Job creation is strong, with total non-farm payroll employment having increased by 295,000 in February and the unemployment rate falling yet again, to just 5.5%.	新就业职位增加势头强劲，二月份的非农就业总人数已经增加了29. 5万，失业率再次下降，仅为5.


But some indicators still have the Fed concerned.	但一些指标依旧引发美联储关注。


The Personal Consumption Expenditures deflator remains well below the 2% target.	个人消费支出平减指数仍远低于2％的目标。


The core consumer price index, to be released next week, is expected to show a year-on-year increase of just 1.7% – or even less, if the lower oil price feeds through from headline to core CPI.	将于下周公布的核心消费者物价指数，预计显示较去年同期增幅仅为1. 7％，如果低油价的影响从新闻标题蔓延至核心CPI的话，这个指数甚至更低。


And real wage growth stands at less than 2%, which is below the level deemed necessary by the Fed to underpin a sustainable acceleration in consumer spending.	而实际工资增长不到2％，低于美联储认为可支撑消费支出可持续加速增长的必要水平。


On top of already modest inflation expectations – characterized by a five-year break-even inflation rate of 1.9% – the dollar has appreciated by around 10% this year, and by almost 25% since the beginning of last year.	在已算温和的通胀预期之外—以五年相对通胀率1. 9％为标志—今年美元汇率已经升值了10％左右，去年至今涨了近25%。


Given the deflationary impact of a stronger currency – and the Fed’s general intolerance of deflation – there is good reason to believe that the Fed will exercise caution in raising interest rates.	考虑到更强势货币所带来的通货紧缩影响—美联储一般不会容忍通缩—有充分的理由相信，美联储将再加息上保持谨慎。


Even if the Fed ignores deflationary pressure and hikes interest rates more quickly, medium- and long-term rates are still likely to be anchored, given how little yield is available elsewhere in the world.	即使美联储无视通缩压力并更迅速提高利率，但由于世界其他地方的利率依然偏低，中期和长期利率仍可能被锁定。


Yields on German Bunds are now negative out to eight years.	德国国债收益率已经持续收益已经连续8年为负。


In Europe’s peripheral economies, ten-year yields are edging closer to 1%, as the European Central Bank pursues a €1.1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) quantitative-easing program.	在欧洲外围经济体，10年期国债收益率均逼近1％，因为欧洲央行实施了一项总额1. 1万亿欧元（1.


And, in Japan, ten-year yields are below 0.4%.	3万亿美元）的量化宽松计划。 在日本，10年期国债收益率低于0.


Lending to the emerging economies is hardly attractive, either, with even the riskiest economies offering low hard-currency yields.	贷款给新兴经济体也几乎毫无吸引力，或者说，即使有最危险的经济体也只能提供较低的硬通货币收益率。


Indeed, even Russia – whose military intervention in Ukraine has led the West to impose strict economic sanctions – offers annual yield of less than 6% on ten-year bonds.	事实上，即便是俄罗斯这种因军事干预乌克兰而导致西方实行严格经济制裁的国家，10年期债券的年化收益率也不足6％。


Given such low yields in most of the world, investors will be eager to take advantage of the relative value opportunity offered by rising US interest rates.	鉴于世界上大多数国家收益率如此之低，投资者会急于利用由美国利率上升带来的相对增值机会。


Add to that America’s safe-haven status, and the fact that any re-pricing of US rates surely would reflect an economic resurgence, and the bid for US Treasuries should be exceptionally strong.	再加上美国的避险地位，以及美国利率的任何重新定价肯定会反映经济复苏的事实，对美国国债的购买欲望必定极为强烈。


In this context, interest rates would remain capped, mitigating the risk of a disorderly bond-market sell-off.	在此背景下，利率提升将继续受到限，减轻遭遇无序债券市场抛售的风险。


The final, technical reason why interest rates are not likely to rise excessively is that years of central-bank purchases and a shrinking US budget deficit have made US Treasuries scarce.	最后，利率不太可能过度上涨的技术原因是央行多年来购买和缩小美国预算赤字使得美国国债稀缺。


Indeed, so-called “repo” activity – that is, the sale of a US Treasury obligation that the seller promises to buy back later at a slightly higher price – has declined considerably, with the balance of such transactions having fallen from $5 trillion before the crisis to $2.5 trillion today.	事实上，所谓“回购”活动—即卖方出售美国国债并承诺在一段时间后以略高的价格买回来—已大幅度减少，交易规模也从危机前的5万亿美元下降至今天的2. 5亿美元。


Both the two-year and five-year US repo rates have been pushed periodically into negative territory, owing to the combined effects of risk-averse behavior, investor deleveraging, and stricter banking regulation.	由于规避风险的行为，投资者的去杠杆化以及更严格银行监管的综合影响，2年和5年期美国回购利率一直会被定期推入负值区域。


Though US monetary policy undoubtedly exerts significant influence on global markets, fears surrounding the direction of US interest rates may be overdone.	尽管美国的货币政策无疑对全球市场发挥着巨大的影响力，但围绕美国利率方向的担忧未免有些过头。


Though the Fed may no longer be promising patience, the current financial environment implies that investors should not, for the time being, anticipate a major hike.	虽然美联储可能不再承诺会保持耐心，但当前的金融环境意味着投资者暂时来说不应期望利率会出现大幅上涨。


America in the Way	碍事的美国


NEW YORK – The Third International Conference on Financing for Development recently convened in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.	纽约—最近，第三届国际发展融资会议（International Conference on Financing for Development）在埃塞俄比亚首都亚的斯亚贝巴召开。


The conference came at a time when developing countries and emerging markets have demonstrated their ability to absorb huge amounts of money productively.	如今，发展中国家和新兴市场已经证明它们有能力吸收大量资金高效地使用。


Indeed, the tasks that these countries are undertaking – investing in infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, and much else), building cities that will one day be home to billions, and moving toward a green economy – are truly enormous.	事实上，这些国家正在完成的任务——投资于基础设施（公路、电力、港口和其他各种设施）、建设有朝一日将成为数十亿人家园的城市、向绿色经济迈进等——不可不谓宏大。


At the same time, there is no shortage of money waiting to be put to productive use.	与此同时，大量资金也等待着被用于生产性用途。


Just a few years ago, Ben Bernanke, then the chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, talked about a global savings glut.	几年前，时任美联储主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）提到了全球储蓄过剩。


And yet investment projects with high social returns were being starved of funds.	但能带来高社会回报的投资项目却饱受资金短缺困扰。


The problem, then as now, is that the world’s financial markets, meant to intermediate efficiently between savings and investment opportunities, instead misallocate capital and create risk.	现在的问题和当时一样，在于本应有效沟通储蓄和投资机会的世界金融市场在错配资本、制造风险。


There is another irony. Most of the investment projects that the emerging world needs are long term, as are much of the available savings – the trillions in retirement accounts, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds.	另一个讽刺之处是，新兴世界所需要的大部分投资项目是长期项目，大量可用储蓄——退休账户、养老基金和主权财富基金拥有数万亿美元——亦然。


But our increasingly shortsighted financial markets stand between the two.	但日益短视的金融市场却成为两者沟通的障碍。


Much has changed in the 13 years since the first International Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002.	自2002年墨西哥蒙特雷第一届国际发展融资会议召开以来，情况发生了很大的变化。


Back then, the G-7 dominated global economic policymaking; today, China is the world’s largest economy (in purchasing-power-parity terms), with savings some 50% larger than that of the US.	当时，G-7主导着全球经济政策制定； 如今，中国是世界第一大经济体（用购买力平价衡量），其储蓄规模比美国大50%左右。


In 2002, Western financial institutions were thought to be wizards at managing risk and allocating capital; today, we see that they are wizards at market manipulation and other deceptive practices.	2002年，西方金融机构被认为是管理风险和配置资本方面的奇才； 而如今，我们看到它们其实是市场操纵和其他欺诈行为的奇才。


Gone are the calls for the developed countries to live up to their commitment to give at least 0.7% of their GNI in development aid.	曾经，人们呼吁发达国家承诺至少将GNI的0. 7%用于发展援助。


A few northern European countries – Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and, most surprisingly, the United Kingdom – in the midst of its self-inflicted austerity – fulfilled their pledges in 2014.	如今已经听不到这样的呼吁。 一些北欧国家——丹麦、卢森堡、挪威、瑞典，以及最令人意外的英国——它陷入了自己给自己施加的紧缩中——在2014年兑现了承诺。


But the United States (which gave 0.19% of GNI in 2014) lags far, far behind.	但美国（2014年只拿出了GNI的0. 19%）远远落后了。


Today, developing countries and emerging markets say to the US and others: If you will not live up to your promises, at least get out of the way and let us create an international architecture for a global economy that works for the poor, too.	如今，发展中国家和新兴市场对美国和其他国家说：如果你不兑现你的承诺，也至少不要碍事，让我们为全球经济建立一套国际制度为穷人服务。


Not surprisingly, the existing hegemons, led by the US, are doing whatever they can to thwart such efforts.	毫不奇怪，以美国为首的老牌霸主正在竭尽全力从中掣肘。


When China proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to help recycle some of the surfeit of global savings to where financing is badly needed, the US sought to torpedo the effort.	当中国意欲成立亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）以帮助周转部分全球过剩储蓄，使其流向急需资金的地方时，美国试图破坏这一努力。


President Barack Obama’s administration suffered a stinging (and highly embarrassing) defeat.	总统奥巴马政府（非常尴尬地）惨遭失败。


The US is also blocking the world’s path toward an international rule of law for debt and finance.	美国还在阻挠世界制定债务和融资国际规则。


If bond markets, for example, are to work well, an orderly way of resolving cases of sovereign insolvency must be found.	比如，要想债券市场运转良好，就必须找到有序地解决主权破产案的方法。


But today, there is no such way.	但如今没有这样的方法。


Ukraine, Greece, and Argentina are all examples of the failure of existing international arrangements.	乌克兰、希腊和阿根廷都是现有国际安排失灵的例子。


The vast majority of countries have called for the creation of a framework for sovereign-debt restructuring.	极大多数国家呼吁建立一套主权债务重组框架。


The US remains the major obstacle.	而美国一直是主要障碍。


Private investment is important, too.	私人投资也很重要。


But the new investment provisions embedded in the trade agreements that the Obama administration is negotiating across both oceans imply that accompanying any such foreign direct investment comes a marked reduction in governments’ abilities to regulate the environment, health, working conditions, and even the economy.	但奥巴马政府正在两个大洋谈判的贸易协定的新投资条款意味着，与外国直接投资一起到来的将是政府监管环境、卫生、工作条件乃至整个经济的能力的显著下降。


The US stance concerning the most disputed part of the Addis Ababa conference was particularly disappointing.	美国在亚的斯亚贝巴会议最具争议性的部分上的立场尤其令人失望。


As developing countries and emerging markets open themselves to multinationals, it becomes increasingly important that they can tax these behemoths on the profits generated by the business that occurs within their borders.	随着发展中国家和新兴市场向跨国公司敞开大门，能够对这些巨无霸在它们的国界内的业务所产生的利润征税变得日益重要。


Apple, Google, and General Electric have demonstrated a genius for avoiding taxes that exceeds what they employed in creating innovative products.	苹果、谷歌、通用电气在避税方面所表现出来的天才远远超过了创造创新性产品。


All countries – both developed and developing – have been losing billions of dollars in tax revenues.	所有国家——包括发达和发展中国家——所损失的税收收入以十亿美元计。


Last year, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists released information about Luxembourg’s tax rulings that exposed the scale of tax avoidance and evasion.	去年，国际调查记者联盟（International Consortium of Investigative Journalists）所披露的卢森堡税收规则信息暴露出逃漏税问题之严重。


While a rich country like the US arguably can afford the behavior described in the so-called Luxembourg Leaks, the poor cannot.	美国等富裕国家想必能经受得住所谓的卢森堡泄密中所描述的行为，但穷国经受不住。


I was a member of an international commission, the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, examining ways to reform the current tax system.	我是国际公司税改革独立委员会（Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation）委员，该委员会考察如何改革当前的税收制度。


In a report presented to the International Conference on Financing for Development, we unanimously agreed that the current system is broken, and that minor tweaks will not fix it.	在国际发展融资会议上，我们递交了发布了报告，全体委员一致同意目前的制度有漏洞，小修小补无法解决这些漏洞。


We proposed an alternative – similar to the way corporations are taxed within the US, with profits allocated to each state on the basis of the economic activity occurring within state borders.	我们建议采取另一种方法——类似于公司在美国国内课税的办法，以经济活动发生地为原则将利润分配到各州。


The US and other advanced countries have been pushing for much smaller changes, to be recommended by the OECD, the advanced countries’ club.	美国和其他发达国家所推出的变革要小得多，且需在发达国家俱乐部经合组织的建议下进行。


In other words, the countries from which the politically powerful tax evaders and avoiders come are supposed to design a system to reduce tax evasion.	换句话说，它们要让在政治上处于强势的逃漏税者来设计减少逃漏税情况的制度。


Our Commission explains why the OECD reforms were at best tweaks in a fundamentally flawed system and were simply inadequate.	我们的委员会解释了为何经合组织改革充其量只是零敲碎打，根本不足以修正存在根本性漏洞的制度。


Developing countries and emerging markets, led by India, argued that the proper forum for discussing such global issues was an already established group within the United Nations, the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, whose status and funding needed to be elevated.	发展中国家和新兴市场在印度的领导下指出，讨论此类全球性问题的合适场合是已经存在于联合国框架内的集团——税收问题国际合作专家委员会（Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters）。 该委员会的地位和拨款需要提升。


The US strongly opposed: it wanted to keep things the same as in the past, with global governance by and for the advanced countries.	美国强烈反对：它希望一切照旧，由发达国家根据发达国家的利益进行全球治理。


New geopolitical realities demand new forms of global governance, with a greater voice for developing and emerging countries.	新的地缘政治现实要求新形式的全球治理，发展中国家和新兴市场必须获得更大的话语权。


The US prevailed in Addis, but it also showed itself to be on the wrong side of history.	美国在亚的斯亚贝巴得逞了，但它站在了历史的错误道路上。


Engaging Trump	从特朗普手中拯救世界


WASHINGTON, DC – If Donald Trump’s victory in the United States’ presidential election was an earthquake, then the transition period leading up to his inauguration on January 20 feels like a tsunami warning.	华盛顿——如果将唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统大选中的胜选比作一次地震，那么他在1月20日就职典礼之前的过渡就像是一次海啸预警。


The entire world is speculating about what will happen, and, depending on who has appointments at Trump Tower that day, the mood oscillates between concern and panic.	整个世界都在猜测将会发生什么，而且，根据当天谁将前往特朗普大厦赴约，外界的情绪在担忧和恐慌之间摇摆不定。


But, rather than wallow in fatalism, we must take steps to avert the worst.	但我们必须采取措施避免发生最坏情况，而不是沉迷于宿命论。


The situation certainly looks bleak.	情况无疑看起来很不乐观。


America’s commitment to its allies has long formed the bedrock of post-World War II security, just as its engagement in international institutions has underpinned global cooperation.	就想美国对国际体系的参与支撑全球合作一样，美国对盟国的承诺一直发挥着后二战安全基石的作用。


This remains as true today as it was 50 years ago, despite some weakening of America’s global primacy.	尽管美国的全球主导地位有所削弱，但与50年前相比，这一点没有任何改变。


Yet Trump seems to think that America’s commitment to its allies should have strings attached, exemplified in incendiary campaign declarations that the US would protect only the NATO allies who are “paying their bills.”	而特朗普似乎认为美国对盟国的承诺应当有附加条件，美国只保护那些“付账”的北约盟国的煽动性竞选声明似乎证实了这一点。


And he is ready to renounce rules-based cooperation across the board, from trade (he has already rejected the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal) to climate change (he has threatened to withdraw from the historic agreement reached last year in Paris).	而且特朗普全面准备放弃以规则为基础的合作关系，包括在贸易（他已经表态拒绝跨太平洋贸易伙伴关系协议）和气候变化（他威胁退出去年巴黎达成的历史性气候协议）方面。


In short, America’s global engagement, in all its forms, can be expected to suffer substantially, posing a serious challenge to the liberal international order.	总而言之，可以预见美国一切形式的全球承诺都将遭受重大影响，从而严重挑战自由国际秩序。


This represents a clear reversal from President Barack Obama’s second term, during which important progress was made in adapting America’s international role to a changing global environment.	这标志着对奥巴马总统第二任期政策的明显逆转，在奥巴马总统任职期间，美国不断根据变化的全球环境调整自身所扮演的国际角色。


At a time when power is increasingly diffuse and organization difficult, Obama began to spearhead more flexible policy responses.	在权力日益分散和组织困难的时刻，奥巴马开始提倡更加灵活的政策响应。


Informal was married with formal.	非正式与正式并存。


Firm ties were replaced by complex regimes that created hundreds of weaker (and often lower-level) connections, rather than a few strong high-level linkages.	复杂制度取代了稳定关系，由此创造出成百上千个（往往是低水平的）弱联系，而不是若干个稳固的高级别连接。


The Paris agreement was the clearest and fullest example of this approach; but efforts in other areas, from disease eradication to Internet governance, reflect a similar philosophy.	巴黎协议是这种做法最明确也最全面的实例； 但从疾病根除到互联网治理等其他领域的工作反映出类似的思维理念。


This is not to eulogize the Obama administration; nor is it to lionize Obama himself.	这绝非要颂扬奥巴马政府； 也不是要吹捧奥巴马本人。


In fact, Obama’s reticence to engage in some areas has contributed to the breakdown of some components of world order during his tenure, most clearly in the Middle East.	事实上，奥巴马在某些领域的缄默导致了他任职期间世界秩序特定部分的崩溃，其中最明显的是中东地区。


Nonetheless, under his leadership, hints of how to structure international cooperation in a new era began to emerge – hints that Trump seems determined to ignore.	尽管如此，在他的领导下，如何在新时代建立国际合作机制的线索开始浮现——这些线索特朗普似乎决意忽视。


Under Trump, the US appears likely to be a largely unilateral actor, focused on its own short-term interests.	特朗普治下的美国似乎很有可能成为独行侠，只关注自身的短期利益。


Without the US in the driver’s seat, the process of developing a new, more flexible underpinning for global cooperation will grind to a halt, at least for the next few years.	失去了美国的领导，为全球合作奠定新型灵活基础的过程至少在未来几年将会陷入瘫痪。


This is bad news for the world, but there seems to be little that can be done about it.	这对世界而言是个坏消息，但目前人们似乎束手无策。


There is, however, another potential consequence of Trump’s presidency that must not be allowed to occur: the deterioration of the structural integrity of the existing global system.	但我们不能容许特朗普当选总统的另外一个潜在后果：即现有全球体系结构的完整性朝着恶化的方向转变。


Failing to make progress is one thing; dismantling the rules-based order that has underpinned relative peace and prosperity for seven decades is quite another.	无法取得进步是一回事； 但摧毁七十年来支撑相对和平与繁荣的以规则为基础的秩序则完全不同。


Beyond being the indispensable power, the US is the interconnected power.	美国不仅是不可或缺的力量，同时也是联系广泛的大国。


It is the hub of the linkages holding the world together, from the dollar to security to law to research and innovation.	它是将世界各国联系在一起的纽带，从美元到安全到法律到科研再到创新。


As damaging as Trump’s unilateralism will be to the rules-based international order, its consequences would pale in comparison to the harm wrought by a truly isolationist and withdrawn US that fails to uphold these bonds.	虽然特朗普的单边主义将破坏以规则为基础的国际秩序，但一个未能保持上述联系的真正孤立内向的美国将会造成更大的损失。


Of course, in theory, another power could step in to replace the US.	当然，从理论上看，另一股力量可以介入以取代美国的位置。


But no one really qualifies at the moment.	但目前还没有哪个国家真正具备这样的素质。


Europe is depressingly far from the level of unity needed to assume a major global role.	欧洲距离承担重要全球角色所需的团结水平还相去甚远。


Russia fills the role of spoiler well, but lacks the vision and authority to act as a world leader.	俄罗斯扮演搅局的角色绰绰有余，但却缺乏作为世界领袖的眼光和权威。


India is certainly not there yet, either.	印度无疑也还没有做好准备。


Perhaps the most obvious candidate is China.	也许最显而易见的候选者是中国。


And the Chinese government’s loud calls for continued climate cooperation and quick moves in the wake of Trump’s election to fill the void left by the TPP’s apparent abandonment indicate a will to assume a more central position in global cooperation.	而中国政府大声呼吁在特朗普当选之后继续进行气候合作并迅速行动填补放弃跨太平洋贸易伙伴关系所留下的空白表明其愿意在全球合作中承担核心角色。


But China, too, remains a long way away from US-style leadership, not least because of the serious and mounting domestic challenges that it faces.	但尤其因为中国国内不断恶化的严峻挑战，中国尚未具备美国式的领导素质。


More regional authority, together with a gradual increase in global participation, provides all of the positive publicity and influence China needs for now.	强化区域领导力再加上逐步扩大全球参与度，能够成就中国目���所需的积极名誉和影响力。


If the US does take a truly isolationist tack, regional hegemony may become the order of the day.	如果美国真的奉行孤立主义政策，那么区域霸权可能有一天会成为新秩序。


China, Russia, the US, and Germany would each lead their respective spheres.	中、俄、美、德各国将各自领导各自的领域。


This raises the specter of conflict along the borders of these spheres: Russia would compete with China in Central Asia, and with Germany in Eastern Europe.	这可能诱发上述区域沿线的冲突：俄国将在中亚与中国较量，而其东欧的竞争对手则是德国。


In regions lacking a clear hegemon, such as in Africa and Latin America, regional rivals would compete for primacy, perhaps backed by other regions’ hegemons in proxy contests, much like during the Cold War.	在非洲和拉美等不具备明确霸权优势的领域，区域对手可能在其他地区霸主的支持下，像冷战时期那样以代理形式就霸权优势展开竞争。


As we know all too well, while spheres of influence can give the appearance of stability, they breed great power conflict.	我们都知道虽然影响力范围内可能看似稳定，但背后其实酝酿着巨大的权力冲突。


We cannot sit idly by and allow such a future to unfold.	我们不能再坐视不理，允许这样的未来成为现实。


The stakes are too high.	这样做付出的代价将过于惨重。


Instead, we must step up now, while the Trump administration is still in its gestation period, to form connections with the US that keep it engaged and active.	相反，我们必须在特朗普政府仍处于酝酿期的时候挺身而出，与美国建立联系，确保其继续积极参与国际事务。


In the short term, this will require a transactional, rather than a principled, approach; Trump is, after all, a dealmaker.	从短期看，这需要本着交易性、而非原则性的态度； 特朗普毕竟是个商人。


But from this low bearing comes a high purpose.	虽然他基础有限，但却有着很高的目标。


As hard as it may be to admit, Trump has a key role to play in saving the world.	虽然很多人不愿承认，但特朗普在拯救世界时可以发挥关键的作用。


We have to make sure he is in place when the curtain goes up.	我们必须保证大幕拉开时，他能够做好准备。


The Decline of US Military Innovation	美国军事创新的衰落


NEW YORK – The United States is at risk of losing its military edge.	纽约—美国可能要失去它的军事优势。


America’s armed forces may still be the most advanced in the world; after all, the US spends more than twice as much on military research and development as major powers like France and Russia, and nine times more than China and Germany.	美国武装力量也许仍是世界上最先进的； 毕竟，美国的军事研究和支出 开发是法国和俄罗斯等主要强国的两倍多，是中国和德国的九倍多。


But America’s continued technological leadership is far from assured.	但美国的持续技术领导地位远非安枕无忧。


Since 2005, the US Department of Defense has cut R&D spending by 22%.	自2005年以来，美国国防部的研发支出削减了22%。


In 2013, as part of a deal to avert a showdown over the debt ceiling, the US Congress mandated some $1.2 trillion in automatic spending cuts.	2913年，作为避免债务上限问题陷入不可收拾局面而达成的协议的一部分，美国国会确定了1. 2万亿美元规模的自动减支。


The move, which requires reduced spending in numerous programs, including many defense research initiatives, was described by US President Barack Obama’s administration as “deeply destructive to national security.”	这一动作要求无数项目减少支出，包括许多防务研究项目。 美国总统奥巴马政府将其描述为“大大破坏了国家安全”。


If US defense innovation continues to erode, not only will America’s defense capabilities suffer; the country will also risk slipping in terms of commercial innovation and competitiveness.	如果美国的防务创新继续节节败退，不但美国国防能力要蒙受损失，还有可能在商业创新和竞争力等方面也有所滑落。


Budget limitations pose some of the greatest challenges to the US military’s efforts to maintain its technological edge.	预算限制是美国军方维持技术优势的最大挑战之一。


The Army and the Missile Defense Agency have been particularly hard hit, with R&D spending nearly halved since 2005.	陆军和导弹防御局（Missile Defense Agency）受影响尤重，自2005年研发支出削减了近一半。


The Navy’s research budget has been cut by some 20%, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) – the organization tasked with keeping the US military ahead of the technological curve – has had to slash R&D spending by 18%.	海军的研究预算削减了20%左右，而国防先进研究项目局（Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency，DARPA，负责让美国军队保持在技术曲线前沿的组织）的研发支出也削减了18%。


Even the Air Force, where research spending has traditionally been a congressional priority, has been forced to cut its budget by roughly 4%.	甚至空军也被迫削减了大约14%的预算——传统上，空军研究支出一直是国会的重中之重。


When money does get allocated, cost pressures too often encourage investment in projects that promise quick results – a bias that comes at the expense of long-term innovation that could provide a strategic advantage.	即使获配资金，成本压力也常常促使投资流入迅速见效的项目——这一偏误的代价是可以提供战略优势的长期创新。


Even DARPA has fallen prey to pressure for research that can demonstrate immediate progress.	即使是DARPA，也不得不屈从于研究必须马上产生进展的压力。


To make matters worse, the US military’s innovation efforts face several structural problems.	更糟糕的是，美国军队的创新项目面临不少结构性问题。


Six decades of attempts to reform the defense acquisition process have yet to yield fruit.	防务并购过程改革已经进行了六十年，但仍未产生成果。


Most of the design, development, and production of military systems is carried out by civilian industry, but decision-making remains firmly in the hands of military officials, who may not be able to strike the right balance between cost-cutting and innovation.	大部分军事系统的设计、开发和生产在民用行业进行，但决策仍紧紧地掌握在军事官员手中，而他们未必能很好地把握削减成本和创新之间的正确平衡。


Rivalries within and among the military services once mimicked the role of competition in the private sector: they drove innovation.	军事部门内部和之间的对立曾经是为了模仿私人部门的竞争：这能促进创新。


But with the end of the Cold War, the pressure to remain a step ahead has waned, depriving the defense sector of a crucial engine of progress.	但随着冷战的结束，保持领先的压力不再，防务部门也失去了关键的前进引擎。


Moreover, top defense contractors’ R&D spending as a proportion of sales plummeted by nearly a third from 1999 to 2012.	此外，1999—2012年间，顶级防务承包商的研发支出占销售额之比下降了近三分之一。


By contrast, America’s technology giants invest 4-6 times as much in R&D.	相反，美国技术巨头的研发投资要高出4—6倍。


Meanwhile, the US is suffering from the hollowing out of its defense industrial base.	与此同时，美国正在因为防务产业基础空心化而蒙受损失。


Increased competition from China and other large emerging economies has eroded US manufacturing capabilities, jeopardizing America’s ability to develop the most technologically sophisticated defense platforms.	来自中国和其他新兴经济体的竞争日益激烈，这侵蚀了美国的制造能力，也破坏了美国开发技术最先进的防务平台的能力。


The defense industry once created the new technologies – lasers, GPS, and the Internet, for example – that helped drive the American economy.	防务产业曾经贡献过诸多推动美国经济前进的新技术，如激光、GPS和互联网等。


Today, in most fields, civilian technology is likely to be leading the way.	如今，在大部分领域，民用科技也许已经遥遥领先。


The result can be seen in the rise of foreign competition in the international arms market.	结果可以从国际军火市场上外国竞争的日益激烈一窥端倪。


American manufacturers are finding themselves increasingly vulnerable in areas that they once dominated – including unmanned aerial platforms, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, missiles, and satellites – as low-cost competitors gain market share.	美国制造商发现它们在曾经主宰的领域日益孱弱——包括无人机平��、情报监视和侦察、导弹和卫星等——因为低成本竞争对手赢得了市场份额。


In 2013, Russia’s weapons exports surpassed America’s by more than $2 billion.	2013年，俄罗斯武器出口额比美国高出20多亿美元。


In November, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a new initiative to “sustain and advance America’s military dominance for the twenty-first century.”	11月，美国国防部长哈格尔宣布了一项新计划，要“保持和推进美国军队在二十一世纪的主宰力”。


In a time of shrinking budgets and shifting strategic challenges, he focused on innovation.	在预算缩减、战略挑战不断变化的背景下，他将创新作为重点。


“Continued fiscal pressure will likely limit our military’s ability to respond to long-term challenges by increasing the size of our force or simply outspending potential adversaries on current systems,” he said. “So to overcome challenges to our military superiority, we must change the way we innovate, operate, and do business.”	“持续的财政压力也许会因为增加我军规模或仅仅因为现有系统比潜在对手支出更多而限制我军响应长期挑战的能力，”他说，“因此，为了克服对我军主宰力的挑战，我们必须改变我们的创新、操作和做生意的方式。


Nine days later, Hagel handed in his resignation, which will take effect as soon as the US Senate confirms his replacement.	九天后，哈格尔递交了辞呈，并将在美国参议院确认其后继者之后生效。


A policy aimed at restoring defense innovation and production in America would ensure that the US upholds its global technological leadership and commercial competitiveness.	旨在重塑美国防务创新和生产的政策将确保美国保持器全球技术领先地位和商业竞争力。


Unfortunately, Hagel’s successor is likely to find that, in an era of limited budgets and automatic spending cuts, the type of comprehensive innovation strategy that Hagel envisioned may simply not be viable.	不幸的是，哈格尔的继任者也许会发现，在预算有限、自动减支的时期，哈格尔所构想的完整的创新战略也许根本不可行。


Economic Prosperity in the Digital Age	数字时代的经济繁荣


SAN JOSE – Around the world, people are demanding change.	圣何塞—放眼全球，人们都在要求变化。


Recent electoral outcomes – perhaps most notably, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the presidential election in the United States – have highlighted rising economic uncertainty.	最新选举结果——也许最令人瞩目的还是英国退欧投票和美国总统竞选——突显经济不确定性的日益增加。


In this environment, it is imperative that leaders articulate and deliver on a clear vision for inclusive economic growth, one that accounts not only for tax and trade policy – the focus of many of today’s debates – but also for digitization.	在这样的环境下，领导人必须尽快构想并给出包容性经济增长的清晰愿景，这一愿景不仅要考虑税收和贸易政策——这两个问题是当今诸多争论的焦点——也要考虑数字化。


Representing $19 trillion in potential economic value over the next decade, digitization has the power to enable countries to kick-start GDP growth, job creation, and innovation.	数字化将在未来十年带来19万亿美元的潜在经济价值，它能让各国刺激GDP增长、就业创造和创新。


We’re already seeing the profound impact that digitization can have on countries that embrace it as a core driver of their economic strategies.	我们已经看到，数字化能给将其作为经济战略核心引擎的国家带来深远的影响。


In India, for example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is implementing a strategy that is transforming India into a technology powerhouse and setting the stage for a digital future.	比如，印度总理莫迪正在实施让印度成为技术强国、为数字未来打下基础的战略。


In France, the government has invested in an extensive national digital plan that is expected to create 1.1 million jobs over the next 3-5 years and contribute $101 billion to GDP over the next decade.	法国政府投资于一项大型全国性数字计划，预计该计划将在未来3—5年创造110万个工作岗位，在未来十年贡献1,010亿美元GDP。


While other countries are embracing robust digital strategies, the US is falling behind.	其他国家纷纷采取强大的数字战略，而美国正在落后。


Despite having led the Internet race in the 1990s, the US is now the only major developed economy without a clear digitization plan.	尽管美国领导了20世纪90年代的互联网竞赛，但如今，美国是唯一一个没有明确的数字化计划的发达经济体。


The consequences are already starting to show: according to the 2016 Bloomberg Innovation Index, the US is now the world’s eighth most innovative country, having fallen two spots since 2015.	其后果已经开始显露：据2016年彭博创新指数，美国现在是世界上创新力第八的国家，比2015年的排名下降了两位。


The message is clear: when it comes to digitization, nobody is entitled to anything, and there is no time to waste.	个中含义是明确的：在数字化方面，没人拥有特权，绝不可浪费时间。


Even in Silicon Valley, we must constantly reinvent ourselves to stay competitive.	即便在硅谷，我们也必须不断地自我革新（reinvent）以保持竞争力。


The US economy must do the same, or risk losing its innovative edge.	美国经济也必须这样做，否则就有可能失去创新优势。


Only with a clear and effective digitization plan can the US ensure that it retains its status as a global economic leader in the Digital Age, while fulfilling its citizens’ demands for more economic opportunities.	只有具备了明确有效的数字化计划，美国才能确保它在数字时代仍保持全球经济领导者的地位，同时满足其公民对更多经济机会的要求。


I believe that connectivity has the power to transform economies and generate new opportunities.	我相信，连通性能够转变经济，创造新机会。


That is why America’s new digital agenda must rectify the fact that, despite living in one of the world’s wealthiest countries, one-third of the US population still lacks broadband access at home.	因此，美国的新数字日程必须纠正一个事实：尽管身为世界上最富有的国家之一，但仍有三分之一的美国人口家中没有宽带网络。


Existing Smart City initiatives promoting connectivity in Chicago and Washington, DC, are encouraging.	现有的智慧城市（Smart City）项目令人鼓舞。 芝加哥和华盛顿都因为这一项目而增强了连通性。


But, to close the digital divide, a more comprehensive national digital strategy is needed, one that emphasizes digital infrastructure investment, rather than just physical infrastructure investment, as in the past.	但是，要填补数字差距，需要更全面的全国性数字战略，该战略要以数字基础设施投资为重点，而不是想过去那样以实体基础设施投资为重点。


Only with broad access can technology continue to fulfill its potential as one of the great economic equalizers.	技术必须依靠宽带接入才能继续实现其作为重要的经济平衡器的潜力。


An effective US digitization plan must also support start-ups.	有效的美国数字化计划还必须支持初创企业。


Young companies represent the future of job creation – they are the primary source of new jobs in the US – and technological disruption.	年轻的公司代表着就业创造——它们是美国新就业岗位的主要源泉——和技术性破坏的未来。


Yet start-ups are on the decline in the US.	但初创企业在美国正在式微。


According to research by the Brookings Institution, the start-up rate (the number of new companies, as a percentage of all firms) has fallen by nearly half since 1978.	据布鲁金斯学会的研究，初创率（新公司占所有企业的百分比）自1978年以来下降了近一半。


To boost innovation and job creation, we need to reverse this trend, injecting more fuel into the US economy’s start-up engine.	为了刺激创新和就业创造，我们需要扭转这一趋势，为美国经济的初创企业引擎注入更多燃料。


This will require businesses and government to work together to create an environment that encourages entrepreneurs to bring their visions to life.	这需要企业和政府合作建立一个鼓励企业家将愿景转化为现实的环境。


A combination of legislation, such as tax benefits for early-stage companies, and corporate/venture capital investments that provide financial backing and mentorship opportunities to start-ups, will be vital to sustain this ecosystem.	立法（如为初期公司提供税收优惠）和公司/风险资本投资（为初创企业提供财务支持指导机会）相结合是维持这一生态系统的关键。


More broadly, US leaders must create an environment that encourages all kinds of business growth and investment.	更广泛地说，美国领导人必须建立一个鼓励一切商业增长和投资的环境。


Trump’s call to update US tax rules in 2017 could produce benefits on this front, assuming that the new rules promote domestic investment by encouraging companies to bring back their overseas earnings and by lowering the corporate tax rate, currently one of the highest among OECD countries.	特朗普要求修订2017年美国税法或许能助一臂之力，如果新税法通过鼓励公司汇回海外利润和降低公司税率（目前为经合组织国家中最高税率之一）刺激国内投资的话。


These steps could bring more than $1 trillion into the US economy, creating jobs and economic opportunities in the process.	这些措施可以为美国经济带来超过1万亿美元的投资，并在此过程中创造就业和经济机会。


Yet another critical element of an effective digitization plan is education and training.	但有效的数字化计划的另一个关键要素是教育和培训。


Businesses need to invest in the existing workforce, which largely lacks the skills necessary to compete in the Digital Age.	企业需要投资于现有劳动力，后者严重缺乏数字时代的竞争技能。


At the same time, we must transform our education system, so that younger generations acquire the skills they need to secure the high-paying digital jobs of the future.	与此同时，我们必须改变我们的教育系统，以使年轻一代获得确保在未来拥有高薪数字就业岗位的技能。


To this end, we must move beyond emphasizing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics – the so-called STEM subjects – to think about how to apply technology and digitization to all fields.	在这方面，我们不能仅仅强调科学、技术、工程和数学——所谓的STEM专业——也要思考如何将技术和数字化运用到所有领域。


Digitization could create $5.1 trillion in economic value for the US by 2025, while significantly lowering unemployment.	到2025年，数字化可以为美国创造5. 1万亿美元的经济价值，同时大大减少失业。


But the US cannot realize this potential unless its leaders work effectively across party lines and with all industries to drive forward a digital agenda.	但如果美国领导人不能有效克服党派成见、与所有产业合作推动数字化日程，美国就无法实现这一潜力。


Technology is changing everything: the way we do business, the rules of capitalism, and entire economic ecosystems – all at tremendous speed.	技术正在改变一切：经商方式、资本主义规则，以及整个经济生态系统——并且速度惊人。


The US must change with it, acting now to do what it takes to reclaim its innovative edge and thrive in the Digital Age.	美国必须随之改变，从现在开始行动起来，不惜一切代价夺回竞争优势，并在数字时代繁荣昌盛。


Fixing America’s Fiscal Problem	修正美国的财政问题


CAMBRIDGE – With America’s elections less than six weeks away, it is time to think seriously about what will be done afterwards to deal with the nation’s fiscal mess.	美国剑桥—距离美国总统大选只有不到六周的时间了，是时候认真思考一下大选之后怎样对付美国财政乱象了。


Regardless of who wins, addressing the problem can no longer be postponed.	不管谁获胜，都不能再拖延解决问题的时间了。


Americans are rightly focused on the “fiscal cliff” looming at the start of 2013, when, under current legislation, virtually all tax rates will rise, sucking more than 3% of GDP out of households and businesses.	美国人正确地把注意力集中在可能从2013年开始的“财政悬崖”，根据当前立法，那时几乎所有税率都会上升，从家庭和企业手中夺走相当于GDP的3%以上的钱。


In addition, automatic cuts in government spending on defense and non-defense programs will subtract nearly another 1% of GDP in 2013 and similar amounts in future years.	此外，防务和非防务政府支出的自动削减将在2013年再砍去GDP的近1%，以后各年也是如此。


The Congressional Budget Office warns that falling off the fiscal cliff would push America’s economy into a serious recession next year.	国会预算办公室警告说，跌下财政悬崖会在明年将美国经济拖入严重衰退。


And the fiscal cliff is only part of the problem that must be solved.	而财政悬崖只是必须解决的问题的一部分。


The bigger problem is that the United States has an enormous fiscal deficit – now about 7% of GDP and predicted to grow rapidly in future decades as an aging population and rising health-care costs increase government outlays for the “entitlement programs” that benefit middle-class seniors.	最大的问题是美国巨大的财政赤字——目前占GDP的约7%，而随着老龄化和医保成本的上升，在未来几十年中，面向中产阶级老年人的“福利计划”政府支出部分将大增，因此，预计财政赤字占GDP比重也会快速上升。


Although politicians on both the left and the right recognize that these programs’ growth must be slowed to avoid massive deficits or very large tax increases, their growth is unlikely to slow enough to prevent the national debt/GDP ratio from rising.	尽管左翼和右翼政客均已认识到这些计划规模的增势必须有所放缓以避免巨额赤字或大幅增税，但不可能让其放缓到能够阻止国民债务/GDP比率不再上升的地步。


Fiscal consolidation therefore requires additional revenue as well as slower growth in entitlement spending.	因此，财政整合就必须将开源和减缓福利支出增速结合起来。


The challenge facing US politicians after the election will be to find a politically acceptable way to raise that revenue without undermining incentives and economic growth.	美国政客在大选后所面临的挑战是找到政治上可行的办法在不破坏激励和经济增长的条件下增加收入。


The task is made more complex by the large number of legislators who insist that the deficit should be reduced by spending cuts alone.	很多立法者坚持赤字必须通过削减支出一途实现减少，这让问题更加复杂化了。


Although no one can be sure how this complex problem will be solved, here is my best guess: Soon after the election, the US Congress will vote to postpone the fiscal cliff for about six months to allow time to work out an acceptable legislative solution.	尽管没人知道这一复杂问题会如何解决，但我还是来猜测一下：大选结束后，国会马上会投票暂时中止财政悬崖，将其延后半年，为可接受的立法方案创造时间。


That solution will involve slowing the growth of Social Security pension benefits for future middle- and upper-income retirees.	该方案将包括限制未来中等和高收入退休者的社会保障退休福利的增长。


Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, has explicitly proposed this, and President Barack Obama indicated support for such an approach back in 2009, before he turned his attention to health care.	共和党候选人罗姆尼已经明确地建议了这一点，而总统奥巴马则在2009年开始关注医保问题之前就表达了对这一点的支持。


The tougher problem will be how to raise revenue.	更棘手的问题是如何开源。


The key will be to focus on the many special features of the tax code that are equivalent to government spending.	关键在于将注意力放在税法的诸多相当于政府支出的特别条款上。


If I buy a hybrid car, install a solar panel at my home, or upgrade to a more efficient water heater, I get a tax credit.	如果我买了一辆混合动力汽车，为我家安装太阳能面板，或是升级更为高效的热水器，那我就能得到税收优惠。


And if I buy a bigger home or just increase the size of my mortgage, I receive a larger deduction that reduces my taxable income, lowering my tax bill.	而如果我买了更大的房子或仅仅是增加我按揭的规模，我就能获得更大的税收豁免，降低我的应税收入和税负。


While the government is not giving me money, these special targeted tax breaks are no less “government spending” than they would be if the government sent me a check.	政府并没有出钱，但这些定向减税无异于政府以给我开支票的形式进行了 “政府支出”。


These features are rightly called “tax expenditures,” because they describe the government spending that occurs through the tax code.	这些条款被正确地称为“税收开支”，它描述的是政府通过税法发生的支出。


Eliminating or reducing these tax expenditures should therefore be seen as cutting government spending.	因此，消灭或减少这类税收开支应该被视为削减政府支出。


Although the effect is to raise revenue, that is just an accounting convention.	尽管其作用是增加了收入，但这只是会计算法内容。


The fundamental economic effect is to reduce government spending.	其真正的经济效应是降低了政府支出。


So the key to raising revenue is to reduce tax expenditures, use some of the resulting revenue to reduce tax rates, and devote the rest to reducing future deficits.	因此，开源的关键是降低税收开支，用由此产生的收入中的一部分来降低税率，用其他部分来降低未来赤字。


Opponents of tax increases should see that, because such revenue-raising is really cutting government spending, it does not imply the adverse incentive effects of raising marginal tax rates.	反对增税者应该看到，由于这类开源实际上是政府支出削减，因此并不会产生增加边际税率所能导致的负面激励效应。


But even if the intellectual objection to extra revenue can be overcome in this way, the practical political problem is that every large tax expenditure – the home mortgage interest deduction, the exclusion of employer payments for health insurance, etc. – has its fervent defenders.	但即使对开源的理论反对可以用这种办法克服，还存在现实政治问题：所有大型税收开支项目——住房按揭利息减免、员工健康保险雇主支付部分税前扣减等——都有狂热的捍卫者。


So here is an idea that might work politically: Let taxpayers keep all of the current tax expenditures, but limit the total amount by which each taxpayer can reduce his or her tax liability in this way.	这里有个或许在政治上可行的主意：让纳税人持有所有当前税收开支，但限制每位纳税人可以用这一方法降低其纳税义务的总量。


I have explored the idea of “capping” the benefit that individuals can get as a percentage of their total income (their “adjusted gross income,” or AGI in US tax parlance).	我研究过给个人的此项福利占总收入（指“调整后总收入”，美国税法简称AGI）的百分比设置“上限”的想法。


Applying a 2%-of-AGI cap to the total benefit that an individual can receive from tax expenditures would have a very powerful effect.	给个人可以从税收开支中获得的福利施加2%-AGI上限可以产生非常强的效果。


It would not limit the amount of deductions and exclusions to 2% of AGI, but rather would limit the resulting tax reduction – that is, the tax benefit – that the individual gets by using all these special features.	它不会将扣减和豁免数字限制在AGI的2%，只是将由此产生的个人利用这些特别条款获得的税收减免额——也就是税收福利——限制在这一范围内。


For someone with a 15% marginal tax rate, a 2%-of-AGI cap would limit total deductions and exclusions to about 13% of AGI.	对边际税率为15%的个人来说，2%-AGI上限相当于扣减和豁免项占AGI的13%。


Such a cap would have a significant impact on the fiscal outlook.	如此上限会显著影响财政前景。


Even if the cap were applied only to “itemized deductions” and the health-insurance exclusion, it would raise about $250 billion in the first year and about $3 trillion over the first decade.	即使上限仅适用于“分项扣减”（itemized deduction）和医保豁免，也仍然能够在第一年筹集2 500亿美元，并在此后的第一个十年里筹集3万亿美元。


There are many options in designing such a policy.	这一政策如何设计，选择很多。


The cap rate could be higher, or it could start higher and be gradually tightened, or it could vary with an individual’s income level.	上限率可以定得高一些，也可以起点上限率较高而逐渐收紧，也可以随个人收入水平而定。


But the economic and political attractiveness of a cap consists in its ability to raise substantial revenue without eliminating specific tax expenditures.	但上限政策的经济和政治吸引力在于它能够大幅增加收入而不必取消具体的税收开支项目。


Fixing America’s fiscal problem will be as difficult as it is important.	解决美国财政问题既困难又重要。


But slowing the growth of Social Security benefits and capping total tax expenditures would be a good framework for the coming reform.	但降低社会保障福利的增速和给总税收开支加上限将是未来改革的一个很好的框架。


Why is Obama Winning?	为什么奥巴马会赢？


PRINCETON – James Carville, Bill Clinton’s chief campaign strategist in 1992, famously expressed a bit of established insider wisdom about winning elections: “It’s the economy, stupid.”	普林斯顿—比尔·克林顿1992年竞选首席战略顾问詹姆斯·卡维尔（James Carville）有句名言，道出了赢得大选的一点现成内幕智慧：“经济最重要，笨蛋。


Incumbents win if the economic outlook is rosy, and are vulnerable – as George H. W. Bush was – when times are hard.	”在任者将赢得连任，如果经济前景看好的话； 在任者将不堪一击——就像老布什那样——如果世道艰难的话。


Indeed, throughout Europe – in France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom – governments have been turned out of office in the face of a crisis that they have seemed unable to address.	事实上，在放眼欧洲——法国、希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙还有英国莫不如此——政府都因为发生了无力解决的危机而该换了门庭。


By this standard, President Barack Obama should now be in a hopeless situation.	从这个标准衡量，奥巴马总统目前应该是连任希望渺茫。


According to United States Census data, household income fell in 2011 for the fourth consecutive year.	根据美国人口普查数据，2011年，家庭收入连续第四年下降。


Unemployment remains persistently high, despite the $787 billion stimulus package in 2009, and house prices, though recovering slowly, remain far below their pre-2008 peak.	失业率一直居高不下，2009年的7870亿美元刺激计划也没能让失业率有所改善； 而房价尽管缓慢地开始复苏，但对2008年高峰水平仍然望尘莫及。


And yet Obama seems likely to be reelected in November.	尽管如此，奥巴马似乎仍将在11月获得连任。


One reason is that there is no reliable way to render an instant judgment about economic effectiveness, and the legacy that Obama inherited – coming to office in the middle of a major economic and financial catastrophe – clearly matters.	一个原因是没有可靠的方法能够立刻判断其经济表现，而奥巴马所继承的烂摊子——他实在重大经济和金融灾难中入主白宫的——显然对经济现状有着巨大影响。


President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Gordon Brown are obviously more responsible for the financial crisis than are their successors, who have to clean up the mess.	小布什总统和布朗首相对金融危机的责任显然比替他们收拾残局的的继任者要大得多。


Moreover, as Zhou Enlai memorably responded when Henry Kissinger asked him about the effects of the French Revolution, “It is too early to tell” (though Zhou apparently thought he was being asked about the consequences of the 1968 Paris student uprising).	此外，正如周恩来在回答基辛格向他提出的关于法国大革命的影响是所回答的，“下结论为时过早。 ”（尽管周恩来显然认为基辛格问的是1968年法国学潮。


Tracing the precise consequences of policy measures or institutional reforms – and estimating when they might “pay off” – is hopelessly complex.	）追踪政策措施和制度改革的精确结果——以及估算它们何时“划算”——实在太复杂了。


Much else is happening.	期间会发生很多其他的事情。


Obama could not have known that a European crisis would have a big impact on US banks, and he could not have done much more to get European leaders to solve their problems.	奥巴马无法获知欧洲危机会对美国银行造成重大影响，也无法为此做出更大努力让欧洲领导人解决他们的问题。


The long-term success of the economy, and its capacity to build wealth and jobs, depends on productivity gains, which in turn depend on technical and organizational innovation.	经济的长期成功，以及经济创造财富和就业岗位的能力，取决于生产率的进步，而生产率的进步又取决于技术和组织创新。


Governments cannot just conjure that up by waving a magic wand.	政府不可能挥挥魔法棒就得到想要的结果。


But governments can influence the development of productivity.	但政府可以影响生产率的发展。


And this is where legitimate debate begins, because immediate action to save jobs does not necessarily help.	而这才是合理争论的起点，因为拯救工作岗位的即期行动并不一定会奏效。


The wrong kind of stimulus may get in the way of future productivity growth by channeling workers into the wrong kind of employment (or keeping them there).	错误的刺激或许会妨碍未来生产率的增长，因为它将员工配入（或钉在）了错误的就业岗位。


Large-scale public projects, particularly when they are aimed simply at putting as many people as possible quickly back to work, will lead to a shortage of labor available for more productive jobs.	大规模公共工程，特别是当它们的唯一目的是尽快让尽可能多的人口回到工作中去时，会导致生产率较高的岗位出现劳动力短缺。


In the 1930’s, some governments tried to make themselves popular with large-scale public work programs.	20世纪30年代，一些政府试图用大规模公共工程项目维持自己的支持度。


John Maynard Keynes and his disciples pushed the idea that even apparently useless projects, such as pyramid construction in ancient Egypt, made sense.	凯恩斯及其信徒提出，即使是显而易见毫无意义的工程——比如古埃及的建设金字塔——也是有用的。


Keynes’s Cambridge disciple, Joan Robinson, was particularly worried because Hitler seemed to have grasped this point more quickly than democratic governments had.	凯恩斯的剑桥大学信徒琼·罗宾逊因为希特勒比民主政府更快地抓住了这一要点而感到焦虑万分。


Hitler, she noted sarcastically, had solved Germany’s problem by “painting the Black Forest white and putting down linoleum in the Polish Corridor.”	她语带讽刺地指出，希特勒通过“把黑森林涂白以及给波兰走廊铺地毯”解决了德国的问题。


In fact, increased spending, which the Keynesians saw simply as boosting aggregate demand, produced distortions.	事实上，增加支出——凯恩斯主义者把它和提振总需求划等号——会产生扭曲。


Under Hitler, the German economy in the 1930’s shifted to a lower-productivity mechanism in order to churn out armaments and shoddy manufactured goods, neither of which would have any use in a market economy.	在希特勒治下，20世纪30年代的德国经济走了一条低生产率的道路，大量生产军火和劣等制造品，这两类东西在市场经济中都是无用的东西。


Such misallocation of resources was not just a menace of the interwar period.	这一资源的不当配置并不是只在两次大战期间才发生的可怕事件。


The big pre-2008 construction boom in Spain did as much harm as subsequent high unemployment, because it encouraged a generation of young people to take high-paying, low-skill jobs in the building industry.	2008年之前，西班牙经历了大规模的建筑繁荣，其危害性一点都不亚于随之发生的高失业，因为这鼓励了一整代年轻人去从事高薪低能的建筑业工作。


But simply permitting the crisis to continue is a terrible option.	但放任危机发酵是可怕的选择。


A severe and long-lasting episode of large-scale unemployment is devastating, because it erodes an economy’s skill base, undermines human potential, and affronts human dignity.	严重而持久的大规模失业是灾难性的，因为这会腐蚀经济的技能基础，破坏人力潜能，有损人格尊严。


Government policy should thus be subject to a longer-term test: How effectively is initiative being enabled and skills developed?	因此，政府政策应该以更长期的眼光考量：其措施实施效果如何？ 对技能的促进作用怎样？


But the answer to that question is not why the pundits are cheering Obama.	但这一问题的答案并不是专家看好奥巴马的原因。


They are cheering because financial markets are cheering, following the Federal Reserve’s recent announcement of further stimulus.	他们感到兴奋的原因是金融市场很兴奋，而金融市场兴奋的原因是美联储最近宣布将实施进一步刺激。


Though the evidence that monetary stimulus produces increased investment and a business upturn is patchy, its effects on financial markets and asset prices are very easy to document quickly.	尽管关于货币刺激能否产生投资增加和商业好转的效果，证据的指向并不一致，但其对金融市场和资产价格的影响效果可以马上显现。


Asset prices create a large “wealth effect” that determines how financially well off people feel.	资产价格会造成大规模的“财富效应”，后者决定了人们关于财务状况改善程度的感觉。


With many Americans anxiously monitoring the monthly performance of their private pension plans, the only economic statistic that matters is that the S&P 500 has returned to its pre-2008 level.	大批美国人焦急的看着自己私人养老金账户的每月表现，对他们来说，唯一重要的经济指标就是标普500指数已经回到了2008年前的水平。


As a result, the lesson about the economy’s electoral salience is being subtly reformulated.	结果，经济显著决定大选后果的结论得做些许修改。


It is no longer the real state of the economy, but rather the perception of asset markets, that is crucial.	其关键作用的不再是经济的真实状态，而是资产市场的感觉。


And the perception can be far removed from reality, which means that the more the prevailing political wisdom assigns decisive electoral importance to the economy, the greater the temptation to view monetary policy’s impact on asset prices, and not on long-term growth, as crucial.	而感觉可以和现实相去甚远，这意味着流行的政治智慧越是强调经济对选举结果的决定性影响，人们就越关注货币政策对资产价格而不是长期经济增长的影响力。


In America, the Federal Reserve is bound to become much more politicized as a result.	在美国，这样的结果是美联储会被越来越政治化。


Republicans will blame their defeat in November on the Fed’s monetary stimulus (if not on the ineffectiveness of Mitt Romney’s blunder-filled campaign).	共和党会将11的月败选归咎于美联储的货币刺激（而不是罗姆尼在竞选活动中所犯的错误）。


Meanwhile, in Europe, many national leaders, looking at Obama and the Fed, may conclude that they would do better with more direct control over the central bank.	与此同时，在欧洲，许多国家的领导人正看着奥巴马和美联储，他们可能会认为更直接地控制央行方为上策。


Given the difficulty of establishing such control over the European Central Bank, the euro’s next great challenge may be growing sentiment in favor of a return to national currencies.	由于控制欧洲央行难度较大，因此，欧元的下一个重大挑战可能将是回归国家货币的呼声越来越高。


Sanders even hammers his opponent Hillary Clinton for her support of earlier trade deals such as the 1992 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).	桑德斯甚至大力抨击其对手希拉里·克林���（Hillary Clinton），因为她对早期签订的贸易协定(如1992年的北美自由贸易协定)表示赞同。


The US Election and the Global Economy	美国大选与全球经济


STANFORD – Big changes are underway in the United States, as the country gears up to elect a new president, one-third of the Senate, and the entire House of Representatives this November.	发自斯坦福——美国正在酝酿着一场重大的变革，因为这个国家即将在今年 11 月选出新总统，三分之一的参议员和全部众议员。


The outcome will have profound consequences for US economic policy, and thus for the global economy.	其结果将对美国的经济政策——并进而对全球经济——产生深远的影响。


As it stands, Hillary Clinton remains the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, though she has not yet pulled away from her socialist opponent, Senator Bernie Sanders.	目前看来，希拉里·克林顿依然领跑民主党总统候选人提名，但尚未成功抛离鼓吹社会主义的对手参议员伯尼·桑德斯。


The bombastic billionaire Donald Trump is leading the Republican field, followed by firebrand Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, Senator Marco Rubio, a talented mainstream conservative from Florida, and, further back, popular Ohio Governor John Kasich and neurosurgeon Ben Carson.	而口无遮拦的亿万富翁唐纳德·特朗普则是共和党这块的领头羊，后面跟着政治煽动家德克萨斯州参议员泰德·克鲁兹，佛罗里达州的天才主流保守派参议员马可·卢比奥，再后面则是民望甚高的俄亥俄州州长约翰 · 卡西奇和神经外科医生本 • 卡森。


It is impossible to know whether these early trends will hold through the rest of the primaries, now turning to the South and Midwest.	我们无法确知这些早期的趋势会否在余下的初选——现在转向南部和中西部——一直延续下去。


America’s media and political junkies are consumed by the various possibilities.	美国媒体和政治圈里充斥着各种可能性。


Can Rubio rally a broad coalition, or will Trump win the Republican nomination?	卢比奥是否能团结起一个多派系联盟，特朗普能否赢得共和党提名？


Would a Trump nomination help Clinton win the general election?	而特朗普的提名是否意味着克林顿将在大选中获胜？


In fact, many Republicans fear a contest pitting Trump against Clinton.	事实上，许多共和党人都担心会出现特朗普对克林顿的局面。


Though Clinton has plenty of weaknesses – voters, especially young people, do not trust her, and she may face legal repercussions for dealing with highly classified information using a private email server when she was Secretary of State – the nasty infighting among Republicans may give her a big advantage in November.	虽然克林顿有很多弱点——选民（尤其是年轻人）不信任她，同时她还可能面对因在国务卿任上使用私人电邮服务器处理高度机密信息而导致的法律后果——但恼人的共和党内讧可能会为她在 11 月时带来极大优势。


Many Republicans believe that Trump’s nomination would cost them the Senate and the White House.	许多共和党人相信提名特朗普会导致本党在参议院和白宫两头落败。


With so much uncertainty, there are a number of directions that US policy could take in the coming years.	在如此多不确定性的作用之下，美国政策可能在未来几年出现多种走向。


While a lot of attention has been paid to headline-grabbing issues like immigration and national security, American voters are highly concerned about economic issues – concerns that the leading candidates would address in very different ways.	虽然大量的注意力都倾注在了移民和国家安全等头条新闻之上，但美国选民依然高度关注经济问题——因为目前领头的候选人未来解决这类问题的方式堪称南辕北辙。


On trade, Trump’s ideas are dangerous and would reverse decades of beneficial bipartisan American leadership in trade liberalization, with large tariffs on foreign imports, such as from China and Mexico.	在贸易方面，特朗普的想法极为危险，可能推翻过往数十年间在贸易自由化上两党互利的美国领导地位，并调高对中国和墨西哥等国的进口关税。


The other Republican candidates barely discuss the topic.	其他共和党候选人几乎没有讨论过这个话题。


As for the Democrats, Sanders inveighs against free trade.	民主党这块，桑德斯对自由贸易大加斥责。


Clinton has flip-flopped on the issue: She now opposes Canada’s Keystone XL pipeline and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which she promoted as Secretary of State.	而克林顿则在这一问题上摇摆不定: 她现在反对的加拿大 Keystone XL 输油管道和跨太平洋伙伴关系，正是当年身为国务卿时大力推动的项目。


The risk of a trade war is low, but rising.	爆发贸易战的风险很小，但却在上升。


Clinton has also inched toward Sanders’s position on financial-system reform, as his attacks on her for taking large donations and speaking fees from Wall Street have clearly struck a chord among young voters.	克林顿也正在逐渐地向桑德斯的金融体制改革立场靠拢，因为后者对她从华尔街获取大笔捐赠和演讲费的攻击显然打动了年轻选民。


Confronting the big-bank bogeyman has been a centerpiece of Sanders’ campaign; Clinton is now partly echoing his populist anti-bank positions.	与大银行的抗争一直都是桑德斯竞选的重头戏； 而克林顿也在某种程度上回应他的民粹主义反银行立场。


The Democrats favor loose monetary policy, low interest rates, and a depreciated dollar.	民主党人喜欢宽松的货币政策，低利率以及美元贬值。


Republicans also oppose bailouts, but worry about excessively loose monetary policy and too much discretion for the US Federal Reserve outside real emergencies.	共和党人也反对救助，但担心过于宽松的货币政策以及给予美国联邦储备委员会过多的非紧急事务自由裁量权。


These differences will have a far-reaching impact.	这些差异将产生深远的影响。


By appointing a new Fed Chair (or reappointing Janet Yellen), and possibly other Fed governors, the next president will have an indirect influence on interest rates, exchange rates, and global financial markets.	通过任命新的美联储主席（或重新任命珍妮特·耶伦）以及其他美联储执行委员, 下任总统会对利率、 汇率和全球金融市场产生间接影响。


If inflationary pressures rise – unlikely any time soon, but possible when the global economy gains strength – the Fed’s response will be a key determinant of economic stability.	如果通胀压力上升——短期内不太可能，但可能在全球经济逐渐恢复元气时出现——美联储的反应将是决定经济能否维持稳定的一个关键因素。


The candidates also differ enormously in their tax and spending plans – and thus their deficit and debt proposals.	各候选人税收和支出计划——进而在其赤字和债务提案上——差异巨大。


Sanders is proposing about $18 trillion of additional spending over the next decade to cover a single-payer health-care system, infrastructure investment, and “free” (that is, taxpayer-paid) tuition at public colleges.	桑德斯计划在未来十年动用约18万亿的额外支出来涵盖一套单一付款人的医疗系统、 基础设施投资和公立大学“免学费”计划(即由纳税人支付)。


During that period, he would impose tax hikes of $6.5 trillion, mostly on the “wealthy.”	在此期间他会增税6. 5万亿美元，而对象大多是“有钱人”。


The catch: Democrats define “wealthy” as an annual household income above $250,000 – roughly the starting salary of an urban couple in their first jobs after law school.	问题是民主党对“有钱”的定义是家庭年收入高于 25万美元——大约相当于一对城市夫妇从法学院毕业后头两份工作的薪酬水平。


The $11.5 trillion deficit would eventually have to be covered by a gigantic future tax hike.	两相抵消之后剩下的11. 5万亿赤字最终将不得不由未来大幅增税来填补。


Clinton has similar spending and tax priorities, though with smaller increases.	对此克林顿也有类似的支出和税收优先针对群体，但涨幅较小。


The Republicans want to lower personal income tax rates and broaden the tax base.	共和党人想要降低个人所得税率并扩大税基。


They would reduce America’s corporate-tax rate – the highest in the OECD – to a far more competitive level.	他们会把美国的公司税率——处于经合组织最高水平——降到一个更具竞争力的水平。


Some propose replacing the current personal and corporate income taxes with a flat tax on consumption.	一些人建议用直接消费税取代当前的个人和企业所得税。


The Republicans would slow growth in spending in most areas, while increasing defense spending.	共和党人将调低大多数地区的支出增长，同时增加国防开支。


Whereas Trump proposes an outsize $10 trillion in tax cuts and Cruz about $9 trillion (statically scored), Rubio and Kasich have offered more economically and arithmetically plausible fiscal plans.	特朗普提出要巨额减税10万亿美元而科鲁兹则提出9万亿（静态计算），卢比奥和卡西奇则提出了在经济和计算上更为可行的财政计划。


Campaign proposals are, of course, partly aspirational, and will have to be negotiated with Congress.	当然竞选时提出的数字在某种程度上有点理想化，最终也不得不和国会讨价还价。


The empirical evidence suggests that tax cuts are more likely than spending increases to spur growth, and that lower spending is more likely than tax hikes to consolidate budgets effectively.	经验证据显示减税是比支出增加更能刺激经济增长，减少支出比增税更能有效巩固预算。


While past experience indicates that constraining spending growth will not be easy, especially with the aging of the post-1945 baby-boom generation fueling rising health-care and pension costs, many countries – including Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and even the US itself – have managed to do so in recent decades.	而过去的经验也表明制约消费增长比较困难，尤其是在1945 年后婴儿潮一代的老龄化导致保健和养老金支出上升的情况下，许多国家——包括加拿大、 英国、 瑞典和美国自己——在近几十年中成功实现了这一点。


Republicans and Democrats differ starkly on reforming exploding entitlement costs, which have unfunded liabilities several times the national debt.	民主共和两党在改革不断膨胀的福利支出方面（规模相当于国家债务的数倍）也大相径庭。


The Republicans – with the exception of Trump, who rejects future Social Security “cuts” – would gradually slow growth, whereas the Democrats propose increasing Social Security benefits.	共和党人——除了拒绝接受未来的社会保障“削减”的特朗普之外——会逐渐降低这项支出的增长，而民主党则要求继续增加社会保障福利。


The next leader of the free world should know that when a ship starts leaking, the first priority is to plug the leak, not open new ones.	自由世界的下一个领导人应该知道，当船开始漏水，首先要做的是堵住漏洞，不再开几个新的。


Overall, the policies proposed by Sanders and Clinton would take the US closer to a European-style social-welfare state.	总体而言，桑德斯和克林顿提出的政策方案会令美国更接近欧洲式的社会福利国家。


But, as Republicans point out, Western Europe’s standard of living is 30% lower than that of the US, on average; Europe also faces slower growth, higher unemployment, and heightening social tensions.	不过正如共和党人指出的那样，西欧国家的生活水平平均低于美国30%； 欧洲也面临着经济增长放缓，高失业率和不断紧绷的社会压力。


That is why Republican candidates – for the presidency, the House, and the Senate – want to roll back President Barack Obama’s tax and spending increases, expensive health-care reform, and regulatory overreach.	这就是为什么共和党候选人——无论是竞逐总统，众议院还是参议院——都想要推翻奧巴馬的税收和支出增加，昂贵的医疗保健改革以及过度管制。


America’s Why Not Election	“不参加白不参加”的美国选举


WASHINGTON, DC – Those having trouble making sense of the American presidential election campaign need not worry.	华盛顿——那些搞不懂美国总统大选的人大可不必担心。


It doesn’t make sense.	这本来就是一次让人看不明白的选举。


The 2016 race is shaping up as the weirdest in modern times, owing not just to the number of candidates – currently 14, with two or three more expected to announce soon – but also to the unusual nature of many of them.	事实上，正在进行的竞选活动可谓现代美国最高职位争夺中最奇怪的一次，这不仅仅因为候选人的数量——目前参选人数已高达14人，很快又会有两到三人加入选举——还因为这些候选人的特质。


The usual question posed about presidential aspirants is: Why is he running?	总统候选人常被问及的问题是：你为什么参选？


This year, the answer seems to be: Why not?	今年，答案似乎是：为什么不？


As long as one is not too attached to one’s dignity, there is little to lose and a lot to be gained from running.	只要不太纠结于个人的尊严，竞选没有什么可以失去，却能得到很多好处。


A failed presidential campaign, even a disastrous one, can lead to higher speaking fees, richer book contracts, or a television gig.	一次失败、甚至是灾难性的总统竞选都可以带来更高的演讲费、更多的出书合同或电视演出。


Newt Gingrich and Mike Huckabee both failed to win the Republican nomination, but secured seats on cable talk shows.	纽特·金里奇和麦克·赫卡比都未能获得共和党提名，但却得到了访谈节目的出镜机会。


On the Democratic side, the question asked in political circles these days is not whether Hillary Clinton can win the nomination, but whether she can lose it.	民主党方面，政界问题的焦点不在于希拉里能否赢得提名，而在于她会否失去。


The answer is yes – in the sense that anything is possible.	答案是肯定的 ——从这个意义上，没有不可能的事。


Nobody I know thinks she is likely to stumble so badly; still, the Clintons are known to be accident-prone, and they have been full of surprises – scandals and scandalettes – since they first appeared on the national scene a quarter-century ago.	据我所知没人认为她会摔得那么惨，不过克林顿家族一贯事故多发，他们也一直令人惊奇。 从他们二十五年前首次登上全国性舞台的那一刻起，丑闻就一直没有停止。


This is why many Democrats back her without enthusiasm.	这解释了为什么很多民主党人对她的支持并不热烈。


Bernie Sanders, a self-described socialist, inspires enthusiasm.	自诩为社会主义者的伯尼·桑德斯能够激发热情。


Sanders is riding the leftist wave in Democratic politics, and while many of his proposals may not be able to stand up against hard questioning (how, for example, would he fund his plan to make college tuition free for everyone?), he has so far managed to avoid any serious challenge to them.	桑德斯是民主政治左翼浪潮的弄潮儿，但他的很多提案都经不起斟酌（比方说，他打算怎样筹措的大学免费方案所需的学费？ ）迄今还没有人对这项计划提出严肃的质疑。


Sanders’s main advantage is that he comes off as authentic – a candidate, who, like the billionaire businessman Ross Perot in 1992, “tells it like it is” – while Clinton very much does not.	桑德斯的主要优势在于他的真实——像1992年的亿万富翁罗斯·佩罗一样，“直言不讳不加掩饰”——而克林顿则完全反其道而行之。


She seems packaged and cautious, slow to get around to a position on some key issues, such as trade, that divide Democrats.	她小心谨慎、装模作样，对贸易等在民主党内有所分歧的关键事务迟迟不肯表明态度。


For the moment, however, nobody can predict whether Sanders will be able to convert the impressive crowds he has been drawing into electoral strength, or even how long he will remain in fashion.	但到目前为止，我们还无法预测桑德斯能否将吸引到的大量关注者转化为选举拥趸，甚至无法确定他还能在多长时间内受人关注。


The latest entry into the Democratic race, Jim Webb – who has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and Senator from Virginia – has talent, but lacks steadiness.	民主党选战的最新参与者吉姆·韦布才华横溢、但欠缺稳重，曾历任助理国防部长、海军部长和弗吉尼亚州参议员等职。


Martin O’Malley, the former governor of Maryland, has promise, but has yet to catch on.	马里兰州前州长马丁·奥马利前途远大，但还亟需提高人气。


And Lincoln Chaffee, a former governor of Rhode Island, is an ethereal mystery.	罗得岛州前州长林肯·查菲空灵神秘。


None is likely to make more than a fleeting impact, if that.	这几位候选人就算乐观来看也顶多造成短暂的影响。


Clinton has fame, money, and organization – advantages that only she (or perhaps her husband) can throw away.	克林顿在名望、资金和组织方面占尽优势，只有她（或者她的丈夫）自己出错才可能将优势白白浪费。


The Republican race, by contrast, remains wide open.	相比之下，共和党选战还有很多机会。


At the beginning of the year, the conventional wisdom was that if Jeb Bush threw his hat into the ring, he would be the odds-on favorite.	今年初，传统智慧认为如果杰布·布什参选，他十拿九稳会成为当红候选人。


He looked like a shoo-in on paper, but candidates don’t run on paper.	他看似能稳操胜券，但竞选毕竟不是纸上谈兵。


Will he prove nimble enough to maneuver through the Republican nominating process, given that its early stages are heavily tilted to the right?	鉴于早期共和党候选体制严重右倾，现实中他是否具有驾驭这套体制的灵活性值得质疑。


Evangelical Christians play a crucial role in the Iowa caucuses, the first contest in the quest for the nomination, but putting too much effort into pleasing them can make a candidate unelectable.	福音派基督徒在爱荷华州选区党内决策会议作用至关重要，布什最先面临的考验是争取提名，但太过取悦党团会议会令候选人陷入不可能当选的窘境。


Bush shows signs of skipping Iowa, but then he would “have to” win New Hampshire.	有迹象表明布什可能放弃爱荷华州，但这样他就必须在新罕布什尔州获胜。


Bush’s interest in running was enough to convince Mitt Romney, who lost the 2012 election to Barack Obama, not to try a third time.	布什对参选的兴趣足以说服2012年大选中败给奥巴马的米特·罗姆尼不要再参选第三次。


But even the supposedly formidable Bush name was not enough to convince younger, scrappier candidates to step aside.	但即便可以称得上令人敬畏的布什姓氏也不足以说服年轻、好胜的候选人不参加选举。


Ambitious young pols like Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker currently are viewed as Bush’s strongest rivals, but both will be facing increased scrutiny and testing.	像佛罗里达州参议员卢比奥和威斯康星州州长斯科特·沃克这样雄心勃勃的年轻政客迄今为止被视为布什最有力的竞争者，但两者都将面临愈来愈严格的考验与审核。


Rand Paul enjoyed a period of buzz, but that seems to have faded, as his dovish brand of libertarianism clashes with a party that leans toward social conservatism and interventionism abroad.	兰德·保罗之前炙手可热现在也不免渐归沉寂，但其打着鸽派烙印的自由主义与一个倾向社会保守主义与国外干预的政党产生了不可调和的冲突。


I seem to have been one of the few journalists who from the outset didn’t think that Donald Trump’s entry into the presidential race was funny.	我似乎是从一开始就未把唐纳德·特朗普参选总统视为笑话的少数记者之一。


Trump is not remotely qualified to be president, but he is no joke.	特朗普的确不具备总统资质，但他也并非不堪一击。


And, sure enough, even in his announcement speech, he demonstrated his ability to appeal to Americas’ dark side.	可以肯定，即便在参选讲话中，他也展现了吸引美国黑暗面的能力。


Trump’s offensive comments about immigrants from Mexico – “They’re bringing drugs.	特朗普有关墨西哥移民的攻击性言论——“他们带来了毒品。


They’re bringing crime.	他们带来了犯罪。


They’re rapists.	他们是强奸犯。


And some, I assume, are good people.” – sent his popularity soaring, to the mortification of many Republican leaders.	我想可能也有些好人。 ”——令共和党人倍感屈辱的是，这些话让他的民调支持率大幅上升。


Those leaders have good reason to be panicked by Trump's rise: They know that if they can’t find a way to attract more Hispanic voters than Romney did in 2012, they will have a poor chance of winning the presidency.	共和党官员知道如果他们找不到办法吸引比2012年罗姆尼更多的拉美裔选票，他们赢得大选的可能性会很低。 因此，特朗普的崛起可能助长恐慌情绪。


Trump’s comments may have cost him some of his commercial ties, but anyone who thinks he doesn’t know what he’s doing should think again.	特朗普的评论可能会使其失去某些商业关系，但任何认为他不知所云的人都应该重新考虑。


No one knows right now whether Trump will flame out or prove to have staying power, but one thing is clear: he is not the only one injecting strangeness into the nomination contest.	现在没人知道特朗普会后劲十足还是昙花一现，但有一点十分明确：他并非为提名竞赛注入怪异元素的唯一候选人。


One of the more bizarre aspects of this election is the success of Ben Carson, a retired neurosurgeon and political neophyte.	本次选举中退休神经外科医生兼政治新手卡森的成功更加离奇。


His extreme views on homosexuality – he has likened it to bestiality and claimed that spending time in prison makes people gay – has resonated with a swath of the Republican electorate, making him a real contender in Iowa.	他对同性恋的极端观点——他把同性恋比作兽交，并称蹲过监狱的人更容易成为同性恋——也迎合了共和党的一部分选民，使其成为爱荷华州真正的竞争势力。


The 2016 presidential election campaign not only has more candidates than ever; it also has the highest proportion in memory who are flat-out unqualified for the job.	本次选举不仅候选人比以往更多； 还有更高比例的候选人根本不具备竞选总统的资质。


And some of them are doing very well at this point.	其中有些人现在还小有成绩。


Many observers will remain mystified; few will be bored.	本次竞选显然不可能沉闷乏味。


Foreign Policy and America’s Presidential Campaign	外交政策和美国的总统竞选


NEW YORK – It is impossible to know whom American voters will choose as their next president.	纽约——提前预知美国选民将选择谁来担任他们的下一任总统是不可能的。


But it is certain that the choice will have profound consequences, for better and for worse, for the entire world.	但无论是好是坏，他们的选择肯定会对整个世界造成深远的影响。


More than anything else, this reflects the continuing reality of American power.	最重要的是，它反映出美国力量的长期现实。


It also reflects the near-certainty that the next president will inherit a world in considerable turmoil.	它还反映出下一任总统几乎肯定将继承一个混乱的世界。


What he or she chooses to do, and how he or she chooses to do it, will matter a great deal to people everywhere.	他或她选择做什么以及怎么做关系到世界各地非常多的民众。


That said, it is difficult to know what role foreign policy will play in determining who will next occupy the Oval Office.	这就是说，很难了解外交政策将在决定由谁入主椭圆形办公室过程中发挥什么样的作用。


The 2016 election is still 17 months away.	还有17个月才举行2016年大选。


A lot can, and will, happen between now and then.	从现在到那时可以、也将会发生很多事情。


Two related but distinct political processes – the Democratic and Republican parties’ nominating contests – will play out over the next year.	今后一年将开展民主及共和党提名赛这两项相互关联而又各自独立的政治进程。


Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is the Democratic frontrunner, though her nomination is not a foregone conclusion.	前国务卿希拉里·克林顿领跑民主党，虽然现在还不能说她已经把提名资格收入囊中。


In any case, foreign policy probably will play little role in the decision, as the issues that most concern voters likely to participate in the Democratic primary elections are domestic and economic in nature.	无论如何，参加民主党初选的选民最关心国内和经济事务，因此外交政策在决策中可能起不到多大作用。


The Republican side is far more crowded and uncertain, and it seems far likelier that foreign policy will play a large role in choosing the party’s nominee.	而共和党方面更拥挤也更不确定，外交政策似乎更可能在党派提名人选择时起到更大作用。


The economy is improving under President Barack Obama, making it a less attractive political target.	经济状况在奥巴马总统领导下逐渐改善，因此削弱了其作为政治目标的吸引力。


Global turbulence, by contrast, has given the Republicans more room to attack Obama and the Democrats.	相比之下，全球动荡让共和党更有理由攻击民主党和奥巴马总统。


Nonetheless, a few foreign-policy issues will dominate the conversation in both parties.	尽管如此，某些外交政策问题仍将主导两党会谈。


One is trade, which is both a domestic and international matter.	比如具有国内国际双重属性的贸易问题。


Obama is seeking Trade Promotion Authority, a necessary prelude to gaining congressional support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would reduce barriers between the US and 11 other Pacific Rim countries. Many – but not all – of the Republican candidates back the TPP; the politics on the Democratic side is more hostile to the deal, making it potentially risky for any Democratic candidate to support it.	奥巴马正努力签署贸易促进授权法案，目的是减轻美国与其他11个太平洋沿岸国家的贸易壁垒，也就是为跨太平洋伙伴关系赢得议会支持铺平道路。


A second issue certain to dominate both parties’ nominating debates is Iran and the international negotiations to contain its nuclear program.	伊朗及遏制其核计划的国际谈判是注定要主导两党辩论的另一个问题。 如果不出所料共和党候选人会批评拟议中的所有提议。


One can expect many of the Republican candidates to be critical of any proposed deal.	共和党人会质疑放松哪些制裁以及何时放松；


Questions will be raised about which sanctions are to be eased and when; about the terms of compliance inspections; and about what will happen once some of the limits on Iran’s nuclear activities expire.	有关合规检查的规则； 以及对伊朗核活动限制到期后会发生什么。


Democratic candidates are more likely to be sympathetic to whatever is negotiated; but there are certain to be differences among candidates on both sides.	民主党候选人更有可能对谈判结果持同情态度； 但两党候选人注定会有分歧。


A third issue is climate change.	气候变化是第三个问题。


Pope Francis will boost the issue’s salience when he releases a major statement on it next week.	弗朗西斯教皇将在下周发表重要声明，强调气候变化问题是多么严重。


Likewise, planning for the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December will keep the issue in the news.	同样，策划12月在巴黎举办的联合国气候变化大会能让媒体持续关注��个问题。


Democrats will be more supportive of more far-reaching US commitments, although, again, differences of view will emerge on both sides.	民主党人将支持更具深远意义的美国承诺，不过两党内部都会出现意见分歧。


A fourth cluster of issues involves the Middle East.	第四大领域是中东问题。


There is little appetite on either side for large-scale military intervention in Iraq and Syria to counter the Islamic State.	两党都对大规模军事干预伊拉克及叙利亚、以及以此对抗伊斯兰国鲜有兴趣。


But there will be heated debate – and considerable posturing – over what should and should not be done.	但他们会激烈争论应该及不该怎么做——当然这其中少不了装腔作势。


Then there are all the other issues, from Chinese assertiveness in Asia to Russian revanchism in Ukraine.	而后还有其他所有问题，从中国在亚洲的自信到俄罗斯在乌克兰的复仇主义。


The rhetoric, especially on the Republican side, will be muscular.	与此相关的言辞，特别是在共和党方面，将会十分激烈。


One hopes that what emerges from the parties’ nominating processes is insight into how the successful candidates answer three big questions.	人们希望从两党提名程序中脱颖而出的是能深刻理解成功候选人如何回答这三大问题。


The first concerns how much importance, in absolute and relative terms, the nominee assigns to foreign policy.	第一个问题关系到被提名者分配给外交政策的相对及绝对重要性。


If one thinks of national security as two sides of a coin, with foreign policy on one side and domestic policy on the other, how likely is each to land face up for the next president?	如果说国家安全是一枚硬币的两面，一面是外交政策另一面是国内政策，那么正对下一任总统会是哪一面呢？


This is the classic “guns versus butter” debate over how resources, from dollars to presidential attention, should be allocated.	这是典型的“大炮与黄油”之争，争论从美元到总统关注的各项资源该如何分配。


Second, what are the purposes and priorities of foreign policy?	其次，什么是外交政策的重点和目的？


The realist tradition in international relations focuses on influencing other countries’ foreign policies and places less emphasis on their internal affairs.	国际关系中现实主义传统侧重影响其他国家的外交政策而对他们的内部事务不太重视。


The main alternative tradition takes the opposite tack, arguing that other countries’ domestic affairs are what matter most, whether for reasons of morality and principle, or because it is believed that how a government behaves at home affects how it acts abroad.	主要的替代性传统则恰恰相反，主张最为重要的是其他国家的内政，这或者是出于道德和原则的考虑，或者是他们相信政府的国内行为影响其在国外的活动。


According to this idealist view, countries that are democratic and treat their citizens with respect are more likely to treat other countries’ citizens with respect.	这种唯心主义观点认为尊重本国公民的民主国家更有可能尊重其他国家的公民。


The problem, of course, is that affecting the trajectories of other societies is typically a difficult, long-term proposition; in the meantime, there are pressing global challenges that need to be addressed, sometimes with the assistance of unsavory regimes.	当然，问题在于影响别国社会轨迹通常是一个长期、困难的过程； 在此期间，有一些迫切需要解决的全球性问题，这些问题有时需要不讨人喜欢的政府的援助。


The last question concerns the nominees’ approach to the execution of foreign policy.	最后一个问题事关被提名人执行外交政策的方式。


What will be their preferred mix of unilateralism and multilateralism, and which tools – from diplomacy and sanctions to intelligence operations and military force – will they reach for most often?	其中包含多少单边及多边主义，他们最愿意采用外交、制裁、情报行动及军事力量等哪些工具？


The answers to these questions should become clearer during the campaign.	随着竞选的深入上述问题的答案应当越来越明确。


Along the way, Americans will gain a better sense of whom to vote for, and people everywhere will develop a better sense of what to expect in January 2017, when the 45th US president takes the oath of office.	在此期间，美国人将更清楚地了解总统候选人，世界各地的人们也将逐渐明确2017年1月美国第45任总统宣誓就职时应当期望什么。


The Not-Ready-for-Prime-Time Republicans	共和党还未做好主宰准备


WASHINGTON, DC – Shortly after America's Republican Party trounced the Democrats and gained control of the Senate in last November's midterm congressional elections, Mitch McConnell, the new Senate majority leader, appealed to his colleagues not to be “scary," but to be “positive" and effective.	华盛顿—去年11月，美国共和党在国会中期选举中痛击民主党，赢得了参议院控制权。 此后不久，新参议院多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔（Mitch McConnell）要求同志们不要“吓人”，而是要“积极”并高效。


This has proved very difficult.	这也许十分困难。


McConnell's strategy is typically farsighted.	麦康奈尔的战略属于典型的远见卓识。


He knows that, if the Republicans are to win back the presidency in 2016, they must prove their ability to govern responsibly.	他明白，如果共和党要在2016年重新赢得总统大选，就必须证明能够负责任地治理国家。


He also recognizes that the Republicans would otherwise find it much more difficult to hold onto the Senate in the next election, when more swing-state seats are in play.	他还认识到，若非如此，共和党将在下一次选举中十分难以控制参议院，因为届时将由更多的摇摆席位。


And he is aware that public approval of Congress has fallen to the mid-teens – nearly an all-time low.	他还知道，公众对国会的认可度已经降到了百分之十几——几乎是历史最低。


With this in mind, McConnell decided that continuing to block President Barack Obama's initiatives, as the Republicans had done during the previous six years, could no longer work.	考虑到这因素，麦康奈尔认为，如过去六年共和党一直做的那样继续阻挠总统奥巴马的计划无法再奏效了。


So he promised that his party would try to compromise on a few issues, and offered an explicit pledge that there would be no government shutdowns like the highly unpopular one in 2013.	因此他承诺共和党将尝试在新问题上妥协，并明确承诺类似2013年的不受民众支持的政府关门绝不会重现。


And he schemed to make Obama the “negative" one by regularly sending him bills that he would be forced to veto.	他还计划只通过定期向奥巴马不得不被迫否决的法案制造他的“消极”形象。


But the strategy has been tough to execute – partly because Congress' staunchest conservatives, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas and his Tea Party-affiliated allies, refuse to be tamed.	但这一战略难以执行——部分是因为国会中的死硬保守派，如德克萨斯州参议员泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）等，拒绝屈服。


In fact, the Tea Party candidates who swept into Congress in 2010 campaigned on a pledge never to compromise – even, apparently, if it means opposing their own party members, such as House Speaker John Boehner, whom they view as too amenable to bipartisanship.	事实上，2010年重新在国会中得势的茶党候选人掀起了一场宣誓绝不妥协的运动——显然，哪怕这意味着反对本党成员，如他们认为过于顺从因此无法实现两党合作的众议院议长约翰·博纳（John Boehner）。


This refusal to compromise has put the Republican Party in a pickle.	如此拒绝妥协让共和党进退两难。


Meanwhile, many Democrats view their new minority status as a source of relief, as it has removed the pressure to deliver results or obey their party's leaders.	与此同时，许多民主党因为重新沦为少数派而舒了一口气，因为这使他们不再有压力必须取得成果获听命于党领导人。


Even Obama seems to feel liberated, proposing popular programs – for example, free tuition at two-year community colleges and a minimum-wage increase – that he knows the Republicans will reject, thereby upholding their reputation as the “party of no."	甚至奥巴马似乎也觉得获得了自由，提出了公众所支持的计划——如两年期社区学院免费和增加最低工资——他知道共和党会拒绝这些计划，因此这样能坐实他们“说‘不’党”的名胜。


The ideological divide between Republicans and Democrats is deeper than ever.	共和党和民主党之间的意识形态差异从未如此之深。


The Republicans eschew anything that enhances the role of the federal government, unless they consider it to be essential to national security (the party of personal liberty supports warrantless wiretapping, for example).	共和党拒绝任何可能加强联邦政府角色的措施，除非他们认为这是国家安全之必须（比如，这一个人自由党支持不正当窃听）。


The Democrats, by contrast, support a more active federal role in setting national standards and ensuring that the benefits of public programs are distributed fairly.	相反，民主党支持联邦政府在制定国家标准、确保公共项目利益公平分配方面扮演更积极地角色。


The Tea Party's rise exacerbated this split.	茶党的崛起加剧了这一分歧。


Though the movement's ranks have thinned somewhat, its adherents continue to exert considerable influence in Congress.	尽管茶党运动风头最近有所消停，但其信徒依然在国会拥有巨大影响力。


It has powerful and well-funded backers, including the billionaire brothers Charles and David Koch.	茶党运动拥有不少有钱有势的支持者，包括亿万富翁查尔斯（Charles）和大卫·科奇（David Koch）兄弟。


And, after some successful challenges by Tea Party members, Republican incumbents have moved steadily rightward.	此外，在受到茶党成员的成功挑战后，共和党在位者也逐渐右倾。


Some Republican strategists say that even Ronald Reagan could not be nominated by today's Republicans.	一些共和党战略家说，甚至罗纳德·里根也无法获得今天的共和党的提名。


To be sure, now that the Democrats are the minority in both congressional chambers, they have turned to tactics – like Senate filibusters and amendments that would be politically costly to oppose – previously favored by Republicans.	诚然，如今民主党已是国会两院少数派，他们因此转向了此前共和党所惯用的战术——如在参议院发表冗长演说阻碍议程和抛出需要极大政治代价才能反对的修正案。


But the Democrats' efforts – say, to force a vote on an amendment designating climate change a human-induced phenomenon – pale in comparison to past Republican manipulations, such as the addition of anti-abortion provisions to entirely unrelated bills.	但民主党的做法——比如强行就将气候变化列为人为导致现象的修正案进行投票——与过去共和党的做法——比如在完全不相关的法案中加入反堕胎条款——比起来只是小巫见大巫。


Despite the desire of party leaders to boost trust in a Republican-led government, many Republicans care little about the effect of their behavior on their party's prospects of winning back the White House.	尽管共和党领袖希望在共和党领导的政府中增加信任度，但许多共和党根本不顾他们的行为对本党重新赢得白宫的大计的影响。


Indeed, the party's agenda remains laden with proposals to reverse or overturn Obama's achievements.	事实上，共和党日程仍充斥着扭转或颠覆奥巴马成就的议案。


In the new Congress' first couple of weeks, the House passed a bill scaling back the Dodd-Frank financial reform act.	在新国会的最初几周中，众议院通过了削减多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革法的法案。


Numerous proposals are pending to undo significant parts of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Obama's signature health-insurance program (if the Supreme Court does not do the job later this year).	大量议案等着阻挠奥巴马签署的医疗保险计划——患者保护和平价医疗法（Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act）的重要部分（如果最高法院在今年晚些时候不这样做的话）。


Moreover, the Senate spent weeks on a bill to force Obama to approve the Keystone XL pipeline, a 1,179-mile conduit to carry oil from Canada's tar sands to the US for refinement and export.	此外，参议院花了数周时间讨论了迫使奥巴马批准基石XL（Keystone XL）输油管道的法案。 这条长1,179英里的管道将加拿大油砂中的石油运往美国用于精炼和出口。


Obama has, as promised, vetoed the bill, owing to the pipeline's adverse environmental implications.	奥巴马如承诺的那样否决了该法案，因为这条管道存在不良环境影响。


Though it will be difficult to marshal the two-thirds House and Senate majorities needed to override a presidential veto, the Republicans will seek to capitalize politically by portraying Democrats who oppose the pipeline as effete elitists who do not care about jobs or national security.	尽管要获得众议院和参议院三分之二多数推翻总统否决十分困难，但共和党会试图通过将反对管道的民主党描述为怯懦的精英、根本不顾就业问题和国家安全，以此赢得政治优势。


But it is the House Republicans' move to overturn Obama's executive actions on immigration reform – which would shield as many as five million undocumented immigrants from deportation – that has turned into the biggest headache for party leaders.	但共和党试图颠覆奥巴马在移民改革中的动作反倒成了共和党领导人最头疼的问题。 奥巴马的移民改革计划将让五百万未登记移民免遭遣返。


They know that in 2016, the party will need more Hispanic votes than it received in 2012.	共和党知道，2016年它需要比2012年更多的西班牙裔选民的选票。


In this sense, the recent ruling by a federal judge in Texas halting the order's implementation – a decision that the Obama administration is appealing – does not help the Republicans, however joyous anti-immigration forces may be.	从这个角度讲，最近德克萨斯州联邦法官中止该命令实施的裁决——奥巴马政府正在就此进行上诉——无助于共和党，不管反移民力量多么欢欣鼓舞。


Likewise, House Republicans set a trap for their party last December, by demanding that funding of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) be separated from legislation funding all other government agencies, so that the anti-immigration legislation could be attached to it.	类似地，众议院共和党在去年12月给本党挖了一个坑，他们要求国土安全部拨款必须与其他所有政府机构拨款立法分离，以使反移民立法可附着其上。


But, as should have been expected, the Senate – which adopted a bipartisan immigration bill in 2013 – would not accept the anti-immigration baggage.	但是，应该不难预期，2013年通过了跨党派移民法案的参议院不会接受反移民包袱。


The Republicans' inability to control their House faction has exposed them to responsibility for a DHS shutdown at a time of increased terror threats.	共和党无法控制其众议院势力让他们可能在恐怖威胁日益严重的档口背上导致国土安全部关门的责任。


To break the impasse, McConnell has proposed addressing the issues in separate bills.	为了打破这一僵局，麦康奈尔提出在不同的法案中解决这些问题。


In their first couple of months dominating Congress, the Republicans have passed no major legislation; taken largely negative positions; and may be about to impede the operation of a crucial government department.	在主宰国会的最初几个月中，共和党没有通过任何重大立法； 他们基本上采取了消极立场；


This is exactly where McConnell and other national leaders did not want their party to be.	并且有可能导致一个关键性政府部门无法运转。 这绝不是麦康奈尔或其他任何国家领导人希望他们的政党做的。


America’s Incarcerated Economy	身陷囹圄的美国经济


BERKELEY – The United States has 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s prison population – about 2.2 million people, five times as many as in 1980.	伯克利—美国拥有5%的世界人口和25%的狱中人口——大约220万人，五倍于1980年。


One out of every 100 American adults is incarcerated – the highest per capita rate in the world, 5-10 times higher than in Western Europe or other democracies.	美国成年人中每100人就有一人深陷囹圄——这一人均比例为世界之最，比西欧或其他民主国家高5—10倍。


The social and economic toll is similarly high.	社会和经济成本也同样高昂。


The boom in America’s prison population in recent decades is the result of ramped up punitive crime-prevention measures, including tougher drug penalties and mandatory minimum sentences, backed up by growing numbers of police and other law-enforcement officials.	近几十年来美国监狱人口的激增是惩罚性预防犯罪措施大行其道的结果，包括更加严格的毒品惩罚和强制性最低刑期，其背后有数量日益增加的警察和执法队伍作为支持。


Beyond the financial costs of larger police forces and increased pressure on the judicial system is $60 billion a year in spending on state and federal prisons, up from $12 billion 20 years ago.	除了警察队伍扩张所带来的财务成本和司法体系压力增加之外，每年有600亿美元花在了州和联邦监狱经费上，而20年前这一数字是120亿。


And then there are the huge costs for those imprisoned (many for non-violent crimes) and for their families and communities – costs that fall disproportionately on the poor, the uneducated, African-Americans and Latinos, and the mentally ill.	除此之外，囚犯（其中许多因为非暴力犯罪而入狱）及其家庭和社区也承受了巨大的成本——其中穷人、受教育程度低下者、非洲裔和拉丁裔美国人以及精神病人负担尤重。


Perhaps the worst part is that the expected benefits of America’s “get tough” approach have failed to materialize.	也许最糟糕的部分是人们所期待的美国“严刑峻法”方针所应有的效果并没有实现。


Indeed, there is only a modest correlation between higher incarceration rates and lower crime rates.	事实上，高入狱率和低犯罪率之间相关性很弱。


Moreover, the recidivism rate is shockingly high: according to a recent US Department of Justice report, more than one-third of released prisoners were rearrested within six months, and more than two-thirds were rearrested within three years.	此外，再犯率畸高：据美国司法部的最新报告，获释囚犯中有三分之一强在六个月内再次被捕，三分之二强在三年内再次被捕。


In order to reduce the size of the prison population, the recidivism rate must drop.	要想降低监狱人口规模，就必须降低再犯率。


Of course, this is a complex problem.	当然，这是一个复杂的问题。


Released inmates face huge barriers to employment, housing, health care, and education.	获释囚犯面临着巨大的就业、住房、医疗和教育壁垒。


At least half face the added challenge of mental health and addiction issues.	至少一半人面临着精神健康压力和成瘾问题。


Yet very few have support networks to navigate re-entry to society.	但只有极少数能获得支持网络以重新加入社会


Clearly, a new approach is needed – one that capitalizes on the comparative advantages of the private sector, state authorities, and the federal government.	显然，我们需要新方针——利用私人部门、州有关部门和联邦政府的比较优势的方针。


The federal government should rely on “progressive federalism” to catalyze and fund state-level programs to combat recidivism.	联邦政府应该依托“进步联邦主义”（progressive federalism）催化和用资金支持州级遏制再犯计划。


Many of these programs can be based on pay-for-performance contracts, such as social impact bonds, in which the federal and state governments share risk with private-sector actors.	这些计划中有许多可以基于按表现付酬合同，如社会影响债券（social impact bonds，由联邦和州政府与私人部门行动方共同承担风险）。


Social impact bonds, or SIBs, require that private investors and other non-government actors cover most or all of the upfront cost of a pilot project, to be reimbursed by the contracting government agency only if independent evaluators conclude that the project achieves its goals and saves taxpayers money.	社会影响证券，即SIB，需要私人投资者或其他非政府行动方覆盖大部分或全部实验计划的前端成本，只有在独立评估者认为该计划实现了其目标并且节约了纳税人的钱时，才由签约的政府机构负责偿还。


The world’s first SIB, launched in the United Kingdom in 2010, focused on reducing recidivism rates among 3,000 prisoners at Her Majesty’s Prison Peterborough in Cambridgeshire, and showed promising results.	全球首笔SIB于2010年在英国发行，其目标是降低剑桥郡彼得伯勒（Peterborough）皇家监狱3,000名囚犯的再犯率。 该SIB实现了令人欣喜的效果。


The first American SIB, aimed at reducing recidivism among juvenile inmates at New York City’s Rikers Island Correctional Facility, was not so effective.	首笔美国SIB就没有那么有效。 该SIB旨在降低纽约市雷克岛监狱（Rikers Island Correctional Facility）少年犯的再犯率。


Indeed, last month, independent evaluators concluded that the program had not met New York City’s targets.	事实上，上个月，独立评估机构认定该计划没有达到纽约市的目标


But, far from being a failure, the Rikers Island project validated the pay-for-performance approach.	但是，雷克岛计划绝不是一场失败，它验证���按表现付酬方针。


New York City did not have to foot the bill for the failed effort, but officials gained valuable knowledge about what does and does not work.	纽约市不需要为失败的计划埋单，但官员获得了关于什么有用、什么没用的宝贵知识。


Based on this experience, another US firm is developing a SIB for a different recidivism project run by New York State.	基于这一经验，另一家美国企业正在开发由纽约州负责实施的不同的再犯率计划。


In fact, many state-level pilot projects – some based on pay-for-success deals – to reduce recidivism are underway across the country.	事实上，美国正在实施许多旨在降低再犯率州级实验计划——其中一些基于成功后付酬的合同。


New York State and Massachusetts have launched statewide pay-for-success experiments.	纽约州和马萨诸塞州实施了全州成功后付酬实验。


Minnesota and Texas have run pilot projects with promising results. Georgia, using a $6 million grant from the Department of Justice, is financing 15 separate pilot programs that range from job-training and housing-support services for released prisoners to faith-based “in-reach” programs for those still in prison.	明尼苏达州和德克萨斯州从司法部获得600按美元经费用于15个不同的实验计划，范围涵盖针对获释囚犯的职业培训和住房支持以及针对在押囚犯的基于信仰的“挽救”（in-reach）计划。


These state projects collectively amount to a form of crowdsourcing – an effective method of testing a wide variety of innovative ideas, which can then be scaled up if they prove successful.	这些州计划集合在一起形成了一种形式的众包——一种测试各种创新想法的与有效的方法，如果想法被证明是成功的，就可以推而广之。


In this sense, state and local governments are serving as “laboratories of democracy.”	从这个角度讲，州和地方政府起到了“民主实验室”的作用。


This is where progressive federalism comes in.	进步联邦主义就在这里起作用。


The federal government can work to sharpen and reinforce state efforts by providing funding and encouraging best practices, while avoiding imposing any ideology on the projects.	联邦政府可以致力于通过提供资金和鼓励最佳实践改善和加强州方案，同时避免给这些计划施加任何意识形态。


The federally assisted pilot projects to combat recidivism in Georgia, for example, reflect both “liberal” and “conservative” strategies, supported by Democrats and Republicans, respectively.	得到联邦支持的佐治亚州打击再犯率的试验计划就体现了“自由”和“保守”两种战略，分别由民主党和共和党支持。


The social sector also has an important role to play in combating recidivism.	社会部门在打击再犯方面也起着重要作用。


Advocacy groups like The Coalition for Public Safety are changing the national dialogue.	公共安全联盟（Coalition for Public Safety）等游说团体正在改变国家对话。


There is an entire sub-industry of nonprofits like Defy Ventures working to help former inmates build new careers and even become entrepreneurs.	一个完整的非盈利子行业（如Defy Ventures等）正在致力于帮助有入狱前科的人获得新的职业生涯甚至成为企业家。


Others programs, such as Measures for Justice, are creating the data needed to gauge results, while non-profits like Pew Charitable Trusts, California Forward, and Third Sector Ventures are helping counties and cities find economically effective alternatives to expensive and ineffective prison expansion.	公平措施（Measures for Justice）等其他计划正在制造评估结果所需要的数据，而皮尤慈善信托（Pew Charitable Trusts）、进步加利福尼亚（California Forward）和第三部门创业（Third Sector Ventures）等非盈利机构正在帮助各县和市寻找更加划算的方案代替昂贵又低效的监狱扩张。


Democrats want an active government that solves tough social problems, whereas Republicans want private-sector investment and innovation to do the job.	民主党想要一个能解决棘手社会问题的活跃的政府，而共和党想要私人部门投资和创新来做这件事。


But both parties like the idea of testing rival strategies in the real world, as evidenced by bipartisan support in Congress for a new federal fund to support pay-for-performance projects on a wide range of social problems, including health care, child care, and job training.	但两党都喜欢在真实世界测试对立战略的想法，国会两党均支持成立一个新的联邦基金以支持按表现付酬计划便是明证。 该基金所涵盖的计划包括各种社会问题，如医疗、儿童看护和职业培训等。


The combination of pay-for-performance contracts and progressive federalism seems to meet both sides’ requirements.	按表现付酬合同和进步联邦主义相结合似乎能同时满足两党的要求。


The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 – which provided funding for states to put more police on the beat, impose tougher prison sentences, and build more prisons – was an example of how the federal government can encourage action by state and local authorities.	1994年暴力犯罪控制和法律执行法——该法向各州拨款增加巡警数量、采取更严格的判刑和建造更多的监狱——向我们表明，联邦政府如何鼓励州和地方当局的行为。


A new federal crime bill, incorporating pay-for-success contracts, could encourage states to take a smarter approach to crime, reducing mandatory prison sentences and investing in effective anti-recidivism programs.	包含成功后付酬合同的新联邦犯罪法可以鼓励各州对犯罪采取更明智的方针，降低强制刑期，投资于 有效的反再犯计划。


Such an approach would reduce incarceration and recidivism rates – and drastically cut the onerous social, economic, and moral costs of imprisonment.	这一方针将降低入狱率和再犯率——并极大地缩小入狱的庞大的社会、经济和道德成本。


Sanctions and the Risk to the Dollar	制裁和对美元的风险


CAMBRIDGE – How can the US respond to cyber attacks by foreign powers or their proxies?	坎布里奇——美国该如何应对外国势力或其代理人的网络攻击？


It is an issue that has faced President Barack Obama in the wake of reports of Russian hacking during the United States’ recent election cycle.	这是巴拉克·奥巴马总统在接到俄罗斯黑客攻击最近总统大选的汇报后所面临的问题。


But it’s not just about Russia or Obama.	但此事不仅关乎俄罗斯或奥巴马。


President-elect Donald Trump will face the same problem.	当选总统唐纳德·特朗普将面临同样的问题。


And he won’t have very good options, either.	而且他也不太可能有完美的选择。


“Naming and shaming” is pretty unsatisfying, because hackers rarely feel any actual shame.	“指名道姓地羞辱”效果并不令人满意，因为黑客极少真的感觉羞耻。


Similarly, criminal indictments – a measure previously taken against Chinese hackers – probably won’t bring anyone to trial.	同样，从前曾对中国黑客提起过的刑事起诉最终或许无法审判任何人。


US Vice President Joseph Biden has put counterattacks against Russian computer networks on the table, but that could trigger an escalation, while ceding the moral high ground.	美国副总统约瑟夫·拜登曾提出对俄罗斯计算机网络发起反击，但这不仅可能导致事态升级，而且也等于放弃道德高地。


Economic sanctions may seem like a simple and inexpensive way to register disapproval for foreign hacking; in Russia’s case, existing sanctions against its largest banks and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest associates could be tightened.	经济制裁或许看上去像是表达对外国黑客不满的一种简单而廉价的方式； 就俄罗斯的情况而言，针对其大银行和俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京最亲密伙伴的现有制裁可能进一步收紧。


But resorting to sanctions too frequently can have far-reaching consequences that eventually diminish the US’s role in the global economy.	但过于频繁地使用制裁手段可能带来深远影响，最终削弱美国在全球经济中的作用。


Two-thirds of all global reserves are in dollars, and 88% of all foreign-exchange transactions worldwide include dollars.	全球储备的三分之二以美元形式存在，88%的全球外汇交易都涉及美元。


So, America’s most powerful sanctions instrument is its ability to block a criminal or rogue bank from making US-dollar transactions.	因此，美国最强大的制裁手段是它能阻止罪犯或流氓银行进行美元交易。


But every time the US unilaterally tightens sanctions against another country, it risks undermining the dollar’s status as the world’s principal reserve currency, which could also make future sanctions less effective.	但每次美国单方面加强对另一个国家的制裁，都有可能破坏美元作为世界主要储备货币的地位，进而导致今后进一步制裁的效果大打折扣。


To be sure, the US can strike a severe blow against terrorist organizations and drug kingpins by preventing them from transacting in dollars, and legitimate banks’ managers turn pale at the mere thought of losing dollar access.	可以肯定，美国可以通过拦截美元交易对毒枭和恐怖组织进行严厉打击，合法的银行经理仅仅想到失去美元交易资格也会吓得脸色发白。


But when sanctions target a country, their effectiveness depends much more on other countries’ participation, which can cost political capital to secure.	但如果制裁针对的是某个国家，其最终效果可能要更多依赖其他国家的参与，而其他国家参与需要消耗政治资本去争取。


For example, US sanctions eventually brought Iran to the table to negotiate a nuclear deal; but sanctions were effective only because a broad international coalition, ultimately backed by the United Nations Security Council, isolated Iran financially.	举例来讲，美国的制裁最终迫使伊朗谈判达成核协议； 但制裁取得效果仅仅因为建立了拥有联合国安理会终极支持的广泛的国际联盟，从财政方面对伊朗进行孤立。


US sanctions against Russia after the latter’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 were amplified by a coincidental oil-price drop, and by the deployment of similar measures by the European Union, Russia’s largest trading partner.	美国在2014年俄国吞并克里米亚后对其进行的制裁因为在俄罗斯最大贸易伙伴欧盟采取类似措施的同时碰巧遇到油价下跌才放大了制裁效果。


Without EU participation, US sanctions would have been far less effective.	如果没有欧盟的参与，美国的制裁效果将大打折扣。


But, while international coalitions lend credibility to US sanctions, they are fragile and temporary at best.	虽然国际联盟增加了美国制裁的可信度，但即使从最乐观的角度讲这样的联盟也非常短暂和脆弱。


Just a year after the Iran deal was reached, it is already hard to imagine that China or Russia would back further joint action against Iran, even if the agreement began to unravel.	与伊朗达成协议仅仅一年，即使协议开始解体，也已经很难想象中俄两国会支持对伊朗进一步采取行动。


Likewise, European leaders must renew their sanctions against Russia every six months, which means they are unlikely to survive long enough to change Kremlin policy.	同样，欧洲领导人必须每六个月延长对俄制裁，这意味着制裁很有可能延续不到迫使克里姆林宫改变政策的时候。


Notwithstanding Trump’s evident rapport with Putin, US sanctions will be far more durable.	尽管特朗普与普京交往明显比过去更加密切，但美国的制裁却能够更加持久。


Even when Obama was actively supporting Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization earlier in his presidency, he had to expend considerable political capital just to repeal the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which secured freer Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union as a condition for normal trade relations.	即使奥巴马任总统早期曾积极支持俄罗斯加入世贸组织，他也不得不花费相当多的政治资本才废除了1974年的“杰克逊-瓦尼克修正案”，以换取苏联境内犹太裔民众自由移民为条件实现贸易关系正常化。


At this stage, pulling off another diplomatic reset would be difficult, if not impossible.	目前阶段重新进行外交安排即使不是完全没有可能，也将是极其困难的。


Beyond building sanctions coalitions, the US must ensure that it is using its disproportionate influence in the global financial system to advance truly global interests.	除建立制裁联盟外，美国必须确保利用其在全球金融体系中的超强影响力来推动全球利益。


Few people would argue that punishing criminals and terrorists is illegitimate, even if there are disagreements about specific cases.	很少有人认为惩治罪犯和恐怖分子非法，即使在具体问题上有可能出现分歧。


And while using financial sanctions to boost widely agreed global efforts such as nuclear nonproliferation, or to defend shared principles such as border sovereignty, may not always work, it is a widely accepted tactic.	而且虽然利用金融制裁来促进受到广泛赞同的核不扩散等全球努力或捍卫边界主权等共同原则并不总能奏效，但这是一种人们普遍接受的策略。


But the difference between global principles and key national interests is often in the eye of the beholder: what the US considers an outrage may be viewed by other countries as a parochial American interest.	但全球原则和关键国家利益之间的差异往往是从旁观者的角度决定的：可能在其他国家看来仅仅因为狭隘的美国利益才激怒了美国。


For example, there was little sympathy for North Korea when Obama imposed sanctions against it last year in response to cyber attacks against Sony Pictures.	例如，当朝鲜因去年对索尼影视公司发起网络攻击而遭受制裁时，几乎没有人采取同情朝鲜的立场。


But there were grumbles about American overreach when the US slapped the French bank BNP Paribas with an $8.9 billion fine in 2014, and temporarily denied it certain dollar transactions, for violating sanctions against Sudan, Iran, and Cuba.	但当美国2014年以违反对苏丹、伊朗和古巴制裁为由对法国巴黎银行施以89亿美元罚款并暂停某些种类的美元交易时，有人抱怨美国管得太宽了。


Similarly, hacking US political organizations in an effort to disrupt the American democratic process arguably qualifies as behavior all respectable countries should abhor.	同样，以破坏美国民主进程为目的对美国政治机构进行黑客攻击可以说被所有受尊重的国家认为应当憎恶。


But some observers will undoubtedly characterize it as yet another chapter in the great-power rivalry between Russia and the US.	但有些观察者无疑认为这不过是俄美大国争霸的另一个段落。


There are clear risks for the US if it is too easily tempted to block access to the dollar in defense of interests that appear selfish or parochial.	美国太容易抗拒不住诱惑为保护自私或狭隘的本国利益而剥夺他国美元交易权是有显著风险的。


Would the US respond with sanctions if the cyber attack on Sony had come from a foreign competitor in a commercial dispute?	如果对索尼公司的网络攻击来自商业纠纷中的竞争对手美国是否会采取制裁的对策？


Or if an attack were carried out ostensibly to protest controversial US policies in the Middle East?	或者网络攻击的表面原因是抗议有争议的美国中东政策又会如何？


These are all difficult calls to make, which is why any US administration should pause before shutting individuals, firms, and countries out of the dollar-trading system.	这些判断都十分困难，因此美国政府在剥夺个人、企业和国家对美元交易系统的使用权时应当经过认真的思索。


Over time, even legitimate actors will find alternative commercial and financial channels if they come to feel that dollar access is conditional on not running afoul of US interests.	随着时间的推移，如果感到对美元的使用权必须以不违反美国利益为前提条件，那么就连合法主体也会寻找替代的商业和金融渠道。


Imposing sanctions seems like an easy, costless response to a global outrage, but it is no such thing.	实施制裁看似对全球暴行一种毫不费力的简单反应，但其实这种认识是完全错误的。


The US should scrutinize each sanctions deployment carefully, and make sure it is reinforcing trust in American leadership – and in the dollar – rather than raising doubts.	美国应当认真审查历次制裁部署，以确保制裁可以强化对美国领导力和美元的信任，而不是起到相反的效果。


The Kingdom and the Power	王国和权力


DENVER – US President Barack Obama supposedly “cleared the air” with Saudi King Salman before the latest meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital.	丹佛—据说美国总统奥巴马在沙特阿拉伯首都利雅得举行的海湾合作委员会最新会议前与沙特国王萨尔曼“澄清气氛”。


Given how strained the bilateral relationship is – a situation long in the making – that was probably the best outcome that could reasonably be expected.	美国-沙特双边关系现在相当紧张——这一状况酝酿已久——这也许是可以合理预期的最佳结果。


But it is not enough.	但仍不足够。


America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is based on a pragmatic give-and-take approach aimed at advancing mutual interests, the most important of which is maintaining relative peace and security in a volatile region that is vital to the global economy.	美国与沙特阿拉伯的关系基于务实的利益交换方针，旨在推进共同利益，其中最重要的是维持这一对全球经济至关重要的高动荡地区的相对和平与安全。


But this approach is fast becoming passé.	但这一方针很快就要过时了。


Indeed, we have entered a new age of ideology, in which the case for pragmatism, rather than shared values, is increasingly difficult to make.	事实上，我们已经进入了新的意识形态时代，务实主义，而不是共同价值，日益难以立足。


Against this background, it should perhaps not be surprising that cracks in the bilateral relationship have begun to show.	在这一背景下，也许美沙双边关系开始出现裂痕并不令人惊奇。


In a recent interview, Obama described the Saudis (as well as other US allies) as “free riders” on American foreign policy.	在最近的采访中，奥巴马将沙特（以及其他美国盟友）描述为美国外交政策的“免费搭车者”。


That sparked discussion not only about whether it is true (the Saudis purchase huge amounts of military hardware from the US), but also about whether it should have been said out loud.	这不但引起了关于此话是否正确的讨论（沙特人购买了大量美国军事装备），也引起了关于是否应该把它大声说出来的讨论。