Given that QE managed to sustain near-zero interest rates for almost seven years, it should have encouraged governments in developed countries to borrow and invest in infrastructure, education, and social sectors. Increasing social transfers during the post-crisis period would have boosted aggregate demand and smoothed out consumption patterns.	由于量化宽松在接近七年间维持了近零利率，它本应鼓励各发达国家政府借贷并投资于基础设施，教育和社会部门，在后危机时期增加社会转移支付，提振总需求并将原本扭曲的消费模式理顺过来。


Moreover, the UN report clearly shows that, throughout the developed world, private investment did not grow as one might have expected, given ultra-low interest rates.	此外，联合国报告清楚地表明，在整个发达世界，民间投资并未像人们所认定的那样在超低利率下扩大。


In 17 of the 20 largest developed economies, investment growth remained lower during the post-2008 period than in the years prior to the crisis; five experienced a decline in investment during 2010-2015.	20个最大的发达经济体中有17个在2008年后投资增速低于危机前水平; 5个国家在2010~2015年间出现了投资总额下跌。


Globally, debt securities issued by non-financial corporations – which are supposed to undertake fixed investments – increased significantly during the same period.	全球范围内，本应转化为固定资产投资的非金融企业债券的发行量在同一时期显著上升。


Consistent with other evidence, this implies that many non-financial corporations borrowed, taking advantage of the low interest rates. But, rather than investing, they used the borrowed money to buy back their own equities or purchase other financial assets.	这跟与其他众多证据一致表明，许多非金融企业只是以低利率的优势来借款，不过目的不是投资，而是用借来的钱回购自己的股票或购买其他金融资产。


QE thus stimulated sharp increases in leverage, market capitalization, and financial-sector profitability.	因此量化宽松政策反而大幅提升了杠杆率，市场资本化程度和金融部门的盈利。


But, again, none of this was of much help to the real economy.	但这一切同样都对实体经济没有多大帮助。


Clearly, keeping interest rates at the near zero level does not necessarily lead to higher levels of credit or investment.	显然，保持利率在接零水平并不一定会催生更高水平的信贷或投资。


When banks are given the freedom to choose, they choose riskless profit or even financial speculation over lending that would support the broader objective of economic growth.	当银行被赋予自由选择的权利时，它们宁愿选择无风险利润甚至金融投机，而非把款贷出去以支持更宏观的经济增长目标。


By contrast, when the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund lends cheap money to developing countries, it imposes conditions on what they can do with it.	相反，当世界银行或国际货币基金组织把廉价资金出借给发展中国家的时候，它们都会规定贷款的用途。


To have the desired effect, QE should have been accompanied not only by official efforts to restore impaired lending channels (especially those directed at small- and medium-size enterprises), but also by specific lending targets for banks.	如果要收到预期的效果，伴随着量化宽松政策的不应仅有政府恢复受损贷款渠道（特别是那些针对中小规模的企业）的努力，还有对银行贷款的具体目标。


Instead of effectively encouraging banks not to lend, the Fed should have been penalizing banks for holding excess reserves.	相对于适得其反地激励银行不放贷，美联储应该已经处罚那些存入超额准备金的银行。


While ultra-low interest rates yielded few benefits for developed countries, they imposed significant costs on developing and emerging-market economies.	而超低利率虽然对发达国家无甚好处，它却对发展中国家和新兴市场经济体强加了巨大的成本。


An unintended, but not unexpected, consequence of monetary easing has been sharp increases in cross-border capital flows.	这个并非政策制定者本意却是意料之中的后果就是货币宽松政策导致跨境资本流动急剧增加。


Total capital inflows to developing countries increased from about $20 billion in 2008 to over $600 billion in 2010.	流入发展中国家的总资本从2008年的约2000亿美元增加到2010年的超过6000亿。


At the time, many emerging markets had a hard time managing the sudden surge of capital flows. Very little of it went to fixed investment.	与此同时，许多新兴市场都难以应对资本流动的突然激增，这些资金中也只有很少的一部分转化为固定资产投资。


In fact, investment growth in developing countries slowed significantly during the post crisis period.	事实上，发展中国家的投资增长在后危机时期显著放缓。


This year, developing countries, taken together, are expected to record their first net capital outflow – totaling $615 billion – since 2006.	今年以来，发展中国家整体将经历自2006年以来首次资本净流出的局面——金额共计达6150亿美元。


Neither monetary policy nor the financial sector is doing what it’s supposed to do.	无论是货币政策还是财政部门都未能履行自己的职责。


It appears that the flood of liquidity has disproportionately gone toward creating financial wealth and inflating asset bubbles, rather than strengthening the real economy.	显然泛滥的流动性中的极大部分都朝着创造金融财富和催生资产泡沫奔去，而非巩固实体经济。


Despite sharp declines in equity prices worldwide, market capitalization as a share of world GDP remains high.	尽管全球股价大幅下跌，市场资本占世界GDP的份额仍然很高。


The risk of another financial crisis cannot be ignored.	爆发另一场金融危机的风险也不容忽视。


There are other policies that hold out the promise of restoring sustainable and inclusive growth.	还有其他一些政策也在支撑着恢复可持续和包容性增长承诺的兑现。


These begin with rewriting the rules of the market economy to ensure greater equality, more long-term thinking, and reining in the financial market with effective regulation and appropriate incentive structures.	这些政策首先由改写市场经济的规则开始，以确保更高程度的平等，更长远考虑，并用有效的监管和适当的激励机制来管理金融市场。


But large increases in public investment in infrastructure, education, and technology will also be needed.	但是也有必要大幅加大在基础设施，教育和科技方面的公共投资。


These will have to be financed, at least in part, by the imposition of environmental taxes, including carbon taxes, and taxes on the monopoly and other rents that have become pervasive in the market economy – and contribute enormously to inequality and slow growth.	而这些投资的资金，至少部分地，都可以通过包括碳税在内的环境税，以及对已经在市场经济中产生负面效应的——并极大催生不平等状况和低增长——的垄断以及其他租金征税来筹集。


The views expressed here do not reflect the views of the United Nations or its member states.	本文观点并不反映联合国及其会员国的意见。


Who Will Help the Poor?	谁来保护弱者？


PARIS – With the deepening of the economic crisis and the prospect of another recession looming large on the horizon, growing social inequality has become an increasingly urgent issue.	巴黎——经济危机进一步加深，衰退前景再度出现，这一切也加剧了社会不平等，使其成为日益严峻的一个问题。


How does one reinforce a sense of solidarity and responsibility within a country?	如何才能在一个国家内部加强归属感和责任感？


Who will protect the weakest?	谁来保护弱势者的权益？


As I ponder this issue, I am reminded of a debate that I had more than ten years ago in Berlin with the German theologian Hans Küng and American and Asian participants.	在思考这个问题之际，我回想起十多年前在柏林同德国神学家孔汉斯（Hans Küng）的一场辩论，当时参加讨论的还有来自美国和亚洲的人士。


The subject was “Globalization and Ethics” – specifically, a comparison of the ways that Europe, the United States and Asia protect the most fragile members of their respective societies.	讨论的主题是“全球化与伦理学”——具体而言，是对欧洲、美国和亚洲保护弱势社会成员的方式做一个比较。


All of the participants agreed that in Europe the state traditionally filled the role played by private philantropy in the US and by the family in Asia.	我们一致认为，传统上，扮演这个保护者角色的，在欧洲是国家，在美国是私营慈善事业，在亚洲则是家庭。


But we all hastened to add that no model was “pure,” i.e., the family was no longer what it used to be in Asia, the state was playing a bigger role than expected in America, and it was often underperforming in Europe.	但我们都连忙补充说，没有哪种模式是“纯粹的”，比方说，亚洲的家庭早已不是原先那样，国家在美国所起的作用超出人们的预想，而在欧洲则往往表现得不尽人意。


Reality has become even more complicated since then: the family’s role continues to decline in Asia; philantropy, despite a few extraordinarily generous individuals, has more than met its limits in America; and, with the possible exception of the Nordic countries, the state in Europe, overburdened by debt, no longer has the means or the will to shoulder new responsibilities.	美国的慈善事业遭遇瓶颈，除了几个慈善家特别慷慨以外，整体上不进反退； 而欧洲的国家被债务压得喘不过气来，已没有能力和意愿去肩负新的责任——北欧国家可能算是例外。


So who will take on the responsibility to protect the weakest if none of these three actors can do it properly?	如果上述三个能动因素统统失灵，还能指望谁去保护弱者？


Are we heading toward a world united by shared incompetence and inadequacy?	这个世界是不是正在走向集体无能的境地？


In the Western world, the poorest are the worst affected by economic stagnation.	在西方，穷人是经济停滞最大的受害者。


But, in rapidly growing emerging-market countries, the rich tend to close their eyes to the suffering of the poorest, except when they feel threatened by the risk of political upheaval, as in, say, Saudi Arabia.	即使在经济快速增长的新兴市场国家，新富们也对穷人的苦难视而不见，只有政治动乱迫近的威胁才能令他们有所醒悟，就像在沙特那样。


In fact, wealthy elites in emerging countries live in a state of denial towards their poor, literally ignoring them.	事实上，新兴国家的富裕精英阶层，其生活方式就是在排斥穷人，就是在漠视穷人。


Brazil and India are particularly striking in this regard.	这情况在巴西和印度尤其令人触目惊心。


Economic growth is necessary, but not sufficient: a strong sense of social responsibility is needed as well.	经济增长是必要的，但光有增长是不够的：对社会责任的强烈意识也不可或缺。


It would be absurd to condemn, as some do, globalization as the main and only culprit in the erosion of traditional sources of support for the poor.	光去谴责全球化，说它是侵蚀传统弱者保护网的主要嫌疑犯，甚至是唯一的嫌疑犯，无疑是荒谬的。


Globalization is above all a context, an environment, even if the consequences of the first major financial and economic crisis of the global age will further deepen the gap between the very rich and the very poor.	全球化最多只是一个背景、一种环境，尽管全球时代的第一场金融经济大危机的确把富豪和赤贫之间的差距进一步拉大了。


But globalization makes the weakest among us more visible, and therefore makes the absence of social justice more unacceptable.	但全球化也凸显了弱者的处境，从而令社会公正的缺位显得尤其不可容忍。


A world of much greater transparency and interdependency creates new responsibilities for the rich.	在一个具有更高透明度和更大相依性的世界里，富人面临着新的责任。


Or, more precisely, it makes the old responsibility to protect the weakest both more difficult and more urgent.	说得更准确一点，它令保护弱势者的旧有责任变得更加困难和更加紧迫。


In a world of increasing complexity, perhaps what is needed are simple solutions.	在一个变得日益复杂的世界里，也许恰恰需要简单的办法。


One could follow, for example, Adam Smith’s principle of comparative advantage: what Europe does best is the state, while Asia still relies on the family and the US continues to focus on individual initiative.	例如，人们可以遵循亚当·斯密的比较优势原理：欧洲的强项是国家，亚洲仍然依赖家庭，美国继续坚持个人善举。


The problem is that in a world of universal benchmarking, the legitimacy of solutions will stem more than ever from their cultural acceptability and their efficiency.	问题是在一个普世对标的世界里，各种办法的合法性以前所未有的程度依赖于文化兼容性和效果的优劣性。


In Western Europe, for example, the call for sacrifice from all citizens in order to resolve the debt crisis runs up against a lingering perception that not all will contribute equally, and that social inequality will be exacerbated by austerity.	例如，在西欧，呼吁全体公民为解决债务危机做牺牲，在一种根深蒂固的感受面前变得苍白无力：每个人的牺牲并不平等，削减福利会加剧社会不公。


Restoring growth in the short term while addressing debt problems in the medium and long term may well be the only valid response to the crisis.	但是，短期内重振经济增长，中长期内解决债务问题，毕竟是应对危机的唯一恰当方式。


But it will not work, in Europe or elsewhere, without a much greater emphasis on social justice.	然而，不论是在欧洲或是其他地方，假如不加大力度强调社会公平，这些应对方式就无法奏效。


While some of the very rich complain, as Warren Buffett did recently, that they do not pay enough taxes, the enlightened generosity of these happy few – who want to save capitalism and liberalism – is unlikely to be emulated by the new rich in the emerging countries, much less by the rich elsewhere.	不过，像沃伦·巴菲特等富豪直言自己纳税太少的开明、慷慨之举——当然，他们是为了拯救资本主义和自由主义——不太可能得到新兴市场国家新富们的群起效仿，更不容易在其他国家的富人群体中一呼百应。


Let’s be realistic: people like Buffett and Bill Gates have very few followers even among the very rich in the US.	我们得现实一点看问题：像巴菲特和比尔·盖茨那样的慈善富豪，即便是在美国这样的富裕国家，也响应者聊聊。


And can Asian societies really revive an effective sense of family responsibility?	此外，亚洲社会真的能够复兴家庭的责任感吗？


Globalization does appear to have weakened cultural differences noticeably in the past decade.	过去十年，全球化的确显著地敉平了文化差异。


But, when it comes to the protection of the weakest and the struggle against rising social injustice, perhaps “global deculturation” creates an opportunity to combine the best of what remains in particular traditions.	但是，在保护弱势者、抵抗社会不公加剧势头方面，这种“文化差异的全球化消除”也许恰恰创造了一个机会，令我们可以把各个传统中的精华部分结合起来。


Perhaps countries should seek to base their social-welfare systems on a new synthesis of the state, the family, and philanthropy.	也许，各国都应尝试在综合国家、家庭和慈善的基础上重建社会福利体系。


Why Bannon Had to Go	为何班农必须走人


WASHINGTON, DC – In many, if not most, US administrations, some figure emerges who convinces the press that the president couldn’t function without him (it’s yet to be a her).	发自华盛顿特区——在许多（如果不是大多数）美国政府机构中，总会不时有些人物冒起并让新闻界确信，如果没有他（目前还没有“她”）总统就没法干活了。


The indispensable aide is, indeed, one of the most well-worn tropes of the modern presidency.	事实上，一位不可或缺的助手是当代总统制最为常见的比喻之一。 卡尔·罗夫（Karl Rove）是“布什的大脑”；


Karl Rove was “Bush’s Brain”; Harry Hopkins held Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s prolific White House team together; Bill Moyers appeared on a magazine cover as “Johnson’s Good Angel.”	哈里·霍普金斯（Harry Hopkins）帮助富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福（Franklin Delano Roosevelt）打点其规模庞大的白宫团队； 比尔·莫耶斯（Bill Moyers）在杂志封面上的称号是“约翰逊总统的天使”。


Without such a figure, the story inevitably goes, the administration would be a mess, if not a disaster.	倘若缺少了这样一位人物，这个故事就会不出意料地出问题，政府也会变得一团糟（如果算不上一场灾难的话）。


As often as not, the trope is invented or encouraged by the particular indispensable figure.	通常，这一比喻是由那个特定的不可或缺的人物发明或鼓励的。


Journalists usually fall for the story, regardless of how well-founded it is: it clarifies everything, and it gives them something to write about.	对于记者来说，寻找一个好故事最重要，而这故事是否有切实的依据则不在考虑之列：这个人物会对一切问题予以澄清，也给新闻界一些爆料去写在文章里。


The indispensable aide is only too happy to reveal some dramatic story about how he saved the day, devised some particularly ingenious idea, or prevented some terrible mistake.	这位不可或缺的助手也非常乐意透露一些关于他如何力挽狂澜，构思了一些特别巧妙的想法，或者制止了某些可怕错误的戏剧性故事。


But, as often as not, the soi-disant crucial figure oversteps.	但有时这位所谓重要人物也会玩得过火。


In the Reagan White House, Don Regan, who succeeded James Baker as Chief of Staff, fancied himself the prime minister: he inserted himself into photos of Reagan with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, was rude to lesser beings (including reporters), and made the fatal mistake of hanging up on Nancy Reagan, who was dedicated to looking after her Ronny.	在里根治下的白宫，接替詹姆斯·贝克（James Baker）担任幕僚长的唐·雷根（Don Regan）把自己当成了总理。 他让自己出现在了里根总统和苏联领导人米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫的合影中，对下属（包括记者）举止粗暴，而他的致命错误则是将千方百计想照顾自己丈夫的南希·里根拒之门外。


Regan was soon out.	结果雷根很快就被赶走了。


Presidents themselves aren’t particularly fond of reading how some super-smart aide saved their bacon.	而总统自己其实也并不特别喜欢读到那些超级助手如何挽救大局的故事。


All presidents have healthy egos – if others are so smart, why aren’t they president?	所有总统都有正常的自我认知——如果他人如此睿智，为啥不把这些人选为总统？


The wise president-elect identifies a peacock and avoids the species from the start, or knows how to keep its feathers in check.	聪明的总统当选人会识别出那些爱出风头的家伙并从一开始就敬而远之，或者知道如何让他们收敛好自己。


Barack Obama was plenty pleased with himself, with reason, but such was his dignity that no super-aide emerged during his presidency.	比如奥巴马总统就有足够的理由自视甚高，而他的尊严就体现在他担任总统期间没有出现超级助手。


It didn’t occur to his advisers to try to outshine him.	他的顾问们也没有想去抢他的风头。


Stephen Bannon wasn’t particularly wise as a White House aide – he couldn’t contain his inner peacock – and Donald Trump’s ego is particularly fragile.	作为白宫助手，斯蒂芬·班农（Stephen Bannon）算不上特别聪明——因为他无法遏制自己内心的表演欲——而唐纳德·特朗普的自我又特别脆弱。


Both are or were misfits in their roles.	他们两人所扮演的角色是错位的。


Trump had spent his business life surrounded by family and flunkies: no stockholders or vice chairmen with their own ambitions.	特朗普过往的商界生涯都被家庭成员和朋友所环绕，没怎么和那些野心勃勃的股东或副主席打过交道。


The two men were a mismatch made in White House hell.	这两个人堪称是白宫地狱里的一对错配冤家。


As a candidate, Trump went with his instincts, and his instinct in the 2016 presidential race was that blue-collar workers and others who feared for their economic future needed their own victims, be they Mexican immigrants or billionaire bankers.	作为候选人，特朗普靠自己的直觉行事，而他在2016年总统竞选中的直觉就是蓝领工人和其他担心自身经济前景的人们需要找一个替罪羊——不管是墨西哥移民还是亿万富翁银行家都行。


A wall – phantasmagorical or not – would keep out the “bad people” Mexico was “sending us.”	一堵墙——无论是幻想还是真实——会阻止墨西哥把“坏人”“送到我们这边”。


As it happened, of all the people around Trump, Bannon most matched these views.	正如我们所看到的那样，在特朗普周围的所有人中班农与这些观点最为契合。


A person like Bannon – who presents himself as a learned figure and confirms one’s own brilliance – is a person one wants to have close by.	一个像班农这样的人——看似极为睿智并且映衬出了总统的英明——必然是成为亲密战友的好人选。


Trump is essentially a “whatever works” kind of guy.	特朗普本质上是个“拿来主义者”。


Once elected, he brought in billionaires to populate his cabinet, and so far seems to have gotten away with telling his supporters that really rich people are needed to run the country.	当选后他邀请了多位亿万富豪来担任要职，到目前为止似乎已经成功避免他的支持者认为他需要一些真正有钱的人来经营这个国家。


Bannon, on the other hand, wrapped himself in what might be loosely termed a philosophy, which consisted of a nihilistic anger toward any “establishment.”	另一方面，班农则把自己包装成一种不太严谨的所谓哲学，其中包括对任何“体制”的无政府主义抵制。


But his was faux populism: while Bannon politically championed blue-collar workers, he lived on the millions he had attained from a stint at Goldman Sachs and through a fortunate investment in the TV comedy series “Seinfeld.”	但他的民粹主义其实是个假货：当班农在政治上为蓝领工人站台的时候，他手里的几百万美元却是靠当年在高盛集团任职以及对电视喜剧《宋飞正传（Seinfeld）》的幸运投资赚来的。


He also flourished with backing from the billionaire Mercer family.	他的成功同时还来自于默瑟家族的支持。


The Mercers, who made their fortune through the high-tech genius of patriarch Robert Mercer and a hedge fund he led, fund Breitbart News, a far-right website formerly edited by Bannon that promotes ultra-nationalism and white supremacy, with a whiff of anti-Semitism.	这个家族依靠领头人罗伯特·默瑟（Robert Mercer）的高科技天才和旗下的对冲基金发了大财，并出资成立了极右翼的布莱因巴特新闻网（Breinbart News），该网站原先由班农编辑，着力宣传极端民族主义和白人至上思想，还有一点反犹太主义的意味。


Bannon’s ostensibly radical views were dressed up in a fancy set of principles embroidered with name-drops of far-out thinkers. In trade and immigration, for example, Bannon’s acquired philosophy aligned with Trump’s political opportunism (Trump’s more liberal, often Democrat-backing former self is another story).	班农会用一套花哨而充斥着新颖思想家名字的原则来粉饰自己表面上激进的观点，例如在贸易和移民方面，班农后天打造的哲学就和特朗普的政治机会主义相一致（特朗普从前更为自由主义，往往得到民主党支持的自我则是另一回事）。


It was a mistake to see Bannon as Pygmalion to Trump’s Galatea, or, as some did, as the Trump White House’s Rasputin.	像某些人那样将班农视为皮格马利翁（Pygmalion），将特朗普视为他亲手打造的加拉蒂亚（Galatea），或者是特朗普白宫里的格利高里·拉斯普廷（Grigori Rasputin）都是错误的。


Bannon reinforced the nationalist inclination that led Trump to overrule his daughter Ivanka and his economic advisers by withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement.	班农强化了特朗普的民族主义倾向，导致后者推翻了其女伊万卡和经济顾问的建议撤出了巴黎气候协议。


And Bannon intruded on foreign policy by getting himself put on the National Security Council for a while, until two of the generals in Trump’s administration – National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster and John Kelly (now the chief of staff) – got him removed.	班农通过将自己安插在国家安全委员会一段时间以插手外交政策，直到特朗普当局的两名将军——即国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特（H. R.


(Bannon was believed to be behind the recent push to force out McMaster, mainly by suggesting that he is “anti-Israel.”)	McMaster）和约翰·凯利（John Kelly，现任幕僚长）将他解职。 （据信班农在幕后推动了近期迫使麦克马斯特下台的动作，主要是声称他“反以色列”）


But Bannon’s role as genius-without-portfolio – in which Trump indulged him, until Kelly arrived and clarified chains of command – was his undoing.	但班农所扮演的不管事天才角色——特朗普对他如此着迷，直到凯利上任并理清了指挥链条才告终——也是他失败的原因。


Without any defined responsibilities, he intruded where he wished – and ended up with a lot of enemies.	在缺乏任何明确责任的情况下，他肆意进入他所希望的领域——最终结下了很多仇敌。


He had plenty of time to fight internal battles by feeding reporters stories about his White House rivals, though he would switch someone (for example, former Chief of Staff Reince Priebus) from rival to friend, as convenient.	尽管他可以很方便地将某人——比如前幕僚长瑞因斯·普利巴斯（Reince Priebus）——从对手转化为朋友，但他却花了大量的时间在内斗上，向记者爆料自己的白宫对手。


Bannon was a troublemaker as much as a policymaker – and the two roles didn’t mesh.	班农既是个麻烦制造者又是个政策决策者——这两个角色根本不相匹配。


Trump also began to see Bannon as a “leaker.”	特朗普也开始把班农看成是一个“告密者”。


And Trump’s White House is all too leaky: many who work there let reporters know that they have, at best, mixed feelings about working for Trump, but believe the better part of valor is to stay and protect the country from his leadership.	而特朗普的白宫已经太多漏洞了，许多在那里工作的人都会告诉记者他们对于为特朗普工作的心情很复杂，但是相信最勇敢的事情莫过于留下来保护国家不受这位总统的荼毒。


Bannon’s braggadocio took him to the most dangerous terrain on which to confront Trump: the president’s obsession with his election victory.	班农的自负也把他带到了与特朗普对抗的最危险地带：总统对选举胜利的痴迷。


The ambiguity of winning the Electoral College vote (not, as he has falsely claimed, by the greatest margin since Reagan) but losing the popular vote by nearly three million votes, dogs Trump.	赢得了选举团投票（不是像他错误地宣称那样自里根以来最大的优势）却落后了近300万个人选票的纠结始终困扰着特朗普。


That’s why he invented millions of “illegal” voters and had maps printed showing the states he won in red – covering most of the territory of the United States – even suggesting to at least one reporter that his newspaper run the map on the paper’s front page.	这就是为什么他发明了数以百万计的“非法”选民并在地图上用红色来标识所赢得的州——覆盖了美国的大部分领土 ——甚至建议至少一名记者在其所属报纸的头版上展示该地图。


Suggestions by Bannon that he played a major role in Trump’s election victory were poisonous to the relationship between the two men.	而班农所谓在特朗普胜选中发挥了重要作用的说法损害了两人的关系。


And so this White House misfit finally had to go.	因此这对白宫冤家终于也无以为继了。


Now that Bannon is gone, however, he will hurl missives from his new-old perch at Breitbart, to which he returned the same day as his announced departure.	如今班农已不在，但他会在布莱因巴特新闻网的老窝里继续大放厥词——他在宣布离职的同一天就回归了那里。


And Trump will still be Trump.	但是特朗普，还将是那个特朗普。


The Truth About Sovereignty	关于主权的真相


CAMBRIDGE – In the French parliament’s recent debate on Europe’s new fiscal treaty, the country’s Socialist government vehemently denied that ratification of the treaty would undermine French sovereignty.	美国剑桥—最近，法国议会对欧洲新财政条约进行了讨论，社会党政府义正辞严地否认批准这一条约有损于法国的主权。


It places “not one constraint on the level of public spending,” Jean-Marc Ayrault, the prime minister, asserted.	它“并没有在公共支出方面形成约束，”总理埃罗声称，“预算主权仍在法兰西共和国议会手中。


“Budget sovereignty remains in the parliament of the French Republic.”	”


As Ayrault was trying to reassure his skeptical colleagues, including many members of his own party, European Commissioner for Competition Joaquin Almunia was delivering a similar message to his fellow social democrats in Brussels.	在埃罗试图让其怀疑派同事——包括许多社会党同志——放心的同时，负责竞争事务的欧洲委员阿尔穆尼亚（Joaquin Almunia）也在布鲁塞尔向其社会民主党同志传递相同的信息。


To succeed, he argued, Europe must prove wrong those who believe there is a conflict between globalization and sovereignty.	他指出，要想成功，欧洲就必须证明，那些认为全球化和主权之间存在冲突的人是错的。


Nobody likes to give up national sovereignty, least of all, it seems, politicians on the left.	没人愿意放弃国家主权，左翼政客尤其如此。


Yet, by denying the obvious fact that the eurozone’s viability depends on substantial restraints on sovereignty, Europe’s leaders are misleading their voters, delaying the Europeanization of democratic politics, and raising the political and economic costs of the ultimate reckoning.	但是，否认欧元区之生存严重依赖于对主权的约束这一事实表明，欧洲领导人正在误导选民，民主政治的欧洲化进程将因此延迟，最终醒悟的政治和经济成本也会因此提高。


The eurozone aspires to full economic integration, which entails the elimination of transaction costs that impede cross-border commerce and finance.	欧元区最求的是完全的经济一体化，包括消除阻碍跨国商业和金融的交易成本。


Obviously, it requires that governments renounce direct restrictions on trade and capital flows.	显然，这要求各国政府抛弃对贸易和资本流的直接限制。


But it also requires that they harmonize their domestic rules and regulations – such as product-safety standards and bank regulations – with those of other member states in order to ensure they do not act as indirect trade barriers.	但这同样要求各国政府协调各自的国内法规和监管——如产品安全标准和银行监管——已确保这些因素不会构成间接贸易壁垒。


And governments must forswear changes in these policies, lest the uncertainty itself act as a transaction cost.	各国政府还不能对这方面的政策朝令夕改，因为不确定性本身会就会形成交易成本。


This was all implicit in the European Union’s single-market initiative.	这些都是欧盟单一市场方案的应有之义。


The eurozone went one step further, aiming through monetary unification to eradicate fully the transaction costs associated with national currencies and exchange-rate risk.	欧元区则更进一步，旨在形成完全的货币联盟，彻底消除与国家货币和汇率风险有关的交易成本。


Simply put, the European integration project has hinged on restrictions on national sovereignty.	简单说，欧洲一体化工程的瓶颈就在于国家主权的限制。


If its future is now in doubt, it is because sovereignty stands in the way once again.	如今，其前景之所以可疑，是因为主权再一次挡在了前进的道路上。


In a true economic union, underpinned by union-wide political institutions, the financial problems of Greece, Spain, and the others would not have blown up to their current proportions, threatening the existence of the union itself.	在一个以泛联盟政治制度为基础的真正的经济联盟中，希腊、西班牙和其他国家的财政问题不会演变到如今的威胁到联盟本身生存的程度。


Consider the United States.	就拿美国来说吧。


No one even keeps track of, say, Florida’s current-account deficit with the rest of the country, although we can safely guess that it is huge (since the state is home to many retirees living off benefits that come from elsewhere).	根本不会有人关心（比如）佛罗里达州对美国其余部分的经常项目赤字，尽管我们可以大胆猜测这笔赤字不会小（因为大量来自其他地区的依靠退休福利生活的退休人士生活在佛罗里达州）。


When Florida’s state government goes bankrupt, Florida’s banks continue to operate normally, because they are under federal rather than state jurisdiction.	当佛罗里达州政府陷入破产时，佛罗里达银行仍能正常经营，因为监管它们的是联邦政府，而不是州政府。


When Florida’s banks go belly-up, state finances are insulated, because the banks are ultimately the responsibility of federal institutions.	当佛罗里达州银行倒闭时，州财政不会受到影响，因为说到底银行是联邦机构的责任。


When Florida’s workers become unemployed, they get unemployment checks from Washington, DC.	当佛罗里达州工人失业时，他们从华盛顿获得失业救济。


And when Florida’s voters are disenchanted about the economy, they do not riot outside the state capital; they put pressure on their representatives in Congress to push for changes in federal policies.	而当佛罗里达州选民对经济彻底失望时，他们也不会在州首府闹事； 他们会对他们在国会的代表施压，要求联邦政策有所反应。


Nobody would argue that US states have an abundance of sovereignty.	没人会争论说美国各州拥有充分的主权。


The relationship between sovereignty and democracy is also misunderstood.	主权和民主的关系也被误解了。


Not all restrictions on the exercise of sovereign power are undemocratic.	并非所有对主权权力的执行的限制都是非民主的。


Political scientists talk about “democratic delegation” – the idea that a sovereign might want to tie its hands (through international commitments or delegation to autonomous agencies) in order to achieve better outcomes.	政治学词叫“民主授权”，说的是君主可能甘愿自缚双手（通过国际承诺或授权自治机构）以追求更好的结果。


The delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is the archetypal example: in the service of price stability, daily management of monetary policy is insulated from politics.	将货币政策授权给独立央行就是原生的例子：在维持价格稳定这个问题上，货币政策的日常管理从政治中独立出来了。


Even if selective limitations on sovereignty may enhance democratic performance, there is no guarantee that all limitations implied by market integration would do so.	即便是对主权施以有选择的限制也有可能加强民主表现，没人能够保证市场一体化所隐含的限制能够做到这一点。


In domestic politics, delegation is carefully calibrated and restricted to a few areas where the issues tend to be highly technical and partisan differences are not large.	在民主政治中，授权将得到仔细审议，并被限制于有限的领域——那些问题具有高度技术性且党派差异不大的领域。


A truly democracy-enhancing globalization would respect these boundaries.	真正能够强化民主的全球化会尊重这些界限。


It would impose only those limits that are consistent with democratic delegation, possibly along with a limited number of procedural norms (such as transparency, accountability, representativeness, use of scientific evidence, etc.) that enhance democratic deliberation at home.	其所施加的限制将与民主授权一致，大致上遵循能够增进国内民主自由化的有限的程序范式（比如透明度、可问责性、代议制、使用科学证据，等等）。


As the American example illustrates, it is possible to give up on sovereignty – as Florida, Texas, California, and the other US states have done – without giving up on democracy.	正如美国的例子所标明的，放弃主权——佛罗里达、德克萨斯、加利福尼亚，美国各州都是如此——并不一定意味着放弃民主。


But combining market integration with democracy requires the creation of supranational political institutions that are representative and accountable.	但将市场一体化与民主结合起来要求创造代议制、可问责的跨国政治机构。


The conflict between democracy and globalization becomes acute when globalization restricts the domestic articulation of policy preferences without a compensating expansion of democratic space at the regional/global level.	如果全球化限制了国内政策偏好的表达，同时民主空间又无法在地区/全球水平进行补偿性扩张，那么民主和全球化之间的冲突就会激烈起来。


Europe is already on the wrong side of this boundary, as the political unrest in Spain and Greece indicates.	西班牙和希腊的政治动荡表明，欧洲已经陷入了这一错误的区域。


That is where my political trilemma begins to bite: We cannot have globalization, democracy, and national sovereignty simultaneously.	这就是我的政治三难：我们无法同时实现全球化、民主和国家主权。


We must choose two among the three.	我们必须在三者中选择两个。


If European leaders want to maintain democracy, they must make a choice between political union and economic disintegration.	如果欧洲领导人要维持民主，那么他们必须在政治联盟和经济分裂中选择。


They must either explicitly renounce economic sovereignty or actively put it to use for the benefit of their citizens.	他们要么选择完全放弃经济主权，要么积极用经济主权来为本国公民造福。


The first would entail coming clean with their own electorates and building democratic space above the level of the nation-state.	前一个选择要求他们向自己的选民说实话，并建设超越民族国家水平的民主空间。


The second would mean giving up on monetary union in order to be able to deploy national monetary and fiscal policies in the service of longer-term recovery.	后一个选择意味着放弃货币联盟，从而得以实施旨在提振长期复苏的国家货币和财政政策。


The longer this choice is postponed, the greater the economic and political cost that ultimately will have to be paid.	这一选择被拖得越久，最终必须付出的经济和政治成本就越大。


How Economics Survived the Economic Crisis	经济学该如何从经济危机中幸存下来


LONDON – The tenth anniversary of the start of the Great Recession was the occasion for an elegant essay by the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman, who noted how little the debate about the causes and consequences of the crisis have changed over the last decade.	发自伦敦——在“大衰退”爆发十周年之际，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）撰写了一篇雅致的论文，指出过去十年来关于危机成因和后果的辩论基本上无甚变化。


Whereas the Great Depression of the 1930s produced Keynesian economics, and the stagflation of the 1970s produced Milton Friedman’s monetarism, the Great Recession has produced no similar intellectual shift.	鉴于1930年代的经济大萧条催生了凯恩斯主义经济学，而1970年代的滞胀则诞生了米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）的货币主义，但“大衰退”却并未产生类似的智力转变。


This is deeply depressing to young students of economics, who hoped for a suitably challenging response from the profession.	这对那些年轻的经济学学子来说可算是非常令人沮丧的，因为他们希望这个专业至少能做出一个有恰当挑战性的回应。


Why has there been none?	但为何却一片沉寂呢？


Krugman’s answer is typically ingenious: the old macroeconomics was, as the saying goes, “good enough for government work.” It prevented another Great Depression.	克鲁格曼的答案果然极为巧妙：正如大家所认定的那样，旧有的宏观经济学“对政府工作来说已经足够了”，也阻止了另一场大萧条。


So students should lock up their dreams and learn their lessons.	所以学生们应该把自己的梦想先放一放，先把课程学好。


A decade ago, two schools of macroeconomists contended for primacy: the New Classical – or the “freshwater” – School, descended from Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas and headquartered at the University of Chicago, and the New Keynesian, or “saltwater,” School, descended from John Maynard Keynes, and based at MIT and Harvard.	十年前，两大流派的宏观经济学家都在争夺制高点：源自米尔顿·弗里德曼和罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas），大本营位于芝加哥大学的新古典学派——或所谓“淡水”； 沿袭于约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes），以麻省理工学院和哈佛大学为基地的新凯恩斯学派，或称“咸水”。


Freshwater-types believed that budgets deficits were always bad, whereas the saltwater camp believed that deficits were beneficial in a slump.	淡水派认为预算赤字总是不好的，而咸水阵营相信赤字在经济处于低谷时是有益的。


Krugman is a New Keynesian, and his essay was intended to show that the Great Recession vindicated standard New Keynesian models.	克鲁格曼是一位新凯恩斯主义者，他的论文旨在表明“大衰退”正好证明了标准的新凯恩斯主义模式的有效性。


But there are serious problems with Krugman’s narrative.	但克鲁格曼的叙述存在严重的问题。


For starters, there is his answer to Queen Elizabeth II’s now-famous question: “Why did no one see it coming?”	首先是他对英女王伊丽莎白二世那个“为什么没有人意识到危机即将来临？ ”的著名问题的回答。


Krugman’s cheerful response is that the New Keynesians were looking the other way.	克鲁格曼乐观地回应说新凯恩斯主义者当时正在专心关注其他问题。


Theirs was a failure not of theory, but of “data collection.” They had “overlooked” crucial institutional changes in the financial system.	他们的失败不是理论有问题，而是“数据收集”有误，他们“忽视”了金融体系的重大制度变迁。


While this was regrettable, it raised no “deep conceptual issue” – that is, it didn’t demand that they reconsider their theory.	虽然这确实令人扼腕，但也并未暴露出“深层次的概念问题”——也就是说这并不要求他们去重新思考自己的理论。


Faced with the crisis itself, the New Keynesians had risen to the challenge.	在危机来临之时，新凯恩斯主义者奋起迎接挑战。


They dusted off their old sticky-price models from the 1950s and 1960s, which told them three things. First, very large budget deficits would not drive up near-zero interest rates.	他们重新拾起了上世纪五六十年代的粘性价格模型，而该模型也给他们指明了三点：首先，巨额预算赤字不会推高近乎为零的利率；


Second, even large increases in the monetary base would not lead to high inflation, or even to corresponding increases in broader monetary aggregates.	其次，基础货币量的更大幅增长不会导致高通胀，甚至不会导致更广意货币总量的相应增长；


And, third, there would be a positive national income multiplier, almost surely greater than one, from changes in government spending and taxation.	第三，政府支出和税收的变化会产生正面的国民收入乘数，而且该数字基本上一定会大于1。


These propositions made the case for budget deficits in the aftermath of the collapse of 2008.	这些主张为2008年经济崩盘后的预算赤字铺平了道路。


Policies based on them were implemented and worked “remarkably well.”	基于这些原则的政策得以施行而且运作得“极为良好”。


The success of New Keynesian policy had the ironic effect of allowing “the more inflexible members of our profession [the New Classicals from Chicago] to ignore events in a way they couldn’t in past episodes.” So neither school – sect might be the better word – was challenged to re-think first principles.	而新凯恩斯主义政策取得如此成就的讽刺性作用在于允许“我们这行中那些更为缺乏灵活性的成员（芝加哥的新古典学派）以一种在过去事件中不可能发生的方式去忽略这类事件”，因此这两大学派——说不上谁比谁更好——都面临着重新思考自身基本原则的挑战。


This clever history of pre- and post-crash economics leaves key questions unanswered.	这种对崩盘前和崩盘后经济学流变的机智回顾却未能解答一系列关键问题。


First, if New Keynesian economics was “good enough,” why didn’t New Keynesian economists urge precautions against the collapse of 2007-2008?	首先，如果新凯恩斯主义经济学真的“足够良好”，那为何新凯恩斯主义经济学家未能敦促人们对2007 ~2008年的崩溃加以防范？


After all, they did not rule out the possibility of such a collapse a priori.	毕竟他们的推算也未排除崩盘的可能性。


Krugman admits to a gap in “evidence collection.” But the choice of evidence is theory-driven.	克鲁格曼承认在“证据收集”方面存在差距，但证据的选择是由理论驱动的。


In my view, New Keynesian economists turned a blind eye to instabilities building up in the banking system, because their models told them that financial institutions could accurately price risk.	在我看来，新凯恩斯主义经济学家们对银行系统的不稳定性视而不见，因为他们的模型告诉他们金融机构可以准确地为风险定价。


So there was a “deep conceptual issue” involved in New Keynesian analysis: its failure to explain how banks might come to “underprice risk worldwide,” as Alan Greenspan put it.	所以在新凯恩斯主义分析中曾经出现了一个“深层次的概念问题”：它无力解释银行如何会像艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）所说的那样“全球一致地低估了风险”。


Second, Krugman fails to explain why the Keynesian policies vindicated in 2008-2009 were so rapidly reversed and replaced by fiscal austerity.	其二，克鲁格曼没有解释为何在2008~2009年被证明有效的凯恩斯主义政策会如此迅速地被财政紧缩政策逆转和取代。


Why didn’t policymakers stick to their stodgy fixed-price models until they had done their work?	为什么政策制定者未能在完工之前一直坚持使用那套古板的固定价格模型呢？


Why abandon them in 2009, when Western economies were still 4-5% below their pre-crash levels?	为什么在2009年西方经济体经济总量仍然低于事件发生前水平4~5％的时候就放弃了它们呢？


The answer I would give is that when Keynes was briefly exhumed for six months in 2008-2009, it was for political, not intellectual, reasons.	我所给出的答案是，当凯恩斯主义在2008~2009年间被短暂起用了六个月时，这是出于政治而非理智的原因。


Because the New Keynesian models did not offer a sufficient basis for maintaining Keynesian policies once the economic emergency had been overcome, they were quickly abandoned.	由于一系列新凯恩斯主义模型在度过了经济紧张时期后未能为凯恩斯主义政策提供充分的依据，所以很快就被抛弃了。


Krugman comes close to acknowledging this: New Keynesians, he writes, “start with rational behavior and market equilibrium as a baseline, and try to get economic dysfunction by tweaking that baseline at the edges.”	克鲁格曼几乎承认了这一点：他写道，新凯恩斯主义者“以理性行为和市场均衡为基准线，试图通过对基准线的边缘微调来应对经济功能失调”。


Such tweaks enable New Keynesian models to generate temporary real effects from nominal shocks, and thus justify quite radical intervention in times of emergency.	这种微调使得新凯恩斯主义模型能够通过名义货币上的冲击产生暂时性的真实作用，从而证明在紧急情况下实施相当激进的干预手段是合理的。


But no tweaks can create a strong enough case to justify sustained interventionist policy.	但是没有任何微调措施可以为持续的干预政策创造足够强大的理由。


The problem for New Keynesian macroeconomists is that they fail to acknowledge radical uncertainty in their models, leaving them without any theory of what to do in good times in order to avoid the bad times.	新凯恩斯主义宏观经济学家面临的问题在于不愿承认自身模型中存在的极端不确定性，以致缺乏任何理论来指导在景气时期应该做些什么以避免不景气。


Their focus on nominal wage and price rigidities implies that if these factors were absent, equilibrium would readily be achieved.	他们对名义工资和价格刚性的关注似乎意味着倘若不存在这些因素，均衡就能被毫不费力地实现。


They regard the financial sector as neutral, not as fundamental (capitalism’s “ephor,” as Joseph Schumpeter put it).	他们认为金融部门是中性的，而不是基础性的——正如约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）所说的那样是资本主义的“监察官”。


Without acknowledgement of uncertainty, saltwater economics is bound to collapse into its freshwater counterpart.	如果不承认这一不确定性，咸水经济学派必然会沦落到跟淡水学派一个德行。


New Keynesian “tweaking” will create limited political space for intervention, but not nearly enough to do a proper job.	新凯恩斯主义的“微调”可以为干预行为创造出有限的政治空间，但还不足以恰当地完成整个工作。


So Krugman’s argument, while provocative, is certainly not conclusive.	因此克鲁格曼的论点虽然让人觉得有点道理，但肯定还算不上是定论。


Macroeconomics still needs to come up with a big new idea.	宏观经济学还有待提出一个新的大理论来支撑。


Four Ways to Beat HIV/AIDS	消灭艾滋病的四个办法


PITTSBURGH – In the fight against HIV/AIDS, some stories illuminate the long road to global eradication more than others.	匹兹堡—在与艾滋病的战争中，一些故事更能说明通往全球消灭艾滋病的漫漫长路。


In 2009, I heard one such story in Tanzania.	2009年，我在坦桑尼亚就听说了这样一个故事。


I was visiting a remote village when I spoke to a woman who knew that she was HIV-positive.	我访问了一个偏远村庄，和一位获知自己艾滋病毒阳性的妇女对话。


She told me that the established health guidelines at the time indicated that she could not receive treatment until her count of CD4 T-helper cells, a type of white blood cell used by the immune system, had dropped below a certain threshold.	她告诉我，当时的卫生指南说，在她的CD4 辅助性T细胞（一种免疫系统中的白血球）下降到一定阈值以下之间，她不会得到治疗。


After walking several miles to get her count checked, she arrived at the clinic only to find its testing machine broken.	她跋涉数英里去检查CD4 辅助性T细胞，到了才发现测试机器坏掉了。


The machine was still inoperative the second time she made the long journey.	过了一段时间，她又跋涉数英里去做检查，但机器仍然坏着。


Only months later, after her third trip to the clinic on foot, did she receive her cell count: her levels were far below the necessary threshold.	过了几个月，她第三次步行前往这家医院才成功地做了检查，她的细胞数量已经远远低于阈值。


Her treatment should have begun months before.	她应该在几个月前就开始获得治疗。


Since HIV/AIDS was first identified in 1984, it has killed more than 35 million people.	自1984年艾滋病第一次被识别以来，它已经杀死了3,500万多人。


Although the number of AIDS-related deaths has fallen by almost half since peaking in 2005, there are still far too many people dying from this preventable condition.	艾滋病相关死亡人数在2005年达到峰值，随后下降了近一半，但仍有太多的人因为这个可预防的疾病而失去生命。


In 2016 alone, one million people around the world died from HIV-related causes, while 1.8 million more became infected.	光是在2016年，全球就有一百万人死于与艾滋病毒有关的状况，另有180万人被感染。


Contrary to popular myth, we have not turned the corner on AIDS – not by a long shot.	与流行的故事相反，我们并没有能够扭转艾滋病形势——至少从长期看没有。


World AIDS Day, on December 1, is an occasion to honor the millions of victims, and to recommit to ending this devastating disease.	12月1日是世界艾滋病日，设立这个日子是为了纪念数百万受害者和鼓励人们消灭这个可怕的疾病。


According to UNAIDS, just 54% of HIV-positive adults, and only 43% of HIV-positive children, are currently receiving the antiretroviral therapies that save lives and prevent new infections.	据联合国艾滋病规划署的数据，目前只有54%的艾滋病毒阳性成年人，以及43%的艾滋病毒阳性儿童，正在接受能够拯救生命和阻止传染的抗逆转录疗法。


With so many untreated patients, the virus will continue to spread.	得不到治疗的患者如此之多，艾滋病毒必然还在继续传播。


As CEO of a global pharmaceutical company, I’m proud of the work we have done to fight HIV/AIDS around the world.	作为一家全球制药公司的首席执行官，我对于我们在消灭艾滋病的全球战争中所做出的贡献深感自豪。


Today, more than eight million people – nearly half of all patients receiving treatment for HIV in developing countries – depend on the antiretroviral treatments that we produce.	如今，超过八百万人——相当于发展中国家接受艾滋病治疗的所有患者的近一半——需要依靠我们所生产的抗逆转录治疗手段。


But for those of us on the front lines of this struggle, our work is far from over.	但对于我们这些站在这场战争最前线的人来说，我们的工作还远没有结束。


The pharmaceutical industry has a responsibility to expand access to testing and treatment, and to help stop the spread of HIV once and for all.	制药业有责任扩大测试和治疗的普及度，帮助一劳永逸地阻止艾滋病毒传播。


Fulfilling four key commitments will make this goal achievable.	兑现四项关键承诺能够助我们实现这一目标。


For starters, pharmaceutical companies should do more to increase the availability of low-cost, generic medicines.	首先，制药公司应该做更多的事增加低成本通用药物的普及度。


My company, Mylan, introduced the first generic once-daily pill for developing countries in 2009, and we have continually reduced its price to make it more accessible to more people.	我的公司——迈兰制药公司在2009年推出了第一种面向发展中国家的一日一次普通药，此后我们一直在调降药价，让它走近更多的人。


With this treatment alone, Mylan and other generic manufacturers save the US government, international donors, and national health programs more than $4.5 billion a year.	光是通过这种药，迈兰和其他通用药制造商每年都能为美国政府、国际捐助人和国家卫生计划节省45亿多美元。


Still, treatment options could be expanded further.	尽管如此，治疗选择可以进一步扩大。


In September, Mylan announced a collaboration with UNAIDS, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Clinton Health Access Initiative, and other partners to provide the next-generation single-pill HIV regimen to patients in more than 90 low- and middle-income countries for less than $75 per year.	9月，迈兰宣布与联合国艾滋病规划署、比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会、克林顿健康倡议计划（Clinton Health Access Initiative）和其他合作者携手为90多个中低收入国家以每年不到75美元的价格提供新一代单一药物艾滋病疗法。


These drugs are widely used in high-income countries because they produce fewer side effects.	这些药品因其副作用更小而在高收入国家广泛使用。


Affordability initiatives like this one should be replicated.	此类平价计划应该被广泛复制。


Next, drug makers must continue investing in capacity and supply-chain reliability.	其次，制药商必须继续投资于产能和供给链可靠性建设。


Since 2005, the number of people on antiretroviral therapies worldwide has grown by a factor of ten, to 21 million.	自2005年以来，全世界接受抗逆转录治疗的人数增加了十倍，达到了2,100万人。


But roughly twice as many people are currently infected with HIV.	但目前被艾滋病毒感染的人数两倍于此。


Over the last decade, Mylan has invested more than $250 million in expanding production capacity, and we now produce four billion tablets and capsules each year.	在过去十年中，迈兰公司投入了2. 5亿多美元用于扩大产能，目前我们每年都要生产四十亿片药片和胶囊。


But further investments are needed if we are to provide access to the other 21 million people still not on treatment.	但如果要为另外2,100万仍然得不到治疗的人提供药物，还需要更多投资。


A third urgently needed commitment is to increase support for research that accelerates the development of new innovations in effective and efficient treatment delivery.	第三项继续做出的承诺是增加研究支持和加快高效治疗实现的新创新的开发。


For example, Mylan provides study medications to research trials, like the MaxART trial in Swaziland, which demonstrated that providing treatment to all HIV-positive people is the best way to slow the disease’s spread.	比如，迈兰公司为研究实验提供研究药品，比如斯威士兰的MaxART试验，该试验发现，向所有艾滋病毒阳性人员提供治疗是遏制艾滋病蔓延的最佳办法。


We also supported the Kirby Institute’s ENCORE1 trial, to develop a reduced-dose version of the most commonly used HIV treatment regimen.	我们还支持科尔比研究所（Kirby Institute）的ENCORE1测试，该测试要开发最常用艾滋病疗法的减剂量版。


And we are currently working with the US Agency for International Development as part of a partnership called OPTIMIZE, which aims to accelerate access to new therapies.	目前，我们还与美国国际开发署进行合作，这是一个叫作“优化”（OPTIMIZE）的合作项目的一部分，其目的是加快新疗法的普及。


We do not support trials like these because we hope to gain any marketable intellectual property – we won’t.	我们支持此类试验不是因为我们向获得可以待价而沽的知识产权。


Rather, we support them because it is the right way to advance science and improve treatment.	相反，我们支持这些试验是因为这是推动科学、改进疗法的正确方法。


Finally, real gains in the fight against HIV/AIDS will require drug makers to account for the limitations of health-care systems and distribution networks in the developing countries they serve.	最后，艾滋病战争的真正收益需要制药公司顾及它们所服务的发展中国的医疗体系和分销网络的极限。


Antiretroviral therapies for children are a good example of these challenges.	儿童抗逆转录治疗是这类挑战的一个显例。


Drugs for young people produced in the West are often liquids that require refrigeration.	西方所生产的年轻人用药通常为液态，需要冷藏。


But developing countries often have limited cold-storage capacities or an inability to transport liquid in bulk.	但发展中国家常常冷藏能力不足，也不具备大量运输液体的能力。


That’s why Mylan has developed heat-stable, taste-masked, dispersible tablets that can easily be incorporated into food.	因此，迈兰公司开发了一种热稳定的矫味分散片，可以方便地掺在食品中。


Our scientists are now working on the next-generation formula, which comes in the equivalent of a sugar packet that even newborns can take.	我们的科学家正在开发新一代配方，将采用糖包，即使是新生儿也可以服用。


More innovations like these will be needed to solve the country-specific issues that patients face.	我们需要更多类似的创新来解决具体国家患者所面临的问题。


The global health community has made remarkable progress in turning the tide on HIV/AIDS, introducing new products and advocating for earlier treatment.	全球医疗界在扭转艾滋病趋势方面做出了重大进步，引入了新产品，推动了提早治疗。


But when I think back to the woman I met in Tanzania, I am reminded of how much work remains to be done.	但每当我回想起在坦桑尼亚遇到的那位妇女，我就会想起还有很多工作等着我们完成。


Makers of generic medicines have an important role to play in this fight, and we will not stop working until treatment is available to every patient in the world who needs it.	通用药制造商在这场战争中扮演着重要角色，我们会一直致力于此，直到全世界所有需要的患者都能得到治疗。


The Risk of a New Economic Non-Order	新经济无序的风险


LONDON – Next month, when finance ministers and central bank governors from more than 180 countries gather in Washington, DC, for the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, they will confront a global economic order under increasing strain.	伦敦—下个月，180多个国家的财政部长和央行官员将齐聚华盛顿，参加国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行峰会。 他们面临着一个日益吃紧的全球经济秩序。


Having failed to deliver the inclusive economic prosperity of which it is capable, that order is subject to growing doubts – and mounting challenges.	这一秩序没能带来它有能力实现的包容经济繁荣，正在受到越来越多的质疑和挑战。


Barring a course correction, the risks that today’s order will yield to a world economic non-order will only intensify.	如果不予以纠正的话，现有秩序导致世界经济失序的风险还会继续增加。


The current international economic order, spearheaded by the United States and its allies in the wake of World War II, is underpinned by multilateral institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank.	当前的国际经济秩序由美国及其盟友在二战后引领，其基础是包括IMF和世界银行在内的多边机构。


These institutions were designed to crystallize member countries’ obligations, and they embodied a set of best economic-policy practices that evolved into what became known as the “Washington Consensus.”	这些机构设立的初衷是为了明确成员国的义务，它们也包含了一系列最佳经济政策实践，即日后著名的“华盛顿共识”。


That consensus was rooted in an economic paradigm that aimed to promote win-win interactions among countries, emphasizing trade liberalization, relatively unrestricted cross-border capital flows, free-market pricing, and domestic deregulation.	这一共识植根于一个旨在促进各国间双赢互动的经济范式，它强调贸易自由化、相对不受限制的跨境资本流、自由市场定价以及国内去监管化。


All of this stood in stark contrast to what developed behind the Iron Curtain and in China over the first half of the postwar period.	所有这些都与铁幕之后的国家和中国在战后时期上半段的做法截然不同。


For several decades, the Western-led international order functioned well, helping to deliver prosperity and relative financial stability.	几十年来，西方领导的国际秩序运转良好，帮助实现了繁荣和相对金融稳定。


Then it was shaken by a series of financial shocks that culminated in the 2008 global financial crisis, which triggered cascading economic failures that pushed the world to the edge of a devastating multi-year depression.	接着，它遭遇了一系列金融冲击，2008年全球金融危机为其高潮，它触发了一连串经济失灵，让世界几乎跌入灾难性的多年萧条。


It was the most severe economic breakdown since the Great Depression of the 1930s.	这是自20世纪30年代大萧条以来最严重的经济倒退。


But the crisis did not appear out of nowhere to challenge a healthy economic order.	但这场危机并不是无中生有冒出来挑战健康的经济秩序的。


On the contrary, the evolution of the global order had long been outpaced by structural economic changes on the ground, with multilateral governance institutions taking too long to recognize fully the significance of financial-sector developments and their impact on the real economy, or to make adequate room for emerging economies.	相反，全球秩序的演化一直落后于结构性经济变化，多边治理机构充分认识金融业的发展及其对实体经济的影响消耗了太长时间，为新兴经济体创造足够空间的动作也过于缓慢。


For example, governance structures, including voting power, correspond better to the economic realities of yesterday than to those of today and tomorrow.	比如，包括投票权在内的治理结构更适合过去的经济现实，但已与今天和未来的经济现实不甚相容。


And nationality, rather than merit, still is the dominant guide for the appointment of these institutions’ leaders, with top positions still reserved for European and US citizens.	国籍，而不是资质，仍然是任命这些机构领导者的主要原则，最高职位被欧洲和美国公民垄断。


The destabilizing consequences of this obstinate failure to reform sufficiently multilateral governance have been compounded by China’s own struggle to reconcile its domestic priorities with its global economic responsibilities as the world’s second-largest economy.	顽固地不肯充改革多边治理所造成的动摇性后果，因为中国难以调和其国内重点和身为世界第二大经济体的全球经济责任而加剧。


Several other countries, particularly among the advanced economies, have also failed to transform their domestic policies to account for changes to economic relationships resulting from globalization, liberalization, and deregulation.	其他一些国家，特别是经济发达国家，也没能转变国内政策以顾及全球化、自由化和去监管化所导致的经济关系变化。


As a result of all of this, the balance of winners and losers has become increasingly extreme and more difficult to manage, not just economically, but also politically and socially.	拜所有这些因素所赐，赢家和输家的平衡变得更加极端和难以管理，不仅经济上是如此，政治和社会上也是如此。


With too many people feeling marginalized, forgotten, and dispossessed – and angry at the leaders and institutions that have allowed this to happen – domestic policy pressure has intensified, causing countries to turn inward.	太多的人感到被边缘化，被遗忘，被剥夺——对放任这些情况发生的领导人和机构充满了愤怒——国内政策压力也随之日益加剧，导致各国不得不向内转。


This tendency is reflected in recent challenges to several features of the economic order, such as the North American Free-Trade Agreement, as well as America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the United Kingdom’s renunciation of European Union membership.	这一趋势体现为最近经济秩序的某些标志（如北美自由贸易协定）受到挑战，以及美国从跨太平洋合作伙伴关系中退出、英国放弃欧盟成员国资格等。


All are casting a shadow on the future of the global economic system.	所有这些都给全球经济体系的未来蒙上了一层阴影。


America’s inward turn, already underway for several years, has been particularly consequential, because it leaves the world order without a main conductor.	美国的向内转已经进行了多年，其影响尤其重大，因为这导致世界秩序失去了舵手。


With no other country or group of countries anywhere close to being in a position to carry the baton, the emergence of what the political scientist Ian Bremmer has called a “G-Zero era” becomes a lot more probable.	其他国家或国家集团都无法接过美国的接力棒，政治学家伊恩·布雷默（Ian Bremmer）所谓的“G-0时代”的出现已是板上钉钉。


China is responding to the global system’s weakening core by accelerating its efforts to build small networks, including around the traditional Western-dominated power structures.	面对全球体系核心的衰落，中国的应对之道是加快构建小网络的步伐，包括在传统的西方主导的权力结构之外另起炉灶。


This has included the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the proliferation of bilateral payments agreements, and the pursuit of the “Belt and Road Initiative” to build infrastructure linking China with western Asia, Europe, and Africa.	其中包括建立亚洲基础设施投资银行、各种双边支付协定的涌现，以及推出“一带一路计划”建设连接中国和西亚、欧洲和非洲的基础设施。


These dynamics are stoking trade tensions and raising the risk of economic fragmentation.	这些动态助长着贸易紧张，也提高了经济分裂的风险。


If this trend continues, the global economic and financial configuration will become increasingly unstable, amplifying geopolitical and security threats at a time when better cross-border coordination is vital to address threats from non-state actors and disruptive regimes, such as North Korea.	如果这一趋势继续下去，全球经济和金融格局将越来越不稳定，加剧地缘和安全威胁，而与此同时，加强跨境合作才是解决来自非国家行动方和破坏性政权（如朝鲜）的威胁的关键。


Over time, the risks associated with this shift toward a global economic non-order could have severe adverse effects on geopolitics and national security.	假以时日，伴随向全球经济无序的转变所产生的风险可能给地缘政治和国家安全造成严重的消极影响。


None of this is new.	所有这些都不是新鲜事。


Yet, year after year, top government officials at the IMF/World Bank annual meetings fail to address it.	但是，年复一年，参加IMF/世界银行年会的政府高官们都无法解决它们。


This year is likely to be no different.	今年预计也不会有什么不同。


Instead of discussing concrete steps to slow and reverse the march toward a global economic non-order, officials will probably welcome the cyclical uptick in global growth and urge member countries to do more to remove structural impediments to faster, more durable, and more inclusive growth.	官员们不会讨论延缓和扭转通往全球经济无序的进程，更有可能因为全球增长的周期性好转而欢欣鼓舞，敦促成员国加大力度克服结构性障碍，构建更快、更持久、更包容的增长。


While understandable, that isn’t good enough.	这一点可以理解，但不够好。


The upcoming meetings offer a critical opportunity to start a serious discussion of how to arrest the lose-lose dynamics that have been gaining traction in the global economy.	即将到来的会议是一次关键的机会，开启关于如何扭转在全球经济中势头渐猛的双输动态的严肃讨论。


The longer it takes for the seeds of reform to be sown, the less likely they will be to take root – and the higher the probability that a lose-lose world economic non-order will emerge.	改革种子撒播的越晚，它们深根发芽的可能性就越小，而出现双输的世界经济经济无序局面的概率就越大。


The World Economy in 2018	2018年的世界经济


STANFORD – All major macroeconomic indicators – growth, unemployment, and inflation – suggest that 2017 will be the American economy’s best year in a decade.	发自斯坦福——所有主要的宏观经济指标——增长，失业率和通胀率——都表明2017年将是美国经济十年来最好的一年。


And the global economy is enjoying broad, synchronized growth beyond what anyone expected.	全球经济也正享受着超出所有人预期的，广泛而同步的增长。


The question now is whether this strong performance will continue in 2018.	而如今的问题这在于：这个强劲表现能否在2018年延续下去。


The answer, of course, will depend on monetary, fiscal, trade, and related policies in the United States and around the world.	答案无疑将取决于美国和全球各国的货币，财政，贸易等相关政策。


And yet it is hard to predict what policy proposals will emerge in 2018.	但2018年会出现哪些政策议案是很难预测的。


There are relatively new heads of state in the US, France, and the United Kingdom; German leaders still have not formed a governing coalition since the general election in September; and the US Federal Reserve has a new chair awaiting confirmation.	美法英三国都有了新的国家元首，德国领导人在9月份大选后尚未组成执政联盟； 美联储的新主席人选还有待确认。


Moreover, major changes in important developing economies such as Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil have made the future outlook even murkier.	同时阿根廷，沙特，巴西等重要发展中经济体国内局势的重大变化也使得前景更加阴暗难猜。


Still, we should hope for the best.	不过我们依然会满怀希望。


First and foremost, we should hope that synchronized global growth at a rate of just under 4% will continue in 2018, as the International Monetary Fund projected in October.	首先，如国际货币基金组织10月预测的那样，我们可以指望略低于4％的全球经济同步增长率能在2018年得以延续。


Growth not only raises incomes, but also makes vexing problems such as bad bank loans and budget deficits more manageable.	经济增长不仅提高了收入，还能使银行不良贷款，预算赤字等问题更加容易应对。


As former US President John F. Kennedy famously said in an October 1963 speech in which he promoted his proposed corporate and personal tax reductions, “a rising tide lifts all boats.”	正如美国前总统约翰·F·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）在1963年10月一次提议降低企业和个人税率的演讲中所说的那样：“潮水一涨，万帆皆高”。


For my part, I predict that the global recovery will continue, but at a slightly slower growth rate of around 3.5%.	在我看来，全球经济复苏将持续，但增速略低，大概在3. 5％左右。


The two most obvious risks to keep an eye on will be Europe, where a cyclical upturn could stall, and the oil-rich Middle East, where tensions could flare up once again.	最需要注意的两个最明显风险一个是周期性好转局面可能出现停滞的欧洲，以及紧张局势可能再次爆发中东产油区。


Second, let us hope that the Fed, guided by the steady hand of its new chair, Jerome “Jay” Powell, will continue or even accelerate its monetary-policy normalization, both by raising its benchmark federal funds rate, and by shrinking its engorged balance sheet.	其次，让我们希望美联储能在其新主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome Powell）的稳定执掌下继续或甚至加快其货币政策正常化进程，一方面提高基准联邦基金利率，另一方面收缩其过度膨胀的资产负债表。


And we should hope that economic conditions allow the other major central banks, especially the European Central Bank, to follow suit.	我们也希望经济条件能允许其他主要央行（尤其是欧洲央行）效仿这些举动。


On this front, I predict that the major central banks will continue to normalize monetary policies more gradually than is necessary.	在这方面，我预计各主要央行将会继续逐步实现货币政策正常化。


The biggest risk here is that markets may try to test the Fed under its new leadership, for example, if inflation rises faster than anticipated.	这里最大的风险在于市场可能试图考验一下新领导人治下的美联储，比如如果通胀上涨速度可能超出预期。


Third, let us hope that the Republican tax package will, if enacted, deliver on its promise of increased investment, output, productivity, and wages over the coming decade.	第三，我们希望共和党的一揽子税收方案能够在未来十年内兑现其提升投资，产出，生产力和工资的承诺。


Here, I predict that the legislation will pass, and that investment in the US over the next few years will be relatively higher than if no action had been taken.	在此我预测立法会通过，而未来几年的对美投资会比不做出任何行动要高。


To be sure, whether investment will rise from its currently subdued level will depend on many other factors than the corporate-tax rate.	可以肯定的是，投资能否摆脱当前的低迷水平还得取决于企业税率以外的其他因素。


But the tax package can still be expected to boost output, productivity, and wages.	但税收方案仍然可以提高产出，生产率和工资。


The question is not if, but when.	问题不在于能否，而是何时。


If the full effects of the legislation are not felt before the 2018 or 2020 elections, that lag could prove politically consequential.	如果立法效应无法在2018年或2020年选举之前全部释放，那么这种滞后可能会产生一定的政治后果。


The biggest danger is that its benefits will be delayed, and that its key provisions will be reversed whenever the Democrats are back in power.	最大的危险在于它的正面效应将会被延后，而其主要条款将会被重夺政权的民主党人所逆转。


Fourth, let us hope that governments everywhere begin to address the looming crisis in public-pension and health-care costs, which have been rising for decades.	第四，让我们希望各地的政府都开始着手解决一项迫在眉睫的危机：几十年来一直在上升的公共养老金和医疗保健成本。


As social programs become costlier, they crowd out government expenditures on necessities such as defense, while generating ever more pressure to impose higher growth-suppressing taxes.	随着社会项目的成本日益上涨，国防等必需品的政府支出遭到了挤占，也令到压抑增长的加税压力不断增大。


Europe, in particular, must not let its cyclical rebound lull it into complacency.	欧洲尤其避免在周期性反弹下保持清醒。


Many European Union member states still need to reduce their government debt, and the eurozone needs to resolve its “zombie bank” crisis.	许多欧盟成员国仍需缩减政府债务，欧元区则得着手解决“僵尸银行”危机。


Beyond that, structural labor-market reforms of the kind French President Emmanuel Macron is pursuing would be most welcome.	除此之外，法国总统马克龙所追求的结构性劳动力市场改革也是最为急需的。


Unfortunately, I’m afraid that progress on structural reforms will be sporadic, at best.	不幸的是我担心结构改革的进展恐怕会是断断续续的。


The danger is that slow growth will not lead to sufficient wage gains and job creation to defuse the ticking time bomb of high youth unemployment in many countries.	危险在于缓慢增长无法带来足够的工资收入增长和就业增量以化解许多国家的高青年失业率定时炸弹。


Another risk is that reform attempts could provoke a political backlash that would be harmful to long-term investment.	另一项风险在于改革尝试可能会引发一场不利于长期性投资的政治反弹。


Fifth, let us hope that the eurozone can avoid a currency crisis.	第五，希望欧元区能避免货币危机。


This will depend largely on whether German Chancellor Angela Merkel can form a coalition government and restore political stability to Europe’s largest economy.	这在很大程度上取决于德国总理默克尔能否组建联合政府，让德国这个欧洲最大经济体恢复政治稳定。


Sixth, we should hope that the EU and the UK can agree on a reasonable Brexit deal that will preserve fairly strong trade relations.	第六，我们应寄望欧盟和英国能达成一个合理的脱欧协议以维护双方之间的密切贸易关系。


The main risk here is that localized declines in trade could spill over and cause broader harm.	这里的主要风险是贸易的局部下降可能会蔓延开来并造成更广泛的伤害。


And, beyond Europe, let us hope that negotiations between the US, Canada, and Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will result in an arrangement that still facilitates continental trade.	而在欧洲之外，我们希望美国，加拿大和墨西哥三国之间就《北美自由贸易协定》进行的谈判将产生一个仍然有利于北美大陆贸易的安排。


For trade generally, the biggest risk is that the Trump administration could start a lose-lose trade dispute, owing to its understandable eagerness to help American manufacturing workers.	对于贸易来说，最大的风险在于特朗普政府会因为急于扶助美国制造业劳动者而发起一场双输的贸易争端。


Seventh, let us hope that new policies targeting information and communication technology (ICT) strike the right balance among all stakeholders’ competing and legitimate concerns.	第七，让我们希望以信息和通信技术为目标的新政策能够在所有利益相关者的竞争和合理关切之间取得适当的平衡。


On one hand, there is reason to worry about certain Internet companies’ concentration of market power, particularly in online content and distribution, and about the effects of new technologies on personal privacy, law enforcement, and national security.	一方面，有理由担心某些互联网公司在某些市场——特别是在线内容和分发方面——攫取过大权力，以及新技术对个人隐私，执法和国家安全的影响。


On the other hand, new technological advances could deliver immense economic gains.	另一方面，新技术进步的巨大经济收益也不容忽视。


It is easy to envision a scenario of too much regulation, or of too little.	监管过多或过少的状况可能出现。


It is also easy to envision a large-scale public backlash against the major technology companies, particularly if poor self-policing or a refusal to cooperate with law enforcement leads to some horrible event.	特别是在因自我管理不善或拒绝配合执法而导致一些可怕事件后，公众针对大型科技公司实施大规模反弹也是有可能的。


Here, I predict that achieving an appropriate policy balance will take years.	在此我预测达致适当的政策平衡将需要几年的时间。


If some future event strikes an emotional chord, the public’s mood could swing dramatically.	如果未来的事件引发情绪上的共鸣，公众的情绪就会剧烈波动。


Ultimately, however, I suspect that competition and innovation will survive the forthcoming regulations.	但我觉得竞争和创新还是可以在即将到来的法规监管中找到生存空间。


Finally, and most important, let us hope that terrorism is thwarted everywhere, conflicts subside, democracy and capitalism regain some momentum, and greater civility and honest dialogue return to the public domain.	最后，也是最重要的是，让我们希望，各地的恐怖主义都能被挫败，冲突消退，民主与资本主义能恢复一些前进的势头，更大范围的文明与诚实的对话能回归公共领域。


Should that happen in 2018, it will be a very good year indeed.	如果这一切能在2018年发生，那这将是非常好的一年。


A Roadmap to End Cholera	消灭霍乱路线图


GENEVA – “Where is your toilet?”	日内瓦—“请问洗手间在哪？


This is often the first question I ask when I visit the site of a cholera outbreak anywhere in the world.	”每当我访问霍乱爆发地区，这常常是我问的第一个问题。


More often than not, the answer is: “We don’t have one.	更多时候，我获得的回答是“我们没有洗手间。


We go wherever we can.”	哪里方便就在哪里解决。 ”


Cholera, an ancient disease, has become a disease of poverty.	霍乱这个古老的病种，如今已经成为贫穷病。


It does not discriminate geographically, but it preys mostly on vulnerable communities in areas with poor sanitation.	它本身不具有地理区别，但主要在卫生设施落后的脆弱社区传播。


Carried by contaminated floodwaters to sources of drinking water, transported by unsuspecting travelers, or brought into homes on produce irrigated with untreated sewage, the Vibrio cholerae bacterium settles in the small intestine after it is ingested, causing severe diarrhea and dehydration.	携带霍乱弧菌的洪水进入到饮用水水源，然后被毫无戒心的旅行者传播，或进入用未处理过的污水进行灌溉的家庭，被摄入人体后栖息于小肠，引发严重腹泻和脱水。


Those who are fortunate enough never to have witnessed cholera’s effects firsthand might assume that it is just another stomach bug.	那些从未亲眼目睹霍乱影响的幸运儿，可能会认为这无非是有一种肠胃病。


But without swift medical attention, cholera can sap the life out of an adult or child in a matter of hours.	但如果不迅速进行治疗，霍乱可能会在几个小时内夺走成年人或儿童的生命。


Each year, cholera claims the lives of an estimated 95,000 people; many who die are children.	每年，霍乱都会导致大约95,000人死亡； 其中许多是儿童。


This year, images of listless, glassy-eyed cholera victims awaiting treatment have emerged in countries worldwide.	今年，无精打采、双目无神的待治疗霍乱患者的形象出现在世界各国。


The disease has spread at an unprecedented rate in Yemen, where more than 2,000 people have died since April.	这种疾病以前所未有的速度在也门传播，4月份以来已造成2,000多人死亡。


Cholera outbreaks are ongoing in Somalia, South Sudan, Haiti, and other countries across sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.	索马里、南苏丹、海地和其他许多撒哈拉以南非洲和亚洲国家也发生了霍乱疫情爆发。


But the saddest fact about cholera’s recent toll on human lives is that every single death was preventable.	但关于最近的致命霍乱疫情的最令人悲哀的事实是每个人的死亡其实都是可以避免的。


The world already has the knowledge and tools to control cholera effectively, but existing resources are not being aligned with the necessary global commitments.	世界早已掌握了有效控制霍乱的知识和工具，但现有资源与必要的全球承诺不相匹配。


That is why the new global strategy developed by the Global Task Force on Cholera Control, a diverse network of technical partners, is so vital.	因此，多元化的技术合作网络——全球霍乱控制任务小组（Global Task Force on Cholera Control）至关重要。


Ending Cholera – A Global Roadmap to 2030 emphasizes a shift to proactive approaches, and aims to reduce cholera deaths by 90% over the next decade.	《消灭霍乱——2030年全球路线图》（Ending Cholera – A Global Roadmap to 2030）强调要转向积极预防方针，制定了在未来十年让霍乱致死人数减少90%的目标。


With full implementation, the plan could also help as many as 20 countries eliminate disease transmission in the same timeframe.	如果能得到全面实施，该计划将帮助多达20个国家在相同的时间框架内根除霍乱传播。


Based on three pillars – early detection, integrated prevention tactics, and coordination between countries and partners – the roadmap provides a concrete path for ending cholera as a public health threat.	该路线图基于三个支柱——早期监测、集中预防以及国家和合作伙伴间的合作——为消灭作为公共卫生威胁的霍乱提供了非常具体的路径。


Once cholera grips a community, it becomes increasingly difficult to control.	一旦霍乱在一个社区内爆发，就会日益难以控制。


It is important, therefore, that the disease is not forgotten even when it is not claiming victims.	因此，很重要的一点是，即使没有报告病例，也不能将它遗忘。


A multi-sector approach that includes investments in water, sanitation, and hygiene – so-called WASH services – can keep cholera at bay.	包括了水、下水道设施和卫生（所谓的WASH服务）投资在内的多部门方针能够将霍乱控制在未萌发状态。


So can the proactive use of oral cholera vaccines and quick access to treatments, such as oral rehydration solution and intravenous fluids.	用口服霍乱疫苗进行预防和快速治疗手段（如口服补水剂和静脉注射）也能起到同样的作用。


Improving WASH infrastructure is the most effective path to prevention, though implementing these services will take time in countries with fewer resources.	改善WASH基础设施是最有效的预防方法，尽管在资源匮乏国家落实这些服务需要时间。


For this reason, the roadmap also encourages the preemptive and large-scale deployment of oral vaccines in cholera hotspots.	因此，路线图还鼓励在霍乱高发地区预防性地大量配置口服疫苗。


The vaccines work immediately, and can prevent cholera for up to three years, serving as a bridge to the implementation of longer-term solutions.	疫苗能够立刻起作用，在三年内防止霍乱爆发，为实施长期解决方案争取时间。


Oral cholera vaccines are available via a global stockpile maintained by the World Health Organization, with support from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.	口服霍乱疫苗可以通过世界卫生组织在Gavi即疫苗联盟的支持下维持的全球储备获得。


More than 15 million doses have been distributed to 18 countries since the program’s creation in 2013.	自2013年该计划成立以来，已有超过1,500剂疫苗分配给18个国家。


Next year, the stockpile is set to increase to more than 25 million doses, up from two million when it began.	明年，疫苗储备将增加到2,500万剂以上，而成立之初只有两百万剂。


Ending cholera as a health threat by 2030, as global partners and the WHO recently pledged, will require sustained collaboration and commitment from cholera-affected countries, technical partners, and international donors.	要在2030年前消灭作为卫生威胁的霍乱——这是全球合作伙伴和世卫组织最新做出的承诺——需要来自受霍乱影响的国家、技术合作伙伴和国际捐赠者的持续合作和致力。


The goal may seem daunting, given that millions of people around the world are at risk of contracting the disease each year.	考虑到如今全世界每年仍有数百万人有可能沾染霍乱，这一目标似乎非常艰巨。


But with urbanization, climate change, and other factors likely to increase the threat of infection, it is a goal that must be met.	但在城市化、气候变化和其他因素有可能让传染风险进一步加剧的情况下，我们必须实现这一目标。


The roadmap makes this possible.	路线图让它成为可能。


Implementing the plan will prove to be a cost-effective solution for countries saddled with responding to frequent cholera outbreaks.	实施路线图计划将是饱受霍乱反复爆发的国家性价比最高的解决方案。


That is one reason why action is urgently needed.	这也是急需行动起来的原因之一。


But embracing the strategy is also the right thing to do for the international community.	但对国际社会来说，采纳这一战略也是一件正确的事。


Governments have a moral obligation to ensure that no one succumbs to a preventable death.	政府有确保所有人都不会遭遇可预防死亡的道德义务。


It is an obligation the WHO shares, and it is why we will work hard to help the world meet the ambitious targets we have set.	这也是世界卫生组织的义务，因此，我们将努力帮助世界实现我们所制定的雄心勃勃的目标。


We have the tools needed to beat cholera.	我们拥有战胜霍乱所需要的工具。


Now, with a plan in place, there can no longer be any excuse not to put them to use.	现在，我们又有了计划，没有任何借口不把计划和工具落到实处。


Whither the Multilateral Trading System?	多边贸易体系将走向何方？


BRUSSELS – Free trade seems to have few supporters these days.	发自布鲁塞尔——自由贸易的支持者最近好像没剩几个了。


Though actual trade volumes are recovering from the post-crisis recession and drop in commodity prices, “globalization” has become increasingly contentious, as exemplified by the election of US President Donald Trump on the back of a promise to rip up international agreements and get tough on trade partners.	尽管实际贸易量正在从危机后的衰退中复苏，大宗商品的价格也逐步下降，但是围绕“全球化”的争议却日益喧嚣，对此美国总统特朗普的当选就是明证——此人的口号就是要撕毁国际协定并强硬对待贸易伙伴。


What does this mean for the future of the rules-based trading system?	那么对于基于规则的贸易体系来说，这又预示着一个什么样的未来？


Some 60 years ago, when the current rules-based global trading system was conceived, the United States was the world’s sole economic “hyperpower,” possessing unquestioned dominance in the day’s most advanced manufacturing industries.	大约60年前，也就是当前这个以规则为基础的全球贸易体系被构思出来的时候，美国是世界上唯一的经济“超级大国”，在当时最先进的制造产业中占据着无可置疑的主导地位。


With enough power to impose rules, and enough dominance to be able to count on accruing the largest share of the benefits, it could – and did – perform the role of “benevolent hegemon.”	既然有了足够的权力来施加规则，又有足够的统治力来确保获得最大的利益份额，它可以 （也确实）扮演着“仁慈的霸主”这一角色。


As Japan and Europe recovered from World War II – with the latter getting an added boost from economic integration – America’s lead began to dwindle, and by the 1970s and 1980s, the US was sharing power over the world’s trade agenda with Europe.	随着日本和欧洲从二战中复苏——后者还得到了经济一体化的进一步推动，美国的领先优势开始缩小，到了1970年代和80年代，美国开始与欧洲分享制定世界贸易议程的权力。


Nonetheless, because the US and Europe share so many common interests, they generally adhered to a cooperative approach.	尽管如此，由于美欧之间存在着诸多共同利益，它们一般还会坚持走合作路线。


It was not until imports began to overwhelm a growing number of industries in the US, fueling the emergence of large and persistent external deficits, that the country’s trade policy became more defensive, creating friction with many of its partners.	但直到进口开始压垮越来越多的美国工业部门并刺激产生了巨额且持续的对外贸易逆差之后，该国的贸易政策才开始变得更加富有防御性，进而与许多合作伙伴产生摩擦。


Yet, even then, US leaders understood the value of the liberal multilateral trading system, and supported the establishment, in 1995, of the World Trade Organization as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.	然而即使如此，美国领导人也清楚意识到自由主义多边贸易体系的价值，并支持在1995年建立世界贸易组织来作为关税和贸易总协定的接班人。


The WTO’s creation amounted to a major step forward, as it addressed not just tariffs, but also other trade barriers, including indirect barriers arising from domestic regulations.	世界贸易组织的创设堪称向前迈进的重要一步，因为它不仅应对关税问题，还处理其他贸易壁垒，包括那些因国内法规产生的间接壁垒。


Given the complexity of assessing how domestic regulations might impede trade, especially compared to judging whether a tariff has been correctly applied, the WTO needed effective dispute-settlement mechanisms, with members agreeing to binding arbitration.	鉴于评估国内法规贸易妨害程度的工作相对判断关税是否正确征收来说显得尤为复杂，世贸组织需要有效的争端解决机制以及得到成员国同意的有约束力仲裁机制。


The system worked, because its major members recognized the legitimacy of independent panels, even if they sometimes deliver politically inconvenient judgments.	这个制度最终奏效了，因为它的主要成员国都承认各个独立（仲裁）小组的合法性，即便后者有时会做出一些在政治上挺棘手的判决。


Yet this recognition is now increasingly in doubt.	然而这种认识如今却越来越遭到怀疑。


Consider what type of economy would support a rules-based system.	试问究竟有哪种什么类型的经济体会支持一套基于规则的体系呢？


After WWII, the US supported such a system, because of its unassailable economic supremacy.	二战后的美国支持这么一套体系，因为它拥有无与伦比的经济优势。


An open rules-based system would also be highly appealing in a world comprising only small countries, none of which could hope to gain by relying on its relative economic power.	一套以规则为基础的公开体系在一个只存在小国的世界中也是非常有吸引力的，因为这些国家都不可能依靠其相对的经济实力来获得好处。


Things become more complicated when the global economy includes a small number of economies of similar size, larger than the small economies from the previous example, but not large enough to dominate the system alone.	当全球经济涵盖了少数几个规模相近，比上文中的小经济体要大却又不足以单独控制整个体系的经济体时，事情就变得更复杂了。


That is the scenario the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman considered in a 1989 paper on bilateralism, in which he reported that a world consisting of three major trading blocs constitutes the worst constellation for trade, as a lack of explicit cooperation among all three would lead to increasing trade barriers.	诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）在1989年发表的一篇关于双边主义的论文中指出一个由三大主要贸易集团组成的世界将会是最差劲的贸易组合，由于三者之间缺乏明确的合作关系，贸易壁垒将因此增加。


Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation in which the global economy finds itself today.	不幸的是，这正是全球经济的现状。


There are three dominant economies or trading blocs – China, the European Union, and the US – with very similar trade volumes (exports plus imports) of around $4 trillion each. (Japan, which was a strong contender 25 years ago, now has a much smaller trade volume.)	三大主要经济体/贸易集团——中国，欧盟和美国 ——的贸易量（出口量加进口量）都在4万亿美元左右（25年前的日本也是一个强有力的竞争者，但该国当前的贸易量就小太多了）。


Together, the G3 economies account for 40% of world trade and 45% of global GDP.	三方经济体合共占据了世界贸易的40％以及全球GDP的45％。


With economic power distributed in this way, explicit cooperation by all three actors is crucial.	在经济权力如此分配的状态下，所有三个行动者的明确合作就变得至关重要了。


Yet there are compelling reasons why they would be reticent to pursue such cooperation.	但也有着令人信服的理由来解释为何各方都不愿意推进这类合作，。


Even if Trump weren’t president, the current global trading system would present problems for the US, whose trade policy has long focused on manufactured goods. (Trade in raw materials has always been relatively free, and trade in agricultural goods has usually been considered special, and thus not subject to rules like the “most favored nation” principle, which applies to manufactures.)	即使特朗普不当选总统，目前的全球贸易体系也会给美国带来麻烦，因为美国的贸易政策长期以来都集中在制成品上（原料贸易一直都相对自由，农产品贸易通常被认为是特殊的，因此不受制于类似制造业“最惠国待遇”条款的那类规定）。


Because the US is now self-sufficient in energy, it needs to export fewer manufactured goods than industrialized countries with no domestic energy resources.	由于美国现在能源上实现了自给，因此无须像那些缺乏国内能源供应的工业国家那样出口那么多的制成品。


Annual US exports of manufactured goods thus now amount to only about $1 trillion annually – significantly less than both the EU and China, which export almost twice as much in manufactured goods, despite having somewhat smaller economies.	当前美国的年均制成品出口额仅为1万亿美元左右，远低于欧盟和中国，后两者虽然经济规模略小，但各自的制成品出口额几乎是美国的两倍。


To be sure, Trump is unlikely to start an outright trade war, because any US tariff would harm the interests of the country’s largest companies, which have invested huge sums in production facilities abroad.	可以肯定的是，特朗普不太可能发起一场惊天动地的贸易战，因为美国施加的任何关税都会损害本国那些大型企业的利益——它们在国外生产设施投资上可是花了大钱的。


Yet no individual firm will be willing to give up much of its political capital to defend the rules-based system, either, because it would have to bear the losses, while its competitors shared the gains.	同时也没有哪个企业愿意舍弃一大笔政治资本来维护基于规则的体系，因为它将不得不蒙受损失，而分享收益的却是竞争对手。


The same goes for the G3 trading blocs: if the EU expends political capital to stop the US from undermining WTO mechanisms, China (and the rest of world) will reap most of the gains.	三大贸易集团也是如此：如果欧盟花费政治资本阻止美国破坏WTO机制，最大的得益者就将是中国（以及世界其他地区）。


That dynamic goes some way toward explaining why China’s leaders, despite having proclaimed their support for the multilateral rules-based trading system, haven’t taken concrete action to reinforce it.	这种动态有助于解释为何中国领导人虽然宣称支持以多边规则为基础的贸易体系，却一直未能采取具体行动来对其加以强化。


Their reticence is probably intensified by the assumption that, within the current generation, their country will dominate the global economy; at that point, they might no longer want to be bound by somebody else’s rules.	而令他们更倾向于保持缄默的可能是这么一个假设：在这一代人的时间内他们的国家将主宰全球经济； 因此在这一点上，他们可能不再想受制于别人的规则。


It does not help matters that the Communist Party of China has recently been empowered even further in all areas of the economy, with all major firms now having to accept a CPC representative on their board.	更无奈的是中国共产党最近在国内各经济领域的权力都得到了进一步加强，以至于所有大企业如今都不得不接受在董事会里安插一个党代表席位。


It is difficult to see how a dominant economic power governed by a single party – especially one with such extensive control over the economy – would accept the primacy of international rules and procedures over domestic considerations.	很难想象一个由一党派执政的经济强国——尤其一个对经济有着如此广泛控制的政党——如何会让国际规则和程序凌驾于国内考虑因素之上。


The conclusion is clear. The world should prepare itself for the erosion of the rules-based trading system enshrined in the WTO.	结论其实很明确：世界是时候准备好迎来一个逐渐崩塌的WTO贸易体系了。


Ready or Not for the Next Recession?	准备好下一次衰退了吗？


COPENHAGEN – A sunny day is the best time to check whether the roof is watertight.	哥本哈根—艳阳天是检查天花板是否漏水最好的时候。


For economic policymakers, the proverbial sunny day has arrived: with experts forecasting strong growth, now is the best time to check whether we are prepared for the next recession.	对经济决策者来说，谚语中的艳阳天已经到来：专家们纷纷预测给力的增长，因此，这是检查我们是否为下一次衰退做好准备的最好时候。


The answer, for the United States in particular, is a resounding no.	答案——特别是对美国而言——是响亮的“否”。


Policymakers normally respond to recessions by cutting interest rates, reducing taxes, and boosting transfers to the unemployed and other casualties of the downturn.	决策者应对衰退的通常手段是降低利率、减少税收以及提高面向失业者和其他衰退受害者的转移支付。


But the US is singularly ill-prepared, for a combination of economic and political reasons, to respond normally.	但由于各种经济和政治原因，美国完全没有做好常规应对准备。


Most obviously, the US Federal Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate is still only 1.25%-1.5%.	最显而易见的是，美联储联邦基金利率目标仍然只有1. 25%—1.


If no recession is imminent, the Fed may succeed in raising rates three times by the end of the year, to around 2%.	5%。 如果近期不发生衰退，美联储可能到今年年底成功升息三次至2%左右。


But that would still leave little room for monetary easing in response to recessionary trends before the policy rate hits zero again.	但如果发生衰退性趋势，货币宽松到政策利率为零的程度仍然是杯水车薪。


In the last three recessions, the Fed’s cumulative interest-rate cuts have been close to five full percentage points.	在过去三次衰退中，美联储累计降息幅度都接近整整五个百分点。


This time, because slow recovery has permitted only gradual normalization of interest rates, and because there appears to have been a tendency for interest rates to trend downward more generally, the Fed lacks room to react.	这一次，由于慢复苏导致利率只能逐渐正常化，并且出现了一般性的利率下降趋势，美联储行动空间十分有限。


In principle, the Fed could launch another round of quantitative easing.	理论上，美联储可以发动新一轮量化宽松。


In addition, at least one of US President Donald Trump’s nominees to the Federal Reserve Board has mooted the idea of negative interest rates.	此外，在美国总统特朗普所提名的美联储理事人选中，至少有一人提出过负利率的概念。


That said, this Fed board, with its three Trump appointees, is likely to be less activist and innovative than its predecessor.	尽管如此，包括三位特朗普任命人选在内的美联储理事会不太可能会比上一届更加积极和创新。


And criticism by the US Congress of any further expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet would be certain and intense.	美国国会也肯定会激烈地批评美联储的任何进一步扩大资产负债表的举动。


Fiscal policy is the obvious alternative, but Congress has cut taxes at the worst possible time, leaving no room for stimulus when it is needed.	财政政策是显而易见的替代方案，但国会在最糟糕的时候选择了减税，这使得真正需要的时候不再有刺激空间。


Adding $1.5 trillion more to the federal debt will create an understandable reluctance to respond to a downturn with further tax cuts.	让联邦债务增加1. 5万亿美元将产生对衰退时期进一步减税的抵制反应，这一点不难理解。


As my Berkeley colleagues Christina and David Romer have shown, fiscal policy is less effective in countering recessions, and less likely to be used, when a country has already incurred a high public debt.	我的伯克利同事卡里斯蒂娜·罗默和大卫·罗默（Christina and David Romer）指出，如果一国已经积累了很高的公共债务，那么财政政策在抵御衰退方面效果较低，采用的可能性也较小。


Instead of stimulating the economy in the next downturn, the Republicans in Congress are likely to respond perversely.	国会中的共和党不太可能在下一次衰退中采取刺激经济的手段，而是会表现得更加顽固。


As revenues fall and the deficit widens even faster, they will insist on spending cuts to return the debt trajectory to its previous path.	随着收入的下降和赤字更快的增加，他们将把减支进行到底，让债务轨迹重回此前的轨道。


Congressional Republicans will most likely start with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which provides food to low-income households.	国会共和党最有可能拿补充营养援助计划（Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program，SNAP）开刀。


SNAP is already in their sights.	SNAP是一项低收入家庭提供食物的计划，目前已经被国会共和党盯上。


They will then proceed to cut Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.	接着，他们会把砍刀挥向医疗保险（Medicare）、医疗补助（Medicaid）和社会保险。


The burden of these spending cuts will fall on hand-to-mouth consumers, who will reduce their own spending dollar for dollar, denting aggregate demand.	这些减支措施的负担将落在无隔宿之粮的消费者头上，他们将一点一点地减少支出，从而拖累总需求。


For their part, state governments, forced by new limits on the deductibility of state and local taxes to pare their budgets, are likely to move further in the direction of limiting the duration of unemployment benefits and the extent of their own food and nutrition assistance.	至于州政府，迫于州和地方税抵扣的新限制吞噬了它们的预算，有可能进一步降低失业救济的领取时间，限制自身食品和营养补助的范围。


Nor will global conditions favor the US.	全球环境也不利于美国。


Foreign central banks, from Europe to Japan, have similarly scant room to cut interest rates. Even after a government in Germany is finally formed, policymakers there will continue to display their characteristic reluctance to use fiscal policy.	从欧洲到日本，外国央行也没有多少降息空间，即使德国政府最终组建成功，德国决策者也将继续其不喜欢动用财政政策的特点。


And if Germany doesn’t use its fiscal space, there will be little room for its eurozone partners to do so.	而如果德国不利用其财政空间，其欧元区伙伴国也将没有财政空间可用。


More than that, scope for the kind of international cooperation that helped to halt the 2008-2009 contraction has been destroyed by Trump’s “America First” agenda, which paints one-time allies as enemies.	不仅如此，帮助遏制了2008—2009年经济萎缩的国际合作已经被特朗普的“美国优先”日程毁于一旦。 “美国优先”方针将曾经的盟友列为敌人。


Other countries will work with the US government to counter the next recession only if they trust its judgment and intentions.	要想让其他国家和美国政府共同抵抗下一次衰退，唯有让它们相信它的判断和意图。


And trust in the US may be the quantity in shortest supply.	而对美国的信任度供给量严重短缺。


In 2008-2009, the Fed extended dollar swap lines to foreign central banks, but came under congressional fire for “giving away” Americans’ hard-earned money.	2008—2009年期间，美联储扩大了与外国央行的美元互换规模，但被国会抨击为“拱手送出”美国人民的辛苦钱。


Then, at the London G20 summit in early 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration made a commitment to coordinate its fiscal stimulus with that of other governments.	接着，在2009年年初的伦敦G20峰会上，总统奥巴马政府承诺与其他政府进行财政政策协作。


Today, almost a decade later, it is hard to imagine the Trump administration even showing up at an analogous meeting.	在金十年后的今天，很难想象特朗普政府会在类似的会议上哪怕是露一脸。


The length of an economic expansion is not a reliable predictor of when the next downturn will come.	经济扩张的长度并非下一次衰退何时到来的可靠预测指标。


And the depth and shape of that recession will depend on the event triggering it, which is similarly uncertain.	而衰退的深度和性质将取决于触发衰退的事件，同样具有不确定性。


The one thing we know for sure, though, is that expansions don’t last forever.	尽管如此，有一件事是笃定的，即，扩张不会永远持续下去。


A storm will surely come, and when it does, we will be poorly prepared for the deluge.	风暴肯定会到来，而当它真的来临时，我们将完全没有做好应对洪水的准备。


An Opportunity for the WTO	世贸组织的一个良机


ONTARIO – This December, trade ministers from around the world will converge in Buenos Aires for the World Trade Organization’s 11th Ministerial Conference.	发自安大略——十二月，世界各地的贸易部长将齐聚布宜诺斯艾利斯参加世界贸易组织（WTO）第十一次部长级会议。


With the United States, which has historically led the world toward trade liberalization, now actively stoking trade tensions, the meeting is set to be unlike any other.	但本届会议注定与往届有所不同，因为美国这个一直以来引领全球迈向贸易自由化的国家如今却在积极挑动贸易紧张局势了。


The WTO’s ministerial gatherings are never easy.	世贸组织部长级会议永远都不那么顺利。


Some kind of agreement is usually delivered, but only at the last minute, and its language is often vague.	会上通常能达成某些协议，但往往要等到最后一刻才形成共识，协议用词也大多模棱两可。


This time, however, the outcome might be even more disappointing, with delegates unable to reach even a symbolic agreement that they can tout with an aggressive marketing campaign.	然而本届结果可能更令人失望，代表们甚至无法达成一个令他们可以在大型选举造势活动中为自己脸上贴金的象征性协议。


The current tensions over free trade, rooted in the uneven distribution of its benefits, cannot be resolved within the WTO, let alone by a ministerial gathering.	目前自由贸易中的紧张局势源自于各方收益的分配不均，而这无法在WTO框架内解决，更不可能在部长级会议上找到答案。


But that doesn’t mean that the upcoming conference must be for naught.	但这并不意味着即将到来的会议注定毫无意义。


On the contrary, it should serve as a critical opportunity to initiate the update and recalibration that the WTO needs to remain an effective platform for international trade cooperation and consensus-building.	相反，如果世贸组织想要保持自身作为国际贸易合作和共识构建有效平台的地位，就必须借助这个关键机会实施所需的更新和重整。


One key problem that must be addressed relates to “special and differential treatment” (S&D).	其中必须解决的一个关键问题与“特殊和差别性待遇”有关。


About two thirds of the WTO’s 164 members have declared themselves developing countries – a label that entitles them to S&D provisions, including the authority to maintain trade tariffs for a longer period of time.	世贸组织164个成员中有2/3宣称自己是发展中国家，这个标签使他们有权获得一些优待，包括在更长时期内收取贸易关税的权力。


With the WTO lacking any benchmarks or indicators to determine when a country should be weaned off S&D, it is no surprise that no developing country has ever “developed.”	由于世贸组织并没有任何基准或指标来确定一个国家何时应该脱离特殊和差别性待遇，因此没有任何发展中国家会变成“发达”。


To be sure, since S&D was first introduced in 1979, many developing countries have grown richer. But they have shown no indication that they are ready to relinquish the benefits of S&D, even for industries that have become internationally competitive.	但自从1979年首次引进该条款以来，许多发展中国家早已发展壮大，可即便其国内某些行业已经具备国际竞争力，它们也没打算放弃这类优待所带来的利益。


It is hard to argue that all developing countries should enjoy the indefinite privilege of opting out of the WTO’s general obligations for all sectors of their economies.	很难说所有发展中国家都应享有无限期特权来避免承担世贸组织对其经济中所有部门所下达的一般义务。


And with so many of their WTO partners claiming preferential status, developed-country members often resist trade concessions within the organization, preferring to conduct negotiations in other forums.	而由于太多世贸组织合作伙伴都声称享有优惠地位，发达国家成员国往往会抵制组织框架内的贸易让步，而更愿意在其他平台上展开谈判。


The dynamic in the WTO stands in stark contrast to that within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	而世贸组织内部的动态则与国际货币基金组织和世界银行形成了鲜明对比。


At the WTO, developed countries would like to see big emerging markets take on more obligations, while developing countries resist.	在世贸组织中，发达国家希望看到各大新兴市场国家承担更多的义务，而发展中国家则抵制；


At the Bretton Woods institutions, developed countries are blocking emerging economies from gaining greater influence.	在布雷顿森林体系机构内，发达国家却在遏制新兴经济体获得更大的影响力。


But the two dynamics have something in common: intransigence, even if coming from different quarters, reflects a denial of reality.	但这两股动态存在一些共同点：即使来自不同阵营，却都反映了对现实的否定。


In the Bretton Woods institutions, the emerging economies are right that their increased economic weight should correlate with larger capital contributions and more weight in decision-making.	在布雷顿森林体系机构中，新兴经济体不断增大的经济体量应当与更大的出资比重和决策权重相关联。


In the WTO, S&D clearly needs to be updated to ensure that it benefits only countries that actually need it.	世贸组织的优待条款显然也需要更新，确保只有那些真正有需要的国家才能受益。


Ministers at the conference in Buenos Aires should thus be prepared to have an honest discussion about S&D.	因此布宜诺斯艾利斯会议的部长们应该准备针对优待条款展开诚布公的讨论。


A second topic that the WTO needs to address relates to consensus-building.	世贸组织需要处理的第二个议题涉及到共识的建立。


Under current WTO rules, most decisions can be adopted by a majority vote.	根据当前的世贸组织规则，大多数决策都可以通过多数赞成票来达成。


But the long-standing practice has been to adopt all decisions by consensus.	但长期以来的做法是以协商一致的方式来通过所有决策。


This is wise and should not change.	这是明智且无须改变的。


Though consensus-building can be slow and cumbersome, it is the only way to generate the legitimacy that WTO decisions need.	虽然建立共识可能冗长而繁琐，但这是世贸组织决策获取所需合法性的唯一途径。


A simple majority vote, after all, would fail to account for differences in market size.	毕竟简单的多数投票将无法体现市场规模的差异。


And weighted voting would undermine the WTO’s capacity to settle disputes by adjudicating rights and obligations among members of different size and political heft.	而加权投票则会破坏世贸组织通过对不同规模和政治影响力的成员之间的权利和义务进行裁定来解决争端的能力。


The problem is that consensus is interpreted as an unlimited veto power, such that a member can block any discussion on matters of interest to others.	但问题在于共识被曲解成了无限制的否决权，这样一个成员就可以阻止别人去讨论一切事关他人利益的问题。


A consensus-based approach can work only if it entails an obligation by all members to work toward shared interests, with members objecting formally only to decisions running counter to some fundamental interest.	如果某项共识能赋予所有成员国责任去追求共同利益，那么寻求公识的手段才能起作用，因为成员国只会对与某些根本利益相违背的决定提出正式反对。


The Paris climate agreement was made possible by a simple method called “Indaba,” adopted from the Zulu and Xhosa people of South Africa. Negotiators had the right to withhold consent, but only if they put forth alternate proposals aimed at finding common ground.	巴黎气候协议就是借助南非祖鲁和科萨人称为“因达巴会议（Indaba）”的简单方法达成的——谈判者有权拒绝共识，但只能是在提出旨在寻求共同点的替代建议之后。


If Indaba worked in Paris, it could also work at the WTO.	如果因达巴可以在巴黎奏效，那么当然也可以用在世贸组织上。


In Buenos Aires, ministers should discuss how to ensure that WTO members responsibly exercise their right to block decisions.	在布宜诺斯艾利斯，部长们应讨论如何确保世贸组织成员负责地行使其否决权。


The final issue that ministers should be prepared to discuss in Buenos Aires is the need to ensure that the WTO adapts effectively to a changing international environment.	部长们应该在布宜诺斯艾利斯讨论的最后一个问题是如何确保世贸组织能有效适应不断变化的国际环境。


The problems with both S&D and consensus decision-making at the WTO are not new, but they have long been ignored, allowing them to deepen.	世贸组织的特殊和差别性待遇以及共识决策问题长期存在，却又一直被忽视以致不断恶化。


This would not have happened if incremental reform was ingrained in the WTO’s regular activities.	如果渐进式改革能根植于世贸组织的日常活动中，这种情况就不会发生了。


Both the IMF and the World Bank have policy watchdogs that regularly scrutinize and evaluate their functioning.	国际货币基金组织和世行都有设有政策监督机构来定期审查和评估自身的运作。


Running on very small budgets, these ruthless truth-tellers regularly force their institutions’ leaders to have honest discussions about organizational effectiveness and possible reforms.	这些真相的无情揭露者不需多少运行经费，却能经常迫使本机构的领导层就组织效率和可能实施的改革开展诚恳的讨论。


Such an independent office for evaluation is precisely what the WTO needs.	而这样一个独立评估办公室正是世贸组织所需要的。


The WTO cannot sweep its problems under the carpet forever.	世贸组织不可能永远掩盖自己的问题。


The question is whether it will undertake the reforms it needs now or wait until a costly crisis leaves it no choice.	问题在于它能否立刻进行所需的改革，还是等待一场巨大的危机将其逼到墙角。


China’s Contradictions	中国的各类矛盾


NEW HAVEN – China’s quinquennial Communist Party congresses are that rare event where ritual and dogma combine with introspection and strategy. The 19th National Congress, which began on October 18, is no exception.	发自纽黑文——五年一度的中共全国代表大会是一场罕见地将仪式、教条和内省、战略相结合的事件，而10月18日召开的十九大也不例外。


Notwithstanding the suspense over potential changes in Party leadership, which typically occur at the end of the meeting, President Xi Jinping’s political report, delivered on the opening day, was a high-impact event.	尽管悬念总是被放在会议末段的中共高层领导班子调整上，但习近平总书记在开幕当天的政治报告也是一个具备高度影响力的事件。


Significantly, it says as much about the Party as it does about Xi.	值得注意的是，报告用了跟谈论习近平一样的篇幅来谈论党。


As Alice Miller, a leading Sinologist at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, emphasizes, the report was carefully crafted over a one-year period to convey the consensus of the Party’s highest organ, the 205-member Central Committee.	正如斯坦福大学胡佛研究所的知名中国研究家爱丽丝·米勒（Alice Miller）所强调的那样，这份精心攥写了一年的报告就是用来传达由205人组成的中共中央委员会（也是中共最高领导机关）的共识。


Three conclusions from Xi’s address are particularly important.	习近平的三个结论尤为重要。


For starters, the ideological underpinnings of “Xi Jinping Thought” have been raised to the same lofty level as those of “Mao Zedong Thought,” effectively elevating Xi over his three predecessors – Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and even the revered Deng Xiaoping.	首先，“习近平思想”已经被提升到与“毛泽东思想”相同的崇高水平，实际上超越了他的三位前任：胡锦涛，江泽民，甚至是威望极高的邓小平。


Much has been written about Xi’s consolidation of power since he was appointed General Secretary in November 2012. But this elevation makes it official.	我们已经看过有很多关于习近平自从2012年11月被任命为党总书记以来如何巩固权力的文章报道，但这一提升使其被正式确定下来。


After only five years in office, the Party leadership has anointed Xi as one of modern China’s two greatest historic figures.	仅仅在位五年时间，党的领导层就已经将习近平拔高成了现代中国的两大历史人物之一。


Second, the political report speaks with great confidence about a China that has now entered a “New Era.” But by underscoring the Chinese adage that the “…last leg of a journey just marks the halfway point,” Xi sketched an even more ambitious future.	第二，这份政治报告以充满信心的语气谈论了现在进入“新时代”的中国，但通过强调“行百里者半九十”这句格言，习近平描绘了一个更加雄心勃勃的未来。


China’s sights are now set on two goals – completing the task of building the so-called moderately prosperous society by 2035, and then establishing its position as a Great Power by 2050.	中国的目光现在放在两个目标上——到2035年完成建设所谓小康社会的任务（报告原文为“在全面建成小康社会的基础上，再奋斗十五年，基本实现社会主义现代化”），然后在2050年前建成一个强国。


Unlike China’s goal-setting exercises in the past, there are no quantitative targets attached to these “twin centenary goals” (which roughly align with the Party’s founding in 1921 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949). They celebrate the long-awaited national rejuvenation that Xi has dubbed the China Dream.	跟中国过去的目标制定做法不同，这两个“百年奋斗目标”（与1921年中共建党和1949年中华人民共和国成立时间大致配对）并没有提出任何量化指标，只是颂扬了期待已久的民族复兴（习近平称之为“中国梦”）。


The third point is perhaps the most intriguing.	第三点可能是最有趣的。


This is couched in the form of China’s “principal contradiction” – a Marxist concept that serves as an admission of a fundamental problem requiring resolution.	这体现在关于中国“主要矛盾”形式的措辞上——这是一个用以提出亟待解决之根本问题的马克思主义概念。


The principal contradiction, while typically elliptical and ambiguous, frames a rich discussion of risks and opportunities, strategy and tactics, reforms and governance – all of which will shape China’s prospects for the foreseeable future.	这一主要矛盾的表述虽然通常是隐晦且模凌两可的，但却会构成对关于风险/机遇、战略/手段和改革/治理的丰富讨论，所有这些都将在可预见的未来塑造中国的前景。


The big news is that, under Xi’s leadership, the Party has revised its principal contradiction for the first time since 1981. Whereas the contradiction had previously been framed as a tradeoff between the needs of the people and China’s “backward social production,” it is now viewed as a tension between “unbalanced and inadequate development” and the “people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.”	最重要的是，在习近平的领导下中共自1981年以来首次修改了对主要矛盾的描述，该矛盾从前被认为是人民日益增长的物质文化需求和“落后生产力”之间的折衷，如今被修改为“不平衡不充分的发展”和“人民日益增长的美好生活需要”之间的紧张关系。


This restatement of the principal contradiction has not emerged from thin air.	这个主要矛盾的重述并不是空穴来风。


It clearly signals a far-reaching change in national perspective – from that of a poor developing country to that of an increasingly prosperous society focused on becoming a Great Power.	其清楚地展现了关于中国国家视野的一个重大变化 ——从贫穷的发展中国家再到一个旨在成为强国的逐渐富裕社会。


It is also consistent with the critique of former Premier Wen Jiabao, who in March 2007 famously warned of a Chinese economy that was becoming increasingly “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and [ultimately] unsustainable.”	这也跟前总理温家宝的评论是一致的，他在2007年3月曾经警告说，中国经济越来越“不稳定，不平衡，不协调，并（最终）不可持续”。


Over the past ten years, two five-year plans – the 12th, enacted in 2011, and the 13th, enacted in 2016 – plus a major set of reforms adopted at the so-called Third Plenum in 2013, have aimed to resolve China’s persistent and worrisome imbalances.	在过去十年来出台的两个五年计划（2011年颁布的十二五和2016年颁布的十三五），加上2013年召开的十八届三中全会所通过的一系列改革，都旨在解决中国持续存在且令人忧虑的失衡问题。


Xi’s political report doesn’t alter the main thrust of those efforts.	习近平的政治报告并未改变这一系列努力的主旨。


The real significance is that rebalancing is now enshrined within the Party’s ideological underpinnings. It is a foundational pillar of Xi Jinping Thought.	真正重大的意义在于再平衡现在已经被纳入了党的思想基础之内，也是习近平思想的基础支柱。


The political report’s focus on China’s principal contradiction also raises important questions about what still may be missing from the Party’s long-term strategy.	政治报告对中国主要矛盾的关注也引发了关与党的长期战略中仍然缺失哪些内容的重大问题。


Three “secondary contradictions” are especially striking on the economic front.	而对此三个“次要矛盾”在经济方面尤为突出。


First, there is ongoing tension between the role of the state and that of markets in guiding resource allocation.	首先，国家与市场在指导资源配置方面所扮演的角色依然存在冲突。


This was a glaring contradiction of the 2013 Third Plenum reforms, which focused on the seemingly inconsistent combination of a “decisive role” for markets and steadfast support for state ownership.	在2013年十八届三中全会改革中曾提到过一个明显矛盾，重点在于市场的“决定性作用”和对国家所有权的坚定支持这两者看似不协调的组合。


The Party has long believed that these two features of economic life are compatible – the so-called blended economy with Chinese characteristics.	长期以来，党始终认为经济生活的这两大特征是可以兼容的——也就是所谓中国特色的混合所有制经济。


Xi’s political report praises the mixed ownership model and also aspires to an economy led by great firms with unmatched global competitive prowess. But it glosses over the thorny issue of state-owned enterprise reform that may be required to resolve this contradiction and avoid the Japanese “zombie” problem of a chronic debt overhang.	习近平的政治报告赞扬了这一混合所有制模式，也渴望建立一个以具备压倒性全球竞争实力的伟大企业为主导的经济，但报告掩盖了解决这一矛盾以及避免日本式“僵尸企业”长期欠债问题所需的棘手国企改革。


Second, there is the tension between supply and demand.	二是供需矛盾紧张。


Consistent with other recent pronouncements of senior Chinese officials, the political report leaves little doubt that supply-side structural reforms are now the highest priority of economic policymakers.	与最近中国高层官员的其他声明一致，政治报告认为供应方面的结构改革无疑是经济决策者当前的首要任务。


The related emphasis on productivity, innovation, pruning excess capacity, and moving up the value chain in manufacturing and services are underscored as key building blocks of this effort.	对提高生产率，创新，削减过剩产能以及向制造业和服务价值链上游迈进的相关强调也是这一努力的重要组成部分。


At the same time, the report de-emphasizes consumer spending and services – now buried deep in the list of priorities for a modernized economy.	与此同时，该报告放弃了对消费者支出和服务的强调——这项事务如今已经在建设现代化经济的优先事项中排名末尾了。


Yet focusing on supply without paying equal attention to the foundations of aggregate demand is a puzzling and potentially worrisome disconnect.	然而，关注供应却不重视那些构建总需求的基础是一个令人困惑且有可能在将来引发担忧的缺失。


A final secondary tension can be found in the contrast between the path and the destination.	最后一个次要矛盾可以在路径和目的地之间的对比中找到。


Notwithstanding all the self-congratulatory flourishes in Xi’s political report, there is good reason to believe that the Chinese economy is only in the early stages of its long-heralded structural transformation.	尽管习近平的政治报告充斥着自我表扬，但有理由相信中国经济依然处于其长期鼓吹的结构转型的早期阶段。


Its services sector is growing rapidly, but is still embryonic, accounting for just 52% of GDP.	其服务业正在快速增长，但仍处于初创阶段，仅占GDP的52％。


And household consumption, which is also growing rapidly, is still less than 40% of GDP.	家庭消费虽然也在快速增长，也还不不足GDP的40％。


China may well be on a path to a New Normal or a New Era.	中国或许已经走上了一个迈向新常态或新时代的道路。


But the final destination remains far down the road, with many contradictions to be resolved during the journey.	但最终目的地依然遥远，旅途中也会有许多矛盾需要解决。


The GDP-Wellbeing Gap	GDP-幸福差异


KUALA LUMPUR – The link between economic growth and human wellbeing seems obvious.	吉隆坡—经济增长和人类幸福之间的联系似乎是显而易见的。


Indeed, as measured by gross domestic product, economic growth is widely viewed as the ultimate development objective.	事实上，用国内生产总值衡量的经济增长被广泛认为是终极发展目标。


But it is time to rethink this approach.	应该反思一下这一观点。


In fact, there is a rising disconnect between countries’ per capita GDP and their citizens’ wellbeing, as rapid output growth exacerbates health challenges and erodes environmental conditions.	事实上，一国人均GDP与其人民幸福之间的联系正在日渐减弱，因为快速增长的产出放大了健康挑战、侵蚀了环境条件。


Given this, people increasingly value non-material wealth just as highly as monetary wealth, if not more.	因此，人们日益向看重货币财富那样看重非物质财富。


But persuading policymakers and politicians of GDP’s limitations is no easy feat.	但说服决策者和政客接受GDP的局限决非易事。


After all, it is far simpler to defend a well-understood, long-accepted framework than it is to champion a new worldview.	毕竟，捍卫一个易于理解并且被长期接受的框架比提出一套新的世界观简单得多。


To be sure, GDP provides valuable information about a country’s production, expenditure, and income streams, as well as the flow of goods across borders.	平心而论，GDP提供了关于一国生产、支出和收入流以及跨境商品流的极有价值的信息。


Moreover, it has provided crucial guidance to countries, helping them to track economic gains that have improved citizens’ quality of life considerably – in many cases lifting them out of destitution.	此外，GDP还为各国提供关键指导，有助于它们追踪极大改善公民生活质量——在许多情形里，还帮助他们摆脱了贫困——的经济成果。


But GDP fails to account for changes in a country’s stock of assets, making it difficult for policymakers to balance economic, social, and environmental concerns.	但GDP没有考虑一国资本存量的变化，导致决策者难以平衡经济、社会和环境问题。


Without better measures of wellbeing – including health, education, and the state of the natural environment – policymakers cannot gain the insights that they need to ensure the long-term health of the economy and the individuals who comprise it.	没有更好的幸福指标——包括健康、教育和自然环境状态等——决策者就无法获得所需的信息确保经济以及组成经济的个体的长期健康。