He repaired the inconsistency by adding new terms to the equations.	他通过新增的方程弥补了这一缺陷。


The augmented equations, today known as the Maxwell equations, described a unified theory of electricity and magnetism.	经过完善的方程组，即麦克斯韦电磁方程组描述了关于电和磁的统一理论。


The new equations showed that light is a moving, self-renewing disturbance in electrical and magnetic fields, and they predicted that new kinds of disturbances are possible.	该方程组表明，光是电磁场中一种运动的、自我更新的波，并且预言存在新的电磁波类型的可能性。


Today we call those disturbances radio waves, microwaves, infrared and ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma rays.	那些新型的电磁波，如今我们叫它们无线电波、微波、红外线、紫外线、 X 光、伽马射线。


We use them to communicate, cook, and diagnose and cure disease.	我们运用它们来通信、烹饪、诊治疾病。


The unified theory of electromagnetism has led to profound advances across all physical science, from atomic physics (where lasers and masers are essential tools) to cosmology (where the microwave background radiation is our window on the Big Bang).	电磁学统一理论引领整个物理学取得了广泛的进步，从核物理学（以激光器和微波激射器为基本工具）到宇宙学（宇宙微波背景辐射为我们打开了了解宇宙大爆炸的窗口）。


Our current understanding of physics is powerful and accurate, as far as it goes, but it is not as beautiful and coherent as it should be.	迄今为止，我们当代的物理学知识相当有力、准确，但它还没有达到它应该达到的完美与一致性。


We have separate equations for four forces: strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational.	我们有不同的方程组，可以分别描述 4 种基本力：强作用力、弱作用力、电磁力和万有引力。


This jumble recalls the piecemeal equations of electricity and magnetism before Maxwell.	这个有待统一的庞杂系统令人回想起麦克斯韦之前电磁学方程的零散状态。


Some of us have proposed expanded equations that unify the different forces.	有些物理学家曾经提出过一些扩展方程组，试图把 4 种基本力中的几种统一起来。


These expanded equations, which incorporate an idea called supersymmetry, predict many new effects.	这些扩展方程组包涵着一种理念，叫做“超对称”，这种理念预言了许多新现象的可能性。


A couple of the predicted effects have already been observed (for experts: tiny neutrino masses and unification of couplings).	这些新现象部分已被观察证实了（例如，中微子、耦合之间的统一等等）。


But, as Carl Sagan observed, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence,” while here the existing evidence is still circumstantial.	但是，根据卡尔·萨刚的看法，“非同一般的理论假设需要非同一般的证据。 ”在这方面的现有证据仍然是零散的。


Fortunately, these ideas for a new unification predict that extraordinary things will be seen at the LHC.	幸运的是，这些关于物理学新统一的理念预言了，通过 LHC 可以看到这些非同一般的东西。


If so, a whole new world of particles will be discovered: each currently known particle will have a heavier relative – its superpartner – with different, but predictable, properties.	如果真是这样，一个崭新的粒子世界将被发现：每一种已知的粒子都会有一个质量更大的亲戚 —— 它的超对称伙伴，它们具有一些不同然而可以预知的性质。


Such are my hopes and expectations for the LHC.	这就是我对 LHC 的希望和预期。


Other speculations for what might be seen abound; they include extra dimensions of space, strings instead of particles, and mini-black holes.	关于我们能通过 LHC 看到什么的猜想还有很多，包括多维空间、超弦、微型黑洞等等。


Very likely, reality will outrun apprehension.	真相可能超乎想象。


Europe’s Youth Unemployment Non-Problem	欧洲的年轻人失业不是问题


BRUSSELS – European policymakers have decided that they must be seen to be “doing something” about youth unemployment.	布鲁塞尔—欧洲决策者决定他们必须让世人看到在为年轻人失业问题“做些什么”。


A special summit of Europe’s heads of state has been called, and a “Youth Employment Initiative,” proposed at the EU Council of Ministers’ meeting in February, aims to “reinforce and accelerate” measures that were recommended in a “Youth Employment Package” in December 2012.	今年2月，欧洲各国首脑举行了一次名为“年轻人就业计划”（“Youth Employment Initiative”）的特别峰会，这次峰会由欧洲部长理事会发起，旨在“增强和加快”2012年12月“年轻人就业方案”（“Youth Employment Package”）中所建议的措施。


This activism comes mainly in response to the latest alarming figures on youth unemployment in southern Europe, with sky-high rates of joblessness widely regarded as politically unacceptable.	如此积极的主要原因是南欧年轻人失业的最新警示信号，极高的无业率被广泛认为是政治上不可接受的。


But there are several reasons to doubt that youth unemployment is a discrete problem meriting special treatment.	但有理由质疑年轻人失业是需要特别关注的离散性问题。


Indeed, official youth unemployment statistics are misleading on two counts.	事实上，年轻人失业数字具有误导性，体现在两个方面。


First, the data refer to those from 15 to 24 years old.	首先，该数字覆盖年龄是15—24岁。


But this age group consists of two sub-groups with very different characteristics.	但这一年龄段可以细分为两个性质迥异的子阶段。


The “teenagers” (15-19 years old) should mostly still be in school; if not, they are likely to be very low skilled – and thus to have difficulty finding a full-time job even in good times.	“十几岁”（15—19岁）应该大部分还在学校中； 如非如此，则可能技能极低，因而即便在好光景时也难以找到全职工作。


Fortunately, this group is rather small (and has been declining in size over time).	幸运的是，这一群体数量很小（并且随着时间的推移越来越小）。


Unemployment among those aged 20-24 should be more troubling.	20—24岁年龄段的失业更加麻烦。


Members of this cohort who are seeking full-time employment have typically completed upper secondary education, but have decided not to pursue university education (or have completed their university studies early).	该群体中正在寻找全职工作者通常完成了高中教育，但决定不读大学（或者较早地完成了大学学习）。


Second, the data on youth unemployment are based on active labor-market participants.	其次，年轻人失业数据是以劳动力市场的积极参与者为基础统计出来的。


But labor-market participation averages just 10% among teenagers in Europe.	但平均而言，欧洲十几岁人群的劳动力参与率只有10%。


(Teenage activity rates come close to 50% only in countries like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where having a part-time job while in school is very common.)	（只有在荷兰和英国等在校学生普遍参与兼职打工的国家，十几岁人群活动率才接近50%。 ）


Labor-market experts thus consider the unemployment rate a potentially misleading indicator, because a youth unemployment rate of 50% does not mean that half of the young population is unemployed.	劳动力市场专家因此认为，这一失业率可能是误导性指标，因为50%的年轻人失业率并不意味着年轻人口有一半无所事事。


That is why one should look at the unemployment ratio – the percentage of the unemployed in the reference population – rather than at the unemployment rate.	这就是为何我们应该看失业比例——失业者占参考人口的百分比——而不是失业率。


Indeed, this indicator paints a somewhat less alarming picture than that created by the headline youth-unemployment rate of more than 50% in Spain, or even the 62.5% rate recently reached in Greece.	事实上，这一数据并不像报纸标题上的年轻人失业率在西班牙超过50%、在希腊（最新数据）超过62. 5%那样触目惊心。


The youth-unemployment rate in Greece does not mean that close to two-thirds of young Greeks are unemployed.	希腊的年轻人失业率并不意味着近三分之二的希腊年轻人没有工作。


Only 9% of Greek teenagers are labor-market participants; two-thirds of that number cannot find a job.	在希腊，只有9%的十几岁人群是劳动力市场参与者，他们之中有三分之二找不到工作。


The unemployment ratio among teenagers in Greece is thus less than 6%.	希腊的十几岁人群失业比例因此还不到6%。


But this figure is not reported widely because it is much less alarming.	但这一数字并没有被广泛报道，因为它没什么可大惊小怪的。


Among those in the 20-24 age group, the difference between the reported unemployment rate and the percentage of youth without a job and looking for one (the unemployment ratio) is less stark.	在20—24岁群体中，报告失业率和没有工作、正在寻找的年轻人的百分比（失业比例）之间的区别没有那么明显。


But, even among this age group, one finds that the unemployment ratio is often about one-half of the widely reported unemployment rate.	但是，就是在这一年龄段，你也可以发现失业比例通常只有广泛报道的失业率的一半左右。


Moreover, one must ask how much youth unemployment contributes to total unemployment.	此外，还必须问问年轻人失业率如何影响总体失业率。


Looking at the problem this way reveals a completely different picture from the one usually presented.	如此思考问题会得出与通常所想完全不同的结论。


In those countries where the problem makes the biggest headlines (the eurozone’s south, with Greece and Spain supposedly the worst cases), youth unemployment accounts for less than a quarter of overall unemployment.	在问题最吸引眼球的国家（南欧，其中又以希腊和西班牙为最），年轻人失业只占总失业的不到四分之一。


By contrast, youth unemployment contributes relatively much more (about 40%) to overall unemployment in countries like Sweden and the UK.	相反，在瑞典和英国等国家，年轻人失业占总失业的比例相对来说要高得多（约40%）。


One could argue that the latter two should worry about their youth unemployment more than Spain or Greece should.	可以这样说，与前两者相比，后两者更应该担心年轻人失业问题。


The fact that youth unemployment is just a part of a larger problem leads to the real policy question: Why should officials spend limited time, energy, and public funding specifically on unemployed young people, rather than on all of the unemployed?	年轻人失业只是更大问题的一部分，这一事实引出了真正的政策问题：为什么官员应该把��限的时间、经历和公帑专门花在年轻人失业上，而不是花在总体失业问题上？


Does a teenager’s unemployment represent a greater loss to society than that of a single mother or an older worker, who might have been providing an entire family’s only income?	十几岁的失业者所造成的社会损失难道会比或许是整个家庭唯一收入来源的单身妈妈或大龄工人更严重吗？


The loss of the value added produced by a teenager is probably much lower.	十几岁失业者所造成的增加值损失可能要低得多。


In purely economic terms, one could thus argue that youth unemployment (especially teenage part-time unemployment) is much less important than unemployment among those who are in their prime earning years.	纯粹从经济学角度，可以这样说，年轻人失业（特别是十几岁人群的兼职失业）远没有进入主要收入年份者失业重要。


Moreover, young people have the option of continuing their education, thus adding to future earnings power, whereas continuing education is a much less viable alternative for their elders.	此外，年轻人可以选择继续深造从而增加未来赚钱能力，而深造对于年龄更大人群来说可行性要低得多。


Europe has a general macroeconomic problem, owing to demand factors that interact with a rigid labor market, rather than a specific youth-unemployment problem.	欧洲存在总体宏观经济问题，其根源是需求因素与劳动力市场僵化的共同作用，而不是具体的年轻人失业问题。


This implies that there is no need for ad hoc measures for young people, which merely risk overloading welfare systems with even more exemptions and special rules.	这意味着不需要特别正对年轻人的措施，这只能造成更多的豁免和特殊规则，让福利系统负担过重。


The Mirage of Youth Unemployment	年轻人失业幻象


PARIS – Economists worldwide need better ways to measure economic activity.	巴黎—全世界经济学家需要更好地手段来度量经济活动。


Relying on GDP growth rates to assess economic health, almost all of them missed the warning signs of the 2008 financial crisis, including an $8 trillion real-estate bubble in the United States, as well as property bubbles in Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.	经济学家用GDP增长率评估经济健康程度，结果几乎无人看见2008年金融危机的警示信号——包括8万亿美元的美国房地产泡沫和西班牙、爱尔兰以及英国的不动产泡沫。


Together with households, financial institutions, investors, and governments, economists were swept up in the financial euphoria that led to excessive risk-taking and severe over-leveraging of banks and households. Even the eurozone’s macroeconomic imbalances largely went unnoticed.	经济学家与家庭、金融机构、投资者和政府一起，都陷入了最终导致过度风险承担和银行和家庭严重的过度负债的金融幻象。


Unemployment estimates also are surprisingly misleading – a serious problem, considering that, together with GDP indicators, unemployment drives so much economic-policy debate.	失业数字的误导作用也令人吃惊——这是个严重问题，因为它和GDP指标一起制造了大量经济政策争论。


Outrageously high youth unemployment – supposedly near 50% in Spain and Greece, and more than 20% in the eurozone as a whole – makes headlines daily.	极高的年轻人失业率——在西班牙和希腊据信接近50%，在整个欧元区超过20%——每天都能登上报纸标题。


But these numbers result from flawed methodology, making the situation appear far worse than it is.	但这些数字使用有缺陷的方法获得的，导致情况看上去比实际严重得多。


The problem stems from how unemployment is measured: The adult unemployment rate is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed individuals by all individuals in the labor force.	问题出在如何衡量失业：成年人失业率的算法是用没工作的个人数量除以劳动力总数。


So if the labor force comprises 200 workers, and 20 are unemployed, the unemployment rate is 10%.	因此，如果劳动力总数为200，其中20人没有工作，那么失业率是10%。


But the millions of young people who attend university or vocational training programs are not considered part of the labor force, because they are neither working nor looking for a job.	但数以百万计的大学在读生和假期培训生并不被认为是劳动力，因为他们既没有在工作，也没有在找工作。


In calculating youth unemployment, therefore, the same number of unemployed individuals is divided by a much smaller number, to reflect the smaller labor force, which makes the unemployment rate look a lot higher.	因此，在年轻人失业率的计算中，同样数量的找不到工作者所除之除数要小得多，这是因为劳动力总数更小，因此失业率看起来会高得多。


In the example above, let us say that 150 of the 200 workers become full-time university students.	在我上面的例子中，我们假设200个劳动力总数中有150人是全日制在校大学生。


Only 50 individuals remain in the labor force.	只有50人仍属于劳动力。


Although the number of unemployed people remains at 20, the unemployment rate quadruples, to 40%.	尽管失业人数仍旧是20，但失业率翻了四倍，达到了40%。


So the perverse result of this way of counting the unemployed is that the more young people who pursue additional education or training, the higher the youth unemployment rate rises.	因此，如此失业率算法会带来不恰当的结果——越多年轻人追求继续深造或培训，年轻人失业率就越高。


While standard measures exaggerate youth unemployment, they likely understate adult unemployment, because those who have given up their job search are not counted among the unemployed.	标准算法会夸大年轻人失业率，也可能低估成年人失业率，因为放弃找工作之人被剔除出视野率计算之外。


As the Great Recession drives up the number of such “discouraged workers,” adult unemployment rates appear to fall – presenting a distorted picture of reality.	随着大衰退导致这类“沮丧工人”数量的增加，成年人失业率会有所下降，这可不是现实图景的真实反映。


Fortunately, there is a better methodology: The youth unemployment ratio – the number of unemployed youth relative to the total population aged 16-24 – is a far more meaningful indicator than the youth unemployment rate.	幸运的是，存在更好的方法。 年轻人失业比率，即事业年轻人与16—24岁年龄段总人口的比值，远比年轻人失业率这一指标有意义。


Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical agency, calculates youth unemployment using both methodologies, but only the flawed indicator is widely reported, despite major discrepancies.	欧盟统计机构欧洲统计局计算年轻人失业率时同时使用这两个指标，但尽管这两者存在明显差异，被广泛报道的只有存在缺陷的前者。 比如，西班牙的年轻人失业率高达48.


For example, Spain’s 48.9% youth unemployment rate implies significantly worse conditions for young people than its 19% youth unemployment ratio.	9%，这看起来比该国年轻人事业比率（20. 8%）严重多了。


Likewise, Greece’s rate is 49.3%, but its ratio is only 13%.	类似地，希腊年轻人失业率高达49. 3%，但失业比率只有13%。


And the eurozone-wide rate of 20.8% far exceeds the 8.7% ratio.	若以整个欧元区来衡量，则年轻人失业率是20. 8%，失业比率为8.


To be sure, a youth unemployment ratio of 13% or 19% is not grounds for complacency.	平心而论，13%或19%的年轻人失业比率决不能令人满意。


But, while the eurozone’s youth unemployment rate has increased since 2009, its ratio has remained the same (though both significantly exceed pre-2008 levels).	但是，尽管欧元区年轻人失业率自2009年以来有所上升，其失业比率一直保持稳定（但两者均远高于2008年的水平）。


During the 2006 French student protests, France’s 22% youth unemployment rate appeared to compare unfavorably to rates of 11%, 12%, and 13% in the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany, respectively.	在2006年法国学生示威运动期间，该国22%的年轻人失业率比英国、美国和德国严重多了，后三者的数字分别为11%、12%和13%。


But the Financial Times showed that only 7.8% of French under-25’s were unemployed – about the same ratio as in the other three countries.	但《金融时报》指出，只有7. 8%的25岁以下法国青年没有工作，这一比率与英美德相同。


France simply had a higher percentage of young people who were full-time students.	法国只是全日制学生的百分比高一些罢了。


Failing to account for the millions of young people either attending university or in vocational training programs undermines the unemployment rate’s credibility.	没有将数以百万计的大学生和假期培训生纳入失业统计，这极大地损害了失业率的可信度。


And, while some young people use higher education to escape a rocky job market, their choice to build new skills should not negatively impact perceptions of their country’s economic health.	尽管确实有年轻人用继续深造逃避严峻的就业形势，但这样的选择会带来更高的技能，不会对一国经济健康造成负面影响。


Policymakers do, of course, need to address the problem of youth unemployment; but they must also acknowledge that the problem is not as serious as the headlines indicate.	当然，决策者必须解决年轻人失业问题； 但他们也必须承认，这个问题并不像新闻标题写得那么骇人听闻。


Unfortunately, these distorted results have become conventional wisdom – even for respected economists like the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, who recently invoked the flawed “50% youth unemployment” figure.	不幸的是，这些扭曲的结果已经成为传统智慧——即使是诺贝尔奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼这样的著名经济学家也是如此，他最近还在大谈有缺陷的“50%年轻人失业率”数字。


Thus, four years after the crisis erupted, methods for measuring and assessing economic health remain alarmingly inadequate.	因此，在危机爆发已过去四周年之际，度量和评估经济健康度的方法仍显得极不完善。


As any pilot knows, flying without radar or accurate weather forecasts is likely to end in a crash.	正如飞行员所熟知的，没有雷达和准确的天气数据，飞机很容易坠毁。


The Misconduct of Science?	学术不端行为？


WOLLERAU, SWITZERLAND – Scientific fraud, plagiarism, and ghost writing are increasingly being reported in the news media, creating the impression that misconduct has become a widespread and omnipresent evil in scientific research.	瑞士沃勒劳——学术造假、剽窃和代笔问题正越来越多地见诸报端，给人的印象是科研领域的不端行为已经成为一种无孔不入的邪恶现象。


But these reports are more an example of sensationalist media latching on to a hot topic than a true account of the deterioration of scientific values.	但这些报道与其说是科学价值观堕落的真实写照，还不如说是哗众取宠的媒体试图紧紧抓住某个热门话题。


Far from being the norm in scientific research, fraud and cheating are rare exceptions, and are usually quickly identified by other scientists.	欺诈和作弊仍然仅仅是科研领域中罕见的例外现象，而且一般很快会被其他科学家揭露出来，距离成为约定俗成的法则还相去甚远。


And the public seems to understand this.	公众似乎也明白这一点。


Indeed, trust and confidence in scientific research have not been seriously undermined by reports of misconduct.	事实上，对科研工作的信心和信任度并未因为相关报道而遭到严重的损坏。


Nor have these rare incidents curtailed scientific progress, which is so valuable to humankind.	上述罕见事例也并未阻碍科技进步，而科技进步能带给人类无法估量的价值。


To be sure, even a few cases of scientific misconduct are too many.	可以肯定的是，少数几起科研不端行为也同样不可容忍。


Scientists are expected to be beacons of hope in the search for knowledge – and clever enough not to try to get away with cheating.	科学家被视为知识探索中希望的灯塔，他们都是智者，不会去尝试作弊这样的行为。


Preventive mechanisms are in place to hold responsible the few who take the gamble.	设立预防机制就是要防止少数人进行赌博。


But, while the scientific community – including academic and professional institutions, agency heads, managers, and editors – is often reluctant to handle cases of misconduct rigorously, the reputation of science as a whole is at stake, not just that of a person, institution, journal, or national science entity.	但由于科学界——包括学术和专业机构、机构负责人、管理者和杂志编辑——往往不愿严格处置涉及不端行为的案例，因此受损的就不仅仅是某个个人、机构、期刊或研究实体，而是科学界的整体声誉。


Ironically, those who are caught often blame their misconduct on competition, pressure to publish, and recognition and prizes – the very practices and incentives that the scientific community introduced and fostered.	颇具讽刺意味的是，那些被抓获的作弊者往往将自己的不当行为归咎于竞争，归咎于发表论文、获得认可及获奖所带来的压力，而这些正是科学界致力打造并发扬的激励机制。


Indeed, while the menace of misconduct has been exaggerated, we have to rethink how we conduct science – its values, virtues, and shortcomings.	其实，虽然对不端行为所造成的威胁有所夸大，但我们不得不重新思考我们该如何正确地对待科学——重新思考我们的优缺点和价值观。


Scientists must follow a path that is not scientifically predefined, and that requires decisions at every step.	科学家必须探索出一条科学本身无法预知的道路，这需要每一步都做出正确的决策。


Whether they are right or wrong becomes clear in retrospect, which is why errors are unavoidable (though they should not be left uncorrected for long).	对与错只有在事后回忆时才会变得清晰，也就是说犯错误是不可避免的（虽然不能长时间不改正错误）。


Science means constantly walking a tightrope between blind faith and curiosity; between expertise and creativity; between bias and openness; between experience and epiphany; between ambition and passion; and between arrogance and conviction – in short, between an old today and a new tomorrow.	科学意味着不断在好奇心和迷信、专业知识和创造力、偏见和开放、经验和顿悟、雄心和激情、傲慢和信念——简言之在已经过去的昨天和崭新的明天之间走钢丝。


But, nowadays, research increasingly is misdirected toward lucrative prizes, professional recognition, and financial gains – rewards that are suffocating the creativity and passion that scientific progress demands.	但今天，科研工作在外界的误导下越来越注重丰厚的奖励、专业领域的认可和财务收益——这些世俗的回报正在扼杀科学进步所必须的激情和创造力。


As T.S. Eliot put it, “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?	正如艾略特所说，“要到哪里去寻找迷失在知识中智慧？


Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?”	要到哪里去寻找迷失在信息中的知识？ ”


In the “hard” sciences, such as mathematics and physics, the truth can be established more transparently, making these fields less prone to scientific misconduct.	在数学和物理等“严密”科学中，发现真理的过程相对透明，学术不端行为在这样的领域立足不太容易。


But branches like medicine, humanities, philosophy, economics, and other social sciences, which rely more heavily on openness and imagination, can be manipulated more easily to suit the goals of bureaucrats.	但是在更多依靠开放和想象力的医学、人文科学、哲学、经济学和其他社会科学领域，真理很容易被人操纵用以达到官僚目的。


Indeed, today, too many areas that are being called ��science” – for example, collecting biased statistics in order to make a politician’s (or corporation’s) point, or publishing a variation of existing knowledge – fall far short of scientific standards of originality and the quest for basic insight.	其实今天有太多的领域被称之为“科学”——比方说搜集偏颇的统计数据用来支持某政治家（或某企业）的观点，或者公开更改现有的知识——这些所谓的科学远没有科学本身所应具备的独创性和对基本观点的追求。


And yet, while bureaucratization of science has fueled concerns about its attractiveness to talented thinkers, we should not be overly pessimistic.	然而，尽管科研领域的官僚习气引发了人们对其能否吸引天才思想家的担忧，我们也不应抱有过于悲观的态度。


To be sure, many people have lamented the loss of brilliant minds to the financial sector over the past few decades.	可以肯定的是，很多人都在感叹过去几十年中人才流入金融业所造成的损失。


But perhaps we should consider it a stroke of luck that these geniuses created their mess somewhere else.	但我们或许应该庆幸这些天才在别的地方留下了他们的烂摊子。


Moreover, we underestimate the younger generation of scientists.	此外，我们也低估了年轻一代科学家的实力。


Like the previous generation, many gifted young researchers know that they must work hard to meet monumental challenges and make valuable contributions to society.	像上代人一样，很多有天赋的年轻研究员知道他们必须竭尽所能迎接面前的巨大挑战，并竭尽所能贡献于社会。


But we must be careful not to corrupt their work with the questionable practices that the scientific community has adopted in recent years.	但我们必须小心谨慎，不让科学界近年出现的问题做法破坏他们的工作。


The new generation of researchers must be given the skills and values – not just scientific ideals, but also awareness of human weaknesses – that will enable it to correct its forebears’ mistakes.	必须赋予新一代研究员充分的技能和价值观——让他们不仅建立起科学的理想，同时也意识到人性的脆弱——进而让他们能够纠正前辈所犯下的错误。


Misreading the Global Economy	误读全球经济


PRINCETON – In April 2010, the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook offered an optimistic assessment of the global economy, describing a multi-speed recovery strong enough to support roughly 4.5% annual GDP growth for the foreseeable future – a higher pace than during the bubble years of 2000-2007.	普林斯顿—2010年4月，IMF《世界经济展望》对全球经济做出了乐观评估，其中所描述的多速复苏足以在可预见的未来支撑4—5%的GDP年增长率——比2000—2007年泡沫期还要高。 但是，此后，IMF稳步下调了其经济预测。


But, since then, the IMF has steadily pared its economic projections.	事实上，今年的预期GDP增长率——3.


Indeed, this year’s expected GDP growth rate of 3.3% – which was revised downward in the most recent WEO – will probably not be met.	3%，这是最新一期《世界经济展望》中向下修正后的数字——也可能无法达到。


Persistent optimism reflects a serious misdiagnosis of the global economy’s troubles.	持续的乐观表明人们对全球经济问题存在重大误判。


Most notably, economic projections have vastly underestimated the severity of the eurozone crisis, as well as its impact on the rest of the world.	最引人瞩目的是，经济预测大大低估了欧元区危机的严重程度及其对世界其他地区的影响。


And recovery prospects continue to depend on the emerging economies, even as they experience a sharp slowdown.	复苏前景继续取决于新兴市场，尽管它们经历了快速减速。


The WEO’s prediction of a strengthening recovery this year continues the misdiagnosis.	《世界经济展望》关于今年复苏加强的预测仍然是误判。


European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s announcement last summer that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro reassured financial markets.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉去年夏天宣布欧洲央行将“竭尽所能”捍卫欧元，这给了金融市场一颗定心丸。


But, as pressure from financial markets has eased, so has European leaders’ incentive to address problems with the eurozone’s underlying economic and political dynamics.	但是，随着金融市场压力有所舒缓，欧洲领导人纠正欧元区经济和政治活力的根本性问题的激励也放松了。


Easy ECB liquidity is now sustaining a vast swath of Europe’s banking system.	如今，宽松的欧洲央行流动性是欧洲银行系统的续命丹。


The eurozone is operating under the pretense that public and private debts will, at some point, be repaid, although, in many countries, the distress now is greater than it was at the start of the crisis almost five years ago.	欧元区的运转基于一个谎言——总有一天公共和私人债务将被偿还，尽管在许多国家，现状比近五年前危机开始时更加危险。


As a result, banks, borrowers, and governments are dragging each other into a vicious downward spiral.	结果，银行、借款人和政府互相拖累，一起陷入了向下恶性循环。


Politicians have exacerbated the situation by doubling down on fiscal austerity, which has undermined GDP growth while failing to shrink government debt/GDP ratios.	政客加倍实施财政紧缩，既破坏了GDP增长，又没有让政府债务/GDP比率下降，让情况更加恶化了。


And no decisive policy action aimed at healing private balance sheets appears imminent.	目前也看不到马上会实施旨在修补私人资产负债表的果断政策的迹象。


Moreover, Europe’s problems are no longer its own.	此外，欧洲的问题早已不仅仅是欧洲的问题。


Europe’s extensive regional and global trade networks mean that its internal problems are impeding world trade and, in turn, global economic growth.	欧洲广阔的地区和全球贸易网意味着其内部问题正在阻碍世界贸易，而这反过来又阻碍了全球经济增长。 2012年，世界贸易扩张量只有2.


In 2012, world trade expanded by only 2.5%, while global GDP grew at a disappointing 3.2% rate.	5%，而全球GDP增长率为令人失望的3. 2%。


Periods in which trade grows at a slower pace than output are rare, and reflect severe strain on the global economy’s health.	贸易增长慢于产出增长的时期十分罕见，这表明全球经济健康状况相当堪忧。


While the trauma is no longer acute, as it was in 2009, wounds remain – and they are breeding new pathologies.	尽管外伤早已不像2009年那样严重，但伤口仍然存在——并在产生新的迸发症。


Unfortunately, the damage is occurring quietly, enabling political interests to overshadow any sense of urgency about the need to redress the global economy’s intensifying problems.	不幸的是，伤害在静悄悄地发生，从而让政治利益凌驾于一切关于急需解决全球经济日益加剧的问题的紧迫感之上。


Against this bleak background, it is easy to celebrate the success of emerging markets.	针对如此险恶的环境，你很容易为新兴市场的成功喝彩。


After all, emerging and developing economies are growing much faster than the advanced countries.	毕竟，新兴和发展中经济体增长远远快于发达国家。


But even the world’s most dynamic emerging markets – including China, Brazil, and India – are experiencing a sharp deceleration that cannot be ignored.	但即使是世界最有活力的市场——包括中国、巴西和印度——也在经历不可忽视的剧烈减速。


Consider India, where growth is now running at an annualized rate of 4.5%, down from 7.7% annual growth in 2011.	就那印度来说吧，该国年化增长率为4. 5%，而2011年年增长率为7.


To be sure, the IMF projects that India’s economy will rebound later in 2013, but the basis for this optimism is unclear, given that all indicators so far suggest another dismal year.	7%。 诚然，IMF预测印度经济会在2013年下半年反弹，但乐观的基础并不一目了然，因为到目前为止所有指标都表明今年将是又一个令人失望之年。


The emerging economies’ supposed resilience, which has buoyed economic forecasts in recent years, needs to be reassessed.	新兴经济体被认为韧劲十足，此乃近几年经济预测的乐观之源，但这一判断需要三思。


Like the advanced economies, emerging economies experienced a boom in 2000-2007.	与发达经济体一样，新兴经济体在2000—2007年间经历了繁荣。


But, unlike the advanced economies, they maintained high GDP growth rates and relative stability even at the height of the crisis.	但是，与发达经济体不同，即使在危机最高峰，它们也维持了较高的GDP增长率和相对稳定性。


This was viewed as powerful evidence of their new economic might.	这被视为它们新经济实力的有力证据。


In fact, it was largely a result of massive fiscal stimulus and credit expansion.	事实上，这大部分要拜大规模财政刺激和信用扩张之功。


Indeed, as the effects of stimulus programs wear off, new weaknesses are emerging, such as persistent inflation in India and credit misallocation in China.	事实上，随着刺激计划效力的减弱，新弱点正在浮现，比如印度持续的通货膨胀和中国的信用错配。


Given this, the notion that emerging economies will recapture the growth levels of the bubble years seems farfetched.	在这样的情况下，新兴经济体能恢复泡沫年代的增长水平的概念令人难以相信。


Economic forecasts rest on the assumption that economies ultimately heal themselves.	经济预测基于经济最终会自愈的假设。


But economies’ powerful self-healing capabilities work slowly.	但经济的强大自愈能力运转缓慢。


More problematic, a misdiagnosis can lead to treatments that impair the healing process.	问题更大的是，误判可能导致破坏恢复过程的疗方。


Overly optimistic economic projections based on mistaken assessments of the global economy’s ailments thus threaten recovery prospects – with potentially far-reaching consequences.	因此，基于对全球经济病因的错误评估的过于乐观的经济预测会威胁复苏前景，可能造成影响深远的后果。


In Europe, the banks’ wounds must be closed – weak banks must be shut down or merged with stronger banks – before recovery can begin.	在欧洲，银行的伤口必须在复苏开始之前合上——疲软银行必须关闭或与坚挺银行合并。


This will require an extensive swap of private debts for equity.	这要求大规模的私人债务-股权交换。


For the global economy, the malaise reflected in anemic trade growth calls for coordinated fiscal stimulus by the world’s major economies.	对全球经济来说，贸易增长疲软所揭示的病症需要世界主要经济体开战财政刺激合作。


Otherwise, the risk of another global recession will continue to rise.	否则的话，另一轮全球衰退风险将继续上升。


The Mixed Blessing of Genetic Choice	福祸相依的基因筛选


The advance of knowledge is often a mixed blessing.	知识的进步经常是祸福相依。


Over the past 60 years, nuclear physics has been one obvious example of this truth. Over the next 60 years, genetics may be another.	过去60年来，核物理学一直是这一真理的明证，而今后的60年里，遗传学很可能成为另一个佐证。


Today, enterprising firms offer, for a fee, to tell you about your genes.	今天，一些雄心勃勃的公司推出个人基因蓝图的收费项目。


They claim that this knowledge will help you live longer and better.	他们宣称，了解自己的基因有助于延长寿命，改善生活。


You might, for example, have extra checkups to detect early signs of the diseases that you are most at risk of contracting, or you could alter your diet to reduce that risk.	例如，如果你知道自己最有可能患什么病，就可以多做一些体检，发现这些疾病的早期迹象，或者可以改变饮食习惯，降低患病风险。


If your chances of a long lifespan are not good, you might buy more life insurance, or even retire early to have enough time to do what you always wanted to do.	如果你长寿的可能性不太高，就可以买更多的人寿保险，甚至提前退休，以便有足够的时间做自己一直想做的事。


Defenders of privacy have worked, with some success, to prevent insurance companies from requiring genetic testing before issuing life insurance.	个人隐私的捍卫者努力阻止保险公司在发放人寿保险前要求投保人接受基因检查，并且取得了一些成效。


But if individuals can do tests from which insurance companies are barred, and if those who receive adverse genetic information then buy additional life insurance without disclosing the tests that they have taken, they are cheating other holders of life insurance.	但是如果个人可以做检查而保险公司不行，那么如果有人隐瞒通过检查得到的不良基因信息，购买额外的人寿保险，实际上就是在欺骗其他的人寿保险投保人。


Premiums will have to increase to cover the losses, and those with a good genetic prognosis may opt out of life insurance to avoid subsidizing the cheats, driving premiums higher still.	保险公司为了弥补损失不得不提高保费，而基因预后结果良好的人为了不倒贴那些隐瞒真相的人，则可能选择不买人寿保险，从而将保费进一步推高。


We need not become too alarmed yet.	我们现在尚无需惊慌。


The United States Government Accountability Office sent identical genetic samples to several of the testing companies, and got widely varying, and mostly useless, advice.	美国审计总署曾向数家基因检查公司送去完全一样的基因样本，得到的建议千差万别，而且大多无用。


But as the science improves, the insurance problem will have to be faced.	不过随着科学的进步，我们终将面临上述保险问题。


Selecting our children raises more profound ethical problems.	子女的筛选会造成更加深刻的伦理问题。


This is not new.	这并不新鲜。


In developed countries, the routine testing of older pregnant women, combined with the availability of abortion, has significantly reduced the incidence of conditions like Down syndrome.	在发达国家，对高龄孕妇的常规检查，佐以人流手段，极大地减少了唐氏综合症等疾病的发生率。


In some regions of India and China where couples are anxious to have a son, selective abortion has been the ultimate form of sexism, and has been practiced to such an extent that a generation is coming of age in which males face a shortage of female partners.	在印度和中国某些重男轻女的地区，选择性流产已经成为性别歧视的终极形式，情况之严重已导致整整一代适龄男性面临女性配偶不足的窘境。


Selection of children need not involve abortion.	筛选子女不一定要做人流。


For several years, some couples at risk of passing a genetic disease on to their children have used in vitro fertilization, producing several embryos that can be tested for the faulty gene and implanting in the woman’s uterus only those without it.	数年来，一些可能将遗传病遗传给子女的夫妇采用试管授精的方式生成多个胚胎，检查基因缺陷，然后挑出没有基因缺陷的胚胎植入女性的子宫。


Now couples are using this technique to avoid passing on genes that imply a significantly elevated risk of developing certain forms of cancer.	现在，有些夫妇已开始使用这种技术避免将某些癌症的高风险基因遗传给子女。


Since everyone carries some adverse genes, there is no clear line between selecting against a child with above-average risks of contracting a disease and selecting for a child with unusually rosy health prospects.	由于每个人都有这样那样的不良基因，因此，在 淘汰 患病风险高于平均水平的子女，和 挑选 健康前景特别乐观的子女之间，不存在一条清晰的界线。


Thus, genetic selection will inevitably move towards genetic enhancement.	有鉴于此，基因筛选必将发展成基因优化。


For many parents, nothing is more important than giving their child the best possible start in life.	对众多父母来说，没有什么比让子女不输在起跑线上更加重要。


They buy expensive toys to maximize their child’s learning potential and spend much more on private schools or after school tutoring in the hope that he or she will excel on the tests that determine entry to elite universities.	他们购买昂贵的玩具，企图最大限度地激发孩子的学习潜力。 他们在私立学校或课外辅导上不惜血本，希望孩子在考试中出类拔萃，考上名牌大学。


It may not be long before we can identify genes that improve the odds of success in this quest.	要不了多久我们可能就会开始寻找能提高成功率的基因。


Many will condemn this as a resurgence of “eugenics,” the view, especially popular in the early twentieth century, that hereditary traits should be improved through active intervention.	许多人会将此斥为“优生主义”复辟——这种在20世纪初特别流行的观点认为应该通过积极的干预改善遗传特征。


So it is, in a way, and in the hands of authoritarian regimes, genetic selection could resemble the evils of earlier forms of eugenics, with their advocacy of odious, pseudoscientific official policies, particularly concerning “racial hygiene.”	从某方面来看，的确是这样，而且在独裁政体的铁腕下，加上他们对伪科学的恶劣官方政策的鼓吹，特别是有关“种族卫生主义”的政策，基因选择可能与优生主义早期的邪恶派别相似。


In liberal, market driven societies, however, eugenics will not be coercively imposed by the state for the collective good. Instead, it will be the outcome of parental choice and the workings of the free market.	然而在开明的市场经济社会里，优生主义不是由国家以集体利益为借口强加于人，而是父母的选择以及自由市场运作的结果。


If it leads to healthier, smarter people with better problem-solving abilities, that will be a good thing.	如果优生主义带来的是更加健康、聪明、解决问题的能力更强的人，那将是一件好事。


But even if parents make choices that are good for their children, there could be perils as well as blessings.	不过即使每对父母所做的选择都是有利于自己的子女的，仍然福祸参半。


In the case of sex selection, it is easy to see that couples who independently choose the best for their own child can produce an outcome that makes all their children worse off than they would have been if no one could select the sex of their child.	就性别挑选而论，不难看出，不同的夫妇分别为自己的子女做出最佳的选择，结果却可能使所有孩子的处境还不如无法挑选子女性别的时候。


Something similar could happen with other forms of genetic selection.	其他形式的基因筛选也可能出现相似的情景。


Since above-average height correlates with above-average income, and there is a clearly a genetic component to height, it is not fanciful to imagine couples choosing to have taller children. The outcome could be a genetic “arms race” that leads to taller and taller children, with significant environmental costs in the additional consumption required to fuel larger human beings.	由于较高的身材与较高的收入有联系，而身高显然又有基因方面的原因，那么可以想象，人们大多会选择生育身材较高的子女，结果可能引发一场基因上的“军备竞赛”，致使孩子们的身材越来越高，对环境造成极大的消耗，因为人类体型增大，消耗越大。


The most alarming implication of this mode of genetic selection, however, is that only the rich will be able to afford it.	然而这种模式的基因筛选最让人警惕的地方在于只有有钱人才负担得起。


The gap between rich and poor, already a challenge to our ideas of social justice, will become a chasm that mere equality of opportunity will be powerless to bridge.	现在已经对社会公正的概念提出挑战的贫富差距将变成一条巨大的裂缝，仅靠机会平等无力弥补。


That is not a future that any of us should approve.	这可不是我们希望的未来。


But avoiding this outcome will not be easy, for it will require that selection for genetic enhancement is either available to no one or accessible to everyone.	不过要避免这样的结果也非易事，因为这需要确保没有人能得到基因优化，或者所有人都可以得到。


The first option would require coercion, and – since countries will not accept that others should gain a competitive edge – an international agreement to forego the benefits that genetic enhancement can bring.	第一个选择需要强制手段，以及——由于各国不会允许别人获得竞争优势——一项国际协议，放弃基因优化可能带来的好处。


The second option, universal access, would require an unprecedented level of social assistance for the poor, and extraordinarily difficult decisions about what to subsidize.	第二个选择，即全民共享，则需要达到前所未有的社会扶贫水平，以及决定资助对象，而这是十分棘手的。


The Morality of Capital Punishment	死刑的道德观


The US is often criticized for its refusal to abolish capital punishment.	美国由于拒绝废除死刑而经常遭病诟。


Many now claim that abolition of capital punishment is a precondition of a civilized criminal-law system.	许多人宣称废除死刑是文明刑法制度的先决条件。


Nobel laureate Gary Becker disagrees.	诺贝尔奖得主贝克则持有异议。


European governments are adamantly opposed to capital punishment – the European Union bans it outright – and some Europeans consider its use in the United States barbaric.	欧洲各国政府坚决反对死刑，欧盟则予以明文禁止，某些欧洲人认为美国使用死刑是野蛮的。


Indeed, many European intellectuals argue that not just capital punishment, but punishment in general, does not deter criminals.	实际上，欧洲的知识分子们认为不仅仅是死刑，甚至连通常意义的处罚都并不震慑罪犯。


But, whereas Europeans, with crime rates well below American rates for the past half-century, could long afford to be relatively “soft” on most crimes, they have seen their crime rates increase sharply during the past twenty years.	过去半个世纪中，欧洲国家的犯罪率大大低于美国。 然而，在过去二十年中，其犯罪率大幅上升，因此再也无法对大多数犯罪姑息迁就。


By contrast, American rates have fallen, in part because of greater use of punishment.	与此相比，美国的犯罪率下降，部分是由于加大使用了处罚。


This includes capital punishment.	这包括死刑。


I support executing some people convicted of murder because – and only because – I believe that it deters other murders.	我支持处死被定罪的杀人犯是因为我相信死刑可以震慑其他杀人犯，别无其他。


If I did not believe that, I would oppose capital punishment, because revenge and other possible motives should not be a basis for public policy.	如果我不相信这一点，我就会反对死刑，因为报复和其他可能的动机不应当是公共政策的基础。


Serious empirical research on capital punishment in the US began with a pioneering study by Isaac Ehrlich, published in 1975 in the American Economic Review.	随着艾萨克·尔里奇1975年在美国经济评论杂志上发表开创性的研究报告，美国开始了对死刑问题严肃认真的经验主义研究。


Some subsequent studies have sometimes found a much weaker deterrent effect, while others have found a much stronger effect.	后来的某些研究有时发现死刑的震慑力大为弱小，而另一些则发现其震慑力更为强大。


The available data are quite limited, however, so one should not base any conclusions solely on the econometric evidence.	但是，现有的数据十分有限，因此，不应当仅仅以计量经济学的证据来得出结论。


Of course, public policy on any punishment cannot wait until the evidence is perfect.	当然，有关任何处罚的公共政策不应当等到证据完美无缺时才予以确定。


But, even with the limited quantitative evidence available, there are good reasons to believe that capital punishment deters.	但是，即使根据现有有限数量上的证据，还是有充足的理由相信死刑具有震慑力量。


Most people, and murderers in particular, fear death, especially when it follows swiftly and with considerable certainty following the commission of a murder.	大多数人，特别是杀人犯惧怕死刑，尤其是在杀人后死刑从速而至，几无怀疑。


As David Hume put it in discussing suicide, “no man ever threw away life, while it was worth living.	大卫·修姆在谈到自杀时说：“只要还有活头，就没有人会轻生，这是因为惧怕死亡是人之天性”。


For such is our natural horror of death…” Likewise, Schopenhauer believed that “as soon as the terrors of life reach a point at which they outweigh the terrors of death, a man will put an end to his life.	同样，思科潘诺尔相信“对生活的恐惧一旦超出对死亡的恐惧，人就会轻生。


But the terrors of death offer considerable resistance…”	但是死亡的恐惧却会顽强抵抗”。


Opponents of capital punishment frequently proclaim that the state has no moral right to take anyone’s life, including that of the most reprehensible murderer.	死刑的反对者经常宣称国家没有道德上的权力来处死一个人，包括最为残忍的杀人犯。


Yet that is absolutely the wrong conclusion for anyone who believes that capital punishment deters.	但是，对于任何相信死刑可以震慑的人来说，这绝对是一个错误的结论。


To see why, suppose that for each murderer executed (instead of, say, receiving life imprisonment), the number of murders is reduced by three, which is a much lower number than Ehrlich’s and some other estimates of the deterrent effect.	为了知道原因，假设每处死一名杀人犯（而不是终身监禁），杀人犯的数量减少三个，这个数字大大低于尔里奇和其他某些人所估计的震慑力。


This implies that for each murderer not executed, three innocent victims would die.	这就意味着每饶过一个杀人犯，就会有三名无辜的受害人遭殃。


In fact, the government would indirectly be “taking” many lives if it did not use capital punishment.	实际上，政府如果不使用死刑，就会间接地“杀害”很多人命。


Saving three innocent lives for every person executed seems like a very attractive trade-off, and even two lives saved per execution seems like a persuasive benefit-cost ratio for capital punishment.	处死一个人可以挽救三个无辜之人的生命看起来是一个很有吸引力的交换，而且即使每处死一人可以救两条人命对于死刑来说也是很有说服力的成本效益比率。


Admittedly, however, the argument in favor of capital punishment becomes less clear-cut as the number of lives saved per execution falls.	当然，当每处死一人挽救的人命数量降低时，赞成死刑的论点就不再毫不含糊。


But, even if only one life were saved per execution, the tradeoff might still be desirable if the life saved is much better than the life taken, which would usually be the case.	但是，即使每处死一人只能挽救一条人命，如果获救的人命要大大好于被处死的人命（通常如此），这一交换还是值得的。


Many people object to comparing the quality of the life spared and the life taken.	许多人反对把被救的人的人命质量和被处死的相提并论。


Yet I do not see how to avoid such a comparison.	但是我看不出如何避免这一比较。


Consider a career criminal who robs and kills a victim who led a decent life and left several children and a spouse behind.	考虑一下一个职业罪犯抢劫和杀害一个生活体面家有妻小的受害者。


Suppose it would be possible to save the life of an innocent victim by executing such a criminal.	假设一下，处死这样一个罪犯有可能挽救无辜受害者的生命。


To me it is obvious that saving such a victim’s life must count for more than taking the criminal’s life.	对于我而言，挽救这样一个受害者的生命必定要高于处死这样一个罪犯的生命。


Obviously, not all cases are so unambiguous, but a comparison of the qualities of individual lives must be part of any reasonable social policy.	明显的是，并非所有的案件都是毫不含糊的，但对个体生命的质量进行比较应当是构成任何合理的社会政策的一部分。


This helps explain why capital punishment should be used only for murders, and not for lesser crimes.	这就说明为什么死刑应当只用于杀人犯，而不是较轻的犯罪。


When the tradeoff is between taking lives and, say, reducing property theft, the case for milder punishments is far stronger.	如果要在处死某人和减少财产遭窃之间作出交换，轻微处罚的理由就更为强大。


Although severe assaults, including some gruesome rapes, may approach some murders in severity, and might conceivably call for capital punishment, I do not support its use in these cases.	尽管暴力攻击，包括某些残忍的强奸可能会在严重性上接近杀人，而且可能料想会要求死刑，但是我并不支持在这些案件中使用死刑。


A powerful argument for reserving capital punishment for murders is “marginal deterrence.”	给杀人犯保留死刑的一个强大的理由是“边际震慑”。


If assault were punished with execution, perpetrators would have an incentive to kill their victims to avoid discovery (which is a major reason why the severity of punishments more generally should be matched to the severity of crimes).	如果用死刑处罚人身攻击，那么罪犯就有动机杀死其受害者来避免被发现（这也是处罚的程度一般应当与犯罪的严重性相匹配的主要原因）。


One complication is that capital punishment may make a murderer fight harder to avoid being captured, which could lead to more deaths.	其中的一个复杂情况是，死刑可能会让杀人犯更加凶残来逃避被捕，也就会造成更多的死亡。


But, while marginal deterrence is important, I believe the resistance of murderers to being captured, possibly at the expense of their own lives, is really indirect evidence that criminals do fear capital punishment.	但是，尽管边际震慑是重要的，我相信杀人犯甚至可能以自身生命的代价拒逋，的确是罪犯们害怕死刑的间接证据。


Of course, I worry about the risk of executing the innocent.	当然，我担心处死无辜之人的风险。


My support for capital punishment would weaken greatly if the rate of killing innocent people were as large as that claimed by many.	如果处死无辜之人的比率正如许多人所说的那样多，我对死刑的支持会大为减弱。


However, I believe that the appeal process in the US offers enormous protection, not so much against wrongful conviction as against wrongful execution, so that there are very few, if any, documented cases of innocent people being killed.	但是，我相信美国的上诉程序提供了强大的保护，这种保护针对错误的执行死刑比对错误定罪要大。 这样，即使有无辜之人被处死的有案可查的案件，数量仍然是很少的。


And this process has been strengthened enormously with the development of DNA identification.	而且这一程序由于DNA鉴定的发展而大为增强。


Again, the debate about capital punishment is essentially a debate about deterrence (which may be reduced by lengthy appeals).	还是这一问题，那就是，有关死刑的辩论基本上是有关震慑（冗长的上诉可能会降低这一震慑力）。


I can understand that some people are skeptical about the evidence, although I believe they are wrong about both that and the common sense of the issue.	我可以理解，尽管某些人对于证据和有关这一问题的常识都持有错误的观念，他们还是怀疑证据。


It is very disturbing to take someone’s life, even a murderer’s life, but sometimes highly unpleasant actions are necessary to prevent even worse behavior that takes the lives of innocent victims.	处死某人，哪怕是杀人犯都是令人恐慌的，但是，某些极度不快的行动对于防止更坏的、夺取无辜受害者性命的行为是必要的。


The Morality of Non-Proliferation	核武器不扩散条约的道德性


Nearly all the world’s nations are meeting in New York to review the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	几乎全世界所有国家将聚集于纽约，参与审核核武器不扩散条约（NPT）。


The NPT was negotiated in the 1960’s after five countries (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China) developed nuclear weapons.	核武器不扩散条约是上世纪六十年代在五国（美国、苏联、英国、法国和中国）发展了核武器之后所达成的。


India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty and, over time, constructed their own atomic bombs.	印度、巴基斯坦和以色列拒绝加入该条约，长期以来着力于制造了他们自己的原子弹。


Now North Korea and Iran stand accused of violating their treaty commitments by pursuing nuclear weapons.	现在北朝鲜和伊朗因发展核武器而被指责为违反条约规定。


Aside from the legal issues, is there a moral case for non-proliferation?	除了法律问题之外，禁止核武器扩散是否也存在道德问题呢？


In a world of sovereign states, is it hypocritical for some to have nuclear weapons and deny them to others?	在这个主权国家的世界里，某些国家能拥有核武器而某些国家却被禁止拥有核武器是不是颇为虚假？


If no one had the bomb today, it would be best if it were not invented.	如果现在要核弹消失，那最好就是它从来没有被发明出来过。


But history depends on the paths that were taken in the past.	但是历史建立在过往的每一步之上。


Suppose it were 1939, and states were debating whether the US should invent the bomb.	假设现在是1939年，世界各国正在为美国是否应当发明核弹进行辩论。


They might have argued that all should get it or none.	他们也许曾这样争论，要么所有人都有，要么都没有。


But if they knew that Hitler’s Germany would get it, they might have approved Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to develop it before the Nazis.	但是如果他们那时候知道希特勒德国会得到核弹，他们或许就会批准弗兰克林·罗斯福的决定，在纳粹之前开发核弹。


Besides, turning back the clock is impossible.	然而，时光不可能倒转。


Even if all countries agree to disarm, some might cheat.	即使所有的国家同意解除武装，部分国家还可能会弄虚作假。


The successful cheaters would most likely be authoritarian states with little transparency.	最成功的欺骗者最有可能是那些透明度极低的独裁国家。


After all, North Korea says that it has developed nuclear weapons despite having signed the NPT.	就像北朝鲜，尽管它签署了NPT条约，它还是发展了核武器。


Libya was also a party to the NPT while it pursued a covert nuclear program.	利比亚也是NPT中一员，但它还是秘密从事核武器计划。


If one regards impartiality and attention to consequences as essential to morality, one could imagine countries accepting the morality of unequal possession of nuclear weapons if certain conditions were met.	如果一个人把公平公正和对后果的重视看作道德的必要条件，这个人就可以想象那些国家怎样在达到某种条件的情形下接受不平等拥有核武器的美德。


For example, the purposes should be limited to self- defense.	这些条件包括，使用核武器的目的应当被限制在自卫范围内；


States possessing weapons should take special steps to reduce the prospect of their use.	拥有核武器的国家应当采取特殊手段减少使用这些武器的可能性；


The weapons should be used to help preserve the independence of all states, rather than for imperial aggrandizement, and steps should be taken to reduce arsenals as political conditions permit.	这些武器应当被用于帮助维护所有国家的独立，而不是帝国扩张，并且应当在政治允许的条件下采取措施减少兵工厂。


Today’s NPT comes close to reflecting such conditions.	今天的核武器不扩散条约已经接近于这些条件。


Of course, the NPT does not rest solely on moral arguments, but primarily on self-interest and prudence.	当然，核武器不扩散条约不仅仅只停留在道德辩论上，而更主要在各国利益与其谨慎行动之上。


Most states adhere because they believe that their security would be diminished if more states obtained nuclear weapons.	大部分国家拥护该条约是因为他们相信，如果更多国家拥有了核武器，将会对他们的安全造成威胁。


The treaty helps them to reduce fears of cheating by neighbors because it provides for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.	该条约提供国际原子能机构的核调查，有助于减少各国对被邻国欺骗的担忧恐惧。


The credibility of American security guarantees for its allies is one of the reasons that the bomb did not spread to 25 countries within a decade, as President John F. Kennedy once expected.	美国为其同盟国提供的安全保障具备了可信度是因为核导弹正如约翰F·肯尼迪所期望的那样，并没有在十年之内扩展到25个国家。


Non-proliferation is not hypocritical if it is based on an impartial and realistic estimation of risks.	如果核武器不扩散条约建立在对风险客观实际的评价基础之上，那么它就不是虚假的。


But if a state like North Korea or Iran decides to accept such risks, should that be purely its own choice?	但是，若北朝鲜或伊朗这样的国家决定接受这种风险，那难道只是他们自己的选择吗？


Perhaps, if the risks were borne solely by its own people, but they are not.	如果这种风险只由这个国家的国民承担，也许那只是他们自己的选择，但是事实并非如此。


Third parties are justified in rejecting the risks that would be imposed upon them.	第三方有理由拒绝那些强加于他们身上的风险。


The history of proliferation shows that political chain reactions often occur – witness China, India, and Pakistan – and there are real fears that North Korea and Iran might trigger such chains in Northeast Asia and the Middle East.	核武器扩散的历史表明，政治连锁反应经常发生——以中国、印度和巴基斯坦为例——北朝鲜和伊朗也许会在亚洲东北部和中东地区触发这样的连锁反应。


Some people argue that nuclear proliferation will actually reduce risks. Call it the “porcupine theory.”	某些人辩称，核武器的扩散事实上能够减少风险，即“豪猪理论”。


In such a prickly world, no country would dare aggression.	在这样一个危机四伏的世界，没有国家能够不惧侵略。


But this assumes perfect rationality.	但是这种想法情有可原。


In the real world, accidents occur, so more proliferation means a greater chance of eventual inadvertent use, weaker capacity in managing nuclear crises, and greater difficulty in establishing controls and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics.	现实世界中，事故在所难免，因此，核武器扩散意味着不当使用的可能性增大，处理核危机能力变弱，确立控制并减少核武器在世界政治中的作用越来越困难。


In addition, the more states possess nuclear weapons, the greater the prospects that terrorists will gain access to them.	此外，越多国家拥有核武器，恐怖分子就越有可能得到它们。


Of course, transnational terrorists usually have no “return address” that allows the threat of mutual deterrence to work, but North Korea or Iran has no moral right to impose this risk upon others.	当然，跨国恐怖分子通常没有“回复地址”以使得相互威慑的恐吓能够奏效，但是北���鲜或伊朗在道德上没有权利将这种风险强加于别人身上。


Three European Union countries – Britain, France, and Germany – are trying to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear enrichment program, which would give it bomb material to use after a quick withdrawal from the treaty.	欧盟三国——英国、法国和德国——正试图劝说伊朗放弃它的浓缩核计划，该计划将使得它在迅速退出条约后获得可使用的核弹材料。


Iran claims a right to enrichment under Article 4 of the NPT, but that article has to be read in light of the other articles and of Iran’s past deception vis-à-vis the IAEA.	伊朗宣称它有权根据NPT第四条进行核浓缩活动， 但是那一条必须根据其他条例和伊朗过去欺骗国际原子能机构（IAEA） 的行为来解读。


In East Asia, North Korea withdrew from the NPT after using it to disguise its weapons program, and China, America, Japan, Russia, and South Korea are trying to persuade Kim Jong Il’s regime to reverse course.	在东亚，北朝鲜借核武器不扩散条约掩饰它的核武器计划后从该条约中退出，中国、美国、日本、俄罗斯和韩国正力图说服金正日政权改变该计划。


It seems right for these states to use pressure to dissuade Iran and North Korea from imposing new risks on the world.	这些国家施加压力劝阻伊朗和北朝鲜不要给世界带来新威胁的做法是正确的。


But the existing nuclear weapons states also must be mindful of the moral conditions that underlie the NPT bargain.	但是目前拥有核武器的国家也应当牢记NPT契约的基础条件。


The obligation under Article 6 to reduce arsenals cannot be interpreted to require prompt disarmament unless that would enhance stability.	有关减少兵工厂的第六条规定不能被看作要求立刻裁军的规定，除非这有助于稳定。


Such conditions do not yet exist in a world where undemocratic states cheat on legal obligations.	但是非民主国家在法律规定上瞒天过海导致这些条件还无法在这样一个世界中存在。


But the nuclear weapons states should continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and refrain from new programs that suggest the prospect of their use.	但是拥有核武器的国家应该继续减少核武器的作用，并且禁止那些有可能使用核武器的计划。


Given the dangers that increased risks imply for everyone, there is a strong moral case for a policy of stopping further proliferation rather than arguing that Iran or North Korea have a right to do whatever they wish as sovereign states.	假如会引发风险的危险涉及到了每个人，制定停止核武器进一步扩散的政策比就伊朗或北朝鲜作为主权国家是否有权做它们想做的进行辩论更具有道德意义。


But it is also important to remember that obligations of non-proliferation bind nuclear weapons states as well.	但是重要的是，我们要记住核不扩散条约的规定也约束了拥有核武器的国家。


Why Pay More?	为什么多花钱？


PRINCETON – When Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, went to Ukraine for talks last month, his Ukrainian counterparts reportedly laughed at him because he was wearing a Japanese quartz watch that cost only $165.	普林斯顿—波兰外长西科尔斯基上个月前往乌克兰谈判，据说他的乌克兰对手因为他手戴价格只有165美元的日本石英表而嘲笑他。


A Ukrainian newspaper reported on the preferences of Ukrainian ministers, several of whom have watches that cost more than $30,000.	一家乌克兰报纸报道了乌克兰部长们的喜好，其中不少人的手表价值超过3万美元。


Even a Communist member of Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, was shown wearing a watch that retails for more than $6,000.	即使是乌克兰议会的共产党议员，也被拍到戴了一只零售价6000多美元的手表。


The laughter should have gone in the opposite direction.	嘲笑者和被嘲笑者应该换一下才对。


Wouldn’t you laugh (maybe in private, to avoid being impolite) at someone who pays more than 200 times as much as you do, and ends up with an inferior product?	如果某人花了200倍于你的钱，最后买了一个还不如你的东西，你难道不会嘲笑他（或许为了避免失礼，你会在私下里嘲笑他）？


That is what the Ukrainians have done.	这就是乌克兰人做的事。


They could have bought an accurate, lightweight, maintenance-free quartz watch that can run for five years, keeping virtually perfect time, without ever being moved or wound.	他们本可以一只走时准确、重量极轻、不需要维护、可以用五年的石英表，完美计时，永远不需要晃动，也不会受伤。


Instead, they paid far more for clunkier watches that can lose minutes every month, and that will stop if you forget to wind them for a day or two (if they have an automatic mechanism, they will stop if you don’t move them).	相反，他们花多得多的钱去买每个月都会快慢几分钟、一两天忘记上发条就会停走（如果是自动机械表，忘了晃动它们也会停走）。


In addition, the quartz watches also have integrated alarm, stopwatch, and timer functions that the other watches either lack, or that serve only as a design-spoiling, hard-to-read effort to keep up with the competition.	除此之外，石英表还有内置闹钟、秒表和定时器功能，其他手表要么没有这些功能，要么使用起来极为不便。


Why would any wise shopper accept such a bad bargain?	为什么聪明的购物者会接受如此愚蠢的交易？


Out of nostalgia, perhaps?	难道是出于怀旧？


A full-page ad for Patek Philippe has Thierry Stern, the president of the company, saying that he listens to the chime of every watch with a minute repeater that his company makes, as his father and grandfather did before him.	在百达翡丽一则整版广告上，公司总裁斯特恩（Thierry Stern）说他会听公司生产的每一只手表走动一分钟，他的父亲和祖父也是这么做的。


That’s all very nice, but since the days of Stern’s grandfather, we have made progress in time-keeping.	这当然好，但自斯特恩祖父的时代以来，我们在计时方面已经取得了重大进步。


Why reject the improvements that human ingenuity has provided to us?	为什么拒绝人类灵感带给我们的改善？


I have an old fountain pen that belonged to my grandmother; it’s a nice memento of her, but I wouldn’t dream of using it to write this column.	我有一支旧钢笔，是我祖母的遗物； 对她来说，这是一件很好的纪念品，但我才不会想用这支笔来写这个专栏。


Thorstein Veblen knew the answer.	凡勃伦（Thorstein Veblen）知道答案。


In his classic The Theory of the Leisure Class, published in 1899, he argued that once the basis of social status became wealth itself – rather than, say, wisdom, knowledge, moral integrity, or skill in battle – the rich needed to find ways of spending money that had no other objective than the display of wealth itself.	在其1899年的经典名著《有闲阶级论》中，他指出，一旦社会地位基础成为财富本身——而不是（比如）智慧、知识、节操或作战技巧——富人就需要找到特别的花钱方式，这种方式没有别的目的，只为展示财富本身。


He termed this “conspicuous consumption.”	他把这称为“炫耀���消费”。


Veblen wrote as a social scientist, refraining from rendering moral judgments, though he left readers in little doubt about his attitude toward such expenditure in a time when many lived in poverty.	凡勃伦是作为社会科学家、通过提炼道德判断写下这番话的，尽管他令读者毫不质疑在大量人口生活在贫困时他对这类支出的态度。


Wearing a ridiculously expensive watch to proclaim that one has achieved an elevated social standing seems especially immoral for a public official in a country where a significant portion of the population still lives in real poverty.	戴一只贵得离谱的手表，以此表明你获得了超凡的社会地位，这对于一个大量人口仍生活在名副其实的贫困中的国家的公职官员来说尤其不道德。


These officials are wearing on their wrists the equivalent of four or five years of an average Ukrainian’s salary.	这些官员手腕上的东西相当于普通乌克兰四五年的工资。


That tells Ukrainian taxpayers either that they are paying their public servants too much, or that their public servants have other ways of getting money to buy watches that they would not be able to afford otherwise.	这相当于告诉乌克兰纳税人，他们要么给了公仆太多的钱，要么他们的公仆有其他渠道搞到钱，买下他们除此之外根本无力承担的手表。


The Chinese government knows what those “other ways” might be.	中国政府知道“其他渠道”是什么东西。


As the International Herald Tribune reports, one aspect of the Chinese government’s campaign against corruption is a clampdown on expensive gifts.	据《国际先驱论坛报》报道，中国政府反腐败运动的一个方面就是打击昂贵礼品。


As a result, according to Jon Cox, an analyst at Kepler Capital Markets, “it’s no longer acceptable to have a big chunky watch on your wrist.”	结果，根据Kepler Capital Markets的乔恩·考克斯（Jon Cox）的说法，“不容你在手腕上戴又大又粗的手表。


The Chinese market for expensive watches is in steep decline.	”中国名表市场大幅萎靡。


Ukrainians, take note.	当心，乌克兰。


Wearing a watch that costs 200 times more than one that does a better job of keeping time says something else, even when it is worn by people who are not governing a relatively poor country.	戴一只比能更好计时的手表贵200倍的手表自有其特殊含义，即使戴它的人并没有在治理相对贫穷的国家。


Andrew Carnegie, the richest man of Veblen’s era, was blunt in his moral judgments.	凡勃伦时代最富有的人——安德鲁·卡耐基的道德判断相当直率。


“The man who dies rich,” he is often quoted as saying, “dies disgraced.”	他有一句名言：“死于富贵，是为死之耻。 ”


We can adapt that judgment to the man or woman who wears a $30,000 watch or buys similar luxury goods, like a $12,000 handbag.	我们可以这一判断应用于戴3晚美元名表或购买类似奢侈品（比如12 000美元手袋）的人。


Essentially, such a person is saying; “I am either extraordinarily ignorant, or just plain selfish.	从根本上说，这类人在说：“我要么特别无知，要么特别自私。


If I were not ignorant, I would know that children are dying from diarrhea or malaria, because they lack safe drinking water, or mosquito nets, and obviously what I have spent on this watch or handbag would have been enough to help several of them survive; but I care so little about them that I would rather spend my money on something that I wear for ostentation alone.”	如果我不无知，我就会知道痢疾和疟疾正在夺走儿童的声明，因为他们缺少安全饮用水或蚊帐，而我花在这只手表或手袋上的钱显然足以拯救好几个这样的儿童的声明； 但我对他们漠不关心，宁可把钱花在穿戴着只能用来炫耀的东西上。


Of course, we all have our little indulgences.	当然，我们都有自己的小嗜好。


I am not arguing that every luxury is wrong.	我并不是说一切奢侈品都是错误的。


But to mock someone for having a sensible watch at a modest price puts pressure on others to join the quest for ever-greater extravagance.	但是嘲弄戴价格低廉的优质手表者不啻于向别人施压，要求他加入追求铺张浪费的行列。


That pressure should be turned in the opposite direction, and we should celebrate those, like Sikorski, with modest tastes and higher priorities than conspicuous consumption.	这样的压力应该反过来施，我们应该赞美西科尔斯基，他口味温和，有着比炫耀性消费更高的理想。


The Moral Vulnerability of Markets	市场的道义脆弱性


LONDON -- Today, there seems to be no coherent alternative to capitalism, yet anti-market feelings are alive and well, expressed for example in the moralistic backlash against globalization.	伦敦-今天，虽然我们并没有看到资本主义有任何合乎逻辑的替代者，然而反市场的情绪还是非常盛行，比如说反映在对全球化在道义上的强烈反对。


Because no social system can survive for long without a moral basis, the issues posed by anti-globalization campaigners are urgent – all the more so in the midst of the current economic crisis.	因为一个没有道义基础的社会体系是很难长时间存在的，所以由反全球化运动所带来的问题非常紧迫，尤其是在目前的经济危机中。


It is hard to deny some moral value to the market.	我们很难否认市场存在一些道义价值。


After all, we attach moral value to processes as well as outcomes, as in the phrase “the end does not justify the means.”	不管怎样，我们把道义价值附加到了过程以及结果中，就像谚语中说的“结果正确并不代表方法正确”。


It is morally better to have our goods supplied by free labor than by slaves, and to choose our goods rather than have them chosen for us by the state.	让我们的商品由自由劳动力而不是努力提供以及由我们选择商品而不是有国家帮我们选择商品在道义上无疑更好。


The fact that the market system is more efficient at creating wealth and satisfying wants than any other system is an additional bonus.	市场体系在创造财富以及满足需求方面比任何其他体系更有效的事实只是一个额外的奖赏。


Moral criticisms of the market focus on its tendency to favor a morally deficient character type, to privilege disagreeable motives, and to promote undesirable outcomes.	对市场的道义批评主要集中在它倾向于让道义上有欠缺的品质类型受益、给予令人不快的动机以特权以及促成不受欢迎的结果。


Capitalism is also held to lack a principle of justice.	资本主义还被认为缺乏公正的原则。


Consider character.	让我们来看一看品质。


It has often been claimed that capitalism rewards the qualities of self-restraint, hard-work, inventiveness, thrift, and prudence.	资本主义常常被认为是奖赏自我克制、辛勤工作、创造性、节俭和谨慎的品质的。


On the other hand, it crowds out virtues that have no economic utility, like heroism, honor, generosity, and pity.	在另一方面，它排挤没有经济效应的美德，比如英雄主义、荣誉、慷慨和同情。


(Heroism survives, in part, in the romanticized idea of the “heroic entrepreneur.”)	（英雄主义部分在被浪漫化的“英雄的企业主”的概念中存活了下来。 ）


The problem is not just the moral inadequacy of the economic virtues, but their disappearance.  Hard work and inventiveness are still rewarded, but self-restraint, thrift, and prudence surely started to vanish with the first credit card.	问题不仅仅在于经济美德在道义上的欠缺，而是它们的消失。 辛勤工作和创造性依然受到奖赏，但是自我克制、节俭和谨慎随着第一张信用卡的诞生显然已经开始消失了。


In the affluent West, everyone borrows to consume as much as possible.	在富裕的西方国家，每个人都借钱以进行尽可能多的消费。


America and Britain are drowning in debt.	美国和英国都是负债累累。


Adam Smith wrote that “consumption is the sole end and purpose of production.”	亚当·史密斯曾说过“消费是生产唯一的结果和目的”。


But consumption is not an ethical aim.	但是消费不是一个合乎道德标准的目的。


It is not positively good to have five cars rather than one.	拥有五辆汽车在务实性上肯定没有拥有一辆汽车好。


You need to consume in order to live, and to consume more than you strictly need in order to live well.	为了生活你需要消费，而为了生活得更好你需要超出你绝对需求的消费。


This is the ethical justification for economic development.	这是对经济发展在伦理上的辩护。


From the ethical point of view, consumption is a means to goodness, and the market system is the most efficient engine for lifting people out of poverty: it is doing so at a prodigious rate in China and India.	从伦理角度上看，消费是向好的方向发展的途径，而市场体系是让人们脱离贫穷的最有效的发动机：在中国和印度它正以惊人的速度这样做着。


But this does not tell us at what point consumption tips us into a bad life.	但是它并没有告诉我们在哪一种情况下消费会把我们推向坏的生活。


If people want more pornography or more drugs, the market allows them to consume these goods to the point of self-destruction.	如果人们想要更多的色情或更多的毒品，市场就会给他们消费这些商品，乃至使他们走向自我毁灭。


It oversupplies some goods that are morally harmful, and undersupplies goods that are morally beneficial.	它过度提供在道义上有害的某些商品，而在某些道义上有益的商品上却供应不足。


For quality of life, we have to rely on morals, not markets.	如果要过有质量的生活，我们只能依赖道义，而不是市场。


No doubt it is unfair to blame the market for bad moral choices.	因为坏的道义选择而指责市场无疑是不公正的。


People can decide when to stop consuming or what they want to consume.	人们能够决定什么时候停止消费或者他们希望消费什么商品。


But the market system relies on a particular motive for action – Keynes called it “love of money” – which tends to undermine traditional moral teaching.	但是市场体系依赖于一种特定的行动动机，凯恩斯称之为“对金钱的热爱”，这种动机倾向于削弱传统的道义教导。


The paradox of capitalism is that it converts avarice, greed, and envy into virtues.	资本主义自相矛盾的地方在于它把贪婪和嫉妒变成了美德。


We are told that capitalism discovers wants that people did not realize they had and thus moves humanity forward.	我们被告知发现资本主义的人希望人们不知道他们拥有什么，从而推动人性向好的方向发展。


But it is truer to say that the market economy is sustained by the stimulation of greed and envy through advertising.	但是更确切的说法应该是市场经济是通过广泛宣传的贪婪和嫉妒的刺激得以维持的。


In a world of ubiquitous advertising, there is no natural limit to the hunger for goods and services.	在一个广告无所不在的世界中，对商品和服务的渴望是没有天然的界限的。


The final moral issue is capitalism’s lack of a principle of justice.	最后一个道义上的问题是资本主义缺乏公正的标准。


In a perfectly competitive market, with full information, models of the market show that all the factors of production receive rewards equal to their marginal products, i.e., all are paid what they are worth.	在一个充分竞争、信息铺天盖地的市场，市场的模型表明生产的所有因素会得到与它们的边际产量等值的回报，即所有的商品都得到符合它们价值的回报。


The full competition and information requirements ensure that all contracts are uncoerced (there is no monopoly power) and all expectations are fulfilled, i.e., people get what they want.	充分竞争和对信息的需要确保所有的协议都不是被胁迫签订的（不存在垄断性的权力）并且所有的期望都能得到满足，就是说��们能够得到一切他们想要的东西。


Justice in distribution is supposedly secured by justice in exchange.	分配的公正被认为可以通过交易的公正得到保障。


But no actually existing capitalist market system spontaneously generates justice in exchange.	但是没有哪个真实存在的资本主义市场体系能产生交易的公正。


There is always some monopoly power, insiders have more information than outsiders, ignorance and uncertainty are pervasive, and expectations are frequently disappointed.	总是有某种垄断权力存在，内幕人士比外面的人拥有更多的信息，忽视和不确定性普遍存在，而期望常常以失望告终。


Justice in exchange has to be supplied from outside the market.	交易的公正只能由市场外的力量来提供。


Moreover, the endowments that people bring with them to the market include not just their own innate qualities, but their starting positions, which are radically unequal.	此外，人们带到市场里来的天赋不仅仅包括他们自己天生的素质，还有他们的起步位置，而这是绝然不平等的。


That is why the liberal theory of justice demands at a minimum equality of opportunity: the attempt – as far as is compatible with personal liberty – to eliminate all those differences in life chances arising from unequal starting points.	这正是为什么公正的自由理论要求机会的最低平等的原因，以便（在尽可能兼容个人自由的前提下）消除因为不平等的起点而造成的人生机会的所有差异。


As a result, we rely on the state to provide social goods like education, housing, and health care.	其结果是，我们依靠国家来提供社会性的商品，比如教育、住房和保健。


Finally, the claim that everyone is – under ideal conditions – paid what they are worth is an economic, not a moral, valuation.	最后，认为每个人在理想的情况下得到符合他们价值的回报的说法只是指一种经济上的而不是道义上的估值。


It does not conform to our moral intuition that a CEO should not be paid 500 times the average wage of his workers, or to our belief that if someone’s market-clearing wage is too low to support life, he should not be allowed to starve to death.	一位首席执行官不应该得到他的员工平均工资500倍的工资并不符合我们的道义直觉，而如果某个人所得到的市场出清工资过低而不足以维持生活他不应该被允许饿死也不符合我们的信念。


As our societies have become richer, we have come to believe that everyone is entitled to a minimum standard, whether in work or sickness or unemployment, which allows for a continuing level of comfort and flourishing.	随着我们的社会变得越来越富裕，我们开始相信每个人都有资格获得某种最低标准，不管是在工作、生病或是失业问题上，从而使他们能够持续获得一定水平的安逸和成功。


The market system does not guarantee this.	但是市场体系并不保证能提供这些东西。


While the market today has no serious challenger, it is morally vulnerable.	尽管今天的市场并没有受到严峻的挑战，但是它在道义上却是脆弱的。


It has become dangerously dependent on economic success, so that any large-scale economic failure will expose the shallowness of its moral claims.	它越来越危险地依赖于经济的成功，因而任何大规模的经济危机都会暴露出它的道义主张的空洞性。


The solution is not to abolish markets, but to re-moralize wants.	要解决问题并不能摧毁市场，而是要对需求重新道义化。


The simplest way of doing this is to restrict advertising. This would prune the role of greed and envy in the operation of markets, and create room for the flourishing of other motives.	对此，限制广告是最简单的方式，它会削弱贪婪和嫉妒在市场运转中的作用，并且为其他动机的繁荣创造空间。


The Muslim Civil War	穆斯林内战


Is the Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East now deeper than the antagonism between Israel and the Arabs?	中东逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林的分歧要比以色列和阿拉伯之间的敌意更深科吗？


You might think so given the response of some Arab governments to Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel.	考虑到某些阿拉伯国家政府对于黎巴嫩真主党攻击以色列的决定作出的反应，你可能会这样认为。


Even as Israeli bombs fell on Beirut and Tyre, Saudi Arabia, perhaps the most conservative Arab Muslim state of all, openly condemned the actions of the Shia Hezbollah in instigating conflict with Israel.	即使当以色列的炸弹投在贝鲁特和提尔，可能是最为保守的阿拉伯穆斯林国家的沙特阿拉伯公开谴责什叶派真主党挑起与以色列的冲突。


Never before in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict has a state that considers itself a leader of the Arab Muslim peoples backed Israel so openly.	在阿以冲突的历史上还从来没有一个自认为是阿拉伯穆斯林人民领袖的国家如此公开地支持以色列。


Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s breach with Hezbollah is not a one-time occurrence.	而且，沙特阿拉伯与真主党的交恶并非一时。


Egypt and Jordan have also roundly condemned Hezbollah and its leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, for their adventurism.	埃及和约旦也直率地谴责了真主党及其领导人纳斯鲁拉的冒险主义。


What is behind this stunning development?	这一惊人的事件发展的背后是什么？


Are we seeing a fundamental shift in relations between Arab nationalism and Islamic sectarianism?	我们是否在目睹阿拉伯民族主义和伊斯兰宗派主义关系中根本性的变化呢？


Is Saudi Arabia’s Sunni government more concerned and frightened by Shia Islam than it is committed to Arab unity and the Palestinian cause?	沙特阿拉伯的逊尼派政府是否对什叶派伊斯兰更为关切和恐惧，要超出它对阿拉伯团结和巴勒斯坦事业的承诺呢？


Arab denunciations of Hezbollah suggest that the Muslim sectarian divide, already evident in the daily violence in Iraq, is deepening and intensifying across the Middle East.	阿拉伯世界谴责真主党表明，早已在伊拉克每天的暴力中暴露无遗的穆斯林宗派分歧正在加深并在整个中东加剧。


President George W. Bush’s desire to shatter the Arab world’s frozen societies was meant to pit the forces of modernization against the traditional elements in Arab and Islamic societies.	布什总统打破阿拉伯世界僵化社会的愿望原本意在利用现代化力量反对阿拉伯和伊斯兰世界中的传统势力。


Instead, he appears to have unleashed the region’s most atavistic forces.	相反，看起来他已经把该地区最为返祖的力量释放了出来。


Opening this Pandora’s Box may have ushered in a new and even uglier era of generalized violence, perhaps what can only be called a “Muslim Civil War.”	打开这一潘多拉盒子有可能迎来一个新的、甚至是更为丑陋的全局性暴力时代，这可能只能被称为“穆斯林内战”。


The Shia-Sunni divide has existed from the dawn of Islam, but the geographical and ethnic isolation of non-Arab Shiite Iran, together with Sunni Arab countries’ dominance of their Shia minorities, mostly kept this rivalry in the background.	什叶派和逊尼派之间的分歧自伊斯兰起源之时就已经存在，但是非阿拉伯人的什叶派的伊朗在地理和种族上的隔离以及逊尼派阿拉伯国家统治其什叶少数派基本上压制了这一对峙。


These tensions further receded in the tide of the “Islamization” created by the Iranian revolution, for in its wake Arabs’ sectarian identity as Sunni was pushed further into the background as a generalized “Islamic” assertiveness appeared.	伊朗革命引发的“伊斯兰化”浪潮进一步缩退了这些紧张关系，这是因为随着伊朗革命，总体上“伊斯兰”咄咄逼人，阿拉伯人的逊尼派宗派身份被进一步弱化。


That all changed when Al Qaeda, a Sunni terrorist force that draws heavily on Saudi Wahabbi ideology and personnel, launched its attacks on America in September 2001.	这一切随着2001年九月逊尼派恐怖主义者发动对美国的攻击而改变。 这些逊尼派者大量依赖于沙特的瓦哈比意识形态以及人员。


A specifically Sunni brand of militant Islam was now on the march.	一支明确的逊尼派的好斗穆斯林正在形成。


When the United States initiated wars on both the Sunni Taliban in Afghanistan and the Sunni Iraqi regime, this new radical Sunni strain became even more emboldened.	当美国对同为逊尼派的阿富汗塔利班和伊拉克政权发动战争的时候，这一新的激进逊尼派世系甚至得到更大的鼓动。


The region’s newly assertive Sunni Arabs perceive Israel and the West as being only one threat, the other comprising the so-called “Shia crescent” – the arc of land extending from Lebanon to Iran through Syria and Iraq that is inhabited by the allegedly heretical Shia.	该地区新近咄咄逼人的逊尼派阿拉伯人认为以色列和西方只是一个威胁，而另一个威胁则包括所谓的“什叶派新月”，也就是从黎巴嫩到伊朗经过叙利亚和伊拉克由被指称为异教徒居住的弧形的大片土地。


Saudi Arabia’s rulers, as custodians of the Muslim faith’s holiest places in Mecca and Medina, perhaps feel this threat most keenly.	沙特的统治者们作为穆斯林信仰圣地麦加和麦地那的守护者可能更加深切地感受到这一威胁。


In Sunni eyes, the Shia not only dominate the oil-rich areas of Iran, Iraq, and the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, but are – through the actions of Hezbollah – attempting to usurp the role of “protector” of the central dream of all Arabs, the Palestinian cause.	在逊尼派眼中，什叶派不仅控制着石油储量丰富的伊朗和伊拉克地区和沙特的东部地区，而且还通过真主党的行动试图篡夺巴勒斯坦事业，也就是所有阿拉伯人中心梦想的“保护者”角色。


It is because the Saudi royal family derives its legitimacy from a strict form of Sunni Islam and doubts the loyalty of its Shia population that the Kingdom has turned on Hezbollah.	正是由于沙特皇室从逊尼派伊斯兰的严格形式中获得合法性并怀疑其什叶派人口的忠诚，因而沙特王国才反对真主党。


Ironically, it is America, Saudi Arabia’s longtime protector, which made Shia empowerment possible by overthrowing Saddam Hussein and bringing Shiite parties to power in Iraq.	具有讽刺意味的是，正是沙特的长期保护者美国通过推翻萨达姆并让什叶派政党在伊拉克掌权从而让什叶派当政成为可能。


The Bush administration seems to recognize what it has done; as the Shia arc rises in the east of the Arab Muslim world, the US is attempting to strengthen its protection of the Sunni arc – Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – in the region’s west.	布什当局似乎认识到了它自己的所作所为； 当什叶派弧形在阿拉伯穆斯林世界的东部升起的时候，美国则试图加强其对该地区西部的埃及、约旦以及沙特阿拉伯，也就是逊尼派弧形的保护。


Israel, the once implacable enemy of the Arab cause, now seems to be slotted into this defensive structure.	以色列曾经是阿拉伯事业的不共戴天之敌，现在却看起来是加入到了这一防御结构之中。


But such a defensive posture is bound to be unstable, due to pan-Arab feelings.  Today, ordinary Saudi citizens are glued to Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite TV networks to follow events in Gaza and south Lebanon.	但是，这个防御态势由于泛阿拉伯世界的感觉而注定是不稳定的。 今天，普通的沙特公民粘在半岛电视台和其他阿拉伯与卫星电视网络上来跟踪加沙地带和南黎巴嫩的局势。


They see Arab (not Shiite) blood being shed, with only Hezbollah fighting back.	他们看到的是阿拉伯人（而不是什叶派）的鲜血流淌，而只有真主党在反击。


In their eyes, Hezbollah has become a heroic model of resistance.	在他们的眼中，真主党已经成为抵抗运动的英雄楷模。


This is causing the Saudi state to deepen the Sunni-Shia schism.	这就促使沙特加深逊尼派和什叶派之间的分裂。


Following the Kingdom’s official denunciation of Hezbollah, the Saudi state called on its official Wahhabi clerics to issue fatwas condemning Hezbollah as Shiite deviants and heretics.	在王国正式谴责真主党之后，沙特国家呼吁其官方瓦哈比教士们发布伊斯兰法令，谴责真主党是什叶派离经叛道之徒和异教徒。


Such condemnations can only sharpen sectarian divisions within Saudi Arabia and the region.	这样的谴责只能加剧沙特和该地区内部之间的派别分歧。


As these antagonisms deepen, will the Sunni regimes come to believe that they need their own Hezbollah to fight in their corner?	在这些敌意加深之际，逊尼派政权是否会相信他们需要自己的真主党来在他们自己的地方战斗呢？


If that is what they conclude, they need not look far, for many such fighters have already have been trained – by Al Qaeda.	如果这就是他们的结论，那么他们就不必四处寻找，因为基地组织已经训练好这样的战士了。


Lives versus Profits	生命与利润之争


NEW YORK – The United States Supreme Court recently began deliberations in a case that highlights a deeply problematic issue concerning intellectual-property rights.	发自纽约——美国最高法院最近开始审议一起案件——该案件突显出了由知识产权所引发的深层次问题。


The Court must answer the following question: Can human genes – your genes – be patented?	最高法院必须回答下面这个问题：人类基因——也就是你我的基因——能被别人申请专利吗？


Put another way, should someone essentially be permitted to own the right, say, to test whether you have a set of genes that imply a higher than 50% probability of developing breast cancer?	换句话说，法律是否应该允许某人持有某种专利，类似检测他人体内是否拥有一组显示其有高于50%的概率罹患乳腺癌的基因。


To those outside the arcane world of intellectual-property rights, the answer seems obvious: No.	对那些知识产权的门外汉来说，答案是很显然的：不可以。


You own your genes.	你拥有自己的基因。


A company might own, at most, the intellectual property underlying its genetic test; and, because the research and development needed to develop the test may have cost a considerable amount, the firm might rightly charge for administering it.	一个公司也许最多能拥有以基因测试为基础的知识产权； 而且因为用来发展该测试的研发工作可能花费巨大，公司可以适当地对测试收费。


But a Utah-based company, Myriad Genetics, claims more than that.	但美国犹他州的麦利亚德基因公司（Myriad Genetics）主张公司应该拥有更多的权利。


It claims to own the rights to any test for the presence of the two critical genes associated with breast cancer – and has ruthlessly enforced that right, though their test is inferior to one that Yale University was willing to provide at much lower cost.	它声称拥有所有检测与乳腺癌相关的两个关键基因是否存在的专利，并且开始无情地强制执行这种权利，尽管其测试效果还不如耶鲁大学愿意提供的另一套成本更低的测试。


The consequences have been tragic: Thorough, affordable testing that identifies high-risk patients saves lives.	其后果是悲剧性的：对高危病人进行彻底且负担得起的测试可以挽救生命。


Blocking such testing costs lives.	反之对这种测试的限制则是以生命为代价的。


Myriad is a true example of an American corporation for which profit trumps all other values, including the value of human life itself.	麦利亚德是典型的将利润置于其它所有价值观——包括人的生命——之上的美国公司。


This a particularly poignant case.	这是一个尤其尖锐的案件。


Normally, economists talk about trade-offs: weaker intellectual-property rights, it is argued, would undermine incentives to innovate.	通常，经济学家们会谈论权衡：他们认为较弱势的知识产权保障会减弱对创新的激励。


The irony here is that Myriad’s discovery would have been made in any case, owing to a publicly funded, international effort to decode the entire human genome that was a singular achievement of modern science.	然而讽刺地是，就算麦利亚德公司没有研究出这种测试来，由于公共资助的对整个人类基因组解码的国际性努力——这是现代科学的非凡成就，人们迟早都会有所发现。


The social benefits of Myriad’s slightly earlier discovery have been dwarfed by the costs that its callous pursuit of profit has imposed.	而麦利亚德公司只不过是把这个发现稍微提早了一点，却因其无情追求经济利润所的行为削弱了这两个基因的社会效益。


More broadly, there is increasing recognition that the patent system, as currently designed, not only imposes untold social costs, but also fails to maximize innovation – as Myriad’s gene patents demonstrate.	更宏观地说，人们越来越意识到专利体系——就其目前的设计，不仅产生了数不清的社会成本，还不能使创新最大化——就像麦利亚德公司的基因专利案所显示的一样。


After all, Myriad did not invent the technologies used to analyze the genes.	毕竟麦利亚德并没有发明用来分析基因的技术。


If these technologies had been patented, Myriad might not have made its discoveries.	如果那些用来分析基因的技术都被申请了专利，那么麦利亚德公司或许就不可能有其发现了。


And its tight control of the use of its patents has inhibited the development by others of better and more accurate tests for the presence of the gene.	而它对别人使用其专利的严格控制已经阻碍了人们去研究一些更好更准确地测试这些基因存在的方法。


The point is a simple one: All research is based on prior research.	我的观点很简单：所有的研究都是基于以前的相关研究成果。


A poorly designed patent system – like the one we have now – can inhibit follow-on research.	设计糟糕的专利体系——像目前这个一样——会阻碍后续研究。


That is why we do not allow patents for basic insights in mathematics.	这就是为什么我们不允许数学上的基本见解有专利。


And it is why research shows that patenting genes actually reduces the production of new knowledge about genes: the most important input in the production of new knowledge is prior knowledge, to which patents inhibit access.	这也是为什么研究表明基因研究专利化实际上会减少关于基因的新知识产出：产出新知识最重要的投入就是之前的研究成果，而这些研究成果却因专利保护而被限制使用了。


Fortunately, what motivates most significant advances in knowledge is not profit, but the pursuit of knowledge itself.	所幸激励那些最重大知识进步的并不是利润，而对知识的追求本身。


This has been true of all of the transformative discoveries and innovations – DNA, transistors, lasers, the Internet, and so on.	在革命性的发现和创新上——比如DNA、晶体管、激光、因特网等等——都是如此。


A separate US legal case has underscored one of the main dangers of patent-driven monopoly power: corruption.	一起美国法律案件曾经突显出专利驱动的垄断权力会引发的其中一种严重风险：腐败。


With prices far in excess of the cost of production, there are, for example, huge profits to be gained by persuading pharmacies, hospitals, or doctors to shift sales to your products.	由于申请了专利的产品价格远远高于其生产成本，因此例如在医药行业，通过说服药房、医院或医生转而推销你的产品就可以获得巨大的利润。


The US Attorney for the Southern District of New York recently accused the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis of doing exactly this by providing illegal kickbacks, honoraria, and other benefits to doctors – exactly what it promised not to do when it settled a similar case three years earlier.	纽约南区的联邦检察官最近指控瑞士制药巨头诺华（Novartis)通过向医生提供非法回扣、酬金和其他好处进行贿赂——三年前当该公司解决一个类似的案子时就已经承诺过不会这么做。


Indeed, Public Citizen, a US consumer advocacy group, has calculated that, in the US alone, the pharmaceutical industry has paid out billions of dollars as a result of court judgments and financial settlements between pharmaceutical manufacturers and federal and state governments.	确实，美国消费者权益保护组织“公共公民”就计算过，仅仅是在美国，医药行业就为药品制造商和联邦及州政府之间的法庭判决和经济调解支付了数十亿美元。


Sadly, the US and other advanced countries have been pressing for stronger intellectual-property regimes around the world.	悲哀地是，美国和其它发达国家一直以来都在全世界范围内推动更强势的知识产权管制。


Such regimes would limit poor countries’ access to the knowledge that they need for their development – and would deny life-saving generic drugs to the hundreds of millions of people who cannot afford the drug companies’ monopoly prices.	这种制度会限制贫穷国家得到那些发展所需的知识——并且会让数以亿计支付不起药物公司垄断价格的人们无法得到用来救命的非专利药物。


The issue is coming to a head in ongoing World Trade Organization negotiations.	这一事务在世界贸易组织（WTO）正在进行的谈判中得到处理的时机已经成熟。


The WTO’s intellectual-property agreement, called TRIPS, originally foresaw the extension of “flexibilities” to the 48 least-developed countries, where average annual per capita income is below $800.	WTO的知识产权协议叫做TRIPS，最初向48个最不发达的国家——这些国家年人均收入在800美元以下——赋予“灵活性”。


The original agreement seems remarkably clear: the WTO shall extend these “flexibilities” upon the request of the least-developed countries.	原始协议看似非常清晰：WTO应该在收到这些最不发达国家的请求之后授予这类“灵活性”。


While these countries have now made such a request, the US and Europe appear hesitant to oblige.	然而现在当这些最不发达国家做出这个请求时，美国和欧洲却犹豫了。


Intellectual-property rights are rules that we create – and that are supposedto improve social well-being.	知识产权是我们创建的规则——而且原本是用来提高社会福祉的。


But unbalanced intellectual-property regimes result in inefficiencies – including monopoly profits and a failure to maximize the use of knowledge – that impede the pace of innovation.	但不平衡的知识产权制度导致了它的无效——这包括垄断利润及不能使知识利用最大化——这就妨碍了创新的速度。


And, as the Myriad case shows, they can even result in unnecessary loss of life.	而且正如麦利亚德案例所示，这些知识产权规则也会导致不必要的生命损失。


America’s intellectual-property regime – and the regime that the US has helped to foist upon the rest of the world through the TRIPS agreement – is unbalanced.	美国的知识产权制度——也是美国借助TRIPS协议强加到世界其它地方的制度——是不平衡的。


We should all hope that, with its decision in the Myriad case, the Supreme Court will contribute to the creation of a more sensible and humane framework.	我们都应该希望美国最高法院通过对麦利亚德案例的判决，会对创造一个更明智和更人道的制度有所贡献。


The Mystery of the Karmapa Lama	噶玛巴背后的谜团


NEW DELHI – The seizure by police of large sums of Chinese currency from the Indian monastery of the Karmapa Lama – one of the most-important figures in Tibetan Buddhism – has revived old suspicions about his continuing links with China and forced him to deny that he is an “agent of Beijing.”	发自新德里——在印度警方于噶玛巴（藏传佛教核心人物之一）驻扎的寺院中搜出巨额人民币现钞后，对他与北京当局之间关系的怀疑又再度升温，迫使他发表声明否认自己的“北京特工”身份。


The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and the Karmapa Lama are the three highest figures in Tibetan Buddhism, representing parallel institutions that have intermittently been at odds with each other throughout their history.	达赖喇嘛，班禅喇嘛和噶玛巴是藏传佛教最重要的三个人物，三者职能相对平行，但历史上也时有摩擦。


And China, seeking to tighten its grip on Tibet, has worked to control the traditional process of finding the reincarnation of any senior lama that passes away.	而希望进一步巩固西藏统治的中国则不遗余力地操纵所有高级喇嘛圆寂后寻找转世灵童的传统程序。


Thus, in 1992, China helped select the seven-year-old Ogyen Trinley Dorje as the 17th Karmapa Lama, installing him at Tibet’s Tsurphu monastery – the Karmapas’ ancestral abode, which was almost destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.	于是在1992年，7岁的邬金钦列多杰在中国的帮助下成为17世噶玛巴，于楚布寺（历代噶玛巴的住所，在文化大革命中几乎全毁）升殿。


He became the first reincarnated “living Buddha” to be recognized and ratified by Communist China.	他也成为首个得到中共批准认定的转世“活佛”。


But then, in 1999, Dorje staged a stunning escape to India via Nepal, attracting the world’s attention, but also deep suspicion because of the apparent ease with which he and his entourage managed to flee.	但在不久之后的1999年，多杰经尼泊尔出走印度，而此举既吸引了世界的目光，也引发了深刻的质疑，因为他本人及随从的逃亡过程显然过于轻易了。


The Dalai Lama has hosted him at the Gyuto monastery in Dharamsala, India, ever since.	而达赖喇嘛将他安排在印度达兰沙拉的上密院并驻扎至今。


Earlier, in 1995, China installed its own Panchen Lama after its security services abducted the Tibetans’ six-year-old appointee, who has simply disappeared, along with his family.	在更早之前的1995年，中国国家安全机关在劫持了藏人选定的6岁班禅喇嘛继任人及其全家之后拥立了自己的班禅喇嘛。


Now, China is waiting for the current Dalai Lama – who is over 75 and has had bouts of ill health in recent years – to pass away, so that it can anoint his successor, too.	如今，中国正坐等现年已75岁并疾病缠身的达赖喇嘛圆寂，以便选定其继任人。


But the Dalai Lama, the charismatic face of the Tibetan movement, has made it clear that his successor will come from the “free world,” thereby excluding Chinese-ruled Tibet.	但达赖喇嘛这个西藏运动的标志性人物已经明确表示他的继任者将来自“自由世界”而非中国统治下的西藏。


This has set the stage for the emergence of two rival Dalai Lamas, one chosen by China and the other by the Tibetan exile movement.	这意味着可能出现两个对立的达赖喇嘛，分属于中国和西藏流亡政府。


In fact, the Chinese-appointed Karmapa Lama has a doppelgänger Karmapa, who has set up shop in New Delhi.	事实上，这个“噶玛巴”不仅有中国政府指派的多杰，还有另外一个目前驻扎在新德里的分身。


With both the Karmapas in India, the Indian government has sought to maintain peace by barring the contenders from the sacred Rumtek monastery in the Indian Himalayan state of Sikkim.	在印度同时存在两个噶玛巴的情况下，印度政府出于维持平和局面的考虑，也阻止这两位竞争者前往位于印度喜马拉雅山脚锡金邦的圣地隆德寺。


Against this background, the discovery of 1.1 million renminbi and large sums of other foreign currency has ignited a fresh controversy over Dorje.	在此背景下，警方搜获的110万元人民币以及其他各国货币就为多杰引来了新的质疑之声。


While his supporters have staged protests against the police raid and interrogation of their leader, Indian officials have expressed apprehension that China may be funding Ogyen Trinley Dorje as part of a plan to influence the Karmapa’s Kagyu sect, which controls important monasteries along the militarized Indo-Tibetan border.	当他的支持者发动示威抗议警方对多杰的搜查和审问之时，印度官员则担心中国正在幕后资助多杰以便增加对藏传佛教噶玛噶举派的影响力，须知该教派控制着军事对峙中的印藏边境的众多重要寺院。


According to Xu Zhitao, an official at the Chinese Communist Party central committee’s United Front Work Department, the allegation that “the Karmapa [may be] a Chinese agent or spy shows that India is keeping its mistrustful attitude toward China.”	根据中共中央统战部官员徐志涛所说，所谓“噶玛巴（可能）是中国特工或间谍的指控反映出印方对中方一贯持有的不信任态度。


But such an attitude seems warranted: Xu’s Tibet division is tasked with overseeing monastic institutions, inculcating “patriotic” norms among monks and nuns – through reeducation when necessary – and infiltrating the Tibetan resistance movement and Tibetan Buddhist monasteries on both sides of the Indo-Tibetan frontier.	”但这样的态度似乎也是不无根据的：徐志涛所在的部门是负责监管宗教机构，包括宗教人士的“爱国”行为准则——有必要时可以进行再教育——以及对西藏反抗运动以及印藏边界两侧藏传佛教寺院的渗透工作。


Communities in the Himalayan region have historically been closely integrated.	分布于喜马拉雅地区的大小社区在历史上一直是紧密连结在一起的。


But, with Tibet locked behind an iron curtain since the 1951 Chinese annexation, the economies and cultures of the entire Himalayan region have weakened.	但随着西藏在1951年遭中国吞并和封锁之后，整个喜马拉雅地区的经济和文化都遭到了削弱。


Tibetan Buddhism, however, still serves as the common link, with the Karmapa’s Kagyu sect a powerful force on the Indian side.	但藏传佛教依然是彼此之间共同的纽带，而藏传佛教噶玛噶举派则是印度一侧的重要力量。


The cash haul has reopened the question that arose in 1999: Was China behind Dorje’s flight to India, or is he a genuine defector who simply got fed up with living in a gilded Chinese cage?	警方搜到的现金也重新凸显了那个在1999年提出的问题：中国是否是多杰逃亡印度的幕后主使，或者他仅仅是个不愿被禁锢在中国镀金监狱里的真正逃亡者？


China had several possible motives for staging his “escape,” including a desire to strengthen his claim to the title at a time when the rival contender (backed by important interests in India, Bhutan, and Taiwan) appeared to be gaining ground.	中国有数种可能的动机去策划多杰的“出走”，包括加强他对“噶玛巴”称号的合法性，因为当时另一个竞争者（得到了印度，不丹和台湾方面的扶持）的影响力不断增强。


Had Dorje remained in Tibet, he could have lost out to his rival, because the 280-year-old Rumtek monastery, the Kagyu school’s holiest institution, is where the sect’s all-powerful “black hat,” the symbolic crown of the Karmapa – believed to be woven from the hair of female deities – is located.	倘若当年多杰不出走的话，迎接他的可能就是失败的苦果，因为具有280年历史的德隆寺——噶举派的最高圣地，该教派全能的“黑帽”（玛噶巴的象征性法冠，���传是由女神的头发编成）的所在地——就是在印度锡金邦境内。


China would also have drawn comfort from the fact that, within the murky world of intra-Tibetan politics, its anointed Karmapa, oddly, had the Dalai Lama’s backing.	而中国可能也感到满意的是，在尔虞我诈的西藏政治中，中方所指派的噶玛巴竟然奇怪地得到了达赖喇嘛的支持。


Historically, the Dalai Lamas and Karmapa Lamas vied with each other for influence until the Dalai Lama’s Gelug school gained ascendancy over the Kagyu order.	历史上达赖喇嘛和噶玛巴各自利用其影响力斗得不可开交，直到达赖喇嘛的格鲁派压倒了噶举派后才告一段落。


According to Tibetan tradition, however, the Dalai Lama has no role in selecting or endorsing a Karmapa.	然而依照西藏传统，达赖喇嘛无权挑选或者批准噶玛巴。


The Dalai Lama in this case gave his approval for purely political reasons.	因此在这方面达赖喇嘛纯粹是出于政治考虑做的决定。


The previous Karmapa Lama died in 1981, and the controversy over his successor that has raged ever since also epitomizes a struggle for control of the $1.5 billion in assets held by the Kagyu order, the richest in Tibetan Buddhism.	前一任噶玛巴于1981年圆寂，对于其继任者的争议自那以后就一直持续，同时也反映出各方对噶举派——藏传佛教中最富有的教派——15亿美元资产的争夺。


With control of the Rumtek monastery embroiled in rival lawsuits, the New Delhi-based Karmapa has, not surprisingly, greeted the recent cash seizure as “exposing” his Chinese-appointed rival.	随着对德隆寺的控制卷入了敌对的法律诉讼中，驻扎于新德里的噶玛巴无疑会认为最近缴获的现金彻底“揭露”了他那由中国选定的对手。


Significantly, in contrast to its increasingly vituperative attacks on the Dalai Lama, China has not denounced (or derecognized) its Karmapa, although his flight to India signaled its failure to retain the loyalty of a supposed puppet.	更值得注意的是，对达赖喇嘛百般攻击的中国政府却没有废除（或取消认可）其指派的噶玛巴，虽然多杰出走印度的行为显示出中国已无法维持一个傀儡的忠诚。


The Mandarin-speaking Ogyen Trinley Dorje, now 25, occasionally criticizes the Chinese government, including for its efforts “to create this ethnic conflict” in Tibet.	说汉语的多杰如今已经25岁，偶尔也会批评中国政府，包括说它在西藏“挑起宗教冲突”。


Nevertheless, China has refrained from attacking him, making clear that it wants him to return eventually.	尽管如此，中国却甚少反唇相讥，这明确表明中国政府是希望他能最终回归的。


And the ongoing Karmapa saga, with its shadowy politics and intrigue, could turn out to be only the opening act – a foretaste of what may come when two dueling Dalai Lamas emerge after the incumbent passes from the scene.	而这个不断发展中的噶玛巴传奇正与暗中的政治和阴谋交织在一起，成为一场大戏的开场白——预示着当现任达赖喇嘛圆寂后同时出现两位继任者时究竟会出现何种景象。


The Myth of Chinese Meritocracy	中国的精英政治神话


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Political scandals sometimes perform a valuable function in cleansing governments.	发自加利福尼亚州克莱蒙特——政治丑闻有时能起到涤荡政府的宝贵作用。


They destroy the political careers of individuals of dubious character.	这些事件能毁掉那些人品可疑者的政治生涯。


More importantly, they can debunk political myths central to the legitimacy of some regimes.	更重要的是，它们还能揭穿那些构建了某些政权合法性的政治神话。


That appears to be the case with the Bo Xilai affair in China.	上述说法似乎也适用于中国近期发生的薄熙来事件。


One enduring political myth that went down with Bo, the former Communist Party boss of Chongqing municipality, is the notion that the Party’s rule is based on meritocracy.	而与这位前重庆市市委书记一同陨落的则是一个经久不衰的政治神话，认为中国共产党的统治是构建于精英政治之上的。


In many ways, Bo personified the Chinese concept of “meritocracy” – well-educated, intelligent, sophisticated, and charming (mainly to Western executives).	薄熙来在许多方面都符合中国人对“政治精英”的定义——受过良好教育，聪明睿智，行事老练，而且富有个人魅力（主要在西方政商界人士看来）。


But, after his fall, a very different picture emerged.	但在他倒台后呈现的却是一幅截然不同的图景。


Aside from his alleged involvement in assorted crimes, Bo was said to be a ruthless apparatchik, endowed with an outsize ego but no real talent.	除了牵涉其中的各项罪名以外，据说薄熙来还是个冷酷无情，志大才疏的共产党官僚。


His record as a local administrator was mediocre.	作为一个地方官来说他的政绩平平无奇。


Bo’s rise to power owed much to his pedigree (his father was a vice premier), his political patrons, and his manipulation of the rules of the game.	薄熙来的得势在很大程度上来自其家世（其父薄一波曾任副总理），其政治赞助者还有他对游戏规则的操纵。


For example, visitors to Chongqing marvel at the soaring skyscrapers and modern infrastructure built during Bo’s tenure there. But do they know that Bo’s administration borrowed the equivalent of more than 50% of local GDP to finance the construction binge, and that a large portion of the debt will go unpaid?	比如说到重庆参观的人都惊叹于薄熙来执政期间如雨后春笋般拔地而起的高楼大厦和现代化基础设施，不知道的却是该政府其实是依赖借贷来资助这场建设狂潮，其总额相当于该市GDP总额的50%有余，而且其中大部分都将无法偿还。


Unfortunately, Bo’s case is not the exception in China, but the rule.	不幸的是，薄熙来事件在中国可不是孤例。


Contrary to the prevailing perception in the West (especially among business leaders), the current Chinese government is riddled with clever apparatchiks like Bo who have acquired their positions through cheating, corruption, patronage, and manipulation.	与当前流行于西方（尤其是商界领袖之间）的观念恰恰相反，当前的中国政府中充斥着像薄熙来这样机灵的官僚，而他们之所以能占据这些位置，就是通过撒谎，腐败，送礼以及捏造事实。


One of the most obvious signs of systemic cheating is that many Chinese officials use fake or dubiously acquired academic credentials to burnish their resumes.	而其中一个最明显的系统性欺骗行为，就是许多中国官员都利用假冒或者循不正常途径取得的学历文凭来粉饰自己的简历。


Because educational attainment is considered a measure of merit, officials scramble to obtain advanced degrees in order to gain an advantage in the competition for power.	由于教育成就被认为是一项加分条件，因此官员们都争相获取更高学位以便在未来的权力斗争中占得先机。


The overwhelming majority of these officials end up receiving doctorates (a master’s degree won’t do anymore in this political arms race) granted through part-time programs or in the Communist Party’s training schools.	其中大部分官员最终都通过业余学习或者党校拿到了博士学位（硕士学位在这场政治军备竞赛中已经起不到任何作用了）。


Of the 250 members of provincial Communist Party standing committees, an elite group including party chiefs and governors, 60 claim to have earned PhDs.	在拥有250名成员的中国共产党中央委员会（这是一个包含中共首脑和地方省市大员的精英团体）中，有60人声称自己拥有博士学位。


Tellingly, only ten of them completed their doctoral studies before becoming government officials.	没错，只有其中10人是在成为官员前获得博士学位的。


The rest received their doctorates (mostly in economics, management, law, and industrial engineering) through part-time programs while performing their duties as busy government officials.	其他人则是通过在繁重的政府本职工作之余参加业余学习获得的学位（大部分都是经济，管理，法律和工业工程类）。


One managed to complete his degree in a mere 21 months, an improbable feat, given that course work alone, without the dissertation, normally requires at least two years in most countries’ doctoral programs.	其中一位仅仅用了21个月就拿到了学位，这简直是一个不太可能实现的成就，因为在大多数国家的博士项目中，不算学位论文，单就课程来说就得花费两年。


If so many senior Chinese officials openly flaunt fraudulent or dubious academic degrees without consequences, one can imagine how widespread other forms of corruption must be.	如果那么多的中国高级官员都能公然捞取可疑的文凭且无需承担任何后果，可想而知其他形式的腐败该有多么广泛。


Another common measure used to judge a Chinese official’s “merit” is his ability to deliver economic growth.	另一个用来判断一名中国官员所具备的“长处”的评估手段就是此人推动经济增长的能力。


On the surface, this may appear to be an objective yardstick.	表面上看，这似乎是一个客观的尺度。


In reality, GDP growth is as malleable as an official’s academic credentials.	但在现实中，GDP增长就跟官员的学历一样可供捏造。


Inflating local growth numbers is so endemic that reported provincial GDP growth data, when added up, are always higher than the national growth data, a mathematical impossibility.	夸大本地经济增长数字的做法是如此流行，以致把这些数字加起来往往会高于国家总体增长数字——这在数学上显然是行不通的。


And, even when they do not doctor the numbers, local officials can game the system in another way.	而即便他们没有对数字做手脚，地方官员也可以用另一种方式来钻系统的空子。


Because of their relatively short tenure in one position before promotion (less than three years, on average, for local mayors), Chinese officials are under enormous pressure to demonstrate their ability to produce economic results quickly.	由于在升迁之前只会在当地执政一段相对较短的时间（各城市市长平均不超过3年），中国官员承受着极大的压力，必须在短时间内展现出自己取得经济成效的能力。


One sure way of doing so is to use financial leverage, typically by selling land or using land as collateral to borrow large sums of money from often-obliging state-owned banks, to finance massive infrastructure projects, as Bo did in Chongqing.	对此一个屡试不爽的手段就是利用金融杠杆，一般通过出售土地或者以土地作为抵押品来从“乐善好施”的国有银行处搞到大笔贷款，以此资助大规模基础设施项目，正如薄熙来在重庆的所作所为。


The result is promotion for such officials, because they have delivered quick GDP growth.	这些官员因此获得了升职，因为他们实现了迅速的GDP增长。


But the economic and social costs are very high.	但因此产生的经济和社会成本都非常高昂。


Local governments are saddled with a mountain of debt and wasted investments, banks accumulate risky loans, and farmers lose their land.	各地方政府都背负着堆积如山的债务和无效投资，银行里坏账不断增加，而农民们则失去了土地。


Worse, as competition for promotion within the Chinese bureaucracy has escalated, even fake academic credentials and GDP growth records have become insufficient to advance one’s career.	更糟糕的是，随着中国官僚系统中向上爬的斗争逐渐升级，连假冒文凭和GDP增长记录都不足以让他们更进一步。


What increasingly determines an official’s prospects for promotion is his guanxi, or connections.	而一个官员的升迁前景则日渐取决于他所拥有的关系。


Based on surveys of local officials, patronage, not merit, has become the most critical factor in the appointment process.	根据对地方官员的调查，送礼（而不是积累优点）已经成为官员委任过程中的最关键因素。


For those without guanxi, the only recourse is to purchase appointments and promotions through bribes.	对那么没有关系的人来说，唯一的办法就是通过贿赂来获得委任或者是升迁。


In the Chinese parlance, the practice is called maiguan, literally “buying office.”	在中国俗语中这种做法被称为“买官”。


The official Chinese press is full of corruption scandals of this type.	而官方媒体中则充斥着这类腐败丑闻。


Given such systemic debasement of merit, few Chinese citizens believe that they are governed by the best and the brightest.	鉴于这种系统性的败坏，只有很少中国人相信自己的治理者们是最优秀和最聪明的。


But astonishingly, the myth of a Chinese meritocracy remains very much alive among Westerners who have encountered impressively credentialed officials like Bo.	但令人震惊的是这个中国精英政治神话却在西方人中广为流传——因为他们碰到的多是薄熙来这样仿佛拥有众多优点，令人过目难忘的中国官员。


The time has come to bury it.	而如今也是时候埋葬这一神话了。


The Myth of Decoupling	脱藕之谜


PALO ALTO, CALIF. -- The fact that America’s economy is slowing is bad news for Europeans, regardless of claims that Europe’s economy has successfully decoupled itself from the United States.	帕罗奥多，加利福尼亚——美国经济疲软对于欧洲人来说无论如何都是一个坏消息，不管人们如何声称欧洲经济已经成功地与美国脱藕了。


Decoupling is an idea that is based on bad economics – and on some Europeans’ reluctance to accept the fact that Europe’s short but sweet economic expansion is also coming to an end.	脱藕一说是建立在经济状况变坏以及某些欧洲人不愿意接受欧洲短暂但却甜蜜的经济扩张同样也在走向尽头的基础上的。


True, the US market has become less important for European exports, while Asia’s trade significance for Europe has grown.	是的，美国市场对于欧洲的出口已经不再那么重要了，而与亚洲的贸易对于欧洲来说正变得越来越重要。


So what?	那又怎样呢？


Trade is just one among the many linkages between the US and European economies that matter.	贸易只是美国与欧洲经济众多重要联系中的一个方面而已。


In today’s inter-connected global economy, uncertainty about the US economic outlook increases one day, and Dutch consumer confidence, for example, takes a tumble the next.	在今天大家越来越相互依赖的全球经济中，某一天如果对美国经济前景产生不确定，那么，比如说，荷兰的消费者信心在第二天就会下滑。


The links between Europe and America are, frankly, much more complex than the advocates of decoupling appreciate.	欧洲与美国之间的联系显然比那些鼓吹脱藕的人想象的要复杂得多。


The US Federal Reserve, for example, is aggressively cutting interest rates to forestall a possible recession.	比如说，美联储正在越来越频繁地降低利率以预先阻止可能的衰退的发生。


As a consequence, the euro is rising not only against the US dollar, but also against Asian currencies, whose central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets to fix their currencies’ value against the dollar.	其结果是，不但是欧元对美元的汇率正变得越来越高，同时欧元对亚洲国家货币的汇率也在提高，那些国家的央行对外汇市场进行干预以便使它们的货币对美元的比率固定在一定的水平。


This damages European exports to both the US and Asia.	这损害了欧洲对美国以及亚洲的出口。


Reduced European dependence on the US export market can hardly protect Europe from the effects of the US economic slowdown if the euro appreciates as much against the key Asian currencies as it has against the dollar.	欧洲对美国出口市场依赖的减少并不意味着欧洲就不会受美国经济疲软的影响，如果欧元在对美元增值的同时对主要亚洲货币也同样增值的话。


The decoupling argument also assumes that recession in America has no effect on Asia.	脱藕论同时认为美国经济的衰退对亚洲没有影响。


This is nonsense.	这完全是无稽之谈。


Asian income certainly will decline if Asians export less to the US – and this, in turn, will reduce Asian imports from Europe.	如果亚洲对美国出口减少的话，那么亚洲的经济收入肯定会下降，而这反过来又会减少亚洲从欧洲的进口。


Thus, the US slowdown affects European exports in two ways.	因此，美国经济的疲软会在两个方面影响欧洲的出口。


It has an indirect effect on European exports to Asia, which can be sizeable because the US market is so important for Asian exports.	它对欧洲对亚洲的出口产生间接影响，鉴于美国市场对亚洲的出口是如此重要，这样的影响会很强烈。


And it has a direct impact on European exports to the US.	同时它也会对欧洲对美国的出口产生直接影响。


Even in the case where the direct effect is small – the decoupling assumption – the US slowdown still can have a substantial net impact on European exports because of its indirect effect on Asian imports from Europe.	即便直接影响会很小，就像脱藕论者所主张的那样，美国经济的疲软依然会因为它对亚洲向欧洲进口的间接影响而对欧洲的出口产生实质性的净影响。


So Europeans should not be tempted to think that they are somehow “decoupled” from America’s foibles and woes.	所以欧洲不应该去想他们已经在某种程度上与美国经济的问题和灾难“脱藕”了。


Until recently, many Europeans thought they were insulated from the current US housing and mortgage crisis.	直到最近，许多欧洲人还以为他们与目前美国发生的房地产和抵押危机没有关系。


But in what has been a truly malignant “export” from America to Europe, the US created “garbage debt” in the form of sub-prime mortgages, and Europeans – hungry for extra yield, and as reckless as Americans – bought it.	但是在一种美国向欧洲真正恶性的“出口”中，以次级抵押形式出现的美国制造的“垃圾债”，贪婪地追逐额外的利润、并且像美国人一样鲁莽的欧洲人购买了这些垃圾债。


Many European banks’ balance sheets are now as contaminated as those of American banks, and no one is sure who is holding – or hiding – the junk, and how to value it.	许多欧洲银行的资产负债表上现在像那些美国银行一样都出现了这样的垃圾债，并且没有人知道是谁在持有或者说在隐瞒持有这堆垃圾，以及如何估算它的价值。


This is why European banks are now reluctant to lend to each other. They could be lending to an institution that is in serious financial trouble.	这正是为什么欧洲的银行现在不太愿意互相进行拆借的原因，因为它们可能会把钱借给一家正陷入严重财政困难的机构。


It is hard to imagine that higher interest rates and reduced credit availability will not lead to distress for Europe’s overall economy.	很难想象越来越高的利率以及信用可获得性的减少不会给欧洲整体的经济带来危机。


Yet this is exactly the stance of the European Central Bank, which is treating the euro zone as if its financial sector was somehow decoupled from the rest of the economy – and running a different monetary policy for each sector at the same time.	但是这正是欧洲央行的立场，它的做法好像是把欧元区的金融业当成在某种程度上是与经济的其他行业脱藕的，并且在同一时间对各个行业实施不同的货币政策。


By pumping in whatever liquidity the financial sector needs to alleviate the credit crunch, the ECB is effectively maintaining a deflationary bias for the financial sector, whereas it has announced an inflationary bias for the rest of the economy.	不管向金融业注入何种流动性都需要缓解信贷紧缩的状况，欧洲央行正有效地在金融业维持通货紧缩的偏向，却宣布要在经济的其他方面维持通货膨胀的偏向。


A monetary policy at war with itself cannot long endure.	一项相互对立的货币政策是无法被长久维持的。


The ECB’s inflationary bias will most likely be dropped, as the effect of the financial crisis and the US slowdown sends Europe’s economy into a spin that even the ever-optimistic ECB will be unable to deny.	欧洲央行对通货膨胀的偏向很有可能会被放弃，因为金融危机和美国经济疲软的影响会让欧洲经济急剧下降，对于这一点甚至连一贯持乐观态度的欧洲央行也无法否认。


That outcome should moderate Europe’s inflation concerns.	这种结果可以缓和欧洲对通货膨胀的担心。