Global economic policy-making remains very much a Western game.	全球经济政策的制定仍是西方社会的游戏。


It beggars belief that China and India are not members of the G-7.	其支持者坚信中国和印度不是七国首脑集团的成员。


The Bretton Woods organizations – the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO – remain heavily Western in structure, leadership, and mentality.	布雷顿森林机构——世界货币基金组织、世界银行和世界卫生组织在结构、思想和领导方式上仍是西方化的。


This is especially true of the WTO, where Washington and Brussels seem more concerned at settling old scores and protecting their respective turfs than in engaging with the new players.	尤其是世贸组织，美国和比利时政府似乎更关心如何保护从前的成绩和他们各自的土地，而不是与新成员国的合作。


China will soon be the world’s biggest trading power. Yet euroatlantic introversion still permeates the WTO.	中国将很快成为全球最大的贸易国，然而世贸组织内部仍然充满了欧洲的内向性思想。


This mindset is also pervasive in Western governments, industry, business schools, and the media.	这种思想在西方政府、工业、商学院和媒体也普遍深入人心。


None of these institutions in the West is ready for Asia’s re-emergence.	这些机构和行业没有一个愿意看到亚洲的复兴。


History is not particularly encouraging when it comes to adjusting to profound changes – new actors and shifting balances of power – as the twentieth century tragically and repeatedly demonstrated.	正如上世纪不断上演的悲剧那样，当历史开始为深远巨变做出调整时，它往往并不鼓舞人心，新的人物不断涌现，权力平衡发生转移。


The tsunami that so devastated much of Asia has provided an opportunity for all key players – in government, industry, academia, the media, and civil society – to look at Asia anew, at both the challenges and the opportunities that have arisen from Asia’s resurgence.	海啸破坏了亚洲大部分的地区，给所有的重要政府、行业、学术界、媒体和文明社会提供了一个机会去重新审视亚洲，审视由亚洲复兴所带来的挑战和机遇。


These opportunities need to be seized with as much alacrity as the world has responded to Asia’s sorrow.	我们要迅速抓住这些机会，就向世界对待亚洲悲剧采取的行动一样。


Asia’s Stifled Services	处在压抑下的亚洲服务业


MANILA – The eurozone crisis has dominated discussion among policymakers over the last few years, but the economic slowdown in Asia’s two giants – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India – has become a source of growing public concern as well.	马尼拉——欧元区危机过去数年来一直决策者的讨论主题，但亚洲两大巨头——中华人民共和国和印度的经济放缓已经日益引发公众的担忧。


How worried should we be about an additional drag on the global economy?	我们该如何看待全球经济面临更多阻力？


After years of double-digit GDP growth, the PRC’s economy is decelerating.	在历经多年两位数的GDP增长之后，中国的经济正在减速。


At the Asian Development Bank, we predict that its growth will slow to 7.7% this year, from 9.3% in 2011.	我们亚洲开发银行预计中国的增长将从2011年的9. 3%放缓至今年的7.


The PRC’s population is aging, real wages are rising, and growth is moderating toward more sustainable rates.	7%。 中国人口开始老龄化，实际工资提升，增长率也正在放缓至相对可以持续的数字。


India, too, has massive potential to grow fast and reap a demographic dividend, but it has been struggling with structural reform.	印度同样具有快速增长及受益于人口红利的巨大潜质，但结构改革问题一直是其拯待解决的。


We expect that India’s expansion will slow to 5.6% in 2012, from 6.5% last year.	我们预计印度经济增长将从去年的6. 5%放缓到2012年的5.


Weak external demand is partly responsible for the falloff in growth, but internal factors – namely, slowing investment and stagnating consumption – are also holding back economic expansion.	外部需求疲软部分造成了经济增长下降，但投资放缓和消费停滞不前等内生性因素也对经济扩张起到了阻碍作用。


Maintaining growth in the face of a global slowdown is a daunting task, and it requires rethinking the future of “factory Asia.”	在全球经济放缓的大背景下保增长是一项艰巨的任务，要完成这项任务就必需重新思考“亚洲工厂”的未来。


Asia’s boom was driven largely by intraregional manufacturing linkages: intermediate goods and parts were sourced from within Asia for assembly into final goods exported to advanced economies.	区域内制造业联系在很大程度上推动了亚洲的繁荣：来自亚洲的零部件和中间产品被组装成最终产品出口到发达国家。


But, with budget-tightening around the world, demand for Asia’s exports is expected to continue to falter.	但随着世界各地预算缩紧，对亚洲的出口需求预计将会持续萎缩。


Where, then, should Asia look for another source of growth?	既然如此，亚洲今后的增长点究竟在哪里？


Upgrading the service sector – for example, business processing, tourism, and health care – could play a critical role in the region’s future growth.	升级业务处理、旅游和医疗保健等服务业或许会在该地区的未来增长中发挥关键的作用。


Asia’s service sector is already large, contributing significantly to growth and employment.	亚洲各国的服务业已经颇具规模，为经济增长和就业做出了显著的贡献。


Services accounted for nearly half of developing Asia’s GDP in 2010, two-thirds of India’s growth from 2000 to 2010, and 43% of growth in the manufacturing-oriented PRC in the same period.	2010年服务业占亚洲发展中国家GDP总额的接近一半，2000至2010年间占印度经济增长的三分之二，而同期在以制造业为主的中国则占经济增长总额的43%。


In addition, service workers comprise more than one-third of total employment in developing Asia.	此外，服务人员在发展中亚洲国家占就业总人数的比例超过三分之一。


If these countries follow the same path traveled by the advanced economies, agriculture’s dominance will give way to industry, which in turn will be supplanted by services, further broadening their role.	如果这些国家重走发达经济体的发展之路，工业将逐步取代农业的主导地位，而工业的主导地位最终又会被范围进一步拓宽的服务业所取代。


There is certainly room to grow: the share of industry in developing Asia’s output surpassed the OECD average in 2010 (41% vs. 24%), but the share of services still lags by a wide margin (48% vs. 75%).	这其中当然不乏发展空间：亚洲发展中国家的工业出产份额2010年超过了经合组织的平均水平（41%比24%），但服务业份额却依然大幅落后（48%比75%）。


Making Asia’s service sector more dynamic is essential to future growth.	让亚洲服务业更有活力是未来经济发展的关键。


But the sector is still dominated by traditional services, such as restaurants, taxis, and barbers.	但传统服务业仍然占据着行业主导，比方说餐厅、出租车和理发店。


Modern services – such as Internet connectivity technology, or financial, legal, and other professional business services – account for less than 10% of Asia’s service economy, well below the 20-25% in advanced economies.	包括互联网接入技术、或金融、法律和其他专业商务服务在内的现代服务业在亚洲服务经济中占比不到10%，这一比例远低于发达经济体20%至25%的份额。


While traditional service industries are able to provide jobs, they do not generate much income.	虽然传统服务业能提供就业机会，但却带不来更多收入。


Labor productivity is also quite low: For most economies in the region, service-sector productivity is less than 20% of the OECD average.	劳动生产率也偏低：就该地区大多数经济体而言，服务业的劳动生产率还不及经合组织平均水平的20%。


Even in South Korea, labor productivity in industry is 118% of the OECD figure, but only 43% of the average for services.	就连工业劳动生产率达到经合组织平均水平118%的韩国，其服务业的劳动生产率却只有经合组织平均水平的43%。


A vibrant service sector could have broad economic benefits.	充满活力的服务业可以带来广泛的经济效益。


Synergies between services and industry could improve overall productivity.	服务业和工业的协同效应可以实现整体生产力的提升。


For example, industrial design, marketing, and legal services could facilitate investment and development of new manufactured products.	比方说，工业设计、市场营销和法律服务可以促进投资和开发新的制成品。


The service sector also tends to be more effective in job creation, particularly for women, thus supporting inclusive growth.	服务业往往能更有效地创造就业机会，其中女性尤其会成为受益者，进而实现包容性增长的效果。


Developing the service sector could also diversify the production base, thereby enhancing economic resilience and boosting growth momentum.	发展服务业可以多元化产业基础，从而提高经济抵抗力并强化经济增长动能。


Modern services are becoming increasingly tradable, providing new export opportunities.	现代服务业的流通性越来越强，提供了全新的出口机遇。


India and the Philippines, for example, have established themselves as world leaders in the export of outsourced business processes.	如印度和菲律宾就已确立了在世界业务流程外包出口领域的领先地位。


Skills gaps and a lack of infrastructure are frequently cited as factors that hinder service-sector dynamism in Asia.	技能差距和基础设施匮乏往往被视为限制亚洲服务业活力的要素。


But burdensome regulations are the biggest barrier.	但其实繁琐的法规才是最大的障碍。


Excessive regulation that protects incumbent firms and other vested interests undermines market competitiveness and limits prospects for improved productivity and efficiency.	保护现有企业和其他既得利益者的过度规管有损市场竞争力并限制了生产率及效率的提高。


For example, legal markets are dominated by rich lawyers, schools are controlled by teachers’ unions, and the medical sector is influenced by powerful doctors, resulting in high business costs that also hamper industrial development.	比方说富有的律师成为法律市场的主导，教师工会控制学校，强势医生影响整个医学界，由此导致的企业成本高企也对工业发展起到了阻碍作用。


Many service firms in Asia are owned by the public sector, so governments have less incentive to deregulate services.	亚洲众多服务企业的所有权归属于公共部门，因此政府并不鼓励放开服务。


But the same authorities have already opened their economies’ manufacturing and agriculture sectors for the common good, even at the expense of minority groups like farmers and factory workers.	但同样这些政府已经为公共利益放开了经济的制造业及农��领域，甚至不惜以牺牲工人和农民等少数群体的利益为代价。


Why, then, are they maintaining policies that protect the special-interest groups that dominate the service sector?	既然如此，他们为什么还要继续执行保护主宰服务业的特殊利益团体的政策？


Many argue that regulations protect small domestic firms against undue competition from large foreign firms.	很多人认为管制可以保护国内小企业免受国外大公司不正当竞争的困扰。


But the truth is that regulations are stifling even for domestic competition.	但其实即使国内竞争也正在受到管制的扼杀。


In India, for example, there is fear that small mom-and-pop retailers will be crushed when Wal-Mart enters the market in the next few months.	比方说在印度，有人担心几个月后沃尔玛进入市场时家庭零售业将会被彻底击垮。


But policymakers must recognize that there are ways to protect small retailers without stifling competition.	但决策者必须认识到有不用扼杀竞争就能保护小型零售业的方法。


The government can, say, impose zoning regulations, help small retailers find specialized niches in the market, or provide skills training to displaced workers.	比方说政府可以制定分区政策帮助小型零售业发现专门的利基市场，也可以为转岗人员开设技能培训课。


The survival of artisanal retailers should not be used as an excuse to introduce or uphold business regulations that ultimately protect the incumbent rich.	个体零售企业的生存不应被用作制定或坚持商业法规，最终保护现有富裕阶层的借口。


Asian policymakers must remember how they successfully developed their manufacturing sector – through competition.	亚洲决策者们必需牢记他们是通过竞争成功发展了制造业。


The same logic should be applied to services.	服务业也应该适用相同的逻辑。


Upgrading the service sector is low-hanging fruit for Asia, because tremendous investments are not required.	服务业升级对亚洲而言是触手可及的果实，因为不需要巨额投资就可以达到这样的效果。


And yet service-sector reform remains just out of reach for the region, owing to the absence of the political will needed to dismantle the vested interests that keep it there.	但由于缺乏破除既得利益所必需的政治意愿，服务业改革对亚洲地区而言仍然是遥不可及的。


Asia’s Take on Austerity	亚洲的紧缩教训


NEW HAVEN – The austerity debate was the topic du jour at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos. With good reason.	发自纽黑文——对紧缩政策的讨论已成为本年度达沃斯世界经济论坛的热门话题。


Europe is slipping back into recession just when recovery in the United States is finally getting some traction.  That has undermined the case for fiscal consolidation, which is so heavily favored in Europe.	其中缘由不言自明：这边美国的复苏才刚有一点苗头，那边欧洲又开始重新滑向衰退。 这种局面对于整个财政巩固进程来说堪称一大祸害——而该进程又是欧洲最为钟爱的。


Yet I took away a different conclusion from Davos.	但笔者却得出了一个与达沃斯不同的结论。


I moderated a session on “The New Context in East Asia,” addressed by a panel of senior representatives from Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan. With the exception of the Japanese participant, all had first-hand experience with the devastating Asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s.	在本次论坛中本人负责主持一个名为“东亚新语境”的议程，期间来自泰国、韩国、马来西亚，新加坡和日本的高级代表都发表了演讲——除了日本代表外的所有人都拥有应对1990年代末期灾难性亚洲金融危机的第一手经验。


I couldn't resist the temptation to draw Asia into the debate between Europe and the US.	作为主持人，笔者忍不住也把他们拉进了上面那场美欧之间的辩论。


Rather than ask the Asian panelists to theorize about the impact of austerity in the overly indebted developed West, I asked them to assess their own experiences during and after the crisis of the late 1990’s.	但我并没有让与会者们去推导紧缩政策将对这些过度负债的西方发达国家造成何种影响，而是询问他们在1990年代末经济危机期间和之后的经历。


Frankly, I was surprised by what I heard.	坦白地说，我对我所听到的一切感到吃惊。


The panelists agreed on two points: first, they initially detested the wrenching adjustment programs dictated by the terms of the International Monetary Fund’s so-called conditional bailouts (the South Koreans still refer scornfully to the “IMF crisis” of the late 1990’s).	与会者都同意以下两点：首先，他们一开始都对国际货币基金组织（IMF）所谓的有条件援助条款感到厌恶，韩国人至今依然充满鄙视地将这一痛苦的调整政策称之为“IMF式危机”。


Second – and here’s where the surprise came – they all agreed that, with the benefit of hindsight, these excruciating adjustments were worth it, because their crisis-torn economies were forced to embrace structural reforms that paved the way for their spectacular economic performance today.	其次——也是令人惊讶的地方——就是他们都同意执行这一政策，而且从事后看来，这些极为痛苦的调整也是值得的，因为深受危机重创的各国经济都被迫实施结构性改革，并为当今亚洲的突出经济表现铺平了道路。


On the surface, the numbers speak for themselves.	从表面上看，数字已经说明了一切。


In 1998, during the depths of the Asian crisis, aggregate output in the so-called ASEAN-5 – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam – plunged by 8.3%.	在1998年亚洲金融危机最为水深火热的时候，所谓东盟五国（印尼、马来西亚、菲律宾，泰国和越南）的总产值下跌了8. 3%。


Real GDP in South Korea – long considered the darling of Asia’s newly industrialized economies – contracted by 5.7% that year.	而在一直被视为亚洲新工业化国家龙头的韩国，当年实质GDP萎缩了5. 7%。


But then the tough conditionality of IMF bailouts and adjustment programs – Asia’s own dose of austerity – kicked in.	也就是在那时，世界货币基金组织那些条件严苛的援助和调整项目——亚洲自己的紧缩政策——开始启动了。


In response, current-account balances – the Achilles’ heel of the so-called East Asian growth miracle – went from deficit to surplus.	而在这些项目实施之后，各国的经常账户收支——所谓东亚增长奇迹的阿喀琉斯之踵——随之从逆差转为顺差。


For the ASEAN-5, current-account deficits averaging 4% of GDP in 1996-97 swung dramatically into average surpluses of 6.8% of GDP in 1998-99.	在东盟五国方面，1996~1997年度平均相当于GDP4%的经常账户逆差戏剧性地逆转为1998~1999年度的6. 8%顺差。


A similar transformation occurred in South Korea, where a 2.8% current-account deficit in 1996-1997 became an 8.6% surplus in 1998-1999.	而韩国也实现了类似的转变，从1996~1997年度相当于GDP的2. 8%经常账户逆差变成1998~1999年度的8.


Since then, the region has never looked back.	从那以后，各国就走上了一条康庄大道。


Within two years, most of Asia’s crisis-ridden economies had regained their pre-crisis peaks. Nor was this a temporary rebound.	在两年之内，亚洲大多数受灾经济体都重新恢复到了危机前水平，而且都不是临时性的回光返照。


Beginning in 1999, the ASEAN-5 began a ten-year spurt of 5% average annual GDP growth (5.5% in South Korea over the same period).	自1999年始，东盟五国经历了GDP年平均增长率达5%的十年（韩国则达到了5. 5%）。


In short, there were no lasting negative effects from the short-term dose of austerity, and, to the extent that austerity was essential to post-crisis healing, the long-term benefits have proven to be both enduring and astounding.	简而言之，这种短期的紧缩行为并不会导致长期性的负面效应，而且紧缩在某种程度上是灾后复原所必不可少的，事实证明，其带来的长期好处不仅持久，而且令人震惊。


Three lessons for the rest of us come to mind. First, there is no gain without pain.	这让我们这些亚洲之外的人领悟到了三个教训：首先，有付出才有收获。


Few of us in the developed world can fathom aggregate-output contractions on the scale that crisis-torn Asia suffered in 1998, let alone muster the political will to impose them on our economies.	只有很少发达国家的人能体会到1998年受灾亚洲国家所经历的那种严峻的总产值收缩状况，更别说拿出将紧缩加诸于本国经济之上的勇气了。


The economic dislocations and the humiliation of proud nations were, indeed, devastating (as Greeks today can attest).	事实上，那种经济紊乱以及对一个原本自信的国家的侮辱都是灾难性的（当今的希腊可以证实这一点）。


But, once the excesses were purged, Asia’s post-crisis rebounds were both strong and sustainable.	然而一旦那些泡沫被挤走，亚洲的后危机复苏也是强劲且可持续的。


Second, currencies played an important role as an escape valve in the early days of Asia’s post-crisis adjustment process.	其二，在亚洲后危机调整过程的初期阶段，货币将扮演一个泄压阀门的重要角色。


As the region moved from hard exchange-rate pegs to floating rates, Asian currencies plunged – with drops against the dollar ranging from 28% in South Korea and roughly 37% in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines to almost 80% in Indonesia.	随着各国从固定汇率转向浮动汇率，亚洲货币汇率急跌——韩元对美元下跌28%，泰铢，马来西亚林吉特和菲律宾比索下跌约37%，印尼盾下跌近80%。


Finally, there is no substitute for restructuring.	最后，除了结构重整之外无路可走。


In Asia in the late 1990’s, measures aimed at the financial sector dominated IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs, but there were also programs that focused on tax and expenditure reforms, corporate governance, privatization, and business-debt restructuring.	在1990年代末的亚洲，虽然国际货币基金组织施加的结构调整项目主导了整个金融部门，但同时还有一些着眼于税制和支出改革的项目。


While not all of these programs were implemented in strict compliance with IMF conditionality, they played a key role in promoting significant improvements in Asian competiveness.	即便这些项目并不全都遵照IMF的严格条款执行，却也在大幅增强亚洲竞争力方面扮演了关键角色。


None of these lessons should be lost on either Europe or the US.	美欧两方都不应该忽视上述任何一个教训。


While individual countries obviously lack currency flexibility in a monetary union – one of Europe’s most obvious and important differences from Asia in the late 1990’s – there is nothing to prevent a depreciation of the euro from boosting pan-regional competitiveness.	虽然在一个货币联盟中单一国家很显然缺乏货币方面的灵活性——而这也是欧洲与1990年代末的亚洲最明显而重要的区别——但为了刺激整个区域的竞争力也不应阻止欧元贬值。


The same, of course, is true of the US dollar.	而这一点当然也适用于美元。


But no country – or group of countries, in Europe’s case – has ever devalued its way back to prosperity.	但没有国家——或者欧洲这样的国家集团——能通过贬值的方式来重获繁荣。


So Asia’s structural lessons are equally important to the developed world.	因此亚洲的结构型教训对发达国家也是同样有益的。


Indeed, Germany’s economy is out-competing and out-growing the rest of Europe, largely owing to labor-market reforms and deregulation.	事实上，德国的经济之所以能比欧洲其他国家拥有更强大的竞争力和增长率，在很大程度上都是得益于劳动力市场改革和放松管制。


The same medicine might prove equally beneficial to the rest of Europe – to say nothing of the US, which faces a major competitiveness challenge of its own.	同样一剂药方或许也能在欧洲其他国家身上生效——更别提正面临着严重竞争力危机的美国了。


In the end, Asia’s developing economies had no choice but to accept draconian measures as the price of bailouts in the late 1990’s.	最后，亚洲的发展中经济体在1990年代末其实已经走投无路，只能接受异常严苛的IMF策略来作为接受援助的代价。


It remains to be seen if rich developed countries are willing to take the same route.	因此富裕发展中国家是否能采取同一条路径还有待观察。


Two decades ago, in their book Changing Fortunes, Paul Volcker and Toyo Gyohten underscored the glaring double standard of crisis resolution: “When the [International Monetary] Fund consults with a poor and weak country, the country gets in line.	20年前，在保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）和行天丰雄（Toyo Gyohten）合著的《时运变迁：国际货币及对美国领导地位的挑战》一书中就特别指出了在危机处理方案上那种显而易见的双重标准：“在为弱小的贫穷国家提供咨询时，那些小国只能俯首听命；


When it consults with a strong country, the Fund gets in line.”	当面对强国时，世界货币基金组织一转身又变成了仆人。 ”


Perhaps that is the key lesson from the Asian crisis of the late 1990’s: austerity can work.  But its success or failure ultimately boils down to power politics – namely, a resolution of the tension between short-term palliatives and the commitment to a long-term strategy.  That’s where the battle still rages in the West. 	或许1990年代末亚洲危机给我们最关键的教训是：紧缩政策是有效的，但成败最终将取决于权力政治——也就是说，一个介乎于短期权宜之计和长期战略之间的解决方案。 而这也是西方依然在纠结的地方。


The Road to Asian Unity	通往亚洲统一之路


NEW DELHI – Asia’s lack of institutions to ameliorate regional tensions is often lamented.	新德里—亚洲缺少减轻地区紧张局势的制度令人扼腕。


But greater Asian unity may be arising by the backdoor, in the form of new and impressive infrastructure links.	但亚洲的进一步统一势头正在悄然出现，其形式便是气象一新的基础设施连接。


Today’s efforts to expand regional infrastructure projects are all the more remarkable for linking even countries locked in diplomatic, and sometimes open, conflict.	如今，扩大地区基础设施项目的努力最令人注目的一点是把受困于外交冲突、甚至有时候是公开冲突的国家也包括进来了。


New bus routes between India and Pakistan may not make headlines, but they deliver a degree of normalcy to relations riddled with mistrust.	印度和巴基斯坦的新巴士路线或许登不上报纸头条，但它们预示着互不信任的两国有了些许关系正常化的苗头。


Elsewhere, rail links between China and Vietnam, road developments connecting India and Bangladesh, and new ports, harbors, and pipelines in Myanmar and Pakistan are forging a new form of economic unity alongside the region’s manufacturing supply chains.	在其他国家，中国和越南之间的铁路线、印度和孟加拉国之间的公路、以及缅甸和巴基斯坦的新机场、港口和管道正在铸就沿地区制造业供应链发展的新形式的经济统一。


Such ventures now dot Asia’s geography, even as tensions over unsettled boundaries and sovereignty claims are fueling turbulence.	目前，亚洲版图上处处都是类似的工程，尽管边境纠纷和主权主张在助长动荡。


Consider Afghanistan, which faces yet another phase of internal dislocation.	就拿阿富汗来说吧。 该国面临着新一轮内乱。


There, India nonetheless continues to build a strategic ring road around the country, as well as a vitally important dam at Salma.	尽管如此，印度仍在继续建设具战略意义的环阿富汗公路以及重要性不相上下的位于萨尔玛（Salma）的大坝。


And a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, which would traverse the country, is coming closer to reality.	横穿土库曼斯坦至巴基斯坦的输气管道也在走向现实。


Then there is the Bay of Bengal, where Chinese infrastructure investment is set to transform the backward Myanmar seaside town of Kyaukpyu and the surrounding region by tapping offshore gas fields and constructing a pipeline to Yunnan Province in southern China.	还有孟加拉湾，中国基础设施投资将在缅甸海滨小城皎漂（Kyaukpyu）建立离岸油田，并建设通往云南省的输油管道，从而改变皎漂及其周边地区的落后面貌。


These initiatives reflect not only China’s voracious drive for natural resources and new trade routes, but also Myanmar’s own plans to create a “mini-Singapore” within its borders.	这些工程不但反映了中国对自然资源和新贸易路线的无尽胃口，也是缅甸自身建设国内“小新加坡”的计划。


Of course, China is not investing in such infrastructure out of altruism.	当然，中国投资这些基础设施不可能出于利他主义。


Almost a decade ago, outgoing Chinese President Hu Jintao identified the country’s “Malacca Dilemma,” referring to the channel between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra that connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as a grave strategic threat.	即将卸任的中国国家主席胡锦涛在近十年前提出中国处于“马六甲困境”，这个位于马来半岛和印度尼西亚苏门答腊岛之间的海峡连接着印度洋和太平洋，是一个重大战略威胁。


Roughly 80% of China’s energy imports pass through that potential chokepoint, which is mostly policed by the US Navy.	大约80%的中国能源进口通过这一几乎完全听命于美国海军的潜在阻塞点进入中国。


The links now being developed in Myanmar will reduce China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca by more than one-third.	现在正在开发的缅甸油矿将让中国对马六甲海峡的依赖程度降低三分之一。


The plans are illustrative of Myanmar’s pragmatic new outlook.	而缅甸的计划则凸显出其现实主义新观念。


Sandwiched between China and India, Myanmar, which had earlier suspended construction of the Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam, may one day be the link that facilitates closer economic ties between the two giants.	早些时候，夹在中印之间的缅甸叫停了中国支持的密松大坝的建设，但它有朝一日极有可能成为促进两个大国经济联系的节点。


Japan, not wishing to be left out of the great infrastructure game in Myanmar, is investing billions in port reconstruction.	日本也不甘心在缅甸基础设施竞赛中落于人后，正在投资数十亿用于机场建设。


To the west, in Pakistan, one can travel on the Makran coast along a road built with Chinese assistance, eventually coming to the ancient fishing port of Gwadar, with its natural deep-water harbor.	在西线的巴基斯坦，你可以沿着中国援建的公路莫克兰（Makran）海岸直达古老渔港瓜达尔（Gwadar），如今这里已是深水良港。


With a development plan by the Port of Singapore Authority having fallen through, the China Overseas Ports Holding Company has taken over, raising strategic concerns in India, Japan, and the US.	新加坡港务局对瓜达尔港的开发计划失败，中国海外港口控股公司接手，这引起了印度、日本和美国的战略担忧。


Indeed, despite intense opposition from the US, China’s project in Gwadar may soon be followed by a joint project with Iran to lay a pipeline carrying 750 million cubic feet of natural gas per day.	事实上，尽管美国强烈反对，在瓜达尔工程后，中国可能很快和伊朗合作实施一项日送气量7. 5亿立方英尺的管道铺设工程。


China is also actively pursuing the construction of a Pan-Asia Railroad, which, when complete, will form an enormous circular route.	中国还在积极寻求建设泛亚铁路，一旦完工，将构成一个巨大的环形铁路圈。


Starting in Kunming in Yunnan Province, it will extend through Myanmar and south to Bangkok, where a spur will traverse Malaysia to Singapore.	这条铁路以昆明为起点，穿过缅甸向南直达曼谷，并在曼谷越海经马来西亚到达新加坡。


From Bangkok, the line will run east through Cambodia and north through Vietnam to Hanoi, then through Laos and back to Kunming.	从曼谷看是，这条铁路又将向东经过柬埔寨、向北经过越南到达河内，然后再穿越老挝回到昆明。


This sounds like an enormous undertaking, and it is; but, with some rail lines already existing (some for many decades), the project could be completed by the 2015 target date.	听起来这是项伟大工程，事实也是如此； 但是，不少铁路线已经存在（其中一些已有几十年历史），因此这项工程的目标完工日在2015年。


The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ long-held dream of unity might first arrive by rail.	东盟长期以来的统一梦想可能先在铁路事业上完成。


Meanwhile, India has already opened up road communications linking the East Indian state of Manipur to North Myanmar, with India’s Border Roads Organization completing the first all-weather road connecting the two countries.	与此同时，印度也已开始连接东印度曼尼普尔邦至缅甸北部的公路建设，印度边境公路组织（Border Roads Organization）正在完成这条连接两国的第一条全天候公路。


And, in Central Asia, India has projects at Ayni Air Base near Dushanbe in Tajikistan, including a functioning field hospital (where the late Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet war, died following an assassination attempt on September 9, 2001).	而在中亚，印度在塔吉克斯坦杜尚别附近建设了雅尼（Ayni）空军基地，包括一个经营中的野战医院（2001年9月9日，遇刺的阿富汗反苏战争领导人马苏德就逝世于这家医院）。


These infrastructure investments clearly hold the potential to bind Asia closer together than ever before.	这些基础设施投资显然具有让亚洲走向前所未有的团结的潜力。


But there are geopolitical risks in this scramble for development.	但这场开发争夺战也蕴含着地缘政治风险。


Predictably, the West is ramping up its aid, particularly in Myanmar, where the streets of Yangon are now choked with traffic created by aid and government development agencies (and investors).	不难看出，西方正在加大援助，特别是对缅甸，仰光街头充斥着援助和政府发展机构（和投资者）的车流。


Of course, tension is probably unavoidable as these links develop.	当然，随着这些联系的发展，冲突或许也是不可避免的。


Tellingly, Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has spoken of her country in terms of the “vicinity of China, the geographical distance of the US, and the cultural linkages with India.”	缅甸亲民主领袖昂山素季在描述其祖国使，提到了“中国的近邻，美国的地理距离和印度的文化联系。


The question is whether Asia’s infrastructure investments, particularly those by China, will be used to create Asian satellites of the Middle Kingdom, or become tools to be used among equals.	”问题在于亚洲基础设施投资，特别是来自中国的投资，是会用于建设中央王国的亚洲卫星，还是成为大家平等使用的工具。


Asia can use its geography either to keep its states isolated, or to trade with one another and develop to the benefit of all.	亚洲可以利用其地理条件保持各国各自为政的状态，也可以互相交易，开发共同利益。


After centuries of isolation and colonial slumber, the region is now awake to the potential benefits of greater unity.	在孤立和殖民地时期后，亚洲地区正在意识到更加统一的潜在好处。


It will not matter that the infrastructure may not have been built solely for that purpose if Asia’s leaders keep their eyes on prosperity, rather than only on power.	基础设施建设可能还有别的目的，但这并没有关系，只要亚洲领导人着眼于繁荣而非只关注实力。


Breaking Asia’s Data Drought	打破亚洲数据荒


MANILA – Many parts of Asia have been gripped by searing temperatures and the worst drought in decades.	马尼拉—亚洲大部受温度急剧升高和几十年来最严重的旱灾的困扰。


Millions of people face shortages of food or water, leading to the loss of lives, livelihoods, crops, and livestock.	数百万人面临食物和水短缺，导致生命、生计、庄稼和牲口损失。


As water shortages depress productivity, reduce energy output at hydro plants, and cut food exports, economies are suffering.	水短缺拖累了生产率，降低了水电能源产出，减少了粮食出口，导致经济蒙受损失。


To find relief, we must look to the skies – but not in the way one might expect.	要想摆脱这一困境，我们必须将目光投向天空——但也许不是你预想中的方式。


While rainfall would obviously be welcome, there is a tool for coping with extreme weather over which we actually have some control: satellites.	降雨当然是令人欢迎的，但有一种应对极端天气的工具我们其实已经能够有所控制：卫星。


The extreme weather confronting Asia is not expected to abate anytime soon.	亚洲所面临的极端天气预计不会很快消失。


The current drought can be blamed partly on an unusually strong El Niño that has been warming the Pacific Ocean since mid-2015.	当前的旱灾部分可归因于异常强大的厄尔尼诺，拜其所赐，2015年年中以来太平洋海水一直在升温。


More and stronger El Niños are expected this century, reflecting the impact of climate change.	本世纪预计还将出现更多更强的厄尔尼诺，反映出气候变化的冲击。


This will aggravate Asia’s already serious water problem, which is becoming particularly serious in cities, owing to rapid urbanization.	这将加剧亚洲已然十分严重的水问题，拜快速城市化所赐，这一问题在城市尤其严重。


The region’s urban population is set to double, to 3.2 billion people, by 2050, by which time nearly three-quarters of its total population could face water stress.	预计到2050年亚洲地区城市人口将翻一番，达到32亿，届时近四分之三的总人口都将面临水压力。


Controlling these forces may seem impossible.	控制这些因素看似不可能。


But preventing further water shortages is not.	但防止进一步水短缺并非如此。


What is needed now is bold action to improve our understanding of the nature and scale of Asia’s water crisis, thereby strengthening our capacity to respond to it.	现在我们需要果断行动起来，改善对大自然和亚洲水危机规模的理解，从而强化应对能力。


A lack of data about, say, riparian flows, including how much water is diverted for agriculture and human consumption, undermines efficient resource management.	缺少（比如）沿岸流的数据，包括多少水被分流用于农业和人类消费，阻碍着有效的资源管理。


Likewise, the absence of detailed rainfall records, particularly in remote areas, impedes efforts to assess flood and drought risk.	类似地，缺少详细降雨记录（特别是偏远地区）妨碍了对洪水和干旱风险的评估。


Accurate data are also needed to design the right irrigation systems, dams, and embankments – not to mention building them where they will have the greatest impact in terms of mitigating the effects of climate change.	设计正确的灌溉系统、大坝和堤岸——更不用说在最有利于降低气候变化影响的地方建设这些设施——也需要准确的数据。


Missing data frustrate sound policymaking in myriad ways.	缺少数据以多种方式阻碍着可靠决策。 。


Though agriculture consumes about 80% of freshwater stocks in Asia, most countries cannot correctly measure how much water is used to grow a crop, and how much of that water is re-used downstream.	农业消费了亚洲淡水储量的约80%，但大部分国家不能准确测量有多少水被用于种庄稼，其中又有多少水被下游重复利用。


Greater clarity about how much water enters and leaves catchments, and for what purposes, would enable smarter policies, just as savvy investors rely on good financial accounting.	厘清多少水进入和流出储水地以及用于何种用途能带来更加明智的政策，正如聪明的投资者需要依赖良好的财务会计。


As some water-scarce countries, such as Australia, have already shown, such accounting helps countries to allocate water more efficiently among agriculture and energy producers and urban consumers.	一些水短缺国家，如澳大利亚，已经证明了此类统计有助于各国更有效地在农业和能源生产者以及城市消费者之间配置水资源。


Here is where satellite technology comes in.	卫星技术可以在这方面起作用。


Regular sweeps over cropped areas using remote sensing – something like a full-body health scan – can quickly gather information on rainfall, land temperature, and even groundwater levels that would otherwise take months to obtain.	使用遥感技术定期扫描庄稼地好比是全身体检，能迅速收集关于降雨、土地温度乃至地下水位的信息，而用常规手段收集这些数据需要几个月之久。


When combined with physical measurements on the ground, these data can help governments gain a better accounting of water resources, prepare for droughts and floods, and plan future water use.	配合地面实地测量，这些数据有助于政府获得更好的水资源统计，为干旱和洪水做好准备，并规划未来水用途。


Already, the Water Accounting Plus software system – developed by UNESCO-IHE, the International Water Management Institute, and the Food and Agriculture Organization – uses open-access remote-sensing data to assess land use, rainfall, and temperature.	目前，由联合国教科文组织水教育学院、国际水管理研究所（International Water Management Institute）以及粮农组织开发的Water Accounting Plus软件系统使用开放获取遥感数据评估土地使用、降雨和温度。


The data enable the system to determine how much water is available in a river basin, how much is being used for various purposes, and how water use has changed over time.	该数据让系统能够确定某条河流流域有多少水，有多少正在用于各种目的，以及水用途如何随时间变化。


With such information, countries like Cambodia and Vietnam can confront the surge in water demand they face.	有了这些信息，柬埔寨和越南等国家能够面对水需求急剧增加的情况。


To help propel them toward that goal, UNESCO-IHE, with support from the Asian Development Bank, has been working with their governments – as well as the authorities in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan – to create a pilot program to answer key questions about land and water use.	为了帮助它们实现这一目标，联合国教科文组织水教育学院在亚洲开放银行的支持下，与这些国家的政府——以及印度、印尼、巴基斯坦、斯里兰卡和乌兹别克斯坦当局——合作成立了一个实验性项目解决关于土地和水使用的关键问题。


More such initiatives are needed – and quickly.	我们还需要更多类似的计划——越快越好。


One area of focus must be agriculture.	关注领域之一必须放在农业上。


In Vietnam’s parched central highlands and coastal provinces, for example, there is an urgent need to harvest “more crop per drop” and improve emergency responses.	比如，越南饱受干旱之苦的中部高地和沿海省份急需增加“单位灌溉产量”、改善紧急情况响应。


If satellite technology is fully exploited, farmers could receive real-time information on their mobile phones about how much water to use and when.	如果卫星技术得到充分利用，农民可以通过手机收到关于何时可用多少水的实时信息。


Moreover, the region’s most productive farmers could be identified and encouraged to share their best practices with other farmers.	此外，还可以识别该地区生产率更高的农民，鼓励他们与其他农民分享最佳实践。


Another key step will be to map water stocks and usage across entire countries, and to make this information available online.	另一个关键措施是绘制全国水储存和使用地图，并将信息在线公开。


Rather than allowing vital data to gather dust, as has occurred in the past, we must augment it, update it, and share it widely, so that it can be put to use.	不能如过去那样将关键数据束之高阁，而必须扩大、更新和广泛分享它们，以使它们能够起作用。


Breaking the data drought will not by itself end Asia’s water crisis.	打破数据荒本身不能终结亚洲水危机。


But it is a crucial first step to ensure that the region’s destiny is not dictated by its weather.	但它是确保该地区的命运不被天气束缚的关键的第一步。


A Solution Now for Cyprus	塞浦路斯问题的立刻解决


NEW YORK – For four decades, Ledra Street in the heart of Nicosia had been a symbol of a divided Cyprus. And then, two years ago this April, the wall that split the capital into north and south was opened.	纽约 ——


Last week, I visited the Ledra Street crossing.	四十年来，位于尼科西亚市中心的莱德拉街始终是塞浦路斯分裂的象征；


Officially, I was there to inaugurate a reconstruction plan for buildings that had fallen into disrepair in the old buffer zone.	而在两年前的那个四月，将首都分为南北两部分的高墙终于被打开了缺口。


More personally, I wanted to see for myself the divide that for too long had kept Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots apart.	慢慢地，四十四年来从未交往过的民众，终于能够开始重新塑造联系并再度认识对方。


As I walked the street, people from both communities crowded around and began chanting, “Solution now! Solution now!”	这条街道便是一个窗口，它向人们展示了未来所能带来的变化。


As a Korean, I know only too well the pain of a land divided.	上周，我访问了莱德拉街过境点。


I also know how difficult reconciliation can be.	此行的官方目的是为一项重建计划揭幕，该计划旨在对老缓冲区内那些年久失修的建筑加以重建；


That is why I went to Cyprus – to show my personal support for the efforts to reunify the island, and to push for further progress.	而另一个更为私人的目的则是：我想亲眼见到这道在过去太长时间内、令希腊族塞浦路斯人与土耳其族塞浦路斯人无法往来的阻隔。 当我漫步街头时，来自两方的民众聚拢于此，并开始高喊：“立刻解决！


Cyprus is at a critical juncture.	身为韩国人，我对于分裂的痛苦再清楚不过； 我也明白和解的难度之大。


The Greek Cypriot leader, Demetris Christofias, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, are working hard to reach an agreement. But it will elude them without a further concerted push.	而这也正是我来到塞浦路斯的原因：我要对实现该岛统一的努力表达个人的支持，同时还要推动进一步的进展。


The United Nations is in Cyprus to help however it can. UN Peacekeepers have stood watch for more than 45 years.	塞浦路斯正处在一个关键的节点上。


My envoy, Alexander Downer, is facilitating the negotiations.	希腊族塞浦路斯人领袖季米特里斯


I had lengthy discussions with both leaders – individually and together – and told them that the destiny of Cyprus is entirely in their hands.	联合国正在塞浦路斯提供一切可能的援助。 联合国维和人员执行监督任务已超过四十五年；


I believe that a solution is within reach.	而我的特使亚历山大·唐纳也正在推动谈判。


First, there is a strong, shared commitment between Christofias and Talat. They have met almost 70 times over the past 16 months, including two weeks of intensive talks immediately prior to my visit.	我已与双方领导人进行了长时间的讨论（其中既包括单独讨论，也包括双方都在场的讨论），我向他们说明：塞浦路斯的命运完全掌握在其手中。


Second, negotiators are finding common ground.	首先， 赫里斯托菲亚斯与塔拉特之间存在着强烈的共同责任感。


While I was there, the leaders joined together in highlighting progress that they have already made on crucial issues such as governance and power-sharing.	双方在过去十六个月时间内有过近七十次会面； 其中，就在我此次访问之前，双方还进行了为期两周的密集谈判。


Third, both sides are staying at the table.	其次，谈判者们正在寻找共同立场。


As the leaders have said, “Time is not on the side of settlement.” That is why they have committed to continue their talks, rather than pause ahead of the upcoming elections in the north in April.	我在塞浦路斯期间，双方领导人共同强调了他们在诸如治理与权力分享等关键议题上所取得的进展。


Finally, Greece and Turkey – the two key regional actors – support the current talks and are willing to be helpful in finding a solution.	正如这些领导人所言：“解决问题，时不我待。 ”因此，他们已做出承诺：将不会在四月份塞浦路斯北部举行选举之前暂停谈判，谈判将继续进行。


No one is under the illusion that any of this is easy – peace negotiations never are. The issues are exceedingly complex and embedded in a troubled history.	最后，希腊与土耳其这两个关键的区域行为体对目前的谈判给予了支持，并愿意为寻找解决方案提供一臂之力。


There will be skeptics and critics every step, and there will be those who seek to divert or derail the process in pursuit of their own interests and agendas.	趁势而行至关重要。 我们不会幻想这是一个轻而易举的过程


Courage and conviction will be required of leaders to do what they know to be right.	领导人在追寻心中的正义之道时，勇气与信念必不可少。


Any agreement will face a popular referendum within both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.	他们所达成的任何一项协定，都将接受希、土两族塞浦路斯社群的公投考验。


Yet it is clear that a solution to the Cyprus problem would be overwhelmingly in the interests of the island’s people, North and South.	不过显而易见的是，塞浦路斯问题的解决将极大地符合该岛民众的利益，南北双方都不例外。


A settlement would also send a message to the world that disputes as long-standing and complex as that in Cyprus can be resolved peacefully. That is why, despite all the obstacles, the negotiators must persevere along the road to peace.	问题的解决也将向全世界发出一种信号：就连塞浦路斯这般漫长而复杂的纷争，都可以通过和平方式得到解决。 因此，尽管障碍重重，但谈判者们仍必须在通向和平的道路上坚持前进。


The people’s call on Ledra Street must be heard.	民众在莱德拉街所发出的呼声，绝不能被人忽略。


For Cyprus, it is time for a “solution now.”	对于塞浦路斯而言，目前正是一个“立刻解决”的时机。


A South Asian Grand Bargain	南亚的宏伟协议


NEW DELHI – South Asia is riddled with multiple antagonisms and mutual suspicions.	新德里—南亚充斥着多边对抗和相互怀疑。


India mistrusts Pakistan, and vice versa.	印度不相信巴基斯坦，反之亦然。


Afghanistan and Pakistan are at loggerheads.	阿富汗和巴基斯坦处于对立之中。


On the sidelines, China, Iran, and Russia look to Afghanistan for opportunities to help themselves, and crimp the United States.	在其他阵线上，中国、伊朗和俄罗斯无不出于自身利益和牵制美国的考虑对阿富汗虎视眈眈。


The Americans, meanwhile, are preparing to retreat from a decade of war in the Afghan hills and valleys.	与此同时，美国人正准备从打了十年仗的阿富汗山区和村庄中撤走。


Given all of these rivalries, I believe that the only path to regional peace and stability runs not through incremental agreements, but through a “grand accord” that reconciles all of the powers’ deepest national-security interests.	在这些敌对状况中，我认为唯一的地区和平和稳定之道并非日渐膨胀的协定，而是一份协调所有势力最高国家安全利益的“宏伟协议”。


But is such an accord feasible?	但这样的协议可行吗？


On the surface, one would not think so.	从表面上看不可行。


US-Pakistan relations have turned poisonous, with blunt statements proliferating from both governments.	美国-巴基斯坦关系已经转恶，两国政府已开始相互攻讦。


In Istanbul, a recent gathering of Afghanistan’s concerned “neighbors” produced only a rather anodyne statement in preparation for a meeting in Bonn later this year.	最近，在伊斯坦布尔，阿富汗的忧心忡忡的“邻居”们聚集在一起，最后只发布了一个不痛不痒的声明，为今年晚些时候的波恩会议做准备。


When confronted by such a diplomatic snarl, there are, in reality, only two options: either allow the disputes to boil in their own cauldrons, or lower the temperature on all of the region’s antagonisms before a cataclysmic explosion occurs.	在如此外交乱象下，只有两个现实选择：要么任争端在各自领域闹到不可开交，要么在矛盾集中爆发前给该地区的冲突降温。


Clearly, today’s frozen regional diplomacy must end; far too much of global importance is at stake.	显然，眼下的外交冷漠现状必须结束； 要不然将给全球带来不可承受之重。


India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US form a rectangle of relationships in South Asia, with India, China, and the US constituting a triangle that not only contains the South Asia region, but is also a major theater in an increasingly global struggle.	印度、巴基斯坦、阿富汗和美国组成了一个南亚关系矩形，而印度、中国和美国则组成了一个不仅包括南亚，同时也是全球斗争中心舞台的三角。


The emerging geopolitical centrality of the Indian Ocean, through which an ever-increasing share of world trade passes, is a third, complicating, factor.	印度洋所浮现出的地缘政治向心力——以其不断增长的世界贸易吞吐份额为表征——是第三大复杂因素。


Untangling this web, and imparting to it a cooperative order, should be high on the agenda of all countries involved.	解构这一网络并给施以合作秩序应当成为所有国家的日程重点。


Consider India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US.	以印度、巴基斯坦阿富汗和美国为例。


Can these relationships be transformed into anything resembling a cooperative effort?	这些关系可以转换为类似合作的关系吗？


To be sure, US-Pakistani relations now appear at an all-time low.	实事求是地说，美国-巴基斯坦关系正处于历史最低点。


Bitter congressional testimony by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen about Pakistani perfidy in supporting terrorism deepened suspicion on both sides, which a high-profile visit to Islamabad by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did little to ameliorate.	前参议长联席会议主席马伦（Mike Mullen）海军上将在国会听证会上猛烈抨击巴基斯坦背信弃义，支持恐怖主义，他的证词加深了双方的猜疑，即便是国务卿希拉里·克林顿对伊斯兰堡的高规格造访也没能让关系有所改善。


On the contrary, Clinton reiterated an earlier warning to Pakistan against keeping “snakes in the backyard.”	另一方面，希拉里重申了早先的警告：巴基斯坦不要“蹚浑水”。


Not surprisingly, Pakistan has reacted angrily to such statements; they are also alarmed.	毫不奇怪，巴基斯坦对这样的言论怒不可遏；


General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s army chief, cautioned the US against intervening in the terrorist bastion of North Waziristan.	巴基斯坦人收到了警示。 巴基斯坦军队总司令卡亚尼提醒美国不要干预北瓦济里斯坦的反恐事务。


“The US must think 10 times” before doing so, he said.	“美国最好三思而后行”，他说。


General Hamid Gul, a former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, went further, warning the US of the “dangers of a third world war.”	前巴基斯坦情报机构首脑古尔（Hamid Gul）更加犀利，警告美国“有挑起第三次世界大战的危险”。


In the midst of this turmoil came the assassination of the Afghan government’s chief peace negotiator with the Taliban, former President Burhanuddin Rabbani.	乱上加乱的是阿富汗政府与塔利班的首席和平谈判员、前总统拉巴尼的遇刺。


Soon after, an outraged President Hamid Karzai signed a “strategic partnership” agreement with India (though he added, as a placatory afterthought, that “Pakistan is our twin brother”).	拉巴尼遇刺后不久，愤怒的总统卡尔扎伊与印度签署了“战略合作伙伴”协议（不过事后他又安慰性地说，“巴基斯坦是我们的同胞手足”）。


Long wars can end in one of three ways: unconditional surrender and an imposed peace; a conditional settlement, such as in Korea or Vietnam; or a diplomatic solution that reconciles all of the concerned parties’ interests.	长期战争可以通过三种方式结束：无条件投降和强迫和平； 有条件和解（如朝鲜战争和越南战争）；


If South Asia is to begin to build a future of peace and prosperity, the latter option is the only viable way forward.	以及协调各方利益的外交手段。 如果南亚想踏上未来的和平和繁荣之路，最后一种方式是唯一可行的办法。


Despite the blunt rhetoric and cold stares between the US and Pakistan, a parting of ways between the two is simply not feasible.	尽管美国和巴基斯坦之间冷眼相对、恶语相向，但分道扬镳对双方来说都是不可能的。


America is leaving Afghanistan, but without victory.	美国正在撤出阿富汗，但并不是胜利班师。


So reaching some agreement with Pakistan, one that both India and Afghanistan can live with, is essential.	因此与巴基斯坦这个与印度和阿富汗都能和平共存的国家达成一致是必须完成的任务。


Both India and the US have a direct – albeit different – interest in restoring peace and order to the South Asian neighborhood.	重塑南亚邻国间的和平和秩序，这符合印度和美国的直接利益（尽管有所不同）。


As Robert Kaplan argues: “stabilizing Afghanistan is about much more than just the anti-terrorist war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban; it is about securing the future prosperity of the whole [region], as well as easing India and Pakistan toward peaceful coexistence through the sharing of energy routes.”	正如罗伯特·卡普兰（Robert Kaplan）所指出的：“稳定阿富汗局势比针对基地组织和塔利班的反恐战争更重要； 这事关确保整个（地区的）未来繁荣，还能缓和印巴关系，促使它们通过共享能源管道实现和平共存。


A comprehensive regional settlement, however, requires dealing with a wider circle of interests.	不过，完整的地区和解方案需要处理好更广的利益圈。


Sino-Indian relations, in particular, can no longer be allowed to drift toward strategic antagonism.	特别是中印关系不能朝战略对峙越走越远。


Yet that is where the bilateral relationship is headed, given China’s efforts to secure maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean.	但这正是两国关系的变化方向，因为中国正在寻求保证其在印度洋的海上霸权。


China may reason that its naval build-up in the Indian Ocean is only about protecting sea lanes vital to shipping the resources that its economy needs.	中国可能会指出，其印度洋海军建设只是为了确保输送中国经济所需资源的海运线的安全。


But others, like India, are bound to see something more sinister afoot, an effort at encirclement.	但印度等国难免会认为中国怀有其他不可告人的目的，真正意图是包围印度。


After all, military power is about its potential use, not the rationalizations for its existence.	毕竟部署军力是为了潜在的使用，而不是为了证明其存在的合理性。


With their burgeoning bilateral trade and shared commitment to eradicating poverty, both India and China have common cause to cooperate in creating a mutually acceptable geopolitical map of South Asia and the Indian Ocean.	随着双边贸易的发展和消除贫困的共同承诺，印度河中国可以找到共同目标，合作创造双方都能接受的南亚和印度洋地缘政治地图。


Of course, this is not to suggest that competition between India and China can or should cease.	当然，这并不意味着印度和中国能够或应该停止竞争。


But their overlapping layers of commercial and political interests do offer hope for agreement – if the two governments seize the opportunity.  Chinese assistance in encouraging Pakistan to reach agreement with India and the US on Afghanistan’s future is a good place to start, and will also benefit Chinese security by crimping the ability of terrorists to infiltrate China’s Xinxiang province from either Pakistan or Afghanistan	但它们的商业和政治利益有诸多重叠之处，只要两国政府抓住机会，就大有形成妥协的希望。 中国在鼓励巴基斯坦与印度和美国就阿富汗的未来达成一致的问题上起到了推动作用，这是一个良好的开端，且压制恐怖分子使其无法经巴基斯坦或阿富汗向新疆自治区渗透对中国来说也不无裨益。


Clinton recently offered a vision of a “strong, constructive relationship among India, the US, and China.”	希拉里最近抛出了“稳固而有建设性的印度、美国和中国关系”的愿景。


She admitted, realistically, that building one will be difficult because “there are important matters on which we all disagree.”	她现实地承认，建设这样的关系很困难，因为“在不少重大问题上我们彼此道不相同”。


Yet she also pointed to “significant areas of common interest,” arguing that, “if we want to address, manage, or solve some of the most pressing issues of the twenty-first century, India, China, and the US will have to coordinate our…efforts.”  	但她还指出了“具有共同利益的重要领域”，认为“如果我们想修正、治理或解决21世纪最紧迫的问题，印度、中国和美国就必须合作……共事”。


The prospect of a grand accord for South Asia is before us.	南亚的宏伟协议前景就摆在我们面前。


It is an idea whose time has come, because there is no longer an alternative path from conflict.	这一思想可谓正逢其时，因为你找不到其他摆脱冲突的替代方案。


The Bezzle Years	占款的年代


LONDON – More than a half-century ago, John Kenneth Galbraith presented a definitive depiction of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 in a slim, elegantly written volume.	伦敦—半个多世纪前，约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）用一部言简意赅的作品描写了1929年华尔街大崩盘。


Embezzlement, Galbraith observed, has the property that “weeks, months, or years elapse between the commission of the crime and its discovery.	加尔布雷斯观察到，占款私用（embezzlement）有一种性质，即“罪行犯下和发现之间会有几周、几个月或几年的时滞。


This is the period, incidentally, when the embezzler has his gain and the man who has been embezzled feels no loss.	顺便说一下，在这段时间里，私用者获得了收益，而被私用者没有感到损失。


There is a net increase in psychic wealth.”	心里财富值存在一个净增长。


Galbraith described that increase in wealth as “the bezzle.”	”加尔布雷斯将财富的这一增值称为“占款”（bezzle）。


In a delightful essay, Warren Buffett’s business partner, Charlie Munger, pointed out that the concept can be extended much more widely.	沃伦·巴菲特的商业合伙人查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）写过一篇优美的文章，指出这一概念可以推而广之。


This psychic wealth can be created without illegality: mistake or self-delusion is enough.	这一心里财富可以在不违法的情况下创造出来：错误或自欺便已足够。


Munger coined the term “febezzle,” or “functionally equivalent bezzle,” to describe the wealth that exists in the interval between the creation and the destruction of the illusion.	芒格创造了“等价占款”（febezzle）一词，或“占款的功能等价物”，来描述幻觉产生和毁灭期间所存在的财富。


From this perspective, the critic who exposes a fake Rembrandt does the world no favor: The owner of the picture suffers a loss, as perhaps do potential viewers, and the owners of genuine Rembrandts gain little.	从这个角度讲，揭发假伦勃朗（Rembrandt）的批评家并没有为世界做出好事：这幅画作的拥有者蒙受了损失，潜在赏画者可能也“躺着中了枪”，但伦勃朗真迹的拥有者没有获得多少好处。


The finance sector did not look kindly on those who pointed out that the New Economy bubble of the late 1990s, or the credit expansion that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis, had created a large febezzle.	金融界对指出20世纪90年代末新经济（New Economy）泡沫，或者2008年全球金融危机前的信用扩张制造了规模巨大的等价占款的人可没有慈眉善目。


It is easier for both regulators and market participants to follow the crowd.	监管者和市场参与者都更容易从众。


Only a brave person would stand in the way of those expecting to become rich by trading Internet stocks with one another, or would deny people the opportunity to own their own homes because they could not afford them.	只有勇敢的人才会站出来阻止期望通过彼此交易互联网股票致富的人，也只有勇敢的人才会否认人人都有拥有房子的机会，因为他们根本负担不起。


The joy of the bezzle is that two people – each ignorant of the other’s existence and role – can enjoy the same wealth.	占款的乐趣在于双方——他们都不知道另一方的存在和角色——可以享受同一笔财富。


The champagne that Enron’s Jeff Skilling drank when the US Securities and Exchange Commission allowed him to mark long-term energy contracts to market was paid for by the company’s shareholders and creditors, but they would not know that until ten years later.	安然公司（Enron）的杰夫·斯基林（Jeff Skilling）为庆祝美国证券交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission）允许他用市场价值给长期能源合同记账而开的香槟是安然公司股东和债权人买的单，但他们直到十年后才知道这一点。


Households in US cities received mortgages in 2006 that they could never hope to repay, while taxpayers never dreamed that they would be called on to bail out the lenders.	2006年，美国各大城市的家庭获得了他们根本无力偿还的按揭，而纳税人从未想过他们会被要求出手援助贷款人。


Shareholders in banks could not have understood that the dividends they received before 2007 were actually money that they had borrowed from themselves.	银行股东绝不可能理解他们在2007年前所收到的股息实际上是他们从自己手中借的钱。


Investors congratulated themselves on the profits they had earned from their vertiginously priced Internet stocks.	投资者们因为他们从价格高得离谱的互联网股票中所赚的利润而沾沾自喜。


They did not realize that the money they had made would melt away like snow in a warm spring.	他们没有意识到，他们所赚到的钱会如同阳光下的冰雪一样融化殆尽。


The stores of transitory wealth that were created seemed real enough to everyone at the time – real enough to spend, and real enough to hurt those who were obliged to pay them back.	当时，似乎每个人都真切地感受到被创造出来的短暂财富——真到他们去花钱，真到伤及背负偿还这些财富的人受到伤害。


Fair value accounting has multiplied opportunities for imaginary earnings, such as Skilling’s profits on gas trading.	公允价值会计成倍地放大了想象利润的机会，比如斯基林的天然气交易利润。


If you measure profit by marking to market, then profit is what the market thinks it will be.	如果你用市值衡量利润，那么例如就是市场认为它将是多少。


The information contained in the accounts of the business – the information that should shape the market’s views – is to be derived from the market itself.	企业账户中所包含的信息——应该是这些信息决定市场的看法——将由市场本身得到。


And the market is prone to temporary fits of shared enthusiasm – for emerging-market debt, for Internet stocks, for residential mortgage-backed securities, for Greek government debt.	而市场容易受到暂时性群情激昂的影响——对象可以是新兴市场债务，可以是互联网股票，可以是住房按揭支持证券，可以是希腊政府债务。


Traders need not wait to see when or whether the profits materialize.	交易员不需要等这些利润何时或是否实现。


IBGYBG, they say – I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.	他们的口号是IGBYBG——什么都是浮云（I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone）。


There are numerous routes to bezzle and febezzle.	可谓条条大路通占款和等价占款。


In a Ponzi scheme, early investors are handsomely rewarded at the expense of latecomers until the supply of participants is exhausted.	在庞氏骗局中，早期投资者盈利颇丰，他们的利润来自后来者的投入，直到参与者链断裂。


Such practices, illegal as practiced by Bernard Madoff, are functionally equivalent to what happens during an asset-price bubble.	这类行为是非法的，比如伯纳德·麦道夫（Bernard Madoff）骗局，在功能上，它们与资产泡沫时期发生的事情是等价的。


Tailgating, or picking up dimes in front of a steamroller, is another source of febezzle.	追尾，或在压路机前捡硬币，是另一种等价占款来源。


Investors search for regular small gains punctuated by occasional large losses, an approach exemplified by the carry trade by which investors borrowed euros in Germany and France to lend in Greece and Portugal.	投资者寻找偶尔被大损失打断的稳定的小收益，一个例子是息差交易，比如投资者在德国和法国借入欧元，然后在希腊和葡萄牙贷出。


The “martingale” doubles up on losing bets until the trader wins – or the money runs out.	“鞅”（martingale）策略让交易员加倍下注输掉的赌注，直到他们获胜——或把钱输光。


The “rogue traders” escorted from their desks by security guards are typically unsuccessful exponents of the martingale.	被保安从交易桌旁架走的“流氓交易员”是典型的不成功的鞅策略的例子。


And the opportunity to switch between the trading book and the banking book creates ready opportunities for financial institutions to realize gains and park losses.	而在交易账户和银行账户之间切换的机会给了金融机构现成的实现利润和处置损失的机会。


The essential story of the period from 2003 through 2007 is that banks announced large profits and paid a substantial share of them to their traders and senior employees.	2003-2007年期间的基本故事是，银行公告获得巨额盈利，并把其中相当大一部分用于奖励交易员和高级员工。


Then they discovered that it had all been a mistake, more or less wiped out their shareholders, and used taxpayer money to trade their way through to new levels of reported profit.	然后它们发现这完全是一场错误，它们的股东或多或少损失惨重，并用纳税人的钱继续交易，直到达到报告利润的新水平。


The essential story of the eurozone crisis is that banks in France and Germany reported profits on money they had lent to southern Europe and passed the bad loans to the European Central Bank.	欧元区危机的基本故事是，法国和德国银行对它们贷给南欧的钱报告利润，并将不良贷款转移给欧洲央行。


In both narratives, traders borrowed money from the future.	在这两个故事中，交易员��从未来借钱。


And then the future came, as it always does, turning the bezzle into a bummer.	接着未来成为现在（永远如此），占款也露出了本质。


What Could Go Wrong in America?	美国会出什么问题？


CAMBRIDGE – Although the United States economy is in good shape – with essentially full employment and an inflation rate close to 2% – a world of uncertainty makes it worthwhile to consider what could go wrong in the year ahead.	美国剑桥—尽管美国经济情况不错——已经达到了事实上的充分就业，通胀率也接近2%——但充满不确定性的世界仍然值得我们考虑未来一年可能出现哪些状况。


After all, if the US economy runs into serious trouble, there will be adverse consequences for Europe, Japan, and many other countries.	毕竟，如果美国经济陷入大麻烦，就会对欧洲、日本和其他许多国家造成负面影响。


Economic problems could of course originate from international political events.	当然，经济问题可能源自国际政治事件。


Russia has been acting dangerously in Eastern and Central Europe.	俄罗斯一直在东欧和中欧玩火。


China’s pursuit of territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, and its policies in East Asia more generally, is fueling regional uncertainty.	中国在东海和南海的领土主张及其在大东亚的政策正在增加地区不确定性。


Events in Italy could precipitate a crisis in the eurozone.	意大利的情况可能让欧元区陷入危机。


But within the US, the greatest risk is a sharp decline in asset prices, which would squeeze households and firms, leading to a collapse of aggregate demand.	但在美国国内，最大的风险是资产价格暴跌，这将累及家庭和企业，导致总需求崩塌。


I am not predicting that this will happen.	我并没有在预测会发生这样的情况。


But conditions are becoming more dangerous as asset prices rise further and further from historic norms.	但随着资产价格涨势越来越脱离历史常态，情况也变得越来越危险。


Equity prices, as measured by the price-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 stocks, are now nearly 60% above their historical average.	用标准普尔500成分股市盈率衡量的股票价格目前比历史平均水平高出60%。 30年美国国债价格之高导致其收益率只有2.


The price of the 30-year Treasury bond is so high that it implies a yield of about 2.3%; given current inflation expectations, the yield should be about twice as high.	3%； 而考虑到当前的通胀预期，收益率应该比2.


Commercial real-estate prices have been rising at a 10% annual pace for the past five years.	3%高出一倍。 商业地产价格在过去五年中以每年10%的速度上涨。


These inflated asset prices reflect the exceptionally easy monetary policy that has prevailed for almost a decade.	这些资产价格的膨胀是近十年来异常宽松的货币政策的体现。


In that ultra-low-interest environment, investors have been reaching for yield by bidding up the prices of equities and other investment assets.	在极低利率环境中，投资者通过提高股票和其他投资资产的价格来追求收益。


The resulting increase in household wealth helped to bring about economic recovery; but overpriced assets are fostering an increasingly risky environment.	由此带来的家庭财富的增长帮助经济复苏； 但资产价格过高正在形成一个日益危险的环境。


To grasp how risky, consider this: US households now own $21 trillion of equities, so a 35% decline in equity prices to their historic average would involve a loss of more than $7.5 trillion.	到底有多危险，我们来看一下。 如今美国家庭拥有21万亿美元股票，因此，股价下跌30%至历史平均水平意味着超过7.


Pension funds and other equity investors would incur further losses.	5万亿美元的损失。 退休基金和其他股票投资者将带来进一步损失。


A return of real long-term bond yields to their historic level would involve a loss of about 30% for investors in 30-year bonds and proportionately smaller losses for investors in shorter-duration bonds.	真实长期债券收益率向历史水平回归将给30年国债投资者带来大约30%的损失，短期债券投资者也将承受相应比例的损失。


Because commercial real-estate investments are generally highly leveraged, even relatively small declines in prices could cause large losses for investors.	由于商业地产投资一般都伴随高杠杆，即使是相对较小的价格跌幅也可能给投资者带来巨大损失。


The fall in household wealth would reduce spending and cause a decline in GDP.	家庭财富的缩水将抑制支出，导致GDP下降。


A rough rule of thumb implies that every $100 decline in wealth leads to a $4 decline in household spending.	粗略的经验法则表明，财富每缩水100美元，家庭支出将下降4美元。


The return of asset prices to historic levels could therefore imply a decline of $400 billion in consumer spending, equal to about 2.5% of GDP, which would start a process of mutually reinforcing declines in incomes and spending leading to an even greater cumulative impact on GDP.	因此，资产价格回报率回归历史水平将导致消费支出下降4,000亿美元，约合GDP的2. 5%，这将开启一个收入和支出之间互相强化的下跌过程，导致GDP累计影响进一步扩大。


Because institutional investors respond to international differences in asset prices and asset yields, the large declines in US asset prices would be mirrored by similar declines in asset prices in other developed countries.	由于机构投资者应资产价格和资产收益率的国际差异而动，美国资产价格大跌将投射到其他发达国家资产价格上，使它们也发生类似的跌幅。


Those price declines would reduce incomes and spending in other countries, with the impact spread globally through reduced imports and exports.	这些大跌将降低其他国家的收入和支出，其影响将通过进出口下降蔓延到全球。


I must emphasize that this process of asset-price declines and the resulting contraction of economic activity is a risk, not a prediction.	我必须强调，这一资产价格下跌过程及其所导致的经济活动的收缩是一种风险，而不是一个预测。


It is possible that asset prices will come down gradually, implying a slowdown rather than a collapse of spending and economic activity.	有可能资产价格逐渐下跌，引起支出和经济活动减速而不是崩溃。


But the fear of triggering a rapid decline in asset prices is one of the key reasons why the US Federal Reserve is reluctant to raise short-term interest rates more rapidly.	但关于触发资产价格暴跌的担忧是美联储不愿更快地的提高短期利率的重要原因之一。


The Fed increased the overnight rate by just 0.25% in December 2015 and is likely to add just another 25 basis points in December 2016.	2015年12月，美联储将隔夜利率仅仅提高了0. 25%，2016年12月可能再次仅仅提高25个基点。


But that will still leave the federal funds rate at less than 1%.	但联邦基金利率将仍保持在1%以下。


With the inflation rate close to 2%, the real federal funds rate would still be negative.	在通胀率接近2%的情况下，真实联邦基金利率仍为负值。


Market participants are watching the Fed to judge if and when the process of interest-rate normalization will begin.	市场参与者正在通过观察美联储判断利率正常化过程是否以及何时开始。


Historical experience implies that normalization would raise long-term interest rates by about two percentage points, precipitating substantial corrections in the prices of bonds, stocks, and commercial real estate.	历史经验表明，利率正常化将让长期利率提高大约两个百分点，导致债券、股票和商业地产价格发生剧烈调整。


The Fed is therefore trying to tamp down expectations concerning future interest-rate levels, by suggesting that changes in demography and productivity trends imply lower real rates in the future.	因此，美联储试图控制担心未来利率水平的预期，其办法就是指出人口和生产率趋势意味着未来利率会更低。


If the Fed succeeds, the decline in asset prices may be diminished.	如果美联储获得成功，那么资产价格���下跌也许微不足道。


But the danger of sharp asset-price declines that precipitate an economic downturn should not be ignored.	但资产价格暴跌并导致经济衰退的危险不容忽视。


The Morocco Option	摩洛哥选择


RABAT – Three years after the Arab Spring revolutions, the democratic world appears more confused than ever about how to respond.	拉巴特—阿拉伯之春爆发已经三年，民主世界对于如何应对变得更加迷茫了。


US Secretary of State John Kerry has re-launched American mediation efforts in the Middle East at a time when his country’s most reliable partners are estranged: Egypt’s military rulers resent the West’s early support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi in his presidential tenure, and Saudi Arabia fears that an Iran that talks to the US may prove to be an even more ambitious regional hegemon.	美国国务卿克里再次启动了美国的中东调停计划，而美国与其最可靠伙伴之间分歧毕露：埃及军方领导人怨恨西方一开始支持穆斯林兄弟会的穆尔西任职总统； 沙特阿拉伯担心与美国谈判的伊朗成为更有野心的地区霸权。


It was against this background that Morocco’s King Mohammed VI recently convened a high-level meeting of the Al Quds Committee, which he chairs.	在这样的背景下，摩洛哥国王穆罕默德六世召开了高规格会议——圣城委员会（Al Quds Committee）并亲自主持。


The Palestinian Authority’s president, senior diplomats of the countries involved in the Palestine-Israel peace process, and the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation all attended the two-day summit.	巴勒斯坦权力机构主席、与巴以和平进程有关的国家的高级外交官员、伊斯兰合作组织秘书长等人都将参加这次为期两天的峰会。


Taking place at a critical moment for this sensitive region, the meeting constituted an effort to contribute to the renewed negotiations and build on Kerry’s efforts to revive the peace process.	在敏感地区的关键时刻召开的此次峰会将致力于重启谈判以及利用克里重启和平进程的努力。


Morocco is an ideal setting for regional diplomacy.	摩洛哥是地区外交的理想场所。


Its strategy of gradual reform, economic modernization, and social development has made the country an oasis of stability in a region rife with violence and strategic rivalries – and thus a reliable partner for Europe and the United States as they seek to influence events in North Africa and across the Middle East.	其渐进式改革、经济现代化和社会发展战略让它成为这片暴力和战略敌对地区的一片稳定绿洲——因此也称为欧洲和美国在寻求影响北非和整个中东地区事态发展时的可靠伙伴。


Indeed, with Morocco’s proximity to Europe making it a gateway to Africa, its full economic and geopolitical potential has yet to be realized.	事实上，毗邻欧洲让摩洛哥成为非洲的门户，其经济和地缘政治潜力尚未充分发掘。


By contrast, the Egyptian government’s struggle to suppress the banned Muslim Brotherhood is fueling seemingly endless turmoil.	相反，埃及政府对被取缔的穆斯林兄弟会的镇压助长了无休止的动乱。


And Tunisia is still without a prime minister to head a caretaker government, further delaying the “national dialogue” that the Tunisian General Labor Union has agreed to mediate.	突尼斯仍没有选出首相领导看守政府，突尼斯总工会（Tunisian General Labor Union）所许诺居中调停的“国民对话”又将被推迟。


Three years after the start of their revolutions, neither country has been able to draft a broadly acceptable constitution.	在革命爆发按年后，这两个国家仍没能起草被广泛接受的宪法。


Meanwhile, Algeria is preoccupied with the presidential election in April, in which the incumbent, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, will stand again.	与此同时，阿尔及利亚将在4月进行总统选举，现任总统本特弗利卡（Abdelaziz Bouteflika）将再次参选。


Mauritanian politics is polarized, with the government unable to restore confidence.	毛里塔尼亚政坛陷入了两极分化，政府无法重塑信心。


Libya stands on the brink of civil war and de facto partition.	利比亚正在内战边缘，并且陷入了事实上的分裂中。


Farther afield, Syria is experiencing only bloodshed and sorrow.	在更远的地方，叙利亚一片狼藉，人们看到的只有流血和哀嚎。


Morocco’s evolutionary approach to improving the country’s well-being – quietly and resolutely building on the political, economic, and social reforms launched more than a decade ago – is backed by an overwhelming majority of citizens.	摩洛哥改善国家福祉的渐进方针——从十多年前开始悄然但坚决地开始了政治、经济和社会改革——基础是压倒多数的公民支持。


A new constitution, proposed by the king and adopted in a referendum in July 2011, has already generated robust political competition.	由国王提出并由2011年7月全民公投通过的新宪法建立了鲁棒的政治竞争。


Meanwhile, a new National Initiative for Human Development is helping to end poverty and social exclusion among Morocco’s most vulnerable citizens, especially women.	与此同时，全国人本发展计划（National Initiative for Human Development）帮助摩洛哥最脆弱公民群体（特别是女性）摆脱贫困、融入社会。


Rising living standards and a broad political consensus have provided the stability needed to allow the economy to grow strongly and diversify.	生活水平的提高和广泛的政治一致带来了刺激经济增长和多元化所需要的稳定。


Slowly but surely, national income is becoming less dependent on agriculture, thereby reducing Moroccans’ vulnerability to poor rainfall and failed harvests.	摩洛哥国民收入逐渐但稳健地脱离了农业，从而让摩洛哥人不再会因为降雨和收成不足而受难。


The country is developing a strong processing industry, especially in fertilizers, based in part on having the world’s largest phosphate reserves.	摩洛哥正在发展强大的加工业，特别是依托世界最大磷肥储量的肥料加工业。


And the textiles industry, recovering from a slowdown caused by the European crisis, is penetrating new export markets.	纺织业也从欧洲危机所造成的减速中复苏，并正在渗透新的出口市场。


A similar story can be told about tourism.	旅游业也是如此。


Indeed, Morocco can be proud of its export strategy.	事实上，摩洛哥应该以其出口战略为傲。


Despite the weak global economy, Morocco sells its goods worldwide, with strong exports to France, the US, Brazil, the Gulf states, and China.	尽管全球经济状况萎靡，但摩洛哥的商品仍然行销全球，对法国、美国、巴西、海湾国家和中国的出口十分强劲。


The country has free-trade agreements with Europe, Turkey, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Tunisia, and – unique in the region – the US.	摩洛哥与欧洲、土耳其、约旦、阿联酋、埃及、突尼斯以及美国签署了自由贸易协议，也是该地区唯一一个与美国建立自由贸易关系的���家。


Morocco boasts solid infrastructure, a robust banking system, sound public finances, low inflation, and manageable unemployment.	摩洛哥拥有可靠的基础设施条件、鲁棒的银行系统、坚挺的公共财政状况，通货膨胀率低，失业也处于可控水平。


Despite capital flight from much of the region, foreign investment continues to flow in.	尽管资本纷纷流出该地区，但外国投资仍在持续流入。


Clearly, Morocco is benefiting from being a stable country in a combustible region.	显然，身处动荡地区的摩洛哥因为国内稳定而获益良多。


But its longer-term interests lie in having politically stable neighbors that embrace similar economic reforms, thereby opening the way for a free-trade area that would benefit the entire region.	但其长期利益仍在于邻国的政治稳定和类似的经济改革，从而实现地区自由贸易，让整个地区都受益。


This regional perspective has been promoted ever since Mohammed acceded to the throne in 1999.	地区前景自穆罕默德六世1999年继承王位以来已有所改善。


One important part of his strategy has been to encourage intra-African economic relations.	他的战略的一个重要组成部分是促进非洲内部经济关系。


Morocco already provides expertise in finance, telecoms, energy, agriculture, and food security across the continent; indeed, it is now Africa’s second-largest investor, after South Africa.	摩洛哥向非洲大陆提供金融、通信、能源、农业和食品安全方面的专家； 事实上，摩洛哥目前是非洲第二大投资者，仅次于南非。


The king’s familiarity with the region’s cultural and spiritual life makes him an invaluable adviser, especially regarding the role of Islam in a modern society.	穆罕默德六世深谙地区文化和精神生活，这使他能够成为难得的顾问，特别是在伊斯兰教在现代社会中的角色这一问题上。


For example, Morocco helps train imams in a form of open Islam, which currently is helping Mali move on from its recent bloodletting.	比如，摩洛哥提供开放伊斯兰教伊玛目的培训服务，目前，这一计划正在帮助马里走出最近的流血事件。


This principle of regional solidarity extends to Morocco’s deployment of military hospitals not only in Mali but also in other conflict zones, such as one in Jordan that serves Syrian refugees.	这一宗教团结原则也扩展到摩洛哥的军事医院部署，不仅出现在马里，也出现在其他冲突地区，比如约旦就有服务叙利亚难民的摩洛哥军事医院。


Morocco is well positioned to promote security and development across northwest Africa and beyond.	摩洛哥是促进西北非和整个地区安全与发展的理想之选。


Its political stability, open economy, and balanced international relations are increasingly aligned with the regional interests of the US and Europe.	其稳定的政治、开放的经济和平衡的国际关系日益符合美国和欧洲的地区利益。


Moreover, Morocco is a loyal and longstanding US ally.	此外，摩洛哥也是美国长期、忠实的盟友。


The West would do well to start cultivating a natural partner in such a dangerous and complex region.	在这个危险而复杂的地区的培养一个摩洛哥这样的天然盟友对西方来说是一个绝佳的开端。


A Standby Program for the Eurozone	欧元区的备选方案


CHICAGO – How will the eurozone crisis play out in the next few weeks?	芝加哥——未来几周，欧元区危机会如何发展？


With luck, Italy may soon get a credible government of national unity, Spain will obtain a new government in November with a mandate for change, and Greece will do enough to avoid roiling the markets.	幸运的话，意大利将很快出现一个国民一致拥护的可信政府，西班牙将在11月形成一个握有改革大权的新政府，希腊也会拿出足够的措施安抚市场。


But none of this can be relied upon.	但所有这些都不一定靠得住。


So, what needs to be done?	那么，人们应该做些什么呢？


First, eurozone banks have to be recapitalized.	首先，欧元区银行必须来个资本重组。


Second, enough funding must be available to meet Italy’s and Spain’s needs over the next year or so if their market access dries up.	其次，如果意大利和西班牙在未来一年左右的时间无法从市场中融资，那么必须成立向它们提供足够资金的渠道。


And, third, Greece, now the sickest man of Europe, must be treated in a way that does not spread the infection to the other countries on the eurozone’s periphery.	第三，必须治理好当前全欧洲最疲软的希腊，防止其他欧元区外围国家受到传染。


All of this requires financing – bank recapitalization alone could require hundreds of billions of euros (though these needs would be mitigated somewhat if the sovereign debt of large eurozone countries looked healthier).	所有这些都要求资金——光是银行资本重组一项就要求数千亿欧元（不过，如果欧元区大国主权债务能更健康的话，此项资金需求会有所减少）。


In the short run, it is unlikely that Germany (and Northern Europe more generally) will put up more money for the others.	从短期看，德国（以及北欧）不会再为其他国家掏腰包了。


Germans are upset at being asked to support countries that do not seem to want to adjust – unlike Germany, which is competitive because it endured years of pain: low wage increases to absorb the former East Germany’s workers and deep labor-market and pension reforms.	德国对于自己被要求支持不愿调整的国家感到十分不安，这些国家和德国不同，德国用多年的痛苦换来了竞争力：低工资有所增长以吸收前东德的工作人口； 劳动力和退休金也得到了深刻的改革。


The unwillingness of the Greek rich to pay taxes, or of Italian parliamentarians to cut their own perks, confirms Germans’ fears.	而希腊富人不愿纳税，意大利议员也不愿削减所享受的待遇，这些都证实了德国的担心。


At the same time, German politicians have done a poor job explaining to their people how much they have gained from the euro.	与此同时，德国政客也没能很好地向人民解释德国从欧元中获得了多少好处。


But we are where we are.	但我们必须直面现实。


A glimmer of hope is Europe’s willingness to use the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) imaginatively – as equity or first-loss cover.	欧洲愿意将欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）用于各种想象得到的新用途——比如用于股权投资或作为第一损失保险。


Clearly, some of the EFSF funds will have to go to recapitalize banks that cannot raise money from the markets.	显然，EFSF的部分资金将不得不用于对无法从市场融资的银行进行资本重组。


As for the rest, the amounts that are not already committed to the peripheral countries could be used to support borrowing that can be lent onward to Italy and Spain.	在剩下的资金中，尚未承诺用于外围国家的部分可以用于支持那些将转手贷给意大利和西班牙的贷款。


There is, however, no consensus about how to do this.	不过，关于如何操作的问题，目前还没有达成一致。


Some propose bringing in the European Central Bank to leverage the EFSF’s funds.	有人提出让欧洲央行纳入EFSF，从提高而后者的融资规模。


This is a recipe for trouble.	这样会适得其反。


Giving the ECB a quasi-fiscal role, even if it is somewhat insulated from losses, risks undermining its credibility.	让欧洲央行扮演准财政部的角色将威胁到它的信誉，即使从某种程度上说这样做不会给欧洲央行造成什么损失。


And if Italy were helped, the incoming ECB President, Mario Draghi, an Italian, would be criticized, no matter how dire Italy’s need.	而如果意大利得到了援助，那么不管它是多么需要这笔援助，未来欧洲央行行长、意大利人德拉基（Mario Draghi）都将遭到口诛笔伐。


Moreover, financing would have to be accompanied by conditionality, and these institutions have neither the requisite expertise nor the necessary distance from the countries at risk to apply and enforce appropriate conditions.	此外，融资必将伴随条件，而这些机构既不具备专业技能，也无法与高风险国家保持必要距离，根本不能要求或强行施加合适条件。


Finally, both the EFSF and the ECB ultimately rely on the same eurozone resources for their financial strength.	最后，说到底，EFSF和欧洲央行都得依赖相同的欧元区资源来保证财政实力。


If markets start panicking about large eurozone defaults, they could question whether even a willing Germany has the necessary capacity to support the EFSF-ECB combine.	如果市场产生了大规模欧元区违约恐慌，就可能怀疑德国即使愿意，也没有必要的能力支持EFSF-欧洲央行合体。


Put differently, these institutions do not offer a credible, non-inflationary, external source of strength.	换句话说，这些机构并不能提供可信的、不会引起通胀的外部实力来源。


Indeed, the eurozone’s problems might soon become too big for its members to address.	事实上，欧元区的问题可能很快就会膨胀到其成员国无法解决的程度。


The world has a stake in their resolution.	欧元区如何决策事关全球福祉。


And it has an institution that can channel help: the International Monetary Fund.	有一个机构能够为援助提供渠道，那就是IMF。


The IMF could set up a special vehicle along the lines of its New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), which would be capitalized by a first-loss layer from the EFSF with the IMF’s own capital comprising a second layer.	IMF可以根据其新借贷安排（NAB）成立一个特殊机构，其资本结构可以以EFSF为第一损失缓冲，以IMF的资本作为第二损失缓冲。


This NAB-like vehicle could borrow as needed from countries, including the United States and China, as well as tap financial markets.	NAB类型的机构在需要时可以从包括美国和中国在内的各国借款，也可以通过金融市场融资。


It would offer large lines of credit to illiquid countries like Italy, with conditionality intended to help such countries resume borrowing from markets at reasonable cost.	它将向意大利等流动性缺失国提供大规模信贷额度，同时要求旨在帮助它们重新以合理成本得到市场融资的条件。


A special vehicle is required because the amounts that must be made available far exceed what IMF members can usually access, and it is only right that if the eurozone seeks such amounts for its members, it should bear a significant portion of any potential losses.	之所以需要成立特殊机构，是因为所要求的资金数量远远超过了IMF成员国通常可以获得的规模，同时，要让该机构具有合理性，就必须如此安排：如果欧元区想要设法让其成员国得到如此数量的资金，它就必须承受潜在损失的一大部分。


At the same time, the Fund’s capital resources would back the vehicle if the first-loss buffer provided by the eurozone were eroded; that way, the market would understand that strength from outside the eurozone can be brought to bear.	与此同时，如果由欧元区提供的第一损失缓冲告罄，IMF的资本资源将继续支持NAV； 这样一来，市场就会明白，欧元区以外的力量也能够被调动起来。


The IMF is not an institution that inspires warm and cuddly feelings.	IMF并不是给人们带来温暖和希望的慈善机构，但也并非如人们所指责的那样是冷血的财政紧缩鼓吹者。


But it is also not the mindless preacher of fiscal austerity that it is accused of being – and it should start taking the lead in managing the crisis, rather than holding up the rear.	它应该站出来担起领导处理危机的重任，而不是躲在大后方。


The eurozone needs an independent outside assessment of what needs to be done, and rapid implementation, before it is too late and the incipient bank runs become uncontrollable.	欧元区需要独立的外部评估来估计需要做什么，并抢在银行挤兑苗头发展成不可控制之势之前迅速落实。


Of course, the IMF cannot act without the permission of its masters, the large countries.	当然，IMF的行动必须得到其主宰者（即几个大国）的首肯。


The eurozone should suppress any wounded pride, acknowledge that it needs help, and provide quickly what it has already promised.	欧元区不应该再死要面子活受罪，应该承认需要帮助，并马上兑现已经做出的承诺。


The US should continue pushing hard for a solution.	美国应该继续大力推行解决方案。


And the emerging-market countries should pitch in too, once some safeguards for their money are in place.	新兴市场国家也不应该置身事外，因为这也包括了对它们自己国家货币的保护。


Unresolved, the crisis will spare no one.	如果这场危机得不到解决，谁也别想独善其身。


As for the birthplace of the euro crisis, Greece’s debt will almost surely have to be restructured.	作为欧元危机的发源地，希腊的债务几乎肯定必须重组。


But adequate funding structures for Italy and Spain must be in place before any resolution.	但在做出任何决定之前，应该为意大利和西班牙留好充足的资金结构。


So, while others have to step forward to do their part, it is best if Greece steps back from the brink.	因此，其他国家必须踊跃做好自己该做的部分，与此同时，如果希腊能够起死回生，对全世界都是件大好事。


A Star is Jailed	被囚禁的明星


BANGKOK – Joseph Estrada, the disgraced former president of the Philippines, faces the prospect of spending his remaining years in prison after a special court in Manila found him guilty of amassing around US$15 million in bribes and kickbacks.	曼谷——被马尼拉的特别法庭裁定染指1500万美元的贿赂和回扣案后，含羞蒙耻的菲律宾前总统约瑟夫·埃斯特拉达（Joseph Estrada）可能会在监狱中渡过余生。


During the 30 months he ruled his country, from mid-1998 to the start of 2001, Estrada accepted payoffs from gambling lords and orchestrated (with social security funds) sales of stocks, channeling much of the profits into his personal aliased account.	在从1998年中到2001年初统治菲律宾的30个月里，埃斯特拉达接受来自赌博巨头的贿赂、（以社会保险基金）人为操纵股票买卖，并将绝大多数利润存入了他个人的化名帐户。


Estrada literally defined plunder: as a senator in the early 1990’s, he was a member of the congress that crafted the law under which he was convicted.	正是埃斯特拉达自己定义了“赃物”这个词的含义：20世纪90年代担任参议员时，他作为国会议员参与了宣判他有罪的法律的制定工作。


For many Filipinos, there is more than enough poetry in this fact, and certainly more irony than Estrada’s action-comedy movies of the 1960’s ever mustered.	对于很多菲律宾人来讲，这里面有着太多的诗意，而且勿庸置疑比20世纪60年代埃斯特拉达主演的动作喜剧片具有更多的讽刺意味。


There is no underplaying the significance of the court’s unanimous decision to convict the first Philippine president ever to undergo a criminal trial.	法院一致裁定判处首位遭受刑事审判的菲律宾总统有罪的事实绝对不容小觑。


This is, after all, the Philippines, where Imelda Marcos is still living free and easy.	这毕竟是在菲律宾，伊梅尔达·马科斯（Imelda Marcos）还在这片国土上轻松自由的生活。


Despite massive evidence of the widespread death, poverty, suffering, and dysfunction she and her late husband, the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, inflicted on the Philippines, the only real disappointment she has subsequently endured has been losing the last presidential election she was allowed to contest.	尽管有大量证据表明她和已故的丈夫费迪南德·马科斯（Ferdinand Marcos）对大规模死亡、贫困、苦难和政府运转失常负有直接责任，但她所忍受的唯一一次真正的失望就是失掉了她参加的上一次总统选举。


The Philippines is not a country used to seeing powerful people punished.	菲律宾并不是一个对权势人物遭受惩罚习以为常的国家。


When officials are accused or suspected of corruption, they do not quickly resign, as in Korea or Japan.	当官员被指控或怀疑涉嫌腐败时，他们并不像在韩国或日本那样很快地辞去职务。


Instead, they often seek immunity by running for public office.	恰恰相反，他们会通过参与总统选举来寻求豁免。


When a bloody coup against Corazon Aquino’s fledgling democratic government failed, the leader of the putsch escaped from a floating prison – and then successfully ran for senator.	当针对科拉松·阿基诺（Corazon Aquino）初出茅庐的民主政府的血腥政变失败后，政变的领导者逃出了一所流动监狱——而后成功当选参议员。


The wheels of Philippine justice need retooling, so much so that the country’s Chief Justice himself recently called for an emergency summit to discuss a rash of extra-judicial killings that have the claimed the lives of leftists, human rights workers, and journalists under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.	菲律宾司法公正的车轮需要调整，这样的调整需求如此迫切，以至于该国的首席法官不久前召开了一次紧急会议，探讨在格洛丽亚·马卡帕加尔·阿罗约（Gloria Macapagal Arroyo）总统统治下发生的对左翼人士、人权工作者和记者的不合法屠杀行为。


There have been few convictions for these crimes.	没有人被裁定要为这样的暴行负责。


Yet Filipinos themselves simply cannot seem to imagine their leaders behind bars.	但菲律宾人自己似乎根本无法想象将领导人送进监狱。


Even before Estrada’s conviction, opinion polls showed that 48% of Filipinos wanted clemency, if not a guaranteed pardon from Arroyo.	即便在法院宣布埃斯特拉达的判决结果前，民意调查仍显示有48%的菲律宾人希望阿罗约能给他特赦，至少也要对他从轻处理。


More than 80% said Estrada should be allowed to languish in a lush private family vacation home where he already spent the last six years awaiting his verdict.	超过80%的民众表示不该让埃斯特拉达在豪华私人假期中郁郁不乐，过去六年中，他一直在私人宅邸等候判决结果的出台。


Is this lack of appetite for justice a part of Filipino culture, or learned behavior?	对司法公正渴望的缺失是不是菲律宾文化、或者是后天行为的一个组成部分？


Has an overly forgiving nature prevented Filipinos from achieving closure in so many painful chapters of their history, or are the ravages of impunity to blame?	过度慈悲的天性是否阻碍了菲律宾人将这么多沉痛的历史篇章抛在脑后，还是因为每次作恶者都可以成功地逃避惩罚？


With so few examples of justice clearly dispensed, and overwhelmed by examples of villains so easily forgiven or forgotten, perhaps Filipinos could not bring themselves to demand what they could not imagine.	由于正义得以伸张的实例少之又少，而作恶者被轻易宽恕或者遗忘的例子却很多，也许菲律宾人无法要求自己根本无法想象的正义降临。


Estrada’s conviction gives Filipinos the clearest illustration of what the rule of law may bring to their society.	埃斯特拉达的判决向菲律宾民众展示了法治将带来怎样的社会结果。


Estrada remains adored by the masses, but so far the public’s reaction to the verdict has been nonviolent and almost subdued.	埃斯特拉达至今仍然受到大众的喜爱，但截至目前为止公众对判决的反应非常柔和，几乎不带有任何暴力的色彩。


Notwithstanding the opinion polls, it does seem as though the public not only accepts his conviction, but that they respect it as the outcome of a fair system that has been allowed to work.	尽管民意调查主张宽恕这位曾经的总统，但目前公众似乎不仅接受判决结果，而且把它当作公平系统的裁决结果而予以尊重。


This suggests not only that justice in the Philippines has a chance; equally important, it suggests that Filipinos will give justice a chance.	这表明司法公正不仅在菲律宾仍有希望，同样重要的是表明菲律宾人会给予司法公正一个真正的发展机会。


If the Estrada saga leads to a firm yet dignified exercise of justice, Filipinos may discover a taste for more of the same.	如果埃斯特拉达的传奇能带来尊严而切实的正义伸张，那么菲律宾人将会对同样的正义之举充满渴望。


Europe’s Lost Keynesians	失败的欧洲凯恩斯主义者


CAMBRIDGE – There is no magic Keynesian bullet for the eurozone’s woes.	发自剑桥——对欧元区所遭受的苦难来说，凯恩斯主义并不是什么灵丹妙药。


But the spectacularly muddle-headed argument nowadays that too much austerity is killing Europe is not surprising.	而当前出现所谓过度紧缩正在扼杀欧洲的这种极端愚昧观点也毫不奇怪。


Commentators are consumed by politics, flailing away at any available target, while the “anti-austerity” masses apparently believe that there are easy cyclical solutions to tough structural problems.	当“反紧缩”的民众显然相信有简单易行的周期性方法去解决困难的结构性问题时，评论家们被成为了政客的大棒，用以抨击所有可见的目标。


The eurozone’s difficulties, I have long argued, stem from European financial and monetary integration having gotten too far ahead of actual political, fiscal, and banking union.	我一直认为，欧元区的困难源自于欧洲的金融与货币一体化进程过度超前于实际的政治、财政和银行联盟。


This is not a problem with which Keynes was familiar, much less one that he sought to address.	这并不是凯恩斯所熟悉的问题，更不是他试图要解决的那种问题。


Above all, any realistic strategy for dealing with the eurozone crisis must involve massive write-downs (forgiveness) of peripheral countries’ debt.	首先，任何用来应对欧元区危机的可行策略都必须涉及大量外围国家债务的资产减值（或减免）。


These countries’ massive combined bank and government debt – the distinction everywhere in Europe has become blurred – makes rapid sustained growth a dream.	而这些国家内部涉及大量银行及政府的合并债务——这令欧洲各地的区别都变得模糊了——使得快速可持续发展成为了一个不切实际的美梦。


This is hardly the first time I have stressed the need for wholesale debt write-downs.	这绝不是我第一次强调要整体削减债务。


Two years ago, in a commentary called “The Euro’s Pig-Headed Masters,” I wrote that “Europe is in constitutional crisis.	两年前，在一篇叫做“欧元的顽固大师们”的评论中，我写到：“欧洲处于宪政危机当中。


No one seems to have the power to impose a sensible resolution of its peripheral countries’ debt crisis.	似乎无人有权对其周边国家的债务危机强加可行的解决办法。


Instead of restructuring the manifestly unsustainable debt burdens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs), politicians and policymakers are pushing for ever-larger bailout packages with ever-less realistic austerity conditions.”	政客和政策制定者们都在追求更庞大但其现实紧缩适用条件更加窄的救助方案，却不愿去大范围重整葡萄牙、爱尔兰和希腊（欧猪三国）显然不可持续的债务负担，。 ”


My sometime co-author Carmen Reinhart makes the same point, perhaps even more clearly.	我以前的合著者卡门·莱恩哈特（Carmen Reinhart）也发表了类似的观点——也许表达得更清晰。


In a May 2010 Washington Post editorial (co-authored with Vincent Reinhart), she described “Five Myths About the European Debt Crisis” – among them, “Myth #3: Fiscal austerity will solve Europe’s debt woes.”	在2010年五月华盛顿邮报的一篇社论（与文森特·莱恩哈特合著）中，她描述了“与欧洲债务危机有关的五个谎言”——其中第三个谎言就是：财政紧缩能解决欧洲的债务灾难。


We have repeated the mantra dozens of times in various settings, as any fair observer would confirm.	我们在不同的情境下重复过好几十次这个说法，所有公正的观察家都可以证实这一点。


In a debt restructuring, the northern eurozone countries (including France) will see hundreds of billions of euros go up in smoke.	在债务重整得过程中，欧元区北部国家（包括法国）将会看到好几千亿欧元化为乌有。


Northern taxpayers will be forced to inject massive amounts of capital into banks, even if the authorities impose significant losses on banks’ large and wholesale creditors, as well they should.	即使当局像其应该做的那样给硬性要求银行的大债权人承担大量损失，北部各国的纳税人也要被迫注入大量的资金到各大银行。


These hundreds of billions of euros are already lost, and the game of pretending otherwise cannot continue indefinitely.	这好几千亿的欧元已经损失了，而假装它们没有消失的把戏不可能无限期地持续下去。


A gentler way to achieve some modest reduction in public and private debt burdens would be to commit to a period of sustained but moderate inflation, as I recommended in December 2008 in a commentary entitled “Inflation is Now the Lesser Evil.”	要达到适度削减公共和私人债务负担的目的，一个比较温和的方法是让这些国家产生一段时期持续但温和的通货膨胀，正如2008年11月我在一篇名为“当前通货膨胀相对债务而言危害更小”的评论中所提议的一样。


Sustained moderate inflation would help to bring down the real value of real estate more quickly, and potentially make it easier for German wages to rise faster than those in peripheral countries.	持续温和通胀有助于更快降低房地产的实际价格，而且很可能会使德国的工资水平比欧元区外围国家上涨得更快。


It would have been a great idea four and a half years ago.	在四年半前，这是一个妙策。


It remains a good idea today.	现在也不失为一个好主意。


What else needs to happen?	还需要做些什么呢？


The other steps involve economic restructuring at the national level and political integration of the eurozone.	其它的步骤包括在国家层面进行经济调整以及欧元区的政治一体化。


In another commentary, “A Centerless Euro Cannot Hold,” I concluded that “without further profound political and economic integration – which may not end up including all current eurozone members – the euro may not make it even to the end of this decade.”	在另一篇评论“无中心的欧元区行不通”中，我断定“如果没有进一步更深层次的政治和经济整合——最终可能不会涵盖当前所有的欧元区成员国——欧元甚至存活不到十年之后。 ”


Here, all eyes may be on Germany, but today it is really France that will play the central role in deciding the euro’s fate.	现在，所有人也许都在关注德国，但在决定欧元命运上起关键作用的其实是法国。


Germany cannot carry the euro on its shoulders alone indefinitely.	德国无法长期单独背负起欧元的责任。


France needs to become a second anchor of growth and stability.	法国需要成为经济增长与稳定的第二个靠山。


Temporary Keynesian demand measures may help to sustain short-run internal growth, but they will not solve France’s long-run competitiveness problems.	暂时的凯恩斯需求方法也许有助于保持短期的内部增长，但它们不能解决法国长期的竞争力问题。


At the same time, France and Germany must both come to terms with an approach that leads to far greater political union within a couple of decades.	与此同时，法国和德国都必须就几十年内引起更大政治联盟的方法上达成一致。


Otherwise, the coming banking union and fiscal transfers will lack the necessary political legitimacy.	否则，未来银行业联盟和财政转移支付将会无法取得必要的政治合法性。


As my colleague Jeffrey Frankel has remarked, for more than 20 years, Germany’s elites have insisted that the eurozone will not be a transfer union.	正如我的同事杰弗里·弗兰克尔（Jeffrey Frankel ）所说的一样，二十多年来，德国精英们都坚持认为欧元区不会成为一个转移支付联盟。


But, in the end, ordinary Germans have been proved right, and the elites have been proved wrong.	但最终，事实证明普通德国民众是对的，而精英们错了。


Indeed, if the eurozone is to survive, the northern countries will have to continue to help the periphery with new loans until access to private markets is restored.	确实，如果欧元区要生存下来，北部国家就需要用新的贷款来继续帮助其外围国家，直到这些国家可以再次从私人市场融资为止。


So, given that Germany will be picking up many more bills (regardless of whether the eurozone survives), how can it best use the strength of its balance sheet to alleviate Europe’s growth problems?	所以，鉴于德国将会包揽更多的账单（无论欧元区是否能维持），它如何能利用好其资产负债表的优势来减轻欧洲的经济增长问题？


Certainly, Germany must continue to acquiesce in an ever-larger role for the European Central Bank, despite the obvious implicit fiscal risks.	当然，尽管它存在明显的隐性财政风险，德国也必须继续默许欧洲央行发挥更大的作用。


There is no safe path forward.	没有人能保证前进的道路上会一路顺风。


There are a number of schemes floating around for leveraging Germany’s lower borrowing costs to help its partner countries, beyond simply expanding the ECB’s balance sheet.	现在广为流传着一些利用德国的低借贷成本来帮助其伙伴国家，而不是简单地扩大欧洲央行的资产负债表的方案。


For meaningful burden-sharing to work, however, eurozone leaders must stop dreaming that the single currency can survive another 20 or 30 years without much greater political union.	然而，为了让责任分担起到作用，欧元区领导得停止幻想在没有更大的政治联盟的情况下单一货币还能存活二三十年。


Debt write-downs and guarantees will inevitably bloat Germany’s government debt, as the authorities are forced to bail out German banks (and probably some neighboring countries’ banks).	债务减免以及担保将不可避免地让德国政府债务膨胀起来，正如当局被迫拯救德国各大银行一样（很可能还有外围国家的银行）。


But the sooner the underlying reality is made transparent and becomes widely recognized, the lower the long-run cost will be.	但对其行为背后的逻辑进行公开透明阐述并争取广泛认可的速度越快，长期成本就会越低。


To my mind, using Germany’s balance sheet to help its neighbors directly is far more likely to work than is the presumed “trickle-down” effect of a German-led fiscal expansion.	在我看来，利用德国资产负债表来直接援助其邻国比起假定中由德国主导的财政扩张所引发的“涓滴”效应更可能起作用。


This, unfortunately, is what has been lost in the debate about Europe of late: However loud and aggressive the anti-austerity movement becomes, there still will be no simple Keynesian cure for the single currency’s debt and growth woes.	但不幸的是，近来关于欧洲的争论中正是缺乏这一点：不管反紧缩运动变得多么声势浩大，凯恩斯主义都不可能是解决单一货币债务和经济增长灾难的灵丹妙药。


A Survival Strategy for the Eurozone	欧元区求生指南


NEW YORK – After the Greek and Irish crises and the spread of financial contagion to Portugal, Spain, and possibly even Italy, the eurozone is now in a serious crisis.	纽约——继希腊、爱尔兰分别爆发危机之后，财政瘟疫传染到了葡萄牙、西班牙甚至意大利，欧元区已陷入严重危机之中。 前景有三种可能：一是“蒙混过关”（继续现在的“贷款加祈祷”）；


There are three possible scenarios: “muddle through,” based on the current approach of “lend and pray”; “break-up,” with disorderly debt restructurings and possible exit of weaker members; and “greater integration,” implying some form of fiscal union.	二是“分崩离析”（债务重组陷入无序状态，某些脆弱的成员国退出货币联盟）； 三是“加强一体化”（预示着某种形式的财政联盟）。


The muddle-through scenario – with financing provided to member states in distress (conditional on fiscal adjustment and structural reforms), in the hope that they are illiquid but solvent – is an unstable disequilibrium.	蒙混过关——向困境中的成员国提供融资，附带财政调整和结构改革等条件，寄希望于它们仅仅是周转困难而非无力偿债——只是一种不稳定非均衡状态。


Indeed, it could lead to the disorderly breakup scenario if institutional reforms and other policies leading to closer integration and restoration of growth in the eurozone’s periphery are not implemented soon.	说真的，如果体制改革和其他政策不能加强一体化程度，并很快恢复欧元区边缘国家的经济增长势头，这种非均衡状态就会转变为无序的分崩离析。


The crisis started with too much private debt and leverage, which became public debt and deficits as crisis and recession triggered fiscal deterioration and private losses were mostly socialized via bailouts of financial systems.	危机的起因是私人部门过度负债和过高杠杆率，随着危机和衰退削弱财政状况，随着大部分私人亏损经由金融体系脱身计划而被摊派给全社会，私人债务危机演变为公共债务和公共赤字危机。


Then, distressed sovereigns that had already lost market access – Greece and Ireland – were bailed out by the International Monetary Fund and the European Union.	再后来，若干受到重创的政府（希腊和爱尔兰）丧失了市场融资能力，从国际货币基金（IMF）和欧盟得到救助。


But no one will bail out these super-sovereigns if the sovereigns prove to be insolvent.	但是，如果欧洲各国政府普遍陷入无力偿债的境地，又有谁来帮那些超政府机构脱身呢？


Thus, the current strategy of kicking the can down the road will soon reach its limits, and a different plan will be needed to save the eurozone.	所以，眼下得过且过的办法很快会撞上南墙，到时候就需要另一套方案来拯救欧元区。


The first institutional reform takes the form of a larger envelope of official resources, which would mean a quasi-fiscal union.	机构改革已经迈出了第一步，其形式是建立一个官方资源的大池子，相当于一个准财政联盟。


Official resources currently are sufficient to bail out Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, but not to prevent a self-fulfilling run on the short-term sovereign and financial liabilities of Spain and other potentially distressed eurozone members.	现有官方资源足够帮希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙脱困，但没办法防止市场对西班牙和其他欧元区问题成员国的短期国债和金融负债挤兑预期的自我实现。


So, even if these countries were to implement the necessary fiscal and structural reforms, an increase of official resources would nonetheless be needed.	所以，即使这些国家实施了必要的财政和结构改革，仍需要更多的官方资源。


Because nervous investors don’t want to be last in line in case of a run, a disorderly rush to the exits is likely when official resources are insufficient.	紧张的投资者谁都不想沦为挤兑中的最后一名，如果官方资源不足，很可能出现无序争抢出路的情形。


Short of full fiscal unification – or a variant of it in the form of eurozone bonds – this increase in official resources would occur through a much-enlarged European Financial Stability Facility and a much greater commitment by the European Central Bank to long-term bond purchases and liquidity operations to support banks.	鉴于财政没有完全统一，也没有欧元区债券等替代形式，要增加官方资源可以通过大规模扩充欧洲金融稳定基金（European Financial Stability Facility）或由欧洲央行增持长期债、增加流动性操作等等方式来实现。


Since quasi-fiscal union implies that the eurozone’s core economies could end up systematically bailing out those on the periphery, only a formal loss of fiscal sovereignty – a credible commitment by the peripheral countries to medium- and long-term fiscal discipline – could overcome the current political resistance of Germany and others.	由于准财政联盟意味着，欧元区核心经济体最终可能不得不系统性地帮边缘经济体脱困，只有边缘国家正式让渡部分财政主权——承诺严守中长期财政纪律——才能克服德国和其他核心国家目前的政治阻力。


But even a larger envelope of official resources is not sufficient to stem the insolvency problems of Greece, Ireland, and, possibly, Portugal and Spain.	可是，即便扩大官方资源池子也不足以解决希腊、爱尔兰以及葡萄牙和西班牙现存或潜在的无力偿债问题。


Thus, a second set of policies and institutional reforms requires that all unsecured creditors of banks and other financial institutions need to be “treated” – that is, they must accept losses (or “haircuts”) on their claims.	因此就需要第二轮政策和机构改革，来“打发”银行和其他金融机构的那些不安的债权人——它们必须接受亏损的现实（也就是“割肉”）。


This is needed to prevent even more private debt being put on government balance sheets, causing a fiscal blowout.	这是为了防止更多的私人债务被移入政府的资产负债表，造成新的财政冲击。


If orderly treatment of unsecured senior creditors requires a new cross-border regime to close down insolvent European banks, such a regime should be implemented without delay.	如果这个过程中，需要建立一个新的跨境机制来清算资不抵债的欧洲银行，那就事不宜迟赶紧建立。


Similarly, super-sovereigns cannot continue to bail out distressed sovereigns that are insolvent rather than illiquid.	同样地，超政府机构不应继续救助那些资不抵债而不仅仅是周转不灵的政府了。


Thus, in addition to an orderly resolution regime for banks, Europe must also implement early orderly restructurings of distressed sovereigns’ public debt.	因此，在银行的有序解决机制之外，欧洲也应该尽早出台公债有序重组方案。


Waiting until 2013 to implement these restructurings, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposes, will destroy confidence, as it implies a much larger haircut on residual private claims on sovereign borrowers.	像德国总理默克尔提出的那样，等到2013年才来实施重组，会摧毁市场信心，因为那时候公债持有人不得不割掉更大的一块“肉”。


Thus, orderly market-based restructurings via exchange offers need to occur in 2011.	因此，应当在2011年通过互换要约（exchange offers）执行有序的市场化重组。


Such exchange offers can limit private creditors’ losses if they are done early.	如果做得够早，互换要约可以限制私人债权人的损失。


That way, formal haircuts on the face value of debt can be avoided via new bonds that include only a maturity extension and an interest-rate cap that is set below today’s unsustainable market rates.	通过提供延后到期且利率低于当前市场利率的新债券，可以避免现有债券面值的正式减计。


Waiting to restructure unsustainable debts would only lead to disorderly workouts and severe haircuts for some private creditors.	坐等债务重组只会导致无序操作和私人债权人的沉重损失。


Finally, Europe needs policies that restore competitiveness and growth to the eurozone’s periphery, where GDP is either still contracting (Greece, Spain, and Ireland) or barely growing (Italy and Portugal).	最后欧洲需要出台一系列政策，恢复欧元区边缘国家的出口竞争力和经济增长，这些国家的GDP要么仍在收缩（希腊、西班牙和爱尔兰），要么增长乏力（意大利和葡萄牙）。


Without growth, it will be difficult to stabilize public and private debts and deficits as a share of GDP – the most important indicator of fiscal sustainability.	没有增长，就难以稳定公私债务和赤字的GDP占比——财政稳定性的首要指标。


Moreover, without growth, the social and political backlash against painful belt-tightening will eventually undermine austerity and reform.	此外，没有增长，勒紧裤腰带的痛苦所激起的社会和政治抗议将最终瓦解财政瘦身和结构改革。


Unfortunately, fiscal austerity and structural reforms are – at least in the short run – recessionary and deflationary.	不幸的是，财政瘦身和结构改革具有引发衰退和通缩的效果——至少短期上是如此。


So other policies are needed to restore growth.	所以需要有其他政策来重振增长。


The ECB should pursue a much looser monetary policy to jump-start growth, with a weaker euro to help boost the periphery’s competitiveness.	欧洲央行应大大放松货币政策，推动一波增长，为启动改革做准备。


In addition, Germany should delay its fiscal consolidation; if anything, it should cut taxes for a couple of years to boost its own growth and – via trade – that of the periphery.	此外，德国应延后本国的财政巩固，它应该维持若干年的减税政策，以促进本国经济增长，并通过贸易支持外围国家的增长。


In the next few months, it will become clear whether European policymakers can compromise and implement reforms that dampen the threat of a eurozone breakup.	今后的几个月内，我们将能看清，欧洲的决策者们是否能达成妥协，厉行改革，对抗危机，挽救欧元区。


Either the EU moves in the direction of a more stable equilibrium of closer integration, or the risk of an unstable and disorderly breakup scenario will rise significantly.	欧洲要么走向更紧密的一体化（这是一个稳定均衡状态），要么就得面对分崩离析的危险。


A Sustainable Recovery	可持续的复苏


NEW YORK – The global recession now underway is the result not only of a financial panic, but also of more basic uncertainty about the future direction of the world economy.	纽约－现在正在持续中的全球衰退，不仅仅是金融恐慌的结果，而且还是世界经济未来方向的更基本的不确定的结果。


Consumers are pulling back from home and automobile purchases not only because they have suffered a blow to their wealth with declining stock prices and housing values, but also because they don’t know where to turn.	消费者在购买住房和汽车上紧缩开支，不仅仅是因为他们遭受了股票价格的下跌和房屋价值的下降对他们财富的冲击，也因为他们无所适从。


Should they risk buying a new car when gasoline prices might soar again?	当汽油价格可能再次飙升的时候，消费者应该冒险买一辆新车吗？


Will they be able to put food on the table after this year’s terrifying rise in food prices?	在今年可怕的食品价格上涨之后，消费者还有能力将食物放上餐桌吗？


Decisions about business investment are even starker.	有关商业投资的决定更为艰难。


Businesses are reluctant to invest at a time when consumer demand is plummeting and they face unprecedented risk penalties on their borrowing costs.	各行业在消费者需求下降以及面临借款成本前所未有的风险损失时，都不愿意投资。 各种行业也面临着巨大的不确定性。


They are also facing huge uncertainties.	在将来，什么样的发电站是可接受的呢？


What kinds of power plants will be acceptable in the future?	这些发电站会被允许像过去那样排放二氧化碳吗？


Will they be allowed to emit carbon dioxide as in the past?	美国仍然支撑得住郊区的生活方式吗？


Can the United States still afford a suburban lifestyle, with sprawling homes in far-flung communities that require long-distance automobile commutes?	在这种生活方式中，房子零乱地分布在遥远的社区里，人们返于工作地点和家之间需要长距离驾驶汽车。


To a large extent, economic recovery will depend on a much clearer sense of the direction of future economic change.	在很大程度上，经济复苏将依赖于对未来经济变化方向更明确的感知。


That is largely the job of government.	这主要是政府的责任。


After the confused and misguided leadership of the Bush administration, which failed to give any clear path to energy, health, climate, and financial policies, President-elect Barack Obama will have to start charting a course that defines the American economy’s future direction.	在布什政府混乱而具有误导性的领导之后——该政府没能给能源、健康、气候和金融政策任何清晰的路径，当选总统巴拉克·奥巴马将不得不开始一个确定美国经济未来方向的旅程。


The US is not the only economy in this equation.	美国不是经济等式中唯一的经济体。


We need a global vision of sustainable recovery that includes leadership from China, India, Europe, Latin America, and, yes, even Africa, long marginalized from the world economy, but very much part of it now.	我们需要一个可持续经济复苏的全球视角，这一视角包括来自中国、印度、欧洲、拉丁美洲以及非洲——对，长期从世界经济中边缘化，但是现在已经是其一部分的非洲——的领导。


There are a few clear points amidst the large uncertainties and confusions.	在巨大的不确定和混乱中，仍然有一些明确的观点。


First, the US cannot continue borrowing from the rest of the world as it has for the past eight years.	首先，美国再也不能像过去八年里那样向世界其他国家借贷了。


America’s net exports will have to increase, meaning that the net exports of China, Japan, and other surplus countries will consequently decrease.	美国的净出口将不得不增加，这意味着中国、日本和其他顺差国家的净出口将因此而减少。


The adjustments needed amount to a sizeable deficit-to-balance swing of around $700 billion in the US current account, or nearly 5% of US GNP.	美国需要的调整相当于其经常账户大约7000亿美元的一个相当大的赤字－到－结余的转换，即约美国国民生产总值的5%。


China’s trade surplus might shrink by half of that amount (with cuts in trade surpluses also spread over other global regions), meaning a shift in Chinese GNP toward internal demand and away from net exports equal to between 5% and 10% of China’s GNP.	中国的贸易顺差可能会减少上述数字的一半（贸易顺差的减少也会蔓延到世界其他地区），这意味着中国国民生产总值向国内需求的转移，以及净出口占中国国民生产总值5%到10%的改变。


Fortunately, China is promoting a major domestic expansion.	幸运的是，中国正在推进一个重大的国内经济扩张计划。


Second, the decline in US consumption should also be partly offset by a rise in US investment.	第二，美国消费的减少也应该会部分地被在美国投资的上升所抵消。


However, private business will not step up investment unless there is a clear policy direction for the economy.	但是，除非有明确的经济政策方向，私营商业将不会逐步增加投资。


Obama has emphasized the need for a “green recovery,” that is, one based on sustainable technologies, not merely on consumption spending.	奥巴马强调了“绿色复苏”的必要性，也就是说，建立在可持续技术，而不仅仅是消费支出基础上的经济复苏。


The US auto industry should be re-tooled for low-carbon-emission automobiles, either plug-in hybrids or pure battery-operated vehicles.	美国的汽车工业应该重组以生产低碳排放量的汽车，这种汽车可以是嵌入式混合动力或纯电池驱动的汽车。


Either technology will depend on a national electricity grid that uses low-emission forms of power generation, such as wind, solar, nuclear, or coal-fired plants that capture and store the carbon-dioxide emissions.	这两种技术都将依赖使用低排放的发电能源——例如风能、太阳能、核能或者能收集和储存二氧化碳排放的燃煤发电站的国家电网。


All of these technologies will require public funding alongside private investment.	所有这些技术都需要公共资金和私���投资。


Third, the US recovery will not be credible unless there is also a strategy for getting the government’s own finances back in order.	第三，除非有使政府自身的财政状况恢复良好状态的策略，否则，美国的复苏是不可靠的。


George W. Bush’s idea of economic policy was to cut taxes three times while boosting spending on war.	乔治·沃克·布什经济政策的观念是，在增加战争支出的同时三次减税。


The result is a massive budget deficit, which will expand to gargantuan proportions in the coming year (perhaps $1 trillion) under the added weight of recession, bank bailouts, and short-term fiscal stimulus measures.	这样做的结果是巨大的预算赤字，预算赤字在接下来的一年内，会在更多的衰退、银行救援以及短期财政刺激措施的压力下变得数额巨大（或许会到1万亿美元）。


Obama will need to put forward a medium-term fiscal plan that restores government finances.	奥巴马需要提出修复政府财政状况的中期财政计划。


This will include ending the war in Iraq, raising taxes on the rich, and also gradually phasing in new consumption taxes.	该计划将包括结束在伊拉克的战争，增加富人的税费，以及逐步实施新消费税。


The US currently collects the lowest ratio of taxes to national income among rich nations.	美国现在在富裕国家中，对国民收入的征税比例最低。


This will have to change.	这一点将不得不发生改变。


Fourth, the world’s poor regions need to be seen as investment opportunities, not as threats or places to ignore.	第四，世界的贫穷地区应该被看作是投资机会，而不应该被看作是威胁或应该忽略的地区。


At a time when the major infrastructure companies of the US, Europe, and Japan will have serious excess capacity, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the US Export-Import Bank, the African Development Bank, and other public investment funds should be financing large-scale infrastructure spending in Africa, to build roads, power plants, ports, and telecommunications systems.	在美国、欧洲和日本的主要基础设施建设公司存在严重的产能过剩的时候，世界银行、欧盟投资银行、美国进出口银行、非洲开发银行以及其他的公共投资基金应该为非洲进行大规模的基础设施建设支出贷款，以修建道路、发电厂、港口以及通信系统。


So long as the credits are long term and carry a modest interest rate (say, 25-year dollar loans at 5% per annum), the recipient countries could repay the loans out of the significant boost in incomes that would result over the course of a generation.	只要这样的贷款是长期的，并且利率适中（例如，25年的美元贷款，年利率5%），接受贷款的国家就能用在一代人的时间里大量增加的收入，来偿还贷款。


The benefits would be extraordinary, for both Africa and the rich countries, which would be putting their businesses and skilled workers back to work.	这对非洲和富裕国家来说，都有极大的好处——可以使富裕国家的相关行业继续运转并使熟练工人回到工作岗位。