But the overall policy mix has been sub-optimal, with too much front-loaded fiscal consolidation and too much unconventional monetary policy (which has become less effective over time).	但总体政策组合只是次优水平，前瞻财政整合和非常规货币政策（随着时间的推移，这一政策效果越来越差）过多。


A better approach in advanced economies would have comprised less fiscal consolidation in the short run and more investment in productive infrastructure, combined with a more credible commitment to medium- and long-term fiscal adjustment – and less aggressive monetary easing.	发达经济体更好的方针应该是短期减少财政整合和增加生产性基础设施投资，同时许以可信的中期和长期财政调整承诺——以及更温和的货币宽松。


You can lead a horse to liquidity, but you can’t make it drink.	你可以把马拉到水边，但你不能强迫它喝水。


In a world where private aggregate demand is weak and unconventional monetary policy eventually becomes like pushing on a string, the case for slower fiscal consolidation and productive public infrastructure spending is compelling.	在私人总需求疲软、非常规货币政策最终效果消失时，减缓财政整合和生产性公共基础设施支出就成为不可缺少的要件。


Such spending offers returns that are certainly higher than the low interest rates that most advanced economies face today, and infrastructure needs are massive in both advanced and emerging economies (with the exception of China, which has overinvested in infrastructure).	在如今大部分发达经济体的低利率环境下，这类支出的回报必然会更高，而不管是发达经济体还是新兴经济体都需要大量基础设施（中国除外，它存在基础设施投资过度的问题）。


Moreover, public investment works on both the demand and supply sides.	此外，公共投资对需求和供给端都能起作用。


It not only boosts aggregate demand directly; it also expands potential output by increasing the stock of productivity-boosting capital.	它不仅直接提振总需求； 也通过增加能提高生产率的资本扩大了潜在产出。


Unfortunately, the political economy of austerity has led to sub-optimal outcomes.	不幸的是，紧缩的政治经济学导致了次优结果。


In a fiscal crunch, the first spending cuts hit productive public investments, because governments prefer to protect current – and often inefficient – spending on public-sector jobs and transfer payments to the private sector.	在财政动荡中，第一批支出削减就来自生产性公共投资，因为政府偏好保护当前——通常效率低下——的公共部门就业和向私人部门的转移支付支出。


As a result, the global recovery remains anemic in most advanced economies (with the partial exception of the US and the UK) and now also in the major emerging countries, where growth has slowed sharply in the last two years.	结果，全球复苏在大部分发达经济体毫无起色（美国和英国勉强算得上例外），目前在新兴国家也是如此，它们的增长在过去两年中显著放缓。


The right policies – less fiscal austerity in the short run, more public investment spending, and less reliance on monetary easing – are the opposite of those that have been pursued by the world’s major economies.	正确的政策——减少短期财政紧缩、增加公共投资支出、减少货币宽松依赖——与世界主要经济体所追求的政策截然相反。


No wonder global growth keeps on disappointing.	毫不奇怪全球增长一直令人失望。


In a sense, we are all Japanese now.	从某种程度上讲，现在我们都是日本人。


A Tipping Point Missed	错失的临界点


WASHINGTON, DC – Before America and the world settle in firmly to the new Donald Trump-based reality, let’s take a little trip down the road not taken.	华盛顿—在美国和世界踏实既受新的基于特朗普的现实之前，让我们来窥探一番美国人民没有选择的那条路。


Suppose we had woken up last Wednesday morning to a President-elect Hillary Clinton.	假设我们上周三醒来，发现克林顿当选了美国总统。


And let’s say that, instead of former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres, New Zealand’s Helen Clark or Bulgaria’s Kristalina Georgieva had been picked to succeed Ban Ki-moon as United Nations Secretary-General.	并且，不是葡萄牙前总理古特雷斯，而是新西兰的海伦·克拉克（Helen Clark）或保加利亚的克里斯塔利娜·乔治艾娃（Kristalina Georgieva）被遴选为联合国秘书长潘基文的继任者。


Clinton would have joined the United Kingdom’s Theresa May and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, helping achieve critical mass in the G7.	克林顿将和英国的梅和德国的默克尔一起，在G7形成临界规模。


And a female UN Secretary-General would have placed women at the helm of two of the world’s three biggest international organizations (France’s Christine Lagarde already runs the International Monetary Fund).	而女联合国秘书长将让女性拥有世界三大国际组织中两个的最高职位。


With so many female leaders, we would have begun to answer the question: what happens when women run the world?	在拥有如此多女性领导人的情况下，我们将开始问一个问题：当女性统治世界时，会发生什么？


Would the world be better for women?	世界会变得对女性更加友好吗？


Would it even be different?	它会有所不同吗？


According to sociologists, female leaders are of two schools: Queen Bees, who are less likely to help other women advance, and Righteous Women, who make the advancement of other women a priority.	按照社会学家的分类，女性领导人可以归为两类：蜂后型，不太可能帮助其他女性晋升； 以及正义女神型，将把其他女性的晋升列为重点。


Most early pioneers, such as the UK’s Margaret Thatcher, India’s Indira Gandhi, and Israel’s Golda Meir, were Queen Bees; all of them eschewed feminism.	大部分早期先驱，如英国的撒切尔夫人、印度的英迪拉·甘地和以色列的梅厄夫人，都属于蜂后型； 她们都回避女权主义。


More recently, Righteous Women have prevailed.	最近，正义女神型开始得势。


Leaders like Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner, Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff, and Iceland’s Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir have all sought, in one way or another, to empower women and help them advance in their countries.	阿根廷的克里斯蒂娜·基什内尔、巴西的罗塞夫、冰岛的西于尔扎多蒂（Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir）以各种各样的方式为女性赋权并帮助她们在各自国家提高地位。


Merkel and May have tended to be more like Queen Bees, while Clinton, Lagarde, Clark, and Georgieva are more like Righteous Women.	默克尔和梅以往更倾向于是蜂后型，而克林顿、拉加德、克拉克和乔治艾娃更像是正义女神型。


To be fair, the first woman leader in a male-dominated culture must often outman the men.	公平地说，在男性主导的世界中的第一位女性领导人往往必须比男人还男人。


Seeking to advance other women can highlight her own womanhood and thereby weaken her.	寻求提升其他女性地位可能突出她自身的女人性质，从而削弱她。


Clinton, for example, was the third woman US Secretary of State but the first who felt secure enough to be able to champion the cause of women and girls worldwide.	比如，克林顿是第三位美国女国务卿，但她是第一位感觉自己地位足够安全，能够引领全球妇女和女孩运动的女国务卿。


As President, she pledged, half her cabinet would be women, and she would further the State Department initiatives launched during her tenure.	作为总统，她承诺内阁中将有一半是女性，并将进一步推进她在国务院任内退出的措施。


Yes, she also would have been careful to avoid being defined as a woman president.	是的，她也将小心翼翼避免被定义为女总统。


Still, just the presence of a plurality of women has an impact.	但是，仅仅是出现了大量女性面���就能产生影响。


For example, studies of US courts with multiple judges show that male judges are more willing to hear bias cases when one woman is on the bench, and significantly more willing when a second woman is added.	比如，对有多名法官的美国法庭的研究表明，男法官更愿意在有女法官在场的情况下听取偏见案例，而如果有第二位女法官加入，他的意愿会大大增加。


“Each of us,” noted Sandra Day O’Connor, the first female member of the US Supreme Court, who was renowned for not wanting to be perceived as a “female” justice, “brings to our job, whatever it is, our lifetime of experience and our values.”	“我们每个人，”因为不愿意被认为是“女性”正义的化身而闻名的美国最高法院第一位女法官桑德拉·奥康纳（Sandra Day O’Connor）指出，“都会在职业生涯中带上我们的生活经验和我们的价值观，不管这些东西是什么。


In other words, women bring a fresh perspective, heard clearly only when a critical mass of them is present in any institution.	”换句话说，女性带来了新鲜视角，只有当她们在某一机构中达到临界规模时才能被听到。


Consider a woman’s perspective on conflict.	考虑一个女性对冲突的视角。


Evidence does not support the stereotype that women are more pacifist than men – the peacemakers and settlers of male disputes.	证据并不支持女性比男性更爱和平的刻板印象——男性纠纷的和平缔造者和“和事佬”。


Women can be Amazons; recall Thatcher’s prosecution of the Falklands War and her admonition to George H.W. Bush not to “go wobbly” in the run-up to the first Gulf War.	女性可以是亚马逊战士； 想想撒切尔夫人发动的马岛战争和她在第一次海湾战争前夕对老布什不要“摇摆”的劝诫。


On the other hand, when men see wars, they naturally imagine the world of the warriors, whereas women see themselves in the women who must try to shelter their families from forces they cannot control.	另一方面，男性在看待战争时会自然想象出一个战士的世界，而女性常常把自己看成必须保护家庭不受她们无法控制的力量摧残的女人。


That is precisely the diversity of perspective that is vital to decision-making.	正是这种视角上的多元化对于决策来说至关重要。


And indeed, the Institute for Inclusive Security at Harvard’s Kennedy School has tracked the differences women make as part of peace negotiations.	事实上，哈佛大学肯尼迪学院的包容性安全研究所（Institute for Inclusive Security）跟踪观察了女性参与和平谈判时所造成的不同。


An acute awareness of the magnitude of civilian suffering in conflicts such as the Syrian civil war or the ongoing horrors in the Congo Basin, and an appreciation of how cycles of violence perpetuate themselves over generations, can actually make women much more likely to urge the use of force in interventions.	敏锐地认识到平民在叙利亚内战和刚果盆地的持续恐怖事件等冲突中可能受到的苦难，以及理解冤冤相报如何在代际间传递确实可能让女性更加可能采取武力干预。


Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously chided Colin Powell for his reluctance to involve the US military in the Balkans in the 1990s, in part because of her own family’s experience as Czech refugees from Communism.	前美国国务卿奥尔布赖特（Madeleine Albright）对科林·鲍威尔（Colin Powell）提出过著名的批评，指责他在20世纪90年代不肯让美军介入巴尔干冲突，这部分是因为她身为捷克共产主义难民的亲身家庭经验。


Overall, a woman leader’s decisions are no more predictable than a male leader’s.	总体而言，女性领导人的决定比男性领导人更加容易预测。


Women are not monolithic: they have various ideological backgrounds and diverse governing styles.	女性不顽固：她们有不同的思想背景和多元化的执政风格。


But when the world finally reaches the point when women are not a rarity at the tables of power, when their numbers reach a tipping point, their voices will be heard differently, and their opinions will hold more weight with the men around them.	但当女性终于不再是权力桌上的稀客时，当女性数量达到临界点时，她们的声音将有所不同，她们的观点将对周边男性具备更大分量的影响。


Women came closer in 2016 than in any other era to reaching that tipping point.	2016年，女性比以往任何时候都更加接近于这一临界点。


But we may still have to wait decades to find out what will happen when we finally do.	但我们也许仍然需要等待几十年才能了解当临界点终于达到时会发生什么。


Homesick Politics	乡愁政治


MADRID – World order – or the lack thereof – is a hot topic these days.	马德里——世界秩序——或者说世界秩序的缺失——是现如今的热门话题。


Our fixation with the future of global structures and systems is evident everywhere – in the news and at conferences, on bestseller lists, even in popular television shows.	我们对全球结构和体系未来的执着随处可见——这种执着不仅存在于新闻会议、畅销书排行榜，甚至存在于热播的电视节目里。


People are anxious.	人们倍感焦虑。


The world seems to be undergoing fundamental change: new actors are emerging on the world stage, previously sacrosanct rules of international behavior are being openly defied, and a new wave of technological progress is disrupting entire industries and economic sectors.	世界似乎正在发生根本的变化：新力量登上世界舞台，此前国际行为神圣不可侵犯的规则正在公然遭到蔑视，与此同时新一轮技术进步浪潮正在扰乱整个行业经济。


In our quest for structure and predictability – a natural impulse in times of rapid change – we are desperate for hints about how the world, and our role in it, will develop.	我们在这个快速变化的时代本能地追求结构和可预测性，不顾一切地想要了解世界和我们自身将向何处去。


It is of course vital in such situations that we identify the best, or at least the most feasible, way forward; predictability provides a foundation for cost-benefit analysis and strategic thinking.	当然，重要的是在这种情况下找到最佳、或至少是最可行的前进线路； 可预见性奠定了成本效益分析和战略思维的基础。


The problem arises when our yearning for certainty overwhelms rational thinking, taking our ideas and actions in an unproductive – or even dangerous – direction.	问题就出在我们对确定性的向往压倒了理性思维，从而将我们的思想和行动带往低效——甚至是危险的方向。


The current trend toward rose-colored retrospection is a case in point.	现在流行带着玫瑰色的回忆就是一个很好的例子。


Faced with political, economic, geostrategic, and social uncertainty, policymakers have increasingly succumbed to the allure of nostalgia, promising a return to what they portray as the familiar and complete rules and practices of the past.	面对政治、经济、地缘政治和社会动荡，决策者们越来越屈服于怀旧的魅力，信誓旦旦要恢复他们所谓熟悉而完整的过去的规则和惯例。


In Russia, President Vladimir Putin has been operating according to a nineteenth-century worldview, in which great powers dominate their spheres of influence unchallenged.	在俄罗斯，普京总统一直奉行某种19世纪的世界观，认定大国毋庸置疑地主宰自己的势力领域。


As he noted at last October’s meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, “The bear will not even bother to ask permission.	去年十月他曾在瓦尔代辩论俱乐部会议上指出 ，“熊才懒得去管别人同意不同意。


Here, we consider it the master of the taiga.”	在我们俄罗斯，熊是主宰针叶林的王者。 ”


The Islamic State is attempting to return to an even more distant past.	伊斯兰国正试图回到更遥远的过去。


Its adherents espouse a medieval ninth-century doctrine to justify their effort to reestablish the caliphate, in which “the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations becomes null” and summary execution and slavery are mandatory.	其追随者信奉中世纪9世纪学说来证明自己竭尽全力重建哈里发，目的是让“酋长、团体、国家和组织的合法性全部失效”，并执行即刻处决和强制奴役。


The West, too, has fallen into the trap of nostalgia, clinging to a late-twentieth-century conception of order in which it makes the rules and can choose whether to follow them.	西方也同样落入到怀旧的陷阱。 他们死抱住二十世纪末的秩序理念不放，固执地认定应由自己来制定规则并选择遵守与否。


The latest example of this anachronistic perspective is America’s ham-fisted (not to mention failed) attempt to stem support for the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, after repeatedly refusing to provide a greater voice for the world’s emerging powers in the Bretton Woods institutions.	这种过时观点的最新例子是美国笨手笨脚（更不用说失败）地试图阻止国际社会支持由中国领导的亚洲基础设施投资银行，之前美国曾一再拒绝在布雷顿森林体系中给这个新兴全球大国更大的发言权力。


Nostalgia has also emerged as a major factor in many countries’ domestic affairs.	怀旧也成为左右许多国家国内事务的主旋律。


Throughout Europe, populist parties – from the right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party to the far-left Syriza in Greece – seek a return to the ostensibly simpler and happier times of national control and closed borders.	在欧洲各国，民粹主义党派——从右翼英国独立党到激进的希腊左翼联盟——都在追求回归表面单纯快乐的国家管制和边界封闭。


In the US, a prominent strain of jurisprudence defends the “original intent” of the Constitution’s framers, while Republicans are shifting toward isolationism and Democrats are denouncing free-trade agreements.	在美国，一系列著名的法律体系捍卫着宪法制定者们所谓的“原意”，而共和党越来越向孤立主义靠拢、民主党则不断谴责自由贸易协议。


But nostalgia offers no solutions – only a dream of escape.	但怀旧解决不了任何问题——仅仅是场逃避的美梦而已。


Looking backward gets us no closer to what we want; on the contrary, it is a surefire way to miss the challenges – and miss out on the opportunities – that lie before us.	回忆给不了我们想要的东西； 相反，它却能让我们错过近在眼前的挑战和机遇。


Trying to advance one’s interests based on the rules of the past is like trying to solve today’s crossword puzzle using yesterday’s clues.	想要依据过去规则追求自身利益就像用昨天的线索来解今天的填字游戏。


Let’s face it: the halcyon world to which many people are so eager to return – before, say, the European Union or the United Nations or even the nation-state – never really existed.	我们必须面对现实：人们如此渴望回归的宁静世界——欧盟、联合国甚至是民族国家建立前的世界——从来就没有存在过。


As Marcel Proust noted: “Remembrance of things past is not necessarily the remembrance of things as they were.”	就像普鲁斯特所说的那样：“对过去的回忆不一定反映过去本来的样子。


The past is being abridged and sugarcoated in order to portray it as superior to the widespread tumult and misery of today.	”我们对过去进行了删减和美化，才让它在今天的混乱和痛苦面前更具吸引力。


Over time, nostalgia has come to have a benign connotation.	随着时间的推移，怀旧的内涵变得越来越亲切。


But the word – a combination of the Greek nostos (homecoming) and algos (pain) – was coined to describe the disease of “acute homesickness.”	但怀旧一词——希腊语nostos（回家）和algos （痛苦）的组合被放在一起形容“极度想家”的顽疾。


Perhaps it would be beneficial to return to that definition of nostalgia, at least in its political manifestation, as something more akin to an illness: a condition that distorts reality and impedes the formulation of effective solutions for real-world challenges.	至少在政治表现方面，或许应该回到怀旧最初“更接近于某种疾病”的定义：这种病扭曲现实并妨碍有效解决现实的难题。


No worldview rooted in the nineteenth century – much less in the ninth century – is adequate to the complexities of today’s globalized world.	没有哪种植根于19世纪——更不用说9世纪——的世界观能够应对今天全球化世界的复杂局势。


Likewise, the rise of new powers and non-state actors means that rule making (and breaking) can no longer be restricted to a small Western club.	同样，全新大国及非国家力量的崛起意味着规则的制定（和打破）不能再作为西方小型俱乐部的专利。


And the intensity of global competition means that European countries cannot hope to thrive independently of one another.	全球竞争的激烈程度意味着欧洲国家不能再关起门来追求富裕。


Flimsy ideas thrive in the absence of a viable alternative.	没有其他可行方案才造成不可行的想法遍地都是。


That is why a period of reflection on world order is so important.	因此有必要对世界秩序进行反思。


But, rather than allowing ourselves to be swept up in the regressive tide of nostalgia, we need to engage one another in a constructive conversation about the challenges that we actually face and propose new ideas for addressing them.	但与其陷在怀旧的倒退潮流里，还不如就世界所面临的挑战进行积极对话并提出新的解决思路。


Managing a World of Great Powers	管理列强的世界


MADRID – Today, great-power competition is a fact: The United States now competes with an increasingly active Russia and a rising China.	马德里—如今，列强相争已是一个事实：美国与日益活跃的俄罗斯和崛起的中国竞争。


The Middle East, the South China Sea, and Ukraine are just three theaters where this new reality is playing out.	中东、南海和乌克兰只是这一新现实的三个展现舞台。


Upon rereading former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s book The Great Experiment, I was left with the impression that the seeds of some of the dynamics at play today were sown some time ago.	在阅读美国前副国务卿塔尔博特（Strobe Talbott）的著作《大实验》（The Great Experiment）时，我的印象是今天正在起作用的动态的某些根源很早前就种下了。


The book describes a conversation that took place in December 2000 between President Bill Clinton and President-elect George W. Bush.	该书描述了2000年12月美国总统克林顿和当选总统小布什之间的一段对哈。


Clinton says that, judging by Bush’s electoral campaign, the security issues that seemed to concern him most were Saddam Hussein and the construction of a large-scale antimissile defense system.	克林顿说，从小布什的选战看来，他最担心的安全问题是萨达姆和大规模反导防务系统的建设。


“That’s absolutely right,” Bush responds.	“完全正确。 ”小布什回答说。


These issues were put on hold when tragedy unexpectedly struck, in the form of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US, which brought a period of international cooperation during which solidarity against terrorism reigned.	当意料之外的悲剧发生时——2001年9月11日美国发生恐怖袭击，这带来了一段国际合作时期，世界因为反恐团结在一起——这些问题被搁置起来。


It was a time when we were all Americans, and when Bush described Putin as “very straightforward and trustworthy.”	那时，我们都是美国人，而小布什把普京描述为“非常直接，非常值得信任。 ”


The winds began to change that December, when the US announced that it was withdrawing from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, in order to build an antimissile defense system to protect itself from a potentially nuclearized Iran.	那年12月，风向开始转变，美国宣布它将退出反弹道导弹条约，目的是为了建设反导弹防御系统保护自己免受潜在核力量伊朗的威胁。


This did not go unnoticed in Russia.	这一举动没有逃过俄罗斯的眼睛。


The US at the time did not seem to understand that a multipolar world order was emerging – one that would make it very difficult to pursue, without serious consequences, the policies that Bush and Clinton had discussed in 2000.	当时的美国似乎并不理解多极的世界正在形成——在这样一个世界里，你很难在不引起严重后果的情况下追求2000年小布什和克林顿所讨论的政策。


In a 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin made this plain, vehemently rejecting the intervention in Iraq and especially US plans to expand antimissile defense systems to Europe, calling this an act of aggression toward Russia and a breach of common European security.	2007年，在俄罗斯总统普京在慕尼黑安全会议的演讲中断然拒绝干预伊朗，尤其是美国将其反导弹防御系统扩大到欧洲的计划，称这是对俄罗斯的侵略行为，也违反了共同欧洲安全。


In the summer of 2008, three events placed the new multipolar order in stark relief.	2008年夏，三件事让这一新多极秩序显露无疑。


China dazzled the world as host of the Olympic Games, reinforcing its status as a significant international player.	中国举办了一届令人炫目的奥运会，强化了其作为重要国际行动方的地位。


Russia’s military actions in Georgia – in the midst of the Games – showed the world that the concept of spheres of influence was still alive and well in the Kremlin.	俄罗斯出兵格鲁吉亚——时间选在了奥运会期间——告诉世界势力范围的概念仍然活生生地存在于克里姆林宫。


And the collapse the following month of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers, which unleashed a global financial crisis from which the world economy has yet to recover fully, underscored the advanced economies’ vulnerabilities, while largely sparing China.	9月美国投资银行雷曼兄弟公司倒闭引发了一场全球金融危机，世界经济至今仍未从中复苏，这凸显出发达经济体的弱点，但中国基本上独善其身。


With a new sense of confidence in its great-power status, China seemed to qualify the concept of a “peaceful rise” that its leaders have invoked since the era of Deng Xiaoping, adopting a more muscular foreign-policy approach within its neighborhood.	带着对其列强地位的新的信心，中国表面上符合自邓小平时代开始实施的“和平崛起”的概念，但对周边近邻采取了更加强硬的外交方针。


Drawing on alleged historical rights, China began to expand its territorial claims, along with its military presence, in the South and East China Seas.	中国基于所谓的历史权利扩大其在南海和东海的领土主张并派兵遣将。


In 2013, tensions peaked when China unilaterally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering territories in the East China Sea that it claims, but Japan controls.	2013年，中国单方面宣布了覆盖其所主张但由日本控制的东海领土的防空识别区。


Many of the countries affected by China’s actions in the South and East China Seas have security treaties with the US, which has been the major maritime power in the Pacific region since World War II.	在南海和东海受到中国行为影响的国家大多与美国签订了安全条约。 自二战以来，美国一直是太平洋地区最主要的海上力量。


China’s ADIZ declaration was therefore viewed by the US as a provocation.	因此，在美国看来，中国宣布防空识别区是一种挑衅。


By expanding its sovereignty claims, China was actually expanding its claims to influence.	中国扩大其主权主张，实质是在扩大其影响力主张。


It has taken the international institutions some time to catch up to the changing world order.	国际机构需要一定时间才能跟上变化的国际秩序。


The 2010 G-20 summit in Seoul produced an agreement to increase the emerging countries’ quotas in the International Monetary Fund by 2014.	2010年首尔G-10峰会形成了在2014年增加新兴国家IMF投票权的协议。


But the US Congress refused to ratify the changes, so nothing came of the agreement.	但美国国会拒绝批准这一变化，因此这一协议等于是一纸空文。


China then took matters into its own hands, spearheading the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	于是中国干脆另起炉灶，牵头成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行。


Fragmentation of the international institutions seemed imminent – that is, until European countries decided to join the AIIB.	国际机构的分裂似乎一触即发——直到欧洲国家决定加入亚投行。


Though the US resisted at first, and has still refused to join, that decision was lent some nuance in a later conversation between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama.	尽管美国一开始从中阻挠，并且至今仍拒绝加入，但这一决定在后来中国国家主席习近平和美国总统奥巴马的会谈中有了一些微妙的变化。


Meanwhile, Russia was exposing its own renewed foreign-policy ambitions in Ukraine.	与此同时，俄罗斯正在乌克兰暴露其新的外交政策野心。


By violating the Helsinki Final Act in the spring of 2014, Putin placed Russian foreign policy in direct opposition to that of the US and Europe.	2014年，普京违反赫尔辛基最终议定书，俄罗斯外交政策开始与美国��欧洲直接冲突。


This position was reaffirmed in September, when Putin decided to intervene in the Syrian conflict, securing for Russia a role in any attempt to bring peace to the country.	这一立场在9月得到确认，普京决定干预叙利亚冲突，确保叙利亚和平方案中必须有俄罗斯的存在。


Today, the world is very different from what some might have imagined at the end of the last century, a decade after the Berlin Wall came down.	当今世界与上个世纪末、柏林墙倒塌十周年时人们所想象的世界大不相同。


Historically speaking, 15 years can seem long or short, depending on the intensity of change.	从历史上看，15年既可以很长，也可以很短，取决于变化的剧烈程度。


During the last 15 years of mounting great-power competition and renewed instability in the Middle East – including the Arab Spring, the rise of the brutal Islamic State, Sunni-Shia proxy wars, and unspeakable human suffering – change has been very intense, to say the least.	过去十五年，列强竞争愈演愈烈，中东动荡卷土重来——包括阿拉伯之春、残暴的伊斯兰国的崛起、逊尼派-什叶派代理战争以及不可名状的人道灾难——变化不可不谓剧烈。


But confrontation is not the whole story.	但冲突并非故事的全部。


Promising steps have been made in two critical areas: nuclear non-proliferation, especially through the nuclear deal with Iran, and the fight against climate change, exemplified in the encouraging preparations for the current climate summit in Paris.	在两大关键领域有了令人振奋的进展：核不扩散（特别是通过伊核协议）以及遏制气候变化（眼下的巴黎气候峰会所呈现出的鼓舞人心的准备工作就是明证）。


If there is one lesson to be learned from all of this, it is that well-executed, tenacious diplomacy still holds extraordinary power to resolve conflicts.	如果说我们可以从所有这些发展趋势中学到什么的话，那就是坚韧不拔地做好外交工作依然能够在解决冲突方面起到极大的作用。


It remains the best instrument to produce those cooperative outcomes that confrontation effectively impedes.	外交仍是形成这些大受冲突掣肘的合作成果的最佳工具。


Worlds Apart	分离的世界


Macroeconomic policies, financial globalization, and changes in labor market institutions have exacerbated inequality in recent decades, not only in income and wealth, but also in access to education, healthcare, social protection, as well as in political participation and influence.	宏观经济政策、金融全球化和劳力市场体制的变化加速了近几十年的不平等状况。 这种不平等不仅表现在收入和财富上，也表现在接受教育、医疗、社会保护以及政治参与和影响方面。


Even within countries experiencing rapid economic growth, an array of factors, exacerbated by tremendous demographic changes, has conspired to transmit inequality of knowledge, social responsibility, and life chances from one generation to the next.	即便是在经济快速发展的国家，由人口统计上的巨大变化所驱动的一系列因素，已经悄然将知识、社会责任和生活机会的不平等从一代人转移到下一代人。


As surveyed in the United Nations report The Inequality Predicament, few countries, rich or poor, have proved immune to the global trend of rising inequality, or to its consequences for education, health, and social welfare.	正如联合国的一份调查报告《不平等困境》中所示，不论贫富，几乎没有国家能够避免全球化大趋势和日益严重的不平等，或由这两者带来的教育、健康和社会福利方面的影响。


Of course, there is no simple causal relationship linking poverty and inequality to violence.	当然，在贫穷和不平等与暴力之间并没有一种简单而随意的联系。


But inequality and a sense of deprivation do contribute to resentment and social instability, threatening security.	但不平等和一种被剥夺感的确会引发怨恨情绪和社会不稳定，从而威胁到安全。


Excluded and facing bleak life prospects, young people, in particular, often experience anomie and may turn to anti-social behavior, including violence.	被排斥和面临暗淡的生活前景，尤其会使年轻人感到困惑无奈并可能诉诸包括暴力在内的反社会行为。


Nor is there a simple explanation of what causes poverty.	在造成贫困的原因方面也没有一个简单的解释。


Clearly, however, poverty arises from various complex conditions, and its amelioration requires a multidimensional approach.	然而，贫困显然是由不同复杂条件造成的，需要多管齐下来改善。


It is hard to imagine, for example, how to “make poverty history” without also generating enough decent work, educational opportunities, and healthcare for all.	比如，很难想象我们如何在没有为所有人提供足够的良好工作、教育机会和医疗保健的情况下，“创造扶贫的历史”。


To be sure, the world has seen progress on some fronts in recent decades.	平心而论，近几十年，世界在一些方面取得了进步。


Access to education for girls has improved, and some gender gaps have been reduced.	女童接受教育的状况得到改善，有些性别鸿沟缩小了。


Despite AIDS and the resurgence of malaria and tuberculosis, life expectancy has increased in much of the world due to improved public health systems.	尽管有艾滋病和疟疾、肺结核的卷土重来，但由于公共医疗体系的改善，在世界很多地方人们的预期寿命都有所提高。


Overall, however, the inequality gaps are large and, in many cases, growing.	但总的说来，不平等的鸿沟仍然巨大，并仍在扩大之中。


The most important determinant of income inequality today is wealth inequality, with the increasing concentration of asset ownership in recent years principally responsible for greater income inequality in most countries.	当今收入不平等的决定性因素是财富不平等。 近几年愈演愈烈的产权集中化是造成大多数国家更严重收入不平等的首要因素。


Meanwhile, growing unemployment, widening skill and productivity gaps, and the “informalization” or “casualization” of labor markets have exacerbated income inequalities worldwide, as the number of “working poor” and the incidence of “jobless growth” has spread.	同时，随着“贫困劳工”和“无工作增长”的蔓延，日益严重的失业问题，日渐扩大的技能和生产力差距，和劳力市场的“非正式化”或“随意化”更加重了世界范围内的收入不平等。


Nor have stabilization and structural adjustment programs, imposed since the 1980’s, delivered on their promise of achieving higher economic growth.	从1980年代就开始实施的稳定和结构调整计划，也未能实现其所承诺地更高经济增长。


Growth in much of the world during the past quarter-century has been slower than in the previous 25 years, despite more rapid growth in East Asia, India, and a few other countries.	尽管有东亚、印度和其他几个国家的高速经济增长，世界许多地方在过去25年以来的经济增长还是慢于此前的25年。


Such growth differences suggest that overall global inequality may not have increased unequivocally.	这种增长差异表明全球的总体不平等可能并没有明确地加剧。


But inequalities at the national level have deepened in most countries in recent years, largely due to economic liberalization at both the national and international levels.	就国家层面而言，近几年，不平等在大多数国家都变得更为深刻。 这主要是由于在国家和国际层面上的经济自由化造成的。


Indeed, in much of the world, such economic reforms have actually undermined growth rates as well as the progressive role of government, while otherwise increasing overall inequalities.	的确，在世界的许多地方，这样的经济改革已经妨碍了经济增长和政府的推动作用，同时在其他方面增加了总体的不平等。


The few exceptions have been due largely to continued or new progressive government interventions.	少数几个例外主要是由于锐意改革的政府新近或持续性的干预。


But they are exceptions: the cumulative impact of these reforms over the past 25 years has been greater inequality in most developed and developing countries, with rising unemployment, greater earnings disparities, reduced social protection, and environmental degradation.	但他们仅仅是例外：过去25年来的经济改革的累积后果是在大多数发达国家和发展中国家造成更大的不平等、持续攀升的失业率、更大的收入差距、更弱的社会保护和环境恶化。


International financial liberalization, for example, has undermined the use of more inclusive and targeted developmental credit to promote desired economic activities.	例如，国际金融自由化已经妨碍了我们使用更具包容性和目的性的发展信贷来促进我们期望的经济活动。


In addition, contrary to the promises of its proponents, financial liberalization has actually resulted in net capital flows from the capital-poor to the capital-rich over the long term, while increasing financial volatility and weakening economic activity.	另外，与其支持者的承诺正好相反，长期而言，金融自由化实际上造成了净资本从资本穷国向资本富国流动，同时增加了金融不稳定性并弱化了经济活动。


Meanwhile, free-trade negotiations seem to ignore historical trends.	同时，自由贸易谈判似乎忽视了历史趋势。


Developing countries’ international terms of trade have worsened: prices of primary commodities have declined in relation to manufactures, as have tropical agriculture prices against temperate agriculture, and prices of generic manufactures have fallen relative to output protected by intellectual property rights.	发展中国家的国际贸易条件恶化了：与工业品相比的初级商品价格下跌，热带农产品的价格相对温带农产品下跌，普通工业品的价格也相对于受知识产权保护的产品下跌。


As a result, trade liberalization of manufactures has resulted in de-industrialization and greater unemployment in much of the world, as in the case of garments this year.	其结果，是工业品贸易自由化造成了世界许多地区地更高失业率和非工业化，就像今年的服装行业一样。


And, while agricultural trade liberalization may enhance export earnings for some poor countries, the main beneficiaries will be the more well-to-do agricultural exporters.	农业贸易自由化可能会增加有些穷国的出口创收，但主要的获益者将会是更富有的农业出口国。


Countries that import currently subsidized food will be worse off.	而目前进口享受补贴的食品的国家的情况将会恶化。


The “retreat of the state” in much of the developing world in recent decades has involved a generally reduced role for government, including the capacity to lead and sustain development, as well as its progressive social interventions in areas such as public education, health, housing, and utilities.	近几十年在许多发展中国家实行的“政府引退”造成了政府职能整体上的弱化，其中包括主导和维持发展的能力，以及在公共教育、健康、住房和公用事业方面的进步性社会干预。


The economic liberalization carried out in much of the world in the last 25 years was a flawed policy from the start, and its consequences have become glaringly obvious.	过去25年里，在世界许多地方实施的经济自由化先天不足，其后果触目惊心。


Unless the world refocuses economic policies to address the adverse impact of economic inequality on growth and poverty reduction, the poor and the privileged will continue to live worlds apart.	除非我们重新调整经济政策，以修正在增长和减轻贫困方面的经济不���等所带来的不良后果，否则穷人和富人会继续生活在两个不同世界之中。


Putin on Parade	游行中的普京


NEW YORK – This May’s parade in Moscow to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II promises to be the greatest Victory Day celebration since the Soviet Union’s collapse.	纽约——今年五月即将在莫斯科举行的二战结束70周年纪念游行有望成为苏联解体以来规模最大的胜利日庆祝活动。


Some 16,000 soldiers, 200 armored vehicles, and 150 planes and helicopters are set to pass through and over Red Square.	大约16,000名士兵、200辆装甲车和150架飞机和直升机将穿越红场地面和上空。


It will be a scene that would easily have been familiar to Soviet leaders like Leonid Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev, taking the salute atop Lenin’s tomb.	勃列日涅夫和赫鲁晓夫等苏联领导人曾非常熟悉向红场列宁墓致敬的场景。


Yet, though Russia’s WWII allies were from Europe and North America, no Western leaders will attend the commemoration – a reflection of the West’s disapproval of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.	但虽然俄罗斯二战盟国均来自欧洲和北美，但西方领导人却不会出席纪念活动——这是西方对普京入侵乌克兰及吞并克里米亚不满的反映。


Instead, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s high-profile guests will include the leaders of China, India, and North Korea, underscoring just how few friends Russia has these days.	相反，俄总统弗拉基米尔·普京的高规格嘉宾包括中国、印度和朝鲜领导人，这凸显了当今俄国鲜有同盟的孤立环境。


The surreal nature of this gathering reflects the increasingly bizarre nature of Putin’s regime.	此次超现实主义聚会是普京政权怪诞现实的反映。


Indeed, watching Russia nowadays is like watching the last installment of the X-Men film franchise, “Days of Future Past.”	事实上，看现在的俄罗斯就像在看最后一集X战警《未来昔日》。


Just as the X-Men in that film join forces with their younger selves to save mankind’s future, today’s Kremlin is harking back to Russia’s Soviet past in what it sees as a contemporary fight for the country’s survival.	正像影片中的X战警与年轻的自己联手拯救人类未来一样，今天的克里姆林宫正试图借助过去苏联的力量来打赢俄罗斯的现代生存战争。


Critical to this strategy is propaganda conflating the West today with the Germans who invaded Russia in 1941, while painting Ukrainian government officials as “fascists” and “neo-Nazis.”	上述战略的关键是将今天的西方与1941年入侵俄国的德国混为一谈，同时把乌克兰政府官员描绘成“法西斯”和“新纳粹分子”。


The Kremlin has relied on such claims, together with the supposed need to defend Russians abroad, to justify its aggression against Ukraine.	克里姆林正是依靠这样的说法和保护海外俄国人的所谓必要性来为侵略乌克兰寻找借口。


In Putin’s speech following the annexation of Crimea, he charged that the West’s refusal “to engage in dialogue” left Russia with no choice.	在吞并克里米亚后的讲话中，普京指责西方国家拒绝“参与对话”令俄罗斯别无选择。


“We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues,” he declared.	普京称“我们不断在所有关键问题上寻求合作”。


“We want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open, and fair.	“我们希望强化信任，让关系平等、开放、公正。


But we saw no reciprocal steps.”	但我们没有看到西方采取相应的步骤。


A month later, Putin reinforced this image of Russians as the morally superior victims of a cruel and uncompromising West.	一个月后，普京再次强调俄罗斯是残酷且拒绝妥协的西方在道德上具有优越感的受害者。


“We are less pragmatic than other people, less calculating,” he asserted, before adding that Russia’s “greatness” and “vast size” means “we have a more generous heart.”	普京称“我们不像其他人那么务实算计”，他还补充说俄罗斯的“伟大”和“广阔疆域”让我们“更加大度和宽容”。


It is not difficult to see the parallels between Putin’s approach and that of Joseph Stalin, who declared at the start of WWII that the “enemy” aims to “destroy” Russia’s “national culture,” to “Germanize” its people, and “convert them into slaves.”	不难看出普京和斯大林的做法有相似之处，后者曾在二战伊始宣布“敌人”想要“消灭”俄罗斯“民族文化”、将俄国人“德国化”并奴役俄国民众。


The difference, of course, is that the Nazi Wehrmacht actually invaded the Soviet Union, whereas Ukraine simply wanted to decide its own future.	当然，不同之处是德国国防军的确入侵了苏联，而乌克兰不过想要主宰自己的命运。


Without defending Stalin, one must recognize the immense Soviet contribution – including the lives of 26 million citizens – to the Allied victory in WWII.	即使一点不为斯大林辩护，人们也必须承认苏联对二战盟军胜利的巨大贡献——包括2，600万民众为此献出生命。


At the time, the military parade in Red Square – featuring almost 35,000 troops, up to 1,900 pieces of military equipment, and a 1,400-man orchestra – was a well-deserved pageant.	当时的红场阅兵——约有步兵35，000人、军事装备1，900件、乐队1，400人——可谓一场当之无愧的盛宴。


The Soviet leadership spared no cost in staging its military displays, which, in the absence of an external military threat, became an important vehicle for rallying national unity.	苏联领导层不遗余力地展示军力，那次阅兵在没有外来军事威胁的情况下，成为凝聚民族团结的重要手段。


After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia, no longer a superpower, put its military spectacles on ice.	��联解体后，俄罗斯不再是超级大国，也因此暂停举办阅兵式。


But in 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII, Putin held a major parade – one that Western leaders, believing that Russia might have a European future, did attend.	但2005年，为纪念二战结束60周年，普京举办了盛大阅兵式——当时西方领导人相信俄罗斯未来可能加入欧洲，并因此出席了那次阅兵式。


The tone of this year’s Victory Day commemorations is far less anticipatory.	今年胜利日纪念活动的气氛远不及预期。


How can one celebrate the end of a war at a time when the descendants of those who fought it (undoubtedly driven by the hope that future generations would live in peace) are killing one another in a brutal little war in eastern Ukraine?	怎么能在战争英雄（推动他们打这场战争的是希望子孙后代能够和平生活）后代在东乌克兰残酷的局部战争中互相残杀的情况下庆祝战争的胜利？


What is the point of grandiose fireworks displays amid the firing of real howitzers and rockets?	在榴弹炮和火箭纷飞之际宏伟的烟花表演能有什么意义？


The historian Robert Paxton believed that one could tell much about a country by its parades.	历史学家罗伯特·帕克斯顿相信游行能在很大程度上反映国家的面貌。


His 1966 book Parades and Politics at Vichy describes how Philippe Pétain, as Chief of State of Vichy France, used pageantry, reactionary politics, and, of course, a partnership with Adolf Hitler to dupe his defeated country into believing that it still mattered in the world.	他1996年的著作《维希的游行和政治》讲述了担任法国维希政府首脑的菲利普·贝当用华丽、反动的政治策略，当然还有与希特勒的联盟来欺骗战败的祖国，让其相信自己在世界事务中仍有一席之地。


The Vichy state’s brand of authoritarian traditionalism lionized family and fatherland, with Pétain, a former military commander, serving as a kind of military king, exalted on the tribune.	作为维希政府标志的专制传统主义让家族和祖国流芳千古，而前军事指挥官贝当则扮演着某种军事王者的角色，并被抬上神圣的讲坛。


The parallels with Putin’s Russia are clear.	维希政府与普京领导下俄罗斯的相似之处显而易见。


Putin views himself as a new czar.	普京以新沙皇自居。


His KGB background dictates his leadership style, which includes the abolition of free and fair elections, the persecution of opponents, and the promotion of conservative values that he, like Pétain before him, juxtaposes with the corrupting influence of an “immoral” and “decadent” West.	他的克格勃背景决定了他的领导风格，包括取消自由公正选举，迫害反对派以及宣传保守的价值观。 就像曾经的贝当一样，“非道德”和“颓废”的西方腐败深深影响着普京。


Relying on this approach, Putin has built alliances with the likes of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad and Egypt’s military ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.	依靠这种方法，普京已与叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德和埃及军事统治者阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西结成联盟。


China, the world’s second largest economy, is a useful addition to this collection of friendly anti-democratic states, as it has its own strategic grievances with the West.	全世界第二大经济体中国因为有其自身对西方的战略不满，成为对友好反民主国家联盟的有益补充。


Unlike China, however, Russia is not a rising superpower.	但不同于中国的是，俄罗斯并不是崛起中的超级大国。


Putin may try to portray his actions in Ukraine as a fight against fascism.	普京可能想把乌克兰行动描绘成一场反法西斯斗争。


But it is really a fight for relevance – a fight he will never win.	但它实际是争夺影响力的战斗——在这场战斗中他根本不可能获胜。


No matter how grand the parade, he cannot hide the truth: Russia’s days as a superpower are in the past.	无论阅兵式多么盛大都无法掩盖真相：俄罗斯作为超级大国的历史已经一去不复返。


Putin’s patriotism, like Pétain’s, is that of the vanquished.	普京的爱国主义像贝当一样属于被征服者。


China’s Dream World	中国的梦想世界


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Ruling elites almost everywhere – whether in democracies or in authoritarian regimes – believe that clever sloganeering can inspire their people and legitimize their power.	发自加利福尼亚克莱尔蒙特——几乎所有国家（不管是民主还是专制政体）的统治精英都认为漂亮的口号能鼓舞民众并使其权力合法化。


There are, of course, crucial differences.	当然，这其中有着关键性的差别。


In functioning democracies, government leaders can be held accountable for their promises: the press can scrutinize their policies, opposition parties are motivated to show that the party in power lies and cheats.	在实行民主制的国家，政府领导人要为其承诺负责：媒体可以仔细考究其政策，在野党会主动揭发执政党的谎言和骗局。


As a result, incumbents are frequently forced to carry out at least some of their promises.	因此，在位者常常会被迫兑现至少一部分承诺。


Autocratic rulers, by contrast, face no such pressures.	相比之下，独裁统治者就无需面对这样的压力。


Press censorship, repression of dissent, and the absence of organized opposition allow rulers the luxury of promising whatever they want, with no political consequences for failing to deliver.	新闻审查制度、对异见的镇压以及有组织反对派的缺失使得统治者可以任意夸下海口，却无须为诺言的无法兑现承担政治后果。


The result is government of the sloganeers, by the sloganeers, and for the sloganeers.	这就会导致政府由喊口号者组成，被喊口号者把持，并只为那些喊口号者服务。


China appears to have perfected this form of government over the last decade.	中国在过去十年间似乎已经完善了这种政府形式。


The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in response to rising public demand for social justice, has devised numerous slogans, such as “governing for the people,” “building a harmonious society,” “balanced development,” “scientific development,” and so on.	执政的中国共产党为了回应公众对社会正义日益增长的需求，已经设计了众多口号，比如“执政为民”、“构建和谐社会”、“平衡发展”及“科学发展”等等。


Whenever the top leadership in Beijing uttered such slogans, they became the rallying cry of the bureaucracy.	不管北京的最高层领导何时提出这样的口号，它们都会成为官僚机构的战斗口号。


The party’s massive propaganda machine went into overdrive and blanketed the country with a publicity blitz that would make the most extravagant Madison Avenue advertising campaign look like child’s play.	中共的庞大宣传机器随之开始急速运转，用宣传闪电战地毯式轰炸整个国家，其情景简直让纽约麦迪逊大道上的广告宣传活动看起来像小孩玩的游戏。


But government by slogan, whether in China or in other autocracies, seldom achieves its declared goals.	但空喊口号的政府，无论是在中国还是在其它独裁国家，很少能达到其宣称的目标。


In the last decade, GDP growth soared, but most indices of social justice, governance performance, and public welfare deteriorated.	在过去的十年，中国GDP实现了高速增长，但社会正义、治理绩效和公共福利的大部分指标反而都恶化了。


Macroeconomic imbalances worsened as economic growth became excessively dependent on investment and exports.	随着经济增长变得过度依赖投资和出口，宏观经济失衡状况不断恶化。


Inequality worsened.	社会不平等状况也在加剧。


Official corruption escalated.	官员腐败升级。


Social mobility declined.	社会流动性下降。


Environmental degradation reached a crisis point.	环境恶化则到达了一个危机爆发点。


Today, it is the responsibility of China’s new leadership, headed by President Xi Jinping, to avert another decade of missed opportunities.	如今，避免接下来的十年继续错失时机的责任落在了以习近平主席为首的新一代领导层肩上。


Without missing a beat, Xi, like his predecessors, rolled out a new slogan to inspire popular confidence in his leadership.	紧随其前任的步调，新主席很快推出了一个新口号来激发公众对其领导能力的信心。


As a catchphrase for his administration’s objective, “the great renaissance of the Chinese nation” is bit long, but it has lately morphed into the simpler “China Dream.”	作为行政目标的宣传语，“中华民族的伟大复兴”有点长了，但它最近被改成了较为简单的“中国梦”。


The substance of the China Dream remains difficult to determine.	但中国梦的实质内容仍然难以确定。


When Xi first unveiled his slogan after being selected as the CCP’s new general secretary, he defined it in simple, accessible, but nonetheless generic terms: The “Chinese people dream of living the same good life as all other people in the world.”	在习近平被选为新任中共总书记后首次公布其口号时，他用简单，容易理解，但依然笼统的术语来定义中国梦：即“中国人民过上和世界其他国家人民一样美好生活的梦想。 ”


Xi has said little about the China Dream since – and his silence has caused considerable trouble.	自那以后习近平很少谈及中国梦——而其沉默已经造成了相当大的麻烦。


China’s ever-zealous propaganda officials, evidently fearful of not demonstrating sufficient loyalty and respect for the new party chief, quickly hijacked the slogan; the China Dream has replaced the “China Model” in official political branding.	一向狂热的中国宣传部门官员显然害怕自己没有对新的党委总书记展示足够的忠诚和尊重，很快就劫持了这个口号； 中国梦已经取代了官方政治宣传中的“中国模式”标牌。


Whatever the new administration does is touted as part of its ambitious effort to make the “China Dream” come true.	不管新政府干了些什么，都会被吹捧为是立志为让“中国梦”成真而努力。


Unfortunately, China propagandists, who double as censors, have a perverse ability to discredit anything that they try to brand.	不幸地是，中国的宣传者——还同时兼任审查者——拥有一种抹黑任何他们想要打造的招牌的怪异能力。


The China Dream is no exception.	如今的中国梦也不例外。


So far, public reaction has ranged from puzzlement to derision.	迄今为止，公众反应从迷惑转为了嘲笑。


After a decade of government by slogan, the Chinese public wants substance.	在经历了十年的口号统治之后，中国民众想要一些实质性的进展。


This presents Xi with a real challenge.	这给习主席提出了真正的挑战。


He has risen to the top by winning friends and allies inside the CCP.	他通过在共产党内部赢得朋友和盟友攀上了权力顶峰。


Now that he is the leader of a dynamic, diverse, and increasingly demanding society, he must gain popular support and confidence to maintain his credibility and become an effective politician.	如今他领导着一个动态、多元且要求越来越高的社会，他必须获得公众的支持和信心以维持其信誉并成为一个拿得出政绩的政治家。


The first thing that Xi should do is to articulate a clearer, more specific, and inspiring version of the China Dream, and stop letting the CCP’s propaganda officials define it for him.	习近平应该做的第一件事情是要明确给出一个更清晰、更具体且鼓舞人心的中国梦版本，并阻止中共宣传官员代他去下定义。


The China Dream may include all of the economic benefits and material comfort that ordinary Chinese desire, but it will not be complete without the human rights and dignity that citizens in civilized societies take for granted.	中国梦可以包含所有普通中国人想要的经济利益和物质需求，但如果缺乏文明社会公民视为理所当然的人权和尊严，中国梦就会是一个不完整的理念。


The second thing that Xi and his colleagues need to do is to follow up with specific policies and actions that can bolster the credibility of their declared goals.	习近平及其同僚应该做的第二件事则是跟进实施可以支撑其宣传目标可信度的具体政策和行动。


Political slogans, however high-sounding, become stale when their purveyors fail to make good on their promises.	政治口号——无论多么高调，当许诺者不能兑现其承诺时都会变味。


Xi may still be enjoying a honeymoon with the Chinese public, but it is likely to be a short one.	习可能还正与中国的民众享受着他们之间的美好“蜜月”，但这个“蜜月”期会很短。


His predecessors had ten years to carry out real reforms and accomplished little, leaving the Chinese in no mood to endure another decade of government by shibboleth.	他的前任有十年的时间来实施真正的改革但只实现了很小一部分，这使得中国人失去了再次忍受十年空喊口号的信心。


Xi of Arabia	阿拉伯的习主席


BEIJING – Those who have criticized China’s cautious foreign policy need to reconsider their position, following President Xi Jinping’s just-completed visit to Saudi Arabia and Iran – two major Middle Eastern powers that are currently at each other’s throats.	北京—那些批评中国外交政策谨小慎微的人需要重新考虑立场了。 中国国家主席习近平刚刚结束了对沙特阿拉伯和伊朗的访问。


The visits reflect the more active foreign-policy approach that Xi has spearheaded, particularly in the Middle East.	这两个国家都是中东主要力量，目前处于严重对峙状态。 此次出访体现了习近平所主导的更加积极的外交政策方针，特别是在中东。


This new approach raises an important question: Can China’s impact on the region be more constructive than that of the United States?	这一新方针引出了一个重要问题：中国在该地区的影响力是否比美国更具建设性？


Now is certainly a tense time to become involved in the Middle East, a region where, as Richard N. Haass argues, a New Thirty Years’ War, in which “civil wars and proxy wars become impossible to distinguish,” is unfolding.	如今显然是介入中东的敏感时刻，理查德·哈斯（Richard N. Haass）认为，该地区正在展开一场新三十年战争，“内战和代理战争已无法区分”。


A key factor in unleashing the current chaos – which represents the convergence of numerous deep-rooted challenges and conflicts – was America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.	导致当前乱象——其根源是众多深层次挑战和冲突汇聚在一起——的一大关键因素是2003年美国入侵伊拉克。


By eliminating Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime, the US paved the way for a Shia-led government, a development that tilted the regional balance of power toward Iran and left Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia feeling encircled by a Shia coalition.	美国推翻了萨达姆·侯赛因的逊尼派政权，为什叶派领导的政府扫清了道路，这一变化让地区平衡向伊朗倾斜，也让逊尼派统治的沙特阿拉伯感到被什叶派联盟所包围。


That is why Iran and Saudi Arabia are so deeply involved in Syria’s civil war.	因此，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯都深深介入了叙利亚内战。


They know that the fate of President Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime will have significant implications for the regional order.	它们知道，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的阿拉维派政权的命运对于地区秩序具有重大影响。


For Saudi Arabia, reining in Iran is all the more important in the wake of the recent agreement on the country’s nuclear program, which has resulted in the lifting of international economic sanctions that have long constrained Iran’s regional leadership ambitions.	对沙特阿拉伯来说，在最近伊核问题达成协议（长期限制伊朗作为地区领导者雄心的国际经济制裁将因此取消）的情况下，制约伊朗是其第一要务。


Of course, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran – or Turkey, which has also joined the competition for regional influence – is seeking a direct confrontation.	当然，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗——还有土耳其，它刚刚加入到争夺地区影响力的竞争中——都不想要直接冲突。


These countries would rather empower other actors, even if it means fueling dangerous religious radicalization and the privatization of violence.	这些国家宁可扶持其他行动方，即使这意味着会增强危险的宗教激进化和暴力私有化。


The terrorist movements that have emerged as a result of this approach – namely, the Islamic State – cannot be defeated using traditional counter-terrorism operations.	因地区国家的这一方略而崛起的恐怖主义运动（即伊斯兰国）是无法用传统反恐行动打败的。


To be sure, these Middle East rivals are not the only ones involved in the region’s current quagmire.	平心而论，这些中东对峙各方并不是该地区当前乱局的唯一当事方。


External powers like France, Russia, and, of course, the US are also deeply involved, each with its own geopolitical objectives.	外部力量，如法国、俄罗斯，当然还有美国，也深深地介入其中，每一方都有其自身的地缘政治目标。


Now China is entering the fray, bringing a uniquely constructive vision with it.	现在中国也在加入其中，带来了独一无二的建设性政策。


The two characters that comprise the Chinese word for crisis (危机) mean, individually, “danger” (危) and “opportunity” (机).	中文词语“危机”包含着“危”和“机”两个汉字。


That is precisely what China sees in today’s Middle East.	这正是当前中国对中东的看法。


For most of the relevant actors, highly perilous geopolitical competition is overshadowing vast economic opportunities.	对最相关的行动方而言，高度危险的地缘政治竞争使巨大的经济机会黯然失色。


Not for China.	对中国来说并非如此。


As Xi put it on his recent visit to Cairo: “Instead of looking for a proxy in the Middle East, we promote peace talks; instead of seeking any sphere of influence, we call on all parties to join the circle of friends for the Belt and Road initiative.”	习近平最近在访问开罗时指出，“我们在中东不找代理人，而是劝和促谈； 不搞势力范围，而是推动大家一起加入‘一带一路’朋友圈。


This reflects the broader foreign-policy rebalancing that Xi has been pursuing since taking office in 2013.	这反映出习近平自2013年执政以来一直在推动的更大层面上的外交政策再平衡。


Unlike the US, which has been engineering a strategic “pivot” from one geographic region to another, China is rebalancing from “politics among nations” to “politics among networks,” focusing on “connectivity” rather than “control.”	与一直在将战略“支点”从一个地区转向另一个地区的美国不同，中国正在实施从“国家间政治”向“网络间政治”的再平衡，着重于“连通”而非“控制”。


The Middle East is crucial to this connectivity-oriented grand strategy, not least because of its key role in the “One Belt, One Road” project that Xi promoted in Cairo.	对于这种以连通为导向的大战略来说，中东地区至关重要，它是习近平此行在开罗所宣扬的“一带一路”计划的关键。


China’s determination to reestablish the ancient Silk Roads – including the overland route that runs through the Middle East – has led it to enter into strategic partnerships with eight Arab countries in recent years, and to sign agreements with six Arab countries to pursue the initiative jointly.	中国决心重建古丝绸之路——包括横穿中东的陆上丝绸之路——因此近几年来中国与八个阿拉伯国家建立了战略伙伴关系，并与六个阿拉伯国家签署协议共同推进“一带一路”。


Iran, Turkey, and seven Arab countries are among the founding members of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a key institution for financing related infrastructure projects.	伊朗、土耳其和七个阿拉伯国家是亚洲基础设施投资银行的创始成员国，该银行总部设在北京，它是相关基础设施项目的关键融资机构。


But China is not waiting for the One Belt, One Road initiative to be completed before pursuing increased trade with Middle Eastern countries.	但中国并没有等到“一带一路”计划完成后再去增加与中东国家的贸易。


During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, he claimed that free-trade negotiations between the Gulf Cooperation Council and China should be concluded this year.	在最近访问沙特阿拉伯期间，习近平宣布，海湾合作委员会与中国的自由贸易谈判要在今年完成。


Moreover, Xi announced that China will issue $55 billion in loans to the Middle East, including a $15 billion special loan for industrialization, $10 billion in commercial loans to boost production capacity, and $10 billion in concessional loans.	此外，习近平还宣布中国将向中东提供550亿美元贷款，包括150亿美元工业化特别贷款、100亿美元用于增进产能的商业贷款和100亿美元优惠贷款。


The remaining $20 billion will go toward a joint investment fund with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to invest in traditional energy, infrastructure development, and high-end manufacturing industries in the region.	其他200亿美元将以与阿联酋和卡塔尔组成联合投资基金的形式，投资于该地区的传统能源、基础设施开发和高端制造业。


All of this aligns with the “1+2+3” cooperation pattern that Xi proposed at the June 2014 Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing.	所有这些都与习近平在2014年6月的中阿国家合作论坛部长级会议上所提出的“1+2+3”合作模式相符。


According to this approach, energy cooperation should form the core of collaboration, while infrastructure construction and trade and investment form two wings. Nuclear power, satellites, and new energy sources are three high-tech areas where cooperation can lead to important breakthroughs.	根据这一方针，能源合作将成为一个核心，而基础设施建设与贸易投资组成两翼，核能、卫星和新能源是合作中可能形成重大突破的三大高科技领域。


Here, the goal is to take advantage of the region’s energy resources, while helping it to industrialize and diversify its economy.	这一合作模式的目标是利用好中东国家的能源资源，同时帮助它们实现工业化和经济多元化。


Of course, China’s success in the Middle East requires progress on mitigating the region’s tensions, cooling its hotspots, and stabilizing weak countries – all of which will require smart diplomacy by many actors.	当然，中国在中东的成功需要在减少该地区紧张局势、给热点降温、稳定较弱国家等方面取得进展——所有这些都需要众多行动方的明智外交政策。


But peace and development are inextricably linked.	但和平与发展是密不可分的。


To turn the tide against extremism, Middle Eastern countries must be able to provide economic opportunities to their people, and these can only be secured through trade, investment, and jobs.	要想扭转极端主义趋势，中东国家必须能够为民众提供经济机会，而经济机会只能通过贸易、投资和就业来实现。


In this fundamental respect, China has a lot to offer the Middle East – and President Xi has once again shown his determination to offer it.	在这一关键方面，中国能够给中东提供很多帮助——而习近平主席也再次表达了提供帮助的决心。


When Xi Meets Obama	当习近平遇见奥巴马


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – As Chinese President Xi Jinping begins his trip to the United States in Seattle, home to many of the world’s leading technology firms, most observers are looking ahead to his subsequent meeting with President Barack Obama.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—中国国家主席习近平在西雅图开始了访美之旅。 西雅图是许多世界领先的科技公司的总部所在地。


Can the summit reverse the downward spiral in US-China relations that began with Xi’s accession to power in 2013?	许多观察者正在期待他随后与美国总统奥巴马的会面。 两人的峰会是否能够扭转2013年习近平上台以来中美关系恶化的趋势？


Few dispute that the world’s most important bilateral relationship is in deep trouble.	毫无疑问，全世界最重要的双边关系陷入了深深的麻烦。


From the US perspective, China’s reckless behavior in the South China Sea, unrestrained cyber attacks against American targets, protectionist economic policies, and escalating political repression at home have demolished the belief that a globally integrated China would be a responsible and cooperative partner.	从美国的角度，中国在南海的“任性”行为、无节制的针对美国目标的网络攻击、保护主义经济政策和逐步升级的对内政治压迫使其无法再相信融入全球的中国将是负责任的合作伙伴。


Indeed, recent Chinese actions directly challenge vital American interests and core values.	事实上，最近中国的行为直接挑战了美国的核心利益和核心价值。


Chinese leaders, for their part, view America’s strategic “pivot to Asia” as a thinly veiled step to tighten its geopolitical containment of China.	而中国领导人将美国战略性“重返亚洲”视为欲盖弥彰的加紧对华地缘政治遏制的措施。


Moreover, they have become obsessed with US dominance in international finance and technology and, most important, America’s ideological commitment to liberal democracy, which they regard as an existential threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).	此外，他们着迷于美国在国际金融和科技方面的主宰地位以及，更重要的，美国坚定的自由民主意识形态（他们视为中共的生存威胁）。


The toxic mix of mutual mistrust and tit-for-tat behavior has brought Sino-American ties to their lowest point since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.	互不信任和针锋相对行为构成了一个危害重重的组合，让中美关系跌至1989年天安门事件以来的最低点。


There is now widespread concern that the US and China may be headed for a new cold war.	如今，人们广泛担忧美国和中国可能开始新的冷战。


For Xi, the stakes of his US trip could not be higher.	对习近平来说，此次访美可谓意义重大。


To maintain his domestic image as a strong leader, he must stick to his nationalist rhetoric and policies.	要想维持其强势领导人的国内形象，他必须坚持其民族主义口风和政策。


But he also needs to stabilize the all-important relationship with the US.	但他也需要稳定最重要的对美关系。


Judging by recent moves by China and the US, we can expect modest success in a few contentious areas.	从中国和美国最近的动作判断，我们可以期待双方在一些有争议的领域取得些许成功。


While such improvements, on their own, will not change the relationship’s adversarial dynamic, they may halt the deterioration in bilateral ties, at least for now.	这些改善本身不会改变中美关系的对抗动态，但也许能够阻止双边关系的恶化，至少在当前是如此。


On the eve of the summit, both the US and China took positive, albeit symbolic, steps to demonstrate their goodwill and improve the diplomatic atmosphere.	在峰会即将到来之际，美国和中国领导人都采取了积极（尽管是象征性）的举措证明各自的良好意愿、改善外交氛围。


The US extradited a low-level Chinese official to face corruption charges.	美国遣返了一名面临腐败指控的低级中国官员。


The Obama administration also decided not to announce sanctions against Chinese entities and individuals allegedly involved in cyber attacks on American companies and government agencies.	奥巴马政府还决定不对被控参与对美国公司和政府机构发动网络袭击的中国单位和个人进行制裁。


For its part, China released a human-rights activist and dispatched a high-level delegation to the US to discuss cyber security.	中国则释放了一位人权活动家，并派了一个高规格代表团来到美国讨论网络安全问题。


In fact, the two sides are reportedly negotiating a landmark deal that would prohibit cyber attacks against each other’s vital infrastructure.	事实上，双方据称正在谈判一项里程碑式的协议，禁止互相网络攻击关键基础设施。


An agreement on the issue could be the most important outcome of the summit, although other types of cyber attacks are unlikely to be covered by it.	在这一问题上形成协议可能是峰会最重要的成果，尽管该协议不可能覆盖其他类型的网络袭击。


For China, the biggest prize is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).	对中国来说，最大的好处是双边投资条约。


In practical terms, a US-China BIT would make it easier for Chinese entities to invest and operate in the US and increase American firms’ access to Chinese markets.	从务实角度，中美双边投资条约将让中国单位更加方便地赴美投资和经营，也能促进美国企业进入中国市场。


Such a deal would be a near-term boon for Xi, because it would represent a vote of confidence by the US in China’s struggling economy.	对习近平来说，这一协议是一个短期福音，因为这代表美国对陷入困境的中国经济充满信心。


But the prospects for a BIT are uncertain, at best.	但双边投资条约的前景并不确定。


The US Congress is deeply skeptical, and the American business community needs convincing as well.	美国国会深刻地怀疑中国，而美国企业界也需要确信。


Both have been bitterly disappointed by China’s mercantilist trading policies after its accession to the World Trade Organization.	国会和企业界都因为中国加入世贸组织后采取的重商主义贸易政策而大失所望。


Given how many contentious issues remain unresolved, an accord is unlikely during the summit.	考虑到众多争议问题尚未解决，峰会期间不太可能形成协议。


The South China Sea dispute may prove to be the toughest diplomatic nut to crack.	南海纠纷也许是最棘手的外交问题。


China has staked its national prestige and its leadership’s nationalist credentials on this issue, which means that Xi is likely to rebuff US demands that China cease all activities seen as militarizing its new artificial islands in disputed waters.	中国在这一问题上押上了国家尊严和领导人的民族主义情操，这意味着习近平可能会断然拒绝美国要求中国停止所有被视为对其在争议海域的新造人工岛进行军事化改造的行为。


The most that can be realistically expected is an insipid statement of the two sides’ agreement to disagree.	从现实角度，我们最多能够期待双方发表一些无关痛痒的承认分歧的声明。


But the most politically sensitive topic for China has little to do with cyber security or the South China Sea. It is China’s ongoing crackdown on civil liberties and human rights.	但对中国来说，政治上最敏感的话题既非网络安全，亦非南海，而是中国一直在镇压公民自由和人权的问题。


Facing enormous domestic pressure, Obama has announced that human rights will be on the agenda of his summit with Xi.	面临巨大国内压力的奥巴马已经宣布人权将是其与习近平峰会的议程之一。


But Xi is unlikely to make any concessions, because doing so could damage his political standing within the CCP and undermine a central component of his political vision: the reassertion of political control over a dynamic society.	但习近平不可能做出任何让步，因为这样做将危害到他在中共党内的政治立场，也有害于其政治愿景的一个关键要素：重新获得对充满活力的社会的政治控制。


Ultimately, the key question looming over the summit is whether Xi will be able to offer enough to repair the damage done to Sino-US relations in recent years.	最终，峰会的关键问题是习近平是否拿出足够的诚意修复近几年来中美关系所遭到的破坏。


To be sure, trying is better than doing nothing.	诚然，做点尝试比什么都不做要好。


But what really matters is whether, after the summit, China takes concrete actions that reflect a genuine shift from the policies that have fueled the deterioration in bilateral ties.	但真正重要的是峰会之后中国是否拿出实际行动证明其真正开始远离那些加剧双边关系恶化的政策。


Why Work at Work?	为什么要上班工作？


PHUKET – Marissa Mayer, the new CEO of Yahoo!, recently created a fuss by issuing an edict that forbids anyone at the company to work from home.	普吉岛—最近，雅虎新CEO玛丽莎·梅耶（Marissa Mayer）发布公告禁止雅虎员工在家办公，此禁令掀起了一阵波澜。


Mayer’s demarche received a lot of press coverage, probably more than it deserved.	梅耶的这一新政吸引了大量媒体注意，以致有大惊小怪之嫌。


That may not be so surprising: she is a woman, and she allegedly has a nursery for her baby next door to her office.	这或许并不那么令人惊奇：她是女人，而且据说她办公室隔壁就有托儿所可以照顾她的孩子。


Above all, people seemed to react to the categorical nature of her decision (why everyone?) and to the irony that Yahoo! is a tech company (don’t they know about Skype?).	毕竟，激起人们反弹的是她的决定的绝对性（为何所有人都得如此？ ）以及雅虎是个技术公司所带来的讽刺意味（他们不知道Skype是怎么做的吗？


I think that Mayer made the right decision, and I am sure that over time exceptions to her order will be allowed at managers’ discretion.	我认为梅耶的决定是正确的，我可以肯定，假以时日，经理就有批准其指令的例外情况的自由裁量权。


But, until now, the “right” to work at home was sacrosanct at Yahoo!, something that an employee’s manager could not overrule.	但是，到目前为止，在家工作的“权利”在雅虎仍是神圣不可侵犯的，是经理不可否决的雇员特权。


And, by all accounts, enough people at Yahoo! were not working, either from home or from more interesting places, that it had become a serious problem.	但是，据大家所说，雅虎有很多人根本不工作，不管是在家还是在更有意思的地方，这已经成了一个严重的问题。


Beyond that, Mayer’s edict makes more sense as a means of cultural change within a business than it does as a way to improve any particular individual’s productivity.	除此之外，梅耶的禁令与其说是改善特定员工的生产率的方法，不如说是改变企业文化的手段。


Almost precisely because working remotely is easy, the advantage that a workplace has over a collection of home workers – or a set of outsourced workers assembled through Task Rabbit – is that people can accomplish more in a setting that provides a common culture and the benefit of serendipitous connections.	远程办公很容易，正是因为如此，有工作场所比起集体在家办公——或通过任务兔子（Task Rabbit）组织一组外包员工——的优势在于在提供共同文化的地方一起办公能完成的工作更多，更能激发意外默契。


Long ago, the advantage of a firm was that it lowered transaction costs (an idea first clearly expressed by the Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase), such as the costs of finding workers, assigning them to tasks, assessing productivity, and setting salaries.	很久以前，企业的优势在于它能降低交易成本（第一个清晰阐述这一思想的是诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗纳德·科斯），即招聘员工、指派任务给员工、评估生产率、设定薪水等活动的成本。


Now that transaction costs are so low, the primary benefit of working at work is that the physical interactions foster an organizational culture and boost creativity, rather than efficiency or productivity, within an established routine.	如今，交易成本已经极低，上班工作的主要好处在于固定模式中的身体互动能激发组织文化和提升创造力，而不在于效率和生产率。


Mayer, I think, did not order her employees back to the office merely because some people were not actually working at home; rather, many of those who were working were not working together.	我认为，梅耶要其员工回到办公室的原因绝不仅仅是某些员工在家并不工作，而是许多工作的员工没有在一起工作。


To be sure, it seems contradictory to some people that Yahoo!, an online business, requires its employees to be physically present in the company’s offices.	诚然，对一些人来说，雅虎作为一个在线企业，要求其员工天天出现在办公室中有些奇怪。


But most of the money and talent in this industry already seem to concentrate physically in one small part of the United States, between San Francisco and San Jose.	但该行业的资金和人才都集中在美国从旧金山到圣何塞的一小块区域中。


Whether it’s the Yahoo! Cafeteria (now more inviting and more frequented with the advent of free food), or the halls of the Plug & Play startup accelerator, proximity matters.	不管是雅虎的自助餐厅（随着免费食物的出现变得更有吸引力也更繁忙）还是Plug & Play创业孵化大楼，面对面（proximity）至关重要。


Being physically present at work means direct contact with other sharp and creative minds.	上班出现在工作场所意味着与其他犀利而富于创造力的头脑的直接交流。


And the benefits of human contact and interaction are why salespeople still call on customers instead of using Skype, and why Meetup (which supports organizers of face-to-face meetings; I am on the company’s board) changes lives in ways that Twitter and Facebook rarely do.	人际交流和互动的好处正是销售员仍在拜访客户，而不是使用Skype的原因，也是Meetup（支持组织者的面对面会议； 我是该公司董事）能以Twitter和Facebook所不能的方式改变生活的原因。


Of course, those who prefer to work at home cite not just the cost and time of commuting, but also the proliferation of meetings – too much culture, perhaps – and a steady flood of communication that simply interrupts their work rather than enhancing it.	当然，喜欢在家工作者的论据不仅包括沟通需要成本和时间，也包括会议滋生——也许是太“多”的文化——和稳定的过度沟通只能干扰其工作，而起不到促进作用。


Interestingly, I heard this point at a WPP Stream “unconference” in Phuket, Thailand, where a couple of hundred people had flown thousands of miles to meet face to face to share ideas and strengthen working relationships.	有趣的是，我在泰国普吉岛WPP Stream“非会议”（unconference）上听说了这一点，在那里，好几百人从千里之外飞来面对面分享关于强化工作关系的心得。


So, yes, online work can make a lot of sense in many situations, but when you are trying to fix a broken corporate culture, you need the commitment, human engagement, and creative interaction that happen most consistently in a physical workplace.	因此，在线工作确实在多种情形中作用多多，但当你试图修复破坏的公司文化时，你需要承诺、人力参与和创造性互动，而这只能在实体工作场所中才能坚持进行。


In the end, it is up to good managers to decide who can work where, and to make meetings short and useful.	最后，优秀的经理会决定谁能在何处工作，并让会议变得简短有效。


Indeed, the whole point of having managers is that they are supposed to exercise judgment.	事实上，之所以要有经理，全部原因在于他们能够执行裁决。


Otherwise, computers and the Internet would allow us not just to work from home, but to report to a software program rather than to a person.	否则的话，计算机和互联网不但可以让我们在家办公，还能让我们向软件程序而不是活人报告。


But, in the end, the challenge is to find the right fit between people and environment.	但是，最终，挑战在于找到人与环境的正确契合点。


Personally, I come at this from the opposite direction.	就个人而言，我是个反面范例。


As an independent angel investor with no real day job, I don’t have an office to report to every day.	作为非真正全日制工作者的独立天使投资人，我没有办公室，也不需每日报告。


But I would miss the companionship of people working around me – even if they do not necessarily work with me.	但我会失去与周围人一起工作带来的交谊机会——即便他们未必是我的同事。


Fortunately, Meetup allows me to sit at a desk amid its roughly 90 people; I travel a lot, but I work from a desk at Meetup whenever I am at “home” in New York City.	幸运的是，Meetup让我能够与大约90人共济一堂； 我做了长途旅行，但我在纽约市的“家”中可以随时随地出现在Meetup会议桌上。


True, I don’t have to go to the company’s meetings, but I like being surrounded by busy people; I know it makes me work harder.	诚然，我不必非得出席公司会议，但我喜欢周围都是忙人的感觉； 我知道，这让我工作更加努力。


Whatever our work, we remain physically social beings.	不管我们做什么工作，我们始终是社会生物。


Yankee Bases Go Home	美军基地滚回去


RIO DE JANEIRO – Last month, the leaders of all 12 countries of South America (except one) gathered in Quito, Ecuador’s capital, for the summit of the Union of South American Nations.	里约热内卢--上个月，南美全部十二个国家的领导人（除了一位）会聚厄瓜多尔首都基多举行“南美国家联盟”（UNASUR）峰会。


UNASUR or UNASUL (depending on whether one speaks Spanish or Portuguese) was established by the twelve presidents in Brasília in May 2008 with the aim of furthering economic and political integration.	UNASUR 或 UNASUL（缩写视西班牙语或葡萄牙语而定）是（南美）十二国总统于2008年五月在巴西利亚建立的，其宗旨是促进经济和政治一体化。


Instead, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez hijacked the Quito meeting to propagate his Bolivarian Revolution and expound his own ideas for the continent’s future as independent of the United States.	然而，委内瑞拉总统查韦斯却劫持了基多会议来宣扬其玻利维尔革命，并详细解释了他自己关于该大陆独立于美国的未来的理念。


Thanks to America’s recently announced military agreement with Colombia, Chávez’s ideas got more of a hearing than might have been expected. For, instead of infrastructure plans, commercial or environmental treaties, or even multilateral action against such common problems as violence and poverty, the issue that dominated both press accounts and the speeches at the gathering was the new US-Colombian military agreement, announced less than a month before the summit.	由于美国最近宣布与哥伦比亚达成军事协定，查韦斯的声音得到了比预想更多的关注：因为媒体报道和峰会演讲中的主导性话题不是基础设施规划，商业或环境条约，甚至也不是应对暴力和贫困等共同问题的多边行动，而是在峰会前不到一个月时宣布的美国--哥伦比亚新军事协定。


To no one’s surprise, Chávez dominated the criticism of the pact.	查韦斯毫无意外地发出了批评该协定的最强音。


He claimed that the “Winds of war are blowing,” and that the announcement of the military agreement “can transform itself into a tragedy.”	他宣称“战争的风正在吹起”，军事协定的宣布“可能转化成一场悲剧。 ”


Unfortunately, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe was absent from the meeting.	不幸的是，哥伦比亚总统Álvaro Uribe没有出席会议。


Colombia and Ecuador broke diplomatic relations in March 2008, after Colombia’s army pursued FARC guerillas, who have been fighting Colombia’s government for decades, into Ecuadorean territory.	在哥伦比亚军队追击FARC 游击队进入厄瓜多尔领土之后，两国于2008年三月断绝了外交关系。 该游击队已经与哥伦比亚政府对抗了数十年。


So Uribe could not defend the new military agreement.	因此Uribe未能就新军事协议进行辩护。


This left the floor open to Chávez to isolate Colombia and preach against the US.	这就给了查韦斯机会孤立哥伦比亚并高唱反美论调。


In a continent where anti-Americanism remains both very popular and an effective way to consolidate national cohesion and political power, Chávez’s attacks found a ready audience.	在这片反美情绪依然广泛，并能被用来有效地强化民族凝聚力和政治权力的大陆，查韦斯的攻击言论大有市场。


In addition, Uribe’s absence allowed Chávez to avoid responding to Colombia’s accusations that Venezuela and its ally Ecuador support the narco-Marxist FARC.	另外，Uribe的缺席使得查韦斯避免了回应哥伦比亚关于委内瑞拉和其盟国厄瓜多尔支持毒品马克思主义的FARC的指控。


One week after the summit, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to calm the continent’s fears about the US-Colombia agreement, explaining that it is merely a minor revision of the Bill Clinton-era Plan Colombia, an American program to support the government against the drug cartels.	在峰会后一周，美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿试图缓和南美诸国对美国--哥伦比亚军事协议的恐惧。 她解释说这只不过是对克林顿时期《哥伦比亚计划》的微调而已。


But her words did little soothing.	美国的该项计划是为了支持哥政府对抗毒品卡特尔。 但她的解释没有令人放心。


Nor did it seem to help that even most local military analysts say that the agreement does not represent any major change in the US military position on the continent.	即使大多数当地的军事分析家都认为该协议并不代表美国在该大陆军事立场的重大改变，但也于事无补。


The simple fact is that the timing of the announcement of the pact was terrible, and gave a platform for Bolivarian rants that will not be without consequences.	事实非常简单，该协议宣布的时机太糟糕了。 它给了玻利瓦尔式“后果很严重” 的咆哮一个机会。


Indeed, the ongoing fallout is likely to remain very negative.	的确，这场未平的余波所带来的影响仍将是非常负面的。


By raising anti-American suspicions and strengthening Chávez’s position across the continent, the agreement weakens the influence of Brazil.	由于激起了反美的怀疑情绪并强化了查韦斯在南美大陆的地位，该协议削弱了巴西的影响力。


Recently, Brazil had been differentiating itself from the rest of the continent through its stable economy and vibrant democratic political system, both of which were helping the country’s poor.	最近，巴西因为稳定的经济和富有活力的政治体系而在南美独树一帜，而这两项都有利于该国的穷人。


So the spread and strengthening of Chávez’s so-called Bolivarian Revolution was not in Brazil’s interests, even though some of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s officials appear to be fans of Chávez and his administration.	所以，查韦斯所谓“玻利瓦尔革命”的推广和强化不符合巴西的利益。 尽管卢拉总统麾下的某些官员似乎是查韦斯及其政府的崇拜者。


The terrible timing of the US-Colombia military agreement also gave Chávez and his allies a reason to build up their armies against the “evil imperialist ianque .”	美国--哥伦比亚军事协议的糟糕时机还为查韦斯及其盟友壮大军力对抗“邪恶的帝国主义美国佬” 提供了理由。


After all, one must remember, the Bolivarian Revolution’s supposed “enemy�� is the US, and no one else.	毕竟，我们必须记住，玻利瓦尔革命的“假想敌”不是别人，正是美国。


So the agreement may legitimize and produce an arms race in South America, which is in no one’s interest.	因此这项协议可能在南美引发一场合法的军备竞赛，而这对于任何国家都是无益的。


Another unexpected consequence of the US-Colombia military agreement may be a further heightening of tensions between Venezuela and Colombia.	美国--哥伦比亚军事协议的另一个意想不到的后果可能是进一步加剧委内瑞拉和哥伦比亚之间的紧张关系。


The radical polarization of the Andean region between those two countries will create difficulties in building regional consensus and security problems in the Amazon, as well as weakening the Brazilian project for South American political and economic integration.	两国之间的安第斯地区的激烈两极分化会给达成区域性共识和阿马逊地区的安全问题造成困难，同时还会削弱巴西在南美政治经济一体化中的努力。


Finally, another major consequence of the US-Colombia deal are the doubts that it has created in Latin America about President Barack Obama’s administration, and about the future of relations between the US and South America, especially Brazil, the main regional power.	最后，美国-哥伦比亚协定的另一个重大后果就是在拉美制造了对奥巴马政府和对美国和南美，特别是和地区大国巴西之间未来关系的怀疑。


The agreement revived the perception that US diplomacy lacks sensitivity where the region is concerned.	该协议又印证了一种看法，即美国外交缺乏对该地区的敏感性。


If Obama wants to encourage moderate and democratic politics in South America, and to bolster Brazil’s efforts to foster stability and economic progress against the region’s radical and undemocratic forces, it must take greater care in not appearing to undermine those the US claims to support.	如果奥巴马想要鼓励在南美实行温和与民主的政治，并支持巴西对抗该地区的激进和非民主力量，以实现稳定和经济进步的努力，他就必须倍加小心不要给人口蜜腹剑的印象。


For Chávez is showing that the old cry of “Yankee go home” still resonates.	因为查韦斯正让人意识到“美国佬滚回去”的经典呼号仍然回响在耳边。


China’s Singapore Swing	中国转向新加坡


BEIJING – The Chinese Communist Party has released the final document of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee.	北京—中共公布了十八大三中全会的最终文件。


In the CCP’s history, the third plenum has traditionally been the occasion for the party to announce its major policies for the next 5-10 years.	从历史上看，中共往往在三中全会上公布未来五到十年的重大政策。


This year happened to be one of leadership transition, so the third plenum became more important.	今年恰逢领导层过渡之年，因此三中全会也变得更加重要。


As expected, its final document unveils a plan for comprehensive reforms that will reshape China’s economy and society in the next decade.	如人们所期望的，此次三中全会的最终文件揭开了将决定未来十年中国经济和社会面貌的全面的改革计划。


For starters, the household registration (hukou) system will be reformed.	首先，户口制度将得到改革。


Small cities and towns will allow migrants to apply for the local hukou with no strings attached, and medium-size cities will do the same, with some restrictions.	小城市和建制镇将放开农民工落户申请，不再附带条件； 中等城市也将如此，但会有一些限制。


Although large cities will remain as closed as ever, the new policy will dramatically weaken the institutional foundation of China’s long history of urban-rural and regional divides.	尽管大城市的大门仍如以往那样关闭着，但这一新政策将极大地削弱中国长期的城乡和地区差距的制度性基础。


Similarly, the one-child policy that has been enforced for the last 34 years will be modified.	类似地，强制执行了34年的独生子女政策也将修改。


In most provinces, parents who are both single children themselves already can have two children.	在大部分省份，双方本身都是独生子女的父母已经可以生育二胎。


The new policy recommends that provinces allow couples to have two children if either parent is a single child.	新政策建议各省允许任一方为独生子女的父母生育二胎。


While this will affect only around 10 million couples – a small number in a country of more than 1.3 billion people – the reform represents a gigantic step toward ending the one-child rule.	这项政策大概只能影响1000万对夫妻——对于人口超过13亿的中国来说，这个数字只是九牛一毛——但它代表了迈向结束独生子女规则的巨大一步。


Farmers, moreover, will be granted the right to sell their residential land on the open market and will be much more likely to be compensated at market rates when their land is taken by the government.	此外，农民将获得在公开市场上出售宅基地的权利，并大大提高他们在土地被政府征用时以市场价格获得补偿的机会。


State-owned enterprises (SOEs), meanwhile, are expected to surrender more of their profits to the government – up to 30% by 2020.	与此同时，国有企业将把更多的利润上缴给政府——到2020年上缴比例最高将达到30%。


This extra revenue will be used to finance China’s social-security system.	这一额外的收入将用于充实社会保障系统。


Indeed, from now on, the central government will take over social-security expenditure, establishing nationally unified pension and health-insurance systems, while the retirement age will be raised gradually.	事实上，从现在开始，中央政府将接管社会保障支出，成立全国统一的养老金和医疗保险系统，同时退休年龄将逐渐提高。


Currently, women can retire at the age of 50, and men at 55 – ridiculously low by global standards and clearly unsustainable, given China’s rapidly aging population.	目前，女性退休年龄是50岁，男性是55岁——以全球标准来看显然过低，且考虑到中国人口迅速老龄化的趋势，这显然是不可持续的。


SOEs’ power will be curtailed in other ways.	国有企业的权力还将受到其他方式的削弱。


Their ability to stifle innovation will be weakened by a drastic reduction in the government’s power to restrict the entry of new competitors into all areas of the economy, as well as a major effort to reduce bureaucratic red tape.	政府限制新竞争者进入经济各个领域的权力将大大受限，官僚主义繁文缛节也将遭到大力削弱，这将极大地降低国有企业对创新的制约作用。


Financial liberalization, too, will be deepened, which will help startups and private firms most of all.	金融自由化也将得到深化，受益最大的将是创业企业和民营企业。


In addition to pledging to liberalize exchange and interest rates, the final document also calls for allowing domestic private capital to form small and medium-size banks.	除了承诺汇率和利率自由化外，三中全会最终文件还要求允许国内民间资本组建中小型银行。


And, in an effort to bring coherence to commercial courts’ rulings, the court system will be directly financed by the central government, rather than by the corresponding local government.	此外，为了保证商业法庭裁决的一致性，法院系统将直接由中央政府而不是对应的地方政府提供资金。


This promises to strengthen the independence of the court system at the local level.	这将有利于增强地方层面法院系统的独立性。


All of these reforms have long been expected.	所有这些改革都是人们所长期期待的。


But the third plenum also provided surprises, including the creation of a leading group within the CCP to steer reform.	但此次三中全会还带来了惊喜，包括在党内成立全面深化改革领导小组。


China used to have a reform commission within the executive branch; the establishment of the leading group indicates the CCP’s commitment, and that of President Xi Jinping, to comprehensive reform.	中国的行政部门体系中已经有了发改委； 领导小组的成立彰显出中共和习近平主席对全面改革的决心。


A second surprise is the document’s emphasis on the market.	第二个惊喜是文件对市场的强调。


In the past, government direction was emphasized, despite an acknowledgement of the market’s positive role.	过去尽管也承认市场的积极作用，但总是强调政府导向。


Now, for the first time, the CCP is officially calling for “allowing the market to take a central role in resource allocation.”	如今，中共首次正式要求“使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用”。


A final surprise is that the document sets a timeframe to complete all of the reforms; by 2020, China is supposed to become a full-fledged market economy.	最后一个惊喜是为完成全部改革制定了时间表； 中国准备在2020年建成成熟的市场经济。


This is the first time in recent history that the CCP has set a specific deadline for policymaking.	这是中共在最近一段时期首次为政策制定设置具体的期限。


And yet, while all of these measures are encouraging signs, some key items are missing.	但是，尽管所有这些措施都是令人鼓舞的信号，也有一些关键点没有触及。


For example, there was no clear mention of further SOE reform.	比如，文件没有明确提出进一步改革国有企业。


Likewise, though the document calls for strengthening local legislatures, it proposes no concrete plan to curb local governments’ role in economic activities, which is one of the sources of distortions in the Chinese economy.	类似地，尽管文件要求加强地方立法机构，但并没有拿出具体的计划限制地方政府在经济活动中的角色，而这是中国经济扭曲的来源之一。


This is related to the final document’s most significant lacuna: political reform.	这与最终文件最重要的空白有关：政治改革。


In fact, a Singapore-style approach – combining a freewheeling market economy and an authoritarian regime – has clearly emerged from the plenum.	事实上，三中全会显然决定采取新加坡式的方针——自由市场经济和专制政权相结合。


It is an approach that awaits the test of time.	这一方针有待时间的检验。


Singapore is a city-state of five million people – roughly the population of the Haidian district of Beijing.	新加坡是一个城市国家，只有500万人口——大概和北京市海淀区相当。


Given China’s much greater size and complexity, the Chinese government’s pursuit of the Singaporean model, with its suppression of any and all social disorder, would ultimately undermine economic dynamism.	中国的规模和复杂性远甚于新加坡，因此中国政府追求新加坡模式以及对一切社会动荡采取高压手段最终会破坏经济活力。


To build the innovative economy envisioned by the third plenum, the CCP’s leadership needs to find a new governance model that fosters a vibrant society.	为了建设三中全会提出的创新型经济，中共领导层需要找到能培养有活力的社会的新的治理模式。


Sooner rather than later, the crucially important economic reforms that have just been unveiled will not be enough.	很快，刚刚展开的具有关键重要性的经济改革便会显得后劲不足。


China’s Real-Estate Wrongs	中国的房地产问题


BEIJING – China’s real-estate sector has been a source of serious concern for several years, with soaring property prices raising fears of overheating in the housing market.	北京—几年来，中国的房地产业已成为一个严重忧虑，一飞冲天的房地产价格让人们担心住房市场存在过热。


But, with price growth easing, it seems that the government’s campaign to rein in property risk is finally taking hold.	但是，随着价格涨势的减缓，政府遏制房地产风险的举措似乎终于见效了。


The danger now is that the housing market will collapse – bringing China’s economic prospects down with it.	现在的危险是住房市场可能崩溃，并将中国经济前景也拖下水。


In its effort to control rising housing prices, China’s government has pursued nine distinct policies, not all of which have served their purpose.	为了控制房价上涨，中国政府采取了九项不同政策，但并非每一项政策都达到了效果。


Though policies like limits on mortgages for first-time buyers and minimum residency requirements for purchasing property in a first-tier city like Beijing or Shanghai helped to ease demand, supply-side tactics, such as limiting credit to real-estate developers and imposing new taxes on property sales, have proved to be counter-productive.	尽管将按揭限定于首次购房者、北京和上海等一线城市要求达到最低定居时限才能买房等政策有助于遏制需求，但供给端的策略，如限制房地产开发商信贷、实施新房销售税等，效果适得其反。


This flawed approach allowed China’s housing prices to continue to rise steadily, fueling major housing bubbles, especially in first-tier cities.	这一存在缺陷的方针让中国房价继续稳步上升，催生了巨大的住房泡沫，特别是在一线城市。


The average Beijing resident would have to save all of his or her income for 34 years before to be able to purchase an apartment outright.	普通北京居民需要将收入不吃不喝存34年才能全款购买一套公寓。


In Shanghai and Guangzhou, the equivalent is 29 and 27 years, respectively – much higher than in other major international cities.	上海和广州则分别为29年和27年——远远高于其他国际大城市。


The expectation that this trend will continue has driven homeowners to retain possession of their properties, even though rental rates amount to less than 2% of a property’s market value.	预期这一趋势还会持续让业主继续持有自己的房产，即便房租率只相当于房产市值的不到2%。


But, with the real-estate sector finally facing a downturn, the time to rethink this investment strategy has arrived.	但是，随着房地产业最终开始面临下降趋势，反思这一投资战略的时间也已到来。


In the first four months of 2014, housing sales dropped by nearly 7% year on year, with construction of new floor area falling by more than 22%.	2014年前四个月，住房销售同比下降近7%，新建楼面面积下降22%以上。


As a result, downward pressure on property prices is mounting.	照此看，房价下跌压力正在积聚。


In normal times, citizens and officials alike would welcome this trend.	在正常时期，公民和官员都会欢迎这一趋势。


But, at a time of weakening economic performance, China cannot afford an implosion of the real-estate sector, which accounts for at least 30% of overall growth.	但是，在经济表现不力的时候，中国无法承担至少贡献了增长总量30%的房地产业崩溃。


Indeed, though China’s government has expressed its willingness to sacrifice some growth in its pursuit of structural reform and rebalancing, the impact of a housing-market collapse on the financial sector would cause growth to slow beyond the acceptable limit.	事实上，尽管中国政府表示愿意为结构改革和再平衡牺牲一些增长，但住房市场崩溃对金融业的冲击会导致增长下降至远低于可接受下限的水平。


That impact partly reflects the highly problematic nature of the Chinese government’s long-awaited move to liberalize interest rates.	这一冲击部分反映了人们期待已久的中国政府放松利率管制的政策有很大问题。


Instead of taking a direct approach – lifting the interest-rate cap imposed on banks – liberalization has been achieved by allowing shadow banking to flourish.	利率自由化并没有采取直接方式——提高银行利率上限——而是通过允许影子银行兴盛的方式实现。


As a result, a large number of nonbank financial institutions – such as wealth-management companies and online financial-services providers – are now using promises of high returns to attract small investors.	结果，如今大量非银行金融机构——如理财公司和在线金融服务商——以高回报承诺吸引小投资者。


Making matters worse, the monetary authorities have tightened the credit supply, in an effort to deleverage the Chinese economy.	更糟糕的是，货币当局收紧了信用供给以促进中国经济去杠杆化。


While both interest-rate liberalization and deleveraging are critical to the long-term health of China’s economy, the skyrocketing cost of borrowing is forcing many low-risk companies, which are unable to offer sufficiently high rates of return, out of the market.	尽管利率自由化和去杠杆化对中国经济的长期健康至关重要，但高企的借贷成本迫使许多低风险公司因为无法提供足够高的回报率而被挤出市场。


At the same time, real-estate developers who have borrowed heavily from shadow-banking institutions, based on the assumption that property prices would continue to rise steadily, may struggle to repay their debts, with a sharp decline in prices inevitably leading to defaults.	与此同时，认为房价将继续稳步上升而大量从影子银行机构举债房地产开发商可能难以偿还债务，价格的急剧下跌将不可避免地导致违约。


Given that the formal banking sector provides a large share of shadow-banking finance, this could initiate a chain reaction affecting the entire financial sector.	考虑到影子银行金融的很大一部分资金来自正式银行部门，这可能导致影响整个金融业的连锁反应。


Many remain convinced that China’s government – which wields with the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves and virtually unchecked authority – would be able to prevent a major financial crisis.	许多人仍认为坐拥世界第一大规模外汇储备、拥有几乎无限权力的中国政府能够避免重大金融危机。


But the financial crisis in the fast-growing city of Wenzhou, triggered by bad loans, suggests otherwise – not least because the economy has yet to recover fully.	但高增长城市温州因为坏账而发生了金融危机，这表明上述观点未必正确——因为经济尚未完全复苏。


There is no reason to believe that a similar crisis could not occur on a national scale.	没有理由认为类似的危机不可能在全国���围内发生。


To avoid such an outcome, China’s leaders must urgently adopt counter-cyclical measures.	为了避免这样的结果，中国领导人必须紧急采取反周期措施。


They should begin by eliminating non-market-based restrictions on the real-estate sector, which have generated serious distortions not only to the economy, but also to people’s lives, with couples divorcing temporarily to gain the right to purchase an additional apartment.	他们应该从取消房地产业的非市场限制开始，这些限制所造成的严重扭曲不但影响了经济，也影响了人民的生活，许多人不惜假离婚以获得购买第二套公寓的权利。


When it comes to the real-estate sector, China’s government has consistently had the right objective and the wrong strategy.	在房地产业的问题上，中国政府一直在用错误的战略追求正确的目标。


It is time to align intention with action.	目的和行动之间应该一致。


Otherwise, China’s financial sector – indeed, its entire economy – will suffer.	否则，中国的金融业——事实上，是整个经济——都要遭殃。


In Praise of China’s New Normal	为中国的新常态欢呼


BEIJING – China’s economy is, at long last, undergoing a rebalancing, with growth rates having declined from more than 10% before 2008 to roughly 7.5% today.	发自北京——在经过了漫长的等待之后，中国经济终于启动了结构再平衡进程，增长率也从2008年以前的超过10%下降到如今的约7. 5%。


Is this China’s “new normal,” or should the country anticipate even slower growth in the coming decade?	这是否就是中国的“新常态”，还是这个国家预期在未来十年内会出现更低的增长？


China’s rebalancing is apparent, first and foremost, in the export sector.	首先，中国经济在出口部门方面的再平衡是显而易见的。


Export growth has slowed from its 2001-2008 average of 29% annually to below 10%, making foreign demand a far less critical engine of growth.	出口增长从2001~2008年间的年均29%下降到低于10%，使得国外需求作为增长引擎的作用不再如此重要。


Moreover, manufacturing employment and output, as a share of the total, began to decline last year.	此外，制造业就业和产出占总体的比重在去年开始下降。


In fact, in the first half of this year, services accounted for more than half of total economic growth.	在今年上半年，服务业占据了总体经济增长的超过一半。


It is no surprise, then, that China’s current-account surplus has shrunk rapidly, from its 2007 peak of more than 10% of GDP to about 2% of GDP today.	因此中国的经常账户顺差从2007年占GDP超过10%的顶峰迅速下跌如今大概2%的情况也就不出所料了，


This rebalancing has helped to improve China’s income distribution.	这一再平衡帮助改善了中国的收入分配状况。


Indeed, in recent years, labor’s share of national income has been on the rise – a direct reflection of the decline in manufacturing and expansion in services.	事实上近年来劳动工资收入在国民收入中的比重有所上升——这也直接反映出制造业的收缩和服务业的扩大。


That has meant greater regional balance as well: The coastal provinces, which produce more than 85% of the country’s exports, are experiencing the most pronounced slowdown, while inland provinces have maintained relatively high growth rates.	这同时也意味着更深层次的区域性再平衡状况：占中国出口总量超过85%的沿海省份正经历着最为显著的放缓过程，而内陆省份则维持着较高的增长率。


As a result, China’s Gini coefficient (a 100-point index of inequality, in which zero signifies absolute equality and one absolute inequality) fell to 0.50 in 2012, from 0.52 in 2010.	在这样的形势下中国的基尼系数（定量测定收入分配差异程度的指数，其值在0和1之间，0表示收入分配极端平等而1表示极端不平等）从2012年的0. 52下跌到了2012年的0.


Two principal factors are driving this shift.	推动这一转变的是两大基本因素。


The first is the decline in global demand in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, which has forced China to adjust its growth model sooner than anticipated.	其一是2008年金融危机以来全球需求下降，迫使中国提前开始调整自身增长模式。


The second is China’s ongoing demographic transformation.	其二则是中国人口结构的不断转变。


The share of working-age people (16-65 years old) in the total population has been declining since its 2010 peak of 72%.	处于16~65岁之间的劳动人口占总人口的比例自2010年达到最高72%后逐年下降。


And the absolute number of working-age people has been falling since 2012.	而劳动人口的绝对数量也自2012年后不断减少。


At the same time, China is undergoing rapid urbanization, with some 200 million people having left the agricultural sector in 2001-2008 to seek urban manufacturing jobs.	与此同时，中国正处于高速城市化进程之中，在2001~2008年间有约200万人脱离农业寻找城市制造业工作。


More recently, however, the pace of migration has slowed substantially, with rural areas retaining 35% of China’s total labor force.	但近年以来这一移民进程持续放缓，而农村地区则吸收了全国劳动者总数的35%。


All of this implies lower growth rates for China – though perhaps not as low as the 6-7% rates that economists like Liu Shijing and Cai Fang are predicting for the next decade.	所有这些都体现出中国更低的增长率——虽然可能不会像经济学家刘世锦，蔡方所预计的那样低到6~7%。


In fact, relying on China’s past growth record to predict future performance is inherently problematic, owing not only to important shifts in the labor force, but also to the fact that the speed and scale of China’s pre-2008 growth was unprecedented.	事实上，依靠中国过去的增长记录去预测未来的经济表现显然是站不住脚的，不仅仅是因为劳动人口方面的重大转换，还必须认识到中国在2008年之前的发展速度和规模都是前所未有的。


For starters, it is likely that the contribution to output growth of the rising ratio of working-age people prior to 2010 was overestimated.	首先，在2010年以前劳动人口数量增长率对生产增长的贡献很可能被高估了。


That makes the subsequent decline in the ratio an inaccurate measure with which to determine the negative impact on economic performance.	这使得随后该比率的下跌成为了测定经济负面影响的一个不准确手段。


Moreover, this approach neglects the educational dividends that China will enjoy over the next 20 years, as the younger generation replaces older workers.	此外，这一手段忽视了中国在未来20年间享受的教育红利，因为新一代劳动者正不断取代老一辈。


As it stands, the rate of return-adjusted educational attainment for Chinese aged 50-60 is half that of those aged 20-25. In other words, young workers will be twice as productive as those entering retirement.	按照这一情况，50~60岁年龄段中国人的收入/受教育程度比率只有20~25岁年龄段的一半，换句话说，新一代劳动者的生产力将是临近退休者的一倍。


Indeed, the level of educational attainment in China continues to improve.	事实上，中国国民的教育水平正不断提升。


By 2020, the share of those aged 18-22 who are pursuing a college education will reach 40%, compared to 32% today.	到2020年，在大学求学的18~22岁青年将占到该年龄段总人口的40%，而目前为32%。


This improvement in human capital is bound to offset, to some extent, the net loss of labor.	这种人力资本的提升将在一定程度上补偿劳动力的净流失。


Furthermore, China’s low retirement age – 50 for women and 60 for men – provides policymakers with considerable room to maneuver.	与此同时，中国的低退休年龄——女性50岁和/男性60岁——为政策制定者们提供了相当大的回旋余地。


Increasing the retirement age by just a half-year for each of the next ten years would more than compensate for the annual decline in the labor force, which is projected to be 2.5 million workers during this period.	只需在未来每十年将退休年龄提高半年就足以补偿每年约250万劳动力的流失。


Other trends are boosting China’s prospects further.	还有另一个趋势在进一步推动中国的繁荣。


Though investment is likely to decline as a share of GDP, it will probably take a decade for it to dip below 40% – still robust by international standards.	虽然投资占GDP的比重不断降低，但可能需要十年的时间才能降到低于40%——按照国际标准来说这一比率依然较高。


Meanwhile, the capital stock can maintain a reasonable growth rate.	同时资本存量也会维持较高的增长率。


Finally, China’s capacity for innovation is improving steadily, owing to rapidly increasing human capital and rising investment in research and development.	最后，因为人力资本迅速增加和研究投资的不断增长，中国的创新能力正在稳步提升。


By next year, Chinese R&D expenditure, at 2.2% of GDP, will be closing in on advanced-country levels.	明年中国的研究支出将相当于GDP的2. 2%，接近发达国家的水平。


Based on these trends – and assuming a constant labor-participation rate – China’s potential growth rate over the next decade is likely to hover around 6.9-7.6%, averaging 7.27%.	基于这些趋势——并假设一个持续的劳动参与率——中国在未来10年的潜在增长率将在6. 9~7.


This may be much lower than the 9.4% average growth rate in 1988-2013, but it is more than adequate by global standards.	这个数字或许比1988~2013年间的年均9. 4%低得多，但相对于全球标准来说这已经足够了。


If this is China’s “new normal,” it would still be the envy of the rest of the world.	如果这就是中国的“新常态”，那么依然会是个令全世界羡慕不已的状况。


China’s Shadow Menace	中国的影子威胁


BEIJING – The US Federal Reserve’s decision to exit from so-called “quantitative easing” – its massive monthly purchases of long-term assets – is stoking fears of a hard economic landing in China.	北京—美联储退出所谓”量化宽松”（大规模月度长期资产购买）的决定正在引起关于中国经济硬着陆的恐慌。


But China’s strong economic fundamentals mean that policymakers have the space to avoid such an outcome – as long as they bring the country’s shadow banking system under control.	但中国强大的经济基本面意味着决策者有空间避免这一结果——只要他们能将中国的影子银行系统控制住。


As it stands, Chinese consumption and investment growth is expected to remain at roughly last year’s levels.	目前，中国消费和投资增长预计将维持与去年相当的水平。


Meanwhile, economic recovery in the advanced economies, especially the United States and Europe, is reinvigorating external demand, leading analysts to project annual Chinese export growth of more than 10% this year – 3-4 percentage points higher than in 2013.	与此同时，发达经济体（特别是美国和欧洲）的经济复苏正在重新刺激外需，这让分析师们预测今年中国出口年怎张率将超过10%，比2013年高3—4个百分点。


This would bring annual GDP growth in 2014 to a very healthy 7.5-8%.	这将让2014年GDP增长率达到相当健康的7. 5—8%。


The problem is that China’s financial sector has accumulated considerable risk in recent years, with broad money (M2) having ballooned to ¥110.7 trillion ($18 trillion) – almost twice the country’s GDP – at the end of last year.	问题在于，近几年来中国金融部门累积了大量风险，到去年年底，广义货币（M2）总量膨胀到110. 7万亿元，接近GDP的两倍。


In an attempt to rein in M2, which could indicate that the economy is overleveraged, the central bank tightened conditions for commercial bank lending, so that, for any given increase in M2, less credit is extended.	为了遏制M2——该指标表明中国经济有杠杆过高之嫌——中国人民银行收紧了商业银行贷款标准，因此，对于任何给定的M2增量，信用增量下降了。


But the move failed to contain M2 growth; on the contrary, M2 grew faster last year than in 2012.	但这一措施并未遏制M2的增长； 相反，去年M2增长比2012年更快。


Worse, restricting commercial banks’ role as financial intermediaries and encouraging the growth of unregulated shadow banking has generated even more risks for China’s economy.	更糟糕的是，限制商业银行作为金融媒介的角色、鼓励不受监管的影子银行的增长已经给中国经济带来了更大的风险。


Clearly, a new approach is needed – one that is based on a deeper understanding of the dangers inherent in China’s banking system.	显然，中国需要新方针——基于对中国银行体系内部风险更深认识的方针。


While it is true that surging M2 can reflect excessive leverage, it is not a particularly accurate gauge in China, where commercial banks can easily circumvent high reserve requirements and quantitative controls by moving loans off their balance sheets to wealth-management products – practices that fuel artificial credit expansion that looks like M2 growth.	诚然，M2的飙涨可能反映了过高的杠杆，但这在中国并不是一个特别准确标尺。 中国的商业银行可以轻松地规避高储备金要求和量化控制手段，只要将它们的贷款从资产负债表移到理财产品即可——如此形成的人为信用扩张与M2增长十分接近。


In this sense, it is the Chinese monetary authorities’ reluctance to open up the formal financial sector to domestic private capital, or to liberalize the deposit rate, that is fueling the expansion of shadow banking.	照此看，助长影子银行扩张的恰恰是中国货币当局不愿向国内私人资本放开正式银行部门和实施存款利率自由化。


With small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – by far the economy’s most important growth engine – unable to acquire sufficient funding from the formal financial sector, they have been forced to turn to informal channels.	中小企业——目前它们是中国经济最重要的增长引擎——无法通过正式金融部门获得足够的融资，被迫转向非正式渠道。


As shadow banking has become the primary source of finance for SMEs – which tend to be higher-risk borrowers – the financial risks in China’s economy have grown exponentially.	随着影子银行变成中小企业的主要融资源——而中小企业总是风险较高的借款人——中国经济的金融风险呈现出指数增长。


Exacerbating matters, the central bank’s repeated efforts to tighten the money supply raises the cost of capital.	雪上加霜的是，中国人民银行一再收紧货币供给，从而提高了资本成本。


Last June, the annualized interbank lending rate surged to more than 10% – a level that it almost matched in December.	去年6月，年化银行间拆借利率飙升到10%以上，12月又几乎重演了一次。


SMEs ultimately shoulder these costs, diminishing their ability to contribute to overall economic growth.	中小企业是这一成本的最终承担者，它们对总体经济增长的贡献能力也因此受到了制约。


Consider the Internet giant Alibaba, which began using Zhi-fu-bao, the Chinese equivalent of PayPal, to raise money last year.	以互联网巨头阿里巴巴为例。 去年，阿里巴巴开始利用支付宝融资。


In just a few months, it received ¥400 billion from 85 million small investors.	不出几个月，支付宝就收到了来自8,500万小投资者的4,000亿元资金。


Tencent, China’s largest Internet company, is now using the same strategy to compete with Alibaba, with both companies offering high rates of return – often 6-7% annually – to attract as many investors as possible.	中国最大的互联万公司腾讯公司现在正在用同样的战略与阿里巴巴竞争。 不管是腾讯还是阿里巴巴，都给出了相当高的回报率——年化水平通常可达6—7%——来吸引尽可能多的投资者。


The problem is that most of this investment is in the interbank market, meaning that SMEs ultimately face interest rates of more than 10% – and that does not include the added 3% for SMEs’ loan guarantees.	问题在于这些投资的主要去向正是银行间市场，这意味着中小企业最终面临超过10%的利率——还不包括3%的额外的中小企业贷款担保。


These unsustainable high rates are transmitting major risks to the real economy.	这一不可持续的高利率正在把巨大的风险转移给实体经济。


Nowhere is this more apparent than in the real-estate sector.	最能说明这一问题的莫过于房地产业了。


Liquidity-thirsty developers, unable to acquire financing through the formal banking sector, have been taking out massive loans at extremely high interest rates.	急需流动性的开发商由于无法从正式银行部门获得融资，不得不以极高的利率借入大量贷款。


But, in many cases, housing demand has not grown as expected, raising the risk of default – the effects of which would be transmitted to the entire financial sector.	但是，在许多情形中，房地产需求的增长赶不上预期，这提高了违约风险——其效应将传递给整个金融部门。


The fact is that China has never been closer to a major financial crisis than it is today.	事实上，中国从未像今天那样如此接近重大金融危机。


Yet China’s monetary authorities do not seem to understand the scale of the risk – or its root causes.	但中国货币当局似乎并不清楚风险的规模，也不清楚它的根源。


The Chinese economy may well need to be deleveraged.	中国经济或许急需去杠杆。


But, instead of blindly tightening the credit supply, policymakers must pursue deep financial-sector reform to liberalize the deposit rate, eliminate quantitative controls, and, most important, allow for the establishment of domestic private financial institutions.	但是，决策不能盲目地收紧信用供给，而必须深化金融部门改革，实现存款利率自由化，取消量化工具，最重要的是，必须允许成立国内私人金融机构。


Pursuing this agenda is essential to China’s long-term financial and economic health.	追求这些日程对于中国的长期金融和经济健康来说是至关重要的。


But doing so presupposes a major shift in Chinese monetary authorities’ mindset.	但这样做需要中国货币当局转换思维。


Therein lies the real challenge facing China today.	而中国今天所面临的挑战也正在这里。


Did US Drone Strikes Lose Yemen?	美国无人机打击输掉了也门吗？


NEW YORK – Recent revelations that the US killed an innocent American in a drone strike in Pakistan confirm what a new study, “Death by Drone,” of civilian harm caused by US drone strikes in Yemen shows – that claims about the precision of drone strikes are overstated.	纽约—最近，也门滑入了危机，这激起了一场争论：美国总统奥巴马政府称其在也门实施的以无人机打击为核心的反恐战略取得了成功是否错误。


The revelations also underscore the stark asymmetry between how the US treats drone strikes that kill its own citizens and those that kill others. While the Obama administration has now publicly acknowledged that it has recently killed three US citizens in drone strikes, it has refused to acknowledge countless other drone strikes around the world which have killed non-US civilians.	事实上，最新报告《死于无人机》（Death by Drone）指出，即使最近的危机不曾爆发，美国无人机打击给也门平民所造成的伤害也足以应该让美国反思这一战略。


In Yemen, the US has been conducting drone strikes since at least 2002, with estimates of the total number of strikes ranging from 91 to 203.	美国至少早在2002年就开始在也门实施无人机打击，总打击次数估计在90次到198次。


While the American and Yemeni governments have lauded the drones’ precise targeting, they have refused to meaningfully disclose key details about the strikes, including how many have been conducted, who has been targeted, or, crucially, the number and identities of civilians killed.	美国和也门政府大肆宣传无人机的精确定位，但拒绝披露打击的关键细节，包括阻止了多少次、以谁为打击目标，以及最关键的，误杀的平民数量和身份。


In a May 2013 speech at the National Defense University, Obama offered assurances that, outside the Afghan war theater, no drone strike would be carried out unless there was “near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.”	在 2013年5月的国防大学（National Defense University）演讲中，奥巴马信誓旦旦地表示，在阿富汗战场之外，除非“几乎肯定不会有平民伤亡，”否则就不会实施无人机打击。


Obama also claimed that the US targets only “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people,” and that it does not launch drone strikes when it has “the ability to capture individual terrorists.”	（总体而言，他的确承认美国无人机打击导致了平民伤亡。 ）奥巴马还宣称美国的目标只是“不断地对美国人造成紧迫威胁的恐怖分子，”美国不会在具备“捕获个体恐怖分子的能力”的情况下发动无人机打击。


“Death by Drone,” which includes first-hand testimony from eyewitnesses and survivors of drone strikes in Yemen, tells a different story.	《死于无人机》包括了也门无人机打击的目击者和幸存者的第一手证词，它向我们讲述了一个完全不同的故事。


The nine case studies documented in the report, four of which cover attacks that came after the 2013 speech, provide credible evidence that US drone strikes have killed and injured Yemeni civilians, suggesting that the “near-certainty” standard is not being effectively implemented.	报告中所记录的九个案例——其中四个包括奥巴马2013年演讲之后所实施的打击——以如山铁证证明美国无人机打击造成了也门平民伤亡，并指出“几乎肯定”标准并没有被有效实施。


The report also casts doubt on Obama’s other claims, with evidence indicating that targets of drone strikes, though perhaps posing a threat to Yemen, may not have posed a direct threat to the US, and that their capture may have been possible.	报告还质疑了奥巴马的另一个说法。 报告提出证据证明，无人机打击目标——尽管他们也许给也门造成了威胁——未必对美国造成直接威胁，并且捕获他们也不是没有可能。


In other words, Yemeni civilians have suffered and died from drone strikes that may not have been necessary.	换句话说，也门贫民因为未必需要的无人机打击而遭遇伤亡。


More generally, the report provides a window into the experiences of Yemeni civilians directly affected by US drone strikes.	对于被杀平民的家庭而言，无法证明无人机打击的必要性——甚至不直接承认实施了无人机打击——让他们更加无法接受家人的死亡。