TEL AVIV – The late American diplomat George Ball once argued that Israel needed to be saved from its own suicidal policies “in spite of herself.”	特拉维夫——已故美国外交家乔治·鲍尔曾经说过以色列需要从其自身“不由自主”实行的自杀式政策中被拯救。


In a 1977 Foreign Affairs article, he called for an even-handed push by the United States for an Arab-Israeli peace.	在一篇1977年《外交事务》杂志刊载的文章中，他呼吁美国不偏不倚地推进阿以和平。


But, while Ball’s realistic position on the Israel-Palestine conflict is not uncommon among US State Department officials, it has remained off-limits for America’s political establishment, which has long upheld an almost sacred consensus on Israel – until now.	但尽管鲍尔有关以巴冲突问题的现实立场在美国国务院官员中屡见不鲜，但却一直被视为美国政治体制的禁区，现有政治体制长期以来就以色列问题达成了几乎神圣的共识——至少持续到目前为止。


To be sure, to some extent, Ball’s position still represents a cry in the desert.	可以肯定，在某种程度上，鲍尔的立场只代表极少数。


After all, America has not wavered in its commitment to maintaining Israel’s “qualitative military edge.”	归根结底，美国从未动摇保持以色列“军事能力质的优势”的决心。


In fact, US President Barack Obama’s administration has broken all historical records in its military aid to Israel, even as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has shown no willingness to use that US taxpayer-funded military edge to take calculated risks for peace.	事实上，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马政府打破了为以色列提供军事援助的所有历史记录，尽管以色列总理内塔尼亚胡从不愿利用美国纳税人资助的军事优势承担合理的和平风险。


In this sense, the US is still underwriting Israel’s defiant annexationist policies.	从这个意义上讲，美国仍然在为以色列目中无人的吞并政策提供支持。


But something is definitely different.	但情况肯定已经发生了变化。


Questions about Palestine are now highly polarized in American politics, with younger generations affected much more by images of an illiberal Israel tyrannizing a disenfranchised Palestinian nation than by the fading memory of the original Zionist epic.	目前美国政界对巴勒斯坦问题的看法高度分化，年轻一代更多地看到偏执的以色列欺压被剥夺权利的巴勒斯坦人，而逐渐淡忘了最初的犹太复国主义史诗。


For them, the Israel-Palestine conflict has become a human-rights issue – and a highly contentious one at that.	对他们来讲，以巴冲突已经成为某种人权问题——而且这种人权问题还备受争议。


Israeli apologists are now facing pro-Palestine activism on university campuses on a level unseen in the US since students were protesting the Vietnam War.	以色列的辩护者正面临着大学校园的亲巴勒斯坦行动主义，而这种状况是从学生抗议越南战争以来从未出现过的。


A 2014 Gallup poll showed that, while a narrow majority of all Americans considered Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza justified, only 25% of people under 30 did; 51% of people under 30 declared Israel’s actions to be unjustified.	2014年一项盖洛普民调显示，虽然占微弱多数的美国人认为以色列有理由在2014年袭击加沙，但30岁以下的年轻人却仅有25%持上述观点；


According to a 2014 Brookings Institution poll, a massive 84% of Democrats and 60% of Republicans would favor a one-state solution, in which a single democratic government guarantees equal rights for all citizens, Israeli and Palestinian.	高达51%的30岁以下民众公开宣称以色列的行动缺乏合理性。


A December 2015 poll by the same organization indicated that 66% of Americans support a more evenhanded US policy in the Israel-Palestine conflict; among Democrats under 35, that proportion rose to 80%.	2014年布鲁金斯学会一项民调显示，高达84%的民主党和60%的共和党更倾向于一国解决方案，也就是由单一民主政府保障所有以色列及巴勒斯坦人享受平等权利。


US politicians are paying attention.	上述变化已经得到了美国政界人士的关注。


In recent months, Democratic lawmakers, headed by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, have called for an investigation into Israel’s “gross violations of human rights,” including torture and extrajudicial executions, against Palestinians.	近几个月来，民主党议员在佛蒙特州参议员帕特里克·莱希领导下，已经呼吁调查以色列“严重侵犯人权的行为”，包括对巴勒斯坦人施以酷刑和法外处决。


And Dan Shapiro, the US ambassador in Israel, lit up the Israeli establishment last January, when he suggested in a speech that Israel is essentially implementing apartheid in the West Bank.	而美国驻以大使丹·夏皮罗去年1月在演讲中提出以色列实际是在西岸实行种族隔离的说法震撼了以色列的体制。


Senator Bernie Sanders, in his US presidential campaign, broke the mold when he called for revising the Democratic Party’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict.	伯尼·桑德斯参议员在总统竞选中呼吁改变民主党的以巴冲突立场打破了原有模式。


In emphasizing the Palestinians’ plight, Sanders has highlighted not only his own morality-focused worldview – one that can tip into idealism, to be sure – but also his understanding of the mood of an important constituency.	通过强调巴勒斯坦人所处的困境，桑德斯不仅凸显了自身以道德为重的世界观——这样的观点当然很有可能演变为理想主义——同时凸显了他理解一种重要的选民情绪。


Thanks to his efforts, the Democrats’ convention later this month is set to mark a turning point for the party’s approach to the issue.	多亏他的努力，将于本月晚些时候召开的民主党大会注定会标志着该党立场的转折。


The Republican Party is also threatening to turn against Israel, but in a much more damaging way.	共和党同样威胁要疏远以色列，但却以一种更具破坏性的方式。


Donald Trump, the party’s presumptive nominee for the presidential election in November, has indicated that he would not endorse America’s automatic support for Israel, hinting that he thinks Israel holds more responsibility in the failure of the two-state solution.	该党11月总统大选的推定提名人唐纳德·特朗普已经表示他不会批准美国无条件支持以色列，暗示他认为两国方案失败的责任更多是在以色列一方。


Instead, he would be, he says, “a sort of neutral guy” in the Israel-Palestine conflict.	相反，他表示自己将在以巴冲突中扮演“某种中立的角色”。


This seems to go over well with his supporters, many of whom like Trump for his anti-establishment approach.	特郎普的表态似乎对其支持者产生了很好的效果，其中很多人都因为他的反体制做法而喜爱特郎普。


If the establishment politicians they despise support Israel, the logic goes, there must be something wrong with that policy.	如果他们鄙视的体制内政客支持以色列，那么合理的推断是那种政策肯定是有问题的。


The danger lies in the fact that Trump has tapped into an overtly xenophobic element of the conservative voter base.	危险之处在于特郎普正在发掘保守派选民群体中某种公开的排外因素。


Indeed, he has been endorsed by white supremacists, including former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke.	事实上，他得到了白人至上主义者的支持，包括前三K党领袖大卫·杜克。


Given this, Trump’s rise is very bad news for American Jews – and, indeed, all of America’s minority groups.	有鉴于此，特郎普的崛起对美国犹太人而言是个非常坏的消息——而且实际上所有美国少数族裔群体都应为此而感到担忧。


Making matters worse, Trump’s impact may even extend beyond the US, with far-right leaders elsewhere, such as Austria’s Norbert Hofer, emulating his tactics to stoke and capitalize on atavistic nativism.	更糟的是，特郎普的影响甚至可能超越美国影响到其他地方的极右翼领袖，比如奥地利的诺伯特·霍费尔，后者可能模仿他的策略煽动并利用尘封已久的本土主义。


For Israel, a Trump presidency would clearly be a major loss, not least because Israel has long counted on Republican lawmakers to push its agenda.	对以色列而言，尤其考虑到以色列长期依赖共和党议员推动其议程，特朗普当选总统肯定是一种重大损失。


In 2011, for example, Republicans went so far as to arrange, without informing the White House, for Netanyahu to address Congress, in an effort to block the nuclear deal Obama had long been negotiating with Iran.	比方说2011年，共和党议员竟然在不通知白宫的情况下安排内塔尼亚胡对国会议员讲话，目的是阻止国会通过奥巴马长期以来一直与伊朗谈判的核协议���


But the problem extends further than that.	但这还远远不是问题的全部。


A less obliging ally in the White House is one thing; having Trump there, implementing his “America First” foreign-policy philosophy, is something else altogether.	有个不那么亲切的白宫盟友是一回事； 但如果特朗普当选并将其“美国第一”的外交哲学付诸实施则完全是另一回事了。


While the idea of placing the highest priority on the interests of one’s own country is not in itself unreasonable, Trump’s particular discourse echoes the calls issued by isolationist, anti-Semitic groups prior to World War II for the US to appease Hitler.	尽管将本国利益放在首位本身并无不合理之处，但特郎普所持的观点令人回想起二战前孤立主义者和反犹团体呼吁美国安抚希特勒。


To Trump and millions of his supporters, “America First” means the end of America’s enlightened global mission.	对特朗普及其成百上千万支持者而言，“美国第一”意味着美国开明全球使命的结束。


Foreign powers, whoever they are, should pay for America’s services.	外国势力，无论他们是谁，应当付钱购买美国的服务。


By ignoring the outcry of European public opinion against its Palestine policy, Israel’s government has definitively lost the support of Europe.	因为对欧洲反对其巴勒斯坦政策的公共舆论充耳不闻，以色列政府显然已经失去了欧洲的支持。


Now, its once-impregnable citadel in America is under threat.	现在，以色列曾几何时在美国坚不可摧的堡垒正在受到威胁。


Surely it must realize that ignoring this challenge would amount to walking off a cliff.	当然以色列必须意识到无视这种挑战几乎等同于跳下悬崖。


Managing the ISIS Crisis	管理伊斯兰国危机


NEW YORK – One day, historians will have their hands full debating the causes of the chaos now overtaking much of the Middle East.	纽约—有一天，历史学家将会争论如今肆虐中东大部的混乱的根源。


To what extent, they will ask, was it the inevitable result of deep flaws common to many of the region's societies and political systems, and to what extent did it stem from what outside countries chose to do (or not to do)?	他们或多或少会问，这场混乱是该地区众多社会和政治制度共有的深刻缺陷的必然结果吗？ 它在多大程度上是拜外部国家的选择（或没有选择）的政策所赐？


But it is we who must deal with the reality and consequences of the region's current disorder.	但必须应对该地区无序现状的现实和结果的是我们。


However we got to where we are in the Middle East, we are where we are, and where we are is a very bad place to be.	不管是什么让我们把中东变成了这副样子，我们都已经把中东变成了这副样子，并且中东的这副样子是一副糟透了的样子。


The stakes – human, economic, and strategic – are enormous.	现状所涉及的利益——人道、经济和战略利益——不可谓不巨。


Hundreds of thousands have lost their lives; millions have been rendered homeless.	数十万人失去了生计； 数百万人无家可归。


Oil prices are low, but they will not remain so if Saudi Arabia experiences terrorist strikes or instability.	石油价格低迷，但如果沙特阿拉伯遭遇恐怖袭击或发生动荡，石油价格就会反弹。


The threat to the region is large and growing, and it menaces people everywhere, as extremist fighters return home and still others who never left are inspired to do terrible things.	中东地区的威胁是巨大的，并且还在上升，全世界的人都在担心极端主义斗士回国以及一直呆在国内的人受恐怖主义影响。


Indeed, though the Middle East is facing an abundance of challenges to its stability, none is as large, dangerous, and immediate as the Islamic State.	事实上，尽管中东面临着诸多稳定挑战，但没有一样像伊斯兰国那样巨大、危险和紧迫。


Those who object to calling the Islamic State a state have a point.	拒绝将伊斯兰国称为国家的人有其道理。


In many ways, IS is a hybrid: part movement, part network, and part organization.	总很多方面看，伊斯兰国是一个混合体：部分是运动，部分是网络，部分是组织。


Nor is it defined by geography.	它也无法以地理归类。


But it does control territory, boasts some 20,000 fighters, and, fueled by religious ideology, has an agenda.	但它确实控制着领土，号称拥有20,000大军，并且在宗教思想的驱动下拥有自己的议程。


Ultimately, of course, deciding whether to call what has emerged “ISIS" or “ISIL" or the “Islamic State" matters much less than deciding how to take it on.	当然，说到底，怎样称呼“ISIS”、“ISIL”或“伊斯兰国”远远没有如何对付它重要。


Any strategy must be realistic.	不管采取什么战略，都必须务实。


Eliminating IS is not achievable in the foreseeable future; but weakening it is.	消灭伊斯兰国在可以预见的未来都是不可能的任务； 但削弱它是可能的。


A strategy must also be comprehensive.	战略还必须全面。


First, the flow of money to the Islamic State must be reduced.	首先，流向伊斯兰国的资金流必须遏制。


Lower oil prices help, and there are only so many banks to rob.	油价下跌对此有帮助，可供抢劫的银行也只有那么几家。


But extortion continues, as does financial support from individuals.	但勒索仍在继续，来自个人的金融支持亦然。


Such flows should be shut down both by governments and financial institutions.	这些资金流应该由政府和金融机构联手扼杀。


Curtailing the flow of recruits is even more essential.	切断人员招募流更加关键。


Countries can do more to make it difficult for individuals to leave for Iraq or Syria; a Europe-wide watch list, for example, would help.	国家可以增加个人前往伊拉克和叙利亚的难度； 比如，泛欧洲观察名单就有所助益。


But nothing would have a greater impact than Turkey deciding that it will no longer allow itself to be a conduit, and that it will enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, which calls for stronger international cooperation against terrorism.	但影响最大的还是土耳其决定不再充当前往伊斯兰国的通道并执行呼吁加强反恐国际合作的联合国安理会2178号决议。


Another component of any strategy must be to counter IS's appeal and propaganda.	战略的另一个要素是必须制衡伊斯兰国的号召力和宣传攻势。


This means publicizing the misery it has caused to those living under its rule.	这意味着宣传它给它所统治地区的人带来的灾难。


It also means persuading Muslim religious leaders and scholars to make the case that IS's behavior is illegitimate from the standpoint of Islam.	这还意味着说服穆斯林宗教领袖和学者澄清伊斯兰国的行为不符合伊斯兰教教义。


Of course, any strategy must challenge IS directly in Iraq and Syria.	当然，任何战略都必须在伊拉克和叙利亚直接挑战伊斯兰国。


In Iraq, there is some evidence that its momentum has been halted; but the growing role of Iran and the Shia militias it backs all but guarantees that many Iraqi Sunnis will come to sympathize with or even support the Islamic State, whatever their misgivings.	在伊拉克，有迹象表明伊斯兰国的势头已经得到了遏制； 但伊朗和及其所支持的什叶派军队作用日益上升，这意味着许多伊拉克逊尼派将同情甚至支持伊斯兰国，不管伊斯兰国犯下怎样的暴行。


This is why outsiders should place greater emphasis on providing military and political support to Kurdish forces and Sunni tribes.	因此，外部人士应该更加着重于为库尔德武装和逊尼派部落提供军事和政治支持。


Syria is a far more difficult case, given its civil war and the competition among outsiders for influence.	叙利亚问题要棘手得多，因为这里仍在内战，并且各外部势力正在争夺影响力。


Attacks from the air on IS forces are necessary but insufficient.	对伊斯兰国力量的空中打击是必要但不充分条件。


Because IS is a territorially based entity, there must be a ground dimension if the effort is to progress; after all, only ground forces can take and hold territory.	由于伊斯兰国是一个基于领土的实体，因此，要想取得进展，必须派遣地面部队； 毕竟只有地面部队能够夺取并守卫领土。


The best approach would be to create a multinational force consisting of soldiers from neighboring countries, particularly Jordan.	最佳方针是成立一支由邻国特别是约旦士兵组成的多国部队。


The United States and other NATO countries could offer assistance, but the fight must be waged largely by other Sunnis.	美国和其他北约国家可以提供援助，但战斗必须主要由其他逊尼派来打。


What is occurring in the region is a clash within a civilization; to enable IS to portray it as a conflict between civilizations – and itself as the true defender of Islam – would be a grave strategic mistake.	目前该地区所发生的是文明内部的冲突； 让伊斯兰国将它描述成文明之间的冲突——并把自己描述为伊斯兰教的捍卫者——将是一个严重的战略错误。


Moderate Syrian opposition forces and local Kurds could be part of such a multinational Sunni force, but they are not in a position to substitute for it.	叙利亚温和反对派武装和本地库尔德人可以成为逊尼派��国部队的一部分，但他们不可能取代后者。


If such an expeditionary force cannot be formed, air attacks can be stepped up, thereby at least slowing IS and buying time to develop alternative strategies.	如果无法组建这样一支远征军，则可以加紧空袭，从而至少延缓伊斯兰国的前进脚步，为制定替代战略赢得时间。


Under such a scenario, IS would remain less a problem to be solved and more a situation to be managed.	在这一情形中，伊斯兰国与其说是一个需要解决的问题，不如说是一个需要管理的局面。


Diplomacy cannot play a large role at this point.	此时，外交无法起到很大作用。


No solution can be imposed, given disagreements among the outside countries with a stake in Syria and the strength of both IS and the Syrian government.	没有方案可以实行，因为在叙利亚有利益纠缠的外部国家之间分歧太多而伊斯兰国和叙利亚政府也太强大。


What diplomacy may be able to do is reduce, if not end, the fighting between the Syrian government and its own people, as the UN is attempting to do in Aleppo.	外交也许能够完成的是减少乃至结束叙利亚政府与本国人民之间的斗争，比如联合国正在阿勒颇所做的尝试。


The biggest danger in 2015 may well be a widening of the regional crisis to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.	2015年最大的危险是这场地区危机蔓延到沙特阿拉伯和约旦。


Intelligence and military support for both countries will be essential, as will enhanced efforts to help Jordan shoulder its massive refugee burden.	对这两个国家的情报和军事支持至关重要，加强帮助约旦承担巨大的难民负担同样重要。


In this time of unprecedented turmoil in the Middle East, one of the region's basic rules still applies: No matter how bad the situation, it can always become worse.	眼下，中东正在经历前所未有的动荡，但该地区的一个基本规则仍然适用：局面没有最恶劣，只有更恶劣。


Is it Okay to Cheat in Football?	足球舞弊行吗？


MELBOURNE – Shortly before half-time in the World Cup elimination match between England and Germany on June 27, the English midfielder Frank Lampard had a shot at goal that struck the crossbar and bounced down onto the ground, clearly over the goal line. The goalkeeper, Manuel Neuer, grabbed the ball and put it back into play.	墨尔本——


After the match, Neuer gave this account of his actions: “I tried not to react to the referee and just concentrate on what was happening.	7月27号，英德两国在世界杯淘汰赛中对决，半场结束前夕，英国前卫弗兰克·兰帕德的一次射门击中了横梁，然后又弹回到地面，明显过了球门线。


I realized it was over the line and I think the way I carried on so quickly fooled the referee into thinking it was not over.”	德国门将曼努埃尔·诺伊尔捡起球后，又重新传了出去。 主裁判和在边线的副裁判都远离德国球门，没法作出准确判断，因此他们没有宣布球进了，于是比赛继续。


To put it bluntly: Neuer cheated, and then boasted about it.	比赛过后，诺伊尔对他的行为是如此描述的：“我试图不对裁判作出进球的反应，把精力集中在比赛当中。 我知道球过了球门线，而且我认为我如此迅速地继续比赛让裁判误以为球没有过线。


By any normal ethical standards, what Neuer did was wrong. But does the fact that Neuer was playing football mean that the only ethical rule is: “Win at all costs”?	坦白地说：诺伊尔舞弊了，而且随后还对此夸耀了一把。


In soccer, that does seem to be the prevailing ethic. The most famous of these incidents was Diego Maradona’s goal in Argentina’s 1986 World Cup match against England, which he later described as having been scored  “a little with the head of Maradona and a little with the hand of God.”	无论从何种正常的道德标准来看，诺伊尔的所作所为是错误的。


Replays left no doubt that it was the hand of Maradona that scored the goal. Twenty years later, he admitted in a BBC interview that he had intentionally acted as if it were a goal, in order to deceive the referee.	难道诺伊尔当时在场上踢球就意味着他唯一的道德准则是“不惜一切代价取胜”吗？


Something similar happened last November, in a game between France and Ireland that decided which of the two nations went to the World Cup.	在足球中，这似乎是流行的道德准则。 最著名的足球事故莫过于阿根廷队的马拉多纳在1986年世界杯对阵英格兰所进的球。


The French striker Thierry Henry used his hand to control the ball and pass to a teammate, who scored the decisive goal.	事后，马拉多纳形容那个球是“部分由于马拉多纳的头和上帝之手”而进的。


Asked about the incident after the match, Henry said: “I will be honest, it was a handball. But I’m not the ref.	录像回放毫无疑问地显示，这个球是马拉多纳用手进的。


I played it, the ref allowed it. That’s a question you should ask him.”	20年后在BBC的一次采访中，马拉多纳承认他故意表现得好像那个球已经进了，以此糊弄裁判。


But is it? Why should the fact that you can get away with cheating mean that you are not culpable?	无独有偶，去年11月份，在法国和爱尔兰的一场决定谁进世界杯的比赛中，法国前锋蒂埃里·亨利用手控制球，然后将球传给队友，队友因此进了一个决定性的球。


Players should not be exempt from ethical criticism for what they do on the field, any more than they are exempt from ethical criticism for cheating off the field – for example, by taking performance-enhancing drugs.	当赛后被问及这次事故时，亨利说道：“我将很坦诚的说，这是一个手球。 但是我并不是裁判。


Sports today are highly competitive, with huge amounts of money at stake, but that does not mean it is impossible to be honest.	但是是这样的吗？


In cricket, if a batsman hits the ball and one of the fielders catches it, the batsman is out.	为什么你舞弊之后安然无恙就意味着你没有过错？


Sometimes when the ball is caught the umpire cannot be sure if the ball has touched the edge of the bat. The batsman usually knows and traditionally should “walk” – leave the ground – if he knows that he is out.	球员应该承担对其在场上表现的道德指责，正如他们在场外舞弊时要受到道德批评一样，比如服用兴奋剂。


Some still do.	如今，运动充满竞争，也牵涉大笔钱财，但是这并不意味着想要诚实是不可能的。


The Australian batsman Adam Gilchrist “walked” in the 2003 World Cup semi-final against Sri Lanka, although the umpire had already declared him not out.	在板球运动中，如果击球手击球后，而其中一个外野手接住了这个球，那么击球手就要被赶出局。 有时当球被接住时，裁判不确定这个球是否碰到了球棒边缘。


His decision surprised some of his teammates but won applause from many cricket fans.	通常这个击球手知悉情况，他一般会“走开”（离开球场）——如果他知道他出局了的话。


An Internet search brought me just one clear-cut case of a footballer doing something equivalent to a batsman walking.	这种例子现在还有发生。


In 1996, Liverpool striker Robbie Fowler was awarded a penalty for being fouled by the Arsenal goalkeeper. He told the referee that he had not been fouled, but the referee insisted that he take the penalty kick.	澳大利亚的击球手亚当·吉尔克里斯特在2003年板球世界杯半决赛对阵斯里兰卡时“走开”了，尽管裁判已经宣布他没有出局。


Fowler did so, but in a manner that enabled the goalkeeper to save it.	他的决定让他的一些队友吃惊，但是却赢得许多板球球迷的掌声。


Why are there so few examples of such behavior from professional footballers? Perhaps a culture of excessive partisanship has trumped ethical values.	我仅在网上搜索到一个类似击球手走开的一个足球例子。


Fans don’t seem to mind if members of their own team cheat successfully; they only object when the other side cheats. That is not an ethical attitude.	在1996年，由于阿森纳守门员犯规，利物浦的前锋罗比·福勒获得一次罚球机会。


(Though, to their credit, many French football followers, from President Nicolas Sarkozy down, expressed their sympathy for Ireland after Henry’s handball.)	他告诉裁判对方没有犯规，但是裁判坚持让他罚球。 ���勒照做了，但是他故意轻轻踢球，让守门员接住。


Yes, we can deal with the problem to some extent by using modern technology or video replays to review controversial refereeing decisions.	为什么职业足球球员的这种行为这么少呢？ 可能是过度支持一边的文化压过了道德价值观。


But, while that will reduce the opportunity for cheating, it won’t eliminate it, and it isn’t really the point.	球迷好像不在乎他们所支持的球队队员们是否成功地舞弊；


We should not make excuses for intentional cheating in sports.	他们只有在对方舞弊的时候才反对。


In one important way, it is much worse than cheating in one’s private life.	这不是一种从道德角度出发的态度。


When what you do will be seen by millions, revisited on endless video replays, and dissected on television sports programs, it is especially important to do what is right.	（虽然，该表扬的是，许多法国球迷，包括总统萨科齐在亨利的手球之后，对爱尔兰表达了同情）。


How would football fans have reacted if Neuer had stopped play and told the referee that the ball was a goal?	是的，从某种程度上来看，我们可以通过现代技术或者录像回放来审视有争议的判罚决定，以此来解决这一问题。


Given the rarity of such behavior in football, the initial reaction would no doubt have been surprise.	然而，虽然此举会减少舞弊的机会，但却不能根除舞弊行为，而且关键也并不是这一点。 我们不应该为运动中故意的舞弊行为找借口。


Some German fans might have been disappointed.	从重要性来说，这比个人私下生活中说谎还要严重。


But the world as a whole – and every fair-minded German fan too – would have had to admit that he had done the right thing.	当球员舞弊的时候，有数以百万计的球迷在观看，而且还有无数次录像重播，电视体育节目还会仔细分析，因而球员行为端正尤为重要。


Neuer missed a rare opportunity to do something noble in front of millions of people.	如果诺伊尔当时停下比赛，告诉裁判球进了，那么球迷们会如何反应呢？


He could have set a positive ethical example to people watching all over the world, including the many millions who are young and impressionable.	由于足球中此类行为很少，球迷的最初反应肯定是惊讶。


Who knows what difference that example might have made to the lives of many of those watching?	一些德国球迷可能还会失望。


Neuer could have been a hero, standing up for what is right. Instead, he is just another footballer who is very skillful at cheating.	但是整个世界——包括每个公正的德国球迷——都将会承认他做的对。


Read more from the "An Ethical Mind" Focal Point.	他原本可以为世界上所有在观看比赛的人们树立正面的道德榜样，包括数以百万计易受影响的年轻人。 谁能知道这种榜样可能会对这些观众的生活造成什么影响呢？


Mosque or Modernity?	清真寺还是现代性？


PARIS – Whatever happened to the “Arab Spring”?	巴黎—“阿拉伯之春”发生了什么？


When demonstrations erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, ultimately leading to the demise of three old and weary dictatorships, no one knew which forces, institutions, and procedures would emerge from the protesters’ demand for democracy.	当示威在突尼斯、埃及和利比亚爆发、最终导致三个已呈强弩之末之势的独裁政权倒闭时，没人知道哪些势力、机构和程序将出现在游行者的民主诉求中。


And yet, despite the unprecedented and unforeseeable nature of events – or perhaps because of it – hope ran high.	而尽管发生的事件前所未有、无法预料——或许也正因如此——但被寄予的希望仍然很高。


What has happened since shows clearly what everyone knew (or should have known) all along: nothing about regime change is simple.	此后发生的一切清楚地表明了所有人都看到（或者说应该早就知道）的东西：政权的转变没有简单的事情。


None of the three countries has yet found a stable institutional solution that can defuse intensifying internal tensions and respond effectively to popular demands.	这三个国家没有一个找到了稳定的制度性解决方案能够平息不断加剧的内部紧张、有效地响应群众要求。


Other countries in the region, including Yemen and some of the Gulf states, have experienced varying degrees of turmoil as well.	地区中的其他国家，包括也门和一些海湾国家，也经历了不同程度的动荡。


Sectarian violence is once again consuming Iraq, while clashes between anti-regime factions in Syria are becoming ever more frequent, with Islamists seeking to gain the upper hand ahead of the political transition that would occur should the government collapse.	宗派暴力再次在伊拉克兴起，叙利亚反体制派系之间的冲突越来越频繁，伊斯兰势力正在寻求在政治过渡期来临前（如果政府倒台的话）占得先机。


Even in Morocco, a king with absolute power as Commander of the Faithful has been forced by intense public outrage to move toward a system more inclusive of political Islam.	甚至在摩洛哥，作为忠实臣民司令官、掌握绝对权力的国王也在汹汹民意下转向了更加包容的政治伊斯兰制度。


Likewise, developments in the region’s two non-Arab powers suggest that neither is immune to instability.	类似地，该地区两个非阿拉伯国家的发展趋势也表明没人能够逃过动荡。


In Turkey, recent protests have highlighted growing opposition to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s overweening power and divisive, religious-based social policies.	在土耳其，最近的游行凸显出对总理埃尔多安过于自负的权力和基于宗教的分裂性社会政策的反对日益增加。


In Iran, much of the middle class backed the most moderate of the candidates acceptable to the country’s Islamic guardians in June’s presidential elections.	在伊朗，大量中产阶级在6月的大选中支持了该国伊斯兰卫队所能接受的最温和的总统候选人。


Several related factors underlie the region’s chronic instability.	该地区长期动荡拜几大相关因素所赐。


One is underdevelopment.	一是欠发展。


While oil has made a few presidents and princes staggeringly rich, the rest of the population has received little benefit.	尽管石油让少数总统和王子暴富，但其他人民并没有得到好处。


Hunger is widespread; indeed, poverty and inequality have fueled much of the popular mobilization in the region.	饥饿随处可见； 事实上，贫穷和不平等助长了该地区的大量群众暴动。


But the region’s protest politics also reflects growing rejection of dictatorship and arbitrary rule.	但该地区的游行政治也反映出人民日渐拒绝独裁和专制统治。


Despite these countries’ lack of a tradition of open dissent, globalization has made it plain to all that economic development requires regime change.	尽管这些国家没有公然持异见的传统，但全球化让所有人都懂得，经济发展需要制度变化。


Finally, political Islam is common to all of the region’s conflicts, and should not be viewed – as it often is – in isolation from these countries’ economic woes.	最后，政治伊斯兰是该地区所有冲突的共同特点，这应该与这些国家的经济乱象放在一起考察（但通常两者是割裂的）。


Simply put, Islam – one of the world’s great religions, practiced by nearly one-quarter of humanity – missed its development takeoff.	简言之，伊斯兰教——世界上最大宗教之一，有近四分之一人口信奉——错过了发展起点。


There are no easy ways out of underdevelopment without challenging traditional lifestyles, customs, and social relations.	不挑战传统生活方式、习俗和社会关系，就没有走出欠发展的容易之路。


Indeed, religions do not resist the pressures of economic change well.	事实上，宗教并不能抵挡经济变化的压力。


For Jews, given the absence of a homeland, development occurred among the diaspora, with civil emancipation in Europe giving rise to reformist movements aimed at reconciling faith and modernity.	对犹太人来说，由于没有故乡，发展在离散犹太人中间发生，其背景是欧洲的文明解放让旨在协调信仰和现代性的改革主义运动兴起。


Similarly, Christianity, whether Catholic or Orthodox, blocked economic development for centuries, until internal reformists redefined theological positions on money and banking, the nature of progress, and science and technology.	类似地，基督教——不管是天主教还是正教——阻碍经济发展达几百年之久，直到内部改革者用货在货币和银行、进步的性质以及科学和技术的基础上重新定义了神学的地位。


It is no accident that religious reform in Scandinavia, Germany, England, the Netherlands, and the United States gave rise to today’s global capitalism.	斯堪的纳维亚、德国、英国、荷兰和美国的宗教改革使今天的全球资本主义得以崛起，这不是偶然。


This dynamic extends even to officially atheist China.	这一动态甚至影响了官方宣扬无神论的中国。


Orthodox Communism, a perfect secular simulacrum of religion, has been the primary victim of development since China launched its market reforms in 1979.	正统共产主义——宗教的完美世俗模拟物——是中国1979年实施市场化改革后发展的主要受害者。


Islam also has its reformists.	伊斯兰也有其自身的改革者。


Consider the mission entrusted to Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, the great Egyptian scholar sent to Europe by Mohammed Ali in 1826 to learn about Western civilization and to try to forge an understanding between it and Islam.	就拿被赋予塔哈塔威（Rifa’a al-Tahtawi）的任务来说吧。 1826年，这位伟大的埃及学者被穆罕默德·阿里（Mohammed Ali）派往欧洲学习西方文明并试图构建它和伊斯兰教之间的谅解。


But everywhere in the Arab world, without exception, reformists have been jailed, killed, or reduced to political impotence.	但在阿拉伯世界的每一处，改革者无一例外地遭到了监禁、杀戮或被政治阉割。


In the absence of an analog to the West’s Industrial Revolution, Muslims (and especially Arabs) have faced multiple humiliations and partial colonization over the past two centuries.	由于缺少类似于西方工业革命的历史，穆斯林（特别是阿拉伯人）在过去两个世纪中经历了多次耻辱和部分殖民。


The resulting legacy of grievance, shame, and anger is part of what underpins the region’s current malaise.	由此带来的仇恨、羞愧和愤怒是该地区当前乱局的部分原因。


Indeed, some of the street demonstrations leave no doubt that many people are moving away from religion altogether.	事实上，一些街头示威毫无疑问地表明，许多人正在从宗教中走出。


This is as visible in Egypt and Tunisia as it is in Turkey.	埃及、突尼斯、土耳其都有这样的迹象。


But the grim reality for the Islamic world is that, in times of widespread uncertainty, the forces of tradition tend to speak more loudly and clearly than those of change.	但伊斯兰世界的残酷现实是，在不确定性遍布的时代，传统的力量比变化的力量声音更大、也更清晰。


Peace in this huge and strategically vital region – and thus in the world – can prevail only if its countries manage, despite their turmoil, to protect themselves from ideological extremes and political excesses.	这片广袤而具有战略关键意义的地区的和平——世界亦然——唯有在地区内国家战胜动荡，保护自己免于意识形态极端和政治过度的情况下才能维持。


The importance of this should be abundantly clear to Westerners, whose modern civilization grew out of religious dissent that was initially met by the violence of the Inquisition and the Counter-Reformation.	这一点的重要性对于西方人来说早已耳熟能详，他们的现代文明正是成长于宗教异见之中，而这些宗教异见，一开始也遭遇了宗教法庭和反宗教改革者的暴力阻挠。


If Islam, particularly in the Middle East, is on a similar trajectory, long-term instability in the region is all but assured.	如果伊斯兰教（特别是中东）也跨上相同的轨迹，那么该地区的长期动荡迟是必然之势。


Mutual understanding is the only way to moderate the consequences.	相互谅解是让后果缓和的唯一办法。


Islam as a Tool of Modernization	使伊斯兰教成为现代化的工具


A big worry in Iraq and the wider Middle East is that Islam and modernization are enemies.	伊拉克和中东地区最大的隐忧就是伊斯兰教和现代化水火不容。


But Malaysian history over the past three decades shows that this belief is mistaken.	但马来西亚过去30年的历史表明：这个命题是错误的。


In fact, Islamization has proved to be an effective political means of reconciling the majority of Malays to the country’s rapid economic development.	实际上，伊斯兰化已经被证实是使多数马来人融入国家快速经济发展的一种有效的政治手段。


In the early 1970’s, when it was still an overwhelmingly agrarian country and Islamization was just gaining momentum, Malaysia embarked on its so-called “New Economic Policy” (NEP), designed to help the majority Malays gain a bigger share of the country’s wealth.	20世纪70年代早期，马来西亚还是个单纯的农业国，伊斯兰化运动也正方兴未艾，马来西亚开始推行所谓的“新经济政策”（NEP），旨在帮助大多数马来人更好地分享国家的财富。


After three decades of spectacular economic growth, many Malays have become prosperous and content not only through secular capitalism, but through the country’s renewed sense of Islamic identity, one which – for the most part – embraced modernization.	经历了长达30年令人叹为观止的经济增长，很多马来人都更加富裕和满足，他们的满足不仅来自世俗的资本主义，还来自国家对伊斯兰特质再一次的认可和接纳。 这些伊斯兰特征中绝大部分都能与现代化水乳交融。


(Of course, paradoxes appear every now and then, such as when globalization is advocated alongside demands for stronger censorship.)	（当然，自相矛盾的现象也不时出现，比如他们在倡导全球化的同时，要求加强审查制度。 ）


Islamic-minded politicians such as Anwar Ibrahim gained prominence when Islamization took off in the 1970’s.	20世纪70年代伊斯兰化刚刚兴起之时，安瓦尔·伊伯拉罕等颇具伊斯兰头脑的政治家也开始登上了舞台。


But the Islam they promoted was not backward looking; instead, it sought to shape a modernizing economic policy that took note of Muslim sensibilities.	但他们所宣传的伊斯兰思想不是盯住过去不放，恰恰相反，他们尝试设计一种现代化的经济政策，同时考虑到穆斯林的诉求。


Faced with the grassroots popularity of this movement, by 1982 the government of then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed decided to co-opt Anwar Ibrahim into his United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party within the country’s ruling coalition.	由于这场运动在百姓中开展得轰轰烈烈，到了1982年，当时的马来西亚首相马哈蒂尔· 穆罕默德决定邀请安瓦尔·伊伯拉罕加入自己的马来民族统一机构(UMNO，简称巫统)，该政党在国家执政联盟中占据了统治地位。


The strategy worked well, and helped defuse Islamic opposition to the wrenching changes that accompanied the country’s rapid economic modernization.	这一策略获得了成功，缓解了伊斯兰教徒对伴随国家快速经济现代化而出现的痛苦变革的激烈反抗。


During the 1990’s, however, Anwar increased his influence within the party, unsettling many of the old guard.	然而20世纪90年代期间，安瓦尔扩大了自己在党内的影响，有些老兵也因此蠢蠢欲动。


Matters came to a head after the 1997 financial crisis, when Anwar, the deputy prime minister, adopted an even more economically liberal approach than Mahathir.	1997年金融危机后问题发展到了顶点，当时担任副首相的安瓦尔推行比马哈蒂尔更为自由的经济政策。


Partly in response to this challenge, Anwar was sacked.	部分由于上述原因，安瓦尔被解职。


Anwar’s bizarre trial and sentencing on charges of sodomy and abuse of power invigorated the reformasi movement, as growing anti-UMNO and anti-Mahathir sentiments took hold among Islamic-minded Malays.	安瓦尔被控鸡奸及滥用权力的奇特审讯和宣判引发了改革运动（reformasi movement），而反马来民族统一机构及反马哈蒂尔的情绪在抱有伊斯兰思想的马来人当中也愈演愈烈。


This culminated in poor electoral results for the ruling coalition in November 1999.	1999年11月执政联盟在选举中惨遭失败标志着这种反对情绪达到了高潮。


The Islamist party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), took power in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu and strongly threatened UMNO in other northern states.	伊斯兰党派泛伊斯兰教党（PAS）掌握了吉兰丹和丁加奴州的权力，对马来民族统一机构在北部其它各州的力量也形成了有力的挑战。


The personal conflict between Mahathir and Anwar thus led to an apparent rupture between Malaysia’s Islamist political forces and the modernizers of UMNO.	马哈蒂尔和安瓦尔之间的个人冲突就这样演变成了马来西亚伊斯兰派政治力量与马来民族统一机构改革者之间显而易见的裂痕。


So, once again, Mahathir felt pressure to adopt a strategy aimed at preventing Islam from becoming a tool of opposition.	就这样，马哈蒂尔再一次感到了采取措施，防止伊斯兰教成为反对派工具的巨大压力。


This impulse strongly affected his choice of a successor when he decided to step down as prime minister.	他决意辞去首相职务的时候，这种压力很大程度上影响了他对接班人的选择。 他最终选择的现任首相阿卜杜拉.


His choice of Abdullah Badawi, the current prime minister, helped UMNO regain the Islamist moral high ground that the PAS had been claiming.	巴达维（Abdullah Badawi）来再次帮助马来民族统一机构赢得伊斯兰民众的爱戴，而此前这种爱戴一直为泛伊斯兰教党所独享。


It was the beginning of America’s global “war on terror” in 2001, however, that brought the political march of the Islamist parties to a screeching halt, as it provided an excuse for the government to crack down on the Malay right and the PAS.	2001年美国全球“反恐战争”的开始使伊斯兰政党的政治长征骤然陷入了停顿，因为它为政府镇压马来右翼和泛伊斯兰教党提供了借口。


But this only renewed UMNO’s desire to portray itself as sufficiently Islamist.	但其结果只是再次坚定了马来民族统一机构把自己描绘成伊斯兰信徒的决心。


So, before stepping down, Mahathir went so far as to declare Malaysia a de facto Muslim state.	由此，马哈蒂尔在辞职前做出了一个大胆的决定，宣布马来西亚为事实上的穆斯林国家。


Eyebrows were raised and questions were asked about the lengths to which Mahathir would go to counteract the Islamist appeal.	此举引起了一场轩然大波，人们纷纷质问马哈蒂尔抵制伊斯兰诉求的政策还要坚持多久。


This trend continues.	这一潮流大有延续之势。


One of Badawi’s first acts after taking over as prime minister in October 2003 was to introduce the concept of Islam Hadhari.	2003年10月巴达维就任首相后最初采取的行动就是引入了伊斯兰文明社会的概念。


This vague term was finally fleshed out with a list of ten principles in September 2004, all but one of which, however, was without religious connotations.	2004年9月，10大原则的清单终于丰富了这个模模糊糊的概念，但其中只有一条不具备宗教的内涵。


Nevertheless, this move appeared to be all that was needed for Islam-minded voters to return to the fold of the ruling front.	尽管如此，此举已足以把伊斯兰教选民拉回到执政党派的怀抱之中。


In the general election in March 2004 – the first since Mahathir stepped down after 22 years in power – moderate Muslims helped Abdullah Badawi to a landslide victory.	2004年3月举行的大选之中¾也是执政22年的马哈蒂尔辞职后的首次选举¾温和派的穆斯林帮助阿卜杜拉. 巴达维赢得了压倒性的胜利。


The release of Anwar Ibrahim soon afterwards raised the new premier’s prestige further as a leader who could heal intra-Malay, and intra-Muslim, conflicts.	不久后安瓦尔·伊伯拉罕的释放令新总理声名雀起，人们把他看作能够修复马来人和穆斯林内部冲突的杰出领袖。


Since then, Abdullah Badawi has been popularizing the concept of “Hadhari,” shaping it as a means to shift Islam’s focus from its sanctioning function to its civilizing potential and rendering it less ideological.	从那以后，阿卜杜拉. 巴达维一直致力于推广“伊斯兰文明社会”的理念，借此将伊斯兰教的重点从偏重制裁转向强调潜移默化的教化以及淡化意识形态的功能。


In Malaysia today, Islam is being presented as a generator of civilization and culture, and not merely as a source of religious inspiration.	在今天的马来西亚，伊斯兰教早已超越了单纯的宗教灵感，变成了文化和文明的使者。


This has helped to counter extremist tendencies domestically and provides a conceptual platform for moderate Islam.	这有助于对抗国内的极端主义势力，并为温和的伊斯兰人士提供概念宣传的讲台。


Islam Hadhari tries to project the idea that UMNO’s materialism and nationalism do not contradict Islam.	“伊斯兰文明社会”力图传播这样一个理念，那就是马来民族统一机构推行的唯物主义和民族主义与伊斯兰教没有矛盾。


With various feints and strategies, Malaysia has effectively managed the tensions between a secular, modernizing agenda and the Islamic faith that the Malays profess.	采取了各种各样的措施和策略，马来西亚终于有效地缓和了世俗的现代化蓝图与马来人坚守的伊斯兰信仰之间的矛盾。


By making Islamists and Islamist sentiments a part of the process of modernization, Malaysia demonstrates that Islamic faith and economic growth can be reconciled if politicians are clever enough not to treat them as contradictions.	通过把伊斯兰信徒及其情感融入到现代化的进程当中，马来西亚表明：如果政治家们能够采取灵活的策略避免双方对立，那么伊斯兰信仰和经济增长完全可以融合在一起。


Reviving Islam’s Enlightenment	复兴伊斯兰教启蒙运动


SEATTLE – In 1877, the great French novelist Victor Hugo wrote, “Invading armies can be resisted; invading ideas cannot be.”	西雅图—1877年，伟大的法国作家雨果写道，“入侵的军队可以抵抗，入侵的思想无法抵抗。


Nowadays, the power of ideas, for good or for evil, is something we need to take into account, particularly in contemplating Islamic radicalism.	”如今，思想的力量——不管是好是坏——使我们所必须考虑的，特别是在伊斯兰激进主义问题上。


The recent terrorist attacks in France, Kuwait, and Tunisia are only the latest reminders of how important it is to understand that, behind these outrages, there are serious ideas, not simply angry, frustrated criminals.	最近在法国、科威特和突尼斯发生的恐怖袭击都再次证明，明白在这些狂暴行为背后都有严肃的思想，而不仅仅是因为愤怒沮丧而犯下罪行。


Violent Islamic jihadist movements do not pose an existential danger to Europe or North America.	暴力伊斯兰圣战运动并没有对欧洲或北美构成生存威胁。


They may occasionally be able to carry out deadly terrorist acts, but they have no chance of destroying or taking over Western societies.	他们偶尔能够实施致人死亡的恐怖行动，但他们无法摧毁或征服西方社会。


Panicked attempts to march into Muslim countries and extirpate the threat have been counterproductive, serving only to increase the appeal of Islamic extremism.	因为恐慌而意欲远征穆斯林国家、将威胁连根拔起无济于事，只能增加伊斯兰极端主义的号召力。


Most Muslims reject the harshest versions of Islam, but many – if not most – harbor sympathy for the idea of struggling against the dictates of the West and returning the faith to its past strengths and glories.	大部分穆斯林都不信奉最强硬的伊斯兰教派，但许多人——甚至大多数人——都对与西方的指手画脚作斗争以及回归伊斯兰教昔日的强盛与光荣的思想持同情态度。


It would be wrong to assert that only a tiny minority of Muslims back the actions of the extremists or that fundamentalist factions have hijacked a religion of which they are completely unrepresentative.	认为只有极少数穆斯林支持极端行动，或者原教旨主义教派已经绑架了这个它们完全无法代表的宗教，这些认识是错误的。


Islamic radicals enjoy enough support to be a serious threat in their part of the world.	伊斯兰激进分子所获得的支持足以使他们成为所在地区的严重威胁。


It is important to understand how this happened.	一个很重要的方面是要明白这一情况是怎样发生的。


Harsh, radically conservative Islamic theologies have been around almost since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, but they have been repeatedly contested by more tolerant, moderate schools of Muslim thought.	强硬而激进的保守派伊斯兰教教派在632年先知穆罕默德去世时便已存在，但它们一再受到更包容、更温和的穆斯林教义流派的制衡。


Like the Christian and Jewish Bibles, the Koran is open to interpretation, whether quite liberal or dogmatic and repressive.	和基督教和犹太教圣经一样，可兰经也对各种解释开放，不管是自由性质的还是教条和压迫性质的。


In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Muslim thinkers – most famously Jamal al-Din al-Afghani – believed that embracing many of the ideals developed in the West during the Enlightenment was the only way to promote progress.	十九世纪末、二十世纪初，许多穆斯林思想家——其中最著名的要数加马尔丁·阿富汗尼（Jamal al-Din al-Afghani）——认为接受许多在启蒙运动期间所产生的西方理想是唯一的促进进步之道。


Al-Afghani and others wrote that Islam’s rejection of Western science and progress was a misinterpretation of the Koran.	阿富汗尼和其他人写道，伊斯兰教拒绝西方科学和进步是对可兰经的误读。


But, as the twentieth century progressed, Muslim reformists lost ground to secular nationalists emphasizing socialism as the path to modernization.	但是，随着二十世纪的深入，穆斯林改革派逐渐式微，而崛起的是世俗民族主义者，他们强调社会主义作为现代化的方式。


The promise of secularism, however, proved hollow, with countries like Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria sinking into despotism and corruption.	但是，世俗化最后沦为空洞的承诺，埃及、利比亚、伊拉克和叙利亚等国家陷入了专制和腐败的陷阱。


This provided fertile ground for anti-Western, reactionary, violent versions of Islam.	这给了反西方的反动暴力伊斯兰教兴起的温床。


These strains have many intellectual roots.	这些“星星之火”有众多思想根源。


But perhaps the single most important modern source is the writing of the Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb.	但也许最重要的现代因素是埃及学者赛义德·库特布（Sayyid Qutb）的著作。


Together with other fundamentalists, such as the Pakistani philosopher Abul A'la Maududi, Qutb argued that true Islam had been infiltrated and corrupted by outside ideas.	库塔布与巴基斯坦哲学家阿卜杜尔·阿拉·毛杜迪（Abul A'la Maududi）等指出，真正的伊斯兰教已经被外部思想渗透和腐蚀。


Only when it was reclaimed would two centuries of humiliation at the hands of Western imperial powers and, more recently, the nascent state of Israel be reversed.	只有重塑伊斯兰教，在西方帝国主义列强面前屈辱的两百年及其后在初生的以色列面前的屈辱才能扭转。


God would side once more with Muslims against their enemies, whom Qutb called “Crusaders and Jews.”	神将再一次站在穆斯林一边帮助他们对抗这些库塔布称之为“十字军和犹太人”的敌人。


Dictatorships in North Africa and the Middle East tried to suppress the Islamic conservatives.	北非和中东的独裁统治试图镇压伊斯兰教保守派。


But Saudi Arabia – a bastion of conservatism – used its oil wealth to counter secular modernizers and any kind of reformed Islam, financing fundamentalist missionaries and conservative mosques throughout the Islamic world.	但沙特阿拉伯——保守主义的堡垒——利用其石油财富掣肘世俗现代主义者和一切伊斯兰教改革，为全伊斯兰世界的原教旨主义传教士和保守派清真寺提供资金支持。


Qutb was executed by the Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966 as part of a brutal but unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood.	库塔布于1966年在一场残酷但没有成功的消灭穆斯林兄弟会的行动中被埃及独裁者纳赛尔处决。


In fact, the crackdowns only strengthened the conservative Islamists, whose faith helped them survive the repression.	事实上，镇压反而强化了保守派伊斯兰教，他们的信仰帮助他们在镇压中存活下来。


And they served to convince young, discontented Muslims that extremism was the only possible solution to their societies’ weakness and lack of opportunity.	信仰还有助于说服不满现状的年轻穆斯林，让他们相信极端主义是解决社会孱弱和缺少机会的唯一的可能办法。


Confronting ideas with military means is a sure path to defeat.	用军事手段对付思想是一条必败之路。


When Western powers send soldiers into Muslim countries, attempt to bomb extremists into submission, prop up brutal dictatorships, or blindly support every Israeli policy, they confirm the claims of the radical Islamists, driving new adherents into their arms.	当西方列强派兵进入穆斯林国家、试图用炸弹让极端分子屈服、支持残酷独裁或盲目支持任何每一项以色列政策时，它们都确认了激进伊斯兰教的主张，让它们获得新的信徒。


The real battlefront is the arena of ideas.	真正的前线在思想领域。


Instead of armed, panicky overreactions, what is needed is cultural exchanges.	需要的不是武装的过度恐怖反应，而是文化交流。


There are plenty of serious intellectuals in Islamic societies who want to revive the reformist call for the embrace of some of the ideas of Western Enlightenment: the value of science, the importance of liberal tolerance, and the need for free and open discussion.	伊斯兰社会中有许多严肃的知识分子想要复兴接受一些西方启蒙运动思想的改革派主张：科学的价值、自由容忍的重要性，以及自由开放讨论的必要性。


Western scholars who understand Islam and speak some of the many languages of its practitioners need to support these intellectual movements.	理解伊斯兰教、懂得众多伊斯兰教实践者语言中的一些的西方学者应该支持这些思想运动。


Hawks in the West may try to dismiss actions like these as weak.	西方的鹰派也许会将这样的行为斥为软弱。


But while they may do little in the short run, they are sure to prove critical over the long term.	但尽管在短期它们也许没什么作用，但在长期，它们必然会成为至关重要的因素。


After all, the force that brought down communism in Europe – a far more dangerous ideology than radical Islam – was not simply military containment, but also the power of ideas and ideals.	毕竟，让欧洲共产主义——比激进伊斯兰教危险得多的意识形态——崩溃的不仅仅是军事遏制，还有思想和理想的力量。


Islam, Faith, and Climate Change	伊斯兰教、信仰和气候变化


AMMAN – The Islamic Declaration on Climate Change, endorsed in August by Islamic scholars from around the world, calls on countries to phase out greenhouse-gas emissions and switch to 100% renewable energy.	安曼——8月由世界各地穆斯林学者批准的伊斯兰气候变化宣言呼吁各国逐步淘汰温室气体排放并转而使用100%的可再生能源。


With 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, the collective statement sends a strong signal ahead of the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit later this month, and the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in December.	全世界16亿穆斯林的集体声明抢在本月晚些时候召开的联合国可持续发展峰会及12月巴黎召开的联合国气候变化大会之前释放了一个明确的信号。


Released during a two-day symposium on Islam and climate change in Istanbul, the Declaration explains why Muslims should be responsible activists for the welfare of the planet, and sets out a series of demands to world leaders and the business community.	在伊斯坦布尔为期两天的伊斯兰和气候变化研讨会上发布的这项声明详细阐述了穆斯林活动人士为什么应该为这个星球的福祉负责，同时面向世界领导人和商界提出了一系列要求。


First, the Declaration calls on policymakers responsible for crafting the comprehensive climate agreement to be adopted in Paris to come to “an equitable and binding conclusion.”	首先，宣言呼吁负责起草《巴黎综合气候协议》的决策者达成“一项公平而具有约束力的共识”。


The agreement should set clear targets and establish ways to monitor them.	上述协议应制定目标并明确监督方式。


Additionally, prosperous countries and oil-producing states should phase out their carbon-dioxide emissions no later than the middle of the century; turn away from “unethical profit from the environment”; and invest in a green economy.	此外，繁荣国家和产油国应在本世纪中叶以前逐步降低其二氧化碳排放； 不赚“破坏环境的不道德利润”并加大对绿色经济投资。


Second, the Declaration asks people and leaders from all countries to commit to 100% renewable energy and a zero-emissions strategy as soon as possible, and to recognize that unlimited economic growth is not a viable option.	其次，该宣言要求所有国家的民众和领袖尽早致力于100%可再生能源及零排放战略，同时认识到无限度追求经济增长并非可行的选择。


Moreover, adaptation should be a high priority, particularly for the most vulnerable groups.	此外，尤其对最弱势群体，适应应当成为工作的重点。


Notably, the business sector is asked to take a more active role to reduce its carbon footprint, commit to 100% renewable energy and zero emissions, shift investments into renewable energy, adopt more sustainable business models, and assist in the divestment from fossil fuels.	值得注意的是，人们要求商界积极削减碳足迹、致力于零排放和100%的可再生能源、加大可再生能源投资、采用持续性更强的商业模式并协助从化石燃料领域完成撤资。


Finally, the Declaration issues an appeal to “all Muslims wherever they may be” that is underpinned by quotes from the Holy Koran.	最后，宣言向“一切地方的穆斯林”发出了由神圣可兰经支持的宣言。


Care for creation is a fundamental part of the Islamic message, the Declaration notes, and humans are currently responsible for squandering gifts bestowed by Allah.	宣言指出关爱万物是伊斯兰教的基本教义，而目前挥霍安拉赐予礼物的责任应当由人类承担。


The Koranic ayah 24:45 tells us how Allah created every living creature from water, and the Hadith instructs us that we are “stewards of the Earth”:	可兰经女仆 24:45向我们讲述了安拉如何用水创造了所有生物，同时圣训教导我们是“地球的管家”：


“The Earth is green and beautiful, and Allah has appointed you his stewards over it.	“地球浓绿美丽，安拉任命你当它的管家。


The whole Earth has been created a place of worship, pure and clean.	整个地球都被缔造成膜拜之所，纯洁而且干净。


Whoever plants a tree and diligently looks after it until it matures and bears fruit is rewarded.	种树并在其后辛勤照拂、直至其长大成材、开花结果的人都会得到报答。


If a Muslim plants a tree or sowed a field and humans and beasts and birds eat from it, all of it is love on his part.”	如果一位穆斯林种下一棵树或耕耘一片土地，其果实为人类和鸟兽所食，这就是他所奉献的挚爱。 ”


This message echoes and affirms examples found in the doctrines of many faiths, which call on us to be kinder and wiser in how we use this planet, and to advocate for all creatures.	这篇教义呼应并肯定了很多宗教中都能找到的实例，呼吁我们更善良、更明智地利用我们的星球，为一切生物说话。


As the Buddhist Za Choeje Rinpoche, the 6th incarnation of ZaChoeje Rinpoche, teaches:	确戒仁波切的第六世化身确戒仁波切活佛告诫我们：


“By injuring any part of the world’s system, you injure yourself.	“伤害世界体系的任何部分都是在伤害你自己。


Think of life on this planet in terms of systems and not detached elements.	应该从系统而不是独立元素的角度来看待地球上的生命。


See that the environment does not belong to any single country to exploit and then disregard.”	不能先是利用环境而后又加以忽视，因为它不属于任何一个国家。 ”


The Islamic Declaration on Climate Change, like Pope Francis’s recent encyclical Laudato Si', is a call to humanity, regardless of faith, to work together to protect the planet upon which we depend.	像教皇弗朗西斯不久前的通谕Laudato Si'一样，伊斯兰气候变化宣言是向无分信仰的全人类发出呼吁，要共同保护我们赖以生存的星球。


I hope that they will indeed provide an impetus for shifts in policies, allowing for deeper and broader reductions in CO2 emissions.	希望它们确实能推动政策改变，从而更深层次、更大范围地削减二氧化���排放。


These statements of faith are both historic and timely, as the world’s countries seek to implement global agreements in areas ranging from climate change to the Sustainable Development Goals and the establishment of marine reserves on the high seas.	上述声明及时且具有历史意义，因为世界各国正致力于从控制气候变化、实现可持续发展目标到建立公海海洋保护区等领域全球协议的落实工作。


Indeed, it is important to remember that the earth’s surface is primarily ocean, which plays a critical role as both a carbon sink and a regulator of the climate.	事实上，重要的是要记住地球表面主要是海洋，海洋在碳汇和气候调解方面发挥的作用至关重要。


The oceans annually absorb approximately 25% of all human-caused CO2 emissions, and we are now overtaxing this capacity.	海洋每年吸收约25%的人类二氧化碳排放，而我们现在正在过度利用海洋的吸收能力。


The carbon dissolved in the ocean has altered its chemistry, driving up acidity by 30% since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.	海洋中溶解的碳已经改变其化学属性，自工业革命开始以来，海洋酸度上升了30%。


The ocean’s health is now largely dependent upon lowering CO2 emissions within the next few decades, before runaway ocean acidification occurs and sea levels change radically.	在失控的海洋酸化及海平面极端变化发生之前，未来几十年内降低二氧化碳排放量现在在很大程度上决定了海洋的健康。


As an Ocean Elder, I was also heartened by Francis’s emphasis in Laudato Si' on the need for strict mechanisms of regulation and control on the open seas – a real step forward in this regard.	身为资深海洋人士，弗朗西斯在通谕Laudato Si' 中强调有必要建立严格的公海调控机制——从而向削减碳排放迈出了坚实的一步——这一举措令我备受鼓舞。


The high seas are the earth’s last great global commons, representing nearly 50% of the planet’s surface, and the multiple threats they face require universal solidarity and action.	海洋是地球最后也是规模最大的全球公共资源，占地球表面的近50%，需要全球团结和行动来消除它所面临的威胁。


Just this past June, UN member states unanimously supported a General Assembly resolution to negotiate a new international agreement to protect marine life in the high seas.	就在今年六月，联合国会员国一致支持联合国大会决议，谈判新的公海海洋生物保护国际协议。


Restoring and regenerating the abundance and diversity of species across one of our planet’s critical life-support systems is essential to building the entire earth’s resilience to climate change.	恢复及再造我们这个星球关键生命支持系统的丰富多样性对建设整个地球对气候变化的适应能力至关重要。


Many have pointed out that we are the first generation to have hard evidence of the enormous damage that humanity is causing to natural ecosystems, and probably the last that can truly do something about it.	许多人指出我们是握有人类给自然生态系统造成巨大伤害确凿证据的第一代，同时或许也是能够改变现状的最后一代。


Now is the critical time for multilateralism, multi-faith dialogues, and, perhaps most important, active engagement.	现在是多边主义、多信仰对话的关键时刻，或许我们的积极参与最为重要。


We are all humans who live on Earth and from it.	我们都是生活在地球上的人类。


We have all been entrusted to care for the planet.	关爱这个星球是我们共同的责任。


We can and must do this by forging bold climate and protective ocean agreements together – regardless of belief, circumstance, or status.	我们可以而且必须共同制定大胆的气候和海洋保护协议——无论我们拥有什么样的信仰、身处什么样的环境或地位。


Science tells us we have to act; our faith and humanity compel us to do so.	科学告诉我们现在必须行动，我们的信仰和人性迫使我们采取措施。


Islamic Evangelism	伊斯兰福音传教


Many believe that religious revival and political radicalism among Muslims who reside in the West reflects the traditions and conflicts of the Middle East or the wider Muslim world.	很多人相信：西方国家穆斯林们的宗教复兴和政治激进反映了中东地区、或是更广阔的穆斯林世界的传统与矛盾。


But Islamic Salafism (fundamentalist religious radicalism) is above all a consequence of the globalization and Westernization of Islam, and of the decoupling of culture and religion more generally.	但伊斯兰沙拉菲主义（原教旨主义宗教激进分子）首先是伊斯兰教全球化和西方化、以及更为广义的文化与宗教分离的恶果。


All forms of religious fundamentalism rely on the notion of a "pure" religion independent of cultural variations and influences.	所有形式的原教旨主义都有赖于一种"纯粹"的宗教观，它不受文化改变的影响而独立存在。


Today's Islamic revival shares the dogmatism, communitarianism, and scripturalism of American evangelist movements: both reject culture, philosophy, and even theology to favor a literalist reading of sacred texts and an immediate understanding of truth through individual faith.	今天的伊斯兰复兴运动与美国福音传教运动有着共同的特点：信奉教条主义、倡导共产主义、推崇圣经主义，而且同样对文化、哲学甚至神学持否定的态度，而信奉神圣经文的字面意义，推崇通过个人的虔诚信仰到达顿悟的境界。


Recent books published in the West reflect this, with titles like What is Islam? , What Does It Mean To Be A Muslim? , and How To Experience Islam?	这在最近西方出版的书籍中都有所反映，其中包括《究竟什么是伊斯兰教？ 》、《身为穆斯林意味着什么？


It is easy to fast during Ramadan in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt, even if one does not want to.	》、和《如何感知伊斯兰教？ 》。


But a Muslim living in Europe is confronted with the necessity of objectifying the religion. Ulemas (religious scholars) are useless for believers who must search for purely religious criteria that are no longer linked to a given culture.	即使心里并不情愿，在阿富汗、巴基斯坦和埃及的斋月中斋戒也还算容易，但居住在西方的穆斯林却不得不面对宗教客观化的难题。 对那些需要苦苦搜寻不再与特定文化相联的纯粹教条的信奉者，像乌里玛这样的宗教学者恐怕也不会有太大的帮助。


The real issue is not a theoretical question about Islam, but concerns the religious practices of Muslims.	真正的问题并非伊斯兰教的理论问题，而是对穆斯林宗教习俗的关注。


The forms of religiosity in Islam today are more or less the same as those found in Catholicism, Protestantism, and even Judaism.	今天，伊斯兰教的信奉形式与天主教、新教、甚至于犹太教大体相同。


Contemporary adherents insist more on personal faith and individual spiritual experience.	现代教众更强调个人信仰和精神历练。


Such "born again" believers rebuild their identities through their rediscovery of religion.	这些"获得重生"的信徒通过对宗教的重新发掘找到了失落的自我。


With Islamic fundamentalism, too, we are not witnessing a traditional religion asserting itself against the Christian West.	即便伊斯兰原教旨主义，也并非从一开始就对西方基督教国家怀有敌意。


When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, they initially had excellent relations with the Americans, and Westerners could travel freely in Afghanistan between 1996 and 1998.	1996年塔利班在阿富汗最初当政时，曾与美国有着亲密的关系。 1996到1998年间，西方人可以在阿富汗自由出入。


The Taliban were not fighting Western culture, but traditional Afghan culture.	塔利班对抗的不是西方文化，而是传统的阿富汗文化。


Why forbid owning songbirds?	为什么禁止养鸟？


Why ban kites?	为什么不让放风筝？


The rationale is common to all forms of fundamentalism: this world exists to prepare believers for salvation.	这样的原则在任何形式的原教旨主义中都十分普遍：世界之所以存在，就是为了对教众进行救赎。


The state's role is not to ensure social justice and the rule of law, but to create opportunities - even through coercion - for believers to find salvation.	国家的作用不是确保法治与社会公义，而是为了创造机会¾即便通过独裁统治¾使信徒得到最终的救赎。


The Taliban's argument was simple: if your bird starts singing while you are praying, you will be distracted and your prayer will be nullified.	塔利班的理由非常简单：如果鸟在祈祷时开始鸣叫，就会分散你的注意力，祈祷就会失去效果。


If you are a good Muslim, you will start again from the beginning.	如果你是个虔诚的穆斯林，就需要从头开始。


But, because we are unsure that you are a good Muslim, it is easier to forbid owning songbirds, so that they cannot jeopardize your salvation.	但是，因为我们不能确定你是不是虔诚，因此干脆禁止养鸟，这样就不会给救赎带来威胁。


Similarly, kites get tangled in trees, and if you climb the tree to free it, you might look over your neighbor's wall and see a woman without her veil, which would put you in sin.	同样，风筝可能被树缠住，而如果你爬到树上够风筝，就可能窥视到邻家的状况，看到他家的妇女没有戴面纱。 如果这样，你就犯了罪。


Why risk burning in hell for a kite?	为什么为了区区风筝而冒险在炼狱中煎熬？


Better to ban them.	因此最好的方法是禁放风筝。


Fundamentalism is thus not a protest by original cultures under threat; it reflects these cultures' disappearance.	因此原教旨主义不是独创文化对威胁的反抗，它反映的是这些文化的逐步消失。


So it is a grave mistake to link modern forms of fundamentalism with the idea of a clash of civilizations.	因此将现代形式的原教旨主义与文化冲突联系在一起简直大错特错。


Young people do not become fundamentalists because their parents' culture is ignored by Western civilization. Fundamentalist religiosity is individual and generational, a rebellion against the religion of one's parents.	年轻人不会因为父辈的文化被西方忽略而成为原教旨主义者，相反，原教旨主义的虔诚既是个人行为，也代表了一个时代对父辈宗教信仰的反抗。


Of course, religious fundamentalists of whatever stripe often emphasize similar codes, norms, and values.	勿庸置疑，任何地方的原教旨主义者都强调类似的规则、标准和价值观。


When Pim Fortuyn in Holland decided to wage a campaign against Muslim influence, he was defending sexual freedom, not traditional Christian values.	当皮姆·弗杜恩决意在荷兰发起运动，抗拒穆斯林的影响，他的目标是捍卫性自由，而不是传统的基督教价值观。


But on this subject and others - say, family and abortion - religious Muslims in Europe side with conservative Christians.	而在上述问题和家庭、堕胎等其它问题上，欧洲的穆斯林教徒与保守的基督教徒持有一致的立场。


Nevertheless, such commonalities do not explain political and radical Islam.	即便如此，这些共同点也无法解释政治和激进的伊斯兰教。


Osama Bin Laden is much more the expression of deracination than of a tradition of political violence in Islam.	与其说奥萨马·本·拉登体现了伊斯兰教政治的暴力传统，还不如说他代表了对传统政治观念的悖离。


Muhammad Atta, Zacharias Moussaoui, and Kamel Daoudi were "born again" in Marseilles, London, and Montreal, not in Egypt or Morocco (and they all broke ties with their families).	Muhammad Atta、Zacharias Moussaoui、和Kamel Daoudi重生的地点都是马赛、伦敦、蒙特利尔，而不是埃及或摩洛哥（他们都与各自的家庭断绝了联系）。


Moreover, young radicals go to fight in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Kashmir rather than in their countries of origin, because they do not regard the Middle East as the heart of a Muslim civilization under siege by crusaders.	不仅如此，激进的青年人到波斯尼亚、车臣、阿富汗或克什米尔参战，而不是留在他们生长的国家，因为他们没有把中东看作被十字军围困的穆斯林文化中心。


They live in a global world; they do not perceive themselves as Middle Easterners.	他们生活在一个全球化的世界，他们不仅仅将自己看成中东人。


The irrelevance of traditional culture explains the growing number of converts in all the recently discovered radical networks.	毫不相干的传统文化能够解释为什么在不久前发现的激进网络中皈依者日众。


The members of the Beghal network in France were roughly one-third converts.	法国贝加尔恐怖网络约三分之一的成员是其后皈依的伊斯兰教。


The French police arrested a German citizen with a Polish name in connection with the terrorist attack on the synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia.	法国警方逮捕了一名波兰姓名的德籍男子，该男子与突尼斯吉尔巴岛发生的犹太教堂恐怖袭击有关。


Richard Reid, who tried to blow up a British airplane, José Padilla, accused of plotting a "dirty bomb" attack in the United States, and John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban, are all converts.	此外企图炸毁英国航班的Richard Reid、被控在美国策划"脏弹"袭击的José Padilla、以及美籍塔利班成员John Walker Lindh，无一不是伊斯兰教的皈依者。


In Europe, conversion is typically confined to underprivileged neighborhoods, populated by young people with no job prospects who generally live in an underground economy of delinquency.	在欧洲，皈依行为通常发生在底层社区，那里居住的年轻人没有工作、只能依靠违法的地下经济为生。


The radical and violent left in Europe today has abandoned these zones of social exclusion.	目前欧洲的激进和暴力分子也舍弃了这些被社会抛弃的角落。


Radicals used to learn to handle a Kalashnikov and hijack planes with the Palestinians. Now they learn to handle a Kalashnikov and hijack planes with Al Qaeda.	激进分子曾经和巴勒斯坦人一道学用卡拉什尼科夫冲锋枪，演练如何劫机，而现在，基地组织成了他们的同伴。


Their quest for mythic, messianic, transnational movements of liberation remains the same, as does the enemy: America's imperial colossus.	他们依然追求虚幻的跨国救世主解放运动，被他们视作仇敌的美帝国主义也是如此。


They are the product not of Western or Middle Eastern history, but the fusion of all histories, of globalization.	他们不是西方或中东历史的产物，而是源自于世界各国的历史和全球化进程。


They are at home in a homeless world.	他们生活在一个没有国界的世界中。


Countering Islamic Extremism	打击伊斯兰极端主义


PRINCETON – Last month, US President Barack Obama hosted a three-day summit on “Countering Violent Extremism."	普林斯顿——上月，美国总统奥巴马举行了为期三天的“打击暴力极端主义”峰会。


That term has already spawned a new abbreviation, “CVE," used no fewer than 12 times in a Fact Sheet released by the Obama administration on February 18.	该词的新英文缩写“CVE”应运而生，在奥巴马政府2月18日发表的简报中出现了不下12次。


The Fact Sheet also uses the term “violent extremism" 21 times.	简报中还出现了21次“暴力极端主义”。


How many times do terms like “Islam," “Islamic," or “Muslim" appear?	“伊斯兰”、“伊斯兰教”或“穆斯林”呢？


Zero.	零次。


There is not even a reference to the “Islamic State."	简报中甚至从未提及“伊斯兰国”。


That entity is referred to only by the initials “ISIL."	而只是以“ISIL”的缩写首字母来称呼该组织。


This is not an accident; it is part of a strategy to win the support of mainstream Muslims.	这种变化绝非偶然，而是赢得主流穆斯林世界支持的战略。


Riham Osman, speaking on behalf of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, which participated in the summit, said that using terms like “radical Islam" harms the cause of stopping the violence.	与会机构穆斯林公共事务委员会代表Riham Osman表示使用诸如“激进伊斯兰”这样的词汇有损于打击暴力的事业。


This may partly reflect the Muslim community's understandable fears that associating Islam with terrorism and violence would contribute to an increase in attacks on, or discrimination against, all Muslims.	这或许部分反映了穆斯林社会的合理担忧，害怕将伊斯兰和恐怖暴力联系在一起会加剧对全体穆斯林的攻击或歧视。


Another reason that has been offered for not referring to “Islamic radicalism" or the “Islamic State" is that to do so concedes the terrorists' claims that they are acting in accordance with Islam's teachings.	没有出现“伊斯兰极端主义”或“伊斯兰国”的另一个原因是上述说法等于承认恐怖分子的宣传，即他们的所作所为符合伊斯兰教教义。


That might draw others, who regard themselves as pious Muslims, to join them.	那样可能吸引其他自诩为虔诚的穆斯林加入到恐怖主义队伍。


Finally, the repeated use of “Islamic" as part of the description of enemy groups may make it appear that the West is “at war with Islam."	最后，反复使用“伊斯兰”来描述敌方组织可能让人误以为西方正“与伊斯兰教作战”。


That could lead more moderate Muslims to fight alongside the extremists, thus broadening the conflict and making it more difficult to end.	这样做可能导致更温和的穆斯林协助极端分子，并因此扩大冲突，导致问题更难以解决。


Yet there are also problems with seeking to avoid these terms.	但避开上述词汇也有问题。


The first problem is political.	最主要的问题是在政治上。


The conservative US Senator Ted Cruz, who may be about to announce his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination, has said, “You cannot defeat an enemy if you refuse to acknowledge what it is."	可能即将宣布竞选共和党总统候选人提名的保守派美国参议员特德·克鲁兹就说过，“拒绝承认敌人是谁就不可能打败他。


That line could win votes.	”很可能有选民支持他的说法。


Indeed, it is never a good idea for a politician to appear to be denying what we can all see before our eyes.	事实上，政治家看似否认显而易见的事实从来都是不明智的。


Moreover, because it is obvious to everyone that most violent extremism is being carried out in the name of Islam, avoiding the word is unlikely to prevent attacks on Muslims in response to this violence.	此外，因为人人有目共睹大部分暴力极端主义都打着伊斯兰的旗号，单纯避免使用这个词不太可能防止针对穆斯林的报复行为。


A further problem becomes apparent as soon as we ask why it is important that mainstream Muslim leaders stand up in public and say that their religion opposes killing innocent people, or that those who die when committing such acts are not “martyrs" and will not be rewarded in the afterlife.	还有一个问题是主流穆斯林领袖为什么要站出来当众表示伊斯兰教反对滥杀无辜，或明确因施暴而死的人不是“烈士”，来世也不会得到奖励。


Why should Muslim leaders, in particular, make such statements, rather than Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, or Hindu leaders?	为什么有基督教、佛教、犹太教或印度教那么多领袖，但只有穆斯林领袖要做出这样的声明？


The answer, once again, is obvious.	答案还是显而易见。


But it is obvious only because we already know that groups like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Taliban are not obeying the precepts of Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism, or Hinduism.	但这恰恰因为我们已知像基地、伊斯兰国和塔利班这样的组织不遵守基督教、佛教、犹太教或印度教戒律。


At the Washington summit, Obama said that “all of us have a responsibility to refute the notion that groups like ISIL somehow represent Islam, because that is a falsehood that embraces the terrorist narrative."	在华盛顿峰会上，奥巴马表示：“我们所有人都有责任反驳ISIL等组织在某种程度上代表伊斯兰教的观点，因为这是一个谎言，正合乎恐怖分子的心意。


At least this statement, unlike the White House Fact Sheet, acknowledges that groups like the Islamic state claim to be Islamic.	”这项声明和白宫简报不同，至少承认像伊斯兰国这样的组织是打着伊斯兰的旗号行事。


Otherwise, what would be the relevance of this statement to “countering violent extremism"?	否则，“打击暴力极端主义”的声明究竟还有什么意义？


Nonetheless, Obama's assertion that “all of us" have this responsibility needs to be more narrowly directed.	即便如此，奥巴马“人人有责”的说法也还需要进一步指明主体。


If I tried to get into a debate with any moderately well-educated Islamic State supporter about whether that organization is true to the teachings of Islam, I would lose the argument.	如果我与任何哪怕受过中等教育的伊斯兰国支持者辩论该组织是否忠实于伊斯兰教的教义，我都很可能没有胜机。


I am not sufficiently expert in the Islamic tradition to be confident that extremists are misinterpreting it, and few of us are.	我对伊斯兰传统的理解不足以认定它被极端分子所曲解，并且多数人都不会比我强到哪去。


The responsibility to which Obama was referring rests with those who are much more learned in Islam than “all of us."	由比“所有人”都更了解伊斯兰的人来承担奥巴马所谓的责任并不现实。


Even for people who are learned in Islam, discharging the responsibility Obama has placed on them will not be easy, as a reading of Graeme Wood's revealing recent account demonstrates.	格雷姆·伍德最近的言论表明，即使对于那些熟悉伊斯兰教的学者，履行奥巴马赋予的责任也绝非易事。


Wood presents a picture of people driven by a firm belief in Islam, and knowledgeable about its key texts.	伍德代表了伊斯兰教的忠贞信徒，熟悉伊斯兰教的主要教义。


Anyone familiar with Christian fundamentalism in the United States should be able to discern a pattern in the attitudes taken by religious fundamentalists, independently of the religion to which they adhere.	美国任何熟悉基督教原教旨主义的人都应该了解上述群体的思维模式，与他们所信仰的宗教并无多大关系。


The Islamic State's spokesmen insist on following the original precepts laid down by the Prophet Mohammed and his earliest followers, understood literally and with no adjustment for different circumstances.	伊斯兰国发言人坚持一字不差地奉行先知穆罕默德及其早期追随者制定的原始戒律，完全不为任何情况做出任何调整。


Like Christian fundamentalists, they see themselves as preparing for – and helping to bring about – the apocalypse.	像基督教原教旨主义者一样，他们认为自己在为天启做准备。


Let me emphasize that I am not saying that the beliefs of today's Christian fundamentalists are morally on a par with those of today's Muslim fundamentalists.	我要强调我并不是说今天基督教原教旨主义者的信仰应该在道德上与穆斯林原教旨主义者相提并论。


There is a vast moral difference between those who oppose the taking of innocent human life and those who kill people because of their nationality, or what they say, or because they are “apostates."	那些反对滥杀无辜和以国籍（也就是他们口中的“判教者”）为由实施杀戮的人有着本质的区别。


But the fundamentalists' worldviews are similar in important respects, regardless of the religion to which they adhere.	但无论信仰什么宗教，原教旨主义者的世界观在很多重要方面都十分相似。


By now, the problem with trying to counter those who seek new recruits for “violent extremism" without focusing on this extremism's Islamic basis should be clear.	言及此，那些不想明确极端主义伊斯兰的根本问题而又想阻止“暴力极端主义”招募新人的人应该已经理解我的意思。


Those considering joining an extremist Islamic group should be told: You believe every other religion to be false, but adherents of many other religions believe just as firmly that your faith is false.	我们应该告诉那些极端伊斯兰组织的潜在加入者：你们认为其他宗教虚伪，但很多其他宗教的信仰者也同样坚定地相信你们宗教的虚伪性。


You cannot really know who is right, and you could all be wrong.	你们无法知道谁对谁错，错的完全可能就是你们。


Either way, you do not have a sufficiently well-grounded justification for killing people, or for sacrificing your own life.	无论如何，你们没有充分的理由可以去杀人，也没有充分的理由去牺牲自己的生命。


Granted, some people are not open to reasoning of any kind, and so will not be swayed by such an argument.	的确，有些人不接受任何类型的理性，也不会因此而回心转意。


But others may be.	但有些人可能会接受。


Why rule it out in advance by denying that much extremist violence is religiously motivated?	为什么先就否认暴力极端分子的宗教动机，从而最终失去这样的机会？


Leveraging Islamic Finance for Sustainable Development	利用伊斯兰金融实现可持续发展


WASHINGTON, DC – Roughly one-third of those suffering from extreme poverty worldwide live in member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).	华盛顿——1/3的全球极端贫困者在伊斯兰合作组织（OIC）成员国生活。


In 21 of those 57 countries, fewer than half of the population has access to adequate sanitation.	这57个国家中的21个有不到一半的人口能够享受恰当的卫生条件。


Four percent of infants born in these countries die before they reach the age of five.	出生在这些国家的婴儿有4%均在5岁前死亡。


Simply put, despite great potential, many OIC countries have struggled to achieve broad-based development.	简言之，尽管潜力很大，不少伊斯兰合作组织国家实现广泛发展的道路却异常艰辛。


For many countries, the infamous “resource curse” is at work; in others, weak leadership and failed institutions are to blame.	其中某些国家面临着臭名昭著的“资源诅咒”； 而另一些国家则需要由领导不力和机构运转不畅来承担责任。


It does not help that the vast majority (some 71%) of the 125 million people affected by conflicts and natural disasters reside in OIC countries.	受困于冲突和自然灾害的1. 25亿人中有绝大部分（约71%）生活在伊斯兰合作组织国家更加大了发展的难度。


Instability places enormous strain on national budgets.	局势动荡令国家财政预算承受着巨大的压力。


But these countries have options.	但这些国家并非无计可施。


In particular, the capital that has accumulated in some of the OIC countries’ financial systems could play an important role in helping them to meet their development goals – especially if Islamic finance is used to its full potential.	尤其是某些伊斯兰合作组织国家金融体系所积累的资本可以在实现发展目标过程中发挥重要作用——尤其是如果我们能将伊斯兰金融的作用发挥到极致。


Islamic finance has important advantages over conventional financial products.	伊斯兰金融拥有超越传统金融产品的重要优势。


Its prohibition of interest and requirement that investments be linked to the real economy, together with its approach to profit- and loss-sharing, add stability to the financial sector.	伊斯兰金融禁止收取利息、并要求投资用于实体经济，再加上其收益和损失分担的做法加大了金融行业的稳定度。


Islamic finance also can enhance financial inclusion, as it incorporates people who, for cultural or religious reasons, are excluded from the traditional financial system.	伊斯兰金融还可以增强金融包容性，因为它允许出于文化和宗教原因而被传统金融体系排除在外的民众共同参与。


This is perhaps one reason why Islamic finance has been expanding at 10-12% per year over the last decade or so.	这也许是过去10年左右伊斯兰金融一直以每年10-12%的速度递增的理由。


If Islamic finance is to play its full part in revitalizing and diversifying the economies of the OIC countries, governments will need to undertake important reforms.	要想让伊斯兰金融在振兴和实现伊斯兰合作组织国家经济多元化的过程中充分发挥作用，政府就必须落实重要的相关改革。


Topping the list is the need for stronger legal institutions that protect property rights and ensure that contracts are enforced.	首当其冲的是要制定执行力更强的法律制度来保护财产权并保障合同得以落实。


If people are to have full confidence in Islamic financial products, moreover, the industry will need to be standardized and regulated.	不仅如此，要想让人们对伊斯兰金融产品拥有充分的信心，就必须对行业进行标准化和规范管理。


National tax policies will also need to be tweaked, to prevent discrimination against Islamic financial instruments.	此外，还要对国家税收政策进行调整，以防止对伊斯兰金融工具有所歧视。


The World Bank Group is working with partners to help realize these reforms.	世界银行集团正在与伙伴国合作协助落实上述改革措施。


Furthermore, it has introduced investment projects that use Islamic financing across the region.	不仅如此，集团还在整个地区推出了采用伊斯兰融资方式的投资项目。


The World Bank Treasury has issued a variety of Islamic financial instruments, including two Sukuk (bonds that meet Islamic strictures on interest), which have raised $700 million.	世界银行财政部已经发行了不同种类的伊斯兰金融工具，包括两种伊斯兰债券（即利率完全符合伊斯兰标准的债券），目前总共完成了7亿美元的筹资。


Similarly, the Bank’s private-sector arm, the International Financial Corporation, has established the IFC Sukuk Company, which issued $100 million in trust certificates in 2015.	同样，世行的私营部门机构国际金融公司已经成立了国际金融公司（IFC）伊斯兰债券公司，并于2015年发行了1亿美元的信托证书。


The Bank’s political risk insurance arm, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), has provided a $427 million Sharia-compliant investment guarantee for an infrastructure project in Djibouti and $450 million in political risk insurance for a telecommunications investment in Indonesia.	世行的政治风险保障机构多边投资担保机构（MIGA）已经为吉布提某基础设施项目提供了4. 27亿美元符合伊斯兰教教法的投资担保服务，同时还为印度尼西亚的电信投资项目提供了价值4.


And, together with the Islamic Development Bank Group, the United Nations, and other donors, the World Bank has created a joint facility to assist the countries hardest hit by instability with concessional financing, which includes an Islamic-finance instrument for Lebanon and Jordan to help them bear the costs of supporting refugees from Syria.	5亿美元的政治风险保险。 而且世行与伊斯兰开发银行集团、联合国和其他捐助者合作设立了利用优惠投资协助遭遇最严重动荡打击的国家的一种联合机制，其中包括为黎巴嫩和约旦提供伊斯兰金融工具，以协助他们承担支持叙利亚难民所需的费用。


New technology can play a vital role in making financial systems more inclusive, particularly for groups that face greater barriers to access.	新技术可以让金融系统更具包容性，尤其当面对融资障碍较大的群体。


For example, some 90% of Syrian refugees have access to smart phones, through which they could access financial services.	举例来说，约90%的叙利亚难民拥有智能手机，他们可以利用这些终端来获取金融服务。


Efforts must be made to ensure that we make the most of such technologies.	必须努力确保我们最大限度的利用这些技术。


Finally, there are humanitarian objectives.	最后，还有人道主义目标需要满足。


And, indeed, work is already underway to address how waqf (charitable endowments), zakat (the obligatory alms tax), and a variety of Islamic financial instruments can be channeled effectively and efficiently to meet humanitarian needs.	而且事实上我们已经在努力引导教产（慈善捐赠）、天课（强制性的施舍税）和其他种类的伊斯兰金融工具以使其有效满足人道主义需求。


Islamic finance can help deliver much-needed solutions to the Muslim world’s development challenges.	伊斯兰金融可以为穆斯林世界发展问题提供迫切需要的解决方案。


Its ability to enhance financial stability, promote financial inclusion, and drive sustainable development could spark transformative change across the region.	伊斯兰金融增强稳定、推动金融包容及驱动可持续发展的潜力有可能引发整个地区的转型及变革。


To realize this potential, Islamic finance, no less than its conventional counterpart, needs an appropriate enabling environment, one characterized by a level playing field, an adequate regulatory framework, and effective partnerships.	为了发挥这一潜力，伊斯兰金融与传统金融形式一样，需要营造以竞争环境公平、监管框架适度和伙伴关系有效为特色的恰当的有利环境。


Islamic Finance Unbound	伊斯兰金融前景无限


WASHINGTON, DC – While uncertainty continues to roil global markets, driving many investors into full retreat, one part of the financial sector is expanding exponentially: Islamic-law-compliant financial assets have grown from about $5 billion in the late 1980’s to roughly $1.2 trillion in 2011.	华盛顿——不确定性依然在困扰全球市场，以至于许多投资者因此完全退出了市场，但金融部门中有一部分仍在指数扩张：符合伊斯兰教义的金融资产从20世纪八十年代末的50亿美元增长到了2011年的约1. 2万亿美元。


This asset class, which is characterized by shared risk between institutions and clients, avoided many of the most severe consequences of the global financial crisis that began in 2008.	这类资产的一大特征是由机构和客户共担风险，2008年全球危机爆发以来避免了诸多最严重的后果。


This resilience, along with several other key features, underpins the high performance and growing popularity of Islamic finance.	这一稳健性和其他几种重要特征一起，构成了伊斯兰金融表现卓越、日渐受到人们欢迎的基础。


The global financial crisis adversely affected a small number of Islamic financial institutions as the real economy contracted and some issuers of Islamic bonds defaulted.	由于实体经济收缩，一些伊斯兰债券发行者违约，全球金融危机也对伊斯兰金融机构造成了些许影响。


But the risk-sharing inherent to Islamic finance made such instruments more resistant to the first round of financial contagion that hit in 2008.	但伊斯兰金融固有的风险共担机制让金融机构在2008年首波金融危机袭来时更具抵抗力。


Leading economists, such as Harvard University’s Kenneth Rogoff, have suggested that Islamic finance demonstrates the advantages of more equity and risk-sharing over the conventional bias in favor of debt instruments.	哈佛大学的肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）等知名经济学家指出，伊斯兰金融表明，股权融资和风险共担要比在传统上更受偏爱的债务工具更有优势。


Several distinctive features have made Islamic financial institutions relatively stable throughout the crisis.	几大显著特征使伊斯兰金融在整个危机中显得相对较为稳定。


One such feature is that Islamic finance emphasizes asset-backing, thereby ensuring a direct link between financial transactions and real economic activities.	其中之一是伊斯兰金融强调资产支持，从而确保了金融交易和实体经济活动之间的直接联系。


Institutions’ savings and investment returns are closely linked, because they are determined by the real sector, not the financial sector.	机构的投资回报和其储蓄紧密相连，因为它们是由实体部门，而不是金融部门决定的。


This creates a flexible adjustment mechanism, should unanticipated shocks occur.	这创造了一个面对意料之外的冲击的灵活调整机制。


It also ensures that real asset and liability values are always equal, while prohibiting excessive leverage and several forms of complicated securitization.	这还保证了真实资产和债务价值永远相等，同时又制止了过度杠杆和各种各样的复杂证券化形式。


Moreover, Islamic finance is more equitable: lenders and borrowers share risks and rewards, which increases the focus on long-term goals and discourages excessive short-term risk-taking.	此外，伊斯兰金融还更加公平：贷款人和借款人共担风险和盈利，因此能够更关注长期目标，抑制了过度承担短期风险的行为。


In short, Islamic financial institutions treat their clients like business partners.	简言之，伊斯兰金融机构向业务伙伴那样对待客户。


They therefore have strong incentives to evaluate financing requests carefully, and to assist borrowers in bad times, thus reducing the pressure to sell assets at “fire-sale” prices and minimizing the likelihood of financial contagion.	因此，它们有很强的激励仔细评估融资要求，在坏光景降临时出手援助借款人，从而降低了“跳楼价”甩卖资产的压力，也让金融危机蔓延的可能性降到了最低。


Finally, the Islamic financial framework protects deposit balances, and prevents excessive credit growth.	最后，伊斯兰金融框架保护存款余额，也防止过度信用增长。


Islamic financial instruments are currently available in at least 70 countries, and today represent about 0.5% of global financial assets.	目前，伊斯兰金融工具已经打入了至少70个国家，占全球金融资产的约0. 5%。


But the prospects for continued rapid growth are strong.	但其有着强劲的持续快速增长前景。


In its November 2011 “Global Islamic Banking Report,” Deutsche Bank projects a 24% compounded annual growth rate in Islamic assets over the coming three years.	德意志银行2011年11月发布的《全球伊斯兰银行业务报告》预测，未来三年，伊斯兰资产的年复合增长率将达到24%。


There are five main reasons for this forecast:	这一预测是基于五大理由做出的：


·         Islamic finance offers savers and investors practical alternatives to conventional instruments.	·         伊斯兰金融为储蓄者和投资者提供了传统工具的实际替代品。


·         The quality of Islamic financial services is improving, and these services are not limited to particular clients.	·         伊斯兰金融服务的质量在改善，服务对象也不再局限于特定客户。


·         Conventional multinational financial institutions are increasingly offering Islamic assets, and there is growing interest in them in London, Luxembourg, and other world financial capitals.	·         传统跨国金融机构提供的伊斯兰资产越来越多，伦敦、卢森堡和其他国际金融中心对伊斯兰金融的兴趣也在增加。


·         The commodity boom in some Muslim countries has generated surpluses that need to be allocated through financial intermediaries and sovereign wealth funds.	·         商品繁荣使一些穆斯林国家得到了需要通过金融中介和主权财富基金汇集起来的盈余。


·         Islamic financial instruments can comply with sharia – Islam’s moral code and religious law – as well as send signals of change compatible with recent developments in several Muslim-majority countries.	·         伊斯兰金融工具需要既能遵守伊斯兰教义（即伊斯兰世界的道德标准和宗教法律），也传递了与不少以穆斯林为主体民族的国家的近期发展形势相符的变化信号。


But realizing the potential of Islamic finance requires strong supervisory oversight.	但实现伊斯兰金融的潜力需要强大的监管。


Financial institutions need to enhance pre-lending screening and post-borrowing monitoring.	金融机构需要加强贷款前检查和借款后监测。


It is also problematic that, in many countries, debt receives advantageous tax treatment, which favors leverage over equity and profit/loss-sharing arrangements.	另一个问题是，在许多国家，债务偿付要优先于税收，因此杠杆要比股权和盈亏共担安排更具吸引力。


This should change.	这需要有所改变。


Moreover, mortgages, mutual insurance, leasing, and microfinance are underdeveloped in Islamic finance; insolvency and bankruptcy procedures must be improved; and mechanisms to deal with “Islamic bond” defaults must be established.	此外，按揭、互助保险、租赁和微观金融在伊斯兰金融中还不发达； 资不抵债和破产程序必须有所改进；


Finally, Islamic financial institutions must address concerns about liquidity-risk management, compliance with Basel III (the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s most recent global regulatory standard), international accounting standards, and corporate governance.	应对“伊斯兰债券”违约的机制也必须设立。 最后，伊斯兰金融机构必须解决好对流动性风险管理的担忧，执行巴塞尔III（即巴塞尔银行监督委员会最新的全球监管标准）、国际会计准则和公司治理。


While recent reports emphasize the size and growth of Islamic financial assets and instruments, it is the quality of services, continued financial innovation, and sound risk-management practices that will ultimately define their success.	最近的报告强调了伊斯兰资产和工具的规模和增长，但归根到底，决定伊斯兰金融成功与否的还是服务质量、持续的金融创新和扎实的风险管理实践。


By addressing its shortcomings, Islamic finance could encourage inclusive growth in many developing countries.	如果能够克服这些短处，伊斯兰金融将有助于大量发展中国家的普惠增长。


If Islamic finance can resolve key regulatory and corporate-governance issues, it has the potential to meet more people’s banking and investment needs, expand its reach, and contribute to greater financial stability and inclusion in the developing world.	如果伊斯兰金融能够解决关键性监管和公司治理问题，是有潜力满足更多人的银行和投资业务需求、扩张业务、并助推发展中国家的金融稳定和普及的。


That is something that everyone should welcome.	所有人都欢迎这样的进步。


Islamicizing Malaysia	马来西亚的伊斯兰化


Malaysian society is now gripped by a fundamental question: is the country, which is more than half Muslim, an Islamic state?	马来西亚社会现在面临一个根本性的问题，那就是，马来西亚的人口一半以上是穆斯林，国家是否是一个穆斯林国家呢？


In practice, various religious and ethnic groups give Malaysia a distinctly multi-cultural character.	在实践上，不同的宗教和种族团体赋予马来西亚独特的多元文化特性。


But the Malaysian constitution provides room for arguments on both sides of the question, and the relatively secular status quo is facing a serious challenge.	但是，马来西亚宪法却给问题的双方都提供了论证的空间，而相对世俗的现状正在面临严重的挑战。


Drafted by a group of experts in 1957, under the auspices of the country’s former British rulers, the constitution includes two seemingly contradictory clauses.	这一宪法在1957年由一群专家在该国的前英国统治者的帮助下起草。 该宪法包含两条看起来矛盾的条款。


On the one hand, Article 3 states that Islam is the religion of the federation, and that only Islam can be preached to Muslims.	一方面，第三条规定伊斯兰教是马来西亚邦联的国教，而且只能向穆斯林宣扬伊斯兰教。


On the other hand, Article 11 guarantees freedom of religion for all.	另一方面，第十一条又保证所有人的宗教自由。


As a result, Malaysia has developed both a general civil code, which is applied universally, and Islamic law, which is applied only to Muslims in personal and family matters.	结果，马来西亚制定了一部全民适用的民法总则以及只在人身和家庭问题上适用于穆斯林的伊斯兰法律。


Recently, however, some Muslim groups have pressed the government to proclaim Malaysia an Islamic state, on the basis of Article 3 and the Muslims’ population majority.	但是最近，某些穆斯林团体给政府施加压力，要求根据宪法第三条的规定以及穆斯林占人口多数宣布马来西亚为伊斯兰国家。


Ultimately, they would like Malaysia to be governed by Islamic law.	最终，他们想让马来西亚接受伊斯兰法律的管治。


For years, there was little need to resolve this constitutional issue.	多年来，没有什么必要来解决这一宪法问题。


For example, if a Muslim decided to renounce his faith, the matter would be handled outside the legal system, or conversion records would be sealed.	例如，如果一个穆斯林决定放弃其信仰，那么，这一问题将会在法律体系外得到处理，否则转变信仰的记录将会被封存。


Today, however, every Malaysian must declare a religious affiliation, which is registered with the government – a requirement that has made it difficult for a Muslim to leave Islam without formalizing the change of status through the legal process.	但是如今，每个马来西亚人都必须申报宗教归属并在政府登记。 这一要求使得穆斯林在不通过法律手续完成现状的改变而脱离伊斯兰非常困难。


The country is now riveted on the fate of ordinary citizens like sales assistant Lina Joy and former religious teacher Kamariah Ali, who are trying to change their religious affiliation through the legal system.	该国现在都在关注像销售助理卓伊和前宗教教员阿里等普通公民的命运。 他们正在试图通过法律体系改变其宗教归属。


Muslim professional organizations and the Islamic opposition political party hold the view that renunciation of Islam is punishable by death.	穆斯林的专业组织和伊斯兰反对党认为，放弃伊斯兰信仰应处以死刑。


Likewise, the defense by Malaysian civil reform movements of individuals’ freedom of conscience has been denounced by some religious leaders as an attack on Islam.	同样，某些宗教领导人把马来西亚公民改革运动为个人信仰自由谴责为对伊斯兰的攻击。


Currently, Malaysia has no law that would impose the death penalty on apostates.	目前，马来西亚对于背离宗教者并无法律规定判处死刑。


Yet public movements have been formed to highlight this Islamic tenet.	但是，人们组织了公众运动来突出这一伊斯兰教义。


If it is not applied, the argument goes, there will be a massive exodus of Muslims to other faiths.	他们争论说，如果不实行这一教义，将会有大规模的穆斯林转向其他信仰。


The immediate goal is to keep the courts from allowing Lina Joy or Kamariah Ali to convert.	当前的目标就是防止法院允许卓伊或阿里转变信仰。


Attempts by other democratic civil society groups to debate this issue in peaceful public forums have been thwarted by threats of violence from a coalition of Muslim non-governmental organizations calling themselves BADAI (the Malay acronym for Coalition against the Inter-Faith Commission).	一个自称是反对信仰转移委员会的穆斯林非政府组织破坏了其他民主社会公民团体在和平的公众场合辩论这一问题的企图。


Concerned about sparking an ethnic clash, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has proclaimed a ban on open discussion of these issues, threatening to arrest Internet news providers and activists if they continue to fan such debates.	总理巴达维担心触发种族冲突而宣布禁止在公开场合讨论这些问题，并且威胁，如果互联网新闻供应者以及活动分子继续煽动此类的辩论的话，就将逮捕他们。


Badawi is right to be worried.	巴达维担心是有道理的。


Since independence, national politics in Malaysia has reinforced group identity, especially among ethnic Malays, an exclusively Muslim community.	自从国家独立以来，马来西亚的国家政治强化了团体身份特征，特别是在全部都是穆斯林社区的原始马来种族。


Identity politics allowed ethnic Malays to assert their claims to control over land, language, and religion.	身份政治允许原始马来人对土地、语言以及宗教实行控制。


All attempts to reduce Malay influence serve to mobilize this community – in both ethnic and religious terms.	试图降低马来人影响的企图只会在种族和宗教方面调动起这一社区。


Malay politicians have learned how to play this card very effectively.	马来政客们已经学会如何有效地打这张牌。


Ethnic Malays’ special status has long been codified in affirmative action policies giving them special economic benefits.	原始马来人的特殊地位长久以来规定在了肯定行动政策中。 这些政策赋予他们特殊的经济利益。


However, as Malaysia engages with the global economy, these privileges may eventually be removed in order to heighten the country’s competitiveness.	但是，随着马来西亚参与到全球经济之中，这些特权有可能会最终被取消，以便提高国家的竞争力。


As a result, many Malay-Muslims increasingly worry about the loss of familiar economic and political safeguards.	结果，许多马来穆斯林越发担心失去熟悉的经济和政治保障。


In particular, tensions have grown between the Malay majority and the country’s large Chinese minority, which has been quicker to benefit from Malaysia’s economic opening to the world.	特别是，占人口多数的马来人和该国最大的少数华人族裔之间的紧张关系已经增加。 华裔更快地从马来西亚经济对外开放中受益。


Moreover, efforts to Islamicize the state comes at a time when conflict in the Middle East has further politicized Muslim movements in Malaysia.	而且，将国家伊斯兰化的企图发生在中东冲突进一步将马来西亚的穆斯林运动政治化大的当口。


They view themselves as counter-forces to cultural domination by the West, asserting their religious identity in the face of what they regard as imperializing ideas like secularism and human rights.	他们自认为是西方文化统治的反抗力量，并且面对他们所认为的例如世俗主义和人权等帝国主义化观念时伸张他们的宗教身份特征。


Small disputes are magnified by this underlying conflict.	这一根本性冲突加剧了小的争议。


Disagreements are increasingly depicted as being rooted in an East-West divide, as a struggle between believers and apostates.	人们越发将观点不同视为植根于东西方之间的分歧以及信仰者和改换信仰者之间的斗争。


Many Muslims are wary of this brand of identity politics.	许多穆斯林都唯恐这种身份政治标签。


They recognize that the intolerance of Islamist groups can easily be turned against moderate Muslims.	他们认识到穆斯林团体的不宽容可能会轻易地对温和派穆斯林不利。


But all Malaysians must learn how to manage pressures that seem to be pushing their country’s constituent communities away from one another.	但是，所有的马来西亚人都应该学习如何处理看起来将该国组成部分的社区离间的压力。


Defending a multi-cultural national identity in the face of religious intolerance is thus the great challenge facing Malaysia’s state and society.	因此，在宗教不宽容当情况下捍卫多元文化的国家特征是马来西亚国家和社会面临的巨大挑战。


Ending Blowback Terrorism	结束反弹式恐怖主义


NEW YORK – Terrorist attacks on civilians, whether the downing over Sinai of a Russian aircraft killing 224 civilian passengers, the horrific Paris massacre claiming 129 innocent lives, or the tragic bombing in Ankara that killed 102 peace activists, are crimes against humanity.	纽约——对平民的恐怖袭击，无论是在西奈半岛上空击落俄罗斯飞机杀害224名平民乘客、恐怖的巴黎大屠杀夺走129条无辜生命，还是对安卡拉的悲剧性轰炸，炸死102名和平积极份子，都是对于人类的犯罪。


Their perpetrators – in this case, the Islamic State (ISIS) – must be stopped.	这些恐怖事件的肇事者——这次是伊斯兰国（ISIS）——必须被制止。


Success will require a clear understanding of the roots of this ruthless network of jihadists.	要想成功实现这一目标需要对该残酷圣战分子网络的根源取得清醒的认识。


Painful as it is to admit, the West, especially the United States, bears significant responsibility for creating the conditions in which ISIS has flourished.	虽然承认现实非常痛苦，但西方、尤其是美国，对创造伊斯兰国蓬勃发展的条件负有重大责任。


Only a change in US and European foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East can reduce the risk of further terrorism.	只有改变美国和欧洲的中东政策才能缓和进一步的恐怖主义危险。


The recent attacks should be understood as “blowback terrorism”: a dreadful unintended result of repeated US and European covert and overt military actions throughout the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia that aimed to overthrow governments and install regimes compliant with Western interests.	最近的袭击应当被理解为“反弹式恐怖主义”：即美欧在整个中东、北非、非洲之角和中亚地区一再开展隐蔽和公开军事行动，推翻政府并扶植符合西方利益的政权所造成的可怕的意外后果。


These operations have not only destabilized the targeted regions, causing great suffering; they have also put populations in the US, the European Union, Russia, and the Middle East at significant risk of terror.	上述行动不仅破坏了目标区域的稳定并造成极大痛苦； 也使得美国、欧盟、俄罗斯和中东民众面临严重的恐怖威胁。


The public has never really been told the true history of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, or the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.	有关本·拉登、基地组织或伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国崛起的历史真相从未被告知公众。


Starting in 1979, the CIA mobilized, recruited, trained, and armed Sunni young men to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.	从1979年开始，中央情报局动员、招募、训练和武装逊尼派男青年在阿富汗与苏联作战。


The CIA recruited widely from Muslim populations (including in Europe) to form the Mujahideen, a multinational Sunni fighting force mobilized to oust the Soviet infidel from Afghanistan.	中情局广泛招募穆斯林民众（包括欧洲的穆斯林民众）组成圣战游击队，这是一支由多国组成的逊尼派战斗部队，目的是将苏联异教徒赶出阿富汗。


Bin Laden, from a wealthy Saudi family, was brought in to help lead and co-finance the operation.	来自富有沙特家族的本·拉登被招募协助领导和支持相关行动。


This was typical of CIA operations: relying on improvised funding through a wealthy Saudi family and proceeds from local smuggling and the narcotics trade.	这是典型的中情局做法：依赖通过富有沙特家庭和当地走私及毒品贸易提供的即兴资金。


By promoting the core vision of a jihad to defend the lands of Islam (Dar al-Islam) from outsiders, the CIA produced a hardened fighting force of thousands of young men displaced from their homes and stoked for battle.	通过构建圣战捍卫伊斯兰领土免受外来侵略的核心愿景，中情局招募的成千上万年轻人组成了一支强硬的战斗力量，这些在战争中流离失所的年轻人渴望参与战斗。


It is this initial fighting force – and the ideology that motivated it – that today still forms the basis of the Sunni jihadist insurgencies, including ISIS.	正是这支最初的战斗部队——及其背后的意识形态——今天依然构成逊尼派圣战叛乱分子的基础，其中也包括伊斯兰国。


While the jihadists’ original target was the Soviet Union, today the “infidel” includes the US, Europe (notably France and the United Kingdom), and Russia.	虽然圣战份子最初的目标是苏联，但今天的“异教徒”包括美国、欧洲（尤其是法国和英国）以及俄罗斯。


At the end of the 1980s, with the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, some elements of the Mujahideen morphed into Al Qaeda, Arabic for “the base,” which referred to the military facilities and training grounds in Afghanistan built for the Mujahideen by bin Laden and the CIA.	20世纪80年代末，随着苏联从阿富汗撤军，圣战部队的某些单位演变成为基地组织（阿拉伯语意为“基地”），指的是由本·拉登和中情局在阿富汗建造的训练场地和军事设施。


After the Soviet withdrawal, the term Al Qaeda shifted meaning from the specific military base to the organizational base of jihadist activities.	苏联撤军后，基地一词从代指某个具体军事基地转而代指组织圣战活动的大本营。


Blowback against the US began in 1990 with the first Gulf War, when the US created and expanded its military bases in the Dar al-Islam, most notably in Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s founding and holiest sites.	对美国的反击始于20世纪90年代第一次海湾战争后，当时美国创建并扩大了其在伊斯兰领土上的军事基地，尤其是在创建伊斯兰教并拥有众多圣地的沙特阿拉伯。


This expanded US military presence was anathema to the core jihadist ideology that the CIA had done so much to foster.	上述美国军力扩张是对中情局竭力培养的核心圣战意识形态的诅咒。


America’s unprovoked war on Iraq in 2003 unleashed the demons.	2003年美国对伊拉克的无端战争释放了恶魔。


Not only was the war itself launched on the basis of CIA lies; it also aimed to create a Shia-led regime subservient to the US and anathema to the Sunni jihadists and the many more Sunni Iraqis who were ready to take up arms.	不仅战争本身建立在中情局谎言的基础之上； 并且旨在建立屈从于美国的什叶派主导政权，并因此激起了准备拿起武器的逊尼派圣战份子和更多逊尼派伊拉克民众的愤怒。


More recently, the US, France, and the UK toppled Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, and the US worked with the Egyptian generals who ousted the elected Muslim Brotherhood government.	近年来，美国、法国和英国推翻了利比亚的卡扎菲政府，并且美国的合作者还包括驱逐民选穆斯林兄弟会政府的埃及将军。


In Syria, following President Bashar al-Assad’s violent suppression of peaceful public protests in 2011, the US, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other regional allies helped to foment a military insurgency that has pushed the country into a downward spiral of chaos and violence.	在叙利亚总统阿萨德2011年暴力镇压和平公众抗议后，美国、沙特、土耳其和其他地区盟友协助煽动了一次军事叛乱，并将利比亚推入到混乱和暴力的恶性循环当中。


Such operations have failed – repeatedly and frequently disastrously – to produce legitimate governments or even rudimentary stability.	上述行动一再经历灾难性失败，无法产生合法的政府甚至最基本的稳定。


On the contrary, by upending established, albeit authoritarian, governments in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and destabilizing Sudan and other parts of Africa deemed hostile to the West, they have done much to fuel chaos, bloodshed, and civil war.	相反，通过颠覆伊拉克、利比亚和叙利亚虽然独裁、但却稳固的政府，动摇被认为敌视西方的苏丹和非洲其他地区的稳定，它们在很大程度上助长了混乱、流血和内战。


It is this turmoil that has enabled ISIS to capture and defend territory in Syria, Iraq, and parts of North Africa.	正是这样的混乱导致伊斯兰国得以占领并捍卫叙利亚、伊拉克和北非的部分地区。


Three steps are needed to defeat ISIS and other violent jihadists.	需要分三步来击败伊斯兰国和其他暴力圣战分子。


First, US President Barack Obama should pull the plug on CIA covert operations.	首先，美国总统奥巴马应该停止中情局的秘密行动。


The use of the CIA as a secret army of destabilization has a long, tragic history of failure, all hidden from public view under the agency’s cloak of secrecy.	利用中情局作为破坏稳定的秘密部队有着漫长、悲惨的失败史，但这些失败在中情局的秘密外衣掩盖下不为公众所知。


Ending CIA-caused mayhem would go far to staunch the instability, violence, and anti-Western hatred that fuels today’s terrorism.	结束中情局所造成的混乱能够在很大程度上制止刺激当今恐怖主义的动荡、暴力和反西方仇恨。


Second, the US, Russia, and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should immediately stop their infighting and establish a framework for Syrian peace.	第二，美国、俄罗斯和联合国安理会其他常任理事国应立即停止内讧并建立叙利亚和平框架。


They have a shared and urgent stake in confronting ISIS; all are victims of the terror.	抗击伊斯兰国符合他们共同的迫切利益； 所有国家都是恐怖主义的受害者。


Moreover, military action against ISIS can succeed only with the legitimacy and backing of the UN Security Council.	此外，针对伊斯兰国的军事行动只有在联合国安理会的合法支持下才能成功。


The UN framework should include an immediate end to the insurgency against Assad that the US, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have pursued; a Syrian cease-fire; a UN-mandated military force to confront ISIS; and a political transition in Syria dictated not by the US, but by a UN consensus to support a non-violent political reconstruction.	组建联合国授权的对抗伊斯兰国的部队； 以及由支持非暴力政治重建的联合国共识、而非美国主导的叙利亚政治过渡进程。


Finally, the long-term solution to regional instability lies in sustainable development.	最后，可持续发展才是地区动荡的长久解决之道。


The entire Middle East is beset not only by wars but also by deepening development failures: intensifying fresh water stress, desertification, high youth unemployment, poor educational systems, and other serious blockages.	困扰整个中东的既有战争又有不断深化的发展失败：越来越严重的淡水紧张、荒漠化、青年失业率过高、糟糕的教育体系和其他严重的发展障碍。


More wars – especially CIA-backed, Western-led wars – will solve nothing.	更多战争——尤其是由中情局支持、西方主导的战争——解决不了任何问题。


By contrast, a surge of investment in education, health, renewable energy, agriculture, and infrastructure, financed both from within the region and globally, is the real key to building a more stable future for the Middle East and the world.	相反，区域和全球资本加大对教育、医疗、可再生能源、农业和基础设施的投资才是为中东和世界建设更稳定未来的真正关键所在。


Democracy’s Missing Meaning	民主逸义


NEW YORK – The decision to abandon relative peace and prosperity for brutal war and instability may seem irrational.	纽约—放弃相对和平与繁荣，追求残酷战争与动荡的决定看起来不合理性。


But young people, born and raised in democratic societies, have increasingly been yielding to the appeal of death-dealing groups like the Islamic State, leaving their homes and families to wage jihad in faraway places.	但生长于民主社会的年轻人越来越多地响应伊斯兰国等亡命集团的感召，离开家园和家庭前往万里之外参加圣战。


Why has democracy lost the allegiance of these restless spirits, and how can it recapture the hearts and minds of others who would follow suit?	民主是如何失去这些鲁莽灵魂的忠诚的？ 应该如何重新赢得可能效而仿之的人的人心？


The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote that humans would rather will nothingness than not will anything at all.	哲学家尼采曾经写道，人宁可追求虚无，也不可一无所求。


The leaden despair of lifelessness, impotence, and hopelessness is vastly less appealing than intensity – even if that intensity is found in violence, death, and destruction.	对生活的沉重的绝望、能力缺失和失去希望，这些东西的吸引力远远比不上热衷（intensity）——哪怕这种热衷是由暴力、死亡和破坏提供的。


In short, it is a matter of meaningfulness, the presence of which motivates us, connects us to one another, and orders our lives.	简言之，这是一个意义（meaningfulness）的问题，这个问题的存在驱使着我们，让我们与其他人联系起来，也主宰着我们的生活。


If it is missing – if, say, democratic ideals and institutions are failing to provide a palpable enough sense of community and purpose – people seek a sense of meaning elsewhere, which in some cases leads them to malevolent causes.	如果失去了意义——比如，如果民主理想和制度无法提供足够多的共同感和使命感——人们就会到其他地方去寻找意义的感觉，有时候，这导致他们走上邪路。


This is the cultural challenge facing democracy today, and those who wish to maintain the freedom and promise of democratic societies ignore it at their peril.	这就是今天的民主所面临的文化挑战，那些渴望保持自由和民主社会的承诺的人如果忽视这一挑战，就会付出代价。


It is a challenge that should be recognized not only for what it says about living conditions in advanced democratic countries worldwide, but also because any crisis is also an opportunity – in this case, to recapture the meaning that lies at the heart of democracy.	这一挑战不应该只是对全球发达民主国家生活环境的论断，它之所以是挑战，也是因为一切危机同时也是机会——在这个问题上，是重获民主核心意义的机会。


The appeal of groups like the Islamic State to young people reared in democratic countries highlights these societies’ growing disparities in educational and economic opportunity, which are breeding cynicism, resignation, and anger among those who find themselves locked out of the social elite.	伊斯兰国等组织的感召在民主国家的年轻人中吸引力大增，这凸显出这些社会教育和经济机会日益不平等的问题，这催生了被发现自己被排除在社会精英群体之外的人的犬儒主义、逆来顺受和愤怒。


Feelings of hopelessness and despair at the center incite extremism at the fringes.	中央的无望和绝望的感觉带来了边缘的极端主义。


Elites in the advanced democracies – say, the top 1% of income earners – can hardly take comfort from such conditions.	发达民主国家的精英——比如收入分配中最顶尖的1%——无法在这样的环境中心安理得。


Even the most insular globetrotter, flitting from one market or cultural playground to another, must consider their children.	即使是最特立独行的环球旅行家，不断地从一个市场或文化背景切换到另一个的人，也必须为他们的孩子着想。


What culture will they absorb?	他们会吸收怎样的文化？


From where will they derive their sense of hope for the future?	他们从哪里产生对未来的希望的感觉？


Defenders of democracy must now determine not only how to create jobs and ensure material prosperity for today’s young people, but also how to feed their souls on the way.	民主卫士现在不但必须决定如何为当代青年创造就业岗位和确保物质繁荣，还必须决定在此过程中如何培养他们的灵魂。


If they fail, as we have seen, others will fill the void, potentially with a call for mayhem in the name of messianic futurity.	如果他们失败——如我们已经看到的——那么其他人就会趁虚而入，可能打着救世主的未来的旗号行残暴之实。


To win this high-stakes contest, democratic societies must look beyond battlefield victory and focus on winning hearts and minds through the power of ideas and the promise of meaningfulness – just as the Islamic State has done.	要赢得这场赌注巨大的竞争，民主社会必须着眼于战场胜利之外，关注通过思想的力量和意义的承诺赢得人心——伊斯兰国就是这么做的。


The notion that democracies can fend off such forces, with their well-resourced and media-savvy ideological apparatuses, with guns alone is a sure loser.	认为民主用枪炮就可以抵挡这股力量，抵挡住它们资源雄厚、精于传播的意识形态攻势，这是大错特错的。


This is a battle of meanings, and it can be won only with ideas that inspire hope, action, and coherence of self and community.	这是一场意义的战争，只能通过刺激希望、行动和个体和社会凝聚力的思想取胜。


The effort should begin with a publicly commissioned gathering of a broad cross-section of political scientists, anthropologists, theologians, philosophers, and artists, among others, from across the political spectrum, convened from universities and similar institutions around the world. Over a predetermined period, they would produce a clear, plainly written report to the public.	首先，我们应该组成一个由各政治流派的政治学家、人类学家、神学家、哲学家、艺术家和其他人所组成的靠开的组织，从全球各所大学和类似机构汇聚人才，由他们根据计划安排撰写面向公众、通俗意赅的报告。


The report should address, tenaciously and honestly, key questions about democracy’s vitality today.	该报告应该深入、诚实地解决关于当代民主活力的关键问题。


What lies at the wellsprings of democratic life?	民主生活的源泉是什么？


How is it best expressed, performed, instituted, and safeguarded?	如何做好地表达、表现、创立和捍卫民主？


What is democracy’s best message of hope, and its most credible promise of future flourishing?	民主对于未来的最好的表述是什么？ 它对未来繁荣的最可信承诺是什么？


What are the deep cultural, intellectual, and spiritual sources for freedom, tolerance, and productivity?	自由、包容和生产率的深层次文化、知识和精神根源是什么？


We live in a dangerous time.	我们生活在一个危险的时代。


With democratic ideals under threat around the world, including within democratic countries, their shared cultural and ideological foundations cannot be taken for granted.	全球民主理想都在受到威胁，包括在民主国家内部，因此，我们的共同文化和意识形态基础绝不是天上掉下来的。


The meaning and vitality of life in a democracy cannot be allowed to fade.	民主国家的生活的意义和活力绝不容削弱。


The challenge ahead demands a concerted response from our deepest thinkers and most creative artists.	我们所面临的挑战需要我们最深邃的思想家和最有创造力的艺术家联合起来面对。 这就是我们今天的目标；


This is our purpose today; we must commit ourselves to it as passionately as democracy’s enemies pursue theirs.	我们必须充满激情地致力于这一目标，就像民主的敌人那样充满激情地致力于它们的���标。


Blinded By ISIS	被伊斯兰国所蒙蔽


MADRID – The general consensus emerging since last month’s carnage in Paris seems to be that the Islamic State (ISIS) can be defeated only by a ground invasion of its “state.”	马德里——上个月巴黎大屠杀后刚刚达成的共识似乎是唯有依靠地面入侵才能打败伊斯兰国（ISIS）。


This is a delusion.	这其实是种错觉。


Even if the West and its local allies (the Kurds, the Syrian opposition, Jordan, and other Sunni Arab countries) could agree about who would provide the bulk of ground troops, ISIS has already reshaped its strategy.	即使西方国家及其当地盟友（库尔德人、叙利亚反对派、约旦和其他逊尼派阿拉伯国家）能就由谁提供大量地面部队达成一致，伊斯兰国也已经调整了自己的战略。


It is now a global organization with local franchised groups capable of wreaking havoc in Western capitals.	它现在已经成为能在西方国家造成严重破坏且拥有当地授权的全球性组织。


In fact, ISIS has always been a symptom of a deeper malady.	事实上，伊斯兰国不过是深层次问题的表象而已。


Disintegration in the Arab Middle East reflects the region’s failure to find a path between the bankrupt, secular nationalism that has dominated its state system since independence and a radical brand of Islam at war with modernity.	阿拉伯中东地区的分裂反映出该地区在独立后一直主导其国家体制的破产的世俗民族主义和与现代化为敌的激进伊斯兰教派之间找不到出路。


The fundamental problem consists in an existential struggle between utterly dysfunctional states and an obscenely savage brand of theocratic fanaticism.	根本问题在于完全无法正常运转的国家和政教合一、极度野蛮的狂热势力间存在不可调和的冲突。