EUGENE – In 2010, I sat across the table from Assistant US Trade Representative Barbara Weisel, who was responsible for negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the mega-regional free-trade treaty among Vietnam, Malaysia, and ten other Pacific Rim countries that President Barack Obama’s administration wants to conclude in the coming weeks.	尤金—2010年，我和负责跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）的美国贸易谈判助理芭芭拉·维塞尔（Barbara Weisel）一起坐在谈判桌前。 TPP是包括越南、马来西亚和其他十个环太平洋国家之间的大型地区自由贸易条约，奥巴马政府希望可以在几周之内完成谈判。


At the time, I was Senior Policy Adviser for the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Education and Labor – a position that made me the top congressional staff member responsible for upholding labor standards in international trade treaties.	当时，我是美国众议院教育和劳动委员会顾问，因此成为国际贸易条约劳动标准方面的国会最高负责人。


The purpose of the meeting was for Congress to understand what steps the Obama administration was taking to protect American workers from being forced into unfair competition with workers from low-wage trading partners.	此次会面的目的是让国会知道奥巴马政府在保护美国劳动者免于与来自低工资贸易伙伴的劳动者进行不公平竞争方面采取了那些措施。


I asked Weisel what I thought was a simple question: “What is the White House’s position on democracy?”	我问了维塞尔一个在我看来十分简单的问题：“白宫对民主持何态度？


Weisel claimed not to understand, so I explained: A majority of congressional Democrats supported the principle that the United States should sign trade agreements only with countries that are democracies.	”维塞尔问此话怎讲，我解释说：国会民主党大部分都支持一个原则，那就是美国只能和民主国家签署贸易协定。


Other democracies feel the same way.	其他民主国家也这么认为。


For example, trade agreements negotiated by members of the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth) contain just such a provision.	比如，英联邦成员之间的贸易协定就包含这样的条款。


The logic is obvious: If we in developed democracies had lacked the right to protest, speak out, organize unions, and vote for representatives of our choosing, we would never have ended child labor or established the eight-hour workday.	其中的逻辑是显而易见的：如果我们发达民主国家没有游行示威权利、发声权利、组织工会的权利和投票选举代表的权利，那么我们就永远无法解决童工问题、建立八小时工作制。


Having used these rights to raise our own living standards, we should not now put developed countries’ workers in direct competition with workers who lack the basic freedoms needed to improve their own conditions.	我们通过这些权利提高了我们自身的生活水平，现在也不能让发达国家的劳动者与缺少改善自身生活条件所需的基本自由的劳动者直接竞争。


But my explanation did not help.	但我的解释并没有起到效果。


Weisel stated simply that “we have no position” on democracy.	维塞尔言简意赅地说，对于民主“我们没有立场”。


I pressed her on how the White House planned to deal with, for example, Vietnam – a country where children as young as 14 are forced to work 12-hour days, and where there is no right to free speech, no right to protest, no right to strike, and no freedom of association.	我追问，对于类似越南的情况，白宫打算怎么处理。 在越南，14岁的儿童被迫每天工作12小时，这里没有言论自由，没有游行示威权，没有罢工权，也没有集社权。


“Oh, you can have labor rights without democracy,” Weisel insisted.	“哦，没有民主也可以拥有劳动权利，”维塞尔坚持说。


She demurred when asked to name an example.	我要求她举一个例子，她拒绝了。


In reality, the one thing that non-democratic regimes can never tolerate is independent workers’ organizations.	在现实中，非民主政权永远不可能接受的一件事情是独立劳工组织。


That is why trade unionists were the first through the gates of Dachau, and why Poland’s Solidarity movement posed an existential threat to Communist power throughout the former Soviet bloc.	这就是穿越达豪（Dachau）大门的首先是工会主义者的原因，也是波兰团结运动给前整个苏联阵营共产主义权力造成生存威胁的原因。


Indeed, part of international investors’ attraction to countries like Vietnam and China is not simply that wages are low, but that the absence of democratic rights promises to lock in cheap labor for years to come.	事实上，国际投资者被越南和中国等国家吸引的部分原因并不是工资低，而是民主权利的缺失保证了劳动力廉价的状态可以维持多年。


For example, when China revised its labor law in 2008, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, and other members of the US-China Business Council lobbied successfully to limit the expansion of Chinese workers’ rights.	比如，2008年中国修改劳动法后，苹果、惠普和其他中美贸易委员会（US-China Business Council）成员成功地游说限制了中国劳工权利的扩大。


While China is not a party to the current negotiations, the TPP is designed to allow additional countries to sign on in the future – and the Chinese, we can assume, will be courted assiduously.	尽管中国不是TPP谈判的参与方，但TPP允许新增成员，我们大可以认为，中国会成为殷勤招徕的对象。


Former US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, for one, noted that he “would love nothing more” than to see China join the treaty.	前美国贸易谈判罗恩·柯克（Ron Kirk）就指出，他“热切期盼”中国加入TPP条约。


But the TPP is not really a “trade” treaty at all.	但TPP其实根本不是“贸易”条约。


Rather, it is a vehicle for corporate lobbyists to achieve what they have been unable to persuade legislators to support through normal means.	反之，它是公司游说集团的工具，目的是达到他们目前无法通过常规手段说服立法者的目的。


For example, pharmaceutical companies have insisted that the TPP force all countries to grant 12-year patents on prescription drugs – increasing their profits while delaying competition from cheaper generic versions.	比如，制药公司要求TPP强制所有国家授予处方药12年的专利期限——这增加了它们的利润，延缓了来自廉价仿制药的竞争。


Likewise, tobacco companies are seeking to use the TPP to prohibit developing countries – which represent the largest cigarette markets – from adopting new controls on their products.	类似地，烟草公司也在寻求利用TPP禁止发展中国家——它们代表了最大的烟草市场——采取对其产品的新的管制措施。


The TPP’s most controversial provision, if adopted, would allow private corporations to sue foreign governments for adopting policies that adversely affect their expected profits.	TPP最具争议的内容（如果采取的话）是允许私人公司起诉外国政府采取了对其期望利润造成消极影响的政策。


For example, if Vietnam were to mandate six weeks of paid maternity leave for all employees, a foreign factory owner might sue the government, insisting that it either repeal the law or reimburse the company for the cost of providing this benefit.	比如，如果越南强制要求给予员工六周时间的产假，外国工厂所有者可以起诉越南政府，要求越南要么取消这一法律，要么赔偿公司提供这一福利的成本。


A private tribunal would hear cases and issue binding rulings, with no possibility of appeal to any court or other democratically accountable authority.	私人法庭将负责审案并作出具有约束力的裁决，根本不可能向法院或其他民主问责当局提起上诉。


This, then, is the future that the TPP holds out: a kind of Potemkin democracy, in which citizens are free to choose their flags and holidays but cannot afford to enact any laws that might reduce international investors’ profits.	于是，这就是TPP带来的未来：波将金（Potemkin）式的民主，公民可以自由选择旗帜和假期，但无法通过可能减少国际投资者利润的法律。


Workers’ wages in the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and other developed countries would be inexorably competed down toward those of lower-wage trading partners, while developing-country workers would find it increasingly difficult – even in nominal democracies – to improve their standard of living.	美国、加拿大、日本、澳大利亚、新西兰和其他发达国家的工人工资将被竞争无情地打压到这些工资更低的贸易伙伴的水平，而发展中国家劳工将发现改善生活条件变得越来越困难，即使在名义上的民主国家也是如此。


The TPP is being crafted in utmost secrecy, with even legislators unable to see the full text that is being negotiated, though corporate lobbyists have been treated as partners in the drafting process.	TPP的谈判过程是最高机密，甚至立法者也无从看到谈判中的全部内容，尽管公司游说集团在起草过程中被视为伙伴。


This is not surprising: In the US, where almost five million manufacturing jobs have disappeared since the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and where real wages have stagnated, a majority of voters across the political spectrum are opposed to more such treaties.	这并不奇怪：在美国，自北美自由贸易协定签署以来，制造业就业岗位减少了近五百万个，实际工资一直停滞不前，大部分选民，不管政治立场如何，都反对更多的此类条约。


At least for the Obama administration, the rush to conclude the TPP negotiations is doubtless driven by the desire to close the deal well ahead of America’s midterm election in November.	至少对奥巴马政府来说，急匆匆地完成TPP谈判背后的驱动力毫无疑问是希望在11月美国中期选举之前把此事完成。


And that, too, is bad for democracy.	而这本身也不利于民主。


Indeed, though the US Constitution stipulates that the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” lies solely in the hands of Congress, the Obama administration is pressing legislators to approve so-called fast-track authority, under which they would have no say over either the TPP’s terms or the parties to it – or even the power to amend the treaty text in any way.	事实上，尽管美国宪法规定“监管与外国有关的商业”的权力全部掌握在国会手里，但奥巴马政府正在敦促立法者授权所谓的“快车道权力”（fast-track authority），这样一来，立法者便无权再对TPP条款或参与方置喙——甚至也无权通过任何方法改变条约内容。


As a political scientist, I am sometimes asked how it is possible for democracies to enact laws that run counter to the interests of the vast majority of voters.	作为政治学家，我有时会被问及民主国家是否有可能会实施违背大部分选民利益的法律。


They do so, in part, by shunning any commitment to democracy itself.	从某种程度上说，确实如此，并且是通过推翻所有对民主本身的承诺完成的。


There is no clearer example of this than the TPP, which almost certainly constitutes the single biggest threat to the preservation – or creation – of any signatory country’s middle class.	在这方面，最显著的例子莫过于TPP，该条约几乎肯定将构成所有签约国保护——甚至形成——中产阶级的最大单一障碍。


Restoring Yesterday\u0027s Hope for Tomorrow\u0027s World	重塑昨日的希望


WASHINGTON, DC – The year 2015 was difficult, punctuated by declining growth forecasts, horrific terror attacks, massive refugee flows, and serious political challenges, with populism on the rise in many countries.	华盛顿—2015年是艰难的一年，这一年，增长预测值下滑，发生了可怕的恐怖袭击、大规模难民和严重的政治挑战，许多国家都兴起了民粹主义。


In the Middle East, in particular, chaos and violence has continued to proliferate, with devastating consequences.	特别是在中东，混乱和暴力继续繁盛，造成了灾难性后果。


This represents a disappointing turn from the undoubtedly flawed, but far more hopeful world of just a few decades ago.	这是一个令人失望的转变，几十年前尽管缺陷重重但满怀希望的世界已经不在。


In his autobiography The World of Yesterday, Stefan Zweig described a similarly drastic change.	在其自传性作品《昨日的世界》（The World of Yesterday）中，斯特凡·茨威格（Stefan Zweig）描述了一个类似的急剧变化。


Born in 1881 in Vienna, Zweig spent his youth in an optimistic, civil, and tolerant environment.	茨威格1881年出生在维也纳，在乐观、文明、宽容的环境中度过了他的青年时代。


Then, starting in 1914, he witnessed Europe’s collapse into World War I, followed by revolutionary convulsions, the Great Depression, the rise of Stalinism, and finally the barbarism of Nazism and the outbreak of World War II.	接着，从1914年开始，他目睹世界爆发第一次世界大战，然后是革命风暴、大萧条、斯大林主义兴起，最终出现了野蛮的纳粹主义和第二次世界大战的爆发。


Devastated, Zweig committed suicide while in exile in 1942.	绝望的茨威格于1942年在流亡途中自杀。


One imagines that Zweig would have been comforted by the post-WWII creation of the United Nations and the Bretton-Woods system, not to mention the subsequent decades of reconstruction and reconciliation.	你也许会想，茨威格会为二战后成立的联合国和布雷顿森林体系感到欣慰，更不用说此后数十年的复兴和和解时期。


He could have witnessed the cooperation and progress that marked the post-war era.	他将目睹成为战后时代标志的合作与进步。


Perhaps, then, he would have looked at the period from 1914 to 1945 as a terrible but limited detour in the world’s march toward peace and prosperity.	到那时，也许他会把1914—1915年视为世界在和平与繁荣长征路上的可怕但有限的一次迂回。


Of course, the second half of the twentieth century was far from perfect.	当然，二十世纪下半叶绝非完美。


Until 1990, peace was secured largely by the threat of mutual nuclear destruction.	直到1990年，和平主要靠互相核毁灭的威胁维系。


Local conflicts, such as in Korea, Vietnam, parts of Africa, and the Middle East, took their toll.	地方冲突频发，如朝鲜、越南、非洲多地和中东。


And while about 100 developing countries gained independence, the process was not always peaceful.	而尽管有大约100个发展中国家赢得独立，但独立过程并不总是和平的。


At the same time, however, the world economy grew more rapidly than ever.	但与此同时，世界经济增长比以往任何时候都要快。


A strong middle class emerged in the advanced countries, and then began to appear elsewhere.	发达国家率先涌现强大的中产阶级，并向其他国家扩张。


The Western democracies and Japan built economies in which productivity growth led to shared prosperity; governments engaged in regulation and redistribution, while private companies fueled growth by implementing technologically advanced production methods.	在西方民主国家和日本，生产率的增加带来了共同繁荣，政府参与到监管和再分配中，而私营公司采用技术先进的生产模式，从而助推增长。


On both the regional and global levels, decisive progress was made in reaping the benefits from trade and economies of scale.	在地区和全球层面，在如何获得贸易和规模经济的果实方面取得了决定性进步。


The European integration project seemed to herald a new kind of cooperation, which could extend to other regions and even influence global cooperation.	欧洲一体化工程似乎预示着新的合作模式，可以扩展到其他地区甚至影响全球合作。


The generation that came of age in the 1960s felt much like Zweig had felt in his youth.	20世纪60年代生人的青年时代与茨威格十分相似。


We believed that, though progress may not be linear, we could count on it.	我们相信，尽管进步未必是线性的，但始终可以充满希望。


We expected an increasingly peaceful and tolerant world, in which technological advances, together with well-governed markets, would generate ever-expanding prosperity.	我们期待一个日益和平和宽容的世界，在这个世界里，科技进步和治理良好的市场能产生不断扩大的繁荣。


In 1989, when the Soviet Union was poised to collapse and China was shifting to a market-based economy, Francis Fukuyama announced the “end of history.”	1989年，在苏联行将解体、中国转向市场经济的时候，弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）宣布了“历史的终结”。


Over the last two decades, however, our hopes – political, social, and economic – have been repeatedly dashed.	但在过去二十年里，我们的希望——政治的、社会的和经济的希望——一再落空。


There was a time when US policymakers were wondering whether Russia should join NATO.	美国决策者曾经思考俄罗斯是否应该加入北约。


That possibility is difficult even to consider today, after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea (apparently carried out in response to fears that Ukraine would deepen its ties with the European Union and NATO).	如今，随着俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、吞并克里米亚（显然是因为害怕乌克兰深化其与欧盟和北约的联系），这一可能性甚至想都难以想象。


Many emerging economies achieved rapid growth for years – even decades – enabling billions of people to escape extreme poverty and reducing the wealth gap between developed and developing countries.	许多新兴经济体实现了好几年——甚至好几十年——的高速增长，让数十亿人摆脱了极端贫困，也缩小了发达国家和发展中国家之间的财富差距。


But that growth has lately slowed substantially, leading many to question whether economists spoke too soon when we labeled them the new engines of global economic growth.	但这一增长最近大幅放缓，让许多人开始质疑经济学家给它们贴上全球经济增长新引擎的标签是不是操之过急了。


Likewise, the Arab Spring in 2011 was supposed to herald a new, more democratic future for the Middle East and North Africa.	类似地，2011年的阿拉伯之春理应成为中东和北非更民主的新未来的先声。


While Tunisia has averted disaster, most of the other affected countries have ended up mired in chaos, with Syria’s brutal civil war facilitating the rise of the Islamic State.	尽管突尼斯避免了灾难，但大部分其他受影响国家最终都陷入了混乱，而叙利亚的残酷内战更是助长了伊斯兰国的崛起。


The euro, meanwhile, suffered its own crisis.	与此同时，欧元经���了其自己的危机。


The common currency, once portrayed as the start of a quasi-federal Europe, instead created serious tension between “creditor” and “debtor” countries when many debtors faced a protracted economic downturn.	这一共同货币曾经被描述为准联邦欧洲的开始，但却在许多债务国面临长期经济衰退时在“债权国”和“债务国”之间制造了严重的紧张。


Just as Europe seemed finally to be escaping the euro crisis, refugees, especially from Syria, began flooding in.	欧洲终于眼看就要摆脱欧元危机了，而难民，特别是来自叙利亚的难民却在此时开始涌入欧洲。


That has jeopardized the Schengen Area of borderless travel, and some are asking whether the EU can withstand the pressure.	这破坏了能够自由旅行的申根区，一些人质疑欧盟能否战胜这一压力。


In the United States, the Syrian refugee crisis has led Congress to rush to restrict visa-free entrance for tourists from 38 countries.	在美国，叙利亚难民危机导致国会急忙限制来自38个国家的游客的免签入境。


This comes at a time when income and wealth inequality is skyrocketing in the US – the median wage for men has not increased in decades – leaving many to wonder whether their children will be able to maintain the living standard they enjoyed.	与此同时，美国的收入和财富不平等性已经达到了令人咋舌的程度——男性中位收入已经几十年没有增长——这让许多人开始怀疑他们的孩子能否保持他们所享受到的生活水平。


On top of all this, for the first time in decades, the growth of international trade no longer comfortably exceeds the growth of global output.	最严重的问题是，几十年来首次，国际贸易增长不再大大超过全球产出增长。


A fundamental driver of many of these problems may well be the unprecedented speed of change – driven by globalization and technological innovation – which has produced disruptions too quickly and on too large a scale for us to manage.	许多这些问题的根本原因是前所未有的变革速度——其背后是全球化和科技创新——高速变革所产生的破坏效应太快太大，让我们措手不及。


For example, while communication technology has done wonders, say, to expand access to finance in Africa, it has also enabled terrorist networks to encrypt their communications effectively.	比如，尽管通讯技术在（比如）扩大非洲金融普及方面收获颇丰，但也让恐怖分子网络能够高效地进行加密通信。


And as the global financial crisis starkly demonstrated, regulators have struggled to keep pace with financial innovation.	而全球金融危机鲜明地表明，监管者难以赶上金融创新的节奏。


The potential for human progress still seems immense, because the world wants for neither resources nor technological innovation.	人类的进步千里仍然巨大，因为世界既不缺少资源，也不缺少科技创新。


Indeed, technology offers the hope of lifesaving medical treatments, higher economic productivity, and sustainable energy systems.	事实上，科技为我们带来了救命医疗技术、更高的经济生产率和可持续能源系统。


But people are fearful, as shown by the return of identity politics and a lack of economic and political inclusiveness.	但人们仍然很害怕，身份政治的回归和经济和政治包容性的缺失就是明证。


As a result, productivity growth is slowing, and, though capital seems cheap and profits plentiful, investment remains sluggish.	结果，生产率增长十分缓慢，而尽管资本看似廉价，利润看似丰厚，但投资仍然停滞不前。


The key to managing the disruptions and assuaging people’s fears is governance.	遏制破坏、平息人们的恐慌的关键在于治理。


Zweig saw the world fall apart a century ago not because human knowledge stopped advancing, but because of widespread governance and policy failures.	一个世纪前，茨威格目睹世界分崩离析，其原因不是人类知识停止进步，而是因为普遍的治理和政策失败。


As we enter 2016, we must focus on adapting governance, in all of its economic and political dimensions, to the twenty-first century, so that our resources and knowledge produce inclusive progress, not violent conflict.	随着2016年的到来，我们必须专注于调整治理，使其在经济和政治的所有方面符合二十一世纪，从而让我们的资源和知识创造包容性进步而不是暴力冲突。


The Good-Governance Trap	好治理陷阱


ROME – Development and improved governance have tended to go hand in hand.	罗马—发展和治理改善总是一起出现。


But, contrary to popular belief, there is little evidence that success in implementing governance reforms leads to more rapid and inclusive economic and social development.	但是，与流行的观念相反，没有证据表明实施治理改革能导致更快、更包容的经济和社会发展。


In fact, it may be the other way around.	事实上，情况可能恰恰相反。


The focus on good governance stems from the struggle to restore sustained growth during the developing-country debt crises of the 1980s.	聚焦于好治理源于20世纪80年代发展中国家债务危机期间重塑持续增长的努力。


Instead of reassessing the prevailing economic-policy approach, international development institutions took aim at the easy targets: developing-country governments.	国际发展机构没有反思主流经济政策方针，而是对准了容易的目标：发展中国家政府。


Advising those governments on how to do their jobs became a new vocation for these institutions, which quickly developed new “technical” approaches to governance reform.	向这些政府建议如何做成了这些机构的新工作，于是很快产生了关于治理改革的“技术”方针。


The World Bank, using well over 100 indicators, introduced a composite index of good governance, based on perceptions of voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and levels of corruption.	世界银行使用100多个指标建立了一套综合性的好治理指数，其基础包括话语权和可问责性、政治稳定和不存在暴力、政府效率、监管质量、法治、腐败水平等。


By claiming that it had found a strong correlation between its governance indicators and economic performance, the Bank fueled hope that the key to economic progress had been found.	世界银行指出，其治理指标和经济表现之间存在强相关性，这让人们觉得经济进步的钥匙已经找到。


The case was flawed from the beginning.	其实从一开始就存在缺陷。


The indicators used were ahistorical and failed to account for country-specific challenges and conditions, with cross-country statistical analyses suffering from selection bias and ignoring the interlinkages among a wide array of variables.	世界银行使用的这些指标无视历史，也没有考虑各国具体的挑战和条件，跨国数据分析存在选择偏误，也忽略了许多变量之间的相互关联。


As a result, the World Bank badly overestimated the impact of governance reform on economic growth.	结果，世界银行大大高估了治理改革对经济增长的影响。


To be sure, governance that is effective, legitimate, and responsive provides untold benefits, especially when compared to the alternative: inefficient governance, cronyism, and corruption.	诚然，高效、合理、高响应力的治理能带来无穷好处，特别是在与另一套做法——低效治理、任人唯亲和腐败——做对比时。


But the focus on governance reform has not proved nearly as effective as promised in fostering development.	但专注于治理改革并不一定能够有效促进发展。


In fact, this governance-focused approach may have actually undermined development efforts.	事实上，这一以治理为核心的方针可能破坏发展措施。


For starters, it has allowed international institutions to avoid acknowledging the shortcomings of the new development orthodoxy of the last two decades of the twentieth century, when Latin America lost over a decade, and Sub-Saharan Africa a quarter-century, of economic and social progress.	首先，它让国际机构不必去认识二十世纪最后二十年的新发展正统理论的短处。 在这二十年里，拉丁美洲失去了十年、撒哈拉以南非洲失去了四分之一世纪的经济和社会进步。


It has also complicated the work of governments unnecessarily.	它也毫无必要地复杂化了政府工作。


With good-governance reforms now a condition for international aid, developing-country governments often end up mimicking donor expectations, instead of addressing the issues that are most pressing for their own citizens.	好治理改革已经成为国际援助的条件，发展中国家最后往往疲于满足出资者的预期，而不去解决对本国公民来说最紧迫的问题。


Indeed, such reforms can even undermine traditional rights and customary obligations worked out among communities over many generations.	事实上，这样的改革甚至可能破坏经历好几代人所形成的传统权利和习惯义务。


Moreover, the required reforms are so wide-ranging that they are beyond the means of most developing countries to implement.	此外，需要的改革范围太广，超过了大部分发展中国家的实施能力。


As a result, good-governance solutions tend to distract from more effective development efforts.	结果，好治理方案往往会对更有效的发展措施形成掣肘。


Another problem with governance reforms is that, although they are formally neutral, they often favor particular vested interests, with grossly unfair consequences.	治理改革的另一个问题是，尽管它们在形式上是中立的，但常常向既得利益倾斜，产生非常不公平的结果。


Reforms aimed at decentralization and devolution have, in some cases, enabled the rise of powerful local political patrons.	在一些案例中，旨在分散化和放权的改革导致了地方权势政治大佬的崛起。


The conclusion is clear: the development agenda should not be overloaded with governance reform.	结论显而易见：发展日程不应该因为治理改革而增加负担。


As Harvard’s Merilee Grindle has put it, we should be aiming for “good enough” governance, selecting a few imperatives from a long list of possibilities.	哈佛大学的梅里利·格林德尔（Merilee Grindle）指出，我们应该致力于“足够好的治理”，从长长的可能性名单中选择一小部分当务之急。


But selecting the most important measures will not be easy.	但选择最终要措施并不容易。


Indeed, advocates of governance reform have rarely been right about the most effective approach.	事实上，治理改革的提倡者对于最有效方针的砍伐很少正确。


Consider the unrelenting promotion of efforts to strengthen property rights.	以顽固地推进强化产权的措施为例。


Absent alienable individual ownership of productive resources, it is asserted, there will be insufficient means and incentives to pursue development initiatives, and shared resources (the “commons”) will be over-exploited and used inefficiently.	这一观点认为，如果不存在可让渡的生产性资料个人所有权，就无法找到充分的激励追求发展政策，而共同资源（“共有物”）将被过度利用和低效使用。


In reality, the so-called “tragedy of the commons” is neither ubiquitous nor inevitable, and individual property rights are not always the best – and never the only – institutional solution for dealing with social dilemmas.	在现实中，所谓的“公地的悲剧”既不普遍，也非不可避免，而个人产权也不是最好——当然更不是唯一——的解决社会困境的制度性方案。


The late Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel laureate in economics, showed that human societies have built myriad creative and lasting solutions to resolve a wide range of dilemmas involving the use of common resources.	已故的诺贝尔经济学奖获得者艾丽诺尔·奥斯特罗姆（Elinor Ostrom）指出，人类社会创造了无数创新而持久办法解决包括公共资源使用在内的各种困境。


The theme of good governance has special appeal to large bureaucratic organizations like multilateral development banks and UN agencies, which favor apolitical solutions to what are essentially political problems.	好治理问题对于多边开发银行和联合国机构等大型官僚组织特别有吸引力，这些组织喜欢用非政治办法解决本质上的政治问题。


In other words, good governance is an ostensibly technocratic answer to what donors and other well-meaning international groups consider bad policies and, especially, bad politics.	换句话说，好治理是出资人和好意国际集团所谓的坏政策和（尤其是）坏政治问题的肤浅的技术官僚答案。


Herein lies the real problem with the good-governance agenda: it supposes that the solution to most policy and political dilemmas lies in compliance with a set of formal process-oriented indicators.	好治理日程的真正问题就在这里：它认为大部分政策和政治困境的解决之道在于按照一组形式上的过程导向的指标去做。


But experience over two decades shows that such directives provide little practical guidance for solving the technically, socially, and politically complex real-world problems of economic development.	但过去二十年的经验证明，这些指导对于解决存在技术、社会和政治复杂性的真实世界经济发展问题来说几乎毫无实践意义。


Recognizing that governance improves with development, the international community would be better served by pursuing reforms that directly advance development, instead of a broad agenda that may have, at best, a small indirect impact.	认识到治理随发展而得到改善，国际社会就会追求直接促进发展的改革而不是充其量也许只能带来微小间接影响的宽泛日程，从而获得更好的表现。


Such a pragmatic approach to improving governance would be neither dogmatic nor pretend to universality.	这一改善治理的务实方针既不教条，也不会装作是万灵丹。


Instead, the major constraints would be identified, analyzed, and addressed, perhaps sequentially.	相反，主要约束也许将顺次得到识别、分析和解决。


Many of the good-governance agenda’s key goals – empowerment, inclusion, participation, integrity, transparency, and accountability – can be built into workable solutions, not because outsiders demand them, but because effective solutions require them.	许多好治理日程的关键目标——赋权、包容、参与、诚信、透明和问责——都可以纳入可行方案，这并不是因为外部人士要求这些目标，而是因为有效的方案需要这些目标。


Such solutions should draw from relevant experiences, with the understanding that they do not amount to “best practices.”	这些方案应该从相关经验中总结而得，必须理解它们并不等于“最佳实践”。


The blind pursuit of good governance has guided development efforts for too long.	盲目追求好治理在太长的时间里引领着发展政策。


It is time to acknowledge what works – and disregard what does not.	如今，应该认识到什么才是真正管用的——并抛弃不管用的。


Reengineering Government	再造政府


PARIS – Since the financial crisis erupted in 2008, governments in advanced countries have been under significant pressure.	巴黎—2008年金融危机爆发以来，发达国家政府承受了巨大的压力。


In many countries, tax receipts abruptly collapsed when the economy contracted, income dwindled, and real-estate transactions came to a halt.	在许多国家，税收收入因为经济衰退、国民收入降低和房地产交易陷入停顿而大幅减少。


The fall in tax revenues was in most cases sudden, deep, and lasting.	税收收入的下降在大多数情况下是突然、深度且持续的。


Governments had no choice but to raise taxes or to adjust to leaner times.	政府别无选择，只能增税或适应不景气。


In some countries, the magnitude of the shock was such that a large tax increase could not fill the gap.	在一些国家，冲击程度非常巨大，以至于大幅增税也无法弥补缺口。


In Spain, despite tax hikes worth more than 4% of GDP since 2010, the tax-to-GDP ratio was only 38% in 2014, compared to 41% in 2007.	在西班牙，尽管2010年以来增税幅度超过了GDP的4%，但2014年税收-GDP之比只有38%，而2007年为41%。


In Greece, tax increases amounted to 13% of GDP during the same period, but the tax ratio increased by only six percentage points.	在希腊，某些时候增税幅度高达GDP的13%，但税收比只增加了六个百分点。


Elsewhere, political limits to tax increases were reached before the gap could be filled.	在其他国家，增税的政治上限在足以弥补缺口之前就已经达到。


Willingly or not, priority is being given to spending cuts.	不管是否愿意，削减支出正在成为重点。


Disillusion about future growth adds to the pressure.	未来增长的幻灭增加了这一压力。


The productivity record has generally been weak over the last few years, and this suggests that growth in the years ahead could be slower than previously expected.	过去几年来，生产率记录总体而言十分疲软，这表明未来多年内的增长将慢于此前的预期。


Revenue growth thus looks insufficient to match the surge in age-related public spending on health and pensions.	因此，收入增长看起来无法足以赶上年龄导致的医疗和退休金公共支出的激增。


This is a very different crisis from those experienced in the 1980s and the 1990s.	对经历过20世纪80年代和90年代的人来说，这是一个非常不同的危机。


Back then, the main issue was political: the legitimacy and efficiency of public spending was under attack.	20世纪八九十年代的主要问题是政治：公共支出的合理性和效率饱受抨击。


In the words of US President Ronald Reagan, government was the problem, not the solution.	用美国总统里根的话说，政府问题，而不是解决问题的办法。


The state, it was loudly proclaimed, had to be rolled back.	一个呼声很高的观点是国家应该缩小规模。


By contrast, today’s concerns are economic.	相反，今天的担忧在于经济。


Partisan disagreement about the proper scope of government remains, but there is no overall rejection of state intervention.	关于政府的合适规模的党派分歧依然存在，但对于国家干预已不存在总体拒绝情绪。


Often, it is not interests or ideologies that make public spending cuts unavoidable – just facts.	通常，导致公共支出削减无法避免的不是利益或者意识形态——而只是事实。


How can governments rise to the challenge?	政府如何应对这一挑战？


The risk they face is clear enough: absent a profound reengineering, inertial spending – owing to entitlements and civil-service wages – is bound to crowd out spending on new priorities and new policies.	它们面临的风险非常清楚：如果不彻底改头换面，惯性支出——来自福利开支和公务部门工资——必然会挤出新重点和新政策上的支出。


Already, the countries that have been forced to cut the most have generally sacrificed public infrastructure investment.	目前，被迫削减支出最多的国家大多都牺牲了公共基础设施投资。


Research is another area at risk.	研究是另一个面临危险的领域。


Social investment in programs that pay off over the long term, such as pre-school child care, is suffering from financial constraints.	效果需要在长期才能显现的社会投资项目，如学前儿童看护，正在饱受融资难困扰。


National security is not given the priority it deserves, despite growing threats.	国家安全也没有得到应有的重视，尽管威胁日益加剧。


Last but not least, makeshift solutions such as protracted wage freezes may eventually erode the quality of public services.	最后，权宜之计——如延长工资冻结期——最终会影响公共服务的质量。


Fortunately, there are a few things governments can do to mitigate the effects of inertial spending.	幸运的是，政府可以采取一些措施减轻惯性支出效应。


For starters, they can simply systematize evaluations of the efficiency of public money.	首先，政府可以简单地系统性评估一下公共资金的效率。


In most countries, such assessments are still rare and haphazard: Parliaments often enact policies without knowing whether they are worth the money, and it may take a very long time before ineffective or inefficient policies are terminated.	在大部分国家，这类评估依然十分罕见而偶然：议会常常在不知道政策是不是值得投入那么多钱的情况下就予以批准，而结束无效或低效政策常常需要极长的时间。


That is why enabling legislation for spending programs should contain sunset clauses, with extensions subject to independent evaluation.	因此，支出项目的赋权立法应该包括“日落”条款，并根据独立评估扩张调整。


Second, spending reviews, too, should be systematized.	其次，支出检查也应该系统化。


Setting priorities – whether to spend more on education and less on pensions, for example, or whether to invest in infrastructure or in research – entails hard choices that should be made explicit.	制定重点——比如，是否要增加教育支出、减少退休金支出，或者投资基础设施还是研究——是艰难的选择，必须明确化。


In an ideal world, these choices would be the focus of electoral debates and parliamentary work.	在理想情形中，这些选择应该成为选举辩论和议会工作的焦点。


But behind every budget line is a constituency tempting policymakers to eschew hard decisions.	但在每一条预算线的背后都有一个引诱决策者逃避艰难抉择的选区。


That is why structured spending reviews are useful: they force officials to bridge the gap between ends and means and encourage informed democratic decision-making.	因此，结构化支出检查能派上用场：它们迫使官员理顺目的与手段，并鼓励知情的民主决策。


Third, governments should equip themselves with a reengineering budget.	第三，政府应该用再造预算（reengineering budget）武装自己。


As private companies know, transformations – deep changes in the way things are done – often cost money before they bring savings.	私营公司知道，转型——做事方式的深刻变化——常常需要花掉很多钱，然后才能带来节省。


This may be because the changes require investment in new technology, retraining of employees, or simply buying stakeholders’ consent.	这也许是因为变革需要新技术投资、再培训员工，或者还需要买来股东的同意。


Money earmarked in the budget for such reengineering of government programs would be a good investment.	政府项目的这类再造预算中所使用的资金是一项很好的投资。


Fourth, governments should promote public-sector innovation.	第四，政府应该鼓励公共部门创新。


Contrary to popular prejudice, local governments and public agencies do innovate; what is missing is a mechanism to select and disseminate innovations in the same way the market selects new products or cost-saving processes.	与流行的偏见相反，地方政府和公共机构确实在创新； 缺乏的是一套机制像市场选择新产品或成本节约型工艺那样选择和传播它们的创新。


A better way to deliver a public service may remain unknown for years.	更好的提供公共服务的办法也许多年不为人知。


That might well change if governments took simple steps like allocating more funding on a project basis and organizing contests.	如果政府采取一些简单步骤，比如将更多资金根据项目进行配置或者组织竞争，就有可能带来极大的改观。


For example, schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods should be allowed to tender for funds for educational innovation.	比如，应该允许欠发达社区的学校投标教育创新资金。


Last but not least, people should be empowered.	最后，人民应该得到赋权。


Citizens want a more nimble state that tailors its operations to local needs.	公民希望国家更加灵活，国家的运作能够与地方需求匹配。


In the digital age, they want it to meet new standards of speed, reliability, and personalization.	在数字时代，他们希望国家符合新的速度、可靠性和个性化标准。


They increasingly challenge the traditional view that efficiency and equality imply less individual choice.	他们日益反对效率和质量意味着更少个体选择的传统观念。


And they want the government to be open, to guarantee access to data, and to make its efficiency and effectiveness directly observable.	他们希望政府变得开放、保证数据的可获得性，并让其效率和效果能够直观观察到。


These are powerful forces for change, and embattled governments should harness them to the goal of achieving the reengineering they so urgently need.	这些都是强大的变革力量，困难重重的政府应该利用它们实现急切需要的再造。


The alternative is to accept the deterioration of the quality of public services, which would lead only to a loss of government legitimacy and, with it, a diminishing willingness to pay taxes.	否则，就必须接受公共服务质量的下降，而这只能削弱政府的合法性，以及越来越低的纳税意愿。


Beyond the Revolving Door	转门之外


LONDON – “Honestly,” said Bill Gates during the COP21 meeting in Paris earlier this month, “I’ve been a bit surprised that the climate talks historically haven’t had R&D on the agenda in any way, shape, or form.”	伦敦—“老实说，”比尔·盖茨在本月早些时候的COP21巴黎大会期间说，“我有些震惊，从历史上看，气候谈判日程上见不到任何研发发面的方法、内容或形式。 ”我也是。


So am I, and the question Gates raises goes to the heart of the relationship between business and government in solving our societies’ toughest problems, from ensuring the planet’s continued habitability to fostering stable and inclusive economic growth.	盖茨所提出的问题直击企业和政府在解决现时代最棘手问题中的关系的核心。 从维持地球宜居性到打造稳定包容的经济增长无不如此。


To be sure, in some areas, government authorities simply don’t consider making business a part of the solution early on.	诚然，在某些方面，政府在一开始根本没有考虑将企业作为解决方案的一部分。


The most striking recent example is the ongoing refugee crisis: Governments in Europe and around the world still don’t fully include business in early-stage thinking about how to manage the flow of asylum-seekers.	最显著的最近的例子便是仍在发酵中的难民危机：欧洲和世界各国政府仍不让企业参与关于如何管理寻求庇护者流动的早期思考。


Granted, in many cases business leaders have chosen to remain on the sideline; but both they and governments need to adjust their thinking.	当然，在很多问题上，企业领袖选择了袖手旁观； 但他们和政府都需要调整思维。


But in other areas, companies are more than eager to step up, be seen and heard, and exercise influence.	但在其他方面，公司迫不及待地想要有所作为，想要被看见、被听见，想要形成影响力。


When it comes to technology, R&D, trade talks, and the like, the benefit for companies’ bottom line is direct and clear, and here Gates’ surprise is understandable, because corporate leaders typically lobby to participate and change the way governments think and act.	在科技、研发、贸易谈判等问题上，对公司利润的好处是直接且显而易见的，盖茨在这方面的震惊也是不难理解的，因为公司领袖总是游说参与和改变政府的思维和行动模式。


And yet dangers arise when business gets too close to government.	但当企业与政府走得过近时，也会产生危险。


Sometimes the risk entails the proverbial “revolving door” between government and business, through which personnel glide from senior private-sector jobs to top official posts and back again.	有时这一风险包括众所周知的政府与企业之间的“旋转门”，即私人部门高级岗位与高级官员岗位之间的人事互换。


It is a cycle that often resembles the fox guarding the henhouse, with those who regulate too close to those whom they regulate.	这个圈子很像是让狐狸看守鸡窝，监管者与被监管者走得太近。


The most obvious example of this is finance and banking, where former employees of a single firm, Goldman Sachs, hold some of the most senior regulatory and monetary positions – and not just in the United States.	最明显的例子是金融和银行业，来自高盛一家公司的前员工把持着全球最高等级的监管和货币岗位——并且不仅仅在美国是如此。


Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank was Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs International, and Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, worked for Goldman Sachs for 13 years.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉曾经是高盛国际副主席兼董事总经理，英格兰银行行长卡尼曾经在高盛工作过13年。


But simply closing the revolving door in finance is not a solution.	但将金融业的旋转门一关了之并不是办法。


Research by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has shown that regulation and legislation in this area must strike a balance, lest it undermine “the ability of regulatory agencies to seek and retain talent.”	纽约联邦储备银行的研究表明，该领域的监管和立法必须达到平衡，否则就会破坏“监管机构寻觅和留住人才的能力”。


In areas like defense, the revolving door moves swiftly.	在国防等领域，旋转门转得很快。


According to the Boston Globe, from 2004 through 2008, some four-fifths of retiring three- and four-star US generals went to work as consultants or defense executives.	据《波士顿环球报》（Boston Globe）的数据，从2004年到2008年，大约五分之四的退役美国中将和上将成为顾问或防务高管。


Likewise, the US-based group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics has shown the extent to which careers lead from the US Department of Defense to the defense industry.	类似地，位于美国的公民责任和道德组织（Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics）披露了美国国防部官员转行进入防务行业的情况。


Corporate scandals often reveal where business and government are too close for comfort, as when senior members of Toshiba’s executive team and board, for example, sit on Japanese government panels and commissions.	公司丑闻常常能够说明企业和政府何时会走得过于接近，比如东芝公司高管团队和董事会高级成员纷纷进入日本政府的各个小组和委员会。


Likewise, Volkswagen’s close relationship with the German government has led to accusations that regulators went easy on the company, setting the stage for the emissions-testing scandal in which the carmaker is now embroiled.	类似地，大众公司与德国政府关系密切，导致人们指责监管者对该公司睁一眼闭一眼，为眼下大众深陷其中的排放测试丑闻创造了条件。


But close ties between business and government are also necessary.	但企业与政府之间的紧密关系也是必要的。


Strong economies need strong businesses and strong trade, and that requires good relationships with policymakers.	强大的经济需要强大的企业和强大的贸易，而这需要与决策者的良好关系。


When government officials travel abroad to encourage economic cooperation, CEOs of some of the country’s biggest companies should go along.	当政府官员出访外国以鼓励经济合作时，本国一些最大公司的CEO也应该随同出访。


The question is whether such companies are so important to the country’s economy and reputation that the government cannot regulate them properly.	问题在于这些公司是否对于国家经济和名誉如此重要，以致于政府无法恰当地监管它们。


They are given excessive leeway because they, like many financial firms, are too important to fail.	它们获得了过大的自由空间，因为和金融企业一样，它们太重要而不能倒。


This complex dance between business and government is never-ending and always evolving.	企业与政府间的这一互动关系永远不会结束，并且永远在演化。


It is the stuff of gatherings like the World Economic Forum, where business leaders and governments talk tough on panels and make nice in back rooms.	在世界经济论坛等场合上，企业领袖和政府在小组讨论中针锋相对，而在幕后一团和气。


And the need to do both has become more obvious than ever in an era of slow economic growth and privatization of services once provided by the public sector.	而在经济增长缓慢、曾经由公共部门提供的服务纷纷私有化的时期，表面针锋相对、背后一团和气的需要更加显而易见了。


The working relationship is important and should not be condemned, but it must be recognized openly.	这一工作关系很重要，也不应该受到谴责，但必须公开。


This brings us back to Gates, who announced in Paris an initiative to spend a total of $20 billion on climate-related R&D over the next five years.	这让我们回到了盖茨的话，在巴黎，他宣布要在未来五年支出总共200亿美元用于气候相关的研发活动。


Gates’ plan highlights a frequently noted component of the relationship between government and business: governments’ vital role in funding early experimental research, which business then often turns into commercially viable solutions.	盖茨的计划突显出一��受到频繁关注的政府和企业关系的要素：政府在资助早期实验性研究起着关键作用，随后由企业接棒具有商业可行性的方案。


All of this is necessary to build stronger economies.	两者都是构建更强大的经济不可或缺的因素。


But, though Gates was right to ask why climate-change negotiations have not included R&D, let’s not pretend that any of this is simple.	但是，尽管盖茨正确地质疑了为何气候变化谈判从未包括研发，但我们不能假装这是个简单的问题。


The need for revolving doors, whether of personnel or ideas, between government and business cannot be a reason to allow companies to gain undue influence on public policy or for regulators to be kept weak.	政府和企业之间需要旋转门——不管是人事旋转门还是思想旋转门——这绝非允许公司获得对公共政策的不当影响力或监管者保持弱势的理由。


Nor can it be a reason to give failing businesses a safety net for their own bad behavior or poor decisions.	这也绝非给因为自身不当行为或糟糕决策而倒闭的企业提供安全网的理由。


This is especially true at a time when public trust is at a low ebb.	如今，公共信任正处于低谷，这一问题尤其突出。


Rather than pretending that this symbiotic relationship doesn’t exist or, worse, that it isn’t necessary, both business and government must err on the side of transparency.	企业和政府不能装作这一共生性关系不存在，或者更糟糕地，这一关系并非必要，而必须在透明度方面小心翼翼。


As Gates’ question made clear, in our fear of allowing the relationship to go too far, we risk not allowing it to go far enough.	盖茨的问题清楚地表明，我们害怕让这一关系走得太远，但也有可能让它们走得不够远。


Innovate or Stagnate	创新还是停滞


DUBAI – Companies, like people, grow old.	迪拜—公司就像人，会变老。


They start life small and eager to survive, fueled by youthful energy and fresh ideas.	在初生期，它们规模很小，渴望生存，动力来自年轻的能量和新思维。


They compete, expand, mature, and eventually, with few exceptions, fade into obscurity.	它们竞争、扩张、成熟，并最终衰亡，只有极少数能成为例外。


The same is true of governments: they, too, can lose the hunger and ambition of youth and allow themselves to become complacent.	政府也是如此：它们也可能失去年轻人的饥饿感和雄心，放任自己沉迷于自满。


Consider this: only 11% of the Fortune 500 companies from 1955 still exist today, while the average time that companies stay in the top 500 has fallen from 75 years to 15 years.	考虑以下事实：1955年的《财富》500强公司只有11%今天仍然存在，与此同时，保持前500强地位的平均持续时间从75年下降到15年。


In this age of rapid change, those who lag behind become irrelevant– in a heartbeat.	在这个快速变化的时代，落后就会变得不再重要——这不过是一瞬间的事。


Countries whose governments grow old face the same fate as outdated companies.	政府变老的国家和过时的公司面临同样的命运。


Their choice is simple: innovate or become irrelevant.	它们的选择很简单，要么创新，要么变得不重要。


The race for national competitiveness is every bit as fierce as the competition among companies in the marketplace.	国家竞争力竞赛和市场中的公司竞争一样激烈。


Countries compete for investment, talent, growth, and opportunity in a globalized world, and those that are pushed out of the running surrender the greatest prize of all: human development, prosperity, and happiness for their people.	国家竞争全球化世界中的投资、人才、增长和机会，而那些被这场竞赛淘汰的国家拱手让出最宝贵的奖励：人力发展、繁荣和人民的幸福。


To avoid this fate, governments must focus on what really matters: how to be like the 11% of companies that have remained, through the decades, in the top 500.	要避免这一命运，政府必须将注意力集中在真正重要的领域：如何成为11%能穿越几十年保持500强地位的公司。


The lifecycle of companies should teach governments that the secret of eternal youth is constant innovation – seizing opportunities and behaving like the dynamic, entrepreneurial companies that are defining today’s world and shaping its future.	公司的生命周期应该教会政府，永远年轻的秘诀是持续创新——抓住机会，并像决定着当今世界及其未来的充满活力和企业家精神的公司那样做。


The key to corporations’ rejuvenation, civilizations’ evolution, and human development in general is simple: innovation.	公司复兴、文明演化和人力发展的关键总的来说很简单——无他，唯创新耳。


I am always amazed when governments think they are an exception to this rule.	有些政府认为它们是这一规则的例外，我对此总是表示惊讶。


Innovation in government is not an intellectual luxury, a topic confined to seminars and panel discussions, or a matter only of administrative reforms.	政府的创新并非一种知识奢侈、一个仅限于研讨会和委员会讨论的话题，或一个仅仅事关行政改革的问题。


It is the recipe for human survival and development, the fuel for constant progress, and the blueprint for a country’s rise.	它是人类生存和发展的秘诀，是永恒进步的助推剂，是国家崛起的蓝图。


The first key to business-like innovation in government is a focus on skills.	在政府中实现与类似于企业的创新的第一个关键是专注于技能。


Top-tier companies continuously invest in their employees to provide them with the right skills for the marketplace.	顶级公司不断地投资于雇员，为他们提供正确的市场技能。


Governments must do the same, by constantly upgrading skills and nurturing innovation – among their own employees, across key sectors of the economy, and at the foundations of the education system.	政府也必须这样做，不断升级技能、培养创新——与它们的雇员一起，跨越经济各大关键部门，并以教育系统为基础。


Governments that fail to equip new generations with the skills needed to become leaders for their time are condemning them to be led by other, more innovative societies.	无法用成为领袖的必须技能武装新一代的政府将导致他们受制于更具创新性的其他社会。


A United States Department of Labor study found that 65% of children currently in primary school will grow up to work in jobs that do not exist today.	美国劳工部的一项研究认为，65%的现在的小学生长大后将从事现在不存在的工作。


Another study at Oxford University found that 47% of job categories are at high risk of ceasing to exist because they can be automated through technology.	另一项牛津大学的研究发现47%的工作种类存在巨大的消失风险，因为它们可以通过技术实现自动化。


So, how do we prepare our children and future generations for such times?	因��，我们如何让我们的孩子和子孙后代为这样的时代做好准备？


How do we equip our countries to compete, not only today, but in the coming decades as well?	我们如何武装我们的国家，让它不仅为今天，也为未来几十年的竞争做好准备？


The answer lies in honing our children’s creativity, and providing them with the analytical and communication skills needed to channel it toward productive ends.	答案在于磨砺儿童的创新力，并给他们提供分析和沟通技能以使创新力转化为生产力。


The second key to transforming governments into engines of innovation is to shift the balance of investment toward intangibles, as in the private sector.	把政府变为创新引擎的第二个关键是改变投资平衡，使之如私人部门那样向无形资产倾斜。


Whereas more than 80% of the value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 consisted of tangible assets 40 years ago, today that ratio is reversed: more than 80% of the largest companies’ value is intangible – the knowledge and skills of their employees and the intellectual property embedded in their products.	40年前，标准普尔500指数的80%以上市值由有形资产构成，如今这一比例已经颠倒过来，最大公司80%以上的资产是无形资产——雇员的知识和技能以及凝聚在产品中的知识产权。


Governments, too, should think strategically about shifting their spending away from tangible infrastructure like roads and buildings, and toward intangibles like education and research and development.	政府也在战略性地考虑告便支出模式，从有形基础设施（如道路和建筑）转向无形资产（如教育和研发）。


It is no secret that the US and Europe, combined, spend more than $250 billion of public funds annually on R&D to maintain their leading positions.	美国和欧洲加起来每年要花2,500多亿美元公共资金用于保持它们的领先地位，这已不是什么秘密。


Likewise, a key driver of rapid development in countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea has been their strategic decision to shift public expenditure away from hard infrastructure and toward the “soft” infrastructure needed to build and sustain a knowledge economy.	类似地，新加坡、马来西亚和韩国等国家之所以能快速发展，关键动力之一也在于采取了将公共支出从硬基础设施转向维持知识经济所需要的“软”基础设施的战略性决策。


Likewise, the British government spends markedly more of its budget on such intangibles than on tangible assets.	类似地，英国政府花在这些无形资产上的预算也要远高于有形资产。


Most of today’s transformative companies are well known for having an innovative corporate culture and working environment that inspires and empowers employees.	今天的大部分变革性公司都以创新性公司文化和启发雇员、赋予雇员权利的工作环境而知名。


Governments that set an example for innovation have the power to implant a nationwide culture of creativity.	作为创新榜样的政府有力量培养全国性的创新文化。


When such a culture takes root, people feel inspired to run further with their ideas, to aim higher with their ambitions, and to pursue bigger dreams.	当这一文化站稳脚跟时，人们就能欢欣鼓舞地发展自己的想法，带着雄心壮志设定更高的目标、追逐更大的梦想。


That is how countries that encourage innovation take the lead – and stay there.	这就是鼓励创新的国家获得并保持领先的原因。


To sustain innovation, businesses must attract and retain the most creative and productive minds.	要保持创新，企业必须吸引和留住最有创造力和生产力的头脑。


In this age of global mobility, countries, too, go head to head in the battle for talent.	在全球流动时代，国家也在挤破头竞争人才。


Global cities compete to provide an ideal life and work environment for innovators, and to harness their creativity to become stronger and more competitive still.	全球城市争相为创新者提供理想的生活和工作环境，并设法让他们的创造力变得更强大、更有竞争力。


Innovative governments do the same thing on a national scale.	创新型政府在全国层面做同样的事。


They attract talent, perform efficiently, and continually upgrade their systems and services.	它们吸引人才、高效运行，并持续升级系统和服务。


They empower citizens to cultivate their collective energy and develop their potential, and thus become drivers of their countries’ growth and advancement in the world arena.	它们赋予公民能力，培养公民的集体能量，开发他们的潜力，从而成为国家在世界竞技场上成长和领先的推动力。


Above all, they value human minds and help people become better guardians and builders of our planet.	总之，它们珍视人力思想，帮助人们成为地球的更好的捍卫者和建设者。


For governments, innovation is an existential question.	对政府来说，创新是一个生存问题。


Only those that sustain innovation can drive change in the world, because they are the governments that never grow old.	只有保持创新的国家可以推动世界的变化，因为它们的政府永远不老。


The rates are bounded by concerns about inflation, over-expansion of the state sector, and the central bank’s independence; but, with our relatively low levels of debt (Japan’s debt amounts to over 230% of its GDP) and depressed output and inflation, these limits are quite distant in the UK and the US.	该利率由通胀，国营部门的过度扩张程度和中央银行的独立性等因素所决定； 但由于债务水平相对较低（日本的债务相当于其GDP的230％）以及产出和通货膨胀率较低，英美两��还远未达到这一限度。


Fraud, Fools, and Financial Markets	骗术，愚人以及金融市场


NEW HAVEN – Adam Smith famously wrote of the “invisible hand,” by which individuals’ pursuit of self-interest in free, competitive markets advances the interest of society as a whole.	发自纽黑文——当年亚当·斯密提出了关于“看不见的手”的著名理论，认为每个个体在自由竞争市场中对个人利益的追求会推动社会整体福利的增加。


And Smith was right: Free markets have generated unprecedented prosperity for individuals and societies alike. But, because we can be manipulated or deceived or even just passively tempted, free markets also persuade us to buy things that are good neither for us nor for society.	他是对的，自由市场无论是为个人还是社会都创造了前所未有的巨额财富，但由于我们会被操纵，蒙骗或者被动地引诱，自由市场同时也会说服我们去购买一些于己于社会都无益的东西。


This observation represents an important codicil to Smith’s vision. And it is one that George Akerlof and I explore in our new book, Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception.	这一观察可以作为对亚当·斯密观点的一项重要注解，也是乔治·阿克罗夫（George Akerlof）和我本人在合著的新书《钓鱼：操纵和骗术的经济学》中所探究的现象。


Most of us have suffered “phishing”: unwanted emails and phone calls designed to defraud us.	大多数人都曾经被“下过饵”——就是那些专门设计来蒙骗我们的邮件和电话。


A “phool” is anyone who does not fully comprehend the ubiquity of phishing.	而一个“愚人”则是那个并未意识到钓鱼行为其实无所不在的人。


A phool sees isolated examples of phishing, but does not appreciate the extent of professionalism devoted to it, nor how deeply this professionalism affects lives.	他们只看到互不关联的钓鱼个案，却不知道其中已经包含了大量的专业性工作，同时这些专业性工作又是如何影响人们生活的。


Sadly, a lot of us have been phools – including Akerlof and me, which is why we wrote this book.	不幸的是，许多人都曾经是“愚人”——包括阿克罗夫和我，这也是我们写这本书的原因。


Routine phishing can affect any market, but our most important observations concern financial markets – timely enough, given the massive boom in the equity and real-estate markets since 2009, and the turmoil in global asset markets since last month.	日常的钓鱼行为可以影响任何市场，但我们最重要的观察则在于金融市场——考虑到2009年以来大规模的资产和地产市场泡沫，以及上个月以来全球资产市场的混乱，也是是时候这样做了。


As too many optimists have learned to their detriment, asset prices are highly volatile, and a whole ocean of phishes is involved.	正如太多乐观主义者在教训中学到的那样，资产价格是极不稳定的，而且其中包含着海量钓鱼行为。 借款者被诱使办理超出其承受能力的抵押贷款；


Borrowers are lured into unsuitable mortgages; firms are stripped of their assets; accountants mislead investors; financial advisers spin narratives of riches from nowhere; and the media promote extravagant claims.	金融顾问编造出不知从何而来的富人； 而媒体则鼓动那些夸张的宣言。


But the losers in the downturns are not just those who have been duped.	但在下跌中的失败者可不仅仅是那些受了骗的人。


A chain of additional losses occurs when the inflated assets have been purchased with borrowed money.	当那些高估资产是被用贷款购买的时候还会招致额外的连锁损失。


In that case, bankruptcies and fear of bankruptcy spawn an epidemic of further bankruptcies, reinforcing fear.	在这种情况下，破产以及对破产的恐惧导致向破产行为不断蔓延，还强化了恐惧。


Then credit dries up and the economy collapses. This vicious downward spiral for business confidence typically features phishes – for example, the victims of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme – discovered only after the period of irrational exuberance has ended.	而这一商业信心的严重螺旋状下行经常会暴露钓鱼行为——比如伯纳德·麦道夫（Bernard Madoff）的庞氏骗局受害者们也是在非理性繁荣结束之后才发现自己上了当。


Epidemics, in economics as much as in medicine, call for an immediate and drastic response.	而经济上的传染病就跟医学上的一样，都需要迅速果断的应对。


The response by the authorities to the Great Crash of 1929 was small and slow, and the world economy entered a “Dark Age” that lasted through the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War.	当年各国政府在1929年的“大暴跌”中出手既慢又小，结果世界随之堕入了一个从1930年代“大萧条”延续到二战的“黑暗时代”。


The 2007-2009 financial crisis portended a similar outcome, but this time the world’s governments and central banks intervened promptly, in a coordinated fashion, and with an appropriately high volume of stimulus.	2007~2009年的金融危机本也预示着类似的后果，但这次全球政府和央行都联合起来果断出手干预，拿出了规模足够大的刺激政策。


The recovery has been weak; but we are nowhere near a new Dark Age.	虽然复苏依然疲软，但总不会让我们陷入另一个“黑暗时代”。


For that we should be grateful.	为此我们应当感激。


Yet some now argue that the fiscal and monetary authorities should not have responded so quickly or strongly when the 2007-2009 crisis erupted.	但如今有人质疑当危机爆发时财政和货币当局不应如此迅速强硬地出手。


They believe that the primary cause of the crisis was what economists call moral hazard: because risk-takers expected that the authorities would intervene to protect them when their bets went awry, they took even greater risks.	他们认为危机的主要成因是经济学家所谓的“道德风险”：风险承受者预期当局会出手保护他们，所以加大赌注，冒更大的风险。


By contrast, our view (supported by plenty of data) is that rapidly rising prices usually reflect irrational exuberance, aided and abetted by phishes.	相反，我们的观点（在大量数据支持下）认为价格的快速上升通常意味着非理性繁荣，而且是由钓鱼行为所助力和唆使的。


The irrationally exuberant were not thinking of the returns they would garner if the authorities intervened to maintain the economy and the flow of credit (or, in extreme cases, moved to bail out their bank or enterprise).	非理性繁荣的参与者根本没想过如果当局出手维持经济以及信贷流（或者在极端情况下援助银行或者企业）后自己收回多少。


Such possibilities were a marginal consideration in the euphoria preceding the 2007-2009 crisis: those selling at inflated prices were making profits; and buyers “knew” they were doing the right thing – even when they weren’t.	这样的可能性在2007~2009年间那种极度兴奋的情绪下被抛到了一边：那些高价卖出者确实赚到了钱； 而接盘者则“知道”自己在做正确的事——即便他们根本是错的。


The reluctance to acknowledge the need for immediate intervention in a financial crisis is based on a school of economics that fails to account for the irrational exuberance that I have explored elsewhere, and that ignores the aggressive marketing and other realities of digital-age markets examined in Phishing for Phools.	那种不愿承认危机来临时需要当即介入的想法是基于一个无法解释我已经在别处探究过的非理性繁荣，以及忽视了《钓鱼》中所阐述的数码时代市场的强力推广和其它现实的经济学派。


But adhering to an approach that overlooks these factors is akin to doing away with fire departments, on the grounds that without them people would be more careful – and so there would then be no fires.	但依赖于一种无视这些因素的手段无异于把消防局撤销，寄望于这能令人们更加小心防火，以为这就不会再有火灾了。


We found out many years ago, to the world’s great regret, what happens when a financial epidemic is allowed to run its course.	凭着前人的教训，我们多年前已经知道如果对金融传染性危机不加制止的话会有何种后果。


Our analysis indicates that not only are there endemic and natural forces that make the financial system highly volatile; but also that swift, effective intervention is needed in the face of financial collapse.	我们的分析显示不仅存在使金融市场高度波动的特有或自然力量； 也意识到在面临金融崩溃之际必须拿出迅速有效的干涉手段。


We need to give free rein to fiscal and monetary authorities to take aggressive steps when financial turmoil turns into financial crisis.	我们需要给财政和货币当局更多自由度，好让他们能在金融风波演变成危机前采取强力措施。


One Dark Age is one too many.	须知人类只需要一个黑暗时代就够了。


The Creative State	创新国家


LONDON – The conventional view in mainstream economics today is that governments have little capacity to spark innovation.	伦敦—当今主流经济学的传统观点是政府没有多少刺激创新的能力。


The state should play as limited a role in the economy as possible, the thinking goes, intervening only in cases of “market failure.”	这一观点认为，国家在经济中所扮演的角色应该尽可能小，只在“市场失灵”时出手干预。


This is far from the truth.	这远非现实。


In fact, governments can and do play a critical role in spurring innovation – actively creating new markets, instead of just fixing them.	事实上，政府应该也确实在刺激创新方面起着关键作用——积极建立新市场而不仅仅是修补它们。


To be sure, advocates of a limited economic role for government believe that market failure justifies some funding of infrastructure and basic science.	诚然，支持政府经济角色应该有限的人认为市场失灵证明有必要为基础设施和基础科学提供一些资金。


But such limited intervention can hardly explain the billions of public-sector dollars that have flowed toward downstream applied research, even providing early-stage financing for companies.	但这一有限的干预很难解释数十亿美元流向下游应用研究、甚至为公司提供早期融资的现象。


Indeed, in some of the world’s most famous innovation hubs, the state has played a key “entrepreneurial” role, envisioning and financing the creation of entire new fields, from information technology to biotech, nanotech, and green tech.	事实上，在一些全球最著名的创新枢纽中，国家扮演着重要的“企业家”角色，谋划建立全新领域并提供融资，包括信息技术、生物技术、纳米技术和绿色技术等。


In Silicon Valley, for example, the government has acted as a strategic investor through a decentralized network of public institutions: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, NASA, the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR), and the National Science Foundation.	比如，在硅谷，政府通过一个分散的公共机构网络扮演着战略投资者的角色，这一网络包括美国国防部先进研究项目局（Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency）、美国宇航局（NASA）、小企业创新研究计划（Small Business Innovation Research program，SBIR）、国家科学基金会（National Science Foundation）等。


The sums involved can be staggering, and not just in IT; large amounts of funding have also been channeled to energy and life sciences.	其中所涉及的总量是惊人的，并且不仅仅局限在信息技术； 大量资金也进入了能源和生命科学。


In 2011, for instance, the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) invested $31 billion in biomedical research.	比如，2011年美国国家卫生研究院（National Institutes of Health，NIH）投资310亿美元用于生物制药研究。


Marcia Angell, a professor at Harvard Medical School, has shown that this financing played a crucial role in the development of some of the most revolutionary new drugs in recent decades.	哈佛医学院教授玛西亚·安吉尔（Marcia Angell）证明这笔融资在近几十年来的一些最具革命性的新药的开发中起到了关键作用。


Similarly, for some of the most innovative American companies, financing from the SBIR has proved to be more important than private venture capital.	类似地，对一些美国最有创新性的公司来说，来自SBIR的资金比私人风险资本更加重要。


Examples outside the US include Israel, where the public venture-capital fund Yozma has provided early-stage funding to some of the country’s most dynamic companies, and Finland, where Sitra, the public innovation fund, supplied early financing for Nokia.	美国之外的例子包括以色列和芬兰。 以色列公共风险资本基金Yozma为以色列的一些最有活力的公司提供了早期融资。


In China, the state-owned development bank is offering billions of dollars in loans to some of the country’s most innovative companies, including Huawei and Yingli Solar.	芬兰公共创新基金Sitra也为诺基亚公司提供过早期融资。 在中国，国有开发银行为华为和天威英利等中国最具创新性的公司提供数十亿美元贷款。


These types of public investments are critical in creating and shaping new markets.	这些类型的公共投资对于建立和塑造新市场至关重要。


Indeed, government investment played a central role in developing nearly all of the technologies that make the iPhone a smart phone: the Internet, GPS, touchscreens, and the advances in voice recognition underlying Siri.	事实上，政府投资在几乎所有让iPhone成为智能电话的技术的研发中都起到了核心作用，包括互联网、全球定位系统、触摸屏和作为Siri基础的声音识别技术等。


Similarly, in many countries, it is the public sector that is leading the way in making green technology possible.	类似地，在许多国家，是公共部门引领着绿色技术成为可能。


Recognizing the importance of government investment in promoting innovation and growth implies the need to rethink the conventional wisdom about state intervention.	认识到政府投资在刺激创新和增长方面的重要性意味着需要反思关于国家干预的传统智慧。


Instead of focusing on picking individual technologies or firms, public organizations should act like investors, betting on a diversified “portfolio” of choices.	公共组织不应该只专注于挑选个别技术或企业，而应该像投资人那样行动，下注于多样化的选择“投资组合”。


Like any other investor, the state will not always succeed.	和其他投资人一样，国家不可能永远成功。


In fact, failure is more likely, because government agencies often invest in the areas of highest uncertainty, where private capital is reluctant to enter.	事实上，失败可能性更大，因为政府机构常常投资于不确定性最大的领域，因为私人资本不愿意进入这些领域。


This means that public organizations must be capable of taking chances and learning from trial and error.	这意味着公共组织必须有能力抓住机会和从试错中学习。


If failure is an unavoidable part of the innovation game, and if government is crucial for innovation, society must be more tolerant of “government failure.”	如果失败时创新游戏不可避免的一部分，如果政府对创新至关重要，那么社会应该更多地容忍“政府失败”。


But the reality is that when government fails, there is public outcry – and silence when it succeeds.	但现实是当政府失败时，往往舆论大哗，而当政府成功时，往往没有什么动静。


For example, the bankruptcy of the US solar energy firm Solyndra, which received a $500 million government-guaranteed loan, triggered partisan protests.	比如，获得5亿美元政府担保贷款的美国太阳能企业Solyndra破产案引起了偏隘的示威。


Yet few have paused to consider that the government provided nearly the same amount to Tesla to help it develop the Tesla S car, a product that is considered an archetype of Silicon Valley innovation.	但很少有人停下来想一想，政府也为Tesla公司提供了类似规模的融资帮助它开发Tesla S汽车，而该产品被认为是硅谷创新的榜样。


What, then, might make the public more accepting of government failure?	那么，什么可以让公众更能接受政府失败？


Private venture capitalists cover their losses from failed investments with their profits from those that succeed; but government programs are rarely set up to generate significant returns.	私人风险资本家用得自成功项目的利润抵消失败投资的损失； 但政府项目很少是为了赢得大量回报。


While some argue that the government’s return comes through taxes, the current tax system is not working, owing not only to loopholes, but also to rate reductions.	一些人认为政府的回报来自税收，但当前税收体系不起作用，不仅因为存在漏洞，也因为税率降低。


When NASA was founded, the top marginal tax rate was over 90%.	NASA建立时，最高边际税率为90%以上。


And capital gains tax has fallen by more than 50% since the 1980s.	而资本利得税自20世纪80年代以来下降了50%多。


In order to build support for public investment in higher-risk innovation, perhaps taxpayers should receive a more direct return, by channeling profits into a public innovation fund to finance the next wave of technologies.	为了营造对高风险创新的公共投资的支持，也许纳税人应该获得更加直接的回报——可通过将利润注入公共创新基金为下一波技术融资实现。


When investments are in upstream basic research, the spillover effect across industries and sectors is sometimes enough of a social reward.	当投资项目为上游基础研究时，其对各行业和部门的溢出效应或许已能产生足够的社会回报。


But other cases might require creating alternative incentives.	但其他情况可能需要其他激励。


For example, some of the profits from the government’s investment in Tesla could have been recovered through shares (or royalties), and used to cover the losses from its investment in Solyndra.	比如，政府对Tesla的投资的部分利润本可以通过股份（或特许费）获得，并用于抵消对Solyndra的投资的损失。


Repayment of public loans to business could be made contingent on income, as student loans often are.	企业公共贷款的偿付可以根据利润变化，如学生贷款常常出现的那样。


And the prices of drugs that are developed largely with NIH funding could be capped, so that the taxpayer does not pay twice.	基本依靠NIH资金开发的药品的价格可以予以限制，这样纳税人就不必付两次钱。


One thing is clear: the current approach suffers from serious shortcomings, largely because it socializes the risks and privatizes the rewards.	有一点很清楚：目前的方针有着严重缺陷，这主要是因为它将风险社会化而回报私人化。


This is hurting not only future innovation opportunities, but also the government’s ability to communicate its role to the public.	这不仅有害于未来创新机会，也有害于政府与公众沟通其角色的能力。


Acknowledging the role that the state has played – and should continue to play – in shaping innovation enables us to begin debating the most important question: What are the new visionary public investments needed to drive future economic growth?	承认国家在塑造创新中所扮演——并应该继续扮演的角色可以让我们开始争论最重要的问题：我们需要哪些新的梦想式公共投资推动未来经济增长？


The Productivity of Trust	信任的生产率


CAMBRIDGE – The Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman once quipped that “Canada is essentially closer to the United States than it is to itself.”	美国剑桥—诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）曾讽刺说，“加拿大其实与美国比与它自己更接近。


After all, most of its citizens live in a narrow band along the more than 3,000-mile-long border.	”毕竟，大部分加拿大公民都生活在3,000多英里长的加美边境周边狭长带中。


Most Canadians live closer to more Americans than they do to other Canadians.	大部分加拿大人住得离更多美国人而不是加拿大人更近。


The same can be said of corporations and governments.	同样的话也适用于公司和政府。


Most firms are closer to the government than they are to other firms: they interact with government rules and agencies more than they do with the rest of the business community.	大部分企业与政府比与其他企业更接近：它们与政府规则和机构的互动要多于其他商业同侪。


The quality of that interaction and its evolution over time is probably the most fundamental determinant of a country’s potential for growth and prosperity.	这一互动的质量以及随时间而发生的演化也许是一国增长率和繁荣的最根本决定因素。


But this is not the Weltanschauung – the worldview – that permeates private-sector discourse, especially the views expressed by most chambers of trade and industry and business associations around the world.	但影响私人部门总体观念，特别是全球大部分贸易和产业商会以及商业协会所表达的观点的并不是这一世界观。


Business organizations often hew to Ronald Reagan’s dictum: “Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”	商业组织常常持有罗纳德·里根的著名格言：“政府不是解决问题的办法，政府就是问题。 ”


It is a great sound bite: short, recursive, and somewhat poetic.	这是一句振聋发聩的名言：简短，反复，还带点诗意。


Unfortunately, it is also dangerously misleading.	不幸的是，它相当具有误导性。


After all, even if government were the problem, then changing what it does must be part of the solution.	毕竟，即使政府就是问题，那么改变它的所作所为也必然是解决办法的一部分。


The truth is that markets cannot exist without governments, and vice versa.	真相是市场不能脱离政府存在，反之亦然。


Governments are essential to the establishment of security, justice, property rights, and contract enforcement, all of which are essential to a market economy.	政府是安全、正义、产权和契约执行制度的关键，而所有这些要素又都是市场经济的关键。


Governments must also organize the provision of infrastructure for transportation, communication, energy, water, and waste disposal.	政府还必须组织提供交通、通讯、能源、水和垃圾处理等基础设施。


They run and regulate health-care systems and primary, secondary, tertiary, and vocational education.	它们运营并监管医疗系统和初等、中等、高等和职业教育。


They create the rules and provide the certifications that allow firms to assure their customers, workers, and neighbors that what they do is safe.	它们建立规则，提供允许企业向客户、工人和所在社区保证安全性的资质。


They protect creditors and minority shareholders from miscreant managers (and managers from impulsive creditors).	它们保护债权人和少数股东免受恶意管理层（或来自鲁莽的债权人的管理层）的侵害。


Saying that governments should get out of the way and let the private sector do its thing is like saying that air traffic controllers should get out of the way and let pilots do their thing.	说政府应该靠边站，让私人部门来做它的事就好比是说空中交通管制员应该靠边站，让飞行员来做他们的事。


In fact, governments and the private sector need each other, and they need to find better ways to collaborate.	事实上，政府和私人部门需要彼此，它们需要找到更好的合作之道。


The problem is that in many countries, both developed and developing, the current relationship between the private sector and the government is often dysfunctional.	问题在于，在很多国家，不管是发达国家还是发展中国家，目前的私人部门和政府的关系往往不正常。


Not only is it characterized by deep distrust, but the broader society does not find a closer relationship to be either legitimate or in the public interest, and for good reason.	不但两者之间存在深刻的不信任，更广义的社会也没有形成更合理或更符合公共利益的更紧密关系。 这是有原因的。


The private sector often engages with the government in order to make itself more profitable.	私人部门常常与政府打交道，以使自己更有利可图。


After all, maximizing profits is what CEOs are supposed to do.	毕竟，利润最大化是CEO的应尽之责。


And the government has ways to help: It can force suppliers to sell their inputs more cheaply, repress workers’ wage demands, protect the final market from competition by imports or new entrants, or lower their taxes.	政府也能够提供帮助：它可以迫使供应商以更低的价格出售投入品、抑制工人的工资要求、保护最终市场免受进口商或新进商家的竞争、降低它们的税负。


But these schemes make firms more profitable by making their suppliers, workers, and customers poorer.	但通过这些机制增加企业的盈利能力导致它们的供应商、工人和客户日子更加难过。


Accepting such demands makes the government rightly illegitimate in the eyes of the rest of society, which cherishes higher priorities than redistribution in favor of the already rich.	接受这样的要求难免会让社会其他成员认为政府不合法，认为政府更注重有利于已经成为富人的人群的再分配。


Outcomes would be very different if the focus of the relationship were productivity rather than profitability.	如果将这一关系的重点放在生产率而不是盈利能力上，结果将会大不同。


Productivity improvements, by lowering costs, allow firms to pay their workers and suppliers better, reduce prices for consumers, pay more in taxes, and still make more money for their shareholders.	通过降低成本实现的生产率改善让企业能够向工人和供应商支付更好的工资和价格、降低消费者面临的价格、缴纳更多税收，并且仍然能给股东赚更多的钱。


A focus on productivity is win-win-win.	关注生产率是三赢之选。


Governments can do many things, in a variety of areas, to raise productivity.	政府可以在诸多领域采取诸多措施提高生产率。


Fresh produce requires a cold-storage logistic system, a green lane at customs, certification of good agricultural practices, and sanitary permits.	生鲜农产品需要冷藏物流系统、绿色通关通道、优质农业活动资质和卫生许可。


Tourism depends on sensible visa requirements, convenient airports, road signs, hotel construction permits, and the preservation of cultural sites and coastlines.	旅游业依赖于合理的签证要求、方便的机场、道路标志、饭店建造许可以及人文景观和海岸线保护。


Manufacturing requires dedicated urban space that is adequately connected to power, water, transport, logistics, security, and a diverse labor force.	制造业需要有充足电力、水、交通、物流、安全设施和多样化劳动力的专用城市空间。


All of these productivity-boosting inputs require institutions that teach and extend industry-relevant knowledge and skills.	所有这些增进生产率的投入都需要教授和扩张产业相关知识和技能的机构。


None of them appears in the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators or the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index.	所有这些都没有出现在世界银行营商环境或世界经济论坛的全球竞争力指数中。


And yet, without these public inputs, the industries that depend on them cannot succeed.	而没有这些公共投入，依赖于它们的产业就无法获得成功。


That is precisely what happens in the absence of a sound and legitimate basis for cooperation between the government and the private sector.	这就是缺乏可靠合理的政府和私人部门合作基础时会发生的事情。


The result is inadequate provision of public goods that raise productivity and make everyone better off.	结果是公共品供给不足，导致无法提升生产率，也无法提高所有人的境况。


To create such a basis for cooperation, many countries need a new compact between the government and the private sector.	为了营造这一合作的基础，许多国家需要新的政府与私人��门之间的契约。


This will not be possible if business groups insist on putting taxes at the center of the discussion.	如果商业组织坚持把税收问题作为讨论的核心，就无法达成这一契约。


Instead, they should focus on measures that raise productivity.	相反，它们应该注重于提高生产率的措施。


More broadly, business groups should seek only those government policies that are unambiguously in the public interest.	更广泛地说，商业组织应该只寻求那些绝对符合公众利益的政府政策。


Demands that are perceived as greedy erode legitimacy and, ultimately, effectiveness.	被认为是贪婪的要求会削弱合法性，最终影响效果。


In this context, watchdog NGOs dedicated to scoring the public-interest value of what business groups ask for from the government could facilitate trust.	考虑到这一情况，致力于评估商业组织对政府要求中的公共利益的非政府组织有助于增进信任。


Perhaps most important, business associations do their members a disservice by seeking to impose on them a single voice.	也许最重要的是，企业协会试图代表全体会员发出一个声音的做法会适得其反。


Doing so usually leads to a focus on policies that are preferred by all members – such as lower taxes – instead of measures that are important to the productivity of each member.	这样做常常导致注重所有会员都偏好的政策——比如减税——而不去关注对各会员生产率很重要的措施。


Just as monopolies are bad for markets and politics, business representation in the private sector would benefit from more competition.	正如垄断有害于市场和政治，私人部门的企业代表也可以从增加竞争中获益。


The Procurement Goldmine	采购金矿


WASHINGTON, DC – Gold is rare.	华盛顿—黄金是稀有的。


More than 99.9% of the Earth’s crust is composed of oxides of silicon, aluminum, calcium, magnesium, sodium, iron, potassium, titanium, and phosphorus.	地球地壳的99%由硅、铝、钙、镁、钠、铁、钾、钛和磷的氧化物组成。


So, for most of human history, people have become quite excited when they have discovered gold.	因此，在人类的大部分历史中，发现黄金是一件令人极其兴奋的事情。


Despite the serious environmental consequences of gold mining, including mercury and cyanide pollution and the devastation of landscapes, humanity has not given up the search – and seems unlikely to do so any time soon.	尽管挖掘金矿会造成严重的环境后果，包括汞和氰化物污染以及风貌破坏，但人类从未放弃搜索黄金，在可预见的未来也不会。


But there is a figurative goldmine – safer and potentially at least as lucrative as the real thing – that most countries possess, but few choose to exploit fully: government procurement.	但大部分国家拥有一种丰富的金矿，它更安全，并且本质上至少与真金矿一样划算。 它就是政府采购。


The potential adverse consequences of government procurement are well known.	政府采购的可能消极后果是众所周知的。


It can enable companies to charge excessive prices for low-quality goods and unreliable services, while facilitating corruption, abuses of power, and waste.	它导致公司漫天要价、以次充好，同时还会滋生腐败、权力滥用和浪费。


To mitigate these risks, most countries have implemented requirements for open bidding processes and strict transparency rules for government purchases.	为了降低这些风险，大部分国家实施了公开竞价程序和严格的透明规则等措施。


Indeed, most recent free-trade agreements require signatories to open up government procurement to one another’s firms, and the World Bank publishes the names of firms barred for fraud or corruption from bidding on Bank-financed projects.	事实上，目前大部分自由贸易协定要求签署国的政府采购向其他国家企业开放，世界银行会公布因欺诈或腐败被禁止参与世行融资项目竞标的企业名单。


Countries that forego open bidding processes end up with the kind of large-scale theft that has been documented in Venezuela and almost certainly occurred in Ukraine under deposed President Viktor Yanukovych.	不采取公开竞标流程的国家最终会导致已证实的委内瑞拉和几乎肯定存在的亚努科维奇治下的乌克兰那样的大规模盗窃。


But beneath all of this arsenic is gold.	但在这些毒药之下藏着黄金。


Most modern production involves not just the cost of doing things, but also the cost of figuring out how to do them.	大部分现代生产不但包括生产成本，还包括学习如何生产的成本。


Before aircraft manufacturers can produce and sell a new airplane model, they must spend billions of dollars over a decade or more of development – costs that must later be recouped.	在飞机制造商可以生产和销售新机型之前，它们需要花费数十亿美元、数十年时间用于研发——这些成本必须在日后收回。


If they were not sure whether there would be a market for the new model, few would assume these costs.	如果它们不能确定新机型是否存在市场，就不会去承担这些成本。


That is where government procurement comes in.	政府采购的作用就在这个时候显现。


For example, in 1946, the United States government issued a contract for Boeing to develop the B-52.	比如，1946年，美国政府与波音公司签订合同，开发B-52飞机。


The government obviously did not want the company to deliver more of the same; it wanted the first fast jet-powered strategic bomber.	政府显然不想波音公司提供更多的同样的产品； 它想要的是第一架喷气式战略轰炸机。


After all, the second-best army in a war is the loser.	毕竟，在战争中，第二名就意味着失败。


The contract thus had to reflect the risks inherent in finding out how to design and produce the most advanced aircraft of its time.	因此，这份合同必须体现寻找如何设计和制造当时最先进飞机的内在风险。


But the benefits of the government purchase extended beyond its specific goal, when Boeing used the knowhow it acquired developing the B-52 to create its commercial B-707 aircraft.	但政府采购的好处不局限于具体的目标，后来波音使用其从研发B-52中获得的知识建造了B-707商用飞机。


Though the government never purposely promoted the development of commercial airplanes, its procurement of high-quality, technologically advanced military aircraft was essential to the emergence of America’s globally dominant commercial aircraft industry.	尽管政府从未有意识地促进商用飞机的开发，但其采购高质量、高科技军用飞机的行为对于美国获得全球商用飞机行业主宰地位功不可没。


Simply put, figuring out how to do one thing often makes it easier to do other things.	简言之，学会做一件事情往往可以让做其他事情变得更容易。


In this way, a government that is exacting about the quality of its purchases can have a powerful impact on the evolution of its country’s comparative advantage.	因此，严格要求采购质量的政府能对该国比较优势的发展形成有力影响。


Israel’s government has had a similar impact through its effort to manage its limited water resources.	以色列政府通过其对该国有限水资源的管理起到了这一作用。


Let’s say that the country incurs a cost of 100 of some unit because of its water shortages.	假设以色列由于水短缺造成的一单位生产成本为100。


The innovations that the government encourages, such as drip irrigation or desalination, not only reduce the domestic cost of such shortages to, say, 70, but also underpin an industry that, by selling its wares in the most demanding markets, accrues a global value of more than 1,000.	政府所刺激的创新，如滴管和海水淡化，不但让水短缺所造成的成本降低到（比如）70，还通过向需求最大的市场出售设备奠定了一个产业，创造出超过1,000的全球价值。


In this sense, Israel’s water scarcity has made the country wealthier than it otherwise would have been.	从这个角度讲，以色列的水短缺反倒让这个国家变得更加富有了。


Likewise, Israel’s military investments have generated a set of solutions that, with some extra effort, have had useful – and lucrative – civilian applications.	类似地，以色列的军事投资产生了一系列解决办法，这些解决办法加上一些额外的努力，就转化为有用的民用设施，物美价廉。


This helps to explain why private investment in research and development constitutes a larger share of GDP in Israel than anywhere else in the world.	这有助于解释为何以色列私人研发占GDP之比堪称世界之最。


The lessons from army purchases can be applied elsewhere.	军事采购的经验也可以应用于别处。


Governments are in the business of procuring solutions to their particular society’s most pressing challenges.	政府从事的行当是为本国社会最紧迫的挑战购买解决办法。


Given that a country’s problems are rarely unique, innovative solutions can spawn globally competitive – even dominant – industries.	一国的问题很少是独此一家的，因此创新性解决办法可以催生具有全球竞争力——甚至主宰力——的行业。


And solutions for one problem may have applications in other areas.	并且一个问题的解决办法也可以应用于其他领域。


This should serve as a model for Latin America as it works to improve the quality of its educational systems.	这款以为致力于改善其教育系统质量的拉丁美洲提供一个样板。


As it stands, the eight Latin American countries that take the OECD’s standardized PISA exam are among the 15 worst-performing countries of the 65 that participate in the program.	目前，参与经合组织标准化PISA考试的八个拉美国家名列65个参与国的倒数前十五名。


Instead of sinking massive amounts of money into poorly performing school systems, Latin American governments would undoubtedly be interested in innovative solutions, such as tablet-based textbooks, that can help teachers provide effective lessons, monitor their students’ progress, and identify remediation strategies.	拉丁美洲政府不应该将大笔资金浪费在表现拙劣的教育系统上，而应该着眼于诸如基于平板电脑的教材等创新性解决办法，以帮助教师高效率地授课、监控学生的进步、制定补习战略。


Beyond improving their own children’s performance, such efforts could spawn a globally competitive industry in state-of-the-art teaching tools.	除了改善本国儿童的表现，这些方案还能催生具有全球竞争力的顶尖教学工具行业。


These are just a few examples of the value that can be extracted from the government-procurement goldmine.	这些只是体现政府采购金矿价值的少数例子。


By committing to purchase large amounts of high-quality products that address major national challenges, governments can encourage private, public, or mixed organizations to incur the fixed costs of finding solutions.	通过致力于大规模采购解决重要国家挑战的高质量产品，政府可以刺激私人、公共或公私混合组织承担寻找解决办法的固定成本。


In many cases, the benefits of those solutions will extend far beyond their original purpose.	在很多时候，这些解决办法的好处大大超过了初始目的。


But, in pursuing such a path, governments must remember that mining is a potentially dangerous industry that must be approached with care.	但是，在追求这一方针的过程中，政府必须牢记，挖金矿是一个潜在危险巨大的行业，必须小心行事。


To this end, they could begin by applying, say, 5% of their procurement budgets to nurture urgently needed solutions in areas with potentially large global markets.	在这方面，它们可以一开始使用（比如）5%的采购预算为存在潜在全球大市场的领域培育迫切需要的解决办法。


After all, anything that is worth doing is worth doing better.	毕竟，值得作为的领域一定值得做得更好。


Let’s Get Fiscal	回归财政


LONDON – Everyone knows there is no gain without pain.	伦敦—众所周知，不吃一堑，难长一智。


But there can be pain without gain – a lesson that Western populations have been learning the hard way since at least 2012.	但吃堑未必长智——至少从2012年开始，西方民众就一直在领教这一点。


With years of fiscal austerity in the United States, Europe, and Japan having achieved nothing, it is time for governments to start spending again.	美国、欧洲和日本采取了多年的财政紧缩，结果一无所获，政府是时候开始重新花钱了。


The proposal will be met with outrage from many governments, especially, but not exclusively, Germany’s, and will be dismissed by the many political candidates who treat sovereign debt, built up by the incumbents they are seeking to depose, as the devil’s work.	这一方案将受到许多政府的怒目相向，特别是（但不限于）德国政府，也将被许多把主权债务（由他们寻求取而代之的在任者制造）视为洪水猛兽的政治候选人嗤之以鼻。


But beyond ideology and self-interest lies a simple and unavoidable truth: austerity is not working.	但除了意识形态和私利，还有一个无法避免的简单真相：紧缩根本没起作用。


Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reluctantly acknowledged austerity’s failure when he announced on June 1 that his government would postpone a planned increase in the country’s consumption tax.	6月1日，日本首相安倍晋三宣布他的政府将暂停提高消费税的计划，不情不愿地承认了紧缩的失败。


Far from helping to control Japan’s budget deficit and huge public debt, the tax hike probably would have reduced revenues.	该加税计划对于控制日本预算赤字和巨大的公共债务毫无助益，倒是可能带来收入减少。


After all, the previous hike, implemented in April 2014, quickly drove the economy back into recession.	毕竟，此前在2014年4月实施的加税很快就将日本经济重新打回衰退。


The eurozone – the developed world’s leading champion of austerity – has yet to come to the same realization, despite glaring evidence.	发达世界最坚定的紧缩派——欧元区尚未作出类似的认识，尽管证据显著。


In 2012, eurozone leaders signed a fiscal compact aimed at controlling public debt – which, in total, amounted to 91.3% of GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund – by forcing countries to cut spending and raise taxes.	2012年，欧元区领导人签署了一项旨在通过迫使各国降低支出、提高税收来控制公共债务的财政契约。 据国际货币基金组织（IMF）数据，欧元区公共债务总量高达GDP的91.


By 2015, the eurozone’s budget deficit, as a share of GDP, had fallen by two-thirds from its peak in 2010.	3%。 到2015年，欧元区预算赤字占GDP之比较2010年峰值水平下降了三分之二。


Yet gross public debt had actually increased, to 93.2% of GDP.	但总公共债务实际有所上升，达到GDP的93. 2%。


Indeed, while Germany has managed to reduce its gross public debt, from 79.7% of GDP in 2012 to 71% last year, debt ratios in France and Italy have continued to rise, despite tight fiscal controls (especially in Italy).	事实上，德国成功降低了其总公共债务，从2012年占GDP的79. 7%下降到去年的71%，但法国和（特别是）意大利尽管采取了严厉的财政控制，债务比继续攀升。


Elsewhere in Europe, the United Kingdom has followed a similar trajectory, with gross public debt increasing from 85.3% of GDP in 2012 to 89.3% of GDP in 2015.	在其他欧洲国家，英国的情况类似，总公共债务从2012年占GDP的85. 3%增加到2015年的89.


And in the US, the debt ratio rose from 102.5% to 105.8% over the same period.	而在美国，同期债务比从102. 5%上升到105.


The problem, of course, lies in sluggish economic growth, which undermines wage growth, weakens tax revenues, and makes it impossible for governments to pay down their debts.	当然，问题出在经济增长停滞，经济增长停滞阻碍了工资增长，削弱了税收收入，也让政府无从通过偿债降低债务。


Among the biggest drags on growth today is fiscal austerity.	如今，对增长的最大拖累因素之一正是财政紧缩。


The more governments cut their deficits, the faster growth slows – and the further out of reach debt-reduction targets become.	政府削减赤字越多，增长减速越快——减债目标也越远。


Thus runs the self-defeating cycle of fiscal austerity.	于是产生了事与愿违的财政紧循环。


To be sure, this is not always how austerity works.	诚然，紧缩并非总是这样起作用。


In the inflation-plagued 1970s and 1980s, when investors’ demand for inflation-risk premia pushed up long-term borrowing costs, larger deficits tended to boost long-term interest rates further, while smaller deficits reduced them.	在通胀肆虐的20世纪七八十年代，当投资者对通胀风险溢价的要求推高长期借贷成本时，扩大赤字起到了刺激长期利率进一步走高的效果，而赤字降低抑制了长期利率。


It was this experience that caused policymakers after 2010 to assume that reducing government demand would help to boost private investment.	正是这一经验促使2010年后的据侧着认为降低政府需求有助于刺激私人投资。


(In the eurozone, it should be noted, arguments for fiscal austerity were also fueled by mistrust among governments, with creditor countries demanding that debtors endure some pain in exchange for “gains” like bailouts.)	（应该指出，在欧元区，财政紧缩论还受到政府间互不信任的推动，债权国要求债务国仍受一些痛苦以换取援助等“好处”。 ）


But times have changed.	但今时不同往日。


For starters, we are no longer living in an inflationary era.	首先，我们不再生活在通胀时代。


On the contrary, Japan and some eurozone countries face deflation, while inflation in the UK is essentially zero.	相反，日本也一些欧元区国家面临通货紧缩，而英国通胀率也基本为零。


Only in America is inflation picking up – and only gently.	只有美国的通胀正在抬头——并且速度缓慢。


Moreover, long-term borrowing costs are at historic lows, just as they have been throughout the last five years.	此外，长期借贷成本位于历史低位，一如过去五年。


Pursuing austerity in this context has resulted in a drag on growth so severe that not even the halving of energy prices over the last 18 months has overcome it.	在这样的背景下追求紧缩严重拖累了增长，以至于过去18个月中能源价格腰斩也没有抵消这一效应。


Expansionary monetary policy – that is, massive injections of liquidity through so-called quantitative easing – is clearly not enough, either.	扩张性货币政策——即通过所谓的量化宽松注入巨量流动性——显然也是不够的。


While QE does serve a purpose – and remains necessary in Europe and Japan – it has failed to stimulate private investment and accelerate job creation and wage growth.	量化宽松确实有效——并且在欧洲和日本仍有必要——但并未刺激私人投资和加速就业创造和工资增长。


Some direct intervention in wages may help.	某些直接干预工资的手段可能有所助益。


The UK has implemented an increase in the mandatory minimum wage, and some US states, led by California, will soon follow.	英国提高了最低法定工资，一些美国州（如加利福尼亚州）很快也会跟进。


Japan, which faces stagnant wages, despite apparent labor shortages, may stand to benefit the most from this approach.	而日本尽��劳动力显然短缺，仍面临工资停滞，或可成为直接工资干预的最大受益者。


But, in today’s world, nothing can substitute for fiscal expansion.	但是，在当今世界，没有东西可以替代财政扩张。


Many countries, particularly in Europe, need to boost public investment in infrastructure.	许多国家，特别是欧洲国家，需要刺激基础设施公共投资。


More broadly, Europe needs a new Marshall Plan, this time self-financed, rather than funded by the Americans, to kick-start economic growth and boost productivity.	更广泛地说，欧洲需要一个新马歇尔计划，该计划应该是自我融资而不是由美国出资，以刺激经济增长和生产率。


There is plenty of scope for a similar program in the US, too.	美国也有足够的空间实施类似的计划。


Such spending could even help get tax revenues growing, by pushing employment and wages higher.	这类支出甚至可能通过就业增加和工资的提高而助推税收收入增长。


At a time of low borrowing costs and little to no inflation (or even deflation), austerity is not the answer.	在借贷成本低廉、通胀甚微或不存在（乃至通缩）的时期，紧缩不是答案。


It is time for policymakers to recognize that there is no need for pain that is not bringing any gain.	决策者应该认识到不能长智的堑没必要去吃。


It is time to get fiscal.	应该采取财政手段了。


Grading Obamanomics	评价奥巴马经济


PALO ALTO – It is still too soon to gauge the full economic impact of President Barack Obama’s implemented and proposed policies, but a preliminary read indicates limited short-term benefit at large long-term cost.	帕洛阿尔托——现在估计巴拉克·奥巴马总统执行和拟议中政策的全面经济效果还为时尚早，但初步的解读表明奥氏政策是在以长期的代价换取短期的收益。


The administration is exploiting a crisis atmosphere to enact a vast agenda that would reengineer the American economy, from autos and financial services to health care, energy, and the distribution of income.	奥巴马政府利用危机氛围推行一项再造美国经济的宏大计划，涉及从汽车到金融服务到医疗保健、能源和收入分配等方方面面的问题。


Obama outsourced the details of the $787 billion fiscal stimulus to Congress and, no surprise, the old barons of the House stuffed it with pork and social engineering.	奥巴马把7870亿美元的财政刺激计划外包给国会，而不出人们所料，把持国会的大佬们又在计划中塞入了笼络人心的社会工程及好处费。


Several months later, only 4%-6% of the funds have been spent, and the federal government is brow-beating state governments – for example, demanding that California rescind a small pay cut for some unionized workers or lose $7 billion in stimulus funds.	几个月过后这笔巨资只花掉了4-6%，联邦政府因此把一腔怒火统统发向州政府——比如要求加利福尼亚取消对某些工会工人的小幅工资削减，或者放弃价值70亿美元的刺激资金。


(Intervening in contractual relations ex post to enforce union demands is an emerging characteristic of the administration).	（事后干预合同关系执行工会要求是本届政府的新特色）。


The foreclosure relief plan is off to an even slower start, and is likely to run into numerous problems concerning how to rework delinquent mortgages without inducing a lot more delinquencies.	防止取消抵押品收回权的救济计划起步则更加迟缓。 该计划可能碰到很多困难，比如怎样在不造成拖欠大幅增加的情况下重做拖欠的抵押贷款。


So score the stimulus a very expensive, largely wasted opportunity.	因此这份刺激计划是一次开销巨大、但浪费严重的机会。


Instead, Obama could, for example, have suspended the payroll tax for a year, getting money directly into people’s pockets quickly and decreasing the need for firms to lay off workers.	相反，奥巴马本可以暂停征收一年的工资税，这样可以迅速把钱直接放进民众的口袋里，并降低企业的裁人需求。


Obama’s long-run budget calls for much higher spending, higher taxes, and an explosion of debt that will crowd out borrowing in capital markets by private companies, state and local governments, and developing countries.	奥巴马要靠高开支、高赋税和债务爆炸支撑其长期预算计划，这将对私人企业、州及地方政府和发展中国家在资本市场的融资产生挤出效应。


Obama would add $6.5 trillion to the United States’ national debt, more than all previous presidents, from George Washington to George W. Bush, combined.	奥巴马将增加6. 5万亿美元的美国国债，超过了从乔治·华盛顿到乔治·W·布什的以往历届美国总统发行国债的总和。


That is in addition to explicit tax hikes on income, capital gains, and dividends, the implicit ones on energy via cap-and-trade, etc.	此外还有所得税、资本收益税和股息税的显性增加，以及总量管理等制度增加的隐性能源税。


It appears that the Obama strategy is to “stuff the beast” (the mirror image of the tax-cutting “starve the beast” philosophy attributed to some of President Ronald Reagan’s advisers), i.e., to initiate massive spending and hide the true cost from citizens.	奥巴马的战略似乎是“喂饱政府”（该理念与里根总统某些顾问提出的减税“饿死政府”的理念针锋相对），也就是启动大规模开支计划并向民众隐瞒其真实的成本。


The large deficits will eventually force much higher taxes, such as a national value-added tax similar to those in Europe, or gigantic increases in everyone’s income taxes.	巨额的赤字最终会导致类似于欧洲国家的高额国家增值税，或者导致每人缴纳的所得税大幅飙升。


The Federal Reserve lowered its target federal funds rate to zero before Obama was inaugurated, and initiated many programs to try to revive credit markets, with mixed results (the commercial paper facility has helped, whereas others seem to have gotten off to less sanguine starts).	美联储在奥巴马就职前把联邦基金目标利率降到了零，并启动了力图恢复信贷市场的多项计划，但取得的效果参差不齐（商业票据工具发挥了作用，而其他措施在启动时似乎没有取得那么乐观的效果）。


The Fed’s independence is a key component of its anti-inflation credibility, and a key test for Obama will be to support the Fed’s efforts to withdraw the liquidity before substantial inflation pressures assert themselves several years from now.	美联储的独立性是其抗通胀信誉的关键所在，而能否在未来几年大规模通胀压力抬头前支持美联储收回流动性将是奥巴马面临的关键考验。


The Obama administration also seems to be heading toward regulating derivatives and financial institutions deemed too big to fail.	奥巴马政府似乎也在向管理衍生品和规模过大无法倒闭的金融机构过渡。


America does need a clearinghouse for derivatives, and a much higher percentage of derivative trading should take place on exchanges, rather than bilaterally over the counter.	美国确实需要建立衍生品交易所，比例远高于现在的衍生品交易均应当进入这个交易所，而不是由买卖双方进行场外交易。


Any institution that is or could quickly become too big to fail needs to have adequate capital (rising with size), and real-time continuous monitoring of risk, but these measures should be implemented without overbearing micromanagement.	现在和将来任何规模过大而无法倒闭的机构都需要筹集充足的资本（规模越大资本要求越高），并执行持续性的实时风险监控措施，但执行这些措施时我们需要的不是专横的微观管理。


Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s decision to put the unions ahead of secured debt-holders in the orchestrated Chrysler bankruptcy risks rupturing the basic fabric of credit markets.	令人遗憾的是，奥巴马政府在策划克莱斯勒破产过程中把工会利益放在担保债务持有人之先的决策可能会撕裂信贷市场的基本体制。


But Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s much-ridiculed bank “stress tests” made sense (although one can argue that sufficiently dire scenarios were not included or that too much was negotiated with the banks, etc.).	但是蒂莫西•盖特纳财长倍受嘲笑的银行“压力测试”有其一定的道理（尽管你可以辩称足够可怕的假设场景没有进入到压力测试，或者与银行谈判的内容过多）。


Determining the size of likely losses is necessary to decide whether banks’ retained earnings from profitable ongoing operations and their ability to raise private capital will allow them to work down their toxic assets over time.	要想确定银行持续性盈利业务的留存收益及其筹集私人资本的能力能否使他们的有毒资产随时间的流逝而下降，那么就很有必要确定可能的损失。


If not, more draconian solutions will be necessary.	如果答案是否定的，则有必要采取更为严厉的措施来解决问题。


I support Geithner’s plan to cooperate with private investors in dealing with the banks’ toxic assets, because they make better business decisions than government bureaucrats.	我支持盖特纳与私人投资者合作处理银行有毒资产的做法，因为私人投资者比政府官僚更具备商业决策能力。


But the Fed’s low-interest, non-recourse loans to buy up toxic assets have not yet caused a stampede of participants.	但美联储收购有毒资产的无追索权的低息贷款到目前为止还没有激发参与者的抢购。


Will banks be willing to part with the assets at a low enough price to attract private investment?	银行是否愿意以够低的价格出售有毒资产，以吸引私人投资？


And would doing so force larger write-downs, requiring banks, in turn, to ration credit – and thus harming the economy?	这样做是否会迫使银行更多减记账面价值，从而导致银行实行信贷定额配给——从而危害实体经济？


Obama has been better than feared on international trade.	奥巴马在���际贸易中还没有人见人惧。


He was famously protectionist during the primaries, declaring he would unilaterally rewrite NAFTA.	他在预选阶段是出了名的保护主义者，声称要单方面改写《北美自由贸易协定》。


But, while he has continued his softer tone since the election, he has not even bothered to ask for fast-track trade-promotion authority, let alone try to pump new life into the Doha Round of global trade talks.	不过，虽然他在当选后继续采取相对缓和的政策，但他甚至都没有费心去争取快速贸易促进的权力，更不用说为多哈回合全球贸易谈判注入生命力了。


Obama is getting a large part of his agenda.	奥巴马计划的绝大部分已经付诸实施。


Unfortunately, the numbers don’t add up and he is laying twin time bombs with the explosion of federal government debt and inefficient government micromanagement of the economy.	不幸的是，这些数字不能累计，而且联邦政府债务爆炸和政府低效的微观经济管理为未来经济发展埋下了两枚定时炸弹。


His call for immense deficits  even once the economy is back to normal, funds are returned from the financial bailouts, and the US is out of Iraq – is simply irresponsible.	即使在经济恢复正常、金融援助计划资金收回和美军撤出伊拉克后奥巴马仍然要求巨额赤字，这根本就是一种不负责任的态度。


The American economy will likely return to growth late this year and next, especially with all the monetary and fiscal stimulus (growth would have initially been slower and then much stronger without it), but it will still be an economy on a government lifeline.	美国经济今年底和明年可能会恢复增长，特别是有了所有这些货币和财政刺激就更是如此（经济增长开始时可能较为缓慢，而后在没有刺激政策的情况下逐渐转为强势），但这样的经济发展仍然离不开政府的救生措施。


The big questions left unanswered are how far Obama wants to push the US toward a European-style social-welfare state, how he intends to pay for it, and how much long-term economic damage will result?	隐而未答的问题是奥巴马在多大程度上愿意推动美国经济向欧洲式社会福利国家的方向发展，他要怎样支付这笔开支，以及会导致多少长期的经济损失？


Grandmasters and Global Growth	象棋冠军与全球增长


CAMBRIDGE – As the global economy limps out of the last decade and enters a new one in 2010, what will be the next big driver of global growth? Here’s betting that the “teens” is a decade in which artificial intelligence hits escape velocity, and starts to have an economic impact on par with the emergence of India and China.	剑桥——


Admittedly, my perspective is heavily colored by events in the world of chess, a game I once played at a professional level and still follow from a distance.	随着全球经济艰难走出过去的十年而迈向2010开始的新十年，全球增长的下一个动力将会是什么呢？


Though special, computer chess nevertheless offers both a window into silicon evolution and a barometer of how people might adapt to it.	下一个赌注：未来“十年”是人工智能以逃逸速度发展，并开始产生和中印崛起一样重要的经济影响的十年。


In 1996 and 1997, World Chess Champion Gary Kasparov played a pair of matches against an IBM computer named “Deep Blue.” At the time, Kasparov dominated world chess, in the same way that Tiger Woods – at least until recently – has dominated golf.	应当承认，我的视野里涂满了象棋世界的色彩，我曾以一种专业的水平玩这个游戏，但如今与这一水平差距甚远。


In the 1996 match, Deep Blue stunned the champion by beating him in the first game. But Kasparov quickly adjusted to exploit the computer’s weakness in long-term strategic planning, where his judgment and intuition seemed to trump the computer’s mechanical counting.	尽管很特殊，但计算机象棋只不过是提供了一个硅革新的视窗以及人类如何去适应这种视窗的晴雨表。


Unfortunately, the supremely confident Kasparov did not take Deep Blue seriously enough in the 1997 rematch.	有一段历史或许能帮助解释此点。 在1996和1997年，世界象棋冠军卡斯帕罗夫和名为“深蓝”的IBM计算机进行了两场对抗赛。


Deep Blue shocked the champion, winning the match 3.5 to 2.5.	当时，卡斯帕罗夫称雄象棋世界，就像今天的老虎伍兹（至少持续到现在）主导高尔夫世界一样。


Many commentators have labeled Deep Blue’s triumph one of the most important events of the twentieth century.	在1996年的比赛中，深蓝在第一局击败卡斯帕罗夫使这个冠军大为震惊。 但卡斯帕罗夫在长期战略规划中迅速适应以窥觊深蓝弱点，其判断力和直觉似乎略胜深蓝的机械计数一筹。


Perhaps Kasparov would have won the rematch had it continued to a full 24 games (then the standard length of world championship matches).	不幸的是，过于自信的卡斯帕罗夫在1997年的复赛中并没有把深蓝很当回事。 最终深蓝以3.


But, over the next few years, even as humans learned from computers, computers improved at a far faster pace.	5的比分赢得比赛，这让冠军震惊不已。 很多评论员把深蓝的获胜称为20世纪最重要的事件。


With ever more powerful processors, silicon chess players developed the ability to calculate so far ahead that the distinction between short-term tactical calculations and long-term strategic planning became blurred.	假使比赛持续24全场（当时的世界象棋锦标赛的标准赛时）的话，卡斯帕罗夫也许会获胜。


At the same time, computer programs began to exploit huge databases of games between grandmaster (the highest title in chess), using results from the human games to extrapolate what moves have the highest chances of success. Soon, it became clear that even the best human chess players would have little chance to do better than an occasional draw.	但随后的几年，尽管人类从电脑中学到了很多，但电脑却以更快的速度改进完善着。


Today, chess programs have become so good that even grandmasters sometimes struggle to understand the logic behind some of their moves.	拥有更强大的处理器，硅棋手的计算能力如此之快以至于短期战术性计算和长期战略规划的差异变得很模糊。


In chess magazines, one often sees comments from top players such as “My silicon friend says I should have moved my King instead of my Queen, but I still think I played the best ‘human’ move.”	与此同时，计算机程序开始挖掘象棋冠军（象棋界最高头衔）比赛中的数据库，使用人类比赛结果来推测哪些象棋步法取胜的可能性最大。 很快，比较明确的事实是：即便是人类最好的象棋手也鲜有机会比偶尔的和局做得好。


It gets worse. Many commercially available computer programs can be set to mimic the styles of top grandmasters to an extent that is almost uncanny.	时至今日，计算机象棋程序变得如此精妙，哪怕是象棋冠军有时候要绞尽脑汁才能理解它们所运行的每一步后面的逻辑。


Indeed, chess programs now come very close to passing the late British mathematician Alan Turing’s ultimate test of artificial intelligence: can a human conversing with the machine tell it is not human?	在象棋杂志上，你经常能看到来自顶尖棋手的评论，诸如“我的硅芯朋友（意指计算机棋手）说我本应该移动我的国王而不是皇后，但我仍然觉得我走好了最好的’人类’步法”。


I sure can’t.	这更糟糕。


Ironically, as computer-aided cheating increasingly pervades chess tournaments (with accusations reaching the highest levels), the main detection device requires using another computer.	（人类所设计的）许多商业性的计算机程序能够模仿顶尖象棋大师的风格，这近乎到达了难以想象的程度。


Only a machine can consistently tell what another computer would do in a given position. Perhaps if Turing were alive today, he would define artificial intelligence as the inability of a computer to tell whether another machine is human!	实际上，象棋程序现在非常接近于通过前英国数学家阿兰-图灵对人工智能的极限测试：人类能否与识别自己不是人类的机器交谈呢？


Encouragingly, the answer is “not yet.” In fact, in some ways, chess is as popular and successful today as at any point in the last few decades.   Chess lends itself very well to Internet play, and fans can follow top-level tournaments in real time, often with commentary.	只有电脑才能连续不断地判断另外哪台电脑处于给定状态中。


Technology has helped thoroughly globalize chess, with the Indian Vishy Anand now the first Asian world champion, and the handsome young Norwegian Magnus Carlsen having reached rock-star status. Man and machine have learned to co-exist, for now.	如果图灵今天还活着的话，也许他会把人工智能形容成一个不能识别另一台电脑是不是人类的无能计算机！


Of course, this is a microcosm of the larger changes that we can expect.	如上种种窘况让棋手们失业了么？ 答案是令人欣慰的------“没有”。


The horrible computerized telephone-answering systems that we all now suffer with might actually improve.	从某种程度上说，事实上国际象棋普及盛行如初，不逊于过去几十年的任何时点。 国际象棋还成功实现了网上支付平台支撑，这样一来粉丝们能够随时关注伴有讲解评论的实时高水准赛事。


Imagine, someday you might actually prefer digital to human operators.	技术让真正意义上的象棋全球化得到了实现，印度的Vishy Anand是首个亚裔世界冠军，帅气的小伙子Norwegian Magnus Carlson已经具备摇滚明星水准。 自此人机慢慢形成了一种共生状态。


In 50 years, computers might be doing everything from driving taxis to performing routine surgery.	当然，这只是我们所能够预期的巨大革新的一个缩影。


Sooner than that, artificial intelligence will transform higher learning, potentially making a world-class university education broadly affordable even in poor developing countries.	当前令人烦厌的计算机化电话答录系统将有望得到优化。


And, of course, there are more mundane but crucial uses of artificial intelligence everywhere, from managing the electronics and lighting in our homes to populating “smart grids” for water and electricity, helping monitor these and other systems to reduce waste.	试想某天，你甚至会更愿意选择自动服务而不是人工接线员的答复。


In short, I do not share the view of many that, after the Internet and the personal computer, it will be a long wait until the next paradigm-shifting innovation.	50年后，可能一切大小繁杂事务诸如驾驶、贯行外科手术等均由计算机处理着。


Artificial intelligence will provide the boost that keeps the teens rolling.	先之而行的是，人工智能会促成高等教育革新：潜然产生一种“地球班”大学教育，即便是贫穷的发展中国家也具备普遍承付力。


So, despite a rough start from the financial crisis (which will still slow global growth this year and next), there is no reason why the new decade has to be an economic flop.	当然，人工智能将在各领域得到世俗而绝妙的运用，包括家庭光电管理、为户主节能减排而引入的“智能水电开关”等凡此种种。


Barring another round of deep financial crises, it won’t be – as long as politicians do not stand in the way of the new paradigm of trade, technology, and artificial intelligence.	简言之，我不苟同大众观点，他们认为因特网和私人计算机出现后，下一轮革新典范的出现将历时颇长。 人工智能使未来十年摇摇晃晃。


The Grassroots of Climate Change	气候变化草根


PARIS – The climate-change agreement reached here on December 12 was a rich victory for diplomacy.	巴黎—12月12日在这里达成的气候变化协定是一次外交的重大胜利。


Both the agreement itself and the atmosphere of cooperation that permeated the proceedings represent a sea change from the failed Copenhagen summit in 2009.	协定本身以及贯穿全过程的合作氛围与2009年失败的哥本哈根峰会形成了鲜明对比。


But while we should congratulate world leaders on their success, Paris marks the beginning, not the end, of the road.	但尽管我们应该向全世界领导人道贺胜利，但巴黎仍只是一个开始而非结束。


It is now our collective duty to hold our leaders to account and ensure that they turn promises into action – especially in the world’s most vulnerable regions, such as Africa.	现在，我们的集体责任是让我们的领导人重视并保证他们会将承诺兑现为行动——特别是在非洲这样的全世界最脆弱地区。