Offering to sell more weapons to the Gulf countries, as Obama is certain to do this week, is likely to embolden regional players, further inflaming the situation.	像奥巴马本周肯定会做的那样提出向海湾国家出售更多武器只会给地区国家壮胆，并进一步激化局势。


He would likely accomplish far more if, instead, he offered an explicit promise that the US would come to the GCC countries’ defense against external aggression in all its forms.	而如果他给出美国将在海湾合作委员会成员国遭受一切形式的外来侵略时提供保护的明确承诺却有可能对局势更为有利。


Such a move would not be unprecedented.	这样的举动并非没有先例。


US presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan offered similar guarantees, and Obama would be reiterating and strengthening this commitment while taking into account Iran’s potential use of non-state actors.	美国总统卡特和里根都曾提出过类似的保障，而奥巴马则是在考虑到伊朗有可能使用非国家主体的前提下再次重申并强化这一承诺。


Such a declaration would put Iran on notice and go a considerable way toward calming Saudi King Salman’s anxiety.	这样的声明可以明确警告伊朗并在很大程度上安抚沙特国王萨尔曼的焦虑情绪。


In return, the US could obtain concessions on domestic and regional fronts.	作为回报，美国有可能得到国内及地区事务的多方面让步。


There is a long history of American interest in domestic Saudi matters.	美国在沙特国内事务中保持利益曾经有悠久的历史。


US involvement was especially heavy during the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford and lasted until the 1990s.	美国的参与直到20世纪90年代才告一段落，而在约翰·肯尼迪和杰拉尔德·福特两位总统执政时则达到鼎盛时期。


The Kingdom has recently embarked on a major reform of its government and restructuring of its economy.	沙特王国最近开始实行改革政府和调整经济结构的重大措施。


The US could insist that, as part of this effort, the Kingdom strengthen political accountability and the transparency of its allocation of oil revenues.	美国可以坚决要求作为改革���施的组成部分，王国应强化其政治问责制并公开其石油收入分配。


Carrying out these reforms would secure the monarchy’s longevity and ensure the country’s stability.	实行上述改革将保障君主制长久存在并确保国家的稳定局势。


The US could also prevail upon the Saudi government to start negotiating with Iran, reducing tensions on a broad range of fronts, including Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.	美国还可以说服沙特政府开始与伊朗谈判，缓解伊拉克、黎巴嫩、巴林和也门等一系列问题上的紧张局势。


The wars in Iraq and Syria will not end until Iran and Saudi Arabia come to an accommodation, which will require US mediation.	伊朗和沙特握手言和前伊拉克和叙利亚战争将不会结束，而美国的斡旋在这两国达成妥协时将发挥重要作用。


If the Middle East is allowed to continue on its present drift, without American leadership, US military intervention – most likely sooner rather than later – will become a near-certainty.	如果允许中东在不受美国领导的情况下按照目前的局势发展下去，那么美国军事干预——最大可能是宜早不宜迟——将近乎无法避免。


Saudi Arabia and Iran may one day find a way to share the Middle East, but only if the US is there to act as an umpire.	只有美国在那里充当裁判，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗才有可能有找到共享中东方法的一天。


Battleground Budget	预算战场


MILAN – The world’s developed economies, of which the United States is by far the largest and systemically most important, face a range of difficult political and social choices.	米兰—以美国为最大、最具系统重要性的发达国家面临着一系列艰难的政治和社会选择。


President Barack Obama’s proposed US budget acknowledges and addresses those choices and tradeoffs directly and fully for the first time in the post-crisis period.	奥巴马总统的美国预算草案直接而全面地承认并列出了这些选择和权衡，这是危机后时期以来的首次。


Obama’s proposal is an important, honest, and politically courageous document.	奥巴马的草案是一份重要、诚实和充满了政治勇气的文件。


The debate that follows will largely determine whether the US shifts toward a strong, inclusive, and sustainable pattern of growth and employment, and how the burden of moving to such a path will be shared by Americans of various ages, educational levels, incomes, and wealth.	随之而来的争论将在极大程度上决定美国是否会朝着强劲、包容且可持续的增长和就业模式转变以及转变的负担如何在不同年龄、教育水平、收入和财富的美国人之间分担。


We know that powerful technological and global market forces have reduced dramatically the number of routine professional and blue-collar jobs, shifted employment options for the middle class toward the non-tradable side of the economy, and channeled growth in national income toward capital and high-end employment, with stagnating income elsewhere.	我们知道，强大的技术和全球市场力量大大减少了传统行业和蓝领工作岗位，让中产阶级的就业选择朝经济的不可贸易端转移，并使国民收入增长偏向资本和高端就业者，而其他人的收入陷入了停滞。


Job creation remains weak, and employment continues to diverge from growth.	就业创造依然疲软，就业依然和增长南辕北辙。


These trends cannot be blamed entirely on poor policy choices or shortsighted government.	这些趋势不能完全归咎于拙劣的政治选择或短视的政府。


They arise mainly from an increasingly integrated global economy’s shifting technological landscape; but they have been exacerbated by a systematic pattern of public-sector underinvestment.	它们出现的主要原因是日益一体化的全球经济向技术端转移，但系统性的公共部门投资不足加剧了这些趋势。


The lesson from many developed and developing countries is that underinvestment in infrastructure, human capital, institutions, and the economy’s knowledge and technology base reduces long-term growth.	许多发达和发展中国家的教训是，基础设施、人力资源、制度和经济的知识和技术基础的投资不足会抑制长期增长。


Short- and medium-term growth can be sustained for a while by substituting public and private debt for investment – that is, borrowing against future income and consumption.	中短期增长可以通过用公私债务替代投资维持，即用未来收入和消费为抵押借钱。


But this approach establishes a self-limiting pattern, because balance sheets are damaged, demand falters, and expectations have to be adjusted downward.	但这种方法会形成一种自我局限的模式，因为资产负债表受到了损坏，需求得不到提振，而预期不得不向下修正。


This brings us to the choices that Obama’s budget embodies.	这就让我们面临着奥巴马的预算方案。


First there is the issue of how fast to reduce government deficits and the accumulation of public debt.	首先，存在多快减少政府赤字和公共债务积累的问题。


Sudden fiscal contraction would reduce domestic aggregate demand faster than the economy’s deleveraging and structural shifts could replace it, thereby killing off growth and hiring, with adverse feedback effects on budget deficits.	突然的财政收缩拉低国内总需求的速度会快于经济去杠杆化和结构变化弥补需求损失的速度，造成预算赤字的负反馈效应。


But delaying the debt reckoning for too long would undermine confidence in the US government’s capacity for fiscal discipline.	但将债务清算推迟过长时间会侵蚀人们对美国政府财政纪律执行力的信心。


Deficits have to fall within a time horizon of 5-10 years.	预算必须在5—10年的时间框架内下降。


The alternative is either a sovereign-debt crisis, followed by a destructive spike in borrowing costs, or a growing burden for subsequent generations of taxpayers.	否则要么发生主权债务危机并继之以借贷成本的急剧上升； 要么大大加重子孙后代纳税人的负担。


In an ideal world, where compromise is unnecessary, US fiscal policy would maintain the commitments embedded in the social-welfare system, even as demographic and other forces drive up costs (especially for health care).	在理想世界中，并不非得做出妥协不可，美国财政政策可以守住社会福利系统的承诺，即便人口和其他因素抬高成本（特别是医疗）。


It would also maintain current consumptions levels and avoid tax increases, while redressing public-investment shortfalls in order to boost growth and expand employment options for today’s middle class and future generations.	美国财政政策还能守住当前消费水平，避免增税，同时修正公共部门投资短缺以提振增长、扩大当今中产阶级和未来子孙后代的就业选择。


Finally, future generations would not be asked to bear the entire burden of rebalancing.	最后，未来子孙后代也不必承担再平衡的全部重担。


Obviously, it is impossible to reconcile all of these objectives.	显然，协调所有这些目标是不可能的任务。


To be fair, some reforms – including tax, regulatory, and health-care measures – will help to restore balance without imposing large additional costs on the public sector.	平心而论，一些改革——包括税收、监管和卫生方面的措施——有助于在不给公共部门带来额外高成本的 同时重新实现平衡。


But these are not sufficient to rebalance the economy and restore its growth momentum.	但这些改革不足以再平衡经济并重塑增长动能。


Simply put, one cannot sustain current levels of consumption and entitlements without crowding out public-sector investment, unless one believes that the state’s borrowing power is unlimited, and that the intergenerational burden shift is unimportant.	简言之，你无法在不挤出私人部门投资的情况下维持现有的消费和福利水平，除非你认为国家借贷能力是无限的，代际负担转移也是无关紧要的。


So choices have to be made.	因此必须做出选择。


Gridlock, too, implies a choice – one that ensures that some version of the status quo will be the outcome.	僵局也意味着选择——一个确保某个版本的现状将成为结果的选择。


What would that look like?	结果会怎样？


Here some guess work is required.	有人认为这需要费一番功夫。


Entitlement programs would likely be reduced, but not enough to offset a substantial intergenerational burden transfer.	福利项目可能会被削减，但不可能减到足以抵消巨大的代际负担转移的程度。


Taxes might rise somewhat in the high-income ranges, with the proceeds going to fund entitlements and redistribution.	高收入范围的税收可能会有一定程度的增加，从而为福利和再分配提供资金。


The desire to avoid substantial tax increases (and to sustain consumption levels) will almost surely be reflected in a continuing shortfall of public-sector investment, in turn undermining long-term growth. 	避免大幅增税（和维持消费水平）的愿望几乎肯定将反映在公共部门持续短缺中，而这反过来会阻碍长期增长。


Obama’s proposed budget recognizes that all objectives and expectations cannot be met, and that growth is partly a distributional issue now and an intergenerational issue (and potentially one of inclusiveness and social stability) in the longer term.	奥巴马的预算草案认识到，不可能所有目标和预期同时达到，从现在看，增长从某种程度上说是一个分配问题，而从长期看，它是一个代际问题（也是潜在的包容性和社会稳定性问题）。


It is an invitation to the US Congress and the American public to acknowledge and address the choices and tradeoffs that are needed to establish a sustainable pattern of economic growth – and to ensure a fair distribution of the burden of getting there.	这无异于要美国国会和美国公众承认并列出建立可持续经济增长模式——以及确保达到这一目标的负担被公平分担——所必须的选择和权衡。


The choices are more extreme in countries where the imbalances are more severe and markets suffer more policy-induced impediments to the private-sector flexibility, mobility, and dynamism that continue to benefit the US.	在失衡更严重，市场遭遇更多政策妨碍私人部门灵活性、流动性和活力（这些因素仍在使美国受益）的问题的国家，面临的选择更加极端。


In Italy and Spain, growth is negative, and youth unemployment is 35% and 55%, respectively.	在意大利和西班牙，增长处于负区间，年轻人失业分别高达35%和55%。


To be sure, this is a moral issue, but it is also an issue of political and social stability.	诚然，这是个道德问题，但这也是个政治和社会稳定性问题。


Every country has its own version of a social contract that defines the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the role of the state, and the idea of inclusiveness.	每个国家都有自身的社会契约，社会契约规定了公民的权利和义务、国家的角色以及关于包容性的观念。


The most successful public policies and fiscal choices are those that are not only guided by the enduring values embedded in the social contract, but that are also adapted to changing demographic, technological, and global circumstances.	最成功的公共政策和财政选择不但要以社会契约中久经考验的价值为指导，也要适应变化的人口、技术和全球环境。


That sometime means making hard choices of the type that the US and many other developed countries are facing now.	总有一天，这将意味着做出美国和其他许多发展中国家现在所面临的艰难选择。


If we make these choices poorly, growth will suffer and future distributional choices will be far more painful.	如果我们的选择做得不成功，增长将会遭受打击，未来分配选择将极其痛苦。


Obama’s China Card?	奥巴马的中国牌？


MELBOURNE – According to the United States Federal Reserve, Americans’ net worth has fallen 40% since 2007, returning to its 1992 level.	墨尔本——据美联储统计，美国人的资产净值自2007年以来下降百分之四十，跌回了1992年的水平。


Progress towards recovery will be slow and difficult, and the US economy will be weak throughout the run-up to November’s presidential and congressional elections.	若要恢复到以往水平，这个过程将会是缓慢且艰辛，从总统和国会大选的准备阶段到结束，美国经济在这段时间内将会变得薄弱。


Can any incumbent – and especially President Barack Obama – win re-election in such conditions?	会否有现任的领导人，尤其是奥巴马总统，在如此不利的环境中再次获选？


To be sure, the blame for America’s malaise lies squarely with Obama’s predecessors: Bill Clinton, for encouraging the Fed to take its eye off financial-market supervision and regulation, and George W. Bush, for his costly wars, which added massively to US government debt.	可以确定的是，美国如今的窘况与奥巴马的前任有着很大关系：柯林顿，他鼓励联邦政府放宽对金融市场的管理和忽视市场规则； 乔治布什，他发动的高成本战争大大加重了美国政府的债务。


But, come Election Day, many (if not most) Americans are likely to ignore recent history and vote against the incumbent.	但是，当选举日来临时，很多（就算不是大部分）美国人都倾向于忽略近年来的历史，给现任者投反对票。


Given this, it would not be surprising if Obama and others in his administration were seeking non-economic issues to energize his campaign.	如果事实真如此，那么奥巴马和他在任期间的其他行政人员在寻求非经济方法去活跃他的选举活动就不足为奇了。


National-security problems in general, and the challenge posed by China in particular, may be shaping up as just such issues.	广泛存在的国家安全问题，尤其是中国带来的挑战，有可能演变为这些非经济手段。


Obama’s foreign and defense policies have been assertive, to say the least, especially in the Middle East and the Pacific.	奥巴马的对外和国防政策一向以来都是武断的，至少可以这么说，尤其是在中东和太平洋地区。 他比布什还要发起更多的无人机袭击；


He has sanctioned far more unmanned drone strikes than Bush did; extended the security services’ intrusion into Americans’ privacy; allowed the CIA to continue its rendition program; approved trials of accused terrorists by flawed military tribunals; and has not shut Guantánamo Bay.	他允许中央情报局继续它的引渡计划； 他同意有缺陷的军事审判机关审判被指控的恐怖分子；


Moreover, the US is increasing its troop presence in the Pacific at a time when it already has more military force in the region than all other countries combined.	除此之外，美国在太平洋地区驻扎的军队比其他国家所驻扎的总数还要多，在此情况下，美国正在继续加派驻军。


Six aircraft carriers, with their accompanying support vessels – indeed, 60% of America’s entire navy – are now stationed in the Pacific.	有六架航空母舰和跟随它们的支援船——事实上，美所有的海军中，有百分之六十驻扎在太平洋地区。


In addition, Obama’s administration has been conducting talks with the Philippines to increase and enhance naval cooperation.	此外，奥巴马政府一直和菲律宾进行对话，为了增加和加强海军合作。


And Singapore has been persuaded to host four advanced naval ships.	新加坡已被说服购买四艘先进的海军军舰。


Australia has established a base for marines in Darwin and another for unmanned spy planes on the Cocos Islands.	澳大利亚已在达尔文建立了海军基地，还为无人驾驶间谍飞机于科科斯群岛另建了一个基地。


That is not all.	这还不止。


In a move that has received little or no publicity, congressional Republicans added a clause to the Defense Appropriation Bill for next year requiring the Obama administration to consult with countries in the Western Pacific about stationing even more forces – including tactical nuclear weapons – in the region.	在一个几乎得不到公众支持的运动中，国会的共和党人在下一年的国防经费法案当中增加了一条规定，要求奥巴马政府和西太平洋国家就加派驻军进行协商——包括在该地区的战略性核武器。


Senator Richard Lugar has advised me that since there has been little or no objection to the amendment from the White House, he sees no reason why it will not pass the Senate.	参议员理查德鲁嘉向我表示，说既然白宫的修正案几乎没有遭到反对，他不觉得有任何理由不通过参议院法案。


At a recent security conference in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta emphasized the American military build-up in the region.	在最近新加坡的安全会议上，美国国防部部长莱昂潘内达强调美国在太平洋地区的军队建立。


Afterwards, he went to Vietnam, allegedly for discussions about the US Navy’s use of Cam Ranh Bay, a major American base during the Vietnam War.	之后，他到访越南，据说是为了和越南谈论美国使用金兰湾进行海军活动，该地是美国在越南战争中的一个主要基地。


The US, like Australia, denies that all of this adds up to a policy of containment aimed at China.	美国，像澳大利亚一样，否认所有的这一切都是源于针对中国的遏制政策。


But few in the Western Pacific see it that way.	但在西太平洋有极少国家看到了这一点。


Panetta’s visit to Vietnam followed hard on US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Beijing for strategic and economic talks.	潘内达是紧跟着美国国务卿希拉里克林顿到访问北京进行战略性经济谈话而出访越南的。


Those talks seemed to go well, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the US is pursuing a two-track policy: talks, yes, but a build-up and repositioning of US military power in the Pacific just in case.	那些谈话似乎进展顺利，但我们可以越来越清楚地看到美国正寻求一种双轨政策：谈话，确实有，但背后却是美国在太平洋地区军事力量的建立和阵地转移。


All of this is happening at a time when China is preparing for a change of leadership.	这些事件都在中国正准备领导人换届的时候发生。


I happen to believe that the political transition will occur smoothly.	这次我相信政治过渡会顺利进行。


Others suggest that it will be – and already is – a difficult period of turmoil and uncertainty.	其他人提出领导人换届将会是——并且已经是——一个动荡和充满不确定性的艰难时期。


The Obama administration may believe that toughness directed at China will generate electoral support in the US.	奥巴马政府可能相信指向中国的强硬措施会使中国在美国的选举中支持它。


During major international incidents or crises, America has seldom voted against an incumbent president.	在主要的国际事件和危机当中，美国人们很少向现任总统投反对票。


But has he properly reckoned with how provocative his policies are to China?     	但他有否正确地思考过他针对中国的政策是多么的充满挑衅性？


None of this is meant to suggest that the Pacific region does not need America.	这绝不是要暗示太平洋地区不需要美国。


But, while America obviously has a significant role to play in the region, the US should have learned by now that its political objectives are unlikely to be achieved by military means.	但是，在美国在该地区扮演一个明显的重要角色是，至今它应该知道它的政治目标是不可能通过军事手段而达到的。


The Chinese themselves do not want the Americans to leave the Western Pacific, as that would make smaller countries on China’s periphery even more nervous about Chinese power.	中国本身并不希望美国军队撤离西太平洋，因为这样会让中国周边的小国对中国的力量感到更加紧张。


China is mature enough to understand this; nonetheless, a major US military build-up throughout the region is another matter.	中国已足够成熟去明白到这一点； 但是，美国在这地区驻军却是另一回事。


These are dangerous days, not only economically, but also strategically.	这是危险时期，不仅仅是经济上的，而且是战略上的。


We really do need to ask whether Obama is trying to play a China card to shift the electoral scales in his favor.	我们真的需要问一问奥巴马是否正在努力地打一副中国牌去让选举有利于他。


If that is his intention, it is a move fraught with great danger.	如果这是他的目的，那么这举动会带有危险。


Australia should be saying to the US that it will have none of this.	澳大利亚应该提醒美国，它将不会达成它的目的。


I would sooner abrogate the ANZUS Treaty with New Zealand and the US – that is, I would sooner end defense cooperation with the US – than allow nuclear missiles to be sited on Australian territory.	我会尽快废除和新西兰以及美国订立的澳新美安全条约——那就是，我会尽快结束和美国的国防合作——在核导弹澳大利亚领土上发射之前。


The current Australian government would not take such a step, and the opposition would be unlikely to do so as well.	当今的澳大利亚政府不会采取这一步措施，反对党也不可能这样做。


But more and more Australians are beginning to question the closeness and wisdom of our strategic ties to the US.	但越来越多的澳洲人开始质疑我们和美国关系的亲密性和明智性。


Perhaps our best hope for stability and peace lies in China’s refusal to be provoked.	可能我们对稳定与和平最好的希望建立在中国拒绝接受挑衅上。


The Chinese understand the game being played.	中国明白游戏正在进行。


I suspect that they will remain on the sidelines during the US election campaign.	我怀疑他们仍然会在美国的选举当中保持局外人的角色。


Obama’s Chinese Balance Sheet	奥巴马的中国资产负债表


CAMBRIDGE, UK – US President Barack Obama’s first trip to China was like a splendid stage play.	发自剑桥——美国总统奥巴马的首次中国之行就像一场辉煌无比的舞台表演。


The performance was long rehearsed in both Washington and Beijing, because both governments needed at least the appearance of a successful visit.	这场大舞台剧在北京和华盛顿都排练了好久，因为中美双方都至少要让这场访问在看上去是成功的。


China’s ruling Communist Party needed Obama’s unequivocal endorsement of China’s increasingly important international role in order to buttress its domestic legitimacy.	执政的中国共产党需要奥巴马清楚明白地强调中国日渐重要的国际角色，好为自己在国内的统治合法性撑腰。


The US needed China’s cooperation to demonstrate the effectiveness of Obama’s new strategy of collaborative global leadership.	而美方则需要中方的配合，好展示奥巴马新的全球集体领导战略的有效性。


Now that the play is over and the applause has died down, it is time to check the balance sheet and see how much Obama achieved and how much he conceded.	随着演出落幕，掌声渐息，也是时候好好查看一下奥巴马此行的“资产负债表”，看看这位总统究竟得到了什么，又丢掉了什么。


On the positive side of the ledger, Obama received ceremonial treatment not normally accorded to visiting foreign leaders, even other visiting US presidents, demonstrating the importance China’s government attached to the visit.	在这本账本的收入方面，我们看到奥巴马受到了一场其他外国元首，即使连到访的往届美国总统都不常有的隆重接待，显示出中国政府对本次访问的极端重视。


China’s President Hu Jintao sent his likely successor, Vice President Xi Jinping, to greet Obama at Beijing Airport, going well beyond the usual protocol.	中国国家主席胡锦涛专门派出了其最可能的接班人，副主席习近平到机场迎接奥巴马，这个规格已经比一般外交礼仪要高出许多了。


And Hu himself dined with Obama twice during his two-day stay in Beijing – a gesture never made to any visiting foreign leader, including Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush.	胡锦涛还在奥巴马的两天北京访问行程中两次亲自与其共同进餐——主席的这个姿态也堪称破天荒第一次，其他如何国家元首都没享受过，包括奥巴马的前任小布什。


Obama also initially appeared to make some progress in giving voice to the universal values of human rights and democracy.	而奥巴马似乎也在人权和民主这些普世价值方面有所斩获。


He met with students in Shanghai in his favorite “town-hall” format, which allowed for face-to-face discussions with young Chinese.	他用自己最喜欢的“大厅议事”形式与上海的青年学生举行了会面，并和这些年轻人进行了面对面的讨论。


Moreover, China’s government allowed Nanfang Zhoumo , the country’s most liberal newspaper, to conduct a 12-minute exclusive interview with Obama.	此外，中国政府还允许《南方周末》这份中国自由化倾向最强的报纸对奥巴马进行了12分钟的专访。


But the Chinese public soon discounted the value of these political set pieces.	但在中国公众眼中，奥巴马这些政治作秀的价值很快被打了折扣。


People quickly discovered that the “students” allowed to ask questions at Obama’s town-hall meeting in Shanghai were young Communist party activists.	因为人们很快发现那些被允许与奥巴马进行“大厅议事”的所谓“学生”都是些共产党青年积极分子。


Moreover, unlike with other US presidents, the event was not broadcast nationwide, and Nanfang Zhoumo’s full interview with Obama did not appear in the newspaper, despite the Communist Party propaganda departments’ advance approval of all the interview questions.	此外跟其他美国总统所不同的是，这场见面会并没有全国广播，而《南方周末》对奥巴马的专访内容也遭到了删减，虽然那些被问到的问题都已经事先通过了共产党宣传部门的审查。


And the negative side of the ledger?	那么在这本负债表中，究竟有哪些坏的方面？


Obama gave up two things that have usually been at the top of the agenda when US presidents meet with Chinese leaders.	这就是奥巴马放弃了通常美国总统会见中国领导人时都会首先提到的两个议程。


First, Obama did not openly criticize the Chinese government’s notorious human rights record, nor did he use his influence to persuade China to release any prisoner of conscience, as his US predecessors always did when visiting the country.	首先，奥巴马并没有公开批评中国政府恶劣的人权纪录，也没有利用自己的影响力去劝告中国释放在押的政治犯，而这两点都是他的前任到访中国时常有的举动。


While Obama toasted President Hu, Liu Xiaobo, a famous Chinese dissident, remained shut away in an unknown location, having vanished last December because of his leading role in drafting a written appeal for constitutional rights.	当奥巴马与胡锦涛推杯换盏之时，刘晓波这个中国著名的异见分子依然被关押在某个不为人知的地方，而他在去年12月被人间蒸发的原因则是带头起草了一份有关维护人民宪法权利的书面宣言。


Soon after Obama left China, two other writers, Huang Qi and Tan Tiandun, were sentenced to prison.	而就在奥巴马离开中国不久，又有两个作者——黄琦（音）和谭天盾（音）都被判入狱。


Their crime was to investigate cases of corruption by local government officials that were linked to the deaths of tens of thousands of students in the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008.	两人身上的罪名则是调查与2008年5月四川大地震数万名学生死亡有关的当地官员腐败问题。


Second, Obama did not seriously seek to resolve existing US-China economic disagreements, particularly over trade.	其次，奥巴马并没有努力尝试去解决目前中美之间的经济分歧，特别是在贸易方面。


With China running a seemingly perpetual external surplus, foreign-currency reserves have continued to mount even during the global economic crisis, with net growth reaching $140 billion in the third quarter of this year.	中国似乎正运行在一个看不到尽头的贸易顺差轨道上，其外汇储备即便在遭受全球金融危机打击的情况下也一直在不断积累，单在今年第三季度就已经净增长了1400亿美元。


China’s main trade partners are deeply worried about the consequences of this continuing imbalance.	中国的各个主要贸易伙伴都对这种持续不平衡状态所可能导致的后果表示深切忧虑。


They urge China’s government to reduce its export subsidies and to allow the yuan to appreciate, expecting such measures to reduce their trade deficits, help their economies recover, and create more jobs.	他们敦促中国政府减少出口补贴并允许人民币升值，希望这些手段可以减少他们的贸易逆差，帮助各国经济复苏并制造更多就业机会。


On this front, however, China’s leaders made no compromise with Obama.	但在这方面，中国领导对奥巴马却没有丝毫让步。


So, on balance, Obama’s first trip to China achieved relatively little.	因此把负债表的正负相抵，奥巴马首次中国之行的收获堪称相对较少。


Moreover, what he did achieve looks superficial, while what he gave up seems substantial.	此外，他所得到的似乎都是些表面的胜利，换回来的却是自己实实在在的让步。


Of course, this is partly because of the changes in the relative economic and political power of the US and China over the past decade, and especially during the current global economic crisis.	当然，产生这种情况的一部分原因是因为中美两国的经济和政治力量对比在近��年间已经发生了变化，尤其是经历了最近的全球金融危机之后。


However, the sizable deficit on the balance sheet of Obama’s China trip could have been much lower if Obama had paid more attention to substance.	但如果能更关注一些实质性议题的话，奥巴马中国之行的资产负债表上的巨大亏空其实能变得小一些。


It seems that Hu Jintao is more skillful than the polished Obama at maximizing his gains at little cost.	而这似乎是因为胡锦涛在“用最小代价换最大收益”方面的政治技巧，要比光鲜的奥巴马强上许多。


Obama’s Promised Land	奥巴马的承诺之地


MADRID – Now that the dust has settled on President Barack Obama’s much-anticipated trip to Israel, it is possible to analyze the significance of the visit.	马德里—早已被人预料到的奥巴马以色列之行已尘埃落定，我们可以分析一下这次访问的重要意义。


The trip – the first foreign visit of his second term – carries important implications for US foreign policy.	这次访问——奥巴马第二个任期的首次出访——对美国外交政策有着重要含义。


Rather than providing the breakthrough for which many had hoped, it demonstrated that Obama – unlike other second-term US presidents, who have staked their legacies on foreign policy – is interested primarily in securing a domestic legacy.	它并没有如很多人希望的那样形成突破，而是表明了奥巴马——与其他总统在第二个任期内打上自己鲜明外交政策烙印不同——的主要意图是为自己打上内政烙印。


Obama’s ambitions are centered on reversing the arrangement that has dominated US politics since Richard Nixon’s election in 1968.	奥巴马的野心是颠覆自尼克松1968年当选以来主宰美国政坛的安排。


He hopes to ensure that a moderate Democratic Party forms the core of domestic politics and policymaking, with the Republican Party consigned to the periphery.	他希望保证温和的民主党能形成内政和决策的核心，将共和党边缘化。


The centerpiece of Obama’s visit was his address in Jerusalem, in which – employing his characteristically compelling rhetoric – he won over the skeptical Israeli public by appealing to their sense of morality, asking them to imagine the conflict from a Palestinian perspective.	奥巴马以色列之行的核心是其在耶路撒冷的演讲，在演讲中，奥巴马展示了自己标志性的雄辩口才，通过吸引道德感、要求他们从巴勒斯坦角度思考巴以冲突赢得了狐疑的以色列公众。


And yet, while the speech was widely considered a successful exercise in public diplomacy, it did not herald renewed US involvement in peace negotiations.	然而，尽管此次演讲被广泛认为是一次成功公共外交行动，却并不预示着美国重新加入和平谈判中。


Rather, it portends a continuation of America’s hands-off approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict.	相反，它预示美国将继续在巴以冲突中采取袖手旁观的方针。


Obama’s decision to address the Israeli people instead of their leaders is telling.	奥巴马决定向以色列人民而不是以色列领导人发表演讲意义重大。


He recognizes that the current political climate is not conducive to successful peace negotiations.	他认识到当前政治气候并不有利于成功的和平谈判。


In Israel, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has crafted a center-right coalition dominated by prominent pro-settlement leaders, including Housing Minister Uri Ariel of the Jewish Home Party and Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon of Netanyahu’s Likud.	在以色列，总理内塔尼亚胡打造了一个中右翼联盟，其主要成员都是支持定居点计划的声望卓著的领导人，包括住房部长、犹太家园党（Jewish Home Party）艾里尔（Uri Ariel）和国防部长、内塔尼亚胡的利库德集团的雅伦（Moshe Yaalon）。


The only notable exception, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, seems to have been appointed merely to provide a veneer of official commitment to the peace process.	唯一的显著例外是司法部长利夫尼（Tzipi Livni），之所以任命他似乎只是为了给和平进程披上一件官方承诺的外衣。


Finance Minister Yair Lapid, a moderate, is removed from the peace process (and has himself sent mixed signals about a two-state solution).	作为温和派的财政部长拉皮德（Yair Lapid）则被清除出了和平进程（他本人对两国方案的态度含混不清）。


Moreover, despite Netanyahu’s 2009 declaration of support for a two-state solution, which he reaffirmed during Obama’s visit, Likud has embraced a pro-settlement position, exemplified by Israel’s planned construction in the E1 corridor, one of the West Bank’s most sensitive areas.	此外，尽管内塔尼亚胡在2009年宣布支持两国方案——他在奥巴马来访期间再次强调了这一点——利库德集团却持有支持定居点的态度，以色列计划在约旦河西岸最敏感地区之一E1走廊建设定居点就是明证。


Meanwhile, the political situation in Palestine – characterized by the erosion of President Mahmoud Abbas’s legitimacy – and the region’s overall instability are contributing further to the decay of the peace process.	与此同时，巴勒斯坦的政局——总统阿巴斯的合法性正在受到侵蚀——以及地区的总体动荡局势都有碍于和平进程。


Rather than expending significant political capital trying to press an unreceptive Israeli government and a fractured Palestinian establishment to pursue peace, Obama used his visit to shift the discourse – and the responsibility for achieving a peace agreement – to the Israeli (and Palestinian) public.	奥巴马并没有花政治血本敦促不情愿的以色列政府和支离破碎的巴勒斯坦立国计划追求和平，而是借此次访问的机会向以色列（和巴勒斯坦）公众传达这层意思——以及实现和平协定的责任。


Indeed, beneath Obama’s rhetoric about empathy and the morality of peace was a clear message about the future of the peace process: the push for negotiations must come from the streets of Israel and Palestine. It will not come from Washington.	事实上，在奥巴马煽动同情和和平道德的表面之下是一个清晰的关于和平进程未来的信号：谈判的推动力必须来自以色列和巴勒斯坦街头，而不会来自华盛顿。


This was a tactical move that allowed Obama to address the conflict without having to put any additional skin in the game, while advancing his visit’s underlying objective of reducing Israel’s ability to distract from his domestic goals.	这是一个战术性动作，使奥巴马能够在不牵涉其中的情况下解决巴以冲突，同时推进了他此次访问的根本目的——削弱以色列让他从国内目标分心的能力。


The price of Obama’s approach is that it denies any potential for progress toward peace.	奥巴马计划的代价是它否认任何通往和平的潜在进步。


Furthermore, Obama’s embrace of Israel during his visit has undermined America’s role as an honest broker in future negotiations – and no credible candidate has surfaced to fill the position.	此外，奥巴马在首次访问中选择以色列不利于美国作为未来谈判真诚牵线者的角色——与此同时，也没有可靠候选人填补这一位置。


The trip also heralds a dramatic shift in Israel’s relationship with Obama, who has been criticized throughout his presidency for supposedly failing to provide sufficient support to America’s strongest ally in the Middle East.	以色列之行还预示着以色列与奥巴马关系的重大变局，在其总统生涯中，奥巴马一直被批评故意不为美国中东最强盟国提供足够支持。


The recent Senate hearings to confirm Chuck Hagel’s appointment as Secretary of Defense, which involved aggressive questioning about the former senator’s commitment to Israel, reflected that criticism.	最近的参议院哈格尔国防部长提名听证会就反映了这一批评——前参议员哈格尔被咄咄逼人地询问在以色列问题上的承诺。


Facing continuing battles with Congress, mid-term elections next year, and increasing instability in the Middle East (including the threat of unilateral Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear facilities), Obama clearly believes that now is not the time to push for a peace agreement, because it is unlikely to succeed.	奥巴马面临着控制国会的持久战、明年的中期选举和中东地区的日渐动荡（包括以色列对伊朗核设施单方面采取行动），他显然认为现在并不是推行和平协定的时机，因为不可能成功。


Instead, he is working to make Israel a non-issue by quieting domestic critics and allaying Israel’s security fears.	相反，他在试图通过安抚国内批评、缓解以色列安全忧虑让以色列不再成为问题。


To this end, Obama has withdrawn his support for preconditions to peace negotiations,  indicating to Palestinians that they should not expect a freeze on Israeli settlement construction ahead of talks.	为此，奥巴马收回了他对和平谈判先决条件的支持，向巴勒斯坦人表示他们不必期望在谈判前冻结以色列定居点建设计划。


In his Jerusalem address, he reaffirmed America’s commitment to preserving Israel’s security while pledging to control Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpile and to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.	在耶路撒冷演讲中，奥巴马重申了美国保护以色列安全的承诺，同时还承诺控制叙利亚化学武器存量、防止伊朗拥有核武器。


This strategy has already produced results.	这一战略已经奏效。


Netanyahu’s apology to Turkey for the commando raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish ship in 2010 was a major diplomatic victory for Obama.	内塔尼亚胡为2010年以色列突击队突袭加沙边境土耳其船只向土耳其致歉，这称得上是奥巴马的一次重大外交胜利。


More important, the absence of a contentious Netanyahu-Obama relationship will deny Republicans an easy target in mid-term elections.	更重要的是，内塔尼亚胡-奥巴马关系的无分歧局面消灭了中期选举中共和党的一大发难目标。


(Such low-hanging fruit has been increasingly scarce for the Republican Party, which is beleaguered by the perception that it has been hijacked by its most extreme elements.)	（对共和党来说，如此良机正变得越来越少，共和党越来越感到被其最极端元素绑架了。 ）


In the unlikely event that circumstances change, Obama could step in as an active peacemaker, giving his trip to Israel historic significance as a turning point in Israel-Palestine relations.	如果发生了环境变化这一不可能事件，奥巴马可以以积极和平缔造者的姿态介入，他的此次以色列之行将具有历史意义，成为以巴关系的转折点。 比如，以色列民意可能因耶路撒冷演讲而被激发起来，支持和平；


For example, Israeli public opinion could become galvanized in support of peace in the wake of the Jerusalem address, or US Secretary of State John Kerry could make headway in initiating talks.	或者美国国务卿克里能够在引导谈判方面顺利前进。 利夫尼可能在以色列政府中获得重要地位；


Livni might find a strong voice in Israel’s government; the Labor Party could replace Jewish Home in a new governing coalition; or Netanyahu’s attitude could change as he seeks to secure his legacy.	劳动党可能取代犹太人家园党加入新执政联盟； 内塔尼亚胡的态度可能因追求自己的烙印而发生改变。


Without a drastic change in Israeli politics and society, however, Obama will continue to play it safe, minimizing his vulnerabilities.	但是，如果以色列政治和社会不发生重大改变，奥巴马将继续安全行事，最小化自己的弱点。


As he moves closer to solidifying the Democratic Party’s position in US politics, Israel will continue to construct settlements and become increasingly isolated.	随着他逐渐巩固共和党在美国政坛中的位置，以色列将继续建设定居点并变得越来越孤立。


We can only hope that the consequences of Obama’s foreign-policy sacrifice are not too high a price to pay for the establishment of his domestic legacy.	我们只能希望奥巴马的外交政策牺牲不会成为他打上内政烙印的过于高昂的代价。


Obama’s Hardest Choices Lie Ahead	奥巴马：最艰难的抉择还未到来


TEL AVIV – It was only natural that Barack Obama, a president whose election was one of the most revolutionary events in American history, should fill his first 100 days in office with a breathtaking, all-embracing agenda.	特拉维夫—奥巴马用令人叹为观止、面面俱到的议程充实着他就任以来的100天。 这也是在人意料之中的事情。


These are times of trial and upheaval that call for such daring.	这位总统的当选是美国历史上最具革命性的事件之一。


Strikingly energetic and self-confident, Obama has set out on a titanic journey to remake America’s economy and redress a broken and dysfunctional international system.	在这个充满考验和动荡的时代需要如此魄力。 精力过人、信心满满的奥巴马已经开始了一次艰巨的旅程，重振美国经济并拯救残缺不全的国际体系。


It is perhaps especially in Obama’s domestic policy – the shift to a more social-democratic tax system and universal health care – that one can best see the new president’s ideological drive.	特别是从奥巴马的国内政策中—一种向更社会民主的税收体系和普遍医疗的转变—我们可能最能看出这位新任总统的意识形态取向。


But emphasizing the reduction of social inequalities does not sit easily with America’s profoundly individualistic ethos, and the attempt to “Europeanize” the nature of the social contract between the state and its citizens might yet crash against the constitutive principles of the American system.	但是强调减少社会不平等与美国深入人心的个人主义价值观并不容易合拍。 将国家与公民之间的社会契约“欧洲化”的企图还可能与美国体系的根本原则发生冲突。


When it comes to salvaging America’s collapsing financial system, Obama has been far more interventionist than any European government.	在挽救美国摇摇欲坠的金融体系方面，奥巴马比任何一个欧洲政府都更具干预性。


For once, the faltering Czech presidency of the EU reflected a European consensus when it defined Obama’s astronomic financial stimulus as a “road to hell.”	举步维艰的欧盟轮值主席国捷克终于头一次反映了欧洲共识：将奥巴马的庞大财政刺激计划称为“通往地狱之路。


The unprecedented explosion of America’s fiscal deficit raises the risk of high inflation in the future – exactly the kind of scenario that Europeans want to prevent at all cost.	”美国财政赤字前所未有的爆炸性增长提升了未来的高通胀风险—而这正是欧洲人不惜一切代价想要防止的情况。


Obama’s foreign policy agenda has been no less audacious than his domestic undertakings.	奥巴马在外交政策上的魄力与其国内政策相比毫不逊色。


After eight years of American unilateralism that left behind a broken transatlantic alliance, resuscitated the specter of a cold war with Russia, and saw the Middle East decline into a doomsday politics, Obama’s injection of new thinking to endemic problems is extremely welcome.	在美国八年单边主义留下了一段破碎的跨大西洋联盟关系、召回了与俄罗斯之间的冷战幽灵并使中东陷入末日政局之后，奥巴马对地区性问题注入的新思维受到了极大的欢迎。


The organizing principle in the new president’s foreign policy is one of not having principled, ideological guidelines.	这位新总统的外交政策组织原则是一种没有既定意识形态方针的原则。


Essentially, his approach to international issues is pragmatic, and, in departing from his predecessor’s penchant for machtpolitik , Obama has pledged always to exhaust diplomacy first.	从本质上讲，他应对国际问题的策略是实用主义的。 为了与其前任的强权政治风格划清界限，奥巴马承诺总要先用尽一切外交手段。


But Obama might soon realize that most of his predecessors started as believers in international cooperation, until events forced them to fall back on a strategy of confrontation.	但奥巴马可能很快就会意识到其大多数前任起初也笃信国际合作，直到在情势逼迫下才采取对抗战略。


Not even George W. Bush seemed to be committed to any particular doctrine in foreign affairs before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, drove him to unleash his ill-conceived “global war on terror.”	就连布什在2001年9月11日恐怖袭击以前似乎也没有致力于贯彻某种外交原则。 “9•11”促使他发动了构想拙劣的“全球反恐战争。


The real test of Obama’s strategy of dialogue and cooperation will come only when it fails, and tough choices will have to be made.	”奥巴马的对话与合作战略的真正考验只有在其失败使他不得不做出艰难的抉择之时才会到来。


Repairing old alliances is vital not only for the exercise of American power, but also for Europe’s empowerment as a global player.	修补旧有的联盟关系不但对美国发挥实力至关重要，对于欧洲扮演全球性角色也不可或缺。


Yet America’s European allies administered Obama’s first setback.	然而，正是美国的欧洲盟友们制造了奥巴马的第一次挫折。


They applauded him everywhere on his recent trip to Europe, but sent him home almost empty-handed, resisting the idea of a coordinated fiscal stimulus and, after years of preaching multilateralism, turning down his call for more European troops for Afghanistan.	在他最近的欧洲之旅中，所到之处都是掌声一片，可欧洲人最后还是让他空手而归。 他们抵制了协同的财政刺激计划，并在鼓吹多边主义多年之后，拒绝了奥巴马向阿富汗派驻更多欧洲军队的呼吁。


For many in Europe, it was easier to live against Bush than to make sacrifices with Obama.	对于许多欧洲人而言，和布什唱反调要比与奥巴马一起做出牺牲更容易。


Obama also pushed the “reset button” with Russia, and suggested that he might freeze Bush’s plan to deploy a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland.	奥巴马还揿动了对俄关系的“重新设置键”，并暗示他可能会冻结布什在捷克和波兰部署导弹防御系统的计划。


The expectation was that Russia would join the United States in putting pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.	他的期望是俄罗斯会和美国一同向伊朗施压令其放弃核野心。


But this has not yet happened.	但这还没有付诸行动。


Nor was North Korea impressed by Obama’s warnings that America might shoot down its rocket if they went ahead with their launch in defiance of the United Nations.	北朝鲜也没有把奥巴马的警告当回事。 此前奥巴马声称如果北朝鲜对抗联合国，坚持发射火箭，美国会将其击落。


Shielded behind a protective China, Kim Jong-il launched his rocket anyway, and the US refrained from action.	在中国的庇护下，金正日���是发射了火箭，美国对此保持了克制。


Iran is another front where Obama might be forced to recognize the limits of his conciliatory approach.	伊朗是令奥巴马可能会被迫意识到其安抚政策局限性的另一条战线。


He has waived America’s long-standing demand that Iran stop uranium enrichment as a precondition for negotiations, and he has sworn off any idea of regime change.	他放弃了美国把伊朗停止铀浓缩活动作为谈判前提的长期要求，并保证不谋求伊朗的政权更替。


But the Iranians are the subtlest negotiators to be found anywhere, and will make certain that their nuclear program outpaces the negotiations.	但伊朗人是最精明的谈判者。 他们会确保其核计划走在谈判之前。


If that happens, then what?	果真如此，奥巴马又意欲何为？


Nor is it clear what Obama really means by saying that he recognizes Iran’s “rightful place in the community of nations.”	奥巴马承认伊朗“在国际社会中的合理地位”的表示也含混不清。


If this means a special status at the expense of other Middle East powers such as Egypt or the Gulf states, Obama might run into strong opposition from America’s traditional allies in the region.	如果这意味着以如埃及或海湾诸国等中东其他强国的利益为代价的某种特殊地位，那么奥巴马可能会遭遇来自该地区的美国传统盟国的强烈反对。


It is right and refreshing that Obama has made clear that America’s aspiration is to lead, not dominate.	奥巴马清楚地表明美国的愿望是引领而不是支配，这是正确的，也令人耳目一新。


But even an exercise in modesty and realism requires strong alliances, with partners ready for sacrifices.	但即便是谦逊和现实主义的施政也需要强大的联盟，而其中的伙伴也要愿意做出牺牲。


Nor would old enemies and competitors like Russia and China readily abandon the benefits of spoiling American plans.	老牌的敌人和竞争者如俄罗斯和中国也不会放弃损美利己的机会。


It is when this becomes crystal clear, and also when some worn-out foreign-policy paradigms, such as the fetish of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fail once again, that real choices will have to be made.	只有当这一切变得异常明了，且当一些陈腐的外交政策范例（如对巴以冲突的两国解决方案的痴迷）再一次失败时，做出真正抉择的时刻才会到来。


Obama’s Israel Problem	奥巴马的以色列问题


NEW YORK – On a rare foray outside his native Texas, Governor Rick Perry accused US President Barack Obama of “appeasement” towards the Palestinians.	纽约——德州州长佩里（Rick Perry）首次在德州之外开火了，他指责奥巴马“姑息”巴勒斯坦人。


Former New York City Mayor Edward Koch supported a Catholic Republican congressional candidate against a Jewish Democrat in New York, because the Republican supports Israel through thick and thin – and because Obama had voiced reservations about Israel’s expansion of settlements on the West Bank.	前纽约市长郭德华（Edward Koch）在纽约州支持天主教共和党国会议员候选人，反对犹太民主党候选人，因为共和党候选人事无巨细都支持以色列，也因为奥巴马对以色列的约旦河先定居点扩张计划持保留态度。


In Koch’s words, Obama “threw Israel under the bus.”	用郭德华的话说，奥巴马“把以色列扔下了车。


The Republican won.	”结果，共和党候选人获胜了。


Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who is rather sensitive about foreigners meddling in domestic Israeli politics, has been openly and consistently courting congressional Republicans by attacking Obama.	与此同时，对外国人干涉本国内政十分敏感的以色列总理内塔尼亚胡倒是一直在通过攻击奥巴马公开讨好共和党国会议员候选人。


And Obama’s response?	奥巴马有何反应？


A speech at the United Nations, reiterating his support for Israel, his understanding of Israel’s fears and vulnerability, with barely a mention of Palestinian fears and vulnerability.	在联合国的演讲中，奥巴马重申了自己对以色列的支持，对以色列忧虑和弱点的理解； 但对巴勒斯坦的忧虑和脆弱只字不提。


What is it about Israel that reduces America’s president to Jell-O?	以色列何以把美国总统搞得灰头土脸？


Why, for that matter, are all American politicians so afraid to be critical of Israeli policies?	在这件事上，为何所有美国政客都那么害怕批评以色列的政策？


Is it fear of being called an anti-Semite?	他们是怕被指为反犹分子吗？


Or is it the “Jewish vote”?	还是所谓的“犹太选票”在起作用？


On the face of it, Democrats don’t have that much to fear.	从表面上看，民主党没什么好害怕的。


Polls suggest that a majority of Jewish Americans (a mere 1.7% of the US population) still vote for the Democratic Party.	民调显示，大多数美国犹太人（大约只占美国人口的1. 7%）仍然支持民主党。


When it comes to the so-called Israel lobby in Washington, which is well organized and very well funded, evangelical Christians play an important part as well.	至于组织精密、资金充足的所谓华盛顿以色列游说团，福音派基督徒在其中也扮演着重要角色。


But they vote overwhelmingly for Republicans, so Obama would not seem to have much to lose there.	但他们压倒性地支持共和党，所以奥巴马也没什么好输的。


True, certain pro-Israeli organizations, notably the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), can generate a great deal of money to make or break political candidates, who are judged solely on their attitudes towards Israel.	诚然，某些亲以色列组织——特别是美国以色列公共事务委员会（AIPAC）——能够用手里的钞票左右政治候选人的立场，让他们一味偏袒以色列。


And money, given or withdrawn, as well as Jews refusing to vote for Obama out of pique, could make all the difference in crucial “swing states” such as Florida.	金钱，加上犹太人因反感而拒绝支持奥巴马，能够在佛罗里达这样的“摇摆州”造成根本变化。


Cash, voters, and lobbies aside, something fundamental has changed in recent years, and this scares the Democrats: Israel’s conflict with Palestine is now being used by the American right as a cudgel to beat up liberals.	除了现金、选民以及游说集团，近几年来还发生了一些根本性变化让民主党感到恐慌：以色列与巴勒斯坦的冲突如今被美国右翼用来作为打击自由派的利器。


This was not true before.	这是以前所没有的事。


In the first few decades of its modern existence, when it was largely run by socialists, Israel was mainly supported by the world’s liberal left.	在现代以色列国的最初几十年里，在以色列由社会主义者执政的年代，支持他们的主要是世界自由派左翼。


In fact, the last US administration to be somewhat tough on the Israeli government was that of the Republican George H.W. Bush.	事实上，上一个对以色列政府不太感冒的美国政府是老布什的共和党政府。


Jews, in both Europe and the US, traditionally tended to lean towards the left.	欧洲和美国的犹太人传统上都倾向于左翼。


Right-wing politics, especially when based on ethnic nationalism, are rarely good for minorities, who fare better in a more open, cosmopolitan environment.	右翼政治，特别是基于种族民族主义的右翼政治，从来都不会有利于少数派，因为少数派只有在较为开放和世界主义的环境中才能活得自在。


Jews were among the most ardent supporters of black Americans’ struggle for civil rights in the 1950’s and 1960’s.	犹太人是20世纪五六十年代美国黑人民权运动最热心的支持者之一。


As long as Israel was a liberal state, it was easy, even natural, for most American Jews to support it.	只要以色列还是自由国家，那么对大部分美国犹太人来说，支持以色列就是十分自然的事情。


There was no conflict between the head and the heart, between an emotional attachment to Israel and a political commitment to liberal causes.	不存在良心和理智之间的冲突，也不存在以色列归属感和自由政治承诺之间的冲突。


But things began to change when the Israeli Labor Party lost ground to the harder-line Likud.	但当以色列工党在与走强硬路线的利库德集团的斗争中失败时，事情起了变化。


More and more, Israel began to be infected by precisely the type of politics most Jews have traditionally feared, especially ethnic nationalism.	以色列开始染上了让许多犹太人感到恐惧的政治类型，特别是种族民族主义。


Provoked, in part, by Arab neighbors’ hostility and Palestinian leaders’ intransigence, Israel began to turn sharply to the right.	部分是因为受到阿拉伯邻国的敌视以及巴勒斯坦领导人不让步立场的刺激，以色列人的立场开始猛烈地向右转。


This was also the result of demographic changes: Middle Eastern Jews were more viscerally anti-Arab than their European brethren, and Jewish immigrants from Russia were viscerally anti-left.	另一个原因地人口变化：中东犹太人比他们的欧洲人更加发自内心地反对阿拉伯人，而来自俄国的犹太移民则发自内心的反对左倾。


Moreover, the number of Orthodox Jews continued to grow apace.	此外，正统犹太教徒数量继续突飞猛进。


As a result, the European liberal left lost its sympathy for Israel, and the country acquired a new set of friends among the right – even the far right.	结果，欧洲自由派左翼不再同情以色列，而以色列在右翼（甚至极右翼）找到了新的同志。


European right-wing populists, including some who represent parties with a strong anti-Semitic past, now proudly proclaim their support for Israeli settlers on Palestinian land.	欧洲右翼民粹主义者——包括一些过去有着强烈反犹立场的党派的代表者——如今骄傲地宣称支持以色列在巴勒斯坦领土建立定居点。


And, in the US, a peculiar alliance of Jewish hardliners and evangelical Christians, who believe that all Jews must eventually return to the Holy Land and convert to Christianity, has become the main base of support for Israel.	而在美国，强硬派犹太人和福音派基督教徒组成了一个奇怪的联盟——福音派基督徒相信所有犹太人都必须落叶归根到巴勒斯坦，转信基督教，如今却成了支持以色列的最大阵营。


This has created a very odd situation.	这就造成了一幅颇为奇怪的图景。


Right-wing politicians from the American South, together with Austrian, German, French, and Dutch populists, are accusing liberals of appeasing “Islamofascism.”	来自美国南方的右翼政客与奥地利、德国、法国和荷兰的民粹主义者一起指责自由派姑息“伊斯兰法西斯”。


These political heirs of deeply racist traditions are the new champions of a Jewish state, whose policies now owe more to nineteenth-century ethnic chauvinism than to Zionism’s socialist roots.	这些纳粹传统的政治传承者如今是犹太国家的执政者，其政策根源与十九世纪的种族沙文主义的渊源比以色列复国运动的社会主义背景更深。


Pandering to Israel’s uncompromising policies may be the easiest way for America’s Democratic president to avoid trouble in an election year.	对美国民主党总统来说，或许迎合以色列的不妥协政策是最简单的在选举年避免麻烦的办法。


Obama certainly needs all the friends he can get.	奥巴马当然需要竭尽全力赢得支持者。


But the price will be high.	但如此的代价是高昂的。


Forced to back Israel, right or wrong, the US is quickly losing credibility and influence in a turbulent Middle East.	被迫支持以色列——不管是对是错——将使美国迅速丢失在动荡中东的信誉和影响力。


Putting pressure on Israel to stop building settlements and come to terms with a viable Palestinian state will be very difficult.	向以色列施压，敦促其停止建设定居点、与巴勒斯坦就后者的建国问题达成妥协是一件非常困难的事。


But it is the only way to break the constant cycle of violence.	但这是打破暴力循环怪圈的唯一办法。


Standing up to Israel, and its new fanatical friends, is not anti-Jewish. On the contrary, it is to uphold the liberal tradition in which many Jews continue to believe.	如今，坚决反对以色列及其狂热新盟友绝不是反犹，相反，这是在支持许多犹太人仍笃信不移的自由传统。


Obama’s Middle East Malady	奥巴马的中东之误


PARIS – No sooner did US President Barack Obama welcome home American troops from Iraq and laud that country’s stability and democracy than an unprecedented wave of violence – across Baghdad and elsewhere – revealed the severity of Iraq’s political crisis.	巴黎—美国总统奥巴马欢迎美国驻伊拉克军队回国、盛赞伊拉克实现了稳定和民主的话音未落，那里就出现了前所未有的暴力——不管是巴格达还是别的地方——表明伊拉克陷入了严重的政治危机。


Is that crisis an unfortunate exception, or, rather, a symptom of the failure of Obama’s Middle East diplomacy, from Egypt to Afghanistan?	这场危机是一个不幸的意外，还是奥巴马的中东外交政策——从埃及到阿富汗——的大溃败的表征？


Upon taking office, Obama set four objectives in the Middle East: stabilize Iraq before leaving it; withdraw from Afghanistan from a position of strength and on the basis of minimal political convergence with Pakistan; achieve a major breakthrough in the Middle East peace process by pushing Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to freeze settlements; and open a dialogue with Iran on the future of its nuclear program.	奥巴马甫一上台，就提出了关于中东的四大目标：在撤军前稳定伊拉克局势； 在于巴基斯坦达成最低限度的政治一致的情况下以优势地位从阿富汗撤军；


On these four major issues, Obama has clearly achieved little.	敦促以色列总理内塔尼亚胡冻结定居点计划从而取得中东和平进程的重大突破； 以及与伊朗就其核计划展开对话。


With regard to Iraq, since George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States has strived to exert a moderating influence on Shia power, so that the country can create a more inclusive political system – specifically, by passing a new law on sharing oil-export revenues among the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities.	在伊拉克，自乔治·W·布什上台以来，美国就一直在努力对什叶派势力施加影响，从而让伊拉克能够建立更加包容的政治体系——特别是通过一项新的法律，在什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人之间分享石油出口收入。


Unfortunately, the precise opposite happened. 	不幸的是，事情的进展与美国的初衷正好相反。


Kurdistan has embarked on a path toward increased autonomy, while the Sunnis are increasingly marginalized by a sectarian and authoritarian Shia-dominated central government.	库尔德地区在朝自治的方向前进，而逊尼派受到宗教色彩强烈的、由什叶派主导的威权中央政府的排挤，日渐被边缘化。


This has implications for the regional balance of power, because Iraq is growing closer to Iran in order to offset Turkey, which is seen as protecting the Sunnis.	这对地区实力平衡产生了影响，因为伊拉克为了对抗被视为逊尼派保护者的土耳其而与伊朗越走越近。


Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s remark during a recent trip to Washington that he was more concerned about Turkey than Iran exposed the huge gulf between Iraq and the US, which now appears to have lost all significant political influence on Iraqi affairs.	伊拉克总理马利基最近在访问华盛顿时说，比起伊朗，他更担心土耳其，这显示伊拉克和美国之间存在巨大的分歧，而美国现在已经在伊拉克事务上不再有重大的政治影响力了。


Indeed, in a disturbing development, the US decided not to play its last remaining card in dealing with al-Maliki: arms sales.	事实上，由于进展不尽人意，美国已决定不动用对付马利基的底牌：军售。


There can no longer be any doubt that the occupation of Iraq was a huge strategic defeat for the US, because it ultimately served only to strengthen Iran.	事到如今，毫无疑问占领伊拉克是美国的重大战略失误，因为其最终效果只是坐大了伊朗。


Yet Obama lacks a medium-term vision to deal with the seriousness of the situation – an oversight that, sooner or later, will cost the US dearly.	但奥巴马并没有处理这一严重情况的中期规划，而迟早会给美国带来沉重代价。


One of two things will happen: either tighter containment of Iran through sanctions on oil exports will produce positive results and weaken Iran, or containment will fail, leading the US inexorably toward a new war in the Middle East.	对以石油出口制裁为手段牵制伊朗将产生积极效果并削弱伊朗，或者牵制手段失败，让美国不得不在中东开展，两者必居其一。


It is not unlikely that some in US foreign-policy circles regard the deepening Iraqi crisis as a building block in constructing the case for military intervention in Iran.	或许美国外交政策圈中有人把伊拉克危机的深化视为军事干预伊朗的借口。


But Obama is nobody’s fool.	但奥巴马还没有愚钝到如此程度。


He has registered the US Congress’s hostility toward Iran and the desire to confront the Islamic Republic militarily.	他已经注意到了美国国会对伊朗的敌对态度和对伊朗伊斯兰共和国采取军事手段的意图。


He believes, however, that he can avoid extreme solutions; in diplomacy, anything can happen, and the worst-case scenario is never guaranteed.	但是，他认为，他可以避免极端手段； 在外交上，什么都可能发生，最坏的情形未必就是唯一的可能。


The problem is that Obama has a strong tendency to overestimate America’s ability to influence weaker actors.	问题在于，奥巴马总是有高估美国对弱势行动者施加影响的能力的倾向。


What is true for Iraq is also true for Afghanistan: Obama can pride himself on having eliminated Osama bin Laden, which was undoubtedly a success, but one that failed to address the root of the problem.	在伊拉克发生的事情同样适用于阿富汗：清除本·拉登足以成为奥巴马引以为傲的功绩，毫无疑问，这是一项成就，但这项成就并没有除掉问题的根源。


Despite a 10-year military presence, involving the deployment of more than 100,000 troops at a cost of $550 billion, the US still has not succeeded in creating a credible alternative to the Taliban. Worse, its political alliance with Pakistan has frayed.	美国入驻阿富汗整整十年，派出了超过10万的军队和花掉了5 500亿美元，仍然没有打造出受人信任的塔利班替代者，反而丢掉了政治盟国巴基斯坦。


Indeed, US-Pakistan relations have regressed to their level before September 11, 2001, a time marked by deep mutual distrust.	事实上，美巴关系已经退回了2001年9月11日之前的水平，当时，两国之间弥漫着相互不信任的情绪。


Pakistani leaders obviously bear a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs.	巴基斯坦领导人显然对这一状态负有重大责任。


But if the US has been unable to involve Pakistan in resolving the Afghanistan conflict, that failure simply reflects America’s refusal to give the Pakistanis what they wanted: a shift in the regional balance of power at the expense of India.	但美国无法将巴基斯坦纳入解决阿富汗冲突的方案中，其失败是美国拒绝满足巴基斯坦要求的明证：牺牲印度，改变地区实力平衡。


Pakistan, accordingly, froze cooperation with the US, because its leaders no longer saw much to gain in fighting the Taliban.	相应地，巴基斯坦冻结了与美国的合作，因为其领导人看不到与塔利班打仗的好处。


The risk is that when the American withdrawal from Afghanistan begins – a process that has just been brought forward to next year, from 2014 – the US will again seek to impose sanctions on Pakistan, an unreliable nuclear state that will react by strengthening ties with China and deploying Islamist terrorism.	问题在于，当美国开始从阿富汗撤军时——该进程将在明年提出，从2014年开始实施——它将重新开始对巴基斯坦采取制裁，因为巴基斯坦是一个不可靠的有核国家，可能倒向中国并开展伊斯兰恐怖主义作为回应。


Obama also sought to use America’s influence to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of his strategy for the broader Middle East.	奥巴马还寻求利用美国的影响力解决以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突，作为其大中东战略的一部分。


He initially thought that by pressuring Netanyahu to freeze settlements, he would succeed in reviving the peace process.	一开始，他认为向内塔尼亚胡施压，要求他冻结定居点计划就可以让和平进程重现生机。


But he was quickly and skillfully outmaneuvered by his ally, who knows how important the Israeli issue is to US domestic politics.	但是，他的盟友很快便巧妙地算计了他，因为内塔尼亚胡知道，以色列问题在美国国内政坛属于不可承受之重。


By putting Obama at odds with the rest of the US establishment, Netanyahu forced him to retreat.	内塔尼亚胡把奥巴马置于美国其他势力的对立面，迫使他让步。


In 2009, Obama envisioned a settlement of the conflict through the strong commitment of the international community.	2009年，奥巴马认为可以通过国际社会的强力承诺解决冲突。


In 2011, he asserted that only both sides’ willingness could ensure a successful outcome.	2011年，他宣称只有双方又有意愿，才能保证出现成功的结果。


Clearly, the US cannot do much to resolve the conflict.	显然，美国对于解决冲突并无多少办法。


There is no overarching explanation for Obama’s successive Middle East failures, but there are a few factors worth considering: the increase in the number of asymmetrical conflicts, in which the traditional use of force is largely ineffective; increasingly blurred lines between difficult allies and intransigent adversaries; and major political differences between a centrist US president and a Congress that is dominated more than ever by extreme ideas. 	奥巴马在中东问题上一再失策，其原因不一而足，但其中有几个因素值得关注：不对称冲突数量上升，传统军事干预已不再奏效； 盟友越来越难对付，敌人越来越强硬，两者之间的界线越来越模糊；


But Obama himself bears a large part of the blame.	但奥巴马本人也颇有失策之处。


Contrary to what one might think, he does not have a real strategic vision of the world – a shortcoming reflected in his quick capitulation in the face of opposition to his proposals.	与人们所设想的相反，他并没有一幅关于全世界的战略图景，这一短板可以从他一碰到反对的声音便迅速妥协一窥端倪。


Obama often has a plan A, but never a plan B. When it comes to conducting a successful foreign policy, plan A is never enough.	奥巴马总是能拿出方案，但永远不会有备选方案。 但要在外交政策上获得成功，只做一手准备是不够的。


Obama’s New World Order	奥巴马的世界新秩序


As the world digests President Barack Obama’s recent historic speech in Cairo, one conclusion is readily apparent: it will take more than a single speech to effect reconciliation between the United States and the Islamic world, after years of hostility and mistrust. But this was a significant start.	当全世界都在努力体会美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马最近在开罗发表的历史性讲话之时，一个结论是显而易见的：那就是虽然一场讲话并不足以消融美国和伊斯兰世界数十年以来的敌意和猜忌，但这无疑是个意义重大的开始。


There is a second conclusion to be drawn, less evident but even more important: Obama’s ambition is not confined to cutting the root of Islamic terrorism, or even to bringing peace to the Middle East. It extends to nothing less than a complete reshaping of the global order.	而另一个不太明显但更重要的结论则是：奥巴马的野心可并不仅限于对伊斯兰恐怖主义来个釜底抽薪或者是中东和平，而是要重新塑造一个新的世界秩序。


Obama’s dramatic overture to the Islamic world was only the latest in a series of such openings by this remarkable US president.	对奥巴马这个不平凡的美国总统来说，此番针对伊斯兰世界的戏剧性开场白只不过是一系列政策启动计划的最新一幕而已。


The economic crisis arguably forced the new American rapprochement with China (the “emerging” power that has now emerged as the big winner from the world’s financial turmoil).	虽然金融危机事实上已经迫使新政府与中国——这个“正在崛起”的世界强权早已一跃成为金融海啸的最大赢家——走得更近。


But no such circumstance prompted the move to “re-set” relations with Russia, the journeys to mend fences with Latin America and Turkey, or efforts to reach out to Iran.	但可没有类似的背景因素去推动美国“重整”与对俄关系，与拉美各国及土耳其重修旧好，或者与伊朗重新接触。


These are all products of a deliberate policy.	因此上述行动都是经过深思熟虑的政策产物。


The unilateral moment has passed. The US had its few short years as a hyper-power, and it did neither America nor the world much good.	单边主义的时代已经落幕，美国享受了短短数年超级霸权的滋味，却并没给自己和这个世界带来了什么好处。


Now, before our eyes, Obama is repositioning the US at the centre of a web of global bilateral relationships – the “G-2” economic relationship with China, the nuclear relationship with Russia, and now the search for a relationship of mutual respect and cooperation with the Muslim world.	如今的奥巴马则转而将美国定义为全球多边关系网的核心——一面和中国发展“G-2(两国集团)”经济关系，一面与俄罗斯磋商核问题，如今再加上与穆斯林世界的相互尊重和合作互动。


As in a Venn diagram, Obama is placing the US at that central point where all the different ellipses overlap.	如果把这些关系画成一张“维恩图解”逻辑图的话，那么奥巴马就是把美国放在了所有椭圆形阴影的重合处。


First among equals, and the indispensable nation.	而美国不仅在同等条件下拥有优先权，同时也是不能缺少的参与者。


Where, one might wonder, does this leave Europe?	那么在这张图上面，奥巴马又给欧洲留了个什么位置？


Europeans have grown used to the idea that the transatlantic relationship is the foundation of the international order.	欧洲人从小就习惯了将美欧跨大西洋关系作为整个世界秩序的基石。


Following the difficult years of the Bush presidency, Obama has duly sought to restore transatlantic harmony as well, visiting Europe in April and extending the hand of partnership there, too.	而在小布什执政的艰难岁月过去后，奥巴马也适时地尝试重建大西洋两岸关系的和谐，他还在4月访问了欧洲并伸出了伙伴关系之手。


To be sure, Europe gave Obama very little back for his pains, whether in terms of help in Afghanistan or support in stimulating the global economy.	毫无疑问，无论是在阿富汗战争还是刺激全球经济方面，欧洲都没有做多少为奥巴马分忧的事。


But if Obama lost sleep over this tepid European response, he showed no signs of it.	而与此同时也没有任何迹象表明奥巴马会因欧洲的冷淡而辗转难眠。


In the new Obama world order, transatlantic relations are not the foundation, but just one of the Venn diagram’s ellipses – as significant or insignificant as Europeans choose to make it.	因为在奥巴马的世界新秩序中，大西洋两岸关系不再是基石，只是众多椭圆形关系的其中一个，至于这层关系到底重不重要，那就要看欧洲人自己的表现了。


While Europeans chew on that, they should also reflect on what the Cairo speech could mean for their own position in the Middle East.	因此当欧洲人思考这种可能性的时候，他们也要开始回想奥巴马开罗讲话对于自己在中东的地位究竟有何意义。


Europeans have long cherished the belief that centuries of history and the facts of geography, not to mention more recent patterns of immigration, have given them some sort of special relationship with the Islamic world – an often strained and sometimes bloody relationship, but nonetheless one based on deep mutual familiarity.	欧洲人长期以来都珍视着一种信念，那就是抛开如今的移民不谈，欧洲与伊斯兰世界数千年以来的历史纠葛和比邻而居，使双方发展出了一种特殊的关系——虽然双方常常僵持不下甚至刀兵相向，但双方至少也因此深入地了解了对方。


In European eyes, Americans lack such sophisticated understanding, and often have no interest in acquiring it, seeing the land around and beyond Israel as populated largely by greedy oil sheikhs and dangerous religious fanatics.	在欧洲人看来，美国缺乏这种深入而复杂的了解，甚至连了解的兴趣都没有，在他们眼中居住在以色列以外土地上的只不过是一帮贪得无厌的阿拉伯油王和丧心病狂的宗教狂人而已。


Like all caricatures, this European view has had some truth to it.	正如所有讽刺画画的那样，欧洲人的观点确实有可取之处。


And, though Europeans have lamented that fate has allocated the real power in the Middle East to their crass cousins, they have nonetheless done pretty well there, not least commercially, simply by not being American.	虽然欧洲人也哀叹命运竟然把主宰中东的实权交到了自己鲁莽的美国亲戚手里，但欧洲人在中东其实也成绩斐然，取得的成就也不仅仅是在商业上的，原因很简单，只要中东人知道你不是美国佬就行了。


Now, after listening to Obama in Cairo, they will have to ask themselves whether this is not another aspect of how the world works, and of Europe’s position in it, that is about to change.	因此如今在聆听了奥巴马的开罗讲话之后，欧洲人也必须自问：这是否不应是世界政治即将变化呈现的另一种样貌，也不应是欧洲人全球地位的未来？


It was a fine speech, and Europeans will duly applaud it; but listen for the growing undertone of anxiety that this bold young US president has just helped himself to some more of Europe’s clothes.	奥巴马的讲话精彩绝伦，而欧洲人也表示了大方得体的欢迎； 但从他演讲中不断流露出的紧张之态来看，这位年轻冒失的美国总统，最好还是多披上几件欧洲理念的“外衣”遮遮丑好了。


Obama’s Nuclear Agenda	奥巴马的核议程


CAMBRIDGE – The announcement of a secret uranium enrichment facility located on a military base in Iran has sharpened President Barack Obama’s efforts to place nuclear proliferation issues at the top of the world agenda.	发自剑桥——伊朗最近公开披露了一处兴建在军事基地中的秘密铀浓缩设施，而这也进一步推动美国总统奥巴马在将核扩散事务提全世界首要议程上所处出的努力。


2010 will be a critical year.	由此看来，2010年将是关键的一年。


In September, both at the United Nations and at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, many countries agreed to work on Obama’s nuclear agenda.	就在今年9月，在联合国会议以及匹兹堡G20峰会上，许多国家都同意对奥巴马的核议程予以配合。


But, in the midst of those meetings, it was revealed that Iran has been secretly building a second enrichment facility with the potential to produce weapons-grade uranium.	但就在这两次会议期间，却爆出消息说伊朗已经秘密兴建了第二座铀浓缩设施，并拥有足够的潜力去生产核武器级别的铀。


In early October, Iranian officials met in Geneva with representatives of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany) and agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the hitherto secret plant.	随后的10月初，伊朗官员和来自各联合国常任理事国（加上德国）的代表在日内瓦进行了会面，并同意让国际原子能机构派人监查这座依然蒙着神秘面纱的核设施。


In addition, the Iranians said that they would export their existing low-enriched uranium to be fabricated into nuclear fuel outside of Iran.	此外，伊朗人还说他们将出口现有的低浓缩铀，以便送往国外加工成核燃料。


If these measures are implemented, they will represent important steps.	而如果上述做法都能成为现实的话，这就意味着迈出了非常重要的一步。


There has been widespread fear that Iran would abrogate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and use its enrichment facilities to develop a nuclear weapon.	因为外界一直广泛担忧伊朗会撕毁《核不扩散条约》并将其铀浓缩设施用来制造核武器。


It is not yet clear whether words will be matched with deeds.	但伊朗人的话是否只是口是心非的空话，还有待验证。


Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, whose stockpiles contain more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, are negotiating in Geneva to produce a strategic arms reduction treaty to replace their START I arms-control agreement, which expires in December.	与此同时，美国和俄罗斯这在两个武器库里囤积了全世界90%核武器的大国也在日内瓦展开磋商，谈论制定一个足以代替即将在今年12月失效的第一阶段《削减战略武器条约》的条约文本。


If those talks are successful, they may yield cuts of up to one-third of all strategic nuclear warheads.	如果这些谈判都能取得成功的话，那将意味着全世界将有1/3战略核弹头被削减。


The US Senate would then consider the new treaty for ratification next year.	如果一切顺利，美国参议院将在明年讨论新条约的批准事宜。


The Obama administration is also consulting with Congress on when to re-submit the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was rejected by the Senate 10 years ago.	而奥巴马政府也在就何时重新提交《全面禁止核试验条约》——此条约10年前遭到美国参议院否决——的问题咨询国会。


International agreements regulating the size and composition of national defenses have often been controversial in the Senate.	在美国参议院内部，针对这个用国际协定来约束本国国防力量的规模和组成的问题一直存在着极大的争议。


The new strategic arms-reduction treaty, which is still a work in progress, and the CTBT have already aroused skepticism from opposition legislators and opinion-makers.	而尚在制定过程中的新战略武器削减条约以及《全面禁止核试验条约》已经在反对派议员和舆论领袖中激起了一片反对之声。


If Obama submits both treaties to the Senate in 2010, he will need to convince the public that they serve an integrated strategy for enhancing national and international security.	如果奥巴马在2010年将两项条约提交给参议院的话，他就必须说服公众，使人们相信这些条约实际上是一个旨在同时提升本国和国际安全形势的整合性战略。


If he fails and the Senate rejects one or both of the treaties, it could have a strong negative effect on the non-proliferation regime.	但如果他惨遭失败而参议院否决了其中一项或者全部两项条约，这将给整个核不扩散体制都将带来非常严重的负面效应。


In May, 189 member states of the NPT will meet in Vienna to review its status.	到了明年5月，189个签署了才的国家将齐聚维也纳，共同检讨条约目前的实施状态。


When the NPT entered into force in 1970, it was intended to limit the number of nuclear-weapons states to five (the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China).	当这个条约在1970年生效的时候，其目的是为了把拥有核武器的国家限制在5个（美苏英法中）。


Overall, the treaty has been a success.	而总的来说这份条约执行得很成功。


Many people, including President John F. Kennedy, believed in the 1960’s that there would be dozens of countries with nuclear weapons by now, and that their use would be highly probable.	因为在1960年代，包括美国前总统约翰·F·肯尼迪在内许多人都曾经认为到今天世界上将存在数十个拥有核武器的国家，而且这些国家极有可能会动用核武器。


Fortunately, this has not been the case.	但幸运是的，这些猜测都没有变成现实。


Since 1970, three states that never signed the treaty have acquired nuclear weapons (India, Israel, and Pakistan).	自1970年以来已经有三个没有签署条约的国家拥有了核武器（印度，以色列和巴基斯坦）。


In addition, North Korea violated its treaty obligations and exploded two crude devices.	此外朝鲜违反了其条约义务并爆破了两座比较低级的核设施。


Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons program has now raised new fears that the global nonproliferation regime may unravel.	而伊朗可疑的核武器计划目前则引发了新的担忧，担心全球核不扩散体制即将因此走向崩溃。


Averting that danger will require multiple, coordinated, and sustained efforts for many years to come, but ratification of post-START and the CTBT would help.	而消除这项危机则需要在未来许多年间进行多边协作并持续努力，而下一阶段《削减战略武器条约》和《全面禁止核试验条约》的国会批准将对此起到正面作用。


For example, a new arms-reduction agreement would improve the US-Russian relationship, and that, in turn, could translate into a more constructive Russian position on Iran in the Security Council.	比如说，一个新的武器削减条约将使美俄关系有所改善，而这随之意味着俄罗斯将在安理会上讨论伊朗问题时采取更加富有建设性的立场。


Senate approval of the CTBT would also restore America’s credibility in its efforts to get other countries to forgo nuclear testing.	而如果美国参议院能够通过《全面禁止核试验条约》，那么自然也会增加美国在促使他国放弃核试验方面的公信力。


Next March, Obama will host a Global Nuclear Security Summit with the aim of developing new means to combat nuclear smuggling and terrorism.	就在明年3月，奥巴马将主持一个旨在发展应对核走私以及核恐怖主义新方法的全球核安全峰会。


In addition, his proposed long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons will require a great deal of preparatory work before it becomes an operational rather than an aspirational objective.	除此之外，他所提议的消灭核武器长期目标将需要大量的准备工作，以便令这个目标从单纯的希望倡议，变成具有操作性的事实。


Obama will need to begin discussions with the Russians, for example, on how to handle the question of short-range nuclear weapons, and how to regulate anti-ballistic missile defenses to maintain stability in a world of fewer offensive weapons.	奥巴马需要与俄罗斯展开讨论，论题包括如何处理短程核武器，以及在一个进攻性武器减少了的世界上如何规管反弹道导弹防御以维持世界稳定。


At some point, he must open discussions with countries like China, France, and Britain to understand better the conditions for transparency and verification that would be necessary for a clearer path toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.	在一些问题上奥巴马必须与中国、法国和英国开诚布公地进行讨论，以便能更好地理解某些透明化以及验证性条件，而这些条件将有助于在依照《核不扩散条约》第六条的情况下找到一条更清晰的，可以最终实现全面消灭核武器的路径


At the same time, Obama cannot allow these long-term issues to divert his attention from crucial short-term issues.	与此同时，奥巴马也不能被这些长期事务分散了他放在短期事务上的注意力。


So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence.	只要世界依然是一个核武国家威胁下的危险之地，奥巴马就必须使美国的盟友们确信美国将提供可靠的核保护伞。


Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states.	另一方面，削减核武器将引发其他国家的恐慌并导致它们发展自己的武器，反而会增加了核武国家的数量。


Obama will also need to pursue negotiations to persuade North Korea to return to the Six-Party talks with the objective of eventually giving up its nuclear weapons (as South Africa once did).	奥巴马还需要说服朝鲜重回六方会谈并最终放弃其核武器（如从前的南非那样）。


And, of course, he will need to pursue the negotiations with Iran to persuade them to keep their word and remain in the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.	当然他也必须与伊朗讨价还价，确保伊朗人能信守承诺，并作为一个无核武器国家继续留在《核不扩散条约》之内。


How successful Obama is in managing the domestic politics and international diplomacy of his nuclear agenda will be an important factor in his effectiveness as a world leader.	由此可见，奥巴马在处理有关其核议程的国内政治和外交事务方面能究竟取得多少成功，将作为一个重要因素决定他作为一个世界领袖的影响力。


Even more important, his progress in 2010 will say a lot about the world’s ability to maintain the existing 60-year taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.	而更重要的是，他在2010年所取得的成绩，将在很大程度上决定世界将如何把这些业已存在了60年的反核武器禁令，继续维护下去。


Obama’s Pacific Pivot	亚太地区成为奥巴马政府的外交政策关键


CAMBRIDGE – Asia’s return to the center of world affairs is the great power shift of the twenty-first century.	剑桥——亚洲重返世界舞台的中心是本世纪具有重大意义的转折。


In 1750, Asia had roughly three-fifths of the world’s population and accounted for three-fifths of global output.	早在1750年，亚洲人口约占世界的五分之三，总产出占全球的四分之三。


By 1900, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, Asia’s share of global output had shrunk to one-fifth.	上世纪初，即西方工业革命之后，亚洲在世界总产出中的贡献缩减到五分之一。


By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to where it was 300 years earlier.	然而，到2050年，亚洲的经济水平预计会重回其三百年前的水平。


But, rather than keeping an eye on that ball, the United States wasted the first decade of this century mired in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.	对于亚洲在新世纪的崛起，美国此前没有给予应有关注，只是忙于伊拉克和阿富汗战争。


Now, as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in a recent speech, American foreign policy will “pivot” toward East Asia.	而日前美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿终于提及，美国的外交政策将把东亚地区视为“关键”。


President Barack Obama’s decision to rotate 2,500 US Marines through a base in northern Australia is an early sign of that pivot.	政策中心的这一转移已有实际体现。 例如，奥巴马总统下令派遣2500名海军陆战队员到澳大利亚北部的某基地进行训练。


In addition, the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, held in Obama’s home state of Hawaii, promoted a new set of trade talks called the Trans-Pacific Partnership.	此外，十一月（在奥巴马的故乡夏威夷州）的亚太经济合作组织会议召开之后，各方贸易谈判的主题成了所谓跨太平洋伙伴关系。


Both events reinforce Obama’s message to the Asia-Pacific region that the US intends to remain an engaged power.	这都佐证了奥巴马政府的政策，即美国意图在亚太地区保有深度力量。


The pivot toward Asia does not mean that other parts of the world are no longer important; on the contrary, Europe, for example, has a much larger and richer economy than China’s.	视亚洲为关键并不意味着世界其他地区不再重要（例如，与中国相比，欧洲的经济总量更大，消费水平也更高），而是将亚太地区发展的深远影响纳入美国外交政策的考虑范畴。


But, as Obama’s national security adviser, Tom Donilon, recently explained, US foreign policy over the past few years has been buffeted by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, concerns about terrorism, nuclear-proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, and the recent Arab uprisings.	如奥巴马的国防顾问汤姆•多尼隆所言，之前美国身陷两场战争，外交政策更多关注的是反恐怖主义、防止伊朗和朝鲜核扩散以及阿拉伯国家的局势。


Obama’s November trip to Asia was an effort to align US foreign-policy priorities with the region’s long-term importance.	而十一月奥巴马对亚洲的访问表明，美国的外交政策重心转向亚洲。


In Donilon’s words, “by elevating this dynamic region to one of our top strategic priorities, Obama is showing his determination not to let our ship of state be pushed off course by prevailing crises.”	多尼隆称，“亚太地区极具活力，将这一地区列入战略重点表明奥巴马决心带领我国与时俱进、共度难关”。


The Obama administration also announced that, whatever the outcome of the defense-budget debates, “we are going to make sure that we protect the capabilities that we need to maintain our presence in the Asia-Pacific” region.	奥巴马政府也表示，无论防务预算结果如何，“我们都会确保在亚太地区的可用力量”。


Obama’s November trip was also a message to China.	奥巴马十一月的访问向中国传递了新信息。


After the 2008 financial crisis, many Chinese expressed the mistaken belief that the US was in terminal decline, and that China should be more assertive – particularly in pursuing its maritime claims in the South China Sea – at the expense of America’s allies and friends.	08年金融危机之后，许多中国人认为美国将一蹶不振，中国理应力抗美国的盟友和伙伴——特别是在南海问题上——以大国形象示人。


During Obama’s first year in office, his administration placed a high priority on cooperation with China, but Chinese leaders seemed to misread US policy as a sign of weakness.	奥巴马执政第一年间重视中美合作，而这一意愿却被中方解读为美国已现颓势。


The administration took a tougher line when Clinton addressed the South China Sea question at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Hanoi in July 2010.	美国政府在南海问题上采取了强硬路线。 10年7月，国务卿克林顿在河内向东盟表达美国的立场。


Chinese President Hu Jintao’s subsequent official visit to Washington in January 2011 was successful, but many Chinese editorialists complained that the US was trying to “contain” China and prevent its peaceful rise.	随后，11年1月，中国国家主席胡锦涛成功对美国进行国事访问。 然而，与此同时，中国国内舆论多对美国“压制”中国和平崛起表示不满。


China’s anxiety about a supposed US containment policy is on the rise again, now that Clinton is insisting that the country’s maritime disputes with its neighbors be placed on the agenda at next year’s East Asia Summit in Manila, which will be attended by Obama, Hu Jintao, and other regional leaders.	近来，这种不满情绪又在升温。 背景是克林顿坚持将南海争端提上东亚峰会的议事日程，这一峰会将在明年与马尼拉举行，中美两国及亚太其他国家领导人都将出席。


But American policy toward China is different from Cold War containment of the Soviet bloc.	但是，美国对华政策不同于对前苏联的压制战略。 冷战时期，美苏间只有相当有限的双边贸易和民间往来。


Whereas the US and the Soviet Union had limited trade and social contact, the US is China’s largest overseas market, welcomed and facilitated China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and opens its universities’ gates to 125,000 Chinese students each year.	如今，中国商品主要出口到美国； 中国入世受到美国的欢迎和协助；


If current US policy towards China is supposed to be Cold War-style containment, it seems unusually warm.	每年有十二万五千名中国学生踏入美国大学校门。 若将如此种种成为冷战式的压制政策未免不太合理。


The Pentagon’s East Asia Strategy Review, which has guided American policy since 1995, offered China integration into the international system through trade and exchange programs.	美国军方1995年发布的《东亚战略评论》是美国的亚太政策的导引。


Although the US hedged its bet by simultaneously strengthening its alliance with Japan, this does not constitute containment.	其中提���，通过贸易和人员交换项目吸引中国加入国际体系。 诚然，美国也在加强同日本的关系。


After all, China’s leaders cannot predict their successors’ intentions. The US is betting that they will be peaceful, but no one knows.	这是为了规避风险，毕竟就连中国领导人自己也不能准确预测其继任者是否会继续奉行和平外交政策。


A hedge expresses caution, not aggression.	美国的谨慎也就是可以理解的，而不能解读为压制政策或侵犯意图。


American military forces do not aspire to “contain” China in Cold War fashion, but they can help to shape the environment in which future Chinese leaders make their choices.	美军可以影响未来中国领导人的决策环境，却不想像“压制”苏联般对待中国。


I stand by my testimony before the US Congress of 1995 in response to those who, even then, wanted a policy of containment rather than engagement: “Only China can contain China.”	针对倡导压制论者，我曾在1995年的美国国会证言：“只有中国能压制中国。 ”


If China becomes a bully in the Asia-Pacific region, other countries will join the US to confront it.	如果中国在亚太地区横行霸道，其他国家会同美国一道做出反抗。


Indeed, that is why many of China’s neighbors have strengthened their ties with the US since 2008, when China’s foreign policy became more assertive.	正是因此，自08年中国对外政策转强以来，其邻国纷纷加强同美国关系。


But the last thing the US wants is a Cold War II in Asia.	但美国实在不想看到第二场冷战在亚洲上演。


Whatever the two sides’ competitive positions, Sino-American cooperation on issues like trade, financial stability, energy security, climate change, and pandemics will benefit both countries. The rest of the region stands to gain, too.	尽管中美两国存在分歧，双方在国际贸易、金融秩序、能源安全、气候变化和疫病控制方面的合作对彼此以及亚太各国均有益处。


The Obama administration’s pivot towards Asia signals recognition of the region’s great potential, not a clarion call for containment.	奥巴马政府以亚洲为中心的政策转向是对该地区巨大潜力的认可，而不是压制政策的先声。


A Man Without a Plan	没有计划的人


NEW HAVEN – During the United States’ recent presidential election campaign, public-opinion polls consistently showed that the economy – and especially unemployment – was voters’ number one concern.	发自纽黑文——在最近的美国总统大选期间，其民意调查始终显示经济——尤其失业率——是选民们关心的首要问题。


The Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, sought to capitalize on the issue, asserting: “The president’s plans haven’t worked – he doesn’t have a plan to get the economy going.”	来自共和党的挑战者——米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）试图利用这一问题，他宣称：“奥巴马总统的计划并不凑效，他没有一个能推动经济的计划。 ”


Nonetheless, Barack Obama was reelected.	然而巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）依然成功连任了。


The outcome may reflect the economy’s slight improvement at election time (as happened when Franklin Roosevelt defeated the Republican Alf Landon in 1936, despite the continuing Great Depression).	这个结果也许反映了经济在选举期间的轻微改善，正如1936年大萧条持续期间富兰克林·罗斯福（Franklin Roosevelt）击败来自共和党的阿夫尔·兰登（Alf Landon）时所发生的情况那样。


But Obama’s victory might also be a testament to most US voters’ basic sense of economic reality.	但奥巴马的胜利或许也证实了大部分美国选民对经济现实的基本观感。


Economic theory does not provide an unambiguous prescription for policymakers.	经济理论并不能为政策制定者开出一个明确的药方。


Professional opinion in macroeconomics is, as always, in disarray.	对宏观经济学的专业判断一如既往地杂乱无章。


Because controlled experiments to test policy prescriptions are impossible, we will never have a definitive test of macroeconomic measures.	由于不可能用受控的实验来测试政策，因此我们永远都不可能对宏观经济措施实施明确的检验。


Romney had no miracle cure, either, but he attempted to tap into voters’ wishful-thinking bias, by promising to reduce the size of the government and cut marginal tax rates.	罗姆尼也没有什么神奇疗法，而是试图通过承诺缩小政府规模及降低边际税率来影响选民的主观选择。


That would work if it were true that the best way to ensure economic recovery were to leave more money on the table for individuals.	如果把更多的钱留在个人手上确实是保证经济复苏的最好办法，也许罗姆尼的策略就凑效了。


But the electorate did not succumb to wishful thinking.	但选民们对这种一厢情愿的想法并不买账。


The idea that Obama lacks a plan is right in a sense: nothing he has proposed has been big enough to boost the US economy’s painfully slow recovery from the 2007-9 recession, nor to insulate it from shocks coming from Europe and from weakening growth in the rest of the world.	奥巴马缺乏计划这一说法在某种意义上来说是对的：他所提议的政策没有一个足以推动美国经济摆脱2007~09年衰退后痛苦而迟缓的复苏，也不能使其免受来自欧洲经济危机的冲击或全球���长减缓的影响。


What Obama does have is a history of bringing in capable economic advisers.	不过奥巴马却有着引进优秀经济顾问的历史记录。


Is there anything more, really, that one can ask of a president?	难道我们还能对一个总统作更多的要求么？


And yet US presidential campaigns generally neglect discussion of advisers or intellectual influences.	然而美国的总统竞选通常忽略了对顾问或知识界影响的讨论。


Although a president’s advisers may change, one would think that candidates would acknowledge them, if only to suggest where their own ideas come from; after all, realistically what they are selling is their ability to judge and manage expertise, not their own ability as economists.	尽管一个总统的顾问人选可能会变更，大家可能会觉得候选人会提到这些人的名字，哪怕只是为了说明自己的观点来自何处； 毕竟实际上这些候选人要展示的只是自己在决策管理方面的专长而非作为经济学家的能力。


This time, too, however, there was no mention by name of any deep economic thinker, or of any specific economic model.	然而这一次也不例外，没有提及任何一个资深经济思想家的名字或任何特定的经济模型。


Obama originally had a wonder team of economic advisers, including Lawrence Summers, Christina Romer, Austan Goolsbee, and Cass Sunstein.	奥巴马原来拥有一个由经济顾问组成的梦之队，包括了劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）、克里斯蒂娜·罗默（Christina Romer）、奥斯坦·古斯比（Austan Goolsbee）以及凯斯·桑斯坦（ Cass Sunstein）。


But they are gone now.	不过现在他们都离开了白宫。


Today, the most powerful economic adviser remaining in the White House is Gene Sperling, head of the National Economic Council (NEC), the agency created by President Bill Clinton in 1993 to serve as his main source of economic policy (somewhat shunting aside the Council of Economic Advisers).	如今依然留在白宫且权力最大的经济顾问是吉恩·斯珀林（Gene Sperling）——国家经济委员会(NEC)主任，NEC是由克林顿（Bill Clinton）总统于1993年创立的机构，充当他经济政策的主要来源——这在某种程度上疏远了经济顾问委员会（Council of Economic Advisers）。


Because this position does not require Congressional approval, the president may appoint whomever he wants, without having his choice raked over the coals in the US Senate.	由于这个职位的任命并不需要国会的批准，总统可以指派任何他想要的人，而不会因他的选择被美国参议院痛骂。


That is why Obama could appoint the highly talented but politically unpopular Summers, the former president of Harvard University.	这就是为什么奥巴马可以任命才华横溢却在政治上不受欢迎的萨莫斯（Summers）——哈佛大学的前任校长。


Sperling is not nearly so well known as Summers.	斯珀林远没有萨莫斯那么有名。


But his record of influence in government is striking; indeed, he has been at the pinnacle of economic-policymaking power in the US for almost a decade.	但他在政府的影响力却是显著的； 确实，他处于美国经济政策制定权的顶峰已经差不多十年了。


He was the NEC’s deputy director from its beginning in 1993 until 1996, and its director from 1996 to 2000.	他曾国家经济委员会成立之初的1993年到1996年间任副主管，1996年至2000年期间升任主管。


Obama reappointed him as head of the NEC in January 2011.	后来奥巴马又在2011年1月再次任命他为NEC主管。


His 2005 book The Pro-Growth Progressive contains many ideas about how to make the economy perform better.	斯柏林2005年出的书《支持增长的改革者》包含了许多有关如何使经济表现得更好的理念。


None is grandiose, but together they might help substantially.	其中的理念都算不上宏大，但它们联合起作用的话却可能产生巨大的影响。


Some of these ideas found their way into the American Jobs Act, which might have had some real impact had Congress passed it in 2011.	其中的一些理念渗入到了美国就业法案中，如果2011年国会能通过这个法案的话那么这些理念可能就会产生一些实际的影响。


The AJA embodied some of what Sperling describes in his book: subsidies for hiring, wage insurance, and job training, as well as support for education and early learning.	美国就业法案体现了一些斯珀林在他书描述的理念：提供雇佣津贴，工资保险和职业培训以及对教育和早期学习的支持。


Moreover, the AJA would have offered some balanced-budget stimulus – the kind of stimulus that would boost the level of economic activity without increasing the volume of government debt.	此外，该法案原本还可以提供一些平衡预算的刺激——是那种可以不用增加政府负债就能促进经济活动水平的刺激。


But the public, despite its concern about unemployment, is not very interested in the details of concrete plans to create more jobs.	然而尽管公众担心失业率，却对创造更多就业机会的具体计划细节不感兴趣。


Sperling is just not very visible to the public.	人们并不怎么了解斯珀林。


His book was not a best seller: in commercial terms, it might be better described as a dud.	他的书也并不畅销：用商业用语来说，也许称之为“哑弹”更合适。


Sperling is fundamentally different from the typical academic economist, who tends to concentrate on advancing economic theory and statistics.	斯珀林与那些典型的学术经济学家有着根本的不同，学术经济学家倾向于专注推进经济理论与统计。


He concentrates on legislation – that is, practical things that might be accomplished to lift the economy.	斯珀林专注于法律——也就是可以用来提升经济的实际事物。


He listens to academic economists, but is focused differently.	他会听取学术经济学家的意见，但其侧重点则有所不同。


At one point in his book, Sperling jokes that maybe the US needs a third political party, called the “Humility Party.”	在其书中某处，斯珀林开玩笑说到也许美国需要第三个政党，叫做“谦逊党”。


Its members would admit that there are no miraculous solutions to America’s economic problems, and they would focus on the “practical options” that are actually available to make things a little better.	它的成员会承认没有可以解决美国经济问题的神奇办法，而且他们会专注在“实际选项”上——也就是那些可以用来改善现状的事物。


In fact, Americans do not need a new political party: with Obama’s reelection, voters have endorsed precisely that credo of pragmatic idealism.	但实际上，美国并不需要一个新的政党：奥巴马连任已经说明选民们明确支持实用理想主义的信条。


Looking Back on Barack	回顾奥巴马


BASEL – Any assessment of Barack Obama’s eight-year US presidency should start at the beginning: his first inauguration, on January 20, 2009.	发自巴塞尔——任何对巴拉克·奧巴马八年美国总统历程的评估都应从2009 年 1 月 20 日他首次就职开始。


The US economy was in free-fall: financial markets had seized up, GDP was shrinking, and employment was plummeting, with some 800,000 jobs being lost each month. And two ill-conceived and badly executed foreign wars were underway.	当时美国经济陷入了自由落体状态：金融市场失灵，GDP萎缩，就业率也急剧下跌，每个月都流失近80万个工作岗位，外加两场策划不周且执行得一塌糊涂的对外战争。


In short, upon entering office, Obama confronted conditions more adverse than any incoming president had faced in many decades.	总之，刚搬进白宫的奧巴马面临着比过去几十年来诸位新总统接手时更为不利的局面。


True, Franklin D. Roosevelt inherited the Great Depression and Abraham Lincoln took office as the Civil War erupted. But who else entered the White House facing both an economic and a national-security crisis?	虽然当年富兰克林 · 罗斯福和亚伯拉罕 · 林肯就职时分别遭遇了大萧条和内战爆发，但试问何曾有人入主白宫时要同时应对一场经济危机和一场国家安全危机呢？


To tackle the economic crisis, Obama launched a fiscal stimulus and rescue programs for the financial system and the auto industry – policies that complemented and reinforced the US Federal Reserve’s aggressive and innovative monetary easing.	为应对经济危机，奧巴马推出了财政刺激政策以及针对金融体系和汽车行业的救助计划，——这些政策对美国联储积极创新的货币宽松政策进行了补充和强化。


Republicans nearly unanimously opposed the stimulus.	共和党人几乎一面倒地反对经济刺激方案。


And almost everybody was critical of the rescue programs, urging Obama either to nationalize the banks and auto companies or let them collapse.	几乎所有人都在对救助项目提出过质疑，敦促奧巴马要么将银行和汽车企业国有化，要么就放任其崩溃。


Against all odds, the Obama administration made the middle path work.	尽管困难重重，奧巴马当局却成功走出了一条中间路径。


The recession ended in June 2009 – an achievement for which the administration did not get enough credit, despite the clarity of the turnaround.	经济衰退在2009年6月结束——尽管经济调头上行势头如此明确，但政府却未能因这些成就而得到多少赞誉。


In the last quarter of 2008, economic output had declined by an astonishing 8.2% per annum.	在2008 年第四季度，年经济产出出现了8. 2%的惊人下跌。


Yet, almost immediately after the stimulus program was implemented, the output decline and employment losses slowed sharply. The bottom came in June 2009, with output growth turning positive in the next quarter.	然而几乎在经济刺激计划退出后的同一时间，产出下降和就业流失的势头就大幅放缓，最终在2009年6月触底反弹，经济产出增长也在随后那个季度转为了正数。


Net job creation followed early in 2010.	随后在2010年年初也出现了就业净增长的状况。


Employment growth persisted for the remainder of Obama’s time in office, reaching record-breaking levels: the US economy added more than 15 million jobs during Obama’s remaining years.	在奧巴马余下的任期中就业一直在增长，甚至达到了创纪录的水平：截至奥巴马卸任时美国经济增加了超过1500万个就业岗位。 同时在奧巴马第二个任期的后半段，失业率下降了一半，不足5%；


By the latter part of Obama’s second term, unemployment had fallen by half, to below 5%; wages were rising; and real median family incomes were finally increasing, by a record-high 5.2% in the most recently reported year, with lower-income groups benefiting from even higher gains.	家庭实际收入中位数也终于有所上涨，在最近有报道的一年实现了创历史新高的5. 2%，意味着低收入群体能从更高的收入中获益。


True, the recovery was disappointingly long and slow.	当然，这场复苏也呈现出了令人失望的漫长而缓慢。


One reason was the depth and financial origins of the 2007-2008 crash.	其中一个原因是2007~08年崩溃的深度影响和金融根源。


Another was the efforts of the Republicans, who secured a majority in Congress in 2010, to block further stimulus, even though more infrastructure spending and well-designed tax cuts were precisely what the US economy needed in 2011-2014.	另一个则是共和党人在2010年夺取了国会多数席位后阻挠了进一步刺激政策的实施，无视美国经济恰恰在2011~14 年急需更多基础设施建设支出和合理减税政策的事实。


Republicans, it seems, support fiscal expansion only when they control the White House.	在这帮共和党人看来，只有当他们控制白宫的时候才是支持财政扩张政策的时机。


Obama managed two other major achievements before Republican obstructionism took hold: the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill and the Affordable Care Act (ACA, also known as “Obamacare”).	奧巴马还在共和党反对势力得势之前实现了两项成就：多德-弗兰克金融改革法案和《平价医疗法案》(也称“奥巴马医改”)。


Despite Republicans’ subsequent steps to weaken Dodd-Frank and the ACA, both reforms did much more good than most people realize.	尽管共和党随后削弱了这两项法案，但这两项改革依然实现了超出大多数人意识的好处。


Dodd-Frank helped make a repeat of the 2007-2008 financial crisis less likely, and the ACA has given more than 20 million Americans access to health insurance while slowing the rise in overall health-care costs.	多德-弗兰克法案减少了2007~08年金融危机重演的机率，而奥巴马医改在令2000多万美国人获得医疗保险的同时减缓了整体卫生保健费用的上涨。


The two wars that Obama inherited were intractable. But he made the difficult decisions that led to the elimination of the instigator of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Osama bin Laden – a goal that his predecessor, George W. Bush, in his eagerness to invade Iraq, had lost interest in pursuing.	而奧巴马继承的这两场战争也极为棘手，但他作出了一系列艰难的决定，成功击杀了2001 年 “9·11”恐怖袭击的幕后主使者奥萨马·本拉登——而他的前任，热衷于入侵伊拉克的小布什则早已将这一目标抛诸脑后了。


Moreover, in 2015, just as the press began labeling him a lame duck, Obama achieved a string of foreign-policy successes – namely, a much-needed nuclear agreement with Iran, normalization of relations with Cuba, and agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).	此外，在媒体开始将其称之为跛脚鸭总统的2015年，奧巴马却实现了一系列外交政策上的成就——比如与伊朗签订了急需的核协议，实现美国古巴关系正常化以及签订《跨太平洋伙伴关系协议》。


He also helped to secure a global deal to fight climate change, particularly by first achieving a breakthrough with China.	他还协助达成了一项对抗气候变化的全球协议，特别是首度与中国签署了一项突破性协议。


President-elect Donald Trump, who takes over the presidency this month, faces far easier conditions than Obama.	而继任总统特朗普面对的形势则比奧巴马当年宽松得多。


Nevertheless, he has announced plans to reverse most, if not all, of Obama’s achievements.	但他声称要将大多数（甚至可能是全部）奧巴马所取得的成果推翻。


The TPP, for example, is dead. And four years from now will probably be too late to revive it, because by then East Asian countries may have been drawn into a China-led trade grouping instead.	举个例子，跨太平洋伙伴关系已经停摆，即便是从现在开始再花四年时间估计也难以将其复活，因为到时候东亚国家可能早就被已经被纳入以中国为首的贸易集团中了。


In some cases, however, Trump will run into obstacles in translating his crowd-pleasing sound bites into reality.	但在某些情况下，特朗普会在将自己的花言巧语变为现实时碰钉子。


In repealing Obamacare, for example, Republicans are likely to be stymied by the absence of an alternative that does not take away the health insurance of 20 million Americans or raise health-care costs.	如果要废除奥巴马医改法案，共和党人就得拿出可以不废除2000万美国人的健康保险或避免提高卫生保健支出的替代方案。


Given this, they may end up making only minor substantive changes to the ACA and then slapping a new name on it – the analog of building a “beautiful” quarter-mile wall along the Mexican border to serve as a backdrop for photo opportunities.	因此他们可能最终只是对《平价医疗法案》进行轻微修改，再安上一个新的名头——类似沿墨西哥边境建设一道长四分之一���里的“华丽”围墙以作为拍照背景。


Trump’s promise to tear up the nuclear agreement with Iran is similarly out of touch with reality.	特朗普撕毁与伊朗核协议的承诺同样是镜花水月。


Without the participation of America’s allies, re-imposing sanctions will have little impact, beyond spurring Iran to restart and even accelerate its nuclear program.	没有美国的盟友们的参与，重新实施的制裁无法实现较大的影响，甚至会刺激伊朗重启甚至加速其核计划。


That’s what North Korea did when Bush, upon taking office, essentially tore up the “agreed framework” with that country.	这正是小布什上任后后撕毁与朝鲜的“协议框架”后与所发生的事情。


With Trump poised to make such imprudent decisions, will US voters hold him accountable?	在特朗普准备做出这种不明智决定的情况下，美国选民还会觉得他可靠吗？


Bush made serious economic- and foreign-policy mistakes during his presidency, beginning in its early years, with predictable consequences for the economy, the federal budget, and national security.	小布什在上任头几年就犯下了一系列严重经济和外交政策失误，为经济、联邦预算和国家安全引发了可预见的后果。


Although his poll numbers soared in his first term, they were far lower by the time he left office.	虽然他的民调支持率在第一个任期内飙升，最终却在卸任时跌到了谷底。


Conversely, Obama’s popularity sagged during much of his eight-year presidency.	相反，奧巴马的人气虽然在其八年任期的大部分时间内表现疲软。


Yet he leaves office with substantially higher approval ratings than most presidents achieve – and far higher than Trump’s.	然而他卸任时的支持率却大大高于大多数前任——也远高于特朗普。


The American public does, eventually, recognize the successes and failures of their leaders.	美国公众最终会看清他们领导人的成败得失。


Unfortunately, it sometimes takes a while.	不幸的是，这有时需要一些时间。


Obama versus Romney on Jobs	奥巴马和罗姆尼的就业问题比拼


BERKELEY – The United States has just completed its third year of economic recovery, but the unemployment rate remains above 8%, and there are worrisome signs of a slowdown.	伯克利——美国刚刚走完了经济复苏的第三个年头，但失业率依然维持在8%以上，并伴有令人担忧的经济放缓迹象。


So it is no surprise that jobs have become a major focus in the presidential campaign – or that the candidates have very different ideas about how to boost employment.	就业因此顺理成章地成为总统竞选的重头戏，而且候选人提出了截然不同的方法来促进就业。


Last autumn, President Barack Obama proposed the American Jobs Act, a $450 billion package of fiscal measures aimed at job creation.	去年秋天，奥巴马总统提出了“美国就业机会法案”，该法案将落实4500亿美元的财政措施创造就业机会。 “美国就业机会法案”约占GDP总额的3%，预定于2012年生效。


The AJA amounted to about 3% of GDP and was designed to take effect in 2012, providing a timely employment boost and insurance for the US recovery against global headwinds.	该法案将在全球经济环境不利的情况下及时推动就业，为美国的经济复苏保驾护航。 绝大多数措施已得到两党的一致支持；


Most of its measures had enjoyed bipartisan support in the past; tax cuts comprised about 56% of the total cost; and the package was paid for in Obama’s long-term deficit reduction plan.	其中减税约占支出总额的56%； 并在奥巴马的长期赤字削减计划下逐渐列支。


Several independent economists concluded that Obama’s plan would provide a significant lift to the job market in 2012-2013.	一些独立经济学家认为，奥巴马计划将于2012-2013年对就业市场实现重大提振。


Indeed, two of the nation’s most respected forecasters predicted that the AJA would add 1.3-1.9 million jobs in 2012 and more than two million jobs by the end of 2013.	事实上，美国最德高望重的两名预测人士预测2012年“美国就业机会法案”将创造130－190万个就业岗位，而到2013年底创造就业岗位将超过200万。


The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also found that most of the AJA’s policies ranked high in budgetary effectiveness, measured by the number of jobs created in 2012-2013 per dollar of budgetary cost.	超党派的国会预算办公室也认为按2012-2013年单位美元预算成本创造的就业岗位数来衡量，绝大多数法案政策的预算效益是排名居前的。


The AJA was filibustered by Senate Republicans, and the Republican-controlled House of Representatives likewise prevented the bill from coming to a vote.	 “美国就业机会法案”遭到参议院共和党人的阻挠，而共和党控制的众议院同样阻止表决这项法案。


Mitt Romney, now the Republican presidential candidate, attacked the plan as “mere stimulus” that would “throw a cup of gasoline on the embers” of the recovery.	该法案被目前的共和党总统候选人米特·罗姆尼诋毁为“单纯的刺激”，就像在经济复苏即将熄灭的余烬上泼上一杯汽油。


Ultimately, Obama, bolstered by polls endorsing his plan, won partial passage of two AJA policies: a one-third cut in employees’ payroll taxes (he had proposed one-half), and an extension of unemployment benefits by about 60% of what he had recommended.	最终奥巴马在赞同该项计划的民调支持下部分通过了两项就业法案政策：包括将雇员的工资税削减三分之一（他原本提议削减一半），以及将失业救济扩展至他所建议的60%。


But Congress failed to approve a 50% cut in employers’ payroll taxes – a business tax cut that many Republicans favored in the past and that ranks high on budgetary effectiveness.	但国会并未批准将雇主工资税削减50%——类似的削减营业税措施过去曾经受到共和党人的青睐，并在预算效益排行榜上排名居前。


Nor did Congress approve $30 billion in federal grants to states to enable them to employ about 135,000 teachers, police, and firemen, despite strong voter support.	尽管选民支持强劲，但国会同样没有批准为州政府提供价值300亿美元的联邦补助，以使他们能够雇佣约135,000名教师、警察和消防人员。


Such grants between 2009 and 2011, totaling $130 billion, helped states to maintain vital services and retain the public employees providing them.	2009年至2011年间总计1300万美元的此类补助协助各州继续提供这些至关重要的服务，并继续雇佣提供上述服务的公营部门人员。


Romney opposes more federal money for the states, arguing that “it is time to cut back on government and help the American people.”	罗姆尼反对联邦政府为各州提供资金，声称“当务之急是削减政府开支和帮助美国人民。


But teachers, firemen, and police are American people who help other American people.	” 但教师、消防员和警察是为他人提供帮助的美国人。


Government employment is falling at the fastest rate since the 1940’s, and is now at its 2006 level.	政府就业正以1940年后的最快速度下降，现已跌落至2006年的水平。


If public employment had grown during the last three years at about the same rate as the population, as it did during George W. Bush’s presidency, the unemployment rate would be around 7% rather than 8.2%, owing to about 800,000 additional jobs.	如果公共就业过去三年的增长速度能像乔治·W·布什总统任期时那样与人口的增长速度相等，那么这800,000个新增就业岗位将使失业率维持在7%左右，而不是8. 2%。


Likewise, Congress failed to approve Obama’s call for $90 billion in additional infrastructure spending, which would have supported about 400,000 jobs, despite the fact that the US has at least $1.1 trillion in unfunded infrastructure needs.	同样，尽管美国有至少1. 1万亿尚未实现融资的基础设施需求，国会仍未能批准奥巴马追加900亿美元基础设施建设投资的建议，如果上述建议获准通过，将能支持约400,000个就业���位。


Moreover, infrastructure investment not only creates jobs in the near term, but also promotes long-term competitiveness.	此外，基础设施投资不仅能在短期内创造就业机会，还能使长期竞争力得到提升。


Altogether, Congress left at least one million jobs on the negotiating table, holding unemployed workers hostage to the outcome of November’s election.	归总计算国会留在谈判桌上的就业机会总量至少达100万份之多，导致失业工人的利益被11月总统大选的结果所绑架。


Meanwhile, in response to persistent media pressure, Romney has unveiled his policies to boost short-term job creation.	此外，面对媒体的持续压力，罗姆尼也已经推出了自己的创造短期就业机会的刺激政策。


They are not convincing.	这些政策是无法令人信服的。


Romney says that he would ensure that the US puts more people to work in the energy sector.	罗姆尼说他将确保美国的能源部门吸纳更多人工作。


But, while the oil and gas industry has grown significantly since 2007, it employs fewer than 200,000 people, implying a negligible effect even if employment in this sector doubled in the short run.	但尽管石油和天然气工业在2007年以后取得了显著的增长，但吸纳的就业人数少于200,000，这意味着即使该领域的就业人数在短期内翻一番，其所产生的影响也几乎可以忽略。


And, while Romney says that he would open new foreign markets, Obama has been doing just that, winning passage of three major trade agreements and increasing federal support for US exports, which have been growing nearly twice as fast as they did during the recovery from the 2001 recession.	此外，尽管罗姆尼承诺会开拓新的海外市场，但奥巴马已经在做同样的事，奥巴马通过了三项重大贸易协定，并加大了联邦政府对美国出口的支持。 与2001年经济衰退的复苏期相比，美国的出口增速已经接近当时的两倍。


Moreover, Romney’s promise to charge China, America’s third-largest export market, with currency manipulation, and to impose large tariffs on Chinese imports, would almost certainly invite retaliation, causing a decline in US exports and jobs.	此外，罗姆尼信誓旦旦称要控告美国的第三大出口市场中国操纵汇率，并对中国进口产品征收高额的关税，这几乎肯定会招致中国方面的报复，从而损害美国的出口和就业。


Romney would also repeal “Obamacare” – the 2010 health-care reform legislation – because it “is scaring small business from hiring.”	罗姆尼还将废除“奥巴马医改法案”——即2010年的医疗改革立法——因为这项法案“吓得小企业不敢招聘员工。


But the evidence for this claim is meager and anecdotal.  A recent survey found that most small businesses support the reform.	” 但这种说法的依据既不充分又站不住脚。 最近的一项调查显示多数小企业支持这项改革。


Most businesses, large and small, cite insufficient demand as the primary reason they are not hiring.	绝大多数企业，无论大小，都认为需求不足是他们不愿招聘的主要因素。


Nor is Romney’s promise to enact immediate cuts in federal discretionary spending by an additional 5% likely to boost job growth, as he asserts.	罗姆尼立即削减联邦自由裁量开支5%的承诺也不太可能如他所断言的那样促进就业增长。


When an economy is suffering from high unemployment and weak aggregate demand, spending cuts are contractionary.	当经济体出现高失业和总需求疲软时，削减开支能够起到紧缩的效果。


Romney conceded this point recently, acknowledging that the “fiscal cliff” – the expiration of Bush-era tax cuts at the end of this year, combined with large spending cuts already scheduled to take effect – would push the economy back into recession.	罗姆尼最近承认了这一点，承认“财政断崖”——布什时代的税收减免将于今年年底前结束，再加上已经预定实施的大规模开支削减计划——将联合起来把经济推入衰退。


Finally, in addition to extending Bush’s tax cuts, Romney promises an across-the-board 20% reduction in marginal personal-income-tax rates and a significant cut in the corporate rate to encourage businesses to hire more workers.	最后，除了延长布什的减税政策，罗姆尼承诺将个人所得税边际税率整体削减20%，并大幅降低企业税，以鼓励企业雇用更多员工。


Despite large cuts in marginal income-tax rates at the start of the Bush administration, however, job growth between 2000 and 2007 was half the rate of the previous three decades.	但尽管在布什政府开始时大幅削减了所得税边际税率，但2000年到2007年间的就业增长仅为前30年速度的一半。


Even if Romney’s new tax cuts strengthened investment and growth in the long run (a debatable proposition that depends on how they are financed), their short-term effect on job creation would be minimal, and they would entail a significant loss of revenue.	即便罗姆尼的全新减税政策长远来看强化了投资和增长（根据资助方式的不同这本身还是一个有争议的命题），但是它们短期创造就业机会的作用仍然微乎其微，而且还会招致严重的收入损失。


Indeed, these cuts perform poorly on the CBO’s measure of budgetary effectiveness.	事实上，这些减税措施在国会预算办公室的预算措施效益排名表上表现不佳。


Obama’s proposals to boost job creation are convincing, whereas Romney’s proposals would have little or no effect – and some could even make matters worse.	奥巴马创造就业机会的建议很有说服力，而罗姆尼的建议则几乎没有效果——有些甚至可能让局势进一步恶化。


Voters need to know the difference. 	选民们需要了解这之中的差别。


Transatlantic Trade’s Transformative Potential	跨大西洋贸易的变革潜力


NEWPORT BEACH – After instant and seemingly coordinated fanfare in Europe and the United States, the proposal for a European Union-US free-trade area has been generating little media attention.	发自纽波特滩——虽然在欧美两地都进行了迅猛且貌似默契的大肆宣传，但建立欧盟与美国自由贸易区的提议却并未引起多少媒体关注。


There are three reasons for this, and all three highlight broader constraints on good national economic policymaking and productive cross-border coordination.	导致这种情况的原因有三个，并且它们都凸显了某些阻碍合理制定国家经济政策以及建设性跨境协调的宏观限制性因素。


In his “State of the Union” address in February, US President Barack Obama proposed a “comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” with Europe based on trade that is “fair and free.”	在二月的“国情咨文”讲话中，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）提出要在“公平与自由”贸易的基础上与欧洲建立“全面跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系”。


His administration regards this as part of a comprehensive approach to generating “good-paying American jobs.”	而政府则将其视为创造“美国国内高收入就业机会”综合策略的一部分。


Obama’s bold proposal received an immediate and enthusiastic reception in Europe.	奥巴马的大胆提议在立刻得到了欧洲的热情回应。


Taking to the airwaves within hours, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy called the proposal “ground-breaking.”	在讲话发表后的数小时内，欧盟委员会主席若泽·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐（José Manuel Barroso）和欧洲理事会主席赫尔曼·范龙佩（Herman Van Rompuy）就纷纷称赞这个提议是“开拓性的”，并认为自由贸易区的建立能让欧洲的年度经济增长提高0.


Arguing that it could increase Europe’s annual economic growth rate by half a percentage point, they declared that formal negotiations would start quickly.	5个百分点，两人还宣称很快就会对此展开正式谈判。


At first, there was quite a bit of general interest, and understandably so.	起初大众对此都颇为关注，这也是可以理解的。


The proposal involves the world’s two largest economic areas, with national, regional, and global implications.	这个提议涉及到世界两个最大的经济区域，且在国家、地区和全球层面都有影响。


Yet, despite the realization that an agreement could fundamentally alter the nature of global trade and production networks, it only took a few weeks for interest to drop off.	但尽管人们知道这项协议可以从根本上改变全球贸易和生产网络的本质，却仅仅在几个星期后就对此就失去了兴趣。


One reason is rooted in initial conditions that limit direct gains from increased trade while widening the scope for tension and conflict.	其中一个原因源自于某些初始条件——这些条件在扩大了对峙和冲突范围的同时限制了可以从贸易增加中取得的直接受益。


Free-trade agreements that promise the greatest benefits are those that link economies characterized by high tariffs, low levels of trade, and little overlap in consumption and production patterns.	那些能带来最大收益的自由贸易协定通常出现在那些以高关税、低贸易水平并在消费与生产方式上极少重叠为特点的国家之间。


This is not the case for the EU and the US.	而欧盟与美国的情况却并非如此。


Average tariff levels are only 3%.	它们的平均关税水平只有3%。