Seeking to boost economic growth, the authorities may soon destroy their one great advantage: the low rate of interest on government debt and private borrowing.	为了提振经济增长，当局可能会破坏其一大优势：国债和私人借贷的低利率。


If that happens, Japanese conditions will most likely be worse at the end of Abe’s term than they are today.	果真如此的话，在安倍晋三任期结束时，日本所面临的条件极有可能会比现在更加糟糕。


The interest rate on Japan’s ten-year government bonds is now less than 1% – the lowest in the world, despite a very high level of government debt and annual budget deficits.	10年期日本国债利率现在还不到1%，为世界最低，尽管日本国债水平和预算赤字水平极高。


Indeed, Japan’s debt is now roughly 230% of GDP, higher than that of Greece (175% of GDP) and nearly twice that of Italy (125% of GDP).	事实上，如今日本债务量大约在GDP的230%，比希腊（175%）更高，几乎是意大利（125%）的两倍。


The annual budget deficit is nearly 10% of GDP, higher than any of the eurozone countries.	年度预算赤字接近GDP的10%，比任何欧元区国家都高。


With nominal GDP stagnating, that deficit is causing the debt/GDP ratio to rise by 10% annually.	在名义GDP停滞不前的情况下，如此赤字造成债务/GDP比率每年升高10%。


Japan’s government is able to pay such a low rate of interest because domestic prices have been falling for more than a decade, while the yen has been strengthening against other major currencies.	日本政府之所以能够获得如此低的利率，是因为十多年来国内物价一直在下降，而日元则对其他主要货币升值。


Domestic deflation means that the real interest rate on Japanese bonds is higher than the nominal rate.	国内通缩意味着日本债券的真实利率高于名义利率。


The yen’s rising value raises the yield on Japanese bonds relative to the yield on bonds denominated in other currencies.	日元升值则提高了日本债券相对于其他货币债券的收益率。


That may be about to come to an end.	这一情况马上就要结束了。


Abe has demanded that the Bank of Japan pursue a quantitative-easing strategy that will deliver an inflation rate of 2-3% and weaken the yen.	安倍晋三要求日本银行采取量化宽松政策，让通胀率达到2—3%，让日元贬值。


He will soon appoint a new BOJ governor and two deputy governors, who will, one presumes, be committed to this goal.	他很快就会任命新的日本银行行长和两位副行长，人们预计，这三人将不折不扣地执行这一目标。


The financial markets are taking Abe’s strategy seriously.	金融市场对安倍晋三的战略反应激烈。


The yen’s value against the US dollar has declined by more than 7% in the last month.	上个月，日元对美元汇率猛跌7%。


With the euro rising relative to the dollar, the yen’s fall relative to the euro has been even greater.	而欧元对美元有所升值，故日元相对欧元的贬值更为强烈。


The yen’s weakening will mean higher import costs, and therefore a higher rate of inflation.	日元的贬值将意味着更高的进口成本，从而推高通货膨胀率。


An aggressive BOJ policy of money creation could cause further weakening of the yen’s exchange rate – and a rise in domestic prices that is more rapid than what Abe wants.	日本银行激进的货币创造政策可能造成日元的进一步贬值，从而让国内物价以比安倍晋三所希望的更快的速度上涨。


With Japanese prices rising and the yen falling relative to other currencies, investors will be willing to hold Japanese government bonds (JGBs) only if their nominal yield is significantly higher than it has been in the past.	随着日本物价上涨以及日元相对其他货币贬值，欲让投资者继续愿意持有日本国债，唯有名义收益率较过去大幅提高。


A direct effect of the higher interest rate would be to increase the budget deficit and the rate of growth of government debt.	利率升高的一个直接效应将是扩大预算赤字和国债增长率。


With a debt/GDP ratio of 230%, a four-percentage-point rise in borrowing costs would cause the annual deficit to double, to 20% of GDP.	在债务/GDP比率已经高达230%的情况下，借贷成本上升4个百分点将导致年度赤字翻番，达到GDP的20%。


The government might be tempted to rely on rapid inflation to try to reduce the real value of its debt.	日本政府可能会采取快速通胀的手段降低债务的真实价值。


Fear of that strategy could cause investors to demand even higher real interest rates.	对这一战略的担忧可能造成投资者要求更高的真实利率。


The combination of exploding debt and rising interest rates is a recipe for economic disaster.	债务爆发和利率上升的综合效应将是经济灾难。


The BOJ’s widely respected governor, Masaaki Shirakawa, whose term expires in April, summarized the situation in his usual restrained way, saying that “long-term interest rates may spike and have a negative effect on the economy.”	广受尊敬、将在4月届满卸任的日本银行行长白川方明以其惯有的克制语气总结了这一情况，说“长期利率可能暴增，对经济产生消极影响。 ”


A spike in long-term rates would lower the price of JGBs, destroying household wealth and, in turn, reducing consumer spending.	长期利率的暴增会压低日本国债的价格，摧毁家庭财富，并反过来抑制消费支出。


The higher interest rates would also apply to corporate bonds and bank loans, weakening business investment.	高利率还会对公司债券和银行贷款产生作用，抑制商业投资。


Even without the prospect of faster inflation and a declining yen, fundamental conditions in Japan point to higher interest rates.	即使不存在通胀加速和日元贬值预期，日本的基本条件也表明利率将上升。


The Japanese government has been able to sell its bonds to domestic buyers because of the high rate of domestic saving.	日本政府之所以能够向国内买家出手债券，是因为国内储蓄率很高。


The excess of saving over investment has given Japan a current-account surplus, allowing the country to finance all of the government borrowing domestically, with enough left over to invest in dollar-denominated bonds and other foreign securities.	相对投资的超额储蓄给日本带来了经常项目盈余，使其能够在国内解决政府融资问题，除此之外还有足够的余额投资美元债券和其他外国证券。


But that is coming to an end.	但这一情况马上就要结束了。


The household saving rate has collapsed in recent years, falling to less than 2%.	家庭储蓄率近几年大幅下降，跌至不到2%。


The combination of high corporate saving and low business investment has sustained the current-account surplus, allowing Japan to fund its budget deficit domestically.	高公司储蓄和低商业投资共存的局面维系着日本的经常项目盈余，让日本能够在国内找到预算赤字融资源。


But the surplus has fallen sharply in the past five years, from roughly 6% of GDP in 2007 to only 1% now.	但盈余在过去五年中迅速下降，从2007年的约占GDP的6%降至现在的1%。


With a falling rate of household saving and the prospect of new fiscal deficits, the current account will soon be negative, forcing Japan to sell its debt to foreign buyers.	随着家庭储蓄率的下降和新财政赤字前景，经常项目很快会转为赤字，迫使日本向外国买家兜售债务。


Abe plans to supplement the easy-money strategy with an increase in government spending of some $120 billion, or 2% of GDP.	安倍晋三计划在宽松的货币战略之外辅之以政府增支1 200亿美元（或GDP的2%）。


It is not clear why Abe and his advisers believe that this will deliver sustained real GDP growth of 2% a year.	安倍晋三及其幕僚为何认为这能将真实GDP增长率维持在每年2%不得而知。


Although the $120 billion is presumably just for the current year (if the spending can be made to happen that quickly), he also spoke during his campaign about a ten-year rise in government spending of ¥200 trillion yen, substantially more than the $120 billion annual rate.	尽管1 200亿美元增支只是今年的计划（如果支出可以以如此之快的速度进行的话），但在竞选过程中，他还声称将在10年中让政府增支200万亿日元，即每年的增支幅度都会超过1 200亿日元。


The impact of all of this on the national debt and on Japan’s interest rates could be staggering.	所有这些对国民债务和日本利率的影响都将是巨大的。


Abe is right about one thing: Japan needs to get out of its no-growth and deflationary trap.	安倍晋三有一点是正确的：日本需要摆脱无增长和通缩陷阱。


But the policies that he favors are not the way to do it.	但其所偏好的政策绝非达到这一目标的良策。


Europe’s Next Great Mistake	欧洲的下一个大错


PRINCETON – In constructing Europe’s monetary union, political leaders did not think through all of the implications, which led to major design flaws.	普林斯顿——在当年架构欧洲货币同盟时，欧洲国家的政治领袖们并没有把所有隐含后果一一想透，这就有了后来的几大设计缺陷。


Worse, they do not appear to have learned from that experience, for they are about to take the same approach to the monetary union’s political analogue.	更有甚者，吃一堑却未长一智，如今，他们的后继者正打算用同样的方式打造欧洲政治同盟。


The logic of the financial crisis is driving Europeans toward greater integration, which implies new mechanisms for political expression.	金融危机的逻辑迫使欧洲进一步加深一体化，这意味着，需要为政治表达找到一种新机制。


Well before the crisis, the European Union was widely perceived to be suffering from a “democratic deficit.”	恰恰就在危机之前，欧盟普遍受到“民主不足”的诟病。


Now, with many Europeans blaming the EU for painful austerity measures, that complaint has grown more powerful – and Europe’s political leaders believe that they must act now to address it.	如今，许多欧洲人都因痛苦的财政瘦身而对欧盟破口大骂，上述诟病声浪日高，让欧洲各国首脑们觉得必须马上着手应对。


Unfortunately, Europe confronts another deficit: a lack of political leadership.	屋漏偏逢连夜雨，欧洲其实还有另一个不足：政治领导力的不足。


The charismatic figures of the mid-twentieth century – Churchill, Adenauer, and de Gaulle – have no contemporary counterparts.	20世纪中叶那些半神式的领袖——邱吉尔、阿登纳、戴高乐——如今后继无人。


Citizens associate the EU with, above all, bureaucratic grayness and technocratic rationality.	欧盟让民众联想到的首先是暮气沉沉的官僚作风和技术官员主导的冰冷理性。


European officialdom is now responding to these deficits with an initiative to reform and democratize the European Commission.	对于这个不足，欧洲官场想出来的应对办法是改革欧盟委员会，让其变得更民主。


Current Commission President José Manuel Barroso suggests that ideologically like-minded political parties running in the next European Parliament elections should intensify their cooperation in political “families” that would then jointly nominate candidates for the Commission presidency.	欧盟委员会现任主席巴罗佐（José Manuel Barroso）建议，在下界欧洲议会选举之时，让意识形态立场相近的政党结成更紧密的政治“派别”，联合提名欧盟委员会主席候选人。


Voters would thus play a more direct role in choosing a new European chief executive.	这样一来，选民就可以更直接地选举新一届欧盟行政首脑。


They would feel as if they were appointing a government.	他们会觉得好像在选举一届政府一样。


And politicians would need to beef up their charisma in order to be elected.	而政治家们为了胜选，就有动力去提升自己的感召力。


This approach has been supported by luminaries such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.	这一倡议得到一些名流的支持，例如英国前首相布莱尔（Tony Blair）。


Because it apparently does not imply any real loss of power for national governments, it has achieved a certain acceptance and seems close to being implemented.	这是因为，该方案显然不会给各国政府带来任何实际的权力损失，它已经获得了一些接受度并且似乎易于实施。


But that does not make it a good idea.	但那并不能使其成为一个好主意。


In particular, the perceived need to channel Europe’s existing political families into a two-party system, with social democrats on one side and “people’s parties” on the other, is deeply problematic.	尤其是，要把现有的欧洲政治“派别”装进一个两党制的框子里——泛社会民主党和泛“人民党”——这种做法有大问题。


The two-party parliamentary model emerged in nineteenth-century Great Britain.	议会两党制出现于19世纪的英国。


Electors chose only a representative for the House of Commons, and the majority party then appointed the prime minister.	选民只要在下院两党中二选一，再由多数党指定首相。


The contemporary British comic opera Iolanthe celebrated the fact that “every boy and every gal that’s born into the world alive is either a little Liberal or else a little Conservative.”	当代英国漫画Iolanthe如此表达这种“体制自信”：每个活着生到这个世界上的小子或丫头，不是一个小自由党，就是一个小保守党。


But what if not every little boy and girl is born that way?	”可是，如果并非每个小子或丫头生出来就是那样，又当如何？


In the stable British model, if a political party is too radical, it will lose the political center in the next election.	按照稳定的英国模式，如果哪个党过于极端，在下界选举里它就会被迫离开权力中心。


The parties’ rivalry is healthy, though there is a built-in tendency to seek solutions that command a broad social consensus.	两党对立不是什么坏事，但按惯例，两党通常都有意愿寻求具备广泛社会共识的政策方案。


But such an institutional outcome is not inevitable (and it probably no longer endures even in contemporary Britain).	然而，这种制度后果并不一定会出现（哪怕在当今的英国，它大概也维持不了多久了）。


British lawyers liked to recommend this model to other countries.	英国立法者喜欢向别国推广这一模式。


They were especially persuasive in Britain’s former colonies, notably in newly independent African states.	在前英国殖民地，这种模式别具吸引力，尤其是在新近独立的一些非洲国家。


The results were disastrous.	但推广的结果是灾难性的。


Citizens could not understand why they should be expected to align their political preferences along a simple left-right spectrum.	那里的公民不理解，为什么他们非得把自己的政治偏好装进简单的左右二分法。


Instead, politics was usually recast in terms of old inter-group or inter-ethnic tensions.	实际上，那里的政治往往还是根据昔日的部落、族群矛盾来站队。


The contemporary United States also is not a compelling demonstration that competition between two parties leads to increasing moderation and political centrism.	美国今日的现实也无法令人信服地证明，两党竞争有利于消弭分歧、壮大政治中坚派。


On the contrary, the partisan struggle can play to the parties’ extremes.	恰恰相反，党争有时会让一个党派走极端。


The two-party moderation thesis makes sense only if the main differences concern redistributive preferences in a simple model driven by an almost Marxist kind of economic determinism.	“两党意味节制”这个命题只有在特殊情况下才成立，那就是：主要的政见分歧是对（一种几乎是以马克思主义经济决定论的方式进行的）再分配的喜好程度。


The left-wing party wants to redistribute wealth and incomes more, and the right-wing party less; but both need to restrain themselves, and in appealing to the median voter, they become near-identical alternatives.	左翼党想要多搞点财富和收入再分配，右翼党则想少一点，但双方都必须自我节制，为了吸引中间选民，两党最终变得似异实同。


In a globally inter-connected world, however, a new politics has developed, in which both the left and right fringes fear that outside competition or influences will limit their ability to shape political choices.	然而，在一个全球互联的世界中，已经产生了一种新政治，在这种新政治环境下，不论左右翼都担心，外部竞争或影响将限制其塑造政治选择的能力。


Their main political preference then becomes resistance to those external threats.	它们的主要政治偏好变成了抵抗那些外部威胁。


The old left-right polarity no longer works.	传统的左—右分野已经行不通了。


Artificially creating a new European polity split between left and right would create new struggles – and intensify old ones – about redistribution.	人为地将欧盟政界分成左派右派会引发新的争斗，并且激化老的、关于再分配的争斗。


The only thing that would hold the left together would be the claim that there should be more redistribution: but to whom, and according to what mechanism?	唯一能把左派团结起来的是“更多再分配”的主张——但是，分配给谁，按什么机制分配？


Nor is it clear that Spanish socialists have more in common with German social democrats than with their fellow nationals.	西班牙社会党和德国社民党之间的共性，也不再比它们各自同国内民族主义党派之间的共性更显著。


Each ideological grouping would most likely become factionalized along complex national lines – divisions likely to be reflected in the ensuing competition to be charismatic.	各个意识形态阵营很可能会沿着复杂的民族界线而分裂——而民族界线也将在追求魅力的政治竞争中发挥更大作用。


Instead of encouraging new Churchills and Adenauers, the result might be new imitators of Hitler or Stalin.	搞不好，这套方案没能催生新的邱吉尔和阿登纳，反而唤醒了新的希特勒和斯大林。


There is a better model, one developed in a linguistically, culturally, and religiously diverse test-tube in the geographic heart of Europe: the Swiss model of Konkordanzdemokratie.	其实，还有一个更好的模式就诞生在欧洲的地理中心，诞生在语言、文化和宗教多元性极大的一个政治试管里：瑞士的协调民主（Konkordanzdemokratie）模式。


In the Swiss system, several parties compete, but they do not aim to control the government exclusively.	在瑞士体制里，若干个政党参与竞争，但并不是为了独占政权。


Instead, all the major parties are represented in the government, and are consequently obliged to hammer out compromises.	在政府里，各大党派都有代表，因此都必须准备妥协。


Members of the federal government are driven by regional loyalties at some times, and by ideological commitments at other times; they all need to be negotiated when making decisions.	联邦政府成员有时忠于地区利益，有时看中意识形态价值，在决策时却无一例外需要谈判妥协。


The Swiss solution of electing an all-embracing and balanced government tends to produce boring and uninspiring politics.	旨在选出广泛而均势政府的瑞士方案容易导致无聊乏味的政治生活。


Famously, few people know who even holds Switzerland’s annually rotating presidency.	很少有人知道谁是瑞士年度轮值主席，就是一个有名的例子。


Charismatic politicians act by polarizing, galvanizing, and mobilizing supporters; routine politics, by contrast, requires maintaining a low profile and being willing to strike compromises.	政治明星靠的是让支持者变得激动、极端化从而达到动员目的； 日常政治则相反，需要保持低调，需要准备妥协。


Europe today does not need inspirational leaders who can whip up a populist frenzy. Instead, it needs locally respected leaders who are capable of working in a complex and multi-dimensional political world.	今日的欧洲不需要能够煽起民众狂热的传奇领袖，而需要能在一个复杂而多维的政治环境下工作的、受当地人民爱戴的领导人。


The Wrong Tax for Europe	金融交易税——欧盟吃错药？


CAMBRIDGE – Europe is already in pickle, so why not add more vinegar?	麻省剑桥——欧洲已是死猪，何妨开水来烫？


That seems to be the thinking behind the European Commission’s proposed financial transactions tax (FTT) – the Commission’s latest response to Europe’s festering growth and financing problems.	看来，欧盟委员会酝酿开征金融交易税，背后就是这个想法。 欧洲的经济金融沉疴每况愈下，那便是它新开的药方。


The emotional appeal of a tax on all financial transactions is undeniable.	对一切金融交易征税，可谓大快人心，似乎没有理由加以拒绝。


Ordinary Europeans have to pay value-added tax on most of the goods and services that they buy, so why not tax purchases of stocks, bonds, and all kinds of derivatives?	欧洲老百姓为其所购买的大多数货品和服务都必须缴纳增值税。 那为什么买卖股票、债券和各种各样的金融衍生工具就不能征税呢？


Surely, such a tax will hit wealthy individuals and financial firms far more than anyone else, and, besides, it will raise a ton of revenue.	这种税冲击的当然主要是富人和金融公司，此外，它可以带来大笔财政收入。


Indeed, the European Commission estimates that its proposed tax of only 0.1% on stock and bond trades, and 0.01% tax on derivatives, will raise more than €50 billion per year.	说真的，按照欧盟委员会的估计，仅按它所酝酿的税率——股票和债券交易的0. 1%、衍生品交易的0.


As a bonus, an FTT will curb destabilizing speculation in financial markets.	01%，有关财政每年便可增加500亿欧元进项。 金融交易税还能顺便遏制一下威胁金融市场稳定的投机行为，何乐而不为呢？


If only it were so simple.	事情要是有这么简单就好了！


Of course, taxation of financial firms’ profits and bonuses should be made more similar to that of other economic activities.	当然，对金融企业的利润和分红征税，理应缩小同其他经济活动的差距。


Excessive leverage needs to be reined in.	过度杠杆需要得到限制。


A return to pre-2007 levels of macroeconomic and financial stability would support growth.	如果宏观经济和金融能恢复到2007年之前的稳定状态，确能支持经济增长。


Unfortunately, much as FTTs are the darling of leading liberal economic commentators and Robin Hood NGOs, they are an extremely misguided approach to achieving such worthy ends.	不幸的是，虽然金融交易税为自由派经济评论家和劫富济贫的NGO们所津津乐道，但要达成上述重要目标，它却是一种极端错误的手段。


True, great thinkers like John Maynard Keynes and the late Nobel laureate James Tobin floated various ideas for taxing financial transactions as a way to reduce economic volatility.	的确，像凯恩斯和诺奖得主托宾（James Tobin）那样的伟大思想家提出过若干理念，认为开征金融交易税是削弱经济波动的一种方法。


(Tobin’s tax applied specifically to foreign-exchange trading.)	（托宾税针对的本是外汇交易。


But, since then, the idea has received close attention from many economic researchers, and, frankly, it is hard to find their research results supportive.	）但是，多年来这些理念得到了众多经济学家的密切关注，而且，说实话，众人的研究结论几乎没有支持的。


Such taxes surely reduce liquidity in financial markets.	这种税固然可以减少金融市场上的流动性。


With fewer trades, the information content of prices is arguably reduced.	随着交易量的萎缩，价格的信息含量可能会有所减少。


But both theoretical and simulation results suggest no obvious decline in volatility.	但不管是理论还是模拟推演的结论，都无法证明经济波动性会随之明显减弱。


And, while raising so much revenue with so low a tax rate sounds grand, the declining volume of trades would shrink the tax base precipitously.	而且，虽然以如此低的税率增加如此多的岁入，听上去很不错，但交易量剧减会导致税基骤然缩窄。


As a result, the ultimate revenue gains are likely to prove disappointing, as Sweden discovered when it attempted to tax financial transactions two decades ago.	结果，最终增加的财政收入将令人失望。 这是20年前瑞典征收金融交易税所得到的一个教训。


Worse still, over the long run, the tax burden would shift.	更糟糕的是，从长期来看，税负会转移。


Higher transactions taxes increase the cost of capital, ultimately lowering investment.	交易成本的增加会推高资本价格，从而抑制投资。


With a lower capital stock, output would trend downward, reducing government revenues and substantially offsetting the direct gain from the tax.	投资疲软拖累产出下滑，所减少的财政收入差不多能抵消该税的直接收入。


In the long run, wages would fall, and ordinary workers would end up bearing a significant share of the cost.	从长期看，工资水平将会下降，普通工人将会分担很大一块成本。


More broadly, FTTs violate the general public-finance principle that it is inefficient to tax intermediate factors of production, particularly ones that are highly mobile and fluid in their response.	说得更宽泛一点，金融交易税违反了公共财政的一般原理：对生产的中间环节征税是低效的，尤其是对那些高度灵活的环节，它们的反应难以预料。


All of this is well known, even if prominent opinion leaders, politicians, and philanthropists prefer to ignore it.	上面所说的一切都是常识，哪怕杰出的意见领袖、政客和慈善家们宁可对此置若罔闻。


The European Commission has surely been strongly cautioned by the Fiscal Affairs Department at the International Monetary Fund, whose economists have thoroughly catalogued the pros and cons of FTTs.	欧盟委员会肯定得到过来自国际货币基金财政事务部的有力警告，在那里工作的经济学家曾详细罗列开征金融交易税的种种得失。


So why did the Commission go forward with the idea?	那它为什么还要铤而走险？


The most generous interpretation is that the Commission simply does not believe economists’ estimates and analysis, and views an FTT as more workable than is commonly realized (a scenario that calls to mind the debate surrounding the creation of the euro).	最大胆的解释是，欧盟委员会根本就不相信经济学家的估计和分析，它认为金融交易税比学界公认的要可取（此情境令人回想起当年关于创设欧元的大辩论）。


It is true that Latin American governments, particularly the Brazilian authorities, succeeded in raising more revenue from taxes on bank withdrawals (a crude version of an FTT) than most policy analysts thought possible.	一些拉美国家，尤其是巴西政府，搞过银行取款税（一种较为粗糙的金融交易税），所获收入的确高于多数政策分析人士的预计。


On the other hand, Latin America’s long-term growth record is hardly an advertisement for the approach, and accounting for lost tax revenues due to lower GDP would surely yield a less impressive fiscal outcome.	但从另一方面来看，拉美的长期增长记录对其上述政策可不是正面宣传，而较低的GDP必然意味着财政成绩乏善可陈。


Another possibility is that the Europeans concluded that an FTT’s political advantages outweigh its economic flaws.	另一种可能性是，欧盟认为金融交易税的政治好处胜过其经济危害。


After all, there certainly is a case to be made that an FTT has so much gut-level popular appeal that politically powerful financial interests could not block it.	金融交易税在民意上如此讨好，以至于颇有政治影响力的金融利益集团也无法加以阻止，这种解释也说得过去。


One can almost buy this idea, except that the tax is so counterproductive in the long run that it is hardly obvious that it would be better than nothing.	这笔买卖兴许划算吧，除了一点：这种税的长期效果实在是不利于增长，很难说有它比没它来得好。


There are more cynical interpretations of the European Commission’s motives.	还有一些更加玩世不恭的解释。


Perhaps officials noticed that virtually everything in Europe is already heavily taxed. So, rather than finance the European Union’s institutions through greater contributions from existing tax bases, they are seeking a consensus for new revenue sources.	或云，欧盟官员知道欧洲的一切都已加了重税，所以，为了给欧盟各个衙门创收，他们没法儿再从现有税基上做文章，只能挖空心思开发新税源。


Or perhaps the Commission realizes that the FTT will be dead on arrival, owing to disputes within Europe, and simply wants to gain political capital from an enormously popular proposal.	还有的说，欧盟委员会明知金融交易税会因欧洲内部的争议无果而终，他们只是想给民众开张空头支票，捞取政治资本罢了。


After the financial crisis erupted with full force in 2008, former US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker claimed that the only worthwhile financial innovation in recent decades was the ATM.	2008年金融危机全面爆发以后，美联储前主席沃克尔（Paul Volcker）曾说，近几十年最有价值的金融创新是——ATM机。


And, as the Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job rightly points out, no one whose other, less useful innovations helped cause the financial crisis – politicians, financiers, and many others – has really paid a price.	而奥斯卡获奖纪录片《圈内勾当》（Inside Job）说得很对：有那么一伙儿人，他们的创新还不如ATM机有用，却共同导致了金融危机，这伙人——政客、金融家等等等等，至今还没有真正付出什么代价。


There is, in short, ample reason to be angry at financiers, and real change is needed in how they operate.	简言之，有大把理由去对金融家发泄怒火，但只有让他们改弦更张才是真正改观。


But the FTT, despite its noble intellectual lineage, is no solution to Europe’s problems – or to the world’s.	而金融交易税，尽管出自学术名门，却不是欧洲问题——或世界问题的药方。


The Wrong Way to Think About Oil	考虑石油问题的错误方式


In his recent State of the Union address, President George W. Bush declared, “America is addicted to oil.”	布什总统在最近的国情咨文讲话中宣布说：“美国使用石油成瘾”。


He announced a program of energy research that would reduce American oil imports from the Middle East by 75% over the next two decades.	他宣布了一项在未来二十年内将美国从中东的石油进口减少75％的能源研究规划。


But even if his program succeeds, it will not do much to increase America’s energy security.	但是，即使他的规划成功，也并不会对美国的能源安全大有帮助。


The United States gets only a fifth of its oil from the Persian Gulf.	美国从波斯湾仅仅进口五分之一的石油。


Americans are not alone in worrying about oil as a security problem.	美国并非唯一把石油作为安全问题来担忧的国家。


China and India, the two largest countries in the world, realize that their high rates of economic growth also depend upon foreign oil.	世界上两个最大国家中国和印度认识到它们的高速经济增长同样依赖于外国石油。


While the two countries together consume slightly less than half as much oil as the US, their consumption is increasing faster.	尽管这两个国家消费的石油比美国的一半稍微多一点，但是它们的消费正在更快地增长。


When poor countries consume as much per capita as rich countries, will there be enough oil to go around?	当穷国与富国消费同样的人均石油之时，那还有足够的石油保证吗？


China and India have been crisscrossing the globe making financially and politically costly deals to try to lock up the output of new oil-producing countries.	中印两国一直在全球各地往返奔波，签署在经济上和政治上都是成本巨大的协议来试图锁定新的产油国的产油。


For example, when Western countries discouraged their oil companies from dealing with Sudan’s government because of its inadequate response to the genocide in Darfur, China was quick to buy up the country’s oil.	例如，当西方国家由于苏丹对发生在达尔福尔的种族灭绝反应不利而阻止它们的石油公司同苏丹政府打交道时，中国当即购买了该国的石油。


Some petroleum experts argue that world oil production will peak in a decade or so.	某些石油专家认为，世界石油生产将会在未来十年左右达到顶峰。


Others reply that new discoveries and improved technologies for extracting oil from existing fields make such projections too alarmist.	某些人则回应说，发现新的油田以及从现有油田中提取石油的技术改良使得这些预计变得过于夸大其实。


Because accurate statistics about reserves in countries like Saudi Arabia are not available, it is impossible to settle the dispute definitively.	由于没有沙特等国家的石油储备的精确统计数字，因此就不可能一劳永逸地解决这一争议。


But the majority of experts agree that the world will not run out of oil anytime soon – even with growing Chinese and Indian demand.	但是，大多数专家同意，即使中印两国需求增长，世界也不会在短期内用光石油。


Over a trillion barrels of reserves have been proven, and more are likely to be found.	已经证明了超过一兆亿桶的石油储备，还可能会发现更多。


In any case, arguments about the size of world oil reserves and when global production will peak misses the key security issue.	无论如何，有关世界石油储备大小以及全球生产何时会达到顶峰的争论都没有击中关键性的安全问题。


The heart of the problem is not the overall quantity of oil, but its location.	问题的关键并不是石油的总体数量，而是石油的地点。


Two-thirds of proven reserves are in the Persian Gulf, one of the world’s most volatile regions.	已经证明储量的三分之二在波斯湾地区，而该地区是世界上最为动荡的地区之一。


Oil supply is likely to be vulnerable to political disruptions long before issues arise from overall scarcity of supply.	在总体供应紧缺问题出现很久之前，石油供应有可能受制于政治干扰。


For China and India, that just reinforces their desire to lock up oil supplies from countries outside the Persian Gulf.	对于中印两国而言，这就更为强化了它们从波斯湾以外的国家锁定石油供应的意愿。


Similarly, it led Bush to his declared objective of cutting imports from the region by 75% over the next two decades.	同样地，这也促使布什宣布在未来二十年内把从该地区的石油进口削减75％的目标。


At first glance, Bush’s task looks easy.	从表面上来看，布什的任务看起来是简单易行的。


The US uses about 21 million barrels of oil a day, and imports about 2.5 million of it from the Persian Gulf.	美国每天大约使用2千1百万桶石油，其中从波斯湾地区进口大约250万桶。


Even before new technologies produce that amount of fuel, the US could switch to imports from Nigeria, Venezuela, and other countries.	即使新技术能够产生这些数量的燃料之前，美国仍可以转向从尼日利亚、委内瑞拉以及其他国家进口。


But even if those countries remain stable, America will not be safe.	但是，即使这些国家保持稳定，美国还是不安全。


What matters is the total amount of oil a country imports, not where it comes from.	重要的是一个国家进口石油的总量，而不是从哪里进口。


Suppose there is a crisis in the Persian Gulf over Iran’s efforts to get nuclear weapons.	设想一下由于伊朗拥有核武器的努力波斯湾发生危机。


Iran has threatened to cut oil exports if the United Nations Security Council imposes sanctions against it for violating its nuclear pledges.	伊朗已经威胁，如果联合国安理会因伊朗违反其核保证而对其施加制裁就中断石油出口。


Most experts predict that such a move would drive the price of oil – including the Venezuelan, Nigerian, and other oil that the US, China, and India consume – above $100 per barrel.	大多数专家预计，这一举动会把包括委内瑞拉、尼日利亚以及其他美国、中国以及印度所消费的石油价格推到100美元以上。


The rapid spike in prices would harm all economies that import oil, regardless of where it comes from.	油价急剧上升将会有害于所有进口石油的经济体，而无论石油来自何处。


The world learned that lesson following the 1973 Arab-Israel war.	世界在1973年的阿伊战争后得出了这一教训。


Arab oil-exporting countries embargoed oil sales to the US and the Netherlands to punish them for their support of Israel.	阿拉伯石油出口国对美国以及荷兰实行石油禁运，以惩罚它们支持以色列。


But the oil destined for the US and the Netherlands was shifted to other countries like Japan, while oil destined for other countries found its way to the US and the Netherlands.	但是，运往美国以及荷兰的石油被转移到了日本，而运往其他国家的石油则被运往美国和荷兰。


Oil is a fungible commodity, and markets clear at a common price.	石油是可替代商品，而且相同价格市场是明了的。


When the dust settled, it turned out that American, Dutch, and other importers all suffered roughly the same degree of shortfall and paid the same damaging high price.	当尘埃落定之时，美国、荷兰以及其他进口国都承受了大致相同程度的短缺，而且为此付出了相同的高昂代价。


This means that China and India are deluding themselves if they think that preferential deals for Sudanese or Iranian oil will provide them with security.	这就是说，如果中印两国认为苏丹或者伊朗石油的优惠交易将为他们提供安全，那么它们就是在自欺欺人。


When a disruption occurs, China, India, and the US will all find that they face equal prices – and thus equal pain.	当供应干扰发生时，中国、印度以及美国都会发现，它们面临相同的价格，因而也是同样的痛楚。


In the meantime, China’s mercantilist misunderstanding of markets means that it often overpays for what it mistakenly thinks is energy security.	目前，中国对市场唯利是图的误解表明，它经常为它所错误地认为是能源安全的东西支付高价。


Bush is similarly mistaken.	布什也是同样错误。


Even if he cuts imports from the Middle East, America will not enjoy energy security unless it curbs its overall thirst for oil.	即使他从中东削减石油进口，除非美国抑制其总体对石油的渴求，否则它不会享有能源安全。


In the past, rising prices helped slow oil consumption in the US. The US uses only half as much oil per dollar of production as it did before the price spikes of the 1970’s.	目前，美国为每一个美元产品使用的石油仅仅是二十世纪七十年代油价暴涨之前的一半。


But over half the oil Americans use goes for driving cars and trucks.	但是超过一半的美国人对驾驶汽车或者卡车情有独钟。


The US will not solve its energy security problem until it gets better at fuel economy, possibly by a combination of technology, gasoline taxes, and regulations.	除非美国或许通过技术、汽油税以及法规相结合而改善燃料经济，否则美国将无法解决其能源安全问题。


Oil was not the cause of the Iraq War in the simplistic sense that American control of Iraqi oil would make it more secure.	石油并不是伊拉克战争的原因，其简单化的原因是，美国控制伊拉克的石油将会使它更为安全。


The world’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil means that all countries have an interest in maintaining stability in that region, while improving energy efficiency and increasing the diversity of their overall energy supplies.	世界依赖于波斯湾的石油意味着各国在改善能源效率、增加其总体能源供应的多样性的同时，对维护中东地区的稳定都利益相关。


The Year of Rational Pessimism	理性悲观之年


NEW YORK – Someone recently quipped that the best thing about 2011 was that it was likely better than 2012.	纽约——最近，有人不无讽刺地说，2011年最好的事情大概莫过于会好于2012年。


By the same token, while there has been much concern about America’s political gridlock, something worse for America, and for the world, could have happened: the Republicans could have prevailed in their program of austerity-cum-redistribution to the wealthy.	同样地，尽管人们对美国的政治僵局已经有了诸多疑虑，但对美国和全世界来说，事情还没有到最坏的地步：共和党还可以将他们的紧缩+再分配计划扩展到富人阶层。


Automatic cuts won’t happen until 2013, which means that the economy in 2012 will be spared, ever so slightly.	自动削减在2013年之前是不会发生的，这意味着2012年的负担会略微减轻一些。


Two more positive notes for 2011: America seems finally to have awakened to the yawning gap between the rich and the rest – between the top 1% and everyone else.	2011年的两件更积极的事情：美国似乎终于认识到富人阶层和其他阶层——即顶层1%和剩余的99%——之间令人咋舌的差距了。


And youth-led protest movements, from the Arab Spring to the Spanish indignados and the Occupy Wall Streeters, have made clear that something is very wrong with the capitalist system.	此外，青年反对运动——从阿拉伯之春到西班牙的“愤怒”青年和“占领华尔街”的美国青年——明白无误地显示，资本主义体系大有问题。


The likelihood, though, is that the economic and political problems that were so manifest in the US and Europe in 2011 – and which have so far been tremendously mismanaged – will only grow worse in 2012.	但是，最有可能的是，2011年美国和欧洲的早已是众人皆知、且迄今为止治理大为不善的经济和政治问题将在2012年继续恶化。


Any forecast for the coming year depends, more than usual, on politics – on the outcome of the US gridlock, and on European leaders’ ability to respond to the euro crisis.	任何对明年的预测均以不同寻常的程度取决于政治——取决于美国僵局以什么结果收场以及欧洲领导人应对欧元危机的能力。


Economic forecasts are difficult enough; but when it comes to political forecasts, our crystal balls are even cloudier. That said, here is my best guess.	经济预测已经够困难的了，但在进行政治预测时，我们的水晶球里更是一团迷雾。


European leaders repeatedly proclaim their commitment to saving the euro, but those who could have repeatedly said that they are committed to not doing what is needed.	欧洲领导人一再重申其拯救欧元的承诺，但实际上，他们是在一再承诺不做应该做的事。


They have recognized that austerity will mean slower growth – indeed, a recession is increasingly likely – and that, without growth, the eurozone’s distressed countries will not be able to manage their debts.	他们已经知道，紧缩将意味着更慢得增长——事实上，衰退的可能性正在与日剧增——而没有增长，欧元区的受困国家将无法治理债务。


But they have done nothing to promote growth.	但他们没有采取任何措施提振增长。


They are on a death spiral.	他们正处于一个死亡螺旋中。


The only thing saving the euro in the short term is the European Central Bank’s purchases of sovereign bonds, which have kept interest rates from soaring.	唯一的拯救欧元的短期措施是欧洲央行买入主权债券，该措施已经遏制了利率飙升的状况。


Like it or not, the ECB is effectively financing the sovereigns.	不管你喜不喜欢，欧洲央行实际上是在做主权融资。


German leaders have frowned on this, and the ECB has felt uncomfortable, limiting its purchases and saying that political leaders, not central bankers, should save the euro.	德国领导人已对此表示了不满，欧洲央行已经感到了不适，其买入举措已有所限制，并称政治领导人，而不是央行行长，才应该站出来拯救欧元。


But the political response has been too little, too late, to say the least.	但政治反应太平静，来得也太晚。


The most likely scenario is more of the same: austerity, weaker economies, more unemployment, and continuing deficits, with European leaders doing the minimum to fend off crisis for the moment.	最有可能发生的是更多的重复：紧缩、经济进一步疲软、失业进一步抬头、居高不下的赤字，而欧洲领导人在抵御眼下的危机方面一直不肯动手。


In short: more turmoil. 	简言之，就是更加混乱。


The day of reckoning – when the euro breaks up or Europe takes the kind of definitive action that would make a single currency work – may come in 2012, but, more likely than not, Europe’s leaders will do whatever they can to postpone that day of reckoning.	清醒之日——当欧元分崩离析或欧洲采取了断然措施使得单一货币继续运行时——大概会在2012年到来，但更有可能的是，欧洲领导人会竭尽所能推迟清醒之日的到来。


Europe will suffer, and so will the rest of the world.	欧洲将承受苦难，世界其他地区亦然。


The United States had hoped for an export-led recovery, but, with economic growth slowing in Europe, its largest customer (and impeding growth in much of the rest of the world), that is unlikely.	美国指望出现出口拉动的复苏，但是，由于其最大客户欧洲增长放缓（世界其他地区也好不到哪里去），这只能是痴人说梦。


And, with the worst effects of spending cuts potentially still to come, gridlock – and Republican spite – may mean that the Obama administration’s payroll-tax cut will not be extended, weakening household consumption.	此外，支出削减的负面影响还没有完全展开，在此背景下，僵局——以及共和党的刁难——可能意味着奥巴马政府的收入税削减不会展期，这将削弱家庭消费。


That, combined with cutbacks at the state and local level, means that the first real manifestations of austerity’s impact will appear in 2012.	这与州和地方政府的开支削减一道，意味着紧缩冲击的第一次真实效果反应将在2012年出现。


(Already, though, public employment is around 700,000 below its pre-crisis level; government, rather than acting counter-cyclically, offsetting weak private demand, has been acting pro-cyclically, exacerbating the economy’s problems.)	（尽管如今公职部门已然比危机之前减少了700000个岗位； 但政府并没有采取反周期措施抵消私人需求不振，而是在顺周期行动，放大了经济中的问题。


Meanwhile, the consequences of failure to deal with the housing crisis – which triggered financial markets’ near-meltdown in 2008 – are continuing to be felt: further decline in real-estate prices, more foreclosures, and thus even greater stress on US households.	）与此同时，应对房地产危机——导致2008年金融市场几乎崩溃的罪魁祸首——不力的后果还没有完全显现：房地产价格还将进一步下跌、房产赎回权剥夺的情况还将经一步发生，因而美国家庭的压力还会进一步加大。


No one in either US political party seems willing to face the fact that fixing the banking system, though necessary, was not sufficient to restore the economy to health (or that the financial system was never really fixed).	美国的两大政党似乎都不愿意直面这一事实：修补银行体系虽是必须的，但并不足以让经济重回健康（或者说，金融体系从未被真正地修复）。


The American economy before the crisis was being maintained on artificial life support by a housing bubble that led to unsustainable consumption.	危机前的美国经济是依靠房地产泡沫所产生的不可持续的消费支撑的虚假生活。


There is no way back to 2007.	不可能回到2007年的老路上去。


But neither party has been willing to admit what is really wrong, or advance an agenda that would address the underlying ills.	但两党都不愿承认哪里真正出了问题，也不愿意给出解决基本病症的时间表。


Platitudes and placebos – vapid calls for more job creation, fiscal restraint, reining in entitlement programs, and so forth – will characterize America’s election year.	陈词滥调和无谓安抚——空洞地号召创造更多就业岗位、财政紧缩、控制福利项目等等——将是美国选举年的一大特征。


Neither side will step forward with a program for restructuring the economy and reducing the inequality that is sapping the country’s strength.	两党都不会拿出重组经济、减少威胁美国富强的不平等性的计划。


I have been a big critic of markets, but even America’s market participants now sense that political leaders are not up to the task.	我一直是市场的严厉批评者，但即使是美国的市场参与者，如今也感到政治领袖不合格了。


If investors suffered from irrational exuberance in the 1990’s, they are likely to suffer from rational pessimism in the coming year.	如果投资者是因20世纪90年代的非理性繁荣而遭受打击，那么明年他们将因理性悲观遭受打击。


After all, Americans will have to choose between a leader who has proven that he can’t lead the US out of its economic morass, and one who has not yet proven his inability to do so – but who could make matters even worse through policies that increase inequality and slow growth.	毕竟，美国人仍不得不在两位领导人中做出选择，其中一位已经证明无法将美国带出经济困境，另一位还没有证明自己在这方面的无能，但他可能会通过恶化不平等性和削弱增长的政策把事情弄得更糟。


I hope that events prove me wrong, and that my pessimism turns out to have been excessive.	我希望事实证明我是错的，我过度悲观了。


But I am afraid that the risks are more on the downside.	但是，恐怕下行风险更大一些。


Indeed, 2012 could prove to be the year in which the experiment with the euro, the culmination of a 50-year process of economic and political integration in Europe, comes to an end.	事实上，2012年将可能是欧元实验——欧洲50年经济和政治一体化进程的高峰——的终结之年。


In that case, rather than bringing the hoped-for end of the Great Recession of 2008, a downturn that has lasted too long and caused too much suffering, 2012 may mark the beginning of a new and more frightening phase of the world’s worst economic calamity in three-quarters of a century.	果真如此的话，走出持续了太长、造成了太多伤害的2008年大衰退的希望将落空，2012年将是75年来全世界最严重的经济灾难走向更严峻阶段的开始。


The Year of the “China Model”	“中国模式”年


It will be China’s year in 2008.	2008年将会是中国年。


The Olympic Games – no doubt perfectly organized, without a protester, homeless person, religious dissenter, or any other kind of spoilsport in sight – will probably bolster China’s global prestige.	奥运会的举办可能会提高中国在全球的威望。 毫无疑问，会组织得很完美，不会看到抗议者、无家可归者、持不同信仰者或任何其他类型的扫兴者。


While the American economy gets dragged down further in a swamp of bad property debts, China will continue to boom.	当美国经济被进一步拖进房地产坏账的泥潭时，中国将会继续保持繁荣。


Exciting new buildings, designed by the world’s most famous architects, will make Beijing and Shanghai look like models of twenty-first century modernity.	由世界最著名的建筑师设计的令人振奋的新建筑将使北京和上海抗上去就像二十一世纪现代化的模型。


More Chinese will be featured in annual lists of the world’s richest people.	更多的中国人将会出现在每年一度的世界富豪榜中。


And Chinese artists will command prices at international art auctions that others can only dream of.	而中国的艺术家会在国际艺术品拍卖会上叫出其他人只敢想象的价格。


To come back from near destitution and bloody tyranny in one generation is a great feat, and China should be saluted for it.	仅仅用一代人的时间就从近乎赤贫和血腥的暴政走出来绝对是一个伟大的成就，中国人应该为此得到祝贺。


But China’s success story is also the most serious challenge that liberal democracy has faced since fascism in the 1930’s.	但是中国的成功故事却几乎是自二十世纪三十年代的法西斯主义以来自由民主所面临的最严峻的挑战。


This is not because China poses a great military threat – war with the United States, or even Japan, is only a fantasy in the minds of a few ultra-nationalist cranks and paranoiacs.	这并不是说中国构成了巨大的军事威胁，与美国或者甚至是日本的战争只是少数极端民族主义的怪人和偏执狂臆想出来的事物。


It is in the realm of ideas that China’s political-economic model, regardless of its environmental consequences, is scoring victories and looking like an attractive alternative to liberal democratic capitalism.	这是一个理念上的问题，不管它的环境效应，会怎样中国的政治经济模式正在取得胜利，并且看起来是自由民主的资本主义的一个很有吸引力的替代模式。


And it is a real alternative.	并且它真的很有吸引力。


Contrary to what some pundits say, Chinese capitalism is not like nineteenth-century European capitalism.	与一些学者们所说的恰恰相反，中国的资本主义与十九世纪欧洲的资本主义并不相同。


True, the European working class, not to mention women, did not have voting rights 200 years ago.	是的，欧洲的工人阶级，更别提妇女了，在200年前并没有选举权。


But even during the most ruthless phases of Western capitalism, civil society in Europe and the US was made up of a huge network of organizations independent of the state – churches, clubs, parties, societies, and associations that were available to all social classes.	但是即便在西方资本主义最无情的时期，欧洲和美国的文明社会也是由独立于政府之外的庞大的组织网络组成的，所有的社会阶层都可以参加的教会、俱乐部、政党、团体和协会组织。


In China, by contrast, while individuals have regained many personal freedoms since the death of Maoism, they are not free to organize anything that is not controlled by the Communist Party.	相反在中国，尽管自从毛泽东主义消亡以来，人们获得了许多的个人自由，但是他们并不能自由地建立任何不是受到共产党控制的组织。


Despite communism’s ideological bankruptcy, China has not changed in this regard.	尽管共产主义的意识形态已经破产了，但是中国在这方面并没有改变。


The China Model is sometimes described in traditional terms, as though modern Chinese politics were an updated version of Confucianism.	中国模式有时被以传统的词汇来描述，似乎现代的中国政治是儒学的更新版本。


But a society where the elite’s pursuit of money is elevated above all other human endeavors is a far cry from any kind of Confucianism that may have existed in the past.	但是一个其精英分子对于金钱的追求盖过任何其他人类事业之上的社会是根本不能与也许在过去存在过的任何形式的儒学沾上边的。


Still, it’s hard to argue with success.	然而，要指责一个取得成功的事物是很困难的。


If anything has been laid to rest by China’s rising wealth, it is the comforting idea that capitalism, and the growth of a prosperous bourgeoisie, will inevitably lead to liberal democracy.	如果说有什么被中国的日益富有所埋葬的话，那就是资本主义以及富有的中产阶级人群的扩大会无可避免地导向自由民主的自信想法。


On the contrary, it is precisely the middle class, bought off by promises of ever-greater material gains, that hopes to conserve the current political order.	恰恰相反，很显然中产阶级被可以获得更大的物质利益的承诺所收买，希望维持现有的政治秩序。


It may be a Faustian bargain – prosperity in exchange for political obedience – but so far it has worked.	这也许是一个浮士德式的交易，用富有换取政治上的顺从，但是迄今为止似乎一切都很不错。


The China Model is attractive not only to the country’s new coastal elites, but has global appeal.	中国模式不仅对于这个国家沿海地区新的精英分子具有吸引力，同时它在全球也很有吸引力。


African dictators – indeed, dictators everywhere – who walk the plush red carpets laid out for them in Beijing love it.	非洲的独裁者们，事实上是各个地方的独裁者都很喜欢这种模式，他们来到北京，受到红地毯的欢迎。


For the model is non-Western, and the Chinese do not preach to others about democracy.	因为这种模式不是西方式的，并且中国人不会向其他人宣扬民主。


It is also a source of vast amounts of money, much of which will end up in the tyrants’ pockets.	同时它还是一个巨额金钱的来源，其中的大部分最后落到了这些独裁者的腰包里。


By proving that authoritarianism can be successful, China is an example to autocrats everywhere, from Moscow to Dubai, from Islamabad to Khartoum.	通过证明独裁也能取得成功，中国俨然成了世界各地，从莫斯科到迪拜，从伊斯兰堡到喀土穆独裁们的榜样。


China’s appeal is growing in the Western world as well.	中国的吸引力在西方世界也变得越来越大。


Businessmen, media moguls, and architects all flock there.	商人、媒体巨头和建筑师们蜂拥而至。


Could there be a better place to do business, build stadiums and skyscrapers, or sell information technology and media networks than a country without independent trade unions or any form of organized protest that could lower profits?	还有哪一个比一个没有会减少赢利的独立的工会组织或任何形式的有组织的抗议活动的国家更好的做生意、盖博物馆和摩天大楼或者兜售信息技术和媒体网络的地方吗？


Meanwhile, concern for human or civic rights is denigrated as outmoded, or an arrogant expression of Western imperialism.	与此同时，对人权或公民权利的担心被蔑视为已经过时了或者不过是西方帝国主义傲慢的措辞而已。


There is, however, a fly in the ointment.	然而，还是有美中不足的地方。


No economy keeps growing at the same pace forever.	没有哪个经济会永远以同一种速度保持增长。


Crises occur.	危机会发生。


What if the bargain struck between the Chinese middle classes and the one-party state were to fall apart, owing to a pause, or even a setback, in the race for material wealth?	如果在中国的中产阶级和一党制国家之间的交易因为物质财富增长的停顿或者甚至是倒退而分崩离析，情况会怎样呢？


This has happened before.	这样的事情以前是发生过的。


The closest thing, in some ways, to the China Model is nineteenth-century Germany, with its industrial strength, its cultivated but politically neutered middle class, and its tendency toward aggressive nationalism.	在某种程度上与中国模式最接近的是十九世纪时的德国。 它们都有强大的工业、受过良好教育但是在政治上保持中立的中产阶级以及咄咄逼人的民族主义倾向。


Nationalism became lethal when the economy crashed, and social unrest threatened to upset the political order.	当经济崩溃时民族主义���为极具破坏力的事物，而社会的不安宁很有可能会颠覆政治秩序。


The same thing could happen in China, where national pride constantly teeters on the edge of belligerence towards Japan, Taiwan, and ultimately the West.	同样的事情也可能会在中国发生，那里的民族自豪感使它频频对日本、台湾，最终是西方摆出一副好斗的姿态。


Aggressive Chinese nationalism could turn lethal, too, if its economy were to falter.	中国咄咄逼人的民族主义也会变得极具破坏力，如果它的经济出现摆动的话。


This would not be in anyone’s interest, so we should wish China well in 2008, while sparing a thought for all the dissidents, democrats, and free spirits languishing in labor camps and prisons.	这不符合任何人的利益，所以我们应该希望中国在2008年一切都好，同时也略加考虑一下在劳改所和监狱里倍受煎熬的所有持不同政见者、民主人士和自由精神者。


We should hope that they will live to see the day when the Chinese, too, will be a free people.	我们希望他们能够活着看到中国人也能成为自由人的那一天。


It might be a distant dream, but dreaming is what New Year’s is all about.	这也许是一个遥远的梦想，但是新年不就是让人们去表达自己的梦想的吗？


The Young General’s Old Tricks	小将军的老把戏


TOKYO – Brinkmanship seems to be congenital in North Korea.	东京—边缘政策似已深入朝鲜骨髓。


Under the late Kim Jong-il’s pudgy young successor – his third son, Kim Jong-un, dubbed “the Young General” – threats and mendacity still mark the Hermit Kingdom’s diplomacy.	在金正日又矮又胖的继承人——即其三太子、人称“小将军”的金正恩——治下，威胁和谎言仍是这一隐遁王国外交的特征。


With North Korea’s announcement of plans to use an Unha-3 rocket to launch its Bright Star-3 satellite into earth orbit in mid-April, the newest threat is a continuation of an old one.	朝鲜宣布计划在4月中旬用银河三号（Unha-3）火箭将光明行三号卫星送入地球轨道，这一新威胁是旧威胁的继续。


Indeed, it signals a quick demise for the agreement reached with the United States just weeks ago.	事实上，这表明几周前才与美国达成的协议将迅速失效。


The decision to launch the satellite, which had been planned by Kim Jong-il, is clearly intended to provide a “heroic” martial achievement for a new leader who lacks any military experience.	该卫星发射计划在金正日时代就已开始谋划，显然，该计划是为了给缺少军队经验的新领导人提供“威武”的军事成就。


The regime aims to boost North Korea’s international prestige and domestic morale simultaneously, with the population supposedly keen to support this show of the country’s technological and military might.	当局意在同时提高朝鲜的国际地位和国内士气，朝鲜人民想必将热烈支持这一计划，并将之视为朝鲜技术和军事实力的展示。


And, no surprise, North Korea’s leaders also claim that what they propose to launch is a “peaceful” satellite.	此外，毫不奇怪，朝鲜领导人还说，这次发射的是“和平”卫星。


But no one, particularly in the region, where North Korean missiles pose the gravest threat, accepts this claim at face value.	但没人会把这句话当真——特别是在将朝鲜导弹视为最大威胁的东北亚地区。


It is clear that the rocket to be launched is effectively a long-range ballistic missile, which might be able to reach Guam, the site of an important US military base.	显然，即将发射的火箭实际上是远程弹道导弹，其射程可能可达美军重要驻地关岛。


So doubtful is the world of North Korea’s claim of peaceful intent that not only did the United Nations, South Korea, the US, Japan, and the European Union immediately express concern; so did China and Russia – perhaps the only two countries in the world that are on good terms with the Kim regime.	国际社会对朝鲜“和平目的”的宣告根本不信，不仅联合国、韩国、美国、日本和欧盟立刻表示关注，就连中国和俄罗斯也持有这一立场——中俄大概是仅有的两个替朝鲜体制说好话的国家。


Despite the international community’s almost unanimous demand for restraint, North Korea is highly unlikely to roll back its launch plans.	尽管国际社会异口同声要求朝鲜保持克制，但朝鲜基本不可能收回发射计划。


Halting such missile tests is simply not an option for a regime whose only claim to legitimacy is the military threat that it poses to others.	对朝鲜政权来说，维持其合法性的唯一办法是对他人施加军事威胁，停止导弹试射绝不是可行的选择项。


The announcement of the forthcoming launch is timed, as always seems to be the case with North Korea’s provocations, to the regime’s need for food and funds from around the world to prevent the reemergence of mass starvation at home.	宣布发射计划的时间是精心选择的——朝鲜的挑衅行为一贯如此——即在该国需要国际粮食和资金以防国内大饥荒重现的时候。


Moreover, 2012 is a special year for North Korea, starting with the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s birth on February 16.	此外，2012对朝鲜来说是一个特殊的年份。 2月16日是金正日诞辰70年纪念。


That occasion will be followed by the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15 and the 80th anniversary of the creation of the People’s Army on April 25.	接着，4月15日将迎来金日成诞辰100周年，4月25日是人民军成立80周年。


The country’s undernourished masses are not being invited to the capital, Pyongyang, for the extravagant parades that will be held at enormous cost.	营养不良的朝鲜群众并未获邀前往首都平壤参加花费靡巨的奢华游行。


The missile launch, it seems, will have to suffice for them.	导弹的发射大概是为了满足他们。


The regime uses food as the currency of its domestic power and foreign policy.	朝鲜当局将粮食作为国内权力和对外政策的通货。


For the commemoration of Kim Jong-il’s birthday in February, a kilogram of fish was provided to residents in one district, but nowhere else.	2月份，为纪念金正日70诞辰，某区居民获发每人一公斤鱼（其他地方的居民无此待遇）。


At the same time, the regime sought 240,000 tons of nutritional support in its recent negotiations with the US and South Korea, though the North was forced to return 30,000 tons of rice from a previous food-aid package as part of its recent agreement with the US.	与此同时，朝鲜当局还在于美国和韩国的最新谈判中获得24万吨营养物资，但与此同时，朝鲜也被迫从先前的粮食援助计划中返还3万吨，作为与美国最新协议的一部分。


Indeed, the North lets few diplomatic occasions pass without strong-arming its interlocutors for more.	事实上，朝鲜基本上不会错过任何外交机会在对话者身上充分榨取好处。


For Kim Jong-un, even a meeting with Japanese officials in Ulan Bator, Mongolia’s capital, to discuss the return of Japanese women who went to North Korea with their Korean husbands thinking that they were journeying to a socialist paradise, served as a platform to secure food aid from Japan.	就拿金正恩来说吧，就连与日本官员在乌兰巴托的会面——本来目的是讨论遣返带着奔赴社会主义天堂的美好愿望与朝鲜丈夫共同前往朝鲜的日本妇女的问题——也可以被他用作保证从日本获得粮食援助的平台。


The negotiations were to be held between Song Il-ho, North Korea’s ambassador responsible for normalizing relations with Japan, and Hiroshi Nakai, a former minister who negotiates officially for the release of Japanese citizens abducted by the North.	该谈判本应在朝鲜负责对日关系正常化的大使宋日昊与负责释放羁押在朝日籍人士谈判的前政府大臣中井洽之间展开。


But Nakai was unable to leave Tokyo, and a university professor replaced him as Japan’s negotiator.	但中井洽无法离开东京，因此由一位大学教授替他担任日方谈判员。


Rank-conscious North Korea would normally send a lower official than Song if his counterpart were substituted, but no change was made, so desperate is the North for food.	按注重级别的朝鲜的一贯作风，如果对方改换谈判员，朝方也将派遣级别不及宋日昊者与其会面。 但这一幕并没有发生，由此可见朝鲜对粮食的渴望。


North Korea then asked Japan for economic aid and food supplies in exchange for returning not only the Japanese wives in question, but also seven Japanese known to have been abducted by the North.	接着，朝鲜要求日本给予粮食和经济援助，作为交换，朝鲜不但可以遣返日本所要求的日籍亲眷，甚至还可以释放被朝鲜羁押的七名日本人。


The Japanese aid, like the ransom paid to a kidnapper, must be provided by April 15, just in time for the commemoration of Kim Il-song’s birth – a clear indication of North Korea’s true intentions, and desperation.	日本的援助——与人质赎金无异——必须在4月15日前落实，以赶上金正日诞辰纪念——显然，这才是朝鲜的真正目的，而且极为迫切。


And now, given the potential cost of scuttling the recent agreement with the US, the decision to launch a long-range missile takes that desperation a step further.	而在眼下，考虑到撕毁新近达成的朝美协议的潜在代价，朝鲜发射远程导弹的决定更加显示了其急不可耐的心理。


In fact, it has been suggested that the launch is intended to be a demonstration to Iran of the North’s missile prowess, as the Islamic Republic could become a customer for the illicit missile and nuclear-technology sales that are one of the regime’s few sources of hard currency.	事实上，朝鲜的这次发射是为了向伊朗展示自己的导弹实力，而伊朗可能成为朝鲜非法导弹和核技术——朝鲜当局唯一的硬通货——的客户。


Thus, the North Korean drama, now starring Kim Jong-un, plays on, relying on extorted proceeds from manufactured crises abroad to finance spectacular kitsch and brutal repression at home.	如此看来，轮到金正恩粉墨登场的朝鲜闹剧还在继续，它利用人造危机大行敲诈之事，为其国内的庸俗纪念仪式和残酷镇压融资。


It is up to China, the real director of the North Korean production, to drop the curtain on this abominable show and its rogue star.	作为朝鲜一言一行的真正指导者，中国应该站出来让这场闹剧及其流氓主演消停消停。


Thick as BRICS	金砖国家底下好乘凉


MEXICO CITY – When the United Nations voted for what was known as partition and created the State of Israel 64 years ago, subsequently granting it full membership, several Latin American countries – Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Honduras – abstained, or, in the case of Cuba, voted against the relevant resolutions.	墨西哥城——64年前，联合国就分割并建立以色列国进行表决，随后又授予以色列完全成员国资格。 当时不少拉美国家——巴西、萨尔瓦多、阿根廷、哥伦比亚、智利、洪都拉斯——都投了弃权票，而古巴则投了反对票。


Mexico abstained on partition, though it voted in favor of admitting Israel to the UN a few months later, and subsequently recognized the Jewish state, acknowledging that its national interest was best served by not taking sides in the Middle East imbroglio.	墨西哥对分割决议投了反对票，但对几个月后的承认以色列国为联合国成员国决议投了赞成票，随后又将以色列视为犹太国家，承认在中东纠纷中不偏不倚最符合其国家利益。


In the coming weeks, most Latin American countries will vote in favor of some form of UN membership or recognition of statehood that the Palestinian Authority is seeking.	在未来几周，拉美国家将向巴勒斯坦权力机构寻求联合国承认巴勒斯坦国家地位或将其接纳为成员国的决议投赞成票。


But some will not. The issue is not a simple one for the Security Council’s two Latin American non-permanent members, Brazil and Colombia, or for Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Honduras, which have already recognized Palestine, but have not yet voted to grant it “observer” status at the UN.	这个问题不论对于安理会的两大非常任理事国巴西和哥伦比亚，还是对古巴、尼加拉瓜、委内瑞拉、哥斯达黎加、阿根廷、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔、秘鲁、乌拉圭和洪都拉斯（这些国家已经承认了巴勒斯坦，但还未在联合国投票赞成授予其“观察国”地位）来说，都不是一个简单的问题。


To become a full-fledged UN member, the Security Council must recommend the move to the General Assembly; but upgrading the Palestinian Authority’s status to that of the Vatican – which in theory would allow it to participate in many UN agencies, including the International Criminal Court – requires only a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.	为了成为完全的联合国成员国，安理会须由安理会提议将这一决议转交给联合国大会； 但将巴勒斯坦权力机构的地位升级至与梵蒂冈相仿——从理论上说，这意味着允许巴勒斯坦权力机构加入众多联合国机构，包括国际刑事法庭——只需要联大三分之二多数赞成即可。


In any case, the political consequences overshadow legal or bureaucratic issues.	无论如何，政治后果都会远大于法律或官僚问题。


Forcing the US to use its veto in the Security Council, or obtaining the support of more than 150 of the UN’s 193 member states in the General Assembly, would be a huge defeat for Israel and the US, which is why the Latin American votes are important.	迫使美国在安理会投出否决票，或者获得联大193个成员国中150个以上的支持，将会是对以色列和美国的一次重大打击，这也是拉美如何投票至关重要的原因。


Brazil has stated that it intends to vote in the Security Council in favor of recommending Palestine’s admission to the General Assembly; Colombia has said that it plans to abstain.	巴西已经声明，它将在安理会投票赞成建议联大吸收巴勒斯坦； 哥伦比亚则说将投弃权票。


Most other Latin American countries would probably vote in favor of some sort of enhanced status for the Palestinian Authority.	其他大部分拉美国家可能会投票赞成提高巴勒斯坦权力机构地位。


The Jewish community in the United States, and to a lesser extent President Barack Obama’s administration, has attempted to convince Chile and Mexico, which have not yet made their stances explicit, that nothing would be gained by isolating Israel (or the US, for that matter) on this issue.	美国的犹太社区，从某种程度讲还包括奥巴马政府，已采取行动试图说服尚未表明清晰立场的智利和墨西哥，让它们相信，在这件事上孤立以色列（也可以说是孤立美国）是没有好处的。


Indeed, little would change on the ground even with full Palestinian statehood if Israel and the US do not accept it – and Mexico and Chile could lose much in distancing themselves from an ally on a question of great importance to it.	事实上，只要以色列和美国不承认，即使巴勒斯坦获得国家地位也无济于事，而墨西哥和智利将因为与美以联盟在对其具有重大意义的问题上保持距离而失去很多东西。


In short, as was the case more than a half-century ago, the region has not spoken with a single voice on these crucial issues.	简言之，与半个多世纪前的事情一样，南美在这些关键性问题上并没有拧成一股绳。


Now, as then, most Latin American countries have not taken a principled stand – either for or against Israel, or for or against the Palestinians.	如今，大部分拉美国家并没有坚持原则立场——不管是反对以色列，还是反对巴勒斯坦。


Instead, they have followed the path of expedience, their positions depending on the relative clout and stridency of their societies’ Jewish or Arab communities, and on urging from Washington or from the so-called ALBA bloc of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Paraguay.	相反，它们在参照以前的故事行事，其立场由国内的犹太和阿拉伯社区势力和实力决定，来自华盛顿和所谓的ALBA区块（古巴、委内瑞拉、尼加拉瓜、玻利维亚和巴拉圭）的压力也将起到作用。


Latin Americans’ lack of conviction on such grave matters – with the exception of the ALBA countries, which have the wrong convictions, but nonetheless believe in them almost religiously – has marginalized the region on other important international issues, such as the recent crisis in Libya, and the ongoing one in Syria.	拉美在如此尖锐的问题上没有坚定信念——ALBA国家是例外，它们的持有着错误的信念，但无论如何相当地坚定——这让该地区在其他重大国际事务（比如最近的利比亚危机以及仍然如火如荼的叙利亚危机）上被边缘化了。


On the UN resolution establishing a no-fly zone and civilian protection in Libya, Brazil, along with three of the other “BRICS” (and world power wannabes) – Russia, India, and China – abstained.	在联合国关于在利比亚建立禁飞区和平民保护区的决议中，巴西与其他三个“金砖国家”（未来超级大国候选者）——俄罗斯、印度和中国——均投了���权票。


The fourth, South Africa, went along only grudgingly.	剩下的那个金砖国家南非则不情不愿地投出了赞成票。


And now, on the European and American attempt to impose UN-mandated sanctions on Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, the BRICS have gone from bad to worse.	而如今，欧洲和美国试图对叙利亚总统阿萨德实施联合国授权的制裁行动，对此金砖国家的举动甚至比利比亚问题还不如。


First, they dispatched a three-country mission (Brazil, India, and South Africa) to Damascus to “persuade” Assad not to murder his people.	首先，它们派遣了一个三国代表团（巴西、印度和南非）去大马士革“说服”阿萨德不要杀戮他的人民。


Needless to say, he did not respond that, yes, he had killed a few thousand here and there, but that now that they brought it up, he would try to be more careful.	不消说，他对此根本不予理睬。 是的，他已经杀了好几千人，但既然如今它们提到了这个问题，他想必会三思而后行。


Then they made statement after statement claiming that Syria was not Libya, and they would not allow another Western intervention to achieve regime change in another Arab country just because its people seemed upset with the local dictator.	其次，它们一次又一次发表声明说叙利亚不是利比亚，它们不会允许西方再次干预从而让又一个阿拉伯国家仅仅因为人民对国内独裁者有所不满而改变其制度。


In the words of a senior NGO human rights leader: “They’re punishing the Syrian people because they were unhappy that NATO took the mandate of protecting civilians in Libya and transformed it into a mandate for regime change.”	用某高级非政府组织人权领导者的话说，“它们在惩罚叙利亚人民，原因是它们不满北约下令保护利比亚平民，最终却变为下令改变利比亚体制。 ”


Given their growing role in the global economy, it is understandable that larger Latin American countries, along with the other BRICS, are seeking a more influential world role.	随着金砖国家在全球经济中的作用越来越大，大型拉美国家与金砖国家保持一致，寻求更大的国际影响力倒也无可厚非。


This is not the way to achieve it.	但这样做不会达到目标。


Which Thinkers Will Define Our Future?	哪些思想家定义我们的未来？


BERKELEY – Several years ago, it occurred to me that social scientists today are all standing on the shoulders of giants like Niccolo Machiavelli, John Locke, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim.	伯克利—几年前，我发现当今社会科学家都站在马基雅维利、洛克、斯密、托克维尔、马克斯·韦伯和涂尔干等巨人的肩上。


One thing they all have in common is that their primary focus was on the social, political, and economic makeup of the Western European world between 1450 and 1900.	他们的一个共同点是他们的主要焦点集中在1450—1900年间西欧世界的社会、政治和经济构成上。


Which is to say, they provide an intellectual toolkit for looking at, say, the Western world of 1840, but not necessarily the Western world of 2016.	这么说吧，他们提供了一个看待（比如）1840年的西方世界的知识工具箱，但未必适合2016年的西方世界。


What will be taught in the social theory courses of, say, 2070?	那么，到了（比如）2070年，社会理论课程应该教些什么？


What canon – written today or still forthcoming – will those who end their careers in the 2070s wish that they had used when they started them in the late 2010s?	哪些经典——成于今天或仍有待出现的——将是那些在21世纪70年代结束职业生涯的人希望他们在21世纪10年代职业生涯伊始时就开始使用的？


After mulling this question for the past few years, I’ve narrowed down my choice to the writings of three people: Tocqueville, who wrote in the 1830s and 1840s; John Maynard Keynes, who wrote in the 1920s and 1930s; and Karl Polanyi, who wrote in the 1930s and 1940s.	过去几年，我仔细地思考了这个问题，将我的选择缩窄为三个人的著作：19世纪30和40年代写作的托克维尔、20世纪20和30年代写作的凯恩斯以及20世纪30和40年代写作的卡尔·波拉尼（Karl Polanyi）。


Keynes’s central concerns for his own time ring true today.	凯恩斯对他的时代的核心担忧在今天仍然正确。


He was worried about the fragility of our collective prosperity, and the grave tensions between nationalism and the rootless cosmopolitan attitudes underpinning a peaceful and flourishing global society.	他担心我们的集体繁荣的脆弱性，以及民族主义和作为和平与繁荣的全球社会的基础的缺乏根基的世界主义观念之间的严重的紧张关系。


He focused on how to organize our activities and use our prosperity to create a world fit for the good life.	他着重于如何组织我们的活动和利用我们的繁荣去创造一个适合好生活的世界。


He sought to expose the bankruptcy of ascendant ideological nostrums: laissez-faire, spontaneous order, collective cooperation, central planning.	他尝试暴露如日中天的思想的必然失败性：自由放任、自发秩序、集体合作、中央计划等。


And he thought deeply about the technocratic problems of economic management – and about the social, moral, and political disasters that would follow from failing to address them.	他深入地思考了经济管理的技术官僚问题——以及无法解决这些问题所带来的社会、道德和政治灾难。


After World War II, the problems that concerned Keynes faded into the background, as renewed prosperity in the West led many to believe that they had been permanently solved.	第二次世界大战后，凯恩斯所担忧的问题逐渐淡化为背景，因为复兴的西方繁荣让许多人相信这些问题已经永久得到了解决。


Even during the stagflation (slow growth and rising prices) in the 1970s, the problem was said to be social-democratic overreach, not any fundamental flaw in the political economy of the West.	甚至在20世纪70年代的停滞时期（增长缓慢、物价上升），问题也被认为是社会民主的过度延伸，而不是西方政治经济学存在根本性缺陷。


That argument cleared the way for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan to scale back the state’s economic role and untether market forces.	这一观点为英国首相撒切尔夫人和美国总统里根缩小国家的经济作用、解放市场力量铺平了道路。


The Thatcher-Reagan correction was an unquestioned success among the moneyed classes that prospered thereafter.	在随后实现繁荣的有钱阶级眼中。 ，撒切尔-里根纠正毫无疑问是一场成功。


It created an ideological consensus that would dominate the public sphere from 1980 to 2010.	它创造了一个主宰1980—2010年公共领域的意识形态共识。


Post-war prosperity also overshadowed the central problems with which Polanyi grappled in the 1930s and 1940s.	战后的繁荣也遮掩了波拉尼在20世纪30年代和40年代所思考的核心问题。


Polanyi accepted that a market society could indeed produce a great deal of material prosperity, but he was concerned that it could only do so by turning people into puppets and playthings of mindless market forces, and that people did not take well to this new role.	波拉尼接受了市场社会确实能够产生大量物质繁荣，但他担心市场社会只能通过让人变为没有思想的市场力量的傀儡和玩具实现这一点，并且人们不能坦然接受这一新角色。


The goal, for Polanyi, was to achieve the prosperity that a market economy generates, without suffering the risks of poverty, creative destruction, and community erosion implied by the operation of market forces.	对波拉尼来说，目标是实现市场经济所创造的繁荣，而免于市场力量操作所隐含的贫困、创造性破坏和社会侵蚀风险。


Crucially, Polanyi warned that if the modern bourgeois order failed at this task, authoritarian and totalitarian political movements would benefit.	关键是，波拉尼警告说，如果现代资产阶级秩序无法完成这一任务，威权和极权政治运动就将受益。


During the post-war period, the fair-weather argument that market-driven prosperity justifies any collateral social pain was taken as a given; it also came to define the consensus view among the moneyed class and its ideological backers.	在战后时期，市场驱动的繁荣证明任何附带社会痛苦都是合理的这一顺境观点被视为理所当然； 它还形成了有钱阶级及其意识形态支持者之间的共识。


This brings us to Tocqueville, who wrote almost two centuries ago, but whose central concerns never went away.	这把我们带到了托克维尔面前，他的写作时代已经过去了近两个世纪，但他的核心担忧从未离我们远去。


Tocqueville focused on the consequences of the destruction of caste as a principle of social and political order.	托克维尔注重作为社会和政治秩序原则的社会等级的破坏的后果。


The big castes – from the supposedly Frankish Nobles of the Sword and Nobles of the Robe to proto-bourgeois merchants and Gallo-Roman villeins – all conferred upon their members small liberties and a measure of personal autonomy in exchange for obligations to the state.	大等级——从传说中的法兰克剑之贵族（Nobles of the Sword）长袍贵族（Nobles of the Robe）到原始资产阶级商人和高卢-罗马隶农——都赋予成员小自由和一定的个人自治权，以换取对国家的义务。


(And, of course, the lower one’s social status, the greater one’s obligations.)	（当然，一个人的社会阶级越低，他的义务越大。 ）


Tocqueville saw this strictly ordered world being replaced by democracy and formal social equality, in which everyone would be equally free, but would also be equally at the mercy of society.	托克维尔看到这一秩序森严的世界被民主和正式的社会平等取代，所有人都平等地自由，但也平等地受社会支配。


In this new setting, no privileges or liberties would protect you if you failed to find a counterparty in the market, or ran afoul of the tyranny of the majority, or simply sought some form of direction as you tried to decide who you were supposed to be.	在这个新的设定中，如果你无法在市场上找到对手方，或站在了多数人的暴政的对立面，或只是在你试图决定应该成为什么样的人时寻求某种形式的方向，没有特权或自由能保护你。


In Tocqueville’s world, the destruction of caste was only partial.	在托克维尔的世界中，等级的消灭只是局部的。


He wrote for white men who knew their nationality, knew what caste membership meant, and knew the privileges such membership brought.	他为知道自己的国籍、知道等级成员资格意味着什么、知道这一资格能带来什么特权的白人男性写作。


In our own time, the destruction of caste and caste privilege is taking another step forward.	在我们的时代，等级和等级特权的消灭正在更进一步。


The period of white males’ political dominion in Western democracies is coming to an end.	白人男性在西方民主国家主宰政坛的时代正在走向结束。


And it is coming to an end at a time when economic populism is replacing technocratic management, often with white males turning to nativism in response to the destruction of their jobs and livelihoods by the impersonal forces of globalization.	而它的结束正逢经济民粹主义正在取代技术官僚管理——常常伴随白人男性面对岗位和生计的被全球化的非人力量破坏而转向本土论。


As we can see in one country after another, the old order won’t give up without a fight.	逐个审视国家，旧秩序不会不做抵抗就放弃。


No old order does.	没有旧秩序会这样做。


But the caste-like privilege of white males is doomed.	但白人男性类似等级的特权已是明日黄花。


The challenge now before us is how best to realize newly available opportunities for human betterment, for the benefit of all.	现在摆在我们面前的挑战是如何最好地实现新出现的机会，为人类造福，让所有人获益。


I can think of few more useful guides to that challenge than Keynes, Polanyi, and Tocqueville.	我想不出有比凯恩斯、波拉尼和托克维尔更好的指引。


Thirty Years of “Test-Tube” Babies	“试管”婴儿之三十年


MELBOURNE – Louise Brown, the first person to be conceived outside a human body, turned 30 last year.	墨尔本-路易斯·布朗,人体外受精而诞生的第一人，去年满30了 。


The birth of a “test-tube baby,” as the headlines described in vitro fertilization was highly controversial at the time.	“试管婴儿” 的诞生，那时的头条新闻中所称为的体外受精，在当时是是极具争议性的。


Leon Kass, who subsequently served as chair of President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics, argued that the risk of producing an abnormal infant was too great for an attempt at IVF ever to be justified.	后来担任小布什政府的生物伦理理事会主席的莱昂·卡斯，由于体外受精认为产生不正常的婴儿的风险过于大，所以对其的尝试无论如何是不能被证明是有理的。


Some religious leaders also condemned the use of modern scientific technology to replace sexual intercourse, even when it could not lead to conception.	一些宗教领袖也谴责利用现代科学技术来取代性交，他们认为即使在不会导致受孕的情况下也不行。


Since then, some three million people have been conceived by IVF, enabling otherwise infertile couples to have the child they longed for.	自那时以来，约有300万人已通过体外受精诞生，使不孕夫妇有了他们渴望的孩子。


The risk of having an abnormal child through IVF has turned out to be no greater than when parents of a similar age conceive though sexual intercourse.	通过体外受精而生出异常孩子的风险概率不会大于年纪相仿的父母通过性交怀孕而出生的孩子。


However, because many IVF practitioners transfer two or three embryos at a time to improve the odds of a pregnancy occurring, twins and higher multiple births are more common, and carry some additional risk.	然而，由于为了增加的怀孕可能性，许多体外受精的的从业人员一次将两个或三个胚胎移入母亲体内，因此双胞胎和多胞胎的现象就更为普遍，也并带来了更多风险。


The Roman Catholic Church has not moved away from its opposition to IVF.	罗马天主教会仍然没有改变反对体外受精的立场。


In a recently released instruction, Dignitas Personae, the Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith objects to IVF on several grounds, including the fact that many embryos are created in the process, and few survive.	在最近发布的“人性尊严”的指示里，教会圣座教义反对体外受精的几个理由，其中包括了因为许多胚胎在这一过程中诞生但却少有生存这一事实。


This outcome is not, however, very different from natural conception, for the majority of embryos conceived by sexual intercourse also fail to implant in the uterine wall, with the woman often not even knowing that she was ever “pregnant.”	但是，这个结果和自然受孕并没有什么大不相同，大多数因性交而受孕的胚胎也并未能成功地植入子宫壁，往往造成一些妇女甚至更本没有意识到她曾“怀孕 ”过


In addition, the Vatican objects to the fact that conception is the result of a “technical action” rather “a specific act of the conjugal union.”	此外，梵蒂冈反对的是由于“技术行为” 而非“婚姻结合中的具体行为”而造成的受孕。 这一事实。


But while any couple would prefer to conceive a child without the intervention of doctors, that option is not available for infertile couples.	不过，虽然每一对夫妻都宁愿在没有医生干预的情况下发生受精怀孕，但这种选择对不育夫妇来说是没有的。


In those circumstances, it is harsh to say to a couple that they cannot have their own genetic child at all.	在这种情况下，向一对夫妇说他们没法拥有带有自己基因的孩子是残酷的。


It also appears contrary to the broad thrust of the Church’s teaching about marriage and the family as the appropriate context for rearing children. Dignitas Personae says that new human life should be “generated through an act which expresses the reciprocal love between a man and a woman.”	这似乎也违背了教会的广泛的主旨，即有关婚姻和家庭才是抚养子女的适当的环境。 “人性尊严”中说，人的新生命的诞生应该“通过表达了一个男人和一个女人相互之间的爱的行为”。


But if by that the Church is referring to sexual intercourse, then it surely has an unduly narrow view of what kinds of acts can express reciprocal love between a man and a woman.	但是，如果教会指的是性交，那么他们肯定对什么样的行为可以表达一个男人和一个女人相互之间的爱的理解过于狭隘了。


Taking the several inconvenient and sometimes unpleasant steps required to have a child together by means of IVF can be, and often is, the result of a much more deliberate and reciprocally loving act than sexual intercourse.	考虑到为了有一个孩子而一起通过体外受精而可能（而且往往确实是）产生的一些不方便、有时还是不愉快的步骤，这个结果的产生，比性交要牵涉到更多的精心设计和相互的爱的行为。


A better objection to IVF is that in a world with millions of orphaned or unwanted children, adoption is a more ethical way of having a child.	更精彩的一种反对体外受精的论点是，世界上有数以百万计的孤儿或弃儿，想要为人父母便可以领养孩子，这种方式更符合伦理道德。


If that is the argument, however, why should we single out couples who use IVF?	如果这个论据成立，那么我们为什么仅仅把矛头指向使用试体外受精的夫妇呢？


Why not, for example, criticize Jim Bob and Michelle Duggar, the Arkansas couple who recently had their 18th child?	为什么不去批评吉姆·鲍勃和米歇尔·达格尔这对最近刚刚生了第18个孩子的来自阿肯色州的夫妇呢的？


Yet Michelle Duggar was named “Young Mother of the Year” in Arkansas in 2004, when she had already given birth to 14 children.	然而，被授予2004年在阿肯色州“年度年轻母亲”的称号时，她已经生下14名孩子。


I haven’t noticed the Vatican telling them that they should be adopting instead of conceiving so many children.	我至今仍未注意到梵蒂冈告诉过他们应该领养而不应该生这么多孩子。


Religious opposition notwithstanding, the use of IVF by infertile couples of normal reproductive age has been widely accepted around the world, and rightly so.	尽管有宗教的反对意见，世界各地广泛接受了正常生育年龄阶段的不孕夫妇尝试体外受精，而这种接受是件好事。


But in countries where the Church’s influence remains strong, IVF’s opponents are fighting back.	但是，在教会影响力依然强大的国家中，体外受精的反对者正在卷土重来。


In Poland, for example, proposed new legislation would drastically restrict its availability.	例如，波兰的正在提议中的新立法将大大限制人工授精的可用性。


Elsewhere, the ethical debate is not about IVF itself, but the limits of its use.	其它地方的伦理上的争议不是体外受精本身，而是对其使用的限制。


Last November, Rajo Devi, a 70-year-old Indian woman, became the world’s oldest mother, thanks to IVF.	去年11月，一名叫诺德维的70岁印度女子，由于体外受精技术，她成了世界上最年老的新生婴儿的母亲。


She and her 72 year-old husband have, she says, longed for a child through 55 years of marriage.	她说，她和她的72岁的丈夫，在55年的婚姻生活中，一直渴望得到一个孩子。


Her husband’s sperm appears to have been used, but news reports are unclear about the source of the egg.	好像她丈夫的精子被使用，但新闻报道没有说清楚卵子的来源。


Some will find it grotesque to become a mother at an age when most women are grandmothers, but the more significant question is what kind of care such children will have if their parents die or become incapable of rearing them.	有些人会觉得在这个年龄生育孩子有点荒唐，因为大多数妇女在这个年纪已经做了祖母了； 但更重要的问题是，如果他们的父母死亡或变得无力抚养他们，这些孩子将得到什么样的照顾呢？


Like many people in rural India, Devi lives in an extended family with other relatives, so she is confident that there would be others to bring up her child if necessary.	和许多印度农村地区的人一样，诺德维和其他亲属生活在一个大家庭中，所以她相信，如果有必要，别人会来帮她带孩子的。


But, as this example suggests, the impact of parental age on a child’s welfare will vary from one culture to another.	但是，正如这个例子所表明的，在不同的文化中，父母的年龄对孩子的福利影响是有所不同的。


Becoming a mother at 70 is more acceptable for someone living in a joint family than it would be for Western couples living in their own home without close relatives or friends nearby.	生活在一个互相关联的大家庭里的70多岁的人成为一个母亲，比起住在自己家里又没有近亲或朋友住在附近的西方夫妇，要更容易被人接受。


This Recovery is Different	本次复苏与以往不同


BRUSSELS – The misguided belief that “this time is different” led policymakers to permit the credit boom of the early 2000’s to continue for too long, thus preparing the ground for the biggest financial crisis in living memory.	发自布鲁塞尔——“这次与以往不同”的错误理念导致政策制定者们纵容2000年代初的信贷繁荣持续时间过长，并因此为我们记忆中最严重的金融危机埋下了伏笔。


But now, when it comes to recovery, the belief that this time should not be different might be equally dangerous.	而今复苏开始之时，那种认为这次不应与以往不同的理念也可能是同样危险的。


Many policymakers and economists have observed that the recovery from the 2007-2008 financial crisis has been much slower than most recoveries of the post-war era, which needed only a little more than a year, on average, to restore output and employment to their previous levels.	许多政策制定者和经济学家都观察到2007-2008金融危机后的复苏要比二战后任何一次复苏都缓慢许多，因为后者平均只需一年多一点就能恢复到先前的产量和就业率水平。


By this standard, the current recovery is unacceptably slow, with both output and employment still below the previous peak.	用这一标准来衡量的话，当前的复苏简直慢得让人无法接受，而产量和就业率水平依旧低于之前的峰值。


Policymakers thus feel justified in using all available macroeconomic levers to achieve a recovery that resembles those of the past.	政策制定者们因此认定应该使用一切宏观经济杠杆去实现一个与从前类似的复苏。


In doing so, officials are reluctant to take into account that the recent crisis resulted from an unprecedented credit boom gone bust. To some extent, it should have been logical to expect an unprecedented upturn as well.	在这种做法下，官员们都不愿去思考最近这场危机其实是由一场史无前例的信贷泡沫爆破所导致的。


When the crisis erupted, many hoped for a V-shaped recovery, notwithstanding a substantial body of research showing that recoveries from recessions caused by a financial crisis tend to be weaker and slower than recoveries from “normal” recessions.	当危机爆发之时，许多人都希望能出现V型复苏，然而一项严谨详实的研究表明由金融危机导致衰退后的复苏要比“常规”衰退后的复苏更为弱势，也更加缓慢。


The observation that recoveries following a financial crisis are different suggests that standard macroeconomic policies might not work as one would usually expect.	对金融危机后复苏特殊性的观察意味着标准的宏观经济政策可能不会向人们通常期望的那样奏效。


And a transatlantic comparison suggests that this may indeed be the case.	而一个针对大西洋两岸状况的比较也说明事实可能就是如此。


One would expect that the shock from the financial crisis should be comparable for the United States and the eurozone, given that they are of similar size, exhibit a similar degree of internal diversity, and experienced a similar increase in house prices (on average) in the years preceding the bust.	人们会预期说金融危机对美国和欧元区的冲击是有可比性的，因为两地国土面积近似，内部差异性程度相近，在泡沫爆发前那些年的住宅价格上升幅度（平均算来）差不多。


Moreover, the relative increase in debt (leverage) in the financial system was similar on both sides of the Atlantic.	此外，两岸金融系统中债务（杠杆）的相对增幅也是相近的。


And, indeed, US economic performance has been very similar to that of the eurozone since the start of the crisis: GDP per capita today is still about 2% below the 2007 level on both sides of the Atlantic.	事实上，美国经济的表现自危机爆发以来都与欧元区非常类似：两岸如今的人均GDP依然比2007年水平低2%。


The unemployment rate in the US and the eurozone has increased by about the same amount as well – three percentage points.	美国和欧元区的失业率也出现了近乎相同幅度的上升——3%。


Of course, one can point to particular countries in Europe that are mired in recession.	当然，人们可以指出欧洲某些国家衰退的幅度较深。


But the US also has depressed areas.	但美国国内也有特别困难的地区。


For Ireland and Spain, read Nevada and California (and, for Greece, read Puerto Rico).	内华达州和加利福尼亚州可以对应爱尔兰和西班牙（波多黎各则可以与希腊相提并论）。


The proper comparison is thus between the average of two continental-sized economies, both of which are characterized by considerable internal diversity.	因此恰当的比较将在两个洲际规模的经济体中展开，而且两者都有着相当程度的内部差异。


These similarities in economic performance are striking, given that macroeconomic policy in the US and the eurozone has been so different.	考虑到美国和欧元区的宏观经济政策是如此不同，这些经济表现上的相似性是相当令人震惊的。


The US let its fiscal deficit rise above 10% of GDP, compared to less than 6% of GDP in the eurozone.	美国让其财政赤字上升到相当于GDP10%以上的水平，而欧元区的数字则是6%。


Measured over a five-year period (2007-2012), the US has thus not done any better than the eurozone, although it has relied on a much larger dose of fiscal expansion.	以连续5年（2007-2012）的数据来衡量的话，虽然美国在财政扩张方面动作极大，但其表现并不比欧元区要好。


In the US (and the United Kingdom), the general government deficit today is still around 8% of GDP, compared to a little more than 3% of GDP in the eurozone, and the US debt/GDP ratio has increased by more than 41 percentage points, compared to “only” 25 points in the eurozone.	美国（和英国）的总体政府赤字依然在8%左右，而欧元区只有3%多一点，美国的债务/GDP比率已经上升了超过41%，而欧元区“仅为”25%。


In fact, the economy that has imbibed the strongest dose of expansionary policy has recovered less: GDP per capita in the UK today is still 6% below the 2007 level.	事实上，扩张性政策最为大手笔的经济体却复苏较慢：当今英国的人均GDP水平依旧比2007年低6%。


Of course, one could argue that the UK was particularly exposed to the bust, because financial services make up a large part of its GDP.	当然有人可以争辩说英国受灾尤其严重，因为该国GDP的很大一部分都是由金融服务业贡献的。


But the fact remains that its economy, supposedly the most flexible in Europe, has not recovered from the shock five years later, despite massive fiscal and monetary stimulus, coupled with a substantial devaluation.	但问题是尽管使用了大规模的财政和货币刺激政策，加上实质性的货币贬值，堪称欧洲灵活性最大的英国经济也未能在5年后从危机中恢复过来。


On balance, it thus seems that this time – or, rather, this post-crisis environment – really is different, and that macroeconomic policies have done little to improve matters.	综上所述，似乎本次——或者说这个后危机环境——确实是不一样的，而宏观经济政策也未能令情况得到多少改善。


Countries like the US and the UK, which are accumulating debt at a record pace, are betting that deficit spending will eventually pay off in a stronger economy.	像美国和英国这样不断以破纪录的速度累积着债务的国家正在进行一场赌博，赌这些赤字消费能最终在一个更强大的经济中得以偿还。


But they risk ending up with debt/GDP ratios north of 100%, which would leave them at the mercy of financial markets should sentiment turn against them.	但它们也冒着债务/GDP比率超过100%的风险，一旦市场情绪向不利方向转换，就只能任由市场摆布了。


History suggests that interest rates will not remain at record-low levels indefinitely, and that when change comes, it might be abrupt.	历史经验告诉我们利率不会无限期地保持在一个破纪录的低位，而当变化到来之时，它的变动可能是极为剧烈的。


Why should we expect this time to be different?	那我们又为何要寄望这次会与以往不同？


Thailand’s Democratic Disorder	泰国的民主无序


BANGKOK – From Thailand to Turkey to Ukraine, the relationship between ruling majorities and electoral minorities has become combustible – and is threatening to erode the legitimacy of democracy itself.	曼谷—从泰国到土耳其到乌克兰，执政的多数派和少数派选民之间的关系十分紧张——甚至威胁到了民主合法性本身。


The unfolding crisis in Bangkok – where a political minority has taken to the streets to bring down Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s democratically elected government – is a case in point.	发酵中的曼谷危机——政治少数派走上街头意图推翻总理英拉的民选政府——便是很好的例子。


Yingluck’s Pheu Thai Party (PTP) won an outright majority in Thailand’s 2011 general election, gaining 265 MPs in the 500-member lower house.	英拉的为泰党（Pheu Thai Party）在2011年泰国大选中获得绝对多数，在500个席位的下院中获得265席。


But the opposition Democratic Party – which returned 159 MPs, mainly from Bangkok and southern Thailand – has lately been staging protests in the capital.	但反对党民主党——获得159席，主要来自曼谷和泰国南部——最近一直在首都举行示威。


The so-called “People’s Committee for Democratic Reform” – led by former Democratic Party MP Suthep Thaugsuban and supported by the Bangkok-based establishment – has effectively attempted to stage a coup.	所谓的“民主改革人民委员会”（People’s Committee for Democratic Reform，由前民主党议员特素班（Suthep Thaugsuban）领导并获得曼谷势力���支持）实际上在尝试一场政变。


The protests began when the government tried to enact amnesty legislation that would have overturned the conviction of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra – Yingluck’s brother and the PTP’s founder, who was overthrown by the military in 2006 – on charges of corruption and abuse of power.	示威的起因是政府试图实施大赦，取消前总理他信——英拉之兄、为泰党创始人，2006年被军队推翻——身上的腐败和滥用权力罪名。


(It also would have superseded the murder charges brought against the Democratic Party’s leader, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.)	（同时也将取消针对民主党领袖、前总理阿披实的谋杀罪名。


But Yingluck’s subsequent attempt to backtrack on the amnesty measure failed to mollify the opposition.	）但英拉随后收回特赦的努力并未平息反对浪潮。


In fact, the street protests intensified, fueled by a new grievance.	事实上，街头示威因为新的仇恨而被强化和放大了。


The Yingluck government had refused to accept the Constitutional Court’s ruling against a bill to change the senate from a half-appointed to a fully elected chamber.	英拉政府拒绝接受宪法法院关于不准许将半指定性质的参议院变为全部由选举产生的法律的判决。


The government asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction over constitutional amendments.	政府声称宪法法院没有超越宪法修正案的司法管辖权。


The People’s Committee viewed this rejection as an attempt to pressure the king into countersigning the law – and thus as a threat to royal prerogatives and the king’s exalted role in Thailand.	人民委员会认为这一拒绝行为是为了施压国王签署这项法律——因此威胁到了王权和国王在泰国的崇高地位。


The People’s Committee’s position deserves explanation, if not agreement.	即使不同意，人民委员会的立场也值得一论。


Since the turn of the century, Thaksin’s party machines, powered by his populist policies, have overcome constant challenges – from both the military and the Constitutional Court – to beat the conservative-royalist Democrats in every election.	自世纪之交以来，他信的政党机器利用民粹主义政策克服了来自军队和宪法法院的一直存在的挑战，在每一次选举中都击败了忠于国王的保守的民主党。


Opposition forces, fed up as much with Thaksin’s corrupt practices as with his longstanding popularity, have recently begun seizing government ministries and calling for a royally appointed government.	反对势力的崛起既是因为他信的腐败行为，也是因为他长期获得群众支持。 最近，反对党派开始冲击政府部门，要求由国王任命政府。


If they succeed, PTP supporters will likely descend on Bangkok, much as they did in 2009-2010, after a “judicial coup” dissolved Thaksin’s People’s Power Party, the PTP’s predecessor, and the Democrats formed a coalition government.	如果他们成功，为泰党支持者就可能在曼谷失势，一如2009—2010年在“司法政变”解散了他信的人民力量党（People’s Power Party，为泰党的前身）、民主党组建临时政府后所发生的事情。


But, this time, the protesters will be even angrier, and the stakes will be much higher, because the monarchy’s role in Thailand’s electoral democracy will be called into question.	但是，此次示威者的愤怒更有过之，赌注也比上一次高得多，因为王权在泰国选举民主中的角色正在遭受考验。


The mere plausibility of such an outcome underscores Thailand’s deep political polarization.	仅仅是这一结果的可能性已凸显出泰国深刻的政治两极分化。


The PTP’s supporters are happy with a system that grants them a political voice – indeed, predictable electoral majorities – and that safeguards their rights.	为泰党支持者乐见能让他们发出政治声音——事实上，还有可以预见的选民多数——和保卫他们的权利的制度。


But the minority – which comprises up to two-fifths of the electorate – is at a loss.	但少数派——大约占选民的五分之二——对此不满。


Its legitimacy and influence depend not on winning electoral majorities, but on its strong alliances with the military, bureaucracy, and judiciary in defense of a traditional hierarchy that places the king at its apex.	他们的合法性和影响力并不取决于赢得选举多数，而是取决于与军队、官僚和司法系统的强大联盟，他们联合起来捍卫着以国王为最高层的传统层级制。


Making matters worse, voters on both sides are tuning in only to views with which they agree, rather than attempting to understand and reconcile opposing arguments.	更糟糕的是，两边的选民眼里都只有自己所认可的观点，而不是试图理解和调和反对观点。


Social media – the much-lauded catalyst of democratization in authoritarian countries – has exacerbated the trend toward polarization in Thailand, just as it has in other electoral democracies that are struggling with a widening majority-minority divide, like Turkey and Malaysia.	社会媒体——常常被歌颂为独裁国家中的民主催化剂——助长了这一将泰国向两极分化推进的趋势，一如它们在其他多数-少数分歧愈演愈烈的选举民主国家所扮演的角色（比如土耳其和马来西亚）。


In emerging democracies, electoral minorities tend to be tied to the old establishment, and often oppose change led by popular upstarts.	在新兴民主国家，少数派选民总是倾向于与旧制度结成同盟，并且往往反对受群众支持的崛起者所领导的改变。


Feeling marginalized and resentful, they may turn to public platforms like social media and the streets to advance their causes and undermine their opponents’ authority.	他们因为觉得被边缘化而心怀愤恨，因此会转向社会媒体等公共平台和街头去主张他们的看法、破坏被反对者的权威。


The proliferation of information technology, together with the unprecedented popular participation that it has fueled, means that electoral minorities have a growing number of increasingly powerful tools at their disposal to organize movements aimed at paralyzing their countries’ governments and even shortening leaders’ terms in office.	信息技术的遍地开花及其所助长的前所未有的公共参与意味着少数派选民拥有了越来越多的越来越强大的工具来组织旨在让国家政府陷入瘫痪甚至缩短国家领导人执政时间的运动。


Indeed, with so much seemingly at stake, a four- or five-year term may seem too long to wait for change.	事实上，由于其中所牵涉的利益太大，四年或五年的任期对于等待改变的人来说太长了。


But, while the right to peaceful protest is critically important in a democracy, electoral minorities should not use endless demonstrations to take the political system hostage.	但是，尽管和平示威权是民主的关键重要部分，少数派选民也不应该利用无限制的示威来绑架政治制度。


In order to create a peaceful, stable, and effective democratic system, electoral minorities must accept the ballot box as the arbiter of political legitimacy.	为了创造和平、稳定、有效的政治制度，少数派选民必须接受选票箱作为政治和发行的裁判。


At the same time, majorities should not view an electoral victory as a license to act without regard for minority concerns.	与此同时，多数派不应该将选举胜利视为可以无视少数派顾虑采取行动的通行证。


While the government must deliver for its constituents, it must also protect its opponents’ rights.	尽管政府必须对支持它的选民负责，但也必须保护反对者的权利。


To this end, Thailand urgently needs a new social contract that allows elected representatives to do their jobs, without marginalizing the establishment-based minority.	在这方面，泰国迫切地需要新的社会契约，让当选代表做好自己的工作，同时又不导致依赖现状的少数派被边缘化。


Increasingly complex majority-minority dynamics are shaping the democratization prospects of a number of countries, and could influence democracy’s durability as a system of government.	越来越复杂的多数派-少数派互动正在影响许多国家的民主前景，并可能影响民主作为一种政治制度的持续性。


Thailand’s experience suggests that efforts to subvert the system by thwarting the will of the majority may ultimately be fruitless, though not before imposing extremely high costs on everyone.	泰国的经验表明，通过阻挠多数派意愿颠覆制度的举动最终不会产生效果，只能徒然给所有人带来及其高昂的成本。


Climate and Competitiveness	气候与竞争力


BERLIN – As Europe’s debt crisis fades, another economic disaster seems to be looming – the price of energy.	发自柏林——随着欧洲债务危机的消退，另一场经济灾难似乎迫在眉睫——能源价格。


Since the early 2000’s, average electricity prices for Europe’s industries have more or less doubled, and European companies now pay twice as much for gas as their US competitors do.	21世纪初至今，欧洲工业的平均电价大概已经翻了一番，目前欧洲企业正在使用的天然气价格相当于其美国竞争对手的两倍。


Are Europe’s highly ambitious climate policies – which seek to increase costs for “bad” energy sources – destroying the continent’s industrial base?	是欧洲雄心勃勃的气候政策——试图增加使用“坏”能源的成本——毁坏了欧洲大陆的工业基础吗？


At first glance, the numbers seem to support the doomsayers.	乍一看，数据似乎倾向于那些悲观的预言者。


How can such a huge price gap not have an impact on competitiveness?	如此巨大的价格差距怎能不影响竞争力呢？


But if high energy prices lead to declining exports, how is it that Germany, which boasts some of the world’s most ambitious climate policies, has doubled its exports since 2000?	但是，如果说能源价格高企导致了出口下降，那拥有某些世界上最激进气候政策的德国又如何从2000年起出口量增加了一倍？


In fact, empirical evidence shows that in many cases, further reducing carbon-dioxide emissions might help to make industries more competitive.	事实上，经验证据表明，在许多情况下，进一步减少二氧化碳的排放量可能有助于提升产业竞争力。


Exploring this potential could open up significant opportunities not only to combat climate change, but also to foster Europe’s long-term economic robustness.	开发这一潜能可以带来很多机遇，不仅能应对气候变化，同时也促进欧洲经济的长期稳定性。


Since 2005, when the European Union introduced its Emissions Trading System, German industry has achieved massive gains in market share, despite energy prices having risen much faster than in the US and elsewhere.	自2005年欧盟引入排放交易系统以来，尽管能源价格上涨的速度远超美国和其他地方，德国工业依然大幅提升了其市场份额。


According to OECD estimates, the relative export performance of high-cost Germany increased by 10% from 2005 to 2013, while US exports grew only 1.2% faster than demand in the rest of the world.	根据经合组织的统计，从2005年到2013年，高成本的德国出口业绩相对增加了10%，，而美国的出口量仅比世界其它地区的需求增长快了1. 2%。


In 2013, both German and US exports fell slightly in relative terms – hardly a sign of an energy-driven competitiveness divide.	2013年，德国和美国的出口量相对而言略有下降——几乎没有证据表明不同的能源驱动竞争力会产生任何区别。


The same holds true, though at a more modest level, even for energy-intensive industries, like chemicals.	即使处于较温和的水平，但甚至是像化学工业这样的能源密集型行业，这个理论同样适用。


Despite already-high and rising energy prices, Europe’s chemical industry has grown at about the same rate as the rest of the economy since 1995.	尽管高能源价格不断上涨，但1995年至今，欧洲化学工业仍然跟其他地区几乎同步增长。


Today, EU chemical companies specialize in high-value products, and Europe exports much more of them than it imports.	今天，欧盟化学品公司专门生产高附加值产品，欧洲化学品的出口量要比进口量多得多。


The reason is simple: there is more – much more – to competitiveness than energy prices.	原因很简单：竞争力比能源价格重要得多——而且是非常多。


Indeed, estimates for Germany show that for most of its industrial base, energy costs account for a mere 1.6% of gross value added.	事实上，德国的统计数据表明大多数工业基地的能源成本只占总附加值的1. 6%左右。


Thus, even rapidly rising energy prices imply only a limited additional cost burden for firms.	因此，即使能源价格迅速上涨，也只意味着企业相当有限的额外成本负担。


Of course, this burden is higher for industries such as chemicals.	当然，对化学工业来说这种负担会更高。


But energy-intensive industries usually benefit from exemptions on carbon charges.	但能源密集型行业通常受益于碳排放费用豁免。


And, even in these sectors, competitiveness must be defined in a much broader sense than that given simply by comparing cost statistics.	而且，即使在这些领域，竞争力必须取决于更广泛的因素而非简单的成本数据对比。


For example, factors like highly qualified labor, or the benefits of being integrated into well-functioning clusters, probably play a more important role.	例如，像高素质劳动力等因素，或者整合进入运行良好的产业集群中所带来的好处，或许都发挥着更重要的作用。


Clearly, such considerations provide no guarantee that rising energy prices will not at some point seriously challenge European competitiveness.	显然，这样的考量并不能保证能源价格上涨不会在某些方面严重影响欧洲的竞争力。


Indeed, new investment in chemical plants has grown only slowly for years now.	事实上，化工厂的新投资增长已经放缓多年了。


But, while this risk must be taken seriously, history suggests that there may well be a way out that does not require rolling back climate policies.	虽然必须认真对待这种风险，但历史表明，这可能是一条不错的出路，没必要撤销气候政策。


What is notable is that rising energy prices have been accompanied not only by relatively robust competitiveness, but also by huge reductions in CO2 emissions.	值得注意的是，能源价格的上涨不仅伴随着相对强劲的竞争力，而且使得二氧化碳排放量大幅减少。


Europe’s chemical industry has halved its greenhouse-gas emissions compared to 1990, while increasing output by 20%.	相比1990年，欧洲化工行业的温室气体排放量减少了一半，同时产量增加了20%。


This suggests that rapidly reducing emissions may sometimes even help to maintain a firm’s competitiveness.	这表明，迅速减少排放，有时甚至可以帮助公司保持竞争力。


In a pilot study on specific chemical products for the European Climate Foundation, experts from McKinsey identified the potential for a further 50-75% reduction in CO2 emissions.	在欧洲气候基金会对特定化学产品的试点研究中，来自麦肯锡的专家确认二氧化碳排放量存在进一步减少50-75%的潜力。


Moreover, in an estimated 60-70% of cases, exploring the additional abatement opportunity would have no effect – or would even strengthen – the industry’s competitiveness.	此外，在减排约60-70%的情况下，探索更多的减排机会将不会影响——或者甚至能增强——行业的竞争力。


This is because greater reliance on recycling, for example, reduces costs – and thus enhances companies’ competitiveness – while reducing emissions and driving new approaches like cross-sector innovation.	这是因为更多的回收利用，例如，降低成本——从而提高企业的竞争力——减少排放量会促进新手段的产生，如驱动跨部门的创新。


It would certainly not be wise to allow Europe’s energy bill to explode in the name of ambitious climate policies.	以激进的气候政策为名任由欧洲的能源账单超标当然是不明智的。


There are smarter ways to reduce emissions than just raising costs for industry and consumers.	有明智的方法来减少排放而不是仅仅增加企业和消费者的成本。


But it would be equally senseless to push for less ambitious policies, thereby stalling progress in the fight against climate change, without being sure that doing so would improve European competitiveness.	但施行不那么激进的政策同样毫无意义，那只会阻碍对抗气候变化的进程，并且也无法保证这样做能提高欧洲的竞争力。


The new paradigm should focus on finding ways to reduce CO2 emissions in ways that ultimately help to produce better products at lower cost.	新的范式应着眼于寻找最终有助于以较低成本生产出更好产品的，减少二氧化碳排放量的方式。


This will also help European producers capture new markets in emerging countries, which will increasingly demand the high-value chemical products that Europe already produces competitively.	这也将有助于欧洲生产者占据新兴国家的新市场，这些新市场对欧洲已经拥有竞争优势的高价值化工产品有着越来越高的需求。


The last thing a crisis-weary Europe needs is a new competitiveness gap.	最后就是，饱受危机折磨的欧洲需要一个新的竞争力飞跃。


But ambitious climate targets, as Germany and other successful European economies have shown, are not the problem. They could even be part of the solution.	德国和其他欧洲国家的成功已经证明，雄心勃勃的气候目标没有问题，它们甚至可以成为解决方案的一部分。


Threading the Fiscal Needle	穿好财政这根针


PALO ALTO – Elections often turn on the state of the economy, especially in hard times.	帕罗奥图—经济通常会左右选举，特别是在世道不景气的时候。


When growth and jobs are down, voters throw out incumbents – whether Spanish leftists, French rightists, or Dutch centrists.	当增长和就业走下坡路的时候，选民就会把现任政府赶下台，不管是西班牙左翼、法国右翼还是荷兰中间派。


The United States is no exception.	美国也不例外。


Three years into the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover was trounced by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.	大萧条爆发三年后，胡佛被富兰克林·罗斯福取而代之。


In 1980, following a severe bout of stagflation, Ronald Reagan routed Jimmy Carter.	1980年，在经历了严重的经济停滞后，里根把卡特赶下了总统宝座。


At the same time, economic performance depends to a considerable extent on economic policy.	与此同时，经济表现在很大程度上取决于经济政策。


The Great Depression was intensified by poor monetary policy, tax hikes, and protectionist trade policies.	大萧条因拙劣的货币政策、增税和保护主义贸易政策而恶化。


Likewise, loose US monetary policy in the middle of the last decade helped to set the stage for the Great Recession by contributing significantly to an explosion of leverage and fueling the housing bubble that burst in 2007-2008.	类似地，过去十年中期美国宽松的货币政策大大提高了经济的杠杆率，助长了房地产泡沫，这个泡沫在2007—2008年破裂，引发了大衰退。


The outcome of two related policy battles will be key to the economic and political outlook in both the US and Europe.	两大相关政策之争将对美国和欧洲的经济和政治前景形成关键影响。


The first is between “austerity” and “growth” – that is, short-term deficit reduction and additional fiscal stimulus.	第一个政策之争是“紧缩”和“增长”，即短期赤字削减和增加财政刺激。


Many on the left, on both sides of the Atlantic, argue that more, not less, government spending is required to lift their economies out of recession.	大西洋两岸的左派均认为，增加（而不是减少）政府支出对于将经济拉出衰退是必不可少的。


Those on the right believe that governments’ top priority should be fiscal consolidation.	右派则认为，政府的第一要务应该是财政整合。


In Europe, large deficits and exploding debt-to-GDP ratios have alarmed creditors and provoked political tension.	在欧洲，巨额赤字和债务-GDP比率的飙升已经引起了债权人的警觉，激发了政治紧张。


In particular, Germany demands more fiscal belt-tightening from heavily indebted Southern European countries, whose unions (and voters) are rejecting further austerity.	特别是德国要求重债南欧国家采取更多的财政紧缩，而后者的工会（还有选民）拒绝这样做。


While the US has thus far avoided the bond market’s wrath, American political leaders confront the same problem of debt and fiscal sustainability.  	美国尽管离债券市场沸腾还相去甚远，其领导人也面临着同样的债务和财政可持续性问题。


The second battle involves long-run structural issues: slowing the growth of government spending, reforming taxes, and increasing labor-market flexibility.	第二个政策之争是长期结构性问题：减慢政府支出增长速度、改革税制，并增加劳动力市场弹性。


In Europe, for example, raising the retirement age for public pensions and shrinking government employment would curtail welfare-state excesses.	比如，在欧洲，提高可领取公共退休金的退休年龄并削减政府部门就业人数将减轻福利国家负担。


In the US, Reagan’s victory in 1980 appeared to signal that America would stop well short of the European social-welfare model.	在美国，里根在1980年大选中的胜出表明美国不会走欧洲社会福利模式的老路。


But President Barack Obama and his congressional allies have rejected the consensus that government should be only a last resort for those in need, in favor of greater dependence, for both individuals and firms, on entitlement programs and other public spending, targeted tax breaks, regulations, and loans.	但奥巴马及其国会盟友拒绝了政府应该仅充当弱势群体最后援助者这一共识，而支持个人和企业更加依赖福利项目和其他公共支出、定向减税、监管和贷款。


Separating the budget’s effects on the economy from those of the economy on the budget is tricky.	分清预算对经济的影响和经济对预算的影响是很复杂的。


There are several cases – Ireland and Denmark in the 1980’s, for example – in which fiscal consolidation helped to expand the economy in the short run, as lower interest and exchange rates boosted confidence enough to stimulate demand.	不少例子——比如20世纪80年代的爱尔兰和丹麦——表明，财政整合在短期有助于经济扩张，因为更低的利率和汇率带来的信心提振足以刺激需求。


Of course, if many of the world’s economies attempt to consolidate simultaneously, with interest rates already low and some of the largest in a monetary union, such a favorable result is less likely.	当然，如果世界上多个国家同时开始财政整合，与此同时，利率已经十分低，且一些最大经济体同处一个货币联盟，那么就不太可能产生有利的结果。


But the evidence on whether additional deficit-financed spending would quickly revive economic growth is mixed.	但在增加赤字融资支出是否能够快速提振经济增长方面，正反面的例子都有。


In a recent survey, “Fiscal Policy for Economic Growth,” I concluded that short-run multipliers – the total change in economic activity resulting from higher government spending – could theoretically be as large as two when the central bank has reduced its target interest rate to zero.	最���新调查报告《旨在经济增长的财政政策》（Fiscal Policy for Economic Growth）中，我推论道，短期乘数——由更高的政府支出带来的经济活动的总体变化——在理论上可以达到2，如果央行将其政策利率降低到零的话。


In other words, one dollar spent by the government could boost GDP by two dollars in the very short run.	换句话说，政府所花的1美元可以在极短期内让GDP增加2美元。


The catch is that the multiplier turns negative by year two: extra government spending contracts, rather than expands, medium-term and long-term economic growth.	问题在于，从第2年开始，乘数就会变负：增加政府支出会抑制而不是扩张中期和长期经济增长。


Moreover, the short-run effect is lower in highly indebted countries, and can even be negative during economic expansions if households and firms, expecting higher taxes to pay for future spending, save, rather than spend, the cash.	此外，重债国的短期效果也会打一个折扣，甚至在经济扩张期内变成负值，如果预期未来支出税会有所提高的家庭和企业将现金储蓄起来而不是花掉的话。


Postponing fiscal consolidation risks aborting it, but consolidating too aggressively risks temporarily hindering growth.	叫停财政整合可能会导致它半途而废，但整合太猛又有可能会暂时拖累增长。


But those now demanding further deficit-financed stimulus must confront considerable evidence that an overhang of public debt impedes growth for a long time.	但现在要求更多债务融资刺激的人需要面对数不清的证据：公共债务过高会在相当长的时期内阻碍增长。


In a recent paper following up on their book This Time is Different, the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded that debt/GDP ratios above 90% tend to be associated with an annual growth slowdown of a full percentage point for 23 years.	经济学家莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）在他们的书《这次不同了》（This Time is Different）出版后发表的一篇最新论文中指出，债务/GDP比率超过90%将伴随着经济增长在23年里减速整整一个百分点。


Thus, a debt overhang cumulatively costs more in lost income than a deep recession does.	因此，过度举债最终的累积成本将超过深度衰退带来的收入损失。


Wise policy simultaneously considers short-, medium-, and long-term effects.	明智的政策同时考虑短期、中期和长期效应。


Both Europe and the US badly need long-run reforms, for example, of public pensions and health care.	比如，美国和欧洲都急需长期的退休金和医疗改革。


Europe requires structural labor-market reform and must resolve its sovereign-debt overhang, banking crises, and the euro’s future.	欧洲需要进行结构性劳动力市场改革并必须解决主权债务过度、银行危机以及欧元区未来的问题。


America must reform its tax code to raise revenue across a wider array of people and economic activity (half the US population pays no federal income tax, and the tax code either excludes or favorably treats many income sources).	美国必须改革其税法，以期从更多的人和更广的经济活动中征收更多的收入（一半美国人口不用缴纳联邦所得税，现行税法要么将多种收入源排除在纳税范围外，要么给予了税收优惠）。


Over the next several years – the medium term – all countries should implement difficult-to-reverse fiscal consolidation, which would persuade the private sector that a gradual or delayed adjustment, primarily on the spending side of the budget, will occur.	在未来几年中——即中期——所有国家都必须实施难以逆转的财政整合，这将让私人部门相信，渐近和被推迟的调整（主要是预算的支出方面）最终将发生。


Successful consolidation generally relies on spending cuts rather than tax increases – indeed, at a ratio of five or six to one.	总的来说，成功的整合需依靠支出削减，而不是税收增加——事实上，这两个方面的权重应该是五比一或六比一。


The US in the 1980’s and 1990’s reduced spending by 5% of GDP and balanced its budget while growing strongly.	20世纪80年代和90年代，美国削减了相当于5%GDP的支出，在保证增长强劲的同时实现了预算平衡。


Canada, in the past two decades, has decreased spending by 8% of GDP and similarly prospered.	加拿大在过去20年中削减了相当于8%GDP，也获得了相同的繁荣。


In the short run, spending flexibility is appropriate only if medium- and long-term measures are in place.	从短期看，只有在中长期措施就绪的情况下，支出弹性才有合适性可言。


That compromise – between Germany and Southern Europe, and between US Republicans and Democrats – should be economically and politically feasible.	这一妥协——在德国与南欧之间以及美国共和党与民主党之间——应该兼具经济和政治可行性。


With many citizens now struggling, political leaders face a daunting task: adopt credible medium- and long-term reforms without derailing the economy in the short term.	如今，许多公民的日子都不好过，政治领导人面临着棘手的任务：采取可信的中长期改革，同时又得保证经济在短期内不会脱轨。


They have little economic – and perhaps even less political – margin for error.	他们没有多少犯错的经济空间，政治空间就更少了。


The Three Fears Sinking Global Markets	打压全球市场的三大担忧