The crisis consists in nothing less than an effort by the major drug cartels to tame and suborn the Mexican state, and not just in the strip along the United States border, though the epicenter of the crisis is there.	墨西哥的危机主要在于重要的毒品卡特尔要控制和买通墨西哥国家的活动，并且这一危机不仅仅只存在于美国边境的地带，虽然危机的中心在这些地区。


Obviously, the cartels’ leaders do not have designs on Mexico’s presidential palace.	显然，贩毒组织的头目对墨西哥总统府没有不良企图。


But, through a policy of terror extending from Oaxaca in the south, through Acapulco on the Pacific coast, and up to the great border cities of Tijuana and Juarez (Mexico’s sixth and seventh most populous cities, respectively), they have made it abundantly clear that they are trying to achieve impunity.	但是，通过从南部的瓦哈卡（Oaxaca），经太平洋沿岸的阿尔普尔科（Acapulco），直至两个大边境城市蒂华纳（Tijuana）和华瑞兹（Juarez）（分别为墨西哥人口排名第六和第七的城市）的恐怖活动，毒品组织的头目已经明白显示，他们正在使自己免受惩罚。


The only recent parallel in Latin America was a similar effort fifteen years ago by the Colombian drug cartels.	近期在拉丁美洲唯一相似的例子是15年前哥伦比亚毒品卡特尔类似的活动。


That disguised coup failed – barely – and there is no guarantee that the result will be similar this time around in Mexico.	哥伦比亚毒品卡特尔进行的伪装的政变失败了——刚好失败——而且，在墨西哥没有结果会与此类似的保证。


Journalists with long experience of war zones report being more worried about their safety in Mexico border than when they were in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Iraq, though much of the violence is internecine.	在交战地带有长期报道经验的记者，在墨西哥边境时比在波斯尼亚、阿富汗或者是伊拉克的时候，更担心他们的安全，虽然这里发生的许多暴力是内讧。


Of the thousands who have been killed, often after being horribly tortured, many, if not most, have been members of the drug cartels and their families.	在通常是遭受残酷折磨之后才被杀死的几千人中，许多人，如果不是大多数人的话，是毒品卡特尔的成员以及他们的家人。


But it is the campaign of targeted assassination against any Mexican official who seems to pose a serious threat to the cartels’ operations that makes the crisis so dire.	但是，对任何似乎对毒品卡特尔的活动构成严重威胁的墨西哥官员有针对性的暗杀行动，让这一危机变得如此可怕。


First, in May 2007, the cartels killed Jose Nemesio Lugo Felix, the general coordinator of information at the National Center for Planning and Analysis to Combat Organized Crime.	首先，在2007年5月份，毒品卡特尔杀害了国家打击有组织犯罪计划和分析中心（National Center for Planning and Analysis to Combat Organized Crime）信息总协调员何塞·费利克斯（Jose Nemesio Lugo Felix）。


Soon after, a hit man murdered Edgar Milan Gomez, Mexico’s highest-ranking Federal police official.	不久之后，一个职业杀手谋杀了墨西哥最高级别的联邦警察官员埃德加·米兰·戈麦斯（Edgar Milan Gomez）。


In November, 2008, a plane carrying Juan Camilo Mourino, Mexico’s national security advisor, crashed under mysterious circumstances.	2008年11月，载有墨西哥国家安全顾问胡安·卡米罗·马利罗（Juan Camilo Mourino）的飞机神秘坠毁。


And very recently, retired General Mauro Enrique Tello Quinones, one of the most decorated officers in the Mexican army, was abducted, tortured, and killed less than a week after assuming a new position as anti-drug chief in the resort city of Cancun.	最近，是墨西哥军队中授勋最多的军人之一的退休将军毛罗·基尼奥内斯（Mauro Enrique Tello Quinones），在担任度假城市坎昆反毒长官的新职务不到一个星期的时间里，就遭到绑架、折磨并被杀害。


For all the lip service paid to relations with Mexico (and, indeed, with Latin America more generally) from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Obama, the truth is that developments in Mexico have always gotten short shrift from US presidents.	虽然有从富兰克林·罗斯福到奥巴马一系列美国总统对美国和墨西哥关系所作的口头支持（事实上，更概括的说是拉丁美洲），但是，真实的情况是，墨西哥的新动向一直受到美国总统的漠视。


Illegal immigration is a major issue, to be sure, as is the drug trade.	当然，非法移民和毒品贸易一样是一个重要问题。


But the US government has always regarded them as domestic American issues rather than as key foreign-policy concerns.	但是��美国政府总是将它们看作是美国的国内问题，而不是重要的外交政策问题。


It is emblematic that while Obama has received Mexican President Felipe Calderón, the White House only recently announced that one of his first foreign trips would be to Mexico.	虽然奥巴马已经接见了墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙 (Felipe Calderón) ，但是，白宫直到最近才宣布奥巴马的首次国外访问会是出访墨西哥，这是具有象征意义的。


And incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was asked almost nothing about Mexico at her confirmation hearing, and she emphasized relations with Mexico neither in her own statement nor in those she has made since assuming her post.	而且，新任命的国务卿希拉里·克林顿在其证实听证会上，几乎没有被问到有关墨西哥的问题，并且，在她自己的听证声明和她就职后所做的申明中，她都没有强调和墨西哥的关系。


Indeed, the conventional wisdom in the US is that Mexico policy regarding illegal immigration and drugs will be the province of the new Homeland Security secretary, Janet Napolitano (herself a former border state governor).	事实上，美国的传统观点认为，有关墨西哥非法移民和毒品的政策是新国土安全部部长珍妮·纳波利塔诺（Janet Napolitano）（她自己曾担任边境州的州长）的职权范围。


Meanwhile, the Treasury and Commerce departments will be handle trade policy concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement.	同时，财政和商务部门会处理和《北美自由贸易协定》有关的贸易政策。


This is the way Mexico policy has been run for decades.	这就是美国的墨西哥政策进行了几十年的方式。


And, offensive as this has been to Mexican sensibilities – and harmful to finding long-term solutions to America’s immigration dilemma –these complacent arrangements have never presented so clear and present danger as they do today.	而且，这样的方式对墨西哥情感是有冒犯的——并且对为美国的移民难题找到长期的解决办法有害——这些自鸣得意的安排从来没有像现在这样明显并且带来危害。


Is Middle East War Inevitable?	中东战争是不可避免吗？


BERLIN – Fuad Siniora, Lebanon’s former prime minister, is a thoughtful man with deep experience in Middle Eastern politics.	柏林——黎巴嫩前总理福阿德·西尼乌拉是一位在中东事务中有着丰富经验的深谋远虑的政治家。


So when he speaks of “trains with no drivers that seem to be on a collision course,” as he recently did at a private meeting in Berlin, interested parties should probably prepare for unwanted developments.	因此当他不久前在柏林举行的一次私人会议上说出“行驶在相撞轨迹上的没有驾驶员的列车”时，所有利益相关方或许应当为出乎意料的事态发展做好准备。


Of course, no one in the region is calling for war.	当然，中东地区没有人想要打仗。


But a pre-war mood is growing.	但一种大战将至的情绪却正在滋长。


Four factors, none of them new but each destabilizing on its own, are compounding one another: lack of hope, dangerous governmental policies, a regional power vacuum, and the absence of active external mediation.	虽然都算不上新问题，但四大不稳定因素的作用正在相互叠加： 缺少希望、危险的政府政策、地区权力真空和积极外部调解努力的缺乏。


It may be reassuring that most Palestinians and Israelis still favor a two-state solution.	令人感到欣慰的是多数巴勒斯坦人和以色列人仍然支持两国并存的解决方案。


It is less reassuring that most Israelis and a large majority of Palestinians have lost hope that such a solution will ever materialize.	但让人不太放心的是多数以色列人和绝大部分巴勒斯坦人已经丧失了解决方案终将实现的希望。


Add to this that by September, the partial settlement freeze, which Israel’s government has accepted, will expire, and that the period set by the Arab League for the so-called proximity talks between the Palestinians and Israelis, which have not seriously begun, will also be over.	而且以色列政府已经接受的部分冻结定居点的政策到今年9月即将结束，而阿拉伯联盟设定的巴勒斯坦和以色列举行所谓近距离间接会谈的期限也将届满，而会谈的举行还看不出任何眉目，这些都令中东局势雪上加霜。


Serious direct negotiations are unlikely to begin without a freeze on settlement building, which Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is unlikely to announce or implement, given resistance within his coalition government.	真正意义上的直接谈判不大可能在不冻结定居点修建活动的情况下开始，而以色列总理内塔尼亚胡不太可能宣布或执行冻结定居点的政策，因为他在联合政府内部面临的阻力很大。


Syria, which until the end of 2008 was engaged in its own Turkish-mediated proximity talks with Israel, does not expect a resumption of talks with Israel anytime soon.	而截止2008年底仍然与以色列在土耳其的调停下举行近距离间接会谈的叙利亚，也不指望与以色列的会谈能在短期之内恢复。


This may be one reason why Syrian President Bashar al-Assad mentions war as an option, as he recently did in Madrid.	这可能是叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德最近在马德里提到以战争方式解决冲突的原因之一。


Moreover, Israelis and people close to Hezbollah in Lebanon are talking about “another round,” while many pundits in the Middle East believe that a limited war could unblock a stagnant political situation.	此外，以色列人和亲近真主党的黎巴嫩人正在探讨“新的一轮”，而中东许多权威人士相信发动有限的战争可以打通停滞不前的政治局势。


Their point of reference is the 1973 war, which helped to bring about peace between Egypt and Israel.	他们以1973年战争为参照系，这场战争协助实现了埃及和以色列之间的和平。


But the wars that followed, and the latest wars in the region – the Lebanon war of 2006 and the Gaza war of December 2008/January 2009 – do not support this reckless theory.	但是后来发生的战争，以及中东地区最新的战争——包括2006年的黎巴嫩战争和2008年12月/2009年1月的加沙战争——根本不支持这一鲁莽的理论。


Iran, whose influence in the Levant is not so much the cause of unresolved problems in the Middle East as the result of them, continues to defy the imposition of new sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.	伊朗继续反抗联合国安理会施加新的制裁，这个国家在黎凡特的影响与其说是中东未决问题的原因还不如说是其所导致的结果。


Iranian rulers have as little trust in the West as the West has in them, and they continue to increase international suspicion by their words and actions.	伊朗统治者像西方不信任他们一样不信任西方，他们继续通过语言和行动导致国际的怀疑氛围加重。


Repeated calls by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about Israel’s eventual disappearance play into the hands of those in Israel who argue that Iran’s nuclear program must be ended militarily.	伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德屡次提出以色列将会最终消失的论断恰巧落入了某些以色列人的圈套，他们声称必须以武力方式终结伊朗的核计划。


Some of the Middle East’s most important players are increasing the risks of confrontation because they have either lost a proper feeling for their regional and international environment, or seek to increase their own political power through provocation and brinkmanship.	中东有些最重要的人物正在增大对抗的风险，因为他们或者对地区和国际环境认识不清，或者试图通过挑衅和外交冒险来扩大自身的政治权力。


Netanyahu’s short-sighted reluctance to give up settlements and occupied territory threatens Israel’s long-term interest to reach a fair settlement with the Palestinians.	内塔尼亚胡目光短浅地不愿放弃定居点和被占领土对以色列与巴勒斯坦达成公平方案的长期利益构成了威胁。


In its deadly assault on the Gaza flotilla in May, Netanyahu’s government demonstrated a kind of political autism in its inability to realize that even Israel’s best friends no longer wish to accept the humanitarian consequences of the Gaza blockade.	在五月对加沙舰队的致命袭击中，内塔尼亚胡政府显示出某种政治自闭症倾向，它没有意识到即使是以色列最好的朋友也不愿再接受加沙封锁所带来的人道主义后果。


In the Arab world, there is currently no dominant power able to project stability beyond its own national borders.	在阿拉伯世界，目前没有哪个举足轻重的国家有能力推动稳定延伸到本国边界之外。


It will take time before Iraq will play a regional role again.	伊拉克需要时间才能重新发挥地区作用。


The Saudi reform agenda mainly concerns domestic issues.	而沙特的改革日程则主要涉及国内事务。


Egypt’s political stagnation has reduced its regional influence.	埃及的政治停滞影响���它的地区影响力。


Qatar over-estimates its own strength.	而卡塔尔则过高地估计了自己的力量。


The only regional power in the Middle East today is Iran, but it is not a stabilizing force.	伊朗是今日中东唯一的地区性大国，但却不是一股稳定的力量。


The Arab states are aware of this.	阿拉伯国家深知这一点。


Much as they dislike it, they are also fearful of a war between Israel or the United States and Iran, knowing that they would have little influence over events.	虽然它们不喜欢伊朗，但也同样害怕在以色列或美国和伊朗之间爆发战争，它们非常清楚一旦战争爆发，它们对事态的发展施加不了多少影响。


Indeed, intra-regional dynamics in the Middle East today are driven by three states, none of which is Arab: Israel, Iran, and, increasingly, Turkey.	实际上，今日中东地区的内部动态主要由三个国家推动，其中哪一个都不是阿拉伯国家： 这三个国家是以色列、伊朗，而且土耳其的影响越来越大。


In recent years, Turkey tried to mediate between Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, opposing factions in Lebanon, and lately between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.	最近几年，土耳其试图在以色列和叙利亚、以色列和哈马斯以及黎巴嫩各对立派别之间充当调停角色，最近又试图为伊朗和加上德国的联合国安理会五大常任理事国进行调和。


Turkey should continue to play this role.	土耳其应当继续发挥这一作用。


But the Turkish government has increasingly allowed itself to be dragged into Middle East conflicts, rather than functioning as an honest broker.	但土耳其政府却日益放纵自身被卷入到中东冲突当中，而不是充当一名诚实的调停者。


The Obama administration has had a strong start with respect to the Middle East.	奥巴马政府的中东政策曾经拥有良好的开端。


But a year and a half after his inauguration, Obama’s “outstretched hand” to Iran has turned into a fist, and his attempts to encourage Israeli-Palestinian negotiations seem stuck.	但在完成就职演说一年半后，奥巴马“伸出的双手”已经握成了拳头，而他鼓励以巴谈判的目标似乎也陷于停滞。


Domestic issues are likely to preoccupy Obama and his team at least up until the mid-term elections this November, thus precluding active diplomacy during the critical months ahead.	至少在今年11月中期选举举行前，国内事务很有可能会吸引奥巴马及其团队的关注，这样在今后关键的几个月之中将会妨碍出台积极的外交政策。


And the European Union?	欧盟呢？


There has not been much active crisis-prevention diplomacy from Brussels or from Europe’s national capitals.	布鲁塞尔和欧洲国家首都都没有采取积极的危机防范政策。


None of the leading EU states’ foreign ministers seems even to have made an attempt to mediate between Europe’s two closest Mediterranean partners, Israel and Turkey.	主要欧洲国家的外长们甚至都没有尝试在以色列和土耳其这两大欧洲最亲密的地中海伙伴间进行调和。


Twenty years ago, in the weeks that preceded Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, many observers saw signs of a looming crisis.	二十年前，在伊拉克入侵科威特之前几周，许多观察家看到了危机来临的迹象。


But Arab and Western players somehow managed to convince themselves that things would not get out of hand.	但是阿拉伯和西方国家却以某种方式成功地说服自己局势不会因此失控。


That crisis, and others before and since, showed that tensions in the Middle East rarely dissolve with the passage of time.	那次危机和它前后的历次危机一样，表明中东地区的紧张局势极少会随着时间的推移而自行解决。


Sometimes they are resolved through active diplomatic intervention by regional or international players. And sometimes they are released violently.	有时的解决方式是通过地区或国际力量积极的外交干预， 而有时则以暴力的形式释放这种积聚的能量。


Is Neo-Conservatism Dead?	新保守主义是否寿终正寝？


Neo-conservatism has served as a badge of unity for those in the Bush administration advocating an aggressive foreign policy, massive military spending, disdain for international law and institutions, an assault on the welfare state, and a return to “traditional values.”	新保守主义曾经是布什政府里那些鼓吹采取攻击性的外交政策、大规模军备开支、蔑视国际法和组织、攻击福利国家以及回归“传统价值观”的人的团结标志。


So, with the Bush era winding down in a tailspin of plummeting popularity and high-level resignations, has the neo-conservative movement, too, run its course?	那么，随着布什时代的民意支持率直线下降以及越来越多的官员从政府中辞职，新保守主义运动是否也走完了它的历程？


Neo-conservatism began with different premises from traditional forms of conservatism.	新保守主义是由传统形式的保守主义各种不同的前提中发展而来的。


Because reforms can become part of “our” heritage, traditional conservatives can adapt to change, even taking credit for negotiating the connection between past and future.	因为改革可以成为“我们”遗产的一部分，所以传统保守主义也会适应变化，甚至以能够连接过去和未来为荣。


By contrast, neo-conservatism’s adherents are unconcerned with what Edmund Burke called the ties that bind “the dead, the living, and the yet unborn.”	相比而言，新保守主义的追随者对于埃德蒙德·柏克所称的连接“逝去的人、活着的人和尚未出生的人”的纽带毫无兴趣。


On the contrary, they are revolutionaries or, rather, “counter-revolutionaries” intent upon remaking America and the world.	恰恰相反，他们是革命者，或者，更多的是“对抗革命者”，意在重塑美国和世界。


Indeed, in a certain sense, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and other neo-conservative elder statesmen remain defined by the communist dogmatism they sought to oppose when they were youthful Trotskyists.	事实上，从某种程度而言，欧文·克里斯托、诺曼·波德霍雷茨和老一辈的新保守主义政治家，当他们还是年轻的托洛茨基主义者时就被他们反对的共产主义教条所限制。


The virtue of their “party” or clique needs no complex justification: it stands for “American values,” while critics merely provide an “objective apology” for the “enemies of freedom.”	他们的“党派”或派系的美德并不需要复杂的正当理由。 新保守主义代表“美国的价值观”，而批评家仅仅为“自由主义的敌人”提供了一个“客观的辩解”。


Until the 1960’s, future neo-conservatives shared the Democratic Party’s vehement anti-communism, acceptance of the Civil Rights Movement, and support for President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal welfare-state policies.	直到二十世纪六十年代以前，未来的新保守主义者与民主党同样激烈地反对共产主义、接受民权运动并且支持弗兰克林·罗斯福总统新政的福利国家政策。


Tellingly, the influential neo-conservative Richard Perle said in 2003 that he was still a registered Democrat, out of “nostalgia” for Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the powerful former Senator who embodied these commitments.	颇能说明问题的是，有影响力的新保守主义者理查德·派瑞2003年的时候说他 仍然 是一名注册的民主党党员，这是出于对体现了这些诺言的强有力的前参议员亨利·杰克逊的“留恋”。


For future neo-conservatives, however, the 1960’s produced a “trauma” that transcended the humiliation of a lost war and the disgrace of Richard Nixon.	然而，对于未来的新保守主义者来说，二十世纪六十年代有的是横跨一场失败的战争的羞辱和尼克松的声名狼藉所带来的“心理创伤”。


What in the 1950’s had seemingly been a culture of contentment was transformed into what Podhoretz called an “adversary culture.”	二十世纪五十年代的一种似乎是满意的文化转变成了波德霍雷茨称之为的“敌对文化”。


New social movements, seeking to de-mythologize history, rejecting platitudes justifying the policies of elite interests, and demanding greater institutional accountability, seemingly threatened the entire “establishment.”	新的社会运动寻求去除历史的神话色彩、拒绝接受代表精英分子利益政策的公正性的老生常谈，要求政府机构更多地负责并且似乎威胁了整个“国家权利机构”。


Nevertheless, it was not until Ronald Reagan forged an alliance between conservatism’s two traditionally warring factions that the political foundations of neo-conservatism’s triumph were secured.	然而，直到里根促成了保守主义两个传统对抗的派系的联合后新保守主义胜利的政治基础才得以确定下来。


One faction primarily comprised elites opposed to state intervention in the market.	其中的一个派系主要由反对国家介入市场的精英组成。


Its members cared little about the verities associated with “community” or “family values.”	其成员对与“社区”或“家庭价值观”相关的事实关心甚少。


Their best intellectual arguments derived from Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, and Robert Nozick, who sought to challenge collectivist theories of society in general and “socialism” in particular.	他们最佳的论点都取自米尔顿·弗里德曼、弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克和罗伯特·诺齐克，这些人寻求在总体上挑战社会的集体主义理论，尤其是挑战“社会主义”。


The other faction was rooted in nineteenth-century “know nothing” populism, with its flights of nationalist hysteria, defense of traditional prejudices, and resentment of intellectual and economic elites.	另一派系源于十九世纪“不可知论”的民粹主义，带有其高涨的民族主义的歇斯底里、为传统的偏见辩护以及憎恨知识分子和经济学精英。


However, its members do not necessarily oppose social legislation that benefits working people – especially when white workers are privileged – and some even retain a positive image of the New Deal.	然而，其成员并不一定反对使工人阶级获益的社会立法，尤其是当白人工人占据优势的时候，有些人甚至对新政依然保持肯定的态度。


Neo-conservatism thus cannot be reduced to advocacy of the free market or right-wing populism, since its ideological specificity consists in the fusion of these contradictory outlooks.	新保守主义由此并不会被降格为仅仅鼓吹自由市场或右翼的民粹主义，因为它的意识形态特性包含了对于这些看上去相互对立的思想的融合。


The question was how to package elites’ interest in free-market capitalism with the provincial temperament of a parochial constituency.	问题是怎样把精英分子在自由市场资本主义上的利益与地方选区的狭隘性情打包在一起。


What sold best was an image of oppressive “big government,” reflected in a tax system that was increasingly burdensome to ordinary people, combined with anti-communist nationalism and barely veiled racism.	这里面最受鼓吹的是令人悲哀的“大政府”，表现为不断给普通百姓增加负担的税收制度，融合了反共产主义的民族主义和并不刻意掩饰的种族主义。


After all, everyone understood who the “welfare cheat” was, and who Kristol had in mind when he famously quipped that a neo-conservative is “a liberal who has been mugged by reality.”	不管怎样，每个人都知道什么是“福利国家”以及当克里斯托说出那句对新保守主义有名的挖苦“一个被现实掐了脖子的自由主义者”时他到底指的是什么意思。


But, with the demise of communism, neo-conservatism’s two factions once again seemed fated to clash.	但是，随着共产主义的灭亡，新保守���义的两个派系再一次似乎注定要发生对抗。


Economic globalization risked provoking a backlash by provincial populists, while the external enemy – the glue that held the neo-conservative movement together – had disappeared.	经济全球化很可能会引起地方平民主义者的强烈反对，而外部的敌人——把新保守主义运动联合到一起的粘合剂——已经消失了。


Then came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.	然后发生9. 11事件。


From the beginning, senior Reagan era officials were wary of pursuing a unilateral response.	一开始的时候，里根时代的高级官员在作出一个片面的回应上表现得很小心。


It was clear to many that Islamic fundamentalism was not comparable to communism, and, particularly in Iraq, military leaders saw the dangers in stretching American forces too thin.	许多人很清楚伊斯兰原教旨主义者不能与共产主义相提并论，尤其在伊拉克，军方的领导人看到了把美国军队的战线拉得太长的危险。


But their arguments did not carry the day.	但是他们的争辩并没有占据上风。


For the neo-conservative enterprise, 9/11 helped create a new context for linking the quest for American hegemony abroad with intense nationalism – and an even more intense assault on the welfare state – at home.	对应新保守主义事业来说，9. 11事件为连接寻求建立美国在海外的霸权地位以及在国内强烈的民族主义，甚至对福利国家更强有力的攻击提供了一个新的借口。


Employing a crude form of “realism,” which has traditionally viewed the state as the basic unit of political analysis, neo-conservatives portrayed al-Qaeda in terms of familiar enemies, namely fascism and communism, with backing from “rogue” states that must not be “appeased.”	运用一种传统上把国家看成是政治分析的基本单位的生硬的“现实主义”，新保守主义者把基地组织描述为他们熟悉的敌人的形式，就是法西斯主义和共产主义，依靠的是绝对不能“姑息”的“流氓”国家的支持。


Thus, the “axis of evil” and the “pre-emptive strike.”	于是，就有了“邪恶轴心”和“先发制人”的说法。


This new “hyper-realism” has little in common with old-style realism.	这种新的“高度现实主义”与过去旧的现实主义几乎没有任何共同点。


Churchill and Roosevelt did not lie to the international community about the threat of fascism, construct an artificial “coalition of the willing,” or employ violence without accountability: these were the tactics of their totalitarian enemies.	丘吉尔和罗斯福在谈到法西斯的威胁时并没有欺骗国际社会，制造一个虚构的“自愿联盟”或者不负责任地使用暴力：这些是他们极权主义敌人的手段。


Today, a meaningful realism calls for recognizing the constraints on building democracy: suspicion of western values generated by imperialism, the power of pre-modern institutions and customs, and the still-fragile character of the state system in most of the world.	今天，有意义的现实主义呼唤人们认识到建立民主所受到的限制：因为帝国主义而对西方价值观的怀疑、近代组织机构和习俗的威力以及在全世界大多数国家体制的依然脆弱性。


But genuine realism, unfortunately, is beside the point.	但是不幸的是，真正的现实主义与我们所讨论的问题无关。


Given the inherent tension implied by neo-conservatism’s simultaneous embrace of secular free-market capitalism and “traditional” values, its strategy, perfected since the Reagan era, has been to re-draw the lines of division: then, as now, the West is “at risk,” which requires nurturing a strongly emotional distinction between “us” and “them.”	因为新保守主义同时接受世俗的自由主义资本主义和“传统”的价值观新保守主义而导致的内在的紧张状态，它的自里根时代得到完善的战略走上了一条把世界分割开的路线：于是，就像现在，西方国家“出于危险中”，这要求我们在情感上对“我们”和“他们”严加区分。


That strategy’s popular appeal will not end with the Bush administration, because neo-conservatism feeds on a set of public fears that are deeply rooted in American history.	这种战略让公众所产生的兴趣并不会随着布什政府的终结而结束，因为新保守主义依靠的深深植根于美国历史的公众对许多问题的担忧。


Changing that will require not merely confronting a new ideological outlook, but also deciding which policies reflect what is best about the American political tradition.	要改变它需要的不仅仅是面对一个新的思想观点，还需要决定那种政策最能体现美国的政治传统。


Is Obama Losing Iraq?	奥巴马丢掉了伊拉克？


BAGHDAD – The Obama administration’s Iraq policy is in chaos. Seven months after Iraq’s national elections, the United States has publicly denied taking sides in the wrangling over who will be prime minister.	发自巴格达——奥巴马政府的伊拉克政策目前正处于一点混乱之中。


Privately, however, the US is backing the incumbent, Nouri al-Maliki.	伊拉克大选已经过去整整7个月之久，而在确定伊拉克总理人选的争议中，美国一方面宣布保持中立，另一方面却又暗地支持现任总理努里·马利基。


The US has applied tremendous diplomatic pressure on Iraq’s Arab neighbors to get them to accept another Maliki term.	美国对伊拉克周边的阿拉伯国家施加了巨大的外交压力，以迫使它们接受马利基连任。


Most have refused.	但大部分努力都白费了。


Initially, the US backed Maliki in order to keep the Sadrist bloc from gaining a share of power.	最初，美国支持马利基是为了阻止一部分权力落到萨德尔派手里。


However, that has now backfired, since the Sadrists are the only group other than Maliki’s coalition of Shia parties that supports him.	而如今看来，这无异于搬石头砸自己的脚，因为除了马利基自己的什叶派政党联盟之外，就只有萨德尔派支持马利基了。


One unsettling consequence of US diplomacy is that it has reinforced Iran’s role in Iraq, because Maliki is Iran’s preferred candidate for Prime Minister.	此举还带来了另一个令人担忧的后果：由于马利基同时也是伊朗心目中的总理人选，故美国的外交政策实际上进一步提升了伊朗在伊拉克的地位。


Thus, at the very moment that the US is leading a global campaign to isolate Iran over its nuclear program, it is strengthening Iran’s regional position.	更讽刺的是，在核武器问题上，美国一面领导全球孤立伊朗，但同时又令伊朗的区域影响力进一步增强。


The US-Iranian dispute is not limited to the nuclear issue.	当然，美伊之间的争端并不仅限于核问题。


American efforts to re-start Israeli-Palestinian peace talks have faced adamant opposition from Iran, which maintains its 30-year-old policy of opposing any effort to promote peace in the region.	美国致力于重启以巴和谈的进程，但伊朗固守30年以来的政策，坚决反对任何促进该区域和平的努力，并对美国造成了极大阻力。


Iran exerts significant influence on both state and non-state actors whose support is indispensible to any long-term peace in the Middle East.	与此同时，对于那些实现中东长期和平所不可或缺的国家和非国家组织，伊朗也施加了极大的影响。


First among these is Syria. Post-election Iraq was an obvious opening for the US to place a wedge between Iran and Syria.	其中首当其冲的要数叙利亚。 大选后的伊拉克显然已经成为了美国挑拨伊朗和叙利亚两国关系一个突破口。


While Iran promotes the Shia religious parties in Iraq, Syria’s interests there tilt toward secular nationalism, as represented by former prime minister Ayad Allawi’s coalition, which actually defeated Maliki in the parliamentary elections held earlier this year.	伊朗支持伊拉克的什叶派政党联盟，而叙利亚则倾向于前总理伊亚德·阿拉维所领导的世俗民族主义联盟。 后者在今年早些时候的国会大选中的确击败了马利基。


Indeed, Syria has supported Allawi for the past seven years. Yet, in the wake of intense US and Iranian diplomatic pressure in favor of Maliki, Syria has apparently shifted its support accordingly.	在过去7年中，叙利亚一直支持阿拉维当政，但在意识到美国和伊朗支持马利基的强大外交压力时，它也知趣地倒向了马利基。


The impact of this American misstep has already been felt, emboldening Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his provocative visit to Lebanon, which included a public appearance on Hezbollah-controlled territory near Israel’s northern border.	美国这一政策失误的影响已经露出了端倪，并促成了伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德对黎巴嫩的高调出访，访问期间内贾德甚至在靠近以色列北部边境的真主党控制区公开露面。


The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, have so far resisted US pressure to endorse Maliki.	海湾国家，尤其是沙特阿拉伯，则一直顶着美国的压力抵制马利基。


They cannot forget that Maliki was in charge during the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad’s Sunni Muslims.	他们无法忘怀在马利基当政期间巴格达爆发逊尼派穆斯林被种族清洗的惨剧。


They regard Iran – and thus Maliki’s closeness to it – as an existential threat.	他们认定伊朗——连同亲伊的马利基一道——是实实在在的威胁。


Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, in particular, perceive Iran as inciting unrest among their own substantial Shia populations.	而科威特，沙特阿拉伯和巴林等国家则把伊朗视为引发国内什叶派骚乱的元凶。


Iraq’s political elites have resisted Maliki’s desire for a second term for two reasons. First, they are weary of renewed Iranian attempts to destabilize Iraq.	而伊拉克国内的政治精英之所以反对马利基连任，原因二：第一，他们对伊朗不断试图制造伊拉克国内不稳定局势的行为十分反感。


Security forces recently intercepted suicide bombers entering Iraqi Kurdistan from Iran, with, Kurdish leaders believe, the support and training of Iranian intelligence.	伊拉克安全部队最近截获了企图从伊朗进入伊拉克库尔德地区的人肉炸弹，而库尔德领导人则认为这些人肉炸弹是伊朗情报机构资助和培训出来的。


Second, Maliki’s tenure has been worrying to those who believe in democracy and the peaceable transfer of power.	其二，马利基任内的所作所为一直令那些相信民主和权力和平更替的人感到担忧。


He has created security forces – some of which have reportedly acted as death squads – that are answerable directly to him, thus bypassing the constitutional chain of command.	他先是绕开了宪法规定的军事指挥系统，创建直接听命于自己的安全部队——据报其中一部分成员还有政治暴力的前科。


He has also replaced career army and security officers with cronies.	马利基还用自己的同党取代了原有的职业军人和安全官员。


Last March, as rumors circulated that he was losing the vote, Maliki asserted that state security would be threatened if he lost, noting his responsibility to maintain order.	去年三月，外界传言说马利基很可能输掉大选，为此他断言如果自己输掉了大选，那么国家的安全就会受到威胁，因为只有他才能维持国家的秩序。


When he did lose, he demanded a recount, not as a candidate, but in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.	当他真的输了大选的时候，他却以武装部队总司令（而不是总理候选人）的身份要求重新计票。


The fact that Maliki, despite his incumbency, has been unable to secure a second term seven months after the elections attests to the widespread opposition to his continued rule among Iraq’s political class.	尽管马利基还在任，但他已经不可能在7个月后的大选中成功连任了，而这也证明了伊拉克政治阶层对他继续统治的普遍反对。


There is only one way to explain the US administration’s decision to exert such diplomatic pressure in favor of Iran’s favorite in Iraq: Obama’s pledge during his presidential election campaign to disengage from Iraq during his first term.	在伊拉克问题上，唯一能够解释美国政府如此施压来支持伊朗青睐的马利基的原因，就是奥巴马在竞选总统选举时曾经许下要在第一届任期内从伊拉克撤军的诺言。


In this, Obama is following the example of President George W. Bush, who let the US electoral agenda, rather than American – not to mention Iraqi – national interests, dictate Iraq policy.	从这个角度看，奥巴马和小布什并无任何区别，他们都是按照美国大选和议程的需要而不是美国的国家��益（更不用说伊拉克的利益）来指导制定伊拉克政策。


The Bush administration insisted that Iraq achieve various “milestones” – elections for which the country was not ready and completing a constitution in six weeks, to name two – simply to create the appearance of substantive achievements ahead of the 2004 presidential election or the 2006 mid-term elections.	布什政府坚持认为伊拉克获得了各种具有“里程碑”意义的成就——试举其中两例：一是在该国仓促举行了一场大选，二是在6个星期内制定了一部宪法——而这些只不过是为2004年的换届大选或2006年的中期选举创造实质利好罢了。


Similarly, the Obama administration is trying to force what it perceives as the easiest path to a new government in Iraq – even if it is pro-Iranian – not because it is in the US national interest, but to enable it to head for the exits more quickly in advance of the president’s re-election campaign.	与此类似，奥巴马政府也正在运用他们认为最简单的方法来推动新伊拉克政府的组建——即便这是个亲伊朗的政府——这也不是为了美国的利益，而是为了能够在总统换届大选之前更快地拿出成绩来。


The administration’s policy in Iraq is now strengthening Iran regionally at the expense of America’s Arab allies, undermining America’s own efforts to forge a Middle East peace, and weakening Iraq’s nascent democracy.	现在，政府当局所采取的伊拉克政策牺牲了美国阿拉伯盟友的利益，增强了伊朗在该区域的影响力，葬送了美国促进中东和平的努力，也削弱了伊拉克新生的民主。


It is difficult to imagine a worse set of outcomes for US national security interests in this vital region.	而由此导致美国国家利益在这一重要区域的损失，则更是难以估量。


Is Oil Becoming Stranded?	石油正在搁浅吗


LONDON – The conventional wisdom regarding the recent plunge in the price of oil is that we are seeing a repeat of the 1985-1986 collapse, when Saudi Arabia ramped up production as part of a dispute with other members of the OPEC cartel.	伦敦—传统智慧对近期石油价格暴跌的解释是我们正在重复1985—1986年的崩盘，当时，沙特阿拉伯加大了产量，这是它与其他欧佩克成员国纠纷的一部分。


This time, the thinking goes, Saudi Arabia is doing the same in response to its loss of market share to shale-oil production in the United States.	这一观点认为，如今沙特阿拉伯正在做同样的事，以应对因为美国页岩油生产而失去市场份额的局面。


But there is another parallel that is even more relevant – with important implications for the long-term price of oil.	但另一个相似之处更加重要——并且对石油的长期价格存在重大影响。


The recent collapse is reminiscent of a similar dive in the price of coal – which crashed from a brief high of $140 a ton in 2008 to about $40 a ton today – which led some deposits to become “financially stranded,” meaning that the cost of developing them outweighs potential returns.	最近的油价暴跌让人想起了煤炭价格崩盘——从2008年每吨140美元的短暂高点下跌到今天的每吨40美元左右——煤炭价格崩盘导致一些煤炭储量“财务搁浅”，即开发它们的成本超过了潜在回报。


The drop was the result of long-term environmental policies, including programs aimed at mitigating climate change, which undercut demand for coal.	煤炭价格下跌的原因是长期环境政策，包括旨在减轻气候变化的措施降低了煤炭需求。


Efforts to improve air quality in China, US carbon and mercury emissions standards, cheaper natural gas, and growing investments in renewable energy have all eroded coal’s share of the energy market.	中国改善空气质量的努力，美国碳和汞排放标准，更加廉价的天然气，以及不断增加的可再生能源投资都在遏制煤炭在能源市场上的份额。


A similar mechanism may be at work in the oil market.	石油市场上也许也在发生同样的机制。


As pressure grows on governments to take action to combat climate change, demand for fossil fuels is likely to drop, which could result in prices remaining depressed for longer than the industry anticipates – perhaps forever.	随着政府日益感到压力要采取行动遏制气候变化，化石燃料需求可能降低，而这可能导致价格被抑制的时间长于行业预期——也许将永无翻身之日。


To be sure, some critics – including the British economist Dieter Helm – dismiss the possibility that assets can become stranded.	诚然，一些批评者——包括英国经济学家迪特·赫尔姆（Dieter Heim）——否定了资产价格搁浅的可能性。


They contend that the absence of serious international efforts to reduce emissions, the cyclical nature of petroleum markets, investors’ short time horizons, and the fact that most oil assets are state-owned make it unlikely that policies to mitigate climate change will have an impact on oil prices.	他们主张，由于没有严肃的国际措施降低排放、石化市场的周期性质、投资者的短视以及大部分石油资产属于国有这一事实决定了遏制气候变化的政策不可能对石油价格产生冲击。


These arguments are easily rebutted.	这些观点轻易就能驳倒。


For starters, while the international community is unlikely to agree any time soon on a global mechanism for putting a price on carbon emissions, other types of environmental policies have already had an effect on demand for oil.	首先，尽管在近期国际社会不可能形成关于碳排放定价全球机制的一致，但其他类型的环境政策已经开始影响石油需求。


That is a crucial development, because even small shifts in supply or demand can cause large swings in the price of oil.	这是一个关键趋势，因为即使是供给或需求的微小改变，也可能引起石油价格的大幅波动。


The drop from $120 per barrel in 2014 to under $35 today is the result of a 2% change (roughly two million barrels a day) in the supply-demand balance.	油价从2014年的每桶120美元下跌到今天的每桶35美元以下是因为供求平衡发生了2%的变化（大约每天两百万桶）。


That reflects Saudi Arabia’s output increase of more than a million barrels a day, as well as mandated efficiency measures in the European Union, partly motivated by efforts to cut carbon dioxide emissions, which have contributed to a comparable drop in demand – by about 1.5% a year.	这体现在沙特阿拉伯每天增产一百万多桶，以及欧盟强制实施的效率措施上，后者部分是为了减少二氧化碳排放，让需求下降了相当的幅度——大约每年1. 5%。


Similar measures can be expected elsewhere as governments strive to meet the targets pledged under the Paris climate agreement.	随着政府加大马力兑现根据巴黎气候协定承诺的目标，类似的措施在其他地区也会实施。


Second, though oil prices may be cyclical, structural changes in energy markets are likely to undermine price increases.	其次，尽管石油价格可能具有周期性，但能源市场的结构变化制约破坏价格上涨。


Alternative transport technologies, including electric cars, static batteries, and hybrid solutions, are already threatening to make oil less necessary.	另类交通技术，包括电动车、静态电池（static batteries）和混合动力方案，已经让石油变得不再那么必须。


Third, while many investors do have short time horizons, development of resources in the oil industry can easily extend to more than a decade.	第三，尽管许多投资者都存在短视，但石油行业资源的开发很容易就会达到十年以上。


That means that the “safe” cash flow from today’s assets can end up invested in the next generation of high-cost assets that are at a far greater risk of stranding.	这意味着来自今天的资产的“安全”现金流最后可能被用于投资于搁浅风险显著更高的下一代高成本资产。


Finally, the fact that many oil properties are state-owned does not protect investors who have put their money into publicly traded assets.	最后，许多石油资产为国家所有这一事实并不能保护将钱投资到公开上市交易资产的投资者。


Governments may have strategic reasons to hold onto unprofitable assets, but investors who own shares in partly privatized state firms do not.	政府可能出于战略性理由一直持有无法盈利的资产，但拥有部分私有化的国家企业的投资者并非如此。


Furthermore, the first victims of any long-term price decrease will be high-cost producers, many of which are publicly traded, leaving investors more – not less – exposed.	此外，长期价格下跌的首当其冲者将是高成本生产商，其中许多是公开上市交易企业，这让投资者的风险更大而非更小了。


Commodity markets have repeatedly proved vulnerable to expectations that prices will fall.	大宗商品市场一再表明，它们极易受到价格下跌预期的影响。


Given the political pressure to mitigate the impact of climate change, smart investors will be watching closely for indications of policies that will lead to a drop in demand and the possibility that their assets will become financially stranded.	考虑到遏制气候变化影响的政治压力，聪明的投资者将密切关注可能导致需求下降的政策信号以及他们的资产财务搁浅的可能性。


It is dangerous to assume that stranding can occur only over the long term.	认为只有在长期才可能发生搁浅食为先的。


Doing so risks putting investors in the same position as the last shareholders in Peabody Energy, the world’s largest private coal company, which is teetering on the edge of bankruptcy.	这样做会可能让投资者处于和皮博迪能源公司（Peabody Energy）最后的股东相同的境地。 皮博迪能源公司是世界上最大的私有煤炭公司，目前正处于破产边缘。


The fact that Peabody Energy is still operating, and thus technically not stranded, is probably of little comfort to its owners.	皮博迪能源公司仍然在营业，因此在技术上并未搁浅，这一事实也许对于其股东来说没有多少安慰功效。


Not So Splendid Isolation	不那么光荣的孤立


PARIS – At the end of the nineteenth century, the British Empire pursued a policy of what it called “splendid isolation,” reflecting its leaders’ determination to stand aloof from international engagements.	巴黎——十九世纪末，大英帝国奉行其所谓“光荣孤立”的政策，反映了其领导人在国际交往中置身事外的决心。


With the strength of its economy and the superiority of its navy, the United Kingdom could afford to avoid entanglement in others’ affairs.	拥有经济实力和海军优势的坚强后盾，英国有能力避免在别国事务中纠缠不清。


Today, as recent events have shown, isolation is – more often than not – a mistake, an unenviable condition resulting from failed policies.	今天，最新的事态发展显示孤立往往最终演变成一种错误，是政策失败所导致的并不值得艳羡的困境。


Cuba’s emergence from decades of forced isolation is a victory for the island, while North Korea’s pariah status has led it to the brink of collapse.	古巴走出长达数十年的强制孤立是这个岛国的胜利，而朝鲜被抛弃的地位已经令国家走到了崩溃的边缘 。


Similarly, Israel’s controversial policies and diplomacy risk leaving the Jewish state unprecedentedly alone.	同样，以色列的争议政策和外交风险令这个犹太国家前所未有的孤立无援。


And inward-looking policies in Russia and Turkey, driven largely by their leaders’ egos, are unlikely to produce anything but harm.	受累于各自领导人强烈的自我意识，俄国和土耳其实行的内向政策很可能只会带来损失。


By beginning to normalize relations, Cuba and the United States have snatched victory from the jaws of a double defeat: the failure of the embargo and the failure of the Cuban economy.	通过启动关系正常化，古巴和美国从两败俱伤——禁运的失败和古巴经济的失败——的魔爪中夺走了胜利。


The deal struck in December allows Cuban President Raúl Castro to claim success in mending ties without making significant political concessions.	十二月达成的协议使古巴总统劳尔·卡斯特罗得以在未作显著政治让步的情况下成功地修复关系。


For US President Barack Obama, the breakthrough is a chance to cement his legacy as a transformative president, like his models Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt – even if, in ending nearly six decades of failed policy, he more closely resembles Richard Nixon, who presided over the opening to China.	对美国总统奥巴马而言，突破是一个继承其偶像亚伯拉罕·林肯和富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福的衣钵，巩固其作为变革总统地位的机遇——虽然他结束近六十年失败政策的功绩更接近理查德·尼克松，后者在执政期间放开了对华关系。


Though Pope Francis, the first Latin American pontiff, was instrumental in facilitating the resumption of diplomatic ties, so was the plunging price of oil.	虽然首任拉美教皇弗朗西斯为促进外交关系恢复作出了贡献，但同样起到重要作用的还有石油价格的下跌。


Continued isolation would have left the Cuban regime dangerously exposed, given the declining financial fortunes of its primary sponsor, petroleum-rich Venezuela.	继续孤立会让古巴政权承担很大的风险，因为其主要赞助国盛产石油的委内瑞拉金融资产规模不断降低。


North Korea stands in stark contrast to Cuba’s successful policy of engagement.	朝鲜与古巴的成功交往政策形成了鲜明的对比。


With its alleged involvement in the recent cyber attack on Sony Pictures, the regime has backed itself further into its tiny corner.	因为涉嫌参与对索尼电影公司最近的网络攻击，该政权再次将自己逼入了死角。


The result can only be deeper – and ultimately more painful – isolation.	结果只能陷入更深——最终也更痛苦的孤立状态。


Even China, North Korea’s main patron, is losing patience with its client state.	就连朝鲜的主要庇护国中国也逐渐对这个附庸国失去了信心。


In an interdependent world, isolation is no longer a source of pride; on the contrary, it is a cause for concern.	在相互依存的世界里，孤立不再是骄傲的源泉;相反，它应当引起人们的关注。


Nowhere is that more evident than Israel.	这方面尤以以色列最为显著。


Not even the country’s technological wonders or its vibrant civil society can make up for its unappealing politics and policies.	就连该国的科技奇迹或充满活力的民间社团都无法抵消其不明智政策所带来的损失。


The result has been a dangerously rapid diminution of much-needed Western support.	以色列因此迅速失去其迫切需要的西方支持。


Equally worrisome is the recent drift of former imperial powers Russia and Turkey.	同样令人担忧的是前帝国主义列强俄罗斯和土耳其最近的走势。


Both countries’ leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, place their own power above their citizens’ interests, and both are fanning the flames of misguided nationalism and religious chauvinism, surrounded by frightened courtiers whose main function has been to keep reality at bay.	两国领导人——俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京和土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安将自身权力凌驾于公民利益之上，两人都在以掩盖事实为主要目的的惊恐不安的臣子包围下，拼命煽动被误导的民族主义和宗教沙文主义情绪。


Turkey is more dynamic and energetic than Russia, and its economy certainly is faring much better, but both regimes are overestimating the strength of their position and underestimating the cost of their autocratic turn.	土耳其比俄罗斯更具动感和活力，其经济境况与俄罗斯相比无疑也有很大优势，但两国政府都过高估计了自己的实力，而低估了向专制转向的代价。


Just four years ago, Turkey was seen as a model to follow, particularly for the Muslim world.	就在四年前，特别是在穆斯林世界眼中，土耳其被看作一种可以追随的模式。


Today, the country is on the defensive, fearful even of its own journalists.	今天，这个国家却陷入防御态势，甚至于害怕自己的记者。


During the early stages of the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish town of Kobani, just across the border in Syria, Turkey seemed to be replicating the Soviet Union’s tactic during the 1944 Warsaw uprising, when Nazi German troops fought Polish resistance fighters: Let the belligerents exhaust each other as much as possible before intervening.	伊斯兰国在边境对面的叙利亚包围库尔德城镇Kobani的早期，土耳其似乎是在模仿苏联在1944年华沙起义中波兰抵抗运动与纳粹德国军队作战时的战术：在军事干涉前让交战双方尽可能相互消耗实力。


Such policy may be brutally effective in the short term; in the long term, it is certain to be costly for Turkey.	这样的政策可能在短期内效果显著； 但从长远看，土耳其肯定会为此付出代价。


Meanwhile, in Russia, the further the economy plunges, the more defiant Putin becomes.	与此同时，在俄罗斯，经济愈是滑落，普京就愈是目空一切。


The great unanswered question is how long Putin will be able to rely on nationalist kitsch to overwhelm Russians’ rational calculation of their interests.	唯一待解的问题是普京能在多长时间内依靠庸俗的民族主义来压制俄罗斯人理性的利益算计。


What is certain – as every recent example shows – is that, in an increasingly transparent and interdependent world, isolation is less a splendor than a blunder.	就像近期实例所表明的那样，可以肯定在日益透明和相互依存的世界里，孤立与其说是一种光荣，还不如说是重大的错误。


Is Open Diplomacy Possible?	公开的外交可行吗？


PRINCETON – At Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson, who was president of the university before he became president of the United States, is never far away. His larger-than-life image looks out across the dining hall at Wilson College, where I am a fellow, and Prospect House, the dining facility for academic staff, was his family home when he led the university.	普林斯顿——


So when the furor erupted over WikiLeaks’ recent release of a quarter-million diplomatic cables, I was reminded of Wilson’s 1918 speech in which he put forward “Fourteen Points” for a just peace to end World War I. The first of those fourteen points reads: “Open covenants of peace must be arrived at, after which there will surely be no private international action or rulings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”	伍德罗•威尔逊在成为美国总统之前，曾任普林斯顿大学的校长，在这所大学里，人们仍然到处可见其身影。 我是威尔逊学院的一名研究员。


Is this an ideal that we should take seriously?	因此，当“维基解密”公开了25万外交电报而引发了一场轩然大波时，我想起了威尔逊1918年的讲话，他在这次讲话中提出了一个结束第一次世界大战，实现公正和平的“十四点计划”。


Is Wikileaks founder Julian Assange a true follower of Woodrow Wilson?	十四点计划的第一点是：“必须以公开的方式缔结公开的和平条约，嗣后各国不得再缔结任何类型的秘密外交协定，而外交活动也必须在众目睽睽之下坦诚进行。 ”


Wilson was unable to get the Treaty of Versailles to reflect his fourteen points fully, although it did include several of them, including the establishment of an association of states that proved to be the forerunner of today’s United Nations.	这有些理想化了，我们应该严肃对待这样的提议吗？


But Wilson then failed to get the US Senate to ratify the treaty, which included the covenant of the League of Nations.	难道说“维基解密”的创始人朱利安•阿桑格是伍德罗•威尔逊的真正追随者吗？


Writing in The New York Times earlier this month, Paul Schroeter, an emeritus professor of history, argued that open diplomacy is often “fatally flawed,” and gave as an example the need for secret negotiations to reach agreement on the Treaty of Versailles.	虽然威尔逊无法使凡尔赛条约完整地反映他的“十四点计划”，但其中也包含他的几个提议，其中之一就是成立“国联”，事实上，国联就是今日联合国的前身。


Since the Treaty bears substantial responsibility for the resurrection of German nationalism that led to the rise of Hitler and World War II, it has a fair claim to being the most disastrous peace treaty in human history.	但威尔逊未能使美国参议院批准凡尔赛条约，国际联盟公约也就没有得到批准。


Moreover, it is hard to imagine that if Wilson’s proposals had formed the basis of the peace, and set the tone for all future negotiations, the history of Europe in the twentieth century would have been worse than it actually was.	保罗•施罗特是一个历史学名誉教授，他在本月早些时候发表在《纽约时报》上的一篇文章中提出，公开外交往往带有“致命的缺陷”，并把凡尔赛条约举作一个需要秘密谈判以达成协议的例子。


That makes the Treaty of Versailles a poor example to use to demonstrate the desirability of secrecy in international negotiations.	由于凡尔赛条约对德国民族主义的复兴，进而导致了希特勒的崛起和第二次世界大战的爆发负有重大责任，公平地说，凡尔赛条约是一个人类历史上最具灾难性的和平条约。


US President Barack Obama endorsed it when he took office in January 2009. “Starting today,” he told his cabinet secretaries and staff, “every agency and department should know that this administration stands on the side not of those who seek to withhold information but those who seek to make it known.”	此外，如果威尔逊的建议形成了和平的基础，并为今后所有谈判定下基调，很难想象欧洲二十世纪的历史会像现实这样糟糕。


He then noted that there would have to be exceptions to this policy to protect privacy and national security.	这使得引用凡尔赛条约来说明在国际谈判中隐秘外交的可取性完全失当。


Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has admitted, however, that while the recent leaks are embarrassing and awkward for the US, their consequences for its foreign policy are modest.	他告诉其内阁部长们和工作人员：“从今天开始，每个机构和部门都应该知道，本届政府绝不试图隐瞒信息，而是尽可能让这些信息公之于众。 ”他接着指出，这个政策也必须有例外，目的是保护隐私和国家安全。


Some of the leaked cables are just opinion, and not much more than gossip about national leaders. But, because of the leak, we know, for example, that when the British government set up its supposedly open inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war, it also promised the US government that it would “put measures in place to protect your interests.”	但是，即便国防部长罗伯特•盖茨也承认，虽然最近的泄漏事件使美国感到尴尬和难堪，其对美国外交政策造成的损害并不大。


Similarly, the cables reveal that President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen lied to his people and parliament about the source of US airstrikes against al-Qaeda in Yemen, telling them that Yemen’s military was the source of the bombs.	某些泄漏的电报只是一些意见，不过是些对它国国家领导人的八卦而已。 例如，由于泄密我们知道了当英国政府拟进行伊拉克战争原因的公开听证会时，它还向美国政府承诺，将“把采取适当的措施以保护美国的利益。


We have also learned more about the level of corruption in some of the regimes that the US supports, like those in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in other countries with which the US has friendly relations, notably Russia. We now know that the Saudi royal family has been urging the US to undertake a military attack on Iran to prevent it from becoming capable of producing nuclear weapons.	同样，这些电报还透露，也门总统阿里•阿卜杜拉•萨利赫在美国空袭在也门的基地组织的事件中也欺骗了他的人民和议会，他称，也门军队提供了轰炸所用的炸弹。


Knowledge is generally considered a good thing; so, presumably, knowing more about how the US thinks and operates around the world is also good.	我们还对美国支持的一些政府的腐败程度有了更多的了解，如阿富汗和巴基斯坦政府，还有其它与该美国保持友好关系的政府，显然也包括俄罗斯政府了。


In a democracy, citizens pass judgment on their government, and if they are kept in the dark about what their government is doing, they cannot be in a position to make well-grounded decisions.	我们现在知道，沙特王室一直在敦促美国对伊朗进行军事打击，以阻止伊朗生产核武器。


Even in non-democratic countries, people have a legitimate interest in knowing about actions taken by the government.	或许在这里，我们看到了美国政府值得信任的一些东西：它已拒绝这一建议。


Nevertheless, it isn’t always the case that openness is better than secrecy.	一般人都认为丰富的知识是一件好事，所以据此推测，对美国政府在世界事务中的所思与所行有更多的了解也应该很好。


Suppose that US diplomats had discovered that democrats living under a brutal military dictatorship were negotiating with junior officers to stage a coup to restore democracy and the rule of law.	在一个民主国家，政府的表现如何要由公民来评判，如果政府在黑箱中运作，则公民对政府的评判就无法获得足够的依据。


I would hope that WikiLeaks would not publish a cable in which diplomats informed their superiors of the plot.	即使在非民主国家内，人民也有合法的权利了解政府要采取哪些行动。


Openness is in this respect like pacifism: just as we cannot embrace complete disarmament while others stand ready to use their weapons, so Woodrow Wilson’s world of open diplomacy is a noble ideal that cannot be fully realized in the world in which we live.	譬如美国外交官发现，某国处在残暴的军事独裁统治下，而该国的民主人士正在与下级军官进行谈判，以发动政变，恢复民主和法治。 我希望“维基解密”在此情况下不会公布外交官向上司报告这个密谋的电报。


We could, however, try to get closer to that ideal.	这方面的公开像是反战派的做法：当其它人磨刀霍霍之时，我们不能接受全面裁军。


If governments did not mislead their citizens so often, there would be less need for secrecy, and if leaders knew that they could not rely on keeping the public in the dark about what they are doing, they would have a powerful incentive to behave better.	所以伍德罗•威尔逊的公开外交设想是一个崇高的理想世界，但在我们生活的这个世界上，无法完全实现。


It is therefore regrettable that the most likely outcome of the recent revelations will be greater restrictions to prevent further leaks. Let’s hope that in the new WikiLeaks age, that goal remains out of reach.	如果各国政府没有如此频繁地误导本国人民，他们也就无需采取如此多的保密措施，如果各国的领导者们知道，他们不能凡是都秘密进行，置公众于无知之中，他们就会有强大的动因表现得更好一些。


Read more from the "An Ethical Mind" Focal Point.	因此，最近的泄密事件最可能产生的结果是更严格的限制措施，以防止今后的泄密。 这种结果真是令人遗憾。


Israel and America on the Wrong Side of History	逆历史潮流而动的以色列和美国


MELBOURNE – Shortly before Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by a right-wing Jewish extremist in November 1995, I met him in Tel Aviv.	墨尔本——1995年11月，以色列总理拉宾被犹太人极右翼分子刺杀前不久，我和他在特拉维夫会过一次面。


I was visiting Israel as Australia’s foreign minister to argue the case for rapid implementation of the Oslo peace accords – all the way through to negotiated acceptance of Palestinian statehood.	当时我以澳大利亚外交部长的身份访问以色列，主要目的是讨论奥斯陆和平协议的快速实施问题，也就是讨论接受巴勒斯坦建国的问题。


I concluded my pitch by saying, with perhaps a little more cheek than was appropriate, “But of course I’m preaching to the converted.”	我如此总结我的观点（也许语气稍微显得重了些）：“但是，很显然，我是在给信徒布道。


Rabin’s response is etched in my memory.	”拉宾对此的回应使我永生铭记。


He paused, then said with a little half-smile: “To the committed, not the converted.”	他略作停顿，然后带着一丝微笑说：“给坚定教徒布道，不是信徒。 ”


For all his deep emotional attachment to the idea of Israel embracing all of historical Judea and Samaria, Rabin knew that the only way to ensure a democratic Jewish state with viable, secure borders was to accept a Palestinian state alongside it, equally secure and viable.	拉宾根深蒂固地认定，以色列应该包括历史上朱迪亚和撒玛利亚的所有地区，他明白，为这个民主的犹太国家划定明确可行边境线的唯一办法是接受一个同一片土地上的巴勒斯坦邻居。


They would share Jerusalem as a capital, and find a mutually acceptable solution to the enormously sensitive issue of the return of Palestinian refugees.	它们将分享耶路撒冷作为首都，并在高度敏感的巴勒斯坦难民回国问题上寻找双方都能接受的解决办法。


Rabin’s murder was a catastrophe from which the peace process has never recovered.	拉宾遇刺是一场灾难，巴以和平进程从此停滞不前，再也没有取得任何进步。


No Israeli leader since has shown anything like his far-sighted vision, commitment, and capacity to deliver a negotiated two-state solution.	此后，没有一位以色列领导人表现出有如拉宾的远见卓识、鞠躬尽瘁和引导两国协商解决方案的能力。


Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert came close, but not close enough.	巴拉克和奥尔默特与拉宾有几分相似，但还不够。


And since then Binyamin Netanyahu has lived down to every expectation of his statesmanship.	此后，内塔尼亚胡没有一个方面体现出了政治家应有的水准。


His routine capitulation to the demands of the most extreme elements of a manifestly dysfunctional Knesset, and his continuing support of his impossibly divisive and pugnacious foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, have earned him little praise at home or abroad.	对于显然不正常的以色列国会中的极端分子的要求，他一味容忍； 对于他的显然毫无决断力的好斗外长利伯曼（Avigdor Lieberman），他一味支持；


One need not be naïve or in denial about the Palestinians’ multiple problems and missteps over the years to recognize that most of the recent obstacles to progress have been erected in Israel.	这让他在国内和国外都不受人待见。 不可否认，巴勒斯坦人在近年来也有各种各样的问题，有各种各样的举措失当，但明眼人都能看出，巴以和平进程的主要障碍来自以色列。


Now, with negotiations at an impasse, settlement building continuing unabated, no end in sight to the never-ending humiliation of occupation, and all other forms of leverage evidently exhausted, the Palestinians are going to the United Nations to seek recognition in some form of their statehood.	如今，谈判已经陷入了僵局，犹太人定居点建设方兴未艾，以色列仍在不断地用强占来羞辱巴勒斯坦，巴勒斯坦被逼上了绝路，不得不寻求联合国承认其某种形式的国家地位。


They want full UN membership, but – facing inevitable veto of that option by the United States in the Security Council – are willing to accept as a fallback a majority vote by the General Assembly recognizing Palestine as a non-member “observer state,” the status now enjoyed by the Vatican.	他们希望获得完全的联合国成员资格，但是——显然，美国一定会在安理会中投否决票——如果联合国大会多数赞成承认其为非成员国的“观察员国”（与梵蒂冈类似），巴勒斯坦也能接受。


Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his colleagues know perfectly well that UN recognition by itself will not deliver an end to occupation and the full realization of a sovereign Palestine.	巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯及其同侪心知肚明，联合国的承认本身并不能让以色列停止侵占，也不能保证主权巴勒斯坦国的完全实现。


Only negotiated agreement on all of the critical outstanding issues – boundary definition, Jerusalem, security guarantees for Israel, and refugees – can do that.	要达到这一目标，只有在所有现存关键性问题（边境、耶路撒冷、以色列安全保障以及难民等）上达成一致才行。


But they have persisted on this course in the face of a fierce campaign to dissuade them – including threats of Israeli sanctions and a cut-off of financial support to the Palestinian Authority by the US Congress – owing to their wholly understandable lack of confidence that anything will move without some new spark.	但尽管劝阻阻力很强——包括以色列的制裁威胁和美国国会削减对巴勒斯坦权力机构的财政支持——阿巴斯仍然坚持这一立场，之所以如此，原因并不难理解——阿巴斯们没有信心认为局势会在风平浪静中有所进展。


Despite frantic efforts by the US and the European Union to find some compromise that would head off a UN vote by kick-starting real negotiations, it is much more probable that, even after a US veto in the Security Council, an early UN General Assembly vote will deliver a strong majority for observer-state status.	美国和欧盟为了寻找快速启动实质谈判，从而阻止巴勒斯坦动议拿到联合国去表决的妥协而忙得手忙脚乱，但更有可能的事情是，即使美国在安理会投了否决票，联合国大会的掀起投票也会以压到多数通过授予巴勒斯坦观察员国地位的决议。


The question for Israel and its friends to address is what the downside risks of that outcome really are, and to calibrate their reaction accordingly.	以色列及其盟友所要解决的问题是，这一结果到底有什么不利影响，并据此决定如何反应。


The argument has been made that recognition as a state, even in limited form, will give Palestine the standing that it probably lacks currently to seek prosecutions in the International Criminal Court for alleged violations of international law.	以色列阵营的观点是，承认其国家地位（即便是有限度的国家地位）会让巴勒斯坦拥有目前所没有的在国际刑事法庭提起违反国际��诉讼的权利。


Even if right, it is difficult to see why Israel and its friends should accept that as a make-or-break argument.	即使这一观点正确，也很难看出为什么以色列及其盟友必须把这视为关乎生死的大事。


The ICC is not a kangaroo court, and allegations without substance can be expected to be treated accordingly.	国际刑事法庭可不是私庭，不具实质内容的指控会依法驳回。


Recognition as a state will not change the situation with respect to Hamas.	获得国家地位也不会改变哈马斯的立场。


Of course, its current ideological hostility to Israel’s very existence is a serious issue; but Israel and the West should not compound their grievous mistake of not recognizing the legitimacy of its electoral victory in Gaza by rejecting any Palestinian state in which Hamas plays a governing role.	当然，哈马斯目前对以色列国所抱的敌对意识形态是一个严重问题，但以色列和西方也不应该在严重错误的道路上越走越远——不承认任何哈马斯获得执政地位的巴勒斯坦国，从而否认哈马斯在加沙选举中获胜的合法性。


The door to dialogue with Hamas should remain open.	和哈马斯对话的大门不应该关闭。


The more positive argument – as Rabin would certainly have understood – is that it is overwhelmingly in Israel’s own interest to defuse this issue by accepting, once and for all, that Palestinian statehood is an indispensable requirement of its own long-term peace and security.	更为积极的观点是——拉宾肯定对此会有共鸣——毫无疑问，一劳永逸地解决这个问题符合以色列的自身利益，而解决的办法，就是承认巴勒斯坦建国是保证以色列长期和平与安全的必要条件。


Indeed, Israel should treat the UN vote as an opportunity for a new start to negotiations, rather than an excuse for renewed confrontation.	事实上，以色列应该把联合国表决视为重启谈判的机会，而不是重开边衅的借口。


Such a constructive outcome has become more urgent than ever, given the Middle East’s new geopolitical realities following the Arab Spring.	如今，在阿拉伯之春的影响下，中东将迎来地缘政治的新局面，寻求这样的建设性结果可谓当务之急。


Moreover, a perceived change of direction on the Israeli-Palestinian issue would be hugely beneficial for the West in its relations with the Islamic world.	此外，让人感觉到在巴以问题上有所转向可以极大地改善西方与伊斯兰世界的关系。


Recent polling to mark the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has shown alarming persistence of the animosity generated by the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.	最近的9·11袭击十周年民调表明，因美国干预伊拉克和阿富汗而造成的敌对情绪根深蒂固，值得警惕。


It is difficult to imagine Israel’s leadership changing course at this stage, and it is probably too late for the Obama administration to escape from the domestic political vice in which it seems pinned on this issue.	很难想象以色列能在巴以问题上转变态度，而奥巴马政府摆脱国内政治弊端、不再在巴以问题上添乱似乎也已经为时晚矣。


But being on the wrong side of history is never a comfortable position.	但逆历史潮流而动绝非良策。


And that is exactly where the US, Israel, and its closest friends – including my own country, Australia – will be if they resist the tide of international sentiment in favor of moving now to recognize Palestinian statehood. 	而如果美国、以色列及其紧密盟友——包括我的祖国澳大利亚——无视如今承认巴勒斯坦国家地位的国际舆情，它们很有可能将置身于逆历史潮流的位置。


Israel and NATO – Between Membership and Partnership	以色列和北约——游弋于成员和伙伴之间


MADRID – The idea of integrating Israel into NATO has frequently been advanced as bait to encourage the Jewish state to make the necessary concessions for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.	发自马德里 —— 将以色列整合进北约的构想经常被作为某种诱饵而被提出来，以吸引前者对巴以和平协定做出必要的让步。


And some Israeli leaders – Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman, for example – are convinced that joining NATO would act as a vital deterrent against Iran.	而有些以色列领导人，比如外长阿维格多·利伯曼 （ Avigdor Liberman ） ，就确信本国加入北约将对伊朗起到有效的威慑作用。


But it is highly unlikely that Israel’s full integration into the Alliance is feasible from NATO’s standpoint.	但站在北约的立场上来说，将以色列完全整合进北约的做法是非常不可行的。


The Alliance would not be happy to apply Article 5 of the NATO charter, which would oblige its members to fight for Israel if it were attacked by any of its many potential enemies in an endemically dangerous region.	因为各成员国都不愿意执行《北约宪章》的第五条：一旦以色列遭到别国进攻，北约成员国就必须参战去保卫它，更何况该国还位处这么一个极端危险，强敌环伺的地区。


Nor is it clear that membership would be in the best interest of Israel, a country whose defense doctrine has been always based on self-reliance and freedom of maneuver in security matters. Israel’s unwritten alliance with the United States is a more convenient alternative.	而另一方面，北约成员国资格似乎也不能使以色列的国家利益最大化，因为该国的防卫策略通常都建立在独立作战以及对各种安全手段的灵活运用之上，因此和美国之间不成文的联盟关系将是一个更方便的选择。


Cooperation and even partnership with NATO – an interim stage potentially leading to membership – is another matter.	但是以色列与北约的合作甚至是伙伴关系 —— 某种可能最终导向成员关系的过渡阶段 —— 则是另外一番情形。


Notwithstanding the stalled peace process and the adverse effect that Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians is having on its international standing, NATO and Israel have been incrementally strengthening their cooperation in recent years.	尽管巴以和平进程的停滞不前以及与巴勒斯坦的冲突为以色列的国际声誉带来了负面影响。 但近年以来北约依然不断加强与以色列合作的力度。


This serves the interests of both sides.	而这对双方来说也都是有利的。


For the Israelis, cooperation with NATO is a major component of legitimacy in its frequently troubled relations with the West; for NATO, cooperation serves its capacity to work in new theaters of operation and	对以色列来说，和北约的合作可以为该国与西方之间麻烦不断的关系提供重要的合法性基础； 而在北约看来，合作对自身在新战场的行动，以及应对新出现的敌人的反应方面都有利，这也符合北约的利益，而帕特里克·阿都因 （ Patrick Hardouin ） 这位北约政治事务和安全政策部的高级官员曾在 2006 年清楚地挑明了这一点，他说“以巴冲突的起伏将不会限制以色列和北约双方的合作。


In recent years, NATO has been undergoing major changes in both its deployment and objectives.	近些年来，北约无论是在兵力部署还是战略目标方面都发生了重大变革。


Two landmarks define these changes: the end of the Cold War, which rendered NATO’s defensive strategy against the Soviet Union obsolete, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, which changed the profile of the enemy and the nature of the battlefield.	两个标志性事件清楚定义了这些变革：一是冷战结束，直接导致北约专门为苏联设计的防御策略彻底作废，二就是 9/11 事件，对美国的恐怖袭击引发了敌人身份的改变以及战场本质的变换。


It also changed the theater of operation, and forced the Alliance to shift its attention from Europe to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond.	这同时也改变了执行军事行动的区域，迫使北约将目光从欧洲延伸到地中海沿岸，中东地区，甚至更远的地方。


NATO’s Mediterranean emphasis was inaugurated in 1994 through the Mediterranean Dialogue, which linked countries like Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, and Tunisia in security discussions with the Alliance.	北约对地中海地区的关注通过 1994 年的“地中海对话 （ Mediterranean Dialogue ） ”展开，埃及，以色列，约旦，摩洛哥，毛里塔尼亚，阿尔及利亚和突尼斯等国都出席了这场会议，各国也都与北约就安全问题进行了磋商。


The Dialogue was not exactly an edifying success, however.	但这场会议却并不能算是一个成功的开始。


The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004, triggered by the trauma of the 9/11 attacks, holds far greater potential, for it transforms NATO’s relations with friendly states in the Middle East from dialogue to partnership – a level comparable to the Partnership for Peace program used to promote Central and Eastern European countries to full membership.	而由 9/11 恐怖袭击所催生的 2004 年“伊斯坦布尔合作计划 （ Istanbul Cooperation Initiative ） ”则更具潜力，因为它将北约与中东地区友好国家的关系由单纯对话转化为伙伴关系 —— 这在外交上相当于用以推动中东欧国家获得北约成员国资格的“和平伙伴关系 （ Partnership for Peace ） ”项目。


Under this framework, multilateral cooperation in combating terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction was offered to the region’s main actors.	在这个框架之下，本地区的所有主要政治力量都获得了在对抗恐怖主义和大规模杀伤性武器扩散方面进行国际多边合作的机会。


The Initiative also envisages the promotion of regional defense reforms and the improvement of interoperability among military forces in the region.	该合作计划同时还构想了推动区域防御体系革新，以及提升区域各国军事力量的协同性。


Nevertheless, both the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative suffer from the lack of a real multilateral culture of cooperation in security matters among the main regional players.	然而地中海对话和伊斯坦布尔合作计划两者都必须面对的，则是该地区各主要势力之间缺乏真正多边合作文化的问题。


The Arab-Israeli conflict is a major political obstacle, but by no means the only one.	其中阿拉伯国家和以色列之间的冲突就堪称一个主要政治障碍，但并不是唯一的一个。


Morocco, Algeria, and Libya are hardly partners for such regional cooperation, which is also the case for most Arab countries in the Middle East.	摩洛哥，阿尔及利亚以及利比亚都算不上这类区域性合作的合作伙伴，而情况对于大多数阿拉伯国家来说也是如此。


Not surprisingly, then, of all the states in the region, it is Israel that has established the closest links with NATO. This reflects the benefits that NATO believes can be drawn from Israel’s unique military experience.	因此自然而然，在该地区的众多国家之中，唯独只有以色列与北约走得最近。


Israel recently became the first country to conclude an Individual Cooperation Program with NATO, through which it conducts an ongoing strategic dialogue with the Alliance covering a wide array of areas, including terrorism, intelligence sharing, nuclear proliferation,	这反映出北约方面希望从以色列独特的军事斗争经验中学到东西的想法。 以色列最近成为了第一个与北约达成独立合作项目


Both sides seem eager to expand the scope of their partnership, with the objective of    reaching a high level of interoperability.	以色列和欧洲双方似乎都希望能扩展伙伴关系合作的范围，而目标则是达到更高程度的协同性。


Recently, in anticipation of a hypothetical confrontation with Iran, a major military maneuver – the Juniper Cobra exercise – was conducted to test Israel’s integration into US ballistic missile defenses.	最近随着与伊朗发生冲突的预期不断增加，一个重要的军事机动行动 —— “杜松眼镜蛇 （ Juniper Cobra exercise ） ”演习 —— 被用以测试以色列与美国弹道导弹防御系统的融合程度。


American sources described the drill as “the most complete air missile defense system we’ve ever done anywhere in the world.”	美方的消息来源将这场演练形容为“我们在全世界部署的最完整的对空导弹防御系统”。


It was a major contribution, they said, to the development of a planned NATO missile shield for Europe.	另外他们还说，这还为北约计划部署为保卫欧洲的导弹阵地提供了很好的借鉴。


The options for further cooperation are many, ranging from intelligence and procurement to the development of an updated anti-terrorism doctrine (including cyber-terrorism), a domain to which NATO is a newcomer.	可以进行进一步合作的选项很多，无论是情报搜集，还是发展最新的反恐策略（包括反网络恐怖主义，一个北约新近接触的范畴）。


David Ben-Gurion’s dream of Israel becoming a NATO member might not materialize, but the developing partnership reflects the Alliance’s unequivocal recognition that Israel shares the challenges facing the West and is a vital partner in developing responses to them.	或许大卫·本 - 古里安 （ David Ben-Gurion ） 关于以色列成为北约成员国的梦想难以成为现实，但不断扩展的伙伴关系已经清晰地反映出，北约意识到在西方目前所遇到的挑战方面，自己是和以色列是同一条战壕里面的战友，而在研究如何应对这些挑战方面，以色列也是一位必不可少的合作伙伴。


Israel and Palestine After Oslo	奥斯陆之后的以色列和巴勒斯坦


RAMALLAH – On September 13, 1993, Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas met on the South Lawn of the White House to sign the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, or the Oslo Accords.	拉马拉—1993年9月13日，西蒙·佩雷斯（Shimon Peres）和马哈茂德·阿巴斯（Mahmoud Abbas）在白宫南草坪会面，并签署了《以色列-巴解组织原则宣言》（Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles），这就是奥斯陆协定。


PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin then sealed the agreement with a historic handshake.	随后，巴解组织领导人阿拉法特和以色列总理拉宾进行了历史性的握手，并将协议封存。


The Oslo Accords – the result of secret talks that had been encouraged by the Norwegian government and conducted in the country’s capital – called for a five-year transitional period during which Israeli forces would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and unspecified areas of the West Bank, and a Palestinian Authority would be established.	奥斯陆协定——由挪威政府推动、并在该国首都举行的秘密谈判的结果——呼吁制定一个五年的过渡期，在此期间，以色列逐渐从加沙地带和约旦河西岸未定区域撤军，而巴方则建立巴勒斯坦权力机构。


Letters of recognition between the PLO and Israel accompanied the agreement.	伴随该协定而生的还有巴解组织和以色列互相承认的信件。


The ultimate aim, though never explicitly stated, was to create a Palestinian state roughly within the 1967 borders.	该协定的最终目标——尽管从未明言——是在1967年边境内建立巴勒斯坦国。


But the goals laid out in the Oslo Accords remain unfulfilled.	但奥斯陆协定中所提出的目标至今仍未实现。


In fact, the agreement is unlikely to survive 89-year-old Peres and 77-year-old Abbas, who are now presidents of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, respectively.	事实上，89岁的佩雷斯和77岁的阿巴斯（他们分别为现以色列总统和巴勒斯坦权力机构主席）尚未离世，而奥斯率协定已经随风而逝了。


Several factors contributed to the deterioration of prospects for lasting peace.	几大原因破坏了持续和平的前景。


Perhaps the most important factor has been the continuation – and, at times, acceleration – of Israeli settlement activities in occupied Palestinian territories.	也许最重要的因素是以色列在巴勒斯坦被占区的定居活动一直没有停止过，有时还有加速之势。


Some Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza objected to the Accords’ failure to call explicitly for the end of illegal Israeli settlement building.	约旦河西岸和加沙地带的不少巴勒斯坦人对于奥斯陆协定没有，明确要求以色列停止非法定居点建设活动极为不满。


But, given the PLO’s weakness and lack of support in the Arab world after its refusal to oppose Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, its leaders accepted the flawed agreement, arguing that Palestinian borders would be agreed upon during the transition period.	但是，由于巴解组织的弱势，以及缺乏阿拉伯世界的支持（因为它拒绝反对伊拉克入侵科威特），其领导人接受了有缺陷的协定，指出巴勒斯坦国边境将在过渡期协商确定。


But, 19 years later, the Washington-based Foundation for Middle East Peace reports that more Jewish settlements have been built in the occupied Palestinian territories since the Oslo Accords than before they were signed.	但是，19年后，华盛顿中东和平基金会（Foundation for Middle East Peace）报告说，自奥斯陆协定以来，巴勒斯坦领土被占区上的犹太人定居点协定达成前更多了。


As a result, the need for Israel to freeze settlement activities has become an international – not just a Palestinian – requirement for effective peace talks.	结果，要求以色列冻结定居活动成了国际社会——而不仅是巴勒斯坦——所要求的有效和平谈判的前提。


Another crucial factor is continued violence.	另一个关键因素是持续的暴力。


Since Rabin and Arafat shook hands, roughly 7,500 Palestinians and 1,400 Israelis have been killed, and many more have been injured or jailed.	自拉宾和阿拉法特握手以来，大约7500巴勒斯坦人和1400以色列人被杀，受伤和被监禁的更是不计其数。


Israel’s unilateral policy of demolishing homes in Palestine has resulted in scores of Palestinians being deported or made homeless in Jerusalem, Hebron, the Jordan Valley, and elsewhere.	以色列摧毁巴勒斯坦家园的单方面政策已经造成大量巴勒斯坦人流离失所，耶路撒冷、希伯伦、约旦河谷和其他地方无家可归者无数。


While killings have declined sharply in recent years, hardly a day passes without some form of violence, often against civilians – including children.	尽管杀戮在近几年有了大幅减少，但暴力活动几乎没有一天不存在，且通常针对包括儿童在内的平民。


Fueling this violence is growing hopelessness in the absence of a diplomatic agreement.	缺乏外交协定所带来的看不到希望的感觉助长了暴力。


While international leaders fill the airwaves with talk of peace, they have failed to address the conflict boldly and resolutely.	尽管国际社会领导人和平谈判之声不绝于耳，但他们始终没能大胆坚决地解决冲突。


For example, US President Barack Obama’s election four years ago revived hope that negotiations would resume.	比如，四年前，美国总统奥巴马的当选重新燃起了谈判的希望。


But Obama’s peace envoy, George Mitchell, resigned, and the quartet (the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and the United States) was sidelined.	但奥巴马的和平特使乔治·米切尔（George Mitchell）却辞职了，而四方（联合国、欧盟、俄罗斯和美国）也退出了和平谈判。


Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s conditional promise to support Palestinian statehood has been rendered meaningless by his government’s provocative settlement policies in the areas that were supposed to comprise the Palestinian state.	与此同时，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的有条件支持巴勒斯坦国的承诺也因以色列政府在被认为是巴勒斯坦国土内的挑衅性定居政策而失去了意义。


The Oslo Accords divided the occupied territories into three regions.	奥斯陆协定将被占领土分为三个地区。


Palestinians took charge of the most densely populated urban areas, while Israel maintained total military and administrative control over the largest territory, “Area C,” which makes up 61% of the West Bank.	巴勒斯坦获得了人口最稠密的城市地区，以色列在最大的领地——“C区”（Area C，占约旦河西岸的61%）保有完全的军事和治理控制权。


Many Palestinians believe that this serves a long-term Zionist aim to keep the land without the people.	许多巴勒斯坦人相信，以色列在实施其复国主义者占领无人之地的长期阴谋。


Indeed, Israeli settlements have amounted to de facto Israeli annexation of territory into which Palestinians seek to expand their state.	事实上，以色列定居点实际上是以色列在巴勒斯坦意欲扩为领土的领地上的扩张。


As a result, without a clear agreement on borders, Area C will witness the most serious confrontations.	结果，在没有明确边境协定的情况下，C区成了冲突最严重的地区。


The Oslo Accords have also failed to put Palestinians on a path toward economic independence.	奥斯陆协定也没能把巴勒斯坦推上经济独立之路。


According to the World Bank and other international agencies, slow and complicated bureaucratic and security processes, including hundreds of checkpoints, make Palestinian economic development impossible.	据世界银行和其他国际机构的数据，迟缓而复杂的官僚和安全程序（包括数百个检查点）导致巴勒斯坦经济根本无从发展。


Palestinian dependence on Israeli goods exacerbates the problem, as does Israeli control over the movement of goods and people to, within, and between the West Bank and the blockaded Gaza strip.	巴勒斯坦对以色列商品的依赖恶化了这一问题，与此同时，以色列控制着流向约旦河西岸以及被封锁的加沙地带以及在上述两地区之内和之间的物流和人流。


The 1994 Paris Protocol, one of the most important annexes to the Oslo Accords, was intended to define economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.	1994年巴黎协议（Paris Protocol，奥斯陆协定的最重要附加协议）试图定义以色列和巴勒斯坦权力机构的经济关系。


But it has been hijacked by Israel for the benefit of its businesses.	但因以色列维护其商业利益而被搁置。


The Protocol requires the Palestinian Authority to peg prices of certain goods and its rate of value-added tax to Israel’s; forces Palestinians to use Israel’s currency; and regulates customs procedures at border crossings with Jordan and Egypt.	巴黎协议要求巴勒斯坦权力机构将特定商品和增值税率盯住以色列的水平、强迫巴勒斯坦使用以色列货币，并规定了约旦和埃及边境的通关程序。


The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, now at least 45 years old, is not a complicated problem; on the contrary, it can be summed up quite succinctly: to paraphrase the American political operative James Carville, “It’s the occupation, stupid.”	如今，巴以冲突已经进行了至少45年，它已经不再是个复杂的问题； 相反，我们可以用美国政治家詹姆斯·卡维尔（James Carville）的话言简意赅地予以总结：“重要的是占领，笨蛋。


Eventually, Abbas will gain the UN General Assembly’s acceptance of Palestinian statehood – his final accomplishment before leaving politics, as he has confided to his top aides.	最终，阿巴斯将赢得联合国大会对巴勒斯坦国的承认——据他对亲信所说，这是他离开政坛前的最后成就。


After his departure, Israel will miss his firm opposition to violence and his support for security cooperation.	他离职后，以色列将失去他对暴力活动的强烈反对和对安全合作的支持。


The symbolic decision on statehood, followed by Abbas’s exit, will mark the end of the process that began in Oslo, and that has been undermining Palestinian aspirations for nearly two decades.	阿巴斯离职之后的象征性建国决定将标志着奥斯陆协定所开启的进程的终结，也将标志着破坏巴勒斯坦人民雄心的20年的结束。


With the Oslo Process now clearly dead, two options remain: chaos, extremism, and violence, or a new peace process – ideally one that can end the occupation and allow for Palestinian independence and freedom alongside a safe and secure Israel.	奥斯陆进程显而易见早已死去，摆在我们面前的有两条路：混乱、极端主义和暴力； 或者新的和平进程——在你理想状况下，这一进程能够终结占领，让巴勒斯坦实现独立和自由，让以色列感到安全和安心。


Israel’s Government Hawks and Military Doves	以色列的政府鹰派和军方鸽派


PRINCETON – Those who lead Israel’s defense establishment often come to consider peace with the Palestinians a necessary condition for the country’s security.	普林斯顿—以色列的国防领导者常常认为与巴勒斯坦的和平是国家安全的必要条件。


Being tasked with maintaining the territories Israel has occupied since the Six-Day War in 1967 evidently causes the military and security brass to support political measures that would end the occupation.	肩负着保持以色列自1967年六日战争以来所占领的领土的重任的军方和安全部门显然支持结束占领的政治措施。


And yet the government shows no interest in pursuing a permanent settlement.	但政府似乎没有兴趣追求永久和解。


To appreciate this divide, consider the late Meir Dagan, who served as Major General of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and then as Director of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency.	要理解这一分歧，可以看一看已故的以色列国防军少将、后来担任以色列情报机构摩萨德主管梅尔·德甘（Meir Dagan）。


Several years ago, I sat on a panel at a conference in Jerusalem convened by then-Israeli President Shimon Peres.	几年前，我在耶路撒冷一次会议中的研讨会上与时任以色列总统佩雷斯一起出席。


To my right sat Dagan, who had just completed eight years as head of Mossad; to my left sat Dore Gold, a former academic and former Israeli ambassador.	我右手边坐着德甘，当时他刚刚结束八年的摩萨德主管任期； 我的左手边坐着前学者、以色列大使多尔·戈德（Dore Gold）。


The two men held very different views about how best to guarantee Israel’s security, and it is worth recapitulating their respective arguments.	两人对如何更好地保证以色列的安全的问题意见强烈相左，在这里有必要概括一下他们各自的观点。


Gold argued that returning to pre-1967 armistice lines would leave Israel without “defensible borders.”	戈德认为，退回1967年前的停战线将让以色列“无险可守”。


He insisted that Israel could guard against threats from the east only if it maintained a military presence in the West Bank and controlled the Jordan River – which runs along the border separating Jordan from Israel and the West Bank.	他坚持说，以色列只有在保持其在约旦河西岸的军事存在并控制约旦河（约旦和以色列及约旦河西岸的界河）的情况下才能抵挡威胁。


Dagan countered that the military’s role is to safeguard Israel’s borders, regardless of where those borders are drawn.	德甘反驳说，军方的作用是捍卫以色列边境，不管边境画在哪里。


While the IDF would certainly prefer to operate with the strategic advantages that holding more territory can confer, it would fulfill its mission under whatever conditions the Israeli government set for it.	以国防军显然更愿意拥有掌握更多领土所带来的战略优势，但不论条件如何，它都将完成以色列政府授予它的任务。


But Dagan went further, describing the principle of “defensible borders” as a canard that ignores the intentions and capabilities of the party on the other side of the border.	但德甘更进一步，将“有险可守”原则描述为无视边境另一边的意图和能力的务虚原则。


With an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the burden of defending the border would be vastly reduced, because Israel would have a serious cross-border partner with a mutual interest in avoiding armed conflict.	在以巴达成和平协议的情况下，防卫边境的重担将大大减轻，因为以色列将拥有一个认真的跨境伙伴，它们有共同利益避免武装冲突。


A Palestinian security force would by default provide a significant measure of security for Israel as well.	巴勒斯坦安全部队想必也将为以色列提供重要的安全措施。


Dagan’s dovish position has a long tradition in Israel’s defense establishment.	德甘的鸽派立场是以色列国防界的老传统。


Peace Now, a nongovernmental organization that represents Israelis who support a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was founded in 1978 when 348 IDF reservists sent a letter to then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin urging him to conclude the peace process with Egypt.	非政府组织“现在的和平”（Peace Now）代表着支持政治解决以巴冲突的以色列人，它成立于1978年348位以色列国防军预备役给时任总理贝京写信敦促他完成于埃及的和平进程。


Similarly, in the aftermath of the first Intifada, the Palestinian uprising that lasted from 1987 to 1993, the defense establishment led the effort for peace.	类似地，1987年至1993年巴勒斯坦第一次抵抗运动（Intifada）后，以色列国防界领导了和平努力。


In 1991 Yitzhak Rabin – a former IDF chief of staff, prime minister, and defense minister who at the time served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset, Israel’s legislature – argued for a comprehensive regional peace effort.	1991年，拉宾——前以色列国防军总参谋长、总理、国防部长，时任以色列立法会外交和国防委员会委员——提出了全面的地区和平措施。


Like Dagan, Rabin considered the Arab-Israeli conflict to be a burden on Israel’s security, and both active and retired military officers have since then led or participated in negotiations with the Palestinians and with Syria.	和德甘一样，拉宾认为阿拉伯-以色列冲突是以色列安全的负担，此后，在职和退休军官都领导或参与了与巴勒斯坦和叙利亚的谈判。


Most recently, many prominent former defense figures supported the deal reached between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) over Iran’s nuclear program – an agreement that Israel’s government bitterly opposed.	最近，许多前防务高官支持伊朗和所谓的P5+1（中国、法国、俄罗斯、英国、美国加上德国）就伊朗核计划所达成的协议——而以色列政府强烈反对该协定。


Indeed, the divide between the security establishment and the politicians now governing Israel seems wider than ever.	事实上，安全界与目前执政以色列的政客之间的这一分歧似乎比以往更大。


Most former senior defense officials echo Dagan’s argument, while government officials sound more like Gold.	大部分前防务高官都支持德甘的观点，而政府官员说话都像戈德。


A number of advocacy organizations have emerged to push for peace.	许多宣传组织应运而生推进和平。


The Peace and Security Association, which includes hundreds of veterans of the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet (Israel’s domestic security agency), and the National Police Force, says its mission is, “to promote a sustainable political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a critical component of Israel’s national security and social resilience.”	成员包括数百名前以色列国防军、摩萨德、辛贝特（以色列对内安全机构）和国家警察部队老兵的和平与安全协会（Peace and Security Association）称其使命为“促进以巴冲突的可持续整治方案成为以色列国家安全和社会韧性的关键组成部分。 ”


The nongovernmental organization Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS), with more than 200 members from Israel’s security elite, just published a paper titled “Security First” with a comprehensive set of proposals to revitalize efforts to share peacefully the land west of the Jordan River.	成员包括200多名以色列安全精英的非政府组织以色列安全指挥官（Commanders for Israel’s Security，CIS）刚刚出版了一篇名为《安全第一》（Security First）的文章，提出了一套全面的方案复振和平共享约旦河西岸土地的努力。


CIS maintains that terror against Israel cannot be defeated by military means alone, and that any peace process must improve Palestinians’ quality of life.	CIS认为，针对以色列的恐怖行动无法光靠军事手段击败，任何和平进程都必须提高巴勒斯坦人的生活质量。


Senior former Israeli security officials also participated actively in a study undertaken by the Center for a New American Security that produced a detailed security plan for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.	以色列前安全高官��积极参与了由新美国战略重心（Center for a New American Strategy）组织的研究，为以巴协定制定了一个详细的安全计划。


Some former officials have gone even further: Former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy argues that Israel should accept “the political reality of Hamas” and open a dialogue with the organization that governs the Gaza Strip.	一些前官员甚至更进一步：摩萨德前主管厄弗莱姆·哈勒威（Efraim Halevy）认为以色列应该接受“哈马斯的政治现实”，开放与该加沙地带执政组织的对话。


Likewise, in the 2012 documentary The Gatekeepers, six former heads of Shin Bet reflect on the lessons of the past few decades and issue a call for peace with the Palestinians.	类似地，在2012年的纪录片《守门人》（The Gatekeepers）中，六名辛贝特前主管反思了过去几十年中的教训，呼吁与巴勒斯坦实现和平。


Remarkably, Israel’s political leadership has not suffered electorally for ignoring the views of the defense establishment.	值得注意的是，以色列政治领导层并没有因为无视国防界的观点而在选举中受到影响。


There was no public reaction when, after The Gatekeepers was released, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying he had not seen the documentary and had no intention of doing so.	《守门人》上映后，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡办公室发布声明称他没有看这部纪录片，也不回去看，此事没有掀起任何公众反应。


Given the public’s high regard for the Israeli defense establishment, particularly relative to the government, voters’ indifference is a mystery.	以色列公众对以色列国防界相当尊重，特别是相对于政府而言，因此选民的漠不关心是一个谜。


In a 2015 survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, 93% of Israeli Jews expressed trust in the army, compared to only 40% in the government, and only 22% in Israeli political parties.	据中央统计局（Central Bureau of Statistics）2015年的一份调查，93%的以色列犹太人表示信任军方，而只有40%表示信任政府，更只有22%表示信任以色列政治党派。


One answer is that, after so many failed efforts, the Israeli public is disillusioned with the peace process.	一个答案是，在经历了大量失败的措施后，以色列公众已经对和平进程不再抱有幻想。


Moreover, acts of incitement and terrorism emanating from the occupied territories have intensified.	此外，占领区发生的煽动和恐怖主义行为有所加剧。


This allows the current governing coalition to justify policies – such as enabling expanded settlement activity in the West Bank – that further deepen the conflict.	这让现任执政联盟能够论证其深化冲突的政策的合理性——如扩大约旦河西岸的定居计划。


Against this backdrop, Netanyahu has portrayed himself as Israel’s protector, appropriating the esteem afforded to the defense establishment.	在此背景下，内塔尼亚胡将自己包装为以色列的保护者，将民众对国防界的尊重占为己有。


Those calling for a renewed peace process will now have to make their case to the public and reclaim that title.	现在，呼吁重新开启和平进程的人必须向公众解释清楚，夺回以色列保护者的头衔。


Whether they can do that in a context of regional turmoil and domestic insecurity remains uncertain, to say the least.	他们是否能够在地区动荡和国内不安全的情况下做到这一点，我们最多只能说还不确定。


Israel at Sixty	花甲以色列


Tel Aviv – Ten years ago, on Israel’s 50th anniversary, the peace process begun by the path-breaking Oslo accord, reached by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 1993, established the legitimacy of two peoples’ national existence in their shared homeland on the basis of territorial compromise.	特拉维夫—十年前，在以色列建国50周年之际，经由奥斯陆协议的铺垫，和平进程启动了。 由以巴当局在1993年达成的该协议确立了两个民族以领土妥协为基础，共享祖国的国家存在的合法性。


There was a general feeling that this long conflict was being resolved.	人们广泛地认为这一长期冲突正得到解决。


Unfortunately, the past ten years have witnessed a painful setback in many areas.	不幸的是，过去的十年见证了这一进程在许多方面的严重挫折。


Individuals and peoples are capable of enduring difficulties if there is a sense that the future will be better and conflicts resolved.	如果对更美好的未来和冲突的解决还有希望，那么个人和民族就都能够承受艰难困苦。


But a sudden backward regression can lead to despair, which we feel today.	但一种突然的倒退可能导致绝望，而这就是我们现今所感受到的。


Why is it that struggles far more complex than the Israel-Arab conflict – apartheid in South Africa, the partition of Germany, or the collapse of the Soviet Union – all seem to have been resolved, usually without bloodshed, whereas the Middle East conflict, after more than a century, claims more victims every day?	为什么比以色列-阿拉伯冲突复杂得多的斗争—南非的种族隔离、德国的分裂、抑或是苏联的解体—似乎都已经被化解，通常也不用流血，而中东的冲突在绵延一个多世纪之后，却依然如故？


One reason is that this conflict is unparalleled in human history.	原因之一是这场冲突在人类历史上是前所未有的。


There is no other example of a nation that returned after a 2,000-year absence to a territory that it never stopped regarding as its homeland.	历史上从未有过这样的先例：一个民族从一片土地上缺失2000年之后又重新回归，他们也从未停止过将这片领土视为自己的祖国。


So it is no wonder that the Arabs, especially the Palestinians, remain unable to comprehend, existentially or morally, what has befallen them.	因此也难怪阿拉伯人，特别是巴勒斯坦人仍然不能从存在和道义上理解他们所遭受的磨难。


The Jews’ return to Israel was not colonialism, as the Arabs thought.	犹太人重返以色列并不像阿拉伯人所想的那样是殖民主义。


Not only did the Jews lack a mother country, but in Europe they lived as a foreign nation, leading to expulsion and annihilation.	犹太人不仅没有祖国，即使在欧洲也是作为一个外来民族寄人篱下，并由此遭受了驱逐和灭绝。


The Jews did not come to exploit Palestine’s resources or subjugate its residents in order to transfer the economic benefits elsewhere.	犹太人不是来剥削巴勒斯坦的资源或征服其居民从而将经济收益转移到别处。


Nor did they come like the American or Australian settlers in order to build a new identity and assimilate the natives into it.	他们也不是像美国或澳大利亚的先民那样为了建立一种新的认同而来，并将原住民归化其中。


Zionism aimed at renewing and deepening an old identity.	复国主义的目的是更新和深化一种旧有的认同。


From the beginning, there was no intention to damage the identity of the native-born Arabs, or to merge it with the traditional Jewish identity.	从一开始，它就无意破坏土生阿拉伯人的认同感，或将其融合到传统的犹太认同之中。


Because the Arabs had no corresponding historical model from which to learn how to relate to the phenomenon that had overtaken them, they tried to interpret Zionism as colonialism, and thought that other nations’ fight against colonialism provided a model for resistance.	因为阿拉伯人没有相应的历史模式来学习如何应对这种让他们错愕的现象，所以就试图将犹太复国主义诠释为殖民主义，并认为其他民族的反殖民主义斗争为其抵抗提供了一种范例。


Thus, the legitimacy of Israel’s right to exist remains an open question.	因此，以色列生存权的合法性仍然是个无解的问题。


Indeed, never before has the question of legitimacy been so fundamental to a conflict between nations.	的确，在国与国的冲突中合法性的问题从未具有过如此根本性的意义。


Although recognition of Israeli nationality is increasingly widespread, even among most nations of the Middle East, it remains obstructed by two closely related – and dangerous – notions.	虽然对以色列国籍的承认正日益普遍，甚至在大多数的中东国家也是如此，但它仍然受到两个紧密关联—且危险的—概念阻碍。


The first is the growing shift in the Middle East, and elsewhere, from rejection of Israel’s legitimacy to rejection of Zionism’s legitimacy.	第一个是在中东和其它地方日益明显的，从拒绝承认以色列的合法性到拒绝承认犹太复国主义合法性的转变。


The second is the growing tendency among Palestinians, other Arabs, and many Europeans to prefer a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state to the original two-state solution.	第二个是在巴勒斯坦人、其他阿拉伯人和许多欧洲人之中日渐增长的，以一个双民族的以色列—巴勒斯坦国来代替原本两个国家的解决方案的倾向。


Hamas spokesmen speak not of “Israelis” but of “Zionists,” as does Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.	哈马斯的发言人和伊朗总统艾哈迈迪－内贾德一样，言不称“以色列人”而称“犹太复国主义者”。


Discussion about the “de-Zionization” of Israel can also be heard at universities worldwide and even among Jewish leftists.	在全世界的大学，甚至在犹太左翼分子当中都可以听到关于“去复国主义化”的讨论。


In Israel, too, there are people, though not many, who call themselves “post-Zionist” or “non-Zionist.”	在以色列，也有为数不多的人自称为“后复国主义者”或“非复国主义者”。


But the sole practical expression of Zionism nowadays is the Law of Return, which is not a racist law but a moral law.	但现今犹太复国主义在实际层面上的唯一表现就是《回归法》，这不是一部种族主义的法案，而是一部道德法律。


When the world’s nations decided in favor of the creation of an independent Jewish state, they did not designate it only for the 600,000 Jews then living there.	当世界各国决定创立一个独立的犹太国，它们不只是将它指定给彼时居住在那里的60万犹太人。


Rather, they intended that Israel would help solve the Jewish problem everywhere in the world by enabling every Jew who wished to leave the diaspora to do so.	它们的用意是通过为每一个想结束离散状态的犹太人提供得偿所愿的条件，让以色列能够帮助解决世界其他地方的犹太人问题。


The idea of a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state embodies the dangerous illusion that two peoples who are utterly different in their language, religion, culture, and history, who are divided by a deep economic chasm and connected to their own external worlds – the Palestinians to the Arab world and Israelis to the rest of world Jewry – can be combined in the framework of a single state.	一个双民族的以色列—巴勒斯坦国的理念包含着一个危险的幻觉，即两个语言、宗教、文化和历史迥然不同的民族，两个被深刻的经济隔阂分割，并与其各自的外部世界相联—巴勒斯坦人和阿拉伯世界，以色列人和世界其他地方的犹太人—的民族，能够被纳入单一国家的框架之中。


Moreover, these are two peoples that have been intensely engaged in a bloody and intractable conflict for the last century.	另外，这还是两个在过去一个世纪里陷入绵延的血腥冲突的民族。


Both Palestinians and Israelis, as two different nations, deserve their own states.	巴勒斯坦人和以色列人作为两个不同的民族都应该拥有自己的国家。


There must be a clear border between the two.	两个国家之间还必须有明确的边界。


In Israel, an Israeli Arab-Palestinian minority has full citizenship, even if much remains to be done to afford it full social and economic equality.	在以色列，以色列籍的阿拉伯裔巴勒斯坦少数民族拥有完全的公民资格，尽管在实现完全的社会和经济平等方面还有很长的路要走。


It is possible that in the Palestinian state there would be a small Jewish minority, consisting of West Bank settlers whose attachment to the Biblical homeland is so intense that they would be willing to live under Palestinian control – provided that the Palestinians would grant them Palestinian citizenship.	在巴勒斯坦国家也可能会有一小部分犹太少数民族。 他们主要由约旦河西岸的定居者组成，他们对教义中的祖国是如此眷恋以至于情愿生活在巴勒斯坦的控制之下—前提是巴勒斯坦人会给予他们公民资格。


During the early years of Zionism, the great Jewish scholar Gershom Scholem – who was born in Berlin – said that the Jews were embarking on a difficult journey, a return to history.	在犹太复国主义的早期，一位出生在柏林的伟大犹太学者Gershom Scholem曾说犹太人正在踏上一次艰难的旅程，一次重返历史的旅程。


In other words, the Jews, who based their identity in the diaspora on mythological memory and time, were now returning to its clear-cut elements: a territory defined by borders, and a detailed chronological understanding of their own history.	换言之，将自己在离散中的认同建立在传说中的回忆和时间之上的犹太人，现在正重��一个真实的家园：一片拥有边界的领土和一种对自身历史的详尽而编年式的理解。


Sixty years later, the Arab-Israeli conflict reminds us that the Jews’ journey back to history continues.	六十年之后，阿拉伯—以色列冲突提醒着我们犹太人重返历史的征程仍在继续。


A Yellow Star for the Jewish State?	标着黄星的犹太国家？


PARIS – The world has recently seen a rapid succession of efforts to delegitimize Israel.	巴黎——这个世界近来出现了一系列非法化以色列运动。


Earlier this month, the CEO of French telecommunications company Orange declared at a press conference in Cairo his desire to part ways with an American partner that is too closely tied to Israel.	本月初，法国电信公司奥兰治首席执行官在开罗举行的新闻发布会上宣布他想与跟以色列关系过于密切的美国合作企业划清关系。


In May, Palestinians tried to have the Israeli soccer federation expelled from FIFA.	今年五月，巴勒斯坦人试图将以色列足协从国际足联驱逐出去。


And Britain’s National Union of Students recently approved a resolution supporting boycotts and sanctions against Israel.	英国全国学生联合会最近批准了一项支持抵制和制裁以色列的决议。


Meanwhile, a campaign to ban Israeli products has been gaining strength in the United States and Europe.	与此同时，一项抵制以色列产品的运动已经在美国和欧洲蓬勃兴起。


And then there are the many performers who – following the lead of Brian Eno, Elvis Costello, Vanessa Paradis, Roger Waters, and others – wonder out loud whether or not to appear in “occupied Palestine.”	众多演员在布赖恩·伊诺、埃尔维斯·科斯特洛、凡妮莎·帕拉迪丝、罗杰·沃特斯及其他明星的领导下公开表达了他们不清楚是否要出现在“巴勒斯坦被占领区”。


None of these developments is, in itself, of great moment.	上述事态发展分开来看都算不上大事。


But, taken together, they create a climate – and perhaps form a watershed.	但它们联系起来却形成了一种氛围——并且或许已经构成了一种转折。


And this is no accident.	上述现象绝不是偶然的。


All of the recent episodes can be traced, more or less directly, to the global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, established in 2005 by 171 Palestinian nongovernmental organizations. So they provide a good occasion to remind those who support this campaign of its true nature.	近期事件或多或少都可以直接追溯到2005年由171个巴勒斯坦非政府组织成立的全球抵制、撤资和制裁（BDS）运动，并因此令上述运动的支持者有机会真正认清其本质。


BDS is supposedly a worldwide civil-society movement embodying respect for law, democracy, and human rights.	抵制、撤资和制裁运动本应是尊重法治、民主和人权的全球民间团体。


If that is true, why target the only country in the region that was founded on those values, and that has continued, for better or worse – and despite a nearly 70-year state of war with its neighbors – to be broadly faithful to them?	如果真是这样，那为什么非要和地区唯一奉行上述价值观、并在与邻国近70年战争中一直忠于上述目标的国家过不去？


How is it that these scrupulous humanists have had nothing whatsoever to say about the 200,000 victims of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, the crimes of the Islamic State, or the massive deportation of Christians from the Plain of Nineveh, to name just a few contemporaneous issues?	这些一丝不苟的人文主义者为什么面对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德、伊斯兰国犯下的累累罪行或尼尼微平原大规模驱逐基督徒的200，000名受害者不置一词？ 这还只是同时期发生的少数几个例子。


BDS is an “anti-apartheid” movement, comes the reply, adopting the methods and spirit of Nelson Mandela in South Africa.	回答是抵制、撤资和制裁运动是“反种族隔离”运动，一贯奉行纳尔逊·曼德拉在南非的方法和精神。


That sounds splendid.	听上去倒是冠���堂皇的理由。


But then, once again, why the focus on Israel?	但问题又来了，为什么只盯着以色列？


With its multiethnic polity and society – a mix of Western and Eastern Europeans, Americans and Russians, Ethiopians and Turks, Kurds, Iranians, and Arabs (17 of whom sit in the Knesset) – Israel is precisely the opposite of an apartheid state.	凭借其多民族的政体和社会——包括东西方欧洲人、美国人、俄罗斯人、埃塞俄比亚人、土耳其人、库尔德人、伊朗人和阿拉伯人（其中有17人进入议会）——以色列恰恰是种族隔离政权的反义词。


By contrast, in Qatar, whose foundations (together with Saudi think tanks) provide most of the financing for the BDS movement, 95% of the labor force consists of Asian non-citizens working in slave-like conditions under the kafala system, which is a close cousin to apartheid.	相反，在为抵制、撤资和制裁运动提供绝大部分资金支持的卡塔尔，卡法拉制度下95%的劳动力都是不具有公民身份、在奴隶般条件下工作的亚洲人，这倒与种族隔离制度颇有几分相近。


Perhaps the goal is to pressure Israel to conclude a peace deal with the Palestinians, which surely is worth a little accommodation with Qatar.	或许目标是向以色列施压与巴勒斯坦人签订和平协议，如果是这种情况卡塔尔的细枝末节当然值得包容。


In that case, it is a peculiar peacemaking strategy that puts pressure on only one of the belligerents, and that, instead of strengthening the hand of the many Israelis who favor negotiation, imposes collective punishment in the form of exclusion from the community of nations.	果真如此这就是只向交战国一方施压的奇特的和平策略，不仅无法支持赞成谈判的以色列民众，反而以排除出国际社会的形式对他们实行集体惩戒。


Only one real formula for peace exists, and everyone knows it.	真正实现和平只有一种方法，而且这种方法尽人皆知。


That formula, enshrined in the Oslo Accords, is the two-state solution.	奥斯陆协议规定和平只能通过签署两国协议。


One has only to read the declarations of Omar Barghouti, Ali Abunimah, and other promoters of the BDS movement to see that this solution is precisely what they do not want.	只要看看Omar Barghouti、Ali Abunimah和其他运动发起人的声明，就知道他们恰恰最不希望订立两国协议。


They prefer a “one-state solution” (Abunimah’s term) – under a Palestinian flag, of course.	他们更愿意接受“一国方案”（这是Abunimah的原话）——当然是打着巴勒斯坦的旗帜。


Is this just a detail that can be safely ignored on the grounds that BDS targets “only” the territories, the Jewish settlements being built there, and the goods that the settlers produce?	难道抵制、撤资和制裁运动“只”针对被占领土、那里修建的犹太定居点和定居人口所制产品就应该被心安理得地忽视？


This is another sucker trap.	这不过是另一个诱人上当的借口而已。


Here, too, it is enough to read the movement’s founding declaration of July 9, 2005, which specifies that one of its “three objectives” is to “protect” the “rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.”	这里，2005年7月9日发布的运动创始宣言依然能说明问题，宣言明确指出其“三大目标”之一就是要“保护”“巴勒斯坦难民按照联合国第194号决议重返家园重获财产的权利。


In fact and in law, that would amount to establishing on those lands a new Arab country that could be counted on, in short order, to undergo an ethnic cleansing that would make it judenfrei.	”在事实和法律上，这相当于在这片土地上建立一个新生的阿拉伯国家，这个国家很快就会实施一次“消灭一切犹太人”的种族清洗。


And, finally, how can I refrain from reminding those whose memory is as full of holes as their thinking that the idea of boycotting Israel is not as new as it appears?	最后，我怎样才能不去提醒那些记忆像思维一样漏洞百出的人抵制以色列的想法算不上什么新鲜事？


In fact, it is older than the Jewish state, having emerged on December 2, 1945, from a decision by the Arab League, which then wasted no time in relying on that decision to reject the United Nations’ dual resolution to establish two states.	事实上，它比犹太国家的历史还要悠久，最初源起于1945年12月2日阿拉伯国家联盟的决策当中，阿盟当时依据上述决策毫不犹豫地拒绝了联合国建立两个国家的双重决议。


Among the promoters of this brilliant idea were Nazi war criminals who had settled in Syria and Egypt, where they gave their new masters lessons in marking Jewish shops and businesses.	上述高见的鼓吹者是定居在叙利亚和埃及的纳粹战犯，他们教叙利亚和埃及人如何标记犹太人的商店和产业。


A comparison is not an argument.	比较并不构成证据。


And the meaning of a slogan does not reside entirely in its genealogy.	而且谱系也并不完全决定口号的涵义。


But words do have a history. As do debates.	但文字和辩论一样确有相关历史渊源。


And it is better to know that history, if we wish to avoid repeating its ugliest scenes.	要想避免最恐怖的场面重演，我们最好对历史渊源进行深入了解。


The truth is that the BDS movement is nothing more than a sinister caricature of the anti-totalitarian and anti-apartheid struggles.	其实，全球抵制、撤资和制裁运动无非是反极权主义和反种族隔离斗争的一幅阴险讽刺画而已。


It is a campaign whose instigators have no aim other than to discriminate against, delegitimize, and vilify an Israel that in their mind never stopped wearing its yellow star.	煽动者无非是想歧视、非法化和丑化他们心目中永远贴着黄星的以色列。


To activists of good faith who may have been taken in by duplicitous representations of the movement, I would say only that there are too many noble causes in need of assistance to allow oneself to be enlisted in a dubious one.	对于那些被欺骗性表述所隐瞒的满怀善意的活动分子，我只能说这个世界有太多崇高的事业需要协助，何必让自己身陷动机不纯的运动。


Those worthy causes include fighting the jihadist decapitators, saving the women and girls enslaved by Boko Haram, defending the Middle East’s imperiled Christians and Arab democrats, and, of course, striving for a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians.	有价值的事业包括反抗圣战主义斩首者、解救被博科圣地奴役的妇女和女童、捍卫中东遭到威胁的基督徒和阿拉伯民主人士，当然还有努力实现以色列和巴勒斯坦人之间的公正和平。


Israel’s Terrorist Aid	以色列对恐怖分子的援助


NEW YORK – The decision by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government to demolish the family home of Abdelrahman al-Shaludi, a Palestinian who rammed his car into a group of pedestrians, killing two (including a three-month-old baby), was both callous and counterproductive.	以色列总理本雅明内塔尼亚胡政府拆毁驾车撞向一群行人，造成两人死亡（其中包括一名三个月大的婴儿）的阿尔沙鲁迪家房屋的决定既冷酷无情又适得其反。


By punishing people whose only known offense was being related to a criminal, Israel inadvertently shifted the focus from the attack, the perpetrator of which was killed immediately after his crime, to Israel’s apparent embrace of a policy of collective punishment.	通过惩罚那些唯一已知罪行是与犯罪份子有关的人，以色列无意间把注意力从恐怖袭击和行凶后当场死亡的罪犯转向了显而易见的集体惩罚政策。


If Israel’s principal concern is deterring terrorist attacks, it should be doing everything in its power to ensure that such acts are universally condemned.	如果阻止恐怖袭击是以色列的主要目的，它应当竭尽全力确保这种行为受到所有人的谴责。


This includes making sure that people who carry out attacks, and those who aid and abet their crimes, are lawfully punished.	其中包括确保实施袭击的犯罪分子以及罪行的同谋者和教唆者依法接受惩罚。


Punishing terrorists’ families and neighbors, or those who share their ethnic and religious identity, has the opposite effect, intensifying hostility toward Israel and dissipating the moral outrage that should be mobilized against the actual perpetrators of terrorism.	惩罚恐怖分子的家人和邻里或者那些与他们具有相同种族和宗教信仰的人效果只会适得其反，进一步激起对以色列的敌视并驱散本应针对恐怖行为实际肇事者的道德义愤。


As observers increasingly equate the two sides, regarding both as victims and victimizers alike, international support and sympathy for Israel wanes.	随着观察员日益将双方同等看待，认为他们同时既是受害者又是加害者，国际社会对以色列的支持和同情正在逐渐消退。


This is not the first time that Israel has been accused of collective punishment.	以色列被指进行集体惩罚已经不是第一次。


Israel’s government regularly destroyed the family homes of alleged terrorists for years before acknowledging that the policy was damaging its image – without deterring terrorist acts.	在承认相关政策损害自身形象且无助于阻止恐怖行为之前，拆毁涉嫌恐怖分子的房屋一直是以色列政府沿用多年的常规手段。


The latest house demolition seems to confirm that Israel’s government is resuming the practice of collective punishment that it abandoned a decade ago.	最近这次拆房行动似乎证实以色列政府正在恢复早在十年前就已经放弃的集体惩罚政策。


Why would Netanyahu’s government resume a failed policy?	内塔尼亚胡政府为什么会恢复执行失败的政策呢？


The most likely explanation is that Netanyahu wants to reassure the Israeli public that no act of terrorism will be tolerated – even if that means a vindictive and cruel response.	最有可能的解释是内塔尼亚胡希望向以色列公众证明即使被迫采取残酷的报复手段，也绝不容忍任何恐怖行为。


In fact, such domestic political considerations were probably also a major driver of the killing and destruction that took place in Gaza over the summer.	事实上，上述国内政治考量很可能还是夏天加沙发生的杀戮和破坏行为的主要动力。


Of course, Israel has the right to defend itself against indiscriminate rocket barrages like that launched from Gaza into its territory, and to punish lawfully those responsible.	当然，以色列有权保卫自己免受从加沙射入其领土的不分青红皂白的火箭弹的伤害，并依法惩罚责任人。


But Israel did more than defend itself.	但以色列的所做所为不止是保护自己。


It mounted a demonstrably disproportionate response, killing a large number of noncombatants, including hundreds of children, and destroying thousands of homes and commercial enterprises.	它做出了明显过激的反应，造成包括数百名儿童在内的大量非战斗人员伤亡，并摧毁了数以千计的家庭和商业企业。


While the initiative may have appeased Israeli public outrage over the rockets, it damaged Israel’s standing in many other countries considerably.	虽然报复行动可能暂时平息了以色列公众对火箭袭击的怒火，但却严重损害了以色列在其他很多国家心目中的地位。


More problematic, Israel’s actions in Gaza probably increased its vulnerability to terrorist attacks, not only by fueling animosity toward Israel, but also by suggesting that Netanyahu’s government will most likely discredit itself with its response.	更有问题的是，以色列在加沙的行动很可能助长了其面对恐怖袭击的脆弱性，因为报复行动不仅助长了对以色列的仇恨，还显示内塔尼亚胡政府很有可能因为采取过激反应而名誉扫地。


That propensity to act against its own interests to appease an enraged and emotional public was underscored by the recent destruction of al-Shaludi’s family home.	这种违反自身利益以安抚被激怒的公众情绪的倾向在最近拆毁阿尔沙鲁迪家房屋的举措中再次得到了证实。


To be sure, Israel is not alone in responding irrationally to terrorist provocations.	可以肯定，不止是以色列在面对恐怖分子的挑衅时失去了理智。


Some aspects of the United States’ response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, reflect the same tendency – but on a significantly larger scale and with more far-reaching consequences.	美国对2001年9月11日恐怖袭击对策的某些方面也反映了同样的趋势——但其规模和造成的影响却远远超过以色列。


While the attacks were immensely costly in terms of lives lost and material damage, the US-led war in Iraq that followed was beyond disproportionate; it was truly devastating.	虽然恐怖袭击造成了不可弥补的生命和财产损失，但随后由美国领导的伊拉克战争却严重反应过激； 这场战争真正地毁灭一切。


And its consequences continue to unfold, as the brutal predations of the Islamic State attest.	直到现在后果仍在不断上演，这一点从伊斯兰国的野蛮掠夺就可以证实。


It is time for governments in Israel, the US, and elsewhere to recognize that by allowing their citizens’ outrage to drive their responses to terrorist attacks, they are offering themselves as the terrorists’ best weapon.	以色列、美国和其他地方的政府应当承认，任由国内民众的怒火驱动他们打击恐怖袭击的对策令他们成为恐怖分子手中最有力的武器。


Only by adopting a pragmatic and legal approach can they galvanize support against their enemies and reduce their citizens’ vulnerability to attack.	只有采取务实合法的对策才能为打击敌人和降低民众在袭击面前的脆弱性赢得支持。


That, rather than slaking the public’s thirst for vengeance, should be their primary objective.	这才应当是他们的主要目标，而不是满足公众的复仇欲望。


Bibi’s Big Surprise	比比的大惊奇


NEW YORK – Binyamin Netanyahu proved the pollsters wrong – not once, but twice.	纽约—内塔尼亚胡（比比）证明了民调专家是错的——不是一次，而是两次。


In the weeks and days leading up to Israel’s election, his defeat was widely predicted.	在以色列大选前几周的日子里，人们广泛预测他会败北。


Then, in the hours after the vote, exit polls suggested parity between his Likud party and the center-left Zionist Union, led by his chief rival, Yitzhak Herzog, with a slight edge for the right-wing bloc.	接着，在投票后几小时，出口民调显示他的利库德集团和他的主要对手赫尔佐格（Yitzhak Herzog）领导的中左翼的犹太复国主义联盟势均力敌，前者略占上风。


Several hours after the polls closed, it turned out that Likud was the big winner, gaining 30 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, compared to 24 for the Zionist Union.	投票结束几小时后，利库德集团成为大赢家，赢得120个议会席位的30个，而犹太复国主义联盟赢得24席。


As a result, Netanyahu will have no real difficulty in forming a right-wing government coalition.	因此，内塔尼亚胡将在没有实际困难的情况下组建中右翼联合政府。