The liberal model has become severely tarnished, owing to the rise in inequality and the plight of the middle class in the West, together with the financial crisis that deregulation spawned.	由于西方国家不平等的加剧及中产阶级陷入困境，还有由放松管制引发的金融危机，自由主义模型已经严重受损。


Medium-term growth prospects for the American and European economies range from moderate to bleak.	美国和欧洲国家的中期增长前景都在温和到黯淡的区间徘徊。


Unemployment will remain a major headache and preoccupation for policymakers.	对决策者来说失业率仍然是一个令人头疼的问题同时也是当务之急。


So mercantilist pressures will likely intensify in the advanced countries.	所以实施重商主义的压力在发达国家很有可能会加重。


As a result, the new economic environment will produce more tension than accommodation between countries pursuing liberal and mercantilist paths. It may also reignite long-dormant debates about the type of capitalism that produces the greatest prosperity.	于是乎，新的经济环境将会在追求自由或重商主义道路的国家中引发更多的对立而非和解，也有可能再次点燃本已长期陷入平静的关于哪种类型的资本主义才能产生最大繁荣的争论。


The Return of Mexico’s Nemesis	墨西哥公敌的回归


MEXICO CITY – On July 1, Mexico will in all likelihood vote the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country for seven decades, back into power.	发自墨西哥城——在即将到来的7月1日，墨西哥人很可能会将曾经统治该国70年的革命制度党（Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI）再次选上权力宝座。


The PRI’s candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, holds an insurmountable lead late in the campaign.	该党候选人恩里克·佩纳·聂托（Enrique Peña Nieto）已经在最近的选举中确立了无法逾越的优势。


Many Mexicans, as well as the country’s foreign friends, fear that this turn of events heralds a return to the authoritarian, corrupt, and discredited past that Mexico had left behind when the National Action Party’s candidate, Vicente Fox, won the presidency in 2000.	而许多墨西哥人，包括外国友人，都害怕这一胜利将预示着专制，腐败和种种不光彩往事的复辟——这些东西本已在2000年随着国家行动党（National Action Party）候选人文森·福克斯（Vicente Fox）当选总统而烟消云散了。


As someone who contributed to the PRI’s defeat, I would prefer a different victor this year: an independent candidate, a center-left social democrat, or a center-right leader running on the best parts of Fox’s and outgoing President Felipe Calderón’s record (while repudiating Calderón’s bloody and futile war of choice against Mexico’s drug lords).	作为当年参与击败革命制度党的当事人之一，我更希望今年能有一场不一样的胜利：一位独立候选人，一位中左翼社会民主派，或是一位具备了福克斯以及即将下台的总统费利佩·卡尔德隆（Felipe Calderón）的优点，同时有能否定后者伤亡惨重且收效甚微的打击毒枭“选择之战”的中右翼领袖。


But I reject the notion that a PRI victory would automatically restore the status quo ante, as if Mexico, its links to the world, and the PRI itself had stood still throughout the last 12 years.	但我也不赞成那些认定革命制度党胜利就意味着一切将自动恢复原状的说法，似乎在他们看来墨西哥自身，该国与世界的联系以及革命制度党在过去12年都原地踏步似的。


Mexico has changed immensely since 1994, the last time a PRI president was elected.	自1994年最后一位革命制度党总统当选以来墨西哥已经发生了巨大的变化。


If Peña Nieto wins, he will have to deal with a strong opposition bloc in Congress, and in all likelihood with minority status for the PRI, at least in the lower house.	一旦佩纳·聂托赢得大选，他就必须在国会中和一个强大的反对派集团打交道，其所属政党也很可能会成为少数派（至少在众议院）。


Moreover, more than ten of Mexico’s 32 state governors will belong to the opposition, while the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution will continue to control the country’s second-most important elected position and budget: the mayor’s office in Mexico City, which the PRD has held since 1997.	此外，墨西哥32个州中有超过10个州长属于反对派阵营，而中左翼的民主革命党也将继续控制着分别与民选和预算相关的本国第二重要位置：墨西哥城市长办公室——而且自1997年以来从未间断。


Meanwhile, Mexico’s media are freer, better, and stronger than ever, even if on occasion the quality of their output leaves much to be desired.	与此同时，墨西哥的媒体也变得比从前更自由，更优秀也更加强势——即便他们的报道质量偶然也会让人大跌眼镜。


The country’s civil society has become more organized, more powerful, and more vibrant.	该国的公民社会也变得更有组织，更强大且生机勃勃。


The government can no longer do what it wants, for better or for worse.	无论如何，政府再也不能为所欲为了。


Indeed, many key institutions have achieved wide autonomy from the government since 2000: the Central Bank, the Transparency Institute, the National Statistics Office, as well as the securities, communications, elections, anti-trust, and drug authorities.	事实上，自2000年新政府上台以来许多关键机构都获得了更大的自主权：中央银行、行政透明化机构（the Transparency Institute），国家统计办公室以及与证券、通信、选举，反垄断和药品管理有关的部门。


Perhaps most important, Mexico, for the first time in its history, has a truly independent and effective Supreme Court. This occasionally made life miserable for Fox and Calderón, but has made things better for ordinary Mexicans in every walk of life.	或许更重要的是，墨西哥有史以来第一次拥有了一个真正独立有权的最高法院，虽然这偶尔会让福克斯和卡尔德隆的日子不太好过，却对普通墨西哥人的生活大有裨益。


Mexico’s relations with the world have changed as well since 2000.	墨西哥的对外关系自2000年以来也发生了变化。


Today, the country is enmeshed in a web of free-trade agreements and other international instruments that have locked in its open economy, orthodox macroeconomic policies, and commitment to democratic rule.	今时今日这个国家已经被纳入了一个自由贸易协定网络，而其他国际机制也确保了该国的经济开放政策，规范的宏观经济政策以及对民主治理的承诺。


It is subject to constant, intrusive, and welcome foreign scrutiny.	同时，墨西哥还处于持续，深入且受欢迎的外国监察之下。


Peer pressure now matters, too.	别国的压力如今也已经不容忽视。


Other countries will listen to Mexico only if Mexico abides by its obligations with respect to labor, the environment, free and fair elections, private property, and human rights.	只有遵守了在劳动者权益，环境，自由公平选举，私有财产和人权方面的义务，墨西哥才能拥有发言权。


In this era, the government can’t get away with stealing elections, throwing political opponents in jail, expropriating foreign or domestic private assets, large-scale corruption, or profligate spending.	在这个时代，没有政府能在选举舞弊、关押政治反对派、没收国内外私人财产，大规模腐败或��挥霍公款之后逍遥法外。


The degree of economic integration with the United States and Canada – which together account for the great bulk of Mexico’s trade, tourism, foreign investment, and remittances – make it especially difficult for the country to be impervious to foreign criticism.	而与美国和加拿大经济的高度整合——总共占了墨西哥贸易、旅游，外国投资和境外汇款的绝大部分——也使该国难以对外国批评置若罔闻。


Finally, the PRI has changed in two fundamental ways since it last held power.	最后，自上次执政以来革命制度党已经发生了两大根本变化。


I cannot vouch for Peña Nieto’s democratic convictions, but, generationally, he came of age in a democratic Mexico: he was barely two years old during the old system’s darkest moment, the student massacre of 1968; he was 28 in 1994, at the time of the country’s first semi-democratic election (which even the victor, Ernesto Zedillo, later acknowledged was free, but not fair); and he turned 34 in 2000.	我无法担保佩纳·聂托的民主信仰，但总的来说他是和一个民主的墨西哥共同成长的：旧体制最黑暗的时刻，1968年学生大屠杀事件时他刚刚两岁； 1994年墨西哥实现首次准民主竞选——虽然当时的胜利者埃内斯托·塞迪略后来声明这场选举确实自由但不算公平——他24岁；


Whatever his personal beliefs, if Peña Nieto wins, he will be the PRI’s first-ever democratically elected president – the first to become head of state because he won more votes at the polls, not because his predecessor hand-picked him.	无论他个人信仰什么，只要佩纳·聂托能获胜，他就将成为革命制度党首位民主选举的总统——也是该党首位并非由前任指定，而是因为得票更多而当选的国家元首。


Whether or not this matters is difficult to say, but morally, politically, and personally, accountability counts; in its absence, anything goes.	这一点是否具有重大意义还很难说，但无论是道义上，政治上还是个人方面，选举问责制度都是有用的；


And accountability is no longer absent in Mexico.	没有了这个制度一切都无从谈起，而墨西哥目前也已经具备了这一制度。


In the end, one either believes that free and fair elections, respect for individual rights and liberties, and rotation in power are the essence of democracy, or one does not.	最后，一个人可以相信自由公平的选举，对个人权利和自由的尊重以及政权更替是民主的要素，也可以不相信。


The PRI’s comeback, under Mexico’s current rules, may not be ideal for the country, but it is not a restoration.	但在墨西哥现行制度下，革命制度党重掌政权对整个国家来说虽然并不理想，但至少不能算是复辟。


If Mexico is not ready for the PRI’s return to power, then we all did our job poorly: we did not build the institutions, the civil society, the political parties, and the international covenants that would have ensured that only democratic players remained in the political game.	如果墨西哥还没准备好让革命制度党执政的话，那就只能说明我们过去没有完成好自己的任务：没能构建一个能够确保只有民主参与者才能继续参与政治所需的体制、公民社会，政党和国际公约。


But I believe that we did accomplish the task, and that to fear an authoritarian restoration would be to deny everything that we have all achieved over the past 12 years.	但我坚信我们已经做到了这一点，而对专制复辟的恐惧等于否定大家在过去12年所取得的所有成绩。


The Return of Post-Communism	后共产主义的回归


The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe 15 years ago brought vast and positive democratic changes.	15年前共产主义在中东欧地区的崩溃带来了巨大而且积极的民主变革。


But in 2006, after more than a decade of striving for acceptance by the West, the moral and political vacuum left by communism was fully exposed.	但到了2006年，在10年试图让西方接受的艰苦努力之后，共产主义留下的道德和政治真空终于暴露无余。


Can a new balance between the democratic ethos and the undertows of the region’s political history and culture be found?	人们能够在民主精神和东欧地区的政治历史和文化下涌动的逆流间找到新的平衡吗？


In Poland, for example, the prevailing mix of Catholicism and nationalism made society particularly resistant to communism (certainly in comparison with the egalitarian, social-democratic ethos of pre-war Czechoslovakia).	譬如在波兰，天主教和民族主义导致社会特别排斥共产主义（这肯定与战前捷克斯洛伐克的平等主义和社会民主主义精神背道而驰）。


But these anti-communist antibodies also worked against the universal acceptance among Poles of liberal democracy.	但这种反共产主义抗体同样也阻碍了大多数波兰人接受自由民主制度。


Indeed, right-wing populists in Poland and left-wing populists in Slovakia are now allied in government with extreme nationalist parties.	事实上，波兰右翼和斯洛伐克左翼民粹主义者如今都在政府中与极端民族主义者结为联盟。


In Hungary, the main opposition party Fidesz organizes demonstrations in front of Parliament for the resignation of a government, even after it won a confidence vote.	在匈牙利，即使政府赢得了信任投票，主要反对派青年民主党（FIDESZ）仍然在议会门前组织示威活动，要求政府辞职。


In the Czech Republic, a minority right-wing government has not gained a confidence vote in Parliament after six months of bickering.	在捷克共和国，右翼少数派政府在长达6个月的争论后也未能在议会的信任投票中获胜。


Bulgaria’s entry into the European Union was heralded by a presidential race between an ex-communist (the victor, who claimed to like the EU) and a proto-fascist (who says he hates Turks, Gypsies, and Jews).	在保加利亚，一位前共产党人（宣称热爱欧盟的获胜者）和一位法西斯支持者（宣称自己痛恨土耳其人、吉普赛人犹太人）参加了总统选举，不久以后，保加利亚就加入了欧盟。


Political instability and unpredictable behavior by elected leaders typifies affairs throughout the region.	政治局势动荡和当选领袖捉摸不定的举止代表了东欧地区的典型状况。


Even more worrying is the erosion of trust in democratic institutions.	更令人担忧的是人们对民主制度的信心日渐消褪。


According to a recent Gallup International poll, Central and East Europeans are the most skeptical about democracy, which only about one-third of people trust.	据盖洛普国际调查数据显示：中东欧居民对民主的怀疑最甚，只有约三分之一的人表示相信民主理念。


In contrast to a majority of West Europeans, East Europeans do not consider their elections free and fair.	东欧居民认为国内选举缺乏自由和公正，这与大多数西欧居民形成了鲜明的对照。


Only 22% responded affirmatively when asked, “Do you think your voice matters?”	当被问及“你认为自己的意见是否起作用”时，只有22%的人给出了肯定的回答。


Democracy today has no rivals, but it is losing support.	今天，民主已经没有了对手，但是，民主正在失去民众的支持。


Populist movements harvest that ambivalence and discontent.	这样的矛盾心理和不满情绪令民粹主义运动渔翁得利。


They are not anti-democratic; indeed, they claim to be the “true voice of the people,” and constantly demand new elections or referenda.	这些人并不反对民主； 事实上，他们自我标榜为“民众的真正喉舌”，而且不停地要求举行新的选举或全民公决。


But they are anti-liberal; they accept democracy’s demand for the popular legitimacy, but reject its demand for constitutionalism (the separation of powers).	但他们却反对自由主义； 他们能够接受民主对公众合法性的要求，却对民主的立宪政府（分权）要求嗤之以鼻。


They do not believe that constitutional norms and representative democracy have primacy over values and “legitimate” popular grievances.	他们不认为宪法原则和代表性民主比“有道理的”民众不满情绪和价值观念更为重要。


In Poland, the “politics of values” is based on the assumption that a “moral order” based on religion should prevail over the freedoms guaranteed by permissive liberalism on issues such as abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty.	在波兰，“价值观政治”的基础是：建立在宗教基础上的“道德秩序”在堕胎、同性恋权利和死刑等问题上的效力应当超越那种毫无节制的自由主义所代表的自由。


In Slovakia, the anti-liberal reaction applies also to the treatment of national minorities.	在斯洛伐克，国内少数民族的遭遇也折射出这种反自由主义的情绪。


Although there has so far been no significant shift in practice, the legitimation of xenophobia is a major feature of this onslaught on political liberalism: Jan Slota, the leader of the Slovak National Party, has said that he envies the Czechs for having expelled the Germans after WWII, and regularly accuses the Hungarian minority of “oppressing the majority nation.”	尽管到目前为止在实际行动上的变化还不是很大，但扼杀政治自由主义的一种重要表现就是排外主义情绪的合法化：斯洛伐克民族党主席斯洛达（Jan Slota）曾公开宣称：捷克曾在二战后驱逐德国人的做法令他倍感羡慕，他还经常谴责匈牙利少数族裔“压迫主要民族。 ”


Acute polarization is occurring everywhere, and it is here where the legacy of communist political culture is mostly keenly felt: an opponent is not someone with whom you argue or negotiate, but an enemy that you must destroy.	到处都存在着严重的两极分化，也正是在这些地方能够最深切地感受到共产主义政治文化对后世的影响：你不是去与你的对手争论或者谈判，提起对手，就是你必须去摧毁的敌人。


After 15 years of free-market policies, populists in Warsaw, Bratislava, and Budapest want to bring back the state.	在经历了15年的自由市场政策后，华沙、布拉迪斯拉发和布达佩斯的民粹主义者们现在希望向国家统治回归。


And, since even socialist parties pushed liberal economic policies, it is not surprising that the far right, with its nationalist and protectionist overtones, has hijacked the social question.	而且因为就连社会党派也卖力地推动自由经济政策，那么有着民族主义和保护主义背景的极右势力借社会问题渔利也就毫不奇怪了。


The populist challenge to the pro-market, pro-Western elite consensus that has prevailed in the region since 1990 takes two forms: an anti-corruption drive and “de-communization.”	民粹主义者对从20世纪90年代起就开始在东欧地区盛行的亲西方唯市场精英论提出的挑战主要分为两种形式：反腐败运动和“去共产主义化。 ”


In Poland, the two are combined in a denunciation of the “original sin” of the 1989 compromise between moderate dissident elites and moderate communist elites, which enabled a non-violent exit from communism, but allegedly allowed the ex-communists to convert their political power into economic power.	在波兰，上述两种形式在谴责温和派持不同证见者与温和派共产主义者所谓的“1989年妥协原罪”中得到了统一，结果在不使用暴力的情况下导致共产主义寿终正寝，但也致使前共产主义者手中的政治权力转化成了经济权力。


Hence the need for a two-pronged attack: anti-corruption and de-communization, which is also a leitmotiv of Fidesz in Hungary, and to some extent of the right-wing Civic Democratic Party now in power in Prague.	因此斗争才需要分为这两种形式：反腐败和去共产主义化，这既是青年民主党在匈牙利的主旨，在某种程度上也是目前在布拉格当权的右翼公民民主党的核心理念。


Moreover, these populists attack the EU as an elite-imposed project, while pro-European coalitions have become exhausted, disintegrating in the aftermath of EU accession in 2004.	不仅如此，民粹主义者认为加入欧盟是精英们强加给民众的任务，这消耗了亲欧联盟的力量，导致该联盟在2004年加入欧盟后即告分裂。


Significantly, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian prime ministers resigned within days or weeks after fulfilling the “historic” task of “returning to Europe.”	特别值得一提的是，波兰、捷克和匈牙利的总理都在完成“回归欧洲”的“历史性”任务之后的几天或者几周之内提出了辞呈。


Populist nationalists present themselves as the only defenders of national identity and sovereignty against “external threats,” as Polish Premier Jaroslaw Kaczynski put it.	按照波兰总理雅罗斯瓦夫·卡钦斯基（Jaroslaw Kaczynski）的说法，民族民��主义者把自己标榜成了保护民族特征和主权免受“外来威胁”的唯一的力量。


Their vision is a “Christian Europe” of “sovereign nation-states” that opposes the existing materialist, decadent, permissive, and supra-national model.	他们的目标是建立由“主权民族国家”组成的“基督教欧洲”，实现与现存的唯物主义者、颓废主义者、放任主义者和超民族主义者彻底决裂。


The EU can probably learn to live with these populists, because it has to.	欧盟也许能够学会与这些民粹主义者和平共处，因为这是解决问题的唯一方案。


Indeed, populism moves in cycles.	事实上，民粹主义者有自己固定的行为周期。


Populists come to power promising “to clean house,” but once they move in and become identified with the house and all its flaws, they fall back on clientelism and state capture by the ruling parties (as we are now seeing in Poland) rather than becoming more radical.	他们带着“清理议员队伍”的承诺进驻议会，但一旦被议会和议会的缺陷所同化，他们就会重新回归到为执政党充当代理的角色（正如我们目前在波兰看到的那样），而不会变得更为偏激。


Many argue that the pro-EU consensus of the last decade emptied politics of its substance, contributing to the current populist backlash.	很多人都认为是过去10年向欧盟回归的共识使政治失去了实际内容，从而导致目前民粹主义的回归。


But the EU can also constrain populism.	但欧盟也可以遏制民粹主义。


After all, populist nationalists have joined (and since left) government coalitions in Austria, Italy, Holland, and Denmark.	归根结底，奥地利、意大利、荷兰和丹麦的民族民粹主义者失去执政地位后都与政府组成了联盟。


And, while nationalist populism is a trans-European phenomenon, populism today, unlike in the 1930’s, it does not hold itself out as an alternative to democracy.	而且，因为民族民粹主义者是整个欧洲的普遍现象，因此和20世纪30年代不同的是，今天的民族民粹主义者并未将自己看作不同于民主之外的另外一种选择。


The Return of Religion?	宗教的回归？


BUDAPEST – It’s a well-worn contrast: the United States is religious, Europe is secular.	布达佩斯——有种老掉牙的对比认为，美国更宗教，而欧洲更世俗。


Yet, in some respects, this clichéd opposition has actually been reversed recently: religion played virtually no role during the last American presidential elections, while in a range of different European countries major controversies about religion have flared up, suggesting that questions of faith are back at the center of European politics.	但不久前这种过时的对比在某些方面实际已经遭到了颠覆：上一届美国总统选举中宗教几乎没有占据任何分量，但在不少欧洲国家却突然爆发了与宗教有关的大规模争论，这表明信仰问题重又回到了欧洲政治的核心。


Consider French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	以法国总统尼古拉·萨科奇为例。


On numerous occasions, he has argued that his country needs to rethink its traditional strict separation of state and religion, called laïcité .	他曾在不同场合多次提出他的国家需要重新思考传统上对国家和宗教的严格分割制度，也就是所谓的“政教分离”。


In particular, according to the twice-divorced self-confessed “cultural Catholic,” France should develop a “positive secularism.”	按照这位离过两次婚、公开声称自己是“文化天主教徒”的总统的说法，法国应该建立一种“积极的世俗主义”。


In contrast to negative laïcité , which according to Sarkozy “excludes and denounces,” laïcité positive invites “dialogue” and recognizes the social benefits of religion.	它与 消极的政教分离 形成鲜明的对照，按照萨科奇的说法，后者能做的只是“谴责和排斥”，而 积极的政教分离 却可以实现“对话”，并承认宗教的社会效益。


In a much criticized speech in Rome at the end of 2007, Sarkozy acknowledged the Christian roots of France, “the eldest daughter of the Church”; he also praised Islam during a visit to Saudi Arabia.	2007年底在罗马一次备受批评的讲话中，萨科奇承认了法国的基督教根基，称法国是“教堂最年长的女儿”； 他还在对沙特阿拉伯的访问中赞扬伊斯兰教。


Now he wants state subsidies for faith-based organizations – a policy proposal that upsets his many secularist critics.	如今他想给以信仰为基础的组织颁发国家津贴，这样一项政策提案让许多世俗主义的批评家气愤不已。


This new appeal to religion – after a long period when it was taken for granted that secularization would make religion less and less politically relevant – is not an exclusively French phenomenon.	在长期以来人们一直想当然地认为世俗化会让宗教与政治越离越远的时候，这种新的对宗教的回归并不是法国独有的现象。


The Spanish People’s Party tried hard to mobilize Catholics during the election campaign in March 2008.	西班牙人民党在08年3月竞选期间也竭力发动天主教徒。


The church supported the PP against a prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, whose advocacy of gay marriage, more relaxed divorce laws, and the removal of compulsory religion classes from the national curriculum upset many religious conservatives.	教堂在选举中支持人民党，反对总理何塞·路易斯·罗德里格斯·萨帕特罗，后者对同性恋婚姻、放松离婚法、和从国家必修课中取消宗教课程的支持让许多宗教保守份子感到愤愤不已。


Zapatero eventually felt it necessary to tell a Vatican envoy that Spanish bishops should stop meddling in the elections (which he won).	萨帕特罗最终觉得有必要告诉一名梵蒂冈特使要求西班牙主教停止干预选举事务（他最终取得了这场选举的胜利）。


In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi precipitated a constitutional crisis by trying to rush through emergency legislation to prevent a comatose patient from being taken off life support.	意大利总理西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼试图快速通过一项紧急法案，阻止撤掉对一名昏迷症患者的生命支持，并由此引发了一场宪法危机。


This reminded many observers of what the America’s Republican Party tried to do in order to demonstrate its “pro-life commitments” during George W. Bush’s presidency.	很多观察员因此想起了在乔治·W·布什总统当政期间，美国共和党为表明自己“支持对生命承诺”时的所作所为。


Finally, there is Britain, usually seen as perhaps the most secular country in Western Europe, and thus the least likely candidate to see the return of religion of any kind (outside its Muslim community).	最后还有英国，人们一般认为英国是西欧世俗化程度最高的国家，因此，英国最不可能（在穆斯林团体之外）出现任何形式的宗教回归。


Under David Cameron’s leadership, the newly invigorated Conservative Party is listening to a number of thinkers, dubbed “red Tories,” who urge the party to turn its back on Thatcherism and embrace civil society, local community, the family, and, not least, religion as a major force in fostering responsible social behavior.	在戴维·卡梅伦的领导下，重新焕发出生机的保守党采纳了几位“红色保守派”思想家的建议，他们要求保守党背弃撒切尔主义，拥抱公民社会、地方团体、家庭，同样重要的是，接受宗教作为鼓励负责任社会行为的重要力量的地位。


In short, there is a pattern here.	简言之，这里存在着某种模式。


But the point is not that individuals in different European countries are becoming more religious – there is hardly any evidence for that.	但我想说的并不是欧洲各国民众正在变得越来越宗教化——在这方面几乎找不到任何证据。


Globally, there might be good reasons to talk about what sociologists describe as the rise of “post-secular societies,” but Europe remains the exception.	如果从全世界范围看，我们可能有理由谈论社会学家所谓的“后世俗社会”的崛起，但欧洲却仍然是个例外。


What really explains these new public controversies surrounding religion is something else, something political: the dilemma in which right-wing and center-right European parties find themselves.	真正能解释这些围绕宗教新出现公众争议的是某些与政治有关的其他因素：那就是右翼和中左翼欧洲政党所处的两难境地。


Many of these parties used to advocate market radicalism, or at least strong doses of economic liberalization.	许多右翼和中左翼党派曾大肆宣扬市场激进主义，至少也拼命鼓吹强力经济自由化。


Not just since the financial crisis have they retreated from these positions and tried to fashion a gentler, more socially conscious image.	不只从金融危机爆发以来他们放弃了这样的立场，试图重塑更温和、更有社会责任感的新形象。


Yet, in the search for what Cameron has called a new “look, feel, and identity,” these parties have been treading a fine line: on the one hand, they have attempted to appear more modern – for example, by appointing an increasing number of women and members of ethnic minorities to cabinet posts.	但在追求卡梅伦所谓的“新形象，新感觉，新特点”的时候，这些政党试图实践一种非常细微的差别：一方面，他们力图显得更加现代——比如任命越来越多的妇女和少数族裔担任内阁公职。


On the other hand, they have painted themselves as sworn enemies of the left’s supposed moral relativism – an image for which the recourse to religion is obviously helpful.	而另一方面，他们又把自己打扮成左派所谓道德相对主义的强硬对手，宗教回归显然对塑造这一形象有所帮助。


In fact, some intellectuals close to the right have long advocated an opening towards Europe’s Muslim immigrants and their descendants.	实际上，亲右翼的某些知识分子很久以来一直鼓吹为欧洲穆斯林移民及其后裔在政治上���出更多余地。


Where they can vote, so the argument goes, Muslim traditionalists would rather vote for a conservative party, even if it has Catholic roots, than for a secular left-wing party perceived as advocating loose morals.	他们的说法是，只要他们有权投票，穆斯林传统主义者宁可把票投给有天主教根基的保守派，也不会支持那些被看作鼓吹放荡行为的世俗的左翼党派。


This is not to say that all appeals to religion are just cynical election ploys.	这并不是说所有对于宗教的回归都只是玩世不恭的竞选手段。


Especially in the face of the financial crisis, religion has been presented as a source for what Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have called the project of “moralizing capitalism.”	特别在金融危机发生后，宗教正像萨科奇和德国总理安格拉·默克尔所说，被人们当成了实现“道德化资本主义”目标的一种武器。


That is not an absurd idea.	那种想法一点也不荒唐。


There is a long and distinguished tradition of Catholic social thought.	天主教社会思想已经有悠久而著名的历史。


But taking these traditions seriously would require much larger transformations of capitalism than even avowed Christian Democrats are prepared to contemplate, including a much wider distribution of ownership and mechanisms for involving workers in management.	但严肃对待这些传统需要对资本主义进行大幅度改革，就连公开宣称的基督教民主党也未必准备考虑，包括分散所有权和让工人参与管理的机制。


Theories of “red Toryism” might go some way in this direction, but it remains to be seen whether they will ever translate into practice.	“红色保守主义”理论可能在这个方向上有所涉猎，但是否会付诸实践仍然是个谜。


For the moment, the temptation is for the European right to find its “new look” through a selective appeal to religion – and wait and see whether it works as an electoral strategy.  They should remember, though, that starting a Kulturkampf is to play with fire: it might be possible to instrumentalize religious passions for a time; but such passions cannot permanently be controlled from above.	目前来看，欧洲右翼党派忍不住要借选择性的回归宗教塑造自己的“新面貌”，而后等着看这招作为选举策略是否有效。 但他们应该记住：挑起一场文化斗争实际是在玩火。


The Return of the African Coup	非洲政变重现江湖


NEW YORK – The conventional wisdom that sub-Saharan Africa has moved beyond military coups may be wishful thinking.	纽约——认为撒哈拉以南非洲军事政变时代已经过去的习惯思维可能不过是一厢情愿。


In the past two years, Africa has seen successful coups in Niger, Guinea, Madagascar, and Mauritania.	两年来，非洲尼日尔、几内亚、马达加斯加和毛里塔尼亚等国都发生过成功的政变。


In addition, there have been a handful of indirect interventions, failed coups, and whispered threats elsewhere.	另外在其他国家还发生过几次间接干涉、政变失败和暗中威胁事件。


Despite the development of democratic institutions in some parts of Africa, coups appear to be once again an option when democracy seems to be failing, political gridlock has taken hold, or impoverished populations are alienated from constitutional authority.	尽管非洲某些国家已经建立民主制度，可是当民主失败、政治僵局形成、贫困民众与宪法权威距离越来越远的时候，政变似乎再次成为解决问题的捷径。


Successful coups legitimated by popular support (or at least acquiescence) and oiled with promises to “restore democracy” may become infectious, encouraging copycats in neighboring states where governments are also weak or failing.	赢得民众支持（或至少是默许）并承诺“恢复民主”的成功政变可能引发政府同样软弱失败的临国群起而仿效。


At the end of February in Niamey, Niger’s capital, armed troops surrounded the presidential palace and arrested President Mamadou Tandja in the midst of a cabinet meeting.	2月底，在尼日尔首都尼亚美，武装部队包围总统府，在内阁会议进行过程中逮捕了总统马马杜·坦贾。


While the African Union, the United States, and other members of the international community protested, popular reaction in Niamey was jubilant.	此事遭到非盟、美国和国际社会其他成员国的抗议，却令尼亚美的普通民众感到欢欣鼓舞。


Tandja, originally democratically elected, had become increasingly autocratic, dismissing the National Assembly and the constitutional court, and eliminating presidential term limits.	当初通过民选就职的坦贾变得越来越专制，不仅解散国民议会和宪法法院，而且取消总统任期限制。


As his governance descended into authoritarianism, the military and at least a visible part of the population came to view a coup as the only way to stop Niger’s downward course.	随着他的执政一步步滑向专制主义，军队和至少一部分民众开始将政变视为阻止尼日尔进一步下滑的唯一方法。


Accordingly, the army rode in promising democracy and free and fair elections.	于是军队介入发动政变，并承诺恢复民主和自由公正的选举制度。


While the military junta has since kept control over the executive branch of government, its head, Salou Djibo, appointed a civilian, Mahamadou Danda, as prime minister.	尽管军政府在政变后控制了政府的职能部门，但其首脑萨洛·吉博任命一名平民穆罕默杜·丹达担任政府总理。


In addition to vowing elections, which have not yet been scheduled, Djibo has pledged that members of the junta will not run for office.	除承诺举行选举（选举日程尚未确定）外，吉博已经承诺军政府成员不参与选举。


If current reports from Niger are accurate, there appears to be a belief that the military will restore democracy.	如果目前来自尼日尔的报道准确无误，人们似乎相信军事行动能够恢复民主。


Niger’s story sounds familiar.	尼日尔的故事听上去有些耳熟。


In Guinea, despite 24 previous years of authoritarian military rule, the population largely supported the December 2008 bloodless coup staged by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara’s immediately following President Lansana Conté’s death.	尽管经历了24年的独裁军事统治，但大多数几内亚民众仍然对兰萨纳·孔戴总统死后穆萨·达迪斯·卡马拉上校于2008年12月发动的不流血的政变持支持态度。


Guineans in fact had little choice but to accept Dadis Camara’s promise of elections and a return to civilian rule – at least until the murder of 157 opposition protesters by members of the Guinean military at Conakry stadium in October 2009 seemed to dash all hope for such an outcome.	几内亚人没有其他选择，只能接受达迪斯·卡马拉举行选举和回归平民统治的承诺，但2009年10月科纳克里体育场发生的几内亚军队射杀157名反对派示威者的事件似乎让人们的希望全部落空。


Yet a peaceful democratic transition may actually happen.	但的确有可能以和平方式完成向民主政权的过渡。


Following an assassination attempt by an aide-de-camp, Dadis Camara fled the country, and the interim junta leader, General Sékouba Konaté, allowed the opposition political parties to appoint a civilian prime minister.	在侍从军官行刺企图失败后，达迪斯·卡马拉逃往国外，接替他的临时军政府领袖赛古巴·科纳特将军允许反对党任命一位平民总理。


He has since scheduled elections for June 27. Accordingly, the public mood is optimistic.	而后他又将选举日期定在6月27日，公众也因此充满乐观情绪。


Escalating popular protests by both incumbent and opposition supporters in Madagascar brought the country to a standstill until the army itself splintered and sacked the president’s office and central bank, forcing the president to step aside in favor of the opposition leader, Andry Rajoelina.	马达加斯加现任及反对派支持者不断升级的民众抗议让这个国家陷入停顿，这种局面直到军队自身出现分裂、解雇总统办公室和中央银行，迫使总统让位给反对派领袖安德里·拉乔利纳才告结束。


Unrest has continued, and the military has issued an ultimatum to Rajoelina to resolve the political deadlock.	此后局势持续动荡，军队已经向拉乔利纳发出打破政治僵局的最后通牒。


While he has pledged not to run in the elections set for November 26, 2011, an alleged mutiny within the military, as well as arrests in April of suspected coup plotters, suggests a widening divide within the military itself.	虽然拉乔利纳已经承诺不参与2011年11月26日的选举，但军队内部的一次涉嫌兵变及4月对政变策划嫌疑人的逮捕表明军队内部的分歧仍在不断扩大。


The international community branded each of these countries a pariah, and various international organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, and the Southern African Development Community, have responded by suspending membership and occasionally imposing sanctions.	这些国家无一例外地被国际社会冠以贱民的标签，而西非国家经济共同体、非盟和南部非洲发展共同体等国际机构作出的反应是暂停政变国家的会员资格，并偶尔实行制裁措施。


But these steps are largely ineffective – or worse.	不过这样的制裁一般都没有什么效果——甚至会起反作用。


The international community has limited leverage, and sanctions may have a greater negative impact on the population than on the coup-makers.	国际社会的影响力有限，而制裁对普通民众的负面影响要超过对政变制造者。


Malagasies, for example, have been the ones to feel the brunt of the suspension of foreign aid, which dominates Madagascar’s budget.	比如马达加斯加人就亲身感受到暂停作为马达加斯加主要财政来源的外国援助的冲击。


Africa’s recent coups have taken place in small countries.	近来的政变全都发生在非洲小国。


With the possible exception of Madagascar, they play only a limited role on the continent.	除马达加斯加外，它们对非洲大陆的影响并不太大。


Nevertheless, successful coups may encourage the military to move in other, larger countries.	但成功的政变可能激励军队在其他大国采取行动。


Many feared that the example of the coup in Niger could encourage Nigeria’s military to move at the height of the country’s crisis in executive authority over President Umaru Yar’Adua’s prolonged absence.	很多人担心尼日尔政变的范例会刺激尼日利亚军队在奥马鲁·亚拉杜瓦总统长期缺位所带来的行政权力危机高潮时采取行动。


In fact, rumors of coup plotting in Nigeria prompted military officers to restrict the movements of soldiers, and may have spurred the political elite to reach the consensus that installed Goodluck Jonathan as acting president.	事实上，尼日利亚策划政变的传言已经促使军官限制士兵的行动，而且可能已经促使政要就任命古德勒克·乔纳森为代总统一事达成一致。


Even more unsettling was the anecdotal evidence of public support for military intervention.	更令人不安的是公众支持军事干预的传闻依据。


Successful coup makers regularly pledge to restore democratic governance, and sometimes they keep that promise.	成功的政变制造者通常都会承诺恢复民主统治，他们有时确实也能兑现自己的承诺。


Nevertheless, coups, whether violent or peaceful, are the antithesis of democratic institutions, and military rule can last a long time.	尽管如此，暴力抑或和平的政变都是民主制度的对立面，而且军事统治可能在很长一段时间内得以延续。


Nigeria endured almost 15 years of it, despite repeated pledges – by three successive dictators – to restore democracy.	尼日利亚就忍受了15年的军事统治，尽管前后三位独裁者全都反复承诺要恢复民主制度。


Yet, until governments – and the elites that support and benefit from them – are prepared to commit to democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, and until they are accountable to their populations, coups will remain a viable option.	即便如此，在政府和支持政府并从中获益的政要切实致力于民主、善政和法治、并对国内民众负责之前，政变都将作为一种可行的选择。


The very rise of that specter over the past two years has been a setback for Africa’s democratic development.	两年来政变幽灵再次浮现本身就意味着非洲民主发展的一种倒退。


The Return of the French?	法国的回归？


PARIS – How difficult is it to erase one’s past as a colonial power?	发自巴黎——要抹去一个殖民帝国的过去有多难？


Tunisia has been independent for 55 years, and Côte d’Ivoire for 51 years, yet France is once more playing a decisive role in these countries.	突尼斯独立至今已有55个年头，而科特迪瓦也独立了51年，但法国却一再在这些国家中扮演着决定性的角色。


Naturally, many Africans are unconvinced that France is acting only to defend the lives of a few thousand of its citizens, rather than its economic and strategic interests, which are negligible for the former and null for the latter.	自然而然地，许多非洲人都不相信法国的举动仅仅是为了保护数千侨民，而更倾向于认为它是为了维护自身的经济和战略利益，但其实所谓经济利益根本无足轻重，战略方面也早已名存实亡了。


The damage that slavery and colonialism inflicted in these countries has left a powerful legacy.	奴隶制和殖民主义所称对这些国家所造成的伤害构成了一个影响巨大的历史遗产。


And, though they have been handling their own business for decades, France still has a duty of friendship that forbids it to forget and requires it to adopt a certain mode of conduct.	虽然这些地方的人民已经独立自主长达数十年，法国依然应尽一个友邦的责任，以防这些国家被法国国际政策所忽略，并要求其采取某种特定的行为模式。


Côte d’Ivoire enjoys large agricultural wealth (along with gold, diamonds, and iron); Tunisia possesses large phosphate deposits; Libya has oil; and all three have a relatively moderate climate.	科特迪瓦坐拥大量农业资源（以及黄金，钻石和铁矿）； 突尼斯拥有磷矿储量巨大；


But none experienced economic takeoff at independence.	利比亚石油丰富； 三国的气候也比较适宜，但却没有一个在独立后实现了经济腾飞，这是为何？


The French historian and sociologist Emmanuel Todd has argued that, everywhere in the world, economic takeoff usually occurs 60-70 years after 50% of the population achieves literacy.	对此法国历史学家和社会学家伊曼努尔·托德（Emmanuel Todd）认为，无论在世界哪个地方，经济腾飞通常都会在一国50%以上民众脱离文盲后的60~70年后实现。


Moreover, the higher the average age of marriage for women, the faster literacy spreads.	此外，妇女平均结婚年龄越高，识字率的提升就越快。


The more time a woman has had to live alone and acquire knowledge, the stronger her desire and capacity to pass it on to her children.	因为一位妇女单身生活并获取知识的时间越长，她的个体意识也越强，也越有能力将知识传授给子女们。


Northern Germany and southern Scandinavia were the first regions to experience mass literacy, which was followed by faster economic development a few decades later.	德国北部和斯堪的纳维亚半岛南部是最早实现大规模识字的地区，并随之在数十年后实现了迅速经济增长。


These are places where women’s average age at marriage has been around 23 for some time. In the Arab world and most of Africa, women marry, on average, at around 15.	有些地方妇女的平均结婚年龄约为23岁，但在阿拉伯世界和非洲大部分地区，妇女的结婚年龄仅为15岁。


Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are three clear cases of massive popular anger against economic underdevelopment and the dictatorships that were justifiably blamed for it.	突尼斯，埃及和利比亚是三个民众对经济落后已经导致这一状况的独裁统治爆发大规模不满的显著例子。


The major difference between the three is that in Tunisia and Egypt, economic development had gone far enough to give rise to a small trading and salaried middle class, which initiated the rebellions and whose members were sufficient in number to succeed – at least in deposing the dictators.	但其中的主要区别在于突尼斯和埃及的经济发展已经足以催生一个小规模的贸易和工薪阶层，不但以此发动了示威暴动，同时也有足够的成员数量来实现成功——至少成功驱逐了那些独裁者。


Libya is entirely different.	利比亚的情况则截然不同。


The anger there, fueled by misery and insufficient food, is popular, not bourgeois.	由痛苦和食物短缺所催生的愤怒主要来自于底层民众而非中产阶级。


The forces of resistance are too limited, while the military – a key tool of social advancement for the poor – remains in the hands of the dictatorship.	反抗的力量太过有限，而政府军——一个穷人提升其社会地位的关键工具——依旧掌握在独裁者手中。


The rebellion could not succeed by itself; from the start, terrible and bloody repression was to be expected.	反抗势力无法依靠自身的力量取得胜利； 暴动伊始，恐怖血腥的镇压就在意料之中。


Côte d’Ivoire looks nothing like North Africa: its troubles are purely local, ethnic, and religious.	科特迪瓦的情况也与北非地区不同。 它的问题纯粹是当地，种族和宗教的。


The Republic’s first president, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, was elected at independence in 1960 and remained in office until he died in 1993 – always careful to construct governments with representatives from all the tribes, and with a balance between southern Catholics and northern Muslims.	该国的第一任总统费利克斯·乌弗埃-博瓦尼（Félix Houphouet-Boigny）在1960年独立时上任并一直担任该职位直到1993年去世——他就任期间一直小心翼翼地构建一个代表所有部族的政府，同时也努力维护着南部天主教徒和北部穆斯林之间的平衡。


Houphouet-Boigny’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié, had neither his talent nor his courage.	但乌弗埃-博瓦尼的继任者亨利·科南·贝迪埃（Henri Konan Bédié）既没有前任的才智，也缺乏足够的勇气。


Bédié founded his power on the country’s Catholics and his government on tribal membership.	贝迪埃将自身的权力构建于天主教势力和部族成员制之上。


And he invented a legitimizing concept of Ivorian identity (Ivoirité), which was largely meant to disqualify northern Muslims as foreigners, because their tribes extended into Mali and Burkina Faso.	还发明了一个关于科特迪瓦人身份（Ivoirité）的合法性概念，并以此将北部穆斯林视为外国人，因为他们的部族延伸到了马里和布基纳法索境内。


This policy ignited a latent conflict, with a military coup in 1999 putting General Robert Gueï in power. But Gueï lasted only three years, with his assassination in 2002 setting the country’s conflicting sides on a path to civil war.	这一政策随即引发了潜在的冲突，导致罗伯特·古埃尔将军（Robert Gueï）在 1999年的一场军事政变后上台，但古埃尔仅仅在位三年即遭暗杀，使整个国家的冲突几乎发展到了内战边缘。


In this tense climate, the northern candidate, Alassane Ouattara, a Muslim and former senior official at the International Monetary Fund, was denied the right to run in the 2005 presidential election.	在这一紧张气氛下，北部的总统候选人阿拉萨内· 瓦塔拉（Alassane Ouattara），一位曾任国际货币基金组织高级官员的穆斯林被剥夺了2005年总统大选的参选权。


The winner, the southerner Laurent Gbagbo, then refused to concede his defeat by Ouattara in 2010, leading to violent conflict and fear of a long and potentially genocidal civil war.	而来自南部的获胜者洛朗·巴博（Laurent Gbagbo）又在2005年拒绝承认被瓦塔拉所击败，导致一系列暴力冲突，还引发了爆发长期内战以及发生潜在种族灭绝事件的担忧。


In both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, massacres of civilians were foreseeable.	无论是在利比亚还是科特迪瓦，对平民的屠杀都是意料之内的。


In both cases, the question in Paris and other capitals was whether to intervene.	在两个事件中，巴黎当局和其他各国的难题都在于是否应当介入。


And in both cases, France had an obvious interest in not intervening, in order to erase its colonial past (more so in Côte d’Ivoire than in Libya, where Italy had been the European colonizer).	其实最符合各国利益的做法都是袖手旁观，以便重新勾起其殖民历史（科特迪瓦尤甚于利比亚，因为意大利也曾是其欧洲殖民国）。


But tens of thousands of French citizens live in Côte d’Ivoire. France had to protect them.	但目前有数万名法国公民居住在科特迪瓦，法国政府必须保护他们的安全。


In Libya, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s wanton violence brought the situation firmly under the purview of the United Nations Security Council and the UN’s recently proclaimed “responsibility to protect” civilians threatened by their own governments.	在利比亚，卡扎菲的滥用暴力使情况完全符合联合国安理会的管辖范围以及联合国最近宣布的“保护民众免遭其政府威胁的责任”。


Libyan civilians are now under the protection of international law.	利比亚民众因此已经处于国际法的保护之下。


Only an international decision could have accomplished this.	只需要达成一个国际决定就能实现这一点。


Indeed, Lebanon’s vote for military intervention in Libya not only enhances its legitimacy, but also raises the suspicion that even Iran condemns Qaddafi’s brutality.	事实上，黎巴嫩对军事介入利比亚事务投下的赞成票不断提升了其政权的合法性，甚至令人怀疑其背后的伊朗都无法容忍利比亚当局的残暴了。


Once the decision to intervene was taken, France, with the largest armed forces in the Mediterranean, alas became the most visible of the intervening countries – with few others capable of joining it, the United Kingdom, and the United States.	一旦下达了军事介入的决定，法国这个在地中海地区的第一军事强国就成为了介入国中最引人注目的国家——别忘了还有英美等其他有能力介入的国家。


Unfortunately, international solidarity for the armed protection of endangered populations does not yet really exist.	但不幸的是，国际上对武装保卫受威胁民众的行动却尚未达成一致。


The danger is that in much of Africa, former imperialists are suspected of being imperialists still, which could make the development of international law appear to be a mere power play.	而危险就在于在非洲大部分地区，前帝国主义者依旧被怀疑为帝国主义者，而这使得国际法的实施仅仅像是一场权力游戏。


This is even clearer in Côte d’Ivoire: it is the UN that explicitly demanded that France, the only foreign presence, implement the resolution that ratified Ouattara as the elected president and Gbagbo as the usurper.	这点在科特迪瓦尤其明显：是联合国明确要求法国这个唯一的外国存在去执行决议，承认瓦塔拉当选总统并废黜巴博。


France did the job rather well, leaving, for example, the arrest of Gbagbo to Quattara’s forces.	法国也相当完美地完成了这项工作，比如说逮捕了巴博并将其移交给瓦塔拉方面。


Civil war was averted.	内战也因此得以避免。


It is, in fact, pure stupidity to believe that France is trying to restore its defunct empire.	事实上，相信法国试图利用这些事件重建其往日帝国是极端愚蠢的。


Defunct imperialisms no longer make sense.	过去的帝国主义已经没有存在的合理性。


Today’s real problems are vastly different from when colonial empires held sway, and they need to be dealt with in a non-imperialist fashion.	如今的问题也已经和殖民帝国崩溃时的大不相同，并需要以一种非帝国主义者的行为方式去应对。


So what is really needed nowadays is for the world public to become convinced of the need for an effective international watchdog for peace and human rights.	如今真正需要的则是全世界人民都能确信：他们需要一个对和平和人权的有效国际监督者。


The Return of the King in Nepal	尼泊尔君主的归来


Every time we in Nepal think things can’t get worse, they do.	在尼泊尔，每次当我们认为事情已经坏到极致时，它总会变得更糟。


In 2001, as our Maoist insurgency intensified and casualties soared, almost the entire royal family – including King Birendra – were massacred by one of Nepal’s princes.	2001年，当毛泽东主义反政府暴动升级、受伤人数直线上升时，所有的皇室成员——包括国王比拉德拉——几乎都被尼泊尔的一个王储所杀害。


The next year, parliament was dissolved and local elected bodies were disbanded.	第二年，议会被解散、地方选举机构被解体。


As political parties bickered, King Gyanendra, who succeeded his murdered brother, sacked the prime minister in 2002 and ruled through an appointed cabinet.	正当各政党争得不可开交之时，贾南德拉国王接替他被谋杀的兄长，在2002年罢黜总理，通过一个任命内阁进行统治。


Last week, King Gyanendra sacked his prime minister again, declared a state of emergency, and suspended civil liberties.	上一周，贾南德拉国王再次罢免了他的总理，宣布全国进入紧急状态，并限制公民自由。


Nepal’s 15-year experiment with democracy now seems over.	尼泊尔15年的民主试行现在看来已告结束。


Since February 1, the Nepali media have been subjected to absolute censorship. Nothing that goes against the “letter and spirit” of the king’s dismissal of his government is allowed to be printed and broadcast, and “action will be taken against anyone violating the notice.”	自2月1日起，尼泊尔媒体开始执行绝对的新闻审查制度，不得出版或广播任何反对国王解散政府的“文字和精神”的材料，并且“将对任何触犯该条例的人采取行动”。


Armed soldiers now sit in newsrooms, vetting the galleys before they go off to press.	全副武装的士兵现在坐在编辑部室，审查即将出版的稿件。


Sometimes, they change headlines that they think are critical of the royal move.	有时候，他们改掉他们认为对皇室行动有批评之嫌的标题。


Nepal’s vibrant FM radio stations – once models for decentralized public-service broadcasting and community radio – have been prohibited from broadcasting current affairs.	尼泊尔充满活力的FM收音机频道——曾经是权力下放给公众服务广播和教派广播的典范——目前已被禁止广播业务。


Some FM stations have been locked down and are silent.	一些FM频道被关闭，保持沉默。


The BBC’s Nepalese service, which used to be relayed through a network of 12 FM stations all over the country, has been stopped.	曾经通过一个由12个FM频道组成的广播网在全国范围内转播的BBC尼泊尔台已经被停止。


All Indian news channels have been dropped from cable networks.	所有的印度新闻频道被从有线网内删除。


On Saturday, two senior journalists were detained for issuing statements critical of the crackdowns.	周六，两名高级记者因为发表批评镇压的言论而被拘留。


Newspapers and magazines are blandly reproducing official pronouncements and reports from the state-run news agency.	报纸和杂志正在温顺听从地重新刊发官方申明以及国营新闻通讯社提供的稿件。


Some have taken the risk of resorting to metaphors and allegory, while others poke fun at the whole thing by writing editorials on ballet or bee-keeping.	有一些曾冒险采取隐喻和讽喻，另一些则撰写有关芭蕾或者养蜂的短评揶揄时世。


At least one newspaper came out with its news pages completely blank.	甚至还有一家报纸的新闻版全版空白地出版。


Most young journalists, especially those in radio, have been shocked by the censorship.	大部分年轻记者，尤其是那些在广播电台的，被审查制度所深深震惊。


The freedoms that they were so accustomed to, and maybe even took for granted, have now been snatched away.	他们已经习以为常的自由，也许甚至已经认为理所当然该有的自由，现在却被掠夺走了。


But, for older journalists like me, there is a strong sense of déjà vu—the controls hark back to the times of the partyless absolute monarchy that existed here before 1990, when self-censorship was the order of the day.	但是，对于像我这样的老记者而言，却有一种强烈的似曾相识感——这种控制让我想起了1990年前这里的无党派绝对君主制，那时每天的任务就是自我审查。


Back then, irrational news decisions, sycophancy, and propaganda were passed off as journalism.	那个时候，非理性的新闻决定、阿谀谄媚和政治宣传与新闻主义一起消失了。


In those days, editors, reporters, and columnists played a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities, resorting to satire, humor, or metaphor.	在那段时间，编辑、记者以及专栏作家借助讽刺、幽默和隐喻，与政府当局玩着猫捉老鼠的游戏。


But punishment could be harsh.	但是，惩罚是残酷的。


Many journalists spent time behind bars, and there was a price to be paid when the morning newspapers contained even accidental typos, such as occurred when a headline concerning a royal birthday read “suspicious” instead of “auspicious.”	许多记者遭受了牢狱之灾，有一家晨报甚至因为意外的排字错误，比如把一个关于皇室成员生日的标题中的“auspicious”拼成“suspicious” 而付出代价。


Old jokes from the pre-1990 days have returned, like this one: a man was walking down a Kathmandu street, shouting, “Down with dictatorship in Pakistan.”	1990年前流传的就笑话又回来了，就像这则：一个男人走在加德满都的大街上，喊着：“打倒巴基斯坦的专政主义。


A policeman grabbed him and took him in.	”一个警察抓住他把他带了回去。


At the police station, he asked the protestor, “Why are you denouncing dictatorship in Pakistan when it exists here?”	在警察局，他问这个抗议者：“为什么专政主义在这里，你却公然抨击巴基斯坦的？ ”


To be sure, many Nepalis have welcomed King Gyanendra’s move this week.	诚然，许多尼泊尔人对贾南德拉国王本周的行动表示欢迎。


Much of the public is disenchanted by the instability caused by fractious and corrupt parliamentary leaders and by the Maoist insurgency, which has cost 12,000 lives in nine years.	国会领导人脾气暴躁且贪赃枉法，毛泽东主义反政府动乱在九年时间内已经夺走12,000人的生命，大部分民众 已经不再抱有幻想。


If this is what the king had to do to restore peace, they say, so be it.	如果这就是国王为了维持和平而所要做的，那么他们说，就做吧！


After all, the king has staked all and gambled his own throne by taking over power.	毕竟国王已将所有一切归入囊中，用他的皇冠作赌注获得了权力。


They have a point. Many expect the king to pull a rabbit out of his hat, to restore peace and start raising the living standards of Nepal’s 25 million people, most of whom live below the poverty line.	还有一点，那就是许多人期望国王能拿出锦囊妙计，维护和平并开始着手提高尼泊尔2500万人民的生活水平。


In his speech on February 1, King Gyanendra said the Nepali people would have to temporarily give up democracy in order to save democracy, and many Nepalese will go along with that, at least for a while.	绝大部分尼泊尔人至今还生活在贫困线下。 贾南德拉国王在2月1日的演讲中说道，为了能将民主保留下来，尼泊尔人民现在不得不暂时放弃民主，并且这至少还将伴随大多数尼泊尔人持续一段时间。


The king has a window of opportunity to deliver on his promises.	国王还有一个机会来不负众望履行他的诺言。


Perhaps King Gyanendra does have something up his sleeves.	说不定贾南德拉国王还真有几手绝招。


In the long run, however, the answer to Maoist totalitarianism is greater and more inclusive democracy, a vibrant free press, and civil liberties.	然而，从长远来看，要解决毛泽东极权主义的方法就是建立更宽广更包容的民主制度，一个生机勃勃享有自由的新闻界，以及公民自由。


Curtailing freedom merely polarizes society.	压制剥夺自由只会使社会走向极端化。


Indeed, even as a short-term strategy against the Maoists, it may well prove counterproductive.	事实上，即使是镇压毛泽东主义者的短期策略，也许都会产生负面作用。


The Return of the Radicals in Iran	激进主义者回归伊朗


Twenty-six years after the Islamic Revolution, just when the West had expected Iran to settle down and become more pragmatic, the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to have lurched back toward radicalism.	伊斯兰革命爆发26年之后，正当西方预料伊朗局势稳定、变得更加注重实效之时，内贾德总统当局标志着伊朗突然回归到激进主义的时代。


By looking at earlier revolutions, we can perhaps come to understand what is happening in Iran, for recent events there have clear historical precedents.	通过考查早先的革命，我们或许可以理解伊朗的现状，因为近期的事件都有明显的历史先例。


Many revolutions have passed through an initial “quiet” period after an early phase of radicalism, only to experience a resurgence of radicalism 15-25 years later.	许多革命都在经历早期激进主义阶段后进入最初的“平静”时期，这为15年到25年之后激进主义的复活埋下了伏笔。


This is because the initial quiet period is often marked by corruption and a retreat from revolutionary goals, leading idealists to feel that the revolution is losing its way.	这是因为，最初的平静时期常常以腐败堕落滋生以及革命目标的倒退为标志，导致理想主义者感到革命失去了方向。


Believing that stronger pursuit of revolutionary ideals is the only way to strengthen their country, these idealists seek to inspire a “return of the radicals,” triggering sharp conflict with their more pragmatic co-revolutionaries.	这些理想主义者相信，更加强烈的追求革命理想是强国的唯一途径，所以他们寻求鼓动“激进分子的回归”，引发了与更为注重实效的革命同伴之间的激烈冲突。


The Mexican Revolution of 1910 began with a challenge to the dictator Porfirio Díaz that ignited peasant uprisings and worker revolts.	1910年墨西哥革命发端于挑战独裁者迪亚斯，随之引发了农民起义和工人暴动。


The revolution’s radical phase seemed to end in 1920 when General Alvaro Obregón seized power; he limited land reforms and sought reconciliation with the United States.	这场革命的激进阶段好像于1920年奥布雷贡将军夺权之后结束。 他限制土地革命，寻求与美国和解。


For the next 14 years, Obregón and his ally General Plutarco Calles ruled Mexico.	以后14年里，奥布雷贡与他的盟友卡列斯将军统治墨西哥。


Then, in 1934, resentment against growing corruption led Calles to choose an “honest idealist” to become president, a young man who had fought for him early in the revolution, who he thought he could control but who would help the government regain popularity.	然后，1934年，出于对愈演愈烈的腐败的愤恨，卡列斯选择一个“忠实的理想主义者”出任总统。 这是一位在革命早期曾为他浴血奋战的年轻人。


That “honest revolutionary,” Lázaro Cárdenas, toured the country, building his popular support, and then turned on Calles, expelling him from Mexico.	他认为他能够垂帘听政，而这位年轻人能够帮助政府重获民心。 卡德纳斯这位“忠实的理想主义者”巡游全国，建立民众支持，随后反戈一击，将卡列斯驱离墨西哥。


Known for both his radicalism and his honesty, Cárdenas refused to live in the presidential palace and cut his salary in half.	卡德纳斯以激进和忠实而著名。 他拒绝入住总统官邸，并且将自己的薪水减半。


He also took seriously the early goals of the revolution, embarking on massive land reforms.	他也对革命早期目标丝毫不怠慢，开始进行大规模土改。


In 1938 – twenty-eight years after the revolution began – Cárdenas provoked a major confrontation with the US and Britain by expropriating their oil companies and nationalizing Mexico’s petroleum.	革命开始28年之后的1938年，卡德纳斯没收英美两国的石油公司，将本国石油收归国有，从而挑起与英美的对抗。


Only in the 1940’s, after Cárdenas left power, did Mexico turn to a more conservative political path.	墨西哥直到1940年卡德纳斯离职之后才转到更为保守的政治路线。


Similarly, China’s Communist Revolution began with a decade of attacks on the middle and professional classes and a reshaping of the countryside, culminating in the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59.	同样的，中共革命一开始的十年也是攻击中产阶级和专业人士阶层，改造农村，并在1958年到59年的“大跃进”登峰造极。


But that disastrous campaign weakened Mao’s influence; by the early 1960’s he seemed to be relegated to the sidelines while pragmatists like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping grew stronger.	但是这场灾难性的运动削弱了毛的影响力； 到60年代初期，他好像越来越边缘化，而像刘少奇和邓小平这样注重实效的人却越来越强。


Yet Mao worried that his revolution was going off track, and in the mid-1960’s he launched an effort to regain control of the Party by educating a new generation of radical youth.	但是毛担心他的革命偏离方向。 在60年代中期，他通过教育新一代激进青年以图重新控制中共。


These “Red Guards” launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966-68, targeting the more conservative elements within the Communist Party.	这些“红卫兵”在1966年到1968发动文化大革命，攻击中共内部更为保守的势力。


The Cultural Revolution tore China apart, but it returned Mao to supreme power and allowed him to purge the pragmatists.	文化大革命造成中国分裂，但却让毛重新回到权力的顶峰，可以放手清洗实用主义者。


But did the battle between pragmatists and radicals end there?	但是，实用主义者与激进主义者之间的斗争就此结束了吗？


In the early 1970’s, moderates gained by engineering a rapprochement with the US, capped by Nixon’s famous visit to China in 1972.	在70年代初期，温和派通过与美国的和解占了上风。 1972年尼克松访华标志着中间路线达到顶峰。


Deng was rehabilitated the following year, and in the late 1970’s, after Mao’s death, Deng’s pragmatists seized control of the regime.	邓也于次年平反。 70年代后期毛逝世之后，邓的实用主义者掌权。


What do these historical examples suggest for Iran?	这些历史上的先例对伊朗有什么样的启示意义？


It is likely that the relatively calm period dating from Khomeini’s death in 1989 is over.	1989年哈梅内伊逝世之后的相对平静时期可能已经结束。 内贾德的当选标志着执政的伊斯兰共和党内部开始了新的斗争。


The election of Ahmadinejad marks the onset of new struggles within the ruling Islamic Republican Party.	斗争的双方分别是“忠实的激进主义者”和更加腐败和注重实效的毛拉们。 “忠实的激进主义者”的领袖是内贾德，获得年轻的第二代革命者拥戴。


These pit the “honest radicals”- led by Ahmadinejad and supported by younger, second-generation revolutionaries known as the Abadgaran, or Developers, who are strong in the Iranian parliament, the Majlis- against the more corrupt and pragmatic mullahs who head the Party, led by Expediency Council Chairman and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.	他们号称“发展者”或“开发者”，在伊朗议会中有强大的势力。 毛拉们是伊斯兰共和党的领导层，他们的领袖是“过渡委员会”主席以及前总统拉夫桑贾尼。


Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is left in the middle, perhaps increasingly isolated and without strong popular support.	最高领袖哈梅内伊的政治立场中间偏左，可能会越来越受到孤立，失去民众强大的支持。


How should the US and European leaders respond?	美国和欧洲的领导人应该如何应对呢？


Historically, phases of resurgent radicalism have lasted 5-10 years, marked by greater aggressiveness against internal and external enemies.	从历史上看，激进主义复活的阶段会持续5到10年，标志是对国内外的敌人采取更具侵略性的行动。


This bodes ill for improved relations with Iran in the short run, and makes it imperative that Western powers unite to make it unambiguously clear that any use of nuclear weapons or materials by Iran or terror groups aligned with Iran will result in an immediate and devastating response.	这就预示着短期内与伊朗改善关系的可行性不大，并且使得西方国家联合起来采取行动变得势在必行。 西方应该明确无误地告诫伊朗及与其有关的恐怖集团任何，使用核武器或核材料的行动都将立即招致毁灭性的打击。


(China developed its nuclear weapons just before its Cultural Revolution, mainly to deter the Soviet Union, but never used them).	(中国在文化大革命开始之前研制出自己的核武器，主要目的是遏制苏联，但从来没有使用过)。


It also seems advisable to offer positive incentives – including US recognition and an end to sanctions – that could help empower pragmatists in their intra-Party struggle, much as Nixon’s overtures to China helped blunt China’s radicalism and strengthened the hand of pragmatists in the Communist Party.	同时也可以采取积极的鼓励措施，包括美国承认伊朗政权和结束制裁，这可以帮助强化党内斗争中的实用主义者，正如尼克松对中国示好帮助压制了中国的激进主义，增强了中共实用主义者的力量。


Nixon did not demand that China’s leaders abandon communism or that Mexico become a competitive democracy, only that they act responsibly and learn to do business with the US.	尼克松没有要求中国领导人放弃共产主义或墨西哥变成一个竞争型民主国家，只是要求他们行动更为负责，并且学习与美国打交道。


Five decades after its revolution, China is still not a democracy, and Mexico is only just becoming one nine decades after its revolution.	在革命50年后，中国仍然不是一个民主国家，墨西哥也是在革命结束90年之后才正在成为民主国家。


Neither country always sees eye to eye with the West.	这两个国家都不可能总是与西方看法一致。


But both became countries with which it is possible to do a great deal of business, and both are increasingly integrated into the global economy.	但是他们都成为可以与大打交道的国家，并且两国都越来越融入到全球经济之中。


That may be the only realistic goal in dealing with Iran.	这或许是处理与伊朗关系时唯一现实可行的目标。


The Return of the Siloviki	“斯洛维奇”的回归


STOCKHOLM – Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently announced that Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have abandoned their separate talks to join the World Trade Organization.	发自斯德哥尔摩——俄罗斯总理普京最近宣布俄罗斯、白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦三个国家将分别放弃它们与世界贸易组织(WTO)的单独谈判。


Instead, they would seek to enter the world trade body as a single customs union.	取而代之的则是寻求以一个单一关税联盟的面目加入世贸组织。


In effect, this means that Russia seems to be casting aside its accession to the WTO – a major reversal of Russian strategy.	这似乎意味着俄罗斯要放弃其入世进程——而此举堪称是俄国家战略的重大转向。


Putin’s statement hit like a bolt from the blue.	普京的声明让所有人都深感意外。


Two days earlier, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk and European Union Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton had completed successful talks on Russia’s accession to the WTO with Putin’s first deputy, Igor Shuvalov, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, and Minister of Economy and Development Elvira Nabiullina.	就在两天前，美国贸易代表罗恩·柯尔克连同欧盟贸易专员凯瑟琳·阿什顿才和普京的首席代表伊戈尔·舒瓦洛夫，财政部长阿列克谢·库德林以及经济和发展部长艾尔维拉·纳比琳娜进行了关于俄入世进程的成功会谈。


As late as June 3, Putin had declared himself sure of Russia’s “swift joining of the WTO.”	甚至在6月3日时，普京还信誓旦旦地保证说俄罗斯要“迅速加入WTO”。


The leaders of Belarus or Kazakhstan seemed equally surprised by Putin’s statement, especially as Russia had just prohibited almost all imports of dairy products from Belarus in a protectionist ploy.	白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦的领导人似乎也对普京的声明同样意外，尤其是在俄方不久之前刚刚采取贸易保护主义措施，禁止进口几乎所有的白俄罗斯奶制品的情况下。


After 16 years of negotiations, Russia appeared poised to join the WTO within a couple of months.	在外人看来，经历了16年的漫长谈判之后，俄罗斯本该在几个月内就顺利加入WTO的。


Indeed, only three difficult hurdles remained.	事实上，俄罗斯的入世进程只剩下三个障碍。


First, Ukraine demands a bilateral protocol on market access, which would force Russia to abolish roughly 100 trade sanctions, primarily in agriculture.	首先，乌克兰要求签订有关市场准入的双边协议，迫使俄罗斯废除主要集中在农业方面的将近100项贸易禁令。


The second obstacle is border controls with Georgia, a mainly political issue: whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia are independent, as Russia maintains, or are part Georgia, as the rest of the world believes.	第二个障碍则是与格鲁吉亚的边境管制问题，而且主要还是政治上的：究竟阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯地区应该如俄方所言，是独立的政治实体，还是如世界所相信的那样是格鲁吉亚的一部分？


Finally, the EU insists that Russia abolish planned prohibitive export tariffs on lumber.	最后，欧盟坚持要俄罗斯废止为抑制木材出口而计划征收的出口关税。


Only the Georgian issue is really serious.	而在上述三点当中，真正棘手的只有格鲁吉亚问题。


A customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan is no alternative to Russia’s WTO accession.	此外一个包括了白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦的海关联盟也并不能取代俄罗斯的入世进程。


No countries have ever entered the WTO collectively, nor is this legally possible says WTO head Pascal Lamy.	因为从来就没有几国组团加入WTO的先例，世界贸易组织主席帕斯卡·拉米也说此举在法理上是不可行的。


Moreover, while the customs union was proclaimed in 1995, the earliest it can be formed is in July 2011, which is unlikely.	此外，虽然关于关税联盟的说法在1995年就已经出现，但联盟最快也要在2011年7月才能成立，因此显然这个做法显然也不太可靠。


Predominantly a commodity exporter, Russia has less need for the WTO than a manufacturer like China. Even so, one-fifth of Russia’s exports comprise metals and chemicals that are sensitive to anti-dumping measures.	虽然作为一个重要的商品输出国，俄罗斯对于WTO的需要并不像中国这些生产国那么紧迫，但依然有1/5的俄罗斯出口产品属于金属和化工品这类对反倾销措施极为敏感的产品。


A series of World Bank and Russian studies have estimated that Russia can gain 0.5-1.0 percentage points in economic growth for half a decade if it joins the WTO.	对此一系列来自世界银行和俄罗斯的研究都预计，如果俄罗斯成功加入WTO，其国家经济发展水平将在此后5年内每年额外增加0. 5~1个百分点。


Membership is also important for Russia’s international standing.	而世贸成员国身份同样对俄罗斯的国际地位也非常重要。


It is the only G-20 country outside of the WTO, which accounts for 96% of global trade.	虽然跻身于坐拥全球贸易总额96%的G20集团之列，但俄罗斯却是其中唯一一个尚未加入世贸的成员。


The WTO also represents a choice of economic and political strategy.	而加入世贸同时也代表着一种经济和政治政策方向的选择。


Before Putin resigned as president in May 2008, he presented his “Russia 2020” program. Its heart was an “innovation strategy” based on more market reforms and investment in human capital, leading to annual growth of 6-7%.	在普京于2008年5月卸任总统之前还推出了“俄罗斯2020”计划，其核心则是一个基于更多市场改革和人力资源投资的“革新策略”，并预计推动俄罗斯年增长率达到6~7%。


In their rhetoric, President Dmitri Medvedev and his technocrats embrace this vision.	而继任的梅德韦杰夫及其技术官僚也都声称认同这个预期。


But Putin and his siloviki (political allies whose power base is in the security apparatus) seem to prefer an “inertia strategy,” the worst of the Russia 2020 scenarios. This strategy amounts to state capitalism, living on Russia’s energy wealth, and doing nothing to curtail Russia’s massive red tape and corruption.	但普京和他那些以俄安全部门为权力依托的政治盟友们（即所谓的“斯洛维奇”）似乎更偏好一个因循守旧��“惯性策略”，而这一策略将可能导致俄罗斯在2020年产生最坏的后果，其内容包括采取国家资本主义政策，一味依靠能源收入维持国家财政，并纵容俄内部大范围的官僚主义和腐败问题。


By reversing course on the WTO, Putin has again shown himself to be Russia’s master.	与此同时通过逆转俄罗斯的入世进程，普京再次昭示了他才是这个国家的真正老大。


He did the same thing last summer by lashing out against a successful mining and metallurgical company, Mechel, and provoking the war in Georgia.	而在去年夏天他同样也通过整治一个成功的采矿和冶金企业——梅切尔公司（Mechel），以及发动格鲁吉亚战争来证明了这一点。


During the winter, Putin’s poor policy choices on the financial crisis undermined his power.	但在2008年冬天，普京在应对经济危机方面低劣的政策选择一度动摇了他的政治权力。


Rather than shielding Russia’s private enterprises, he engineered a domestic liquidity freeze, which led to a sharp drop in GDP of 9.5% in the first quarter of 2009, despite Russia’s huge foreign reserves.	他不仅没有保护俄罗斯的私人企业，还在囤积了大量外汇储备的情况下冻结了国内的资金流动性，导致2009年第一季度俄罗斯GDP重挫9. 5%。


The pragmatic technocrats took over, but the subsequent doubling of oil prices signals that the danger for Russia’s economy is over for now, so the siloviki are resuming command.	危急之下务实的技术官僚一度掌握了权力，但随后油价的翻倍上涨则显示俄罗斯的经济危机已暂时过去，于是“斯洛维奇”们又卷土重来了。


The question is what their next step will be.	现在问题就在于，这帮人下一步将怎么走？


The prominent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer insists that their prime aim is to finish off Georgia and its president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who remains in power and defiant.	著名俄罗斯军事分析家帕维尔·费根哈尔坚持说“斯洛维奇”的首要目标一定是钳制格鲁吉亚，并收拾依然在位而且桀骜不驯的格总统米哈伊尔·萨卡什维利。


Georgia has received no military support and is virtually undefended. The Kremlin continues its propaganda offensive against Georgia, and has vetoed prolonging the mandate for United Nations observers in Georgia and Abkhazia.	虽然格鲁吉亚并未获得军事援助且事实上毫无还手之力，但克林姆林宫依然对其发动了一浪接一浪的宣传攻势，并否决了联合国在阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯地区派驻观察员的延长任命。


A major Russian military maneuver, Caucasus 2009, is underway. The last such maneuver, Caucasus 2008, was followed by the invasion of Georgia.	而代号“高加索2009”一个重大的俄罗斯军事调动行动也正在进行当中，须知上一年的“高加索2008”行动则直接催生了俄方入侵格鲁吉亚的事件。


During the latter part of this maneuver, July 6-8, US President Barack Obama is supposed to meet President Medvedev in Moscow.	而在此次军事行动的末尾，7月6日~8日，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马将计划在莫斯科会见梅德韦杰夫。


Medvedev obviously hopes to reach out and improve Russia’s and his own standing in the world.	很显然，梅德韦杰夫是想寻求国际合作并力图改善俄罗斯以及他本人的国际地位。


The siloviki , however, prefer Russia isolated and authoritarian, with power securely in their hands.	但“斯洛维奇”则更希望俄罗斯走向孤立和独裁，好让他们能继续把权力紧紧地抓在手里。


The Kremlin wants a new strategic arms control agreement, but the siloviki desire nothing more.	克里姆林宫希望能签订一个新的战略武器控制协议，但“斯洛维奇”希望能到此为止。


Obama’s administration had hoped for a final breakthrough in Russia’s WTO talks, but Putin’s actions have eliminated prospects for such an outcome.	奥巴马政府希望俄罗斯能在入世谈判方面取得最终突破，但普京的所作所为让一切希望化为乌有。


The US also wants progress on the territorial integrity of former Soviet states, such as Georgia, but that, too, is unlikely.	美国也希望在格鲁吉亚这些前苏联加盟共和国的领土完整问题上有所进展，但这些努力也同样一无所获。


Putin or his collaborators seem to be setting up Medvedev for a failure, suggesting that their jealousy of Medvedev’s limited power is greater than their interest in defending Russia’s national interests.	普京和他的同党们似乎想要把梅德韦杰夫的执政演变一场悲剧，因为他们对梅德韦杰夫有限权力的妒恨，似乎要远大于对俄罗斯国家利益的捍卫之心。


Yet there is still hope that Putin encounters a sufficiently negative reaction that he changes his stance on WTO accession.	但希望依然存在：普京将可能遇到足够有力的政治反弹，以致被迫改变其在入世进程中的立场。


After all, he suspended Russia’s WTO accession talks after the August 2008 war in Georgia, only to allow them to restart this spring.	毕竟他在2008年8月格鲁吉亚战争后就曾一度中止了入世谈判，但在今年春天，却也最终重新回到了谈判桌前。


The Return of the Stiff Upper Lip	坚忍者的回归


LONDON – Normally, British politics is a ferocious sport.	发自伦敦——一般来说，英国政治堪称某种残忍的竞技运动。


Its parliamentary debates are often pugilistic and personal.	议会辩论里充斥着针锋相对和人身攻击。


The British media have been described as “feral” (a word used by Tony Blair, among others).	而英国媒体的作为则可以用“野蛮”两字来形容（出自前首相东尼·布莱尔之口）。


The questions asked of politicians by journalists are often so aggressive or implicitly insulting that one wonders why their recipients don’t walk out of interviews in a huff, or wither on the spot from humiliation.	记者质问政治家的问题极富挑衅性以及侮辱意味，以致人们都奇怪为何被提问者不会勃然大怒，拂袖而去，又或者当场颜面扫地，无地自容。


But nothing has been normal in Britain of late.	但最近英国发生的一切都有点不“一般”。


For one thing, there is the new coalition government – a rarity unseen since the end of World War II.	首先，出现了个新联合政府——这可是个自二战结束以来都罕见的稀奇事。


Then, there are the reactions to the new government, which have been marked by a temperateness of tone that is highly unusual – and all the more surprising, given that David Cameron, the new prime minister, has not exactly been the bearer of good news.	其二，外界对新政府的反应异常克制，这更是闻所未闻——而最令人感到惊讶的，则是新首相戴维·卡梅隆竟然没有给英国人带来任何好消息。


Cameron’s central proposition is that Britain is in a state of “crisis,” and that getting through it will require fortitude and patience.	卡梅隆的核心观点就是英国正处于“危机”状态，而从危机中走出来则需要坚忍和耐心。


In a major speech, he warned that there is “pain” ahead, and that it will be felt by everyone, as severe spending cuts will be required to bring down Britain’s massive fiscal deficit.	在一场重要讲话中，他警告说“阵痛”即将到来，而每个人都将有切身感受，因为如果要降低英国严重的财政赤字的话，就必须实施严厉的开支削减政策。


Ordinarily, such pronouncements would provoke outcries of dismay, and of real or pretended indignation.	要是在过去，类似的声明都将刺激民众的焦虑情绪，并引来或真或假的愤怒声讨。


And, of course, there have been demurrals and criticisms. But, aside from former Labour ministers, protesting bitterly at being blamed for the state of the economy, the response has been remarkably civil and thoughtful.	当然，这番话也遭到了质疑和批评，但与前任工党首相遭到劈头盖脸的抗议，要求其为经济陷入困境负责的遭遇不同的是，外界对这番声明的回应相当客气，也非常理智。


What has happened?	这究竟是怎么回事呢？


Perhaps an alliance between Conservatives and Liberals – the two parties ostensibly farthest apart in their views – confounded everyone out of their certainties.	或许，是保守党和自由党——这两个表面上政见南辕北辙的政党——的结盟让外界一时犯了迷糊，不知如何应对。


This in itself may be no bad thing.	这种状况可能不会是件坏事。


But the “absence of war,” as the British playwright David Hare once called it, suggests that Britain’s political tectonic plates have shifted.	但如今这种英国剧作家大卫·海亚曾经所谓的“战争缺席”状态则意味着：英国的政治板块已经发生了位移。


For one thing, the coalition exposes an undercurrent in British political life that has  coexisted – almost furtively – with heated rhetoric: convergence among the main parties towards a kind of centrist synthesis on most of the big issues.	首先，尽管英国政治生活以言辞激烈著称，但执政联盟的出现则昭示了与之低调共存的另一股暗流：在绝大多数重要议题中，各主要党派都出现了向中间路线靠拢的趋势。


In a sense, the Conservative-Liberal coalition represents a culmination of this trend.	在某种意义上，保守自由两党联盟的出现意味着这一趋势的最终确立。


The policies and positions articulated by the new government suggest not so much the once vaunted Third Way (a slogan for the age of prosperity) as a carefully calibrated Middle Way.	新政府所采取的政策和立场不再是过去繁荣年代所吹嘘的“第三条道路”，而是一条小心平衡的“中间道路”。


It is clear, for example, that the sacred cows of public services and social benefits – among the most extensive in the world – will not remain untouched. Both will be subject to cuts.	最明显的例子，莫过于原本似乎神圣不可侵犯——而且费用也居世界前列——的公共服务和社会福利不再是政治禁区，并将遭到削减。


In addition, Cameron is proposing other reforms, such as requiring people, after several years’ unemployment, to accept a job offer, even if it is not the applicant’s preference.	此外，卡梅隆正在推动其他改革，比如要求那些连续失业了几年的人接受一份工作，即便申请人不情愿也必须执行。


This may help break the demoralizing cycle of unemployment and alienation.	这将有助于失业者打破丢掉工作-被社会抛弃-更加找不到工作的死循环。


But, to be clear, no one is thinking of eliminating basic services, or dismantling the social safety net.	但必须说明的是，没人会想要取消基础社会服务，或者是瓦解整个社会安全网。


There will also be new restraints on immigration.	此外还会颁布新的移民限制政策。


These come, however, after a vast influx of legal and illegal immigrants.	虽然这项改革是在一大批合法或者非法移民涌入英国之后的亡羊补牢之策。


But no one is suggesting that Britain should become a mono-cultural country again.	但没有人会想让英国重新回归一个一元文化国家。


At the other end of the economic spectrum, banking practices will – one hopes – be better regulated, following a prolonged period of stunning financial irresponsibility.	在经济光谱的另一端，银行行为将——正如人们所希望的那样——得到更好的规管，这也是在一段长时期内令人震惊的金融失职之后才出现的。


Clearly, however, nationalization, or a state-managed economy, is not in the cards.	但很明显，一个国有化或者由国家来管理的经济是不可能出现的。


For all the discomforts that may lie ahead, Britain is not about to enter an age of brutal austerity.	而对于未来可能遭受的阵痛来说，并非意味着英国即将步入一个节衣缩食的艰难时代。


Instead, what the coalition seems to be proposing is a sort of correction, a retrenchment from various excesses and dysfunctions to something more restrained and disciplined.	事实上，两党联盟所提议的恰恰是某种矫正措施，力图将过去诸多过度且失去效用的政策削减为某些更节制且更有效的政策。


And it seems that this agenda has captured a deep, if mostly unspoken vein of popular feeling – a consensus that something has been amiss in “broken Britain,” and that something needs to be done about it.	似乎这一议程已经获取了民众在情感上的深度认同（即便大多数总是保持沉默）——这已经形成了一种共识，认为在“颓败的英国”的肌体中某些地方出了故障，而且有必要做点什么来挽救它。


Now that the problem has been articulated, one can sense not only general agreement, but almost palpable relief.	如今问题已经被清晰地表述出来，人们可以感觉到的不仅是两党之间的一纸宏观协议，而是几乎实实在在的交替。 或许那个不负责任的时代已经一去不返了；


Perhaps the age of irresponsibility is over; perhaps we no longer have to shop until we drop; perhaps the compact between the individual and the government, in which both are understood to have obligations as well as rights, can be restored; perhaps the state will cease to treat its citizens like maladjusted adolescents, of whom nothing much can be demanded and to whom everything is permitted.	或许个人与政府之间订立的，双方都理解自身权利义务的的契约能够重新得到遵守； 或许国家不再把自己的公民当成心智尚未成熟的年轻人来对待，不但不相信公民的自觉性，而且每做一件事都要得到批准。


Instead of polemical mudslinging, words like “realism,” “necessity,” and “practicality” have again entered the public domain.	除了乐此不疲地互相揭发隐私之外，类似“现实主义”，“必要性”和“实用”这些词汇又一次进入到公众语境当中。


The ubiquitous sense of entitlement, accompanied by automatic skepticism about all things political, seems to have been replaced by a recognition that some problems are not susceptible to simple left-right explanations or solutions; that the government is neither omnipotent nor always ill-intentioned; and that there are limits to the prosperity that politics can provide.	那种普遍存在的享受公共服务意识，以及凡是政治事务都值得质疑的心态，都将被一种认为有些问题不能仅仅靠左派/右派的解释和解决方案来处理的想法所替代； 政府既非全能，也非总是图谋不轨；


The tone of stern warning has recently been adopted by other European leaders.	这种严厉警告的口吻最近也被一些欧洲领导人所借用。


But the coalition has one thing going for it: the Brits still love a crisis – and being told that they are in the middle of one has played very well.	但执政联盟正在努力的则是：英国人依然喜欢危机——而且被告知他们是危机中表现最好的那类。


There is a challenge to meet, a reason to pull together.	这是一个必须面对的挑战，也是大家齐心协力的理由。


It is difficult to know how long this sentiment of solidarity will last.	很难说这种团结的气氛能持续多久。


Politics abhors equilibrium as much as nature abhors a vacuum; and undoubtedly, tensions within the coalition, as well as outside it, will surface.	政治厌恶平衡，正如自然界厌恶真空； 毫无疑问，联盟内部以及外部的矛盾将逐渐浮现。


Still, possibly the British mood portends a wider change of climate for Western liberal democracies, and the onset of a new, less indulgent era.	但英国人当前的情绪预示着西方自由民主气候的重大转折，以及一个更少纵容的新时代的开始。


For now, the British upper lip seems to have regained some of its stiffness.	如今，英国人似乎正变得更加坚忍。


One hopes that this will last long enough for British society to regain its stability and its much-needed vigor.	我们希望这种状况将维持足够时间，令英国社会能够恢复稳定，并获取急需的活力。


The Revolt of the Debtors	债务人的逆袭


BRUSSELS – Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou’s call to hold a referendum on the rescue package agreed at the eurozone summit in late October has profound implications for European governance, despite the fact that the referendum will not now go ahead.	布鲁塞尔——希腊总理帕潘德里欧声称要对去年10月达成一致的救助计划进行全民公投将对欧洲的治理产生深远影响。


It may also determine the future of the euro. 	此举可能决定欧元的未来。


Papandreou had to reverse course quickly in response to both internal and external pressure, but the option that he put on the table will not go away whatever the fate of the present Greek government.	出于国内外的压力，帕潘德里欧被迫收回了成命，但不论希腊现任政府的命运如何，他所抛出的方案始终有实施的可能。


As long as the Greek people have to be asked to accept one austerity package after another, they might wonder when they will have a direct say on this matter.	只要希腊人民被迫要求接受一个又一个紧缩计划，他们就会考虑是不是应该对这个问题来个快刀斩乱麻。


Less than one week before Papandreou dropped his bombshell, eurozone leaders had spoken unequivocally: “The introduction of the European Semester has fundamentally changed the way our fiscal and economic policies are coordinated at European level, with co-ordination at EU level now taking place before national decisions are taken.”	在帕潘德里欧抛出这个重磅炸弹前不到一周，欧元区领导人明确地说：“引入‘欧洲学期’（European Semester）从根本上改变了在我们欧洲层面上进行财政和经济政策协调的办法，现在，欧盟层面的合作将先于国家层面的决策发生。


Simply put, pan-eurozone financial governance had supposedly won the day.	”简言之，泛欧元区财政治理的时代已经开始了。


Technically, Papandreou’s proposed referendum was not directly about fiscal or economic policy, but it is a decision that would have had huge economic ramifications for the eurozone.	从技术上说，帕潘德里欧的全民公投计划并非直接针对财政或经济政策，但这一决定会给欧元区带来巨大的经济分歧。


Despite that, it was taken without any coordination with other eurozone leaders.	尽管如此，希腊是在未与任何欧元区领导人协商的情况下做出这一决定的。


Moreover, if Greece’s voters had rejected the deal that has just been proposed to them, the outcome might have foreclosed any further coordination on the country’s debt problems with the European Union.	此外，如果希腊选民否决了将施加在它们头上的方案，将对希腊与欧盟就债务问题的未来协商构成阻碍。


Greece would have sunk or swum on its own.	希腊必须得自力更生寻找生机。


So, only days after the eurozone’s heads of state and government congratulated themselves on their summit success, the concept of coordination was shown to be meaningless for the one country where coordination matters most.	于是，欧元区各国首脑为他们在峰会上取得的成就沾沾自喜仅仅几天后，合作的概念就对最需要合作的国家失去了意义。


Papandreou’s move also exposes the fatal flaw of grand plans for a political or fiscal union to support the euro: the “people,” not governments, remain the real sovereign.	帕潘德里欧的举动还暴露了以政治或财政联盟支持欧元的宏伟计划的致命弱点：“人民”，而不是政府，才是真正的主导者。


Governments may sign treaties and make solemn commitments to subordinate their fiscal policy to the wishes of the EU as a whole (or to be more precise, to the wishes of Germany and the European Central Bank); but, in the end, the people may reject any adjustment program that “Brussels” (meaning Berlin and Frankfurt) might want to impose.	政府可以签订条约，信誓旦旦地承诺牺牲本国财政政策配合欧元区整体利益（或者更准确地说，配合德国和欧洲央行的利益）； 但最后人民可以拒绝执行“布鲁塞尔”（其实是柏林和法兰克福）所希望实施的调整计划。


The EU remains a collection of sovereign states, and it therefore cannot send an army or a police force to enforce its pacts or collect debt.	欧盟仍然是主权国家的集合体，因此不能派遣军队或警察来强制执行公约或集中债务。


Any country can leave the EU – and, of course, the eurozone – when the burden of its obligations becomes too onerous.	任何国家都可以脱离欧盟——当然也包括欧元区——只要其身上的负担重到不可承受。


Until now, it had been assumed that the cost of exit would be so high that no country would consider it.	到目前为止，人们一直认为，退出的成本太大，没有国家会考虑这一选择。


This no longer seems to be the case – or so the Greeks, at least, seemed to believe.	但世道似乎已经起了变化——至少希腊人这么看。


This also implies that Eurobonds will never constitute the silver bullet that some had hoped would solve Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis.	这还表明，欧元债券永远成不了一些人眼中的解决欧元主权债务危机的良方。


As long as member states remain fully sovereign, investors cannot be assured that if the eurozone breaks up, some states will not simply refuse to pay – or will not refuse to pay for the others.	只要成员国仍拥有完全的主权，投资者就得不到保证。 若欧元区分崩离析，一些国家将拒绝偿付——或拒绝替其他国家偿付。


With popular resistance to paying for profligate southern Europeans rising in Germany and Holland, governments there might be forced to ask their people whether they want to pay the huge costs implied by their commitments to bail out eurozone members that are unwilling or unable to pay.	由于德国和荷兰民众拒绝替不知节制的南欧国家偿还债务，两国政府可能不得不问问它们的人民，愿不愿意支付它们援助不愿或不能偿付的欧元区成员国的承诺所隐含的巨大成本。


That is why the bonds issued by the eurozone’s rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, are trading at a substantial premium relative to German debt, while efforts by Klaus Regling, the EFSF’s head, to convince China, Japan, and other Asians to buy the bonds have gotten nowhere.	这就是为何欧元区救助计划欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）所发行的债券对德国国债存在高溢价的原因，也是为何EFSF首脑雷格林（Klaus Regling）使出浑身解数也无法说服中国、日本和其他亚洲国家购买EFSF债券的原因。


The broader message of the Greek move is that “coordination” has so far been a code word for almost total control by creditors (sometimes together with the ECB).	希腊此举更深的潜台词是，如今，“合作”一词已经成了任债权人（有时也包括欧洲央行）宰割的潜台词。


The attempt to impose a benevolent creditors’ dictatorship is now being met by a debtors’ revolt.	让仁慈的债权人来主宰命运遭到了债务人的强烈抵抗。


Financial markets have reacted so strongly because investors now comprehend that “sovereign debt” is the debt of a sovereign that can simply decide not to pay.	金融市场反应强烈，因为投资者们已经看穿，“主权债务”无非是主权国家可以决定不偿还的债务。


Holders of bonds of the eurozone’s member states have now been put on notice that, when the going gets tough, the real sovereign, “We, the people,” might be asked whether they actually want to pay.	欧元区成员国债券的持有者现在已经得到了告示——当世道变得艰难时，真正的主权者，即“我们人民”，可能会被问及是否真的愿意偿付。


And the answer might very well be an emphatic “no,” as opinion polls in Greece and the experience of Iceland (whose population twice voted down deals agreed by the Icelandic government) suggest is likely.	而答案很可能是大声说出的“不”字，希腊的态度调查以及冰岛的经验（其人民两次否决了冰岛政府所同意的决定）都是明证。


Nobody can know at this point whether Portugal or Italy might be the next stops on this road of resistance.	现在，没人知道葡萄牙和意大利是否会是下一个走上抵制之路的国家。


The result, however, is quite predictable: soaring risk premia throughout the periphery.	不过，结果是可预测的：外围国家的风险溢价将出现飙升。


Papandreou’s decision to call a referendum in Greece could thus have marked the beginning of the endgame for the euro.	因此，帕潘德里欧的全民公投决定标志着欧元揭开了告别序幕。


At this point, the common currency can be saved only if systemically important countries – namely, Italy and Spain – take concerted action to demonstrate that they are different from Greece.	事到如今，要想挽救共同货币，唯一的办法是具有系统重要性的国家，即意大利和西班牙，一致行动，表明它们与希腊绝不相同。


The Revolt of the Meritocrats	英才的反叛


PARIS – The bailout of the financial system was a bizarre moment in economic history, for it benefited those who benefited most from the markets’ irrational exuberance – the bosses of financial firms.	巴黎--拯救金融体系是经济史上的一个怪异时刻，因为它的最大受益者是那些从市场的非理性繁荣中获得最多利益的人--金融公司的大佬们。


Before the crisis hit, however, redistribution of wealth (and the tax and social security payments that make it possible) was considered the biggest obstacle to economic efficiency.	然而，在危机到来之前，财富的再分配（以及使之成为可能的税收与社会保障费用）却被认为是实现经济效益的最大障碍。


Indeed, the values of solidarity had given way to those of individual “merit,” judged by the size of one’s paycheck.	的确，团结的价值已经屈从于个人的“功绩”，而后者则是以人的收入多少来衡量的。


The paradox is that a part of this evolution may be attributable to two positive factors: the slow work of democracy, which liberates individuals but at the same time leaves them more isolated; and the development of a welfare system that shares risks and makes individuals more autonomous.	矛盾的是，这种情况的形成可以被归咎于两个积极的因素：民主的循序渐进使个人获得自由但同时也使人陷入孤立； 福利体系的发展分担风险，并使得个人更加自主。


With this isolation and autonomy, people increasingly tend to believe, for better or for worse, that they alone are responsible for their own fate.	有了这种孤立和自主，人们更加愿意相信，不论是福是祸，他们自己对自身的命运负责。


Here lies the conundrum.	而难题也正在于此。


An individual is free and autonomous only because of the collective decisions taken after democratic debate, notably those decisions that guarantee each person access to public goods such as education, health care, etc.	个人自由和自主的获得恰恰是因为民主辩论后的集体决策，特别是那些确保每个人有机会享有教育、医疗等公共商品的决策。


Some sense of social solidarity may remain, but it is so abstract that those for whom the wheel of fortune has spun so favorably feel little debt.	虽然社会连结感还在一定程度上存在，但它已经变得如此抽象，以至于那些得到命运眷顾的人极少感恩社会。


They believe that they owe their status purely to merit, not to the collective efforts – state-funded schools, universities, etc. – that enabled them to realize their potential.	他们相信自己所取得的地位完全是个人功绩使然而不是集体努力--国家资助的学校、大学等等--使他们能发挥自身的潜力。


When merit is measured by money, there is no ethical limit to the size of an individual’s paycheck.	当我们用金钱来衡量成功，那么个人收入的多少就没有了任何的道德局限。


If I earn ten, a hundred, or a thousand times more than you, it is because I deserve ten, a hundred, or a thousand times more than you.	如果我的收入是你的十倍、一百倍或者一千倍，是因为我理应比你多赚十倍、一百倍或一千倍。


Merit and skills are how we give an intrinsic value to money.	我们通过功绩与技能赋予金钱内在价值。


Human nature – ego and/or arrogance – does the rest.	人性--自负和/或傲慢－最终完成这一过程。


It is no surprise, then, that many people think of themselves as priceless.	因此，有许多人认为自己是无价之宝也就不足为奇了。


The central place where this self-(over)evaluation meets the fewest obstacles is the financial market.	而能够几乎毫无阻碍地完成这一自我评价的中心场所就是金融市场。


Money there is an abstraction – “the abstraction of abstractions,” as Hegel put it – which helps explain why salaries are no longer rooted in reality.	这里的金钱是抽象的－如黑格尔所说“抽象中的抽象”－这就有助于解释为什么薪酬会脱离现实。


Of course, when the crisis hit, financial institutions were the first to argue that autonomy was unrealistic, and that we are all interdependent.	当然，在危机到来时，金融机构首先提出自主不现实，而且我们都是相互依靠的。


After all, why else should taxpayers agree to rescue them?	毕竟，如若不然纳税人为何要拯救它们？


But now these same institutions are deciding that they want to go their own way again.	但现在同样是这些金融机构却正决定它们要我行我素了。


So yesterday’s (pre-crisis) world is being resurrected.	于是昨日（危机前的）世界死而复生。


Dismissing the risks that taxpayers incurred, financial institutions used the bailout to restore profitability and are now reverting to their old habits, which had worked so well for them and so badly for others.	全然不顾纳税人所遭受的风险，金融机构们利用拯救计划来恢复它们的赢利性，而它们损人利己的老习惯又开始死灰复燃。


No one should be surprised about this.	没有人应该对此感到意外。


The economic stakes encourage everyone to make the best of their circumstances.	经济赌注使每个人都充分利用环境让利益最大化。


The bailout of banks led to a wave of mergers.	拯救银行引发了一股兼并潮。


If they were already too big to fail, what should we now say when banks are even bigger?	如果这些银行已经因为过于庞大而不能破产，那么在它们变得更为庞大时我们还有什么话可说？


Their market power has increased, yet they know they incur no risk, owing to the aggravated systemic impact of their potential bankruptcy.	它们的市场影响力增加了，然而它们知道由于可能破产的严重系统性影响，自己不会面临风险。


Moreover, they face an economy starved of credit, in which the crisis endangered many companies whose bankruptcy would have no systemic effect.	另外，它们所面对的是一个信贷饥渴的经济，危机令许多公司身处险境，但这些公司的破产不会产生系统性影响。


Working in so uncompetitive a market is a real stroke of luck.	在如此没有竞争的市场上翻云覆雨真是交了好运。


I do not know many businessmen who would not take advantage of this; to be honest, I do not know any.	我认识的生意人中没有几个不利用这样的环境牟利； 老实说，一个也没有。


The free-market doctrine, which has become almost a religion, reinforced this belief: markets are efficient, and if they pay me so much (a potentially mind-boggling amount, as seen in recent cases), it is because my own efficiency warrants it.	几乎已经成为一种宗教的自由市场教条，强化了这一信念：市场是有效率的，如果他们付我这么多钱（就最近的例子来看，很可能是笔令人难以置信的数额），那是因为我自己的效益值得了这个价。


I also participate indirectly and abstractly in forging the common good, by creating value through my work, and I am rewarded for it.	通过工作创造价值，我也间接并抽象地参与了创造公共利益，并由此获得奖励。


But suddenly the system collapses, the creation of value turns into destruction and parallel universes collide.	但这个体系突然间崩溃了，价值的创造变成了毁灭，平行世界发生了冲撞。


No mathematician can remember so unprecedented and spectacular a result: parallel lines intersecting, with autonomy becoming (for the brief moment of the bailout at least) interdependence.	没有任何一个数学家能记得如此史无前例且令人叹为观止的结果：随着自主变成相互依赖（至少是在拯救中的短暂一刻），平行线相交了。


For the connections between the economy and the world of finance are so strong and the interdependency between the so-called parallel universes so tight that there was no choice.	因为经济与金融世界的联系是如此强烈，所谓平行世界之间的相互依赖是如此紧密，以至于我们别无选择。


Eyes are opened; the illusion of arbitrage between efficiency and solidarity fades.	公众大开眼界； 效益与连结之间的套利幻象淡去。


The crisis reminds us what each person owes to others, highlighting an ethical truth that we were quick to forget: the rich benefit more than the poor from their cooperation with other members of society.	这场危机提醒我们每个人对他人的亏欠，并揭示了一个我们很快忘却的道德真相：富人比穷人更能从与社会其他成员的合作中所获得利益。


Two conclusions can be drawn from all this. The first is that we all owe at least some of our success to others, given the public goods that society provides.	从中我们可以出两个结论：首先，鉴于社会所提供的公共商品我们的成功至少在一定程度上应该归功于他人。


This calls for more modesty and restraint in determining the highest salaries, not for moral reasons but for the sustainability of the system.	这就要求我们在决定最高薪酬时表现出更多的谦卑和克制，不是出于道德原因，而是为了这个体系的可持续性。


The second conclusion is that the most privileged classes, which have benefited the most from the solidarity of others, notably the poor, can no longer deny the latter’s contributions.	第二个结论是最富有特权的阶层从他人，特别是穷人的连结中获得了最多的利益。 他们不能再抵赖后者的贡献。


But don’t hold your breath waiting for them to agree.	但你不要屏住呼吸指望他们同意这一点。


The Revolutionary Ethics of Embryo Research	胚胎研究中的伦理激变


What appeared to be the most momentous scientific advance of 2005 is currently under siege.	看似是2005年最为重大的科技进步正遭受质疑。


In June, the prestigious journal Science published an article by the South Korean scientist Woo-Suk Hwang and an international team of co-authors describing how they had developed what were, in effect, “made to order” lines of human stem cells cloned from an adult.	6月份，著名的<<科学>>杂志发表韩国科学家黄禹锡以及一个国际合作小组的文章。 该文描述他们如何制成从成人身上克隆而成的“预制的”干细胞株。


Although the scientific validity of their research is now the subject of several separate investigations, it is no less important to examine its ethical implications.	尽管其研究的科学准确性正在同时接受不同的调查，但是，审查其伦理含义的重要性一点也不逊色。


Hwang and his colleagues claimed to have replaced the nucleus of an unfertilized human egg with the nucleus of an ordinary cell taken from another person, developing stem-cell lines from the resulting embryo that matched the DNA of the person who supplied the ordinary cell.	黄禹锡及其同事宣称，他们将未受精人卵核替换为从另一个人身上提取的正常细胞核，从而，从由此产生的胚胎上制成了干细胞株，这一胚胎符合提供正常细胞人的NDA。


That achievement appeared to take us significantly closer to a world in which patients could be given cell or tissue transplants that their bodies would not reject, because the biological materials, cloned from the patients themselves, would be a perfect match.	这一成就似乎把我们大为推近到这样一个世界，那就是将来可以对病人进行细胞或组织移植，而病人的身体不会拒绝，因为从病人自身身体克隆而得的生物材料将会完全相符。


At the beginning of December, Hwang disclosed that some of the eggs came from two women working in his lab, and that other “donors” had been paid for their eggs – a breach of ethical guidelines that had nothing to do with the accuracy of the science.	12月初，黄禹锡披露，其中某些卵子来自于在其实验室工作的两名妇女，而且，其他“捐献者”也为她们的卵子而得到报酬。 这违反了伦理标准，而与科学准确与否无关。


But then Hwang’s collaborators began questioning the validity of the experiment itself, and Hwang notified Science that he wished to withdraw the paper.	但是，黄禹锡的同僚们随后又开始质疑实验本身的准确性，而黄通知<<科学>>杂志表明希望撤回论文。


At the time of this writing, he still defends the validity of his work, while admitting “human errors” in the preservation of the stem-cell lines, including contamination by a fungus.	在本文写作之时，他仍然为其工作的准确性辩护，同时承认在保持干细胞株时出现了“人为错误”，包括受到真菌感染。


He has reportedly even suggested that some cells may have been tampered with.	据报道，他甚至暗示对某些细胞做了手脚。


We will not know how close we are to the production of individually tailored stem-cell lines until the scientific investigations into Hwang’s research are completed.	在对黄禹锡的研究的科学调查完成之前，我们无法知道我们距离制造量体裁衣的干细胞株究竟有多远。


Nevertheless, few researchers doubt that what Hwang and his colleagues claimed to do is, in principle, achievable.	但是，几乎没有研究人员怀疑，黄禹锡及其同僚宣称所做到的在原则上是可以实现的。


If Hwang was not the first to do it, someone else eventually will.	如果黄禹锡不抢得头筹，别人早晚也会。


Once it can be done reliably, it will pave the way for important medical breakthroughs.	一旦可以稳健地做到这样，就将会为重大的医学突破铺平道路。


But the ethical significance of such research goes far beyond the undoubted importance of saving critically ill patients.	挽救重症病人无疑是十分重要的。 但是，这种研究的伦理意义远远超出这一范围。


Proving the possibility of cloning from the nucleus of an ordinary human cell would transform the debate about the value of potential human life, for we would find that “potential human life” was all around us, in every cell of our bodies.	证实有可能克隆普通的人类细胞核将会转变有关潜在的人的生命价值的辩论，这是因为，我们将会发觉“潜在的人类生命”无处不在，充斥于我们身体的每一个细胞。


For example, when President George W. Bush announced in 2001 that the United States would not fund research into new stem-cell lines that are created from human embryos, he offered the following reason: “Like a snowflake, each of these embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of an individual human being.”	例如，布什总统在2001年宣布美国将不会资助从人类胚胎制成的新的干细胞株时，他提出如下理由：“这些胚胎像雪花一样，每个都是独一无二的。 它们都具有单一个人的独特的基因潜力”。


But it is precisely this reasoning that is threatened by what Hwang and his team claimed to have achieved.	但是，黄禹锡及其小组宣称实现的东西恰恰威胁到这一推理。


If it is the uniqueness of human embryos that makes it wrong to destroy them, then there is no compelling reason not to take one cell from an embryo and destroy the remainder of it to obtain stem cells, for the embryo’s “unique genetic potential” would be preserved.	如果是由于人类胚胎独一无二的特性而使得摧毁它们是错误的话，那么，就没有什么迫切的理由不从胚胎中提取一个细胞并摧毁剩余的胚胎而获得干细胞，因为胚胎的“独一无二的基因潜力”将会得到保持。


This possibility highlights the weakness of the argument that abortion, too, is wrong because it destroys a genetically unique human being.	这一可能性突出了堕胎是错误的论断也是脆弱的，因为堕胎摧毁一个从基因上而言是独一无二的人。


By this reasoning, a woman who finds herself pregnant at an inconvenient time could have an abortion, as long as she preserves a single cell from the fetus to ensure that its unique genetic potential is preserved.	根据这一推理，一个在不恰当的时候怀孕的妇女可以堕胎，只要她从胎儿身上保留一个单一细胞来保证保存其独一无二的基因潜力就可以。


But it seems absurd that this should make any difference to the morality of aborting the fetus.	但是，这与将胎儿堕胎的道德性有所不同的说法看��来是荒谬的。


If, at a later date, the woman wants to have a child, why should she use the DNA of her earlier, aborted fetus rather than conceiving another fetus in the usual way?	如果以后这个妇女想要一个孩子，为什么她使用她的较早的堕胎掉的胎儿的DNA，而不去通过通常的方式怀上另一个胎儿呢？


Each fetus – the one she aborts and the one she later conceives through sexual intercourse – has its own “unique” DNA.	每个胎儿，也就是她堕胎掉的以及她随后通过性交怀上的都有其“独一无二的”DNA。


In the absence of special reasons, like a change in sexual partners, there seems to be no reason to prefer the existence of one child to that of the other.	在没有特别理由的情形下，正如改变性伴侣一样，看起来并没有什么理由喜欢一个孩子超过另一个。


Perhaps the assumption is that, as opponents of abortion sometimes say, the aborted fetus had the genetic potential to become a Beethoven or an Einstein.	可能假定是，正如反对堕胎人士有时所说的那样，被堕胎掉的胎儿具有基因潜力成为贝多芬或爱因斯坦。


But, for all we know, it is the next fetus that the woman will conceive, not the one she aborted, that will turn out to be the Beethoven or Einstein.	但是，自如我们都知道的那样，妇女怀的下一个胎儿，而不是堕胎掉的那个胎儿将成为贝多芬或爱因斯坦。


So why prefer one genetic potential over the other?	那么，为什么喜欢某个基因潜力超过另一个呢？


Once we abandon arguments based on potential, the claim that it is wrong to kill embryos and fetuses must be based on the nature of those entities themselves – that they are actual human beings who already possess the characteristics that make killing wrong.	一旦我们放弃了建立在潜力基础上的论断后，那么，杀死胚胎和胎儿的论断必须建立在那些个体本身的性质基础之上，也就是说，它们也实际上是人，所具备的特征使得杀死它们是错误的。


But, because fetuses, at least at the stage of development when most abortions are performed, have yet to develop any kind of consciousness, it seems reasonable to regard ending their lives as much less serious than killing a normal human being.	但是，由于胎儿至少在堕胎时的发育阶段尚未发育出任何意识，这样也就有理由认为，结束它们的生命的严重性要比杀死一个正常的人要轻得多。


If so, then this is all the more true of embryos.	如果是这样的话，那么，对于胚胎而言也是如此。


The Revolution Reborn	革命的重生


MEXICO CITY – In El Salvador, for the first time ever in Latin America, a former political-military organization that tried to gain power through the barrel of a gun has achieved its aims through the ballot box.	墨西哥城-在萨尔瓦多，一个曾试图通过枪杆子夺取政权的前政治军事组织，终于以民主投票的方式实现了其目的。 这在拉丁美洲有史以来绝无仅有。


Although the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua did win a semi-legitimate election in 1984, it had reached power five years earlier by overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship.	虽然尼加拉瓜的桑地诺阵线确实也在1984年赢得了半合法的选举，但其在之前的五年就已通过推翻索摩查独裁统治的方式获取了政权。


By 2006, when Daniel Ortega was finally re-elected, the old Sandinista Front of 1979 was unrecognizable.	而到2006年，当丹尼尔·奥尔特加最后再次当选时，1979年时的旧桑地诺阵线已面目全非了。


El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) was created in 1980, through the fusion of five guerrilla groups supported by Cuba and Nicaragua.	萨尔瓦多的法拉本多·马蒂解放阵线（马解阵线）成立于1980年，包括了由古巴和尼加拉瓜支持的五个游击队组织。


The FMLN nominated a presentable and attractive candidate, Mauricio Funes, for last Sunday’s presidential election, and, despite seeing a 10-point lead whittled down to barely two points by election night, squeaked out an uncontested victory.	为上周日的总统大选，马解阵线推出了举止得体而且富有魅力的候选人毛·富内斯，尽管领先十个百分点的优势到大选之夜时最后下降到了只领先二个百分点，但他还是赢得了无可争议的胜利。


The conservative ARENA party, which has governed El Salvador since the country’s 10-year civil war ended in 1992, did everything possible to prevent an FMLN victory, resorted, once again, to every red-baiting trick in the book.	自从萨尔瓦多在1992年结束了长达10年的内战以来，保守的共和联盟党一直统治着这个国家，为阻止马解阵线赢得大选，该党用尽了一切手段，甚至再次用上了给人扣红帽子的各种把戏。


According to ARENA’s relentlessly negative campaign, a triumph for the left would bring communism, Hugo Chávez, and the Castro brothers to San Salvador.	联盟党对马解无情的反对攻势宣传认为，如左翼获胜，这将给萨尔瓦多带来共产主义、查韦斯和卡斯特罗兄弟。


But scare tactics did not work this time.	但是，恐吓战术此次没有奏效。


There is obviously a lesson here to be learned by other left-wing political movements and guerrilla groups in Latin America.	显然这是给拉美的其他左翼政治势力和游击组织上了一课。


The Socialist Party in Chile, the Workers Party in Brazil, the Broad Front in Uruguay, even Chávez in Venezuela and the PRD and FSLN in Mexico and Nicaragua, respectively, have shown that, after years of waiting, the left can win elections in Latin America.	智利的社会党、巴西的工人党、乌拉圭的广泛阵线，甚至于委内瑞拉的查韦斯和墨西哥的PRD党和和尼加拉瓜的FSLN党都已向人们显示，经过多年的等待，左翼是可以在拉美赢得大选的。


The difference between these victorious leftists and El Salvador’s FMLN will be revealed when the FMLN’s old characteristics as an armed movement are challenged by the daily facts of governance.	这些获胜的左翼势力和萨尔瓦多的马解阵线之间的区别，在马解阵线这个武装运动的旧特征遭到日常治国的新事务挑战的时候，就能显现出来。


For, while Funes is no old guerrilla hack, his vice president, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, and almost the entire FMLN leadership are unreformed Castroist guerrilla leaders and cadres.	因为，虽然富内斯根本不是个老游击队员，但他的副总统萨尔瓦多·桑切斯塞伦以及几乎整个马解阵线的领导层都是没有改革头脑的卡斯特罗式的游击队领导干部。


It is they, not Funes, who control the FMLN organization.	正是他们，而不是富内斯，实际控制了马解阵线。


The FMLN’s most reform-minded, democratic, modern, and brilliant leaders – Facundo Guardado, Joaquin Villalobos, Salvador Samayoa, Ana Guadalupe Martinez, and Ferman Cienfuegos – have all left the party.	马解阵线中最具改革和民主意识的现代派聪明的领导人- Facundo Guardado, Joaquin Villalobos, Salvador Samayoa, Ana Guadalupe Martinez, 和 Ferman Cienfuegos -都已离开了该党。


A second worrying factor is the FMLN’s links to Cuba and Venezuela.	第二个令人担忧的因素是马解阵线与古巴和委内瑞拉的联系。


As recently as a year ago, anyone who visited FMLN headquarters in San Salvador to interview, for example, Ceren, its Secretary General, would be struck by the overwhelming presence of Chávez: red shirts, red berets, pictures of the Venezuelan caudillo, quotations from his teachings and musings.	近在一年前，若谁去马解阵线设在圣萨尔瓦多的总部去采访总书记塞伦，他将为那里的无处不在的查韦斯的影响而头晕目眩：红色衬衣和红色贝雷帽、这位委内瑞拉领袖的画像以及他的语录和思想的标语。


Chávez helped the FMLN by giving free or cheap oil to its mayors in many parts of the country, and probably (though it has not been proven) by channeling funds, if only in small quantities, to the party’s electoral coffers.	查韦斯给了该国许多地区马解阵线的市长免费或是廉价石油，而且可能（虽未经证实）还为该党的竞选提供资金，如果只是小数目的话。


The Cuban presence also remains strong, although the recent political purges initiated by Raúl Castro make it difficult to know who exactly is working for whom.	古巴的影响也依然强大，尽管最近劳尔·卡斯特罗发起的政治整肃让人很难了解到底是谁在为谁工作。


Ramiro Abreu, who “ran” El Salvador for Cuba’s Department of the Americas in the 1980’s and 1990’s, remains active, but now more as a businessman and a senior statesman than as a Cuban operative.	拉米罗·阿布雷乌，这个在1980年和1990年代为古巴的美洲部“统治”着萨尔瓦多的家伙，他仍然活跃着，但他现在更象是一个商人和一名资深的政治家，而不是古巴的操手。


But Cuba’s influence on the old FMLN leadership remains intact.	但是，古巴对巴解阵线领导层的影响力毫发无伤。


Cuban and Venezuelan involvement in political parties in Mexico or Brazil, for example, is undisputable, but not necessarily very relevant.	例如，古巴和委内瑞拉尽管肯定参与到了墨西哥或巴西政党中，但不一定非常有用。


These are large countries with huge economies, where conspiring and doling out small perks and favors is not very effective.	这两国都是大国，拥有巨大的经济体，搞些小恩小惠式的阴谋不是很奏效。


But El Salvador, like Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, is another story.	但是，萨尔瓦多，还有如尼加拉瓜、玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔这些国家，却不是那么一回事了。


A third factor that weighs in the balance in analyzing what sort of government the FMLN may deliver is the economic crisis that is battering Latin America.	我们在分析马解阵线会带来一个什么样的政府的时候，需要考量平衡的第三个因素是正在袭击拉美的经济危机。


For the moment, it is impossible to ascertain whether the recession will provoke a radicalization of the left in the region, which Chávez seems to be promoting, or induce moderation through resignation – that is, a postponement of revolutionary goals owing to inauspicious economic conditions.	目前还不可能确定经济衰退是否会在该地区促进左翼势力的激进化（而这似乎是查韦斯想要促成的事情）或是通过软化带来温和主义，也就是说不良的经济情况推迟了革命目标。


We will know soon.	但答案我们很快就会知道。


But the most important consequence of the FMLN’s victory may lie in its effect on the rest of Central America and Mexico.	但马解阵线获胜的最重要的后果是它可能对中美洲其它地区和墨西哥产生的影响。


Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, more out of convenience and demagogy than conviction, has moved into the Chávez orbit; Nicaragua’s Ortega was always part of that orbit, as are people close to Alvaro Colóm in Guatemala.	更多是出于便利和蛊惑公众而不是其信念，洪都拉斯总统曼努埃尔·塞拉亚罗已加入查韦斯阵线;尼加拉瓜的奥尔特加则本来就属这一阵线，接近危地马拉的阿尔瓦罗·哥伦布的人们也同样如此。


If too we add El Salvador to this list, only Costa Rica and Panama to the south remain out of the loop, leaving Mexico to the north increasingly exposed.	如果我们把萨尔瓦多也加到这个名单中，那么只有南部的哥斯达黎加和巴拿马仍在这个圈子之外，从而使北部的墨西哥日显突兀。


Of course, the Central American nations do not wield huge influence in Mexico; if anything, it is the other way around.	当然，中美洲国家对墨西哥没有巨大的影响力;要说影响力，相反倒是墨西哥对它们有着影响力。


But the Mexican left, while no longer as weak as it was after its defeat in 2006, has always needed foreign role models.	但是，墨西哥现在的左翼势力，已不再像2006年大选失败时那样脆弱不堪，它一直需要外国的榜样。


It sympathizes far more with Chávez, Bolivian President Evo Morales, Cuba, the Sandinistas, and now the FMLN than with the moderate left elected in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru. They will read Funes’ victory as one more notch on the barrel of “the people’s” rifle and one more hair plucked from Uncle Sam’s beard.	比起与在智利、巴西、乌拉圭和秘鲁在竞选中获胜的温和派左翼的关系，墨西哥的左翼远远要与查韦斯、玻利维亚总统莫拉莱斯、古巴以及桑地诺民族解放阵线在思想上更为合拍，他们会把富内斯的当选解读为“人民的”枪杆子的又一次胜利，也视为又拔下了一根山姆大叔的胡子。


To dismiss the FMLN’s historical achievement as simply an act of justice or a foreseeable event in a tiny backwater would be reckless.	如果把马解阵线的历史性的成就不当回事，以为那只是个公正的选举或是一桩发生在无关紧要的小地区的可预见的事件，那将是有欠认真考虑的。


The Right Populism for Poland	波兰的右翼民粹主义


Poland’s parliamentary and presidential elections this month saw the death of a left-leaning postcommunist party that mostly dominated the country since 1995.	在这个月的波兰国会与总统选举中，从1995年以来就基本上统治着这个国家的左倾后共产主义党派落选。


But the demise of the left does not mean that the right has a coherent economic program. For the victorious coalition of the Law and Justice (PiS) party and Civic Platform (PO) is torn between liberal (PO) and populist instincts (PiS). 	但是，左派的退位并不表示右派就有条理清晰的经济方案，因为法律与公正党（PiS）和公民纲领党（PO）的成功结盟在自由主义（PO）和民粹主义（PiS）之间的摇摆中岌岌可危。


If PiS’s populist slogans become policy, government spending is likely to expand, which will exacerbate Poland’s already weak fiscal position and consequently trigger inflationary expectations.	如果PiS的民粹主义口号成为政策，政府开支大概会增加，从而加剧波兰已经脆弱不堪的财政状况，引发通胀预期。


Worse, boosting social spending will contribute little to resolving the country’s staggering 17.5% rate of unemployment – most of it structural –while any hope of quick euro adoption will be dashed.	更糟糕的是，增加社会开支对解决该国17. 5%的惊人失业率——主要是结构上的——几乎没有什么助益，而在短时间内采用欧元的希望也将破灭。


What Poland needs most is fiscal discipline and market-oriented reforms, including relaxation of the rigid labor laws that are inhibiting job creation.	波兰最需要的是财政上的整顿和以市场为导向的改革，包括放宽阻碍工作岗位产生的僵化的劳动法。


After all, over the past two decades, the enduring goals of dismantling communism and central planning, as well as joining the European Union, have served as important driving forces of reform.	毕竟，在过去的二十年里，废除共产主义和中央计划经济的不懈努力，以及加入欧盟的长期目标，一直是改革的重要动力。


But can the political will for renewed reform be mustered in a government that is half liberal and half populist?	然而，一个半自由主义半民粹主义的政府能够鼓起重新改革的政治勇气吗？


A specific commitment to adopt the euro at the earliest possible date could serve as the same sort of springboard as the push to join the EU in the 1990’s.	尽早采用欧元的决心可以起到跳板的作用，就像上世纪90年代为加入欧盟所做的努力一样。


Such a strategic goal would provide justification for prudent fiscal and monetary policies, and, given Poles’ desire to consider themselves full Europeans, it would boost political support for such policies.	这样一个战略性目标可以使谨慎的财政与货币政策合理化，同时，考虑到波兰人渴望成为完全意义上的欧洲人，还能推进人们对这些政策的政治支持。


Only such support can bring the government budget deficit, expected to reach 4.4% of GDP in 2005, down to the EU’s benchmark of less than 3% of GDP within the next two years.	只有这样的支持才能在今后的两年内把政府预算赤字——2005年预计会达到GDP的4. 4%——降到低于GDP的3%的欧盟标准之下。


Moreover, a commitment to pursue euro membership will have positive spillover effects. It will reinforce convergence expectations among financial market participants, which will translate into lower risk premia for investors.	除此之外，追求欧元国身份还能带来正面的伴随效果，会增强金融市场参与者之间的统合预期，并将其转化为降低投资者的风险利差。


Lower risk also will bring inflation expectations down and reduce interest rates, which will in turn speed up the compression of Polish government bond yields to comparable EU levels, increasing financial stability.	风险降低进而又会降低通胀预期和利率，从而加速将波兰政府的国债收益率压缩到欧盟水平，增进金融稳定性。


While the current yield on 10-year Polish government bonds of 4.7% appears to be at the edge of meeting the Maastricht long-term interest-rate benchmark, sustainability will depend on the fiscal policy outlook and on the overall credit risk.	波兰政府10年期国债当前的收益率为4. 7%，尽管似乎已经濒临马斯特里赫特长期利率基准，但可持续性还要取决于财政政策的前景，取决于整体信用风险。


More stable financial markets and a less volatile exchange rate relative to the euro will bring many advantages.	增进金融市场和对欧元汇率的的稳定性将带来许多好处。


Most importantly, lower exchange-rate risk will boost both domestic and foreign direct investment, thereby helping to alleviate unemployment.	最重要的是，汇率风险降低会促进国内和国外直接投资，从而有助于减轻失业负担。


So it is imperative that the new government prepares – in cooperation with the National Bank of Poland (NBP) – a comprehensive program to steer the course of fiscal and monetary policy toward the goal of euro membership.	因此，新的政府必须与波兰国家银行（NBP）合作，制定一套综合方案，将财政和货币政策的方向转到争取成为欧元国的目标上来。