We should applaud China, India, the United States, and the European Union for their pre-Paris pledges on climate action.	我们应该赞扬中国、印度、美国和欧盟在巴黎之前所做出的气候行动承诺。


These countries’ commitments created the sense of responsibility, trust, and solidarity that enabled 195 nations not merely to agree on a one-off deal, but to set in motion a series of increasingly ambitious five-year cycles to phase out greenhouse-gas emissions this century.	这些国家的承诺营造了一种负责、信任和团结的感觉，让195个国家不仅达成了一个前所未有的协议，还制定了一系列逐渐加强的五年计划，在本世纪内结束温室气体排放。


This is a clear signal that the carbon era has reached a turning point; as a result, there will be more investment in renewable energy.	这是一个清晰的信号，表明碳时代已经到达了一个转折点； 因此，对可再生能源的投资将会增加。


Countries also promised to work harder to protect the world’s most vulnerable, by aiming to limit average global warming to as little as 1.5º Celsius above pre-industrial levels.	各国还承诺更加努力地保护全世界最脆弱群体，将全球变暖平均幅度限制在前工业化水平以上1. 5℃以内。


And developed countries pledged at least $100 billion of annual climate finance to help the least developed countries cut their carbon emissions and prepare for climate change.	发达国家承诺每年至少拿出1,000亿美元融资帮助最不发达国家减少碳排放和为气候变化做好准备。


For the first time, an international agreement offers the least developed countries funds to cover some of the loss and damage caused by climate shocks.	历史上首次，国际协定将为最不发达国家提供资金弥补气候冲击造成的损失和伤害。


But in order to fulfill the Paris agreement, we must ensure that governments keep their promises.	但为了实现巴黎协定，我们必须确保政府信守承诺。


National emissions targets are voluntary, rather than inscribed in the agreement, so they are not legally binding.	各国的排放目标为自愿制定，而非协定指派，因此不具有法律约束力。


In hard, practical terms, there is not yet anything specific to slow the extraction of fossil fuels or stop high-polluting countries from using coal for electricity.	从实际角度看，并没有任何具体的规定减少化石燃料开采或阻止高污染国家用煤炭发电。


Developed countries made no individual commitments, and the starting year for funding adaptation assistance remains unclear.	发达国家没有做出个别承诺，适应援助融资的起始年份也没有确定。


We must keep the pressure on to make sure that the promised climate finance is sufficient to enable the least-developed countries to adapt to present and future climate change.	我们必须保持压力，以确保承诺的气候融资足以让最不发达国家适应当前和未来气候变化。


All of this must happen urgently.	所有这些都必须立刻发生。


The cumulative effect of previous decades of emissions means that there will be no chance for a last-minute solution.	前几十年排放的累积效应意味着最后一分钟才开始行动将追悔莫及。


In Africa, climate change may already be responsible for falling water levels in West African rivers; declining coral reefs in tropical waters; lower fruit production in the Sahel; fewer fish in the Great Lakes region; and the spread of malaria in the Kenyan uplands.	在非洲，气候变化已经导致西非地区河流水位下降、热带水域珊瑚礁数量下降、萨赫勒地区水果减产、大湖地区渔业产量降低和肯尼亚高地地区疟疾肆虐。


Without significant cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions, we will see far worse.	如果不大幅削减温室气体排放，我们还会看到更加糟糕的情况。


By threatening basic human needs, such as food and water, climate change will be a catalyst for instability, migration, and conflict.	气候变化威胁着粮食和水等基本人类需要，可能成为动荡、移民和冲突的催化剂。


Africa will pay a heavy price.	非洲将付出沉重的代价。


Fortunately, we now know that we can prevent catastrophic climate change while still providing the energy needed to sustain economic growth, create jobs, and lift millions of people out of poverty.	幸运的是，现在我们知道我们能够阻止灾难性气候变化而不妨碍提供保持经济增长、就业创造和让数百万人脱贫所需要的能源。


The many benefits of pursuing a low-carbon development path include not only cleaner air and better energy security, but also the opportunities that arise from decentralized and renewable power.	追求低碳发展道路有诸多好处，不但包括更清洁的空气和更好的能源安全，也包括分散化、可再生的能源带来的机会。


These opportunities are particularly crucial for Africa, where more than 620 million people live without electricity.	这些机会对于非洲来说尤其关键。 6.


The falling cost of solar power, batteries, and LED lighting means that renewable sources can now provide affordable, modern energy.	2亿多非洲人用不上电。 太阳能、电池和LED照明成本的下降意味着可再生资源已经能够提供平价的现代能源。


In Kenya, for example, Maasai women in Magadi who have been trained to install solar power have brought electricity to 2,000 households in just two years.	比如，在肯尼亚，接受太阳能电板安装技能的马加迪（Magadi）的马赛（Maasai）女性在不到两年时间内为2,000 户家庭带来了电力。


But to realize this economic and social potential, African leaders must combat corruption.	但要实现这一经济和社会潜力，非洲领导人必须打击腐败。


They must make the management of their utilities more transparent, strengthen regulations, and increase public spending on energy infrastructure.	他们必须更加透明地管理公用设施，增强监管，增加能源基础设施方面的公共支出。


Investment and external financing must follow.	投资和外部融资必须跟进。


This is not a question of aid, but of fairness, given that Africa contributes so little to global emissions but stands to suffer the most from climate change.	这不是援助问题，而是公平问题，因为非洲几乎没有“贡献”任何全球排放，却要面对气候变化最严重的冲击。


Investing in low-carbon energy also makes sound business sense: It boosts technology companies and promotes social entrepreneurship globally.	投资于低碳能源也具有很大的商业意义：它提振了科技公司，促进了全球社会企业家精神。


I am pleased that two initiatives launched in Paris will take us farther down the renewable-energy path.	我很高兴地看到，巴黎启动的两项几乎将让我们在可再生能源的道路上越走越远。


Europe and Canada pledged $10 billion toward an ambitious project called the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, which aims to install ten gigawatts of solar, wind, and geothermal capacity by the end of the decade.	欧洲和加拿大承诺投资100亿美元用于一项名为非洲可再生能源计划（Africa Renewable Energy Initiative）的雄心勃勃的项目，其目标是在这个十年末建设十兆瓦的太阳能、风能和地热能发电量。


And France and India launched the International Solar Alliance to raise more than $1 trillion by 2030 to deploy solar power in more than 100 developing countries.	法国和印度也提出了一个国际太阳能联盟（International Solar Alliance），目标在2030年筹集1万亿美元以上的资金用于在100多个发展中国家部署太阳能电力。


The Paris agreement has drawn the first broad strokes of a solution to climate change.	巴黎协定勾勒出首个气候变化解决方案的广阔图景。


But until its targets are translated into action, the world’s least-developed countries may not be convinced that the developed countries are serious about equity – or “climate justice.”	但在目标转化为行动之前，世界最不发达国家是不会相信发展中国能够认真对待平等问题——或“气候正义”的。


For Africa, 2015 must be a turning point.	对非洲来说，2015年必须是一个转折点。


If the world’s citizens hold their leaders to account for the targets they have set, it will be.	如果世界人民坚决要求他们的领导人重视他们所许下的目标，2015年就将真的成为转折点。


Quite simply, the historic responsibility for the planet’s future rests on the shoulders of us all.	很简单，对地球未来的历史责任落在我们所有人的肩上。


Revanchist China	复仇主义中国


SYDNEY – In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, on February 22, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe informed the audience of officials, experts, and journalists that Japan is “back” and will not stand down in its ongoing sovereignty dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.	悉尼——日本首相安倍晋三2月22日在华盛顿特区战略与国际问题研究中心发表演讲时向在座官员、专家和记者宣布日本“回来了”，并重申不会在与中国的尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛主权之争中让步。


With Chinese provocations on the rise, US President Barack Obama, Abe’s host, appealed for calm and restraint on both sides.	随着中国越来越多地采取挑衅行为，美国总统奥巴马呼吁双方保持冷静克制的态度。


Japan is likely to accede – grudgingly – to America’s request, as it remains dependent on its alliance with the US for its security.	日本有可能勉强答应美国的要求，因为其国内安全仍有赖于日美联盟。


But it will be much more difficult to persuade China that it should stand down.	不过，说服中国让步的难度会大得多。


China’s assertiveness over its sovereignty claim reflects more than a desire to exploit seabed resources, or to gain a widened strategic gateway into the western Pacific.	中国对主权要求的自信反应不仅限于利用海底资源、抑或扩大西太平洋战略门户的愿望。


It is also about national renewal and rejuvenation – the core of the Chinese Communist Party’s raison d’être.	它还关系到民族的重塑与复兴，也是中国共产党存在的核心理由。


Turning away from a fight with its former occupier and historical rival would be a step backward in this six-decade-long quest.	躲避与曾经的占领者和历史对手作战被视为面对六十年追求的一种退步。


The idea of Chinese renewal or rejuvenation was popularized by then-Premier Zhao Ziyang in the late 1980’s, and frequently promoted by Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.	20世纪80年代末时任总理赵紫阳提出了重建或复兴中国的思想，江泽民和胡锦涛两任主席将这一思想发扬光大。


Most recently, incoming President Xi Jinping, visiting the National Museum of China’s “Road Toward Renewal” exhibition, pledged to continue the “great renewal of the Chinese nation.”	最近，新任主席习近平在参观国家博物馆中国“复兴之路”展览时承诺要继续“中华民族的伟大复兴之路。 ”


What does “renewal” or “rejuvenation” mean to the Chinese?	“恢复”或“复兴”对中国民众来讲意味着什么？


All nations – great and small – embody a combination of historical fact and myth.	无论大小，所有国家都是历史现实和神话的有机结合。


In this case, the CCP’s view of rejuvenation is built on the belief that the zenith of Chinese power under the Ming and Qing dynasties represents the natural, just, and permanent state of affairs for a 5,000-year-old civilization.	以中国为例，共产党复兴理念的基础是明清两代国力的最高境界代表了这个5，000年古老文明自然合理的永久状态。


When Mao Zedong took power in 1949, his immediate goal was to re-establish the “greater China” of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), insisting that the Manchu-led empire was the permanent and enduring China.	1949年毛泽东上台执政时以重塑清代（1644-1912 ）的“大中国”为近期目标，并相信由满族领导的中华帝国定能国运长久。


But, while the assault on the Qing Dynasty by foreign powers is a historical fact, the notion that there has been one enduring China struggling against avaricious outsiders across several millennia is false and self-serving.	但清代遭受外侮却是不争的事实，因此认为数千年来中国一直与贪婪外部势力斗争的想法是虚伪自私的。


Mao achieved his goal following the so-called peaceful liberation of the East Turkestan Republic (now Xinjiang) in 1949 and the invasion of Tibet in 1950, which promptly increased China’s size by more than one-third.	毛通过所谓1949年和平解放东突厥斯坦共和国（也就是现在的新疆）以及1950年入侵西藏实现了自己的目标，令中国的国土面积扩大了三分之一以上。


And every CCP leader since has carried forward his vision of a greater China, adjusting and expanding it as the country’s power grows.	之后的每一任共产党领袖无不以发扬毛的大中国目标为己任，随着中国国力不断增长大中国也不断地调整和扩张。


For example, China showed little interest in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands prior to 1968 – the year a geographical study pointed to vast oil reserves beneath the seabed.	例如1968年前中国对尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛兴趣并不是很大，而恰恰是1968年的一份地理研究指出海底蕴藏着丰富的储备石油。


The same can be said for China’s growing stridency with respect to its claims in the South China Sea.	中国对南海领土要求日趋强硬也遵循同样的理由。


In 2009, relying heavily on a dubious historical claim, China formally tabled its “nine-dotted line” map to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and has since referred to almost all of the South China Sea as being under its “indisputable sovereignty.”	2009年，中国首次基于值得怀疑的历史陈述正式画出了标明大陆架界线的“九虚线”图并呈递给联合国委员会，并自此提出对南海几乎全部海域拥有“无可争辩的主权”。


Having dominated East and Southeast Asia for all but the last two centuries of the past two millennia, China is chafing at the current US-led regional order of sovereign states, in which even the smallest enjoys the same rights, privileges, and protection as the largest.	除过去两个世纪外的两千年间中国在东南亚一直占据主导地位，现在又对美国主导的最小国家享有与最大国家同等权利、特权和保护的主权国地区秩序发起挑战。


Modern China has benefited enormously from this arrangement; nonetheless, there is keen resentment that the Chinese civilization-state’s vast achievements over several thousand years offer China no special status.	这种秩序曾经让现代中国受益匪浅，但数千年来中国文明古国的巨大成就没有换来任何特殊地位令中国感到非常不满。


To a people imbued with a deep sense of superior moral worth, historical achievement, and victimization by foreign powers, this state of affairs is unjust and unnatural.	在深感道德价值优越、历史成就辉煌及外国势力迫害的民众看来，这种情况既不公平也不自然。


It follows that pulling back from any territorial dispute with smaller and inferior states would be seen as a humiliating defeat, rather than a step toward ensuring long-term regional stability.	人们因此感到在低人一等的小国面前就领土争端让步是一种耻辱的失败，而不是通往长期地区稳定的必由之路。


Moreover, an expanding view of greater China implies that a resolution of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in China’s favor would be likely to embolden rather than satisfy its ambitions.	此外，越来越被人接受的大中华概念意味着尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛争端以有利于中国的方式解决或许不仅无法满足中国的野心，反而会进一步扩大中国的抱负。


Making good on its claim to the South China Sea could be next.	同样解决南海问题也许将成为下一个目标。


As Obama and Abe forge a common strategy aimed at helping to manage China’s rise peacefully, they must understand that China’s conception of renewal seeks to resurrect a glorious past, and that this implies revision, not affirmation, of the existing regional order.	奥巴马和安倍在制定管理中国和平崛起统一策略时必须意识到中国的复兴概念意在重振过去的辉煌，而这意味着要对现有的地区秩序进行修改而非巩固。


This means that they will have to limit China’s strategic and military options, even if they cannot constrain its ambitions.	这意味着即使无法限制中国的野心，奥巴马和安倍也必须限制中国的战略和军事选择。


Greece and the Limits of Anti-Austerity	希腊以及反紧缩政策的限制


CAMBRIDGE – Is austerity dead?	发自剑桥——紧缩政策已经穷途末路了吗？


At last month’s G-8 meeting at Camp David, the German-led austerity program for the eurozone’s troubled southern members ran up against substantial resistance.	上月在戴维营举行的八国集团（G8）会议上，由德国主导的针对欧元区南部问题成员国的紧缩措施遭到了强力抵制。


Likewise, France’s recent presidential election bolstered those who argue that Europe must grow its way out of its debt-heavy public sector, rather than aim for immediate fiscal orthodoxy.	同样，对于那些认为欧洲必须逐步为其负债累累的公共部门找到出路，而不是硬要在短时间内符合财政教条规定的人来说，最近的法国总统大选结果堪称一记强心针。


And there is no guarantee that Greece’s newly elected center-right New Democracy party, which favors honoring the country’s bailout terms, will be able to form a majority government.	但我们也无法保证希腊新选出的中右翼新民主党——该党倾向于遵守（欧盟针对）该国的援助条件——有能力去组建一个多数派政府。


The United States, by contrast, has pursued expansionary and growth-oriented macroeconomic policies since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, despite massive budget deficits.	相比之下，美国虽然也拥有巨额财政赤字，但自2007-2009年金融危机后一直在追求扩张性以及以增长为目标的宏观经济政策。


Thus far, judging from the modest recovery in the US versus non-recovery in Europe, American policy accommodation is performing better than European austerity.	因此如果用美国的温和增长与欧洲的无增长作对比的话，前者的政策调节效果显然比后者的紧缩措施表现更佳。


But simply choosing between expansion and austerity is not the whole story.	但问题并不是选择扩张或者紧缩那么简单。


Macroeconomic policies interact with on-the-ground microeconomic realities in subtle but powerful, rarely remarked-upon ways.	宏观经济政策会以一种微妙却有力，而且鲜有人提到的方式与微观经济现实进行互动。


Simply put, Europe’s microeconomic structure makes the same growth-based macroeconomic policies less effective in the European Union than in the US.	简而言之，虽然同样都是以增长为目的的宏观经济政策，但欧洲的微观经济结构使其无法在欧盟取得与美国一样的效果。


Here’s why: macroeconomic easing, by lowering interest rates or otherwise pumping money into the economy, aims to increase economic activity.	原因在于：宏观经济宽松政策——通过降低利率或以其他方式向经济注入货币的方式——致力于增加经济活动。


With more money moving around, businesses rehire employees and ask existing employees to work more hours.	随着更多的货币四处流动，企业重新雇佣人手并要求现有的雇员工作更长时间。


Entrepreneurs considering whether or not to start a business decide to proceed, and their bank lends them the money to make the new business viable.	那些原本犹豫是否创业的企业家们决定动手，而他们的银行则发放贷款令这些新企业变成现实。


The newly hired workers and newly formed businesses spend money, which induces more hiring, more start-ups, and yet more spending.	这些新雇佣的工人和新生企业都会消费，也因此催生了更多的雇佣，更多新企业以及更多的消费。


The economy grows, yielding higher tax revenues, thereby helping governments to put their fiscal house in order.	经济发展，税收增加，因此也有助于政府理顺其财政机制。


The country grows its way out of its economic problems.	国家也因此逐渐摆脱经济困局。


But the EU cannot realize this scenario as easily as the US can, because micro-level rules in the EU generate friction that slows that kind of an expansion.	但欧盟无法像美国那样轻易实现这一设想，因为欧盟在微观层面的规则会造成一些摩擦，拖慢了这种扩张的步伐。


The EU’s stricter labor rules are a well-known and often-cited example.	对此欧盟更为严苛的劳动法就是一个广为人知且经常被提到的例子。


European labor-market rigidities mean that it is difficult in many EU countries to downsize a company.	欧洲劳动力市场的僵化性意味着在许多欧盟国家想要（以裁员方式）缩减一家公司的规模是极为困难的事。


Anticipating that difficulty, companies are less willing to hire in the first place, until they are sure that long-term demand for their products is sufficient to justify long-term hires.	正因为预见到了这种困难，企业首先会缺乏雇佣的意愿，直到他们确信长期的需求能支撑长期的雇佣为止。


Hence, even if businesses get easier access to money and loans, many firms will still decline to hire on a large scale, fearing that they would be saddled with a large payroll in a future downturn.	因此即便企业更容易得到钱和贷款，许多公司依然不愿意大规模招人，因此害怕在未来经济下滑时要背上一张巨额工资单。


For example, The Economist’s recent portrait of Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti shows that Italy continues to be stymied by labor rules that make businesses reluctant to expand beyond 15 employees (after which it becomes hard for a firm to downsize).	例如《经济学人》杂志最近对意大利总理马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）的描述就体现出意大利依然受到劳动法的制肘，使企业不愿雇佣超过15人以上（超过此数则难以缩减规模）。


To work smoothly, expansive macroeconomic policies require compatible microeconomic rules.	如果要更顺利地推动扩张性宏观经济政策的话，就需要令微观经济规则与其协调一致。


There is some irony in the fact that the strongest proponent of austerity has been German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government, because Germany, particularly under her predecessor Gerhard Schroeder’s Social Democrat-led government, did much more to liberalize the country’s rules for labor and business than other EU governments.	而讽刺的是，紧缩政策的最热情拥护者之所以是德国总理默克尔的政府，因为德国——尤其是在她的前任总理施罗德的社会民主党主导政府任上——已经在解放该国对劳动和企业规管方面比其他欧盟国家做出了更多努力。


Expansive, growth-based policy could work better in Germany than in many eurozone countries for which it is being prescribed.	因此扩张性，以增长为基础的政策在德国能比许多欧元区国家取得更好的效果。


Rules that impede business start-ups may be an even more important obstacle to making monetary expansion effective.	那些阻碍新生企业的规管可能是阻碍货币扩张有效性的一个更重要因素。


It is simply too difficult to launch many types of businesses in many places, and to expand those that are started.	在许多地方，启动一个新生企业或者扩张一个已有企业实在是太难了。


Necessary licenses are often not routinely obtained. The simple start-up paperwork is still more burdensome than it is in the US.	获取所需的执照往往需要走后门，简单的新企业文书申请工作比美国要繁杂许多。


Indeed, while this process has become easier in Europe in recent years, the World Bank estimates that it still takes twice as long to start up a small business in Greece and much of the rest of the EU as it does in the US – and four times as long in Spain.	事实上，当这些程序在欧洲变得日益简易之时，世界银行估计在希腊以及其他大部分欧盟国家成立一家小企业所花费的时间依��要比美国要多一倍——在西班牙则要再多花两倍时间。


While the relative absence of Facebook-style mega-entrepreneurial successes in Europe is regularly bemoaned, the difficulties of opening hairdressers, basic retailers, and simple mail-order businesses may have an equally profound overall effect.	当人们经常抱怨欧洲那种脸书（Facebook）式巨大创业成功的相对匮乏之时，开办美发店，小零售店以及小型邮购业务所遇到的困难也同样会带来深远的整体影响。


Consider taxi licensing.	以出租车执照为例。


Many people can drive a cab, including many who are unemployed, but not so many can get permission to do so in many major cities in Europe and the US.	许多人都能驾驶出租车，包括许多失业者，但没有多少人能被获准在许多欧美主要城市中从事这一营生。


Imagine much of the economy organized like the taxi industry.	试想大部分经济都采用出租车业类似的组织形式。


Most kinds of economic stimulus won’t generate more taxis, until entry restrictions are reduced.	因此大部分形式的经济刺激政策都不可能催生更多的出租车，除非行业准入限制被放宽。


Magda Bianco, Silvia Giacomelli, and Giacomo Rodano, researchers at the Bank of Italy, report that these institutional roadblocks to expansion remain substantial in Italy.	一份由意大利银行研究员马格达·彼安科（Magda Bianco）, 西尔维亚·吉阿科迈利（Silvia Giacomelli）和贾科莫·罗丹诺（Giacomo Rodano）共同撰写的报告指出意大利国内依然存在大量阻碍经济扩张的制度性障碍。


A factory might get easier access to funds, and it might see more demand for its products, but, rather than hiring new workers, it might decide to raise its prices.	一所工厂或许能更容易获得资助，并发现市场对自己的产品存在更多需求，但它为此做出的决定往往不是雇佣更多的工人，而是去提高产品售价。


A potential competitor might consider entering that market; but, given substantial regulatory entry barriers, it might ultimately decide to remain in its current business.	一个潜在竞争者或许想去进入这一市场，但考虑到大量的规则性准入壁垒，它可能最终还是决定留在原来所在的行业。


Expansionary monetary policy in such an environment might fail.	在这种环境下的扩张性货币政策很可能会遭遇失败。


Perhaps for this reason, France’s new president, François Hollande, favors using the government to direct specific outcomes – for example, by hiring 60,000 new teachers.	或许正因如此，法国新总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande）更偏爱用政府手段来引出特定的成果——比如雇佣6万名新教师。


One can imagine a grand bargain in Europe, with expansionary macroeconomic policies coupled with the easing of microeconomic impediments.	人们可以幻想在欧洲能达成一项大型讨价还价协议，把扩张性宏观经济政策和放宽微观经济障碍结合在一起。


But existing businesses and already-employed workers prefer the status quo, and can powerfully inhibit policymakers.	但现有的企业和已经找到工作的劳动者们都更倾向于维持现状，并可以有力地牵制政策制定者们。


There may be more than a little of this in Greek politics, and that of other EU countries.	而在希腊以及其他欧盟国家政治中，这个因素的影响力可非同一般。


Europe’s Last Act?	欧洲的最后行动？


NEW YORK – European Union leaders continue to play a game of brinkmanship with the Greek government.	纽约—欧盟领导人继续与希腊政府进行着边缘政策博弈。


Greece has met its creditors’ demands far more than halfway.	希腊已经满足了债权人的一大半要求。


Yet Germany and Greece’s other creditors continue to demand that the country sign on to a program that has proven to be a failure, and that few economists ever thought could, would, or should be implemented.	但德国和其他希腊债权人仍继续要求希腊签署已经证明失败了的计划，极少有经济学家认为这一计划可以、将会或应该得到实施。


The swing in Greece’s fiscal position from a large primary deficit to a surplus was almost unprecedented, but the demand that the country achieve a primary surplus of 4.5% of GDP was unconscionable.	希腊财政处境从大规模初级赤字转为盈余，如此进步几乎前所未见，但要求该国实现初级盈余达到GDP的4. 5%是不合理的。


Unfortunately, at the time that the “troika” – the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund – first included this irresponsible demand in the international financial program for Greece, the country’s authorities had no choice but to accede to it.	不幸的是，“三驾马车”——欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）——首次将这一不负责任的要求纳入希腊国际金融计划中时，希腊当局别无选择，只能屈从。


The folly of continuing to pursue this program is particularly acute now, given the 25% decline in GDP that Greece has endured since the beginning of the crisis.	继续追求这一计划的荒谬之处如今已经显露无疑，自危机开始以来，希腊GDP已经下降了25%。


The troika badly misjudged the macroeconomic effects of the program that they imposed.	三驾马车严重误判了该计划给希腊宏观经济造成的影响。


According to their published forecasts, they believed that, by cutting wages and accepting other austerity measures, Greek exports would increase and the economy would quickly return to growth.	根据三驾马车公布的预测，它们相信，通过削减工资和接受其他紧缩措施，希腊出口将有所增加，经济将快速回归增长。


They also believed that the first debt restructuring would lead to debt sustainability.	它们还相信首次债务重组就可以带来债务可持续性。


The troika’s forecasts have been wrong, and repeatedly so.	三驾马车的预测是错误的，并且一错再错。


And not by a little, but by an enormous amount.	不是略微错误，而是大错特错哦。


Greece’s voters were right to demand a change in course, and their government is right to refuse to sign on to a deeply flawed program.	希腊选民要求有所变化是正确的，希腊政府拒绝签署有深度缺陷的计划也是正确的。


Having said that, there is room for a deal: Greece has made clear its willingness to engage in continued reforms, and has welcomed Europe’s help in implementing some of them.	话虽如此，但仍有达成协议的空间：希腊明确表示愿意继续采取改革措施，也欢迎欧洲帮助其实施部分改革计划。


A dose of reality on the part of Greece’s creditors – about what is achievable, and about the macroeconomic consequences of different fiscal and structural reforms – could provide the basis of an agreement that would be good not only for Greece, but for all of Europe.	希腊债权人方面的某些现实——关于可以实现什么，以及关于不同财政和结构改革的宏观经济结果——可以成为协议基础，不但对希腊有利，对整个欧洲都有利。


Some in Europe, especially in Germany, seem nonchalant about a Greek exit from the eurozone.	一些欧洲人，特别是德国人，似乎对希腊退出欧元区漠不关心。


The market has, they claim, already “priced in” such a rupture.	他们说，市场已经将这一事件“体现在价格中”。


Some even suggest that it would be good for the monetary union.	一些人甚至认为这对货币联盟是件好事。


I believe that such views significantly underestimate both the current and future risks involved.	我认为这些观点���大低估了当前和未来的相关风险。


A similar degree of complacency was evident in the United States before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.	类似程度的自满在2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒闭前的美国也存在。


The fragility of America’s banks had been known for a long time – at least since the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns the previous March.	美资银行的脆弱性早已众所周知——至少在前一年贝尔斯登破产时已经如此。


Yet, given the lack of transparency (owing in part to weak regulation), both markets and policymakers did not fully appreciate the linkages among financial institutions.	但是，由于缺少透明度（部分拜监管不力所赐），市场和决策者都没有充分认识到金融机构之间的联系。


Indeed, the world’s financial system is still feeling the aftershocks of the Lehman collapse.	事实上，世界金融体系仍在感受到雷曼兄弟倒闭的余波。


And banks remain non-transparent, and thus at risk.	银行仍然不透明，因此仍然危险。


We still don’t know the full extent of linkages among financial institutions, including those arising from non-transparent derivatives and credit default swaps.	我们仍然未能充分了解金融机构之间的联系，包括来自不透明的衍生品和信用违约互换的联系。


In Europe, we can already see some of the consequences of inadequate regulation and the flawed design of the eurozone itself.	在欧洲，我们已经能够看到监管不力和欧元区本身设计缺陷所带来的部分后果。


We know that the structure of the eurozone encourages divergence, not convergence: as capital and talented people leave crisis-hit economies, these countries become less able to repay their debts.	我们知道，欧元区的结果鼓励分化而非趋同：随着资本和人才离开受危机影响的经济体，这些国家更加无法偿还债务。


As markets grasp that a vicious downward spiral is structurally embedded in the euro, the consequences for the next crisis become profound.	随着市场发现欧元在结构上出现了恶性循环，下一场危机的后果就会变得十分深远。


And another crisis in inevitable: it is in the very nature of capitalism.	而另一场危机是不可避免的：这是资本主义的天然性质。


ECB President Mario Draghi’s confidence trick, in the form of his declaration in 2012 that the monetary authorities would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro, has worked so far.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉2012年宣布货币当局将“不惜一切代价”捍卫欧元，这一信心游戏到目前为止效果很好。


But the knowledge that the euro is not a binding commitment among its members will make it far less likely to work the next time.	但认识到欧元并非成员国之间有约束力的承诺意味着下一次还能起效的可能性很小。


Bond yields could spike, and no amount of reassurance by the ECB and Europe’s leaders would suffice to bring them down from stratospheric levels, because the world now knows that they will not do “whatever it takes.”	债券收益率可能飙升，欧洲央行和欧洲贷款人的担保也不可能足以把它们从高空拉下，因为世界现在知道它们不会“不惜一切代价”。


As the example of Greece has shown, they will do only what short-sighted electoral politics demands.	希腊的例子表明，它们只会做拿下短视的选举政治要求它们做的事。


The most important consequence, I fear, is the weakening of European solidarity.	我担心，最重要的后果是欧洲团结的弱化。


The euro was supposed to strengthen it.	欧元理应增强团结。


Instead, it has had the opposite effect.	但它却起到了相反的效果。


It is not in the interest of Europe – or the world – to have a country on Europe’s periphery alienated from its neighbors, especially now, when geopolitical instability is already so evident.	让一个欧洲外围国家与其邻国脱离关系不符合欧洲——或者世界——的利益，特别是当地缘政治动荡已经显而易见之时。 相邻的中东正陷入动乱；


The neighboring Middle East is in turmoil; the West is attempting to contain a newly aggressive Russia; and China, already the world’s largest source of savings, the largest trading country, and the largest overall economy (in terms of purchasing power parity), is confronting the West with new economic and strategic realities.	西方正在试图遏制新的侵略性的俄罗斯； 而已经身为世界最大储蓄来源、最大贸易国和最大总体经济（以购买力平价衡量）的中国正在以新的经济和战略现实对抗西方。


This is no time for European disunion.	这绝不是欧盟解体的好时机。


Europe’s leaders viewed themselves as visionaries when they created the euro.	在创造欧元时，欧洲领导人认为他们具有远见卓识。


They thought they were looking beyond the short-term demands that usually preoccupy political leaders.	他们认为他们的眼光超越了常常左右着政治领导人的短期要求。


Unfortunately, their understanding of economics fell short of their ambition; and the politics of the moment did not permit the creation of the institutional framework that might have enabled the euro to work as intended.	不幸的是，他们对经济学的理解不如他们的雄心； 当下的政治状况也不允许成立或许能够让欧元如愿起作用的制度框架。


Although the single currency was supposed to bring unprecedented prosperity, it is difficult to detect a significant positive effect for the eurozone as a whole in the period before the crisis.	尽管单一货币应该带来前所未有的繁荣，但在危机到来之前的时期，你很难监测到欧元对欧元区整体存在巨大的积极效应。


In the period since, the adverse effects have been enormous.	从这一时期以来，消极影响倒是颇为巨大。


The future of Europe and the euro now depends on whether the eurozone’s political leaders can combine a modicum of economic understanding with a visionary sense of, and concern for, European solidarity.	如今，欧洲和欧元的未来取决于欧元区政治领导人是否能够将少量经济学理解和关于欧洲团结的远见卓识和关注结合起来。


We are likely to begin finding out the answer to that existential question in the next few weeks.	我们可能会在未来几周中找到这一生存问题的答案。


Europe’s Greek Failure	欧洲的希腊失败


BRUSSELS – Narratives matter, especially when they are intertwined with hard interests.	布鲁塞尔—叙事（narrative）很重要，特别是当它们与切实利益纠结在一起时。


As Greece and its creditors court catastrophe, we are getting a clear picture of how conflicting narratives can lead to a lose-lose result.	当希腊及其债权人撕破脸时，我们清楚地看到了互相冲突的叙事是如何导致双输结果的。


The facts are indisputable.	事实无可争论。


In early 2010, when the Greek government could no longer finance itself, it turned to its European partners and the International Monetary Fund for financial support.	2010年初，当希腊政府不再能够为其自己融资时，它转向欧洲伙伴国和国际货币基金组织（IMF）寻求金融支持。


And they delivered: not only did other eurozone countries issue loans to Greece, but the IMF provided its largest-ever loan to the country.	它们也提供了支持：不但欧元区国家向希腊提供了贷款，IMF也向希腊提供了有史以来最大规模的贷款。


Later, Greece received even more support through the eurozone’s bailout funds.	随后，希腊从欧元区援助资金中获得了更多的支持。


The result was hundreds of billions of euros worth of assistance.	援助总额达到了数千亿欧元。


But, as time progressed, Greece and its creditors came to view these facts very differently.	但是，随着时间的推移，希腊及其债权人对这些事实的看法出现了巨大的差异。


As Greece’s economic situation deteriorated, its citizens got the sense that the loans were not really intended to help them, but rather to bail out German and French banks.	随着希腊经济状况的恶化，希腊公民认为贷款并不是真的为了帮助他们，而是为了救助德国和法国银行。


With this narrative, Greeks could avoid admitting the role of their own government’s policy mistakes in thrusting them into recession.	采用这一叙事的希腊人可以避免承认希腊政府错误在导致他们陷入衰退中所扮演的角色。


Greece’s creditors, by contrast, felt that they had generously saved a profligate country from bankruptcy.	相反，希腊债权人觉得他们慷慨解囊让一个挥霍无度的国家免于破产。


This narrative allowed policymakers in Germany to disregard the fact that their country’s banks had financed Greek borrowing for too long.	这一叙事让德国决策者不顾德国银行长期为希腊债务融资的事实。


Both narratives contain a large amount of truth, but conveniently overlook some important facts.	这两种叙事都包含了大量事实，但也根据需要忽视了一些重要真相。


For instance, a substantial share of the loans given to Greece until early 2012 was indeed used to pay off maturing debt.	比如，2012年初以来向希腊提供的贷款中有很大一部分被用于偿还到期债务。


But it is likely that the holders of the debt were no longer French or German banks – who for the most part would have been unable to bear the uncertainty that preceded the 2012 bailout and haircut on Greek debt.	但有可能这些债务的最终持有者已不再是法国或德国银行——否则它们多半无法承受2012年前所存在的不确定性和希腊债务的减记。


By the time the eurozone governments intervened decisively, most French and German banks had largely unloaded their holdings at a loss to hedge funds and other investors with a greater appetite for risk.	当欧元区政府果断采取干预措施时，大部分法国和德国银行早已亏本脱手了所持有的希腊债务，把它们卖给了对冲基金和其他风险偏好更大的投资者。


Whatever debt they had held onto lost more than half its value in the haircut.	而没有脱手的债务在减记中损失了一半以上的价值。


Given this, it cannot be said that French and German banks did not suffer losses.	因此，不能说法国和德国银行没有遭受损失。


Similarly, the creditor countries were right that they had helped Greece, a country that had undeniably overspent for years.	类似地，债权国认为它们帮助了希腊，而希腊多年来支出过度是不可否认的，这也是正确的。


Their financial assistance allowed Greece to reduce its fiscal deficits more slowly than if it had simply gone bankrupt in 2010, as it enabled the country to remain connected to financial markets.	它们的金融援助让希腊能够以比2010年就破产的情形更加缓慢地减少财政赤字，因为援助让希腊能够继续进入金融市场。


In the first quarter of last year, Greece actually experienced a slight uptick in growth and a small decline in unemployment.	去年一季度，希腊经济实际上略有回升，失业略有下降。


What the creditors overlooked was that, over time, the pain of austerity began – in the minds of many Greeks – to outweigh the benefits of their assistance.	债权人忽略的是，随着时间的推移，紧缩的痛苦开始显现，在许多希腊人看来，这一痛苦超过了援助带来的好处。


Until a few months ago, it still looked as if Greece could achieve a primary surplus, albeit a small one, this year.	直到几个月前，似乎希腊今年仍可以实现初级盈余（尽管规模不大）。


When the country turned to its creditors for help, it was only because it could not cover some large payments on maturing loans.	希腊之所以向债权人求助，只是因为拿不出偿还到期贷款的巨大金额。


Greece had ceased to be a “bottomless pit.”	希腊已经成了一个“无底洞”。


With a bit of financial engineering, Greece’s creditors could have postponed some of the payments the country owed this year – payments that, it should be noted, everyone knew it would not be able to repay at this stage – and enabled it to continue its gradual recovery.	如果进行一些金融工程工作，希腊债权人可以暂停一些希腊今年所欠债务的偿付——应该指出，所有人都知道现阶段希腊无力偿付——让希腊能够继续缓慢复苏。


Instead, these clashing narratives created a deleterious spiral, fanning the flames of animosity and leading to the election of a left-wing government in Greece with a mandate to oppose austerity – with disastrous results for both sides.	相反，这两个互相矛盾的叙事制造了一个恶性循环，助长了敌意，导致了希腊左翼政府赢得选举。 该政府身负反对紧缩的使命——这给双方都会带来灾难性影响。


Rather than help Greece make its payments, the creditors reacted by imposing tough conditions for a new loan that would be used only to repay debts that they themselves held – a point that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras emphasized in his last proposal.	债权人的反应不是帮主希腊偿付，而是给新贷款施加严苛的条件——只能用于偿付它们本身所持有的债务，希腊总理齐普拉斯在其最终方案中强调的正是这一点。


And yet, blaming the creditors for their “punitive” conditions, as Greek negotiators have done, would also be a mistake, for this simplistic narrative too obscures a complicated truth.	但是，希腊谈判者指责债权人施加“惩罚性”条件也是一个错误，因为这一简单化的叙事也掩盖了复杂的真相。


Right before the talks were abruptly cut off for Greece to hold its referendum, the two sides had agreed on fiscal targets for Greece; all that was left was to determine how the targets should be reached.	就在谈判因为希腊举行公投而戛然而止之前，双方已经就希腊财政目标形成了一致； 剩下的内容只是确定这��目标如何达到。


The Greek government wanted to raise some taxes.	希腊政府希望提高一些税收。


Its creditors believed that this approach would stifle growth even more, so they advocated increasing the tax base, such as by eliminating the lower value-added tax rates enjoyed by Greek islands, instead.	其债务人认为这一方针会进一步制约增长，因此建议扩大税基，比如取消希腊各岛屿的优惠增值税率。


Though the creditors’ logic was sound and their intentions laudable, the Greek side believed that such a condition would amount to an affront to their country’s sovereignty.	尽管债权人的逻辑合理，初衷善意，但希腊方面认为这个条件冒犯了国家主权。


With that, their narrative morphed into one of national pride.	于是，他们的叙事演变成国家尊严。


It was a classic “prisoner’s dilemma.”	这是一个典型的“囚徒困境”。


Both sides have known throughout the tortuous negotiations of recent months that failure to reach an agreement would benefit no one.	双方都从近几个月来一波三折的谈判中明白，无法取得一致对双方都不利。


Greece’s economy would contract even further, and its creditors would have to accept even larger write-offs.	希腊经济将继续在衰退中挣扎，而其债权人也不得不接受更大的减记损失。


But the two sides have remained locked in their respective narratives – narratives that the recent cutoff of negotiations and hastily arranged referendum have reinforced.	但双方都陷入了各自的叙事之中——而最近的谈判中止和匆忙安排的公投强化了这些叙事。


Now, the Greek electorate is rejecting the creditors’ demands in the name of national pride, democracy, and sovereignty; the creditors are angry not only at their attitude, but also at their government’s unreliability.	如今，希腊选民打着国家尊严、民主和主权的旗号拒绝债权人的要求； 而债权人不但因为希腊选民的这一态度，也因为希腊政府的不可靠而愤怒。


Saving Greece was always going to be difficult, given its previous fiscal excesses and weak economy.	拯救希腊永远是件难事，因为之前希腊财政入不敷出且经济疲软不堪。


But last year, it seemed that success was within reach – until the clash of narratives derailed the progress the two sides had made.	但在去年，我们已经看到了成功的希望——直到互相冲突的叙事导致双方所取得进步毁于一旦。


This highlights a larger problem: the European Union lacks a unifying narrative strong enough to prevent the emergence of conflicting – and highly destructive – narratives within its borders.	这凸显出一个更大的问题：欧盟缺少足够强的统一叙事以阻止其内部出现互相冲突——并且极具破坏力——的不同叙事。


In this sense, the failure to save Greece amounts to a failure of Europe.	从这个角度讲，拯救希腊的失败意味着欧洲的失败


Getting Personal With the Greek Crisis	希腊危机的人格因素


BERLIN – Today’s decision-makers are supposed to embrace the virtues of big data, relentlessly pursue quantitative metrics, and then adhere to the optimal course of action that these powerful tools supposedly indicate.	柏林—如今，决策者被认为都接受了大数据的优点，大力追求量化指标，并遵循这些强大工具推断显示的最优行动方案。


Yet if there is one thing that the Greek crisis has made clear, it is the importance of the human factor in negotiations.	但如果说希腊危机说明了一点什么的话，那就是人的因素在谈判中的重要性。


People and their personalities, and the way they perceive one another, can make small debts seem unserviceable or large debts disappear with a handshake.	人和人格，以及他们彼此的感觉，能够让小规模的债务看起来如同无法维持，也能够让大规模债务在握手间烟消云散。


In a world that feels increasingly unstable, many seek reassurance in the illusion of certainty that data provide.	在这个日益动荡的世界中，许多人试图从数据所提供的确定性幻觉中寻找保证。


We want it in our journalism.	我们想在新闻中有它。


We want it in our investment decisions.	我们想在投资决策有它。


We even want gadgets that count our every step and heartbeat.	我们甚至想要为我们的每一步和每一次心跳计数的装置。


We want to bring our wellbeing and our future fully under our control.	我们想让我们的福祉和我们的未来位于充分的掌控之中。


But the Greek financial crisis serves as a reminder that life is not governed by data alone.	但希腊金融危机提醒我们，生活并不完全由数据决定。


In the end, outcomes may – and often do – depend on the amorphous yet essential qualities of integrity, trustworthiness, and interpersonal “chemistry.”	最后的结果可能——也常常——取决于诚信、信誉和人际“化学”的无形但重要的品质。


The importance of such factors was no less clear in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.	这些因素的重要性在伊朗核谈判中也尽显无疑。


Whereas partisan grandstanding and nationalist posturing in the Greek negotiations have eroded confidence in the entire European project, the negotiators on the Iran deal overcame an even deeper trust gap.	在希腊谈判中，党派秀和民族主义姿态腐蚀了对整个欧洲工程的信心，而伊朗核协议的谈判员克服了更加深刻的信任鸿沟。


With arguably more at stake, and despite the involvement of more players with overlapping and, at times, antagonistic agendas, entrusting the process to professional diplomats, rather than elected politicians, clearly paid off.	尽管所涉利益更大，尽管参与方面更多并且彼此日程重叠且（往往）互相冲突，但将谈判过程托付给职业外交家而非当选政治家收到了很好的成效。


There is an important lesson here for Europe.	这对欧洲来说是一个重要的教训。


People selected to lead countries or companies must have the technical competence – and the number-crunching support teams – needed to make good decisions.	被选出领导国家和公司的人必须具备技术胜任能力，还必须有数据分析团队支持，这样才能做出好决策。


But that is never enough.	但这样远远不够。


Effective leaders must be able not only to represent a point of view, but also to work well with others to realize their vision.	高效领导人不但必须代表一个观点，还必须和其他人精诚合作实现他们的愿景。


If deals – whether on bailout arrangements, nuclear programs, or corporate mergers – could be concluded on the basis of quantitative data alone, they would be.	如果协议——不管是援助计划、核方案还是公司并购——可以仅仅依靠定量数据基础就能达成，那早就达成了。


But they never are.	但事实是它们从未如此达成。


For Greece and its creditors now, the latest agreement is only the first step.	现在，对希腊及其债权人来说，最新协议只是第一步。


The six months of finger pointing and brinkmanship that preceded the deal have created a mountain of mistrust among leaders and citizens alike.	协议前六个月的相互指责和打擦边球在领导人和公民之间制造了巨大的不信任。


When multiple ceasefire agreements fail in South Sudan and eastern Ukraine, or a humanitarian truce in Yemen collapses within hours, one or more of the parties is said to lack “credible commitment.”	当南苏丹和东乌克兰多边停火协议失败时，当也门人道主义停火在几小时内便宣告失败时，有一方或多方被称为没有“可信的承诺”。


Similarly, when the Greek side proposes essentially the same deal that it just called a snap referendum to reject, or when the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, following Germany’s lead, simply ignores the unsustainability of Greece’s debt, the ability to execute any deal must be in doubt.	类似地，当希腊方面提出与它刚刚召集临时公投否决的协议几乎一样的方案时，当由欧元区财政部长组成的欧元集团在德国的领导下完全无视希腊债务的不可持续性时，任何协议的执行力都必然会遭受质疑。


What will make this deal work is quick ratification and credible follow-through in terms of day-to-day implementation.	让协议起作用的办法是迅速批准和可信地以逐日实施的方式跟进。


Both sides need incentives to stick with it and deterrents to defecting from it.	双方都需要激励遵守协议，需要震慑使之不敢违背协议。


Above all, conditioning further, essential debt relief for Greece on its execution of the deal should be used as a way to commit both sides.	最重要的是，以执行协议作为对希腊实行进一步的至关重要的债务纾困的条件应该被双方都采用。


A track record of failed implementation – of accepting bailouts without implementing the reforms needed to regain solvency – creates a climate in which deal making becomes ever more difficult.	实施失败的历史记录——即接受援助但没有实施重塑偿债能力所需要的改革——形成了一个让形成协议变得更加困难的气候。


The risks are too high, especially when every development in the talks is spun for partisan advantage, to make leaders look smart, to label winners and losers, or to undermine progress by nit-picking the data.	其中的风险太大，尤其是当谈判的每一次发展都围绕党派利益、都是为了表现领导者的英明、都要贴上胜败标签、都因为对数据吹毛求疵而破坏进展时。


It is to the credit of European leaders involved in the negotiations that they have been able to reach a deal in the face of enormous uncertainty.	参与谈判的欧洲领导人值得赞扬，因为他们在面临巨大的不确定性的情况下成功达成了协议。


They have committed not just financial resources but also significant political capital at a make-or-break moment for Europe.	面对欧洲生死存亡的时刻，他们不但投入了金融资源，也投入了巨大的政治资本。


Given the lack of trust between the parties to the deal, the situation will remain extremely volatile for some time.	由于协议各方缺少信任，有时局面会极度波动。


Quantitative data will be necessary to monitor Greece’s progress on carrying out the agreed reforms, as well as to determine the extent of further debt relief.	要监督希腊在实施协议改革方面的进展，要决定后续债务纾困的程度，都需要定量数据。


But neither Greece nor Europe will regain a sense of stability merely because the data add up.	但希腊和欧洲都不会因为数据的堆积而重新获得稳定感。


Their leaders’ personal qualities – their unshakable will and determination to make the deal stick – must add up, too.	它们的领导人的个人品质——稳定协议的坚不可摧的意愿和决心——也是必须的。


Greece’s Imperfect Imperative	希腊的不完美任务


LONDON – Greece and its creditors are now enacting a deal that provides financial support in exchange for wide-ranging reforms.	伦敦—希腊及其债权人正在制定一份协议，用金融支持换取范围广泛的改革。


Although reservations about the agreement abound, political conditions did not permit a better one.	尽管对于该协议充满了保留意见，但这已是现有政治环境下的最好结果了。


But the deal can – and must – serve as the basis for saving Greece and the eurozone.	但该协议能够——也必须——成为拯救希腊和欧元区的基础。


For the plan to work, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras must show real commitment to a reform program in which neither he nor many Greek citizens believe.	要让计划起作用，希腊总理齐普拉斯必须拿出真正的改革方案承诺，而他和许多希腊公民都不相信这一方案。


And he must forge an alliance with Greece’s pro-European parties, because only a united government will be able to deliver.	他还必须与希腊的亲欧洲政党结成联盟，因为唯有联合政府能够实施改革。


The creditors must find the money to fund the bailout.	债权人必须筹集资金支持援助。


And the International Monetary Fund must agree with the Eurogroup on how to restore debt sustainability in Greece, a precondition for the country to regain access to capital markets.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）必须同意欧元集团关于如何重建希腊债务可持续性（这是希腊重回资本市场的先决条件）的建议。


In this effort, a critical distinction must be made: though Greece has committed to deep and rapid reform, it must not be forced into hurried fiscal consolidation.	在此过程中，必须做一个关键性区分：尽管希腊承诺采取深刻而迅速的改革，但不能强迫它匆忙进行财政整合。


Indeed, such an approach could undermine urgently needed structural reforms, not least by destroying the political capital required to enact them.	事实上，这一方针可能破坏急需的结构改革，因为它毁掉了实施改革所需要的政治资本。


Unfortunately, the recent agreement includes unrealistic proposals for fiscal adjustment.	不幸的是，当前协议就包含了不切实际的财政调整方案。


Before Greek banks closed and capital controls were imposed in late June, the European Commission put the primary budget deficit for this year at €4-6 billion ($4.3-6.5 billion), or 2-3% of GDP.	在6月底希腊银行关门、实施资本管制之前，欧盟委员会将今年的初级预算赤字定为40—60亿欧元或GDP的2—3%。


Now, it looks like the primary deficit (which excludes interest payments) could reach 6% of GDP, with GDP falling by 4%.	如今，初级赤字（不含利息支付）可能达到GDP的6%，因为GDP下降了4%。


Yet the new deal anticipates that Greece will make up for the year’s fiscal shortfall in just five months.	但新协议预计希腊将在短短五个月后弥补今年的财政窟窿。


As Greece and other eurozone countries have already learned, attempting to rush fiscal adjustment increases the debt burden, as the liquidity squeeze and concomitant uncertainty undermine output and reform efforts.	希腊和其他欧元区国家已经知道，匆忙进行财政调整会增加债务负担，因为流动性挤压和伴生不确定性会拖累产出和改革措施。


For example, one of the key initiatives to address the fiscal shortfall is an increase in the value-added tax to 23% for almost all goods and services.	比如，填补财政窟窿的主要措施之一是对几乎所有商品和服务增加23%的增值税。


But with VAT evasion in Greece as high as 50%, the hike will place firms that pay, which tend to be larger and more efficient, at an even greater disadvantage relative to firms that do not.	但希腊增值税逃税率高达50%，如此增税将让缴税企业——一般是规模较大、效率较高的企业——相对不缴税的企业处于更大的劣势。


Greece should therefore focus first on building the legal and technical infrastructure to combat tax evasion.	因此，希腊应该首先着重于构建治理逃税的法律和技术基础设施。


Greece’s government will find it hard to adhere to the new program unless its fiscal targets make sense.	除非希腊政府的财政目标有意义，否则它就无法完成新方案。


Though it is politically unrealistic to renegotiate the deal at this point, a serious analysis of the necessary fiscal adjustment, possibly arbitrated by independent experts, is needed.	尽管现在重新谈判协议在政治上不现实，但需要对必要的财政调整进行严格分析，���一分析可以让独立专家审核。


The IMF’s latest analysis of Greece’s debt sustainability reinforces this assessment.	IMF对希腊债务可持续性的最新分析强化了这一评估。


Despite pressure from Germany and other countries to participate in the new bailout program, the Fund will not get involved unless it judges Greece’s debt to be sustainable.	尽管有来自德国和其他参与新援助方案的国家的压力，但IMF不会介入其中，除非它判断希腊债务可持续。


That means making the economy’s debt stocks and fiscal flows consistent, with the right combination of tough but feasible fiscal targets and debt relief.	这意味着让希腊经济的债务存量和财政流相一致，并有艰难但可行的财政目标和债务纾困的正确组合。


Fiscal discipline should not take priority over the important structural reforms included in the new deal, particularly measures to overhaul pensions, the legal system, product markets, public administration, and the judiciary.	财政纪律不应该优先于包含在新协议内的重要结构改革，特别是改进退休金、法律制度、产品市场、公共行政和司法的措施。


Implementation will be very difficult even without excessively tight fiscal targets; with them, it may be impossible.	即使没有过紧的财政目标，实施也十分困难； 如果有过紧的财政目标，那么实施根本无从下手。


Previous attempts at pension reform, for example, have been partial and indecisive, with exceptions and grace periods undermining their effectiveness.	比如，此前的退休金改革只是非决定性的局部小打小闹，各种例外和宽限破坏了其效果。


Similarly, though attempts to reform the code of civil procedure, aimed at improving the judicial system’s efficiency, began in 2011, little progress has been made, owing largely to the government’s failure to face down opposition from lawyers’ associations, which stand to lose their excessive fees from useless procedures.	类似地，2011年希腊大刀阔斧地改革民事诉讼法以改善司法体系的效率，结果收效甚微，很大程度上是因为政府无法抵挡来自律师协会的反对——他们将失去来自无效诉讼的大量费用。


And, although the groundwork has been laid for product-market reforms, no preparations for serious public-administration reform have been made.	此外，尽管产品市场改革基础已经打好，但动真格的公共行政改革准备从未就绪。


The key to overcoming these challenges is for the Greek people to take ownership of the reforms, so that the public interest can prevail over vested interests.	克服这些挑战的关键是让希腊人民拥有改革，从而使公共利益压倒既得利益。


But that, too, will be difficult, given the widespread view that the reforms are being imposed on Greece by its creditors.	但这也十分困难，因为人们广泛认为改革是债权人强加给希腊的。


Tsipras must lead the way by building a broad consensus.	齐普拉斯必须带头建立广泛共识。


The details of the reform legislation are important.	改革立法的细节很重要。


Rather than attempting to meet unfeasible deadlines, legislators should proceed with deliberate speed.	立法者不应该去迎合不可行的期限，而应该从容推进。


Meanwhile, Greek banks – which, given their huge volume of non-performing loans, are now more likely to be insolvent than illiquid – will require massive recapitalization, funded by the European Stability Mechanism, not the Greek state, in order to break the bank-sovereign link.	与此同时，希腊银行——拜巨额不良贷款所赐，它们更大的问题是资不抵债而不是缺乏流动性——需要大规模资本重组（recapitalization），重组资金应该来自欧洲稳定性机制（European Stability Mechanism，ESM）而非希腊国家，以打破银行-主权联系。


The operation might involve restructuring as well.	具体的操作还应该包括结构重组（restructuring）。


In this effort, there must be no bail-in of depositors, which would have damaging social consequences, or Greek state ownership of the banks, which would entrench clientelism in the financial system.	在此过程中，绝不能有储户的自救（bail-in），自救将产生危险的社会后果； 也不能有希腊银行国有化，国有化将让金融体系中的裙带主义变得根深蒂固。


The ESM would later sell the banks in open auctions to recoup its investment.	ESM随后将以公开拍卖的方式出售希腊银行以收回投资。


Many in Greece, as well as some outsiders, have called the new agreement “neocolonialist oppression.”	许多希腊人，以及一些外部人士，将新协议称为“新殖民主义压迫”。


And, indeed, Greece’s humiliation in the negotiations evoked memories of the Indonesian president’s treatment by the IMF during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.	事实上，希腊在谈判中的羞辱让人想起了印尼总统在1997年亚洲金融危机时受到的IMF的“待遇”。


(Some creditors feel that they are the true victims, exploited by Greek counterparts who never intended to fulfill their promises.)	（一些债权人认为他们是真正的受害人，上了希腊对手方的圈套，后者从来没有想过兑现承诺。 ）


But the Greeks must put aside these emotional responses and recognize the need for many of the proposed reforms.	但希腊人决不可感情用事，他们必须认识到改革方案中许多内容是必要的。


Greece’s failure to implement them has allowed the clientelism, oligarchy, corruption, and tax evasion underpinning its economic and political dysfunction to continue practically unfettered.	希腊没能实施这些改革导致了裙带主义、寡头政治、腐败和逃税几乎得不到约束，而这些东西是希腊经济和政治动荡的根源。


The alternative is a Greek exit from the eurozone.	另一条路是希腊退出欧元区。


(German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s suggestion that Greece can just take a “time out” is a fiction.)	（德国财政部长朔伊布勒建议希腊只能“暂退”的说法是杜撰。


Economists who pretend that this would be anything less than an economic and political catastrophe for Greece should look closely at the structure of Greek trade, the anemic response of exports to the already huge internal devaluation, and company and household balance sheets.	）假装这一情形不会给希腊带来经济和政治灾难的经济学家应该仔细看看希腊贸易的结构，看看已经进行了巨大的内部贬值的希腊出口并没有得到提振，看看希腊公司和家庭的资产负债表。


Some would welcome the damage this would do to European unity; we would not.	一些人乐于见到这样的情形给欧洲统一带来的伤害；


The recent agreement is far from ideal.	我们不是这样。 最新协议远非理想。


But Greece and its creditors must make it work.	但希腊及其债权人必须让它起作用。


Saving Greece, Saving Europe	拯救希腊，拯救欧洲


BERKELEY – Whatever one thinks about the tactics of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government in negotiations with the country’s creditors, the Greek people deserve better than what they are being offered.	伯克利—不管你如何评论希腊总理齐普拉斯政府在与希腊债权人谈判中所使用的策略，希腊人民理应获得比目前所得到的更优厚的条件。


Germany wants Greece to choose between economic collapse and leaving the eurozone.	德国想让希腊在经济崩溃和退出欧元区之间做出选择。


Both options would mean economic disaster; the first, if not both, would be politically disastrous as well.	这两个选项都意味着经济灾难； 其中前者（或者两者都是如此）还可能引发政治灾难。


When I wrote in 2007 that no member state would voluntarily leave the eurozone, I emphasized the high economic costs of such a decision.	我在2007年写道，没有一个成员国会自愿离开欧元区。 我强调，这一决定将带来巨大的经济代价。


The Greek government has shown that it understands this.	希腊政府表明，它明白这一点。


Following the referendum, it agreed to what it – and the voters – had just rejected: a set of very painful and difficult conditions.	公投之后，它同意了此前它——以及希腊选民——拒绝的东西：一系列非常痛苦和困难的条件。


Tsipras and his new finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos, have gone to extraordinary lengths to mollify Greece’s creditors.	齐普拉斯和他的新财政部长察卡洛托斯（Euclid Tsakalotos）做出了重大让步以期与希腊债权人达成妥协。


But when I concluded that no country would leave the eurozone, I failed to imagine that Germany would force another member out.	但我在下结论说没有一个国家将离开欧元区时，我没有想到德国会强迫另一个成员国退出。


This, clearly, would be the effect of the politically intolerable and economically perverse conditions tabled by Germany’s finance ministry.	显然，这将是德国财政部所提出的政治上不可接受、经济上“任性”跋扈的条件的后果。


German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s idea of a temporary “time out” from the euro is ludicrous.	德国财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）提出暂时“停止”欧元区资格，这一想法实在荒谬。


Given Greece’s collapsing economy and growing humanitarian crisis, the government will have no choice, absent an agreement, but to print money to fund basic social services.	希腊经济正在崩溃，人道主义危机日益严重，若无法达成协议，其政府将别无选择，只能印钱提供基本社会服务。


It is inconceivable that a country in such deep distress could meet the conditions for euro adoption – inflation within 2% of the eurozone average and a stable exchange rate for two years – between now and the end of the decade.	要让一个陷入如此深度危机的国家在从现在到2020年间满足采用欧元的条件——两年内通货膨胀限制在欧元区平均水平2%之内并且汇率保持稳定——是无法想象的。


If Grexit occurs, it will not be a holiday; it will be a retirement.	如果希腊退出，将不是“休假”而是“退休”。


Early Monday morning, European leaders agreed to remove the reference to this “time out” from the announcement of the latest bailout deal.	星期一清晨，欧洲领导人同意将“暂停”一词从最新援助协议中删除。


But this door, having been opened, will not now be easily closed.	但这扇门已经打开，再想关上它绝非易事。


The Eurosystem has been rendered more fragile and subject to destabilization.	欧元系统（Eurosystem）变得更加脆弱，极易受到动摇。


Other European finance ministers will have to answer for agreeing to forward to their leaders a provisional draft containing Schäuble’s destructive language.	其他欧洲财政部长将不得不同意向他们的领导人递交包含朔伊布勒的破坏性用词的方案草案。


Economically, the new program is perverse, because it will plunge Greece deeper into depression.	从经济上讲，这一新方案非常糟糕，因为它将希腊推向了根深的萧条。


It envisages raising additional taxes, cutting pensions further, and implementing automatic spending cuts if fiscal targets are missed.	该方案计划提高税收、进一步削减退休金、并且在财政目标无法完成时实施自动减支；


But it provides no basis for recovery or growth.	但却没有为复苏或增长打下基础。


The Greek economy is already in free-fall, and structural reforms alone will not reverse the downward spiral.	希腊经济已经呈现出自由落体之势，光靠结构改革无法扭转下降螺旋。


The agreement continues to require primary budget surpluses (net of interest payments), rising to 3.5% of GDP by 2018, which will worsen Greece’s slump.	协议继续要求初级预算盈余（不含利息支付）到2018年增加至GDP的3. 5%，这将恶化希腊衰退。


Re-profiling the country’s debt, which is implicitly part of the agreement, will do nothing to ameliorate this, given that interest payments already are minimal through the end of the decade.	重组希腊债务是协议的隐含内容，但它无法减轻负担，因为到2020年，利息支付都将是最小限度。


As the depression deepens, the deficit targets will be missed, triggering further spending cuts and accelerating the economy’s contraction.	随着萧条的深入，赤字目标将无法达成，引起进一步减支和经济收缩加速。


Eventually, the agreement will trigger Grexit, either because the creditors withdraw their support after fiscal targets are missed, or because the Greek people rebel.	最后，该协议将引发希腊退出（Grexit），或者是因为债权人在财政目标无法实现的情况下收回支持，或者是因为希腊人民奋起反抗。


Triggering that exit is transparently Germany’s intent.	引发希腊退出显然就是德国的初衷。


Finally, the privatization fund at the center of the new program will do nothing to encourage structural reform.	最终，作为新方案核心的私有化基金的唯一作用是鼓励结构改革。


Yes, Greece needs to privatize inefficient public enterprises.	诚然，希腊需要私有化效率低下的公共单位。


But the Greek government is being asked to privatize with a gun held to its head.	但希腊政府可以说是被枪指着脑袋强迫私有化。


Privatization at fire-sale prices, with most of the proceeds used to pay down debt, will not put Greek parliamentarians or the public in a mood to press ahead enthusiastically with structural reform.	以跳楼价私有化——所得资金大部分用来还债——不可能让希腊议会或公众充满热情地推动结构改革。


Greece deserves better.	希腊理应变得更好。


It deserves a program that respects its sovereignty and allows the government to establish its credibility over time.	它利用获得尊重其主权、能让其政府随着时间推移建立信誉的方案。


It deserves a program capable of stabilizing its economy rather than bleeding it to death.	它理应获得能够稳定其经济而不是落井下石的方案。


And it deserves support from the ECB to enable it to remain a eurozone member.	它理应获得欧洲央行的支持以使其保留欧元区成员资格。


Europe deserves better, too.	欧洲也理应变得更好。


Other European countries should not in good conscience accede to this politically destructive, economically perverse program.	其他欧洲国家不应该怀着良好的初衷同意采取这一政治上有害、经济上“任性”的方案。


They should remind themselves that Greece had plenty of help from its European partners in getting to this point.	它们应该提醒自己，希腊走到今天这一步少不了欧洲伙伴国的“帮助”。


They must continue to push for a better deal.	它们必须继续要求更好的协议。


These partners should not allow the European project to be sacrificed on the altar of German public opinion or German leaders’ insistence on “rules.”	这些伙伴国不应该放任欧洲工程成为德国民意或德国领导人对“规则”的坚持的牺牲品。


If Germany’s government refuses to see the light, the others should find a way forward without it.	如果德国政府拒绝面对现实，其他国家应该设法撇开德国前进。


Franco-German solidarity would be irreparably damaged, but Franco-German solidarity is worth nothing if the best it can produce is this agreement.	法德联盟将发生不可挽回的破坏，但如果法德联盟充其量只能形成这么一个协议，那么不要也罢。


Last but not least, the German public deserve better.	最后，德国公众也理应变得更好。


Germans deserve a leader who stands firm in the face of extremism, rather than encouraging it, whether at home or abroad.	德国人理应获得一位坚定反对而非鼓励极端主义——不管在国内还是国外——的领导人。


They deserve a Europe that can play a greater role in global affairs.	德国人理应获得一个能在全球事务上扮演更重要角色的欧洲。


Above all, given Germany’s stunning political and economic achievements since World War II, they deserve their fellow Europeans’ admiration and respect, not renewed resentment and suspicion.	最重要的是，德国在二战以来取得了令人瞩目的政治和经济成就，因此德国人理应获得欧洲同胞的敬仰和尊重，而不是卷土重来的仇恨和怀疑。


A Way Out for Greece	希腊的出路


QUITO – The Greek crisis is a tragedy for the country and a danger for the world economy.	厄瓜多尔基多——希腊危机对这个国家来讲是个悲剧，而对世界经济来讲是种危险。


Germany is demanding that Greece continue to service its debts in full, even though Greece is clearly broke and the International Monetary Fund has noted the need for debt relief.	德国要求希腊继续全额偿还债务，即使希腊明显已经破产且国际货币基金组织指出有必要进行债务减免。


The collision of reality (Greece’s insolvency) with politics (Germany’s demands) was bound to create a disaster.	现实（希腊破产）与政治（德国要求）之间的冲突注定会酿成灾难。


And, indeed, it has: the shocking collapse this week of the Greek banking system.	事实也的确如此：本周希腊银行体系出现了令人震惊的崩溃。


Yet there still is a way out of this mess.	但摆脱困境的办法依然存在。


Greece’s debt should be cut sharply, and the country should remain within the eurozone.	必须大幅度削减希腊债务，同时应让希腊继续留在欧元区之内。


In negotiations with its creditors this spring, Greece recognized this, insisting that its debt be reduced.	今年春天与债权人谈判时希腊已经认识到这一点，并坚持要求降低债务。


Germany refused.	德国拒绝了希腊的要求。


Though the United States and the IMF privately sided with Greece, Germany prevailed, as creditors usually do.	虽然美国和国际货币基金组织私下站在希腊一边，但德国像所有债主一样在这个问题上胜出。


Yet creditors sometimes prevail to their own detriment; by pushing the debtor to the breaking point, they end up bringing about a complete default.	但债权人胜出有时未必对自己有利，将债务人推向崩溃的边缘只能带来彻底违约的结果。


Germany’s mistake this past week was to push the Greek economy – already in conditions rivaling those of the Great Depression – into a complete financial collapse.	过去一周德国的失误在于将原本已经媲美大萧条的希腊经济推向了彻底的金融崩溃。


German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has a clear negotiating strategy, aimed at getting Greece to agree to leave the eurozone.	德国财长朔伊布勒有着明确的谈判策略，就是让希腊同意退出欧元区。


Unfortunately for him, Greece does not want to exit, and it cannot be forced to do so under the treaties governing the European Union.	但令他感到遗憾的是，希腊却不愿退出，而且按照欧盟条约规定无法强制希腊这样做。


What Greece wants is to remain in the eurozone, with a lower debt burden – a position that is both economically astute and protected by treaty.	希腊想要的是继续留在欧元区，同时能够降低负债——上述立场不仅是理智的经济决策，而且也受到欧盟条约的保护。


Indeed, a euro exit would be remarkably costly for Greece, and would almost certainly create political and social chaos – and perhaps even hyperinflation – in the heart of Europe.	事实上，退出欧元区对希腊来讲代价惨重，几乎肯定会在欧洲中心造成政治社会混乱——甚至恶性通胀。


The value of Greek residents’ savings would be slashed, as euros were suddenly converted into New Drachmas.	希腊居民储蓄价值将大幅缩水，因为欧元突然转换成新的德拉克马。


The middle class would be eviscerated.	中产阶级将失去一切财富。


And the currency conversion would not save the country one cent with regard to its external debt, which would, of course, remain denominated in euros.	而货币转换不会为该国省下一分钱外债，因为外债当然仍以欧元计价。


Still, Greece’s debt burden is unsustainable.	但希腊的债务负担不可持续。


This week, Greece defaulted on its payments to the IMF, rightly choosing pensions over debt service.	本周，希腊拖欠了对国际货币基金组织的还款，理所当然地选择支付养老金而非偿还债务。


The country’s creditors should now negotiate a consensual debt reduction through some combination of lower (and fixed) interest rates, reduced face value of debt, and very long maturities.	该国债权人现在应通过谈判达成双方都能接受的债务减免，包括降低（固定）利率、减少债务面值和延长偿还期限。


There are plenty of precedents for such a course.	这样的解决方法有不少先例。


Sovereign debts have been restructured hundreds, perhaps thousands, of times – including for Germany.	主权债务已经调整过几百甚至几千次——其中也包括针对德国。


In fact, hardline demands by the country’s US government creditors after World War I contributed to deep financial instability in Germany and other parts of Europe, and indirectly to the rise of Adolf Hitler in 1933.	事实上，一战后美国政府债权人的强硬要求造成德国和欧洲其他地区严重的金融动荡，并间接促成了阿道夫·希特勒1933年的崛起。


After World War II, however, Germany was the recipient of vastly wiser concessions by the US government, culminating in consensual debt relief in 1953, an action that greatly benefitted Germany and the world.	但二次大战后，德国接受了美国政府明智得多的让步，以双方同意在1953年减免债务而达到高潮，这一举措惠及了德国和整个世界。


Yet Germany has failed to learn the lessons of its own history.	但德国却未能从自��的历史中汲取教训。


I propose a four-step path out of the Greek crisis.	就希腊债务危机我提出一项四步走的建议。


First, I recommend that the Greek people give a resounding “No” to the creditors in the referendum on their demands this weekend.	首先，我建议希腊人民在本周末公投中对债权人坚决说“不”。


Second, Greece should continue to withhold service on its external debts to official creditors in advance of a consensual debt restructuring later this year.	其次，希腊应在今年晚些时候双方达成债务重组方案之前继续停止偿还正式债权人的外债。


Given its great depression, Greece should use its savings to pay pensioners, provide food relief, make crucial infrastructure repairs, and direct liquidity toward the banking system.	鉴于经济大萧条，希腊应利用储蓄来支付养老金、提供粮食救济、维修关键基础设施和向银行体系提供直接流动性。


Third, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras must use his persuasive powers to convince the public, in the style of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the only thing they have to fear is fear itself.	第三，总理亚历克西齐·普拉斯必须利用说服力像美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福一样来说服公众，除了恐惧本身他们没有什么值得恐惧。


Specifically, the government should make clear to all Greeks that their euro deposits are safe; that the country will remain within the eurozone (despite the false claims by some members of the Eurogroup that a no vote means a Greek exit); and that its banks will reopen immediately after the referendum.	具体来讲，政府应明确向所有希腊人保证他们欧元存款的安全性;该国仍将留在欧元区内（尽管欧元集团某些成员诈称投否定票意味着希腊退出欧元区）;并且希腊将在公投后立即重新开放其银行体系。


Finally, Greece and Germany need to come to a rapprochement soon after the referendum and agree to a package of economic reforms and debt relief.	最后，希腊和德国需要在公投后达成和解，并就一揽子经济改革及债务减免达成协议。


No country – including Greece – should expect to be offered debt relief on a silver platter; relief must be earned and justified by real reforms that restore growth, to the benefit of both debtor and creditor.	任何一个国家——包括希腊——都不能希望债务减免被放在银盘上端到他们手中； 必须靠恢复增长的实质性改革来合理赢得债务减免，采取对债权人和债务人双方同样有利的方式。


And yet, a corpse cannot carry out reforms.	但一具尸体无法进行改革。


That is why debt relief and reforms must be offered together, not reforms “first” with some vague promises that debt relief will come in some unspecified amount at some unspecified time in the future (as some in Europe have said to Greece).	这就是为什么债务减免和改革必须同时进行，而不是改革“第一”，而债权方仅仅做出某种模棱两可的承诺，未来将在某个不确定的时点免除不确定数额的债务（就像欧洲某些国家对希腊所做的承诺）。


To be sure, in the Greek debacle, both sides have made countless mistakes, misjudgments, and misdeeds over the last decade, and even before.	可以肯定在希腊崩溃的过程中，双方在过去十年甚至更早时间里的错误、判断失误和不当行为都难以计数。


A country does not reach Greece’s parlous state without a generation of egregious mismanagement.	没有整整一代人令人震惊的管理不善，一个国家不可能陷入像希腊这样的危险境地。


But nor does a country go bankrupt without serious mistakes by its creditors – first in lending too much money, and then in demanding excessive repayments to the point of the debtor’s collapse.	但若非债权人严重失误一个国家也不会破产——先是出借过多资金、而后又要求过度还款，将债务人逼到崩溃的地步。


With both sides at fault, it is important for them not to lose the future by squabbling endlessly over the past.	因为双方都有过错，重要的是不能因为无休止的争吵而失去未来的机会。


Easing Greece’s debt burden while keeping the country within the eurozone is the correct and achievable path out of the crisis, and it can be accomplished easily through a mutual accord between Germany and Greece, to which the rest of Europe will subscribe.	缓解希腊债务负担、同时将其留在欧元区内是走出危机可以实现的正确途径，达成这一目标需要德国和希腊签订双边协议，并且得到欧洲其他国家的认同。


The result would be a win not only for those countries, but also for the world economy.	这样做上述国家和世界经济都能实现双赢。


A New Deal for Greece	希腊新政


ATHENS – Three months of negotiations between the Greek government and our European and international partners have brought about much convergence on the steps needed to overcome years of economic crisis and to bring about sustained recovery in Greece.	雅典—希腊政府与我们的四个欧洲和国际合作伙伴之间的谈判就克服希腊多年来的经济危机、制造持续经济复苏所需要的步骤的问题达成了许多一致。


But they have not yet produced a deal.	但仍没有产生协议。


What steps are needed to produce a viable, mutually agreed reform agenda?	产生可行的、互相同意的改革日程需要什么措施？


We and our partners already agree on much.	我们和我们的合作伙伴已经就许多问题达成了一致。


Greece’s tax system needs to be revamped, and the revenue authorities must be freed from political and corporate influence.	希腊税收体系需要修正，收入当局必须摆脱政治和公司的影响。


The pension system is ailing.	退休金体系有很大的问题。


The economy’s credit circuits are broken.	希腊经济的信用循环已经破坏。


The labor market has been devastated by the crisis and is deeply segmented, with productivity growth stalled.	劳动力市场被危机摧毁并且深度割裂，生产率增长停滞不前。


Public administration is in urgent need of modernization, and public resources must be used more efficiently.	公共管理急需现代化，公共资源必须得到更有效率的使用。


Overwhelming obstacles block the formation of new companies.	巨大的障碍阻碍着新公司的形成。


Competition in product markets is far too circumscribed.	产品市场竞争限制过多。


And inequality has reached outrageous levels, preventing society from uniting behind essential reforms.	不平等性也达到了非常激烈的成都，导致社会无法团结在必须的改革背后。


This consensus aside, agreement on a new development model for Greece requires overcoming two hurdles.	除了这一个共识，希腊的新发展模式协议还需要克服两大障碍。


First, we must concur on how to approach Greece’s fiscal consolidation.	首先，我们必须就如何整合希腊的财政形成一致。


Second, we need a comprehensive, commonly agreed reform agenda that will underpin that consolidation path and inspire the confidence of Greek society.	其次，我们需要一个全面的、互相同意的改革日程，以此作为整合路径的基础并激发希腊社会的信心。


Beginning with fiscal consolidation, the issue at hand concerns the method.	从财政整合开始，目前的问题与方法有关。


The “troika” institutions (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) have, over the years, relied on a process of backward induction: They set a date (say, the year 2020) and a target for the ratio of nominal debt to national income (say, 120%) that must be achieved before money markets are deemed ready to lend to Greece at reasonable rates.	多年来，“三驾马车”机构（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织）都依赖逆向归纳过程：它们制定一个日期（如2020年）和一个名义债务占国民收入比例的目标（如120%），在认为货币市场已经做好以合理利率向希腊贷款的准备之前必须实现这一目标。


Then, under arbitrary assumptions regarding growth rates, inflation, privatization receipts, and so forth, they compute what primary surpluses are necessary in every year, working backward to the present.	接着，它们根据任意决定的增长率、通货膨胀、私有化进程等指标的假设计算出每年必须获得多少初级盈余，然后倒推到现在。


The result of this method, in our government’s opinion, is an “austerity trap.”	希腊政府认为，这一方法的结果是一个“紧缩陷阱”。


When fiscal consolidation turns on a predetermined debt ratio to be achieved at a predetermined point in the future, the primary surpluses needed to hit those targets are such that the effect on the private sector undermines the assumed growth rates and thus derails the planned fiscal path.	财政整合需要在事先决定的未来时间点实现事先决定的债务比例，在这样的情况下，达到这些目标所需要的初级盈余对私人部门的影响将破坏假设的增长率并因此破坏计划好的财政路径。


Indeed, this is precisely why previous fiscal-consolidation plans for Greece missed their targets so spectacularly.	事实上，这正是此前的希腊财政整合计划总是与目标相去甚远的原因。


Our government’s position is that backward induction should be ditched.	希腊政府的立场是放弃逆向归纳。


Instead, we should map out a forward-looking plan based on reasonable assumptions about the primary surpluses consistent with the rates of output growth, net investment, and export expansion that can stabilize Greece’s economy and debt ratio.	相反，我们应该合理地假设初级盈余，使之与产出增长率、净投资率、出口扩张速度匹配，从而稳定希腊经济和债务比率，在此基础上制定前瞻性计划。


If this means that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be higher than 120% in 2020, we devise smart ways to rationalize, re-profile, or restructure the debt – keeping in mind the aim of maximizing the effective present value that will be returned to Greece’s creditors.	如果这意味着2020年债务-GDP比率高于120%，我们就想办法明智地梳理、重估和重组债务——并时刻铭记我们的目标是让返回希腊债权人的有效现值最大化。


Besides convincing the troika that our debt sustainability analysis should avoid the austerity trap, we must overcome the second hurdle: the “reform trap.”	除了让三驾马车相信我们的债务可持续性分析应该避免紧缩陷阱之外，我们还必须克服第二个障碍：“改革陷阱”。


The previous reform program, which our partners are so adamant should not be “rolled back” by our government, was founded on internal devaluation, wage and pension cuts, loss of labor protections, and price-maximizing privatization of public assets.	此前的改革计划——要不是被希腊政府“踢了回去”，我们的合作伙伴对此相当坚决——建立在内部贬值、工资和退休金削减、劳动力保护减少和公共资产的价格最大化私有化的基础上。


Our partners believe that, given time, this agenda will work.	我们的合作伙伴认为，假以时日，这一日程会起效。


If wages fall further, employment will rise.	如果工资进一步降低，就业就会上升。


The way to cure an ailing pension system is to cut pensions.	修正漏洞百出的退休金体系的办法是减少退休金。


And privatizations should aim at higher sale prices to pay off debt that many (privately) agree is unsustainable.	而私有化必须着眼于更高的出售价格以偿付许多人（私下里）认为是可持续的债务。


By contrast, our government believes that this program has failed, leaving the population weary of reform.	相反，希腊政府认为这一计划已经失败，并且让希腊人民厌恶改革。


The best evidence of this failure is that, despite a huge drop in wages and costs, export growth has been flat (the elimination of the current-account deficit being due exclusively to the collapse of imports).	最好的失败证据是，尽管工资和成本有了大幅下降，但出口增长仍然不见起色（经常项目赤字的消��完全是因为进口崩跌）。


Additional wage cuts will not help export-oriented companies, which are mired in a credit crunch.	进一步降低工资无助于陷入信用动荡的出口导向型公司。


And further cuts in pensions will not address the true causes of the pension system’s troubles (low employment and vast undeclared labor).	进一步降低退休金也无法根治退休金体系问题的真正根源（低就业和大量未报告劳动力）。


Such measures will merely cause further damage to Greece’s already-stressed social fabric, rendering it incapable of providing the support that our reform agenda desperately needs.	这些措施只能给希腊已经紧绷的社会组织带来进一步的伤害，使其无法给予我们的改革日程以急需的支持。


The current disagreements with our partners are not unbridgeable.	目前，与我们的合作伙伴的分歧并非不可调和。


Our government is eager to rationalize the pension system (for example, by limiting early retirement), proceed with partial privatization of public assets, address the non-performing loans that are clogging the economy’s credit circuits, create a fully independent tax commission, and boost entrepreneurship.	希腊政府渴望理顺退休金体系（比如通过限制早退休），继续进行公共资产的局部私有化，解决阻塞经济信用循环的不良贷款问题，建立完全独立的税收当局，刺激企业家精神等。


The differences that remain concern how we understand the relationships between the various reforms and the macro environment.	剩下的分歧主要是我们如何理解各种改革与宏观环境之间的关系。


None of this means that common ground cannot be achieved immediately.	所有这些都不意味着无法立刻找到共同立场。


The Greek government wants a fiscal-consolidation path that makes sense, and we want reforms that all sides believe are important.	下列政府希望获得有效果的财政整合路径，我们也希望实施各方都认为重要的改革。


Our task is to convince our partners that our undertakings are strategic, rather than tactical, and that our logic is sound.	我们的任务是说服我们的合作伙伴，我们的任务是战略性而不是战术性的，我们的逻辑是可靠的。


Their task is to let go of an approach that has failed.	他们的任务是不要再坚持已经失败的方针。


A New Deal for Debt Overhangs?	债务积压的新协议？


CAMBRIDGE – The International Monetary Fund’s acknowledgement that Greece’s debt is unsustainable could prove to be a watershed moment for the global financial system.	美国剑桥—国际货币基金组织（IMF）承认希腊债务不可持续，这也许将是全球金融体系的一个分水岭时刻。


Clearly, heterodox policies to deal with high debt burdens need to be taken more seriously, even in some advanced countries.	显然，应对巨大债务负担的非正统政策应该获得更加严肃的对待，即使是在某些发达国家。


Ever since the onset of the Greek crisis, there have been basically three schools of thought.	自希腊危机爆发以来，基本上存在着三个思维流派。


First, there is the view of the so-called troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF), which holds that the eurozone’s debt-distressed periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) requires strong policy discipline to prevent a short-term liquidity crisis from morphing into a long-term insolvency problem.	首先是所谓的三驾马车（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）的观点，它们认为债务重重的欧元区外围国（希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙）需要强大的政策纪律以避免短期流动性危机演变为长期偿债能力问题。


The orthodox policy prescription was to extend conventional bridge loans to these countries, thereby giving them time to fix their budget problems and undertake structural reforms aimed at enhancing their long-term growth potential.	正统政策药方是扩大给这些国家的常规过桥贷款，从而让它们获得时间解决预算问题并采取结构改革以增强长期增长潜力。


This approach has “worked” in Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, but at the cost of epic recessions. Moreover, there is a high risk of relapse in the event of a significant downturn in the global economy.	这一方针在西班牙、爱尔兰和葡萄牙获得了“成功”，但代价是巨大的衰退。


The troika policy has, however, failed to stabilize, much less revive, Greece’s economy.	但是，三驾马车的政策没能稳定希腊经济，更不用说使之复苏了。


A second school of thought also portrays the crisis as a pure liquidity problem, but views long-term insolvency as an outside risk at worst.	第二个思想流派也将这场危机描述为纯粹的流动性危机，但认为长期偿债问题最多只是个外部风险。


The problem is not that the debt of countries on the eurozone’s periphery is too high, but that it has not been allowed to rise nearly high enough.	问题不在于欧元区外围国的债务太高，而在于没有允许它上升到接近于足够高的程度。


This anti-austerity camp believes that even when private markets totally lost confidence in Europe’s periphery, northern Europe could easily have solved the problem by co-signing periphery debt, perhaps under the umbrella of Eurobonds backed ultimately by all (especially German) eurozone taxpayers.	这一反紧缩阵营认为，即使私人市场完全丧失了对欧洲外围国的信心，北欧也能够通过联署外围国债务轻而易举地解决问题，也许可以在最终由所有欧元区纳税人（特别是德国）共同买单的欧元债券的支持下实现这一点。


The periphery countries should then have been permitted not only to roll over their debt, but also to engage in full-on countercyclical fiscal policy for as long as their national governments deemed necessary.	因此，外围国不但应该被允许债务延期，还应该被允许采取强烈的反周期财政政策，只要它们的国家政府认为有必要。


In other words, for “anti-austerians,” the eurozone suffered a crisis of competence, not a crisis of confidence.	换句话说，对“反紧缩派”而言，欧元区经历的是一场能力危机，而不是信心危机。


Never mind that the eurozone has no centralized fiscal authority and only an incomplete banking union.	欧元区没有集中的财政当局，只有一个不完整的银行联盟，这没有关系。


Never mind moral-hazard problems or insolvency.	道德风险或无力偿还债务不是问题。


And never mind growth-enhancing structural reforms.	强化增长的结构改革也无关紧要。


All of the debtors will be good for the money in the future, even if they have not always been reliable in the past.	所有债务人在未来都能偿还债务，哪怕它们的历史记录并不完全可靠。


In any case, faster GDP growth will pay for everything, thanks to high fiscal multipliers.	无论如何，在财政乘数的作用下，GDP增长加速将解决一切问题。


Europe passed up a free lunch.	欧洲错过了免费的午餐。


This is a fully coherent viewpoint, but naive in its unqualified confidence (for example, in the polemical writings of the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman).	这是一个逻辑清晰的观点，但其没来由的信心显得有些天真（比如诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）的诡辩的文章）。


As a result, the anti-austerian view masks strong assumptions and risks.	结果，反紧缩派观点掩盖了强假设和高风险。


In fact, piling loans atop already-high debt burdens in the eurozone’s periphery entailed a significant gamble, particularly as the crisis erupted.	事实上，在已经很沉重的欧元区外围国债务负担之上在添加贷款不啻一场豪赌，特别是在危机爆发时。


Political corruption, exemplified by the revolving door between Spain’s government and financial sector, was endemic.	政治腐败根深蒂固，西班牙政府和金融部门之间的旋转门就是明证。


Dual labor markets and product-market monopolies still hobble growth, and oligarchs have disproportionate power to protect their interests.	双重劳动力市场和产品市场垄断仍然阻碍着增长，而寡头拥有无比强大的力量捍卫自己的利益。


In reality, Germany could not have underwritten all of the European periphery’s debt without risking its own solvency and creditworthiness, particularly in the absence of a functioning system of eurozone-wide checks and balances.	在现实中，德国无法承担所有欧洲外围国债务而不影响其自身的偿债能力和信誉，特别是在有效的泛欧元区制衡机制缺位的情况下。


Expansive and open-ended guarantees might have worked, but if they didn’t, the economic rot from the periphery could have spread to the center.	扩张性无限期担保也许有效果，但万一没有见效，那么外围国的经济腐败就有可能传染到核心国。


A third point of view is that, given the massive financial crisis, Europe’s debt problem should have been diagnosed as an insolvency problem from the start, and treated with debt restructuring and forgiveness, aided by moderately elevated inflation and structural reform.	第三种观点是，在严重的金融危机面前，欧洲债务问题应该从一开始就被诊断为偿债能力问题，并用债务重组和豁免来治疗，辅之以略微提高的通胀和结构改革。


This has been my viewpoint since the crisis began.	这也是危机爆发以来我的观点。


In Ireland and Spain, private bondholders, not Irish and Spanish taxpayers, should have taken the hit from bank failures.	在爱尔兰和西班牙，在银行倒闭中受损失的应该是私人债券持有人，而不是爱尔兰和西班牙纳税人。


In Greece, there should have been faster and larger debt write-downs.	在希腊，应该有更迅速、规模更大的债务减记。


Of course, national governments would have had to use taxpayer funds to recapitalize northern European banks – especially in France and Germany – that lent too much to the periphery.	当然，国家政府将不得不动用纳税人的钱重组向外围国过度贷款的北欧银行——特别是法国和德国。


And transfers would have been needed to recapitalize the periphery banks.	而重组外围国银行则需要转移支付。


But at least then the public would have understood the reality of the situation, while restructured and recapitalized banks would have been in a position to start lending again.	但至少这时公众将理解真实状况，而结构和资本重组后的银行将能够重新开始贷款。


Unfortunately, too many policymakers in advanced economies allowed themselves to believe that such heterodox policies are only for emerging markets.	不幸的是，太多发达经济体决策者相信这些反正统政策只适用于新兴市场。


In fact, advanced countries have resorted to heterodox policies to reduce debt overhangs on many occasions.	事实上，发达国家多次求助于反正统政策减少债务积压。


Debt restructuring would have given Europe the reset it needed.	债务重组将让欧洲获得它需要的喘息机会。


Yes, there would have been risks, as IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard has pointed out, but running those risks would have been well worth it.	是的，如IMF首席经济学家奥利佛·布兰查德（Olivier Blanchard）所言，这会带来风险，但承担这些风险是很值得的。


So what is the way forward?	那么，未来怎么办？


Deeper European integration, stricter equity requirements for banks, and deeper but homegrown structural reforms are certainly key elements of any solution.	更深度的欧洲一体化、更严格的银行股本要求以及更深度但主动的改革显然是一切解决方案的关键要素。


Further aid to the European periphery is still badly needed.	进一步援助欧洲外围国家也是迫切需要。


But, beyond that, Europe’s experience ought to spur a full rethink of the global system for administering sovereign bankruptcies.	但是，除了这些，欧洲的经验应该促使我们充分反思管理主权破产的国际体系。


That could mean bringing back older IMF proposals for a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism, or finding ways to institutionalize the Fund’s recent stance on Greek debt.	这可能意味着迎回IMF主权破产机制的就方案，也可能意味着寻求将IMF最近的希腊债务立场制度化。


There is no free lunch in Europe, and there never was; but there are much better ways to deal with unsustainable debt.	欧洲没有免费的午餐，从来没有过； 但应对不可持续的债务有更好的办法。


The Threat of Greek Debt Relief	希腊债务纾困的威胁


BERLIN – With Greece’s economic crisis still raging, prominent voices, ranging from Nobel laureate economists like Paul Krugman to officials like US Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew, are calling for more lenient bailout terms and debt relief.	柏林—希腊经济危机还在肆虐，从保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）等诺贝尔经济学奖获得者到美国财政部长杰克·卢等名声显赫人士纷纷呼吁采取更宽大的援助条件和债务纾困。


Even the International Monetary Fund – which, along with other European lenders, has provided Greece with emergency financing – recently joined that call.	甚至国际货币基金组织（IMF）——它与其他欧洲贷款人一起为希腊提供了紧急融资——最近也发出了这样的呼声。


But could such an approach really be the proverbial silver bullet for Greece’s crisis?	但这一方针真的能够成为众所周知的希腊危机特效药吗？


The short answer is no.	简单的回答是不能。


While Greece’s public debt is undeniably high, and evidence abounds that high debt can hold back economic growth, the country faces even stronger drags on growth, including structural weaknesses and political brinkmanship, that must be addressed first.	希腊公共债务水平毫无疑问很高，并且很多证据表明高债务可能制约经济增长，但希腊面临着更加严重的增长拖累因素，包括结构性弱点和政治边缘政策，这些因素必须首先解决。


In fact, Greece will likely depend on concessional funding from official sources in the years ahead – funding that is conditional on reforms, not debt ratios.	事实上，希腊有可能将在未来多年仰仗来自官方资源的优惠融资生存——这些融资的条件是改革而不是债务比率。


Greece’s nominal debt stock will matter only once the country re-enters the debt markets and becomes subject to market, not concessional, borrowing terms.	希腊名义债务存量只有在它重返债务市场并面临市场而非优惠借贷条件时才有意义。


In the meantime, Greece must implement the structural reforms needed to restore the country’s long-term growth prospects and thus to strengthen its capacity to repay its creditors without a large nominal debt reduction.	与此同时，希腊必须实施结构改革才能重塑长期增长前景，从而强化其在没有获得大量名义债务减免的情况下偿付债权人的能力。


But there is another critical reason why debt relief is not the answer, and it lies in the political architecture of the European Monetary Union.	但债务纾困不是答案还有另一个原因，即欧洲货币联盟的政治结构。


Because the eurozone lacks a strong central governing body, crisis policies emerge from a political process in which each of the 19 member states has veto power.	由于欧元区缺少强有力的中央治理机构，危机政策由一个所有19个成员国都拥有否决权的政治进程决定。


For such a complex system to work, eurozone policymakers must be able to trust one another to behave in a particular way – and that requires a common framework of rules and standards.	要让如此复杂的系统起作用，欧元区决策者必须能够相信彼此以特定方式行事——而这有需要共同规则和标准框架。


A restructuring of Greece’s official debt, despite offering short-term benefits, would weaken that framework in the long run by setting a precedent for exceptions, with other eurozone countries, sooner or later, requesting the same concession.	希腊官方债务的重组尽管能带来短期好处，从长期看，也会削弱这一框架，因为它树立了一个先例，其他欧元区国家迟早也会提出同样的要求。


In 2013, the extension of Greece’s loan maturities prompted Ireland and Portugal to demand – and receive – comparable extensions, despite their less obvious need.	2013年，延长希腊贷款期限的决定促使爱尔兰和葡萄牙也要求相应的贷款期限延长，尽管它们延长期限的需要并不那么显而易见。 它们的要求得到了满足。


Instead of offering concessions, which could create long-term instability in the eurozone, Europe’s leaders must remain committed to creating strong incentives for all member states to maintain prudent fiscal policies capable of reducing public-debt ratios and restoring fiscal buffers against asymmetric shocks to the currency union.	欧洲领导人不应该提供优惠条件，这可能造成欧元区长期不稳定，而必须继续致力于为所有成员国营造强大的激励，促使它们保持审慎财政政策，从而能够降低公共债务比率、重塑抵抗对货币联盟的非系统性冲击的财政缓冲。


Only then will the eurozone have a chance of upholding the Lisbon Treaty’s “no bailout” clause.	惟其如此，欧元区才有机会坚持里斯本条约的“无援助”条款。


Greece may account for less than 2% of eurozone GDP, but the pursuit of shortsighted ad hoc solutions to its problems may set precedents that could bring down the entire monetary union.	希腊GDP也许只占欧元区的2%，但追求短视的“临时”方针解决希腊问题可能树立一个让整个货币联盟毁于一旦的先例。


To prevent such an outcome, it is critical that any solution to the Greek crisis reinforces, rather than undermines, the eurozone’s cohesion.	为了阻止这样的结果，关键是任何希腊危机解决方案都必须增强而不是削弱欧元区的凝聚力。


It is true that Greece has had to undergo painful adjustments to address its deep structural weaknesses, unsustainable public finances, and lack of price competitiveness – adjustments that led to a drop in Greek output.	诚然，希腊不得不进行痛苦的调整以解决深层次结构弱点、不可持续的公共财政以及缺少价格竞争力的问题——这些调整措施导致希腊产出下降。


But high unemployment and a lack of investment cannot be blamed on the medicine prescribed; they are symptoms of the country’s failure to reform its public administration and to enhance the flexibility of its economy.	但高失业和投资不足绝非为因为这一药方而带来； 它们是希腊无法改革其公共管理、增强其经济灵活性的结果。


The international debate about how much austerity is appropriate to balance the interests of Greece and its creditors has distracted policymakers for too long.	国际上正在争论需要多少紧缩能够恰当地平衡希腊及其债权人的利益，这场争论长期占据了决策者的注意力。


It is time to focus on the real imperative: designing and implementing vital structural reforms, at the national and European levels.	现在，应该将注意力集中在真正的当务之急上：在国家和欧洲层面设计并实施关键的结构改革。


To guide this process, the German Council of Economic Experts, which I chair, has developed a set of reforms – called “Maastricht 2.0” – that would reinforce the rules-based framework that is so essential to the eurozone’s long-term success.	为了指引这一过程，由我担任主席的德国经济专家委员会（German Council of Economic Experts）提出了一套改革方案——称为“马斯特里赫特2. 0”——该方案将强化对欧元区的长期成功至关重要的基于规则的框架。


For example, the banking union needs to be strengthened through an enhanced resolution regime and an integrated financial supervisor, and a sovereign insolvency mechanism should be introduced.	比如，银行联盟需要通过加强清算机制和综合金融监督机构进行强化，并且应该引入一套主权破产机制。


Underpinning the proposed reforms is the so-called “principle of unity of liability and control,” which demands that both the power to make decisions and liability for their consequences are kept at the same political level, be it national or supranational.	这套改革方案的基础是所谓的“责任和控制的统一原则”，该原则要求做决定的权力和为后果负责的责任必须具备同等的政治地位，要么是国家级，要么是超国家级。


In other words, if countries want to make their own fiscal decisions independent of their eurozone partners, they cannot expect those partners to step in and save them later.	换句话说，如果各国想独立于欧元区伙伴国独立进行财政决策，那么就不能指望日后伙伴国站出来救它们。


To be sure, in recent years, the European institutional framework has undergone major reforms that reflect the principles of “Maastricht 2.0,” such as the need to emphasize national responsibility for public finances and international competitiveness.	诚然，近几年来，欧洲制度框架经历了体现“马斯特里赫特2. 0”原则的重大改革，比如强调公共财政和国际竞争力的国家责任的需要。


But the reform process remains far from complete.	但改革进程仍远未结束。


There is no denying that short-term measures to address acute problems – such as debt relief for Greece – threaten the eurozone’s long-term stability.	毋庸置疑，解决紧急问题的短期手段——如对希腊的债务纾困——威胁到欧元区的长期稳定。


If the European Monetary Union is to survive and ultimately thrive, its leaders must not be tempted by facile solutions.	如果欧洲货币联盟想要生存下来并最终实现繁荣，其领导人决不能被易行的方案蛊惑。


The Lethal Deferral of Greek Debt Restructuring	希腊债务重组的致命延迟


ATHENS – The point of restructuring debt is to reduce the volume of new loans needed to salvage an insolvent entity.	雅典—重组债务的要点是降低拯救一个破产实体所需要的新贷款量。


Creditors offer debt relief to get more value back and to extend as little new finance to the insolvent entity as possible.	债权人提供债务纾困以拿回更多的价值，并尽可能降低给破产实体的新融资。


Remarkably, Greece’s creditors seem unable to appreciate this sound financial principle.	邻人注目的是，希腊债权人似乎无法理解这一可靠的金融原则。


Where Greek debt is concerned, a clear pattern has emerged over the past five years. It remains unbroken to this day.	在希腊债务问题上，过去五年中早已浮现出一个清晰的模式，至今仍未打破。


In 2010, Europe and the International Monetary Fund extended loans to the insolvent Greek state equal to 44% of the country’s GDP.	2010年，欧洲和国际货币基金组织（IMF）给破产的希腊的贷款相当于其GDP的44%。


The very mention of debt restructuring was considered inadmissible and a cause for ridiculing those of us who dared suggest its inevitability.	债务重组的想法连提都不能提，而像我们这样胆敢提出债务重组不可避免的，马上回招来嘲笑。


In 2012, as the debt-to-GDP ratio skyrocketed, Greece’s private creditors were given a significant 34% haircut.	2012年，希腊债务-GDP之比一飞冲天，其私人债权人惨遭34%的“剃头”（haircut）。


At the same time, however, new loans worth 63% of GDP were added to Greece’s national debt.	但是，与此同时，价值GDP的63%的贷款又加到了希腊的国民债务中。


A few months later, in November, the Eurogroup (comprising eurozone members’ finance ministers) indicated that debt relief would be finalized by December 2014, once the 2012 program was “successfully” completed and the Greek government’s budget had attained a primary surplus (which excludes interest payments).	几个月后，11月，欧元集团（由欧元区成员国财政部长组成）表示债务纾困将在2014年12月完成，只要2012年的计划被“成功”完成并且希腊政府预算实现初级盈余（不包括利息偿付）。


In 2015, however, with the primary surplus achieved, Greece’s creditors refused even to discuss debt relief.	但是，在2015年，初级盈余已经实现，而希腊债权人甚至拒绝讨论债务纾困问题。


For five months, negotiations remained at an impasse, culminating in the July 5 referendum in Greece, in which voters overwhelmingly rejected further austerity, and the Greek government’s subsequent surrender, formalized in the July 12 Euro Summit agreement.	五个月来，谈判者毫无进展，最终导致了7月5日的希腊公投。 在公投中，选民一边倒地拒绝了进一步紧缩以及希腊政府随后的就范（通过7月12日的欧元峰会协议正式化）。


That agreement, which is now the blueprint for Greece’s relationship with the eurozone, perpetuates the five-year-long pattern of placing debt restructuring at the end of a sorry sequence of fiscal tightening, economic contraction, and program failure.	目前，该协议是希腊与欧元区关系的蓝图，它延续了五年来的模式——在一连串令人抱歉的财政紧缩、经济衰退和计划失败后祭出财政重组。


Indeed, the sequence of the new “bailout” envisaged in the July 12 agreement predictably begins with the adoption – before the end of the month – of harsh tax measures and medium-term fiscal targets equivalent to another bout of stringent austerity.	事实上，不难预测，7月12日协议所构想的新“援助”序列的起点便是（在本月底前）采取严厉的税收措施和中期财政目标——这相当于新一轮严厉紧缩。


Then comes a mid-summer negotiation of another large loan, equivalent to 48% of GDP (the debt-to-GDP ratio is already above 180%).	接着是关于新一笔巨额贷款（等于GDP的48%，而目前债务-GDP之比已经高于180%）的仲夏谈判。


Finally, in November, at the earliest, and after the first review of the new program is completed, “the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures… aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level.”	最后，最早在11月，在对新计划的完成情况进行首次评估后，“欧元集团将准备在有必要的情况下考虑增加措施……以确保总融资需求保持可持续水平。 ”


During the negotiations to which I was a party, from January 25 to July 5, I repeatedly suggested to our creditors a series of smart debt swaps.	在我作为一方参与的谈判期间（1月5日—7月5日），我反复向希腊债权人提出进行一系列明智的债务互换。


The aim was to minimize the amount of new funding required from the European Stability Mechanism and the IMF to refinance Greek debt, and to ensure that Greece would become eligible within 2015 for the European Central Bank’s asset-purchase program (quantitative easing), effectively restoring Greece’s access to capital markets.	我的目标是尽可能降低欧洲��定性机制（European Stability Mechanism，ESM）和IMF为希腊债务再融资所必须给出的新资金的规模，以及确保希腊能够在2015年年底之前符合欧洲央行资产购买计划（量化宽松）标准，从而在事实上让希腊重新进入资本市场。


We estimated that no more than €30 billion ($33 billion, or 17% of GDP) of new, ESM-sourced financing would be required, none of which would be needed for the Greek state’s primary budget.	我们估计，所需新增ESM融资的规模不会超过300亿欧元（或希腊GDP的17%），其中希腊国家初级预算不需要一分钱。


Our proposals were not rejected.	我们的方案没有被拒绝。


Although we had it on good authority that they were technically rigorous and legally sound, they simply were never discussed.	尽管我们有理有据，但方案连讨论的机会都没有。


The political will of the Eurogroup was to ignore our proposals, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and force the Greek government to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is almost triple the size we had proposed.	欧元集团的政治意愿就是忽略我们的方案，让谈判失败，给银行放个长假，迫使希腊政府接受所有条件——包括几乎相当于我们所提出的规模的三倍的巨额新贷款。


Once again, Greece’s creditors put the cart before the horse, by insisting that the new loan be agreed before any discussion of debt relief.	希腊债权人再一次本末倒置——他们要求先同意新贷款，然后再讨论债务纾困。


As a result, the new loan deemed necessary grew inexorably, as in 2010 and 2012.	结果，被认为属于“必要”的新贷款规模大大地增加了，一如2010年和2012年。


Unsustainable debt is, sooner or later, written down.	不可持续的债务迟早需要减记。


But the precise timing and nature of that write-down makes an enormous difference for a country’s economic prospects.	但具体的时机和减记性质可能给一国经济前景造成巨大的不同。


And Greece is in the throes of a humanitarian crisis today because the inevitable restructuring of its debt has been used as an excuse for postponing that restructuring ad infinitum.	而如今的希腊陷入了一场人道主义灾难，原因就在于不可避免的债务重组被用来充当无限期中止重组的借口。


As a high-ranking European Commission official once asked me: “Your debt will be cut come hell or high water, so why are you expending precious political capital to insist that we deliver the restructuring now?”	一位欧盟委员会高级官员曾经问我：“无论如何，你们的债务都要削减，既然如此，为什么你们还要浪费宝贵的政治资本坚持要我们现在就重组。 ”


The answer ought to have been obvious.	答案本应该显而易见。


An ex ante debt restructuring that reduces the size of any new loans and renders the debt sustainable before any reforms are implemented stands a good chance of crowding in investment, stabilizing incomes, and setting the stage for recovery.	事先债务重组能降低在改革实施前让债务达到可持续水平所需要的新贷款规模，从而增加吸引投资、增加收入、为复苏打好基础的机会。


In sharp contrast, a debt write-down like Greece’s in 2012, which resulted from a program’s failure, only contributes to maintaining the downward spiral.	与此形成鲜明对比的是，2012年希腊债务减记——作为计划失败的结果发生——只是让下降螺旋继续维持下去。


Why do Greece’s creditors refuse to move on debt restructuring before any new loans are negotiated?	希腊债权人为何拒绝在任何新贷款谈判前进行债务重组？


And why do they prefer a much larger new loan package than necessary?	为什么他们偏好比必要规模大得多的贷款计划？


The answers to these questions cannot be found by discussing sound finance, public or private, for they reside firmly in the realm of power politics.	这些问题的答案无法通过公开或私下讨论可靠金融（sound finance）找到，因为它们牢牢地掌握在权力政治手中。 债务是债权人的权力；


Debt is creditor power; and, as Greece has learned the hard way, unsustainable debt turns the creditor into Leviathan.	希腊以惨痛的教训认识到，可不可持续的债务会让债权人变成“利维坦”（Leviathan）。


Life under it is becoming nasty, brutish and, for many of my compatriots, short.	债务重压之下的生活是恶劣、野蛮的，对我的许多同胞来说，也是短命的。


Greece’s Two Currencies	希腊的双重货币


ATHENS – Imagine a depositor in the US state of Arizona being permitted to withdraw only small amounts of cash weekly and facing restrictions on how much money he or she could wire to a bank account in California.	发自雅典——想象一下，如果在美国亚利桑那州的某位储户每周只允许提取少量现金，同时对加利福尼亚州另一个银行账户的汇款数量也受到了限制。


Such capital controls, if they ever came about, would spell the end of the dollar as a single currency, because such constraints are utterly incompatible with a monetary union.	这么样的资本管制如果变成现实的话，就等于判了美元这个单一货币的死刑，因为这类限制是与一个货币联盟完全不兼容的。


Greece today (and Cyprus before it) offers a case study of how capital controls bifurcate a currency and distort business incentives.	而当今希腊今日（以及从前的塞浦路斯）则提供了一个资本管制如何撕裂货币和扭曲商业激励的案例。


The process is straightforward.	这个过程很简单。


Once euro deposits are imprisoned within a national banking system, the currency essentially splits in two: bank euros (BE) and paper, or free, euros (FE).	一旦欧元存款被囚禁在全国银行系统内，货币基本上会一分为二：银行欧元（下文简称银行欧）和现钞，或所谓自由欧元（简称自由欧）。


Suddenly, an informal exchange rate between the two currencies emerges.	紧接着产生的还有出现两种货币之间的非正式汇率。


Consider a Greek depositor keen to convert a large sum of BE into FE (say, to pay for medical expenses abroad, or to repay a company debt to a non-Greek entity).	试想一位希腊储户希望将一大笔银行欧转为自由欧（比如为了支付国外医疗费用，或者偿还公司债务给一个非希腊实体）。


Assuming such depositors find FE holders willing to purchase their BE, a substantial BE-FE exchange rate emerges, varying with the size of the transaction, BE holders’ relative impatience, and the expected duration of capital controls.	假设此人找到了一个自由欧持有人愿意出手兑换，则会根据交易的额度，银行欧持有者的急迫程度，以及资本管制的预期持续时间而出现一个银行欧/自由欧汇率。


On August 18, 2015, a few weeks after pulling the plug from Greece’s banks (thus making capital controls inevitable), the European Central Bank and its Greek branch, the Bank of Greece, actually formalized a dual-currency currency regime.	在2015年8月18日，希腊银行被冻结（从而使得资本管制无法避免）后数周，欧洲央行及其希腊分行（希腊银行）实际上正式实施了一种双货币制度。


A government decree stated that “Transfer of the early, partial, or total prepayment of a loan in a credit institution is prohibited, excluding repayment by cash or remittance from abroad.”	一项政府法令规定，“禁止一切对信贷机构贷款的初期，部分或全部提前还款的汇款行为，但现金或国外汇款除外。 ”


The eurozone authorities thus permitted Greek banks to deny their customers the right to repay loans or mortgages in BE, thereby boosting the effective BE-FE exchange rate.	欧元区当局因此允许希腊银行剥夺了自身储户通过银行欧偿还贷款或抵押贷款的权利，从而导致银行欧/自由欧之间的实际汇率大涨。


And, by continuing to allow payments of tax arrears to be made in BE, while prescribing FE as a separate, harder currency uniquely able to extinguish commercial bank debt, Europe’s authorities acknowledged that Greece now has two euros.	与此同时，通过持续允许使用银行欧来支付欠税，又将自由欧作为一个单独且更加硬通的，唯一能够消除商业银行债务的货币，欧洲当局实际上承认希腊现在存在着两种欧元。


The real effects of the dual-currency regime on Greece’s economy and society can be gleaned only from the pernicious interaction between the capital controls and the “reforms” (essentially tax hikes, pension reductions, and other contractionary measures) imposed on the country by the eurozone authorities.	双货币制度对希腊的经济和社会的实际影响可以通过对这个国家实行的资本管制与欧元区当局强加在希腊身上的“改革”（基本上是增税，削减养老金及其他紧缩措施）之间的恶性互动中观察到。


Consider the following beguiling example.	请参见下面这些让人云里雾里的示例：


Greece’s companies fall roughly into two categories.	希腊的企业大致可分为两类。


In one category are a large number of small firms asphyxiating under the tax office’s demand that they pay in advance, and immediately, 100% of next year’s corporate tax (as estimated by the tax authorities).	在一类是大量的无以为继的小企业，因为税务机关要求他们提前且立即支付明年100％的企业税（根据税务机关的估计值）。


The second group comprises listed companies whose depressed turnover jeopardizes their already diminished share value and their standing with banks, suppliers, and potential customers (all of which are reluctant to sign long-term contracts with an underperforming company).	第二组以上市公司为主，其营业额萎缩导致原本已经低迷的股票价值及其与银行，供应商和潜在客户的关系双双恶化——谁都不愿意和一个经营欠佳的企业签订长期合同。


The coexistence, in the same depressed economy, of these two types of businesses gives rise to unexpected opportunities for shadowy trades without which countless businesses might close their doors permanently.	这两种类型的企业在同一个低迷经济中的共存状况催生了一种意想不到地下交易的机会——否则的话��数的企业可能永久关门。


One widespread practice involves two such firms, say, Micro (a small family firm facing a large advance tax payment) and Macro (a publicly traded limited liability company that needs to demonstrate higher turnover than it has).	一个普遍的做法涉及到两家公司，比方说，微型企业（面临大额提前纳税的小型家族企业）和大型企业（需要夸大营业额的上市有限责任公司）。


Macro agrees to issue invoices for (non-existent) goods or services rendered to Micro, up to, say, €20,000 ($22,000).	大型企业同意出具面值2万欧元（合2. 2万美元）的发票给微型企业来出售（其实不存在的）商品或服务。


Micro agrees to pay €24,600 into Macro’s bank account (the price plus 23% value-added tax) on the understanding that Macro will reimburse the €20,000 to Micro.	对此微型企业将汇2. 46万欧元到大企业的银行账户（原价加23％的增值税）。


This way, at a cost of €4,600, Micro reduces its taxable revenue by €24,600, while Macro boosts its turnover figure by €20,000.	这样一来，通过支付4,600欧元成本，微型企业减少了2. 46万欧元的应纳税收入，而大企业则提高了2万欧元的营业额。


Alas, due to capital controls, Macro cannot reimburse Micro in FE, nor can it wire €20,000 to Micro’s BE bank account (lest they be found out by the authorities).	可惜的是，由于资本管制，大企业不能用自由欧回款给微型企业，也没法把2万欧元汇至微小企业的银行欧账户（以免被当局发现）。


So, to seal the deal, Micro and Macro approach a cash-rich vendor.	因此为了完成这笔交易，双方就去找一个资金雄厚的供应商。


This is usually a gas-station owner who is flush with cash at the end of each day and who, for security reasons and in order to pay for his fuel supplies, is obliged to deposit his cash daily at his bank, turning valuable FEs into less valuable BEs.	这通常是一位每日现金充裕的加油站老板，出于安全原因或者为了支付其燃料供应，有必要每天把自己的钱存到银行，把宝贵的自由欧换成不值钱的银行欧。


The mutually beneficial deal is completed when Macro wires €20,000 in BE to the gas-station owner, who then hands over a smaller sum of FE (cash) to Micro’s owner, pocketing the difference.	这种互惠互利的交易，首先是大企业汇2万欧给油站老板，后者把一笔稍小的数目给回微型企业，从中赚取差价。


The fact that this informal deal benefits all sides exposes the terrible inefficiency of current fiscal policy (namely, punitive business taxes) and how capital controls magnify it.	这种有利于各方的非正式协议事实上暴露了现行财政政策（即惩罚性营业税）可怕的低效率，以及资本管制是如何将其进一步放大的。


The state collects additional VAT from Micro (at a loss of corporate taxes that Micro cannot pay anyway); Macro enjoys the benefits of seemingly higher turnover; and the gas-station owner reduces his losses from converting FE into BE.	国家从微小企业身上征收额外的增值税（以损失企业营业税为代价，反正微小企业也无力支付）； 大型企业享受看似较高的营业额所带来的好处；


The downside is that economic activity is overstated and, more important, that reform becomes even harder as entrepreneurs internalize the necessity to find new, creative ways of bending the rules.	加油站老板也减少了从自由欧转成银行欧的损失。 不足之处是经济活动被夸大了，更重要的是，改革变得更加困难，因为企业家坚信有必要寻找新的创造性方式来扭曲规则。


The sole purpose of the capital controls imposed on Greece last summer was to force the country’s rebellious government to capitulate to the eurozone’s failed policies.	去年夏天强迫希腊实施资本管制的唯一目的是迫使逆叛的新政府屈从于欧元区的失败政策。


But an unintended consequence was the formalization of two parallel (euro-denominated) currencies.	但是一个意想不到的后果是两个平行（以欧元计价）货币的正规化。


Combined with the punitive taxation caused by Europe’s refusal to recognize the unsustainability of Greek public debt, the dual-currency regime produces unforeseen incentives for informal transactions in a country that desperately needs to defeat informality.	结合因为欧洲拒绝承认希腊公共债务不可持续性的惩罚性税收，双货币机制催生和鼓励了原本并未预见的非正式交易，可是希腊却恰恰是最迫切需要消除非正式交易的国家。