In Vietnam, an estimated 1,000 households farm and trade pythons, and python harvesting in Malaysia provides incomes for low-skilled, low-income workers during periods when other employment opportunities are either out of season, or simply scarce because of larger economic factors.	在越南，估计有1，000家家庭农场从事蟒蛇的养殖及贸易，而捕蛇在其他就业机会缺乏或因为宏观经济因素十分罕见的情况下为马来西亚的低技能、低收入工人提供了收入。


Researchers found that most of those harvesting pythons implement simple and effective sustainable-management plans, and that this has reduced pressure on wild populations.	研究人员发现大部分蟒蛇捕猎者采用简单而有效的可持续管理计划，且该计划在减轻野生种群压力方面发挥了很大作用。


However, python skins, like many wildlife products, are a commodity, so communities harvesting them are limited in terms of how they can add value to increase returns.	但蟒蛇皮像很多野生动物产品一样是一种商品，因此蟒蛇捕猎群体在如何增加附加值以提高收益方面是受到限制的。


Women in the Peruvian Andes may clean vicuña wool by hand to increase the price it fetches per kilogram by $50, whereas selling a wool-scarf could yield them $150-200; a Malaysian python skin sells for $200, while a python-skin bag could sell for $2,000.	秘鲁安第斯山区女性可以手工清理驼羊毛来换取每公斤增加50美元的收益，而售卖一条羊毛围巾则可以收入150到200美元； 一张马来西亚蟒蛇皮售价为二百美元，而一个蟒蛇皮手袋却能以2，000美元的价格出售。


Still, some emerging countries are moving up the value chain and retaining a greater share of returns, as demonstrated by local brands such as Kuna, which markets alpaca and vicuña wool in Peru, and Natura, a Brazilian natural-cosmetic brand.	不过，某些新兴国家正在逐步加入价值链的上游，并因此增加在收益中所占的比例，这方面的例子有售卖羊驼呢和羊驼毛的秘鲁本土品牌Kuna，以及巴西天然化妆品品牌Natura。


The biggest threats to the legal wildlife trade are poaching, smuggling, improper trade permitting, and animal abuse, all of which must be addressed by regulators and rural community stakeholders at the local level.	偷猎、走私、不正当贸易许可和动物虐待是对合法野生动物贸易最大的威胁，所有这些都必须由监管机构和农村群体的利益相关者在当地层面加以解决。


Fortunately, rural communities are already in the best position to protect wildlife, so long as they are motivated to do so.	幸运的是，只要农村群体愿意这样做，他们已经占据了保护野生动物最有利的地位。


In the right circumstances, a virtuous cycle, whereby local producers have a direct interest in protecting wildlife (because they are benefiting from its legal trade) is the best – and sometimes the only – long-term solution to the problem of sustainability.	在适当的环境下，野生动物关系到当地生产者利益（因为他们从野生动物合法贸易中受惠）的良性循环是确保可持续收益的最好——而且有时也是唯一的——长期解决办法。


To help with this, governments can increase rural communities’ resource- and wildlife-use rights so that they can manage and protect their natural resources sustainably.	为实现这一目标，政府可以扩大农民群体对资源及野生动物的使用权，以求使他们能以长远的眼光对自然资源进行管理和保护。


For example, in the 1970s when Peru granted Andean communities the right to use vicuña wool, it saved the vicuña from extinction and created new, long-term income streams for the community.	举例来讲，二十世纪七十年代秘鲁批准安第斯山脉民众有权使用驼羊毛挽救了濒于灭绝的驼羊并为当地民众创造了长期的新的收入流。


Because legal and natural circumstances vary by country and community, we will need similar policy innovations across different sectors.	因为不同国家和群体的法律和自然环境千差万别，在各个部门实现类似的政策创新十分必要。


One promising sector is tourism, which also fits into the CITES framework.	另外一个前景远大的部门是旅游，而且旅游业完全符合野生动植物濒危物种国际贸易公约的架构。


To take one example, since Rwanda began sharing wildlife-tourism revenues with local communities, the mountain-gorilla population has grown.	举一个例子，自从卢旺达开始与当地民众分享野生动物旅游的收入后，山地大猩猩的数量一直在增长。


As we see time and again, when local communities are included, they can become resolute wildlife defenders.	我们一次又一次地看到，只要允许当地民众分享收益，他们可以成为坚定的野生动物捍卫者。


More generally, we should be supporting scientists working on new adaptive-management methods, and the private sector should be given incentives to invest in greater sustainable sourcing and increased supply- and production-chain transparency.	从更广义的角度讲，我们应当支持科学家研究新的适应性管理方法，并激励私营部门投资于扩大可持续采购以及加大供给——还有生产链的透明度。


As the examples above show, conservation and improved livelihoods for the rural poor are feasible, and even mutually reinforcing.	上面的例子表明，在保护的同时改善贫困农民生活不仅可行、甚至是相辅相成的。


With more political will and smart investments, there is no reason we can’t reach the SDGs to both reduce poverty and safeguard wildlife for future generations.	只要强化政治意愿和明智投资，完成可持续发展目标为子孙后代减少贫困和保护野生动物的双重任务是完全可能的。


Last year, the UN passed an historic resolution to tackle illicit wildlife trafficking, recognizing the effectiveness of the CITES legal framework.	去年，联合国通过了一项解决野生动物非法贩卖问题的历史性决议，承认野生动植物濒危物种国际贸易公约合法构架的积极作用。


The resolution calls on the 182 CITES member countries to protect the interests of wildlife as well as to provide tangible benefits for the poor and rural communities.	该决议呼吁野生动植物濒危物种国际贸易公约的182个成员国保护野生动物利益，同时实实在在地惠及贫困人口和农村群众。


We hope that delegates from those member countries meeting at the World Wildlife Conference in South Africa are hearing that call.	我们希望参与世界野生动物大会的来自上述成员国的代表对这一呼吁表示认同。


Will Banks and Financial Markets Recover in 2009?	银行和金融市场会在2009年复苏吗？


NEW YORK – Global financial markets in 2008 experienced their worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	纽约—2008年的全球金融市场经历了自从二十世纪三十年代大萧条以来最严重的危机。


Major financial institutions went bust; others were bought up on the cheap or survived only after major bailouts.	有许多大型金融机构破产，另外一些以非常低廉的价格被收购或者在巨额融资后方才得以生存。


Global stock markets fell by more than 50%; interest-rate spreads skyrocketed; a severe liquidity and credit crunch appeared; and many emerging-market economies staggered to the International Monetary Fund for help.	全球股票市场下跌超过50%，利率差急剧扩大，出现了严重的流动性和信用紧缩，还有许多新兴市场经济体不得不向国际货币基金组织求助。


So what lies ahead in 2009?	那么2009年的情况会怎样呢？


Is the worst behind us or ahead of us?	最糟糕的时候是已经过去了还是尚未到来？


To answer these questions, we must understand that a vicious circle of economic contraction and worsening financial conditions is underway.	要回答这些问题，我们必须认识到经济紧缩的恶性循环和持续恶化的财政状况还远未结束。


The United States will certainly experience its worst recession in decades, a deep and protracted contraction lasting about 24 months through the end of 2009.	美国可能会经历几十年来最严重的衰退。 严重并且漫长的经济紧缩可能将持续24个月，直至2009年底。


Moreover, the entire global economy will contract. There will be recession in the euro zone, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Canada, Japan, and the other advanced economies.	此外，整个全球经济也将步入衰退，欧元区、英国、欧洲大陆、加拿大、日本和其他发达经济体都将出现衰退。


There is also a risk of a hard landing for emerging-market economies, as trade, financial, and currency links transmit real and financial shocks to them.	新兴市场经济体存在硬着陆的风险，因为贸易、金融和货币联系将把实际的金融动荡传导给它们。


In the advanced economies, recession had brought back earlier in 2008 fears of 1970’s-style stagflation (a combination of economic stagnation and inflation).	而在发达经济体中，早在2008年初人们就担心衰退会引发二十世纪七十年代出现的那种经济滞胀（经济停滞和通货膨胀的合称）。


But, with aggregate demand falling below growing aggregate supply, slack goods markets will lead to lower inflation as firms’ pricing power is restrained.	但是，由于总需求低于不断增长的总供应量，疲软的商品市场将因为企业的定价能力受到限制而使通货膨胀得以缓解。


Likewise, rising unemployment will control labor costs and wage growth.	同样地，失业率的上升将限制劳动力成本和工资的增长。


These factors, combined with sharply falling commodity prices, will cause inflation in advanced economies to ease toward the 1% level, raising concerns about deflation, not stagflation.	这些因素，加上急剧下降的商品价格，将使发达经济体的通货膨胀下跌到1%的水平，从而使人们担心会出现通货紧缩而不是滞胀。


Deflation is dangerous as it leads to a liquidity trap: nominal policy rates cannot fall below zero, so monetary policy becomes ineffective.	通货紧缩是非常危险的，因为它会导致流动性陷阱：名义政策利率不可能降到零以下，因此货币政策将失去效力。


Falling prices mean that the real cost of capital is high and the real value of nominal debts rise, leading to further declines in consumption and investment – and thus setting in motion a vicious circle in which incomes and jobs are squeezed further, aggravating the fall in demand and prices.	商品价格的不断下降意味着资本的实际成本非常高并且名义债务的实际价值提高了，这将导致消费和投资的进一步下滑，从而引发恶性循环：收入和就业机会进一步萎缩，从而加剧了需求和商品价格的下滑。


As traditional monetary policy becomes ineffective, other unorthodox policies will continue to be used: policies to bail out investors, financial institutions, and borrowers; massive provision of liquidity to banks in order to ease the credit crunch; and even more radical actions to reduce long-term interest rates on government bonds and narrow the spread between market rates and government bonds.	由于传统的货币政策失去效力，其他一些非传统的政策将继续被使用：帮助投资者、金融机构和借贷者摆脱困境，向银行注入巨额的流动资金以缓解信用紧缩，甚至采取更加激进的行动以降低政府债券的长期利率和缩小市场利率与政府债券之间的利差。


Today’s global crisis was triggered by the collapse of the US housing bubble, but it was not caused by it.	今天的全球危机是由美国房地产泡沫的破灭触发的，但是它并不是这场危机的根源。


America’s credit excesses were in residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and student loans.	美国的信用发放过度存在于住房抵押、商业抵押、信用卡、车贷和学生贷款中。


There was also excess in the securitized products that converted these debts into toxic financial derivatives; in borrowing by local governments; in financing for leveraged buyouts that should never have occurred; in corporate bonds that will now suffer massive losses in a surge of defaults; in the dangerous and unregulated credit default swap market.	此外将这些债务转化为有害的金融衍生产品的证券化产品、地方政府的借款、向本不该发生的杠杆收购提供的融资、由于违约现象的大量发生现在可能将遭受巨额损失的公司债以及危险并且缺少监管的信用违约掉期市场都存在过多过滥的状况。


Moreover, these pathologies were not confined to the US.	此外，这些病症并不仅仅存在于美国。


There were housing bubbles in many other countries, fueled by excessive cheap lending that did not reflect underlying risks.	其他许多国家因为不能反应潜在风险的低息贷款的泛滥而引发了房地产市场的泡沫。


There was also a commodity bubble and a private equity and hedge funds bubble.	此外还有商品泡沫及私募股权和对冲基金的泡沫。


Indeed, we now see the demise of the shadow banking system, the complex of non-bank financial institutions that looked like banks as they borrowed short term and in liquid ways, leveraged a lot, and invested in longer term and illiquid ways.	事实上，我们现在看到了影子银行系统的倒台以及非银行金融机构的复杂性。 这些金融机构看上去像是银行，因为它们拆借短期资金，然后以流动性方式进行大量的杠杆收购和长期及非流动性的投资。


As a result, the biggest asset and credit bubble in human history is now going bust, with overall credit losses likely to be close to a staggering $2 trillion.	其结果是，人类历史上最大的资产和信用泡沫现在正在破灭，总信用损失很可能将接近2万亿美元。


Thus, unless governments rapidly recapitalize financial institutions, the credit crunch will become even more severe as losses mount faster than recapitalization and banks are forced to contract credit and lending.	在这种情况下，除非各国政府迅速向金融机构注资，随着损失增加的速度快于再资本化的速度以及银行被迫紧缩信用和贷款，信用紧缩将变得更加严重。


Equity prices and other risky assets have fallen sharply from their peaks of late 2007, but there are still significant downside risks.	股权价格和其他风险资产的价格自2007年下半年达到最高点以来急剧下降，但是依然还存在大幅下降的风险。


An emerging consensus suggests that the prices of many risky assets – including equities – have fallen so much that we are at the bottom and a rapid recovery will occur.	有一种共识是鉴于许多风险资产的价格，包括股权价格，已经下降如此之多，市场现在已经处于底部并且将很快出现快速反弹。


But the worst is still ahead of us.	但是最糟糕的时候还远未到来。


In the next few months, the macroeconomic news and earnings/profits reports from around the world will be much worse than expected, putting further downward pressure on prices of risky assets, because equity analysts are still deluding themselves that the economic contraction will be mild and short.	接下来几个月，世界各地出台的宏观经济消息和收入/利润报告将比预想的更糟糕，从而给风险资产价格带来更大的下行压力，因为股权分析师还在自欺欺人地说经济紧缩是温和的并且短暂的。


While the risk of a total systemic financial meltdown has been reduced by the actions of the G-7 and other economies to backstop their financial systems, severe vulnerabilities remain.	尽管发生系统性的金融危机的风险由于七国集团和其他经济体采取行动支持它们的金融体系而被减小了，但是依然存在相当大的脆弱性。


The credit crunch will get worse; deleveraging will continue, as hedge funds and other leveraged players are forced to sell assets into illiquid and distressed markets, thus causing more price falls and driving more insolvent financial institutions out of business.	信用紧缩将变得更严重； 去杠杆化的行动将会继续，因为对冲基金和其他杠杆化玩家被迫将资产出售给流动性较差和低迷的市场，从而导致价格进一步下滑以及使更多无力清偿债务的金融机构破产。


A few emerging-market economies will certainly enter a full-blown financial crisis.	一些新兴市场经济体可能将陷入全面爆发的金融危机。


So 2009 will be a painful year of global recession and further financial stresses, losses, and bankruptcies.	因此2009年将会是全球衰退的痛苦一年，财政压力、损失和破产将会进一步加剧。


Only aggressive, coordinated, and effective policy actions by advanced and emerging-market countries can ensure that the global economy recovers in 2010, rather than entering a more protracted period of economic stagnation.	只有发达经济体和新兴市场经济体采取强有力、协同并且有效的政策行动，才能确保全球经济在2010年复苏，而不是进入一个更加漫长的经济滞胀期。


Europe’s Unending Berlusconi Problem	欧洲未完的贝卢斯科尼问题


LONDON – Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s three-time prime minister and the country’s dominant politician for two decades, has now been convicted and sentenced to four years in prison – a sentence since reduced to one year.  But few people in Italy – or in Europe – believe that Berlusconi will fade from Italian, or European, politics anytime soon.	伦敦—二十年来意大利最主要政客、三度出任总理的贝卢斯科尼如今被判四年监禁，此后又被减刑为一年。 但在意大利（或者说在欧洲）几乎没人相信贝卢斯科尼会马上从意大利或欧洲政坛上消失。


Just a few days ago, he declared his intention to remain involved in politics, though not to run for prime minister a fourth time.	就在几天前，他宣布无意退出政坛，尽管他也不会追求第四次总理生涯。


Whatever role Berlusconi chooses to play, it is unlikely to be a marginal one.	不管贝卢斯科尼选择扮演什么角色，肯定不会是边缘角色。


He may not wish to be king again, but he certainly can be a kingmaker, owing to his control of Mediaset, Italy’s largest media group.	他可能不再原因充当国王，但显然还可以成为拥立国王的人，因为他是意大利最大传媒集团Mediaset的控制着。


And, given his abysmal popularity ratings, he may decide to play the wild card, embrace a euro-skeptic and anti-government stance, and try to bring down Prime Minister Mario Monti’s technocratic administration.	此外，由于他支持率极低，他可能会选择使出王牌，采取质疑欧元和反对政府的立场，并试图推翻总理蒙蒂的技术官僚政府。


Monti’s government took over from Berlusconi in November 2011, arriving with a clear mandate, and full parliamentary support, to implement the measures needed to restore market confidence and reassure Italy’s eurozone partners and the International Monetary Fund that the country was not going down the path taken by Greece.	蒙蒂政府于2011年11月取代贝卢斯科尼，在议会的一直支持下，以鲜明的立场实施了重振市场信心、保证意大利欧元区成员国地位、向IMF表明意大利不会像希腊那样堕落到底的措施。


At the time of the G-20 summit in Cannes that month, Italy – and Europe – was dangerously close to collapse, with Berlusconi’s government deeply divided about the fiscal measures needed to bring down the country’s debt-service costs.	当月戛纳举行G20峰会时，意大利（以及欧洲）岌岌可危，而贝卢斯科尼政府在减少意大利债务利息支付负担所必须的政策方面分裂为两个阵营。


Domestic political deadlock, and Berlusconi’s inability to engage with Germany and France resulted in spiraling refinancing costs, with the spread relative to German bunds consistently over 500 basis points between July and November 2011.	国内政治僵局，加上再融资成本增加导致贝卢斯科尼无法与德国和法国合作，导致意大利国债相对德国国债的利差在2011年7月—11月间一直保持在500个基点以上。


The Monti government has restored market confidence and Italy’s international credibility.	蒙蒂政府已经重塑了市场信心和意大利的国际信誉。


But the overall picture remains fragile.	但整体状况依然脆弱。


The interest-rate spread has stabilized around a more manageable 300 basis points, but is still higher than it was three years ago.	利差稳定在较易控制的300个基点的水平，但仍比三年前要高。


In addition, Italy’s economic outlook remains highly uncertain.	此外，意大利经济前景仍高度不确定。


Indeed, the modest economic recovery that should benefit many countries in 2013 seems to be eluding Italy.	事实上，预计在2013年给众多国家带来好处的温和经济复苏似乎不会光临意大利。


According to the IMF, the economy will remain in recession next year, and, though the rate of contraction will be less severe than in 2012 (-0.7% in 2013, compared to -2.3% this year), the unemployment rate is expected to rise further, from 10.6% to 11.1%.	根据IMF的预测，意大利经济明年将继续衰退，尽管衰退不会像2012年那样严重（2013年经济增长将为-0. 7%，而今年将为-2.


More needs to be done in order to support economic growth in the short term, improve the country’s fiscal position in the medium term, and implement the structural reforms needed to make the Italian economy more robust and internationally competitive in the long term.	意大利需要采取进一步行动以支持短期经济增长、改善中期财政状况，并采取结构性改革以保证意大利经济在长期更加稳健和具有国际竞争力。


Italy is ranked 43rd in the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index, well below the main eurozone countries, owing to lack of investment – especially in human capital – and structural rigidities that have constrained growth for many years.	意大利在经合组织全球竞争力排名中名列第43，与主要欧元区国家相去甚远，这主要是由于投资不足（特别是人力资本方面的投资）以及约束增长多年的结构性僵化造成的。


The answer to Italy’s economic problems is not, as Berlusconi advocates, an exit from the eurozone and a return to the flexibility of its own currency, which in the past allowed policymakers to boost competitiveness through irresponsible devaluations.	意大利经济问题的答案并不是如贝卢斯科尼所鼓吹的退出欧元区、回归更加灵活的本国货币等在过去能让政客用不负责任的贬值提振竞争力的老办法。


Italy needs to learn how to live with the euro and within the eurozone, which means adopting policies that ensure that productivity growth and innovation, not currency devaluation, are the main drivers of competitiveness.	意大利需要学习如何与欧元共存，如何在欧元区内生存，这意味着采取保证生产率增长和创新而不是货币贬值的政策，这才是提振竞争力的主要动力。


A stable, competent, and responsible government with a comfortable parliamentary majority is essential to continue what Monti’s government has initiated.	稳定、胜任而负责的政府以及一个满意的议会多数是维持蒙蒂政府措施的关键。


While the odds still favor a relatively smooth transition, many uncertainties could derail the reform process.	尽管相对平稳的转型仍是最可能发生的情景，但不确定性仍可能妨碍改革过程。


In particular, whether Italy will be able to move beyond technocratic politics to a “normal” government remains the outstanding question both at home and for the other eurozone member states.	特别是，意大利是否能够打破官僚政治的藩篱，回到“正常”政府上来仍是其国内和其他欧元区成员国关注的悬而未决的问题。


From this perspective, what Berlusconi advocates for Italy, and the consequences of his agenda for the eurozone, is not good news.	从这个角度看，贝卢斯科尼建议意大利做的，以及他的欧元区日程表的后果，对意大利来说都不是好消息。


Any hint that the country may be locked again in parliamentary inertia, as in the final months of Berlusconi’s last government, would push the markets to question the credibility of Italy’s fiscal-consolidation plan, jeopardizing the country’s ability to refinance its debt.	意大利可能再次陷入贝卢斯科尼上届政府最后几个月的议会僵局的风险将使市场质疑意大利财政整合计划的可信度，妨碍意大利再融资其债务的能力。


That debt is the largest in the eurozone – at roughly €2 trillion ($2.6 trillion), or 120% of the country’s GDP – which means that Italy can be helped, but not rescued.	而这笔债务是欧元区中最大的一笔——大约2万亿欧元，或相当于其GDP的120%——这意味着意大利只能被帮助，不能被救助。


With potential instability looming, Monti should ensure that Italy is not defenseless in the event of another round of market instability.	在潜在的动荡面前，蒙蒂应该确保意大利不会再新一轮市场动荡前束手无策。


Unlike some months ago, now the European Central Bank can intervene and buy troubled countries’ debt.	与几个月前不同，如今欧洲央行可以干预并购买受困国的债务。


But this mechanism can be activated only by formal request.	但这一机制被激活是有正式条件的。


Italy should follow this route without delay.	意大利应该毫不迟疑地朝这个方向前进。


It is better to have a powerful weapon that may gather dust than to be unarmed in a time of need.	在这个节骨眼上，宁可获得有力武器而任其蒙尘，也不应该赤手空拳。


Will Britain Choose Irrelevance?	英国会选择边缘化吗？


LONDON – When voters in the United Kingdom go to the polls on June 23 to decide whether their country should leave the European Union, the issues they will have to reckon with will include the impact of their decision on unemployment, trade flows, and the stability of financial markets.	伦敦—6月23日，当英国选民来到投票箱前，决定是否要让祖国脱离欧元区时，他们必须考虑的一个问题是他们的决定对失业、贸易流和金融市场稳定的影响。


But there are other less quantifiable considerations that must also be weighed in the balance.	但其他不太能够量化的考虑也必须进行权衡。


The economic arguments against a British exit from the EU – or Brexit – have been well rehearsed.	反对英国退出欧盟（简称英国退出）的经济理由早已耳熟能详。


Many have suggested that if the UK were to leave, manufacturers would secure continued access to the European market by fleeing across the English Channel, costing the country millions of jobs.	许多人认为，如果英国脱离欧盟，制造业必须越过英吉利海峡进入欧洲市场，导致英国损失数百万工作岗位。


Similarly, withdrawal from the EU risks undermining London’s position as a global financial center, which depends on the city’s integration into European markets.	类似地，退出欧盟有可能破坏伦敦的全球金融中心地位，这一地位依赖英国融入欧洲市场。


Trade agreements, too, would have to be renegotiated in the wake of a Brexit.	贸易协定也必须在英国退出后重新谈判。


Another area of concern for many voters regards the UK’s sovereignty – the idea that independent countries should have ultimate decision-making authority over what happens within their borders.	对许多选民来说，另一个忧虑是英国的主权——即独立国家对于发生在其疆界内的事物应该拥有最终决定权的思想。


Membership in the EU sometimes requires ceding control to a complex web of often-inefficient Brussels-based supranational institutions.	欧盟成员国地位有时需要向位于布鲁塞尔，常常效率低下的复杂的超国家机构网络让渡一些控制权。


I hold a doctorate in economics and work with businesses whose employees and operations benefit from the UK’s membership in the EU.	我拥有经济学博士学位，并与一些员工和经营活动因为英国的欧盟成员国地位而收益的企业合作。


I also have a pronounced disdain for red tape and inefficiency.	我也相当鄙视官样文章和低效率。


And yet I do not believe that economic considerations or concerns about sovereignty offer compelling arguments for Brexit.	但我并不认为经济考虑或对主权的担忧是英国退出问题最主要的原因。


Much more important is the potential impact of such a decision on the UK’s global standing.	比这些因素重要得多的是这一决定对英国全球地位的潜在影响。


Membership in a European community of 500 million people provides the UK with considerable influence over geopolitics and the global economy.	加入到拥有5亿人口的欧洲社会能让英国拥有对地缘政治和全球经济的可观的影响力。


As the world becomes ever more daunting and complex, maintaining that influence is clearly in the country’s interest.	随着世界变得越来越可怕和复杂，保持这一影响力显然符合英国的利益。


The referendum campaign is playing out against a global economic and political backdrop that is nothing if not foreboding.	全民公决是在一个全球经济和政治背景下进行的，这一背景带来了不祥的预兆。


The International Monetary Fund has warned that global growth is unlikely to return to the levels that it attained before the 2008 financial crisis.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）警告全球经济不可能回到2008年金融危机前的水平。


Indeed, the global consulting firm McKinsey predicts that global growth rates during the next 50 years will be half of what they were over the previous five decades.	事实上，全球咨询公司麦肯锡预测，未来50年全球增长率将只有此前五十年的一半。


Meanwhile, Martin Dempsey, a retired army general and former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that the world has entered the most dangerous period he has ever witnessed.	与此同时，退休陆军上将、前美国参谋长联合会议主席马丁·邓普西（Martin Dempsey）说，世界已经进入了他所见过的最危险的时期。


Developing countries are home to roughly 90% of the world’s population, and some two-thirds of their residents are younger than 25.	发展中国家占据了世界人口的90%左右，并且其中三分之二的居民年龄不到25岁。


Stagnant growth or shrinking output in many emerging economies has serious consequences.	许多新兴经济体的增长停滞或产出萎缩产生了严重后果。


The UK’s Overseas Development Institute predicts that by 2025, roughly 80% of the world’s poor will live in fragile states.	英国海外发展研究所（Overseas Development Institute）预测，到2025年，80%的世界人口将生活在脆弱国家。


Job-eroding technological advances, worsening income inequality, demographic shifts, dwindling natural resources, and environmental depletion are adding even more straws to the camel’s back.	减少工作岗位的技术进步、恶化的收入不平等、人口变化、日益遭到破坏的自然资源和环境耗竭给骆驼压上了更多的稻草。


The world is already undergoing the worst refugee crisis since the end of World War II, with some 60 million people having been driven from their homes.	世界正在经历二战结束以来最严重的难民危机，大约6,000万人被迫流离失所。


The mounting instability will only exacerbate the problem.	日益严重的动荡将进一步恶化问题。


Leaving the EU will not shield the UK from the vagaries of the global economy.	脱离欧盟无法将英国隔离在全球经济的变幻莫测之外。


It will only deprive the country of a leading voice in shaping the response to new and existing challenges.	这样将剥夺英国在制定新旧挑战应对方案上的领导权。


The UK is far better placed to influence the global policy agenda from inside the EU than from outside it.	对英国来说，从欧盟内部影响全球政策日程比从外部要有利得多。


To be sure, leaving the EU would not strip the UK of its historical prominence in international organizations – most notably its permanent membership of the United Nations’ Security Council.	诚然，脱离欧盟不会影响欧盟在国际组织中的历史主导地位——最显著的便是联合国安理会常任理事国地位。


But a non-European Britain would be less likely to secure the same standing and influence in whatever institutions emerge in the years ahead.	但不属于欧洲的英国在今后新���现的任何机构中拥有同样地位和影响力的可能性降低了。


Within the EU, the UK is a critical part of an influential economic and political bloc with undeniable heft.	在欧盟内部，英国是影响力毋庸置疑的经济和政治集团的关键部分。


Amplified by the EU, its voice can influence world events, providing the country with what the British like to describe as an ability to punch above its weight.	通过欧盟的放大，英国的声音能够左右世界事件，给英国带来英国人常说的超越国家实力的能力。


Should the UK leave, however, its influence would be limited to its true size on the global stage: a relatively small country with limited economic and political power.	但是，如果英国脱离欧盟，其影响力将限于其在世界舞台上真正规模：一个相对较小的、经济和政治实力有限的国家。


As British voters prepare to cast their ballots, they should weigh carefully the consequences of international irrelevance.	在英国选民准备投票之际，他们应该仔细掂量国际边缘化的后果。


Will Cap-and-Trade Incite Protectionism?	“总量管制和排放交易”（CAP-AND-TRADE）制度会引发贸易保护主义么？


CAMBRIDGE – There is a serious danger that the international adoption of cap-and-trade legislation to limit carbon-dioxide emissions will trigger a new round of protectionist measures.	剑桥——目前，关于“总量管制和排放交易”在国际间被广泛接受，很有可能引发新一轮的贸易保护主义。 而且在近期乃至将来对经济造成非常不好的影响。


While aimed at reducing long-term environmental damage, cap-and-trade policies could produce significant harmful economic effects in the near term that would continue into the future.	“总量管制和排放交易”是为了限制二氧化碳的排放而制定的一项立法，目的是限制碳排放量对环境的长期危害。


Scientific evidence appears to indicate that the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels (primarily coal, oil, and natural gas) – mainly in electricity production, transportation, and various industrial processes – contributes to gradual global warming, with long-term adverse effects on living conditions around the world.	科学证据表明：由于燃料化石（主要是煤，石油和天然气）——主要是用于发电，运输和各种工业化等——在空气中的大量燃烧，使得二氧化碳在大气层中的含量不断升高，迫使全球气候变暖，由此威胁到我们生活的环境。


It is with this in mind that representatives of more than 150 countries are scheduled to meet in Copenhagen in December to discuss ways to reduce CO2 emissions.	因此，今年12月，全球150多个国家的代表将在哥本哈根聚集，共同讨论如何减少二氧化碳的排放量问题。


A common suggestion is to impose a tax on all CO2 emissions, which would be levied on companies that emit CO2 in production, or that sell products like gasoline that cause CO2 emissions when used.	如何解决这一难题呢？ 目前一种普遍的解决方案是对于二氧化碳的排放实施税收管制，也就是说针对那些由于生产环节而产生二氧化碳的企业，或是产品本身（例如汽油）的使用导致二氧化碳排放的企业增加税收。


Such a tax would cause electricity companies and industrial firms to adopt techniques that reduce their CO2 emissions, as long as the cost of doing so is less than the tax that they would otherwise have to pay.	目的是使得电力公司和其他工业企业改进工艺，减少二氧化碳的排放，只要是税金的数额高于工业改造的成本，他们就会选择后者。


The higher cost of production incurred to reduce emissions – and of any emissions tax still due – would, of course, be included in the price charged to consumers.	如果对生产企业加增赋税——目前这些税种还没有开始实施——必然的结果就是，这些负担将会被转嫁到消费者头上。


Consumers would respond to the tax-induced increase in the cost of the emissions-intensive products by reducing their consumption of those goods and services in favor of goods and services that create smaller amounts of CO2 emissions.	而由于产品价格的升高，消费者自然也会因此减少购买这些产品，转而购买那些排放二氧化碳较少的产品和服务。


A carbon tax causes each firm and household to respond to the same cost of adding CO2 to the atmosphere.	同样的，每一个家庭和公司都会受到排放税的影响。


That uniform individual cost incentive allows total CO2 to be reduced at a lower total cost than would be achieved by a variety of administrative requirements, such as automobile mileage standards, production technology standards (e.g., minimum renewable fuel inputs in electricity generation), etc.	政府可以通过行政的手段，迫使个人消费者减少二氧化碳的排放量，这如同汽车里程标准和其他一些产品技术标准（例如，在电动机中，有最小可再生汽油消耗量的标准。 ）一样。


Yet we do not see carbon taxes being adopted.	然而，目前我们并没有看到碳附加税的出台。


Although governments levy taxes on gasoline, they are reluctant to impose a general carbon tax because of public opposition to any form of taxation.	虽然汽油有附加税，考虑到公众的反对态度，政府不大可能采用一般碳附加税的做法。


Governments have therefore focused on a cap-and-trade system as a way of increasing the cost of CO2-intensive products without explicitly imposing a tax.	于是，政府采用了“总量管制和排放交易”系统来提高和二氧化碳相关产品的成本，以此来达到收税的一样的目的。


In a cap-and-trade system, the government sets total allowable national emissions of CO2 per year and requires any firm that causes CO2 emissions to have a permit per ton of CO2 emitted.	在“总量管制和排放交易”系统中，政府对国家每年可以排放二氧化碳的总量给出一个标准，对那些排放二氧化碳的公司，要求他们领取一定的执照。


If the government sells these permits in an auction, the price of the permit would be a cost to the firm in the same way as a carbon tax – and with the same resulting increases in consumer prices.	政府再对这些牌照进行竞价拍卖，如此一来，这些公司将会增加一定的成本，就如同碳税收一样——变相提高了产品的价格。


The cap-and-trade system thus imposes a carbon tax without having to admit that it is really a tax.	“总量管制和排放交易”系统实际上就相当于一种税收，只是不这么称呼而已。


A cap-and-trade system can cause serious risks to international trade.	“总量管制和排放交易”系统对国际贸易中有着非常严重的危害。


Even if every country has a cap-and-trade system and all aim at the same relative reduction in national CO2 emissions, the resulting permit prices will differ because of national differences in initial CO2 levels and in domestic production characteristics.	即使为了减少本国的碳排放量，世界上每个国家都有采取“总量管制和排放交易”系统。


Because the price of the CO2 permits in a country is reflected in the prices of its products, the cap-and-trade system affects its international competitiveness.	但由于各个国家的不同的二氧化碳水平排放水平以及国内产品上的差异性，每个国家的碳排放的执照价格就会不同， 由此影响到相对应产品的价格，从而影响到该产品在国际上的竞争力。


When the permit prices become large enough to have a significant effect on CO2 emissions, there will be political pressure to introduce tariffs on imports that offset the advantage of countries with low permit prices.	当执照的价格对二氧化碳的排放量影响力足够大时，国内就会有政治上的呼吁，要求对那些牌照费用较低国家的产品增收进口关税。


Such offsetting tariffs would have to differ among products (being higher on more CO2-intensive products) and among countries (being higher for countries with low permit prices).	这些关税也会因产品而异（排放二氧化碳越多的产品征收税额会越高）。


Such a system of complex differential tariffs is just the kind of protectionism that governments have been working to eliminate since the start of the GATT process more than 50 years ago.	这种复杂的税收体制其实就是各国政府的一种贸易保护主义措施，这种贸易保护主义早在50年前的关税贸易总协定中就已经被禁止使用。


Worse still, cap-and-trade systems in practice do not rely solely on auctions to distribute the emissions permits.	更为糟糕的是，“总量管制和排放交易”系统在实际操作中不仅仅是通过竞价拍卖来发放牌照。


The plan working its way through the United States Congress (the Waxman-Markey bill) would initially give away 85% of the permits, impose a complex set of regulatory policies, and allow companies to buy CO2 offsets (e.g., by paying for the planting of trees) instead of reducing their emissions or buying permits.	例如，美国国会通过实行一个复杂的立法政策，要求相关企业通过抵消二氧化碳的排放量（例如，栽种一定数量的树木的做法），来获得85%的排放执照。 如此复杂的系统将无法和其他国家的排放执照的费用加以比较。


Such complexities make it impossible to compare the impact of CO2 policies among countries, which in turn would invite those who want to protect domestic jobs to argue for higher tariff levels.	这样就会给那些想要保护本国就业机会的国家提供一定的借口，实施对外来产品的关税。


There is no easy answer to this problem.	看来，问题的解决远没有那么简单。


But before rushing to impose tariffs, it is important to remember that cap-and-trade policies would not be the only government source of differences in competitiveness.	在忙于推出关税之前，我们还应该知道，除了“总量管制和排放交易”系统，各国政府还有其他手段来提高本国的竞争力。


Better roads, ports, and even schools all contribute to a country’s competitiveness.	完善本国的公路，港口，甚至是建立较好的学校都能增加一个国家的竞争力。


No one attempts to use tariffs to balance those government-created differences in competitiveness, and there should be no such attempts if a cap-and-trade system is introduced.	我们不愿意看到政府用关税手段来影响产品的国际竞争力，这同样也违背了“总量管制和排放交易”系统的初衷。


If an international agreement to impose a cap-and-trade scheme is adopted in Copenhagen, the countries there should agree as well that there will be no attempt to introduce offsetting tariffs that would ultimately threaten our global system of free trade.	如果在本次哥本哈根会议上，“总量管制和排放交易”系统能够得以通过。 与会的国家还应该保证不会采用关税壁垒的手段，因为这将关乎到全球自由贸易系统的生死存亡。


Will China “Lose” the 2008 Olympics?	中国将“失去”2008年奥运会吗？


When the International Olympic Committee awarded Beijing the 2008 Summer Games in July 2001, the announcement ignited wild celebrations across the country.	当国际奥委会在2001年7月将2008年夏季奥运会的主办权授予北京时，整个国家都陷入欢腾之中。


The Chinese Communist Party hoped to use the Games to showcase the country’s emergence as a dynamic, modern nation.	中国共产党希望用这次奥运会来展示这个国家已经成长为一个充满活力、现代化的国家。


But as China’s leaders begin final preparations for the Games next August, they may be wondering if hosting the event was such a good idea after all.	但是当中国的领导人正在为明年八月举办的奥运会作最后的准备时，他们也许正怀疑举办这样一次运动会到底是不是一个那么美妙的主意。


They have significant reasons for doubt.	他们很有理由要对此表示怀疑。


China’s senior leaders always closely monitor spontaneous public expressions of nationalist fervor, fearful that shifting winds might blow an unwelcome storm in their direction.	中国的高层领导人总是密切地监视公众自发表现出的民族主义狂热，担心转动的风向也许会发起针对他们的不受欢迎的风暴。


Of course what they hope is that the Games will channel these energies toward national solidarity, which will allow the leadership to deliver its people a moment of achievement and patriotic glory.	他们希望的当然是奥运会能把这些能量引向民族的团结，从而使领导层能够给它的人民带去一个充满成就和爱国主义荣耀的时刻。


But the Olympics will also bring intense international scrutiny of China’s weaknesses at a delicate moment in the country’s development.	但是奥运会也会带来国际社会对正处于国家发展微妙阶段的中国的弱点的密切观察。


The world already knows of China’s success and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, but few outsiders have seen firsthand the steep price the country is paying for its new prosperity.	世界已经了解到了中国的成功以及它对外商投资的吸引力，但是很少有外人能够亲眼看到这个国家为它新的繁荣所付出的高昂代价。


The most obvious signs of that cost flow through the country’s waterways and contaminate its air.	最明显的迹象是流动在这个国家的河道和弥漫在空气中的代价。


Runaway growth and development have left about 70% of China’s lakes and rivers severely polluted, many unfit for human use of any kind.	快速的经济增长使中国大约70%的河流遭到了严重的污染，许多已经不适合人类进行任何形式的使用了。


Indeed, nearly a half-billion Chinese lack access to clean drinking water, and the number of terminally polluted rivers and lakes grows daily.	事实上，几乎有近五亿中国人无法获得干净的饮用水，而遭到严重污染的江河湖泊的数量每天都在增加。


But air quality will prove the more embarrassing problem next August.	但是空气质量将会在明年八月被证明是一个更令人尴尬的难题。


Television coverage of athletes gasping for breath will hardly provide Beijing with the signature Olympic image it had in mind, and growing international anxiety over climate change and other environmental hazards will ensure that such issues receive considerable media coverage.	运动员呼吸苦难的电视画面很难让北京获得它心目中想留给人们的奥运会形象，而国际社会对气候变化及其他环境灾害的日益关注肯定会使媒体大量地关注这些问题。


There is also the risk that the Games will become a political circus, as the international spotlight generates irresistible opportunities for public protest.	同时奥运会还存在成为一场政治马戏的危险，因为国际社会对奥运会的关注给公众抗议活动带来了令人难以拒绝的机会。


The Chinese leadership has demonstrated many times that it can quell domestic dissent, but the unique scale of the Olympics will require round-the-clock vigilance.	中国的领导层已经多次展示了它压制国内不满声音的能力，但是像奥运会这样大规模的盛会需要一天二十四小时不停地保持警戒。


Activists with grievances over Tibet, Taiwan, Burma, Darfur, and dozens of other political, environmental, and human-rights issues are already making plans.	对西藏、台湾、缅甸、达尔富尔和许多其他政治、环境和人权问题感到不满的激进分子已经在进行筹划了。


Is China ready for Greenpeace, Human Rights in China, Amnesty International, and Falun Gong supporters to take to the streets, with thousands of foreign journalists hungry for stories and asking questions that the authorities are unaccustomed to answering?	中国已经准备好如何应对绿色和平组织、人权在中国、国际特赦组织和法轮功的支持者走上街头，还有数千名渴望寻找故事素材并且会问一些当局不习惯回答的问题的外国记者了吗？


Even if police are able to maintain order in Beijing, can they extend that control across the country?	即便警察能够维持北京的秩序，但是他们能够控制整个国家吗？


Can they manage the flow of information and ideas through the blogosphere as online activists open yet another front in their battle for free information?	他们能够限制通过网志空间传播的信息和思想吗？ 因为网上的激进分子已经开辟了他们为信息自由而战的另一条战线。


What we do know that Chinese officials have never faced a challenge of this scale with such a potential to both win and lose face.	我们所知道的是中国的官员而从来没有这样大规模的可能使他们在赢得脸面的同时也失去脸面的挑战。


The Games will generate significant foreign-policy risks as well.	奥运会同时也会带来严重的外交政策风险。


In Taiwan, outgoing President Chen Shui-bian is stirring the independence pot, knowing that the Olympic spotlight will limit Beijing’s ability to respond forcefully.	台湾即将离任的总统陈水扁正在掀起独立运动，因为他知道对奥运会的关注会限制北京做出强硬反应的能力。


He has already proposed a popular referendum on Taiwanese membership in the United Nations.	他已经提出要在台湾加入联合国的问题进行全民公投。


China’s influence within the UN would prevent such a move even if Taiwan voted yes, but an international confrontation is the last thing China wants coinciding with the Olympics.	即便台湾人表决同意加入联合国，中国在联合国内的影响力也会阻止这样的行动，但是国际对抗是中国在奥运会举办期间最不想发生的事情。


Then there is the matter of how the Games will be received in the West.	另外还有西方国家如何接受奥运会的问题。


Since 2001, China has increasingly become the focal point of much anxiety in the developed world.	自从2001年以来，中国越来越成为发达国家严重忧虑的焦点。


Huge bilateral trade deficits, accusations that China keeps its currency undervalued, and a rash of defective and dangerous Chinese-made exports have fueled a protectionist backlash in the United States and Europe.	巨额的双边贸易赤字、对中国让货币保持在低水平的谴责、中国出口的产品一再发生质量低劣以及危险性的问题遭到了美国和欧洲的保护主义者的强烈抗议。


Amid bitter election-year debates over Iraq and Iran, and a souring economic outlook, Americans may be in no mood for the triumphalist pageantry of a new rising power on display in Beijing.	在选举年对伊拉克和伊朗问题进行的激烈辩论中，以及经济前景的暗淡使美国人也许没有心思关注在北京上演的一个新崛起的大国胜利主义者的盛大场面。


Will China’s uneasy Asian neighbors be any more receptive?	中国那些感到不安的亚洲邻国会更接受这场盛会吗？


International criticism is sure to follow if something, anything, goes wrong during the Games, especially if it involves the suppression of dissent and is vectored around the world via 24-hour cable television and the Internet.	如果在奥运会期间有什么事或者任何事出了差错，国际的批评家可能会穷追不舍，尤其是如果它压制不满的声音并且通过有线电视和因特网将消息24小时不间断地传播到整个世界的话。


China has changed since it “won” the 2008 games seven years ago.	自从七年前“赢得”2008年奥运会的举办权以来中国已经发生了巨大的变化。


The Party leadership has grown more self-assured in its growing international role, but its ability to manage the pace of change at home has become more uncertain.	共产党的领导层因为它在国际社会越来越高的地位而变得更加自信，但是它是否能跟上国内所发生的变化的步伐也变得更加不确定了。


In 2001, then President Jiang Zemin hoped the Games would herald China’s arrival as an industrialized power.	在2001年时，当时的国家主席江泽民希望奥运会能够展现中国已经成为一个工业化强国。


But his successor, Hu Jintao, has focused on the damage that has come from unrestrained growth.	但是他的继任者胡锦涛则把注意力集中在无节制的发展所造成的危害上。


He and Premier Wen Jiabao have also championed a more “harmonious” society, because they understand that the growing wealth gap, social tensions, environmental and public health problems, and the Party’s tenuous relationship with China’s less advantaged people can no longer be neglected.	胡锦涛和总理温家宝还提倡更加“和谐”的社会，因为他们认识到越拉越大的贫富差距、社会矛盾、环境和公共健康问题以及党与中国的劣势人群的紧张关系都是不能够再忽视的问题。


As China’s leaders scramble to address these challenges, will they still relish the idea of providing an international audience with front-row seats?	当中国的领导人艰难地应对这些挑战时，他们还有心思为国际社会的观众提供前排的座位吗？


How they look back on the Games once the confetti is swept from the streets is far from certain.	我们还不知道等到大街上的彩纸屑散去时他们会怎样回头看这届奥运会。


Will China’s Capitalist Revolution Turn Democratic	中国的资本主义革命能否转变为民主化


Communist China has experienced a monumental capitalist revolution in the last two decades, with an economy that is now six times bigger than it was 20 years ago.	过去二十年中，共产中国经历了资本主义革命巨变，其现今的经济总量是二十年前的6倍。


A minor player in the global economy in the 1980’s, China today is the world’s third largest trading power.	二十世纪八十年代中国在全球经济中还微不足道，如今，它已经是世界第三大贸易大国。


But if these stunning economic statistics make you think that so much capitalist development must also have brought more democracy to China, think again.	但是，如果这些耀人的经济数据让你以为如此多的资本主义发展必定给中国带来了更多的民主，那你就需要三思了。


Most Westerners believe in a theory of liberal evolution, according to which sustained economic growth, by increasing wealth and the size of the middle class, gradually makes a country more democratic.	大多数西方人相信自由演变的理论。 根据这一理论，持续的经济增长提高财富、扩大中产阶级的规模，将逐步让国家变得更为民主。


While the long-run record of this theory is irrefutable, China’s authoritarian ruling elite is not only determined to hold on to power, but it also has been smart enough to take adaptive measures aimed at countering the liberalizing effects of economic development.	尽管这一理论的长期性纪录毋庸置疑，但是，中国专制主义统治精英不仅决心保持权力，而且，它已经聪明之极，采取适应性措施，目的在于打击经济发展的自由化效果。


Thus, for all its awe-inspiring economic achievement, China has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization.	因此，尽管取得了令人仰慕的经济发展成就，中国在政治自由化方面依然裹足不前。


Indeed, judging by several key indicators, progress toward democracy in China has stalled, despite unprecedented economic prosperity and personal freedom.	实际上，根据几项关键性指标来评估，尽管中国取得了前所未有的经济繁荣和个人自由，其朝向民主的进步已经停滞。


For instance, in the mid-1980’s, Chinese leaders seriously discussed and later drew up a blueprint for modest democratic reforms.	例如，八十年代中期，中国领导人认真地讨论并后来制定了温和的民主改革的蓝图。


Today, the topic of political reform is taboo.	今天，政治改革的话题是禁区。


Nearly all the major institutional reforms, such as strengthening the legislature, holding village elections, and building a modern legal system, were launched in the 1980’s.	几乎所有主要的机构性改革，例如加强人大、举行乡村选举以及建立现代司法制度等都是在八十年代发起的。


Since the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, however, not a single major democratic reform initiative has been implemented.	但是，自从1989年6月天安门广场屠杀以来，没有任何一个主要的民主改革项目得到了实行。


Instead of democratic transition, China has witnessed a consolidation of authoritarian rule – the strengthening of a one-party regime through organizational learning and adaptation.	中国不仅没有实行民主转型，其专制统治，也就是通过组织上的学习和改造强化一党统治反而得到了加强。


Since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing a two-pronged strategy: selective repression that targets organized political opposition and co-optation of new social elites (the intelligentsia, professionals, and private entrepreneurs).	1989年以来，中国共产党一直实行两手策略，即针对有组织的政治反对派进行有选择的镇压以及拉拢收买社会精英（知识分子、专业人员以及私营企业家）。


This strategy emphasizes the maintenance of an extensive law enforcement apparatus designed to eliminate any incipient organized opposition.	这一策略强调维持庞大的执法力量，目的在于消灭任何早期的有组织反对势力。


Huge investments have strengthened the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a large anti-riot paramilitary force whose specialty is the quick suppression of anti-government protests by disgruntled industrial workers, peasants, and urban residents.	武警是一支庞大的半军事化防暴力量，专门用来迅速镇压怨声载道的产业工人、农民和城市居民的反政府抗议。 中共投入巨资加强其力量。


Frequent deployment of the PAP is a major reason why the tens of thousands of collective protests that occur each year (74,000 in 2004 and 86,000 in 2005) have had a negligible impact on China’s overall stability.	时常调集武警，因此，每年数以万计的集体抗议事件（2004年7万4千起，2005年8万6千起）对中国的整体稳定无关痛痒。


To deal with new emerging political threats, such as the information revolution, the Chinese government has spent mightily on manpower and technology.	为了应付类似信息革命等新涌现的政治威胁，中国政府花费巨资增强人员和技术。


A special 30,000-strong police unit monitors and screens Internet traffic, advanced technology is deployed to block access to overseas Web sites considered “hostile or harmful,” and Internet service and content providers, both domestic and Western, must comply with onerous restrictions designed to suppress political dissent and track down offenders.	3万多人组成的特别网警监视和过滤互联网内容，采用先进技术阻挡被认为是“敌对和有害”的海外网站。 国内和西方的互联网服务和内容供应商必须遵守严格的限制措施，目的在于压制政治异议以及追踪违反者。


The regime has even conducted multi-agency exercises to test whether different government bodies could cooperate closely to keep “harmful information” off the Net during an emergency.	中共甚至举行了多部门的演习来测试不同的政府部门是否能够紧密合作，在紧急情况下将“有害信息”拒之于网门之外。


Having learned from the collapse of the Soviet Union that a bureaucratic ruling party must co-opt new social elites to deprive potential opposition groups of leaders, the Communist Party has conducted an effective campaign of expanding its social base.	中共从苏联解体中得到教训，那就是官僚的执政党必须拉拢新的社会精英来剥夺潜在反对团伙的领导人，因此，它有效地扩大了其社会基础。


The urban intelligentsia and professionals have been pampered with material perks and political recognition, while new private entrepreneurs have been allowed to join the Party.	城市知识分子和专业人员大举获得物质实惠和政治承认，而新兴的私营企业家则被允许入党。


This strategy of pre-emptive political decapitation has produced enormous dividends for the Party.	中共从这种先发制人的政治斩首战略中获益不少。


In the 1980’s, its principal adversaries were the urban intelligentsia, who constituted the backbone of the pro-democracy movement that culminated in Tiananmen Square.	八十年代，中共的主要对手是城市知识分子，他们构成了要求民主运动的骨干力量，这场运动最终导致天安门事件。


Today, the mainstream of the Chinese intelligentsia is an integral part of the ruling elite.	今天，中国知识分子的主流是统治精英不可或缺的一部分。


Many have joined the Party and become government officials, and a large percentage enjoy various professional and financial privileges.	许多人已经入党当官，还有很大一部分人则享受专业和财政上的特权。


Predictably, the intelligentsia, usually the most liberal social group, is no longer a lethal threat to party rule.	不难想见，知识分子尽管通常是最为自由化的社会团体，但是他们已经不再是中共统治的致命威胁了。


Worse, without support from this strategic group, other social groups, such as workers and peasants, have become politically marginalized and rudderless.	更糟的是，没有这一战略性团体的支持，其他社会团体，例如工人和农民已经在政治上被边缘化了，而且群龙无首。


Although the Party’s carrot-and-stick approach has worked since 1989, it is doubtful that it will retain its efficacy for another 17 years.	尽管中共的胡萝卜加大棒的政策自1989年以来一直奏效，它能够在下一个17年里维持其效力还很难说。


To the extent that China’s authoritarian regime is by nature exclusionary (it can only incorporate a limited number of elites), the co-optation strategy will soon run up against its limits, and the Party will no longer have the resources to buy off the intelligentsia or keep private entrepreneurs happy.	只要中国的专制统治政权在本质上排除异己（它只能吸纳数量有限的精英），拉拢收买策略不久就会黔驴技穷，而中共也就不会再有资源来收买知识分子或者让私营企业家心满意足。


At the same time, selective repression can contain social frustrations and discontent only temporarily.	与此同时，有选择性的打压只能暂时控制社会失望和不满。


As long as much of Chinese society views the current political system as unjust, unresponsive, and corrupt, there will always be a large reservoir of ill will toward the ruling elites.	只要中国社会的大部分都认为当前的政治体制不公正、麻木不仁以及腐败，那么，就会有大量的朝向统治精英的恶意。


When things go wrong – as is likely, given mounting social strains caused by rising inequality, environmental degradation, and deteriorating public services – China’s alienated masses could become politically radicalized.	鉴于不平等加剧、环境破坏以及日益崩溃的公共服务引发不断上涨的社会压力，形势有可能恶化。 持敌对意见的中国大众有可能在政治上极端化。


And, unlike past protests, which have usually been allied with students or members of the intelligentsia, popular disaffection might not have the virtue of rational leaders with whom the government could talk and negotiate.	以往的抗议大多与学生或知识分子结盟，与此不同的是，大众的不满不大可能具有理性的、政府可以对话和谈判的领导人了。


So it may be premature for the Party to celebrate the success of its adaptive strategy.	所以，中共现在庆贺其适应策略的胜利为时尚早。


China’s rulers may have stalled democratic trends for now, but the current strategy has, perhaps, merely delayed the inevitable.	中国的统治者现在可能拖延了民主趋势，但是，目前的策略可能只不过是推迟了不可避免的事情。


The Mirage of the Financial Singularity	金融奇点的幻象


NEW HAVEN – In their new book The Incredible Shrinking Alpha, Larry E. Swedroe and Andrew L. Berkin describe an investment environment populated by increasingly sophisticated analysts who rely on big data, powerful computers, and scholarly research.	发自纽黑文——在拉里·E·斯威德罗和安德烈·L·博尔金发表的新书，《不可思议的高回报萎缩》中，他们描述了一个充斥着日渐老练的高精尖分析员依赖大数据，超级电脑和学术研究成果工作的投资环境。


With all this competition, “the hurdles to achieving alpha [returns above a risk-adjusted benchmark – and thus a measure of success in picking individual investments] are getting higher and higher.”	在所有这些竞争态势之下，“实现高回报（也就是获取高于所承担风险基准的回报并以此制定一个挑选各单一投资方式的成功策略）的门槛将越来越高”。


That conclusion raises a key question: Will alpha eventually go to zero for every imaginable investment strategy?	这一结论产生了一个关键问题：对于所有人类可以设想出的投资策略来说，高回报是否最终会归零？


More fundamentally, is the day approaching when, thanks to so many smart people and smarter computers, financial markets really do become perfect, and we can just sit back, relax, and assume that all assets are priced correctly?	更根本的是，是否有一天，在所有这些聪明人和更聪明的电脑的作用下，金融市场会否最终达到了完美的平衡，而我们只需要坐在那里什么都不干，并假设所有资产都被合理的定价？


This imagined state of affairs might be called the financial singularity, analogous to the hypothetical future technological singularity, when computers replace human intelligence.	这个想象中的状况或许可被称为金融奇点，也是一个与设想中的未来科技奇点相似的东西，也就是电脑会代替人类智能。


The financial singularity implies that all investment decisions would be better left to a computer program, because the experts with their algorithms have figured out what drives market outcomes and reduced it to a seamless system.	而金融奇点则意味着，所有的投资决策最好留给电脑程序去决定，因为那些算法研究专家们已经找出了驱动市场表现的背后动力，并将其精简成为了一个天衣无缝的系统


Many believe that we are almost there.	许多人相信我们离那天不远了。


Even legendary investors like Warren Buffett, it is argued, are not really outperforming the market.	甚至认为即便是像沃伦·巴菲特这样的传奇投资者其实也并没有表现得比市场更好。


In a recent paper, “Buffett’s Alpha,” Andrea Frazzini and David Kabiller of AQR Capital Management and Lasse Pedersen of Copenhagen Business School, conclude that Buffett is not generating significantly positive alpha if one takes account of certain lesser-known risk factors that have weighed heavily in his portfolio. The implication is that Buffet’s genius could be replicated by a computer program that incorporates these factors.	在最近发表的一篇名为《巴菲特高回报》的文章中，AQR资本管理的安德烈·法兹尼和戴维·卡比勒，以及哥本哈根商学院的拉斯·佩德森总结认为，如果考虑到巴菲特投资组合中某些权重极大的但不太为人知的风险因素，他其实并未获取非常巨大的正回报，暗示巴菲特的天赋是可以被一个综合协调所有这些因素的电脑程序所替代的。


If that were true, investors would abandon, en masse, their efforts to ferret out mispricing in the market, because there wouldn’t be any.	如果这是真的话，投资者们会立刻全体行动，放弃尝试纠正市场错误定价的努力，因为不会再存在任何错误定价了。


Market participants would rationally assume that every stock price is the true expected present value of future cash flows, with the appropriate rate of discount, and that those cash flows reflect fundamentals that everyone understands the same way.	市场参与者们会理性的假设每一个股价都是未来现金流预期的真实当前体现，而且折价率也非常恰当，而所有人对那些现金流所反映的基本面的理解都是一致的。


Investors’ decisions would diverge only because of differences in their personal situation.	投资者决策只是因为他们个人状况的不同而有所不同。


For example, an automotive engineer might not buy automotive stocks – and might even short them – as a way to hedge the risk to his or her own particular type of human capital.	比如说一个汽车工程师可能不会购买汽车公司的股票甚至会故意做空其中某个股票，以便对冲他或者她自身特定种类的人力资本风险。


Indeed, according to a computer crunching big data, this would be an optimal decision.	事实上，对于一个拼命处理大数据的电脑来说，这才是一个最优选项。


There is a long-recognized problem with such perfect markets: No one would want to expend any effort to figure out what oscillations in prices mean for the future.	但这些完美市场也存在一个长期被认识到的问题：没人再会花费任何精力去找出价格的波动对未来意味着什么。


Thirty-five years ago, in their classic paper, “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz presented this problem as a paradox: Perfectly efficient markets require the effort of smart money to make them so; but if markets were perfect, smart money would give up trying.	在经典论文《论信息有效市场的不可能性》中，森福德·格罗斯曼和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨将这一问题视作一个矛盾个体：完美有效的市场需要聪明的资金不断努力去达到完美，但一旦市场变成了完美，这些聪明的资金将不会再进行任何运作了。


The Grossman-Stiglitz conundrum seems less compelling in the financial singularity if we can imagine that computers direct all the investment decisions.	但如果我们想象只有电脑来指导所有投资决策的话，格罗斯曼-斯蒂格利茨迷题什么似乎在金融奇点方面缺乏说服力。


Although alpha may be vanishingly small, it still represents enough profit to keep the computers running.	虽然高回报或许会小得不能再小，但始终意味着足够的利益去让这些电脑继续运作。


But the real problem with this vision of financial singularity is not the Grossman-Stiglitz conundrum; it is that real-world markets are nowhere close to it.	但对于这一金融奇点未来图景的真正问题并不是格罗斯曼-斯蒂格利茨迷题，而是真实的市场跟这就跟这个完全不相似。


Computer enthusiasts are excited by things like the blockchain used by Bitcoin (covered on an education website called Singularity University, in a section dramatically titled Exponential Finance).	电脑爱好者们会为比特币所用的阻断链欢呼雀跃（由一个叫基点大学的教育网站中戏剧化地命名为指数金融的部分所描述)。


But the futurists’ financial world bears no resemblance to today’s financial world.	但未来主义者的金融世界可能与目前的金融事件没有任何相似之处。


After all, the financial singularity implies that all prices would be based on such things as optimally projected future corporate profits and the correlation of profits with expected technological innovations and long-term demographic changes.	毕竟金融基点意味着所有的价格将会基于最优投射的未来企业盈利，以及这些盈利与预期的技术革新和长期人口结构变化的相关性。


But the smart money hardly ever talks in such ethereal terms.	但那些聪明资金却绝少谈及这些超现实的词汇。


In this context, it is difficult not to think of China’s recent stock-market plunge.	在这一背景下很难不去联想起中国市场最近的股票大跌。


News accounts depict hordes of emotional people trading on hunch and superstition.	新闻里描述成群像游牧民族般狂热的人们凭着直觉和迷信进行交易。


That looks a lot more like reality than all the talk of impending financial singularity.	而相比于所谓的金融奇点来说，这更像真实的市场。


Markets seem to be driven by stories, as I emphasize in my book Irrational Exuberance. There are stories of great new eras and of looming depressions.	正如在我的新书《非理性充沛》中写的那样，市场似乎是有故事驱动的，同时也存在着伟大新时代和衰退即将逼近的故事，也有一些基本面故事关于技术和资源枯竭的，还有关于政治和令人瞠目结舌的阴谋的故事。


No one knows if these stories are true, but they take on a life of their own.	没人知道这些故事是否是真的，但这些故事却有着自身的生命力。


Sometimes they go viral.	有时这些故事像病毒一样传播。


When one has a heart-to-heart talk with many seemingly rational people, they turn out to have crazy theories.	当你和许多看上去似乎理性的人深入交谈的时候，他们都会满嘴疯狂理论。


These people influence markets, because all other investors must reckon with them; and their craziness is not going away anytime soon.	这些人会影响市场，因为其他所有的投资者都必须参考他们的决策，而他们的疯狂也不会在短期内消失。


Maybe Buffett’s past investing style can be captured in a trading algorithm today.	或许巴菲特过去的投资风格可以被当今一个交易算法所模仿。


But that does not necessarily detract from his genius.	但这不一定会有损于他的天才。


Indeed, the true source of his success may consist in his understanding of when to abandon one method and devise another.	事实上，他成功的真正源泉或许是因为他能理解是什么时候应当放弃一个投资手法并选择另外一种。


The idea of financial singularity may seem inspiring; but it is no less illusory than the rational Utopia that inspired generations of central planners.	金融奇点的理论似乎除非常振奋人心，但是这也并不比那些鼓舞了数代中央计划者的理性乌托帮一样虚幻。


Human judgment, good and bad, will drive investment decisions and financial-market outcomes for the rest of our lives and beyond.	人类的判断，无论是好还是坏，都将在我们的余生甚至更长时间推动投资决策和金融市场表现。


Will Europe Be Willing but Disabled?	欧洲非不为，乃不能乎？


NEWPORT BEACH – When it comes to describing Europe’s ever-worsening crisis, metaphors abound.	纽波特海滩—在描述欧洲不断恶化的危机时，可谓遍地隐喻。


For some, it is five minutes to midnight; for others, Europe is a car accelerating towards the edge of a cliff.	一些人说，太晚了； 另一些人说，欧洲就像是开足了马力驶向悬崖的汽车。


For all, a perilous existential moment is increasingly close at hand.	所有人都说，生死存亡的时刻越来越近了。


Optimists – fortunately, there remain a few, especially in Europe itself – believe that when the situation becomes really critical, political leaders will turn things around and put Europe back on the path of economic growth, job creation, and financial stability.	乐观派——幸运的是，这类人依然存在，特别是在欧洲存在——认为当临界时刻真的来临时，政治领导人会力挽狂澜，把欧洲带回经济增长、就业创造和金融稳定的正规上来。


But pessimists have been growing in number and influence.	但悲观派的人数和影响力正在与日俱增。


They see political dysfunction adding to financial turmoil, thereby amplifying the eurozone’s initial design flaws.	他们看到，在金融动荡之外，政治瘫痪正在发生，这扩大了欧元区原始设计漏洞。


Of course, who is ultimately proven correct is a function of eurozone governments’ willingness to make the difficult decisions that are required, and in a coordinated and timely fashion.	当然，谁最终会被证明是正确的取决于欧元区各国政府是否愿意及时、合作地做出必须的决策。


But that is not the only determinant: governments must also be able to turn things around once the willingness to do so materializes.	但这并非唯一的决定因素：在“为”的意愿成为现实时，政府还必须“能”力挽狂澜。


And here, the endless delays are making the challenges more daunting and the outcome more uncertain.	而正是在这方面，没完没了的延迟让挑战越来越令人畏惧，也让结果越来越不确定。


Experienced observers remind us that crises, rather than vision, have tended to drive progress at critical stages of Europe’s historic integration – a multi-decade journey driven by the desire to ensure long-term peace and prosperity in what previously had been one of the world’s most violent regions and the site of appalling human suffering.	有经验的观察家提醒我们，危机，而不是愿景，更能在欧洲历史性一体化的关节阶段推动进步。 欧洲一体化是一个几十年的历程，其背后的推动力是对确保在这个曾经是全世界最暴力地区、饱受可怕人道灾难摧残的地区实现长期和平与繁荣的渴望。


After all, the European Union (including the eurozone’s 17 members) remains a collective of nation-states with notable divergences in economic, financial, and social conditions.	毕竟，欧盟（包括由17个成员国组成的欧元区）仍只是国家的组合，各国在经济、金融和社会条件诸方面存在巨大差异。


Cultural differences persist.	文化差异也持久存在着。


Political cycles are far from synchronized.	政治周期也远称不上同步。


And too many regional governance mechanisms, with the important exception of the European Central Bank, lack sufficient influence, credibility, and, therefore, effectiveness.	而太多的地区治理机制（欧洲央行是一个显著的例外）缺乏足够的影响力和信誉，从而效率低下。


Left to its own devices, such a grouping is vulnerable to recurrent bickering, disruptive posturing, and disagreement over visions of the future.	若任其自身自灭的话，这样一种组合极易因反复争吵、破坏性故作姿态以及在未来愿景问题上的分歧而深受伤害。


As a result, progress towards meaningful economic and political integration can be painfully slow during the good times.	结果，在好光景时，通往真正经济和政治一体化之路困难又缓慢。


But all of this can change rapidly when a crisis looms, especially if it threatens the integrity of the European project.	但若危机降临，所有这些都可以发生快速变化，特别是当危机威胁到欧洲工程的完整性时。


That is where the eurozone is today.	而欧元区如今就处于这样一个时刻。


A debt crisis that erupted in Greece, the eurozone’s outer periphery, has migrated with a vengeance towards the core, so much so that the survival of the eurozone itself is at stake.	欧元区外围国希腊所爆发的债务危机复仇般地朝核心国蔓延，以至于威胁到欧元区自身的生存。


The more the policy response has lagged, the broader the set of questions about Europe’s future has become.	政策反应月缓慢，关于欧洲未来的质疑声就越多。


Maintaining a 17-member monetary union is no longer a given.	维持17国组成的货币联盟已不再是理所当然之事。


Talk of countries exiting, starting with Greece (the “Grexit”), is now rampant.	让一些国家退出的声音——首先是希腊，称为“希腊退出”——现在已相当普遍。


And only hard-core idealists dismiss altogether the mounting risk of the eurozone’s total disintegration.	只有最顽固不化的理想主义者才会对日渐增加的欧元区总体瓦解危险视而不见。


Nonetheless, many veterans of the European integration project see a silver lining in the dark clouds massing over their creation.	尽管如此，许多经验丰富的欧洲一体化工程实验者还是在围绕他们的心血的阴云中看到了一丝曙光。


For them, only a crisis can stop politicians from just kicking various cans farther down the road and, instead, catalyze the policy initiatives – greater fiscal, banking, and political union – that, together with monetary union, would ensure that the eurozone rests on a stable and sustainable four-legged platform.	对他们来说，唯有危机才能让政客们停止得过且过的幻想，刺激政策出台，在货币联盟之上加以银行联盟和政治联盟，确保欧元区能有一个稳定而可持续的四脚平台。


But this view is not without its own risks.	但这一观点���不是没有风险的。


It assumes that, when push comes to shove, political leaders will indeed do what is necessary – the willingness question.	它包含一个假设，当事情演变为千钧一发时，政治领导人真会去应该做的事情——这是“为”的问题。


It also presumes that they will have the capacity to do so – the ability question.	它还包含另一个假设，政治领导人有能力做这些事——这是“能”的问题。


And, over time, uncertainty concerning the latter question has risen to an uncomfortable level.	而随着时间的推移，后一个问题上的不确定性已上升到了令人不安的水平。


Today’s eurozone is beset by an unprecedented degree of rejection – on economic, financial, political, and social grounds – by citizens in a growing number of countries.	眼下，欧元区正深陷前所未有的不合作态度的重围，越来越多的国家的国民在经济、金融、政治和社会领域无法达成一致。


The longer this persists, the harder it will be for politicians to maintain control of their countries’ destinies and that of Europe’s collective enterprise.	这一状况持续得越久，政客就越难控制国家命运，欧洲这一集体的未来也就越悬。


Private-sector activity is slowing, and it is nearing a standstill in the eurozone’s most vulnerable economy (Greece), where a bank run is in full swing.	私人部门活动正在放缓，在欧元区最疲软经济体（希腊，那里正在爆发全面银行挤兑）更是接近停滞。


Elsewhere, too, depositors are beginning to transfer their savings to the strongest economy (Germany) and to safe havens beyond (Switzerland and the United States).	在其他地方，存款人也在开始将储蓄转移到欧元区内最坚挺经济体（德国）和区外安全港（瑞士和美国）。


Weaker companies are shedding labor, while stronger firms are delaying investments in plant and equipment.	疲软公司正在裁员，坚挺公司则推迟了厂房和设备投资。


And global investors continue to exit the eurozone in droves, shifting countries’ liabilities to taxpayers and the ECB’s balance sheet.	全球投资者继续蜂拥逃离欧元区，各国负债不断地被转移给纳税人和欧洲央行。


No wonder that social unrest is evident in a growing number of countries.	毫无疑问，越来越多的国家已经出现显而易见的社会动荡迹象。


No wonder that fringe political movements are gaining traction throughout the eurozone.	毫无疑问，边缘政治运动正在整个欧元区赢得动力。


And no wonder that voters in almost two-thirds of eurozone countries have turned out the incumbents in their most recent elections.	毫无疑问，近三分之二欧元区国家的选民在最近的选举中抛弃了现任政府。


All of this serves to undermine the effectiveness of government policies – by reducing their credibility, clogging their channels of transmission to the economy, and making it difficult to offset the withdrawal of private-sector capital and spending.	所有这些都削弱了政府政策的效率——损害了政策的信誉、堵住了政策向经济的传播渠道、增加了抵消私人部门资本和支出减少的难度。


As a result, the market-based economic and financial systems that prevail in Europe, and that, not so long ago, were a source of significant strength, are losing their vibrancy.	结果，在欧洲处于绝对优势地位、不久前仍是欧洲主要优势之所在的市场经济和金融体系正在丧失活力。


I, too, am fond of metaphors.	我对隐喻也感兴趣。


During a trip to the continent last week, I heard one that captures very well the key dynamic in Europe today.	上周，我对欧洲大陆进行了访问，期间我听说了一个能够很好地抓住当今欧洲动态关键点的隐喻。


The eurozone’s leaders are on a raft heading towards a life-threatening waterfall.	欧元区领导人正身处一艘救生筏上。 这艘救生筏正在驶向致命瀑布。


The longer they wait, the more the raft gains speed.	欧元区领导人等得越久，救生筏的速度就越快。


So the outcome no longer depends only on their willingness to cooperate in order to navigate the raft to safety. It also hinges on their ability to do so in the midst of natural forces that are increasingly difficult to control and overcome.	因此，结果不仅取决于他们愿不愿意合作以改变救生筏方向驶向安全，也取决于他们能不能做到这一点——他们所处的自然环境意味着控制和赢得胜利的难度正变得越来越大。


The message is clear.	形势十分明朗。


The current crisis might indeed eventually break eurozone leaders’ inherent resistance to compromise, collaboration, and common action.	当前的危机或许确实能够在最终打破欧元区领导人对妥协、合作、采取共同行动的天生抵制。


But the longer they bicker and dither, the greater the risk that what they gain in willingness will be lost to incapacity.	但他们争吵和犹豫的时间越长，他们在“为”方面所取得的进展因“能”方面的欠缺而沦为于事无补的风险就越大。


Will Europe Learn to Love Bush?	欧洲会开始喜欢布什吗？


President George W. Bush will soon travel to Europe, and President Jacques Chirac will visit Washington.	布什总统即将展开欧洲之行，而希拉克总统也即将访问华盛顿。


EU “Foreign Minister” Javier Solana has already been there, and returned bullish on future transatlantic cooperation.	欧盟的“外交部长” 贾维尔·索拉纳已先期到过华府，归来后对跨大西洋合作的未来豪情万丈。


Atmospherically, at least, relations have, indeed, improved since the US presidential election, and both sides have expressed good will.	从气氛上看，至少欧美之间的关系自美国总统大选之后确实有所改善，且双方都表示过良好的意愿。


Yet there is little ground for genuine optimism.	然而，这还不足以让我们对此感到真正的乐观。


Bush’s declared intention to “better explain the reasons for his decisions” to America’s Allies simply will not do.	布什所宣称的向其盟国“更好地解释他的决策理由”的意图不会奏效。


Europeans don’t want explanations; they want to be consulted – to have input into American decision-making and see their concerns reflected in US foreign policy.	欧洲人不想听解释； 他们想要协商—影响美国的决策并看到他们所关注的问题从美国的外交政策中反映出来。


None of this is likely to happen.	而这样的情况似乎不会发生。


On the contrary, the US is continuing to thwart European efforts gradually to establish a rule-based international order.	相反，美国正继续阻碍欧洲的努力以求建立一种以统治为基础的国际秩序。


There are no signs that the Bush administration is relenting on, for example, the UN, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the ban on land mines, or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.	布什政府对例如联合国、《京都议定书》、国际刑事法院、禁止地雷或反弹道导弹公约等事务方面也没有态度缓和的迹象。


In Iraq, Europeans fully share the American objectives of preserving the country’s unity and achieving at least some modicum of democracy.	在伊拉克，欧洲人完全支持美国维护该国统一和至少实现一定程度民主的目标。


At the same time, they believe that it is up to the US to remove the chaos it created, so they are reluctant to contribute to the task in a substantive way.	同时，他们认为美国应该为其造成的混乱负责，所以不愿为实现这一目标做出实质性的贡献。


European attitudes may seem shortsighted to Americans, but it would need a lot of cajoling to change them.	在美国人看来，欧洲的态度未免有点鼠目寸光，但要使欧洲人改变这一点需要美国付出相当的努力。


There is general agreement on the aims to be achieved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the end of violence and a peaceful solution based on the concept of two sovereign states.	欧美在解决巴以冲突要达成的目标方面也有共识：终止暴力和一个以两个主权国家的理念为基础的和平解决方案。


However, Europeans consider the opinion recently expressed by Bush – that Palestinian democracy and not Israeli occupation of the West Bank is at the core of the problem – to be ill conceived.	然而，欧洲人认为布什最近发表的关于巴勒斯坦的民主而非以色列对约旦河西岸的占领才是问题核心的言论有失妥当。


The same is true with respect to the President’s assertion that Israel’s permanent presence in Palestinian territories and the non-return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in Israel must be accepted as realities on the ground.	同样欠妥的，还有布什关于必须接受以色列在巴领土上的永久性存在和不允许巴勒斯坦难民重返其以色列家园这些既成事实的言论。


It may well be that such painful deviations from agreed principles will be reflected in an eventual comprehensive settlement, but prejudging these issues before the beginning of negotiations denies the Palestinians some of their most important bargaining chips.	这种对公认原则的严重背离最终很可能以混合的聚居点的形式反映出来，但在谈判还未开始之前就给这些问题盖棺定论实际上就剥夺了巴勒斯坦方面一些最重要的谈判筹码。


On the question of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, Americans and Europeans also fundamentally agree: it should be prevented.	在伊朗制造核武的能力问题上，欧美双方的根本立场是一致的：应该防止。


While the US tries to achieve this through hard power, regime change, sanctions, and threats of pre-emptive military intervention, Europe uses soft power, diplomacy, inclusion, and partnership.	当美国试图通过硬权力、改变政权、制裁和以先发制人的武装干涉相威胁来达到其目的时，欧洲却采用了软权力、外交、接触和伙伴关系的策略。


Unfortunately, this “good cop, bad cop” game doesn’t work in international politics.	不幸的是，这种“好警察，坏警察”的游戏在国际政治中却是行不通的。


European efforts to induce Teheran to renounce its nuclear designs by addressing Iran’s legitimate security concerns and offering important opportunities for economic and social betterment cannot be successful without active US support.	欧洲致力于通过正视伊朗合法的安全考虑和为其提供经济及社会发展的重要机会来促使德黑兰断绝设计核武的意图。 但这种努力没有美国的支持就不能成功。


In other words, Europe’s carrots are not enough; a successful outcome requires American carrots, too.	换言之，欧洲的胡萝卜是不够的； 要取得成功还需要美国的怀柔。


By standing aside and discounting the European approach from the outset, America is merely helping to bring about a self-fulfilling prophecy.	美国从一开始就对欧洲的努力漠不关心，因此其作用充其量也只是帮助促成了一个自我实现的预言。


It would be more productive for the US to join in, at the same time agreeing with Europeans on measures to be taken should their combined efforts fail.	更有成效的做法是美国应该参与进来，同时与欧洲就共同努力失败后所应采取的行动达成一致意见。


Relations with China have improved over the years on both sides of the Atlantic.	大西洋两岸与中国的关系随着时间的推移都有所改善。


China has become Europe’s biggest trading partner, and its huge reserves of US dollars has made it America’s most important creditor.	中国已经成为欧洲最大的贸易伙伴，其巨额的美元储备使之成为美国最重要的债权国。


Despite this rosy picture, China could be the cause of a major transatlantic row if Europeans make good on their intention to lift the arms export embargo in place since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.	尽管前景光明，但如果欧洲真的实践解除其自1989年天安门事件以来就对中国实施的武器禁运的意图，那么中国就可能成为欧美之间发生争执的重要原因。


The Bush administration is fiercely opposed to lifting the embargo, pointing out that in the event of a military clash over Taiwan, US troops would face weapons provided to China by America’s own allies.	布什政府强烈反对解除禁运，并以一旦台海发生武装冲突，美国军队可能会面对自己的盟国卖给中国的武器为理由。


In fact, European assurances that arms sales to China could be controlled and threats to an ally avoided do appear unconvincing.	事实上，欧洲在对华军售在掌控之中和对盟国的威胁可以被避免方面的保证确实不令人信服。


On the other hand, economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China has grown to such an extent that an armed conflict is increasingly unlikely.	另一方面，中国大陆和台湾之间的经济依存度已经变得如此之高，从而使武装冲突的几率进一步降低。


Of course, this would change were Taiwan to push for independence, but it would hardly do so without a nod from Washington.	当然，如果台湾坚持要独立，形势可能会发生改变，但没有华盛顿的默许台湾也不大可能如此行事。


In short, on many of the most important current international issues, Americans and Europeans share the same objectives and basic goals.	简而言之，欧美在当前许多最重要的国际问题方面有着共同的目标和基本立场。


Where they often diverge is in the means to achieve them.	双方出现分歧的地方往往是在达成目的的手段方面。


Political wisdom would demand that the two sides pool their considerable resources and march together whenever possible.	政治��慧要求欧美双方整合其可观的资源，并尽可能步调一致地行动。


This, however, requires a change of attitudes both in America and in Europe.	但这需要欧美双方都改变态度。


Bush must be willing to accept Europeans as genuine partners and stop treating them like recalcitrant vassals.	布什必须愿意接纳欧洲人作为其真正的伙伴，而不是顽抗的附庸。


European leaders must overcome any latent Anti-Americanism and be prepared to make the kind of contributions to common endeavors that would entitle them to equal partnership with the US.	欧洲的领导者们必须克服一切潜在的反美国主义情绪，并准备为实现与美国真正的伙伴关系做出应有的贡献。


Will Europe’s Fiscal Compact Work?	欧洲财政契约有用吗？


CAMBRIDGE – At the start of 2013, the eurozone’s “fiscal compact” entered into force, owing to its ratification on December 21 by a 12th country, Finland, a year after German Chancellor Angela Merkel prodded eurozone leaders into agreement.	发自剑桥——在德国总理安吉拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel）敦促欧元区各国领导人达成协议的一年之后，2012年12月21日，“财政契约”得到了欧元区第12个国家芬兰的批准，由此从2013年起，欧元区“财政契约”开始生效。


The compact – technically called the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union – requires member countries to introduce laws limiting their structural government budget deficits to less than 0.5 % of GDP (or less than 1% of GDP if their debt/GDP ratio is “significantly below 60%”).	这份全称为《欧洲经济货币联盟稳定、协调与治理公约》的文件要求成员国制定法律限制政府结构性预算赤字不得高于GDP的0. 5%（如果该国的债务对GDP比率“显著低于60%”，则为1%）。


So, will this new approach work?	那么这一新措施能起到作用吗？


A limit on the “structural deficit” means that a country can run a deficit above the limit to the extent – and only to the extent – that the gap between revenue and spending is cyclical (that is, its economy is operating below potential due to temporary negative shocks).	对“结构性赤字”的限制意味着成员国可以——也只可以——在收入与支出之间的差距是周期性的范围内最大程度地存在财政赤字，所谓周期性是指一国经济在暂时的负面冲击下在低于其潜能的水平上运行。


In other words, the target is cyclically adjusted.	换句话说，所设立目标是可以随周期性调整的。


The budget-balance rule must be adopted in each country – preferably enshrined in their national constitutions – by the end of 2013.	在2013年结束之前，每个成员国都必须将预算平衡内容添加到其法律体系中——最好是加入到本国宪法体系之中。


The aim is to fix Europe’s long-term fiscal problem, which has been exacerbated by three factors: the failure, since the euro’s inception, of the eurozone-wide Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to enforce deficit and debt limits; the crisis that erupted in Greece and other countries on the eurozone periphery in 2010; and the various bailouts that have followed.	此举的目的是为了解决欧洲的长期财政问题，且该财政问题已在以下三个因素的作用下加速恶化：自欧元诞生后覆盖欧元区的《稳定与增长公约》已经无法有效实施赤字与债务限制； 2010年在希腊和一些欧元区外围国家爆发的经济危机；


There is no reason to doubt that the member states will follow through and adopt national rules by the end of the year.	以及随后的各种救助行动。 毫无疑问，在年底之前各成员国都会跟进并颁布实施相关国家规定。


The problem is what comes after that: the risk that the fiscal compact will founder on precisely the same shoals as the SGP.	而问题在于随后发生的事情：财政契约的失败风险其实和《稳定与增长公约》是同样大的。


Ever since the eurozone was established, its members have issued official fiscal forecasts that are systematically biased in the optimistic direction.	自从欧元区建立以来，其成员国发布了一系列普遍偏向乐观的官方财政预测。


Other countries do this, too, but the bias among eurozone countries is, if anything, even worse than it is elsewhere.	当然其他国家也会如此，但如果说欧元区国家的预测有什么不同的话，那就是这种偏向实在是太离谱了。


During an economic expansion, such as in the 2002-2007 period, governments are tempted to forecast that the boom will continue indefinitely.	在经济扩张期间，比如2002到2007年，各国政府都倾向于预测经济繁荣会无限期持续下去。


Forecasts for tax revenue and budget surpluses are correspondingly optimistic and so hide the need for fiscal adjustment.	税收收入和预算盈余的预测都相对乐观，因而掩盖了财政调整的必要。


During a recession, such as in 2008-2012, governments are tempted to forecast that their economies and budgets will soon rebound.	在衰退期间，比如2008到2012年，各国政府都倾向于预测本国经济和预算都会很快回升。


Since forecasting is subject to so much genuine uncertainty, no one can prove that the forecasts are biased when they are made.	由于预测会受到很多不确定性因素的影响，在做预测时也没人能够证明那些预测有失偏颇。


But, if forecasts are biased, fiscal rules will not constrain budget deficits. In any given year, governments can forecast that their growth rates, tax revenues, and budget balances will improve in subsequent years, and then argue the following year that the shortfalls were unexpected.	但由于预测有失偏颇，财政规定就不会对预算赤字进行限制。 在任何一年，政府都会预测本国增长率、税收收入及预算平衡将在未来几年有所上升，而在接下来的一年又会为自己辩护说那些不符合预期的差额是意外因素导致的。


Indeed, in a new paper, co-authored with Jesse Schreger, we show that eurozone members’ bias in official forecasts can be neatly characterized as responding to the SGP’s 3%-of-GDP limit on budget deficits in 1999-2011: each time governments exceeded the limit, over-optimistic forecasts followed.	确实，在笔者与杰西·施雷格（Jesse Schreger）合作撰写的新报告中，我们提出欧元区成员国在官方预测上的偏向性整齐划一地表现为对《稳定与增长公约》中1999-2011年财政赤字低于GDP3%条款的回应：每当政府预算赤字超过限制，就会出台过度乐观的预测。


In other words, governments adjust their forecasts, not their policies.	换句话说，各国政府调整的是其预测，而非政策。


Framing the budget rules in cyclical terms, while highly desirable in terms of its macroeconomic impact, does not help to solve the problem of forecast bias.	而周期性地调整财政限制制度尽管在其对宏观经济的影响方面非常有利，却无助于解决财政预测偏差的问题。


In fact, it can make the problem worse.	事实上，这只会让问题变得更严重。


In a year when a forecast for the structural budget deficit turns out to have been over-optimistic, the government can still claim that its own calculations show the shortfall to have been cyclical rather than structural.	对结构性预算赤字的预测被证明过度乐观的一年，政府依然可以声称其内部计算显示差额的出现是周期性而非结构性的。


After all, estimation of potential output – and hence the cyclical versus structural decomposition of the fiscal position – is notoriously difficult, even after the fact.	毕竟对潜在产出的估算——从而对财政状况进行周期性或是结构性的解读——是出了名的困难，即便是在事实之后计算也是如此。


Perhaps it will help that, under the fiscal compact, the rules are to be adopted at the national level, as opposed to the SGP, which operated on the supranational level.	也许在财政契约实施的情况下，它会有助于这些规则在国家层面上被采纳，而不像《稳定与增长公约》在超国家的层面上运作。


A look at the various rules and institutions that European countries have already tried shows that some work and others do not.	纵观欧洲国家已经尝试过的各种规则和机制我们就会知道，有些能起作用，有些则不能。


Creating an independent fiscal institution that provides its own budget forecasts works, insofar as it reduces the bias in deficit projections.	创建一个能自行做出预算预测的独立财政机构是可行的，因为它减少了赤字预算的偏差。


When forecasting while in violation of the eurozone’s Excessive Deficit Procedure, eurozone members with an independent budget-forecasting institution have a mean bias that is 2.7% of GDP smaller at the one-year horizon than members without such an institution.	当预测违反了欧元区的过度赤字程序机制时，拥有独立预算预测机构的欧元区成员国的一年期平均偏差比没有这类机构的成员国要小，且小于的幅度达到GDP的2. 7%。


It would be better still if governments were legally bound to use these independent forecasts in their budget plans (borrowing an innovation from Chile).	如果各国政府能立法要求在其预算计划中必须使用这些独立预测的话则更好（这是从智利借鉴来的创新）。


But, regardless of how well designed the rules are, clever and determined politicians can find ways around them.	但是，不管规则设计得多么巧妙，聪明而有决心的政治家都有办法绕过这些规则。


One trick is privatization of government enterprises, which reduces the budget deficit in a given year on a one-time basis, but might increase the deficit in the long run if the enterprise had been profitable.	其中一个窍门就是把政府企业私有化，这就减少了某年的预算赤字——当然只能使用一次，但如果这个企业是盈利的话这也许会增加政府的长期赤字。


Another trick is to legislate tax cuts that are “temporary,” in order to make future revenues look larger, despite the intention to make the cuts permanent before they expire.	另一个窍门就是立法实施“暂时”的减税，这会使未来的收入看起来更多——尽管其意图是维持减税直到该法律失效为止。


Other things being equal, the right institutions can curbpro-cyclical fiscal policies – tax cuts and spending hikes during booms and austerity during downturns – in the short run, while helping to deliver debt sustainability in the long run.	在其他条件不变的情况下，好的机构可以在短期内遏制那些以周期性为幌子的财政政策——经济繁荣时期减税并增加支出，经济低迷时期实施财政紧缩——并在长期内有助于实现债务可持续性。


These institutions include independent fiscal-forecasting agencies, combined with the cyclically adjusted budget targets that the eurozone’s fiscal compact mandates.	这些机构包括独立的财政预测机构，并与由欧元区财政契约授权的周期调整预算目标相结合。 虽然即使具备这样的机制也很可能出错；


Much can go wrong even if such mechanisms are in place; but, as the history of the SGP illustrates, the risk is higher if they are not.	但正如《稳定与增长公约》的历史表明的那样，如果没有这样的机制，出错的风险将会更高。


Will Ex-Mexicans Choose America’s Next President?	墨西哥移民是否选择美国的下任总统？


Among the many surprises during the Republican Party presidential candidates’ debates a couple of weeks ago was the rekindled importance of immigration.	几个星期前共和党总统侯选人辩论中出现的众多惊奇之一就是重新触及了移民的重要性。


After the failure of President George W. Bush’s and Senator Edward Kennedy’s comprehensive immigration reform effort last spring, most observers thought the matter would remain dormant until 2009, since even touching it was potentially fatal for Democrats and Republicans alike.	去年秋天布什总统和肯尼迪参议员的全面移民改革失败以来，大多数观察家认为这一事情将会在2009年以前搁置起来，因为即使是触及此事也会对民主和共和两党是潜在致命的。


But as Democrats discovered in other recent debates, and as Republicans realized with a little help from the CNN organizers, who skewed the questions toward issues they feel strongly about, immigration is an issue that just won’t go away.	但是正如民主党人在最近的辩论中所发现的以及共和党人在有线电视新闻网组织者帮助下认识到的那样，移民问题是一个挥之不去的问题。 这些电视台组织者拼命对那些他们有强烈感觉的问题提出问题。


This is one reason why I wrote a short but – I hope – useful book on Mexican immigration to the United States, entitled Ex-Mex: From Migrants to Immigrants .	这就是为什么我写一本短小但是希望是有用的有关墨西哥人移民美国的书。 这本书的名字叫<<原墨西哥人：从移居者到移民>>。


Based on internal documents from the Mexican and US governments, countless interviews, and a survey of much of the existing literature on the subject, Ex-Mex seeks to fulfill three purposes.	这本书力图根据墨西哥和美国两国政府的内部文件、数不清的采访以及对这一问题现有的文献调查来达到三个目的。


First, I wanted to provide a Mexican voice in the immigration debate.	第一，我想要在移民问题辩论中提出墨西哥的声音。


Mexicans make up more than half of the flow and stock – legal or not – of all immigrants in the US, but a point of view attempting to reflect their interests and aspirations has been largely absent from the American discussion.	墨西哥人在美国的所有合法或非法移民移动和总量上占据一半以上，但是在美国人的辩论中却基本上一直没有试图反映墨西哥人利益以及渴求的观点。


Of course, my book cannot be the Mexican stance.	当然，我的书并不能成为墨西哥的立场。


But an assessment from the vantage point of past, current, and future Mexican immigrants to the US is a necessary component of the American debate – all the more so when one recalls that immigration has, in fact, not generally been exclusively a domestic US policy question.	但是分析过去、现在以及将来墨西哥到美国的移民的观点却是美国人辩论的一个必要的组成部分。 实际上，如果人们记得移民一直并不是单纯的美国国内政策问题，这一点就更为如此了。


The first American immigration agreement with another country was signed in 1907 – the so-called Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan, while the US and Mexico negotiated and administered the Bracero Program for more than twenty years, from 1942 thru 1964.	美国与外国签订的第一个移民协议是在1907年，也就是与日本签订的所谓君子协定。 从1942年到1964年，美国和墨西哥在二十多年的时间里谈判并执行了短工项目。


And, of course, the US has had a standing immigration agreement since 1965 with a country most Americans would not imagine: Fidel Castro’s Cuba.	当然，美国自1965年以来与一个大多数美国人难以想像的国家即卡斯特罗统治下的古巴一直保持一项移民协议。


Second, it is important to place the current, raging debate in historical context.	第二，把当前情绪化的辩论放置在历史的角度非常重要。


The most important feature of that context is that the actual flow of Mexicans entering the US today is not much greater than the overall average figure for the Bracero Program period: around 400,000 per year.	最为重要的特点就是今天实际进入美国的墨西哥人数量远远大于短工项目期间的总体平均数量，也就是每年40万人左右。


It is similarly important to understand the evolution of US legislation on immigration since the 1920’s, and the shifts and hypocrisy involved in the application of those laws.	同样重要的是理解自二十世纪二十年代以来美国移民立法上的变迁以及在执行这些法律上的变化和伪善。


For example, the 1996 immigration reforms implemented by the Clinton administration, along with other, underlying structural trends, halted the traditional circular pattern whereby Mexicans came and went to the US every year.	例如，由克林顿政府在1996年实行的移民改革与其他基本的结构性趋势一样停止了墨西哥人传统上每年往返美国的循环模式。


Instead, they began to settle in communities farther from the border, greatly increasing the stock of Mexicans in the US.	相反，他们开始远离边界社区，从而大幅度增加了美国的墨西哥人数量。


Finally, the efforts of the Mexican and US governments since 2001 to reach an accommodation on the issue have not been well understood.	最后，人们还没有很好地理解墨西哥和美国两国政府自2001年以来试图达成移民问题的努力。


Confidential papers from the Bush and Fox administrations show that talks went further than previously known.	布什政府和福克斯政府的机密文件显示，会谈进行的要比原来知道的要深入。


The US, and particularly then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, was willing, as stated in a unclassified memo addressed to Bush in late August 2001, to go to great lengths to reach an understanding with Mexico on the issue.	根据2001年8月底向布什提交的一份解密的备忘录所称，美国政府特别是国务卿鲍威尔愿意尽力与墨西哥在这一问题上达成谅解。


Indeed, the substance of the negotiations was not much different from the content of the Bush-Kennedy “grand bargain” that was fashioned in 2007.	实际上，谈判的实质内容与布什肯尼迪在2007年提出的“大赦”并没有多大区别。


The electoral numbers perhaps best explain the immigration equation’s importance in today’s presidential campaigns.	选民数量可能最好解释当今总统竞选中移民问题的重要性。


In 2008, it is likely that Latinos will make up 9% to 10% of the electorate, the highest share ever.	在2008年，拉美族裔人口有可能占据选举人口的9%到10%，这是有史以来最高的。


They will wield decisive importance in swing states like Colorado, New Mexico, Florida, and Nevada.	他们将会在科罗拉多、新墨西哥、佛罗里达以及内华达等摇摆不定的州发��决定性的作用。


Having made significant inroads among Hispanic voters in 2000 and 2004, thanks to Bush’s support for immigration reform, Republicans now can barely count on 20% of that total – mainly among Cuban-Americans – thanks to their strident anti-immigration stance.	由于布什支持移民改革，共和党在2000年和2004年在拉美选民中取得重大进步。 由于共和党人强硬的反移民立场，他们现在只能指望这一总数的20%，主要是在古巴美国人中。


Thus, if the Democrats demonstrate a minimum of compassion, sensitivity, and realism, they can count on a 7% advantage in the popular vote.	这样，如果民主党表现出最低程度的同情、敏感以及现实主义，那么他们就可以在全民投票中得到7%的优势。


But doing so could cost Democrats dearly in old industrial states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan, where the arrival of Mexican migrants, transformed into immigrants, has stoked passions.	但是这样做有可能在宾夕法尼亚、俄亥俄以及密西根等老的工业州让民主党付出代价。 在那些地方，墨西哥的移居者转变成为移民燃起了热情。


Since the Democrats’ victory will most likely depend on these states, the Democratic candidate who can square this circle, or the Republican who can break it, may well win the presidency.	由于民主党的胜利最需要依靠这些州，那些能够在移民问题上获得成功的民主党人或者打破这一问题包围的共和党人就有可能赢得总统大选胜利。


Will Global Imbalances Return?	全球失衡会重现吗？


BEIJING – Future history books, depending on where they are written, will take one of two approaches to assigning blame for the world’s current financial and economic crisis.	北京－未来的历史书籍，由于写作地点的不同，会采用下述两种方式中的一种，来归咎当前世界金融和经济危机的责任。


One approach will blame lax regulation, accommodating monetary policy, and inadequate savings in the United States.	历史书籍两种归责方式中的一种，会将当前的金融和经济危机归咎于美国松懈的监管、没有原则的货币政策以及储蓄不足；


The other, already being pushed by former and current US officials like Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, will blame the immense pool of liquidity generated by high-savings countries in East Asia and the Middle East.	另一种——像格林·斯潘和本·伯南克这样的前任美联储官员和现任美联储官员已经强调了这种方式，会将当前的金融和经济危机归咎于东亚和中东的高储蓄国家制造的巨大流动性。


All that liquidity, they will argue, had to go somewhere.  Its logical destination was the country with the deepest financial markets, the US, where it raised asset prices to unsustainable heights.	他们认为，所有这些流动性都去了某个地方，其合理的目的地就是拥有最复杂的金融市场的美国，并且在进入美国之后将美国的资产价格抬升到了无法持续的高度。


Note the one thing on which members of both camps agree: the global savings imbalance – low savings in the US and high savings in China and other emerging markets – played a key role in the crisis by allowing Americans to live beyond their means.	请注意，上述两个阵营的人对这个观点达成了共识：即全球储蓄失衡——美国的低储蓄和中国及其他新兴市场的高储蓄——使美国人过上一种本身无法承受的生活，这对经济危机的发生起到了关键作用。


It encouraged financiers desperate to earn a return on abundant funds to put them to more speculative use.	这种全球储蓄失衡，促使金融家为了获得收益，不顾一切地将大量资金投入到越来越具有投机性的用途中去。


If there is a consensus on one issue, it is the impossibility of understanding the bubble and the crash without considering the role of global imbalances.	如果说人们已经在某个问题上达成了共识的话，这个问题就是，如果不考虑全球失衡的作用，要想理解资产泡沫和经济危机是不可能的。


Preventing future crises similar to this one therefore requires resolving the problem of global imbalances.	因此，要预防将来发生类似的经济危机，我们就要解决全球失衡的问题。


Here, the early signs are reassuring.	在这里，事情发展的初步迹象是令人欣慰的。


American households are saving again.	美国家庭再次开始储蓄了。


The US trade deficit has declined from $60 billion a month to just $26 billion, according to the most recent data.	根据最新的数据，美国的贸易逆差已经从每月600亿美元下降到每月只有260亿美元了。


As a matter of simple arithmetic, we know that the rest of the world is running correspondingly smaller surpluses.	只要我们进行一个简单的算术运算，就知道世界其他地区的贸易顺差相应地减少了。


But once American households rebuild their retirement accounts, they may return to their profligate ways.	但是，一旦美国家庭重新充实了他们的退休账户，他们就有可能回到挥霍的老路上去。


Indeed, the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve are doing all they can to pump up US spending.	事实上，奥巴马政府和美联储都在竭尽所能地提振美国消费。


The only reason the US trade deficit is falling is that the country remains in a severe recession, causing US imports and exports to collapse in parallel.	美国贸易逆差减少的唯一原因是美国仍然处在严重的衰退之中，而衰退又导致美国的出口和进口同时减少。


With recovery, both may recover to previous levels, and the 6%-of-GDP US external deficit will be back.	随着经济的复苏，美国的出口和进口都有可能恢复到以前的水平，占美国GDP6％的国际收支赤字会再次出现。


In fact, there has been no change in relative prices or depreciation of the US dollar of a magnitude that would augur a permanent shift in trade and spending patterns.	事实上，美元相对价格的变化，或者是美元的贬值，都没有达到足以预示国际贸易和消费模式会发生永久性转变的程度。


Whether there is a permanent reduction in global imbalances will depend mainly on decisions taken outside the US, specifically in countries like China.	全球失衡是否会有永久性的减少主要取决于美国之外的国家的决策，具体来说，就是像中国这样的国家的决策。


One’s forecast of those decisions hinges, in turn, on why these other countries came to run such large surpluses in the first place.	反过来，人们要预测这些国家会作出什么决策，其关键在于首先要知道，这些国家为什么要保持这么巨额的贸易顺差。


One view is that their surpluses were a corollary of the policies favoring export-led growth that worked so well for so long.  China’s leaders are understandably reluctant to abandon a tried-and-true model.	一种观点认为，这些��家的顺差是长期以来运行良好的鼓励以出口为导向的经济增长模式的政策的必然结果。 中国的领导人不愿意放弃一个经过检验的模式，是可以理解的。


They can’t restructure their economy instantaneously.	他们不能瞬间改变中国的经济结构。


They can’t move workers from painting children’s toys in Guangdong to building schools in Western China overnight.	他们也无法在一夜之间，将在广东给儿童玩具上色的工人转移到中国西部建造学校。


They need time to build a social safety net capable of encouraging Chinese households to reduce their precautionary saving.	他们需要时间来建立一个能够鼓励中国家庭减少预防性储蓄的社会保障网络。


If this view is correct, we can expect to see global imbalances re-emerge once the recession is over and to unwind only slowly thereafter.	如果这种观点是正确的，我们就可以预期，一旦经济衰退结束，我们又会看到全球失衡再次出现，而且此后只能慢慢调整这种失衡。


The other view is that China contributed to global imbalances not through its merchandise exports, but through its capital exports.	另一种观点认为，中国不是通过其商品出口造成了全球失衡，而是通过其资本输出造成了全球失衡。


What China lacked was not demand for consumption goods, but a supply of high-quality financial assets.	中国缺乏的不是对消费品的需求，而是对高质量的金融资产的供应。


It found these in the US, mainly in the form Treasury and other government-backed securities, in turn pushing other investors into more speculative investments.	中国在美国找到了自己缺乏的高质量的金融资产——这些金融资产主要表现为美国国债和其他政府证券，而这又促使其他投资者进行更为投机的投资活动。


Recent events have not enhanced the stature of the US as a supplier of high-quality assets.	最近的经济危机并没有提升美国作为高质量的金融资产提供者的形象。


And China, for its part, will continue to develop its financial markets and its capacity to generate high-quality financial assets internally.	而在中国方面，中国会继续发展其金融市场以及提供高质量的国内金融资产的能力。


But doing so will take time. Meanwhile, the US still has the most liquid financial markets in the world.	但是，中国要实现这一点需要时间，同时，美国仍然拥有世界上流动性最好的金融市场。


This interpretation again implies the re-emergence of global imbalances once the recession ends, and their very gradual unwinding thereafter.	这样的阐释再次暗含着，一旦经济衰退结束，全球失衡就会重现，在此之后对其的调整也很漫长。


One development that could change this forecast is if China comes to view investing in US financial assets as a money-losing proposition.	有一种变化能够改变这种预期，即中国认为投资美国金融资产是一个赔钱的买卖。


US budget deficits as far as the eye can see might excite fear of losses on US Treasury bonds.	就目前而言，美国的预算赤字可能会引起中国对投资美国国债亏损的担忧。


A de facto policy of inflating away the debt might stoke such fears further.	美国事实上的通过通货膨胀抵消债务的政策，会进一步强化中国的这种恐惧。


At that point, China would pull the plug, the dollar would crash, and the Fed would be forced to raise interest rates, plunging the US back into recession.	届时，中国就会撤出投资，美元就会崩溃，美联储就可能被迫提高利率，进而使美国经济再次陷入衰退。


There are two hopes for avoiding this disastrous outcome.	对避免这种灾难性的后果，存在两个希望。


One is relying on Chinese goodwill to stabilize the US and world economies. The other is for the Obama administration and the Fed to provide details about how they will eliminate the budget deficit and avoid inflation once the recession ends.	一个希望是希望中国具有稳定美国和世界经济的善意，另一个是希望奥巴马政府和美联储提供有关一旦经济衰退结束，他们会怎样消除预算赤字并避免通货膨胀的详情。


The second option is clearly preferable.	显然，第二种选择更可取。


After all, it is always better to control one’s own fate.	毕竟，掌握自己的命运总是比依靠别人要好。


Will Governmental Folly Now Allow for a Cyber Crisis?	政府的愚蠢能否立即导致一场网络危机？


CAMBRIDGE – When the financial crisis of 2008 hit, many shocked critics asked why markets, regulators, and financial experts failed to see it coming.	剑桥——2008年金融危机来袭时，很多大吃一惊的批评家们质问为什么市场、监管机构和金融专家未能预见到这场危机。


Today, one might ask the same question about the global economy’s vulnerability to cyber-attack.	今天，人们或许会对全球经济面对网络攻击时的脆弱性提出同样的问题。


Indeed, the parallels between financial crises and the threat of cyber meltdowns are striking.	其实，金融危机和网络崩溃这两种威胁之间惊人的相似。


Although the greatest cyber threat comes from rogue states with the capacity to develop extremely sophisticated computer viruses, risks can also come from anarchistic hackers and terrorists, or even from computer glitches compounded by natural catastrophe.	虽然最大的网络威胁来源于有能力研发复杂计算机病毒的流氓国家，但风险也同样来自于信奉无政府主义的黑客和恐怖分子，甚至可能来自于因自然灾害而加剧的电脑故障。


A few security experts have voiced great alarm, including, most recently, Jonathan Evans, the head of the British Security Service (MI5).	不止一位安全专家都发出了严正警告，包括不久前英国安全局（军情五处）的负责人乔纳森·埃文斯。


By and large, however, few leaders are willing to compromise growth in the tech sector or the Internet in any significant way in the name of a threat that is so amorphous.	但总的来讲，很少有领导人愿意因为这样一种难以名状的威胁而明显放缓科技领域或互联网的发展速度。


Instead, they prefer to establish relatively innocuous working groups and task forces.	反之，他们更愿意组建相对无伤大雅的特遣队和工作组。


It is difficult to overstate the dependence of modern economies on large-scale computer systems.	人类几乎不可能夸大现代经济对大型计算机系统的依赖程度。


But imagine if one day a host of key communications satellites were incapacitated, or the databases of major financial systems were erased.	但想象一下如果哪天某台管理关键通信卫星的主机瘫痪无法工作，或者主要金融系统中的数据库遭到删除。


Experts have long identified the electricity grid as the most acute vulnerability, since any modern economy would collapse without power.	电网早就被专家认定为最严重的漏洞，因为一旦供电被切断，任何现代经济都会陷入崩溃。


True, many skeptics argue that with reasonable low-cost prophylactic measures, large scale cyber-meltdowns are highly implausible, and that doom-mongers overstate the worst-case scenarios.	当然，很多怀疑论者提出只要采取低成本的合理预防措施，大规模网络崩溃的可能性非常之低，末日论者夸大了可能出现最坏情况。


They say that the ability of cyber-terrorists and blackmailers to take the global economy to the brink, as in the 2007 Bruce Willis movie Die Hard 4, is utterly fictional.	他们表示网络恐怖分子和恐吓勒索者再现2007年布鲁斯·威利斯电影《虎胆龙威4》中的恐怖一幕，将全球经济推向崩溃边缘的能力完全是虚构的。


It is difficult to judge who is right, and there are important experts on both sides of the debate.	辩论的正反两方都有重量级的专家，很难判断哪一方的观点更加贴近事实。


But there do seem to be an uncomfortable number of similarities between the political economy of cyberspace regulation and of financial regulation.	但是，网络空间监管和金融监管的政治经济之间的确存在着令人不安的相似之处。


First, both cyber-security and financial stability are extremely complex topics with which government regulators can hardly keep up.	首先，网络安全和金融稳定都是极为复杂的课题，政府监管部门想要完全跟上它们的发展有些力不从心。


Industry remuneration for experts is far in excess of any public-sector salary, and the best minds are continually bid away.	从业专家的报酬远远超过任何公共部门的工资，而顶尖的人才不断地被吸引过去。


As a result, some argue that the only solution is reliance on self-regulation by the software industry.	因此有人认为，唯一的办法是依赖软件业的自我调节机制。


One hears this argument for many modern industries, from big food to big pharma to big finance.	人们在许多现代工业中都��听到这种说法，从大型食品到大型制药再到大型金融公司。


Second, like the financial sector, the tech industry is enormously influential politically through contributions and lobbying.	其次，像金融业一样，高科技行业通过捐款和游说拥有了巨大的政治影响力。


In the United States, all presidential candidates must make pilgrimages to Silicon Valley and other tech centers to raise money.	美国的所有总统候选人必须到硅谷和其他高科技中心去朝圣筹资。


Excessive financial-sector influence was, of course, a root cause of the 2008 meltdown and remains deeply implicated in today’s continuing eurozone mess.	金融部门影响过大无疑是2008年危机的根本原因，而且在今天的欧元区乱象中仍然脱不了干系。


Third, with slowing growth in advanced economies, information technology seems to hold the moral high ground, just as finance did until five years ago.	第三，随着先进经济体增长放缓，就像五年前的金融业那样，道德的制高点似乎被信息业所占据。


And crude attempts by governments to enforce regulation are likely to prove ineffective in protecting against catastrophe, while all too effective in strangling growth.	事实证明政府执行监管的粗暴尝试可能无法防止灾难的发生，但在扼杀经济增长方面却收效显著。


In both cases – financial stability and cyber security – the risk of contagion creates a situation in which a wedge can form between private incentives and social risks.	在金融稳定和网络安全两大课题下，蔓延的危险造成了私人激励和社会风险机制的分离。


Admittedly, progress in the technology sector overall often produces huge social-welfare gains, which arguably outstrip those produced by all other sectors in recent decades.	诚然，技术领域的总体进展往往能产生巨大的社会福利效益，这种效益甚至可能超过近几十年来所有其他行业的总和。


But, just as with nuclear power plants, progress can go awry in the absence of good regulation.	但正如核电厂一样，缺乏良好的监管可能导致在进展的过程中出现差错。


Finally, the greatest risks come from arrogance and ignorance, two human characteristics at the heart of most financial crises.	最后，最大的风险来自于傲慢和无知，这两种人性的弱点一直处在多数金融危机的核心位置。


Recent revelations about the super-viruses “Stuxnet” and “Flame” are particularly disconcerting.	最近关于超级病毒Stuxnet和火焰（Flame）的披露尤其令人不安。


These viruses, apparently developed by the US and Israel to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program, embody a level of sophistication far beyond anything previously seen.	这些病毒似乎由美国和以色列研发用于破坏伊朗的核计划，体现出远超之前记录的先进水平。


Both are deeply encrypted and difficult to detect once inside a computer.	这两种病毒均经过深度加密，一旦输入计算机就很难被发现。


The Flame virus has the capacity to take over a computer’s peripherals, record Skype conversations, take pictures through a computer’s camera, and transmit information via Bluetooth to any nearby device.	火焰病毒能够接管计算机的外围设备、Skype通话记录、借助电脑摄像头拍照，并通过蓝牙设备向任何邻近设备传输信息。


If the world’s most sophisticated governments are developing computer viruses, what guarantee is there that something won’t go awry?	如果世界上最先进的政府都在研制计算机病毒，那么还有什么能够保证不会出现差错？


How can we be sure that they won’t “escape” and infect a much broader class of systems, or be adopted for other uses, or that future rogue states or terrorists won’t find a way to turn them on their creators?	我们怎能肯定它们不会“泄露”并感染更大范围的系统，或者被转作其他用途，再或者未来的无赖国家或恐怖分子不会利用它们反过来攻击它们的创造者？


No economy is more vulnerable than the US, and it is arrogance to believe that US cyber superiority (to all except perhaps China) provides it with impenetrable security from attack.	没有哪国经济比美国更加脆弱，认为美国（对除中国之外所有国家）的网络优势在攻击面前坚不可摧仅仅是傲慢而已。


Unfortunately the solution is not so simple as just building better anti-virus programs.	不幸的是，解决办法不是编写更好的防病毒程序那么简单。


Virus protection and virus development constitute an uneven arms race.	病毒防护和病毒开发构成了一场不平衡的军备竞赛。


A virus can be just a couple hundred lines of computer code, compared to hundreds of thousands of lines for anti-virus programs, which must be designed to detect wide classes of enemies.	病毒可能仅仅是几百行计算机代码，但防毒程序的长度却至少成千上万，因为防毒程序的设计必须能够发现各式各样的敌人。


We are told not to worry about large-scale cyber meltdowns, because none has occurred, and governments are being vigilant.	我们被告知不用担心大规模的网络崩溃，因为政府会时刻保持警惕，而且这样的网络崩溃还从未发生过。


Unfortunately, another lesson of the financial crisis is that most politicians are congenitally incapable of making difficult choices until risks actually materialize.	不幸的是金融危机的另一个教训是，多数政客命中注定无法在风险实际兑现前作出艰难的抉择。


Let us hope that we are lucky for a while longer.	我们只能希望能够幸运更长一段时间。


Will Hamas Win the Peace?	哈马斯会赢得和平吗？


WASHINGTON, DC –For generations to come, the Palestinians will remember the horrific war in Gaza with pain and bitterness.	华盛顿特区－接下来的几代巴勒斯坦人都会充满痛苦地记住可怕的加沙战争。


But what cannot yet be seen is how Palestinians will view Hamas.	但是，巴勒斯坦人会怎样看待哈马斯，仍然有待观察。


Whether Hamas can claim a victory – and whether Palestinians will believe them will be determined by the type of ceasefire that is eventually agreed, if a formal one is eventually agreed.	哈马斯是否能获胜，以及巴勒斯坦人是否信任他们要取决于最终达成的停火的种类——如果最终达成了正式停火协议的话。


The end game – for both Israel and Hamas – is thus crucially important.	因此，对以色列和哈马斯来说，战争的结局都是至关重要的。


For the moment, Hamas is perceived by the majority of Palestinians as the victim of a war intended to gain its surrender.	当前，大多数巴勒斯坦人将哈马斯看作是一场为了使哈马斯投降的战争的受害者。


After all, Hamas was democratically elected, but was forbidden from ruling and besieged in Gaza.	毕竟，哈马斯是民主当选的，但是，却被禁止在加沙进行统治，而且还被包围。


At the same time, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is accused of siding with Israel in order to restore his lost authority in Gaza.	同时，许多巴勒斯坦人指责巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席穆罕默德·阿巴斯为了恢复其在加沙失去的威信，而支持以色列。


The war exposed flaws in Hamas’ judgment.	这次战争暴露了哈马斯判断的失误。


Hamas apparently did not envision a full-scale confrontation with Israel when it refused to renew a six-month truce.	当哈马斯拒绝续订六个月的休战协定时，它显然没有预想到会和以色列进行全面的对抗。


With Gaza suffering under a lengthy siege, Hamas leader Khalid Mashal said that there was no point in a new truce, since the old one had “failed to lift the siege on Gaza.”	在加沙遭到长时间的封锁时，哈马斯领导人卡里德·马舍尔（Khalid Mashal）声称，因为老停火协议“没能解除对加沙的封锁”，所以没有订立新停火协议的必要。


Other leaders were quoted as saying that Hamas would “lift the siege by force.”	根据有人援引的哈马斯其他领导人的说法，哈马斯会“使用武力解除封锁”。


If Hamas is to survive the war, it must demonstrate that its resistance resulted in a permanent opening of Gaza’s border crossings, especially in Rafah.	如果哈马斯要在此次战争中幸存下来，它必须证明其抵抗在加沙边境地带，特别是在拉法（Rafah），形成了一个永久性的通路。


For Palestinians, these are signs of victory.	对巴勒斯坦人来说，这些都是成功的标志。


With open borders, Hamas would secure its regime in Gaza and build its popularity in the West Bank, putting enormous pressure on Abbas, the leader of the rival Fatah movement, to accept a national unity government on terms set by Hamas.	随着边境的开放，哈马斯会巩固其在加沙的政权并建立其在约旦河西岸的声望，这会对竞争对手法塔赫运动的领导人阿巴斯形成巨大的压力，迫使其接受按照哈马斯确定的条件组成的全国统一政府。


Members of Fatah’s Central Committee are already accusing Abbas of supporting Israel in the fighting, of wanting to “return to Gaza on an Israeli tank.”	法塔赫中央委员会的成员已经开始指责阿巴斯在本次战争中支持以色列，想“坐在以色列的坦克上返回加沙”。


Radical groups within Fatah are leaning toward an open alliance with Hamas.	法塔赫内部的激进团体，也想要和哈马斯公开结盟。


If Hamas comes out ahead, Abbas’s allies in other Palestinian factions will press him to accept Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the PLO.	如果哈马斯提前发表观点，阿巴斯在其他巴勒斯坦派别中的盟友就会向其施加压力，迫使其在巴勒斯坦解放组织内部接受哈马斯和伊斯兰圣战组织。


Egypt will have to backtrack on its rejection of Hamas in order to recover its image among the Arabs and to reduce tensions within Egyptian society.	埃及也将不得不为了恢复其在阿拉伯人中的形象和缓解埃及社会内部的紧张状态而放弃对哈马斯的抵制。


Pressure to integrate Hamas into Palestinian politics is also likely in some European capitals, particularly Paris and London, where some expressed opposition to isolating Hamas even before the war.	有些欧洲国家的政府，特别是巴黎和伦敦，也可能存在将哈马斯纳入巴勒斯坦政治的压力——在巴黎和伦敦，有人甚至在战争爆发前就表示反对孤立哈马斯。