And, to ensure fairness, it seeks the restoration of the GST Disputes Settlement Authority provided for in the original bill, so that the GST council administering the tax would not rule on its own decisions.	而且为确保公平，它试图恢复原法案规定的商品服务税纠纷解决机制，以避免负责征税的商品服务税委员会就自己的决定做出裁决。


There are a few more minor objections, but these are the core issues holding up the adoption of the GST.	还有一些小的争议，但以上这些核心问题阻止了商品服务税的通过。


Instead of addressing these legitimate problems, Modi is accusing Congress of unconstructive opposition by thwarting reforms that it had once advocated.	莫迪不去解决上述合理问题，反而指责国会非建设性地反对曾经提倡的改革。


But Congress will not back down, insisting that it will not allow the bill to pass through the upper house of parliament, where the BJP does not have a majority, until the government accepts the key amendments.	但国会不会退缩，在政府接受关键修正之前，坚持不让该法案在人民党不占多数的议会上院通过。


The resulting stalemate means that Modi’s plan to roll out the new tax at the start of the next fiscal year, on April 1, 2016, is probably dead in the water.	由此造成的僵局意味着莫迪在下一财年开始，也就是2016年4月1日推出新税收计划的方案可能会胎死腹中。


Some will see in this contretemps proof of the age-old argument that India’s democracy is an obstacle to development.	有人据此认为这证明了一种古老的说法，即印度民主是发展的障碍。


After all, it was democracy – specifically, the pressure to maintain adequate support – that led the Modi government to hollow out the GST concept.	归根结底，是民主——具体地讲是确保足够支持的压力——导致莫迪政府掏空了商品服务税概念。


And it is democracy – that is, the need to secure adequate support for the bill in parliament – that is enabling Congress to block any further progress until Modi relents.	也正是民主——也就是法案在议会赢得足够支持的必要性——导致国会在莫迪让步前阻止任何深入的进展。


These kinds of problems do not arise in top-down autocracies like China and Singapore.	诸如此类的问题在自上而下的中国和新加坡不会出现。


Nonetheless, India is right to organize itself this way.	尽管如此，印度的组织方式依然正确。


Its system of governance rests on the belief that an integrated process of bargaining, disagreement, reflection, and compromise – not top-down unchallenged decision-making – is the most effective route to wise, fair, and successful policymaking.	它的治理体系依据这样一种信仰，即完整的谈判、分歧、反馈和妥协进程而非自上而下未经挑战的决策是制定明智、公平和有效决策的最佳途径。


The GST bill that eventually emerges from this standoff will be better for having gone through these detailed, if time-consuming, debates.	最终从僵局中脱颖而出的商品服务税法案会因为这些详细、耗时的辩论而有所改善。


When it is finally adopted, the chances that it will transform the Indian economy for the better are high.	当最终获得采纳时，它能让印度经济变得更好的几率很大。


India’s Economic Hotspots	印度经济热点


MUMBAI – India’s economy could soon be on the move again.	孟买—印度经济也许很快就会重新上路。


The new government is re-establishing fiscal discipline and energizing the bureaucracy, fueling optimism that rising business confidence will re-activate investment, particularly in infrastructure.	新政府正在重建财政纪律、激励官僚，这让人们乐观地认为高涨的商业信心能够重新激活投资，特别是是基础设施投资。


But India’s overall growth prospects conceal a patchwork of economic opportunities that exist within states, districts, cities, and even towns – opportunities that companies can uncover only with careful research.	但印度总体增长前景掩盖了存在于邦、区、市甚至镇的经济机会图景——公司只有通过仔细研究才能发现这些机会。


India’s economic data are promising.	印度经济数据令人振奋。


Annual average GDP growth is forecast to range from 6.4% to 7.7% until 2025.	2025年前的平均年GDP增长预计将达到6. 4—7.


This compares favorably with last year’s 4.7% rate, and is close to the 7.7% average recorded in the decade up to 2012.	这比去年4. 7%的注资漂亮不少，已接近于截至2012年的十年的平均增长记录。


Moreover, it contrasts sharply with the expectations of secular stagnation in the developed world.	此外，这一预测与发达国家长期停滞的预期形成了鲜明对比。


This acceleration would place India among the world’s fastest-growing large economies and increase the number of Indian consumers who can afford discretionary items from 27 million in 2012 to 89 million in 2025.	如此经济加速将让印度成为世界增长最快的大经济体之一，并让有能力随意消费的印度人数量从2012年的2,700万增加到2025年的8,900万。


But the potential is far from uniform.	但潜力并不是均匀分布的。


According to a new report, more than half of India’s GDP growth between now and 2025 will come from just eight states (Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttarakhand), home to just 31% of the country’s population.	根据最新报告，从现在到2025年，印度GDP增长的一大半将来自八个邦（古吉拉特、哈里亚纳、喜马偕尔、南方、喀拉拉、马哈拉施特拉、泰米尔纳德、安德拉和北阿坎德），这八个邦只涵盖了31%的印度人口。


Along with four dynamic city-states (New Delhi, Goa, Chandigarh, and Pondicherry), these states will be home to 50 million consumers, or 57% of the country’s middle-class households.	这八个邦加上四个城市邦（新德里、果阿、昌迪加尔和本地治里）将拥有5,000万消费者，或57%的印度中产阶级家庭。


Indeed, per capita GDP in India’s highest-performing regions could grow to twice the national level.	事实上，印度表现最好地区的人均GDP增长率可能达到全国水平的两倍。


This reflects several factors, including rapid urbanization, sustained investment in skills and infrastructure, and a shift from agriculture to industries such as automotive components, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, financial, and IT-enabled services.	这是多重因素的反映，包括快速城市化、技能和基础设施方面的持续投资以及从农业向汽车零件、石油化工、制药、金融和IT服务业等工业行业的转变。


By 2025, the economies of these regions will resemble those of middle-income countries.	到2025年，这些地区的经济将赶上中等收入国家。


Maharashtra’s consumer market of 128 million will wield purchasing power similar to that now seen in Brazil.	马哈拉施特拉的1. 28亿消费者市场将产生于今天的巴西等量齐观的购买力。


New Delhi’s 22 million people will boast living standards similar to today’s Russia.	新德里的2,200万人将拥有与今天的俄罗斯相当的生活水平。


Slightly less dramatically, though still significant, per capita GDP in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, West Bengal, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, based on current trends, is forecast to reach 0.7-1.2 times the national average by 2025, swelling the number of middle-class consumers four-fold, to 16 million.	不那么显而易见但仍可谓重大发展的是，按照当前趋势，恰蒂斯加尔、奥里萨、西孟加拉、拉贾斯坦和中央等邦的人均GDP到2025年预计将达到全国平均水平的0. 7到1.


By contrast, the weakest-performing states, including Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Jharkhand, with per capita GDP of under 0.7 times India’s average, will struggle with low incomes and high population growth, unless they improve their governance and investment trajectory significantly.	相反，表现最差的邦，包括比哈尔、北方和贾坎德邦，人均GDP将在印度平均水平的0. 7倍以下，它们将在低收入和高人口增长中苦苦挣扎，除非能够大幅改善治理和投资轨迹。


But investors seeking the best growth opportunities will have to search beyond states’ headline figures and scrutinize India’s districts more closely, especially urban clusters and their hinterlands.	但追求最佳增长机会的投资者必须超越各邦的标题数字，仔细审视印度各区，特别是城市集群（urban clusters）及其内部。


We have identified 49 such high-growth clusters, located in 183 districts nationwide.	我们发现了49个这种高增长集群，分布于全国183个区中。


In 2012, these areas accounted for half of India’s population, 70% of its GDP, and 71% of consumers.	2012年，这些地区涵盖了印度人口的额一半、GDP的70%和消费者的71%。


They are also home to 250 of India’s 450 cities with populations above 100,000.	它们还包括了印度450个10万人以上城市中的250个。


Interestingly, one-third of these clusters can be found in states that have delivered low to medium economic performance, or are located close to smaller, lesser-known towns in better-performing states.	有趣的是，这些城市集群中有三分之一处于中低经济表现的邦或接近于表现较好邦中较小、知名度较低的城镇。


The Nellore cluster in Andhra Pradesh, for example, has paddy, tobacco, groundnut, mango, and sugarcane farms.	比如，安德拉邦的内洛尔（Nellore）城市集群拥有稻田、烟草、花生、芒果和甘蔗农场。


The Bikaner cluster in Rajasthan is rich in oilseed and the quarrying and production of Makarana marble and limestone.	拉贾斯坦邦的比卡内尔（Bikaner）城市集群富于含油种子和Makarana大理石和石灰石的开采和制造。


The more diversified Aurangabad cluster, in Maharashtra, is home to some of India’s largest seed companies, an active automotive, pharmaceutical, and sugar-manufacturing industry, and a tourism hub that includes the Ajanta and Ellora caves.	更加多元化的马哈拉施特拉邦的奥兰加巴德（Aurangabad）城市集群是不少印度最大的种子公司的所在地，拥有活跃的汽车、制药和糖生产行业，同时也是旅游枢纽，坐落着阿旃陀（Ajanta）和艾洛拉（Ellora）石窟。


The location of these lesser-known clusters underscores the point that investors, seeking low-cost real estate and a skilled workforce, should look more carefully at India’s economic geography when deciding where to place their operations.	这些名气较小的城市集群的区位表明，寻找低成本不动产和高技能工人的投资者应该更加仔细地审视印度的经济地理以决定在哪里经营。


These locations could eventually become knowledge-based industry or services hubs, similar to those of large Indian cities such as Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and Pune – only cheaper.	这些区位最终可能成为基于知识的行业或服务业的枢纽，类似于班加罗尔、海德拉巴和普纳而印度大城市——并且更加便宜一些。


As they continue to develop, India’s dynamic economic clusters will themselves need to invest in modern sanitation and water systems, education and health, airports, railways, and road links.	随着印度有活力的经济集群的继续发展，它们会自然产生投资卫生和水系统、教育和医疗、机场、铁路和公路连接的需要。


As such, they offer investors opportunities in many sectors, including consumer goods, financial services, housing, and infrastructure.	这将给投资者带来许多部门的机会，包括消费品、金融服务、住房和基础设施。


Given their structural advantages – including proximity to large urban centers for some – these clusters could generate some of the best returns on investment anywhere in India.	考虑到这些集群的结构性优势——包括接近大城市中心——它们能够为面向印度的投资带来最佳回报。


Companies hoping to catch India’s next growth wave might want to consider areas that seldom feature on investment lists, but that might offer better value than marquee destinations.	希望抓住印度下一轮增长浪潮的公司也许会想考虑很少出现在投资列表上的地区，但这也许比热门地区更有价值。


Maintaining Growth in India	保持印度增速


MUMBAI – The global economy’s slowdown has not spared India.	孟买——印度也未能从全球经济放缓的大趋势中幸免。


Sustaining the growth that it needs to continue to lift millions of people out of poverty will require rethinking its economic-policy approach.	保持继续实现能使成百上千万人脱贫的经济增长需要对经济增长模式进行重新思考。


If India is to succeed, it will have to deepen regional and domestic demand, strengthen its macroeconomic institutions, and join in the fight for an open global system.	印度要想成功，深层次发掘地区和国内需求、强化宏观经济体制并勇敢加入缔造开放全球体系的斗争就是必由之路。


Diminished expectations abroad should not lead India to lower its ambitions.	印度的雄心壮志不应受到国外预期降低的影响。


Fulfilling these ambitions will require efficiency-boosting investments, particularly in infrastructure.	实现上述目标需要靠投资来提高效率，其中基础设施投资尤为重要。


Every corner of the country should be linked to domestic and international markets through roads, railways, ports, and airports.	我们要确保国内每个角落都能通过公路、铁路、港口和机场联通到国内和国际市场。


Inputs, such as energy, minerals, and water, must be made available at competitive prices.	能源、矿产、水资源等各项投入要素必须确保有竞争力的价格。


The country should be linked to broader markets through mobile devices and broadband, and access to finance must be made easier, especially for those who traditionally have been excluded.	印度必须借助移动设备和宽带与更广泛的市场保持联系，而且确保融资渠道畅通，尤其要确保传统上被排除在外的人能够享受到融资服务。


Plans to achieve these goals are being developed; they must now be implemented.	实现上述目标的计划现在正在制定过程中； 这些计划现在必须付诸实行。


Moreover, human capital must be improved.	此外，必须改善人力资本。


This presupposes higher investment in health care, nutrition, and sanitation, so that India’s citizens are healthy and able; education tailored to developing skills that are valued in the labor market; and the creation of jobs in firms that have an incentive to invest in training.	这需要加大在医疗保健、营养及卫生领域的投入，以确保印度民众掌握才干、身体健康； 要确保教育能够缔造出劳动力市场所看重的技能；


Achieving all of this requires that the bureaucracy focus on serving the economy, rather than – as has too often been the case – vice versa.	同时在有意愿投资于培训的企业创造就业机会。 实现所有这些目标需要各级官员一心一意地服务经济，而不是像在多数情况下那样——反过来要经济适应他。


Promisingly, the political leadership has affirmed its belief in “minimum government, maximum governance.”	幸运的是，政治领导层已经明确了其“小政府、大执政”的信仰。


Fueling growth through domestic demand will have to be carefully managed.	通过国内需求推动经济发展需要认真加以管理。


As a country that does not belong to any power bloc, India cannot afford to put itself in the position of needing multilateral support – a trap into which even developed countries, like Portugal and Spain, have fallen.	因为不属于任何权力集团，印度不能将自己置于需要多边支持的地位——就连像葡萄牙和西班牙这样的发达国家也未能躲开这样的陷阱。


There is the risk of overstimulation, with fiscal deficits fueling large current-account deficits and debts, which suddenly become unsustainable when money gets tight.	此外还有可能过度刺激，表现为财政赤字推升巨额经常账户赤字和债务，并在流动性收紧时突然变得不可持续。


The few emerging economies that have avoided booms and busts have done so by adhering to sound policy frameworks.	坚持稳健的政策框架是少数几个成功避开繁荣萧条循环的新兴经济体的秘诀。


Fiscal prudence is essential.	审慎的财政政策必不可少。


Whether India needs more institutions to control deficits and monitor the quality of its budgets is a question worthy of discussion.	印度是否需要更多机构来控制赤字和监测预算质量的问题值得探讨。


A number of countries have independent organs that pronounce on budgets.	不少国家设立了公开管理预算问题的独立机构。


These bodies are especially important in providing budgetary estimates, particularly for unfunded long-term liabilities.	上述机构的重要职责是评估预算、特别是尚未有着落的长期负债。


As the experience of developed countries has shown, long-term fiscal commitments, such as universal pensions and health care, can be easy to make, but difficult to fulfill.	发达国家的经验表明，制定通用养老金和医疗保健等长期财政政策轻而易举，但真正落实却难度不小。


On the monetary side, the Reserve Bank of India should focus on keeping inflation low and stable, ensuring optimal conditions for growth.	在货币政策方面，印度储备银行应注重保持低通胀和稳定，确保为经济增长创造最佳条件。


As it focuses on inflation, however, the RBI must recognize that emerging markets are not as resilient as industrial economies.	但在解决通胀问题时，印度储备银行必须认清新兴市场并不具备工业国家那样出色的适应性。


They are more fragile, and their households’ economic buffers and safety nets are thinner.	他们的地位更加脆弱，家庭经济缓冲能力和安全网更不可靠。


Disinflation, when necessary, cannot be as steep.	必要情况下的通缩不能超过限度。


The RBI will also have to pay attention to financial stability.	印度储备银行还需要关注金融稳定。


This is normally a secondary objective, but it may become central if the economy enters a low-inflation credit and asset-price boom.	上述目标通常放在第二位，但在经济进入低通胀信贷阶段且资产价格上涨时可能成为核心目标。


It will be important to remember that the central bank’s role is not to boost stock prices, but to ensure that the economy’s underlying fundamentals and its financial system enable sustainable growth.	重要的是记住央行的作用不是提振股价，而要确保经济基本面和金融系统实现可持续增长。


India will run a current-account deficit for the foreseeable future, which means that it will need net foreign financing.	在可预见的未来印度都将维持经常项目赤字，也就是说印度需要外国资金净流入。


The most stable form of financing, foreign direct investment, has the additional benefit of bringing in new technologies and methods.	融资最稳定的形式外商直投还有引进新技术和新方法的额外好处。


But India should not be railroaded into compromising its interests to attract FDI.	但印度不应被迫牺牲自身利益来吸引外资直投。


For example, India’s requirements for patenting a medicine are perfectly reasonable, regardless of what the international drug companies say.	比方说，印度对药物专利申请的要求完全合理，而不管国际制药公司怎么说。


But India must ensure that its policies are transparent, and that contractual disputes, especially over taxation, are quickly resolved.	但印度必须确保政策透明，且涉及合同纠纷，尤其是税收方面的纠纷，能够保证较快的解决速度。


Efforts to ensure this have already begun.	我们已经开始努力实现这一目标。


Finally, as a country that does not export vital natural resources and is dependent on substantial commodity imports, India needs an open, competitive, vibrant system of international trade and finance.	最后，身为依赖大宗商品进口的重要自然资源净进口国，印度需要开放、竞争、充满活力的国际贸易和金融体系。


India’s energy security, for example, depends not on owning oil assets in remote fragile countries, but on ensuring that the global oil market works well and is not disrupted.	比方说，与其说印度能源安全取决于掌握遥远脆弱国家的石油资产，还不如说取决于确保全球石油市场正常运行不受破坏。


Strong, independent, multilateral institutions that can play the role of impartial arbiter in facilitating international economic transactions are in India’s interest.	建立强势、独立的多边机构，在促进国际经济交易中发挥公平的仲裁作用符合印度的利益。


For now, the international monetary system remains dominated by the frameworks implemented by developed countries.	目前，国际货币体系仍然以发达国家执行的框架为主。


Though this is slowly starting to change, there is a growing need for a rapid overhaul.	虽然这正在慢慢发生改变，但现实越来越需要加速改革。


As developed countries struggle with slow growth and large debt burdens, their interest in an open global system can no longer be taken for granted.	因为受到经济增长放缓和债务负担沉重的困扰，我们不能再认为发达国家对开放全球体系的关注是理所当然的。


Indeed, their policymakers’ attention is likely to turn inward amid growing demands for protectionist measures.	事实上，越来越强的保护主义呼声可能迫使决策者将注意力转向国内。


Responsibility for keeping the global economy open may thus fall on emerging countries like India.	保持全球经济开放的责任因此可能会落到像印度这样的新兴国家身上。


That is why these countries must press for quotas and management reforms in multilateral institutions and inject new agendas, new ideas, and new thinking into the global arena.	上述国家因此必须敦促多边机构设立配额、推进管理改革并为全球舞台注入新议程、新理念和新想法。


India can no longer simply object to proposals by developed countries; it must put its own proposals on the table.	印度不能再满足于对发达国家提出的议案说不； 而必须提出自己的方案。


Our research departments, universities, and think tanks have to generate ideas that India’s representatives can use.	我们的研究部门、大学和智库必须拿出印度代表可以利用的想法。


India can continue to thrive if it invests in physical and human capital and pursues prudent fiscal and monetary policies.	如果投资于实物和人力资本、追求稳健的财政和货币政策，印度就能继续茁壮成长。


But this strategy also requires India to embrace its place on the international stage.	但上述策略也需要印度对自身在国际舞台上的地位有所把握。


India’s Sacred Cows and Unholy Politics	印度：神圣的牛和不神圣的政治


NEW DELHI – The headlines out of India in recent weeks have often made sickening reading.	新德里—最近几周，印度的热门新闻读起来令人作呕。


Startlingly, the central protagonist in most of these stories is that most peaceable and innocent of animals, the cow.	令人震惊的是，这些报道中的主角大多是和平的无辜动物——牛。


A Muslim man was beaten to death by a mob in a small town an hour from New Delhi in response to rumors that he had slaughtered and eaten a cow, sacred to Hindus.	距离新德里一小时行程的一个小镇，一位男性穆斯林因为据传屠宰并吃掉了一只牛而被打死。 牛是印度教的圣物。


Another man died after being attacked by villagers who believed he was involved in cattle smuggling.	另一位男性因为被相信卷入了牛只走私而被村民袭击致死。


And a trucker was killed in Udhampur, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, over rumors that he had been involved in cow killings.	还有一位卡车司机在查谟和克什米尔邦的乌德汉普尔（Udhampur）被杀，因为据传他参与了杀牛。


Three deaths in just three weeks.	三起死亡事件相隔不到三周。


Public officials, too, are getting in on the action.	公职官员也参与了行动。


After the chief minister of Karnataka, a member of the opposition Congress party, recently declared that he would eat beef, a politician from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) threatened to behead him if he follows through.	反对党国大党党员、卡纳塔克邦首席部长最近宣布他要吃牛肉，而执政党印度人民党的一位政客威胁说，如果他真的吃了牛肉，就要他的项上人头。


Likewise, 20 policemen stormed the canteen of the Kerala state government’s outpost in Delhi, because it advertised a “beef fry” on its menu.	类似地，20名警察突袭了卡拉拉邦驻德里办事处的餐厅，因为它的菜单宣传“炒牛肉”。


Kashmiri legislator Engineer Abdul Rashid had his face smeared with black paint for throwing a “beef party.”	克什米尔议员、工程师拉希德（Abdul Rashid）因为举办“牛肉派对”，头上被涂满黑漆。


And the chief minister of BJP-ruled Haryana, Manohar Lal Khattar, declared that Muslims living in India would have to give up eating beef.	印度人民党执政的哈雅纳邦首席部长哈塔尔（Manohar Lal Khattar）宣称居住在印度的穆斯林必须放弃吃牛肉。


To be sure, there have been plenty of other repellent stories of intolerance that have nothing to do with cows.	当然，还有其他许多与牛无关的令人反感的排斥性报道。


Two children from the impoverished Dalit community recently burned to death in their own home, in an arson attack by upper-caste goons.	两位贫困的达利特种姓儿童最近在自己家中被烧死，纵火犯是高种姓暴徒。


A prominent public intellectual had his face blackened with ink for organizing a book release for a former Pakistani foreign minister in Mumbai.	一位著名公共知识分子因为在孟买为一名巴基斯坦外交部前部长组织新书发布会而被喷了 一脸黑墨水。


And Hindu zealots stormed a Cricket Control Board meeting to disrupt discussion of a possible India-Pakistan cricket series (which now seems unlikely to take place).	狂热印度教徒还席卷了板球协会（Cricket Control Board）会议，干扰板球协会讨论印度-巴基斯坦板球联赛事宜（目前已几乎铁定无法实现）。


But none of these incidents has acquired the toxicity of the assaults on those deemed insufficiently respectful of the holy cow.	但所有这些事件都没有被认为没有得到充分尊重的受害者——圣牛有害。


Indeed, a signal illiberal achievement of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP regime has been the revival of the cow as an instrument of political warfare.	事实上，总理莫迪的与印度人民党政权的一个标志性的狭隘成就是让牛重新成为政治斗争的武器。


And the recent spate of attacks reveals a serious problem with the country’s trajectory under Modi.	而最近的一连串袭击事件表明，莫迪治下的印度问题重重。


Of course, the cow has long had a place in Indian politics: the country’s constitution includes a provision explicitly urging a gradual movement toward full prohibition of cow slaughter – a ban that has already been implemented in most states.	当然，牛在印度政治中早已占据特殊的地位——印度宪法有一个条款明确要求逐渐实现完全禁止牛只屠宰——大部分邦已经实施了这一禁令。


For most of India’s existence, however, the default approach has essentially been “live and let live” – make your own choice about beef, and let others do the same.	但是，在大部分印度的存在中，默认的观点其实是“各活各的”（live and let live）——你对牛肉的选择你自己定，让其他人也自己定。


I am a vegetarian myself, but I have never considered it my business what others eat.	我本人是素食者，但我从来不会去考虑被人吃什么。


Where beef was legally available, it was consumed not just by Muslims and other minorities, but also by many poorer Hindus, who could not afford other kinds of meat.	在吃牛肉合法的地方，不但穆斯林和其他少数群体消费牛肉，许多较穷的印度教徒也消费牛肉，因为他们消费不起其他肉类。


But that response was possible only so long as relatively liberal or moderate officials (including an earlier BJP-led coalition government) were in power.	但只有相对自由或温和的官员（包括早期印度人民党领导的联合政府）执政时才可能实现这一点。


The Modi government does not fit that description.	莫迪政府并不符合这一标准。


Instead, it is full of leaders who seem more concerned with what goes into other people’s mouths than what comes out of their own.	相反，莫迪政府中充满了更关心别人嘴里有什么，而不是从自己嘴里说出什么的领导人。


Modi’s government has given voice to a peculiar kind of Hindu chauvinism, one that embraces activist assertion of a narrowly constructed version of the faith.	莫迪政府让一种特殊的与印度沙文主义兴起，这种印度沙文主义积极的主张狭隘的信仰观。


It cannot be described as “fundamentalism,” for Hinduism is a religion singularly devoid of fundamentals: it lacks a single sacred book, a single version of divinity, and even the equivalent of a Sabbath day.	它不能被称为“原教旨主义”，因为 印度教是一种罕见的没有原教旨的宗教：它没有单一的圣经，没有单一的神，甚至没有“安息日”。


In fact, Hindus who eat beef can, like those who abjure it, find support for their beliefs in the religion’s ancient texts and scripture.	事实上，吃牛肉的印度教徒可以和戒吃牛肉的印度教徒一样，在印度教的典籍中找到支持自己信念的内容。


Rather, what Modi’s government has fostered is a form of subjective intolerance, with supporters, emboldened by the BJP’s absolute majority, imposing their particular view of what India should be, regardless of whom it hurts.	相反，莫迪政府制造了一种主观不容忍的形式，拜印度人民党绝对多数地位所赐，其支持者将自己关于印度应该是什么样的观念强加给其他人，丝毫不顾这可能带来伤害。


The state of Maharashtra’s recent beef ban – which threatens the livelihoods of a million Muslim butchers and truckers – would not have been imposed by any previous state government or supported by any previous administration in New Delhi.	马哈拉斯特拉邦最近的牛肉禁令——这一禁令将威胁到一百万穆斯林肉贩和卡车司机的生计——在此前任何邦政府中都不会实行，也不会得到此前的新德里政府的支持。


Such bans are not really about beef, but about freedom.	这些禁令其实并不是针对牛肉，而是关乎自由。


Indians have generally felt free to be themselves, within their dynamic and diverse society.	总体而言，印度人很有自由感，认为自己生活在有活力的多元社会中。


It is that freedom that the BJP’s representatives and followers are challenging today.	如今，印度人民党的代表和追随者们正在挑战这一自由。


The good news is that a backlash has already emerged.	好消息是这样做的反作用已经出现。


Nearly 40 distinguished authors and poets have returned their prestigious Sahitya Akademi (Literary Academy) awards to protest the silence of the academy and other government bodies following the killing of three intellectuals by suspected Hindu hardliners.	近40位著名作家和诗人返还了此前获得的地位崇高的印度文学院奖，以反对印度文学院和其他政府机构对于三维知识分子被杀事件无动于衷。 嫌凶是印度教强硬派。


A top scientist has now followed suit, returning his Padma Bhushan, the government’s third-highest honor.	一位顶尖科学家也效而仿之，返还了他的莲花装勋章（第三高的政府荣誉）。


As these gestures highlight the explosion of Hindu chauvinism, support for Modi has begun to erode.	这些姿态彰显出��度沙文主义的爆发之势，莫迪的支持率开始下降。


When Modi came to power, foreign observers lauded him as just the kind of decisive, business-minded economic reformer that India needed in order to fulfill its massive potential.	当莫迪上台执政时，外国观察者赞颂他正好是印度实现其巨大潜力所需要的有商业头脑的果断的经济改革家。


During the election campaign, he seemed to recognize that achieving good economic results was more important than the politics of religious identity for which his party had been notorious.	在选战期间，他似乎认识到，实现好的经济结果比政治身份政治更重要。 他的政党在政治身份政治方面臭名昭著。


To the dismay of many, Modi has underperformed economically, while the zealots have run amok, hijacking his development agenda.	让很多人失望的是，莫迪没有拿出出色的经济表现，狂热分子胡作非为，劫持了他的发展日程。


And his silence in the face of it all confirms what many in India had feared: his economic sloganeering was merely a ploy to secure power.	而他对这样的局面默不作声，这证实了许多印度人所担心的：他的经济口号只是用来保证权力的幌子。


Now that power is becoming a tool of the unsavory agenda pursued by the Hindu chauvinists who enabled his rise.	如今，权力正在成为让他成功崛起的印度教沙文主义者所追求的令人作呕的日程的工具。


As a result, divisive politics is now overwhelming constructive economic policymaking.	因此，如今，政治分裂已经压倒了建设性经济决策。


Unfortunately for India, this is likely to continue until the cows come home.	对印度来说，不幸的是，圣牛不消停，这一局面就将一直继续。


India, Iran, and the Case for Double Standards	印度、伊朗以及双重标准的理由


All but lost in the controversies surrounding Iraq and Iran is a major initiative involving a third “I” country: India.	在有关伊朗和伊拉克乱局中唯独缺少了有关第三个以英语字母“I”开头的国家，即印度的主要事件。


Sometime this year, the United States Congress is likely to vote on the “US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” signed when President Bush visited New Delhi in March.	今年某些时候，美国国会可能对布什总统在三月访问新德里期间签署的“美国和印度民用核子合作倡议”进行投票。


The agreement paves the way for American exports of nuclear technologies and materials for use in India’s civilian nuclear program.	该协议为美国向印度出口核能技术以及核子原料用于其民用核子项目铺平了道路。


In return, India has pledged to open 14 of its 22 existing and planned nuclear power reactors, as well as all future civil reactors, to international inspection.	作为交换，印度已经承诺向国际核查人员开放其22个现有以及计划中的核能反应堆中的14个，以及未来所有的民用反应堆。


The agreement matters for at least two reasons.	这一协议十分重要，原因有两个。


First, the accord symbolizes the arrival of a new geopolitical relationship between the world’s two largest democracies that were often on opposite sides during the Cold War.	首先，这一协议标志着世界最大的两个民主国家新的地缘政治关系的来临。 两国在冷战期间经常处于对立状态。


This development may be of historic importance if it not only leads to a deepening of US-Indian technical and economic ties, but also strengthens their ability to tackle regional and global challenges, ranging from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to climate change.	这一协议具有历史意义，不仅将会深化美印两国之间的技术和经济联系，同时还加强它们的处理地区和全球挑战的能力，这些挑战包括核武器扩散一直到气候变化。


But the proposed US-India accord is attracting notice for a second, and far more controversial, reason: concern that it could weaken, rather than advance, efforts to resist the further worldwide spread of nuclear weapons.	但是，拟议中的美印协议却由于第二个、也是远远更有争议的原因而引起人们的注意。 那就是，人们担忧，这一协议不仅不会促进，反而会削弱抵制世界范围内核武器的进一步扩散。


Critics charge that the agreement undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by letting India have its cake (nuclear weapons) and eat it, too (by giving it access to nuclear fuel and technology).	批评者们说这一协议通过允许印度一举双得，也就是既拥有核武器又向其提供核原料和技术而破坏了核不扩散条约。


They allege that the agreement creates a double standard, according to which only some countries may possess nuclear weapons.	他们指称，这一协议建立了只有某些国家才可以拥有核武器的双重标准。


To be fair, the critics are right, at least in part.	公平而言，批评者们的说法至少有一部分是正确的。


There is a double standard at work.	的确是有双重标准。


But there is nothing new about that.	但是，这并没有什么稀奇的。


The NPT, some four decades old, is based on a double standard that gives only five countries – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US – the right (for how long is not defined) to possess nuclear weapons.	核不扩散条约具有四十年的历史，其本身就是建立在双重标准之上，也就是说，只有五个国家，即中国、法国、俄国、英国和美国才有权拥有核武器，至于多久则语焉不详。


Moreover, the world seems to have learned to tolerate the reality that three other countries – Israel, India, and Pakistan – also possess nuclear weapons.	而且，世界似乎已经学会容忍这一现实，也就是其他三个国家即以色列、印度和巴基斯坦同样拥有核武器。


Where the critics of the proposed US-India accord are wrong is in charging that such a double standard is wrong when it comes to India because it opens the way for countries such as North Korea and Iran to develop nuclear weapons.	拟议中的美印协议的批评者们错误的地方是，他们说这一双重标准用到印度身上就是错误的，因为它为类似朝鲜和伊朗等国发展核武器铺平了道路。


Not all countries are equal.	国家之间并不平等。


India is a democracy.	印度是一个民主国家。


Transparency and the rule of law are the norm, and its government does all it can to fight terrorism.	透明和法制已经落地生根，印度政府竭尽全力打击恐怖主义。


There is no reason to believe that India will promote the spread of nuclear fuel, technology, or weapons to any other party or country; on the contrary, it is committed to preventing this.	没有理由相信印度会加速核燃料、核技术或者核武器向任何一方或者国家的扩散； 相反，印度则承诺防止扩散。


This is not true of either North Korea or Iran.	对于朝鲜或者伊朗而言情况就有所不同了。


The former is arguably the most closed, tyrannical, and militarized society in the world, with a long record of irresponsible exports of dangerous technologies.	前者毫无疑问是世界上最为封闭、专制以及军事化的社会，有一长串不负责任的出口危险技术的记录。


Iran offers official support to terrorists and its president has threatened publicly to destroy Israel.	伊朗为恐怖份子提供正式援助，其总统公开威胁消灭以色列。


The world has good reason to be far less tolerant of what North Korea or Iran do in the realm of nuclear weapons and to reject their calls for equal treatment with India.	在朝鲜以及伊朗的核武器领域，国际社会有足够的理由对此不予姑息迁就，并且拒绝其要求与印度一视同仁的呼吁。


Indeed, if there is a danger in the proposed US-India accord, it is the possibility that either North Korea or Iran might conclude that it is only a matter of time before the world comes to accept their nuclear status.	确实，如果说美印拟议中的协议还有危险的话，那就是朝鲜或者伊���可能得出结论说，国际社会承认其核国家地位只是一个时间问题。


Here the US and others must disabuse them.	在此问题上，美国和其他国家必须让它们打消这个幻想。


The message seems to have gotten through to North Korea; we have seen no nuclear weapons test, despite its probable ability to so.	朝鲜似乎已经领教到了这一信息。 尽管它可能有能力进行核武器试验，但是我们还没有看到它付诸行动。


China, the transit route for most of what goes enters and leaves North Korea, understands that were North Korea to cross this red line, it would risk US military reprisal and possibly lead Japan and/or South Korea to rethink their nuclear weapons policy.	作为绝大多数朝鲜物资的流经国，中国理解朝鲜一旦跨越红线就有可能招致美国的军事报复并且引发日本和韩国重新考量其核武器政策。


None of these outcomes is in China’s strategic interest.	以上结果都不符合中国的战略利益。


Unfortunately, there is no country in a position to influence Iran to the extent that China can influence North Korea.	不幸的是，还没有任何一个国家可以像中国影响朝鲜一样影响伊朗。


The situation is made more difficult by the fact that oil prices are already at a record high, while US ground forces are busy in Iraq, thus reducing the credibility of American military threats to Iran.	石油价格已经达到创纪录的高水平，因此形势就变得愈发困难。 与此同时，美军在伊拉克应接不暇，因此也就降低了美国军事威胁伊朗的可信度。


Iran’s leaders, though, would be unwise to proceed with an unconstrained nuclear program and discount the possibility of US military action.	但是，伊朗领导人如果继续进行不受管制的核子项目并且对美国军事行动的可能性置之不理，那就大为不智了。


This said, a US preventive strike at Iran’s nuclear-related installations is not in the interest of either country.	就此而言，美国预防性打击伊朗与核武器有关的设施不符合任何一国的利益。


The potential for loss of life, for Iranian retaliation, and for global economic disruption is high.	人命牺牲、伊朗的报复以及全球性经济破坏的可能性是巨大的。


Both countries – indeed, the world – would be better served by a diplomatic outcome in which Iran accepted severe limits on any independent uranium enrichment activity it could undertake and agreed to place all of its nuclear-related facilities under highly intrusive international inspection in exchange for economic benefits and security assurances. Better yet would be if Iran turned to Russia or the IAEA for uranium-generated electrical power.	如果能够达到这一外交解决结果，也就是伊朗接受对其进行的任何铀浓缩活动实行严格的限制并同意将其所有核子设施置于高度认真的国际核查之下用来换取经济利益以及安全保障，美伊两国、而且是世界各国都将受益。


Direct US-Iran talks should be convened if they are required to bring about any such agreement.	如果达成这样的协议要求美伊直接对话的话，美伊两国就应该如此。


Iran’s calculations will not be affected by what happens between the US and India.	美国和印度之间的关系不应当影响到伊朗的考量。


Rather, Iranian policy will be shaped by its domestic politics, by the ability of the international community to present a united front, and by the willingness of the US to put forth a reasonable diplomatic offer against the backdrop of sanctions and potential military strikes should diplomacy fail.	进一步而言，伊朗的内政、国际社会采取一致立场的能力以及美国在制裁和在外交努力不成军事打击的背景下提出合情合理的外交提议的意愿都将左右伊朗的政策。


The stakes could hardly be greater.	事关重大，莫过于此。


It is Iran, not India, that we should all be worried about.	我们应当担心的是伊朗，而不是印度。


Modi’s Chauvinism Problem	莫迪的沙文主义问题


NEW DELHI – As the New Year dawns, it has become increasingly clear that India’s new government faces a dilemma entirely of its own making – one that its predecessor never had to confront.	新德里—随着新年的来临，我们也日益明确地看到，印度新政府陷入了一个完全属于作茧自缚的困境——前任政府从未面临过如此困局。


Narendra Modi’s election as Prime Minister in May 2014 was initially hailed worldwide as marking the advent of a more business-friendly government in the world’s largest democracy.	2014年5月，莫迪当选为印度总理，当时，全世界为之欢呼，认为世界最大的民主国家终于迎来了对商界比较友好的政府。


Encouraged by Modi’s pro-market sound bites – he vowed to “replace red tape with a red carpet,” declared that the government has “no business” in business, and campaigned on the slogan “Make in India” – investors rushed to praise him as a new messiah of development.	受莫迪亲市场态度的鼓舞——他宣誓要“用红地毯代替红头文件”，称政府“无为”于商业，并打出了“印度制造”的口号——投资者纷纷赞扬他是发展的新救星。


Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gained the first absolute majority in the lower house of parliament in a quarter-century, thereby freeing it from the pressures and constraints of coalition governance.	莫迪所在的印度人民党（Bharatiya Janata Party）赢得了四分之一个世纪以来的首次下议院绝对多数，从而不必面临联合政府的压力和约束。


Modi’s trips abroad brought talk of new business opportunities, a wave of foreign investment, and joint ventures.	莫迪的海外访问也带来了新商业机会、一大波外国投资和合资企业。


He vowed to improve India’s ranking in the World Bank’s global “Doing Business” report, from a dismal 142nd place to at least 50th.	他宣誓要改善印度在世界银行全球《营商环境》报告中的排位，从羞于见人的142名至少提高到前50名。


Such talk continues, but it seems increasingly removed from the BJP’s central preoccupations.	这些话题还在继续，但日益不再出现在印度人民党的核心议题中。


In fact, Modi rose to power at the head of a family of right-wing organizations that largely do not share his economic priorities, and that are obsessed with so-called “cultural nationalism” – which is essentially just repackaged Hindu chauvinism.	事实上，莫迪能执掌大权，凭借的是一系列经济重点与他不同的右翼组织，这些组织沉溺于所谓的“文化民族主义”中——实质上是重新包装的印度教沙文主义。


The tension between Modi’s avowed economic reformism and the cultural nativism that animates his government’s electoral base is a major impediment to progress.	莫迪所承诺的经济改革与巩固其政府选举基础的文化沙文主义之间的紧张将是进步的主要障碍。


After all, the political majority that Modi needs to pursue his economic policies depends on the organizational capacity of the very people whose chauvinism is undermining him.	毕竟，莫迪追求其经济政策需要政治多数，政治多数取决于组织力，组织力要靠的正是持沙文主义的人——也就是莫迪的执政基础。


In fact, Modi’s rise was followed almost immediately by a series of attacks on India’s minorities, particularly Muslims.	事实上，莫迪上台后，几乎马上出现了攻击印度少数派尤其是穆斯林的局面。


A legislator from Shiv Sena, a far-right regional party allied with the BJP, forced a Muslim cafeteria employee to eat bread during the Ramadan fast.	来自与印度人民党结盟的极右翼地区政党湿婆神军党（Shiv Sena）的立法者强迫穆斯林自助餐厅雇员在斋月期间吃面包。


A more tragic fate befell a young Muslim tech worker in Pune, who was beaten to death in “retaliation” for a defamatory social-media post with which he had no connection.	普纳（Pune）的一位年轻的穆斯林技术工人更惨，他因为完全与他无关的冒犯性社交媒体言论而惨遭“报复”，被殴致死。


Then came a nationwide scare about “love jihad” – an alleged Muslim ploy to make India a Muslim-majority country by seducing Hindu girls into romantic entanglements that would lead to their conversion to Islam.	接着是对“爱圣战”（love jihad）的全国性恐慌。 “爱圣战”据称是一场以让印度成为穆斯林多数国家为目标的穆斯林运动，其手段是引诱印度教女孩陷入浪漫陷阱，把她们转变为伊斯兰教徒。


No sooner had this BJP-fueled hysteria been widely dismissed – Muslims comprise 13% of India’s population, and there have been only a handful of such marriages – than the inflammatory rhetoric mounted.	这场印度人民党推波助澜的歇斯底里刚刚大致消散——穆斯林只占印度人口的13%，这类婚姻的数量也很少——煽动性的言辞就乘势而起。


A prominent Modi supporter declared that all Indians had to acknowledge that they were culturally Hindu.	一位莫迪的主要支持者宣称，所有印度人都必须承认他们是文化上的印度教徒。


A member of the Council of Ministers divided the country into Ramzada (believers in the Hindu god Ram) and Haramzada (bastards) – and was allowed to retain her post.	一位内阁会议（Council of Ministers）成员将印度分为“拉姆扎达”（Ramzada，信奉印度教的神拉姆的人）和“哈拉姆扎达”（Haramzada，杂种）。


Another BJP legislator declared Mahatma Gandhi’s Hindu-nationalist assassin to be a patriot, while a fringe party in the Modi camp announced a campaign to install the assassin’s busts throughout the country.	另一位印度人民党立法者宣称刺杀圣雄甘地的印度民族主义刺客是爱国者，而莫迪阵营中的一个边缘政党还发起了一场为这名刺客在全国树立雕像的运动。


The galloping chauvinism has known no bounds.	急速膨胀的沙文主义没有底线可言。


Modi himself made the embarrassing declaration – in a speech at a new hospital, no less – that the figure of the Hindu god Ganesh, with its elephant’s head on a human body, attested to the ancient Hindus’ knowledge of plastic surgery.	莫迪本人也在一家新医院所做的演讲中令人尴尬的声称印度教象鼻神（Ganesh）的人身象首形象正是古印度教对整形手术的知识的象征。


The education ministry abruptly withdrew German as an optional third language in government schools, and replaced it with Sanskrit.	教育部长突然取消了德语作为公立学校的第三外语选项，替之以梵文。


And the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a volunteer organization modeled on the fascist groups of the 1920s – complete with khaki shorts and staves – declared a campaign of Ghar wapasi (“return home”), or reconversion of minorities to the Hinduism from which their ancestors had allegedly lapsed in the distant past.	而以20世纪20年代法西斯组织为榜样（卡其色短裤和棍棒也照抄不误）成立的志愿者组织民族卫队（Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh）宣布发起一场名为Ghar wapasi（“回家”）的运动，即要求少数派恢复信仰据说他们的祖先在遥远的过去所背叛的印度教。


The resulting controversies have convulsed the country and dominated political discourse, sidelining Modi’s economic policies in the process.	由此造成的争议震动了整个印度，也主宰了政治议程，而在此过程中，莫迪的经济政策被边缘化了。


Indeed, protests by opposition parties have paralyzed the parliament, making it impossible for the government to introduce – let alone pass – important elements of pending economic-reform legislation, such as a law raising the limit on foreign-owned stakes in the insurance sector to 49%.	事实上，反对党的示威已经让议会陷入了瘫痪，政府根本不可能引入——更不用说通过——待定经济改革立法的要素，包括将保险业外国所有权比例上限提高到49%的法律。


Yet Modi has said nothing to quiet his supporters or mollify his critics, raising concerns among investors – especially foreigners – about his ability to manage his own constituents.	然而莫迪没有做出任何表示平息支持者或安抚批评者，这让投资者——特别是外国投资者——担心他是否有能力管好自己的选民。


For example, Lorenz Reibling, of the German-American firm Taurus Investment Holdings, had a few questions – beginning with the implications of recent anti-Christian and Muslim tirades and conversion propositions – before committing to a major investment in India.	比如，德美合资企业陶鲁斯投资控股公司（Taurus Investment Holdings）的雷布林（Lorenz Reibling）在承诺大量投资印度之前就提出了不少问题——首先就是最近的反基督教和穆斯林言论和转变信仰计划的影响。


As Reibling put it, “Conversion and ethnic/religious cleansing doesn’t ring well here in Germany particularly.	雷布林说，“转变信仰和种族/宗教清洗的声音在德国尤其刺耳。


The bizarre dream of a 100% Hindu India would be an India with little or no foreign support.	100%信奉印度教的印度这个千秋大梦将让印度失去几乎一切外部支持。


That is not what India deserves.”	这不是印度应该做的。


If Christians, in particular, are exposed to an “inquisition in reverse,” he observed, they would scale back investment considerably.	”特别是，如果基督徒必须面临“反向调查”（inquisition in reverse），他观察到，他们就会大幅撤回投资。


Similarly, Reibling added, Middle Eastern investors would respond to an anti-Muslim policy by cutting India out of their portfolios.	类似地，雷布林还说，中东投资者也会将印度排出在投资组合之外，以此对付印度的反穆斯林政策。


Reibling is far from the only investor to harbor these fears; indeed, he was merely expressing what his fellow investors abroad have been discussing among themselves.	雷布林绝不是唯一一个有次担忧的投资者； 事实上，他只不过表达了他的投资者同侪在相互讨论中所提出的观点。


The alarm bells have already rung.	警钟已经敲响了。


Modi has found himself in an unenviable position vis-à-vis his own supporters: He cannot live with them, and he cannot live without them.	莫迪已经陷入了与其自身的支持者的不利对峙中：他无法和他们共事，也无法脱离他们单干。


Unless he can find a way to resolve his political dilemma, hope for a “Modi miracle” in India’s economy will ebb as rapidly as it rose.	除非他可以找到解决政治困境的办法，否则对印度经济出现“莫迪奇迹”的希望将以与崛起一样快的速度消退。


The Modi Government Turns One	莫迪政府化为一人政治


NEW DELHI – India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, will mark its first anniversary in office this month.	新德里—总理莫迪领导的印度人民党（Bharatiya Janata Party）政府将在本月迎来执政一周年。


While it is too early to assess its overall performance, the overwhelming sentiment across India so far is one of disappointment.	现在就评估它的总体表现还为时尚早，但目前印度的压倒性观点是失望。


The BJP rode to power on a wave of expectations after a decade in opposition to the United Progressive Alliance government, led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress party.	印度人民党反对国大党总理辛格（Manmohan Singh）领导的联合进步联盟（United Progressive Alliance）政府达十年之久。


(Full disclosure: I was a member of that government.)	（充分披露：我是该政府成员。


Support for the BJP was so strong, in fact, that the party became the first in 30 years to win a majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s parliament).	）去年，印度人民党带着一系列期望上台执政。 印度人民党的支持率非常高，事实上，它是30年来第一个赢得印度议会下院多数的政党。


Early enthusiasm for the BJP government was based on the perceived contrast with its predecessor.	一开始人们之所以对印度人民党政府报以如此大的热情，是因为人们觉得它与前任大不相同。


Here, at last, was a strong single-party government led by a decisive “man of action,” rather than a fractious coalition led by a reticent octogenarian, who was often unfairly caricatured as uncertain and vacillating.	印度终于有了一个“行动派”领导的强大的一党政府，而不是由沉默寡言的耄耋老人所领导的脆弱的执政联盟——后者常常被不公平地刻画为不确定的优柔寡断形象。


Modi was marketed to voters through a clever (and lavishly financed) campaign that portrayed him as the business-savvy leader who had transformed the state of Gujarat into a lodestar of development – and who would do the same for the country as a whole.	莫迪的选战策略很明智（并且资金充沛）。 他被描述为精通商业的领导人——他曾经将古吉拉特邦变成发展明星，现在他要实现整个国家的同样的变迁。


Attracting young people with the promise of jobs, and older voters with the prospect of reform and growth, Modi won a mandate that stunned the country’s pollsters.	莫迪用就业承诺吸引年轻人，用改革和增长前景吸引年纪较大的选民，他获得的支持率让印度民意专家大跌眼镜。


Congress, meanwhile, recorded its worst-ever performance.	与此同时，国大党的表现堪称史上最遭。


Since the election, Modi has energetically strutted the global stage, touting his government as more hospitable to investors and urging foreign manufacturers to “Make in India.”	当选以来，莫迪充满激情地在全球舞台上展现自己，标榜他的政府对投资者更友好，促使外国制造商“在印度制造”。


Yet his foreign travels have achieved little, beyond improving his personal standing, which had suffered considerably following accusations that, as Chief Minister of Gujarat, he had been at least negligent as more than a thousand people were killed in a 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom.	但他的出访除了改善个人处境之外成果寥寥——有指控声称他在担任古吉拉特邦行政长官时对2002年反穆斯林屠杀中遇难的一千多人毫不关心，这让他的名声遭遇重挫。


Modi’s domestic performance has also been underwhelming.	莫迪的国内表现也不尽如人意。


Although his speeches and sound bites continue to impress fans of his Hindi oratory, the gap between rhetoric and reality widens by the week.	尽管他的演讲和声音仍令他的印地语“粉丝”印象深刻，但说辞与现实之间的差距日益拉大。


Indeed, despite speaking eloquently of tolerance and accommodation, Modi has remained largely silent in the face of hate speech by BJP ministers and MPs that is alienating India’s non-Hindu minorities.	事实上，尽管莫迪言必称容忍和融和，但对于印度人民党部长和国会议员冒犯非印度教少数群体的仇恨言论，他几乎毫无反应。


The BJP may preach development, but it is practicing bigotry – a contradiction that Modi could resolve only by repudiating the forces that helped ensure his electoral victory.	印度人民党嘴里说的固然是发展，但他们的所作所为相当偏执——莫迪要想解决这一矛盾，就必须否定帮他确保选举胜利的力量。


Likewise, Modi has not kept his vow of “minimal government, maximum governance”; on the contrary, he has created the most centralized, top-down, bureaucracy-driven, personality-cult-dominated central government since Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule in the mid-1970s.	类似地，莫迪没有兑现其“最小政府、最大治理”的承诺； 相反，他创造了一个自20世纪70年代英迪拉·甘地的紧急状态以来最集中、最自上而下、最官僚主义、最讲裙带关系的中央政府。


Those who decried the alleged “paralysis of decision-making” under Modi’s excessively democratic, consultative, and consensual predecessor are now faced with a different kind of paralysis, as files pile up in Modi’s office, the only place where decisions are made.	谴责莫迪的前任因为过度民主、协商和追求全体满意而导致“决策瘫痪”的人，现在需要面临另一种不同的瘫痪——所有决定都出自莫迪的办公室，导致哪里问题堆积如山。


Senior positions – including two on the indispensible three-member independent election commission – stand vacant, leaving vital institutions unable to function effectively.	高级岗位——包括不可或缺的三人独立选举委员会中的两席——一直空缺，导致重要机构无法有效运转。


Despite his talk about transparency and accountability, Modi has failed to appoint a central information commissioner, vigilance commissioner, or lokpal (the ombudsman who has jurisdiction over all corruption cases involving MPs and central-government employees).	尽管莫迪强调透明度和问责，但他并没有任命中央情报委员（central information commissioner）、纠察委员（vigilance commissioner）或洛克帕尔（lokpal，负责涉及国会议员和中央政府工作人员的所有腐败案件的监察人员）。


With Modi too busy to keep up with all of the decisions he – and only he – can make, the government is adrift.	莫迪疲于做出他——也只有他——可以做的决定，而政府被架空。


In some cases, it is pursuing blatantly contradictory approaches.	在某些情形中，政府追求自相矛盾的方针。


Consider economic policy.	以经济政策为例。


Although Modi has declared that “the government has no business to be in business,” he has failed to question his government’s ownership and control of airlines and hotels.	尽管莫迪声称“政府将与商业划清界限”，但他并没有质疑他的政府对航空公司和饭店的所有权和控制权。


Indeed, privatization of major public-sector behemoths is no longer mentioned.	事实上，主要公共部门巨头企业的私有化早已无人再提。


Furthermore, labor-market liberalization, once considered indispensable to attract investors and promote industrial growth, is on the back burner.	此外，劳动力市场自由化曾被认为是吸引投资者、促进工业增长不可或缺的方针，现在也开始倒退。


Optimistic talk of reform has been replaced by officially articulated respect for “graduated incrementalism.”	关于改革的乐观看法被官方的“步步为营”方针所取代。


Likewise, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, who once derided “tax terrorism,” has unleashed the taxman on entirely new categories of victims, including the foreign institutional investors Modi is trying to attract.	类似地，曾痛斥“税收恐怖主义”的财政部长贾特里（Arun Jaitley）往税务官的受害者名册中又添加了全新的类别，包括外国机构投资者。 莫迪正在试图吸引投资者。


Unsurprisingly, investor sentiment, which perked up during Modi’s campaign, has dampened considerably.	毫不奇怪，在莫迪选战期间欣欣向荣的投资者情绪大受打击。


Modi’s government has also revealed a fine talent for announcing grandiose schemes and failing to finance them.	莫迪政府还擅长宣布宏大的计划而不为它们提供资金。


Worse, budgets for health, education, sanitation, and women’s security – all major talking points of the BJP’s election campaign – have been cut.	更糟糕的是，卫生、教育、环境卫生和妇女安全等方面的预算都遭到了削减——而这些都是印度人民党选战期间重点讨论的领��。


None of this has been lost on the public.	所有这些都没有逃脱公众的眼睛。


India’s farmers, for example, are up in arms, because the land-acquisition law passed by the previous government has been gutted through a series of amendments imposed by fiat (which are now, however, running into legislative resistance).	比如，印度农民已经揭竿而起，因为前任政府通过的土地兼并法因为行政指令（但现在已经遭遇了立法抵制）带来的一系列修改而面目全非。


More generally, voters are not impressed by Modi’s transformation from the chai-wallah (tea-seller) of the election campaign, who had sacrificed domestic bliss to serve the nation, into an omnipresent, gaudily attired celebrity hobnobbing with other bold-face names.	更一般地看，对于莫迪从舍小家为大家而参选的茶叶商转型为衣着浮夸的名人，到处现身与其他显要人物应酬，选民并不买账。


The nadir was reached in January, when Modi received US President Barack Obama – “my friend Barack” – in a pinstripe suit with his own name embossed in gold on every stripe.	最糟糕的例子要数1月份莫迪身着条纹西装迎接美国总统奥巴马——“我的朋友巴拉克”——每个条纹上都烫金印上了他的名字。


The public, appalled by this display, promptly humiliated the BJP in polls for the Delhi Assembly, which the party had nearly won the previous year.	公众被这一打扮震惊了，结果，在德里议会选举中，印度人民党遭到了很大的抵制——而在前一年，印度人民党几乎在德里议会选举中胜出。


Needless to say, the opposition, flattened electorally a year ago, is back on its feet.	不消说，一年前在选举中败北的反对派正在卷土重来。


In a sense, Modi is fortunate that his government’s failings have become so starkly apparent so early in his tenure; he now has time to address them.	从某种程度上说，莫迪是幸运的——他的政府的失败在他执政伊始就表露无遗，这让他还有时间解决问题。


He showed that he is capable of learning the right lessons when he quickly auctioned the pinstripe suit for charity.	他已经证明，他有能力从汲取正确的教训——他迅速将那件条纹西装送进了慈善拍卖会。


Unfortunately, the rest of his errors cannot be so easily undone.	不幸的是，他的其他错误纠正起来就不那么容易了。


Realizing the Indian Dream	实现印度梦


NEW DELHI – It is not often that I get to wear two hats at once.	新德里—我很少同时戴两顶帽子。


But that is exactly what happened earlier this month, when I spent a few days in New Delhi.	但本月早些时候我在新德里的那几天就发生了这样的事。


I was in India primarily as part of my current role as Chairman of a review for the British prime minister on anti-microbial resistance (AMR).	我在印度主要是以当前的身份——英国首相抗耐药性（AMR）评估小组主席。


But my visit coincided with the presentation of India's 2015-2016 budget, the first under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.	但我的访问恰逢印度出台2015—2016年预算——总理莫迪任期中的第一份预算。


Given some of my other interests and experiences, I found what was presented to be very interesting.	从我的其他兴趣和经验出发，我发现了一些很有趣的东西。


Following recent revisions to its GDP figures, India's economy has recently grown – in real terms – slightly faster than China's.	在最近修订了GDP数据后，印度经济增长略快于中国（以真实值衡量）。


A key feature of my research into the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) more than ten years ago was that at some point during this decade, India would start to grow faster than China and continue to do so for dozens of years.	十多年掐按，我对金砖经济体（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）的研究的一个关键论断是，在这个十年的某个时点，印度将开始以快于中国的速度增长并持续这一状况数十年。


The reasoning is straightforward.	原因很直白。


India's demographics are considerably better than China's, and the size and growth rate of a country's workforce is one of the two key factors that drive long-term economic performance – the other being productivity.	印度人口结构大大优于中国，而一国劳动力的规模和增长率是驱动其长期经济表现的两大关键因素之一——另一个是生产率。


Between now and 2030, the growth rate of India's workforce will add as much to the existing stock of labor as continental Europe's four largest economies put together.	从现在开始到2030年，印度劳动力增长率将给印度带来相当于欧洲大陆前四大经济体现有劳动力存量总和的新增劳动力。


India is less urbanized than China, and it is in the early stages of benefiting from the virtuous forces that normally accompany that process.	印度城市化不如中国，它正处于从这一过程中经常伴有的各种有益力量中获益的早期阶段。


But there is a catch.	但有一个问题很棘手。


When it comes to productivity, India has been a laggard.	在生产率方面，印度一直落后。


Unless it finds a way to improve, the country's demographic profile could become a burden rather than a benefit.	除非找到改善办法，否则印度人口结构将成为负担而不是优势。


In this regard, Modi's first full budget did not include anything dramatic.	在这方面，莫迪的第一份全面预算并无任何显眼之处。


But if a number of initiatives are successfully implemented, the economy should receive a real boost.	但如果多项计划得到成功实施，印度经济应该能够获得真正的提振。


Indeed, the budget's main feature is its commitment to investments in public-sector infrastructure, even at the expense of raising next year's deficit from 3.6% to 3.9% of GDP.	事实上，预算的主要特征是所承诺的公共部门基础设施投资，即使这会让明年的赤字从占GDP的3. 6%增加到3.


I have argued for several years that India should emphasize investment spending, so I welcome this shift.	多年来，我一直认为印度应该着重投资支出，因此我欢迎这一变化。


The budget also includes a number of other helpful measures, such as the reduction of the corporate-tax rate and efforts to improve the business environment.	预算还包括了众多其他有裨益的措施，如降低公司税率和改善营商环境的措施。


My visits as chairman of the AMR review also allowed me to witness some encouraging signs.	我作为AMR评估主席的访印之旅让我看到了一些令人鼓舞的信号。


In my book The Growth Map, I describe my unforgettable first visit to Gurgaon, a municipality near Delhi that serves as a regional financial and industrial hub.	在我的书《增长地图》（The Growth Map）中，我描述了让我永生难忘的第一次吉尔刚（Gurgaon）之行。 吉尔刚是德里附近的一座都市，是地区金融和工业枢纽。


Gurgaon is home to a lot of high-flying technology firms, and on this trip I visited one of India's leading diagnostics companies, SRL Diagnostic, which is developing tools that could improve the use of antibiotics.	吉尔刚坐落着许多腾飞的科技企业，而在这次访问中，我拜访了一家印度领先的诊断公司——SRL诊断公司，它正在开发能够改善抗生素使用的工具。


The last time I made the trip from the Oberoi hotel in New Delhi to Gurgaon, it took well over 2.5 hours to travel the 30 kilometers.	上一次我从新德里奥拜罗（Oberoi）饭店前往吉尔刚，30公里的路走了两个半多小时。


Though a new freeway was under construction, the building site was full of cars and animals.	尽管新的高速公路还在建设，但施工现场布满了车辆和动物。


As a result, traffic was in a state of chaos, and it was impossible for any roadwork to be done.	结果，交通一团乱麻，根本无法进行长途旅行。


I had always promised myself that the next time I took the trip, I would somehow repeat the exact journey.	我总是对自己说，下一次故地重游我还会走和原来一样的行程。


I am pleased to say that the drive now takes less than an hour and the experience was much less dramatic.	我很高兴看到这次出发只走了不到一小时，体验也不再像上次那么戏剧化了。


Moreover, the hotel car that made the journey provided free Wi-Fi – the first time I have come across this anywhere in the world.	此外，我所乘坐的饭店车辆还提供免费Wi-Fi——我还是第一次享受这种待遇。


It is probably too early to say with certainty that India will soon take its place as the world's third largest economy, behind China and the United States.	笃定地认为印度很快就会成为仅次于中国和美国的世界第三大经济体可能还为时尚早。


But, given that India's investment climate seems to be improving, that moment might not be too far away.	但是，考虑到印度的投资环境正在改善，这一时刻恐怕不会太遥远了。


By 2017, India could surpass Italy and Brazil to become the world's seventh largest economy; by 2020, there is a reasonable chance that it will overtake France and the United Kingdom to become the fifth largest.	到2017年，印度有望超过意大利和巴西成为世界第七大经济体； 到2020年，它很有机会超过法国和英国成为第五大经济体。


Overtaking Germany and Japan, however, will require bolder steps, especially regarding education, health, and economic policy.	但是，超越德国和日本需要印度把步子迈得更大，特别是在教育、卫生和经济政策方面。


India will need to improve its education system dramatically, both at the secondary and tertiary level, and make similarly large advances in basic sanitation (not to mention implementing my review's recommendations for combating AMR).	印度需要大幅改善其教育系统，包括中学和本科阶段教育，并在基本环境卫生方面也取得类似的重大进步（更不用说实施我的评估报告所建议的遏制AMR的错失了）。


These developments, along with a more stable framework for monetary and fiscal policy, could lead to the type of double-digit growth that China has enjoyed for the past three decades.	这些发展加上更稳定的货币和财政政策框架，或许能带来中国在过去三十年中所取得的两位数增长。


It is up to India's policymakers to realize this ambition.	要实现这一宏大目标，就要看印度决策者的了。


Closing India’s Technology Gap	填补印度的技术差距


MUMBAI – It is a notable irony that India, which produces solutions to many of the knottiest information-technology problems faced by the world’s largest companies, has benefited little from technological progress.	孟买—有一个值得注意的讽刺之处，印度为世界最大公司提供了大量最棘手的信息技术问题的解决方案，但它自己并没有从技术进步中获得多少好处。


Fortunately for India’s citizens, Prime Minister Narendra Modi intends to change that.	对印度人民来说，幸运的是总理莫迪要改变这一幕了。


The gap between India and its emerging Asian counterpart China is significant.	印度与其新兴亚洲对手中国之间的差距是巨大的。


Whereas China has created the world’s largest online bazaar and become a global leader in renewable energy, India has just begun to explore the potential of e-commerce; IT remains beyond the scope of millions of small and medium-size enterprises; and most citizens remain cut off from the digital economy.	中国创造了全世界最大的在线市场，并成为可再生能源的全球领袖，而印度菜刚刚开始开发电子商务的潜力，数百万家中小企业仍然不知IT为何物，大部分公民也与数字经济绝缘。


To bring India up to speed, Modi’s government announced in August a national digital initiative: 1.13 trillion rupees ($19 billion) in investment to bring broadband communications to 250,000 villages, provide universal mobile access, expand online government services, and enable online delivery of all sorts of basic services.	为了加快印度速度，莫迪政府在8月宣布了一项全国数字计划：投资1. 13万亿卢比（190亿美元）用于将250,000个村庄接入宽带通讯、提供普遍的移动网络、扩大在线政府服务以及实现各种基本服务的在线提供。


Needless to say, this will do much to advance India’s e-government ambitions.	不消说，这十分有利于政府的电子政府雄心。


Technology trends are helping Modi’s cause.	技术趋势有利于莫迪的计划。


The rapid decline in costs and increase in performance capabilities of a range of digital technologies – including mobile Internet, cloud computing, and expert systems – make large-scale adoption a distinct possibility in the coming decade, even in relatively poor India.	成本的快速下降和各种数字技术性能的增强——包括移动互联网、云计算和专家系统——让未来十年大规模应用成为可能，即使是在相对贫穷的印度。


These digital technologies – together with advances in genomics (supporting agricultural and medical innovation) and unconventional energy (wind, solar, and shale oil and gas) – will enable financial inclusion for hundreds of millions of Indians and potentially redefine how services like education, food allocation, and health care are delivered. Research by the McKinsey Global Institute indicates that, by 2025, these factors are likely to contribute at least $550 billion – and as much as $1 trillion – to India’s annual income.	这些数字技术——以及基因组学（支持农业和医学创新）和非常规能源（风能、太阳能和页岩油气）——有利于实现数千万印度人的金融包容，从根本上重新定义了教育、食品分配和医疗的实现方式。 麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）的研究表明，到2025年，这些因素每年至少可以为印度带来5,500亿美元的���收入，可能会高达1万亿美元。


The gains would be distributed among a variety of sectors, even some that currently have low levels of technology adoption.	其中的好处将在众多部门间分配，甚至包括一些目前技术采用水平很低的部门。


Existing applications in agriculture, health care, education, and infrastructure can collectively contribute $160-280 billion to annual GDP – and, more important, empower ordinary Indians.	现有的农业、医疗、教育和基础设施方面的应用加起来每年可以增加1,600—2,800亿美元的GDP——更重要的是，能让普通印度人获得更多的实力。


Indeed, educational innovations – such as adaptive learning and remote teaching – could enable some 24 million workers to receive more years of education and find higher-paying employment.	事实上，教育创新——如适应性学习和远程教学——能使2,400多万工人获得更长的教育年限，找到收入更高的就业机会。


Mobile financial services will give 300 million Indians access to the financial system, allowing them to build credit.	移动金融服务可以让3,000万印度人进入金融系统，建立信用。


And precision agriculture – using geographic information systems and data to guide planting, watering, and other activities – can help 90 million farmers increase their output and reduce post-harvest losses, with access to timely market data bolstering their incomes.	而精细农业——使用地理信息系统和数据指导种植、灌溉和其他活动——能让9,000万农民增加产量、降低耕种-收获损失，并及时获得市场数据以增加收入。


Moreover, some 400 million Indians in poor rural areas can gain access to better health care in field clinics, where health workers can diagnose and treat some ailments using low-cost diagnostic tools, expert software, and online links to physicians.	此外，大约4亿贫困农村地区的印度人能够在乡村诊所获得更好的医疗。 乡村诊所工作人员将能够使用低成本诊断工具、专家软件和与医生的在线联系诊断和治疗一些小病。


Finally, by digitizing government services, such as food-distribution programs for the poor, India could eliminate the leakage that diverts, according to our estimates, half of the food from intended recipients.	最后，政府服务数字化——如面向穷人的食品分配计划——有助于印度根除漏出和转移，根据我们的统计，有一半的食品因为漏出和转移问题无法达到计划接收者手中。


For India to derive the full potential of these technologies, it will need to dismantle barriers to adoption.	印度要想实现这些技术的全部潜力，就需要解决实施技术的壁垒。


McKinsey’s Internet Barriers Index for 25 countries classifies India as part of a cluster (along with Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines) characterized by medium-to-high barriers in four key areas: infrastructure, affordability, incentives, and capability.	麦肯锡25国互联网壁垒指数（ Internet Barriers Index）将印度归为四个关键领域——基础设施、平价、激励和能力——的中高壁垒类别（与埃及、印度尼西亚、泰国和菲律宾相当）。


Even with low prices for devices and data plans relative to the rest of the world, Internet access in India remains beyond the grasp of close to a billion people.	即使相对于世界其他国家，印度互联网接入设备和数据计划成本较低，但印度仍有近十亿人与互联网绝缘。


Furthermore, network coverage and the adjacent infrastructure remain inadequate, particularly in rural areas.	此外，网络覆盖和相关基础设施仍然不足，特别是在农村地区。


And, though 48% of urban Indians are computer literate, only 14% of rural Indians are able to use a computer efficiently.	尽管48%的印度城市人口拥有使用电脑的能力，但只有14%的印度农村人口能够高效操作电脑。


Indian policymakers should be working with the country’s tech industry and other private-sector actors to implement measures that would enable technology adoption.	印度决策者应该与印度技术产业和其他私人部门行动方合作实施采用技术所必须的措施。


These include ensuring ongoing investment in broadband backbone networks, establishing inter-operability standards, and creating a supportive environment for low-cost devices.	这些措施包括保证宽带主干网投资、建立跨网操作标准、创造支持低成本设备的环境等。


In order to spur growth in online-services delivery, the authorities must also address broader challenges to entrepreneurship, such as India’s cumbersome procedures for starting new businesses.	为了刺激在线服务的增长，当局还必须解决更广泛的对企业家精神的挑战，如印度冗长的开办新企业的手续。


Moreover, as the experience of India’s mobile telephony sector clearly demonstrates, scaling up for massive impact requires more than start-up innovation; it also demands a regulatory environment characterized by a liberal approach to pricing, manufacturing, and distribution.	此外，印度移动电话部门的经验清楚地表明，要形成大规模影响力，所需要的不仅是起始阶段的创新； 还需要一种监管环境，对定价、制造和分销采取自由方针。


Sustaining the benefits of technological adoption and innovation will require continued investment and adjustment to compensate for its disruptive effects.	维持技术采用和创新的好处需要持续投资和以及补偿由此带来的破坏性效应的调整。


For example, the automation of knowledge work – the software and systems that are increasingly capable of performing human tasks that require judgment – could affect 19-29 million jobs by 2025.	比如，到2025年，知识工作的自动化——软件和系统日益能够从事需要判断的人力任务——将影响到1,900—2,900万工作岗位。


Technology can help create new – perhaps better – jobs to replace those that are lost, but only if India’s education and training systems prepare workers adequately.	技术有助于创造新的——也许也是更好的——工作岗位取代失去的就岗位，但这只有在印度的教育和培训提供能够让工人做好充分准备的情况下才会发生。


With thoughtful planning, productive collaboration between public and private institutions, and capable execution, India’s government can clear the way for technological progress.	深思熟虑的计划、公共和私人机构间的生产合作、着力的执行，通过这些措施，印度政府才能为技术进步铺平道路。


The social and economic benefits of a successful strategy cannot be overstated.	成功的战略的社会和经济受益是无穷的。


Peace with Pakistan?	印巴和平？


NEW DELHI – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore, Pakistan, on Christmas Day brought his hyperkinetic year of global diplomacy to a headline-grabbing close.	新德里—印度总理莫迪在圣诞节出人意料地访问了巴基斯坦拉合尔，以极其吸引眼球的方式为他无比活跃的全球外交之年画上了句号。


It also raised serious questions about the direction of the highly fraught relationship between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.	此次访问也引起了关于这两个关系高度紧张的有核邻国未来方向的严肃问题。


Since Modi took office in May 2014, India-Pakistan relations have experienced more ups and downs than a child’s yo-yo.	自2014年莫迪执政以来，印巴关系起伏就像是孩子的脸，说变就变。


The victory of a Hindu chauvinist hardliner – a man who had systematically blocked his predecessor’s peace-making efforts while in opposition and demonized Pakistan in his campaign speeches – was naturally assumed to portend a bilateral chill.	印度沙文主义强硬派的胜利必然预示着双边关系的恶化。 莫迪曾经有系统地阻碍其前任的和平努力，并且在选战中大肆妖魔化巴基斯坦。


Instead, Modi invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration.	但他却邀请了巴基斯坦总理沙里夫参加他的就职典礼。


Less than two months later, however, the two countries were exchanging artillery fire across the border, with Modi instructing the Indian Army to respond disproportionately to Pakistani provocations.	但是，不到两个月后，两国就在边境猛烈地互射炮火，莫迪命令印度军队加倍奉还巴基斯坦的挑衅。


Talks between the two countries’ foreign secretaries were scheduled in New Delhi, only to be called off when the Pakistanis, like so many times before, met with Indian Kashmiri separatist leaders.	两国外交部长计划在新德里举行谈判，但因为巴基斯坦人与从前多次一样会见克什米尔分裂派领导人而取消。


In November 2014, at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Kathmandu, a photograph was taken of Modi reading a brochure, ostentatiously ignoring Sharif as he walked past.	2014年11月，在南亚地区合作组织（South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation）加德满都峰会上，有人拍到莫迪顾自阅读一本小册子，故意对走过的沙里夫视而不见。


(It was subsequently revealed, however, that the two leaders had met in the hotel suite of an Indian businessman who enjoys good relations with Sharif.)	（但据随后的披露，两位领导人已经在于一位与沙里夫私交甚笃的印度商人的饭店套房中进行了会晤。 ）


Last February, Modi again initiated a thaw, calling Sharif to wish his country luck in the Cricket World Cup, and dispatching his foreign secretary to Islamabad.	去年2月，莫迪再次示好，致电沙里夫祝巴基斯坦在板球世界杯上好运，并派外交部长前往伊斯兰堡。


But mistrust again prevailed, and a cold peace ensued.	但得到的仍然是不信任，冷和平继续保持。


An unexpected meeting of the two prime ministers in Ufa, Russia, in July produced little progress, with both sides immediately repudiating each other’s statements about what was discussed and agreed.	7月，两位总理在俄罗斯乌法进行了意料外的会面，但双边关系并未获得进展，双方立刻就否认了对方关于讨论内容和所达成的一致的陈述。


Soon after, yet another scheduled meeting of national security advisers in Delhi was called off at the last minute, again following a meeting between Pakistani officials and Kashmiri separatists.	不久后，计划中的印巴国家安全顾问德里会议在最后时刻被取消——又是在巴基斯坦官员会见克什米尔分裂分子之后。


But, with a brief encounter between Sharif and Modi on the sidelines of the United Nations climate change conference in Paris on November 30, the tone changed yet again.	但是，沙里夫和莫迪在11月30日的联合国气候变化巴黎大会上进行了短暂的会晤，随后双方口风又发生了转变。


Without any buildup or forewarning, the two countries’ national security advisers conferred in Bangkok in December.	在没有铺垫和预热的情况下，两国国家安全顾问在12月的曼谷举行了会议。


Just days later, India’s external affairs minister, in Islamabad for the fifth Heart of Asia ministerial conference on Afghanistan, met with top Pakistani officials, including both Sharif and his foreign affairs adviser, before announcing that the two countries had decided to restart a comprehensive dialogue.	几天后，在伊斯兰堡出席第五届亚洲心脏（Heart of Asia）阿富汗问题部长级会议的印度外交部长与包括沙里夫及其外交顾问在内的巴基斯坦高官会晤，接着宣布两国决定重启全面对话。


It is against this background that Modi made his impromptu visit to Lahore (to attend celebrations of Sharif’s birthday and his granddaughter’s marriage), raising hopes among some that the bilateral relationship may be undergoing a genuine sea change.	在这样的背景下，莫迪对拉合尔进行了突访（出席沙里夫的生日聚会及其孙女的婚礼），让人们感到双边关系可能开始了真正的大转变。


But within a week of the Christmas bonhomie, seven Indians were killed by militants at the Pathankot Air Force Base near the border with Pakistan.	但圣诞愉快的气氛维持了不到一周，七名印度人就在靠近巴基斯坦边境的伯坦果德（Pathankot）空军基地被军人杀害。


Because such an attack was entirely predictable, it may not derail the diplomatic process completely.	这样的袭击完全是可预测的，因此它也许不会让外交进程完全“脱线”。


But, because lives were lost, it cannot be ignored, either.	但是，由于出了人命，因此此事也不可能不了了之。


With two bilateral meetings – between the two countries’ foreign secretaries, and then between Modi and Sharif – scheduled to take place this month, we will not have to wait long to find out how much political damage the attack has caused.	本月按计划将举行两次双边会议——先是外交部长会议，然后是莫迪和沙里夫会晤，我们用不了多久就可以看到此次袭击造成了多大的政治伤害。


But it should not be taken for granted that resuming a dialogue with Pakistan is appropriate, at least in the current context.	但不要想当然地认为恢复与巴基斯坦的谈判是合适的，至少在当前环境下是如此。


After all, Pakistan has not really done anything to warrant the diplomatic reward of a visit from India’s prime minister.	毕竟，巴基斯坦从未真正做出任何事情保证印度总理访问能取得什么外交成果。


Indeed, it has failed to fulfill any of the minimum requirements for dialogue that Modi himself has cited.	事实上，巴基斯坦没有满足过任何莫迪本人所提出的对对话的最低要求。


It has not prosecuted the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai massacre, or constrained the terrorist forces that operate, with the complicity of the military establishment, on its territory.	巴基斯坦没有起诉2008年孟买大屠杀的凶手，也没有约束在其境内活动的、有军方共谋的恐怖主义力量。


It has not even handed over Dawood Ibrahim, the fugitive don of the Mumbai underworld.	巴基斯坦甚至没有交出藏匿在巴基斯坦的孟买黑社会头子达乌德·伊布拉西姆（Dawood Ibrahim）。


Against this background, Modi’s unplanned Christmas excursion – which caught his own aides by surprise – seems more impulsive than statesmanlike.	再这样的背景下，莫迪意外的圣诞节访问——就连他的副手都出乎意料——似乎只是冲动，而不是政治家风度的体现。


Whereas such gestures are typically criticized as too little too late, this might be a case of too much too soon.	这样的姿态常常被批太少太晚，但实际上也许是太多太早了。


The question is why Modi did it.	问题在于莫迪为什么要这样做。


While he has so far refused to share his vision for the bilateral relationship, even with members of his Bharatiya Janata Party, there are some potential clues.	尽管到目前为止他仍不愿分享其对双边关系的愿景，哪怕是其所在的印度人民党也无从得知，但仍能找到一些政治线索。


During his election campaign, Modi once said that Hindus and Muslims could either fight each other or fight poverty.	在选战期间，莫迪曾说印度教徒和穆斯林可以互斗，也可以共同与贫困搏斗。


Perhaps he believes that the same goes for India and Pakistan: They can focus either on their mutual enmity or on mutual development.	也许他认为印度和巴基斯坦也是如此。 两国可以专注于敌对，也可以专注于互相开发。


The day before he visited Lahore, he told Afghanistan’s parliament that he hopes “Pakistan will become a bridge between South Asia and Afghanistan and beyond,” and discussed how the region’s countries “can all prosper together.”	在访问拉合尔的前一天，他告诉阿富汗议会，他希望“巴基斯坦成为南亚和阿富汗之间的桥梁，”并讨论了该地区国家如何“实现共同繁荣”。


If this is Modi’s vision, he should articulate it to the Indian public, along with a coherent peace policy that he will pursue consistently.	如果这是莫迪的愿景，那么他应该让印度公众知道，并提出他将追求不懈的一致的和平政策。


But even then, there would be a serious potential hitch: Pakistan’s prime minister does not, ultimately, call the shots in his country.	但即便如此，仍存在严重的政治困难：说到底，巴基斯坦总理无法在巴基斯坦做主。


The military does.	巴基斯坦军方才能做主。


They are not impressed by theatrics like Modi’s Lahore visit, and they maintain their power precisely by sustaining a narrative that spurs hostility toward India.	他们对莫迪访问拉合尔这样的“表演”不感兴趣，他们把持权力靠的正是坚持刺激对印度的敌意。


Pathankot could be a signal that they are not reconciled to peace, and a reminder that they have many more arrows in their quiver.	伯坦果德也许是一个信号——他们不会向和平妥协； 也可能是一个提醒——他们有的是办法。


Indians cannot afford to forget that the last time Sharif hosted a celebrated feel-good visit by an Indian prime minister in Lahore, in 1999, his army subsequently started a war with India on the Kargil heights and unseated Sharif himself within months.	印度决不能忘记，沙里夫上一次招待怀着良好意愿访问拉合尔的印度总理是在1999年，当时，他的军队随后就在卡尔基尔（Kargil）高地对印度宣战，沙里夫自己也在几个月后被赶下台。


As 2016 begins, votaries of peace can only hope that history will not repeat itself.	随着2016年的到来，热爱和平的人们只能希望历史不会重复。


Railroading India’s Railways	修建印度的铁路


NEW DELHI – Every February, the Indian Parliament performs a curious and unique ritual.	新德里——每年二月，印度议会都会举行奇怪而独特的仪式。


The railway minister (a portfolio that exists in few democracies nowadays) presents the “railway budget" to the lower house for its approval.	铁路部长（如今还设立这一职位的民主国家寥寥无几）将“铁路预算”提交给下院审核。


A packed chamber hangs on the minister's every word.	议员们对铁路部长的预算字斟句酌。


The practice began in the days of the British Raj, when the railway budget rivaled that of the rest of the Indian government.	该做法起源于英统时期，当时铁路预算相当于印度政府其他预算的总和。


Of course, railway revenues today, at $23 billion, no longer dwarf the country's budget, which now stands at some $268 billion.	当然，今天约2680亿美元的印度预算与230亿美元的铁路收入相比已不再相形见绌。


But India's railways still produce other mind-boggling figures: 23 million passengers are transported daily (over eight billion per year, more than the world's entire population) on 12,617 trains connecting 7,172 stations across a 65,000-kilometer (40,000-mile) network.	但印度铁路仍会出现其他令人难以置信的数字：12,617 趟列车联系着 65,000公里（合40,000英里）路网上的 7,172座车站，日均运送2300万名乘客（每年运送人数高达80多亿，超过全世界人口总和）。


And, with 1.31 million employees, the railways are the country's biggest enterprise.	而且，拥有131万名员工的铁路业在国内规模最大。


In short, the railways are the lifeblood of India's economy, touching the lives of every segment of society and playing a key role in moving people, freight, and dreams across a congested landscape.	总之，铁路是印度的经济命脉，与社会各阶层生活息息相关，在运送人员、货物和梦想穿越这片拥挤的大陆时发挥了重要作用。


Yet much needs fixing.	但需要解决的问题还有很多。


India's trains carry four times the number of passengers as China's, despite covering only half as many kilometers, but still lose about $7 billion annually.	虽然印度火车里程数仅有中国的一半而载客量为中国的四倍，但每年仍带来高达70亿美元的亏损金额。


The problem is that a succession of railway ministers, viewing the trains as poor people's only affordable means of transport, have refused to raise passenger fares, squeezing freight instead.	问题在于连任铁路部长视火车为穷人唯一负担得起的交通工具，不约而同地拒绝提高客运票价而代之以挤压货运。


This has proved popular with voters but disastrous for the country.	事实证明这种做法颇受选民欢迎，但却为国家带来了灾难性的后果。


Though freight transport still accounts for 67% of railway revenues, with 2.65 million tons carried every day, the higher fares needed to subsidize passengers have deterred shippers.	虽然每天265万吨的货运量仍占铁路收入的67％，但补贴客运所造成的高额运费已经令货主却步。


As a result, the share of freight carried across India by rail has declined from 89% in 1950-1951 to 31% today.	结果是铁路在印度货运中所占的份额已经从 1950-1951年的89%下降到今天的31%。


Instead, an increasing volume of goods is shipped by road, choking India's narrow highways and spewing toxic pollutants into the country's increasingly unbreathable air.	相反，越来越多的商品经由公路运输不仅堵住了印度狭窄的高速公路，还向这个国家越来越无法呼吸的空气中排放有毒污染物。


By contrast, China's railways carry five times as much freight as India's, even though China has a far better road network.	相比之下，中国铁路货运量是印度的五倍，虽然中国拥有更高质量的公路网络。


Making matters worse, politicians have continued to add trains to please various constituencies – but without adding track.	更有甚者，政客们继续加开客运车辆以讨好选民——但却没有增铺铁路。


Indeed, owing to land constraints, India has laid only 12,000 kilometers of rail track since independence in 1947, adding to the 53,000 left behind by the British.	事实上，因为土地限制，印度自1947年独立后在英国人留下的53,000公里轨道基础上仅增铺了12,000公里。


(China added nearly 80,000 kilometers to its rail network over the same period.)	（而中国同期却增铺了近80,000公里的铁路网络。


As a result, several lines are operating beyond their capacity, creating long delays.	）结果造成多条线路超负荷运行，并因此造成长时间延误。


Exacerbating this inefficiency are slow train speeds, which rarely exceed 50 kilometers per hours (and 30 kilometers per hour for freight), partly owing to the need to stop at an ever-rising number of stations to appease political interests.	低速运行进一步加剧了低效，开行速度很少超过每小时50公里（货车的开行速度为每小时30公里），部分原因是为了安抚各派政治利益而导致停靠的车站数量越来越多。


But perhaps the biggest problem is how dangerous the railways are.	但最大的问题或许是铁路的危险性。


Aging rails, tired coaches, old-fashioned signals, and level crossings dating back to the nineteenth century combine with human error to take dozens of lives every year.	老化的铁轨、超负荷的车厢、老掉牙的信号、可以回溯到十九世纪的平交道口和人为失误每年都会夺走数十条生命。


Yet the railway ministers continue to insist on their populist approach.	但铁路部长们仍继续坚持其民粹主义做法。


With the government losing $4.5 billion every year by subsidizing passenger fares, it has little money to spend on upgrading infrastructure, improving safety standards, or speeding up the trains.	因为每年亏损45亿美元补贴客运票价，政府用于升级基础设施、改善安全标准或提高运行速度的资金已经极其匮乏。


As a result, the railways run out of money before running out of plans.	结果是铁路修建计划还没执行资金就已经耗尽。


In the last 30 years, only 317 of 676 projects sanctioned by Parliament have been completed, and it is difficult to imagine how the railways will acquire the estimated $30 billion needed to complete the remaining 359 projects.	过去30年中，国会批准的676个项目仅完成了317个，而且也很难想象铁路部门完成其余359个项目的资金应该从哪里获得。


And if all of this were not bad enough, India's leadership seems not to recognize the challenges that the railways present.	如果这一切还不够糟糕，印度领导人似乎并未认识到铁路所面临的挑战。


In a country where rail passengers cannot even expect a clean toilet, let alone an on-time arrival, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken of introducing bullet trains – the latest in a string of irrationally grandiose aspirations.	在一个铁路旅客甚至不能奢望有干净厕所、更不必说准点到达的国家，纳伦德拉·莫迪总理却奢谈要引入子弹头列车——这是一连串非理性宏伟抱负中的最新力作。


A technocratic new railway minister, Suresh Prabhu, has once again left passenger fares untouched and raised freight rates.	新任技术派铁路部长苏雷什·帕布再次决定保持旅客票价不变而提高货运票价。


Though, unlike his predecessors, he has resisted the temptation to announce any new trains, his plans for India's railways remain inadequate.	但和前任不同的是，他没有宣布增开任何新的列车，他对印度铁路的计划仍然严重不足。


Prabhu's pledges include improving and expanding rail lines, introducing wireless Internet at railway stations, eliminating unmanned level crossings, creating a 24-hour toll-free number for users to phone in complaints, and installing security cameras to protect women passengers.	帕布的承诺包括翻修和扩建铁路线、在火车站建设无线互联网、消除无人值守道口、设立24小时免费投诉热线和为保护女性乘客安装监控摄像头。


These improvements seem to his critics to be marginal, at best, and have left his fellow MPs underwhelmed.	他的这些改善举措在批评者们眼中微不足道，也没有点燃其他国会议员的激情。


Prabhu's most impressive promise – to raise $140 billion from market lenders – is also his most problematic, as he has failed to clarify how exactly the railways would repay the loans.	帕布给人留下最深印象的承诺问题也最大——向市场贷款人筹措1400亿美元，但却没有明确铁路偿还贷款的方式。


Given how high interest rates would have to be to attract investors, this will be no easy feat, especially because the railways currently have an operating surplus of just 6%, or about $100 million annually – barely 1% of the amount needed to upgrade and modernize the network.	考虑到需要多高利率才能吸引投资者，还款绝不会是小菜一碟，尤其因为铁路目前的经营利润仅有6%（约合每年1亿美元），在路网升级现代化所需的资金中仅占1%的份额。


It is far from clear how Prabhu's grand vision of a safer, cleaner, and speedier Indian railway system will be achieved in practice.	帕布打造更安全、清洁、快速的印度铁路系统的目标如何真正实现还根本不清楚。


The railway minister has created a dream budget –though “pipe dream" might be a more accurate description.	铁路部长制定了一份梦想预算——尽管“白日梦”可能才是更准确的描述。


In fact, this is in line with the Modi government's approach thus far: lofty aspirations, soaring rhetoric, and quotable sound-bites have been accompanied by few specifics, no implementation plan, and no improvements in execution capacity.	事实上，这符合莫迪政府到目前为止的做法：远大的志向、骤增的空谈和到处播放的原声讲话，但没有相应的细则、计划，执行能力也没有任何增加。


India's overburdened trains cannot run on hot air, but that seems to be what they are being offered for now.	印度不堪重负的火车开行不能靠热空气，但它们现在除了这些却貌似一无所有。


Faster Growth Through Stronger Regulation	通过加强监管实现更快增长


WASHINGTON, DC – When India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, was on the campaign trail, he promised to improve the way the country is governed.	华盛顿—印度总理莫迪在竞选期间承诺改进治国之道。


Since taking office in May, he has strived to deliver.	自5月开始执政以来，他一直在努力兑现承诺。


Recently, he declared that he wants to boost India’s position in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” survey, which assesses the regulatory climate in 189 countries.	最近他宣布希望改进印度在世界银行《营商环境》调查中的排位。 该调查评估189个国家的监管气候。


Modi’s goal is to lift India into the top 50 – a bold ambition given that the country currently sits at 142.	莫迪的目标是让印度进入前50名——这是一个宏伟目标，因为目前印度只排在第142名。


Cutting bureaucratic red tape can help foster a culture of entrepreneurship and dynamism.	减少官僚繁文缛节有助于营造企业家精神和活力文化。


But putting in place an effective regulatory and enforcement infrastructure can be equally important, especially in areas where consumers have difficulty assessing the value of products and the risks they can pose.	但构建有效监管和执法基础设施也同样重要，特别是在消费者难以评估产品价值和潜在风险的领域。


In all countries – but especially in developing economies – a robust regulatory system is essential to building trust in the marketplace.	不论在什么国家——发展中国家尤其如此——鲁棒的监管体系都是建立市场信心的关键。


Consumers need to know that the food they eat, the cars they drive, and the medicines they take are safe.	消费者需要知道他们吃的食物、开的汽车和服用的药品是安全的。


Confidence in local products boosts domestic consumption and makes exports more attractive in foreign markets.	对地方产品的信心可以提振国内消费，让出口品在外国市场更具吸引力。


By contrast, a country riddled with regulatory shortcomings will find its arteries of commerce clogged and foreign investors spooked by unpredictable quality and unfair competition from unscrupulous producers.	相反，一国如果监管漏洞百出，其商业血脉就会不畅，外国投资者因为不可预测的质量和来自阴险生产商的不公平竞争而却步。


In developing countries, “poor quality regulation and implementation are formidable barriers to entrepreneurship and investment,” according to a World Bank report. “Regulatory failures expose people and the environment to horrific risks.”	在发展中国家，“监管和实施质量低下是企业家精神和投资的重要障碍，” 一份世界银行报告如是说，“监管失灵将人们暴露在可怕的风险环境下。


As developing countries upgrade their regulatory systems, they should focus on closing legal gaps that put consumers at risk and undermine market credibility.	在发展中国家升级监管体系的时，它们应该关注消除让消费者面临风险、破坏市场信誉的法律空白。


In China, for example, the manufacturers of pharmaceutical ingredients can dodge drug regulation by claiming that their products will be used for non-medical purposes.	比如，在中国，药物成分制造商可以通过宣称产品为非药用用途规避药品监管。


Even as reputable firms ensure the quality of all their inputs, this loophole can allow unsafe products to enter the market, as occurred in 2008, when at least 81 Americans died after receiving doses of the blood thinner heparin that contained adulterated Chinese material.	即使信誉卓著的企业能确保所有原料的质量，这一漏洞也足以导致不安全产品流入市场，比如，2008年至少81名美国人死于含有不合格中国原料的血液稀释肝素。


By the same token, regulations should be based on international standards, where they exist.	同理，监管应该基于国际标准（只要有）。


For example, American, European, Japanese, and other drug regulators have developed guidelines, through the International Conference on Harmonization, that take advantage of their collective expertise.	比如，美国、欧洲和日本及其他国的药品监管部门都根据国际协调会议（International Conference on Harmonization）依靠集体经验制定了指引。


Countries such as South Korea and Singapore are drawing on these guidelines to flesh out their own regulatory systems.	韩国和新加坡等国家正在制定类似指引充实监管体系。


As a result, their citizens will enjoy quick access to new medicines, and their researchers will find it easier to participate in global clinical research, a boon to domestic industries.	这些国家的公民因此能很快用上新药，它们的研究人员也更容易参与全球临床研究，这对于国内产业来说是一个福音。


Because a regulatory institution can only be as effective as the people who work for it, another area of focus for developing countries should be training skilled staff.	监管机构的有效性取决于其工作人员，因此发展中国家的另一个关注点应该是训练高技能人手。


In China, fewer than 200 people work at the Center for Drug Evaluation, the agency that reviews applications for new drugs.	在中国，评审新药申请的药品审评中心只有不到200名工作人员。


By contrast, the United States Food and Drug Administration employs 4,000 reviewers, and the European Medicines Agency has 3,000.	相反，美国食品和药品监督局（Food and Drug Administration）雇用了4,000名评审员，欧洲药品局（European Medicines Agency）有3,000人。


Predictably, China’s approval process for new drugs is one of the world’s slowest – eight years on average.	不难预测，中国的新药批准程序是位于全世界最慢行列——平均长达八年。


As a result, patients are denied access to the medicines they need.	结果，患者难以获得他们需要的药物。


Building intellectual capital and institutional competence can take years, but it can be done.	建立知识资本和机构胜任力需要多年时间，但仍是可行的。


A decade ago, Japan’s drug-approval process was lethargic relative to that of other developed economies.	十年前，日本的药品批准程序相对其他发达经济体来说也十分冗长。


The country made the safe acceleration of the approval process a high priority, and tremendous progress has followed.	日本将安全提高批准程序作为高级别当务之急，并取得了巨大的进步。


The median time taken to approve new drugs fell from 833 days in 2006 to 306 days in 2012, according to the London-based Center for Innovation in Regulatory Science.	根据位于伦敦的监管科学创新中心（Center for Innovation in Regulatory Science）的数据，日本新药批准中位时间从2006年的833天下降到2012年的306天


For regulation to be truly effective, it must be backed by robust enforcement – with sanctions for noncompliance.	要想让监管真正有效，必须有鲁棒的执行支持——并且必须惩罚不合规的情况。


That calls for a legal system that can adjudicate disputes and ensure fair, equitable, and timely treatment.	这需要能仲裁纠纷和确保公正、公平、及时处理的司法体系。 在印度，每 100,000人只拥有1.


For India, which has only 1.2 judges per 100,000 people (compared to 10.8 in the US), this will be a difficult challenge.	2名法官（美国有10. 8名），这是一项艰难的挑战。


According to the Supreme Court of India, in March 2012 the country had 31.2 million cases pending, more than 80% of them in lower courts.	根据印度最高法院的数据，2012年3月印度未了结案件数量为3,120万宗，其中80%为较低级法院案件。


Such extraordinary backlogs have persisted – and can undermine the rule of law.	如此大规模的案件积压持久存在，破坏了法治精神。


The world’s richer countries created their regulatory infrastructure over generations, during a time when there was little direct global competition.	世界较发达国家在鲜有全球竞争的时代花了好几代人才建立起监管基础设施。


Emerging markets need to create theirs in a greatly compressed timeframe.	新兴市场需要在短得多的时间框架里建立起自己的监管基础设施。


This will not be easy anywhere.	不论对谁来说，这都不是易事。


It will require significant resources, and the process risks angering domestic companies that have become accustomed to a lack of regulatory oversight.	这需要大量资源，在此过程中，习惯于缺少监管束缚的国内公司可能会怒气冲冲。


But, if implemented correctly, sound regulation can strengthen countries’ growth capacity, while protecting citizens and improving their long-term living standards.	但是，只要实施得当，可靠的监管能够增强国家的增长力，同时保护公民、改善他们的长期生活水平。


Clicks over Bricks in India	鼠标时代已经来临，而印度还在为水泥争个不休


SINGAPORE – After years of debate, India’s government recently announced that will open the country’s retail sector to foreign investment.	新加坡—在经历了多年的争论后，最近印度政府宣布将向外资开放零售部门。


The move was met with howls of protest from those who argue that the entry of large hypermarket chains like Carrefour and Walmart will devastate the small shops that currently dominate India’s retail sector.	此举遭到大规模反对，人们认为，家乐福和沃尔玛等大型超市的进入会让目前主导印度零售业的小商店死无葬身之地。


A country-wide strike called by opposition parties on September 20 brought many cities and towns to a halt.	9月20日，反对党发起所发起的全国大罢工让全国大量城市和乡镇陷入了瘫痪。


So far, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government has not relented, despite the loss of support from a key coalition ally.	目前，总理辛格的政府并未屈服，尽管它已经失去了一大关键盟友的支持。


The debate around opening the retail sector to foreign investment is currently being framed, on the one hand, by the need to modernize supply chains and, on the other hand, by the desire to protect small shopkeepers’ livelihoods.	关于向外资开放零售业的争论最近才兴起，其中一方说印度需要现代化其供给链，另一方则希望保护小商店主的生活。


Those who support the decision argue that India’s supply chains are simply too wasteful, and that only the finance and knowhow of big, international retail chains can upgrade them.	支持政府决定者指出，印度供给链浪费太大，只有大型国际零售连锁的财务实力和专业技能才能帮助印度供给链升级。


Opponents point to how big retailers decimated the traditional retail segment in the West.	反对者指出，在西方，大型连锁店吞噬了传统零售业。


But this debate misses a crucial point: the hypermarket model is itself under serious threat everywhere from online shopping.	但这一争论没有抓住一大关键点：超市模式本身无处不受着在线购物的威胁。


Consumers worldwide are finding that they can access virtually unlimited choice on the Internet – including customized goods and services that big retailers simply cannot deliver.	全世界的消费者都发现，他们可以通过互联网获得几乎无限的选择——包括大型零售商根本无法供应的个性化商品和服务。


As a result, large hypermarkets are suddenly finding that their business model is unraveling.	因此，大超市突然发现，自己的业务模式不灵了。


They watched in horror as Amazon, en route to becoming the world’s largest online retailer, pushed the bookstore chain Borders into bankruptcy, and have wondered if they will be next.	它们惊恐地看到，正在成为世界第一大在线零售商的亚马逊将连锁书店Borders推向了破产，它们害怕自己会成为下一个。


The American discount retailer Walmart, reportedly concerned that it is cannibalizing its own sales, has gone so far as to stop selling Amazon’s Kindle tablets.	据报道，由于担心自己的销售受到侵蚀，美国折扣零售商沃尔玛已经停止出售亚马逊的Kindle平板电脑。


Indeed, the Indian government’s decision to welcome foreign retailers coincided with French retailer Carrefour’s announcement that it will shut down its substantial operations in Singapore by the end of this year.	事实上，在印度政府做出接受外国零售商的决定的同时，法国零售商家乐福宣布将在今年年底关闭其在新加坡的大量业务。


Meanwhile, its British counterpart, Tesco, is shifting away from the large hypermarket format and investing heavily in online systems.	与此同时，英国零售商乐购正在从大型超市模式转型，大力投资在线购物系统。


Quite clearly, the established framework of retailing is being fundamentally overhauled.	很显然，现有的零售业框架正在发生根本性改变。


Given these developments, India may simply skip the hypermarket stage and go online, just as it skipped fixed-line telephony and went mobile.	既然如此，印度大可以越过超市阶段，直接进入在现阶段，正如其越过固定电话直接进入了手机时代。


Of course, hypermarkets will do well in a few locations, but they are unlikely ever to dominate India’s retail sector.	当然，在不少地区，超市仍能表现出色，但它们已不可能主宰印度零售业。


For small shopkeepers, this poses both a challenge and an opportunity.	对小商店主来说，这既是挑战，也是机会。


The challenge is that the rise of online shopping will increase competitive pressure, regardless of whether big foreign retailers enter the market.	挑战在于在线购物的崛起将增加竞争压力，不管大型外国零售商是否进入市场。


While Indians have traditionally been wary of buying online, owing to their distrust of digital security, in recent years the urban middle class has become increasingly accustomed to using the Internet to purchase airline tickets, reserve hotel rooms, and order books.	出于对数字社会的不信任，印度人仍对在线购物充满了狐疑，但近几年来，城市中产阶级越来越习惯于是用互联网买机票、订酒店、购图书。


As rising affluence and falling technology prices make online shopping accessible to a growing pool of customers, more products will follow.	随着物品的丰富和技术成本的下降让越来越多的客户有机会进行在线购物，在线购物的种类也会随之增加。


Change is inevitable.	改变是不可阻挡的。


But this shift may also open an opportunity for small shops.	但这一改变也为小商店开启了机会之门。


We know from international experience that online shopping undermines hypermarkets more than neighborhood stores, which often offer home delivery, credit, and the reassuring familiarity of personal relationships.	我们从国际经验中可以知道，在线购物对超市的影响大于社区商店，后者通常可以提供送货上门、接受赊销，并可以作为维系个人社会关系的场所。


A local shop may be able to use the Internet to tailor more precisely its selection of goods to its customers’ tastes.	本地商店还可以利用互联网根据客户口味定制更精确的物品种类。


In other words, small shops may be more than capable of holding their own against big retailers if they adapt to the new environment.	换句话说，小商店只要适应了新环境，就会比大零售商更有能力立足。


Indeed, small shops’ advantages are so compelling that Tesco is investing heavily in expanding its network of convenience stores, Tesco Express, thereby effectively mimicking the traditional model of local grocery stores.	事实上，小商店的优势是如此明显，以至于乐购对其便利店网络Tesco Express进行了大规模投资扩张，大举模仿传统的本地杂货店模式。


So India’s political debate over the entry of foreign retailers into the market, while heated, is probably already outdated.	因此，印度关于开放外国零售商进入市场的政治争论尽管热度很高，却已注定是明日黄花。


The real question is how India’s creaking supply chains will respond when consumers leapfrog hypermarkets and go online.	真正的问题是，当消费者跳过超市走向在线购物时，印度破败的供给链怎样做出反应。


No other country has created a logistical network directly for online retailing.	没有任何国家打造了直接用于在线零售的物流网络。


For investors and businesses – perhaps including India’s small shopkeepers – this is where the really interesting opportunities will emerge.	对投资者和企业来说——或许还包括印度的小店主——这就是真正有趣的机会所在。


India’s Agony	印度的悲痛


MUMBAI – In most cities of South Asia, hidden beneath the grime and neglect of extreme poverty, there exists a little Somalia waiting to burst out and infect the body politic.	孟买－在南亚的大部分城市，在污秽和对极度贫困忽视的下面隐藏着一个伺机爆发并侵染整个国家的导火索。


This netherworld, patrolled and nourished by criminals who operate a vast black-market economy, has bred, in Mumbai, a community that has utter contempt for the state, because it knows that its survival depends on corrupting the police.  Like underground magma, that underworld has now burst into the streets of Mumbai.	这个由操纵着巨大的黑市经济的犯罪分子掌控和支持着的黑社会，已经在孟买孳生了一个对国家极其轻蔑的团体，因为它知道其生存依赖于对警察的贿赂。 像地下的岩浆一样，现在这个黑社会已经喷涌上了孟买的街头。


Because the denizens of this netherworld know neither patriotism nor morality, they are easily lured into partnership with terrorists, particularly when they have reason to feel aggrieved.	因为黑社会的成员既不知道爱国主义也不知道道德为何物，所以他们会很容易就被诱惑成为恐怖分子的同伙，特别是当他们感到受到不公正对待的时候。


In Mumbai, a large proportion of them are Muslims who were denied space in the formal economy and have developed strong vested interests over the past 50 years.	在孟买，他们中的大部分是被拒绝在正式的经济中拥有一席之地，而且在过去50年里取得了巨大既得利益的穆斯林。


Details about the Mumbai outrage, where terrorists killed over 100 people, are still unfolding.	关于孟买暴行——恐怖分子杀害了100多人——的细节还没有完全清晰。


But we do know that at least 30 men armed with AK47 rifles and grenades held India’s business and financial center hostage, targeting both Indians and foreigners, particularly Americans and British.	但是我们知道，至少有30个手持AK47步枪和手榴弹的恐怖分子劫持了印度商业和金融中心中的人质，这些恐怖分子的目标既有印度人也有外国人，特别是美国人和英国人。


It is likely that this operation was propelled from Pakistan through the Lashkar e Tauba, a terrorist organization sustained by hatred of secular India and backed by shadowy Pakistani agencies and street support.	这次恐怖袭击可能是由巴基斯坦的恐怖组织虔诚军(Lashkar e Taiba)——它是一个由对世俗印度的仇恨支撑着并受到阴暗的巴基斯坦机构和街头组织支持的恐怖组织。


In the blood and drama of the events, however, we might miss a significant element of the story.	然而，在这次事件的流血和冲突中，我们可能遗漏了事件的一个重要因素。


The attacks were an operation that must have required months of planning: serious weapons were deployed, a small army was mobilized, targets were studied, transport was organized, and weak points identified.	这次恐怖袭击是需要几个月时间进行策划的行动：部署了杀伤力很大的武器，动员了一小部分武装分子，研究了袭击目标，组织了交通路线，而且识别了袭击弱点。


A plan of attack that involved hundreds of people was put in motion, and yet the massive infrastructure of India’s government discovered nothing.	一个涉及数百人的袭击计划正在进行，然而印度政府的广大职能部门却什么也没有发现。


The chief of India’s Anti-Terrorist Squad, Hemant Karkare (who lost his life in the battles that raged through the night) received a death threat from the nearby city of Pune, but his own unit did not bother to investigate it, since it was busy playing games on behalf of its political masters.	印度反恐中队队长汉蒙特·卡凯尔(Hemant Karkare)（他在夜晚的激战中牺牲）收到了来自附近城市普纳（Pune）的死亡威胁，但是他自己的队伍没有费心去调查这个威胁，因为他们忙于代表其的政治领导人进行敷衍塞责。


Complacency and politics gave the terrorists more protection than silence or camouflage ever could.	自满和政治权谋远远比沉默和伪装给了恐怖分子提供的保护多得多。


Indeed, the attacks represent more than a failure of police work.	事实上，恐怖袭击不仅仅代表了警察工作的失败。


They represent a collapse of governance; these are the wages of the sins of administrative incompetence and political malfeasance.	恐怖袭击也代表政府治理的失败； 它们都是行政无能和政治渎职罪恶的报应。


India is a tough nation.	印度是一个强硬的民族。


No one should have illusions about that.	没有人应该对此产生错觉。


It has fought off Muslim terrorists in Kashmir, Sikh terrorists in Punjab, Christian terrorists in Nagaland, and Hindu terrorists in Assam and across the country.	印度已经击退了克什米尔的穆斯林恐怖分子，旁遮普的锡克教恐怖分子，那加兰邦的基督教恐怖分子，以及阿萨姆邦和全国各地的印度教恐怖分子。


It understands that you cannot blame the whole community for the sins of a few.	印度知道，不能因为少数人的罪行而谴责其所在的整个群体。


But under ineffectual governance, particularly during the last three years, India is in danger of degenerating into a soft state.	但是在无效的治理下，尤其是在过去的三年间，印度处在沦为软弱无力的国家的危险之中。


Instead of being an international leader in the worldwide war against terrorism, it is sinking into the despair of a perpetual victim.	印度不仅没有成为世界反恐战争的国际领导者，反而陷入了永久的受害者的绝望之中。


Indeed, India stands only behind Iraq in the number of people killed each year in terrorist attacks.	事实上，印度每年死于恐怖袭击的人数仅次于伊拉克。


Three years ago, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rather smugly told President George W. Bush in Delhi that Indian Muslims were not involved in any act of terrorism.	三年前，印度总理曼莫汉•辛格在新德里相当得意地告诉乔治 ·沃克·布什总统，印度的穆斯林没有卷入任何恐怖主义行动。


The implication was that the integration of Muslims in Indian society constituted a success story.  Muslims, Singh implied, also benefit from the virtues of democracy, a conclusion that Bush happily repeated.	这种说法暗示着穆斯林融入印度社会是一件成功的事情。 辛格暗示，穆斯林也从民主的优点中受益——这是布什愉快地重申的论断。


But Singh certainly did not fool any of the terrorists, some of whom may have read his self-congratulation as a challenge for them to act.	但是，辛格当然无法愚弄任何恐怖分子，恐怖分子中的一些人可能将辛格的自鸣得意解读为是要他们采取行动的挑衅。


I am an Indian and a Muslim and proud to be both.	我既是印度人也是穆斯林，并对此感到很自豪。


Like any Indian, today I am angry, frustrated, and depressed.	和任何印度人一样，今天我很愤怒、失望而且沮丧。


I am angry at the manic dogs of war who have invaded Mumbai.	我对袭击孟买的战争疯狗感到愤怒。


I am frustrated by the impotence of my government in Mumbai and Delhi, tone-deaf to the anguish of my fellow citizens.	我对孟买和德里的政府的无能感到失望，它们对我的同胞的痛苦充耳不闻视而不见。


And I am depressed at the damage being done to the idea of India.	我对恐怖袭击对印度这一理念造成的损害感到沮丧。


India’s American Friends and Iranian Partners	印度的美国朋友和伊朗伙伴


NEW DELHI – The United States recently took the Iran-sanctions monkey off India’s back: it granted India an exemption from Iran-related financial sanctions in exchange for significant cuts in Indian purchases of Iranian oil.	发自新德里——美国最近卸掉了印度为制裁伊朗行动所承受的负担：对与伊朗打交道的印度企业免除经济制裁，条件是印度大幅减少伊朗石油的进口量。


Nevertheless, Iran continues to cast a pall over an otherwise brightening US-India relationship.	但在其他各方面都欣欣向荣的美印关系之上，伊朗依然是一道浓重的阴影。


From India’s perspective, Iran is an important neighbor with which it can ill afford to rupture its relationship.	从印度的角度上看，伊朗是一个极为重要的邻国，自身也无法承受与后者断绝关系的后果。


Indeed, India already seems locked geographically in an arc of failing or dysfunctional states, confronting it with external threats from virtually all directions.	其实在地理上印度似乎已经陷入了一批失败或者失能国家的弧形包围圈中，遭受着几乎来自所有方向的外部威胁。


If India joined the US containment strategy against Iran, it would have to bear serious strategic costs.	一旦印度加入了美国对伊朗的遏制战略，就必须承担极为沉重的战略成本。


For starters, it would lose access to Afghanistan via Iran, which has served as a conduit for the substantial flow of Indian aid to Kabul.	首先它将失去由伊朗进入阿富汗的通道，而这是印度援助源源不断输往喀布尔的动脉。


Moreover, containment would undermine India’s energy interests.	此外遏制行动也将威胁到印度的能源利益。


Few countries are as dependent on the Persian Gulf region’s hydrocarbons as is India, which imports almost 80% of its consumption.	很少国家会像印度这样严重依赖波斯湾的石油天然气供应——占其国内总消费量的80%。


Iran is the world’s third-largest net oil exporter (with the world’s second-largest natural-gas reserves as well), and it is a strategically located gateway to other energy suppliers in Central Asia and the Middle East.	伊朗是世界第三大石油净出口国（其天然气储量也位居全球第二），同时还占据着通往其他中亚和中东石油供应国的战略门户。


Iraq and Iran used to be India’s principal oil suppliers.	伊拉克和伊朗曾经都是印度的主要石油供应国。


But the first fell prey to a long US occupation, and the second currently faces a US-led oil-export embargo designed to throttle it financially.	但前者被美国的长期占领搜刮一空，后者如今面对着以美国为首的，旨在扼杀其国内经济命脉的石油出口禁运。


As a result, America’s efforts to give international effect to its new Iran Sanctions Act constitute a double whammy for India.	结果美国为推动新出台的《伊朗制裁法案》所作的国际努力却对印度造成了双重打击。


First, it threatens to sabotage India’s energy-import diversification strategy by making it overly dependent on the Islamist-bankrolling oil monarchies – including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – which have managed to ride out the Arab Spring.	首先，该政策会使印度更加依赖那些伊斯兰教主义者资助的石油君主国——包括沙特阿拉伯，阿联酋和卡塔尔——它们都成功躲过了阿拉伯之春的冲击，进而威胁到印度的能源进口多元化战略。


Second, further isolation of Iran will make it very difficult for India to play a more active role in Afghanistan at a time when the US is hastening its military disengagement there and seeking to cut a deal with the Taliban.	其二，在美国加速从阿富汗撤军并试图与塔利班媾和的情况下，进一步孤立伊朗将使印度更加难以在阿富汗事务中扮演积极角色。


India, one of the largest aid donors to Afghanistan, has no contiguous corridor to that country and must rely on Iran for access.	作为阿富汗其中一个主要援助者之一，印阿两国之间缺乏直接接壤的通道，只能借道伊朗。


Both countries share a common goal in Afghanistan – to ensure that the Pakistan-backed Taliban does not return to power.	其实伊朗和印度在阿富汗都有着同样的目标，那就是确保由巴基斯坦撑腰的塔利班不再重夺政权。


If the already-unstable situation there deteriorates after the end of US-led combat operations, India and Iran may be compelled to revive their strategic cooperation of the 1990’s.	如果本已不稳定的局势在美国为首的战斗行动终止后发生恶化，那么印伊两国就必须重拾在1990年代的战略合作。


It was the Northern Alliance, backed by India, Iran, and Russia, that overthrew the Taliban regime in Kabul in late 2001 with the help of America’s air war.	当年也正是印度，伊朗和俄罗斯支持的北方联盟在美国空中力量的帮助下推翻了塔利班政权。


For the US today, containment of Iran is dictated by several geopolitical considerations.	对于今天的美国来说，遏制伊朗是出于几大地缘政治考虑。


One consideration is the need to neutralize the strategic advantage that Iran gained from the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein in neighboring Iraq – a development that helped to empower Iraq’s Shia majority.	其中一个就是消除美国推翻萨达姆政权后伊朗在邻国伊拉克所获得的战略优势，因为当时这一举动帮助人口占多数的伊拉克什叶派穆斯林民众夺取了权力。


President George W. Bush called Iran part of an “axis of evil,” yet his decision to invade and occupy Iraq benefited Shia-dominated Iran above all.	美国前总统小布什曾将伊朗称之为“邪恶轴心”的一分子，但他当年做出的入侵占领伊拉克决定却为什叶派同样占大多数的伊朗造了福。


Moreover, regional geopolitics pits the powerful “Sunni Crescent,” led by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, against the beleaguered “Shia Crescent” states – Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.	再者，区域地缘政治中以土耳其、沙特阿拉伯，卡塔尔和阿联酋为首的强大 “逊尼派新月”对伊朗、伊拉克，叙利亚和黎巴嫩等“什叶派新月”国家展开了围攻。


The US has profited from a longstanding alliance with the Sunni bloc.	美国从与逊尼派集团的长期联盟中获益良多。


In addition to the strategic advantages, America’s close ties with the oil sheikhdoms – which are among the world’s leading holders of foreign-exchange reserves – contribute to propping up the dollar.	除了战略优势之外，美国与这些石油酋长国（也是世界上外汇储备最为庞大的一些国家）的亲密关系也为美元撑了腰。


It is against this background that the Iranian nuclear program has come to symbolize the larger geopolitical tensions underlying the confrontation between the US and Iran.	在上述背景下伊朗核计划已经成为了美伊冲突之下更宏观地缘政治紧张局势的象征。


Indeed, the nuclear issue has served to rationalize the face-off, with Iran’s leaders playing to their domestic audience by whipping up nuclear nationalism and the US playing to the international audience by harping on the proliferation threat.	但事实上核事务只是双方���以对峙合理化的工具，伊朗领导人用它来向国内听众煽动核爱国主义情绪，而美国人则借此向国外听众宣扬核浓缩威胁论。