Now, however, success means preventing countries from leaving the EU or hollowing out its institutions.	但是，如今，成功意味着阻止各国脱离欧盟或掏空欧盟机构。


History moves in cycles.	历史呈现出周期性波动。


The interregnum will eventually end and a new order will be born.	权力真空终将结束，新秩序终将诞生。


What is certain is that the survivors and inheritors of the old order will write the rules of the new one.	可以肯定的是，新秩序的规则将由旧秩序的幸存者和继承者书写。


The EU’s goal, achievable only with flexibility and courage, must be to remain a viable project – and thus be one of the authors.	欧盟的目标只有通过灵活性和勇气才能实现，它必须是保持一项可行的工程——从而成为新秩序规则的撰写者之一。


Playing for Human Rights	为人权而赛


PRAGUE -- The selection of Beijing to organize and host the 2008 Olympic Games was accompanied by the Chinese government’s pledges of visible progress on respect for human rights.	布拉格--当北京被挑选主办2008年奥运会的时候，中国政府承诺在尊重人权上取得明显的进步。


We understood these as a condition whose fulfillment the International Olympic Committee would demand.	我们理解，国际奥委会也要求实现这些承诺作为一项主办条件。


That is how this year’s Olympics could contribute to a greater openness and respect for international standards of human rights and liberties in the host country.	这也就是今年的奥运会有可能为主办国的更大开放和尊重国际人权和自由标准做出贡献的原因。


If the words of the Olympic Charter, stating that it is a goal of Olympism to “place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity,” are to be fulfilled, it is necessary for all Olympians to be able to learn about the real situation in China and to point out human rights violations freely whenever and wherever in line with their conscience.	奥林匹克宪章指出，奥林匹克运动的目标是“将体育服务于人的和谐发展，维护人类尊严，促进和平社会”。 要实现这一目标，就有必要让所有的奥运选手了解中国的真实情况并且凭着他们的良心随时随地自由地指出违反人权的问题。


We call on the International Olympic Committee to make that possible.	我们呼吁国际奥委会力促此事。


An interpretation of the Olympic Charter according to which human rights would be a political topic not to be discussed in the Olympic venues is alien to us.	对于我们来说，根据对奥林匹克宪章的解释，认为人权是一项不得在奥运场合讨论的政治议题是难以理喻的。


Human rights are a universal and inalienable topic, enshrined in international human rights documents that China has also signed onto, transcending international as well as domestic politics, and all cultures, religions and civilizations.	人权是体现在众多国际人权文书中普世以及不可分离的议题，中国也签署了这些文书。 它们超越了国际国内政治、所有的文化、宗教以及文明。


To speak of the conditions of human rights therefore cannot be in violation of the Olympic Charter.	因此，谈论人权状况不应当是违反奥林匹克宪章。


To speak of human rights is not politics; only authoritarian and totalitarian regimes try to make it so.	谈论人权并非政治； 只有极权和专制政权才会这样做。


To speak of human rights is a duty.	提出人权问题是一项义务。


We are concerned that the Beijing Olympics might simply become a giant spectacle to distract the attention of the international public from the violations of human and civil rights in China and in other countries with the Chinese government’s significant influence.	我们担心，北京奥运会或许会成为盛装表演，利用中国政府的巨大影响力把国际公众的注意力从中国和其他国家违反人权和民权中转移开来。


Therefore, we see a dignified celebration of the Olympic ideals not only in sporting performances, but also in the opportunity to express one’s civic attitudes.	因此我们认为，不仅是体育有尊严地欢庆奥林匹克理想，而且，有机会表达个人的公民态度也是如此。


We call on all participants of the summer Olympic Games in Beijing to use this liberty to support those whose freedoms, even at the time of the Olympics, are denied by the Chinese government.	我们呼吁所有北京奥运会的参赛选手利用这一机会支持那些即使在奥运会期间其自由也遭到中国政府剥夺的人士。


Plugging the Leaks	堵塞漏洞


MUNICH – With pain and misgiving, the United States Congress bailed out Wall Street in order to prevent a meltdown of America’s financial system.	慕尼黑-美国国会为了防止美国金融系统的崩溃，在痛苦和疑虑中，对华尔街进行了纾困。


But the $700 billion to be used may flow into a leaky bucket, and so may the billions provided by governments throughout the world.	但是，将动用的七千亿美元可能流入一个竹篮子里，而且世界各政府拿出的数以亿计的资金也可能落得如此下场。


The US financial institutions that went bankrupt in 2008 – or that would have gone bankrupt without government help – were in trouble because they lacked equity capital.	在2008年破产的美国金融机构（或者说，没有政府的帮助，它们肯定已经破产）遇到了麻烦，因为他们缺股本金。


They did not lack that capital because they never had it, but because they paid out too much of their abundant earnings in previous years to shareholders, leveraging their operations excessively with debt capital.	他们并非因为从来没有股本金而造成资金匮乏，而是因为他们前些年从大把的盈利中拿出太大的一部分给了股东，而其业务过于利用债务资本的杠杆效应。


If no measures are taken to increase the minimum equity requirements for banks and other financial institutions, financial crises like the current one could recur.	如果不采取措施让银行和其它金融机构提高最低股本金额度，目前这样的金融危机将来可能重演。


Anglo-Saxon financial institutions are known for their high dividend-payout ratios.	西方英语世界的金融机构的高股息是众所周知的。


From a European perspective, the hunger for dividends and the emphasis on short-term performance goals that characterize these institutions is both amazing and frightening.	从欧洲的角度来看，竭力追逐红利并强调短期业绩目标是这些机构的特征，而这些特征既令人惊叹又令人害怕。


Investment banks, in particular, are known for their minimalist equity approach.	尤其是投资银行，以最低的股本行事而著称。


While normal banks need an equity-asset ratio of at least 7%, investment banks typically operated on a ratio of only 4%.	虽然一般的银行股本和资产比率需要至少为7 ％ ，但投资银行通常仅以4 ％ 的比率就可以运行。


The lack of equity resulted largely from the concept of “limited liability,” which provided an incentive for excessive leveraging.	由于股本金的缺乏主要是由 “有限责任”的概念造成的，这种概念鼓励了对过度杠杆效应的运用。


Earnings left inside a financial institution can easily be lost in turbulent times.	留在金融机构内部的收益在动荡的时代可以很容易地挥发。


Only earnings taken out in time can be secured.	只有及时取出的收入才是落袋为安的。


Lack of equity capital, in turn, made risk-averse shareholders hire gamblers to manage their limited-liability investment companies.	股本金的缺乏，进而使厌恶风险的股东们聘用赌徒般的经理来管理他们的有限责任投资公司。


The managers chose overly risky operations, because they knew that the shareholders would not participate symmetrically in the risks.	而经理选择了过于冒险的操作，因为他们知道，股东们在风险中的参与不会是对称的。


While upside risks would be turned into dividends, downside risks would be limited to the stock of equity invested.	虽然上行风险会变成红利，而下滑的风险将仅仅限于投资的股本。


Claims against the personal wealth of shareholders would be blocked by the limited liability constraint.	对股东的个人财富的索取将受到有限责任的限制。


The banks’ creditors or governments ultimately would bear any losses.	这些银行的债权人或政府最终将承担任何的损失。


The mutual interaction between the incentive to minimize equity capital and the incentive to gamble in order to exploit the upside risks caused America’s crisis.	尽量减少股本金和充分利用上行风险的赌博行为，这二者的激励效应之间的互动，造成了美国的危机。


In theory, bank lenders and the government could anticipate the additional risks they encounter when a company chooses a high-leverage strategy.	从理论上讲，银行贷款方和政府在遇到一家选择高杠杆作用的战略的公司的时候，它们是可以预见额外的风险的。


Lenders may charge higher interest rates, and the government may charge higher taxes or fees.	贷方可收取较高的利率，而政府则可以征收较高的税收或费用。


But this theory fails to match reality.	但是，这一理论不符合现实。


Governments do not tax the return on equity less than debt interest, and lenders do not sufficiently honor the benefits of high equity with lower interest rates, owing to a lack of information about the true repayment probability.	政府对股本回报所征收的税率并不比对债务利息的低，由于缺乏真实还款概率的信息，贷款人没有充分认同高股本低利率的好处。


This is why equity capital held by financial institutions typically is more than twice as expensive as debt capital and why these institutions try to minimize its use.	这就是为什么由金融机构持有的股本金通常比债务资本贵两倍以上，这也是为什么这些机构尽量减少其使用的原因。


The provision of limited liability not only turned Wall Street into a casino, but so-called “Main Street” also was induced to gamble, because homeowners enjoyed a limited liability similar to that of the companies.	责任有限的规定不仅把华尔街变成赌场，而且所谓的“主街”也被引诱去参与这场赌博，因为房主享有和公司一样的有限责任。


When low-income borrowers took out a loan to buy their homes – often 100% of the purchase price – they typically could use the home as collateral without warranting the repayment with additional wealth or even their income.	当低收入借款人获得贷款购买房子的时候- 经常是买价1 00％的贷款-它们通常可以就把房子作为抵押而不需要押上更多的财产甚至他们的收入来保证偿还贷款。


Thus, they were protected against the downside risk of falling house prices and profited by speculating on the upside risk of appreciation.	因此，他们免受房价下跌的下行风险，但却能通过投机房产升值的上行风险来获利。


Such homeowners knew that with rising prices they would be able to realize a gain by either selling their homes or increasing their debt, while in the case of falling prices they could simply hand over the keys to their banks.	这些业主知道，随着价格上涨，他们可以卖了房子或增加他们的债务而获利； 而在房价下降的情况下，他们则把房子还给银行就行了。


Given the uncertainty about future house prices, they could reasonably expect gains, which induced them to pay even more in the first place.	鉴于对未来房价的不确定性，他们可以合理地预估收益，这引诱他们一开始就想买更贵的房子。


Gambling by Main Street caused the sub-prime crisis.	“主街”的赌博造成了次贷危机。


The crisis spread because the banking system was not sufficiently risk-averse – and in some cases even seemed to relish risk.	这一危机的蔓延，是因为银行系统避险性不够-在某些情况下它甚至偏爱风险。


Mortgage banks kept some claims on their books, but sold most of them to investment banks as “mortgage-backed securities.”	抵押贷款银行把一些未收的资金放在帐簿上，但把其中的大部分以“以抵押为后盾的证券”售给投资银行。


The investment banks blended these securities into “asset-backed securities” and “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs) and sold them on to financial institutions throughout the world.	这些投资银行又把这些证券混合为“以资产为后盾的证券”和抵押债务契约（ CDOs ）出售给世界各地的金融机构。


These institutions, attracted by the high rates of return that were promised, invariably neglected the downside risks.	这些机构被高回报率的所吸引，而总是忽视了下行风险


The buyers of the CDOs were often misguided by rating agencies that performed badly and did not provide reliable information.	CDOs���买家往往被行为不良且提供不了可靠信息的评级机构所误导。


As private rating agencies live on the fees they collect from rated companies, they cannot easily downgrade important clients or the assets they sell.	至于靠收取被评估公司费用生存的私人评级机构，它们不能轻易对重要客户或所出售的资产给予降级。


The big American investment banks received excellent ratings up to the last moment, and so did the CDOs with which they betrayed the world.	美国最大的投资银行直到最后一刻仍获得良好的评级，它们用来欺骗世界的CDO也受到同样优秀的评级。


All of this explains why the US had such a formidable period of growth in recent years, despite the fact that household savings were close to zero, and why foreigners were willing to finance a record US current-account deficit of more than 5% of GDP – higher than it has been since 1929.	所有这一切都说明了，尽管美国人的储蓄几乎为零，为什么近年美国仍有这样高的增长，为什么外国人愿意为美国创纪录的超过5 ％（为1929年以来的最高）国内生产总值的赤字融资。


That period is now over.	而这一时期已经成为历史。


The US must carry out fundamental reforms of its financial system to plug the equity leaks and recover investors’ confidence.	美国必须对其金融体系进行根本性的改革以堵塞资本漏洞并恢复投资者信心。


But even then it will have a hard time continuing to sell financial assets to the rest of the world.	但是，即使到那时，美国也很难继续向世界其它地区出售金融资产。


American households will need to learn to accumulate wealth by cutting consumption rather than speculating on real estate.	美国家庭需要学习以减少消费而不是投机房地产来积累财富。


A painful decade of stagnation for America lies ahead.	一个痛苦的停滞的十年，将摆在美国面前。


But, though rotavirus vaccines have been rolled out in 79 countries – a significant accomplishment – a staggering 74% of the world’s infants remain unlikely to be inoculated this year.	但是，尽管���状病毒疫苗已在79个国家铺开——这是个了不起的成就——但全世界仍有高达74%的儿童无法在今年获得接种。


Poland’s Successful Losers	波兰成功的失败者


WARSAW – How can a government with the best economic record in Europe (indeed in the entire OECD) be humiliated at the polls by a Euroskeptic, nationalistic, and economically illiterate opposition – one deemed unelectable only a year ago?	华沙——拥有欧洲（实际是整个经合组织）最佳经济记录的政府怎会遭到怀疑欧洲、奉行民族主义且不懂经济的反对党的羞辱——短短一年前人们还认为反对党不可能在选举中获胜。


That is the question many Poles, and friends of Poland, are now asking, following the defeat on October 25 of the Civic Platform government.	这是10月25日公民纲领党政府失败后，很多波兰人和他们的朋友急于想知道的问题。


If creating jobs and boosting incomes can’t get you re-elected, what can?	如果创造就业机会和提高收入都不能让你重新当选，那什么才能？


One reason for the opposition’s victory is, of course, universal: after a time, people everywhere want change, and Civic Platform had been in power since 2007.	当然，反对党获胜的原因之一非常普遍：随着时间的推移，人们渴望变化，而公民纲领党从2007年来一直权力在握。


And impatience with the status quo is arguably stronger in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where much of the social, political, and economic order is yet to be generally accepted.	而且中东欧后共产主义国家对现状的不耐烦可能更加强烈，那里的大部分社会、政治和经济秩序尚未被普遍接受。


Indeed, Civic Platform’s Donald Tusk was Poland’s first post-communist prime minister to win successive terms.	事实上，公民纲领党的唐纳德·图斯克是后共产主义首位竞选连任的波兰首相。


Moreover, as parties govern longer, their strongest personalities tend to be replaced by weaker ones.	此外，随着政党执政时间的延长，强势人物往往会被弱势人物所取代。


Civic Platform contested this election after replacing Tusk with Ewa Kopacz, and has had the same problem with a number of other “substitutions.”	公民纲领党用科帕奇取代图斯克参与竞选，此外的几次“换人”也是一样。


What is specific to Poland is that the past eight years have apparently created a pronounced case of cognitive dissonance.	波兰特有的情况是过去八年显然出现了明显的认知失调。 年均GDP增长率为3.


Annual GDP growth averaged 3.2% over this period; and, unlike in the rich West, both inequality and unemployment have actually fallen, with growth mainly benefiting the middle three quintiles of the income distribution.	2%； 而且和富裕的西方国家不同，不平等和失业率实际出现了下降，经济增长主要惠及五大收入分配层次中处在中间位置的三类民众。


This segment of the population – usually politically crucial – enjoyed a 28% rise in per capita real income from 2007 to 2014.	这部分人往往在政治上至关重要，从2007到2014年人均实际收入出现了28%的增长。


At one level, Poles are aware of this, with large majorities describing financial conditions in their own families, workplaces, and social environments as either “good” or “very good.”	某种程度上，波兰人对此十分清楚，大部分人用“好”或“很好”来形容家庭、单位和社会经济状况。


The dissonance is that equally large majorities also describe Poland’s economic situation and the “direction in which the country is moving” as either “bad” or “very bad.”	但不和谐之处是同样还是这些人却用“坏”或者“很坏”来形容波兰经济和“国家的发展方向”。


Poland’s transformation is visible not only in the form of new motorways, local roads, airports, hospitals and stadiums, but also in the appearance of vast numbers of new and refurbished housing units, supermarkets, and modern factories.	波兰的变化不仅体现在新建高速公路、地方公路、机场、医院和体育场，还体现在新建和装修了众多住宅、超市和现代化工厂。


And this has not been achieved by mortgaging the future.	波兰并非通过抵押未来才取得这样的成就。


Poland has recorded the fourth lowest increase in public debt (as a percentage of GDP) in the European Union.	波兰已经实现欧盟成员国公共债务（占GDP比例）倒数第四的增长。


And yet the disconnect between this reality and the Poland “in ruins” or “on the verge of catastrophe” perceived by many voters was too strong to ignore.	但我们无法忽视现实和很多选民认为波兰“毁灭”或“处在灾难边缘”之间的脱节。


Even Kopacz admitted the contrast between the “public affluence” that everyone sees and the “private penury” that many feel persists (at least relative to Germany, the preferred benchmark for Poles).	就连科帕奇本人也承认人们感受到的“公共财富”和很多人认为持续存在（至少相对于波兰人的首选基准德国而言）的“私人贫困”存在着巨大的反差。


In today’s Poland, it is harder to accept wages – nominally about a third of those in Germany – that had seemed perfectly adequate in 2007, when they were only a quarter of the German level.	今天的波兰人已经很难接受在2007年似乎还足够的工资，目前波兰的名义工资是德国的三分之一，而2007年却仅有德国的四分之一。


But, unsurprisingly, Kopacz’s campaign slogan, “A strong economy – higher wages,” and her implicit promise to address the issue in one parliamentary term, did not appear credible.	但不出所料，科帕奇的竞选口号“强劲的经济——更高的工资”以及她在一届议会期内解决问题的承诺似乎并不可信。


Although the problem faced by Kopacz and Civic Platform was specifically Polish, it contains a universal truth: to win, politicians must define the context in which they operate.	尽管科帕奇和公民纲领党面临的问题具有波兰特色，但其中也包含一条普遍的真理：要想取胜，政治家必须确定自己所处的执政环境。


During Tusk’s premiership, the government was perversely reluctant to claim credit for Poland’s economic success.	在图斯克任首相期间，政府倔强地不愿为波兰的经济繁荣居功。


Tusk praised Poles themselves for their hard work, but neglected to emphasize that without the government’s effective macroeconomic policies, that work would have been wasted.	图斯克赞扬波兰民众自身的勤奋工作，但却忘了强调没有政府有效的宏观政策，民众的努力很难发挥作用。


He never even reminded voters that the government’s choices in managing the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis – which were neither obvious nor easy, because they required rejecting the EU’s austerity consensus – was the right one.	他甚至从未提醒选民政府在管理2008年全球金融危机后果时做出了正确的选择——这些选择既非显而易见亦非轻而易举，因为它们需要拒绝欧盟的紧缩政策。


Given that most voters do not consider themselves able to judge competence in government, they base their choice of party on the general direction in which it intends to take the country and the overarching principles by which it intends to govern.	鉴于多数选民不认为自己能评价政府的判断力，他们会根据国家发展的大方向和政府的总体执政原则来进行党派选择。


Civic Platform came to power in 2007 with a strongly pro-business and free-market ethos.	2007年公民纲领党执政时有着强烈的支持商业和自由市场精神。


During the financial crisis, it had to moderate these views considerably, taking steps that ran counter to its ideology: increasing deficits in the trough of the crisis (2009-2010) and raising taxes once growth resumed (2011).	金融危机期间它被迫对上述观点进行了大幅调整，并采取了有悖于其思想的举措：在危机低谷期（2009-2010年）增加财政赤字，并在恢复增长后(2011年）提高了税收。


And then, when the government reduced the size of the absurdly expensive, but popular, funded pension system (2011-2014), Tusk attempted to compensate voters by pumping all additional free resources into family benefits.	之后，政府在削减贵得离谱却颇受欢迎的社会养老体系（2011-2014年）期间，图斯克试图以向家庭提供一切额外免费资源的方式对选民进行补偿。


Although this was justified, given Poland’s very low birth rate, it was also intended to appeal to his urban electorate.	尽管鉴于波兰的低生育率这项措施有其合理之处，但也不免有迎合城市选民的意图。


But, to many voters, it seemed that Civic Platform, which had identified itself in 2007 as socially conservative and economically liberal, was drifting to the economic (as well as the cultural) left.	但在很多选民看来，似乎2007年曾自称社会保守、经济自由的公民纲领党正在放任经济（和文化）左翼政策。


By 2014, the government was perceived as being so pragmatic as to be almost value-free.	到2014年，公众眼中的政府实用到几���没有固定的价值观。


That perception naturally raised the suspicion that self-interest had become Civic Platform’s main motivation.	这种看法自然引发了公民纲领党以自身利益为主要动机的怀疑。


As the party’s narrative became an endless litany of the good social things it had done (or was about to do), Poles came to view the campaign as a cynical attempt to buy their votes – and to do so with their own money.	因为该党连篇累牍地赘述所做（或要做的）种种好事，波兰人开始认为竞选就是用他们自己的钱来购买他们的选票。


Even the fact that these promises, though plentiful, were mostly inexpensive (certainly compared to those of the opposition) was not used to convey a commitment to fiscal responsibility.	尽管这些承诺虽然很多但大多并不昂贵（当然是与反对党所做的承诺相比），但也未能成功传达政府对于财政责任的承诺。


Elections are a choice, not an auction between competing lists of promises, with victory simply going to the highest bidder.	选举是个选择的过程，而非由竞争性承诺所组成的拍卖，其中胜利只简单归属于出价最高者。


Civic Platform lost because it failed to explain to Poles its own view of that choice.	公民纲领党失败的原因是未能向波兰人解释自己怎样看待这种选择。


It hardly mattered that the opposition’s program lacked credibility: Civic Platform had already become the architect of its own defeat.	反对派的计划缺乏公信力几乎无关紧要：公民纲领党已经成了自身失败的缔造者。


Poland’s Double Trouble	波兰的双重麻烦


Much of the world seems fascinated by the fact that Poland is now governed by a set of identical twins who first became famous as child movie actors: President Lech Kaczynski and Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski.	世界上很多人似乎都对波兰现在由一对长相一模一样的双胞胎兄弟——总统莱赫·古钦斯基和总理雅罗斯瓦夫·古钦斯基掌权的事实感到非常有趣，他们一开始是作为童星而成名的。


They are indeed intriguing, but the political forces they represent are even more interesting – and worrying.	他们俩确实迷人，但是他们所代表的政治力量更令人感兴趣也更令人担忧。


Since the fall of 2005, the Kaczynskis have led a conservative-populist coalition, with a dose of nationalism – represented by the small League of Polish Families (LPR) – thrown in.	自从2005年秋季以来，古钦斯基兄弟领导了一个由保守派和民粹主义加上一点民族主义、由波兰家园联盟（LPR）所代表组成的联盟。


The Polish right was last in power in 1997, having previously governed in the years 1990-1993.	波兰的右翼上次掌权是在1997年，在此前是1990至1993年间。


The post-communist Party of the Democratic Left (SLD) was voted out in 1997, despite a five-year streak of economic prosperity and rapidly falling unemployment.	后共产党民主左翼联盟（SLD）在1997年选举中下台，尽管在其统治期间保持了五年的经济繁荣和失业率的快速下降。


Although the SLD’s popularity remained high, the previously fragmented right prevailed due to temporary unity.	尽管民主左翼联盟的支持率依然很高，但还是为此前各自为政的右翼党派的暂时联合所击败。


In 1998, however, prosperity vanished.	然而，1998年繁荣消失了。


So the right’s turn in government was followed by years of stagnation and exploding unemployment.	右翼政府遭遇了连续数年的经济停滞和爆发性的失业增长。


Unable to cope with the downturn, the right was replaced by another SLD-led government in 2001.	因为无法抵御经济下滑，右翼政府在2001年又一次被民主左翼联盟领导的政府所取代。


During this period, the right disintegrated.	在这一段时间，右翼联盟分解了。


Among the splinter groups that arose were the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) and the nationalist LPR.	在新冒出来的众多小派别中就有保守的法律和公正党（PiS）以及民族主义的波兰家园联盟（LPR）。


As they emerged on the political stage, the left was failing: the economy did not improve, unemployment remained high, and the SLD, which attracted all kinds of riffraff, became mired in corruption scandals.	当他们出现在政治舞台上时，左翼正面临失败。 经济并未增长，失业率依然维持高位，而吸收了各种各样的地痞流氓的民主左翼联盟，深陷于腐败丑闻的泥潭中。


The scandals provided the right with an opportunity to deliver a coup de grace to the SLD in the form of parliamentary investigative commissions.	这些丑闻给右翼提供了以议会调查委员会的形式给予民主左翼联盟以致命一击的机会。


The hearings, reminiscent of Joe McCarthy’s witch hunts in 1950’s America, humiliated the SLD and, in large part, compromised the entire post-1989 period.	使人想起50年代美国的乔·麦卡锡推动的政治迫害的这场听证会羞辱了民主左翼联盟，并且在很大程度上拖累了89年后的整个阶段。


But the large swings in Polish politics are not merely the result of political shenanigans.	但是波兰政坛的巨大摇摆并不仅仅是政治把戏的结果。


They reflect the instincts of Polish voters.	它们反映了波兰选民的本能。


People vote for all kinds of parties, from the far right all the way to the left, so long as they are convinced that the parties will deal with their social concerns and grievances.	波兰人会选各种各样的政党，从极右到极左，只要他们确信这些政党会解决他们关心的社会问题和苦难。


The fusion of an irresponsible right-wing campaign and economic stagnation made Poland’s “wandering” electorate shift in the direction of the PiS, whose success was mostly due to its leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, currently the right’s most prominent politician.	一场不负责任的右翼运动加上经济的停滞使波兰“摇摆不定”的选民选择了法律和公正党，其成功主要归因于它的领导人、目前右翼最最出名的政治家雅罗斯瓦夫·古钦斯基。


Kaczynski presented this fluid electorate with a credible vision of a state concerned with social solidarity (with no one’s refrigerator standing empty) and opposed to heartless liberalism (which brings empty refrigerators for the poor and full ones for the rich).	古钦斯基代表了那些希望看到社会团结（没有人家的冰箱是空的）以及反对无情的自由主义者（他们带给穷人的是空的冰箱，而富人的冰箱却满满当当）的摇摆不定的选民。


This contrast, and a strong attack on the liberal Civic Platform, made it impossible to create a moderate right-wing coalition.	这一反差，以及对自由主义的公民纲领党的强烈攻击，使得要组建一个温和的右翼联盟变得不再可能。


Having rejected Civic Platform as a partner, Kaczynski decided to ally his minority PiS with the populist Self-Defense party and the nationalist LPR.	在拒绝与公民纲领党组成联合政府后，古钦斯基决定把他的少数党法律和公正党与民粹主义的自我保护党及民族主义的波兰家园联盟联合起来。


The stated goal of the new alliance was to establish what Kaczynski calls the “Fourth Republic” (implying a constitutional break with the supposedly compromised post-1989 Third Republic).	这一新的联盟宣称要建立古钦斯基所描述的“第四共和国”（意指要与被认为遭到损害1989年以后的第三共和国在宪政上彻底决裂）。


The Kaczynskis want to destroy the “corrupt system composed of careerist politicians, post-communists, former secret service functionaries, and criminal organizations,” who, according to the twins, have ruled Poland since 1989.	古钦斯基兄弟想要彻底击毁由政治野心家、后共产主义者、前秘密警察部门官员和犯罪组织组成的腐败体系。 在古钦斯基兄弟看来，这一体系在1989年后一直霸占着波兰政治。


The Fourth Republic is supposed to be republican, rather than liberal, with greater state involvement in the economy.	第四共和国被认为将更为共和，而不是更为自由，并且国家将更多地参与经济。


It is to be a democracy steered from above, with only a limited division of power and a streak of authoritarianism, guided by a mixture conservatism, populism, and nationalism.	这将是从上至下的民主运动，只有一点分权并且会带有一点点的专制，受到保守主义、民粹主义和民族主义融合的导向。


It is to be assertive in its dealings with the EU – perhaps not so much Euro-skeptical as “Euro-difficult” – aping Margaret Thatcher’s Britain of the 1980’s, despite Poland’s being much poorer and less politically influential than Thatcher’s Britain was.	在与欧盟的关系上它将变得强硬，也许不会像“欧盟怀疑论”那样有那么多对欧盟的嘲弄，这是效仿八十年代玛格丽特·撒切尔夫人统治下的英国政府的做法，尽管波兰比那时的英国更穷、政治影响力也更小。


The notion of a Fourth Republic incites heated opposition.	第四共和国的观念遭到了激烈反对。


President Lech Kaczynski’s approval ratings, are dramatically lower than those of his predecessor, the SLD’s Aleksander Kwasniewski.	总统莱赫·古钦斯基的支持率比他的前任左翼民主联盟的阿历克桑德·科瓦斯涅夫斯基要低得多。


His brother, Jaroslaw, has always evoked popular mistrust.	他的弟弟，雅罗斯瓦夫，是个总是会引发公众不信任的人。


Most Poles did not vote for the Kaczynskis and still do not want to follow them.	绝大多数波兰人并没有选举古钦斯基或者响应他们的主张。


But they did not see the risk in letting them gain so much power, and so did not mobilize to block them.	但是他们并不认为让他们掌握如此大的权力有多么危险，也没有发动起来阻止他们。


New elections are not due until 2009.	新的选举要到2009年才进行。


To be sure, a political crisis can bring the coalition down, but this can happen only if Poland’s “wandering” electorate decides that the PiS has let it down.	当然，一场政治危险将会使这个联盟垮台，但是这只有在波兰摇摆不定的选民认为是法律和公正党让他们的生活变得艰难时才会发生。


That looks unlikely.	这看起来并不太可能。


The coalition took power at the start of what seems to be a new period of prosperity, underpinned by large EU subsidies.	这个联盟掌权的时候似乎适逢一个新的繁荣期的开始，而大笔欧盟的补贴更使这种繁荣成为可能。


As a result, there will be room for myriad favors for special interests and for boosting social benefits, which may buy time for the PiS and its vision of a Fourth Republic.	这样的话，将给特殊利益集团带来无数的好处，另外也会大为提高社会福利，而这些将给法律和公正党以及它所描绘的第四共和国挣得时间。


How far will the twins push their idea?	这对双胞胎兄弟能在多大程度上推动他们的主张？


Jaroslaw Kaczynski is an intelligent politician who understands the link between currency stability and political success.	雅罗斯瓦夫·古钦斯基是个聪明的政治家，他懂得货币稳定和政治成功之间的联系。


So he will not allow government largesse to become excessive and thus risk a negative reaction in the financial markets.	所以他不会允许政府过分慷慨从而引发金融市场的负面反应。


Yet the strong link between the fate of the coalition (and that of the Fourth Republic) and a fickle electorate addicted to social benefits will block the serious reforms that are needed to put the economy on a sound footing in the long term.	然而这个联盟（以及由此带来的第四共和国）的命运和摇摆不定的选民对于社会福利的迷恋之间的强烈联系将阻止为给经济的长期发展打下坚实基础而迫切需要进行的激烈改革。


This will likely result in a gradual loss of economic competitiveness – all the more dangerous for being obscured by the temporary boost from EU funds, which will help maintain the government’s popular support.	这很可能会导致经济竞争力的慢慢消失。 这一更大的危险目前却因为欧盟资金的补贴所带来的，也是帮助政府得以维系公众支持的经济的暂时繁荣而被掩盖了。


In that case, life with the twins could become more interesting than Poland needs.	由此看来，这对双胞胎兄弟治国会比波兰人到底需要的程度更为有趣。


Europe Moves East	欧洲东进


PARIS – Madrid and Warsaw recently looked very similar: both were the sites of massive demonstrations.	发自巴黎——马德里和华沙最近看似非常相似：两地都爆发了大规模示威。


But the crowds gathered at Europe’s western and eastern extremities had very different agendas in mind.	但聚集在欧洲东西两端的民众心中却有着截然不同的议程。


In Spain, citizens were united by economic and social despair.	在西班牙，令市民们聚集在一起的是在经济和社会方面的绝望感。


They took to the streets to express their rejection of a European Union-imposed austerity policy that they believe is leading them into an abyss.	他们涌上大街去反对欧盟强加的紧缩政策——据信这会将把他们推入无底深渊。


They want jobs and the dignity and salaries that go with them.	他们想要工作以及随之而来的尊严和薪水。


The indignation of some had a clear anti-capitalist and anti-globalization tone.	某些人的激愤中还含有明确的反资本主义和反全球化语调。


In the Polish capital, Catholic and conservative parties, together with the “Solidarity” Trade Union, inspired by a reactionary Christian radio network, “Radio Maria,” gathered for political and cultural, rather than economic, reasons.	而在波兰首都，天主教和保守派政党，再加上名为“团结”的贸易联盟，在保守基督教“玛利亚电台”的鼓动下，出于政治和文化——而非经济——的原因走上街头。


In the name of the defense of media freedom, they were denouncing a government that they found too “centrist” and insufficiently “Polish.”	在维护媒体自由的旗号下，他们指责现任政府太过“中立”且不够“波兰”。


Ten years ago, then-US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously distinguished between “Old” and “New” Europe on the basis of their attitudes toward the United States and the war in Iraq.	十年前，时任美国国防部长的唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德（Donald Rumsfeld）根据对美国以及伊拉克战争的态度下了一个将欧洲分为“新”“旧”两块的著名论断。


New Europe (at least its governments), understanding the need to exercise power, was from Mars, whereas Old Europe (with the main exception of Great Britain), having decayed into a culture of weakness, was from Venus.	那些理解为何需要运用权力的新欧洲（至少是其政府）来自火星，而来自金星的旧欧洲（英国显然是例外）则堕落成为一种弱势文化。


The differences between the demonstrations in Madrid and Warsaw suggest that the distinction between Old and New Europe remains valid, though not in the way that Rumsfeld meant.	马德里和华沙示威之间的差别表明新旧欧洲之间的区分依然有效——虽然已经不是拉姆斯菲尔德的原意了。


Of course, it would be inaccurate to oppose a thriving Poland to a collapsing Spain.	当然，用欣欣向荣的波兰来和逐渐崩溃的西班牙对照是不准确的。


Given the overall European crisis, even Poland’s economy is no longer booming.	考虑到欧洲的整体危机，即便波兰的经济也难言蓬勃。


Unemployment is around 10% (still less than half the Spanish rate), and annual GDP growth is around 1% (Spain’s growth rate is negative).	波兰的失业率约为10%（但依然只有西班牙的一半），GDP年增长率1%（西班牙则是负的）。


But the moods in the two countries, as well as their perceptions of Europe and their role in it, contrast starkly.	但两国国内弥漫的情绪，以及它们对欧洲及其所扮演角色的认识却是泾渭分明。


Poland, which is not yet part of the eurozone, sees no alternative to the EU.	而波兰，虽然还不是欧元区的一部分，将欧盟认定为唯一的前途。


The country has fully reconciled itself with America’s strategic shift away from the European continent, even though Poles are as obsessively fearful of Russia as ever.	虽然依然跟从前一样惧怕俄罗斯，但该国已经完全适应了美国将战略中心从欧洲大陆移开的事实。


And can one blame them, given that Russia seems more nostalgic for its imperial tradition than ever?	而考虑到俄罗斯似乎比以往更加怀念其帝国传统的现状，这又有什么可指责的呢？


But, given the political evolution of Ukraine, not to mention Belarus, Poland can no longer dream of an Eastern future.	但由于乌克兰政治的当前发展状况，更别提白俄罗斯，波兰对东边已经不再抱有幻想。


Poland’s only way is West – but the European West more than the American one.	波兰的唯一道路就是西方——但不是美国所代表的西方，而是欧洲。


Poland is benefiting from economic growth and prosperity in Germany, its immediate western neighbor and closest ally.	波兰从德国这个西边邻国和亲密盟国的经济增长和繁荣中受益。


Reconciliation between the two countries has been one of their greatest achievements, and Poland may, for the first time in its history, be in the right place – close to Berlin – at the right time.	两国的和解是双方所取得的最大成果，而波兰可能，或许也是历史上的头一次，在正确的时间出现在了正确的地点——更接近柏林。


By contrast, Spain seems to be moving south, figuratively if not literally (witness the desertification affecting some parts of Andalusia).	相比之下，西班牙似乎正在南移，即便不是实际上也是数字上的（鉴于安达卢西亚某些地区的沙漠化）。


But Spain adamantly – and legitimately – refuses to be compared with Greece.	但西班牙坚决——并合理地——反对把自己和希腊相比。


Consider its modern infrastructure, the dynamism of its young entrepreneurs, and the internationally recognized quality of its cultural goods. The Spaniards are right.	考虑到该国现代化的基础设施，年轻企业家的活力及其文化产业的在国际上的声誉，西班牙人显然是对的。


But Spain increasingly regards Europe more as a problem than as a solution.	但西班牙越来越把欧洲视为一个问题，而不是一个解决方案。


It is not so much that its people want to leave the eurozone (or, for that matter, that many want their regions to leave Spain); rather, the country wants to remain itself – that is, to maintain a lifestyle that is largely the product of climate.	该国人民并不是太想脱离欧元区（或者说，在这个问题上，许多人想让自己所在的地区从西班���独立出去）； 相反，该国希望继续做回自己——就是维持着一个因当地气候而生的生活方式。


For Poles, the EU is still a tool for modernization, whereas Spaniards increasingly consider it synonymous with an attack on their dignity, if not on their essence.	对波兰人来说，欧盟依旧是一个实现现代化的工具，而西班牙人日渐认定其等同于对他们尊严——如果不是精髓的话——的损害。


How can one unite member countries with such different emotional calendars?	为何一个联盟内的成员国会有如此不同的情感区别？


And how can Europe move ahead with such vivid pecking orders?	欧洲又如何能在如此刺眼的等级区分之下继续前行？


Spaniards are offended when they are compared to Greeks, Poles are shocked when they are compared with Spaniards, the French refuse to be compared to Italians, and so on, in an infernal spiral.	西班牙人听说自己被拿来与希腊人比较时感觉受到了侮辱，波兰人发现自己被跟西班牙人比较时大感震惊，法国人不愿和意大利人相提并论，等等等等，简直就是个无尽的地狱螺旋。


Yet not long ago – after the fall of Franco – Poles looked with envy at Spain.	但就在不久之前——就在佛朗哥倒台之后——波兰人还在妒忌西班牙人呢。


Here I am reminded of a conversation with the Polish historian, statesman, and politician Bronisław Geremek in 1978, when we shared an office in Washington, DC.	在此我回想起了1978年时与波兰历史学家，政治家布罗尼斯拉夫·盖莱梅克（Bronisław Geremek）的一段对话——当时我俩在华盛顿特区共享一间办公室。


For him, Poland and Spain had long had a somewhat parallel history.	在他看来，波兰和西班牙一直以来都有着在某种意义上平行发展的历史。


Both were unable to integrate modernity into their institutions, and both had fallen into decline after a brilliant historical period between the late fifteenth and early eighteenth centuries.	两国都无法把现代性整合进自己的体制，也同时在15世纪晚期和18世纪早期的黄金历史时期陷入了衰退。


Poland had even disappeared from the map of Europe – the victim of its immediate neighbors’ virulent greed.	波兰甚至一度从欧洲的地图上消失了——始作俑者正是那个曾经贪得无厌的邻国。


Democracy returned to Spain in 1975, and the country soon recovered its place within Europe, just when Poland seemed trapped in its tragic history.	就在波兰似乎深陷其悲剧历史之时，西班牙在1975年恢复民主，并迅速重新树立了自己在欧洲的地位。


But, 11 years after my conversation with Geremek, communism collapsed in Poland, and in 2004 the country’s “return” to Europe was complete.	但在我与盖莱梅克对话的11年后，波兰社会主义制度崩溃，2004年该国终于完成了“回归”欧洲的大业。


Today’s Poles do not believe that Europe has cheated them.	今天的波兰人不相信欧盟欺骗了他们。


Nearly everywhere, you can see tangible signs of the EU’s support: a bridge here, a school there.	在那里你可以在各处看见欧盟支持的具体体现：这里一座桥，那里一所学校。


In Spain, by contrast, disillusion with the Union has replaced the early enthusiasm of the “movida” period.	相反在西班牙，对欧盟的幻灭已经取代了早期“欢乐派对”时期的热情。


Whether that remains true will most likely determine the future of Europe.	而这是否会保持真实则可能将决定欧洲的未来。


Building Stability for Indian Growth	为印度增长营造稳定


MUMBAI – In their efforts to stimulate demand by pursuing increasingly aggressive monetary policies, advanced economies have been imposing risks on emerging-market countries such as India.	孟买—发达经济体在通过日益激进的货币政策刺激需求时给印度等新兴市场国家带来了风险。


Indeed, one day we face surging capital inflows, as investors go into “risk-on” mode, and outflows the next as they switch risk off.	事实上，昨天我们还因为投资者进入“冒险”模式而面临资本大量流入，今天，投资者切换成避险模式，资本也大量流出。


India has responded to this external volatility by trying to create a domestic platform of macroeconomic stability on which to build growth.	印度对这一外部波动性的反应是试图建立 一个国内宏观经济稳定平台，以此为基础构建增长。


India’s latest central budget emphasizes fiscal prudence, adheres to past commitments, and aims at structural reforms, especially in agriculture.	印度最新中央预算强调财政审慎，恪守过去的承诺，并致力于结构改革（特别是农业）。


Fiscal consolidation has also helped to keep the current-account deficit under 1% of GDP.	财政整合有助于将经常项目赤字限制在GDP的1%以内。


Moreover, inflation has been brought within the official target range.	此外，通货膨胀被限定在官方目标范围内。


And parliament has created a monetary-policy committee for the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which should ensure that multiple views are embedded in policy and improve continuity.	议会还为印度储备银行（RBI）成立了一个货币政策委员会，该委员会将确保政策考虑多重观点并改善持续性。


We must also address banks’ non-performing loans so that their balance sheets have room for new lending.	我们还必须解决银行的不良贷款问题，从而让它们的资产负债表有空间进行新的借贷。


Unlike more developed countries, India does not have an effective bankruptcy system (though a bill to create one has just cleared the lower house of Parliament).	和大部分发达国家不同，印度没有有效破产制度（尽管 议会下院刚刚通过了制定有效破产制度的法案）。


But, using some “out-of-court resolution” mechanisms devised by the RBI, and with capital support from the government, banks should have well-provisioned balance sheets by March 2017.	但是，利用RBI所制定的“法院外办法”，在政府资本的支持下，银行将在2017年3月完成资产负债表的优化。


Perhaps the hardest challenge has been to persuade the public, impatient for rapid growth, of the need to ensure stability first.	也许最艰巨的挑战是说服对高增长急不可耐的公众理解首先确保稳定的需要。


Growth, it is argued, is always more important, regardless of the looming economic risks.	公众认为增长永远更加重要，不管前方面临怎样的经济风险。


Yet, despite the focus on stability, inhospitable global growth conditions, and two successive droughts (any of which would have thrown the economy into a tailspin in the past), growth is above 7%.	但是，在强调稳定、全球增长条件不利和连续遭遇两次旱灾（在过去，一次旱灾就足以让经济陷入困境）的情况下，印度经济增长仍高于7%。


The task is to build on this base.	我们的任务是巩固这一基础。


For the first time in decades, global trade has grown more slowly than global output.	几十年来第一次，全球贸易增长慢于全球产出。


As countries become richer, non-traded services constitute a greater share of output, causing GDP to grow faster than trade, while global overcapacity has restrained trade growth further.	随着各国变得日益富裕，非贸易服务构成了产出的更大份额，导致GDP增长快于贸易，同时全球产能过剩进一步遏制了贸易增长。


And, as advanced economies become more competitive, and as China moves up the value chain, more inputs are being sourced within countries.	此外，随着发达经济体竞争力日益提高，以及中国在价值链中地位的攀升，更多的投入品需要在各国国内就地解决。


For all these reasons, the heady days of double-digit growth in Indian trade in goods and services will not return soon.	出于所有这些原因，印度商品和服务贸易增长动辄两位数的好日子近期难以重现了。


Many emerging markets have been hit by lower prices for their commodity exports, but India’s exports of goods seem to be doing worse recently than those of other emerging markets.	许多新兴市场因为大宗商品出口价格下跌而蒙受损失，但最近印度商品出口表现似乎比其他新兴市场更加糟糕。


At the same time, India’s exports of services are doing somewhat better, perhaps because of demand from the United States.	与此同时，印度服务出口表现相对较好，原因可能是美国需求。


Of course, these differences are over very short periods, so it is probably unwise to draw too many conclusions – except that India is not alone in suffering a fall-off in trade.	当然，这些区别只在非常短的时期内有效，因此就此得出过多结论也许并不明智——除了印度并不是唯一一个贸易惨淡的国家之外。


That does not stop industry bodies from demanding that the authorities “do something” – especially by lowering the value of the rupee.	这并没有让产业界停止要求当局“做些什么”——特别是让卢比贬值。


The rupee seems to have weakened by about 6% against the dollar since the beginning of 2015.	自2015年年初以来，卢比兑美元贬值了6%。


This depreciation should have helped our merchandise exports, and yet it coincides with their relative underperformance, because other currencies have depreciated against the dollar, too.	这一贬值理应有助于我们的商品出口，但实际上商品出口表现相对来说十分低迷，因为其他货币兑美元也有所贬值。


For this reason, economists focus on the “nominal effective exchange rate,” which compares the rupee’s value to that of other currencies by weighing their share in trade.	出于这一原因，经济学家强调“名义有效汇率”，即通过贸易比例权重比较卢比和其他货币的价值。


In trade-weighted terms, the rupee has remained relatively flat since early 2015.	以贸易加权值衡量，卢比自2015年初以来保持相对稳定。


That said, inflation in India is higher than in most other countries.	尽管如此，印度的通货膨胀比大部分其他国家都要高。


If a widget cost a dollar to make a year ago in the US, and cost 63 rupees to make in India, the Indian producer would have been competitive with the US because the dollar was worth 63 rupees.	如果一年前某个小玩意在美国的生产成本为1美元，在印度为63卢比，那么印度生产商对美国拥有竞争力，因为1美元价值63卢比。


But if inflation in India is 5% and zero in the US, it will cost the Indian manufacturer 66.2 rupees to make it today – and still just a dollar for American competitors.	但如果印度通胀率为5%，而美国为零，那么现在印度制造商的成本是66. 2卢比，而美国竞争对手仍然为1美元。


Hence the need to look at the “real effective exchange rate,” or the nominal effective exchange rate adjusted for inflation.	因此我们需要着眼于“实际有效汇率”，或经通胀调整的名义有效汇率。


The higher the index is, the less the exchange rate has depreciated to offset inflation – and the more uncompetitive India is.	这一指数越高，汇率抵消通胀的贬值就越小——印度的竞争力也越低。


Interpretation is in the eye of the beholder.	对此的解读不一而足。


Someone who wants to blame the exchange rate for India’s export slowdown can look at the index from the low point of September 2013 and argue that it has appreciated 20% (based on the IMF measure).	一些人想将印度出口减速归咎于汇率，他们着眼于2013年9月这一指数的低点，认为它升值了20%（基于IMF的衡量指标）。


But, over the past year, as goods exports have slowed, the real effective exchange rate has been rather flat.	但是，在过去的一年里，商品出口减速，而实际有效汇率几乎没有什么变化。


So someone who wants to absolve the exchange rate of blame will point to the recent period.	因此如果你认为汇率没有什么责任，可以着眼于最近一段时期。


But exchange rates are only one measure of competitiveness.	但汇率只是竞争力的一个衡量指标。


Productivity also matters.	生产率也很重要。


In a rich country, firms typically can improve productivity only through innovation.	在富裕国家，企业常常只能通过创新改善生产率。


In India, productivity can be improved simply by building a better road from a factory to the railhead.	在印度，生产率的提高可以通过建造���接工厂和铁路车站的更好的道路来实现。


Much of the appreciation in the real exchange rate is offset by increased productivity.	实际汇率的大部分升值被生产率的提高所抵消。


India’s trade has certainly been slowing – but not necessarily because of the rupee’s value.	印度贸易毫无疑问在减速——但并不一定是因为卢比的价值所导致。


Non-economists typically advocate a strong rupee: Not only does it convey national strength, but it also allows one to buy more stuff when one travels abroad, and imports are cheaper.	非经济学家常常鼓吹强势卢比：这不但能彰显国家实力，也能让印度人在出国旅游时购买更多东西，也让进口品更加便宜。


Of course, it is precisely because domestic tourism and production are disadvantaged relative to tourism and production abroad that many economists prefer a weak rupee.	当然，这正是因为国内旅游业和生产相对国外旅游业和生产处于劣势，才让许多经济学家更加偏好弱势卢比。


Yet these modern-day mercantilists do not acknowledge that undervaluation is a subsidy to India’s producers, financed by India’s consumers and savers.	但这些现代重伤主义者不承认币值低估是对印度生产商的补贴，而拿出这笔补贴的是印度消费者和储户。


The ideal exchange rate for India is neither strong nor weak; it is the “Goldilocks rate” produced by market forces, with the RBI focusing on attracting long-term capital inflows and intervening only to maintain orderly movement of the rupee versus other currencies.	对印度来，理想的汇率是既不强也不弱； 即由市场力量形成的“金发姑娘率”（Goldilocks rate），而RBI则着重于吸引长期资本流入，只在出于维持卢比对其他货币的有序波动的必要时干预。


To ensure such an orderly market, in good times we must resist the temptation to open up too much to short-term foreign-currency debt.	要确保这样一个有序的市场，在好光景时我们必须抵制对短期外币债务过度开放的诱惑。


Our rules now encourage investors in infrastructure and other projects with limited foreign earnings to issue Masala bonds (whereby Indian companies can borrow abroad in rupees), or to borrow long term, thereby limiting their risk when the exchange rate moves against them.	现在，我们的规则鼓励外国利润有限的基础设施和其他项目的投资者发行玛萨拉债券（印度公司向海外筹集卢比债务）或进行长期借贷，从而在汇率不利于它们时遏制风险。


So if the exchange rate is unlikely to be helpful, how should India export more?	因此，如果汇率形势不利，印度如何出口更多？ 答案在于通过更好的基础设施改善生产率；


The answer is to improve productivity with better infrastructure; improve human capital with better schools, colleges, and vocational and on-the-job training; simplify business regulation and taxation; and improve access to finance.	通过更好的学校、学院和假期和在职培训改善人力资本； 简化企业监管和税收；


I am often asked, “Which industries should we encourage?”	常常有人问我：“我们应该鼓励那些行业？


I would say that “encouraging” any industry may be the surest way of killing it.	”我会说“鼓励”任何行业都会无一例外的扼杀这个行业。


Our job as policymakers is to enable business activity, not to dictate its course.	作为决策者，我们的职责是让企业活跃起来，而不是决定企业的命运。


Why Haven’t We Ended Polio?	我们为什么不能消灭脊髓灰质炎？


BERN, LONDON, GENEVA – October 24, 2016, should be a unique day in the history of polio.	伯尔尼、伦敦、日内瓦——2016年10月24日理当是脊髓灰质炎历史上独一无二的日子。


If all goes according to plan, it will be the last annual World Polio Day before the disease is eradicated.	如果一切按照计划，它将是这种病根除前最后一个年度世界脊髓灰质炎日。


But now is not the time for celebration or complacency; while we know how to eliminate polio, we have not yet finished the job.	但现在还不是庆祝或自满的时候； 虽然我们知道如何消灭脊髓灰质炎，但我们还没有完成这项任务。


Consider this: in August 2014, the World Health Organization declared the Ebola crisis in West Africa a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC); it lifted that status in March 2016.	设想一下：2014年8月，世卫组织宣布西非埃博拉危机为国际关注的公共卫生紧急状况（PHEIC）； 后紧急状况于2016年3月被取消。


In May 2014, the WHO declared the international spread of wild poliovirus a PHEIC as well; yet that status is still active today, leaving one to wonder if world leaders are paying sufficient attention.	2014年5月，世卫组织同样宣布脊灰野病毒的国际传播也是国际关注的公共卫生紧急状况； 但上述状况迄今一直生效，让人不禁怀疑世界领导人是否给予了足够的关注。


They should be.	他们应当��以关注。


The continuing polio PHEIC is endangering the success of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), into which the world has invested $15 billion since it was launched in 1988; and it threatens global health generally.	脊髓灰质炎公共卫生紧急状况持续不断正在危及全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动（GPEI）的成功，自1988年启动以来，世界各国已累计投入150亿美元用于这项行动； 同时还威胁到全球公共卫生。


For starters, the GPEI effort to interrupt poliovirus transmission could miss its latest target date; unfortunately, it would not be the first time.	首先，全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动切断脊髓灰质炎病毒传播的工作有可能错过最近的日期目标； 不幸的是，这已经不是第一次了。


By the original 2000 target date, the incidence of polio had been reduced by more than 99%, from an estimated 350,000 cases in 1988.	截止2000年的原定日期目标，脊髓灰质炎的发病率已经比1988年估计的35万例下降了99%以上。


Since then, however, a long, stubborn “tail” of infection has persisted, mainly in remote, poor regions and conflict zones.	但长期以来顽固的感染“尾巴”仍持续存在，偏远贫困地区和冲突地区受到主要影响。


The effort to tackle these lingering cases is laborious, and it remains incomplete, despite PHEIC status.	虽然全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动一直持续开展，但应对上述持续爆发的病例非常吃力，而且也未能彻底完成根除脊髓灰质炎的任务。


To be sure, there have been some successes, such as in India, which was certified polio-free in 2014, and in Nigeria, which interrupted transmission the same year.	当然，我们也取得了一些成功，比如印度于2014年被认证为已根除脊髓灰质炎，而尼日利亚同年也切断了病毒传播。


But there have also been setbacks: in 2016, Nigeria suddenly had two new cases among children from an area that had just been liberated from the militant group Boko Haram.	但我们也同样经历了一些挫折：2016年，尼日利亚某刚从激进组织博科圣地解放的地区突然出现两例儿童新增病例。


The two other polio-endemic countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, missed their 2015 eradication target and have had to extend it by another year, at a cost of $1.5 billion.	另外两个脊髓灰质炎流行的国家，阿富汗和巴基斯坦，未能完成其2015年根除脊髓灰质炎的目标，于是被迫延期一年，并因此付出了15亿美元的代价。


The root causes of both countries’ missed deadlines will require delicate, skilled political handling to resolve.	化解两国未能满足最后期限的根源需要细致巧妙的政治技巧。


They include internal conflicts that make children inaccessible to public-health professionals, opposition by some religious leaders, and public mistrust of national governments and international initiatives.	其中包括导致儿童无法接触公共卫生专业人士的内部冲突、某些宗教领袖的反对，以及公众对国家政府和国际卫生计划持不信任态度。


Eradicating polio is expensive, but it would cost tens of billions of dollars more to fight the disease in perpetuity.	消灭脊髓灰质炎代价昂贵，但永远与疾病作战需要多付出数百亿美元的代价。


Politicians and policymakers should be reminded that a polio-free world would be a global public good, that eradication is by far the best bargain, and that sustained financing and political support is necessary to ensure the GPEI’s success.	应当提醒政治家和决策者一个彻底消灭脊髓灰质炎的世界符合全球公共利益，消灭脊髓灰质炎毫无疑问是最省钱的办法，有必要给予持续的资金和政治支持才能确保全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动的成功。


But it is also important to ensure that valuable assets and practices built up by the GPEI over time are not squandered once polio is gone.	但随着时间一点一滴过去，确保全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动所累积的宝贵资产和形成的惯例在消灭脊髓灰质炎后不会被白白浪费也很重要。


These include cold chains to preserve vaccines during transport from factories to patients; established “immunization days” and negotiated “days of tranquility” in conflict zones, when vaccinations can be administered; trained health-care workers; and systems for surveillance, laboratory analysis, and rapid response.	上述资产包括在从工厂到患者的运输途中保存疫苗的冷链； 在冲突地区确立的“免疫日”和谈判达成的“平静日”，可以抓紧时间接种疫苗；


These assets have proved their worth in combating other diseases: Nigeria was able to stop Ebola’s spread during the West Africa outbreak owing to its efficient polio-tracking system.	以及监测、实验室分析和快速反应系统。 上述资产已经证明了它们在抗击其他疾病方面的价值：由于建立了有效的脊髓灰质炎追踪系统，尼日利亚在西非疫情爆发期间成功地阻止了埃博拉的传播。


The reality, however, is that countries will be able to absorb GPEI assets into their health systems only if they are supported financially, logistically, and politically.	但现实情况是只有在资金、后勤和政治上得到支持，各国才能将全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动的资产融入国内卫生系统。


A major effort will be required to transfer materials to where they are needed, and to coordinate surveillance and laboratory operations.	需要付出大量努力将材料转移到需要的地方，并协调监测及实验室操作。


Doing so would not only boost global-health security and resilience for the next outbreak; it would also help us reach the United Nation Sustainable Development Goal for universal health-care coverage.	这样做不仅可以促进全球卫生安全并增强抵御下一次疫情爆发的能力； 还能帮助我们实现全民医疗覆盖的联合国可持续发展目标。


More broadly, lessons from the GPEI and other eradication efforts must not go unlearned.	从更广义的角度看，全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动和其他根除工作的经验教训是必须要总结的。


In 1980, smallpox became the first disease in people to be successfully eradicated, and there were prior unsuccessful campaigns against hookworm, yaws, yellow fever, and malaria.	1980年，天花成为人们成功根除的第一种疾病，之前根除钩虫、雅司、黄热病和疟疾的活动都没有取得成功。


But many lessons that were already known by the 1980s went unheeded for too long – such as the importance of tackling remote infection reservoirs and maintaining high immunization levels everywhere so that health systems aren’t overwhelmed.	但20世纪80年代就已经明确的经验却在太长时间内得不到应用——比方说治理造成远程感染的水源和在各地保持较高的水平免疫，以确保医疗系统不会承受过重的负荷。


A complex array of political pressures, motives, and aspirations determines which lessons we take from history, and which new global-health targets we set for ourselves.	一系列复杂的政治压力、动机和愿望决定了我们能从历史中吸取哪些教训，以及我们为自身设定的新全球卫生目标。


World Polio Day is thus an occasion to urge politicians to renew their commitments to polio eradication, and to apply lessons from the GPEI to improve health everywhere.	因此，世界脊髓灰质炎日是一次敦促政治家重申消灭脊髓灰质炎承诺的机会，并借此吸取全球根除脊髓灰质炎行动的经验，以改善世界各地的健康状况。


In the fight against polio, the world is largely relying on the generosity of the United States, Rotary International, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and European countries such as Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom (with additional political support from others such as Monaco).	在抗击脊髓灰质炎方面，世界主要依靠美国、扶轮国际、比尔和梅林达·盖茨基金会以及德国、挪威和英国等欧洲国家的慷慨捐助（还有来自摩纳哥等其他国家的额外政治支持） 。


Other European countries and the European Commission itself should do more to contribute to the eradication effort.	其他欧洲国家和欧洲委员会本身应当进一步为根除脊髓灰质炎的努力作工作。


While G7 member states renewed their commitment to eliminating polio at a summit in Japan earlier this year, a subsequent G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, where two-thirds of the world’s population was represented, made no reference to it; nor did the G77 group of 134 developing countries at its last meeting.	虽然G7成员国今年早些时候在日本举行的首脑会议上重申了消除脊髓灰质炎的承诺，但随后在中国杭州举行的20国集团首脑峰会上，世界三分之二人口的代表却并未提及消除脊髓灰质炎的目标； 由134个发展中国家组成的77国集团召开的上届会议也同样没有。


That is not good enough.	我们在这方面做得还不够好。


After years of effort, it is now clear that only a strong, consistent, worldwide commitment to full eradication can end the polio emergency.	经过多年的努力，显然只有旨在彻底根除的坚定连贯的全球承诺才能结束脊髓灰质炎的紧急状况。


Squashing the Superbugs	碾碎超级病菌


LONDON – Current antibiotics are becoming increasingly ineffective, not only at fighting common illnesses like pneumonia and urinary tract infections, but also at treating a range of infections, such as tuberculosis and malaria, which now risk again becoming incurable.	伦敦—最新的抗生素效果越来越差，不但对肺炎和尿路感染等常规疾病是如此，对各种传染病，比如结核病和疟疾，也是如此，这些疾病如今再一次变得难以治愈。


With the G-7 leaders having committed, in a recent joint declaration, to tackle “antimicrobial resistance” (AMR), it is time for the more inclusive G-20 – and China, as it chairs the group for the first time – to take the fight to the next level.	G-7领导人在最近的联合声明承诺解决“抗生素耐药性”（AMR），包含面更广的G-20——以及首次担任其主席国的中国——应该担起下一阶段战斗的领导责任。


Failure to address AMR will affect everyone, regardless of their nationality or their country’s level of development.	无法解决AMR将影响所有人，不论他们的国籍和国家的发展水平。


Indeed, by 2050, ten million people could be dying as a result of AMR, up from around 700,000 today, with China and India each housing about one million sufferers.	事实上，到2050年，可能有1,000万人死于AMR，而今天的人数为700,000，而中国和印度均将有一百万受害者。


At that point, an estimated $100 trillion in global GDP will already have been lost.	到那时，据估计GDP总损失将达到100万亿美元。


No G-7 strategy, however well crafted, can succeed without the involvement of the rest of the international community.	G-7的战略无论多么精心设计，如果不能包括国际社会其他部分，就无从成功。


After all, if infections travel with the people who carry them, so does resistance, meaning that the only solution to AMR is a shared one.	毕竟，如果传染病随着携带病菌的人类传播，那么抗药性也会随之扩散，这意味着解决AMR的唯一办法是齐心协力。


That is why members of the World Health Organization have agreed to implement a “global action plan on AMR,” and have called upon the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting of political leaders in 2016.	因此，世界卫生组织成员国同意实施“全球AMR行动计划”，并呼吁联合国在2016年举行高规格政治领导人会议。


In this effort, the emerging economies – with their large populations, rising wealth, and growing international clout – have a particularly important role to play, with China leading the way.	在与AMR的抗争中，新兴经济体——它们拥有庞大的人口、日益增加的财富和国际势力——能扮演非常重要的角色，首屈一指的便是中国。


We at the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance (which I chair) have already recommended such a role for China, including in discussions with some Chinese policymakers.	由我担任主席的抗耐药性评估（Review on Antimicrobial Resistance）已经建议中国承担这样的责任，并在与一些中国决策者的讨论中提出了这一点。


Between now and 2016, the stage must be set for China to act.	从现在开始到2016年，我们必须搭建好让中国大显身手的舞台。


The G-7 countries should drive this effort forward by taking concrete steps to fulfill the commitments they made in their joint declaration.	G-7国家应该采取切实措施实现它们在联合宣言中做出的承诺，以促进这方面的进步。


One such commitment is to reduce the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry.	一个承诺是减少畜牧业抗生素的使用。


Some European governments have already made significant progress in regulating this practice.	一些欧洲政府已经在监管这方面行为上取得了重大进步。


The United States has been slower to act, but has lately made some important policy moves.	美国的动作比较迟缓，但最近也有了重要的政策动作。


But perhaps the best way to change the way livestock are raised is by putting pressure on major food companies – a feat that consumers could achieve most effectively.	但也许改变畜牧养殖方式的最佳办法是向大型食品公司施压——在这方面，消费者的作用最为显著。


Indeed, rising demand for healthier foods, including antibiotic-free meat, has already compelled major food-industry players like McDonald’s, Costco, and KFC to declare their intention to phase out antibiotic-laden meat.	事实上，对健康食品（包括无抗生素肉类）的需求的增加已迫使麦当劳、好事多（Costco）和肯德基等食品业巨头宣布逐步淘汰含抗生素肉类的计划。


Governments should capitalize on this trend by implementing a major social-media campaign highlighting the smarter, healthier habits that all people should adopt – habits that would indirectly reduce demand for antimicrobials.	政府应该利用这一趋势，实施大范围社交媒体宣传战，强调所有人都应该养成能够间接减少防腐剂需求的更聪明、更健康的习惯。


The low cost and potentially high payoff of such a campaign makes it all the more appealing.	这一宣传战成本低、潜在回报高，很有吸引力。


A second commitment included in the joint declaration – to help ensure that medicines are used only when they are needed – may seem obvious, but in fact represents a major problem driving AMR.	联合宣言中的第二个承诺——帮助确保药物旨在需要时使用——看起来理所当然，但实际上这是导致AMR的一个大问题。


The key to addressing this problem is, as the declaration recognizes, to develop and improve access to rapid point-of-care diagnostic tools.	解决这一问题的关键——如宣言所指出的——是开发和改善快速检测诊断工具。


Improved diagnostic technologies are undoubtedly within the reach of the world’s top technology firms.	毫无疑问，改善诊断技术在世界顶尖科技公司的能力范围内。


But they will invest only if they are confident that health systems will use their innovations.	但它们只有在有信心卫生体系会使用它们的创新时才会进行这方面的投资。


If governments, say, mandated that particular diagnostic tests must be conducted before antibiotics could be prescribed, companies would have the necessary incentive.	如果（比如）政府强制要求在开具抗身素处方前进行某些皮试，高科技公司就能得到必要的激励。


Such a requirement would face criticism, with some claiming that testing takes too long, and thus is not always possible before starting treatment.	这一要求将面临批评，一些人认为皮试时间太长，有时在治疗开始前并不一定可行。


While this may be true in rare cases, there are many areas where fast and effective tests exist, but are not yet used widely – either in developing or developed countries.	也许偶尔确实会有这样的情况，但很多地区能够快速有效的皮试却没有广泛使用——在发展中国家还是发达国家都是如此。


Consider one of the most common infections: sore throats.	以最常见的传染病之一——喉咙痛为例。


Though they are often viral, rather than bacterial, they are frequently treated with antibiotics – an approach that not only is ineffective, but also fuels AMR.	它通常由病毒而非细菌引起，但仍频繁使用抗生素治疗——这样做不但效率很低，还助长了AMR。


A quick and easy swab test could solve this problem – and, indeed, one already exists.	迅速简易的筛查就可以解决这一问题——事实上，我们已经有了这样的筛查技术。


In a trial by a British pharmacy chain (which, admittedly, used a small sample), the test reduced the number of antibiotics consumed by nearly 60%.	在某英国连锁药店的实验中（实事求是地讲，样本数较小），这项筛查降低了近60%的抗生素消费数量。


Investment in the development and deployment of this technology could lead to a substantial decline in unnecessary antibiotic treatments for sore throats, not to mention ease pressure on health systems and save doctors’ time.	开发也推广这一技术的投资可以大大降低非必要的抗生素喉咙痛治疗，更不用说对卫生体系压力的缓解和节约医生时间了。


A third imperative, recommended by the Review and recognized by the G-7, is improved surveillance of the spread of drug-resistant infections, particularly in developing countries, where such data is most sparse.	抗耐药性评估建议、G-7国家承认的第三个当务之急是改进监控耐药性传染病的传播，特别是在数据缺失严重的发展中国家。


On this front, our own government is leading the way, with Chancellor George Osborne pledging in March to allocate £195 million ($307 million) to help emerging countries finance the fight against AMR.	在这方面，英国政府一马当先，3月份，财政大臣乔治·奥斯本（George Osborne）承诺投入1. 95亿英镑帮助新兴国家开展抗耐药性项目。


Foundations are likely to pledge their own funds to this initiative.	各大基金会也有可能拿出资金用于抗耐药性项目。


Meanwhile, the US government is focusing on supporting the development of new drugs via the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority.	与此同时，美国政府正在着眼于通过生物制药前沿研究和开发局（Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority）支持新药开发。


The world faces many challenges and crises, virtually all of which will demand strong political commitment and significant investment to resolve.	世界面临着诸多挑战和危机，几乎每一项挑战和危机都需要坚定的政治承诺和大手笔投资才能解决。


But the fact is that, when it comes to AMR, governments have a rare opportunity to preempt a major crisis, at a fraction of the cost of responding to the crisis once it has escalated.	但事实上，在AMR问题上，政府有一个千载难逢的机会能够阻止大危机的爆发，而其成本只是危机爆发后响应成本的几分之一。


In the scramble to address the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, for example, the US alone had to contribute $5.4 billion in public funds.	比如，在解决最近的西非地区埃博拉疫情爆发的过程中，光是美国就拿出了54亿美元的公共资金。


Add to that the savings to health systems and even employers, and concerted action to combat AMR becomes even more cost-effective.	再加上卫生体系甚至雇主的储蓄，解决AMR的联合行动的性价比将会更高。


That is why the G-7 governments should intensify their efforts to address AMR.	因此，G-7政府应该加紧解决AMR。


And it is why China and the other emerging economies should join the fight.	因此，中国和其他新兴国家也应该加入战斗。


Together, we can safeguard the curative powers of our medicines.	只要齐心协力，我们能够捍卫我们的药品的疗效。


Political Evolution	政治进化


People everywhere want a new relationship with power – more autonomy and more respect.	世界各地的人们都要求建立新权力关系——寻求更大自治权与更多尊重。


This reflects our current era, in which new knowledge, ideas, and possibilities have made our identities richer, more fluid, and less subject to fate.	新知识、新观念和各种可能性已使得我们的身份定位更为多样化，更具可变性，且不再受制于命运，这正反映了当前时代的特征。


At the same time, the information society and globalization have made ours a more insecure world, where we experience risks that politics-as-usual has been unable to address.	但与此同时，信息社会和全球化造就了一个愈来愈不安全的世界，在这个环境中，我们不得不承担难以为日常政治下定义的风险性。


As the leader of a political party, the central idea for me nowadays is to empower individuals.	作为一名政党领导人，如今我的主要观点就是予以个人更多权力。


A traditional party leader says to his followers, “You can trust me. ”	传统政党领导人会对支持者说，“你们可以信任我。


I think the future for progressive politics lies in leaders trusting citizens .	”而我认为，在将来只有相信公民的领导人才能取得政治进步。


It’s a new kind of relationship.	这是一种新型关系。


We in PASOK, the party that I lead, have started to think through what we want out of politics in a practical sense and how this can be delivered in a way that respects people’s lives.	我领导的泛希腊社会主义运动党（PASOK）已经开始从实践层面上来仔细思考我们究竟要从政治中获取什么并如何以一种尊重人们生活的方式获取。


We’re making changes at the top in order to open up our party to greater participation.	我们从上层开始改革，以示我党开诚布公乐于接受更多的改变。


We need to highlight, not hide , different views, and see our parties less as “war headquarters” and more as bio-diverse think tanks or workshops.	对于不同的观点意见，我们必须突出强调而不再是藏头露尾，应当视其他政党为提供多样化意见的智囊团和工作室，而非“战争总部”。


People can easily become lost in today’s ocean of information. They will always be looking for a lighthouse, faros , as we say in Greek.	人们常易于迷失在今日的信息海洋中，因此他们总在找寻一座灯塔，在希腊语中我们称之为， faros 。


But what are these lighthouses?	但是何为灯塔？


In an information society they will be those who are trusted to be able to help interpret or analyse what is happening.	在一个信息社会中，灯塔就是那些被人们信任并为他们解释分析形势的人。


So I believe that the future for political parties is to develop a culture of debate, dialogue, and critical understanding of issues, where people can help set a nation’s priorities and are not simply told by experts or their leaders what is right and wrong for them.	因此，我相信政党的未来应该发展辩论、对话以及批判性理解政治事件的风尚，这样国民就能帮助确立国家重点，而不是仅仅由专家或他们的领导人来告诉他们对错。


Big issues, such as migration, narcotics, or the environment, no longer fall within a traditional left-right framework.	一些重大问题，诸如移民、毒品或是环境问题，不再仅仅在左右翼党的框架内下定论。


For example, people may see an inevitable tradeoff between tough environmental standards and jobs.	比如，人们也许无可避免会在严格的环境标准和就业机会之间折衷妥协。


But these same people often want both.	但同一批人往往两者皆取。


It is no longer just one side against the other.	这将不再是双方的对抗。


The nature of capitalist growth requires us to take a more holistic view and work out how we can achieve sustainable development.	资本主义的发展特性要求我们从全局出发思考如何取得可持续发展。


Of course, bringing more democracy into our daily lives cannot mean perpetual debate, without actually making decisions.	当然，引进更多的民主并不意味着永久性辩论却不做实事。


Rather, it should mean that certain principles of respect, consultation, and deliberation become part of everyday life.	事实上，这意味着某一程度上的尊重和磋商原则，慎重考虑成为每天生活的一部分。


There is, by contrast, a traditional style of leadership that almost encourages fear and insecurity, so that a savior can come along and say, “I am the one who will solve this.”	与此相反的是，有一种传统领导方式却制造恐慌与不安全感，好让救世主降临并宣称，“我就是那个可以解决问题的人”。


President George W. Bush projects this style very openly.	乔治W·布什总统总是公开使用这种方法。


I opposed the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq because this type of foreign policy is associated with a form of power – resurgent, I believe, in conservative parties around the world – that projects leadership as command.	我反对布什政府的伊拉克政策，因为这种外交政策与一种权力形式紧密联系在一起，并且我相信这种命令式领导方式在全世界的保守政党中正在全面复苏。


I know this mindset well.	我对这种心态了如指掌。


When I was first elected as a member of parliament in 1981, people said, “Now George, you’ve got to bang the table.”	当1981年我第一被选举为国会议员时，人们说，“乔治，现在你可是一言九鼎了。


People would say you look weak if you’re not cursing the opposition and driving around in a big black car wearing a tie.	”而如果你不镇压反对派，不戴着领带坐在黑色大轿车里四处转悠，人们就会说你看上去软弱无能。


Above all, to be “strong,” you’re supposed to be giving orders.	总而言之，要成为“强势”之者，你就该颐指气使。


I said to myself, “I’m going to have to go about things in a more democratic way.”	我心里想，“我必须用一种更民主的方式来处理这些。


I realized that I would have to fight to communicate what I wanted to achieve.	”我认识到必须努力去传达我所要达成的目标。


There was a whole political culture that had to change.	整个政治文化都必须有所改变。


Part of my thinking concerns personal style, but also something deeper: the relationship between professional politicians and voters.	我考虑到了个人风格，但还有个更深的问题：职业政治家和选民之间的关系。


Obviously, there is a point where a leader must commit to a decision. But one can do this in ways that are not violent and aggressive, by defending the principles of that new relationship.	很明显，领导者必须完成他的决定，但他可以用一种非暴力的温和方式来做到，同时也捍卫了新关系原则。


Power by itself has no principles.	权力其本身无原则可言。


Our societies and citizens need more freedom if we are to build a more peaceful, prosperous, and secure world.	若要建立一个更和平、繁荣和安全的世界，社会和公民需要更多的自由。


Consider the example of Greek-Turkish relations, which had hardened under the compressed weight of “establishment” views that were long entrenched in both countries.	以希腊和土耳其为例，两国关系在各自长期坚持的“根据地”观点重压下不断恶化。


Only a new approach could break the mold of conventional wisdom.	只有新的方法才能打破传统的旧模式思维。


Quite often in confrontational situations, people and politicians create a zero-sum game culture, which results in authoritarian and militaristic leadership.	通常在冲突状态下，人们和政治家就会创造一种零和游戏文化，最终导致独裁主义和军事主义占据领导上风。


We in the former PASOK government instead helped create a more positive framework by declaring our commitment to work for consensus, thereby creating the basis for trust and mutual understanding.	我们过去在泛希腊社会主义运动党（PASOK）政府中，却是通过公布我们的承诺，即服务于大众利益，来帮助建设一个更积极的框架，创造信任和相互理解的平台基础。


Political parties everywhere must now become an agent for similar change.	所有的政党现在都应该成为推行类似改变。


Nowadays, the framework of power itself – the old-fashioned party hierarchy that takes command of the state or municipality – is a kind of abuse.	如今，权力框架其本身——掌握国家或市政权传统的政党等级——其实就是一种滥用职权。


It takes power away from people in their own names, but gives them fear rather than confidence.	它以人民的名义从他们手中抢走权力，却给他们带来多于信任的恐惧。


Not surprisingly, my party is now seeking to return to power in the next election.	毫无疑问，我党现在正谋求在下一届选举中重掌大权。


But we’re also looking deeper and further ahead.	但我们也在寻求更深更远的前进。


We will not be returned to government unless we offer a better kind of democracy in the long term.	如果不能在���期内提供更好的一种民主形式，我们就不能回到政府。


In this enedeavor, we hope to set an example to the world.	我们正在努力向世界树立一个榜样。


Political Islam’s Loss of Democratic Legitimacy	政治伊斯兰的民主合法性损失


DURHAM – This year, Islamist politics has faced massive setbacks in two major predominantly Muslim countries: Egypt and Turkey.	达拉姆—今年，伊斯兰政治在埃及和土耳其这两个穆斯林占多数的国家面临着重大挫折。


But it is too soon to write political Islam off as a capable participant – even a leading force – in a pluralist democracy.	但认为政治伊斯兰不再是多元民主中能有作为的参与者甚至是领导力量还为时过早。


Just one year after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s first elected president, millions of Egyptians took to the street, triggering the military coup that ousted him.	穆斯林兄弟会的穆尔西成为埃及首位民选总统还不到一年，数百万埃及人就走上了街头，引发了导致其下台的军事政变。


Morsi’s political incompetence and lack of vision in the face of economic collapse would have been enough to diminish support for his government.	穆尔西在政治上的无能以及缺少应对经济崩溃之策足以让他的政府的支持丧失殆尽。


But his rejection of pluralism and pursuit of an Islamic dictatorship, exemplified by his efforts to centralize power in the hands of the Brothers and place himself beyond the review of Egypt’s judiciary, proved to be his undoing.	但他拒绝多元主义和追求伊斯兰独裁——他试图将权力集中在穆兄会手中并让自己获得超然于埃及司法的地位就是明证——才是他的失败因由。


Similarly, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has taken to governing in a way that is unraveling a decade of progress, one marked by economic dynamism, rapid growth, and the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control.	类似地，土耳其总理、正义和发展党（Justice and Development Party，AKP）的埃尔多安的治国之道让十年进步毁于一旦，破坏了经济活力、快速增长和军队服从文治的传统。


The Erdoğan government’s recent brutal crackdown on popular protests against planned construction in Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park made Turkey look like a one-party dictatorship.	埃尔多安政府最近残忍地镇压了反对伊斯坦布尔Taksim Gezi公园改建计划的群众游行，这让土耳其看起来像是一党独裁。


To make things worse, Erdoğan then spent weeks subverting pluralism through polarizing speeches that stigmatized Turks who do not share his social conservatism or subscribe to his particular interpretation of Islam.	更糟糕的是，在此后的几周中，埃尔多安发表极端讲话，污蔑不同意其社会保守主义或其对伊斯兰教的特别解读的土耳其人，以此镇压多元主义。


Given that Egypt and Turkey are two of the three most populous countries of Islam’s historic core (the third is theocratic Iran), one might infer that their ongoing difficulties have destroyed any prospect of reconciling political Islam with pluralist democracy.	埃及和土耳其是伊斯兰教历史核心的三个人口最多的国家中的两个（另一个是神权统治下的伊朗），因此你也许会据此认为发酵中的困境破坏了任何让政治伊斯兰和多元主义民主协调起来的前景。


But the two countries’ situations include fundamental differences, as do political Islam’s prospects for renewal.	但这两国家的局势存在根本性的不同，政治伊斯兰的复兴前景亦然。


In Egypt, the economic challenges are so dire, and traditions of consensual governance so shallow, that it may be impossible for any party to rule democratically in the foreseeable future, let alone the Muslim Brotherhood, which would have to reinvent itself completely.	在埃及，经济挑战让人绝望，一致赞成的治理传统岌岌可危，以至于在可预见的未来可能没有哪个政党能够民主执政，更不用说需要彻底自新的穆斯林兄弟会了。


And non-Islamists are even less likely to trust the hardline Salafist Nour Party – the Islamist party that participated in Morsi’s ouster – to uphold democratic principles.	非伊斯兰教徒更加不可能相信强硬的沙拉菲派光明党（Nour Party，参与了推翻穆尔西的伊斯兰政党）会坚持民主原则。


In contrast, Turkey’s AKP still stands a chance of re-legitimizing itself in the eyes of offended constituencies, because its retreat from pluralism is strongly identified with Erdoğan himself.	相反，土耳其的AKP仍有机会修复其在受侵犯选民中的合法性，因为该党在多元主义方面的倒退带有深刻的埃尔多安个人印记。


In fact, some AKP heavyweights, including Erdoğan’s longtime associate, President Abdullah Gül, believe that he badly mismanaged the recent protests.	事实上，一些AKP要人，包括埃尔多安的长期助手、总统居尔在内，认为埃尔多安在处理最近的游行方面严重失误。


By replacing Erdoğan as party leader, the AKP could dissociate itself from his Islamization campaign and rehabilitate its potential as a democratic political force.	AKP可以通过不再让埃尔多安担任该党领袖摆脱他的伊斯兰化运动，重振其作为民主政治力量的潜力。


Many AKP constituencies are wary of cultural conflict, if only because it threatens their economic interests.	许多AKP选民担心文化冲突，大概是因为这威胁到了他们的经济利益。


Hence, such a move would probably be enough to restore much of the AKP’s lost support and to calm opponents who fear that their personal freedoms will continue to erode under its governance.	因此，如此可能便已足以重振AKP所失去的大部分支持，安抚担心AKP执政会影响他们的个人自由的反对者。


An opportunity to replace Erdoğan will arise next year, when Gül’s term expires.	取代埃尔多安的机会明年将会出现在明年居尔任期到期时。


Erdoğan wants to deny Gül a second term, taking his place under an amended constitution that would transfer full executive authority to the president.	埃尔多安希望阻止居尔连任，由自己取而代之，并通过宪法修正案把全部行政权力转移给总统。


By denying his wish, AKP parliamentarians would weaken Erdoğan’s standing, possibly enabling the party to push him aside.	AKP议员可以通过否决埃尔多安的这一意图削弱埃尔多安的地位，使AKP有可能将他甩掉。


If this proves insufficient to drive Erdoğan from power, the arrival of his self-imposed prime ministerial term limit in 2015 will allow the AKP Executive Council to force him to retire simply by holding him to his word.	如果这还不足以让埃尔多安失去权力，那么在他自己所设定的总理任期大限——2015年，AKP执行委员会也可以以尊重其意愿为由迫使他退休。


With the AKP having demonstrated its disapproval of Erdoğan’s undemocratic behavior, its new leadership could begin to rebuild its legitimacy as a party that respects minority rights.	AKP可以通过证明自己不认同埃尔多安的不民主行为使其新领导层重建其作为尊重少数派权利的政党的合法性。


To keep it from losing its way again, the AKP must also address the root cause of Erdoğan’s metamorphosis into an intolerant autocrat.	为了避免再次失败，AKP还必须纠正埃尔多安向不可容忍的独裁蜕变的根本原因。


Early in Erdoğan’s premiership, he was restrained by the president, the judiciary, and the military, which were all committed to upholding the secularism enshrined in Turkey’s constitution.	在埃尔多安担任总理早期，他还受到总统、司法和军队的约束，后三者均效忠于写入土耳其宪法的世俗主义。


As recently as 2008, Turkey’s highest court considered shutting down the AKP for violating that principle.	直到2008年，土耳其最高法院还在考虑以违反这一原则为由取缔AKP。


But changes in the judiciary’s composition, Gül’s 2008 accession to the presidency, and a 2010 constitutional amendment allowing military officials to be tried in civilian courts contributed to the gradual loosening of restrictions on Erdoğan’s authority.	但司法系统组成的改变、居尔于2008年成为总统以及2010年宪法修正案允许军官可由民事法庭审讯导致对埃尔多安权力的约束逐渐松弛。


More than 400 generals have been imprisoned for allegedly plotting coups, in many cases on the basis of patently fabricated evidence.	400多名将军因被控密谋政变而被关进了见于，很多案例的判据是显然出于伪造的证据。


Erdoğan has also misused the legal system to stifle the media and repress citizens’ freedom of expression.	埃尔多安还滥用司法系统扼杀媒体、抑制公民的言论自由。


Clearly, Turkey’s political institutions lack adequate safeguards.	显然，土耳其的政治制度缺少充分的保卫。


They have allowed an enormous concentration of power in the hands of one person and the parliamentary majority that he leads.	这使得大量权力集中在独夫之手及其所领导的议会多数。


Turkish policymakers must now guarantee the judiciary’s autonomy and political impartiality, restore freedom of expression for all citizens, and establish a system of checks and balances to replace the military as the guardian of secularism.	如今，土耳其决策者必须捍卫司法的自治地位和政治上的公正性，重塑全体公民所共有的言论自由，并建立政府机关的相互制衡以取代军队成为世俗主义的捍卫者。


Pursuing the latter objective would require the AKP to relinquish some power voluntarily.	追求后一个目标要求AKP自愿放手某些权力。


It might sell the requisite constitutional reforms to its conservative base by conveying that, in the long run, Islamists have as much to gain from effective political checks and balances as do the targets of Erdoğan’s social engineering.	它可以证明，在长期，伊斯兰教可以从有效的政治制衡中获益良多，不亚于埃尔多安社会工程的目标群体，以此让其保守主义选民接受宪政改革的必要条件。


After all, as Morsi’s overthrow demonstrated, public opinion can quickly turn against a ruling party, especially in an economic crisis.	毕竟，正如穆尔西下台所显示的，公共观点可以迅速地转变为不利于执政党，特别是在经济危机时。


Egypt’s recent experience offers a glimpse into Turkey’s potential future should it fail to establish effective political safeguards.	埃及最近的经验可以提供借鉴，土耳其若不能建立有效的政治防线，可能将步埃及后尘。


Morsi was able to rule without restraint, trampling freely on citizens’ fundamental rights, because the military regime that assumed control after Hosni Mubarak’s 2011 ouster scheduled presidential elections before a constitution was adopted.	穆尔西曾能够不受限制地执政，自由践踏公民的基本权利，因为在穆巴拉克2011年倒台后掌控局面的军政权在宪法被采用之前先安排了总统选举。


The only way the Muslim Brotherhood can hope to regain broad acceptance as a legitimate democratic player is with a constitution that includes credible mechanisms for guaranteeing pluralism and due process.	穆斯林兄弟会有望重新被广泛接受为合法民主参与者的唯一机会是宪法规定了可信的多元主义保护和正当程序的机制。


Political Islam has reached a critical juncture on the road toward democratic legitimacy.	政治伊斯兰遇到了通往民主合法性的关键节点。


Its continued progress will depend on the commitment of two of its leading promoters – Turkey’s AKP and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – to design and implement political systems that safeguard the basic democratic principles of pluralism, freedom, and the rule of law.	其未来前途将取决于其两大推行者——土耳其的AKP和埃及的穆斯林兄弟会——做出承诺设计并实施捍卫多元主义、自由和法治精神的基本民主原则的政治制度。


What’s Wrong with Normal?	正常人怎么了？


LONDON – In Britain these days, one can’t avoid hearing and seeing more and more about the wretched campaign to spit in the face of the world (and of reality) and quit the European Union.	伦敦—这些天，在英国，你无法避免听到或看到越来越多的向世界（和现实）脸上吐口唾沫然后退出欧盟的令人不快的运动。


Visiting the United States, as I recently did, provides some relief.	访问美国——就像我最近做得那样——能让你获得一些喘息。


But it comes at a price: wall-to-wall coverage of the presidential primaries.	但这是有代价的：全天候的总统初选报道。


The Republican contest is almost egregiously distasteful, with the exception of the performance of Governor John Kasich of Ohio.	共和党的竞争几乎是异乎寻常地令人反感，除了俄亥俄州州长约翰·卡西奇（John Kasich）的表现。


Unfortunately, he is not going to win.	不幸的是，他没法获胜。


His problem is simple: He is recognizably a normal human being.	他的问题很简单：他显然是一个正常人。


Watching the incendiary, invective-filled campaigns of his opponents – Donald Trump and Senator Ted Cruz – makes one mourn for the Grand Old Party.	看看他的对手的那些煽动成性、充满咒骂的选战——比如唐纳德·特朗普和泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）参议员——不禁让你为这个大老党哀叹。


The first election campaign that I got involved in was some 50 years ago, in New York, where all of today’s candidates – Republican and Democrat – recently traded blows, with Trump and Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton emerging triumphant.	我所参与的第一场选战是在大约50年前的纽约，也就是今天的共和党和民主党候选人刚刚进行过角逐、最后特朗普和民主党领跑者希拉里·克林顿胜出的地方。


In the mid-1960s, the leaders of the state and city, Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Mayor John Lindsay, were Republicans, as were New York’s two senators, Kenneth Keating and Jacob Javits.	在20世纪60年代中期，纽约州和纽约市领导人、州长纳尔逊·洛克菲勒（Nelson Rockefeller）和市长约翰·林赛（John Lindsay）都是共和党，纽约州的两位参议员、肯尼斯·基庭（Kenneth Keating）和雅各布·贾维茨（Jacob Javits）亦然。


These political moderates, and many other Republicans in the 1960s, still reflected the party of Abraham Lincoln in readily defined ways.	这些政治温和派以及20世纪60年代的许多其他共和党人仍在以既定的风格体现林肯的党。


For one thing, they were internationalists.	一方面，他们是国际主义者。


For another, they believed in a partnership between government and the private sector (think of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s record, say, in building the US interstate highway system).	另一方面，他们相信政府和私人部门之间的合作（比如艾森豪威尔总统在建设美国州际高速公路系统方面的记录）。


Above all, they understood and identified with the integrationist project that remains the country’s continuing civilizing mission (reflected in the words – E Pluribus Unum – on America’s seal).	毕竟，他们理解并认同仍是美国文明使命的融合（integrationist）工程（体现在美国国玺上的“合众为一”铭文中）。


One cannot imagine those Republicans from the 1960s campaigning alongside the two leading GOP candidates today.	你无法想象这些20世纪60年代的共和党人与今天领先的两位老大党候选人一起竞选。


Cruz is an ideological bruiser; Trump is just a bruiser, with no discernible ideology at all.	科鲁兹是意识形态斗士； 特朗普只是斗士，根本没有意识形态可言。


On the other hand, I don’t imagine those former Republicans would have had any difficulty endorsing Kasich, a successful conservative governor whose primary motivation is plainly not hating people, whether in his own party or in the Democratic Party.	另一方面，我认为这些前共和党支持卡西奇不会有任何困难，他是一位成功的保守派州长，其主要动机绝不是恨人，不管是党内的人还是民主党的人。


And that appears to be the source of his weakness as a candidate.	而这似乎 是他作为候选人的弱势的源头。


He doesn’t froth at the mouth.	他不会因为言辞激动而嘴角挂着唾沫。


He seems – what a crime – blessedly sane.	他看上去心智健全——这就是他的罪状。


Apparently, normal isn’t good enough in today’s Republican Party.	显然，正常对于今天的共和党来说不够好。


The party is paying the price for surrendering in panic over the years to Tea Party zealots backed by disgracefully large treasure chests of billionaires’ loot.	共和党正在为多年来屈从于对得到亿万富豪不可告人的巨大财富支持的茶党狂热分子的恐慌而付出代价。


Acquiescence in heavily bankrolled, fearsome prejudice has left the rational and electable parts of the Republican Party in moral and political ruin.	在默许大规模献金的情况下，可怕的偏见让理性的、可堪当选的共和党人陷入了道德和政治困境。


So now there is a late-in-the-day scramble by the party’s establishment to convince themselves that Cruz, an arrogant, bullying extremist, is not as ghastly as they have always told people he is.	于是，现在，共和党建制派姗姗来迟地说服自己相信，自大凌人的科鲁兹并不像他们一直告诉人们的那样可怕。


They fear him less as the party’s presidential candidate than they fear Trump.	他们害怕特朗普成为共和党总统候选人甚于科鲁兹。


On the Democrats’ side, the battle between Senator Bernie Sanders and former Secretary of State (and US Senator) Hillary Clinton is nowhere near as grubby.	在民主党方面，伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）参议员和希拉里·克林顿前国务卿（和参议员）的斗争远远没有那么肮脏。


It exposes some real issues of social equity and hostility to globalization that need to be addressed.	他们的斗争暴露出一些社会平等性和敌视全球化的需要解决的现实问题。


But the rest of the world will hope that the result is not to give way to protectionism and to turn America’s back on the leadership that only it can give in tackling global problems.	但世界其他部分希望结果不是保护主义和美国背弃只有它才能提供的处理全球问题的领导力。


Watching all this close up could encourage despair.	看到所有这些结果可能令人绝望。


But we should not forget that, especially in the US, all politics is local.	但我们不应该忘记，特别是在美国，所有政治都是地方政治。


And, at the state and city level, there are still plenty of sane, decent, and intelligent elected officials trying to provide sensible leadership.	此外，在州和市层面，仍然有大量健全、体面、聪明的当选官员正在试图提供理智的领导。


And some will move on to the national stage.	而其中一些人将走上全国舞台。


For example, in Los Angeles, where I spent a few days, a clever, well-educated young mayor, Eric Garcetti, combines energy, good looks, and common sense in a way that will almost certainly take him further.	比如，在我盘桓了一些时日的洛杉矶，一位受过良好教育的聪明的年轻市长埃里克·加尔赛迪（Eric Garcetti）能量、颜值和常识皆备，将几乎肯定能够走的更远。


There must be a lot more like him, genuinely committed to public service, not to the self-aggrandizing antics of some of today’s dangerous clowns.	肯定还有很多其他和他一样的人，他们真正致力于公共事业，而不是像某些今日的小丑那样热衷于自我扩张。


But what is required in America, as in Britain these days, is for the normal and the moderate to stand up, make more noise, and be counted.	但和这些日子的英国一样，美国所需要的是正常人和温和派站出来，发出更多的声音，并获得关注。


Almost a century ago, in his anguished and all too prescient poem “The Second Coming,” W.B. Yeats wrote: “Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.”	近一个世纪前，在其充满了痛苦但极具先见之明的诗作《基督再临》中，叶芝写道：“一切都四散了，再也保不住中心。


The reason the center could not hold is as relevant today as it was then: “The best,” Yeats argued, “lack all conviction, while the worst/ are full of passionate intensity.”	”保不住中心的原因在今天和在当时如出一辙：“好人，”叶芝写道，“信心尽失，坏蛋则充满了炽烈的激情。 ”


It is time in Western democracies for the best to show more of that “passionate intensity.”	西方民主必须尽力表现出更多的“炽烈的激情”。


Without it, there is always the danger of the birth of what Yeats called the “rough beast” slouching toward Bethlehem.	没有它，就永远有诞生叶芝所谓的“狂兽”向伯利恒蹒跚而行的危险。


There are at the moment rather too many “rough beasts” around, in US and British politics alike – indeed, almost everywhere in the democratic world.	如今，在美国和英国政坛——事实上，是民主世界的几乎每���个角落——有太多的“狂兽”环伺。


Bentham’s Fallacies, Then and Now	边沁的谬误，过去与现在


MELBOURNE – In 1809, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, set to work on The Book of Fallacies.	墨尔本—1809年，功利主义（utilitarianism）创始人边沁开始写作《谬误集》（The Book of Fallacies）。


His goal was to expose the fallacious arguments used to block reforms like the abolition of “rotten boroughs” – electorates with so few electors that a powerful lord or landowner could effectively select the member of parliament, while newer cities like Manchester remained unrepresented.	他的目标是揭露用来阻挠改革的谬误论调，比如取消“腐败选区”（即选民太少以致于强大的贵族或地主能轻松当选为国会议员，而曼彻斯特等新兴城市则无法在议会中得到代表。


Bentham collected examples of fallacies, often from parliamentary debates.	边沁搜集各种谬误例证，它们常常来自议会辩论。


By 1811, he had sorted them into nearly 50 different types, with titles like “Attack us, you attack Government,” the “No precedent argument,” and the “Good in theory, bad in practice” fallacy.	1811年，他总结了50种不同类型的谬误，冠以《攻击我们就是攻击政府》、《没有先例的论点》、《理论漂亮，实践糟糕》的等标题。


(One thing on which both Immanuel Kant and Bentham agree is that this last example is a fallacy: If something is bad in practice, there must be a flaw in the theory.)	（一件康德和边沁都同意的事情是最后一个例子是一个谬误：某物如果在实践上很糟糕，那么在理论上必然也有缺陷。 ）


Bentham was thus a pioneer of an area of science that has made considerable progress in recent years.	于是，边沁成为这一近几年来突飞猛进的科学领域的先锋。 他一定会喜欢心理学家所证明的事情：我们存在一种确认偏误（confirmation bias，即我们支持并记住符合而非有悖于我们的信念的信息）；


He would have relished the work of psychologists showing that we have a confirmation bias (we favor and remember information that supports, rather than contradicts, our beliefs); that we systematically overestimate the accuracy of our beliefs (the overconfidence effect); and that we have a propensity to respond to the plight of a single identifiable individual rather than a large number of people about whom we have only statistical information.	我们系统性地高估我们的信念的准确性（过度自信效应）； 我们倾向于对某个具体个体的遭遇产生反应，而对我们仅拥有统计信息的大量人群无动于衷。


Bentham did not rush to publish his work.	边沁并没有急于发表他的工作。


An abridged version appeared in French in 1816, and in English in 1824, but the complete work remained in manuscript form until its publication this year as part of an ongoing project, under the editorship of Philip Schofield of University College, London, to publish Bentham’s collected works.	1816年他出版了一个删节法文版，1824年出版了英文版，但完整版一直只有手稿，直到今年才作为由伦敦大学学院的菲利普·斯科菲尔德（Philip Schofield）主编的边沁全集的一部分出版。


Some of the fallacies Bentham identified still make frequent appearances, while others are less relevant.	边沁所总结的一些谬误至今仍频繁出现，也有一些则无关紧要。


The “wisdom of our ancestors” fallacy has often been invoked in debates over same-sex marriage.	“祖传知识”谬误常常用于同性婚姻辩论中。


Anyone familiar with political discussion in the United States will instantly recognize a more specific version that could be called the “wisdom of the Founding Fathers” fallacy.	只要你熟悉美国的政治辩论，就能立刻发现一个更加具体的版本，可称之为“国父智慧”谬误。


Another fallacy popular both in Bentham’s day and in ours is what he characterized as “What?	另一个在边沁时代和现时代都相当普遍的谬误被边沁称为“什么？


More jobs?”	更多就业？


By “jobs,” he meant government spending, and he considered this a fallacy because blanket opposition to more government spending fails to take into account the good that the extra employees will be able to achieve.	”。 边沁所谓的“就业”是指政府支出，他认为这之所以是一个谬误，原因在于一边倒地反对增加政府支出没有考虑到增加的雇员所能带来的好处。


The “fallacies” that really challenge the modern reader, however, are those that characterize arguments that today are widely accepted even in the most educated and enlightened circles.	但是，真正挑战现代读者的“谬误”是那些今天被广泛接受的观点，即使是教育程度最高、最文明的社会也是如此。


One of these, Bentham says, in a jarring juxtaposition, “may be termed Anarchy-preacher’s fallacy – or The Rights of Man fallacy.”	其中之一，边沁说，是令人震惊的并置，“也许可称之为无政府-传教士谬误——或人类权利谬误”。


When people argue against a proposed measure on the grounds that it violates “the rights of man” – or, as we would say today, human rights – they are, Bentham claims, using vague generalities that distract us from assessing the measure’s utility.	边沁认为，当人们以违反“人类权利”——或者用今天的话说，违反人权——为由反对一项方案时，他们用模糊的概括误导我们评估方案的功利（utility）。


Bentham accepts that it may be to the advantage of the community that the law should confer certain rights on people.	边沁同意，法律应该授予人们一定的权利，这也许有利于社会。


What threatens to bring us closer to anarchy, he argues, is the idea that I have certain rights already, independent of the law.	他指出，可能让我们迈向无政府主义的是这样的观点：我已经有了一些权利，这与法律无关。


Whereas the principle of utility calls for inquiry and argument, Bentham believes that those who advocate such pre-existing rights disdain both and are more likely to stir people up to use force.	功利原理要求调查和论证，但边沁认为主张这些先验权利的人蔑视调查和论证，并且更有可能鼓动人们使用暴力。


Bentham’s objection to “natural rights” is often cited.	边沁对“天然权利”的反对常常被人引用。


Less frequently discussed is what he calls “the Posterity-chainer’s device.”	较少得到讨论的是他所谓的“子孙锁链”（Posterity-chainer’s device）。


One example is the Act of Union between England and Scotland, which requires all succeeding sovereigns of the United Kingdom to take an oath to maintain the Church of Scotland and the Church of England.	一个例子是英格兰和苏格兰的《联合法案》（Act of Union），该法案要求联合王国的所有后续君主宣誓维持苏格兰教会和英格兰教会。


If future generations feel themselves bound by such provisions, they are, Bentham thinks, enslaved by long-dead tyrants.	如果未来子孙后代感到自己受此条款束缚，那么，边沁认为，他们便沦为了早已去世的暴君的奴隶。


Bentham’s objection to such attempts to bind posterity applies not only to the union that created the UK, but also the one that formed the US: Why should the current generation consider itself bound by what was decided hundreds of years earlier?	边沁对这些约束子孙后代的措施的反对不但适用于构成英国的联合，也适用于形成美国的联合：为何当代人应该认为自己要受到几百年前所做的决定的约束？


Unlike the framers of the US Constitution, we have had centuries of experience to judge whether it does or does not “promote the general welfare.”	与美国宪法的缔造者不同，我们拥有几百年的经验来判断它是否“促进了总体福利”。


If it does, we have all the reason we need to retain it; but if it does not, don’t we have as much power and as much right to change the arrangements under which we are governed as the framers had to prescribe them in the first place?	如果答案是肯定的，我们就有充分的理由认为需要维持它； 但如果答案是否定的，难道我们不应该拥有改变这一让我们根据宪法缔造者一开始所规定的内容被统治的安排的权力和权利？


If we do, why should provisions that make the constitution so difficult to amend bind a majority of the electorate?	如果我们有这一权力和权利，那么为何还要让修宪变得如此困难的条款约束绝大部分选民？


In the case of the unification of two or more previously sovereign states, Bentham is sensitive to the problem of providing assurances to the smaller states that the larger ones will not dominate them.	在联合两个和多个从前的主权国家的例子中，边沁对一个问题十分敏感：向较小的国家提供较大的国家不会主宰它们的保障。


Given what he takes to be the impossibility of tying future generations’ hands, he places his trust in the belief that sooner or later, after having been under one government, “the two communities will have become melted into one.”	他认为束缚子孙后代的双手是不可能的，因此在一个政府的统治下，迟早“两个社会会融合成一个。 ”


Public support for independence in Scotland and Catalonia shows that this is not always the case.	对苏格兰和加泰罗尼亚独立的公众支持表明并非总是如此。


Bentham, of course, would have accepted that he might be mistaken.	当然，边沁应该接受他也可能错误。


After all, the “Authority-worshipper’s argument” was another of the fallacies he rejected.	毕竟，“权威崇拜论”也是他所拒绝的另一个谬误。


Conditioning the Arab Transition	协调阿拉伯过渡


CAMBRIDGE – Nowadays, International Monetary Fund missions come and go in the Middle East without reaching agreement.	坎布里奇——今天，国际货币基金组织的任务在中东来来去达不成任何协议。


Meanwhile, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen are becoming increasingly polarized along political, social, and sectarian lines, gravely threatening their democratic future.	另外，突尼斯、埃及、利比亚和也门等国沿政治、社会和宗派界线日益极化，对民主未来构成严重的威胁。


With the looming prospect of failed states in Iraq and Syria, the international community cannot afford to stay on the sidelines any longer.	随着伊拉克和叙利亚国家失败的前景隐约可见，国际社会已经无法再承担袖手旁观所带来的后果。


The world urgently needs to create a political mechanism to help these countries escape the quagmire into which they are sinking.	世界迫切需要建立政治机制，帮助这些国家从日益深陷的泥潭中摆脱。


Without adequate support, their popular uprisings for freedom, justice, and dignity will end in chaos, insecurity, and economic meltdown.	如果没有足够的支持力量，他们为争取自由、正义和尊严的人民起义将以混乱、不安全和经济危机而结束。


Unlike the European Community’s support for Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the tragedy for the Arab world is the absence of a useful blueprint for institutional reform and the resources to implement it.	阿拉伯世界的悲剧在于有效的机构改革蓝图和执行资源缺位，这种情况与柏林墙倒塌后欧共体对东欧的支持有着本质的不同。


The Deauville Partnership launched at the 2011 G-8 Summit was a half-baked initiative long overtaken by events.	2011年G-8峰会发起的“多维尔伙伴关系”仅仅是项半生不熟的倡议，而且早就因为各项事态频发而时过境迁。


The region’s financial needs are well beyond what the Deauville agreement can deliver.	且多维尔协议远不能满足阿拉伯地区的金融需求。


More important, the support must be not only financial, but also political.	还有一点更为重要，金融和政治支持同样不可或缺。


Economic reforms, on the other hand, can wait.	而另一方面，经济改革却可以无限期延后。


As in any post-revolutionary situation, the ongoing transitions are highly complex processes.	后革命形势下的所有过渡程序都极其复杂。


A power vacuum sucks in all political forces and creates incentives to achieve ascendancy at all costs.	权力真空牢牢吸引住一切政治力量，促使他们不择手段把权力抢到手中。


As a result, the minimal consensus needed to establish rules for regulating these countries’ political transitions has failed to emerge.	结果是规范国家政治过渡的最低限度的共识都无法达成。


In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has adopted non-inclusive policies – reflected, for example, in the manner in which the new constitution was finalized.	埃及国内穆斯林兄弟会采取了一种非包容性政策，以何种方式完成新宪法制定是它的具体反映。


The opposition remains fragmented and ineffective.	反对派仍然低效，形不成合力。


The “street” is boiling and increasingly radicalized, with violence against women, minorities, and politicians on the rise.	沸腾的“街道”越来越激进，暴力侵害妇女、少数族裔和政客的事件时有发生。


Meanwhile, the economy is on the verge of collapse.	同时经济也处在崩溃的边缘。


Tunisia, too, is facing profound polarization.	突尼斯也正受到两极分化的深刻困扰。


Ennahda, the ruling Islamist party, may once have been committed to moderation, but it has gradually succumbed to the will of its radical wing and is narrowing the space for political opposition.	执政伊斯兰政党复兴运动党此前曾一度以中庸为己任，现在却已经向党内激进派的意志低头，执政反对派的生存空间受到逐步压缩。


And, as in Egypt, the protracted transition risks faltering under the weight of rising political violence and socioeconomic decline.	而且像埃及一样，旷日持久的过渡风险在政治暴力上升和社会经济衰退的双重压力下踯躅前行。


The situation is equally worrisome in Yemen and Libya.	也门和利比亚的局势也同样令人担忧。


While short-term pain is not unusual following the end of despotic regimes, long and protracted transitions can be terribly costly, requiring decades for societies to recover.	尽管专制政权结束后经历短期动荡亦属正常现象，但冗长持久的过渡过程代价极其惨重，可能需要几十年才能逐步复苏。


Political impasse is not only depressing economies by discouraging trade and investment; it is also preventing the formation of governments that could implement much-needed economic and institutional reforms – and thus threatening to take these countries into a long downward spiral.	政治僵局不仅阻碍贸易投资而且影响经济； 并且阻碍可以落实急需的经济和体制改革的政府的形成——这些国家可能因此走上漫长的螺旋式下降道路。


Now is not the time to start on the path of economic reform.	现在着手经济改革的时机尚不成熟。


While necessary, economic reforms are highly contentious, creating winners and losers – and thus generate social and political pressures that are impossible to manage in the absence of viable mechanisms for channeling and reconciling diverse interests and demands.	虽然经济改革势在必行，但以输赢为界线的经济改革同时也备受争议——在引导和协调各种利益要求的可行机制缺位的情况下根本不可能控制由此产生的社会和政治压力。


It is past time for the international community – including the international financial institutions, the EU, the United States, Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) – to raise the resources needed to give these countries sufficient fiscal space to meet their people’s immediate needs.	以国际金融机构、欧盟、美国、海湾合作委员会成员国、金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）为代表的国际社会筹集资源为这些国家创造能满足民众迫切需求的充足财政空间的时代已经过去。


If €250 billion ($325 billion) can be found to rescue Greece, it is certainly not too much to ask of the international community to find €100 billion to ensure successful democratic transitions in countries that are starting with low external-debt levels.	如果能筹集2，500亿欧元用于救助希腊，那么筹集1，000亿欧元确保低外债国成功完成民主过渡任务也应当属于合理要求。


But, while support should be generous, discipline is needed as well.	但虽然慷慨解囊非常重要，严格管理也势在必行。


In particular, populist policies that promote the parties currently in office should not be allowed, and the international community needs to speak the truth so that electoral campaigns paint a reasonable picture of reality.	尤其不应允许宣传执政党的民粹主义政策，国际社会需要说出实情，以确保现实状况在选举中得到合理的反映。


The most important task will be to create a new type of political conditionality.	创造新型政治条件是最重要的任务。


Political players need to be nudged to agree on the rules that organize how they compete for power.	政治人物需要某种推动才能就竞争权力的规则达成一致。


Without taking sides, the international community needs to encourage moderation and help policymakers, civil society, and politicians reach consensus.	在不偏袒任何一方的情况下，国际社会需要鼓励温和节制的态度，并帮助决策者、民间团体和政界人士达成共识。


The financial rescue package should be linked to a time-bound process of political transition involving broadly endorsed rules – a constitution, electoral law, election finance law, and an electoral calendar.	金融救市计划应当和有明确时限的政治过渡进程相挂钩，上述政治过渡进程必须遵守宪法、选举法、选举财务法和选举日程等为公众普遍接受的相关规则。


To avoid giving undue advantage to existing political parties, the creation of a political finance fund should be part of the new deal.	为避免执政党过分获益，建立政治财务基金应当成为新政的部分内容。


A financial package conditioned on political agreements may seem ambitious.	以政治协议为条件的一揽子财政计划或许有些过于雄心勃勃。


But there are many precedents, including the post-conflict packages agreed for Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.	但我们有过不少成功的先例，包括苏丹、利比里亚和塞拉利昂的后冲突援助计划。


If the transition is assisted now, the crucial economic reforms that will occupy elected governments for years to come stand a much greater chance of succeeding.	如果国际社会现在着手协助转型，那么当选政府今后若干年进行的重要经济改革成功率将会陡然增大。


The reform agenda will, no doubt, be defined by the need to make markets more competitive, democratize credit, introduce a more progressive tax policy, improve the quality and scope of public services, and tackle large-scale and petty corruption.	改革计划无疑将致力提升市场竞争力、实现信贷民主化、引入更先进的税收政策、改进公共服务的范围和质量，并且应对大规模和小范围的腐败举动。


It is in the interest of the international community, especially the West, to support the universal values that it holds dear – the same values that are now being embraced by millions of Europe’s neighbors.	支持为自己珍视的普世价值观符合国际社会、尤其是西方国家的利益，这套价值观现在正在为欧洲邻国成百上千万民众所接受。


For decades, the West gave its support to Arab autocrats, often for reasons of Realpolitik.	数十年来西方往往出于现实政治原因选择支持阿拉伯独裁者。


Now, at long last, the West has an opportunity – by providing concrete and generous support for political transition – to bring its values and its interests into alignment.	现在，经过漫长的等待，西方终于有机会通过为政治过渡提供慷慨而具体的支持而将自身的价值观和利益统一到一处。


The Mealy-Mouthed West	拐弯抹角的西方


MADRID – Among the numerous challenges the West faces, one is consistently overlooked: its addiction to meaningless rhetoric.	马德里—在西方所面临的诸多挑战中，有一个挑战一直没有被注意到：西方的言辞总是拐弯抹角。


From US President Barack Obama’s oxymoronic first-term mantra “leading from behind” to the recent German variant “leading from the center,” empty phrases have become the currency of Western governments’ foreign policies.	从美国总统奥巴马第一个任期的矛盾体魔咒“从背后领导”，到最近德国对此的变体“从中央领导”，空洞的说辞已成为西方政府外交政策的通例。


Of course, the inherent complexity and unpredictability of international affairs intensify politicians’ inclination to equivocate.	当然，国际事务的内在复杂性和不可预测性加剧了政客的模棱两可倾向。


And today, with the geopolitical environment more complicated and less predictable than ever, our leaders have even less incentive to offer the kind of boldness and clarity that effective policymaking demands.	而如今，地缘政治环境比以往任何时候都更复杂、更难预测，我们的领导人拿出有效决策所需要的果断和明确的动力也就更小了。


Unfortunately, the result has been to make a bad situation worse.	不幸的是，其结果是导致糟糕的状况变得更加糟糕。


Strategic statements play an important role in signaling a country’s direction and intentions to its adversaries, allies, citizens, and government agencies.	战略言论是一国向对手、盟友、公民和政府机构挑明其方向和意图的重要手段。


When such statements require endless interpretation and explanation, their impact is weakened dramatically.	当这些言论都需要无尽的解读和诠释时，它们的影响力也大大削弱了。


This is not to say that there is no place for ambiguity in international affairs.	这并不是说国际事务中容不得含糊。


History abounds with episodes when strategic ambiguity would have been beneficial.	历史充斥着从战略烟幕弹中获益的例子。


For example, some historians suggest that then-US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s decision in 1950 to exclude South Korea from America’s “defense perimeter” signaled to North Korea and the Soviet Union that the United States would not defend the South in the event of an attack.	比如，一些历史学家认为时任美国国务卿艾奇逊（Dean Acheson）1950年将韩国排除在美国的“防务周线”之外是在向朝鲜和苏联表示美国不会在发生袭击的情况下保护韩国。


The problem with today’s ambiguity is that it is not particularly strategic.	今天的含糊性的问题是它并不特别具有战略性。


Consider Obama’s underlying rationale for his foreign policy – the so-called “Obama doctrine” – which he finally provided following the announcement of the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.	举个例子。 在伊朗核计划框架性协议公布后，奥巴马终于给出了他的外交政策的基本逻辑——所谓的“奥巴马主义”。


“We will engage,” Obama declared, “but we preserve all our capabilities.”	“我们会介入，” 奥巴马宣称，“但我们保留我们的一切实力。 ”


On the surface, that statement makes sense.	从表面上看，这一言论掷地有声。


But it leaves us with more questions than answers.	但它给我们带来的问题比答案多。


What has Obama really signaled?	奥巴马真正表示的是什么？


What, in his view, are the boundaries for US engagement?	在他看来，美国介入的边界在哪里？


Under what conditions would the US use its capabilities?	美国会在怎样的条件下才使用它的实力？


Nearly 70 years ago, when George Orwell examined the tendency toward ambiguity, he offered the rather simple explanation that “political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible.”	近70年前，乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）考察了含糊倾向，他给出了一个相当简单的解释，即“政治话语和字句基本上是明知不可辩而辩。


In other words, hazy language is necessary to obscure unsavory realities.	”换句话说，朦胧的用语是模糊令人不快的现实的必不可少的手段。


Massive violence against civilian populations is “pacification,” and ethnic cleansing is a “transfer of population.”	针对平民的大规模暴力是“绥靖”，种族清洗是“改变人口”，奥威尔指出，“直言的大敌是伪善。


As Orwell noted, “[t]he great enemy of clear language is insincerity.”	”


To some extent, Orwell’s observations still ring true.	在某种程度上，奥威尔的观察今天仍然成立。


But the issue today is different: politicians are using vague rhetoric less because their policies are fundamentally indefensible than because they fear having to defend any position at all.	但今天的问题有所不同：政客使用模糊的言辞，这与其说是因为他们的政策从根本上站不住脚，不如说是因为他们害怕不得不为任何立场辩护。


While there are myriad reasons for this reticence, when it comes to international relations, two stand out.	这种缄默有各种原因，，但在国际关系问题上，有两个原因特别突出。


The first is the hyperbolic political atmosphere in Western democracies, where the 24-hour news cycle and social media have made “gotcha politics” the order of the day.	第一个原因是西方民主国家夸张的政治氛围，24小时不间断的新闻圈和社交媒体让“曝光政治”（gotcha politics）成为当代秩序。


Add to that the intrinsic uncertainty of foreign affairs, and it is unsurprising that politicians would rather spout empty lines than risk saying something that might blow up in their faces.	除此之外还有外交事务的内在不确定性，并且，毫不奇怪，政客宁可大放空炮也不愿说一些可能被“打脸”的话。


Indeed, one need only consider the years-long stream of commentary – characterized by partisanship, hearsay, and hostility – following the 2012 attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi to understand leaders’ angst.	事实上，你只要看一下2012年美国班加西领事馆遇袭后多年的评论情况——充满了党派之争、风言风语和针锋相对——的情况就理解领导人的担心之处了。


The second reason is more fundamental: the waning sense of purpose and conviction that characterizes Western democracies today.	第二个原因更加根本：成为当今西方民主一大特征的目的和信念感的消失。