So it is important to consider the causes of underinsurance and whether our insurance institutions are adequate to the risks that we face.	因此，我们很有必要去探寻不足额保险背后的各种原因以及我们的保险体系是否足以处理将要面对的各种风险。


According to a report from the Insurance Information Institute, nearly 70% of homeowners’ claims in Louisiana were settled by the end of January, for a total of $7.5 billion dollars.	保险资讯中心的一份报告显示，截至1月份，路易斯安纳州将近70％的屋主都已得到赔偿，赔偿总额达75亿美元。


Sounds good, but there were roughly 200,000 homes that were either severely damaged or destroyed, so the total amounts to less than $40,000 per home – far below what was needed.	这听起来不错，但遭受严重毁坏或彻底毁坏的房屋达200，000座，因此平均每户只能得到不到40,000美元的赔偿费――这距离需要还远远不够。


Indeed, a large share of New Orleans homeowners – 60% in Orleans Parish – were completely uninsured against floods.	确实，新奥尔良大部分屋主――60％是住在新奥尔良的居民――完全没有为洪水投保。


Many of those who were insured discovered that clauses in their policies barred them from collecting full benefits.	那些投保的屋主发现他们保单上的条款使其无法享受到全额赔偿。


In some cases, insurance companies argued that houses were damaged by flood, not wind, which their policies cover more generously.	在有些案例中，保险公司声称房屋毁坏的原因是洪水而非大风； 而对于大风带来的损失，他们愿意慷慨赔付。


That may seem like capricious hair-splitting to people who have suffered a major loss, but such terms are in the insurance contracts that they signed, whether they understood them or not.	对这些遭受严重损失的人们来说，这是在细枝末节上纠缠，而且结论不定。 但这就是他们签下的保险合同，不管他们是否真的看懂了。


Claims disputes have led to many lawsuits, and many of those who have lost their homes have discovered that the only help available to them now is a low-interest loan.	保费引发的争执很多上了法庭，很多房屋遭受毁坏的人们发现，唯一可能提供帮助的是低息贷款。


Not unreasonably, President George W. Bush wants government grants to bail out only the approximately 20,000 homeowners who can’t be faulted for failing to buy flood insurance, because they lived outside the designated flood plains.	并不奇怪，乔治·W·布什政府只愿为将近20，000位屋主赔偿损失； 这些屋主确实不需因未投保而受到任何指责，因为他们并不住在洪泛区。


Despite the disappointments, private insurance is still the best way to deal with possible future disasters.	尽管有诸多不满，个人保险仍然是对付未来灾难的最好方法。


Insurance policies that clearly specify the amounts that will be paid and the types of damage that will be covered are far better than the government-administered, after-the-fact bailout that many people seem to have expected.	明晰赔付金额以及可赔付的损失种类的保险确实要比很多人所期待的政府事后援助好很多。


Adequate private insurance can be boosted in the future through public education, improved insurance institutions, and lower insurance costs.	充分的个人保险将来可以通过公众教育、保险制度的改善、以及降低保险费等措施来实现。


We need to work on all of these agendas, because each must be part of any new plan to deal with the next catastrophe.	我们需要为以上这些而努力，因为其中每一项都需要被列入为下一场灾难而制定的新规划中。


The cost of insurance may be the most serious problem.	保险费是最重要的问题。


According to estimates by Robert Klein of Georgia State University, homeowners’ insurance premiums in Louisiana had already gone up by 70% between 1997 and 2005.	据佐治亚州立大学的罗伯特·克莱因测算，路易斯安纳州的保费在1997至2005年间提高了70%。


State insurance regulators resist rate increases, but they are ultimately powerless, because insurers can simply take their business elsewhere.	该州保险监管者反对提高保费，但他们并无实权，因为保险公司可以到其他地方开业。


The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) proposed in December that each of America’s 50 states should establish a disaster insurance fund to cover a wide range of big calamities.	全美保险总监协会在12月份提议，美国50个州各自设立灾害保险基金来赔付重大灾害所造成的各种损失。


The funds – modeled after similar funds in France and Spain – would be designed to cover the biggest, once-in-fifty-years catastrophes.	这项效仿法国和西班牙的基金将用于那些最为严重的，50年一遇的重大灾害。


The federal government would then augment the protection up to the once-in-five-hundred-year level.	联邦政府则要将其保障制度提高到500年一遇的重大灾害上。


The NAIC’S proposal is now under discussion.	全美保险总监协会的提议正在讨论中。


If it were fully implemented, which is unlikely, it would constitute a revolution in risk management in the US similar to that of the creation of Social Security in 1934.	如果该提案被充分执行（看似不可能），它将成为美国风险管理的一项重大革命，可以与1934年的社会保障计划相媲美。


But preparation for catastrophe does not have to reside exclusively with the government.	但预防灾害并不一定非要依靠政府。


Mega-disaster risks can be handled with private financial markets, as long as these markets manage to get the full attention and interest of portfolio investors.	重大灾害的风险可以通过个人金融市场来解决，只要这些市场得到投资组合的投资者们充分的重视和兴趣。


Consider catastrophe bonds (or “cat bonds”), which contain clauses that stipulate that the issuer of the bond (the borrower) does not have to repay the money if a specified catastrophe occurs.	我们可以考虑巨灾债券，这种债券规定当某种特定灾难发生时，债券购买者不必还债。


The bonds can be sold to a worldwide market by insurance companies that incur major risks by writing policies.	这些债券可以通过那些凭书面保单进行重大风险赔付的保险公司在全世界发行。


If the insurance companies can get a good enough price for such bonds, they can eliminate their exposure to the risk of a major disaster, thereby allowing them to issue policies to homeowners at a lower cost.	如果保险公司能够在这些债券上得到不错的价格，他们便不必承担重大灾害的风险，因而可以低价为屋主投保。


Cat bonds have been growing in importance in recent years.	近几年，巨灾债券的重要性越来越大。


According to estimates by Lane Financial, there were $1.8 billion worth of cat bonds issued in the year April 2004-March 2005.	据Lane Financial估算，2004年4月至2005年3月间，共有价值18亿美元的巨灾债券发行。


Since Katrina, issuance has accelerated.	卡特里娜飓风发生后，保险业呈上升势头。


In the first three post-Katrina months alone (September to December 2005), $2.1 billion were issued.	单单卡特里娜飓风过后的三个月里（2005年9月至12月）便发行了21亿美元。


The total value of outstanding cat bonds is small by Katrina standards.	根据卡特里娜飓风的灾害水平，现在发行的债券总额仍然很小。


But the trend towards increasing sophistication and breadth of our financial markets suggests that we can expect to see much further growth in cat bonds.	但以目前的趋势，我们金融市场正在加强其深度与广度，因此我们可以期待巨灾债券的进一步发展。


Ultimately, even Hurricane Katrina and other disasters of similar magnitude are small by world standards.	最终，从全世界来看，即便是卡特里娜飓风以及其他类似的灾害仍然不足为奇。


The total insured property loss of Katrina, $34.4 billion according to an insurance industry estimate, even if expanded to represent uninsured losses, represents a miniscule fraction of world wealth.	根据一家保险公司的估算，卡特里娜飓风中投保财产的损失为344亿美元。 即便考虑到未投保的财产损失，也只代表全世界财富的九牛一毛。


But such disasters represent a much larger share of a single country’s wealth.	但这样的灾难体现了一个国家的财富在全世界的份额。


This is why financial theory prescribes spreading risks as evenly as possible around the world, rather than around only one country, as plans for a national catastrophe fund envision.	这就是为什么金融理论中认为应该在全世界范围内均摊风险，而不该像国家灾难基金所想像的，由一国承担风险。


The possibility of managing national risks globally is another example of the advantages of economic globalization and expansion of financial markets.	将国家风险全球化的可能性正是经济全球化以及金融市场拓展的优势所在的又一个范例。


Intellectual-Property Rights and Wrongs	知识产权及其错误


Last October, the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) decided to consider what a development-oriented intellectual property regime might look like.	去年10月，世界知识产权组织（WIPO）成员国大会决定研究什么样的知识产权制度才有利于促进发展。


The move was little noticed, but, in some ways, it was as important as the World Trade Organization’s decision that the current round of trade negotiations be devoted to development.	虽然未曾引起广泛的关注，但从某种意义上，这次行动的意义丝毫也不亚于世界贸易组织决定把正在进行的回合谈判核心问题界定为促进发展。


Both decisions acknowledge that the current rules of the international economic game reflect the interests of the advanced industrial countries – especially of their big corporations – more than the interests of the developing world.	这两项决议都承认，与其说国际经济竞争现有的规则反应了发展中国家的利益，还不如说反应了先进工业国家，尤其是先进国家中大企业的利益更为妥当。


Without intellectual property protection, incentives to engage in certain types of creative endeavors would be weakened.	如果没有知识产权的保护，会从一定程度上削弱某些人从事特定类型的创造性研究的积极性。


But there are high costs associated with intellectual property.	但与知识产权相关的代价也不容忽视。


Ideas are the most important input into research, and if intellectual property slows down the ability to use others’ ideas, then scientific and technological progress will suffer.	创意是科学研究最重要的源泉，而如果知识产权使利用他人创意速度的放缓，那么科学和技术进步会为此蒙受损失。


In fact, many of the most important ideas – for example, the mathematics that underlies the modern computer or the theories behind atomic energy or lasers – are not protected by intellectual property.	事实上，很多最为重要的创意¾比如作为现代计算机基础的数学或原子能或激光背后的理论¾都并未受到知识产权的保护。


Academics spend considerable energy freely disseminating their research findings.	研究人员花费了大量的时间精力，无偿地传播自己的研究成果。


I am pleased when someone uses my ideas on asymmetric information – though I do appreciate them giving me some credit.	每次有人使用我提出的信息不对称理论，都会令我感到由衷的高兴¾虽然如果他们提及我的名字，会使我感到更加高兴。


The growth of the “open source” movement on the Internet shows that not just the most basic ideas, but even products of enormous immediate commercial value can be produced without intellectual property protection.	因特网上“开放代码”运动的发展表明：不仅是最基本的创意，就连具有巨大商业价值的产品都可以不受知识产权的保护而免费获得。


By contrast, an intellectual property regime rewards innovators by creating a temporary monopoly power, allowing them to charge far higher prices than they could if there were competition.	与此相反，知识产权体系通过赋予创新者暂时的垄断权力来对其努力进行褒奖，允许他们制定比竞争情况下高得多的价格。


In the process, ideas are disseminated and used less than they would be otherwise.	在上述过程中，创意的传播速度和利用率都大打折扣。


The economic rationale for intellectual property is that faster innovation offsets the enormous costs of such inefficiencies.	知识产权的经济原理是技术的快速革新能够抵消人们为低效率付出的巨大代价。


But it has become increasingly clear that excessively strong or badly formulated intellectual property rights may actually impede innovation – and not just by increasing the price of research.	但有一点越来越明晰：那就是过于强大或先天存在缺陷的知识产权可能实际上会阻碍创新¾而且阻碍的方式绝不仅仅限于增加研究成本。


Monopolists may have much less incentive to innovate than they would if they had to compete.	垄断者对创新的积极性远远比不上竞争中那样强烈。


Modern research has shown that the great economist Joseph Schumpeter was wrong in thinking that competition in innovation leads to a succession of firms.	现代研究表明：伟大的经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）认为创新竞争会导致公司的更替，这种想法是错误的。


In fact, a monopolist, once established, may be hard to dislodge, as Microsoft has so amply demonstrated.	事实上，垄断者地位一旦得到了巩固，就很难再被动摇，这一点已经在微软公司的案例中充分得到了证明。


Indeed, once established, a monopoly can use its market power to squelch competitors, as Microsoft so amply demonstrated in the case of the Netscape Web browser.	实际上，一旦地位得以巩固，垄断者就可以借用市场的力量来压制竞争者，就像微软公司在网景浏览器一案中所充分表现的那样。


Such abuses of market power discourage innovation.	这种滥用市场力量的行为会阻碍进一步的创新。


Moreover, so-called “patent thickets” – the fear that some advance will tread on pre-existing patents, of which the innovator may not even be aware – may also discourage innovation.	不仅如此，所谓的“专利丛林”¾也就是害怕研究过程中的某些进展会在创新者自己都不知情的情况下践踏业已存在的专利¾也会阻碍创新的产生。


After the pioneering work of the Wright brothers and the Curtis brothers, overlapping patent claims thwarted the development of the airplane, until the United States government finally forced a patent pool as World War I loomed.	在莱特兄弟和柯蒂斯兄弟最初的创新工作后，重复的专利申请严重阻碍了飞机的研制，一直到第一次世界大战爆发前，美国政府强制推行专利共享制度，这个问题才最终得以解决。


Today, many in the computer industry worry that such a patent thicket may impede software development.	今天，计算机行业的很多有识之士都担心这样的专利丛林可能会再次阻碍软件领域的研发。


The creation of any product requires many ideas, and sorting out their relative contribution to the outcome – let alone which ones are really new – can be nearly impossible.	任何产品创新都需要一系列的创意，搞清它们对最终成果相对贡献其可能性可以说微乎其微，更不用说分清哪些是最新创意了。


Consider a drug based on traditional knowledge, say, of an herb well known for its medicinal properties.	我们来看看以传统知识为基础研发的药品，像药理作用尽人皆知的草药。


How important is the contribution of the American firm that isolates the active ingredient?	从中成功提取活性成分的美国公司贡献到底有多大？


Pharmaceutical companies argue that they should be entitled to a full patent, paying nothing to the developing country from which the traditional knowledge was taken, even though the country preserves the biodiversity without which the drug would never have come to market.	制药公司指出他们应该有权独享专利，而拒绝付给提供传统知识的发展中国家一分钱，即便这种草药为该国所独有，没有他们的支持这种药品永远也不可能上市。


Not surprisingly, developing countries see things differently.	当然，发展中国家可不这么看。


Society has always recognized that other values may trump intellectual property.  The need to prevent excessive monopoly power has led anti-trust authorities to require compulsory licensing (as the US government did with the telephone company AT&T).	人类社会一直认为，有些��物的价值远远超过了知识产权。 防止过度垄断权力的需要曾经导致了反托拉斯权威机构强制要求转让专利所有权（美国政府也曾对美国电话电报公司提出过同样的要求）。


When America faced an anthrax threat in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, officials issued a compulsory license for Cipro, the best-known antidote.	2001年9月11日，当美国面对着恐怖分子发动的炭疽热袭击，政府颁布了对人所共知的解毒药品¾西扑热（Cipro）的强制转让许可。


Unfortunately, the trade negotiators who framed the intellectual-property agreement of the Uruguay trade round of the early 1990’s (TRIP’s) were either unaware of all of this, or more likely, uninterested.	不幸的是，20世纪90年代早期制定乌拉圭回合谈判《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》的贸易谈判代表要么是对此知之不详，而更有可能的还是根本不感兴趣。


I served on the Clinton administration’s Council of Economic Advisors at the time, and it was clear that there was more interest in pleasing the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries than in ensuring an intellectual-property regime that was good for science, let alone for developing countries.	那时我在克林顿政府的经济顾问委员会中任职，很明显，与确保建立对科学，尤其是发展中国家有所帮助的知识产权制度相比，当时的谈判代表对取悦制药和娱乐等行业更感兴趣。


I suspect that most of those who signed the agreement did not fully understand what they were doing.	我怀疑签署协定的大多数人都不完全了解自己行为的意义。


If they had, would they have willingly condemned thousands of AIDS sufferers to death because they might no longer be able to get affordable generic drugs?	如果确实了解，那他们是否还会欣然判处成千上万名艾滋病患者死刑，因为这些病人也许再也无法得到价格低廉的普通药品？


Had the question been posed in this way to parliaments around the world, I believe that TRIP’s would have been soundly rejected.	如果全球各国的议会都清楚这个问题的含义，我相信《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》会很容易遭到否决。


Intellectual property is important, but the appropriate intellectual-property regime for a developing country is different from that for an advanced industrial country.	知识产权很重要，但有利于发展中国家的恰当知识产权制度与有利于发达国家的制度大不相同。


The TRIP’s scheme failed to recognize this.	这一点在《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》的提案中没有得到体现。


In fact, intellectual property should never have been included in a trade agreement in the first place, at least partly because its regulation is demonstrably beyond the competency of trade negotiators.	实际上，知识产权永远也不该成为贸易谈判的内容，这至少部分是因为知识产权规定显然超出了贸易谈判代表们所能处理的范畴。


Besides, an international organization already exists to protect intellectual property.	另外，旨在保护知识产权的国际组织已经存在。


Hopefully, in WIPO’s reconsideration of intellectual property regimes, the voices of the developing world will be heard more clearly than it was in the WTO negotiations; hopefully, WIPO will succeed in outlining what a pro-developing intellectual property regime implies; and hopefully, WTO will listen: the aim of trade liberalization is to boost development, not hinder it.	也许在世界知识产权组织重新思考知识产权体系的时候，会比世界贸易组织更充分地听取发展中国家的声音，也许，世界知识产权组织会成功诠释有利于发展的知识产权制度的含义，而且也许，世界贸易组织会采纳这些意见：贸易自由化的目标是促进，而不是阻碍发展。


The International Barriers to Trump’s Economic Plan	特朗普经济计划的国际壁垒


DUBAI – US President-elect Donald Trump should have a relatively clear road ahead at home for the implementation of his economic program: with Republicans holding majorities in both houses of Congress, he seems likely to benefit from a break in the political gridlock that has paralyzed the body for the last six years.	迪拜—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普应该有一个相对明确的国内政策方向，以便实施其经济计划：在共和党同时控制国会两院多数的情况下，他似乎有望从政治僵局被打破中获益。 过去六年来，政治僵局让美国经济陷入瘫痪。


But the United States economy does not exist in a vacuum.	但美国经济并非存在于真空中。


If Trump is to succeed in delivering the high growth and genuine financial stability that he has promised, he will need some help from abroad.	特朗普要想成功实现他所承诺的高增长和真正的金融稳定，就需要来自海外的助力。


Trump has established infrastructure investment, tax reform, and deregulation as central components of his strategy to boost the US economy’s actual and potential growth.	特朗普已经确定基础设施投资、税收改革和去监管化为其提振美国实际和潜在增长战略的要素。


Confident that his plan can unfold as intended, he has set ambitious targets, including GDP growth approaching 4% per year.	他信心满满地认定他的计划可以如愿展开，因此制定了雄心勃勃的目标，包括GDP增长要达到每年4%。


For now, investors seem to be pretty much sold.	就目前而言，投资者似乎非常买账。


Under the assumption that the incoming Trump administration will ultimately refrain from triggering a trade war, they moved fast to price in optimistic prospects for higher real growth, higher inflation, and more money entering the financial markets.	他们认定即将履新的特朗普政府最终能够保持克制，不发动贸易战，因此迅速下注于乐观前景——更高的实际增长、更高的通胀和更多资金流入金融市场。


This has enabled the US Federal Reserve to begin to normalize its monetary-policy stance; in addition to a 25-basis-point interest-rate hike on December 14, the Fed has indicated that the pace of such hikes will accelerate in 2017.	这使得美联储能够开始其货币政策立场的正常化，除了12月14日加息25个基点，美联储还表示2017年的加息节奏将会更快。


As a result, markets seem convinced that the US will gradually exit its prolonged period of excessive reliance on unconventional monetary policy, replacing it with a mix of looser fiscal policy and pro-growth structural reforms – an approach much like that pursued by former US President Ronald Reagan.	结果，市场似乎认定美国将逐渐退出为时已久的过于依赖非常规货币政策的时期，取而代之的将是宽松的财政政策和促增长的结构性改革双管齐下——这一方针很像前总统里根所采取的政策。


President Barack Obama sought to pursue a similar approach, but was frustrated by a highly polarized Congress.	奥巴马总统也试图采取类似的方针，但受到高度计划的国会的阻挠。


The expectation that Trump will have better luck on this front has produced a textbook asset-price response.	特朗普在这方面将会有更好的运气的预期产生了教科书般标准的资产价格反应。 股价上涨，金融股和工业股领头；


Stock prices have climbed, led by financials and industrials; interest rates on US government bonds have risen, both on a standalone basis and relative to those in other advanced economies; and the dollar has surged to levels not seen since 2003.	美国政府债券利率上升，不管是绝对水平还是相对其他发达经济体的水平； 美元和飙升至2003年以来从未见到的水平。


Here is where the rest of the world comes in.	然后，世界其他国家的影响就要来了。


Other major economies – namely, in Europe and Asia – may have a much harder time than the US rebalancing their policy mix (which continues to be characterized by excessively loose monetary policy, inadequate structural reforms, and, in some cases, excessively tight fiscal policy).	其他主要经济体——即欧洲和亚洲——在实现政策组合再平衡方面比美国困难得多（它们的货币政策仍然过于宽松，结构性改革仍不充分，一些经济体的财政政策仍然过于紧缩）。


But if they do not, the Fed’s continued interest-rate hikes would stimulate investors to trade their German and Japanese bonds, in particular – which are now bringing low and even negative returns – for higher-yielding US varieties.	但如果它们不进行再平衡，美联储继续升息将驱使投资者卖出（尤其是）德国和日本债券——目前这些债券回报非常低，甚至为负——买入收益率更高的美国债券。


The resultant wave of capital flows into the US would push up the value of the dollar even further.	结果，资本将蜂拥流向美国，从而进一步推高美元。


Though the US economy is doing much better than most of the other advanced economies, it is not yet on sound enough footing to withstand a prolonged period of a substantially stronger dollar, which would undermine its international competitiveness – and thus its broader economic prospects.	尽管美国经济比其他大部分发达经济体表现更加出色，但仍不足以面对长时间大幅升值的美元，美元的升值将影响美国的国际竞争力——从而影响到其整体经济前景。


Augmenting the risk is the prospect that such a development could spur the Trump administration to follow through on protectionist rhetoric, potentially undermining market and business confidence and, if things went far enough, even triggering a response from major trade partners.	令风险进一步增加的是这一发展趋势前景可能导致特朗普政府兑现其保护主义承诺，从而破坏市场和商业信心，如果形势恶化太快，甚至有可能遭到主要贸易伙伴的报复。


If Trumponomics is to deliver on its promise, key countries – in particular, Germany (the largest and most influential European economy) and China and Japan (the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively) – must promote their own pro-growth policy adjustments.	如果特朗普经济学旨在兑现承诺，那么关键国家——特别是德国（欧洲最大、最有影响力的经济体）以及中国和日本（分别是世界第二大和第三大经济体）——就必须推进自身的促增长政策调整。


They should implement quickly growth-enhancing structural reforms to support monetary stimulus.	它们应该实施迅速刺激增长的结构性改革支持货币刺激。


Germany, in particular, would also need to pursue a looser fiscal policy, while adopting a more conciliatory attitude toward outright debt reduction for beleaguered Greece.	特别是德国，它还必须采取更宽松的财政政策，同时对步履维艰的希腊转变态度，不再要求它权力降低债务。


Unfortunately for Trump, the rest of the world does not seem prepared at this stage to pursue such a comprehensive policy shift.	对特朗普来说，不幸的是世界其他国家在现阶段似乎还没有准备好采取如此全面的政策转向。


That is why, beyond advancing Trump’s pro-growth economic agenda at home, the newly appointed members of his economic team should be establishing direct contact with their German, Chinese, and Japanese counterparts, with a view to improving international policy coordination.	因此，除了推进特朗普的国内促增长经济日程，新经济团队成员还应该与德国、中国和日本的对应官员建立直接联系，立足于改善国际经济政策协作。


Germany, China, and Japan have good reasons to embrace such an approach.	德国、中国和日本都有很好的理由采取这样的方针。


They are not getting enough out of monetary expansion at this point; the risk of collateral damage and unintended consequences is rising; and pro-growth structural reforms are overdue.	现阶段，它们还深陷货币扩张； 附带伤害和意料外后果的风险正在上升；


Furthermore, helping the US to achieve healthy and sustainable growth would bring about an indirect boost to their own economies.	而促增长结构性改革迟迟没有落实。 此外，帮助美国实现健康可持续的增长也能给这些经济体自身带来直接提振。


And it would help to avoid a scenario in which a Trump administration, under political pressure, would threaten protectionist measures, increasing the risk of a trade war that would hurt nearly everyone.	这也有助于避免这样的情景：特朗普政府屈于政治压力威胁采取保护主义措施，增加爆发一损俱损的贸易战的风险。


Despite the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s impending presidency, one thing is certain, at least on paper: he is in a strong position to boost US economic growth.	尽管即将到来的特朗普任期充满了不确定性，但有一点是确定的，至少理论上如此：他处于十分有利的刺激美国经济增长的地位。


He and his team must, however, take the time to dismantle potential international barriers to success.	但是，他和他的团队必须花点时间消除潜在的国际成功壁垒。


Financial Scarcity Amid Plenty	流动性充裕之中的金融稀缺


MILAN – With interest rates at all-time lows and central banks buying everything that moves, the world is awash with credit.	发自米兰——利率已经跌至历史最低点，而各大央行又四处大肆收购，世界一时间被信贷所充斥。


Yet, paradoxically, a dangerous shortage of international liquidity is putting the global economy at risk.	但矛盾之处则在于，一场国际流动性的危险短缺将令全球经济暴露于风险之下。


“International liquidity” refers to high-quality assets accepted around the world for paying import bills and servicing foreign debts. These are the same assets that central banks use when intervening in foreign-exchange markets.	“国际流动性”指的是那些可以用来支付进口账单和偿还外债的，全球通行的优质资产，也是中央银行对外汇市场中进行干预时动用的资产。


They serve as reliable stores of value for international investors.	对国际投资者来说这些就是可靠的保值品。


They provide pricing benchmarks in financial markets. And they are widely accepted as collateral for cross-border loans.	这些资产是金融市场的定价基准，也被广泛接受并作为跨境贷款的抵押物。


The key difference between these international assets and liquid assets in general, then, is that only the former are accepted in a large number of different countries and regularly used in transactions between them.	总体来说，这些国际资产和流动资产之间的关键区别就是只有前者能被多个不同国家所接受并经常在彼此之间的交易中使用。


The single most important form of international liquidity is, of course, US government bonds, which are held by banks, firms, and other countries’ governments.	当然，国际流动性的其中一个最重要的表现形式就是银行，公司和其他国家政府所持有的美国政府债券。


More generally, international liquidity comprises the liabilities of OECD countries’ central banks (their “high-powered money”), those countries’ AAA-rated and AA-rated central-government bonds, the debt securities of supranational organizations like the World Bank and regional development banks, and gold in official and private hands.	如果把范围再扩大一点，国际流动性还包含了经合组织国家中央银行的债券（它们的“强力货币”），这些国家的AAA 级、 AA 级中央政府债券，还超国家组织如世界银行和区域性开发银行发行的债券以及官方和私人手中的黄金。


But add them up and you immediately come to a startling conclusion. International liquidity has plummeted from nearly 60% of global GDP in 2009 to barely 30% today.	可一旦把这些都累加起来你会立即得到一个惊人的结论：国际流动性总额已从2009年时相当于全球GDP 的60%暴跌至如今的30%。


This change is due, equally, to downgrades in the ratings of heavily indebted crisis countries’ government bonds, which make them unattractive for use in international transactions, and the inelasticity of other sources of supply.	同样，这种变化源自于那些重负债危机国家的政府债券被下调了评级，使他们在国际交易中变得缺乏吸引力，以及其他国家流动性供应源的弹性缺乏。


Observers are perplexed by why global trade, having long grown faster than world GDP, is now expanding more slowly. They are also struggling to understand an unprecedented decline in global capital flows.	观察员们都为全球贸易何以在长时间实现快于全球GDP的增幅后如今却远逊于后者而迷惑不解，同时也在努力理解这场前所未有的全球资本流动下降现象。


A shortage of international liquidity, by making it harder to finance and settle these cross-border transactions, is one explanation.	对此国际流动性提供了一种解释，因为它导致这些跨境交易更加难以融资和结算了。


Urging the US government to issue more debt is no solution; doing so would only threaten rating downgrades and make foreign investors reluctant to hold US Treasury bonds.	敦促美国政府发行更多债券可不是个解决办法； 因为这么做只会导致评级下调，令外国投资者不愿持有美国国债。


Alternatively, one could urge crisis countries whose bonds have lost their investment-grade status to repair their finances so that these securities are again attractive for financing international transactions.	或者有人可以敦促那些债券投资评级下跌的危机国家尽快修复自身的财务状况，使这些债权在国际交易方面重获吸引力。


But financial strengthening takes time even for the most committed government, as any Greek official can tell you.	但正如任何一个希腊官员告诉你的那样，即便对最有决心的政府来说财政巩固工作也都需要一段时间。


Can privately-issued obligations – high-grade corporate bonds, for example – supplement official forms of international liquidity?	那么私人债权——例如高等级的公司债券——可否作为官方形式国际流动性的补充？


This question dates back to the 1990s, when observers quaintly worried that the US government, by running surpluses, might retire its entire stock of debt.	这个问题可以追溯到上世纪 90 年代，当年观察员们都毫无根据地担心实现了运算盈余的美国政府可能要清空自己的所有负债。


It turned out that central banks and governments, in particular, were reluctant to hold private-label securities, even when these instruments had investment-grade ratings.	结果人们发现中央银行和政府都尤为不愿持有私人债券，即便这些债权都已获得了投资级评级。


The reason is simple: Privately-issued assets without the backing of a government with the power of the purse might look safe in normal times; but, following a shock, they could quickly be reassessed as risky.	理由很简单：没有政府财政权力背书的私营部门发行资产可能在正常时期看起来相当安全； 可一旦受到冲击， 它们就会迅速被重新评估为高风险资产。


Others suggest that the International Monetary Fund could augment the supply of international liquidity by issuing Special Drawing Rights.	还有人建议说国际货币基金组织可以通过发行特别提款权来增加国际流动性供给。


SDRs are accounting units made up of US dollars, British pounds, euros, Japanese yen, and Chinese renminbi. They can be credited to the accounts of IMF member countries, which are obliged to accept them in cross-border transactions under the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.	特别提款权是由美元、 英镑、 欧元、 日元和人民币构成的会计单位，可以打进国际货币基金组织成员国的账户里，根据基金组织的协议条款，这些国家必须在跨境交易中接受这些特别提款权。


Voilà: problem solved.	好家伙，这下问题解决了。


Or not.	但事情可没那么简单。


There are no private markets in SDRs.	由于特别提款权无法在私人市场交易。


To use them, a holder has to exchange them for, say, dollars in a transaction with the US government.	若要使用它们，持有人只能在与美国政府的交易中用其来交换美元。


As a result, no additional liquidity is created.	因此也未能创建出额外的流动性。


The corresponding amount of dollar currency or deposits is simply transferred from one set of hands to another – from the US Treasury to the foreign holder.	相应数额的美元货币或存款只是被从一只手转到了另一只手——从美国财政部到外国持有者。


Meanwhile, the world as a whole has gained no additional liquid resources.	此时世界作为一个整体并未获得任何额外的流动性资源。


Things would be different if, instead of allocating SDRs to governments, the IMF could sell them directly to central banks like the Fed, which, in return, would provide the Fund with additional dollars, which the Fund could then distribute among its members.	此外还有其它的方案，与其向各国政府分配特别提款权，国际货币基金组织可以将其直接卖给美联储这样的央行机构，而后者则以向基金提供额外的美元作为回报让该基金可以在成员国之间分派。


But while this is a neat solution in principle, the Fed and its political masters would surely be reluctant to cede control of the money printing press in practice.	但这虽然在理论上是个很棒的解决方案，但美联储和其政治后台在实际操作中肯定不愿意放弃对印钞机的控制权。


Probably the most practical solution is to permit the IMF to borrow on private financial markets and use the proceeds to issue additional SDRs.	最实际的解决方法可能是允许国际货币基金组织在私人金融市场上借钱并利用这一过程发行额外的特别提款权。


With member governments collectively guaranteeing its obligations, its bonds would be as good as gold.	既然各成员国政府集体保证会承担相关义务，其债券价值也将保持坚挺。


To be sure, for their guarantee to be credible, members would have to commit to recapitalizing the Fund if it ever took losses on its loans. But, then, nothing is free.	当然既然为信用进行了担保，各国也必须承诺在国际货币基金组织贷款遭遇损失的时候注资援助，这叫有得必有失，没什么好说的。


Globalization’s benefits are sometimes exaggerated, but there have been important benefits.	全球化的利益有时是被夸大了，但也存在着重要的优点。


Failure to address the international liquidity problem could jeopardize all that has been accomplished.	如果不能解决的国际流动性问题，就可能危及所有已完成的事业。


During the Cold War, ideological competition limited US-Soviet cooperation, but both sides’ awareness of nuclear destructiveness led them to develop a crude code of conduct to avoid military confrontation.	冷��时期，意识形态竞争限制了美苏合作，但双方对于核破坏性的认识促使他们制定了避免军事对抗的初步行为准则。


The Trouble with International Policy Coordination	国际政策协作的麻烦


BOLOGNA – After a 30-year hiatus, international coordination of macroeconomic policy seems to be back on policymakers’ agendas.	博洛尼亚—在经历了30年的间歇后，宏观经济政策的国际协作似乎又回到了决策者的日程当中。


The reason is understandable: growth remains anemic in most countries, and many fear the US Federal Reserve’s impending interest-rate hike.	原因不难理解：大部分国家增长依然萎靡，许多人担心美联储即将到来的升息。


Unfortunately, the reasons why coordination fell into abeyance are still with us.	不幸的是，让协作陷入停顿的原因仍然存在。


The heyday of international policy coordination, from 1978 to 1987, began with a G-7 summit in Bonn in 1978 and included the 1985 Plaza Accord.	国际政策协作的黄金时代是1978—1987年，始于1978年波恩G-7峰会，也包括1985年广场协议。


But doubts about the benefits of such cooperation persisted.	但对这些合作的质疑一直存在。


The Germans, for example, regretted having agreed to joint fiscal expansion at the Bonn summit, because reflation turned out to be the wrong objective in the inflation-plagued late 1970s.	比如，德国人后悔在波恩峰会上同意加入了共同财政扩张，因为在通胀肆虐的20世纪70年代末期，再通胀是一个错误的目标。


Similarly, the Japanese came to regret the appreciated yen after the Plaza Accord succeeded in bringing down an overvalued dollar.	类似地，日本人在广场协议成功地让高估的美元实现贬值后也开始后悔让日元升值。


Moreover, emerging-market countries’ representation in global governance did not keep pace with the increasingly significant role of their economies and currencies.	此外，新兴市场国家在全球治理中的代表力与它们的经济和货币的日益重要的角色并不匹配。


These countries’ very success thus became an obstacle to policy coordination.	这些国家的成功成为国际协作的一大障碍。


The effort to revive international coordination began in response to the 2008 global financial crisis.	重振国际协作的努力始于2008年全球金融危机后的应对措施。


The larger emerging-market countries acquired more representation when the G-20 succeeded the G-7 as the preeminent global economic grouping.	G-20取代G-7成为全球主要经济集团，较大的新兴市场国家也因此获得了更多的代表。


G-20 leaders agreed on coordinated expansionary policies at their London summit in April 2009.	在2009年4月的伦敦峰会上，G-20领导人同意采取协作性扩张政策。


Then they agreed in Seoul in 2010 to give emerging-market countries quota shares in the International Monetary Fund that would be more commensurate with their economic weight.	接着，在2010年的首尔峰会上，他们同意给予新兴市场国家在国际货币基金组织（IMF）更大的份额，以体现它们的经济分量。


(The US Congress, to its shame, has yet to pass the necessary legislation.)	（美国国会可耻地至今仍未通过必要的立法。 ）


Since then, many calls for coordination have lamented the outbreak of “currency wars,” otherwise known as competitive depreciation – an old phenomenon that recalls the tit-for-tat devaluations of the 1930s.	此后，大量协作的呼声哀叹“货币战争”——或称竞争性贬值——的爆发。 竞争性贬值令人想起了20世纪30年代的以牙还牙贬值政策。


Now, as then, the fear is that if all countries try to depreciate their currency to gain export competitiveness and boost their economies, all will fail.	而如今，人们担心的是如果所有国家试图贬值货币以获得出口竞争力、提振经济，那么所有国家都会失败。


This concern has been reflected, for example, in complaints about intervention by China and other emerging markets to prevent currency appreciation.	这一担忧反映在（比如）对中国的干预以及其他信心市场国家阻止货币升值的行为的指责上。


Likewise, successive rounds of quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve in 2009-2014, the Bank of Japan since 2013, and the European Central Bank since earlier this year, resulted in depreciations of the dollar, yen, and euro, respectively.	类似地，2009—2014年的美联储、2013年以来的日本银行以及今年早些时候开始的欧洲央行实施了多轮量化宽松，分别造成美元、日元和欧元贬值。


The most recent set of calls for coordination arise from fears – articulated, for example, by Raghuram Rajan, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India – that the Fed will not adequately take into account the adverse impact on emerging-market economies when it raises interest rates.	最近对协作的呼声来自人们担心美联储在决定提高利率时不会充分考虑这样做给新兴经济体带来的消极影响。 比如，印度储备银行行长拉古兰·拉詹便撰文指出了这一问题。


The US has led some international attempts to address competitive depreciation, including an agreement among G-7 ministers in February 2013 to refrain from foreign-exchange intervention and a November 2015 side agreement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership to address currency manipulation.	美国领导了一些国际行动解决竞争性贬值问题，包括2013年2月G-7同意不进行外汇干预以及2015年11月达成解决货币操纵问题的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系补充协议。


But critics are agitating for a stronger agreement backed up by the threat of trade sanctions.	但批评者认为必须达成更强有力的协议，并用贸易制裁威胁来支持这些协议。


Attempting to use game theory to interpret the various calls for coordination is revealing, though not in the way that game theorists assume.	用博弈论来解释各种协作呼声很有启发，尽管并非是以博弈论专家预想的方式。


The players often do not think they are playing the same game.	行动方常常并不认为他们在进行同样的博弈。


For example, when the US urges German fiscal stimulus – as at it did in Bonn in 1978, in London in 2009, and at the G-20’s Brisbane summit in 2014 – it has in mind the “locomotive game,” in which fiscal stimulus has positive “spillover effects” on its trading partners.	比如，当美国敦促德国财政刺激时——如1978年在波恩、2009年在伦敦以及2014年在G-20布里斯班峰会上那样——美国想的是“机车博弈”（locomotive game），在这个博弈中，财政刺激对其贸易伙伴有积极的“溢出效应”。


The global economy will do better if the major countries – each afraid to undertake fiscal expansion on its own, for fear of worsening its trade balance – agree to act together to pull it out of recession and up to speed.	如果主要国家——它们都害怕自己采取财政扩张，担心这会恶化贸易平衡——同意采取共同行动让德国走出衰退、加速增长，那么全球经济的表现将有所好转。


Germans, by contrast, think they are playing a “discipline game.”	相反，德国认为它们进行的是“纪律博弈”（discipline game）。


They view budget deficits as creating negative spillover effects for neighbors, owing, for example, to the moral hazard of bailouts.	德国人认为预算赤字等于给邻国制造消极溢出效应，原因在于（比如）援助的道德风险。


Their idea of a cooperative equilibrium is the European Union’s 2013 “fiscal compact,” under which euro members agreed yet again to rules for limiting their budget deficits.	德国的合作均衡概念是2013年欧盟“财政契约”。 在该契约中，欧元区成员国再次同意限制预算赤字的规则。


The most recent example of this “dialogue of the deaf” occurred in Europe, from January to July 2015.	这一“鸡同鸭讲”现象的最近一个例子发生在2015年1月—7月的欧洲。


Month after month, the Greek government and its eurozone partners sat at the board, one side thinking the game was checkers and the other thinking it was chess.	月复一月，希腊政府及其欧元区伙伴坐在谈判桌两端，一边认为这是一场西洋跳棋（checkers）博弈，另一边认为这是一场国际象棋（chess）博弈。


Interpretations vary no less when it comes to monetary policy.	在货币政策方面，解读也是五花八门。


Some believe that monetary expansion in one country shifts the trade balance against its partners, owing to the exchange-rate effect; others believe that any adverse effect on trade balances is offset by higher spending.	一些人认为一国的货币扩张会令其贸易平衡向不利于贸易伙伴的方向倾斜，原因在于汇率效应； 也有人认为对贸易平衡的消极影响被增加的支出所抵消。


Some argue that the problem is competitive depreciation or too-low interest rates; others maintain that the real problem is overvalued currencies or too-high interest rates.	一些人认为问题在于竞争性贬值或过低的利率； 另一些人坚持真正的问题是货币高估或利率过高。


Some believe that the way to overcome competitive depreciation for good is to fix exchange rates, as the architects of the Bretton Woods arrangements did in 1944; others, including some US politicians today, advocate the opposite approach: an agreement against seeking to influence exchange rates at all.	一些人认为克服竞争性贬值的最佳办法是固定汇率，1944年布雷顿森林按牌的缔造者就是如此； 另一些人，包括当今一些美国政客，鼓吹反其道而行之：制定完全不试图影响汇率的协议。


Yes, regular meetings of officials can be useful.	诚然，官员定期开会可能管用。


Consultation can minimize surprises.	协商能让意外最小化。


Exchanges of views might help narrow differences in perceptions.	交换观点有助于缩小认知差异。


But some calls for international coordination are less useful, particularly when the aim is to blame foreigners in order to distract attention from domestic constraints and disagreements.	但一些关于国际协作的呼声并不那么有用，特别是当它们的目标是指责外国人、从而转移对国内约束条件和分歧的关注时。


Consider the Brazilian officials who coined the phrase “currency wars” in 2010.	以巴西为例。 正是巴西官员在2010年提出了“货币战争”一词。


Their country’s budget deficit was too large, causing its economy to overheat.	巴西财政赤字太大，导致其经济过热。


Private demand was going to be crowded out one way or another, if not via currency appreciation, then via higher interest rates.	私人需求将以各种方式惨遭挤出，不是通过货币升值，就是通过提高利率。


Yet officials blamed the US and others for the strong real.	但巴西官员指责美国和其他国家要求里亚尔升值。


Likewise, US politicians’ ongoing efforts to ban currency manipulation in trade agreements may be an effort to scapegoat Asians for US workers’ stagnant real incomes.	类似地，美国政客始终要求在贸易协议中加入禁止货币操纵条款，这可能是让亚洲人充当美国工人真实工资停滞不前的替罪羊。


Officials would often be better advised to improve their own policies, before they tell others what to do.	通常，官员最好专注于改进他们自身的政策，然后再去互相指导。


Otherwise, calls for international cooperation may do more harm than good.	否则，对国际合作的呼声将是弊大于利。


The Rule of the Lawless	无法之治


CAIRO – In one of his last essays, the late, great historian Tony Judt asked what we should have learned from the last century, a period in which so many soldiers and civilians died in conflict.	开罗，已故的伟大历史学家托尼·朱特（Tony Judt）在其身前最后的文章之一提出了我们应该从过去的一个世纪中学到什么的问题。 在过去的一个世纪中，如此之多的士兵和平民在冲突中丧生。


One important part of the answer, I think, is the critical importance of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally.	我认为，答案的一个重要部分在于法治（rule of law）的关键重要性，不管对于国内还是国际都是如此。


To be sure, there are many other things that are crucial to the good life in peaceful, open societies: freedom of speech, religion, and association, and the power to choose – and remove – your own government.	诚然，对于和平的开放社会而言，有许多其他东西对于好生活也至关重要：言论、宗教和结社自由以及选择（和推翻）你自己的政府权力。


But nothing guarantees free societies' liberties as much as the application of the rule of law with equal force to the governed and the governing.	但没有一样东西可以像在治人者和治于人者之间公平地运用法治那样保证自由社会的自由。


When I was a British cabinet minister and chairman of the Conservative Party, I had a legal adviser who was aptly named Mr. Maybe.	我在担任英国内阁部长和保守党主席期间，有一个名字颇为应景的法律顾问：梅比先生（Mr.


When I was taken to task for some infringement of administrative law or alleged excessive use of my legal powers, he would never be able to tell me how the courts would ultimately rule.	Maybe，“也许”之意）。 当我因职务需要违反了一些行政法或遭到指控滥用我的法律权力时，他从来不能告诉我法院最终会怎么判。


“Will we win this case?" I'd ask Mr. Maybe.	“我们能赢这宗官司吗？


His reply was always conditional.	”我问梅比先生。


“You should win," he once said.	他的回答永远是两可的。


“But I cannot promise that you will."	“您应该赢，”有一次他说，“但我无法保证您会赢。 ”


Authoritarian governments find this a difficult concept to understand.	极权政府难以理解这一概念。


I recall negotiations with my Chinese counterpart when I was Governor of Hong Kong.	我还记得我担任香港总督时与中国官员谈判的情景。


I was attempting to explain why the rule of law mattered so much to the territory's future, and I noted that when I was in the British government, the law applied to me just as much as to those I helped govern.	我试图解释为何法治对香港的未来至关重要，我指出，我在英国政府任职时，对我适用的法律与对我帮助治理的人适用的法律一模一样。


My interlocutor thought I was joking.	我的谈判对手认为我是在说笑。


What the Chinese practice is rule by law – the law as defined by the Communist Party to its own advantage.	中国所实践是依法治国（rule by law）——法律由中共根据自身利益制定。


Consider China's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, for example.	以中国现在正在进行的反腐运动为例。


It is plainly being used by President Xi Jinping and his ally in the Politburo, Wang Qishan, as a tool to target not just the corrupt, but those who are not part of Xi's faction of red princelings.	反腐运动显然是中国国家主席习近平及其政治局盟友王岐山的工具，其目标不仅包括腐败，也包括不属于习近平所在的“太子党”派系的人。


In Xi's hands, the law is an instrument for securing his political objectives.	在习近平手中，法律只是保证其政治目标的工具。


Likewise, in Russia, President Vladimir Putin rules a state apparatus designed and run by elements of the country's old intelligence services and its new mafia.	类似地，在俄罗斯，总统普京所统治的国家机器由该国旧情报机关和新黑手党成员制定和运营。


The law is used to reward the regime's cronies and to penalize its critics, such as the businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the activist Alexei Navalny.	法律被用来奖励政权的朋友、惩罚政权的批评者，如商人米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基（Mikhail Khodorkovsky）和活动家阿列克谢·纳瓦尔尼（Alexei Navalny）。


Because neither Russia nor China apply the rule of law at home, it is unsurprising that they do not recognize its value in international affairs.	俄罗斯和中国对内都不实施法治，因此毫不奇怪它们在国际事务中也无法认识到法治的价值。


Indeed, Putin has breached one of the most fundamental principles of international law: that national borders may not be changed by force.	事实上，普京违反了国际法最基本的原则之一：不可用武力改变国界。


Indeed, he has made it a regular feature of Russian foreign policy, which is characterized by deceit, bullying, violence, and the desire to restore the empire that was dismembered after the collapse of communism.	事实上，在他手上，这已经成为俄罗斯外交政策的固定特征，以欺骗、欺凌、暴力和对重建共产主义崩溃后分崩离析的帝国的渴望为其要素。


Long before Russia's armed annexation of Crimea and its invasion of eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin played similar games when it engineered the secession of Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions and propped up the bandit territory of Transnistria in Moldova.	在俄罗斯武装吞并克里米亚并入侵乌克兰东部之前，克里姆林宫早已开始了类似的游戏：煽动格鲁吉亚南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹地区分裂、支持摩尔多瓦德涅斯特河沿岸地区的动乱。


And, given such blatant disregard for the international order, it is no surprise that Putin's agents have been implicated in the murder of at least one opponent on the streets of London.	考虑到如此公然无视国际秩序，毫不奇怪普京的特工卷入至少一起伦敦街头谋杀反对者的案件。


Building on the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and similar binding agreements, global rules were first institutionalized with the establishment of the United Nations.	全球规则建立在关于战争法的日内瓦公约（Geneva Conventions）和类似的约束性协议基础上，其首次制度化随联合国的成立而发生。


But, above all, the international framework for managing global affairs was the creation of the United States.	但是，管理全球事务的国际框架首先是美国的产物。


What was remarkable about this framework was that its principal author, the major superpower of the day, accepted its authority.	在这一框架中，值得关注的是其主要作者、当时的主要超级大国接受它的权威。


As US President Harry Truman memorably put it, “We all have to recognize – no matter how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please."	美国总统杜鲁门令人难忘地指出：“我们都需要认识到——不管我们的实力多么强大——我们决不能给我们自己发放为所欲为的通行证。 ”


In times when the international system has been under assault, only America has had the standing to provide renewed credibility to the rule of law.	在国际制度遭到攻击的时期，只有美国坚持立场，为法治赢回了信誉。


Unfortunately, this may no longer be the case.	不幸的是，也许如今已不再如此。


During President George W. Bush's administration, the US was willfully destructive of its global interests when it disregarded international law on issues like torture.	在小布什总统执政期间，美国在虐囚等问题上无视国际法，这不啻故意损害其全球利益。


Those US politicians who regard international institutions as anti-American conspiracies are continuing the harm, costing their country much of its moral authority.	将国际机构视为反美阴谋的美国政客在继续为害，导致美国失去了大量道德权威。


The picture is no brighter in Europe, where countries' willful neglect of their military capabilities has undermined their ability to enforce the rule of law when international mechanisms break down.	欧洲的局面也不比美国光明。 欧洲国家故意忽视它们的军事实力，这损害了它们在国际机制破坏时执行法治的能力。


The UN Security Council, meanwhile, has become ineffectual, stymied by the great-power interests of China and Russia.	与此同时，在中国和俄罗斯等强大力量的利益的紧逼下，联合国安理会影响力也日益下降。


So it does nothing, even as Europe's borders are challenged, Ukrainian citizens are bombed in their homes by Russian troops, and a violent, bandit army ravages the greater Middle East, from the beaches of Libya to the borders of Iran.	因此，当乌克兰公民在家中遭遇俄罗斯军队轰炸时，当暴力的匪帮蹂躏大中东、席卷利比亚海岸直至伊朗边界的广袤地区时，欧洲毫无作为，即使欧洲的边界也受到了挑战。


After the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s, world leaders once again solemnly declared, “Never again."	20世纪90年代，在卢旺达和波斯尼亚发生大屠杀后，世界领导人再一次庄严宣告“下不为例”。


Today, Syrian, Iraqi, and now Egyptian citizens must be wondering what happened to that pledge.	如今，叙利亚人、伊拉克人和现在的埃及公民肯定会奇怪这一宣言到底发生了什么。


In short, the growing, bloody challenges of the twenty-first century are to be confronted by a toothless UN, a morally weakened US, and a Europe well on the path toward disarmament.	简言之，二十一世纪日益严峻的血腥挑战将由无权无势的联合国、道德上被削弱了的美国和在去武装道路上越走越远的欧洲来面对。


If that prospect worries you, it should.	如果这一前景让你感到不安，这就对了。


In the absence of a change of heart by our political leaders, the power of prayer may be our only recourse.	如果我们的政治领袖不改变思维，也许我们就只能祈求上帝了。


International Taxation and Global Development	国际税收和全球发展


NEW YORK – When it comes to funding development, taxes are perhaps the most critical piece of the puzzle.	纽约—在发展融资这个问题上，税收也许是整个谜题中最关键的一环。


But the system of taxing global profits is broken – and it is exacerbating inequality both within and across countries.	但全球利润税收制度大可商榷——并且正在导致国内和国家间不平等性的恶化。


If the world is to make progress toward its goals of eradicating poverty and stemming rising inequality, the system must be reformed.	如果世界想朝着减少贫困、阻止不平等性加剧的目标前进，这一制度就必须改革。


The biggest problem with the current system is that, by taxing the subsidiaries of multinational corporations as separate entities, it provides plenty of room for global companies to dodge their tax obligations.	当前制度的最大问题是，它将跨国公司分支机构当作独立实体征税，从而给全球性公司创造了充分的逃税空间。


The reform efforts by the OECD, acting at the request of the G-20, represent welcome attempts to address so-called “base erosion and profit shifting” (BEPS), but they do not go far enough.	经合组织应G-20的要求采取了改革措施，这些措施是解决所谓的“税基侵蚀和利润转移”（BEPS）问题的有益尝试，但步子迈得不够大。


The most significant deliverable of the OECD’s BEPS initiative lies in its new country-by-country reporting requirements, which force multinationals to provide aggregate information annually, in each jurisdiction where they do business, relating to the global allocation of income and taxes paid.	经合组织BEPS计划中可行性最强的要数新的逐国（country-by-country）报告要求，该要求强制跨国公司提供每一个有业务活动的司法辖区的与利润和缴税额全球配置有关的年度总量信息。


They must also provide information about which entities do business in each jurisdiction and the economic activities in which they engage.	它们还必须提供关于各司法辖区有哪些实体开展业务以及参与哪些经济活动的信息。


But such reporting will apply only to entities with revenues above €750 million ($845 million) and will not be made public.	但这一报告要求将只适用于营收超过7. 5亿欧元的实体，并且不会公开披露。


Furthermore, countries have to meet certain conditions to access the information – a structure that will not benefit most developing countries.	此外，各国必须瞒住一定条件才能获得这一信息——这一结构无法惠及大部分发展中国家。


Yet developing countries have the most at stake.	但发展中国家才是受影响最大的。


Indeed, the International Monetary Fund recently reported that developing countries lose three times more of their corporate-tax revenue to BEPS activities than their developed counterparts.	事实上，国际货币基金组织（IMF）最近报告，发展中国家因为BEPS行为而蒙受的公司税收入损失是发达国家的三倍。


According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, such activities by multinationals – which represent one-third of the potential corporate-tax base in developing countries – result in annual losses of $100 billion.	据联合俄国贸易和发展会议（Conference on Trade and Development）的数据，跨国公司——它们占发展中国家潜在公司税基的三分之一——的BEPS行为导致的每年损失高达1,000亿美元。


Given the major role that tax revenues play in funding development efforts – providing two-thirds of the financing for the UN Millennium Development Goals, with official aid and private flows covering the rest – the bleeding must be stanched.	税收收入对于发展措施融资具有重要作用——它们提供了联合国千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals）资金的三分之二，其余资金来自官方援助和私人资金流——这一出血口必须堵住。


As world leaders gear up for this month’s Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD3) in Addis Ababa, where they will develop a strategy to fund the post-2015 global development agenda, a move toward a more efficient and equitable global tax system could not be more urgent.	本月，全球领导人将在亚的斯亚贝巴召开第三届国际发展融资会议（FFD3），届时将制定为2015年后全球发展日程融资的战略，而更高效、更平等的全球税收制度是不容置疑的当务之急。


That is why a group of public intellectuals from around the world has created the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT), which I chair.	因此，来自全世界的公共知识分子小组组成了国际公司税改革独立委员会（ICRICT），由我担任主席。


We believe that the world has an unprecedented opportunity to bring about significant reform of the international corporate-taxation system that serves the global public interest, rather than national advantage.	我们认为，世界正面临一次前所未有的良机，对国际公司税制度进行重大改革，使其服务于全球公共利益而非国家利益。


To help induce world leaders to take advantage of this opportunity, the ICRICT has issued a set of recommendations for reform of the rules and institutions governing international corporate-taxation.	为了促使世界领导人抓住这一机会，ICRICT给出了一系列建议，被容包括规则和全球公司税治理机构改革等。


The proposals include a minimum corporate tax agreed by developed countries, and mechanisms to prevent multinationals from shifting their profits to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.	我们的方案包括获得发达国家同意的最低公司税以及防止跨国公司将利润转移到低税收司法辖区的机制。


Moreover, in contrast to the OECD reforms, the ICRICT recommends public reporting by multinationals on taxes paid in all jurisdictions.	此外，与经合组织的改革相反，ICRICT建议跨国公司公开报告在所有司法辖区的缴税情况。


And, in the longer term, it calls for a transition to a system in which multinationals are taxed as one firm, with taxes allocated to the different countries in which they operate according to an agreed-upon formula.	在长期，ICRICT建议将跨国公司作为一家企业课税，它们开展业务的不同国家的税额分配根据协商确定。


A first step toward achieving these objectives would be the establishment of an intergovernmental body with the mandate and resources to push through much-needed tax reform, while promoting stronger tax cooperation among governments.	实现这些目标的第一步是成立一个跨政府机构，授予它权限和资源推进急需的税收改革，同时促进政府间税收合作。


The decision about whether to establish such a body is an important feature of the FFD3 agenda.	决定是否成立这样一个机构将是FFD3日程的重要一环。


Such a globally representative forum on taxation should not only serve as a venue for inter-governmental cooperation; it should also support a broader, more inclusive debate on tax reform.	这一具有全球代表性的税收论坛不应该只是作为跨政府合作的场合； 它还应该支持更广泛、更包容的税收改革争论。


For too long, such discussions have been the preserve of closed-door negotiations among governments and large corporations, with the topic considered too technical for the general public to understand.	长久以来，类似的讨论一直是政府和大公司间的闭门磋商，这一问题被认为技术性太强，普通大众无法理解。


Even now, many argue that including everyone in the discussion would result in politicization of the tax system, and that decisions should thus be left to the experts.	即使是现在，许多人仍认为让所有人参与这一讨论会导致税收制度的政治化，因此应该把决定留给专家去做。


But taxation is inherently political, as it involves issues of equity, justice, and the common good.	但税收本来就是个政治问题，并且包含着平等、正义和公共利益因素。


Indeed, issues of taxation were at the heart of the creation of modern democratic parliaments.	事实上，税收问题是建立现代民主议会的核心。


An issue with such far-reaching consequences should not be debated in secrecy.	影响如此深远的问题不容秘密讨论。


If world leaders are serious about reducing inequality and eradicating poverty, they must commit to creating a just and transparent tax system.	如果世界领导人认真地想降低不平等性、消灭贫困，就必须致力于构建平等透明的税收制度。


One hopes that this month in Addis Ababa, they take credible steps in that direction.	我们希望，在本月的亚的斯亚贝巴，他们能够朝这一方向迈出可信的步伐。


Inequality and the Internet	不平等性与互联网


BERKELEY – The conclusion that America has become vastly more unequal over the past 35 years is beyond doubt.	伯克利—美国在过去35年中不平等性程度剧增，这一结论已是不容置疑。


Since 1979, the pattern has been clear: The richer you were, the far richer you have become.	1979年以来的模式十分明确：越富的人，变得更富的程度也就越高。


And if you were poor, you probably stayed poor.	而如果你是穷人，你有可能继续当穷人。


But the same period has also been an era of rapid technological change.	但同样是这一时期，也是科技快速变化的时期。


The United States is undergoing a third industrial revolution, an information-age upheaval that could be as momentous as its predecessors, which transformed society through the introduction of steam, iron, cotton, and machinery, and then internal combustion, electricity, and steel.	美国正在经历第三次工业革命——信息时代的崛起可能与此前工业革命一样动力十足——先是蒸汽、铁、棉花和机械； 接着是内燃机、电力和钢铁，它们都改变了社会。


Today, nearly every resident of a developed country – and soon most of the rest of the world – can easily afford a smartphone, thereby gaining inexpensive access to a universe of human knowledge and entertainment that, until a generation ago, was far beyond the reach of all but the rich.	如今，几乎所有发达国家的居民——大部分世界其他部分的人很快也会加入其中——可以轻松购买智能手机，从而以十分低廉的代价获得人类知识和娱乐的全部，而在一代人之前，这还仅仅是富人的特权。


Is it possible that conventional measures of inequality and income vastly underestimate just how good we have it?	是否有这样的可能，传统不平等性和收入衡量手段大大低估了我们现在的境况？


According to conventional economics, the answer, at first glance, seems to be no.	根据传统经济学，乍一看答案是否定的。


The calculations of economic growth that reveal growing inequality already take into account spending on telecommunications, information processing, and audiovisual entertainment.	揭示不平等性增加的经济增长计算已经考虑了通信、信息处理和视听娱乐方面的支出。


Unless the benefits from information-age goods and services greatly outstrip what we spend on them, the wellbeing they provide will have already been accounted for.	除非信息时代商品和服务所带来的好处大大超过了我们为此付出的钱，否则它们所提供的福利已经考虑在内。


But is that “unless” really so far-fetched?	答案这一“除非”的距离有多远？


When we invest in our wellbeing, we not only spend money to purchase goods and services; we allocate a portion of our free time to use them properly.	当我们投资于我们的福利时，我们不但花钱购买产品和服务； 我们还配置了一部分自由时间用于恰当地使用它们。


A movie ticket will not do you much good if you leave before the curtain rises.	如果你提早退场，电影票就不会给你带来很大的享受。


Time, like money, is a scarce resource; and, because goods and services related to information require our attention, they are time-intensive.	时间就像金钱，也是稀缺资源； 而与信息有关的商品和服务需要我们的注意力，因此它们是时间密集的。


Ever since Homer chanted his Iliad around the campfire after dark, we have been willing to pay dearly for stories, entertainment, and information.	自从荷马围着日暮后的篝火吟出他的《伊利亚特》以来，我们就一直愿意花大把钞票消费故事、娱乐和信息。


The technology of the information age has given us the possibility to invest our time in ways that once only the most powerful could afford.	信息时代的技术给了我们以曾经只有最有权力的人才负担得起的方式投资我们的时间。


If, in the seventeenth century, you wanted to watch Macbeth in your house, you had to be named James Stuart, have William Shakespeare and his acting company on retainer, and have a full-sized theater in your royal palace.	在十七世纪，如果你想在家中观赏《麦克白》，你必须名叫詹姆斯·史都华（James Stuart），有莎士比亚和他的演艺公司当你的家佣，还得在你的皇宫中拥有全尺寸剧院。


We spend, on average, two hours a day with our audio-video devices.	平均而言，我们每天要花两小时用于视听享受。


Assume for a minute that the opportunities provided by the rollout of broadband Internet has at least doubled the utility – the pleasure – that we get during that time.	假设互联网宽带在一分钟内所提供的机会让你在这段时间的效用——即你得到的乐趣——至少增加一倍。


That is the equivalent of receiving an extra two hours of free time every day, on top of the ten hours on average that we spend awake and not at work.	这相当于每天活得额外的两小时自由时间。 平均而言我们每天保持清醒又不需工作的时间为十小时。


Put in economic terms, that is an extra rise of 0.6% per year in standards of living since 1990, a far larger increase than the 0.2% per year that reliance on conventional measures would lead us to conclude.	用经济学行话讲，这相当于1990年以来每年生活水平额外增加0. 6%，远远高于常规衡量手段的计算结果0.


The question then becomes whether our smartphones, Kindles, tablets, and computers actually do provide us that extra utility.	于是，问题变成了我们的智能手机、Kindle阅读器、平板电脑和计算机是否真的给我们提供了额外效用。


Do we value what we get from Netflix, YouTube, Facebook, and the Internet’s online library of humanity far more than what we previously learned, listened to, watched, or gossiped about through traditional means?	我们认为我们从Netflix、YouTube、Facebook和互联网上的在线人类图书馆中获得的价值远远高于我们此前通过传统方式所学到、听到、看到和“八卦”到的东西吗？


Is watching television on demand more rewarding than visiting a movie theater?	看电视点播比看电影更值得吗？


Is your Twitter stream more illuminating than a trip to a nearby library?	你的Twitter流比前往附近的图书馆对你的启发更大���？


Are Facebook friends more valuable than, well, friends?	Facebook朋友比真实世界的朋友更有价值吗？


Whatever the answer to those questions, there is an even bigger wrinkle.	不论这些问题的答案如何，都有一个更大的问题。


We do not consume goods and services in a vacuum.	我们不是在真空中消费商品和服务的。


Part of the pleasure we receive from them derives from a feeling that our status is rising relative to that of our peers.	我们从商品和服务中所获得的乐趣中有一部分来自一种感觉，即我们相对于周边人群的地位有所上升。


The information age has not only provided us with new entertainment options; it has opened new vistas into our neighbors’ lifestyles – and what we have noticed is that some of them are getting much, much richer.	信息时代不但给我们提供了新的越来选择； 他还打开了窥探邻里生活方式的镜头——而我们看到的是，他们中有些人变得比以前富了很多很多。


If I were to hazard a guess, I would say that, as a society, the benefits we have received from information-age technology have been neutralized by the envy and spite that results from living in a world that is ever more unequal.	如果我冒险猜测一下，我会说，作为一个社会，我们从信息时代技术中获得的好处被我们生活在前所未有地不平等的世界中所带来的嫉妒和怨气所中和了。


Connectivity for All	让所有人联网


OXFORD – Over the last decade, the number of new Internet users tripled.	牛津——过去10年来，新增网络用户数达原有用户数的3倍。


But, though a large majority of the world’s population remains offline, the pace of expansion has slowed sharply in recent years.	但尽管绝大多数世界人口仍未实现联网，但互联网扩张的步伐却在近几年急剧放缓。


Is the Internet revolution losing steam?	网络革命的动力是否正在消退？


From 2005 to 2008, the number of Internet users increased at a compound annual rate of 15.1%, bringing the number of people online to some 2.7 billion.	从2005到2008年，联网用户数复合年增长率高达15. 1％，联网用户数也因此达到约27亿。


But, according to a new report by McKinsey & Company, the growth rate fell to 10.4% in 2010-2013.	但麦肯锡全球研究院最新发布的一份报告显示，2010-2013年增长率滑落至 10.


Given the enormous economic benefits of connectivity, finding ways to provide Internet access to the world’s remaining four billion people should be a high priority.	4%。 鉴于联网巨大的经济效益，想方设法为世界剩余的四十亿人口提供联网接入服务应该引起我们的高度重视。


Of course, that is easier said than done.	当然，要想实现目标谈何容易。


Around three-quarters of the unconnected – 3.4 billion people – live in just 20 countries.	在34亿未联网人口中，约四分之三都生活在20个国家。


In 2012, about 64% lived in rural areas, compared with only 24% of Internet users, while about half live below their country’s poverty line and median income.	2012年，未联网人口的64%生活在仅有24%网络用户的农村，其中约半数处于各自国家的贫困线和平均收入以下。


Some 18% are older than 54, compared with about 7% of the online population, and roughly 28% are illiterate, whereas the literacy rate for Internet users is close to 100%.	约18%未联网人口年龄超过54岁，而在线人口中年龄超过54岁的仅有7%，另外有28%的人是文盲，而网民的识字率接近100%。


Finally, women comprise 52% of the offline population and only 42% of the online population.	最后，在联网人口中仅占42%的女性却在未联网人口中占到52%的份额。


These groups face particularly high barriers to Internet connectivity, beginning with inadequate infrastructure, including poor mobile Internet coverage or network access and unreliable electricity supply.	上述群体面临着尤其严重的联网障碍，包括基础设施不足，移动网络覆盖范围狭窄和供电中断。


Indeed, 1.1-2.8 billion people cannot get online via a mobile network, because their area lacks sufficient coverage.	事实上，有11-28亿人无法借助移动网络上网，因为他们所在地区缺少充足的网络覆盖。


Another barrier is affordability: Internet access is simply too costly for many low-income people.	另外一个障碍是负担能力：上网超过了很多低收入群体的承受范围。


Beyond the need to address insufficient competition, inadequate regulation, and high taxes on Internet-enabled devices and service plans, there is the fundamental challenge of supplying cost-effective access to the most remote regions.	除要解决竞争不充分、监管不力、对联网设备和服务计划征收高额税费等各项问题外，还必须解决为偏远地区提供高性价比接入服务的根本性挑战。


In ten countries, largely in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, fixed broadband prices exceed per capita GDP.	在非洲和亚太地区的十个国家，固定宽带价格甚至超过人均GDP。


The third major barrier to Internet adoption is user capability.	用户能力是互联网应用的第三大障碍。


The high level of illiteracy among those who remain offline often implies an inability not only to read and write, but also to use digital technology.	未联网居民文盲比例高往往意味着他们不仅不能读写，而且无法运用数字技术。


An estimated 43% of India’s unconnected citizens are illiterate.	估计印度未联网人口中文盲约为43%。


Without technological solutions, such as user interfaces that feature text-to-speech and voice-recognition capabilities, people who have not attained basic language proficiency will struggle to engage with Internet content.	如果没有配备将文字转化为语音及语音识别等用户界面，不具备基本语文能力的人要想接触网络内容难度可想而知。


The lack of relevant local-language content may also limit use.	相关地方话内容的欠缺也有可能限制使用面。


Making matters worse, misperceptions of the Internet – for example, that it is a security risk or solely for the wealthy – mean that many people will remain reluctant to use it, even if affordable access becomes available.	更有甚者，对互联网的误解——比方说将其视为富人的专属品或者安全隐患——意味着很多人即使有能力承担联网费用，但仍不愿使用网络。


In many emerging economies, a lack of trust in the system has fueled resistance to doing business online.	在众多新兴经济体中，对系统的不信任导致人们对网上业务��抵制态度。


The final barrier to Internet adoption is a lack of incentives.	互联网应用的最后障碍是缺乏激励机制。


As research by the Oxford Internet Institute on broadband in East Africa has shown, many poor people in rural areas may know little, if anything, about the Internet, or may not be offered it.	牛津大学互联网研究所针对东非宽带的研究表明，很多穷人对网络可能知之甚少，也没有人为其提供联网服务。


Given that tailoring content to such potential customers is expensive, Internet service providers are unlikely to do so without clear incentives like government support or high profit margins.	鉴于为上述潜在客户定制内容需要付出高额成本，网络服务供应商不太可能在没有政府支持或高额利润等明确刺激因素的情况下为他们提供服务。


Advertisers are not interested in reaching such markets.	广告商也对这样的市场不感兴趣。


McKinsey has developed a new Internet Barriers Index that ranks 25 developed and developing countries on their performance in the face of these challenges.	麦肯锡已研发出全新互联网壁垒指数排名，针对25个发达及发展中国家面对上述问题的表现进行评估。


The top five countries are the United States, Germany, South Korea, Japan, and Spain.	排名前五位的国家分别是美国、德国、韩国、日本和西班牙。


The bottom five are Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.	排名垫底的分别是尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、孟加拉，坦桑尼亚和埃塞俄比亚。


Nearly half of the world’s offline population lives in ten countries that face a significant struggle to overcome all four barriers.	世界近半数的未联网人口生活在克服四大障碍有显著困难的十个国家。


In the bottom five countries in the McKinsey index, the average Internet penetration rate was only 15% in 2013.	在麦肯锡指数排名垫底的五国，2013年平均互联网普及率仅为15％。


The offline population was largely young and rural, with low literacy rates.	占据未联网人口主体的是低识字率的农村年轻人。


Five other countries – Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand – face medium to high barriers across the board, especially when it comes to infrastructure and incentives.	埃及、印度、印尼、菲律宾和泰国等其他五国在各领域都面临中高壁垒，尤其当涉及到基础设施和激励机制。


With an offline population of more than 1.4 billion people, these countries had an average Internet penetration rate of 19% in 2013.	上述国家未联网人口超过14亿，2013年平均互联网普及率为19%。


Another 1.1 billion people live in countries where a single barrier – especially a lack of awareness of the Internet, weak purchasing power, or low levels of digital literacy – dominates.	还有11亿人生活在单一障碍占主导地位的国家——特别是对网络缺乏认识、购买力弱或数字文化水平低。


Identifying the particular barriers affecting a country or region enables the development of effective solutions – not least because some barriers, such as awareness, are far cheaper to tackle than others, like infrastructure.	找出影响国家和地区的特定障碍有助于制定有效的解决方案——尤其因为某些障碍（如对网络缺乏认识）比基础设施等其他障碍解决起来成本低得多。


That is the purpose of the Internet Barriers Index.	这也是制定互联网障碍指数的目的。


By mapping the major social, political, and economic obstacles to Internet adoption, the index can help make efforts by governments and network and service providers as targeted and efficient as possible.	通过确定互联网应用的主要社会、政治和经济障碍，该指数有助于提高政府、网络和服务提供商工作的针对性和效率。


The imperative to address the formidable challenges to further expansion of Internet usage is clear.	化解进一步拓展网络应用的严峻挑战是我们的当务之急。


Doing so would create considerable potential for economic growth.	各国可以借此创造可观的经济增长潜力。


Many governments have recognized this to some extent, setting ambitious goals for mobile Internet coverage, broadband infrastructure, and public Wi-Fi access.	许多国家已经在一定程度上对此有所认识，制定了雄心勃勃的移动网络覆盖、宽带基础设施和公共Wi-Fi接入计划。


But investment in infrastructure is not enough.	但仅有基础设施投资依然不够。


Only comprehensive, targeted, and nationally tailored strategies, backed by a strong commitment from policymakers, can bring the next one billion people online.	只有拥有决策者坚定支持的目标明确的全国性战略才能再带来10亿网络用户。


The Digital Transformation of Europe	欧洲的数字转型


SAN JOSE – Europe is on the cusp of an unprecedented technological transformation.	圣何塞—欧洲正处在前所未有的技术转型的风口浪尖。


I call it the Internet of Everything: the penetration of the World Wide Web into the everyday aspects of our lives.	我称之为“万物联网”（Internet of Everything）：万维网渗透入我们日常生活的方方面面。


Wearable technology will tell us how well we are sleeping and whether we need to exercise.	可穿戴技术告诉我们睡得怎样，是否需要锻炼。


Sensors in the street will help us avoid traffic jams and find parking.	街头的传感器帮我们避免交通堵塞，帮我们找到车位。


Telemedicine applications will allow physicians to treat patients who are hundreds of miles away.	远程医疗应用让医生可以为数百英里外的病人施治。


This massive transition will transform how citizens interact with their governments, revolutionize entire industries, and change the way we engage with one another.	这一大变革将改变公民与政府互动的方式，给全行业带来一场革命，并改变我们彼此交往的方式。


In Europe, the Internet of Everything is emerging as the single most promising way to revive a moribund economy and tackle the continent's stubborn unemployment problem, with companies, cities, and even countries positioning themselves as leaders in innovation, growth, and the creation of jobs.	在欧洲，万物联网正在成为振兴萎靡的经济、解决欧洲大陆的失业顽疾的最有希望的途径，公司、城市改制国家都争相成为创新、增长和就业创造的领导者。


The most recent example is France.	最新的例子是法国。


Last month, Prime Minister Manuel Valls and I announced an ambitious partnership to promote a digital transformation of the entire country.	上个月，法国总理瓦尔斯和我宣布了一项宏大的合作计划，旨在促进全法国的数字转型。


The collaboration, which includes a $100 million investment from Cisco in French startups, could transform energy management, health care, and education – boosting France's economic competitiveness, job creation, dynamism, and growth in the process.	我们的合作——其中包括思科投资1亿美元于法国初创企业——能够改变能源管理、医疗和教育，从而刺激法国的经济竞争力、就业创造、活力和增长。


France's program is a major step toward a digital Europe, following German Chancellor Angela Merkel's Industrie 4.0 initiative and the United Kingdom's planned expansion of innovation centers to foster technological breakthroughs and pioneer solutions in energy, transport, health care, and education.	0”（Industrie 4. 0），英国也计划扩大创新中心以培育能源、交通、医疗和教育方面的技术突破和创新方案。


Cities too are embracing digitization.	城市也在拥抱数字化。


Barcelona has installed in-ground parking sensors and launched connected public transportation as part of its Smart City strategy.	巴塞罗那植入了地下停车传感器，并启动了互联公共交通系统，以作为其“智慧城市”（Smart City）战略的一部分。


Nice has constructed a “connected boulevard," including smart lighting and environmental monitoring.	尼斯建设了一条采用智能照明和环境监测系统的“互联大道”。


And the Port of Hamburg has a digital system to reduce water, rail, and ground traffic congestion.	汉堡港也采用了一套数字系统以降低水路、铁路和地面交通的拥挤程度。


Projects like these are being replicated across the continent, generating billions of dollars in value in terms of reduced costs, productivity gains, and increased revenues.	这些工程在整个欧洲大陆遍地开花，它们所带来的成本降低、生产率提高和收入增加值高达数十亿美元。


As a result, Europe's leaders see not only opportunities for growth, but also the need to avoid being left behind.	因此，欧洲领导人不但看到了增长机会，还意识到必须避免落于人后。


To create a truly digital Europe will require a foundation of high-speed, high-quality broadband, both wired and wireless.	建设真正的数字欧洲需要高速、高质量的无线和有线宽带基础。


As part of Europe's Digital Agenda, policymakers have set out to connect 50% of European households to superfast broadband (100 mbps or greater) by 2020.	作为欧洲数字议程（Digital Agenda）的一部分，决策者已决定要在2020年让50%的欧洲家庭接入极速宽带（100m或以上带宽）。


They also aim to connect all residences to broadband (at least 30 mbps) by this time.	他们的另一个目标是到2020年让所有居民都能用上宽带（网速至少30m）。


These targets should be fully embraced, and policymakers should continue to encourage major investments in broadband, as well as in the infrastructure needed to support the wireless devices in which we have all come to depend.	这些目标应该充分实现，决策者还应该继续鼓励在宽带以及支持无线设备所需要的基础设施方面加大投入。 我们迟早要依靠无线宽带。


Of course, Europe will also have to encourage entrepreneurship, which requires fostering a culture of risk-taking, facilitating access to venture capital, and investing in strong educational institutions.	当然，欧洲还必须鼓励企业家精神，而这需要建设冒险文化、让风险投资更加容易获得，并投资建设强大的教育机构。


Many countries are doing just that, implying that the next game-changing technology may not come from Silicon Valley; it could just as easily be developed in a lab in Paris, London, or Berlin.	许多国家都在这么做，这意味着下一代局面改变技术也许不会来自硅谷； 而是很有可能来自巴黎、伦敦或柏林的实验室。


Over the longer term, Europe will need a workforce trained for careers in the new digitized economy.	从长期看，欧洲需要为新数字经济做好准备的劳动力大军。


It is estimated that Europe will have an e-skills gap that, if filled, could lead to 850,000 potential jobs in 2015, rising to twice that by 2020.	据估计，欧洲将发生巨大的电子技能缺口，如能填补这一缺口，将可以给2015年带来850,000个潜在工作岗位，到2020年还能再翻一番。


On a continent where youth unemployment exceeds 50% in some countries, there should be no problem finding young and eager people able to do these jobs, provided they receive the proper training.	欧洲一些国家的年轻人失业率超过50%，渴望在该领域工作的年轻人大有人在，只要他们能���获得合适的培训。


This gap cannot be closed overnight, but countries that do nothing to overcome it could very well fall behind.	这一缺口不可能一夜之间填上，但对此视而不见的国家极有可能会落于人后。


Widening the talent pipeline sufficiently will require a generational commitment to teaching math and science, providing technical training, and mentoring young people of all backgrounds so they understand the full range of possibilities that a career in technology affords.	充分扩展人才渠道需要一整代人致力于教授数学和科学、提供技术训练、指导背景各异的年轻人以使他们充分理解技术岗位所能提供的无限可能。


As Europe continues down the road of digital transformation, the possibilities for growth are immediate and significant.	随着欧洲继续沿数字转型之路前行，可观的增长也将随之而至。


The continent is already the world's largest economic bloc, with a GDP of more than €14 trillion ($15.2 trillion) in 2014.	如今，欧洲大陆已是世界最大经济体，2014年GDP超过14万亿欧元。


But its growth has been waning.	但其增长正在消失。


The European Commission estimates – conservatively, in my opinion – that the digital revolution could spur an “additional 2.1% of GDP growth over the baseline."	欧盟委员会估计——在我看来显得有些保守——数字革命将给“GDP带来基准线以上2. 1%的增长”。


On the jobs front, the Internet of Everything will be a key driver of employment.	在就业方面，万物联网有望成为就业驱动力。


Advances in cloud computing alone are expected to create 2.5 million additional jobs in Europe by 2020.	光是云计算方面的进步，就预计可在2020年给欧洲增加250万个岗位。


The digital transformation will bring opportunities and create new types of jobs: systems developers, transportation network engineers, medical device consultants, data analysts, electrical engineers for smart grids, and many more.	数字转型将带来新的机会，创造新型岗位：系统开发人员、交通网络工程师、医疗设备顾问、数据分析师、智能电网电子工程师，等等。


As Europe charts its economic course for the next decade, its leaders must ensure that digital transformation forms the foundation of their strategy.	在欧洲为未来十年制定经济道路之际，其领导人必须确保数字转型为其战略基础。


This will allow them to create a Europe that is stronger, faster, more dynamic – and more digital.	这将让他们打造一个更强大、更快速、更有活力——也更“数字”——的欧洲。


Internet or Splinternet?	互联网还是分裂网？


CAMBRIDGE – Who owns the Internet?	坎布里奇——谁是互联网的主人？


The answer is no one and everyone.	答案是每个人都是，每个人又都不是。


The Internet is a network of networks.	互联网是网络连成的网络。


Each of the separate networks belongs to different companies and organizations, and they rely on physical servers in different countries with varying laws and regulations.	每个独立网络属于不同的企业和机构，并依赖位于法律法规各异的不同国家的物理服务器为其提供服务。


But without some common rules and norms, these networks cannot be linked effectively.	但如果没有某些共同的规定和准则，将无法实现上述网络的有效联通。


Fragmentation – meaning the end of the Internet – is a real threat.	碎片化意味着互联网的终结，而这种碎片化风险始终存在着。


Some estimates put the Internet’s economic contribution to global GDP as high as $4.2 trillion in 2016.	有人估计2016年互联网对全球GDP的经济贡献高达4. 2万亿美元。


A fragmented “splinternet” would be very costly to the world, but that is one of the possible futures outlined last month in the report of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt.	碎片化的“分裂网”可能让世界付出惨重的代价，但那仅仅是上月全球互联网治理委员会报告提到的若干种可能性之一。 前瑞典首相卡尔·比尔特现任全球互联网治理委员会主席。


The Internet now connects nearly half the world’s population, and another billion people – as well as some 20 billion devices – are forecast to be connected in the next five years.	互联网现在联接全球近半数人口，据估计今后5年将另有10亿人——以及约200亿台设备——加入连接。


But further expansion is not guaranteed.	但互联网规模进一步扩大并非板上钉钉。


In the Commission’s worst-case scenario, the costs imposed by the malicious actions of criminals and the political controls imposed by governments would cause people to lose trust in the Internet and reduce their use of it.	根据委员会的最坏情况想定，犯罪分子恶意行为及政府政治控制所带来的成本可能导致民众对互联网失去信任并减少对网络的使用。


The cost of cybercrime in 2016 has been estimated to be as high as $445 billion, and it could grow rapidly.	2016年网络犯罪造成的损失据估算高达4450亿美元，而且仍有可能呈迅速增长态势。


As more devices, ranging from automobiles to pacemakers, are placed online, malicious hackers could turn the “Internet of Things” (IOT) into “the weaponization of everything.”	随着从汽车到起搏器等越来越多的设备被联入互联网，恶意的黑客有可能借“物联网”（IOT）实现“武器化一切”的企图。


Massive privacy violations by companies and governments, and cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure such as power grids (as recently happened in Ukraine), could create insecurity that undercuts the Internet’s potential.	企业和政府大规模侵犯隐私以及对电网等民用设施发动网络攻击（就像不久前乌克兰发生的那样）可能带来削弱互联网发展潜力的不安全因素。


A second scenario is what the Commission calls “stunted growth.”	还有一种情况是委员会所说的“发展停滞”。


Some users capture disproportionate gains, while others fail to benefit.	某些用户从中获得绝大部分好处，而其他人则基本无法受益。


Three or four billion people are still offline, and the Internet’s economic value for many who are connected is compromised by trade barriers, censorship, laws requiring local storage of data, and other rules that limit the free flow of goods, services, and ideas.	目前有三四十亿人仍处于脱机状态，而互联网对很多入网用户的经济价值主要受贸易壁垒、审查制度、当地数据存储规定和阻碍商品、服务及理念自由流动的其他规则的限制。


The movement toward sovereign control of the Internet is growing, and a degree of fragmentation already exists.	互联网主权控制运动正不断壮大，某种程度的碎片化已经成为现实。


China has the largest number of Internet users, but its “Great Fire Wall” has created barriers with parts of the outside world.	中国拥有全世界最多的网民数量，但那里的“防火长城”已经阻碍了国内和世界其他国家网民的交流。


Many governments censor services that they think threaten their political control.	很多政府都审查其认为会对国内政治控制造成威胁的服务。


If this trend continues, it could cost more than 1% of GDP per year, and also impinge on peoples’ privacy, free speech, and access to knowledge.	如果任由这种趋势持续下去，有可能每年造成GDP缩减1%，并同时侵犯民众的隐私、言论自由和知识获取。


While the world could muddle along this path, a great deal will be lost and many will be left behind.	虽然世界可以沿这条路继续走下去，但会因此造成巨大损失并导致很多人被时代抛弃。


In the Commission’s third scenario, a healthy Internet provides unprecedented opportunities for innovation and economic growth.	但委员会提出的第三种想定中，健康的互联网为创新和经济发展提供前所未有的机遇。


The Internet revolution of the past two decades has contributed something like 8% of global GDP and brought three billion users online, narrowing digital, physical, economic, and educational divides.	过去20年爆发的互联网革命已经贡献了全球GDP的8%并实现30亿用户上网，缩小了数字、物理、经济和教育方面的差距。


The Commission’s report states that the IOT may result in up to $11 trillion in additional GDP by 2025.	委员会报告表明物联网到2025年可能带来11万亿美元的增量GDP。


The Commission concluded that sustaining unhindered innovation will require that the Internet’s standards are openly developed and available; that all users develop better digital “hygiene” to discourage hackers; that security and resilience be at the core of system design (rather than an afterthought, as they currently are); that governments not require third parties to compromise encryption; that countries agree not to attack the Internet’s core infrastructure; and that governments mandate liability and compel transparent reporting of technological problems to provide a market-based insurance industry to enhance the IOT’s security.	国家同意不袭击互联网核心基础设施； 政府实行强制责任制度，规定技术问题必须公开报告，并提供以市场为基础的保险来强化物联网的安全性。


Until recently, the debate about the most appropriate approach to Internet governance revolved around three main camps.	到近期为止，有关互联网治理最佳方案的争论主要涉及到三大阵营。


The first, multi-stakeholder approach, originated organically from the community that developed the Internet, which ensured technical proficiency but not international legitimacy, because it was heavily dominated by American technocrats.	首先是多利益相关方方案，由互联网的开发群体自发提出，因为很大程度上受美国技术专家的主导，由此在确保技术领先的同时却缺乏国际合法性。


A second camp favored greater control by the International Telecommunications Union, a United Nations specialized agency, which ensured legitimacy but at the cost of efficiency.	第二阵营倾向于由国际电信联盟加强控制，该联盟是联合国下属的专业机构，这种方案能保障合法性但却同时有损效率。


And authoritarian countries like Russia and China championed international treaties guaranteeing no interference with states’ strong sovereign control over their portion of the Internet.	而俄罗斯和中国这样的独裁国家则倡导出台保障不干涉国家对境内互联网实施强主权控制的国际协议。


More recently, the Commission argues, a fourth model is developing in which a broadened multi-stakeholder community involves more conscious planning for the participation of each stakeholder (the technical community, private organizations, companies, governments) in international conferences.	近来，该委员会提出正在制定第四种方案，即允许扩大化的多利益相关方群体更有意识的敦促各方（技术团体、民间组织、企业和政府）参与国际会议。


An important step in this direction was the US Commerce Department’s decision last month to hand oversight of the so-called IANA functions – the “address book” of the Internet – to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.	上述方面的重要举措是美国商务部上月决定将所谓IANA功能——即互联网“地址簿”功能——的监管权移交给国际互联网域名和编号分配公司（ICANN）。


ICANN, with a Government Advisory Committee of 162 members and 35 observers, is not a typical inter-governmental organization: the governments do not control the organization.	ICANN下设由162个成员国和35个观察员国组成的政府顾问委员会，并不属于典型的政府间组织：即政府对该机构并不具有控制力。


At the same time, ICANN is consistent with the multi-stakeholder approach formulated and legitimated by the Internet Governance Forum, established by the UN General Assembly.	与此同时，ICANN符合互联网治理论坛制定并通过的多利益相关方方案，该治理论坛的设计者是联合国大会。


Some American senators complained that when President Barack Obama’s Commerce Department handed its oversight of the IANA functions to ICANN, it was “giving away the Internet.”	某些美国参议员抱怨当奥巴马政府商务部将IANA功能监管权移交给ICANN时，相当于“将互联网控制权拱手让出”。


But the US could not “give away” the Internet, because the United States does not own it.	但美国无法“让出”互联网，因为互联网的所有权并不属于美国。


While the original Internet linked computers entirely in the US, today’s Internet connects billions of people worldwide.	尽管原始互联网连接的电脑都在美国境内，但今天的互联网连接着全球数十亿人。


Moreover, the IANA address book (of which there are many copies) is not the Internet.	此外，IANA地址簿（该地址簿存在多个版本）并不是互联网本身。


The US action last month was a step toward a more stable and open multi-stakeholder Internet of the type that the Global Commission applauded.	美国上个月的所作所为是朝着全球委员会所赞赏的那种稳定公开的多利益相关方网络所做出的努力。


Let’s hope that further steps in this direction follow.	我们希望在这方面，不久将出现进一步的跟进措施。


Golden Slumbers	黄金的沉寂


CAMBRIDGE – In principle, holding gold is a form of insurance against war, financial Armageddon, and wholesale currency debasement.	发自剑桥——原则上，持有黄金是为了应对战争、金融末日和大规模货币贬值的保险形式。


And, from the onset of the global financial crisis, the price of gold has often been portrayed as a barometer of global economic insecurity.	而且自全球金融危机爆发以来，黄金价格一直被形容为反映全球经济不稳定态势的晴雨表。


So, does the collapse in gold prices – from a peak of $1,900 per ounce in August 2011 to under $1,250 at the beginning of July 2013 – represent a vote of confidence in the global economy?	那么，黄金价格的跳水——从2011年8月的1,900美元/盎司跌到2013年7月初的1,250美元/盎司——就代表着人们对全球经济投下了信任票吗？


To say that the gold market displays all of the classic features of a bubble gone bust is to oversimplify.	要说黄金市场显示出所有破产泡沫的经典特征就未免过于简单化了。


There is no doubt that gold’s heady rise to the peak, from around $350 per ounce in July 2003, had investors drooling.	毫无疑问，在从2003年七月的350美元/盎司迅猛上升到峰值的过程中，黄金成为了投资者们垂涎的对象。


The price would rise today because everyone had become convinced that it would rise even further tomorrow.	因为所有人都曾确信明天的黄金价格一定会比今天涨得更高，所以黄金价格一路高歌猛进。


Doctors and dentists started selling stocks and buying gold coins.	医生和牙医们都开始抛售股票并购买金币。


Demand for gold jewelry in India and China soared.	印度和中国对黄金首饰的需求飞涨。


Emerging-market central banks diversified out of dollars and into gold.	新兴市场国家的中央银行都将部分美元变成黄金。


The case for buying gold had several strong components.	人们购买黄金有几个强大的理由。


Ten years ago, gold was selling at well below its long-term inflation-adjusted average, and the integration of three billion emerging-market citizens into the global economy could only mean a giant long-term boost to demand.	十年前，黄金价格远低于其计入通胀后的长期平均水平，而30亿新兴市场人民被整合进入全球经济也仅仅意味着一个庞大的长期需求刺激。


That element of the story, incidentally, remains valid.	顺便说一句,该故事的一小部分仍然是有效的。


The global financial crisis added to gold’s allure, owing initially to fear of a second Great Depression.	由于开始害怕会出现第二次大萧条,全球金融危机增加了黄金的诱惑力。


Later, some investors feared that governments would unleash inflation to ease the burden of soaring public debt and address persistent unemployment.	后来,一些投资者担心政府会为减轻不断增长的公共债务负担并解决居高不下的失业率而释放通胀。


As central banks brought policy interest rates down to zero, no one cared that gold yields no interest.	由于中央银行已经将政策利率降至零，没有人会在意黄金也是零利息的事实。


So it is nonsense to say that the rise in the price of gold was all a bubble.	因此也没有理由说黄金价格上涨完全是泡沫。


But it is also true that as the price rose, a growing number of naïve investors sought to buy in.	但另一方面的事实就是随着金价上升，越来越多天真的投资者开始积极尝试买入黄金。


Lately, of course, the fundamentals have reversed somewhat, and the speculative frenzy has reversed even more.	当然，随着后期基本面有所逆转，黄��投机狂潮出现了更大程度的回退。


China’s economy continues to soften; India’s growth rate is down sharply from a few years ago.	中国经济继续趋缓； 印度增长率远低于前几年。


By contrast, despite the ill-advised fiscal sequester, the US economy appears to be healing gradually.	相反地，尽管实施了不明智的财政隔离政策，美国经济似乎逐渐恢复。


Global interest rates have risen 100 basis points since the US Federal Reserve started suggesting – quite prematurely, in my view – that it would wind down its policy of quantitative easing.	全球利率自美联储开始暗示——在我看来有点过早了——将逐步停止量化宽松政策后上升了100个基点。


With the Fed underscoring its strong anti-inflation bias, it is harder to argue that investors need gold as a hedge against high inflation.	由于美联储表现出了坚决的反通胀倾向，因此也很难证明投资者需要黄金来对抗高通货膨胀。


And, as the doctors and dentists who were buying gold coins two years ago now unload them, it is not yet clear where the downward price spiral will stop.	而且，随着那些两年前购入金币的医生和牙医们开始倾销这些金币，我们并不知道黄金价格会下滑到哪里。


Some are targeting the psychologically compelling $1,000 barrier.	而有人则将其锁定在1000美元的心理关口。


In fact, the case for or against gold has not changed all that much since 2010, when I last wrote about it.	事实上，自2010年以来，支持或看空黄金的情况都没改变多少，2010年当我最后一次写有关黄金的事时。


In October of that year, the price of gold – the consummate faith-based speculative asset – was on the way up, having just hit $1,300.	那一年的10月，黄金价格——完美的以信任为基础的投资性资产——正在上升，刚到1300美元。


But the real case for holding it, then as now, was never a speculative one.	但持有黄金，不管是那时还是现在，却从不是投机行为。


Rather, gold is a hedge.	相反，黄金是一种对冲产品。


If you are a high-net-worth investor, or a sovereign wealth fund, it makes perfect sense to hold a small percentage of your assets in gold as a hedge against extreme events.	如果你是一个高净值投资者，或一个主权财富基金，那么将你一小部分的资产换成黄金以对抗极端情况就意义重大。


Holding gold can also make sense for middle-class and poor households in countries – for example, China and India – that significantly limit access to other financial investments.	持有黄金对像中国和印度这些国家的中产阶级和贫困家庭来说也有意义，因为这些国家大大限制国内人民的其它金融投资渠道。


For most others, gold is just another gamble that one can make.	对其他大多数人来说，黄金只是另一种赌博罢了。


And, as with all gambles, it is not necessarily a winning one.	跟其它赌博一样，赌黄金不一定赌得赢。


Unless governments firmly set the price of gold, as they did before World War I, the market for it will inevitably be risky and volatile.	除非政府坚决确定黄金的价格，像它们一战前所做的那样，否则黄金市场将不可避免地会有风险和波动。


In a study published in January, the economists Claude Erb and Campbell Harvey consider several possible models of gold’s fundamental price, and find that gold is at best only loosely tethered to any of them.	一月份发表的一份研究中，经济学家克劳德·厄尔布（Claude Erb）和坎贝尔·哈维（Campbell Harvey）考虑了黄金基本价格的几种可能模型，并发现黄金是充其量只是松散地绑在其中任何一个之上。


Instead, the price of gold often seems to drift far above or far below its fundamental long-term value for extended periods.	相反,黄金的价格似乎常常远高于或低于其一段时间的长期基本价值。


(This behavior is, of course, not unlike that of many other financial assets, such as exchange rates or stock prices, though gold’s price swings may be more extreme.)	（当然这种行为与很多其它金融资产没有什么不同，比如汇率或股票价格，尽管黄金价格波动可能更极端。 ）


Gold bugs sometimes cite isolated historical data that suggest that gold’s long-term value has remained stable over the millennia.	主张金本位的人有时会引用表明黄金长期价值在过去一千年一直保持稳定的孤立历史数据。


For example, Stephen Harmston’s oft-cited 1998 study points to anecdotal evidence that an ounce of gold bought 350 loaves of bread in the time of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, who died in 562 BC.	比如，斯蒂芬·哈姆斯顿（Stephen Harmston）再三被引用的1998年研究指出轶事证据表明巴比伦国王尼布甲尼撒二世（死于公元前562年）时期，一盎司黄金可以买350块面包。


Ignoring the fact that bread in Babylon was probably healthier than today’s highly refined product, the price of gold today is not so different, equal to perhaps 600 loaves of bread.	忽略巴比伦时期的面包可能比现在高度精制的产品更健康这个事实，现在黄金的价格并没有差很多，相当于600块面包。


Of course, we do not have annual data for Babylonian gold prices.	当然，我们并没有巴比伦时期面包价格的年度数据。


We can only assume, given wars and other uncertainties, that true market prices back then, like today, were quite volatile.	我们只能假设，考虑到战争和其它不确定性，那时的真实市场价格像今天一样，也是很不稳定的。


So the recent collapse of gold prices has not really changed the case for investing in it one way or the other.	所以近期黄金价格崩溃并没有改变人们对它的投资情况。


Yes, prices could easily fall below $1,000; but, then again, they might rise.	是的，价格很有可能会下降到1000美元以下； 但是它也可能会上升。


Meanwhile, policymakers should be cautious in interpreting the plunge in gold prices as a vote of confidence in their performance.	同时，政策制定者也应该在将黄金价格暴跌解读为对自身表现的肯定时更加谦虚谨慎一些。


The New Interventionists	新干涉主义者


MUNICH – The consequences of Russia’s intervention in Syria stretch far beyond the Middle East.	慕尼黑—俄罗斯干涉叙利亚的后果远远不止于中东。


The Kremlin’s military campaign has tilted the stalemate in favor of the government and derailed efforts to craft a political compromise to end the war.	克里姆林宫的军事行动使得僵局想政府倾斜，也导致结束战争的政治妥协无法形成。


It also heralds the beginning of a new era in geopolitics, in which large-scale military interventions are not carried out by Western coalitions, but by countries acting in their own narrow self-interest, often in contravention of international law.	它也标志着地缘政治新时期的到来，大规模军事干涉不再由西方联盟实施，而是由为了满足有悖于国际法的自身狭隘利益的国家实施。


Since the end of the Cold War, the debate over international military action has pitted powerful, interventionist Western powers against weaker countries, like Russia and China, whose leaders argued that national sovereignty is sacrosanct and inviolable.	自冷战结束以来，关于国际军事行动的争论的双方是强大的干涉主义西方力量和较弱的俄罗斯和中国。 俄罗斯和中国领导人认为国家主权神圣不可侵犯。


The unfolding developments in Syria are further evidence that the tables are turning.	叙利亚局势的发展进一步证明了形势正在变化。


While the West is losing its appetite for intervention – particularly involving ground troops – countries like Russia, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are increasingly intervening in their neighbors’ affairs.	西方正在失去干涉的兴趣——特别是派遣地面部队干涉——而俄罗斯、中国、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯正在越来越多地干涉邻国事务。


In the 1990s, after genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans, Western countries developed a doctrine of so-called humanitarian intervention.	20世纪90年代，卢旺达和巴尔干半岛发生种族灭绝后，西方国家制订了所谓的人道主义干涉原则。


“The Responsibility to Protect” (colloquially known as “R2P”) held countries accountable for their people’s welfare and compelled the international community to intervene when governments failed to protect civilians from mass atrocities – or were themselves threatening civilians.	“保护责任”（简称“R2P”）规定各国有责任保护人民的福祉，并要求国际社会在政府无法保护公民免遭大规模暴力侵犯——或政府本身威胁到平民时实施干涉。


The doctrine upended the traditional concept of national sovereignty, and in countries like Russia and China, it quickly came to be viewed as little more than a fig leaf for Western-sponsored regime change.	这一原则颠覆了传统国家主权概念，在俄罗斯和中国等国家，它很快就成为西方敌对势力试图颠覆政权的代名词。


So it is ironic, to say the least, that Russia is using a concept similar to R2P to justify its intervention, only in this case it is defending the government from its citizens, rather than the other way around.	因此，俄罗斯用类似于保护责任的概念论证自己的干涉看上去颇为讽刺。 俄罗斯实际上是在保护政府免遭公民侵犯，而不是相反。


Russia’s efforts are, in effect, an argument for a return to the era of absolute sovereignty, in which governments are uniquely responsible for what happens within their country’s borders.	俄罗斯的做法实际上是主张回归绝对主权时代，政府是国界之内发生的情况的唯一责任人。


Russia’s stance also reflects its preference for stability over justice and its acceptance of the legitimacy of authoritarian rule.	俄罗斯的立场还体现在它认为稳定要压倒正义，并且接受极权统治的合法性。


With the proliferation of “color revolutions” in places like Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, Russia and China have become increasingly wary of popular uprisings.	随着“颜色革命”在格鲁吉亚、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦的兴起，俄罗斯和中国越来越担心群众起义。


The threat of Western intervention, in their view, only compounds the potential for instability.	在它们看来，西方干涉只能加剧潜在动荡。


Indeed, the Chinese have coined their own stiff foreign-policy jargon for this sentiment: fanxifang xin ganshe zhuyi (loosely translated, “countering Western neo-interventionism”).	事实上，中国已经出现了体现这一情绪的外交政策口号：反西方新干涉主义。


But Russia’s respect for sovereignty has notable limits.	但俄罗斯对主权的尊重有着明确的界限。


In Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin embraced a very different doctrine of intervention, justifying its actions in Ukraine on the grounds that it was defending the rights of ethnic Russians.	2014年，在克里米亚，克里姆林宫采取了截然不同的干涉思想，以捍卫俄罗斯族的权利为借口为其在乌克兰的行动开脱。


This marks a return to a pre-Westphalian world of linguistic, religious, and sectarian solidarity, of the sort Czarist Russia practiced when it regarded itself as the protector of all Slavs.	这标志着回归前威斯特伐利亚的语言/宗教和宗派团结时代，当时的沙皇俄国以所有斯拉夫民族的保护人自居并据此行动。


Not surprisingly, this justification for intervention is rapidly finding adherents in other parts of the world.	毫不奇怪，这一干涉借口迅速在世界其他部分找到了“知音”。


In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has adopted a parallel argument for its support of Sunni forces in Yemen and Syria, as has Iran in backing its Shia allies in both countries.	在中东，沙特阿拉伯采取了同样的借口论证其对也门和叙利亚逊尼派力量的支持，正如伊朗支持其在上述两国的什叶派盟友。


Even China is increasingly being pushed to take responsibility for its citizens and companies overseas.	甚至中国也在日益为其海外公民和公司伸张利益。


At the beginning of the Libyan civil war, China airlifted tens of thousands of its citizens out of the country.	在利比亚战争爆发之初，中国撤出了数万侨民。


All of this has come at a time when the West is losing its military preeminence.	所有这些发生在西方正在失去其军事主宰力的时刻。


Improvements in the Russian and Chinese militaries and the increasingly common use of asymmetric strategies by state and non-state actors are leveling the battlefield.	俄罗斯和中国军队的发展，以及国家和非国家行动方日益将不对成战略作为常规，正在让对抗变得日益平衡。


Indeed, the proliferation of state-sponsored non-state actors in places like Libya, Syria, Crimea, and Donbas is blurring the distinction between state and non-state violence.	事实上，在利比亚、叙利亚、克里米亚和顿巴斯等地区，国家支持的非国家行动方层出不穷，让国家和非国家暴力的界限日益模糊。


After the Cold War, the West imposed an international order that defined geopolitics worldwide.	冷战结束后，西方指定的国际秩序决定了全球地缘政治。


When that order was threatened, Western leaders felt authorized to intervene in the affairs of whatever “rogue state” was causing the problem.	当这一秩序受到威胁时，西方领导人认为自己有权利干涉任何“流氓国家”所造成的问题。


But now that order is being challenged on several fronts simultaneously – globally by Russia and China, and at the regional level by increasingly assertive players in the Middle East, Latin America, and even Europe.	但如今这一秩序正在多条阵线上同时受到挑战——在国际上是俄罗斯和中国，在地区层面是中东、拉美甚至欧洲的日益激进的行动方。


As a new order takes shape, the roles countries have played for the last 25 years are likely to be reversed.	随着新秩序的形成，过去25年来各国所扮演的角色可能颠倒。


In the West, the concept of sovereignty and the limited use of power is likely to make a comeback, while national leaders who have traditionally called for restraint will become increasingly bold in unleashing their troops.	在西方，主权的概念和有限使用武力可能卷土重来，而传统上总是呼吁克制的国家领导人越来越热衷于派遣军队。


The Wrong Lessons of the Iraq War	伊拉克战争的错误教训


WASHINGTON, DC – The Chilcot report was finally released this month, seven years after it was commissioned by the British government to “identify lessons” from the United Kingdom’s participation in the Iraq War.	华盛顿——在英国政府委托编写报告总结英国参与伊拉克战争教训七年后， 齐尔考特报告终于于本月面世了。


But in the frenzied focus on former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s errors of judgment and process in bringing the UK into the war alongside the United States, the real lessons risk being lost.	但在人们对前首相托尼·布莱尔判断及流程出错导致英国和美国一道卷入伊拉克战争的狂热关注中，真正的教训却有可能被人们忽略掉。


For many critics, the failure of the Iraq War proves that interventionist Western foreign policies are both futile and immoral.	许多批评者认为，伊拉克战争的失败证明西方干涉主义外交政策既徒劳又不道德。


But interventions should never be assessed on the basis of the success or failure of the last one.	但我们不能根据上一次干涉行动的成败来评估干涉行动的效果。


That logic is what led Bill Clinton’s administration, following the failure of US intervention in Somalia in 1993, to fail to act the following year to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, which in retrospect could have been halted with quite limited action.	正是这样的逻辑导致比尔·克林顿政府1993年介入索马里失败后，未能于第二年采取行动制止发生在卢旺达的种族大屠杀，现在回想起来，制止那次种族大屠杀本来可以只要非常有限的行动。


In the case of the Iraq War, the intervention killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and shattered the country, as well as costing the lives of thousands of US and British soldiers.	说回到伊拉克战争，干涉行动杀害了数十万伊拉克人并摧毁了这个国家，同时也导致数千名英美士兵因此而丧生。


The tragic legacy of the Iraqi intervention continues today, however, because it now stands as a cautionary tale against all intervention.	伊拉克行动的悲剧性影响今天仍在继续，因为这次行动已经成为反对一切干涉活动的警示标。


President Barack Obama has repeatedly justified his refusal to use force in Syria, other than against the Islamic State (ISIS), in terms of avoiding another Iraq.	奥巴马总统一再以避免另一次伊拉克战争为由拒绝对除伊斯兰国以外的叙利亚势力动武。


Moreover, his decisions have been affected by British reactions to Iraq.	不仅如此，英国人对伊拉克战争的反应也影响了他的决策。


Indeed, Obama came closest to using force in Syria when presented with unequivocal evidence in the summer of 2013 that President Bashar al-Assad was using chemical weapons against his citizens.	事实上，2013年夏奥巴马在拿到巴沙尔·阿萨德总统对本国民众使用化学武器的明确证据后，曾非常接近于出兵叙利亚。


But he changed his mind, in part based on former UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s failure to win parliamentary support to act against Assad’s regime.	但他后来又改变了主意，部分因为英国首相戴维·卡梅伦未能赢得议会支持对阿萨德政权采取行动。


Despite Cameron’s warning that “this is not like Iraq…we must not let the spectre of previous mistakes paralyze us,” members of his Conservative Party joined with opposition Labour MPs to defeat the motion to launch airstrikes in Syria in response to Assad’s chemical-weapons attacks.	. 我们不应听任之前错误的幽灵妨碍我们采取行动”，但保守党议员还是与工党反对派议员一道，否决了对叙利亚发起空中打击以惩戒阿萨德化武袭击的��议。


After the defeat, British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond recognized that it was the Iraq War that had “poisoned the well” of public opinion, while former Labour leader Ed Miliband said the British public, “want us to learn the lessons of Iraq.”	空中打击动议被否决后，英国国防大臣菲利普·哈蒙德承认是伊拉克战争“毒化”了公众舆论，而前工党领袖埃德·米利班德则表示英国公众“希望我们吸取伊拉克战争的教训。 ”


The Chilcot report found that the case for invading Iraq was made on the “basis of flawed intelligence,” that the resources committed did not meet the stated goals, and that interveners failed to plan for unintended consequences.	齐尔考特报告发现入侵伊拉克的理由建立在“情报错误的基础之上”，即投入的资源没有达到既定目标，且干预方也并未预料到意想不到的后果。


As a result, Britain ended its six-year commitment in Iraq “a very long way from success.”	结果导致英国结束长达6年的伊拉克行动时“根本谈不上成功。


This catalogue of failure should not be read as a brief against all intervention, but as a set of criteria for future success.	”这份失败目录不应被解读为反对所有干预行动的概述，而是确立了一系列标准以保障未来的成功。


First, the intelligence must be cross-examined from every conceivable angle.	首先，必须从一切可能的角度交叉审核获得的情报。


This maxim was not applied in Libya, either, such that the initial reports of a potential massacre of hundreds of thousands of people in Benghazi has since come under sustained and credible attack.	这条准则在利比亚也并未付诸使用，以至于不断有人客观质疑数十万人在班加西可能遭受屠杀的初步报告。


Second, the means and the ends must be at least roughly aligned.	其次，手段和目的必须至少大概具备一致性。


Transforming a dictatorship into a democracy in a country that has never known democracy and lacked the economic and civic resources to sustain it was at least a generation-long endeavor (though neither the US nor the UK government initially justified the intervention on these grounds).	至少需要一代人的努力才有可能在一个从未实行过民主并缺乏维护民主所需经济和民间资源的国家实现由独裁到民主的转化（但最初美国和英国政府都并未以此为由来解释干涉行动）。


The original stated end of removing weapons of mass destruction could have been achieved at much lower cost, had such weapons in fact existed.	即使所谓大规模杀伤性武器真的存在，同样能够以低得多的代价来实现销毁上述武器的最初目标。


Third, intervention planners should assume worst-case rather than best-case scenarios.	第三，干预策划者应当设想最坏、而不是最好的情况。


The cost of non-intervention must be as high as or higher than the projected cost of intervention (where many things that can go wrong frequently do).	不干预的代价必须等同于预期的干预成本（很多可能出问题的地方确实会发生问题）甚至比它还高。


These lessons set a high bar for any future intervention.	上述教训要求满足高标准才能实施未来的干预行动。


But it is a bar cleared by at least some proposed measures in Syria.	但拟议中叙利亚的某些措施至少相对于这样的干预标准可以满足。


The intelligence concerning Assad’s atrocities against his own is irrefutable.	阿萨德针对本国民众的施暴行为无可辩驳。


The stated goal of intervention in Syria should be to stop Assad from committing mass murder against his own population, which has forced millions to flee the country, and to convince him and his supporters that if they cannot win by any means, they are better off negotiating a genuine peace settlement, however fragile.	叙利亚干预行动的公开目标应当是阻止阿萨德大规模屠杀本国民众，上述屠杀已经迫使数百万人逃离叙利亚，并说服阿萨德及其支持者如果他们用尽一切方法都无法获胜，那么无论和谈的过程多么脆弱，都最好能够通过真正的和谈来解决冲突。


To achieve this specific end, the means are available and calibrated: the targets should be Assad’s air force and airports.	实现上述具体目标的手段切实存在、并能产生精准的效果：应当以阿萨德的空军和机场为打击目标。


The US and its allies are already bombing perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Syria, but only when those perpetrators belong to ISIS rather than to the Syrian government.	美国及其盟国已经在对叙利亚的危害人类罪罪犯进行轰炸，但轰炸的目标仅限于伊斯兰国、而非叙利亚政府。


Finally, if such an intervention failed either to stop Assad’s massacre of civilians or to create the conditions for a negotiated peace, Syria would be no worse off than it is today.	最后，如果干预行动未能阻止阿萨德屠杀平民或者为和谈创造条件，叙利亚的情况也不会比今天更糟。


The fear is that weakening Assad will strengthen ISIS, and that a Syria overrun by ISIS would be worse for the West, for other countries in the Middle East, and arguably for Syrians.	人们担忧削弱阿萨德将强化伊斯兰国，而由伊斯兰国控制叙利亚将对西方、中东其他国家甚至叙利亚民众造成更加不利的后果。


But Assad actively benefits from the presence of ISIS in Syria; it reinforces precisely the counterterrorist narrative that he has promoted since the first peaceful protests against his government began in March 2011.	但阿萨德其实是叙利亚伊斯兰国的直接受益者； 伊斯兰国一再强化了2011年3月阿萨德政府上台首次和平抗议以来一直宣传的反恐承诺。


And Syrians across the country will fight ISIS just as fiercely with or without Assad’s air force.	而且无论有没有阿萨德的空军配合，全体叙利亚民众都将全力抵抗伊斯兰国。


Russia and Iran will continue to fight ISIS as well.	俄罗斯和伊朗也将继续对抗伊斯兰国。


One of Chilcot’s main conclusions is surely correct: “aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated, and challenged with the utmost rigour.”	齐尔考特的主要结论之一无疑是正确的：“人们需要对干预行动的任何层面严格进行计算、辩论和质证。


That said, intervention can still be the right course.	”这就是说，干预仍有可能是正确的选择。


Three Ways to Improve Child Health	改善儿童健康的三个方法


SEATTLE – Over the last 15 years, the international community has made great strides in improving child health.	西雅图—过去十五年中，国际社会在改善儿童健康方面取得了巨大的进步。


But, with millions of children under the age of five dying each year from preventable and treatable diseases like diarrhea and pneumonia, the job is far from finished.	但是，每年仍有数百万五岁以下儿童因为腹泻和肺炎等可防可治疾病而死亡，改善儿童健康仍然任重道远。


Most people would say that malaria or even HIV/AIDS are the leading child killers.	大部分人认为疟疾甚至艾滋病是儿童死亡的主因。