But, as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrated with his famous policy pivot in 2002, that consensus tended largely to prevail. And it continued to hold sway as recently as almost two years ago, when Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras executed an equally notable U-turn.	但是，巴西总统卢拉以其著名的2002年政策重点证明，华盛顿共识最后往往还是能够胜出，并且一直主导全局直到两年前希腊总理齐普拉斯采取了同样令人瞩目的一百八十度大转弯。


But after years of unusually sluggish and strikingly non-inclusive growth, the consensus is breaking down.	但在经历了多年反常的停滞和令人震惊的不包容增长后，华盛顿共识正在解体。


Advanced-country citizens are frustrated with an “establishment” – including economic “experts,” mainstream political leaders, and dominant multinational companies – which they increasingly blame for their economic travails.	发达国家公民对“建制”——包括经济“专家”、主流政治领导人、主要跨国公司——感到失望，越来越多的人指责它们是经济艰难的罪魁祸首。


Anti-establishment movements and figures have been quick to seize on this frustration, using inflammatory and even combative rhetoric to win support.	反建制运动和人物很快就抓住了这一不满，利用煽动性乃至战斗性言辞赢得支持。


They do not even have to win elections to disrupt the transmission mechanism between economics and politics.	他们甚至不需要赢得选举就能干扰经济学和政治学之间的传递机制。


The United Kingdom proved that in June, with its Brexit vote – a decision that directly defied the broad economic consensus that remaining within the European Union was in Britain’s best interest.	6月份，英国以退欧投票证明了这一点——这一决定直接否认了留在欧盟符合英国的最佳利益这一经济共识。


The referendum happened for one reason: in 2013, then-Prime Minister David Cameron feared that he would be unable to secure sufficiently his Conservative Party base in the general election that year.	英国公投的发生原因是，2013年，时任首相卡梅伦担心他在当年的大选中无法确保其保守党基本盘。


So he pandered to Euroskeptic voters with the promise of a referendum.	因此他用承诺举行公投诱惑疑欧派选民。


The source of Cameron’s fear?	卡梅伦为什么要担心？


The political disruption caused by the UK Independence Party – an anti-establishment party that ended up winning only one seat in Parliament and subsequently found itself leaderless and in turmoil.	因为英国独立党（UK Independent Party）所造成的政治干扰。 反建制的英国独立党最后只在议会赢得了一个席位，随后便陷入群龙无首的乱局。


Now, it seems, the floodgates have opened.	如今，防洪门似乎已经洞开。


At the recent Conservative Party annual conference, speeches by Prime Minister Theresa May and members of her cabinet revealed an intention to pursue a “hard Brexit,” thereby dismantling trading arrangements that have served the economy well.	在最近的保守党年度大会上，首相梅及其内阁成员的讲话表明他们准备追求“硬退欧”，取缔给英国经济带来巨大好处的贸易安排。


They also included attacks on “international elites” and criticism of Bank of England policies that were instrumental in stabilizing the British economy in the referendum’s immediate aftermath – thus giving May’s new government time to formulate a coherent Brexit strategy.	他们还抨击“国际精英”，批评英格兰银行的政策。 在公投刚刚结束的那段时间，英格兰银行的政策起到了稳定英国经济的中流砥柱的作用，从而给梅的新政府赢得了制定一致的退欧战略的时间。


Several other advanced economies are experiencing analogous political developments.	其他一些发达经济体也正在经历类似的政治发展趋势。


In Germany, a surprisingly strong showing by the far-right Alternative für Deutschland in recent state elections already appears to be affecting the government’s behavior.	在德国，极右翼的德国另类党（Alternative für Deutschland）在最近的州选举中表现出人意料的强势，它已经开始影响德国政府的行为。


In the US, even if Donald Trump’s presidential campaign fails to put a Republican back in the White House (as appears increasingly likely, given that, in the latest twist of this highly unusual campaign, many Republican leaders have now renounced their party’s nominee), his candidacy will likely leave a lasting impact on American politics.	在美国，即使唐纳德·特朗普的竞选不能让共和党重新问鼎白宫（这一可能性日益增加，因为这出相当反常的总统选战最近又曝出新转折，许多共和党领导人宣布不再支持本党提名人），他成为候选人这一事实也可能给美国政治带来持续影响。


If not managed well, Italy’s constitutional referendum in December – a risky bid by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to consolidate support – could backfire, just like Cameron’s referendum did, causing political disruption and undermining effective action to address the country’s economic challenges.	如果管理不当，12月的意大利宪政公投——总理伦齐为巩固其支持而兵行险招——将适得其反，一如卡梅伦的公投方案，导致政治干扰，阻碍解决意大利经济挑战的有效行动。


Make no mistake: solid and credible policy options are available.	不要弄错了，可靠可信的政策选项仍在可及范围内。


After years of mediocre economic performance, there is widespread agreement that a shift away from excessive dependence on unconventional monetary policy is needed.	在经历了多年的平庸经济表现后，一个广泛的一致是必须摆脱对非常规货币政策的过度依赖。


As IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde put it, “central banks cannot be the only game in town.”	IMF总裁拉加德指出，“中央银行不可以成为唯一的博弈”。


And yet they have been.	但它们正是。


As I argue in The Only Game in Town, published in January, countries need a more comprehensive policy approach, involving pro-growth structural reforms, more balanced demand management (including higher fiscal spending on infrastructure), and better cross-border policy coordination and architecture.	我在1月出版的《唯一的博弈》（The Only Game in Town）中指出，各国需要更加全面的政策方针，包括促增长的结构性改革、更平衡的需求管理（包括增加基础设施方面的财政支出）和更好的跨国政策协作和组织。


There is also a need, highlighted by the protracted Greek crisis, to address pockets of severe over-indebtedness, which can have crushing impact extending well beyond the directly affected.	此外还需要解决严重的过度负债问题——没完没了的希腊危机突出了这一点——该问题的破坏性影响远远不局限于直接受害者。


The emergence of a new consensus on these points is good news.	在这些问题上形成新共识是好消息。


But, in the current political environment, translating that consensus into action is likely to happen too slowly, at best.	但是，在当前政治环境下，将这一共识转化为行动可能过于缓慢甚至无从实现。


The risk is that, as bad politics crowds out good economics, popular anger and frustration will rise, making politics even more toxic.	风险在于，随着坏政治学挤出好经济学，群众愤怒和不满将愈演愈烈，让政治学变得更加有害。


One hopes that enlightened political leadership takes the reins in time to make the needed mid-course corrections voluntarily, before unambiguous signs of economic and financial crisis force policymakers to scramble to minimize the damage.	我们希望开明的政治领导层及时掌控全局，自愿采取中途纠错，以免明确的经济和金融危机信号迫使决策者不得不将重点放在影响最小化上。


A Rest Stop for Europe	欧洲：退一步海阔天空


PRINCETON – Last week, in a highly anticipated speech, German President Joachim Gauck cautioned against the blind pursuit of an “ever-closer” European Union, acknowledging that the growing inequality among member states is generating “a sense of unease, even unmistakable anger,” and increasing the risk of national humiliation.	普林斯顿—上周，在一次备受期待的演讲中，德国总理高克对盲目追求“前所未有地紧密”的欧盟表达了担忧，他承认成员国之间日渐增加的不平等性正在产生“不安的感觉，甚至错误的愤怒，”这增加了国家受辱的风险。


He pointed out that, in addition to the economic crisis, there is “a crisis of confidence in Europe as a political project.”	他指出，除了经济危机，还有“一场对作为政治工程的欧洲的信心的危机”。


While Gauck made clear that he remains decidedly pro-Europe, he highlighted the need for closer reflection about Europe’s future – and especially that of the eurozone.	尽管高克断然表示他仍是坚决的欧洲支持者，但他也强调了深刻思考欧洲未来的需要，特别是欧元区的未来。


Standing on the verge of greater integration, Europeans are hesitant, “unsure whether we should really stride out on the onward journey.”	站在进一步一体化的边上，欧洲人犹豫了，“不确定我们是否应该向前跨出新的步伐”。


Addressing this hesitation, he declared, will require a thoughtful, nuanced understanding of what “more Europe” actually means.	他说，要打消这一犹豫，深入细致地思考“更欧洲”的真正含义。


Gauck may not have gone far enough: At this point, an ever-closer union may be a political mirage.	或许高克走的还不够远：目前前所未有地紧密的联盟可能是一场政治婚姻。


Any meaningful progress toward stabilizing the eurozone would require a significant – potentially open-ended – financial commitment, and the EU is not politically ready to cross that threshold.	任何有让欧元区更稳定的有意义的进步都需要重大——从根本上说是开放——的财政承诺，而欧盟还没有做好跨越之一门槛的政治准备。


Repeatedly pretending to move forward, then pulling back at the critical point, exacerbates political uncertainty and economic vulnerability.	一再地假装前进，然后又在临界点退缩，这增加了政治不确定性和经济脆弱性。


Rather than indecisively pursuing more unity, this may be the moment to restore effective sovereignty to national authorities in eurozone countries.	现在或许并不是犹犹豫豫追求更统一的时机，而是重塑欧元区国家当局有效主权的时机。


Such a move would alleviate anxiety in the short term, thereby giving Europeans the opportunity to regroup in preparation for future steps toward a more integrated Europe and a more resilient euro.	这样做能够在短期缓和焦虑，从而使欧洲得到重组机会，为未来迈向更一体化的欧洲和更坚挺的欧元做好准备。


To this end, eurozone leaders must take three key steps.	在这方面，欧元区领导人必须实施三个基本措施。 功能不全的欧洲财政治理制度应该取消；


The dysfunctional system of European fiscal governance should be dismantled; fiscal responsibility should be returned to member states; and, to minimize the risk of excessive future lending, private lenders should be required to bear the losses implied by unsustainable sovereign debt.	财政责任应该交还给成员国； 同时，为了让未来过度借贷最小化，应该要求私人债权人承担不可持续的主权债务的损失。


The case against European fiscal governance is straightforward.	欧洲财政治理的问题是显而易见的。


Before the crisis, the single-minded emphasis on reducing national budget deficits to less than 3% of GDP led to extensive abuse.	危机前一根筋地强调将预算赤字限制在GDP的3%之内导致了这一方针的滥用。


Either the target was openly flouted, as it was in leading economies like Germany and France, or the data were manipulated to obscure problems (a common practice throughout the eurozone, not just in Greece).	德国和法国等领先经济体公开奚落这一目标，而有的国家则操纵数字掩盖问题（这是欧元区普遍的现象，不光是希腊）。


And the belief in economic growth as a fiscal panacea led to unrealistically optimistic GDP forecasts.	而把经济增长当作财政万灵丹的思想导致了不切实际的乐观GDP预期。


When the crisis struck, the 3% deficit target became the focal point for unrelenting austerity – a form of what anthropologist Clifford Geertz described as “involution,” which occurs when a process intensifies rather than changes in response to external or internal pressure.	危机爆发后，3%赤字目标成了无情的紧缩政策的焦点——人类学家格尔茨（Clifford Geertz）将这种形式称为“内卷化”，当一个过程因外部或内部压力而加剧而不是变化时就发生了内卷化。


In other words, EU leaders began to complicate fiscal governance, ultimately creating an inefficient, inescapable labyrinth of regulation and bureaucracy.	换句话说，欧盟领导人开始强化财政治理，最终形成了不可避免的低效监管和官僚主义难题。


As fiscal metrics become increasingly intricate, monitoring efforts will become ever easier to undermine.	随着财政指标变得越来越复杂，监控财政行为越来越容易糊弄。


The case for returning fiscal responsibility to national authorities is also strong – and not only because centralized fiscal authority has proved to be so inefficient.	把财政责任交还给国家当局的问题也很大——这不仅是因为集中财政当局已被证明极其低效。


With citizens of distressed countries bearing the fiscal burden of the crisis, the enduring presumption that they will not act responsibly is patronizing, at best.	受困国人民承担了危机的财政负担，如此仍认为它们不负责任的说法不可不谓傲慢。


And the current strategy of exchanging goodies for good behavior encourages game-playing and dilutes responsibility.	当前用甜头换良政的策略鼓励博弈而不利于责任。


While the risk that governments will succumb to fiscal temptation remains, citizens’ current suffering is likely to deter future excesses.	尽管政府受财政诱惑的风险仍然存在，但当下人民所受的苦难有可能会遏制未来的过度。


National fiscal sovereignty would facilitate the final crucial step: building a more mature relationship with private lenders.	国家财政主权能促进最后的关键措施：建立与私人债权人的更成熟的关系。


The eurozone was founded on the “no bailout” principle: if member states could not repay their debts, lenders would bear the losses.	欧元区是建立在“无援助”原则上的：如果成员国无法偿还债务，债权人必须承受损失。


But lenders chose – correctly, as it turned out – to disregard that threat.	但债权人选择无视这一威胁——事实表明他们是正确的。


Instead of enforcing the no-bailout principle and establishing a precedent, debtor countries used official loans to repay private creditors.	债务国并没有强推无援助原则为后来者建立榜样，而是用官方贷款偿付私人债权人。


As a result, these countries have condemned themselves to continued austerity, low growth, and high debt, while diminishing any future incentive for private lenders to impose fiscal discipline on sovereign borrowers.	结果，这些国家把自己推向了持续紧缩、低增长和高债务，同时又切断了所有让私人债权人对主权债务人施加财政纪律的未来激励。


Only by shifting the burden of responsibility back onto private lenders can debtor countries escape this quagmire.	除非将这一负担抛回给私人债权人，否则债务国就无法摆脱债务泥淖。


In the United States, each state is responsible for its fiscal management, without being forced to comply with a single, overarching template.	在美国，各州对其财政管理负责，不需遵守单一的总模式。


The states are not regulated by the federal government; they are disciplined by the knowledge that no one will repay their debts for them.	各州不受联邦政府监管； 它们受没人会为它们的债务买单这一认识的约束。


And the system seems to work: entering the crisis, US states had significantly lower deficit and debt ratios than the eurozone’s vulnerable member states.	这一制度运转良好：与欧元区的脆弱成员国相比，进入危机后，美国各州大幅降低了赤字和债务率。


So far, European integration has largely been a process of “falling forward,” with each stumble serving as a lesson from which a stronger union emerges.	目前，欧洲一体化大体上是一个“掉向前”（falling forward）的过程，每一次跌倒都会成为形成更坚固的联盟的教训。


But, while this uncertain approach may suffice as a basis for declarations of good intentions, it does not inspire the confidence required for countries to make the profound financial commitment that is now needed.	但是，这一不确定方法或许足以成为宣称善意的基础，但并不能激发各国做出当下所急需的深刻财政承诺所需要的信心。


Europeans should have the chance to regain their footing.	欧洲人应该获得站稳脚跟的机会。


Transferring fiscal responsibility back to national authorities would not only mean the end of counterproductive efforts to manage fiscal affairs centrally; it would also diminish the sense of frustration and lack of control that is fueling Euro-skepticism.	将财政责任交还给国家当局不仅意味着倒行逆施的集中管理财政事务的做法的终结，还能减轻沮丧感和无从掌握全局感，后两者正是欧元悲观主义的温床。


In short, taking a step back would provide an opportunity to reset, to reflect, and to plot the best course toward a more stable, more integrated Europe.	简言之，退后一步将是重设、反思和策划迈向更稳定、更一体化欧洲的最佳方案的机会。


For a fiscal union to function – however unlikely that outcome may be – a solid foundation is crucial.	对于一个能够运转的财政联盟来说——不管这一可能性多么渺茫——稳固的基础是至关重要的。


As Gauck explained, Europeans “are pausing to… equip [themselves] both intellectually and emotionally for the next step, which will require [them] to enter uncharted territory.”	正如高克所解释的，欧洲人“正在停下来……从知识和情绪两方面为下一步武装（自己），下一步要求（他们）踏入未知领域。 ”


Giving Europeans the time and space to choose more Europe would reinforce the core values upon which integration has rested for more than six decades.	给欧洲人时间和空间去选择更欧洲有助于强化六十多年来作为欧洲一体化基石的核心价值。


Continuing to stumble forward, however, would inevitably lead to a debilitating, if not fatal, fall.	但是，继续蹒跚向前不可避免地会导致孱弱甚至衰亡。


A European Cure for Balkan Depression	巴尔干衰退的欧洲式疗法


VIENNA – European politics is mostly shaped by events and anniversaries.	发自维也纳－欧洲政治的绝大部分内容都是由某些重大事件和周年纪念构成的。


But while events are often unforeseeable, anniversaries are not.	而虽然重大事件往往有其不可预测性，但周年纪念却还是有迹可循的。


Five years from now, Europe will be reflecting on the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War 1, which led to a loss of life almost without parallel and set in motion a chain of events that led to the creation of Europe as we now know it.	就在5年之后，欧洲将迎来第一次世界大战爆发100周年的纪念活动，那场战争不但造成了其它事件所无法比拟的流血牺牲，更通过推动一系列事件，最终催生了今天我们眼中的欧洲。


World leaders may have already reserved some days in August 2014 to mark the occasion.	而世界各国的元首们说不定也早就预留了2014年8月的某些日子来操办纪念仪式。


It is easy to predict that Sarajevo will be the place where they will meet to look back on Europe’s savage twentieth century.	不难想象，萨拉热窝将成为他们齐聚一堂，共同回顾残酷血腥的20世纪欧洲史的地方。


But how will Sarajevo look in five years?	但不知５年后的萨拉热窝又将是何种风貌？


Will it still be the capital of a country whose citizens view the future bleakly and whose politicians have totally lost touch with the electorate?	它是否仍会是那个国民对未来彻底绝望，政治家与选民彻底绝缘的国家的首都？


Or is there a hope that European leaders will use the anniversary to announce the successful integration of the remaining Balkan countries into the European Union?	或者是否存在这样的可能性，那就是欧洲各国的领导人将借此周年纪念之机，宣布巴尔干半岛上的其余国家已经被成功整合进了欧盟？


A Balkan Monitor survey recently conducted by Gallup Europe gives suggests the state of public opinion in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo 20 years on from the fall of the Berlin Wall and a decade after the end of the Kosovo war.	但就在最近，由盖洛普欧洲完成的一份名为《巴尔干观察》的调查给出了自柏林墙倒塌20年以及科索沃战争爆发10年以来，塞尔维亚，黑山共和国，马其顿，阿尔巴尼亚，克罗地亚，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及科索沃各地的舆论状况。


The findings seem to indicate that the next five years will be a make-or-break period for the region’s future development.	而调查结果似乎显示，今后5年将是一个关键时期，决定该地区未来发展的成败。


While the overwhelming majority of citizens are convinced that further armed conflict in the region is unlikely, the public’s mood – with the exception of Kosovars and Albanians – is pessimistic.	报告显示，尽管绝大多数市民相信在本地区内爆发进一步的武装冲突不太可能，但公众的情绪——除科索沃和阿尔巴尼亚以外——却都甚为悲观。


The future promises peace without development.	未来唯一能带给他们的只有和平，而发展却遥遥无期。


Trust in political elites and in national and European institutions has been steadily declining.	人们对政治精英，国家机关及欧盟机构的信任度也都在不断下降。


The majority of citizens have experienced a decline in living standards in the last year, and there remains a perception that people have more opportunities outside their own countries.	就在去年，绝大部分市民都遭遇了生活水平的下降，人们依然认为到了国外才有更多的机会。


Pessimism about employment is alarmingly high among young people, while corruption and government mismanagement are regarded as being widespread.	年轻人中对就业感到悲观的比率高得惊人，而政府腐败和管理不当也被认为是广泛存在的现象。


All those who have made it their job to praise the stability in the region should look at these figures.	因此这些数据值得那些视称颂该地区的稳定为己任的人去好好看看。


Indeed, it is striking that the majority of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that their leaders are not interested in their country joining the EU.	事实上令人感到震惊的是，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的大部分市民都认为他们的领导人对加入欧盟不感兴趣。


An absolute majority of citizens in each of the surveyed countries are convinced that their country is heading in the wrong direction.	而各被调查国中的绝大部分市民都认为他们的国家已经误入歧途。


Less than one in 10 Croats (whose country could be joining the EU in the near future) believes that their country is heading in the right direction.	只有不到1/10的克罗地亚人（该国将在不久后加入欧盟）认为自己的国家走上了正轨。


There are now two options for the region: one is a “shock integration” program that takes all of the Western Balkan states into the EU; the other is a journey into the unknown.	事到如今，该地区面临两个选择：一是选择“休克式整合”计划，即把巴尔干半岛西部的所有国家不管好坏一股脑全部纳入欧盟；


The hope that these countries can muddle through on their own is a dangerous illusion.	另一个选择则是走着瞧，但期望这些国家能够靠自身实力涉险过关显然都是些极端危险的幻想。


Stability alone can no longer be the EU’s only objective in the region.	因此欧盟在本地区的目标可不应仅限于“维稳”两字。


The EU’s continuing presence as a colonial power in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo could cause even more problems in the future, especially if benefits are not forthcoming.	而欧盟如果继续以殖民强权式的面目不断在波黑及科索沃等地进行活动的话，那么就只能给未来造成更多的问题，尤其是当许诺的好处无法马上兑现之时。


In particular, a delay in Serbia’s integration into the EU could bring Tito-inspired fantasies to the heart of the country’s foreign and security policy.	特别对于塞尔维亚来说，如果迟迟不能加入欧盟，那么从前那种铁托式的不结盟主义思想就将重新占据该国外交和安全政策的核心。


Thus, demoralization of Balkan society creates a dynamic of its own when the best and the brightest see their future outside of their own countries and where “stability” is just another name for political and economic stagnation.	由此可见，当最优秀和最聪明的人都认为自己的未来在异国他乡之时，当“稳定”只是政治和经济停滞的代名词时，巴尔干社会的混乱就将催生一种自身的内在动力。


If European leaders do plan to meet in 2014 in Sarajevo, they should act now.	因此如果欧洲的领导人真的计划在2014年在萨拉热窝召开会议，那么他们现在就得行动起来。


The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty allows for an element of visionary realism in European politics, as there are no longer any institutional obstacles to the future enlargement of the EU.	其实《里斯本条约》的通过已经为欧洲政治的组成元素增添了兼具长远眼光的现实主义理念，而欧盟未来的扩张至此已不再存在任何制度上的障碍。


Today, unlike a year ago, we know how many states are in the Balkans, and the Balkan Monitor results show that all of them want to join the Union.	而今天与一年前不同的是，我们已经能弄清楚在巴尔干半岛���究竟有多少个国家，况且《巴尔干观察》的结果也显示这些国家都想加入欧盟。


What the EU has learned from the results of the last parliamentary elections in Bulgaria is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the leverage of Brussels over new member states increases rather than diminishes after they join.	此外欧盟应从最近一次保加利亚议会选举中学到的东西则是，与传统思维相反，在新成员加入之后，布鲁塞尔对这些国家的影响力其实是有增无减。


The EU’s decision to liberalize its visa regime for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia – and the fact that George Papandreou, the major architect of the EU’s Balkan integration strategy, is back in power in Greece – is another source of optimism.	欧盟放宽对塞尔维亚，黑山共和国和马其顿的签证限制的决定——以及欧盟巴尔干整合战略的主要构建者乔治·帕潘德里奥在希腊重新掌权的事实——都是令人感到乐观的理由。


But it is now or never for the Balkans.	而对于巴尔干人来说，要么现在加入，要么就永远不加入。


Visa liberalization can be a strategic step in the direction of “shock integration,” but if it is not followed by bold political action from the EU, it could merely become a re-packaging of the status quo .	放宽签证可以作为向“休克式整合”迈进的一个战略步骤，但如果欧盟没能紧接着给出清晰的政治行动，那这一切就仅仅是换汤不换药而已。


In short, the moment has arrived for shaping events instead of simply marking anniversaries.	一句话，一战100周年的时刻有的不仅是纪念，更是时机，一个决定重大事件的时机。


Closing Europe’s Strategy Gap	填补欧洲的战略空白


MADRID – The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has been a hot topic of analysis for almost a year.	马德里—持续发酵的乌克兰危机已经成为近一年来的一个热点分析话题。


But one question has largely escaped thorough examination: what Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine indicates about the European Union’s foreign policy.	但有一个问题几乎没人研究：俄罗斯吞并克里米亚和入侵东乌克兰对欧洲外交政策意味着什么。


During the early stages of the crisis, Germany, which had bet heavily on Russia’s modernization, was averse to taking any consequential action.	在危机的早期阶段，对俄罗斯现代化下了重注的德国反对采取任何可能带来后果的行动。


But, as the crisis deepened, German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked to persuade her European counterparts to implement a broad and biting sanctions regime.	但是，随着危机的深化，德国总理默克尔设法说服了欧洲同侪，实施了广泛而严厉的制裁措施。


This certainly was a step in the right direction, but it did nothing to address the foreign-policy failings that helped spark the Ukrainian crisis and continue to undermine Europe’s response – namely, the EU’s misguided Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its muddled approach to energy.	这毫无疑问是防线争取的一步，但对于纠正引发乌克兰危机、制约欧洲的反应的失败外交政策——即欧洲被误导的邻国政策（Neighborhood Policy，ENP）以及混乱的能源方针——无济于事。


On both of these fronts, the EU’s lack of strategic vision has created the impression that Europe is repeatedly being outmaneuvered by Russian President Vladimir Putin.	在这两条阵线上，欧洲缺乏战略眼光，以至于给人们造成了被俄罗斯总统普京玩弄于鼓掌之间的印象。


It increasingly appears that Ukraine is becoming locked in a “frozen conflict” – Russia’s foreign-policy specialty.	乌克兰危机日益表现出陷入“冻结冲突”的迹象——此乃俄罗斯外交政策的专长。


Indeed, the situation in Ukraine represents a tactical victory for Russia, with the fragile but enduring ceasefire – and accompanying legislation that grants Donetsk and Luhansk considerable political autonomy – allowing Russia to entrench the conflict near the EU’s border.	事实上，乌克兰局势表明俄罗斯取得了战术性胜利，脆弱但一直得以维持的停火——以及随之发生的授予顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克巨大政治自治权的立法——让俄罗斯可以在欧盟眼皮底下根深蒂固地建立冲突。


Moreover, the delayed implementation of key elements of the EU’s association agreement with Ukraine is clear evidence that, at the moment, Russia dictates the terms of EU-Ukrainian engagement.	此外，欧盟与乌克兰的入盟协定的关键要素迟迟得不到执行，这清楚地表明眼下俄罗斯主宰着欧盟-乌克兰联姻的条件。


In Europe, the Kremlin has been able to pursue a successful divide-and-rule strategy, particularly in view of Hungary’s decision to suspend gas flows to Ukraine.	在欧洲，克里姆林宫一直能够追求成功的分而治之（divide-and-rule）战略，匈牙利暂停向乌克兰输气的决定就是显著的例子。


Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government, whose behavior in recent years has been at odds with the EU’s criteria for democracy, now openly approves of authoritarian regimes – and Putin’s, in particular – with serious potential consequences for European unity.	匈牙利总理奥班政府近几年来的行为与欧盟的民主标准格格不入，现在又公开支持给欧洲的统一带来严重阴影的极权政权——特别是普京政权。


Nonetheless, the timing of the current ceasefire, which coincides with the installation of a new EU Commission, is advantageous, as is Putin’s shortsighted emphasis on tactical victories.	尽管如此，当前停火的时机——正逢欧盟委员会换届——非常有利，普京短视地强调战术性胜利亦然。


EU leaders should take advantage of the break in the fighting to stop reacting and start anticipating.	欧盟领导人应该利用战斗间歇停止被动反应，开始主动预测。


With a long-term strategic vision, the EU could overwhelm and ultimately undermine Putin’s short-term successes.	欧盟可以着眼于长期战略，克服并最终破坏普京的短期成功。


Such a vision must include a reconceptualization of the ENP.	如此算盘必须包括重新定义ENP。


The program’s mission – to help guide the political, social, and economic transitions of neighboring states – is not inherently problematic; the problem lies in the way that the mission has been interpreted and pursued.	该计划的任务——帮助引导邻国的政治、社会和经济转型——并无本质问题； 问题在于该任务的解释和执行方法。


For starters, the ENP assumes that all of the EU’s neighbors, both in the south and in the east, ultimately want to realize European values and structures in their own countries.	首先，ENP假设所有欧盟邻国——不管是南部邻国还是东部邻国——说到底都希望在本国实现欧洲价值和结构。


In other words, the ENP does not account for the developmental, cultural, and aspirational differences among the EU’s partner countries.	换句话说，ENP没有考虑欧盟伙伴国之间的发展、文化和志趣差异。


The ENP suffers operationally from its excessively technical approach and lack of strategic vision.	在实际操作中，ENP过度强调技术方针，缺少战略眼光，因此大受影响。


For example, before the Ukraine crisis, the European Commission was so focused on negotiating the technical features of the association agreement that it did not consider adequately the potential fallout of the process – such as, say, a response from Russia.	比如，在乌克兰危机前，欧盟委员会全部精力都集中在入盟协定的技术细节上，完全没有充分考虑该进程潜在后果——比如俄罗斯的反应。


To be sure, the EU recognized its need for a coherent strategy, and attempted to resolve it by establishing the European External Action Service and the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs.	平心而论，欧盟认识到需要统一的战略，也试图通过设立欧洲对外行动署（European External Action Service，EEAS）和对外事务高级代表解决这一问题。


But the EEAS ended up in a turf war with the European Commission, and outgoing High Representative Catherine Ashton did little to ease the tension, owing to her unwillingness to involve herself in intra-EU disagreements.	但EEAS最终在与欧盟委员会的扯皮中无疾而终，而即将卸任的高级代表凯瑟琳·阿什顿（Catherine Ashton）也没能缓和这一紧张局面，因为她自己也不愿卷入欧盟内部的纠纷中。


It is telling that Ashton has made progress exclusively in areas defined by ample consensus, such as the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and the pact between Kosovo and Serbia.	很能说明问题的是阿什顿只在用充分共识的领域取得了进展，如伊朗核计划谈判和科索沃与塞尔维亚的契约。


Further eroding Europe’s effectiveness is its fragmented approach to securing energy supplies.	进一步制约欧洲效率的是其在确保能源供给方面的各自为政。


With every country largely controlling its own energy policy, Europe’s energy market has become inefficient and excessively dependent on Russian supplies.	各个国家大体上都控制着本国的能源政策，欧洲能源市场变得效率低下，过度依赖俄罗斯的供给。


To the extent that there has been an EU-wide energy strategy, it has related to renewables, rather than the intersection of geopolitics and energy security.	泛欧盟能源政策是存在的，但是关于可再生能源而非地缘政治和能源安全互动的。


But there is reason for hope.	但我们仍可抱有很大希望。


The new Commission, which its president, Jean Claude Juncker, has restructured significantly, could provide Europe with the strategic leadership it so badly needs.	新欧盟委员会主席让·克劳德·容克（Jean Claude Juncker）对其进行了大刀阔斧的重组，将为欧洲提供急需的战略领导。


In fact, Juncker has already expressed a desire to integrate incoming High Representative Federica Mogherini into the Commission’s policy program.	事实上，容克已经表达了让即将赴任的高级代表费得利卡·莫格里尼（Federica Mogherini）参与欧盟委员会政策计划的意思。


The new structure – which tasks Mogherini with guiding and coordinating the work of multiple commissioners, including those responsible for trade, the ENP, and climate and energy – should strengthen the coherence and direction of EU policies, particularly after Mogherini completes her European Council-mandated assessment of the global strategic landscape.	这一新结构——莫格里尼将负担指导和协调多名委员工作的任务，包括负责贸易、ENP和气候与能源的委员——应能强化欧盟政策的统一和防相，特别是在莫格里尼完成了她的欧洲理事会任命的全球战略局势评估后。


But a restructured Commission is not enough to ensure a reset of Europe’s foreign-policy strategy.	但重组后的欧盟委员会仍不足以确保欧洲外交政策战略的重设。


For that to happen, Mogherini must assert herself as a leader, backed by Juncker and the new European Council president, Donald Tusk.	若要实现这一点，莫格里尼必须把自己当作受容克和欧洲理事会主席唐纳德·塔斯克（Donald Tusk）支持的领导者。


And, most important, all EU member states must recommit themselves to cooperation.	最重要的是，所有欧盟成员国都必须承诺合作。


The Ukrainian people have demonstrated the power of Europe’s values.	乌克兰人民已经证明了欧洲价值的力量。


Indeed, Europe has a large set of tools at its disposal; it just needs to figure out how to use them.	事实上，欧洲有的是可用手段； 它只是需要明白如何使用。


If it can, it will be better able to respond not only to the Russian challenge, but also to many of the other challenges that characterize today’s rapidly shifting global environment.	如果可以，欧洲不但可更好地响应俄罗斯挑战，对当今快速变化的全球环境的其他许多挑战同样如此。


A Europe of Women?	女性主导欧洲？


PARIS – Are women in Europe on the verge of becoming an engine for political change?	发自巴黎——欧洲女性是否将摇身一变成为政治变革的原动力？


In economic-development circles, experience and common sense suggest that progress, accountability, and hard work start with and depend on women.	经验和常识告诉我们，经济发展周期中的进步，责任和勤奋都发端于女性并依靠她们走向成功。


Micro-credits, for example, are much more efficient when women receive and repay them.	以小额贷款为例，由女性获取并偿付的贷款一般都更有效率。


Perhaps because they bear children and must find the means to feed them, women are now perceived as the best and most determined “agents of change.”	或许因为女性往往负有养育儿女的责任，于是也就成了最优秀且最坚决的“变革代理人”。


That seems to be as true now of European politics as it has been of economics in parts of Africa and Asia.	上述情况早就在亚非部分经济体中有所体现，而当今欧洲政治似乎也在向其靠拢。


The results of Italy’s recent municipal elections could be a signal of an incipient electoral dynamic: it was women who voted Silvio Berlusconi’s party out of power in Milan, a city that he has long controlled (and the original seat of his power).	最近的意大利地方政府大选则堪称这种新生选举原动力所发出的一个信号：正是女性选票在米兰市长选举中把西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼的政党拉了下台，要知道米兰一直以来都由贝氏控制（也是其权力的根源所在）。


No direct link exists between that result and the dramatic Dominique Strauss-Kahn scandal in New York, but in the immediate aftermath of DSK’s arrest, Italian women and young voters decisively mobilized to defeat Berlusconi’s party (led in Milan, ironically, by a woman).	贝卢斯科尼阵营的溃败与国际货币基金组织前总裁斯特劳斯-卡恩在纽约的离奇性丑闻本无直接联系，但在后者被捕之后，意大利的女性和年轻选民当即动员起来反对贝卢斯科尼阵营（讽刺的是该阵营的米兰市长恰好是位女性）。


These voters could no longer stand the combination of machismo and vulgarity that had once served so well the man Italian humorists now call “Berlus-Kahn.”	她们再也无法忍受这种大男子主义和粗鄙言行的结合体，即便这些元素曾被如今意大利漫画家称为“贝卢斯-卡恩”的那个男人玩得出神入化。


When Berlusconi first came to power 17 years ago, he had the support of a majority of women.	当贝卢斯科尼在17年前首次当权的时候，他曾受到广大女性的一致爱戴。


They were not discouraged by his ambivalent perception of them (by turns celebrating their traditional domesticity and glorifying their sexual objectification).	她们并未受到他对女性矛盾看法的影响（一边赞美她们在传统家庭生活中的角色，另一方面又将她们比作男人的性玩物）。


But Italian society has changed: most women are now working, and they are no longer willing to accept Belusconi’s anachronistic and outrageous chauvinism.	但意大利的社会早已今非昔比：如今大部分女性都是职业女性，因此对贝卢斯科尼那套陈词滥调及其胡作非为的大男子主义失去了兴趣。


Italian men may pity the aging, isolated leader, who looks increasingly like his wax effigy at Madame Tussaud’s.	意大利男性可能会同情这位日渐衰老孤立的领导人，因为他越来越像自己在杜莎夫人蜡像馆里的蜡像了。


But Italian women (indeed, women everywhere, it seems) feel only anger and humiliation over a man so obsessed with himself, his various criminal trials, and his vulgar pleasures that he appears to them to have no purpose left except to remain in power as long as possible.	但对意大利的女性来说（事实上几乎世界各地的女性都一样），她们对一个如此自恋，如此沉迷于各种犯罪指控和低级趣味的人感到无比愤怒和羞耻，在她们眼中贝卢斯科尼一无是处，只不过是个贪恋权位的政客而已。


Women, of course, are not alone in their opposition to Berlusconi, but they made the difference in Milan.	当然反对贝卢斯科尼的并不仅仅是女性，但她们在米兰表现得特别抢眼。


They are the incarnation of modernity, animated by a yearning for simple dignity and respect.	她们成为了现代性的化身，在渴求基本尊严与尊重的驱使下挺身而出。


They are not alone in the vanguard of a new Europe of women.	在崭新的女性主导的欧洲中，她们不是一个人在战斗。


As Iceland spiraled into bankruptcy, owing the irresponsible behavior of its mostly male political and financial elites, the people of Iceland decided that only a strong and responsible woman could redress the country’s problems.	随着冰岛逐渐破产的过程中——这是由其主要由男性组成的政治和金融界精英阶层的不负责任行为所导致的——其国民一致认定，只有一个强势和勇于担当的女性才能解决国家当前所面临的问题。


So they elected one as President.	于是他们选出了一位女总统。


The depth and gravity of the current economic and social crisis in countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain present women with a new opportunity.	在希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙这样的国家，国内经济和社会危机的深刻和严重程度也为当地女性带来一次新的机会。


Confronted with what many of them perceive as the equivalent of an “economic war,” women are playing an increasingly important role in maintaining their families’ financial security.	在面对被许多人所谓的“经济战争”时，女性在维持家庭财政安全方面扮演了越来越重要的角色。


And the more widespread this becomes, the more women will seek a political role that reflects their economic clout.	随着危机的扩散，女性会寻求获取更多能够体现其经济影响力的政治地位。


Of course, women’s changing status may not translate immediately into growing political influence.	当然女性地位的变化不会立刻转化为政治影响力。


And the rest of Europe might never follow the example of Scandinavia, where gender equality has advanced much further than anywhere else.	而欧洲其他国家可能永远不会向斯堪的那维亚半岛国家看齐——在那里的性别平等要比世界任何地方都发展得更快。


But such a dynamic does now seem to be in motion.	但这种动力确实不断在推进之中。


Similarly, regardless of the outcome of DSK’s trial in New York, the case might represent a turning point in the treatment of women in Europe.	同样，不管IMF前总裁的纽约审判结果如何，这个案子都将成为欧洲女性社会待遇的一个转折点。


Public and private displays of atavistic machismo, one hopes, will no longer be considered acceptable.	在人们的意识中，那种对公开或私下的返祖式大男子主义行为的认同也将一去不返了。


In the Arab world, too, from Tunis to Cairo, young women have played an important role in the revolutionary process.	与此同时在从突尼斯到开罗的阿拉伯世界里，年轻女性在这场茉莉花革命中也扮演了重要角色。


Their appetite for change – understandable, given the treatment of women in traditional Muslim societies – appears to be one of the main causes underlying the force of the revolutionary impulse in Tunisia and Egypt.	她们对变革的渴望——只要想一下她们在传统穆斯林社会中的待遇，就不难理解这种渴望了——成为了突尼斯和埃及革命动力的主要来源之一。


None of this is to argue that “women” are a universal force for positive change in Europe and around the world.	但上述一切也并不能证明“女性”就是欧洲以及全世界改革的积极力量。


Consider, for example, Marine Le Pen, the new head of France’s National Front, Elena Ceaucescu, the sordid wife of the former Romanian dictator, or, more recently, Tunisian ex-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Trabelsi, who fled to Dubai with 1.5 tons of gold plundered from the central bank.	不要忘记这世界上还有诸如法国国民阵线的新女领袖马琳·勒庞，恶行累累的前罗马尼亚独裁者之妻埃列娜·齐奥塞斯库，以及最近曝光的莱拉·特拉贝尔西，这位突尼斯前总统本阿里的妻子逃亡到了迪拜，还不忘带上从突尼斯中央银行盗取的1. 5吨黄金。


The point, simply, is that with so many people in so many countries demanding far-reaching change, the politics of gender is very much in play – in Europe and beyond.	简而言之，在欧洲境内外的众多国家之中有如此多人渴望实现意义深远的革新，那么性别政治也会在其中大显身手。


The main question is whether the growing number of women in politics will deliver the different perspectives and modes of leadership that many voters (or protesters) now seem to crave.	但最主要的问题是，随着女性政治参与度的不断上升，她们又是否能创造出选民（或示威者们）渴望的崭新前景和领导模式呢？


A Euro Sabbatical	休病假的欧元区受灾国


MUNICH – Under substantial external pressure, the eurozone’s crisis-hit countries are, at long last, bringing themselves to make painful cuts in their government budgets.	发自慕尼黑——在持续的外部压力之下，那些遭到危机侵袭的欧元区国家终于放弃了长期以来的抵抗，开始忍痛削减财政预算。


Salaries are being slashed and public employees sacked to reduce new borrowing to a tolerable level.	一方面大幅下调工资水平，另一方面削减公务员职位，希望能令新增债务的规模维持在一个可忍受的水平上。


And yet, competitiveness in Greece and Portugal, in particular, is not improving.	但这些国家的竞争力——尤其是希腊和葡萄牙——却并未得到改善。


The latest Eurostat figures on the evolution of the price index for self-produced goods (GDP deflator) show no tendency whatsoever in the crisis-stricken countries towards real devaluation. But real devaluation, achieved by lowering prices vis-à-vis their eurozone competitors, is the only way to re-establish these countries’ competitiveness.	最新的欧盟统计局数字显示：无论哪个受灾国家的自产商品价格指数（扣除GDP中的通货膨胀因素后）都没有出现向实质性贬值靠拢的趋势，而如果要重新树立竞争力优势的话就只能通过压低与其他欧元区国家竞争时的我方报价，也就是实质性贬值。


A reduction in unit labor costs can also increase competitiveness only to the extent that it actually results in price reductions.	也只有在真正实现价格下降的情况下，单位劳动力成本的降低才能转化为竞争力的提升。


After all, it was price inflation in the crisis countries, fueled by massive inflows of cheap credit following the introduction of the euro, that resulted in their loss of competitiveness, ballooning current-account deficits, and accumulation of enormous foreign debt.	毕竟，正是在引入欧元后廉价信贷大量涌入，随后引发价格通货膨胀才最终导致了这些国家的竞争力下降，经常账户赤字膨胀和大量外债的积累。


Now that capital markets are no longer willing to finance these deficits, prices should be going into reverse, but this, obviously, is not happening.	如今资本市场已不愿再去填补这些赤字缺口，因此价格应该逆向走低，但很显然，预料中的这一切都没有发生。


In 2010, inflation in some of the crisis countries lagged slightly behind that of their eurozone competitors.	在2010年，某些欧元区危机国的通胀水平仅比同区竞争者低一点点。


The latest Eurostat figures for the third quarter of 2011, however, are already showing a different picture: the price level in Portugal and Greece has remained practically unchanged over the course of the year, and in Italy and Spain it even rose slightly (by 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively).	但最新的2011年第三季度欧盟统计局数字则展示出一个截然不同的画面：葡萄牙和希腊的价格水平在经历了一整年的救灾行动后依然维持原状，意大利和西班牙的价格水平甚至还分别略微上升了0. 4%和0.


Only Ireland continued on a path of rapid deflation – as it has since the country’s real-estate bubble burst in 2006 – with a relative price decrease of 2.2%.	只有爱尔兰继续在迅速贬值——从该国2006年地产泡沫爆破之后就是如此，至今相对价格已经下跌了2. 2%。


On the whole, Ireland has become cheaper relative to its eurozone competitors by a total of 15% over the course of the past five years.	从整体上看，在经历了五年调整后爱尔兰相对于其他欧元区竞争者来说价格已经便宜了总共15%。


This internal devaluation is paying off: while Ireland was still running a current-account deficit of 5.6% of GDP in 2008, the European Commission expects the outturn for 2011 to have been a 0.7%-of-GDP current-account surplus.	这一内部贬值进程是有所回报的：爱尔兰在2008年时的经常账户赤字相当于GDP的5. 6%，而欧盟委员会预计该国会在2011年实现相当于GDP0.


True, much of this is mere debt-service relief, given that Ireland was able to repay its foreign liabilities with self-printed money, for which it pays only 1% interest.	7%的盈余。 没错，考虑到爱尔兰可以自己印刷货币来偿还那些利率只有1%的外债，上述大部分成果都仅仅是缓解了债务偿付问题。


However, Ireland’s big trade surplus did improve further.	但爱尔兰的大宗贸易盈余确实得到了进一步改善。


Ireland owes much of this turnaround to its efficient export sector, whose supporters were able to enforce a political U-turn.	爱尔兰所实现的逆转大部分都归功于其高效的出口部门——这些部门的支持者们有能力促成政治上的转向。


Greece, on the other hand, is under the influence of a strong import lobby.	相反希腊国内进口部门的游说力量却极为强大。


As the Greek economics minister, Michalis Chrysochoidis, has said, this is attributable to European Union subsidies, which drove entrepreneurs to follow the easy money into the import sector.	正如希腊经济部长米哈利斯·赫里索希季斯（Michalis Chrysochoidis）所说，这都要怪欧盟实施的补贴政策，搞得企业家们都跑到进口部门去挣快钱了。


Now these importers form a powerful bulwark against any policy that causes deflation, even though lowering prices – and thereby redirecting Greek demand from foreign to domestic products and helping tourism – is the only way to put the Greek economy back on its feet.	如今这些进口商已经构筑了一个强大的壁垒来抵制任何可能引发通货紧缩的政策，即便降低价格——并因此将希腊的需求从外部转向内部产品同时扶助旅游业发展——才是让希腊经济重回正轨的唯一方法。


Since Greece’s current-account deficit as a share of GDP was three times higher than Ireland’s, Greek prices would have to fall by about half to achieve the same kind of success.	由于希腊经常账户赤字占GDP的比例比爱尔兰高三倍，希腊的价格水平也必须下跌一半才能取得爱尔兰那样的成就。


It is inconceivable that Greece could manage that within the eurozone without widespread social unrest, if not conditions approaching those of civil war.	但谁也不相信希腊能在避免大规模社会动乱——说不定还会濒临内战边缘——的情况下作为欧元区成员国实现这一点。


But it isn’t just importers who are blocking real devaluation. Unions, too, are resisting the necessary wage reductions, and public and private debtors fear the prospect of insolvency if their assets and revenues are assessed at a lower value, while their debts remain unchanged.	而且阻止实质性贬值的不仅仅是进口商，公会也在抵制必要的工资削减，虽然债务总额依然不变，但无论公私债务人都害怕国家破产预期会令自己的资产和收益估值降低。


The situation is intractable.	由此可见，情况相当棘手。


Many people regard debt relief and socialization of debts as the only way out.	许多人都认为债务缓解以及债务社会化才是唯一出路。


This help has been given.	但其实这类手段早就实施了。


The recent agreement gave Greece relief of €237 billion ($316 billion), about 30% more than Greece’s net national income of roughly €180 billion euros.But such help only entrenches the wrong prices – and thus the economy’s lack of competitiveness.	最近签订的协议减免了希腊2370亿欧元（折合3160亿美元）的债务，比希腊约1800亿欧元的净国民收入还高出30%。 但这类援助仅仅是巩固了那些错误的价格——以及随之产生的国家竞争力低下状况。


The debts will re-emerge like a tumor, growing year by year, while undermining the creditworthiness of stable eurozone countries.	这些债务会像一个肿瘤一样重新滋长起来，一天比一天更大，同时还会腐蚀那些稳健欧元区国家的资信可靠度。


If that happened, the euro would eventually collapse.	如果出现这个情况的话，欧元将最终走向崩溃。


Only a price reduction would create current-account surpluses and enable the crisis countries to pay off their foreign debts.	只有降低价格才能创造经常账户盈余并令这些受灾国家得以偿还自身外债。


It is time for Europe to come to terms with this remorseless truth.	而欧洲如今也是时候面对这个残酷的现实了。


Those crisis countries that do not want to take it upon themselves to lower their prices should be given the opportunity to leave the eurozone temporarily in order to devalue prices and debts.	那些不愿意自己行动起来降低价格的受灾国家应该获得一个暂时脱离欧元区以削减价格和债务的机会。


In other words, they should take a kind of euro sabbatical – a proposal that has now also been taken up by American economist Kenneth Rogoff.	换句话说，他们应该放一个欧元意义上的离岗病假——正如美国经济学家肯尼思·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）建议的那样。


After the ensuing financial thunderstorm died down, the sun would come out again very quickly.	在在随之而来的金融风暴逐渐散去之后，阳光将很快重新普照大地。


The creditor countries would have to shoulder big losses from write-downs, but they would still end up with more than they would have gotten had the crisis countries remained within the eurozone, because these countries’ new prosperity, gained by leaving, offers the only chance of recovering any assets at all.	那些债权国可能要承担因债务减免而带来的巨大损失，但相对于把那些受灾国留在欧元区内的做法，前者最终获得的好处会更多，因为这些受灾国通过脱离而实现的繁荣才是重新追回所有资产的唯一机会。


A Fair Deal for Turkey	土耳其的公平待遇


Turkey has been given what looks like an ultimatum from the EU Commission: open your ports for ships from Cyprus within a month, or you may risk a halt to the EU accession talks now underway.	土耳其好像收到了欧盟委员会的最后通牒，那就是在一个月内向来自塞浦路斯的船只开放港口，否则，就有暂停目前正在进行的入盟谈判的危险。


At the same time, the Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s progress toward accession notes that political reforms have slowed down, further calling into question the country’s future EU membership.	与此同时，委员会有关土耳其入盟进展的最新报告说明，政治改革已经放慢，从而进一步质疑该国未来加入欧盟的可能性。


The Commission’s progress report will be dealt with by the European Council next month.	欧盟理事会将在下月研究欧盟委员会的进展报告。


At that meeting, European leaders should ask themselves the following questions: Has the EU given Turkey a fair deal in the case of Cyprus?	在这一会议中，欧洲领导人应当向他们自己提出下面的问题：在塞浦路斯问题上，欧盟是否公平对待土耳其？


Has the EU’s behavior been consistent in supporting political reform in Turkey?	欧盟是否一如既往地支持土耳其的政治改革？


What are the EU’s long-term interests vis-à-vis Turkey?	在土耳其的问题上，欧盟的长久利益是什么？


If the answers to the first two questions are “no” – as I believe they are – the third question becomes vitally important.	如果前两个问题的答案正如我所相信的那样是否定的话，那么，第三个问题就极为重要。


True, Turkey has closed its ports to ships from (Greek) Cyprus, and this is a violation of agreements.	确实，土耳其对(希腊)塞浦路斯关闭了其港口，这违反了协议。


But it is also true that the northern Turkish part of Cyprus is denied access to free trade and other benefits from EU-membership.	但是，拒绝给予塞浦路斯北部的土耳其部分欧盟成员的自由贸易待遇以及其他利益也是事实。


This is because Cyprus remains a divided island.	这是因为塞浦路斯依然还是一个分裂的岛屿。


It was assumed that Cyprus should be united when the country joined the EU in 2004.	当时认为，当塞浦路斯在2004年加入欧盟之时将会统一。


A United Nations plan for unification was accepted by the Turkish part.	土耳其方面接受了联合国提出的统一方案。


But the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan because their leaders did not live up to the implicit deal with the EU to support it.	但是，希腊族塞浦路斯的领导人并没有遵守与欧盟的默契来支持这一方案，因此，它投票否决了这一方案。


Nevertheless, Cyprus became an EU member – but only the Greek part.	但是，塞浦路斯成为了欧盟成员，但仅仅是希腊部分。


This was clearly a mistake, because it made the EU part of the conflict.	这明显是一个错误，因为它使得欧盟成为冲突的一部分。


It gave Greek Cypriot leaders the possibility of blocking progress in negotiations between the EU and Turkey.	它给了塞浦路斯希腊族领导人阻碍欧盟与土耳其之间谈判进展的可能性。


So how can Turkey under these conditions maintain confidence in the EU’s fairness?	那么，在这种情况下，土耳其如何对欧盟的公平维持信心呢？


Political and legal reforms in Turkey in recent years have been remarkably far-reaching, for they have clearly been spurred by Turks’ wish to move closer to the EU.	近年来土耳其的政治和法治改革极为广泛，因为土耳其人向欧盟靠拢的愿望促进了这些改革。


But Turkish public support for EU membership has fallen dramatically as Turks have grown to feel that they are not being given a fair deal.	但是，土耳其人越发感觉到他们没有得到公平待遇，因此土耳其公众对于入盟的支持已经急剧下降。


This has given new strength to those who want Turkey to develop in another direction, towards a more Islamic society instead of a modern secular state.	这样，就给那些想要让土耳其向另一个方向发展的人增添了新的力量。 他们想要让土耳其向更为伊斯兰社会、而非现代世俗国家的方向发展。


Therefore, the recent lack of progress in Turkey’s reform process can to a large extent be explained by the EU’s behavior.	因此，欧盟的举动就可以在很大程度上解释最近土耳其的改革进程缺乏进展了。


This leaves us with the third question: what kind of Turkey does the EU want?	这样就出现了第三个问题：欧盟想要一个什么样的土耳其？


There should be no doubt about the answer: it is clearly in the EU’s interest to see Turkey’s democracy and economy continue to strengthen.	对于这一问题应当没有疑问，那就是，土耳其的民主和经济继续得到加强显然符合欧盟的利益。


More than 40 years ago, it was promised that once Turkey lives up to the preconditions for membership, it will be welcome in the EU.	四十多年前，欧盟保证说一旦土耳其满足了成员的先觉条件就将欢迎其入盟。


It is high time that European leaders take this promise seriously.	现在，欧盟领导人们应当认真履行这一保证了。


It is a sad fact that a large majority of voters in the EU are against Turkish membership.	欧盟内部的大多数选民反对土耳其入盟，这是一个悲哀的事实。


But they are reacting to the current situation.	但是，他们不过是对当前的局势做出反应。


When they are asked if they would like a reformed Turkey as a partner – a Turkey that lives up fully to the conditions for membership described in the Copenhagen Criteria (democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and an effective market economy) – many more are inclined to say yes.	如果问他们，他们是否想要一个改革后的土耳其作为伙伴，有更多的人倾向于说是的。 所谓改革后的土耳其，就是完全符合哥本哈根标准指定的入盟条件，也就是民主、法治、尊重人权以及有效的市场经济。


European leaders must therefore take up two challenges.	因此，欧洲领导人必须接受两项挑战。


First, they should say clearly to their own voters that the EU must live up to its promises to Turkey, and that this is in the larger interest of all Europeans.	首先，他们应当向自己的选民明确地说明，欧盟必须遵守对土耳其所做得保证，而且，这也符合所有欧洲人更大的利益。


Second, they should give Turkey a fair deal in the negotiations.	第二，他们必须在谈判中公平对待土耳其。


The first litmus test on European leadership concerns the practical problem of access to harbors.	欧洲领导作用的第一块试金石就是有关使用港口的现实问题。


Here the Finns, who chair the EU right now, have taken an initiative to implement a pragmatic solution that takes into consideration both sides in the conflict.	在这一问题上，欧盟轮值主席国芬兰提议落实一项现实的、考虑冲突双方的解决方案。


The Finnish initiative should be given strong support from all European leaders.	所有欧洲领导人都应该大力支持芬兰的提议。


At the same time, a new effort should be made to bring life to the UN’s proposals regarding Cyprus.	同时，应当重新努力让联合国有关塞浦路斯的提议恢复生机。


If this means putting pressure on some actors within the EU’s own ranks, so be it.	如果这意味着对某些欧盟成员国施加压力，那就应当如此。


A Farewell to (Glorious) War	永别了（荣耀的）战争


In recent days, Italy’s government fell after losing a parliamentary vote on the country’s troop deployment in Afghanistan, while Britain and Denmark announced that they are to begin withdrawing their troops from Iraq.	最近几天，意大利政府在国会中未能通过向阿富汗部署军队的议案之后倒台。 同时英国和丹麦也宣布了它们将开始把部队撤出伊拉克。


Whereas the Bush administration is deploying an additional 21,000 American soldiers in Iraq, and is pushing for more allied troops in Afghanistan, America’s allies are rejecting its Middle East policy.	而布什政府却正向伊拉克增派21000名美国士兵，并敦促盟国增兵阿富汗。 美国的盟友们正抵制其中东政策。


They are increasingly convinced that “victory” will be elusive in any asymmetric conflict between states, however powerful, and religiously driven armed insurgents.	它们日益坚信在任何不对称的国家间冲突中，不论武装叛乱者有多强大、其宗教驱动力有多深厚，“胜利”都是不可捉摸的。


Donald Rumsfeld’s dogma of military “transformation” – the technological upgrading of an army’s capacity to enable decisive victory with fewer troops – failed resoundingly in Iraq.	唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德的军事“转型”定论—以军队实力的技术升级来实现用更少的部队取得决定性胜利—在伊拉克彻底失败。


Nor could Israel, with its overwhelming technological advantage, defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon.	以色列即便拥有超强的技术优势也未能打败黎巴嫩真主党。


More rockets and missiles fell on northern Israel in 33 days than hit Britain during all of World War II.	在33天时间里落到以色列北部的火箭和导弹数量比二战期间袭击英国的还多。


So the Israelis now must reckon with an entirely new phenomenon: an asymmetric entity, Hezbollah, with nation-state firepower.	因此以色列人现在必须正视这一全新的现象：一个拥有国家级火力的不对称实体，真主党。


So the fierce debate over whether to increase the size of American ground forces in Iraq is beside the point.	所以关于是否应该扩大美军驻伊拉克地面部队规模的激烈争论是毫无意义的。


Neither the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980’s nor NATO’s today vindicates the claim that troop numbers are what matter most on the modern battlefield.	前苏联1980年代在阿富汗的经验和北约当今的情况都无法证明军队的数量是现代战场上最为重要的因素这一命题。


When geo-strategic military front lines are non-existent, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, mass no longer equals victory.	当地缘战略军事前沿不复存在，正如在科索沃、阿富汗和伊拉克那样，人多势众就不再等同于胜利。


The great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz’s notion of “decisive battles” as the “center of gravity” of war is simply irrelevant to conflicts that have no visible “center of gravity.”	伟大的军事思想家克劳斯·冯·克劳塞维茨关于将“决定性战役”作为战争的“重心”的理念在全然没有“重心”的冲突中也失去了用武之地。


Indeed, while wars from the time of Hannibal’s defeat of the Romans in 216 B.C. to the Gulf War of 1991 had this center of gravity, with a massive concentration of force capable of bringing an enemy to its knees, such industrial inter-state wars have now become an historical anachronism.	的确，尽管从公元前216年汉尼拔击溃罗马人到1991年的海湾战争都有一个这样的重心（其表现是能对敌方施以毁灭性打击的军事力量的大规模集中），而这种工业化的国家间战争现在已经成为历史陈迹。


Most states nowadays lie within borders that are widely accepted as legitimate, and they increasingly abide by international norms of behavior in times of war.	现今大多数国家都有被广泛认可的合法边界，它们在战争时期也越来越遵守国际规范和行为准则。


In fact, the obligation of states to abide by humanitarian rules of conduct while their enemies are free to barbarize warfare is what makes asymmetric wars especially insoluble.	事实上，国家遵守人道主义行为规范的义务与其敌方肆意挑起野蛮战事的矛盾使得不对称的战争特别难以调解。


Moreover, in an era of global media and international war crimes courts, the criteria for states’ use of military force have become more complex than ever.	此外，在一个全球性媒体和国际战争罪行法庭的时代，国家使用武力的条件变得越来越复杂。


Inter-state combat may still occur where strategic front lines can be found, such as Israel’s border with Syria, India’s border with Pakistan, and the border dividing the two Koreas.	在战略前沿存在的地方，如叙以边界、印巴边界和南北韩分界线，国家间的武装冲突仍然可能发生。


In such cases, war, as the Egyptians showed in 1973, might still serve as an avenue to resolving a conflict.	在这种情况下，战争，正如埃及人在1973年所展示的那样，仍可能成为解决冲突的一种途径。


The Syrians might be tempted to launch an offensive against Israel with the objective of breaking the deadlock over the future of the Golan Heights.	叙利亚人可能会企图对以色列发起进攻以达到打破戈兰高地未来僵局的目的。


However, in the case of Kashmir, the asymmetric conflict currently fought by proxies and terrorist groups might not degenerate into all-out war precisely because India and Pakistan have mutual nuclear deterrence.	然而，在克什米尔问题上，现在由代理人和恐怖分子集团参与的不对称冲突可能不会退化为一场全面的战争，恰恰是由于印度和巴基斯坦都拥有相互的核威慑。 的确，这种通过代理人进行的不对称冲突已成为各个国家避免付出全面战争代价的新的常规方式。


This changing nature of the battlefield essentially means that war as a conclusive event in an international conflict has become obsolete.	战场不断变化的特点从本质上意味着战争作为国际冲突的决定性事件的理念已经过时了。


The facile Clausewitzian wisdom that military action ultimately leads to a political solution is no longer convincing.	克劳塞维茨式的 认为军事行动最终将导致政治解决的浅显理论已不再让人信服。


“Victory” cannot bring peace, simply because there will always be a war after the war.	“胜利”不能带来和平，就是因为战争还会接连不断地发生。


Thus, for example, the conventional war in Kosovo lasted for two months, only to usher in a six-year asymmetric conflict.	因此，例如，科索沃的常规战争持续了两个月，就开启了长达六年的非对称冲突的序幕。


Likewise, America’s three-week “shock and awe” campaign in Iraq in 2003 ended in “victory,” but opened the gates of hell for occupiers and ordinary Iraqis alike.	同样，美国2003年在伊拉克发动的为期三周的“震慑行动”战役以“胜利”告终，但却为占领者和普通的伊拉克人打开了地狱之门。


And six months after the merciless pounding of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is as strong as it was before.	在经历了对黎巴嫩南部六个月的无情打击之后，真主党的实力并未被削弱。


Nor does the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan six years after their overthrow now seen too far-fetched.	被推翻的塔利班六年之后在阿富汗卷土重来似乎也不是空穴来风。


It is during the war after the war that the occupier’s inferiority is revealed, with constant reinforcements increasing the number of targets for the insurgents far more quickly than the occupier can adapt to the changing battlefield.	占领者的劣势在战后的战斗中暴露出来。 持续的强化部署为叛乱分子增加了目标，而占领军根本来不及适应战场形势的变化。


The insurgents in Iraq, as the British admit, were able in just three years to cope with their enemies’ technological superiority in a way that the IRA in Northern Ireland was unable to do in 30 years.	伊拉克的叛乱分子，正如英国人所承认的，仅用了三年的时间就能应对它们敌方的技术优势，而同样的应对能力北爱的爱尔兰共和军花了30年都没做到。


The Iraq war and Israel’s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah show the limits of what military power can achieve, as well as vindicate diplomacy and conflict resolution.	伊拉克战争和以色列与哈马斯及真主党的战争显示了武力的局限性，同时也证实了外交和冲突决议的作用。


When it comes to tackling complex political and cultural conflicts, forging international and regional alliances around a legitimate objective is more important than sheer military capacity.	在应对复杂的政治和文化冲突时，围绕一个合法的目的建立国际和地区性联盟比单靠武力更为重要。


That said, it would be dangerously naïve to believe that the exercise of power and the capacity to intimidate are unnecessary.	虽然如此，认为使用武力和威慑力并不必要的想法也是天真得危险。


But the objectives of the use of force need to be linked to the recognition that in today’s asymmetric conflicts, victory is no longer achieved on the battlefield.	但使用武力的目的需要与这样一个认识联系起来，即：在当今的非对称冲突中，胜利不再能够从战场上获得。


Only better-informed foreign policies that can address the genuine anxieties of civilizations in crisis will yield more sustainable results.	只有能应对处于危机中的文明的真正焦虑的，更明智的外交政策才能产生更具可持续性的成果。


Affirmative Action for Europe	平权欧洲


The violence in France, fueled by staggering unemployment and ruthless policing, reflects the utter failure of the French model of social integration.	高居不下的失业率和鲁莽的警察执法为法国的暴力冲突火上浇油。 这反映了社会一体化法国模式的彻底失败。


But violence elsewhere in Europe, such as the London bombings of July and the brutal murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam in November 2004, had already made Europe’s failure to integrate its minorities painfully clear.	然而，发生在欧洲其它地方的暴力，例如7月的伦敦爆炸和2004年11月荷兰电影制作人在阿姆斯特丹街头被残忍地谋杀，已经用痛苦的明了方式见证了欧洲在少数族裔融合上的失败。


As the riots in France fade, French politicians are agonizing about how to proceed.	随着暴乱在法国的逐渐平息，法国的政治家们又开始为何去何从而苦恼。


Forty years ago, after legal segregation of blacks and whites formally ended in America, the United States was confronted by similar problems.	40年前，当对黑人和白人在法律上的隔离制度正式终结后，美国也面临过类似的问题。


America’s response shows, however, that integration cannot be viewed as a one-way street.	然而，美国的应对表明民族融合不能被看作是一条单行道。


In addition to imposing demands and constraints on minorities to join the mainstream, society must be willing to demand of itself that it make room for all its citizens.	除了对少数族裔加入主流社会实行法律上的保障外，社会也必须自愿为其所有的公民腾出空间。


As a potential model to be followed, Europe should look at the so-called “affirmative action” policies that America enacted to provide opportunities to blacks.	作为一种可资效仿的模式，欧洲应该仔细考察美国为给黑人提供机会而实施的所谓“平权(affirmative action)” 政策。


Affirmative action, or “positive discrimination,” as some have called these policies, began with university admissions.	平权，或又被称作“积极差别待遇（positive discrimination）”，开始于大学录取。


But, in the early 1970’s, President Richard M. Nixon expanded the scope of affirmative action.	但是，在1970年代早期，尼克松总统扩大了平权的范围。


As a result, ethnicity began to be weighed as a positive factor not only in university admissions, but also in public procurement decisions, credit facilities for small enterprises, and government hiring.	其结果是种族划分开始被接受成为一种积极的因素。 这不仅表现在大学录取过程中，也被贯彻到了公共采购决策、对小型企业的信贷和政府雇用等方面。


The rational for affirmative action in those early years was the fact that, after a long history of systemic injustice, merely outlawing discrimination based on race or gender would not ensure equal opportunity for all.	早期平权背后的理由是：经过长期系统性的不公正，仅仅依靠将种族和性别歧视非法化还并不足以保证所有人的机会平等。


Such programs are often viewed as contradicting a basic American value, namely that admissions, lending, and hiring decisions should be based on the merits of the individual, not group distinctions.	这些政策经常被认为是有悖于基本的美国价值观，即：录取、放贷和雇用的决策应该基于个人的成绩表现，而不是种族的划分。


But they remain in existence three decades later.	但三十年后，这些政策仍然存在。


Indeed, leading American companies, like General Motors, General Electric, and Walmart, have created affirmative action programs for hiring and selecting suppliers at their own initiative.	的确，如通用汽车、通用电气和沃尔玛等领导性的美国公司都已创立了自身在人员雇用和供货商选择方面的平权政策。


Similarly, anchormen and anchorwomen from all ethnic backgrounds populate American television news programs.	同样，美国的电视新闻节目中有很多来自各种族裔背景的男女主播。


In France, by contrast, the appointment of the black anchorwoman Audrey Pulvar was big news on its own, because most of her colleagues in France are white.	相比之下，在法国，黑人女主播奥黛丽•布尔瓦的任命本身就是一条大新闻，因为她的大多数法国同事都是白人。


Affirmative action in the US has been effective in creating a large African-American middle class.	美国的平权在建立一个庞大的非洲裔美国人中产阶级方面卓有成效。


The percentage of black households earning over $50,000 a year (adjusted for inflation) has more than tripled over the last four decades, from 9.1% in 1967 to 27.8% in 2001.	在过去的40年里，年收入超过5万美金（计入通胀因素）的黑人家庭的百分比增长了三倍多，从1967年的9. 1%增加到2001年的27.


Indeed, in the US, more people of color and women hold top jobs in the public and private sector than anywhere else in the world.	的确，在美国的公私领域身居高位的有色人种和女性数量超过了世界上任何其它地方。


The fact that a large black underclass remains – something the recent floods in New Orleans revealed in a horrifically dramatic way – is mainly the result of failing school systems.	而庞大的黑人下层阶级仍然存在的事实—被最近的新奥尔良洪水以惊人的戏剧性方式暴露出来—主要是每况愈下的学校体系造成的。


Affirmative action programs, of course, have always been vulnerable to attack by those who can’t benefit from them.	当然，平权政策从来就是那些不能从中获益的人的攻击目标。


In 2003, a white student asked the US Supreme Court to declare that the use of race in the University of Michigan’s admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution.	在2003年，一位白人学生要求美国最高法院宣布密歇根大学在招生政策中使用种族标准违反了美国宪法第十四条修正案中的《平等保护条款》。


The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the program was constitutional, citing a “compelling state interest” in racial diversity.	但最高法院裁决认为该政策符合宪法精神，并引用了种族多样性中的“强制性国家利益”为理由。


“Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civil life of our nation,” the court said, “is essential if the dream of one nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”	判决中说：“所有种族和民族集团的成员有效地参与我们国家的公民生活，对于一个国家不可分割的梦想的实现至关重要。 ”


In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court took into account a legal brief submitted by 60 major American businesses, led by General Motors, asking that affirmative action be upheld.	在达成该判决的过程中，最高法院还认真参考了一份由通用汽车为首的60家美国大公司呈交的法律纲要。 该文件要求维持平权政策。


They argued that the skills needed in today’s global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to a wide diversity of people.	这些公司认为，当今全球市场所需的技能只有通过族裔多样性的沟通才能获得。


Retired military officers and commanders told the court that affirmative action was essential to maintaining an integrated officer corps.	退伍的军官和指挥官告诉法院平权对于保持军官队伍的完整性���关重要。


What America’s affirmative action programs may not do is set quotas for minorities, as this prevents competition between different groups.	美国的平权政策不可能做的就是对少数族裔设定配额，因为这会妨碍不同族裔集团之间的竞争。


But, in comparing groups, it is permitted to use an individual’s status as member of an under-represented minority in his or her favor.	但在进行不同族群的比较时，该政策允许将个体的少数族群成员身份作为一项对个人有利的条件。


As a result, a university may select a black student with a satisfactory score on the admissions test, even if there is a white student with a better score.	其结果是，即使是另一个白人学生的成绩更高，大学仍可能录用一个在入学考试中成绩合格的黑人学生。


From the current French viewpoint, however, laws and regulations based on ethnicity are regarded as an unwelcome encroachment on the Republican ideal.	然而，从目前的法国观点来看，基于种族的法律和法规被认为是不受欢迎的，对共和理想的侵犯。


French President Jacques Chirac vehemently opposes quotas for immigrants, out of fear that such a policy would stigmatize groups.	法国总统希拉克激烈反对移民配额，担心这样的政策会成为种族烙印。


And French businesses don’t see it as their role to solve the problems of the suburbs.	而法国的公司并不认为解决郊区的问题是他们的责任。


Moreover, French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy hasn’t done much except hand out some special grants to the smartest immigrants from the suburbs.	另外，法国内政部长Nicolas Sarkozy除了给来自郊区的最聪明的移民颁发一些特殊津贴以外也无所建树。


France does have affirmative action programs, but they address poverty, not ethnicity.	法国也有平权政策，但都是针对贫困问题，而不是族群问题。


If European politicians are serious about preventing a schism between population groups, affirmative action is essential – not only at the workplace, but also for small business loans, home loans, public procurement, and school admissions.	如果欧洲的政治家们认真地想要防止人口族群的分裂，那幺平权政策就至关重要—这不仅要体现在职场，还要体现在小额商业贷款、房屋贷款、公共采购和学校招生等方面。


Tony Blair, who in July was faced with the shortcomings of integration in the UK, should take advantage of the country’s current presidency of the European Union to make affirmative action programs the top priority at next month’s summit of European government leaders in Brussels.	在7月直面了英国民族融合中的缺陷的托尼•布莱尔，应该利用英国作为目前欧盟轮值主席国的机会，将平权政策作为下月将在布鲁塞尔举行的欧洲政府首脑峰会的首要议题。


Affordable Green Energy	我们所负担得起的绿色能源


COPENHAGEN – Public skepticism about global warming may be growing, but the scientific consensus is as solid as ever: man-made climate change is real, and we ignore it at our peril.	发自哥本哈根——虽然公众对全球变暖的质疑之声日益滋长，但科学界对于该现象也达成了空前一致的共识：人为造成的气候变化时确实存在，而我们却忽视了它所造成的风险。


But if that issue is settled (and it should be), there is an equally large and important question that remains wide open: what should we do about it?	但如果这个问题能得到（也应该得到）解决的话，那么就有一个同样宏大而且重要的问题亟待解答：究竟该用什么方法解决？


One prescription that is bandied about with increasing frequency certainly sounds sensible: the world should drastically cut the amount of greenhouse gases that it pumps into the atmosphere each day.	对此有一种解决方案正日渐流行，而且听上去似乎也合情合理，那就是全世界必须大幅削减每天的温室气体排放量。


Specifically, we are told, the goal should be a 50% reduction in global carbon-dioxide emissions by the middle of the century.	具体来说，目标就是在本世纪中期将全球二氧化碳排放量减少50%。


Even its backers concede that achieving this target won’t be easy – and they are right.	而即便是该方案的支持者也自知达到这个目标非常不易——他们是对的。


In fact, they are so right that they are wrong.	事实上，正是他们的正确导致了自身的错误。


Allow me to explain.	且听我细细道来：


Our dependency on carbon-emitting fuels is more than enormous.	如今，我们对那些排放二氧化碳的燃料的依赖何止是巨大，简直是压倒性的，太阳能，风能以及其他热炒的绿色能源目前仅占全球能源消费的0.


It is overwhelming.	6%。


For all the talk about solar, wind, and other hyped green-energy sources, they make up only 0.6% of global energy consumption. Renewable energy overwhelmingly comes from often-unsustainable burning of wood and biomass by people in the Third World.	绝大多数可再生能源都来自于第三世界人民燃烧木柴或者其他生物燃料，而且往往是不可持续地滥用。


Fossil fuels account for more than four-fifths of the world’s energy diet.	而化石燃料则占据了全世界能源总消耗量的4/5强。


So, in order to cut global carbon emissions in half by the middle of the century, we would obviously have to start getting a lot more of our energy from sources that don’t emit carbon.	因此如果要实现在本世纪中期将全球碳排放量减半的话，很显然，我们必须得从那些不排放碳的资源中获取更多的能源。


Can we do this?	我们能做到这一点吗？


According to the International Energy Agency, here’s what it would take to achieve the goal of cutting emissions by 50% between now and mid-century:	根据国际能源署的研究，要在2050年时达到50%的碳排放削减，我们必须做到以下几点：


30 new nuclear plants; 17,000 windmills; 400 biomass power plants;Two hydroelectric facilities the size of China’s massive Three Gorges Dam; and42 coal and gas power plants with yet-to-be-developed carbon-capture technology.Now consider this: this list does not describe what we would have to build between now and 2050, but what we would have to build each and every year until then!	兴建30座核电站竖立17000台风力发电机新建400座生物能电站建造2座规模类似中国三峡大坝的水电站为42座火力发电站安装碳捕捉装置（这些装置目前尚未研究出来）现在再考虑一下：上面所列的可不是我们需要在未来40年间总共所需的装置，而是这40年间每年都需要建设的装置数量！


One more thing: even if we managed to do all this (which we obviously cannot), the impact on global temperatures would be hardly noticeable by 2050.	还有一点：即便我们拼死拼活把这些东西都建起来了（很显然，这是不可能的），但到了2050年时，这一切努力对全球气温的影响几乎微乎其微。 照最著名的气候-经济模型推算，这场大规模建设最终将把全球气温降低0.


According to the best-known climate-economic model, this vast undertaking would likely wind up reducing global temperatures by just one-tenth of one degree centigrade (one-fifth of one degree Fahrenheit), while holding back sea-level rises by only one centimeter (less than half an inch).	1摄氏度（约为0. 2华氏度），而海平面升高的幅度也只会减少1厘米（不到半英寸）。


That’s not a lot of bang for the buck.	这可不是一笔划算的买卖。


Indeed, the projected costs of this approach – some $5 trillion annually by mid-century – are so much greater than its likely benefits that it makes no sense to call it a solution at all.	实际上，这一套方案的预计成本——大概5万亿美元一年——相比其取得的效果来说是如此庞大，将其称之为“解决方案”简直就有点荒谬了。


Fortunately, there is a better, smarter way to deal with global warming.	幸运的是，我们还有一种更好，更明智的方法来应对全球变暖问题。


What if, instead of spending trillions of dollars trying to build an impossible number of power plants – or, more likely, condemning billions of people around the world to continued poverty by trying to make carbon-emitting fuels too expensive to use – we devoted ourselves to making green energy cheaper?	与其花费数千亿美元兴建无数的发电站——或者刻意提高碳排放燃料的费用，不惜令全球数十亿人生活在贫困当中——不如让我们一起努力，令绿色能源变得更加廉价。


Right now, solar panels are so expensive – about 10 times more than fossil fuels in terms of cost per unit of energy output – that only well-heeled, well-meaning (and, usually, well-subsidized) Westerners can afford to install them.	目前，太阳能电池板非常昂贵——其能源输出成本相当于化石燃料的10倍之多——只有那些富有而热心（而且往往手握大把补贴）的西方人才能用得起。


But think where we’d be if we could improve the efficiency of solar cells by a factor of ten – in other words, if we could make them cheaper than fossil fuels.	但试想，如果我们能把太阳能电池的效率提高十倍——换言之，如果我��能令其比化石燃料更便宜。


We wouldn’t have to force (or subsidize) anyone to stop burning coal and oil.	那时我们根本不需要强迫（或补贴）人们停用化石燃料。


Everyone, including the Chinese and the Indians, would shift to the cheaper and cleaner alternatives – and global emission targets would automatically be met.	世界上的每个人，包括中国和印度人民，会转向这种更廉价且清洁的替代方案——而全球减排目标也自动实现了。


Can we achieve this technological miracle over the next 20 to 40 years?	那么我们究竟能不能在未来20至40年间实现这一科技奇迹呢？


In a word, yes.	总而言之，可以！


The price of solar energy has been dropping steadily for 30 years – by about 50% every decade – and we could likely accelerate that decline further with sufficiently large investments in research and development.	太阳能的价格将在未来30年内稳步下降——大概每10年下降50%——而如果有足够大量的资金投入研究的话，我们可以进一步加快下降的速度。


How large?	那么究竟要多“大量”的资金？


If we were willing to devote just 0.2% of global GDP (roughly $100 billion a year) to green-energy R&D, I believe that we could bring about game-changing breakthroughs not just for solar power, but also for a wide variety of other alternative-energy technologies.	只要投入全球年度GDP的0. 2%（大概1000亿美元）投入到研究当中，相信就能取得开创性的突破，而且不仅限于太阳能领域，其他各类可替代能源技术都将从中受益。


This belief in the potential of technological progress strikes some climate activists as naïve or even delusional.	我这种对技术进步潜力的信心被某些气候活动分子认为是痴心妄想。


But is it really?	这是真的吗？


Consider one of the miracles of the modern age – the personal computer.	想想当今世界的其中一个奇迹——个人电脑。


These devices didn’t become household items because governments subsidized purchases or forced up the price of typewriters and slide rules.	由于政府补贴采购并强迫提高打字机和计算尺的价格，这些设备起初根本无缘进入普通家庭。


No, what happened is that, largely as a result of the space race, the United States government poured lots of money into R&D for solid-state physics and electronics engineering. The resulting breakthroughs not only got Neil Armstrong to the moon in 1969, but also made it possible for Apple to introduce the first Mac in 1976 and IBM to debut the first PC five years later.	而事实上，由于太空竞赛的缘故，美国政府投入巨资到固态物理和电子工程领域，结果不仅仅是尼尔·阿姆斯特朗1969年登月成功，同时还催生了苹果公司于1976年推出的第一台苹果电脑，以及5年之后IBM个人电脑的诞生。


We can do the same for clean energy.	这是可供洁净能源借鉴的成功先例。


Forget about subsidizing inefficient technologies or making fossil fuels too expensive to use. Instead, let’s fund the basic research that will make green energy too cheap and easy to resist.	不要再试图补贴低效率的技术或者尝试提高化石能源的价格，反过来，让我们去资助那些有助于令绿色能源更廉价，更让人难以抗拒的基础研究吧！


Afghanistan Is Lost Without Better Governance	没有更好的统治，阿富汗前途黯淡


NEW YORK – President Obama's recent trip to Afghanistan highlighted the growing American and international perception that without better governance Afghanistan will fail.	纽约 ——


As President Obama apparently made clear in his late night meeting with President Hamid Karzai, no matter what other progress is made, America and its allies cannot succeed in Afghanistan unless the Afghan government succeeds—and that government is moving in the wrong direction.	今年，在阿富汗问题上，美国阿富汗及北约盟友都取得不错的进展。 正在进行的玛利亚行动，逮捕了位于巴基斯坦的巴拉达尔和两名塔利班“影子内阁部长”；


Until this changes, all other efforts will ultimately be in vain and current levels of international engagement with Afghanistan will become unjustifiable.	近期持续打击亲塔利班的哈卡尼组织等行动，都是在正确的方向上取得的胜利。


The United States and its Afghan and NATO allies have demonstrated unmistakable progress in Afghanistan this year.	但不管在其他方面的进展如何，只有阿富汗政府有效运作，美国及其盟友才能谈得上胜利 —— 但现在，阿富汗政府正在朝着错误的方向前行。


The ongoing Marja campaign, the arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and two Taliban "shadow governors" in Pakistan, and the recent drone strike hitting top leaders of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Haqqani network are all clear steps in the right direction.	只有改变方向性错误，不然所有一切的努力都是白费，国际社会的参与也就没了合法性。


President Obama has defined America's goals in Afghanistan as denying Al Qaeda a safe haven, reversing the Taliban's momentum, and helping the country's security forces and government "take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future."	美国总统奥巴马将美国在阿富汗的目标设定为：击垮基地组织老巢，阻击塔利班和帮助阿国建立安全部队及有效政府，以 “担负起阿富汗未来的领导责任。


To this end, Obama launched an 18-month military "surge" with the backing of other NATO member countries, to be followed by the beginning of withdrawal.	”为此，在北约盟友的协助下，奥巴马展开了在正式撤军之前为期 18 个月的军事行动。


To achieve these goals in such a short time, NATO and its Afghan partners must overcome three enormous obstacles.	为了在短时间内达到上述目标，北约及其阿富汗盟友必须克服三大障碍。


First, they must fight far more successfully against the Taliban to create space for rebuilding and possible negotiation.	首先，他们必须在对塔利班的战争中取得巨大胜利，以创造重建国家及和谈的可能。


Second, they must convince Pakistan to begin actively opposing the Afghan Taliban and denying them the safe haven and support they currently receive in Pakistan.	第二，他们必须说服巴基斯坦积极加入反对阿富汗塔利班的行动，消除塔利班在巴的老巢。


Third, they must support the emergence of a legitimate Afghan government that is not, unlike the current government, seen as corrupt and ineffectual by its citizens.	第三，他们必须支持成立阿富汗合法政府，而不是现任那个腐败低效的政权。


Because the NATO strategy's success requires significant progress on each of these fronts, even the current preliminary signs of military progress and in Pakistan's relations with the Afghan Taliban will be for naught if Afghanistan's government cannot establish its legitimacy domestically.	北约战略成功来自于全方面的成功。 如果阿富汗无法建立合法政府，那么，现在的军事胜利和巴基斯坦对阿塔利班的打击都会毁于一旦。


Recent efforts by President Hamid Karzai’s administration to limit its public accountability demonstrate that the Afghan government in its current form lacks either the capacity or the willingness to do so.	近期对卡尔扎伊政府的不信任显示出目前的政权缺乏能力和意愿来管理国家。


For at least a year prior to the August 2009 elections, NATO officials recognized that ordinary Afghans' disgust with their government's massive corruption was among the Taliban's most effective recruitment tools.	早在 2009 年 8 月的大选之际，北约官员就发现，普通阿富汗民众对政府大规模腐败感到厌恶，这也是塔利班征兵的一个最有效借口。


At that time, these officials argued that the elections would give Afghanistan’s leaders a clear mandate for reform.	当时，他们原指望通过大选来帮助阿富汗领导人实施改革。


The deeply discredited elections put an end to those hopes.	随后充满舞弊的大选让所有人都寒了心。


The original flaw of the 2009 elections was structural. There was no voter list, and so it was nearly impossible to prevent ballot-stuffing.	2009 年大选的失败是全面的，没有选民名单的选举很难阻止舞弊发生。


The body empowered to conduct the vote, the Independent Election Commission, was run by commissioners all appointed by and partial to one candidate, Karzai.	作为选举机构的独立选举委员会的委员，很大程度上都由卡尔扎伊任命。


One institution, the Electoral Complaints Commission—a hybrid Afghan-international oversight body with a majority vote controlled by United Nations-appointed commissioners—retained its credibility throughout the process.	由阿富汗和国际社会共同组成的选举监督委员会中大部分委员由联合国任命 —— 在选举过程中保持一定的威信。


Only the presence of the ECC, particularly its international commissioners, and the hope that it would ensure at least some fairness into the process prevented the electoral controversy from erupting into open conflict.	选举监督委员会的存在保证了选举过程上某种程度的公平，阻止选民潜在的公开冲突。


As flawed as the elections were and as contentious as the outcome ultimately was, the situation would have been far worse without the ECC.	虽然整个选举漏洞百出，但如果没有监督委员会，情况会更加糟糕。


After the election, many hoped that Karzai would recognize the need to build a more accountable government to help secure both Afghanistan's future and the future of international military and financial support.	大选之后，许多人希望卡尔扎伊能建立一个值得信任政府，确保阿富汗的未来和后期维和部队介入及国际援助的顺利展开。


In a high-profile speech in London this past January, Karzai pledged to make progress in fighting corruption and promoting government accountability.	今年 1 月，卡尔扎伊在伦敦高调讲演，承诺在反腐和推动政府诚信问题上作出努力。


Instead, the opposite appears to be happening.	但事实却是恰恰相反。


Since his London speech, Karzai has actively opposed efforts to attack official corruption, sought to appoint warlords to his cabinet, failed to promote civil society, and weakened processes aimed at increasing the representation of women in parliament.	自从伦敦讲话之后，卡尔扎伊积极反对反腐行动，把军阀引入内阁中，无法推动公民社会的建设，反对增加妇女在议会中比例的活动。


To make matters worse, Karzai issued a decree on February 13 permitting him to appoint all of the ECC's members, a measure clearly designed to strengthen the patronage system and weaken opposition movements’ prospects in future elections and a strong demonstration that his administration is not serious about establishing greater government accountability.	更有甚者， 2 月 13 日，卡尔扎伊颁布法令，让自己任命所有选举监督委员会成员。 这显然是为了强化裙带关系，以便在未来的选举中打压反对势力，这清楚地表明他对提高政府诚信视为儿戏。


NATO and the international community must do everything possible to foster accountable government at all levels in Afghanistan.	北约和国际社会必须行动起来，竭力建立一个全方位的可信政府。


Although Afghanistan's government does not need to be fully centralized, Afghanistan cannot succeed if the central government fails.	虽然阿富汗政府不能完全集权，不过，如果中央政府失灵，人民也就不会幸福。


For this reason, unless the Karzai government changes course there is no justification for NATO member countries to risk the lives of their soldiers and commit other valuable resources to the struggle in Afghanistan if the Afghan government’s corruption and legitimacy deficit make current progress unsustainable and achievement of NATO’s goals impossible.	所以，除非卡尔扎伊作出改变，积极反腐，否则，北约盟国没有必要让自己的士兵冒险和向阿提高宝贵的资源。


Karzai is free to lead his country as he pleases, but America and its allies cannot and should not maintain their current levels of commitment unless his government can establish itself as a viable partner.	卡尔扎伊可以按照自己的意愿领导国家，不过，除非现任政府能成为有效的合作伙伴，否则美国及其盟友不能，也不应该保持自己的承诺。


The 18-month clock is ticking.	18 个月最后期限的倒计时已经开始。


No Exit from Afghanistan	阿富汗没有出路


NEW DELHI – Despite frequent turmoil and repeated invasions, Afghanistan has remained virtually unchanged for centuries.	新德里—尽管动乱频仍并一再被侵略，但几百年来阿富汗几乎没有任何变化。


Nearly 120 years ago, Winston Churchill described the futility of warfare in the region: “Financially it is ruinous.	近120年前，温斯顿·丘吉尔这样描述在该地区发动战争的无用性：“财政上这是灾难。


Morally it is wicked.	道德上这是邪恶。


Militarily it is an open question, and politically it is a blunder.”	军事上这不确定。 政治上这是大错。


Churchill’s assessment undoubtedly rings true for many United States and NATO officials today, as they attempt to coordinate an exit from America’s longest overseas combat commitment in history.	”毫无疑问，丘吉尔的评价对当今许多美国和北约官员来说是正确的警钟——他们正在组织从美国为时最长的海外战斗中联合撤军。


While the war in Afghanistan may have resulted in fewer American deaths and injuries than previous US wars, the human cost remains substantial – especially after factoring in Afghan deaths and injuries.	阿富汗战争造成美军伤亡人数比前几场战争都要少，但人力成本仍然非常巨大——特别是在考虑到阿富汗方面的伤亡后。


Moreover, trillions of dollars have been wasted, with the few positive effects of the US-led military intervention already beginning to fade, and its many adverse consequences continuing to destabilize the region.	此外，数万亿美元被浪费，美国领导的军事干预所造成的少得可怜的积极效果已开始消失，副作用倒是在继续动摇该地区。


US President Barack Obama is now trying to negotiate a new “status of forces” agreement with the Afghan government in order to establish how many US troops will remain in Afghanistan and the terms of their deployment.	如今，美国总统奥巴马在试图与阿富汗政府谈判新的“驻军地位”协议，以确定多少美军将留驻阿富汗以及他们的部署问题。


But the reality is that the US is scuttling from a conflict that it has lost, just as it did in Vietnam almost 40 years ago, leaving the beleaguered population to its own devices.	但现实是美国从冲突中败北遁走，一如近40年前的越南，任其走后被包围的群众自生自灭。


Rather than admit defeat, US officials are resorting to diversionary rhetoric.	美国官员不承认失败，反而再次祭出了转移注意力的把戏。


For example, speaking recently in New Delhi, Secretary of State John Kerry said that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to build a “new silk road” connecting it with central Asia – a cynical contrivance apparently aimed at cloaking America’s failure in illusions of future commerce.	比如，国务卿克里在其最近的新德里演讲中表示，稳定阿富汗的关键是建设“新丝绸之路”，将它和中亚联系起来——这个蹩脚的借口显然是在用未来商业幻觉掩盖美国的失败。


Kerry’s insistence that the US is not withdrawing, but “drawing down,” is a similarly transparent attempt at manipulation.	克里坚持说美国不是撤退，而是“缩编”，这也显然是文字操纵伎俩。


To be sure, America’s presence in Afghanistan has spawned important regional linkages; unfortunately, they are not the kind that support economic renewal.	毫无疑问，美国在阿富汗的存在催生了重要的地区联系； 不幸的是，这些联系并不能支持经济复苏。


The last decade of war and lawlessness has facilitated the Taliban’s proliferation across Pakistan and Afghanistan, leading the Taliban to consider itself an indefatigable force – a belief that could lead its leaders to undercut any progress toward stability.	过去十年的战争和法律真空助长了塔利班在巴基斯坦和阿富汗的滋生，导致塔利班自视为不屈不挠的军事力量——这样的信念可能导致其领导人破坏任何通往稳定的进程。


In fact, the Taliban’s confidence already drove them to disrupt plans for peace talks with the Afghan government.	事实上，塔利班的信心已然促使他们干扰与阿富汗政府的和平谈判计划。


After agreeing to establish an office in Qatar exclusively to host the talks, in June the Taliban opened a quasi-embassy of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”	塔利班先是同意在卡塔尔成立一个办公室专门用来举行谈判，但在6月，他们又与“阿富汗伊斯兰酋长国”建立了准大使级关系。


The Afghan government responded by suspending talks with the Taliban, as well as the status-of-forces negotiations with the US.	阿富汗政府的反应时中止了与塔利班的谈判和与美国的军队地位谈判。


Pakistan recommends seeking an alternate venue for the negotiations with the Taliban, rather than abandoning reconciliation efforts altogether.	巴基斯坦建议寻找其他地点与塔利班谈判，而不要一股脑儿放弃协调努力。


This bodes well for the resumption of talks, given that Pakistan played a leading role in facilitating the Taliban’s emergence and is now home to the Afghan Taliban’s ruling council, including its leader, Mullah Omar, along with the Pakistani Taliban.	这对重启谈判来说是个福音，因为巴基斯坦在帮助塔利班崛起方面扮演了重要角色，也是阿富汗塔利班统治委员会（包括其领袖奥马尔）和巴基斯坦塔利班的老巢。


India’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, Vivek Katju, is confident that Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s anger at the Taliban’s gambit in Qatar will not delay negotiations for long.	前印度驻阿富汗大使卡特居（Vivek Katju）信心满满地认为，阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊对塔利班卡塔尔策略的愤怒将长期推迟谈判。


(Indeed, Karzai has reportedly already met with Taliban representatives for secret talks aimed at restarting the stalled peace initiative.)	（事实上，卡尔扎伊已多次会见塔利班代表进行秘密谈判，目的是重启陷入停顿的和平计划。 ）


Katju attributes the talks’ inevitable resumption to America’s “strategic desperation,” which is so acute that the US would be unlikely even to follow through on Kerry’s pledge to call off the talks if any link to Al Qaeda were found.	卡特居认为谈判必然重启的原因是美国的“战略绝望”，这种绝望极其强烈，以至于如果找到与基地组织的联系，美国甚至不可能兑现克里取消谈判的承诺。


After all, the US has already accepted the Taliban’s unrealistic assurances that it will not use Afghanistan as a base from which to “foment trouble” – that is, execute terrorist attacks – elsewhere.	毕竟，美国已经接受了塔利班不现实的保证——不会利用阿富汗作为在别的地区“挑起麻烦”（即进行恐怖袭击）的基地。


Fortunately for the US, the Taliban is no longer a homogeneous group.	对美国来说，幸事是塔利班不再是铁板一块的组织。


A decade of running and hiding from unrelenting surveillance and targeted drone attacks has caused the movement to splinter.	十年来一刻不停地与监控和定向无人机攻击捉迷藏已经造成了塔利班内部的裂痕。


Yet, as the security expert Sajjan M. Gohel has observed, “the displaced and disillusioned Taliban youth of today” have “found solace and purpose in an extremely radical interpretation of Islam.”	但是，正如安全专家高尔（Sajjan M. Gohel）所观察的，“流离失所、幻想破灭的今日塔利班青年”已经“在对伊斯兰教的极端激进的解释中找到了慰藉和目标。


The Taliban may no longer be a unified force, but they clearly remain a dangerous one.	”塔利班可能不再是团结的军事力量，但显然仍是极其危险的。


All of these developments have put India in a difficult position.	所有这些发展趋势让印度的处境极其艰难。


In Afghanistan, America’s military was so tactically dependent on Pakistan that, on several occasions, the US encouraged India to curtail development projects, such as rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure.	在阿富汗，战术上美军极其依赖巴基斯坦，在不少情形中，美国还鼓励印度削减开发项目，如阿富汗基础设施的重建。 美军撤退后，阿富汗极有可能回到战前状态；


Following America’s military withdrawal, Afghanistan will most likely revert to pre-war conditions; Pakistan will revive state-sponsored terrorism against India; and extremism will spill into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.	巴基斯坦国家支持的针对印度的恐怖主义将复兴； 极端主义���溢出波及印度查默邦和克什米尔邦。


In order to make the best of a grim situation, India must be prepared to protect its own interests at all costs.	为了尽量减轻不利情形，印度必须做好不惜一切代价捍卫自身利益的准备。


After all, as the US extricates itself from its Afghan quagmire, its own national interests will continue to trump all other considerations.	毕竟，随着美国从阿富汗泥沼中脱身而出，其自身国家利益将继续压倒其他一切考虑。


But China, Pakistan, and Iran also have their own important national-security interests in Afghanistan that each will now do their utmost to guarantee.	但中国、巴基斯坦和伊朗也有其重要国家安全利益在阿富汗，它们都会竭尽全力维护这一利益。


So, while US troops may be leaving Afghanistan, an end to the violence spawned by America’s war remains nothing more than a distant dream – especially for Afghanistan’s South Asian neighbors.	因此，早美国军队可能离开阿富汗的同时，而由这场美国战争而形成的暴力平息局面也将化为一场泡影——特别是对阿富汗的南亚邻国来说。


Afghanistan’s Customary Anguish	阿富汗陋习所带来的痛苦


FARAH , AFGHANISTAN – When the problems riddling Afghan society are listed – violence, insecurity, corruption, religious fundamentalism – one dominating factor is usually left out: the influence of customary law.	阿富汗法拉赫 —— 在历数暴力、危险、腐败、原教旨主义等诸多困扰阿富汗的谜题时，人人往往遗漏了一个起决定作用的因素：那就是习惯法的影响。


In Afghanistan, there are three principal legal references:   constitutional law, the Koran, and the system of customary law known as Farhang , the most dominant and strictest version of which is called Pashtunwali (the way of the Pashtuns).	当前影响阿富汗的主要有三大法律体系：宪法、古兰经和被称为 Farhang 的习惯法。 而在习惯法中，最重要也最严格的版本当属普什图法 （ Pashtunwali ） 。


Originally an ancient honor code, Farhang ensures the dominance of the oldest male of any household, followed by married sons, unmarried sons, and grandsons, then wives (with the youngest at the bottom).	Farhang 起源于古老的荣誉守则，目的是确保家庭控制权掌握在最年长的男子手中。 接下来掌握决策权的依次是已婚儿子、未婚儿子、孙子和妻子（最年轻的排在最末）。


Collective decisions are taken by patriarchs in councils called jirgas , where all have to be in agreement.	集体决策由 jirgas 委员会中的长老做出，所有人都必须服从他们的决策。


This agreement includes including collaborating or not with the Taliban, cooperating with the Coalition forces, accepting or refusing poppy eradication in a village.	决策内容包括是否与塔利班和联盟武装合作，还包括接受或拒绝在村子里铲除罂粟。


Everything else is left to patriarchal discretion.   Here, no one will intervene except to reinforce the application of   the patriarch's rights – say, in stoning a supposedly wayward girl, or turning a blind eye to so-called “honor killings” of women.	所有事务的生杀大权均由族长们掌握。 除巩固族长权利外任何人无权干涉 —— 比方说用石块砸死一个任性胡为的女孩，或者对女性所谓的“荣誉杀戮”熟视无睹。


Every act of an Afghan male’s life is integrated in a form of reciprocity, in which nothing is free.	阿富汗男性生命中的一举一动均包含某种形式的互换，没有什么东西是不付出代价就可以得到的。


Melmastia , the basic tenet of hospitality means “I will give you shelter if you ask me to, even if you are a fugitive murderer; but, in exchange, you fight my battles.”	Melmastia （互惠互利） 是人际交往的基本原则，它意味着“即使你是亡命天涯的杀人凶手，只要来求我帮助我也会为你提供栖身之所，但交换条件是，你必须为我战斗。


This sense of customary obligation is why so many of President Hamid Karzai’s cronies remain in place and Taliban leaders remain safe.	”这种约定俗成的责任意识就可以解释为什么哈米德·卡尔扎伊总统的那么多亲信依然在位，也可以解释塔利班领导人为什么仍然安全。


Women are excluded from collective decision-making, as they are mere objects.	女人被排斥在集体决策的过程之外，因为她们不过是没有思想的物品。


Girls are literally sold upon marriage (the father is paid money for his daughter’s labor and reproductive capacity) and join their husband’s household.	女孩在结婚时基本上是待价而沽（父亲能为自己女儿的劳动和生育能力而得到报酬），并在婚后进入丈夫的家族。


The younger the girl, the higher the price.	越年轻的女孩售价就越高。


Marriage, especially in the provinces, is routinely consummated on pre-pubescent bodies.	尤其是在阿富汗所属各省，结婚的通常都是尚在青春期的女孩。


Yet women are precious in their own way.	但女性也有女性的宝贵之处。


A family’s principal “cultural capital” is its honor, which is ensured by denying women any opportunity to highlight male failings and therefore tarnish clan respectability.	一个家族主要的“文化资本”是家族的荣耀，而保护家族荣耀必须确保不让女性有任何机会指出男性所犯的错误、从而玷污家族的名望。


As a result, women must be strictly secluded and made invisible when in public, for they are personally responsible for the desire that they could ignite in schools, hospitals, parks, or markets.	因此，必须让女性彻底与世隔绝，不在公众场合抛头露面，因为女性出现在学校、医院、公园或市场可能点燃的欲望都要由她们自己负责。


The all-covering burqa ensures sufficient anonymity to permit women a certain amount of freedom in public space.	把浑身上下包裹得严严实实的长袍可以很好地隐藏她们的身份，让她们一定程度上能在公共场所自由活动。


Every female simultaneously carries her father’s and her husband’s honor, and will stoically submit to all forms of violence committed in its name.	每位女性同时肩负着父亲和丈夫的荣耀，对于所有以上述名义强加的暴力都必须无条件的服从。


This may mean dying in childbirth rather than risking the “dishonor” of giving birth in a public place, a hospital, in front of strangers.	这或许意味着她们必须选择宁愿在生孩子的时候死去，也不能甘冒受辱的危险去医院这样的公共场所接受陌生人的帮助。


Going to court is practically unheard of, as it would mean renouncing family practices.	上法院更是几乎闻所未闻，因为这意味着放弃家族决定权。


From the male point of view, resorting to outside police or judicial intervention would signify an inability to fight one’s own battles – an admission of defeat and a symbolic castration.	从男性的角度看，求助于外来的警察或司法力量意味着没有能力独立作战


This helps explain the intense corruption present in Afghan courts, where “honor” can be redeemed by bribing a judge to have a rapist or murderer released.	这有助于解释阿富汗法院存在的严重腐败现象，人们相信可以通过贿赂法官释放强奸或杀人犯来赎回“荣耀”。


As violence is strictly a private matter, relinquishing justice to state institutions could be an unacceptable humiliation.	因为暴力纯属于私人事务，将裁决权拱手让给国家机构可以成为一种令人无法忍受的耻辱。


Customary law is not rigid in that it is made to fit round the demands of global economy.	习惯法在最初诞生时并不死板，因为它需要适应全球经济发展的需求。


It has become more rigorous in it s applications due to the influence of	后来在执行上越来越僵化死板主要是受到伊斯兰好战主义的影响，好战份子试图借助宗教教义来实现暴力升级、特别是使针对妇女的暴力合法化。 但是，


For example, while the Koran allows for a measure of female inheritance, tribal custom does not authorize it, which explains the popularity of tribal councils to resolve inheritance problems and cheat women out of their rights.	比方说，尽管古兰经允许对女性的继承权进行考量，但部族惯例对此却并不认可，这也可以解释为什么靠欺骗妇女放弃继承权来解决继承问题在部族委员会如此盛行。


Similarly, whereas the Koran requires four eyewitnesses as proof of adultery, mere suspicion of some unregulated, potentially sexual conduct by a woman warrants stoning under customary law.	同样，古兰经规定必须有四名目击证人才能证实通奸罪，但仅仅怀疑一名女性可能发生过违法性行为就足以按照习惯法的规则对其处以石刑。


Yet an awareness of alternatives is seeping in through the media, even in remote provinces.	但即使是在最边远的省份，对于替代性选择的认识也正透过媒体逐渐地向人们渗透。


Iranian films and the much loved Indian TV serials, not to mention the occasional American film, influence peoples' expectations.	伊朗影片和备受喜爱的印度连续剧，更不要说偶尔上映的美国电影都在潜移默化地影响着人们的看法。


Add to that the experience of having lived abroad as refugees in Pakistan and Iran.	曾经在巴基斯坦和伊朗的难民生活经历也起到同样的作用。


Girls know that there are options to an unacceptable way of life: women are increasingly demanding more from life than what custom ordains.	女孩们知道除接受无法容忍的生活方式外还有其他选择：在习俗规定的范围外，女性对生活提出了越来越多的要求。


This is especially true for those who have lived in Iran, a totally Muslim environment that allows women the freedom to study and work as well as access to adequate healthcare and family planning.	那些曾经在伊朗生活的人尤其如此，那里虽然是纯而又纯的穆斯林环境，但却允许妇女自由地学习和工作，也可以享有充分的医疗和计划生育保障。


Once back in rural Afghanistan, forced into brutal marriages, many desperate women – especially returnees from Iran – resort to self-immolation.	一旦返回到阿富汗农村，被迫接受野蛮的婚姻，许多绝望的女性 —— 特别是从伊朗回国的女性 —— 宁愿选择自我毁灭的道路。


Violence and murder of women are on the increase, perpetrated by men who feel that these alternatives pose a threat to their authority.	针对妇女的暴力和谋杀呈上升趋势，因为犯罪的男性感到这些选择对他们的权威构成了挑战。


The West imagines that religion is the central issue in Afghanistan.	西方人普遍认为宗教是阿富汗问题的核心。


But the heart of the matter is the preservation of ancient patriarchal rights that go back to Biblical times, reformatted to fit the demands of globalized capitalism.	但问题的症结所在是保留了可以追溯到《圣经》时代的古老的宗族权利，上述宗族权利只是进行了某些调整来适应全球化资本主义的要求。


Governments and international aid organizations have failed to take into consideration the role of Farhang , perhaps because the power of unwritten law remains largely inconceivable in the West.	政府和国际援助机构尚未将 Farhang 的作用纳入考虑，也许因为多数西方人无法理解不成文法律的力量。


But Afghanistan cannot begin to solve its many problems until it criminalizes the privatized violence of this antiquated code.	但在惩罚这项古老规则引发的私人暴力之前，阿富汗的许多问题都无法得到解决。


Afghanistan’s Drug-Friendly Environment	阿富汗适宜毒品的环境


Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai has stepped up international fundraising efforts in recent weeks, seeking a fresh package of military and reconstruction aid from the United States, together with stronger strategic guarantees.	阿富汗总统哈米德·卡尔扎伊（Hamid Karzai）最近几周加强了国际筹款活动，向美国寻求新的一系列武器和重建援助以及更强的战术保障。


But Karzai’s relationship with his sponsors has begun to sour, in part owing to charges that his government has failed to stop the resurgence of Afghanistan’s huge opium trade.	但是卡尔扎伊与其资助人之间的关系已经开始恶化，一部分原因是由于他的政府未能阻止阿富汗大规模的鸦片贸易的兴起。


Underlying the opium trade issue is a security threat of another kind, one overlooked since the US-led invasion toppled the Taliban regime in 2001, despite the grave risk it poses to Afghanistan’s long-term stability, and that of the region.	隐藏在鸦片贸易问题下面的是另外一种安全威胁，尽管这个问题对阿富汗以及该地区的长期稳定造成了严重威胁，但是自2001年美国为首发动入侵并颠覆塔利班政权以来，它从来没有被重视过。


In countries like Afghanistan, where 80% of the population lives on what they grow and many communities live far from any water source, environmental damage can be both economically devastating and politically momentous.	阿富汗国内80%人口以种植业为生，许多村落居住在远离水源之处，在这样一个国家里，环境的危害不仅会造成经济恶化，也会给政治带来严重影响。


That lesson should have been absorbed and understood, not least by American strategists, long before the Taliban’s fall.	在塔利班垮台以前，人们就应该吸取并记住这个教训，尤其是美国的战略家。


After all, desertification and deforestation helped fuel the rise, two decades earlier, of the Maoist guerilla group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.	毕竟，沙漠化和森林采伐促成了二十多年前秘鲁的毛泽东主义游击队Sendero Luminoso（光辉道路）的崛起。


Sendero, which supplemented its income with drug production and timber smuggling, deliberately chose drought-weakened and deforested mountain villages as the stronghold of its insurgency.	Sendero靠种植毒品和走私木材补充收入，刻意选择那些久经干旱、采伐过度的山地村庄作为他们叛乱的根据地。


Similarly, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, which has claimed 10,000 lives, exploits the desperation of mountain villagers hit by flash floods – the result of deforestation higher up.	同样，导致10,000多人丧生的尼泊尔毛泽东主义叛乱使得那些遭受骤发洪水袭击的山地村民彻底绝望，骤发洪水正是高地森林采伐的结果。


No Maoist group could ever gain a toehold in Afghanistan’s parched Pashtun south (these were, after all, people who, bare-knuckled, smashed the Soviets).	没有毛泽东主义团体可以在阿富汗南部普什图族（Pashtun）干裂的土地上获得立足之地（毕竟这些人曾经赤手空拳击溃苏联）。


But the Taliban’s rapid rise in the 1990’s was inextricably linked to the failure of irrigation systems.	但是上世纪九十年代塔利班的迅速壮大与灌溉体系的失败不无关系。


Villagers whose crops shriveled and whose livestock died in a prolonged drought saw joining the Taliban as an economic opportunity.	村民们的庄稼在一场持续干旱中枯萎、牲口也大批死亡，他们把加入塔利班看作一个改善经济的机会。


Had there been more irrigation, the Taliban’s gains might have been far less impressive.	如果有更多的灌溉的话，塔利班所占有的也许就远没有那么令人印象深刻。


The Taliban are now an increasingly spent force, but lack of water reinforced the logic of opium production across its former strongholds in the south.	如今，塔利班已是强弩之末，然而水源的缺乏更使它难以维系它在前南方大本营的鸦片生产流程。


Irrigation has failed or is inadequate in Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kandahar – three of the top five opium-producing provinces – where indebted farmers are hooked by the economics: opium brings in eight times as much cash as wheat and uses less water.	在灌溉失败或不足的赫尔曼德、Uruzgan和坎大哈——五大鸦片生产大省中的三个——负债累累的农民受到经济利益的诱惑； 鸦片带来的收入是种植小麦的八倍，并且用水更少。


Without serious investment in irrigation, including construction of reservoirs to make use of the snowfall in the Hindu Kush, and in new cash crops such as saffron and rose oil, Afghanistan’s drift toward narco-statehood will continue, with all the instability that this implies.	如果缺乏对灌溉系统的大力投资，包括建造水库以充分利用兴都库什（Hindu Kush）的降雪，并投资种植新的诸如藏红花和玫瑰油等经济作物，阿富汗将随着由此引发的种种不稳定性，逐渐成为一个毒品之国。


Clear-cutting of old growth forests in the mountains bordering Pakistan may prove as problematic.	巴基斯坦山区边界滥砍滥伐老熟森林的做法受到质疑。


Agriculture there has been damaged by the cutting of walnut, apricot, and mulberry trees for winter fuel, and by a failure to replant poplar, willow, and tamarisk – the trees that hold fragile meadows in place.	由于为获取冬天的燃料而砍伐核桃树、杏树和桑树，同时又未能重新种植那些能够紧抓松弛地表土壤的白杨树、柳树和西河柳，当地的农业已经遭受重创。


These sorts of trees can be restored, given a concerted campaign and investment in nurseries to produce local varieties.	如果人们齐心协力，投资培育开发本地树木品种，这些种类的树木就能重新恢复。


Loss of the ancient cedar, pine, fir, and oak forests on the slopes above is another matter.	山坡上的古杉木、松树、枞树和橡树林的消失是另外一个问题。


This year’s snowmelt caused landslides and flooding – a warning of more soil erosion and destruction of arable land to come; hundreds died and thousands lost their livelihoods.	今年的雪融水引发了山崩和洪水——这是更多土壤遭受侵蚀以及耕地将被大量破坏的警告； 数百人丧生于此，成千上万的人失去了生计。


Forestry has always been a problem in Afghanistan.	阿富汗的森林一直是一个棘手问题。


In 1960, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization spoke of wasteful logging practices, such as “head-skidding” (in which a log is rolled downhill, ripping up plants and soil).	1960年，联合国食品和农业组织（FAO）谈到了不经济的伐木行为，例如“ 木头滚滑法（head-skidding）”（即将木头滚下山去，同时将树木带着土壤连根拔起）。


Aerial photographers were called in, and a large budget was set aside.	航空摄影师被召来拍摄照片，结果预算被取消了。


But, in 1976, the FAO admitted in a new plan that forest and watershed management activities had “turned out to be quite limited.”	但是1976年FAO在一项新计划中承认森林和水流域的管理行动“十分有限”。


The 1976 plan called for sustainable logging and basic forest-fire control, but war intervened, costing Afghanistan half its forest cover.	1976年计划呼吁可持续发展地伐木以及森林火灾的基本控制，但是战争爆发使阿富汗失去了一半的森林土地。


Up to 60% of the old growth forest in Nangahar, the second largest opium-producing province, may have been cut during the war years.	第二大鸦片生产省楠阿哈省（Nangahar）有达60%的土地是老熟林，但它们在战争期间被砍伐一空。


Mujahedin factions and later the Taliban exported stands of fine-grained cedar by the truckload from Nangahar and surrounding provinces to Pakistan, often in return for arms.	圣战组织的派系以及后来的塔利班用货车从楠阿哈省及周边地区向巴基斯坦出口品种优良的杉木，经常以此交换武器。


Illegal logging continues today, with only ineffectual efforts made to stop it.	直至今日，由于没有有效措施，非法伐木仍在继续。


At the current rate, Afghanistan’s old growth forest could vanish within a decade.	按照目前的速度，阿富汗的老熟林将在十年内消失尽贻。


The UN acknowledges the problem but is (rightly) unwilling to risk sending forestry experts into a tribal region where American and allied troops venture only in armored convoys.	联合国认识到了这个问题，但是却不愿意冒风险将森林学专家派往一个连美国及其联军只有在武装护卫的情况下才敢冒险涉足的偏远部族地区。


Safety concerns and cost also limit intervention by international conservation organizations.	安全问题及成本问题限制了国际保护组织的介入。


A new initiative called the Green Corps includes 300 forest rangers charged with stopping illegal logging, and the ministry hopes to boost their numbers within a year. But the initiative is unlikely to have much effect.	一项新的称之为绿色团体（Green Corps）的计划包括了300名负责阻止非法伐木的森林巡逻员，并且政府希望在一年内增加巡逻员人数。


Illegal logging crews number 200 or more.	但是这个计划看起来并不太可能有效。


They have chain saws and trucks. They are armed and work with the backing of drug and emerald smugglers – and often of local officials.	非法伐木队共计200余人，他们有锯子和卡车，他们全副武装，并在毒品和翡翠走私者（通常是当地官员）的支持下工作。


The price of plank cedar in Lahore is incentive enough to corrupt, or kill, any Green Corps men brave enough to stand in their way.	厚杉木在拉合尔（Lahore）的价格之高足以让他们去贿赂或杀害任何一个绿色团体中敢挡他们路的人。


Environmental issues are of paramount importance in marginal countries because their impact on human survival is immediate and direct.	环境问题对边缘国家十分重要，因为它对人类生存具有立竿见影的直接影响。


The inadequate response to pressing questions of natural resource management, whether of water or trees, merely strengthens the hands of opium dealers and malcontents in what is already the most disaffected and sensitive part of Afghanistan – the clear-cut mountain slopes where intelligence officers believe Osama bin Laden is most likely holed up.	若对紧迫的自然资源管理问题——不管是水资源还是森林资源的管理问题反应措施不当，就只会在砍伐一空的山坡地带——阿富汗本已充斥不满情绪和最敏感的地带，加强鸦片商人和不满分子的力量。 情报官员相信那里是奥萨马·本·拉登最有可能洗劫的地方。


Afghanistan’s Feminist Revolution	阿富汗的女权主义革命


On April 16, more than 300 Afghani women – many of them students – marched together in Kabul in protest of a new law passed by Parliament that would impose a series of Taliban-like restrictions on women.	4月16日，300多名阿富汗妇女——其中有不少是学生——在喀布尔举行联合游行，抗议议会通过一项新的法律，将一系列塔利班式的限制强加给女性。


The law would permit marital rape, limit women’s movements – say, for work or study – without male permission, and even make it illegal for a woman to refuse to dress as her husband wishes.	这项法律允许婚内强奸行为，限制在没有得到男性许可前提下女性的行动——比如工作或者学习，甚至将女人拒绝像丈夫希望的那样穿衣打扮规定为非法。


The women, facing a crowd of furious men calling them “whores” and other epithets, marched two miles under a rain of abuse and delivered their petition against the law to legislators.	这些妇女面对着用“妓女”和其他侮辱性绰号辱骂她们的愤怒的男人，在一片谩骂声中游行了两英里，向议员们表达了她们对这部法律的不满。


Both houses of Parliament had approved the law, and President Hamid Karzai signed it.	议会上下两院都已经通过了这部法律，哈米德·卡尔扎伊总统也已经签字批准。


The law now affects only the Shia minority, but threatens to affect pending legislation that could restrict the rights of non-Shia women as well.	这部法律目前只影响到什叶派少数族裔，不过或许会影响到可能限制非什叶派妇女权利的即将表决的法案。


When Western media sought quotes from the women, they frequently heard a Western-style feminist refrain: “These laws would make women into a kind of property.”	当西方媒体采访游行妇女的时候，他们经常会听到与西方式女权主义类似的观点：“这部法律会把女人变成一种财产。


In the West, the counterpoint to the notion of woman as property has been a highly individualistic demand for personal autonomy – decision-making based primarily on a woman’s own wishes, rather than as wife, mother, community member, or worshipper.	”在西方，把女人当作财产的说法对应着高度个性化的个人自主权要求——即按照妇女自身的愿望做出决定，而不顾及她作为妻子、母亲、社会成员或宗教信徒的社会角色。


But, while some Western feminist insights may be useful to Afghani women and other women in the developing world as they resist certain forms of male oppression, we should not assume – as Western feminists often have – that our job is to proselytize “our” feminism.	不过尽管某些西方女权主义观点可能有助于阿富汗和其他发展中国家女性抗拒特定形式的男性压迫，但我们不应当想当然地认定——就像西方女权主义者常干的那样——我们的任务是让“我们的”女权主义者改变她们的观点。


On the contrary, the feminism expressed by women such as these Afghani heroines should educate us in the West about our own shortcomings.	恰恰相反，阿富汗女主人公们表达的女权主义思想应当教育西方人认识到自身的弱点。


The core theory with which emerging feminists in more traditional and religious societies are working is far different from that of Western feminism – and in some ways far more profound and humane.	在传统并信奉宗教的社会中新兴的女权主义核心理论与西方的女权主义差别很大——从某种角度来讲前者的人性化和深刻程度远远超过了后者。