When a fiscally responsible government launches a war, it typically cuts back on other domestic expenditures and raises taxes.	当一个财政上负责的政府发动战争时，它通常会缩减国内支出，并提高税收。


The Bush administration did the opposite.	而布什政府却反其道而行之。


It may not be good economics, but the strategy proved to be good politics, for a time.	这可能不是好的经济学手段，但在一定时期内却是一项不错的政治战略。


Unfortunately, it is unlikely the new Democratic majority in Congress will do much about it.	不幸的是，新的民主党主导的国会似乎对此不以为然。


Of course, it takes two to tango.	当然，孤掌难鸣。


In order for the US economy to run deficits with the world, other countries must be willing to spin off a counterbalancing supply of savings.	为了让美国经济在世界上带赤字运行，其它国家必须愿意提供能自动抵销的等量储蓄。


Ben Bernanke, the US Federal Reserve chairman, once famously pinned the whole US current account deficit on a “global savings glut.”	美联储主席Ben Bernanke的一句名言曾将美国全部的经常账目赤字归罪于“全球性的储蓄过剩”。


But it would be more accurate to say that there is global investment shortfall, with investment trending downwards despite the upward trend in global growth.	但更为准确的说法是全球投资不足，虽然全球经济增长趋向放慢，但投资却趋向提升。


This investment shortfall is due to many factors, but perhaps the main one is that there are substantial medium-term institutional roadblocks to investment in many developing countries, where long-term returns now seem to be by far the highest.	造成这种投资不足的因素有很多，但可能最主要的一点是在向许多发展中国家投资的过程中有不少中期的制度性障碍。 在这些国家里现在似乎长期投资的回报最高。


The net result is that money is being parked temporarily in low-yield investments in the US, although this cannot be the long-run trend.	其直接的结果就是资金被暂时停泊在低投资回报率的美国，虽然这不会是一个长期趋势。


What then is future of the dollar?	那么，美元的未来趋��如何？


As long as the status quo persists, with strong global growth and stunning macroeconomic stability, the US can continue to borrow and run trade deficits without immediate consequence.	只要现在的情况持续下去，再加上强劲的全球经济增长和惊人的宏观经济稳定性，美国就能够继续举债并维持贸易赤字而不会马上遭遇后果。


Over time, the dollar will still decline, but perhaps by no more than a couple of percent per year.	随着时间的推移，美元仍会贬值，但幅度可能不会大于每年两个百分点。


Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine scenarios in which the dollar collapses.	但不论如何也不难想象美元崩溃的情景。


Nuclear terrorism, a slowdown in China, or a sharp escalation of violence in the Middle East could all blow the lid off the current economic dynamic.	恐怖主义、中国经济增长放缓、或中东暴力冲突的突然升级都可能完全破坏现有的经济局面。


In principle, one can also think of scenarios in which the dollar shoots up, but overall these seem less likely.	从原则上讲，我们也可以想象美元升值的情况。 但总体上看，这不大可能出现。


In sum, the fact that the US trade balance has defied gravity for so many years has made it possible for the dollar to do so, too.	总而言之，美国贸易平衡多年以来逆风运行的情况，也同样可能发生在美元上。


But some day, the US may well have to pay the bill for its spendthrift ways.	但总有一天，美国还是得要节俭度日。


When that day arrives, Americans had better pray that their creditors will be as happy to accept dollars as they are now.	当那一天到来时，美国人最好祈祷他们的债主们还会像今天一样乐于接受美元。


Beware of Smiling Bears	谨防俄罗斯笑里藏刀


WARSAW – Remember the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), aimed at enshrining “commonly-shared values” between Russia and the European Community? Signed in 1994 during the hopeful early days of Russia’s first-ever democracy, the PCA was bolstered in 1999 by the creation of the European Union’s Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP).	华沙——


Both sides often refer to this desire to forge closer relations as a “strategic partnership.”	还记得旨在发扬俄罗斯与欧共体“共同价值”的《伙伴关系与合作协定》（Partnership and Cooperation Agreement，PCA）吗？


But as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel meet Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Deauville, it would be wise to recognize that the Kremlin appears to be changing the terms of this nascent relationship.	该协定签订于1994年，彼时俄国刚刚进入民主社会，充满着希望。 1999年，PCA因欧盟共同安全和防务政策（Common Security Defense Policy，CSDP）的建立而得到进一步强化。


In the wake of Russia’s apparent departure from democratization during Vladimir Putin’s presidency, and of the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, the EU has adopted increasingly cautious language, sounding less optimistic about the prospects of a real partnership.	缔约双方都意欲打造更加紧密的“战略合作伙伴”关系。 但从法国总统萨科齐和德国总理默克尔与俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫在多维尔（Deauville）的会面中不难看出，俄罗斯对于这一诞生没多久的关系已经发生了态度转变。


Thus, the European Security Strategy, adopted in 2004, says only that, “we should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.”	在普京总统任期内，俄罗斯发生了明显的去民主化，对车臣和格鲁吉亚战火连连，这使得欧盟对俄罗斯的态度越来越谨慎，对双方实质关系的前景也不再像以前那样乐观。


Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia produced a sterner variation: “No strategic partnership is possible if the values of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are not fully shared and respected.”	因此，2004年生效的欧洲安全战略（European Security Strategy）仅仅提到“我们就应该继续致力于加强与俄罗斯的紧密关系，这是关系到我们安全与繁荣的一大重要因素。 尊重共同价值有利于促使双方缔结战略合作伙伴关系。


Russians, meanwhile, are struggling to reconcile their disparate views on Europe. Some profess to be “sick and tired of dealing with Brussels bureaucrats.”	俄罗斯在2008年8月对格鲁吉亚出兵使形势急转直下。


As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Russian Duma’s foreign relations committee, put it, “In Germany, Italy, France, we can achieve much more.”	“如果民主的价值、人权的尊重、法治的精神不能得到完全的承认和尊重，就不可能建立任何战略合作伙伴关系。 ”


Kosachev and others do not believe that the EU is committed to serious talks on “hard” security, a Russian imperative – and with good reason.	而俄罗斯则忙于调和自己与欧洲迥异的价值观。


How to deal with Russia on security issues – particularly on energy security – is one of the most divisive issues facing the EU.	部分俄罗斯人坦诚“对与布鲁塞尔官僚打交道感到厌倦。


Despite their commitment to speak to Russia with one voice, various EU countries negotiate with Russia bilaterally whenever possible (especially over lucrative business contracts), congregating under the EU umbrella only when necessary.	”俄罗斯杜马外交关系委员会主席康斯坦丁·科萨切夫（Konstantin Kosachev）称：“在德国、意大利和法国，我们能够取得更大的成果。


That gives Russia great scope to play one country against another.	”


Russia, meanwhile, harbors deep disappointment with the West for its actions after communism’s collapse. During the Gorbachev era, it was assumed that the West would stick to the essence of its Cold War containment policies.	科萨切夫等人认为欧盟不会与俄罗斯就“硬”安全问题——俄罗斯的当务之急——进行严肃探讨。


Russians expected that, once their country was seen to be no longer confrontational and expansionist, it would be treated as a legitimate partner, not as a defeated enemy.	这自有道理。 在欧盟，如何处理与俄罗斯有关的安全问题——尤其是能源安全问题——可谓众说纷纭。


It would retain its status alongside the United States’ on the world stage, its territorial integrity would be unquestioned, and it would be left to manage its domestic affairs without outside interference or criticism.	按理，欧洲应该以一个声音与俄罗斯对话，但实际上，欧盟各国一有机会就会与俄罗斯进行双边协商（特别是在利润丰厚的商业合同事务上），只是在万不得已的情况下才会统一打出欧盟的旗帜。 这使得俄罗斯可以游刃有余地各个击破。


Growing resentment toward the West has reinforced Russian leaders’ enduring penchant for the concepts of “Great Powers” and “spheres of influence,” and the belief that international relations is a zero-sum game, in which others’ gain is Russia’s loss.	而俄罗斯对西方在苏联解体后的行径怀着深深的不满。 在戈尔巴乔夫时代，俄罗斯认为西方会坚持冷战时期的遏制政策。


Thus, they cannot accept that more robust multilateral institutions, confidence, cooperation, and interdependence could assure international security.	俄罗斯人希望，一旦俄罗斯不再采取对峙和扩张主义态势，西方就应该视其为合法合作伙伴而不是被打倒在地的敌人。


On the contrary, Russia’s loss of superpower status is completely unacceptable.	俄罗斯应该能够维持其在世界舞台上与美国平起平坐的地位，俄罗斯领土完整应该是毋庸置疑之事，而俄罗斯如何处理民主事务完全是内政，不应受到任何外部干涉和批评。


Economic growth during the Putin years, combined with the defeat of Georgia – which was regarded in Russia as the beginning of a great political comeback – provided the confidence needed to embrace efforts to re-model the transatlantic security architecture.	对西方日益不满的情绪使得俄罗斯领导人开始着眼于“超级大国”、“势力范围”等概念，相信国际关系是一场零和游戏，西方之所赢即俄罗斯之所输。


Medvedev’s proposed transatlantic security treaty would enshrine the principle of avoiding external force to resolve national disputes, which would rule out international intervention in the conflicts affecting the northern Caucasus, including Chechnya.	因此，他们不再接受强大的多边机构、信心、合作以及相互依存可以保证国际安全的观点。 相反，俄罗斯失去超级大国地位是不可容忍的。


The status quo would be reinforced further by the principle that no country may increase its security to the detriment of another. But it is unclear who decides what is detrimental.	普京时代的经济增长与对格鲁吉亚的胜利一道——在俄罗斯人看来，出兵格鲁吉亚意味着俄罗斯在政治上的重新崛起——使俄罗斯充满了信心，欲重塑大西洋两岸安全模式。


Worse, the freedom to join military treaties, stipulated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and in other major international agreements like the Charter of Paris for a New Europe or the Charter for European Security, is ominously omitted. The expansion of military alliances, such as NATO, would be declared a threatening measure.	梅德韦杰夫版的跨大西洋安全条约将强化外部势力不应干涉国内纠纷的原则，这将把对北高加索地区（包括车臣）冲突的国际干预挡在俄罗斯国门之外。


Europe should react to this Russian proposal, first, by acknowledging that Russia has a critical role to play in transatlantic security, and that it should be treated not only with caution, but also with respect.	俄罗斯还有更进一步的打算，认为一国不能为了自己的安全而损坏他国利益。 到底由谁来定义什么是“损坏”目前还不清楚。


At the same time, a range of institutions already deals with the issue: OSCE, the NATO-Russia Council, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, to name but a few.	但是，由1975年《赫尔辛基协定》（Helsinki Accords）和其他国��协定——如建设新欧洲（New Europe）的《巴黎宪章》（Charter of Paris）和《欧洲安全宪章》（Charter for European Security）——所规定的自由加入军事条约的权利，梅德韦杰夫的计划只字未提。


These existing institutions might need to be reinvigorated and fortified, but there is no need for more of them.	北约等军事联盟的扩张将被俄罗斯视为威胁手段。


Second, the principle of the indivisibility of European and US security, so fundamental during the Cold War, remains valid.	首先，应该承认俄罗斯在跨大西洋安全事务上的关键作用。 欧洲不应该仅仅防范俄罗斯，更应该尊重它。


Security initiatives should therefore first be discussed bilaterally within the NATO-EU framework; only then should a common position be presented at the OSCE. Speaking to Russia with one voice is absolutely essential.	同时，已经存在的安全事务机构——欧安组织（OSCE）、北约-俄罗斯理事会（NATO-Russia Council）以及欧洲-大西洋合作伙伴理事会（Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council）等等——应该得到强化，而为此设置新机构则没有必要。


Third, the idea implicit in Medvedev’s plan – that Russia should have veto power over all security-related decisions of NATO or the EU – must be rejected.	其次，冷战中至关重要的欧洲与美国安全荣辱与共的原则仍有必要性。


Given that Russia’s own new military doctrine presents NATO as a potential threat, its leaders can logically claim that NATO enlargement undermines Russian security.	因此，安全措施应该首先在北约-欧盟框架内进行双边讨论，在此基础上形成一个OSCE共同立场。 以一个声音与俄罗斯对话至关重要。


Russia should nonetheless be consulted on all major security issues. NATO-Russia consultation during the drafting of the latest NATO Strategic Concept is a good example – an approach that Russia itself rejected before adopting its new military doctrine.	第三，对梅德韦杰夫计划的如意算盘——俄罗斯应该对所有北约或欧盟安全相关决定拥有否决权——必须严词拒绝。


Consultations on the Medvedev Plan should also include other former Soviet-bloc countries, such as Ukraine.	俄罗斯自己的军事新思维将北约列为潜在威胁，因此其领导人宣称北约东扩会威胁俄罗斯安全再自然不过了。


The best way to proceed on the Medvedev Plan would be an OSCE declaration similar to the one adopted in Istanbul in 1999 – that is, a political resolution, not a legally binding treaty.	北约-俄罗斯在最近的《北约战略概念》（NATO Strategic Concept）问题上的磋商就是很好的例子——让俄罗斯在接受军事新思维之前自己把它给拒绝了。 在梅德韦杰夫计划问题上的协商应该将其他前苏联加盟国——如乌克兰——也包括进来。


According Russia more formal recognition as a great power might help EU and US efforts to engage its leaders in a serious security dialogue.	处理梅德韦杰夫计划的最佳方式是效仿1999年的伊斯坦布尔OSCE宣言——即采取政治解决方案，而不是法律限制条约。


But no treaty should be signed so long as the sincerity of Russia’s commitment to the norms of international behavior remains in doubt.	给予俄罗斯正式超级大国地位可能有助于欧盟和美国就重大安全问题与俄罗斯领导人展开对话。 但不能和俄罗斯签署任何协议，因为俄罗斯是否会践行所做的按国际标准行事的承诺还未可知。


Beyond Fukushima	福岛之后


VIENNA – Nuclear power has become safer since the devastating accident one year ago at Fukushima, Japan.	维也纳—一年前日本福岛灾难性事故以来，核电变得更加安全了。


It will become safer still in the coming years, provided that governments, plant operators, and regulators do not drop their guard.	在未来几年中，只要政府、核电站运营商和监管者做好自己的工作，核电的安全性将继续提高。


The accident at Fukushima resulted from an earthquake and tsunami of unprecedented severity.	福岛事故是由史上最严重的地震和海啸引起的。


But, as the Japanese authorities have acknowledged, human and organizational failings played an important part, too.	但是，日本当局也 承认，人事和组织方面的不力也是事故的重要原因。


For example, Japan’s nuclear regulatory authority was not sufficiently independent, and oversight of the plant operator, TEPCO, was weak.	比如，日本的核监管当局不够独立，核电站的运营方东京电力公司也不够强大。


At the Fukushima site, the backup power supply, essential for maintaining vital safety functions such as cooling the reactors and spent fuel rods, was not properly protected.	在福岛核电站，用于维持关键安全功能——如冷却核反应堆和乏燃料棒——的后备电源没有得到合适的维护。


Training to respond to severe accidents was inadequate.	应对严重事故的培训做得不够充分。


There was a lack of integrated emergency-response capability at the site and nationally.	福岛核电站和日本都缺少综合紧急响应的能力。


Human and organizational failings are not unique to Japan.	人事和组织不力绝不是日本独有的问题。


Fukushima was a wake-up call for all countries that use nuclear power.	福岛事故不啻向所有使用核电的国家敲响了警钟。


It prompted serious soul-searching and recognition that safety can never be taken for granted anywhere.	该事故引起了深刻的反思，人们意识到，安全大过天，决不能存在侥幸心理。


Key causes of the accident have been identified.	此次事故的关键起因也已被查明。


Indeed, governments, regulators, and plant operators around the world have begun learning the right lessons.	事实上，全世界的政府、监管者和核电站运营商已开始吸取教训。


A robust international nuclear safety action plan is being implemented.	鲁棒的国际和安全行为计划已开始实施。


As a result, the likelihood of another disaster on the scale of Fukushima has been reduced.	因此，再次发生如福岛这样严重的核灾难的可能性已经被降低了。


What, exactly, has changed?	那么，到底是哪些地方有了变化？


Perhaps most importantly, the worst-case assumptions for safety planning have been radically revised.	也许最重要的一点是安全规划中的最坏情形假设被彻底地重新修订了。


At Fukushima, the reactors withstood a magnitude 9.0 earthquake – far more powerful than they were designed to tolerate.	在福岛，核反应堆经历了9. 0级的地震，远高于其设计抗震能力。


But the plant was not designed to withstand the 14-meter-high tsunami waves that swept over its protective sea wall less than an hour later.	但该核电站并没有设计抵抗14米巨浪的能力，结果，巨浪在一小时之内就摧毁了防护海塘。


In the aftermath of Fukushima, defenses against multiple severe natural disasters, including earthquakes and tsunamis, are being strengthened at nuclear facilities all over the world.	福岛事故发生后，全世界核设施都加强了多重严重自然灾害（如地震和海啸）的防护。


Measures are being taken to improve preparedness for prolonged power outages, protect backup power sources, and ensure the availability of water for cooling even under severe accident conditions.	采取的措施包括：改善应对长期停电的准备、维护备用电源以及在发生严重事故的情况下确保冷却水的可获得性。


Global nuclear safety standards are being reviewed.	全球核安全标准正在被重新修订。


National and international emergency-response capabilities are being upgraded.	国家和国际紧急响应能力正在升级。


Plant operators and national regulators are being scrutinized more critically.	核电站运营商和国家监管者正在受到更严格的详细检查。


Countries are opening their plants to more –amp#160;and more thorough – international safety reviews.	各国正在开放核电站，接受过多更彻底的国际安全检查。


Despite the accident, global use of nuclear power looks set to grow steadily in the next 20 years, although at a slower rate than previously forecast.	尽管发生了福岛事故，但全球核电用量将在2未来20年中稳步增长，只是增长速度比先前预计的有所下降。


The reasons for this have not changed: rising demand for energy, alongside concerns about climate change, volatile fossil-fuel prices, and the security of energy supplies.	其中的原因并没有改变：对能源的需求在上升，对气候变化、波动的化石燃料价格和能源供给安全性的担忧也在与日俱增。


It will be difficult for the world to achieve the twin goals of ensuring sustainable energy supplies and curbing greenhouse gases unless nuclear power remains an important part of the global energy mix.	世界要想同时实现可持续能源供给和限制温室气体两大目标是非常困难的，除非核电能在全球能源消费中占据重要一席。


The International Atomic Energy Agency expects at least 90 additional nuclear-power reactors to join the 437 now in operation globally by 2030.	国际原子能机构预计，到2030年，全球开机发电的核反应堆将从现在的437座的基础上增加90座。


Although some countries abandoned or scaled back their nuclear energy plans after Fukushima, major users of nuclear power, such as China, India, and Russia, are going forward with ambitious expansion plans.	一些国家在福岛事故后放弃了核能计划或减小了核能计划的规模，但核电的主要消费国——中国、印度、俄罗斯等国——并没有停止雄心勃勃的核电扩张脚步。


Many other countries, mainly in the developing world, are considering introducing nuclear power.	其他国家也有不少（主要是发展中国家）正在考虑引入核电。


Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to both established users and newcomers.	不管是老用户还是新用户，核安全都是至关重要的考虑因素。


It matters to countries that have decided to phase out nuclear power, because their plants will continue to operate for decades and will need to be decommissioned, with nuclear waste stored safely.	该问题同样关系到已决定放弃核电的国家，因为那里的核电站还将运行几十年，退役后也将面临核废料安全置放的问题。


And it matters to countries that are firmly opposed to nuclear power, as many of them have neighbors with nuclear-power plants.	该问题同样关系到明确反对核电的国家，因为它们的邻国在使用核电站。


Countries planning new nuclear-power programs must recognize that achieving their goals is a challenging, long-term undertaking.	计划建造新核电项目的国家必须认识到，这是一个极具挑战性的目标，是一项长期工程。


They need to invest considerable time and money in training scientists and engineers, establishing genuinely independent, well-funded regulators, and putting in place the necessary technical infrastructure.	它们需要投入大量时间和资金训练科技人员和工程师、成立真正独立且资金充裕的监管者，还要建设必要的技术基础设施。


Some countries still have shortcomings in this regard.	从这个方面看，不少国家仍需努力赶上。


Nonetheless, contrary to popular perception, nuclear power has a good overall safety record.	尽管如此，与流行的感觉相反，核电在安全记录上总体来说相当优秀。


New reactors being built today incorporate significantly enhanced safety features, both active and passive, compared to the Fukushima generation of reactors.	与福岛核电站所采用的那一代反应堆相比，眼下在建的新核反应堆采用了强化的主动和被动安全设施。


But, in order to regain and maintain public confidence, governments, regulators, and operators must be transparent about the benefits and risks of nuclear power – and honest when things go wrong.	但是，为了重新赢得并维持公众信心，政府、监管者和运营商必须公布核电的好处和风险，在出问题时诚实承认。


The fact that an accident such as Fukushima was possible in Japan, one of the world’s most advanced industrial countries, is a reminder that, when it comes to nuclear safety, nothing can be taken for granted.	日本是世界上最发达的工业国之一，既然它都免不了出现福岛这样的事故，那么在核安全问题上绝对不能心存侥幸。


Complacency can be deadly.	自满将招来惨重的代价。


The safety improvements seen in the past 12 months can only be a start.	过去12个月以来所实现的安全性改进只是个开始。


We must not slip back into a “business as usual” approach as Fukushima recedes from memory.	我们决不能因为福岛事件逐渐从记忆中消失而回到“老方一帖”的状态。


Beyond Pandemics	从传染病谈开去


NEW YORK – The World Health Organization has now officially declared the H1N1 flu virus to be a global pandemic.	纽约——世界卫生组织现已正式宣布将H1N1流感病毒列为全球流行病毒。


Governments, international organizations, and people around the world are rightly focused on fighting it.	世界各国政府、国际组织和民众正在与病毒进行斗争。


The speed with which the H1N1 virus has spread to almost every continent highlights our mutual interdependence.	H1N1病毒以如此快的速度传播到几乎所有大洲凸显出人类的相互依存程度。


Nowadays, the impact of disease in one country is ultimately felt by all.	今天，疾病对一个国家的影响最终会波及到所有国家。


Any effective response, therefore, must be grounded in a sense of global solidarity and enlightened self-interest.	因此，应对传染病的有效对策必须以全球团结和文明对待自身利益为基础。


We must recognize, yet again, that we are all in this together.	我们必须意识到人类的命运是休戚相关的。


When a new disease sweeps the world, access to vaccines and anti-viral medicines cannot be limited to those who can pay for them.	当一种新疾病席卷全球的时候，疫苗和抗病毒药物的使用不能只局限在有钱人当中。


Wealthy nations cannot hope to remain healthy if poorer nations do not.	如果贫穷国家不健康，富裕国家也很难独善其身。


Virus samples and information must be shared openly and quickly.	我们必须公开迅速地共享病毒样本和相关信息。


Governments and major pharmaceutical companies must be sure that poorer nations receive the medical supplies they need.	政府和大型制药企业必须确保贫困国家也能得到所需的医疗物资。


Even as we cope with today’s challenge, however, we must look ahead.	在迎接今天挑战的时候，我们还必须放眼未来。


Beyond this pandemic, there almost certainly lurks another down the road – potentially far more serious.	抛开此次疾病流行不论，几乎可以肯定在未来的道路上还隐藏着其他危机——而且后果可能更严重。


The same principles of solidarity must guide us as we mobilize to meet the other health challenges that afflict the world populations, and the poorest in particular.	在我们动员起来迎接影响世界民众、特别是贫困人群的其他健康挑战的时候，我们也必须遵守同样的团结原则。


Around the world, one woman dies every minute in childbirth.	放眼世界，每一分钟就有一名女性死于分娩。


More than a billion people continue to suffer from neglected tropical diseases – often easy to prevent and easy to control.	10多亿人仍患有被人忽略的热带疾病——这些疾病通常很容易预防和控制。


Just as we once eliminated smallpox, so can we eliminate others.	就像我们曾经消灭天花一样，我们也能消灭其他热带疾病。


It also bears remembering that 60% of the world’s population dies of non-communicable illnesses such as cancer or heart disease.	我们还必须记住有60%的世界人口死于癌症或心脏病等非传染性疾病。


That is why, in speaking about development and the stability of nations, we place such emphasis on health, particularly of the most vulnerable, and why, at a time of multiple crises, we will take up the issue of health this week in New York.	这也解释了为什么在谈到国家发展和稳定时，我们如此关注健康，特别是最脆弱人群的健康，以及为什么在危机纷至沓来的时刻，本周我们仍要在纽约探讨健康话题。


Continuing to invest in global health makes sense both in terms of lives and dollars saved.	继续投资于全球健康无论从挽救生命还是节约开支的角度讲意义都十分重大。


Healthy people are more productive.	健康的人生产率高。


They take fewer days off work.	他们较少因病休假。


They live longer, go further in school, and tend to bear fewer and more prosperous children as they invest more in the children they do have.	他们寿命更长、受教育更多、普遍生子较少但质量较高，因为他们对已有子女投入较多。


Studies have shown that investments in health care can yield a six-fold economic return.	研究表明医疗投资可以产生六倍的经济回报。


To offer but one example: the global impact of maternal and newborn deaths has been estimated at US$15 billion a year in lost productivity.	这里仅举一例：产妇和新生儿死亡估计已造成每年150亿美元的生产率损失。


And yet, when hard times hit, spending on health is often among the first things to be cut.	但当困难袭来的时候，健康投资通常会首先受到威胁。


During past recessions, especially in developing economies, the best care has tended to go to the wealthy; the poor, too often, have been left to fend for themselves.	在此前的经济衰退期，特别是在发展中经济体，通常只有富人才能享受到最高水平的医疗服务，而穷人则通常除了孤军奋战没有其他选择。


But the social and economic health of any society depends on the physical health of all its members.	但任何社会的社会和经济健康都取决于社会全员的身体状况。


When governments cut back on primary health care for their poorer citizens, the entire society ultimately pays a high price.	当政府削减贫困群体基本医疗开支的时候，整个社会最终会付出更高的代价。


Today, large parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia have still not recovered from mistakes made during previous economic downturns.	今天，非洲、拉美和亚洲大部分地区仍然未能从以前经济低迷期所犯的错误中恢复。


Nothing is more important than investing in maternal health.	没有什么比投资于妇女卫生更加重要。


In the poorest countries, especially, women make up the fabric of society.	尤其是在最贫困国家，女性构成了社会的基本单位。


Disproportionately, they farm the land, carry the water, raise and educate the children, and care for the sick.	她们超出比例地承担着种地、挑水、抚养教育子女、照顾病人的职责。


Investing in maternal health should thus be a high priority.	因此投资于妇女卫生应当成为最重要的任务。


Yet, of all the Millennium Development Goals, maternal health is the slowest to be achieved.	但在所有千年发展目标中，妇女卫生是最晚实现的目标。


As a result, worldwide mortality rates in 2005 were 400 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births – barely changed since 1990.	因此，2005年全世界死亡率是每100，000例活产儿有400例产妇死亡——这一数据从1990年来几乎从未改变过。


In Africa, the ratio is 900 per 100,000.	非洲的比例是每100，000例中有900例。


The harsh reality behind these figures is this: mothers, very often young, are dying for lack of what most of us take for granted in the twenty-first century – access to affordable health care.	这个数字背后的残酷现实是：很多年轻母亲们正死于缺少多数人在二十一世纪已经习以为常的服务——那就是负担得起的医疗保健服务。


Maternal health care is also a barometer of how well a health system functions.	妇女保健同样是医疗体系运转是否正常的晴雨表。


If women have access to hospitals and clinics, they are less likely to die in childbirth.	如果妇女能进入医院和诊所，她们死于分娩的可能性就会大大降低。


These hospitals and clinics in turn reduce the burden of illness and deaths from other causes as well.	这些医院和诊所同样能减轻其他原因造成的疾病和死亡负担。


Failure to mobilize the resources and muster the political will to put an end to this senseless tragedy would be unforgivable.	未能集中资源和政治意愿结束这场无知的悲剧是不可原谅的。


We have made progress on so many other fronts.	我们已经在其他许多领域中取得了进展。


We are within a few years of ending deaths from malaria.	再过几年我们就可以消灭疟疾死亡病例。


Mass immunization has largely eliminated polio.	群众免疫已基本实现了脊髓灰质炎绝迹。


Thanks to new programs of oral rehydration and improved water and sanitation, we have seen marked gains in treating dysentery and other parasitic diseases, contributing to a 27% decline between 1990 and 2007 in mortality rates for children under five.	多亏有口服补液和改善饮用水及卫生条件的新计划，我们在治疗痢疾和其他寄生虫病时也取得了显著的进步，并在1990到2007年间使五岁儿童的死亡率降低了27%。


Yes, the world faces its first influenza pandemic in more than 40 years.	是的，世界正面临着四十多年来的第一次流感肆虐。


We must remain on guard against changes in the virus.	我们必须警惕病毒变异。


We must also be prepared for potentially different impacts in parts of the world where malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, and other serious health conditions are prevalent.	我们还必须做好准备，迎接对世界某些营养不良、艾滋病和其他严重疾病流行区域的可能大相径庭的挑战。


In short, we must remain vigilant and continue actively to manage this pandemic.	简言之，我们必须保持警惕，继续积极推进传染病管理。


At the same time, the pandemic reminds us that we need to think and act beyond it.	同时，传染病提醒我们应当采取更大范围的思考和行动。


Only by doing so can we truly protect our people, our countries, our economy, and our global society.	只有这样我们才能真正保护我们的人民、我们的国家、我们的经济和我们的全球社会。


Beyond Revolutionary Disillusion	超越革命理想的破灭


PRAGUE - All revolutions, in the end, turn from euphoria to disillusion.	所有的革命最终都会从民众的兴奋转入理想的破灭。


In a revolutionary atmosphere of solidarity and self-sacrifice, people tend to think that when their victory is complete, paradise on Earth is inevitable.	在团结和自我牺牲的革命气氛中，人们趋向于认为当他们取得胜利的时候，人间天堂就指日可待了。


Of course, paradise never comes, and – naturally - disappointment follows.	当然，从来就没有过天堂，而且，失望很自然地随之而来。


That seems to be the case in Ukraine today, as its people prepare to vote for a new parliament little more than a year after their successful Orange Revolution.	在当今的乌克兰，橙色革命成功一年多一点以后，乌克兰人民准备选举新一届议会的时候，就会发生这种情况。


Post-revolutionary disillusion, especially after the revolutions against communism - and in Ukraine's case revolution against post-communism - is rooted in psychology.	后革命的理想破灭，特别是在反对共产主义的革命之后的理想破灭（乌克兰的情况则是反对后共产主义革命）扎根于人们的心理。


New circumstances imposed new challenges for most people.	新的形势给大多数人带来了新的挑战。


Formerly, the state decided everything, and many people, particularly in the middle and older generation, began to see freedom as a burden, because it entailed continuous decision-making.	以前，国家决定一切。 许多人，特别是中年和老年人，开始把自由视为负担，因为自由带来的是持续不停的自我决定。


I have sometimes compared this psychological ennui to my own post-prison situation: for years I yearned for freedom, but, when finally released, I had to make decisions all the time.	我有时候把这种心理上的厌倦和我自己的狱后生活作比较。 多年来我渴望自由。


Confronted suddenly with many options every day, one starts to feel a headache, and sometimes unconsciously wants to return to prison.	但是，当我最终被释放的时候，我不得不总是来为自己作决定。 当一个人突然间每天面对许多选择的时候就会开始感觉头疼，而且有时候会无意识地想要回到监狱。


This depression is probably inevitable.	这一种忧郁症可能是无法避免的。


But, on a societal scale, it is eventually overcome, as new generations grow up.	但是在社会层面来讲，随着新一代的成长，它最终被克服。


Indeed, 15 years after the disintegration of Soviet Union, a new catharsis seems underway, and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was part of that.	实际上，在苏联解体15年后，一种新的宣泄看起来正在进行，而乌克兰的橙色革命就是其中的一部分。


As Ukraine so clearly shows, the process of self-liberation from communism was, by definition, associated with a gigantic privatization.	正如乌克兰如此清楚地所表明的那样，从共产主义中自我解放的进程从定义上来讲是同大规模的私有化联系在一起的。


Naturally, members of the old establishment, with their inside knowledge and connections, gained much of the privatized property.	很自然地，旧权贵的成员们凭借他们的内线消息和关系取得了私有化了的财产的大部分。


This "inevitable" process poisoned political life and the media, which led to a strange state of limited freedom and a mafia-like environment.	这一“不可避免”的进程毒化了政治生活和媒体，进而导致一种奇怪的有限自由局面以及类似黑手党那样的环境。


The shadings differed from country to country in the post-communist world, but the new generations rising in these societies now seem to be fed up with it.	后共产主义世界的情况各国均不相同，但是成长在这些社会中的新的一代人现在看起来对此不耐烦了。


Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, as well as Georgia’s Rose Revolution, seems to confirm this.	乌克兰的橙色革命以及格鲁吉亚的玫瑰革命看起来都验证了这一点。


While revolutions in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s were directed against totalitarian communist regimes, nowadays they aim to get rid of this mafia-type post-communism.	二十世纪八十年代末期以及九十年代早期的革命针对的是专制的共产政权，现在这些革命的目的是要消除这种类似黑手党似的后共产主义。


But to make the change irreversible, a truly independent and incorruptible judiciary is essential.	但是，为了让这一改变不可逆转，一个真正独立和不受腐败侵袭的司法体系是至关重要的。


Too often in politically connected cases, suspicions and charges of wrongdoing are not pursued to an unambiguous conclusion.	在与政治有关的案件中，很多情况下并没有认真审理从而得出好不模棱两可的结论。


This is understandable: the communist justice system was manipulated to serve the regime, and thousands of judges cannot be replaced overnight.	这是可以理解的，因为共产司法体系受到操纵来服务于政权，而数以万计的法官则不可能一夜之间就被更换掉。


Although it is clear that a return to the old Soviet Union is not possible, some blame Russian influence for the disillusion in Ukraine.	回到苏联时代是不可能的，尽管这一点很清楚，但是，有些人把乌克兰民众的理想破灭归咎于俄国的影响。


Yes, there are some alarming elements in Russian policy, mostly because Russia has never really known where it begins and where it ends.	是的，俄国政策中有许多令人担忧的地方，大多数情况下是因为俄国从来就不知道何去何从。


It either owned or dominated many other nations, and now it is only with grudging reluctance dealing with the loss of them all.	它要么占领要么掌控着其他许多国家，现在，它极为不情愿地应付失去所有这些国家。


Some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements seem to recall the Soviet era with nostalgia.	俄国总统普京的某些言论看起来对苏联时代很怀旧。


Indeed, he recently called the disintegration of the Soviet Union a tragic mistake.	的确，他最近说苏联解体是一个悲剧性的错误。


But Soviet nostalgia has far more to do with Russia’s traditional Great Power ambitions than with communism.	但是，怀恋苏联与俄罗斯传统的大国情怀联系要远远大于与共产主义的联系。


Russia, I believe, should clearly say – and the international community should clearly say to Russia – that it has defined borders that will not be questioned, because disputed borders lie at the core of most conflicts and wars.	我相信，俄罗斯应该明白无误地声明、而且国际社会应该明白无误地对俄罗斯声明，俄罗斯的边界是确定的、不会受到怀疑，因为边界争议时大多数冲突和战争的根源。


On the other hand, I don’t want to demonize Putin.	在另一方面，我并不想把普京妖魔化。


He may lower oil prices for someone close to him, like Belarus’ dictator Alexander Lukashenko, and insist on a market price for someone else, but that’s basically all he can do.	他可能会把石油低价卖给与其亲近的人，例如白俄罗斯的独裁者卢卡申科，而坚持以市场价格出售给其他人，但是他也只能如此而已。


I don't envision any serious conflict beyond that.	我并不看到除此以外还会有什么严重的冲突。


The promise of Western integration is one reason that conflict seems impossible, for it is a question of geography as much as shared values and culture.	融入西方的许诺是使得冲突看似不可能的一个原因，因为这不仅是一个地理上的问题，也是共同价值观和文化的问题。


Ukraine belongs to a united European political entity; the values that Ukraine endorses and that are embedded in its history are European to the core.	乌克兰属于联合的欧洲政治实体； 乌克兰所信奉的以及在其历史中植根的价值观本质上是欧洲式的。


The Czech experience shows that implementing all of the European Union’s norms so as to be ready to qualify for membership takes some time.	捷克的经验表明，实施欧盟所有的法令条例以便做好准备入盟需要时日。


But in principle, Ukraine can succeed as well.	但是在原则上来讲，乌克兰也同样可以成功。


Much the same is true for Ukraine and NATO.	对于乌克兰和北约来讲情况大体也是如此。


Partnerships based on shared rules, standards, and values are the heartbeat of modern security.	建立在共同规则、标准以及价值观念基础之上的伙伴关系是现代安全的中心。


Moreover, NATO in a way defines the sphere of a civilization, which of course doesn’t mean that NATO’s community is better than any other.	而且，北约确定了一个文明的领域，当然这并不是说北约就是高人一等。


But it’s a community that is good to belong to – provided that people want it and that it makes historical sense for them.	但是，只要人们有愿望，而且对于人们来说具有历史性的意义，加入北约就是不错的事情。


NATO membership carries obligations, because situations may arise – and we have already experienced them – when NATO follows a United Nations appeal and conducts an out-of-area military intervention where, for example, genocide is being committed.	北约成员资格规定了义务，因为可能会出现这样一种情况，而且我们已经经历了，那就是北约响应联合国的呼吁，在北约以外、例如种族屠杀正在进行的地方实行军事干预。


In other words, NATO membership, like EU membership, comes at a price.	换句话说，如同欧盟成员资格一样，北约的成员资格是有代价的。


However, I think that the advantages far outweigh any possible disadvantages.	但是，我认为有益之处要远远大于可能的不利之处。


It is up to Ukrainians to decide this for themselves and thus to overcome post-revolutionary disillusion.	乌克兰人民要自己作出决定，并进而克服后革命时代的理想破灭。


Beyond the Death Penalty Debate	死刑辩论之外


China’s decision to execute the head of its drug regulatory agency has rekindled international debate about capital punishment.	中国判处原药监局局长死刑再度引发了有关死刑的国际争论。


It is an age-old question, one that harks back to Plato, who in his “Laws” saw the need to punish by death those who commit egregious crimes.	这个问题由来已久，可以追溯到波拉图时代，按照波拉图“定律”，必须要对犯下重罪的人处以死刑。


Supporters of capital punishment usually put forward three arguments to justify state-sanctioned killing of those who take the life of another.	死刑支持派通常会罗列三种论点，来为国家审批杀人者死刑进行辩护。


First, there is the old law of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”	首先是“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”的古老原则。


In the words of Immanuel Kant, not some Texas governor, no other “penalty is capable of satisfying justice.”	用伊曼努尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）、而不是某位德克萨斯州州长的话说，没有任何一种其他刑罚“足以伸张正义”。


Then there is a utilitarian argument: capital punishment deters many criminals from murder.	其次是实用主义的论调：死刑能够阻止罪犯进行谋杀。


Furthermore, killing murderers prevents recidivism: if released from prison, they might kill again.	不仅如此，对杀人犯执行死刑可以有效地防止重犯：如果从监狱中获释，他们可能会再次行凶。


The third argument is also utilitarian, although of a lower quality: the state saves money by killing murderers instead of keeping them in prison for life at the expense of the community.	第三点理由同样出于实用主义考虑，但质量却没有那么高：对杀人犯执行死刑而不是由社会出钱把他们终生养在监狱里，可以为国家节省下大笔的开支。


Abolitionists respond with two ethical arguments.	死刑废除派也提出了两条道德理由作为回应。


First, in a modern democracy, punishment must be not only retributive, but should also try to rehabilitate the criminal in order to enable him to live in society with other human beings.	首先，在现代社会里，刑罚的目的不仅是为了渊渊相报，也是为了让犯人改过自新，使他们能够在社会中与他人和谐相处。


But, while this is a compelling argument, those who know modern prisons recognize that many inmates are not susceptible to improvement – a fact that cannot be attributed only to conditions of detention.	尽管这个理由非常充分，但对现代监狱有了解的人却认定很多犯人并不那么容易悔过，他们这样的态度很难全部归咎于现有的关押条件。


The second ethical argument is based on the commandment “thou shalt not kill” which also enjoins the state from killing.	第二条道德理由来自于“不可杀人”的圣经训诫，这条训诫同样也禁止国家杀人。


But this argument is undermined by the fact that the state can resort to lethal force to prevent serious crimes, or to fight a war or rebellion.	但事实上国家可以借助毁灭性力量、或者是战争和叛乱来阻止严重罪行的发生，在这样的极端事例面前，这条理由实际也很难成立。


Opponents of the death penalty also rely on utilitarian arguments.	实用性理由同样也是死刑反对者的法宝。


The death penalty is irreversible.	死刑无法逆转。


If a convict turns out to be innocent, his execution cannot be undone.	如果最终证明犯人是无辜的，人们也无法让他死而复生。


Moreover, abolitionists assail the deterrent effect of the death penalty.	不仅如此，死刑废除派还质疑死刑的震慑效果。


Thucydides, in recounting the Athenians’ discussion of what penalty to impose on the rebellious Mytilenians, noted that “the death penalty has been laid down for many offenses, yet people still take risks when they feel sufficiently confident; it is impossible for human nature, once seriously set upon a certain course, to be prevented from following that course by the force of law or by any other means of intimidation whatsoever.”	修西得底斯（Thucydides）在讲述雅典人讨论该对叛乱的密提林人（Mytilenians）施以何种惩罚的故事时，指出“很多犯罪行为的法定判决都是死刑，但人们却仍然大着胆子甘愿冒险，也就是说一旦认准了某个特定的方向，法律的威严或者其他形式的恫吓都不可能阻止人们去犯罪行凶。


Criminologists have shown, statistically, that in US states where convicts are executed, serious crimes have not diminished.	犯罪学家用实实在在的数据表明，在对罪犯执行死刑的美国各州，严重犯罪并没有任何减少的迹象。


Other criminologists argue that this finding, if well-founded, should then apply to any criminal law: every day, criminal prohibitions are infringed; yet if we did not have such prohibitions, crimes would be even more rampant.	其他犯罪学家认为上述发现如果理由充分，就应该适用于所有的刑事规则：刑法设立的禁区时时都在被人打破。 但如果根本没有这些禁区，犯罪行为就会更为猖獗。


In their view, capital punishment serves at least to restrain the homicidal leanings of human beings.	因此在他们看来，死刑至少可以对人类行凶倾向起到抑制的作用。


So the death penalty debate boils down to an exchange of conflicting ethical and utilitarian views.	有关死刑的争论至此就归结为相互矛盾的道德和功利观点之间的交流和碰撞。


But we should not sit idly by and refrain from taking sides.	但我们不应该三缄其口、置身事外。


I, for one, believe that the death penalty radically negates the doctrine of human rights, which is founded on respect for life and the dignity of human beings.	比如我就认定死刑从根本上破坏了以尊重生命和人类尊严为基础的人权学说。


But, whether or not you oppose the death penalty, two lessons can be drawn from the debate.	但无论你反对死刑与否，都可以从这场辩论中汲取到两个教训。


First, the fight for human dignity and respect for life, as with any struggle for human rights, is set in motion and tenaciously pursued by members of civil society, by individuals more than by states.	首先，争取人类尊严和对生命尊重的斗争如同任何一场人权斗争一样，受到民主社会全体成员的顽强推动，而个人为推动人权所付出的努力要远远超过国家。


It was a representative of the Age of Reason, Cesare Beccaria, who first advocated in 1764, in a few pages of a seminal booklet, the abolition of capital punishment.	它所代表的是一个理性的时代，1764年切萨雷·贝卡利亚（Cesare Beccaria）在一份仅有几页的发展手册中首次提出了这样的概念，并竭力倡导废除死刑。


Indeed, it is thanks to a few thinkers and activists that states have gradually moved away from age-old tenets.	实际上，国家逐渐放弃古老的原则多亏少数思想家和积极分子的功劳。


As Tommaso Campanella, a great philosopher who spent much time in prison and was tortured because of his ideas, wrote a few centuries ago, “history is changed first by the tongue and then by the sword.”	正如康帕内拉（Tommaso Campanella）在几个世纪前写到的那样：“改变历史的首先是言论，其次才是武力。 ” 伟大的哲学家康帕内拉一生大部分时间都在囹圄中渡过，并且由于他的思想而受尽折磨。


Nowadays, it is associations such as Amnesty International and Hands Off Cain that push states to abolish capital punishment.	在当今世界，也存在像大赦国际和拯救该隐这样的组织极力敦促国家取消死刑。


The second lesson is that the death penalty debate should not absorb all our attention.	第二个教训是有关死刑的争论不该吸引我们全部的注意力。


If we intend to abolish the gallows, we should also fight for the prevention of crime and against the inhumanity of many prisons.	如果我们要废除绞刑，那么也该为预防犯罪和反对监狱虐待犯人努力进行斗争。


After all, what is the point of suggesting imprisonment as an alternative to electrocution, if inmates are subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment?	归根结底，如果犯人受到可耻的非人道虐待，那么用监禁来取代电刑又有什么实际意义呢？


How can we ignore that a high number of inmates commit suicide – self-inflicted capital punishment – to escape the inhumanity of their imprisonment?	很多犯人用自杀（自我执行死刑）的方式来逃避在狱中所受的非人道待遇，��此我们怎能视而不见？


How can we ignore that many states today kill not only through legal punishment, but also by murdering and massacring in international or civil wars, or by allowing starvation?	今天许多国家不仅通过法律惩戒的方式进行杀戮，而且还以国际或国内战争或任由饥荒蔓延的方式开展谋杀和大规模屠杀，我们又怎能麻木不仁？


In short, opposition to the death penalty cannot be an end in itself, for it is only one element of a more general fight for human dignity.	简言之，反对死刑不应该是终极目的，因为它只是争取人类尊严大规模斗争中的要素之一。


Beyond the Gaza Ceasefire	加沙停火之外


TEL AVIV – Finally, the long-sought truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has become a reality.	特拉维夫－终于，期盼已久的以色列和哈马斯在加沙地带上的停战变成了现实。


Reaching this uneasy state has not been easy.	取得这样的不稳定状态并不容易。


For months, wise and responsible people had exhorted Israel to accept the ceasefire that the Hamas leadership in Gaza had proposed. But Israel’s government, using all kinds of pretexts, stubbornly resisted.	几个月以来，明智而负责的人们劝诫以色列接受位于加沙的哈马斯领导层提出的停火协定，但是以色列政府利用各种借口，坚决地予以拒绝。


“A truce would weaken Palestinian President Abu Mazen,” officials claimed, as if the construction of new Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the refusal to dismantle previous illegal ones had not already weakened him.	以色列官员们声称“停战协定会削弱巴勒斯坦总统阿布·马赞的威望” ，仿佛在东耶路撒冷建立的新以色列定居点以及拒绝拆除以前的非法定居点没有削弱他的威望一样；


Or they argued that “Hamas does not recognize the state of Israel,” as if other ceasefire agreements with the Arab states and the PLO in the last 60 years had been based on recognition of Israel, rather than on a simple ethical principle that has guided Israel for many years, namely to gain, for us and our enemies, a pause in hostilities.	或者他们辩称“哈马斯并不承认以色列这个国家”，仿佛和阿拉伯国家以及巴勒斯坦解放组织在过去60年里达成的停战协定都是基于他们对以色列的承认，而不是基于一个指导以色列多年的简单道德原则－即为我们和我们的敌人暂停敌对状态－那样。


In the end, however, logic prevailed over escapism and hesitation, a ceasefire was signed, and we can only regret all the time that was lost and the unnecessary suffering on both sides.	但是，最终，理性战胜了空想和犹豫，以色列和哈马斯签署了一个停火协定，我们只能为因为长期不签署停战协定而造成的时间损失和双方不必要的苦难感到遗憾。


In this war, which has been going on for nearly a century, it is important to keep one principle in mind: the Palestinians are Israel’s neighbors and will live side by side with Israelis forever.	在这场几乎长达一个世纪的战争中，记住这样一个原则是很重要的：巴勒斯坦人是以色列的邻居，他们将和以色列人肩并肩的永远生活在一起。


Because of this simple fact, the military considerations are very different from those in a conflict between countries that are distant from each other.	因为这个简单的事实，这里的军事考虑就要和那些相距很远的国家之间的冲突中的军事考虑非常不同。


Memories of spilled blood, be it Israeli or Palestinian, remain vivid in the hearts of both peoples.	喋血的记忆，不管这血是以色列人的还是巴勒斯坦人的，都鲜明地留在两国人民的脑中。


An immediate break in the hostilities is therefore more important than a chimerical long-term “capitulation.”	因此，立即停止敌对状态比一个空想的长期“投降条约”更为重要。


The launch of five Qassam rockets into Israel five days after the signing of the truce suggests its precariousness.	在签署停战协定后的五天内，已经有五枚卡萨姆型火箭被发射到以色列境内，这暗示了该协定的不稳定。


So can it last and evolve into something durable?	所以，这个停战协定能持续并演化成为一个持久的状态吗？


Opponents of the truce predict, – indeed, wish – that it will be short-lived.	该停战协定的反对者预言－甚至是希望－它很短命。


But even skeptics nourish many hopes.	但是即使是怀疑主义者也怀有许多希望。


To be sure, if this new truce is merely technical, if efforts are not made to stabilize and consolidate it, it could become just one another in a long string of bitter episodes.	确实，如果这个新停战协定仅仅是技术上的，如果不进行稳定和巩固该协定的努力，它又会变成一长串痛苦事件中的另一个。


But all who had feared a “great Israeli offensive” in Gaza should make every effort to strengthen the truce and create a climate for relaxing tensions that could, with time, lead to a peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority.	但是，所有担心在加沙发生“巨大的以色列攻击”的人都应该努力巩固这个协定并创造一个缓和紧张的气氛，从而随着时间的推移，能在这种氛围里与巴勒斯坦当局达成一个和平协定。


So what should be done to bring this about?	那么，为了实现这一点要做些什么呢？


Above all, border crossings between Israel and the Palestinian territories should be reopened for the sick, for students, and for families whose members were separated by the blockade.	首先，以色列和巴勒斯坦领土之间的边境交界处应为病人、学生和家庭成员被封锁分开的家庭重新开放。


Second, a generous (and, with time, growing) quota should be set for Palestinian laborers to work in Israel – indeed, they must be allowed to work in the very agricultural centers around Gaza which were the most affected by the rocket attacks.	其次，应该为巴勒斯坦工人到以色列工作设定一个慷慨的额度（并且，随着时间的推移，增加额度）－确实，他们应被允许在最受火箭袭击影响的加沙周围的农业中心工作。


Palestinians working in Israel are good for both sides, and better than the foreigners who come from distant lands and live an isolated life in Israel, solitary and under constant threat of expulsion.	巴勒斯坦人在以色列工作对双方都有好处，也比来自遥远国家并在以色列过着孤立的生活的外国人好，这些外国人很孤独并且经常处于被开除的威胁之下。


Palestinian workers, who go back home every night, do not become alienated from their normal life.	巴勒斯坦工人每天晚上都会回家，不会变得与他们正常的生活状态疏离。


Future workers from Gaza, having a moral right to earn their living in Israel, will become natural supporters of the maintenance of the truce.	将来来自加沙的工人，有道德上的权利在以色列谋生，他们将会自然地成为维护停战协定的支持者。


Furthermore, past industrial projects that fell victim to the hostilities should be revived and made more legitimate in the eyes of Hamas through the participation of the Arab state.	此外，过去成为敌对状态牺牲品的工业建设项目应该重新开始，并通过阿拉伯国家的参与使其在哈马斯眼中更具合法性。


The killing by Israel of Hamas terrorists in the West Bank should also be stopped – or at least limited as much as possible – and the Palestinian Authority should be permitted to deal with them in their own way.	以色列在约旦河西岸消灭哈马斯恐怖分子的行动也应该停止－或者至少在可能的情况下最大限度的减少这样的行动－并且允许巴勒斯坦当局用他们自己的方法来对付他们。


Above all, we must assure that the armistice has its own dynamic.	最重要的是，我们必须确保停战具有它自己的力量。


In a state of war, people get used to the status quo and cannot imagine anything else. But when tensions relax, the idea of taking up arms again becomes painful and unsupportable inasmuch as it means a return to the familiar and terrible experience of suffering.	在战争状态中，人们习惯了现状并不能作其他的想象，但是当紧张局势得到缓解后，再次拿起武器的想法会变得令人痛苦和不能忍受，因为它意味着回到常见和恐怖的苦难经历中。


So this truce must be seen not as a piece of paper with some legal significance, but as a young plant that needs to be tended to, watered, nursed, and protected, so that it grows into a strong and robust tree that cannot be uprooted with an occasional Qassam rocket or a stray grenade.	所以，这个停战协定不应该被看作是一个具有一些法律意义的文件，而应该被看作是一个需要照顾、浇水、施肥和保护的幼小植物，以至于能成长为一棵强壮繁茂的大树，不会因为偶尔的卡萨姆型火箭或零星的手榴弹而被连根拔起。


Beyond the Gender Gap	超越性别差距


Last Spring, The Economist trumpeted “womanpower” as  the driving force for the world economy.	去年春天，经济学家杂志曾经鼓吹“女性势力”就是世界经济的推动力量。


But if Europe’s economy is to become more competitive and innovative, it is not enough that women enter the labor market in droves.	但是，如果欧洲经济要想变得更为具有竞争力以及创新力，妇女仅仅大量进入劳动力市场还是不够的。


To reap the full fruits of women’s talents, they must be in more top jobs, too, both in the public and private sector.	为了充分利用妇女才能的果实，她们还必须在公营部门和私营部门居于最高的职务。


Women in Western Europe have long since bridged the education gap with their male peers.	西欧的妇女长久以来已经消除了同她们的男性同龄人在教育上的差距。


Women not only outnumber men at universities; they also outperform them, most notably in math, physics, and information science.	在大学里，女生不仅在人数上超过男生，而且她们也比男生成绩要好，最为显著的是在数学、物理以及信息科学方面。


But female students’ academic achievements have not increased women’s presence in top jobs.	但是女生在学术上的成就并未增加妇女在最高职务上的存在。


In Europe, the percent of women on corporate boards remains in single digits, as is true of the top ranks of government and academia.	在欧洲，妇女在企业董事会中的比例在百分之十以下，在政府和学术界最高职务上也是一样。


While in the United States almost one out of five corporate officers are women, in mainland Europe the female to male ratio on company boards is one to twenty or worse.	在美国的企业官员中几乎每五个人就有一个人是女性，而在欧洲大陆，在公司董事会中妇女和男子的比例是一比二十或者更低。


The situation is only slightly better in science.	在科学界，这一局面稍微好一点。


One of every ten professors in Europe is a woman.	在欧洲，每十名教授中有一人是女性。


In the US, the ratio is – once again – more favorable to women, with more than 20% of professors at American universities being female.	在美国，这一比例再一次对妇女更为有利。 在美国大学中，超过20%的教授是女性。


Europe cannot afford to waste valuable human capital at a time when China and India are on the rise and its own population is aging.	欧洲无法在中国和印度两国崛起、其自身人口老龄化的时候浪费宝贵的人力资本。


The first baby boomers have reached retirement age, and the labor force will soon be shrinking in most parts of Europe.	首批婴儿潮已经到达退休年龄，劳动力在欧洲的大部分地区将会马上萎缩。


To cover the costs of aging and maintain its position as an economic power, Europe must increase overall labor participation considerably.	欧洲为了承担人口老龄化的成本以及维持其经济强国的地位就必须大幅度增加劳动力的总体参与。


Not only can and must fathers assume a greater role in child rearing; a large part of homemaking is perfectly suitable to be met by the market.	父亲们不仅能够、而且必须在抚养孩子上承担更大的责任； 家务中的很大一部分完全可以由市场得到满足。


As economists Ronald Schettkat and Richard Freeman have pointed out, career women do not necessarily work more hours per week than women with part-time jobs or stay-at-home moms.	正如经济学家斯科塔和弗里曼所指出的那样，职业妇女每周工作时间并不一定比兼职工作妇女或者居家母亲们要长。


Instead, they tend to outsource activities like grocery shopping, cooking, and cleaning.	相反，她们往往把某些家务，例如购买杂货、做饭以及清洁等外包出去。


If women in Europe work more hours in better quality jobs, it will stimulate demand for service jobs like cleaning and child care, thus reducing unemployment among low-skilled workers.	如果欧洲妇女在更高质量的工作中工作更长的时间，那么，这将会刺激像清洁和托儿等服务性工作，从而降低低技能工人的失业率。


Moreover, the increased supply of high-quality female labor will not incur additional healthcare and pension costs, unlike labor immigration.	而且，高质量女性劳力供应的增加不会像劳工移民那样引发额外的医疗和养老金成本。


Women use those benefits anyway, whether they are stay-at-home moms or perform paid work outside the home.	无论是居家母亲还是在外从事带薪工作的妇女都是要使用这些福利补助的。


Because people live longer and procreate less, raising and caring for children requires less of a parent’s life than it used to.	由于人们寿命延长，生育降低，所以，父母抚养孩子所花费的精力比过去要少。


Women should be able to aspire to top jobs without squandering their fertility, and their success would encourage women in lower-ranking positions, because female managers tend to implement more gender-conscious hiring policies and serve as strong role models.	妇女可以在不错过生育的情况下谋求最高的职位，而且，她们的成功将会鼓励职位较低的妇女，因为女性经理往往会落实更为考虑性别的录用政策，而且是强大的楷模。


Obstacles to the professional advancement of educated women in Europe is rooted in corporate culture, gender biases, and stereotyping, rather than outright discrimination.	欧洲受过教育的妇女的职业进步的障碍根源在于企业文化、性别偏向以及成见，而不是赤裸裸的歧视。


Group dynamics prevent company boards that consist solely of males from including women, even if members individually would support such a decision.	群体能动阻碍全部由男性组成的公司董事会包含妇女，即使单个董事成员会支持这一决定。


Moreover, those women who do reach higher-ranking positions are susceptible to a visibility-vulnerability spiral, owing to their minority status.	而且，那些提升到更高职位的妇女由于居于少数地位，其知名度容易受到损害而螺旋状下降。


As long as women are perceived to be the weaker sex, men and women alike will project their own feelings of vulnerability onto the female candidate.	只要女性被认为是弱势性别，那么，男女都会将其自有的损害感觉适用到女性候选人上。


Such exclusionary group dynamics can be overcome only by attaining a critical mass of women in high-ranking positions.	只有妇女在高级职位中获得大量位置，这种排斥性的群体能动才能够得到克服。


The benefits of doing so would be enormous.	这样做有许多好处。


Studies show that companies with more women in senior management are more profitable than those with few women at the top.	研究结果表明，如果公司的高级管理层中有众多的妇女，就会比那些在顶层中妇女寥寥无几的公司更为盈利。


Diversified management means better management.	多样化的管理就意味着更好的管理。


Including more women in top positions, both in the public and private sector, changes decision-making processes fundamentally, because women tend to play down the importance of formalities and communicate directly, thereby overcoming organizational blockages.	在公营和私营部门的最高职位中包含更多的妇女根本性地改变决策进程，因为妇女往往降低繁文缛节的重要性并且直接沟通，从而克服组织上的妨碍。


A decisive pro-women strategy would thus create new momentum for Europe, allowing it to compete with the United States and Asia.	因此，一个决定性的亲妇女的战略将会为欧洲创造新的势头，能够使其与美国和亚洲竞争。


At the start of this year, Norway enacted legislation that requires that both sexes be represented by at least 40% on all corporate boards.	今年年初，挪威通过立法，要求所有的公司董事会中两性至少占有40%。


Companies that do not meet the new gender rules, which also apply to the public sector – risk being dissolved by court order.	这一性别规则也适用于公营部门。 不符合这一规则的公司有可能会有被法院下令解散的风险。


Spain’s prime minister, José Zapatero, recently proposed similar standards for gender balance in business and politics.	西班牙首相萨帕特罗最近提议在商界和政界实施类似的标准。


Norway has set an excellent example – one that all of Europe should follow as the best way to transcend the culture of gender bias and stereotyping that is still prevalent in many companies and institutions.	挪威现在树立了一个良好的范例。 这是超越在许多公司和机构中依然盛行的性别偏见和成见文化的最佳做法，欧洲应该予以效仿。


But women, too, must adjust.	但是妇女自身也应当调整。


The reality is that top jobs require more than two workdays a week, and they do not coincide with school hours.	现实是，最高职位要求每周工作超过两天，而且工作时间也与学校时间不吻合。


Assuming the responsibilities that have long belonged to men requires that women let go of the tasks that have prevented them from advancing beyond low-ranking positions.	承担长久以来一直属于男子的责任要求妇女放弃那些阻碍她们从低职位更进一步的任务。


Beyond the Two-State Solution	建国方案之外的方案


NEW HAVEN – As the turmoil in the Middle East worsens, the fate of the Palestinians seems to have been put on the diplomatic back burner.	发自纽黑文——随着中东动荡加剧，巴勒斯坦人的命运似乎已被外交界抛在了脑后。


Indeed, the two-state solution has been on life-support since Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, despite US Secretary of State John Kerry’s heroic efforts to revive it.	的确，尽管美国国务卿约翰·克里（John Kerry）奋力斡旋，但巴勒斯坦以色列两地分别建国的方案自以色列于2014年在加沙地区执行“防护之刃”军事行动后就陷入了垂死状态。


Many in the region, and elsewhere, now believe that it is dead.	而对于该地区和其他地方的许多人来说，这一方案早就宣告不治了。


But that raises a new problem.	但这又引发了一个新问题。


With statehood seemingly out of reach, it will be only a matter of time before large numbers of Palestinians begin demanding the right to vote in Israeli elections.	既然建国大业变得遥不可及，那么迟早有一天会有大批巴勒斯坦人要求在以色列大选中获得投票权。


That fight will be intense.	针对这项权利的斗争将会异常激烈。


Israelis embraced the idea of two states for so long partly to keep Palestinian enfranchisement off the table.	因为以色列人之所以能在两国方案上坚持那么久，在一定程度上就是因为这可以避开巴勒斯坦人的选举权问题。


How can the emerging order become more inclusive and legitimate?	那么这一新兴秩序如何才能变得更具包容性的和合法性？


Elements of a constructive way forward are hiding in plain sight.	可以说那些构成建设性前进方案的要素就隐藏在众人的目光之下。


Shortly after Israel signed its 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres proposed a cross-border joint economic zone to solidify the agreement. This became the Jordan Gateway Industrial Park (JGIP), a 346-acre special economic zone (SEZ) occupying the Israeli and Jordanian banks of the Jordan River near Haifa.	以色列与约旦于1994年签署了和约后不久，时任以色列外长的希蒙·佩雷斯（Shimon Peres）提出建设跨境经济合作区以巩固该协议，并以此建成了占地346英亩，横跨海法附近约旦河段以色列和约旦两岸的经济特区——约旦通商工业园。


Championed by Israeli industrialist Shlomi Fogel, the JGIP has recently experienced marked growth.	由以色列实业家索罗米·福格尔（Shlomi Fogel）主导的该工业园最近经实现了大幅增长。


Israel’s government contributed $34 million in 2013. Jordan, which has largely directed the project since 2001, provides ongoing fiscal support.	以色列政府在2013年为园区提供了3400万美元资金，而自2001年以来都在很大程度上执掌着该项目的约旦则提供了持续的财政支持。


As with SEZs elsewhere around the world, the industries in the park are exempt from taxes and tariffs and enjoy other economic benefits.	与世界其他地方的经济特区一样，园区内的企业可以享受税收和关税的减免以及其他经济利益。


This model should be expanded to include special political zones (SPZs) that erode divisions between Israelis and Palestinians.	这种模式应该扩大到某种涵盖以色列人和巴勒斯坦人的政治特区，并以此取消双方之间的隔离区。


SPZs could be created along the borders between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. They should be more fully integrated than the JGIP, which depends on outside labor.	这些特区可以沿着以色列和约旦河西岸及加沙地带之间的边界创建，并实现比依赖外来劳工的约旦工业园更为全面的整合。


People in the SPZs would effectively constitute themselves as microcosms of a new order.	在政治特区的人们实际上会将自身视为一个新秩序的缩影。


SPZ businesses could be owned by Israelis, Palestinians, or jointly, and workers would come from both sides of the divide.	特区内的企业主可以是以色列人，巴勒斯坦人，或是双方合资，而工人将来自隔离区的两侧。


But everyone would have to live in the SPZ, in which they would receive ownership shares and governance roles that would grow in proportion to the length of their tenure.	但是这些人都得是特区的居民，而他们所享有的所有权和管治权都将随着居住时间的延长而按比例增加。


SPZs should enjoy high degrees of political autonomy from the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.	特区应该分别从以色列政府和巴勒斯坦权力机构处享有高度的政治自治。


Residential infrastructure, from schools to municipal services and medical facilities, would be built in the zones, making them substantially self-sufficient.	特区内将建设包括学校，市政服务和医疗设施在内的居民基础社会，使其基本实现自给自足。


Day-to-day governance would be left to residents, who would have an economic interest in the SPZ’s vitality, as well as incentives to sustain integrated binational communities.	日常治理将留给区内居民，因为这些人会因特区的兴旺而获得经济利益，也拥有不断保持这些双边社区融合一体的动力。


Co-Op City, the largest residential complex in the United States, is a suggestive model.	美国最大的住宅综合体公社城（Co-Op City）也是一个可供借鉴的模式。


Directed by a community-based corporation, Co-Op City contains schools, stores, and private law enforcement.	在一家社区型企业的主导下，公社城内包含了学校，商店和私人执法部门。


Such common-interest housing developments (CIDs) have grown in the US in recent years. Part of the attraction is enhanced participation.	这种基于共同利益的住房开发模式近年来在美国遍地开花，其中一部分吸引力就来自于居民参与感的增强。


In the Middle East, such arrangements could foster new forms of inter-ethnic cooperation.	而在中东地区，这类方案可以催生一系列族群间合作的新形式。


Security would be a major concern.	安保将会是主要问题。


Initially, SPZ perimeters would have checkpoints like those for crossing into the West Bank and Gaza.	一开始，特���周边将设有类似西岸和加沙地区的边检站。


But people would not need to come and go on a daily basis, an albatross that has bedeviled cross-border SEZs until now.	但由于人们无需每日进出，也就舒解了迄今为止一直困扰着跨境经济特区的一道难题。


Autonomous forces, similar to those employed by CIDs and university campuses, would maintain internal order.	类似于公社城和大学校园所雇佣的自治型安保力量将负责维持内部秩序。


This differs from the JGIP, where Israel and Jordan maintain control over their respective spheres on either side of the Jordan River.	这一点与约旦通商工业园不同——以色列和约旦都保持着对约旦河两岸各自领域的控制。


SPZs should be located near transportation on both sides of the border, but away from religious shrines, settlements, and strategically important military installations.	政治特区应位于边界两侧的交通要道附近，但远离宗教圣地，定居点和具有重要战略意义的军事设施。


Possible sites include the once-planned Khaddourie industrial park between Tulkarem in the West Bank and Herzliya, and the Karni Industrial Zone outside Gaza City.	可能的地点包括曾经计划过的位于西岸地区图尔卡雷姆和荷兹利亚之间的卡杜里工业园，以及加沙城外的卡尔尼工业区。


The idea need not be sold to electorates or extremists to go forward. Nor need it uproot people.	这个想法无需说服选民或极端分子就能推行,也无需强制移民或拆除定居点。


SPZs will be attractive to those who are hungry for constructive alternatives to the prevailing political stagnation and the inexorable, demography-driven drift toward Israeli apartheid.	对于那些渴望到终结当前政治停滞局面并避免以色列不可避免地滑向因人口构成而导致的种族隔离制度的人来说,这是极富吸引力的建设性替代方案。


Those who move into SPZs would be actively committed to making them work.	那些进入政治特区的人们将积极致力于让特区顺利运转起来。


If the early SPZs succeed, there will be pressure to create others.	如果最初的特区取得了成功，就会有压力创造更多的。


Indeed, cross-border SPZs might eventually be replicated within the occupied territories and in Israel proper, including cities like Ramallah and Tel Aviv.	事实上，跨境政治特区最终可能在被占领土内的复制和以色列境内，包括拉马拉和特拉维夫这样的城市。


Much will depend on the communities that the residents create. But outsiders can help.	大部分工作都将由居民们建立的社区来完成,但外界也可以提供帮助。


As with the JGIP, SPZs would provide opportunities for investors from the region and beyond to contribute to, and profit from, peace.	如同约旦工业园那样，政治特区将为特区内外的投资者提供机会，让人们可以从和平中获利。


They would receive local tax breaks, and maybe also support from their own governments.	他们能享受当地的税收减免，也许也会从他们自己的政府处得到支持。


The US could take the lead, as it has done with SEZs in Egypt and Jordan.	美国可以带头，正如它在在埃及和约旦建立经济特区那样。


Governments and philanthropists could provide seed grants.	各国政府和慈善家可以提供种子基金。


As with the JGIP, the goal should be to model best practices that others will want to imitate.	对于约旦工业园来说，运作的目标应当树立别人也想模仿的最佳实践榜样。


There are already serious players poised to become SPZ entrepreneurs.	目前已经有参与者表达了成为政治特区企业家的正式意愿。


Fogel belongs to Breaking the Impasse (BTI), a group of prominent Palestinian and Israeli business leaders committed to advancing peace.	比如上文提到的福格尔就属于属于一个名为"打破僵局"的组织，而该组织则由一群致力于推进和平的巴勒斯坦和以色列商界领袖组成。


Established by Palestinian magnate Munib al-Masri and Israeli tech billionaire Yossi Vardi in July 2012, BTI has some 300 members, whose companies account for at least 30% of Israeli and Palestinian GDP.	该组织由巴勒斯坦商业巨头穆尼比·马斯里（Munib al-Masri）和以色列高科技亿万富翁贝纳约西·瓦迪（Yossi Vardi）于2012年7月成立，拥有300名成员，下属企业占以色列和巴勒斯坦国内生产总值的30％以上。


In other words, they have the influence and resources to instigate a first wave of SPZs.	换言之，他们拥有足够影响力和资源来推动政治特区的第一波浪潮。


The first SPZs must demonstrate that a marriage of economics and politics can induce collaboration that would not be possible otherwise.	第一个政治特区必须证明经济政治的联姻可诱发其他手段无法实现的合作。


Israel’s government and the Palestinian Authority must play facilitating roles.	以色列政府和巴勒斯坦权力机构必须发挥推动作用。


But they will mostly be in the back seat of a venture driven by entrepreneurs, external friends of regional peace, and – most important – the individual Palestinians and Israelis who make the sweat-equity commitment to become a new kind of pioneer for peace.	但是政府只是后坐的乘客，真正的驱动者将是那些企业家，致力地区和平的国际友人，以及——也是最重要的——那些愿意付出自己的汗水去实现一种新和平尝试的普通巴勒斯坦人和以色列人。


If they succeed, the death of the two-state solution might prove to be a blessing in disguise.	如果他们能成功的话，两国方案的破产可能被证明是因祸得福。


Big Brother Google?	老大哥谷歌


MOSCOW – “Google violates its ‘don’t be evil’ motto.”	莫斯科-ampquot;谷歌违背了其'不作恶'的座右铭ampquot; 。


To Google’s credit, if you Google that sentence, you can find reference to a debate on that claim that I took part in recently.	如果你用谷歌搜索这句话，你可以找到人们对这一说法的争论（这对谷歌来说是加分的），而我最近也参加了这场辩论。


As it happens, I have a complex relationship with Google.	事实上，我与谷歌的关系是复杂的。


I have fed at its trough many times – as a personal guest; as an advisory board member of Stop Badware, an NGO it sponsors; and as a speaker at its events.	我曾多次以各种身份支持过谷歌-无论是作为私人宾客、还是作为谷歌所资助的非政府组织ampquot;停止恶意软件ampquot;公司的顾问团成员、或是作为在其举办的活动上发言的嘉宾。


I also sit on the board of 23andMe, co-founded by the wife of Google co-founder Sergey Brin.	我还是23andMe公司的董事会成员，这个公司是由谷歌的创始人之一Sergey Brin 的妻子和他人共同创立的。


But I also sit on the boards of Yandex in Russia, one of a small number of companies around the world who beat Google in their local markets, and of WPP, a worldwide advertising/marketing company famous for its rivalry with Google.	但我也是俄罗斯Yandex的董事会成员，它是世界上为数不多的能在本地市场打败谷歌的公司之一； 我还是WPP公司的董事会成员，它是全球性的广告/营销公司，因与谷歌竞争而闻名。


Finally, I’m suspicious of concentrations of power of any kind.	最后我想说的是，我质疑任何形式的权威的高度集中。


So I welcomed the chance to clarify my thinking.	因此，我很高兴有这个机会让我澄清我的想法。


I took the con side of the debate: Google does not violate its motto.	我在这场辩论中的立场是反对方：即谷歌并没有违背其座右铭。


However, I do think there is a danger that someday it could.	但是，我觉得将来有一天，是可能出现谷歌会这样做的危险。


The danger lies in the concentration of information – arguably a concentration of power – that Google represents.	危险在于谷歌所代表的信息的高度集中-这或许是权威的高度集中。


Google doesn’t merely point users to existing information on the Web; it also collects information that it doesn’t share about its users’ behavior.	谷歌不仅是为用户在网络上搜索现存的信息时指明了方向，而且还收集用户行为的信息，而这些信息谷歌是不与外界分享的。


If you can use patterns in Google searches to track flu outbreaks and predict a movie’s commercial prospects, can you also use it to forecast market movements or even revolutions?	如果你能用谷歌搜索的规律来跟踪流感爆发和预测一部电影的商业前景的话，那么，你也可以用它来预测市场走势甚至是革命的爆发吗？


Even if Google uses personal information only for their benefit (whatever that means), it represents an attractive target for governments.	即使如果谷歌只是为了自己的利益而使用个人信息（无论这么说是什么意思） 的话，它仍然是政府很感兴趣的一个目标。


In fact, Google generally fights government requests for personal information.	事实上，谷歌一般都会与政府提出的提供个人信息的要求进行抗争。


(It was Yahoo, not Google, that gave personal information to China’s government, which then jailed a blogger.)	（是雅虎，而不是谷歌，曾把个人信息提供给中国政府，而致使一名博客作者入狱。 ）


Google has become a de facto gatekeeper of information, to the extent that if your site is not highly ranked by Google, you are like the tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it.	其次，谷歌已经成为事实上的信息看门人，以至于如果你的网站在谷歌排名不高，那你就会像一棵树那样，在森林中无声无息地倒下。


It doesn’t matter that people seeking information are free to bypass Google and use other tools; they don’t.	寻找信息的人们可以自由地绕过谷歌而使用其它工具，这也没有关系，可人们并没有这样做。


So how does information equal power?	那么信息是怎样等同于力量的呢？


The active power that information provides is typically the threat of exposure.	，典型的由信息所提供的积极的力量，是披露信息而带来的威慑力。


Such information gives you power primarily in a secretive, opaque world where access to information is limited.	在一个诡秘、不透明且获取信息的渠道有限的世界里，这种信息尤其会给你带来力量。


But generally, the free flow of information reduces the concentration of power.	但一般来说，信息的自由流动能减少权威的集中。


So, rather than suppressing or regulating the information that Google uncovers, we are better off making it more freely available.	因此，我们最好让谷歌披露的信息更自由地被公众获取，而不是去压制或监管这些信息。


A Google that is accountable to its users – searchers, advertisers, investors, and governments – is likely to be a better outfit that does more good in today’s relatively open market.	一个对其用户-搜索用户、广告商、投资者和政府-负责的谷歌可能是能在今天相对开放的市场里做更多益事的好公司。


In short, there is no regulatory system that I trust more than the current messy world of conflicting interests.	总之，没有任何监控体系能比目前充满利益冲突的混乱世界更让我信任。


Whatever short-term temptations it faces – to manipulate its search results, use private information, or throw its weight around – Google, it is clear, could lose a lot by succumbing to them in a world where its every move is watched.	无论谷歌所面临的短期诱惑是什么-操纵搜索结果、使用私人信息或仗势欺人-很清楚的是，如果经不住这些诱惑，谷歌就可能在这个它一举一动都备受关注的世界里损失巨大。


Meanwhile, Google is not merely avoiding evil; it actively fights against it.	同时，谷歌不仅仅是避免邪恶;他还积极地对抗邪恶。


For example, Google fights censorship – by doing, not by shouting.	例如，谷歌与审查制度所做的抗争-它通过行动，而不是喊口号。


Rather than stand on the sidelines and proclaim censorship evil, it is picking its way through the landmines in China – competing with a politically well-connected rival and politely letting its users know that they aren’t always getting the whole picture.	谷歌不是采取站在一边大声谴责审查制度的邪恶作为其抗争的方法，而是在中国的地雷中摸索出一条路-它与一家占有政治关系优势的对手进行竞争，并礼貌地告诉用户，他们搜索到的内容并不总是事情的全貌。


In short, Google is changing expectations about what people can know – even in the United States, where formal censorship is absent, but government obfuscation, opaque corporations, and the like are not.	总之，谷歌正在改变什么是人们可以知道的期望值-甚至在美国也如此，虽然那里没有正式的信息审查，但政府造成的模糊以及不透明的企业，以及此类的情况确是存在。


Moreover, in countries where Google is criticized for blocking access to information, it points out the information’s absence when something is blocked – letting people know that it exists but that they can’t have access to it.	此外，在以妨碍信息获得而使谷歌遭受非议的国家里，当某些信息被封锁时，谷歌会指出这些信息的缺失，-谷歌要让人们知道，此信息是存在的但他们无法获得它。


On the other hand, every time someone in China Googles something and gets an answer – a product’s good and bad points, the details about someone the government does not like – he must wonder, “Why can’t I get this kind of information about everything?”	另一方面，每当有人在中国用谷歌搜寻信息并得到搜索结果后-比如搜索某产品的优劣情况，以及不受政府喜欢的某个人的详细情况-他一定会想，ampquot;为什么不是所有的信息都能查得到？


With Google, people start to expect answers about everything .	ampquot;谷歌的出现，使人们开始期望能获得任何事情的信息。


A little transparency inevitably leads to more.	一丁点的透明度就肯定会带来更多的透明度。


Rather than demand an end to censorship now – an impossible dream – Google is working to make that happen by eroding government control over information.	不是现在就要求取消审查制度-这个梦想不现实-而谷歌正通过削弱政府对信息的控制而努力朝这个梦想迈���。


Moreover, from a purely practical point of view, Google makes the world more efficient.	另外，从纯粹的实用角度来看，谷歌使这个世界变得更有效率。


Buyers and sellers can find one another, schoolchildren can find information needed for their homework, and sick people can find health information.	买家和卖家都可以相互找到对方，中小学生可以找到完成功课所需的资料，生病的人可以找到保健信息。


The real threat of evil, I think, lies in the temptations of “international governance” – say, a sinister multilateral government body called the World Information Center.	真正的邪恶威胁，我认为在于ampquot;国际治理ampquot;的诱惑 –例如，一个称为世界信息中心的险恶的多边政府机构。


Nice as it sounds, the reality is likely to be ridden with bureaucracy, susceptible to control by the worst of the world’s governments rather than its best ones, and incapable of innovation.	尽管名字听上去好听，但现实中可能是官僚主义盛行，而且容易受世界上最糟而不是最好的政府的控制，并没有创新能力。


Take, for example, ICANN, the body that sets policy for the Domain Name System.	例如， ICANN，一个为域名系统制定政策的机构，我是其创办的主席。


I was its founding chairman, and I don’t think anyone considers it a success.	我想没有人认为它是成功的。


Its saving grace is that it is widely considered illegitimate and therefore has little power.	幸好可以弥补的是，人们普遍认为它不具合法性，因此它几乎没有什么权威。


By contrast, Google is effective at what it does, and therefore has the legitimacy of results.	相比之下，谷歌把它所做的事情做得很有效，因此它的搜索结果就有合法性。


But it has little coercive power, because anyone is free to try an alternative.	但它没有强制力，因为任何人都可以自由地尝试另一搜索引擎。


Its only option is to be better than the competition.	谷歌唯一的选择就是做得比竞争对手更优秀。


The fact that these issues are being debated is a good sign in itself – keeping Google and its watchers on guard.	这些问题目前正被讨论，本身就是个好现象-这让谷歌和关注它的人们保持不松懈。


Fortunately, a wary press corps, powerful governments, and nervous competitors watch its every move, hoping the company to fight its many temptations.	幸运的是，多疑的记者们、强大的政府和紧张的竞争对手们都看着谷歌的一举一动，并希望它抵制住许多诱惑。


Abuse of power is evil, but power itself is not.	滥用权威是邪恶的，但权威本身却不邪恶。


Big Brother, Tibet, and the Sichuan Earthquake	监控、西藏和四川地震


Shanghai – Tight media control of the unrest in Tibet has been followed by what, to some, looks like far more open coverage of the devastating earthquake in Sichuan province.	上海--西藏骚乱时媒体受到严加管束，而接下来在四川毁灭性地震中，媒体对于有些人而言好像放开了报导。


Is this a change in China’s media strategy, or just a short term change in tactics?	这是中国媒体战略的改变，还是仅仅一个短期战术变化？


This question stands out in view of Chinese public opinion in the latter phase of the Tibet crisis.	在西藏危机的后半阶段，这一问题在中国舆论中十分突出。


Much to the consternation of the Western media, Chinese people worldwide lashed out against its allegedly biased coverage of the Tibetan riot.	令西方媒体惊愕不已的是，全世界的中国人都愤怒谴责对西藏骚乱的偏向报导。


Throngs of Chinese expatriates and students took to the streets, protesting the prejudice they perceived in Western media reports.	大量的海外华人和留学生走向街头，抗议他们所感受到的西方媒体报导的偏见。


Angry youngsters even founded Web sites such as anti-cnn.com to express their outrage.	愤怒的年轻人甚至建立了像Anti-cnn. com那样的网站来表达愤怒。


Western reporting, once commended for its veracity, now seems discredited across China, although sympathetic coverage of the loss of life in Sichuan may have redeemed the Western media somewhat.	西方报导曾经因其准确性而受到赞扬，而且尽管对四川地震大量死亡富有同情心的报导或许在某些程度上挽回了西方媒体的声誉，但是现在全中国好像都不信它们了。


Even Chinese liberals admit that Western journalists blundered badly in Tibet, using cropped images and false captions as evidence of China's heavy-handed rule.	甚至连中国的自由派人士也承认西方记者使用剪接的图像和虚假的字幕证明中国的严厉统治，从而在西藏问题上出现了大错。


One sarcastic posting on China's popular Web portal Tianya even went so far as to say that “CNN is of the same ilk as CCTV (China Central Television).	中国流行的门户网站天涯发表一个帖子甚至说“有限新闻网和中央电视台是一丘之貉。


Both talk grandiosely and profusely about impartiality.	它们都对公正报导夸夸其谈。


Ironically, both turn out to be hypocrites.”	具有讽刺意味的是，两个到头来都是伪君子。 ”


One can argue that this trend bodes ill for China.	人们可以说这一趋势对中国并不好。


But pessimism is misplaced.	但是悲观不得其所。


Much of the Chinese wrath is directed at biased reports, not at Western media in general.	大多数中国怒气都指向偏向的报导，而非整体西方媒体。


And when one looks more closely at how Chinese responded, both to the unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake, one sees tangible signs that the Chinese are embracing a greater degree of free speech.	而且要是仔细看看中国人对西藏骚乱和四川地震是如何反应的话，就可以发现切实迹象，也就是中国人正在接受更大程度的言论自由。


Despite a news blackout during the riots in Lhasa, for example, Chinese Internet users managed to dodge the country’s censorship.	例如，尽管在拉萨实行了新闻封锁，中国的互联网用户还是突破了新闻管治。


Much as they loathed domestic publications for blindly following the guidelines of Xinhua, China’s state news agency, they were similarly contemptuous of Western media that mishandled the story.	尽管他们憎恶对中国国家通讯社新华社的导向言听计从，对于西方媒体错误处理事件同样也是很轻蔑。


As a result, those Chinese who use the Internet as a source for news awakened to the fact that no account – Chinese or Western – is flawless.	结果，那些把互联网作为新闻来源的人清醒了，原来无论西方还是中国的报导都不是十全十美的。


Such skepticism, which is a fundamental attribute of the democratic mind, may have played a role in pushing the government toward more openness in Sichuan.	这种怀疑是民主思维的基本特征，或许在推动政府在四川地震事件上更为开放上发挥了作用。


Indeed, the fact that many school buildings were flattened in Sichuan prompted an outcry from ‘netizens,’ who grilled local officials about whether it substandard building codes or even a notorious “toufuzha construction scandal,” namely, jerry-built projects, that had led to the disproportionate number of dead pupils.	确实，四川许多学校建筑被夷为平地引发了网民的愤慨。 他们质疑当地干部，这些是否是不合格的建筑标准或者甚至是臭名昭著的“豆腐渣工程”才导致了学生的大量死亡。


Under mounting public scrutiny, government officials felt compelled to promise that those responsible will be brought to justice.	在不断加重的公共调查下，政府官员不得不保证那些责任人将会受到惩处。


Unlike in the past, when Chinese Internet users passively received information, years of exposure to concepts such as human rights and democracy have emboldened them to challenge entrenched yet dubious views, even if it means iconoclasm.	中国的互联网用户以往被动地接收信息，现在和以往不一样了。 经过几年接触类似人权和民主的概念，他们敢于质疑根深蒂固而又含糊不清的观点，即使是打破旧有观念也在所不惜。


Chinese audiences are as fed up with the glowing encomiums broadcast by CCTV as they are with the simplistic, context-free reporting of Western media.	中国的受众已经厌倦了中央电视台的歌功颂德，也厌倦了西方媒体简单化、没有新闻背景的报导。


Caught in the middle, Chinese increasingly sift for the truth on their own.	中国民众夹在两者中间，于是越发自己筛选真相。


Many, indeed, tried to present to the outside world their own version of the Tibet story, rebutting the orthodox narrative – be it Chinese or Western – and posting comments and footage on YouTube and the BBC's bulletin board.	的确，有许多人试图把自己有关西藏骚乱事件的版本向外界展示，反驳无论是中国还是西方正统的说辞，并且在YouTube和英国广播公司的留言板上张贴评论和上载录像。


Moreover, due to their repeated queries for explanation, a few Western media outlets eventually owned up to their mistakes.	而且，由于他们不断要求解释，一些西方媒体终于承认了错误。


After China’s government became aware that independent grassroots movements could convince ordinary Chinese where government propaganda had failed, it lifted its initial ban on reporting on Tibet.	中国政府意识到独立的民间运动可能让中国百姓相信政府的宣传所不能达到的事情，于是就放开了最初对西藏报导的禁令。


“Net nannies” – as China’s Internet censors are often dubbed – blocked sensitive articles less frequently.	中国的互联网审查人员经常被称为“网络奶妈”，他们也不是那么频繁地阻挡敏感的文章了。


China’s government has apparently begun to appreciate the limitations of cover-ups and stonewalling, and perhaps also the merits of allowing some room for free speech.	中国政府明显地开始意识到掩盖和拒不改变的局限性，或许也意识到来允许某种程度的自由言论的好处。


This thirst for unbiased information highlights the dramatic change that the Internet has brought to China’s political landscape.	这种渴求没有偏见的信息表明了互联网给中国政局带来的巨大变化。


Nowadays, the government no longer monopolizes information and the right to process it.	如今，政府不再独揽信息以及处理信息的权利。


Insightful bloggers attract considerably more clicks than do official mouthpieces.	富有见地的博客吸引的点击要远远超过官方喉舌。


A “virtual civil society” is in the making.	一个“虚拟民间社会”正在形成。


But can Web activism mature into a full-blown campaign for free speech without being manipulated by the government or blindfolded by Western media?	但是网络积极行动主义是否会在不受政府操纵或者西方媒体蒙骗的情况下成熟成为要求言论自由的全面行动呢？


The answer may prove to be mixed.	其答案可能是混杂的。


Admittedly, the fierce popular backlash against Western media was partially motivated by nationalist ardor, which played into the government’s hands.	无疑，民族主义热情尤其推动了大众反对西方媒体的强烈反弹，这正中政府的下怀。


The Internet can foster more demagoguery than sober analysis.	互联网要比冷静分析更加可以进行煽动。


But the best way to prevent this is to create an environment in which opposing views can clash freely, enabling truth ultimately to triumph.	但是防止这一情形的最佳方式就是创造一种对立的观点可以自由交锋的环境，从而让真相最终取胜。


On the government’s part, the more open media in Sichuan may be mere posturing to appease critics after the Tibet upheaval and the scuffle over the Olympic torch.	在政府方面，四川更为开放的媒体可能只不过是一种姿态来安抚西藏动乱以及圣火传递的混乱。


The government’s willingness to address squarely questions about shoddy infrastructure will be a key test of the genuineness of its supposed new found tolerance of freeish speech.	政府是否愿意直接处理伪劣基础工程可以验证它是否果真容忍更为自由的言论。


Although free speech is no panacea for China’s woes, only when it is established will the country’s progress be sustainable.	尽管言论自由并非解决中国重重难题的灵丹��药，但是只有确立了言论自由，中国的进步才会持续。


Despite the watchful eyes of Big Brother in Beijing, the Internet is sowing the seeds of free speech in China.	尽管北京监管人员时刻监控，互联网正在中国播撒自由言论的种子。


That may be the most important lesson of the crisis in Tibet and Sichuan.	这也许是西藏和四川危机中最为重要的教训。


The Conglomerate Way to Growth	通过集团公司刺激增长


CAMBRIDGE – Countries do not become rich by making more of the same thing.	美国剑桥—生产更多同样的东西无法让国家变富。


They do so by changing what they produce and how they produce it.	改变产品和生产方式才能让国家变富。


They grow by doing things that are new to them; in short, they innovate.	生产新东西才能让国家增长； 简言之，国家需要创新。


Many countries have been altering their growth strategies to reflect this insight.	许多国家改变增长战略以反映这一洞见。


But they are being distracted by some of the greatest – but atypical – examples of success.	但它们因为最伟大但不典型的成功例子分散了注意力。


We all have heard of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and Mark Zuckerberg – twenty-something college dropouts who built billion-dollar companies at the cutting edge of global innovation.	我们都知道史蒂夫·乔布斯、比尔·盖茨和马克·扎克伯格——这些20出头的大学辍学者建立了数十亿美元规模的公司，站在了全球创新的最前沿。


We have heard of the many start-ups that they and others acquired for hundreds of millions of dollars - Instagram, Skype, YouTube, Tumblr, and, most recently, Waze.	我们听说过许多赚取亿万美元的创业企业——Instagram、Skype、YouTube、Tumblr，还有最近的Waze。


So why not emulate these successes?	既然如此，为何不效仿这些成功者？


The main problem is that these examples are peculiar to the software industry, which provides a woefully insufficient blueprint for the rest of the economy.	主要的问题在于这些例子都是软件行业的个例，对经济中的其他部分来说远不能成为成功蓝图。


The software industry is unique, because it has unusually low barriers to entry and ready access to a huge market through the Internet.	软件行业是独特的，因为其进入壁垒极低，并且可以通过互联网进入现成的巨大市场。


A start-up is typically just a group of kids with a good idea and programming skills.	创业企业通常只是善于编程、灵光一现的黄口小儿。


All they need is time to write the code.	他们所需要的全部投入是写代码的时间。


Incubators provide them with space, legal advice, and contacts with potential clients and investors.	孵化器为他们提供空间、法律顾问服务，帮助联系潜在客户和投资者。


But consider a steel, automobile, or fertilizer plant – or a tourist resort, a hospital, or a bank.	但想象一下钢铁、汽车和肥料公司——或者度假区、医院和银行。


These are much more complex organizations that must start at a much larger scale, require much more upfront investment, and need to assemble a more heterogeneous team of skilled professionals.	这些组织要复杂得多，起始规模要大得多，前期投资要多得多，并且需要集中多元化的熟练专业团队。


This is not something at which a young college dropout is bound to excel, because he lacks the experience, the organization, and the access to capital that these ventures require.	这绝非年轻的大学辍学者生来就能脱颖而出的，因为他缺少经验、组织和这些企业所要求的资本。


And, compared to software development, these activities also require more infrastructure, logistics, regulation, certifications, supply chains, and a host of other business services – all of which demand coordination with public and private entities.	此外，与软件开发相比，这些活动还要求更多的基础设施、物流、监管、资质、供应链和其他商业服务——所有这些都需要协调众多公共和私人实体。


Most important, these activities are most likely to be central to economic growth in developing and emerging countries.	最重要的是，这些活动极有可能是发展中和新兴国家经济增长的核心。


So, how will companies in these sectors arise, and what can be done to stimulate their formation?	因此，这些部门的公司如何崛起？ 它们的形成有什么可以效仿之处？


Many developing-country governments are ignoring that question.	许多发展中国家政府忽略了这一问题。


For example, Chile’s government, obsessed with so-called “horizontal” policies that do not tilt the playing field in favor of any industry, recently implemented Start-Up Chile, a program with standardized rules to encourage new ventures.	比如，智利政府沉迷于所谓的“水平”政策——即不因为偏向某一行业而倾斜——最近实施了“创业智利”（Start-Up Chile）计划，该计划用标准化规则鼓励创业。


Although the rules were designed for all industries, the scheme attracts almost exclusively software ventures – the only ones that can be formed with the low level of support that the program provides.	尽管规则适用于所有行业，但这一机制所吸引的几乎清一色是软件创业企业——它们也是这个绝少提供支持的计划所能促发的唯一行业。


Other industries face more daunting chicken-and-egg problems: countries lack the capabilities that growth industries demand, yet it is impossible to develop these capabilities unless the industries that require them are present.	其他行业面临令人气馁的鸡和蛋问题：国家缺少成长行业所需要的功能，而这些功能无法被开发，除非需要这些功能的行业出现。


One way to solve this coordination problem is through vertical integration – that is, firms that can solve internally the coordination of the supply and demand for any new capability.	解决这一协调问题的一个办法是通过垂直整合，即形成可以在内部解决新功能供需协调的企业。


That is why national business groups – conglomerates – often play a key role in transforming an economy and its exports.	这也是国家商业集团——集团公司（conglomerate）——总是在改变经济及其出口方面起到关键作用的原因。


This is especially true in developing counties, where many markets are missing and the business environment is often extremely challenging.	发展中国家尤其如此，那里许多市场存在空白，商业环境也极不友好。


Conglomerates can use their knowledge, managerial skills, and financial capital to venture into new industries.	集团公司可以利用其知识、管理技能和金融资本试水新行业。


They can start things at a scale that would be impossible for a start-up.	它们可以以创业公司不敢想象的规模开辟新业务。


They can make credible commitments to future suppliers and influence the business ecosystem to make new industries feasible.	它们可以向未来供应者做出可信承诺，并改变商业生态环境使新行业成为可能。


Consider South Korea.	以韩国为例。


In 1963, the country exported goods worth less than $600 million at today’s prices, mostly primary products such as seafood and silk.	用今天的价格衡量，1963年韩国出口商品总价值不到6亿美元，大部分是海货和丝绸等初级产品。


Fifty years later, it exports goods worth almost $600 billion, mostly electronics, machinery, transportation equipment, and chemical products.	五十年后，韩国出口商品总价值接近6000亿美元，大部分是电子产品、机械、交通设备和化工产品。


This transformation was not achieved through independent start-ups. It was done through conglomerates, or chaebols in Korean.	如此变化并不是通过独立的创业企业完成的，而是通过集团公司（韩语称之为财阀）完成的。


For example, Samsung started as a trading company, moved to food processing, textiles, insurance, and retail, and then on to electronics, shipbuilding, engineering, construction, and aerospace, just to name a few activities.	比如，三星公司一开始是一家贸易公司，接着转型为食品处理、纺织、保险和零售商，后来又转变成电子、造船、工程、建筑和航天公司（这里提到的只是其活动的一小部分）。


South Korea’s transformation was reflected in the transformation of its leading companies.	韩国领导公司的转变是韩国国家转变的缩影。


But, in many developing countries, conglomerates have not played an equivalent role.	但是，在许多发展中国家，集团公司并没有起到类似的作用。


They have focused on non-tradable goods and services – those that cannot be imported or exported – and have eschewed international competition.	它们专��于不可贸易商品和服务——即无法进出口的商品和服务——避开国际竞争。


They have focused on banking, construction, distribution, retail, and television broadcasting.	它们专注于银行、建筑、分销、零售和广电业务。


Once these companies dominate one market, they move to another that is equally sheltered from competition and devoid of export opportunities, often using their size and political influence to keep out would-be competitors.	一旦这些公司主宰了一个市场，它们就会转向下一个同样没有竞争、全无出口机会的市场，通常利用其规模和政治影响排挤潜在竞争对手。


Instead of becoming agents of change, they often prevent change.	它们不但没有变成变化的代理人，反而往往阻碍变化。


(Indeed, the big economic debate in South Korea nowadays concerns whether the chaebols are stifling innovation by preventing start-up competitors from challenging them.)	（事实上，今日韩国的一大经济争论就在于财阀是否通过阻挠创业竞争者挑战它们而阻碍了创新。 ）


The productive transformation that developing countries need is much easier to achieve with the support, rather than the obstruction, of their conglomerates.	如果有来自集团公司的支持而不是阻碍，发展中国所需要的生产性转型要容易得多。


But ensuring such support requires policies that nudge (or even shove) conglomerates toward export industries that can grow beyond the limits of the domestic market – industries in which competition will encourage the discipline that they lack as a result of dominating local markets.	但确保集团公司的支持需要促使（甚至迫使）集团公司进入可以冲破国内市场限制的出口行业的政策——在这类行业中，竞争能改进它们因为主宰国内市场而有所缺少的纪律。


To succeed, conglomerates need the support of government and the acceptance of society.	要想成功，集团公司需要政府的支持和社会的接受。


They must earn it through their contribution to the growth of employment, exports, and tax revenues, and to the country’s technological transformation.	它们必须通过为就业、出口和税收收入以及国家技术转型做出贡献赢得政府支持和社会接受。


That is what General Park Chung-hee (South Korea’s longtime ruler, and father of current President Park Geun-hye) pressured the chaebols to do in the early 1960’s.	这就是朴正熙将军（韩国的长期统治者，现总统朴槿惠之父）强迫财阀在20世纪60年代初所做的事情。


And it is what governments and civil societies in developing countries today should demand of their conglomerates.	而这也是当今发展中国家政府和公民社会应该要求其集团公司所做的事情。


Big Countries, Small Wars	大国家，小战争


LONDON – US President Barack Obama has vowed to avenge the murder of J. Christopher Stevens, America’s former ambassador to Libya.	伦敦—美国总统奥巴马已宣誓要为美国前驻利比亚大使克里斯托弗·史蒂文斯之被杀报仇。


How he proposes to do this is unclear – historical precedent is of little use.	这个仇应该如何报还不得而知，历史先例在这方面没什么指导意义。


In 1864, the Emperor of Abyssinia took hostage the British consul, together with some missionaries, in the country's then-capital, Magdala.	1864年，阿比西尼亚皇帝在当时的首都抹大拉（Magdala）绑架了英国领事和几位传教士。


Three years later, with Emperor Tewodros still refusing to release them, the British dispatched an expeditionary force of 13,000 troops, 26,000 camp followers, and 44 elephants.	三年后，皇帝西奥多（Tewodros）仍拒绝放人，结果英国派遣了一支13 000作战人员、26 000后勤人员和44头大象的远征军。


In his book The Blue Nile, Alan Moorehead described the expedition thus: “It proceeds first to last with the decorum and heavy inevitability of a Victorian state banquet, complete with ponderous speeches.”	在《青尼罗河》（The Blue Nile）一书中，莫尔赫（Alan Moorehead）写道，远征军于是“先参加了壮行仪式和免不了的维多利亚时期国宴，与冗长的讲话先斗了一场。


Yet it was a fearsome undertaking.	”然而这是一次可怕的远征。


After a three-month journey through the mountains, the British reached Magdala, released the hostages, and burned the capital to the ground.	在山区行进了三个月后，英国人才到达抹大拉，解救了人质，将阿比西尼亚首都焚为焦土。


Emperor Tewodros committed suicide, the British withdrew, and their commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, was made Baron Napier of Magdala.	西奥多皇帝自杀，英国人撤军，指挥官、陆军中将罗伯特·纳皮尔（Robert Napier）爵士被称为抹大拉的纳皮尔男爵。


Today's great powers have relied on similar methods, also heavy with rhetoric, against puny opponents, but with far less convincing results.	当今超级大国走的也是类似的路子，针对孱弱的反对者，超级大国口气强硬，但最后结果总是不能令人信服。


The United States put 500,000 troops into Vietnam in the 1960’s, but withdrew before North Vietnam overran the South in 1975.	20世纪60年代，美国在越南用兵50万人，但在1975年撤军后，北越还是占领了南越。


The Russians began pulling their 100,000 troops from Afghanistan in 1987, after nine years of fighting had failed to subdue the country.	1987年，俄罗斯向阿富汗派遣了10万大军，结果在九年的战争后仍不能让阿富汗屈服。


Now, 25 years and $500 billion later, roughly 100,000 NATO troops, mainly American, are about to leave Afghanistan, with the Taliban still controlling much of it.	25年后的今天，在花掉5 000亿美元后，大约10万北约部队——主要是美军——也要离开阿富汗了，而塔利班仍然控制着这个国家的大部。


Meanwhile, the US has withdrawn 150,000 troops from Iraq, after nine years of frustration.	与此同时，美国还从伊拉克撤出了15万军队，此前也是经历令人沮丧的九年。


The evidence is clear: big countries can lose small wars.	历史经验明白无误地表明，大国可能输掉小战争。


So, if massive use of force fails, how is a big country, believing that its interests or moral duty compel it to intervene in the affairs of a small one, to do so successfully?	然则如果大规模动武无效，出于利益和道德责任而不得不出手干预小国事务的大国如何才能胜利完成任务呢？


Gillo Pontecorvo’s brilliant 1966 film The Battle of Algiers spelled out the dilemma for the occupying colonial power.	庞德科沃（Gillo Pontecorvo）1966年的经典电影《阿尔及尔之战》（The Battle of Algiers）道出了殖民势力面临的两难。


The FLN (National Liberation Front) uprising against French rule in Algeria started in 1954 with assassinations of policemen.	FLN（国民解放阵线）反抗法国统治的起义爆发于1954年，以刺杀警察为开端。


The French at first responded with orthodox measures – more police, curfews, martial law, etc. – but the insurgency spread amid growing atrocities by both sides.	一开始，法国人以正统手段应对——增加警力、宵禁、戒严令等——但在双方暴行不断的刺激下，动乱还是蔓延了开去。


In 1957, the French sent in paratroopers.	1957年，法国派遣了伞兵部队。


Their commander in the film, Colonel Mathieu (based on General Jacques Massu), explained the logic of the situation from the French point of view.	影片中的指挥官马蒂厄上校（Mathieu，原型是马苏（Jacques Massu）将军）解释了法国看待当时情况的逻辑。


The way to crack the insurgency was not to antagonize the people with oppressive, but “useless” measures; it was to take out the FLN’s command structure.	打击起义军并不是要用“无用”的镇压手段站在人民的对立面；


Eliminate that and the result would be a leaderless mass.	而是击溃FLN的指挥结构，让他们成为失去首脑的群氓。


This required the use of torture to identify and locate the leaders, followed by their capture or assassination.	这就要求用严刑拷打套出FLN头目的下落，并继之以抓捕和刺杀。


Torture was illegal, but, as the Colonel explained, “If you want France to stay, you must accept the consequences.”	严刑拷打的非法的，上校解释说，“如果你不想法国人离开，你就必须接受这个结果。 ”


Colonel Mathieu is the unsung hero of current counter-insurgency orthodoxy, which requires a minimum military presence in the target country, mainly of intelligence agencies like the CIA and “special forces.”	马蒂厄上校是当前反起义正统方式的无名英雄：将针对目标国家的出兵规模降至最低，派遣人员主要是情报机构（如中央情报局）和“特别部队”人员。


Through “rendition,” a captured suspect can be handed over to a friendly government to be tortured, and, on the basis of the information thus gathered, “kill lists” can be compiled.	通过“引渡”，被抓获的嫌疑人可以转送至友邦政府进行拷问，再根据获得情报完善“刺杀名单”。


The killing of Osama bin Laden last year required an actual hit squad to verify its success, but normally assassinations can be left to drones – unmanned aircraft, mainly used for surveillance, but which can be armed with computer-guided missiles.	去年清除本·拉登的行动要求派遣一支实体攻击小队确认是否成功，但通常暗杀行动可以由无人飞机来完成——无人飞机通常用于监控，但也可以安装计算机导航导弹。


Not surprisingly, the US is the leading developer and user of drones, with a fleet of 7,500.	毫不奇怪，美国是无非人际的领先开发者和使用者，拥有一支7 500架规模的无人飞机队伍。


An estimated 3,000 drone killings have taken place, mostly in Pakistan, but also in Yemen and Somalia.	据估计，无人飞机暗杀已经进行了3 000次，大部分在巴基斯坦使用，在也门和索马里也有少量使用。


The other half of the counter-insurgency strategy is to win the “hearts and minds” of populations that are susceptible to terrorist propaganda.	反起义战略的另一半是赢得极易受到恐怖主义宣传蛊惑的“民心”。


The Americans did this in Vietnam by pouring in consumer goods and building up infrastructure.	在越南，美国人通过分发消费品和建设基础设施达到这一目的。


They are doing the same in Iraq and Afghanistan.	他们在伊拉克和阿富汗也如法炮制。


The civilian side of “nation building,” it is reckoned, will be made easier by the absence of a heavy-handed foreign military presence.	现在的看法是，不出现重装外来军队可以使“国家建设”的民用方面更易取得进展。


Trying to win hearts and minds is certainly an improvement over bombing or shooting up the local population.	争取民心显然较轰炸和射杀本地居民而言是一大进步。


But the new way of conducting “asymmetrical warfare” does raise uncomfortable ethical and legal issues.	但进行“不对称战争”的新方法却引起了令人不安的伦理和法律问题。


The United Nations Convention on Torture explicitly forbids “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” so their use must be denied.	联合国酷刑问题公约（The United Nations Convention on Torture）明文禁止“残忍、非人道和有失体面的对待和惩罚”，因此这是必须否认的。


Also, assassination by drones inevitably leads to the killing of innocent civilians – the very crime that defines terrorism.	用无人飞机进行暗杀免不了会导致无辜平民死亡，而这正是恐怖主义的定义。


Even putting aside moral and legal questions – which one should never do – it is doubtful whether the strategy of torture and assassination can achieve its pacifying purpose.	即使将道德和法律问题放在一边——当然我们绝不能这样做——严刑拷打和暗杀策略是否能够达成平息叛乱的目的也值得怀疑。


It repeats the mistake made in 1957 by Massu, who assumed that he faced a cohesive organization with a single command structure.	这会重演马苏1957年犯下的错误——他认为他面临着由同一个指挥结构发号施令的组织。


Relative calm was restored to Algiers for a couple of years after his arrival, but then the insurgency broke out again with redoubled strength, and the French had to leave the country in 1962.	他抵达阿尔及尔后，重新建立了相对平静，但不久起义死灰复燃，而且声势更加壮大，马苏也不得不于1962年离开阿尔及利亚。


Today, the international community similarly misconceives the nature of the “war” that it is fighting.	如今，国际社会对它们所进行的“战争”的性质也存在类似的误解。


There is no single worldwide terrorist organization with a single head.	没有哪个世界级恐怖组织只有一个首脑。


Insofar as Al Qaeda still exists at all, it is a Hydra that sprouts new heads as fast as the old ones are cut off.	从基地组织仍然存在这一事实看，它根本就是一个九头蛇怪，旧头被斩立刻可以生出新头。


Trying to win “hearts and minds” with Western goods simply corrupts, and thus discredits, the governments established by those intervening.	试图用西方商品来争取赢得“民心”只能腐化通过这些干预措施扶植的政府，让它们信誉扫地。


It happened in Vietnam, and it is happening now in Iraq and Afghanistan.	越南就是明证，如今伊拉克和阿富汗也在走这条路。


We are being driven slowly but ineluctably to the realization that the people whom we are fighting will, to a significant extent, inherit the shattered countries that we leave behind.	我们正逐渐但又不可避免地被迫意识到，从很大程度上说，与我们战斗的人民将不得不接收我们留下的焦土。


They are fighting, after all, for their peoples’ right to (mis)manage their affairs in their own way.	毕竟，他们战斗是为了争取人民以自己的方式（不当）管理自己的事务的权利。


Blame the French Revolution for having bequeathed to us the idea that self-government is always better than good government.	自治政府总是比好政府更好，这是法国大革命留给我们的遗毒。


An Economics to Fit the Facts	符合事实的经济学


CAMBRIDGE – The economics profession was arguably the first casualty of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.	剑桥—经济学界也许是2008—2009年全球金融危机的第一受害人。


After all, its practitioners failed to anticipate the calamity, and many appeared unable to say anything useful when the time came to formulate a response.	毕竟，经济学实践家没有预见到这次灾难，当需要对此作出反应时，许多经济学家也提不出任何有用的建议。


But, as with the global economy, there is reason to hope that the discipline is on the mend.	但是，与全球经济一样，有理由相信这门学科正在逐渐进步。


Mainstream economic models were discredited by the crisis because they simply did not admit of its possibility.	主流经济学模型因为危机而信誉扫地，因为这些模型根本不承认有可能发生危机。


And training that prioritized technique over intuition and theoretical elegance over real-world relevance did not prepare economists to provide the kind of practical policy advice needed in exceptional circumstances.	经济学的训练强调技术甚于直觉，强调理论优美性甚于真实世界相关性，这让经济学家无法给出反常条件下的实用政策建议。


Some argue that the solution is to return to the simpler economic models of the past, which yielded policy prescriptions that evidently sufficed to prevent comparable crises.	有人认为，解决办法是回归过去比较简单的经济模型，这类模型所产生的政策药方显然足以阻止可以比较的危机。


Others insist that, on the contrary, effective policies today require increasingly complex models that can more fully capture the chaotic dynamics of the twenty-first-century economy.	其他人坚持相反的意见，认为如今有效政策日益需要复杂模型以充分把握二十一世纪经济的混乱动态。


This debate misses the point.	这一争论根本没有触及核心。


Simple models have their place.	简单模型有它们的地位。


They are useful for making the straightforward but counterintuitive points that distinguish macroeconomics from other fields of economic analysis.	在提出将宏观经济学与其他经济分析领域区别开来的直观但反直觉的观点方面，简单模型很有用。


We rely on such models to explain, for example “the paradox of thrift,” whereby individual decisions to increase saving can, by depressing spending and output, result in the population as a whole saving less.	比如，我们依赖这类模型解释“节俭悖论”——个体增加储蓄的决定可能抑制支出和产出，最后导致全体储蓄总量变少。


At the same time, complex models can be useful for illustrating special cases and reminding us that the world is a messy place.	与此同时，复杂模型在说明特殊情况、提醒我们世界是一个混乱场所方面很有用。


Neither class of models is useful, however, for providing the practical advice that policymakers need in a crisis.	但是，对于决策者在危机中所需要哦的实用建议，两类模型都派不上用场。


Both are too stylized to be of use when analyzed in the abstract.	这两类模型过于风格化，只能用于抽象分析。


To make them useful, evidence is required.	要让它们变得实用，就必须有证据。


In fact, largely unbeknownst to the protagonists in this debate over models, an evidentiary revolution is already underway.	事实上，这场关于模型的争论的主角们大多不知道，一场证据革命已经开始了。


While older members of the economics establishment continue to debate the merits of competing analytical frameworks, younger economists are bringing to bear important new evidence about how the economy operates.	老派经济学家仍在争论分析框架之间的优劣，而年轻经济学家已经开始引入关于经济如何运行的重要的新证据了。


For example, a longstanding debate in macroeconomics has focused on how prices respond to news about the economy, and whether companies pass through to consumers changes in import prices that result from exchange-rate movements.	比如，宏观经济学中有一个长期争论，争论的焦点是价格如何反应于关于经济的消息，以及公司是否会把汇率变动导致的进口价格变化转嫁给消费者。


Today, “big data” promises to enhance our ability to understand and even predict such responses.	如今，“大数据”可以强化我们理解甚至预测这些反应的能力。


One application of this approach, the Billion Prices Project at MIT, uses billions of observations from online retail websites to track inflation.	这一方法的一种应用是麻省理工学院的“十亿价格项目”（Billion Prices Project），该项目观察在线零售网站的数十亿种价格跟踪通货膨胀。


A second approach relies not on big data but on new data.	第二种方法不依赖大数据，但依赖新数据。


Economists are using automated information-retrieval routines, or “bots,” to scrape bits of novel information about economic decisions from the World Wide Web.	经济学家用自动信息检索方法或“爬虫”（bots）从万维网上抓取关于经济决策的小道消息。


Websites where commercial artists submit designs for company logos and freelance editors offer services for authors promise to shed new light on issues like the determinants of innovation.	商业艺术家提交公司标志和自由职业编辑为作者提供服务的网站可以提供观察关于创新的决定因素等问题的新角度。


A third approach employs historical evidence.	第三种方法利用历史证据。


A number of commentators have observed that the global financial crisis was good for economic history, because it directed attention to previous crises and to the insights that could be gleaned from studying them.	许多评论家观察到，全球金融危机对经济史来说是一件好事，因为它将注意力引向此前发生过的危机以及可以从研究这些危机中获得的洞见。


In fact, economic history never stopped playing its role in economic research.	事实上，经济史在经济研究中从未停止起作用。


But the financial crisis served as a useful reminder that history is replete with similar events and with evidence concerning which policy responses work.	但此次金融危机是一次有益的提醒，告诉我们历史总是相似的，还提供了关于哪些政策反应能起作用的证据。


This realization then dovetailed with the availability of more extensive historical data on the operation of the economy.	接着，这一认识与关于经济运行的更详细的历史数据结合起来。


Economic historians have long gathered information from parish registers, population censuses, and corporate financial statements.	长期以来，经济史学家从教区纪事、人口普查和公司财务报表奥中收集信息。


But working in dusty archives has become easier with the advent of digital photography, mechanical character recognition, and remote data-entry services.	但随着数字摄像、机器字符识别、远程数据接入服务的进步，与大量陈旧档案打交道的工作变得更加容易了。


Larger data sets are enabling economic historians to address key questions – for example, how aggregate economic conditions affect labor-force participation decisions in different times and places – more effectively than ever before.	更大的数据集让经济史学家能够比以往更有效地解决一些关键问题——比如不同时间和地点的总体经济环境如何影响劳动力参与决策。


This reference to different times and places points to the fourth and final focus of the new empirical research: institutions.	这一“不同时间和地点”的定语触及到新实证研究的第四个也是最后一个重点：制度。


Macroeconomic models have tended to neglect the role of institutions, ranging from trade unions and employer associations to property-rights regimes and mechanisms for redistribution.	宏观经济模型总是忽略制度的作用——不管是工会、雇主联盟还是产权制度和再分配机制。


Taking them seriously means considering long historical intervals, because institutions change slowly and vary significantly only over time.	认真处理这些因素意味着考察长期历史时期，因为制度的演变十分缓慢，并且只能随着时间的推移发生重大变化。


Renewed attention to history is thus allowing economists to consider more systematically the role of institutions in macroeconomic outcomes.	因此，重新关注历史让经济学家可以更系统地考察制度对宏观经济结果的作用。


These developments amount to a sea change in economics.	这些发展趋势极大地改变着经济学。


As recently as a couple of decades ago, empirical analysis was informed by relatively small and limited data sets.	几十年前，我们只能在相对较小和局限的数据集上做实证分析。


To be sure, analytical frameworks are still needed to help make sense of the data.	诚然，我们仍需要分析框架让数据变得有意义。


But now there is reason to hope that, in the future, economists’ conclusions and policy advice will be shaped not by those frameworks’ elegance, but by their ability to fit the facts.	但如今我们有理由相信未来经济学家的结论和政策建议将不再由框架的优美程度决定，而由它们是否能够符合事实决定。


Big Money Merges with Big Brother	资本与权力的联合


PARIS – All over the world, Internet users entertain romantic delusions about cyberspace.	巴黎——全世界的网络用户大多对网络空间抱有某种浪漫的错觉。


To most of us Web surfers, the Internet provides a false sense of complete freedom, power, and anonymity.	在大多数网上冲浪者看来，网络提供了完全自由、自主和匿名的假象。


Every once in a while, of course, unsolicited messages and ads that happen to be mysteriously related to our most intimate habits intrude.	当然，偶尔也会有神秘地迎合我们最隐私习惯的不请自来的邮件和广告侵入这块自由的领地。


They remind us that we Internet users are, indeed, under constant virtual surveillance.	这种现象提醒我们：网络用户实际上一直在受到虚拟的监视。


When the watchers have only commercial motives, such “spam” feels like a minor violation.	如果监视者出于单纯的商业动机，这样的“垃圾邮件”似乎只是一种轻微的违法。


But in China or Russia, the Internet is patrolled not by unsolicited peddlers, but by the police.	但是在中国和俄罗斯，在网络上巡查的却不是不请自来的小商贩，而是警察。


So Russian human-rights activists and the environmental organization Baikal Environmental Wave should not have been surprised when, earlier this month, flesh and blood policemen – not Internet bots – confiscated their computers and the files stored within them.	因此俄罗斯人权活动者和贝加尔湖环境浪潮等环保组织的电脑及其存储文件在本月初被活生生的警察（而不是网络机器人）没收并不令人感到惊奇。