This recalls former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s experiment in the late 1990s, when he let the US economy boom, on the hunch – which proved to be right – that productivity was accelerating.	这让人想起了美联储前主席艾伦·格林斯潘在20世纪90年代的实验，他直觉地认为——最后证明是正确的——生产率正在加速，因此放任美国经济繁荣。


Might Yellen be willing to make a similar wager on labor supply?	耶伦也许也想在劳动力供给上下类似的赌注？


For now, the politics of populist discontent – from Donald Trump’s presidential campaign to the potential of a British exit from the European Union – are capturing the world’s attention.	目前，民粹主义不满的政治——从唐纳德·特朗普的总统选战到英国可能退出欧盟——正在吸引全世界的关注。


But the US employment and inflation reports are the real sources of clues about the future.	但美国就业和通胀报告才是未来线索的真正来源。


It is there that one should look for the factors most likely to drive the biggest wagers – for policy and for markets alike.	你可以在这里找到最有可能驱动最大赌注——不管是政策还是市场——的因素


The Fed Versus Price Stability	美联储与价格稳定


SAN FRANCISCO – There is a big difference between the Federal Reserve’s mandate to maintain “stable prices” – as enunciated in the Federal Reserve Act – and the Fed’s self-selected target of 2% annual inflation.	旧金山—美联储维持“物价稳定”的使命（由联邦储备法明文规定）和美联储自己选择的2%通胀目标之间有一个极大的不同点。


So how is it that policymakers have managed to substitute the latter for the former?	那么，决策者为何用后者代替前者呢？


The term “stable prices” is self-explanatory: a bundle of goods will cost the same ten, 50, or even 100 years from now.	“物价稳定”一词顾名思义是指一揽子商品今后十年、50年甚至100年价格都不会变。


By contrast, if a country experiences 2% inflation over a ten-year period, the same items that $100 can buy today will cost $122 at the end of the decade.	相反，如果一国以每年2%的通胀度过十年吗，那么今天100美元可以买到的东西，十年好需要花122美元购买。


After 100 years, the price tag will be a whopping $724.	100年后，价格标签将变成724美元。


In her recent Congressional testimony, Fed Chair Janet Yellen referred several times to the mandate of maintaining “stable prices”; but she mentioned the Fed’s 2% inflation objective twice as often.	在最新的国会听证中，美联储主席耶伦数次提到保持“物价稳定”的使命，但提到美联储2%的通胀目标的次数是前者的两倍。


“US inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2% objective,” she said, and the current “high degree of policy accommodation remains appropriate to foster further improvement in labor market conditions and to promote a return of inflation toward 2% over the medium term.”	“美国通胀仍低于委员会2%的目标，”她说，当前的“高度政策协调仍然有利于刺激劳动力市场条件进一步改善、促使通胀在中期回到2%。 ”


Does the Fed really want to increase annual inflation to 2%, such that the price level of the country will increase by more than 700% over the next century?	美联储真的想让年通胀率增加到2%，即让美国物价水平在未来一百年中上涨700%多吗？


Is that what Congress had in mind when it tasked the Fed with achieving “stable prices”?	这就是国会在授予美联储实现“物价稳定”目标的任务时所想的吗？


Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan knew that it did not.	美联储前主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）知道，答案是否定的。


On July 2, 1996, at a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which was devoted to extensive discussion of the appropriate inflation target for the Fed, Greenspan posed a simple question: “Are we talking about price stability or are we talking about zero inflation?” he asked.	1996年7月2日，在联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC，该委员会通过广泛讨论为美联储确定合适的通胀目标）会议上提出了一个简单的问题：“我们是在讨论物价稳定，还是在讨论零通胀？


“As we all know, those are two separate things.”	”他说，“我们都知道这是两个不同的东西。 ”


The discussion quickly turned to the difficulty of measuring inflation accurately and the need to build in a “safety cushion” to avoid deflation.	讨论很快转向了准确衡量通胀的困难性和建立避免通缩的“安全缓冲”的必要性。


According to Greenspan, “Price stability is that state in which expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business and household decisions.”	根据格林斯潘的说法，“物价稳定是一种状态，在这种状态下，总体物价水平的预期变化不会有效改变企业和家庭决策。


Yellen, then a Fed governor, was not satisfied: “Could you please put a number on that?” she asked.	”当时还是美联储理事的耶伦对此并不满足：“您可以具体说一个数字吗？ ”她问。


Greenspan did: “I would say that number is zero, if inflation is properly measured,” he replied.	格林斯潘满足了她：“我得说这个数字是零，如果通胀可以合理衡量的话。 ”他回答说。


At the time of that FOMC meeting, the consumer price index was increasing at about 3% per year.	那次FOMC会议举行时，消费者物价指数正在以每年约3%的速度增加。


Most of the discussion focused on whether the Fed should slow annual price growth to 2% or even lower, thereby consolidating the gains made in the difficult fight against inflation that policymakers had waged for the previous 15 years.	大部分讨论集中在美联储是否应该将年物价增长减缓至2%甚至更低，以巩固过去15年中决策者苦苦缠斗通胀所取得的战果。


Greenspan summarized the consensus: “...we have now all agreed on 2%...”	格林斯潘总结陈词：“……现在，我们全体同意2%……”


Thus, the Fed’s 2% inflation objective was born.	于是，美联储的2%通胀目标就这样诞生了。


During the ensuing discussion, several FOMC members argued that the inflation rate might be reduced to less than 2%, but nobody argued that inflation should be pushed higher if a lower, but still positive, rate was achieved.	在随后的讨论中，一些FOMC成员认为通胀率应该调低至2%以下，但没有人认为如果通胀比这更低（但仍然为正）的话应该让通胀增加一点。


Following the discussion, Greenspan exhorted the FOMC members to keep the discussion of the inflation target secret.	讨论结束后，格林斯潘要求FOMC成员们对关于通胀目标的讨论保密。


“I will tell you that if the 2% inflation figure gets out of this room,” he warned, “it is going to create more problems for us than I think any of you might anticipate.”	“我告诉你们，如果2%的通胀数字流出这个房间，”他警告说，“给我们造成的问题将超过你们的预期。


The official minutes of the meeting make no reference to the entire discussion of the inflation target, which took up several hours, and the FOMC never formally announced its 2% target for annual inflation until Chairman Ben Bernanke, Yellen’s predecessor, finally did so in 2012.	”这次会议的官方记录没有提到为期数小时的通胀目标的全部讨论过程，FOMC也从未正式宣布2%为其年通胀目标，直到2012年，耶伦的前任伯南克（Ben Bernanke）才将这一目标公之于众。


The 2% inflation target now is at the forefront of FOMC decision-making.	如今，2%的通胀目标已成为FOMC决策的最前沿。


For example, while annual inflation stood at 0.8% in December 2014, the minutes of the January 2015 FOMC meeting refer several times to the Committee’s need to make “progress toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2% inflation” by maintaining a highly accommodative policy stance.	比如，尽管2014年12月年通胀率为0. 8%，但2015年1月FOMC会议记录数次提到FOMC需要通过保持高度合适政策立场以 “接近就业最大化和2%的通胀目标”。


Increasing the rate of inflation is now the stated objective of Fed policy.	增加通胀率如今已成为美联储政策的具体目标。


Congress did not give the Fed a mandate to pursue that goal.	国会并未授权美联储追求这一目标。


The Federal Reserve Act is explicit: the Fed should achieve “price stability” for the US currency, along with moderate interest rates and maximum employment.	联邦储备法说的很明确：美联储应该为美国货币实现“物价稳定”，以及温和的利率和最大化的就业。


As long as inflation is somewhere between zero and 2%, the Fed should declare victory and leave it at that.	只要通胀处于零和2%之间，美联储就应该认为自己是成功的，并采取放任不管的态度。


The Wrong War for Central Banking	错误的央行战争


BEIJING – Fixated on inflation targeting in a world without inflation, central banks have lost their way.	北京—在一个没有通胀的世界以通胀目标为核心，这让央行迷失了方向。


With benchmark interest rates stuck at the dreaded zero bound, monetary policy has been transformed from an agent of price stability into an engine of financial instability.	基准利率被锁定在骇人听闻的零区间，货币政策已经从物价稳定的代表转变成金融动荡的发动机。


A new approach is desperately needed.	我们急需新的方针。


The US Federal Reserve exemplifies this policy dilemma.	美联储是这一政策两难的写照。


After the Federal Open Market Committee decided in September to defer yet again the start of its long-awaited normalization of monetary policy, its inflation doves are openly campaigning for another delay.	9月，美联储公开市场委员会决定再次推迟人们翘首以待的货币政策正常化，而如今，其中的通胀鸽派仍在公开呼吁再次推迟。


For the inflation-targeting purists, the argument seems impeccable.	对通胀目标孜孜以求的人来说，这一目标是无可挑剔的。


The headline consumer-price index (CPI) is near zero, and “core” or underlying inflation – the Fed’s favorite indicator – remains significantly below the seemingly sacrosanct 2% target.	标题消费物价指数（CPI）接近于零，“核心”或基础通胀——美联储最喜欢用的指标——仍显著低于堪称神圣的2%的目标。


With a long-anemic recovery looking shaky again, the doves contend that there is no reason to rush ahead with interest-rate hikes.	长期萎靡不振的复苏眼看就要再次夭折，鸽派认为没有理由急于提高利率。


Of course, there is more to it than that.	当然，事情没那么简单。


Because monetary policy operates with lags, central banks must avoid fixating on the here and now, and instead use imperfect forecasts to anticipate the future effects of their decisions.	货币政策操作存在时滞，因此央行必须避免只着眼于当下，而是要利用不完美的预测来推断它们的决策的未来影响。


In the Fed’s case, the presumption that the US will soon approach full employment has caused the so-called dual mandate to collapse into one target: getting inflation back to 2%.	对美联储来说，美国即将接近充分就业这一前提导致了所谓的双重使命变成了单一目标：让通胀回到2%。


Here, the Fed is making a fatal mistake, as it relies heavily on a timeworn inflation-forecasting methodology that filters out the “special factors” driving the often volatile prices of goods like food and energy.	在这方面，美联储正在犯致命的错误，它严重依赖过时的通胀预测方法，该方法忽略推动食品和能源等商品价格时常剧烈波动的“特殊因素”。


The logic is that the price fluctuations will eventually subside, and headline price indicators will converge on the core rate of inflation.	美联储的逻辑是，价格波动最终将抹平，标题物价指标将趋同于核心通胀率。


This approach failed spectacularly when it was adopted in the 1970s, causing the Fed to underestimate virulent inflation.	这一方针在20世纪70年代开始采用时就是一场彻头彻尾的失败，导致美联储低估了恶性通胀。


And it is failing today, leading the Fed consistently to overestimate underlying inflation.	今天，它也是一场失败，导致美联储持续高估基础通胀。


Indeed, with oil prices having plunged by 50% over the past year, the Fed stubbornly maintains that faster price growth – and the precious inflation rate of 2% – is just around the corner.	事实上，去年油价暴跌50%，但美联储顽固地坚持认为物价上升加速——以及2%这一神奇通胀率——就在眼前。


Missing from this logic is an appreciation of the new and powerful global forces that are bearing down on inflation.	这一逻辑的漏洞是没有认识到正在压制通胀的强大的全球性新力量。


According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest outlook, the price deflator for all advanced economies should increase by just 1.5% annually, on average, from now to 2020 – not much higher than the crisis-depressed 1.1% pace of the last six years.	据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的最新展望，从现在到2020年，全体发达经济体的物价平减指数平均每年只上升1. 5%——比过去六年饱受危机遏制的速度1.


Moreover, most wholesale prices around the world remain in outright deflation.	1%高不了多少。 此外，全球大部分批发物价指数仍陷在严重的通缩中。


But, rather than recognize the likely drivers of these developments – namely, a seemingly chronic shortfall of global aggregate demand amid a supply glut and a deflationary profusion of technological innovations and new supply chains – the Fed continues to minimize the deflationary impact of global forces.	但是，美联储没有看到这些发展态势背后可能的驱动力——即，在供给过剩和大量科技创新和新供应链带来的通缩效应下，全球总需求可能进入了长期萎靡——而是继续致力于尽量降低全球力量的通缩效应。


It would rather attribute low inflation to successful inflation targeting, and the Great Moderation that it presumably spawned.	它宁愿将低通胀归因于成功的通胀目标政策，以及很可能是因此形成的大稳健（Great Moderation）。


This prideful interpretation amounted to the siren song of an extremely accommodative monetary policy.	这一骄傲的解释成为极度宽松的货币政策的引诱剂。


Unable to disentangle the global and domestic pressures suppressing inflation, a price-targeting Fed has erred consistently on the side of easy money.	眼中只有物价目标的美联储无法理清遏制通胀的全球和国内压力，一直犯着宽松货币的错误。


This is apparent in the fact that, over the last 15 years, the real federal funds rate – the Fed’s benchmark policy rate, adjusted for inflation – has been in negative territory more than 60% of the time, averaging -0.6% since May 2001.	这明显地体现在一个事实中：过去15年来，真实联邦基金利率（美联储的基准政策利率，经通胀调整）在超过六成的时间里位于负区间，自2001年5月以来的平均水平为-0.


From 1990 to 2000, by contrast, the real federal funds rate averaged 2.2%.	6%。 相反，1990—2000期间，真实联邦利率平均为2.


In short, over the last decade and a half, the Fed has gone well beyond a powerful disinflation in setting its policy interest rate.	2%。 简言之，在过去十五年里，美联储通过其政策利率制造了强大的反通胀。


The consequences have been problematic, to say the least.	其结果往好了说是值得商榷。


Over the same 15-year period, financial markets have become unhinged, with a profusion of asset and credit bubbles leading to a series of crises that almost pushed the world economy into the abyss in 2008-2009.	在这15年中，金融市场变得十分混乱，各种资产和信用泡沫导致了一系列危机，几乎在2008—2009年将世界经济推向万劫不复。


But rather than recognize, let alone respond to, pre-crisis excesses, the Fed has remained agnostic about them, pointing out that bubble-spotting is, at best, an imperfect science.	但美联储并没有认识到危机前的过度情况，更不用说采取应对措施了，它一只持有不可知论，认为识别泡沫充其量只是不完美的科学。


That is hardly a convincing reason for central banks to remain fixated on inflation targeting.	这绝不是央行继续坚持通胀目标令人信服的理由。


Not only have they failed repeatedly to get the inflation forecast right; they now risk fueling renewed financial instability and sparking another crisis.	它们不但一再无法正确预测通胀； 如今还有可能助长卷土重来的金融动荡、引发另一场危机。


Just as a few of us warned of impending crisis in the 2003-2006 period, some – including the Bank of International Settlements and the IMF– are sounding the alarm today, but to no avail.	正如我们少数人在2003—2006年期间发出的危机迫在眉睫的警告，一些人——包括国际清算银行和IMF——今天也在大声疾呼，但没有人听他们的。


To be sure, inflation targeting was once essential to limit runaway price growth.	诚然，通胀目标曾经对于遏制物价增长失控至关重要。


In today’s inflationless world, however, it is counterproductive.	但是，在今天无通胀的环境下，它只能适得其反。


Yet the inflation targeters who dominate today’s major central banks insist on fighting yesterday’s war.	但主宰当今主要央行的通胀目标派坚持要继续打昨天的战争。


In this sense, modern central bankers resemble the British army in the Battle of Singapore in 1942.	从这个角度讲，现代央行官员与1942年新加坡战役中的英军十分相似。


Convinced that the Japanese would attack from the sea, the British defenses were encased in impenetrable concrete bunkers, with fixed artillery that could fire only to the south.	当时，英国算定日本只能从海上发动袭击，建造了无法突破的混凝土掩体和只能朝南开火的炮台。


So when the Japanese emerged from the jungle and mangrove swamps of the Malay Peninsula in the north, the British were powerless to stop them.	因此，当日本人穿过马来半岛的热带雨林和红树林沼泽，从北面出现时，英国人毫无还手之力。


Singapore quickly fell, in what is widely considered Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s most ignominious military defeat.	新加坡很快就沦陷了，至今仍被广泛视为丘吉尔首相最难堪的军事失败。


Central bankers, like the British army in Singapore, are aiming their weapons in the wrong direction.	央行官员就像是新加坡的英军，将火炮对准了错误的方向。


It is time for them to turn their policy arsenal toward today’s enemy: financial instability.	他们应该改变政策军火库，让它们对准今天的敌人：金融动荡。


On that basis alone, the case for monetary-policy normalization has never been more compelling.	光凭这一点，货币政策正常化就是一个十分紧迫的任务。


Emerging Markets After the Fed Hikes Rates	美联储升息后的新兴市场


NEW YORK – The prospect that the US Federal Reserve will start exiting zero policy rates later this year has fueled growing fear of renewed volatility in emerging economies’ currency, bond, and stock markets.	纽约—美联储将于今年晚些时候开始退出零利率政策，这一前景让人们日益担心新兴经济体货币、债券和股市波动将卷土重来。


The concern is understandable: When the Fed signaled in 2013 that the end of its quantitative-easing (QE) policy was forthcoming, the resulting “taper tantrum” sent shock waves through many emerging countries’ financial markets and economies.	这一担心不难理解：2013年美联储放出信号表示即将结束量化宽松政策时，由此到来的“缩减恐慌”（taper tantrum）在诸多新兴国家金融市场和经济中引起余震。


Indeed, rising interest rates in the United States and the ensuing likely rise in the value of the dollar could, it is feared, wreak havoc among emerging markets’ governments, financial institutions, corporations, and even households.	事实上，人们担心，美国利率的上升以及美元价值的继续上升可能重创新兴市场政府、金融机构、公司甚至家庭。


Because all have borrowed trillions of dollars in the last few years, they will now face an increase in the real local-currency value of these debts, while rising US rates will push emerging markets’ domestic interest rates higher, thus increasing debt-service costs further.	在过去几年中，所有这些部门借入了数以万亿计的美元，如今，它们将面临债务实际本币价值的上升，而与此同时，美国利率的升高将进一步推高新兴市场国内利率，从而进一步增加债务维持负担。


But, although the prospect of the Fed raising interest rates is likely to create significant turbulence in emerging countries’ financial markets, the risk of outright crises and distress is more limited.	但是，尽管美联储升息的前景可能造成新兴国家金融市场的剧烈动荡，但爆发全面危机和灾难的风险比较有限。


For starters, whereas the 2013 taper tantrum caught markets by surprise, the Fed’s intention to hike rates this year, clearly stated over many months, will not.	首先，2013年的削减恐慌让市场措手不及，但美联储在今年升息的意图已经明确表态了好几个月，不会再让市场措手不及。


Moreover, the Fed is likely to start raising rates later and more slowly than in previous cycles, responding gradually to signs that US economic growth is robust enough to sustain higher borrowing costs.	此外，美联储升息时机和节奏可能会比此前几个周期更晚更慢，采取逐步响应的方式，以符合美国经济增长之稳健足以维持更高的借贷成本的信号。


This stronger growth will benefit emerging markets that export goods and services to the US.	更加强劲的增长将有益于向美国出口商品和服务的新兴市场。


Another reason not to panic is that, compared to 2013, when policy rates were low in many fragile emerging economies, central banks already have tightened their monetary policy significantly.	另一个不必恐慌的理由是，2013年许多脆弱新兴经济体的政策利率很低，而如今，各国央行已经大大收紧了货币政策。


With policy rates at or close to double-digit levels in many of those economies, the authorities are not behind the curve the way they were in 2013.	许多新兴经济体政策利率接近或超过了两位数，当局不再像2013年那样滞后于美联储行动。


Loose fiscal and credit policies have been tightened as well, reducing large current-account and fiscal deficits.	宽松的财政和信用政策也已经有所收紧，降低了大规模经常项目和财政赤字。


And, compared to 2013, when currencies, equities, commodity, and bond prices were too high, a correction has already occurred in most emerging markets, limiting the need for further major adjustment when the Fed moves.	此外，2013年货币、股票、大宗商品和债券价格均处于过高状态，而如今大部分新兴市场都已出现修正走势，采取进一步调整以适应美联储动作的必要性不再那么强。


Above all, most emerging markets are financially more sound today than they were a decade or two ago, when financial fragilities led to currency, banking, and sovereign-debt crises.	最重要的是，如今大部分新兴经济体的金融状况要比十年或二十年前可靠得多。 当时，金融脆弱性导致了货币、银行和主权债务危机。


Most now have flexible exchange rates, which leave them less vulnerable to a disruptive collapse of currency pegs, as well as ample reserves to shield them against a run on their currencies, government debt, and bank deposits.	而如今，大部分新兴经济体采取了浮动汇率，这意味着它们不会再轻易地受到盯住汇率崩溃的冲击； 并且它们也拥有足够的储备以抵御本币、政府债务和银行存款挤兑。


Most also have a relatively smaller share of dollar debt relative to local-currency debt than they did a decade ago, which will limit the increase in their debt burden when the currency depreciates.	大部分新兴经济体的美元债务/本币债务之比也低于十年前，这有助于遏制因为本币贬值导致的债务负担增加。


Their financial systems are typically more sound as well, with more capital and liquidity than when they experienced banking crises.	它们的金融体系也往往更加稳固，比遭遇银行危机时拥有更多的资本和流动性。


And, with a few exceptions, most do not suffer from solvency problems; although private and public debts have been rising rapidly in recent years, they have done so from relatively low levels.	此外，除了少数例外，大部分新兴经济体都不存在偿债能力问题； 尽管近几年来公私债务迅速增加，但相对水平仍然较低。


In fact, serious financial problems in several emerging economies – particularly oil and commodity producers exposed to the slowdown in China – are unrelated to what the Fed does.	事实上，一些新兴经济体——主要是受中国减速影响的石油和大宗商品生产国——的严重金融问题与美联储的动作无关。


Brazil, which will experience recession and high inflation this year, complained when the Fed launched QE and then when it stopped QE. Its problems are mostly self-inflicted – the result of loose monetary, fiscal, and credit policies, all of which must now be tightened, during President Dilma Roussef’s first administration.	将在今年出现衰退和高通胀的把戏在美联储启动量化宽松和停止量化宽松时都怨声载道��它的问题大部分是自我造成的——是总统罗塞夫在第一个任期中采取了宽松的货币、财政和信用政策的结果，这三大政策如今都必须收紧。


Russia’s troubles, too, do not reflect the impact of Fed policies.	俄罗斯的麻烦也与美联储政策无关。


Its economy is suffering as a result of the fall in oil prices and international sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine – a war that will now force Ukraine to restructure its foreign debt, which the war, severe recession, and currency depreciation have rendered unsustainable.	其经济萎靡不振的原因是油价下跌和因其入侵乌克兰而遭受的国际制裁——这场战争也迫使乌克兰重组其对外债务，战争、严重衰退和货币贬值让乌克兰外债变得不可持续。


Likewise, Venezuela was running large fiscal deficits and tolerating high inflation even when oil prices were above $100 a barrel; at current prices, it may have to default on its public debt, unless China decides to bail out the country.	类似地，委内瑞拉甚至在石油价格高居100美元/桶以上时就存在巨大的财政赤字和高通胀； 而在当前的油价水平上，要不是中国出手救援，委内瑞拉也许将不得不对其公共债务违约。


Similarly, some of the economic and financial stresses faced by South Africa, Argentina, and Turkey are the result of poor policies and domestic political uncertainties, not Fed action.	类似地，南非、阿根廷和土耳其所面临的一些经济和金融压力也是拜不当政策和国内政治不确定性所赐，而不是美联储的动作引起的。


In short, the Fed’s exit from zero policy rates will cause serious problems for those emerging market economies that have large internal and external borrowing needs, large stocks of dollar-denominated debt, and macroeconomic and policy fragilities.	简言之，美联储退出零政策利率将给存在巨量内部和外部借贷需求、巨量美元计价债务存量以及宏观和政策脆弱性的新兴市场经济体造成严重问题。


China’s economic slowdown, together with the end of the commodity super-cycle, will create additional headwinds for emerging economies, most of which have not implemented the structural reforms needed to boost their potential growth.	中国经济的减速，加上大宗商品超级周期的结束，将给新兴经济体带来更多阻力，大部分新兴经济体都还没有采取提振潜在增长所需要的结构改革。


But, again, these problems are self-inflicted, and many emerging economies do have stronger macro and structural fundamentals, which will give them greater resilience when the Fed starts hiking rates.	但是，这些问题也是自我造成的，许多新兴经济体确实有着更强大的宏观和机构基本面，这将让它们面对美联储开始升息时拥有更强的恢复力。


When it does, some will suffer more than others; but, with a few exceptions lacking systemic importance, widespread distress and crises need not occur.	当美联储真的开始升息时，一些经济体将比其他经济体受到更大的冲击； 但是，除了少数不具备系统重要性的例外，大面积灾难和危机不一定会发生。


The Fed’s Dollar Distraction	美联储为美元分心


CAMBRIDGE – In its September policy statement, the US Federal Reserve took into consideration – in a major way – the impact of global economic developments on the United States, and thus on US monetary policy.	坎布里奇—在9月的政策陈述中，美联储考虑了——以非常重点的方式——全球经济发展对美国、进而对美国货币政策的影响。


Indeed, the Fed decided to delay raising interest rates partly because US policymakers expect dollar appreciation, by lowering import prices, to undermine their ability to meet their 2% inflation target.	事实上，美联储决定推迟升息的部分原因正是美国决策者预期美元升值将拉低进口品价格，从而妨碍其实现2%通胀目标的能力。


In reality, while currency movements can have a significant impact on inflation in other countries, dollar movements have rarely had a meaningful or durable impact on prices in the US.	在现实中，其他国家的货币波动可能给它们的通胀造成重大影响，但美元波动很少对美国物价造成有意义的或持久的影响。


The difference, of course, lies in the US dollar’s dominant role in the invoicing of international trade: prices are set in dollars.	当然，这当中的差别原因在于美元是国际贸易的主要结算货币：价格都是用美元定的。


Just as the dollar is often the unit of account in debt contracts, even when neither the borrower nor the lender is a US entity, the dollar’s share in invoicing for international trade is around 4.5 times America’s share of world imports, and three times its share of world exports.	正因美元常常作为债务合同记账单位，即使是借贷双方都不是美国实体的情况下也是如此，所以国际贸易结算的美元占比高达美国的世界进口占比的4. 5倍和世界出口占比的三倍左右。


The prices of some 93% of US imports are set in dollars.	93%左右的美国进口品用美元计价。


In this environment, the pass-through of dollar movements into non-fuel US import prices is one of the lowest in the world, in both the short term (one quarter out) and the longer term (two years out), for three key reasons.	在这样的情况下，美元波动对非燃料美国进口品的价格渗透作用为全球最低之一，不管是短期（一季度）还是较长时期（两年）都是如此，主要原因有三。


First, international trade contracts are renegotiated infrequently, which means that dollar prices are “sticky” for an extended period – around ten months – despite fluctuations in the exchange rate.	首先，国际贸易合同不会频发重订，这意味着美元价格会在相当长的时间——大约十个月——内保持“粘性”，尽管汇率会发生波动。


Second, because most exporters also import intermediate inputs that are priced in dollars, exchange-rate fluctuations have a limited impact on their costs and thus on their incentive to change dollar prices.	其次，由于大部分出口国同时也进口用美元计价的中间投入品，汇率波动对于它们的成本影响有限，因此对它们更改美元价格的刺激也有限。


And, third, exporters who wish to preserve their share in world markets – where prices are largely denominated in dollars – choose to keep their dollar prices stable, to avoid falling victim to idiosyncratic exchange-rate movements.	第三，欲保持其在世界市场——价格主要用美元计价——占比的出口国选择保持美元价格稳定以避免成为不利汇率波动的受害者。


What little impact import price shocks have on US inflation is highly transitory, with most of the effect tapering off after just two quarters.	进口价格对美国通胀的微小冲击基本上都是暂时性的，大多在两个季度后便已消失。


A sharp 10% appreciation of the US dollar, for example, would reduce inflation for non-fuel imports by 4.4% cumulatively over the next 2-3 quarters, but would have only a negligible impact on inflation after that point.	比如，美元急剧升值10%将在此后2—3个季度内累计造成非燃料进口品通胀下降4. 4%，但此后对通胀的影响便可忽略不计。


If one accounts for consumer goods expenditure on imports, that 10% appreciation would lower inflation, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), by just 0.5 percentage points in the first two quarters.	如果你考虑进口消费品支出，那么10%的升值在前两个季度内将仅仅让通胀——用消费物价指数（CPI）衡量——下降0. 5个百分点。


And that is likely to be an upper bound, because it assumes that US retailers will pass through to consumers the full amount of any increase in import prices.	而这可能是其影响的上限，因为其中假设美国零售商将把所有进口价格上涨的因素转嫁给消费者。


In practice, they are more likely to increase retail markups and lower cost pass-through.	在实践中，这更有可能提高零售售价而降低成本转嫁。


The estimated price pass-through for imported manufactured goods, which would better represent what enters the consumption bundle, is even lower than that for all non-fuel imports.	据估计，进口制造品价格转嫁——该指标更好地体现消费选择集所受到的影响——甚至比非燃料进口品总体水平更低。


Although these factors insulate the US from the inflationary pressures stemming from exchange-rate fluctuations, they increase the vulnerability of other countries, especially emerging economies.	尽管这些因素使美国与来自汇率波动的通胀压力隔离开来，但它们加剧了其他国家的弱点，特别是新兴经济体。


Because the dollar prices of most of these countries’ imports are not very responsive to exchange-rate movements, the pass-through of those movements into import prices denominated in their home currencies is close to 100%.	由于这些国家大部分进口品的美元价格对汇率波动不十分敏感，因此汇率波动对本币计价的进口品的价格转嫁效应接近100%。


The impact of exchange-rate movements on inflation in most countries is thus 3-4 times larger than in the US.	因此，大部分国家的汇率波动影响比美国要大3—4倍。


A 10% depreciation of the Turkish lira, for example, would raise cumulative CPI inflation by 1.65-2.03 percentage points, over two years, all else being equal.	比如，保持其他情况一致，土耳其里拉升值10%将导致土耳其CPI通胀在两年中累计增加1. 65-2.


Despite this imbalance, the US dollar’s dominance as an invoicing currency is unlikely to change anytime soon – not least because bringing about a shift would require coordination among a huge number of exporters and importers worldwide.	尽管存在这一失衡，美元作为主要结算货币的地位在近期不可能改变——因为要做出改变需要全世界大量出口国和进口国的合作。


The euro might seem like a strong contender, given the volume of trade among eurozone countries; but, outside Europe, the currency is not used nearly as widely as the dollar.	从欧元区国家之间的贸易量看，欧元也许是一个强大的竞争对手； 但是，在欧洲之外，欧元的使用范围远远不及美元。


In deciding when to normalize interest rates, the Fed has placed considerable weight on the weakness of inflation, and its global underpinnings.	在决定何时实现利率正常化时，美联储着重考虑了通货膨胀的颓势及其全球成因。


But while it is true that some global developments – especially falling commodity prices, and perhaps also slowing emerging-economy growth and rising financial volatility – may push down inflation, dollar appreciation will not, at least not in any meaningful way.	的确，一些全球发展趋势——特别是大宗商品价格下跌，也许还有新兴经济体增长放缓和金融波动增加——可能在遏制通胀，但美元贬值不会，至少不会有效遏制通胀。


A stronger dollar thus is not a legitimate reason to delay the normalization of US interest rates.	因此，强势美元不是推迟美国利率正常化的合理理由。


Will Fed Tightening Choke Emerging Markets?	美联储货币紧缩会不会搞垮新兴市场？


CAMBRIDGE – As the Federal Reserve moves closer to initiating one of the most long-awaited and widely predicted periods of rising short-term interest rates in the United States, many are asking how emerging markets will be affected.	坎布里奇——随着被外界广为期待和猜测的美联储在美启动短期利率上调的日子越来越近，很多人都无法确定新兴市场经济将受到哪些冲击。


Indeed, the question has been asked at least since May 2013, when then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke famously announced that quantitative easing would be “tapered” later that year, causing long-term US interest rates to rise and prompting a reversal of capital flows to emerging markets.	事实上，这个问题的提出始于2013年5月，时任美联储主席伯南克公开宣布将在当年晚些时候“收紧”量化宽松政策。 该声明使美长期利率攀升，并导致资金流出新兴市场。


The fear, as IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has reminded us, is of a repeat of previous episodes, notably in 1982 and 1994, when the Fed’s policy tightening helped precipitate financial crises in developing countries.	国际货币基金组织总裁克里斯蒂娜·拉加德提醒我们这种担忧已经不是第一次，比方说在1982和1994年，当时美联储货币政策收紧导致发展中国家陷入金融危机。


If the Fed decides to raise interest rates this year, which emerging markets are most vulnerable to a capital-flow reversal?	如果美联储今年决定加息，哪些新兴经济体最容易受到资本流出的打击？


There is no question that emerging markets are highly sensitive to global market conditions, including not only changes in short-term US interest rates, but also other financial risks, as measured, for example, by the volatility index VIX.	新兴市场无疑对全球市场波动极为敏感，这当中不仅包括美国的利率变化，还包括波动指数等其他金融风险。


Capital-flow bonanzas, often spurred by low US interest rates and calm global financial markets, end abruptly when these conditions reverse.	美国低利率所带来的充足现金流往往能稳定全球金融市场，但一旦条件逆转却会导致资金流突然枯竭。


By the end of the currency crises in East Asia and elsewhere in the late 1990s, emerging-market governments had learned some important lessons.	到20世纪90年代东亚和其他国家货币危机结束，新兴市场国家政府已经记取了某些重要教训。


Five reforms were particularly effective: more flexible exchange rates, larger foreign-currency holdings, less pro-cyclical fiscal policy, stronger current accounts, and less debt denominated in dollars or other foreign currencies.	其中的五项改革尤为有效：放开汇率、增持外汇、控制顺周期财政政策、巩固经常账户和减少以美元及其他外币计价的借债。


Many, but not all, developing and emerging-market countries took steps to implement these desirable policies.	很多发展中国家都积极推行上述合理措施。


Their choice was put to the test during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.	2008-2009年全球金融危机考验了他们选择的正确性。


Countries that had adopted such reforms were, on average, less adversely affected.	推行了上述改革的国家平均而言没有受到那么强的冲击。


Those that had not, particularly middle-income countries in Central Europe and the continent’s periphery, tended to be hit the hardest.	那些未进行改革的国家，特别是地处中欧及欧洲边缘的中等收入国家却往往沦为重灾区。


In particular, after 2001, many developing countries overcame their historic pattern of using periods of capital inflows to finance large fiscal and current-account deficits.	尤其在2001年后，许多发展中国家成功走出了利用资金流入赞助大规模财政及经常项目赤字的历史格局。


As a result of reduced debt and enhanced reserves, their creditworthiness improved during the 2003-2007 boom.	正因为减少负债、增加储备，2003-2007年的繁荣期改善了发展中国家的信誉。


By 2008, they were in a strong enough position to respond to the financial crisis by allowing larger budget deficits and thus mitigating the downturn in 2009.	到2008年，他们已经强大到可以用扩大财政赤字缓解2009年经济衰退来破解金融危机。


Chile was the star reformer, but other countries – including Botswana, China, Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea – also avoided pro-cyclical fiscal policies.	除改革明星智利外，博茨瓦纳、中国、哥斯达黎加、马来西亚、菲律宾和韩国也都避免了采取顺周期的财政措施。


Unfortunately, policy backsliding is jeopardizing this historic “graduation” from pro-cyclicality.	不幸的是，政策倒退正危及“摆脱”顺周期操作的历史进程。


Countries like Brazil did not take advantage of the recovery from 2010 to 2014 to strengthen their budgets, and are now in a difficult position.	巴西等国并未利用2010到2014年这段时间强化预算，因此现在正在落入困难的境地。


Some of these countries used the renewed capital inflows to run large current-account deficits after 2010 as well.	有些国家利用资本再次流入的机遇扩大经常账户的赤字规模。


Such deficits, together with high inflation rates, earned Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa their membership on the Fragile Five list of countries that were hit particularly hard by Bernanke’s announcement in 2013.	上述赤字加之通胀率高企，使巴西、土耳其、南非等脆弱五国在2013年伯南克宣布加息预期时受到最沉重的打击。


India and Indonesia were on this list as well, though they have begun to move in the right direction since then (thanks in part to new governments).	印度和印尼也同样如此，但他们从那以后就开始朝正确的方向前进（这在很大程度上应该感谢新一届政府的努力）。


Then there are the countries – including Venezuela, Argentina, and Russia – that never moved in the reform direction in the first place.	此外还有委内瑞拉、阿根廷和俄罗斯等从未走上改革道路的经济体。


They were temporarily bailed out by strong world prices for their export commodities, but that ended last year.	他们暂时为出口商品价格强势所救，但商品价格强势已经在去年成为历史。


A less visible threat is the denomination of debt in dollars and other foreign currencies.	以美元和其他外币计价的债务也构成了不那么明显的威胁。


The currency crises of the 1980s and 1990s were particularly devastating because devaluations so often hit countries that had borrowed in dollars.	二十世纪八九十年代的危机具有毁灭性，因为身负美元债务的经济体往往特别容易受到贬值冲击。


This resulted in a “currency mismatch” between dollar liabilities and revenues that were often denominated in local currencies.	这导致美元债务和往往以当地货币计价的收入形成“货币错配”。


When the cost of dollars doubled in terms of pesos or rupiah, otherwise-solvent local banks and manufacturers could no longer service their dollar debts.	当美元兑比索或印尼盾的汇价翻番，原本有偿付能力的银行和企业再也无力偿还其美元负债。


Owing to this adverse balance-sheet effect, devaluation turned out to be contractionary, leading to severe recessions.	由于不良资产负债表影响，贬值的结果带来紧缩，并由此导致严重的经济衰退。


Most emerging-market borrowers had learned their lesson by the turn of the century, as exchange-rate volatility had made the risks of currency mismatch more tangible.	截止世纪之交，随着汇率波动凸显货币错配风险，多数新兴市场借款人已经吸取了教���。


When international investors came knocking again in 2003, many emerging markets declined to borrow in dollars or other foreign currencies.	当国际投资者2003年再次上门推销贷款时，很多新兴经济体都谢绝借款采取美元或其他外汇形式。


Instead, they took the inflows in the form of direct investment, equity, or debt denominated in local currency.	相反，他们关注那些采取直接投资、股权或以本币形式计价的债务。


The relative absence of mismatch was one of the reasons why emerging markets did much better when their currencies depreciated in 2008-2009 than in past crises.	2008-2009年新兴市场货币贬值时错配问题没那么严重是新兴国家日子好过的合理解释。


Exceptions like Hungary, where homeowners had foolishly borrowed in seemingly cheap euros and Swiss francs, proved the rule.	但也存在匈牙利这样的特例，那里的房主愚蠢地借入了看似便宜的欧元和瑞士法郎贷款，又一次证明了这条颠扑不破的真理。


Unfortunately, in the last five years, many emerging markets have reverted to borrowing in foreign currency.	不幸的是在过去五年中，很多新兴市场已经恢复了外币借款的惯例。


Though, for the most part, governments have continued the shift away from dollar debt, the corporate sector, as the Bank for International Settlements has warned, has been tempted by ultra-low interest rates.	虽然多数情况下政府仍尽量避免以美元计价，但据国际清算银行警告企业部门美元借贷似乎未能抵御住超低利率的诱惑。


The Chinese private sector may have the biggest problem.	中国的私营部门可能面临最严重的问题。


Much of its recent borrowing violates key tenets of hard-earned wisdom gained in past crises: it is foreign exchange-denominated, short-term, shadow-bank-intermediated, and housing-backed.	很多近期借贷违反了过去危机中来之不易的重要原则：债务以外币计价、期限较短、由影子银行居中撮合并以房屋作为抵押。


Even though the Fed has not yet started raising interest rates, the well-established US economic recovery and the prospect of monetary tightening have, over the last year, caused the dollar to appreciate sharply against most currencies, those of emerging markets and advanced countries alike.	尽管美联储尚未开始加息，但美国稳固的经济复苏和货币紧缩预期已经在过去一年中造成美元兑多数新兴市场和发达国家货币大幅升值。


If the Fed tightens as early as the middle of this year, further dollar appreciation is likely.	如果美联储于年中收紧货币政策，有很大可能美元还会进一步升值。


Those who have been playing with mismatches may be about to get burned.	那些一直在玩货币错配的人很可能将引火烧身。


The Fed Sets Another Trap	美联储又挖坑


NEW HAVEN – America’s Federal Reserve is headed down a familiar – and highly dangerous – path.	纽黑文—美联储正在走一条熟悉的高危之路。


Steeped in denial of its past mistakes, the Fed is pursuing the same incremental approach that helped set the stage for the financial crisis of 2008-2009.	它完全否认过去的错误，正在追求渐进方针——同样的方针为2008—2009年金融危机创造了条件。


The consequences could be similarly catastrophic.	这一回的结果也可能具有同样的灾难性。


Consider the December meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), where discussions of raising the benchmark federal funds rate were couched in adjectives, rather than explicit actions.	以12月的联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）会议为例。 会议对提高联邦基金利率的讨论充斥着形容词而不是明白无误的行动。


In line with prior forward guidance that the policy rate would be kept near zero for a “considerable” amount of time after the Fed stopped purchasing long-term assets in October, the FOMC declared that it can now afford to be “patient” in waiting for the right conditions to raise the rate.	美联储此前曾发布前瞻指引，表示在10月份结束长期资产购买操作后的“相当长”时间内保持近零利率。 与此相应，FOMC宣布它现在可以“耐心”等待提高利率的合适条件。


Add to that Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s declaration that at least a couple more FOMC meetings would need to take place before any such “lift-off” occurs, and the Fed seems to be telegraphing a protracted journey on the road to policy normalization.	此外，美联储主席耶伦声称在任何利率“升空”发生前，FOMC至少还要开好几次会议，而美联储似乎也在暗示拖延政策正常化进程。


This bears an eerie resemblance to the script of 2004-2006, when the Fed’s incremental approach led to the near-fatal mistake of condoning mounting excesses in financial markets and the real economy.	这与2004—2006年期间的政策惊人地相似。 当时，美联储的渐进方针导致了几乎致命的错误——纵容金融市场和实体经济的过度行为。


After pushing the federal funds rate to a 45-year low of 1% following the collapse of the equity bubble of the early 2000s, the Fed delayed policy normalization for an inordinately long period.	21世纪初股市泡沫破裂后，美联储将联邦基金利率降低到45年来的低点1%，并且在非常长的时间内一直没有将政策正常化。


And when it finally began to raise the benchmark rate, it did so excruciatingly slowly.	而当美联储最终开始提高基准利率时，又做得过于缓慢。


In the 24 months from June 2004, the FOMC raised the federal funds rate from 1% to 5.25% in 17 increments of 25 basis points each.	2004年后的24个月里，FOMC以每次25个基点的节奏通过17次操作将联邦基金利率从1%提高到5. 25%。


Meanwhile, housing and credit bubbles were rapidly expanding, fueling excessive household consumption, a sharp drop in personal savings, and a record current-account deficit – imbalances that set the stage for the meltdown that was soon to follow.	与此同时，房地产和信用泡沫出现了快速扩大，助长了家庭过度消费、个人储蓄急剧减少和创纪录的经常项目赤字——这些失衡为随后到来的崩溃埋下了伏笔。


The Fed, of course, has absolved itself of any blame in setting up the US and the global economy for the Great Crisis.	当然，美联储不承认任何关于它造成了美国和全球经济大危机的指控。


It was not monetary policy’s fault, argued both former Fed Chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke; if anything, they insisted, a lack of regulatory oversight was the culprit.	两位前主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）和伯南克（Ben Bernanke）都说这不是货币政策的错； 他们坚持认为，要错也是缺乏监督监管的错。


This argument has proved convincing in policy and political circles, leading officials to focus on a new approach centered on so-called macro-prudential tools, including capital requirements and leverage ratios, to curb excessive risk-taking by banks.	这一观点在政策和政治圈中很有影响，导致官员关注一套以所谓的宏观审慎工具——包括资本要求和贷款比率——遏制银行过度冒险行为为核心的新方针。


While this approach has some merit, it is incomplete, as it fails to address the egregious mispricing of risk brought about by an overly accommodative monetary policy and the historically low interest rates that it generated.	这一方针有其优点，但并不完善，因为它没有解决过于舒适的货币政策及其所造成的历史最低利率导致的风险定价严重错误。


In this sense, the Fed’s incrementalism of 2004-2006 was a policy blunder of epic proportions.	从这个角度讲，美联储在2004—2006年所采取的渐进主义是一个足以遗臭万年的政策错误。


The Fed seems poised to make a similar – and possibly even more serious – misstep in the current environment.	从当前环境看，美联储可能要重蹈覆辙——后果可能更加严重。


For starters, given ongoing concerns about post-crisis vulnerabilities and deflation risk, today’s Fed seems likely to find any excuse to prolong its incremental normalization, taking a slower pace than it adopted a decade ago.	首先，由于人们一直担心后危机时代的脆弱性和通缩风险，今天的美联储可能会寻找一切借口延长其渐进式正常化，采取比十年前还要慢的正常化节奏。


More important, the Fed’s $4.5 trillion balance sheet has since grown more than fivefold.	更重要的是，美联储4. 5万亿美元规模的资产负债表已经增长了五倍多。


Though the Fed has stopped purchasing new assets, it has shown no inclination to scale back its outsize holdings.	尽管美联储已经停止购买新资产，但并未表现出缩减巨额持有量的意图。


Meanwhile it has passed the quantitative-easing baton to the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, both of which will create even more liquidity at a time of record-low interest rates.	与此同时，它将量化宽松的接力棒传给了日本银行和欧洲央行，后两者都会在利率位于创纪录低水平的情况下创造出更多的流动性。


In these days of froth, the persistence of extraordinary policy accommodation in a financial system flooded with liquidity poses a great danger.	在这些泡沫时期，在充斥着流动性的金融体系中坚持过度政策便利导致了一个巨大风险。


Indeed, that could well be the lesson of recent equity- and currency-market volatility and, of course, plummeting oil prices.	事实上，这可能正是当前股市和货币市场波动——当然还有油价崩跌——的教训。


With so much dry kindling, it will not take much to spark the next conflagration.	风大柴干，只需要一点火花就可以带来一场新的大火。


Central banking has lost its way.	中央银行迷失了方向。


Trapped in a post-crisis quagmire of zero interest rates and swollen balance sheets, the world’s major central banks do not have an effective strategy for regaining control over financial markets or the real economies that they are supposed to manage.	世界主要央行陷入了后危机时代的零利率和��产负债表膨胀的陷阱，拿不出有效战略重新控制应该由它们进行管理的金融市场和实体经济。


Policy levers – both benchmark interest rates and central banks’ balance sheets – remain at their emergency settings, even though the emergency ended long ago.	政策杠杆——基准利率和央行资产负债表——仍然处于紧急状况设定中，虽然紧急状况早就结束了。


While this approach has succeeded in boosting financial markets, it has failed to cure bruised and battered developed economies, which remain mired in subpar recoveries and plagued with deflationary risks.	这一方针成功地提振了金融市场，但并未治愈伤痕累累的发达经济体，它们仍困于复苏萎靡和通缩风险。


Moreover, the longer central banks promote financial-market froth, the more dependent their economies become on these precarious markets and the weaker the incentives for politicians and fiscal authorities to address the need for balance-sheet repair and structural reform.	此外，央行鼓吹金融市场泡沫越久，经济对这些危险的市场的依赖程度就越大，政客和财政当局满足资产负债表修正和结构改革的需要的激励就越弱。


A new approach is needed.	我们需要新方针。


Central banks should normalize crisis-induced policies as soon as possible.	中央银行应该尽快将引发危机的政策正常化。


Financial markets will, of course, object loudly.	当然，金融市场会大声反对。


But what do independent central banks stand for if they are not prepared to face up to the markets and make the tough and disciplined choices that responsible economic stewardship demands?	但独立的中央银行如果不准备直面市场、做出负责任的经济管理工作所要求的严守纪律的艰难抉择，还要它们做什么？


The unprecedented financial engineering by central banks over the last six years has been decisive in setting asset prices in major markets worldwide.	过去六年中，前所未有的央行金融工程成为全球主要市场资产价格的主要决定因素。


But now it is time for the Fed and its counterparts elsewhere to abandon financial engineering and begin marshaling the tools they will need to cope with the inevitable next crisis.	但如今，美联储以及其他央行需要放弃金融工程，开始准备应对难以避免的下一场危机所需要的工具。


With zero interest rates and outsize balance sheets, that is exactly what they are lacking.	零利率和庞大资产负债表意味着这才是它们所缺少的。


But, in the end, the FOMC members must recognize that they cannot postpone the increase in interest rates indefinitely, and that once they begin to raise the rates, they must get the real (inflation-adjusted) federal funds rate to 2% relatively quickly.	但是，最终��FOMC委员们必须认识到，他们无法永远阻止利率升高，而一旦他们开始提高利率，就必须让实际（经通胀调整的）联邦基金利率相对迅速地提高到2%。


How the Fed Just Reduced Inequality	美联储如何降低不平等性


NEW YORK – The US Federal Reserve has finally done it, raising interest rates for the first time in almost a decade.	纽约—美联储终于这么做了，近十年来第一次升息。


The ramifications for interest-rate spreads, emerging-market equities, and housing demand, among much else, are the subject of widespread debate.	这对利差、新兴市场股市、住房需求和其他许多方面的影响是一个争论激烈的话题。


But, as markets learn to cope with a less accommodative monetary policy, there could be an important silver lining, which most people have ignored.	但是，在市场不得不应对不太友好的货币政策的同时，也有一个重要的闪光点，这个闪光点大部分人都没有注意到。


Income and wealth inequality in the United States has grown steadily since the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, but monetary-policy normalization could mark the beginning of the end of this trend.	自2008年全球金融危机爆发以来，美国收入和财富不平等稳步加剧，但货币政策正常化可能标志着这一趋势结束的开始。


Indeed, it should serve to accelerate its reversal.	事实上，这有助于这一趋势的逆转。


Consider a few dismal statistics reflecting the current state of affairs.	看一看反映现状的令人触目惊心的统计数字。


Real (inflation-adjusted) median household income in the US is about the same as in 1979.	美国实际（经通胀调整的）中位家庭收入和1979年的水平大致相当。


A recent study by the Pew Research Center noted that Americans earned 4% less income in 2014 than they did in 2000, and for the first time in more than 40 years, middle-class Americans no longer constitute a majority of the population.	皮尤研究中心的最新研究指出，2014年美国人的收入比2000年少4%，并且40多年来第一次出现中产阶级不再占人口大部分的情况。


America’s 20 wealthiest people now own more wealth than the bottom half of the entire population The wealth gap between America’s high-income group and everyone else has never been more extreme; rich households account for more than one in five of the entire US population.	如今，20位最富有美国人所拥有的财富比全部美国人口中较穷的一半的总和还要多。 美国高收入群体和其他群体之间的财富差距从未如此极端；


Strikingly, one hour north of Wall Street, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the Gini coefficient – a standard measurement of income distribution and inequality – is worse than in Zimbabwe.	富裕家庭占美国总人口的五分之一多。 令人震惊的是，在华尔街以北一小时路程的康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport），基尼系数（衡量收入分配和不平等性的标准指标）比津巴布韦还要糟糕。


Ironically, this trend was exacerbated by the policy response to the financial crisis.	讽刺的是，这一趋势因为应对金融危机的政策而更加强烈了。


While the recession of 2007-2008 caused higher-income groups to suffer more than lower-income groups (because the former tend to derive relatively more of their income from more volatile sources of capital income, as opposed to labor income), the opposite has been true since 2009.	2007—2008年衰退导致高收入群体损失大于低收入群体（因为前者相对更多的收入来自波动性更大的资本收入而不是劳动收入），但2009年以后，情况正好相反。


Since then, about 95% of all income gains have gone to the top 1%.	2009年以来，大约95%的全部收入增量流向了最顶层1%的腰包。


The causes of rising income and wealth inequality are multiple and nuanced; but the unintended consequences of the recent unprecedented period of ultra-loose monetary policy deserves a chunk of the blame.	收入和财富不平等性加剧的原因是多样而微妙的； 但最近一段时期的极端宽松货币政策所造成的意外后果必须受到指责。


Negative real interest rates and quantitative easing have enforced financial repression on holders of cash, hurting savers, while broadly boosting prices of riskier financial assets, most commonly held by the rich.	负实际利率和量化宽松加强了对现金持有者的金融抑制，“收割”了存款者，同时大面积刺激了高风险金融资产（一般主要由富人持有）的价格。


When there is no yield in fixed income, even the most conservative pension funds pile into risk assets, driving prices higher and higher.	当固定收入证券难以产生收益时，就连最保守的退休基金也纷纷转向风险资产，导致价格节节攀升。


Corporations have benefited massively from these stimulus measures, but at the expense of the working population.	公司从这些刺激措施中收益颇丰，但这建立在劳动人口的损失之上。


Profit margins have expanded to record highs as companies have cut costs, delayed infrastructure investments, borrowed at ultra-low rates, and taken advantage of weak labor markets to avoid raising wages.	公司旭也见了成本，推迟了基础设施投资，以极低利率借贷，并利用劳动力市场��软的状态拒不加薪，利润率随之提高到创纪录的水平。


But are we now on the verge of a trend reversal?	但现在趋势即将反转了吗？


The S&P 500 has rallied 150% since its 2009 lows, and valuations look rich given weakening growth dynamics (the Shiller price/earnings ratio stands at 26, compared to 15 in 2009).	标准普尔500指数自2009年低点反弹了150%，基于萎靡不振的增长动态，估值看上去已经相当高（希勒市盈率高达26倍，2009年只有15倍）。


Against this backdrop, the wealthiest Americans are unlikely to enjoy substantial further profits from their financial investments in the near term.	在这一背景下，短期内最富有的美国人已无法从金融投资中获得利润的进一步大幅提升。


At the same time, we should see meaningful upward pressure on wages for the first time in many years.	与此同时，我们应该看到，多年来第一次出现了有意义的工资上涨压力。


The unemployment rate has dropped to 5%, just above the Fed’s current median estimate for the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).	失业率已经降到5%，略高于美联储最新的不引起通胀加速的失业率（NAIRU）中位估计值。


While the true NAIRU level is probably lower, and we are likely witnessing a secular decline in the workforce participation rate, the US labor market should still tighten in 2016.	尽管真正的NAIRU水平可能还要更低一些，并且劳动参与率可能出现长期下降，但2016年美国劳动力市场仍应该趋紧。


Indeed, the number of those “not in the labor force, currently want a job” category dropped 416,000, to just above 5.6 million, in November; historically, this kind of change has been closely associated with rising wage pressure.	事实上，11月“不属于劳动力，目前想要找工作”的人数下降了416,000人，目前略高于560万； 从历史上看，这类人的数量变化与工资上涨压力密切相关。


And the average hourly wages for all employees on private non-farm payrolls posted an annual increase of 2.5% in October, the biggest since 2009.	而10月私营部门非农就业全体雇员平均时薪录得2. 5%的年增长率，为2009年以来的最高值。


As the Fed slowly raises interest rates, those middle-class families holding their hard-earned savings at the bank will finally start realizing some return on their deposits.	随着美联储缓慢提高利率，把辛苦赚的的储蓄存在银行的中产阶级家庭将开始从存款中获得一些回报。


The long-term effects should not be underestimated, given the helpful impact of compound savings.	其长期效应不应该低估，因为复合存款（compound savings）能带来积极影响。


During the last tightening cycle between 2004 and 2006, households’ interest income rose 29%.	在2004—2006年的紧缩周期中，家庭利息收入增加了29%。


Although this time, the gains presumably will be smaller and slower to arrive, owing to the likely pace and extent of Fed tightening, interest paid on savings will move household income in the right direction: up.	拜美联储紧缩的可能速度和规模所赐，这一次的这一收益应该规模更小、实现更晚，但储蓄所获得的利息将让家庭收入迈向正确的方向：增加。


Of course, a multitude of political reforms, each with potential positive implications for welfare, could reduce the extent of inequality further.	当然，大量政治改革——每一项都有望带来积极的福利影响——可能进一步降低不平等程度。


But the barriers to such measures – say, to make the tax system more progressive – are well known, especially against the backdrop of a presidential election campaign.	但这些措施（比如增加税收制度的累进性）的障碍也是众所周知的，特别是考虑到总统选战的背景。


This means that an increase in real wages for workers will have the most immediate impact, even if the downside is lower profit margins for corporate America.	这意味着工人实际工资的增加形成影响最快，尽管这可能导致美国公司利润率下降。


The Fed’s decision to raise rates is a historic moment for financial markets and is already ushering in a period of increased volatility for asset prices worldwide.	美联储决定升息对于金融市场来说是一个历史性时刻，并且已经给全世界资产价格带来了波动增加的时期。


Although this may be challenging for investors, we should take comfort in the implications for the real economy.	尽管这会对投资者构成挑战，但我们大可放心这对实体经济的影响。


The social contract in the US has frayed badly, and this is likely to play an important role in the upcoming presidential election, as voters express anger that the American Dream is increasingly out of reach.	美国的社会契约已饱受摧残，并可能在即将到来的总统选举中造成重大影响，因为选民纷纷对日益难以企及的美国梦表示愤懑之情。


No economic recovery can sustain itself without rising wages and higher consumer spending power.	工资不增长、消费者购买力不提高的经济复苏无法自我维持。


The Fed may have just signaled that the beginning of this necessary dynamic, perhaps the key inflection point of the inequality trend, is finally here.	美联储所释放的信号表明，这一必须的动态——也许是不平等趋势的关键拐点——终于要开始了。


And it may also have done its part to speed its arrival.	并且它也许已经尽了力让它更早到来。


A Cautionary History of US Monetary Tightening	美国货币紧缩史的警示


BERKELEY – The US Federal Reserve has embarked on an effort to tighten monetary policy four times in the past four decades.	伯克利—在过去四十年中，美联储四次着手收紧货币政策。


On every one of these occasions, the effort triggered processes that reduced employment and output far more than the Fed’s staff had anticipated.	在这四次中，每一次紧缩都引发了就业和产出降低的过程，并且下降幅度之大远超美联储工作人员的预测。


As the Fed prepares to tighten monetary policy once again, an examination of this history – and of the current state of the economy – suggests that the United States is about to enter dangerous territory.	美联储已准备好再次收紧货币政策，考察这段历史——以及当前经济状况——表明美国马上就要进入危险区域了。


Between 1979 and 1982, then-Fed Chair Paul Volcker changed the authorities’ approach to monetary policy.	1979—1982年间，时任美联储主席保罗·沃克尔（Paul Volker）改变了当局的货币政策方针。


His expectation was that by controlling the amount of money in circulation, the Fed could bring about larger reductions in inflation with smaller increases in idle capacity and unemployment than what traditional Keynesian models predicted.	他的预期是，通过控制流通中货币量，美联储可以在更大幅度地降低利率的同时以比传统凯恩斯主义模型所预测的更小的幅度增加闲置产能和失业。


Unfortunately for the Fed – and for the American economy – the Keynesian models turned out to be accurate; their forecasts of the costs of disinflation were dead on.	对美联储——以及美国经济——来说，不幸的是凯恩斯主义模型才是对的； 它们关于不通胀（disinflation）的代价的预言完全正确。


Furthermore, this period of monetary tightening had unexpected consequences; financial institutions like Citicorp found that only regulatory forbearance saved them from having to declare bankruptcy, and much of Latin America was plunged into a depression that lasted more than five years.	此外，这一货币紧缩期带来了预料外的后果； 花旗集团等金融机构发现，救它们于破产的完全是监管宽容（regulatory forbearance），许多拉美国家陷入了长达五年以上的萧条。


Then, between 1988 and 1990, another round of monetary tightening under Alan Greenspan ravaged the balance sheets of the country’s savings and loan associations, which were overleveraged, undercapitalized, and already struggling to survive.	接着，1988—1990年，艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）进行了新一轮货币紧缩，这轮紧缩摧毁了过度负债、资本不足、原本便已经岌岌可危的美国储贷协会的资产负债表。


To prevent the subsequent recession from worsening, the federal government was forced to bail out insolvent institutions.	为了防止随之而来的衰退恶化，联邦政府被迫援助了资不抵债的机构。


State governments were on the hook, too: Texas spent the equivalent of three months of total state income to rescue its S&Ls and their depositors.	州政府也被拖下了水：德克萨斯州将相当于全州三个月总收入的资金用于援助该州储贷银行及其储户。


Between 1993 and 1994, Greenspan once again reined in monetary policy, only to be surprised by the impact that small amounts of tightening could have on the prices of long-term assets and companies’ borrowing costs.	1993—1994年，格林斯潘再一次勒紧货币政策，结果人们惊讶地发现，小规模紧缩可以给长期资产价格和公司借贷成本带来如此大的影响。


Fortunately, he was willing to reverse his decision and cut the tightening cycle short (over the protests of many on the policy-setting Federal Open Markets Committee) – a move that prevented the US economy from slipping back into recession.	幸运的是，他愿意推翻自己的决定，立刻中止紧缩周期（在诸多负责制定政策的美联储公开市场委员会委员的抗议下）——这一举动防止了美国重新滑入衰退。


The most recent episode – between 2004 and 2007 – was the most devastating of the four.	最近一次紧缩是2004—2007年，也是四次紧缩中最具破坏力的一次。


Neither Greenspan nor his successor, Ben Bernanke, understood how fragile the housing market and the financial system had become after a long period of under-regulation.	格林斯潘和他的继任者本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）都不明白，在经历了长期去监管化后，房地产市场和金融体系已经变得多么脆弱。


These twin mistakes – deregulation, followed by misguided monetary-policy tightening – continue to gnaw at the US economy today.	这些双重错误——去监管化，然后错误地收紧货币政策——至今仍在折磨着美国经济。


The tightening cycle upon which the Fed now seems set to embark comes at a delicate time for the economy.	如今，美联储似乎马上又要开启紧缩周期了。 这次紧缩正逢经济的微妙时刻。


The US unemployment rate may seem to hint at the risk of rising inflation, but the employment-to-population ratio continues to signal an economy in deep distress.	美国失业率也许暗示存在通胀抬头的风险，但就业-人口比仍表明经济举步维艰。


Indeed, wage patterns suggest that this ratio, not the unemployment rate, is the better indicator of slack in the economy – and nobody ten years ago would have interpreted today’s employment-to-population ratio as a justification for monetary tightening.	事实上，工资形势表明，该比率，而非就业率，才是更好的经济松弛度指标——而在十年前，没有人会将今天的就业-人口比作为货币紧缩的依据。


Indeed, not even the Fed seems convinced that the economy faces imminent danger of overheating.	事实上，就连美联储也不相信经济面临着过热的紧迫威胁。


Inflation in the US is not just lower than the Fed’s long-term target; it is expected to stay that way for at least the next three years.	美国通胀不但低于美联储的长期目标； 并且至少三年内都将如此。


And the Fed’s change in policy comes at a time when its own economists believe that US fiscal policy is inappropriately restrictive.	而美联储要在它自己的经济学家都认为美国财政政策过于严格的时候改变政策。


Meanwhile, given the fragility – and interconnectedness – of the global economy, tightening monetary policy in the US could have negative impacts abroad (with consequent blowback at home), especially given the instability in China and economic malaise in Europe.	与此同时，考虑到全球经济的脆弱性——以及连通性，美国收紧货币政策可能产生负面海外效应（并给美国国内带来反作用力），特别是考虑到中国的波动以及欧洲经济萎靡的情况下。


It is tempting to conclude that the Fed’s eagerness to tighten monetary policy – despite unfavorable historical precedents and ongoing economic uncertainty – is driven by commercial banks with excessive influence in official policymaking.	你很有可能得出一个结论，即，美联储急于收紧货币政策——尽管有不利的历史先例和经济不确定性存在——背后的驱动力是对官方决策影响力过大的商业银行。


After all, commercial banks’ business model works only when the banks can earn (via passive and relatively safe long-term investments) at least 3% a year more than they pay depositors.	毕竟，商业银行的业务模式只有在银行每年（通过消极和相对较安全的长期投资）所赚的收益至少比它们向储户支付的利率高3%时才能运转下去。


And that is possible only if US Treasury rates are higher than they are now.	而这只有在美国国债收益率比现在更高时才能实现。


If this is true, it would reflect a failure by bankers to understand their industry’s material interests.	果真如此的话，这将反映出银行家没有理解银行业的实质利益（material interest）。


What would most benefit commercial banks is not an immediate increase in interest rates, but a monetary policy that contributes to ensuring that the economy is capable of supporting higher interest rates in the future.	让商业银行获益最大的不是立即提高利率，而是有利于确保经济能够支持未来更高利率的货币政策。


If history is any guide, tightening monetary policy in the near term will only lead to further economic turbulence, followed by a rapid retreat to low interest rates.	如果历史能够作为指引，那么在短期内收紧货币政策只能导致更多的经济动荡，然后是迅速回归低利率。


Embarking on that path should be a cause of concern for everyone.	升息之路应该引起所有人的警觉。


The Fed’s Risk to Emerging Economies	新兴经济体的美联储风险


MILAN – The US Federal Reserve has finally, after almost a decade of steadfast adherence to very low interest rates, hiked its federal funds rate – the rate from which all other interest rates in the economy take their cue – by 25 basis points.	米兰—美联储在坚守了近十年极低利率后终于提高了其联邦基金利率25个基点。 联邦基金利率是所有其他利率的参考利率。


That brings the new rate up to a still-minimal 0.5%, and Fed Chair Janet Yellen has wisely promised that any future increases will be gradual.	这次升息将新利率提高到0. 5%，仍然很低，美联储主席耶伦聪明地承诺，未来升息都将是渐进的。


Given the state of the US economy – real growth of 2%, a tightening labor market, and little evidence of inflation rising toward the Fed’s 2% target – I view the rate rise as a reasonable and cautious first step toward normality (defined as a better balance between borrowers and lenders).	从美国经济状态看——实际增长率为2%，劳动力市场吃紧，通胀也没有靠近美联储2%的目标——我认为升息是迈向正常化的合理谨慎的第一步（正常化是指借款人和贷款人之间达成更好的平衡）。


However, other central banks, particularly in economies where the output gap is larger than in the United States, will not be keen to follow the Fed’s lead.	但是，其他央行，特别是产出缺口比美国更大的新兴经济体央行，不会急切地步美联储后尘。


That implies a coming period of monetary-policy divergence, with uncertain consequences for the global economy.	这意味着世界将迎来一段货币政策分歧时期，给全球经济带来不确定后果。


On the face of it, a tiny change in the US rate should not trigger dramatic shifts in global capital flows.	在如此形势下，美国利率的微小变动应该不会导致全球资本流的剧烈变动。


But, as US monetary policy follows the path of interest-rate normalization, there could well be knock-on effects, both economic and financial, especially in the form of currency volatility and destabilizing outflows from emerging economies.	但是，随着美国货币政策继续向利率正常化迈进，极有可能产生经济和金融连锁反应，特别是货币波动和破坏性流出新兴经济体。


The reason we should fear this possibility is that the world’s economic equilibrium is both fragile and unstable – and could wobble dangerously without determined and coordinated policy intervention.	我们之所以应该担忧这一可能性，是因为世界经济均衡脆弱不稳——如果没有果断而的协作政策干预，可能出现危险的波动。


A Fed rate hike might not tip it over, but some other seemingly innocuous event could.	美联储升息未必会导致如此波动，但其他一些看似安全的事件可能达到这一“效果”。


One doesn’t need a long memory to understand how even relatively modest policy shifts can trigger outsize market reactions.	不需要很久远的记忆就能理解相对温和的政策变化如何引发市场的剧烈反应。


Consider, for example, the “taper tantrum” that roiled financial markets in the spring of 2013, after then-Fed Chair Ben Bernanke said only that policymakers were thinking of gradually ending quantitative easing.	比如，2013年春金融市场出现了一次“锥形崩盘”，原因只是时任美联储主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）说决策者正在考虑逐渐停止量化宽松。


But that announcement came as a surprise (as did the devaluation of China’s renminbi this past summer).	但伯南克的这番话出乎人们意料（今年夏天人民贬值也是如此）。


Capital that had flooded into emerging markets seeking yields no longer available in developed economies abruptly reversed course.	涌入新兴市场追寻在发达经济体无法实现的高收益率的资本猛然转向。


No investor wanted to be the last one out.	没人愿意成为最后一个离开的。


A jittery global financial system, like the one we have now, does not tolerate unwelcome surprises well.	我们现在的全球金融体系犹如惊弓之鸟，一点都不欢迎意外冲击。


Unlike the taper tantrum and the devaluation of the renminbi, the Fed’s rate-hike announcement on December 16 certainly was no surprise.	和锥形崩盘以及人民币贬值不同，12月16日的美联储升息决定不属于意外。


So one might argue that if the Fed’s move does lead to volatility in international capital flows, the process must have already started.	因此，人们也许会认为，如果美联储的动作却是导致了国际资本流波动，这一过程必然也已经开始了。


In fact, near-universal anticipation of a US rate rise did not produce a spike in capital flows or asset prices.	事实上，几乎被一致预期到的美联储升息没有造成资本流或资产价格的大起大落。


Yet widespread concerns persist.	但普遍的担忧依然存在。


The International Monetary Fund for example, has argued that any rate hike by the Fed would need an “effective monetary policy communication strategy” – a polite way of saying that any monetary tightening in the US and other advanced economies would be premature.	比如，国际货币基金组织（IMF）认为美联储的任何升息举动都需要“有效的货币政策沟通策略”——委婉的表示美国和其他发达经济体的任何货币紧缩政策都操之过急了。


The reasoning is that emerging economies have become dangerously dependent on low interest rates and high commodity prices.	原因在于新兴经济体对低利率和高大宗商品价格产生了危险的依赖。


Many emerging-market companies are in the highly vulnerable position of having borrowed heavily in foreign currencies.	许多新兴市场公司十分虚弱，背负着沉重的外币债务。


If capital flight occurs, the consequences will be dire: tightened credit, balance-of-payments difficulties, inflation, rising interest rates, fiscal stress, and downgrades by the major credit-rating agencies – all of which implies more capital flight.	如果发生资本逃离，后果将十分可怕：信用收紧，收支平衡出现困难，通货膨胀，利率上升，财政压力，以及被主要评级机构降级——所有这些都意味着更多的资本逃离。


Europeans, too, have become dependent on low interest rates, with the European Central Bank as the key stabilizing force.	欧洲人也变得依赖低利率，他们有欧洲央行充当重要的稳定器。


Without the ECB’s commitment, in place since 2012, to prevent sovereign-debt yields from soaring, there would be a persistent risk to the eurozone – and, indeed, to the entire edifice of the European Union – of sovereign-debt defaults.	欧洲央行自2012年以来一直竭尽全力阻止主权债务收益率一飞冲天，若非如此，欧元区也将有持久的主权债务违约风险——甚至整个欧盟都会受到动摇��


But at least Europe has benefited from falling commodity prices.	但至少欧洲是大宗商品价格下跌的受益者。


By contrast, many emerging economies, highly dependent on commodity export earnings, have been stressed by the commodity-price reset, sluggish growth in developed economies, and slower growth in China.	相反，许多新兴经济体高度依赖大宗商品出口收益，它们因为大宗商品价格暴跌、发达经济体增长乏力和中国增长减速而饱受压力。


Capital flight would materially add to their plight – in some cases disastrously so.	资本外逃则令它们雪上加霜——一些国家因此一蹶不振。


Since the 2008 financial crisis, the world has become accustomed to such linkages and spillovers.	自2008年金融危机以来，世界已经习惯于这样的联系和溢出效应。


And yet policy responses to crises remain decentralized.	而应对危机的政策反应仍然是各自为政。


There is no ECB for the emerging economies.	新兴经济体没有自己的欧洲央行。


They cannot be confident of appropriate reactions by their policymakers to rapid capital outflows, or of their capacity in terms of policy tools, reserves, and balance sheets.	它们无法信任它们的决策者能应对快速的资本外流，也无法信任政策工具、储备和资产负债表。


And they cannot be fully certain of the speed and effectiveness of the international policy responses that might otherwise act as “circuit breakers.”	它们无法确定国际政策反应的“断路器”效果。


The reality is that emerging markets that benefited after the 2008 crisis from China’s economic growth, rising commodity prices, and cheap foreign capital must now adjust to reversals in all of these factors.	现实是在2008年危机后受益于中国经济增长、大宗商品价格上涨和廉价外国资本的新兴市场现在必须适应所有这些因素的一齐逆转。


The necessary transitions for these markets will be complex, risky, and not entirely within their control.	这些市场的必要转型是复杂而危险的，它们自身未必能够完全掌控。


While the Fed’s rate hike, prudently accompanied by an emphasis on small and gradual steps, may not turn out to be a trigger, the concerns about the knock-on effects are legitimate.	美联储在升息的同时强调了微小、渐进的节奏原则，因此这也许不会成为触发因素，但对连锁反应的担忧不无道理。


It would be unwise to assume that, with the initial hike now behind us, systemic risk has somehow disappeared.	认为第一步升息已经过去，因此系统性风险已经有所消散的观点是不明智的。


In the long run, of course, emerging markets will benefit from interest-rate normalization, because they will no longer suffer the distortions and imbalances that lead to unsustainable growth patterns.	当然，从长期看，新兴市场将从利率正常化中获益，因为它们不再需要面对导致不可持续增长路径的扭曲和失衡。


But the hard part will be getting from here to there without an accident.	但难点在于平安地从短期过渡到长期。


Felipe Calderón’s Two Faces	费利佩·卡尔德龙的两副面孔


MEXICO CITY – Mexican President Felipe Calderón has finally gotten what he wanted: the resignation of United States Ambassador Carlos Pascual.	墨西哥城——墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德隆终于达到了自己的目的：逼迫美国大使卡洛斯·帕斯夸尔辞职。


Calderón shot the messenger for delivering bad news through confidential cables released by WikiLeaks.	卡尔德隆惩罚了通过维基解密秘密电报透露坏消息的信使。


Pascual’s harsh assessments of the “war on drugs” that Calderón unleashed four years ago infuriated the president.	帕斯夸尔对四年前卡尔德隆“反毒战争”的严厉评价激怒了这位总统。


The revelations also annoyed the Mexican army, for they pointed out that the military frequently doesn’t act on intelligence provided by the US, and displays a strong aversion to risk.	因为指出军队经常不对美国提供的情报采取行动并极端厌恶风险，此次泄密事件也惹恼了墨西哥军队。


Moreover, Pascual’s candid assessments described a dysfunctional situation in which Mexican security agencies fight each other more than they fight organized crime.	此外，帕斯夸尔坦率地批评了墨西哥安全机构内斗比打击有组织犯罪更积极的混乱状况。


Essentially, Pascual was forced to leave for describing a reality that Calderón does not want to face, and that his government would prefer to ignore.	实际上，帕斯夸尔因为说出了卡尔德隆及其政府宁愿忽视也不愿面对的现实而被迫离职。


In other words, he lost his job for doing it properly.	换句话讲，他因为恪尽职守而丢掉了工作。


But the stubborn truth revealed by the US diplomat emerges every day, despite the impact of drug kingpins who are arrested, the number of weapons discovered, or the amount of cocaine seized.	但这位美国外交官揭露的残酷现实每天都在发生，不管逮捕的贩毒头目，发现的武器或缴获的可卡因数量有什么影响。


Mexico is not winning the “war” against drug trafficking and organized crime: Pascual’s forced resignation cannot hide the 34,000 dead, the growing number of Mexicans addicted to drugs, the surge in kidnappings and executions, and widespread impunity.	墨西哥没有打赢这场针对贩毒和有组织犯罪的“战争”：帕斯夸尔的辞职无法掩盖34，000人丧生，越来越多墨西哥人染上毒瘾，绑架和处决数量激增和大面积犯罪行为不受惩罚的残酷现实。


The official narrative is that violence is an inevitable consequence of taking on the drug cartels.	官方的说法是暴力是对抗贩毒集团的必然结果。


But other countries have managed to prevent drug gangs from unleashing their fury on innocent civilians.	但其他国家的确防止了贩毒集团向无辜民众发泄怒火。


And, while Mexicans are told that the violence is only between rival gangs, executions transcend the realm of drug trafficking.	尽管墨西哥人得到的说法是暴力活动只发生在帮派内部，但可以判处死刑的罪名却不仅仅限于贩毒。


Citizens are exhorted by their government to denounce criminals, though 98.5% of criminal investigations are never solved.	政府告诫民众要声讨犯罪份子，但98. 5%的刑事调查却永远没有结果。


A recent poll showed that 59% of Mexicans believe that the government is losing the war that it declared, while only 23% support the government’s current course.	最近的民意调查显示59%的墨西哥人认为政府的反毒战争失败，只有23%的人支持政府目前的举措。


As Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, all wars entail deception.	正如《孙子兵法》所云，欺骗是所有战争的必然结果。


Mexico has become its latest victim.	墨西哥就是最新的受害者。


The Mexican government has not been sufficiently honest about the scale of the challenges that it faces, the measures that it has taken, and the level of US support, involvement, and collaboration that it has sought.	墨西哥政府不肯如实说出所面对的问题、采取的措施和要求美国给予的支持、参与和协作。


Therein lie the contradictions, evasiveness, and lack of transparency regarding the terms on which Calderón’s war is being conducted.	这也是卡尔德隆战争条件的矛盾、隐晦和不透明所在。


Everyone on his team demands that the US devote more attention and resources to Calderón’s effort, but publicly denies doing so when evidence of heightened US presence in Mexico becomes public.	卡氏政府人人要求美国提供更多的关注和资源，但又公开拒绝美国加强驻墨力量。


In recent weeks, the Calderón administration has twisted itself into knots trying to explain how and why it authorized US drone planes to fly over Mexican territory for intelligence-gathering purposes.	最近几周，卡尔德隆政府在解释授权美国无人机穿越墨领空搜集情报的方法和原因时前言不搭后语。


And yet, while Calderón insists that the US assume its bilateral responsibilities, he also demands the US Ambassador’s head for revealing his own tactical and strategic mistakes in the war he insists on prosecuting.	然而，就在卡尔德隆坚持美国负起双边责任的同时，他也要求美国大使为揭露其在执意发动的这场战争中的战略和战术失误而引咎辞职。


Calderón’s contradictory stance is rooted in the reflexive habits of a Mexican political class trained to gain points by kicking the US.	墨西哥政界习惯借谴责美国来给自己加分，卡尔德隆的立场因此自相矛盾。


Calderón, too, has sought refuge behind the folds of the Mexican flag and in diatribes about sovereignty under siege.	卡尔德隆也经常借墨西哥国旗和抨击陷入重围的主权来当挡箭牌。


In other words, Calderón accuses the US of intervention, even as he assiduously seeks it.	换句话说，卡尔德隆一边谴责美国干涉其内政，一边又积极寻求美国的干涉。


He criticizes the US for meddling, after his government promoted that meddling.	他的政府在推动美国干涉的同时严厉批评美国干涉。


Pascual is accused of behaving like a “Proconsul,” after Mexican authorities – due to incompetence or irresponsibility – assigned him that role.	无能或不负责任的墨西哥当局在迫使帕斯夸尔扮演总督角色的同时又借此对其横加指责。


In a recent interview, Calderón lambasted Pascual for his “ignorance,” after the ambassador sent incontrovertible cables describing the real situation on the ground.	最近一次会面中，卡尔德隆因帕斯夸尔发电报说明真实情况而痛斥这位美国大使“无知”。


They’re painful to read, but difficult to refute.	电报内容读起来令人痛苦，但却令人难以反驳。


Rather than shooting the messenger, Calderón should reflect on the message itself, and rethink not only the war but the terms on which he has decided to wage it.	卡尔德隆的当务之急不是杀死信使，而是认真反思这场战争及其发动的条件。


The cables should lead Calderón to rectify a strategy that so far has increased the level of violence without decreasing drug trafficking.	电报应促使卡尔德隆纠正目前滋生暴力，但却没有遏制贩毒的无效策略。


The “success” of the war needs to be measured by the reduction in its toll of violence.	这场战争“成功”与否要靠暴力伤亡的缓和程度来衡量。


Moreover, Pascual’s conclusions should force Calderón to redefine Mexico’s relationship with the US in a more honest fashion.	此外，帕斯夸尔的结论应该迫使卡尔德隆以更诚实的方式重新界定墨美关系。


Because if all of this does not happen, Calderón’s ability to force out the US ambassador, and any short-term political gain he obtained in doing so, will be irrelevant.	因为若非如此，卡尔德隆迫使美国大使出局及其凭借此举获得的任何短期政治利益都不会带来好的结果。


Indeed, after the “ugly American” has packed his bags, Ciudad Juárez will still be the most dangerous city in the world.	实际上，在这个“丑陋的美国人”打包滚蛋之后，华雷斯仍将是世界上最危险的城市。


The homicide rate in the country will continue to soar, and public security agencies will remain incapable of preventing, detecting, or punishing the vast majority of violent events that have placed the country on edge.	墨西哥的杀人案发率仍将居高不下，公安机关仍将对导致国家边缘化的绝大多数暴力案件的预防、侦破或惩罚束手无策。


The Mexican government will continue to request US aid in a surreptitious fashion, and deny doing so when it becomes public.	墨西哥政府仍将以诡异的方式要求美国的援助，而在公之于众时又忙着矢口否认。


The message is clear.	问题已经非常明确。


If we Mexicans don’t end this war – so ill-conceived, so poorly executed, and so badly explained – it will end us.	如果我们墨西哥人不结束这场考虑不周、执行不力、解释不清的战争，我们就会为它陪葬。


One does not have to read Carlos Pascual’s leaked cables to understand that.	这一点不用看卡洛斯·帕斯夸尔的泄密电报也能知道。


Feminism and the Male Brain	男性大脑和女权主义


NEW YORK – North Americans of my generation grew up with the 1970’s children’s record “Free to Be...You and Me,” on which Rosey Grier, an immense former football star, sang “It’s Alright to Cry.”	纽约——我这一代北美人是听着20世纪70年代“自由自在…表现真我”的儿童唱片长大的，在这张唱片中，伟大的前足球巨星格里尔唱道“哭吧没关系”。


The message: girls could be tough, and boys were allowed not to be.	这就是说：女孩可以坚强，而男孩不坚强也没有关系。


For almost 40 years, that era’s Western feminist critique of rigid sex-role stereotyping has prevailed.	近40年来，那个年代西方女权主义批评在性别角色领域的僵化成见一直占统治地位。


In many ways, it has eroded or even eliminated the kind of arbitrary constraints that turned peaceable boys into aggressive men and stuck ambitious girls in low-paying jobs.	在很多方面，它侵蚀甚至是消灭了那种把温和的男孩变成有侵略性的男人、并让有抱负的女孩深陷低薪工作而无法自拔的强迫性限制。


Feminists understandably have often shied away from scientific evidence that challenges this critique of sex roles.	女权主义者一直不愿承认挑战这类性别角色批评的科学依据，这一点是可以理解的。


After all, because biology-based arguments about gender difference have historically been used to justify women’s subjugation, women have been reluctant to concede any innate difference, lest it be used against them.	毕竟，由于有关性别差异的生物依据在过去一直被用来解释女性的从属地位，女性也因此不愿承认任何先天的差异，唯恐这会被当成对她们不利的证据。


But, in view of recent scientific discoveries, has feminist resistance to accepting any signs of innate gender difference only created new biases?	不过，鉴于最新得出的科学结论，女权主义者拒绝承认任何天生性别差异的存在是否只能创造出新的偏见？


The feminist critique, for example, has totally remade elementary-level education, where female decision-makers prevail: the construction of male hierarchies in the schoolyard is often redirected nowadays for fear of “bullying,” with boys and girls alike expected to “share” and “process” their emotions.	举例来讲，女权主义批评已经彻底重塑了基础教育，其中的统治地位由女性决策者占据：校园里男性等级制度的建立如今经常被重新引导，因为人们对“欺侮”一词充满了恐惧，无论男孩女孩都被希望“分享”和“处理”他们的情绪。


But many educators have begun to argue that such intervention in what may be a hardwired aspect of “boy-ness” can lead to boys’ academic underperformance relative to girls, and to more frequent diagnoses of behavioral problems, attention deficit disorder, and so on.	但许多教育学家已经开始提出，对于硬性“男孩特点”诸如此类的干预可以导致男孩的学业成绩逊于女孩，被频繁诊断出行为疾患、注意力缺失，以及诸如此类的其他问题。


And education is just the beginning.	而教育问题不过是个开始。


An entire academic discipline emerged out of the wholesale critique of the male tendency to create hierarchy, engage in territoriality, and be drawn to conflict.	对男性建立等级制度、保护领土权和参与冲突的趋向不分青红皂白的批判形成了完整的学术领域。


When I was in college, the feminist solution to “patriarchy” was an imagined world without hierarchy, where people verbalized all day long and created emotional bonds.	我上大学时，“家长制”的女权主义解决方案是想象中没有等级制度的世界，人们在这里整天靠语言交流，建立起情感方面的联系。


This critique of “masculinity” also dramatically affected intimate relationships: women were encouraged to express their dissatisfaction with men’s refusal to “share” their inner lives.	这种对“男子气”的批评同样在很大程度上影响了亲密关系：女性受到鼓励，表达因男子拒绝“分享”他们内心生活所引起的不满情绪。


Women complained of not being heard, of men disappearing after work to tinker in the garage or zone out in front of the TV.	女性抱怨没有人听她讲话，抱怨男人下班后就钻进车库修修补补不见人影，或者坐在电视机前发呆。


But, however heartfelt, such complaints assumed that men choose all of their behavior.	不过不管如何真心实意，这样的抱怨都假定男人所有这些行为无不是 有意为之。


Now a spate of scientific analyses, based on brain imaging technology and new anthropological and evolutionary discoveries, suggests that we may have had our heads in the sand, and that we must be willing to grapple with what seem to be at least some genuine, measurable differences between the sexes.	现在大量以脑显像以及全新人类和进化研究成果为基础的科学分析表明我们可能一直在逃避现实，我们必须愿意尽力解决两性间至少某些真实存在并可以度量的性别差异问题。


The most famous of these studies, anthropologist Helen Fisher’s The Anatomy of Love , explains the evolutionary impetus for human tendencies in courtship, marriage, adultery, divorce, and childrearing.	人类学家海伦·费舍尔 《爱的解析》 是上述研究中最著名的一项，它解释了人类求爱、结婚、通奸、离婚和抚养子女倾向背后存在的进化动力。 她的某些发现引发了广泛争议：比如，我们可能会有多次一夫一妻的经历，必须非常努力才能很好地维护伴侣关系；


Some of her findings are provocative: it seems, for example, that we are hard-wired for serial monogamy and must work very hard to maintain pair-bonds; that highly orgasmic women enjoy an evolutionary advantage; and that flirtation among primates closely resembles the way young men and women in a bar show their sexual interest today.	再如情欲亢奋的女性拥有进化优势； 以及灵长类动物的调情非常类似于今天酒吧里男女青年表达性喜好的方式。


Moreover, in her description of our evolution, Fisher notes that males who could tolerate long periods of silence (waiting for animals while in hunt mode) survived to pass on their genes, thus genetically selecting to prefer “space.”	此外，在对人类进化的描述中，费舍尔强调能够忍受长时间沉默的男性（以捕猎状态等待猎物）能将他们的基因传递下去，因此从基因的角度讲他们会选择“空间”偏好。


By contrast, females survived best by bonding with others and building community, since such groups were needed to gather roots, nuts, and berries, while caring for small children.	恰恰相反，女性则只有通过与他人合作、形成团体才能更好地生存下去，因为她们需要团体来采集块根、坚果和浆果，并同时照顾孩子。


Reading Fisher, one is more inclined to leave boys alone to challenge one another and test their environment, and to accept that, as she puts it, nature designed men and women to collaborate for survival.	读过费舍尔的研究结果，人们就更倾向于让男孩们相互挑战并测试环境，同时像她所说的那样接受男女合作生存是大自然的设计。


“Collaboration” implies free will and choice; even primate males do not succeed by dominating or controlling females.	“合作”隐含着自由意愿和选择，就连灵长类动物中的雄性也无法通过占有或者控制雌性来取得成功。


In her analysis, it serves everyone for men and women to share their sometimes different but often complementary strengths – a conclusion that seems reassuring, not oppressive.	在她的分析中，男人和女人分享他们有时差异巨大但通常又互为补充的优势符合所有人的利益——这样的结论似乎很令人放心，而不是给人压力。


What Could He Be Thinking? , by Michael Gurian, a consultant in the field of neurobiology, takes this set of insights further.	由神经生物学领域顾问麦克·古瑞创作的 《他到底在想什么？ 》 进一步发展了这样的看法。


Gurian argues that men’s brains can actually feel invaded and overwhelmed by too much verbal processing of emotion, so that men’s need to zone out or do something mechanical rather than emote is often not a rejection of their spouses, but a neural need.	古瑞提出男人的大脑实际可以被太多关于情绪的语言加工侵入并且压倒，因此男人发呆或从事某些机械活动而不是表达感情的需求通常并不是拒绝伴侣的表现，而只是一种神经方面的需要。


Gurian even posits that the male brain actually can’t “see” dust or laundry piling up as the female brain often can, which explains why men and women tend to perform household tasks in different ways.	古瑞甚至假设男性的大脑事实上不能像女性那样“看到”成堆的灰尘或待洗的衣物，这可以解释为什么男人和女人以不同的方式处理家务。


Men often can’t hear women’s lower tones, and their brains, unlike women’s, have a “rest” state (he actually is sometimes thinking about “nothing”!).	男人通常听 不 到女人的低音，他们的大脑和女人不一样，存在一种“休眠”模式（他在有些时候实际上“什么也没想”！ ）


Moreover, Gurian argues that men tend to rear children differently from women for similarly neurological reasons, encouraging more risk-taking and independence and with less awareness of the details of their nurture.	此外，古瑞提出由于相似的神经病学原理，男人倾向于以一种不同于女性的方式来抚养孩子，鼓励孩子更多地冒险和独立，而对育儿方面的细节并不那么关注。


One can see the advantages to children of having both parenting styles.	人们可以看到两种教育方式并存给孩子带来的好处。


He urges women to try side-by-side activities, not only face-to-face verbalization, to experience closeness with their mates.	他敦促女人尝试肩并肩的活动，而不是面对面的交流，通过这种方式来体验与伴侣的亲密关系。


Somehow, all this is liberating rather than infuriating.	从某种角度讲，所有这些事实都让人放松，而不是使人发怒。


So much that enrages women, or leads them to feel rejected or unheard, may not reflect men’s conscious neglect or even sexism, but simply their brains’ wiring!	那些激怒女性、或者让她们感到遭受拒绝或没有被倾听的因素可能并不反应男性的有意忽视甚至性别歧视，而只是因为大脑的连接方式不同！


According to Gurian, if women accept these biological differences and work around them in relationships, men respond with great appreciation and devotion (often expressed nonverbally).	按照古瑞的说法，如果女性接受上述生物差异并在两性关系中找到解决的办法，男人就会以更多的欣赏和忠诚作为回报（通常会以非语言的方式来表达）。


Women who have embraced these findings report that relations with the men in their lives become much smoother and, paradoxically, more intimate.	接受上述结果的女性报告与生命中男性的关系变得更亲密，同时也更顺畅。


None of this means that men and women should not try to adjust to each other's wishes, ask for shared responsibility with housework, or expect to be “heard.”	这些结论并不意味着男人和女人不应努力调整各自的愿望，要求分担家务劳动的责任，或期望“有人听自己说话”。


But it may mean we can understand each other a bit better and be more patient as we seek communication.	但它可能意味着我们可以更好地去了解对方，并且更耐心地进行沟通和交流。


Nor does recent scientific research imply that men (or women) are superior, much less justify invidious discrimination.	最新的科学研究并未显示男人（或女人）应当高人一等，更不用说为令人作呕的歧视找到证据了。


But it does suggest that a more pluralistic society, open to all kinds of difference, can learn, work, and love better.	不过它们确实显示一个开放地对待所有差异的更加多元化的社会，可以更好地学习、工作和恋爱。


Fictional Sovereignties	虚构主权国家


LONDON – A year ago, tiny Georgia tried to regain control over its breakaway enclave of South Ossetia.	伦敦—一年前，小国格鲁吉亚试图重新控制被其合围的叛离之地南奥塞梯。


The Russians quickly expelled the Georgian army, to almost universal opprobrium from the West.	俄国人很快出兵驱逐了格鲁吉亚军队。 此举遭到西方的一致谴责。


South Ossetia, together with Abkhazia (combined population 300,000), promptly declared their “independence,” creating two new fictional sovereignties, and acquiring in the process all the official trappings of statehood: national heroes, colorful uniforms, anthems, flags, frontier posts, military forces, presidents, parliaments, and, most important, new opportunities for smuggling and corruption.	南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹（总人口30万）立即宣布“独立”，建立了两个虚构的主权国家，并在此期间努力发展所有官方的国家身份系统：民族英雄、光鲜的制服、国歌、国旗、边境哨所、军队、总统、议会以及最重要的走私和腐败的新机会。


So far, only Russia and Nicaragua recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.	到目前为止，只有俄罗斯和尼加拉瓜承认阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的独立。


Russian recognition was widely seen as retaliation for Western recognition of Kosovo (population two million), the breakaway province of Serbia, earlier last year.	俄罗斯的承认被广泛认为是其对西方在去年初承认科索沃的报复。 拥有200万人口的科索沃是塞尔维亚的一个分裂省份。


A thousand miles to the west of Georgia is Moldova (population 3.5 million), which lies between Romania and Ukraine.	格鲁吉亚以西1000英里就是摩尔多瓦（人口350万）。


Annexed by Tsarist Russia in 1812, joined to Romania in 1918, and re-annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, it seized its independence from Moscow in 1991.	它位于罗马尼亚和乌克兰之间，1812年被沙俄吞并，1918年加入罗马尼亚，1940年重新被前苏联侵占，最终于1991年摆脱莫斯科的统治获得独立。


It is a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and various other prestigious international bodies.	它是联合国、欧洲理事会、世贸组织、欧洲安全与合作组织等多个重要国际机构的成员国。


Moldova’s main claim to fame is King Stephen the Great, who defeated the Ottomans in a great fifteenth century battle.	摩尔多瓦的名声主要来自于史蒂芬王在十五世纪的一次伟大战役中打败了奥斯曼人。


It also produces rather good wine.	它也出产葡萄佳酿。


An enduring memory from my own recent visit to its capital Chisinau is the election poster of a local politician called Lupu, who holds a pair of spectacles to his eyes, whether to suggest visions or wisdom isn’t clear.	我最近走访该国首都基希纳乌所获得的一个持久印象是一张竞选海报。 海报上一位名为鲁普的政治人物将一副眼镜举到眼前，不清楚这究竟是暗示着远见还是智慧。


To get to Moldova from Odessa (now in Ukraine) one must drive through the self-proclaimed “republic” of Transdniestria (population 700,000), a sliver of land on the north shore of the Dniester river.	从敖德萨（现在乌克兰境内）驾车到摩尔多瓦必须经过所谓的Transdniestria“共和国”（人口70万），德涅斯特河北岸的一条狭长地带。


A clump of peeling buildings, rusting wire, and a filthy lavatory mark the start of Transdniestrian sovereignty.	一片斑驳的建筑、锈蚀的铁丝网和一个肮脏的厕所标志着Transdniestria主权的起始。


Progress through this squalid, but well manned, frontier post involved the stamping of lots of documents and a liberal scattering of bribes, a process repeated on leaving the “republic.”	穿行在这个污秽却重兵把守的边境哨所，需要敲大量的图章和进行无处不在的贿赂，这一过程在离开该“共和国”时又周而复始。


A shadowy mafia-style company, Sheriff, owns most of the economy.	一个影子般的、黑社会性质的公司，Sheriff，掌控着绝大部分经济命脉。


It is said to have close links to the president and his family.	据说该公司和总统及其家庭有着密切的关系。


It has built a giant football stadium in the capital, Tiraspol, which seems to be some kind of symbol of Transdniestrian virility.	该公司在首都Tiraspol修建了一个巨大的足球场，似乎要借此来象征其国民的男子气概。


Unrecognized by the rest of the world, Transdniestrian “independence” is secured by a Russian garrison.	由于未受到世界其他国家的承认，该国的“独立”由俄罗斯驻军来保全。


The world’s population is about six billion.	世界人口约六十亿。


Suppose it was divided into independent political units of two million people each. That would mean 3,000 micro-states, each refusing to accept any sovereignty superior to its own.	假设将其等分为200万人口的独立政治单位，那就将意味着3000个拒绝接受更高主权的微型国家。


Of course, this would be a recipe for global anarchy.	当然，这将会是全球无政府主义状态的温床。


Yet the trend over the past century has been towards a continuous increase in the number of small states, mainly owing to nationalist revolts against multi-national empires: the latest bout of state creation followed the disintegration of the USSR.	然而，过去一个世纪以来的趋势是小国家的数量不断增多，这主要是由于针对多民族帝国的民族主义反抗的发生：最近一次大规模的建国潮出现在前苏联解体之后。


Even long-established states like the United Kingdom now have strong separatist movements.	就连英国这样的老牌国家现在也出现了强势的分裂运动。


In its political life, the world has been regressing to a form of tribalism, even as its economic life has become increasingly globalized.	即便在世界的经济生活日益全球化的情况下，我们的政治生活也正日益倒退到某种形式的部族主义。


The equation of state with nation is the arch-heresy of our time.	将国家等同于民族是我们这个时代无出其右的异端邪说。


A “nation” is, at root, an ethno-linguistic – occasionally religious – entity, and because it is through language and liturgy that culture is transmitted, each nation will have its own distinctive cultural history, available for use and misuse, invention and discovery.	一个“民族”，从根本上讲，是一个种族语言学—间或也是宗教—的实体。 因为文化是通过语言和礼拜仪式传播的，所以每一个民族都会有自身独特的文化历史，可以被使用和误用，被发明和发现。


The state, however, is a political construction, designed to keep the peace in an economically viable territory.	然而���家却是一种政治构造，目的是在一片具有经济活力的领土上维持和平。


There are simply too many “nations,” actual or potential, to form the basis of a world system of states, not least because so many of them, having been jumbled up for centuries, cannot now be disentangled.	有太多实际或潜在的“民族”可以形成世界国家体系的基础。 更重要的是，它们中的许多经过了数世纪以来的相互纠葛，早已是剪不断，理还乱。


Micro-states can never be made small enough to satisfy their advocates’ exalted standards of cultural integrity.	微型国家再小也满足不了被其倡导者拔高的文化完整性标准。


So the unraveling of multi-national states is a false path.	所以拆散多民族国家是一条歧途。


The way forward lies in democratic forms of federalism, which can preserve sufficient central authority for the purposes of statehood, while respecting local and regional cultures.	真正的出路在于某种形式的联邦主义，这既能够为国家统一保持足够的中央权力，又尊重了地方和地区的文化。


Today’s upsurge of micro-nationalism is not just a consequence of the revolt against empires: it is also a revolt against globalization.	当今的微型国家主义高涨不仅是反抗帝国的结果：它也是对全球化的反叛。


There is widespread resistance to the idea that the chief function of modern states is to slot their peoples into a global market dominated by the imperatives of efficiency and cheapness, heedless of the damage to non-economic activities.	有一种理念认为现代国家的首要职能就是将其各民族分配到以效率和廉价为第一要旨的全球市场，而不顾对非经济活动的破坏。 而这一理念现在遭到了广泛的抵触。


This feeling is strengthened when the global economy turns out to be a global casino.	当全球经济最终成为全球赌场时，这种情绪又被强化了。


National assertion is a way of combating impersonal forces and remote authorities.	民族主张成为对抗非人性力量和远距离权威的一种方式。


Globalization promises too much in terms of welfare gains, particularly to developing countries, to be abandoned.	全球化在福利增长方面的过度承诺（特别是对发展中国家）使其被摒弃。


But the lesson from the current crisis is that we will have to develop styles of global economic governance to manage, regulate, and mitigate the creative, but often disruptive forces unleashed by the global market.	但从当下的危机中我们学到的教训是必须发展出一种全球经济治理的方式来管理、监管并遏制全球市场所释放出的创造性，但通常也是破坏性的力量。


In the absence of an actual world government, this can be done only through cooperation among states.	在一个实际的世界性政府缺位的情况下，这只能通过国家间的合作实现。


The fewer “sovereigns” there are, the easier it will be to secure the necessary cooperation.	“主权国家”越少，实现必要的合作就越容易。


The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, which laid the institutional foundation for the post-war World War II economy, was made possible because the United States and Britain called the shots.	为二战后的世界经济打下制度基础的1944年《布雷顿森林协议》之所以能成功是因为美国和英国掌握了话语权。


When objections were raised to Cuba being put on the drafting committee, Harry Dexter White, the American representative, remarked that Cuba’s function was to provide cigars.	当古巴的反对意见被提交到起草委员会，美国代表哈里·德克斯特·怀特却说，古巴的职能就是提供雪茄。


Such a cavalier attitude to the demands of lesser powers to be heard is no longer possible.	现今已不可能再出现这种针对较弱小国家的傲慢态度。


But all this means is that the facades will have to be more subtle and the fictions more elaborate.	但这一切都意味着表面的功夫将不得不更微妙，而背后的摩擦也更复杂。


Provided we do not deceive ourselves about where real power lies, let presidents and parliaments be three a penny if that is what makes people feel good about themselves.	倘若我们不在真正权力归属的问题上自欺欺人，那么就让总统们和议会们多如牛毛吧，如果那样能让人们觉得舒服的话。


Fiddling at the Fire	玩火


PARIS – Financial markets have rallied since July on the hope that the global economic and geopolitical outlook will not worsen, or, if it does, that central banks stand ready to backstop economies and markets with additional rounds of liquidity provision and quantitative easing.	巴黎—7月份以来，金融市场因为寄希望于全球经济和地缘政治前景不会再恶化——即使真的恶化了，各大央行也早已做好了准备通过更多轮的流动性供应和量化宽松力挺经济和市场——而出现了反弹。


So, not only has good – or better-than-expected – economic news boosted the markets, but even bad news has been good news, because it increases the probability that central-banking firefighters like US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi will douse the markets with buckets of cash.	因此，不但关于经济的好（或好于预期的）消息提振着市场，就连坏消息也被视为好消息，因为这增加了美联储主席伯南克和欧洲央行行长德拉吉等央行救火队员用现金扑灭市场之火的可能性。


But markets that rise on both good and bad news are not stable markets.	但不论利好利空都上扬的市场绝不是稳定的市场。


“Risk-off” episodes, in which investor sentiment sours, are likely to return if economic news worsens and confidence in policymakers’ effectiveness drops.	“去风险”模式——即投资者情绪全面转坏——很可能随着经济消息的恶化以及对决策者效率的信心的下降而卷土重来。


In the eurozone, euphoria followed the ECB’s decision to provide support with potentially unlimited purchases of distressed countries’ bonds.	在欧元区，乐观情绪随着欧洲央行实行事实上无限制的购买受困国债券的支持决策而泛滥。


But the move is not a game changer; it only buys time for policymakers to implement the tough measures needed to resolve the crisis.	但这一动作并不能扭转局势； 而只能为决策者赢得一些时间来实施解决危机所必须实施的痛苦措施。


And the policy challenges are daunting: the eurozone’s recession is deepening as front-loaded fiscal consolidation and severe credit rationing continues.	政策挑战令人沮丧：随着前瞻性财政整合和严格的信用配给制的继续实施，欧元区的衰退正在深化。


And, as eurozone banks and public-debt markets become increasingly balkanized, establishing a banking union, a fiscal union, and an economic union while pursuing macroeconomic policies that restore growth, external balance, and competitiveness will be extremely difficult.	而随着欧元区银行和公共部门债务日益呈现出两极分化，在建立银行联盟、财政联盟和经济联盟的同时追求重塑增长、外部平衡和竞争力的宏观经济政策会变得特别困难。


Even the ECB’s support is not obvious.	甚至欧洲央行的支持也不是板上钉钉。


Monetary hawks – the Bundesbank and several other core central banks – who were worried about a new open-ended ECB mandate pushed successfully for strict and effective conditionality for countries benefiting from the bond purchases.	担心欧洲央行采取无限制动作的货币鹰派——德国央行和其他核心国央行——成功地给从债券购买计划中受益的国家施加了严格而有效的条件。


As a result, they can pull the plug on the program if its stringent criteria are not met.	如果这些严苛的条件得不到满足，它们可以叫停购买计划。


Moreover, Greece could exit the eurozone in 2013, before Spain and Italy are successfully ring-fenced; Spain – like Greece – is spiraling into depression, and may need a full-scale bailout by the “troika” (the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund).	此外，希���可能在2013年退出欧元区，此后，西班牙和意大利也将被隔离； 西班牙像希腊一样，也在逐渐步入萧条，需要“三驾马车”（欧洲央行、欧洲委员会和IMF）的全面援助。


Meanwhile, austerity fatigue in the eurozone periphery is increasingly clashing with bailout fatigue in the core.	与此同时，欧元区外围国的紧缩疲劳与核心国的援助疲劳的对立正日渐严重。


Small wonder, then, that Germany, politically unable to vote on more bailout resources, has outsourced that job to the ECB, the only institution that can bypass democratically elected parliaments.	因此，不必奇怪在政治上不可能赞成更多援助措施的德国会把这一职责踢给唯一能够绕过民选议会决策的机构——欧洲央行。


But, again, liquidity provision alone – without policies to restore growth soon – would merely delay, not prevent, the breakup of the monetary union, ultimately taking down the economic/trade union and leading to the destruction of the single market.	但是，流动性供应——如果不尽快辅之以重塑增长的政策的话——仍然只能推迟而不能阻止货币联盟的解体，最终导致经济/贸易联盟的崩溃和单一市场的毁灭。


In the United States, the latest economic data – including a weak labor market – confirm that growth is anemic, with output in the second half of 2012 unlikely to be significantly stronger than the 1.6% annual gain recorded in January-June.	在美国，最新经济数据——包括疲软的劳动力市场数据——确认了增长不振的现状，2012年下半年产出不可能大大超过1—6月份的1. 6%的年增长率。


And, given America’s political polarization and policy gridlock, we can expect more fights on the budget and the debt ceiling, another rating downgrade, and no agreement on a path toward medium-term fiscal consolidation and sustainability – regardless of whether President Barack Obama is reelected in November.	此外，由于美国政坛的两极分化和政策僵局，不难预期，在预算和债务上限问题上还会有更多争论，信用评级降级还会再次发生，关于中期财政整合和可持续性问题的协议也将难以达成，不管奥巴马是否能在11月连任总统。


On the contrary, we should expect agreement only on the path of least political resistance: avoidance of tough fiscal choices until the bond vigilantes eventually wake up, spike long rates, and force fiscal adjustment on the political system.	相反，协议只可能在政治阻力最小的方向上达成：在债券卫士最终觉醒、长期利率大幅上升、政治制度不得不进行财政调整之前避免痛苦的财政选择。


In China, a hard economic landing looks increasingly likely as the investment bubble deflates and net exports shrink.	在中国，随着投资泡沫的消灭和净出口的下降，硬着陆的可能性正在与日俱增。


Meanwhile, the reforms necessary to reduce savings and increase private consumption are being delayed.	与此同时，降低储蓄、增加私人消费所必需的改革被推迟了。


As in Europe and the US, the worst will be avoided in 2012 only by kicking the can down the road with more monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus.	与欧洲和美国一样，中国只能通过更多的货币、财政和信用刺激避免问题在2012年爆发。


But a hard landing becomes more likely in 2013, as the stimulus fades, non-performing loans rise, the investment bust accelerates, and the problem of rolling over the debts of provincial governments and their special investment vehicles can no longer be papered over.	但2013年，由于刺激措施停止、不良贷款增加、投资泡沫破裂加速以及省政府及其地方融资平台债务展期问题无法再掩盖，发生硬着陆的可能性会更大。


And, given a new leadership’s caution as it establishes its power, reforms will occur at a snail’s pace, making social and political unrest more likely.	此外，新领导层掌权阶段将会谨慎为上，因此改革进度将极为缓慢，导致社会和政治动荡可能性大增。


Meanwhile, Brazil, India, Russia, and other emerging economies are playing the same game.	与此同时，巴西、印度、俄罗斯和其他新兴国家情况也差不多。


Many have not adjusted as advanced economies’ weakness reduces the room for export-led growth; and many delayed structural reforms needed to boost private-sector development and productivity growth, while embracing a model of state capitalism that will soon reveal its limits.	许多新兴国家并没有随发达国家疲软挤压了出口拉动型增长空间而采取调整措施； 许多新兴国家推迟了提振私人部门发展和生产率提高所必须的结构性改革，而采取了很快就会到达极限的国家资本主义模式。


So the recent slowdown of growth in emerging markets is not just cyclical, owing to weak growth or outright recession in advanced economies; it is also structural.	因此，最近新兴市场的减速并不完全是周期性的，不完全是因为发达国家增长疲软或发生全面衰退所致； 其中也有结构性因素。


Similar dithering is apparent at the geopolitical level as well.	类似的摇摆在地缘政治中也是显而易见。


The major global powers are still trying negotiations and sanctions to induce Iran to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons.	主要全球性大国仍在就促使伊朗放弃开发和武器的谈判和制裁做着努力。


But Iran is playing for time and hoping to reach a zone of immunity.	但伊朗却在争分夺秒争取进入豁免区。


By 2013, an Israel that – rightly or wrongly – perceives Iran’s nuclear program to be an existential threat, and/or the US, which has rejected containment of a nuclear Iran, may decide to strike, leading to a war and a massive spike in oil prices.	2013年，以色列（不管对错）都将把伊朗核计划视为外部威胁，而拒绝包容伊朗核计划的美国可能会发动袭击，导致战争和油价暴涨。


Ineffective governments with weak leadership are at the root of the problem.	低效的政府和孱弱的领导力是问题的根源。


In democracies, repeated elections lead to short-term policy choices.	在民主国家，定期选举导致了政策的短视。


In autocracies like China and Russia, leaders resist the radical reforms that would reduce the power of entrenched lobbies and interests, thereby fueling social unrest as resentment against corruption and rent-seeking boils over into protest.	中国和俄罗斯等专制国家，领导人拒绝采取削弱根深蒂固的游说集团和既得利益集团权力的改革，从而导致因反腐败和寻租情绪激发的社会不安转变为示威。


But, as everyone kicks the can down the road, the can is getting heavier and, in the major emerging markets and advanced economies alike, is approaching a brick wall.	但是，由于每个人都想把负担一扔了之，结果负担越变越重，不管是新兴市场还是发达国家，都已经快走到了南墙。


Policymakers can either crash into that wall, or they can show the leadership and vision needed to dismantle it safely.	决策者可以选择撞向南墙，也可以选择用领导力和远见卓识安全巧妙地拆掉南墙。


The Soccer Mafia	足球黑手党


NEW YORK – The only surprise about the arrest of seven FIFA officials in a Swiss hotel in the early morning of May 27 is that it happened at all.	纽约—5月27日清晨，七名国际足联官员在瑞士一家饭店被捕，此事的唯一令人震惊之处是它居然发生了。


Most people assumed that these pampered men in expensive suits, governing the world’s soccer federation, were beyond the reach of the law.	大部分人认为这些管理着世界足球联盟的养尊处优、金履华服之士享受着“刑不上大夫”的待遇。


Whatever rumors flew or reports were made on bribes, kickbacks, vote-rigging, and other dodgy practices, FIFA President Joseph “Sepp” Blatter and his colleagues and associates always seemed to emerge without a scratch.	不论关于贿赂、回扣、选举操纵和其他不法行为的流言和报道如何日嚣尘上，国际足联主席“赛普”约瑟夫·布拉特（Joseph “Sepp” Blatter）及其同僚和相关人士总是可以逍遥法外。


So far, 14 men, including nine current or former FIFA executives (but not Blatter), have been charged with a range of fraud and corruption offenses in the United States, where prosecutors accuse them, among other things, of pocketing $150 million in bribes and kickbacks.	目前，包括九名现任或前任国际足联高官在内的14人（但不包括布拉特）在美国被控从事一系列欺诈和腐败行为，检方指控他们收受1. 5亿美元贿赂和回扣。


And Swiss federal prosecutors are looking into shady deals behind the decisions to award the World Cup competitions in 2018 and 2022 to Russia and Qatar, respectively.	瑞士联邦检察官正在调查2018年和2022年世界杯主办权（分别授予了俄罗斯和卡塔尔）决定的幕后交易。


There is, of course, a long tradition of racketeering in professional sports.	当然，职业体育的勒索传统已是老生常谈了。


American mobsters have had a major interest in boxing, for example.	比如，美国黑帮涉入拳击运动很深。


Even the once gentlemanly game of cricket has been tainted by the infiltration of gambling networks and other crooked dealers.	甚至曾经的绅士运动板球也被赌博网络和其他不法商人染指。


FIFA is just the richest, most powerful, most global milk cow of all.	国际足联只不过是其中最富有、最强大、最全球化的奶牛罢了。


Some have likened FIFA to the Mafia, and Blatter, born in a small Swiss village, has been called “Don Blatterone.”	有人将国际足联和黑手党相提并论，而出生于一个瑞士小村庄的布拉特被称为“唐布拉特龙”（Don Blatterone）。


This is not entirely fair.	这并不完全公平。


So far as we know, no murder contracts have ever been issued from FIFA’s head office in Zürich.	就目前我们所知而言，苏黎世国际足联总部还从未找过职业杀手。


But the organization’s secrecy, its intimidation of the rivals to those who run it, and its reliance on favors, bribes, and called debts do show disturbing parallels to the world of organized crime.	但该组织的秘密性、其对于反对其管理者的人的恐吓，以及其对惠赠、贿赂和债务的依赖确实与有组织犯罪没什么区别。


One could, of course, choose to see FIFA as a dysfunctional organization, rather than a criminal enterprise.	当然，你也可以选择将国际足联视为一个功能失调的组织而非犯罪帝国。


But even in this more charitable scenario, much of the malfeasance is a direct result of the federation’s total lack of transparency.	但即使在这个比较善意的情形中，许多渎职行为也直接源自国际足联缺少透明度。


The entire operation is run by a close-knit group of men (women play no part in this murky business), all of whom are beholden to the boss.	其全部运作都由一个紧密的男人帮（女性在其隐晦难辨的行为中不起任何作用）进行，所有人都对老板效忠。


This did not start under Blatter.	布拉特不是始作俑者。


It was his predecessor, the sinister Brazilian João Havelange, who turned FIFA into a corrupt and vastly rich empire by incorporating more and more developing countries, whose votes for the bosses were bought with all manner of lucrative marketing and media deals.	他的前任、阴险的阿维兰热才是。 阿维兰热把越来越多的发展中国家拉入国际足联，用各种丰厚的营销和媒体协议收买选票，将国际足联变成了腐败的财富帝国。


Huge amounts of corporate money from Coca-Cola and Adidas went sloshing through the system, all the way to the roomy pockets of Third World potentates and, allegedly, of Havelange himself.	来自可口可乐和阿迪达斯的巨额企业资金涌入这个系统，流入第三世界当权者以及（据说）阿维兰热本人贪得无厌的腰包中。


Coke was the main sponsor of the 1978 World Cup in Argentina, ruled in those days by a brutal military junta.	可口可乐是1978年阿根廷世界杯主赞助商，当时的阿根廷由残酷的军人集团统治。


Blatter is not quite as uncouth as Havelange.	布拉特不像阿维兰热那样粗鄙。


Unlike the Brazilian, he does not openly associate with mobsters.	和巴西人（阿维兰热）不同，他不会公开与黑帮扯上关系。


But his power, too, relies on the votes of countries outside Western Europe, and their loyalty, too, is secured by the promise of TV rights and commercial franchises.	但他的权力也依赖西欧之外的国家，而这些国家的忠诚需要电视转播权和商业特许经营权来保障。


In the case of Qatar, this meant the right to stage the World Cup in an utterly unsuitable climate, in stadiums hastily built under terrible conditions by underpaid foreign workers with few rights.	在卡塔尔的例子中，这意味着在极不适合的气候条件下举办世界杯的权利，工资低廉、毫无权利可言的外国工人在可怕的工作条件下急速建设着足球场。


Complaints from slightly more fastidious Europeans are often met with accusations of neo-colonialist attitudes or even racism.	欧洲人提出稍显严苛的抱怨就会招致新殖民主义乃至种族主义的指责。


Indeed, this is what makes Blatter a typical man of our times.	事实上，正是这一点让布拉特成为现时代的典型人物。