A PIA is a tool used to identify, analyze, and mitigate privacy risks arising from technological systems or processes.	隐私影响评估程序是识别、分析和减轻技术系统或程序所产生隐私风险的工具包。


While there is no single established approach to undertaking a PIA, experience has produced some best practices, comprising a set of privacy principles and criteria, according to which systems for collecting, storing, and share refugees’ data should be assessed.	虽然进行隐私影响评估并没有一种唯一确定的方法，但人们从多年的经验的已经总结出某些最佳惯例，包括一整套隐私原则和标准，必须按照这套体系对难民数据的搜集、存储和共享进行评估。


For a PIA to work, it must weigh privacy against other imperatives, such as efficient aid provision.	隐私影响评估要想充分发挥作用，就必须在隐私和提供援助的效率等其他必要条件之间进行权衡。


Given the lack of experience with this type of assessment, the framework and those applying it should be flexible.	鉴于我们缺乏此类评估的经验，应当对整体框架及其应用保持态度上的灵活。


In settings that are continually changing, in response to the needs and capabilities of a range of actors, an iterative approach with qualitative elements is imperative.	在不断变化的环境里，面对一系列主体的需求和能力，采用以定性要素为主的迭代方式势在必行。


There is no perfect methodology, and practice will always differ from theory.	现实中不存在完美无缺的方法，而且实践往往会与理论不同。


But a high-quality PIA can help an organization assess and mitigate the privacy risks associated with the use of information and communications technology, biometric technologies, geo-location tracking devices, and so on.	但高质量的隐私影响评估可以协助机构评估并缓解与信息和通讯、生物识别、地理位置跟踪设备等有关的隐私威胁。


It is not a solution to the privacy challenge faced by refugees and their advocates, but it is an important step in the right direction.	这并非难民及其支持者所面临隐私挑战一劳永逸的解决办法，但却是朝着正确方向迈出的重要一步。


Rio’s Unsustainable Nonsense	里约不可持续的胡说


NEW YORK – If George Orwell were alive today, he would be irritated, and then shocked, by the cynical way in which every lobby with an axe to grind and money to burn has hitched its wagon to the alluring phrase “sustainable development.”	纽约—要是乔治·奥威尔还活着，看到如今游说集团各打各的算盘、数不清的钱被驶向“可持续发展”的诱人前景牢牢套住，他一定会感到既惊且怒。


In fact, the United Nations’ Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development is about pet projects of all and sundry – many of them tangential to the major environmental issues, such as climate change, that were the principal legacy of the original Rio Earth Summit.	事实上，联合国的里约+20可持续发展会议是一次所有人各自争利的会议，许多人对里约地球峰会的主要遗留问题——气候变化等重大环境问题根本不关心。


Thus, the International Labor Organization and trade-union lobbies have managed to insert “Decent Jobs” into the seven priority areas at the Rio conference.	因此，国际劳工组织和工会游说集团想方设法将“体面工作”加入到里约会议的七大主要议题中。


I would love for everyone, everywhere, to have a decent job.	我衷心祝愿世界各地所有人都能得到体面的工作。


But what does that have to do with either the environment or “sustainability?”	但这和环境和“可持续性”有关系吗？


No one should pretend that we can magically offer decent jobs to the huge numbers of impoverished but aspiring workers in the informal sector.	没人会假装认为我们可以像变法术那样为非正式部门大量志向远大的穷困工人提供体面工作。


Such jobs can only be created by adopting appropriate economic policies.	这样的工作只能通过采取合理经济政策创造。


Indeed, the really pressing task facing many developing economies is to pursue policies that promote economic opportunities by accelerating growth.	事实上，许多发展中国家所面临的真正紧要的任务是实施通过加快增长扩大经济机会的政策。


The flavor of the week in Rio is “sustainability indexing” for corporations, by way of corporate social responsibility (CSR).	里约会议的一大特色是根据公司社会责任（CSR）的公司“可持续性指数”。


Such indexing is being compared to accounting standards.	该指数堪与会计标准媲美。


But the latter are “technical” and gain from standardization; the former are not and must reflect variety instead.	但后者是“技术性的”，具有标准化的优点； 而前者则否，且必须反映多样化。


Corporations can, of course, be asked to conform to a “don’t” list – don’t dump mercury into rivers, don’t employ children for hazardous tasks, etc.	当然，公司可以被要求遵守“禁止”清单——禁止向河道排放汞、禁止让儿童进行危险活动，等等。


But what they practice as “do’s” by way of altruism is surely a matter of what they consider virtuous to spend their money on.	但它们以利他主义“做事”的行为毫无疑问被它们认为是把钱花在了应该花的地方。


The notion that a self-appointed set of activists, in conjunction with some governments and international agencies, can determine what a corporation should do by way of CSR contradicts the liberal notion that we should ask for virtue to be pursued, but not in a particular way.	以自主行为者为主体、辅之以政府和国际机构参与者，如此便能通过CSR决定公司应该做什么，这一概念与我们应该要求求善但不应该规定做法的自由理念相悖。


At a time when the world is emphasizing the importance of diversity and tolerance, it is effrontery to suggest that corporations should standardize their notion of how they wish to promote good in the world.	当今世界强调的是多样化和包容，认为公司应该将其如何向全世界推销商品的理念标准化是无耻的想法。


Even when the Rio+20 agenda includes something more properly “environmental” – say, the supply of water – platitudes predominate.	即便里约+20日程包括了更符合“环境”性质的内容——比如供水问题——也多是陈词滥调在唱主戏。


Thus, the availability of safe drinking water is now to be enshrined as a “right.”	因此，如今，获得安全饮用水被奉为一项“权利”。


We have traditionally distinguished in human-rights conventions between (mandatory) civil and political rights, such as the right to habeas corpus, from (aspirational) economic rights, because the latter require resources.	传统上，我们会在人权会议上将（强制性）公民和政治权利（如人身保护权）与（愿景性）经济权利区分开来，因为后者要求投入资源。


Blurring that distinction – thereby disregarding the problem of scarcity – is no solution.	模糊其中的区别，从而忽视稀缺性问题，不是解决问题的办法。


After all, “availability” can be interpreted according to many criteria and thus in myriad ways: How much water?	毕竟，“获得”一词可以用多种标准来进行数不清的解读：多少水？


At what distance from different households (or by pipe into each house)?	与不同家庭的距离多远（还是通过水管送入千家万户）？


At what cost?	成本几何？


These decisions have different implications for the availability of water, and they must compete, in any event, against other “rights” and resource uses.	这些问题的决定对水的获得具有不同的影响，且它们必须随时与其他“权利”和资源用途竞争。


In the end, therefore, water availability cannot properly be called a “right.”	因此，说到底，称获得水为“权利”是不恰当的。


Rather, it is a “priority,” and countries will inevitably differ in the sequence with which they pursue it relative to others.	它应该是一项“紧迫任务”，各国将该问题列于问题解决序列的哪个位置不可避免地会有所不同。


While these are “sins of commission,” the “sins of omission” at Rio+20 are even more glaring.	相比这些“做不该做的事”，里约+20“不做该做的事”的问题更加严重。


For a conference that is supposedly addressing “sustainability,” it is worth lamenting the absence of a heroic effort to agree on a successor treaty to the Kyoto Accord.	该会议本是为了解决“可持续性”，在会议上看不到人们拿出京都议定书的后续条约的豪情壮举实在令人悲哀。


If the cataclysmic scenarios implied by neglect of climate change are valid – and extreme estimates, it must be said, could backfire politically by looking implausible or, worse, by producing a “Nero effect” (if Rome is burning, let’s party) – Rio+20’s lack of action should be regarded as an historic failure.	如果忽视环境变化所隐含的灾难性后果成为现实——我得说一下，极端估计可能看起来没人会信，甚至造成“尼禄效应”（罗马大火日，尽情派对时），因此可能形成政治上的反作用——那么里约+20的不作为将会钉上历史耻辱柱。


But a matching omission is that prompted by our societies’ increasing political unsustainability, not because of the immediate financial problems like those afflicting Europe and threatening the world, but because the modern media have made visible to all the disparities in the fortunes of the rich and the poor.	但还存在一个相伴而生的、受社会政治不可持续性与日俱增推波助澜不作为问题，该问题不是由于困扰欧洲、威胁世界的紧迫金融问题引起的，而是因为现代媒体让贫富差距无所遁形。


The rich should be urged not to flaunt their wealth: extravagance amid much poverty arouses wrath.	应该敦促富人不要再炫富了：在贫困遍地时铺张浪费会引发愤怒。


The poor, meanwhile, need a fair shot at raising their incomes.	与此同时，穷人需要有增加收入的希望。


That can only come through access to education and economic opportunity, both in poor and rich countries.	这只有通过让穷人获得教育和经济机会实现，不管在穷国还是富国都是如此。


“Less Excess and More Access”: only a policy mix based on this credo will guarantee that our societies remain viable and achieve genuine “sustainability.”	“更多获得、更少过度”：唯有基于这一信条的政策组合能够保证我们的社会保持稳定、实现真正的“可持续性”。


The Dangerous Rise of Buddhist Chauvinism	佛教沙文主义的危险崛起


TOKYO – The Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, composed no sutta to religious hatred or racial animus.	东京—佛陀乔达摩·悉达多从未有过宗教仇恨或种族敌意的话。


And yet Buddhist chauvinism now threatens the democratic process in both Myanmar (Burma) and Sri Lanka.	但如今佛教沙文主义正在威胁缅甸和斯里兰卡的民主进程。


Some of the same Buddhist monks who braved Myanmar’s military junta in the “Saffron Revolution” of 2007 today incite violence against members of the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority.	在2007年“藏红花革命”（Saffron Revolution）中勇敢面对缅甸军方的和尚，如今正在对该国穆斯林罗兴亚人行使暴力。


In Sri Lanka, the ethnic chauvinism of the Buddhist Sinhalese, stirred by a former president determined to reclaim power, mocks the supposed goal of reconciliation with the vanquished Hindu Tamils.	在斯里兰卡，决心重夺权力的前总统煽动信仰佛教的僧伽罗人的种族沙文主义，对计划中的与被征服种族、信仰印度教的泰米尔人的和解嗤之以鼻。


In Myanmar, Buddhist racism is at the root of a virtual civil war in the state of Rakhine and is fueling a humanitarian crisis in which hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya have fled their country by land and sea.	在缅甸，佛教种族主义是若开邦几乎陷入内战的根源，它正在煽动一场人道主义危机，数十万穆斯林罗兴亚人从陆路和海路逃离缅甸。


Most ominous for Myanmar’s future, given that all genocides are linked to official action, this racial and religious antagonism is in no way spontaneous.	对缅甸的未来最不幸的是，所有种族灭绝行为都与官方行动有关，这一种族和宗教对抗绝不是自然形成的。


The Rohingya have already been stripped of their Myanmar citizenship, and a raft of new and proposed legislation that would further marginalize Islam seems certain to provoke further violence.	罗兴亚人已被剥夺缅甸公民权，大量新立法和提案将进一步边缘化穆斯林，挑起进一步暴力几乎是必然的。


A new marriage law, for example, requires interfaith couples to register their intent to marry with local authorities, who will display a public notice of the engagement; only if no citizen objects to the union – highly unlikely in the present tense climate – is the couple permitted to wed.	比如，新婚姻法要求信仰不同的夫妻在地方相关部门登记结婚原因，他们的婚约将被公示，除非没有公民反对他们的结合——在当前的紧张氛围中这几乎是不可能的事——否则就不准结婚。


Another bill in the pipeline would forbid anyone under the age of 18 from converting to another religion, and would require even an adult seeking to convert to gain the permission – subject to repeated interrogation – of local officials.	另一项筹备中的法律将禁止任何不满18岁的缅甸人改信其他宗教，成年人改信其他宗教也必须获得当地官员的许可——在此过程中将受到反复询问。


Perhaps most disturbing, a third recent bill would allow for the imposition of Chinese-style population control on any group with a growth rate that is higher than the national average.	也许最令人不安的是第三项立法，该立法将对任何人口增长率高于全国平均水平的群体采取类似中国的人口控制政策。


Women could be ordered to wait, say, three years after the birth of a child before having another.	女性必须在生育前一胎至少三年后才能生育下一胎。


Here, too, local governments, which are the most susceptible to popular prejudices, will be empowered to implement a law that seems specifically targeted at the Rohingyas, with their large families.	对于这项立法，仍然是最容易受流行偏见左右的地方政府将获得执法权，而这项法律看上去是专为家庭规模庞大的罗兴亚人设立的。


These laws do not yet amount to an updated version of the Nuremberg laws (the anti-Jewish legislation enacted by the Nazis in 1935).	这些法律还没有升级成为当代版纽伦堡法（1935年纳粹实施的反犹太立法）。


But they do reflect the agenda of those seeking to fan Buddhist resentment in order to thwart Myanmar’s democratic transition.	但它们确实反映出试图煽动佛教徒怨气以实现阻碍缅甸民主转型的人的算盘。


That dark ambition has gained urgency, because the country is due to hold its first democratic presidential election since the transition began in 2011.	这一黑暗野心已经相当紧迫，因为缅甸即将举行自2011年民主转型开始以来的第一次民主总统选举。


The Rohingyas are, of course, the main target of this strategy.	当然，罗兴亚人是这一战略的主要针对目标。


But there is another target as well: Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and opposition leader.	但还有另一个目标：诺贝尔和平奖获得者、反对派领袖昂山素季。


For now, Suu Kyi is precluded from running for President by a cynical constitutional provision that excludes anyone whose spouse or child has a foreign passport (Suu Kyi’s two sons by her late English husband hold British passports).	如今，昂山素季无法竞选总统，因为一条犬儒主义宪法条文禁止任何配偶或子女拥有外国护照的人竞选总统（昂山素季与已故英国丈夫的两个儿子持有英国护照）。


Nonetheless, the regime, still fearing her popularity, is playing the race and religion card in order to discredit her and her party, the National League for Democracy, which won all but one of the parliamentary seats contested in the recent general election (and swept the annulled 1990 election).	尽管如此，缅甸当局仍害怕她的支持率，打出种族和宗教牌打击她和她的政党全国民主联盟（National League for Democracy）的信誉。 在最近的选举（以及被撤销的1990年选举）中，全国民主联盟几乎获得了所有其所竞争的议会席位，只有一席旁落。


By stoking Buddhist violence against the Rohingya, the regime aims to damage Suu Kyi and the NLD’s chances of victory in two ways.	当局煽动佛教徒对罗兴亚人的暴力，目标是从两方面降低昂山素季和全国民主联盟的获胜机会。


If she speaks out for the Rohingya, her appeal among Buddhists, the vast majority of Myanmar’s citizens, may be dented enough to preserve the army’s grip on power.	如果她为罗兴亚人说话，那么她在占印度人口绝大多数的佛教徒中的号召力将大大削弱，军方将足以控制权力。


If she does not defend the Rohingya, her aura of moral leadership may be dimmed among her own supporters, both at home and abroad.	如果她不为罗兴亚人辩护，她的道德领导光环就会在其国内外支持者中褪色。


So far, Suu Kyi has circumvented this booby trap with the verbal evasiveness that one would expect of an ordinary politician, rather than someone of her courage and standing.	目前，昂山素季用闪烁其词躲避这个陷阱，这是平常政客惯用的手段，不符合她的勇气和立场。


But, as the violence grows and the election nears, her room for maneuver will undoubtedly narrow.	但是，随着暴力的升级和选举的临近，她的腾挪空间毫无疑问也会越来越小。


Instead of highlighting the country’s real needs – serious land reform, an anti-corruption drive, and freeing the economy from oligarchic control – she may instead be drawn into defending an unpopular minority.	她也许不会强调缅甸的实际需要——严肃的土地改革、反腐运动、将经济从寡头控制中解放出来——而是陷入为不受欢迎的少数群体的辩护。


A similar political imperative is at the heart of the Sinhalese chauvinism that has made a sudden return to public life in Sri Lanka.	在斯里兰卡，僧伽罗沙文主义猛然回归公共生活，而其中心正是类似缅甸的政治���面。


The religious and ethnic passions of the Sinhalese were encouraged during the final, bloody push that ended Sri Lanka’s quarter-century of civil war with the Tamil Tigers in 2009.	2009年，结束与泰米尔老虎组织二十五年内战的最后的流血行动点燃了僧伽罗人的宗教和种族热情。


But instead of seeking reconciliation with the Tamils following their defeat, then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa continued to play on ethnic hatred as he subverted Sri Lanka’s democracy.	但时任总统拉贾帕克萨（Mahinda Rajapaksa）没有在失败后寻求与泰米尔人和解，而是继续用种族仇恨破坏斯里兰卡的民主。


Rajapaksa’s unexpected defeat by a coalition of Sri Lanka’s democrats and Tamil political parties in last January’s presidential election – a result that he then sought to annul – should have ended both his career and the politics of race-baiting.	在去年1月的总统选举中，拉贾帕克萨出人意料地败给了斯里兰卡民主派和泰米尔政党所组成的联盟——后来他试图废除这一结果——这并应该结束他的政治生涯和种族迫害政治。


But the former president is now mounting a furious comeback bid and might well win the parliamentary election scheduled for August 17.	但如今，这位前总统正在策划愤怒的逆袭，并有望在8月17日的议会选举中获胜。


One reason for Rajapaksa’s potential victory is his deep pockets; another is that he can probably count on support from China, having allowed the construction of ports and other facilities for the People’s Liberation Army during his presidency.	拉贾帕克萨之所以有望获胜，一个原因是他有钱； 另一个原因是他有希望获得中国的支持——在他就任总统期间，中国被允许在斯里兰卡建设港口和其他军用设施。


But the key to his fortunes has been his effort to stoke the fears of the majority Sinhalese.	但他成功的关键是煽动主体民族僧伽罗人的恐惧。


Rajapaksa is thus placing Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in the same difficult position faced in Myanmar by Suu Kyi.	就这样，拉贾帕克萨让总理维克拉马辛哈（Ranil Wickremesinghe）处于和缅甸的昂山素季一样的困境中。


So far, Wickremesinghe has succeeded in suggesting that the Sinhalese have more to fear from the return of Rajapaksa than they do from the country’s ethnic minorities.	维克拉马辛哈成功地表明，僧伽罗人对拉贾帕克萨回归的恐惧甚于对少数群体的恐惧。


But no one should ever underestimate the power of hatred to undermine a democracy from within.	但决不可低估仇恨从内部破坏民主的力量。


This suggests that stronger economic – and, thus, employment – growth would reduce the number of workers engaged in independent work.	这表明，经济增长——从而就业走强将减��参与独立工作的人数。


Rise Up and Walk	站起来向前走


In July 2005, millions of people filled stadiums for the Live 8 concerts in support of Africa’s people.	2005年七月，数百万人参加了“Live 8”世界群星扶贫义演音乐会以支持非洲人民。


It was also for ordinary citizens that African leaders traveled to Scotland to meet the G-8 heads of state that summer.	同样是为了普通民众着想，非洲领导人在那年的夏天来到苏格兰会见了八国峰会领导人。


It was for these same people that the Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt relief was carried out by many individuals and organizations all over the world.	全世界的许多人和组织发起了为了给非洲人们解除债务的福音2000运动。


And in St. Petersberg in July 2006, the G-8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the ambitious goals they had set the year before, although they did not go further.	而2006年7月八国峰会的领导人在圣彼得堡再次确定了他们在一年前定下的雄心勃勃的目标，尽管他们并有作出进一步的行动。


Nearly a year and a half on, there are signs of progress toward fulfilling the commitments to Africa’s development made by world leaders and committed campaigners.	在最近的大约一年半时间里，由世界领导人和坚定的活动家作出的要推动非洲发展的承诺取得了很大的进展。


But it is fair to ask when a sustainable solution to Africa’s dehumanizing poverty will be found, not only by the G8 and the organizers of Live 8, but also by Africa’s leaders and people.	但是，人们有理由要问什么时候才能对非洲非人的贫困给出一个可持续的解决方案，不仅仅是依靠八国领导人和“Live 8”世界群星扶贫义演音乐会的组织者，而且要同样依靠非洲的领导人和及其人民。


Africa is a paradox.	非洲是一个充满矛盾的地方。


It is one of the richest continents on the planet, endowed with oil, precious stones, forests, water, wildlife, soil, land, agricultural products, and millions of women and men.	它是地球上最富有的大洲之一，有着丰富的石油、宝石、森林、水、野生动物、土壤、耕地、农产品和众多的人口。


Yet most of Africa’s people remain impoverished.	然而非洲绝大部分的人民还生活在贫困之中。


I continue to ask myself, “Why?”	我不断地在问自己，“这到底是为什么？ ”


One reason is that many Africans lack the knowledge, skills, tools, and the political will to create wealth from their resources.	其中的一个原因是许多非洲人缺少知识、技能、工具和政治意志从他们的资源去创造财富。


They are unable to add value to raw materials in order to sell processed goods in local and international markets and negotiate better prices and favorable trade rules.	他们无法给他们的原材料增添价值从而把加工过的产品推销到国内和国际市场，并且谈判达成好价钱和更有益的贸易规则。


Another reason is that ordinary citizens suffer when debts are not cancelled, when financial assistance is not forthcoming, or when trade barriers are raised.	另一个原因是普通的民众受困于债务得不到取消，经济援助得不到兑现以及贸易壁垒的存在。


I have also seen the need for ordinary Africans to embrace a set of values, like service for the common good, and commitment, persistence, and patience until a goal is realized.	我还看到普通的非洲人缺乏一整套的价值观，比如为公益服务，奉献、坚持、耐心直到实现目标的精神。


We also need Africans who love Africa so much that they want to protect their countries – their land – from environmentally destructive processes.	我们还需要如此热爱非洲的非洲人民能够保护他们的国家和他们的耕地不要再继续遭受环境的破坏。


The transformation of grasslands into deserts due to deforestation, encroachment into forests for subsistence farming, overgrazing, and loss of biodiversity and soil threaten the entire continent.	因为生存农业而大肆砍伐、蚕食森林，过度放牧，以及失去生物多样性和土壤给整个大洲带来了巨大的威胁。


Another value Africans must adopt is love and concern for young people.	非洲必须拥有的另一个价值观是爱护和关心年轻人。


One of the most devastating experiences is to see youth wasting away because they are unemployed, even after they have completed secondary and tertiary education, or because their health has deteriorated.	最令人心碎的体验之一是看到年轻人因为没有工作而无所事事，即便他们已经接受了中等和高等教育，或者因为他们的健康遭到了破坏。


African governments should give priority to investments in technical education and HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care, and support programs.	非洲国家的政府应该重视技术教育以及对艾滋病的防治、关心和支持计划。


Without skills, people find themselves locked out of productive, rewarding economic activities, leaving them unable to meet their needs for housing, healthcare and nutrition.	没有技能，人们就会发现他们无法进行富有成效和有得益的经济活动，也无法满足他们对于房屋、医疗和营养的需要。


They get trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty and, sometimes, crime.	他们深陷于贫穷，有时甚至是犯罪的恶性循环中。


Africa needs to prepare for the opportunities and challenges to come by deliberately working for peace and security.	非洲需要通过不懈地追求和平和安全来迎接即将到来的机遇和挑战。


Much of Africa’s poverty is fueled by conflicts.	很大程度上非洲的贫穷是因为冲突而引起的。


In the course of my work over the past 30 years, I have observed that whether it is at the national or regional level, most conflicts are over resources.	在我过去30年的工作经历中，我注意到，不管冲突是发生在国家间还是地区间的，绝大多数的冲突都是因为争夺资源而引发的。


Who will control and utilize them?	谁能够控制和利用它们？


Who will be included or excluded?	谁会被包括在内或是被排除在外？


When resources are scarce, or so degraded that they can no longer sustain livelihoods, or inequitably distributed, conflict invariably ensues.	当资源变得如此稀少或者如此地贬值以致它们无法在维持人们的生活，或者被不均衡地分配了，那么就肯定会引发冲突。


In Africa, we need to manage our resources sustainably, accountably, and responsibly.	在非洲，我们需要可持续地、负责任地并且认真地管理我们的资源。


And we need to share those resources equitably.	并且我们应该共同平等地享有这些资源。


Otherwise, we will continue to invest in wars and conflicts, or in fighting crime and domestic instability, rather than in promoting development and thereby eliminating poverty.	否则的话，我们将继续生活在战争和冲突中，或者面临好战的犯罪活动和国内的不稳定，而不是促进发展以及由此消除贫困。


African leaders should govern and serve for the benefit of the people, not themselves.	非洲的领导人应该为了他们的人民，而不是他们自己的利益去管理国家。


But perhaps the most unrecognized problem in Africa, especially at the grassroots level, is the disempowerment of ordinary people.	但是也许非洲存在的最没有引起人们注意的问题，尤其是在基层，是剥夺了普通民众的选择和行动权。


This is one of the main reasons why so many people are unable to take advantage of the many opportunities available in Africa.	这是为什么有如此多的人无法抓住非洲所存在的许多机会的主要原因之一。


Africa’s people must be allowed to gain confidence, dignity, and a sense of self-worth.	非洲的人民必须被允许拥有自信心、尊严和一种自尊的感觉。


They must also be empowered with knowledge, skills, and tools to take action.	他们还必须掌握采取行动所需要的知识、技能和工具。


This is why debt relief is so important.	这正是消除债务如此重要的原因所在。


It provides governments additional resources to invest in initiatives that can empower their people.	它将使政府有额外的资源来采取一些能使他们的人民更有作为的行动。


Despite the many challenges that remain, there has been much recent progress in Africa.	尽管存在着许多挑战，非洲最近还是取得了很大进展。


There are indications of good governance in many countries.	许多国家的管理都非常好。


In many others, civil society continues to grow, supported by national governments, the African Union, and the international community.	在其他许多方面，在各国政府、非盟和国际社会的支持下文明社会不断地在扩展。


Many countries are resolving their conflicts and working for peace and stability.	许多国家正在解决他们的冲突，并且为和平和稳定而努力着。


We must appreciate and encourage those who are making bold decisions.	我们应该对那些作出大胆决定的人给予赞赏和鼓励。


But much must still be accomplished, by Africans and with Africa’s many friends around the world.	但是对于非洲人和全世界的非洲朋友而言，还有许多的事情需要去做。


As in the Bible story, when Peter and John said to a beggar, “rise up and walk,” Africans are called upon to walk away from ignorance, inertia, apathy, and fatalism.	就像《圣经》里彼得和约翰对一个乞丐说，“站起来向前走，”非洲人被呼唤着远离无知、惰性、冷漠和宿命。


To walk towards economic and political freedom.	去奔向经济和政治的自由。


To walk to an Africa free of poverty.	去奔向一个没有贫穷的非洲。


How Much Debt Is Too Much?	多少债务算太多？


LONDON – Is there a “safe” debt/income ratio for households or debt/GDP ratio for governments?	伦敦—存在“安全”的家庭债务/收入比或政府债务/GDP比吗？


In both cases, the answer is yes.	两个问题的答案都是肯定的。


And in both cases, it is impossible to say exactly what that ratio is.	对于这两个问题，说出正确的比例为多少又都是不可能的。


Nonetheless, this has become the most urgent macroeconomic question of the moment, owing not just to spiraling household and government debt since 2000, but also – and more important – to the excess concern that government debt is now eliciting.	尽管如此，这已经成为眼下最紧迫的宏观经济问题，不但是因为2000年以来家庭和政府债务不断上升，也是因为——也更重要地——政府债务正在引起过多担忧。


According to a 2015 report by the McKinsey Global Institute, household debt in many advanced countries doubled, to more than 200% of income, between 2000 and 2007.	据麦肯锡全球研究所的一份2015 年报告，许多发达国家家庭债务在2000—2007年间翻了一番，达到收入的200%。


Since then, households in the countries hardest hit in the 2008-2009 economic crisis have deleveraged somewhat, but the household debt ratio in most advanced countries has continued to grow.	接着，受2008—2009年经济危机冲击最大的国家家庭债务有所下降，但大部分发达国家的家庭债务比仍在上升。


The big upsurge in government debt followed the 2008-2009 collapse.	政府债务的大涨发生在2008—2009年崩盘之后。


For example, British government debt rose from just over 40% of GDP in 2007 to 92% today.	比如，英国政府债务从2007年进展GDP的40%出头增加到今天的92%。


Persistent efforts by heavily indebted governments to eliminate their deficits have caused debt ratios to rise, by shrinking GDP, as in Greece, or by delaying recovery, as in the UK.	重债政府一直在采取措施消灭赤字，但这样导致GDP下降（如希腊）或复苏推迟（如英国），从而债务比例上升（如希腊）。


Before modern finance made it easy to live on borrowed money, getting into debt was considered immoral.	在现代金融让人们能够轻易地靠借钱过活之前，陷入债务被认为是不道德的。


“Neither a borrower nor a lender be,” Shakespeare’s Polonius admonishes his son Laertes.	“不要借钱，也不要借人钱，”莎士比亚笔下的普罗尼尔斯这样警告他的儿子雷欧提斯。


The expectation of uninterrupted economic growth brought a new perspective.	经济永远增长的预期带来了新的角度。


Mortgage debt, unknown a century ago, now accounts for 74% of household debt in developed countries (43% in developing ones).	一个世纪前闻所未闻的按揭债务如今已占发达国家家庭债务的74%（发展中国家占43%）。


Banks have been lending, and households borrowing, as if tomorrow was sure to be better than today.	银行一直在贷款，家庭一直在借款，好像明天一定会比今天更好似的。


Likewise, governments used to be expected to balance their budgets, except during wartime.	类似地，曾经人们对政府的预期是保持预算平衡，除非要打仗。


But they, too, came to expect continually rising revenues at unchanged, or even falling, tax rates.	但是，它们也开始期望收入不断上升而税率保持不变甚至下降。


So it seemed prudent to borrow against the future.	因此拿未来作抵押在现在借钱看上去是审慎的。


Today, with many households and governments facing severe financing problems, that no longer appears to be true.	如今，许多家庭和政府面临严重的融资问题，这已不再是真理。


But the only certainty is that the “safe” debt ratio depends on the context.	但唯一的确定之处是“安全”债务比需要看情况而定。


Consider Denmark and the United States.	以丹麦和美国为例。


In 2007, Denmark’s household debt/income ratio reached 269%, while the US peak was 125%.	2007年，丹麦家庭债务/收入比达到了269%，而美国的峰值为125%。


But household default rates have been negligible in Denmark, unlike in the US, where, in the depths of the recession, almost a quarter of mortgages were “under water” and some homeowners chose strategic default – fueling further downward pressure on housing prices and harming other indebted households.	但家庭违约率在丹麦可以忽略不计，而美国在衰退最严重 时几乎有四分之一的按揭贷款“资不抵债”，一些屋主选择战略性违约——进一步加剧了房价的下行压力，危及其他负债家庭。


This can be attributed to the distribution of borrowers.	这可以归因于借款人的分布。


In Denmark, high-income households borrowed the most, relative to their income, and standards for mortgage lending remained high (mortgages were capped at 80% of the value of the property).	在丹麦，高收入家庭借钱最厉害（相对于收入而言），按揭贷款标准一直和高（按揭不能超过物业价值的80%）。


In the US, households with the lowest income (the bottom quintile) had a higher debt/income ratio than the top 10%, and mortgages were dispensed like gumballs.	在美国，收入最低的家庭（底层五分之一）的债务/收入比高于顶层10%，而获得按揭贷款易如反掌。


In the US, as well as in Spain and Ireland, banks and households became what the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf called “highly leveraged speculators in a fixed asset.”	在美国，以及西班牙和爱尔兰，银行和家庭成为《金融时报》专栏作家马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）所谓的“固定资产的高杠杆投机者”。


As for government debt, Japan’s debt/GDP ratio is 230%, compared to Greece’s 177%.	至于政府债务，日本的债务/GDP比未230%，而希腊为177%。


But the consequences have been much more dire in Greece than in Japan.	但希腊的后果远远比日本悲惨。


The distribution of the creditors is crucial.	债权人的分布至关重要。


Most of Japan’s bondholders are nationals (if not the central bank) and have an interest in political stability.	日本债券持有人大多为本国国民（甚至中央银行），政治稳定符合他们的利益。


Most Greek bondholders are foreign banks.	大部分希腊债券持有人是外国银行。


Yet, while crises of confidence come much sooner if debt is mainly owned by foreigners, no steps have been taken to restrict government borrowing to domestic sources.	此外，对于债务主要由外国人所有的情况，信心危机要来得早得多，但并没有什么措施用来限制政府向国内资源借钱。


We now know that the expectation of uninterrupted growth was a delusion.	我们现在知道，永远增长的预期只是个幻觉。


But governments have been slow to rearm against the next crisis.	但政府预防下一次危机的行动十分缓慢。


Macro-prudential tools like counter-cyclical capital and reserve requirements on banks have been emasculated by vested interests in the financial industry.	宏观审慎工具——如反周期资本和银行准备金要求——被金融业既得利益所削弱。


And, while governments have been trying (albeit ineffectually) to reduce their net liabilities, they have been encouraging households to increase their debt, in order to support the restoration of “healthy” growth.	此外，尽管政府一直在试图（尽管收效甚微）减少净负债，但却在鼓励家庭增加债务； 以支持重塑“健康”增长。


The McKinsey report uses consensus data from the International Monetary Fund and the OECD to forecast that, with the notable exceptions of Germany, Greece, and Ireland, the debt/GDP ratio in advanced economies is set to rise.	麦肯锡报告用来自IMF和经合组织的共识数据（consensus data）预测，除了德国、希腊和爱尔兰等显著例外，发达经济体的债务/GDP比将会上升。


This seems alarming.	这值得警惕。


But a great deal of the alarm is based on the oft-repeated canard that government spending is unproductive and a burden on future generations.	但这一警报很大程度上基于一个老生常谈的流言：政府支出不属于生产性活动，而是子孙后代的负担。


In fact, future generations will benefit more than the current one from government infrastructure investment, so it is reasonable that they should pay for most for it.	事实上，子孙后代能够比当前一代从政府基础设施投资中获得更多好处，因此让他们来出基础设施的大头也是合理的。


The purpose for which the debt is incurred is important.	债务为了什么目的而产生很重要。


Debt crises are likelier if debt is being used to cover current spending.	如果债务被用于填补当前支出，就更有可能引发债务危机。


But now, when real interest rates are almost zero or negative, is the ideal time for governments to borrow for capital spending.	但如今，利率接近于零甚至为负，是政府借钱用于资本支出的理想时机。


Bondholders shouldn’t worry about debt if it gives rise to a productive asset.	如果债务让生产性资产有所增加，债券持有人就不应该感到担心。


All governments nowadays aim for a fiscal surplus to pay down debt.	现在，所有政府都想通过财政盈余降低债务。


This is sensible, but how it is done matters.	这是明智之选，但如何做是个问题。


In conditions of incomplete recovery and stagnating growth, raising taxes or cutting welfare spending is the wrong approach; fiscal consolidation requires taking active steps to increase GDP growth.	在复苏不完全、增长停滞的情况下，增税或削减福利支出是错误的方法； 财政整合需要采取积极措施增加GDP增长。


In the long run, this can be achieved only by raising productivity.	在长期，这只有通过提高生产率实现。


But governments can help make the long run shorter.	但政府可以帮助让长期变得更短。


They have been relying on printing money to offset their fiscal policies’ deflationary effects.	它们一直在依赖印钱抵抗财政政策的通缩效应。


But as McKinsey puts it, “Liquidity...cannot translate into inflation when demand is depressed, the propensity to save is high, and banks are still de-leveraging.”	但麦肯锡的报告指出，“当需求受到抑制时、储蓄倾向很高、银行仍在去杠杆时，流动性……无法转变为通胀。 ”


Expansionary fiscal policy is taboo, because it threatens to increase national debt further.	扩张性财政政策是一种禁忌，因为它可能让国民债务进一步增加。


But much depends on how governments present their accounts.	但这在很大程度上取决于政府如何管理它们的账户。


In 2014, the Bank of England held 24% of UK government debt.	2014年，英格兰银行持有24%的英国政府债务。


If we discount this, the UK’s debt/GDP ratio was 63%, not 92%.	扣除这一部分，英国债务/GDP比为63%而不是92%。


So it makes more sense to focus on debt net of government borrowing from the central bank.	因此，更明智的做法是着重关注扣除政府向央行借贷后的债务。


Governments should be ready to say that they have no intention of repaying the debt they owe their own bank.	政府应该随时准备表示无意偿还欠它们自己的银行的钱。


Monetary financing of government spending is one of those taboo ideas that is sure to gain support, if, as is likely, economic recovery grinds to a halt.	如果（很有可能）经济复苏政府支出最终停顿，那么政府支出的货币融资将是必然会受到支持的禁忌思想之一。


Egypt’s Security Harvest	埃及的安全收获


LONDON – “I have a request for all Egyptians,” General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt’s president, declared in 2013.	伦敦—“这是全体埃及人民的要求，”埃及总统西西将军在2013年宣布。


Just three weeks after staging the most brutal military coup in Egypt’s history, he wanted “all honorable, decent Egyptians” to take to the streets to march for the military, thereby giving him and his army “a mandate and an order to fight potential violence and terrorism.”	在发动埃及历史上最残酷的军事政变仅仅三周后，他希望“所有可敬体面的埃及人”走上街头为军方游行呐喊，从而给予他和他的军队“与潜在暴力和恐怖主义搏斗的使命和命令。


Tens of thousands of Egyptians heeded his call.	”成千上万埃及人响应了他的号召。


Yet, three years later, the violence and terrorism Sisi pledged to prevent remain a potent reality.	但是，三年后，西西承诺阻止的暴力和恐怖主义仍然是严峻的现实。


In fact, the military itself has been a leading perpetrator – and instigator – of violence.	事实上，军方本身即是暴力的主要执行者——以及煽动者。


Its assertion of leadership included cracking down on anyone who protested the overthrow of Egypt’s first-ever freely elected president, Mohammed Morsi.	军方的领导权主张包括镇压任何反对推翻埃及历史上首任自由选举产生的总统穆尔西的人。


The crackdown culminated on August 14, 2013, when the military stormed sit-ins in Cairo’s Raba‘a Square and Giza’s al-Nahda Square, and carried out what Human Rights Watch called the “worst mass unlawful killings in Egypt’s modern history” and “a likely crime against humanity.”	镇压在2013年8月14日达到顶峰，军方扫荡了开罗拉巴广场（Raba‘a Square）和吉萨纳达广场（al-Nahda Square）的静坐示威人群，进行了人权观察组织（Human Rights Watch） 所谓的“埃及现代史上最可怕的非法大规模屠杀”，这“或许是人道主义犯罪”。


More than 1,000 demonstrators died in less than ten hours.	十小时内，有1,000多示威者死亡。


The Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights recorded 932 fully documented bodies, 294 partly documented bodies, and 29 undocumented bodies, including 17 women and 30 teenage girls and boys.	埃及社会和经济权利中心（Center for Social and Economic Rights）记录有923具有完整记录的尸体，294具有部分记录的尸体，29具无记录尸体，包括17名女性和30名青少年男女。


The message was clear: those in power were clearly convinced that eradicating their opponents was a better strategy than including them.	其中的信息是明确的：掌权者显然认为清除反对者是比容纳他们更好的策略。


Young political activists who wanted change quickly realized that ballots, strikes, and sit-ins would not change a corrupt regime – and might well get them killed.	希望迅速发生改变的年轻政治活动家意识到，选票、罢工和静坐示威不能改变一个腐败政权——倒是很有可能引来杀身之祸。


Unsurprisingly, the coup and subsequent crackdown on opponents triggered a spike in an enduring insurgency.	毫不奇怪，政变及随后的镇压反对者引发了持续的叛乱。


Almost immediately, in response to an already restive North Sinai, elite brigades from the Second and Third Field Armies, assisted by the air force, launched operation “Desert Storm” to quell the burgeoning rebellion.	为了响应已然躁动不已的西奈半岛北部局势，第二和第三集团军的精英部队几乎马上在空军的配合下发动了“沙漠风暴”行动，将叛乱扼杀在萌芽状态。


Afterward, the military spokesperson declared that 78 “terrorists” had been killed and 207 arrested, effectively ending terrorism in the Sinai.	事后，军方发言人宣布78名“恐怖分子”被击毙，207人被捕，有效地结束了西奈半岛的恐怖主义。


But the insurgency seemed to have more motivation than ever.	但叛乱的动力似乎比以往任何时候都更加强大。


A few months later, Sinai insurgents shot down a Mi-17 helicopter that belonged to the Second Field Army, an unprecedented display of military capacity.	几个月后，西奈叛军击落一架隶属第二集团军的直升机，表现出前所未有的军事能力。


By November 2014, local rebels were swearing their loyalty to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) – another unprecedented move.	到2014年11月，地方叛军宣布向所谓的伊斯兰国效忠——这也是前所未有的举动。


(No jihadist organization in Egypt had ever before offered its loyalty to a foreign entity.)	（埃及的圣战组织此前从未有过向国外实体效忠的举动。 ）


Like other ISIS-affiliated groups, the so-called Sinai Province publishes its military metrics and reports both monthly and annually.	和其他伊斯兰国支持的组织一样，所谓的西奈省（Sinai Province）发行月度和年度军事指标和报告。


Those data indicate that, last year, SP killed about 800 soldiers and 130 civilians (alleged informants or collaborators).	这些数据表明，去年西奈省杀死了800名士兵和130名平民（以告密和通敌的罪名）。


It also claims to have captured heavy mortars, two ZU-23 anti-aircraft autocannons, five DShK heavy machine guns, and dozens of AK assault rifles.	西奈省还声称缴获有多门重型迫击炮、两部ZU-23防空自行火炮、五挺DShK重机枪和数十支AK突击步枪。


In October 2015, SP operatives infiltrated Sharm al-Sheikh Airport and planted a bomb on a Russian Airbus, killing all 224 of its passengers and crew.	2015年10月，西奈省特工潜入沙姆沙伊赫机场，在一架俄罗斯空中客车飞机上安装炸弹，造成全部224名乘客和机组人员丧生。


It was the worst terrorist operation in the history of Egypt and Russia.	这是埃及和俄罗斯历史上最严重的恐怖主义行为。


In the first two months of this year, SP reported that it had destroyed 25 armored vehicles (including tanks, minesweepers, and bulldozers) and killed 100 soldiers (the military acknowledged 37).	今年前两个月，西奈省报告其摧毁了25部装甲车（包括坦克、扫雷车和推土机），杀掉了100名士兵（军方承认的死亡人数为37人）。


Clearly, violence and terrorism are thriving, despite Sisi’s pledge.	显然，尽管西西许下了承诺，但暴力和恐怖主义仍然盛行。


And, though the insurgency has remained largely limited to Egypt’s periphery, primarily Northeastern Sinai and parts of the Western Desert, with occasional strikes in the Nile Valley, it has also reared its head in Cairo.	此外，尽管叛军仍然主要局限在埃及外围，主要是东北部的西奈半岛和西部沙漠的部分地区，以及尼罗河谷地区的零星打击，但在开罗也有所抬头。


Most recently, gunmen attacked an undercover security minibus in Cairo's Helwan suburb last May, killed all eight armed security agents, and vanished into the working-class cement jungle.	最近一次袭击是开罗赫尔旺（Helwan）郊区发生的抢手袭击便衣安全车事件，八名武装保安全部丧生，抢手随后消失在工人阶级的水泥丛林中。


Meanwhile, the relative moderates who have remained committed to contesting official policies by democratic means are sidelined and mocked.	与此同时，仍致力于通过民主途径反对官方政策的相对温和派被边缘化和嘲笑。


One prominent example is Essam Derbala, the head of the Consultative Council of the Islamic Group (IG), a post-jihadist organization that led a terror campaign in the early 1990s, before abandoning political violence in 1997 and engaging in mainstream politics.	一个显著的例子是伊斯兰集团（IG）协商委员会主席伊山姆·德尔巴拉（Essam Derbala）。 IG是一个后���战（post-jihadist）组织，在20世纪90年代曾领导过一场恐怖主义运动，后于1997年放弃政治暴力，参与主流政治。


From 2002 to 2009, Derbala and other IG leaders produced around 30 books to counter al-Qaeda’s ideology.	从2002年到2009年，德尔巴拉和其他IG领导人出版了大约30部著作反对基地组织意识形态。


After ISIS announced its intention to declare a “province” in Upper Egypt in April 2015, Derbala toured the Upper-Egyptian IG strongholds, giving public lectures countering ISIS ideology.	2015年4月，伊斯兰国宣布它意欲在上埃及设“省”后，德尔巴拉访问了上埃及地区的IG据点，公开演讲反对伊斯兰国意识形态。


A few months later, he was arrested and died in prison.	几个月后，他被捕并死在狱中。


Among his last messages to his supporters was “not to give up on democracy and peaceful resistance.”	他对支持者的最后指示包括“不要放弃民主和和平抵制。 ”


Derbala’s death reinforced the view that, in today’s Egypt, relative moderation gets you nowhere – a view that drives radicalization.	德尔巴拉之死强化了一个观点，即，在今日埃及，相对温和派一无是处——这一观点推动了激进化。


Consider Ahmed El-Darawy, a former police officer and a popular pro-democracy activist who ran in Egypt’s first free and fair parliamentary election in 2012.	以前警官、参与了2012年埃及首次自由公正的议会选举的亲民主活动家艾哈迈德·达拉维（Ahmed El-Darawy）为例。


After the Raba‘a Square massacre, however, he joined ISIS, under whose flag he was ultimately killed.	拉巴广场大屠杀发生后，他加入了伊斯兰国，并最终为伊斯兰国死去。


One of the main motivations behind the 2013 military coup was to counter potential violence and terrorism. Yet one of its main upshots is a surge in violence and terrorism, committed by both state and non-state actors – and there is no sign of de-escalation, much less reconciliation, in sight.	2013年军事政变背后的一个主要动机是阻止潜在暴力和恐怖主义，但其主要后果之一却是暴力和恐怖主义激增，而这些活动的发动者既有国家也有非国家行动方——并且我们看不到任何缓和迹象，更不用说和解了。


Risky Advice	危险的建议


BRIGHTON – Why do we seem to be witnessing an increasing number of nasty technological surprises?	发自布莱顿——为何我们遭遇的突发性科技灾难似乎正不断增多？


Indeed, this year’s Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan and last year’s BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have taken their place alongside older problems, such as ozone depletion.	但事实上，无论是今年的福岛核危机还是去年的英国石油公司墨西哥湾漏油事件都与臭氧层变薄这样的老问题差别不大。


We believe that the way in which scientific advice is developed and communicated lies at the heart of the question.	而在我们看来，真正的核心问题其实是科学顾问建议的整套制定和传递模式。


Science is increasingly used to support what are essentially public-policy decisions, particularly concerning new and complex technologies like genetically modified (GM) foods, novel chemicals, and contending energy infrastructures.	科学正日益被用于佐证相关公共政策决策，尤其是在那些涉及到类似基因改造，新型化合物以及能源基础设施这类复杂新技术的领域。


Decisions about options and how to implement them are difficult, owing to uncertainties over hazards, benefits, and potential side effects.	由于种种与危害，利益和潜在副作用有关的不确定性，做出选择并实施这些选项的决策将变得相当困难。


Doubts surround not just likelihoods, but extend to the outcomes themselves, and what they might mean.	质疑的声音不但围绕着出现风险的可能性，还扩展到了对政策产物本身及其后果的讨论。


Powerful economic interests are often at stake, raising the pressures even more.	其中还会牵涉到庞大的经济利益，使压力变得更为巨大。


Too often, expert opinion is thought most useful to policymakers when presented as a single “definitive” interpretation.	而经常出现的情况是，专家意见对政策制定者最有用的时刻就是其作为某个单一“权威性”解释被发布之时。


As a result, experts typically understate uncertainty.	因此专家一般都会刻意隐瞒那些不确定性。


And, to the extent that they acknowledge uncertainty, they tend to reduce unknowns to measurable “risk.”	而当他们认识到某种程度的不确定性的时候，专家们还倾向于删减未知因素以便计算“风险”。


Yet risk is just one – relatively tractable – aspect of uncertainty.	而风险只不过是不确定性的其中一个相对较易应对的方面。


Beyond familiar notions of risk lie deeper predicaments of ambiguity and ignorance.	在常见的风险概念之外其实还存在更深层次的模糊和无知困境。


Such insights are not new, but they are often neglected in policymaking.	这些见解并不新颖，但却经常在政策制定过程中被忽略。


They can be traced back to the economist Frank Knight’s 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.	这些概念最早可以追溯到弗兰克·奈特于1921年出版的《风险，不缺定性和收益》一书。


Knight recognized that a significant distinction should be drawn between outcomes whose probabilities are well characterized (“risks”) and those where this is not possible (“uncertainties”).	书中奈特认识到必须将两种不同的产物明确区分开来，其中一种的可能性被可以被完全辨认和定义（“风险”），而另一种则不可能预测（“不确定性”）。


Examples of risk arise when individuals or groups are confident in their accumulated knowledge or experience.	当个人或者团体对自身所积累的知识或经验过度自信的时候，相应的风险就会爆发。


This is the case with many established consumer products, routine transport safety, or the incidence of familiar diseases.	这是许多业已打开市场的产品，日常交通安全或者某些常见病症所带来的教训。


Where we face uncertainty, though, we are confident in our knowledge of possible outcomes, but not of their likelihood – owing either to difficulties in prediction or to lack of information.	当面对不确定性的时候，我们自认了解的只是可能发生的后果，而不是这些后果发生的可能性——原因可能是预测的困难性或是缺乏相关信息。


And yet scientific advisers face strong temptations and pressures to treat every uncertainty as a risk.	但科学建议依然面临着强大的诱惑和压力去将一切不确定性当作风险来看待。


Unfortunately, there are two further and even more problematic aspects of uncertainty.	不幸的是，不确定性还有两个更深层次且麻烦更大的方面。


These arise where we are unsure not just about how likely different outcomes are, but also about which outcomes are relevant.	我们不但难以确定不同产物出现的概率，对哪些产物与事件相关也一无所知。


What options should be considered?	哪个选项应该被考虑？


What might these mean given differing views and interests?	在不同观点和利益下这些究竟意味着什么？


How should we classify and prioritize costs and benefits?	我们应该如何区分并在成本和收益找出最优选项？


Examples of such ambiguity arise in fields as diverse as nuclear power, GM food, and the Iraq War.	这些模糊性的例子出现在包括核能，转基因食品和伊拉克战争等不同领域。


Each is definitely happening (so “probability” is not the problem), but what do they mean?	这三件事务显然都已经发生（因此“可能性”就不是问题），但它们意味着什么？


Do they leave the world better or worse?	它们对这个世界是利是弊？


In what senses?	理由是什么？


What are the alternatives, if any?	如果有替代方案的话，这个方案又该是什么？


Different experts, studies, and organizations adopt contrasting but often equally legitimate and scientifically-founded perspectives on these questions.	对于这些问题，不同的专家，研究和组织都会持有相互对立但却同样有逻辑和科学依据的观点。


To try to enforce a single definitive interpretation is deeply misleading, and thus unhelpful – and potentially dangerous – in policymaking.	尝试将其中任何一个设为权威解释都具有误导性且对政策制定毫无帮助——甚至是有潜在危险性的。


Indeed, there can be no guarantee under ambiguity that even the best scientific analysis will lead to a definitive policy answer.	事实上，在模糊性之下就算最完美的科学分析都无法保证能取得一个明确无误的政策对策。


Consequently, fully “science-based decisions” are not just difficult to achieve; they are a contradiction in terms.	因此，全面的“有科学依据的决策”不但难以实现； 而且这些决策在概念上都是有分歧的。


The final, most intractable aspect of incomplete knowledge is ignorance.	而知识不完整性所包含的最终，也是最难解决的方面就是无知。


Here, our understanding of both likelihoods and the possibilities themselves is problematic.	在这方面，我们对于发生率以及这些可能性本身的理解都是有问题的。


Of course, no one can reliably foresee the unpredictable, but we can learn from past mistakes.	当然，没人能有效预测那些不确定因素，但我们可以从过去的错误中学习。


One example is the belated recognition that seemingly inert and benign halogenated hydrocarbons were interfering with the ozone layer.	其中一个例子就是人们在很长一段时期后才认识到那些似乎是惰性且无害的卤代碳氢化合物原来正在破坏地球臭氧层。


Another is the slowness to acknowledge the possibility of novel transmission mechanisms for spongiform encephalopathies (“mad cow disease”).	另一个则是后来才发现的关于牛海绵状脑病（“疯牛症”）新转移机制的可能性。


In their early stages, these sources of harm were not formally recognized, even as possibilities.	在初期阶段，这些危害源都未能被正式认识，甚至未被归入可能性的范围。


Instead, they were “early warnings” offered by dissenting voices.	而它们反而是一些不同声音所发出的“早期预警”。


Policy recommendations that miss such warnings court over-confidence and error.	忽略了这些警告的政策建议就会变得过度自信并导致失误。


The key question is how to move from the narrow focus on risk toward broader and deeper understandings of incomplete knowledge – and thus to better scientific policy advice.	因此关键问题就是如何从对风险的狭隘关注转向范围更宽广的对知识不完整性的认知——并提出更好的科学政策建议。


One high-stakes – and thus particularly politicized – context for expert policy advice is the setting of financial interest rates.	一个涉及重大利益——并因此被高度政治化的——专家政策建议情景就是对于金融利率的设定。


In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee describes its expert advisory process as a “two-way dialogue” – with a priority placed on public accountability.	在英国，英格兰银行的货币政策委员会将其专��建议程序定义为一个“双向对话”的过程——并将维持公信力为其首要重点。


Great care is taken by officials to inform the Committee not just of the results of formal analysis by the sponsoring bodies, but also of complex real-world conditions and perspectives.	官员们要努力确保传达给委员会的不仅仅是受资助机构透过正式分析所产生的结果，还必须将其代入到某个复杂的现实情况并加以透视分析。


Reports detail contrasting recommendations by individual members and explain reasons for differences.	此外还必须详细报告那些由各独立成员所作出的互相对立的建议，并解释产生分歧的原因。


Why is this kind of thing not normal in scientific advising?	试问这些做法为什么不能在科学建议中成为常态呢？


When faced with immeasurable uncertainties, it is much more common for a scientific committee to spend hours negotiating a single interpretation of the risks, even when faced with a range of contending but equally well-founded analyses and judgments, often from different (but equally scientific) fields and disciplines.	当面对无法衡量的不确定性时，即便是在面对一系列互有分歧却同样具备科学依据——源自于不同（但同样具备科学性）的领域和学科——的分析和判断的情况下，一个科学委员会通常的做法依然是花时间去商定某个对风险的单一解读。


As we know from the work of Thomas Kuhn and other philosophers of science, dominant paradigms do not always turn out to be the most accurate.	但正如我们从汤玛斯·库恩（Thomas Kuhn）以及其他科学哲学家那里所认识到的那样，最主流的理论范式往往不一定是最准确的。


Knowledge is constantly evolving, and it thrives on skepticism and diversity.	知识不断更新，并在怀疑与分歧的推动下不断繁荣。


Experience with standard-setting for toxic substances, and policy processes concerning the safety of various GM and energy technologies, shows that it would often be more accurate and useful to accept divergent expert interpretations, and focus instead on documenting the reasons underlying disagreement.	无论是在有毒物质标准设定方面的经验，还是关注各类基因改造和能源技术安全性的政策过程，其中都可以看出一个特点：接受各个专家解释中所存在的分歧，并将重点放在阐明这些分歧中背后的理由才是更准确且有助于制定政策的做法。


Concrete policy decisions could still be made – possibly more efficiently.	明确政治决策的将随后出台——而且可能更有效率。


Moreover, the decision’s relationship with the available science would be clearer, and the inherently political dimensions more transparent.	此外，决策与现有科学技术之间的关系将变得更加清晰，并以此催生更加透明的内部政治过程。


Instead of seeking definitive global judgments about the risks of particular choices, it is wiser to consider the assumptions behind such advice – since these are central in determining the conditions under which the advice is relevant.	与其苦苦寻觅针对某些特定选项风险的全面权威性判断，不如考察这一判断背后的多种假设——因为它们才是决定相关决策情景的核心因素。


Above all, there is a constant need for humility about “science-based decisions.”	最重要的是，人类对“科学决策”的探索永无止境。


A Year on the Brink	处在边缘的一年


NEW YORK – The year 2012 turned out to be as bad as I thought.	发自纽约——2012年正如我想的一样糟糕。


The recession in Europe was the predictable (and predicted) consequence of its austerity policies and a euro framework that was doomed to fail.	欧洲的经济衰退从其紧缩政策和注定失败的欧元体系中就能预测到（而且也预测中了）。


America’s anemic recovery – with growth barely sufficient to create jobs for new entrants into the labor force – was the predictable (and predicted) consequence of political gridlock, which prevented the enactment of President Barack Obama’s jobs bill and sent the economy toward a “fiscal cliff.”	美国的微弱复苏仅能勉强为其新生劳动力提供足够的工作岗位，这个结局从美国的政治僵局也能推测到（且预测中了），政治僵局使美国总统奥巴马无法实施其工作法案，也把整体经济推向了“财政悬崖”。


The two main surprises were the slowdown in emerging markets, which was slightly sharper and more widespread than anticipated, and Europe’s embrace of some truly remarkable reforms – though still far short of what is needed.	一是新兴市场增长速度放缓，情况比预想中稍差且波及范围更广； 二是欧洲采取了一些意义重大的改革—虽然远不及实际所需。


Looking to 2013, the biggest risks are in the US and Europe.	展望2013，最大的危机在美国和欧洲。


By contrast, China has the instruments, resources, incentives, and knowledge to avoid an economic hard landing – and, unlike Western countries, lacks any significant constituency wedded to lethal ideas like “expansionary austerity.”	对比之下，中国拥有各种各样的工具、资源、刺激方案和知识来避免经济硬着陆。 而且中国不同于西方国家，没有会紧抓着“扩张型紧缩”等致命想法不放的选民。


The Chinese rightly understand that they must focus more on the “quality” of growth –rebalancing their economy away from exports and toward domestic consumption – than on sheer output.	中国人正确地认识到他们需要多注意增长的质量而不是数量——将出口导向转为国内消费，实现中国经济的再平衡。


But, even with China’s change in focus, and despite adverse global economic conditions, growth of around 7% should sustain commodity prices, thereby benefiting exports from Africa and Latin America.	但即使中国转换了关注点，并考虑到不利的全球经济情况，其约7%的增长率还是会对大宗商品价格有所支撑，并使非洲和拉丁美洲的出口从中获益。


A third round of quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve could help commodity exporters as well, even if it does little to promote US domestic growth.	美联储第三轮量化宽松虽然对促进美国国内经济增长作用甚微，但也有助于大宗货品出口。


The US, with Obama re-elected, is likely to muddle on, much as it has for the past four years.  Inklings of recovery in the real-estate market will be enough to discourage dramatic policy measures, like a write-down of principal on “underwater” mortgages (where the outstanding loan exceeds the market value of the house).	随着奥巴马连任，美国很可能会像过去四年一样继续混日子。 房地产市场复苏的迹象足以打击任何重大的政策措施，如同调低了“溺水抵押贷款”（贷款额已经远远超出了房产市价的贷款）的本金。


But, with real (inflation-adjusted) house prices still 40% below the previous peak, a strong recovery for real estate (and the closely related construction industry) seems unlikely.	但是，实际房价（已考虑通货膨胀因素）仍比上个高峰期价格低40%，所以房地产市场（以及与之紧密关联的建筑业）不会出现强劲复苏。


Meanwhile, even if Obama’s Republican opponents do not push the country over the fiscal cliff of automatic tax increases and spending cuts on January 1, they will ensure that America’s own form of mild austerity will continue.	同时，在1月1日的时候，即使奥巴马的共和党对手不把美国推下自动加税和削减开支构成的财政悬崖，他们也一��会让本国继续处在美国式的温和紧缩之下。


Public-sector employment is now roughly 600,000 below its pre-crisis level, while normal expansion would have meant 1.2 million additional jobs, implying a public-sector jobs deficit of almost two million.	公共部门的工作岗位已比危机前水平少了60万个，而按照正常发展应该增加120万份工作，这就意味着公共部门的岗位缺口已达到200万。


But the real risk for the global economy is in Europe.	然而对全球经济来说，真正的风险存在于欧洲。


Spain and Greece are in depression, with no hope of recovery in sight.	西班牙和希腊现都处于经济萧条期，目前看不到复苏的希望。


The eurozone’s “fiscal compact” is no solution, and the European Central Bank’s purchases of sovereign debt are at most a temporary palliative.	欧元区达成的“欧洲财政协定”不是解决办法，欧洲央行购买国债的行动至多只是暂时的止痛剂。


If the ECB imposes further austerity conditions (as it seems to be demanding of Greece and Spain) in exchange for financing, the cure will only worsen the patient’s condition.	如果欧洲央行把进一步紧缩作为融资交换条件施加于各国（似乎现在就要求希腊和西班牙这么做），这剂药只会加重病人的病情。


Likewise, common European banking supervision will not suffice to prevent the continuing exodus of funds from the afflicted countries.	同样，普通的欧洲银行监管不足以阻拦受灾国资金不断出逃。


That requires an adequate common deposit-insurance scheme, which the northern European countries have said is not in the cards anytime soon.	欧洲需要的是一个充分的普通存款保险体系，但是北欧国家已表明近期无法实现。


While European leaders have repeatedly done what previously seemed unthinkable, their responses have been out of synch with markets.	虽然欧洲领导人不断做出一些以前看来不可想象的举措，但他们的反应已经跟不上市场的步调。


They have consistently underestimated their austerity programs’ adverse effects and overestimated the benefits of their institutional adjustments.	欧洲领导人始终低估了其紧缩政策的反作用而高估了体制调整的好处。


The impact of the ECB’s €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), which loaned money to commercial banks to buy sovereign bonds (a bootstrap operation that seemed as peculiar as the ECB’s financing of sovereigns to shore up the banks), was impressively short-lived.	价值1万亿欧元（约合1. 3万亿美元）的欧洲央行长期再融资计划(LTRO)——把钱借给商业银行去购买主权债务（这个类似一个人拽着自己头发尝试把自己提起来的行动就跟欧洲央行通过对主权国家融资来支持银行一样怪异），其影响效果极为短暂。


Europe’s leaders have recognized that the debt crisis in the periphery will only worsen in the absence of growth, and they have even (sometimes) recognized that austerity will not help on that front; nonetheless, they have failed to deliver an effective growth package.	欧洲领导人已经认识到欧洲外围国家的债务危机只会在缺乏增长的情况下恶化，甚至也（时不时地）认识到紧缩政策在此方面毫无作用。 然而，他们还是没能推出有效的一揽子增长方案。


The depression that European authorities have imposed on Spain and Greece already is having political consequences.	欧洲当局给西班牙和希腊带来的经济萧条已经显现出政治后果。


In Spain, independence movements, especially in Catalonia, have revived, while neo-Nazism is on the march in Greece.	在西班牙，尤其是在加泰罗尼亚，要求独立的活动死灰复燃；


The euro, created for the avowed purpose of fostering the integration of a democratic Europe, is having precisely the opposite effect.	在希腊，新纳粹主义正在上演。 当年宣称为了促进民主欧洲一体化而创设的欧元现在恰恰起了反作用。


The lesson is that politics and economics are inseparable.	得到的教训就是政治与经济密不可分。


Markets on their own may be neither efficient nor stable, but the politics of deregulation gave scope to unprecedented excesses that led to asset bubbles and the rolling crisis that has followed their collapse.	市场本身既不有效也不稳定，但是撤销管制的政治行为为前所未有的过剩留出了余地，从而引起资产泡沫和泡沫破裂后的滚动危机。


And the politics of crisis has led to responses that are far from adequate.	危机政治学触发的反应还远远不够。


Banks have been saved, but the underlying problems were left to fester – no surprise there, given that, in both Europe and America, the task of fixing them was assigned to the policymakers who had caused them.	银行虽然得到了救助，但内在问题却被放任不管，任其恶化——这没什么好奇怪的，因为在欧洲和美国，解决内在问题的任务被分配给了决策者，而正是这些人引发了这些问题。


In Europe, it was politics, not economics, that drove the creation of the euro; and it was politics that led to a fundamentally flawed structure that created ample room for bubbles, but little scope for dealing with the aftermath.	在欧洲，推动欧元成形的不是经济，而是政治。 正是政治创造了一个存在根本缺陷的体系，为泡沫经济制造了大量空间，却没为事后处理留下多少余地。


To forecast 2013 is to predict how divided government in the US and a divided Europe respond to their respective crises.	要对2013进行预言，就是要预计美国政府内部分裂有多严重，一个分化的欧洲国家又会对各自的危机作何反应。


Economists’ crystal balls are always cloudy, but those of political scientists are even cloudier.	经济学家手中的水晶球一直处于浑浊状态，然而政治科学家手中更甚。


That said, the US will probably muddle through another year, neither pushed over the cliff nor put on the road to robust recovery.	即便如此，美国既不会被推下财政悬崖也不会走上复苏之路，可能会再继续浑浑噩噩过一年。


But, on both sides of the Atlantic, the polarized politics of bravado and brinkmanship will be much in evidence.	但是，大西洋两岸都会明显出现虚张声势和边缘政策的极端政治。


The problem with brinkmanship is that, sometimes, one does go over the brink.	而边缘政策的问题就是，有时它会让人越过悬崖边缘。


Europe’s Secret Bailout	欧洲的秘密援助


MUNICH – While the world worries about Donald Trump, Brexit, and the flow of refugees from Syria and other war-torn countries, the European Central Bank continues to work persistently and below the public radar on its debt-restructuring plan – also known as quantitative easing (QE) – to ease the burden on over-indebted eurozone countries.	慕尼黑—在世界担心唐纳德·特朗普、英国退欧和来自叙利亚和其他战争摧残国家的难民流之际，欧洲央行一直在公众视线之外进行着其债务重组计划——又称为量化宽松（QE）——以缓解欧元区过度负债国的负担。


Under the ECB’s QE program, which started in March 2015 (and will likely be extended beyond its scheduled end in March 2017), eurozone members’ central banks buy private market securities for €1.74 trillion ($1.84 trillion), with more than €1.4 trillion to be used to purchase their own countries’ government debt.	欧洲央行的量化宽松计划始于2015年3月，并且有可能在2017年3月计划到期时延期。 在该计划下，欧元区成员国央行买入1.


The QE program seems to be symmetrical, because each central bank repurchases its own government debt in proportion to the size of the country.	量化宽松计划貌似对称，因为各央行都根据国家规模依照比例回购本国政府债务。


But it does not have a symmetrical effect, because government debt from southern European countries, where the debt binges and current-account deficits of the past occurred, are mostly repurchased abroad.	但其影响是不对称的，因为南欧国家在过去十年中大量举债并且存在经常项目赤字，它们主要靠海外回购。


For example, the Banco de España repurchases Spanish government bonds from all over the world, thereby deleveraging the country vis-à-vis private creditors.	比如，西班牙银行在全世界回购西班牙政府债券，从而降低西班牙对私人债权人的负债。


To this end, it asks other eurozone members’ central banks, particularly the German Bundesbank and, in some cases, the Dutch central bank, to credit the payment orders to the German and Dutch bond sellers.	在这方面，它要求其他欧元区成员国央行——以德国联邦银行为甚，在一些案例中也包括荷兰央行——对德国和荷兰债券卖家的支付指令（payment orders）授信。


Frequently, if the sellers of Spanish government bonds are outside the eurozone, it will ask the ECB to credit the payment orders.	很多时候，如果西班牙政府债券的卖家位于欧元区之外，它将要求欧洲央行对支付指令授信。


In the latter case, this often results in triangular transactions, with the sellers transferring the money to Germany or the Netherlands to invest it in fixed-interest securities, companies, or company shares.	后一种情况往往造成三角交易，卖家将钱打给德国和荷兰投资于固定利息证券、公司或公司股票。


Thus, the German Bundesbank and the Dutch central bank must credit not only the direct payment orders from Spain, but also the indirect orders resulting from the Banca de España’s repurchases in third countries.	因此，德国联邦银行和荷兰央行不但要为来自西班牙的直接支付指令授信，还必须给因西班牙银行在第三国的回购所产生的间接指令授信。


The payment order credits granted by the Bundesbank and the Dutch central bank are recorded as Target claims against the euro system.	德国联邦银行和荷兰央行所发出的支付指令授信被记录为对欧元系统的Target债权。


At the end of September, these claims amounted to €819.4 billion, with the Bundesbank accounting for €715.7 billion, which was 46% of Germany’s net external assets at midyear.	截至9月底，这些债权已达8,194亿欧元，其中德国央行占了7,157亿欧元，或德国年中净对外资产的46%。


Since the beginning of the year, both countries’ combined claims have increased by €180.4 billion, or €20 billion per month, on average.	自年初以来，德国和荷兰Target债权总和增加了1,804亿欧元，平均每个月增加200亿欧元。


Conversely, the Target debt of the Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS) – amounted to €816.5 billion.	反之，南欧国家——希腊、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙（欧猪四国）——的Target债务达到了8,165亿欧元。


For the GIPS countries, these transactions are a splendid deal.	对欧猪四国而言，这些交易相当美妙。


They can exchange interest-bearing government debt with fixed maturities held by private investors for the (currently) non-interest-bearing and never-payable Target book debt of their central banks – institutions that the Maastricht Treaty defines as limited liability companies, because member states do not have to recapitalize them when they are over-indebted.	它们可以用其央行的（目前）不生息也永不偿付的Target债务交换私人投资者所持有的固定期限的升息政府债务。 根据马斯特里赫特条约，欧元区成员国央行被定义为有限责任公司，因为欧元区成员国在过度负债时不必进行资本重组。


If a crash occurs and those countries leave the euro, their national central banks are likely to go bankrupt because much of their debt is denominated in euro, whereas their claims against the respective states and the banks will be converted to the new depreciating currency.	如果发生崩溃，这些国家退出欧元，它们的国家央行有可能破产，因为大部分债务用欧元计价，而它们对各自国家和银行的债权已转换为新的贬值货币。


The Target claims of the remaining euro system will then vanish into thin air, and the Bundesbank and the Dutch central bank will only be able to hope that other surviving central banks participate in their losses.	剩余的欧元系统中的Target债权也将灰飞烟灭，德国联邦银行和荷兰央行只能寄望于其他存活的央行分担损失。


At that time, German and Dutch asset sellers who now hold central bank money will notice that their stocks are claims against their central banks that are no longer covered.	到那时，现在持有央行资金的德国和荷兰的资产卖家将注意到，他们手里拿着的是对不再安全的本国央行的债权。


One should not assume that anyone is actively striving for a crash.	我们不应该认为有谁会去积极争取崩溃。


But, in view of the negotiations – set to begin in 2018 – on a European fiscal union (implying systematic transfers from the EU’s north to its south), it wouldn’t hurt if Germany and the Netherlands knew what would happen if they did not sign a possible treaty.	但是，从将从2018年开始的欧洲财政联盟（意味着系统性地由欧盟北方向南方进行��移支付）谈判的角度看，如果德国和荷兰知道不在可能形成的条约上签字意味着什么也没有问题。


As it stands, they will presumably agree to a fiscal union, if only because it will enable them to hide the expected write-off losses in a European transfer union, rather than disclosing those losses now.	目前，它们想必都会同意财政联盟，只不过原因是它们能因此隐藏欧洲转移联盟中的预期减记损失，而不是现在就披露这些损失。


Will Americans Become Poorer?	美国人会变得更穷吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Robert Gordon of Northwestern University has launched a lively and important debate about the future rate of economic growth in the United States.	美国剑桥—西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）发起了一场既生动又重要的关于美国未来经济增长率的争论。


Although his book The Rise and Fall of American Growth will not be published until January 2016, his thesis has already garnered coverage in the Economist and Foreign Affairs.	尽管他的书《美国增长的兴衰》（The Rise and Fall of American Growth）要到2016年1月才出版，但他所提出的话题已经吸引了《经济学人》（Economist）和《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）的报道。


Clearly, Gordon’s gloomy assessment of America’s growth prospects deserves to be taken seriously.	显然，戈登对美国增长前景的悲观态度值得认真对待。


But is it right?	但果真如此吗？


Gordon argues that the major technological changes that raised the standard of living in the past are much more important than anything that can happen in the future.	戈登认为，过去提高生活水平的重大技术变化比未来任何东西都要重要得多。


He points to examples such as indoor plumbing, automobiles, electricity, telephones, and central heating, and argues that all of them were much more important for living standards than recent innovations like the internet and mobile phones.	他援引自来水、汽车、电、电话、中央供暖等例子，指出所有这些东西对于生活水平的提升所起到的作用远远高于互联网和移动电话等最近的创新。


I agree with Gordon that I would rather give up my mobile phone and even the Internet than go without indoor plumbing and electricity.	我同意戈登，我宁可放弃手机甚至互联网，也不愿忍受没有自来水和电。


But that just means that we are lucky to be living now rather than a century ago (and even luckier to be living now than two centuries ago or in the middle ages).	但这无非意味着我们幸运地生活在现在，而不是一个世纪前（当然，比生活在两个世纪前或生活在中世纪就更加幸运了）。


The fact that these major innovations happened in the past is not a reason to be pessimistic about the future.	这些重大创新发生在过去这一事实并不构成对未来悲观的理由。


Gordon also points to the recent slowdown in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth.	戈登还讨论了最近的真实（经通胀调整的）GDP放缓。


According to official US statistics, real GDP per worker grew at an average annual rate of 2.3% from 1891 to 1972, but by only 1.5% since then.	据美国官方数据，1891—1972年每工人真实GDP平均每年增长2. 3%，而此后的平均增长率只有1.


But the official statistics on GDP growth fail to capture most of the gains in our standard of living that come from new and improved goods and services.	但官方GDP数据没有将新的和改进的商品和服务所带来的生活水平的提高计算在内。


That means that the official growth rate does not reflect the rise in real incomes that came with air conditioning, anti-cancer drugs, new surgical procedures, and the many more mundane innovations.	这意味着官方增长率没有反映与空调、抗癌药物、新手术流程以及其他许多普通创新一起到来的真实收入的提高。


Moreover, because the US government does not count anything in GDP unless it is sold in the market, the vast expansion of television entertainment and the introduction of services like Google and Facebook have been completely excluded from the national account.	此外，由于美国政府不将任何不是在市场中出售的东西计入GDP，电视娱乐的快速扩张和谷歌和Facebook等服务的引入完全被排斥在国民账户之外。


This means that the true rise in real incomes was actually faster than the official statistics imply – possibly much faster.	这意味着真实收入的实际增长其实比官方数据所体现的更快——可能快很多。


That is true of the data for the first half of the twentieth century, and it continues to be true today.	对于二十世纪上半叶的数据是如此，并且一直到今天都是如此。


It is not clear whether the measurement problem was bigger in the more distant past than it has been recently; but it is irrelevant when we think about the future.	不知这一测算问题在遥远的过去是否比现在更严重； 但这对于我们思考未来无关紧要。


Whether growth in per capita income that is officially estimated at 1.5% is in reality more like 3%, we are enjoying the higher level of real incomes inherited from the past.	不管官方测算结果为1. 5%的人均收入增长实际是否为3%，我们都享受到了源自过去的实际收入的提高。


So will future generations.	子孙后代也将如此。


Indeed, there is simply no reason for the view, often expressed in surveys and appearing in Gordon’s book, that the children of today’s generation will not enjoy a standard of living as high as their parents’.	事实上，对于在调查中经常出现并在戈登的书中讨论的观点，即今天的孩子无法享受到父辈那么高的生活水平，其实是毫无道理的。


That may be true for some people, especially those with relatively high incomes, but it is definitely not true for most people.	对于一些人可能确实如此，特别是那些收入相对较高的人，但对于大部分人显然不是如此。


Think about a 30-year-old new parent at the middle of the income distribution.	设想一位处于收入分布中间位置的30岁的新父母。


Thirty years from now, the child will be as old as her median-income parent is now.	三十年后，他的孩子将和他现在一般大。


If real incomes grow at just 1.5% a year, the median income 30 years from now will be nearly 60% higher than the income of today’s median-income individual.	如果真实收入每年只增长1. 5%，那么30年后的中位收入将比今天中位收入个体高出近60%。


Even if the child earns 30% less than the median at that time, her income would still be higher than today’s median income.	到那时，即使这位孩子收入比中位收入还要低30%，也仍然比今天的中位收入高。


And if product innovations and improvements imply that per capita real incomes grow at 3% a year, the median income of someone 30 years from now would be more than twice today’s median income.	而如果产品创新和改善意味着人均真实收入增长率为每年3%，则30年后的中位收入将比今天高一倍。


So Americans are lucky that they have inherited the innovations of the past, and that real incomes will continue to grow in the future.	因此，美国人是幸运的，他们继承过去了的创新，真实收入在未来也将继续上升。


But that is not a reason for complacency.	但这不是自满的理由。


The US can increase its future growth rate by improving its education system, raising its rates of saving and investment to where they were in the past, and fixing the features of its tax and transfer systems that reduce employment and earnings.	美国可以通过改善教育系统、提高储蓄率和对过去投资项目的投资、修补降低就业和利润的税收和转移支付系统来增加未来增长率。


Gordon focuses on the effect of technological innovation on Americans’ real incomes.	戈登的注意力放在了技术创新对美国真实收入的影响上。


But an important limitation of his argument is that it gives short shrift to policy innovation.	但他的观点有一个重要局限，即他的观点忽视了政策创新。


America’s economy – and those of many other countries – could grow faster in the future if policymakers adopt the appropriate reforms.	美国经济——以及其他许多国家的经济——未来能够增长得更快，如果决策者实施恰当的改革的话。


The Financial Fire Next Time	下一场金融大火


NEW HAVEN – If we have learned anything since the global financial crisis peaked in 2008, it is that preventing another one is a tougher job than most people anticipated.	纽黑文—如果说我们从2008年达到顶峰的金融危机中学到了什么，那就是预防下一场危机比大部分人所想象的难得多。


Not only does effective crisis prevention require overhauling our financial institutions through creative application of the principles of good finance; it also requires that politicians and their constituents have a shared understanding of these principles.	有效的危机预防需要用创造性地运用好金融原则整顿我们的金融机构； 还需要政客和他们的选民理解这些原则。


Today, unfortunately, such an understanding is missing.	不幸的是，如今我们缺少的正是这样的理解。


The solutions are too technical for most news reporting aimed at the general public.	对以普罗大众为目标受众的新闻报道来说，解决方案技术性太强。


And, while people love to hear about “reining in” or “punishing” financial leaders, they are far less enthusiastic about asking these people to expand or improve financial-risk management.	而尽管人们喜欢听到“制约”和“惩罚”金融大佬，却并不热衷于要求这些人扩大或改善金融风险管理。


But, because special-interest groups have developed around existing institutions and practices, we are basically stuck with them, subject to minor tweaking.	但是，由于现有机构和行为滋生了特殊利益集团，因此我们很难���脱它们，只能做一些轻微的调整。


The financial crisis, which is still ongoing, resulted largely from the boom and bust in home prices that preceded it for several years (home prices peaked in the United States in 2006).	金融危机仍在进行中，这场危机的主要原因是此前几年中的房价起落（美国房价在2006年见顶）。


During the pre-crisis boom, homebuyers were encouraged to borrow heavily to finance undiversified investments in a single home, while governments provided guarantees to mortgage investors.	在危机前的繁荣期，屋主被鼓励大量举债投资于单一的住房，而政府为按揭投资者提供了担保。


In the US, this occurred through implicit guarantees of assets held by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.	在美国，这是通过对联邦住房局（Federal Housing Administration，FHA）和房利美、房地美等按揭机构的隐性担保实现的。


At a session that I chaired at the American Economic Association’s recent meeting in Philadelphia, the participants discussed the difficulty of getting any sensible reform out of governments around the world.	在我主持的美国经济学会在费城召开的最新会议上，与会者讨论了世界各国出台有意义的改革的困难。


In a paper presented at the session, Andrew Caplin of New York University spoke of the public’s lack of interest or comprehension of the rising risks associated with the FHA, which has been guaranteeing privately-issued mortgages since its creation during the housing crisis of the 1930’s.	在会上，纽约大学的安德鲁·卡普林（Andrew Caplin）宣讲了一篇论文，指出公众对于FHA相关的风险不断上升的局面根本不感兴趣或难以理解。 FHA成立于20世纪30年代住房危机期间，成立后一直为私人按揭提供担保。


Caplin’s discussant, Joseph Gyourko of the Wharton School, concurred.	卡普林的讨论者、沃顿商学院的约瑟夫·盖约克（Joseph Gyourko）对此表示同意。


Gyourko’s own 2013 study concludes that the FHA, now effectively leveraged 30 to one on guarantees of home mortgages that are themselves leveraged 30 to one, is underwater to the tune of tens of billions of dollars.	盖约克本人的2013年研究认为，FHA对住房按揭贷款的担保的杠杆率达到了30:1，而被它所担保的按揭贷款本身的杠杆率也达到了30:1，这导致FHA已经资不抵债，缺口达数十亿美元。


He wants the FHA shut down and replaced with a subsidized saving program that does not attempt to compete with the private sector in evaluating mortgage risk.	他希望关闭FHA，替之以不与私人部门竞争按揭风险评估业务的补贴储蓄计划。


Similarly, Caplin testified in 2010 before the US House Committee on Financial Services that the FHA was at serious risk, a year after FHA Commissioner David Stevens told the same committee that “We will not need a bailout.”	类似地，2010年卡普林在美国金融服务住房委员会（US House Committee on Financial Services）做听证时说，FHA具有严重风险，而在此前一年，FHA主管大卫·史蒂文斯（David Stevens）对金融服务住房委员会说“我们不需要援助。


Caplin’s research evidently did not sit well with FHA officials, who were hostile to Caplin and refused to give him the data he wanted.	”卡普林的研究显然与FHA官员的说法不相容，后者对卡普林相当不满，拒绝提供他所需要的数据。


The FHA has underestimated its losses every year since, while proclaiming itself in good health.	此后的每一年，FHA都低估了它的损失，并且自称健康。


Finally, in September, it was forced to seek a government bailout.	最终，在去年9月，FHA被迫寻求政府援助。


At the session, I asked Caplin about his effort, starting with his co-authored 1997 book Housing Partnerships, which proposed allowing homebuyers to buy only a fraction of a house, thereby reducing their risk exposure without putting taxpayers at risk.	在此次会议上，我向卡普林询问了他的研究。 首先是1997年他与人合著的《合伙买房》（House Partnership），该书提出了一个方案：允许买房者只买房子的一部分，从而减少他的风险敞口，也不必拿纳税人的钱冒险。


If implemented, his innovative idea would reduce homeowners’ leverage.	如果该方案实施，他的创新思维将能降低屋主的杠杆。


But, while it was a highly leveraged mortgage market that fueled the financial crisis 11 years later, the idea, he said, has not made headway anywhere in the world.	但是，尽管11年后正是高杠杆按揭市场助长了金融危机，他表示自己的思想从未在世界上得到认真对待。


Why not, I asked?	我问，这是为什么？


Why can’t creative people with their lawyers simply create such partnerships for themselves?	为什么创新者和他们的律师不为自己创造这样的合伙关系？


The answer, he replied, is complicated; but, at least in the US, one serious problem looms large: the US Internal Revenue Service’s refusal to issue an advance ruling on how such risk-managing arrangements would be taxed.	他回答说，原因很复杂； 但是，至少在美国，一个严重的问题是美国国税局（US Internal Revenue Service）拒绝就这一风险管理安排的征税问题发布预案。


Given the resulting uncertainty, no one is in a mood to be creative.	这造成了不确定性，以至于无人愿意创新。


Meanwhile, there is strong public demand – angry and urgent – for a government response aimed at preventing another crisis and ending the problem of “too big to fail” financial institutions.	与此同时，对于政府采取措施防止又一场危机以及解决金融机构“太大而不能倒”的公众要求十分强大——甚至可以说是愤怒且紧迫。


But the political reality is that government officials lack sufficient knowledge and incentive to impose reforms that are effective but highly technical.	但政治现实是政府官员不具备足够的知识和激励实施有效但技术性极强的改革。


For example, one reform adopted in the US to help prevent the “too big to fail” problem is the risk retention rule stipulated by the 2010 Dodd Frank Act.	比如，美国所采取的防止“太大而不能倒”问题的一项改革是2010年多德-弗兰克法案（Dodd-Frank Act）中的风险自留（risk retention）规则。


In order to ensure that mortgage securitizers have some “skin in the game,” they are required to retain an interest in 5% of the mortgage securities that they create (unless they qualify for an exemption).	为了保证按揭证券发行者自身“入局”，它们必须在它们所创造的按揭证券中保留5%的投资（除非满足豁免条件）。


But, in another paper presented at our session, Paul Willen of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston argued that creating such a restriction is hardly the best way for a government to improve the functioning of financial markets.	在此次会议上的另一篇宣讲论文中，波士顿联邦储备银行的鲍罗·维伦（Paul Willen）指出，制定这样的限制很难说是政府改善金融市场功能的最佳方式。


Investors already know that people have a stronger incentive to manage risks better if they retain some interest in the risk.	投资者已经知道，如果风险涉及到自身利益，人们会更有动力管理好风险。


But investors also know that other factors may offset the advantages of risk retention in specific cases.	但投资者也知道，对于具体的案例，其他因素可能抵消风险自留的好处。


In trying to balance such considerations, the government is in over its head.	为了平衡这些考虑，政府会过度涉足。


The most fundamental reform of housing markets remains something that reduces homeowners’ overleverage and lack of diversification.	住房市场最根本的改革仍旧是降低屋主的过高杠杆和过低的多样化程度。


In my own paper for the session, I returned to the idea of the government encouraging privately-issued mortgages with preplanned workouts, thereby insuring them against the calamity of ending up underwater after home prices fall.	在我本人为此次会议准备的文章中，我重新回到了政府在鼓励私人按揭的同时做好预案的方案，这样做可以确保它们在房价下跌后免于落得资不抵债的下场。


Like housing partnerships, this would be a fundamental reform, for it would address the core problem that underlay the financial crisis.	与合伙买房一样，这将是根本性改革，因为它将解决金融危机背后的核心问题。


But there is no impetus for such a reform from existing interest groups or the news media.	但现有利益集团和新闻媒体都没有动力推动这一改革。


One of our discussants, Joseph Tracy of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (and co-author of Housing Partnerships), put the problem succinctly: “Firefighting is more glamorous than fire prevention.”	我们的讨论者之一、纽约联邦储备银行的约瑟夫·特雷西（Joseph Tracy，同时也是《合伙买房》的合著者）言简意赅地总结了这一问题：“救火比防火光荣得多”。


Just as most people are more interested in stories about fires than they are in the chemistry of fire retardants, they are more interested in stories about financial crashes than they are in the measures needed to prevent them.	大部分人对火灾故事的兴趣远大于阻燃剂化学，同理，他们对金融灾难故事的兴趣也远大于防灾措施。


That is not a recipe for a happy ending.	这可不是大团圆结局的秘方。


The Global Economy’s Tale Risks	全球经济的故事风险


TOKYO – Fluctuations in the world’s economies are largely due to the stories we hear and tell about them.	东京—世界经济体的波动原因大体上就是我们所听到和谈论的那些。


These popular, emotionally relevant narratives sometimes inspire us to go out and spend, start businesses, build new factories and office buildings, and hire employees; at other times, they put fear in our hearts and impel us to sit tight, save our resources, curtail spending, and reduce risk.	这些流行的、与情感相关的故事有时会促使我们出门消费、开办企业、建造新工厂和写字楼、雇用工人； 有时则会让我们心存恐惧、坐立不安，让我们将资源储蓄起来，削减支出，降低风险。


They either stimulate our “animal spirits” or muffle them.	它们要么刺激我们的“动物精神”，要么压制这一精神。


Visiting Japan on a speaking tour, I am struck by the positive impact of the economy-related stories on people’s thinking and behavior, and also by how fragile that change is.	在来日本演讲的过程中，我震惊于与经济相关的故事给人们的思维和行为所造成的额积极影响，也震惊于变化如此脆弱。


Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe assumed office in December 2012 and launched his program of monetary and fiscal stimulus and structural reform, the impact on Japanese confidence has been profound.	自首相安倍晋三于2012年12月重新执政并实施他的货��和财政刺激以及结构性改革计划以来，对日本人信心的影响可谓深远。


According to the International Monetary Fund, the output gap – the difference between actual and potential GDP – narrowed from -3.6% in 2011 to -0.9% in 2013.	根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，产出缺口——实际和潜在GDP之间的差额——从2011年的-3. 6%收窄至2013年的-0.


Most of the rest of the world lacks a comprehensive, easily understood narrative of positive change similar to Japan’s “Abenomics.”	大部分世界其他国家缺少可以与“安倍经济学”相媲美的全面又易于理解的积极变化故事。 据IMF测算，世界主要发达经济体产出缺口依然令人失望，2013年为-3.


The output gap for the world’s major advanced economies, as calculated by the IMF, remains disappointing, at -3.2% in 2013, which is less than half-way back to normal from 2009, the worst year of the global financial crisis, when the gap was -5.3%.	2%，只较2009年（全球金融危机最严重的一年，产出缺口高达-5. 3%）向正常水平恢复了不到一半。


We seem to be at the mercy of our narratives.	我们似乎在等待故事救命。


Ever since 2009, most of us have just been waiting for some story to turn our hearts aglow with hope and confidence – and to reinvigorate our economies.	自2009年以来，我们大部分人一直都在等待让我们的心里重燃希望和信心——并重振我们的经济——的故事。


Think of the story of the real-estate boom in the United States and other countries in the first half of the 2000’s.	以21世纪最初五年美国和其他国家的房地产繁荣故事为例。


This was a story not of a “bubble”; rather, the boom was a triumph of capitalist enterprise in a new millennium.	这不是一个“泡沫”的故事，繁荣被看成是资本主义制度在新千年的胜利。


These stories were so powerful because a huge number of people were psychologically – and financially – invested in them.	这些故事十分显眼，因为很多人在心理上——和财务上——都投资于这个故事。


Most families owned a house, so they were automatically participating in the boom.	大部分家庭都拥有房子，因此自动地参与了繁荣。


And many homeowners, eager to participate even more in the boom and feel like savvy capitalists, bought more expensive houses than they normally would.	而许多屋主急切地想更深地参与繁荣，更多地表现出精明的资本主义者的风貌，他们买下了比通常更贵的房子。


With the abrupt end of the boom in 2006, that ego-boosting story also ended.	2006年，房地产繁荣戛然而止，让参与者自我膨胀的故事也完结了。


We were not all investing geniuses after all.	我们根本不是投资天才。


It was just a bubble, we learned.	我们领会到这只是一个泡沫而已。


Our confidence in ourselves, and hence in our futures, took a hit, discouraging economic risk-taking.	我们对自己的信心——以及我们对未来的信心——遭遇重创，让我们不敢冒经济风险。


Then the financial crisis erupted, scaring the entire world.	接着，金融危机爆发，让全世界震怖不已。


A story of opportunity and riches turned into one of corrupt mortgage lenders, overleveraged financial institutions, dimwitted experts, and captured regulators.	机会和致富的故事变成了腐败的按揭贷款人、过度负债的金融机构、愚蠢的专家和充当爪牙的监管者的故事。


The economy was careening like a rudderless ship, and the sharp operators who had duped us into getting on board – call them the 1% – were slipping away in the only lifeboats.	经济像一艘无舵的船那样倾斜，而当初诱骗我们上船的精明操盘手——不妨称之为1%——乘坐唯一的救生艇逃之夭夭。


By early 2009, the plunge in stock markets around the world reached its nadir, and fear of a deep depression, according to the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey, was at its highest level since the second oil crisis in the early 1980’s.	2009年初，全球股市崩盘达到谷底，密歇根大学消费情绪调查表明，对深度萧条的恐慌达到了自20世纪80年代初第二次石油危机以来的最高水平。


Stories of the Great Depression of the 1930’s were recalled from our dimmest memories – or from our parents’ and grandparents’ memories – and retold.	关于20世纪30年代大萧条的故事从我们——或我们父辈和祖父辈——记忆最深处被唤醒，并重新讲述。


To understand why economic recovery (if not that of the stock market) has remained so weak since 2009, we need to identify which stories have been affecting popular psychology.	要明白为何2009年以来的经济复苏（如果不是股市复苏的话）一直如此疲软，我们需要知道那些故事在影响大众心理。


One example is the rapid advance in smartphones and tablet computers.	一个例子是智能手机和平板电脑的迅速发展。


Apple’s iPhone was launched in 2007, and Google’s Android phones in 2008, just as the crisis was beginning, but most of their growth has been since then. Apple’s iPad was launched in 2010.	苹果公司的iPhone发布于2007年，谷歌的Android手机发布于2008年，都赶上了危机的起点，但它们在此后持续增长。


Since then, these products have entered almost everyone’s consciousness; we see people using them everywhere – on the street and in hotel lobbies, restaurants, and airports.	苹果的iPad发布于2010年，此后，这一产品进入了几乎每一个人的印象中； 我们随处都能见到用iPad的人——不管是街头、饭店大堂、餐厅还是机场。


This ought to be a confidence-boosting story: amazing technologies are emerging, sales are booming, and entrepreneurship is alive and very well.	这应该是一个提振信心的故事：令人惊讶的科技正在兴起，销售在增加，企业家精神仍然活着并且动力十足。


But the confidence-boosting effect of the earlier real-estate boom was far more powerful, because it resonated directly with many more people.	但早先的地产繁荣的信心提振效应要强大得多，因为它与多得多的人产生了直接共鸣。


This time, in fact, the smartphone/tablet story is associated with a sense of foreboding, for the wealth that these devices generate seems to be concentrated among a tiny number of tech entrepreneurs who probably live in a faraway country.	事实上，智能手机/平板的故事似乎是一个先兆，这些设备所创造的的财富会集中到极少数也许生活在遥远的国家的科技创业家手里。


These stories awaken our fears of being overtaken by others on the economic ladder.	这些故事唤醒了我们对于被经济阶梯上的其他人主宰的恐惧。


And now that our phones talk to us (Apple launched Siri, the artificial voice that answers your spoken questions, on its iPhones in 2010), they fuel dread that they can replace us, just as earlier waves of automation rendered much human capital obsolete.	现在，我们的手机能和我们对话（2010年，苹果为iPhone发布了一项叫做Siri的服务，这是一种人工声音，能回答你提出的问题），更加剧了它们可以取代我们的担忧，一如早先的自动化浪潮导致了大量人力资本的废置。


I had the pleasure of meeting with Abe on this trip.	在我的日本之旅中，我很愉快能与安倍减免。


He sticks to the script, telling a story of taking aggressive and definitive action against an economic malaise that has plagued Japan for decades.	他仍执着于自己的蓝图，讲着采取激进、切实的行动对付困扰日本几十年的顽疾的故事。 他在激发信心；


He inspires confidence; I felt it immediately.	我可以立刻感受到这一点。


Abe is also described as reviving national patriotism, even nationalism.	安倍还被认为激发了民族爱国主义甚至民族主义。


Though I heard none of this from him in my meeting, I think it may be a central part of his story, too.	尽管我在我们的会面中没有听到任何这方面的信息，但我认为这也是他的故事的核心部分之一。


Nationalism, after all, is intrinsically bound up with individual identity.	毕竟，民族主义与个人身份从根本上不可分割。


It creates a story for each member of the nation, a story about what he or she can do as part of a successful country.	民族主义构成了对全体国民的故事，一个关于他或她在一个成功的国家可以做些什么的故事。


Some of Abe’s most controversial steps, such as visiting the Yasukuni Shrine despite Chinese and Korean objections, only increase the story’s impact.	安倍的一些最有争议的举措，如顶着中国和韩国的反对参拜靖国神社，都增加了这一故事的影响力。


Still, it is not easy for national leaders, even those with Abe’s talents, to manage such stories, just as it is hard for film producers to make a blockbuster every time.	但是，即使向安倍这样有才干的国家领导人，要在这些故事上游刃有余也不容易，正如电影制片人很难每次都制作出石破天惊的作品。


No leader can consistently shape the narratives that affect the economy.	没有哪位领袖能够一贯地构造出影响经济的故事。


But that does not rule out the need to try.	但这并不意味这不需要尝试。


Booming Until It Hurts?	不到亡羊不补牢？


NEW HAVEN – In recent months, concern has intensified among the world’s financial experts and news media that overheated asset markets – real estate, equities, and long-term bonds – could lead to a major correction and another economic crisis.	纽黑文—最近几个月来，世界金融专家和新闻媒体对房地产、股票和长期债券等资产市场的担忧日升，这可能导致市场大调整和又一场经济危机。


The general public seems unbothered: Google Trends shows some pickup in the search term “stock market bubble,” but it is not at its peak 2007 levels, and “housing bubble” searches are relatively infrequent.	普通公众似乎不为所动：谷歌趋势（Google Trend）表明“股市泡沫”一词的搜索量有所增加但仍未达到2007年的峰值水平，而“住房泡沫”一词搜索量相对较少。


But the experts’ concern is notable and healthy, because the belief that markets are always efficient can survive only when some people do not completely believe it and think that they can profit by timing the markets.	但专家的担忧是值得关注的，也是健康的，因为市场永远有效这样的信念只能在有人不完全相信它并且认为可以通过市场择时获利时才正确。


At the same time, this heightened concern carries dangers, too, because we do not know whether it will lead to a public overreaction on the downside.	与此同时，这凸显出担忧也携带者危险，因为我们不知道它是否会导致公众在跌势中反应过度。


International agencies recently issued warnings about speculative excesses in asset markets, suggesting that we should be worried about a possible crisis.	最近，国际机构纷纷发布警告称资产市场投机过度，认为我们应该担心可能的危机。


In a speech in June, International Monetary Fund Deputy Managing Director Min Zhu argued that housing markets in several countries, including in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, “show signs of overheating.” The same month, the Bank for International Settlements said in its Annual Report that such “signs are worrying.”	在6月的演讲中，国际货币基金组织（IMF）副总裁朱民指出，一些欧洲、亚洲和美洲国家的住房市场“表现出过热迹象”，同一个月，国际清算银行在其年度报告（Annual Report）中说，“迹象令人担忧。


Newspapers are sounding alarms as well.	报纸也在纷纷提出警告。


On July 8, the New York Times led its front page with a somewhat hyperbolic headline: “From Stocks to Farmland, All’s Booming, or Bubbling: Prices for Nearly All Assets around World Are High, Bringing Economic Risks.”	7月8日，《纽约时报》在头版刊登了一则略显夸张的标题：《从股票到农地，到处都是繁荣甚至泡沫：全球各类资产几乎无不高企，带来经济风险》（From Stocks to Farmland, All’s Booming, or Bubbling: Prices for Nearly All Assets around World Are High, Bringing Economic Risks）。


The words “nearly all” are too strong, though the headline evinces the newfound concern.	“几乎无不”一词分量相当重，尽管它说的只是新发现的担忧。


It is not entirely clear why the alarms are sounding just now, after five years of general expansion in markets since they hit bottom in early 2009.	为何这些警报到现在才拉响并不完全明白，因为自2009年初触底以来，市场已经经历了五年的整体扩张。


Why aren’t people blithely expecting more years of expansion?	为何人们不再乐观地预期还有多年的扩张？


It seems that this thinking is heavily influenced by recent record highs in stock markets, even if these levels are practically meaningless, given inflation.	似乎这一思维受到了近期股票频创新高的巨大印象，虽然考虑到通货膨胀，这些只不过是伪新高。


Notably, just a month ago the Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Index broke the record that it reached on October 31, 2007.	值得注意的是，仅仅一个月前，摩根士丹利资本国际所有国家全球指数（Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Index）打破了其在2007年10月31日创造的纪录。


The International Monetary Fund announced in June a new Global Housing Watch website that tracks global home prices and ratios.	6月，IMF 发布了新的全球住房观察（Global Housing Watch）网站。 该网站追踪全球住房价格和比率。


The site shows a global index for house prices that is rising, on a GDP-weighted basis, as fast as during the boom that preceded the 2008 crisis, though not yet reaching the 2006 record level.	网站显示，按GDP加权的全球住房价格指数正在上升，上涨速度与2008年危机前的繁荣不相上下，尽管尚未触及2006年的记录水平。


There is also the US Federal Reserve’s announcement that, if the economy progresses as expected, the last bond purchase from the round of quantitative easing that it began in September 2012 will be in the month after the Federal Open Market Committee’s October 2014 meeting.	美联储也宣称，如果经济进展如预期，那么从2012年开始9月开始的新一轮量化宽松将在2014年10月美联储公开市场委员会会议后迎来最后一次债券购买操作。


That kind of news story seems also to affect observers’ thinking, though it is not really much in the way of news, given that everyone has known that the Fed would end the program before long.	这类新闻似乎也影响了观察者的观点，尽管实际上这些新闻根本没有什么意义，因为所有人都知道美联储不久就将结束量化宽松。


The problem is that there is no certain way to explain how people will react to such a policy change, to any signs of price overheating or decline, or to other news stories that might be spun as somehow important.	问题在于没有确定的方法能够解释人们会如何对此类政策变化做出反应，对任何价格过热或下跌的信号做出反应，或对其他可能具有重要性的报道做出反应。


We simply do not have much well-documented history of big financial crises to examine, leaving econometricians vulnerable to serious error, despite studying time series that are typically no more than a few decades long.	我们缺乏大型金融危机的详细历史记录可供考察，这导致计量经济学家很容易犯下严重错误，尽管他们所研究的时间序列通常不会超过几十年跨度。


Until the recent crisis, economists were talking up the “great moderation”: economic fluctuations were supposedly becoming milder, and many concluded that economic stabilization policy had reached new heights of effectiveness.	在最近的危机之前，经济学家一直在大谈“大稳健”（great moderation）：经济波动将趋缓，许多人认为经济稳定政策效果达到了新的高度。


As of 2005, just before the onset of the financial crisis, the Harvard econometricians James Stock (now a member of President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers) and Mark Watson concluded that the advanced economies had become both less volatile and less correlated with each other over the course of the preceding 40 years.	2005年，金融危机爆发前夕，哈佛计量经济学家詹姆斯·斯托克（James Stock，现为奥巴马总统经济顾问委员会成员）和马克·沃森（Mark Watson）指出，在此前的40年中，发达经济体的波动变得更低，相互间的相关性也变得更小。


That conclusion would have to be significantly modified in light of the data recorded since the financial crisis.	在自此次金融危机以来所录得的数据面前，这一结论得做出重大修正。


The economic slowdown in 2009, the worst year of the crisis, was nothing short of catastrophic.	2009年（危机最严重的一年）的经济衰退完全可以称之为灾难。


In fact, we have had only three salient global crises in the last century: 1929-33, 1980-82, and 2007-9.	事实上，过去一百年中我们只经历了三场突出的全球危机：1929—1933年、1980—1982年，以及2007—2009年。


These events appear to be more than just larger versions of the more frequent small fluctuations that we often see, and that Stock and Watson analyzed.	这三次危机都不是斯托克和沃森所分析的、或我们通常所见到的小波动的加强和加频版。


But, with only three observations, it is hard to understand these events.	但是，仅凭三次观察很难真正理解这类事件。


All seemed to have something to do with speculative price movements that surprised most observers and were never really explained, even years after the fact. They also had something to do with government policymakers’ mistakes.	所有这三次危机似乎都与震惊大部分观察并且此前从未得到真正解释（甚至发生多年后仍未得到真正解释）的投机性价格波动有关。


For example, the 1980-82 crisis was triggered by an oil price spike caused by the Iran-Iraq war.	比如，1980—1982年危机是由两伊战争导致的石油价格飙升引发的。


But all of them were related to asset-price bubbles that burst, leading to financial collapse.	但所有这些危机都与导致金融崩溃的资产价格泡沫和破裂有关。


Those who warn of grave dangers if speculative price increases are allowed to continue unimpeded are right to do so, even if they cannot prove that there is any cause for concern.	如果你发出警告说，若放任投机性价格上涨继续自由发展将引致巨大危险，那么你做得对，即使你不能证明这样的担忧有何依据。


The warnings might help prevent the booms that we are now seeing from continuing much longer and becoming more dangerous.	你的警告或能有助于防止我们目前仍在目睹的、来自维持时间更长、带来更大危险的繁荣。


Is Economics a Science?	经济学是科学吗？


NEW HAVEN – I am one of the winners of this year’s Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which makes me acutely aware of criticism of the prize by those who claim that economics – unlike chemistry, physics, or medicine, for which Nobel Prizes are also awarded – is not a science.	发自纽黑文——作为今年诺贝尔经济科学奖的获奖者之一，我深刻意识到外界对这一奖项的批评，在有些人眼中经济学不像化学，物理，医学等诺贝尔奖学科那样是一门科学。


Are they right?	那他们的看法是否是正确的？


One problem with economics is that it is necessarily focused on policy, rather than discovery of fundamentals.	经济学的一个问题就是，它必须更多的聚焦在政策研究上，而不是去发现基本原理。


Nobody really cares much about economic data except as a guide to policy: economic phenomena do not have the same intrinsic fascination for us as the internal resonances of the atom or the functioning of the vesicles and other organelles of a living cell.	除了用来指导政策之外，没有人真正关心经济数据：对我们来说，经济现象并没有像原子内部共振或活细胞囊泡及其他细胞器功能那般具有内在魅力。


We judge economics by what it can produce.	我们以经济学的所产生的结果来对其进行评价。


As such, economics is rather more like engineering than physics, more practical than spiritual.	因此经济学更像工程学而非物理学，更实用而非形而上。


There is no Nobel Prize for engineering, though there should be.	但是诺贝尔工程奖是不存在的，虽然应该有。


True, the chemistry prize this year looks a bit like an engineering prize, because it was given to three researchers – Martin Karplus, Michael Levitt, and Arieh Warshel – “for the development of multiscale models of complex chemical systems” that underlie the computer programs that make nuclear magnetic resonance hardware work.	今年的化学奖看起来确实有点像个工程奖，因为它颁给了三位研究者马丁·卡普拉斯，迈克尔·莱维特和亚利耶·瓦谢尔——“在发展复杂化学系统的多尺度模型方面的贡献”——这一理论基础使驱动核磁共振硬件工作的计算机程序成为现实。


But the Nobel Foundation is forced to look at much more such practical, applied material when it considers the economics prize.	但在评定经济学奖时，诺贝尔基金会不得不去寻找一些更具实践应用性的材料。


The problem is that once we focus on economic policy, much that is not science comes into play.	问题是，一旦我们把重点放在经济政策上，那更多非科学领域的东西就进场了。


Politics becomes involved, and political posturing is amply rewarded by public attention.	政治因素被卷入其中，政治姿态又会吸引极大的公众关注。


The Nobel Prize is designed to reward those who do not play tricks for attention, and who, in their sincere pursuit of the truth, might otherwise be slighted.	而诺贝尔奖获奖者应当一心探求那些很可能会被他人忽视的真理，而不是为了吸引关注而耍手段的人。


Why is it called a prize in “economic sciences,” rather than just “economics”?	为什么叫它“经济科学（economic sciences）”奖而不是“经济学（economics）”奖？


The other prizes are not awarded in the “chemical sciences” or the “physical sciences.”	而其他奖项是不会被称为“化学科学”奖或者“物理科学”奖的。


Fields of endeavor that use “science” in their titles tend to be those that get masses of people emotionally involved and in which crackpots seem to have some purchase on public opinion. These fields have “science” in their names to distinguish them from their disreputable cousins.	那些努力使用“科学”命名的学科往往是有许多群众情绪卷入其中，并且有居心不良者在其中利用公众舆论的领域，因此只好用“科学”两字来把自己与其声名狼藉的旁系学说区分开来。


The term political science first became popular in the late eighteenth century to distinguish it from all the partisan tracts whose purpose was to gain votes and influence rather than pursue the truth.	政治科学这个词最初在十八世纪后期开始流行，用以将自身与那些为赢得选票和影响力而非追求真理的派系文章区分开来。


Astronomical science was a common term in the late nineteenth century, to distinguish it from astrology and the study of ancient myths about the constellations.	天文科学在十九世纪后期成为常用词，以区别于占星术和星座的古代神话研究。


Hypnotic science was also used in the nineteenth century to distinguish the scientific study of hypnotism from witchcraft or religious transcendentalism.	催眠科学也在十九世纪被用于区分巫术或宗教超验主义的催眠术科学研究。


There was a need for such terms back then, because their crackpot counterparts held much greater sway in general discourse. Scientists had to announce themselves as scientists.	这些学科名词需要回归本原，因为它们��些居心不良的近似者在总体论述中的影响力反而更大，以致科学家们不得不去声明自己才是科学家。


In fact, even the term chemical science enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century – a time when the field sought to distinguish itself from alchemy and the promotion of quack nostrums.	事实上，即使是化学科学这个术语也在十九世纪享有一定的知名度——一个在其领域寻求区别于炼金术和江湖秘方推广的时代。


But the need to use that term to distinguish true science from the practice of imposters was already fading by the time the Nobel Prizes were launched in 1901.	但当诺贝尔奖于1901年推出的时候，已不再需要使用这个术语来区分骗子法术与真正的科学。


Similarly, the terms astronomical science and hypnotic science mostly died out as the twentieth century progressed, perhaps because belief in the occult waned in respectable society.	同样，天文科学与催眠科学这些术语几乎在二十世纪的进程中消失，因为对神秘学的信仰已经在理性社会中衰落了。


Yes, horoscopes still persist in popular newspapers, but they are there only for the severely scientifically challenged, or for entertainment; the idea that the stars determine our fate has lost all intellectual currency.	是的，占星依然在报纸上流行，但它们仅作为严肃科学挑战的标靶或是娱乐； 认为星座决定我们的命运的观念已经失去了所有的智力市场。


Hence there is no longer any need for the term “astronomical science.”	因此也不再需要“天文科学”这个术语。


Critics of “economic sciences” sometimes refer to the development of a “pseudoscience” of economics, arguing that it uses the trappings of science, like dense mathematics, but only for show.	对“经济科学”的批评有时是指经济学“伪科学”的发展，批评它采用科学的派头，像密集的数学，但只为了吸引眼球。


For example, in his 2004 book Fooled by Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb said of economic sciences: “You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations, and nobody can catch you since there is no such thing as a controlled experiment.”	例如，纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布（Nassim Nicholas Taleb）在他2004年出版的书《被随机性愚弄的傻瓜》中提到经济科学：“你可以用方程式来掩盖自己的把戏，没有人能够揭穿你，因为没有东西可以进行对照实验。


But physics is not without such critics, too.	但是，物理学也同样受过这样的批评。


In his 2004 book The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, Lee Smolin reproached the physics profession for being seduced by beautiful and elegant theories (notably string theory) rather than those that can be tested by experimentation.	李·斯莫林（Lee Smolin）在他2004年的著作《物理学的困惑：弦理论的兴起，一门科学的没落以及展望》中责备物理学界被美丽和优雅的理论（尤其是弦理论）而不是那些可以通过实验测试的理论所诱惑。


Similarly, in his 2007 book Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law, Peter Woit accused physicists of much the same sin as mathematical economists are said to commit.	同样，在彼得·沃尔特（Peter Woit）2007年的著作《甚至没有错：弦理论的失败以及对物理统一规律的探索》，指责物理学家具有与数学经济学家同等的罪恶。


My belief is that economics is somewhat more vulnerable than the physical sciences to models whose validity will never be clear, because the necessity for approximation is much stronger than in the physical sciences, especially given that the models describe people rather than magnetic resonances or fundamental particles.	依我看来，在那些永远不可能弄清其正确性的模型之中，经济学在某种程度上比物理学更站不住脚，因为经济学对近似值指标的需求要比物理学更强烈，前者的模型研究的是人，而不是磁共振或者是基本粒子。


People can just change their minds and behave completely differently.	人可以随时改变主意并做出截然不同的行为。


They even have neuroses and identity problems, complex phenomena that the field of behavioral economics is finding relevant to understanding economic outcomes.	他们甚至有神经和身份认知问题，还存在着与行为经济学领域如何理解某些经济结果相关的复杂现象


But all the mathematics in economics is not, as Taleb suggests, charlatanism.	但正如塔勒布所言，经济学中的所有数学都不是江湖骗术。


Economics has an important quantitative side, which cannot be escaped.	经济学也拥有重要的量化一面，这是无法抹杀的。


The challenge has been to combine its mathematical insights with the kinds of adjustments that are needed to make its models fit the economy’s irreducibly human element.	挑战在于如何将数学分析手段与使其模型符合经济中不可抹去的人类因素所需的调整结合起来。


The advance of behavioral economics is not fundamentally in conflict with mathematical economics, as some seem to think, though it may well be in conflict with some currently fashionable mathematical economic models.	不像某些人所想的那样，行为经济学的先进之处并不与数学经济学存在根本性的冲突，虽然前者或许与某些当前流行的数学经济模型背道而驰。


And, while economics presents its own methodological problems, the basic challenges facing researchers are not fundamentally different from those faced by researchers in other fields.	此外，在经济学暴露其自身的方法论问题时，研究者们所面临的根本挑战跟其他领域研究者面对的也并并无本质性的不同。


As economics develops, it will broaden its repertory of methods and sources of evidence, the science will become stronger, and the charlatans will be exposed.	随着经济学不断发展，它将扩充其方法库和证据源，这门科学将变得更加完善，而那些浑水摸鱼者将被昭示于天下。


Parallels to 1937	与1937年的相似之处


NEW HAVEN – The depression that followed the stock-market crash of 1929 took a turn for the worse eight years later, and recovery came only with the enormous economic stimulus provided by World War II, a conflict that cost more than 60 million lives.	纽黑文—1929年股市崩盘之后的萧条开启了此后八年更加惨淡的岁月，复苏直到导致6,000多万人死去的二战带来巨大的经济刺激才正式开始。


By the time recovery finally arrived, much of Europe and Asia lay in ruins.	当复苏最终来临时，欧洲和亚洲大部已是一片焦土。


The current world situation is not nearly so dire, but there are parallels, particularly to 1937.	目前的全球状况没有那么悲观，但确实与1937年有相似之处。


Now, as then, people have been disappointed for a long time, and many are despairing.	与当时一样，现在的人们也已失望了相当长一段时间，许多人甚至感到了绝望。


They are becoming more fearful for their long-term economic future.	他们变得更加恐慌他们的长期经济未来。


And such fears can have severe consequences.	而这一恐慌可能带来严重后果。


For example, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Ukrainian and Russian economies might ultimately be behind the recent war there.	比如，2008年危机对乌克兰和俄罗斯经济的冲击可能正是当前战事的背后原因。


According to the International Monetary Fund, both Ukraine and Russia experienced spectacular growth from 2002 to 2007: over those five years, real per capita GDP rose 52% in Ukraine and 46% in Russia.	根据���际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，2002—2007年，乌克兰和俄罗斯都经历了卓越的经济增长：在这五年中，真实人均GDP在乌克兰增长了52%，在俄罗斯增长了 46% 。


That is history now: real per capita GDP growth was only 0.2% last year in Ukraine, and only 1.3% in Russia.	现在这些都已成为历史：去年乌克兰真实人均GDP只增长了0. 2%，俄罗斯为1.


The discontent generated by such disappointment may help to explain Ukrainian separatists’ anger, Russians’ discontent, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex Crimea and to support the separatists.	3%。 失望所产生的不满也许有助于解释乌克兰分裂分子的愤怒、俄罗斯人的不满以及俄罗斯总统普京决定吞并克里米亚以支持分裂分子。


There is a name for the despair that has been driving discontent – and not only in Russia and Ukraine – since the financial crisis.	对于这一在金融危机后滋生着不满的绝望——不仅仅在俄罗斯和乌克兰——有一个名字，叫做“新常态”。


That name is the “new normal,” referring to long-term diminished prospects for economic growth, a term popularized by Bill Gross, a founder of bond giant PIMCO.	新常态是指经济增长长期前景暗淡，由债券巨头太平洋投资管理公司（PIMCO）创始人比尔·格罗斯（Bill Gross）提出。


The despair felt after 1937 led to the emergence of similar new terms then, too.	1937年后的所感到的绝望也曾经导致类似新名词的出现。


“Secular stagnation,” referring to long-term economic malaise, is one example.	“长期停滞”（即经济长期萎靡不振）即是其一。


The word secular comes from the Latin saeculum, meaning a generation or a century.	“长期”（secular）来自拉丁语saeculum，意思是一个世代或一个世纪。


The word stagnation suggests a swamp, implying a breeding ground for virulent dangers.	“停滞”（stagnation）一词意味着泥足深陷，其中酝酿着致命危险。


In the late 1930s, people were also worrying about discontent in Europe, which had already powered the rise of Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini.	20世纪30年代末，人们也担心欧洲的不满，而此时希特勒和墨索里尼已经崛起并掌握了权力。