Having suffered what economists call a “sudden stop,” many parts of the US economy were imploding or had ceased to function – to extend the medical metaphor, even the most vital organs were threatened.	在经历了经济学家所谓的“骤停”后，美国经济中的许多部件要么衰竭，要么停止了运转——用医学术语讲，最重要的器官受到了严重威胁。


Economic activity collapsed and unemployment surged.	经济活动大幅衰减，失业率出现了飙升。


Credit stopped flowing.	信用停止了流动。


Banks were on the verge of bankruptcy and nationalization.	银行处于破产和被国家化的边缘。


International trade was disrupted.	国际贸易中断。


Income and wealth inequalities worsened.	收入和财富不平等性恶化。


And a general sense of fear and uncertainty inhibited the few healthy parts of the economy from engaging in meaningful hiring, investment, and expansion.	仅存的健康部分也因弥漫着恐慌和不确定性而不再进行有意义的招聘、投资和扩张。


Parlous conditions required dramatic measures.	非常时期需要非常手段。


And that is what the economy got in the form of unprecedented fiscal stimulus and unthinkable policy activism on the part of the US Federal Reserve.	因此，美国经济获得了前所未有的财政刺激，美联储也采取了不可想象的激进立场。


As they intervened, American policymakers consulted closely with their counterparts around the world, urging them to take supportive steps.	在大手笔干预经济的同时，美国决策者也与全世界同僚展开了密切沟通，敦促他们也采取支持举措。


And they did, culminating in one of the most successful periods of global policy coordination in history, involving both advanced and emerging economies.	他们接受了建议，于是出现了历史上最成功的全球政策协调，发达国家和新兴市场均参与其中。


For many, the global economic summit held in London in April 2009 marks the point when the US economy turned the corner.	在许多人看来，2009年4月举行的伦敦全球经济峰会是美国经济的转折点。


The change was so notable that many policymakers fell into the trap of projecting a quick rebound, especially given America’s prior history of economic dynamism and resilience, only to be humbled by what has proven to be a protracted and complex process of recovery.	变化是如此之巨，以至于许多决策者错误地认为将出现迅速反弹，特别是他们认为，历史表明，美国经济是有活力、有韧性的。 而最终的事实令他们大跌眼镜，复苏的过程既拖沓又复杂。


Even today, that process highlights the scale and scope of the economy’s structural weaknesses.	即使时至今日，复苏仍然暴露着美国经济结构性弱点的规模与范围。


Having reduced the risk of a relapse into recession, the US economy is able now to move on its own power, though gingerly.	在减弱了再次陷入衰退的风险后，如今美国经济终于可以自力更生向前走了——只不过脚步不那么稳健就是了。


The horrific collapse in the labor market has given way to consistent monthly employment gains, albeit less than what is needed for a full recovery.	令人胆战心惊的劳动力市场崩溃已经让位于持续的月度改进，虽然仍不足以支持完全的复苏。


Manufacturing activity has picked up, helped by a surge in exports.	受出口大涨的推动，生产活动也在改善。


The housing sector seems to be finding a tentative bottom (though housing finance remains incoherent).	房地产部门似乎摘到了暂时的底部（尽管住房融资情况仍然惨不忍睹）。


Consumers have better access to credit.	消费者获得信用的难度止升回跌。


And, sensing all of this, companies are beginning to deploy the massive precautionary cash balances that they have accumulated.	而公司似乎感受到了这些改善迹象，开始布局前段时间所囤积的大量预防性现金余额。


With the US still by far the largest economy in the world and the anchor of the international monetary system, its well-being has huge implications everywhere.	美国现在仍是世界第一大经济体，也是国际货币体系之锚，因此它的安康与否事关全世界大局。


So, not surprisingly, the US recovery has helped to set a calming and constructive tone – and at a critical juncture, given that Europe is still struggling with a debt crisis on the eurozone periphery, and emerging economies are going through a cyclical slowdown.	因此，毫不奇怪，美国的复苏不啻一剂强心针和定心丸——特别是眼下欧洲仍在欧元区外围国债务危机中苦苦挣扎，而新兴市场正在经历周期性减速的当口。


Politics is also in play, and in a manner that significantly influences who will lead the world’s superpower after this November’s presidential and congressional elections.	政治也在其中起作用，而且将对谁能在今年11月的总统和国会选举中获得世界超级大国领导权造成重大影响。


The economic improvements already have helped President Barack Obama’s re-election prospects, as has the continuing drama of a drawn-out, divisive, and expensive Republican primary.	经济的改善有利于奥巴马的连任，共和党初选的旷日持久、山头林立和日费万金亦然。


The problem is that the sense of relief now can – and probably will – be taken too far.	问题在于，如今的乐观情绪可能有些夸张了。


Indeed, today’s good news should not obscure some consequential structural limitations that will require prolonged therapy and caution.	事实上，我们不能因为今天的好消息而蒙蔽了双眼，应该看到还存在不少重大结构性局限需要长期治疗和留心。


After all, the US economy has yet to regain its full strength, is too structurally impaired to sustain any rapid forward movement, and has not yet started to overcome the many distortive side effects of the extreme medicine that it received.	毕竟，美国经济还没有完全恢复健康，仍具有结构性缺陷，不足以维持快速改进； 也没有开始克服一开始的猛药所带来的诸多扭曲性副作用。


Locking in recovery implies a multi-year program of serious and coordinated reforms that fundamentally improve the way the country educates and trains its citizens, invests in infrastructure and finances other productive outlays and housing, competes in the global economy, and formulates and adheres to a rational budgetary process.	保持复苏意味着需要出台一个重大的多年期协调性改革计划，从根本上改善美国教育和培训其公民、投资基础设施以及为其他生产性开销和住房提供融资、与全球经济开展竞争，以及形成和坚持理性预算过程的方式。


Such a program will also require a recovering America to navigate several key challenges in the next few months.	这样一个改革计划也需要复苏的美国在未来几个月中应对好几大关键性挑战。


For starters, the economy is not yet in a position to handle the 4-5%-of-GDP “fiscal cliff” that is approaching as all of the hard political decisions that were postponed come into view at the end of this year.	首先，随着多项重大政治决策将于年底中止，美国经济正在迈向其尚无法处理的相当于GDP的4%—5%的“财政悬崖”。


The prospect of a disorderly fiscal contraction needs to give way to a more rationally designed approach that avoids undermining the fragile recovery.	无序财政紧缩必须让位给设计合理的过程，以避免影响脆弱的复苏。


To accomplish that, the political class must avoid the bickering that almost sent America back into recession in 2011, and that raised major questions about the quality of the country’s economic governance.	为此，政界必须避免2011年几乎将美国重新打回衰退的争吵，这也引起了人们对美国经济治理质量的重大怀疑。


Oil prices are not helping.	油价也在添乱。


Having already surged on account of Iran-related geopolitical concerns, they are altering American consumers’ behavior, weakening their confidence, aggravating the country’s payments imbalances, and further reducing policymakers’ flexibility.	由于有关伊朗的地缘政治忧虑，油价已出现了飙升，正在改变美国消费者的行为，削弱他们的信心，恶化美国收支失衡问题，也进一步削弱了决策者的灵活度。


And then there is Europe, which is yet to overcome decisively its debt and growth problems.	还有欧洲。 欧洲仍没有拿出果断的措施克服其债务和增长问题。


Like other countries, the US must continue to strengthen internal firewalls to limit its vulnerability to what is still a complex crisis across the Atlantic.	与其他国家一样，美国必须继续强化其内部防火墙，减少其因复杂的跨大西洋危机而受害的可能性。


America’s full recovery is not yet guaranteed.	美国的完全复苏绝非板上钉钉。


A mix of steadfastness, caution, and good luck is needed for that to happen.	美国需要坚决、谨慎和好运来实现完全复苏。


And when it does, the country will be in a better position to repay its massive hospital bill.	而实现了完全复苏，美国才能更好地偿付为数巨大的医药费。


The American Way of Debt	美国的负债方式


After almost 15 years of unprecedented growth - interrupted only by a brief slowdown in 2000-2001 - the United States has accumulated a huge stock of foreign liabilities, equivalent to 25% of its GDP.	经过15年前所未有的增长－期间只在2000－2001年有过短暂的停顿－美国已经累积了数额庞大的国外债务，占到了国内生产总值的25%。


With the current account deficit now exceeding 5% of GDP, US foreign debt is rising fast.	经常项目赤字现已超过国内生产总值的5%，美国的国外负债还在快速地增长。


But no country can accumulate debt forever - and what cannot last sooner or later must end.	但任何国家都不能永远负债－如果不能永远欠下去，就早晚要有清偿的一天。


In early 1985, when the US current account deficit reached $120 billion, about a third of today's level at current prices, the rest of the world stopped financing it. The outcome was a sudden fall in the value of the dollar, which depreciated by 50% against the Deutschemark.	1985年初，美国经常项目赤字达到1200亿美元的时候（按现行价格计算大约是今天的1/3），世界其它国家停止了对它的借贷，结果导致美元迅速贬值，与德国马克相比下跌近50%。


Europe should not welcome a sequel.	欧洲不会希望类似的事情发生。


Indeed, the world itself cannot afford the disappearance of the US current account deficit - at least not quickly.	实际上，世界本身也经受不起美国经常项目赤字的消失－至少也得有个过程。


Take away US imports and the timid growth Europe has seen in the past year would immediately disappear.	如果没有美国的进口，欧洲去年的那种微弱增长立刻就会消失殆尽。


This may already be happening: the appreciation of the euro, from $1.20 to $1.30 in the past few months, was enough to bring European growth to a standstill during the third quarter of this year.	这或许已经发生了：过去几个月欧元从1. 20涨到了1.


Before the dollar started to weaken, exports from the 25 EU member states were growing at 6.5% per year, compared with 2% for consumption and 3% for investment.	30美元，已经足以让欧洲今年第三季度的增长化为泡影。 美元开始疲软前，25个欧盟成员国的年出口增长率是6.


Even in Japan, the recent recovery was almost entirely led by exports.	5%，对应的消费增长是2%，投资增幅为3%。 即使在日本，近期的复苏也几乎完全依赖出口。


But as the yen strengthens, Japan, too, seems to stop growing.	但随着日元的上涨，日本的增长似乎也陷入了停滞。


With central banks around the world full of dollars and trade imbalances becoming worrisome, there are three possible solutions.	在各国央行都储备了大量美元、贸易不平衡也开始引起人们忧虑的情况下，我们有可能采取三种不同的对策。


One is that domestic saving in the US increases. But this is unlikely, at least in the near future, given President Bush's ambitious fiscal plans and the continuing war in Iraq.	一种是增加美国的国内储蓄，但至少在不远的将来，考虑到布什总统雄心勃勃的财政计划和连绵不断的伊拉克战争，这种可能性算得上是微乎其微。


US private savings are also slightly negative, and an increase might lead to a slowdown in the short run.	美国的私人储蓄也略有下降，而上升可能导致短期内增速放缓。


The second possibility is a more pronounced devaluation of the dollar, bringing it well beyond the current levels relative to both the euro and the yen.	第二种可能是公开降低美元汇率，使它在现有基础上对欧元和日元大幅贬值。


Revaluation of the Chinese yuan would also help.	人民币汇率的重新调整也会起作用。


The third option is a pick up of growth in Europe, which would increase US exports.	第三种选择是加快欧洲的增长速度，造成美国的出口增加。


This could happen only if European companies cut costs and increase productivity.	只有欧洲公司削减开支、提高生产率，这种情况才有可能发生。


As always, a litany of plans and promises for "structural reforms" can be heard, but none of them is likely to be implemented anytime soon.	就像以前一样，到处可以听到这样那样的计划和"结构"改革的承诺，但无论计划还是承诺短期内都不可能实施。


So what can be done?	那么我们还能做什么？


One alternative is to increase working hours without increasing salary per hours proportionally.	一种选择是增加工作时数，但不相应地提升工资报酬。


Americans and Europeans worked the same number of hours in the early 1970's.	20世纪70年代初，美国人和欧洲人工作时数大体相同；


Today, Europeans work 50% less on average in France and Germany than in the US.	而今天，法德两国的欧洲人比美国人平均少工作50%以上。


This is partly due to higher taxes in Europe, and this cannot be undone: nobody can force someone to work if they consider their take-home pay too low because of a high marginal tax rate.	这部分是因为欧洲实行高税收，任何人对此都无能为力：如果人们认为自己拿回家的报酬太低，而边际税率太高，没有人能强迫他们去工作。


But the relative decline in work hours is also due to trade unions' success in winning compulsory vacation time.	但工作时数的相对下降也是因为工会成功争取到了强制性的休假时间。


Labor reform leading to longer hours would not reduce the total income of the employed, but it would reduce production costs.	延长工作时间的劳工改革不会削减雇员的总体收入，却能够降低企业的生产成本。


Some discussion of this idea is beginning to appear in the press and, it is to be hoped, behind close doors among policymakers and union leaders.	媒体已经开始刊登有关这一问题的探讨，在决策者和工会领袖紧闭的大门内，这样的改革至少值得期待。


Until this happens, it is in the rest of the world's interest to let the US continue to run an unprecedented current account deficit by financing it at the rate of $500 billion per year.	上述变化真的发生以前，让美国继续以每年5000亿美元的速度维持前所未有的经常项目赤字，对整个世界都有好处。


This allows the Chinese to keep their currency stable vis-à-vis the dollar, remain super-competitive, and thus enable a gradual shift of 200 million workers from agriculture into manufacturing, the authorities' aim over the next 10 years.	这能使中国人保持货币对美元的相对稳定，保持超强的竞争力，让政府在未来10年内实现2亿人从农业向工业的过渡。


In Europe, America's external deficit keeps the sole source of growth alive.	在欧洲，美国的外部赤字是维持现有增长的唯一源泉。


But, again, this will not last forever.	可我还要说，这也不是长久之计。


Eventually, Europe will have to stop thinking that the US can save its economy and will have to start relying on its own resources.	欧洲必须停止认为美国会拯救他们的经济，并开始依靠自身的资源。


But don't be surprised if the next European downturn will be blamed on the US and the depreciation of the dollar.	但如果人们把下一次欧洲经济低迷归咎于美国和美元贬值，你千万不要感到惊讶。


It is always useful to have a scapegoat.	有个替罪羊总是件好事。


The American World Turned Upside Down	美国的世界天翻地覆


PARIS – From Washington, the enthusiasm of the French for intervention in Libya is seen with a mixture of relief and puzzlement.	巴黎——在华盛顿看来，法国干涉利比亚的热情既让人迷惑又让人解脱。


The Americans do not want the job and are happy that someone else does.	美国人并不愿插手此事，因此很高兴别人愿意。


Indeed, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s willingness to intervene (alongside British Prime Minister David Cameron) helped close a dangerous gap between the world of “values,” which would call for direct American intervention against Muammar el-Qaddafi, and the world of “interest,” which impelled President Barack Obama to restraint.	实际上，尼古拉·萨科奇总统（和英国首相大卫·卡梅伦的干涉意愿）有助于弥合“价值观”和“实际利益”之间的危险差距，前者要求美国直接干预穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲，而后者则迫使巴拉克·奥巴马总统保持克制。


America’s strategy seems to be to squeeze Qaddafi’s regime out of power through a combination of financial, economic, and even “psychological” pressure aimed at isolating the Colonel from his sources of support within his own inner circle.	美国的策略似乎是要通过金融、经济甚至是“心理”压力的联合效应将卡扎菲政权挤出权力核心，让上校在核心支持圈里陷入孤立。


That is a wise approach, one that may ultimately work.	这不失为可能起到终极作用的明智之举。


But it will likely take a lot of time to produce results.	但可能需要等很长时间才能看到结果。


While Americans are relieved by France’s display of determination, they cannot refrain from expressing a sense of bemusement: Do the French really know what they are up against?	虽然法国的坚定决心让美国人长出一口气，但他们还是情不自禁的感到困惑：法国人真的清楚自己在干什么吗？


What has happened to them?	他们究竟是怎么回事？


We know what war means, but they seem to have forgotten!	我们知道战争意味着什么，但他们似乎已经忘得一干二净。


Indeed, France and the United States seem to have switched roles from just a few years ago.	事实上，就在几年前法国和美国似乎互换了位置。


Listening to Obama’s reflexive and distant speeches on Libya, one can nearly hear French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s flamboyant intervention at the United Nations on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.	听着奥巴马在利比亚问题上充满反省和冷淡意味的讲话，人们似乎听到了2003年入侵伊拉克前法国外长多米尼克·德维尔潘在联合国慷慨激昂的陈词。


And, though the circumstances and the “legal” environment are very different – there is a UN resolution for the Libya intervention, and a vague declaration of support by the Arab League – Sarkozy’s stance reminds some of George W. Bush’s enthusiasm for war.	尽管两者的具体情况和“法律”环境截然不同——利比亚干涉行动得到了联合国决议批准和阿拉伯联盟模棱两可的支持——萨科奇仍然让人联想起乔治·W·布什对于战争的狂热态度。


The British, too, seem to be regarding the French with some perplexity.	英国人似乎也对法国人的态度感到疑惑。


Even though they are fighting side-by-side in Libya, with their armies expressing a deep confidence in each other, there are distinct nuances in each country’s position on military intervention.	尽管英法两国在利比亚并肩作战，双方部队都对对方表示信任，但两国在军事干预问题上的立场却明显有所差异。


The view from London contains the same element of “distance” – if not slight apprehension – found in the view from Washington.	伦敦的看法即便不是略显担忧，至少也像华盛顿一样包含着“冷淡”的因素。


To explain this difference in perspective, perhaps one should venture further into the past than the Iraq War and consider the divergence that already existed traditionally between the United Kingdom’s pragmatic approach to its imperial role and the French Empire’s missionary zeal.	要想解释这种态度上的差异，可能要回到伊拉克战争之前，思考英国对其帝国地位的务实态度和法兰西帝国传道热情的传统区别。


A duty to accumulate wealth catalyzed the former; a duty to civilize inspired the latter.	积累财富的目标驱动了前者，而后者则受到教化责任的推动。


The spectacular inversion of the French and US roles on the issue of intervention has different causes.	法美两国在干涉问题上惊人的立场颠倒有着不同的原因。


Some are linked to the personalities of Obama and Sarkozy; others reflect the nature of their political imperatives.	奥巴马和萨科奇的个性因素占一定比重，其余恐怕是政治需要的反映。


Obama’s priority is not to be dragged into another conflict.	奥巴马的当务之急是避免被拖进另一场冲突。


Afghanistan is already such a costly quagmire.	阿富汗已经让美国深陷其中无法自拔。


Sarkozy’s goal is to “exist” as much as possible on the global stage.	而萨科奇的目的是尽可能在全球舞台上占据一席之地。


But, beyond personalities and political calculus, what we are witnessing is a fundamental shift in the international system.	但抛开个性和政治权衡的因素，我们看到的是国际体系的根本性变化。


It is a shift that raises a major question: if those who are willing to act prove incapable of doing so “successfully,” what happens to global stability unless those who are capable are also willing to step in?	上述变化派生出一个重要的疑问：如果愿意行动的人没有能力取得“成功”，那么除非有能力的人也愿意参与进来，否则全球稳定还能否保持？


At the crossroads of this question stands NATO, an organization perceived as American by Europeans and international (i.e., not American) by the average US citizen.	北约实际处在问题的核心，该组织被欧洲人视为归属美国而被普通美国人视为归属国际（即非美）。


But if NATO is – for better or worse – in command on the ground in Libya, it is the UN that has given the necessary green light to French action there.	但无论怎样如果北约在利比亚战场处于领导地位，为法国行动打开必要绿灯的却是联合国。


It is this specific “marriage of reason” between France and the UN that is essential to understanding the French position on Libya.	正是联合国和法国之间这种特别的“理性联姻”造就了理解法国对利比亚立场的关键因素。


Indeed, the same relationship between France and the UN that led to the country’s resistance to intervention in Iraq in 2003 has now pushed France to intervene in Libya in 2011.	实际上，导致法国反对2003年入侵伊拉克的同样一种法国和联合国关系现在却在促成2011年法国进行利比亚干涉。


Yet it is dangerous to believe that the world has found in this new-model Coalition of the Willing the solution that it was seeking in today’s increasingly chaotic post-American order.	但就此认为世界已经在后美国秩序愈加混乱的局势下新形成的“自愿联盟”模式中找到了苦苦寻找的解决办法是危险的。


Neither France nor Britain – not to mention the European Union, which is more divided than ever when it comes to military interventions – can be seen as substitutes for the US.	无论法国还是英国都不能代替美国，更不要说在军事干预问题上分歧达到顶点的欧盟。


Despite Sarkozy’s exceptional activism, they have neither the means nor, in reality, the will.	尽管萨科奇表现出异乎寻常的积极性，但他们既没有办法，其实也不具备真正的意图。


Confronted with the world’s increasing complexity and America’s decreasing appetite for international responsibilities, the need for adequate rules – and for a referee to enforce them – is greater than ever.	在世界局势日趋复杂和美国越来越不愿承担国际责任的条件下，制定充分规则并指定贯彻裁判的必要性变得日益突出。


In the face of growing risks of global anarchy, the courageous but risky activism of France and Britain should not be seen as a substitute for an engaged US.	在全球无政府状态风险越来越突出的情况下，法国和英国勇敢但冒险的积极态度不应被视为美���贡献的替代物。


But does such an engaged America still exist?	但这样专注的美国究竟还是否存在？


The answer is probably no.	答案也许是不。


The America that Can Say No	一个可以说不的美国


NEW YORK – Early this month, Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev went cap in hand to Moscow to ask for financial aid.	纽约-本月初，吉尔吉斯斯坦总统库尔曼别克·巴基耶夫必恭必敬地来到莫斯科请求财政援助。


To make his request more palatable, Bakiyev announced that he was demanding that the United States close its airbase in Kyrgyzstan, which resupplies NATO troops in neighboring Afghanistan.	为了让他的请求更令人愉快，巴基耶夫宣布，他已要求美国关闭其在吉尔吉斯斯坦的用以向邻国阿富汗增派北约部队的空军基地。


Similarly, late last year, Iceland’s government asked Russia to help bail out its banking system, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited China in hopes of securing an emergency infusion of cash.	同样，去年年底，冰岛政府也曾请求俄罗斯帮助其银行体系摆脱困境，而巴基斯坦总统阿西夫·阿里·扎尔达里也曾访华，希望能获得救援现金的注入。


Some observers cite these episodes as evidence of decline in America’s international clout.	一些观察家把这些事件作为美国国际影响力下降的证据。


But there’s a larger point: so far, except for relatively small sums offered to the Kyrgyz, Russia and China haven’t offered much help.	但还要注意到更重要的一个现象：到目前为止，除了相对小规模的资金提供给了吉尔吉斯之外，俄罗斯和中国还没有提供过多少帮助。


Amid much talk of a “post-American world,” many observers see a shift from a US-dominated international order toward a multipolar system, in which countries like China, Russia, and several others compete for global leadership on a range of common challenges and risks.	许多观察家在大谈“后美国世界”的时候，他们认为由美国主导的国际秩序正在向多极化体系转变，在这一体系中，如中国、俄罗斯和其它几个国家在一系列共同面临的挑战和风险上，互相竞争以谋求对全球的领导。


More than five years ago, China’s President Hu Jintao proclaimed that, “the trend toward a multipolar world is irreversible and dominant.”	五年多前，中国国家主席胡锦涛宣称，“世界多极化的趋势是不可逆转的，并已取得支配地位。


When Vladimir Putin complained during a conference in Munich last year that US unilateralism stoked conflict around the world, an offended Senator John McCain responded that confrontation was unnecessary in “today’s multipolar world.”	”当弗拉基米尔·普京去年在慕尼黑的一次会议上抱怨说，美国的单边主义在世界各地挑起冲突时，生气的参议员约翰·麦凯恩回答说， 在“当今多极世界 ”中，对抗是不必要的。


When Putin welcomed Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to Russia last September, he observed that, “Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming.”	当去年9月普京在欢迎委内瑞拉总统雨果·查韦斯访问俄罗斯时，他指出，“拉丁美洲正在成为正在形成的多极世界中的一个引人注目的环节。


Chávez agreed: “A multipolar world is becoming reality.”	”查韦斯表示同意：“一个多极世界正在成为现实。 ”


All of them have it wrong.	他们全都错了。


US dominance is clearly on the wane, but a multipolar order implies that several emerging powers hold competing views about how the world should be run, and that they are prepared to act to advance their global agendas.	美国的统治地位显然是在减弱，但一个多极秩序是意味着，一些新兴大国在对世界应该如何运转的看法上互相竞争，而且他们也准备好采取行动，以推进其全球范围的议程。


That is not the case.	但情况并非如此。


Instead, we are witnessing the birth of a non-polar order, in which America’s chief competitors remain too busy with problems at home and in their immediate neighborhoods to shoulder the heaviest international burdens.	相反，我们正目睹一个非极化秩序的诞生，在这样的世界秩序中，美国的主要竞争国家仍然忙于国内和近邻地区的问题，而没法挑起国际重担。


None of the emerging powers has even begun to use its growing political and economic clout to advance truly global ambitions – or to take on responsibilities that Washington can no longer afford.	没有一个新兴大国甚至已开始利用其日益增长的政治和经济影响力来推进他们真正的全球目标-或承担美国再也承担不起的责任。


Start with Russia.	先来看看俄罗斯的情况。


Despite its growing ties with Venezuela and efforts to coordinate energy policy with natural gas-rich countries in North Africa, the Kremlin has no aspirations to rebuild Soviet-scale influence in Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia.	尽管它与委内瑞拉的关系越来越紧密，以及它努力与北非的天然气资源丰富的国家协调能源政策，但克里姆林宫没有雄心要重建苏联时期在拉丁美洲、非洲或东南亚地区的影响规模。


Nor does it have Soviet-style ideological appeal.	它也没有苏联式的意识形态上的号召力。


Instead, Russia’s leaders are busy protecting Russian markets, banks, and companies from the worst effects of the global financial crisis, consolidating state control over domestic economic sectors, and extending their foreign-policy leverage across former Soviet territory.	相反，俄罗斯领导人正忙于保护俄罗斯市场、银行和企业免受全球金融危机的最恶劣影响，并巩固国家对国内经济部门的控制，以及扩大其外交政策在前苏联领土范围的影响。


China’s need to satisfy its hunger for imported oil and other commodities has given it an international presence.	中国为满足其对进口石油和其他商品的胃口的需要，使它在国际上有了一席之地。


But its influence is more commercial than political.	但它的影响力更多的是在商业上而不是政治上。


China’s leaders must devote their attention to a staggering array of pressing problems at home: averting an economic slowdown that could push millions out of work and into the streets, the fallout from rural land reform, and efforts to manage enormous environmental and public health problems.	中国领导人必须把他们的注意力专心放在国内多得惊人的紧迫问题上：避免可能让数百万人失去工作并到走到街头示威的经济增长放缓，农村土地改革带来的问题，以及努力管理严重的环境和公众健康问题。


India must hold its own in China’s lengthening shadow.	印度在中国的不断扩展的阴影下，必须不加屈服。


Facing elections next year, the ruling Congress Party is spending the government’s time and money on subsidies for consumers, wage hikes for state employees, and debt relief for farmers.	面对明年的大选，执政的国大党政府正把时间和金钱花在补贴消费者、上涨国家工作人员工资以及减轻农民债务负担方面。


Brazil is similarly preoccupied, appearing to have no grander near-term aspirations than to promote stability in Latin America, manage the effects of the global financial crisis, and inspire others in the developing world.	巴西也同样地顾虑重重，除了在拉美地区促进稳定、处理好全球金融危机的对其的��响并激励发展中国家之外，它似乎没有更宏伟的短期抱负。


In short, there is a vacuum of global leadership just at the moment when it is badly needed.	总之，就在全球迫切需要领导的时刻，全球领导却出现了一个真空。


President Barack Obama’s attention is now concentrated on stimulating the anemic US economy, crafting tax cuts, reforming energy and health-care policies, and restoring confidence in US financial institutions.	奥巴马总统的注意力现在集中在刺激美国疲软的经济、制定减税政策、改革能源和医疗保健政策并恢复人们对美国金融机构的信心等方面。


The European Union continues its internal debate over how best to bail out its failing banks and industries, handle the fallout from EU and euro-zone expansion, and manage increasingly rocky relations with Russia.	欧盟继续在内部争论不休，争论的方面包括如何以最佳的方式挽救其失败的银行业和工业部门，处理由欧盟和欧元区的扩大而产生的问题，以及处理与俄罗斯的关系中日益增加的摩擦。


Who, then, can take the lead on efforts to create a new global financial architecture that reflects the complexities of twenty-first-century commerce?	那么，谁能起带头作用，努力来创建一种新的能反映二十一世纪全球商业的复杂性的金融结构呢？


Who can drive consensus on a multilateral response to climate change?	谁能够推动各国对气候变化的反应上达成一致呢？


Who will replace an obsolete nonproliferation regime, provide collective security in emerging international hotspots, and build momentum behind Middle East Peace talks?	谁将会取代过时的防核扩散条约，在新出现的国际不稳定地区提供集体安全并推动中东和谈呢？


The international summit meeting in Washington in November 2008 underlined the problem.	2008年11月在华盛顿举行的国际首脑会议突显了这个问题。


The world’s richest countries (the G7) turned to the emerging powers within the G20 to help coordinate a response to the global financial slowdown.	世界上最富有的国家（七国集团）转向20国集团中的新兴大国以求助协调如何应对全球金融危机。


Difficult as it is for seven countries to agree on anything, imagine the challenge of building consensus among 20.	即便是七国在任何问题上要达成共识也是困难，那可以想象20个国家间要达成共识是怎样一种挑战。


Consider the competing views within this group on democracy, transparency, the proper economic role of government, new rules of the road for financial markets and trade, and how best to ensure that the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank fairly reflect today’s global balance of power.	想想这些国家之间在如下问题上相互对立的立场吧：民主、透明度、政府适当的经济方面的角色、金融市场和贸易道路上的新规则以及如何以最佳的方式确保联合国、国际货币基金组织和世界银行公平地反映今天全球权力的平衡。


For the next several years, when those in crisis turn to the US for help, they are increasingly likely to hear the word no.	在未来几年内，当陷入危机的国家向美国寻求帮助时，它们越来越有可能听到“不”这个词。


And it is not at all clear that anyone else is willing and able to say yes.	而且根本就不明确哪个国家愿意并且能够说“是”。


The Anatomy of Global Economic Uncertainty	解剖全球经济不确定性


NEWPORT BEACH – The sense of uncertainty prevailing in the West is palpable, and rightly so.	发自纽波特滩——当前西方社会中充斥的不确定感不仅是人们的感受，同时也是事实。


People are worried about their futures, with a record number now fearing that their children may end up worse off than them.	人们都在为自己的未来忧心不已，还有相当数量的人害怕儿女的境遇可能会更糟。


Unfortunately, things will become even more unsettling in the months ahead.	但不幸的是，未来几个月的情况将更加动荡。


The United States is having difficulties returning its economy to the path of high growth and vigorous job creation.	美国经济在恢复高增长并大量创造就业方面举步维艰。


Thousands of people have taken to the streets of US cities, and thousands of others in Europe, to demand a fairer system.	成千上万人涌上欧美各大城市街头要求建立一个更加公平的体制。


In the eurozone, financial crises have forced out two governments, replacing elected representative with appointed technocrats charged with restoring order.	欧元区的经济危机已经掀翻了两个国家的民选政府，取而代之的则是掌控复苏进程的技术官僚。


Concern about the institutional integrity of the eurozone – key to the architecture of modern Europe – continues to mount.	建构现代欧洲的关键之处就是欧元区体制整合，而各界对此的关注程度也日渐增加。


This uncertainty extends beyond countries and regions.	这种不缺定性同时还跨越了不同国家和区域。


Those looking around the next corner also worry about the stability of an international economic order in which the difficulties faced by the system’s Western core are gradually eroding global public goods.	那些担心自身未来的人同时也对全球金融秩序的稳定感到忧心，因为这个秩序的西方核心所面对的难题正逐渐扩散到全球公共产品之上。


It is no coincidence that all of this is happening simultaneously.	所有一切的同时爆发并不是巧合。


Each development, and certainly their occurrence in tandem, points to the historic paradigm changes shaping today’s global economy – and to the anxiety that comes with the loss of once-dependable anchors, be they economic and financial or social and political.	事态的每一步发展（以及其环环相扣的发生次序）都指向那个彻底塑造了当今全球经济的历史范式变革，同时也指向某种焦虑——以往不论是在经济/金融还是社会/政治方面都能找到一个可以依赖的“锚”，如今它们却荡然无存了


Restoring these anchors will take time.	重新建立这些“锚”需要时间。


There is no game plan as of now, and historic precedents are only partly illuminating.	新的游戏规则尚未制定，而历史先例也无法完全照搬。


Yet two things seem clear: different countries are opting, either by choice or necessity, for different outcomes; and the global system as a whole faces challenges in reconciling them.	但有两点是比较明确的：不同的国家（不管是任意还是必须）所冀望的结果各有不同； 而把各方协调在一个整体全球体制框架下则需要花费很大力气。


Some changes will be evolutionary, taking many years to manifest themselves; others will be sudden and more disruptive.	有些挑战是革命性的，需要许多年才能彻底显露出来； 而另外一些则会突然爆发并造成一定混乱。


Yet, as complex as all of this sounds – and, by definition, paradigm changes are complicated affairs that, fortunately, seldom occur – a simple analytical framework may help shed light on what to look for, what to expect and where, and how best to adapt.	而虽然这一切听上去非常复杂——幸运的是，从定义上来说范式变革作为一种结构复杂的事物其实发生率极低——因此一个简单的分析框架将告诉我们应该寻找什么，期待什么，从哪里寻找以及什么适应方式才是最优选项。


The framework relies on an often-used analytical shortcut: identifying a limited set of explanatory variables in what statisticians call “a reduced-form equation.”	这个分析框架基于一个常用的分析捷径：在统计学家所谓的“方程简约式”中定义数量有限的几个解释变量。


The objective is not to account for everything, but rather to pinpoint a small number of variables than can explain key factors, albeit neither perfectly nor fully.	虽然不一定完美也不够全面，但这样做的目的不是要解决所有问题，而是准确找出一小部分可以用来解释关键因素的变量。


Using this approach, it is possible to argue that the future of many Western economies, and that of the global economy, will be shaped by their ability to navigate four inter-related financial, economic, social, and political dynamics.	利用这个方法我们就有机会阐明：许多西方经济体乃至全球经济的未来，都将由它们拿捏金融、经济，社会和政治这四个互联驱动因素的能力来塑造。


The first relates to balance sheets. Many Western economies must deal with the nasty legacy of years of excessive borrowing and leveraging; those, like Germany, that do not have this problem are linked to neighbors that do.	第一个变量与资产负债表相关：许多西方国家都必须处理因过往过度借债和杠杆化所留下的烂摊子；


Faced with this reality, different countries will opt for different de-leveraging options.	而德国这类不存在类似问题的国家也会受到邻居的牵连。 面对同样的现实，不同的国家会选择不同的去杠杆化选项。


Indeed, differentiation is already evident.	事实上差异是明确存在的。


Some, like Greece, face such a parlous situation that it is difficult to imagine any outcome other than a traumatic default and further economic turmoil; and Greece is unlikely to be the only Western economy forced to restructure its debt.	有些国家（比如希腊）的状况是如此糟糕，以致除了实施一场灾难性违约并进一步引发金融海啸之外根本找不到其他选项； 而希腊也不是唯一一个被迫重组其债务的西方经济体。


Others, like the United Kingdom, have moved quickly to take firmer control of their destiny, though their austerity drives will inevitably involve considerable sacrifices.	包括英国在内的其他国家则抢先一步奋力掌握自己的命运，虽然他们的紧缩动作将不可避免地带来一定程度的牺牲。


A third group, led by the US, has not yet made an explicit de-leveraging choice.	以美国为首的第三类国家则尚未找到清晰的去杠杆化选项。


Having more time, they are using the less visible, and much more gradual, path of “financial repression,” under which interest rates are forced down so that creditors, including those on modest fixed incomes, subsidize debtors.	由于时间尚算充裕，所以它们会选择相对隐性也更加渐进的“金融抑制”路径，利率会被压低，以便让那些债权人，包括那些拥有中等固定收入的人能补贴债务人。


De-leveraging is closely linked to the second variable – namely, economic growth.	而去杠杆化则跟第二个变量密切相关——也就是经济发展。


Simply put, the stronger a country’s ability to generate additional national income, the greater its ability to meet debt obligations while maintaining and enhancing citizens’ standards of living.	简而言之，一个国家创造额外国家收入的能力越强，它在维持和提高人民生活水平的同时履行债务责任的能力也越强。


Many countries, including Italy and Spain, must overcome structural barriers to competitiveness, growth, and job creation through multi-year reforms of labor markets, pensions, housing, and economic governance.	包括意大利和西班牙在内的许多国家必须通过在劳动力市场、养老金，住房和经济治理方面进行多年改革，才有可能跨越在竞争力，增长和创造就业方面所面对的结构性障碍。


Some, like the US, can combine structural reforms with short-term demand stimulus.	美国等国可以把短期需求刺激计划和结构性改革结合在一起。


A few, led by Germany, are reaping the benefits of years of steadfast (and underappreciated) reforms.	而以德国为首的一些国家则能收割多年以来坚定（且不受欢迎的）改革所结下的硕果。


But growth, while necessary, is insufficient by itself, given today’s high unemployment and the extent to which income and wealth inequalities have increased.	但考虑到如今的高失业率以及收入差距的不断扩大，增长虽然不可或缺的，但也存在着不足。


Hence the third dynamic: the West is being challenged to deliver not just growth, but “inclusive growth,” which, most critically, involves greater “social justice.”	于是要引入第三个驱动因素：西方面临的挑战是不但要实现增长，而且要实现“包容性增长”，而其中最关键的则是实现更多“社会公正”。


Indeed, there is a deep sense that capitalism in the West has become unfair.	事实上，人们已经深刻认识到西方资本主义的不公平态势。


Certain players, led by big banks, extracted huge profits during the boom, and avoided the deep losses that they deserved during the bust.	以大银行为首的某些市场参与者在景气时大肆渔利，却又能在泡沫破裂时逃脱应有的损失。


Citizens no longer accept the argument that this unfortunate outcome reflects the banks’ special economic role. And why should they, given that record bailouts have not revived growth and employment?	而对这种令人沮丧的高收入“体���了银行特殊经济职能”的说法大众也不买帐了——既然史无前例的拯救计划都未能振兴经济和就业，那么凭什么要让他们相信这些？


Calls for a fairer system will not go away.	对一个更公平体制的呼声不会消散。


If anything, they will spread and grow louder.	一旦出事，这些呼声将以更大的力度扩散开来。


The West has no choice but to strike a better balance – between capital and labor, between current and future generations, and between the financial sector and the real economy.	西方无路可走，只能努力在资本和劳动力，在这一代和下一代人之间，在金融部门和实体经济之间保持更佳的平衡。


This leads to the final variable, the role of politicians and policymakers.	这随之引入最后一个变量：政治家和政策制定者的角色。


It has become fashionable in both America and Europe to point to a debilitating “lack of leadership,” which underscores the extent to which an inherently complex paradigm change is straining traditional mindsets, processes, and governance systems.	目前欧美最流行的说法都指向日渐恶化的“领导力缺失”现象，而这也说明了一个本身就极为复杂的范式转换究竟在多大程度上颠覆了传统的思维，程序和治理体制。


Unlike emerging economies, Western countries are not well equipped to deal with structural and secular changes – and understandably so.	跟新兴经济体不同，西方国家在处理结构性和世俗的变化方面都有所欠缺——这是可以理解的。


After all, their histories – and certainly during what was mislabeled as the “Great Moderation” between 1980 and 2008– have been predominantly cyclical.	毕竟他们的历史——当然包括被错误定义为“大规模现代化”的1980至2008年间——都是以循环往复为主。


The longer they fail to adjust, the greater the risks.	而他们花在调整上的时间越长，风险也就越大。


Those on the receiving end of these four dynamics – the vast majority of us – need not be paralyzed by uncertainty and anxiety.	而作为这四大驱动因素最终承受者，我们也无需出于不确定和忧虑而裹足不前。


Instead, we can use this simple framework to monitor developments, learn from them, and adapt.	相反，我们可以利用这个简单框架来观察事态的发展，从中汲取知识并最终适应。


Yes, there will still be volatility, unusual strains, and historically odd outcomes.	虽然我们依然可能遭遇反复，不寻常的压力以及史无前例的古怪结果。


But, remember, a global paradigm shift implies a significant change in opportunities, and not just risks.	但请一定记住：一个全球范式转换带来的不仅仅是风险，还有巨大的机遇！


North Korea’s Blackmail Missile	朝鲜的勒索导弹


TOKYO – The Unha-3 rocket launched from Sohae in North Korea on the morning of December 12 passed through Japanese air space over the island of Okinawa 12 minutes later, and crashed into the Pacific Ocean roughly 300 kilometers east of the Philippines.	东京——12月12日上午从朝鲜西海发射的Unha-3型火箭在12分钟后掠过冲绳岛上方的日本领空，之后在菲律宾以东约300公里的太平洋海域坠毁。


The launch could be considered a mild surprise, because South Korean intelligence sources had suggested that it had been canceled.	此次发射略有些出人意料，因为韩国情报部门曾有消息称发射计划已经取消。


More surprising was the success of the launch, which makes North Korea the tenth member of the world’s “Space Club” (the ninth member was Iran, which successfully launched its Safir rocket in 2008).	更令人意想不到的是导弹发射成功，朝鲜第十个加盟全球“太空俱乐部”（2008年伊朗成功发射萨菲尔火箭后第九个加盟）。


The Unha-3, a three-stage rocket weighing 92 tons, follows the Unha-2, which failed spectacularly in 2009, so the evident progress that North Korea has made in its missile technology in such a short period has shocked governments around the world.	继Unha-2之后的Unha-3是重达92吨的三级火箭，2009年Unha-2在发射时曾遭遇惨败，因此朝鲜导弹技术在如此短期内的显著进步令各国政府深感震惊。


The United Nations Security Council responded by debating a resolution on strengthening sanctions against North Korea.	联合国安理会作出回应，就加强对朝鲜制裁的决议进行辩论。


Only China – no surprise – opposed new sanctions, stressing that “actions that heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula should not be taken.”	不出所料，只有中国反对新的制裁措施，强调“不应采取行动加剧朝鲜半岛的紧张局势。


China has agreed to Security Council resolutions against Iran on several occasions, but it has backed sanctions against North Korea on only two, both coming after the North conducted nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009).	”中国曾数次同意安理会对伊朗实施制裁，但同意对朝鲜制裁决议却只有两次，而且这两次都是在朝鲜进行核试验以后（分别是2006及2009年）。


China’s leaders oppose stiffer sanctions against North Korea for a simple reason: they fear the frailty of Kim Jong-un’s regime more than they fear the international security consequences of the missile launch.	中国领导人反对更严厉制裁朝鲜的原因非常简单：与导弹发射所造成的国际安全问题相比，他们更担心金正恩政权的脆弱性。


Above all, China wants to prevent the regime’s collapse, which it fears may result from stricter sanctions.	归根结底中国希望防止朝鲜政权倒台，因此对更严厉的制裁可能导致的后果感到担忧。


If the Kim regime timed the missile launch to have a direct impact on elections in nearby Japan and South Korea, it may have succeeded merely in boosting support for defense-oriented conservative parties.	如果金正恩政权选择此时发射是为直接影响日韩邻国的选举结果，它也许只是成功提高了公众对以防御为核心的保守党的支持。


Indeed, although it is difficult to say how large an impact the launch had on the result in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (of which I am a member, serving as Deputy Chair of the election campaign) won a landslide victory.	其实，尽管很难界定发射在多大程度上影响了日本的选举，自民党（我本人是自民党党员，并担任竞选活动副主席）获得压倒性胜利却是不争的事实。


Although Park Geun-hye’s victory in South Korea, where she became the country’s first-ever female president, followed a campaign mainly focused on domestic economic issues, North Korea’s missile-guided brinkmanship probably shifted many undecided voters to the security-minded Park’s camp.	尽管朴槿惠在以国内经济问题为主线的竞选获胜后成为韩国有史以来第一位女总统，但朝鲜以导弹发射为标志的外交冒险政策或许令众多犹豫不决的选民倒向了主张防御的朴槿惠阵营。


So, given the seemingly negative impact of the launch on neighboring South Korea and Japan, why didn’t the North hold its fire?	那么鉴于导弹发射对韩日两国造成的负面影响，朝鲜为什么没有三思而后行？


Some suggest that North Korean leaders were determined to stage the launch before the first anniversary of Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power on December 17.	有人认为朝鲜领导人决意在12月17日金正恩掌权一周年之前完成发射活动。


Others suggest that the North Koreans prefer conservatives in power in Seoul and Tokyo, because a more robust vision of national defense in Japan and South Korea will antagonize China, which, isolated in East Asia, will then be more likely to maintain its support for the Kim regime.	还有人认为朝鲜希望首尔和东京的保守派掌权，因为日韩两国国防力量的强盛将引发中国的敌意，从而导致在东亚陷入孤立的中国更有可能支持金正恩政权。


After all, China’s small list of friends in Asia became even smaller in 2012, given Myanmar’s democratic transition.	毕竟，由于缅甸的民主过渡，中国本已有限的亚洲盟国清单在2012年陷入进一步缩减的窘境。


So, in Kim’s perverse logic, a new push for UN sanctions, and new security-conscious governments in Japan and South Korea, will strengthen North Korea’s hold on Chinese foreign policy.	因此，按照金正恩倒行逆施的逻辑，再次推动联合国制裁、促成日韩两国选出新的注重安全问题的政府将协助朝鲜绑架中国的外交政策。


Thus, the missile launch can be viewed as an indication of how threatened the Kim dynasty feels: the regime appears to believe that it must blackmail its closest ally in order to maintain its support.	因此，导弹发射可以看作金氏王朝深感遭受威胁的凭据：朝鲜政权似乎认为必须绑架最亲密的盟友才能确保获得支持。


The primary cause of the regime’s fears is growing political uncertainty, which is the direct result of the failing health of Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-un’s aunt and the power behind the throne.	日益加剧的政治局势动荡是朝鲜政权担忧加剧的主要原因，也是金正恩的姑姑金敬姬健康状况恶化和围绕宝座展开权力斗争的直接结果。


Indeed, keen observers of North Korea suggest that Kim Jong-un ordered the missile launch as a way to strengthen his grip on power while he still has the experienced and ruthless Kim Kyong-hui’s backing.	其实，敏锐的朝鲜问题观察家指出金正恩希望在仍然拥有冷酷而经验丰富的金敬姬支持的情况下，通过下令发射导弹来巩固自己对权力的掌控。


Without it, the Kim dynasty’s hold on power would almost certainly weaken, given Kim Jong-un’s youth and inexperience, plunging the country into chaos.	如果没有这次导弹发射，金氏王朝对权力的把控几乎肯定会因金正恩的年轻和经验不足而逐渐削弱，从而导致朝鲜局势陷入混乱之中。


One seemingly obscure political move last month – the appointment of Jang Sung-taek (Kim Kyong-hui’s husband) as the chairman of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission – suggests that Kim Kyong-hui’s ill health is already having an impact on the regime.	上月一项看似不起眼的政治举动——任命金敬姬的丈夫张承泽担任国家体育文化和体育指导委员会主席表明金敬姬健康状况恶化已经对政权产生了影响。


Although no modern state would do so, the Sports Guidance Commission comprises the regime’s most powerful members.	尽管极少有现代国家秉承类似作法，但体育指导委员会的确是朝鲜政权最有权势者的俱乐部。


Jang’s move to the post strongly suggests that the internal struggle for power is already heating up.	张就任该职强烈表明朝鲜内部权力斗争已趋向白热化。


North Korea’s missile launch, coming amid the internal uncertainty arising from Kim Kyong-hui’s failing health, creates an extremely dangerous situation for the international community.	朝鲜的导弹发射发生在因金敬姬健康状���恶化引发内部动荡的重要关口，在国际社会面前造成了极端危险的局势。


Only by strengthening UN sanctions to such an extent that North Korea is forced to abandon its missiles and nuclear weapons – and China to reconsider its knee-jerk support – can the regime be dissuaded from further, and more ominous, maneuvering.	只有加强联合国制裁迫使朝鲜放弃导弹及核武器计划——并促使中国重新考虑其下意识的支持——才能使朝鲜政权放弃进一步的可怕行动。


But, given China’s continuing opposition to further sanctions, there is scant hope of this happening.	但鉴于中国持续反对进一步制裁，这种情况几乎不太可能发生。


Until China puts its responsibilities as a modern global power ahead of its narrow national interests, the danger from North Korea will grow as the Kim regime becomes ever more unstable.	除非中国将身为现代化全球大国的责任置于其狭隘的国家利益之上，否则朝鲜的危险局势将伴随金氏政权的动荡而日益恶化。


The Andean Engagé	安第斯的参政


MEXICO CITY – The role of the politically committed intellectual has a long and ubiquitous history.	墨西哥城——投身政治的知识份子在历史上起到过长期而又普遍的作用。


The Spanish-French novelist and screenwriter Jorge Semprún, who died recently, was for many years a member of the Spanish Communist Party’s Central Committee, and subsequently served as Minister of Culture in Spain’s first post-Franco Socialist government.	不久前刚刚去世的西班牙籍法语小说家兼编剧赫尔豪·塞姆普伦多年来一直担任西班牙共产党中央委员会委员，而后还担任过后佛朗哥时代的首任西班牙社会党政府文化部长。


Dissidents like Václav Havel had a decisive impact in the downfall of Eastern Europe’s communist regimes.	以瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔为代表的持不同政见者在东欧共产党政权垮台期间发挥了决定性的影响。


And, as recently as a few months ago, a French intellectual’s activism was crucial to initiating the so-far unsuccessful attempt to bring down Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.	而且，就在短短几个月前，一位法国知识分子的积极斡旋在发起迄今为止不太成功的打倒利比亚上校穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲的行动中起到了关键作用。


For it was Bernard-Henry Lévy who convinced French President Nicolas Sarkozy to meet with Libya’s rebel leaders, an encounter that led directly to France taking a leading role in persuading the United Nations Security Council and US President Barack Obama to back military intervention.	因为正是伯纳德·亨利列维说服法国总统尼古拉·萨科奇与利比亚叛军领袖会面，这次会面直接导致法国在说服联合国安理会和美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马支持军事干涉事务中发挥了领导作用。


But perhaps no one exemplified the tradition of the intellectuel engagé better than Jean-Paul Sartre.	不过最能为知识分子参政传统做出榜样的也许莫过于让·保罗·萨特。


His point of view was quite different from that of artists and thinkers in the liberal tradition, like Octavio Paz and Isaiah Berlin.	他的观点与奥克塔维奥·帕斯和以赛亚·柏林等遵循自由主义传统的艺术和思想家有很大不同。


For Sartre (and for many of his contemporaries), intellectuals must not only express political stances, but must also be actively engaged in politics, fighting for the right causes (whatever that meant).	对于萨特（及很多同龄人）来说，知识分子不仅应该表达政治立场，还应该积极参政，为正确的事业而努力奋斗（不管这意味着什么）。


This led some, like Sartre, to defend Stalin and the Gulag; others, like André Malraux, formed part of Charles de Gaulle’s government; and still others, somewhat later, became unconditional defenders of Israel and its policies.	这导致某些人，比如萨特，积极捍卫斯大林和古拉格； 其他人，像安德烈·马尔罗，自愿供职查尔斯·戴高乐政府；


In Latin America, the committed intellectual is alive and well.	积极参政的知识分子正在拉美表现得生龙活虎。


Some – including me, up to a point – might have thought that once democracy had taken hold in the region, the disproportionate political weight of painters, writers, poets, and musicians would begin to decline; they would no longer be the voice of the voiceless, because the voiceless now had a voice of their own.	包括我在内的有些人在某种程度上可能认为一旦民主在拉美地区得以确立，画家、作家、诗人和音乐家超出常规的政治影响力也许会开始下降； 他们也许将不再扮演沉默者喉舌的角色，因为沉默的民众现在能够表达自己的看法。


But Octavio Paz and Pablo Neruda, Gabriel García Márquez and Carlos Fuentes, Diego Rivera and the Nueva Trova Cubana and their successors did not fade into the background as representative democracy emerged in Latin America.	然而奥克塔维奥·帕斯、巴勃罗·聂鲁达、加布里埃尔·加西亚·马尔克斯、卡洛斯·富恩特斯、迭戈·里维拉、古巴新吟游音乐运动及其后继者并没有随着拉美代表制民主的诞生而淡出人们的视线。


On the contrary, they have continued to retain a great deal of influence, not only for their readers, but also for the broader public.	相反，他们仍然拥有巨大的影响力，不仅代表他们的读者，也代表普罗大众。


This persistence is best reflected in the role that Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario Vargas Llosa plays in his native Peru.	曾获诺贝尔奖的小说家马里奥·巴尔加斯·略萨在他的祖国秘鲁所起的作用就是这种持续影响力的最佳代表。


He was, of course, always an engagé: in the early 1960’s, when he supported the Cuban Revolution; when he later became one of Fidel Castro’s most ferocious and effective critics; and when he ran for Peru’s presidency in 1989 (losing to Alberto Fujimori).	毋庸置疑，在20世纪60年代支持古巴革命的时候，在后来成为菲德尔·卡斯特罗最猛烈有效的批评者的时候，在竞选1989年秘鲁总统的时候（当时他败给了阿尔韦托·藤森），略萨一直保持着参政者的本色。


And he was a committed partisan in Peru’s recent presidential election.	他还是秘鲁最近一次总统选举的铁杆拥护者。


In a sense, Vargas Llosa is a contradictory committed figure: in the European meaning of the word, he is probably the most liberal of Latin America’s public intellectuals, but also the most vocal and daring.	从某种意义上讲，巴尔加斯·略萨是位有争议的参政人物：在欧洲人看来，他或许不仅是拉美公众知识分子中最信奉自由的一个，而且在他们当中也最大胆敢言。


He put his money where his mouth was by running for Peru’s presidency, and he became a virtual king-maker by throwing his support to Ollanta Humala, who has apparently abandoned populism to embrace the tenets of the modern Latin American democratic left.	他通过参选秘鲁总统用实实在在的资金和行动支持了自己的观点，他对奥兰塔·乌马拉的支持最终决定了选举的结果，乌马拉似乎放弃了民粹主义，开始接受现代拉美民主左派的处事原则。


Humala drew more votes than all of his rivals in the first round of the presidential election, but had to face Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko, in a run-off.	乌马拉大选首轮拉到的选票超过所有竞争对手，但却在决胜轮中遭遇到���森女儿惠子的竞争。


Vargas Llosa initially declared that the choice was between AIDS and cancer, but later secured commitments from Humala on economic policy, democratic rule, and a one-term administration.	巴尔加斯·略萨开始时声称这好比是在选择艾滋病和癌症，但后来得到了乌马拉在经济政策、民主规则和总统任期（一任）等方面的承诺。


With those conditions met, the novelist endorsed the former military officer with a penchant for coups and quirky ideas.	满足上述条件后，小说家宣布支持这位嗜好政变和古怪思想的前军官进行总统竞选。


Vargas Llosa argued – eloquently and elegantly – that he could not vote for the daughter of a corrupt and repressive former president currently serving a 25-year prison sentence for human rights violations.	巴尔加斯·略萨雄辩而又不失优雅的宣称他不能为因侵犯人权服刑25年的腐败独裁前总统的女儿投票。


But nor could he abstain or call for others to do so, since this would not only favor Keiko, but would also be a de facto abdication of the intellectuel engagé’s responsibility.	但他也不能禁止或号召其他人这么做，因为这样不仅惠子能从中占到便宜，还意味着实际放弃了知识分子参政的义务。


Exit polls did not measure the “Vargas Llosa effect,” so it is difficult to say whether his backing was decisive in Humala’s victory (the margin was less than 2%).	出口民调并没有衡量过“巴尔加斯·略萨效应”，因此很难判断他的支持是否是乌马拉取胜的决定因素（获胜优势还不到2%）。


But most observers seem to believe that his support was crucial in bestowing a mantle of legitimacy and democratic disposition on Humala, who in 2007 ran on an unabashedly pro-Hugo Chávez platform.	但多数观察家似乎认为他的支持为乌马拉披上了民主合法的外衣，后者在2007年公然登上了亲查韦斯的舞台。


And Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Mario’s son, has been helping Humala convince financial markets and the international community that he is now a true believer in capitalism.	而马里奥的儿子阿尔瓦罗·巴尔加斯·略萨一直帮乌马拉说服金融市场和国际社会，把他说成真正的资本主义信徒。


The problem with all of this lies in the risk that Vargas Llosa and so many other Latin American public intellectuals run whenever they throw their considerable reputations and talents into the political arena.	这样做的问题在于巴尔加斯·略萨和其他拉美公众知识分子在将自身巨大声誉和才华搬上政治舞台时所甘冒的风险。


Whether they actually make a difference or are mistakenly perceived to have made even a minor contribution to a given cause (my own case with Vicente Fox’s election as Mexico’s president in 2000), they are held responsible for the results, for better or for worse.	无论他们是切实改变了局势还是被误认为对特定事业做出过哪怕是极其微小的贡献（我自己曾经影响过2000年墨西哥总统选举中比森特·福克斯的获胜），那么无论结果是好是坏，公众都认为他们必须为此负责。


If matters turn out well, they look like statesmen and visionaries; if things go sour, it was their fault for not foreseeing the obvious and inevitable.	如果事态发展顺利，他们会被奉为有识之士和政治家； 但如果局势突然恶化，他们就要为未能预见明显且不可避免的未来而负责。


Ollanta Humala might keep his promises and complement Peru’s spectacular economic growth over the past decade with sensible social policies.	奥兰塔·乌马拉也许会恪守自己的诺言，用明智的社会政策来补充秘鲁十年来蔚为壮观的经济发展。


Or he might not.	他也可能反其道而行之。


One can admire Vargas Llosa for his courage in taking the plunge, without being entirely convinced that it was the right plunge to take.	人们可以钦佩巴尔加斯·略萨果断冒险的惊人勇气，但却不一定认为这次冒险是正确的选择。


The Anti-Hunger Imperative	反饥饿的使命


BRUSSELS – There are plenty of summits to choose from this year, but the World Summit on Food Security deserves not to be lost in the crowd.	布鲁塞尔 ——到年底之前，国际上将召开多场峰会，其中有一场不应淹没无闻，那就是世界食物安全峰会。


This meeting in Rome from November 16-18 provides badly needed political momentum to three linked issues that rank among the most challenging of the current era: food security, biodiversity, and climate change.	这场预定11月16日至18日召开于罗马的会议是一个非常必要的政治契机，可以讨论当今世界最具挑战性的三大问题：食物安全、生物多样性和气候变化。


Collectively, we are failing in the fight against world hunger.	人类眼看就要在同饥饿的斗争中失败了。


More than one billion people in the world today do not have enough food to meet their basic daily nutritional needs, and the situation in developing countries is getting worse.	世界上目前有超过10亿人缺乏足够的食物，以应每日营养之基本所需，而且发展中国家的情形还在日益恶化。


This is, first and foremost, a moral outrage.	首先，这是一种道德上的暴行。


How can it be that in the twenty-first century, when we have taken men to the Moon and back, we still cannot feed everyone on this planet?	都已经是21世纪了，我们都把人送上月球再接回来了，却还没有能力让地球上的所有人都吃饱肚子，这怎么可以？


Policymakers must recognize, moreover, that food insecurity is linked to the lasting effects of the economic crisis and ongoing climate change, and that it represents no less a threat to our global community.	此外，政策制定者必须承认一点，食物安全问题同经济危机和气候变化的长期效应紧密相关，并且它对国际社会所构成的挑战一点也不比后两个问题来得少。


To be fair, world leaders have responded.	平心而论，各国首脑对食物安全问题并非毫无回应。


At the recent G-8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, we made a firm commitment “to act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve global food security,” and we collectively pledged $20 billion over three years.	最近在意大利拉奎拉举行的八国集团峰会上，与会各方坚定地承诺“将依据应有的广泛性与紧迫性而采取行动，以确保全球食物安全”，并且共同许诺在三年之内投入200亿美元。


This is a sizeable commitment, but it may not be enough – more needs to be done to increase agricultural production, to free up the potential of trade to address food insecurity, and to deal with the increasing impact of climate change on agriculture.	这些承诺相当有分量，但还不够——我们还需要做很多事情，以促进农业生产，释放贸易潜力，应对气候变化对农业所造成的日益增强的影响。


The European Commission, too, has responded, with finance for food security coming via a number of instruments.	欧盟委员会对食物安全问题也并非毫无回应。 我们通过若干措施提供了资金以保障食物安全。


Our European Union food facility, agreed last year, is mobilizing an additional $1.5 billion for a rapid response to rising food prices.	欧盟于去年制定通过的食物规划（Food Facility）正在设法筹集15亿美元的资金，以迅速回应食物价格的上涨。


And we will pump in another $4 billion in the coming three years to fund activities that help countries improve food security and adapt to climate change.	欧盟还将在三年内另外投入40亿美元，以支持各国提升食物安全状况和适应气候变化。


Extra money to address food security problems, among other things, should be one of the key outcomes of the finance package that the EU strongly supports for the next crucial event on the summit calendar: the Copenhagen climate conference in December.	国际日程表上的下一次重要峰会是12月将于哥本哈根召开的气候大会，欧盟坚定地主张在此次大会上通过一揽子融资方案，其中有相当一部分资金将用于应对食物安全问题。


Changing weather patterns and the increasing magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events will require substantial investments if farmers are to adapt successfully.	气候模式的变迁以及极端天气日益频繁而广泛的出现对农业生产者构成极大挑战，他们需要有力的资助才能应对这种挑战。


These changes hit the poorest the hardest, and global trends mask deep regional disparities.	这些变化对最贫困的国家打击最重，而全球气候变化的种种趋势也容易让人忽视，各地区所受的影响并不均等。


Small farmers, predominantly in developing countries, will bear the brunt of climate change.	主要分布于发展中国家的小农业生产者将遭受到最沉重的打击。


If we do not act quickly, the 40 poorest countries, predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, will by 2080 lose from 10% to 20% of their basic grain-growing capacity due to drought.	如果我们不迅速采取行动，到2080年，全球40个最贫困国家（它们绝大多数分布于撒哈拉以南的非洲地区和拉丁美洲地区）将被干旱夺去10%乃至20%的基本粮食生产能力。


But answers to this problem are close to hand.	食物安全问题的后果还容易看见。


The impact of biodiversity is often insufficiently understood, which means that we have undervalued its contribution to tackling global challenges.	生物多样性却常常得不到充分重视，这也表明我们低估了生物多样性在应对全球挑战方面的意义。


The more diverse the variation of life forms within a given ecosystem, the more resilient it is to change.	任何一个生态系统，其所包含的物种越多样，整个系统承受变化冲击的能力也就越强。


So biodiversity can act as a natural “insurance policy” against sudden environmental changes and a buffer against losses caused by them (as well as by pests and diseases).	这样来看，生物多样性是一种针对环境突变的天然“保险”和减震器，可以缓和环境突变和病虫害对农业造成的冲击。


Biodiversity is essential for reliable and stable long-term food production.	对于可靠稳定的长期食物生产而言，生物多样性是至关重要的。


The famines in Ireland in the nineteenth century and in Ethiopia in the late twentieth century provide clear evidence of the vulnerability of undiversified crops to environmental changes, and the dramatic consequences of such vulnerability for the population.	分别爆发于19世纪的爱尔兰和20世纪后期的埃塞俄比亚的两次大饥荒清楚地证明了，过于单一化的农作物是在环境变化的影响下是多么脆弱，而这种脆弱性又会给人类带来多么严重的后果。


Crop diversity can also deliver important ecosystem benefits.	农作物多样性还能给生态系统带来许多好处。


Varieties that are tolerant to drought and flood can not only increase productivity, but also can prevent soil erosion and desertification.	混合种植抗旱性和抗涝性较强的农作物变种不仅有助于提高产量，而且可以防止水土流失和荒漠化。


In southern Ghana, for example, farmers have managed to reduce crop failures arising from rainfall variability and unpredictability by cultivating several drought-tolerant types of the same crop species.	例如在加纳南部，农民就通过种植同一类农作物的几种抗旱变种，成功地减少了变化无常的降水所导致的歉收。


In addition, crop diversification has reduced the need for costly and environmentally damaging pesticides.	更何况，农作物多样性还可以减少对杀虫剂的依赖，后者不仅费用高昂，而且对环境破坏极大。


So I am convinced that we should raise the profile of biodiversity in tackling climate change and food insecurity, and that we need more high-level attention to this subject.	所以我坚信，在应对气候变化和食物安全问题的各种对策里，我们应该提升生物多样性的地位，使其得到各国高层的重视。


Next week, when leaders meet in Rome, I hope that we will agree on the key priorities to fight hunger and food insecurity, and in particular to establish an authoritative source of advice on food security to governments and international institutions.	下一周，当各国首脑相聚在罗马时，我希望我们能够一致认识到反饥饿斗争和食物安全问题的紧迫性，我尤其希望能成立一个权威专家团，向各国政府和国际组织提供食物安全方面的建议。


In fact, we need for food security what the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel has done for climate change: a science-based red-alert system for the planet.	说真的，在食物安全问题领域，我们需要一个像联合国气候变化政府间专门委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change，IPCC）那样的机制：一个以科学为基础的地球预警系统。


And at the start of a new five-year term at the European Commission, I will continue to do all I can to promote this important issue.	新一届为期5年的欧盟委员会任期刚刚开始，在这一届任期里，我将竭尽所能促进这一重要问题的应对和解决。


But even the best and most up-to-date donor policies will remain vain exercises if governments in developed countries fail to translate their commitments into hard cash and improvements in agricultural investment worldwide.	但是，如果发达国家的政府不能把它们的承诺变成真金白银，提高全世界在农业上的投入，那么再新再好的援助政策都是空话。


So finally let the World Summit on Food Security provide tangible evidence of a commitment from all governments to a common objective: a world free of hunger.	所以，最后，希望在世界食物安全峰会上，各国政府都能够拿出令人信服的诚意，为一个共同目标而努力：让世界免于饥饿。


History will judge us unfavorably if we fail.	如果我们不这样做，那就请想一想，后人将如何评说。


The Arab Drama	阿拉伯政剧


PRINCETON – The Arab world has entered the most dramatic period in its modern history.	普林斯顿——阿拉伯世界进入了现代史上最富戏剧性的阶段。


Oppressive regimes are being swept away, as Arab people finally take their fate into their own hands.	随着阿拉伯人最终掌握自己的命运，暴虐政权正在被彻底推翻。


The excitement of the moment, however, does not tell us what the future holds.	但这样令人兴奋的时刻并没有告诉我们未来将走向何处。


At best, democracy is still off in the distance: the military still dominates in Egypt and Tunisia, tribal forces are on the rise in Libya and Yemen, and sectarian divides between Sunni and Shia are likely to dominate politics in Bahrain, as they have in Iraq since 2003.	民主充其量还很遥远： 军方仍然统治着埃及和突尼斯，部族力量仍在利比亚和也门处在上升阶段，逊尼和什叶的教派分裂仍可能主导巴林的政局，这与2003年伊拉克的局势非常相似。


There is no single narrative that makes sense of this all.	没有哪一种说法能够解释所发生的一切。


Regimes throughout the Middle East, the United States, and European governments, as well as Al Qaeda and other Islamist groups, are all struggling to understand what comes next.	中东、美国和欧洲政府，还有基地及其他伊斯兰组织都在拼命试图搞清接下来会发生什么。


Scholars of the region, like myself, are also recognizing that our understanding of Arab politics did not anticipate this wave of successful protest.	像我一样的地区学者同样意识到我们对阿拉伯世界的政治理解并未预见到会出现如此成功的抗议浪潮。


Until the uprising in Tunisia, we thought that political change would be led either by Islamist forces or by a coup by a group of military officers – not by disorganized, youth-led masses.	直至突尼斯起义之前，我们都认为伊斯兰势力或某场政变或某群军官，而不是由年轻人领导的缺乏组织的群众将左右中东的政治变局。


The Middle East’s demographic youth bulge is well known, but no one predicted that its members would mobilize social media and cell phones to topple long-established dictators.	中东青年人口膨胀早已人所共知，但谁也没有料到青年人能够利用手机和社会媒体来推翻根深蒂固的独裁者。


The technologies of the Internet were thought to fragment societal forces rather than unite them in a common cause.	互联网技术被视为分裂社会的力量，而不是把人们集合起来为了共同的事业奋斗。


And the regimes were considered to be too brutal, as we see tragically in Libya, to go down without a fight.	而且人们认为政府也太过残暴，就像我们在利比亚看到的那样，这些独裁政府不会坐以待毙。


By its own admission, Al Qaeda has been caught off guard, no doubt because the group’s central argument has been that the fall of oppressive Arab governments could come only through violence.	无疑因为阿拉伯暴虐政府倒台只能源于暴力一直是其核心思想，就连基地组织都承认自己措手不及。


In response to recent events, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s second in command, released a tedious Powerpoint-like analysis of Egyptian constitutional law and political history.	为应对最近的突发事件，基地组织的二号人物扎瓦赫里抛出了一份关于埃及宪法和政治史的乏味的Powerpoint分析。


Like Egypt’s now-deposed President Hosni Mubarak, al-Zawahiri’s tone was patronizing and condescending.	扎瓦赫里的语气中充满了屈尊俯就和居高临下，这种语气与埃及罢免总统胡斯尼·穆巴拉克几乎毫无二致。


If anything, the lecture underscored how out of touch Al Qaeda’s senior leaders are with the spirit of the time.	如果说两者有什么区别，那就是这样的说教凸显了基地组织高层领导与时代精神是多么格格不入。


A younger Al Qaeda ideologue is more convincing, however.	但一位年轻基地思想家的说法更令人信服。


In a message dated February 16, 2011, entitled “The People’s Revolution and the Fall of the Corrupt Arab System: A New Beginning and the Shattering of the Idol of ‘Stability,’” a Libyan who goes by the name Atiyat Allah writes, “It is true that this revolution is not the ideal that we had desired….[W]e hope that this is the first step to better times yet.”	2011年2月16日发布了一条消息：“人民革命和阿拉伯腐败体制的倒台： 打碎‘稳定’偶像的新起点”，一位名叫Atiyat Allah的利比亚人写道，“显然这场革命并不符合我们的理想…[我们]希望这是通向美好时代的最初一步。 ”


Allah goes on to argue that these revolutions did more than just topple regimes like Mubarak’s.	Allah 接着提出上述革命不仅推翻了像穆巴拉克这样的政权。


More importantly, they have destroyed the doctrine of “stability” that allowed the regimes and the West to exploit the region and provide security for Israel.	更重要的是其摧毁了独裁政府和西方赖以压榨中东地区并为以色列提供安全的“稳定教条”。


Admitting surprise at the speed of events, Allah advises Al Qaeda groups to engage gently with the rising forces in these countries.	在承认对事态的发展速度始料未及的同时，Allah建议基地组织与上述国家正在崛起的势力进行温和的接触。


Tactically, he argues, this is the only way for Al Qaeda to achieve its ultimate goal of taking power.	他提出在策略上，这是基地组织实现最终权力目标的唯一方法。


Other Al Qaeda thinkers have expressed admiration for the ability of young men like Wael Ghonim to mobilize thousands of his fellow Egyptians by conveying his sincere desire for change and love of country.	其他基地组织思想家同样表达了对Wael Ghonim这样的年轻人通过表达自身的改革以往和对国家的热爱，能够动员成千上万名埃及同胞的卓著能力的钦佩。


There is certainly a degree of envy for what others have accomplished and a sense of desperation about how Al Qaeda can capitalize on this change.	其中肯定折射出某种对他人成功的嫉妒以及基地组织拼命希望利用改革的心态。


Unlike the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the current fighting in Libya presents Al Qaeda with an opportunity to confirm its classic narrative about the importance of change through violence.	与埃及和突尼斯的情况不同，利比亚正在进行的战斗为基地组织提供了证明其暴力改革经典论述重要性的机会。


More troubling still is that Libya’s violence reveals certain features of the Middle East that had been forgotten after the heady success in Tunis and Cairo.	更令人不安的是利比亚暴力事件揭示了中东地区的某些特点，这些特点在突尼斯和开罗令人兴奋的成功之后被忘得一干二净。


Most clearly, political change will not occur in the same fashion across the diverse countries of the Arab world.	最显而易见的是，政治改革不会在阿拉伯世界的不同国家以同样的面目出现。


Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, which are largely homogeneous societies, Libya has important tribal cleavages, whereas Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria are riven by sectarianism.	与大体同源的突尼斯和埃及不同，利比亚存在重大的部族裂痕，而巴林、也门和叙利亚则遭受宗派主义的蹂躏。


In the absence of strong national institutions, change in these countries risks significant bloodshed.	在缺乏强力国家制度的情况下，上述国家的改革可能造成大规模流血事件。


In addition, the excessive violence in Libya might send the message to other peoples in the region that the cost of change is too high to pay, and that the relatively peaceful transitions seen in Egypt and Tunisia might not be replicable.	此外，利比亚的过度暴力也会让其他国家的民众认为代价太过高昂，而埃及和突尼斯相对和平的过渡可能无法重现。


Finally, the chaos in Libya has shown how dependent the rest of the world is on the political fate of Middle Eastern societies.	最后，利比亚的混乱政局已经表明世界其他国家是多么依赖中东国家的政治命运。


Should chaos of the kind witnessed in Libya occur in the Persian Gulf countries, for example, the world could literally come to a standstill, given the quantity of oil that they supply.	比方说，如果与利比亚类似的混乱发生在波斯湾国家，考虑到那里出产的石油数量，世界可能就此陷入停滞。


While unlikely anytime soon, this possibility should give everyone pause and spur us to find policies that will help Arabs find the political dignity and good governance they deserve through an ordered, peaceful process. The alternative is a world in which we remain hostage to the region’s pathologies, which provide ample opportunity for Al Qaeda to reassert its narrative and influence.	虽然近期希望渺茫，但这种可能性应当促使我们冷静下来，找到能通过井然有序的和平进程帮助阿拉伯国家实现政治尊严和良性管理的相关政策�� 我们也可以选择面对地区问题讳疾忌医，而基地组织将充分利用这样的机会扩大自己的影响。


The Arab Revolutions’ Reality Check	阿拉伯革命的现实考验


BERLIN – Two years after popular uprisings began to convulse the Middle East, few people speak of an “Arab Spring” anymore.	柏林—震撼中东的群众暴乱爆发两年后，如今已不再有人大谈“阿拉伯之春”了。


Given Syria’s bloody civil war, the rise to power of Islamist forces through free elections, the ever-deepening political and economic crises in Egypt and Tunisia, increasing instability in Iraq, uncertainty about the future of Jordan and Lebanon, and the threat of war over Iran’s nuclear program, the bright hope of a new Middle East has vanished.	叙利亚血腥内战、伊斯兰通过自由选举上台、埃及和突尼斯不断加深的政治和经济危机、伊拉克的日渐动荡、约旦和黎巴嫩未来的不确定性以及伊朗核计划头上的战争阴影，这些因素让新中东的美好前景消失殆尽。


Add the region’s eastern and western peripheries – Afghanistan and North Africa (including the Sahel and South Sudan) – and the picture becomes even grimmer.	若再考虑东西方边缘——阿富汗和北非（包括萨赫勒和南苏丹），前景就更加悲观了。


Indeed, Libya is increasingly unstable, al-Qaeda is actively engaged in the Sahel (as the fighting in Mali shows), and no one can foresee what will happen in Afghanistan after the US and its NATO allies withdraw in 2014.	事实上，伊比亚正在日渐动荡，基地组织在萨赫勒活动频繁（马里内战就是明证），没人可以预见阿富汗在2014年美国和北约盟军撤走后会发生什么。


All of us tend to make the same mistake repeatedly: we think at the beginning of a revolution that freedom and justice have prevailed over dictatorship and cruelty.	我们所有人都反复犯着同样的错误：革命一开始，我们认为自由和公正会压倒独裁和残暴。


But history teaches us that what follows is usually nothing good.	但历史告诉我们，随之而来的往往不会有好结果。


A revolution not only overthrows a repressive regime; it also destroys the old order, paving the way for a mostly brutal, if not bloody, fight for power to establish a new one – a process that affects foreign and domestic policy alike.	革命不但席卷了镇压性政权，也摧毁了旧秩序，造成残酷（如果不是血腥的话）的新权力争夺——这一过程会影响国内和国外政策。


Normally, revolutions are followed by dangerous times.	通常，随革命而来的是危机四伏的岁月。


Indeed, exceptions to this pattern are rare: South Africa is one, owing to the genius of one of the century’s most outstanding statesmen, Nelson Mandela.	事实上，很少有国家能逃出这一宿命：南非是一个例外，这是因为南非出了一位不世出的伟大政治家纳尔逊·曼德拉。


The alternative option can be observed in Zimbabwe.	其他选择可以看看津巴布韦。


Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, though a very interesting reference point for analysts of the Arab revolutions, is not an appropriate reference point, because the region’s new domestic and foreign order resulted from the change in external conditions stemming from the collapse of Soviet power.	1989年后的中欧和东欧是阿拉伯革命分析的有趣参照点，但却不是合适的参照点，因为该地区的新国内外秩序来源于外部条件的变化——苏联解体。


Internally, nearly all of these countries had a very clear idea about what they wanted: democracy, freedom, a market economy, and protection from the return of the Russian empire.	从内部而言，几乎所有中东欧国家都有着非常明确的愿望：民主、自由、市场经济以及免收俄帝国卷土重来的威胁。


They wanted the West, and their accession to NATO and the European Union was logical.	它们希望西方，希望被北约和偶们接纳，这是自然而然的需求。


Nothing of the sort applies to the crisis belt of the Middle East.	中东危机地带则完全不是这样。


No power anywhere, within the region or without, is willing and able to implement the barest vision of a new regional order – or even a vision for parts of it.	中东内外没有任何一股势力愿意也能够推行哪怕是最原始的新秩序，连带来新秩序部分要素的打算都没有。


Chaos is a constant threat, with all of its accompanying risks and threats to world peace.	混乱是永远的威胁，给世界和平也带来了风险和威胁。


In addition to poverty, backwardness, repression, rapid population growth, religious and ethnic hatred, and stateless peoples (such as the Kurds and the Palestinians), the region has unstable borders.	除了贫困、退步、镇压、快速人口增长、宗教和种族仇恨以及无家可归的民族（比如库尔德人和巴勒斯坦人），该地区还存在边境不稳定。


Many were drawn by the colonial powers, Great Britain and France, after World War I, and most, with the exception of Iran’s and Egypt’s, have little legitimacy.	大量边境又殖民国家（英国和法国）在一战后划定，除了伊朗和埃及之外，大部分边境毫无合理性可言。


As if this were not enough, some countries – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even tiny (but very rich) Qatar – have ambitions to be regional powers.	一些国家——伊朗、沙特甚至蕞尔小国（但极其富有）卡塔尔——好像还嫌不够乱，对地区权力雄心勃勃。


All of this worsens an already tense situation.	所有这些让已然紧张的局面进一步恶化了。


All of these contradictions are currently exploding in Syria, whose population is suffering a humanitarian catastrophe, while the world stands by, up to now unwilling to intervene.	所有这些矛盾目前在叙利亚出现了大爆发。 叙利亚人民正在遭遇人道主义灾难，而世界冷眼旁观，到目前为止不愿施以援手（如果动用了化学武器，则干预将不可避免）。


(If chemical weapons are deployed, intervention will become inevitable.) Although intervention would be temporary and technically limited, everyone seems to be avoiding it, because the stakes are very high: not only a devastating civil war and massive human suffering, but also a new order for the whole of the Middle East.	尽管干预可以是暂时性的、技术上也存在限制，但所有人都在避免这么做，因为干预的代价极高：不但包括灾难性内战和大规模人道伤害，也包括整个中东的新秩序。


Any military intervention would entail a confrontation not only with the Syrian military (supported by Russia and China), but also with Shia Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.	任何军事干预都将不但面对叙利亚军队（有俄罗斯和中国支持），还将面对伊朗什叶派及其代理人黎巴嫩真主党。


Moreover, no one can guarantee that intervention would not quickly lead to another war with Israel.	此外，没人能保证干预不会立刻导致另一场与以色列的战争。


The dangers of both action and inaction are very high.	作为和不作为的危险都很高。


The most likely outcome in Syria is that the human catastrophe will continue until President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses, after which the country very likely could be divided along ethnic and religious lines.	叙利亚最有可能的结果是，人道灾难将一直持续到总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权倒台，此后，叙利亚极有可能会因种族和宗教原因分裂。


And Syria’s disintegration could further balkanize the Middle East, potentially unleashing new violence.	叙利亚的分裂将导致中东的进一步巴尔干化，形成新的保暴力。


Frontline states like Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan will not manage to remain aloof from a disintegrating Syria.	前线国家，如黎巴嫩、伊拉克和约旦等国，不可能在叙利亚分裂时独善其身。


What will happen with Syria’s Kurds and Palestinians, or its Christians, Druze, and smaller Muslim minorities?	叙利亚库尔德人和巴勒斯坦人，或基督徒、德鲁兹派以及人数更少的穆斯林少数派命运会如何？


And what about the Alawites (the backbone of Assad’s regime), who could face a terrible destiny, regardless of whether the country splits up?	阿拉维派（巴沙尔政权的基石）将面临可怕的命运，不管叙利亚是否分崩离析。


Unanswered questions abound.	有待回答的问题很多。


Of course, even in the face of this misery, we should not lose hope in agreements reached by diplomatic means; but, realistically, the chances are dwindling every day.	当然，即使如此悲观，我们也不能失去通过外交途径达成协议的希望； 但从现实角度看，希望在日渐渺茫。


The whole of the Middle East is in motion, and a new and stable order will take a long time to establish.	整个中东都在震动，新的稳定秩序要很长时间才能建立。


Until then, the region will remain very dangerous, not only internally, but also for its neighbors (including Europe) and the world.	在此之前，该地区将一直非常危险，不仅对国民是如此，对邻国（包括欧洲）和世界也是如此。


The Arab Spring and Europe’s Turn	阿拉伯的春天和欧洲的转机


NEW HAVEN – Until now, and with few exceptions, the West has nurtured two distinct communities of foreign-policy specialists: the development community and the democratic community.	纽黑文市——到目前为止，西方基本形成了发展和民主两大截然不同的外交专家阵营。


More often than not, they have had little or no connection with one another: development specialists dealt comfortably with dictatorships and democracies alike, believing that prosperity can best be created by concentrating exclusively on economic issues and institutions.	两大阵营之间一般没有瓜葛，发展阵营的专家对待独裁和民主政权可以做到一视同仁，他们认为集中关注经济问题和运行机制可以带来繁荣。


The consequences of this approach have a special resonance in the Arab world today.	上述方法在当今阿拉伯世界产生了特殊的共鸣。


But, as the recent United Nations Security Council debates on the Arab Spring have shown, it is not the major emerging countries that will influence events in the region.	但联合国安理会有关阿拉伯春天的讨论显示影响中东地区事务的恰恰不是主要新兴国家。


Brazil has barely uttered a word in reaction to the region’s tumult, while Russia and China have little taste for sanctions against Libya in light of their own autocratic governments.	巴西对中东乱局几乎一言不发，而俄罗斯和中国则由于自身受控于独裁政府而没有兴趣制裁利比亚。


All of this adds up to a unique opportunity for the European Union to support its neighbors’ transition from revolutionary upheaval to democratic government.	所有这些都赋予欧盟独一无二的机会，支持邻国实现从革命剧变到民主政府的过渡。


At the same time, we need to promote the progress of other regimes in the region toward inclusive democracy.	同时，我们需要推动该地区其他政权朝着包容性民主逐渐进步。


Indeed, the EU is their natural partner in this endeavor.	事实上，欧盟是这项事业天然的支持者。


Since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, EU Mediterranean policy has been criticized for not linking financial aid to democratic reform, and for giving priority to European concerns like immigration, security, and cooperation on counter-terrorism.	自1995年启动巴塞罗那进程以来，欧盟地中海政策就因优先关注移民、安全和反恐合作等欧盟重点问题及未能将财政援助和民主改革联系在一起而倍受诘责。


At the same time, EU policy has sidelined clear southern priorities, like opening up Europe’s agriculture and textile markets.	同时，欧盟政策并不关心南部邻国的意愿，比方说开放农业和纺织市场。


The result is that the vision of the official Euro-Mediterranean Policy (EMP) has lagged far behind its original goals.	这导致官方欧洲地中海政策（EMP）的愿景远远落后于它原定的目标。


Europe should shift its focus on immigration and security back to policies that reflect the original objectives of the Barcelona Declaration.	欧洲应该把对移民和安全问题的关注转回到《巴塞罗那宣言》的最初目标。


The EMP’s central goals were to advance a “comprehensive partnership” and political reform, and to create “a common area of peace and stability,” together with a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area.	欧洲地中海政策的核心目标是推进政治改革和“全面伙伴关系”，同时建设“和平稳定的共同区域”和欧洲地中海自由贸易区。


Moreover, the associated MEDA funding mechanism crucially and specifically included the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.	此外，相关欧洲地中海伙伴关系（MEDA）融资机制实际包括民主人权欧洲计划。


This link between security, democracy, and human development has since been broken and needs to be restored through investment in good governance, regional development, and education.	安全、民主和人类发展之间的联系就此被打破，需要通过投资廉政、地区发展和教育加以重建恢复。


The EMP evolved in 2004 into the European Neighborhood Policy framework, and in 2007, the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) replaced MEDA as the EU’s main financing mechanism for Euro-Mediterranean policy.	2004年欧洲地中海政策过渡为欧洲睦邻政策架构，而2007年，欧洲睦邻政策暨合作关系协议（ENPI）取代欧洲地中海伙伴关系（MEDA）成为欧洲地中海政策的主要融资结构。


This put human rights funding into the National Indicative Program (NIP), which encompasses 17 countries: ten in the south and seven in Eastern Europe.	17个国家指标计划（NIP）据此有权获得人权资金，其中包括10个南欧和7个东欧国家。


Although good governance and human rights remained among the ENP’s proclaimed goals, official communications of the European Commission show that it emphasized security and border control.	虽然廉政和人权一直是欧洲睦邻政策公开目标的组成部分，但欧洲委员会的官方通讯显示安全和边境控制才是重点关注的目标。


When the EMP was “re-launched” in 2008 under the newly established Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to give it greater political emphasis, the result was an exercise in “realism” that further weakened the original EMP.	新组建的地中海联盟（UfM）2008年“重启”欧洲地中海政策以彰显其政治地位时，原有政策在“现实主义”运动中被进一步削弱。


And, for all its high-flown language, the UfM is an empty shell.	尽管使用了夸张的语言，但地中海联盟却充其量只是一具空壳。


This is partly due to unfortunate timing: the UfM’s launch coincided with the outbreak of the Gaza War and became entangled in the complexities of Arab-Israeli relations.	这部分因为联盟生不逢时（成立时恰逢加沙战争爆发），并因此陷入到阿以关系的旋涡中不能自拔。


But the initiative also failed to gain momentum among political leaders.	但这项计划也未能获得政治领袖的认可。


To implement the far-reaching vision of the Barcelona Process, the ENP will have to revisit the way it distributes its financial support, rebalance the funding that it provides to the EU’s eastern and southern neighborhoods, and place much greater emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.	为落实巴塞罗那进程具有深远意义的目标，欧洲睦邻政策（ENP）必须重新审核财政援助的分配模式，重新调整其向东南邻国提供的援助款项，并重点强调民主、法治和人权等目标。


Education remains a key area where the EU should contribute to the development of the southern neighborhood, if only because young people are a growing majority of the Arab population.	欧盟应该推动其南部邻国的教育发展，因为年轻人占阿拉伯人口的比重正在逐年提高。


Although many Arab states have been opening new schools and universities, and are allowing more private educational institutions to flourish, the quality of education in the region still leaves much to be desired.	尽管许多阿拉伯国家已经开办新的学校及大学并允许私立教育机构蓬勃发展，但中东地区的教育质量仍然很有改进的必要。


Religion remains a compulsory subject throughout university programs, while inquisitiveness, critical thinking, and objective analysis are all widely discouraged.	宗教仍然是所有大学规定的必修课，而求知欲、批判思维和客观分析精神则普遍受到压制。


As the Jordanian intellectual and former foreign minister Marwan al-Muasher has argued, state and religious interpretations of history, science, and political values are hammered into Arab students.	正如约旦知识份子兼前任外长马尔万·马阿谢尔所说的那样，对历史、科学和政治价值观的国家和宗教解释被强行灌入阿拉伯学生的头脑。


Wilfried Martens, President of the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament and former Prime Minister of Belgium, recently made a similar point: “The West is not at war with Islam.	欧洲议会欧洲人民党（EPP）主席兼比利时前总理威尔弗利德·马尔腾斯前不久也提出过相似的观点：“西方不是在和伊斯兰交战。


Christianity is not at war with Islam.	基督教不是在和伊斯兰交战。


And neither is democracy.	民主也不是在和伊斯兰交战。


All three, however, are incompatible with a certain interpretation which claims that the scripture is the basis upon which to build a state.”	但这三者都与声称圣典是立国之本的说法发生冲突。 ”


Of the Arab countries receiving ENP funds, only Egypt has channeled a high proportion – nearly 50% – toward education.	在接受欧洲睦邻政策援助的阿拉伯国家中，只有埃及把近50%的比例投资于教育项目。


In any case, Europe’s spending on education in the region is scattered among inter-regional, national, and thematic programs, which makes it difficult to see how these funds’ effectiveness might be measured.	无论如何，欧洲对中东的教育援助全部分散在跨区域、跨国家和跨主题的研究项目中，因此很难对资金利用的有效性做出评估。


Europe now faces key decisions that concern both its values and its interests in the Arab world, and the reconciliation of its short- and long-term objectives.	欧洲现在需要协调短期和长期目标，并就其在阿拉伯世界的价值观和利益做出关键决策。


Infrastructural investment and economic reform are crucial for the Mediterranean region’s future development, but they cannot transform the region without a parallel emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and education.	基础设施投资和经济改革对地中海地区的进一步发展无疑至关重要，但如果不同时关注民主、法治、人权和教育，就无法为地区带来变化。


To advance both objectives, the EU must link its investment and aid programs to concrete progress on democratization, and press for much greater accountability and improvement in reforming educational systems throughout the region.	欧盟必须把投资及援助项目与民主化的具体进程相联系，敦促建立责任制，改善地区教育制度，才能切实推进这样的双重目标。


The Arab Spring’s Backward Leap for Women	阿拉伯之春让妇女地位倒退


CAIRO – This summer, as the dust of the Arab Spring revolutions begins to settle, women – who stood shoulder to shoulder with men in defying tyranny – are finding themselves marginalized and excluded from decision-making.	开罗—这个夏天，随着阿拉伯之春开始尘埃落定，妇女——她们曾与男人肩并肩地反对暴政——正在被边缘化，被排挤出决策圈之外。


Despite the new freedoms championed by the revolutionaries, women continue to be regarded as subordinate to men.	尽管革命者拥护新自由，但妇女仍被认为低男人一等。


In Tunisia, a mass protest called for all women to be veiled, which led to unveiled female religion professors being hounded off campuses.	在突尼斯，一场群众运动呼吁所有妇女都戴上面纱，这导致大学里不戴面纱的女宗教教授被赶出了校园。


Mobs shouted at Tunisian women demonstrators to go back to the kitchen “where they belong.”	暴徒冲着突尼斯示威妇女大喊，要她们回到“身之所属”的厨房去。


In Egypt, too, conservative forces are on the rise, demanding policies – particularly reforms of family legislation – that would represent a step backward for women.	在埃及，保守势力也早抬头，他们的政策要求——特别是家庭法律方面的改革——不啻男女平等道路上的大倒退。


Angered and alarmed by these developments, Arab women have been forced to defend their rights.	被这些发展态势所激怒和引起警觉的阿拉伯妇女被迫站起来捍卫自己的权利。


In April 2011, Tunisian women successfully pressed for an electoral-parity law, thanks to which they won 49 of 217 parliamentary seats in last October’s elections.	2011年4月，突尼斯妇女成功地施压通过了选举公平法，这使得她们在去年10月的选举中赢得了217个议会席位中的49席。


In Egypt, though, the prospects for women seem gloomier, because they failed to retain the pre-revolution quota system that had given them 64 parliamentary seats.	但是，在埃及，妇女前景看起来颇为不妙，因为她们没能保住革命前的分配制度——当时，她们可以获得64个议会席位。


That system was replaced by a new electoral law that obliges political parties to include at least one woman on their candidate lists.	该制度被新的选举法取代了。 新选举法规定，每个政党的候选人名单中至少要有一名妇女。


But almost all of the parties put female candidates at the end of their lists; as a result, only nine women were elected to the parliament.	但几乎所有政党的妇女候选人都位居名单最后； 结果，只有9名妇女当选议员。


The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling junta, appointed two more women, bringing the share of women MPs to about 2%.	执政集团最高军事委员会（SCAF）又任命了另外两名妇女，从而让女性议员比例达到了2%。


Islamist groups won majorities in both the Tunisian and Egyptian parliaments.	伊斯兰主义团体在突尼斯和埃及议会选举中均取得了胜利。


Draft legislation that reflects a restrictive interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), particularly concerning women’s status, is now being submitted for debate in Tunisia.	立法草案体现了对伊斯兰法律的严格解读，特别是在妇女地位方面，现在突尼斯已提交并处于讨论中。


And there seems to be a clear intention in many Arab countries to allow unrestricted polygamy, for example, even where it was prohibited prior to the Arab Spring.	比如，似乎很多阿拉伯国家都有显而易见的允许一夫多妻的倾向，即使这在阿拉伯之春爆发以前是被禁止的。


In Egypt, matters are more complicated.	埃及的情况要复杂得多。


SCAF, fearing an Islamist takeover ahead of the presidential election, dissolved the parliament in June, following a judicial decision that they (and the court) insist must be upheld.	SCAF担心伊斯兰主义者在总统大选前就大权在握，因此在6月解散了议会。 解散议会的举措是根据司法裁决做出的，SCAF和法院认为必须支持这一判决。


But the new president, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, has ordered the parliament to reconvene.	但来自穆斯林兄弟会的新总统穆尔西下令议会重新召开。


Previously, the parliament’s legislative committee received a proposal to lower the age of marriage for girls from 18 years to 12.	先前，议会立法委员会收到了一个旨在将女性结婚年龄从18岁降到12岁的方案。


Needless to say, this would cut short girls’ education, not to mention other harmful implications.	不消说，这将导致女性受到教育年限缩短以及其他一系列伤害。


A powerful feature of the Egyptian revolution was the equality between the very different actors who initiated it.	埃及革命的一大有力特征是参与者不论出身一律平等。


None tried to seize a leadership role.	没有人试图垄断领导权。


The power struggle pitted the forces of Hosni Mubarak’s regime against the people, including women, who were on the streets and in the squares demanding freedom, dignity, and social justice.	权力斗争让穆巴拉克的部队站到了人民的对立面——也包括妇女，她们走上街头，走上广场，要求自由、尊严和社会公正。


But now things are strikingly different.	但现在，事情有了极大不同。


The once unified opposition to the Mubarak regime has become fragmented, with each faction defending its own interests and advocating its own version of the revolution’s goals.	曾经紧密团结的穆巴拉克政权反对者出现了分化，各派都致力于捍卫自己的利益，鼓吹自己的革命目标。


The two most prominent actors in the new power spectrum – the military, represented by SCAF, and the Islamists, who include the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists – are surrounded by lesser political parties, youth coalitions, and others.	在新的权力版图中，处于中心的是两大主要阵营——以SCAF为代表的军方和包括穆斯林兄弟会和沙拉菲派在内的伊斯兰主义者，处于周围的则是次要政党、青年联盟和其他团体。


Unfortunately, women’s political position is weak.	不幸的是，妇女政治地位相当孱弱。


The National Council for Women has been restructured, there is a new Egyptian Feminist Union, and a number of coalitions made up of feminist NGOs have been created.	全国妇女委员会（National Council of Women）已经成立，此外还有埃及女权联盟（Egyptian Feminist Union）和由各色女权主义NGO组成的联盟。


But they are far from being sufficiently organized to work together effectively.	但她们的组织性远远不够强，无法形成强大的合力。


There now seem to be two scenarios for women’s future status in Egypt, neither of which is very hopeful.	如今，埃及妇女的未来似乎面临着两种情景，没有一种让人满怀希望。


In the first scenario, SCAF – which, aside from dissolving the parliament, stripped the presidency of most powers in order to weaken its rivals – continues to rule the country under the military system introduced in 1952 when Mohamed Naguib and then Gamel Abdel Nasser seized power.	在第一种情景中，SCAF——它不但解散了议会，还剥夺了大部分总统权力，以此削弱竞争对手——将继续执政，走1952年由纳吉布创立并随后被纳赛尔夺权的军政老路。


Militarism and patriarchy are inextricably linked, and both view masculinity as the opposite of femininity.	军国主义和家长统治免不了会交织在一起，且这两者均把阳刚和阴柔截然独立起来。


If soldiers – and, by extension, all “real” men – are strong and daring, then real women should be the antithesis: passive, obedient, and in need of protection as “good” wives, sisters, and mothers.	如果士兵——或者推而广之，所有“纯”爷们——是强大而有勇气的，那么真女人就应该正好相反：消极、驯服、需要以“好”妻子、“好”姐妹、“好”母亲的身份被保护。


The second scenario is an Islamist regime: Morsi negotiates with SCAF a transition to civilian rule; Islamists continue to dominate a restored parliament; and the new constitution establishes a theocratic state.	第二种情景是伊斯兰主义政权：穆尔西与SCAF就文治转型展开谈判； 伊斯兰主义者继续主导重开的议会；


Most of Egypt’s Islamists, particularly those who returned from exile in Saudi Arabia, adhere to the Wahhabi sect, with its severe restrictions on women, implying that women’s status would be much worse than it was before the revolution.	而新宪法将建立一个神权国家。 大部分埃及伊斯兰主义者，特别是从流亡沙特归来者，都属于严格限制妇女的瓦哈比（Wahhabi）派，这意味着妇女地位将远不及革命前的状态。


Among other things, new legislation would make polygamy the rule, rather than the exception, and would deprive women of an equal right to divorce.	此外，新立法还将让一夫多妻成为规则而不是例外，并剥夺妇女平等的离婚权。


The Islamists could also impose the veil and later on the niqab.	伊斯兰主义者还可能把面纱强加给妇女。


An immense effort would be required of women’s-rights activists to be prevent a reign of injustice.	妇女权利活动家需要立刻行动起来，以防止对妇女不公正的统治。


Unfortunately, neither SCAF nor Morsi espouses the type of liberal regime that would provide women with opportunities to take on the leadership roles that have traditionally been denied to them.	不幸的是，SCAF和穆尔西都不支持为妇女提供领导人角色机会（传统上，妇女没有这一权利）的自由主义制度。


Indeed, the only glimmer of hope remaining for women’s equality and dignity in Egypt is the willingness of all who seek such a regime to unite and try yet again to fulfill the democratic promise of Egypt’s revolution.	事实上，在埃及，妇女的平等和尊严曙光非常微弱，唯有所有认为男女应该平等的人联合起来，再一次致力于履行埃及革命的民主承诺才能带来希望。


The Arab Spring’s Balance Sheet	为阿拉伯之春算笔账


CAIRO – Last year’s events in Egypt and Tunisia drew the curtain on a tottering old order and delivered much of the Arab world into a long-awaited new era. But what that new era will look like remains very much an open question, given the many challenges that the region’s countries still face.	开罗——去年，埃及和突尼斯发生的事情终结了摇摇欲坠的旧秩序，为阿拉伯地区开启了期待已久的新时代。 但这个新时代会是什么样，目前仍是个有待观察的问题，因为该地区的国家仍然面临着诸多挑战。


The old order that has begun to vanish extends beyond the former regimes.	开始崩溃的旧秩序并不局限于从前的政治体制。


The region’s entire value system – a political culture forged by autocracy – is being transformed.	该地区的整个价值体系——由独裁体制所造就的政治文化——正在发生转型。


Arab men and women have shed the sense of humiliation and inferiority that despotism imposed on them – and that fostered desperation, anger, violence, and insularity.	阿拉伯人身上流淌着一种专制强加给他们的自卑和软弱，正是这种自卑和软弱造成了绝望、愤怒、暴力和偏狭。


This transformation, though far from complete – indeed, it may well last years – has nonetheless started to bear fruit.	但无论如何，这一远未完成的转型——事实上，可能还将持续多年——已经开始产生成果了。


If the 2011 uprisings had not occurred, we would now be witnessing another year of autocracy, with more talk of dynastic successions.	如果没有2011年的爆发，那么阿拉伯人将度过又一个独裁的年头，大街小巷上流传的将更多的是王朝传承的问题。


That would mean further humiliation for ordinary people, who bear the brunt of corruption, as government officials and their crony capitalists continued to siphon off public funds.	而这将加重普通阿拉伯人的自卑感，他们已经受够了日益严重的压力，政府官员及其裙带资本家会继续吮吸公帑。


The Arab media would still be heaping uncritical praise on the region’s presidents and their families, while development programs would be looted by them.	阿拉伯媒体将继续无原则地赞美该地区的总统及其家族，而事实上他们攫取了发展计划的果实。


Education would continue to stagnate, and Arab societies, which are divided across sectarian, tribal, and regional lines, would experience rising levels of retribution and violence.	教育将继续停滞不前，因宗族、部落和宗教的不同而彼此割裂的阿拉伯社会将经历越来越多的冤冤相报和暴力相向。


The infamous “death boats,” on which hundreds of young North African men risked their lives every year in search of employment and a better life abroad, would continue to deliver those who survived the journey onto Europe’s unwelcoming shores. And Arabs’ rage would reach unprecedented levels, causing utter mayhem and destruction.	每一年，成百上千北非年轻人将继续冒着生命危险搭“死亡之舟”去国外寻找工作和更好地生活，他们之中的幸存者能够成为欧洲的二等公民。 而阿拉伯人的愤怒会达到前所未有的新高度，导致恶性的伤害和毁灭。


Arab youth have rescued the Arab world from this fate.	阿拉伯年轻人挽救了阿拉伯地区的命运。


Their conscientiousness and integrity have restored people’s self-confidence.	他们的责任心和团结重塑了人们的自信心。


The old regimes’ opponents have demonstrated bravery without recklessness, and differences of opinion without bigotry.	旧体制的反对者冷静勇敢地示威，不同的观点可以不带成见地共存。


Indeed, we have seen Islamists, liberals, and leftists standing together in defiance.	事实上，我们已经看到，伊斯兰主义者、自由派和左派在反抗过程中走到了一起。


We have seen Muslims and Copts protect each other in Cairo.	我们看到，穆斯林和科普特教徒在开罗互相保护。


In Yemen, we have seen local tribesmen follow a woman, Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakel Karman, in the fight for freedom.	在也门，我们看到当地部落成员在女诺贝尔获奖者卡尔曼（Tawakel Karman）的带领下为自由而抗争。


And we have seen the Arab media foster a mature debate about democracy, constitutionalism, and the role of Islam in the modern state, rather than dispensing disinformation and crass propaganda.	我们也看到，阿拉伯媒体开始成熟地就民主、宪政以及伊斯兰在现代国家中的角色等问题展开争论，而没有像以前那样散布假消息、做赤裸裸的宣传。


But the transformation must not stop here.	但转型不能就此停止。


The new and old political forces should initiate a dialogue to create a consensus on the rules of political engagement.	新旧政治势力应该展开对话，就政治参与的规则达成一致。


As the people become their own masters, those who fail to engage in this process will eventually find themselves without political power.	随着人真正成为自己的主人，没有参与到这一过程中的人最后将会发现，自己得不到政治权力。


Other countries in the region, and beyond, should embrace the Arab Spring.	该地区内外的其他国家应该欢迎阿拉伯之春。


In particular, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) should abandon their hesitance to support the post-revolution governments.	特别是，海湾合作委员会（GCC）成员国应该停止犹豫，支持革命后建立的新政府。


Ultimately, the changes occurring in the Arab world will contribute to the entire region’s economic prosperity and political stability.	归根结底，阿拉伯地区所发生的变化有利于整个地区的经济繁荣和政治稳定。


Today, Tunisia and Egypt are experiencing severe economic crises.	如今，突尼斯和埃及正在经历严重的经济危机。


Before Tunisia’s revolution, for example, 500,000 of its labor force of 3.6 million were unemployed, and that number has since risen to 700,000.	比如，在突尼斯爆发革命之前，该国360万劳动人口中有50万找不到工作，现在，这一数字上升到了70万。


Egypt has lost roughly $9 billion in capital flight in recent months.	近几个月来，有90亿美元资本从埃及出逃。


But, according to Egypt’s prime minister, Kamal al-Ganzouri, the country’s Arab “brethren” have delivered only $1 billion of the $10.5 billion in aid and loans that they promised.	但是，埃及总理詹祖里透露，该国的阿拉伯“同胞”承诺给予埃及105亿美元贷款和原著，但只兑现了10亿美元。


Moreover, Tunisia and Egypt have so far received none of the $35 billion promised by the G-8 countries.	此外，G8向突尼斯和埃及承诺的350亿美元到现在一分钱也没有兑现。


And, given the current global economic crisis, the funds are not likely to be forthcoming in the near future.	而在全球经济危机的背景下，这笔钱在近期汇出的可能性十分渺茫。


The region’s emerging democracies urgently need an Arab initiative that resembles the Marshall Plan – a program to attract large-scale investment in infrastructure, industry, and agriculture (and in the region’s wealth of untapped technical skills), thereby boosting employment.	该地区的新兴民主体制迫切需要阿拉伯版的马歇尔计划——吸引基础设施、工业和农业方面的大规模投资，并大力开发该地区的技术技能财富，从而提振就业。


The initiative should also encourage free movement of goods and people within the region, by lifting the customs restrictions and complicated procedures that hinder bilateral and multilateral trade.	该计划还应该鼓励地区内商品和人事流动，这一点可以通过取消通关限制和妨碍双边和多边贸易的复杂程序来实现。


Creating regional development banks and building a Mediterranean express railway from Alexandria to Rabat would serve this goal.	设立地区开发银行以及建设从亚历山大港到拉巴特的地中海高速铁路有助于这一目标的实现。


But long-term investments will not solve the immediate crisis.	但长期投资不能解决眼前的危机。


Egypt and Tunisia need immediate cash deposits and grants, and their newly elected leaderships should not be forced to resort to begging.	埃及和突尼斯需要的即刻的存款和原著，新当选的领导人不能被迫向国外摇尾乞怜。


In the past, the Gulf countries have supported Egypt and Tunisia.	在过去，海湾国家一直是支持埃及和突尼斯的。


It is now in the GCC’s best interests to support them again as they make the transition to freedom.	现在，在两国进入自由转型期时，继续支持符合GCC的最高利益。


Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union should recognize the nature and depth of the unfolding changes.	与此同时，美国和欧盟应该认识到当前变迁的性质和深度。


The Arab public is fully aware of the close alliances that existed between the West and the now-defunct despotic regimes, yet they have exhibited no desire for vengeance or retribution towards the West.	阿拉伯公众十分清楚西方和如今已被打倒的暴政体制之间的紧密关系，但他们并没有显示出意欲报复西方的倾向。


It is past time for the West to accept the Arab people’s will and to stop exaggerating the repercussions of change.	西方应该接受阿拉伯人民的意愿，不要对变革的影响夸大其词。


The West must support genuine democracy in the Arab world.	西方必须支持阿拉伯世界的真正民主。


If the Arab Spring is aborted, the result will be not dictatorships that are loyal to the West, but rather, a tsunami of rage that will spare no one.	如果阿拉伯之春夭折，那么结果产生的将不会是忠于西方的独裁体制，而是席卷所有人的愤怒风暴。


There is nothing more dangerous than aborted dreams, especially when those dreams may be the last chance for change.	世界上没有比梦想夭折更危险的事情了，尤其是当这个梦想乃是激起变革的最后机会的时候。


The Arab Springtime of Nations?	阿拉伯之春，阿拉伯国家之春寒？


JERUSALEM – Two things stand out in the Middle East since the Arab Spring began – one that happened, and one that did not.	耶路撒冷——自从阿拉伯之春发生至今，中东有两件事情很突出——一件是发生的，另一件是没有发生的。


What happened was that for the first time in modern Arab history, authoritarian regimes and rulers were toppled, or seriously challenged, by popular demonstrations, not – as in the past – through military coups.	发生的事情是，民众抗议——而不是以往的军事政变——打倒了专制政权和统治者，这在阿拉伯现代史上还是第一次。


But what did not happen might be as important as what did.	但是，没有发生的事情同样重要。


While dictators associated with military juntas were challenged overnight, the Arab Spring never came to the region’s conservative monarchies.	虽然独裁者和军政府纷纷垮台，但阿拉伯的春雷并没有震撼到该地区的保守王权。


The dynastic rulers of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states (with the exception of Bahrain) remain more or less firmly in the saddle, even though Saudi Arabia’s regime, at least, is in many respects far more oppressive than were the former Egyptian and Tunisian regimes.	摩洛哥、约旦、沙特阿拉伯和波斯湾诸国（除了巴林）的统治王朝仍然稳据宝座，尽管如沙特阿拉伯等政权对人民的压迫，在许多方面都比被推翻的埃及和突尼斯政权来得严酷。


Of course, oil money helps to sustain autocracy, but this is not a factor in Morocco and Jordan.	当然，石油金元有助于维系专制，但摩洛哥和约旦没有这一稳定因素。


It appears that these monarchies enjoy a form of traditional authority that the region’s secular nationalist rulers never had.	事态表明，这些王权政府拥有一种传统权威，是该地区的世俗民族主义统治者所没有的。


Being descendants of the Prophet, as in Morocco and Jordan, or having custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, as in Saudi Arabia, bestows a legitimacy on the countries’ rulers that is directly linked to Islam.	传承着先知穆罕穆德血脉的摩洛哥与约旦王室、保管着圣城麦加和麦地那的沙特阿拉伯，其统治者经由这种直接的伊斯兰纽带获得了某种合法性。


The only monarchical regime that was seriously challenged during the Arab Spring was the Sunni ruling family in Shia-majority Bahrain, where precisely this sectarian divide seems to have been the crucial ingredient in the uprising, which was then brutally suppressed with Saudi military help.	在阿拉伯之春期间受到严峻挑战的唯一王权政府是巴林的统治家族，该家族属于逊尼派，而巴林是什叶派占多数的国家。 在沙特阿拉伯军事干预下被血腥镇压的巴林抗议运动，派别分歧在其中似乎发挥了重要作用。


Yet, for all of the success epitomized by the protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, bringing down a dictatorship is one thing – a drama lasting a few weeks – while the transition to a functioning, consolidated democracy is quite another.	然而，以开罗解放广场抗争为代表的这些成功运动，如今面临真正的考验——推翻独裁不过是几个星期的一幕戏剧，而向一个有效、稳固的民主转型则完全是另一回事了。


Here, a lengthy process is involved, and its success – exemplified in the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe – depends on key preconditions.	后者将是一个长期的演进过程，而成功的转型——东欧的后共产主义转轨是其典范——有赖于若干关键前提。


Where these conditions exist – for example, a vibrant and autonomous civil society, as in Poland, or a strong pre-authoritarian tradition of pluralism, representation, and tolerance, as in the Czech Republic – the transition is relatively smooth.	在一些条件有利的地方，例如拥有一个活跃且自治的市民社会的波兰，或是拥有强劲的前专制多元主义、代议制和宽容传统的捷克共和国，这种转轨相对顺利。


Where they are lacking or weak, as in Russia or Ukraine, the outcome is much more problematic.	但在缺乏此类条件的地方，例如俄罗斯和乌克兰，转型将会出现更多的问题。


Simply put, a rosy outlook for countries like Egypt cannot be assumed on the basis of exhilarating images on CNN or Al Jazeera, or the fact that masses of young, well-educated, English-speaking men and women are connected through Facebook and Twitter.	简言之，不应基于CNN或半岛电视台所播放的那些令人振奋的图像，或是Facebook和Twitter上那些受过良好教育、会说英语的年轻人上传的消息，对埃及等国的前景抱有不切实际的乐观。


The great majority of Egyptians were not in Tahrir Square, and many of them lack not only access to online social networks, but also electricity and safe drinking water.	埃及人的大多数并不在解放广场，他们许多人不仅上不了社交网络，连用电和获取安全的饮用水的机会都没有。


Democracy and free speech are not at the top of their agenda.	民主和言论自由并非他们眼下最渴望的东西。


Egypt’s silent majority also identifies with the authenticity represented by various Islamic groups, while principles of democracy and civil rights seem to them to be imported Western abstractions.	同埃及“沉默的大多数”相契合的，是各种伊斯兰团体所代表的现实，在这些团体眼中，民主和公民权等等是西方舶来的空洞字眼。


So the tremendous victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Nour Party in Egypt – as well as that of Ennahda in Tunisia – should come as no surprise.	因此，穆斯林兄弟会和光明党（Al-Nour Party）在埃及、伊斯兰复兴运动��在突尼斯所赢得的巨大胜利并不令人吃惊。


A similar scenario could unfold in Syria, if and when President Bashar al-Assad falls from power, while both post-Qaddafi Libya and post-Saleh Yemen point to the difficulties that these countries face in constructing a coherent democratic regime.	一旦巴沙尔总统垮台，叙利亚局势也可能向类似方向演变——后卡扎菲的利比亚和后萨列赫的也门表明，此类国家要建立起一个团结的民主政权困难重重。


Looking at Egypt’s prospects realistically, one should not exclude the possibility that the two strongest forces in the country – the military and the Muslim Brotherhood – ultimately will find a way to share power.	现实地看待埃及的前景，也不应排除另一种可能性：该国最大的两股势力——军队和穆斯林兄弟会最终找到一种办法分享权力。


The Brotherhood’s vision of democracy is purely majoritarian, not liberal: winning an election, according to its spokespeople, permits the victor to rule according to his views.	穆斯林兄弟会的民主观念完全是多数至上主义的而非自由的，其发言人声称，选举的胜利者有权按照自己的意志施政。


Minority rights, institutional checks on government power, human rights – the liberal aspects of democracy – are entirely absent.	少数人的权利、对政府权力的制度化约束、人权等等民主的自由面向，在其意识中完全缺失。


Another, more fundamental, dimension to current and future changes in the region may come into view as well.	观察该地区当前和未来变局，还有一个更基本的维度亦需考虑。


Most international borders in the Middle East and North Africa were drawn by imperial powers – Britain, France, and Italy – either after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (the Sykes-Picot agreements), or, as in Libya and Sudan, earlier.	中东北非各国的疆界，大多是由帝国主义强权如英、法、意划定的，要么是在一战后在分崩离析的奥斯曼帝国疆土上划出（赛克斯—皮科协定），要么更早一些，如利比亚和苏丹。


But in no case did these borders correspond with local popular will, or with ethnic or historical boundaries.	但这些国境线丝毫不符合当地人的愿望，也不与民族或历史疆界重合。


In other words, none of these countries, except Egypt, had ever been a discrete political entity.	换言之，这些国家，除了埃及之外，没有一个曾是独立政治体。


Until recently, their rulers had a common interest in keeping this Pandora’s Box of borders tightly sealed.	一直到最近，它们的统治者出于共同的利害关切，把领土疆界问题这一潘多拉魔盒捂得严严的。


That has changed, and we see the region’s imperially imposed frontiers being called into question.	但如今形移势异，我们可以看到，针对帝国主义者强加给该地区的边境线，已经出现了质疑的声音。


In Iraq, the emergence of a de facto Kurdish autonomous region in the north has put an end to Saddam Hussein’s centralized Arab-controlled state.	随着萨达姆的阿拉伯集权国家垮台，在伊拉克北部事实上出现了库尔德自治区。


With South Sudan’s independence,the rest of Arab-dominated Sudan could face further division, with Darfur leaving next.	随着南苏丹的独立，阿拉伯人统治下的苏丹剩余部分面临进一步分裂，达尔富尔将会是下一个分离出去的地区。


In Libya, the transitional authorities are finding it extremely challenging to create a coherent political structure that can unite two very different provinces, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, which were held together only by the Qaddafi regime’s brutality.	在利比亚，过渡当局发现，要建立一个团结的政治结构，把东部的昔兰尼加和西部的的黎波里塔尼亚这两个截然不同的省份统一在一起，是极端困难的事情； 而卡扎菲政权则是用残暴手段把它们强行捆绑在一起的。


In Benghazi, there are already calls for autonomy, if not outright independence.	班加西已经有人主张自治，甚至索性独立。


Similarly, Yemen’s unity is far from assured.	类似的，也门的统一也远非板上钉钉。


The divisions between its south and north, which had been two different countries – with totally different histories –until Saleh’s dictatorship, are resurfacing again.	其南部、北部曾是两个国家，历史经历迥异，在萨列赫的独裁终结之后，南北分歧再度浮出水面。


In a post-Assad Syria, the ethnic and religious fissures betweenSunnis, Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurdsmight equally threaten the country’s unity.	到了后阿萨德时代的叙利亚，逊尼派、阿拉维派、德鲁兹派、基督徒和库尔德人之间的民族和宗教罅隙同样将威胁该国的统一。


In his brutal way, Assad may be right that only his iron grip keeps the country together.	阿萨德的统治虽然残暴，但也许只有他的铁腕才能让这个国家凑合在一起。


And developments in Syria will undoubtedly have an impact on neighboring Lebanon.	而叙利亚的发展无疑将会对邻国黎巴嫩发生影响。


The end of communist autocracies in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and even Czechoslovakia brought about a dramatic wave of state creation.	共产党专政在苏联、南斯拉夫甚至捷克斯洛伐克的终结引发了一波新国家成立的潮流。


Likewise, no one should be surprised if democratization in the Arab world, difficult as it might be, brings in its wake a redrawing of borders.	类似地，如果阿拉伯世界的民主化，在蹒跚前行之余，引发了重划国界的风潮，谁也不必惊诧。


How violent or peaceful this may be remains to be seen.	这一过程是和平还是狂暴，我们拭目以待。


The Arab World’s Democratic Opening	阿拉伯世界的民主机遇


Roughly 400 million Muslims currently live in non-Arab Muslim majority states – including Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Senegal, Mali, and Albania – that have held relatively free elections for their highest political offices.	目前大约四亿穆斯林居住在包括土耳其、印度尼西亚、孟加拉、塞内加尔、马里和阿尔巴尼亚等非阿拉伯穆斯林国家。 这些国家都已经相对自由地选举出了他们的最高政治领导人。