The Republicans will ride the beast they created – and hope that it does not consume them.	共和党人要驯服这头他们自己制造的猛兽——但希望他们最终不会被这头猛兽吃掉。


Donald Trump and the Sense of Power	唐纳德·特朗普和力量感


NEW HAVEN – US President-elect Donald Trump campaigned in part on a proposal to cut taxes dramatically for those with high incomes, a group whose members often have elite educations as well.	纽黑文—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普胜选的部分原因在于他提出要为高收入者大幅减税，而这一人群往往接受过精英教育。


And yet his most enthusiastic support tended to come from those with average and stagnating incomes and low levels of education.	但他最热烈的支持往往来自收入平常而停滞不前，并且教育程度较低的人。


Trump’s victory clearly appears to stem from a sense of economic powerlessness, or a fear of losing power, among his supporters.	特朗普的胜利显然来自其支持者的经济无力感，或者说对失去力量的恐惧。


To them, his simple slogan, “Make America great again,” sounds like “Make YOU great again”: economic power will be given to the multitudes, without taking anything away from the already successful.	对他们来说，特朗普简单的口号——“让美国重新伟大”听起来就好像是“让你重新伟大”：芸芸众生将获得经济力量，而已经获得成功的人不会失去任何东西。


Those on the downside of rising economic inequality generally do not want government policies that look like handouts.	经济不平等性加剧的受害者一般不待见看起来像是施舍的政府政策。


They typically do not want the government to make the tax system more progressive, to impose punishing taxes on the rich, in order to give the money to them. Redistribution feels demeaning.	他们通常不想然给政府让税收制度变得更加累进，对富人征收惩罚性税收，通过这样来为他们发钱。


It feels unstable. It feels like being trapped in a relationship of dependency, one that might collapse at any moment.	再分配令人感觉羞耻，感觉像是被贴上了失败者的标签，感觉不稳定，感觉陷入了一种随时可能崩溃的依赖关系。


The desperately poor may accept handouts, because they feel they have to.	赤贫者可能接受施舍，因为他们觉得必须这样做。


For those who consider themselves at least middle class, however, anything that smacks of a handout is not desired.	但是，对那些自认为至少是中产阶级的人来说，带有施舍味道的东西都令人唯恐避之不及。


Instead, they want their economic power back.	相反，他们想要赢回他们的经济力量。


They want to be in control of their economic lives.	他们想要控制他们的生计。


In the twentieth century, communists politicized economic inequality, but they made sure that their agenda could in no way be interpreted as creating alms or charity for the less successful.	在二十世纪，共产党将经济不平等政治化，但他们确保了他们的日程绝不会被解读为向不太成功者施舍或做慈善。


It was fundamentally important that communists take power by a revolution, in which workers unite, take action, and feel empowered.	一个基本要点是共产党通过革命夺权，在革命中，工人联合起来行动，并感到被赋予了力量。


Trump supporters call his triumph a revolution, too, though the violence – at least by the campaign itself – was limited to name-calling and insults.	特朗普支持者也将他的胜利称为革命，尽管其中的暴力——至少从选战本身角度讲——仅限于指名道姓的攻讦和羞辱。


It was still nasty enough, apparently, to inspire those of his supporters who interpret aggressiveness as evidence of power.	但这显然已经足以令将咄咄逼人视为力量的证明的特朗普支持者感到不悦，激发了他们的斗志。


It is certainly not just in America that people desire a sense of vocational accomplishment, rather than simply money to live on.	显然，不仅是美国人向往职业成就感，而不仅仅是赖以生活的金钱。


In no country does it feel generally right to respond to rising economic inequality by imposing heavy taxes on the rich and transferring the money to others.	没有一个国家认为用对富人课以重税并将税金转移支付给其他人来作为不平等性加剧的应对之道是大体正确的。


That feels like changing the rules of the game after it has been played.	这种感觉就好像是在游戏玩完后再更改规则。


In their recent book Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe, Kenneth Scheve of Stanford and David Stasavage of New York University use two centuries of data on tax rates and on income inequality to examine outcomes in 20 countries.	在近著《对富人课税：美国和欧洲财政公平史》（Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe）中，纽约大学的肯尼斯·谢夫（Kenneth Scheve）和大卫·斯塔萨维奇（David Stasavage）用两个世纪以来的税率和收入不平等性数据考察了20多个国家的结果。


They found that there was little or no tendency for governments to make taxes more progressive when pretax inequality increased.	他们发现，政府不存在或极少存在当税前不平等加剧时增加税收的累进性的倾向。


Katherine Cramer, author of The Politics of Resentment, gained some insight into this outcome in Wisconsin, where, like Trump, the state’s governor, Scott Walker, has been popular among working-class voters.	《怨恨政治学》（The Politics ofResentment）一书的作者凯瑟琳·克莱默（Katherine Cramer）在威斯康辛州获得了关于这一结果的一些洞见。


After he was elected in 2010, Walker cut taxes on higher incomes, refused to raise the state minimum wage above the federally-mandated minimum, and rejected the insurance exchanges created by President Barack Obama’s signature 2010 health-care reform, which would benefit lower-income people.	与特朗普一样，威斯康辛州州长斯科特·沃尔克（Scott Walker）十分受工作阶级选民欢迎。 2010年当选州长后，沃尔克降低了高收入者的税收，拒绝将州最低工资提高到联邦规定水平线之上，也拒绝了依照奥巴马总统签署的、有利于较低收入人群的2010年医疗改革建立的保险交易所。


Instead, Walker promised measures that would take power away from labor unions, actions that usually are perceived as likely to lower working class incomes.	相反，沃尔克承诺采取降低工会权力的措施，这样的行动通常被认为可能降低工作阶级的收入。


Cramer interviewed rural working-class voters in Wisconsin, trying to understand why they supported Walker.	克莱默采访了威斯康辛州农村地区的工作阶级，试图理解他们为什么支持沃尔克。


Her interviewees stressed their rural values and commitment to hard work, which have been a source of personal pride and identity.	她的受访者强调农村价值观和努力工作的保证，而这正是自尊和身份的源泉。


But they also stressed their sense of powerlessness against those perceived as unfairly advantaged.	但他们也强调，他们面对被认为是不公平地获得优势的人的无力感。


She concluded that their support for Walker, amid evidence of economic decline, reflected their extreme anger and resentment toward privileged people in big cities, who, before Walker, had ignored them, except to tax them.	她认定，他们在经济衰退确定无疑的情况下支持沃尔克反映了他们对大城市特权人群的极端愤怒和怨恨，在沃尔克当选之前，这群特权人士忽视他们，只有在征税时才想起他们。


And their taxes went, in part, to pay for government employees’ health insurance and pension plans, benefits that they themselves often could not afford.	而他们的税收一部分被用于支付政府雇员医疗保险和养老金这些他们自身通常无力承担的福利。


They wanted power and recognition, which Walker seemed to offer them.	他们想要力量和承认，而沃尔克能够给他们这些东西。


Such voters are also almost certainly anxious about the effect of rapidly rising information technology on jobs and incomes.	这些选民也几乎肯定在焦虑信息科技的迅速崛起对就业和收入的影响。


Economically successful people today tend to be those who are technologically savvy, not those living in rural Wisconsin (or rural anywhere).	如今，经济成功人士往往是那些技术强人，而不是威斯康辛（或其他任何地方）的农民。


These working-class voters feel a loss of economic optimism; yet, admiring their own people and upholding their values, they want to stay where they are.	这些工作阶级选民感到不再具备经济乐观； 但是，他们热爱自己的人民，坚守自己的价值观，希望能够维持自己的地位。


Trump speaks these voters’ language; but his proposals to date do not seem to address the underlying shift in power.	特朗普是这些选民的代言人； 但迄今为止他的方案似乎并不能解决最基本的力量变迁。


He stresses cutting domestic taxes, which he asserts will unleash a new flurry of entrepreneurism, and renegotiating trade deals in a protectionist direction, to keep jobs in America.	他强调降低国内税收，宣称这将释放新一波企业家精神； 他提出要以保护主义方向重新谈判贸易协议，让就业机会留在美国。


But such policies are unlikely to shift economic power to those who have been relatively less successful.	但这些政策无法让相对不太成功的人获得经济力量。


On the contrary, entrepreneurs may develop even more clever ways to replace jobs with computers and robots, and protectionism may generate retaliation by trading partners, political instability and, ultimately, possibly even hot wars.	相反，企业家将发现更加智能的方式用计算机和机器人取代工作岗位，而保护主义可能引起贸易伙伴的报复、政治动荡等，最终甚至爆发战争。


To satisfy his voters, Trump must find ways to redistribute power over income, not just income itself, and not just by taxing and spending.	为了满足选民，特朗普必须找出办法再分配力量，这种再分配的方法要超越收入而不只是收入本身，也不只通过税收和支出手段。


He has expressed only limited ideas here, like subsidizing school choice to improve education.	他在这方面只给出了有限的办法，比如补贴学校改善教育的选择。


But powerful economic forces such as technological innovation and lower global transportation costs have been the main drivers of increasing inequality in many countries.	但强大的经济力量——比如科技创新和全球运输成本的下降——才是许多国家不平等性加剧的主要原因。


Trump can’t change this fact.	特朗普无法改变这一事实。


If those who lack the skills that today’s economy demands refuse redistribution, it is hard to see how Trump will make them better off.	如果不具备当今经济所要求的技能的群体拒绝再分配，特朗普很难让他们的境况变好。


The Trump revolution, as it has been presented so far, seems highly unlikely to deliver what his supporters really want: an increase in workers’ economic power.	从目前的表现看，特朗普革命似乎很难带来他的支持者真正想要东西：工作者经济力量的提高。


The Coming Short-Termism	即将到来的短期主义


WASHINGTON, DC – The inauguration of Donald Trump as US president on January 20 could bring more short-term thinking to economic policymaking in the United States and around the world.	华盛顿—1月20日，唐纳德·特朗普将履行美国总统，这可能给美国和世界经济决策带来更多短期思维。


If it does, we can expect to see increased tension between official measures and long-term goals, especially for monetary policy, development, and trade.	果真如此的话，官方措施和长期目标日益冲突的局面可期，特别是在货币政策、发展和贸易方面。


With respect to monetary policy, I am reminded of when I became Turkey’s Minister of Economic Affairs after the February 2001 financial crash.	在货币政策方面，我还记得2001年2月金融大崩盘后我担任土耳其经济部长时的情景。


At that time, one of my first priorities was to bring medium-term inflation down to single digits from the 30-70% range that had prevailed during the previous decade.	当时，我的工作重点之一是让此前十年动辄达到30—70%的中期通货膨胀下降到一位数。


With great difficulty, we passed a law granting the Central Bank of Turkey independent control over the instruments of monetary policy; the government and the central bank would jointly set the inflation target, which I consider to be the proper arrangement.	面对重重困难，我们通过了一项法律，授予土耳其中央银行独立控制货币政策工具的权力； 政府和央行联合制定通胀目标，我认为这是一项合理的安排。


In 2001, inflation was going to be near 65%, and the International Monetary Fund wanted Turkey to commit to a 20% target for the following year.	2001年，通货膨胀来到接近65%的水平，国际货币基金组织（IMF）希望土耳其承诺2002年降低到20%。


Instead, we committed to a 35% target, and surpassed that by bringing inflation down to 30% in 2002.	而我们承诺降低到35%，最后2002年通胀降低到30%，超额完成任务。


The takeaway from this story is that the central bank gained credibility.	这段历史的一个副产品是土耳其央行赢得了信誉。


After we had set the 35% target, I visited businesses across the country, and saw that they were all budgeting for a 50-55% inflation rate.	我们制定35%的目标时，我拜访了土耳其全国企业，了解到它们根据50—55%的通胀率做预算。


When I stressed to them that the target was 35%, they signaled their incredulity with polite smiles.	当我强调我们的目标是35%时，他们皮笑肉不笑地表示不信。


So, when that target was exceeded, the central bank became known as a stable and effective institution that would serve Turkey well for many years.	因此，当我们超额完成任务时，土耳其央行就赢得了稳定有效的机构名声，这让土耳其在此后多年获益良多。


Credible, independent central banks have become a valuable economic policymaking asset around the world over the last three decades.	过去三十年，可信的独立的央行成为全球宝贵的经济决策资产。


They are a good example of the benefits to long-term thinking.	它们是长期思考的益处的最佳范例。


To be sure, central banks are not always right; but they are far better than governments engineering short-term boosts to win elections.	诚然，央行不是永远正确的； 但它们总比为了赢得选举而采取短视的政府强得多。


Short- and long-term thinking do not necessarily align in economic development, either.	短期和长期思维在经济发展中也未必一致。


I have often heard business leaders complain that competitive-bidding laws prevent them from just “making a deal” with development agencies.	我常听商界领袖抱怨竞标规则阻止了他们与发展机构公平“交易”。


But even though a transparent procurement process that rules out quick deals is slow, there is good reason to insist on it.	但即使排除匆忙交易的透明的采购流程耗时甚长，也有很好的理由坚持这样做。


Despite the “lost” time on individual projects, studies have shown that competitive-bidding laws generally save money and reduce corruption in the long term.	尽管“损失”了单个项目上的时间，但研究表明长期而言竞标法总体能够节约资金、减少腐败。


If red tape is slowing things down too much, the solution is to simplify the procedures, not to abolish competitive bidding.	如果“红头文件”让项目进展过于缓慢，解决方案也应该是简化流程，而不是放弃竞标。


Similarly, on trade policy, some protectionist measures can deliver quick benefits to a sector or even a country, and in the case of well-crafted export subsidies, those benefits may last a long time.	类似地，在贸易政策方面，一些保护主义措施能给某个行业甚至某个国家带来速效收益，并且，（比如）如果实施巧妙的出口补贴，这些收益可以维持相当长时间。


But, eventually, when other countries retaliate, and trade wars become the order of the day, the benefits are overwhelmed by the costs, and everybody is worse off.	但是，最终，当其他国家采取报复措施时，就会爆发贸易战，收益将被成本超过，所有人都蒙受损失。


The World Trade Organization was established precisely to prevent this scenario, and its system of agreed rules and legal procedures has generally kept a lid on competitive protectionism.	世界贸易组织的成立正是为了防止这一情形，其一致规则和法律程序制度总体上遏制了竞争性保护主义。


In these and many other areas, such as climate policy, there are clear trade-offs between short- and long-term thinking.	在这些和其他许多领域——如气候政策——显然存在着短期和长期思维的权衡。


Generally speaking, the best policies should take both perspectives into account.	大体言之，最佳政策应该短期长期兼顾。


But, over time, long-term thinking has rightly become a hallmark of good governance.	但随着时间的推移，长期思维已经成为好治理的标志。


John Maynard Keynes was correct that “in the long run we are all dead,” but the human life span can be quite a long run, indeed.	约翰·凯恩斯说，“长期看，我们都死了，”这固然正确，但人的一生确确实实是一段相当长的时间。


And we should also think about how our children and grandchildren will benefit – or not – from the policy choices we make today.	我们也应该考虑今天的政策选择将给我们的子辈和孙辈带来怎样的利益或损失。


Political leaders who have a purely private-sector background tend to take a more short-term approach than leaders with experience in public service, not least because most markets produce incentives for corporations to emphasize quarterly and yearly profits and share prices above all else.	纯私人部门出身的政治领袖往往比富有公职经验的领袖更加短视，这是因为大部分市场激励公司注重季度和年度利润和股价甚于一切。


So, the incoming Trump administration, which is heavily staffed with life-long private-sector players, will likely emphasize speed and quick deals over long-term policies and institution building.	因此，即将履新的特朗普政府——包括相当多的终身在私人部门效力的人士——可能强调快速迅捷地达成协议甚于长期政策和制度建设。


This approach may create short-term gains, or even spectacular results; and many observers will welcome it as a departure from slow, procedural bureaucracy.	这一方针或许能够带来短期收益，甚至非常可观的效果； 额许多观察家也欢迎这一点，将其视为与缓慢的、程序化的官僚主义的决裂。


And long-term thinking is about a future that is uncertain, and may play out very differently than expected.	而长期思维适用于不确定的未来，形势的演变可能大大出乎人们意料之外。


But if leaders end up pursuing an extreme form of short-termism – by, say, passing big tax cuts with no accompanying revenue increase, weakening public institutions, or imposing tariffs or engaging in other forms of protectionism, without accounting for retaliation by other countries – the gains will not last long.	但如果领袖因此而追求极端短期主义——比如，在没有相应的增支手段的情况下大幅减税、削弱公共机构、征收关税或采取其他形式的贸易保护主义而不顾及与友邦的关系——收益不会维持太久。


In both politics and economics, no reform should throw out the baby with the bathwater.	不论是政策还是经济，改革都不应该将婴儿和洗澡水一起倒掉。


The Tarnished Golden Rule	被玷污的黄金法则


BERLIN – “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”	柏林——“己所不欲、勿施于人。


What a simple and logical concept – a straightforward way to resolve knotty moral dilemmas.	”多么简单和符合逻辑的概念——也是解决棘手道德困境的直接方式。


Yet, at a time when distinguishing right from wrong seems to be more difficult than ever, this classic postulate – the “Golden Rule” – seems to be going out of fashion.	但在这个分辨对错比以往任何时候都更为困难的时代，黄金法则这一经典假设似乎已经过时了。


The ethical norm of reciprocity pervades human history, beginning with the ancient civilizations in Egypt, Greece, India, and China.	从埃及、希腊、印度和中国的古代文明发端时开始，互惠互利的道德规范就贯穿人类历史的始终。


It is among the only intellectual threads that connect the teachings of virtually every major religion and those of philosophers through the ages, from classical Rome’s Seneca the Younger to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, and on to Jean-Paul Sartre and John Rawls.	古往今来，它是联系几乎所有主要宗教和哲学家教义的唯一思想线索，从古罗马的塞内卡到让 - 雅克卢梭和约翰·洛克，再到让 - 保罗萨特和约翰·罗尔斯。


The Golden Rule is the backbone of our modern understanding of universal human rights and forms the core of the modern social contract.	这一黄金法则是我们对普遍人权现代理解的支柱，也是现代社会契约的核心形式。


It is the starting point of our interactions with one another within our communities and on a global basis.	我们在社区和全球范围内相互交流的出发点盖源于此。


It underpins the rise of today’s sharing economy, exemplified by Uber and Airbnb.	它支持了今天分享经济的兴起，耳熟能详的例子有Uber和Airbnb。


It even guides our personal relationships.	它甚至指导我们的个人关系。


But the Golden Rule is under assault, and those with the most influence are leading the charge.	但在最具影响力的人领导下，这项黄金法则正在受到攻击。 即使在世界上所谓的开明民主国家，政治家也拒绝收容逃离残酷战争的绝望民众；


Politicians, even in the world’s supposedly enlightened democracies, are refusing to provide refuge to desperate people fleeing brutal war; making little, if any, effort to address high and rising economic inequality; and are all but ignoring the factors driving civil-rights movements like America’s Black Lives Matter.	人类几乎没有付出任何努力解决业已严重且不断恶化的经济不平等问题； 并几乎忽视了美国“黑人的生命同样珍贵”等民权运动的驱动因素。


This lack of empathy is frightening, and it is not limited to politics.	这种缺乏同情心非常可怕，它不仅局限于政治领域。


At a time when business has massive – perhaps even excessive – influence worldwide, companies, in their drive for profit or power, often disregard their own societal obligations.	在这样一个企业对世界拥有巨大——甚至可能过于巨大的——影响力的时代，企业在利润或权力的驱动下往往会忽略自己的社会义务。


Consider the case of Theranos, a biotech company founded by Elizabeth Holmes in 2003 that promised to revolutionize blood tests.	以2003年伊丽莎白·霍尔莫斯创办的Theranos公司为例，该公司承诺要彻底改革血液检测。


For several years, the company’s “Edison” blood-testing devices were lauded as groundbreaking.	若干年来，该公司的“爱迪生”血检设备被定义为“突破性”的而备受赞誉。


Theranos boasted reputable financial backers, partnerships with a large number of pharmacies, and a board that seemed very impressive on paper.	Theranos拥有知名的金融支持者，与大量药房合作，还拥有表面看上去令人印象深刻的董事会。


Its valuation skyrocketed to $9 billion.	该公司估值猛增至90亿美元之巨。


Last year, the truth came out: Theranos was all smoke and mirrors.	去年，外界知道了真相，Theranos 充其量是镜花水月。


Not only were the vast majority of the lab tests the company offered conducted on traditional machines; many of the results it was producing were inaccurate.	不仅该公司得出的绝大多数实验室测试利用传统设备进行； 它所得出的很多结果也根本不准确。


In fact, it later emerged that Theranos had stopped using the Edison machines altogether in the summer of 2015, and had voided results from them that had been issued since 2014, sending tens of thousands of corrected reports to physicians and patients.	事实上，后来传出消息证实Theranos在2015年夏彻底停用了爱迪生系列设备，并向医生和患者发出了数万份的修正报告。


But Theranos could not void the damage.	但Theranos却不能抹去损失。


It was, after all, in the health-care industry; it wasn’t selling socks or soap.	毕竟，医疗保健行业卖的不是袜子或肥皂。


Its mistakes had real-world consequences for the many patients who had based their health decisions on erroneous data.	它所犯下的错误对基于错误数据做出健康决策的许多患者造成了现实的后果。


It is hard to fathom the hubris and callous disregard for human beings that enables a CEO and management team to play with people’s health and hopes in such a manner.	很难理解纵容CEO和管理团队以此等方式玩弄人类健康和希望者对民众的傲慢和无情。


Holmes, who was touting her company’s transparency and reveling in its massive valuation long after she knew that the Edison machines were not cutting it, did not just break the Golden Rule; she melted it down.	霍尔姆斯在知道爱迪生系列设备没有效果后的很长时间内还一直在吹嘘她公司的透明度，并陶醉于它所得到天价估值。 她不仅是打破了黄金法则；


And she has plenty of company.	并且她绝非孤例。


The Panama Papers – the leaked files of the world’s fourth-largest offshore law firm, Mossack Fonseca – provided a glimpse of the lengths to which people go to hide their assets and avoid paying taxes.	巴拿马文件——世界第四大离岸律所Mossack Fonseca所泄露的文件 ——让外界有机会粗略地了解人们为了隐藏资产、躲避纳税不惜付出什么样的代价。


Major multinationals like Apple, Amazon, and Starbucks have structured their businesses to minimize taxes to such an extent that they are now facing sanctions from the likes of the European Union.	像苹果、亚马逊和星巴克这样的大型跨国公司已经为避税重组了公司结构，以至于它们现在面临像欧盟等政体的制裁。


The New York Times recently disclosed that US presidential candidate Donald Trump is a tax-avoidance enthusiast, as well.	《纽约时报》最近披露美国总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普也是一个热衷于避税的人。


Trump calls tax avoidance “smart.”	特朗普用“聪明”来形容避税。


Most people, including me, call it selfish, insidious, irresponsible, and a breach of the social contract that enabled him and his family to accrue their wealth in the first place.	多数人，包括我在内，称之为自私、阴险、不负责任，违反了最初令他及家人致富的社会契约。


Any society that made a virtue out of his reckless and self-serving behavior could not function, much less prosper.	任何将他的鲁莽和自私行为视为美德的社会都无法正常运转，更不要说成功。


Yet such behavior is increasingly common, with serious consequences.	但这种行为越来越普遍，并且带来了严重的后果。


In the United Kingdom, political leaders stoked fears and made impossible promises – ultimately bringing about a vote to “Brexit” the EU.	在英国，政治领导人挑起人们的恐惧，并做出不可能实现的承诺——最终导致“英国投票脱欧”。


The new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has launched what is essentially a war on human rights, while pursuing an isolating path of aggressive behavior toward other countries.	菲律宾新总统罗德里戈·杜特尔特（Rodrigo Duterte）发起了一场实质上是针对人权的战争，同时走上一条侵略别国的孤立之路。


The Trump campaign may be collapsing under the weight of its standard-bearer’s personal history; but an important reason it got this far is that it advanced the lie that American workers would benefit from the construction of a wall – both literal and metaphorical – around the country.	特朗普的竞选活动或许会在这位旗手个人历史的重���下崩溃； 但它取得如此成功的一个重要原因是提出了这样一种谎言，即美国工人无论从表面抑或隐含的意义上，将会受益于全国各地的筑墙运动。


The truth, however, is that Trump’s isolationist approach – which will not die with his defeat next month – would have the opposite impact.	但事实是特朗普的孤立主义做法不会随他下个月的失败而烟消云散——而是将会产生相反的影响。


The reciprocity norm has been virtually omnipresent since the dawn of human civilization.	从人类文明的黎明开始，互惠准则就几乎是无所不在的。


Yet we cannot take it for granted.	但我们不能认为它理所应当。


We must not lose sight of its value, in our personal or professional lives, and we must not allow our leaders to do so, either.	我们不能忽视它在个人或职业生活中的价值，也不能允许我们的领导人这样做。


Will Trump Bring Down the West?	特朗普会打垮西方吗？


LONDON – I have spent my whole political life somewhere called “the West.”	伦敦——我把自己的整个政治生涯都奉献给了所谓的“西方”。


It was not literally “west”: while its heartland was Western Europe and the United States, it also included faraway countries like Australia and Japan.	这不是字面意义上的“西方”：尽管欧洲和美国是它的核心地带，但它也包括像澳大利亚和日本这样遥远的国家。


Rather, it was a community that embraced shared hopes and values.	说它是拥抱共同希望和价值观的社会反而更加形象。


Reflecting America’s global leadership after World War II, the West was protected by US hard power and shaped by US soft power.	由于美国在二战后的全球领导地位，西方世界受到美国硬实力的保护和美国软实力的影响。


And it was the most peaceful and prosperous place in the world.	而且这里是全世界最和平和繁荣的地方。


The West has long provided the foundation for the global order – probably the most successful such foundation ever created.	西方早已为全球秩序奠定了基础——上述基础也许在有史以来最为成功。


Led by the US, the West built, shaped, and championed international institutions, cooperative arrangements, and common approaches to common problems.	在美国的领导下，西方建立、打造和倡导一整套国际制度、合作安排和解决共同问题的共同办法。


As it helped to sustain peace and boost prosperity in much of the world, its approaches and principles attracted millions of followers.	因为这套体系有助于维护世界多数国家的和平并促进繁荣，其中的方法和原则吸引了成百上千万的追随者。


The election of Donald Trump as US President, however, threatens this entire system.	但唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统威胁到了整套制度。


If Trump does in office what he promised to do during his crude and mendacious campaign, he could wreck a highly sophisticated creation, one that took several decades to develop and has benefited billions of people.	如果特朗普任职期间兑现他在虚伪粗俗竞选活动时所作出的承诺，他有可能会破坏一项复杂的创造，这项创造耗费了数十年才得以完成，并已经惠及了成百上千万的民众。


Those of us who, like Americans, have gained from it must fight for it while it still breathes.	像美国人一样，我们这些这套制度的受益者必须在其走向消亡前为之奋斗。


One promise on which Trump must not follow through is to advance trade protectionism.	推进贸易保护主义是特朗普不应兑现的一项承诺。


The case for tearing up free-trade agreements and aborting negotiations for new ones is premised on the belief that globalization is the reason for rising income inequality, which has left the American working class economically marooned.	自由贸易协定和终止新的谈判前提是认为全球化应当为导致美国工人阶级在经济上陷入困境的收入不平等加剧而负责。


But the real sources of American workers’ economic pain are technological innovation and tax-and-spend policies that favor the rich.	但美国工人经济痛苦的真正根源是技术创新和向富人倾斜的税收及支出政策。


If Trump, say, walks away from the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, turns his back on ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and challenges the World Trade Organization, he will hurt the very people who voted for him.	举例来讲，如果特朗普废除与墨西哥和加拿大签署的北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA），拒绝批准跨太平洋伙伴关系并挑战世界贸易组织，他注定将伤害那些为他投票的民众。


And he will lose friends and influence abroad.	他还会失去在海外的盟友和影响。


Another dangerous policy that Trump could pursue would be to back away from America’s security arrangements with countries like Japan and South Korea, as well as with NATO.	特朗普可能推行的另外一项危险政策是废除美国与韩日等国及欧盟签署的安全协定。


In Trump’s distorted view, the US should not be offering “free” security to its allies, and instead should leave them to fend for themselves.	从特朗普扭曲的视角，美国不应向盟国提供“免费”安全，而应当让他们自我保护。


In practice, such a stance would be highly destabilizing.	在现实中，这样的立场可能造成强烈动荡。


Eastern Europe and the Baltic states would be at the mercy of Russia.	东欧和波罗的海国家将落入俄罗斯的魔爪。


And Asia and the Middle East would be at risk of nuclear proliferation, as countries lacking the US security backstop would seek to develop their own nuclear arsenals – an approach that Trump has said would be acceptable.	而亚洲和中东则将面临核扩散的危险，因为缺乏美国安全支持的国家会试图研发本国的核武库——特朗普曾说这样的做法可以接受。


Trump’s pledge to scrap the nuclear deal with Iran is a case in point.	特朗普信誓旦旦废除与伊朗核协议就是很好的例子。


Does anyone think Saudi Arabia would sit still if Iran restarted its weapons program?	有谁觉得如果伊朗重启核武器计划，沙特阿拉伯会坐以待毙、束手无策？


Criticizing the agreement – a major achievement of US President Barack Obama – might have served Trump during the campaign, but actually abrogating the deal would make the world a far more dangerous place.	批评伊朗核协议——这也是美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马一项主要成就——可能让特朗普在竞选期间捞到了好处，但实际废除这项协议却会使世界变成更加危险的地方。


Trump’s stated approach to climate change is just as problematic.	特朗普明确提出的气候变化政策也同样问题重重。


He has declared his intention to pull out of the Paris climate agreement, aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions and staving off catastrophic climate change.	他宣布打算退出巴黎气候协议，上述协议旨在减少温室气体排放和延缓灾难性气候变化。


He has already appointed Myron Ebell, an outspoken climate change denier, to oversee the transition at the US Environmental Protection Agency.	他已经任命直言不讳的气候变化否定者迈伦·依波尔负责监督美国环保局的过渡工作。


Trump bases this approach on the nonsensical belief that human-driven climate change is a hoax, invented by the Chinese to make US industry less competitive. And that is far from the only accusation Trump has hurled at China.	特朗普的做法基于一种荒谬的观点，即由人类驱动的气候变化是一场中国人发明的旨在削弱美国竞争力的骗局。


His generally hostile attitude toward the country, particularly with regard to trade, threatens further damage to an already-tense bilateral relationship – and thus poses a risk for US multinationals and US allies alike.	他对中国普遍持有敌视态度，特别是在贸易方面，很可能进一步损害本已紧张的双边关系——从而同时威胁美国跨国公司和美国的盟友。


A Trump presidency also poses something of an existential threat.	特朗普的总统任期还有可能造成某种生存威胁。


His derogatory comments about marginalized groups – including Muslims, Mexicans, women, and people with disabilities – imperil the values that are fundamental to America’s identity and place in the world, and that bind the countries of the West together.	他对穆斯林、墨西哥人、妇女和残疾人等边缘群体的贬义评论损害了美国全球特征和地位赖以存在并将西方国家团结在一起的价值观。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel is one leader who seems to recognize how quickly the collapse of US leadership could bring about the end of the post-1945 global order.	德国总理安格拉·默克尔似乎是一位意识到美国领导力坍塌将以多快速度带来后1945年全球秩序终结的领袖。


Her response to Trump’s victory was eloquent and powerful: “Germany and America are connected by values of democracy, freedom, and respect for the law and the dignity of man, independent of origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or political views.”	她对特朗普获胜所做的回应意味深长、难以辩驳：“德美两国因为民主、自由、尊重法律和人类尊严而联系在一起，这种联系无关于种族、肤色、宗教、性别、性取向或政治意见。


On the basis of those values, she declared, she would work with Trump.	”她公开宣布愿意在上述价值观的基础上与特朗普展开合作。


That is precisely how all of America’s allies and friends should be responding.	这恰恰是所有美国的盟国和朋友应当采取的应对之策。


Like Merkel, we should all speak up for all that the West has stood for, and all that it has achieved.	我们应当像默克尔一样坚持西方所抱有的信仰，以及它所取得的一切成就。


We must condemn any move by Trump to shirk the rule of law and the norms of a free society.	我们必须对特郎普颠覆法治和自由社会规范的一切行动进行谴责。


We must argue the case for free trade, which has brought far-reaching benefits to humanity.	我们必须支持自由贸易，大声说出它为人类带来的意义深远的好处。


And we must fight to uphold the nuclear deal with Iran and nuclear non-proliferation around the world.	我们必须坚决支持伊朗核协议以及世界各国的核不扩散政策。


There is also an imperative to reiterate our commitment to stand firm against Russian adventurism in Eastern and Central Europe.	此外我们还必须重申反对中东欧地区俄罗斯冒险主义的承诺。


In particular, we must make clear that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty applies to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland – all members of the military alliance that the US still leads.	具体来讲，我们必须明确北大西洋公约的第5条适用于立陶宛、拉脱维亚、爱沙尼亚和波兰——它们都是美国依然领导的军事联盟成员国。


(It would also help if, after years of backsliding, NATO’s European members upped their contributions to our collective defense.)	（如果历经多年衰退后，北约的欧洲成员国增加对我们集体防务的贡献同样将有所帮助。 ）


Finally, we should assert that, while we in the West do not agree with China’s mercantilist policies and repressive measures at home, we want to work with it, not seek to marginalize and humiliate it.	最后，我们应当申明虽然我们西方国家不赞同中国的重商主义及其在国内实行的压制政策，但我们不想排挤和羞辱这个大国，而是希望与它合作。


The idea of “the West” is one of America’s finest achievements (though many other countries have also contributed).	“西方集团”的理念是美国最重要的成就（虽然其他许多国家也是有贡献的）。


It would be a true disaster for the world if America, in an act of self-destructive decadence, tossed this noble, practical, and inspiring creation into the dustbin of history.	如果美国采取自我破坏的颓废行为，将这项高贵、实用和鼓舞人心的创造扔进历史的垃圾堆对世界而言将会是真正灾难性的。


The Trump team is dismissive of China’s reaction to its threats – believing that the US has nothing to lose and everything to gain.	特朗普团队对中国面临威胁的反应不屑一顾——他们认为��国没有什么好输的，无论怎样都是赢。


Trump’s Uncertain New World	特朗普的无定新世界


MEXICO CITY – The only certainty about US President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration is the uncertainty that will attend it.	发自墨西哥城——继任美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的新政府唯一确定能为人们带来的一点，就是其不确定性。


Remaining unpredictable may be a successful tactic in business, but it is an unsettling, even dangerous, trait for the leader of the world’s most powerful country.	保留不确定性或许是一个成功的商业策略，但对于世界上最强大国家的领导者来说，这却是一个令人不安甚至危险的特质。


This is especially true with respect to three sensitive policy areas.	而在三大敏感政策领域则尤其如此


The first is the US economy and its impact on all other countries’ economies.	第一是美国经济及其对所有其他经济体的影响。


If Trump cuts taxes and manages to enact a massive infrastructure program, America’s budget deficits will rise, perhaps dramatically.	如果特朗普实施减税并成功启动大规模基础设施计划，美国的预算赤字将会上升，甚至可能急剧上升。


This, together with the Federal Reserve’s gradual interest-rate hikes, will strengthen the dollar, weaken so-called emerging-market currencies, and shift money from the rest of the world to the US.	这会与美联储的逐步加息一起令美元进一步走强，进而削弱所谓的新兴市场货币，并将货币从世界其他地区转移到美国。


As Latin American, Asian, and African countries’ currencies depreciate, their reserves will plummet or their own interest rates will spike, and inflation will rise.	随着拉丁美洲，亚洲和非洲国家的货币贬值，它们将面临储备下跌或本国利率飙升的情况，同时通胀率上升。


For economies that have been barely holding on since the recent commodities boom ended, this is a worrying, if not terrifying, prospect.	对于那些自从大宗商品繁荣期终结以后只能勉强维持的经济体，这是一个令人担忧，甚至有点可怕的前景。


On the other hand, Trump might maintain his aura of unpredictability by not pursuing tax cuts, significant infrastructure spending, or even his promised Mexican border wall.	另一方面，特朗普可能继续维持自身决策飘忽不定的特质，不去减税，不兴建大型基础设施，甚至连在竞选时承诺修建的墨西哥边境墙都置诸脑后。


In that case, the US economy would not heat up, the stock market’s rally might reverse, the Fed might postpone new interest rate increases, and American deficits would not spiral out of control, as they did during George W. Bush’s presidency, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.	在这种情况下，美国经济不会升温，股市的反弹可能逆转，美联储可能延后提升利率，美国的赤字也不会如小布什执政时 2001年9月11日遭遇恐怖袭击后失控。


Emerging economies would not suffer too much in this scenario, and they might even benefit from a prudently valued dollar and a deficit- and inflation-free American economy.	新兴经济体在这种情况下不会受到太大的影响，它们甚至可能受益于谨慎定价的美元以及无赤字无通胀的美国经济。


But, as long as Trump projects uncertainty, he will effectively create worst-case-scenario conditions, because markets, investors, central banks, and governments have no choice but to prepare for the worst, even if they are hoping for the best.	但是只要特朗普的项目继续存在不确定性，他实际上将可能导致最坏的情况发生，因为市场，投资者，各国中央银行和政府虽然都想往好的方向想，但它们别无选择，只能为最坏的情况做好准备。


The same can be said for Cuba, a country that is acutely vulnerable to Trump’s promises to roll back President Barack Obama’s policies.	对古巴来说就是如此，这个国家首当其冲地受到特朗普推翻奥巴马政策的竞选承诺影响。


Because Congress refused to normalize US-Cuba relations by repealing the US embargo, Obama was forced to resort to legally reversible executive orders to loosen restrictions on travel, remittances, and trade and investment.	由于美国众议院拒绝通过废除美国禁运来实现美古关系正常化，奥巴马被迫诉诸在法律上可以撤销的行政命令来放宽对旅行，汇款以及贸易和投资的限制。


Trump, for his part, has promised to undo all of this unless he can get “a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban-American people, and the US as a whole.”	而特朗普却许诺要废除所有这一切，直到他能够“为古巴人，古巴裔美国人和美国整体达成一项更好的交易”。


Though he has not specified what he means by this, he seems to want more concessions on human rights from Raúl Castro, in exchange for the unilateral concessions already made by the Obama administration.	虽然他并未具体说明自己究竟想干什么，但似乎想从劳尔·卡斯特罗争取更多的人权让步以换取奥巴马政府本已作出的单方面让步。


This is a nonstarter: the Castro regime is not going to do what it has never done and negotiate internal political issues with another country.	但这根本就是个不可能实现的计划：卡斯特罗政权不会做些自己从来没有做过的事，也没打算就内部政治问题与另一个国家谈判。


So no one knows if the Obama administration’s Cuba policy will remain in place under Trump.	因此也没人知道奥巴马政府的古巴政策是否会在特朗普那得以延续。


If it does not, the tourism industry will suffer the most.	如果未能延续，则美国的旅游业将受害最甚。


Now that major airlines have flights to and from the island, Cuban-Americans and any other tourists can travel there freely, which means that there are investment opportunities in hospitality, telecommunications, transportation, retail banking, and other related industries.	如今各主要航空公司都开通了往返古巴的航班，古巴裔美国人和任何其他游客可以自由旅行，这意味着在酒店，电信，交通，零售银行和其他相关行业都有投资机会。


But, now that Trump could possibly cancel all those flights, it would be madness for anyone to commit, say, $200 million to refurbishing Havana’s José Martí International Airport.	可一旦特朗普可能取消所有这些航班，任何投资承诺都将其刻化为乌有，例如花2亿美元翻新哈瓦那的何塞·马蒂国际机场。


Once again, the continued uncertainty weighs most heavily not only on Cuba, but on potential investors, who must assume the worst.	值得再次强调的是，这种持续的不确定性不仅影响古巴，还会极大作用于那些潜在投资者，因为他们必须承担最坏的后果。


No smart investor is going to bet on Trump acting sensibly, and plunge ahead into Cuba when the rules of the road are subject to change.	任何脑子清醒的投资者都不敢打赌说特朗普必定表现明智，并在规则随时改变的情况下投资古巴。


And those rules will remain unclear for some time in Mexico as well – another country that will be disproportionately affected by Trump’s words and actions.	而另一个不时在特朗普言论和行动的影响下一惊一乍的国家则是墨西哥，其规则究竟如何走向也是未知之数。


During his campaign, Trump did everything he could to offend Mexico and the Mexican people, and to shroud future US-Mexican relations in uncertainty, by promising to build the border wall, deport undocumented Mexican immigrants en masse, and renegotiate or withdraw the North American Free Trade Agreement.	在大选期间，特朗普无所不用其极地诋毁墨西哥和墨西哥人民，还承诺兴建边界墙，大规模遣返无证墨西哥移民，重新谈判或废除北美洲自由贸易协定。


There is an ongoing debate in Mexico today over whether any of this will actually happen, and how the country should respond if it does, especially with regard to the abrogation of NAFTA.	这在墨西哥国内引发了广泛辩论，研究这一切是否真的会发生以及该国如何应对，特别是在废除北美自由贸易协定方面。


According to Trump, the US has suffered a net job loss under NAFTA, because Mexican workers are paid lower wages for work that was previously done in the US.	据特朗普所说，美国在自由贸易协定下遭受了净失业，因为墨西哥工人要求的工资低于美国工人。


But NAFTA’s US-based supporters and many Mexicans argue that the deal actually created more American jobs than were lost in Rust Belt states that Trump won in the election, because it increased US exports to Mexico.	但北美自由贸易协定的美国支持者以及许多墨西哥人认为该协定实际上为美国创造的职位要比在特朗普胜选的老工业州流失的更多，因为它增加了美国对墨西哥的出口。


Either way, imposing tariffs on imports from Mexico would merely operate as a tax on US consumers.	无论如何，对来自墨西哥的产品征收关税只会变成对美国消费者征税。


There is room for negotiation, and a new, better NAFTA could eventually address all member countries’ concerns.	其中还有谈判的空间，而一个新的更合理的北美自由贸易协定将最终打消所有签约国的忧虑。


The problem is “eventually”: Mexico does not have much time.	但问题在于这个“最终”究竟要多久：墨西哥人没有太多时间了。


Under Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration, economic growth – at barely 2% annually – has been unexceptional, and the economy cannot expand more rapidly without increased foreign investment.	墨西哥总统恩里克·佩尼亚·尼托治下的年经济增长率只有2％，这可是不正常的，如果没法增加外国投资，经济也不能更快地扩张。


But that will not be forthcoming until the NAFTA issue is laid to rest and new trade and investment rules are clarified and codified.	但在北美自由贸易协定问题一天未能尘埃落定，新的贸易和投资规则也就一天没法理清和编纂，自然也无力实现投资和经济复苏。


Uncertainty may as well be Trump’s middle name, and he might even welcome that moniker.	我们或许可以把特朗普的全名改成唐纳德·“无定（Uncertainty）”·特朗普，而他甚至可能挺喜欢那个绰号。


But for nearly everyone else, Trump’s unpredictability is an albatross.	但对于几乎所有人来说，特朗普的不可预测性是一个大麻烦。


Come January 20, all countries that deal with the US will have to make minimizing the burden of his administration one of their highest priorities.	1月20日，所有与美国打交道的国家都必须将尽量减少与新政府的瓜葛作为最高优先事项之一。


A Majority of “Deplorables”?	“可悲”的大多数？


VIENNA – Barack Obama was right to say that democracy itself was on the ballot in the just-concluded US presidential election.	维也纳—奥巴马说得对，在刚刚结束的美国总统选举中，选择的对象是民主本身。


But, with Donald Trump’s stunning victory over Hillary Clinton, do we now know for certain that a majority of Americans are anti-democratic?	但是，随着唐纳德·特朗普出奇制胜希拉里·克林顿，现在我们能确定大多数美国人是反民主的吗？


How should Clinton voters relate to Trump’s supporters and to the new administration?	投票给克林顿的人如何面对特朗普的支持者和新政府？


Had Clinton won, Trump most likely would have denied the new president’s legitimacy.	如果克林顿获胜，特朗普很可能拒绝承认新总统的合法性。


Clinton’s supporters should not play that game.	克林顿的支持者不会上演这样的戏码。


They might point out that Trump lost the popular vote and hence can hardly claim an overwhelming democratic mandate, but the result is what it is.	他们可能会指出特朗普输掉了普选，因此不能说赢得了压倒性民主授权，但结果仍然是特朗普当了总统。


Above all, they should not respond to Trump’s populist identity politics primarily with a different form of identity politics.	最重要的是，他们应该不会主要依靠另一种形式的身份政治来 应对特朗普的民粹主义身份政治。


Instead, Clinton supporters ought to focus on new ways to appeal to the interests of Trump supporters, while resolutely defending the rights of minorities who feel threatened by Trump’s agenda.	相反，克林顿支持者应该聚焦于用新方法吸引特朗普支持者的兴趣，同时坚决捍卫感到受到特朗普日程威胁的少数人的权利。


And they must do everything they can to defend liberal-democratic institutions, if Trump tries to weaken checks and balances.	他们必须竭尽全力捍卫自由民主制度，如果特朗普试图削弱制衡的话。


To move beyond the usual clichés about healing a country’s political divisions after a bitterly fought election, we need to understand precisely how Trump, as an arch-populist, appealed to voters and changed their political self-conception in the process.	要想克服艰难选战后加剧一国政治分歧的经常出现的陈词滥调，我们需要准确理解特朗普作为极端民粹主义者是如何吸引选民，并在此过程中改变他们的政治自我意识的。


With the right rhetoric, and, above all, plausible policy alternatives, this self-conception can be changed again.	运用正确的话语，以及最重要的，可信的政策方案，这一自我意识可以再次改变。


Members of today’s Trumpenproletariat are not forever lost to democracy, as Clinton suggested when she called them “irredeemable” (though she is probably right that some of them are resolved to remain racists, homophobes, and misogynists).	今天的“无产阶级特朗普”（Trumpenproletariat）们不会永远败给民主，克林顿说，她称他们是“不可挽救的”（但她也许有一点是对的，其中一些人决定继续成为种族主义者、“恐同”和“直男癌”）。


Trump made so many deeply offensive and demonstrably false statements during this election cycle that one especially revealing sentence went entirely unnoticed.	在此次选举周期中，特朗普做出过无数极具冒犯性又显而易见的错误陈述，这导致他有一句特别具有揭示性的话完全没有被注意到。


At a rally in May, he declared, “The only important thing is the unification of the people, because the other people don’t mean anything.”	在5月的集会上，他宣称“唯一重要的是人民的团结，因为他者等于什么都不是。


This is telltale populist rhetoric: there is a “real people,” as defined by the populist; only he faithfully represents it; and everyone else can – indeed should – be excluded.	”这是一句暴露其民粹主义本质的话语：存在一种“真正的人民”，即民粹主义者； 只有他忠实地代表这一“人民”；


It is the kind of political language deployed by figures as different as Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chávez, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.	其他所有人都可以——事实上也应该——被排斥。 这与委内瑞拉已故总统查韦斯和土耳其总统埃尔多安等不同人物所采用的政治话语属于同一类。


Notice what the populist always does: he starts with a symbolic construction of the real people, whose supposedly single authentic will he deduces from that construction; then he claims, as Trump did at the Republican convention in July: “I am your voice” (and, with characteristic modesty: “I alone can fix it”).	注意民粹主义者的常用伎俩：他首先构建出一个象征性的人民，从这一构造中，他推演出人民的单一的真正意愿； 接着他宣布——如特朗普在7月的共和党大会上所言：“我为你发声”（并且故作谦虚地说：“我一个人就能解决”）。


This is an entirely theoretical process: contrary to what admirers of populism sometimes argue, it has nothing to do with actual input from ordinary people.	这是完全是一个理论过程：与民粹主义拥趸有时的观点相反，它与来自普通人民的真实输入完全无关。


A single, homogeneous people who can do no wrong and need only a genuine representative to implement their will properly is a fantasy – but it is a fantasy that can respond to real problems.	一个单一、同质的人民，他们不会犯错，只需要一个真正的代表来合适地实施他们的意愿，这是一个幻想——但这个幻想可以应对实际问题。


It would be a mistake to think that Venezuela and Turkey had been perfect pluralist democracies before Chávez and Erdoğan came along.	认为委内瑞拉和土耳其在查韦斯和埃尔多安出现之前一直是完美的多元化民主国家是一个错误。


Feelings of dispossession and disenfranchisement are fertile ground for populists.	没收和剥夺权利的感觉是民粹主义的温床。


In Venezuela and Turkey, parts of the population really were systematically disadvantaged or largely excluded from the political process.	在委内瑞拉和土耳其，部分人口确实系统性地处于弱势，或者说基本上被排斥在政治进程之外。


There is substantial evidence that low-income groups in the US have little to no influence on policy and go effectively unrepresented in Washington.	大量证据表明美国的低收入群体对政策几乎毫无影响，也没有人在华盛顿为他们代言。


Again, notice how a populist responds to a situation like this: instead of demanding a fairer system, he tells the downtrodden that only they are the “real people.”	再次注意民粹主义者如何应对这样的情况：他不会要求更公平的制度，而是告诉受压迫者，他们才是“真正的人民”。


A claim about identity is supposed to solve the problem that many people’s interests are neglected.	民粹主义者要用身份宣言（claim about identity）解决许多人的利益被忽视的问题。


The particular tragedy of Trump’s rhetoric – and, arguably, its most pernicious effect – is that he has convinced many Americans to view themselves as part of a white nationalist movement.	特朗普的话语特别悲剧——也许也是最恶毒——的影响是他让许多美国人将自己视为白人民族主义运动的一部分。


Representatives of what is euphemistically called the “alt-right” – latter-day white supremacy – were at the center of his campaign.	被委婉称为“另类右翼”——现代白人至上主义——的群体的代表是他的竞选阵营的核心。


He has stoked a sense of common grievance by maligning minorities and, like all populists, portraying the majority group as persecuted victims.	他通过中伤少数群体以及——与所有民粹主义这一样——将多数群体描绘成被逼迫的受害者来煽动共同的仇恨。


It did not have to be this way.	特朗普并未就此打住。


Trump has obviously made a successful claim to represent people.	他显然成功地获得了代表人民的权利。


But representation is never simply a mechanical response to pre-existing demands.	但代表绝不仅仅是对先验需求的机械式反应。


Rather, claims to represent citizens also shape their self-conception.	相反，代表公民的权利也影响着他们的自我认识。


It is crucial to move that self-conception away from white identity politics and back to the realm of interests.	让这一自我意识远离白人身份政治，回归利益领域至关重要。


This is why it is crucial not to confirm Trump’s rhetoric by dismissing or even morally disqualifying his supporters.	因此，关键不在于通过抨击甚至在道德上唾弃特朗普的支持者来确认他的话语。


This only allows populists to score more political points by saying, in effect: “See, elites really do hate you, just as we said, and now they are bad losers.”	这只能让民粹主义者有效地散布“看，精英真的讨厌你，我们早就说了。 并且现在他们是糟糕的输家”这样的话，从而得到更高的政治分数。


Hence the disastrous effect of generalizing about Trump’s supporters as racists or, as Hillary Clinton did, “deplorables” who are “irredeemable.”	因此，将特朗普支持者一般化地称为种族主义者或如希拉里·克林顿所言，把他们称为“可悲”和“不可救药”效果是灾难性的。


As George Orwell once put it: “If you want to make an enemy of a man, tell him that his ills are incurable.”	乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）曾说，“如果你想给一个男人树敌，就告诉他他的病已经治不好了。 ”


Of course, identity and interests are often linked.	当然，身份和利益往往纠缠在一起。


Those defending democracy against populists also sometimes have to tread on the dangerous ground of identity politics.	在民粹主义面前捍卫民主的人有时也需要踏入身份政治的危险禁区。


But identity politics need not require an appeal to ethnicity, let alone race.	但身份政治不需要诉诸民族性，更不用说种族了。


Populists are always anti-pluralists; the task for those opposing them is to fashion conceptions of a pluralist collective identity devoted to shared ideals of fairness.	民粹主义者永远是反多元论者； 反对他们的人必须打造一个致力于共同理想和正义的多元论集体身份的流行概念。


Many rightly worry that Trump might not respect the US Constitution.	许多人真确地担心，特朗普不会尊重美国宪法。


Of course, the meaning of the constitution is always contested, and it would be naive to believe that non-partisan appeals to it will immediately deter him.	当然，宪法的含义永远有争议，认为无党派偏见地诉诸宪法立即能让特朗普胆战心惊是天真的。


Still, America’s founders obviously wanted to limit what any president could do, even with a supportive Congress and a favorably inclined Supreme Court.	但是，美国开国元勋们显然希望限制总统能够做什么，即使他有一个支持他的国会和倾向性 有利于他的最高法院。


One can only hope that enough voters – including Trump supporters – see things the same way and put pressure on him to respect this non-negotiable element of the American constitutional tradition.	我们只能希望有足够多的选民——包括特朗普支持者——已同样的方式看待事物，向他施压要求他尊重美国宪政传统中不容讨论的要素。


When Leaders Are True to Their Lies	当领导人真实地对待他们的谎言时


HANOI – What does the Venezuelan domestic payments crisis have in common with the death of the North American Free Trade Agreement, announced by Wilbur Ross, US President-elect Donald Trump’s pick to be the next US Secretary of Commerce?	河内—委内瑞拉国内支付危机与北美自由贸易协定之死有什么关系？ 美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的下任商务部长提名人威尔伯·罗斯（Wilbur Ross）宣布美国将退出北美自由贸易协定。


These two seemingly disparate events are linked by the odd relationship with the truth that both Trump and the Chavista regime seem to share.	特朗普和查韦斯主义体制与真相之间都有一种奇怪的关系，这就是这两件看似风马牛不相及的事情之间的联系。


All governments lie.	所有政府都会撒谎。


A few believe their own lies.	一些政府相信自己的谎言。


But things get dangerous when they act in order to be true to their lies.	但当政府为了圆谎而采取行动时，就会带来危险。


That is the trap into which Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s government has fallen, and it seems to be the logic behind the decision articulated by Ross to withdraw from NAFTA.	委内瑞拉总统马杜罗的政府就陷入了这个陷阱，而罗斯所宣布的退出NAFTA的决定背后似乎也是这一逻辑。


Many observers have noted similarities between Trump and Maduro’s predecessor, the late Hugo Chávez, even though they represent opposite ends of the political spectrum.	许多观察家注意到特朗普和马杜罗的前任、已故的查韦斯之间的相似之处，尽管在政治谱系上，他们两人代表着两个极端。


But our brains are designed to identify patterns.	但我们的大脑天然能够发现模式。


Toddlers learn the concept of a cat by being shown just a handful of exemplars.	幼儿只要看到一些例子，就能学会“猫”这个概念。


Even adults classify things based on concepts that we cannot really define.	即使是成年人，也根据我们无法真正定义的概念分类事物。


In 1964, US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart stated his now famous criterion of obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”	1964年，美国最高法院法官波特·斯图尔特（Potter Stewart）给出了如今众所周知的下流的标准：“看到就明白了。 ”


That certainly seems true of the connection between Chávez (who died in 2013) and Trump.	查韦斯（2013年逝世）和特朗普之间的联系显然是真的。


Chávez, and then Maduro, adopted policies that put Venezuela in a very weak position: lavish spending, expropriation, price and foreign-exchange controls, and reckless borrowing abroad.	查韦斯，以及随后的马杜罗，所采取的政策让委内瑞拉岌岌可危：挥霍、征没、价格和外汇管制，以及肆无忌惮地从海外借钱。


Global capital markets lost confidence in Venezuela in 2013, and the price of oil plummeted in 2014, making these policies unsustainable and sending the economy into a tailspin.	全球资本市场在2013年就对委内瑞拉失去了信心，再加上2014年石油价格大跌，导致这些政策不可持续，将经济推向了混乱。


Confronting a declining economy, Maduro decided to blame it all on an economic war waged by the United States and its local cronies.	面临萧条的经济，马杜罗决定将责任全部推卸给美国及其委内瑞拉爪牙所掀起的经济战。


The crucial point is that this imaginary war ended up being the rationale for government decisions.	其关键点是这场想象的战争最后成为政府决策的出发点。


Every symptom of the crisis was transformed into the consequence of an action taken by the enemy.	危机的每一个症候都被说成是敌人破坏的结果。


Shortages were the result of hoarding by speculators.	短缺是投机客囤积居奇所致。


Inflation was caused by price gouging by unscrupulous businessmen.	通货膨胀是为富不仁的商人价格欺诈的结果。


Currency depreciation was driven by a website that reported on the exchange rate.	货币贬值幕后黑手是一个报道汇率的网站。


People have been prosecuted and imprisoned on the basis of these allegations.	很多人因为这些指控被诉诸法庭和入狱。


In managing the crisis, Maduro failed to authorize the issuance of higher-denomination banknotes, which would constitute an acknowledgement of the high inflation that the country has suffered.	在管理危机时，马杜罗没有批准发行更高面额钞票，因为这等于是承认委内瑞拉存在高通胀。 最高面额钞票——100玻利瓦尔纸币——在2008年引入时价值46.


The highest-denomination banknote, the 100-bolivar bill, which was worth $46.5 when it was introduced in 2008, fell to just $0.03, requiring mountains of bills to make small payments.	5美元，如今只值0. 03美元，买点小东西都得用到一大捆钞票。


The value of the stock of bills and coins held outside banks has fallen from about $150 per capita in 2012 to less than $6 at the beginning of this month.	银行外持有的钞票和硬币存量价值从2012年的人均150美元下降到这个月初的不到6美元。


And the shortage of bills – caused in part by the difficulty of supplying so much low-value currency – upset Venezuelans to the point that the government finally took action.	而钞票短缺——部分原因是供应价值如此低的货币非常困难——让委内瑞拉人深感不安，以至于政府终于采取了行动。


According to Maduro, the problem was straightforward: bills were being siphoned out of the country by mafias financed by the CIA.	按照马杜罗的说法，问题很简单：钞票被有中央情报局资金支持的黑帮偷运出境。


To destroy the mafias, Maduro canceled these bills as legal tender and gave their holders only 72 hours to exchange them at banks.	为了打击黑帮，马杜罗取消了这些钞票的法币地位，持有者只有72小时时间去银行兑换。


To prevent the mafias from returning the money from abroad in this period, the borders with Colombia and Brazil were closed.	为了防止黑帮在这段时间里将钱从国外运回国内，委内瑞拉与哥伦比亚和巴西的边境也被关闭。


The chaos that ensued is hard to describe.	这造成了难以名状的混乱。


Just as Venezuelans were getting ready for Christmas, they found out that they had no money to pay for anything.	在委内瑞拉人民喜迎圣诞之际，他们发现自己没钱买任何东西。


Nobody would accept their 100-bolivar notes, and banks had no bills to exchange for those being returned by the public.	没人愿意接受他们的100玻利瓦尔钞票，银行也没有钞票可用于与公众手里的旧钞票兑换。


People without bank accounts, mainly the poor, lost what little they had.	没有银行账户的人——主要是穷人——失去了手头仅有的一点钱。


The payment system went into a tailspin, and the country fell into chaos.	支付系统瘫痪，国家陷入一片混乱。


Now consider NAFTA.	现在来看NAFTA。


Trump convinced many voters that NAFTA was the worst trade deal the US ever signed.	特朗普让很多人相信，NAFTA是美国签署过的最糟糕的贸易协议。


It was a deal negotiated by “really stupid people,” he declared.	这个协议是由“十足的蠢货”谈成的，他说。


Millions of jobs left the US for Mexico, causing Americans to suffer.	数百万美国工作岗位流失到了墨西哥，导致美国人民蒙受损失。


The lack of good manufacturing jobs was clearly a major complaint during the election; but let’s check the facts before blaming Mexico and NAFTA.	在竞选期间，缺少优质制造业岗位显然是个主要“痛点”； 但在指责墨西哥之前，让我们先核实一下事实。


In 1993, the last year before NAFTA came into effect, Mexican manufacturing value added was equivalent to just 7.7% of US manufacturing.	1993年，即NAFTA生效的前一年，墨西哥制造业增加值只相当于美国制造业的7. 7%。


By 2014, it had grown to about 10% of the US level, a gain representing about $50 billion.	到2014年，该数字上升到10%，相当于500亿美元收益。


With average US productivity per worker at about $150,000, if Mexico’s manufacturing gain is attributed entirely to NAFTA, this represents about 333,000 US jobs, or less than one out of every 400 jobs in the US.	美国平均每工人生产率大约为150,000美元，��果墨西哥制造业的收益全部都归因于NAFTA，就相当于333,000个美国工作岗位，还不到总就业岗位的400分之一。


In the same period, value added in US manufacturing increased by $972 billion, more than 19 times as much as Mexico’s gain.	同一时期，美国制造业增加值增长9,720亿美元，是墨西哥收益的19倍多。 与2.


Compared to US manufacturing value added of $2.1 trillion, Mexico’s $50 billion is a paltry sum.	1万亿美元的美国制造业增加值相比，墨西哥的500亿美元只是九牛一毛。


And the US may have derived other benefits from the deal, such as more jobs, thanks to more exports to Mexico and more competitive Mexican inputs.	美国还从NAFTA中获得了其他好处，比如对墨出口增加和墨西哥输入品竞争力提高所带来的更多的就业岗位。


In the same 1993-2014 period, industrial employment as a share of total employment fell by 8% in the US, 8.5% in Japan, and 9.8% in Germany, but it barely moved in Mexico.	同样在1993—2014年期间，工业就业占总就业比例在美国下降8%，日本下降8. 5%，德国下降9.


Clearly, the industrial jobs that are missing in the US have also gone missing in Japan and Germany, and those jobs are not in Mexico.	8%，但肯定没有流入墨西哥。 显然，美国所失去的工业就业在日本和德国也都失去了，并且这些就业也不在墨西哥。


Trump may have convinced Rust Belt voters that “their” jobs are in Mexico.	特朗普可以让锈带选民相信“他们的”岗位在墨西哥。


But if he actually believes it, a lot of damage will be done before people discover the truth.	但如果他真的相信这一点，那么在人民发现真相之前将会发生巨大的伤害。


As a consequence of all the talk about withdrawing from NAFTA, the Mexican peso has lost about 14% of its value since the election results were announced.	退出NAFTA的传言的一个后果是，自选举结果出台以来墨西哥比索已经贬值了14%左右。


That depreciation is larger than the likely tariffs the US would impose on Mexican goods if it left NAFTA.	该幅度要大于美国退出NAFTA后可能向墨西哥征收的关税税率。


Lying to get ahead is a human foible.	靠谎言前进是人类的一个弱点。


But it becomes something much worse if, like Chávez, Maduro, and Trump, you remain true to your word.	但如果你像查韦斯、马杜罗和特朗普一样认真对待你说的话，情况将变得更加糟糕。


Straight Talk on Trade	关于贸易的大白话


CAMBRIDGE – Are economists partly responsible for Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential election?	坎布里奇—唐纳德·特朗普令人震惊地在美国总统大选中胜出，经济学家是否要为此负部分责任？


Even if they may not have stopped Trump, economists would have had a greater impact on the public debate had they stuck closer to their discipline’s teaching, instead of siding with globalization’s cheerleaders.	即使他们没能阻止特朗普，经济学家也应该在公共辩论中起到更大的影响力，如果他们更加专注于经济学教育而不是为全球化鼓吹者站边的话。


As my book Has Globalization Gone Too Far? went to press nearly two decades ago, I approached a well-known economist to ask him if he would provide an endorsement for the back cover.	我在近二十年前写作《全球化是否过犹不及》（Has Globalization Gone Too Far? ）一书时曾经请一位著名经济学家撰写推荐跋。


I claimed in the book that, in the absence of a more concerted government response, too much globalization would deepen societal cleavages, exacerbate distributional problems, and undermine domestic social bargains – arguments that have become conventional wisdom since.	我在书中说，如果没有更加协调的政府应对机制，过度全球化将深化社会分裂，加剧分配问题，破坏国内社会契约——该书出版后，这些观点都成为常规智慧。


The economist demurred.	这位经济学家对此持有异议。


He said he didn’t really disagree with any of the analysis, but worried that my book would provide “ammunition for the barbarians.”	他说，他并不真的反对其中的分析，但是担心我的书会“为野蛮人提供火力”。


Protectionists would latch on to the book’s arguments about the downsides of globalization to provide cover for their narrow, selfish agenda.	保护主义者会抓住书中关于全球化弊端的论点，为他们的狭隘自私的日程提供支持。


It’s a reaction I still get from my fellow economists.	这样的反应我仍然能够从经济学家同事那里听到。


One of them will hesitantly raise his hand following a talk and ask: Don’t you worry that your arguments will be abused and serve the demagogues and populists you are decrying?	其中一位在经过了一番谈话后举手问道：你难道不担心你的观点被滥用，帮了你所驳斥的煽动家和民粹主义者的忙？


There is always a risk that our arguments will be hijacked in the public debate by those with whom we disagree.	我们的观点被我们所反对的人在公共辩论中劫持，这样的风险永远存在。


But I have never understood why many economists believe this implies we should skew our argument about trade in one particular direction.	但我始终不明白为何许多经济学家认为这意味着我们应该让我们的贸易观点呈现出一边倒。


The implicit premise seems to be that there are barbarians on only one side of the trade debate.	潜在的假设似乎是野蛮人只存在于贸易争论的一边。


Apparently, those who complain about World Trade Organization rules or trade agreements are awful protectionists, while those who support them are always on the side of the angels.	显然，抱怨世界贸易组织或贸易协定的人是可怕的保护主义者，而那些支持世贸组织和贸易协定的人永远是天使。


In truth, many trade enthusiasts are no less motivated by their own narrow, selfish agendas.	事实上，许多贸易支持者也完全是出于自身狭隘自私的日程。


The pharmaceutical firms pursuing tougher patent rules, the banks pushing for unfettered access to foreign markets, or the multinationals seeking special arbitration tribunals have no greater regard for the public interest than the protectionists do.	制药企业追求更严格的专利规则，银行推动外国市场的完全开放，寻求特别仲裁法庭的跨国公司对公共利益的关心绝不会比保护主义者多。


So when economists shade their arguments, they effectively favor one set of barbarians over another.	因此，当经济学家遮掩观点时，他们实际上是为了躲避一群野蛮人而便利了另一群野蛮人。


It has long been an unspoken rule of public engagement for economists that they should champion trade and not dwell too much on the fine print.	对经济学家来说，有一个存在已久的不成文的公共参与规则，即他们应该站出来支持贸易，不要扭扭捏捏。


This has produced a curious situation.	这造成了一个有趣的局面。


The standard models of trade with which economists work typically yield sharp distributional effects: income losses by certain groups of producers or worker categories are the flip side of the “gains from trade.”	经济学家日常使用的标准贸易模型常常会产剧烈的分配效应：某个生产者或工人群体收入损失，另一些人“从贸易中获益”，此乃同一枚硬币的两面。


And economists have long known that market failures – including poorly functioning labor markets, credit market imperfections, knowledge or environmental externalities, and monopolies – can interfere with reaping those gains.	经济学家早就知道市场失灵——包括劳动力市场功能失调、信用市场不完美、知识和环境外部性、垄断等——可能起到干扰作用，让这些好处无法获得。


They have also known that the economic benefits of trade agreements that reach beyond borders to shape domestic regulations – as with the tightening of patent rules or the harmonization of health and safety requirements – are fundamentally ambiguous.	他们还知道，影响国内监管的跨境贸易协定——比如收紧专利规则或调和健康和安全要求——的经济收益从根本上是模棱两可的。


Nonetheless, economists can be counted on to parrot the wonders of comparative advantage and free trade whenever trade agreements come up.	尽管如此，凡是有贸易协定出台，人们永远希望经济学家高举比较优势和自由贸易的大旗。


They have consistently minimized distributional concerns, even though it is now clear that the distributional impact of, say, the North American Free Trade Agreement or China’s entry into the World Trade Organization were significant for the most directly affected communities in the United States.	他们一直在尽量减小分配顾虑，即使如今已经十分清楚（比如）北美自由贸易协定或中国加入世贸组织的收益效应对于美国最直接的受影响群体而言是非常大的。


They have overstated the magnitude of aggregate gains from trade deals, though such gains have been relatively small since at least the 1990s.	他们过分强调来自贸易协议的总收益，尽管这些���益至少从20世纪90年代以来已经相对较小。


They have endorsed the propaganda portraying today’s trade deals as “free trade agreements,” even though Adam Smith and David Ricardo would turn over in their graves if they read the Trans-Pacific Partnership.	他们大力渲染今天的贸易协议是“自由贸易协定”，即使亚当·斯密和大卫·李嘉图看到跨太平洋合作伙伴协定的话肯定会从坟墓中气活过来。


This reluctance to be honest about trade has cost economists their credibility with the public.	经济学家不愿意在贸易问题上说实话，这导致他们在公众面前失去信誉。


Worse still, it has fed their opponents’ narrative.	更糟糕的是，这有利于他们的反对者的话语权。


Economists’ failure to provide the full picture on trade, with all of the necessary distinctions and caveats, has made it easier to tar trade, often wrongly, with all sorts of ill effects.	经济学家没有提供完整的贸易图景，没有说明白必不可少的区分和警告，这让贸易的各种副作用更加容易被错误地渲染。


For example, as much as trade may have contributed to rising inequality, it is only one factor contributing to that broad trend – and in all likelihood a relatively minor one, compared to technology.	比如，贸易固然可能导致不平等性加剧，但它只是推动这一广泛趋势的因素之一——并且起作用远远不如科技。


Had economists been more upfront about the downside of trade, they may have had greater credibility as honest brokers in this debate.	如果经济学家能够预先普及贸易的弊端，他们本应在这场争论中拥有更高的信誉，被视为诚实的真理代言人。


Similarly, we might have had a more informed public discussion about social dumping if economists had been willing to recognize that imports from countries where labor rights are not protected do raise serious questions about distributive justice.	类似地，如果经济学家愿意承认来自劳动者权利不受保护的国家的进口品确实严重影响了分配正义，我们也可以获得信息更加充分的关于社会倾销（social dumping）的公共讨论。


It may have been possible then to distinguish cases where low wages in poor countries reflect low productivity from cases of genuine rights violations.	我们也因此有望区别对待贫穷国家低工资体现地生产率的例子和真正存在践踏权利现象的例子。


And the bulk of trade that does not raise such concerns may have been better insulated from charges of “unfair trade.”	而大部分没有引起这一担忧的贸易能够更好地与“不公平贸易”指控绝缘。


Likewise, if economists had listened to their critics who warned about currency manipulation, trade imbalances, and job losses, instead of sticking to models that assumed away such problems, they might have been in a better position to counter excessive claims about the adverse impact of trade deals on employment.	同理，如果经济学家听从批评者关于货币操纵、贸易失衡和就业岗位损失的警告，而不是顽固地坚持将这些问题排除在外的模型，他们原本有可能站在更有利的位置反驳过度强调贸易协议对就业的影响的论调。


In short, had economists gone public with the caveats, uncertainties, and skepticism of the seminar room, they might have become better defenders of the world economy.	简言之，如果经济学家在公共话语中拿出警告、不确定性和在研讨班上的怀疑精神，他们原本可以成为更加出色的世界经济捍卫者。


Unfortunately, their zeal to defend trade from its enemies has backfired.	不幸的是，捍卫贸易的热情后院失火。


If the demagogues making nonsensical claims about trade are now getting a hearing – and, in the US and elsewhere, actually winning power – it is trade’s academic boosters who deserve at least part of the blame.	如果产生荒谬的贸易论点的煽动正在被接受——在美国和其他国家，这些实际上已经开始得势——那么贸易学术界至少必须承担部分责任。


Trust Negotiations, Not Iran	相信谈判，而非伊朗


North Korea’s agreement to give up its military nuclear programme was a huge success for the international community.	北韩同意放弃其核子计划对于国际社会而言是一个巨大的成功。


Admittedly, the country’s dire economic condition and its urgent need for energy made the agreement venal in a way.	显然，该国经济状况恶劣，急需能源，从而使得这一协议在某种程度上有点贿赂的味道。


But North Korea’s decision nonetheless demonstrated the virtues and efficacy of diplomacy, which brings us once again to the case of Iran.	但是北韩的决定还是表明了外交的优点和功用。 这就再一次把我们带到了伊朗问题上来。


French President Jacques Chirac recently implied that we should not overestimate the seriousness of Iran’s possessing nuclear weapons.	法国总统希拉克最近指出，我们不必过高估计伊朗拥有核武的严重性。


I disagree.	我对此不敢苟同。


It is true that possessing does not mean using; that for 15 years the world has had eight nuclear powers; and that nuclear force has not been used since 1945.	当然，拥有并非意味着使用，过去15年来世界有了8个核子国家，而自从1945年以来还从来没有使用过核武器。


But it is also true that Iran’s emergence as the ninth nuclear power would provoke a regional and global upheaval, dangerously aggravate fears and suspicions, and confront the international community with a profound crisis of vision and policy.	但是，伊朗一跃成为第九个核子国家将会促发地区和全球动荡，危险地加剧恐惧和怀疑，并且让国际社会面对一场深刻的事关大局观和政策的危机。 这也是毫无疑问的。


So, what can we do?	那么，我们可以做些什么呢？


First, resorting to force is simply not realistic.	首先，诉诸武力根本就是不现实的。


A nuclear strike would have incalculable consequences, and the Muslim world would in this case stand together.	一次核武器打击将会产生无可估量的后果，穆斯林世界将会在这一情况下同仇敌忾。


Nor is a conventional attack possible, as Israel has no common border with Iran and most of the American army is tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq.	使用常规武力打击也是不可能的，因为以色列和伊朗没有共同边界，而大多数美国陆军都身陷阿富汗和伊拉克。


Exploring diplomatic avenues is therefore absolutely necessary.	探索外交途径也就绝对必要了。


Success would be guaranteed if the international community, especially the United States, clearly understands and admits its necessity, and supports it firmly and completely.	如果国际社会、特别是美国清楚地理解和承认这是必要的并且予以坚定和完全支持，那么成功就会有所保证。


For example, economic sanctions, to which Iran is very sensitive, could be tightened, with a commitment not to resort to military force facilitating Russian and Chinese approval.	例如，可以加强对于伊朗非常敏感的经济制裁，同时又承诺不诉诸武力，从而便于俄国和中国的批准。


The only possible framework for negotiations is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968.	唯一可能的谈判框架就是1968年达成的核不扩散条约。


Iran was one of the first countries to sign, and it cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for more than 30 years – a relationship that deteriorated only in the last three years.	伊朗是首批签署该条约的国家之一，而且在30多年的时间里一直与国际原子能机构合作。 这一关系只是在最近三年中才恶化。


But the current climate of mutual wariness between Iran and the self-proclaimed triad of Germany, Great Britain, and France (with sporadic US support) is not propitious to effective negotiations.	但是目前，伊朗和自称的由德国、英国和法国组成的三方(美国不时地提供支持)相互猜忌，这对于有效的谈判并非吉祥。


The West’s aim, announced by the US and followed by the triad, is to force Iran to give up uranium enrichment.	正如美国所宣称的那样，西方国家的目标是强迫伊朗放弃铀浓缩。 三方也对此予以附合。


Yet the NPT is clear: any signatory country that gives up nuclear weapons and accepts the IAEA’s absolute and unconditional control is entitled to produce electric energy from civil nuclear sources, and to receive from the international community, if necessary, technical and financial support.	但是核不扩散条约是明白的，那就是，任何放弃了核武器并且接受国际原子能机构绝对和无条件的监控的签署国都有权力从民用核原料中生产电力，并且在必要的情况下从国际社会那里接受技术和财政支持。


Iran’s oil resources are not infinite, and it wants to have complete control over the civil nuclear field – a basic right as an NPT signatory.	伊朗的石油资源并非是无限的，它想对民用核子领域拥有完全的控制，而这是条约签署国道一个基本权利。


I cannot see how a negotiation aimed at getting Iran to renounce unilaterally a right recognized for all NPT signatories simply in order to build confidence in the West could be successful.	我无法设想，一个目的在于让伊朗单方面放弃所有核不扩散条约签署国都得到承认的一项权利、从而在西方建立信心的谈判可以成功。


Uranium enrichment is certainly the first condition for making bombs, but the level of enrichment must reach about 95%, compared to 3.5% for energy production.	铀浓缩当然是制造原子弹的首要条件，但是其浓缩水平必须达到大约90%，与之相比，能源生产只需要3. 5%。


Are the international scientific community and the IAEA really incapable of providing indicators and criteria that would allow the international community to differentiate between two types of industrial operations?	国际科学界和国际原子能机构果真就没有办法提供指标和标准，从而让国际社会区分这两种工业操作吗？


For example, forty years ago, when fear of nuclear proliferation was new, my teacher and friend Vassili Leontief, who invented the macroeconomic table of inter-industrial flows, argued that the best indicator of an illegal arms program is massive electricity consumption.	例如，40年前，当人们刚刚开始担忧核子扩散的时候，我的老师和朋友、发明了产业间流向的宏观经济表格的雷昂迪耶夫主张，非法武器计划的最佳的指标就是大量的消耗电力。


Nor has the Iranian government ever publicly expressed a will to possess nuclear weapons.	伊朗政府从未公开表示拥有核武器的愿望。


In fact, it has offered several times to accept IAEA monitoring and has suggested that its civil nuclear program would be carried out with international cooperation.	实际上，它几次表示接受国际原子能机构的监督并且表明在国际合作下实施其民用核子计划。


So far, the West has rejected everything, on the pretext that any uranium enrichment would indicate a military program.	至今为止，西方社会拒绝了所有的提议，其借口是任何铀浓缩都将意味着军事计划。


Although this stance is technically wrong, it is strategically rational, given the West’s wariness regarding Iran’s true intentions.	尽管这一立场在技术上是错误的，但是在战略上，鉴于西方国家对伊朗的真实意图抱有戒心，它却是理性的。


I recently met in Paris with Iran’s ambassador to France, and I began brusquely: “So, you really want this bomb, Ambassador?”	我最近在巴黎同伊朗驻法国大使见面，我开门见山地问到：“大使先生，你们真的要原子弹吗？


His answer deserves consideration.	”他的回答值得令人深思。


“Of course not,” he replied.	他说：“当然不是。


“You know very well that the actual ambition of my country is to achieve regional leadership.	你们非常清楚我国的实际上的雄心是获得地区领导地位。


If we had the bomb, the relationships with all our neighbors would immediately deteriorate.”	如果我们有了原子弹，那么，我们与所有邻国的关系都将会恶化。 ”


As everybody knows, ambassadors are paid to lie.	众所周知，大使拿工资就是骗人。


The West’s wariness is well founded, and we have no reason to renounce our mistrust.	西方的戒心是有道理的，而且我们没有理由放弃我们的不信任。


But that should not prevent us from exploring all scenarios.	但是这不应该阻止我们探索所有的可能性。


If we interpret the NPT correctly, we can launch negotiations with Iran that would carefully explore the potential sincerity or not of its official stance.	如果我们正确解释核不扩散条约，那么，我们就可以同伊朗开展可以揭示其官方立场是否具有潜在诚意的谈判。


Even outright lies spoken in a nationally broadcast interview go unchallenged, as if Trump were indeed entitled to his own facts.	此人即便在全国广播的采访中说弥天大��也毫无顾忌，仿佛他确实有权去捏造自己所认定的事实。


Greece Without Illusions	没有幻想的希腊


ATHENS – “The costliest minor government reshuffle in Greece’s history.” That is at least one way to describe the result of the Greek general election on September 20.	雅典——“希腊有史以来代价最昂贵的局部政府改组”，这至少是形容9月20日希腊大选结果的一种方式。


Indeed, with few exceptions, the same ministers have returned to the same offices as part of an administration backed by the same odd pair of parties (the left-wing Syriza and the smaller right-wing Independent Greeks), which received only a slightly lower share of the vote than the previous administration.	事实上，除去极少数例外，同样的部长又回到了由同样奇怪的党派组合（即左翼联盟和规模略小的右翼独立希腊人党）支持的同样的政府职位，而且得票率仅仅略低于前任政府。


But the appearance of continuity is misleading.	但表面的连续性很容易让人对形势产生误读。


While the percentage of voters backing the government is relatively unchanged, 0.6 million of the 6.1 million Greeks who voted in the July 5 referendum on continued “extend-and-pretend” loans with stringent austerity strings attached did not turn out.	尽管支持政府的选民比例相对未变，但7月5日公投中就附带严格紧缩条件的“救助和遮掩”贷款投票的610万希腊选民中有060万都没有参与选举投票。


The loss of so many voters in little more than two months reflects the electorate’s dramatic change in mood – from passionate to glum.	短短两个多月就损失这么多选民反映了选民情绪从热情到忧郁的戏剧性变化。


The shift reflects the mandate that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought and gained.	上述差异反映出亚历克西斯·齐普拉斯首相所获授权的变化。


Last January, when I stood with him, we asked voters to back our determination to end the “extend-and-pretend” bailouts that had pushed Greece into a black hole and operated as the template for austerity policies across Europe.	去年1月我和他并肩战斗时，我们要求选民支持我们结束将希腊推入深渊并成为欧洲标准模版的紧缩政策。


The government that was returned on September 20 has the opposite mandate: to implement an “extend-and-pretend” bailout program – indeed, the most toxic variant ever.	而9月20日再次当选的政府任务完全相反：即推行有史以来毒性最大的“救助和遮掩”援助计划。


The new Tsipras administration knows this.	新任齐普拉斯政府对此非常清楚。


Tsipras understands that his government is skating on the thin ice of a fiscal program that cannot succeed and a reform agenda that his ministers loathe.	齐普拉斯明白他的政府如履薄冰，财政计划没有成功的希望，部长们实际非常反感改革议程。


While voters wisely prefer that he and his cabinet, rather than the conservative opposition, implement a program that an overwhelming majority of Greeks detest, the reality of the austerity agenda will test public patience.	尽管选民明智地选择了他和他的政府而没有投票给保守反对派，但推行一项绝大多数希腊人厌恶的紧缩计划的现实将会考验公众的耐心。


The Tsipras government is committed to enacting a long list of recessionary measures.	齐普拉斯政府决心颁布一长串紧缩措施。


Three highlight the tax avalanche that awaits: More than 600,000 farmers will be asked to pay additional back taxes for 2014 and to pre-pay over 50% of next year’s estimated tax.	即将实施三项大规模增税政策： 600,000多农民将被要求补缴2014年税款，并预缴50%以上的来年预估税赋。


Some 700,000 small businesses (including low-wage workers who are forced to operate as private service providers) will have to pre-pay 100% (yes, you read that right) of next year’s taxes.	约700,000 家小企业（包括被迫成为私人服务提供商的低薪工人）将被迫预缴100%（是的，你没有看错）的来年赋税。


As of next year, every merchant will face a 26% turnover tax from the first euro they earn – while being required to pre-pay in 2016 a full 75% of their 2017 taxes.	截止来年，每名商人从挣第1块欧元起就必须缴纳26%的营业税——此外还被要求在2016年预缴高达75%的2017年赋税。


In addition to these ludicrous tax hikes (which also include substantial increases in sales taxes), the Tsipras government has agreed to pension cutbacks and fire sales of public assets.	除去这些可笑的增税计划（其中也包括销售税的大幅增加），齐普拉斯政府还同意削减养老金和公共资产贱卖。


Even most reform-minded Greeks balk at the agenda imposed by the “troika” (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank).	就连最具改革头脑的希腊人都拒绝接受“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、国际货币基金组织和欧洲央行）强加的改革方案。


Tsipras is attempting to erect two lines of defense against the coming tsunami of pain (and thereby minimize popular discontent).	齐普拉斯正试图建立两道防火墙以抵御即将到来的海啸般的痛苦（进而最大限度地平复民众的不满情绪）。


The first line is to press the troika to make good on its promise to enter into debt-relief negotiations once its recessionary agenda has been fully implemented.	第一道是敦促三驾马车兑现承诺，在希腊紧缩计划全面实施后开始债务减免谈判。


The second line of defense is based on the promise of a “parallel” agenda aimed at ameliorating the worst effects of the troika program.	第二道防线是基于推行“平行”计划缓解三驾马车计划最坏影响的承诺。


But both lines are porous, at best, given the harsh realities of Greece’s economic circumstances.	但考虑到希腊经济环境的严酷状况，这两道防火墙即使最乐观地看也是漏洞百出。


There is little doubt that the Greek government will gain some debt relief.	人们并不怀疑希腊政府会获得某种程度的债务减免。


An unpayable debt is, one way or another, a haircut.	任何未偿还债务或多或少都是一种价值折扣。


But Greece’s creditors have already had two haircuts, first in the spring of 2012, and another that December.	但希腊的债主已经打折过两次，第一次是在2012年春天，第二次是在当年12月。


Alas, those haircuts, while substantial, were too little, too late, and too toxic in terms of their financial and legal parameters.	唉，那些让步虽然绝对数额可观，但对缓解希腊困难仍然太晚、太少，并且在金融和法律方面毒性太大。


The question facing the Tsipras government is thus whether the next haircut will be more therapeutic than the last.	因此下一次债务减免能否对希腊经济疗效明显需要引起齐普拉斯政府的关注。


To help the Greek economy heal, debt relief must be both sizeable and a lever for eliminating most of the new austerity measures, which merely guarantee another spin of the debt-deflation cycle.	为帮助希腊经济复苏，债务减免必须数额巨大且能带动新紧缩措施的消除，因为紧缩措施所起的作用仅仅是诱发新一轮的债务紧缩。


More precisely, debt reduction must be accompanied by a reduction in the target for the medium-term primary budget surplus, from the current 3.5% of GDP to no more than 1.5%.	更准确地讲，债务减免必须伴随中期主要预算盈余目标的缩减，从目前占GDP的3. 5%缩减到1.


Nothing else can allow the Greek economy to recover.	5%以下。 希腊经济复苏除此以外别无他法。


Is anything like this politically possible?	这在政治方面能否做到？


One clue recently emerged in an article in the Financial Times in which Klaus Regling, the head of Europe’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, returned to the troika’s mantra that Greece does not need substantial debt relief.	《金融时报》最近刊登的文章提供了一条线索，欧洲稳定机制欧洲救助基金会会长克劳斯·雷格林重提三驾马车的口头禅，即希腊不需要大规模减免债务。


Regling may not be a major player in his own right, but he never speaks out of turn or contradicts the ECB and the German government.	雷格林本人或许算不上重要人物，但他从未说话不合时宜或否定欧洲央行和德国政府。


Of course, there is the IMF, whose staff tell anyone willing to listen that Greek debt must be cut by approximately one-third, or €100 billion ($112 billion).	当然还有国际货币基金组织，该组织工作人员告诉所有愿意倾听者希腊债务必须削减三分之一，或者1万亿欧元（合1. 12万亿美元）的总额。


But if the recent past is any guide to the near future, the IMF’s views will be trumped.	但如果过去能给未来任何启示，国际货币基金组织的观点将被抛到脑后。


This leaves Tsipras with only his second line of defense: the “parallel” program.	齐普拉斯因此只剩下第二道防线：即“平行”计划。


The idea here is to demonstrate to the electorate that the government can combine capitulation to the troika with its own agenda of reforms, comprising efficiency gains and an assault on the oligarchy that may liberate funds for the purpose of lessening austerity’s impact on weaker Greeks.	其目的是向选民显示政府可以边向“三驾马车”低头边推行自己的改革计划，即将提高效率和攻击寡头相结合，并将由此解放的资金用于减少紧缩政策对希腊弱势群体的影响。


This is a worthy project.	这是个有价值的项目。


If the government can pull it off, it is a potential game changer.	如果政府能够执行到位，它或许可能决定最终胜负。


To succeed, however, the government will have to slay two dragons at once: The incompetence of Greece’s public administration and the inexhaustible resourcefulness of an oligarchy that knows how to defend itself – including by forging strong alliances with the troika.	但要想取得成功，政府却不得不面临双线作战：一是解决希腊公共政府的无能，二是应对深谙自保之道（包括与三驾马车强强联手）且财力雄厚的寡头。


Tuberculosis or Hair Loss?	肺结核还是脱发？


Refocusing Medical Research	重新定位医学研究


PRINCETON – In an ideal world, the amount of money we spend on medical research to prevent or cure a disease would be proportional to its seriousness and the number of people who suffer from it.	普林斯顿 – 理想世界中，我们为治疗某种疾病而花在医学研究上的经费应该是和此病的严重性和受此疾病困扰的人数成比例的。


In the real world, 90% of the money spent on medical research is focused on conditions that are responsible for just 10% of the deaths and disability caused by diseases globally.	而现实世界中，医学研究的90%的经费集中在仅10%的引起死亡和残疾的全球性疾病上。


In other words, the diseases that cause nine-tenths of what the World Health Organization refers to as “the global burden of disease” are getting only one-tenth of the world’s medical research effort.	换句话说，世界卫生组织称之为“全球疾病负担”的十分之九的疾病仅有世界上十分之一的医疗研究在为之努力。


As a result, millions of people die every year from diseases for which no new drugs are in the pipeline, while drug companies pour billions into developing cures for erectile dysfunction and baldness.	结果是，每年数以百万计的人死于没有新药可治的疾病，而药品公司却投入数十亿的资金来开发治疗勃起功能不良和脱发的药品。


But blaming drug companies is too easy a response.	但是，因此而指责制药公司却是过于简单了。


They cannot justify developing new drugs unless they can expect to recoup their costs through sales.	制药公司只有在预计到销售该药能赚回成本的前提下，才会考虑开发一种新药。


If they target diseases that affect affluent people, or people living in countries with national health insurance, they will be able to patent any new drugs they discover.	如果这些新药针对的是那些影响富人或生活在有全民健康保险的国家的人的疾病，药厂就能为新发明的药品注册专利。


For the 20 years that the patent lasts, they will have a monopoly on the drug’s sale and be able to command a high price.	在20年的专利期限中，他们会垄断药品的销售，保证了药品高价。


If drug companies target diseases that affect only people who are unable to pay high prices for drugs, they cannot expect to cover their research costs, let alone make a profit.	如果制药公司针对的疾病仅仅是困扰那些付不起高药价的人，那就无望收回研发成本，更妄谈盈利了。


No matter how much their directors may want to focus on the diseases that kill the most people, the current system of financial incentives means that if they did so, their shareholders would remove them, or their companies would soon be out of business. That would help no one.	无论药厂的总监们多么地想致力于开发针对于人类生命最大杀手的药品，现有的财务回报体系却意味着，如果他们这样做，股东们就会抛弃他们，或公司不久就会倒闭，这样的结果对谁都没有好处。


The problem is with the system, not with the individuals who make their choices within it.	所以说，问题是出在体系上，而不是出在因体系做出选择的人。


At a meeting in Oslo in August, Incentives for Global Health, a nonprofit organization directed by Aidan Hollis, professor of economics at the University of Calgary, and Thomas Pogge, professor of philosophy and international affairs at Yale, launched a radical new proposal to change the incentives under which corporations are rewarded for developing new medicines.  They suggest that governments contribute to a Health Impact Fund that would pay pharmaceutical companies in proportion to the extent to which their products reduce the global burden of disease.	八月在在奥斯陆召开的会议上，全球健康促进，一个由卡尔加利大学经济学教授Aidan Hollis和耶鲁大学哲学和国际事务教授Thomas Pogge领导的非盈利组织，推出了一项激进的新提议以改变药厂开发新药获得回报的体系。 他们建议政府出钱建立一个健康影响基金，这个基金可以按药厂的产品对于减低全球疾病负担所做的贡献，来付钱给药厂。


The fund would not replace existing patent laws, but would offer an alternative to them.  Pharmaceutical companies could continue to patent and sell their products as they do now.  Alternatively, they could register a new drug with the Heath Impact Fund, which would set a low price based on the drug’s manufacturing cost.	该基金不会取代现有的专利法，但是会提供一项变通。 制药公司可以继续和现在一样为它们的产品注册专利并进行销售，而变通的是，他们可以向健康影响基金注���另一种新药名，基金再按照此药的生产成本定一个比较低的价格。


Instead of profiting from sales at high prices, the corporation would become eligible for a share of all payments made by the fund over the next ten years.	药厂有资格在接下来的十年中，从基金获得一部分款项，而不是靠高价出售药品盈利。


The size of the share would be calculated by assessing the contribution the drug has made to reducing death and disability.	至于获得的数额，会通过评估该药对降低死亡和残疾的贡献来计算。


The beauty of the scheme is that it gives economic support to the idea that all human lives are of equal value.	次项提议的妙处在于，它从经济上支持了每个人的生命都同样宝贵的理念。


For products that drug companies register with the Health Impact Fund, corporations would get the same reward for saving the lives of Africans living in extreme poverty as they would get for saving the lives of wealthy citizens of affluent nations.	药厂注册在健康影响基金的药品，企业无论是在挽救极度贫穷人们的生命，或是挽救富裕国家的富裕公民的生命，都得到了同样的回报。


The most potentially lucrative targets would become the diseases that kill the most people, because that is where a breakthrough drug would have the biggest impact on global health.	这样，最有赚钱潜力的目标就对准了夺取最多人生命的疾病，因为在这个领域，突破性的新药才能对全球健康做出最大影响。


Moreover, companies would have an incentive to produce and distribute drugs at the lowest possible price, because only when the poor could use them would the drug save the greatest possible number of lives.	而且，制药公司会有更大的热情去生产药品并在尽可能低的价格销售，因为只有当穷人能买得起，药才可能挽救尽可能多的生命。


A company might choose to allow cheap generic copies of its drug to be made in developing countries, because that would enable it to be used more widely, and to save more lives – for which the Health Impact Fund would reward the company that registered it.	公司也能允许无专利的廉价复制药品在欠发达国家制造，因为这能让药品在更广泛的范围内使用以挽救更多的生命，而健康影响基金将以此奖赏注册该药的公司。


Hollis and Pogge estimate that about $6 billion a year would be required to enable the Fund to provide a sufficient incentive for drug companies to register products that target the diseases of the poor.	据Hollis 和 Pogge教授估计，每年需要60亿美元才能使该基金向注册针对穷人的药品的药厂提供足够的资金激励。


That figure would be reached if countries accounting for one-third of the global economy – say, most European nations, or the United States and one or two small affluent nations – contributed 0.03 % of their gross national income, or three cents for every $100 they earn.	如果要达到这个数字，需要占世界经济总量三分之一的国家，比如大部分的欧洲国家或美国，再加上两个小的富裕国家，拿出他们国民总收入的0. 03%，或者说是从每100美元中拿出三分钱。


That’s not a trivial sum, but it isn’t out of reach, especially considering that affluent nations would also benefit from cheaper drugs and from medical research that was focused on reducing disease rather than on maximizing profits.	那不是个小数目，但也并非遥不可及，尤其是考虑到，富裕国家也能从廉价药品中获益，也能从旨在消除疾病而非盈利最大化的医学研究中获益。


It’s the Economy, Tunisia	突尼斯，经济才是问题的关键！


TUNIS – On December 21, Tunisia completed a remarkable democratic transfer of power, with the election of Beji Caid Essebsi, the leader of the secular political party Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia).	发自突尼斯市—12月21日，随着世俗派政党呼声党（Nidaa Tounes）领袖贝吉·凯德·埃塞卜西（Beji Caid Essebsi）当选，突尼斯完成一场了不起的民主权力转移。


As with the parliamentary election in October, the process of choosing a president was, for the most part, fair and free of violence.	最重要的是，在十月的议会选举中，总统选举的过程很大程度上是公平而且非暴力的。


For the moment, Tunisia is the only Arab Spring country that appears to be on a path to genuine democratic governance.	目前看来，突尼斯似乎是“阿拉伯之春”革命中，唯一一个真正走上民主治理之路的国家。


Since the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, the country has endured pressures from Islamic radicals, a deterioration of its economy, and a chaotic transitional period.	由于总统宰因·阿比丁·本阿里（Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali）在2011年下台，这个国家遭受了伊斯兰激进分子的压力，恶化的经济，以及一个混乱的过渡期。


But it has also written and adopted a new constitution structured to encourage the separation and balance of powers, and it seems on track to pull off a successful change in government.	但它也谱写和实现了旨在鼓励分权与制衡的新宪法，似乎也走上了一条为政府带来成功变革的轨道。


Tunisia is relatively homogeneous ethnically and lacks sharp sectarian divisions; nonetheless, owing partly to its porous borders with Algeria and Libya, the specter of violence is always present.	突尼斯是一个种族分布相对均匀，缺乏尖锐教派分歧的国家； 尽管如此，由于与阿尔及利亚和利比亚接壤，暴力的幽灵一直存在。


Indeed, the issue of security dominated both the parliamentary and presidential elections, with all sides claiming to be the best qualified to counter extremism.	事实上，安全问题是议会和总统选举的核心，各方都声称自己最有资格去打击极端主义。


Lurking in the background of the presidential election was fear in some quarters that a victory by Nidaa Tounes, which won a plurality in parliament, might mean a return to authoritarian rule.	但潜伏在总统选举背后的忧虑是，呼声党以多数票在议会中胜利在某种程度上可能意味着这个国家将重新回到威权统治之下。


Given concerns about security and the fate of the democratic transition, economic issues were essentially put on hold in both elections.	鉴于安全和民主转型命运的担忧，在两个选举中，经济问题几乎都被搁置。


Now it is time for Tunisia’s leaders to put the economy at the top of their agenda.	现在是突尼斯领导人把经济放在首位的时候了。


In the coming weeks, Nidaa Tounes, which won 86 of the parliament’s 217 seats, will face a difficult decision as it attempts to form a government.	虽然在217个议会席位中拿下了86个席位，但呼声党将在未来几周试图组建政府时面临一个艰难的决定。


The party’s leaders could strike a power-sharing arrangement with the moderate Islamist Ennahda party, which finished second, with 69 seats, and risk a stalemate over policy.	该党领导人可以选择与温和的伊斯兰复兴运动党达成权力分享协议，后者在选举中赢得69座位，位居第二，并因此面临陷入政策僵局的风险。


Or they could piece together a working majority from smaller political parties and try to govern in an unstable coalition beset by deep policy disagreements.	或者他们可以选择拼凑小政治党派形成多数派，然后试图管理一个因政策分歧严重而极不稳定的联合政府。


Whatever Nidaa Tounes decides, the new government will have to act quickly.	无论如何决定，新政府必须迅速行动。


The country’s moribund economy has fueled public disillusionment.	该国疲弱的经济使公众深感沮丧。


Unemployment is falling, but it remains high, at more than 15% – and higher still among the young.	失业率虽然下降了，但仍然很高，达到15%以上——年轻人的失业率更高。


The fiscal and current-account deficits are widening, foreign investment is weak, inflation is rising, and corruption remains rampant.	财政和经常账户赤字扩大，外国投资疲软，通胀上升，同时腐败依然猖獗。


Distrust of political parties and disappointment in their ability to govern is widespread, as evidenced by low voter turnout in the recent elections.	对政党的不信任，对执政能力的失望正在蔓延，最近的选举中的低投票率就是一种表现。


Tunisia’s political achievements could rapidly be reversed if the new government cannot quickly revive the economy and improve citizens’ daily lives.	如果新政府不能迅速振兴经济和改善市民生活，那么突尼斯的政治成果将很快被推翻。


Nidaa Tounes must take the lead in forging support from all major parties for a national-unity agenda on economic reforms.	呼声党必须带头推动所有主要政党支持国家统一的经济改革进程。


In its first 30 days, the new National Assembly should publicly announce a consensus vision for economic growth and job creation.	在最初的30天，新的国民大会应公布对于经济增长和创造就业机会的共同愿景。


A broad multi-party commitment would likely help discipline subsequent legislative action and assist in generating the necessary public support.	一个广泛的多方承诺可能有助于规范以后的立法行动和帮助催生必要的公共支持。


There is already broad agreement among the major political parties on the necessary priorities: bringing public spending under control, encouraging private-sector growth and employment, promoting regional development and social inclusion, and investing in essential infrastructure.	主要政党之间已经有针对某些必要性重点事务的宏观协议：控制公共支出，鼓励私营部门的增长和就业，促进区域发展和社会包容，并投资于基础设施。


In the previous assembly, work stalled on several significant pieces of legislation, including laws on public-private partnerships, foreign investment, and banking reform.	在以往的议会中，若干重要的立法工作停滞，包括对公私合作关系的法律，外国投资以及银行业改革。


The unity agenda should include early passage of these bills.	统一的议程应包括这些法案的迅速制定通过。


Tunisia’s politicians will be able to draw on existing work.	突尼斯的政治家们将可以利用现有的工作。


The program developed by acting Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa in September 2014 deserves serious consideration.	这个由代理总理迈赫迪·朱马（Mehdi Jomaa）在 2014年9月发展的项目很值得认真考虑。


The International Monetary Fund Stand-By Arrangement of 2013 provides a similar starting point.	国际货币基金组织2013年的备用信贷安排提供了一个类似的启动点。


To maintain support from the IMF when its current program ends in summer 2015, Tunisia will need to negotiate new commitments.	要在2015年夏天项目结束时维持国际货币基金组织的支持，突尼斯将需要商讨制定出一个新的承诺。


A consensus reform package could serve as a credible point of departure.	一个获得共识的改革方案可以作为一个可靠的出发点。


In the meantime, Western democracies must do their part and sustain engagement with Tunisia.	与此同时，西方民主国家必须做好自己的本分，并维持与突尼斯的约定。


The 2011 Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, in which G-8 members pledged to support Arab countries’ efforts to move toward “free, democratic, and tolerant societies,” has a role to play.	2011年多维尔伙伴关系与阿拉伯转型国家��议发挥了作用，会议中八国集团成员承诺支持阿拉伯国家努力走向“自由、民主、包容的社会”。


This mechanism may be unlikely to mobilize significant new financing, but participating countries can provide valuable political and technical support on structural reform, regional integration, and private-sector development.	这种机制不太可能动员大量新的融资，但参与的国家可以就结构改革，区域一体化，以及私人企业的发展提供宝贵的政治和技术支持。


Provided the security threats are contained, an early consensus within Tunisia on a credible economic agenda would open the taps of the largest potential source of capital: international financial markets.	考虑到安全威胁已经得到了遏制，突尼斯针对可靠经济议程的一个前期共识将开启最大的潜在资本来源水龙头：国际金融市场。


The incoming funds, and the subsequent growth and job creation, would undergird the consolidation of democracy – and thus help cement the impressive gains that Tunisia has made so far.	资金流入，然后是经济增长和创造就业机会，将大大巩固民主，从而有助巩固突尼斯至今创造的伟大成果。


Turkey’s ISIS Crisis	土耳其的ISIS危机


ISTANBUL – Following the recent safe return of 46 Turkish hostages held by the Islamic State, hopes were raised in the United States that Turkey would finally commit to joining the US-led coalition now fighting the group.	伊斯坦布尔—最近，46名被伊斯兰国劫持的土耳其人质安全返回，美国开始希望土耳其最终能够加入其所领导的对抗伊斯兰国(IS)的联盟。


But Turkey’s willingness to contribute to the coalition remains constrained by the legacy of its ill-fated Syria policy, as well as by a fundamental strategic disconnect between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government and US President Barack Obama’s administration.	但土耳其为该联盟出力的意愿饱受其不幸的叙利亚政策以及总统埃尔多安政府和美国总统奥巴马政府在基本战略方面的分歧的掣肘。


Since Syria’s civil war began three years ago, Turkey has provided logistical and financial support to virtually all elements of the Syrian opposition, while allowing them to use Turkish territory to regroup after launching military operations across the border.	自三年前叙利亚内战爆发以来，土耳其为所有叙利亚反对派都提供了物流和金融援助，同时还开放土耳其领土供他们在发动跨境军事行动后进行整顿。


Committed to regime change in Syria, Turkey turned a blind eye to some of these groups’ brutal tactics, radical ideologies, and big ambitions.	土耳其致力于叙利亚的政权更迭，对这些组织的野蛮做法、极端意识形态和巨大野心睁一只眼闭一只眼。


The fear now is that this benign neglect has allowed the Islamic State to embed itself in Turkey and build the capacity to conduct terrorist activities on Turkish soil – and thus to retaliate for Turkish participation in the US-led coalition.	现在的担忧是这一友善的视而不见导致伊斯兰国在土耳其生根并有能力在土耳其土地上开战恐怖活动——以此报复土耳其参加美国领导的联盟。


But there is more behind Turkey’s reticent response to the coalition.	但土耳其对联盟反应冷淡还有其他原因。


Turkey fundamentally disagrees with the US in its interpretation of the threat that the Islamic State poses – and how to address it.	土耳其从根本上反对美国对伊斯兰国威胁——以及如何解决这一威胁——的看法。


Simply put, whereas the US is approaching the Islamic State as the Middle East’s most pressing problem, Turkey views the group as a symptom of deeper pathologies.	简言之，美国将伊斯兰国视为中东最紧迫的问题，而土耳其认为伊斯兰国只是更深层次病根的症候。


According to this view, any campaign that focuses exclusively on destroying the Islamic State will do nothing to prevent the emergence of similar threats in the near future.	根据这一观点，只关注摧毁伊斯兰国的方案无助于防止类似的威胁在随后重新发生。


And, unlike the US, Middle Eastern countries and their neighbors cannot decide to “pivot” away from the region when the consequences of their poorly designed interventions become too unruly.	此外，与美国不同，中东国家及其邻国无法在组织拙劣的干预流于无序后选择“离开”该地区。


In this context, Turkey’s leaders believe that the international community’s response to the Islamic State should be far more ambitious, seeking to redress the underlying causes of the current disorder.	在这样的背景下，土耳其领导人认为国际社会对伊斯兰国的反应应该更具进取心，应该试图解决当前乱象的根本原因。


Such a strategy would have to include efforts to compel Iraq’s new government to break with the sectarianism of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, while supporting the new leadership’s efforts to provide basic health, educational, and municipal services to all of Iraq’s citizens.	这一战略必须包括迫使伊拉克新政府与前总理马利基的宗派主义决裂，同时支持新领导层为伊拉克公民提供基本卫生、教育和市政服务的努力。


As for Syria, the only plausible route to normalcy begins with forcing President Bashar al-Assad to cede power.	至于叙利亚，唯一可行的正常化途径必须从迫使总统巴沙尔·阿萨德交出权力开始。


To this end, the US and its allies should consider striking Assad’s strongholds in Syria, while establishing safe havens for the moderate opposition under the protective cloak of a no-fly zone.	在这方面，美国及其盟友应该考虑袭击巴沙尔在叙利亚的据点，同时划定保护性禁飞区，为温和反对派建立避风港。


Here, Turkey, for which the establishment of safe havens is vital to accommodate Syrians who have been displaced by the conflict, could play a central role.	土耳其可以在这方面起到关键作用。 对土耳其来说，建立避风港对于安置因冲突而流离失所的叙利亚人来说至关重要。


Turkey is already bearing a heavy burden of Syrian refugees, having absorbed more than one million since the crisis began in 2011.	土耳其已经不堪叙利亚难民的重负，自2011年危机开始以来吸收的难民人数超过100万。


Following Islamic State attacks against Kurdish enclaves, more than 120,000 refugees crossed into Turkey in a single weekend.	在伊斯兰国袭击库尔德飞地后，120,000多难民在一周之内涌入土耳其。


That is roughly the same number of Syrians allowed to seek refuge in the entire European Union since the crisis began in 2011.	这一数字与2011年危机爆发以来被允许以难民身份进入欧盟的叙利亚人数差不多。


An orchestrated military campaign against the Islamic State will undoubtedly displace even more Syrians.	精心组织的打击伊斯兰国军事行动毫无疑问会让更多叙利亚人流离失所。


But, in Turkey’s view, they should not have to cross the border to be safe.	但是，在土耳其看来，他们不需要逃到国外寻找安全。


Instead, Turkey wants to take the lead in building infrastructure that could serve the needs of Syria’s displaced people within the country’s borders.	相反，土耳其希望在建设能在叙利亚境内满足流亡民众需要的基础设施方面起领导作用。


Such projects would make sense only within internationally guaranteed safe havens protected by a no-fly zone.	只有建立受禁飞保护的有国际保证的安全港，这些工程才有意义。


Given that the Islamic State poses a graver threat to Turkey than to any other Western country, Turkey has no choice other than to participate in the campaign against it.	考虑到伊斯兰国对土耳其的威胁甚于其他任何西方国家，土耳其别无选择，只能参与与其对抗的联盟。


This means, first and foremost, adopting a zero-tolerance policy toward the Islamic State at home, aimed at preventing the group from fundraising and recruiting on Turkish soil.	这首先意味着对国内伊斯兰国组织采取零容忍政策，旨在防止该组织在土耳其境内洗钱和招募人手。


Continued improvement of border security and deeper cooperation with Western intelligence agencies on the issue of foreign fighters are also essential.	边境安全的持续改善和与西方情报机构在外国战士问题上的更深层次合作也十分关键。


But Turkey’s imperative to fight the Islamic State does not trump – much less invalidate – Turkish leaders’ concerns about Obama’s long-term goals.	但土耳其语伊斯兰国斗争的当务之急没有超过——更不用说搁置——土耳其领导人对奥巴马长期目标的关心。


If the US and Turkey are to work together to eradicate the Islamic State, they will first have to agree on a longer-term strategy for restoring some semblance of order to a crisis-ravaged region.	如果美国和土耳其意欲合作清除伊斯兰国，它们首先必须在长期战略上达成一致，为饱受危机摧残的地区重建表面秩序。


Turkey and Europe: Two Trains on a Collision Course?	土耳其与欧洲：两列迎头相撞的火车？


By intervening in Lebanon, Europeans have made a far-reaching, risk-fraught, and, at the same time, correct decision.	欧洲插手黎巴嫩的事务，是做了一个影响深远、充满风险、但同时又正确的决定。


The reason is that the future of Europe’s security will be determined in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.	究其原因，欧洲未来的安全将取决于地中海东部和中东的局势。


Europe, whether it likes it or not, has taken on a new, strategic role in the region.	欧洲，不论愿意与否，已经在这个地区承担起新的战略性作用。


Should it fail, the price will be high.	一旦失败，代价将非常高昂。


In view of the serious risks that Europe has assumed, in full awareness of the consequences, it is of the utmost importance that a European “Grand Strategy” for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East be developed, so that Europe can calmly and clearly define its interests.	鉴于欧洲承担的重大风险，充分意识到其后果，欧洲必须对地中海中部和中东制定一套“宏大的战略”，从而冷静、明确地界定其利益所在。


In any serious variation of this Grand Strategy, Turkey will need to play a central role – politically, militarily, economically, and culturally.	要对这套宏大战略进行任何重要的改动，土耳其应该发挥核心作用——政治上、军事上、经济上、以及文化上。


Safeguarding Europe’s interests today means establishing a strong link – indeed an unbreakable bond – with Turkey as a cornerstone of regional security.	保障欧洲今天的利益意味着要和土耳其建立牢固的联系——应该说是一种牢不可破的纽带，作为地区安全的基石。


So it is astonishing that Europe is doing exactly the opposite: firmly closing its eyes to the strategic challenge posed by Turkey.	然而让人莫名其妙的是欧洲的做法刚好与此背道而驰：对土耳其引起的战略挑战视而不见。


Successful modernization and democratization of Turkey – with a strong civil society, the rule of law, and a modern economy – will not only be hugely beneficial for Turkey, but will also export stability and serve as a model for transformation in the Islamic world.	土耳其的现代化和民主化如果成功——形成坚强、文明的社会、法制以及现代化的经济——不仅仅对土耳其自己有着极大的好处，而且还将输出稳定，成为伊斯兰世界转型的榜样。


Above all, the successful modernization of a large Muslim country will make a decisive contribution to Europe’s security.	最重要的是，一个穆斯林大国的现代化成功将对欧洲的安全做出决定性的贡献。


Since the days of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, the modernization of Turkey has relied on its Western or European perspective.	从现代土耳其的国父凯末尔·阿塔土克时代起，土耳其的现代化就一直以其西方或欧洲前景为准绳。


For the last 43 years, this perspective has been largely defined by Turkey’s interest in joining the European Union and by the EU’s promise of accession.	过去43年来，这个前景主要体现在土耳其对加入欧盟的兴趣和欧盟同意接收的承诺上。


But at the very moment when even slightest glance at the crisis-ridden region on Europe’s eastern flank – Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Middle East conflict, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, Islamic terrorism, emigration, and threats to Europe’s energy supplies – should make clear Turkey’s paramount importance to European security, Europe is reveling in its disinterest in the state of European-Turkish relations.	然而此时，虽然放眼欧洲东翼这个危机重重的地区——伊朗、伊拉克、叙利亚、中东冲突、中亚和南高加索地区、伊斯兰恐怖主义、移民、欧洲能源供应危机——就可以看出土耳其对欧洲安全至高无上的重要性，但是欧洲却还在因其对欧土关系现状的不关心而沾沾自喜。


This autumn, the European Commission is scheduled to issue a progress report on accession negotiations with Turkey.	今秋，欧盟委员会将按计划颁布土耳其入盟谈判进程报告。


A dangerous situation may well emerge, as this report threatens to derail the whole process.	一种危险的情况可能出现，因为这份报告可能导致整个进程脱轨。


The key dispute is over Cyprus.	争执焦点在于塞浦路斯。


Turkey has refused to open its ports, airports, and roads to the Republic of Cyprus, as it is obligated to do by the Ankara Protocol, which set the terms of Turkey’s accession negotiations.	土耳其拒绝按照安卡拉协议（该协议规定了土耳其入盟谈判的条款）的规定开放通往塞浦路斯共和国的港口、机场和公路。


Turkey explains its refusal by the EU’s failure (as a result of a veto by the Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia) to fulfill its own promise to open up trade with Northern Cyprus, which is under Turkish rule.	对此，土耳其的解释是欧盟没有履行自己的承诺（因为尼科西亚的希腊族塞浦路斯政府投了否决票），开放与土耳其人控制下的北塞浦路斯的贸易。


The EU made these promises at the Council of Europe in December 2003 and formally at the Council of Foreign Ministers in April 2004. But so far it has not fulfilled them.	欧盟是在2003年12月的欧洲议会上做出上述承诺的，但迄今仍未履行。


So it is Ankara – and not the EU! – that has a legitimate point here.	因此，有理的是安卡拉——不是欧盟！


When the Ankara Protocol was agreed, the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved something that, until then, had been considered impossible: he shattered the decades-old opposition of Turkish Cypriots to a compromise between the two parts of the divided island.	安卡拉协议的签订标志着土耳其总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安领导的政府取得了之前被认为不可能取得的成就：他打破了数十年来土耳其族塞浦路斯不肯在这个岛屿分裂的双方之间接受妥协的固执。


Turkish Northern Cyprus accepted UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan (massively supported by the EU) to resolve the long-standing conflict.	土耳其族的北塞浦路斯接受了联合国秘书长科菲·安南解决长期冲突的计划（该计划得到欧盟的大力支持）。


But the Greek South, goaded and inflamed by its government, rejected it.	但是希腊族的南部在其政府的怂恿和煽动下，拒绝了这个计划。


It would be deeply unjust and outright foolish if the EU Commission’s report holds Turkey responsible for its refusal to make further concessions to Greek Cyprus (now an EU member), while refusing to blame the government in Nicosia, which is the real cause of the blockage.	如果欧盟委员会的报告因土耳其拒绝向希腊族塞浦路斯（现任欧盟成员国）作进一步的退让而将责任推到他们身上，而不肯批评尼科西亚政府这个真正的障碍，那将是非常不公平的，而且绝对是愚蠢的。


Some in the EU – mainly in France, Germany, and Austria – seem smugly pleased by the prospect of a clash on this issue, believing it will force Turkey to give up its drive for membership.	欧盟的某些人——主要在法国、德国和奥地利——似乎对这个问题上可能发生的冲突幸灾乐祸，认为这样会促使土耳其放弃对加入欧盟的追求。


But this attitude is irresponsible.	但是这样的态度是不负责任的。


The EU is about to commit a grave strategic error by allowing its report this autumn to be guided by the short-sighted domestic policy considerations of some of its important member states.	欧盟如果任由某些重要成员国短视的国内政策想法主导今秋的报告，就会犯下一个严重的战略性错误。


And what perspective would Turkey have outside the EU?	那么除了欧盟之外土耳其还有哪些前景呢？


Pan-Turkish illusions?	泛土耳其梦想？


A return to the Orient and to Islam?	回归东方和伊斯兰世界？


None of these will work.	这些都行不通。


But Turkey will not sit idly on Europe’s doorstep.	但是土耳其不会坐在欧洲的门槛上无所事事。


Europe’s attitude is pushing Turkey towards forging alliances with its traditional regional rivals, Russia and Iran.	欧洲的态度正在把土耳其推向与其传统的地区竞争对手俄罗斯和伊朗结盟。