In his first public appearance after being appointed Foreign Secretary, Johnson compared the Brexit vote to the French Revolution.	在被任命为外交大臣的首次公开露脸中，约翰逊比较了英国脱欧投票和法国大革命。


Provoking boos at the French Embassy’s Bastille Day celebration, he hailed the referendum as “a great popular uprising against a stifling bureaucratic ancient regime (sic) whose democratic credentials had become very far from obvious.”	他在法国大使馆国庆日庆典上欢呼雀跃地将公投称为“一次针对令人窒息的官僚主义旧体制的伟大的群众起义，这个体制的民主特征早已难以辨别。 ”引起一片嘘声。


But the Brexit vote – with its promise to recreate the Britain of yesterday – is less revolution than counter-revolution.	但英国脱欧投票——及其重建昔日英国的许诺——与其说是革命，不如说是反革命。


Boris and his band of Brexiteers have more in common with Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who overturned the French republic to create a new monarchy, than with Danton or Robespierre.	鲍里斯及其脱欧派同道更像是颠覆法兰西共和国、重建君主制的拿破仑三世，而不是丹东或罗伯斯庇尔。


If anyone or anything has a claim to embody the progressive ideals of 1789, it is the EU.	如果说有人可以宣称代表了1789年的进步理想的话，也是欧盟。


Its politicians and officials have translated the vague trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity into a concrete form: 80,000 pages of laws that cover rights and regulations from the bedroom to the factory floor.	欧盟政治家和官员将模糊的自由、平等、博爱三位一体塑造为一个实在：涵盖了从床头到车间的各种权利和规则的80,000页法律。


And the application of these rules helped waves of countries – from Greece and Spain to Estonia and Poland – move from autocracy to democracy.	而这些规则的实施帮助一波又一波的国家——从希腊和西班牙到爱沙尼亚和波兰——摆脱专制，走向民主。


The EU has driven a revolution in how countries live together – advancing individual rights, international law, and the pooling of sovereignty.	欧盟推动了一场各国如何共存的革命——推进个体权利、国际法和主权集合。


Its transformative power springs from the promise of potential membership, a “neighborhood policy” that exports European values, and its facilitation of global institution-building and copycat regional integration.	其变革力量来自未来成员资格承诺、输出欧洲价值观的“周边政策”及其为全球机构建设和效仿性地区融合所提供的便利。


Now, as a result of the counter-revolution, the EU club is shrinking, rather than growing.	如今，拜反革命结果所赐，欧盟俱乐部正在解体而不是成长。


Rather than remaking the world in its image, the EU fears neighbors that export chaos rather than import values.	欧盟没有在重塑世界形象，而是担心输出混乱而不是输入价值观的邻国。


Interdependence causes, rather than ends, intra-European conflict.	互相依存导致而不是结束了欧洲内部冲突。


And the European idea has become a focus of political opposition across the continent.	欧洲概念也成为整个大陆的政治反对焦点。


Indeed, the most troubling thing about Europe today is not the United Kingdom’s departure, but the fragility and disunity of the remaining 27 states, where the domestic consensus for Europe has all but evaporated.	事实上，对于当今欧洲来说，最麻烦的事情不是英国脱离，而是剩余27国的脆弱性和离心离德，欧洲民主共识已经蒸发殆尽。


The UK’s “Leave” campaign channeled a widely felt desire to restore past certainties, not to establish new rights.	英国“脱欧”阵营引导了广泛存在的重建昔日确定性而非树立新权利的渴望。


And all member states are subject to the economic insecurity, cultural anxiety, and political alienation that new political forces are exploiting by using referenda to recast politics as a fight between the people and self-serving elites.	而新政治力量利用改变政治局面的公投作为人民和自私的精英之间的斗争，以此利用所有成员国都在面对的经济不安全、文化焦虑和政治疏离。


Britain’s post-referendum economic and political travails will make other EU member states think twice before holding their own popular votes on membership.	英国公投后的经济和政治阵痛将让其他欧盟成员国在进行成员资格投票前三思而后行。


But make no mistake: the EU is well into an era of disintegration.	但不要搞错了：欧盟绝对已经进入了解体时代。


A slow slide into ungovernability can be just as devastating as a breakup.	缓慢地滑向不可治理与解体一样糟糕。


Some EU decisions are already being challenged by national referenda, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s planned plebiscite on refugee quotas.	一些欧盟决定已经在受到国家公投的挑战，如匈牙利总理欧尔班计划就难民配额进行公投。


In France, the so-called Posted Workers Directive (which allows employers to pay seconded workers no more than the minimum rate in the host country) may not be implemented.	在法国，所谓的派遣劳务指令（Posted Workers Dircetive，允许雇主向借调人员支付不高于所在国最低工资的薪酬）也许得不到实施。


And the European Commission is backtracking on favored projects such as a free-trade deal with Canada.	而欧盟委员会也在改变一些有利项目，比如与加拿大的自由贸易协议。


Rather than banding together, each new challenge has divided the EU into ever-smaller groups.	新挑战无不将欧盟分裂为更小的团体，而不是将欧盟绑在一起。


The euro has divided north and south; Ukraine and the refugee crisis have divided east and west.	欧元造成南北分裂； 乌克兰和难民危机造成东西分裂。


Pro-Europeans need to engage with the sources of discontent and rethink the forms used to express the European ideal.	亲欧派需要战胜不满的根源，并反思欧洲理想的表达形式。


The EU was based on a mechanical idea that interdependence would reduce conflict.	欧盟是基于一个机械的概念——互相依存能减少冲突。


By linking European means of production together – first through the European coal and steel community, and later through the common market and the euro – the EU hoped to bind Europe’s states together so closely that war between them would no longer be an option.	欧盟希望将欧洲的生产方式联系在一起——首先是通过欧洲煤钢共同体，后来是通过共同市场和欧元——以此让欧洲国家实现紧密团结，彼此之间的战争永远消弭。


True, war in Europe is now mostly unthinkable, with much wealth created.	诚然，创造了大量财富之后，如今欧洲爆发战争基本上已经难以想象。


But the backlash against interdependence – whether through the euro, free movement, or terrorism – is undeniable.	但不可否认的是，反对相互依存——不管是通过欧盟、自由迁徙还是恐怖主义——的力量仍然存在。


To save the EU, European leaders should focus on making people feel safe with interdependence.	要想拯救欧盟，欧洲领导人必须专注于让人们感到相互依存的安全性。 这意味着将自由迁徙的经济收益中拿出一些重新分配给承担自由迁徙负担的国家；


That means redistributing some of the economic benefits of free movement to communities bearing the burden of it; strengthening control of external borders and cooperation against terrorism; ensuring greater flexibility for eurozone integration and migration; and returning to the idea that EU institutions’ highest calling is to defend Europe’s nation-states, not to develop their own power.	确保增加欧元区一体化和移民的灵活性； 以及回归欧盟机构的最高使命是捍卫欧洲民族国家而不是发展自身权力的概念。


The Brexit crisis gives the remaining EU members a chance to reconceive the European project.	英国脱欧危机给了其余欧盟成员国一次反思欧洲工程的机会。


If they succeed, the UK may even eventually want to rejoin.	如果成功，英国最终还会想要重新加入。


Of course, that is not what the Brexiteers or their allies elsewhere are seeking.	当然，这绝非英国脱欧派及其其他地区的盟友想要的结果。


They may succeed in unraveling the EU, but they are unlikely to deliver on their promise of recreating the world of yesterday, much less a better future.	他们可以成功解散欧盟，但他们不可能实现重建昨日世界的承诺，更不用说建设更美好的未来了。


In fact, they could inadvertently destroy the benefits of European integration that people most value.	事实上，他们可能在不经意间摧毁人民最珍视的欧洲一体化的好处。


Voters who supported Brexit may yet echo what Marx said of Louis Napoleon’s counter-revolution: “A whole people, that imagines it has imparted to itself accelerated powers of motion through a revolution, suddenly finds itself transferred back to a dead epoch.”	支持英国脱欧的选民也许并不同意马克思论拿破仑三世的反革命的话：“整个民族，想象着它已经通过一场革命而为自己注入了加速的运动力量，突然发现自己被送回了一个死去的时代。


They discover that what they overthrew was not the tyranny of the ancien régime, but “the concessions that were wrung from it by centuries of struggle.”	”他们发现他们所颠覆的并不是旧制度的苛政，而是“通过数百年的斗争从它手中获得的让步。 ”


That is where Johnson’s political cross-dressing may come into its own.	约翰逊的政治异装最后的面目也许正是如此。


If the UK enters a deep recession and struggles to deliver on the Leave campaign’s promises, many voters may yet want to remain in the single market, or even the EU itself.	如果英国陷入严重衰退，无法兑现脱欧阵营的承诺，许多选民可能宁可留在单一市场乃至欧盟本身。


That sort of volte-face would be impossible for most of the Brexit camp, for whom the dream of sovereignty trumps the threat of economic collapse.	如此大转变对于大部分脱欧阵营来说是不可能的，对他们来说，主权之梦压倒了经济崩溃的威胁。


But Johnson is culturally at ease with Europe and at times seemed ambivalent about the Leave campaign that he led.	但约翰逊在文化上与欧洲很融洽，有时候似乎与他所领导的脱欧阵营才是矛盾体。


Johnson’s ability to escape the shackles of his previous statements would inspire Houdini.	约翰逊推翻自己先前的说法的能力将启发逃脱大师（Houdini）。


If the EU manages to reform and the UK’s economic problems deepen, all that seems solid – particularly Johnson’s Euroskepticism – could melt into air.	如果欧盟成功改革，而英国经济问题深化，那么一切坚固无比的东西——特别是约翰逊的欧洲怀疑论——都可能烟消云散。


The Creditworthy Poor?	信誉卓著的穷国？


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last five years, several low-income countries, such as Rwanda and Honduras, have issued their first-ever bonds to private foreign investors in London and New York.	华盛顿—过去五年来，一些低收入国家，如卢旺达和洪都拉斯，首次在伦敦和纽约向私人外国投资者发行了债券。


Until recently, that might have been unthinkable, so the new borrowers’ initial bond issue should be viewed as a sign of great investor confidence.	在此以前，这几乎是不可想象的，因此这些新借款人的债券首发应该被视为投资者信心坚挺的信号。


But it should also sound some familiar warning bells.	但这也拉响了熟悉的警报。


Some 20 “debut issues” have raised around $12 billion at interest rates that, on average, are just 4.5 percentage points above what the United States government pays at maturities of five or more years.	大约20笔“首发”筹集到大约120亿美元，平均利润只比五年或更长期限的美国国债高4. 5个百分点。


This is small change in the grand scheme of global finance; but, given that many of these borrowers were in distress or default just a decade ago, and needed debt forgiveness, theirs is an especially impressive turnaround.	这只是全球金融大局的一个小变化； 但是，考虑到这些借款人中有许多十年前曾经历过困难和违约，并且需要债务豁免，因此这应该被视为令人瞩目的大转折。


But low-income countries’ access to private lenders comes with risks that should be highlighted at the outset, before they grow into imminent threats.	但低收入国家得以接触私人贷款人也带来了风险，这一风险从一开始——在它们演变为重大威胁之前——就应该得到高度重视。


For starters, there is rollover risk.	首先是延期风险。


The bonds have to be repaid in a foreign currency, usually US dollars, in a single “bullet” payment.	这些债券必须用外币偿付，通常是用美元“一次性”还本付息。


These bullets can be big, especially when compared with past debt obligations or future export earnings.	这些还本付息额可能相当巨大，特别是与过去的债务或未来的出口收入相比。


World Bank data tracking the evolution of developing-country debt since the 1970s show that the probability of a country falling into debt distress increases nine-fold (to a one-in-five chance) if its repayments are equivalent to more than one-tenth of its exports – a situation that one in three of today’s new issuers could face when their bonds come due.	追踪20世纪70年代以来发展中国家债务演化的世界银行数据表明，如果一国的偿付额等于或大于其出口额的十分之一，其陷入债务困境的概率就会增加九倍（达到五分之一）——今天的新发行国中每三个就有一个在债券到期时面临这一情景。


Whether poor borrowers can avoid such a financial squeeze will depend on several factors.	穷借款国是否能避免这一金融困局取决于几个因素。


One is whether they will be able to issue more bonds to pay off those coming due.	一是它们是否能够在债券到期日临近时发行更多债券用于偿付。


Another is whether they invest the money prudently, thereby enabling prompt repayment.	其二是它们能否审慎地将资金用于投资，从而能够利落地偿付。


And it will also depend on whether countries with volatile incomes, especially those reliant on natural resources, put money aside when earnings are high.	三是收入波动较大的国家，特别是那些依赖自然资源的国家，是否能在收入较高时将钱存起来。


A second, medium-term risk involves capital-flow reversals.	第二个中期风险是资本流逆转。


Lenders’ appetite for low-income-country bonds has been fueled in large part by a combination of abundant liquidity and near-zero interest rates in developed economies since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.	贷款人对低收入国家债券的胃口之所以增加，很大程度上是受2008—2009年全球金融危机依赖发达经济体流动性充裕和利率接近于零的推动。


With only paltry yields on offer at home, investors have looked to riskier, “frontier” markets for higher returns.	在国内只能获得可怜的收益率，这促使投资者着眼于风险较高的“前沿”市场追求更高回报。


Sooner or later, however, developed economies will revert to tighter monetary policy, which will make developing-country bonds less attractive.	但是，发达经济体早晚要回归较���的货币政策，这将让发展中国家债券吸引力缩水。


Those borrowers with sound macroeconomic policies will probably retain some appeal for global financial markets; but less prudent governments might suddenly find themselves cut off.	那些宏观政策可靠的借款人可能仍能对全球金融市场保持吸引力； 但不太审慎的政府将突然发现自己已被踢出了局。


Unfortunately, the quality of debt-management practices among the new bond issuers is uneven.	不幸的是，新债券发行国的债务管理实践质量参差不齐。


Sensible debt strategies, a professional and independent debt office, and a clear legal framework for public borrowing have become more important than ever.	明智的债务战略、专业而独立的债务部门以及明确的公共借贷法律框架比以往任何时候都更加重要。


To be sure, there has been significant progress on this front over the past decade, much of it funded by rich-country assistance.	平心而论，过去十年中，这方面有了长足的进步，其中富裕国家的资金支持功不可没。


But more can and should be done before this new borrowing wave becomes too large to manage, or spreads to state and municipal governments that suffer from weaker administrative capacity.	但在这一新借贷潮变得太大而难以管理或者蔓延至饱受行政能力不足困扰的州和地方政府之前，可以也应该做更多事情。


It is worth noting the strong negative correlation between the quality of a country’s debt-management practices and its risk of debt distress, with 90% of low-risk countries demonstrating good practices.	值得注意的是，一国债务管理实践的质量与其债务困境风险之间存在强烈的负相关关系，90%的低风险国家都表现出良好的实践水平。


A third risk is that future debt workouts will become harder to agree.	第三个风险是未来债务解决方案（debt workouts）将更难形成一致。


Traditionally, low-income countries’ creditors were rich-world governments and multilateral organizations that found it politically unfeasible to call in debts if this meant that borrowers had to cut vital public services such as education or health.	传统上，低收入国家的债权人是富裕国家政府和多边机构，如果索债意味着借款国必须削减教育和卫生等关键公共服务，就会饱受政治压力。


In a process that has already taken 15 years – and remains unfinished – the debts of 35 highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) have been forgiven, at a cost of more than $100 billion.	在已经进行了15年——并且还没有完成——的过程中，35个高负债穷国的债务获得了豁免，其代价超过1,000亿美元。


Now, however, many former HIPCs are selling bonds in the global market to private investors, which has become significantly riskier in recent months, in the wake of court rulings in the United States that permit bondholders to reject debt workouts and sue for full payment.	但是，现如今许多昔日的高负债穷国正在全球市场上向私人投资者出售债券，而最近几个月以来，美国法院裁定债券持有人可以拒绝债务解决方案并起诉要求足额偿付，其风险也因此大大增加了。


One must hope that the funds raised will be put to good use, and that repayments will not require major sacrifices, as there is currently no agreed mechanism to restructure, let alone cancel, the new debts.	人们必须寄希望于筹得资金能够得到很好地利用，偿付不会要求做出重大牺牲，因为目前没有大家都同意的机制用于重组（更不用说取消）新债务。


One might ask why anyone but the private global investors taking the risk should care about roll-overs, reversals, debt management, and workouts.	你或许会问，为何偏偏是承担风险的私人全球投资者要担心延期、流向逆转、债务管理和债务解决方案风险。


The reason is that public-debt distress most harms a country’s poorest citizens, who have little knowledge, and no choice, about issuing bonds.	原因在于公共债务困境最伤害的是一国最贫穷的公民，他们没有关于债务发行的知识，也没有选择。


When a country defaults, the economic damage swells the number of poor people and worsens their living conditions.	当一国违约时，经济伤害将让穷人数量增加，并使他们的生活条件恶化。


When Argentina defaulted in 2001, one in five citizens fell under the poverty line.	2001年阿根廷违约时，五分之一的公民落入了贫困线以下。


Sound debt management is, in effect, sound social policy – a lesson that borrowers and lenders alike should heed as they enter into debts that, if not properly managed, can turn out to be more complicated than first assumed and more troublesome than anyone expected.	事实上，可靠的债务管理就是可靠的社会政策——在债务产生之前，借款国和贷款国都应该汲取一个教训：如果管理不当，情况会变得比一开始想象的更复杂，造成比所有人所能想到的更大的麻烦。


Bottom Dollar	美元的底线


As more time passes with neither the value of the dollar declining sharply nor market forces beginning to shrink America’s current-account deficit – which may well reach $1 trillion this year – two diametrically opposed reactions are emerging.	美元价值不会急剧下跌，市场力量也无法缩小美国经常账户赤字，该赤字今年很可能达到10,000亿美元。 随着时间的推移，出现了两种截然对立的反应。


Most international finance economists are becoming increasingly frightened that a major international financial crisis could erupt.	大多数国际金融经济学家越来越担心可能出现重大国际金融危机。


Indeed, they fear that the scale of that potential crisis is becoming larger and larger.	确实，他们害怕该潜在危机的规模会越变越大。


Others – especially managers of financial assets – are becoming increasingly convinced that economists don’t know very much, and that what they do know is of no use to traders like themselves.	其他人（特别是金融资产管理者）则越来越认为经济学家知之甚少，而且他们所知晓的那点东西对自己这样的商人毫无用处。


They see little reason to believe that current asset values and trade flows are not sustainable.	他们认为，没有理由相信流动资产价值和贸易流是不可持续的。


After all, they (or some of them) argue, the real GDP of the United States is growing by $400 billion per year, with about $270 billion going to labor and $130 billion to capital.	毕竟，他们（或其中一些人）认为，美国实际GDP每年增长4,000亿美元，其中约2,700亿美元用于劳动力，1,300亿美元用作资本。


Even after depreciation, that $130 billion of extra annual income is capitalized at about $1.5 trillion of wealth, so the current-account deficit, even at $1 trillion, is not overwhelmingly large.	甚至在美元贬值之后，1,300亿美元的额外年收入资本化为15,000亿美元的资产，这样，经常账户赤字即便达到10,000亿美元，数额也不算特别大。


We Americans can sell off two-thirds of the increment to our wealth to finance imports and still be $500 billion better off this year than we were last year.	我们美国人可以卖掉三分之二的资产增量用于资助进口，今年依然能比去年富余5,000亿美元。


Moreover, the annual interest charged on the extra $1 trillion per year that Americans borrow from the rest of the world is about $50 billion – just one-eighth of annual economic growth, while the trade deficit is financed out of the growth of the value of capital.	另外，每年从美国人向其他国家借款10,000亿美元所收取的年利息为大约5000亿美元—仅占年度经济增长的八分之一，而资本价值的增长就完全能平衡贸易赤字。


So what’s unsustainable?	那么还有什么不可持续的呢？


Why can’t the US current-account deficit remain at its 2006 value indefinitely?	为什么美国经常账户赤字不能无限期地保持在2006年的数额呢？


The counterargument hinges on the difference between the current-account deficit and the trade deficit.	反驳错误观点的论据取决于经常账户赤字和贸易赤字之间的差异。


The current-account deficit is equal to the trade deficit plus the cost of servicing the net international asset position: the net rent, interest, and dividends owed to foreigners who have invested their capital in the US.	经常账户赤字相当于贸易赤字加上维持国际资产净值地位的费用：即所欠的在美国投入资本的外国人的净租金、利息和股息。


As time passes, deficits accumulate.	随着时间的推移，赤字累加。


As deficits accumulate, the cost of servicing the net international asset position grows.	由于赤字累加，维持国际资产净值地位的费用相应增加。


Thus, in order to keep the current-account deficit stable, the trade deficit must shrink.	因此，为了保持经常账户赤字稳定，必需缩减贸易赤字。


And the only way for the trade deficit to shrink substantially is for net imports to fall, which requires either a relatively sharp decline in the value of the dollar, thereby raising import prices, or a depression in the US.	大幅度缩减贸易赤字的惟一方法是进口净值下降，这就要求要么相对急剧地降低美元价值从而提高进口价格，要么美国出现经济萧条。


Both outcomes would weaken demand for foreign goods by making Americans feel that they are too poor to buy them.	两种结果都会使美国人感觉自己没有足够的经济实力从而削弱对外国货物的需求。


As a result, holders of dollar-denominated assets should be looking forward to two alternative scenarios.	因此，美元计价的资产持有人应该预计到两种可能的情景。


In one, the value of the dollar will be low; in the other, the US will be in a depression.	一种情景是，美元价值降低； 另一种是，美国出现萧条。


In neither scenario does it make sense to hold huge amounts of dollar-denominated assets today.	无论出现哪种情况，现在再持有大量美元计价的资产都没多大意义。


Therefore, foreign speculators should, any day now, dump their dollar-denominated assets onto the market, and so bring about the dollar decline that they so fear.	因此，外国投机者在任何时候都应当将其美元计价的资产向市场倾销，而这样一来就会出现他们所害怕的美元贬值。


But foreign-currency speculators and international investors are not looking forward to either of these scenarios.	但是，外币投机者和国际投资者并不期待出现任何一种情况。


They continue to hold very large positions in dollar-denominated assets, which they would not do if they thought the US faced a choice between a cheap dollar and a deep depression.	他们继续在美元计价的资产中占据大量份额，如果美国面临美元贬值或大萧条，他们将无可奈何。


So, what alternative does the market see?	那么，根据市场的预计会出现什么状况呢？


And why is it so different from the possible scenarios that international financial economists see?	为什么市场与国际金融经济学家的预测大不相同呢？


The answer appears to be that there is nobody in the financial centers of New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong who thinks it is their business to bet on a future flight from the dollar.	答案似乎在于，纽约、伦敦、东京、法兰克福和香港金融中心的人们似乎认为赌注未来资金从美元的抽逃不是他们的事情。


Especially in times of crisis – and a sharp fall in US imports would imply a much more severe crisis for Asian and European exporters than it would for the US – the dollar is a currency that you run to, not from.	特别是在发生危机时—美国进口量急剧下降显示，危机对于亚洲和欧洲出口商较之美国要严重得多—美元是他们趋之若骛、而不是避之不及的货币。


George Soros can bet on a run on the British pound. Thai import-export firms can bet on a run on the baht by accelerating their dollar receipts and delaying their dollar payouts.	乔治·索罗斯可以赌英镑危机，泰国进出口公司可以通过加快美元收入，延迟美元支出来赌泰铢危机。


Everyone can bet on a run on the Argentine peso – a favorite sport of international financial speculators for a century and a half.	每个人都可以赌阿根廷比索危机—这是国际金融投机者这一个半世纪以来最喜欢做的事情了。


But not the dollar. Not yet.	但不是美元，至少现在还不到时候。


In other words, the market is betting that the dollar will fall gradually in the next five years, and that the US current-account deficit will narrow without a financial crisis.	换句话说，市场把赌注押在美元在接下来五年内会逐渐贬值，美国经常账户赤字将缩减，但不会发生金融危机。


That is what happened in the late 1980’s, and in the late 1970’s, too.	那就是二十世纪八十年代末和七十年代末所发生的事情。


After all, God, it is said, protects children, fools, dogs, and the United States of America.	毕竟，据说，上帝保护儿童、傻瓜、狗及美利坚合众国。


But the odds on a soft landing are lengthening with each passing day.	但软着陆的可能性随时间的推移而正在加大。


The Emperor’s New Goal	天皇的新目标


NEW DELHI – Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko, in a rare overseas trip, are scheduled to begin a tour of the Indian cities of New Delhi and Chennai on November 30.	新德里—日本明仁天皇和皇后美智子将罕见地出国访问，于11月30日来到印度城市新德里和金奈。


The imperial couple’s weeklong visit is likely to mark a defining moment in Indo-Japanese relations, fostering closer economic and security ties between Asia’s two leading democracies as they seek a pluralistic, stable Asian order.	天皇夫妇为期一周的出访有可能标志着印日关系的里程碑，在亚洲两大民主国家间塑造更紧密的经济和安全联系，寻求更加多元、稳定的亚洲秩序。


Traditionally, a visit from the Japanese emperor – except for a coronation or royal anniversary celebration – signified a turning point in a bilateral relationship.	传统上，日本天皇的访问——除加冕礼和皇室周年庆典以外——标志着双边关系的转折点。


While the emperor is merely the “symbol of the state” under Japan’s US-imposed postwar constitution, he retains significant influence, owing to Japanese veneration of the imperial dynasty – the world’s oldest continuous hereditary monarchy, the origins of which can be traced to 660 BC.	根据美国为日本制定的战后宪法，天皇仅仅是“国家的象征”，但他仍具有重大的影响力，因为日本人十分崇敬帝国皇朝——世界上最古老的持续世袭君主制，其源头可追溯到公元前660年。


Indeed, the emperor’s overseas visits remain deeply political, setting the tone – if not the agenda – for Japan’s foreign policy.	事实上，日本天皇的出国访问仍有着深刻的政治意义，决定着日本外交政策的节奏甚至日程。


Consider Akihito’s 1992 visit to China – the first such visit by any Japanese emperor.	就拿明仁天皇1992年出访中国来说吧，这是日本天皇第一次出访。


Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s government – grateful for Japan’s reluctance to maintain punitive sanctions over the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and eager for international recognition, not to mention Japanese capital and commercial technologies – had extended seven invitations over two years.	中国领导人邓小平的政府——感谢日本没有就1989年天安门大屠杀采取惩罚性制裁，并急切地渴望获得国际认可，更不用说期盼日本的资本和商业技术了——在两年的时间里七次发出邀请。


Akihito’s trip, which came at the height of Japan’s pro-China foreign policy, was followed by increased Japanese aid, investment, and technology transfer, thereby cementing Japan’s role in China’s economic rise.	明仁天皇的到访标志着日本亲中外交政策的顶峰，随之而来的日本援助、投资和技术转移的增长，也造就了日本在中国崛起中的作用。


The improved diplomatic relationship lasted until the recent flare-up of territorial and other bilateral disputes.	改善的双边关系一直持续到最近的领土和其他双边纠纷。


Although no Japanese emperor has visited India before, the bilateral relationship runs deep.	尽管此前从未有日本天皇到访印度，但印日双边关系十分深刻。


In traditional Japanese culture, India is Tenjiku (the country of heaven).	在传统日本文化中，印度被称为天竺国（天堂之国）。


Today, Japan is India’s largest source of aid and has secured a key role in supporting infrastructure development, financing projects like the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, and the Bangalore Metro Rail Project.	如今，日本是印度最大的援助国，并且在支持印度基础设施开发方面起着关键作用，为西部货运专线（Western Dedicated Freight Corridor）、德里-孟买产业走廊和班加罗尔地铁工程提供资金。


With these natural allies seeking to add strategic bulk to their rapidly multiplying ties, Akihito’s tour is the most significant visit to India by any foreign leader in recent years.	两大天然盟友寻求在快速发展的关系中添加战略成分，明仁天皇的访问是近几年来最重磅的外国领导人来访。


Indeed, it is expected to be one of the last foreign trips for the 79-year-old emperor, who has undergone several major surgeries in the past decade.	事实上，预计这次访问是这位79岁高龄、在过去十年中经历了数次重大手术的天皇的最后出访之一。


Akihito’s travel schedule contrasts sharply with that of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.	明仁天皇的行程与印度总理辛格形成了鲜明对比。


Despite having had open-heart surgery during his first term, India’s 81-year-old leader has sought to offset his low domestic political stock by flying more than one million kilometers on overseas trips – including visits to Japan, China, Indonesia, Russia, Thailand, and the United States in the last six months alone.	尽管辛格在第一个任期中经历了体外循环心脏手术，但这位81岁的印度领导人仍寻求通过出访抵消自己国内政治资本不足的劣势，光是在过去六个月，其海外行程就超过100万公里，出访对象包括日本、中国、印尼、俄罗斯、泰国和美国。


The paradox of Akihito’s tour – for which Singh has appointed a special envoy with ministerial rank to oversee preparations – is that Japan is investing substantial political capital to build a strong, long-term partnership with India’s government at a time when India is gripped by policy paralysis.	明仁天皇到访（辛格派了一位部长级特使负责准备工作）的矛盾之处在于，日本投入了巨大的政治资本寻求与印度政府建立强大、长期的合作关系，而印度正处在政策瘫痪中。


Japan’s leaders are perhaps counting on the continuity of India’s strategic policies, which would require the Indian government that emerges from next year’s general election to sustain the momentum of cooperation.	也许日本领导人寄望于印度战略政策的持续性，而这要求明年大选产生的印度新政府保持合作势头。


But, more important, Japan is adjusting to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing regional environment, characterized by rising geopolitical competition with China.	但是，更重要的是，日本正在作出调整以应对快速变化的地区环境的挑战，其特征是来自中国的地缘政治竞争日渐激烈。


In a historical reversal, Japan has found itself on the defensive against the increasingly muscular foreign policy of its former colony and old rival.	历史发生了逆转，日本发现，自己在前殖民地和老对手日益强硬的外交政策下已经处于被动。


This situation is forcing the Japanese government to reconsider its postwar pacifism, revise its defense strategy, and increase its military spending.	这一局面正在迫使日本政府反思其战后和平主义，重新修订其防务战略，并增加军事支出。


In this context, Japan knows that a deeper strategic collaboration with India – which is also seeking to blunt increasing military pressure from China – is its best move.	在这样的背景下，日本知道，与印度开展更深层次的战略合作是上上之策，而印度也在寻求遏制来自中国的日益增加的军事压力。


In modern history, Japan has had the distinction of consistently staying ahead of the rest of Asia.	在现代历史上，日本在亚洲鹤立鸡群，遥遥领先。


During the Meiji era, in the second half of the nineteenth century, it became the first Asian country to modernize.	在明治时代，十九世纪下半叶，日本成为亚洲第一个现代化国家。


It was also the first Asian country to emerge as a world power, defeating Manchu-ruled China and Czarist Russia in separate wars.	它还是亚洲第一个成为世界列强的国家，在战争中打败了清朝和沙皇俄国。


And after its defeat in World War II, Japan rose from the ashes to become Asia’s first global economic powerhouse.	二战战败后，日本从废墟中崛起，成为亚洲第一个世界经济强国。


With per capita GDP of more than $37,000, Japan still ranks among the world’s richest countries, specializing in the highest-value links of global supply chains.	日本的人均GDP超过37000美元，仍是世界最大的国家之一。 日本专长于全球供应链的高价值环节。


And income inequality in Japan ranks among the lowest in Asia.	日本的收入不平等程度是亚洲最低的。


Nonetheless, almost two decades of economic stagnation have eroded Japan’s regional clout.	尽管如此，近二十年的经济停滞削弱了日本的地区影响力。


This raises the question of whether Japan’s current problems –sluggish growth, high public debt, and rapid population aging – presage a similar trend across East Asia.	这引起了一个疑问：日本当前的问题——增长停滞、公共债务高企和快速老龄化——是否预示着整个东亚都将步入这一状态。


Similar problems are already appearing in South Korea, while China has been driven to loosen its one-child policy and unveil plans for economic reforms aimed at reviving growth.	相似的问题也已出现于韩国，而中国已开始放松其独生子女政策、展开了旨在重振增长的经济改革。


For India, Japan is indispensable as both an economic and a security partner.	对印度来说，日本是不可或缺的经济和安全合作伙伴。


It is central to India’s “Look East” policy, which has evolved into more of an “Act East” policy, whereby the original strategy’s economic logic has been amplified by the larger geopolitical objective of ensuring Asian stability and a regional balance of power.	日本是印度“向东看”政策的核心，而“向东看”已越来越有“向东行动”的趋势，最初的政策经济逻辑因为确保叶舟稳定和地区实力均衡这一更大的地缘政治目标而放大了。


It is in this light that Akihito’s historic visit should be viewed.	明仁天皇对印度的历史性访问也应该在这一背景的基础上来看待。


China’s Borderline Belligerence	中国的边境好战性


NEW DELHI – In recent years, the People’s Liberation Army has been taking advantage of its rising political clout to provoke localized skirmishes and standoffs with India by breaching the two countries’ long and disputed Himalayan frontier.	新德里—近几年来，解放军一直在利用其日益增强的政治影响力，进犯中国和印度在喜马拉雅山区的漫长的争议边界，挑起局部冲突。


The PLA’s recent intensification of such border violations holds important implications for President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to India – and for the future of the bilateral relationship.	最近，解放军的这种进犯边界的行为的加剧对国家主席习近平即将进行的访印之旅——以及两国关系的未来——具有重要影响。


In fact, such provocations have often preceded visits to India by Chinese leaders.	事实上，这样的挑衅行为在中国领导人访问印度前经常发生。


Indeed, it was just before President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit that China resurrected its claim to India’s large northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.	事实上，2006年胡锦涛主席访问印度前夕，中国重新声称其对印度东北部大邦——阿鲁纳恰尔邦拥有主权。


Likewise, prior to Premier Wen Jiabao’s trip to India in 2010, China began issuing visas on loose sheets of paper stapled into the passports of Kashmir residents applying to enter China – an indirect challenge to India’s sovereignty.	类似地，2010年温家宝总理访问印度前，中国开始为持有克什米尔护照的居民发放进入中国的签证——这是对印度主权的间接挑战。


Moreover, China abruptly shortened the length of its border with India by rescinding its recognition of the 1,597-kilometer (992-mile) line separating Indian Kashmir from Chinese-held Kashmir.	此外，中国突然不再承认1,597公里长的印控克什米尔和中控克什米尔分界线，缩短了其与印度的边界长度。


And Premier Li Keqiang’s visit last May followed a deep PLA incursion into India’s Ladakh region, seemingly intended to convey China’s anger over India’s belated efforts to fortify its border defenses.	去年5月，李克强总理访问印度之前，解放军曾深入到印度的拉达克地区，似乎是为了表示中国对印度姗姗来迟的加强边界防卫措施行为的愤怒。


Now, China is at it again, including near the convergence point of China, India, and Pakistan – the same place last year’s PLA encroachment triggered a three-week military standoff.	如今，中国故技重施，入侵范围包括中国、印度和巴基斯坦三国的边界点——即去年解放军深入其中并导致三周军事对峙的地方。


This pattern suggests that the central objective of Chinese leaders’ visits to India is not to advance cooperation on a shared agenda, but to reinforce China’s own interests, beginning with its territorial claims.	这一模式表明，中国领导人访问印度的核心目标不是增进共同日程上的合作，而是主张中国自身利益，首先就是领土主张。


Even China’s highly lucrative and fast-growing trade with India has not curbed its rising territorial assertiveness.	甚至颇为诱人的对印贸易的高速增长也没有让它减弱领土主张。


By contrast, Indian prime ministers since Jawaharlal Nehru have traveled to China to express goodwill and deliver strategic gifts.	相反，自尼赫鲁以来，历任印度总理去中国总是带着良好意愿和战略礼物。


Unsurprisingly, India has often ended up losing out in bilateral deals.	毫不奇怪，印度在双边交易中总是吃亏的一方。


Particularly egregious was Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 2003 surrender of India’s Tibet card.	特别令人蒙羞的是2003年瓦杰帕伊总理将印度的西藏牌拱手让出。


Vajpayee went so far as to use, for the first time, the legal term “recognize” to accept what China calls the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as “part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”	瓦杰帕伊软弱到什么程度？ 他是第一个使用“承认”这一法律术语，接受中国将西藏自治区称为“中华人民共和国领土的一部分”。


That opened the way for China to claim Arunachal Pradesh (three times the size of Taiwan) as “South Tibet” and reinforced China’s view of territorial issues: Whatever area it occupies is Chinese territory, and whatever territorial claims it makes must be settled on the basis of “mutual accommodation and understanding.”	这为中国打开了大门，随后中国将阿鲁纳恰尔邦（面积三倍于台湾）称为“南西藏”，并加强了中国在领土问题上的立场：它所占领的地区都是中国领土，它所做出的领土主张必须建立在“互谅互让”的基础上。


Vajpayee’s blunder compounded Nehru’s 1954 mistake in implicitly accepting, in the Panchsheel Treaty, China’s annexation of Tibet, without securing (or even seeking) recognition of the then-existing Indo-Tibetan border.	瓦杰帕伊的失招加剧了1954年尼赫鲁犯下的错误。 尼赫鲁在《潘查希拉条约》（Panchsheel Treaty）中间接接受了中国对西藏的吞并以及不保证（甚至寻求）承认当时的印度-西藏边界。


In fact, under the treaty, India forfeited all of the extraterritorial rights and privileges in Tibet that it had inherited from imperial Britain.	事实上，根据该条约，印度丧失了一切其从大英帝国那里所继承的西藏治外法权和特权。


As agreed in the pact, India withdrew its “military escorts” from Tibet, and conceded to the Chinese government, at a “reasonable” price, the postal, telegraph, and public telephone services operated by the Indian government in the “Tibet region of China.”	根据条约，印度从西藏撤回“军事防卫”，并以“合理”的价格向中国政府让渡印度政府在“中国西藏地区”所经营的邮政、电报和公共电话服务。


For its part, China repeatedly violated the eight-year pact, ultimately mounting the trans-Himalayan invasion of 1962.	而中国一再违反八年契约，最终在1962年跨过喜马拉雅山入侵印度。


In short, China used the Panchsheel Treaty to outwit and humiliate India.	简言之，中国利用《潘查希拉条约》欺骗和羞辱印度。


Yet, just this summer, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s new government sent Vice President Hamid Ansari to Beijing to participate in the treaty’s 60th anniversary celebrations.	但是，就在今年夏天，莫迪总理的新政府还派副总统安萨里（Hamid Ansari）赴北京出席该条约签署60周年庆典。


Ansari was accompanied by Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, who, during her stay, signed an agreement allowing China – without any quid pro quo – to establish industrial parks in India.	与安萨里同行的还有商务部长西萨拉曼（Nirmala Sitharaman），访问中国期间，她签署了一份协议，允许中国在不做出任何交换条件的情况下在印度建立工业园区。


This will exacerbate existing imbalances in the bilateral trade relationship – China currently exports to India three times more than it imports from the country, with most of these imports being raw materials –thereby exposing India to increased strategic pressure and serving China’s interest in preventing India’s rise as a peer competitor.	这将加剧现有的双边贸易关系失衡——目前中国对印出口是其从印度进口的四倍，其中大部分进口品是原材料——从而让印度承受更大的战略压力，阻止印度成为旗鼓相当的竞争对手，令中国受益。


The fact that the spotlight is now on China’s Tibet-linked claim to Arunachal Pradesh, rather than on Tibet’s status, underscores China’s dominance in setting the bilateral agenda.	如今的焦点是中国的西藏相关主张对象直至阿鲁纳恰尔邦，而不是西藏的地位，这一事实表明中国主宰着双边日程。


Given India’s dependence on cross-border water flows from Tibet, it could end up paying a heavy price.	由于印度需要依赖来自西藏的跨国河流，它最终将付出沉重代价。


Embarrassed by China’s relentless border violations – according to Indian Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju, there were 334 in the first 216 days of this year – India has recently drawn a specious distinction between “transgressions” and “intrusions” that enables it to list all of the breaches simply as transgressions.	印度因为中国不断的边界入侵而十分难堪——根据印度内政部长里吉朱（Kiren Rijiju）的说法，在今年的前216天中发生了334次——最近在“越界”和“闯入”之间划了一条暧昧的分界线，从而把所有的侵犯边界行为都归为越界。


But word play will get India nowhere.	但这对印度来说于事无补。


A reminder of that came at July’s BRICS summit of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, when, yet again, China emerged ahead of India.	在这方面，今年7月的金砖国家峰会是一个提醒。 在巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非出席的这次峰会上，中国再一次压倒了印度。


The BRICS’ New Development Bank, it was announced, will be headquartered in Shanghai, not New Delhi; India’s consolation prize was that an Indian will serve as the Bank’s first president.	金砖国家的新开发银行总部将设在上海而不是新德里； 而印度得到的安慰是该银行的首任行长将由印度人出任。


Under pressure from an unyielding and revanchist China, India urgently needs to craft a prudent and carefully calibrated counter-strategy.	在顽固地想要恢复失地的中国的压力下，印度迫切地需要一个审慎的、精心调整的遏制战略。


For starters, India could rescind its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, while applying economic pressure through trade, as China has done to Japan and the Philippines when they have challenged its territorial claims.	首先，印度可以撤销其对中国西藏主权的承认，同时通过贸易施加经济压力，正如中国在日本和菲律宾挑战其领土主张一样。


By hinging China’s market access on progress in resolving political, territorial, and water disputes, India can prevent China from fortifying its leverage.	印度可以通过将中国的市场准入与解决政治、领土和水纠纷的进展挂钩，从而阻止中国变本加厉。


Moreover, India must be willing to respond to Chinese incursions by sending troops into strategic Chinese-held territory.	此外，印度必须准备着以向中控战略领土派遣军队作为对中国乳清的回应。


This would raise the stakes for Chinese border violations, thereby boosting deterrence.	这将增加中国冒犯边界的代价，从而增强威慑。


Finally, India must consider carefully the pretense of partnership with China that it is forming through trade and BRICS agreements – at least until a more balanced bilateral relationship emerges.	最后，印度必须仔细考虑其通过贸易和金砖国家协议与中国形成的伙伴关系的伪善性——至少在形成更加平衡的双边关系前是如此。


After all, neither booming trade nor membership in the BRICS club offers protection from bullying.	毕竟，贸易繁荣和加入金砖国家俱乐部都不能让印度免于欺凌。


The International Misrule of Law	国际法暴政


NEW DELHI – On the face of it, China’s recent declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) extending to territories that it does not control has nothing in common with America’s arrest and strip-search of a New York-based Indian diplomat for allegedly underpaying a housekeeper she had brought with her from India.	新德里——表面上，中国不久前宣布在其实际控制区外设立防空识别区（ADIZ）与美国因涉嫌克扣印度管家而逮捕一名驻纽约印度外交官并对其进行搜身似乎毫无关联之处。


In fact, these episodes epitomize both powers’ unilateralist approach to international law.	其实，上述事件集中体现了两个大国所奉行的单边主义国际法。


A just, rules-based global order has long been touted by powerful states as essential for international peace and security.	大国一贯吹嘘建立在规则基础上的公正的全球秩序对国际和平与安全至关重要。


Yet there is a long history of major powers flouting international law while using it against other states.	但实际上大国却一边藐视国际法，一边借国际法来惩罚其他国家。


The League of Nations failed because it could not punish or deter such behavior.	国联解体就是因为无法惩罚或遏止这样的作法。


Today, the United States and China serve as prime examples of a unilateralist approach to international relations, even as they aver support for strengthening global rules and institutions.	今天，美中两国是国际关系中奉行单边主义作法的典型代表，即使两国都信誓旦旦支持强化全球制度和规则。


Consider the US, which has refused to join key international treaties – for example, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (which has not yet entered into force), and the 1998 International Criminal Court Statute.	以美国为例，美国一直拒绝签署重要的国际公约——其中包括1982年的联合国海洋法公约（UNCLOS）、1997年的联合国国际水道非航行使用法公约（该公约目前尚未生效），以及1998年的国际刑事法院规约。


Indeed, unilateralism remains the leitmotif of US foreign policy, and this is also reflected in its international interventions, whether cyber warfare and surveillance, drone attacks, or efforts to bring about regime change.	事实上，单边主义依然是美国外交政策的主旋律，这也体现在包括网络战、监控、无人机袭击或者以政权更迭为目的的国际干预行动之中。


Meanwhile, China’s growing geopolitical heft has led to muscle-flexing and territorial claims in Asia that disregard international norms.	同时，中国地缘政治重要性日渐增长已导致其无视国际规则炫耀武力和在亚洲提出领土要求。


China rejects some of the same treaties that the US has declined to join, including the International Criminal Court Statute and the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the first law to establish rules on the shared resources of transnational rivers, lakes, and aquifers).	中国和美国一样拒绝签署某些协议，包括国际刑事法院规约和联合国国际水道非航行使用法公约（这是明确跨国河流、湖泊及地下蓄水层资源共享规则的首部国际法）。


Indeed, despite their geopolitical dissonance, the world’s most-powerful democracy and its most powerful autocracy have much in common when it comes to how they approach international law.	事实上，尽管在地缘政治问题上分歧颇多，世界最大的民主国家和世界最大的独裁国家却在对待国际法的问题上有很多共同之处。


For example, the precedent that the US set in a 1984 International Court of Justice (ICJ) case filed by Nicaragua still resonates in China, underscoring that might remains right in international relations.	比方说，由美国开创的尼加拉瓜国际法庭案先例在中国仍能引发共鸣，凸显强权依然是国际关系的正确规则。


The ICJ held that America violated international law both by supporting the contras in their insurrection against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua’s harbors.	当时国际法庭裁定美国支持尼反政府武装叛乱推翻尼加拉瓜政府和在尼加拉瓜港口布雷的行为均违反国际法。


But the US prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any compensation by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions that called for enforcement of the ICJ’s judgment.	但联合国安理会呼吁执行国际法院判决的决议却遭到美国否决，致使尼加拉瓜未能得到任何补偿。


China still hews to Mao Zedong’s belief that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”	中国依然坚信毛泽东“枪杆子里面出政权”的信仰。


Indeed, while China ratified UNCLOS, it then reinterpreted the provisions to justify cartographic aggression in the South and East China Seas.	事实上，中国虽然批准了联合国海洋法公约，但随即重新解释该公约规定，为其对东南中国海的版图侵略寻找理由。


Worse still, China has refused to accept the UNCLOS dispute-settlement mechanism, thereby remaining unfettered in altering facts on the ground.	更糟的是，中国一直拒绝承认联合国海洋法公约的争端解决机制，从而可以继续无拘无束地改变现状。


The Philippines has filed a complaint against China with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.	菲律宾已经在国际海洋法法庭对中国提起诉讼。


China, however, has simply refused to participate in the proceedings, as if it were above international law.	但中国根本不参与诉讼，就好像自己凌驾于国际法之上。


Whatever the tribunal’s decision, China will simply shrug it off.	无论法院如何裁决，中国人都可以置之不理。


Only the Security Council can enforce an international tribunal’s judgment on a noncompliant state.	只有安理会有权对不服从国家执行裁决。


But China wields a veto there and will block enforcement of an adverse ruling, just as the US did in the Nicaragua case.	但中国手握否决权，可以像美国在尼加拉瓜案中一样阻止执行不利的判决。


China’s new ADIZ, while aimed at solidifying its claims to territories held by Japan and South Korea, is similarly provocative, because it extends to areas that China does not control, setting a dangerous precedent in international relations.	中国新设立的防空识别区旨在巩固对日韩所占领土的主权要求，新航空识别区因为延伸到中国实际控制区外而同样具有挑衅性，并在国际关系领域开创了危险的先例。


Japan has asked its airlines to ignore China’s demand for advance notification of flights, even if they are merely transiting the new zone and not heading toward Chinese territorial airspace.	日本要求其航空公司无视中国有关航班预先通知的要求，中国要求一切航班均需预先通知，即使这些航班只是途径新识别区，而不是飞往中国领空。


By contrast, the US has advised American carriers to obey China’s prior-notification demand.	相反，美国却已通知美国航母服从中国预先通知的要求。


There is a reason for this: Although the prior-notification rule in American policy applies only to aircraft headed for US national airspace, in practice the US demands advance notification of all flights through its ADIZ, regardless of their intended destination.	这里面有个缘故：虽然美国政策中预先通知原则仅适用于飞往美国空域的飞行器，但实际操作中美方却要求途经其防空识别区的所有航班无论目的地是哪里都要预先通报。


If other countries emulated the example set by China and the US by establishing unilateral claims to international airspace, a dangerous situation would result.	如果其他国家模仿中美先例单方面主张国际空域，那么将会导致非常危险的后果。


Binding international rules are thus imperative in order to ensure the safety of fast-growing commercial air traffic.	因此必须制定强制性国际规则，以确保快速发展的商业航空安全性。


But who is supposed to take the lead when China and the US have pursued a unilateralist approach on this issue?	但中美在这个问题上采取单边主义做法，那么谁又能在这个问题上带头？


Now consider the case of the Indian diplomat, Devyani Khobragade, whose treatment India’s national security adviser called “despicable and barbaric.”	现在回到印度外交官科巴拉加德的案例，她所受到的待遇被印度安全顾问形容为“卑鄙而野蛮”。


True, as a consulate-based diplomat, Khobragade enjoyed only limited diplomatic immunity under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.	诚然，身为一名领事馆外交官，科巴拉加德按照1963年维也纳领事关系公约仅享有有限的外交豁免权。


But this convention guarantees freedom from detention until trial and conviction, except for “grave offenses.”	但该公约规定只要所犯不属于严重罪行，在对外交官进行审判和定罪前不得予以拘留。


Can a wage dispute qualify as a “grave offense” warranting arrest and humiliation?	工资纠纷是不是应该遭到逮捕羞辱的“严重罪行”？


Would the US tolerate similar treatment of one of its consular officers?	美国能否容忍以同样方式对待自己的领事官员？


The harsh truth is that the US interprets the Vienna Convention restrictively at home but liberally overseas, in order to shield even the military and intelligence contractors that it sends abroad.	严峻的现实是美国在国内对维也纳公约进行限制性解释，而在海外却严格执行，甚至用于保护其派遣出境的军事及情报承包商。


A classic case involved the CIA contractor Raymond Davis, who fatally shot two men in 2011 in Lahore, Pakistan.	一个经典案例涉及中情局承包商雷蒙德·戴维斯，戴维斯2011年在巴基斯坦拉合尔打死两名男性。


Claiming that Davis was a bona fide diplomat with its Lahore consulate, and thus enjoyed immunity from prosecution, the US accused Pakistan of “illegally detaining” him, with President Barack Obama defending him as “our diplomat in Pakistan.”	美国声称戴维斯是其拉合尔领事馆事实上的外交官，指控巴基斯坦对其进行“非法拘禁”，美国总统奥巴马称戴维斯为“驻巴基斯坦的我方外交官。 ”


Despite a widely held belief that the current international system is based on rules, the fact is that major powers are rule makers and rule imposers, not rule takers.	虽然普遍认为当前国际体系建立在规则基础之上，但事实是大国是规则的制定者和执行者，但却不是规则的遵守者。


They have a propensity to violate or manipulate international law when it is in their interest to do so.	他们一般在符合自身利益时违反或操纵国际法。


If universal conformity to a rules-based international order still seems like a distant prospect, an important reason is that countries that should be leading the charge still so often behave like rogue states.	如果说所有国家遵守以规则为基础的国际法目前仍然遥不可及，那么重要原因是本应领导这项事业的国家却仍然往往像流氓国家般行事。


Japan’s Obama Problem	日本的奥巴马问题


TOKYO – When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Tokyo’s controversial Yasukuni Shrine last month, Chinese leaders predictably condemned his decision to honor those behind “the war of aggression against China.”	东京—当日本首相安倍晋三拜访存在争议的东京靖国神社时，中国领导人如意料之中谴责安倍瞻仰“侵华战争”背后的人。


But Abe was also sending a message to Japan’s main ally and defender, the United States.	但安倍也在向日本的主要盟友和保护人美国释放信号。


Faced with US President Barack Obama’s reluctance to challenge China’s muscle-flexing and territorial ambitions in Asia – reflected in Japan’s recent split with the US over China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) – an increasingly desperate Abe was compelled to let both countries know that restraint cannot be one-sided.	美国总统奥巴马不愿意挑战中国在亚洲的耀武扬威和领土野心——近期日本和美国在中国新划定的防空识别区问题上的反差就是明证——这让越来越焦急的安倍被迫通知两国，克制不可能是单方面的。


For China and South Korea, the Yasukuni Shrine’s inclusion of 14 Class A war criminals who were executed after World War II has made it a potent symbol of Japan’s prewar militarism, and Abe had long refrained from visiting it – including during his previous stint as prime minister.	对中国和韩国来说，供奉14名在二战后被处死的甲级战犯的靖国神社是日本战前军国主义的化身，安倍一直没有访问靖国神社，包括在他第一次担任首相期间。


He may well have maintained that stance had China not established the ADIZ, which set an ominous new precedent by usurping international airspace over the East China Sea, including areas that China does not control.	如果中国不划定防空识别区——这是一个不祥的预兆，侵占了东海上空非中方控制区域的国际空域——安倍也许将继续保持原来的立场。


(Abe does not appear to have considered the possibility that his pilgrimage to Yasukuni might end up helping China by deepening South Korea’s antagonism toward Japan.)	（安倍应该没有考虑他参拜靖国神社最终会加深韩国对日本的敌意、从而有利于中国的可能性。 ）


The Obama administration had been pressing Abe not to aggravate regional tensions by visiting Yasukuni – an entreaty reiterated by Vice President Joe Biden during a recent stopover in Tokyo on his way to Beijing.	奥巴马政府一直在敦促安倍不要因为参拜靖国神社加剧地区紧张——副总统拜登在访问北京之旅中特意经停东京，重申这一要求。


In fact, Biden’s tour deepened Japan’s security concerns, because it highlighted America’s focus on balancing its relationships in East Asia, even if that means tolerating an expansionist China as the strategic equivalent of an allied Japan.	事实上，拜登之旅加深了日本的安全担心，因为这强调了美国重在平衡其在东亚的关系，即使这意味着容忍���张主义的中国，把它视为与盟友日本一样重要的战略考虑点。


Instead of postponing Biden’s trip to Beijing to demonstrate disapproval of China’s new ADIZ, the US advised its commercial airlines to respect it, whereas Japan asked its carriers to ignore China’s demand that they file their flight plans through the zone in advance.	美国并没有取消拜登的北京之行以表明不承认中国新划定的防空识别区，反而建议美国商业航空公司尊重中国的这一举动。 而日本要求它的飞机忽视中国关于通过防空识别区的航班预先递交飞行计划的要求。


By calling for Japanese restraint, the US stoked Japan’s anxiety, without winning any concessions from China.	美国要求日本保持克制，这加剧了日本的焦虑，也没有赢得中国的让步。


Now, the widening rift between the US and Japan has become starkly apparent.	如今，美日之间日益扩大的裂痕已经清晰可见。


Abe feels let down by Obama’s decision not to take a firm stand on the ADIZ – the latest in a series of aggressive moves by China to upend the status quo in the East China Sea.	安倍感觉被奥巴马不就防空识别区问题采取强硬立场的决定出卖了。 划定防空识别区是中国逆转东海现状的一系列侵略性动作的最新一步。


For its part, the US government openly – and uncharacteristically – criticized Abe’s Yasukuni visit, with its embassy in Japan releasing a statement saying that the US was “disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.”	而美国政府一反常态地公开批评安倍参拜靖国神社，其驻日大使发表声明称美国“对日本领导人采取会加深日本与邻国紧张的行为表示失望”。


Such recriminations do not mean that the US-Japan alliance – the bedrock of America’s forward military deployment in Asia – is in immediate jeopardy.	如此反诘并不意味着日美同盟——美国在亚洲的积极军事部署的基石——马上会受到损害。


Japan remains a model ally that hosts a large US troop presence, even paying for the upkeep of American forces on its soil.	日本仍是模范盟友，国土上驻有大量美国军队，甚至负责驻日美军的维持费用。


Indeed, Abe’s visit to Yasukuni came only a day after he completed a long-elusive, US-backed bilateral deal to relocate America’s airbase in Okinawa to a less populous area of the island.	事实上，在参拜靖国神社前一天，他刚刚完成了长期未能完成的美国所支持的双边协议，将美国驻冲绳空军基地迁往冲绳岛人口较少的地区。


And he supports Japan’s entry into the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, an emerging regional trading bloc that will exclude China.	安倍也支持日本加入美国领衔的、不含中国的新兴地区贸易协定跨太平洋合作伙伴关系。


Nonetheless, a psychological schism between the Abe and Obama administrations has gradually developed.	尽管如此，安倍和奥巴马政府之间的心理分裂正在逐渐发展。


While the US frets about Abe’s nationalistic stance vis-à-vis China and South Korea, Japanese officials have stopped trying to conceal their uneasiness over Obama’s effort to strike a balance between its alliance commitments and its desire for Sino-American ties.	美国担心安倍针对中国和韩国的民族主义立场，与此同时，日本官员也不再掩饰他们对奥巴马在其联盟承诺和中美关系渴望之间取得平衡的努力的不安。


Biden spent more than twice as much time in discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping as he did with Abe.	拜登与中国国家主席习近平对话讨论的时间是比与安倍多一倍。


The paradox is that while anxiety over China’s growing assertiveness has returned the US to the center of Asian geopolitics and enabled it to strengthen its security arrangements in the region, this has not led to action aimed at quelling China’s expansionary policies.	矛盾之处在于，尽管对中国日益自信的担忧让美国重新回到亚洲地缘政治的中心并强化其在亚太地区的安全安排，但并没有带来旨在遏制中国扩张政策的行动。


As a result, Japan is becoming skeptical about America’s willingness to support it militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu Islands in China).	结果，日本对于美国是否愿意在中国袭击日本控制之下的钓鱼岛时予以军事支持产生了怀疑。


The Obama administration’s contradictory rhetoric – affirming that the US-Japan security treaty covers the Senkakus, while refusing to take a position on the islands’ sovereignty – has not helped.	奥巴马政府的矛盾说辞——确认美日安全条约覆盖钓鱼岛，但在钓鱼岛的主权问题上又不持立场——于事无补。


A wake-up call for Japan was Obama’s inaction in 2012, when China captured the Scarborough Shoal, part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.	让日本清醒过来的是2012年奥巴马在中国占领菲律宾专属经济区海域的黄岩岛事件上的不作为。


In an effort to end a tense standoff, the US brokered a deal in which both countries agreed to withdraw their maritime vessels from the area.	为了结束紧张的僵局，美国牵线搭桥形成了一个协议，中菲两国同意从该海域撤军。


But, after the Philippines withdrew, China occupied the shoal – and, despite a mutual-defense treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US did little in response.	但是，在菲律宾海军舰只撤出后，中国占领了黄岩岛，而尽管美国和菲律宾签订了共同防务条约，美国对此几乎无动于衷。


This emboldened China effectively to seize a second Philippine-claimed shoal, part of the disputed Spratly Islands.	这让中国放大了胆子，又在存在争议的南沙群岛侵占了第二个菲律宾主张主权的岛礁。


Factors like geographical distance and economic interdependence have made the US wary of entanglement in Asia’s territorial feuds.	地理距离和经济互赖等因素让美国对于涉足亚洲领土争端慎之又慎。


And, unlike Asian countries, America would not really suffer from a Chinese “Monroe Doctrine” declaring that China would not accept any outside intervention in Asia.	而与亚洲国家不同，美国不会因为中国的“门罗主义”——中国不会接受对亚洲的任何外部干预——而真正受损。


But America’s neutrality on sovereignty disputes threatens to undermine its bilateral security alliances (which, by preventing countries like Japan from turning toward militarism, actually serve Chinese interests).	但美国在主权争端上的中立有可能影响到它的双边安全联盟（而防止日本等国家转向军国主义，美国实际上是在为中国的利益服务）。


The Obama administration’s Asian balancing act obfuscates the broader test of power that China’s recent actions represent.	奥巴马政府的亚洲平衡策略让中国最近的举动所呈现的广义实力考验变得模糊了。


What is at stake are not merely islands in the East and South China Seas, but a rules-based regional order, freedom of navigation of the seas and skies, access to maritime resources, and balanced power dynamics in Asia.	此事非但关于东海和南海上的几个岛屿，也关乎基于规则的地区秩序、航海和航空自由、海洋资源和亚洲实力平衡。


By fueling Japanese insecurity, US policy risks bringing about the very outcome – a return to militarism – that it aims to prevent.	美国的政策加剧了日本的不安全感，有可能导致美国旨在防止的结果——军国主义。


Arming the Elephant	武装大象


NEW DELHI – The rise in US arms sales to India is being widely cited as evidence of the two countries’ deepening defense relationship.	新德里—美国对印军售增长被广泛解读为两国深化防务关系的证据。


But the long-term sustainability of the relationship, in which India is more a client than a partner, remains a deep concern for Indians.	但这一关系的长期可持续性——印度更多地是客户而不是合作伙伴——仍是印度心头的深深疑虑。


Does the recently issued Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation, which establishes intent to move beyond weapons sales to the co-production of military hardware,mark a turning point, or is it merely a contrivance to placate India?	最近的防务合作联合声明（Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation，确定了超越武器销售、迈向军事硬件合作生产的方向）标志了一个转折点，还是仅仅是对印怀柔策略？


The factors driving the strategic relationship’s development are obvious.	推动战略关系发展的因素显而易见。


Since 2006, bilateral trade has quadrupled, reaching roughly $100 billion this year.	自2006年以来，双边贸易翻了四倍，今年达到了约1000亿美元。


And, over the last decade, US defense exports to India have skyrocketed from just $100 million to billions of dollars annually.	此外，在过去十年中，美国对印防务年出口从1亿美元猛增到数十亿美元。


With US military spending slowing and other export markets remaining tight, American defense firms are eager to expand sales to India, which is now the world’s largest arms importer.	随着美国军事支出减缓和其他出口市场依然紧张，美国防务企业急切地欲扩张对印销量，后者现在是世界第二大武器进口国。


And the political environment is amenable to their plans: India now conducts more joint military exercises with the US than with any other country.	政治环境也有利于它们的算盘：印度与美国进行的联合军演次数超过了其他任何一个国家。


For the US, displacing Russia as India’s leading arms supplier was a major diplomatic triumph, akin to Egypt’s decision during the Cold War to shift its allegiance – and its arms supplier – from the Soviet Union to America.	对美国来说，取代俄罗斯成为印度第一大武器供应商是一次重大外交胜利，不亚于冷战期间埃及从苏联盟友（以及武器供应）阵营跳到美国阵营。


The difference is that India can actually pay for the weapons that it acquires.	区别在于印度能够为其购买的武器付出真金白银。


And the bills are substantial.	订单是巨大的。


In recent years, India has ordered American arms worth roughly $9 billion.	最近几年，印度向美国订购了价值约90亿美元的武器。


It is now purchasing additional US weapons systems – 22 Apache attack helicopters, six C-130J turbo military transport aircraft, 15 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and 145 M-777 ultra-light howitzers – worth $5 billion.	眼下它还在购买更多的美国武器系统——22架阿帕奇攻击直升机、六架C-130J涡轮军事运输机、15架支奴干起重直升机、145台M-777超轻型榴弹炮——价值50亿美元。


The value of India’s arms contracts with US firms exceeds that of American military aid to any country except Israel.	印度与美国企业签订的武器合同的价值超过了除以色列以外的任何一个国家。


Nirupama Rao, India’s ambassador to the US, has called such defense transactions “the new frontier” in US-India relations and “a very promising one at that.”	印度驻美国大使拉奥（Nirupama Rao）称这些防务交易为美印关系“新前沿”，且“前途十分光明”。


But, while it is certainly a positive development for the US, for India, it represents a new frontier of dependency.	但是，尽管对美国来说这毫无疑问是积极的，但对印度来说，这代表了新的依赖性。


The problem is that India’s defense sector has virtually nothing that it can sell to the US.	问题在于印度防务部门几乎没有可以卖给美国的东西。


The country has yet to develop a credible armament-production base like that of, say, Japan, which is co-developing advanced weapons systems with the US.	印度还没有发展出与（比如）日本类似的可靠的武器生产基础，日本已可以与美国合作开发先进的武器系统。


In fact, India depends on imports – not only from major suppliers like the US and Russia, but also from Israel, the world’s sixth-largest arms exporter – to meet even basic defense needs.	事实上，甚至是基本防务需要，印度也依赖进口——不仅从美国和俄罗斯等主要供应国进口，也从世界第六大武器出口国以色列进口。


Moreover, India’s leaders have not leveraged the bargaining power afforded by its massive arms purchases to advance national interests.	此外，印度领导人并未利用大量购买所带来的议价能力争取国家利益。


They could, for example, try to persuade the US to stop selling arms to Pakistan, or secure better access to the American market for India’s highly competitive IT and pharmaceutical sectors, which are facing new US non-tariff barriers.	比如，他们本可以试图说服美国停止向巴基斯坦军售，或要求让印度竞争力很强但面临着新的非关税壁垒的IT和制药部门更好地进入美国市场。


Applying the recent declaration on defense cooperation will not be easy.	最新的防务合作声明的运用起来并非易事。


For example, efforts to identify specific opportunities for collaborative weapons-related projects are to be pursued in accordance with “national policies and procedures.”	比如，认识武器相关合作工程的具体机会的努力将根据“国家政策和程序”进行。


But the two sides cannot truly “place each other at the same level as their closest partners” unless national policies and procedures – especially in the US – evolve sufficiently.	但双方不可能真正“彼此将对方置于与最紧密伙伴相同的地位”，除非国家政策和程序——特别是美国——充分发展。


Similarly, the declaration merely reiterates America’s position that it supports India’s “full membership” in the four US-led technology-control regimes: the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group.	类似地，声明仅仅反复强调美国的立场——支持印度在美国领导的四大技术控制机制——瓦森纳协定（Wassenaar Arrangement）、核供应国集团（Nuclear Suppliers Group）、导弹技术控制制度（Missile Technology Control Regime）和澳大利亚集团（Australia Group）中的“完全成员”地位。


Given that US policy is to deny sensitive technologies to those outside these regimes, India’s admission would make all the difference in facilitating technology sharing.	美国的政策是不向这些机制之外的国家提供敏感技术，因此印度的进入将极大地有利于技术共享。


But the declaration does not include any commitment from the US to expedite India’s admission.	但声明并未包括任何美国加快印度进入的承诺。


All of this suggests that the US is pandering to India’s desire for a more equal defense relationship.	所有这些表明美国在迎合印度对更平等的防务关系的渴望。


It is willing to co-produce with India some smaller defensive systems, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, in order to pave the way for more multi-billion-dollar deals for US-made systems.	美国愿意与印度合作生产某些小型防务系统，如“标枪”反坦克导弹，从而为几十亿美元的美制系统大单铺平道路。


The Indian media are doing their part to strengthen the illusion of progress, latching onto the phrase “closest partners” in their acclaim for the agreement.	印度媒体也在煽风点火制造进展幻觉，紧紧抓住“最紧密合作伙伴”一词为协议喝彩。


The irony is that, while America’s pursuit of a stronger defense relationship with India is aimed largely at offsetting an increasingly assertive China, US President Barack Obama has charted a neutral course in Sino-Indian disputes.	讽刺之处在于，尽管美国之所以寻求与印度的更强的防务关系，其目的很大程度上是遏制日益专横的中国，但美国总统奥巴马却在中印争端中采取了中立立场。


For example, the US has declined to hold joint military exercises in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China has claimed as “South Tibet” since 2006.	比如，美国拒绝在印度东北部的阿鲁纳恰尔邦（中国自2006年以来称之为“藏南”）采取联合军事行动。


As it stands, the US sells mainly defensive weapons systems to India, while Russia, for example, offers India offensive weapons, including strategic bombers, an aircraft carrier, and a lease on a nuclear submarine.	可以这样说，美国主要向印度出售防御性武器系统，而（比如）俄罗斯向印度提供进攻性武器，包括战略轰炸机、航空母舰和核潜艇租赁。


Would the US be willing to sell India offensive weapons – including high-precision conventional arms, anti-submarine systems, and long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles – that could help to deter Chinese military preemption?	美国会愿意向印度出售进攻性武器——包括高精确度常规武器、反潜系统和长程空基和地基巡航导弹——以有助于威慑中国的军事先发制人吗？


As US-India defense cooperation broadens, this question will loom ever larger.	随着美印防务合作的扩展，这个问题也会变得越来越大。


America’s Never-Ending War	美国从未结束的战争


NEW DELHI – It is official: US President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama is at war again.	新德里—官方消息：美国总统、诺贝尔和平奖获得者奥巴马又要打仗了。


After toppling Libyan ruler Muammar el-Qaddafi and bombing targets in Somalia and Yemen, Obama has initiated airstrikes in the Syria-Iraq belt, effectively declaring war on the Islamic State – a decision that will involve infringing on the sovereign, if disintegrating, state of Syria.	在推翻利比亚统治者卡扎菲、轰炸索马里和也门目标后，奥巴马发动了对伊拉克北部的空袭，向伊斯兰国事实宣战——这一战争决定将影响叙利亚的主权甚至致其分崩离析。


In his zeal to intervene, Obama is again disregarding US and international law by seeking approval from neither the US Congress nor the United Nations Security Council.	在他的干预热情中，奥巴马再次违反了美国和国际法——他既没有征得美国国会的同意，也没有获得联合国安理会的批准。


Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, launched America’s so-called “war on terror” to defeat groups that he insisted wanted to “establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia.”	奥巴马的前任小布什发动了所谓的“反恐战争”以打击他所坚称的意在“建立从西班牙一直延伸到印度尼西亚的极端伊斯兰帝国”的组织。


But Bush’s invasion and occupation of Iraq was so controversial that it fractured the global consensus to fight terror, with the Guantánamo Bay detention center and the rendition and torture of suspects coming to symbolize the war’s excesses.	但布什对伊拉克的入侵和占领引起了巨大争议，甚至破坏了全球反恐战争共识，关塔那摩湾监狱以及对嫌犯的引渡和虐待无不象征着这场战争的过犹不及。


After Obama took office, he sought to introduce a gentler, subtler tone.	奥巴马上台后，选择了更温和、更微妙的基调。


Contending in a 2009 interview that “the language we use matters,” he rebranded the war on terror as a “struggle” and a “strategic challenge.”	在“用词很重要”的2009的采访中，他将反恐战争改名为“斗争”和“战略挑战”。


But the rhetorical shift did not translate into a change in strategy, with the Obama administration moving beyond security concerns to use its anti-terrorism activities to advance America’s broader geopolitical interests.	但修辞的变化并没有带来战略改变，奥巴马政府仍然超越了安全顾虑的边界，利用其反恐活动为美国更宽泛的地缘政治利益服务。


Thus, instead of viewing the elimination of Osama bin Laden in 2011 as the culmination of the anti-terror “struggle” that Bush launched, the Obama administration increased aid to “good” rebels (such as those in Libya), while pursuing “bad” terrorists more vehemently, including through a “targeted killing” program.	因此，奥巴马政府没有将2011年清除本·拉登的行动视为布什所发动的反恐“斗争”的顶峰，反而增加了对“好”叛军（如利比亚）的支持，同时采取包括“定点清除”在内的手段更猛烈地追杀“坏”恐怖分子。


When it comes to terrorist activity, however, such lines are difficult to draw.	但是，在恐怖活动方面，要划定界线是很困难的。


For example, Obama initially placed the Islamic State in the “good” category, as it undermined Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s rule and Iran’s interests in Syria and Iraq.	比如，奥巴马一开始将伊斯兰国归为“好”的一类，因为它破坏了叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿达的的统治和伊朗在叙利亚和伊拉克的利益。


His position changed only after the Islamic State threatened to overrun Iraq’s Kurdish regional capital, Erbil – home to US military, intelligence, diplomatic, and business facilities.	他的立场直到伊斯兰国威胁要颠覆伊拉克库尔德地区首付埃尔比勒（Erbil，美国军事、情报、外交和商业设施所在地）才有所改变。


Add to that the beheadings of two American journalists, and suddenly Obama’s team was using Bush’s war rhetoric, declaring that the US is at war with the Islamic State “in the same way that we are at war with Al Qaeda and its affiliates all around the globe.”	加之两名美国记者突然遭遇斩首，因此奥巴马团队突然开始采用布什��战争言辞，宣布美国将“以与对待基地组织及其全球同伙同样的方式”和伊斯兰国开战。


America’s war on terror now risks becoming a permanent war against an expanding list of enemies – often inadvertently created by its own policies.	如今，美国的反恐战争有可能演变为一场持久战争，对手的名单越来越长——并且往往来自其自身政策的副作用。


Just as covert aid to Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet rebels in the 1980s contributed to Al Qaeda’s emergence – something that Hillary Clinton acknowledged when she was Obama’s secretary of state – the help that the US and its allies provided to Syrian insurgents after they emerged in 2011 contributed to the rise of the Islamic State.	正如20世纪80年代对阿富汗的反苏叛军的秘密援助导致了基地组织的崛起——希拉里·克林顿在担任奥巴马的国务卿期间也承认了这一点——2011年叙利亚叛军出现后美国及其盟友对他们援助也导致了伊斯兰国的崛起。


The US returned to Afghanistan in 2001 to wage an as-yet-unfinished war on the jihadists whom its actions had spawned.	2001年，美国返回阿富汗，开始了至今仍未结束的战争。 其对手——圣战主义者越打越多。


Likewise, it is now launching a war in Iraq and Syria against the offspring of Bush’s forced regime change in Baghdad and Obama’s ill-conceived plan to topple Assad.	类似地，如今美国所发动的伊拉克和叙利亚战争的对手正是布什强迫巴格达政权发生更迭和奥巴马颠覆巴沙尔的失误政策所造成的。


It is time for the US to recognize that since it launched its war on terror, the scourge has only spread.	美国应该认识到，自其发动反恐战争以来，兵灾越打越盛。


The Afghanistan-Pakistan belt has remained “ground zero” for transnational terrorism, and once-stable countries like Libya, Iraq, and Syria have emerged as new hubs.	阿富汗-巴基斯坦一带仍是跨国恐怖主义的“原爆点”，而曾经稳定的利比亚、伊拉克和叙利亚等国家则成了新的枢纽。


Obama’s effort to strike a Faustian bargain with the Afghan Taliban, whose top leaders enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, indicates that he is more interested in confining terrorism to the Middle East than defeating it – even if it means leaving India to bear the brunt of terrorist activity.	奥巴马想与阿富汗塔利班达成浮士德式的交易，而后者最高领袖在巴基斯坦逍遥法外，这表明他更想将恐怖主义限制在中东，而不是击溃恐怖主义——即使这意味着印度将成为恐怖主义的首当其冲者。


(In fact, Pakistan’s ongoing war of terror against India also sprang from America’s anti-Soviet operation in Afghanistan – the largest in the CIA’s history – as the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence siphoned off a large share of the billions of dollars in military aid for the Afghan rebels.)	（事实上，迄今仍在进行的巴基斯坦与印度的反恐战争也源于美国在阿富汗的反苏行动——这也是中央情报局历史上规模最大的行动——因为巴基斯坦三军情报局（Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence）随后继承了给阿富汗叛军的数十亿美元军事援助的大头。 ）


Similarly, Obama’s strategy toward the Islamic State seeks merely to limit the reach of a barbaric medieval order.	类似地，奥巴马的伊斯兰国战略也只是意图限制野蛮中世纪秩序的蔓延。


Moments after declaring his intention to “degrade and destroy” the group, Obama responded to a reporter’s request for clarification by stating that his real goal is to turn the Islamic State into a “manageable problem.”	在宣布要“击溃和摧毁”该集团后不久，应记者澄清要要求，奥巴马表示他的真正目标是将伊斯兰国变为“可管理的问题”。


Making matters worse, Obama plans to use the same tactics to fight the Islamic State that led to its emergence: authorizing the CIA, aided by some of the region’s oil sheikhdoms, to train and arm thousands of Syrian rebels.	更糟糕的是，奥巴马计划用导致伊斯兰国崛起的策略与伊斯兰国斗争：授权中央情报局在该地区几个 石油酋长的协助下训练和武装数千叙利亚叛军。


It is not difficult to see the risks inherent in flooding the Syrian killing fields with even more and better-armed fighters.	不难看到，用更多武装更精良的战士让叙利亚流血漂橹是十分危险的。


The US may have some of the world’s top think tanks and most highly educated minds.	美国也许拥有世界上最好的智库、教育程度最高的脑袋。


But it consistently ignores the lessons of its past blunders – and so repeats them.	但它一直无视过去的错误的教训，因此一再重蹈覆辙。


US-led policies toward the Islamic world have prevented a clash between civilizations only by fueling a clash within a civilization that has fundamentally weakened regional and international security.	美国领导的伊斯兰世界政策之所以能够防止文明之间的冲突，完全是因为它滋长了从根本上削弱地区和国际安全的文明内部的冲突。


An endless war waged on America’s terms against the enemies that it helped to create is unlikely to secure either steady international support or lasting results.	美国与其所帮助培养的敌人的无尽的战争不可能获得稳定的国际支持或带来持久性结果。


Nowhere is this more apparent than in the tepid Arab and Turkish response to America’s effort to assemble an international coalition in support of what the Obama administration admits will be a multiyear military offensive against the Islamic State.	阿拉伯和土耳其对于美国试图建立国际联盟支持奥巴马政府承认可能持续多年的针对伊斯兰国的军事打击反应冷淡就是最好的证明。


The risk that imperial hubris accelerates, rather than stems, Islamist terror is all too real – yet again.	帝国傲慢可能再一次助长而不是遏制伊斯兰恐怖主义，这一风险是实实在在的。


An Afghan Afghanistan	一个阿富汗人的阿富汗


NEW DELHI – As it braces for its upcoming presidential election, Afghanistan finds itself at another critical juncture, with its unity and territorial integrity at stake after 35 years of relentless war.	新德里—在即将迎来总统大选之际，阿富汗再一次面临关键时刻，在经历了35年的残酷战争后，它的统一和领土完整正处于紧要关头。


Can Afghanistan finally escape the cycle of militancy and foreign intervention that has plagued it for more than three decades?	阿富汗人能够最终摆脱困扰了他三十多年的交战和外国干预循环吗？


Two key questions are shaping discussions about Afghanistan’s post-2014 trajectory.	两大关键问题左右着2014年之后阿富汗的走势。


The first concerns the extent to which Pakistan will interfere in Afghan affairs, such as by aiding and abetting the Afghan Taliban and its main allies, including the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s militia.	第一个问题是巴基斯坦会在多大程度上干扰阿富汗事务，比如支持和教唆阿富汗塔利班及其盟友哈卡尼（Haqqani）网络和希克马蒂亚尔（Gulbuddin Hekmatyar）义勇军等。


This will depend on whether the United States conditions its generous aid to cash-strapped Pakistan on noninterference in Afghanistan.	这将取决于美国是否会用慷慨援助为条件换取急需现金的阿富汗人不干预阿富汗。


The second question is whether US-led NATO forces will continue to play any role in Afghanistan.	第二个问题是以美国为首的北约军队是否会继续在阿富汗起作用。


It is no secret that US President Barack Obama wants to maintain an American military presence in the country – a reversal of his declaration in 2009 that the US sought no military bases there.	美国总统奥巴马希望美军继续留在阿富汗早已不是秘密——这与他2009年宣布美国不寻求在阿富汗保留军事基地的说法相反。


Indeed, for several months, the US has been involved in painstaking negotiations with the Afghan government to conclude a bilateral security agreement that would enable the US to maintain bases in Afghanistan virtually indefinitely.	事实上，几个月来，美国和阿富汗政府进行了痛苦的谈判以确定可以让美国几乎无限制地在阿富汗保留军事基地的安全协议。


What was supposed to be an endgame for Afghanistan has turned into a new game over America’s basing strategy.	原本的阿富汗闹剧尾声最后成了关于美国新军事基地战略的新博弈。


But, despite having finalized the terms of the agreement, Obama failed to persuade Afghanistan’s outgoing president, Hamid Karzai, to sign it.	但是，尽管最终完成了协议条款，但奥巴马没能说服即将卸任的阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊在协议上签字。


That means that America’s role in the country can be settled only after the new Afghan president assumes office in May.	这意味着美国在阿富汗的角色只有在5月阿富汗新总统履新后才能敲定。


And the election’s outcome is far from certain.	而大选的结果非常不确定。


While all eight Afghan presidential candidates claim to support the security accord, this may offer little comfort to the US, given that most of the candidates have directly opposed US interests in the past – not to mention that several of them are former or current warlords.	八位总统候选人都宣称支持安全协议，但这并不能令美国安心，因为大部分候选人过去都曾直接反对美国的利益——更不用说其中一些还是前任或现任军阀了。


Moreover, there remains the question of how a residual American-led force, even if sizable, could make a difference in Afghanistan, given that a much larger force failed to secure a clear victory over the past 13 years.	此外，还有一个问题是以美国为首的留驻军队（即使规模不小）是否能给阿富汗带来不同，因为原先大得多的军队也没有在过去13年里确保明确的胜利。


Obama has offered no answer.	奥巴马并未给出答案。


Nonetheless, there is strong bipartisan support in the US for maintaining military bases in Afghanistan, as a means of projecting hard power, and the increasingly charged confrontation between the US and Russia over Ukraine has boosted that support considerably.	尽管如此，美国两党都十分支持保留阿富汗军事基地，以此彰显其硬实力，而美俄在乌克兰问题上日趋紧张的冲突更大大增加了这一方案的支持度。


In fact, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explicitly linked Russia’s actions in Ukraine with “talk of withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether the security situation warrants it or not.”	事实上，前国务卿赖斯明确地将俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动与“阿富汗撤军谈判”挂钩，“不论从安全局势看这是否必要”。


According to Rice, anything less than a residual force of 10,000 American troops will send the message that the US is not serious about helping to stabilize Afghanistan – a message that would embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin further.	按照赖斯的说法，只要留驻军队少于10,000人，其所释放的信号就是美国对于帮助稳定阿富汗局势并不上心——而这一信号会让俄罗斯总统普京更加肆无忌惮。


What she does not seem to recognize is that America’s deteriorating ties with Russia – a key conduit for US military supplies to Afghanistan – could undercut its basing strategy.	她似乎没有认识到，美国与俄罗斯关系的恶化可能削弱这一驻军战略——俄罗斯是美国向阿富汗提供军事供给的主要渠道。


The US is clearly convinced that a continued military presence in Afghanistan is in its interests.	美国显然认定在阿富汗保留驻军符合其利益。


But what would it mean for Afghanistan, a country that has long suffered at the hands of homegrown militant groups and foreign forces alike?	但这对长期饱受国内军事集团和外国势力摧残的阿富汗意味着什么？


Afghanistan has been at war since 1979, when Soviet forces launched a disastrous eight-year military campaign against multinational insurgent groups.	阿富汗自1979年以来便一直处于战争状态。 1979年，苏联人发动了长达八年的针对跨国反对集团的军事行动。


That intervention – together with the US and Saudi governments’ provision of arms to Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet guerrillas through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency – helped spread militancy and terrorism, which the subsequent US military intervention has kept alive.	这场干预——以及美国和沙特政府通过巴基斯坦三军情报局为阿富汗反苏游击队提供武装——导致了战争和恐怖主义的蔓延，并在后来的美国军事干预期间存活下来。


As a result, Afghanistan is now at risk of becoming partitioned along ethnic and tribal lines, with militia- or warlord-controlled enclaves proliferating.	结果，阿富汗现在极有可能陷入种族和部族分裂，割据势力或军阀控制的飞地将遍地开花。


In short, foreign involvement in Afghanistan has so far failed to produce positive results.	简单讲，外国对阿富汗的干预到目前为止都未能产生积极结果。


That is why Afghanistan’s political and security transition would be better served by focusing on three key internal factors:	因此，阿富汗的政治和安全转型更应该专注于三大关键国内因素：


·         Free and fair elections that are widely viewed as reflecting the will of the Afghan people to chart a peaceful future.	·         被广泛视为反映了阿富汗人民争取和平未来的自由而公平的选举。


·         The ability of Karzai’s successor to unite disparate ethnic and political groups – a tall order that can be filled only by a credible and widely respected leader.	·         卡尔扎伊的继任者须有能力统一各自为政的种族和政治集团——这一艰巨使命只有信誉卓著、广受尊敬的领袖才能实现。


·         The government’s success in building up Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic security forces.	·         阿富汗政府成功地建立多种族的阿富汗安全部队。


How next month’s presidential election plays out is crucial.	下个月的总统大选结果如何十分关键。


If threats and violence from the Taliban prevent too many Afghans from casting their vote, the legitimacy of the outcome could be questioned, possibly inciting even more turmoil, which Afghanistan’s fledging security forces would struggle to contain.	如果塔利班的威胁和暴力阻止太多的阿富汗人投出选票，那么选举结果的合法性就会受到质疑，可能带来进一步的动荡，刚刚建立的阿富汗安全部队将难以应付。


To be sure, the security forces have, so far, mostly held their ground, deterring assassinations and keeping Kabul largely secure.	平心而论，到目前为止，阿富汗安全部队表现尚可，阻止了多起暗杀，也大体维持了喀布尔的安全。


But they have also failed to make significant gains, and US plans to cut aid will make progress even more difficult.	但他们也没有取得重大成就，美国计划削减援助将让他们更加难有作为。


Unable to sustain the current force with reduced aid, the Afghan government will have to try to make it “leaner and meaner.”	如果无法在援助减少的情况下维持当前力量，阿富汗政府将不得不试图让他们“更加短小精悍”。


Whether it will succeed is far from certain.	是否能够成功远未可知。


That only increases the pressure to maintain a foreign military presence, even though it is unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan.	这进一步增加了留驻军队的压力，即使这也不可能为阿富汗带来和平。


In fact, the risk of becoming locked in a protracted, low-intensity war against militancy and warlordism is likely to outweigh any geopolitical advantages that the US would gain from military bases in the country.	事实上，在阿富汗保留军事基地可能让美国陷入针对军阀和割据势力的长期低强度战争，其风险或许比由此带来的地缘政治优势更大。


After all, the terrorist havens and command-and-control centers for the Afghan insurgency are located in Pakistan – undercutting the US military effort to rout the Afghan Taliban since 2001.	毕竟，巴基斯坦才是恐怖分子避难所和阿富汗叛军指挥控制中心，这令2001年以来美国搜寻阿富汗塔利班的军事行动大受掣肘。


All of this points to a clear conclusion: Afghanistan’s future must finally be put in the hands of Afghans.	所有这些都指向一个明确的结论：阿富汗的未来必须最终由阿富汗人掌握。


Outside resources should be devoted to building the governing capacity needed to keep the country united and largely peaceful.	外部资源应该用于建设统一阿富汗并保持其大体和平的治理能力上。


IMF Therapy for Brazil	IMF的巴西药方


MONTEVIDEO – Brazil’s economy is in intensive care.	蒙德维的亚—巴西经济已经进入了重症监护阶段。


And its intensifying political crisis – impeachment proceedings have now been initiated against President Dilma Rousseff for allegedly using irregular accounting maneuvers to disguise the size of the budget deficit – is raising serious questions about who can provide the much-needed treatment.	其严重的政治危机正在让人们深切忧虑谁能够为它提供急需的治疗。 目前，总统罗塞夫正面临弹劾程序，据称她使用了非法会计手段粉饰预算赤字规模。


The situation is certainly serious.	情况毫无疑问相当严重。


Output is contracting; fiscal revenues are faltering; and the budget deficit exceeds 9% of GDP.	产出正在收缩； 财政收入日益下降；


Inflation has surpassed the double-digit mark, forcing the central bank to raise interest rates – an approach that is unsustainable, given the deepening recession and the ballooning cost of servicing Brazil’s rapidly growing debt.	预算赤字已超过GDP的9%。 通货膨胀超过了两位数，迫使央行提高利率——由于深度衰退和迅速增长的债务维持成本的日益膨胀，这一政策不具备可持续性。


Indeed, with Brazil’s creditworthiness deteriorating fast, interest-rate spreads on its sovereign debt are reaching Argentine levels.	事实上，巴西的信誉正在快速恶化，其主权债务的利差正在向阿根廷靠拢。


And its international reserve position of $370 billion, which once seemed unassailable, looks increasingly vulnerable.	其国际储备头寸为3,700亿美元，曾经貌似坚固无比，但现在看来不堪一击。


When the notional value of foreign-exchange swaps ($115 billion) is netted out, the share of short-term public debt (foreign and domestic) covered by international reserves is below the critical threshold of 100%.	当外汇互换名义值（1,150亿美元）用完时，可由国际储备覆盖的短期（对外和对内）公共债务的比重将低于100%的临界值。


At the beginning of the year, when Rousseff’s second presidential term officially began, her administration’s priorities were clear: implement a credible fiscal-adjustment program that would take the primary budget balance (which excludes interest payments) comfortably back into surplus and reduce the growth rate of public debt to sustainable levels.	今年初，当罗塞夫正式开始其第二个总统任期时，她的政府的重点一目了然：实施可信的财政调整计划，使初级预算平衡（不含利息支付）稳稳地回归盈余并让公共债务增长率回到可持续水平。


Rousseff soon appointed an economic team associated with fiscal orthodoxy to lead the effort.	罗塞夫很快就认命了一个正统财政派经济团队负责这些政策。


But the situation has only deteriorated, owing partly to China’s economic slowdown, the end of the commodity boom, tighter international financial conditions, weak global growth, and a years-long legacy of policy mismanagement.	但情况每况愈下，部分是因为中国经济减速、大宗商品繁荣结束、国际金融条件趋紧、全球增长萎靡和多年来的政策管理不善。


But domestic politics has made a bad situation much worse; indeed, the biggest obstacle to economic recovery this year came in the form of a massive corruption scandal at the state-owned oil giant Petrobras.	但国内政治让糟糕的情况大大恶化了； 事实上，今年经济复苏的最大障碍是国有石油巨头巴西石油（Petrobras）大规模腐败丑闻。


Although the scandal broke last year, allegations and evidence have more recently been mounting against senior officials of the traditional political parties, as well as prominent businessmen.	丑闻爆发于去年，但最近矛头和证据大量指向了传统政治党派高官和商界要人。


And, like Italy’s mani pulite (“clean hands”) investigations in the 1990s, the Petrobras scandal has thrown Brazilian politics into disarray.	此外，与20世纪90年代意大利的“净手”（mani pulite）调查类似，巴西石油丑闻扰乱了巴西政坛。


A sitting senator has, for the first time, been arrested on corruption charges.	首次有在任参议员因为腐败指控而被捕。


Impeachment proceedings against Rousseff will only complicate the situation further.	针对罗塞夫的弹劾程序必然会让情况进一步复杂化。


Brazil is now trapped in a vicious circle, or what economists call a “bad equilibrium.”	如今，巴西陷入了一个恶性循环，或经济学家所谓的“坏均衡”。


Even if there were a government willing and able to carry out the necessary fiscal adjustment, the political fallout of the Petrobras affair has damaged Brazil’s credibility severely.	即使政府愿意也能够实施必要的财政调整，巴西石油事件所造成的政治震动也严重伤害了巴西的信誉。


That credibility will take time to recover – and time is a luxury that Brazil does not have.	信誉需要很长时间才能恢复——而时间正是巴西所不具备的奢侈品。


Without market credibility, interest rates and credit spreads will remain high and hijack the fiscal-adjustment effort, forcing the economy into a downward spiral.	失去了市场信誉，利率和信用利差就将保持高企，掣肘财政调整政策，迫使巴西经济进入下降螺旋。


Moreover, budgetary pressures will make it increasingly difficult for the central bank to raise short-term interest rates to fulfill its mandate of curbing excess inflation.	此外，预算压力将让巴西央行日益难以提高短期利率以履行其遏制过度通胀的职责。


In short, Brazil lacks a credible fiscal and monetary anchor.	简言之，巴西失去了可信的财政和货币锚。


If Brazil is to regain its credibility swiftly, it will need the support of the international community.	如果巴西想要迅速重新赢回信誉，就需要来自国际社会的支持。


Brazil doesn’t have the institutional equivalent of the European Central Bank to do “whatever it takes” to retain access to credit at reasonable interest rates as it pursues fiscal and structural adjustment.	巴西没有类似于欧洲央行的机构可以“不惜一切代价”在追求财政和结构调整的同时以合理利率重新获得信用。


The closest thing Brazil has is the International Monetary Fund, with which it should negotiate an adjustment program.	巴西所具备的最接近于欧洲央行的是国际货币基金组织（IMF），它应该和IMF商谈调整计划。


Such a program would include increasing the primary surplus to 2-3% of GDP over the medium term; constraining government expenditures (the tax burden is already sky high); and eliminating indexing rules that make spending overly rigid.	这一计划应该包括在中期将初级盈余增加到GDP的2—3%； 约束政府支出（税收负担已经畸高）；


Moreover, Brazil would have to delink revenues and expenditures – a feature of the country’s budget that renders it difficult to manage properly in times of distress.	并取消让支出过于僵化的指数化规则。 此外，巴西必须让收入和支出脱钩——巴西预算的这一特点让其难以在逆境时合理地进行管理。


And it would gradually have to phase out treasury subsidies to BNDES – the country’s development bank – and increase the use of market-based references for BNDES’s lending rates, thereby helping to restore fiscal health and eliminate distortions in financial intermediation.	此外，该计划还必须逐渐取消对BNDES（巴西开发银行）的财政补贴——并更多地使用市场利率作为BNDES贷款的参考利率，从而协助重塑财政健康、去除金融中介的扭曲。


For its part, the IMF would give the adjustment program its stamp of approval and make its own resources available, so that Brazil does not have to tap international capital markets for a reasonable period.	至于IMF，它应该批准巴西的调整计划，并随时提供自身资源，以使巴西在一段合理的时间内不必求助于国际资本市场。


This would greatly enhance Brazil’s chances of success.	这将大大增加巴西的成功机会。


To be sure, calling in the IMF carries a considerable stigma.	诚然，要求IMF帮助是一个很大的羞辱。


But the reality is that helping countries in situations like Brazil’s is an area where global financial institutions like the IMF – which, it should be noted, is more flexible and open today than it was a decade ago – can play a constructive role.	但现实是，帮助境况类似于巴西的国家正是IMF这样的全球金融机构能够起到建设性作用的领域。 应该指出，今天的IMF比十年前更加灵活和开放。


More to the point, Brazil has run out of good – let alone easy – options.	此外，巴西已经没有了好选择——更不用说容易的选择了。


The only alternatives to an IMF program are an inflationary spiral to dilute the real value of debt and other nominal liabilities, or a downward economic spiral that may cause a need for debt restructuring.	除了IMF计划，唯一的其他办法是进入通胀螺旋以降低债务和其他名义负债的实际价值； 或者进入会导致债务重组的经济衰退螺旋。


Either outcome would threaten the reforms and social gains that the country has made since the Plano Real stabilization program was launched in 1994.	无论如何，结果都将威胁到自1994年雷亚尔稳定计划实施以来所取得的改革和社会成果。


Given this, and despite the potential political difficulties and the risk of a social backlash, Brazil has little choice but to pursue an IMF-sponsored adjustment program.	因此，尽管可能导致政治困境和社会反弹，但巴西别无选择，只能追求IMF支持的调整计划。


It may taste bitter, but only the IMF can provide the medicine Brazil needs.	这也许是一个苦涩的选择，但只有IMF才能提供巴西所需要的医药。


Brazil’s Way Out	巴西的出路


WASHINGTON, DC – Now that impeached Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff is out of office, it is up to the newly empowered administration of President Michel Temer to clean up Brazil’s macroeconomic mess.	华盛顿—被弹劾的巴西总统罗塞夫已经下台，清理巴西宏观经济乱局的担子落在了新掌权的总统特梅尔政府肩上。


Can Temer’s government save Brazil’s crumbling economy?	特梅尔政府能够拯救步履维艰的巴西经济吗？


The situation is certainly dire.	情况不可不谓惨淡。


In fact, Brazil has lately been experiencing the most powerful economic contraction in its recent history.	事实上，巴西最近正在经历近年来最强力的经济收缩。


Its per capita GDP will be more than 10% smaller this year than it was in 2013.	人均GDP比2013年下降了10%以上。


And unemployment has soared to more than 11%, up four percentage points from January 2015.	失业飙升到11%以上，比2015年1月高了四个百分点。


Brazil has no easy route to recovery for a simple reason: the current rout derives from the intensification in recent years of long-standing economic vulnerabilities – in particular, fiscal profligacy and anemic productivity growth.	巴西复苏之路漫漫，原因很简单：当前的乱局源头是近年来其长期存在的经济弱点不断恶化——特别是财政挥霍和生产率增长低迷。


Consider Brazil’s fiscal position, which has deteriorated rapidly since 2011, with a 3.1%-of-GDP primary surplus giving way to a deficit of more than 2.7% of GDP, leading to an overall budget deficit of close to 10% of GDP.	巴西财政自2011年以来迅速恶化，从占GDP的3. 1%的盈余变为占GDP的2.


In fact, the groundwork for that deterioration was laid a long time ago.	7%的赤字，总预算赤字更是接近GDP的10%。 事实上，恶化的根源很久以前就已经种下。


Brazil’s primary government expenditures as a proportion of GDP rose from 22% in 1991 to 36% in 2014.	巴西初级政府支出占GDP之比从1991年的22%增加到2014年的36%。


Much of that spending can be explained by a commitment to tackling endemic poverty – an effort that included the world’s largest conditional cash-transfer program, among other things – without reducing the privileges enjoyed by Brazil’s better-off citizens.	这笔支出中有很大一部分用于治理贫穷——其中包括世界最大规模的有条件现金转移项目等——同时巴西境况较好的公民的特权并没有被削弱。


For some time, Brazil’s government was able to fund higher expenditure with tax revenues, which also rose as a result of levies on rising consumption and labor-market formalization.	有一段时间，巴西政府能够通过税收收入为支出增加筹集资金，税收收入因为消费的增加和劳动力市场正规化而增加。


And high global commodity prices helped sustain GDP growth of around 4.5% per year from 2003 to 2010, which also bolstered government revenues.	而高企的全球大宗商品价格帮助巴西GDP增长率在2003—2010年期间保持在每年4. 5%的水平，这也提振了政府收入。


But, of course, the formal labor force cannot expand forever, and commodity prices always fall eventually.	但是，正规的劳动力市场当然不可能永远扩张，大宗商品也终有下跌的一天。


Unfortunately, Brazil failed to take advantage of the good times to reap productivity growth.	不幸的是，巴西没有利用高景气时期实现生产率增长。


Indeed, only 10% of Brazil’s GDP growth in 2002-2014 can be attributed to total factor productivity gains, while two-thirds was the result of an increase in slightly better-educated workers entering the labor force.	事实上，2002—2014年间巴西GDP增长中只有10%可归因于全要素生产率改善，而三分之二是教育程度比以往略高的工人进入劳动力市场带来的结果。


So when Brazil’s tax-revenue boosters finally collapsed, legally mandated increases in public spending drove Brazil rapidly toward a fiscal cliff.	因此，当巴西税收收入刺激因素最终消失时，增加公共支出的法定义务迅速让巴西走向了财政悬崖。


Today, counter-cyclical policies are not an option; there simply isn’t enough fiscal or monetary space.	如今，反周期政策不再是选项之一； 根本没有足够的财政或货币空间。


This leaves Brazil’s government with only one real option for restoring business confidence and reviving economic growth: tackling Brazil’s structural weaknesses.	这让巴西政府只剩下一个重塑企业信心和复兴经济增长的真正选项：治理巴西的结构性弱点。


The good news is that Temer’s government seems to recognize this imperative.	好消息是特梅尔政府似乎认识到这一当务之急。


Already, it has proposed to Brazil’s Congress a constitutional amendment forbidding for the next 20 years nominal annual increases in public expenditures, including at the subnational level, that exceed the previous year’s inflation rate.	目前，政府已经建议巴西国会修订宪法禁止名义公共支出（包括次国家级公共支出）在未来20年中出现超过前一年通货膨胀率的增长。


Provided that inflation stabilizes at some lower level, such a cap would cause public expenditure as a share of GDP to decline as soon as the economy began to grow again.	假设通货膨胀稳定在某个较低水平，那么，只要经济再次开始增长，这一上限就能立刻让公共支出占GDP之比开始下降。


If increases in tax revenues accompany GDP growth, fiscal imbalances and the accumulation of public debt would automatically be addressed.	如果税收收入跟着GDP增长一起增加，财政失衡和公共债务的积累问题将自动得到解决。


At a time when Brazil has little flexibility in its budget, such a rule could turn out to be a fiscal game changer.	在巴西预算已没有灵活余地的时候，这一规则可以起到财政局面改变因素的作用。


Of course, a cap on expenditure growth would not by itself eliminate the need to address existing budget rigidities.	当然，支出增长上限本身无法消除解决现有的预算僵化问题的需要。


Temer’s government has declared its intention to present to Congress a pension reform plan for precisely this reason.	特梅尔政府已宣布准备以此为由向国会提交养老金改革计划。


As for productivity, the government is focused on reducing waste caused by insufficient infrastructure construction in recent decades.	至于生产率问题，政府的重点是减少近几十年来基础设施建设不足所造成的浪费。


Scaling up infrastructure investment also promises to spur private investment in other sectors.	扩大基础设施投资还能刺激其他部门的私人投资。


The key will be to fine-tune the division of responsibilities between the private and public sectors – including independent regulatory agencies – in the various segments of infrastructure services.	关键是理顺基础设施服务的诸多细分的私人和公共部门责任分工——包括独立的监管机构。


Temer’s government also hopes to tap investment in human capital as a source of productivity growth.	特梅尔政府还希望增加人力资本投资，以此作为生产率增长的源泉。


As it stands, private companies in Brazil invest less in personnel training than those in other countries with similar per capita incomes, owing largely to disincentives embedded in tax and labor laws – incentives that Temer’s government has proposed to change.	目前，巴西私营企业的人事培训投资要低于人均收入相当的其他国家，主要原因在于税收和劳动法激励不足——特梅尔政府准备改变这些激励。


To maximize the impact of these efforts, Temer’s government should also focus on reducing waste in the private sector caused by other problems with the business environment.	为了让这些措施影响最大化，特梅尔政府还应该关注与营商环境有关的问题所造成的私人部门的浪费。


The more efficient use of human and material resources would make firms more competitive and boost Brazil’s total-factor productivity, especially if Brazil’s human capital were enhanced.	人力和物质资源的使用效率越高，企业的竞争力就越好，巴西全要素生成率也能得到提振，特别是在巴西人力资本得到增强的情况下。


Add to that efforts to facilitate foreign trade, and Brazil’s “animal spirits” of entrepreneurship could be unleashed, enabling Brazil to escape the current crisis and move toward a more prosperous future.	除此之外还要采取便利对外贸易的措施，巴西的企业家“动物精神”也要得到释放，以使巴西摆脱当前危机，走向更加繁荣的未来。


The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank or any of the governments he represents.	本文仅代表作者本人观点，不代表世界银行或其供职的政府的立场。


Brazilian Lessons for Industrial Policy	产业政策之巴西经验


SAO PAULO – Few economic ideas are more lauded and reviled than that of industrial policy.	圣保罗——没有多少经济理念像产业政策那样备受赞美和斥责。


Proponents, such as those who studied the rise of the East Asian economies, swear by it.	研究东亚经济崛起的支持者们对其推崇备至。


Opponents see red at its very mention.	而反对者则是乍闻其名就勃然大怒。


The former point to economic development; the latter maintain that tens, even hundreds, of billions of dollars have been squandered.	前者直指行业政策带来经济发展，而后者则坚持行业政策浪费了成百上千亿美元。


One recent theatre of (dis)content is that of renewable fuels.	可再生燃料是（不）满意的最新演示场。


Worldwide, $184 billion is being allocated in public stimulus investments to promote clean energy, led by the United States ($67 billion) and China ($47 billion).	在全球范围内，用于推动洁净能源发展的公共刺激计划投资高达1840亿美元，其中美国居于首位（670亿美元），中国紧随其后（470亿美元）。


Of course, there is some progress – wind power meets 20% of the electricity demand in Denmark and about 15% in Spain and Portugal, for example – but the recipe for success remains elusive.	毋庸置疑，洁净能源领域也取得了一些进展——比如风能满足了丹麦20%的能源需求，在西班牙和葡萄牙总能耗中的占比也达到了15%——尽管如此，取得成功的秘诀仍然难以捉摸。


In this vein, Brazil’s experience at promoting renewable fuels, beginning in the 1970’s, is directly relevant to today’s polarized views of industrial policy.	在这样的背景下，巴西20世纪70年代开始的推动可再生燃料发展的经验直接关系到今天对行业政策截然相反的观点。


A 10-year industrial policy program called Pro-álcool was crucial in the development of the industry.	一项名为“Pro-álcool ”的十年期行业政策计划在可再生能源的发展中起到了关键的作用。


Today, Brazil is the world’s most competitive producer of renewable fuels, based primarily on bioethanol.	今天，巴西已经成为全球以生物乙醇为基础的可再生燃料最具竞争力的生产国。


Ethanol accounts for more than 50% of current light-vehicle fuel demand in the country, and Petrobras – Brazil’s energy giant and one of the largest companies in Latin America – expects this share to increase to more than 80% by 2020.	乙醇占到了巴西国内轻型车燃料需求的50%以上，巴西能源巨头、拉美最大的企业之一巴西国家石油公司预测这一比例到2020年会增长到80%以上。


Our research shows that industrial policy was successful in promoting a competitive bioethanol industry in Brazil.	我们的研究结果表明行业政策成功地推动了巴西颇具竞争力的生物乙醇行业。


A massive stimulus package, prompted by the 1970’s rise in oil prices, gave rise to an entirely new industry.	一项由20世纪70年代油价上涨引发的巨额刺激计划催生了一个全新的行业。


But it would not have worked without the crucial role played by competition.	但如果没有竞争所发挥的关键作用，这个行业也不会取得成功。


Brazil was attempting to become energy self-sufficient in a manner similar to modern efforts by other countries.	巴西当时力求实现能源自给自足的方式与其它国家现在的所为颇为相似。


But, as opponents of industrial policy are right to remind us, freebies never lead to a good outcome.	但正像行业政策的反对者提醒我们的那样，免费的东西永远不会带来好结果。


The aftermath was the key.	这一次，经济停滞所造成的后果扮演了至关重要的角色。


As world energy prices collapsed, Brazil fortuitously turned off its subsidy tap, whereupon a brutal Darwinian free-for-all ensued.	随着世界能源价格的崩溃，巴西在这一偶然因素的作用下关闭了补贴的龙头，一场残酷的达尔文式的生存混战随之发生。


This competitive rationalization was the key to the policy’s success.	这种竞争合理化在政策成功中发挥了关键的作用。


The details of Pro-álcool involved providing incentives to several parties to participate, without which they would have sat on the sidelines.	Pro-álcool 计划的相关规定刺激各方进入到新兴行业，如果没有刺激计划他们可能会选择置身事外。


The Brazilian state offered low-interest loans and credit guarantees for the construction of distilleries, as well as tax incentives for the purchase of ethanol-powered vehicles.	巴西政府为建设蒸馏企业提供低息贷款和信用担保，同时为购买乙醇燃料汽车提供了税收优惠。


Ethanol prices were manipulated to make it an attractive alternative to gasoline.	乙醇的价格受到人为干预，使其与汽油相比成为一项有吸引力的选择。


In addition, the government induced Petrobras to distribute the renewable fuel.	此外，政府还诱导巴西国家石油公司参与可再生燃料的销售。


Gas stations installed ethanol pumps.	加油站都装备了乙醇燃料泵。


The government signed agreements with the major automobile companies to provide incentives to make vehicles that could run on 100% ethanol.	政府与主要汽车企业签订协议，鼓励生产100%乙醇燃料汽车。


A visitor to Brazil today will see these flex-fuel cars everywhere.	到访巴西的游客今天能够随时看到混合燃料动力车。


The experience of filling these vehicles’ tanks is curious.	加满汽车燃料箱是一种新奇的体验。


Just before entering a gas station, Brazilian drivers calculate whether conventional gasoline or ethanol is cheaper (bioethanol has 30% less energy content than traditional gasoline), then choose between a gasoline and an ethanol pump.	驶入加油站前，巴西的驾车族会计算传统汽油和乙醇燃料哪个更便宜（生物乙醇比传统汽油的能源含量低30%左右），然后在汽油和乙醇泵之间作出选择。


At the outset, Brazil’s policies attracted entrepreneurs of all sorts.	刚一开始，巴西的政策就吸引了各式各样的创业者。


Some were talented and believed that the new subsidies and incentives rendered long-term investments in the industry highly attractive.	其中有些人颇具才干，相信新的补贴和奖励使针对这个行业的长期投资颇具吸引力。


Entrepreneurs of dubious quality no doubt entered as well, thanks to the generosity of the state.	多亏了国家的慷慨计划，素质可疑的创业者们当然也大量涌入。


Fortunately, the government did not attempt the impossible task of trying to separate winners from losers.	幸运的是，政府并没有试图完成分辨成功者和失败者这个不可能完成的任务。


By the 1990’s, the major subsidies and policies were abolished, and the industry was deregulated.	到20世纪90年代，政府取消了主要的补贴和政策，解除了行业管制。


Our statistical analysis of the entry and exit patterns of entrepreneurs in the Brazilian ethanol industry shows that the more efficient acquired the less efficient.	我们掌握的巴西乙醇业进入及退出模式的分析统计结果表明，低效企业被高效企业所兼并。


Most underperforming ethanol companies went bankrupt or were taken over by entrepreneurs who had successful track records in running efficient operations.	多数业绩不佳的乙醇企业宣告破产，被拥有高效经营成功经验的企业所兼并。


The government did not bail out the underperformers, allowing market forces to restructure the industry during the post-subsidy phase.	政府并没有挽救表现不佳的企业，而是任由市场力量在后补贴阶段对行业进行重组。


Certainly, the beneficiaries of Pro-álcool’s subsidies lobbied the state to continue the protective policies even after their usefulness – inducing the development of the industry – had expired.	当然，Pro-álcool补贴的受益者们游说政府在行业政策已经丧失了促进行业发展的作用之后继续实行保护性的政策。


Fortunately, the government was not persuaded.	幸运的是，政府并没有为之所动。


Brazil’s experience offers three important lessons for nations implementing renewable energy initiatives: (1) government policies must be consistent, simple, and long-lasting, providing assurance to would-be entrepreneurs that they can invest for the long haul; (2) picking winners, the familiar weakness of overenthusiastic bureaucrats, must be kept to a minimum; and (3) the state must have the discipline to dismantle subsidies when the need for them has passed.	巴西的发展历程可��总结出国家推行可再生能源计划的三条重要经验： （1）政府政策必须连贯、简单、有持续性，能够为潜在创业者提供长期投资的信心保证； （2）人为挑选获胜者是过度热情的官僚们常犯的错误，这种情况必须被控制在最低限度；


If these lessons are implemented, market forces can pick up where industrial policy leaves off.	如果汲取这些经验，市场力量就能在行业政策退出后继续发挥作用。


As industrial policy returns to the scene in countries around the world, that is a goal that advocates and opponents alike should be happy to embrace.	随着行业政策在世界各国的复苏，相信无论它的拥护者还是反对者都乐于接受这样的目标。


Brazil’s Institutional Limbo	巴西的制度摇摆


SÃO PAULO – International investors are watching closely as Brazilians prepare to vote in the second round of the presidential election on October 26.	圣保罗—国际投资者正在密切关注将于10月26日举行的巴西总统选举第二轮投票。


Their vote will not only decide who will be the country’s next president; it may also determine the future of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and therefore the country’s macroeconomic trajectory.	巴西人的选票不但将决定下一任总统； 也许还将决定巴西中央银行的未来，从而也将决定巴西宏观经济的轨迹。


While the incumbent president, Dilma Rousseff, supports the BCB’s existing institutional framework, her opponents contend that monetary policy is plagued by political interference, which would best be addressed by giving the BCB greater autonomy.	现任总统罗塞夫支持巴西央行当前的制度框架，但反对货币政策受政治干预、最好的解决办法是授予巴西央行更大自主权的主张。


But no candidate has yet advanced a proposal for reform that would reduce the scope for political interference while ensuring greater accountability and promoting financial stability.	但两名候选人都没有提出减少政治干预程度、同时又确保更大的可问责性和促进金融稳定的改革方案。


If Brazil is to sustain strong and stable economic growth, the central bank will need an overhaul.	如果巴西想要保持强劲稳定的经济增长，其中央银行就必须进行大修。


Monetary policy has long played an important role in Brazilian politics.	在巴西政坛，货币政策长期扮演着重要角色。


During the democratization process of the 1980s and 1990s, successive governments tried to tame hyperinflation, which reached 2,477% in 1993.	20世纪八九十年代民主化过程中，历任政府试图驯服恶性通胀（1993年曾达到2,477%）。


The introduction of the “Real plan,” launched in 1994, managed to suppress annual price growth to an “acceptable” 22% by the following year.	1994年实施的“里亚尔计划”成功地在第二年将年度价格涨幅抑制在“可接受”的22%。


Riding on the plan’s success, its architect, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former economy minister, was twice elected President (in 1994 and 1998), underscoring voter concern about price stability.	凭借该计划成功的东风，其提出者、前经济部长卡多佐连续两次当选总统（1994年和1998年），彰显出选民对价格稳定的重视。


Today, as central bankers in developed countries fret about the threat of deflation, Brazilian politicians are once again forced to respond to widespread fears about slowing growth and a return to high inflation.	如今，发达国家央行担心通缩，而巴西政客再次被迫就普遍的增长放缓和高通胀回归做出反应。


Unfortunately, the presidential candidates’ plans for the BCB fall short of what is required.	不幸的是，总统候选人的对巴西央行的计划不足以满足需要。


Historically, Rousseff’s Workers’ Party (PT) has resisted giving the bank formal autonomy, and she has played a distinctly populist card during the campaign, arguing that BCB autonomy would hand too much control to private bankers.	历史上，罗塞夫的劳工党（Worker’s Party）一直拒绝给予巴西央行正式的独立地位，而她在选战中一直打着鲜明的民粹主义旗号，认为把巴西央行的独立会导致过多的控制权落入私人银行家之手。


Marina Silva, the Socialist Party’s candidate, demanded formal bank independence – an argument subsequently adopted by the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) candidate, Aécio Neves, who now faces Rousseff in the election run-off.	社会党（Socialist Party）候选人席尔瓦（Marina Silva）要求巴西央行正式独立——该主张随后被社会民主党（Social Democratic Party）候选人内维斯（Aécio Neves）采纳，他将在第二轮选举中与罗塞夫一决高下。


But Neves wants de facto, rather than formal, operational autonomy for the BCB.	但内维斯想要的是事实而非正式的操作自主权。


Like Cardoso, Neves is committed to inflation targeting, creating a primary surplus, and maintaining a floating exchange rate.	与卡多佐一样，内维斯承诺采取通胀目标、建立基本盈余和维持浮动汇率。


While such policies may promote price stability, his proposal neglects the two most important issues for the BCB: legal autonomy and institutional reforms that ensure accountability to citizens.	尽管这些政策或有助于价格稳定，但他的方案忽略了巴西央行问题最重要的两个方面：法律自主权和保证公民问责权的制度改革。


A legal commitment to BCB autonomy would contribute to currency confidence in a way that informal autonomy cannot.	法律授权巴西央行独立将有助于货币信心，这是非正式独立不能带来的。


Legal structures have a direct impact on inflation expectations, because law can provide institutional protection to public goods, such as price and financial stability.	法律结构对通胀预期有直接影响，因为法律可以提供公共品（如价格和金融稳定）的制度性保护。


Properly designed and executed, institutional reform could also increase BCB accountability to society at large while guarding against undue political influence and lobbying by the big banks.	精心设计、合理实施的制度改革还能增加巴西央行的总体社会可问责性，同时抵御过度政治干预和大银行的游说。


The BCB is ripe for reform.	巴西央行的改革时机已经成熟。