Regardless of longstanding disagreements over how cross-border freshwater resources should be allocated and managed, and understandable preferences by governments and water professionals to rely on basin agreements rather than on international legal instruments, that half-century wait can be explained only by a lack of political leadership.	关于跨国淡水资源应该如何配置和管理的问题长期存在争议，也不难理解政府和水务专业人士更倾向于依靠流域协议（basin agreements）而非国际法律工具，抛开这些不谈，这半个世纪的等待只能用缺乏政治领导来解释。


So, though the world may celebrate the convention’s long-awaited adoption, we cannot rest on our laurels.	因此，虽然世界可能因为公约在��期等待后终于被接受而欢欣鼓舞，但我们不能因此踌躇满志。


Roughly 60% of all freshwater runs within cross-border basins; only an estimated 40% of those basins, however, are governed by some sort of basin agreement.	大约60%的淡水在跨国流域中奔腾； 但在这些流域中，只有大约40%有流域协议管辖。


In an increasingly water-stressed world, shared water resources are becoming an instrument of power, fostering competition within and between countries.	在这个水资源日益紧缺的世界，共享的水资源日益成为权力工具，在国家内部和国家之间造成竞争。


The struggle for water is heightening political tensions and exacerbating impacts on ecosystems.	水之争凸显出政治紧张，也放大了对生态系统的破坏效应。


But the really bad news is that water consumption is growing faster than population – indeed, in the twentieth century it grew at twice the rate.	但真正的坏消息是水消费量比人口增长得更快——事实上，在二十世纪，前者的增速是后者的两倍。


As a result, several UN agencies forecast that, by 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in regions stricken with absolute water scarcity, implying a lack of access to adequate quantities for human and environmental uses.	结果，一些联合国机构预测，到2025年将有18亿人生活在水极度紧缺的地区，无法获得足够维持人类和环境使用的水量。


Moreover, two-thirds of the world’s population will face water-stress conditions, meaning a scarcity of renewable freshwater.	此外，有三分之二人口将面临水紧张，即可再生淡水紧缺。


Without resolute counter-measures, demand for water will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities.	如果不采取果断措施，谁需求将超过许多社会的适应能力。


This could result in massive migration, economic stagnation, destabilization, and violence, posing a new threat to national and international security.	这可能导致大规模移民、经济停滞、动荡和暴力，给国家和国际安全造成新威胁。


The UN Watercourses Convention must not become just another ignored international agreement, filed away in a drawer.	联合国水道公约决不能成为另一个被束之高阁的国际协定。


The stakes are too high.	兹事体大。


In today’s context of climate change, rising demand, population growth, increasing pollution, and overexploited resources, everything must be done to consolidate the legal framework for managing the world’s watersheds.	在当今气候变化、需求激增、人口增长、污染日益严重、资源过度开采的环境下，我们应该竭尽全力巩固全球水域管理框架。


Our environmental security, economic development, and political stability directly depend on it.	我们的环境安全、经济发展和政治稳定直接取决于此。


The convention will soon apply to all of the cross-border rivers of its signatories’ territories, not just the biggest basins.	公约将很快用于所有签署国领土的跨国河流，而不仅仅是最大流域。


It will complement the gaps and shortcomings of existing agreements and provide legal coverage to the numerous cross-border rivers that are under increasing pressure.	公约能够弥补现有协定的缺口和不足，为大量压力日增的跨国河流提供法律保护。


Worldwide, there are 276 cross-border freshwater basins and about as many cross-border aquifers.	从全球看，共存在276片跨国淡水流域和数量相当的跨国蓄水层。


Backed by adequate financing, political will, and the engagement of stakeholders, the convention can help address the water challenges that we are all facing.	若有充分的资金和政治意愿支持和相关利益方参与，公约将有助于解决我们所有人都面临的水挑战。


But will it?	但这可能吗？


An ambitious agenda should be adopted now, at a time when the international community is negotiating the contents of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the successor to the UN Millennium Development Goals, which will expire in 2015.	眼下，在国际社会讨论联合国千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals，将于2015年到期）的后续项目——可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals）时，就应该采取一个雄心勃勃的日程。


We at Green Cross hope that the new goals, which are to be achieved by 2030, will include a stand-alone target that addresses water-resources management.	我们绿十字组织（Green Cross）希望新的2030年目标能包含解决淡水管理问题的独立目标。


Moreover, the international community will soon have to agree on a climate-change framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol.	此外，国际社会必须很快形成取代京都议定书（Kyoto Protocol）的气候变化框架。


Climate change directly affects the hydrological cycle, which means that all of the efforts that are undertaken to contain greenhouse-gas emissions will help to stabilize rainfall patterns and mitigate the extreme water events that so many regions are already experiencing.	气候变化直接影响水循环，这意味着所有为遏制温室气体排放的措施都有助于稳定降水模式、减轻许多地区已开始经历的极端水事件。


But the UN Watercourses Convention’s entry into force raises as many new questions as existed in the period before its ratification.	但联合国水道公约生效所引发的新问题不少于生效前。


What will its implementation mean in practice?	该公约的实施有何实际意义？


How will countries apply its mandates within their borders and in relation to riparian neighbors?	各国如何在国内以及针对隔河相望的邻国行使其权力？


How will the American and Asian countries that have largely ignored ratification respond?	大多对该公约生效视而不见的美洲和亚洲国家会如何应对？


Furthermore, how will the convention relate to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, which is already in force in most European and Central Asian countries and, since February 2013, has aimed to open its membership to the rest of the world?	此外，该公约如何与保护和使用跨国水道和国际湖泊公约（Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes，该公约已于2013年2月起在大部分欧洲和中亚国家生效，并希望将其成员国扩大到全世界）对接？


Similarly, how will the convention’s implementation affect existing regional and local cross-border freshwater agreements?	类似地，该公约的实施将如何影响现有地区和地方跨国淡水水域协定？


The countries that ratified the UN Watercourses Convention are expected to engage in its implementation and to go further in their efforts to protect and sustainably use their cross-border waters.	在联合国水道公约上签字的国家预计将参与到公约的实施，并将更进一步地保护和可持续地使用跨国水资源。


What instruments, including financial, will the convention provide to them?	公约能够为它们提供怎样的工具（包括金融工具）？


Several legal instruments can be implemented jointly and synergistically: the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, to name just a few.	一些法律工具已得到联合协同地实施，如拉姆萨尔湿地公约（Ramsar Convention on Wetlands）、联合国防治沙漠化公约（Convention to Combat Desertification）和联合国气候变化框架公约（Framework Convention on Climate Change）等。


The UN Watercourses Convention’s long-delayed enactment should be viewed as an opportunity for signatory states to encourage those that are not yet party to cooperative agreements to work seriously on these issues.	姗姗来迟的联合国水道公约的实施应该被视为一次良机，签字国可以利用它来鼓励尚未加入合作协议的国家认真对待这一问题。


Clearly, politicians and diplomats alone cannot respond effectively to the challenges that the world faces.	显然，光靠政治家和外交家是无法有效应对世界所面临的挑战的。


What the world needs is the engagement of political, business, and civil-society leaders; effective implementation of the UN Watercourses Convention is impossible without it.	因此，世界需要政治、商业和公民社会领袖的参与； 没有他们的参与，联合国水道公约就得不到有效实施。


This is too often overlooked, but it constitutes the key to the long-term success of cooperation that generates benefits for all.	这一点常常被忽视，但它构成了能让所有人共赢的合作的长期成功的关键。


Inclusive participation by stakeholders (including the affected communities), and the development of the capacity to identify, value, and share the benefits of cross-border water resources, should be an integral part of any strategy to achieve effective multilateral collaboration.	相关利益方（包括受影响社区）的包容性参与，以及识别、评估和共享跨国水资源好处的能力的发展，应该成为任何旨在实现有效多边合作的战略的重要组成部分。


Milosevic’s Trial Was Not in Vain	审判米洛塞维奇并非徒劳


Slobodan Milosevic cheated justice, and by doing so demonstrated the futility of attempting to deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity through international prosecutions.	米洛塞维奇欺骗了司法审判，而且通过这样做表明，试图通过国际公审来对付战争罪以及反人类罪是徒劳无功的。


That, at least, is the conclusion that some people have reached after Milosevic’s death in a Hague prison: the fact that he was able to drag out his trial for four years and still escape a verdict is considered proof that the international community is wasting its resources by putting such people on trial for their misdeeds.	米洛塞维奇死于海牙的监狱之中之后，某些人得出至少这样的结论说：他能够挺过对他的审判长达四年之久，而且依然能够逃避判决这一事实就足以证明，国际社会把这些人因其所犯罪行送交审判是在枉费资源。


Even the most dedicated partisans of international justice concede that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has had many shortcomings.	即使是国际司法最忠实的拥护者也不得不承认前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭有许多缺陷。


All those associated with it were new to such proceedings, and had to learn on the job, as there had been no such bodies since the courts at Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II.	由于在二战后的纽伦堡和东京法庭之后就再也没有这样的机构了，因此，这一法庭的所有人员都是这一司法程序的新手，他们不得不边干边学。


Moreover, the post-WWII bodies were tribunals in which the war’s victors judged the losers, and those prosecuted were already in custody.	而且，二战后的法庭是战争胜利者审判战败者的法庭，而且那些遭到起诉的人已经被拘押。


The ICTY, by contrast, has no capacity of its own to arrest defendants.	与此相反的是，前南国际刑事法庭却没有能力自己来逮捕被告。


It must rely on persuasion to secure cooperation by others – cooperation that is still being withheld in the case of the two most notorious defendants from the Bosnian War, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic..	它必须依赖于说服手段来确保其他方面的合作，而在有关波斯尼亚战争两个最为臭名昭著的的被告，即卡拉季奇和姆拉季奇的问题上，其他各方仍旧不予以合作。


Until Tony Blair and Robin Cook became, respectively, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in 1997, four years after the ICTY was established, NATO troops in Bosnia failed to arrest indicted suspects even when they ran into them.	在波斯尼亚的北约部队即使撞见了受到起诉的嫌疑犯都一直没有将他们逮捕，直到1997年布莱尔和库克分别担任英国首相和外相、前南国际刑事法庭建立四年之后局面才有所改变。


By now, of course, 133 defendants from all parties to the wars in ex-Yugoslavia have appeared before the Tribunal, charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide.	当然，到目前为止，前南斯拉夫战争各方的133名被告都已经出庭，他们被控犯有战争罪、反人类罪甚至是种族屠杀。


These are highly complex cases, frequently involving not only novel issues under international law, but also thousands of witnesses – often traumatized by their suffering – dispersed to many lands, the constant need for high-quality simultaneous translations, and disruptive tactics by some defendants.	这些都是极为复杂的案件，不仅经常包含国际法中的新兴事务，而且还有数以万计饱受痛苦折磨、流离失所的证人，对高质量同传翻译的需求，以及某些被告的破坏性伎俩。


Yet the proceedings against 85 of them, including appeals, have been completed.	但是，对其中85人包括上诉在内的审判程序已经完成。


In trying them, the ICTY has been a model of fairness at all times.	前南国际刑事法庭的审判堪称公平的典范，名垂青史。


The mountains of evidence in its records make the horrendous crimes committed in the wars in ex-Yugoslavia comparable in the extent of their documentation to those by the Nazis.	大量证据表明，在前南斯拉夫所犯下的骇人听闻的罪行足以同纳粹所犯罪行相提并论。


Inevitable efforts by demagogues to revise the history of what took place in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990’s will be complicated by the availability of that evidence, including the facts compiled during the Milosevic trial.	那些蛊惑人心的政客毫无疑问会尽力重写发生在二十世纪九十年代前南斯拉夫的历史。 这些证据，包括在审判米洛塞维奇期间所整理的事实将会让这些企图难以得逞。


Far from being a failure, the ICTY has inspired the establishment of several other such courts, including those for Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and the permanent International Criminal Court.	前南国际刑事法庭不仅不是一个失败，而是激发人们建立其他类似的法庭，包括针对卢旺达、塞拉利昂、柬埔寨的法庭以及常设国际刑事法庭。


Even heads of state have not escaped these bodies.	即使是国家元首也没能逃脱这些机构的审判。


Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia, and then Serbia, died in prison.	米洛塞维奇是南斯拉夫以及随后的塞尔维亚前总统，他死于狱中。


Biljana Plavsic, the President of the Bosnian Serb Republic after Karadzic, expressed remorse for her crimes, pled guilty, and is serving a prison sentence.	在卡拉季奇之后担任波斯尼亚塞尔维亚共和国总统的普拉夫希奇表达了她的忏悔并且认罪，目前正在服刑。


Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, pled guilty to crimes against humanity and genocide and is serving a life sentence in prison.	卢旺达前总理坎班达对反人类罪以及种族屠杀表示认罪，目前在狱中服终身监禁。


We are thus slowly reaching the point where some of those contemplating crimes such as those committed by Slobodan Milosevic must recognize that one day they could be held accountable.	如此，某些妄想类似米洛塞维奇一样所犯罪行的人必须认识到，总有一天他们会受到审判。 这一天已经为期不远了。


Charles Taylor was President of Liberia when the Tribunal for Sierra Leone indicted him.	塞拉利昂国际法庭起诉泰勒之时，他还是利比里亚总统。


He had to flee his country, paving the way for the democratic transition that resulted in the recent election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.	他不得不逃离祖国，因而为民主进程铺平了道路，而瑟里夫因此而在最近当选为总统。


Taylor still faces the prospect of trial and, another former dictator, Saddam Hussein, is now on trial before a national court in Iraq.	泰勒依旧面临审判，而另一个前独裁者萨达姆·侯赛因则在伊拉克的国家法庭中接受审判。


Persisting on the path of international justice will continue to require substantial resources.	坚持国际司法之路就会继续要求提供实质性的资源。


Great as they are, the costs are trivial in comparison to the expense of humanitarian aid, international military intervention, and reconstruction assistance.	尽管这些要求很高，但是同人道主义援助、国际军事干预以及重建援助相比，它们就微不足道了。


Most important, of course, is the need to prevent the suffering caused by the crimes that lead to international prosecutions; and when those crimes cannot be prevented, we must provide some comfort and redress to the victims and their families by doing justice.	当然，最为重要的是要预防导致国际公审的犯罪所造成的人们的痛苦； 而且，在无法预防这些犯罪的时候，我们必须通过伸张正义来为受害者及其家属提供某些慰藉和补偿。


Of course, the slow, tortuous process of international justice is often frustrating to the victims.	当然，国际司法进程缓慢而且折磨人，经常令受害者垂头丧气。


But it would be worse if those responsible for great crimes got away with it, as happened all too often in the past.	但是，如果对巨大罪行承担责任的人经常像以往那样逍遥法外，情况就会更糟。


In the wake of Milosevic’s death, Karadzic and Mladic should be brought before the ICTY, both to reinforce its work and to demonstrate to their victims that the international community is resolved not to allow their suffering to be forgotten.	米洛塞维奇死后，卡拉季奇以及姆拉季奇都应该送交前南国际刑事法庭，这样做不仅会加强其工作，而且向他们的受害者表明，国际社会决心不让他们的痛苦被人遗忘。


The ICTY’s mission is as valid and as vital as ever: to show that the era of impunity for some of humanity’s worst crimes is coming to an end.	前南国际刑事法庭的使命一如既往，是有效和重要的。 那就是表明，犯下人类社会中最严重的罪行后可以逍遥法外的时代正在终结。


Mind the Neighbors	注意邻居


PRINCETON – The conventional wisdom last week on whether Syria would comply with former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s ceasefire plan was that it was up to Russia.	普林斯顿—关于上周叙利亚会不会遵守前联合国秘书长安南的停火计划这一问题，传统智慧认为答案取决于俄罗斯。


We were reverting to Cold War politics, in which the West was unwilling to use force and Russia was willing to keep arming and supporting its client.	我们正在回归冷战政治，西方不愿使用武力，而俄罗斯愿意为其客户提供武装和支持。


Thus, Russia held the trump card: the choice of how much pressure it was willing to put on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to comply with the plan.	于是，王牌落到了俄罗斯手里：施加多少压力给叙利亚总理巴沙尔让他遵守安南的计划完全取决于俄罗斯的意愿。


If this view were correct, Iran would surely be holding an equally powerful hand.	如果这一看法正确，则伊朗手里也握有同样的王牌。


Annan, after all, traveled to Tehran as well.	毕竟，安南也去了德黑兰。


Traditional balance-of-power geopolitics, it seems, is alive and well.	传统实力平衡地缘政治似乎活力依旧。


But this is, at best, a partial view that obscures as much as it reveals.	但这说到底只算得上片面的观点，揭开了盖头的一半，却盖住了另一半。


In particular, it misses the crucial and growing importance of regional politics and institutions.	特别是，这一观点没有看到地区政治和制度日益增加的关键作用。


A longer-term resolution of the Syrian crisis depends as much on Turkey and the Arab League as it does on the United States, Europe, and Russia.	叙利亚危机的长期解决取决于美国、欧洲和俄罗斯，同样取决于土耳其和阿拉伯联盟。


Consider what else happened last week: Turkey’s government made clear that it would turn to new measures if Annan’s plan does not produce results.	想想上周所发生的其他事情：土耳其政府明确表明，如果安南的计划不能收到成效，它将采取新的措施。


Turkish officials have been issuing similar proclamations for months, but now Syrian troops have fired into Turkey, chasing Free Syrian Army rebels who fled across the border, while the number of Syrian civilian refugees has increased sharply.	土耳其官员如是宣称已经有好几个月了，但现在，随着叙利亚军队追剿逃过边境的自由叙利亚军（Free Syrian Army）起义者，枪炮已经打到了土耳其的领土上，叙利亚难民数量也在剧增。


Last week, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan raised the stakes dramatically with talk of having “many options,” and by adding: “Also, NATO has responsibilities to do with Turkey’s borders, according to Article 5.”	上周，土耳其总理埃尔多安口气硬了很多，说土耳其有“多种选择”，还说“此外，根据第五条，北约有责任与土耳其并肩作战。 ”


Article 5 of the NATO treaty stipulates that an attack on one NATO member is to be considered an attack on all, and that all will come to the member’s aid.	北约条约第五条规定，对某一成员国的攻击视为对北约全体的攻击，所有成员国都会出手相助。


Of course, other NATO members could disagree that Syria has in fact attacked Turkey, but if Turkey were to invoke Article 5, a refusal to offer assistance could have unpleasant consequences for the alliance as a whole.	当然，其他北约成员国可以拒绝承认叙利亚真的袭击了土耳其，但如果土耳其诉诸第五条，拒绝出手相助将对整个联盟产生不利后果。


And Assad knows full well that it will be impossible to avoid further border incidents unless he is prepared to allow the Free Syrian Army to use Turkey as a safe zone.	而巴沙尔也心知肚明，除非他放任自由叙利亚军利用土耳其作为安全区，否则边境事件将是不可避免的。


The significance of Article 5 is that if a credible case can be made that Turkey and its allies are acting in self-defense, they do not need to seek the UN Security Council’s approval.	第五条的重要性在于，如果土耳其及其盟友能够提出可信的依据证明其行动为自卫行为，那么可以不必寻求联合国安理会批准。


That makes Erdoğan’s suggestion a game-changer, forcing Assad to reckon with the prospect of a de facto militarily-enforced safe zone for the civilian opposition.	这意味着埃尔多安的表态有改变全局之效，迫使巴沙尔认真考虑起义者事实上的军事强化安全区这一情景。


The deeper point here is that regional organizations, including NATO, provide the first level of legality and legitimacy required for a successful use of force.	这里有一个深层次的问题，地区组织，包括北约在内，提供的是成功使用武力的第一层次的合法性和合理性。


The US would not have supported intervention in Libya if the Arab League had not supported a no-fly zone and been willing to go to the UN on that basis.	如果阿盟当初不支持建立禁飞区并对此在联合国投赞成票，美国根本不会支持干预叙利亚。


Indeed, assuming that Assad does not start bulldozing entire cities, I cannot imagine any circumstances under which the US would support even limited military intervention in Syria without public approval by the Arab League and Turkey.	事实上，假设巴沙尔不会将各城市整个夷为平地，我无法想象美国会在阿盟和土耳其不点头的情况下支持哪怕是有限的军事干预叙利亚。


That is why we have seen a game of “after you” with respect to Syria, with the Turks saying that they need Western support, the US saying that it needs regional support, and both saying that they need UN support.	这就是我们在叙利亚问题上看到一个“你先动”博弈的原因，土耳其说它需要西方支持，美国说它需要该地区支持，而土美均说它们需要联合国支持。


Looking beyond the Middle East, Africa provides the best evidence for a geopolitics based as much on regional powers and institutions as on traditional great powers.	放眼中东之外，非洲提供了一个很好的既基于传统大国又基于地区势力的地缘政治例证。


While Annan has been trying his diplomatic best to resolve Syria’s crisis, upheavals in Senegal, Mali, Malawi, and Guinea-Bissau have been swiftly addressed by other regional powers.	在安南正在竭尽全力用其外交技巧解决叙利亚危机时，塞内加尔、马里、马拉维和几内亚比绍等国的动荡被该地区的其他力量快刀斩乱麻地解决了。


In particular, the African Union (AU) has acted repeatedly in the name of enforcing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.	特别是，非盟以捍卫非洲民主、选举和治理宪章（African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance）的名义多次出手。


In Senegal, simmering violence accompanied recent elections in which President Abdoulaye Wade was allowed to stand for an unprecedented third term.	在塞内加尔，总统韦德（Abdoulaye Wade）史无前例地获准参与竞选第三度总统连任，这引发了暴力冲突。


The first round forced Wade into a run-off with Macky Sall, at which point the AU promptly sent an Elections Observer Mission, drawn from 18 African countries, to assess whether the elections were legal and the results “reflected the will of the Senegalese people.”	第一轮选举迫使韦德进入与萨尔（Macky Sall）的决胜，此时非盟当机立断，派遣由18个非洲国家的代表组成的选举观察团（Elections Observer Mission）评估塞内加尔大选是否合法、其结果是否“反映了塞内加尔人民的意愿”。


We cannot be sure what impact the mission had on Wade’s ultimate decision to concede defeat to Sall, but knowing that the region was watching must have focused his mind.	我们无法确定选举观察团在韦德最终承认败于萨尔的结果中起到了什么作用，但知道选举正在接受地区监督一定集中了他的精力。


The situation in Mali is more complicated, for it involves an ongoing secessionist movement, as well as a coup on March 21.	马里的情况更加复杂，该国一直存在分裂运动，终于在3月21日发生了政变。


But, after the coup the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), backed by the UN, immediately suspended Mali’s membership in the AU, imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on the country, and placed travel restrictions on coup leaders.	但是，政变发生后，非盟和西非国家经济共同体（Economic Community of West African States，受联合国支持）立刻中止了马里的成员资格，对其进行了经济和外交制裁，并限制政变领导人的出行。


Just over two weeks later, ECOWAS announced that it had reached an agreement with the coup leaders to return the government to civilian rule in exchange for lifting the sanctions.	区区两周后，西非国家经济共同体就宣布它与政变领导人达成了一致，马里恢复文官政府，以换取去取消制裁。


Likewise, AU President Jean Ping condemned a coup in Guinea-Bissau in early April immediately and in the strongest terms.	类似地，今年4月初，非盟主席让·平（Jean Ping）用最强硬的口气批评了几内亚比绍的政变。


Those who interpret all moves on the international stage in terms of states’ eternal jockeying for power and prestige will never lack for evidence.	在一些人看来，国际舞台上的动作永远无一例外地是某些国家在谋取权力和特权。 他们可以拿出数不胜数的例子。


The way in which the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is playing out in Syria is a prominent example.	沙特-伊朗矛盾在叙利亚危机中的演绎就是显例。


But countries’ desire to stop mass murder in their neighborhood, or to enforce regional norms, has its own force.	但各国希望邻国停止大屠杀或强化地区秩序自有其道理。


Increasingly, when a regional institution will not act, powers from outside the region find it difficult to intervene.	当某地区的机构不作为的时候，让地区外力量进行干预变得越来越困难了。


And, when a region does unite on a course of action, intervention by outside powers becomes either less necessary or more effective.	此外，当某地区真的组织起联合行动的时候，地区外力量的干预将要么不再不必可少，要么效率更高。


China’s Measured Embrace of India	中国慎重拥抱印度


BEIJING – Chinese President Xi Jinping’s three-day visit to India, the main leg of a recent tour of Central and South Asia, sheds new light on China’s emerging approach to its neighbors, particularly Asia’s other giant.	北京—中国国家主席习近平为期三天的印度之旅是他中亚和南亚巡访的最重要一站，这次访问让人们能够了解中国对邻国特别是亚洲其他大国的新方针。


Recent subtle changes in Sino-Indian relations could prove to be enormously consequential for the world in the coming decades.	近期中印关系的微妙变化可能会在未来几十年中给全世界造成重大影响。


Under Xi, China is adopting a new grand strategy which can be called “dual rebalancing”: implementing bold domestic reforms to regain economic momentum while overhauling China’s global posture and diplomacy, focusing on sources of risk in its near abroad.	在习近平领导下，中国采取了全新的战略，可称之为“双再平衡”：实施果断的国内改革重新赢得经济动能，同时大幅改变中国的全球立场和外交，专注于周边风险源。


The Silk Road Economic Belt, which is focused on Central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which concentrates on the countries bordering the Indian Ocean’s shipping lanes, are leading initiatives on China’s foreign-policy agenda.	以中亚为目标的丝绸之路经济带和以印度洋航路周边国家为目标的21世纪海上丝绸之路是中国外交政策日程的重点。


Their success will depend, in large part, on whether China gets support from other great powers, specifically Russia in Central Asia and India in South Asia.	它们的成功很大程度上取决于中国是否能够获得其他大国——即中亚的俄罗斯和南亚的印度的支持。


China understands that India’s position on the world stage has been strengthening since the beginning of this century.	中国知道，印度的世界地位自本世纪开始以来节节上升。


India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, an aspirational and authoritative leader from Gujarat, one of the country’s most developed states, has promised to bring India’s economy out of a half-decade funk, enhance the living standards of his country’s have-nots, and boost the country’s standing as a global power.	印度新总理纳兰德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）是一位来自印度最发达邦之一——古吉拉特邦的有雄心也有权威的领导人，他承诺将印度经济带出五年来的踯躅不前，提高印度无产阶级的生活水平，增强印度作为全球强国的地位。


The trick for Chinese policy is to reconcile Modi’s ambitions with China’s strategic goals.	中国的政策需要将莫迪的雄心与中国的战略目标协调起来。


Since Modi came to power, India has been basking in the adulation of major powers like Japan and the United States.	莫迪掌权以来，印度一直受到日本和美国的强国的追捧。


Partly motivated by a desire to counterbalance China’s rising geopolitical influence, Japan and the US have sought to draw India into a multilateral alliance consisting of democratic countries in the Asia-Pacific region.	部分是因为渴望制衡中国地缘政治影响力的增加，日本和美国决定将印度纳入由亚太地区民主国家组成的多边联盟。


Indeed, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed to forge a “democratic security diamond” with the US, Australia, and India.	事实上，日本首相安倍晋三信誓旦旦地要与美国、澳大利亚和印度打造“民主安全菱形”。


During Modi’s visit to Japan in early September, Abe offered to invest $35 billion in Indian infrastructure projects over five years, accelerate negotiations on civil nuclear deals, and boost bilateral maritime security cooperation.	9上旬，在莫迪访日期间，安倍提出五年内在印度投资350亿美元用于基础设施项目、加速民用核协议谈判以及进行双边海洋安全合作。


The two sides agreed to build up a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” leaving Chinese strategists to wrestle with the implications of deeper India-Japan ties.	印日双方同意成立“战略和全球特别伙伴关系”（Special Strategic and Global Partnership），让中国战略家去应对印日关系深入所造成的挑战。


Likewise, despite an on-again off-again relationship with India since Bill Clinton’s presidency, the US continues to view the country as a “natural ally.”	类似地，尽管自比尔·克林顿以来，印美关系一直在起起伏伏，但美国仍把印度视为“天然盟友”。


US cabinet members – Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel – both visited India in recent months to try and woo Modi by promising improved economic and strategic ties.	最近几个月来，美国内阁成员——国务卿约翰·克里（John Kerry）和国防部长查克·哈格尔（Chuck Hagel）纷纷访问印度，试图以承诺改善经济和战略关系打动莫迪。


In the last three years, the US has surpassed Russia as India’s largest arms supplier.	在过去三年中，美国超过俄罗斯成为印度最大武器供应国。


Modi’s government is desperate to diversity its sources of advanced weapons and become self-reliant in defense production.	莫迪政府渴望实现先进武器来源多元化、在国防产品领域实现自力更生。


Barack Obama’s administration is now expected to do whatever it can to strengthen relations with India during Modi’s upcoming visit to Washington.	如今，预计奥巴马政府将竭尽全力在莫迪即将到来的华盛顿之旅中加强印美关系。


As Nicholas Burns, a former under-secretary of state, has argued, US strategic interests in the century ahead will align more closely with India’s than with those of any other continental Asian power, making India central to America’s strategic rebalancing toward Asia.	前副国务卿尼古拉斯·伯恩斯（Nicholas Burns）指出，美国在本世纪的战略利益与印度的联系胜过其他仍和亚洲大陆强国，这使得印度成为美国偏向亚洲的战略性再平衡的核心。


Xi is confident that China can understand and satisfy many of Modi’s needs better than regional rivals like Japan.	习近平有信心中国能够比日本等地区对手更加理解和满足莫迪的需要。


But China should not underestimate India’s determination to uphold its strategic autonomy in Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.	但中国不应该低估印度掌握其在变化的亚洲地缘政治局势中的战略主动权的决心。


During Xi’s visit, the two leaders signed 15 agreements in the fields of trade, finance, and culture.	习近平访印期间，两位领导人在贸易、金融和文化领域签署了15项协议。


Xi committed China to invest $20 billion in India over the next five years, particularly to modernize India’s decrepit and overused railway system.	习近平承诺，未来五年中国将向印度投资200亿美元，特别是在帮助印度实现破旧过时的铁路系统方面。


This compares with just $400 million, or 0.18% of India’s inward foreign investment, in Chinese investment from 2000 to 2014.	与此形成对比的是，2000—2014年，中国对印投资只有4亿美元，占印度流入外国投资的0. 18%。


China also promised to establish two industrial parks, in Gujarat and Maharashtra, as well as provide greater market access to Indian products, in an effort to allay India’s worries over the widening bilateral trade deficit, which has soared from $1 billion in 2001 to more than $40 billion today.	中国还承���在古吉拉特邦和马哈拉施特拉邦建设两个工业园，并为印度产品提供更大的市场准入，以此安抚印度队双边贸易赤字扩大的担忧。 印度对中国贸易赤字从2001年的10亿美元增加到如今的400亿美元。


Modi’s efforts to revive market-oriented reform and improve the country’s business environment will help to attract Chinese corporations eager to capitalize on India’s vast labor force, varied skill base, and geographical advantages.	莫迪试图重振市场改革、改善印度的商业环境，这将有助于吸引渴望利用印度巨大的劳动力资源、多元的技能基础和地理优势的中国企业。


In addition, China wants to strengthen cooperation with India in regional and global affairs.	此外，中国希望与印度加强在地区和全球事务方面的合作。


India is likely soon to gain full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the club of Central Asian and Asian states formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union.	印度可能很快就能成为上海合作组织（苏联解体后形成的中亚国家和亚洲国家组成的俱乐部）成员国。


India’s “Connect Central Asia policy,” and its efforts to build a North-South Transit Corridor, would benefit development in Central Asia, a region of major concern to China, because it abuts the restless Chinese province of Xinjiang.	印度的“联系中亚政策”（Connect Central Asia policy）以及建设南北交通走（North-South Transit Corridor）廊的努力将有助于中亚的发展，而中亚因为毗邻躁动不安的新疆，也是中国的一个重大关切点。


As major aid providers and investors in Afghanistan, China and India also have common interests in stabilizing that country, and countering religious extremism and terrorism after NATO troops leave.	作为阿富汗的主要援助提供者和投资者，中国和印度在稳定阿富汗、制约北约军队撤出后留下的宗教极端主义和恐怖主义方面也具有共同利益。


Moreover, the two countries share similar interests in reshaping global economic governance, particularly by further strengthening cooperation among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and ensuring that climate change is addressed in a way that does not impede growth.	此外，两国在变革经济治理，特别是进一步深化金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）之间的合作、确保气候变化能在不影响增长的前提下得到解决等方面也具有相近的利益。


But India’s lingering bitterness over the 1962 war with China remains.	但印度仍没有摆脱1962年与中国开战留下的阴影。


On many occasions, Modi has voiced suspicions about China’s growing footprint in disputed border areas.	莫迪曾多次质疑中国在争议边界地区活动日益频繁。


India’s sensitivity to potential Chinese encirclement is similar to China’s fears of encirclement by the US and its allies.	印度对可能被中国包围十分敏感，正如中国担心被美国及其盟国包围。


That is why China is unlikely to develop its relations with India and Pakistan (with which China still values its all-weather partnership) on separate tracks, as the US did during the Bush administration.	正因如此，中国不可能向布什执政时期的美国那样区别发展与印度和巴基斯坦（中国仍将其视为全天候伙伴）关系。


Xi’s visit to India strongly suggests that China is determined to engage with Modi in ways that are intended to inhibit the bilateral rivalry from intensifying.	习近平的印度之旅强烈表明，中国与莫迪打交道绝不会以恶化双边对立的方式进行。


But, despite Xi’s investment pledges, it is far from certain that Asia’s two giants, both with growing global aspirations, can bridge the differences that continue to burden their relationship.	但是，尽管习近平做出了投资承诺，但两个怀揣全球雄心的亚洲大国是否能够克服仍然影响两国关系的差异还远未可知。


China’s Arab March	中国的阿拉伯长征


BEIJING – The growing bloodshed in Iraq and Syria is being watched as keenly in China as anywhere else in the world.	北京—伊拉克和叙利亚的流血日益升级，中国与世界其他国家一样对此十分关切。


Indeed, the greater Middle East is becoming an ever greater focus of Chinese foreign policy.	事实上，大中东正在成为也来越重要的中国外交政策重点。


At the just-concluded sixth ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, held in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping called upon his Arab counterparts to upgrade their strategic relationships with China, by deepening bilateral cooperation in areas ranging from finance and energy to space technology.	而刚刚结束的北京中阿合作论坛第六届部长级会议上，中国国家主席习近平建议阿拉伯国家升级其与中国的战略关系，深化从金融和能源到空间技术等领域的双边合作。


This reflects China’s broader goal – established partly in response to America’s “pivot” toward Asia – of rebalancing its strategic focus westward, with an emphasis on the Arab world.	这反映出中国更大的目标——这一目标部分是为了应对美国的亚洲“支点”政策——战略焦点向西倾斜的再平衡，以阿拉伯世界为重点。


Of course, economic ties between China and Arab countries have been growing stronger for more than a decade, with the trade volume increasing from $25.5 billion in 2004 to $238.9 billion in 2013.	当然，中国与阿拉伯国家的经济关系十多年来一直在加强，贸易额从2004年的255亿美元增加到2013年的2,389亿美元。


China is now the Arab world’s second-largest trading partner, and the largest trading partner for nine Arab countries.	如今，中国是阿拉伯世界第二大贸易伙伴，也是九个阿拉伯国家最大的贸易伙伴。


Within ten years, the volume of China-Arab trade is expected to reach $600 billion.	不出十年，中阿贸易额预计将达6,000亿美元。


Engineering contracts and investment have also enhanced ties.	工程合同和投资也有助于加强合作。


Under Xi’s leadership, China is attempting to reshape its relationships with Arab countries according to its new “march west” strategic framework.	在习主席的领导下，中国正在试图根据其新的“西进”（march west）战略框架改变与阿拉伯国家的关系。


The most notable component of this strategy is the “Silk Road economic belt,” which is to run along the ancient Central Asian Silk Road and the modern maritime Silk Road – an initiative that Xi promoted heavily at the recent meeting in Beijing.	这一战略最引人瞩目的部分是沿古代中亚丝绸之路和现代海上丝绸之路而进的“丝绸之路经济带”——习主席在最近的北京会议上着重强调了这一计划。


This effort highlights China’s goal of establishing hub-and-spoke relationships with key developing economies around it.	这一计划凸显出中国意在与周边发展中经济体建立中心辐射型关系。


To this end, Prime Minister Li Keqiang has proposed an economic corridor linking China to Pakistan, and has spoken of other corridors running through Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar.	在这方面，李克强总理提出了连接中国和巴基斯坦的经济走廊，并谈到了穿越孟加拉国、印度和缅甸的走廊。


Unsurprisingly, energy has been a key factor in economic ties with the Arab world.	毫不奇怪，能源是与阿拉伯世界经济关系的重要因素。


From 2004 to 2013, China’s crude oil imports from Arab countries grew by more than 12% annually, on average, reaching 133 million tons per year.	从2004年到2013年，中国从阿拉伯国家的能源进口平均每年增加12%，达到每年1. 33亿吨。


And China’s “march west” strategy furthers its goal of safeguarding access to these resources.	中国的“西进”战略进一步深化了保护这些能源来源的目标。


As the director of the State Council’s Development Research Center, Li Wei, pointed out in February, at the current rate, China will be consuming 800 million tons of oil annually, and importing 75% of its petroleum, by 2030.	国家发改委研究中心李铁在2月份指出，按照当前速度，到2030年，中国每年将消费8亿吨石油，75%的石油需要进口。


In this sense, China’s trajectory contrasts sharply with that of the United States, where the rapid growth in output of shale oil and gas, together with energy-saving measures, has brought energy independence closer than ever – a point that President Barack Obama emphasized in his most recent State of the Union address.	从这个角度看，中国的轨迹与美国形成了鲜明反差。 拜页岩油气产量快速增长以及节能措施所赐，美国比以往任何时候都要接近能源自给——美国总统奥巴马在其最新国情咨文中也强调了这一点。


In fact, according to the US Energy Information Administration, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest net oil importer earlier this year.	事实上，根据美国能源信息署的数字，今年早些时候中国已超过美国成为世界第一大石油净进口国。


Moreover, the US is gradually disengaging strategically from the greater Middle East, creating a vacuum that China seeks to fill.	此外，美国正在从战略上逐渐远离大中东，这位中国创造了能够填补的真空。 要想获得成功，中国更加关注该地区的复杂动态；


To succeed, China will need to become more attentive to the region’s complex dynamics; find creative ways to participate in conflict-resolution efforts; and respond enthusiastically to Middle Eastern governments’ growing desire to connect to Asia.	寻找参与冲突解决方案的办法； 并热情地响应中东各国政府日益增长的与亚洲的联系渴望。


Doing so would enable China’s leaders to advance their goal of developing the country’s vast inland regions. Specifically, western provinces like Ningxia and Qinghai, which have substantial Muslim communities, could benefit from deeper links with Arab economies.	这能让中国领导人推进开发中国广袤内陆地区的目标，具体而言，新疆和青海等拥有众多穆斯林人口的西部省份能够从深化与阿拉伯经济的联系中获益。


Enhanced influence in the Arab world would also promote the perception of China as a leader of the developing world – a position that could boost China’s strategic and economic resilience considerably.	加强在阿拉伯世界的影响力也有助于促进中国在发展中世界的领导形象——这一地位能够极大地增进中国的战略和经济恢复力。


For starters, it would enable China to capitalize on the demographic heft of the developing world, which will house more than 80% of the world’s population in 2020.	首先，这能让中国利用发展中国家的人口优势——到2020年，发展中国家人口将占世界总人口的80%以上。


Moreover, it would allow China to maximize its gains from burgeoning trade among developing economies, which surged from 8% of global trade in 1990 to 24% in 2011.	此外，这将让中国尽可能低从发展中国家贸易中获得最大的好处——发展中国家间贸易占全球贸易之比从1990年的8%增加到2011年的24%。


To be sure, not all Arab governments are welcoming China with open arms.	诚然，并非所有阿拉伯政府张开双臂欢迎中国。


Indeed, many of the Middle East’s most powerful actors – including Turkey and Saudi Arabia – are suspicious of China’s long-term intentions.	事实上，许多中东最强大的行动方——包括土耳其和沙特阿拉伯——都对中国的长期意图表示怀疑。


But China can take steps to gain these countries’ trust.	但中国能够采取行动获得这些国家的信任。


For example, China’s leaders should work to address the unrest in the Muslim-dominated province of Xinjiang more effectively.	比如，中国领导人应该致力于更有效地解决穆斯林占主导地位的新疆自治区的动荡。


Clearly, China’s rising clout is no longer confined to Asia.	显然，中国实力的崛起已不再局限于亚洲。


China’s “march west” into the Arab world is a bold effort to translate its economic might into enduring regional – and, ultimately, global – influence.	中国向阿拉伯世界的“西进”是一项大胆措施，目标是将其经济实力转化为持续的地区影响力，最终形成全球影响力。


This is a daunting task, but it is one that can not only help to secure China’s long-term future, but perhaps bring greater weight to bear in resolving the region’s immense challenges.	这是一个艰巨的任务，但这个任务不仅有助于确保中国的长期未来，或许也有助于解决阿拉伯地区的巨大挑战。


Hunting Tigers in China	中国打老虎


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – In the boldest move yet since President Xi Jinping launched his anti-corruption campaign, China has announced the start of a formal investigation into “serious disciplinary violations” by one of the Chinese Communist Party’s most senior figures, Zhou Yongkang.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—中国国家主席习近平所发起的反腐风暴实施了迄今为止最大的动作，宣布将开始对中共最高级官员之一周永康的“严重危机”进行正是调查。


Though rumors of Zhou’s political demise had been circulating for nearly a year, anyone familiar with Chinese political intrigue knew that, until the CCP made it official, Zhou’s many powerful patrons and cronies could still save him.	尽管关于周永康政治失势的传闻流传已近一年之久，但任何熟悉中国政治权谋的人都知道，在中共正式公布前，周永康的众多强力保护人和紧密盟友仍能够挽救他。


Now it is official: a “mega-tiger” has been brought down.	现在，消息被正式公布了：一只“打老虎”被打倒了。


But is that what China really needs?	但这真是中国真正需要的吗？


Since 2012, when Xi began “hunting tigers,” as he put it, three dozen government ministers, provincial governors, and other high-level officials have fallen into his net.	自2012年习近平开始提出“打老虎”以来，三十多名政府部长、省级官员和其他高官落马。


But Zhou is no ordinary tiger.	但周永康不是一般的老虎。


A former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP’s top decision-making body, Zhou was considered untouchable.	他是中共最高决策机构中央政治局的前常委，曾被认为拥有免罪金身。


Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has adhered to the implicit rule that members of the Politburo Standing Committee, sitting or retired, enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution.	自文化大革命以来，中共一直遵循一条不成文的规矩，政治局常委，不管在任还是退休，都可以获得刑事豁免权。


Some have, of course, been purged in power struggles, such as the one that led to the fall of Hua Guofeng, Mao’s immediate successor, in the early 1980s.	当然，其中一些在政治斗争中遭到清洗，如20世纪80年代早期毛泽东的指定继承人华国锋。


But the defeated have typically retired quietly, and never faced formal corruption charges.	但即使在政治斗争中败北，仍可以静悄悄地退休，并且不会面临证实腐败指控。


Given this history, the prosecution of Zhou is a watershed event – far more significant than the riveting trial of the disgraced former Chongqing Communist Party Secretary Bo Xilai a year ago.	从这段历史看，起诉周永康是一次分水岭式的事件——远比一年前重庆市委书记薄熙来被送上审判台更加重要。


It unambiguously demonstrates Xi’s personal authority and political resolve.	该事件明白无误地表明了习近平的个人权威和政治决心。


But the question remains: What exactly does Xi hope to achieve with China’s most fearsome anti-corruption campaign in more than three decades?	但问题依然存在：习近平希望通过三十多年来最惊心动魄的反腐运动实现什么目的？


The conventional wisdom is that the threat of prosecution serves Xi’s goals of consolidating power and compelling the bureaucracy to implement economic reforms that run counter to its interests.	传统智慧认为，起诉威胁是为习近平巩固权力、迫使官僚系统实施不符合自身利益的经济改革的目的服务的。


The two prongs of Xi’s political strategy – cleansing the Party and reinvigorating China’s economy – are thus complementary and interdependent.	因此，习近平政治战略的两大要点——清党和重振中国经济——是相辅相成的。


This strategy has considerable merit.	这一战略有其可观的长处。


But even the Machiavellian dictum that a ruler should encourage his citizens’ fear rather than their love can go only so far.	但权谋政治有其局限——统治者应该激发人民的恐惧，而不是爱戴，这一秘诀并不总是有效。


The most successful political leaders are skilled coalition-builders.	最成功的政治领袖无不长于构建联盟。


Consider Deng Xiaoping, China’s most successful reformer (the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 notwithstanding).	以中国最成功的改革家邓小平为例（尽管他也有1989年天安门大屠杀的败迹）。


The grand coalition that he forged, against all odds, upon his return to power in 1979 was essential to bringing about the economic transformation that followed.	他排除万难在1979年重掌权力后所构建的广泛联盟是随后发生的经济转型的关键。


The question today is thus not whether Xi has amassed enough authority to effect change in China (he has), but whether he has built a coalition capable of advancing his declared goal of reviving pro-market reforms.	今天的问题不在于习近平是否积累了足够的权威影响中国的变革（这方面他已经成功了），而在于他是否已经构建了一个有能力推进他的公开宣称的目标——振兴市场改革的联盟。


And, so far, the answer seems to be no.	到目前为止，答案似乎是否定的。


Since taking over the presidency, Xi’s actions have been both resolute and contradictory.	成为中国共产党总书记以来，习近平的行动既坚决又矛盾。


On one hand, he has been aggressively pursuing “tigers” and “flies” (lower-level officials), while curbing, at least temporarily, the privileges enjoyed by Chinese officials.	一方面，他积极地“打苍蝇”（较低级别官员）和“打老虎”，同时（至少是暂时地）削减了中国官员所享有的特权。


On the other hand, he has launched an equally ferocious campaign against political liberalization, arresting and jailing leading human-rights activists and cracking down on China’s once-vibrant social media.	另一方面，他对政治自由化也采取了铁腕政策，逮捕并拘禁了人权活动领袖，封禁了曾经非常活跃的社交媒体。


The risks of waging a two-front war are obvious.	两线作战的风险是显而易见的。


If Xi’s fight against corruption is genuine, it will engender fear and resentment among the Chinese bureaucracy.	如果习近平的反腐斗争动真格，就会引起中国官僚系统的恐慌和不满。


While officials feign compliance with Xi’s economic-reform agenda, they will seek any opportunity to stymie it.	尽管官员们表面上都配合习近平的经济改革日程，但会抓住一切机会从中作梗。


The absence of significant real progress since Xi unveiled his economic blueprint last November suggests that this is already happening.	自去年11月习近平公布其经济蓝图以来，就一直没有实质性重大进展，这表明已经官僚集团中有人在从中作梗。


At the same time, Xi’s tough stance against political reform is diminishing hope among liberals.	与此同时，习近平在政治改革上的强硬立场让自由派不在抱有希望。


Of course, this group – including intellectuals, social activists, journalists, and progressive private entrepreneurs – has little institutional power.	当然，这一群体——包括知识分子、社会活动家、记者和进步私人企业家——没有什么制度力量。


What it does have is the capacity to influence ordinary Chinese – making them a valuable addition to a pro-reform coalition.	他们所拥有的是影响普通中国人民的能力——让他们称为亲改革联盟的重要增量。


Deng recognized this potential in the 1980s; unless Xi follows suit, he will find it increasingly difficult to rally the public behind his vision for China’s future.	邓小平在20世纪80年代认识到这一潜力； 除非习近平效而仿之，否则他会发现，将公众团结在他的中国未来愿景身后越来越困难。


This is not to say that caging Zhou was not a good move.	这并不是说周永康的落马不是好事。


But Xi must now shift his focus from bagging another quarry to winning over new and perhaps unexpected allies.	但习近平现在必须将注意力从抓住另一只老虎转向赢得新的、也许是意料之外的政治盟友。


His long-term success – and that of China – depends on it.	他的长期成功——中国的长期成功亦然——取决于此。


Wooing China’s Princelings	拉拢中国的太子党


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – China’s “princelings” – the offspring of senior Chinese officials who benefit from lavish privileges in education, employment, and business – are coming under scrutiny as never before.	加州克莱尔蒙特——中国的“太子党”，那些在教育、就业和商务方面享尽特权的人，正前所未有地经受着外界审视的目光。


Bo Xilai, the son of one of Mao’s comrades and a supposed “immortal” of the revolution, was recently sentenced to life in prison after his conviction on charges of corruption and abuse of power.	毛的同志及所谓“不朽”革命者的儿子薄熙来，因为腐败及滥用权力的罪名在不久前被判处无期徒刑。


Outside China, princelings are feeling the heat as well.	国外的太子党们也同样感到了压力。


Not long ago, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission announced that it was investigating JPMorgan Chase’s hiring of princelings in Hong Kong, who apparently delivered lucrative underwriting deals for the bank.	不久前，美国证券交易委员会宣布正在调查摩根大通在香港聘用、并且显然提供了丰厚承销业务的太子党。


While recent scandals have put China’s princelings under a harsh media spotlight, they have been hot commodities for Western companies seeking to capitalize on their guanxi (connections) in order to secure multi-billion dollar transactions.	虽然最近的丑闻才让中国太子党进入到媒体耀眼的聚光灯下，但他们一直是西方企业炙手可热的目标。 这些企业希望利用其关系获得数十亿美元的交易业务。


The list of financial institutions that have engaged in such hiring practices reads like a who’s who of investment banking.	进行过此类雇佣的金融机构名单与投资银行界名人录如出一辙。


Of course, it is premature to conclude that JPMorgan violated the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by employing children of Chinese officials who oversaw companies that retained the bank to underwrite their stock offerings.	当然，现在就断言摩根大通违反美国海外反腐败法雇佣中国官员子女，并由此获得股票承销业务还为时尚早。


Nonetheless, the case highlights a broader trend: the wooing of China’s princelings by prestigious Western educational institutions and businesses for the purpose of advancing their parochial interests in the burgeoning Chinese market.	但此案却折射出更为广泛的趋势：西方著名的教育机构和企业为在蓬勃发展的中国市场求得狭隘利益而拉拢中国太子党。


The unseemly race to recruit princelings starts at the world’s leading colleges and universities.	招收太子党的不光彩竞争最早始于全球最知名的高校。


Because China has no universities that rival the Ivy League or Oxford and Cambridge, senior Chinese officials prefer to send their children to these schools.	因为中国没有能与常青藤、牛津和剑桥相媲美的大学，中国高官更愿意将子女送到那里就读。


Given the opacity surrounding admission to these highly selective institutions (where the acceptance rate typically is as low as around 8%), it is impossible to tell whether princelings get in on the basis of merit or family background.	鉴于上述具有高度选择性的院校招生缺乏透明度（录取率通常低至8%左右），因此很难分辨太子党被录取是因为自身优势还是家庭背景。


But it is notable that princelings are not found in the most prestigious doctoral programs, where professors, not administrators, make admissions decisions.	但值得一提的是最负盛名的博士课程中都没有太子党的身影，因为招生决策由教授而不是管理人员做出。


Likewise, MIT and Caltech, where only the truly gifted survive, have a dearth of princelings.	同样，只有真正天才才能生存的麻省理工学院和加州理工学院也没有太子党。


Indeed, the sheer number of princelings, including children of incumbent Chinese leaders, now attending Ivy League universities clearly points to the importance of family ties.	事实上，单凭现在就读于常青藤大学的含中国现任领导人子女在内的太子党数量就足以证明家庭关系有多重要。


President Xi Jinping’s daughter, for example, studies at Harvard under an assumed name, and Bo Xilai’s son has been a student at Oxford and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government; he is now studying at Columbia Law School.	比方说习近平主席的女儿在哈佛化名就读，而薄熙来的儿子曾经是牛津大学和哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的学生； 他目前正在哥伦比亚大学法学院就读。


Simply put, elite Western colleges and universities, having identified China as a top market for fund-raising and high-end network-building, regard the princelings as a valuable investment.	简言之，西方精英高校把中国当作筹资和高端网络建设的顶级市场，并将太子党视为有价值的投资。


Nurturing ties with China’s political elite is good business, and the princelings can help open doors.	培养和中国政治精英的关系有利可图，而太子党为打开大门提供了帮助。


But preferential treatment for princelings at elite universities (and business schools) has real social costs, because admission to these institutions is zero-sum.	但是精英大学（和商学院）对太子党的优惠待遇具有真实的社会成本，因为这些学校的招生名额是一场零和游戏。


A place awarded to a less-qualified princeling is a place denied to a more qualified applicant.	招收一个素质较差的太子党入学就意味着有一位素质更高的申请者被拒。


Worse still, this injustice is self-perpetuating.	更糟糕的是这种不公平可以自我延续。


Western investment banks and multinationals can use princelings’ elite academic credentials to justify hiring them, even if the real reason is the hope that putting a princeling on the payroll will give the company a rainmaker in China.	西方投资银行和跨国公司可以凭借太子党的精英学历雇佣他们，即便真正的原因是希望工资单上的太子党能帮助公司在中国呼风唤雨。


Defenders of this practice insist that princelings are well educated and highly qualified.	这种做法的辩护者认为太子党大多具有高素质并受过良好教育。


Undoubtedly, some of them are; but many are not.	当然有些人确实如此，但也有很多人不是。


Apologists also claim that nepotism is universal, citing examples of children of American politicians and business leaders who have graduated from Ivy League universities and secured coveted private-sector jobs.	辩护者还声称裙带关系的存在相当普遍，比如美国政界和商界领袖的子女也有很多毕业于常青藤大学并获得了令人艳羡的私营部门工作。


But hiring Chinese princelings is not the moral equivalent of American-style nepotism.	但雇佣中国太子党在道德上并不等同于美国式的裙带关系。


The political and social environments in which the two practices occur are completely different.	这两种行为发生的政治和社会环境是完全不同的。


In the US, nepotism is difficult to hide, and public scrutiny helps to check its most blatant manifestations.	在美国，裙带关系很难掩饰，公众监督会对遏制其最明目张胆的泛滥有所帮助。


The democratic process, particularly the role played by a free press, constrains rent-seeking by children of government officials.	民主进程，特别是自由媒体所起到的作用，限制了政府官员子女的权力寻租。


In China, by contrast, pervasive corruption, the absence of a free press, and state capitalism mean that princelings’ conduct is unconstrained – and typically shrouded in secrecy.	相反，中国腐败现象泛滥，没有新闻自由，国家资本主义意味着太子党的行为不受约束——并且通常不为人所知。


Chinese censors methodically suppress news coverage of princelings’ business dealings.	中国审查人员系统地控制对太子党商业行为的新闻报道。


Most important, as part of its strategy for regime survival, the Chinese Communist Party favors princelings for appointments in government and state-owned enterprises.	最重要的是，作为政权生存策略的组成部分，中国共产党更愿意任命太子党在政府和国有企业任职。


Now, in the wake of Bo’s fall from grace, and in light of the controversy over JPMorgan’s hiring of Chinese princelings, Western academic and business leaders must ask themselves a tough question: Do they want to be complicit in helping the Party perpetuate its hereditary rule?	现在，随着薄熙来的失宠和摩根大通聘请中国太子党引来争议，西方学术及商界领袖必须问自己一个棘手的问题：他们是否愿意成为共产党延续其世袭统治的同谋？


China’s Plenum Test	三中全会考验


TOKYO – There is something odd and disturbing about the conventional wisdom surrounding the upcoming Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).	东京—即将到来的中共十八大三中全会有些不同寻常和令人不安。


As the November 9-12 conclave draws near, the international community’s attention seems to be focused mainly on technocratic policy changes deemed essential to restructuring China’s state-dominated economy and reenergizing growth.	随着11月9—12日会期的日渐临近，国际社会的注意力似乎主要集中在技术层面的政策变化。 这些变化被认为是重组中国国家主导型经济、重振经济增长的关键。


Will the government liberalize interest rates or loosen capital controls?	政府会实施利率自由化和放松资本管制吗？


How will the fiscal system be revamped?	财政制度如何修改？


Will land reform be part of the package?	土地改革会成为改革方案的一部分吗？


The list of such questions goes on.	类似的问题还有很多。


Outside China, the prevalent view among business leaders is that President Xi Jinping’s new administration has consolidated its power and acquired enough authority to push through far-reaching economic reforms.	在中国国外，商界领袖普遍持有的观点是习近平主席的新政府已经巩固了权力，并获得了足够的权威来推行深刻的经济改革。


He and his colleagues need only to get the specific policies right.	习近平和他的同事们只需要保证具体措施正确。


On the surface, such thinking may seem reasonable.	表面上看，这一观点似乎很合理。


In China’s top-down political system, a unified leadership is seen as fully capable of forcing the bureaucracy to comply with its wishes.	人们认为，在中国自上而下的政治体系中，统一的领导层完全有能力强迫官僚系统听命。


With Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in full swing, and the example of Bo Xilai’s imprisonment serving as a warning to the new president’s adversaries (no matter how senior they are), Chinese officials at all levels, it is widely believed, are likely to toe the line.	习近平的反腐败运动正在如火如荼地展开，薄熙来的入狱则是对新主席对手（不管地位多高）的一次警告。 人们广泛认为，中国各个级别的官员都会顺从习近平。


Unfortunately, this view is both too sanguine and naïve.	不幸的是，这一观点太乐观也太幼稚。


It overestimates the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaigns in contemporary China (there have been many in the last three decades), and it overlooks the political sources of the country’s economic slowdown.	这一观点高估了当代中国反腐败运动的效果（过去三十年类似的运动进行过多次），也忽略了中国经济减速的政治原因。


While Xi’s efforts to cleanse the rot inside the Chinese party-state should be applauded, it is no less important to recognize their limits.	尽管习近平在党国内部着手净化腐败的努力值得赞赏，但认识到其局限性同样重要。


So far, Xi’s campaign has remained a conventional affair involving selective prosecution.	目前，习近平的反腐运动仍只是有选择性起诉的常规作战。


Given the central government’s well-known inability to enforce its policies at the local level and the prevalence of tight-knit patronage networks in Chinese provinces and cities, it is unrealistic to expect that the current anti-corruption drive will produce significantly better results than in the past.	众所周知，中国中央政府无力在地方层面强行推行政策，而中国各省市之间普遍存在紧密的互助互惠关系，因此期待当前的反腐运动产生比过去好得多的效果是不现实的。


Indeed, the fight against corruption is at war with itself, because Xi is simultaneously seeking to buttress one-party rule.	事实上，反腐斗争还需要与自身作斗争，因为习近平同时也在寻求巩固一党执政。


But it is precisely the absence of effective checks on the exercise of power that encourages and sustains rampant corruption in the first place.	但一开始正是缺乏对权力执行的有效制衡助长和维持了无处不在的腐败。


Optimism about the CCP’s ability to push through market-oriented reforms also ignores the real obstacles to future growth and prosperity, which do not include a lack of economic ideas or policy expertise; on the contrary, it is well known – even obvious – what kind of economic reforms are needed.	对中共推行市场导向改革持乐观态度者还忽视了通往未来增长和繁荣的现实障碍，这一障碍并不在于缺少经济思想和政策的专业性，相反，需要什么样的经济改革，大家心里都清楚，甚至可以说显而易见。


What prevents China from pursuing these reforms is a combination of opposition from powerful entrenched interest groups – state-owned enterprises, local governments, the economic-policy bureaucracy, and family members of political elites and well-connected businessmen – and flawed political institutions.	阻止中国追求这些改革的是来自权势既得利益集团（国有企业、地方政府、经济政策官僚机构、政治精英家族和后台强大的商人家族的成员）和有缺陷的政治制度的联合反对。


Unless Xi and his colleagues demonstrate their resolve to overcome such opposition and launch comprehensive reforms, their chances of success are not high.	除非习近平及其同事表现出克服这些反对势力的决心并推行全面的改革，否则他们取得成功的机会并不大。


Compared with the two previous breakthroughs in reforming China’s economy, in 1978 and 1992, Xi faces a different environment and a much tougher challenge.	与前两次中国经济改革突破（分别在1978年和1992年）相比，习近平面临着不同的环境和严峻得多的挑战。


Opponents of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were ideologically driven; they had no personal stake in the Maoist political economy.	邓小平改革的反对者受意识形态驱使，他们在毛泽东主义政治经济体系中并没有个人利益。


Defeating them required building a winning coalition within the party, discrediting the communist ideology, and rallying public support, all of which Deng did.	战胜他们需要建立党内胜利联盟、打破共产主义意识形态、争取公众支持，邓小平正是这么做的。


Today, by contrast, members of the ruling elite benefit directly and immensely from the state-dominated economy.	相反，如今执政精英从国家主导型经济中获得了直接且巨大的好处。


Market-oriented reform, by leveling the competitive playing field, would hurt their interests and reduce their privileges, making fierce opposition likely.	市场导向改革要创造公平的竞争平台，就会伤害他们的利益，削减他们的特权，可能引起激烈的反对。


Only by mobilizing pressure outside the party-state can these insiders be forced to accept some of the decentralizing and liberalizing reforms that China’s economy needs.	只有动员党国之外的压力才能迫使这些内部人士接受中国经济所需要的一些分散化和自由化改革。


At that point, China will have a better chance of improving its legal institutions, increasing political accountability, strengthening protection of private property rights, and making the government genuinely – in Mao’s words – “serve the people.”	若能如此，中国将更有可能改善其法律制度、增加政治问责、强化私人产权保护、让政府真正“为人民服务”（毛泽东语）。


Without real and significant political change, technocratic reform proposals will treat only the symptoms of China’s economic malaise, without addressing its underlying institutional causes.	没有真正的重大政治变革，技术层面改革方案只能治中国经济症候之标，而不能治其制度性原因之本。


In assessing the outcome of the Third Plenum, what observers should really be looking for is evidence of a bold strategy for political reform.	在评估三中全会成果时，真正应该寻找的是大胆的政治改革迹象。


If Xi and his colleagues produce no credible sign of such a commitment, everything else will be eyewash – and skepticism about China’s fate under their leadership eventually will be vindicated.	如果习近平及其同事不能给出可信的政治改革承诺信号，那么一切都只是表面文章，而对其领导下的中国命运持悲观态度者将最终胜出。


Fallen Tiger, Shaken Dragon	抓虎震龙


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Less than 18 months after becoming General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping is poised to cage the biggest political “tiger” – a corrupt top official – in the history of the People’s Republic.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚—成为中共中央总书记还不到18个月，习近平似乎准备拿新中国历史上最大的政治“老虎”——某腐败顶级官员开刀了。


Although rumors of the imminent fall of former internal security chief Zhou Yongkang have been swirling for months, many observers remained unsure whether Xi would prosecute Zhou and thus break the party’s long-established unwritten rule of immunity for sitting or retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee.	尽管关于前国内安全总管周永康即将落马的流言已经传播的几个月之久，但许多观察者仍不确定习近平是否会起诉周永康，从而打破中共长期存在的不成文规矩——刑不上政治局常委，不管现任还是退休。


But doubts about Zhou’s fate have now been dispelled by a recent flurry of uncensored news stories in the Chinese media that revealed shocking details of corruption involving Zhou’s family and former subordinates.	但如今关于周永康命运的怀疑已经被打消——近段时间以来中国媒体曝出一系列未受管制的新闻报道，披露了周永康家庭成员和前下属所涉及的令人震惊的腐败细节。


One newspaper reported that the authorities recently searched the homes of Zhou’s two brothers.	某报纸报道说，当局最近搜查了周永康两位兄弟的家。


Though these stories have yet to implicate Zhou directly, it will be only a matter of time before the Chinese government officially charges him with corruption.	尽管这些报道并未直指周永康，但中国政府正式以腐败罪名起诉他只不过是时间问题。


Whispered reports are even more lurid.	广为流传的报道可谓耸人听闻。


Zhou is said to have plotted to murder his first wife, and there are rumors that at the height of last year’s scandal involving disgraced former Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai, he attempted to assassinate Xi in the leadership compound at Zhongnanhai.	据说周永康曾设局谋杀首任妻子，还有传闻说，去年的前重庆市委书记薄熙来（现已被定刑）丑闻的最高潮亦是周永康试图在中南海刺杀习近平。


Based on what the Chinese press has disclosed thus far, it is clear that the Zhou case will be the ugliest and most sensational scandal involving a senior party leader that the country has ever seen.	根据中国媒体已经披露的报道，周永康案毫无疑问将是前所未见的最丑陋、最令人发指的牵涉中共高级领导人的案件。


It will make Bo, an ally of Zhou and a former Politburo member who was sentenced to life imprisonment for corruption, look like a petty thief.	和此案相比，周永康的盟友、因腐败被判无期徒刑的前政治局委员薄熙来简直就是小毛贼。


Apparently, the Chinese government is meticulously building a case against Zhou by pursuing two critical leads.	显然，中国政府正在通过两条线周密地对周永康立案。 第一个目标是他的儿子周滨。


The first one targets his son, Zhou Bin, a businessman who has amassed a huge fortune through shady deals and possibly criminal activities.	身为商人的周滨通过见不得人的交易和可能的犯罪行为攫取了巨额财富。


With so many officials and private businessmen eager to curry favor with his father, Zhou Bin had no difficulty cashing in.	对周滨来说，急切地想巴结父亲的官员和私营企业家多如牛毛，从中捞点好处易如反掌。


His business activities include brokering sales of oil-field equipment to Iraq (causing huge losses for Chinese state-owned oil companies); construction of hydroelectric power stations in Sichuan (where his father was the provincial party boss from 1997 to 2002); providing information technology for 8,000 state-owned gas stations; and investments in real estate, oil exploration, and toll roads.	他的经商活动包括向伊拉克经销油田设备（给中国国有石油企业带来了巨额损失）、四川水电站项目（1997—2002年周永康曾任四川省委书记）、为8,000个国有天然气站提供信息技术，以及房地产、石油开采和收费公路方面的投资。


The most damaging revelation so far concerns Zhou Bin’s friendship with a billionaire mafia boss, Liu Han, who is now standing trial for organized crime and murder.	目前，最有杀伤力的曝光是周滨与亿万富豪刘汉之间的朋友关系。 刘汉目前正在以有组织犯罪和谋杀罪名待审，他的发迹与周滨的帮助不无关系。


Liu made his fortune with Zhou Bin’s help. In one case, the younger Zhou allegedly used his political connections to help Liu sell two hydroelectric power stations to a state-owned power company for a profit of ¥2.2 billion ($330 million).	在一个案子中，两人中年纪较轻的周滨被控动用政治关系帮助刘汉将两座水电站卖给国有电力公司，其中的利润高达22亿元。


The second lead centers on Zhou Yongkang’s former lieutenants.	第二条线集中于周永康的前下属。


A tactic favored by Chinese anti-corruption investigators is to detain junior officials who have worked closely with their primary target.	中国反腐调查的一个惯用手段是拘捕曾在主要目标身边工作过的低级官员。


Typically, these minions are threatened with long prison sentences, or even the death penalty, unless they cooperate.	通常这些低级官员会受到重刑甚至死刑威胁，除非他们选择合作。


In this case, a dozen officials who worked for Zhou in the energy sector in Sichuan and in the Ministry of Public Security (where Zhou was Minister from 2003 to 2008) have been arrested.	在周永康案中，十多位其在四川能源部门和公安部（2003—2008年周永康担任公安部长）的下属已经被拘捕。


Most ominously for Zhou, the officials include two of his former executive assistants, who presumably have intimate knowledge of Zhou’s activities.	对周永康最不利的是，其中还包括两名他的前秘书，这两人应该对周永康的活动十分了解。


When the Chinese government formally announces Zhou’s arrest – probably after the conclusion of the annual session of the National People’s Congress in mid-March – the revelations of the rot within the Chinese party-state will stun even the most jaded observers.	当中国政府正式宣布拘捕周永康时——可能会在3月中旬一年一度的人大会议结束后——由此揭露的中国党国内部腐败将令所有观察者大惊失色。


What Zhou, his family, and their cronies have done can be described only as insatiable looting and blatant gangsterism.	周永康及其家人和爪牙的所作所为可以说是贪得无厌的洗劫和赤裸裸强盗行为。


More important, the Zhou scandal will almost certainly implicate a record number of senior officials.	更重要的是，周永康丑闻几乎肯定会牵涉创纪录的高级官员数量。


As of now, one minister, two provincial vice governors, one vice minister, and several senior executives in state-owned oil companies have been detained.	到目前为止，已有一位部级、两位副省级、一位副部级、和多位国有石油企业高管被拘捕。


More officials are expected to fall in the coming year.	据估计，在接下来的一年中还会有更多的官员落马。


For Xi, ensnaring Zhou in his anti-corruption net will likely provide a boost in his popular standing.	对习近平来说，诱使周永康进入他的反腐网可以增加他的民众支持度。


He can show a skeptical Chinese public that he has the political will to take down one of the country’s most powerful politicians.	他可以向持怀疑态度的中国公众证明，他有惩治中国权力最大的政治人物之一的政治意愿。


Moreover, vanquishing a once-untouchable politician will leave no doubt about Xi’s personal authority.	此外，拿下曾被认为不可撼动的政治人物也将让习近平获得一言九鼎的个人权威。


For the rest of the world, the unfolding Zhou scandal reconfirms a profoundly worrisome fact: the Middle Kingdom remains deeply corrupt.	对世界其他地区来说，周永康丑闻的发酵确认了一个影响深远又令人担心的事实：这个中央王国依然是深度腐败的。


Caging a tiger will not destroy a vampire.	抓一只老虎无法摧毁一个吸血鬼。


Down with Dengism	放下邓小平理论


CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – China has recently held a series of solemn, high-profile ceremonies, barely noticed by the outside world, in honor of the 110th anniversary of former leader Deng Xiaoping’s birth.	克莱蒙特，加利福尼亚州—最近，中国举行了一系列鲜为外界关注的高规格隆重仪式纪念前领导人邓小平110年诞辰。


But, as with most political festivities in China these days, few have bothered to reflect on what is being celebrated – and what Deng’s leadership actually meant.	但是，与近期中国的大部分政治节日一样，很少有人会去思考究竟在庆祝什么，也很少有人去思考邓小平的治国理念究竟意义何在。


The truth is that, while Deng deserves appreciation for having brought China back from the abyss of Maoism, his approach – “Dengism,” or authoritarian developmentalism – is now impeding China’s prospects.	事实上，尽管邓小平理应因为领导中国走出毛泽东极左思潮的深渊而受到国人爱戴，但他的治国大政方针——即所谓的“邓小平理论”，或者说是专制发展观（authoritarian developmentalism）——如今正在阻碍中国的进步。


Distinguishing Deng the reformer from Dengism the governing philosophy is no idle academic exercise.	将作为改革家的邓小平和作为治国之道的邓小平主义区分开来，这决非毫无意义的学术游戏。


Deng, who risked his authority and that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to break with Maoist convention and launch China’s economic revolution, died in 1997.	邓小平拿其个人和中共的权威冒险打破毛泽东思想传统，发动了中国的经济革命。 作为一个伟大的改革家，邓已于1997年逝世。


Dengism, which emphasizes the goal of modernization under a powerful one-party state, continues to shape China’s governance system.	作为治国理念，邓小平理论强调强大的一党统治下的现代化，在邓小平逝世后继续决定着中国的治国方略。


Deng, who famously declared, “A cat’s color does not matter as long as it catches mice,” is generally remembered as an unabashed pragmatist.	邓小平有一句名言，“不管黑猫白猫，能抓到老鼠就是好猫。 ”这被认为是邓小平坚定务实主义的写照。


But even pragmatists have core principles that limit their actions, and Deng was no exception.	但即使是务实主义者，也有核心原则约束他们的行为，邓小平亦不例外。


Two ideas were incontrovertible: the CCP could retain its grip on power only by delivering economic development, and China could modernize only under a strong one-party system.	他有两个信念是不可动摇的：中国共产党只有通过经济发展才能继续掌握权力； 中国只有在强大的一党制度下才能实现现代化。


Thus, rejection of democracy in any form was fundamental to Deng’s viewpoint.	因此，邓小平的基本观点是拒绝任何形式的民主。


Though he advocated legal reform as a tool of modernization, Deng was adamant that the rule of law not be allowed to limit the CCP’s power.	尽管他也支持将法制改革作为现代化的工具，但坚决认为法治精神决不能限制中共的权力。


To be sure, Deng recognized some of the pathologies of the party-state.	平心而论，邓小平本人亦意识到了党国体制（party-state）的一些弊端。


With leadership positions allocated – often for life – on the basis of personal connections, rather than merit, he understood that the system suffered from gross inefficiency, risk aversion, and a lack of technical expertise.	他明白，领导岗位通常根据个人关系而非能力分配，并且是终身制，整套体制因为效率低下、不愿冒险、缺乏专业能力而举步维艰。


But Deng was convinced that administrative reforms could resolve these issues.	但邓小平相信行政改革能够解决这些问题。


What he did not anticipate was how difficult it would be to overcome resistance from within the CCP to any diminution of its powers.	他没有预料到的是，克服来自党内的抵制放权的力量会如此困难。


The slow pace of reform frustrated Deng so much that, in the late 1980s, he asked the reformist premier Zhao Ziyang to lead a secret high-level task force to examine options for more radical changes – this time, directly targeting the political system.	改革进展缓慢一度让邓小平大失所望，因此，在20世纪80年代中期，他要求改革派总理赵紫阳领衔成立一个高级别秘密任务组考察更彻底的变革——直接将目标对准了政治体制。


But when the group asserted that progress toward modernization would require the incorporation of some democratic principles and the rule of law, Deng immediately quashed the initiative.	但当该小组认为迈向现代化的进程需要纳入一些民主原则和法治精神时，邓小平立刻否决了这一改革方案。


His view that modernization required keeping power concentrated in the hands of a single party failed to anticipate the threat that a predatory state would pose to sustained development.	他认定现代化需要将权力集中在共产党手中，但他没有预料到专制会产生掠夺型政府，从而会给持续发展带来威胁。


Herein lies the tragedy of Dengism.	这就是邓小平理论的悲剧。


It gained credibility from the fact that its creator dismantled a cruel and destructive system, and left behind a more prosperous and humane China.	它的信誉来自其创始人打破了一个残酷的破坏性体制，带给人民一个更加繁荣、更加人道的中国。


But that credibility has been used to justify the maintenance of a system that is now hampering China’s continued progress.	但这一信誉被用来作为维持一套目前已开始阻碍中国继续前进的体制的依据。


Dengism’s greatest intellectual failure is its inability to account for the potential of unchecked power to nurture greed and corruption among ruling elites.	邓小平理论的最大理论缺陷在于它没有考虑到不受管制的权力会在执政精英中间引起如此程度的贪婪和腐败。


Its greatest political failure is its resistance to the democratic reforms needed to constrain that power.	其最大的政治失败在于它拒绝约束权力所需要的民主改革。


During Deng’s rule, Dengism’s inherent contradictions and limitations were less apparent.	在邓小平执政期间，邓小平理论的内在矛盾和局限并不那么明显。


After all, the Chinese people had been repressed for so long that economic reforms alone represented a huge step forward.	毕竟，中国人民此前经受了长期压迫，光是经济改革已经代表了巨大的进步。


Indeed, by creating space for individual creativity and entrepreneurship, they unleashed a historically unprecedented period of rapid growth that lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty.	事实上，经济改革为个人创造力和企业家精神营造了空间，带来了前所未有的快速增长时期，将数亿中国人民带出贫困。


But the lack of political reform meant that there was nothing to stop the ruling elites from appropriating a disproportionate share of the new wealth.	但缺乏政治改革意味着没人能够阻止执政精英将新创造的财富的大头揽入自己腰包。


Recent revelations of systemic corruption at all levels of government demonstrate that the gravest threat to China’s long-term economic success is the unchallenged, unruly party-state.	最近所披露的政府各个级别的系统性腐败表明，中国长期经济成功的最大威胁正是权力没有监督、不守规矩的党国。


The good news is that President Xi Jinping seems to recognize this problem.	好消息是国家主席习近平似乎认识到了这一问题。


Beyond taking up Deng’s mantle in pursuing market-oriented economic reforms, he has been directing a bold anti-corruption campaign since coming to power.	除了继承邓小平追求市场经济改革的衣钵外，自从成为中共一把手以来习近平还发动了果断的反腐斗争。


In July, he launched a formal investigation into one of the Chinese Communist Party’s most senior figures, Zhou Yongkang – a testament to his commitment to rooting out abuse of power.	今年7月底，他开始对前中共最高层人物之一周永康进行正式调查——履行了他根治权力滥用的承诺。


Xi’s desire to become China’s next great reformer may well be why his government has been investing so much energy in lauding Deng’s achievements.	习近平渴望成为中国的下一位伟大改革家，这或许正是其政府花如此大的力气宣扬邓小平的成就的原因。


One hopes that he continues to emulate Deng, without allowing his approach to become distorted by Dengism.	我们希望他继续模仿邓小平，同时也不要让他的方针因为邓小平理论而被扭曲。


Mirror, Mirror, on the Screen	电脑屏幕上的魔镜


NEW YORK – Suppose a group of workers frequently communicate among themselves, and then suddenly one of them gets left off all the “copy-tos.”  “It could be that they’re planning a surprise birthday party,” says Elizabeth Charnock, whose company, Cataphora, analyzes e-mail traffic and content as well as other documents, primarily for clients involved in litigation and crime detection.	发自纽约——试想有一帮员工经常在自己的小圈子里互通有无，不料突然之间所有人都与某个人断绝了消息。 “大概他们正在策划一个生日惊喜，”伊丽莎白·夏诺克如是说，她经营着一间名叫Cataphora的公司，主要为那些卷入了法律诉讼或者犯罪调查的客户分析电子邮件及其它各类文件。


“It’s more likely that they’re planning to engage in fraud and they know this one person won't go along with it.”	“更有可能的是这些人正在策划一起诈骗，而且知道那个人是不会和他们一伙的。 ”


“All abnormal behavior may not be bad,” says Charnock, “but virtually all really bad behavior is abnormal. From years of analyzing the abnormal, I’ve developed a keen appreciation for the myriad peccadilloes that are quite normal: the dull co-worker whom others scheme to avoid, the eleventh-hour passing of the buck, the ex you promised to ‘stay friends’ with but never wrote to again, the small but telling things that really get under your skin.”	“异常行为并不都是恶意的，”夏诺克说，“但事实上所有恶意行为都是异常的，在对异常行为进行了多年分析之后，我已经对那些常见的微小恶行有了敏锐的判断：那些因为能力不足而遭到他人排挤的合作者，最后关头推卸责任的人，那些你承诺说‘再见亦是朋友’却再也没有联络过的伴侣或恋人，还有那些隐藏在你表情之下，细微却真实的小动作。


Now she, and Cataphora, are applying those same analytics to a different market: people who want to analyze their own e-mail correspondence (and eventually other content) to see a reflection of their interactions with others.	如今她及Cataphora公司正将类似的分析应用于一个完全不同的市场：那些希望分析自己的电子邮件往来（以及其他文本）并了解他人与自己互动时作何反应的人。


Call it a visualization of your social graph in action.	这被称为可视化的社会行为图表。


With Cataphora’s new software tool called Digital Mirror, you can see the top asymmetries in your own relationships: whom you respond to before others versus whom you postpone, reschedule, or otherwise delay – and who does the same to you.	通过Cataphora开发出来的名为“Digital Mirror（数码魔镜）”的新软件，你可以了解到自身关系网中的高度不对称性：你会首先对谁作出回应，又会对谁的邀约进行推辞，改期或者延后——而谁又会对你做出同样的行为。


To the extent that you are cc’ed, you can also see patterns among your friends or colleagues: Which topics provoke huge amounts of stress or argument?	在你被抄送的电子邮件中，你也可以观察到朋友和同事的沟通模式：什么话题引发了极大的紧张和愤怒？


Which are dismissed with little comment?	哪些话题只有寥寥数人响应？


The software works by analyzing not just the “shape” of a conversation – who writes to whom, who answers, and when – but also the content.	软件不仅分析一场对话的“轮廓”——谁给谁写信，谁回应，什么时候回应——还分析其内容。


What are the key words?	比如说关键字是什么？


And what – judging by everything from words such as “must” or “immediately” to slang or profanity, to “softeners” such as “if you don't mind” and “please,” and text written in ALL CAPS – is the tone?	同时通过从字里行间挑出类似“必须”或“从速”这样的词汇，某些俚语和粗口，还有类似“如果您不介意的话”或者“请”这样的婉转语，又或者是全部用大写字母强调的语句来判断对话的语气如何。


Obviously, some cultures have their own jargon and tone, so Digital Mirror looks at the relative as well as absolute frequency of the values that it measures.	很显然，某些文化有其特有的表达方式和说话语气，因此Digital Mirror也分析其测量值出现的相对和绝对频率。


Is Juan obsequiously polite to Alice, but abrupt to Marvin?	比如说胡安是否对艾丽丝百般奉承，却对马文粗暴无礼？


Does he respond promptly to Teresa, but ignore Anatoly?	他是否对特蕾莎有问必答，却对安纳托利不闻不问？


The sofware offers nine visualizations that reflect behavior and trends over time, including quality time (a pie chart of whom you spend time with online and offline), pecking order (illustrated with chickens!), blow-off scorecard (relationship asymmetry), and temperature gauge.	软件提供了反映行为和趋势的9个图像化指标，而且是随时间变化的，包括有效时间（用饼图显示你在线上或者线下花了多少时间在哪些人身上），强弱次序（用小鸡的身材大小来表示！ ），推辞计分卡（关系的不对称性）以及关系温度计。


The result is a startlingly clear look at what is going on in a circle of people: who defers to whom, who takes charge, who passes the buck.	最后得出的结果就是关于所有团体成员的令人惊叹的清晰分析：谁服从谁，谁说了算，谁又经常推脱责任。


Digital Mirror – along with a book written by Charnock called E-Habits, which serves as a kind of extended documentation – can be used for self-analysis or analysis of the local ecosystem.	Digital Mirror——加上夏洛克写的一本叫《网上行为习惯》的书作为延伸说明——可以用来进行自我分析或者团体分析。


The program is targeted at individuals, but a company systems administrator or human-resources manager could use it to identify company- or group-wide patterns – though to do so without informing employees that their mail is being monitored would be illegal in Europe and bad practice at best in the United States.	该程序主要分析个人，但也可以被企业系统管理员或者人力资源经理利用来分析公司或者团体范围内的沟通模式——即便这种在员工不知情的情况下监控电子邮件的行为在欧洲属于违法，但在美国，这仅仅是一种不道德行为而已。


Of course, transparency is unsettling – whether it’s seeing your own wrinkles in the mirror, or confirming unpleasant aspects of how others treat you.	当然，清晰透明的状态是令人感到不安的——不管是对着镜子里查看自己的皱纹，还是看到别人与你沟通中的那些不利的方面。


Transparency is unambiguously good for companies and for governments; by and large they don’t welcome it, but it makes them more accountable to their constituents and to society.	毫无疑问，对企业和政府来说透明是有益的； 虽然总的来说他们不太欢迎这一点，但这能令他们对选民或者社区更加负责。


Personal transparency and accountability, on the other hand, are harder, owing both to a lack of visibility and to people’s reluctance to confront one another – or themselves.	另一方面，要确定个人透明度以及可靠性难度更大，因为缺乏可视化的分析或者人们不愿去与其他人——或者自身发生冲突。


Once you see your own digital reflection, will you improve your behavior? (Surely you are not already perfect?)	假如你看到了自己在Digital Mirror中的分析结果（显然没有人是完美的），你会对自己的行为加以改善吗？


Though personal transparency is uncomfortable, wouldn’t you rather answer to a piece of software than confront your friends’ candor face-to-face?	虽然个人透明度令人感到不安，你宁愿对一个软件做出回应还是向你的朋友面对面坦白？


Conversely, if someone at work is bothering you, you don’t need to tell them directly; you can just e-mail them a link to Digital Mirror (just like the old trick of dropping a can of deodorant on a co-worker’s desk – difficult but sometimes necessary).	相反，如果一个人在工作中老是烦着你，你不需要直接对他们说明，你只要发一个Digital Mirror的链接给他们（正如把一罐除臭剂放在一个合作者桌面上的老办法，虽然略显尴尬，但是非常必要）。


Indeed, I suspect that the people who need Digital Mirror the most are the ones who will recognize that need the least.	事实上，我觉得那些最需要Digital Mirror的人至少是认可这种必要性的。


Still, it may help the semi-self-aware to improve their personal relations – or at least to be more aware of the trade-offs they make when they favor one friend or colleague over another.	除此之外，软件能帮助那些对人际关系一知半解的的人去改善自己——或者至少更加意识到当自己亲近一个朋���或者疏远另一个时所付出的代价。


According to Charnock, “People believe that the digital world largely masks their preferences for different individuals. For example, in a real-world office, you can see who goes out to lunch together or gossips at the water cooler, who has a line in front of their door, and so on.	夏诺克说：“人们相信数码世界能掩盖他们对不同人的好恶，比如说，在一个现实的办公环境中，你可以看到哪些人一起吃饭或者在茶水间交流八卦，谁喜欢四处打听等等。


Not only are many of the equivalent online activities harder to see or quantify, but things like Facebook encourage you to ‘friend’ everyone….Everyone is more popular, more intelligent, and better looking than average.	许多在线行为不但难以观察或者评估，而且Facebook这样的软件还鼓励你将任何人加为‘好友’……每个人都更受欢迎，更聪明，比普通人更光鲜靓丽”。


Digital Mirror does the reverse.	而Digital Mirror却反其道而行之。


It is like the difference between a bar or club where the lights are low, and a good make-up mirror.”	如果说前面的一切是一面漂亮的化妆镜，那么Digital Mirror就如同酒吧和俱乐部中的阴暗角落。


This all reflects a trend toward greater clarity in our relations.	这都反映出我们人际关系更加清晰化的趋势。


Facebook and other social tools operate under the covers: Facebook notices which friends you interact with and whose photos you comment on in order to select the items in your NewsFeed or the ads you see.	Facebook和其他社会工具其实早在暗中运作了：Facebook分析你与哪些好友互动，你对哪些照片作出评论，并针对这些来向你发送特定的新闻源或者广告。


But Facebook does not show that information to you. Digital Mirror does.	但Facebook不会向你提供这些资料，Digital Mirror却可以做到。


Within a few years, this kind of transparency will probably be commonplace, both from Facebook and from ad networks and behavioral targeters trying to derive information about your likely purchases.	在未来几年内，这种透明度可能会变得稀松平常，无论是来自Facebook或是那些试图找出你购物偏好的广告网络或者行为分析公司。


But right now, only Digital Mirror is one of the few to give you the ability to do the same for yourself.	但今时今日，只有少数几个软件能让你获得同样的能力，Digital Mirror就是其中之一。


Mismanaging Missile Defense	处理不当的导弹防御系统


Missile defense has suddenly emerged as a divisive issue in Europe.	导弹防御系统突然间成为了一个使欧洲面临分裂的问题。


Rather than enhancing European security, the Bush administration’s plan to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic threatens to increase strains with Russia and deepen divisions with America’s European allies, particularly those in Eastern Europe, where support for US polices has been strongest.	布什政府在波兰和捷克部署导弹防御系统的计划非但没有加强欧洲的安全，反而更加深了与俄罗斯的紧张关系，并且造成了美国的欧洲盟友的分裂，尤其是在那些对美国的政策支持最坚定的东欧国家。


The growing opposition to the US missile defense deployment is rooted in the way in which America has managed – or rather mismanaged – the presentation of its deployment plans.	对美国部署导弹防御系统越来越强烈的反对声，其根源在于美国对其部署计划的处理，确切地说是处理不当的方式。


First, US officials did not lay the political and psychological groundwork for deployment.	首先，美国的官员并没有做好部署计划的政治及心理根基。


They assumed that Czech and Polish leaders – who were strongly pro-American – would willingly agree to deployment, and that public opinion in both countries would go along with whatever the governments decided.	波兰和捷克的领导人均表现出强烈的亲美倾向。 美国认为他们将会爽快地同意进行部署，而两国的公众会完全听从他们的政府所作出的任何决定。


But America failed to develop a coherent public rationale for its planned deployment of a system designed to destroy a missile fired by a rogue regime.	但是美国对于其计划部署一套旨在摧毁由某个流氓国家发射的导弹的系统，却未能向公众给出一个连贯的合理解释。


As a result, the Czech and Polish governments were unable to answer fundamental questions about the costs and benefits of the deployment for Polish and Czech national security.	其结果是，波兰和捷克的政府无法回答这一部署会给波兰和捷克的国家安全带来怎样的代价和利益这些最根本的问题。


This allowed skeptics and opponents of missile defense to gain the upper hand in the internal debates in both countries.	这使得那些怀疑和反对导弹防御系统的人在两国的内部争论中占据了上风。


Second, US officials initially tended to view missile defense largely as a technological issue divorced from its political context.	其次，美国官员一开始倾向于把导弹防御系统更多地看成是一个与其政治内涵不相干的技术问题。


For most Europeans, however, the military-technical issues are less important than the broader political implications of deployment for European stability and security.	然而，对于绝大多数欧洲人来说，部署计划对于欧洲稳定和安全更广泛的政治含意要远比军事技术问题重要得多。


The initial American briefings to European allies ignored this fact.	而美国人一开始对其欧洲盟友作出的解释忽略了这一事实。


Third, America underestimated the role of public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic.	第三，美国低估了波兰和捷克国内公众意见的力量。


US officials assumed that it was sufficient to have the consent of the governments and failed to recognize the degree to which these countries have become increasingly “Europeanized” in the last decade.	美国官员认为有了政府的同意就足够了，却没有认识到过去十年来这些国家越来越“欧洲化”的程度。


Membership in the European Union has resulted in the proliferation of ties to Europe at many levels, as well as a major influx of EU money.	成为欧盟成员使它们在许多层面上加深了与欧洲的联系，同时欧盟资金也大量流入了这些国家。


This has had an enormous impact on public attitudes in Eastern Europe.	这对于东欧国家的公众的观点产生了重大影响。


In Poland, a big gap exists between the government’s attitude and that of the population regarding the EU.	在波兰，政府与公众在欧盟问题的看法上存在巨大的分歧。


The Polish government is dominated by Euro-skeptics and has pursued a highly nationalistic policy that has often antagonized EU officials.	波兰政府由对欧洲抱怀疑态度的人所掌控，他们极度民族主义的政府常常会惹恼欧盟的官员。


Ordinary Poles, by contrast, are strongly pro-European.	相反，普通的波兰民众则强烈地对欧洲抱有好感。


According to recent polls, 80% of the population supports Poland’s membership in the EU – the highest in Europe.	根据最近的民意调查，80%的公众支持波兰成为欧盟的成员国，这个比例在欧洲国家中是最高的。


Fourth, American officials have tended to assume that the countries of Eastern Europe will remain staunchly pro-American and automatically support US policy.	第四，美国官员总是认为东欧国家会继续坚定不移地亲美，并且毫无保留地支持美国的政策。


That was true five years ago, but it is much less true today.	五年前是这样，但是今天情况不同了。


As Eastern European countries become more closely integrated into the EU, they increasingly have to calculate the impact of their policies on relations with Europe.	随着东欧国家越来越融入到欧盟中，它们必须越来越多地考虑它们的政策对于与欧洲关系的影响。


At the same time, the war in Iraq and abuses associated with it have tarnished America’s image in Eastern Europe.	此外，伊拉克战争以及虐俘丑闻玷污了美国在东欧国家的形象。


This is true even in Poland, which is the most pro-American country in the region.	甚至在波兰这个在该地区最最亲美的国家也出现了这一倾向。


The Polish government strongly supported the US in Iraq, sending the third largest contingent of forces, after the US and Great Britain.	波兰政府坚定支持美国在伊拉克的战争，它们派出了仅次于美国和英国的第三大军事力量。


However, Polish public opinion, like public opinion in Western Europe, was overwhelmingly opposed to the Iraq invasion.	然而，波兰公众对此的意见就像西欧公众的意见一样，强烈地反对入侵伊拉克。


Moreover, many Poles feel they have little to show for the government’s support.	再者，许多波兰人并不赞同政府对美国的支持。


As former Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski noted recently, there is a sense among many Poles that the US takes Poland for granted.	就像波兰前国防部长西科斯基最近所说的，许多波兰人认为美国没有给予波兰足够的重视。


Sikorski’s argument shocked many US officials, because he is considered one of the most pro-American politicians in Poland.	因为西科斯基曾被认为是波兰最最亲美的政治家之一，他的这一说法让许多美国官员感到震惊。


But it reflects a widespread sentiment among many Poles, including those who are staunch supporters of close ties to the US.	但是这确实反映了波兰许多民众的看法，包括那些坚定支持与美国保持紧密关系的人。


Unlike the Iraq operation, the planned missile defense deployment will almost certainly require approval by the Polish parliament.	与伊拉克问题不同，计划中的导弹防御系统的部署几乎必定需要得到波兰议会的批准。


This approval cannot be taken for granted.	这个批准可不会那么轻易地得到。


The government will need to explain to a skeptical Polish population and parliament why the deployment is in Poland’s national interest – not just America’s interest – and how it enhances Polish security.	政府需要向对此持怀疑态度的波兰民众和议会解释为什么这一部署符合波兰的国家利益，而不仅仅是美国的利益，以及它会怎样加强波兰的安全。


Simply saying, “because the Americans want it” will not be enough.	单单说“因为美国需要它”是远远不够的。


The US can still win the missile debate in Europe, but only if it stops treating missile defense primarily as a technological issue and addresses the broader political concerns that are driving the debate among European publics, including those in Eastern Europe.	美国依然可以在欧洲赢得关于导弹防御系统的争论，但是它必须不再把导弹防御系统仅仅看作是一个技术问题，而去探讨其更广泛的政治意义。 因为这正是欧洲民众，包括那些东欧国家的民众产生争论的问题所在。


Misusing the Inaction Argument	误用无所作为的论点


SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA – One commonly repeated argument for doing something about climate change sounds compelling, but turns out to be almost fraudulent.	哥斯达黎加圣何塞-人们经常采用一种论点来呼吁采取行动应付气候变化。 这一论点听起来挺有道理，但是实际上几乎是骗人的。


It is based on comparing the cost of action with the cost of inaction, and almost every major politician in the world uses it.	这一论点的基础是比较采取行动的代价和无所作为的代价，而全球几乎所有的政坛人物都使用这一论点。


The president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, for example, used this argument when he presented the European Union’s proposal to tackle climate change earlier this year.	例如，欧洲委员会主席巴罗索在今年早些时候提出欧盟应对气候变化建议的时候就采用了这一论点。 欧盟承诺到2020年的时候将其二氧化碳的排放削减20%。


The EU promised to cut its CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020, at a cost that the Commission’s own estimates put at about 0.5% of GDP, or roughly €60 billion per year.	欧盟委员会自己估计其成本是每年大约600亿欧元，大约为其GDP的0. 5%。


This is obviously a hefty price tag – at least a 50% increase in the total cost of the EU – and it will likely be much higher (the Commission has previously estimated the cost to be double its current estimate).	明显这是一个巨大的代价，相当于欧盟总成本提高至少50%。 而且，还有可能更高(欧盟委员会以前估计成本是目前估计的一倍)。


But Barroso’s punchline was that “the cost is low compared to the high price of inaction.”	但是巴罗索的关键论点是：“与无所作为相比，这一成本还是低的”。


In fact, he forecasted that the price of doing nothing “could even approach 20% of GDP.”	实际上，他预计无所作为的代价“甚至可能接近GDP的20%”。


(Never mind that this cost estimate is probably wildly overestimated – most models show about 3% damages.)	(他们从来就没有注意这一估计本身就大大偏高； 大多数的模式估计损失为大约3%)。


So there you have it.	这样大家就清楚了。


Of course, politicians should be willing to spend 0.5% of GDP to avoid a 20% cost of GDP.	当然，政坛人物们理应愿意花GDP的5%来避免20%的损失。 这听起来很有道理。


This sounds eminently sensible – until you realize that Barroso is comparing two entirely different issues.	但是你一旦认识到巴罗索是在比较两个完全不同的问题时，你不会如此认为了。


The 0.5%-of-GDP expense will reduce emissions ever so slightly (if everyone in the EU actually fulfills their requirements for the rest of the century, global emissions will fall by about 4%).	相当于GDP5%的花费减少排放微不足道(如果欧盟各国都在本世纪内实际履行其要求，全球二氧化碳排放将下降大约4%)。


This would reduce the temperature increase expected by the end of the century by just five-hundredths of a degree Celsius (nine-hundredths Fahrenheit).	这只是在本世纪末的时候降低气温升高百分之五摄氏度(相当于百分之九华式度) 。


Thus, the EU’s immensely ambitious program will not stop or even significantly impact global warming.	如此，欧盟雄心勃勃的规划就不会停止甚至大幅度影响全球气候变暖。


In other words, if Barroso fears costs of 20% of GDP in the year 2100, the 0.5% payment every year of this century will do virtually nothing to change that cost.	换一句话来说，如果巴罗索担心在2010年的时候损失20%的GDP，那么，本世纪每年0. 5%的花费根本无济于事。


We would still have to pay by the end of the century, only now we would also have made ourselves poorer in the 90 years preceding it.	而我们还是要在本世纪末的时候支付这一代价，只是我们是在前九十年把我们自己搞得更穷而已。


The sleight of hand works because we assume that the action will cancel all the effects of inaction, whereas of course, nothing like that is true.	这种手法是有效的，因为我们大家都假定采取行动将会抵消无所作为的影响，而实际上，根本就不是如此。


This becomes much clearer if we substitute much smaller action than Barroso envisions.	如果我们采用更为小规模的行动来代替巴罗索的提议的时候就更为如此。


For example, say that the EU decides to put up a diamond-studded wind turbine at the Berlaymont headquarters, which will save one ton of CO2 each year.	例如，欧盟决定在其总部大楼上树起一个镶满钻石的风力涡轮机，这一机器每年可以减少一吨的二氧化碳排放。


The cost will be $1 billion, but the EU says that this is incredibly cheap when compared to the cost of inaction on climate change, which will run into the trillions.	成本是十亿美元，但是欧盟说这一成本与在气候变化上无所作为相比较还是非常便宜的。 气候变化带来的代价将会是以万亿来计算。


It should be obvious that the $1 billion windmill doesn’t negate the trillions of dollars of damage from climate change that we still have to pay by the end of the century.	很明显，这一价值十亿美元的风车并不抵消气候变化带来的数以万亿计的损失，而我们还是要在本世纪莫的时候付出这些损失。


The EU’s argument is similar to advising a man with a gangrenous leg that paying $50,000 for an aspirin is a good deal because the cost compares favorably to the cost of inaction, which is losing the leg.	欧盟的论点就像是向一个腿坏疽的人推销一种五万美元的阿斯匹林，并且说与无所作为、断腿相比较这还是很值得。


Of course, the aspirin doesn’t prevent that outcome.	当然，这一阿斯匹林并不防止这一后果。


The inaction argument is really terribly negligent, because it causes us to recommend aspirin and lose sight of smarter actions that might actually save the leg.	无所作为的论点一叶障目，因为这让我们建议使用阿斯匹林并且忽视那些灵巧有效、可以确实保住腿的行动。


Likewise, it is negligent to focus on inefficiently cutting CO2 now because of costs in the distant future that in reality will not be avoided.	同样，现在集中精力低效地减少二氧化碳排放也是无知的，因为在遥远的将来所要付出的代价实际上无法避免。


It stops us from focusing on long-term strategies like investment in energy R&D that would actually solve climate change and at a much lower cost.	这让我们无法集中精力制定长久战略，例如有可能确实以远远更低的代价解决气候变化的能���研发投资。


If Barroso were alone, perhaps we could let his statement go, but the same argument is used again and again by influential politicians.	如果巴罗索是孤家寡人的话，我们或许还可以放过他的论点。 但是，有影响力的政坛人物们一而再再而三地使用同一论点。


Germany’s Angela Merkel says it “makes economic sense” to cut CO2, because the “the economic consequences of inaction will be dramatic for us all.”	德国总理默克尔说减少二氧化碳排放“在经济上是有利的”，因为“无所作为的经济后果对我们大家都是巨大的”。


Australia’s Kevin Rudd agrees that “the cost of inaction will be far greater than the cost of action.”	澳大利亚总理陆克文也认为“无所作为的代价远远高于有所作为的代价”。


United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has gone on record with the exact same words.	联合国秘书长潘基文也说过同样的话，有据可查。


In the United States, both John McCain and Barack Obama use the cost of inaction as a pivotal reason to support carbon cuts.	在美国，麦凯恩和奥巴马都使用无所作为的代价作为支持减少二氧化碳排放的关键原因。


California senator Diane Feinstein argues that we should curb carbon emissions because the Sierra snowpack, which accounts for much of California’s drinking water, will be reduced by 40% by 2050 due to global warming.	加利福尼亚州参议员费恩斯坦说，我们应当限制二氧化碳排放，因为加利福尼亚饮用水源大多数来自于积雪，而这些积雪到2050年的时候将会由于全球变暖而减少40%。


What she fails to tell us is that even a substantial reduction in emissions – at a high cost – will have an immeasurable effect on snowmelt by 2050.	但是她却没有告诉我们，即使以高昂的代价大幅度减少排放，到2050年的时候对积雪融化的影响还是无法衡量。


Instead, we should perhaps invest in water storage facilities.	相反，我们或许应该投资于水储存设施。


Likewise, when politicians fret that we will lose a significant proportion of polar bears by 2050, they use it as an argument for cutting carbon, but forget to tell us that doing so will have no measurable effect on polar bear populations.	同样，政坛人物着急地说，到2050年的时候北极熊的数量将会大幅度减少。 然而他们只是利用这一点来支持减少二氧化碳排放，却没有告诉我们这样做对于北极熊的数量没有可以衡量的效果。


Instead, we should perhaps stop shooting the 300 polar bears we hunt each year.	相反，我们应当停止每年捕杀300头北极熊。


The inaction argument makes us spend vast resources on policies that will do virtually nothing to deal with climate change, thereby diverting those resources from policies that could actually make an impact.	无所作为的论点让我们在应付气候变化几乎无济于事的政策上投入巨大的资源，从而把这些资源偏离了本可以有所效果的政策。


We would never accept medical practitioners advising ultra-expensive and ineffective aspirins for gangrene because the cost of aspirin outweighs the cost of losing the leg.	如果医生建议采用极为昂贵而又没有效果的阿斯匹林来治疗腿坏疽是因为阿斯匹林的成本要低于断腿的代价，那么我们将永远不会接受。


Why, then, should we tolerate such fallacious arguments when debating the costliest public policy decision in the history of mankind?	那么，为何我们在辩论人类历史上代价最为高昂的公共政策决定的时候会容忍这样虚假的论点呢？


Managing Europe’s Perfect Storm	应对欧洲的完美风暴


NEW YORK – The Chinese often point out that in their language the character for crisis and opportunity are one and the same.	纽约——中国人常说在他们的文字和语言中危险和机遇并存在同一个词中。


But, while it is indeed true that crisis and opportunity often go hand in hand, it is difficult to see much opportunity in Europe’s current circumstances.	尽管危险和机遇往往的确会结伴而行，但欧洲目前的情况却很难看到机遇的影子。


One reason the current situation facing Europe is so difficult is that it was so unexpected.	目前欧洲局势如此艰险的原因之一是它完全出乎意料。


Here we are, 70 years after the end of World War II, a quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, and some two decades after the Balkan wars, and suddenly Europe’s political, economic, and strategic future seems much more uncertain than anyone predicted as recently as a year ago.	二战结束70年、冷战结束四分之一世纪、巴尔干战争结束20年后，突然间，欧洲的政治、经济和战略未来似乎比一年前任何人的预测都更不确定。


Another reason to be worried is that Europe faces not one crisis, but several.	担心的另一个原因是欧洲的危机不止一个。


The first is economic: not just the current reality of slow growth, but the prospect that slow growth will continue without respite, owing above all to policies that often discourage businesses from investing and hiring.	首先是经济领域：因为推行阻碍企业投资和聘用的政策，不仅目前经济增长缓慢，而且这种缓慢将延续下去，不给人以喘息的机会。


The rise of populist political parties of both the left and the right across the continent attests to popular frustrations and fears.	欧洲大陆左右两翼民粹主义政党的崛起就证明了民众的恐惧和失望。


Making matters worse for Europe’s economy was the decision taken decades back to introduce a common currency without a common fiscal policy.	数十年前决定在不统一财政政策的情况下统一货币让欧洲的经济雪上加霜。


Discipline disappeared at the national level in many countries; Greece was the most recent casualty, but it is unlikely to be the last.	很多国家都不再遵守纪律； 希腊是最近一个受害者，但应该不会是最后一个。


The second crisis results from Russian actions in Ukraine.	另外一次危机是俄罗斯的乌克兰行动所导致的。


There is no prospect of Russia giving up Crimea, and questions about its intentions in eastern Ukraine and the Baltics are mounting.	俄罗斯不可能放弃克里米亚，而外界对其在东乌克兰和波罗的海国家的质疑也越来越多。


The result is the return of geopolitics to Europe at a time when defense spending is modest and public support for armed intervention is largely absent.	结果导致在国防开支减少和民意不支持武装干涉的情况下地缘政治回归欧洲。


The third, and most pressing, crisis is the result of massive flows of migrants from the Middle East and elsewhere into Europe.	第三次也是最急迫的一次危机是大量难民从中东和其他地区潮水般涌入欧洲。


The flood of people is exposing new rifts among EU members, raising questions about the principle of open borders and free movement that has long been at the core of the EU.	难民潮凸显出欧盟国家新的裂痕，引发了对欧盟核心边界开放和人员自由流动原则的质疑声。


Germany and a few other countries have stepped up to the challenge in ways that are admirable but unsustainable.	德国和其他某些国家的应对方式令人敬佩但却不能持久。


Some 8,000 refugees a day – a modern day Volkerwanderung – are entering Germany, partly because of harsh conditions back home, and partly because of Germany’s willingness to take them in.	这次现代欧洲大迁徙中每天约有8，000名难民涌入德国，这部分因为国内条件恶劣，部分因为德国表露出来的欢迎态度。


The challenge of caring for, employing, and integrating such numbers will soon run up against the limits of physical capacity, financial resources, and public tolerance.	照料和融入如此数量的难民会很快达到实际容量、财政资源和公众忍耐度的极限。


It is obvious that public policy cannot succeed if it is focused on the consequences, rather than the causes, of the refugee crisis.	关注难民危机后果而非原因的公共政策显然不能成功。


The change that would have the greatest positive impact would be the emergence of a new government in Damascus that was acceptable to the bulk of the Syrian people and a satisfactory partner for the United States and Europe.	大马士革出现既能被叙利亚民众接受又能让美欧满意的新政府���能会是个积极的变化。


Unfortunately, this seems likely to come about only with the blessing of Russia and Iran, both of which appear more inclined to increase their support for President Bashar al-Assad than to work for his removal.	不幸的是，出现上述结果的前提是得到俄罗斯和伊朗的支持，但上述两国都倾向于支持阿萨德总统的政府。


Other steps, however, would improve the situation.	但还有其他举措可以改善局势。


Increased international financial support for countries in Europe or the Middle East hosting large numbers of refugees is one.	增加对欧洲或中东难民收容国的国际财政支持就是其中一项。


Ideally, such funding would help persuade more countries to follow Germany’s example.	理想情况下，上述资金可能有助于说服更多国家效法德国。


Another useful development would be the creation of enclaves inside Syria where people could gather with some expectation of security.	另一项有用的进展是在叙利亚建设可以安全聚集的飞地。


Such enclaves would require local support from Kurdish forces or select Arab tribes, with military backing by the US and others.	实现这一目标需要得到库尔德军或特定阿拉伯部落的地方支持，还有美国和其他国家的军事保护。


A new comprehensive arrangement with Turkey is also needed to reduce the flow of jihadist recruits to Syria and the number of refugees heading north.	此外要与土耳其签署全面协议，以减少难民向北迁移和新招募的圣战份子流入叙利亚。


Turkey would receive financial and military assistance in exchange for asserting greater control over its borders, while the question of Turkey’s long-term relationship with Europe would be set aside until the crisis passed.	土耳其可以得到财政和军事援助以换取其加强边境控制，而该国与欧洲的长期关系问题可以搁置到危机结束。


The US has a special obligation to help.	美国负有特别的帮助义务。


Both by what it has done and what it has failed to do in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East, American foreign policy bears more than a little responsibility for outcomes that have led to the refugee exodus.	因其在伊拉克、叙利亚和中东其他地方的所作所为和未能作为，美国的外交政策都应在很大程度上为导致难民外流的结果负责。


The US also has a strategic interest in helping Germany and Europe contend with this crisis.	协助德国和欧洲抗衡危机也符合美国的战略利益。


Europe still constitutes a quarter of the world’s economy and remains one of America’s principal geopolitical partners.	欧洲仍占据世界经济的四分之一，依然是美国主要的地缘政治合作者。


A Europe overwhelmed by a demographic challenge, in addition to its economic and security challenges, would be neither able nor willing to be an effective ally.	除经济和安全难题外深陷人口困局的欧洲既不能也不愿扮演有效的盟友。


In all of this, time is of the essence.	时间是这一切的本质因素。


Europe – and Germany in particular – cannot sustain the status quo.	欧洲，尤其是德国，绝对不能维持现状。


Waiting for a solution to the Syrian situation is no answer; while lesser steps will not resolve Europe’s predicament, they could make it manageable.	等候叙利亚问题解决不是办法； 就算相对次要的举措不能让欧洲摆脱困境，也可以让局势更加可控。


Africa’s Urban Challenge	非洲的城市挑战


NAIROBI – My mother, like her mother, her grandmother, and so on, was born into poverty in the rural village of Rarieda, Kenya.	内罗毕—我的母亲、我的外祖母、我的曾外祖母……她们都出生在肯尼亚农村一个叫Rarieda的村庄，生而贫穷。


I, too, was born in the village, and lived there until it was struck by a brutal famine when I was two years old.	我也出生在这个村子，并且一直生活在那里直到两岁时爆发严重饥荒。


With no food, money, or opportunities, my mother did what thousands of African villagers do every day: she moved us to the city in search of a better life.	我母亲没有食物，没有钱，也没有机会，她和万千非洲村民一样，把我们迁往城市寻找更好的生活。


But, given the lack of jobs and housing in Nairobi, we ended up in Kibera, one of Africa’s largest slums.	但是，由于在内罗毕找不到工作和房子，我们只能住在Kibera，这是非洲最大的贫民窟之一。


Located just a couple of miles from downtown Nairobi, Kibera is a heavily polluted, densely populated settlement composed of informal roads and shacks with corrugated tin roofs.	Kibera距离内罗毕市中心不过几英里，这里污染严重，简易道路和铁皮瓦楞屋顶棚户构成了密密麻麻的定居所。


Kenya’s government does not recognize Kibera, there is no sewage system or formal power grid.	肯尼亚政府不承认Kibera的存在，这里没有下水道，也没有正式的电网。


Its residents, estimated to number anywhere from a few hundred thousand to more than a million, do not officially exist.	这里的居民约有几十万到上百万，在官方记录中，他们根本不存在。


Kibera is just one example of the consequences of the rapid urbanization that is gaining momentum worldwide.	Kibera只是全世界如火如荼的快速城市化进程的一个后果。


More than 44% of developing-country residents already live in cities.	超过44%的发展中国家居民已经入住城市。


The Population Reference Bureau estimates that by 2050, only 30% of the global population will remain in rural areas.	人口资料局估计，到2050年，只有30%的全球人口仍将生活在农村地区。


But few have stopped to consider this shift’s implications for families like mine.	但很少有人会停下来想一想，如此变化会对类似我家的家庭产生什么影响。


When people think of Africa, they often focus on the hardships of village life – a perception reflected in iconic images of African women on their daily excursions to fetch water.	一提到非洲，人们往往就会将注意力集中在农村的艰苦生活上——这都是非洲女性远途取水的日常生活影像给人们的印象。


But an increasing number of people – already nearly 300 million – are facing the harsh reality of the urban slum, where resources are scarce and economic opportunities are elusive.	但越来越多的人——目前已接近3亿——面临着城市贫民窟的严峻现实，这里资源紧缺，经济机会微乎其微。


More than 78% of the urban population in the world’s least-developed countries, and one-third of the global urban population, lives in slums.	在全世界最不发达国家，超过78%的城市人口生活在贫民窟，若以全球城市人口算，这一比例为三分之一。


Nairobi is a dynamic and growing city, with shopping centers, restaurants, and Western-style companies catering to Kenya’s emerging middle class.	内罗毕是一个充满活力的成长之城，这里有购物中心、餐厅、西方式的公司，滋养着肯尼亚新兴中产阶级。


Yet no one knows how many people live there.	但没人知道有多少人生活在这里。


According to the last (highly politicized) census, completed in 2009, Nairobi has a population of over three million; but it is probably closer to five million, with a large percentage living in slums.	根据2009年完成的最新的（被高度政治化的）人口普查，内罗毕人口超过300万； 但也许其人口有接近500万，其中很大一部分生活在贫民窟。


It is these people, Nairobi’s poorest residents, who build the buildings, staff the restaurants, drive the taxis, and power the city.	这些人——内罗毕最穷的居民——承担着建造房屋、餐厅服务、驾驶的士、生产电力等任务。


(From the age of 12 until I was 22, I was part of this group, working at construction sites and in factories.) Indeed, without the poor, Nairobi could not function for a single day.	（我从12岁到22岁一直是这一群体的一员，在建筑工地和工厂干活。 ）事实上，没有穷人，内罗毕连一天都过不下去。


Nevertheless, they remain all but invisible, with no political voice.	尽管如此，他们仍然微不足道，发不出任何政治声音。


The world’s enduring perception of Africa as a village exacerbates slum dwellers’ plight, keeping them off the global development agenda.	世界一直把非洲视为一个大农村，这加剧了贫民窟居民的困境，将他们排除在全球发展日程之外。


Every day, more people arrive in Nairobi, lured by the promise of employment, resources, and a better life, only to realize that they are not equipped to survive there and that their children will grow up in a slum.	每一天，都有更多的人来到内罗毕，他们憧憬着就业、资源和更好的生活，但最终他们将意识到他们没有在这里是哼存的技能，他们的孩子只能生长在贫民窟。


At least half of those living in urban slums are under the age of 20.	城市贫民窟居民至少有一半不到20岁。


Without access to education, this generation – which will soon be the majority – has little hope of ever escaping its straitened conditions.	由于得不到教育，这一代人——很快他们就将成为大多数——基本无望摆脱窘境。


But for how long will a majority serve a minority? For how long will it accept a lack of water, sanitation, education, and dignity?	但大多数能服务少数多久？ 他们能忍受缺水、缺医疗、缺教育、缺尊严的状况多长时间？


Urban slums worldwide will soon reach a tipping point, with young people rejecting the lives that they have been offered.	全球城市贫民窟很快将达到转折点，年轻人将拒绝接受他们获得的生活。


Their power lies in their numbers – more than half of the world’s youth shares their fate – and in their anger.	他们的力量在于他们的数量——全世界一大半年轻人和他们感同身受——和他们的怒火。