But, while ECT rarely, if ever, causes clear clinical evidence of brain damage and has not been shown to do so in animal studies, antipsychotic drugs regularly do, in the form of tardive dyskinesia and other syndromes. The same is true of antidepressants.	但是，虽然ECT很少——如果曾经有的话——有导致大脑损害的明确的临床证据，而且在动物实验中也没有得到证明，然而，安定类药物却经常以迟发性运动障碍及其他并发症的形式给大脑造成损害，抗抑郁剂也是如此。


There is no dispute that ECT can cause short-term memory loss.	人们对ECT治疗会引起短期的记忆丧失没有争议。


But critics have found it difficult to demonstrate memory or other cognitive problems that endure beyond three months. Nor can enduring autobiographical memory disturbances and inability to remember lists be readily attributed to ECT, because ECT is rarely given on its own.	但是，ECT的批评者发现很难去证明记忆或其他认知问题能持续三个月以上，而且，持续的自传性记忆问题以及无法记忆清单也不能被轻易归咎于ECT治疗，因为ECT很少单独使用。


Indeed, very few of those who receive ECT do not also receive benzodiazepines, which do cause significant autobiographical memory problems when given alone, and antipsychotic drugs, which cause difficulties with lists of names or telephone numbers, and other comparable problems.	事实上，那些接受ECT治疗的人很少有没有接受过苯（并）二氮和安定类药物治疗的，而苯（并）二氮单独使用的时候确实会导致严重的自传性记忆问题，安定类药物会导致记忆姓名和电话号码名单困难以及其他类似的问题。


Yet these drugs are rarely, if ever, blamed for cognitive disturbances following psychiatric treatment.	然而，这些药物很少——如果曾有的话——会被责怪要对精神病治疗后的认知障碍负责。


The failure of ECT’s critics to demonstrate what to them seems obvious indicates an active conspiracy to minimize treatment-induced problems and to block those who have been injured by treatment from seeking redress.	ECT的批评者没能证明对他们来说似乎是明显的东西说明，在最小化治疗引起的问题和阻止那些受到治疗伤害的人要求赔偿上存在积极的共谋。


In fact, at recent guideline meetings in the United Kingdom on the issue of ECT, there have been no representatives from psychiatry, but many from patient groups.	事实上，最近在英国召开的有关ECT的方针会议上，没有来自精神病治疗方面的代表，但是有许多来自病人团体的代表。


Organized psychiatry appears to have little interest in ECT, or is scared of harassment from patient advocates.	有组织的精神病学界似乎对ECT缺乏兴趣，或者是他们对来自病人支持者的骚扰感到害怕。


As a result, even evidence that a person’s mood and clinical state has been significantly improved after ECT can be transformed into evidence of brain damage.  When patients come forward to say they were helped by ECT, or a patient’s medical record points to clinical improvement with treatment, the apparent improvements are read as indicating the disinhibition and vacuousness that accompanies brain damage.	结果，甚至一个人的情绪和临床状况在ECT治疗后有了很大的改善的证据也可以被转变成大脑受损的证据。 当病人站出来说他们得到了ECT治疗的帮助，或者一个病人的病历显示治疗能起到临床改善作用的时候，这些明显的改善被解读成为其显示了伴随着大脑受损的抑制解除和茫然。


There are better targets in mental health than ECT.	在心理问题治疗上有比ECT更好的靶子。


Where is the concern about the millions who are becoming physically dependent on antidepressants?	对几百万人变得在身体上依赖抗抑郁剂的担心在哪里？


Where are the protests about the one-year-olds being treated with antipsychotic drugs?	对一岁大的婴儿使用安定类药物治疗的抗议在哪里？


How is it possible that, because no company with currently patented drugs is campaigning to help medical and nursing staff recognize the catatonic features displayed by one in ten patients going through a psychiatric unit – features that could be treated rapidly with benzodiazepines or ECT – these features are missed completely?	因为没有当前拥有专利药物的公司要求帮助医护人员认识在进行住院治疗的精神病人中十个就有一个显示的紧张性精神症特征——可以通过苯（并）二氮或ECT快速治疗的特征——这些特征怎么可能就被完全忽略了？


Why is it all but impossible to find anything but vilification of ECT on the Internet, and anything but glowing testimonies about drug treatments?	为什么在互联网上除了对其中伤外几乎找不到有关ECT的任何东西，以及除了对药物治疗效果辉煌的证词之外的任何东西？


ECT’s critics seem to think that if they do not protest against its use at every opportunity, its advocates will inflict it on people who do not need it.	ECT的批评者似乎认为如果他们不抓住任何一个机会反对使用它，ECT的支持者就会将其使用在不需要它的人身上。


But, in contrast to psychotropic drugs, there are no marketing departments geared to maximizing ECT.	但是，和精神药物相比，没有致力于最大化使用ECT的市场销售机构。


This visceral focus on ECT has almost certainly led to ever more people ending up on drugs, and ever more brain damage and memory problems as a consequence.	这种对ECT的直觉关注几乎肯定会导致更多的人最终使用药物，以及由此导致的更多的大脑损害和记忆问题。


It sometimes seems that the critics are behaving according to the romantic illusion that if they can just abolish ECT, mental illness will disappear with it.	有时候，ECT的批评者似乎是按照如果他们可以废除ECT，精神疾病就会随之消失这样的浪漫幻想来行为的。


Sigmund Freud would have been fascinated.	如果真是这样，这都已经使希格蒙德·弗洛伊德着迷了。


Should Adult Sibling Incest Be a Crime?	成人兄弟姊妹间乱伦应当被视为犯罪吗？


PRINCETON – Last month, the German Ethics Council, a statutory body that reports to the Bundestag, recommended that sexual intercourse between adult siblings should cease to be a crime.	普林斯顿——上个月，一家向联邦议院汇报的法定机构德国伦理委员会建议停止将成年兄弟姐妹间的性交视为犯罪行为。


The recommendation follows a 2012 decision by the European Court of Human Rights upholding the conviction of a Leipzig man for having a sexual relationship with his sister.	德国伦理委员会在欧洲人权法院2012年判决一名与其姊妹性交的莱比锡人有罪之后提出了这项建议。


The man has served several years in prison, owing to his refusal to abandon the relationship.	该男子因拒绝放弃这段关系而被判数年入狱。


(His sister was judged to be less responsible and was not jailed.)	（其姊妹被认为责任较小，因此并未被关进监狱。 ）


Incest between adults is not a crime in all jurisdictions.	成人乱伦在所有司法辖区都不是犯罪。


In France, the offense was abolished when Napoleon introduced his new penal code in 1810.	乱伦罪早在1810年拿破仑引入新刑事法典时在法国即宣告废止。


Consensual adult incest is also not a crime in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Côte d’Ivoire, Brazil, Argentina, and several other Latin American countries.	在比利时、荷兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、俄罗斯、中国、日本、韩国、土耳其、科特迪瓦、巴西、阿根廷和其他几个拉美国家，两厢情愿的成人乱伦也都不算犯罪。


The Ethics Council took its investigation seriously.	伦理委员会认真进行了调查取证工作。


Its report (currently available only in German) begins with testimony from those in a forbidden relationship, particularly half-brothers and sisters who came to know each other only as adults.	该委员会提交的报告（目前仅限于德语版）开始时采用了禁止关系当事者、特别是那些成年后才知道对方是自己同父异母兄弟姊妹的当事者的证词。


These couples describe the difficulties created by the criminalization of their relationship, including extortion demands and the threat of loss of custody of a child from a previous relationship.	这些情侣描述了因其关系被定义为犯罪所带来的困难，包括遭到敲诈和可能失去之前关系子女的监护权。


The report does not attempt to provide a definitive assessment of the ethics of consensual sexual relationships between siblings.	该报告并未试图对兄弟姊妹间两厢情愿的性关系做出决定性的道德评价。


Instead, it asks whether there is an adequate basis for the criminal law to prohibit such relationships.	相反，它质疑刑法禁止上述关系是否有充分的理由。


It points out that in no other situation are voluntary sexual relationships between people capable of self-determination prohibited.	报告指出其他任何情况下有决定权的人自愿发生性关系都不被禁止。


There is, the report argues, a need for a clear and convincing justification for intruding into this core area of private life.	报告认为理应为侵入私人生活这一核心领域提供明确且令人信服的理由。


The report examines the grounds on which it might be claimed that this burden of justification has been met.	报告还分析了为什么有人认为上述举证责任已经履行完毕。


The risk of genetically abnormal children is one such reason; but, even if it were sufficient, it would justify only a prohibition that was both narrower and wider than the current prohibition on incest.	理由之一是有可能生出遗传异常的子女； 但即便该理由足够充分，也只能证明应当收窄或者放宽目前的乱伦禁令。


The prohibition would be narrower, because it would apply only when children are possible: The Leipzig man whose case brought the issue to attention had a vasectomy in 2004, but that did not affect his criminal liability.	禁令应当收窄，因为只有当可能生育子女的时候才适用：其案件引发关注的莱比锡人2004年就接受了输精管切除术，但这并未影响他承担刑事责任。


And the goal of avoiding genetic abnormalities would justify widening the prohibition to sexual relationships between all couples who are at high risk of having abnormal offspring.	并且为避免遗传异常有理由将禁令拓宽至诞育异常后代风险较大的所有夫妇。


Given Germany’s Nazi past, it is difficult for Germans today to treat the desirability of that goal as anything but permitting the state to determine who may reproduce.	鉴于德国的纳粹史，今天的德国人很难不联想到将决定谁有生育权的权限交给政府。


The Council also considered the need to protect family relationships.	保护家庭关系也进入到委员会的考虑范畴。


The report notes that incest between siblings is rare, not because it is a crime, but because being brought up together in a family or family-like environment (including Israeli kibbutzim that rear unrelated children collectively) tends to negate sexual attraction.	报告指出兄弟姐妹间的乱伦非常罕见，但并非因为这样做犯罪，而是因为从小在家庭或家庭式环境（包括集体养育无关儿童的以色列集体农场）中一起长大一般会扼杀性吸引力。


The report does recognize the legitimacy of the objective of protecting the family, however, and makes use of it to limit the scope of its recommendation to sexual relations between adult siblings.	但报告承认保护家庭目标的合法性，也承认应合理利用该目标限制其成人兄弟姊妹间性关系建议适用的范畴。


Sexual relations between other close relatives, such as parents and their adult children are, the report argues, in a different category because of the different power relations between generations, and the greater potential for damage to other family relationships.	报告认为其他近亲属、如父母与成年子女间的性关系属于完全不同的领域，因为代际间不同的权力关系，以及对其他家庭关系可能造成更大的损伤。


The taboo against incest runs deep, as the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt demonstrated when he told experimental subjects about Julie and Mark, adult siblings who take a holiday together and decide to have sex, just to see what it would be like.	人们对于乱伦的禁忌根深蒂固，社会心理学家乔纳森•海特面对受试者讲述朱莉和马克这对成年兄妹一起度假，并决定发生性关系，只为看看它是什么样子的。


In the story, Julie is already on the Pill, but Mark uses a condom, just to be safe.	故事中的朱莉已经在服用避孕药，但马克为了安全起见仍旧使用了避孕套。


They both enjoy the experience, but decide not to do it again.	两人都很享受这种体验，但决定不再这样做。


It remains a secret that brings them even closer.	这次秘密经历增加了他们的亲密度。


Haidt then asked his subjects whether it was okay for Julie and Mark to have sex.	海特之后询问受试者朱��和马克发生性关系他们是否接受。


Most said that it was not, but when Haidt asked them why, they offered reasons that were already excluded by the story – for example, the dangers of inbreeding, or the risk that their relationship would suffer.	多数人回答不能接受，但当海特追问理由时，他们所提的理由都已在故事中排除——比方说，近亲繁殖的危险，或者他俩的关系有可能受到损伤。


Perhaps not coincidentally, when a spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats was asked to comment on the Ethics Council’s recommendation, she also said something completely beside the point, referring to the need to protect children.	也许并非巧合的是，当德国总理默克尔所在基督教民主党一名发言人被要求对伦理委员会的建议发表意见时，她也做出了一些完全跑题的评论，比方说需要为儿童提供保护。


The report, however, made no recommendations about incest involving children, and some of those caught by the criminal law did not even know each other as children.	但报告并未对涉及子女的乱伦行为给出任何建议，而刑法判决的某些乱伦情侣童年时根本不认识对方。


When Haidt pointed out to his subjects that the reasons they had offered did not apply to the case, they often responded: “I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.”	当海特向受试者指出他们的理由在本案中根本不适用，他们往往会回答：“我不知该怎么解释，我只知道这样做不对。


Haidt refers to this as “moral dumbfounding.”	”海特将这称为“道德错愕”。


In the case of the incest taboo, our response has an obvious evolutionary explanation.	在涉及乱伦禁忌的情况下，我们的反应具有鲜明的进化理由。


But should we allow our judgment of what is a crime to be determined by feelings of repugnance that may have strengthened the evolutionary fitness of ancestors who lacked effective contraception?	但我们是否应任由厌恶感左右我们对犯罪行为的判断，虽然这种厌恶感可能强化了我们缺乏有效避孕手段的祖先对进化的适应程度？


Even discussing that question has proved controversial.	事实证明就连探讨这一问题也备受争议。


In Poland, a comment presenting the views of the German Ethics Council was posted online by Jan Hartman, a philosophy professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.	在波兰，一则介绍德国伦理委员会观点的评论被克拉科夫雅盖隆大学的哲学教授哈特曼张贴到网上。


The university authorities described Hartman’s statement as “undermining the dignity of the profession of a university teacher” and referred the matter to a disciplinary commission.	校方称哈特曼的说法是“破坏一名大学老师的职业尊严”，并将此事提交纪律委员会。


In so quickly forgetting that the profession’s dignity requires freedom of expression, a renowned university appears to have succumbed to instinct.	这么快就忘记职业尊严要以言论自由为前提，这间著名的大学似乎在向本能低头。


That does not augur well for a rational debate about whether incest between adult siblings should remain a crime.	这对展开是否应将成人兄弟姊妹间的乱伦继续视为犯罪的理性辩论似乎不是好兆头。


Should Bondholders be Bailed Out?	是否该救助债券持有人？


CAMBRIDGE – A year after the United States government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail but then bailed out AIG, and after governments around the world bailed out many other banks, key question remains: when and how should authorities rescue financial institutions?	剑桥 ——


It is now widely expected that, when a financial institution is deemed “too big to fail,” governments will intervene if it gets into trouble. But how far should such interventions go?	去年，美国政府先是任由雷曼兄弟破产，而紧接着又巨额注资AIG；


In contrast to the recent rash of bailouts, future government bailouts should protect only some creditors of a bailed-out institution.	同时，各国政府纷纷救助其他银行。


In particular, the government’s safety net should never be extended to include the bondholders of such institutions.	时下，关键问题还是摆在那里，即政府在解救金融机构时的择时择径问题。


In the past, government bailouts have typically protected all contributors of capital of a rescued bank other than shareholders.	人们现在都想，当一个大到不允许崩坍的金融机构遇到问题的时候，政府便会介入疏通。 但是政府要帮到什么程度呢？


Shareholders were often required to suffer losses or were even wiped out, but bondholders were generally saved by the government’s infusion of cash.	相比近期的救助潮而言，政府在今后的救助行动中应当只考虑保护受助企业的某些债权人。 特别是，政府永远不应当照顾这些企业的持债人。


For example, bondholders were fully covered in the bailouts of AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Fannie Mae, while these firms’ shareholders had to bear large losses.	过去，政府注资普遍具有的特点是保护所有对银行贡献了资本的人，而股东则排除在外。


The same was true in government bailouts in the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, and elsewhere.	股东经常得迫受损失，甚至直接清扫出去。


Bondholders were saved because governments generally chose to infuse cash in exchange for common or preferred shares – which are subordinate to bondholders’ claims – or to improve balance sheets by buying or guaranteeing the value of assets.	但是多数债券持有者则可收到政府注资的保护。


A government may wish to bail out a financial institution and provide protection to its creditors for two reasons.	比如在AIG，美银，花旗以及房利美的救助中，公司的债券持有人全部受到照顾，可是公司的股东则损失惨重。


First, with respect to depositors or other creditors that are free to withdraw their capital on short notice, a protective government umbrella might be necessary to prevent inefficient “runs” on the institution’s assets that could trigger similar runs at other institutions.	英国，欧洲大陆，以及其他的地方也是如此。 债券持有人之所以受到救助，是因为各国政府普遍选择以注资而非普通或优先股（从属于债券持有人的利益）的形式，或者以收购和资产价值担保来改善银行资产负债表的方式给与救助。


Second, most small creditors are “non-adjusting,” in the sense that they are unable to monitor and study the financial institution’s situation when agreeing to do business with it.	第一是考虑到享有自由取款的储户及其他债权人。 一个具保护能力的政府可能需要防止债权人无效率的“挤兑”金融企业资产，因为如果某个金融机构产生“挤兑”，将会引发其他银行发生类似的情况。


To enable small creditors to use the financial system, it might be efficient for the government to guarantee (explicitly or implicitly) their claims.	再者，多数小债权人都是“缺乏调节力”的，因为在同金融机构达成协议的时候，这些小债权人无法得知并监督该机构的实际状况。 为保小债权人得以享受金融体系的优越，政府出面对他们的利益提供各种形式的担保可能也是有其利的。


But, while these considerations provide a basis for providing full protection to depositors and other depositor-like creditors when a financial institution is bailed out, they do not justify extending such protection to bondholders.	当某个金融机构得到救助的时候，在顾及上述各方面的情况下，储户及其他类储户性质的债权人就当得到全面的保护，不过债券持有人则不能因此受顾。


Unlike depositors, bondholders generally are not free to withdraw their capital on short notice.	债券持有人不比储户，他们普遍不具有即刻变现所持资本的自由。


They are paid at a contractually specified time, which may be years away.	按照合约规定，这些债券持有人都是在某个特定的时间得到支付，而这个约定的时间可能长达数年。


Thus, if a financial firm appears to have difficulties, its bondholders cannot stage a run on its assets and how these bondholders fare cannot be expected to trigger runs by bondholders in other companies.	所以，如果一家金融机构出现麻烦迹象，其债券持有人也无法急忙兑现他们的资产，而且他们的状况如何也不会引发其他企业的债券持有人“挤兑”资产。


Moreover, when providing their capital to a financial firm, bondholders can generally be expected to obtain contractual terms that reflect the risks they face.	此外，在债券持有人向一家金融机构提供资本的时候，他们都会同企业签订反映所承风险的合同。


Indeed, the need to compensate bondholders for risks could provide market discipline: when financial firms operate in ways that can be expected to produce increased risks down the road, they should expect to “pay” with, say, higher interest rates or tighter conditions.	实际上，金融机构需要对债券持有人提供风险补偿这一条件能够形成一定的市场约束：当预期到金融机构的运作会产生更高的风险的时候，他们就当支付更高的利率或者在合约中定下更加严格的条款。


But this source of market discipline would cease to work if the government’s protective umbrella were perceived to extend to bondholders.	但是一旦人们认为政府的保护伞会利及债券持有人的时候，这种市场约束力就消失了。


If bondholders knew that the government would protect them, they would not insist on getting stricter contractual terms when they face greater risks.	如果债券持有人知道政府将会保护自己，那么在他们承担更高风险的时候，就不会坚持要求同金融机构签订更严格的合约条款。


The problem of “moral hazard” – which posits that actors will take excessive risks if they do not expect to bear fully the consequences of their actions – is commonly cited as a reason not to protect shareholders of bailed-out firms.	“道德风险”（认为当行为人预期到自己不用承担所有自己行为的后果时，行为人将会冒更大的风险）问题通常都被视为不保护受助企业股东的缘由所在。


But it also counsels against protecting firms’ bondholders.	但这同时表明应将债券持有人排除在保护圈之外。


Thus, when a large financial firm runs into problems that require a government bailout, the government should be prepared to provide a safety net to depositors and depositor-like creditors, but not to bondholders.	所以，当一家大型金融机构驶入泥潭，需要政府救助的时候，政府就应当做好保护储户以及类储户性质的债权人的准备，而不要去顾及债券持有人。


In particular, if the firm’s equity capital erodes, the government should not provide funds (directly or indirectly) to increase the cushion available to bondholders.	当企业的权益资本变质的时候，政府尤其不应当为债券持有人直接或间接提供资本以供缓冲。


Rather, bonds should be at least partly converted into equity capital, and any infusion of new capital by the government should be in exchange for securities that are senior to those of existing bondholders.	更好的做法应当是，将债券（至少是部分债券）转换为权益资本，并且政府注入的任何新鲜资本都应当用以购买优先于债券持有人所持有的债券的企业证券。


Governments should not only avoid protecting bondholders after the fact, when the details of a bailout are worked out; but should also make their commitment to this approach clear in advance.	在政府救助计划细节定好之后，政府不仅应当避免对债券持有人提供保护，还应当把丑话清楚地说在前面。


Some of the benefits of a government policy that induces bondholders to insist on stricter terms when financial firms take larger risks would not be fully realized if bondholders believed that the government might protect their interests in the event of a bailout.	如果债券持有人认为政府在救助企业的时候也可能会保护自己的利益的话，那么当金融机构进行更大风险操作时，促使债券持有人同金融机构签订更加严格合同条款的政府政策将无法发挥所有的效用。


In other words, governments should establish bailout policies before the need to intervene arises, rather than make ad hoc decisions when financial firms get into trouble.	换言之，政府应当在需救助事件发生之前就制定好一套救助政策，而不是当金融机构遇到麻烦的时候才临时做出某种决定。


The best policy should categorically exclude bondholders from the set of potential beneficiaries of government bailouts.	最佳的政府政策应当将债券持有人坚决划除在政府救助的得益人之外。


This would not only eliminate some of the unnecessary costs of government bailouts, but would also reduce their incidence.	因为这不仅能够消除不必要的救助成本，还将会减少需要救助实际发生的可能性。


Should Children Take Antidepressants?	儿童应该服食抗抑郁药吗？


The last 12 months have witnessed radical changes and considerable controversy regarding how childhood and teenage depression is treated.	在过去的一年中，儿童及青少年抑郁症的治疗方案发生了彻底的变化，同时也引起了诸多争议。


Although few antidepressant drugs have been licensed for pediatric use, rates of prescribing in the under-18 age group have risen by around 60% over the past decade, with over a million children and adolescents receiving what are called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI’s).	尽管目前为止几乎没有一种抗抑郁药获准用于治疗儿童抑郁患者，但十年以来，18岁以下人群使用抗抑郁类药的人数增加了60%，与此同时，还有超过一百万的儿童和未成年人正在使用一种叫做复合胺再摄取抑制剂(SSRI’s)的药物。


Now, however, concerns over these drugs’ safety and side effects in children and adolescents – including elevated suicide rates – have awakened regulators in many countries.	但是现在，这些药品对儿童和青少年的安全性问题及其副作用——其中包括不断上升的自杀率——已经引起了许多国家政府的重视。


After reviewing all relevant pediatric trials, the UK’s Medinces and Heathcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) advised that the risks outweighed the benefits for all SSRI’s (except fluoxetine), and that these products should not be prescribed as new therapy for patients under 18 years of age with depressive illness.	在评估了所有相关儿科案例之后，英国医药与健康产品管理委员会(MHRA)认为所有的SSRI’s药物的（除了氟西汀以外）风险性大于其药效，因此禁止将这些药品作为治疗18岁以下患者的治疗用药。


For the first time, the MHRA made public a summary of the review that this decision was based on, including both efficacy and safety data for all of the trials, regardless of whether they had previously been published or not.	为此，英国医药与健康产品管理委员会(MHRA)第一次公布了一份调查摘要，申明此决定是在评估了所有案例的功效性和安全性数据之后作出的，无论这些数据曾经被公布与否。


This was important because about half of the trials had not been published in peer-reviewed journals.	这一点相当争议颇多，因为有近一半的案例没有在同类医学期刊中出现过。


The pediatric trial data released by the MHRA presented a unique opportunity to examine whether the unpublished data supported the findings from published studies of SSRI’s.	MHRA所公布的儿科案例数据给人们提供了一个难得的机会，去调查那些未曾公开的数据是否对有关SSRI’s并已发表的研究结果有利。


My colleagues and I addressed this question in a review published in The Lancet in April 2004. The review showed that while the published data generally indicated minimal risk, the unpublished trial data were far less sanguine, and even suggested an increased risk of serious adverse events, including suicide-related behavior.	我和同事们在2004年4月的《The Lancet》的一篇评论中也提到这一问题，尽管发布的数据一般只说明了最小风险，但实际上，那些被隐匿的数据所说明的情况不容乐观，甚至也暗示了引发严重恶性事件的风险性正在不断升高，包括自杀倾向的行为。


The MHRA was not alone in being concerned about pediatric trials.	当然，关注儿童临床案例的不止英国医药与健康产品管理委员会(MHRA)一家。


A review in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) in April 2004, claimed that most papers on SSRI trials overstated the evidence for efficacy and understated the risk of harm.	《英国医学杂志》(《British Medical Journal》)2004年4月称，关于SSRI临床案例的大部分论文都夸大了它的实际效用，而对它的危险性却轻描淡写。


An article by the Center for Science in the Public Interest classified all available published placebo-controlled trials of SSRI’s in children and adolescents as industry-funded or non-industry funded.	SSRI’s控制安慰剂用量后对儿童和青少年进行试验，公众利益科学中心(Center for Science in the Public Interest)对已发表的这些实验进行分类后，发表文章称，这种试验可分为两种，一种为厂商赞助性试验，另一种为非厂商赞助性试验。


The results showed that 90% of industry-funded trials in the published literature were reported as positive, while only 55.6% of non-industry-funded trials were positive.	前者的90%在社会公共刊物中被正面报道，与之相比，正面报道非厂商赞助性试验的概率只有55. 6%。


More recently, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) applied a ”black box” warning to all antidepressant drugs labelling, but fell short of restricting the use of any individual drug.	前不久，美国食品药物管理局(FDA)在所有的抗抑郁类药品标签上添加“黑框”警告，但却无法限制于个人使用此类药品。


This was done after an FDA commissioned re-analysis of safety data from all trials of the newer antidepressants demonstrated increased risk of suicidality (definitive suicidal behaviour/ ideation) and increased risk of treatment-emergent hostility or agitation in those treated with the active drug compared to placebo.	在此之前，FDA授权对一些新抗抑郁类药品试验的安全数据进行再分析，结果发现这些药品与安慰剂相比，能造成更高的自杀性（确定的自杀行为/倾向）风险和更强烈的紧急治疗敌对情绪或兴奋感。


Taken together, it is not hard to see why some commentators argue that there has been little attempt by the pharmaceutical industry to properly assess the risks and benefits of their products in under 18’s.	纵观上述几点，难怪一些评论家总是要指责医药行业态度消极，对重新评估这些用于18岁以下未成年人的药品无动于衷。


Often, where trials have been conducted, only favorable results have been published.	通常来说，进行临床试验的机构只会公开对其有利的结果。


The problem is widespread and not restricted to drug companies.	这一现象不仅仅在医药公司，在整个行业都普遍存在。


Both regulators and clinicians who run trials have been criticized.	为此，批评的矛头指向了进行临床试验的政府机构和医药机构。


Adding further fuel to the fire, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer recently filed a civil lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline for potentially misleading doctors by publicizing a favorable study of paroxetine for pediatric depression while downplaying other unfavorable trials.	纽约州司法部长埃略特． 斯皮策(Eliot Spitzer)也参与进这场风波，于近期对葛兰素史克提出了一项民事诉讼，认为葛兰素史克一方面对通过对关帕罗西汀的偏好性研究进行大力宣传，一方面故意忽略那些对他们不利的临床案例，而对医生们形成了潜意识的误导。


In response, GlaxoSmithKline made full-trial reports of all studies involving paroxetine in patients under 18 available on their website.	作为回应，葛兰素史克对其网站上使用帕罗西汀的18岁以下患者进行调查后，发表了一份详尽的临床案例研究报告。


The case points to several changes in the way data are collected and released that are urgently needed to determine definitively whether SSRI’s are safe and effective for treating pediatric depression.	这一案例其实发出了这样一个信号：改变收集和公布实验数据的方式亟需改变，以确定SSRI’s用于抑郁症治疗是否安全。


Tighter regulation of all clinical trials is needed, as is a public worldwide database that contains trial protocols and regularly updated information about trial status and publications.	同时应加强对临床试验的管理，以使它成为一个全球性的公共数据库，提供各种临床试验方案，发布定期更新的试验进展状况。


Moreover, both benefits and harms of all trials must be published within a reasonable timeframe, and properly designed, non-industry-funded trials are needed to confirm both safety and efficacy. Finally, product labels must reflect negative or equivocal results, not just those that are positive.	此外，无论是设计性实验，非厂商赞助的实验还是那些具有争议结果的试验，其利弊都应该在一个合理的时间框架内被公布。


Such changes may well lead to a dramatic reduction in the use of SSRI’s in treating depressed children and adolescents.	这些改变很有可能导致SSRI’s在儿童和青少年抑郁症患者中使用的比例急速下降。


But whatever the outcome, it is urgent that doubts about the safety of these drugs are resolved.	但是无论会产生何种结果，在人群中树立起对于此类药品安全的意识已是刻不容缓。


Should China be “Contained”?	中国应当被遏制吗?


CAMBRIDGE – This month marks the 40th anniversary of Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing, which launched the process of mending a 20-year breach in diplomatic relations between the United States and China.	发自剑桥——就在40年前的7月，亨利·基辛格秘密访问北京，着手修复中美两国间长达20年的外交裂痕。


That trip, and President Richard Nixon’s subsequent visit, represented a major Cold War realignment. The US and China put aside their intense hostility in a joint and successful effort to contain an expansionist Soviet Union.	而那次访问以及随后美国总统理查德·尼克松的访华都意味着冷战中的一次重新结盟，从此双方摒弃激烈对立，成功联手遏制了苏联的扩张主义行动。


Today, the Soviet Union has vanished, and Chinese power is growing.	如今苏联早已灰飞烟灭，而中国却在不断膨胀。


Some Americans argue that China’s rise cannot be peaceful, and that the US, therefore, should now adopt a policy of containing the People’s Republic.	有些美国人认为中国不可能以和平的方式实现崛起，应当立刻采取政策进行遏制。


Indeed, many Chinese officials perceive that to be the current American strategy.	事实上许多中国官员也认为这就是美国的现行战略。


They are wrong.	但这些人都错了。


After all, Cold War containment of the USSR meant virtually no trade and little social contact.	毕竟在美国对苏联的冷战遏制过程中，双方基本不存在任何贸易往来，社会间接触也少之又少。


Today, by contrast, the US not only has massive trade with China, but also extensive social contact, including 125,000 Chinese students attending American universities.	相比之下如今的美国不仅与中国有着巨额双边贸易，还具备广泛的社会接触，其中包括12. 5万名在美国各大学求学的中国留学生。


With the end of the Cold War, the containment of the Soviet Union ushered in by Kissinger’s visit could no longer serve as the basis for US-China relations.	随着冷战结束，基辛格访华所引入的遏制苏联计划已不再是中美关系的基础。


Moreover, relations with China cooled after the Tiananmen Square shootings in 1989, and the Clinton administration had to devise a new approach.	而两国关系更在1989年天安门事件后跌入冰点，以致克林顿政府只能另辟蹊径。


When I was supervising the Pentagon’s East Asia Strategy Review in 1994, we rejected the idea of containment of China for two reasons. If we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing an enemy in the future.	当笔者在1994年为五角大楼制定的《东亚战略概述》（East Asia Strategy Review）担任顾问时，我们提出了反对遏制中国的两点理由：首先，如果视中国为敌，那么我们就注定在未来收获一个敌人；


If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee friendship, but we could at least keep open the possibility of more benign outcomes.	倘若待中国为友，虽无法确保一定能建立友谊，但至少保留了取得更加良性成果的可能性。


In addition, it would have been difficult to persuade other countries to join a coalition to contain China unless China resorted to bullying tactics, as the Soviets did after World War II.	其次，除非中国采取类似苏联在二战后的那种恐吓策略，否则难以说服其他国家加入遏制中国的行列。


Only China, by its behavior, could organize the containment of China by others.	只有中国自己动手犯错才可能引发其他国家遏制中国。


Instead of containment, the strategy that the Clinton administration devised could be termed “integrate but hedge” – something like Ronald Reagan’s “trust but verify” approach to strategic agreements with the Soviets.	克林顿政府没有选择遏制，而是设计出了一种名为“融合，但包围”（integrate but hedge）的策略——这在某种程度上与里根在与苏方签订战略协议时采取的“信任，但监察”（trust but verify）策略类似。


On one hand, the US supported China’s membership in the World Trade Organization and accepted Chinese goods and visitors.	一方面，美国支持中国加入世界贸易组织并接受中国商品和访问人员。


On the other hand, the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration of April 1996 affirmed that the US-Japan security treaty, rather than being a Cold War relic, would provide the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia.	另一方面，1996年4月签订的克林顿-桥本宣言确保美日安全条约能成为东亚地区稳定和繁荣的基础，而不仅仅是一项冷战遗产。


Clinton also began to improve relations with India, a strategy that has enjoyed bipartisan support in the US.	克林顿同时也在民主共和两党的支持下着手与印度改善关系。


The Bush administration continued to improve bilateral relations, while deepening and formalizing the economic dialogue with China.	随后小布什政府继续改善双边关系，并将中美经济对话进一步深入和常态化。


Then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made clear that the US would accept the rise of China as a “responsible stakeholder.”	其国务卿罗伯特·佐利克公开表明美国可以接受中国作为一个“负责任的利害攸关方”而走向崛起。


That policy continues to guide the Obama administration, which has broadened the annual economic consultations with China to include security issues.	这一政策也在奥巴马政府得以延续，并进一步将两国的年度经济磋商议题扩展到安全事务方面。


As I argue in my new book The Future of Power, one of the major power shifts of the twenty-first century is Asia revival.	正如笔者在拙作《权力的未来》中所提到的那样，二十一世纪所发生的其中一个权力转移就是亚洲的复兴。


In 1800, Asia represented half the world’s population and half the world’s economy.	在1880年，亚洲拥有占世界1/2的人口和经济总量。


By 1900, the industrial revolution in Europe and North America drove down Asia’s share of global output to 20%.	到了1900年，欧美地区的工业革命将亚洲生产总值的全球份额压低到只剩20%。


By the middle of this century, Asia should again represent half the world’s population and GDP.	而预计到了本世纪中叶，亚洲将重新恢复1880年的辉煌。


This is a natural and welcome evolution, as it enables hundreds of millions of people to escape from poverty. At the same time, however, it has given rise to fears that China will become a threat to the US.	这是一个合理而且可喜的进步，数亿人将因此摆脱贫困，但与此同时也催生了某种恐慌情绪，认为中国将成为美国的威胁。


Such fears appear exaggerated, particularly when one considers that Asia is not one entity. It has its own internal balance of power.	这些恐慌其实过于夸张了，尤其是考虑到亚洲并非一个整体，其内���也存在着权力平衡的现状。


Japan, India, Vietnam, and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome a US presence in the region.	日本、印度，越南以及其他国家都不希望被中国所操纵，因此也乐于接受美国在该区域的存在。


Unless China develops its “soft power,” the rise in its military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbors into seeking coalitions to balance its rise.	而除非中国能发展出自身的“软实力”，否则其不断膨胀的军事和经济力量将更可能引起其他邻国的恐慌，并随之结成联盟予以制衡。


It is as if Mexico and Canada sought an alliance with China to balance US power in North America.	就像加拿大，墨西哥与中国结盟共同抗衡美国一样。


After the 2008-2009 financial crisis, as China recovered rapidly and resumed 10% annual economic growth, some Chinese officials and commentators urged a more assertive foreign policy to reflect China’s new strength.	由于中国经济在2008~2009年经济危机后迅速复原并回复到10%的年增长率，有些中国官员和政策评论员都敦促政府采取某种更为自信的外交政策以展现自身的新势力。


Many mistakenly believed that the US was in decline, and that the crisis presented new strategic opportunities for China.	许多人错误地认为美国正在走向衰落，而危机则为中国提供了新的战略机遇。


For example, China began pressing territorial claims in the South China Sea, as well as escalating a longstanding border dispute with India.	于是中国一方面开始加紧对南中国海的领土诉求，另一方面也逐渐升级与印度的长期边界纷争。


The net result is that over the past two years, China has worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and others – quite a remarkable record that confirms the US strategic premise that “only China can contain China.”	而这些举动的后果就是过去两年间中国与日本、印度、韩国，越南和其他国家的关系都走向恶化——这也为美国那条“只有中国才能遏制中国”的战略前提提供了绝佳的注脚。


But it would be a mistake to focus only on the hedging part of American strategy.	但仅仅将目光放在美国战略的“包围”方面是不全面的。


The US and China (as well as other countries) have much to gain from collaborating on transnational issues.	美国和中国（以及其他国家）可以通过在国际事务上的合作获益良多。


One cannot devise and implement solutions to global financial stability, climate change, cyber terrorism, or pandemics without such cooperation.	没有这些合作，一个国家是无法独力策划和应对包括全球金融稳定、气候变化，打击网络犯罪或者抗击传染病等事务的。


If power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants, it is important to remember that sometimes our power is greater when we act with others rather than merely over others.	而如果实力就是确保实现某些人制定的目标的能力，也必须牢记有时实力会在与他人合作（而非施加于他人之上）时变得更加强大。


This important dimension of a “smart power” strategy for the twenty-first century is not captured by the concept of containment.	一个21世纪“巧实力”战略的重要部分也不应被遏制的想法所占据。


When Kissinger landed in Beijing four decades ago, he ushered in not only a Cold War transformation, but also a new era of US-Chinese engagement.	须知当基辛格在40年前飞抵北京的时候，他带来的可不仅仅是一场冷战的转变，还迎来了一个中美合作的新时代。


Should Europe Regulate Sovereign Wealth Funds?	欧洲应该监管主权财富基金么？


WIESBADEN – State-controlled investments from overseas – so-called sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) – are now the subject of intense debate.	WIESBADEN—来自海外的受国家掌控的投资—即所谓主权财富基金(SWFs)—现在是个颇具争议的话题。


The United States and France have made their fears known.	美国和法国公开表示了对此的担忧。


In Germany, too, the debate centers on SWFs’ political and economic significance for the country’s future.	在德国，争论的焦点也是关于SWFs对该国未来的政治和经济意义。


The problem has been exacerbated by the growing wealth of a number of countries, some of them formerly run by socialist or communist regimes.	而这一问题又因为一些曾被社会主义或共产主义政权治理的国家的财富增长而更为突出。


China, Russia, India, and the Gulf States have integrated their wealth into the global economy, to the immense benefit of world trade.	乘着世界贸易所带来的巨大收益的东风，中国、俄罗斯、印度和海湾国家已将它们的财富融入了全球经济之中。


The openness of Germany’s markets makes them especially attractive to global trade.	德国市场的开放性使它们对全球贸易具有特别的吸引力。


This openness will not change, yet there are some who now call for new safety fences – in other words, for protection.	这种开放性不会改变，但现在有人呼吁建立新的安全机制—换言之，就是保护机制。


For example, Russian investors are interested in taking a massive share in the German-French aerospace company EADS, which is already 5%-owned by a Russian bank.	例如，俄罗斯的投资者现在对大量持有德-法航空航天工业公司EADS的股份兴趣高涨。 该公司5%的股份已经为一家俄罗斯银行所拥有。


For many, this proposal has underscored a change in investors’ behavior.	对很多人而言，这种投资动议标志着投资者行为的改变。


But what, exactly, has changed?	但究竟是怎样的改变呢？


SWFs have been around for years.	SWFs并非初来乍到。


Among the first countries to invest their considerable state-owned funds were Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Norway, and Singapore.	最早将庞大的国有基金进行投资的国家包括科威特、阿拉伯联合酋长国、挪威和新加坡。


They invested, and still invest, their budgetary surpluses worldwide in government bonds and state-owned enterprises.	他们曾经并正在将预算赢余投资于全球的政府债券和国有企业。


Industrialized countries like the US and Japan also have so-called “reserve funds.”	美国和日本这样的工业化国家也有所谓的“储备基金”。


Some of these funds are huge.	有的此类基金规模甚为庞大。


In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has estimated capital assets of $875 billion, making it probably the world’s largest state-owned investment company.	在阿联酋，阿布扎比投资局的资本资产估计达到8750亿美元，使其可能是全世界最大的国有投资公司。


In July 2007, another rich UAE fund, Dubai International Capital, bought 3% of EADS, after taking a stake of almost 2% in the automotive manufacturer Daimler in January 2006.	在2007年7月，另一支富有的阿联酋基金，“迪拜国际资本”买下了EADS 3%的股份。 而此前该基金已于2006年1月买下了汽车生产商戴姆勒公司近2%的股份。


The Kuwait Investment Authority, also a state-owned fund, holds 7% of Daimler.	同为国有基金的科威特投资局持有戴姆勒7%的股份。


Singapore possesses two SWFs – Temasek-Holdings, with capital assets of roughly $100 billion, and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, with approximately $330 billion.	新加坡拥有两只SWFs—淡马锡控股（资本资产约1000亿美金）和新加坡政府投资公司（资本资产约3300亿美金）。


Both funds are invested worldwide, including with the port operator PSA.	两只基金都在全世界范围内投资，包括对港口营运商PSA的投资。


Some funds are subject to considerable restrictions.	有些基金运作受到很大的限制。


Japan limits its state investments overseas to bonds, mostly those issued by the US.	日本的国家海外投资仅限于债券，且大多是美国发行的债券。


Until recently, China, which holds foreign currency reserves of more than $1.2 trillion (the world’s largest), followed this policy, too.	直到最近，拥有（全世界最大）外汇储备超过1. 2万亿美金的中国也遵循着这一严格政策。


But a $3 billion investment by the Chinese SWF in the US investment firm Blackstone suggests a more worryingly strategic investment policy, one that appears aimed at advancing its own industrial interests in certain markets.	但这只中国SWF对美国投资公司黑石的30亿美元注资则显示了一种更令人担忧的战略投资政策，一种似乎是以推进自己在某些市场的产业利益为目的的政策。


Russia, where the line between state-controlled and privately controlled companies is often blurry, has demonstrated this strategy in Europe.	国有与私营公司界限通常较为模糊的俄罗斯也在欧洲显示了这样的政策。


Indeed, Russian investments in aerospace, telecommunications, and, most of all, in the energy sector, are the main source of concern for Germany.	的确，俄罗斯在航空航天、电讯以及最重要的能源行业的投资，令德国最为关注。


Are state-controlled investors now aiming primarily for strategic rather than purely financial returns?	国有投资者的投资目前主要是出于战略目的而不是纯粹为了经济回报么？


Because SWFs’ resources are so substantial, it is advisable to take precautions to avoid becoming a target of politically motivated market manipulation, or becoming economically and psychologically dependent on foreign governments’ decisions.	由于SWFs的资源非常雄厚，所以从理论上将它们应该未雨绸缪避免成为政治性市场操纵的目标，或避免在经济和心理上依赖外国政府的决策。


Most Western countries already have instruments to deter foreigners from making unwanted investments, not only in defense industries, but also in other sectors.	大多数的西方国家都已经出台了相关的举措，不仅在国防工业，也在其他的工业部门阻止外国人进行非其所愿的投资。


But, while Germany’s Foreign Trade and Payments Act protects against takeovers in the defense industry (though the law needs strengthening) elsewhere Germany has no system for examining investments by SWFs that may be strategically motivated.	但是，尽管德国的《对外贸易和付款法案》保护国防工业不被并购（虽然该法律仍需强化），而在其他产业，德国却没有审查可能具有战略目的的SWFs投资的体系。


The International Monetary Fund now encourages more transparency by foreign investors, and has plans for a code of conduct.	国际货币基金组织现正鼓励外国投资者增加透明度，并已准备出台一套行为规范。


The EU Commission also favors voluntary agreements aimed at strengthening transparency.	欧盟委员会也希望各方在增强透明度方面达成自愿协议。


Some SWFs now seem willing to engage in constructive dialogue.	有些SWFs现在也似乎愿意参与建设性的对话。


But assessing potential threats is not easy.	但评估潜在的威胁并非易事。


Most investments are seen to benefit a country’s economy, if not its security.	大多数投资被认为即便不会增加目的国的安全利益，也会增进经济利益。


We in Germany need to distinguish one from the other.	我们德国需要将这两种利益区别开来。


Bills have been drafted that amount to amendments to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and related regulations.	相关的议案正在起草中，它们会形成《对外贸易与付款法案》的修正案和相关的监管机制。


While strengthening the act, they seek to avoid affecting the openness of the German economy.	在强化该法案的同时，它们也力图避免影响德国经济的开放性。


Under proposed new legislation, if a foreign investment in a German company amounts to more than 25%, an assessment can be made of whether public order or safety might be threatened.	在新的立法提案中，如果一家外国公司在一家德国公司的投资超��了25%，就可以对公共秩序或安全是否可能受到威胁进行评估。


In my view, this would address the concerns about SWFs, while not generally impeding investment because it would apply only in a very few cases.	在我看来，这样的举措可以应对关于SWFs的担忧，而又不会在总体上妨碍投资，因为它只适用于极少数的个案。


Germany has also drawn up a plan to protect its industries that is modeled on US regulation.	德国也已计划参照美国的监管模式对其工业进行保护。


Since 1988, the US president can prohibit foreign direct investment if it is seen as a threat to national security.	从1988年开始，美国总统就有权禁止被认为对国家安全构成威胁的外国直接投资。


An additional control was introduced last year, so now all direct investments in which a foreign government is involved are scrutinized by the Committee on Foreign Direct Investment.	去年又引入了另一项控制机制，因此现在所有涉及外国政府的直接投资都会经由外国直接投资委员会审核。


The principle of reciprocity should clearly apply to transnational investments.	互惠原则显然应该适用于跨国投资。


Germany is open to foreign investors, but in return we Germans demand the same market access abroad.	德国对外国投资者开放，但作为回报，我们德国人要求在国外享有同样的市场准入。


Much remains to be done in this area even in Europe, as Germany’s own experiences with France and Spain demonstrate.	而正如德国自身在同法国和西班牙打交道的经验中所显示的那样，欧洲在这方面还有很长的路要走。


In China and almost all Middle Eastern countries, foreigners are restricted to minority shareholdings and must contend with high import duties and numerous non-tariff barriers.	在中国和几乎所有的中东国家，外国人被限制只能少数控股并必须面对高进口关税和无数的非关税壁垒。


Protective measures must remain the exception rather than the rule.	保护性措施必须作为特例而不是规则。


We Europeans must accept the challenges of global competition, and transnational investments are the basis of thriving economic development at home and abroad.	我们欧洲人必须接受全球竞争和基于国内外经济蓬勃发展的跨国投资的挑战。


Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to become the passive economic playthings of other nations, or of big state-owned enterprises.	但无论如何，我们都不能允许自己被动地成为其他国家或大型国有企业的经济玩物。


We must play an active part in shaping globalization, and that means crafting appropriate rules.	我们必须在全球化的形成中发挥积极作用，而这就意味着打造适当的规则。


Should Germany Exit the Euro?	德国应该退出欧元吗？


MUNICH – Last summer, the financier George Soros urged Germany to agree to the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, calling on the country to “lead or leave.”	慕尼黑—去年夏天，金融家乔治·索罗斯敦促德国同意成立欧洲稳定性机制（ESM），要求德国“要么领导，要么离开”。


Now he says that Germany should exit the euro if it continues to block the introduction of Eurobonds.	如今，他说，德国应该退出欧元，如果它继续阻挠欧元债券的推出的话。


Soros is playing with fire.	索罗斯在玩火。


Leaving the eurozone is precisely what the newly founded “Alternative for Germany” party, which draws support from a wide swath of society, is demanding.	退出欧元区正是新成立的“德国替代方案”（Alternative for Germany）党的要求，该党受到了社会的广泛支持。


Crunch time is fast approaching.	动荡时刻正在快速临近。


Cyprus is almost out of the euro, its banks’ collapse having been delayed by the European Central Bank’s provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance, while euroskeptic parties led by Beppe Grillo and Silvio Berlusconi garnered a combined total of 55% of the popular vote in the latest Italian general election.	塞浦路斯几乎已经脱离欧元，其银行的崩溃因欧洲央行提供的紧急流动性援助而被延迟，与此同时，格里洛（Beppe Grillo）和贝卢斯科尼领导的反欧元政党在最新的意大利普选中总共获得55%的民众支持。


Moreover, the Greeks and Spaniards are unlikely to be able to bear the strain of economic austerity much longer, with youth unemployment inching toward 60%.	此外，希腊人和西班牙人也不可能再长时间忍受经济紧缩的压抑了，这两个国家的年轻人失业率在朝60%挺进。


The independence movement in Catalonia has gathered so much momentum that a leading Spanish general has vowed to send troops into Barcelona should the province hold a referendum on secession.	加泰罗尼亚独立运动风起云涌，以至于一位西班牙高级将军誓要派遣军队进驻巴塞罗那，如果加泰罗尼亚省举行独立公投的话。


France, too, has competitiveness problems, and is unable to meet its commitments under the European Union’s Fiscal Compact.	法国也存在竞争力问题，无法坚守其欧盟财政契约义务。


Portugal needs a new rescue program, and Slovenia could soon be asking for a rescue as well.	葡萄牙需要新的援助计划，斯洛文尼亚也将很快要求援助。


Many investors echo Soros.	许多投资者同意索罗斯。


They want to cut and run – to unload their toxic paper onto intergovernmental rescuers, who should pay for it with the proceeds of Eurobond sales, and put their money in safer havens.	他们想出货脱逃——把手上的有毒票据转移给跨政府救星，后者将用出售欧元债券的钱来付账，让前者把钱投入更安全的避风港。


The public already is being misused in an effort to mop up junk securities and support feeble banks, with taxpayer-funded institutions such as the ECB and the bailout programs having by now provided €1.2 trillion ($1.6 trillion) in international credit.	公众已经被出卖了一次——到目前为止，欧洲央行等纳税人出资的机构和援助计划已经提供了1. 2万亿欧元的国际信用，囤积着垃圾证券，支持着疲软的银行。


If Soros were right, and Germany had to choose between Eurobonds and the euro, many Germans would surely prefer to leave the euro.	如果索罗斯是对的，德国必须在欧元债券和欧元中间做出选择，那么许多德国人毫无疑问会选择离开欧元。


The new German political party would attract much more support, and sentiment might shift.	德国替代方案党将吸引更多的支持，情绪将会发生改变。


The euro itself would be finished; after all, its primary task was to break the Bundesbank’s dominance in monetary policy.	欧元本身将会迎来末日； 毕竟，其主要目的是打破德国央行在货币政策上的主导权。


But Soros is wrong.	但索罗斯是错的。


For starters, there is no legal basis for his demand.	首先，他的要求没有法律基础。


Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union expressly forbids the mutualization of debt.	欧盟运行条约（Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union）第125条明文禁止债务共同化。


Worst of all, Soros does not recognize the real nature of the eurozone’s problems.	最糟糕的是，索罗斯没有认识到欧元区问题的真正性质。


The ongoing financial crisis is merely a symptom of the monetary union’s underlying malady: its southern members’ loss of competitiveness.	发酵中的金融危机只是货币联盟深层症结的症候：南欧成员国竞争力缺失���


The euro gave these countries access to cheap credit, which was used to finance wage increases that were not underpinned by productivity gains.	欧元让这些国家得到了廉价信用，这笔信用被用来为工资提升买单，而工资的提升并无生产率提高作为支撑。


This led to a price explosion and massive external deficits.	这导致价格暴涨，外部赤字剧增。


Maintaining these countries’ excessive prices and nominal incomes with artificially cheap credit guaranteed by other countries would only make the loss of competitiveness permanent.	用其他国家人造的廉价信用维持这些国家过高的价格和名义收入只能让竞争力缺失永久化。


The entrenchment of debtor-creditor relationships between the states of the eurozone would fuel political tension – as occurred in the United States in its first decades.	欧元区成员国之间债权人-债务人关系的沟壑会助长政治紧张——正如美国建国最初几十年所出现的情景。


In order to regain competitiveness, the southern countries will have to reduce their goods prices, while the northern countries will have to accept higher inflation.	为了重获竞争力，南欧国家将必须降低商品价格，而北欧国家将必须接受更高的通胀。


Eurobonds, however, would impede precisely this outcome, because relative prices in the north can be raised only when northern savers invest their capital at home instead of seeing it publicly escorted to the south by taxpayer-financed credit guarantees.	但是，欧元债券恰恰会阻碍这一结果，因为只有在北欧储蓄者将资本投资于国内，而不是目送这笔钱作为公帑通过纳税人出资的信用担保流向南欧，北欧相对价格才会上升。


According to a study by Goldman Sachs, countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain will have to become 20-30% cheaper, and German prices will have to rise by 20% relative to the eurozone average.	高盛的研究表明，希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙等国家的价格必须下降20%—30%，而德国的价格必须升高20%（相对欧元区平均水平）。


To be sure, if Germany were to leave the common currency, the road back to competitiveness would be easier for the southern countries, since the rump euro would undergo devaluation; but the crisis countries’ fundamental problem would remain as long as the other competitive countries remain in the eurozone.	诚然，如果德国退出共同货币，那么南欧国家的回归竞争力之路将会更加容易，因为残余欧元将会贬值； 但危机国的根本问题将依然存在，只要其他竞争力强国留在欧元区。


Spain, for example, would still have to cut its prices by 22-24% relative to the new eurozone average.	比如，西班牙的价格仍必须下降22—24%（相对新欧元区平均水平）。


From this perspective, the crisis countries would not be spared painful retrenchment as long as they remained in a monetary union that includes competitive countries.	照此看来，危机国不可能摆脱痛苦的缩紧裤腰带，只要它们留在存在竞争力强国的货币联盟中。


The only way to avoid it would be for them to exit the euro and devalue their new currencies.	唯一的避免之法是它们退出欧元，让新货币贬值。


But, so far, they have not been willing to go this route.	但是，到目前为止，它们尚不愿这样做。


Politically, it would be a big mistake for Germany to exit the euro, because that would reinstate the Rhine as the border between France and Germany.	从政治上说，德国退出欧元是个巨大的错误，因为这会重新使莱茵河成为法德分界线。


Franco-German reconciliation, the greatest success of the postwar period in Europe, would be in jeopardy.	法德和解——战后欧洲最伟大的成功——将遭遇挫折。


Thus, the only remaining option, as unpleasant as it may be for some countries, is to tighten budget constraints in the eurozone.	因此，唯一剩下的选择——尽管对一些国家来说难以接受——是收紧欧元区预算约束。


After years of easy money, a way back to reality must be found.	在经历了多年的资金宽松后，必须找到回归现实之路。


If a country is bankrupt, it must let its creditors know that it cannot repay its debts.	如果一国破产，它必须让其债权人知道它无法偿还债务。


And speculators must take responsibility for their decisions, and stop clamoring for taxpayer money whenever their investments turn bad.	投机者必须为他们的决定负责，而不是在投资转坏时叫嚣着要求纳税人的钱来补偿。


Should Iran Be Attacked?	是否应该进攻伊朗？


President George W. Bush has said that Iran’s development of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, and recent press accounts suggest that his administration is exploring preventive military options.	布什总统表示无法接受伊朗发展核武器，近来的新闻报道也显示布什政府正在研究预防性军事策略。


In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has defied the diplomatic efforts of the European Union and others, using the nuclear issue to stir rally domestic support.	而伊朗总统内贾德则对欧盟和其他国家的外交斡旋无动于衷，利用核问题积集国内的支持。


Is it too late to prevent a showdown?	现在要阻止公开的冲突，是否为时已晚？


Iran claims that its nuclear program is aimed solely at peaceful uses, and that it has the right to develop uranium enrichment and other technologies as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).	伊朗宣称其核计划的目的仅在于和平用途，辩称自己作为“核不扩散条约”（NPT）的签字国有权发展铀浓缩等技术。


But it spent 18 years deceiving inspectors from the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency, leading some countries to argue that Iran destroyed its credibility and forfeited its rights to enrichment on its own soil.	然而该国花了18年的时间来迷惑监督机构“国际原子能组织”派出的调查员，以致有的国家认为伊朗已经自毁信誉，放弃了在本国土地上发展铀浓缩的权利。


Russia has offered to provide nuclear enrichment and reprocessing services for the civilian reactor it is building in Iran.	俄罗斯提出为其在伊朗修建的民用反应堆提供核浓缩和再处理服务。


If Iran were interested solely in peaceful uses, the Russian offer or some other plan (such as placing stocks of low enriched uranium in Iran) could meet their needs.	如果伊朗的确只对和平用途感兴趣，那么俄罗斯的提议或者其他某些计划（如在伊朗存放低浓度铀）就足以满足他们的需要。


Iran’s insistence on enrichment inside the country is widely attributed to its desire to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb.	然而伊朗坚持要在国内发展浓缩铀，因此人们普遍认为该国企图生产高浓度铀，用以制造原子弹。


Would an Iranian bomb really be so bad?	让伊朗制造原子弹真的有那么糟糕吗？


Some argue that it could become the basis of stable nuclear deterrence in the region, analogous to the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.	有人认为这样有助于在该地区形成稳定的核威慑，相当于冷战时期美国和苏联之间的核平衡。


But statements by Iranian leaders denying the Holocaust and urging the destruction of Israel have not only cost Iran support in Europe, but are unlikely to make Israel willing to gamble its existence on the prospect of stable deterrence.	然而伊朗领导人屡放厥词，否认大屠杀，鼓吹毁灭以色列，这不但使伊朗失去了欧洲的支持，也使以色列不愿将自己的生存押在核威慑带来的稳定上。


Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others will sit passively while the Persian Shia gain the bomb.	同样，沙特阿拉伯、埃及和其他国家也不会消极地等待波斯什叶派得到原子弹。


They will likely follow suit, and the more weapons proliferate in the volatile Middle East, the more likely it is that accidents and miscalculations could lead to their use.	他们很可能会效法伊朗，而且，在本来就不稳定的中东，核武器扩散得越多，因意外和判断错误而使用核武器的可能性就越大。


Moreover, there are genuine fears that rogue elements in a divided Iranian government might leak weapons technology to terrorist groups.	更严重的是，伊朗分治政府中的无赖分子可能会把武器技术泄露给恐怖主义集团，这样的担心并非杞人忧天。


These are the dangers that lead some to contemplate air strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities before they can make weapons.	鉴于上述风险，有人考虑趁伊朗还不能制造核武器的时候通过空袭摧毁伊朗的核设施。


At first glance, a “surgical” strike may look tempting.	粗看之下，这种“一劳永逸”的打击似乎颇为诱人。


But military options are less attractive when carefully analyzed.	但是经过仔细的分析可以发现，军事行动的吸引力并没有那么大。


Iran’s nuclear facilities are dispersed; some are underground.	伊朗的核设施相当分散； 有些还在地下。


If one adds suppression of air defenses, such a strike might involve roughly 600 targets – far from surgical.	考虑到还要镇压防空武装，打击的目标大约有600个——远远谈不上一劳永逸。


Moreover, while an air strike might set back Iran’s program by a few years, it would solidify nationalist support for the government and the nuclear program, particularly because one attack would not be enough.	而且，空袭虽然可能会将伊朗的核计划推迟几年，但也会促使民族主义者团结起来支持政府和核计划，特别是在一次打击不够的情况下。


The process of protracted strikes could thwart positive political changes among the younger generation, thus reducing the chances of a more democratic and benign Iran emerging in the future.	而如果实施长期打击，那么年轻一代中正面的政治转变可能会受挫，从而降低未来伊朗民主化、温和化的可能性。


At the same time, Iran has effective means of retaliation.	另一方面，伊朗具备有效的报复手段。


It might not be able to close the Strait of Hormuz, but threats to refineries, storage facilities, and tankers would send oil prices even higher.	她或许不能封锁霍尔木兹海峡，但却可以威胁各地的炼油厂、储油设施和油轮，使油价继续飙升。


Moreover, Iran’s support of terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, could bring violence to other countries.	此外，伊朗对黎巴嫩真主党等恐怖组织的支持可能给别的国家带来暴力侵害。


With the outcome of Bush’s ill-advised war in Iraq uncertain and his legacy depending heavily upon finding a political solution, Iran’s support for Iraqi Shiite radicals could give it considerable leverage.	布什轻举妄动发起的伊拉克战争迄今后果仍不明了，他的功过很大程度上取决于是否能找到政治上的解决办法，在这种情况下，伊朗如果支持伊拉克什叶派的极端分子，将取得相当大的优势。


When Bush administration officials say that “all options are on the table,” they are warning the Iranians that the use of force is possible.	布什政府官员说：“不排除任何手段。 ”他们这是在警告伊朗人，军事力量的使用并非不可能。


But one is tempted to believe them when they add that they are now focused on diplomacy.	不过他们又补充说现在主要在考虑外交手段，这倒比较容易让人相信。


As Theodore Roosevelt once said, negotiations may go better when you talk softly but carry a big stick.	正如西奥多·罗斯福说的，一边举着大棒，一边温柔地劝诱，这样谈判的效果可能更好。


At the same time, however, Iran knows how costly it would be for the Americans (and perhaps the Israelis) to use force, which reduces the effect of the threat.	不过同时，伊朗知道美国人（或许还有以色列人）诉诸武力的代价有多么巨大，从而降低了威胁的效果。


At present, a diplomatic solution does not look promising.	目前看来，外交途径前途暗淡。


Iran has threatened to leave the NPT if sanctions are imposed, and Russia and China worry that even modest targeted sanctions could escalate and ultimately legitimize an American use of force that they wish to avoid.	伊朗已经威胁说一旦实施强制制裁就要退出NPT，而俄罗斯和中国都担心即便是有针对性的小规模制裁也可能升级，最终让美国人找到使用武力的借口，而这正是他们想避免的。


China wants to preserve its access to Iranian oil, and Russia seeks to preserve a valuable commercial market.	中国想保住伊朗的石油来源，俄罗斯想保住一个有价值的商业市场。


But both realize that a failure to resolve the issue in the context of the UN (in which they are major stakeholders as permanent members of the Security Council) could severely damage the future of that institution.	不过两国都明白，如果问题不能在联合国（���国都是举足轻重的安理会常任理事国）内解决，那么联合国的未来可能受到严重损害。


Today, the diplomatic package consists mostly of penalties, albeit the small ones of targeted sanctions.	今天，外交解决办法主要由各种惩罚组成，虽然都是有针对性的小规模制裁。


Their main effect will be psychological if widespread support for them creates a sense in Iran that it has isolated itself.	这些惩罚的主要作用是心理上的，通过人们的普遍支持使伊朗觉得自己被孤立起来了。


Unlike North Korea, Iran is more likely to care about its international standing.	和朝鲜不同，伊朗可能会比较在意自己的国际声誉。


The diplomatic package could be made more attractive if the US would add more positive incentives.	如果美国愿意增加积极的鼓励政策，外交解决办法的吸引力可能会有所提高。


Through a credible intermediary, the US could offer to consider security guarantees and relief from existing sanctions if Iran agrees to forego domestic enrichment and accept the Russian offer, perhaps garbed as an IAEA-backed international consortium in which Iran could participate.	美国可以通过一个值得信赖的中间人，提出如果伊朗同意放弃在国内发展铀浓缩技术，接受俄罗斯的提议（可以采取国际联盟的形式，由国际原子能组织管辖，允许伊朗参加），美国愿意考虑提供安全保障，取消现有的制裁。


This would mean abandoning the temptations of coercive regime change that hamstrung American diplomacy in Bush’s first term.	这样的话就要克服强行改变伊朗政体的冲动，毕竟这样的做法在布什的第一任任期内曾使美国外交政策受挫。


By increasing economic and cultural ties, diplomacy might unleash the soft power that could contribute to more gradual regime transformation over the longer term.	外交手段能增进经济和文化联系，有利于发挥软实力，在较长的时期内逐步实现政体的转变。


Meanwhile, such an approach might avoid the costly use of force and buy time for a more benign outcome than what lies at the end of the current path of events.	同时，与当前局势发展的趋势相比，这样的办法可以避免巨额的军事开支，最终的结果也更加温和。


Blaming the Fed	对美联储的谴责


FRANKFURT – Critics of the US Federal Reserve are having a field day with embarrassing revelations of its risk assessments on the eve of the financial crisis.	发自法兰克福——美联储最近披露的金融危机前夕风险评估不但令自己蒙羞，也让它的批评者们获得了一次对其大肆鞭挞的机会。


By law, the Fed is required to publish the transcripts of its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings with a five-year lag.	根据法律，美联储下属联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）的会议记录必须在时隔五年后向公众解密。


While the full-blown crisis did not erupt until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it was clear by the summer of 2007 that something was very wrong in credit markets, which were starting to behave in all sorts of strange ways.	全面危机是在2008年9月雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之后才正式爆发的。 到2007年夏天为止，信贷市场开始变得有点不对劲，并开始以各种各样怪异的方式运作。


Yet many Fed officials clearly failed to recognize the significance of what was unfolding.	然而很多美联储官员显然不能意识到当时这一切的重要性。


One governor opined that the Fed should regard it as a good thing that markets were starting to worry about subprime mortgages.	一个管理员表示美联储应该把这种现象视为好事，因为这体现出市场开始担心次贷问题了。


Another argued that the summertime market stress would most likely be a hiccup.	另一位则认定夏季的市场压力很有可能只是个小问题。


Various critics are seizing on such statements as evidence that the Fed is incompetent, and that its independence should be curtailed, or worse.	各路批评家都抓住这类声明来证明美联储很无能，并主张其独立性应该被减少甚至剥夺。


This is nonsense.	这很荒谬。


Yes, things could and should have been done better; but to single out Fed governors for missing the coming catastrophe is ludicrous.	确实，事情可以也应该被做得更好； 但专门把官员挑出来指责其没有注意到灾难即将来临的做法则是非常荒唐的。


The Fed was hardly alone.	并不只是美联储未能注意到即将来临的经济危机。


In August 2007, few market participants, even those with access to mountains of information and a broad range of expert opinions, had a real clue as to what was going on.	2007年8月，很少市场参与者——即使是那些有能力获取大量信息和广泛专家意见的参与者——能看出些蛛丝马迹。


Certainly the US Congress was clueless; its members were still busy lobbying for the government-backed housing-mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thereby digging the hole deeper.	美国国会肯定是一无所知的； 其成员仍然忙于为政府支持的住房抵押贷款机构——房利美和房地美——四处游说，从而把危机推向更深处。


Nor did the International Monetary Fund have a shining moment.	国际货币基金组织当时也没有意识到所发生的情况。


In April 2007, the IMF released its famous “Valentine’s Day” World Economic Outlook, in which it declared that all of the problems in the United States and other advanced economies that it had been worrying about were overblown.	2007年4月，国际货币基金组织发布了著名的“情人节”世界经济展望，在这份报告中它宣称其一直担忧的美国及其他发达国家经济问题被夸大了。


Moreover, it is misleading to single out the most misguided comments by individual governors in the context of an active intellectual debate over policy.	此外，在对政策进行积极理性探讨的情况下挑出个别官员最具误导性的评论来做为证据有失偏颇。


It is legitimate to criticize individual policymakers who exercised poor judgment, and they should have a mark on their record.	批评个别判断力差的决策者很合理，而且他们也应该被批评。


But that does not impugn the whole FOMC, much less the entire institution.	但是不能由此抹黑整个联邦公开市场委员会，更不能因此批判整个制度。


Central banks’ state-of-the-art macroeconomic models also failed miserably – to a degree that the economics profession has only now begun to acknowledge fully.	各央行最先进的宏观经济模型也非常不幸地未能发挥作用——以至于经济学业界当今时今日才开始完全承认的程度。


Although the Fed assesses many approaches and indicators in making its decisions, there is no doubt that it was heavily influenced by mainstream academic thinking – including the so-called real business cycle models and New Keynesian models – which assumed that financial markets operate flawlessly.	尽管美联储在做决定时评估了很多方法和指标，但毫无疑问它深受主流学术思想的影响——包括所谓真实商业周期模型和新凯恩斯模型——这些模型假设金融市场会完美运行。


Indeed, the economics profession and the world’s major central banks advertised the idea of the “great moderation” – the muting of macroeconomic volatility, owing partly to monetary authorities’ supposedly more scientific, model-based approach to policymaking.	事实上经济学业界以及世界各大国央行都在鼓吹“大稳定”策略——就是抑制宏观经济的波动，而部分则源自于金融当局臆想中的更科学且基于模型的政策制定方法。


We now know that canonical macroeconomic models do not adequately allow for financial-market fragilities, and that fixing the models while retaining their tractability is a formidable task.	我们现在知道标准的宏观经济模型并没有考虑到金融市场的脆弱性，而既要修复模型又保留其可追溯性则是一项艰难的工作。


Frankly, had the models at least allowed for the possibility of credit-market imperfections, the Fed might have paid more attention to credit-market indicators as a reflection of overall financial-market conditions, as central banks in emerging-market countries do.	坦白说，如果这些模型能考虑到信贷市场不完美的可能性，作为对整体金融市场条件的反映，美联储就可能会更多地关注信贷市场指标，就像新兴国家央行所做的一样。


Last but not least, even if the Fed had better understood the risks, it would not have been easy for it to avert the crisis on its own.	最后同样重要的是，即使美联储能在危机爆发之前更清楚地了解这些风险，它仅靠自身来避免风险也极为困难。


The effectiveness of interest-rate policy is limited, and many of the deepest problems were on the regulatory side.	利率政策的效力是有限的，很多最深层次的问题都出在监管方面。


And calibrating a response was not easy.	而要调整反应并不容易。


By late 2007, for example, the Fed and the US Treasury had most likely already seen at least one report arguing that only massive intervention to support subprime loans could forestall a catastrophe.	比如，至2007年底，美联储和美国财政部极有可能已经见过至少一份宣称只有大规模干预支持次级贷款才能阻止灾难的发生的报告。


The idea was to save the financial system from having to deal with safely dismantling the impossibly complex contractual edifices – which did not allow for the possibility of systemic collapse – that it had constructed.	其理念就是想要使金融系统不至于去安全拆解其一手打造的复杂得难以置信的合同网络——而且不得出现系统崩溃的可能性。


Such a bailout would have cost an estimated $500 billion or more, and the main beneficiaries would have included big financial firms.	这样的救助行动可能会花费约五千亿美元甚至更多，而最重要的受益人就包括大型金融公司。


Was there any realistic chance that such a measure would have passed Congress before there was blood in the streets?	有没有这样一种可能——在外面的世界血流成河之前国会就已经通过了这样的措施？


Indeed, it was precisely this logic that me led to give a very dark forecast in a widely covered speech in Singapore on August 19, 2008, a month before Lehman Brothers failed.	事实上，正是这一逻辑让我于2008年8月9日（雷曼兄弟破产前一个月）在一场受到广泛报道的新加坡演讲中作出了一个极为负面的预测。


I argued that things would not get better until they got much worse, and that the collapse of one of the world’s largest financial firms was imminent.	我提出一切在变得更糟糕之前不会变好起来，而且某个全球最大金融企业的倒闭指日可待。


My argument rested on my view that the global economy was entering a major recession, and I had the benefit of my quantitative work, with Carmen Reinhart, on the history of financial crises.	我的论点构建于当时全球经济正在进入一个重大衰退期的观点之上，并受益于我本人和卡门·雷哈特（Carmen Reinhart）一起从事的金融危机史量化研究工作。


I was not trying to be sensational in Singapore.	当时我并无意在新加坡制造轰动。


I thought that what I was saying was completely obvious.	我以为自己所说的一切都是很明显的事实。


Nevertheless, my prediction gained bold front-page headlines in many major newspapers throughout the world.	然而，我的预言却在全世界的许多重要报纸上以粗体字上了头条。


It gained headlines, evidently, because it was still far from a consensus view, although concerns were mounting.	很显然，它之所以上头条是因为人们还没有就这一事情达成一致的观点，尽管各种担忧已经逐渐增加。


Were concerns mounting at the Fed as well in the summer of 2008?	在2008年的那个夏天美联储的担忧也在逐渐上升吗？


We will have to wait until next year to find out.	这要留待明年才知分晓。


But, when we do, let us remember that hindsight is 20-20.	但是当我们知道的时候，那已经是事后诸葛亮了。


Should the Troops Come Home Now?	军队应该立刻回家吗？


Last weekend’s announcement that Iraqi lawmakers have finally formed a unity government is welcome news, both for Iraq and for George W. Bush and Tony Blair.	上周末，伊拉克向世人宣告：立法委终于成立了临时政府，这个消息着实令人鼓舞，无论对伊拉克、乔治·W·布什和托尼·布莱尔来讲莫不如此。


The American and British governments, increasingly unpopular at home, desperately needed some tangible evidence of progress to assuage their domestic critics and to begin to speak openly of an exit strategy.	美国和英国政府在国内的日子越来越艰难，迫切需要用实实在在的进展来缓和国内的批评， 公开把撤军问题提上日程。


But Iraq’s greatest challenges lie ahead.	但伊拉克所面临的最艰巨的挑战还在前面。


If Bush and Blair declare victory before the real battles have begun, they will undermine the very process to which both have committed so much at such great cost.	如果布什和布莱尔在真正的战斗打响前就宣布获胜，就会为他们曾经付出巨大代价的事业埋下隐患。


Bush waited weeks for a positive development that would allow him to suggest he can reduce troop levels in Iraq from 133,000 to 100,000 by the end of 2006.	布什苦苦等候了几个礼拜，才等来了这次积极的进展。 这使他得以提出在2006年底之前把驻伊美军从原来的133，000人减至100，000人。


Blair, still stung by his Labour Party’s defeat in local elections in early May, also welcomed the good news from Iraq.	布莱尔还没来得及从5月上旬工党地方选举落败的打击中清醒过来，也急忙对伊拉克这一振奋人心的消息表示欢迎。


During a triumphal surprise visit to Baghdad on May 22, he said he expected Iraqi forces to take responsibility for “territorial security” in much of the country by the end of the year.	在5月22日突然造访巴格达时，布莱尔说他希望伊拉克军队到年底就能承担该国大部分国土的“领土安全”责任。


“It is the violence that keeps us here,” he said.	“暴力迫使我们留在这里”，他说。


“It is the peace that allows us to go.”	“和平终于允许我们撤出军队。 ”


The optimism is premature.	这样的乐观未免有些太早。


The formation of a unity government is only the first of many hurdles Iraq’s new government must clear if it is to build a durable peace.	联合政府的成立不过是伊拉克新政府希望取得持久和平而必须克服的众多障碍中的一个。


Its first task will be to remove those provisions of Iraq’s constitution that pit Iraq’s Sunni, Shia, and Kurds against one another.	联合政府的首要任务是取消导致逊尼派、什叶派和库尔德人相互敌对的宪法规定。


Under current Iraqi law, the parliamentary committee charged with making these constitutional changes has four months to complete its task.	根据目前伊法律规定，负责进行上述宪法修改的议会委员会有四个月的时间完成这项任务。


The four-month clock began ticking on May 3, following the first meeting of Iraq’s new parliament.	从5月3日伊拉克新议会的首次会议后，这四个月期限就开始进入倒计时。


The changes are badly needed.	改革要求实在太紧迫了。


The committee must enact a new hydrocarbon law that guarantees each of Iraq’s factions a fair share of the country’s oil wealth, which accounts for 97% of total export revenue.	委员会必须执行新的碳氢化合物法律，确保伊拉克的各个集团能对该国的石油财富利益均沾，石油出口占到了伊拉克总出口收入的97%以上。


Under the current constitution, local governments have the right to exploit (and profit directly from) oil extracted from new sites beneath their territory, while only a share of the income from existing sites must go to Iraq’s central government.	按照目前的宪法，地方政府有权享受所辖领土上发现新油田带来的收益，与此同时，只有现存油田的一部分收入必须上缴伊拉克中央政府。


On May 15, two small independent energy companies (Turkey’s Genel Enerji and Canada’s Addax Petroleum) became the latest foreign firms to begin drilling in Kurdish-controlled territory under an agreement with the regional government.	5月15日，两家独立的小型能源公司（土耳其Genel Enerji和加拿大Addax石油公司）成了根据与地方政府签订的协议在库尔德控制地区进行石油开采的最新的外国公司。


Kurdish politicians within the new parliament have good reason to protect these lucrative deals as debate begins over constitutional changes.	在有关修改宪法的争论开始时，新议会中的库尔德政客有充分的理由保护这些令人垂涎欲滴的诱人利益。


But the central government will need a large share of that income if it is to finance the construction of new institutions of governance, invest in critical infrastructure, undertake onerous reforms aimed at economic liberalization, and provide the resource-poor (and already restive) Sunnis of central Iraq with a greater share of the country’s wealth.	但是伊中央政府如果要想有足够的资金建立新的统治机构、投资重要的基础设施、进行以经济自由化为目标的困难改革、以及为伊中部资源贫乏地区生活的难以控制的库尔德人争取更多的国家财富，就需要拿到更大份额的石油收入。


The constitution must also be amended to reverse the worst effects of a de-Baathification process that aimed to dismantle the vestiges of Saddam Hussein’s regime.	此外还必须修改宪法，逆转以瓦解萨达姆·侯赛因政权残余势力为目的的非复兴社会党化潮流所造成的恶果。


In practice, de-Baathification has excluded thousands of Iraqis – most of them Sunnis who joined the party during the Saddam era only to secure good jobs – from the country’s political and economic life.	实际上，非复兴社会党化已经使成千上万的伊拉克人¾¾大部分是曾在萨达姆时期入党的逊尼派教徒找不到像样的就业机会¾¾进而将他们排除在国家的政治和经济生活之外。


Finally, the Iraqi government must begin dismantling the militia groups that still outgun the fledgling Iraqi army, and it must defeat the largely Sunni-led insurgency.	最后，伊拉克政府必须开始解散民兵组织，与这些组织相比，新生的伊拉克军队还显得非常稚嫩。


Each of these tasks is formidable. If Bush and Blair prematurely withdraw large numbers of the troops that support Iraqi stability, the country’s new government would have little chance of success.	如果布什和布莱尔在此时过早地撤出支持伊拉克稳定的大批军队，那么伊拉克新政府的成功机会可以说是微乎其微。


There is some reason for optimism that efforts to stem the tide of violence can succeed.	抱有阻止暴力活动将会胜利的乐观态度并非全无道理。


Media reports of Iraqi bloodshed focus overwhelmingly on Baghdad – where the large majority of foreign journalists are based – creating the impression that the desperate security situation there is representative of the country as a whole.	媒体对伊拉克流血事件的报导大部分集中在巴格达¾这里是绝大部分外国记者的聚集地¾¾留给人的印象是那里毫无希望的安全局势是伊拉克全国局势的缩影。


But in the Kurdish-controlled areas of the north and Shiite-dominated provinces in the south, levels of crime and deadly violence compare favorably with those in many cities in the United States.	但在库尔德人控制的北部地区和什叶派占绝对优势的南部省份，犯罪情况和致命的暴力事件与美国的不少城市相比也毫不逊色。


But attacks in Iraq’s “Sunni triangle” (and Baghdad in particular) occur at a rate rivaling those in Chechnya and the Niger Delta.	但伊拉克“逊尼三角区”（特别是巴格达周围）发生袭击的概率甚至可以和车臣和尼日尔三角洲相媲美。


Since Sunni militants destroyed the Shiite Askariya mosque in February, hundreds of Iraqis have been killed in a series of tit-for-tat sectarian attacks.	自从逊尼派民兵2月摧毁了什叶派圣殿阿斯卡里亚清真寺（Askariya mosque）后，已经有成百上千的伊拉克人在一系列报复性的宗派袭击中无辜丧生。


Tens of thousands have fled from mixed Sunni-Shiite cities to safer havens in ethnically homogenous enclaves that are effectively controlled by Sunni and Shiite militias.	成千上万人逃离逊尼－什叶派混居城市，来到由逊尼和什叶派民兵控制的人口单一的安全庇护所栖身。


Only the presence of foreign troops slows the further balkanization of the country’s already fractious politics.	只有外国军队的存在才能延缓该国本已很难驾驭的政治局势像当年的巴尔干一样进一步四分五裂。


That’s why the temptation for Bush and Blair to limit further political damage at home by prematurely declaring victory in Iraq is so dangerous.	这解释了为什么布什和布莱尔为控制对国内局势的进一步损害提早在伊拉克宣告胜利如此危险的原因。


If they use the good news to begin withdrawing significant numbers of the foreign troops who bolster Iraq’s stability at a crucial and vulnerable moment, they will have undermined the project to which both have devoted so much political capital.	如果他们利用新政府成立的好消息在如此关键而又脆弱的时刻开始撤出支撑伊拉克稳定的大批外国军队，无疑会为已经投入了大量政治资本的事业埋下无穷的隐患。


And they will leave the new Iraqi government at the mercy of forces that would eventually pull the country apart.	他们会使新成立的伊拉克政府独自面对强大的力量，而这些力量终会把这个脆弱的国家撕成碎片。


Hands Off Syria?	不干涉叙利亚？


WASHINGTON, DC – More than any of the previous events in the Arab Spring, Syria’s turmoil has presented serious difficulties for Western policymakers.	华盛顿—和此前阿拉伯之春的所有事件相比，叙利亚动乱给西方决策者造成的困难更大。


Just as Syria comprises a more complex society than the other Arab countries currently in the throes of political transition, so, too, are its external relations more complex.	叙利亚的社会复杂程度比其他处于政治转型过程的阿拉伯国家都大，其对外关系亦然。


As a result, any attempt at decisive military intervention would be not only difficult, but also extremely risky.	结果，任何决定性的军事干预不但更加困难，而且风险极大。


Syria’s leading role in Lebanon, even after withdrawing its occupying forces there, is only one complication.	叙利亚对黎巴嫩的领导作用只是复杂情况之一，即使其占领军已经撤出了黎巴嫩。


Another is Alawite-minority rule in a Sunni-majority country, which makes Syria a proxy for Shia Iran in the Sunni Arab world.	另一大复杂性叙利亚的少数派阿拉维派统治着占多数的逊尼派，这使得叙利亚成为什叶派伊朗在逊尼派阿拉伯世界中的代理。


Still other Syrian minority groups – non-Alawite Shia, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, and Druze – are linked to neighboring countries and regional players, inviting intense external interest and even active support.	更加少数的叙利亚宗教团体——非阿拉维派什叶派、东正教、天主教、和德鲁兹派——均和邻国以及地区势力有关联，这使得不少外部势力都在叙利亚拥有利益甚至积极地支持各教派的活动。


Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia all have strategic interests and factional connections to Syria.	土耳其、沙特以及俄罗斯都在叙利亚有战略利益和派别关系。


The United States and its NATO allies would, of course, prefer a democratic, Western-oriented regime to emerge in Syria.	当然，美国及其北约盟国希望叙利亚产生一个民主的西方导向的政权。


But, given the country’s complex society and external ties, the West should happily settle for a stable government not dominated by Russia or Iran, and not in military conflict with its neighbors, including Israel.	但是，由于叙利亚错综复杂的社会和外部关系，只要产生非俄罗斯和伊朗主导的稳定新政府，且该政府不与包括以色列在内的邻国产生军事冲突，西方也乐得接受。


So what is the best US and Western policy?	那么，什么才是美国和西方的最佳政策？


A negotiated end to the current warfare could leave President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in power, albeit with a different face in charge.	谈判解决当下的战争状态将让总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的统治延续下去，但会换一副面目。


Such an outcome would be a triumph for the cause of hardline dictatorship, suppression of human rights, and Iran and Russia.	如此结果将是强硬独裁的胜利，是镇压人权行径的胜利，是伊朗和俄罗斯的胜利。


But it also becomes less feasible as the violence mounts.	但随着暴力的愈演愈烈，这一结果的可能性也越来越小。


That leaves supporting the rebels, but which ones, and how?	于是，问题变成了支持哪派反对者？


Yet another factor militating against intervention is that the distribution of power resulting from the Arab Spring is leaving the US with limited influence and little intelligence.	怎样支持？ 但另一个不利于干涉的因素是，阿拉伯之春所产生的权力分配正在让美国在该地区的影响越来越有限，情报工作越来越吃力。


But the US and the West cannot leave the matter entirely to others or confine their efforts to the United Nations, where Russia and China prevent any effective action.	但美国和西方不能将这一任务撒手任由其他人处理，也不能将努力局限于联合国，因为俄罗斯和中国会阻止任何有意义的行动。


So, what should be done?	那么，它们应该做些什么？


In my view, the US could work with Turkey, Saudi Arabia (taking care not to support Islamic extremists), and its NATO allies, especially France and Britain, to create a prospective successor government for Syria, and to arm its military element.	在我看来，美国可以和土耳其、沙特（需要注意不要支持伊斯兰极端分子）和北约盟友（特别是法国和英国）合作，扶持一个潜在的叙利亚后继政府，并为其提供武装力量。


Such a government would have to be representative and coherent.	这样一���政府将具有代表性和凝聚力。


And Western powers would need to be sure that their weapons would not fall into potentially unfriendly hands.	西方列强需要确保它们提供的武器不会落到潜在敌人手里。


The fact that Iran is arming the Assad regime calls for countervailing action.	伊朗正在武装巴沙尔政权，这一事实要求西方采取争锋相对的行动。


Some have suggested a more active military role for the US, beginning with a no-fly zone.	一些人建议美国应该扮演更积极的军事角色，设置禁飞区。


It may come to that.	这或许可以实现。


But the French and British, who urged that course in Libya, have made no such proposal for Syria.	但在利比亚问题上颇为积极的英国和法国在叙利亚问题上却没有提出类似方案。


One reason is that Syria has a substantial air-defense system, which would have to be suppressed by a bombing campaign – causing significant civilian casualties and risking the loss of aircraft and crews.	原因之一是叙利亚的防空力量要强得多，必须通过轰炸行动才能压制，而轰炸可能会造成大量平民伤亡，飞机和飞行员也有可能遭受损失。


Before starting down that road, the US should be convinced that military action would not require US ground forces in Syria.	在采取行动之前，美国应该确保军事行动不会涉及地面力量。


It should also be confident (which is impossible now) about the nature of a successor government.	此外，美国还应该对后继政府的性质有充分的信心（这一点现在做不到）。


To meet these criteria would require convening interested countries in order to gain greater insight into both internal Syrian and regional implications of military action.	为了满足这些条件，应该召开相关国家大会，以更好地弄清楚军事行动对叙利亚国内和整个地区的影响。


The attention devoted to the Syrian issue during the “non-aligned” countries’ recent Tehran summit was a parody of such an exercise.	“不结盟”国家最近的德黑兰峰会期间关注叙利亚问题就是这类行动的拙劣范例。


Holding such a conference is easier said than done.	举办这样的会议说起来容易做起来难。


Merely finalizing the guest list would be a major diplomatic feat.	仅仅是完善宾客名单就是一个艰巨的外交任务。


Surely, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq must be invited.	显然，土耳其、埃及、沙特和伊拉克都应该邀请。


Russia, the US, and perhaps France and Britain should be present as well.	俄罗斯、美国、或许还有英国和法国也必须出席。


But to omit a neighbor like Israel, a Syrian client like Lebanon, or a patron like Iran would be peculiar – and inviting all of them would be a formula for chaos.	但撇开以色列这样的邻邦、黎巴嫩这样的叙利亚代理人以及伊朗这样的幕后推手将让会议显得颇为奇怪，而把它们都请来又会造成混乱。


The uprising in Syria, the most violent of the Arab Spring rebellions, is playing out slowly and lethally.	作为阿拉伯之春叛乱的最暴力部分，叙利亚起义的发展势头缓慢而血腥。


The estimated 10,000 deaths over the last 18 months equal the number killed in just a few days in 1982 in the city of Hama by Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, whose scorched-earth policy strengthened his hold on power and incurred only rhetorical condemnation from the international community.	过去18个月中，据估计有10 000人丧命，和巴沙尔之父哈菲兹·阿萨德1982年在哈马（Hama）几天之内杀的人数相当。 哈菲兹的焦土政策巩固了他对权力的掌握，而国际社会对此只是进行了口头谴责。


The repercussions are likely to be all the more disruptive when, sooner or later, the regime falls.	巴沙尔政权迟早要倒台，那时，反响或许会更具破坏性。


The Assads, like other authoritarian Arab leaders, kept a lid on internal violence and their own citizens’ aspirations.	阿萨德家族将和其他阿拉伯世界领袖家族一样，隐瞒国内暴力和公民的意愿。


But the sheer complexity of conditions in Syria means that the regime’s endgame could trigger a transition unlike any other in the Arab Spring, different in both its domestic course and in its effects on the region.	但叙利亚情况的高度复杂性意味着巴沙尔政权的末日将触发与其他阿拉伯之春国家不同的过渡期，不管是国内进程还是地区影响。


Diplomats make careers of finding procedural solutions to insoluble dilemmas; surely, they hope, there is a conference table with a shape that matches a given strategic configuration.	外交官们让找到程序性解决方案的任务陷入了不可调和的两难； 毫无疑问，他们希望能够给出一个与当前战略形势匹配的会议日程。


So far, the US has handled the various forms of political transition in the Arab Spring without severely damaging missteps.	到目前为止，美国在阿拉伯之春中处理了多种形式的政治转型，且没有造成破坏性失策。


Syria poses the toughest challenge yet.	而叙利亚将是最棘手的挑战。


Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions?	我们应该相信道德直觉么？


When we condemn the behavior of a politician, celebrity, or friend, we often end up appealing to our moral intuitions.	当我们谴责政客、名人或朋友的行为时，我们通常会倾向于使用我们的道德直觉。


“It just feels wrong!” we say.	我们说：“我就觉得这是错的！


But where do these intuitive judgments come from?	”但这些直觉判断从何而来呢？


Are they reliable moral guides?	它们是可靠的道德指南么？


Recently, some unusual research has raised new questions about the role of intuitive responses in ethical reasoning.	最近，一些特别的研究提出了关于直觉反应在道德推理中的作用的新问题。


Joshua Greene, a philosophy graduate now working in psychology who has recently moved from Princeton University to Harvard, studied how people respond to a set of imaginary dilemmas.	乔舒亚·格林，一位刚从普林斯顿大学转到哈佛大学进行心理学研究的哲学硕士，研究了人们如何对一组想象中的困境做出反应。


In one dilemma, you are standing by a railroad track when you notice that a trolley, with no one aboard, is heading for a group of five people.	在一种困境中，你站在铁轨边，看到一辆空无一人的电车正驶向前方的五个人。


They will all be killed if the trolley continues on its current track.	如果电车继续在现有的轨道上行使，他们将会被撞死。


The only thing you can do to prevent these five deaths is to throw a switch that will divert the trolley onto a side track, where it will kill only one person.	能避免造成五个人死亡的唯一办法就是加入一个道岔，将电车引导到旁边的轨道，如此一来它就只会撞死一个人。


When asked what you should do in these circumstances, most people say that you should divert the trolley onto the side track, thus saving a net four lives.	当被问到你在这样的情况下会如何做时，大多数人说应该扳道岔，这样可以拯救四条生命。


In another dilemma, the trolley, as before, is about to kill five people.	在另一种困境中，这部电车如前所言，会撞死五个人。


This time, however, you are not standing near the track, but on a footbridge above the track.	然而这一次，你并不是站在铁轨旁，而是位于铁轨上方的天桥上。


You cannot divert the trolley.	你不能使电车变道。


You consider jumping off the bridge, in front of the trolley, thus sacrificing yourself to save the five people in danger, but you realize that you are far too light to stop the trolley.	你考虑从天桥上跳到电车前面，从而舍己救人，但你同时也意识到你的重量远不足以使电车停止。


Standing next to you, however, is a very large stranger.	然而，在你旁边有一位大块头的陌生人。


The only way you can prevent the trolley from killing five people is by pushing this large stranger off the footbridge, in front of the trolley.	你能够阻止电车撞死五个人的唯一办法就是把他推下天桥，落在电车的前面。


If you push the stranger off, he will be killed, but you will save the other five.	如果你把陌生人推下去了，他就得死，但你能救另外的五个人。


When asked what you should do in these circumstances, most people say that it would be wrong to push the stranger.	当被问到你在这种情况下会如何做时，大多数人都说将陌生人推下去是错的。


This judgment is not limited to particular cultures.	这种判断不只限于某些文化之中。


Marc Hauser, at Harvard University, has put similar dilemmas on the web in what he calls a “Moral Sense Test,” available in English, Spanish, and Chinese ( http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu ).	哈佛大学的马克·豪塞尔将类似的困境以“道德感测试”的形式放到网上，并提供了英语、西班牙语和中文版本（ http://moral. wjh.


After receiving tens of thousands of responses, he finds remarkable consistency despite differences in nationality, ethnicity, religion, age, and sex.	edu ）。 在收到了成千上万的反馈之后，他发现尽管人们的国籍、种族、宗教信仰、年龄和性别不同，但反应却出奇的一致。


Philosophers have puzzled about how to justify our intuitions in these situations, given that in both cases, the choice seems to be between saving five lives at the cost of taking one life.	哲学家们为如何证明我们在这种情况下的（道德）直觉的正当性而颇费脑筋。 因为在两种情况下，我们的选择似乎都是牺牲一条命，拯救五条命。


Greene, however, was more concerned to understand why we have the intuitions, so he used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or fMRI, to examine what happens in people’s brains when they make these moral judgments.	然而格林更想了解的是我们 为何 会有这样的直觉。 所以他运用了功能性核磁共振设备（FMRI）来检测人们做出这些道德判断时大脑中发生的情况。


Greene found that people asked to make a moral judgment about “personal” violations, like pushing the stranger off the footbridge, showed increased activity in areas of the brain associated with the emotions.	格林发现当人们被要求对有关“个人化”侵犯（如将那个陌生人推下天桥）的情况做出道德判断时，他们的脑部与情感相关的区域活动增加。


This was not the case with people asked to make judgments about relatively “impersonal” violations like throwing a switch.	而当人们被要求就相对“非个人化”的情况（如扳道岔）做出道德判断时则不然。


Moreover, the minority of subjects who did consider that it would be right to push the stranger off the footbridge took longer to reach this judgment than those who said that doing so would be wrong.	此外，少数认为将陌生人推下去是对的做法的被访者，做出这个判断所��的时间也比那些认为这样做是错的人要长。


Why would our judgments, and our emotions, vary in this way?	为什么我们的判断和我们的情感会如此不同呢？


For most of our evolutionary history, human beings – and our primate ancestors – have lived in small groups, in which violence could be inflicted only in an up-close and personal way, by hitting, pushing, strangling, or using a stick or stone as a club.	在我们进化史的相当一部分，人类—和我们灵长类的祖先—都以小群体聚居。 在小群体中，暴力只能通过击打、推搡、掐勒或使用棍棒或石头等近距离个人化的方式引发。


To deal with such situations, we developed immediate, emotionally based intuitive responses to the infliction of personal violence on others.	为了应对这样的情况，我们发展出一套即时的、以情感为基础的直觉反应，专门针对施加于他人的人身暴力。


The thought of pushing the stranger off the footbridge elicits these responses.	将陌生人推下天桥的念头会引起这样的反应。


On the other hand, it is only in the last couple of centuries – not long enough to have any evolutionary significance – that we have been able to harm anyone by throwing a switch that diverts a train.	而在另一方面，仅仅是在过去的两百年里—时间短得毫无进化意义—我们才能够通过扳道岔而加害于人。


Hence the thought of doing it does not elicit the same emotional response as pushing someone off a bridge.	因此这样做的念头不会引发如将某人推下天桥那样的情感反应。


Greene’s work helps us understand where our moral intuitions come from.	格林的研究有助于我们了解自身道德直觉的来源。


But the fact that our moral intuitions are universal and part of our human nature does not mean that they are right.	但我们的道德直觉具有普遍性和它们作为人性的一部分的事实并不意味着它们是正确的。


On the contrary, these findings should make us more skeptical about relying on our intuitions.	恰恰相反，这些研究成果应该让我们对依赖直觉表示怀疑。


There is, after all, no ethical significance in the fact that one method of harming others has existed for most of our evolutionary history, and the other is relatively new.	毕竟，一种加害于人的方式在进化史上长期存在，而另一种方式相对更新的事实是毫无道德意义的。


Blowing up people with bombs is no better than clubbing them to death.	用炸弹将人炸死和用棍棒将人打死并无优劣之分。


And surely the death of one person is a lesser tragedy than the death of five, no matter how that death is brought about.	不管死亡是如何发生的，死一个人肯定没有死五个人悲惨。


So we should think for ourselves, not just listen to our intuitions.	所以我们应该自己动脑思考，而不应盲从直觉。


Hope Amid the Middle East’s Turmoil	中东动荡中的希望


LONDON – Syria is a living nightmare.	伦敦——活生生的噩梦笼罩着叙利亚。


Egypt hovers on the brink.	埃及徘徊在崩溃边缘。


But, as the opening of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority shows, there are signs of hope.	但以色列和巴勒斯坦权力机构举行和谈表明中东地区还有希望。


And, though it may seem counter-intuitive, the region’s turmoil is finally bringing to the surface its fundamental problems in a way that allows them to be confronted and overcome.	而且，尽管可能与直觉不符，但该地区的混乱局面终于让最根本的问题有机会浮出水面，让人们能够克服和解决。


Now is a time not for despair, but for active engagement.	现在不是绝望的时候，而是应该积极地投身其中。


No one put the chances of reviving the Israel-Palestine peace process at more than minimal.	没有人认为以巴和平进程有机会重启。


Yet it has happened.	但这样的机会却已真实地发生。


And these are not talks about talks, but a full-blown revival of final-status negotiations, with an undertaking by both parties to remain in the process for at least nine months.	而且这次不是为了谈判而谈判，而是最终地位谈判的全面恢复，而且谈判双方承诺将在至少九个月期限内持续参与谈判进程。


To those of us who have toiled, often fruitlessly, on this issue in the past, it is a huge achievement brought about by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s sheer dogged determination and the willingness of Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to take political risks with their domestic public opinion.	对于我们这些曾为此努力但徒劳无功者而言，这是美国国务卿约翰·克里纯粹的顽强意志和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡及巴勒斯坦权力机构主席马哈茂德·阿巴斯甘冒国内舆论风险所取得的成就。


Much less noted was the visit of Yemen’s president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, to Washington, DC.	也门总统阿卜杜－拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪对华盛顿的访问不太为人所知。


Against all the odds, Yemen is undergoing a process of political transformation, with 500 delegates from all parts of society working on plans for democracy, justice, and equality.	尽管条件极为不利，也门正处在政治转型期，来自社会各阶层的500位代表正积极制定民主、公平和平等计划。


In Iraq, after years of declining sectarian violence, the casualty figures are up again, in part owing to the war in neighboring Syria.	伊拉克在宗派暴力活动下降多年后，部分因为邻国叙利亚战争而导致伤亡人数再次增加。


Yet, even in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the country’s most influential Shia cleric, recently issued a seminal statement proclaiming the need for a civil, not religious state, with equal freedom for all to participate.	但即使在伊拉克，该国最具影响力的什叶派教士大阿亚图拉西斯塔尼最近也发表了一项开创性声明，宣布要建立人人自由平等的公民而非宗教国家。


Sistani also expressed disagreement with those close to Iran who want Shia to go to Syria to fight for Bashar al-Assad’s regime alongside Hezbollah.	西斯塔尼还表达了与亲伊朗势力的不同意见，这些人希望什叶派进入叙利亚，与真主党一道为巴沙尔·阿萨德政权作战。


Similarly, at the start of Ramadan, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who is also the custodian of the two holy mosques, made a powerful statement reclaiming the faith of Islam from those who would pervert it in the name of politics.	同样，斋月开始时，沙特阿拉伯阿卜杜拉国王兼两圣地清真寺的���管者发表有力声明，从以政治为名的宗教破坏者手中收回伊斯兰教的信仰。


Libya and Tunisia are far from settled, as the recent assassination of Tunisia’s leading opposition politician and the presence of unrestrained militia in Libyan towns show.	最近针对突尼斯主要反对派政客的暗杀行动和利比亚城镇为所欲为的民兵势力表明利比亚和突尼斯问题还远没有解决。


But the democrats are not giving up.	但民主人士并未放弃希望。


Across the northern part of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are now huge challenges from well-armed and well-financed terrorist groups that have imported toxic Islamist ideology from the Middle East.	资金充足、武器精良的恐怖团体为撒哈拉以南非洲地区北部带来了巨大的挑战，这些人从中东舶来了有毒的伊斯兰思想。


Countries such as Nigeria, for example, have suffered horribly from terrorism based on a brand of religious extremism that is alien to their society.	比如尼日利亚等国就一直饱受与本国社会格格不入的极端宗教恐怖主义的困扰。


But, again, despite it all, the country is experiencing rapid economic growth and has just implemented a major reform – widely considered impossible until recently – of the power sector.	尽管存在这些不稳定因素，但尼日利亚正在经历快速的经济增长，并刚刚完成了一项针对电力行业的重大改革（不久前这项改革还被普遍认为是不可能的）。


Meanwhile, with a genuinely inclusive and objectively administered constitution, Egypt could pivot back toward democracy.	此外，依靠真正包容和客观管理的宪法，埃及有可能再次完成民主转型。


Elections by early 2014 have been promised, and all parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, could take part.	各方已经承诺于2014年年初举行选举，包括穆斯林兄弟会在内的所有政党都有权参加。


Or Egypt could become paralyzed and unable to rectify its dire economic situation and restore order, without which no progress is possible.	但埃及也有可能陷入瘫痪，无法改变严峻的经济形势并恢复秩序，而这种情况下要想取得进展是不可能的。


But Egypt’s internal divisions reveal a deeper awakening in the region that has its own significance.	但埃及的内部分歧显示了该地区更深层次的觉醒，这种觉醒本身是很有意义的。


Lessons about government, governance, and democracy that took the West centuries to learn are being taken in at extraordinary speed.	西方人花了几百年才逐步学到的政府、执政和民主理念正在以极快的速度被埃及民众吸收。


It is now clear that the status quo in the region will not hold.	人人都清楚地区的现状不可能持久。


The idea of “strong man” government – a regime that maintains order, and that the rest of the world likes to deal with because it is predictable – has gone.	有能力维持秩序并因为可以预测而受到其他国家欢迎的“强人”政府理念现在已经走到了尽头。


It doesn’t matter whether the “strong man” is a psychopath, like Saddam Hussein, or a moderate, like Hosni Mubarak, who kept peace in the region.	这个“强人”是像萨达姆·侯赛因那样的精神病患者还是像胡斯尼·穆巴拉克那样维持地区和平的温和派领袖并不重要。


This is the twenty-first century, and ordinary people want to shape their country’s politics.	现在是二十一世纪，普通百姓要参与制定国家的政策。


The choice is between evolution and revolution.	我们需要在进化和革命之间做出选择。


Evolution, if attainable, is clearly preferable.	如果可以以进化形式达到目的显然是更好的选择。


Frankly, Syria would have been better for it.	坦率地讲，叙利亚如果采取这种形式恐怕会有更好的结果。


People have had a taste of politics conducted by firestorm.	人们已经尝够了急风暴雨式执政的味道。


Across the region, there is fatigue with the wildness and disorder that politics conducted by firestorm brings.	民众已经厌倦了粗暴执政带来的野蛮和无序。


There is growing recognition that change is best accompanied by stability, and that democracy works only if debate is conducted in an atmosphere in which arguments can be bold, even harsh, but not inflammatory.	人们开始认识到稳定才是改革最好的搭档，只有在大胆、甚至犀利辩论但杜绝粗暴和煽动的氛围下才有利于进行民主建设。


There is also a burgeoning acceptance that religious freedom is a necessary part of free and open societies.	人们也逐渐开始接受宗教自由在自由开放社会中必不可少的作用。


The discussion about religion’s role in government and society is now out in the open.	人们开始公开讨论宗教在政府和社会中的作用。


This is enormously important and healthy.	这种做法既健康又有意义。


For the first time, there is lively and intelligent debate around this issue, which is at the core of the Middle East’s problems.	有史以来首次就这个中东核心问题进行了活跃而理智的辩论。


Open societies are incompatible with closed economies.	社会开放与经济封闭格格不入。


A functioning private sector that creates adequate jobs, and schools that educate the large young population for today’s inter-connected world, are prerequisites of progress.	民主进步的前提是正常运转的私营部门创造出充分的就业机会，而学校教育则使大批年轻人适应当今相互联系的开放社会。


The Israeli-Palestinian issue is crucial for all the obvious reasons.	以巴问题显然至关重要。


But it is also a test of the region’s capacity to forge a different and better future.	但它同时能够检验该地区是否有能力创造美好的未来。


If these two peoples can find common ground to create two states, both democratic and free, after decades of bitterness and bloodshed, the region would have an enormously powerful model of hope.	如果两国民众能够找到建设自由民主独立国家的共同点，那么经过几十年的流血和苦难，该地区新生的强大模式将会充满希望。


But the opening of the peace talks in Washington, DC, would not have happened without the full engagement of the US and other international partners.	但没有美国和其他国际伙伴的参与就不可能在华盛顿重启以巴和谈。


This is the lesson that we should bear in mind as Syria disintegrates before our eyes.	我们应当从叙利亚的解体中吸取教训。


However much we may wish to look away, the consequences of allowing the bloodbath in Syria to take its own course may well be disastrous for the region and for the West’s security.	无论我们多希望能够坐视不管，允许叙利亚流血事件自生自灭可能会对该地区和西方国家的安全构成严重的威胁。


Surely we can begin to see certain common threads running through the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab revolutions, Iran, Syria, Egypt, and the spread of terror based on religious extremism.	无疑我们可以在2001年9月11日发生在阿富汗、伊拉克、阿拉伯革命、伊朗、叙利亚、埃及的恐怖袭击和宗教极端恐怖主义蔓延中找到某些相通的线索。


One concerns how states emerge from years of repression to build institutions capable of responding to the needs of the modern world.	其中一条线索涉及到国家如何摆脱多年的压制，建设能够响应现代社会需求的制度。


Another – plainly linked – is Muslim-majority countries’ efforts to define the relationship between religion and politics.	而另一条线索明显与上条线索有关，涉及到以穆斯林为主的国家如何确定宗教和政治的关系。


The entire world has a massive interest in where these threads lead.	这些线索最终去向何方关系到整个世界的利益。


Silent Momentum on Climate Change	无声无息的气候变化势头


NAIROBI – The last two years have been a roller coaster ride in respect to securing a new global treaty to combat climate change.	内罗毕——过去两年订立气候变化全球协议的过程经历了大起大落。


Some even despair that the window for action is closing fast.	甚至有人绝望地认为采取行动的机会已经错过。


But giving up is not an option.	但我们绝不能轻言放弃。


The latest round of climate negotiations, held last month in Cancún, Mexico, put the world’s efforts on climate change back on track – albeit at a pace and on a scale that will undoubtedly leave many onlookers frustrated.	上个月墨西哥坎昆举行的最新一轮气候谈判虽然进展的速度和幅度无疑令很多局外人大失所望，但是气候变化的努力却因此再次走上了正轨。


President Felipe Calderón’s government in Mexico and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention deserve credit for gains in a range of important areas, including forestry, a new Green Fund to assist developing nations, and the anchoring of the emission-reduction pledges made at the December 2009 climate-change conference in Copenhagen.	上述关键领域的进展理应归功于墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德隆政府和联合国框架公约执行秘书，进展的具体领域包括林业、设立绿色基金帮助发展中国家、以及兑现2009年12月哥本哈根气候变化会议所做出的减排承诺。


But, as the UN Environment Program and climate modelers made clear in the run-up to the Cancún meeting, a significant emissions gap exists between what is being promised by countries and what is needed to keep the rise in global temperature below two degrees Celsius, let alone move towards the 1.5-degree threshold needed to protect low-lying island states.	但是联合国环境计划署和全球气候决策者在坎昆会议的准备阶段就明确指出，各国做出的承诺和将全球升温控制在两摄氏度以内的现实需求相比尚有很大差距，距离保护低洼岛国所需的1. 5度气温界线差距自不必说。


Despite some gains, that gap – which, under the most optimistic scenario, amounts to the combined emissions of all the world’s cars, buses, and trucks – remains firmly in place post-Cancún.	尽管已经取得了某些进展，上述差距（按照最乐观的估计也相当于全世界所有轿车、公共汽车和卡车排放的总和）仍然在后坎昆时代切实存在着。


Indeed, no one should underestimate the magnitude of the challenge now facing South Africa, the host of next year’s talks, in terms of midwifing a new legally binding agreement to bridge this gap and securing the finance needed to bring the Green Fund into operation.	事实上，任何人都不应低估明年会谈主办国南非所面临的挑战，在促成新的法定协议弥合既有差距，并获得让绿色基金投入运营的经费支持方面，南非所面临的挑战不可低估。


Yet, while the official summit in Cancún struggled to a conclusion, an unofficial one being held a few minutes away also concluded.	不过，就在坎昆正式峰会艰难结束的时候，相隔几分钟开幕的一次非正式峰会也很快闭幕。


This parallel summit brought together progressive heads of state, regional and local government, business, and civil society, and underscored just how far and how fast some sectors of society will make the transition to a low-carbon future and build the green and clean-tech economies of the twenty-first century.	这场同时召开的峰会汇聚了进步国家首脑、区域和地方政府、企业及民间团体，并突出强调了社会各界向低碳未来过渡及建设二十一世纪绿色清洁技术经济可能的速度和幅度。


Calderón’s policies echo this momentum: by some estimates, he is transforming his country into the world’s fastest-growing wind-power market.	卡尔德隆的政策从侧面反映了这种势头： 有人估计他正将墨西哥建设成世界增长最快的风电市场。


Moreover, Mexico will also phase out old, inefficient light bulbs by 2014.	不仅如此，墨西哥还将在2014年前逐步淘汰所有老旧低效的照明灯泡。


And it has just retired 850,000 inefficient household refrigerators in favor of modern, energy-efficient models, with millions more earmarked over the coming years.	这个国家刚用高效现代的家用冰箱替换了850,000台低效冰箱，今后几年还将有几百万台冰箱按计划完成换代工作。


Mexican homeowners who install energy-saving systems such as solar water heaters are becoming eligible for lower-rate “green mortgages.”	安装太阳能热水器等节能系统的墨西哥房主可以获得申请低利率“绿色抵押贷款”的资格。


Mexico is not alone in adopting a national strategy for the transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient green economy.	而墨西哥在推行国家战略，完成向低碳、高能效经济过渡的方面并非绝无仅有。


Uruguay, for example, announced a strategy to generate half its electricity from renewable sources by 2015.	比方说乌拉圭就已宣布在2015年之前实现半数电能来自可再生资源的目标。


Sixty regional and local governments, responsible for 15% of global greenhouse-gas emissions, are also taking action.	占全球温室气体排放15%的六十个区域和地方政府也在积极采取行动。


Québec and São Paolo, to cite just two examples, are aiming for cuts of 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.	比方说其中的魁北克和圣保罗就制定了到2020年比1990年实现减排20%的目标。


Big companies, from banks to airlines, are contributing as well.	从银行到航空公司的大型企业也都各尽所能。


The US retailer Wal-Mart, for example, plans to cut emissions equivalent to 3.8 million cars, in part by implementing energy-efficiency measures at its Chinese stores.	比如美国零售企业沃尔玛就计划部分通过其中国门店落实能效措施，减少相当于380万量汽车的碳排放。


Indeed, the world is witnessing an extraordinary mobilization of national-level projects and policies that are shifting economies onto a low-carbon path.	事实上，世界各国普遍启动全国范围的项目和政策，旨在实现经济向低碳目标过渡。


In Kenya, a new feed-in tariff is triggering an expansion of wind and geothermal power.	肯尼亚新的上网电价正促使风能和地热发电快速扩张。


Indonesia is not only addressing deforestation, but will begin phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies for private cars next month.	而印尼则不仅解决森林砍伐的问题，还将从下个月起逐步取消私车化石燃料补贴。


Many countries and companies are forging ahead, signaling a determination not to be held hostage by the slowest at the official negotiating table.	很多国家和企业都在锐意进取，明确表示出不受正式谈判中个别落后份子左右的决心和愿望。


All this may lead some to wonder why time-consuming international negotiations and UN climate summits are needed at all.	所有这些可能都会引发某些人的疑虑，耗时费力的国际谈判和联合国气候峰会究竟意义何在？


But the fact is that this groundswell has in large part been catalyzed by the existing targets, timetables, and innovative mechanisms of the UN climate treaties, and not least by the momentum generated around the often-criticized 2009 Copenhagen summit.	但实际情况是上述积极潮流在很大程度上得力于联合国气候条约现有目标、时间表和创新机制的推动，特别是备受诘难的2009年哥本哈根峰会后形成的势头。


This momentum would continue to grow with a new global treaty that not only brings certainty to carbon markets and triggers accelerated investments in clean-tech industries, but that also ensures that more vulnerable countries are not marginalized.	上述势头将随新全球协议的订立而继续强化，相关协议不仅可以稳定碳市场，还能加速洁净能源行业的资金投入。 与此同时，协议也可以确保相对脆弱的国家不被边缘化。


The challenge today is to unite these goals in a mutually reinforcing way.	今天的挑战是如何确保这些目标取得相辅相成的效果。


Only then will the world have a fighting chance to keep the global temperature rise in this century under two degrees, build resilience against a changed climate, and truly transform the energy structures of the past – and thus the development prospects for six billion people in the future.	只有这样世界才有机会将本世纪全球升温控制在两度以下，形成针对气候变化的抗灾能力，并真正改变过去的能源结构，从而确保全球六十亿人口未来的发展前途。


Make Your Own Silicon Valley	建设自己的硅谷


SEATTLE – California may be the world’s largest and best-known technology hub, but it is not alone in fostering innovative startups.	西雅图——加利福尼亚州或许是全世界最大最著名的科技中心，但培养新型创业企业的地方也不是非它莫属。


In fact, such firms are emerging – almost unnoticed – everywhere, from Asian megalopolises like Singapore and Shanghai to small European cities like Espoo in Finland and Dwingeloo in the Netherlands.	事实上，此类企业几乎在不知不觉间从新加坡和上海这样的亚洲特大城市到芬兰埃斯波和荷兰德文格洛这样的欧洲小城如雨后春笋般随处可见。


Many international startups – including Sweden’s Spotify, Estonia’s Skype, Israel’s Waze – and, most recently, China’s Alibaba – have gained billion-dollar valuations.	包括瑞典的Spotify、爱沙尼亚的Skype、以色列的Waze和最新涌现的中国的阿里巴巴等众多的国际创业公司都已被估值数十亿美元。


Clearly, the key features of Silicon Valley that foster innovation and entrepreneurship – a dense concentration of human talent, a competitive spirit, easy access to capital, and a supportive regulatory environment – can be replicated in and adapted to a wide variety of contexts.	显然，硅谷推动创新和创业精神的主要特点——即人才高度集中、竞争精神、容易获得资金支持和友好的监管环境——可以在各种不同场合得到复制和应用。


Indeed, these pillars of creativity and progress have been erected even in countries whose economies, politics, and cultures diverge sharply from those of the United States.	其实，这类创造力和进步的支柱甚至已经在经济、政治和文化氛围与美国完全不同的国家被建立起来。


Of course, not every country approaches innovation in the same way.	当然，并非所有国家的创新方式都一模一样。


Finland, for example, owes its dynamic computer-games cluster largely to a student-driven movement in higher education.	比方说芬兰生机勃勃的电脑游戏业就应在很大程度上归功于一场由高校学生发起的运动。


Though Rovio Entertainment’s release in 2009 of the popular video game Angry Birds catalyzed an innovation boom in Espoo, it is Aalto University – Finland’s equivalent of Stanford in California – that continues to fuel innovation in the area, by nurturing programmers, designers, and others with the necessary talents.	虽然Rovio娱乐于2009年发布的流行视频游戏“愤怒的小鸟”引爆了埃斯波的创新热潮，但不断培养出程序员、设计师和其他必要人才、持续为该地区提供创新动力的却是芬兰的阿尔托大学（相当于芬兰的加州斯坦福）。


Aalto students also have launched Europe’s most dynamic startup conference, which will bring together more than 10,000 entrepreneurs and financiers this November.	阿尔托大学的在校生还发起了欧洲最具活力的创业企业会议，即将于11月召开的此次会议将汇聚超过10,000名企业家和金融家。


Moreover, the university’s Startup Sauna seed-accelerator program helps promising early-stage startups take their first steps toward success.	不仅如此，阿尔托大学的创业企业桑拿种子加速器计划帮助前途光明的早期创业公司迈出走向成功的第一步。