But we – or at least I – have gotten significant components of the last four years wrong.	但是，在过去四年中，我们——或者说，至少是我——在诸多重要方面都犯了错。


Three things surprised me (and still do).	有三件事让我感到很惊奇（现在仍是如此）。


The first is the failure of central banks to adopt a rule like nominal GDP targeting or its equivalent.	首先是中央银行没能采取以名义GDP为目标的政策（或其等价政策）。


Second, I expected wage inflation in the North Atlantic to fall even farther than it has – toward, even if not to, zero.	其次，我原本以为北大西洋工资膨胀会进一步下降到（接近于）零。


Finally, the yield curve did not steepen sharply for the United States: federal funds rates at zero I expected, but 30-Year US Treasury bonds at a nominal rate of 2.7% I did not.	最后，美国收益率曲线并未显著陡峭化：联邦基金利率如我所料降至了零水平，但30年期美国国债名义利率保持2. 7%则出乎我意料之外。


The failure of central banks to target nominal GDP growth remains incomprehensible to me, and I will not write about it until I think that I have understood the reasons.	我至今仍无法理解为何央行没能以名义GDP增长为目标，在我理解个中原因之前也无意撰文探讨此事。


As for wages, even with one-third of the US labor force changing jobs every year, sociological factors and human-network ties appear to exercise an even stronger influence on the level and rate of change – at the expense of balancing supply and demand – than I would have expected.	置于工资问题，尽管三分之一的美国劳动力每年都要换工作，但社会因素和人脉网络联系在工资变化率方面的影响力比以前更大了，超出了我的预料，而这是以牺牲供求平衡为代价的。


The third surprise, however, may be the most interesting.	不过，最有趣的还是第三件让我感到惊奇之事。


Back in March 2009, the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas confidently predicted that the US economy would be back to normal within three years.	2009年3月，诺贝尔奖得主卢卡斯信心满满地预测美国经济将在三年内重回正轨。


A normal US economy has a short-term nominal interest rate of 4%.	正常状态下的美国经济伴随着4%的短期名义利率。


Since the ten-year US Treasury bond rate tends to be one percentage point above the average of expected future short-term interest rates over the next decade, even the expectation of five years of deep depression and near-zero short-term interest rates should not push the 10-Year Treasury rate below 3%.	由于10年期美国国债利率总是会高于未来十年预期短期利率平均水平1个百分点，因此即便预期深度萧条只维持5年、短期利率会下降到零，10年期国债利率也不应该在3%以下。


Indeed, the Treasury rate mostly fluctuated between 3% and 3.5% from late 2008 through mid-2011.	事实上，2008年末—2011年年中，10年期美国国债利率大体上在3%—3. 5%之间波动。


But, in July 2011, the ten-year US Treasury bond rate crashed to 2%, and it was below 1.5% at the start of June.	但是，2011年7月，利率下降到了2%，今年6月初更是下降到了不到1. 5%。


The normal rules of thumb would say that the market is now expecting 8.75 years of near-zero short-term interest rates before the economy returns to normal.	常规经验法则告诉我们，如今市场预期在经济重回正轨之前将经历8. 75年的短期（近）零利率时期。


And similar calculations for the 30-year Treasury bond show even longer and more anomalous expectations of continued depression.	以30年期国债为基础做类似的计算则指向时间更长、幅度更深的萧条。


The possible conclusions are stark.	结论是无情的。


One possibility is that those investing in financial markets expect economic policy to be so dysfunctional that the global economy will remain more or less in its current depressed state for perhaps a decade, or more.	一种可能是金融市场的投资者预计经济政策将是无能的，全球经济将维持当前萧条状态达十年之久或更长。


The only other explanation is that even now, more than three years after the US financial crisis erupted, financial markets’ ability to price relative risks and returns sensibly has been broken at a deep level, leaving them incapable of doing their job: bearing and managing risk in order to channel savings to entrepreneurial ventures.	此外只存在一种可能：即使是现在，在美国金融危机爆发已经三年的时候，金融市场为相对风险和回报正确定价的能力仍处于严重受损的状态，无法起到应有的作用——承受和管理风险，从而将储蓄导向创业冒险。


Neither alternative is something that I would have predicted – or even imagined.	不管那种可能，都不是我此前所能预测的，甚至连想都不敢想。


The Perils of Striking Iran	与伊朗作战的危险


In the winter of 2002-03, supporters of regime change in Iraq were upbeat in their vision of the post-invasion phase of the war.	2002-03年冬天，对战争后入侵期前景的预测让伊拉克政府更迭的支持者们亢奋不已。


Anyone who suggested that what is happening today was a likely scenario was criticized as being a pro-Saddam appeaser, anti-American, or both.	只要有人提出可能发生今天这样的状况，肯定会被斥之为拥戴萨达姆的和事佬、反美主义者，或者两者兼具。


Yet a sober assessment of the difficulties ahead would have helped to avoid many of the mistakes that have proved to be so costly in terms of American lives and resources – not to mention the suffering of Iraqis.	但如果当时能够清醒地考虑到可能遇到的困难，就能够避免很多错误的发生，而事实已经证明这些错误让美国在生命和资源上付出了惨重的代价¾这还不包括伊拉克人民受到的苦难。


Now some voices in the United States and elsewhere are proposing military action against Iran.	如今美国和其他国家的一些人又要对伊朗采取军事行动。


So it is logical to ask: what are the realistic scenarios concerning the consequences of such an intervention?	因此我们顺理成章地要问：这样的入侵将给我们带来什么样的真实后果？


Are there any plans regarding how to handle the post-strike situation?	主张军事干预的人是否考虑过战争后局势的管理计划？


Without doubt, those willing to strike – either alone or in a coalition – have a range of options, ranging from naval and air blockades to targeted raids, sabotage inside the country, and massive attack from without.	勿庸置疑，那些希望单打独斗或以联盟形式发动战争的人提出了一系列解决方案，从海空封锁到定点打击、从国内预谋破坏到海外大规模袭击。


But the Iranians also have cards up their sleeve – some predictable, some wild.	但伊朗人也有自己的应对之策，有些对策我们可以预测，而有些则是极为疯狂的。


They may become malicious and aggressive in Iraq and Afghanistan.	伊朗人可能会在伊拉克和阿富汗发动恶意的袭击。


The Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hezbollah militia may reinitiate hostilities.	伊朗和叙利亚支持的真主党游击队可能会重新点燃对美国的仇恨。


Terrorist groups, both old and newly created, may receive fresh funding and volunteers.	无论是老牌还是刚刚成立的恐怖组织都会再次得到资金和志愿人员的注入。


A direct military showdown in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, through which about 40% of the world’s traded oil is shipped, cannot be ruled out.	在运送世界石油交易量40%的波斯湾和 霍尔木兹海峡发生直接军事冲突的可能性也不能排除。


As a consequence, oil prices would skyrocket.	如果真的发生那样的情况，油价肯定会一路飙升。


Some analysts argue that the negative effects of such an outcome would only last for “months.”	某些分析家认为军事行动的负面效果只会持续短短“几个月”。


In their view, once Iran’s military capabilities and nuclear program are destroyed, the Iranians will no longer represent a threat.	他们认为，一旦伊朗的军事能力及核计划被彻底摧毁，伊朗人就不会再构成威胁。


However, it seems obvious that whatever happens, the Iranians will fight an asymmetric war not only on their own territory, but also in the neighboring region for years to come.	但无论如何，伊朗人似乎都会把这场不对等的战争继续下去，他们的战争将不仅局限在自己的领土，还将波及到邻国的土地，这场战争可能要持续数年才会平息。


As the case of Iraq shows, “months” is a long time in the Middle East.	正像伊拉克战争所显示的那样，“几个月”在中东地区可能是“旷日持久”的代名词。


The fact that an Iranian reaction to a military attack might be ferocious does not mean that Iran’s government should be allowed to do whatever it deems appropriate.	尽管伊朗人对军事打击的反应也许非常可怕，但这并不意味着伊朗政府就能不受任何束缚的为所欲为。


On the contrary, the international community must be ready to enforce the most sacrosanct rules of peaceful coexistence, and sometimes this may include resorting to the use of force.	恰恰相反，国际社会必须贯彻和平共处的神圣原则，而贯彻原则有时也需要使用武力。


But, in an interdependent and interconnected world, the use of force cannot be the result of national political calculations.	但在一个相互依赖、相互联系的世界，使用武力绝不是仅仅是国内政治企图的后果。


Rather, it must be the product of the widest possible consensus on a critical threat assessment.	相反，武力干涉的基础应该是危机评估后达成的最为广泛的共识。


The war against Iraq in 1991 is the leading example of military intervention following global consensus.	1991年的伊拉克战争是达成全球共识后进行军事干预的典范。


If such a consensus cannot be reached, at least Western powers and like-minded states must agree, as in Kosovo in 1999, for example.	如果无法达成全球共识，至少西方大国以及有相近思想的国家必须达成一致，比如1999年的科索沃战争。


The third possibility – military action endorsed by a small group of states – should be avoided, for practical, legal, and moral reasons.	出于现实、法律和道德等方面的考虑，第三种选择¾即由某个小团体授权的军事行动¾应该绝对避免。


Today, efficiency of external action is inextricably linked to its legitimacy.	今天，国外军事行动的效率与其合法性之间有着无法割裂的联系。


When it comes to deciding on how to deal with Iran, the US and its allies should bear in mind the following principles.	决定如何处理伊朗问题时，美国及其盟国应该遵守下列原则。


First, it is crucial to make a rational threat assessment.	首先，必须要进行合理的威胁评估。


Learning the lessons of the decision to invade Iraq, democracies should not allow personal obsessions, fantasies, and dogmas to contaminate the foreign policy-making process.	入侵伊拉克的决策告诉我们，民主国家不应允许个人的好恶、想象以及教条影响到外交政策的制定过程。


It is essential to distinguish between what we know, what we ought to know – and what, therefore, we would like the Iranians to tell us – and what is speculation.	搞清楚我们知道什么，应当知道什么¾希望伊朗人让我们知道什么¾以及哪些问题只是我们的猜测具有至关重要的意义。


Alarm bells signaling that the time to take action has arrived should ring at the right moment, and not before.	标志着行动时机已经成熟的警报应该在合适的时机、而不能提前拉响。


Second, as long as a serious breach of international law is not detected, negotiations with Iran must continue.	其次，只要没有发现严重违反国际法的现象，与伊朗之间的谈判就必须继续下去。


Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has repeatedly declared that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.	伊朗也是《核不扩散条约》的签订国之一，并且反复强调其核计划将完全用于和平用途。


Engaging in discussions with Iran does not necessarily mean that we believe or deny those declarations.	与伊朗接触并不意味着我们相信或否认这些说法。


Rather, it provides a way of reaching a better understanding of their point of view.	相反，谈判是一种了解对方观点的很好方式。


Negotiations are useful, too, because they promote an internal debate in Iran.	谈判能促进伊朗开展内部辩论，因此在这方面的作用也不容小视。


While an end to all contacts would probably lead to further radicalization, negotiations and the mere prospect of a future settlement may reinforce the influence of moderates.	切断一切接触可能会导致极端主义倾向进一步泛滥，而谈判和未来和平解决方案的前景可能会扩大温和派的影响。


With historical perspective, lack of proper negotiations has been counterproductive in the North Korean case.	从历史的角度看，缺乏真正的谈判在北朝鲜问题上曾经起到过负面的作用。


Third, sanctions should not be discarded, but they should be interpreted as a means of pressure rather than as a mere prelude to war.	第三，制裁手段也不能轻易放弃，但这里的制裁应该被理解成一种施压的手段，而不只是战争的前奏。


As Javier Solana, the European Union’s chief diplomat, who has conducted lengthy negotiations with Iran, rightly points out, even if the United Nations Security Council approves sanctions against Iran, the door to negotiations will always be open.	正如曾经长期主持与伊朗谈判的欧盟首席外交官 哈维尔·索拉纳（ Javier Solana）所指出的那样，即便联合国安理会批准对伊朗实施制裁，通往谈判的大门也永远是敞开的。


The same applies, of course, to sanctions dictated by Western powers on their own.	当然，西方大国自己实行的制裁也必须遵守同样的原则。


Finally, dealing with the Middle East, not just with Iran, requires a fresh, open-minded, and comprehensive approach.	最后，处理中东、而不只是伊朗问题需要开放、全面的新方法。


All regional and local actors should be involved.	所有地区和当地势力都应该参与其中。


New methods should be explored.	应该探索新的解决之道。


The US administration must recognize that foreign policy is not security policy, and that a powerful military is not a magic wand.	美国政府必须承认外交政策不同于安全政策，拥有强大的军事实力也不是能使所有问题迎刃而解的魔杖。


True, if one has a hammer, all problems look like nails.	的确，如果你有一把锤子，所有问题看起来都像是钉子。


The real trouble begins when one thinks that the hammer might be the right solution for headaches, too.	但如果你认为锤子可能是治愈头疼的有效方法，那么就会引来真正的麻烦。


Big Banks’ Tall Tales	大银行怪谈


WASHINGTON, DC – There are two competing narratives about recent financial-reform efforts and the dangers that very large banks now pose around the world.	发自华盛顿特区——关于近期金融改革的努力和大型银行给全世界带来的危险，有两种相互矛盾的说法：其中一种是错的；


One narrative is wrong; the other is scary.	而另一种则是令人胆寒的。


At the center of the first narrative, preferred by financial-sector executives, is the view that all necessary reforms have already been adopted (or soon will be).	金融业高管偏爱第一种说法，其核心观点是银行已经（或者很快会）采取所有必要的改革措施。


Banks have less debt relative to their equity levels than they had in 2007.	银行的负债/资产比率已经低于2007年的水平。


New rules limiting the scope of bank activities are in place in the United States, and soon will become law in the United Kingdom – and continental Europe could follow suit.	美国限制银行活动的新规定已经就位，而英国很快会就此立法——随后欧洲大陆可能会效仿。


Proponents of this view also claim that the megabanks are managing risk better than they did before the global financial crisis erupted in 2008.	这一观点的支持者还声称银行巨头的风险管理比2008年全球金融危机爆发前做得要好得多。


In the second narrative, the world’s largest banks remain too big to manage and have strong incentives to engage in precisely the kind of excessive risk-taking that can bring down economies.	第二种说法是，世界上的银行巨头依然庞大得难以驾驭，而且它们有强烈的动机进行那种会搞垮经济的过度冒险。


Last year’s “London Whale” trading losses at JPMorgan Chase are a case in point.	去年摩根大通的“伦敦鲸”巨额交易损失就是一个明显的例子。


And, according to this narrative’s advocates, almost all big banks display symptoms of chronic mismanagement.	而且按照这种说法的主张，几乎所有大银行都表现出长期管理不善的病态。


While the debate over megabanks sometimes sounds technical, in fact it is quite simple.	虽然围绕银行巨头的争论有时听起来过于专业，实际上却很简单。


Ask this question: If a humongous financial institution gets into trouble, is this a big deal for economic growth, unemployment, and the like?	想一想这个问题：如果巨大无比的金融机构陷入危机，那么对经济增长、失业等情况造成极大影响吗？


Or, more bluntly, could Citigroup or a similar-size European firm get into trouble and stumble again toward failure without attracting some form of government and central bank support (whether transparent or somewhat disguised)?	或者更直接点说，花旗集团或类似规模的欧洲企业陷入困境并再次面临破产时，它们有可能不争取任何形式的政府或央行帮助吗（不管是用透明还是暗度陈仓的方式）？


The US took a step in the right direction with Title II of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation in 2010, which strengthened the resolution powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  And the FDIC has developed some plausible plans specifically for dealing with domestic financial firms.	随着多德-法兰克改革立法第二章在2010年通过，美国在正确的方向迈出了一步，这加强了美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的危机解决能力。 在与国内金融公司打交道方面，FDIC也已经研究出一些看似不错的方案。


(I serve on the FDIC’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee; all views stated here are my own.)	（我在FDIC的系统性解决方案咨询委员会任职； 此处陈述的所有观点都是本人个人观点）。


But a great myth lurks at the heart of the financial industry’s argument that all is well.	但潜伏在金融业论点核心的则是一切顺利的伟大神话。


The FDIC’s resolution powers will not work for large, complex cross-border financial enterprises.  The reason is simple: US law can create a resolution authority that works only within national boundaries.	DFIC的危机解决能力对大型而复杂的跨境金融企业并不起作用。 原因很简单：美国法律只能创立在本国境内有效的危机处理机构。


Addressing potential failure at a firm like Citigroup would require a cross-border agreement between governments and all responsible agencies.	要解决像花旗银行这种跨国公司的潜在破产问题需要一个各国政府和所有相关机构之间的跨国协议。


On the fringes of the International Monetary Fund’s just-completed spring meetings in Washington, DC, I had the opportunity to talk with senior officials and their advisers from various countries, including from Europe.	在华盛顿特区刚刚结束的国际货币基金组织春季会议的外围会谈中，我有幸能和来自不同国家的高级官员以及他们的顾问交流，也包括来自欧洲的官员。


I asked all of them the same question: When will we have a binding framework for cross-border resolution?	我问了所有人同一个问题：我们什么时候才会有一个针对跨国解决方案并具备约束力的框架？


The answers typically ranged from “not in our lifetimes” to “never.”	他们的回答不外乎是“在我们有生之年都不可能”或“永远不可能”。


Again, the reason is simple: countries do not want to compromise their sovereignty or tie their hands in any way.	再次强调一下，原因很简单：所有国家都不想要妥协其主权或以任何方式被束缚。


Governments want the ability to decide how best to protect their countries’ perceived national interests when a crisis strikes.	各国政府都想有能力决定危机爆发时怎样最好保护所谓的本国利益。


No one is willing to sign a treaty or otherwise pre-commit in a binding way (least of all a majority of the US Senate, which must ratify such a treaty).	没有人愿意签署任何条约或以受束缚的方式提前承诺（大多数美国参议员尤其如此，须知只有在他们批准之后条约才能生效）。


As Bill Dudley, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, put it recently, using the delicate language of central bankers, “The impediments to an orderly cross-border resolution still need to be fully identified and dismantled.	正如纽约联储主席比尔·达利德（Bill Dudley）最近所说—���他使用了中央银行家们的精巧语言：“我们仍需充分识别并去除那些妨碍建立有序跨境决议的因素。


This is necessary to eliminate the so-called ‘too big to fail’ problem.”	这对消除所谓的‘太大而不能倒’的问题来说是很有必要的。 ”


Translation: Orderly resolution of global megabanks is an illusion.	言下之意：针对全球银行巨头的有序解决方案是一种幻想。


As long as we allow cross-border banks at or close to their current scale, our political leaders will be unable to tolerate their failure.	只要我们允许跨境银行处在或接近它们目前的规模，我们的政治领导人就无法接受它们的破产。


And, because these large financial institutions are by any meaningful definition “too big to fail,” they can borrow more cheaply than would otherwise be the case.	而且因为这些大型金融机构无论如何都是“太大而不能倒”的，它们能获得相对低利率的贷款。


Worse, they have both motive and opportunity to grow even larger.	更糟糕的是，它们既有动机也有机会变得更大。


This form of government support amounts to a large implicit subsidy for big banks.	这种形式的政府支持相当于对大型银行的大规模隐性补贴。


It is a bizarre form of subsidy, to be sure, but that does not make it any less damaging to the public interest.	可以肯定这是一种奇特的补贴形式，但并不意味其对公众利益的损害减少了。


On the contrary, because implicit government support for “too big to fail” banks rises with the amount of risk that they assume, this support may be among the most dangerous subsidies that the world has ever seen.	相反，伴随政府对“太大而不能倒的”银行的隐性资助会出现相应的风险，因此这可能会是世界上史无前例最危险的补贴。


After all, more debt (relative to equity) means a higher payoff when things go well.	毕竟，更多的债务（相对于资本）意味着一切顺利的话会有更高的回报。


And, when things go badly, it becomes the taxpayers’ problem (or the problem of some foreign government and their taxpayers).	但如果形势逆转，这就会成为纳税人的问题（或是一些外国政府及其本国纳税人的问题）。


What other part of the corporate world has the ability to drive the global economy into recession, as banks did in the fall of 2008?	企业界还有哪些行业能像银行业那样有能力在2008年让全球经济陷入衰退？


And who else has an incentive to maximize the amount of debt that they issue?	还有谁有动机将发行的债券数量最大化？


What the two narratives about financial reform have in common is that neither has a happy ending.	这两种对金融改革的说法有一个共同之处，那就是它们都没有一个好结局。


Either we put a meaningful cap on the size of our largest financial firms, or we must brace ourselves for the debt-fueled economic explosion to come.	我们要么限制大金融公司的规模，否则就得防范由债务推动的经济爆破的降临。


The Phantom Middle East Peace Process	飘忽不定的中东和平进程


TEL AVIV – Twenty years after the Madrid Peace conference, and ten years after President Bill Clinton’s heroic efforts at Camp David failed to yield a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, one cannot escape the conclusion that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has become one of the most spectacular deceptions in modern diplomatic history.	发自特拉维夫——转眼间，马德里和会已经过去了整整20年，而美国前总统克林顿召开戴维营以巴领导人谈判的失败壮举也是10年前的事了，这让人不得不得出结论：所谓以巴和平进程，不过是现代外交史上一场伟大的骗局罢了。


The process fell victim to the parties’ inability to bridge the gap between what was politically feasible for them and what was required for a settlement.	而和平进程之所以失败，原因就是在政治可行性和达成协议的必要条件之间存在着相当明显的分歧，而双边各方却无力将其弥合。


Trapped between the possible and the necessary, Israelis and Palestinians simply learned to live without a solution.	以至于在可能性和必要性之间左右为难的以色列人和巴勒斯坦人，都已经学会了如何在没有和平方案的情境下生活。


However obsessed international opinion may be with Gaza’s agony, to most Israelis the Palestinian “problem” seems to be happening on the dark side of the moon.	当国际舆论都倾注在加沙的苦难之上时，巴勒斯坦“问题”对许多以色列人来说似乎是件非常遥远的事情。


The wall/fence in the West Bank and Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from Gaza have practically done away with daily friction between Jews an Arabs.	矗立在西岸的隔离墙以及阿里埃勒·沙龙从加沙撤军的举措已经有效防止了犹太人和阿拉伯人之间的日常摩擦。


Absorbed by their booming economy, reassured by President Barack Obama’s recent commitment never to let Israel down, and convinced of their success in defeating Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and deterring Hamas from venturing into another war, Israelis have lost any sense of urgency concerning the Palestinian problem.	而以色列人也已经失去了解决巴勒斯坦问题的紧迫感——他们正把心思放在不断增长的经济上，最近还得到了奥巴马不会背弃以色列的承诺，更何况在西岸地区的反巴勒斯坦恐怖活动也取得了成果，此外还成功阻止了哈马斯发动另一场战争的企图。


Israelis also find satisfaction in the relative prosperity of the West Bank, where order and stability are being secured by well-trained security forces, in line with Prime Minister’s Salam Fayyad’s meticulous bottom-up construction of Palestinian statehood.	以色列人同时也对西岸地区的相对繁荣感到满意，训练有素的安全部队有效维护了当地的秩序与稳定，并与巴勒斯坦民族联合政府总理萨拉姆·法耶兹精心策划的自下而上建国方略步调一致。


Moreover, massive inflows of international aid make Israel’s occupation one of the most convenient in world history; the Israelis control the land and its population without having to bear the financial burden of direct rule.	此外，国际援助的大批流入也令以色列的占领行动成为有史以来最惬意的：他们控制了当地的土地和人口，却无需背上相应的经济负担。


It is as if Moshe Dayan’s old existential political philosophy is being brought back to life.	由此看来，似乎已故以色列政治家莫萨·达扬的存在主义政治哲学又一次得到了验证。


When asked in November 1970 to spell out his views of a possible peace deal with the Palestinians, Dayan’s answer was one that could easily be endorsed by most of the ministers in Binyamin Netanyahu’s government. Dayan said: “The only peace negotiations are those where we settle the land and we build, and we settle, and from time to time we go to war.”	当他在1970年11月被问及对双方可能达成和平协议的观感时，达扬的回答大概是最容易得到内塔尼亚胡政府的部长们赞同的，他说：“唯一的和谈，就是我们占领，然后建设，然后再占领，偶尔还要打打仗。


With peace plans and envoys coming and going, Israelis and Palestinians alike have finally become blasé about the chances of a final settlement. The two-state solution is rapidly losing its appeal.	随着和平方案和特使们像走马灯似的换了又换，以色列和巴勒斯坦人都开始对达成最终解决方案的可能性感到厌倦了，就连两国分治方案也迅速失去了吸引力。


For, if a two-state solution really is the future, a social and political earthquake of untold dimensions awaits Israelis: a massive evacuation of settlers and a desperate need for a difficult political realignment to deal with the threat of civil strife and perhaps even military disobedience.	而倘若两国方案真的就是未来走向的话，那么等待以色列人的将是一场波及广泛的社会和政治大地震：首先要面对犹太定居者的大规模撤离，还需要费尽心思重新构建国内政治机制，以应对民众内部的冲突甚至是军队的不服从。


All this in order to go back to the 1967 borders, for which few Israelis feel nostalgic.	所有一切都意味着回归到1967年的边界状态，大概也没几个以色列人会喜欢这一点。


As for the Palestinians, the gap between the colossal tragedy of the Nakbah (the lost war at Israel’s founding) and the poverty of a territorial solution that sandwiches their demilitarized mini-state between Israel and Jordan – neither suffering from excessive love for Palestinian statehood – is bound to remain an open wound.	对巴勒斯坦人来说，他们既无法忘却“灾难日”（1948年以色列建国并驱逐巴勒斯坦人的日子）所造成了巨大悲剧，也无法接受将自己变成一个不能拥有武装的迷你国家，夹在以色列和约旦（两国都没有对巴勒斯坦建国表现出极大兴趣）之间的恶劣区域划分方案，这种矛盾心理注定要成为一个长期隐隐作痛的伤口。


And Palestinians would view any solution to the refugee problem that Israel might accept as a betrayal of the ethos of Palestinian nationalism, namely the Right of Return.	而巴勒斯坦人也会将任何可能得到以色列同意的难民问题方案视为对其民族主义精神（即所谓家园回归权）的背叛。


The state of Palestine would lack legitimacy among Palestinians themselves.	这也会导致巴勒斯坦国在巴勒斯坦人心中失去其合法性。


True, Hamas has been indicating recently a readiness to contemplate a solution based on the 1967 borders, but it is doubtful that its leaders and members could live with the betrayal of the refugees.	没错，哈马斯最近似乎正考虑接受一个基于1967年边界划分的解决方案，但该组织的领袖和成员能否容忍这个方案都令人存疑。


Then again, the idea of Palestinian statehood is not central to Hamas’s worldview, in which the strategic objective is the ultimate victory of Islam.	除此之外，建国并不是哈马斯世界观的核心思想，他们真正追求的其实是伊斯兰教的最终胜利。


For Hamas, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is a “transitional figure,” to be swept away together with his secular PLO in the revolutionary drive to an Islamic society.	对于哈马斯来说，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿巴斯也只不过是个“过渡人物”，因此最终也会连同其世俗的巴勒斯坦解放组织一道，在一场迈向伊斯兰社会的革命中彻底滚蛋。


It is the resulting sense of paralysis that explains the proliferation of new political paradigms in both Israel and Jordan.	而在进程瘫痪的作用下，以色列和约旦两国国内也出现了新的政治风向。


Jordanians of the caliber of Former Prime Ministers Abdelsalam Al-Majali and Taher al-Masri, as well as a former adviser of King Hussein, Adnan Abu-Odeh, have been advancing schemes for a Jordanian-Palestinian solution.	两位约旦前首相阿卜杜勒·萨拉姆·马贾利和塔希尔·马斯里，还有侯赛因国王的前顾问阿德南·阿布奥德都图谋推动一个约旦-巴勒斯坦合并解决方案。


Their argument is essentially that the peace process’s troubles stem from its deviation from the original intention of the architects of the Madrid Peace Conference, where a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation sat representing the two peoples.	在他们看来，和平进程之所以出现了那么多问题，就是因为进程偏离了马德里和平会议架构的原本意图，当年两国可是组成了一个联合代表团，共同代表两国人民，就跟一个国家一样。


Conspicuously, notable figures on the Israeli right – among them Former Defense and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, who is also a political mentor of Netanyahu, and Knesset Speaker Rubi Rivlin – mirror the Jordanians’s position.	值得关注的是，以色列右翼的一些头面人物——比如历任国防和外交部长的莫夏·阿伦斯（此人也是内塔尼亚胡的政治导师），以及议会议长鲁比·里夫林——也跟约旦持有类似的立场。


Whereas the latter champion the concept of one political space that would include the two banks of the Jordan River, the Israelis respond with their own concept of one political space between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.	当约旦方面坚持必须在约旦河两岸建立一个政治空间的概念时，以色列则用地中海和约旦河之间只能有一个政治空间的概念相回应。


Never truly convinced of the viability of the two-state solution, and encouraged by the failure of the peace process so far, the Israeli right is going back to toying with the most dangerous scenario of all, the bi-national state.	以色列右翼从来就不相信两国方案的可行性，同时还受到了迄今为止和平进程屡遭失败的激励，于是他们开始玩弄一个最危险的政治幻景——把巴勒斯坦控制区彻底并入以色列，建立一个双民族国家。


As always, they want the best of all worlds: an emphatically Jewish state in which Palestinians would have citizenship rights, but no national rights whatsoever. That is not a bad formula for a state of permanent civil war.	一如既往，这些人满嘴花言巧语：建立一个巴勒斯坦人拥有公民权，却没有民族权利的犹太国家，这对于一个陷入长期内战的国家来说似乎还不错。


Trapped in their contradictions and zero-sum national dreams, Israelis and Palestinians cannot expect a perfect solution.	由此可见，受困于自身的矛盾心态以及零和博弈式的建国梦想，以色列人和巴勒斯坦人双方都不可能祈求能得到一个完美的解决方案。


Their task is to embrace the least imperfect solution before they decline into Doomsday scenarios, such as a hostile Israeli unilateral disengagement, or a one-state reality of unending conflict.	而他们唯一能做的，就是在彻底崩盘（比如一个充满敌意的以色列单方面分离行动，或者一个永无宁日的双民族国家）之前，接受一个最接近完美的方案。


The Phelps Factor	菲尔普斯因素


On December 10, Edmund Phelps, my colleague at Columbia University, received the Nobel Prize in economics for 2006. The award was long overdue.	12月10日，我在哥伦比亚大学的同事菲尔普斯将会接受2006年度的诺贝尔经济奖，这是一份他早就应该得到的奖。


While the Nobel Prize committee cited his contributions to macroeconomics, Phelps has made contributions in many areas, including the theory of growth and technological change, optimal taxation, and social justice.	诺贝尔奖委员会表彰了他对宏观经济方面的贡献，但是菲尔普斯在许多领域都作出了很大的贡献，包括关于增长和技术改变、最佳税收和社会正义的理论。


Phelps’ key observation in macroeconomics was that the relationship between inflation and unemployment is affected by expectations, and since expectations themselves are endogenous – they change over time – so, too, will the relationship between unemployment and inflation.	菲尔普斯在宏观经济领域方面最主要的发现是通货膨胀率和失业率的关系受到预期的影响，而因为期望值本身是内生的，它们会随着时间而改变，所以，通货膨胀率和失业率的关系也会改变。


If a government attempts to push the unemployment rate too low, inflation will increase, and so, too, will inflationary expectations.	如果政府试图把失业率降到过低的水平，那么通货膨胀率就会上升，而通货膨胀预期也会升高。


This insight holds two possible policy implications.	这一见解可能会带来两种政策。


Some policymakers have concluded from Phelps’ analysis that the unemployment rate cannot be lowered permanently without ever-increasing levels of inflation.	一些政策制定者从菲尔普斯的分析总结说，失业率不可能会被永久地降低而不带来通货膨胀率的持续上升。


Thus, monetary authorities should simply focus on price stability by targeting the rate of unemployment at which inflation does not increase, referred to as the “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU).	因此，货币管理当局只需把注意力放在价格的稳定上，其做法是找到一个合适的失业率水平，在该水平上通货膨胀率不会上升，称作“非加速通货膨胀的失业率”（NAIRU）。


But the NAIRU is not immutable.	但是NAIRU并不是永久不变的。


The correct implication, which Phelps repeatedly emphasized, is that governments can implement a variety of policies, particularly structural policies, to allow the economy to operate at a lower level of unemployment.	正确的政策，即菲尔普斯一再强调的，应该是政府应该实施多种政策，尤其是结构性的政策，以让经济运行在一个较低失业率的水平上。


Policies that focus exclusively on inflation are misguided for several other reasons.	专门盯牢通货膨胀率的政策被误导还有其他几个原因。


As a practical matter, even controlling for expectations (as Phelps’ work insists that we do), the relationship between unemployment and inflation is highly unstable.	在实际操作中，即便控制住预期（正如菲尔普斯的工作强调我们应该做的），通货膨胀率和失业率的关系还是极度不稳定的。


It is virtually impossible to discern the relationship from the data except in a few isolated periods.	除开在几个孤立的阶段，我们根本无法从数据中看出这种关系。


Changes in education levels, unionization, and productivity are part of the explanation for this instability.	教育水平、工会和生产效率的变化可以部分解释这种不稳定性。


But, whatever the reason, policymakers face considerable uncertainty about the level of NAIRU.	但是，不管是出于什么原因，政策制定者还是很难寻觅到一个合适的NAIRU水平。


Thus, they still face a trade-off between pushing unemployment too low, and setting off an episode of inflation, and not pushing hard enough, resulting in an unnecessary waste of economic resources.	于是，他们还是要作出权衡，即把失业率推得过低会带来一段时间的通货膨胀，而如果不过分追求低失业率，又会造成经济资源不必要的浪费。


How one views these risks depends on the costs of undoing mistakes, which in turn depends on other properties of the inflation-unemployment relationship that Phelps’ analysis did not address.	人们如何去看待这些风险取决于改正错误的代价，后者又取决于菲尔普斯的分析所没有涉及到的通货膨胀和失业关系的其他一些特性。


The weight of evidence indicates that the cost of undoing the mistake of pushing unemployment down too far is itself very low, at least for countries like the US, where the relationship has been carefully studied.	许多证据表明，改正把失业率推得过大的错误的代价就其本身而言是很小的，至少对美国这种对这种关系研究得很深的国家而言是如此的。


In this view, the Federal Reserve should aggressively pursue low unemployment, until it is shown that inflation is rising.	根据这种观点，美联储应该极力追求低失业率，直到有现象表明通货膨胀率开始上升为止。


By contrast, inflation “hawks” argue that inflation must be attacked preemptively.	与之相对照，通货膨胀的“鹰派”争辩说，应当对通货膨胀先发制人。


While most central banks are inflation hawks, this stance is a matter of religion, not economic science.	绝大多数中央银行都是通货膨胀的“鹰派”，这种立场是一种宗教信仰问题，与经济学无关。


There is simply little or no empirical evidence that inflation, at the low to moderate rates that have prevailed in recent decades, has any significant harmful real effects on output, employment, growth, or the distribution of income.	很少或者没有实验证据表明，在过去几十年间存在的较低到中等水平的通货膨胀对于产量、就业、经济增长或收入分配有任何明显有害的实际影响。


Nor is there evidence that inflation, should it increase slightly, cannot be reversed at a relatively minor cost – comparable to the benefits of additional employment and growth enjoyed in the excessive expansion of the economy that led to the increase in inflation.	也没有证据表明，轻微上升的通货膨胀不能被以一个相对较低的代价扭转过来，与过度的经济扩张所带来的就业机会增加和经济增长的好处相比，这点通货膨胀所带来的代价算不了什么。


In the early 1990’s, the Fed, and many others, thought that the NAIRU was around 6%-6.2%.	在二十世纪九十年代早期，美联储和其他一些中央银行认为，NAIRU应该在6%到6. 2%之间。


Based on changes in the economy, I and the staff that worked with me on President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers argued that the NAIRU was considerably lower.	根据经济状况的改变，我和跟我一起在克林顿总统的经济顾问委员会工作的同事们争辩说，NAIRU的水平应该要低得多。 结果证明我们是对的。


We were right.	失业率降到 3.


Unemployment fell to 3.8% without any surge in inflation.	8% 时并没有带来通货膨胀率的猛升。


This matters because, as the great economist Arthur Okun argued, reducing unemployment by two percentage points would increase output by 2%-6%, or $0.5-1.5 trillion dollars in the case of America.	这很重要，正像伟大的经济学家Arthur Okun所说的，在美国把失业率降低两个百分点会把产量增加2%到6%，或者说5千亿到1万5千亿美元。


Even for a rich country, that is a lot of money.	即便对一个富有的国家来说，这也是很大一笔钱。


It could be used to put America’s social security system on a stable footing for the next 75-100 years.	用它可以使美国未来75到100年间的社会保障体系都高枕无忧。


It could even pay for a substantial share of the cost for a war like that in Iraq!	甚至它可以支付打一场像伊拉克战争那样的费用！


Phelps’ work helped us to understand the complexity of the relationship between inflation and unemployment, and the important role that expectations can play in that relationship.	菲尔普斯的工作帮助我们理解了通货膨胀率和失业率之间复杂的关系，以及预期在那种关系中所扮演的重要角色。


But it is a misuse of that analysis to conclude that nothing can be done about unemployment, or that monetary authorities should focus exclusively on inflation.	但是如果根据这种分析就认为对于失业率不能够有所作为��或者货币管理部门应该只关心通货膨胀率，那就是对这一分析的误用了。


That view belongs to a school of modern macroeconomics that assumes rational expectations and perfectly functioning markets.	持有这种观点的是一个现代宏观经济学的流派，他们假设存在理性的预期和充分发挥功能的市场。


In other words, individuals – usually assumed to be identical – fully use all available information to forecast the future in an environment of perfect competition, no capital market shortcomings, and full insurance of all risks.	换句话说，通常被认为是雷同的个人会运用所有可提供的信息来预测在一个完整竞争、没有资本市场的缺点和充满各种风险的环境下的未来。


Not only are these assumptions absurd, but so are the conclusions: there is no involuntary unemployment, markets are fully efficient, and redistribution has no real consequence.	不仅这种架设是荒谬的，其结论同样也是荒谬的，即认为不存在被迫的失业，市场效率完美，以及再分配不会带来任何真正的结果。


But, while government policies, according to this school, are ineffective, that matters little.	根据这种流派的理论，政府的政策是没有效力的，成事不足。


Because markets are always efficient, there is no need for government intervention.	因为市场总是有效的，不需要政府的干预。


More perniciously, many supporters of this view, when confronted with the reality of unemployment, argue that it arises only because of government-imposed rigidities and trade unions.	更加有害的是，许多支持这种观点的人在碰到失业的现实问题时，争辩说，它的发生只是因为政府僵化和工会。


In their “ideal” world without either, there would, they claim, be no unemployment.	他们宣称，在他们“理想”的世界中不会有失业的情况。


For more than three decades, Phelps has shown that there is an alternative approach.	三十多年以来， 菲尔普斯表明了还存在另一种方式。


He has tried to understand what we can do to lower unemployment and increase the well-being of those at the bottom.	他试图弄清楚我们如何能降低失业率以及提高那些生活在底层的人的生活水平。


But he has also striven to understand what makes capitalist economies dynamic, what lies behind the entrepreneurial spirit, and what we can do to promote it further.	但是他也努力弄清楚究竟是何物使资本主义经济体充满活力，创业精神的背后隐藏的是什么，以及我们如何来进一步推动它。


Phelps’ economics remains one of action, not resignation.	菲尔普斯的经济学追求的是行动，而不是顺从。


The Philippines Joins the Asian Race	重回亚洲竞赛的菲律宾


MANILA – In 1980, my father arrived in the United States to undergo a heart bypass, due to the rigors of his imprisonment by the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos.	发自马尼拉——1980年，我父亲在独裁者费迪南德·马科斯的牢狱迫害之下心脏病发，前往美国接受搭桥手术。


The dictatorship offered him a reprieve, but, true to its nature, one dependent on its whims.	当时独裁政府还口是心非地许诺给予我父亲缓刑。


Having already been condemned by a kangaroo court to death by musketry, my father refused to hoist a white flag. “The Filipino,” he insisted, “is worth dying for.”	政府操纵下的法庭早已判决要枪毙我父亲，但他仍然拒绝屈服，因为在他心中“为菲律宾人民而死，死得其所”。


Three years later, my father went home, not to die, but to infuse new life into the demoralized ranks of the opposition to the dictatorship.	3年后父亲归国，不为求死，而是为陷入低谷的反独裁运动注入新生。


His assassination upon his arrival at Manila airport became the ultimate proof of the sincerity of what he had proclaimed throughout his life.	父亲刚抵达马尼拉机场便遭行刺，而这一事件也成为了他为其事业献身的最有力证明。


In 1986, my countrymen peacefully defied Marcos’s tanks and demonstrated their faith in themselves.	1986年，我国民众用自己的信念和平抵抗了马克斯的坦克。


Marcos fled, and democracy was restored without bloodshed.	马克斯流亡，民主在没有流血的情况下回到了菲律宾。


My mother, who then became President, also had an enduring message: the democracy that we had regained at such a high price could be ensured only by a vigorous commitment to making its institutions work.	而后来成为了菲律宾总统的我母亲也一直怀着一个理念：只有不懈推行民主，才能保卫我们付出极大代价争取回来的民主制度。


In 2009, my countrymen again took to the streets to accompany my mother to her final resting place.	2009年我母亲逝世，人民再次涌上街头送她最后一程。


This massive expression of solidarity evolved into an effort to draft me to run for the presidency in 2010.	而他们展现的团结一致也成为了我参加2010年总统大选的动力。


At the polls, my countrymen conferred a solemn mandate on me to make democracy the means for eliminating corruption and alleviating poverty.	在投票中，我的支持者给予我的庄严委托就是要让民主成为消除腐败和贫困的手段。


Our administration is committed to transforming a country where nice guys finish last into one where those who deviate from the straight and narrow face punishment for their crimes.	我的政府致力于将菲律宾从一个好人遭殃的国度向一个坏人受罚的国家转变。


Our goal is to empower citizens to demand the rule of law, regardless of who is in power.	我们的目标是不论谁当政，都能让人民享有法治。


My colleagues in government are expected to demonstrate this by means of sustained reforms that foster meritocracy, transparency, and accountability.	人民期望我的同僚们能够通过持续改革——提高执政能力，透明度和责任感——来展现这一精神。


We started with the National Food Authority, a government corporation tasked with ensuring an adequate supply of rice.	我们从国家食品管理局这家以确保大米供应的国营机构开始着手。


From 1972 to 2000, the NFA accumulated 12.9 billion pesos ($290 million) in debt.	从1972年到2000年间，NFA负债达129亿比索（约2.


Within a year of taking office, my predecessor increased the NFA’s debt to 18 billion pesos.	9亿美元）。 我的前任在就职当年就把债务推高到180亿比索。


In the course of the next eight and a half years, her administration imported much more rice than was needed, resulting in 177 billion pesos in debt by the time she stepped down.	在此后的8年半时间里，她领导的政府进口了过多的大米，致使她下台时债务总额累积到了1770亿比索。


In a shift from the illogical import policy of the past, we focused our energies on revitalizing rural irrigation, which boosted the first dry-season crop yields.	在转变过去那种非理性进口政策的过程中，我们把精力放在激活郊区灌溉系统上，提高了旱季第一季稻的收成。


This year, our government will import 64% less rice than in 2010.	因此今年政府进口的大米数量将比2010年减少64%。


My father taught me that the most important freedom is freedom from hunger.	我父亲曾教导我，最重要的自由是免于饥饿的自由。


Without food security, individuals can have no chance of achieving social mobility.	没有食物的安全，其他一切的社会流动都无从谈起。


That is why we are investing in our fellow citizens by means of a conditional cash-transfer program, called Pantawid Pamilya in Tagalog, which is patterned after Brazil’s Bolsa Familia.	这正是为什么我们仿效巴西“Bolsa Familia”制度，开展有条件向国民进行现金转移支付的“Pantawid Pamilya”项目


We are also providing cash assistance to eligible poor families on the condition that pregnant mothers and children avail themselves of preventive health care, and that children regularly attend school.	此外我们还向合资格的贫困家庭提供资金援助，确保孕妇和儿童能够得到疾病防治，适龄儿童能够上学。


This program already covers roughly 2.3 million poor families, providing them with yet another key to social mobility.	这个项目已资助了约230万个贫困家庭，为他们提供了实现社会流动的另一渠道。


Mobilizing resources for these programs depends on cutting wasteful programs and rooting out corruption in our bureaucracy.	支持这些项目的可用资源主要依靠裁撤多余项目和根除政府腐败。


One agency where large-scale graft and corruption was traditionally rampant was the Department of Public Works and Highways.	而政府中腐败渎职风气泛滥的机构之一就是公共工程和高速公路部门。


By instituting open, competitive, and transparent bidding, the department has saved 2.5 billion pesos from 3,692 projects nationwide in the past year.	通过推进招投标工作的公开，竞争和透明，去年该部门从全国3692个项目中节省了25亿比索。


We expect 6-7 billion pesos in savings by the end of this year, which can be used for other high-priority development projects.	到今年底，我们期望可以节省60-70亿比索的资金，并把这些资金投入到其他更为紧急的发展项目上。


To promote fiscal transparency, our Finance Department has created a Web site called “Pera ng Bayan,” or “The People’s Money.”	为了推进财务透明化，我们的财政部创建了一个名为 “人民财富”（Pera ng Bayan）的网站。


It allows the public to report tax cheats, smugglers, and crooks anonymously.	人们可以通过该网站上匿名举报税务欺诈，走私以及其他官员不正当行为。


The government likewise subjects officials to lifestyle checks and vets their statements of assets and liabilities to find out if what they have acquired is commensurate with their declared income.	同时，政府鼓励各级官员检查自身生活方式并公开财产和债务，以确保其财产和收入相一致。


These campaigns are yielding results. Sixty-seven tax-evasion cases and 43 smuggling cases, with claims totaling more than 26 billion pesos and 58 billion pesos, respectively, have been filed against groups and individuals.	这些举措都取得了有效的成果，目前已经发现了涉及多个群体或个人的67宗税务欺诈和43宗走私行为，涉案总额分别达到260多亿比索和580多亿比索。


But it is not enough to be efficient and honest in public spending.	不过，在公共支出的效率和诚实性方面我们还做得不够。


We must also attract foreign investment, despite the difficulties facing Europe, the US, and Japan.	尽管欧洲，美国和日本目前都面临困境，但我们必须吸引更多的国外投资。


Our economic diplomacy has three key objectives, one of which is to secure more markets for our exports and enticing more tourists to visit the country.	我们的经济外交有三个主要目标，其中之一就是确保出口并吸引更多的旅客前来参观旅游。


Our diplomacy is also focused on protecting the well-being of the roughly ten million Filipinos working overseas.	其二则是关注保护1000多万菲律宾籍海外劳工的福利。


But attracting investment to create jobs at home and ease poverty is the best way to ensure that our countrymen are not forced to go overseas in the first place.	而吸引投资，在国内创造就业和缓解贫困是确保国人不再离乡背井到海外谋生的最好方法。


Investment has been coming in, but more is needed.	虽然菲律宾的国外投��一直都保持着净流入的态势，但这还远远不够。


Our Business Process Outsourcing industry is now the second largest in the world, behind India, with revenues of $8.9 billion in 2010 rising to a projected $11 billion in 2011.	目前我们拥有紧随印度之后的全球第二大商业流程外包行业，在2010年创造了89亿美元利润并预计2011年能达到110亿美元。


The Philippines also ranks fourth in the world in terms of shipbuilding.	造船产业也达到了全球第四的水平。


Our sound fiscal management has been widely recognized, with all of the major credit ratings agencies upgrading the Philippines within our government’s first year.	我们稳健的财政管理得到了全球的认可，在我们政府执政的第一年，全球主要评级机构都上调了菲律宾的主权评级。


And the World Economic Forum ranked us 75th in its latest Global Competitiveness Report – a ten-spot jump from last year, and the Philippines’ highest ranking since it entered the survey.	同时，世界经济论坛在最近出版的全球竞争力排行报告中把我们排在了第75位——比去年上升了10位，这也是自菲律宾参加调查以来最高的排名。


The Philippines reopened for business under new management only a little more than a year ago. It is faring very well – and is set to become increasingly profitable.	虽然菲律宾在新政府管理团队的领导下重新向商业世界开放还不到一年时间，而一切都进展得很顺利——也必将变得日益富强。


The Philippines’ Sanctuaries of Terror	菲律宾的恐怖主义避难所


The presence of insurgent or terrorist sanctuaries in non-belligerent countries is one of the most intractable, explosive issues in international relations.	在非交战国里出现恐怖分子或恐怖分子避难所的现象是国际关系中最棘手、最易引发争端的一个问题。


It was a central fact of the Vietnam War, brought about the destruction of Lebanon, and continues to plague the coalition in Iraq.	这是爆发越战的一个主要原因，并导致黎巴嫩解体，至今仍旧困挠着伊拉克联合政府。


It is also key to the present war on terror in Southeast Asia.	这同时也是目前东南亚打击恐怖主义战争的关键所在。


Vietnam differed from Korea and Malaya, where containment and counterinsurgency prevailed, because the communists could outflank allied forces in South Vietnam by using “neutral” territory in Cambodia and Laos.	越南与朝鲜、马来西亚不同，在那里牵制政策与对叛乱的镇压获得了成功。 因为南越共产党可以利用柬埔寨和老挝这两个“中立”区从侧翼突袭盟军。


Like the PLO presence in Lebanon until 1982, this strategy plunged hapless host countries into civil war and provoked invasions by stronger powers, in turn spurring more extremist movements – the Khmer Rouge, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.	正如巴勒斯坦解放组织在黎巴嫩一直存在到1982年，使其中寄居国不幸地陷入了内战，并导致强权国家入侵，最终引发更多的极端主义运动——红色高棉, 黎巴嫩真主党以及伊斯兰圣战组织。


Like previous host countries, the Philippines is a weak state, at peace with its neighbors and the West.	像其他恐怖主义寄居国一样，菲律宾是一个弱国，与邻国及西方保持着友好关系。


But, since 1994, its lawless southern islands have replaced Afghanistan as the main training ground and refuge for Southeast Asian jihadists.	但1994年以来，其不受法律控制的南部诸岛代替阿富汗成为东南亚圣战组织者们主要的训练基地和避难所。


Most are Indonesians belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Mujahidin Kompak, and other Darul Islam factions.	其中大部分是隶属于伊斯兰祈祷团、圣战者康帕克组织以及回教之家分支组织的印尼人。


Graduates of Mindanao’s terror camps, for example, now rival in number the older generation of Southeast Asian Afghan alumni that forged ties with al-Qaeda.	以位于棉兰佬岛的恐怖训练营为例，那里训练出的恐怖分子人数已可以与上一代阿富汗训练营媲美。


Veterans of the Mindanao camps took part in almost every JI-linked bombing since 2000, including the attack that killed hundreds in Bali in 2002.	阿富汗恐怖训练营与棉兰佬岛训练出的盖达组织勾结一体，参与了2000年以来几乎所有与伊斯兰祈祷团相关的爆炸事件，其中包括2002年在巴厘岛发生的造成数百人死亡的惨案。


New cohorts will pose a danger for years to come.	他们的新同伙们将成为今后几年的危险所在。


The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, galvanized American interest in the southern Philippines.	2001年美国911恐怖袭击事件激发了美国人对菲律宾南部的兴趣。


Mere weeks after the planes hit, Pentagon planners negotiated a return of American troops to Mindanao for the first time since the colonial era. Indeed, Mindanao was the second front in the war on terror until Iraq came to dominate US threat perceptions.	在911事件发生几周后，五角大楼在殖民时代后第一次讨论了向棉兰佬岛再次派驻美国部队的问题。


Australian Premier John Howard has likewise openly mulled pre-emptive military strikes on terrorist sanctuaries in the region.	确实，在伊拉克成为美国主要威胁之前，棉兰佬岛曾是美国反恐战争的第二战线。


Mindanao is not Cambodia or Lebanon, but the essential dilemma is the same.	棉兰佬岛不是柬埔寨或者老挝，但主要矛盾却是相同的。


How does one separate the terrorist parasite from its unwilling host, without doing fatal violence to the patient?	怎样能够将恐怖分子与其并不情愿的寄居国加以区分，能够不给其寄居国以致命打击？


In the Philippines, the diagnosis is complicated by the fact that terrorists are embedded in a volatile Muslim insurgency with which the West has no quarrel.	在菲律宾问题上，解决方法很复杂，因为这些恐怖分子与不稳定的穆斯林叛军结合一体，而西方与穆斯林叛军并不敌对。


The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is Southeast Asia’s strongest separatist group.	摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线是东南亚最强大的分裂主义集团。


It enjoys popular support, expresses legitimate grievances, and peace talks are underway.	他们拥有大众的支持，在法律允许的范围内表达着不满，而且和平谈判正在进行中。


Like the Palestinians, however, the MILF is riven by factions, and its leaders cannot, or will not, exclude terrorists from areas that they control.	和巴勒斯坦类似，摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线因派系斗争而四分五裂，其领导人不可能或不愿意将这些恐怖分子从自己控制的地区驱逐出去。


In part, this reflects political hedging by the MILF in the face of Manila’s incapacity to make meaningful concessions.	这部分地反映了摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线面对马尼拉无力做出有真正意义让步所采取的一种迂回的政治手段。


President Gloria Arroyo’s government is on the ropes, with a state of emergency declared in February, following an abortive coup attempt and months of instability arising from allegations of fraud in the 2004 elections.	总统阿罗约政府正如履薄冰。 传出2004年大选作弊丑闻后，在经历一次政变未果以及长达数月的动乱后，已于今年2月宣布紧急状态。


The allegations involve the armed forces’ manipulation of the Mindanao vote – underscoring how state failure in the south, a politicized military, and paralysis in the capital reinforce each other in a downward spiral.	作弊传闻中还包括军方干预了棉兰佬岛的选举——这更加突出了菲律宾南部地区的国家失败，军事政治化以及中央政府的无能。 所有这些因素互相影响，形成一个呈下降状的螺旋。


State failure in the southern Philippines now places the entire region at risk.	菲律宾南部的国家失败使整个东南亚地区带入了危险之中。


After a rough passage to democracy, a traditionally strong Indonesian state is reasserting itself, forcing jihadists out, and across Mindanao’s porous frontiers.	经过曲折的道路走向民主后，一个传统上强大的印度尼西亚正在重新发挥作用，把伊斯兰祈祷团赶出了国门，赶到棉兰佬岛千疮百孔的边界上。


Despite concerns over conflict in southern Thailand, there are no secessionist enclaves beyond government control, and no indications of foreign terrorist involvement.	尽管泰国南部的争端使人担忧，但分裂主义并没有超越政府的控制，没有任何外国恐怖主义介入的迹象。


Only in the Philippines do state failure, chronic insurgency, and proliferating ties between local and foreign terrorists come together in a lethal cocktail.	只有在菲律宾，国家失败，长期叛乱，国内以及国外恐怖主义日益紧密的勾结，都构成了一杯致命的鸡尾酒。


Combined with a restive military and an impotent administration, the country has become Southeast Asia’s weakest link in the war on terror.	难以驾驭的军队加之无能的政府，菲律宾已经成为东南亚反恐战争中最薄弱的一环。


So what is to be done?	应该如何解决？


American forces are probing the sanctuaries in the guise of training exercises, and they are backing targeted air strikes.	美军正在军事训练的掩护下对叛乱军队进行堪察，并支持目标性空中打击。


But they must tread lightly, lest they be drawn into a shooting war, which would catalyze new alliances among local and foreign militants.	但他们必须小心行事，以免于陷入枪战，使当地与国外恐怖武装结成新的联盟。


A conventional military approach failed in Cambodia and Lebanon. It would fail in Mindanao, too.	过去传统的军事行动在柬埔寨和老挝都失败了，在棉兰佬岛也会遭到失败。


Instead, surgical military strikes based on an expanded intelligence effort should complement the peace process, prying extremists away from the MILF mainstream.	相反，基于大规模情报工作基础上的外科式军事打击能够成为和平进程的补充，使极端分子与摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线的主流相分离。


A crucial, if embryonic, mechanism in this campaign is the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, established by the Philippine government and MILF negotiators to facilitate cooperation against “lawless elements” in MILF territory.	特设小组（Ad Hoc Joint Action Group）是这一战斗中的关键机制（即便是初步形式），由菲律宾政府与摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线谈判人员共同建立，旨在加强合作并共同对抗摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线地区的“无法制因素”。


The Group’s mandate should be widened, and resources should be provided to allow it to tackle terrorism explicitly.	特设小组的权力应该增大，并应为其提供资源以给予恐怖主义明确的打击。


In return for MILF cooperation, the US, Australia, and other interested countries must pick up political slack and build the government’s capacity to deliver a sustainable peace agreement for Mindanao.	对于摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线的合作，美国、澳大利亚以及其他利益国家必须弥补政治上的疏漏，加强政府职能以达成棉兰佬岛的持久和平协议。


Prompt, substantial infusions of post-conflict aid will be indispensable ingredients for peace.	战争结束后给予及时且有实质性的援助也是实现和平所不可或缺的元素。


But so will security reforms.	因此，安全改革势在必行。


The Filipino armed forces must be better equipped to close down any remaining terrorist sanctuaries – and keep them closed.	菲律宾武装部队需要得到更好的装备以消灭所有残余的恐怖主义避难所¾¾而且让他们永远消失。 但这一切都仅是一个无效的使命。


However, this will remain a futile mission until the armed forces are professionalized and depoliticized through reorientation to external defense, border security, and special operations. Only then will they lose their vested interest in an insurgency that has no end.	只有通过对外部防御、边界安全以及特殊军事行动方面重新定位使菲律宾军队实现职业化和非政治化，到那时他们才能对无休止的叛乱状态失去兴趣。


The Pillars of Darwinism	达尔文主义的支柱


This month marks the 150th anniversary of the publication of Charles Darwin’s  On the Origin of Species .	本月是查尔斯·达尔文的《物种起源》出版150周年纪念。


The evolutionary theory he presented in that great book rests on two pillars: the idea of descent with modification, and the idea of natural selection. amp#160;	达尔文在这本巨著中提出的进化论是建立在两个支柱之上的：即物种不断演化的观点和自然选择的观点这两大支柱。


Darwin believed that present-day organisms are descendants of much simpler ancestors: they are the products of unbroken lines of heredity that stretch back to the origin of life.	达尔文 认为，现在的生物是更简单的物种的后裔：它们是回溯到生命起源的完整遗传过程的产物。


Today, we have a mass of evidence, ranging from studies of ancient fossils to the latest discoveries of molecular biology, that supports this theory.amp#160;	当前，我们拥有从古老化石的研究报告到分子生物学的最新发现的大量证据，来支持这种理论。


Darwin, however, did not invent the idea of descent with modification.	amp#160;但是，达尔文并没有创造出物种不断转变的观点。


Fifty years earlier, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had suggested that living things are products of a long historical process of transformation.	在达尔文理论出现的50年前，让－巴提斯·拉马克（Jean-Baptiste Lamarck）就认为，生物是一个漫长的变化过程的产物。


But the evolutionary mechanisms he proposed, which included the inheritance of characteristics induced by the environment, never found favor.amp#160;	但是，拉马克提出的包括由环境引起的特性遗传的进化机制，从来没有得到人们的支持。


It is Darwin’s second powerful idea – the idea that even the most complicated features of organisms are the outcome of natural selection – that has been the key to his theory’s long-term success.	达尔文第二有力的观点——即使是生物最复杂的特征也是自然选择的结果的观点，是达尔文的理论长期以来成功的关键。


Natural selection has provided scientific explanations of traits as diverse as the mammalian eye, the bird’s wing, and the ability of plants to transform light into sugars.	自然选择为诸如哺乳动物的眼睛，鸟类的翅膀，以及植物将光转变成为糖类的能力这样多样化的特性提供了科学的解释。


There are now many examples of the operation of natural selection in nature.	现在，自然界中有许多自然选择起作用的例子。


The two pillars of evolutionary theory are the consequences of interaction among three distinctive features of living organisms: reproduction (individuals produce offspring), heredity (like gives rise to like), and variation (sometimes offspring are different from their parents).	进化论的两个支柱是生物三个显著特征间互动的结果：繁殖（个体繁衍后代），遗传（同样的东西引起同样的东西），以及变异（有时候后代与其亲本不同）。


Natural selection results whenever the differences between individuals affect the number of offspring they produce.	只要个体之间的差异影响到它们产生后代的数量，自然选择就会发生。


If the variations that affect reproduction are  heritable , the outcome is  evolution by natural selection.	如果影响繁衍的变异是 可遗传 的，自然选择的结果就是 进化 。


Many generations of selection in a particular direction – say, for moving efficiently through the air – can give rise to complicated structures like wings and the coordinated processes of flying.	向同一方向的多代选择——例如，在空气中的高效移动——能够造成像翅膀和协调的飞行过程这样复杂的结构。


To flesh out Darwinism, we obviously have to understand the three processes that are at its core. We need to know how organisms develop and reproduce, what is inherited and how it is inherited, and how heritable variations are generated.	很显然，为了充实达尔文主义，我们必须明白达尔文主义中处于核心地位的三个过程：我们要知道生物是怎样发展和繁衍的，什么被遗传以及是怎样遗传的，以及遗传变异是怎样发生的。


Until recently, biologists’ view of these processes has been very gene-centered, as exemplified by Richard Dawkins’ idea of the “selfish gene.”	直到最近，生物学家对这些过程的观点还都是以基因为中心的，像理查德·道金斯(Richard Dawkin)“自私基因”的观点所例证的那样。


Inheritance and reproduction have been seen in terms of DNA and its replication, and variation in terms of random changes in DNA sequences.	遗传和繁殖曾被认为是DNA及其复制，而变异是DNA序列的随机改变。


Yet discoveries made during the latter part of the twentieth century have shown that there is much more to inheritance than DNA.	然而，20世纪后半期的发现显示，除了DNA外，还有很多东西可遗传。


We now know of several mechanisms that enable cells with identical DNA to have different characteristics, which are transmitted to daughter cells.	我们现在知道，有能使拥有相同DNA的细胞遗传给子细胞不同特征的几个机制。


This epigenetic inheritance is a crucial part of normal development in multi-cellular animals like us.	这一基因外遗传是像我们这样的多细胞动物正常发育关键的一环。


A person’s pancreas cells and skin cells are clearly different, yet they have the same genes with the same DNA sequences.	一个人的胰腺细胞和皮肤细胞显然是不同的，然而它们却具有有同样DNA序列的相同基因。


Moreover, the cells’ features are inherited in their respective cell lineages, even though the stimuli that triggered the differences between them during embryonic development are long gone.	而且，即使在胚胎发育时期引起它们之间差异的刺激物早就不存在了，这些细胞的特征也在各自的细胞谱系中分别得到了遗传。


Epigenetic inheritance occurs not only  within individuals during their development; it also occurs  between generations : individual yeast cells or bacterial cells can transmit epigenetic variations from one generation to the next, and multi-cellular organisms can transmit them through their sperm and eggs.	基因外遗传不仅在个体的发育过程中发生，也在代与代之间发生：个体酵母细胞或细菌细胞可以将基因外变异从一代遗传到下一代，而多细胞生物可以通过其精子和卵子遗传它们。


If the epigenetic state of its germ cells is altered during an organism’s development, this variation can be transmitted to its descendants.	如果在生物的发育过程中，其受精卵的后生状态被改变，这种变异就可以被遗传给其后代。


The work of Michael Skinner and his colleagues provides a good example of this: they found that injecting pregnant rats with a chemical that suppresses androgens (male sex hormones) causes their descendants to have diseases that are inherited for several generations.	麦克·斯肯纳（Michael Skinner）及其同事的工作，为此提供了一个很好的例子：他们发现，给怀孕的老鼠注射一种抑制雄性荷尔蒙（雄性性激素）的化学物质，会导致老鼠的后代患上会遗传好几代的疾病。


There are many other examples of heritable epigenetic variations, some of which are environmentally induced.	现在，有许多可遗传基因外变异的例子，其中有些是由环境引起的。


Gal Raz and one of us (EJ) recently went through the scientific literature and found 101 cases of epigenetic inheritance between generations of bacteria, fungi, protozoa, plants, and animals, and we are sure that this is just the tip of a very large iceberg.	戈尔·列兹（Gal Raz）和我们研究人员中的一位最近翻阅了科学文献，发现了101个细菌、真菌、原生生物、植物和动物间的隔代基因外遗传的例子，并且我们肯定这仅仅只是冰山一角。


In addition to cellular epigenetic inheritance, there are other non-genetic ways in which variations can be transmitted from generation to generation.	除了细胞基因外遗传之外，变异还可以通过其他非基因遗传方式代代相传。


As humans, we are well aware of these: the transmission of cultural variations, such as different religious beliefs, is a prime example.	作为人类，我们都对此非常清楚：诸如不同的宗教信仰这样的文化变异的流传，就是一个重要的例子。


But there are many less familiar examples of information that is learned or acquired from parents by non-genetic means, ranging from the feeding techniques of monkeys and rats to the food preferences of rabbits and the song dialects of birds and whales.	但是，还有很多通过非基因方式从父母那里学到或获取信息的我们不那么熟悉的例子，这包括了从猴子和老鼠的喂食技巧，到兔子的食物偏好和鸟及鲸鱼的歌唱语调的一系列例子。


Recognizing that there is more to heredity than DNA has implications for medicine and agriculture, as well as for evolutionary theory.	承认除DNA以外更多的物质遗传，对医药和农业以及进化论具有重要意义。


For example, we know that some environmental insults and stresses, such as temporary starvation, can affect future generations.	例如，我们知道一些环境刺激和压力，例如暂时的饥饿，能够影响后代。


In evolutionary studies, because heritable non-genetic variations are often induced by the environment, we have to expand our notion of heredity and variation to include the inheritance of acquired variations, the once disparaged idea that was part of Lamarck’s theory.	在进化研究中，因为可遗传的非基因变异通常是由环境引起的，所以我们应该将我们的遗传和变异概念扩大到包括获得性变异的遗传——这一被轻视的观点是让－巴提斯·拉马克（Jean-Baptiste Lamarck）理论的一部分。


In a sense, we have to go back to Darwin’s original, pluralistic convictions.	amp#160;从某种意义上来说，我们不得不回到达尔文最初的多元化信念。


Darwin, unlike many of his more dogmatic followers, saw a role for induced variation in evolution.	达尔文，和他的很多教条主义的追随者不同，看到了进化中的诱发变异。


Today, in the light of the newly discovered epigenetic mechanisms, Darwinian evolution should include descent with epigenetic as well as genetic modifications, and natural selection of induced as well as random variations.	今天，根据新发现的基因外机制，达尔文的进化论应该包括基因外遗传和基因转变遗传，以及诱发性变异和随机变异的自然选择。


Certainly, it should not be reduced to “selfish genes.”	当然，这不应该被归纳为“自私基因”。


The Poetry of the Euro	欧元之诗


PRINCETON – The purpose of creating a common currency has been largely and surprisingly forgotten in crisis-torn Europe.	发自普林斯顿——饱受危机摧残的欧洲已经令人吃惊地将当初创立共同货币的目的抛诸脑后。


Instead, there seem to be more pressing concerns: gloomy speculation about the eurozone’s impending collapse and desperate attempts to find institutional fixes to its extensive governance problems.	取而代之的则是某些看似更为紧迫的焦点：充斥着悲观的欧元区崩溃论，以及那种穷尽一切办法，希望为欧元区内部深重的管治问题找到制度性修复方案的尝试。


But the euro was not just the outcome of an idiosyncratic quest to reduce the wear on pockets stuffed with odd national coins, or to facilitate intra-European trade.	但欧元可不仅是为了减少衣服口袋遭各国大小硬币磨损而做出的怪异探索，也不是为了方便欧洲内部贸易。


The bold European experiment reflected a new attitude about what money should do, as well as how it should be managed.	这场宏大的欧洲实验反映了一种关于货币应该起到何种作用，又应该如何管理的新思维。


In opting for a “pure” form of money, created by a central bank independent of national authority, Europeans self-consciously flew in the face of what had become the dominant monetary tradition. 	通过设立一个独立于各国当局的中央银行，并由该银行发行一种“纯粹”形式的货币，欧洲人有意识地脱离了过去那种占统治地位的货币传统。


In the twentieth century, the creation of money – paper money – was usually thought to be the domain of the state.	在二十世纪，货币——纸币——的创设一般被认为是国家的专利。


Money could be issued because governments had the power to define the unit of account in which taxes should be paid.	纸币之所以能发行就是因为政府拥有定义缴税记账单位的权力。


This tradition went back well before paper, or fiat, currencies.	而该传统可以上溯到纸质（或者法定）货币之前的久远年代。


For many centuries, even while metallic money circulated, the task of defining units of account – livres tournois, marks, gulden, florins, or dollars – remained a task of the state (or of those with political power).	多个世纪以来，甚至在金属货币流通的时代，定义记账单位——里弗尔（中世纪法国）、马克（德国）、基尔德（荷兰），弗罗林以及美元——都属于国家（或者政治实体）的责任。


Abuse of this role, with governments addressing excessive debt by inflating it away, was deeply destructive of political order in the first half of the twentieth century.	而对这种角色的滥用——比如政府利用通胀的方式摆脱巨额债务——对二十世纪前半叶的政治秩序造成了极大破坏。


After World War II, the liberal politicians most committed to European federalism saw this point clearly.	二战后，那些致力于欧洲联邦化的自由主义政治家清楚地认识到了这一点。


The economist, central-bank governor, finance minister, and president of the Italian Republic, Luigi Einaudi, pleaded the case in the immediate aftermath of the war: “If the European federation takes away from the individual states the power of running public works through the printing press, and limits them to expenses that are financed solely by taxes and voluntary loans, it will by that act alone have accomplished a great work.”	当时曾担任意大利中央银行行长，财政部长，后于1948年就任意大利共和国总统的经济学家路易吉·伊诺第在反思战争时提出了这一点：“如果欧洲联邦能剥夺各国利用印钞机来运行公共服务的权力，只允许它们用税款和无偿贷款来支付消费，那么这个行动本身就是一个伟大的成就。 ”


But monetary abuse is no less dangerous in political systems with multi-layered authority, and in the past often led to the breakup of federal states.	但滥用货币的行为对于那些拥有多层次主权的政治系统也同样危险，许多联邦国家也因此分崩离析。


That is because inflation is not a benign cure for economic ills, in which beneficent and stimulatory effects are spread equally over the entire region under the inflationary monetary authority.	这是因为通胀并不是一个应对经济问题的良药，其良性和经济刺激效应也不会在通胀货币当局治下的整个区域均衡散播。


Making inflation depends on the central bank’s decision to monetize specific debt instruments.	而制造通胀则取决于中央银行将特定债务工具货币化的决定。


After all, the monetary authority never decides simply to convert every obligation into money.	归根结底，货币当局不会只是决定要把所有负债转化成纸币。


Instead, it decides that some industries, banks, or political authorities need to be sustained for the general good.	相反出于总体利益的考虑，它会认定某些行业，银行或者政治权力机构必须得到扶持。


Those industries, banks, and political authorities that are not so privileged are inevitably resentful, and view the central bank’s actions as an abuse of power.	而那些并受优待的行业，银行或者政治权力机构无疑会对此感到愤愤不平，并将中央银行的行为视作滥用货币。


In federal systems, in particular, those businesses and political authorities far removed from the center are most likely to be excluded from the monetary stimulus and hence are inclined to be resentful.	尤其是在联邦系统中，那些远离核心的企业和政治权力机构最有可能被排除在货币刺激政策之外，并因此埋怨不已。


Hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920’s fanned separatism in Bavaria, the Rhineland, and Saxony, because these remote areas thought that Germany’s central bank and central government in Berlin were discriminating against them.	1920年在德国爆发的极度通胀助长了巴伐利亚，莱茵兰以及萨克森地区的分离主义，因为这些偏远地区认为柏林的中央银行和中央政府歧视它们。


The separatists were politically radical – on the left in Saxony, and on the far right in Bavaria and the Rhineland.	那些分离主义分子都是些政治激进派——在萨克森是左派闹事，而在巴伐利亚和莱茵地区却是极右派在活动。


There are also more recent cases of the same effect. In late-1980’s Yugoslavia, as the socialist regime disintegrated, the monetary authorities in Belgrade were inevitably closest to Serbian politicians such as Slobodan Milošević and to Serbian business interests.	关于类似效应还有更近的例子：在1980年代末的南斯拉夫，随着整个社会主义统治分崩离析，贝尔格莱德的货币当局不可避免地偏袒斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇这样的塞族政治家以及塞族的经济利益，导致克罗地亚族和斯洛文尼亚族希望脱离联邦。


As a result, the Croats and Slovenes wanted out of the federation. In the Soviet Union, inflation appeared as an instrument of Moscow bureaucrats, and there, too, more remote areas sought to break away.	在前苏联，通货膨胀几乎变成了莫斯科官僚手中的玩物，因此也有更多偏远地区试图独立。


The makers of modern Europe saw that unstable and politically abused money would be a European nightmare, and lead to destructive national animosities and antagonisms.	现代欧洲的缔造者们认识到不稳定且被政治滥用的货币将是欧洲的梦魇，并将导致各国之间破坏性的仇恨和敌对情绪。


They were supported by the twentieth century’s two most influential economists, Friedrich von Hayek and John Maynard Keynes.	而支撑他们这一观点的则是二十世纪影响最大的两位经济学家：哈耶克和凯恩斯。


Hayek was the most consistent critic of state-produced money.	哈耶克堪称坚持批评国家发行货币时间最长的人。


His proposal, competitive currencies produced by “free banking” in which numerous private authorities would issue their own money, was more radical than the solution adopted by Europeans in the 1990’s.	他那套允许由无数私人机构组成的“自由银行”各自发行竞争性货币的方案比欧洲人在1990年代采取的方案更加激进。


But the Hayekian element of a money-issuing authority that was extensively protected against political pressures, and consequently against political opprobrium, was a key part of the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty.	但哈耶克提出的货币发行机构必须不受政治压力的影响，并因此免遭政治干涉的想法则成为了欧盟《马斯特里赫特条约》的核心内容之一。


Keynes, too, in planning for the postwar order, proposed a synthetic global currency that would guarantee stability and prevent deflation.	另一方面，凯恩斯为了制定整个战后秩序，提出（将各国货币）合并成为一个全球货币以确保稳定和反通胀。


The vision of central-bank independence as a necessary part of the constitution of a sound and stable political order was not simply a European construct in the 1990’s.	而只有保证中央银行独立性才能构建一个合理而稳定政治秩序的观点并不仅限于1990年代的欧洲。


It was also reflected in legislative changes affecting other central banks, and in central bankers’ growing prestige.	该观点同样也反映在影响其他中央银行的��法变革，以及中央银行管理者与日俱增的威望之上。


That view is now seriously challenged.	但这个观点如今正遭受着最强烈的质疑。


In the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since WWII, central banks are once again being called on to monetize securities issued by some debtors, but not others.	在应对二战后最严重的经济危机之时，中央银行再次被用来将某几个欠债者所发行的证券货币化，而其他欠债者则被晾在了一边。


That task of selecting between debtors is highly political, and poisons the idea of monetary stability.	拯救哪些欠债者的决定受到了政治的极大影响，并腐蚀了货币稳定的理念。


Jean-Claude Trichet, until recently the president of the European Central Bank, liked to claim that money was like poetry, before adding that both give a sense of stability.	最近才卸任欧洲央行主席的让-克劳德·特里谢总喜欢将货币比作诗歌，因为两者都能给人一种稳定感。


That unusual but accurate formulation is reminiscent of General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau’s famous reply to the Prussian King, who dismissed as “nothing more than poetry” von Gneisenau’s patriotic concerns in the early nineteenth century.	这个不寻常但准确的表述使人回想起奥古斯特·奈哈特·冯·格奈森瑙将军与普鲁士国王之间的著名问答。 国王认为冯·格奈森瑙在十九世纪早期的爱国主义忧思“不过是些诗歌而已”，“那么宗教，祈文，对领袖的爱，对祖国的爱，这些不是诗歌又是什么呢？


“Religion, prayer, love of one’s ruler, love of the fatherland, what are these but poetry?” von Gneisenau asked.	” 冯·格奈森瑙将军反问，“而王位的稳固恰恰是奠基在这些诗歌之上啊。


“Upon poetry is founded the security of the throne.”	”


Stable money, too, is the foundation of political order.	同样，稳定的货币也是政治秩序的基石。


We should not allow ourselves to be so overwhelmed by today’s crisis that we forget that.	我们不应该让当今的危机迷昏了头脑，却忘却了这一点。


Europe’s Political Stress Tests	欧洲的政治压力测试


PRINCETON – In recent years, the European Union – or, more accurately, the powerful countries of northern Europe – has been subjecting its weaker members to social and political “stress tests” in the name of fiscal rectitude.	普林斯顿—近几年来，欧盟——或者更准确地说，是北欧强国——一直在以财政清明的名义迫使其较弱成员国进行社会和政治“压力测试”。


As a result, southern Europe and parts of Eastern Europe have become a kind of political laboratory, with experiments producing strikingly varied – and increasingly unpredictable – outcomes in different countries.	结果，南欧和部分东欧国家成了政治实验室，不同国家的不同实验产生了大相径庭——也越来越难以预测——的结果。


At the last EU summit, Luxembourg’s prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, even suggested that the risk of a “social revolution” should not be excluded.	在上一次欧盟峰会后，卢森堡首相容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）甚至表示应该排除“社会革命”风险。


While that outcome remains unlikely, it is increasingly clear that many European countries – and the EU as a whole – need to renegotiate their basic social contracts.	尽管这一结果尚难发生，但越来越显而易见的是，许多欧洲国家——以及欧盟作为一个整体——需要重新商定基本社会契约。


But European elites, preoccupied with short-term fixes, have not considered the long-term need for such revisions – to their own detriment.	但欧洲精英被短期问题缚住了手脚，并未考虑到长期修正的需要——这会给他们自身带来伤害。


Indeed, despite significant variations by country, one trend is becoming increasingly apparent across the EU: voters, regardless of their political orientation, are ejecting at the first opportunity leaders who implement austerity.	事实上，尽管欧洲各国之间有着重大不同，但有一个趋势正在整个欧洲逐渐显露：选民，不管哪种政治倾向的选民，一开始都拒绝了实施紧缩的领导人。


But, beyond this overwhelming opposition to austerity, countries’ experiences vary widely.	但是，在一边倒地反对紧缩之外，各国的经历大相径庭。


Greece has seen the rise of an overtly fascist party, Golden Dawn, which proudly celebrates the legacy of former dictator Ioannis Metaxas.	在希腊，公然自称法西斯党派的金色黎明（Golden Dawn）的崛起，该党以继承前独裁者梅塔克萨斯（Ioannis Metaxas）的衣钵而自豪。


Although Golden Dawn has existed for roughly two decades, only in the last year did it gain enough support to enter parliament.	尽管金色黎明存在已有近20年，但直到去年才赢得足够的支持进入议会。


Moreover, its poll numbers continue to climb.	其支持度在持续上升。


Golden Dawn’s success does not reflect a deep-seated desire among Greeks to return to authoritarianism.	金色黎明的成功并不表明希腊人深深地渴望回归专制。


The party has simply stepped in where the Greek state – long plagued by inefficiency and corruption – has retreated, providing basic welfare and other services to desperate citizens, while engaging in unprecedented violence against people who are or look like immigrants.	该党只是抓住了希腊国家政府——长期以来饱受低能和腐败困扰——的弱点，向绝望的公民提供基本福利和其他服务，同时还参与了前所未有的针对貌似移民的暴力活动。


One way that Golden Dawn attempts to embody the state is by having party members out on the streets as vigilantes.	金色黎明强调希腊的一种方式是派党员走向街头充当义务治安维持员。


Austerity has similarly sharpened a long-standing crisis of statehood and political legitimacy in Italy, reflected in the rise of a new anti-establishment party, the Five Star Movement, which claims to transcend the traditional left-right political spectrum.	紧缩同样激化了意大利长期存在的国基和政治正统性危机，这反映在新的反成规党派五星运动（Five Star Movement）的崛起上，该党自称在传统中右翼政党中脱颖而出。


Indeed, the movement lacks clear policy objectives, instead capitalizing on popular disgust with Italy’s political elites – a sentiment that led directly to the last election’s failure to produce a clear winner.	事实上，该党并无明确的政策目标，只是利用了公众对意大利政治精英的厌憎——这一情绪直接导致了最新选举没能产生优势明显的赢家。


The sense of revulsion is acute: Many of the Five Star Movement’s supportershope to transfer control of Italy’s government to citizen-representatives, whose every move would be digitally monitored to preclude corruption.	厌憎感相当尖锐：许多五星运动支持者希望由人民代表掌握意大利政府的控制权，他们的一举一动都将受到数字监控，以防腐败。


Some countries’ electorates initially backed austerity, but none has re-authorized it.	一些国家的选民最初支持紧缩，但没有人会再次授权紧缩。


In Spain, for example, voters understood the implications of supporting the ruling Popular Party, making it one of the only southern states where the government had some kind of mandate to implement tough austerity.	比如，在西班牙的地区选举中，选民清楚支持执政的民众党（Popular Party）意味着什么，这也使西班牙成为南欧唯一一个政府有能力实施严苛紧缩的国家。


But the mutually reinforcing recession and debt crisis that Spain now faces have reinvigorated Catalonia’s long-standing secessionist movement; austerity has transformed a chronic, though manageable, problem into an acute existential question.	如今，西班牙面临的的衰退及其导致的债务危机之间的相互强化，这导致长期存在的加泰罗尼亚独立运动再度崛起； 紧缩已经将慢性但可控的问题变成了尖锐的生存危机。


Similarly, Portugal’s center-right Social Democratic Party has pushed a tough pro-austerity line, including tax hikes and spending cuts, since coming to power in 2011.	类似地，自2011年执政以来，葡萄牙中右翼社会民主党（Social Democratic Party）成功推行了严苛紧缩政策，包括增税和减支。


But new measures introduced last month have driven an increasingly frustrated population – which, until recently, had endured painful austerity with little of the public outcry seen elsewhere in southern Europe – to the streets to demand a general election two years ahead of schedule.	但上个月引入的新措施促使日益失望的民众走���街头——到目前为止，葡萄牙人民忍受着痛苦的紧缩，并且没有像其他南欧国家那样大呼小叫——要求提前两年举行大选。


Political and social turmoil across southern Europe holds several lessons for austerity’s proponents – especially for Germany.	遍及南欧的政治和社会动荡给紧缩支持者提供了不少教训，特别是德国。


First and foremost, the dogma that solid public finances – and, more broadly, a functioning state – can be achieved only through painful austerity is an illusion.	首先，稳固的公共财政——更广义地说，运转良好的国家——只有通过痛苦的紧缩才能实现的观点纯属幻觉。


When forced to choose between their societies and their clientele, politicians may well decide that allowing social tensions to rise – even to dangerous levels – is better than sacrificing their own power bases.	当政客不得不在社会和衣食父母之间做出选择时，他们极有可能会放任社会紧张发展——即使到达了危险水平——而不愿牺牲自身权力基础。


In fact, when Germany embarked a decade ago on a reform program featuring major cuts to the welfare state and a more flexible labor market, it broke the rules of the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact.	事实上，当十年前德国要求采取改革计划大幅削减福利国家和建立更加灵活的劳动力市场时，它破坏了欧元区的稳定和增长公约。


Public spending had to rise before it could fall, in order to provide some slack while renegotiating parts of the social contract.	公共支出必须在可以下降之前升高，以提供空间重新商定部分社会契约。


The second lesson from southern Europe is that muddling through is unlikely to work.	南欧给人的第二个教训是得过且过不可能奏效。


Building the needed support for a new social contract will require an appeal to fairness, not just to fiscal rectitude.	形成对新社会契约的必须的支持要求公正，而不仅仅是财政清明。


And a mechanism to authorize the new deal – such as a grand coalition actually empowered by elections (not just reluctant support by major parties for technocratic leaders like Italy’s Mario Monti) – is essential.	而授权这一新方案的机制——比如一个事实上由选举授权的大联盟（而非只是主要政党不情不愿地支持技术官僚领导人，如意大利的蒙蒂）——是至关重要的。


Alternatively, citizens could try to lead efforts to re-negotiate their countries’ constitutional arrangements.	或者，公民可以试图领导其祖国的宪法安排再协商。


Iceland, for example, has embarked on an unprecedented experiment in crafting a bottom-up, “crowd-sourced” constitution.	比如，冰岛提出了一个前所未有的实验——起草一份自上而下的“众包”宪法。


Similarly, albeit less radically, ordinary citizens comprise two-thirds of Ireland’s Constitutional Convention.	类似地（尽管不像冰岛那样彻底），普通公民占据了爱尔兰制宪会议的三分之二席位。


If southern eurozone countries followed the route of forging a new social deal, they would have to ensure that it ultimately intersects with the paths of the northern European members.	如果南欧元区国家采取新社会契约的道路，它们必须确保它最终与北欧成员国的道路相交。


While all eurozone countries do not have to converge on a single model, their interdependence means that a pan-European social and economic settlement is needed.	欧元区国家不必采取一刀切的模式，但它们相互依赖的事实意味着泛欧洲社会和经济安排是必须的。


European leaders must move beyond the increasingly implausible mantra of “belt-tightening today; full bellies tomorrow,” and recognize that, at its core, the euro crisis is a political crisis.	欧洲领导人必须超越越来越不得人心的“今天勒紧裤腰带，明天敞开随便吃”的教条，明白从本质上讲，欧元危机是一场政治危机。


Rather than focus on quick policy fixes, Europe’s leaders need to pursue long-term solutions.	欧洲领导人不应该纠结于政策速效药，而应该追求长期解决方案。


And that includes new social contracts.	而这包括了新的社会契约。


Europe’s Populists at the Gate	民粹主义兵临欧洲城下


LONDON – Is Europe’s crisis over?	伦敦—欧洲的危机结束了吗？


Investors, policy analysts, and even officials are quietly beginning to suggest that this might be the case.	投资者、政策分析师甚至官员都开始静悄悄地暗示可能确实如此。


The euro has strengthened by nearly 10% against the dollar since European Central Bank President Mario Draghi vowed on July 26 to do “whatever it takes” to hold the currency together.	自7月26日欧洲央行行长德拉吉宣布将“竭尽全力”捍卫欧元以来，欧元对美元汇率已经上升了近10%。


Similarly, the Euro VIX, a popular measure of expectations of euro volatility, has fallen significantly.	类似地，常用的欧元波动性期望值指标欧元 VIX大幅下降。


The cost of buying protection against fluctuations in the euro/dollar exchange rate declined last month to its lowest level in nearly five years.	对冲欧元/美元汇率波动风险的工具的价格在上个月跌到了五年来的最低水平。


Borrowing costs for the Spanish and Italian governments have similarly fallen dramatically.	西班牙和意大利政府的借贷成本也出现了类似的大幅下降。


A consistent narrative underpins this change in market conditions.	市场条件的这些变化背后的驱动力是相同的。


European leaders have put in place mechanisms to support Italy and Spain.	欧洲领导人推出了支持意大利和西班牙的机制。


As of October, the continent has an operational European Stability Mechanism to purchase new Italian and Spanish government bonds if investors go on strike.	10月，欧洲大陆有了操作性的欧洲稳定性机制（ESM），用于在投资者拒绝购买时收购意大利和西班牙政府债券。


In parallel, the ECB has announced an “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) program to purchase bonds already trading on the secondary market.	与此同时，欧洲央行推出了“直接货币交易”（OMT）计划，用于购买二级市场交易的债券。


At their most recent summit, European Union leaders reiterated their commitment to finalize the design of a single supervisory mechanism by January 1, 2013, and to activate it by the end of next year.	在最近的峰会上，欧盟领导人强调，将在2013年1月1日前完成单一监督机制的设计，并于2013年底之前开始实施。


These steps, it is argued, have taken both sovereign-default risk and a banking crisis off the table.	人们指出，这些举措将主权违约风险和银行危机都解决了。


With the ESM and ECB capping interest rates on government bonds, countries will have as much time as they need – and they will need plenty – to reduce their debt burdens to manageable levels.	ESM和ECB限制了政府债券的利率上限，各国将获得充足的时间将其债务水平降低到可管理水平。


And, with a single supervisor in place, the ESM will be permitted to inject capital directly into troubled banks.	此外，有了单一监督者，ESM可以直接向受困银行注资。


The new banking union can then be extended to include a common resolution fund to enable the orderly dissolution of insolvent institutions.	于是，新的银行联盟也将得以扩展，形成一个共同清算基金，让资不抵债的机构有序破产。


To be sure, there are some gaps in this narrative.	坦白说，这些项目之间存在差异。


The ESM has limited firepower, and, along with the ECB, will buy only the bonds of governments that ask, something that proud leaders are reluctant to do.	ESM火力有限，并且只能跟在欧洲央行屁股后头购买开口要求的国家的政府债券，而开口求助这种事情，自负的领导人是不会干的。


The end-2013 deadline for implementation of the banking union is a long way off.	2013年年底实施银行联盟的期限也还遥不可及。


Even if there is agreement on the need for a common resolution fund – which is not clear – there is no agreement on how to pay for it.	即使形成了需要清算基金的一致——目前还为未可知——也没有怎样筹资的协议。


Nevertheless, the markets evidently regard this as a comforting bedtime story – all the more so now that European leaders have averred that Greece will not be pushed out of the eurozone.	尽管如此，市场显然认为这是个令人安心的睡前故事——自从欧洲领导人断然否认不会迫使希腊离开欧元区后，这种观点更加强烈了。


Officials recognize that cutting off EU support and compelling the ECB to stop providing credit to the Bank of Greece would be Europe’s Lehman Brothers moment.	官员认识到削减欧元支持、强迫欧洲央行停止为希腊银行提供信用将成为欧洲的雷曼兄弟时刻。


The consequences could be catastrophic, not just for Greece, but also for Portugal, Spain, Italy, and who knows whom else.	其后果将是灾难性的，不仅对希腊如此，对葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利和大家都知道的其他国家也是如此。


In their October 18 communiqué, eurozone leaders stated in no uncertain terms that they are not prepared to go there.	在10月18日的联合公报中，欧元区领导人以确凿的用词表示���们还没有准备走这一步。


Given Europe’s facility at creative accounting, some way will be found to keep Greece on life support.	欧洲可谓会计伎俩的温床，一定能找到维持希腊生命的办法。


So, is the crisis really over?	那么，危机真的结束了吗？


In focusing on summit declarations and promises of far-reaching reforms of EU institutions, investors are missing the real risk: the collapse of public support for, or at least public acquiescence to, the austerity policies required to work down heavy debt burdens – and for the governments pursuing these policies.	投资者将注意力集中在欧盟机构关于深度改革的峰会宣言和承诺上，而忽略了真正的风险：对降低沉重债务负担来说不必可少的紧缩政策以及对政府追求这些政策的公众支持（或至少是公众默许）。


Mass anti-austerity protests are one warning sign.	大规模反紧缩游行是一个警示信号。


Another is growing popular support for neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn, now the third-largest political party in Greece.	另一个警示信号是日渐增加对新纳粹运动的公众支持，如现已成为希腊第三大政党的金色黎明（Golden Dawn）党。


The rise to power of a “rejectionist” European government – that is, one that unilaterally rejects the policy status quo – would immediately bring the crisis to a head.	 “拒绝主义”欧洲国家政府——即单方面拒绝现有政策的政府——的掌权将立刻让危机重燃。


A Greek government that summarily rejected conditions set by the EU and the International Monetary Fund would immediately be cut off by the ECB and forced to exit the euro.	基本拒绝欧盟和IMF设置的条件的希腊政府将立刻为欧洲央行所不容，并被迫离开欧元区。


A Spanish government that did likewise would lose all prospect of support from the ECB’s OMT program, and the markets would quickly pounce.	采取类似立场的西班牙政府也将失去所有欧洲央行OMT计划的可能支持，市场也会马上做出反应。


Some will object that dire warnings of political reaction are overdrawn.	有人会反对说，政治反应的可怕警告言过其实了。


So far, no country has voted into power a rejectionist administration.	到目前为止，还没有国家选出了拒绝主义政府。


Even in Greece, where conditions are the worst, Golden Dawn is still a minority party.	即使在环境最恶劣的希腊，黄金黎明党也只是个少数党。


The answer to these critics is, unfortunately, “just wait.”	不幸的是，对于这些危机，答案是“等着瞧”。


It is worth recalling that nearly four years passed from the onset of the Great Depression in Germany to the Nazis’ accession to power.	好好回忆一下，从大萧条爆发到纳粹在德国掌权之间有四年的间隔。


Europe needs a growth strategy to put this political genie back in the bottle.	欧洲需要增长战略将这个潜在的妖怪关回瓶中去。


It needs policies that hold out the promise of lower unemployment and better times.	欧洲需要坚持更低通胀、更高景气的承诺。


The continuing absence of such policies is the gravest threat to the euro.	持续缺乏这类政策是对欧元最大的威胁。


Unless that changes, markets will wake up to that risk – perhaps with a jolt – sooner or later.	除非这种状态有所改变，市场迟早会意识到这一风险——或许是以大颠簸的方式。


The Political Stock Market	政治股市


Many economic and financial analysts complain that emerging countries' stock markets are often heavily manipulated by their governments and are more political than economic.	很多经济及金融分析人士牢骚满腹，称新兴国家的股市常常受到政府的严重干预，政治色彩比经济色彩更为浓厚。


The unstated assumption seems to be that, in contrast, some pristine force of economic nature drives stock markets in advanced countries, and that forecasting their performance is thus like forecasting the growth of trees.	言外之意似乎是：发达国家股市只受纯粹经济因素的驱动，预测股市发展就像预测树木成材一样顺理成章。


This description of stock markets in emerging countries is not wrong, just biased, because the same description applies to stock markets in advanced countries.	对新兴国家股市的上述描述并没有错，而是带有偏见，因为同样的描述对发达国家的股票市场也同样适用。


Indeed, the best analysts know that forecasting the performance of any country's stock market substantially means forecasting how well the government wants stock market investors to fare in the current political environment.	事实上，顶级的股市分析家都知道，预测任何国家的股市动态实质上是预测政府在目前政治环境中希望股票投资者有何表现。


Consider the United States stock market, by far the world's largest.	就拿世界最大的美国股市来说。


The general perception is that the government leaves companies alone and that the returns from investing in the US stock market reflect the fundamental forces of a strong capitalist economy.	流行的看法认为：政府不干涉公司运转，美国股市的投资收益反映了强大资本主义经济的根本活力。


This is one reason why the US is a magnet for portfolio investors from around the world.	这是美国牢牢吸引着全球证券投资者的原因之一。


But the returns that make US stock markets so attractive reflect a delicate political balance. In particular, tax rates that affect stocks have varied through time as political pressures change.	但使美国股市如此诱人的投资回报却反映了微妙的政治平衡，特别是影响股票的税率随政治力量的改变而不断变化。


During World War II, for example, political support for great fortunes diminished and the government sharply increased taxes on capital gains, dividends, and high incomes in general.	如二次大战期间，对巨额财富的政治支持下降，政府对资本收益、股息和一切高收入的课税激增。


When World War II produced a strong recovery from the Great Depression of the 1930's, President Roosevelt and Congress slapped on an excess-profits tax to ensure that shareholders would not benefit too much.	当二次大战使经济从20世纪30年代的萧条阶段明显复苏后，罗斯福总统和议会抛出了超额利润税，确保股东们不会受益过多。


By contrast, in 1980, when there was no war but the stock market was low, US voters elected Ronald Reagan, a man many thought too right wing to be president.	与此相反，1980年未曾开战但股市低迷，美国选民们推举了罗纳德·里根，一位不太像总统的右翼分子。


He asked for - and got - cuts in capital gains, dividend, and income taxes.	他首先倡导并实现了资本收入、股息和所得税的减免。


Political interference in the stock market is not merely about taxes on capital gains, dividends, and income.	对股市实行政治干预不仅限于资本收益、股息和收入等项税收。


Property taxes, excise taxes, import duties, and sales taxes - all of which are paid, directly or indirectly, by corporations - can have a magnified impact on corporate profits, and hence on the stock market.	财产税、运营税、进口税和销售税¾所有这些由企业直接或间接支付的税收都会对企业盈利，进而对股市产生放大的影响。


It is no coincidence that wherever stock markets thrive, governments take care that these taxes stop well short of destroying after-tax corporate profits.	凡是股市繁荣的国家，政府都十分注重不让企业的税后盈利因税收而化为乌有。


Indeed, the politics of stock markets does not stop with taxes. On the contrary, almost every activity of government has an impact on corporate profits, and in turn, on the stock market.	事实上，影响股市的政治因素不仅限于税收，相反，政府的一举一动几乎都会对企业盈利，进而对股市产生影响。


After the 1929 stock market crash the US government suspended much anti-trust activity, allowing companies to acquire monopoly power that would boost their value.	1929年股市崩溃后，美国政府暂时停止了反托拉斯活动，默许公司拥有能增加市值的垄断能力。


This policy delayed the recovery from high unemployment, but even that was not enough to rein in the political forces arrayed in favor of supporting the stock market.	上述政策让高失业问题久拖不决，但即便如此都没能阻止政治力量继续支持股市。


Similarly, one of the most important things that President Reagan did was to destroy much of the remaining power of America's labor unions, which compete for their share of the corporate pie.	与此相似，里根总统要摧毁的重要力量之一是美国工会的残余势力，他们要求在企业蛋糕中拥有自己的利益。


Reagan's defeat of the Air Traffic Controllers' strike in 1981 was a watershed event for the US labor movement - and for the stock market, which started its dramatic bull market in 1982.	里根压制1981年的空管人员大罢工，这不仅是美国劳工运动史的分水岭，也是股市的转折点¾1982年，美国股市牛市阶段戏剧性地拉开了序幕。


The US government has been particularly aggressive in supporting the stock market since the peak of the equities price bubble in 2000, most notably cutting interest rates repeatedly.	2000年股价泡沫达到颠峰后，美国政府更加卖力地支持股市，最明显的是一再削减利率。


Of course, this was publicly justified in terms of stimulating the economy, not supporting the stock market. But it is a telling sign of the US stock market's significance that one of the most important factors perceived to be weighing on the economy was declining equity prices.	当然，刺激经济，而不是支持股市，成了公众面前冠冕堂皇的借口，但却生动地表明了美国股市的重要性，延缓经济发展的一个最重要的因素就是不断下跌的股价。


Indeed, the authorities' response was not limited to monetary stimulus.	事实上，当局的反应不仅限于财政刺激。


The US National Income and Product Accounts show that the effective rate of corporate profits tax (the percentage of profits actually paid to the government in taxes) crested at 33.7% in the first quarter of 2000 - the peak of the stock market and the economy in general - and fell to 20.2% in the fourth quarter of 2003, when the market was down.	美国国民所得和产品帐显示：企业盈利税的有效税率（实际以税收形式上交政府的利润百分比）于2000年第一季度达到顶峰33. 7%，当时股市和总体经济状况均处于辉煌时期，而2003年第四季度降到了20.


Much of that decline reflects explicit tax relief measures voted by Congress, as well as the perception among corporations that in the current economic and political environment they can be more aggressive in tax avoidance.	2%，当时的股市状态十分低迷。 这很大程度上是国会直接减税政策的结果，另外一个重要因素是，在目前的经济政治环境下，企业认定可以更加积极地回避税收。


Moreover, after the stock market crash, the maximum tax on dividends paid on stocks was slashed from 35% to 15%, giving a substantial new advantage to long-term investors and boosting the compounding effect of reinvesting after-tax dividends.	此外，股市崩盘后，股票红利支付的最高税率从35%下降到15%，为长期投资者提供了更多的利润空间，强化了税后红利再投资的复利效果。


Again, this tax cut was justified in terms of stimulating the economy, which can, of course, be said of practically any measure aimed at supporting the stock market. But it is the balance of political forces that determines whether such a justification will be credible.	当然，此次减税的理由也是刺激经济发展，实际上支持股市的任何举措都可以冠以上述目的，但可信与否还要看各种政治因素的平衡。


One might say that the same variables, including hostility to high taxes and a weak labor movement, have operated in the US for the past 200 years - and can thus be expected to continue operating in the future, producing high stock market returns and attracting huge inflows of foreign investment.	可以说，对高额税收的抵触和工人运动的疲软在美国已经持续了200多年，未来也还将持续下去，带来高额的股市回报并吸引巨额的国外资本。


Those who believe that investments in the US stock market will maintain the same strong growth trend for decades may well be right.	有人相信美国股市投资的强劲增势还会持续几十年，他们很可能所言不虚。


But one should be clear about what one is forecasting.	但我们应该确切地了解预测的原因。


Essentially, one is forecasting not just economics, but politics - and even the cultural values - that shape economic policies and performance.	本质上看，我们不仅在预测经济，也是在预测政治，甚至是文化价值，是它们最终决定了经济政策和走向。


The Human Thatcher	人间撒切尔


LONDON – It is difficult to separate some of my personal memories of Margaret Thatcher – mundane but revealing – from the sweeping judgments of history.	伦敦—很难将我对玛格丽特·撒切尔——平凡但具有启发性——的个人记忆从压倒性的历史判决分开。


I had worked for her as the Conservative Party’s research director, and as a minister for about 15 years, before going to Hong Kong as Britain’s last Governor there.	我曾以保守党研究主任的身份在她麾下做事，并担任部长职务15年，随后赴任英国末代港督。


Because she had negotiated Hong Kong’s handover to China, she was a frequent and welcome visitor during my tenure. 	她是香港回归中国的谈判者，因此在我的任期内，她频繁到港访问，大受欢迎。


Thatcher was always hugely supportive of the preservation of Hong Kong’s rule of law, civil liberties, and democratic aspirations.	撒切尔总是鼎力支持维持香港的法治精神、公民自由和民主诉求。


She sympathized with, and appeared to like, pro-democracy campaigners.	她同情——也表现出喜爱——民主运动家。


I also remember that, while our official residence was full of excellent, hardworking staff (to whom she was always kind and courteous), she was the only visitor – and there were many – who made her own bed!	我还记得，尽管我们的官邸成员无不出色而努力（对于我们，她总是和蔼而谦恭），但她是唯一一个自己铺床的访问者（访问者不计其数）！


The job was done with all the care and precision of a grand hotel: boxed corners and neatly turned-down cover.	她的工作的仔细和精确与大饭店相比毫不逊色——铺盖整洁，有棱有角。


Invariably, when she traveled on business to Beijing, she would insist on first shopping for a present for the former Chinese leader, Zhao Ziyang, with whom she had negotiated Hong Kong’s handover.	当她以公务访问北京时，也总是会坚持先为前中国领导人赵紫阳买件礼物。 赵紫阳是和她谈判香港回归事宜的人。


Since the Tiananmen killings, which he had tried to avert through compromise, he had been under house arrest.	天安门事件时，赵紫阳试图以妥协避免流血，事后他被软禁。


By asking whichever senior officials she saw to pass on her gift and her best wishes to Zhao, the Chinese leadership would understand that the outside world was still thinking of him and wanted to ensure his survival.	不论她会见哪个高级官员，她都会要求为她转交礼物和传达对赵紫阳的最佳祝愿，中国领导人想必因此会明白外部世界仍然记得赵紫阳，希望赵紫阳获得自由。


It was typically practical and kind.	这既务实，又周到。


As a national leader, Thatcher’s principal achievements were to reverse Britain’s decline, which had gained momentum in the 1970’s, before her first term as Prime Minister in 1979.	作为国家领导人，撒切尔的主要成就是扭转了20世纪70年代（她于1979年首次就任首相）英国的衰落之势。


Little of the extensive coverage of her death has focused on what Britain was like in those years.	在她逝世后的铺天盖地的报道中，鲜有人将注意力放在那些年英国的状况上。


The economy was on its knees, and the abuse of trade-union power had made Britain almost ungovernable.	经济一蹶不振，工会的滥用权势让英国几乎变得无从治理。


Paradoxically, she made accountable and authoritative government possible again partly by curtailing the state’s role in the economy.	反常的是，她之所以能让政府重新变得负责而权威，部分是通过削弱国家在经济中的作用实现的。


Her reforms laid the foundations for a period during which Britain’s per capita wealth grew faster than most of its competitors’.	她的改革为一个时代打下了基础，英国的人均财富增长比大部分竞争对手都要快。


Thatcher’s reforms reinvigorated the private sector, promoted home ownership, lowered taxes on enterprise, deregulated large parts of the economy, and reined in the unions’ power to use their industrial muscle.	撒切尔的改革振兴了私人部门、促进了房屋所有权、降低了企业税、减少了对经济大部的监管，并遏制了工会动用其行业能量的实力。


She set about this reform program with determination, but – at least until her last years – with subtle pragmatism as well.	她以决心推动改革项目，但在执行方面相当务实——至少在其首相生涯晚期之前是如此。


She moved step by step, invariably in the same direction.	她步步为营，不懈地朝一个方向前进。


No one in government would be in any doubt about what she wanted to do.	政府上下没有任何人怀疑她的目标。


The reforms that she undertook struck a chord internationally.	她所推出的改革还掀起了国际反响。


Her period in office coincided with the crumbling of Soviet communism in Europe, which culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.	在她的执政生涯中，欧洲苏维埃共产主义瓦解了——其高潮便是1989年柏林墙的倒塌。


She had been an outspoken critic of Soviet communism, like her transatlantic friend and partner, Ronald Reagan.	她一直是苏联共产主义的毫不掩盖的批评者，一如她在大西洋对岸的朋友和同志罗纳德·里根。


Her espousal of free markets – indeed, her ringing declarations about the link between political and economic freedom – inspired the Soviet bloc’s peoples, who had suffered under the Soviet yoke for 40 years.	她拥护自由市场——事实上，她直白地大声宣扬政治自由和经济自由的联系——这启发了苏维埃阵营中的人民，促使他们摆脱了40年的枷锁。


While her antipathy to German reunification was ill-judged, her doubts about the ability to reconcile greater political integration in the European Union with democratic accountability in its member states has gained many more sympathizers over the years – and not only in her own country.	她反对德国重新统一，这是她的重大误判； 但她对更伟大的欧盟一体化能否与成员国的民主问责相协调的怀疑在多年后赢得了更多的同情者——不光是英国人。


She pushed for greater integration of the European single market, while questioning whether this really required ceding more political authority to the European Commission.	她推进了欧洲单一市场的进一步一体化，但同时也质疑这是否真的需要将更多的政治主权割让给欧盟委员会。


Many consider the Falklands War in 1982 as the apogee of her patriotism.	许多人认为1982年福克兰群岛战争是撒切尔爱国主义的顶峰。


It was just as much a sign of her political bravado. 	这只是她政治冒险的又一信号。


The recovery of this far-flung British dependency, whose citizens were resolutely committed to remaining British subjects after the Argentine invasion, was a daring military act.	收复福克兰群岛是一次大胆的军事行动。 福克兰群岛是遥远的英国属地，其人民在被阿根廷侵占后坚定地站在英国一边。


It could have gone terribly wrong, bringing down her and her administration.	它可能成为巨大的错误，让她和她的政府黯然下台。


Even the Reagan administration came close to balking at supporting Britain’s military campaign.	即使是里根政府，也逡巡不前，没有支持英国的军事行动。


But fortune favored the brave, and victory solidified her reputation for decisiveness and raw courage.	但幸运青睐勇敢者，胜利巩固了她果断和果敢的名声。


As Britain’s taxi drivers liked to say, she was the best man in the government.	英国出租车司机总是说，她是政府里最棒的男人（man）。


Thatcher’s confidence in the strength of Britain’s relationship with the United States was underpinned by her friendship with Reagan.	撒切尔对英美关系的强度信心十足，这可以从她和里根的友谊中一窥端倪。


They were very different characters who shared a similar philosophy, albeit expressed with more charm by a president who much admired her directness and her simple, even blunt assertions of the old verities.	他们的个性绝不相同，但人生哲学相近，总统的表达更加优雅，而他相当仰慕她的直率和对古老真理的单刀直入甚至话糙理直。


“Isn’t she wonderful,” he is reported to have said to an aide, one hand over the telephone, as she scolded him from London for some US policy error.	“她真是个可人儿，”据报道他曾这样对助手说。 当时他一只手握着电话，听着她在伦敦向他斥责美国的政策失误。


It was a sentiment shared by many Americans who went to hear her lecture after her retirement.	前去聆听她卸任后演讲的许多美国人也有同感。


I most admired Thatcher for her political style.	我最仰慕撒切尔的地方是她的政治风格。


She never required a focus group to tell her what she believed or how to express it.	她从来不会要专家小组告诉她应该信什么，应该怎样说。


She regarded ideas as the very core of politics, and she battled for those that she held.	她认为思想是政治的核心，她为她所信的思想而战。 她不会对两个相反的观点作“三分法”而取折中；


She did not “triangulate” in an effort to find the middle point between opposing views; she deplored the idea that the middle ground of politics, where most voters dwell, was pre-determined by a wishy-washy elite consensus.  An effective leader, she believed, could shift this political terrain by convincing people of the truth and relevance of his or her position.	她厌恶中间道路政治的思想，而被空泛的精英共识先入为主的大部分选民正是如此。 她认为，作为领导人，雷厉风行可以通过让人们相信真相及其与他（她）立场的关联改变政治地图。


Thatcher was often more careful than her admirers have subsequently suggested in the way she set about doing this.	在行事方面，撒切尔比她的仰慕者后来所显示的更加谨慎。


But, ultimately, her passion for the ideas to which she was devoted splashed bright colors across a political world usually painted in shades of grey.	但是，说到底，她对自己所拥护的思想的热情为总是灰蒙蒙的政治界带来不少鲜明的色彩。


Margaret Thatcher was not perfect.	玛格丽特·撒切尔不是完人。


Like everyone else, she made mistakes and got some things wrong.	与其他人一样，她也犯错误，也捅娄子。


But she was undoubtedly a giant of twentieth-century politics, a leader who changed her and our world – for the better.	但毫无疑问，她是20世纪政坛的巨人，主宰她和我们的世界的人——让我们和世界更美好。


The Asian Tigers of Nationalism	民族主义的亚洲之虎


DENVER – Among the many arguments that former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević used to make to his interlocutors was that he never incited nationalism among his people.	发自丹佛——在南联盟前总统斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇（Slobodan Milošević）曾向他的听众们提到过的许多观点中，其中一条就是他从未在自己的民众中煽动过民族主义。


Indeed, his public statements and speeches during those turbulent times were carefully calibrated to avoid any outright exhortation to nationalism.	事实上，他在那些混乱时期公开发表的声明和演说都经过小心斟酌，以避免出现任何公然鼓吹民族主义的状况。


But it was not so much the words that he used as it was the music.	但他所使用的词语可不是什么天籁之音。


With his crafty use of code words and body language to encourage a sense of victimhood among Serbs, Milošević was one of the most demagogic nationalists Europe had seen in generations.	通过狡猾地运用影射性字句和身体语言去在塞族人中鼓动一种受害者情绪，米洛舍维堪称欧洲近几代人中最能蛊惑人心的民族主义者。


Today, East Asia – especially China – is awash in a sea of nationalism.	如今，东亚地区——尤其是中国——正沉浸在民族主义的海洋之中。


The patterns of this age-old scourge are familiar, featuring national narratives based on a supposed record of victimization.	人们对这种古老的诉苦行为模式是毫不陌生的，其实就是基于一个想定的受害经历来进行国家叙事。


In China’s case, the narrative revolves around “the century of shame,” when China was too weak to defend itself against encroachments on its sovereignty, and the idea that it should never have to succumb again.	具体就中国来说，该叙事围绕着“一个世纪的屈辱史”——当年的中国是如此积弱，甚至无力阻止自身主权惨遭侵犯——因此我们的国家再也不能向别人卑躬屈膝了。


Among Japanese nationalist groups, the narrative is one of frustration with the wartime Allies’ version of history; almost 70 years – and billions of dollars in reparations and foreign assistance – later, Japan would like to move on.	在日本的民族主义团体中，这种叙事就变成了对战时盟友所采用的历史版本的沮丧感； 都过去70多年了——加上数十亿美元的赔偿和外国援助，日本也该甩开这些包袱了。


“We are done apologizing,” Liberal Democratic Party leader Shinzo Abe has said.	“我们已经道过歉了，”自民党党首安倍晋三如是说。


Whether this outbreak of nationalism will end soon depends on the willingness of governments in the region – not just China’s – to take a stand and appeal to their publics to cease and desist.	这种民族主义的爆发是否会很快平息取决于该区域——不仅仅是中国——各国政府是否愿意去采取一个立场并呼吁本国公众把情绪平息下来。


These governments need to engage in a more honest dialogue with their citizens.	这些政府必须与自己的人民开展一些更加坦诚的对话。


While historical frustration often shapes the narratives that fuel nationalism, there are clearly deeper and more powerful forces at work.	虽然历史的沮丧感经常会塑造那些鼓动民族主义的叙事，但很显然有更深层次也更强大的力量在起作用。


One of Japan’s persistent problems in recent years has been growing disenchantment with the political class and its inability to articulate a vision for the country’s future.	近年困扰日本的其中一个顽疾就是人们对本国政治阶层的认识越来越清醒，也逐渐明白后者无法为国家的未来构筑一幅图景。


Many young Japanese are alienated from their country’s politics.	许多年轻日本人疏远了本国政治。


Although this is hardly an exclusively Japanese phenomenon, the narrowness of the political elite has made the problem more acute than elsewhere.	虽然这种现象并不仅限于日本，但政治精英阶层的狭隘性确实令该国所面临的问题比其他地方更加尖锐。


Japan is rapidly becoming one of the world’s oldest nations.	日本正在迅速成为全球老龄化最严重的国家。


Having already passed its population peak, it will, in the continued absence of significant immigration, begin an increasingly rapid slide down the demographic curve, becoming a country that is much smaller than it is today.	由于人口高峰期早已过去，日本的人口曲线将在持续缺乏大规模移民的情况下开始日渐加速下滑，并成为一个比现在小得多的国家。


And China has been a major source of angst for Japan, because, historically, there has seldom been a time when both countries could be strong.	而中国已经成为日本的主要恐惧来源，因为在历史上两国几乎就没有同时强大过。


Thus, in the hierarchical understanding of power that prevails in East Asia, if China is up, Japan surely must be down.	因此在东亚地区流行的权力等级观念中，一旦中国崛起，那日本就必然会衰落。


But Japan remains one of the world’s most culturally sophisticated societies.	但日本依然是世界上其中一个在文化上最为精深的社会。


And, just as the British made the transition from “Rule Britannia” to “Cool Britannia,” Japan, too, can engage in an internal process to define better its identity as a vibrant modern culture in the context of globalization.	而正如英国人实现了从充满爱国激情的“统治者不列颠尼亚（Rule Britannia）”向洋溢文化自豪感的“酷帅不列颠尼亚（Cool Britannia）”转型那样，日本也可以启动一个内部进程来将自身更好地定义为全球化背景下一个生机勃勃的现代文明。


Japanese culture has global reach, and much to be proud of, besides a desultory and unproductive debate about victimization and rock-strewn islands.	在针对受害情绪和几个乱石海岛的不着边际徒劳辩论之外，日本文化早已全球远播，且有许多值得自豪的地方。


The problem in China is more serious.	而中国的问题则更严重。


China is moving toward another leadership transition, relatively calm by the standards of other powers, where elections sometimes take on the characteristics of political warfare.	中国正在经历另一场领导层转换，这相对于其他大国的标准来说较为平静，因为后者的选举有时会显现出政治战争的特征。


China’s political rivalries do not play out in televised national debates; rather, they play out in the shadows, leaving the public to guess what the country’s leadership has in store.	中国的政治斗争不是以全国电视辩论的形式呈现，一切都是暗中操作，留待公众猜测究竟谁会是接班人。


As China’s economy slows, the public stirs, and its confidence in nonelected leaders wanes.	随着中国的经济放缓，公众开始躁动不安，对非选举领导人的信心也开始动摇。


While some of the criticism calls for more openness and accountability in government, much of it is less inspiring to the rest of us.	当某些批评呼吁政府要更加公开和负责任之时，绝大多数批评对其他人来说都没什么意思。


The critics ask – often in pointed terms – what the government is doing to safeguard the country’s economic interests.	批评者们——通常会用尖锐的语句——质问政府正在做什么来维护国家的经济利益。


In democratic countries, such critics would group themselves into some kind of political movement, ultimately creating an opposition party that, through the dialectical process of democracy, would influence policymaking by the party in power.	在民主国家，这些批评者会聚拢到某些政治运动当中，最终创设一个反对党，并借助民主制度的辩证程序，来影响执政党的政策制定。


China, however, lacks the institutional framework needed to channel this sentiment into the political process.	然而中国缺乏将这些意见导入政治进程的体制框架。


This does not mean that opposition disappears, much less moderates itself; rather, it simmers and incubates – and gathers strength.	这并不意味着反对派消失了，更不是将自身温和化，相反，它蓄势待发并逐渐成形——同时积聚力量。


Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party has no intention of ceding economic nationalism to an Internet-based proto-opposition.	与此同时，中国共产党无意把经济民族主义割让给一个以互联网为基础的反对派雏形。


After all, rapid economic growth lies at the heart of the CCP’s raison d’état, so it embraces economic nationalism, whether in disputes with Japan, the Southeast Asian countries, or the United States.	毕竟迅速的经济增长就是中共的统治合法性基础，所以它采用了经济民族主义，哪怕这会与日本，东南亚国家或是美国产生争端。