In lieu of raising the gas tax, Obama has proposed a four-year $302 billion plan to close the existing HTF funding gap, and boost HTF spending by $20 billion a year above current levels.	奥巴马提出了一个四年3,020亿美元的弥补公路信托基金现有资金缺口、让公路信托基金在当前水平上每年增加200亿美元的计划，作为增税的替代方案。


His plan, which relies on using transitional corporate tax revenues raised in conjunction with corporate tax reform, has virtually no chance of becoming law this year.	他的计划依赖公司税改革所带来的过渡性公司税收入增加，今年基本上无望成为法律。


Nor does his oft-repeated proposal for a federal infrastructure bank to attract more private funds for infrastructure projects.	他一再提及的建立联邦基础设施银行为基础设施项目吸引更多私人资金的方案亦然。


Confronted with implacable Republican opposition, Obama is relying on what the administration calls a “pen and phone” strategy – combining the bully pulpit and executive orders – to move forward on several fronts, including infrastructure.	面临难以调和的共和党反对，奥巴马依赖其政府所谓的“笔和电话”战略——宣传和行政指令相结合——在多条阵线上取得进展，其中也包括基础设施。


At the urging of his 2011-2012 Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, he signed several executive orders to modernize and expedite the interagency review-and-permitting processes for high-priority federal infrastructure projects.	在其对2011—2012年就业和竞争力委员会（Council on Jobs and Competitiveness）的敦促中，他签署了数项行政令以动员和加速高优先级联邦基础设施项目的跨部门审查和批准程序。


Moreover, Obama recently announced the creation of the Build America Transportation Investment Center to provide technical assistance to state and local officials seeking private-sector partners to support transport infrastructure.	此外，奥巴马最近宣布成立建设美国交通投资中心（Build America Transportation Investment Center），为寻求私人部门合作以支持交通基础设施的州和地方官员提供技术援助。


With similar offices, Canada and the United Kingdom have far surpassed the US in attracting private capital for such projects.	加拿大和英国也有类似的机构，并且在为此类项目吸引私人资本方面遥遥领先于美国。


A pen-and-phone strategy may be the only way to make any progress on addressing America’s infrastructure needs in a mid-term election year.	笔和电话战略也许是在中期选举年解决美国基础设施需求问题上取得进展的唯一办法。


But Obama alone does not have the power to stanch the HTF’s bleeding or to reverse years of underinvestment.	但仅靠奥巴马不足以止住公路信托基金的失血状况或扭转多年来的投资不足情况。


That will require congressional action and additional revenues.	这需要国会的行动和新的收入源。


The Government as Venture Capitalist	作为风险资本家的政府


BERKELEY – The American public’s attitude toward government, especially toward the federal government, recalls a classic scene in Monty Python’s “Life of Brian.”	伯克利—美国公众对政府，尤其是联邦政府的态度就像是巨蟒剧团（Monty Python）的《布莱恩的一生》（Life of Brian）中的经典一幕。


“What have they ever given us in return?” fulminates John Cleese, playing a Judean revolutionary.	“他们给过我们什么回报吗？ ”扮演犹太革命家的约翰·克里斯（John Cleese）怒问。


“The aqueduct,” concedes a sheepish co-conspirator. “And sanitation,” says a second, as others pipe up with more examples.	“水渠，”一位同谋怯生生地说，“还有下水道，”另一名同谋说，接着，其他人也纷纷开始举例。


“All right,” Cleese erupts in exasperation.	“好吧，好吧，”克里斯暴怒。


“But apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the fresh-water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”	“然则除了下水道、医药、教育、葡萄酒、公序良俗、灌溉、公路、净水系统和公共卫生，罗马人还为我们做了什么？ ”


The scene brilliantly captures America’s cantankerous and contradictory zeitgeist.	这一场景完美地抓住了美国浮躁而矛盾的时代精神。


On one hand, public trust in government is at an all-time low.	一方面，对政府的公共信任处于历史最低点。


On the other hand, Americans are deeply frustrated with gaping holes in health care, education, equality of opportunity, infrastructure, and environmental protection – goods and services traditionally provided by government.	另一方面，美国人又对公共卫生、教育、机会公平、基础设施和环境保护方面的不足感到深深的不安——这些商品和服务向来是由政府提供的。


A reflection of this contradictory mindset is a surge in private activity to address social problems. These include billion-dollar efforts by non-profits like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies to spur innovative solutions in education, public health, and poverty reduction.	这一矛盾思维的一个体现是，在解决社会问题方面，私人活动日益活跃，比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会（Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation）和彭博慈善基金会（Bloomberg Philanthropies）等非营利组织出资数十亿美元刺激教育、公共卫生和减贫等方面的创新方案。


It is also reflected in social-enterprise start-ups designed to achieve both social and financial returns, as well as in new impact-investing platforms aimed at the growing number of investors who are also seeking both types of returns.	另一个体现是旨在同时实现社会和财务回报的社会企业创业（social-enterprise start-ups）以及旨在增加同时追求这两种回报的投资者数量的影响力投资平台（impact-investing platforms）


All of this is good news.	这些都是新现象。


The government’s capacity to invest is under severe pressure.	政府的投资能力受到了极大掣肘。


And, though many government programs deliver good value for money – Medicare is a good example – far too many do not.	而尽管不少政府项目物有所值——联邦医疗保险（Medicare）就是一个很好的例子——但不划算的项目数量更多。


Peter Schuck’s new book Why Government Fails So Often provides a thoughtful if pessimistic analysis.	彼得·舒克（Peter Schuck）的新书《为何政府屡战屡败》（Why Government Fails So Often）提供了周详的悲观分析。


Government agencies are always at risk of putting money into what Schuck calls “bad bets” and “bad apples.”	政府机构总是倾向于将钱用于舒克称之为“坏赌注”和“烂苹果”的项目。


They are also inherently rigid, risk-averse, and reluctant to innovate, because they know that if they deviate from the letter of the law, or if an innovation goes awry, they will be chastised politically.	它们还天生具有僵化、风险厌恶、不愿创新的特点，因为它们知道，如果偏离了法律条文，或者如果创新效果不佳，它们就会受到政治上的惩罚。


And costly, ineffective programs are notorious for surviving indefinitely because they develop powerful defenders.	而低效率项目总能毫无例外地存在，原因在于它们有强大的撑腰力量。


But blanket distrust in government, framed by glaring examples of boondoggles and fueled by ideology, too often focuses on the wrong question: How big should government be?	但一边倒地对政府不信任始于令人瞩目的小例子，受到意识形态的推动，它们往往关注了错误的问题：政府多大合适？


The right question is how to develop innovative and efficient government programs to provide public goods and services that neither the marketplace nor the nonprofit sector can deliver on its own.	正确的问题是如何开发创新而高效的政府计划，以提供市场和非营利组织无法提供的公共商品和服务。


One approach is to put government in the role of venture capitalist.	一个方法是让政府扮演风险资本家的角色。


Its task would be less to design and implement top-down solutions than to solicit, support, evaluate, and scale up innovative strategies by tapping into ideas developed by state and local governments, businesses, and non-profit institutions.	它的任务不是设计和实施自上而下的方案，而是通过投资于州和地方政府、企业以及非营利组织提出的想法招揽、支持、评估和扩大创新战略。


This can happen – indeed, in the US under President Barack Obama’s leadership it is already happening – in many different ways.	这可以通过许多方式实现——事实上，在总统奥巴马的领导下，美国正在这样做。


For example, the US Department of Education’s Race to the Top Fund, which offered $4 billion in grants to states that developed successful educational reforms, spurred innovations that hold promise for school systems across the country.	比如，美国教育部的“争第一基金”（Race to the Top Fund）向开发成功的教育改革的州提供40亿美元资助，这刺激了让全美国学校系统都受益的创新。


More broadly, prize competitions to reward targeted innovation and crowd-source new ideas offer a highly cost-effective opportunity for government to leverage its scarce resources for important public goals.	更广泛地看，奖励定向创新和众筹新思维的有奖竞赛为政府提供了撬动稀缺资源用于重要公共目标的高性价比机会。


The federal government now operates Challenge.gov, an Internet platform to facilitate new competitions.	目前，联邦政府运营了一家叫做Challenge. gov的互联网平台以促进新竞争。


Some 50 public agencies have sponsored more than 260 challenges since 2011.	自2011年以来，大约50家公共机构赞助了260多项挑战。


After the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the Obama administration teamed up with the X-Prize Foundation to offer a $1.4 million prize to the group that produced the most efficient oil-recovery solution.	2010年墨西哥湾深海钻井漏油事件后，奥巴马政府建立了X奖基金会（X-Prize Foundation），向提供最有效原油回收方案的团队奖励140万美元。


The winning approach, from Elastec American Marine, was three times as efficient as the industry’s previous best rate.	获胜方案来自Elastec American Marine公司，其效率是此前石油业最佳水平的三倍。


The United States’ Affordable Care Act, which entered into force this year, contains further variants on the idea of government as a catalyst, including incentives to reward health-care systems that improve outcomes and reduce costs.	今年生效的美国平价医疗法案（Affordable Care Act）中包括了政府充当催化剂这一思想的后续衍生品，如用奖金激励改善效果、降低成本的新医疗体系。


The incentives have spurred a number of state-level experiments in Medicaid (America’s health-insurance program for the poor) through waivers of the standard rules.	这套激励刺激了许多摈弃标准规则的州级医疗补助计划（Medicaid，面向穷人的全国医保项目）的产生。


Likewise, the new federal Social Innovation Fund provides grants to social-sector intermediaries – foundations, non-profits, and social enterprises – that develop new programs to tackle problems like unequal educational opportunity.	类似地，新的联邦社会创新基金（Social Innovation Fund）为社会中介部门——基金会、非营利组织和社会企业——提供补助开发新项目应对教育机会不平等等问题。


These grants are awarded on a competitive basis, and funding is contingent on achieving measurable outcomes.	这些补助基于竞争标准发放，资金量取决于是否实现可测量的目标。


Some state and local governments are experimenting with new “pay-for-performance” contracts – sometimes called social impact bonds (SIBs) – to promote social innovation.	一些州和地方政府正在试验以“按表现付酬”合同——有时被称为社会影响债券（social impact bond，SIB）——促进社会创新。


In a SIB, the government contracts with an outside provider to achieve a measurable social goal (like reducing recidivism among juvenile offenders), private impact investors finance the program’s upfront costs, and the government promises a return to them if the program’s targets are achieved.	在SIB安排中，政府与外部供应商签订合同，后者需要实现可测量的社会目标（如降低青少年犯罪的再犯率），前期成本由私人影响力投资者提供融资，政府则承诺在计划目标实现后给予回报。


Recently, the Obama administration proposed a $300 million fund to catalyze federal pay-for-performance contracts.	最近，奥巴马政府成立了一个3亿美元的基金用于推广联邦按表现付酬合同。


Several existing federal programs like the Community Reinvestment Act and the Small Business Investment Companies program are supporting the growth of impact investing funds.	一些现有联邦项目——如社区再投资法案（Community Reinvestment Act）和小商业投资公司项目（ Small Business Investment Companies program）——支持影响力投资基金的成长。


According to a recent study, impact investing in the US would not exist without the support of and partnership with the federal government through grants, loans, and guarantees.	根据最新研究，如果不通过补助、贷款和担保等形式获得联邦政府的支持与合作，美国的影响力投资根本无法生存。


Metrics are an essential feature of pay-for-performance contracts, and must be an essential feature of all government programs.	量化标准是按表现付酬合同的关键特征，也必须成为所有政府项目的关键特征。


This is mostly not the case today, but the situation is improving as the Obama administration links more of its spending to evidence of success, and as non-profit groups, like America Achieves, develop sophisticated new techniques to evaluate government programs.	今天，情况往往并非如此，但随着奥巴马政府将其更多的支出与成功证据挂钩，随着美国成就（America Achieves）等非营利组织开发出完备的政府计划评估新技术，局面正在改善。


With the government acting as a venture capitalist, the private sector can create effective new programs to address social problems.	有政府充当风险资本家，私人部门可以建立新的有效计划解决社会问题。


But scaling up these programs will require government resources.	但扩大这些计划需要政府资源。


The Gates Foundation may devise breakthrough innovations for public schools; but, even with its billions of dollars, it lacks the resources to revitalize education at the national or even the state level.	盖茨基金会或许可以为公立学校提供突破性创新； 但即使其可以拿出数十亿美元巨款，但它仍缺乏在全国甚至州范围水平上振兴教育的资源。


As former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently observed, philanthropists should test innovative policy ideas and then rely on government money to implement them widely.	前纽约市长迈克尔·彭博（Michael Bloomberg）最近观察道，慈善家应该检验创新政策思维，然后依靠政府资金推而广之。


Only governments can provide public goods and address social challenges on a national scale.	只有政府能够提供全国范围水平的公共品、解决全国范围水平的社会挑战。


But there are numerous ways in which governments can work with non-profits, investors, businesses, and citizens to find the best ways to achieve these goals – and thus restore public trust in government itself.	但政府可以通过多种方式与非营利组织、投资者、企业和公民合作寻找实现这些目标的最佳办法——从而重塑公众对政府的信任本身。


Paying for Productivity	把钱花在生产率上


BERKELEY – One of the United States’ defining – and disheartening – economic trends over the last 40 years has been real-wage stagnation for most workers.	伯克利—美国的一大招牌式（但令人心碎的）经济趋势是，在过去40年里，工人的真实工资一直停滞不前。


According to a recent US Census report, the median full-time male worker earned $50,033 in 2013, barely distinguishable from the comparable (inflation-adjusted) figure of $49,678 in 1973.	根据最新的美国人口普查报告，2013年中位全职男性工人工资收入是50,033美元，和1973年的可比（经通胀调整）数字49,678美元相差无几。


Because most households earn the bulk of their income from their labor, the absence of real-wage growth is a major factor behind the stagnation of family incomes.	大部分家庭的大部分收入都来自劳动所得，因此真实工资增长缺失是家庭所得停滞的主要因素。


The average family income of the bottom 90% of households has been flat since about 1980.	从1980年前后开始，低层90%平均家庭所得几乎未曾改变。


Real family income for the median household in 2013 was 8% below its 2007 level and nearly 9% below its 1999 peak.	2013年中位真实家庭所得比2007年低8%，比1999年峰值低近9%。


Stagnating middle-class wages and family incomes are a major factor behind the US economy’s slow recovery from the 2007-2009 recession, and pose a serious threat to long-term growth and competitiveness.	中产阶级工资和家庭所得停滞不前是美国从2007—2009年衰退中复苏缓慢的主要原因，也给长期增长和竞争力带来了严重威胁。


Household consumption accounts for more than two-thirds of aggregate demand, and consumption growth depends on income growth for the bottom 90%.	家庭消费占总需求的三分之二强，而消费增长取决于低层90%的所得增长。


The heyday of US economic growth in the two decades after World War II was also a golden era for the middle class.	二战后的二十年是美国经济增长的黄金时期，也是中产阶级的黄金时期。


The long boom of the 1990s, when the US enjoyed sustained full employment, was one of few periods in the last 40 years when incomes climbed at every quintile of the income distribution.	20世纪90年代的长时间繁荣——长久保持充分就业状态——是过去40年中少有的收入分配各层次所得全面增长的时期。


Many influential economists are now worried that the US faces anemic growth and “secular stagnation,” owing to a persistent gap between aggregate demand and full employment.	如今，许多著名经济学家担心，拜总需求和充分就业之间的持久缺口所赐，美国面临着增长萎靡和“长期停滞”。


Stagnant middle-class incomes imply weak aggregate demand, which in turn means slack labor markets and stagnant wages for most workers.	中产阶级所得停滞不前意味着总需求疲软，而疲软的总需求反过来意味着劳动力市场萎靡和大部分工人工资无法增长。


In the absence of aggressive monetary and fiscal policies to support aggregate demand at full-employment levels, the result is a vicious slow-growth cycle.	在没有支持总需求维持充分就业水平的积极货币和财政政策的情况下，结果将是低增长的恶性循环。


Two competitiveness gurus, Michael Porter and Jan Rivkin of Harvard Business School, recently warned that stagnant middle-class incomes undermine US companies in several ways.	两位竞争力理论大家，哈佛商学院的迈克尔·波特（Michael Porter）和詹·李夫金（Jan Rivkin）最近警告说，中产阶级所得停滞不前从几个方面不利于美国。


“Businesses cannot thrive for long while their communities languish,” they cautioned.	“在所在社会萎靡不振的情况下，企业无法长时间兴旺。


Unless corporations step up to the plate, “American business will suffer from an inadequate workforce, a population of depleted consumers, and large blocs of anti-business voters.”	”除非公司采取行动，否则“美国企业将因为劳动力不足、消费者囊中羞涩以及大量反商业选票而受损。 ”


Porter and Rivkin are not calling on businesses simply to pay their workers more.	波特和李夫金认为，企业不应该仅仅提高工人工资。


Instead, they are urging businesses to engage in a “strategic, collaborative” push to improve education and training to raise the skill levels of their workers.	相反，他们敦促企业采取“战略性、合作式”的动作改善教育和培训以提高工人的技能水平。


That is a laudable goal.	这是值得称赞的目标。


But, as Porter and Rivkin find in their survey of business leaders, companies often discourage investment in skills by their reluctance to hire full-time workers.	但是，波特和李夫金通过商业领袖调查发现，公司不愿意聘用全职工人，因此阻碍了技能投资。


Nearly half of the respondents indicated that, when possible, they prefer to invest in technology or outsource to third parties and hire part-time workers, none of whom receive much additional training or have a stake in their company’s long-term success.	近一半受调查者指出，只要可能，他们更愿意投资于技术或外包给第三方和聘用兼职工人，而这些方案都不会对公司的长期成功带来大的裨益。


There is also a disturbing implication in the Porter-Rivkin survey that workers themselves, along with America’s schools, are to blame for wage stagnation: If only workers were not so poor in math and science, so ill-equipped for the modern world, and so unproductive, they would earn higher incomes.	波特-李夫金调查中还有一个令人担心的推论：工人本身以及美国的学校要为工资停滞负责。 如果工人的数学和科学不是那么差，对现代世界的准备不是那么差，生产率不是那么差，那么他们就可以赚到更高的所得。


The reality is different.	现实有所不同。


US productivity has been growing at a respectable pace for two decades.	二十年来，美国的生产率以颇为可观的速度增长着。


The problem is that productivity gains have not translated into commensurate wage increases for the typical worker or income growth for the typical family.	问题在于生产率的提高没有带来典型工人工资或典型家庭所得的相应增长。


According to standard economic theory, real wages should track productivity.	根据标准的经济学理论，真实工资应该与生产率同步变动。


As Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute has documented, this was the case from 1948 until about 1973.	经济政策研究所（Economic Policy Institute）的劳伦斯·米歇尔（Lawrence Mishel）指出，从1948年到1973年左右都是如此。


Since then, real wages for the typical worker have flat-lined, while productivity has continued to climb.	接着，典型工人真实工资曲线变平，而生产率曲线依然向上。


Mishel calculates that productivity increased 80.4% from 1948 to 2011, while median real wages rose only 39% – almost none of the wage growth occurred during the last four decades.	米歇尔测算��从1948年到2011年，生产率增加了80. 4%，而中位真实工资只增长了39%——并且在过去四十年中几乎毫无增长。


True, highly skilled workers, especially those with sought-after technology skills and postgraduate degrees, have fared much better.	诚然，高技能工人，特别是拥有紧缺技术技能和研究生以上学历者的境况要好得多。


But that prosperity has reached only a small elite.	但这一繁荣景象只限于一小撮精英。


From 1979 to 2012, the real median wage increased by only 5%.	从1979年到2012年，真实中位工资只增长了5%。


But real wages climbed 154% for the top 1% of wage earners and 39% for the top 5%, while real wages stagnated for the bottom 20th percentile of workers and fell for the bottom tenth.	但顶层1%打工者的真实工资增长了154%，顶层5%增长了39%，底层20%真实工资持平，底层10%工人工资有所下降。


Indeed, inequality in labor compensation has been the largest driver of yawning income inequality, except at the very top of the income distribution, where capital income has been more important.	事实上，劳动报酬不平等已成为收入不平等高企的最大原因，收入分配的最顶层除外，对他们来说，资本所得更加重要。


Meanwhile, corporate profits have soared.	与此同时，公司利润大幅增长。


The GDP share of after-tax corporate profits is at a record high, whereas labor compensation has plunged to its lowest share since 1950.	税后公司利润占GDP之比处于历史高位，而劳动报酬占GDP之比下降到了1950年以来的最低水平。


Strong productivity growth is an important policy goal.	强劲的生产率增长是重要的政策目标之一。


But it is not enough to increase most workers’ wages or most families’ incomes.	但这不足以提高大部分工人的工资或大部分家庭的所得。


Reconnecting productivity gains and wage gains requires both policy actions, such as an increase in the minimum wage with a link to productivity growth, and changes in corporate human-resources practices, such as broader reliance on profit-sharing programs.	让生产率增长和工资增长重新联系起来既需要政策动作（如将最低工资增长与生产率增长挂钩）也需要公司改变人力资源行为（如更多地采取利润分享计划）。


Such programs have intuitive appeal.	这些计划具有直观的好处。


Employees who have a direct stake in a company’s profitability are likely to be more motivated and engaged, and turnover is likely to be lower.	能直接分享公司利润的雇员有望具有更大的激励和干劲，跳槽率也会更低。


This intuition is confirmed by empirical research.	这一直观认识与实证研究相符。


Some 20 years ago, Alan Blinder of Princeton University corralled a number of economists, including me, to examine existing studies on the link between profit-sharing and productivity.	大约20年前，普林斯顿大学的艾伦·布林德（Alan Blinder）集合了包括我在内的多名经济学家一起考察已有的关于利润分享和生产率之间的关系的研究。


The overwhelming majority of the studies found a strong positive effect. Shared Capitalism at Work, a recent book edited by Douglas Kruse, Richard Freeman, and Joseph Blasi, confirms this conclusion with more recent evidence.	绝大部分研究发现它们之间有强烈的积极作用。 道格拉斯·克鲁斯（Douglas Kruse）、理查德·弗里曼（Richard Freeman）和约瑟夫·巴雷西（Joseph Blasi）所编的《在工作中分享资本主义》（Shared Capitalism at Work）用更新的证据证明了这一结论。


Various forms of profit-sharing – including grants of options and restricted stock, annual profit-based bonuses, and employee stockownership plans – have been growing as a share of labor compensation since the 1960s.	各种形式的利润分享——包括授予期权和限售股、基于年度利润的奖金、雇员股票所有权计划等——占劳动报酬的比例自20世纪60年代以来一直在增加。


But most workers are not covered by such plans, and the biggest beneficiaries have been CEOs and top managers, a significant fraction of whose pay is tied to productivity, as reflected in profits and stock performance.	但大部分工人并未参与到这些计划中，而最大的受益者则是CEO和高层管理者，他们的收入大头与生产率挂钩，反映在利润和股票表现中。


Such incentive pay schemes have driven the outsize increases in compensation for the top 1% of the wage and salary distribution.	这一激励机制导致工资和薪水分配最顶层1%群体报酬超常增长。


America’s long-run living standards and economic competitiveness depend not just on productivity growth, but also on how that growth is shared.	美国的长期生活水平和经济竞争力不但取决于生产率增长，也取决于其增长如何被分享。


More equitable sharing of profits with America’s workers and their families would do much to address the worrisome stagnation of wages and middle-class incomes in recent decades. 	更平等地与美国工人及其家庭分享利润能够极大地有助于解决几十年来令人担忧的工资和中产阶级所得停滞不前的问题。


Law and Order, Russian-Style	俄国的法律和秩序


Around the world, people worry that political freedom is disappearing in Vladimir Putin's Russia.	在弗拉基米尔·普京领导下的俄国，政治自由正逐渐消失，这让全世界的人忧心忡忡。


Indeed, about the only people who are unconcerned about creeping authoritarianism in Russia are the Russians themselves.	实际上，唯一不关心独裁主义蔓延的恐怕就是俄国人自己。


Russians seem to care less about political freedom than they do about social welfare - pensions, domestic violence, children's rights, or police brutality.	比起政治自由，俄国人似乎更看重社会福利－养老金、家庭暴力、儿童权利或警方暴行。


In fact, most Russians are indifferent to the government's efforts to curtail press freedom and limit the right to protest.	实际上，多数俄国人对政府剥夺公民的言论自由和抗议权利显得漠不关心。


Such apathy makes my task as Russia's ombudsman, an office charged by the State Duma (parliament) with protecting political rights in Russia, difficult, if not impossible.	这种冷漠让我在履行国家杜马（议会）赋予的保护政治权利的职责时面临着重重困难，甚至根本就寸步难行。


The ombudsman acts as a bridge between the authorities and the people, seeking to resolve conflicts that arise between state bodies and citizens.	监察员是沟通政府和百姓的桥梁，负责解决国家机构和公民间产生的矛盾。


My office is open not only to Russian citizens, but to foreigners and stateless people who feel their political rights have been compromised.	我的办公室不仅对俄国公民开放，对外国人和无国籍者也同样敞开大门，只要他们觉得政治权利受到了侵害。


The standards we apply are not only those contained in Russia's constitution, but also international legal principles and human rights norms, even if they sometimes contradict our constitution.	我们不仅遵循俄国宪法规定的条款，国际法原则和人权标准在我们这里同样适用，即便它们有时会与宪法产生冲突。


For example, as ombudsman, I was opposed to curtailing the right of Russians to jury trials.	举例来讲，作为监察官员，我反对剥夺公民的陪审审理权。


Those who wanted to limit the use of juries supposedly feared a risk to state security in some instances.	限制使用陪审团据说是怕有些情况下威胁到国家安全。


My office worked closely with the state to assure that, in most cases, juries are used.	我的办公室和国家密切合作，保证陪审员能够审理绝大多数案件。


Similarly, my office defended the liberal weekly newspaper Novoe Vremya (New Times), which was being pressured by Moscow's city government on the pretext of a commercial dispute about a lease.	类似情况下，我的办公室保护了《新时代》（ Novoe Vremya ）自由周刊。 莫斯科市政府借口商业租赁方面的争议，对这家媒体施加压力。


That fight is not over, but after my intervention, Moscow's authorities must take into account the public's negative attitude to their effort to quash this publication.	这场斗争虽然还没有结束，但在我们干预后，莫斯科当局不得不开始考虑公众对压制媒体的反对意见。


Of course, Russia provides far more headline-grabbling examples of political and human rights problems, such as the low-grade war in Chechnya or the Yukos affair.	当然，俄国还有很多的政治和人权问题都能上报纸头版，包括粗俗的车臣战争或尤科斯事件。


My office pays maximum attention to Chechnya, although this is not easy to do from Moscow.	我的办公室尽可能地关注了车臣状况，尽管这在莫斯科不容易做到。


Indeed, I could spend all my time in Chechnya, but Russia has 89 regions with countless human rights issues to address.	实际上，我把所有的时间都花在车臣也毫不为过，但俄国共有89个地区，还有难以数计的人权问题等待解决。


This is why I suggested to Putin that Chechnya have its own regional rights ombudsman who would spend all his time there.	因此我向普京提议设立专门的地区监察员，专门解决车臣问题。


The new Chechen authorities seem to welcome this prospect.	这一提议似乎受到了新任车臣当局的欢迎。


As to the Yukos affair, my office cannot intervene in any legal process until it is completed.	至于尤科斯事件，司法程序完成前我没法干预。


Former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky's lawyers have sent a complaint to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg.	尤科斯前首席执行官米卡耶·克多可夫斯基的律师已经向斯特拉斯堡的欧洲人权法庭提起了申诉。


If Khodorkovsky disagrees with the final decision of the Russian courts, he will undoubtedly appeal to that court. Only then will I be able to express an opinion.	如果克多可夫斯基对俄国法庭的裁决不满，他肯定会向人权法庭再次上诉，那时我才有机会表达意见。


Many observers nonetheless insist that those under criminal investigation should be released on bail instead of being kept in prison.	虽然如此，很多观察家坚持：刑事调查对象有权取保候审，而不该一直羁押。


Others say that this is not an option in Khodorkovsky's case - being very rich, he could easily jump bail and flee abroad.	其它人则说在克多可夫斯基的案子里，这其实根本就不现实－像他那么富有，可以轻而易举地摆脱看管，逃往国外。


In fact, this is precisely what happened with other figures accused in the Yukos case.	实际上，尤科斯案件的其它被告不少已经这么做了。


All of these serious human rights questions expose the fact that Russia's legal institutions remains half-formed.	所有严重的人权问题都暴露出俄国法制还不太完善。


For example, the Duma has taken far too long to enact a law on lobbying, which in most developed democracies clearly defines what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior.	举例来讲，杜马长时间通不过游说法，而在多数发达的民主国家，游说法明确划定了合法和非法的界线。


Khodorkovsky might not be in as much trouble if such precise laws existed.	如果这样的法律存在，克多可夫斯基的问题也就不会那么严重。


Unformed laws are directly related to unformed ideas.	法律不完善与观念的不成熟有着直接的联系。


Human rights in Russia are often violated simply because people are not aware that they have some particular right.	俄国的人权被破坏，很多时候只是因为人们不知道有哪些人权。


The most important strategic goal of my office is that people learn how to defend their rights better, and to make the authorities take the complaints of ordinary Russians into consideration.	我办公室最重要的战略目标是告诉人们如何维护自己的权利，让当局重视俄国百姓的呼声。


Sadly, most bureaucrats still look upon human rights values with disdain.	可悲的是，多数官僚分子还是对人权嗤之以鼻。


But the real problem for my office is neither ignorance nor legal infirmity, it is that in an under-developed legal system such as Russia's, my authority is mostly personal, and requires help from the mass media.	但我面临的真正问题不是愚昧，也不是法律不完善，而是在俄国这样不健全的体系中，多数时候要靠我的个人威望，还需要大众媒体的鼎立支援。


Because concepts of human rights remain rudimentary, the best that can be hoped for is that awareness will slowly begin to take hold.	由于人权观念还非常原始，最好的希望就是人权意识会逐渐占据上风。


My tactical goal is thus to raise the public profile of the ombudsman's office, in order to win more respect and recognition by both citizens and the state.	因此，我的战术目标是提升审查机构在群众中的威望，争取来自公民和国家双方面的尊重和认可。


This will be all but impossible without cooperation with non-governmental human rights organizations in Russia.	如果不与国内非政府人权组织合作，这样的目标根本就不可能实现。


Indeed, I view one of my tasks as being to facilitate contacts between these groups and the authorities.	实际上，我认为当务之急就是促进这些团体与政府的联系。


The government's response to these efforts will be an important indicator of whether and to what extent Putin's administration intends to include human and political rights within its so-called "dictatorship of law."	政府所持的态度可以清楚地反映普京政权是否愿意在所谓的"法制专政"中容忍人权和政治权利，以及能容忍到什么程度。


Happiness by Design	幸福源于设计


LONDON – Over the last few years, thinking on happiness has undergone a sea change.	伦敦——过去几年里，幸福的理念已经发生了翻天覆地的变化。


Until recently, it seemed sensible to assume that our happiness was determined by factors such as luck, fate, or genes that are beyond our control.	直到不久前，由运气、命数或我们无法控制的基因等因素决定我们幸福与否还貌似是合理的假设。


It was easy to believe that, in the words of Samuel Beckett, the “tears of the world are a constant quantity.”	用塞缪尔·贝克特的话说，人们愿意相信“全世界的泪水是个恒定的常数。 ”


But new discoveries point to fresh ways of thinking about happiness, as something over which we do have control and that can be taught.	但新研究成果揭示了幸福可以控制也可以习得，这是一种看待幸福的全新方式。


Happiness depends on many factors, from obvious things, like enjoying good health and close relationships, to others that might not seem immediately intuitive, like engaging in generous behavior.	幸福取决于诸多因素，既有身心健康和亲密关系等显而易见的因素，还有些因素也许看起来不那么直观，比方说从事慷慨行为。


Some of these can be learned or cultivated, and courses that teach positive mental habits – like appreciating things that matter or avoiding dwelling on setbacks – have demonstrated measurable improvements in wellbeing.	其中有些可以学习和培养，事实证明教授积极思维习惯——比方说学会欣赏重要事务或避免纠结于挫折——的课程已经对幸福造成了重大改变。


The Dalai Lama recently helped launch a series of such courses in London, developed by Action for Happiness, an organization that I helped found.	达赖喇嘛最近在伦敦开办了一系列类似课程，上述课程由我协助创建的幸福行动机构负责开发。


Whole societies can also try to improve their happiness.	全社会同样可以进行提升幸福感的尝试。


British Prime Minister David Cameron introduced the measurement of happiness into national statistics, and more recently German Chancellor Angela Merkel launched a program to promote citizen’s wellbeing.	英国首相戴维·卡梅伦将对幸福的衡量纳入国家统计数据，最近德国总理默克尔也启动了一项计划提升民众的幸福程度。


How countries are governed has a huge impact on happiness.	国家的管理会极大地影响幸福程度。


Success in maintaining peace, the rule of law, and a functioning democracy matter greatly.	维护和平、法治和有效民主至关重要。


There is very strong evidence that these tend to correlate with wellbeing, and probably cause it, and there are obvious reasons why this should be the case.	有充分证据表明上述因素往往不仅关乎福祉，而且是幸福感的源头，个中原因也是显而易见的。


Being in a country at peace does not of itself make everyone happy; but it removes many obvious causes of unhappiness.	身处一个和平的国度本身并一定会让人幸福； 但却排除了很多显而易见的不幸福因素。


Individual policies can have a big impact, too.	具体政策同样可以影响很大。


There is strong evidence for encouraging greater attention to mental and physical health, and for placing a high priority on reducing unemployment.	有确凿证据表明应当加大对精神和身体健康的关注，并且重点关注失业问题。


But evidence in other areas remains patchy.	但其他领域的证据仍不完整。


We simply don’t know how different policies on marriage will affect wellbeing, even though we know that marriage correlates with it.	我们根本不知道不同的婚姻政策将如何影响幸福感，尽管我们知道婚姻与幸福感有着直接的联系。


Similarly, we don’t know whether more or less compulsory schooling, or which curriculum, has a positive or negative effect.	同样，我们不知道增加或减少义务教育，抑或具体哪门课程会产生正面或者负面的影响。


Overall, education has surprisingly little clear impact on happiness (perhaps because expectations often rise faster than the possibility of meeting them).	总体而言，教育对幸福感的影响出人意料的不明确（可能因为预期往往比满足预期的可能性提升得更快）。


Nor is the science unambiguous about whether rights to parental leave and flexible time, later retirement ages, or laws promoting work sharing, have the effects one might expect.	科学也无法确知育儿假和弹性工作权、延迟退休年龄或推进工作共享的法律能否达到预期的效果。


The problem is partly a matter of insufficient evidence; but complex interactions sometimes make tracing causation difficult.	其中部分原因是因为证据不足； 但复杂的互动有时会很难确定因果关系。


At first glance, one might think that lowering taxes would make people happier, because having more disposable income increases their wellbeing.	乍看上去，人们可能认为减税会让人更快乐，因为拥有更多可支配收入增进了他们的福祉。


But other factors can also come into play, such as whether the tax cuts are perceived as fair and whether they are accompanied by unpopular spending cuts.	但其他因素也有可能发挥作用，如减税在民众眼中是否公平、以及是否伴有不受欢迎的开支紧缩。


By contrast, at the level of individual programs, there is now a great deal of strong evidence.	相比之下，涉及到具体项目有着大量有力的证据。


There are now detailed manuals describing the effects of different kinds of exercise on both physical and psychological health.	现在有详尽的手册描述各类运动与身体和心理健康的关系。


For the elderly, remaining active is a clear source of happiness, whether that means exercising, volunteering, or engaging in paid employment.	对老人而言，活跃显然是幸福的源泉，无论这意味着锻炼、志愿服务抑或从事带薪工作。


(Indeed, a survey in Canada found that paid employment was the most satisfying activity for people over the age of 65.)	（事实上，加拿大一项调查发现带薪就业是65岁以上人群最富满足感的行为。 ）


There is also mounting evidence that policy interventions in schools to promote resilience or empathy can have a positive impact on wellbeing.	越来越多的证据表明借助政策干预在学校促进坚韧或同情可以对幸福产生积极的影响。


And there are suggestive indications that urban planning can influence happiness, especially when it reduces the time spent commuting or alleviates worries about crime.	并且有迹象表明城市规划会影响幸福感，尤其当它能够缩短通勤时间或缓解对犯罪的担忧。


It is impossible, of course, to eliminate suffering.	当然消除痛苦是根本不可能的。


It is part of the human condition.	痛苦是人类生存环境的一部分。


But it is within the power of individuals and governments to make the world a happier place.	但无论个人还是政府都有能力使世界更加快乐。


The tears of the world need not be a constant quantity.	这个世界的泪水并不一定是常数。


Learning from America	向美国学习


As the United States prepares to celebrate the inauguration of its first African-American president, it showcases again one of the best aspects of its national identity.	美国正在准备庆贺第一位黑人总统宣誓就职，这再一次表明了美国民族特性最佳的一面。


Though it took more than 200 years to reach this point, foreign observers, especially in Europe, marvel at Barack Obama’s ascendancy.	尽管美国花了两百多年时间才做到了这一点，但是外国、特别是欧洲的观察家们惊叹于奥巴马的崛升。


They recognize from their own relative marginalization of people of color or of immigrants that no French, German, Italian, or British Obama is on the horizon, and they wonder: how does America do it?	欧洲各国自己的有色人种或者移民相对受到排挤。 他们从中认识到，法国、德国、意大利或者英国还不会出现奥巴马，而且他们在问：美国是怎样做得到这样的呢？


America certainly has its flaws and its struggles over race and national identity, but it also has much to be proud of in terms of how it assimilates those with foreign or minority backgrounds.	美国当然有它的缺点，并且一直在种族和国家身份特性问题上纠缠不清。 但是，在如何同化具有外国或者少数族裔背景的人上它又十分自豪。


Obama’s example – and that of his newly formed cabinet, which includes many accomplished leaders from ethnic or racial “out-groups” – holds useful lessons for other nations, particularly in Western Europe.	奥巴马本人的事例以及他新近组成的、包含众多来自各个种族或者外来族裔杰出领导人的内阁给其他国家、特别是西欧上了生动的一课。


So what is it that America is doing right?	那么，美国究竟在哪里做得好呢？


First, America’s national story is different in essence from those of Western European nations.	首先，美国民族经历就与西欧国家不同。


The French story is that of French-ness, the British story one of British-ness; by definition, newcomers are “less than” or “outside of” this narrative.	法国就是法国，英国就是英国。 从根本上来说，新来的的人要“低于”他们的经历或者是“局外人”。


But the American national drama is the drama of immigration: everyone, except Native Americans, came from somewhere else.	但是美国的民族经历就是一部移民历史。 除了印第安人之外，所有人都是从他处而来。


All who are now part of the national elite have ancestors who came, often bedraggled and harassed, from somewhere else.	美国现今精英人士的祖先都是从世界其他地方而来，很多都是受到排挤和压迫。


Indeed, in America the qualities that lead people to become immigrants – initiative, ambition, risk-taking – are lionized.	确实，美国看中的是让人们成为移民的素质，也就是进取心、雄心以及冒险。


Immigrants are seen as arriving on a journey of continual reinvention, driven to exceed their opportunities in their countries of origin.	移民来到美国视为一种持续创新的历程。 他们受到驱动，要超越在其原住国家的机遇。


By contrast, immigrants in Western Europe were invited to fill low-status jobs, creating a built-in incentive for natives to see them and their children as a servant class, incapable of entering, let alone leading, the larger society.	与此相比较，西欧的移民则来做底下的工作，无法进入更为广泛的社会，更不用说领导社会了。


Moreover, unlike America, Western Europe must live with the uneasy conscience stirred by immigrants whose very presence serves as a reminder of a history of colonialism.	而且，与美国不同的是，西欧移民的存在本身就提醒人们殖民主义的历史。 西欧必须迁就由此引发的不安心态。


In this sense, the relationship between native-born and new Americans starts out “cleaner.”	在这一意义上说，美国土著和新美国人之间的关系就“比较干净”。


Second, Americans don’t demand that immigrants regard their cultural or ethnic background as being in contrast to or in opposition to their American-ness.	第二，美国并不要求移民把其自身文化或者种族背景看作是美国化的对比或者相反的东西。


Everyone gets to be hyphenated.	每个人都是得到同化。


By contrast, when identity is presented as being a stark choice, people often do not choose the identity of the host country that is being so inflexible.	当接纳国家十分不灵活、而身份认同又是艰难的选择的时候，人们经常不认同接纳国家。


As a result, Britain, France, and The Netherlands contain deeply entrenched subcultures of alienated, radicalized Muslim youth.	结果，英国、法国和荷兰等国家居住着激进化、深深隔离、属于亚文化的穆斯林青年。


But, while they and other radical Muslims around the world may hate Americans, it is hard to imagine a more Americanized, suburbanized immigrant subculture than Muslim immigrants in the US.	但是，尽管他们和全球其他激进穆斯林会憎恨美国，人们还是很难想像比在美国的穆斯林移民更为美国化、更具有中产阶级意味的移民亚文化了。


Rather then listening to radical clerics, they are busy assimilating, sending their kids to law and medical school, barbequing on weekends, and going to (American) football games – all while still maintaining devout ties to their religion and community.	这些穆斯林并不听取激进的教士，而是忙着融入同化，把自己的孩子送到法学院和医学院，在周末的时候进行烧烤，而且还观看美式足球比赛。 而与此同时，他们又与他们的宗教和社区保持着紧密的联系。


That has not changed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite rising hostility toward US Muslims among native-born Americans, based the assumption that they could not assimilate (a charge often directed in the past at Jews in various countries).	这一点从911以来并没有改变，尽管本土出生的美国人对美国穆斯林越发怀有敌意。 他们这样做就是假定穆斯林无法同化(过去在不同的国家人们也这样攻击犹太人)。


More generally, Americans view immigrants as being welcome to combine their culture of origin with their new American-ness, while immigrants see no conflict between their ethnicity and religion and their embrace of America.	在广义而言，美国人对移民的看法就是欢迎他们把原始国家的文化同美国化结合起来，而移民本身并不认为自己的种族和宗教与接纳美国观点有什么矛盾。


And, most significantly when it comes to assessing the ease of integration over time, they fully expect their kids to be completely, unhesitantly “American” – a promise that, by and large, is readily fulfilled.	而且最为重要的是，当他们估计长久的融合问题的时候，他们完全想要让自己的孩子全部、毫无迟疑地成为“美国人”。 从总体上而言，这一许诺已经实现了。


How different it is in Western Europe.	但是在西欧情况是多么的不同。


Three generations after West Indians began immigrating en masse to the United Kingdom, Caribbean-descended Britons still doubt that their children or grandchildren will ever be seen as fully British.	西印度人开始大批移民英国以来已经三代人了，但是祖先是加勒比国家的英国人依旧怀疑他们的孩子或者孙辈将会被完全视为英国人。


Turkish Gastarbeiter are still, two generations later, not seen as fully German.	经过了两代人，在德国的土耳其外来工人还是不被视为德国人。


And the unrest of the children and grandchildren of Algerian, West African, and Moroccan immigrants in the French banlieues attest to France’s failure to assimilate its immigrant population, despite the Republic’s official egalitarian rhetoric.	尽管法国官方鼓吹平等主义，但是法国近郊阿尔及利亚、西非以及摩洛哥移民表明了法国未能同化其移民人口。


Third, and perhaps most importantly, Americans separate Church and State.	第三、或许是最为重要的一点就是，美国的政教分离。


As long as there is a Church of England, if you are Jewish or Muslim or Sikh, there is a subtle level at which you will simply not feel fully English.	只要英格兰国教存在，而且如果你是犹太人、穆斯林或者锡克人，那么，在某一微妙的层面上，你就难以感觉自己完全是英国人。 美国的创立者们许多自己也是逃离官方宗教迫害的后裔。


But because the US Founders – many of them descended from people fleeing official religious persecution – guaranteed that there would never be a state-sanctioned religion, no religious group in America, no matter how small, is made to feel marginalized.	他们保证，美国不会有国家支持的宗教。 因此，美国的宗教团体无论多么渺小都不会感到受到排挤。


It is for this reason that Americans are not alarmed by visible symbols of different religions in public settings.	正是由于这一原因，美国人才不会对公众场合展示不同宗教象征物品感到惊惶失措。


It is assumed that since religion is a private matter for everyone, personal religious symbols are just that – personal.	人们假定，由于宗教是个人的私事，个人的宗教象征也就不过如此，也就是属于私人而已。


A Muslim girl who wears a headscarf in a public school is simply wearing a headscarf, not provocatively challenging a hegemonic social order.	在公共场合佩戴头巾的穆斯林姑娘只是戴着一块头巾而已，并非是在挑战居于霸主地位的社会秩序。


Fourth, America is defined in terms of a set of values that everyone can share, not as a lineage, a specific history, and a geographical area.	第四，美国的一整套价值观念每个人都可以分享，而非某一血统、特殊的历史以及地理区域。


Immigrant kids who go to US schools learn that America – ideally – is about freedom, aspiration, and tolerance.	在美国学校上学的移民子弟知道，在理想上而言，美国就是自由、渴望以及宽容。


The history that they learn about their new home illustrates how the US fulfills (or falls short of) those ideals, whereas an immigrant schoolchild in Europe learns less about ideals and more about a monarchical lineage, a set of historical events, and a roster of “great men.”	他们所学习到的有关新的家园的历史表明了美国是如何实现(或者没有实现) 这些理想的，而在欧洲的移民子弟学到的并非是理想，而是帝王血统、一整套历史事件以及一大堆所谓伟人。


If Western Europe took a leaf from the US, it would be more peaceful within its own borders and better able to use the talents and leadership of its Turkish, Algerian, Caribbean, and other immigrants.	如果欧洲学习美国的话，那么它就会变得更为平和，更加能够利用其土耳其、阿尔及利亚、加勒比以及其他移民的人才和领导能力。


Only then would we see a British, French, Dutch, or German Obama.	只有在那时，我们才会见到英国、法国、荷兰或者德国的奥巴马。


Learning from Crises	为什么我们从危机里学不到教训？


PRINCETON – Crises, especially very severe ones, are often learning opportunities.	普林斯顿——危机，尤其是严重的危机，常常可以让人吃一堑长一智。


Unfortunately, so far the world seems to have learned very little from the recent financial crisis.	不幸，最近这场金融危机之后，世人并没有多少长进。 实际上，今日之情形同2007年时一般险恶：美国经济复苏有气无力，令人心焦；


In fact, the situation today is just as dangerous as it was in 2007, with the United States now worried by its anemic economic recovery, Europe paralyzed by fears for the survival of its currency union, and emerging markets wrestling with asset-price bubbles.	欧洲货币联盟生死未卜，各国束手； 而新兴市场，则在苦斗资产价格泡沫。


Learning from crises is partly an exercise in analyzing what went wrong. But it is also about finding solutions.	从危机中学习，分析错在哪里固然是必要的，但寻找对策也同样重要。


Collectively, we have done well on the former, and very poorly on the latter.	全世界把前一半工作做得不错，后一半却做得很糟。


Most explanations of the causes of the post-2007 financial crisis point to five sources of instability.	在解释2007年金融危机为何爆发时，人们大多指出了不稳定性的5个来源。


First, the crisis was precipitated by the peculiarities of the US real-estate market, by government incentives for increased homeownership, and in imprudent lending by financial institutions.	第一，美国房地产市场的问题、政府力图提高住宅拥有率的政策以及金融机构的轻率放贷是危机的直接起因。


Second, perverse incentives led financial institutions to assume excessive risks.	第二，扭曲的内部激励制度致使金融机构过度冒险。


Internally, bankers had enormous potential to benefit from risky moves, but were insulated from the costs of failure.	银行业者以冒险操作获利，这个诱惑非常大，却缺乏相应的机制令其承担亏损的成本。


For individual institutions, this was not seen as a problem, because they were protected by the logic of being “too big to fail.”	某些机构甚至根本不觉得这里有问题，因为它们有一顶保护伞——“大到倒不得”的逻辑。


When the crisis erupted – owing to a downturn in the US housing market that was clearly foreseeable but willfully unforeseen – the public sector had to absorb the contingent liabilities built up in the financial system.	果然，当危机爆发——美国房地产市场走软是迟早的事，却被人为忽视——公共部门不得不吸收了金融系统的过度负债。


Third, global imbalances led to cheap money.	第三，全球收支失衡导致融资成本过低。


Long-term current-account surpluses in some countries (China, other rapidly growing Asian economies, and Gulf oil producers) permitted the long-term financing of deficits in others (the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, Ireland, and, above all, the US).	某些国家（中国、其他亚洲高增长经济体和海湾产油国等）长期保有的经常账户盈余支持了其他一些国家（英国、澳大利亚、西班牙、爱尔兰，当然首先是美国）的长期赤字融资。


Fourth, central banks, especially in the US, mistakenly maintained loose monetary policy.	第四，各中央银行，尤其是美国央行，错误地维持了宽松的货币政策。


With dollar financing by the Federal Reserve available to large institutions, the Fed became the equivalent of a world central bank.	美联储向各大金融机构提供美元，由此相当于扮演了世界央行的角色。


Finally, once the crisis erupted, the fiscal consequences of bailing out too-big-to-fail financial institutions contributed to rapid public-debt unsustainability, which threatens to boomerang on the banking sector.	最后，危机爆发之后，政府用公共资金保释了一批“大到倒不得”的金融机构，其财政后果致使公债不可持续性加剧，反过来又威胁到银行业。


None of these issues, with the possible exception of the first, has been resolved.	上述五个问题，也许除了第一个，至今都没能得到解决。


Of course, some discussion of financial-sector reform is taking place in a variety of forums, with a gradual consensus building around sliding or incremental capital-adequacy rules.	当然，大大小小的论坛上讨论过一些金融业改革的问题，渐渐形成一个共识——修订流动或增量资本充足率规则。


But many systemically important banks became bigger rather than smaller as a result of the crisis.	然而，危机之后，许多在整个金融系统中具有重要地位的银行，实际上是变大了，而不是变小了。


Moreover, while global imbalances were immediately reduced in the course of the initial crisis, with the US adjusting its deficit relatively rapidly, they are now re-emerging.	此外，尽管全球收支失衡在危机爆发之初有所收缩，但随着美国相对快速地调整其赤字，失衡情形又重新出现了。


The world’s major industrial economies, meanwhile, are maintaining very low interest rates.	与此同时，世界各大工业化国家都维持着很低的利率。


Before 2007, such a policy was seen as a mistake at worst; now it is interpreted as a malign strategy.	在2007年之前，这样的政策最多也就是个错误，而现在，有人说它是心存歹毒的战略。


There is a widespread suspicion that the US is deliberately pursuing dollar depreciation (or “currency wars,” in the words of Brazil’s finance minister).	如今，到处有人怀疑美国刻意追求美元贬值，或者——用巴西财长的话说——美国发动了“货币战争”。


We do not know how to handle the fiscal issues posed by the financial crisis.	我们不知道如何处理金融危机引发的财政难题。


Doubts about the sustainability of government debt produce sudden surges in interest rates, as risk premia rise dramatically with perceptions of the likelihood of default.	对政府债务可持续性的质疑导致债券息率飙升，对违约可能性的觉察使得风险溢价大涨。


Such surges are, by definition, abrupt – and thus highly disruptive.	这些上涨曲线非常陡峭，因此极具干扰性。


For countries on the brink, a merciless logic follows.	对那些站在悬崖边的国家来讲，未来是冷酷的。


Government debt service has in general become easier, owing to low interest rates.	得益于低利率，政府举债变得容易一些。


But hints of new fiscal imprudence or of backsliding on long-term debt consolidation and reduction can drive up borrowing costs dramatically.	但财政不稳健的新苗头和长期债务安全性的下滑可能会迅速推高借债成本。


In these circumstances, the additional costs of debt service easily outweigh any gains that might come from some measure of fiscal relaxation.	一旦出现这种情况，举债的新增成本将会轻易抵消财政纾缓措施所带来的好处。


As a result, fiscal uncertainty is affecting all major industrial countries, and producing political paralysis.	结果，财政不确定性成了悬在各大工业化国家头上的一柄利剑，导致政治僵局。


So, while we understand very well what may have produced the financial crisis, we find ourselves helpless to draw usable lessons from it.	于是，即便我们想透了是什么导致了金融危机，我们也无法从中得出有益的教训。


In a longer historical perspective, this policy paralysis may not be surprising.	从更长的历史视角来看，出现这种政策僵局也没什么好大惊小怪的。


It took a good deal of time to learn what we all now take to be the lessons of the interwar Great Depression.	20世纪30年代大萧条的种种教训，如今已成常识，当初却是花了��长一段时间才得到消化的。


It was only 30 years later, in the 1960’s, that Keynesian fiscal policy was widely accepted.	30年后，到了20世纪60年代，凯恩斯主义财政政策才得到广泛接受。


It was also only in the 1960’s that Milton Friedman clearly formulated the Great Depression’s monetary lessons.	也是在60年代，米尔顿·弗里德曼才清晰地阐述了货币主义从大萧条中得出的教训。


It was only in trade policy that the lesson was learned more quickly.	只有在贸易政策方面，教训吸收得要快一些。


During the Great Depression, a spiral of protectionist trade quotas and tariff restrictions was used to combat monetary deflation, as popular demand for political action met legislative “log-rolling” by representatives of groups with very different – and often very locally oriented – policy priorities.	大萧条期间，各国争相出台贸易配额和关税壁垒等保护主义手段，试图遏制通货膨胀，而公众对政府采取行动的呼声遭遇立法“扯皮”——代表各种地方性利益的集团为争斗不休。 政治学家（E.


The political scientist E.E. Schattschneider’s analysis of the process was influential in transferring responsibility for trade measures from the US Congress to the President.	E. Schattschneider）对该过程的分析产生了深远影响，导致制定贸易政策的权力从美国国会转移到总统手中。


The modern equivalent of that learning about trade policy would be to think about mechanisms to ensure long-term improvement in fiscal policymaking.	时至今日，我们应该借鉴上述贸易政策的政治改良，思考怎样确保财政决策有一个持续改善的长效机制。


In particular, it would be helpful to devise a way to identify potential risks to fiscal stability (such as those implied by an over-extended banking and financial system).	尤其应该考虑有什么办法可以预警财政稳定性的风险（例如银行业和金融体系过度扩张所带来的风险）。


Moreover, there is a need to limit legislative pressure for additional spending on locally important projects that fuel overall fiscal dysfunction.	此外，需要限制立法部门的施压能力，避免它们强推一些只有地方意义的项目，产生额外开销干扰整个财政大局。


The constructive (and relatively quick) trade-policy response in the aftermath of the Great Depression did not pay off immediately.	大萧条之后贸易政策的建设性（且相对快速的）反应并没有立即带来回报。


But, in the long run, it produced a much better policymaking environment.	但是，从长期来看，它创造了一个好得多的决策环境。


Now is the moment to launch an analogous effort to reform and rationalize the political process that produces fiscal policy.	如今，是时候来改革和优化财政政策的决策机制了。


Learning from Lebanon	从黎巴嫩吸取教训


NEW YORK – After watching the collapse of Lebanon’s government last week, it is hard not to think about efforts to build a stable Iraq.	纽约——见证过上周黎巴嫩政府的倒台，很容易让人联想起伊拉克的建设。


The two countries have so much in common.	这两个国家有很多共同之处。


Both are volatile democracies where any political question can provoke not just intense debate, but also the threat of violence.	它们都是极不稳定的民主国家，任何政治问题都有可能触发暴力，而不只是激烈的讨论。


Both countries have relative freedom of speech, at least relative to their Arab neighbors, and a multitude of political parties that are always ready to use it.	至少相比其阿拉伯邻国而言，这两个国家的言论都相对自由，而希望利用这种自由的政党也不在少数。


Each faces a greater risk of manipulation by outsiders than other countries in the region.	这两个国家受国外势力操纵的危险也与该地区其他国家不可同日而语。


Iraq and Lebanon are also the Arab world’s most ethnically and religiously diverse countries.	伊拉克和黎巴嫩同样是阿拉伯世界种族和宗教多样性的代表。


Though Lebanon has not conducted a reliable census in decades, its population is thought to be about 30% Sunni Muslim, 30% Shia Muslim, and 30% Christian, with Druze and others accounting for the rest.	尽管黎巴嫩近几十年来没有进行过可靠的人口普查，其人口构成大致为逊尼派穆斯林占30%，什叶派穆斯林占30%，基督教徒占30%，剩下的则是德鲁兹和其他族裔。


In Iraq, about 60% are Shia, 20% are Sunni Arabs, and 20% are Kurds, who are mostly Sunni.	而伊拉克则是什叶派占60%，逊尼派占20%，以逊尼派为主的库尔德人占20%。


In both countries, representatives of each of these groups demand substantial political influence.	在上述两个国家，各个团体代表都要求掌握实质性的政治权利。


But, as Lebanon turns to Saudi and Syrian mediators to help rebuild a governing coalition, Iraq moves forward with a tenuous unity government of its own.	但就在黎巴嫩指望沙特和叙利亚的斡旋重建执政联盟的同时，伊拉克却成立了自己脆弱的联合政府。


At times like these, the two countries’ similarities and differences can point Iraq’s leaders toward a stable democratic future.	正是在这样的时刻，分析这两个国家的相同和不同能为伊拉克领导人指点通往稳定民主的未来之路。


Despite this week’s turmoil in Beirut, Lebanon has an advantage that Iraqis should emulate.	尽管本周在贝鲁特发生骚乱，黎巴嫩仍具备伊拉克应当仿效的优势。


The personal freedoms that Lebanese citizens enjoy give their country a special resilience, and its cultural dynamism is the envy of young people throughout the Middle East.	黎巴嫩民众享有的个人自由赋予这个国家一种特殊的适应性，而中东地区所有的年轻人都羡慕这个国家拥有的文化活力。


Though some of Iraq’s conservative local clerics wield considerable influence, its current leaders will resist any drive to transform the country into a socially repressive and isolated state.	尽管伊拉克保守宗教势力仍能施加很大的影响，但其目前的领导人会对将国家变成压迫、孤立政体的任何企图加以抵制。


If Iraq is to keep the best of its next generation at home, cultural openness will be critically important.	如果伊拉克想要留住年轻一代中的精英，那么确保文化开放就具有至关重要的意义。


Second, Lebanon’s leaders were reminded again this week that their country can be governed only with some degree of consensus among the major factions.	其次，本周发生的事件再次提醒黎巴嫩领导人，实现国内执政必须依靠主要群体间某种程度的默契。


This principle is even more important in Iraq, where the Shia majority faces the constant temptation to punish Sunnis for years of repression under Saddam Hussein.	这种原则对伊拉克而言甚至更为重要，那里占人口多数的什叶派抑制不住因萨达姆·侯赛因治下所受的多年压迫而报复逊尼派穆斯林的冲动。


In Lebanon, sectarian power-sharing is enshrined in the constitution.	在黎巴嫩，不同教派间权力的分配在宪法中做出了明确的规定。


The president must always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker of parliament a Shia.	总统必须由基督教马龙派担任，逊尼派担任总理，什叶派担任议会议长。


This system, which codifies Lebanon’s factionalism, remains a subject of much controversy, but, by ensuring that no group can govern at the expense of others, it also reinforces baseline stability in a country built atop powerful religious and ethnic fault lines.	上述体系以法律形式固定了黎巴嫩的宗派利益，虽然仍是争议的焦点，但因为确保任何团体无法在执政时损害其他团体的利益，上述体系也确保了一个建筑在强大宗教和种族断层之上的国家的基本的稳定。


Without opposition support, Lebanon’s government can do little more than manage the most basic day-to-day state functions, but the country is unlikely to relapse into civil war.	没有反对党的支持，黎巴嫩政府除行使最基本的日常国家职能外几乎毫无建树，但国家也不大可能再次陷入内战。


In Iraq, sectarian power-sharing will remain less formal, and compromise won’t come easily to many of the country’s elected leaders.	伊拉克的教派分权将不会如此正式，许多当选领导人的妥协也将会来之不易。


Each major faction is represented in government.	政府囊括了所有主要势力。


Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, retains control of Iraq’s largely ceremonial presidency.	库尔德人贾拉勒·塔拉巴尼保持着对伊拉克礼仪性总统职位的控制。


Osama Nujaifi, a Sunni, has been elected speaker of Iraq’s parliament.	逊尼人奥萨马·阿努加菲已经当选为伊拉克议会议长。


But Shia leaders will lose their constituents’ support if they formally surrender any of the powers denied them for decades under Saddam.	但如果什叶派领导人正式交出萨达姆治下几十年一直被剥夺的权力，将会失去自己选民的支持。


Government stability will remain a delicate balancing act.	保持政府稳定仍然要靠微妙的平衡关系。


Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will have to manage relations with firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers, who can provoke unrest in southern Iraq if they feel under-served.	总理努里·马利基必须要与煽动叛乱的教士萨德尔及其追随者搞好关系，如果后者感觉受到冷落，就会挑起伊拉克南部的动荡局势。


In addition, the Kurds will expect to retain a veto over any proposal that might compromise Kurdish autonomy in the northern provinces.	此外，库尔德人希望保留否决权，以便否决可能威胁北部省份库尔德自治的任何动议。


Then there are the Sunni Arabs.	此外还有逊尼派阿拉伯人。


Support for Maliki’s government from Iraqiya, the multi-sectarian political coalition supported by most Sunnis, will remain in question.	多数逊尼派阿拉伯人支持的多教派政治联盟“伊拉克名单”是否支持马利基政府仍然无法确定。


Iraqiya won the largest share of seats in the March 2010 parliamentary elections, yet its leader, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, will not return to his old job.	“伊拉克名单”在2010年3月的议会选举中赢得的席位最多，但其领导人，前总理伊亚德·阿拉维将不会再任旧职。


Instead, he will lead the National Council for Strategic Policy, an institution charged with overseeing domestic security, but whose authority remains unclear.	相反，他将领导全国战略政策委员会，这个机构负责管理国内安全，但其权限界定尚不够清晰。


Nor is it clear whether Maliki will finally end the de-Baathification process – another major source of tension.	此外也不清楚马利基是否将结束清除复兴党行动——这项行动造成了��前主要的紧张局势。


Many Shia insist that the last vestiges of Saddam’s elite must be purged, but many Sunnis argue that the process is intended to bar them from good jobs and political influence.	很多什叶派坚持最后的萨达姆精英残余必须清除，但很多逊尼人认为阻止他们获取好职位和政治影响力才是行动的真正目的。


If Sunnis come to believe that Shia and Kurds intend to treat them as second-class citizens, they will have no stake in the success of Maliki’s government and could again begin to pursue their political interests by other means, provoking another surge of sectarian violence.	如果逊尼派开始相信什叶派和库尔德人会将他们当作二等公民，马利基政府的成功对他们没有任何意义，他们就会再度采用其他方式谋求自身的政治利益，从而引发又一轮的宗派暴力。


Worse still, factional conflict would undermine further development of a post-Saddam Iraqi identity.	更糟的是，派系冲突会阻碍后萨达姆时期伊拉克统一身份的进一步建立。


Otherwise, the country’s various interest groups could, like Lebanon’s feuding factions, turn to outsiders to negotiate solutions to their problems.	不然的话，伊拉克不同利益团体会像黎巴嫩的对立派系一样，转而依靠外来势力协调谈判解决自身问题。


There are good reasons for Iraq to avoid Lebanon’s example in this respect.	伊拉克在这方面避免步黎巴嫩后尘的理由非常充分。


Even in the best of times, Lebanon muddles through with a politically dysfunctional government and an army that operates in the shadow of a large Shia-dominated militant organization.	即使在最好的时候，黎巴嫩也只能依靠政治功能失调的政府和大型什叶派武装组织阴影下的军队得过且过。


With the exception of Iran, none of Iraq’s neighbors wants to see that model in Iraq.	恐怕除伊朗以外，没有哪个邻国愿意这种模式被移植到伊拉克。


Lebanon’s democracy often looks a lot like a train wreck, and the country has stumbled into armed conflict many times in recent years.	黎巴嫩的民主就像一辆脱轨的列车，这个国家近年来也曾多次卷入武装冲突。


But if Iraq’s leaders can create enough near-term stability to combine Lebanon’s openness and entrepreneurial energy with the revenue that comes from development of the country’s vast oil reserves – an advantage that Lebanon’s leaders can only envy – Iraq might one day offer citizens of neighboring states something they don’t have: a hopeful model for the future.	但如果伊拉克领导人能实现足够的近期稳定，将黎巴嫩的开放和创业活力与开发本国丰富石油资源所带来的收入相结合（这一优势让黎巴嫩领导人只剩下嫉妒），伊拉克或许有一天会给邻国人民带来他们不曾有过的恩赐： 一个充满希望的未来模式。


Learning from Mexico	墨西哥的启示


On July 2, Mexico held a presidential election that triggered what has become a bitter political firefight.	今年7月2日，墨西哥举行总统大选，引发了一场剧烈的政治斗争。


After conservative candidate Felipe Calderon was declared the winner by less than 1% of the vote, his populist rival, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, quickly claimed fraud.	在宣布保守派竞选人卡尔德隆以不到1%的优势成为赢家之后，其民粹派对手洛佩斯立刻声称有舞弊行为。


For the past two months, thousands of Lopez Obrador’s most fervent supporters have transformed the Zocalo, Mexico City’s central square, into a virtual sea of tents – the center of gravity of opposition to the official result.	过去两个月来，数千名最狂热的洛佩斯支持者们把墨西哥城的中心广场实际上变成了一个帐篷的海洋，使之成为反对官方大选结果的重心。


On September 1, dozens of opposition lawmakers created a primetime spectacle inside Mexico’s parliament by occupying the speaker’s podium, thereby denying outgoing President Vicente Fox the chance to deliver his final state of the nation address in person.	9月1日，几十名反对派议员在电视黄金时间制造了一起轰动事件。 他们占领了墨西哥议会大厦讲台，从而阻止了即将卸任的福克斯总统亲自发表他最后一次的国情咨文演说。


Four days later, Mexico highest electoral court ruled that Fox had improperly interfered in the election but unanimously reaffirmed Calderon’s victory.	四天后，墨西哥最高选举法院裁决福克斯不恰当地干预了选举，但是再次一致确认了卡尔德隆的胜利。


Lopez Obrador has vowed to obstruct Calderon’s presidency from the moment he takes office on December 1.	洛佩斯誓言要在从12月1日卡尔德隆就任总统之后阻碍其履行总统职务。


You learn a lot about a country’s underlying stability by how it responds to a crisis.	人们可以通过观察一个国家如何应付危机来了解该国的基本稳定程度。


Similar electoral conflicts unfolded in the United States in 2000 and in Ukraine in 2004.	类似的选举冲突2000年在美国以及2004年在乌克兰也发生过。


In the wake of fiercely contested presidential elections, large numbers of voters in each country questioned the legitimacy of the outcome.	在激烈的总统选情结束后，这两个国家的大量选民都质疑结果的合法性。


The nation’s highest courts were compelled to rule on demands for a ballot recount.	两国的最高法院都不得不对重新记票的要求做出裁决。


But US political and economic stability was never in doubt in 2000, because public confidence in the country’s governing institutions allowed them to resolve the conflict peacefully.	但是在2000年，美国的政治和经济稳定从来没有受到怀疑，因为公众信任该国的治国机制，从而使得他们平和地解决冲突。


These institutions proved far more powerful than the political personalities involved.	这些机制要比所涉及的政治人物远远更为强大。


In Ukraine, on the other hand, public outrage, buttressed by international pressure, brought the government to a halt.	相反，在乌克兰，公众的愤怒在国际社会压力的支持下让政府限于瘫痪。


In a second vote, the election’s loser was crowned the winner.	在第二次投票中，选举的输家成了赢家。


But the initial euphoria that accompanied the so-called “Orange Revolution” quickly faded, and Ukraine is still dealing with the political and economic fallout.	但是最初的伴随所谓“橙色革命”的乐观情绪马上褪去，而乌克兰目前还在应付其政治和经济余波。


What, then, should we make of Mexico and its disputed election?	那么，我们应如何看待墨西哥及其有争议的选举呢？


Here, too, a large segment of the electorate told pollsters that they doubted the legitimacy of the official result.	在墨西哥也是一样，选民的很大一部分告诉民意调查机构说他们怀疑官方结果的合法性。


The judiciary rejected calls for a full recount, though they did examine roughly 9% of the ballots before ruling that the review indicated no challenge to the election’s outcome.	司法机关拒绝了全部重新记票的要求，而只是检查了大约9%的选票，随后做出裁决说，复查的结果没有表明选举结果有什么问题。


Like Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko, who lost the initial vote in Ukraine, Lopez Obrador demanded that the result be overturned.	和在乌克兰的第一轮投票中败北的尤先科一样，洛佩斯要求推翻结果。


Unlike Yushchenko, he was denied.	和尤先科不同的是，其要求被拒绝。


But the good news for Mexicans is that their country’s political institutions have proven far more stable than did Ukraine’s.	但是对于墨西哥人来说的好消息是他们国家的政治机制要比乌克兰要稳定许多。


Despite Lopez Obrador’s best efforts to create chaos in the streets with public demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of protesters, domestic and international confidence remains strong.	尽管洛佩斯竭力在街头制造混乱，几十万的抗议者公开抗议，但是，国内和国际信心依旧十足。


The peso has barely budged since the election—a clear indication that investors have not lost faith in the country.	墨西哥比索在选举以来略有下跌，这清楚地表明投资者对墨西哥并没有丧失信心。


Their resilience is important, because market fears of instability often become a self-fulfilling prophecy.	由于市场对于不稳定的担忧经常成为自我实现的预言，因此，他们的复原能力非常重要。


The point is not that public confidence (or lack thereof) in an election outcome doesn’t matter.	关键并不是说公众对于选举结果具有信心(或者缺乏信心)无关紧要。


It does.	它确实重要。


But the broader picture – whether, as in Mexico, a country is able to continue to go about its business as its political institutions sort out the mess – matters far more.	但是， 正如在墨西哥一样，一个国家能否在其政治机构清理乱局之时继续正常运作，这一大局更为主要。


Unlike in Ukraine, investors have shrugged off the noisy demonstrations in Mexico City’s streets and remained focused on interest rates and fluctuations in the global economy.	与乌克兰不同，投资者对墨西哥城街头喧闹的游行示威置之不理，而是把精力集中在利率和全球经济的起伏之上。


This suggests that governing principles and sturdy political institutions, not powerful individuals, have become the bedrock of Mexican governance.	这表明，治国原则和稳固的政治机制，而非强人，已经成为墨西哥治国的基础。


Indeed, while Lopez Obrador continues to denounce the outcome and has threatened to make Mexico ungovernable, Mexico’s growing middle class has taken the political conflict in stride.	确实，在洛佩斯继续谴责选举结果并威胁让墨西哥天下不宁之时，墨西哥不断壮大的中产阶级对于政治冲突泰然处之。


Many who supported Lopez Obrador’s candidacy do not support the post-election protests in his name.	许多支持洛佩斯竞选的人并不支持以他的名义进行的选后抗议。


A recent poll in the newspaper Reforma found that Calderon would now defeat him by 19 percentage points.	改革报最近所作调查显示，卡尔德隆现在可以19个百分点击败洛佩斯。


Voters may prefer Lopez Obrador, but they value Mexico’s stability above all.	选民可能喜欢洛佩斯，但是，他们珍视墨西哥的稳定超过一切。


Moreover, during the political standoff, Calderon has worked behind the scenes to form an administration and to settle on a governing strategy.	而且，在政治僵局中，卡尔德隆做了幕后的工作来组建政府并达成治国战略。


Aware that he must establish a greater sense of political legitimacy, his cabinet is likely to include representatives of other political parties.	他清楚，他必须建立起更大的政治合法性，因此他的内阁可能会包括其他政党的代表。


He will probably introduce measures to tackle poverty and create jobs.	他还可能引入措施来处理贫困并创造就业机会。


Calderon’s task will not be easy.	卡尔德隆的任务是艰巨的。


Lopez Obrador and his supporters can be expected to work relentlessly to thwart his plans.	洛佩斯及其支持者会不遗余力地破坏他的方案。


But they are unlikely to derail his government.	但是他们却不大可能把政府拉下马。


The underlying stability highlighted by Mexico’s post-election crisis is also evident elsewhere in Latin America.	墨西哥选后危机所突出的根本性稳定局面也在拉美其他国家显现。


Whatever the potential for a leftward shift this year in some Latin American countries, others, including Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, are clearly less vulnerable to the type of populist rule we’ve seen in Venezuela and Bolivia.	无论今年在某些拉美国家中的左倾趋势如何，其他国家，包括墨西哥、智利以及巴西明显地不受民粹主义的控制。 我们在委内瑞拉和玻利维亚已经见到了这一统治。


Elected leaders in these countries face institutional constraints – parliaments that check the powers of the executive and courts that check the powers of both – on their ability to shape policy.	这些国家的当选领导人制定政策能力面临机制限制。 这些限制包括制衡行政的议会以及制衡前两者权力的法院。


To be sure, political and market volatility in a broad range of emerging-market economies will continue.	毫无疑问，大量新兴市场经济体中的政治和市场波动将会继续。


But some of them appear to have “graduated” toward a stability rooted in sustainable governance.	但是，其中一些看起来已经“毕业”，转向了植根于可持续治国的稳定局面。


Beyond Latin America, several Eastern European countries offer ready examples.	在拉美以外，几个东欧国家也提供了现成的范例。


In these states, regulatory and taxation issues now affect confidence more deeply and consistently than does political tension.	在这些国家中，管理问题和税收问题现在要比政治紧张局势更为深刻和一贯地影响信心。


Many in the media may not comprehend that yet.	现在，许多媒体可能对此还不理解。


But markets do.	但是市场理解。


Though Mexico’s election saga may continue to make headlines, its true significance is that it reveals just how politically sturdy a place Mexico has become.	尽管墨西哥的选举长剧可能会继续成为报章的头条新闻，但是其真正的意义在于，它揭示了墨西哥已经成为了一个多么政治稳固的地方。


Learning from the Cold War	冷战的智慧


NEW YORK – Every war is fought three times.	发自纽约——每场战争都必须经历三个阶段。


First comes the political discussion over whether to start or enter it.	首先是在政治上考量是否宣战或参战；


Then comes the question of how to fight it.	然后是解决仗该怎么打的问题；


And, finally, there is consideration of what lessons should be learned from it.	最后，就是总结教训。


The Cold War, the third major conflict of the twentieth century, is no exception to this rule.	而作为20世纪世界三大主要冲突之一的冷战也逃脱不了这条法则。


All three phases can be identified, and all three triggered intense debate.	我们可以从中清晰地勾勒出这三个阶段，而且每一个阶段在当时都引发了激烈的辩论。


There were, for example, those who questioned whether the Cold War was in fact necessary and whether the Soviet Union and Communism constituted a threat.	例如，当时就有人质疑这场冷战是否有必要开打，而苏联和共产主义是否真的构成了威胁。


Such “revisionists” were a distinct minority, which is a good thing, as there is no reason to believe that the Soviets and Communism were a benign force.	尽管这种质疑的存在是个好现象，但这些“修正主义者”很明显只是些少数派，因为当时可没人会相信苏联和共产主义是一股友好的力量。


As a result, the Cold War, a four-decade-long global struggle, became a reality.	结果就促成了一场长达40年的国际冲突。


There was also an ongoing debate about how best to wage the Cold War throughout its history.	而贯穿整个冷战历史，关于冷战怎么打这个问题也是一直争论个不休。


The two principal schools of thought were “roll back” and “containment.”  The former argued that nothing less than overthrowing communism – “regime-change” in today’s parlance – would do.	其中“击退”和“围堵”则是当时的两大主要思想流派。 前者强调说我们要做的就是要打倒共产主义——用今天的话来说就是“颠覆政府”。


The latter approach held that efforts to roll back Communism in the short run were too risky, given the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and that the United States and the West should content themselves with limiting the spread of Soviet power and influence.	后者则考虑到苏联有核武器，短期内把共产主义推翻的做法显然有点冒险。 因此美国和西方国家的行动应该仅限于遏制苏联国力和势力范围的扩张之上。


Containment prevailed, but this hardly settled the debate, as there were intense arguments both over where it should be applied (Vietnam, Central America, and the Middle East all come to mind) and how it should be carried out, i.e., the right mix of military force, covert action, diplomacy and arms control, and economic sanctions and assistance.	最终围堵政策占了上风，但这可并不意味着争论就此平息，因为该政策应该在哪里推行（越南，中美洲和中东地区都被考虑过了）以及如何推行，如混合使用武装力量，秘密行动，外交行动和武器控制条约，以及经济制裁和援助等措施这类问题，又引发了新一轮的激烈争论。


And now, exactly 20 years after the Berlin Wall came down, we are well into the third phase – the debate over why the Cold War ended when it did and how it did.	时至今日，在柏林墙倒塌整整20年后，我们也就恰好进入了第三个阶段——关于冷战为什么结束以及如何结束等问题的讨论。


One school of thought maintains that the Cold War was won as a result of decades of sustained US and Western pressure on the Soviet Union and its allies.	有一种思想流派认为冷战的胜利来源于美国和西方国家对苏联及其盟友长达几十年的压制。 这种压制在各个时期分别不同的形式呈现——比如美英法三国的核计划；


This pressure at various times took the form of US, British, and French nuclear programs; NATO’s willingness to counter Warsaw Pact deployments of both conventional military and tactical nuclear forces; the decision to defend South Korea against the North’s aggression; the arming of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan to bleed Soviet occupation forces; and the decision to build a costly missile-defense system aimed both at negating the Soviet Union’s principal military investment and bankrupting its government.	武装阿富汗的穆斯林游击队员来拖垮入侵的苏军； 构建耗资巨大的导弹防御系统，让苏联的重要军事投资毫无用武之地，并迫使其政府破产。


A second and very different school of thought emphasizes less what the West did and more what the Soviet Union was.	除此之外，另一种截然不同的思想流派则较少强调西方的作用，而更多地强调了苏联的所做作为。


In this narrative, the Cold War was not so much won by the US and the West as lost by the Soviets, the inevitable result of Soviet economic weakness and political decay.	这个流派认为，与其说美国和西方打赢了冷战，倒不如说是苏联打败了，冷战的结束只是其国内经济硬伤和政治腐败的必然结果而已。


Yet another perspective stresses that Western willingness to engage the Soviet Union as much as confront it played a major role in how history turned out.	此外还有一种观点认为西方向苏联的渗透与其对苏联的对抗一样，在那段历史中发挥了重要的作用。


Détente helped to keep the competition from spilling over into conflict as it exposed the Communist world to Western ideas of freedom and capitalism along with their benefits.	缓和政策，即通过把自由和资本主义这些西方理念以及好处传播到共产主义阵营的方式，使得西方与苏联的竞争没有演变成冲突。


The Soviet and other top-heavy regimes increasingly found themselves losing the battle of ideas and, as a result, the support of their own citizens.	而苏联和其他岌岌可危的政权则不断发现自己正在意识形态的战场上节节败退，并随之失去了民心。


All of these factors played a part.	但事实上，以上所有因素其实都发挥了一定作用。


Western willingness to deny the Soviets success was an essential component of strategy.	西方对抗苏联成就的意愿是整个战略不可���缺的组成部分。


But this alone would not have been enough; indeed, the Cold War could well have turned hot if Western strategy had consisted only of military competition and confrontation.	但仅仅对抗是不够的。 的确，如果西方战略仅限于军备竞赛和军事冲突，冷战肯定会演变成一场热战。


It was important to moderate the competition in order to allow pressure for change to build up from within the Soviet bloc.	其关键就在于拿捏控制竞争的剧烈程度，以便能让那些变革的力量在苏维埃集团内部滋长起来。


And it was important to expose the societies under Soviet control to their shortcomings and to the advantages of outside ideas.	同样重要的则是要令那些在苏联控制下的社会集团意识到自身的缺陷和外来思想的优点。


All of the above has implications for today’s challenges.	以上所述都与今天我们面临的挑战有密切关系。


To be sure, there is no global threat on the scale of the former Soviet Union, but there are dangerous challenges emanating from such countries as Iran and North Korea.	现在，我们可以确定，在前苏联领土范围内并不存在什么全球威胁，但来自伊朗和朝鲜这些国家的危险挑战却是切实存在的。


What is required is a policy on the part of the global community that mixes military strength with a willingness to negotiate and interact, a policy of collective strength and collective flexibility.	而目前国际社会真正需要的则是一种在全球部分地区军事行动和协商互动相结合的政策，一种强调集体力量和集体灵活性的政策。


It is important here to keep in mind that containment, the dominant doctrine of the Cold War era, sought to push back against Soviet and Communist expansion – not just to limit the reach of Soviet power, but to frustrate it – in order to create a context in which the inherent flaws of communism and authoritarian rule would come to the fore.	我们不能忘记，围堵，这个冷战时期主要的指导思想，目的是要遏制苏联和共产主义的扩张——不但要限制苏联的势力范围，而且还要挫败它——以营造出一种使社会主义和独裁统治的固有缺陷得以暴露无遗的局面。


Mikhail Gorbachev could only have done what he did amidst a crisis of confidence.	由此看来，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫所下的决定也只是深陷信心危机时的自然行为而已。


Today, the world needs to create similar crises of confidence in the minds of those ruling Iran and North Korea.	今天，世界需要在那些伊朗和北韩统治者的头脑中构建一场类似的信心危机。 目的是要在短期内限制他们的所作所为；


The goal should be to limit what they can accomplish in the short term; to get them to change their policies in the medium term; and to set in motion forces that will bring about new and fundamentally different governments and societies in the long term.	在中期则迫使他们改变政策； 最终在长期的过程中在激发那些足以构建一个全新的，截然不同的政府和社会的力量。


Such an approach served the world well during the Cold War; it could do the same now.	而这种方法在冷战时期大派用场，现在也必将屡试不爽。


Learning Globalization From Football	从足球中领略全球化


Football is not only the world’s most popular sport, but also probably its most globalized profession.	足球不仅是全世界最为风行的体育运动，而且可能也是最为全球化的职业。


It is inconceivable that Brazilian, Cameroonian, or Japanese doctors, computer scientists, blue-collar workers, or bank tellers could move from one country to another as easily as Brazilian, Cameroonian, or Japanese football players do.	巴西、喀麦隆或者日本的医生、计算机科学家、蓝领工人或者银行出纳可以像它们的足球运动员一样在不同国家之间自由流动是不可想象的。


Indeed, London’s Arsenal football club is composed entirely of foreigners, including a French coach.	的确，伦敦的阿森纳足球俱乐部完全由外国球员组成，还包括一名法国教练。 甚至连队长的角色也不再由本国球员占据。


Even the captain roles are no longer reserved for domestic players: Thierry Henry, a Frenchman, is Arsenal’s captain, Andriy Shevchenko, a Ukrainian, is often the captain of AC Milan, and Christiano Zanetti, an Argentine, is captain of Inter Milan.	法国球员亨利是阿森纳的队长； 乌克兰人舍普琴科经常是AC米兰的队长；


Similarly, dozens of South Americans and Africans play in Russian, Turkish, Polish, and various Southeast European leagues.	阿根廷人扎内地则是国际米兰的队长。 同样，几十个南美以及非洲球员在俄国、土耳其、波兰以及不同的东南欧联赛中效力。


Football thus provides a glimpse of how true globalization of labor would work.	足球因此而揭示出真正的劳务全球化如何运作。


In football, as in other occupations, restrictions on labor mobility came entirely from the demand side.	像其他职业一样，对足球领域中的劳务流动限制完全来自于需求方。


No limits were ever imposed on players’ movements, except by Communist countries.	除了共产国家外，球员的流动没有任何限制。


But the demand side was heavily regulated, owing to a rule that clubs could field no more than two foreign players in any single game.	但是，由于规则规定俱乐部不得在单场比赛中有两名以上的外籍球员上场，因此需求方受到重重管制。


The Bosman ruling, named after a Belgian player who successfully challenged the rule’s application to players from other European Union countries, eroded the limit, which collapsed altogether under the onslaught of the richest European clubs’ demand for a free hand in hiring the best players, wherever they might be found.	比利时球员博斯曼成功地挑战了这一规则适用于其他欧盟国家球员，以他的名字命名的裁决侵蚀了这一限制。 欧洲最富有的俱乐部要求自由雇佣最好的球员，而无论他们在哪里被发现，这一限制最终在它们的攻击下瓦解。


So wherever globalization and full commercialization reign supreme, there is an unmistakable concentration of quality and success.	所以，在全球化和完全商业化统治称霸的领域内，质量和成功都会毫无疑问地聚集。


Consider the number of clubs that have qualified for the European Champions’ League top eight slots.	让我们看看那些获得欧洲冠军杯前八名资格的俱乐部数量。


If we look at five-year periods between 1967 and 1986, the number of different teams that qualified for the quarterfinals varied between 28 and 30.	我们看一看1967年到1986年之间的五年期间，进入四分之一决赛的队伍数量在28到30之间。


In the next two five-year periods, however, the number fell to 26, and in the most recent period (2000-2004), there were only 21.	但是，在下一个五年期间，这一数量下降到了26个，而在最近的期间（2000年到2004年），只有21个。


The bottom line is simple: fewer and fewer clubs are making it into the European elite.	结论是简单的，那就是越来越少的俱乐部可以跻身欧洲精英行列。


National leagues are similar.	国内联赛也是一样。


Since the English Premier League was started in 1992, only one championship was not won by Manchester United, Arsenal, or Chelsea.	1992年英超问世以来，只有一届冠军不是在曼联、阿森纳或者切尔西之间产生。


In Italy, all but two Serie A championships since 1991 have been won by either Juventus or AC Milan.	在意大利，1991年以来所有的甲级联赛冠军只有两次不是被尤文图斯或者AC米兰获得。


In Spain, all but three championships since 1985 have been won by either Real Madrid or Barcelona.	在西班牙，1985年以来的所有冠军只有三次不是被皇家马德里或者巴塞罗那队获得。


The reason for this concentration at the top is obvious: the richest clubs are now able to attract the best players in the world.	这一集中于顶端的原因是明显的，那就是最富有的俱乐部能够吸引全世界最佳的球员。


Yet this has arguably been accompanied by improved quality in the game itself, owing to what economists call “increasing returns to scale.”	但是，由于经济学家所称的“渐增的回报规模”，因此集中也无疑伴随着足球运动本身质量的提高。


When the best players play together, the quality of each, and of the team as a whole, increases exponentially.	当最佳球员们同场竞技时，每人以及整个球队的水平也大为增长。


When Ronaldinho and Messi, or Kaka and Shevchenko, play together, their combined “output” (number of goals) is greater than the sum of goals that each would score if he played in a different club with less talented co-players.	当小罗纳尔多、梅西、卡卡和舍普琴科同场竞技时，其所产生的总体综合“产量”（进球数）要多于各个球员在不同的俱乐部与天赋略逊一筹的队友合作情况下所取得的单个进球数。


Free mobility of labor in other areas would probably produce the same effect.	其他领域内的劳工自由流动可能也会产生同样的效应。


If doctors, computer specialists, or engineers (let alone the proverbial Polish plumbers!) were allowed to move freely, the concentration of talent in the richest countries would most likely increase.	如果允许医生、计算机专家或者工程师（更不用提众所周知的波兰管道工！ ）自由流动，人才汇集于最富有国家几乎肯定将增加。


Inequality in the distribution of talent across countries would rise, even if total world output of goods and services, and their average quality, improved, as with football today.	即使商品和服务的世界总产量如同今天的足球一样得以增加而且平均质量得以改善，国家间的人才分配不平等仍然将会上升。


Poorer or smaller countries can hardly dream of winning a European championship, as Steaua (Romania), Red Star (Serbia), or Nottingham Forest (now languishing in the English third division) once did.	穷国或者小国几乎无法像布加勒斯特星队（罗马尼亚）、红星队（塞尔维亚）或者诺丁汉森林队（现在英国丙级球队中苦苦挣扎）那样辉煌一时，梦想赢得欧洲冠军。


But, while we see inequality and exclusion in club-level football, the opposite is true for competitions between national teams.	但是，尽管我们在足球俱乐部中发现不平等以及排斥，国家队之间的竞争却是相反。


The average winning margin among the top eight World Cup national teams has steadily decreased, from more than two goals in the 1950’s, to about 1.5 goals in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s, and only 0.88 goals in the 2002 World Cup.	世界杯国家队中前八强之间的平均获胜差距稳步下降，从二十世纪五十年代的两个球以上到六十年代、七十年代以及八十年代的1. 5个，直到2002年世界杯赛的0.


The same is true of all games played at the final tournament, not only those among the top eight national teams.	世界杯决赛阶段中所有比赛也都是一样，而不仅仅是八强。


The decrease in winning margins is all the more impressive because the World Cup has grown from 16 to 32 national teams – many of them new and rather inexperienced.	由于世界杯从16支队伍增加到32支，它们中的许多都是新近入围、没有经验，因此赢球差距缩小也就更为令人印象深刻了。


Remarkably, they are not trounced by the traditional powerhouses.	令人瞩目的是，它们并没有被传统足坛强国打得落花流水。


On the contrary, the elite eight teams of the last four World Cups have included two “newcomers ” that had never been quarterfinalists, such as Turkey and South Korea in 2002.	相反，上四届世界杯赛的八强精英包括了以前从未晋级四分之一决赛的“新来者”，例如2002年的土耳其和韩国。


There are again two reasons for this.	对此也有两个原因。


First, free movement has meant that good players from small leagues improve much more than they would had they stayed home.	首先，自由流动意味着来自弱小联赛的优秀球员的进步要比留在本国快很多。


A good Danish or Bulgarian player improves much faster if he joins Manchester United or Barcelona.	一名优秀的丹麦或者比利时球员如果加入曼联或者巴塞罗那，那么他的进步就会快很多。


Second, that improvement in quality was “captured” by national teams thanks to FIFA’s rule requiring players to play only for their national team.	第二，由于国际足联规定，球员只能为本国国家队效力，因此国家队就“获得”了质量提高。


Eto’o can play for any Spanish, Italian, or English club, but in the national competitions, he can play only for Cameroon.	埃托奥可以为任何西班牙、意大利或者英国俱乐部踢球，但是在国家队比赛中他只能为喀麦隆效力。


In other words, FIFA has introduced an institutional rule that allows small countries (in the football sense) to capture some of the benefits of today’s higher-quality game, thereby partly reversing the “leg drain.”	换句话说，国际足联引入了一种让足球小国获得当今更高水平比赛部分利益的机制性规则，因此也就部分逆转了“足球人才流失”。


The same rule could be applied to other activities.	同样的规则也可以适用到其他活动中。


Free movement of skilled labor could be accompanied by binding international requirements that migrants from poor countries spend, say, one year in five working in their countries of origin.	具有技能的劳工自由流动会带来有约束力的国际性要求，也就是来自穷国的移民要在五年中为其本国工作一年。


They would bring home skills, technology, and connections that are as valuable as the skills that Eto’o, Essien, or Messi bring back to Cameroon, Ghana, or Argentina.	这样他们就会给本国带来像埃托奥、埃森或者梅西带回给喀麦隆、加纳或者阿根廷的足球技巧一样宝贵的技能、技术以及人脉联络。


Job placement would remain a problem, but the principle is sound: the world should learn from its most popular sport.	安置工作仍然是一个问题，但是原则是确定的，那就是，世界可以从其最为流行的体育中领悟到东西。


Self-Measurement and Self-Manipulation	自我测量和自我控制


HONG KONG – Recently I met with two nice slim men who have just launched a weight-loss app that provides daily menus and recipes, and offers some substitutions in case the user does not like a particular food.	香港—最近，我遇到了两位身材苗条的男士，他们开发了一个减肥应用，这个应用提供每日菜单和食谱，如果用户不喜欢某种食物，它还能提供替代品。


The two are programmers who have little understanding of their target market and have not read much of the relevant literature.	两位男士都是程序员，几乎毫不了解他们的目标市场，也没有读过多少相关文献。


I must confess that I was appalled at their ignorance of nutrition, psychology, game dynamics, and even women’s magazines.	我得承认，我对他们对营养、心理、博弈动态学甚至女性杂志的无知感到震惊。


Yes, they mean well, and they feel their users’ pain. “We get letters...” one said.	是的，他们的初衷良好，并能感受用户的烦恼。


“One lady wrote that she follows the menus properly, but then she wakes up at midnight and goes to the refrigerator....I don’t know what to tell her!”	“我们收到了不少信……”其中一位说，“一位夫人写信告诉我们，她照着菜单亦步亦趋，但她总是半夜饿醒去淘冰箱……我不知道该怎么跟她说！ ”


Well, for starters, he could suggest that she keep sweets out of the house to avoid temptation, or that she put aside part of one of each day’s meals for a midnight snack.	好吧，首先，他可以建议把糖类驱逐出家里，以免受到诱惑，或者可以把正餐中的一些食物生下来当夜宵吃。


The idea is not to get overly scientific or precise, but to help people change their habits.	这个主意不是为了科学或精确，而是为了帮助人们改变习惯。


I think about this challenge a lot these days, because my new startup, called HICCup (Health Initiative Coordinating Council), aims (in part) to help people do just that on a massive scale, though initially concentrated in just a few communities.	这些天来，我一直在想这一挑战。 因为我的新项目HICCup（健康计划协调委员会，Health Initiative Coordinating Council）旨在（部分地）帮助大量的人这样做，尽管一开始该项目的对象只局限在少数社区。


The point is not to turn everyone into an obsessive calorie-, weight-, or step-counter, but to get people to be better self-manipulators.	要点不在于让每个人都成为卡路里、体重和阶段控制狂，而是让人们更好地自我控制。


The way to do that is to replace temptations with safe choices.	我们的方式是用安全的选择取代诱惑。


Give people rules of thumb, not product manuals.	给人们经验法则而不是产品手册。


Suggest new habits to replace old ones.	用新习惯取代旧习惯。


Let people see how they are being manipulated already by advertising, product formulations, and the media to buy more, consume more, and want more.	让人们看到自己是如何被广告、产品配方和媒体控制、从而买得更多、消费得更多、想要更多。


In the field of diet and nutrition, there is a fundamental debate between calorie counters and proponents of specific diets, whether low-fat, low-carbohydrate, or buy-my-line-of-expensive-formulated-products.	在饮食和营养领域有一个根本性的争论，即卡路里斗士和具体饮食方法之争——不管是低热量派、低碳水化合物派还是“订购我的昂贵配方餐”派。


The issue is less whether any such diet works in general (though some of them are actually unhealthy) than whether more than a few individuals can follow such a regimen over the long term.	问题与其说在于一般而言这样的饮食是否有效（尽管其中一些其实是不健康的），不如说在于是否能有较多的个人长期坚持这一套。


Calories do count; the physics of energy works even in the human body.	卡路里确实有用； 能量的物理学在人体中也起着作用。


But the kind of food you eat and when you eat it does influence how hungry you feel (and thus your self-control), and whether you use up the calories you eat or turn them into fat even as you still feel hungry.	但吃什么和何时吃确实影响着你的饥饿感（从而影响你的自控力），以及你吃下去的卡路里是否会转化为脂肪（即使你仍有饥饿感）。


(Sugar is the main culprit, as Robert Lustig, the author of Fat Chance, has argued.)	（糖果是主要罪魁，《肥胖有望》（Fat Chance）作者罗伯特·卢斯蒂格（Robert Lustig）如是说。 ）


So our approach at HICCup will be to help people figure out for themselves what works.	因此，我们在HICCup的方法是帮助人们为自己找到行之有效的方法。 也许这种方法是使用小一号的晚餐餐盘；


Maybe it is using smaller dinner plates; or keeping temptation out of the house, store, or workplace; or following the increasingly modish (but actually ancient) creed of eating breakfast like a king, lunch like a prince, and dinner like a pauper.	也许是将诱惑赶出家里、商店和单位； 也许是遵守越来越流行（其实自古有之）的吃饭口诀——早餐向国王，午餐像王子，晚餐像乞丐。


Then there is the simple tactic of restricting your options in advance, when you have the strength.	也可以使用简单的策略——限制你的未来选择，如果你足够强大的话。


Avoid shopping for food when you are hungry.	避免在饥饿时逛食品店。


Tell the waiter in advance that you do not want dessert.	一开始就告诉侍者你不要甜点。


Or read Predictably Irrational, by Dan Ariely, and apply it to your own health and behavior.	或者可以读一读丹·艾利里（Dan Ariely）的《可预测的非理性》（Predictably Irrational），并应用于你自己的健康和行为。


As Ariely points out, general advice is generally useless.	艾利里指出，一般的建议一般是没用的。


Individuals need their own tricks, and each person knows best what will work for them – if they think about it.	个体需要个体的窍门，每个人最了解对自己什么办法最有效——如果他们认真对待的话。


For example, I face my own dilemmas, and I do my own experiments.	比如，我就面临过我自己的两难，有切身体验。


I have a seemingly dangerous condition called Barrett’s esophagus – mysterious “lesions” around the entrance to my stomach that were discovered by chance (during medical exams for my cosmonaut training).	我身上有种危险的状况，称为巴雷特食道（Barrett’s esophagus）——在我的胃的入口处存在神秘的“病灶”，我（在宇航员体检时）偶尔发现了它。


Not much is known about it, but it is probably not a good idea to swim – as I do every morning – with coffee in my stomach.	对于这种状况我们知之甚少，但在胃里装满咖啡的时候游泳——我每天早上都处于这样的状态——不是个好主意。


Yet my swimming time is definitely better after having coffee.	但在喝了咖啡后游泳感觉好得多。


So I take my chances on mornings when I am really tired; otherwise, I do not.	因此我只有在很累的时候才选择喝咖啡； 在其他时候，我选择不喝。


For many people, the next big development will be non-invasive blood analysis, so that everyone, not just super-motivated diabetics, can test their own blood and understand their own metabolic chemistry.	对许多人来说，下一个大发展将是无创血液分析，依靠这种技术，每个人（而不仅仅是动机强烈的糖尿病患者）都可以检验自身血液，了解自身的代谢化学。


Just what does a doughnut do to your blood sugar?	一个甜甜圈会给你的血糖带来什么变化？


If Lustig is right and eating sugar just makes you hungry, you can see the mechanics for yourself.	如果卢斯蒂格是对的，吃糖只能让你感到更饿，那么你可以自己查看其中的机制。


I do not expect everyone to carry a blood-sugar monitor; freedom from such devices is surely what diabetics crave as much as sugar.	我并不是希望每个人都配一个血糖仪； 糖尿病人摆脱血糖仪的愿望和摆脱糖的愿望一样强烈。


But if HICCup can set loose a bunch of schoolchildren to study sugar metabolism for themselves, they are likely to spread the message far and wide in their own communities, to friends and family alike.	但如果HICCup可以让一些学生学习自身体内的糖代谢，他们就有可能在所处社区中将其中学到的信息广而告之，让亲朋好友都有所了解。


Likewise, people could start experimenting with sleep.	类似地，人们可以从睡眠入手实验。


There are lots of little quizzes you can take to compare your performance after different amounts of sleep.	你可以做很多小测试比较不同睡眠时间的表现。


I have found it much easier to leave parties early since I started doing this.	在开始这么做了以后，提前从派对中抽身就不再那么困难了。


How much drunken conversation will compensate for a drop in IQ (even if only temporary) the next day?	多少第二天醉意重重的对话才能补偿智商的（即使是暂时性的）下降？


All these little tricks are just that: tricks.	所有这些小诀窍仅仅是诀窍。


But, because they are tricks that you play on yourself, they can make you feel in control rather than manipulated.	但是，由于你可以把这些诀窍用于自身，它们可以让你感觉能够自我控制，而不是被控制。


I do not know the right approach for each person; the point is to liberate people to find their own path, not to chain them to some new “healthy” protocol that may or may not suit them.	我不知道具体哪个人适合哪种方法； 要点在于让人们自由寻找自己的办法，而不是把他们束缚于某种新的“健康”协议，而不管是否适合。


The way to do that is with more information – not from books or learned articles, but through awareness of habits that can lead to finding one’s own answers to eternal questions about freedom and self-control.	这样做需要更多地信息——不是来自书本或研究文章，而是通过对习惯的了解以找到你个人对自由和自我控制这一永恒问题的答案。


Learning to Lead	学会领导


CAMBRIDGE – Public-opinion polls show that citizens in many democracies are unhappy with their leaders. This is particularly true in Great Britain, where a number of members of Parliament have used their housing allowances to enhance their income, sometimes legally and sometimes not.	剑桥——民意调查显示，许多民主国家的公民对其领导人并不满意，这一现象在英国尤甚，该国许多议员曾利用住房补贴增加收入，这一行为时而合法，时而非法。


Some analysts predict that only half of Britain’s MPs will be returned in next year’s election.	一些分析家预测，只有半数的英国议员将在明年的选举中获得连任。


But, whatever the failures of particular British legislators, the issues go further than merely allowing voters to “throw the rascals out.”	但无论具体的英国立法者们犯有何种过错，这一议题较之仅仅允许选民们“将坏蛋赶下台”更深入了一层；


There is also a question of how successful leadership is taught and learned in a democracy.	此处的另一个问题便是在民主国家内，成功的领导能力应如何施教与学习。


A successful democracy requires leadership to be widespread throughout government and civil society.	一个成功的民主国家需要广泛遍布于政府与民间社会的领导能力；


Citizens who express concern about leadership need to learn not only how to judge it, but how to practice it themselves.	对领导力表现出关注的公民们不单需要学习怎样评判这种能力，并且还要知晓如何身体力行。


Many observers say that leadership is an art rather than a science.	许多观察者指出，与其说领导能力是一种科学，不如将它视为一门艺术。


Good leadership is situational. In my book The Powers to Lead , I call this skill “contextual intelligence.”	优秀的领导能力关乎情境，在我所著的《领导力》一书中，我将这种技艺称为“情境智力”。


The ability to mobilize a group effectively is certainly an art rather than a predictive science, and varies with situations, but that does not mean that it cannot be profitably studied and learned.	有效动员一个团体的能力肯定是艺术，而非可以预测的科学； 这种能力视情境而定，但这并不表示对它的研究与学习得不偿失。


Music and painting are based in part on innate skills, but also on training and practice.	音乐与绘画都部分地基于先天能力，但训练与实践同样会起作用。


And artists can benefit not merely from studio courses, but also from art appreciation lessons that introduce them to the full repertoires and pallets of past masters.	而且艺术家不仅能从画室的课程中获益，向他们介绍此前大师们全部作品的鉴赏课程同样会使其受益匪浅。


Learning leadership occurs in a variety of ways. Learning from experience is the most common and most powerful.	对领导能力的学习有许多种途径，从经验中学习是其中最常见、也是最有力的方式，它带给人们在危机中至关重要的习惯知识。


It produces the tacit knowledge that is crucial in a crisis. But experience and intuition can be supplemented by analytics, which is the purpose of my book.	但分析学能为经验与直觉提供补充，而这正是我此书的宗旨。


As Mark Twain once observed, a cat that sits on a hot stove will not sit on a hot stove again, but it won’t sit on a cold one, either.	正如马克·吐温曾经评论的那样，尝过烫火炉滋味的猫再也不会坐在烫火炉上，但它也不会坐在冷炉子上。


Consequently, learning to analyze situations and contexts is an important leadership skill.	因此，学会分析情境与背景是一项重要的领导技能。


The United States Army categorizes leadership learning under three words: “be, know, do.”	美国陆军用“性、知、行”三个字对领导能力的学习加以分类。


“Be” refers to the shaping of character and values, and it comes partly from training and partly from experience.	其中，“性”指性格与价值观的塑造，这一点部分源于训练，部分源于经验；


“Know” refers to analysis and skills, which can be trained.	“知”指分析与技能，它们是可以通过训练获得的；


“Do” refers to action and requires both training and fieldwork.	“行”指行动，它既需要训练，也需要现场经验。


Most important, however, is experience and the emphasis on learning from mistakes and a continuous process that results from what the military calls “after-action reviews.”	然而最重要的还是经验，以及强调从失败和一个连续过程（源于军方所称“事后评估”）中习得教训。


Learning can also occur in the classroom, whether through case studies, historical and analytic approaches, or experiential teaching that simulates situations that train students to increase self-awareness, distinguish their roles from their selves, and use their selves as a barometer for understanding a larger group.	学习还能在教室中进行，无论是以案例研究的方法，还是通过历史学或分析学的途径，抑或借助体验式教学模式。 体验式教学模拟特定情境以训练学生增加自我意识，区分他们的角色与自我，并将其自我作为理解更大团体的度量工具。


Similarly, students can learn from the results of scientific studies, limited though they may be, and by studying the range of behaviors and contexts that historical episodes can illuminate.	同样，尽管科学型研究的结果可能有局限性，但学生仍可从中获益； 另外学生们也可通过研究历史案例所能阐释的一定范围的行为与背景得以提高。


In practice, of course, few people occupy top positions in groups or organizations.	当然在实践中，只有少数人能占据团队或组织的高层。


Most people “lead from the middle.”	大部分人只能“从中层加以领导”。


Effective leadership from the middle often requires attracting and persuading those above, below, and beside you.	源自中层的有效领导常常需要吸引并说服上下级与同辈。


Indeed, leaders in the middle frequently find themselves in a policy vacuum, with few clear directives from the top.	的确，中层的领导者们经常发现他们置身于政策真空之中，缺乏来自高层的清晰指示。


A passive follower keeps his head down, shuns risk, and avoids criticism.	被动的追随者会保持低调、规避风险、免遭批评；


An opportunist uses the slack to feather his own nest rather than help the leader or the public.	而机会主义者则运用这一管理松散之处经营私利，而非助力于领导或群众。


Bureaucratic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, take advantage of such opportunities to adjust and promote policies.	但另一方面，官僚体系中企业家式的人物会借助这些机会调整和促进政策。


The key moral question is whether, and at what point, their entrepreneurial activity exceed the bounds of policies set from the top.	关键的伦理问题在于，他们的创业活动是否以及在哪一点上逾越了高层设定的政策边界。


Since they lack the legitimate authority of elected or high-level appointed officials, bureaucratic entrepreneurs must remain cognizant of the need to balance initiative with loyalty.	因为他们缺乏民选或高层指派官员的合法权威，因此官僚体系中的创业者们必须对在主动性与忠诚度之间求得平衡的需求保持清醒的认识。


Leaders should encourage such entrepreneurship among their followers as a means of increasing their effectiveness.	领导者应当激励其下属中的这种创业精神，以此作为提升效能的手段。


After all, the key to successful leadership is to surround oneself with good people, empower them by delegating authority, and then claim credit for their accomplishments.	毕竟成功领导术的秘诀就在于，拥有优秀的人员，通过委任权威使他们获得权力，最后将其成就归于自己名下。


To make this formula work, however, requires a good deal of soft power.	然而，这一方案要想奏效，充足的软实力不可或缺。


Without the soft power that produces attraction and loyalty to the leader’s goals, entrepreneurs run off in all directions and dissipate a group’s energies.	缺乏能让领导的目标对下属产生吸引力与忠诚感的软实力，那些���业家式官僚就会各行其是，使团队的能量白白耗散。


With soft power, however, the energy of empowered followers strengthens leaders.	不过拥有软实力的话，获得授权的下属们的能量就会有助于领导者。


Leadership is broadly distributed throughout healthy democracies, and all citizens need to learn more about what makes good and bad leaders.	领导能力广泛地散布于健康的民主国家之中，全体公民都需要学习更多关于产生好领导与差领导的原因。


Potential leaders, in turn, can learn more about the sources and limits of the soft-power skills of emotional IQ, vision, and communication, as well as hard-power political and organizational skills.	反之，潜在的领导者可以学会更多软实力技巧的来源与局限性，这些技巧涉及情商、预见力和交流能力； 他们还可习得硬实力层面的政治与组织技巧。


They must also better understand the nature of the contextual intelligence they will need to educate their hunches and sustain strategies of smart power.	他们也必须更好地理解情境智力的本质，这是他们将来在培育自己的直觉并维持巧实力战略时所需的素质。


Most important, in today’s age of globalization, revolutionary information technology, and broadened participation, citizens in democracies must learn more about the nature and limits of the new demands on leadership.	最重要的是，在当今全球化时代、革命性信息技术以及更为广泛的参与度等背景下，民主国家的公民必须对领导能力所受的新要求的本质与局限性了解更多。


Learning to Leave Extremism	用学习来摆脱极端主义


BEIRUT – Report after report from the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, and the Arab League emphasize that the education deficit in the Arab world is among the main causes of its underdevelopment.	发自贝鲁特——来自世界银行，联合国和阿拉伯联盟的一份接一份报告都强调，低下的受教育程度才是导致阿拉伯世界不发达的主要原因。


With 5% of the world’s population and the bulk of the world’s oil and gas, the Arab world nonetheless lags behind most of the rest of the world, and suffers from what can best be termed “educational poverty.”	虽然拥有占全世界5%的人口以及极大份额的石油和天然气资源，但阿拉伯世界却总是落后于世界其他地区，并品尝着所谓“教育贫困”所结下的苦果。


Without dramatic improvement at all educational levels, unemployment, illiteracy, and income inequality will continue to worsen, and the region will remain a danger to itself and its neighbors.	而如果不能在各级教育上都取得极大改善的话，那么失业率，文盲比例以及收入不平衡的状况都将持续恶化，使这一地区继续成为威胁其自身以及邻邦国家的一大祸患。


Even before the current economic recession, unemployment in the Arab world was estimated at 14% – the world’s highest average outside sub-Saharan Africa.	即使在最近的经济衰退之前，阿拉伯世界的失业率也达到了14%的水平——除了撒哈拉以南非洲之外这个数字堪称全世界最高。


Among young people and recent graduates, the figure is more than double.	而青少年和学校毕业生群体的失业率则是这个数字的一倍不止。


The Arab world also has the highest population growth rate in the world, with almost 40% of its population now below the age of 15.	与此同时，阿拉伯世界还拥有全世界最高的人口增长率，其总人口中几乎40%都是15岁以下的青少年。


According to some estimates, the Arab world accounts for one-quarter of the world’s unemployment among the 15-24 age group.	而据某些方面估计，全世界15-24年龄段的失业人口有1/4生活在阿拉伯世界。


Just to keep up with the inflow of young people into the labor market, Arab economies will have to generate 100 million new jobs over the next 10 years, which will be impossible if education remains impoverished.	为了应对这些不断涌入就业市场的青少年，阿拉伯经济体必须在未来10年内创造1亿个新工作，但如果教育发展依旧滞后的话，这一目标是根本无法实现的。


Enrollment ratios in the Arab world have improved over the past decade, but Arab countries still have one of the lowest average net enrollment ratios in the developing world.	虽然阿拉伯世界的学校入学率在最近十年得到了改善，但阿拉伯国家的平均净入学率在发展中国家中依然是最低的。


About one-fifth of eligible children, more than seven million, are not in school, and 60% of these are girls.	大概有1/5的学龄儿童，大概700万人，没能进学校读书，而其中60%是女孩。


The average years of schooling for Arabs is less than half that for the East Asian countries.	在受教育时间方面阿拉伯国家还不到东南亚国家的一半。


Not surprisingly, despite progress in recent decades, illiteracy remains at around 30% on average, and in some Arab countries reaches 50% and 60%.	因此我们也毫不奇怪地看到，尽管在近年有所改善，但阿拉伯国家的平均文盲率却依然在30%左右徘徊，在某些国家内部甚至达到了50%或60%。


The quality of Arab education is also an obstacle.	阿拉伯国家的教育质量也是一块绊脚石。


Today’s job market demands skills based on problem-solving, critical thinking, modern languages, and technology, but Arab educational systems generally remain traditional, rote-based, and authoritarian.	当今的就业市场需要那些以问题解决为导向，具备批判性思维，掌握现代语言和技术的高技能人才，但阿拉伯世界的教育体系却依然大体停留在传统化，机械式死记硬背以及一言堂的层面上。


Research throughout the world shows that education is a key prerequisite for sustainable growth.	对全世界的研究显示了教育是实现可持续发展的一个关键性先决条件。


The East Asian tigers invested heavily in education, and it paid off in terms of a capable and modern workforce.	被称为“亚洲四小龙”的香港，台湾，新加坡和韩国都在教育上倾注了极大的投资，而回报它们的则是一支有能力且现代化的劳动力大军。


By contrast, development in the Arab world, driven largely by oil revenues, has left the population under-educated and economically marginalized.	相比之下，主要由石油收入推动下的阿拉伯世界却让其人民饱受教育不足之苦，并在经济上边缘化他们。


Education is also important in the Arab context because of its special status in Islam, which, like Judaism and Christianity, is a religion of the book.	其实在阿拉伯语境中教育也是非常重要的，教育在伊斯兰教——和犹太教以及基督教一样——中享有独特的地位，因为人们都对经典教义信仰备至。


The Gospel of St. John says, “In the Beginning was the Word”; the first word that was revealed to the prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel was “Read…” Among the Prophet’s sayings is, “It is the duty of every Muslim man and woman to seek learning.”	《新约·约翰福音》开篇第一句话中就是“太初有道（“道”在此释义为解释/说明）”； 天使吉卜利勒向先知默罕默德传达安拉启示的第一个词就是“宣读……”，而先知默罕默德言行录中则记载说“学习是每一男女穆斯林之责。


Moreover, Islam does not have a priesthood, just scholars.	此外，伊斯兰教没有教士，只有宗教学者。


The Arab golden ages, in eleventh-century Baghdad and fourteenth-century Andalucía, are revered as periods of great learning.	在阿拉伯世界的黄金时代，比如11世纪的巴格达和14世纪的安达卢西亚地区，都被考证为学习和教育发展的鼎盛时期。


Schools and universities received large-scale support, and students and scholars traveled from city to city in pursuit of knowledge.	学校和大学都获得了广泛支持，学生和学者们在城市之间游学以追求知识。


After these golden ages, education fell into decline.	但在黄金时代远去之后，教育也随之衰落了。


By the 1970’s and 1980’s, the Arab world’s post-independence states had made great improvements in their education sector.	到了上世纪70~80年代，一批独立后的阿拉伯国家极大地改善其教育部门的运作。


But they did not have the resources to keep up with their own growing populations.	但他们却无法没有获得与人口高速增长所相对应的资源。


The dramatic levels of investment of the 1950’s and 1960’s tapered off, with the result that too many children are now either outside the school system or are receiving a low-quality education that leaves them without basic literacy and numeracy skills.	1950~60年代引人注目的大笔教育投资逐渐式微，结果导致许多儿童要么无书可读，要么就只能接受一些连基本读写和算数技能都谈不上的低质量���育。


And there are still too many disparities based on gender, location, wealth, disability, and other markers of marginalization.	而且基于不同性别、地区、收入、身体状况以及其他社会排斥性指标方面的受教育状况也都表现得极为悬殊。


What the West has most, and what the Arab world most needs, is education.	但目前阿拉伯世界最需要，也是西方掌握得最多的资源，就是教育。


It requires more schools and fewer guns; more universities and fewer aircraft carriers.	教育要求兴建更多的学校和购买更少的武器； 成立更多的大学而开工更少的航空母舰。


The American University of Beirut, founded in 1866, has arguably done more to transform the Middle East in positive ways than any other comparable institution, yet it receives only $3 million in annual aid from the United States, which spends billions on armies and weaponry in the region.	始建于1866年的贝鲁特美国大学在把中东向积极方面转化上所做出的努力无疑比其他同类学校都多得多，但该校每年从美国获得的资助只有区区300万美元，而美国在中东砸下的军费却是以10亿计的。


Indeed, the cost of a single month of western military spending in Iraq or Afghanistan would be enough to triple total aid for education in the Middle East.	事实上，西方在伊拉克或阿富汗一个月所花的军费就等于中东地区教育总援助金额的三倍。


The cost of two cruise missiles would build a school, the cost of a Eurofighter a small university.	制造两枚巡航导弹的费用就可以建一所学校，而一架“欧洲战士”战斗机的价值就等于一所小型大学了。


Education can also have a fundamental effect on forming values.	而与此同时，教育在构筑价值观方面可以发挥某些最基本的作用。


Radical Islamists recognized this long ago and plowed their resources into schools.	伊斯兰极端分子早就意识到了这一点并在学校中投放了大量资源。


Saudi Arabia recognized it in the 1970’s as it sought to expand its influence, and over the years the Kingdom has funded thousands of schools and colleges that teach its stringent brand of Wahhabi Islam.	沙特阿拉伯也在1970年代意识到了这一点，为了扩展其影响力，该国资助了数千所学校和学院来传授其保守严厉的瓦哈比伊斯兰思想。


In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the radical vision is conveyed to the young in religious schools known as madrasas.	在阿富汗和巴基斯坦，极端主义思维则通过被称为“马德拉萨斯”的宗教学校灌输给青少年。


Indeed, “Taliban” means “students.”	其实“塔利班”就是“学生”的意思。


The struggle for the future of the Arab and Muslim worlds that is being fought now will be won or lost not on the battlefield, but in the classroom.	由此可见，目前已经展开的，对阿拉伯以及穆斯林世界未来走向的争夺，其决定最终胜负的地方不是在血肉横飞战场，而是在那学校的朗朗读书声中。


Learning Without Theory	没有理论的学习


CAMBRIDGE – How can we improve the state of the world?	坎布里奇—我们如何改善世界的状态？