数席位—而这种优势曾经使得该联盟在过去的50年里对宪法进行了40次修改。


Parliament now will have to pay attention to any serious policy that the opposition proposes.	议会现在不得不对反对派提出的任何严肃的政策动议加以关注。


But serious opposition will require serious leadership.	但严肃的反对派需要严肃的领导力。


Strong leadership also is needed to protect the interests of the five states in which the opposition has now won control for the first time.	要保护反对派第一次赢得控制权的5个州的利益需要强大的领导力。


Because the federal government disburses fiscal allocations to Malaysia’s 13 states, the government will be tempted to squeeze opposition-held states.	因为联邦政府要给马来西亚的13个州进行财政支付的分配，所以很可能会企图挤压反对派领导的各州。


Thus, they will need strong advocacy at the federal level to ensure they receive their fair due.	因此他们就需要在联邦层面有强大的活动能力以确保受到公平的对待。


What makes the National Front’s loss particularly dramatic has been its defeat in the state legislatures of Penang, Selangor, Perak, and Kedah – large states with important industrial bases.	民族阵线在Penang, Selangor, Perak, 和 Kedah等州议会的落败使得其失利更具有戏剧性。 这些州都是重要工业基地的所在地。


(Kelantan state, however, was always expected to continue to be held by PAS.)	（然而Kelantan州却一直被认为是PAS的势力范围。 ）


Urban and middle-class voters such as those in Penang – a predominantly Chinese state with strong opposition sentiment – had always voted to keep the state legislature under the National Front in order to ensure continued funding, while sending opposition candidates to parliament to “pester” the National Front there.	城市和中产阶级的选民（就像在Penang的那些以华人为主，具有强烈的反对派情绪的选民）总是让州议会在民主阵线面前保持低姿态以确保继续得到财政资金，同时又派遣反对派的候选人去联邦议会“纠缠”执政联盟。


This calculation has been abandoned, reflecting deep dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s administration and impatience for change.	这种策略已经被摒弃，从而反映出反对派对总理Abdullah Badawi政府的不满和急于求变的心态。


Malaysia is now at a crossroads.	马来西亚正处在一个十字路口。


For five decades, its democracy has not been premised on a daily test of ideas – whether between political parties or through grassroots engagement – that is then confirmed at the ballot box.	50年以来，它的民主是建立在对理念日复一日的检验的基础之上—不论是在政治党派之间或是通过草根层面的介入—然后又通过选举来确认。


There is still a newfound opportunity to improve governance, but only Anwar has the experience to provide that direction, because no one else in the opposition has worked in government at such a senior level as he has.	现一个改善国家治理的新机遇出现了，但只有Anwar能够引导方向，因为没有任何其他人像他那样曾在政府担任如此高级的职位。


That said, it is also likely that the UMNO, in its hour of crisis, will try to recruit Anwar.	然而，UMNO也很可能在危难之际力图将Anwar招安。


Arguably, the best legacy Anwar might eventually leave Malaysia would not be what he can achieve for the UMNO and the National Front, but what role he might play in entrenching a contest of ideas into Malaysian politics – a project he has shown himself keen to promote.	或许，Anwar最终可以为马来西亚留下的最好的遗产不是他能为UMNO和民族阵线赢得什么，而是他能为马来西亚政坛开创百家争鸣的局面发挥什么样的作用—这也是他极力推动的一项事业。


Mali and the Islamic Reformation	马里和伊斯兰宗教改革


PARIS – Mali is a landlocked West African country of 15 million people, covering 1,240,000 square kilometers (478,800 square miles), three-quarters of it desert.	巴黎—马里是一个西非内陆国家，有1 500万人口，1 240 000平方公里领土，其中四分之三是沙漠。


In the fourteenth century, the powerful Mali Empire included parts of modern-day Senegal, Guinea, and Niger.	在14世纪，强大的马里帝国统治着今天的塞内加尔、圭亚那和尼日尔。


Defeated and divided, it became a French colony in the nineteenth century, regaining independence in 1960.	被击败并分崩离析后，19世纪马里成为法国殖民地，1960年赢得独立。


Mali’s population is diverse: desert nomads, notably Tuaregs, in the north, and a majority of sedentary black populations in the south.	马里的 人口十分多样化：北方分布着沙漠游牧部落，主要是图阿雷格人（Tuareg），南方分布着占据多数的定居黑人。


Many languages are spoken, but Islam, to which almost 95% of the population adheres, is a unifying factor.	马里语言众多，但伊斯兰教徒占全国人口的95%，成为一个稳定要素。


Agriculture is the main economic activity, notably in the vast internal delta of the Niger River, home to many tribes, including the Dogon, a people remarkable for their sculpture and architecture.	农业是主要经济活动，主要分布在广袤的尼日尔河内陆三角洲，这里也是众多部落的大本营，包括以雕塑和建筑著称的多贡族（Dogon）。


Long a military dictatorship, Mali became an African democratic success story from 1991 to 2012, before a coup crippled its rudimentary public institutions.	马里经历过长时间的军事独裁统治，但1991—2012年，马里成为非洲民主成功的典范，接着，一场政变摧毁了马里尚显幼稚的公共制度。


In the north, Tuaregs traveling to Mauritania, Algeria and Niger, were particularly weakened by persistent drought and the collapse of the caravan economy.	在北方，图阿雷格人向毛里塔尼亚、阿尔及利亚和尼日尔迁移，他们对持续干旱和大篷车经济的崩溃最为敏感。


Many have turned to weapons, slave, or gold trafficking; some are demanding independence.	许多人开始从事武器、奴隶和黄金买卖； 一些人开始要求独立。


In the wake of the ferocious religious war that tore Algeria apart in the 1990’s, a great number of Muslim fundamentalist Arabs fled south to the vast Sahara that covers part of Mali.	20世纪90年代，残酷的宗教战争让阿尔及利亚陷入了分裂，大量原教旨主义阿拉伯穆斯林向南逃入广袤的撒哈拉沙漠——马里正是撒哈拉沙漠的一部分。


Then, in 2011, Western-backed regime change in Libya toppled Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi and drove more fundamentalists to flee into the desert – but not before they had gotten their hands on a significant part of Qaddafi’s heavy weaponry, as well as many vehicles.	接着，2011年，在西方的支持下，利比亚推翻了卡扎菲政权，这让更多的原教旨主义者逃入撒哈拉——此时他们已经控制了卡扎菲庞大武库的主要部分，还掌握了大批车辆。


These fundamentalists, becoming bandits of sorts, came to terms with the nomadic traffickers.	这些沦为匪帮的原教旨主义者与游牧商人勾搭成奸。


All, including the traffickers, ended up embracing the fundamentalist rhetoric of revenge against infidels.	他们——包括游牧商人在内——最终都皈依了清算异教徒的原教旨主义思想。


In January 2013, these groups formed a convoy of several hundred pick-ups and ATVs, armed with heavy machineguns.	2013年1月，这些匪帮集合了几百配有重机枪的辆皮卡和越野车。


The desert cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu quickly fell to them.	加奥（Gao）、基达尔（Kidal）和廷巴克图（Timbuktu）等沙漠城市很快沦陷。


Islamic monuments, including some of Timbuktu’s glories, were destroyed.	包括廷巴克图的一些功德碑在内的伊斯兰纪念碑被摧毁。


Sharia law was applied; women who were never forced to do so before had to wear the veil.	什叶派法律被推行； 妇女被强迫佩戴面纱（此前从未有过如此要求）。


The convoys even threatened Bamako, the capital, composed mostly of black Africans.	这支匪帮部队甚至还威胁到了主要由非洲黑人组成的首都巴马科。


In a panic, acting President Dioncounda Traoré, a colonel from the south, called upon the French authorities to enforce a bilateral defense agreement, though he had contributed to the coup that drove the legally elected former president, Amadou Toumani Touré, into exile, causing the state to collapse and straining relations with France.	在恐慌中，来自南方的代理总统特劳雷上校求助于法国当局派兵履行双边防务协定，尽管他也参与了推翻合法当选的前总统图雷迫使其流亡的政变。 这场政变导致了国家的崩溃，也恶化了与法国的关系。


France has no interest in Mali other than the protection of its citizens and the stability of the Sahel region.	除了保护国民和维持萨赫勒地区稳定之外，法国在马里并无别的利益。


Indeed, France withdrew all of its permanently based military forces from Mali years ago.	事实上，多年前法国便已撤走了在马里的常驻军。


And, with fewer than a thousand French citizens still living in Mali, even its pragmatic interest is relatively slight.	居住在马里的法国侨民还不到一千人，及时从现实角度看，法国的利益也十分微小。


Although isolated, French President François Hollande courageously decided to respond firmly to Traoré’s call for help.	尽管孤军奋战，但法国总统奥朗德仍鼓起勇气决定给予特劳雷的求助积极响应。


In France, everyone understood and approved.	在法国，所有人都表示理解并批准了这一决定。


Few suggest that French military intervention was a means to recapture its colonial empire.	几乎没人认为法国的军事干预是重建其殖民帝国的举措。


And the United States – indifferent to the integrity of the Malian state and the welfare of its citizens in normal circumstances – was aware of the possibility that Mali’s vast territory could fall under fundamentalist/terrorist control.	对马里国家统一及其国民在常规环境内的福利漠不关心的美国十分清楚，马里广袤的国土可能在原教旨主义/恐怖主义的控制下分崩离析。


So it decided to take part in the transport, communications, logistical, and intelligence components of the French-led operation.	因此它决定参与由法国领导的行动，担任运输、通信、物流和情报工作。


For similar reasons, Great Britain, though allergic to any common European defense policy, offered two planes.	出于类似的理由，英国——它讨厌任何欧洲共同国防政策——也派了两架飞机。


As for Europe, it did nothing – which was foreseeable.	欧洲则无动于衷——这也是可以预见的。


France performed marvelously.	法军表现出色。


In just a few days, it managed to send in nearly 3,000 men, heavily armed and efficiently motorized.	不出几天，法国就派出了近三千充分机动化的重装军队。


Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu were recaptured; Bamako was saved.	加奥、基达尔和廷巴克图相继收复；


The fundamentalists, having lost most of their vehicles and arms to French aerial bombing, fled headlong into the desert.	巴马科成功获救。 法国的轰炸摧毁了原教旨主义者的大部分车辆和武器，他们仓皇逃入撒哈拉沙漠。


French troops are now set to return home.	现在，法军即将回国。


But, with thousands of fundamentalist killers in the desert, now poorly motorized but still armed, should they do so?	��是，沙漠中还潜藏着数千原教旨主义者，他们虽然机动性能较差但仍握有武器。 法国的撤军合理吗？


Mali, of course, is not the only country facing a fundamentalist insurrection.	当然，马里并非唯一一个面临原教旨主义者暴动的国家。


Such violence is typical of Islam’s contemporary crisis.	此类暴力行为在当代伊斯兰危机中稀松平常。


The learned, cultured, and radiant traditions of earlier centuries seem to have vanished.	过去几百年中学习、培育和发展出来的传统似乎已经消失殆尽。


Having missed their economic takeoff, many Muslim-majority countries appear open to the call of Islamist fundamentalism.	失去经济起飞机会的许多穆斯林多数国家似乎正在敞开胸腓接受伊斯兰原教旨主义的召唤。


These countries now require painful, far-reaching reforms to attain economic prosperity, a goal that presupposes cultural change as well.	这些国家如今需要痛苦、深远的改革以实现经济繁荣，这既是目标，也是文化变革的先决条件。


In Christianity, the Reformation was essential to forging democracy and capitalism.	在基督教历史上，宗教改革是促成民主和资本主义的根本原因。


But, in contemporary Islam, the powerful have always managed to eliminate would-be reformers.	但是，在当代伊斯兰教，当权者总是设法排除潜在改革者。


As a result, the Islamic world is mostly weak, partly colonized, humiliated, and economically powerless.	结果，伊斯兰世界大部分十分孱弱，一部分沦为殖民地，丧权辱国，经济萎靡。


Oil benefits a handful of princes.	石油收益则是一小撮贵族的禁脔。


Despite their travails, only a few thousand of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims have embraced the extremist project of killing infidels and moderates.	尽管经历着如此痛苦，在全球15亿穆斯林中，只有几千人持有杀光异教徒和温和派的极端主义思想。


But, amid the resulting political and religious confusion – and, because religious authorities remain silent in the face of Islamist rhetoric – no Muslim state can solve its problems domestically.	但是，在随之而来的政治和宗教混乱中——也因为宗教当局在面对伊斯兰口号时保持缄默——没有一个穆斯林国家可以从内部解决问题。


External help is needed.	它们需要外部帮助。


Mali was the first to ask for it, with local religious authorities supporting the government’s request for military assistance from France.	马里是第一个提出诉求的国家，地方宗教当局支持政府求助法国的军事援助。


Now Mali’s army must be reconstituted, its police trained, and its government restructured.	如今，马里必须重新组建军队、训练警察、重组政府。


This, too, will be possible only if religious authorities back the necessary reforms.	而这些也只有在宗教当局支持必要改革时才能实现。


But, as in Mali, the task of assisting reform in Muslim states is not for France alone.	但是，正如马里所显示的，协助穆斯林国家改革的任务并不专属于法国。


It is the responsibility of the West as a whole.	这是整个西方的责任。


The Many Faces of Malnutrition	营养不良的多张面孔


ABUJA – If you happen to be sitting with two other people right now, chances are one of you is malnourished.	阿布贾—如果现在你碰巧正和其他两人坐在一起，那么很有可能你们中间有一个营养不良。


And you might not even know it.	而你可能根本不知道这一点。


Yes, that’s right: one in three people worldwide suffer from malnutrition, and it does not always look the way one might expect.	是的，就是这样：全世界有三分之一人存在营养不良，而营养不良往往看上去并不是你想象中的样子。


From the two billion adults who carry too much weight to the 159 million children with stunted growth, malnutrition takes many forms.	从超重的20亿成年人，到发育不良的1. 59亿儿童，营养不良有各种形式。


As a doctor, I see women who appear healthy, but who suffer from anemia, owing partly to low iron intake.	作为一名医生，我看到一些女性看似健康但身患贫血，部分原因是铁摄入不足。


And I see relatively able-bodied men with big bellies, which elevate their risk for heart disease.	我也见过大腹便便的健壮男子，他们是心脏病高风险人群。


West Africa is home to some of the world’s highest rates of malnutrition.	西非是全世界营养不良率最高的地区之一。


That includes the most obvious “face” of the condition: roughly 9% of West African children under five are wasted, or too thin for their height.	这里有营养不良最显而易见的“面孔”：大约9%的五岁以下西非儿童瘦骨嶙峋，体重与身高不成比例。


At its most severe, wasting is fatal.	在最严重的情况中，瘦可能是致命的。


But West Africa also suffers from many other forms of malnutrition.	但西非还有其他各种形式的营养不良。


One-third of children under five in the region are stunted (too short for their age), a condition with irreversible effects on cognitive development.	该地区三分之一的五岁以下儿童身高与年龄不匹配，这将给认知发育带来不可逆的影响。


According to the Cost of Hunger in Africa studies, stunted children across the continent receive up to 3.6 fewer years of schooling than well-nourished children.	据《非洲饥饿的成本》（Cost of Hunger in Africa）的研究，非洲身高不足儿童与营养优良儿童的受教育年限差距高达3. 6年。


The problem does not affect only children.	这一问题不仅影响儿童。


Half of all women of reproductive age in West Africa are anemic.	在西非，一半育龄妇女存在贫血。


Not only does anemia contribute to almost one-fifth of global maternal deaths; babies born to anemic women are also more likely to be underweight.	贫血造成了近五分之一的全球母婴死亡； 并且贫血妇女所生的孩子体重不足的几率更大。


The result is a vicious cycle of poor health.	结果是健康状况的恶性循环。


Perhaps the least obvious face of malnutrition is not undernutrition, but excessive weight and obesity.	营养不良最鲜为人知的面貌也许不是营养不足，而是超重和肥胖。