They know that practically all of the ruling elite’s children attend expensive schools in the United States and the United Kingdom, where they would be shielded from the mindless drivel at home.	因为他们知道基本上所有统治精英的子女都在英美等国的那些贵价学校读书，自然也不会受到本地这些愚话的影响。


Leung’s son, for example, is reportedly a student at Winchester College, one of the UK’s most exclusive boarding schools. And most, if not all, of the children of the ruling elite in Beijing are in a similar position.	例如，据说梁振英的儿子就是温彻斯特学院（英国最高贵的寄宿学校之一）念书，这跟大部分（如果不是全部）北京统治精英子女的情况类似。


The daughter of Xi Jinping, the presumptive future leader who has now reemerged from an unexplained absence, is attending Harvard under an assumed name.	最近莫名消失而又重新现身的未来政权接班人习近平的女儿正用一个假名在哈佛上大学。


Disgraced ex-Politburo member Bo Xilai’s hard-partying son, Bo Guagua, attended Harrow, Winston Churchill’s alma mater, then Oxford and Harvard.	被免职的前中共中央政治局委员薄熙来热衷派对的儿子薄瓜瓜在哈罗公学——温斯顿·丘吉尔的母校——上过学，后来去了牛津大学和哈佛大学。


Their parents clearly know that “national education” is not needed for a good education.	他们的父母显然明白好的教育并不需要“国民教育”。


Unfortunately, Hong Kong’s younger generation is losing confidence in democracy.	不幸的是，香港的年轻一代正对民主失去信心。


Popular elections do not translate into representation in a system designed by China to ensure that its allies win a majority every time.	因为普选并不意味着能在一个中国设计用来保证其拥护者每次都能稳获多数票的体制中获得代表性。


As a result, more and more young people are turning to street demonstrations to make their voices heard.	于是越来越多的年轻人转向街头示威来发出他们的声音。


And, while no one in Hong Kong wants independence from China, continued strong-arm tactics to force Hong Kong to “love” China could begin to inspire such sentiments.	而且，虽然没有香港人希望脱离中国独立，但继续使用强硬策略来迫使香港人“爱”中国有可能会开始激发这样的情绪。


Leung’s tone-deafness to popular feeling revives one of the main issues that he managed to dodge during the election campaign.	梁振英对民意充耳不闻的态度使人们再度提起一个他在竞选活动中成功避开的重要问题。


At the time, he denied vehemently that he was a member of the CCP.	当时他坚决否认自己是一个共产党员。


He claimed that he had only Hong Kong’s interest in mind within the limits of China’s “one country, two systems” formula.	他宣称在中国“一国两制”政策的范围内只会考虑香港的利益。


So far, however, he seems inclined to make one of those systems resemble the other.	然而迄今为止，他似乎想要把其中的一种体制变得越来越像另一个。


But China’s national interest is to ensure that Hong Kong remains a first-rate city, modern and open.	中国的国家利益就是要保证香港仍然是一个一流的，现代且开放的城市。


Pulling Hong Kong down, in the name of patriotism, can only impede the advance to modernity that all of China needs to become truly great.	以爱国的名义把香港降格只会阻碍现代化的进程——而这一进程正是中国变得真正强大所急需的。


The Reform Game	改革游戏


Reform, when long discussed but never implemented, can do far more harm than good.	改革若是长期停留在讨论阶段而不付诸于实施，危害将远远大于其会带来的好处。


Anticipation of a reform – say, of pension rules, the health system, or unemployment benefits – worries everyone who might feel the impact.	对于诸如养老金制度、健康体系或者失业补贴方面的改革的期盼，使得人们变得忧虑万分，尤其是那些将深受改革影响的人们。


In response, they cut consumption and save more, expecting that sooner or later they will have to start paying for some of the services they had been used to getting free or at subsidized rates.	预计到他们迟早得开始为那些他们早已习惯的免费或者享受津贴的服务掏腰包，他们开始降低消费、增加储蓄。


But because reform in Europe is usually only discussed, the benefits fail to materialize: people work harder only when they are sure that tax rates are actually cut, and in financial markets the positive effects of lower government spending do not come before any reform is approved.	但在欧洲，由于改革通常只是被讨论的对象，其带来的利益得不到实现：只有确定税率下调的时候人们才努力工作； 而在金融市场，只有等改革得以批准后，政府降低支出的政策才能产生积极效果。


In the meantime, as politicians debate and do nothing, consumer confidence falls, economic performance worsens, and the consensus needed to get reforms approved in the first place vanishes.	同时，政治家们热衷于辩论却不做实事，使得消费者信心下降，经济表现恶化，人们对于批准改革的愿望第一个消失了。


Still the talk does not stop, nor does the fall in consumer confidence.	然而讨论还在继续，消费者信心也随之继续下滑。


Germany’s recent experience provides a worrying example of this vicious circle.	最近发生在德国的事就是这样一个恶性循环的例子，令人担忧。


Reform of Germany’s generous social system has claimed the front pages for German papers for more than ten years.	德国慷慨大方的社会体系改革占据了近十年来德国各大报纸的头版。


Some timid measures have been implemented, but the general feeling among Germans is best described by the following answer to a survey conducted two months ago by the newspaper Die Welt : “47% of those interviewed plan to cut consumption due to the uncertainty about pensions and health reform.”	虽然德国政府实施了一些有限的措施，但两个月以前，德国报纸 Die Welt 作了一个调查后发现，可以用下面这句话来形容德国民众的普遍感觉：“采访者中47%由于对养老金和健康改革没有把握，正准备减少消费支出。 ”


The result has been a sharp fall in consumer confidence: the German index of consumer sentiment was small but positive in November 2000; it has since fallen to -20, the sharpest decline in the euro area.	其导致的结果就是消费者信心急剧下滑：2000年11月德国的消费者情绪指数虽然不高却成积极态势，自那以后，却急落至-20，创了欧洲下滑最快纪录。


Out on the street, pessimism runs rampant.	悲观主义盛行在德国大街上。


For two years now, the growth rate of private consumption (measured at constant prices) has been negative: - 1% in 2002, -0.5% in 2003.	两年来，个人消费率（根据基价计算）一直呈负增长趋势，2002年为- 1%，2003年为-0.


Similar declines in real consumption are rare in industrial countries, as in bad years consumers typically draw on their savings to keep their consumption relatively constant. In the case of Germany, one has to go back to the early 1980’s to see similar negative numbers in consumption growth.	5%。


As a result, rather than falling, the household saving rate has increased, rising from 9.7% of disposable income in 2000 to 11.8% last year.	这样的实消费下降幅度在工业国家实属罕见，即使是在经济不景气年代，消费者典型的做法都是动用储蓄以维持消费水平。


Depressed consumption and higher savings have affected all age groups, but the relatively old have been more prone to the trend than the relatively young.	消费低迷和储蓄上涨对各年龄层都有影响，但是比起年轻人来说，相对年龄大的群体更能适应这一趋势。


The only positive signs in consumption are seen among the youngest households, those headed by people in their early twenties, who evidently hope that sooner or later the reforms will be approved and their tax burden reduced.	唯一的积极消费标志出现在最年轻家庭中，尤以二十岁出头的年轻人为主，显然，他们坚信批准改革是迟早的事，到那时他们的税务负担将得以降低。


But the saving rate even in households in their thirties has risen along with concern about reforms.	但是即使到他们三十岁时，每户的储蓄率将与对改革前途的担忧一起上涨。


Not surprisingly, elderly people cut consumption more.	预料之中，老年人更多幅度地削减了消费。


With retirement, they have lost almost all options: they can no longer work more, nor can they sign up for private health plans – the insurance premiums at their age are too high.	退休后，他们丧失了各种选择：他们不能再工作，也不能再签私人健康保险——因为他们这个年龄的保险费已过于高昂。


So they are forced to rely on their savings, and virtually stop consuming.	因此他们不得不依赖于他们的储蓄，而最终停止消费。


Put this in the context of a rapidly aging population and the effects on overall consumption are dramatic.	在一个人口迅速老化的环境中，这种情况对于总体消费来说影响巨大。


Interestingly, France is the only large Euro area country where consumer confidence is growing (from -24 a year ago to -13 today).	有趣的是，法国是欧洲唯一保持消费信心增长的国家（从一年前的-24增至如今的-13）。


The reason is simple: as the 2006 elections approach, reforms have been shifted off the political agenda.	原因很简单：随着2006年大选逼近，改革已经被拿下了政治议程。


If a government does not have the will to adopt a reform program, then the best thing it can do is stop talking about reform altogether.	如果一个政府并不打算实施改革计划，那它最好停止有关改革的任何讨论。


This may start happening in Germany and for the same reason: consumer confidence remains lackluster.	也许德国已经开始这么做了，但也正是由于这一原因，消费信心仍呈欲望低迷状态。


Europe’s economy grew at an anemic 1.8% annual rate in 2004, and the OECD has recently revised downward its growth forecast for next year, from 2.5 to 1.9%, owing to the rising euro and the fall in exports – so far the only driver of the euro area economies.	2004年欧洲经济上升了微弱的1. 8个百分点，经济合作发展组织（OECD）最近也根据欧元升值和出口下降这两个因素而修改了其对明年经济长势的预测，从2.


The common wisdom is that to faster European growth requires a boost from domestic demand.	5降至1. 9个百分点，而出口正是目前欧洲唯一的经济动力。


But this will not happen as long as politicians keep talking about reforms, while doing virtually nothing to realize them.	通常来说，要加快欧洲经济增长就要拉动刺激内部需求。


On the contrary, all they are doing is spreading pessimism.	但若政治家们还一边空谈改革一边却无所作为，这一目标就不可能实现，反而会使悲观情绪愈加蔓延。


Europe has two ways ahead.	欧洲现有两条出路。


It can forget about reform and enjoy the four or five decades it will take for its per capita income to fall below the level of, say, Chile, or it can deeply change its social model and start growing like the US.	要么忘掉改革，花上四五十年放任其人均收入跌至智利的水平以下，要么彻底改变社会模式促使其经济开始像美国经济一样增长。


Doing nothing but talking, which is Europe’s current model of inaction, is the worst possible course.	而欧洲目前无所事事却一味泛泛而谈的消极状态，是最糟糕的一个过程。


The Refugee Dilemma	难民的困境


One reason Greek Cypriots rejected last April UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan for the reunification of Cyprus was that an overwhelming majority of them felt it did not do justice to the claims of refugees displaced during the 1974 Turkish invasion.	希腊塞浦路斯人拒绝去年4月联合国秘书长科菲·安南提出的塞浦路斯统一计划，其中的一项重要原因是绝大多数人认为这项计划未能给在1974年土耳其入侵中无家可归的难民以应有的公正。


This was also one of the few occasions when international public opinion became aware that there was a refugee problem on the island, because few people knew that refugees from that war still exist.	这也是国际公众舆论认识到该岛还存在难民问题的有数几个场合之一，究其原因，已经很少有人知道这场战争中仍然有难民存在。


When Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 after an abortive attempt by the Greek military junta in Athens to carry out Enosis (unification with Greece), 250,000 or so Greek Cypriots were uprooted from their homes.	希腊雅典军政府的统一努力失败后，1974年土耳其入侵塞浦路斯期间，约有250，000希腊塞浦路斯人无家可归。


Some fled in terror from the invading army, some were expelled - the usual complex, morally problematic picture that emerges in such situations.	其中有些人由于惧怕侵略军而逃走，有些人被入侵者驱逐¾战争中常会出现这种复杂、充满道德问题的状况。


Although overwhelmed, the Greek Cypriot community reacted with humanity, solidarity, and prudence.	尽管遭到了毁灭性打击，希腊塞浦路斯社团仍然以仁爱、团结、审慎的态度做出反应。


Initially, refugees camps were set up, but the Greek Cypriot government decided that while it will not surrender the refugees' claim eventually to return to their homes in the North, it would do its utmost in the interim not to leave them vegetating in squalid camps.	最初修建了很多难民营，但希腊塞浦路斯政府决定：既然不能放弃难民们最终回归北方故里的要求，就应该尽力避免让他们在回归之前居住在肮脏破旧的难民营中。


No UN-sponsored refugee agency was established to help the refugees.	没有任何联合国难民机构为难民提供援助。


Instead, with some international help, but mostly out of its own resources, the Republic of Cyprus - a small, then not very prosperous country that was devastated by war - launched a re-settlement and rehabilitation program as a national project.	相反，弱小、贫困的塞浦路斯共和国刚刚受过战争的蹂躏，就在国际社会有限的援助下，依靠自身的力量开展了全国范围内的难民重新安置计划。


Government loans were offered for housing construction.	政府为修建房屋发放贷款。


In many cases, refugees built their own new homes.	很多情况下，难民们都自力更生建造新居。


Businesses were encouraged with government subsidies and loans.	政府提供补贴和贷款，鼓励开办企业。


Schools and training centers were established.	设立了学校和培训中心。


Within a few years, the refugees were absorbed into the economy and society of the southern, Greek Cypriot sector of the island.	若干年内，难民们完全融入了南方的经济社会，成了岛上的希腊塞浦路斯人。


As in post-World War II West Germany, much of the current prosperity in Cyprus today is an outcome of the boost the economy received from the absorption of refugees.	就像二战后的德国一样，塞浦路斯今天的繁荣很大程度上是吸收难民、推动经济发展的成果。


Anyone visiting the Greek Cypriot part of the island nowadays will not find refugee camps: most of the millions of tourists are unaware of the fact that more than a third of the Greek Cypriots they encounter are refugees or descendants of refugees.	现在去岛上希腊塞浦路斯聚居地参观的人不会再看到难民营：成百上千万的游客多数都不会想到，他们碰到超过三分之一的希腊塞浦路斯人或者是难民、或者是难民的后裔。


The Greek Cypriot community can justly be proud of the way they handled the humanitarian and social problems of the refugees, without at any point surrendering their claims to the lands they lost.	希腊塞浦路斯社团应该为自己处理难民人道主义和社会问题的成就感到骄傲，任何时候他们都从未放弃对失去土地的要求。


Equally commendable has been the Greek Cypriot strategic decision to follow a Gandhi-like policy of non-violence: while there is deep bitterness about the Turkish occupation, and the fact that Turkish settlers were implanted in the North, the Greek Cypriot community decided not to use violence against the occupation.	希腊塞浦路斯人信奉甘地那样的非暴力政策同样值得称颂：尽管他们对土耳其占领和土耳其北方移民有着刻骨的仇恨，希腊塞浦路斯社团最终决定不对侵略者使用武力。


Not one incident of Greek Cypriot terrorism or violence against Turkish occupation has occurred in more than a quarter of a century.	四分之一个世纪过去了，没有发生一起希腊塞浦路斯人针对土耳其占领者的恐怖活动。


This is also one of the reasons few people have ever heard about the Greek Cypriot refugees.	这也是很多人从未听说过希腊塞浦路斯难民问题的部分原因。


It could, of course, be different: had Greek Cypriots followed the Palestinian example since 1948 - that is, kept the refugees in camps, segregated them from the non-refugee society, and fed their children a daily militaristic message of hatred, revenge, and terrorism - a completely different atmosphere would permeate the island.	当然，这一切完全可能是另一种样子：如果希腊塞浦路斯人效法1948年巴勒斯坦人的先例，将难民集中到难民营、将他们与非难民社会隔离开来、给后代日日灌输仇恨、报复和恐怖的军国主义思想，那么完全不同的气氛就会在岛上蔓延。


The Greek Cypriot example shows that it is simply not true that the occupied have no recourse other than violence and terrorism.	希腊塞浦路斯人的例子表明：被占领者并非除了暴力和恐怖之外别无选择。


Recourse to violence and terror is a moral and strategic choice.	恐怖和暴力只是一种战略抉择。


The Greek Cypriots chose the path of non-violence; the Palestinians chose the opposite route.	希腊塞浦路斯人选择了非暴力之路，而巴勒斯坦人的选择恰恰相反。


There is always a choice, and there are always consequences.	人们总会面对选择的机会，也总要承担选择的后果。


Consider what the Greek Cypriot community has achieved - a thriving economy, no one living under conditions of misery and humiliation in camps, membership in the European Union - compared to the catastrophe the Palestinian choice has brought to their own people.	想想希腊塞浦路斯社团取得的成就¾经济繁荣、没有人痛苦、屈辱地在难民营里生活、还成为欧盟新的成员¾对比巴勒斯坦人的选择带给人民的灾难。


Perhaps on the level of public relations, the Palestinian leadership - sacrificing their own people on the altar of propaganda - can bask in their achievement: yet it is their own people who suffer.	也许只有在公共关系方面，巴勒斯坦领袖将自己的人民作为宣传祭坛上的牺牲品，能够为所谓的成就感到骄傲：尽管如此，倍受折磨的是他们自己的人民。


These leaders would do better to look across the Mediterranean at Cyprus and see how - without giving up claims to disputed land - refugees can live in dignity and honor.	如果巴勒斯坦领袖看看地中海对面的塞浦路斯，就能看见难民们如何在不放弃领土要求的情况下有尊严、有名誉地生活。


But then again, the Republic of Cyprus is a democracy, while the Palestinians have not been able to emancipate themselves from the violent militarized option that has brought them such misery.	但要再次提到，塞浦路斯共和国实行的是民主制度，而巴勒斯坦却还没能从带给他们无尽痛苦的暴力选择中获得解放。


The Renminbi Goes Forth	人民币在前进


BEIJING – In June, the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank, announced an end to the renminbi’s 23-month-old peg to the dollar and a return to the pre-crisis exchange-rate regime adopted in July 2005.	发自北京——今年6月，中国人民银行宣布结束持续了23个月的人民币/美元汇率挂钩，并重新恢复到危机发生前2005年7月颁布实施的汇率管理办法。


So far, however, the RMB’s appreciation against the dollar has been slow.	但迄今为止人民币兑美元的升值速度依旧缓慢。


Will the pace of appreciation accelerate enough to satisfy American demands?	而人民币升值的步伐是否足够迅速，足以满足美方的要求？


If it does, will global imbalances disappear sooner?	如果是的话，全球贸易不平衡是否又会很快消失？


It is hard to argue that the RMB is not undervalued, given China’s large and persistent current-account and capital-account surpluses.	考虑到中国庞大且持续存在的经常账户和资本账户盈余，很难说人民币没有被低估。


But, despite ending the dollar peg, faster appreciation of the RMB seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.	但尽管结束了与美元的挂钩，人民币的更快升值似乎在可见的未来不会发生。


China’s official position is that, to avoid the negative impact of a stronger RMB on China’s exports and hence employment, appreciation must proceed in an autonomous, gradual, and controllable manner.	在中国官方的立场上，为了避免更强势人民币对中国出口（以及就业）的打击，升值必须在一个中方自行决定，逐步推进而且可控的情况下实施。


The current exchange-rate regime, which links the RMB to a basket of currencies, was designed to give the PBC leeway to control the pace of RMB appreciation, while creating two-way fluctuations in the exchange rate against the US dollar in order to discourage speculators from making one-way bets on the RMB.	而目前这种将人民币与一揽子货币挂钩的汇率管理措施，就是为了让中国人民银行能够灵活控制人民币升值过程而设计的，通过制造对美元汇率的双向波动来遏制投机者赌人民币升值的单向交易行为。


RMB appreciation should have started earlier and at a faster pace, when China’s trade surplus was much smaller and its growth was much less dependent on exports. Delay has made current-account rebalancing via RMB appreciation costly.	当中国的贸易顺差规模已经大幅缩小，经济增长对出口的依赖也进一步减轻之时，人民币的升值本应更早更快的启动，但这一进程的延迟令通过人民币升值来重新平衡经常账户所付出的代价更大。


And now China faces a dilemma.	而如今中国正面对着一个两难困境。


As a result of the global financial crisis, China’s export growth in 2009 dropped by 34% compared to 2008.	由于全球金融危机，中国2009年度的出口增长比前一年下降了34%。


In the first seven months of 2010, China’s trade surplus was $84 billion, down 21.2% from January-July 2009.	在2010年头七个月，中国的贸易顺差为840亿美元，相比去年同期下降了21.


This large, steady fall in the country’s trade surplus makes the Chinese government hesitant to allow the RMB to appreciate significantly, for fear of the lagged impact on the trade balance.	2%。 这种大幅下降的局面令中国政府不敢让人民大幅升值，害怕可能对贸易平衡产生长远影响。


But the PBC is also reluctant to buy dollars constantly.	但中国人民银行也不敢持续买入美元。


The PBC knows that rapid deterioration in America’s fiscal position and continual worsening in its external balance may create an irresistible temptation for the US to inflate away its debt burden.	因为他们知道美国财政状况以及外部贸易平衡的迅速恶化可能诱发美国人用美元贬值的方式来减轻债务负担。


The more the PBC intervenes, the larger the national welfare losses that China may suffer in the future.	人行买入得越多，未来中国国家财富的损失可能就越大。


The Chinese government must, therefore, strike a balance between protecting China’s export sector and preserving its national welfare.	对此中国政府必须在保护出口部门和维护国家财富之间取得平衡。


The dilemma that officials face is that the impact of a fall in exports as a result of RMB appreciation will be felt acutely and immediately, whereas the large welfare losses due to the evaporation of the value of China’s foreign-exchange reserves will be borne by society as a whole – but not immediately.	而政府所面对的两难困境在于国民会切实并迅速地感觉到由人民币升值所导致的出口下降的影响，而由于中国外汇储备价值蒸发所导致的国家财富损失将由全社会来承担，且不会那么迅速地被感受到。


Moreover, the increase in China’s overall price level – and wage levels in particular – has caused the RMB to strengthen steadily in real terms, reducing (to a certain extent) the need for nominal RMB appreciation.	此外，中国整体物价水平的上升——特别是工资水平——已经实现了人民币的稳步走强，并在某种程度上减低了名义升值的需要。


True, commerce ministry officials recently declared their wish to see a further fall of China’s trade surplus in 2010.	没错，商务部官员最近宣布希望能看到2010年中国的贸易顺差进一步缩小。


But RMB appreciation is not the preferred instrument for achieving this goal.	但他们可能不太会用人民币升值来实现这一目标。


Thus, nothing dramatic will happen to the RMB exchange rate in the near term – unless something dramatic happens.	因此短期内人民币汇率都不会发生太大的波动——除非发生了某些重大事件。


At the same time, the effect of currency appreciation on the trade balance should not be exaggerated.	而与此同时，货币升值对贸易的影响作用不应被夸大。


The RMB appreciated by 18.6% in real effective terms, and by 16% in dollar terms, from June 2005 to August 2008.	从2005年6月到2008年8月，在实际有效汇率方面人民币升值了18. 6%，兑美元则升值了16%。


Yet, from 2006 to 2008, China’s annual exports grew 23.4%, outpacing import growth of 19.7%.	在2006到2008两年间，中国的年度出口增速达到了23. 4%，超过进口增速19.


Exchange rates are just one of many factors that affect trade balances.	影响贸易平衡的因素很多，而汇率只是其中一个。


For China’s, the income effect of global demand is significantly larger than the price effect of the exchange rate.	对中国来说，全球需求所带来的收入效应比汇率所带来的价格效应要大得多。


The fall in China’s trade surplus since late 2008 is attributable mainly to the global slowdown and the stimulus package introduced by the Chinese government, rather than to changes in the RMB’s exchange rate.	中国贸易顺差自2008年年末开始的下降主要来自于全球增长的放缓以及政府的经济刺激计划，而不是人民币汇率的变化。


But if the RMB is allowed to float, isn’t a balanced trade account likely?	那么如果人民币汇率可以浮动的话，是不是就能实现经常账户平衡？


Probably not.	答案可能是否定的。


With a fast-rising RMB, net capital outflows will increase, which is what Japan experienced after the Plaza Accord of 1985 pushed the yen upward.	随着人民币的快速升值，资本净流出可能增加，而日本在1985年签订了《广场协议》之后正是经历了这一幕。


As a result, balance-of-payments equilibrium would be reached at a certain exchange-rate level, but a current-account surplus (albeit smaller) would still exist.	结果是，贸易支付差额将在某个汇率水平上达到均衡，但经常账户的顺差（虽然变得更小）依然会继续存在。


America should not pin too much hope on a weakening dollar to correct its trade imbalances.	美国不应寄望于用弱势美元来扭转其贸易不平衡的态势。


For the US, the fundamental cause of imbalances is not a strong dollar, but America’s over-consumption and over-borrowing.	对美国来说，贸易不平衡的深层原因不是强势美元，而是过度的消费和借债。


A strengthening dollar would worsen the US trade balance, but a weakening dollar could cause panic in capital markets, which might push up risk premia on dollar-denominated assets, including US government securities, in turn leading to an economic slowdown and a further weakening of the dollar.	一个强势的美元将令美国的贸易平衡进一步恶化，但弱势美元则会导致资本市场的阵痛，并推高包括美国政府债券在内的美元资产的风险利差，导致经济增长放缓以及美元的进一步走弱。


Of course, RMB appreciation may displace Chinese goods sold in the US. But if the US fails to narrow its savings gap, its current-account deficit will not disappear, regardless of where the dollar goes.	毫无疑问，人民币升值会使美国市场上的中国商品数量减少，但如果美国无法收窄其储蓄缺口的话，无论美元汇率如何变化，经常账户逆差都不会消失。


Whether America can achieve decent growth while keeping its current-account deficit in check depends on whether it can reinvigorate its ability to innovate and create, thereby restoring competitiveness and creating demand at the same time.	美国是否能够在实现合理增长的同时继续保持这种危险的经常账户逆差状态，这取决于是否能重振其创新能力，并在重建竞争力的同时创造新的需求。


For both China and America, the RMB-dollar exchange rate is important for achieving growth and a more balanced current account.	对于中美两国来说，人民币/美元汇率对于实现增长和更平衡的经常账户都非常重要。


But that dual objective requires structural change in the Chinese and US economies.	但这两个目标都要求中美两国经济实施结构性的革新。


May’s Day	梅的舞台


LONDON – Britain’s new prime minister, Theresa May, has a monumental task ahead of her: fulfilling British – or, more accurately, English and Welsh – voters’ demand to “Brexit” the European Union, and managing the far-reaching consequences of that effort.	伦敦——摆在英国新任首相特雷莎·梅面前的是一个艰巨的任务：执行英国人——或者更确切的说，英格兰和威尔士——选民“退出欧盟”的要求并管理这项工作所带来的意义深远的后果。


Her challenge dwarfs those faced by her recent predecessors.	她所面临的这项挑战令近年来的历届前任首相相形见绌。


But she may well be up to it.	但她或许有能力完成这项任务。


No one should underestimate May.	任何人都不应低估梅。


Like German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has proved her mettle in successive crises, May has all the tools she needs to get things done.	像在一系列危机中已经证明勇气的德国总理默克尔一样，完成任务所需的一切工具都掌握在梅的手中。


She is clever and tough, with little patience for nonsense.	她聪明坚韧，对废话没有耐心。


She has a strong sense of public service, and an equally strong set of values.	她拥有强烈的公共服务意识及同样强烈的价值观。


She carries little ideological baggage, and is adept at staying in control, operating within self-imposed boundaries that keep her on familiar terrain.	她不受任何意识形态的约束，非常善于掌握控制权，她在自我划定的界限中行事，以确保熟悉所处理的问题。


May wins most of the battles she fights, and shows little mercy to those who have used underhanded tactics against her.	梅在参与的多数战役中获胜，对那些曾用卑鄙手段对付她的人毫不留情。


Yet she has few known enemies within her party and is popular with its rank and file.	但她在党内却树敌甚少，并在普通党员中颇受欢迎。


It is a robust combination – one that she will need to use fully as she attempts to lead Britain out of the EU.	这是一种强大的组合——她需要充分加以利用以领导英国的退欧进程。


And make no mistake: Britain is on its way out.	英国退欧进程已经开始，这一点毋庸置疑。


May has repeatedly stated that there can be no going back on the vote to leave, even though Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay.	就算苏格兰和北爱尔兰投票希望留欧，梅仍多次表示退欧公投不可能走回头路。


“Brexit means Brexit,” she insists, with her ministers echoing her refrain.	她一再表示“退欧就是退欧”，其手下部长也都赞同她的观点。


But May has yet to elucidate precisely how she defines Brexit.	但梅还未对英国退欧给出精确的定义。


That’s the hard part.	这项任务非常不容易完成。


Imagine if someone told you, “Breakfast means breakfast,” and then headed off to prepare your meal.	试想一下有人对你说，“早餐就是早餐，”然后开始为你准备食物。


You would have little idea what you were actually going to eat.	你很难清楚地知道你实际将要吃到什么。


A Northern Irish “Ulster fry-up” – eggs, bacon, pork sausage, black pudding, potato and soda bread, and a fried tomato – with a cup of tea?	一份北爱尔兰“阿尔斯特煎蛋”——鸡蛋、培根、猪肉香肠、黑布丁、土豆、苏打面包再配上油炸番茄——搭配一杯茶？


Coffee and a pastry?	咖啡和糕点？


Depending on your circumstances and preferences, you would probably feel very differently about the various possibilities.	根据你所处的环境和个人爱好，你对各种可能的搭配或许感觉会非常不同。


The same goes for Brexit.	同样的情况也适用于英国脱欧。


Some are concerned primarily with stopping EU labor from entering the United Kingdom.	有人可能主要关注阻止欧盟劳动力进入英国。


Others are focused on maintaining access to the single market.	还有人则更关心取得单一市场准入权。


But, unlike a breakfast, Britain can’t just demand everything on the menu.	但不同于早餐的是，英国不能把菜单上的所有菜品每样都点一份。


The reality, so often ignored by the Brexiteers, is that the EU is not going to offer something for nothing.	退欧派常常忽略的现实是欧盟不会把好处白给英国。


That is not because its leaders want to score points, or punish the UK for rejecting the EU (sometimes with inflammatory rhetoric, as when Britain’s new foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, referred to its “Hitlerian imperialism”).	这不是因为欧盟领导人想要拉拢人心或因为拒绝欧盟而惩罚英国（有时这样的煽动性言论甚嚣尘上，比如英国新任外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊所说的“希特勒式的帝国主义”）。


Rather, as we British tend to forget, everyone – including the EU and each of its member states – has their own political or commercial interests, which they are committed to protect.	相反，我们英国人常常会忘记，所有人——包括欧盟及其一切成员国——都有自己发誓要保护的政治或商业利益。


For May, a central challenge over the next few months will be to determine what, realistically, Britain should be seeking when it begins the laborious negotiations on its relationship with Europe (and, on the trade front, with the world).	对梅来讲，今后几个月的核心挑战将是在现实基础上确定在与欧盟关系（在贸易领域则涉及与世界关系）的艰苦谈判开始后英国的目标应当是什么？


Given the scope of the agenda (I can think of at least six major topics that will demand their own negotiations), the process could take several years.	鉴于议程所涉及的范畴（我能想到至少有六大主题需要单独谈判），谈判过程可能需要数年才能完成。


(My 11-year-old granddaughter could be starting university by the time they conclude!)	（谈判完成时我11岁大的孙女可能都开始上大学！


Clear priorities will be essential to keep them from dragging on even longer.	）我们必须明确重点才能防止谈判拖延的时间更长。


The goal, of course, must be to strike a balance between ensuring access to the rest of Europe for British exporters of goods and services (especially financial services) and limiting the movement of EU citizens into Britain.	目标当然是在英国出口的商品服务（尤其是金融服务）进入欧洲其他国家和限制欧盟民众进入英国间取得平衡。


The more the negotiators secure in one area, the more they will have to compromise elsewhere.	谈判者在一个领域得到的越多，在其他领域就需要作出更大的让步。


May will have to muster all of her considerable knowledge, skill, and political capital to negotiate a reasonable deal.	梅需要充分利用她所掌握的知识、技能和政治资本来确保谈判交易的合理性。


But even if she succeeds, she may find that not just some people are dissatisfied – an unavoidable outcome – but that everyone is.	但即使她能成功实现目标，仍然会发现不满的人不仅是其中某一部分——这样的结果不可避免——而是所有。


That would compound another major challenge facing May’s government: narrowing the yawning divide in British society that the Brexit campaign exposed.	这将加剧梅政府所面临的另一重大挑战：缩小因英国退欧暴露出来的英国社会越来越大的鸿沟。


The Brexit vote was driven by the blue-collar workers of England’s North and Midlands, who have long felt alienated from their political leaders, left behind by globalization, and marginalized by its perceived agent, the EU.	英格兰北部和中部的蓝领工人是英国脱欧公投的主要力量，一直以来他们与政治领袖关系疏远、被全球化抛在脑后并且被全球化的所谓代理——欧盟——边缘化。


Metropolitan England – especially London – may have benefited, but they did not.	英格兰大都市——尤其是伦敦——可能因全球化受益匪浅，但他们却没有得到任何好处。


Lacking faith in a Labour Party that is melting down under its left-wing leader Jeremy Corbyn, many members of this group fell prey to the populist promises of the Brexiteers.	由于对左翼领导人杰里米·科尔宾所领导的工党缺乏信心，蓝领工人群体的诸多成员最终沦为退欧派民粹主义承诺的猎物。


“We will reverse globalization,” they declared.	“我们将逆转全球化，”他们称。


“We will turn away the migrants who are suppressing your wages, and redirect millions of pounds from the EU to public services.”	“我们将赶走压低工资的移民，并将本来交给欧盟的成百上千万英镑转移到公共服务当中。


Brexit, they pledged, would return Britain to a safer and more prosperous past.	”他们承诺脱欧会让英国重温更加安全、繁荣的过去时光。


The promises were false.	脱欧者无法真正兑现这些承诺。


Globalization cannot be undone, and migration from the EU cannot be cut off.	全球化无法逆转，同样无法切断来自欧盟的移民。


Any attempt to do so would devastate UK businesses.	任何这样的举措只会毁掉英国的企业。


Even if a faltering economy leads to falling immigration, the workers who voted for Brexit will probably find, frustratingly, that low-paid jobs are still low paid, and that their public services are still under pressure.	即使经济不景气导致移民下降，那些为英国脱欧投票的工人仍然可能灰心丧气地发现低报酬的工作依然低报酬，公共服务压力依然很重。


This is unlikely to boost social cohesion.	这不太可能导致社会凝聚力提升。


The Brexit vote has unleashed a storm of populist sentiment that will be difficult to control.	英国脱欧公投已经启动了一场难以控制的民粹主义情绪风暴。


Just as Donald Trump will not make his working-class constituents better off in the United States, Brexit will utterly fail to benefit those who chose it – no matter what it looks like.	就像唐纳德·特朗普无力改善美国工薪阶层选民的境遇一样，无论情况看似怎样，英国脱欧也完全无法为选择它的人带来好处。


That is the one challenge that May, despite all of her assets, may not be able to overcome.	尽管具备诸多优点，但这样的挑战梅可能仍然无法克服。


Mayday in the UK	危在旦夕的英国


LONDON – Conservative Brexiteers – who campaigned for the United Kingdom to vote to leave the European Union – continue to blather about building an open, outward-looking, free-trading Britain.	发自伦敦——虽然推动英国公投脱欧的保守派脱欧主义者一直吹嘘要建立一个开放，外向型且自由贸易的英国，但英国实际上是向内转向。


But the UK is in fact turning inward. Prime Minister Theresa May, who styles herself as the UK’s answer to Angela Merkel, is turning out to have more in common with Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s far-right National Front, than with Germany’s internationalist chancellor.	相比于秉承国际主义立场的德国总理，以英国版默克尔自诩的英国首相特雷莎·梅（Theresa May）似乎与法国极右翼民族阵线领导人玛丽·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）有更多相似之处。


May set out her vision for Britain’s future at the Conservative Party conference this month.	梅在本月的保守党会议上阐述了自己对英国未来的展望。


She pledged to trigger the UK’s formal exit process by the end of March 2017, and declared national control over immigration – not continued membership in the EU single market – to be her priority in the upcoming “Brexit” negotiations.	她承诺在2017年3月底前启动英国的正式退出程序，并宣布将全国性移民管制——而非在欧盟单一市场中继续保留成员国资格——列为近期“脱欧”谈判的首要任务。


That stance puts the UK on course for a “hard Brexit” by April 2019.	这种立场将使得英国在2019年4月驶入“硬脱欧”轨道。


EU governments rightly insist on freedom of movement as a central pillar of the single market, and May’s nativist lurch has already prompted Merkel and other EU leaders, notably French President François Hollande, to take a tougher line with the UK.	而欧盟各国政府则依然正确地坚持将迁徙自由列为单一市场的中心支柱，梅的本土主义者暴动也促使默克尔和其他欧盟领导人，尤其是法国总统弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande），一起对英国采取更加强硬的路线。


The pound has duly plunged on currency markets, anticipating the economic harm of a hard Brexit: costly trade barriers – customs controls, rules-of-origin requirements, import duties, and discriminatory regulation – will divide UK and EU markets and affect nearly half of Britain’s trade.	由于预期经济会因“硬脱欧”而受到冲击，英镑已经在货币市场暴跌：耗费甚多的贸易壁垒——海关管制、原产地规则，进口关税和歧视性监管——将把英国和欧盟市场割裂开来并影响近一半的英国贸易额。


But May has not only set the stage for a complete break with the EU; she has also adopted a deeply illiberal vision for the UK’s future, consisting of economic interventionism, political nationalism, and cultural xenophobia.	但是梅不仅为与欧盟的完全决裂铺平了道路； 还对英国的未来采取了包括经济干预主义、政治民族主义和文化仇外心理在内的极端狭隘视角。


This unelected prime minister is rejecting former Prime Minister David Cameron’s liberal Conservative manifesto (which won him a parliamentary majority last year), Margaret Thatcher’s embrace of globalization in the 1980s, and Britain’s much longer tradition of liberal openness.	前首相大卫·卡梅伦（David Cameron）的自由保守主义宣言（他正是以此在去年赢得了议会多数席位）以及撒切尔夫人（Margaret Thatcher）1980年代拥抱全球化的举措以及英国源远流长的自由开放传统都遭到了这位并非由选举产生的首相的一一否定。


After being a near-silent supporter of remaining in the EU during the Brexit campaign, May has now donned the mantle of Brexiteer populism, targeting both “international elites” and Britons with a cosmopolitan outlook.	作为一个在脱欧运动期间近乎沉默的留欧支持者，如今的梅已经披上了脱欧民粹主义大衣，专门批评那些“国际化精英”和“具有国际视野的英国人”。


“Just listen to the way a lot of politicians and commentators talk about the public,” she said in her keynote conference speech. “They find your patriotism distasteful, your concerns about immigration parochial, your views about crime illiberal.”	正如她在主题会议演讲时所说：“听听那些政治家和评论家谈论公众的方式，他们觉得你的爱国主义令人生厌，你对移民问题的关注相当狭隘，你对犯罪的看法极不开明。


Echoing nationalists such as Le Pen and Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s authoritarian prime minister, she asserted that, “If you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means.”	与勒庞和匈牙利专制总理维克托·欧尔班（Viktor Orbán）这类民族主义者相呼应，梅声称“如果你相信你是世界公民，你实际上连任何地方的公民都不是，因为你不明白“公民”一词是什么含义。


Ironically, it is May’s notion that there is a single way of belonging to Britain’s political community that is un-British.	”讽刺的是，在梅的概念中却存在一种以非英国的方式去归附于英国政治社群的方法。


May demanded that UK-based businesses privilege British workers in the “spirit of citizenship” – another term for what Le Pen calls “national preference.” This is more than just rhetoric.	梅要求英国企业凭“公民精神”为英国工人提供特权，这不过是勒庞所谓“民族偏好”的另一个说法。


The status of EU nationals in the UK is a bargaining chip in the upcoming Brexit negotiations. May wants to keep out future EU migrants, whom she wrongly blames for taking Britons’ jobs and depressing their wages.	但可不是随口说说，因为欧盟居民在英国的地位会是未来脱欧谈判的议价筹码。


Home Secretary Amber Rudd would go even further. She recently called for UK-based businesses to list their foreign staff, in order to “name and shame” companies that do not recruit “enough” British workers.	梅想要阻止那些被她错误指责为占用英国人工作岗位并拉低其工资的欧盟移民继续进入英国，而内政大臣安布尔·拉德（Amber Rudd）则更���，她最近呼吁所有英国企业列出其外籍员工，以“点名和羞辱”那些没有招聘“足够”英籍职员的公司。


“British jobs for British workers” was a slogan used by the racist National Front party in the UK in the 1970s. Now it has backing in the cabinet.	“英国的工作仅为英国工人提供”这句1970年代种族主义势力英国国家阵线党所使用的口号如今又重新回荡在内阁之上。


This chauvinism is not just despicable; it is foolish. It has already prompted outrage and threats from other countries.	这种沙文主义不仅卑鄙而愚蠢，更激起了其他国家的愤怒和威胁。


At a time when many companies are reconsidering their post-Brexit investment plans, it makes a mockery of the government’s claim that the UK is open for business.	当许多公司重新考虑脱欧后的投资计划时，政府声称的英国商业开放性看起来像是个笑话。


Apparently, May’s government expects Citibank to operate in London without American staff, Nissan without Japanese managers, and global companies without their diverse talent.	显然，梅带领的政府预计花旗银行将在没有美国员工的情况下在伦敦经营，日产汽车将没有日本经理，众多全球性的公司将把多样化的人才排除在外。


Even foreign-born doctors who save British lives are no longer welcome; May wants the UK to be “self-sufficient” in health care by 2025.	即使是那些拯救英国人生命的外国医生也不再欢迎； 梅希望英国在2025年前实现医疗保健的“自给自足”。


Since one in three physicians in the UK is an immigrant, the country would suffer if many now decided to practice elsewhere.	由于英国三分之一的医生是移民，如果许多人决定在别处就业，民众的日子就不好过了。


May’s government experience has been limited to command-and-control functions, overseeing internal security and immigration as Home Secretary in Cameron’s cabinet.	梅的从政经验仅限于担任卡梅伦内阁内政部长期间监管国内安全和移民的指挥和管控职能。


She seems clueless about how an open market economy works, and unaware that international trade, investment, and migration are intertwined.	她似乎对开放市场经济如何运作没有意识，也不知道国际贸易、投资和移民是相互交织的。


She recently boasted that London is the world’s financial capital, without acknowledging that this is thanks mostly to foreign banks that employ foreign staff (those “citizens of the world”) to serve international markets, including the EU’s.	她最近吹嘘说伦敦是世界金融之都，却并未意识到这主要是由于外国银行聘用外国工作人员（所谓“世界公民”）来为包括欧盟在内的国际市场服务而构建的。


More fundamentally, May doesn’t seem to realize that immigration controls are trade barriers.	更根本的是，梅似乎没有意识到控制移民就是贸易壁垒。


It is called “trade” if a British company outsources computing work to Bangalore, and “migration” if Indian programmers do the same work in Birmingham – yet the transactions are analogous.	如果一家英国公司将程序工作外包给班加罗尔，则称为“贸易”，如果印度程序员在伯明翰做同样的工作，则称为“移民”——但交易是类似的。


If Poland specializes in construction, and the UK wants to procure its services, people have to move between countries to trade.	如果波兰人擅长于建筑业而英国想要采购其服务，人们就必须在两国之间移动以完成交易。


Officially, the British government remains gung-ho about free trade. In practice, its illiberal politics are taking precedence: Europhobia trumps free exchange with Britain’s neighbors and main trading partners, while xenophobia trumps the need for foreign workers.	从表面上英国政府仍然热心自由贸易，但现实中狭隘政治已经占了上风：对欧元的恐惧胜过了与邻国及主要贸易伙伴的自由交流，仇外心理胜过了对外国工人的需求。


How long will the rest of its globalization agenda survive?	那么其全球化议程的其余部分又能存活多久？


Assuming that it can find willing partners, populism may preclude any trade deal that appears to serve “international elites.”	就算它可以找到有意合作的伙伴，民粹主义仍会将任何貌似为“国际精英”服务的贸易协议排除在外。


Nationalism may lead Britain to slam the door on Chinese investment, too.	民族主义也可能导致英国对来自中国的投资关上大门。


British voters chose to leave the EU, but they did not specify how; so May has no electoral mandate for her swing toward illiberalism.	英国选民选择离开欧盟，但他们没有具体说明要如何脱离； 因此梅并没有获得选举授权去倒向反自由主义。


But her official opposition is a Labour Party that, taken over by the hard left, is not electorally viable.	而她的官方反对派是因由极左派接管而没有选举胜算的工党。


So, unless the Liberal Democrats can bounce back, Britain may need a new political party (or cross-party alliance) to fight for a country that is outward-looking, liberal, and tolerant.	因此，除非自由民主党人能够重振声威，否则英国可能需要一个新的政党（或跨党派联盟）去为一个外向型，自由和宽容的国家而奋斗。


The Resisted Rise of Segolene Royal	罗雅尔举步维艰


Two months ago, Paris’s political insiders were unanimous: the presidential race was still open, but Ségolène Royal was clearly the favorite.	两个月前，巴黎的政治圈中人士还一致认为总统大选胜负难料，但是罗雅尔女士明显受到青睐。


Today, the reverse seems true.	但是今天，情况看起来恰恰相反。


While the race is not over, Nicolas Sarkozy has emerged as the consistent favorite in the polls, as well as of those who declared “him” nearly defeated in early December.	尽管大选还没有结束，萨尔科奇已经稳居为民意调查中的宠儿，连那些在十二月初宣布他基本落选的人也是如此。


The new consensus can be described as follows: Ségolène Royal cannot defeat Nicolas Sarkozy, but Sarkozy can defeat himself.	新的共识基本可以概括如下：罗雅尔无法击败萨尔科奇，但是萨尔科奇却会败在自己手下。


Why has the Socialist candidate, the first woman who had a serious chance to be elected President of France, fallen from grace so quickly?	为什么社会党候选人、同时也是第一位有望问鼎法国总统宝座的女性如此迅速地失宠呢？


And why has Sarkozy proved to be so resilient, despite the often negative passions aroused by his personality?	为何萨尔科奇尽管其个性时常招致负面情绪，但又如此坚韧呢？


If Ségolène Royal is defeated, it will not be because she is a woman, but in spite of it.	如果罗雅尔被击败，原因不会是因为她是女性，而是，尽管是女性，依旧败北。


The French are ready for a woman, but perhaps not this one.	法国人已经做好了女总统的准备，但是可能不是这样的一个。


She is beautiful, energetic, resolute, and in many ways surprising.	她端庄秀丽，充满活力，敢做敢为，而且在许多方面还令人惊讶。


Indeed, on issues such as law and order, respect for authority, and nationalism, one finds her positions far from what one would expect of a Socialist candidate.	实际上，在有关法律和秩序、尊重权威以及民族主义方面，人们发现她的立场与典型的社会党候选人大相径庭。


But Royal has so far failed to rally her camp behind her.	但是罗雅尔至今未能将其竞选队伍团结一致。


Her campaign’s combination of authoritarianism and confusion, if not sheer incompetence, is sapping her supporters’ morale while confirming the deep reservations of her opponents.	她的竞选过程如果不是完全难堪重任的话，也是综合了专制和混乱，挫伤了其支持者的士气，与此同时又坚定了其反对者的深切保留。


Whatever their political preferences, many French voters have the feeling that an “amateur” is facing a “professional.”	许多法国选民，无论政治倾向如何，都感到这是一个“业余选手”在面对一个“专业选手”。


Whereas Sarkozy has managed to impose himself on the right without the support of Jacques Chirac, the Socialist heavyweights cannot fully convince themselves to come out behind Royal.	萨尔科奇成功地在没有希拉克的支持下统领了右翼，而社会党的重量级人物们却无法完全说服自己支持罗雅尔。


Her defeat would be theirs, too, but their resentment over losing the nomination to her is so far proving stronger than their political survival instincts.	她的失败也会是他们的失败，但是他们对败落在她的手下依旧怀恨在心，其程度超过了他们的政治生存本能。


Royal’s emphasis on the concept of participatory democracy – “Tell me what you want, I will be your spokesperson” – has so far shown itself to have limited appeal.	罗雅尔强调参与民主的概念，她提出“告诉我你想要什么，我来做你的发言人”。 这一概念目前吸引力有限。


Voters like to be consulted, and citizens love to express themselves, but at the end of the day, they want a leader, someone they can trust.	选民希望得到咨询，公民渴望表达自我，但是归根到底，他们还是想要一个领导人物，一个他们可以信赖的人。


In other terms, they don’t want only a receptive ear, but a reassuring, authoritative, and competent figure.	换言之，他们并不只是想要某人洗耳恭听，而是令人安心、一言九鼎而且办事干练。


Two months before the vote, the presidential campaign has demonstrated that the modernization, if not “Americanization,” of French politics (for example, heavy use of the Internet) has taken hold.	距离投票还有两个月，总统大选已经表现出，法国政治即使没有美国化，也是现代化了(例如大量使用互联网)，这一点已经无庸置疑。


But the campaign is also proving the resilience of “classical politics.”	但是这一场竞选还体现了“经典政治”的韧性。


Royal may have presented herself as a “post-modern” politician, but it is a “classical” politician who seems to be winning.	罗雅尔可能将自身表现为一个“后现代派”政客，但是一个“经典政客”看起来却要赢得大选胜利。


At the same time, Sarkozy has been able to emerge as the natural leader of the right partly because Chirac has been less of a liability than many people, including the experts, predicted.	与此同时，由于希拉克并不如许多人、包括专家所料是累赘，因而萨尔科奇还成为该党自然的领导人。


Indeed, the reverse seems to be true, which perhaps reflects the tendency of French voters to adopt a positive view of departing presidents.	确实，看起来恰恰相反，希拉克还有所帮助。 这可能反映出法国选民趋向于对行将离任的总统持有正面观点。


Chirac himself has orchestrated his departure with a grace, presenting himself in the best possible light with personal confidences and public speeches.	希拉克自己优雅地谢幕，用个人自信和公共演说的形式以最佳的形像展示自我。


It is as if France were now seized by a kind of nostalgic generosity toward a presidency that had been marked by suspicion and derision.	人们对希拉克总统任期抱有怀疑和嘲讽，现在法国好像一下子对他抱有某种怀旧式的宽宏大量。


Chirac is not about to present himself as a candidate to divide the conservative camp, and the new leniency surrounding his record may actually benefit Sarkozy, his impatient and rebellious heir.	希拉克并不会再度出马而分裂保守派阵营，而民众对其任期内政绩的大度评价可能会确实有助于其不可耐烦以及桀骜不驯的继位者萨尔科奇。


Yet opposition to Sarkozy remains high, and not only among minorities and young people, who have registered to vote in high numbers, supposedly to oppose him and his heavy use of the police in the banlieues .	但是反对萨尔科奇的势力依旧高涨，不仅仅是那些少数族裔和青年人。 他们大量登记投票，大概是要反对他本人及其在市郊用警过度。


“Bonaparte” may be about to triumph easily over “Joan of Arc,” as some foreign commentators like to describe the two leading candidates, but Sarkozy’s supposedly “Bonapartist” qualities have fueled a potent sense of apprehension.	正如某些评论家对两大候选人所做到描绘一样，“拿破仑”可能会轻取“圣女贞德”，但是人们认为萨尔科奇具有的拿破仑式的特质已经引起了巨大的恐惧感。


In fact, the persistence of strong reservations about both Royal and Sarkozy helps explain the surge in popularity for a third candidate, Francois Bayrou, a traditional centrist, pro-European politician.	实际上，对罗雅尔和萨尔科奇强烈保留挥之不去也就解释了第三候选人的民意为何扶摇直上。 此人是传统中间派人物，亲欧洲的政客贝胡。


Bayrou has never had it so good, but, barring the unlikely collapse of one of the two leading candidates’ campaigns, he will fail to qualify for the second-round runoff.	贝胡的行情从未如此看好，但是，如果两大候选人的竞选不崩溃，当然不大会如此，那么，他就不会进入第二轮投票。


In our media-dominated age, personalities ultimately matter more than programs, which means that elimination prevails over selection.	在我们这个由媒体控制的年代，个性最终比纲领更为重要，这就意味着淘汰在遴选之上。


That process seems to favor Sarkozy.	这一进程似乎青睐于萨尔科奇。


An anybody-but-Sarkozy reflex may exist in some circles of French society, but, in order to prevail, a credible alternative is required.	在法国社会的某些圈子中似乎还存在着“唯独萨氏不可”的习惯性思维，但是，为了获胜，就需要一个有公信力的替换人物。


So far, Royal has failed to play that role.	目前为止，罗雅尔尚未能扮演这一角色。


The Resistible Rise of Asia?	可阻挡的亚洲崛起？


NEW DELHI – A favorite theme in international debate nowadays is whether Asia’s rise signifies the West’s decline.	新德里—如今，国际争论最热门的话题是亚洲的崛起是不是意味着西方的衰落。


But the current focus on economic malaise in Europe and the United States is distracting attention from the many serious challenges that call into question Asia’s continued success.	但最近一段时间，欧洲和美国的经济窘境吸引了人们的目光，以至于许多事关亚洲能否持续保持成功的严峻挑战都被忽视了。


To be sure, today’s ongoing global power shifts are primarily linked to Asia’s phenomenal economic rise, the speed and scale of which have no parallel in world history.	诚然，当今世界正在发生的实力转移主要与亚洲令人瞩目的经济崛起相关，亚洲速度是人类历史上所罕见的。


With the world’s fastest-growing economies, fastest-rising military expenditures, fiercest resource competition, and most serious hot spots, Asia obviously holds the key to the future global order.	亚洲拥有世界增长最快的经济体、膨胀最迅速的军费开支、最激烈的资源竞争。 而最重要的热点在于，全球秩序的钥匙显然含在亚洲嘴里。


But Asia faces major constraints.	但亚洲也面临着沉重的约束。


It must cope with entrenched territorial and maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea; harmful historical legacies that weigh down its most important interstate relationships; increasingly fervent nationalism; growing religious extremism; and sharpening competition over water and energy.	亚洲必须处理好根深蒂固的领土和领海纠纷（比如南海问题）、妨碍其最重要国际关系的历史遗留问题、愈演愈烈的民族主义、日滋月长的宗教极端主义，以及日益尖锐的水和能源之争。


Moreover, Asia’s political integration badly lags behind its economic integration, and, to compound matters, it has no security framework.	此外，亚洲政治一体化严重滞后于经济一体化，更严重的问题是，亚洲缺少安全框架。


Regional consultation mechanisms remain weak.	地区协商机制仍然相当无力。


Differences persist over whether a security architecture or community should extend across Asia, or be confined to an ill-defined “East Asia.”	亚洲存在持久的分歧——安全机构或共同体应该将整个亚洲纳入其中，还是只局限于定义模糊不清的“东亚”？


One central concern is that, unlike Europe’s bloody wars of the first half of the twentieth century, which made war there unthinkable today, the wars in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century only accentuated bitter rivalries.	一个关键问题在于，亚洲和欧洲不同。 欧洲在20世纪上半叶经历了两次惨烈的战争，时至今日，欧洲人已对战争深恶痛绝。


Several interstate wars have been fought in Asia since 1950, when both the Korean War and the annexation of Tibet started, without resolving the underlying Asian disputes.	而亚洲在20世纪下半叶所经历的战争加剧了各种仇恨。 自1950年的朝鲜战争和解放西藏战事以来，亚洲经历了多场战争，但基本争端仍未得到解决。


To take the most significant example, China staged military interventions even when it was poor and internally troubled.	一个显著的例子是，中国在其一穷二白、仍面临诸多国内麻烦时仍进行了军事干预。


A 2010 Pentagon report cites Chinese military preemption in 1950, 1962, 1969, and 1979 in the name of strategic defense.	五角大楼一份2010年的报告援引了中国在1950、1962、1969和1979年以战略防御为名进行的先发制人。


There was also China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, and the 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, amid protests by the Philippines.	1974年中国从越南手中夺取西沙群岛、1995年在菲律宾的抗议声中占领南沙群岛美济礁亦是明证。


This history helps to explain why China’s rapidly growing military power raises important concerns in Asia today.	这段历史有助于解释中国快速膨胀的军力为何会引起当今亚洲的严重忧虑。


Indeed, not since Japan rose to world-power status during the reign of the Meiji Emperor (1867-1912) has another non-Western power emerged with such potential to shape the global order.	事实上，日本在明治时期（1867—1912年）跻身世界强国之林方才开创了非西方势力参与决定全球秩序的局面。


But there is an important difference: Japan’s rise was accompanied by the other Asian civilizations’ decline.	但日本的例子有一个绝大不同点：其崛起伴随着其他亚洲文明的衰落。


After all, by the nineteenth century, Europeans had colonized much of Asia, leaving in place no Asian power that could rein in Japan.	毕竟，19世纪时，欧洲人已经在亚洲广开殖民地，因此没有哪个亚洲国家可以制约日本。


Today, China is rising alongside other important Asian countries, including South Korea, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia.	如今，中国正在与其他重要亚洲国家一同崛起，包括韩国、越南、印度和印尼。


Although China now has displaced Japan as the world’s second largest economy, Japan will remain a strong power for the foreseeable future.	尽管中国现已超越日本成为世界第二大经济体，但在可预见的将来，日本仍将保持超群的实力。


On a per capita basis, Japan remains nine times richer than China, and it possesses Asia’s largest naval fleet and its most advanced high-tech industries.	从人均水平看，日本仍比中国富裕九倍，而且拥有亚洲最大的海军舰队和最先进的高科技产业。


When Japan emerged as a world power, imperial conquest followed, whereas a rising China’s expansionist impulses are, to some extent, checked by other Asian powers.	日本崛起为世界一强后便开始了帝国主义征服，而中国的扩张冲动在某种程度上受着其他亚洲力量的制约。


Militarily, China is in no position to grab the territories that it covets.	从军事上看，中国还无力染指其所觊觎的土地。


But its defense spending has grown almost twice as fast as its GDP.	但其国防开支增长速度要比其GDP几乎快出一倍。


And, by picking territorial fights with its neighbors and pursuing a muscular foreign policy, China’s leaders are compelling other Asian states to work more closely with the US and each other.	此外，通过与其邻国的领土角力和强硬外交政策，中国领导人正在迫使其他亚洲国家加强与美国和彼此之间的联系。


In fact, China seems to be on the same path that made Japan an aggressive, militaristic state, with tragic consequences for the region – and for Japan.	事实上，中国似乎走在让日本成为激进军事化国家的老路上，这将给地区（以及日本）带来灾难性后果。


The Meiji Restoration created a powerful military under the slogan “Enrich the country and strengthen the military.” The military eventually became so strong that it could dictate terms to the civilian government.	当年明治维新在“富国强兵”的口号下创造了一支强大的军队，终于造成了尾大不掉之局，文职政府不得不受军队摆布。


The same could unfold in China, where the Communist Party is increasingly beholden to the military for retaining its monopoly on power.	中国也可能发生这一幕，共产党越来越依赖军队维持权力垄断。


More broadly, Asia’s power dynamics are likely to remain fluid, with new or shifting alliances and strengthened military capabilities continuing to challenge regional stability.	从更广的角度看，亚洲实力格局可能仍将维持变局，新���（或变化的）盟友关系和军事实力的增强将继续对地区稳定构成挑战。


For example, as China, India, and Japan maneuver for strategic advantage, they are transforming their mutual relations in a way that portends closer strategic engagement between India and Japan, and sharper competition between them and China.	比如，中国、印度和日本都在追求战略优势，正在形成一种印日战略合作日渐紧密、与中国竞争日渐尖锐的关系。


The future will not belong to Asia merely because it is the world’s largest, most populous, and fastest-developing continent.	未来不会因为亚洲是世界最大、人口最多、发展最快的大洲而属于亚洲。


Size is not necessarily an asset.	规模并不一定是优势。


Historically, small, strategically oriented states have wielded global power.	从历史上说，战略导向的小国也可以成为列强。


In fact, with far fewer people, Asia would have a better balance between population size and available natural resources, including water, food, and energy.	事实上，如果人口再少一点，亚洲可以获得更佳的人口规模与自然资源（包括水、食品和能源）之间的平衡。


In China, for example, water scarcity has been officially estimated to cost roughly $28 billion in annual industrial output, even though China, unlike several other Asian economies, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, is not listed by the United Nations as a country facing water stress.	比如，据中国官方数据估计，水资源短缺每年要造成大约280亿美元的工业产出损失，尽管中国并没有出现在联合国面临水压力国家的名单中（印度、韩国和新加坡在列）。


In addition to its growing political and natural-resource challenges, Asia has made the mistake of overemphasizing GDP growth to the exclusion of other indices of development.	除了日益严峻的政治和自然资源挑战，亚洲还犯了过度强调GDP以至于忽视了发展指标的错误。


As a result, Asia is becoming more unequal, corruption is spreading, domestic discontent is rising, and environmental degradation is becoming a serious problem.	结果，亚洲的不平等问题愈演愈烈，腐败横行，国内不满情绪日益高涨，环境破坏也日益严重。


Worse, while many Asian states have embraced the West’s economic values, they reject its political values.	更糟糕的是，尽管许多亚洲国家接受了西方的经济价值观，但却拒绝接受其政治价值观。


So make no mistake.	因此，不要搞错了。


Asia’s challenges are graver than those facing Europe, which embodies comprehensive development more than any other part of the world.	亚洲面临的挑战比欧洲还要严峻，欧洲的整体发展是其他任何地区所不能比你的。


Despite China’s aura of inevitability, it is far from certain that Asia, with its pressing internal challenges, will be able to spearhead global growth and shape a new world order.	尽管亚洲打上中国烙印已成定局，但面临严峻内部挑战的亚洲能否充当全球增长领头羊并创造新的世界秩序还远未可知。


The Resource Curse Revisited	再谈资源劫难


There is a curious phenomenon that economists call the resource curse - so named because, on average, countries with large endowments of natural resources perform worse than countries that are less well endowed.	在经济学中，有一种奇怪的现象，经济学家称之为'资源劫难'。 之所以冠名如此，是因为，一般来说，那些拥有大量丰富自然资源的国家，它们的经济发展反而不如那些相对来说资源较不丰富的国家。


Yet some countries with abundant natural resources do perform better than others, and some have done well.	但是，的确有一些自然资源丰富的国家比其他国家发展迅速，而且其中某些国家已经相当富裕。


Why is the spell of the resource curse cast so unequally?	为什么同是资源丰富，却给有的国家带来劫难，有的国家带来好运呢？


Thirty years ago, Indonesia and Nigeria - both dependent on oil - had comparable per capita incomes.	三十年前，印度尼西亚和尼日利亚--两个国家经济发展的支柱都是石油工业--有着很接近的人均国民收入。


Today, Indonesia's per capita income is four times that of Nigeria.	今天，印度尼西亚的人均国民收入为尼日利亚的四倍。


Indeed, Nigeria's per capita income (as measured in constant dollars circa 1995) has fallen.	事实上，尼日利亚的人均国民收入（用大概1995年的美元值来衡量）已有所下降。


A similar pattern holds true in Sierra Leone and Botswana. Both are rich in diamonds.	比较塞拉利昂和博茨瓦纳两个国家，会发现相似的现象。


Yet Botswana averaged 8.7% annual economic growth over the past thirty years, while Sierra Leone plunged into civil strife.	两个国家都盛产钻石，然而在过去的三十年中，博茨瓦纳平均的年经济增长率为8. 7%，而塞拉利昂则陷入了国内纠纷之中。


The failures in the oil-rich Middle East are legion.	与此同时，我们可以看到，中东地区许多盛产石油的国家，经济发展都是失败的。


Economists put forward three reasons for the dismal performance of some richly endowed countries:	关于一些资源丰富的国家经济发展不景气的现象，经济学家们提出了三种解释：


• First, the prospect of riches orients official efforts to seizing a larger share of the pie, rather than creating a larger pie.	l 其一，对财富的渴求使得一些政府官员不再想把蛋糕做大，而是想如何分到蛋糕中更大的一份。


The result of this wealth grab is often war. At other times simple rent-seeking behavior by officials, aided and abetted by outsiders, is the outcome.	这种争夺财富的结果通常是战争，或者有时是在局外人的帮助和怂恿之下政府官员简单的寻租行为。


It is cheaper to bribe a government to provide resources at below-market prices than to invest and develop an industry, so it is no surprise that some firms succumb to this temptation.	毕竟贿赂政府官员，让他们以低于市场价的价格出售资源，要比投资和开发一个工业的成本低得多，因此某些公司企业屈服于这种诱惑（贿赂政府官员）也并不令人惊奇。


• Second, natural resource prices are volatile, and managing this volatility is hard.	l 其二，自然资源的价格具有波动性，而对于这种波动性的管理又十分困难。


Lenders provide money when times are good, but want their money back when, say, energy prices plummet.	投资者总是在时局很好的时候投入资金，而当时局不好时，比如说，能源的价格骤跌时，他们又会撤回资金。


(As the old adage has it, banks only like to lend to those who do not need money.)	（正如老话所说，银行只喜欢借钱给那些不需要钱的人。


Economic activity is thus even more volatile than commodity prices, and much of the gains made in a boom unravels in the bust that follows.	）经济活动因此比商品的价格具有更强的波动性，繁荣时期所获得的收益正好可以抵消紧接下来的经济衰退。


• Third, oil and other natural resources, while perhaps a source of wealth, do not create jobs by themselves, and unfortunately, they often crowd out other economic sectors.	l 其三，石油和其他一些自然资源，也许可以创造财富，但这些资源本身却不能创造就业机会，而且不幸的是，这些资源的存在还会对其他经济部门产生挤出作用。


For example, an inflow of oil money often leads to currency appreciation - a phenomenon called the Dutch Disease .	例如，出售石油获得的收益通常会引起本币升值--我们称作'荷兰病'的一种经济现象。


The Netherlands, after its discovery of North Sea gas and oil, found itself plagued with growing unemployment and workforce disability (many of those who could not get jobs found disability benefits to be more generous than unemployment benefits.)	自从荷兰在北海地区发现石油和天然气之后，整个国家就一直被不断上升的失业率和劳动力失去劳动能力的问题所困扰（许多找不到工作的人发现失去劳动能力救济要比失业救济更有利可图。


When the exchange rate soars as a result of resource booms, countries cannot export manufactured or agriculture goods, and domestic producers cannot compete with an onslaught of imports.	）能源工业迅速发展使得荷兰盾币值骤升，制造业和农业产品出口减少，国内产品同大量廉价的进口产品相比，在价格上处于劣势。


So abundant natural wealth often creates rich countries with poor people.	因此说，丰富的自然资源经常会导致富国贫民。


Two thirds of the people in Venezuela, the Latin American country with the largest oil deposits, live in poverty.	委内瑞拉，拥有拉丁美洲最大的石油储量，但其人口的三分之二都生活在贫困当中。


No wonder that they are demanding that the small group of those who benefit from the country's wealth start to share it.	难怪人们要求那些少数依靠国家的资源致富的人们将他们的收益均分呢。


Fortunately, as we have become aware of these problems, we have learned much about what can be done about them.	幸运的是，我们对这些问题有所意识的同时，也学会了很多方法去处理这些问题。


Democratic, consensual, and transparent processes - such as those in Botswana - are more likely to ensure that the fruits of a country's wealth are equitably and well spent.	一些民主，协商，透明的做法--比如博茨瓦纳所采用��那些做法--更加能够保证国家的财富果实得到公平有效的利用。


We also know that stabilization funds - which set aside some of the money earned when prices are high - can help reduce the economic volatility associated with natural resource prices.	还有经济稳定基金--在物价较高时将一部分赚得的钱储备起来--有助于缓解因自然资源价格波动造成的经济波动。


Moreover, such fluctuations are amplified by borrowing in good years, so countries should resist foreign lenders who try to persuade them of the virtues of such capital flows.	而且，这种经济波动还会由于在时局较好时接受国外投资而加剧，因此当外国投资者竭力宣传资本流入的好处时，政府应当加以抵制。


The Dutch disease, however, is one of the more intractable consequences of oil and resource wealth, at least for poor countries.	然而，至少对于那些贫困的国家来说，'荷兰病'只不过是众多由石油和资源财富引起的棘手问题之一而已。


In principle, it is easy to avoid currency appreciation: keep the foreign exchange earned from, say, oil exports out of the country. Invest the money in the US or Europe.	一般来说，避免本币升值并不难：例如，可以不让从石油出口中赚得的外汇流回本国，先将这些钱投资到美国或欧洲，然后慢慢收回。


Bring it in only gradually. But in most developing countries, such a policy is viewed as using oil money to help someone else's economy.	但是在大多数发展中国家，这种政策被认为是用本国的财富帮助其他国家经济的发展。


Some countries, notably Nigeria, are trying to implement these lessons.	某些国家，其中较突出的就是尼日利亚，正在将这些方法付诸实施。


Nigeria has proposed creating stabilization funds, and, in the future, it will sell its natural resources in transparent, competitive bidding processes.	尼日利亚已经提出设立经济稳定基金，而且，将来要通过透明的，竞争性的竞标程序来出售资源。


Most importantly, the Nigerians are taking measures to ensure that the fruits of this endowment are invested, so that as the country's natural resources are depleted, its real wealth - fixed and human capital - is increased.	更为重要的是，尼日利亚已采取措施确保出售资源的获益将会被再投资，这样，在自然资源枯竭的时候，国家真正的财富--固定资本和人力资本--才会有所增加。


Western governments can help with common-sense reforms.	西方国家的政府也应采取一些常识性的改革给予以上国家帮助。


Secret bank accounts not only support terrorism, but also facilitate the corruption that undermines development.	秘密银行账户不仅为恐怖主义提供支持，而且还为破坏经济发展的腐败行为提供了可乘之机。


Similarly, transparency would be encouraged if only payments that are fully documented were tax deductible.	同样，如果只有单据齐备的收入款项才能享受减税待遇的话，增加透明度的政策也会进一步得到鼓励。


Violent conflict is fed and its effects worsened by massive sales of arms by Western governments to developing countries.	西方国家向发展中国家大量出售武器助长了那里的暴力冲突，使局势进一步恶化。


This should be stopped.	这些做法都应该加以制止。


Abundant natural resources can and should be a blessing, not a curse.	丰富的自然资源能够，也应该为国家国民带来好运而不是劫难。


We know what must be done. What is missing is the political will to make it so.	我们知道应该怎样做，缺少的只是政治方面的推动。


The Responsibility to Protect Comes of Age	负起保护责任的时代来了


NEW YORK – Good news not only sells less well than bad news, but also often seems harder to believe.	纽约——好消息不仅在传播速度上不如坏消息，而且通常似乎相信起来也更加困难。


Reaction to Harvard psychologist Stephen Pinker’s majestic new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, is a case in point.	哈佛心理学家斯蒂芬·平克宏伟的新著《人类本性中的善良天使》就是很好的例证。


In 800 meticulously argued and documented pages, Pinker shows that, over the course of history, there has been a dramatic decline in violence, both domestically and internationally – and that this downward trend is continuing through the post-Cold War years.	在800页精心的举证和记录中，平克告诉人们在历史的长河中，国内和国际暴力活动均呈现大幅下降之势——这样的下降之势在冷战后仍然得以延续。


But the response of many reviewers to Pinker’s work has been incomprehension, denial, or a tenacious focus on individual horror stories, as though they somehow change the larger picture.	但很多评论家既不理解、也不承认平克的著作，或者固执地将关注的重点放在个人的恐怖故事，就好像这些恐怖故事能以某种方式改变大局。


Many will be similarly slow to accept that when it comes to the most conscience-shocking classes of violence – genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other mass atrocities – dramatic progress has been made recently.	很多人同样不愿承认在制止最令人震惊的暴力活动——种族灭绝、种族清洗和其他大规模暴行上，近年来也取得了重大的进步。


Those gains culminated in the interventions, unthinkable a decade ago, that the United Nations Security Council authorized this year to stop unfolding human-rights catastrophes in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.	这种进步在联合国安理会今年授权阻止科特迪瓦和利比亚人权灾难时达到了高潮，如此规模的干涉行动在十年前是无法想象的。


With progress like this, it is no longer fanciful to hope that never again will there be another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, or Srebrenica.	面对这样的进步，永远不再出现另一次大屠杀、另一个柬埔寨、卢旺达或斯雷布雷尼察的期望不再是纯粹的幻想。


It is ten years since an international commission that I co-chaired gave birth to the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”), and six years since more than 150 heads of state and government endorsed it unanimously at the UN’s World Summit in 2005.	我所主持的一家国际委员会首次提出保护责任（“RtoP”）思想距今已经十年，该理念在2005年联合国世界首脑会议上获得150多位国家和政府首脑的一致认可距今也已六年了。


The core idea was simple: stop arguing for a “right to intervene,” which inevitably generates a backlash, and talk instead about “responsibility” – that of every state to protect its own citizens from atrocities, but also that of the wider international community to act if a state is unable or unwilling to do so.	其中的核心思想非常简单：不要再就“干涉权”问题争论不休，这样的思想肯定会引发强烈的反抗，相反应该提出“责任”理念——不仅各国有责任保护民众免受暴行的侵害，整个国际社会也有责任在国家不能或不愿这么做时采取行动。


The new concept also made clear that international protective action meant military coercion only in extreme and unavoidable cases.	新理念同样明确了国际保护行动只在极端和不可避免的情况下意味着军事胁迫。


The normal sequence would be assistance, persuasion, and non-military pressure like sanctions and criminal prosecution.	正常的程序是协助、规劝和像制裁和刑事诉讼这样的非军事性施压行为。


For some time after 2005, it was possible to argue that all of this was hot air, and that fast, decisive action to respond to genocidal atrocities would remain as unlikely as ever.	2005年后有段时间，仍然有可能说所有这些都只不过是吹牛，针对种族灭绝暴行迅速、果断地采取行动和以前一样颇有难度。


The jury remained out even after Kenya in early 2008, when horrific post-election violence was widely considered an RtoP case, and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan led a successful diplomatic mission to persuade ethnic-group leaders to quell the storm.	即使在2008年初肯尼亚暴力事件发生后陪审团仍然没有进入角色，选举后可怕的暴力活动被公认符合保护责任的要求。 前联合国秘书长科菲·安南领导了一次外交活动，成功说服民族组织领导人平息这场风暴。


But it was in Côte d’Ivoire, and especially in Libya early this year, that RtoP really came of age.	但是在年初的科特迪瓦，尤其是利比亚，保护责任才真正开花结果。


The two Security Council resolutions on Libya in February and March were textbook examples of a phased response to an increasingly desperate situation.	2月和3月安理会两项决议是对日益绝望的局势做出的典型阶段性反应。


Invoking RtoP, that response began with a warning and the threat of sanctions and prosecution at the International Criminal Court, and only subsequently allowed military force to protect civilians.	适用保护责任的行动在开始时仅限于警告、威胁制裁和在国际刑庭提出起诉，后来才开始允许军队为民众提供保护。


The threat was real, and the response – in terms of many thousands of lives saved – was unquestionably effective.	这种威胁是切实存在的，而从挽救了数千条生命的角度看，这次的反应行动无疑非常有效。


Other developments, both before and since, have reinforced and embedded the RtoP norm.	之前和之后的其他进展使保护责任标准得以深入和巩固。


Even as the NATO-led intervention in Libya was being widely criticized for overreaching its narrow mandate, a major General Assembly debate in July 2011 reaffirmed overwhelming support among UN member states for the RtoP concept, in all of its dimensions.	即使联合国主导的利比亚干涉行动由于超越其狭窄的权限而广受批评，2011年7月的重要联大辩论仍然确认了成员国在全部领域压倒性地支持保护责任理念。


The arguments now are not about the principle, but about how to apply it.	现在的争议不在于原则本身，而在于实施方法。


In particular, unlike previous situations – ranging from the Burmese response to Cyclone Nargis to the Sri Lankan military’s civilian massacres masquerading as a legitimate response to terrorist insurgency – there is little conceptual disagreement now about what are, and are not, “RtoP cases.”	尤其与之前的情况——从缅甸对纳吉斯气旋所做出的反应到斯里兰卡军队伪装成打击恐怖分子叛乱的合理对策所进行的针对平民的屠杀——不同的是，现在对哪些情况属于、哪些不属于“保护责任案例”并不存在概念上的分歧。


For all of the lamentable inadequacy of the Security Council’s response to the situation in Syria, no one has seriously argued that it is not an RtoP case.	虽然安理会对叙利亚局势的对策之匮乏令人痛心，但没有人真正提出这不属于保护责任范畴。


Moreover, there have been important institutional developments in terms of early-warning mechanisms and civilian and military preparedness, not least with President Barack Obama’s recent initiation in the United States of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board.	此外，在早期预警机制和军民准备工作方面已经取得了重要的制度性进展，其中以巴拉克·奥巴马总统最近在美国发起的跨机构暴行预防委员会最有代表性。


Nobody denies that challenges remain in ensuring that RtoP is applied effectively and consistently.	没有人否认在确保保护责任持续有效履行方面仍然存在挑战。


An immediate need is to counter the perception that any condemnatory response to an unfolding RtoP situation means stepping onto a slippery slope to military confrontation – a perception that Russia and China heavily milked in seeking to justify their vote against an early-stage Security Council resolution on Syria.	当务之急是要反对这样一种观点，即对保护责任局势的任何谴责性反应无一例外意味着滑入军事对抗的深渊——俄中两国大量利用了这样的观点，目的是为其反对安理会的早期叙利亚决议找出理由。


It is crucial in this context that RtoP advocates continue to emphasize that coercive military force can be contemplated only in the most extreme and exceptional circumstances.	在这种情况下，关键是保护责任的支持者继续强调只在最极端和最特殊的情况下才会考虑采取强制军事行动。


The best way to make that point would be to revive the dormant debate about adopting narrow guidelines for military intervention, as recommended by my commission and Secretary-General Annan prior to the UN vote in 2005.	明确这一点的最佳方式是重启陷入停滞的辩论，探讨2005年联合国投票前我所领导的委员会和秘书长安南共同提出的实行限制性军事干预行动的指导原则。


Clear criteria like “last resort,” “proportionality,” and “balance of consequences” would make it harder to use cynical diversionary tactics in the Security Council and elsewhere.	“不得已”、“适度”和“平衡后果”等明确的标准将会增加在安理会和其他地方采用“玩世不恭的声东击西战术”的难度。


I have learned from long experience that to be optimistic about almost anything in international affairs is to run the risk of being thought ignorant or naïve, if not demented.	长期积累的经验告诉我对任何国际事务问题保持乐观就会被人看作无知或者天真，甚至是精神错乱。


But, on the issue of mass-atrocity crimes – where the international community has long had good reason for shame – real optimism is now justified.	但在国际社会早就应该引以为耻的大规模暴力犯罪的问题上，现在却有理由抱有真正的乐观态度。


That is very good news indeed.	这的确是非常好的消息。


The Cooperation Crisis	合作危机


PARIS – The rise of emerging economies worldwide has generated much optimism, in terms not only of economic development, but also of global cooperation.	巴黎——新兴经济体在全球崛起让人们对经济发展和全球合作充满了乐观情绪。


But the shift to a multipolar world order has not bolstered multilateralism.	但是朝多极世界秩序的转变并没有带动多边主义。


In fact, the opposite is true: the logic of national sovereignty has staged a comeback, with major economies consistently undermining cooperation on issues ranging from security to trade to climate change.	现实恰恰相反：国家主权逻辑卷土重来，各主要经济体在从安全、贸易到气候变化等问题上一贯破坏合作机制。


Consider the muddle in the United Nations Security Council over Syria’s civil war.	想想联合国安理会在叙利亚内战问题上的混乱态度。


Just two years ago, the Council approved a resolution authorizing a military intervention in Libya – the first resolution to implement the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle, which the general assembly adopted unanimously in 2005.	两年前，安理会通过决议授权在利比亚实施军事干预——这是执行联大2005年一致通过的“保护责任”（R2P）原则的首项决议。


But the emerging powers soon came to believe that the West had used the protection of Libya’s civilian population as a pretext for regime change (though, realistically, it would have been impossible to protect the population without toppling Muammar el-Qaddafi’s government).	不过新兴大国很快认定西方将保护利比亚平民作为政权更迭的借口（尽管从现实角度讲，不可能在不推翻卡扎菲政府的情况下保护利比亚平民）。


Now, these countries are largely rejecting R2P, viewing it as a device employed by Western governments to legitimize their attempts to infringe upon national sovereignty.	现在，这些国家大都拒绝接受保护责任，将其视为西方政府企图令侵犯国家主权行为合法化的一种工具。


Brazil has attempted to address the issue by crafting a resolution that would decouple the R2P mandate from the use of force – effectively eliminating the possibility that the doctrine could be applied.	巴西曾尝试为解决问题起草一项将保护责任授权与武力脱钩的决议——从而有效排除了西方利用这项原则的机率。


For their part, Russia and China have blocked three resolutions condemning the Syrian regime, and Russia has worked hard – with evident success – to derail any military intervention in Syria.	而俄罗斯和中国都曾否决过谴责叙利亚政权的三项决议，同时俄国一直竭尽全力并成功延缓了对叙利亚的军事干预。


In this sense, Russia and China now exercise de facto control over the formal international legality of the use of force.	从这个意义上讲，正式国际军事干预的合法性事实上由俄罗斯和中国控制。


To be sure, many countries now believe that the West is going too far in challenging state sovereignty, with even European countries like Germany recoiling at the prospect of military confrontation.	可以肯定，很多国家现在认为西方过分挑战了国家主权，就连德国这样的欧洲国家都对军事对抗的前景望而却步。


At the G-20 summit in early September, for example, US President Barack Obama struggled to convince ten states to sign a declaration on Syria that did not even mention the use of force.	比方说，美国总统奥巴马在9月初举行的G-20峰会上努力游说十国签署根本没有提到武力应用的叙利亚问题声明。


Only the US, the United Kingdom, and France remain willing to use force if it is deemed necessary.	只有美、英、法三国仍然愿意在必要的情况下使用武力。


But viewing intervention in Syria within the paradigm of Western messianism is a mistake.	但以西方政治救世主义的思维模式看待军事干预叙利亚是一个错误。


After all, in Syria, as in Libya, the forces challenging the government are not a creature of Western manipulation.	毕竟，叙利亚和利比亚挑战政府的势力都并非源自西方的操纵。


They are indigenous – and they are asking the West for help.	他们源于本土——只不过要求西方提供帮助。


The legal basis for military intervention may be weak, but Syria is no Iraq, either.	军事干预的法律基础或许薄弱，但叙利亚也不同于伊拉克。


Security is not the only area where sovereignty concerns have superseded multilateralism.	安全并不是主权担忧压倒多边主义的唯一领域。


In 2008, the US abandoned its commitment to the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of global trade negotiations.	2008年，美国放弃其对世贸组织多哈回合全球贸易谈判所做的承诺。


While the decision followed a technical disagreement with India, it was driven largely by the belief that any agreement would benefit China more than the US.	尽管上述决策在与印度产生技术分歧后做出，但归根结底是因为美国相信中国从协议中得到的好处要超过美国。


Given that the Doha Round has failed to address the main problems that the US and Europe have encountered in trade relations with China – non-compliance with intellectual-property rules, subsidies for state-owned enterprises, closed government-procurement markets, and limits on access to the services market – both are now emphasizing bilateral trade agreements.	由于多哈回合并未解决美欧与中国贸易关系中违反知识产权规则、国有企业补贴、封锁政府采购市场、限制进入服务市场等主要问题，双方现在都对双边贸易协定更加关注。


But, while the world may be happy to pretend that bilateral cooperation will revitalize multilateralism, nobody should be fooled.	不过尽管世界各国可能愿意假装认为双边合作能够重振多边主义，我们不应该真的被愚弄。


The WTO will survive, but its centrality in the trade system is rapidly diminishing.	世贸组织将继续存在，但其在贸易体系中的核心地位正在迅速削弱。


Even cooperation on climate change is crumbling, with the US and China rejecting the multilateral, top-down approach to policymaking.	由于美中两国拒绝接受自上而下的多边决策模式，就连气候变化领域的合作也正在摇摇欲坠。


This implies the end of the Kyoto Protocol model, which, like the Doha model, is based on a detailed agenda, established according to specific and ambitious targets, with all relevant actors then compelled to negotiate each topic.	这意味着京都议定书模式走到了终点，该议定书和多哈模式一样建立在远大而又具体的目标基础之上，当时曾迫使相关各方就具体议题进行谈判。


Rather than being subject to an internationally agreed standard, the US and China want the fight against climate change to begin with countries’ individual commitments.	相比于遵守国际公认的标准，美中两国更希望与气候变化的对抗源自各国所做出的承诺。


But this new, bottom-up framework, in which states determine the conditions for a multilateral agreement, lacks an authority to establish standards.	但这一各国自主决定多边协议条件的自下而上的新框架缺乏设定标准应有的权威性。


Multilateralism requires minimal consensus on global rules and norms among all major powers.	多边主义要求所有大国就全球规则及规范达成最低限度的共识。


The greater the number of countries that have the power to block or veto international initiatives, the more difficult multilateralism becomes – and the less motivated dominant countries are to cooperate.	有能力阻止或否决国际倡议的国家越多，多边主义就越难以实现——主要国家也越不愿意展开合作。


In the emerging multipolar world, characterized by sovereignty concerns and strategic competition, progress toward resolving global issues will be more difficult than ever – with potentially devastating consequences.	在以主权担忧和战略竞争为特色的新兴多极世界里，在解决全球问题上取得进展将比以往更加困难——而这有可能产生破坏性的后果。


The Return of 1948	回归1948


TEL AVIV – The forthcoming United Nation’s conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of UNRWA (The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) could not come at a better moment.	特拉维夫——联合国即将召开巴勒斯坦难民救济与工程局成立六十周年纪念大会，这次纪念大会召开得正是时候。


The restitution of lands occupied in 1967 will obviously continue to be indispensable to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it is the legacy of the 1948 war that both parties to the conflict have now put at the center of the debate.	归还1967年的被占领土显然将继续成为解决巴以冲突的必要步骤，但1948年战争的遗留问题已经成为目前双方争议的焦点。


Oddly, it was Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu who, by requesting that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, reopened the 1948 file.	奇怪的是，重新翻开1948年档案的是以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡，他的目的是要求巴勒斯坦人承认以色列这个犹太国家。


That demand brought the quest for peace back to its fundamentals, where the question of the refugees is bound to play a central role.	内塔尼亚胡的要求致令对和平的探索向本质问题回归，而难民问题注定要成为其中的核心事务。


Netanyahu’s intention was essentially to force the Palestinians into admitting that the right of return of refugees applies only to the Palestinian state, not Israel.	内塔尼亚胡的目的是迫使巴勒斯坦人承认难民回归权只适用于巴勒斯坦国，而对以色列不适用。


But the true significance of his demand lies in that it’s being pronounced at a time when Prime Minister Salam Fayaad’s policies are posing a genuine challenge to the Palestinian national movement to choose between an ethos of vindication and one of state building.	但其真正的意义在于提出要求的时机选择在萨拉姆·法雅德总理的政策给巴勒斯坦民族运动带来真正挑战的时刻，要求巴民族运动在定罪和建国两者当中做出选择。


Under Fayaad, the Palestinian Authority seems to be superseding the Palestinian national movement’s diaspora-based emphasis in favor of state-building within the territorial confines of the occupied territories.	在法雅德的领导下，巴勒斯坦当局似乎放弃了离散族群在巴勒斯坦民族运动中的重点地位，在被占领土的地域范围内更偏重于建国。


It is as if the voice of the diaspora were being silenced in Palestine.	巴勒斯坦似乎已经听不到离散族群的声音。


Conspicuously, the recently elected PLO Executive Committee – which in the past consisted exclusively of representatives of the Palestinian Diaspora – now has only one member from the diaspora, a delegate from Lebanon.	显然，最近当选的巴解执委会目前只有一名来自黎巴嫩的离散族群代表，而过去巴勒斯坦离散族群几乎占据了所有的代表席位。


This could mark a sea change in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism.	这在巴勒斯坦民族主义的发展过程中可能带来彻底的改变。


In Zionism, the Jewish community in Palestine was the focus of decision making, with the Jewish Diaspora a strategic back-up.	在犹太复国运动中，巴勒斯坦境内的犹太族群曾经是决策的焦点，并以离散犹太人作为战略后援。


But the situation was reversed in the case of the Palestinians: the ethos of the diaspora, with the plight of the refugees at its center, has been the beating heart of the Palestinian cause and the focus of decision making for the national movement.	但巴勒斯坦人的情况却恰恰相反：以难民困境为核心的离散族群思想一直是巴勒斯坦事业的心脏和民族运动决策的核心。


As a result, the Palestinian community in the occupied territories was always subservient to the primacy of the Palestinian Diaspora.	因此，被占领土上的巴勒斯坦人相对于巴勒斯坦离散族群一直处于从属地位。


When it sought to assume a leading role – during the first Intifada in 1987, for example, its effort was suppressed by the diaspora-based PLO.	当它试图发挥领导作用的时候——例如在1987年的首次巴勒斯坦起义中，它所付出的努力被以离散族群为基础的巴解组织所扼杀。


Fayaadism, by contrast, seeks the “Zionization” of the Palestinian national movement.	相反，法雅德主义试图实现巴勒斯坦民族运动的犹太化。


It imbues the Palestinian cause with a positive ethos of nation- and state-building by superseding Palestinian nationalism’s diaspora-centered preoccupations – and thereby transcending the paralyzing obsession with a never-fulfilled vindication of rights and justice.	它将民族和国家建设的思想注入巴勒斯坦人的事业，替代了巴勒斯坦民族主义运动以离散族群为核心的首要关注——并由此逾越了令人茫然无措的困扰，代之以从未实现的权利和公正思想。


In the peace process as it has been conducted up to now, the Israelis always wanted to concentrate on the issues of 1967 – that is, land and security.	在迄今为止的和平进程中，以色列人一直希望重点关注以土地和安全问题为代表的1967年事务。


The Palestinians, however, always wanted to return to the issues of 1948: refugees, dispersion, and what Akram Hanya, a close Arafat confidant, defined as the need “to make the Israelis face the tribunal of history.”	而巴勒斯坦人则一直希望回到1948年的问题：也就是难民、离散、和阿拉法特的心腹知己Akram Hanya所描述的必须“让以色列人面对历史的审判”。


It looks as if now the roles have been inversed.	现在角色似乎已经发生了转变。


Precisely when Israel managed to domesticate the Palestinian national movement by forcing it to abandon its revolutionary path in favor of state-building and economic development – a reorientation undertaken by Zionism as well – the Israelis decided to draw the Palestinians back to the fundamentals of the conflict.	恰恰就在以色列成功驯化巴勒斯坦民族运动，迫使其放弃革命路线以换取建国和经济发展的时候，犹太复国运动的目标也发生了改变——以色列人决心吸引巴勒斯坦人重新关注冲突的基本原则。


Indeed, despite of the rise of Fayaadism, the Palestinian national movement will be careful not to betray its real sources of legitimacy: the ethos of dispossession and the refugee.	事实上，尽管经历了法雅德主义的崛起，巴勒斯坦民族运动仍然小心翼翼地避免背叛其真正的合法性来源：那就是难民和剥夺。


The decisions taken at the last Fatah Convention were explicit in calling for the refugees to “return to their homes and cities.”	法塔赫大会做出的决议明确呼吁难民们“回归到自己的城市和家园”。


The Palestinians are attempting to hold the stick at both ends, claiming before the world their endorsement of the two-state solution while calling for the right of return at the same time.	巴勒斯坦人试图在两个方面取得平衡，在世界面前宣称他们认可两国方案，并同时主张回归权。


Any sober Palestinian leadership must know by now that the rhetorical promise of a return to an abandoned house and to the olive tree is an irresponsible mirage that fundamentally contradicts the rationale for a separate Palestinian state.	所有头脑清醒的巴勒斯坦领袖现在必须意识到，回归废弃家园和橄榄树的口头承诺是一种从根本上与独立的巴勒斯坦国原则对立的不负责任的海市蜃楼。


Peace is frequently not about justice but about stability.	和平的核心通常不是公平而是稳定。


The Palestinians must align their national conversation with what is realizable, while Israel must resolve its own contradictions and address the refugee problem in a way that secures the legitimacy and durability of a future peace agreement with the Palestinians.	巴勒斯坦人必须依据现实状态调整民族对话的目标，而以色列则必须解决自身和难民问题，确保与巴勒斯坦人签订的未来和平协议合法而又持久。


Because Israel will have to implement practical measures of resettlement and compensation that will not be based on an automatic right of physical return, a symbol of genuine moral compensation is also called for.	因为以色列一定会采取与自动回归权无关的补偿和重新安置的实际措施，我们同样需要真正的道德补偿标志。


Instead of suppressing the memory of the refugees, Israel needs to recognize that in 1948 the land was bisected by the sword, and that the Jewish state came into being partly because of the massive uprooting and dispossession of Palestinian communities.	以色列需要的不是压制难民的记忆，而是承认1948年被占领土曾经被武力撕裂，而巴勒斯坦族群的大规模被迫迁徙和剥夺恰恰是犹太国家成立的部分原因。


Israel should develop enough self-confidence in its solidity as a nation to integrate into its schools’ curriculum the tragedy of the Palestinian Naqbah.	以色列应当建立起足够的民族自信，将巴勒斯坦大灾难的悲剧写进学校的教材。


The resolution of conflicts of this nature requires the recovery of historical memory and a proper hearing of the two parties’ historical narratives, perhaps through the creation of Truth and Reconciliation Committees.	此类性质冲突的解决需要恢复历史的记忆，并通过成立真相和调节委员会，公正地听取双方的历史叙述。


Israel’s consolation would be that the Palestinians, too, will have to come to terms with their share of responsibility for the calamities that have befallen them.	巴勒斯坦人同样必须承认自身在这场灾难中所应承担的责任，这或许能够成为以色列的安慰。


Only an acceptable deal on the refugees can definitely close the 1948 file – and only then can the conflict in Palestine end.	只有一份关于难民问题的可以接受的协议才能合上1948年档案——巴勒斯坦冲突只有到那时才会结束。


The Return of American Realism	美国现实主义的回归


NEW YORK – There are many recurring debates in American foreign policy – for example, isolationism versus internationalism, and unilateralism versus multilateralism. But no debate is more persistent than that between those who believe that American foreign policy’s principal purpose should be to influence the external behavior of other states and those who hold that it should be to shape their internal nature.	纽约——有关美国外交政策的争论许多都是老生常谈——例如，是孤立主义还是国际主义，单边主义相对于多边主义，最近讨论最为激烈的是：美国的外交政策的根本目的是影响其他国家的外部政策还是直接干涉其他国家的内政。


This debate between “realists” and “idealists” is intense and long-standing.	关于“现实主义”和“理想主义”的争论一直是激烈且持久。


During the Cold War, there were those who argued that the United States should try to “roll back” the Soviet Union, bring down the communist system, and replace it with democratic capitalism.	在冷战时期，有一种声音认为美国应该“击垮”苏联，摧毁共产主义制度，给它带来资本主义的民主制度。


Others deemed this to be too dangerous in an era defined by nuclear weapons, and the US opted instead for a policy of containment, working to limit the reach of Soviet power and influence.	另一些人这样做过于危险，因为苏联拥有核武器。 美国当时采取的外交政策是“遏制”，就是限制苏联政权的权力及对周边的影响力。


As it turned out, after 40 years of containment, the Soviet Union and its empire unraveled, though this outcome was a byproduct of US policy, not its principal purpose.	结果是，经过40年的“遏制”政策，苏联及其帝国轰然倒塌。 这些虽然不是美国外交政策的主要目的 ，但这都是美国外交政策所带来的结果。


George W. Bush was the most recent “idealist” proponent of making democracy promotion the main priority for US foreign policy.	乔治·W·布什就是近期美国外交政策“理想主义”的典范。


Bush embraced the so-called “democratic peace” theory, which holds that democracies not only treat their own citizens better, but also act better toward their neighbors and others.	小布什采取的是所谓“民主和平论”，就是民主不仅仅对本国的国民适用，也应该适用于美国邻国乃至以及其他国家。


It was, of course, his father, George H.W. Bush, who was a strong representative of the alternative, “realist” approach to American foreign policy.	当然，在美国对外政策上，他的父亲老布什一直奉行着“现实主义”的做法。


Much of this debate can be viewed through the lens of American involvement with Iraq.	有关这个问题的讨论，在对待伊拉克问题上显得尤为激烈。


George W. Bush went to war with Iraq in 2003 to change the government.	小布什2003年发动了对伊战争，并且推翻了其政权。


He expected regime change in Baghdad to lead to a democratic Iraq, a development that would in turn transform the region when people elsewhere in the Arab world saw this example and forced their own governments to follow suit.	他希望通过对巴格达政权的改变可以将伊拉克民主化，从而使得周边的阿拉伯国家受到影响，迫使他们也向民主转型。


By contrast, in the earlier Iraq war, the first President Bush, after amassing an unprecedented international coalition that succeeded in liberating Kuwait, did not press ahead to Baghdad to oust Saddam Hussein and his government, despite the urging of many that he do just that.	相反的，老布什在对伊拉克的前一场战争中，获得其他一些国家的支持下，成功地解放了科威特之后，他并没有进一步挺进巴格达而赶走萨达姆政权，虽然当时有一些人希望他这么做。


Nor did he intervene on behalf of the Shia and Kurdish uprisings that erupted just after the war ended early in 1991.	在1991年对伊战后，老布什也没有介入土耳其什叶派和库尔德人之间的冲突。


To him, intervention would have placed US soldiers in the midst of a complex domestic struggle, one that would have cost enormous resources to sort out if it could be sorted out at all.	他认为，如果派兵的话会使得美国士兵处于土耳其复杂的国内争斗。 如果不能彻底解决问题的话，还是不要介入的好。


President Barack Obama appears to agree with this realist approach.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统当然是“现实主义”的信奉者。


The new US policy toward Afghanistan makes no mention of trying to transform that country into a democracy.	在对待阿富汗问题上，美国新的外交政策目的不是要将阿富汗变成民主国家。


On the contrary, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated before Congress in January, “If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose.”	相反的，正如美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨在国会作证时表示：“如果我们的目的是建立所谓的“瓦尔哈拉式ampquot;的中亚国家的话，那我们必将失败。 ”


For his part, Obama said in March that “We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”	奥巴马总统的说法是：“我们有一个明确鲜明的目标：干扰，瓦解和击退巴基斯坦和阿富汗的基地组织，不能让他们在未来获得政权。 ”


This shift is also evident in US policy toward China.	美国对中国外交政策也有所转变。


Speaking during her trip to Asia in February, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made clear that human rights issues would be a secondary concern in US-China relations.	在今年2月亚洲之行中，美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿明确表示，人权问题是中美关系中退居到第二的位置。


Similarly, the joint statement issued by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev after their April 1 meeting in London, while mentioning that US-Russia relations would be “guided by the rule of law, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, and tolerance for different views,” placed far greater emphasis on reducing nuclear arms, addressing Iran’s nuclear program, and stabilizing Afghanistan.	以此同时，在4月1日的伦敦峰会之后，奥巴马总统和俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫发表发表联合声明表示，美俄的关系应该是“以法律为指导，双方在尊重基本自由和人权的前提下，可以各自保留自己的观点。 ”双方还表示，两国应该加大了对核武器的消减力度，关注伊朗的核设施，稳定阿富汗的局势。


US support for Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization was unconditional.	美国无条件地支持俄罗斯加入世界贸易组织。


This change in US foreign policy is both desirable and necessary.	此次美国外交政策的改变是现实而且令人鼓舞的。


Mature democracies do tend to act more responsibly, but immature democracies can easily succumb to populism and nationalism.	成熟的民主国家应该更加有责任感，不成熟的民主国家容易沦为民粹主义和民族主义国家。


It is difficult and time-consuming to build mature democracies.	毕竟，建立成熟的民主国家的道路漫长而且艰难。


While encouraging the rule of law and the growth of civil society, the US still needs to work with other governments, democratic and otherwise. Pressing problems, such as the economic crisis, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, will not wait.	美国需要和其他国家，不管是民主还是非民主的国家，一起合作，共同解决问题，这些问题包括经济危机，核扩散以及气候变化等。


The good news is that history shows that it is possible to make peace with and work with non-democracies.	令人欣慰的是，历史的经验告诉我们，和非民主国家进行合作不是不可能的。


Israel, for example, has had peaceful relations with non-democratic Egypt and Jordan for more than three decades.	例如，以色列和非民主的国家埃及和约旦达成了和平协议。


The US and the Soviet Union cooperated in limited ways (for example, in controlling nuclear arms) despite fundamental differences.	美国和苏联虽然当时有着根本的分歧，但也有有限的合作（例如，核裁军等）。


Today, the US and authoritarian China have mutually beneficial trade and financial ties, and have shown on occasion that they can work together on strategic issues, for example in shaping North Korea’s behavior.	如今，美国和威权主义的中国在贸易和金融上有着双边的合作。 在某种程度上，两国也有战略的合作，例如对朝鲜政权的改变等。


This is not to say that promoting democracy will have no role in American foreign policy.	当然，这也不是说美国的外交政策部不包含推动民主的进程。


It will, and it should.	民主进程的推动是应该的，也是必须的。


But democracy promotion is too uncertain a proposition, and the world too dangerous a place, for it to occupy center stage in what the United States does.	但是，推动民主化在外交政策中所占得的比重值得商榷，如果将它作为美国外交政策核心的话，那是很危险的。


Barack Obama’s foreign policy will thus resemble that of George Bush – the father, that is, not the son.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统的外交政策应该是继承老布什，而不是小布什的外交政策。


Bretton Woods III	布雷顿森林III


SINGAPORE – Many analysts and observers believe that the global imbalances that characterized the world economy in the years before the 2008 crisis have substantially dissipated.	新加坡—很多分析师和观察员认为，2008年危机之前伴随世界经济的全球失衡已经大大消散了。


But, while it is true that China’s current-account surpluses and America’s deficits have somewhat moderated since then, have the imbalances really been corrected?	但是，固然此后中国的经常项目盈余和美国的赤字都略有下降，但失衡真的得到纠正了吗？


More important, can the post-crisis global economy enjoy both growth and balance?	更重要的是，后危机时代的全球经济能同时实现增长和平衡吗？


To answer these questions, it is important to understand the imbalances’ underlying dynamics.	要回答这些问题，很重要的一点是理解失衡的基本动态。 一国的经常项目是其投资率和储蓄率之差。


An economy’s current account is the difference between its investment rate and its savings rate.	2007年，美国的储蓄率为GDP的14. 6%，但投资率为19.


In 2007, the United States had a savings rate of 14.6% of GDP, but an investment rate of 19.6%, generating a current-account deficit.	6%，故会产生经常项目盈余。 与此相反，中国的固定投资率为GDP的41.


By contrast, China had a fixed investment rate of 41.7% of GDP and a savings rate of 51.9%, reflected in a large surplus.	7%，储蓄率为51. 9%，其反映便是大量盈余。


Since 2007, the US current-account deficit has narrowed, but not because of a higher savings rate.	自2007年以来，美国经常项目赤字有所减少，但这并不是因为储蓄率提高了。


Rather, the external deficit has been squeezed by a collapse in investment activity, while America’s overall savings rate has fallen below 13% of GDP, owing to worsening government finances.	外部赤字因投资活动的大幅冷却而被挤出，而由于政府财政状况恶化，美国的总体投资率已降至GDP的13%。


Meanwhile, China’s savings rate remains stubbornly high.	与此同时，中国的储蓄率仍然非常高。


The surplus has narrowed because investment has been ramped up even higher, to roughly 49% of GDP.	其盈余之所以减少，是因为投资增加得更快，达到了GDP的49%左右。


In other words, the Americans save even less today than they did before the crisis erupted, and the Chinese invest even more.	换句话说，如今美国比危机爆发前储蓄得更少，而中国投资得更多。


Any future recovery in the US economy will almost certainly trigger a revival in investment activity.	未来美国经济的复苏几乎必定将触发投资活动的重新抬头。


American businesses have postponed much-needed capital spending and, with American airports and bridges in appalling condition by developed-country standards, investment in infrastructure is crucial as well.	美国企业延迟了急需的资本支出，此外，考虑到美国的机场和桥梁用发达国家标准衡量不可不谓破旧，因此基础设施投资也很关键。


Indeed, it is very likely that reviving growth will lead to larger current-account deficits, even if the savings rate improves and domestic energy production curtails oil and gas imports.	事实上，增长复苏极有可能导致更大的经常项目赤字，即便储蓄率有所改善、国内能源产量增加减少石油和天然气进口。


China has the opposite problem.	中国的问题正好相反。


In order to sustain growth, it needs to continue to invest half of its $9 trillion annual GDP – no easy task for a country that already has brand new highways and airports.	为了维持增长，中国需要继续将其9万亿美元的年度GDP用于投资——这对一个遍地新建高速公路和机场的国家来说实属不易。


In fact, over the next decade, as China attempts to move up the value chain into services and adjusts to a shrinking workforce, its investment requirements will shrink – and its investment rate will fall sharply.	事实上，在未来十年中，随着中国试图沿着价值链向服务业推进并适应劳动人口的下降趋势，其投资要求会下降——而其投资率将急剧下降。


Of course, China’s savings rate will also decline, but Japan’s experience since the 1980’s demonstrates how a sharp fall in investment can generate large and persistent current-account surpluses, even when the savings rate is falling and the currency is appreciating.	当然，中国的投资率也将下降，但日本20世纪80年代以来的经验表明，投资的急剧下降可能造成大规模持续性经常项目盈余，即使储蓄率也在下降且货币在升值。


Indeed, a stronger currency can paradoxically feed external surpluses, while discouraging investment in export-oriented industries.	事实上，货币升值反而会助长外部盈余，同时妨碍对出口导向行业的投资。


The implication is that the post-crisis global economy will not be characterized by balance, but by a return to large macroeconomic imbalances.	其影响是，后危机时代全球经济将不会有平衡，只能复现大规模宏观经济失衡。


But, although many economists will consider this problematic, history shows that symbiotic imbalances have characterized virtually all periods of global economic expansion.	但是，尽管许多经济学家会带着狐疑的眼光看待这一论断，但历史表明，共生失衡几乎是所有全球经济扩张期的共同特征。


The Roman Empire ran a persistent trade deficit with India for centuries.	罗马帝国曾在几百年的时间里持续地存在对印度的贸易赤字。


Although the resulting outflow of gold caused monetary debasement in the Roman Empire, Indo-Roman trade remained the backbone of the global economy.	尽管由此造成的黄金外流导致罗马帝国货币贬值，但印度-罗马贸易仍是全球经济的基石。


Similarly, Spain ran persistent deficits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, paid for by Andean silver.	类似地，在16和17世纪���西班牙持续地保持赤字，这些赤字用安第斯山出产的白银偿还。


The resulting flood of liquidity caused a global boom that benefited economies from Elizabethan England to Mughal India.	由此造成的流动性泛滥导致了全球繁荣，伊丽莎白的英格兰和莫卧儿帝国都从中获益。


And 1870-1913, another period of rapid growth and globalization, was not characterized by balance; it was funded by the United Kingdom, acting as the world’s “bank.”	而1870—1913年——又一个快速增长和全球化的时代——也没有出现平衡； 资金提供者是英国，它就好比是世界的“银行”。


In the last 60 years, the US has underpinned global growth by running persistent current-account deficits.	过去60年来，美国用持续的经常项目赤字支撑着全球增长。


Under the Bretton Woods system, the US ran deficits that enabled war-torn Europe and Japan to rebuild.	在布雷顿森林体系中，美国的赤字让饱受战争创伤的欧洲和日本得以重建。


In return, Europe funded the US deficits.	反过来，欧洲为美国的赤字提供了资金。


The system broke down when European countries, particularly France, decided to stop funding those deficits.	当欧洲国家——特别是法国——决定停止为这笔赤字提供资金时，布雷顿森林体系就崩溃了。


But the economic model persisted, with Asian economies stepping in to finance the US deficits, while using the US market to grow rapidly.	但其经济模式保留了下来，亚洲经济体接过了为美国赤字融资的任务，同时也利用美国市场实现了快速增长。


China is the latest and largest beneficiary of the economic model dubbed “Bretton Woods II.”	中国是这一被称为“布雷顿森林II”的经济模式的最新也是最大的受益者。


Clearly, periods of global growth are almost always characterized by symbiotic imbalances.	显然，全球增长时代几乎总是伴随着共生失衡。


But, while each of these episodes was characterized by macroeconomic distortions caused by the imbalances, they lasted for years, or even decades.	但是，每一次失衡都会导致宏观经济扭曲，并将持续好几年甚至几十年。


So, the real question is what the next generation of symbiotic imbalances will look like.	因此，真正的问题是下一次共生失衡会以什么面貌出现。


It is likely that China will soon return to running very large current-account surpluses – potentially large enough to fund the US, with plenty left over for the rest of the world.	有可能中国马上会回归大规模经常项目盈余——必须足以满足美国的融资需求，还要给世界其他部分留出足够的份额。


As this capital cascades through the global financial system, it will re-inflate the economy.	随着这股资本流进入全球金融体系，经济将重新获得繁荣。


In the “Bretton Woods III” system, China will transform from “factory to the world” to “investor to the world.”	在“布雷顿森林体系III”中，中国将从“世界工厂”转变为“世界投资者”。


Like all imbalanced systems, it will have its distortions, but the arrangement could last for many years.	与所有失衡的体系一样，这会造成扭曲，但其安排可以维持多年。


The New Mercantilist Challenge	新重商主义的挑战


CAMBRIDGE – The history of economics is largely a struggle between two opposing schools of thought, “liberalism” and “mercantilism.”	发自剑桥——经济学的历史在很大程度上就是两种对立思想流派——“自由主义”和“重商主义”——之间的斗争史。


Economic liberalism, with its emphasis on private entrepreneurship and free markets, is today’s dominant doctrine.	强调私人企业家精神和自由市场的经济自由主义是当今的显学。


But its intellectual victory has blinded us to the great appeal – and frequent success – of mercantilist practices.	但其在理论上取得的胜利让我们对重商主义的巨大吸引力——及其频繁的成功——视而不见。


In fact, mercantilism remains alive and well, and its continuing conflict with liberalism is likely to be a major force shaping the future of the global economy.	事实上，重商主义依旧生机勃勃，而其与自由主义的持续冲突则可能成为塑造全球经济未来的重要力量。


Today, mercantilism is typically dismissed as an archaic and blatantly erroneous set of ideas about economic policy.	对当今的经济政策看来，重商主义通常被视为陈旧及完全错误的一套思想。


And, in their heyday, mercantilists certainly did defend some very odd notions, chief among which was the view that national policy ought to be guided by the accumulation of precious metals – gold and silver.	当然，在其鼎盛时期，重商主义确实维护了某些非常奇怪的观念，其中最主要的一个观点就是国家政策应该致力于贵金属——黄金和白银——的积累。


Adam Smith’s 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations masterfully demolished many of these ideas.	亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）1776年的著作《国富论》高明地推翻了许多这类思想。


Smith showed, in particular, that money should not be confused for wealth.	史密斯特别指出，不应该把钱和财富混淆起来。


As he put it, “the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds.”	正如他所说，“一个国家的财富不仅仅存在于其金与银两种金属中，也存在于它的土地、房屋以及各种可消费商品中。


But it is more accurate to think of mercantilism as a different way to organize the relationship between the state and the economy – a vision that holds no less relevance today than it did in the eighteenth century.	然而把重商主义视为另一种协调国家与经济关系的方式才更为准确——这一视角和当年18世纪时具有同等的现实意义。


Mercantilist theorists such as Thomas Mun were in fact strong proponents of capitalism; they just propounded a different model than liberalism.	重商主义理论家，比如托马斯·曼（Thomas Mun），实际上是资本主义的强烈支持者； 他们只是提出了一个不同于自由主义的模型。


The liberal model views the state as necessarily predatory and the private sector as inherently rent-seeking.	自由主义的模型把国家视作必然的掠夺者，且把私人企业看作是天生的寻租者。


So it advocates a strict separation between the state and private business.	因而它提倡要将政府企业与私人企业严格隔离开来。


Mercantilism, by contrast, offers a corporatist vision in which the state and private business are allies and cooperate in pursuit of common objectives, such as domestic economic growth or national power.	相反，重商主义则提供了一个合作主义的视角——政府与私人企业是盟友，并为追求共同的目标——例如国内经济增长或国家实力——而合作。


The mercantilist model can be derided as state capitalism or cronyism.	重商主义的模型可能会被嘲笑为国家资本主义或裙带主义的思想。


But when it works, as it has so often in Asia, the model’s “government-business collaboration” or “pro-business state” quickly garners heavy praise.	但当它起作用的时候——它在亚洲确实常常行之有效，该模型的“政府-企业合作”或者说“重商国家”概念就会迅速得到许多赞美。


Lagging economies have not failed to notice that mercantilism can be their friend.	落后的国家并不是没有意识到重商主义可以成为其助手。


Even in Britain, classical liberalism arrived only in the mid-nineteenth century – that is, after the country had become the world’s dominant industrial power.	即使在英国，古典自由主义也只是在19世纪中期才出现的——也就是在英国成为世界主要的工业强国之后。


A second difference between the two models lies in whether consumer or producer interests are privileged.	两种模型之间的第二个不同之处在于究竟是消费者还是生产者的利益优先。


For liberals, consumers are king.	对自由主义模型来说，消费者就是国王。


The ultimate objective of economic policy is to increase households’ consumption potential, which requires giving them unhindered access to the cheapest-possible goods and services.	经济政策的最终目标就是为了提高家庭消费潜力，这要求让消费者不受限制地获得尽可能便宜的商品和服务。


Mercantilists, by contrast, emphasize the productive side of the economy.	相反地，重商主义强调经济的生产方面。


For them, a sound economy requires a sound production structure.	对他们来说，一个稳健的经济需要一个良好的生产结构。


And consumption needs to be underpinned by high employment at adequate wages.	而消费需要拥有体面工资的高就业来支持。


These different models have predictable implications for international economic policies.	这些不同的经济模型对国际经济政策有着可预测的影响。


The logic of the liberal approach is that the economic benefits of trade arise from imports: the cheaper the imports, the better, even if the result is a trade deficit.	自由模式的逻辑是贸易的经济效益来自进口：进口越便宜越好，即使会导致贸易逆差。


Mercantilists, however, view trade as a means of supporting domestic production and employment, and prefer to spur exports rather than imports.	而重商主义者则把贸易视为一种支持国内生产和就业的手段，因而更愿意刺激出口而不是进口。


Today’s China is the leading bearer of the mercantilist torch, though Chinese leaders would never admit it  – too much opprobrium still attaches to the term.	当今中国是重商主义衣钵的主要继承者，尽管中国领导人永远都不会承认这一点——这个名词仍背负着很多坏名声。


Much of China’s economic miracle is the product of an activist government that has supported, stimulated, and openly subsidized industrial producers – both domestic and foreign.	大部分中国经济奇迹都产生于其激进的政府——该政府支持，刺激并公开补贴工业生产者——不管是国内还是国外的。


Although China phased out many of its explicit export subsidies as a condition of membership in the World Trade Organization (which it joined in 2001), mercantilism’s support system remains largely in place.	尽管作为2001年加入世贸组织的条件，中国逐步淘汰了许多直接的出口补贴，但支撑重商主义的体制基本没有改变。


In particular, the government has managed the exchange rate to maintain manufacturers’ profitability, resulting in a sizable trade surplus (which has come down recently, but largely as a result of an economic slowdown).	尤其是政府通过操控汇率来保持制造商的盈利能力，这导致了相当可观的贸易顺差（这种情况近来有所减少，但主要是因为经济放缓）。


Moreover, export-oriented firms continue to benefit from a range of tax incentives.	此外，出口导向型的企业仍然受益于一系列的税收激励政策。


From the liberal perspective, these export subsidies impoverish Chinese consumers while benefiting consumers in the rest of the world.	从自由主义的角度来看，这些出口补贴伤害了中国消费者的利益却使世界上其他地方的消费者受益。


A recent study by the economists Fabrice Defever and Alejandro Riaño of the University of Nottingham puts the “losses” to China at around 3% of Chinese income, and gains to the rest of the world at around 1% of global income.	由诺丁汉大学经济学家法布里斯·迪弗尔（Fabrice Defever）和亚力杭德罗·雷阿诺（Alejandro Riaño）近期发表的一项研究指出中国的“损失”约为其国民收入的3%，而世界其他地区则获得了约为全球总收入1%的收益。


From the mercantilist perspective, however, these are simply the costs of building a modern economy and setting the stage for long-term prosperity.	然而，从重商主义的角度来看，这些只不过是建立现代经济及为长期繁荣打好基础的代价而已。


As the example of export subsidies shows, the two models can co-exist happily in the world economy.	正如出口补贴的例子所示，这两种模型可以在世界经济和谐共存。


Liberals should be happy to have their consumption subsidized by mercantilists.	自由主义派应该为其消费有来自重商主义者的补贴而高兴。


Indeed, that, in a nutshell, is the story of the last six decades: a succession of Asian countries managed to grow by leaps and bounds by applying different variants of mercantilism.	事实上，简而言之，这就是过去六十年的经济史：一个又一个的亚洲国家通过应用不同形式的重商主义政策使其经济突飞猛进。


Governments in rich countries for the most part looked the other way while Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China protected their home markets, appropriated “intellectual property,” subsidized their producers, and managed their currencies.	在日本、韩国、台湾和中国在保护其国内市场，盗窃“知识产权”，补贴生产商并操纵其货币汇率时，大部分富裕国家政府却在走另一条道路。


We have now reached the end of this happy coexistence.	现在我们已经走到了快乐共存的尽头。