The testimonies of these individuals, vital for assessing the US drone program, are all too easy to overlook because these individuals are poor and have no political influence, and because the strikes are conducted in secret, far away from the US.	2014年4月19日在美国无人机打击身亡的四位无辜平民之一的纳赛尔·穆罕默德·纳赛尔（Nasser Mohammed Nasser）的父亲哀痛地说：“我儿子以及和他一起死去的人和基地组织毫无瓜葛。 他们只是在讨生活的路上。


As Yaslem Saeed bin Ishaq, whose son was killed in a US drone strike in Wadi Sir on August 1, 2013, observed, “They just kill.	当然，从距离遥远还往往保密的地方打着国家安全的旗号发动无人机打击在政治上相对容易一些。


They do not know what havoc their missiles have caused. They are unaware of the suffering they create for our families.”	当受打击影响的平民是缺少政治影响力的穷人、因此没有什么能力吸引媒体眼球时，发动打击就更加容易了。


Indeed, if the US never acknowledges the specific strikes, how can ordinary Americans possibly know that Rasilah al-Faqih, a pregnant Yemeni woman, was killed in Walad Rabei’, along with her husband and ten-year-old daughter, as they headed home from a visit to the doctor?	亚斯勒姆·赛义德·本·依沙克（Yaslem Saeed bin Ishaq）的儿子在2013年瓦迪瑟（Wadi Sir）美国无人机打击中身亡，他观察道：“他们只是为了杀戮。 他们根本不知道他们的导弹造成了怎样的破坏。


Or that Abdoh Mohammed al-Jarraah’s house in Silat al-Jarraah had 19 people, including women and children, inside when it was hit by a US drone strike?	他们不知道他们给我们的家庭造成了多大的痛苦。 ”


The US’ refusal to acknowledge drone strikes that kill foreigners is sending a damaging message in Yemen and beyond.	事实上，如果美国不承认具体的打击，普通美国人如何能够知道也门孕妇拉西拉·法基赫（Rasilah al-Faqih）在瓦拉德拉贝（Walad Rabei’）与她的丈夫以及十岁的女儿在就医返回途中被杀？


As Moqbel Abdullah Ali al-Jarraah, a villager from Silat al-Jarraah, put it: “I believe that America is testing its lethal inventions in our poor villages, because [it] cannot afford to do so at any place where human life has value. Here, we are without value.”	他们如何知道阿卜杜赫·穆罕默德·贾拉哈（Abdoh Mohammed al-Jarraah）在希拉特贾拉哈（Silat al-Jarraah）的房子被无人机打击夷为平地时里面有19人，包括妇女和儿童？


In every incident recorded in this report, the families of Yemeni civilians killed in US strikes want to know why they were targeted.	但是，尽管美国政府一直对无人机袭击保持沉默在国内或许有帮助，但在也门和其他地区，这释放了一个危险信号。


As the father of Nasser Mohammed Nasser, one of four innocent civilians killed in a US drone strike on April 19, 2014, lamented: “My son and those who were with him had nothing to do with Al Qaeda. They were simply on their way to earn a living.	希拉特贾拉哈的一位村民莫贝尔·阿卜杜拉·阿里·贾拉哈（Moqbel Abdullah Ali al-Jarraah）说：“我认为美国拿我们贫穷村庄试验它的致命发明，因为它不能在其他任何人命很值钱的地方进行试验。


Why, then, did the American aircraft strike them?”	在这里，我们的命毫无价值。 ”


But the US has given Nasser no answers.	2013年2月，时任白宫反恐首席官员的约翰·布伦南（John Brennan）在其赴任重要情报局局长的审核听证会上说：“为了��明度，”美国必须公开承认误杀。


It has not even acknowledged that it killed his son.	当月晚些时候，他承认美国政府“应该公开因为美国针对基地组织的打击而丧生的平民总数。 ”但这两件事美国一件也没有做。


In February 2013, then-White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan testified at his Senate confirmation hearing to become CIA Director that, “in the interest of transparency,” the US must acknowledge mistaken killings publicly.	因此，对于像纳赛尔那样在美国袭击中失去了母亲、父亲、儿子和女儿的平民来说，毫不奇怪他们不但对美国怒不可遏，对同意采取无人机打击的也门政府同样怒不可遏。


Later that month, he recognized that the US government “should make public the overall numbers of civilian deaths resulting from US strikes targeting Al Qaeda.” The US has done neither.	从这个角度讲，无人机打击远远没有让也门和美国变得更安全，反倒可能强化对基地组织的支持。


It should come as no surprise, then, that civilians like Nasser, who have lost mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters in US strikes, are outraged not only at the US, but also at the Yemeni government, which consented to the attacks.	今年早些时候，美国宣布了新的无人机出口政策，据称这是为了与其他国家合作为无人机的使用“制定国际标准”并约束无人机进口国“根据国际法使用无人机系统。


They believe that instead of making Yemen and the US safer, drone strikes only strengthen support for Al Qaeda.	”但是，《死于无人机》指出，美国本身也没有遵守国际法，甚至连它自己的指引也不遵守。


Earlier this year, the US announced a new policy for drone exports, purportedly part of a broader effort to work with other countries to “shape international standards” on the use of drones and compel recipient states “to use these systems in accordance with international law.”	如今，美国仍然拒绝承认无人机计划对平民百姓造成的影响。


But, as “Death by Drone” shows, the US drone program is fundamentally flawed and should not be perpetuated. The Obama administration’s recent admissions that its drone strikes killed its own citizens only underscore this fact.	但是，它们至少绝不应该向其他国家出口它在也门所使用的保密的、有可能是非法的无人机武器模型。


Can Yemen Be Saved?	也门还有救吗？


SANA'A – Yemen is no stranger to crisis.	萨那—也门对冲突绝不陌生。


Exposed to a regional proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, plagued by an entrenched Al Qaeda affiliate, and divided by tribal disputes and a secession movement, the country has become a poster child for everything that can go wrong in the Arab world.	也门暴露在伊朗和沙特阿拉伯的地区代理战争中，饱受根深蒂固的基地组织折磨，也因为部落纠纷和独立运动而分裂。 阿拉伯世界中的所有问题，你都可以在也门找到。


Yemen has demonstrated remarkable resiliency in the past.	在过去，也门表现出引人注目的恢复力。


To ensure that the recent overthrow of its government by the Shia Houthi rebel movement does not deal Yemen the lethal blow that it has avoided so far, the international community must not abandon the country in what may be its hour of greatest need.	为了确保最近什叶派胡塞（Shia Houthi）反抗运动颠覆政府不会给也门造成其到目前为止成功避免了的致命一击，国际社会绝不能再也门最需要的时候放弃这个国家。


The origins of the Houthi movement date to 1991, when it was created to protect Zaydism, a moderate form of Shi'ism, from the encroachment of Sunni Islamists.	胡塞运动的起源可以追溯到1991年。 这一年，胡塞运动成立，初衷是保护什叶派伊斯兰教的温和形势斋德主义（Zaydism）不受逊尼派伊斯兰教迫害。


After the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, the group's battle took on a geopolitical dimension, as its fighters objected to Yemen's decision to collaborate with the United States and enhance bilateral intelligence cooperation.	2001年9月11日纽约和华盛顿恐怖袭击发生后，该组织的战斗又增加了地缘政治维度，其战士拒绝也门与美国采取联合行动和加强双边情报合作的决定。


From 2004 to 2010, the group fought six wars against the Yemeni government and even skirmished with Saudi Arabia.	从2004到2010年，该集团与也门政府打了六场战争，甚至与沙特阿拉伯也产生过摩擦。


Yet it never managed to expand its reach beyond its stronghold in the north of the country.	但它从未成功将势力范围推广到其牢牢掌握的也门北部以外。


That changed in 2011, when the popular protests and political chaos stemming from the Arab Spring led to widespread institutional paralysis, allowing the Houthis to march past a military that largely refused to fight it.	2011年，形势发生了变化，阿拉伯之春所导致的群众游行和政治混乱引起了普遍的制度瘫痪，军队拒绝与胡塞运动分子作战。


The group's power grab has frightened its adversaries, leading them to seek new alliances that could imperil the state's security.	该集团的得势令其对手大感恐惧，促使它们结成新的联盟，以至于危及国家安全。


In the central region of Marib, home to the oil and gas facilities that Yemen relies on for foreign currency, several tribes have vowed to fight the Houthis.	在马利布（Marib，作为也门主要外汇来源的油气设施所在地）地区，多个部落都宣誓与胡塞运动斗争到底。


The region was once a stronghold of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an affiliate of the global terrorist organization.	该地区曾为阿拉伯半岛基地组织（AQAP，基地组织的分支）所牢固掌握。


If the military refuses to assist the tribes – as is likely – they may be tempted to turn to AQAP.	如果军队拒绝帮助部落——很有可能如此——它们就有可能倒向AQAP。


The situation is no less precarious in the southern provinces, where a secession movement has been active since 2007.	南部省份的情况尤其恶劣。 也门南部的分裂运动在2007年便已十分活跃。


Southerners are up in arms because the Houthi rebellion halted plans for the adoption of a federal system, which would have given the region greater autonomy.	南方人之所以武装起来，是因为胡塞叛军中止了采取联邦制的计划，而联邦制将带给南部更大的自治权。


In response, armed groups seized checkpoints and closed the port of Aden.	结果，武装集团占领了检查站，关闭了亚丁港。


The risk of secession is very real.	分裂的风险是实实在在的。


Southern Sunnis have been marginalized since a 1994 civil war that left northerners in control of most of the country's political institutions.	1994年的内战让北方人控制了也门的大部分政治机构，此后，南方的逊尼派就一直被边缘化。


Many in the region worry that the Houthis will discriminate against them further.	该地区的许多人担心胡塞运动分子会更加歧视他们。


AQAP is firmly rooted in this region as well, implying the possibility that local residents will seek its help in defending against an expected Houthi onslaught.	AQAP也在该地区根基深厚，这意味着当地居民可能寻求AQAP的帮助以抵抗预料中的胡塞运动突击。


Meanwhile, Yemen continues to serve as a battleground in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.	与此同时，也门依然是伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的代理战争的战场。


Iran has armed and trained the Houthis, and, though the rebels' brand of Shi'ism shares little with that practiced in Tehran, they have praised the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and held up Iran's Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, as a model to be emulated.	伊朗武装并训练了胡塞运动，而尽管叛军的什叶派伊斯兰幌子与德黑兰的什叶派伊斯兰几乎没有共同之处，但他们歌颂伊朗伊斯兰共和国创始人霍梅尼，也支持其模仿对象、伊朗的黎巴嫩代理人真主党。


When the Houthis took over Sana'a, the capital, in September, Saudi Arabia cut off aid to the country.	9月，当胡塞运动占领首都萨那时，沙特阿拉伯切断了对也门的援助。


To make matters worse, falling oil prices and attacks on pipelines imperil a hydrocarbon industry that provides 63% of government revenues.	更糟糕的是，油价下跌和对油管的袭击令石化行业岌岌可危，而石化行业贡献了也门63%的政府收入。


Decreased earnings led Yemen to forecast a $3.2 billion budget deficit last year.	下降的收入导致也门去年预算赤字预计高达21亿美元。


If the turmoil is not curtailed and the Saudis do not resume the payments that have long ensured the country's ability to function, Yemen may not be able to cover its expenditures.	如果动荡得不到遏制，并且沙特不重新开启长期以来作为也门正常运转保证的转移支付，也门可能无法筹得资金。


The US has followed Saudi Arabia's lead, shuttering its embassy and freezing intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism operations.	美国也步了沙特阿拉伯后尘，关闭了大使馆、冻结了情报合作和反恐行动。


This is a mistake.	这是错误的。


Yemen's military is largely intact, having remained in its barracks as the Houthis marched to the capital, and there is little evidence that the units that work with the Americans are loyal to the new rebel government.	也门军队可以说毫无作为，在胡塞叛军兵临首都时仍然呆在军营里，也没有迹象表明与美国人合作的单位会忠于新的叛军政府。


Suspending cooperation risks giving AQAP free rein in a country where it was able to wreak havoc even when bridled.	中止合作有可能让AQAP主宰也门——要知道，即使在饱受遏制时，AQAP也能在也门呼风唤雨。


Yemen is mired in crises that it cannot solve alone.	也门陷入了它无法独力应对的危机中。


Unless its international allies throw it a lifeline, it risks being swallowed by a sea of disorder that could imperil the entire region.	除非国际盟友伸出救命之手，否则也门可能会被无须吞没，整个地区也将岌岌可危。


Yemen’s Regime Change Gets Personal	沦为私人事务的也门政权更替


SANAA – When Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh ordered his military on March 18 to fire on peaceful protesters calling for his resignation, he sealed his fate.	发自也门首都萨那——从也门总统阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在3月18日命令部队向要求他下台的和平示威者开枪的那一刻起，他就已经注定走向末路了。


A wave of military, government, and diplomatic defections, led by his long-time ally First Armored Brigade Commander General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, rocked his regime.	以他的长期盟友，精锐部队第一装甲师师长阿里·穆赫辛·阿赫玛尔将军为首的一众军队，政府和外交官员纷纷倒戈，使其统治当即陷入危机之中。


But, although al-Ahmar announced that he was appalled by the use of force and vowed to defend the constitution, his decision was anything but altruistic.	虽然阿赫玛尔将军声称对总统使用武力的决定深表震惊并呼吁保卫宪政，他的这一决定却肯定是别有用心的。


The disgruntled general, who has long-standing ties to the type of jihadists that the United States is battling in Yemen, merely sought to settle a score with the president’s family.	这位将军长期与美国在也门频繁打击的伊斯兰圣战分子过往甚密，同时也早已对总统本人心怀不满，而他本次的举动仅仅是要跟总统家族划清界限而已。


The relationship between al-Ahmar and Saleh extends to their youth, with Saleh’s mother having had a second marriage to al-Ahmar’s uncle.	阿赫玛尔和萨利赫的关系可以追溯到他们的青年时代，当年萨利赫的母亲改嫁给了阿赫玛尔的叔叔。


Though they are not half-brothers, this frequent, if mistaken reference, indicates their closeness.	虽然两人并无血缘关系，但这一频繁的交往（如果没错的话）也显示出两人关系非同一般。


Al-Ahmar has long been considered either Saleh’s right hand man or the country’s hidden president.	阿赫玛尔一直以来都被视为萨利赫的左右手及也门的幕后总统。


When the Nasserite party attempted to overthrow Saleh less than 100 days into his presidency, al-Ahmar defended him and quashed the coup.	当也门的纳塞尔主义党试图在萨利赫就任总统还不到100天的时候推翻他时，是阿赫玛尔站出来保护他并挫败了那场政变。


In 1994, his units put down a secessionist movement in the south.	在随后的1994年，阿赫玛尔的部队又在也门南部地区镇压了一场分离主义运动。


But, as Saleh prepared the way for his son Ahmad – the head of the Presidential Guard – to succeed him, he began to marginalize al-Ahmar.	但当萨利赫决定将总统职位交由其子阿赫玛德（现任总统卫队队长）继承之后，他就开始逐步将阿赫玛尔边缘化。


In 2009, Saleh sacked al-Ahmar’s key backers, including Central Command Chief General al-Thahiri al-Shadadi and Lieutenant General Haydar al-Sanhani, from power.	在2009年，萨利赫分别解除了阿赫玛尔的重要支持者，中央司令部司令塔希里·萨达迪将军以及海耶尔·萨哈尼中将的职务。


Al-Ahmar has also not benefited from the military aid that the US lavished on Yemen in the wake of al-Qaeda’s failed Christmas Day plot in 2009 to down an American airliner.	同时阿赫玛尔也没有从美国向也门提供的大规模军事援助（起因是基地组织于2009年圣诞针对一架美国客机的未遂袭击）中捞到任何好处。


While the Central Security Service, led by Saleh’s nephew Yahya, has received millions of dollars to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Ahmar has been left out of the economic bonanza.	当由萨利赫的侄子雅赫亚领导的也门中央情报机构坐收美国数百万美元打击阿拉伯半岛基地组织经费时，阿赫玛尔却只能眼睁睁地看着前者大发其财。


At the same time, al-Ahmar’s dismal performance in spearheading the war against the Houthi-led sectarian rebellion in the north made him a convenient scapegoat for the regime’s failures.	与此同时，阿赫玛尔在北部打击以胡锡为首的宗教反抗势力时的作战不力又使他经常被用作掩饰该政权种种弊端的替罪羊。


The regime’s desire to get al-Ahmar out of the picture became clear during the last round of fighting aginst the Houthis in 2009-2010, when Saudi Arabia began bombing the rebels. According to a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Yemeni officials gave the Saudis the coordinates for al-Ahmar’s command center, telling them that it was a Houthi camp.	萨利赫政权试图将阿赫玛尔逐出最高权力的意图在2009-2010年的上一轮对胡锡分子作战行动中昭然若揭：根据维基解密网站所披露出来的美国外交电报，当沙特开始轰炸暴乱分子的时候，也门官员竟然向沙特方面提供了阿赫玛尔指挥部的坐标，并宣称那是一处胡锡暴乱分子的营地。


His relationship with Saleh frayed and his influence waning, al-Ahmar understood that his loyalty to Saleh had become a liability.	眼看着自己与萨利赫的关系逐渐恶化而自身的影响力日渐衰微，阿赫玛尔意识到自己对萨利赫的忠诚已经成为了一种负担。


So his decision to abandon Saleh stemmed less from his love of the constitution and democracy than from his desire to even the score with the president and his son Ahmad Saleh, with whom he has long clashed.	因此他抛弃萨利赫的决定与其说是出于对宪法和民主的爱戴，不如说是为了与总统以及其子阿赫玛德·萨利赫（此人与阿赫玛尔也经常发生冲突）算账。


Their units skirmished during the Houthi campaign, and the two engaged in a power struggle over defense of the radio and television stations.	这两人所掌握的部队在镇压胡锡暴动期间已经发生过小规模冲突，并卷入了争夺广播电台和电视台的权力斗争中。


Saleh won at the time, but today al-Ahmar’s troops have control.	当时萨利赫赢得了胜利，如今阿赫玛尔又成为了赢家。


Al-Ahmar’s relationship with jihadists is a source of serious concern.	阿赫玛尔与伊斯兰圣战分子之间的关系总会引起极大的关注。


He is married to the sister of Tariq al-Fadhli, a Yemeni who fought alongside al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.	他的妻子就是基地组织领导人奥萨马·本·拉登在阿富汗的战友塔里克·法赫里的姐妹。


When more than 4,000 Arabs returned from fighting the Soviets there, al-Ahmar organized them into units and deployed them in the 1994 civil war.	当4000多名阿拉伯人结束在阿富汗的抗苏战斗后，阿赫玛尔又将他们组织起来投入到了1994年的内战中。


One jihadist who trained in al-Qaeda’s camps, and met bin Ladin, told me that upon his return from Afghanistan, he was invited to meet al-Ahmar’s associates and was given a monthly stipend.	一名曾在基地组织训练营受训并见过本·拉登的圣战分子告诉我，当他从阿富汗回到也门后就被阿赫玛尔招致麾下并按月发给工资。


During a 1999 trial of Yemenis convicted of kidnapping 16 Europeans, it emerged that the group’s ringleader called al-Ahmar during the ordeal.	在1999年对绑架16名欧洲人的也门人进行审判时，证据显示该团伙的头目在绑架过程中曾经致电阿赫玛尔。


Though his ties to jihadists may be expedient rather than ideological, they are deeply worrying.	而虽然阿赫玛尔与圣战分子的联系主要是策略上的而非意识形态上的，但这也足以令外界忧心不已了。


Today, Saleh’s support among his top generals is dwindling.	如今，萨利赫在高级军官中的支持度已经江河日下。


Of Yemen’s four regional commanders, only Southern Command Chief General Mahdi Maqwala still backs him.	也门的4大军区指挥官中只有南部军区司令马赫迪·马克瓦拉将军依旧支持他。


Lesser lieutenant generals have deserted the president in droves.	更低级的中将们则大批倒向了总统的对立面。


The fate of the country may not hinge on Saleh, a crafty veteran who knows that his career is over.	这个国家的命运已经不再由萨利赫决定，而这个��猾的政治老手也知道自己的政治生涯已经终结。


But his son Ahmad, who is less politically astute, may yet seek to settle accounts with al-Ahmar.	但他的儿子，在政治上还不那么成熟的阿赫玛德，可能还会试图与阿赫玛尔达成交易。


His forces have already clashed with rival units in Mukalla and surrounded the presidential palace in Aden.	阿赫玛尔的部队已经与位于木卡拉的敌对部队交火并包围了位于亚丁的总统官邸。


If the Salehs retain control of the air force, which remains under the control of Saleh’s half-brother, employing it against defecting military divisions would likely lead to a bloodbath.	如果萨利赫家族还维持着对空军的控制力——指挥权目前还在萨利赫的另一个兄弟手里——并利用其对反对派部队发动进攻的话，那么结果将是一场血战。


Nevertheless, the doomsday scenarios predicting anarchy and chaos in the post-Saleh era are most likely exaggerated.	此外，人们想象中的那种后萨利赫时代的政治乱局和社会动荡的末日景象可能也过于夸张了。


Unlike in Egypt, the vacuum resulting from Saleh’s departure can be quickly filled, so the country need not fall back on a military oligarchy.	跟埃及不同，萨利赫下台所导致的权力真空将很快被填补，因此也门也不太可能会退回到军政府独裁的年代。


The Yemeni opposition is not only organized, but also plays an active role in politics and has true grassroots support.	也门反对派不但极有组织，而且在政治方面也扮演着积极角色，同时又确实拥有草根民众的支持。


And, unlike in Egypt, where the ruling party was detested and out of touch with the masses, Yemen’s General People’s Congress has some following in society. If Saleh leaves peacefully and represses the urge to unleash the last remaining loyal army units against protesters and defecting soldiers, the country can avert Libya-like mayhem.	同时也门执政党全国人民大会党并不像埃及执政党那样遭人痛恨并且脱离群众，相反该党在社会上依然拥有一批追随者，如果萨利赫能和平下台并解散余下的那些镇压示威者和反抗部队的武装力量，也门就可以避免出现像利比亚那样的大混乱。


Indeed, the opposition parties have already organized a transitional council to take Saleh’s place.	事实上，各反对党已经组织了一个过渡委员会以接替萨利赫的位置。


With the sun quickly setting on the Saleh era, the president is out of options.	当萨利赫时代迅速落幕之时，总统本人已没有任何回旋余地。


The only decision before him and his thinning ranks of allies is whether to leave peacefully or go down fighting.	摆在他及其不断萎缩的盟友面前的只有两个选择：要么和平地离开，要么还是继续顽抗下去。


Japan vs. the Currency Speculators	日本 vs. 货币投机者


TOKYO – With Japan’s economy struggling to escape its deflationary torpor, the economic-revitalization plan that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched in 2012 has come under growing scrutiny.	东京—日本经济正在竭力摆脱通缩麻木，首相安倍晋三在2012年推出的经济振兴计划也受到越来越多的审视。


But Japan’s current travails, which have brought a concomitant decline in Japan’s stock market, stem from the yen’s appreciation – 24% over the last year – against major currencies.	但日本当前的艰苦来自日元兑其他主要货币的升值——去年升值幅度达到了24%，并导致日本股市也随之下跌。


“Abenomics” – which included substantial monetary and fiscal expansion – has nothing to do with it.	包括大规模货币和财政扩张的“安倍经济学”与此毫无干系。


Since Abenomics was introduced, Japan’s labor market has improved considerably: 1.5 million new jobs have been created, and the unemployment rate has fallen to just over 3%.	自安倍经济学实施以来，日本劳动力市场显著改善：新创150万工作岗位，失业率下跌至略高于3%。


Moreover, corporate profits have soared, and tax revenues have increased by more than ¥20 trillion ($188 billion).	此外，公司利润大幅增长，税收收入增加了20万亿多日元。


To build on these gains, Japan has promised a large fiscal expansion next month, which some describe as a piecemeal, temporary version of so-called “helicopter drops” (permanent monetization of government debt).	为了在此基础上更进一步，日本承诺下个月开始大规模财政扩张，有人称之为零散性、暂时性“直升机撒钱”（政府债务永久货币化）。


But there is concern that it will not be enough, if the yen continues to appreciate.	但有人担心这还不够，如果日元继续升值的话。


To be sure, expansionary policies, particularly monetary policies – a pillar of Abenomics – could contribute to currency depreciation.	诚然，扩张性政策，个别是货币政策——安倍经济学的一大支柱——可以带来货币贬值。


But the US Federal Reserve’s dovish approach to exiting its own quantitative-easing program, together with expansionary policies in other major economies, has weakened their impact on the exchange rate.	但美联储对于退出量化宽松的鸽派立场，以及其他主要经济体的扩张性政策，削弱了其对汇率的影响。


More recently, the United Kingdom’s vote to “Brexit” the European Union, together with the introduction of negative rates by multiple central banks, including the Bank of Japan (BOJ), shook markets.	最近，英国投票“脱离”欧盟，在加上多家央行（包括日本银行）引入了负利率，对市场形成了冲击。


Taking advantage of this nervousness, hedge-fund managers and other speculators have increasingly been betting on the yen’s appreciation; indeed, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange shows substantial interest in the yen futures market.	利用这一紧张情绪，对冲基金经理和其他投机者越来越多地下注于日元升值； 事实上，芝加哥商业交易所（CME）对日元期货市场持仓量巨大。


In a flexible exchange-rate system, each country conducts monetary policy independently, based on domestic objectives, and accepts the resulting exchange rate.	在浮动汇率制度中，一国基于国内目标独立制定货币政策，并接受汇率结果。


But when exchange-rate movements become sharp or erratic, monetary authorities have the authority – even the obligation – to intervene to smooth them out.	但当汇率波动变得剧烈或反覆时，货币当局有权——甚至有义务——出手干预，平息波动。


The Japanese authorities seem to recognize this, in theory.	日本当局似乎认识到了这一点——在理论上。


On August 18, officials from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Financial Services Agency, and the BOJ gathered to discuss what can be done to stem the yen’s appreciation.	8月18日，日本财务省、金融厅和日本银行开会讨论如何阻止日元升值。


After the meeting, Masatsugu Asakawa, the deputy minister of finance for international affairs, declared that the MOF would act swiftly against exchange-rate movements deemed to be speculative.	会后，负责国际事务的副财务大臣浅川雅嗣（Masatsugu Asakawa）宣布财务省将在认定出现投机性汇率波动时迅速出手阻止。


The announcement was supposed to cause speculators to shake in their boots.	此番宣告是为了敲山震虎。


Yet markets moved only slightly, within a range of a couple of yen to the dollar.	但市场对此反应平淡，日元兑美元只波动了几个点位。


After all, the MOF has made such threats before – for example, just after the introduction of the BOJ’s negative interest-rate policy, and again after the Brexit decision – but never followed through.	毕竟，财务省此前也发布过此类威胁——比如在日本央行引入负利率政策之后，以及英国退出之后——但从未执行。


Like Aesop’s boy who cried wolf, the MOF has lost credibility, at least when it comes to the threat of intervention in currency markets.	就像“狼来了”的故事，财务省信誉尽失，至少在干预货币市场的威胁方面是如此。


So speculators remain convinced that they are making a one-way bet – win big or break even – and continue to push the yen higher.	因此，投机者仍然心安理得地单边押注——要么大赚，要么打平手——继续推高日元。


At this point, the MOF’s words will not be enough to deter speculation.	眼下，财务省的话已不足以震慑投机。


But the MOF remains hesitant to back its tough talk with action, not least because of American disapproval of supposed “currency manipulation.”	但财务省仍然犹犹豫豫，不兑现严厉的威胁，因为美国反对所谓的“货币操纵”。


High-level officials at the US Treasury and Federal Reserve actively try to dissuade advocacy of direct intervention, including by me.	美国财政部和美联储高官积极地试图劝阻直接干预的支持者，包括我。


An American scholar reacted angrily when I merely mentioned the word, as if it were an obscenity.	我只是提到了这个词，就遭到一位美国学者的愤怒反驳，好像我在说什么淫词秽语似的。


American officials, for their part, emphasize that if Japan can be accused of manipulating currency markets, the US Congress will not approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).	而美国官员强调，如果日本涉嫌操纵货币市场，美国国会就不会批准跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）。


It is possible that the MOF will choose to keep the US on its side, and continue to offer only empty threats to speculators.	有可能财务省将选择站在美国一边，继续对投机者进行空头威胁。


Or it may simply vacillate until it is too late to take real action.	或者它将继续摇摆，直到错失动真格的时机。


Either approach may well produce the same disastrous result: allowing the yen to appreciate to damaging levels and causing Abenomics to fail.	不论哪种方法，都将导致同样的灾难：日元升值到危险水平，使安倍经济学失败。


What the MOF should do is intervene courageously in currency markets to stem the yen’s appreciation.	财务省应该做的是勇敢地干预货币市场，阻止日元升值。


Speculators will learn a tough lesson, and Japan’s economy could get back on track.	投机者将得到痛苦的教训，日本经济也可以重回正轨。


Though Japan may become a scapegoat for the failure of the TPP, it seems unlikely that the deal would be ratified in any case, given the current political climate in the United States.	尽管日本可能因此成为TPP失败的替罪羊，但从当前美国政治气候看，该协议本来获得批准的希望就十分渺茫。


An alternative would be for the BOJ to purchase foreign securities.	一个替代方案是日本银行购买外国证券。


Many hedge-fund managers, along with some economists, claim that the key to saving Japan’s economy from deflation is a more direct helicopter drop, with newly printed cash delivered directly to consumers.	许多对冲基金经理，以及以及一些经济学家，认为拯救日本经济于通缩的关键是更直接的直升机撒钱，将新印出来的现金直接给消费者。


Yet these same people are impeding effective macroeconomic policy, by betting on the yen’s appreciation.	但正是这批人通过押注日元升值阻止宏观经济政策生效。


Only when the speculators are brought to heel should such a bold – and highly risky – monetary policy even be up for discussion.	唯有将投机者“斩于马下”，这一大胆——并且高风险——的货币政策才值得讨论。


Asia’s Military Revolution	亚洲军事革命


SEOUL – A vast revolution in military affairs is taking place across East Asia.	首尔—一场军事事务大革命正在东亚展开。


The latest signs are Chinese President Xi Jinping’s purge of General Xu Caihou, an ex-Politburo member and former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, on charges of corruption, and Japan’s “reinterpretation” of Article 9 of its constitution to permit the country to provide military aid to its allies.	最新信号包括中国国家主席习近平以腐败罪名清洗前政治局委员、中央军委副主席徐才厚上将，以及日本“重新解释”其宪法第九条，允许日本为盟国提供军事援助。


Despite the rising regional tensions that inspired these moves, China’s relations with its neighbors and the United States are not fated to lead to direct confrontation.	尽管升级的地区紧张局势刺激了这些动作，但中国与邻国和美国的关系并未恶化到产生直接冲突的程度。


But the relentless march of new initiatives to meet the perceived “China threat” will require the region’s political leaders, including the Chinese, to address their disputes in new and more creative ways if that outcome is to be avoided.	但不断地采取新措施以至于产生“中国威胁”论需要地区政治领导人（包括中国）用更新、更有创造力的方式解决争端，否则难以避免直接冲突。


In general, there are three ways to foster international peace: deepening economic interdependence, promoting democracy, and building international institutions.	总体而言，有三种方式构建国际和平：深化经济相互依存、推进民主，以及建立国际机构。


Unfortunately, because East Asia’s political leaders have failed to pursue the latter objective, they now find themselves playing dangerous balance-of-power games reminiscent of Europe a century ago.	不幸的是，由于东亚政治领导人在最后一个目标上已经失败，因此现在已经陷入了与一个世界前的欧洲十分相似的危险的实力平衡博弈。


Deepening economic interdependence in the wake of Asia’s 1997 financial crisis has not generated political momentum for peace and cooperation.	1997年亚洲金融危机所带来的经济相互依存深化并未产生和平与合作的政治动力。


The region’s business leaders have been unable to prevent deteriorating foreign relations from harming their interests.	东亚商业领袖一直无法避免外交关系恶化影响自身利益。


By contrast, military lobbying now deeply influences foreign and defense policies – witness China’s double-digit increase in defense spending and rising US arms sales in the region.	相反，军事游说目前深刻地影响着外交和国防政策——中国以两位数增长的国防支出和节节攀升的美国东亚地区军售就是明证。


What explains this failure?	这一失败的原因何在？


International-relations theorists since Immanuel Kant have held that democracies rarely (if ever) fight one another; as a result, political leaders, such as US President Woodrow Wilson, have tried to promote democracy as a means to spread peace.	自康德以来的国际关系理论家都认为，民主国家间很少互相开战； 因此，政治领导人，如美国总统威尔逊，试图通过推进民主作为扩大和平的途径。


Until recently, the US seemed to have assumed that China’s engagement with Western democracies would bolster peaceful ties.	直到最近，美国似乎一直都认为中国加入西方民主阵营能推动和平关系。


But, since the 2008 financial crisis, China’s confidence in its authoritarian development model has grown stronger.	但是，自2008年金融危机以来，中国对其集权发展模式的信心日益高涨。


Its leaders now increasingly appear to believe that a new “Beijing Consensus” of mercantilism and state intervention has replaced the old “Washington Consensus” of free trade and deregulation.	中国领导人现在日益相信，强调重商主义和国家干预的新的“北京共识”已经取代了强调自由贸易和去监管的旧的“华盛顿共识”。


China’s ideological incompatibility with the US thus is making the shift in their relative power difficult to achieve peacefully.	因此，中国与美国的意识形态不相容决定了它们相对实力的变化难以以和平方式实现。


In the late nineteenth century, a rising US was able to cooperate with a declining Britain, owing to their shared culture and values.	19世纪末，崛起的美国能够与衰落的英国合作，这是因为它们有共同的文化和价值。


China’s leaders, however, tend to suspect that the US is deliberately trying to undermine their country’s political stability by questioning its record on human rights and political freedoms.	但是，中国领导人向来怀疑美国在通过质疑中国人权和政治自由状况处心积虑破坏中国的政治稳定。


Meanwhile, Xi’s domestic policies seem to be taking the country ever further from Western norms.	与此同时，习近平的国内政策也让中国与西方范式渐行渐远。


It is this ideological divide that is undermining the development in East Asia of institutions that establish principles, rules, and decision-making procedures for the region.	这一意识形态分歧破坏了东亚的机构建设，导致没有形成制定原则、规则和决策流程的地区机构。


While much of the West is bound together by institutions like the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe and NATO, East Asia’s main body, the ASEAN Regional Forum, is too weak to play an analogous role, leaving the region beset with unregulated rivalries.	大部分西方国家通过欧安组织和北约等机构而联系在一起，但东亚的主要机构——东盟地区论坛太软弱，无法起到类似的作用，这使得东亚陷入了不受约束的对峙状态。


So far, US and East Asian leaders have done little beyond offering rhetorical support for the creation of multilateral security institutions.	目前，美国和东亚领导人采取的措施无非是口头支持建立多边安全机构。


With the exception of the almost defunct six-party talks aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, Asia’s powers refuse to be constrained by international rules or norms.	除了濒死的六方会谈（旨在消除朝鲜带来的核威胁），亚洲大国拒绝受到国际规则或范式的约束。


Instead, East Asia’s leaders resort to realpolitik.	相反，东亚领导人转向了现实政治。


Unfortunately, unlike Europe’s nineteenth-century political masterminds – figures like Talleyrand, Metternich, Bismarck, and Disraeli – who crafted durable international alliances, Asia lacks leaders willing and able to look beyond their narrow national interests.	��幸的是，与塔列朗（Talleyrand）、梅特涅（Metternich）、俾斯麦（Bismarck）和迪斯累利（Disraeli）等创造了持久国际联盟的19世纪欧洲政治家不同，亚洲缺少愿意也能够让目光超越狭隘国家利益的领导人。


For example, China’s leaders seem to believe that the 2008 economic crisis and the high costs of two foreign wars have left the US in no position to exercise international leadership.	比如，中国领导人似乎认为2008年经济危机和两场海外战争的巨大代价意味着美国已不再能够行使国际领导力。


That may explain China’s recent foreign-policy assertiveness, particularly in its dispute with Japan over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which could be intended to probe the strength of the US-Japan alliance.	这或许能够解释中国最近的激进外交政策，特别是在钓鱼岛控制权问题上与日本的争端，这也许是意在探测美日同盟的坚固程度。


Testing US power in this way could prove to be a dangerous miscalculation.	以这种方式试探美国的实力或许是危险的误判。


Though weakened economically, the US remains a military superpower.	尽管经济颓势尽露，美国仍是军事超级大国。


Its interests in East Asia date back to the late nineteenth century.	其对东亚的兴趣可以追溯到19世纪末。


Just as Britain refused to concede naval supremacy to Germany a century ago, the US will not easily accept any Chinese challenge to its strategic position in the western Pacific, especially given that so many East Asian states are pleading for US protection.	正如一个世纪前英国拒绝将海军霸权拱手让给德国，美国也不会轻易接受中国对其西太平洋战略地位的挑战，特别是考虑到大量东亚国家都要仰仗美国的保护。


China and the US need to talk.	中国和美国需要谈判。


Despite their economic interdependence and some 90 inter-governmental channels for bilateral dialogue, the two superpowers are caught in a perilous tug-of-war over interests in the East and South China Seas and the western Pacific.	尽管两国经济需要互相依存，并且两国间存在大约90条政府双边对话渠道，但这两个超级大国在东海和南海以及西太平洋利益上陷入了危险的角力。


Sino-Japanese relations are particularly fraught, with two decades of economic stagnation in Japan and rapid growth in China fueling nationalist overreaction on both sides.	中日关系尤其令人担心，日本二十年的经济停滞和中国二十年的快速增长加剧了双方民族主义热情高企。


Having become accustomed to outsourcing its security to the US, and despite having the world’s third-largest economy, Japan neglected to develop its own constructive diplomatic vision.	日本早已习惯将安全外包给美国，尽管其经济规模位居世界第三，但仍没有发展出其自身的建设性外交愿景。


It remains to be seen whether Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation, cloaked in the language of regional cooperation, advances such a new vision.	安倍披着地区合作外衣的修宪是否标志着日本有了新外教愿景还有待观察。


It does not help that the US wants Japan to shoulder more of the burden of maintaining Asia’s security, a position that may make sense strategically and financially, but that betrays a lack of understanding of the political context.	日本希望日本承担更多的维持亚洲安全的责任，这无济于事，让日本扮演这一角色或许在战略和金融上有意义，但也暴露出缺少对政治环境的理解。


The US seems to underestimate regional concerns over Japan’s potential remilitarization.	美国似乎低估了东亚地区对日本军国主义死灰复燃的担忧。


By providing Japan with a diplomatic carte blanche, the US may find itself hostage to Japanese interests, with the result that Japan becomes part of Asia’s security problem, not part of its solution.	美国可能最终会发现，向日本发放外交委任状让自己站在了日本利益的对立面，其后果将是日本成为亚洲安全问题而不是解决办法的一部分。


Asia-Pacific leaders must shake off their complacency.	亚太领导人必须摆脱自满情绪。


Serious efforts and far-reaching compromises are needed to begin the process of building institutions for regional security cooperation.	要想开启地区安全合作机构的建设，就需要严肃动作和深刻妥协。


Otherwise, the much-heralded “Asian century,” far from bringing economic prosperity and peace, will be an age of suspicion and peril.	否则，近期大热的“亚洲世纪”带来的将绝非经济繁荣与和平，而是怀疑和冒险的时代。


The Politics of Young and Old	青年和老人的政治


PARIS – If one considers some of today’s main challenges – including climate change, pensions, public debt, and the labor market – an obvious conclusion emerges: It is relatively much worse to be young today than it was a quarter-century ago.	巴黎——如果深入思考气候变化、养老金、公共债务和劳动力市场等当今世界某些主要挑战，人们可以显而易见地得出结论：今天年轻人的处境远逊于四分之一世纪以前。


Yet in most countries, the generational dimension is remarkably absent from the political debate.	但在多数国家，代际问题却在政治辩论中踪影不见。


Fifty years ago, people spoke often, and loudly, of a “generation gap.”	50年前，人们往往公开谈论“代沟”。


Today, that gap has become invisible.	而今天，人们对代沟问题的讨论却已十分罕见。


This is bad for the young, for democracy, and for social justice.	这对年轻人、民主政体和社会公平而言都不是好现象。


Start with climate change.	先来说气候变化。


Its containment requires changing habits and investing in emission reductions so that future generations will have a habitable planet.	遏制气候变化需要改变习惯、投资减排，以便留给后代一个可以居住的星球。


The alarm bell was first rung in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro; but over the last generation, little was done to contain emissions.	1992年召开的里约热内卢地球峰会首次敲响了警钟； 但过去这代人却鲜有减排的举措。


And progress following the landmark agreement achieved in Paris in December is unlikely to be fast, because the accord is premised on postponing major efforts.	而且因为以推迟重大努力为前提，12月巴黎协议达成后也不太可能很快取得进展。


Universal assent was made possible only by further delaying.	达成普遍一致仅仅是因为进一步的拖延。


Given the massive inertia inherent in the greenhouse effect, the gap between responsible and irresponsible behavior will start resulting in different temperatures only in a quarter-century, and major consequences will follow only in 50 years.	鉴于温室效应所固有的巨大惯性，负责和不负责行为所导致的温差将在25年后才得以显现，而产生重大后果则需要50年。


Anyone older than 60 today will hardly notice the difference between the two scenarios.	今天60岁以上的人很可能不会注意到两者之间的差距。


But the fate of most citizens currently younger than 30 will be fundamentally affected.	但多数目前还在30岁以下的民众其命运将会遭到根本性的改变。


In due course, the respite gained by the older generations will have to be paid for by the younger ones.	总有一天，年轻一代将为老一代的喘息之机付出代价。


Now consider debt.	再来说说债务问题。


Since 1990, public debt has increased by about 40 percentage points of GDP in the European Union and the United States (and much more in Japan).	自20世纪90年代以来，欧盟和美国（其实日本更甚）的公共债务占GDP之比提高了约40个百分点。


Given near-zero interest rates, the corresponding drag on income is currently low; but, because inflation is virtually inexistent and growth is anemic, the debt ratios have only stabilized.	鉴于利率接近于零，债务增加目前对收入造成的拖累不大； 但因为通胀近乎为零且增长萎靡不振，造成负债率基本稳定下来。


So debt reduction will take longer than expected in the aftermath of the global crisis, which will deprive the coming generations of the fiscal space they might need to invest in climate action or in the containment of security threats.	因此全球危机后需要更长的时间来削减债务，从而剥夺了子孙后代投资气候行动或遏制安全威胁所需的财政空间。


Future pensions represent another form of debt.	未来养老金支出其实是另一种形式的债务。


The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in place in many countries are giant intergenerational transfer schemes.	很多国家实行的现收现付制度都是规模巨大的代际转移方案。


True, everyone is expected to contribute while they work, before becoming a recipient in retirement.	诚然，在成为养老金的领取者之前，每个人在工作期间都会为之做出贡献。


In an ideal steady state, pension regimes would not redistribute income across cohorts born at different points in time.	在理想的稳定状态下，养老金制度不会在不同时间出生的群体间造成收入再分配。


As specialists say, they would be generationally neutral.	正如专家所言，养老制度的代际影响基本为中性。


But the baby boomers (those born from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s) paid little into the PAYG schemes because economic growth, population size, and their parents’ low life expectancy made financing pensions easy.	但（20世纪40到60年代中期出生的）婴儿潮一代对现收现付制度所做的贡献有限，因为经济增长、人口规模及其父母较低的预期寿命降低了养老金的筹措难度。


All these factors have now gone into reverse: Growth has slowed, the baby boomers are a demographic bulge weighing on their children, and they are expected to live long.	现在一切因素都已经出现了逆转：增长开始放缓、绝对数量庞大的婴儿潮一代为子女造成了沉重的负担，而且他们拥有相当长的预期寿命。


Countries where pension reforms were introduced early have been able to limit the resulting burden on the young and keep the balance between generations approximately fair.	那些较早推行养老金改革的国家勉强能够限制年轻人所承受的���担，从而实现代际负担的相对平衡。


But countries where reforms were delayed have allowed that balance to place the young at a disadvantage.	但那些推迟改革的国家却已坐视年轻人陷入到相当不利的境地。


Finally, consider the labor market.	最后，再来看劳动力市场。


Over the last decade, conditions for new entrants have worsened markedly in many countries.	过去十年，很多国家新进劳动力面临的条件显著恶化。


The number of young people categorized as NEET (neither in employment nor in education or training) currently stands at 10.2 million in the US and 14 million in the EU.	被称之为NEET（即既未就业也未接受教育或培训）的年轻一族在美国有1020万 、欧盟则有1400万。


Furthermore, many of those who have recently entered the labor market have suffered from job insecurity and repeated spells of unemployment.	此外，很多新进劳力动都面临着缺乏就业安全和反复失业的境况。


In continental Europe, especially, young workers are the first to suffer from economic downturns.	在欧洲大陆，也是年轻劳动者最先尝到经济衰退之苦。


On all of these issues – climate, debt, pensions, and jobs – the younger generations have been made relatively worse off by developments over the last quarter-century.	在气候、债务、养老金和就业等所有问题上，过去四分之一世纪的发展只是让年轻人的处境进一步恶化。


A telling symbol is that there is often more poverty among the young than among the elderly.	一个生动的标志是年轻人中的贫困人数比老年人更多。


This ought to be a major political issue, with significant implications for public finances, social protection, tax policy, and labor market regulation. And it reinforces the imperative of reviving growth through productivity-boosting policies.	这本来应该成为重大政治问题，对公共财政、社会保障、税收政策和劳动力市场监管都产生显著的影响，并且刻不容缓地促使领导人推进通过提高生产率恢复经济的举措。


Yet the new generation gap has had little direct political effect.	但新生代差异却几乎没有造成任何直接的政治影响。


It hardly arises in electoral debate and has generally not led to the emergence of new parties or movements.	它几乎没有在选举辩论中出现，总体而言也没有导致产生新的运动和政党。


Instead, the generational divide shows up in electoral participation.	相反，在选举参与度方面却明显体现出两代人的不同。


In the latest US mid-term elections, the turnout rate among younger citizens was less than 20%, compared to more than 50% for senior voters.	在最新的美国中期选举中，年轻民众的投票率低于20%，而老年公民却在50%以上。


Similar trends are observable in other countries.	类似的趋势也能在其他国家观察到。


Despite the increased uncertainty they face, younger citizens are much more disengaged from electoral politics than their parents and grandparents were at the same age.	尽管所面临的不确定性增加，但年轻人较之其父辈和祖父辈同龄时参与选举政治的意愿却显著下降。


This generational gap in electoral participation explains why politicians care more about the elderly than about the young.	选举参与度方面的代沟解释了政治家为什么关心老年人比年轻人更多。


But in aging societies, the more the young abstain from voting, the more decisions by parliaments and governments will be biased against their interests.	但是在老龄化社会，年轻人越不愿投票，议会和政府的决策对其利益的考虑也就越少。


True, parents are generally not selfish.	诚然，父母一般都非常无私。


They help their children through private transfers and grants.	他们会通过私人转移和赠与等方式来帮助自己的子女。


But only those with income and wealth can provide meaningful support.	但只有那些拥有收入和财富者才能提供有意义的支持。


The result of neglecting young people collectively while supporting them privately is social inequality on a massive scale.	忽视年轻人群体利益而私下为其提供支持必然导致大规模社会不平等。


How to redress generational biases in the political system is a key question for all democracies.	如何纠正代际偏见是所有民主国家政治体系的关键问题。


Solutions do exist: mandatory voting, term limits for elected officials, and youth parliaments or special bodies to examine intergenerational issues, for example.	的确存在解决方案：比方说强制投票、当选官员任期限制、青年议会或研究代际问题的专门机构。


But such measures are either difficult to implement or only moderately effective in view of the magnitude of the challenges.	但这些举措要么难以实施、要么考虑到挑战的规模其效果非常有限。


Current trends are clearly unsustainable politically and socially.	目前的趋势显然在政治和社会方面是不可持续的。


What is unclear is when and how young people will recognize that and make themselves heard.	但我们尚不清楚年轻人会在何时以及以何种方式认识到这个问题，并让自己的意见被全社会听到。


Your Genes or Mine, How Different Are We?	你我的基因，我们有何不同？


For some time, scientists have believed that individual human beings were 99.9% genetically identical.	曾经有一段时间，科学家们认为人类单个个体99. 9%的基因都是相同的。


The 0.1% of the genome that was different (approximately 3,000,000 bases of DNA) was comprised of “single nucleotide polymorphisms” (SNPs are alterations of the individual bases of DNA) scattered throughout the genome.	另外不同的0. 1%（大约为3, 000,000个碱基）是由散布于基因组的 “单核苷酸多态性”组成的（单核苷酸多态性即SNPs，为DNA单个碱基的改变）。


It was thought that some of these DNA alterations may in part explain some of the physical differences that exist between two different, but otherwise normal individuals.	这些DNA的改变被认为可以或多或少地解释两个不同的、普通个体之间存在的身体差异。


In the summer of 2004, two groups of scientists working independently (one led by researchers at Harvard Medical School and Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston and the other led by researchers at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories) called this scientific dogma into question.	2004年的夏令时节，两个独立开展研究的科学家团体对这一科学教条提出了疑问。 （其中一个团体由哈佛医学院、伯明翰大学以及波士顿女子医院的研究者负责，另一个团体由冷泉港实验室的研究者负责）。


Their research identified hundreds of regions of the human genome where the number of copies of a particular DNA segment varied from individual to individual.	他们的研究涉及到成百上千的人类基因区域，在这些区域，特殊DNA片断的组数因个体而不同。


With only a few exceptions, all DNA segments were thought to exist in two copies (one copy inherited from your mother and one copy inherited from your father).	除了少数几个例外，所有的DNA片断都被认为存在于两个基因组中（一个遗传于母亲，另一个遗传于父亲）。


Both studies showed that there are hundreds of regions of the genome that could have more or less than the expected two copies.	两份研究都显示在成百上千的基因区域中都有可能多于所认为的两个基因组。


This alerted scientists to the existence of a larger source of genetic variation than was previously understood, and forced us to speculate on the implications of this discovery.	这些科学家提出的存在更多基因差异来源的想法使我们对其相关性展开了想象。


This discovery was made recently because until now, the technology was not available to comprehensively assess genomic imbalances in a genome-wide fashion.	这些探索是最近才开展的，原因是到目前为止，以整组基因的方式进行基因不平衡性全面评定的技术还达不到要求。


That has changed over the last five or six years, with the development of a technique known as “array-based comparative genomic hybridization” (array-CGH), revolutionizing genetic research and diagnostics.	随着被称为“微矩阵列比较型基因杂交法”（array-CGH）技术的开发，这种情况在过去的五到六年得到了改变。 该技术使得基因研究和诊断被彻底变革。


About three years ago at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, when we were seeking a potential tool for high-resolution diagnostics, array-CGH offered the hope of providing a reliable and efficient genome-wide test that could detect gains or losses in an unbiased and non-subjective fashion.	大致三年前在伯明翰大学和女子医院，在寻求高精诊断的有利工具时，array-CGH提供了可靠、有效的整组基因测试的希望，该测试可公正地找到得失。


When validation experiments were performed that compared the DNA from one “normal, healthy” individual with the DNA from another “normal, healthy” individual, we were astonished to find an average of 12 DNA fragments that showed copy number differences between the two individuals being compared.	在对两个“正常的、健康的”个体之间的DNA进行比较的有效试验时，我们惊奇地发现在所比较的两个个体中，平均存在12个显示组数差异的DNA片断。


These became known as copy number variants, or CNVs.	这被称为组数差异（或CNVs）。


Combining the data from our study and the study from Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories, over 300 regions of the genome were found to exhibit CNVs among normal individuals.	结合我方以及冷泉谷实验室的研究数据，我们发现在正常个体中，有超过300个基因区域存在CNVs。


Since these two initial studies, many other groups, including ours, have confirmed and documented many more CNVs in other individuals studied.	伴随着这两份最初研究的开展 ，其它许多团体（包括我们）证实了其他个体中的CNVs现象。


This is the goal of the Structural Genomic Variation Consortium’s Copy Number Variation Project, which aims at providing researchers the most comprehensive list and characterization of CNVs in humans.	这即是结构基因改变协会的组数改变项目的目标，旨在为研究者提供人类CNVs的最全面信息及说明。


The Consortium recently assessed 270 individuals from four populations with ancestry in Africa, Asia or Europe (known as the HapMap collection) to construct a new map of the human genome.	该协会近期对来自四个种群的270个个体开展了评估（这些个体具有非洲、亚洲或欧洲的血统, 被称为抽样图谱集）以构建人类基因的新图谱。


Using two complementary genome-wide technologies, with subsequent validation studies, a total of 1,447 CNVs were identified.	通过使用两种互补的整组基因技术以及随后的有效研究，总计有1,447 份CNVs被识别。


The data clearly demonstrate that individuals are not as genetically similar as once thought.	该数据清楚地表明个体基因并不像以往所认为的是类似的。


Many of the regions in which the CNVs were identified overlapped known disease genes.	许多CNVs被交叠识别的区域为疾病基因。


Since they are being identified in normal individuals, CNVs may not necessarily be a direct cause of human disease, but many may confer susceptibility to certain diseases, serve as disease markers, and/or indicate potential regions of genomic instability.	因为CNVs是在正常个体中被识别的，所以它们不是疾病的直接原因，但许多CNVs会造成对某些疾病的易感性，成为疾病的标志，并且/或者表明重要区域的基因不稳定性。


Some CNVs are also associated with genes involved in immune response and detoxification-related metabolism (some of the human body’s reactions to the environment that we live in).	某些CNVs联合了免疫回应和解毒相关代谢（人类对所居住环境的一些反应）中的基因。


Indeed, some CNVs may turn out to explain why some people react differently to specific medications.	事实上，某些CNVs可以解释为什么一些人对某些药品的反应各异。


Hopefully, a more comprehensive understanding of human genetic variation (i.e. single base pair changes and structural genomic variation, such as CNVs) will ultimately help physicians to prescribe medication in a more individualized manner, that would result in maximum therapeutic effects to each patient, with minimal side effects.	对人类基因改变（比如单碱基对改变和结构性基因改变，如CNVs）更全面的了解有望帮助医生在开药时考虑到个体差异性，这将带来对病人最好的治疗效果，而使副作用降到最小限度。


Overall, we anticipate that many of these CNVs will provide explanations to how we adapt and interact with our ever-changing environment.	总之，我们可以预想CNVs能够解释我们如何适应并与不断改变的环境的互相作用。


Indeed, as studies continue to identify and characterize CNVs, we anticipate achieving a better understanding of the relationship between these genetic variations, complex diseases, and human adaptability.	基于对CNVs 的识别和特性的更多研究，我们可以预想到更多地了解基因改变、疑难杂症和人类适应性之间的关系。


Unburdening the Facebook Generation	不要拖累Facebook一代


LOS ANGELES – Once again, young people have gotten the short end of the political stick.	洛杉矶——年轻人再一次在政治上遭遇了不公平。


The outcome of the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum is but another reminder of a yawning generational divide that cuts across political affiliation, income levels, and race.	英国脱欧公投的结果仅仅是撕裂政治派别、收入水平和种族关系等不断扩大的代际鸿沟的另一种形式的提醒。


Almost 75% of UK voters aged 18-24 voted to “Remain” in the European Union, only to have “Leave” imposed on them by older voters.	18到24岁的英国选民近75%投票留欧，但结果却是上了年纪的选民将“退欧”的结果强加给他们。


And this is just one of several ways in which millennials’ economic future, and that of their children, is being determined by others.	这只是别人决定千禧一代及其子孙经济未来的其中一种方式。


I am in my late fifties, and I worry that our generation in the advanced world will be remembered – to our shame and chagrin – as the one that lost the economic plot.	我本人是五零后，我感到羞愧和懊恼的是，我担心我们这代人在发达经济体将作为丧失经济主动权的一代被载入史册。


In the run-up to the 2008 global financial crisis, we feasted on leverage, feeling increasingly entitled to use credit to live beyond our means and to assume too much speculative financial risk.	2008年全球金融危机前，我们享受着杠杆盛宴，越来越习惯于借助信用过超出我们能力的生活并承担过多的投机金融风险。


We stopped investing in genuine engines of growth, letting our infrastructure decay, our education system lag, and our worker training and retooling programs erode.	我们停止了对真正增长引擎的投资，任由我们的基础设施破败、教育体制落后、工人培训及重组计划遭到破坏。


We allowed the budget to be taken hostage by special interests, which has resulted in a fragmentation of the tax system that, no surprise, has imparted yet another unfair anti-growth bias to the economic system.	我们坐视特殊利益群体绑架预算，从而导致税收体制碎片化并再次阻碍了经济体系的发展。


And we witnessed a dramatic worsening in inequality, not just of income and wealth, but also of opportunity.	我们目睹了不平等大幅恶化，这种不平等不仅涉及到财富和收入，而且也涉及到机会。


The 2008 crisis should have been our economic wake-up call.	2008年危机本应在经济上为我们敲响警钟。


It wasn’t.	但实际却并未起到这样的效果。


Rather than using the crisis to catalyze change, we essentially rolled over and went back to doing more of the same.	我们不仅没有利用这次危机来促进改革，反而放弃责任，仍然沿用以前旧的方法。


Specifically, we simply exchanged private factories of credit and leverage for public ones.	具体来讲，我们只是将私营企业信贷置换成了公共部门杠杆。


We swapped an over-leveraged banking system for experimental liquidity injections by hyperactive monetary authorities.	我们将杠杆过高的银行体系换成了由极度活跃的货币当局推进流动性注入试验。


In the process, we overburdened central banks, risking their credibility and political autonomy, as well as future financial stability.	在此过程中，我们加重了央行的负担，用央行的信誉、政治主权和金融稳定的未来冒险。


Emerging from the crisis, we shifted private liabilities from banks’ balance sheets to taxpayers, including future ones, yet we failed to fix fully the bailed-out financial sector.	后危机时代，我们将银行资产负债表上的私人债务转换成纳税人债务，甚至包括未来的纳税人，却未能强制接受救助的金融体系进行改革。


We let inequality worsen, and stood by as too many young people in Europe languished in joblessness, risking a scary transition from unemployment to unemployability.	我们坐视不平等恶化，面对欧洲众多年轻人陷入失业窘境、又从失业过渡到无能力就业的可怕局面无动于衷。


In short, we didn’t do nearly enough to reinvigorate the engines of sustainable inclusive growth, thereby also weakening potential output and threatening future economic performance.	总之，我们为重振包容性可持续发展引擎所做的工作还远远不够，因此削弱了潜在生产能力，并对未来的经济效益造成威胁。


And we are compounding these serial miscarriages with a grand failure to act on longer-term sustainability, particularly when it comes to the planet and social cohesion.	尤其在涉及到环境保护和社会凝聚力的问题上，我们不仅犯下了一系列错误，更大的问题是未能采取行动保障长期可持续发展。


Poor economics has naturally spilled over into messy politics, as growing segments of the population have lost trust in the political establishment, business elites, and expert opinion.	有贫穷的经济自然就会有纷乱的政治，越来越多人已经对政治体制、商业精英和专家意见失去了信任。


The resulting political fragmentation, including the rise of fringe and anti-establishment movements, has made it even harder to devise more appropriate economic-policy responses.	由此造成的政治分裂，包括边缘及反体制运动的兴起，进一步加大了制定恰当经济政策的难度。


To add insult to injury, we are now permitting a regulatory backlash against technological innovations that disrupt entrenched and inefficient industries, and that provide people with greater control over their lives and wellbeing.	雪上加霜的是，我们正在对破坏技术创新的监管反弹置之不理，恰恰是这些技术创新动摇了根深蒂固的无效产业，让人们对自己的生活和福祉有更大的自主权。


Growing restrictions on companies such as Airbnb and Uber hit the young particularly hard, both as producers and as consumers.	对Airbnb和Uber等企业的限制在生产和消费领域对年轻人造成了特别沉重的打击。


If we do not change course soon, subsequent generations will confront self-reinforcing economic, financial, and political tendencies that burden them with too little growth, too much debt, artificially inflated asset prices, and alarming levels of inequality and partisan political polarization.	如果我们不能迅速改变，我们的后代将被迫面对自我强化的经济、金融和政治趋势，他们将被迫背负低增长、高债务、人为抬高资产价格、惊人不平等及党派政治两极分化所带来的负担。


Fortunately, we are aware of the mounting problem, worried about its consequences, and have a good sense of how to bring about the much-needed pivot.	幸运的是，我们意识到了问题的严重性、对这种情况所带来的后果深感忧虑并完全了解解决问题的关键。


Given the role of technological innovation, much of which is youth-led, even a small reorientation of policies could have a meaningful and rapid impact on the economy.	鉴于技术创新主要由年轻人主导，就连细微的政策调整也能对经济产生迅速、积极的影响。


Through a more comprehensive policy approach, we could turn a vicious cycle of economic stagnation, social immobility, and market volatility into a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth, genuine financial stability, and greater political coherence.	通过全面落实相关政策，我们可以把经济停滞、社会固化和市场波动的恶性循环转化为包容性增长、金融稳定和加强政治协调的良性循环。


What is needed, in particular, is simultaneous progress on pro-growth structural reforms, better demand management, addressing pockets of excessive indebtedness, and improving regional and global policy frameworks.	具体地讲，我们需要同步推进有利于增长的结构性改革、加强需求管理、解决过度负债问题并改善地区和全球政策框架。


While highly desirable, such changes will materialize only if greater constructive pressure is placed on politicians.	虽然上述改革措施十分可取，但只有对政客施加更多建设性压力这样的改革才能兑现。


Simply put, few politicians will champion changes that promise longer-term benefits but often come with short-term disruptions.	简单地讲，没有多少政客愿意推动牺牲短期利益来换取长期利益的改革。


And the older voters who back them will resist any meaningful erosion of their entitlements – even turning, when they perceive a threat to their interests, to populist politicians and dangerously simplistic solutions such as Brexit.	那些支持他们的年长选民会对任何侵蚀自身权利的改革方案产生抵触情绪——甚至在自身利益遭到威胁时求助于民粹主义政客和英国退欧等简单而危险的解决方案。


Sadly, young people have been overly complacent when it comes to political participation, notably on matters that directly affect their wellbeing and that of their children.	悲哀的是，在涉及政治参与、尤其是直接影响自身及后代福利的问题上年轻人一直过度自满。


Yes, almost three-quarters of young voters backed the UK’s “Remain” campaign.	没错，支持英国“留欧”运动的年轻选民占到近3/4。


But only a third of them turned out.	但只有1/3的人真正参与了投票。


In contrast, the participation rate for those over 65 was more than 80%. Undoubtedly, the absence of young people at the polls left the decision in the hands of older people, whose preferences and motivations differ, even if innocently.	毫无疑问，年轻人缺席投票给了年长选民决定权，而即便没有恶意，但年长者的动机和偏好都不同于年轻人。


Millennials have impressively gained a greater say in how they communicate, travel, source and disseminate information, pool their resources, interact with businesses, and much else.	千禧一代在沟通、旅行、获取和传播信息、集中资源、与企业互动以及众多其他方面赢得了令人印象深刻的话语权。


Now they must seek a greater say in electing their political representatives and in holding them accountable.	现在他们必须在选举自身政治代表并要求他们承担责任方面寻求更大的发言权。


If they don’t, my generation will – mostly inadvertently – continue to borrow excessively from their future.	如果他们不这样做，我们这代人将在不经意间继续过度透支他们的未来。


A Prisoner’s Reflections on Nelson Mandela	纳尔逊·曼德拉牢狱生活反思


KHARKIV – Incarceration is said to leave you with a feeling of helplessness and vulnerability.	哈尔科夫——监禁据说能令人体会到无助和脆弱。


But the truth of life for a political prisoner, even for one on a hunger strike, is the opposite.	但政治犯、即使是绝食政治犯的真实生活也恰恰反其道而行之。


As a prisoner, I have been forced to focus on what is essential about myself, my political beliefs, and my country.	身为囚犯的我曾被迫反省我的政治信仰、国家，以及什么对我必不可少。


So I can almost feel the presence of the brave women and men, old and young, who have gathered in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities to defend their dreams of a democratic and European future.	因此我几乎可以感觉到聚集在基辅和其他乌克兰城市捍卫民主和欧洲未来之梦的勇敢的男男女女、老老少少。


In prison, your hopes and dreams become your reality.	在狱中，希望和梦想与现实是完全重合的。


I am sure that Nelson Mandela would have understood my feelings and agreed.	我相信纳尔逊·曼德拉理解并赞同我的感受。


The South African apartheid regime may have locked him away for almost three decades, but in the great Soweto protests and the other demonstrations for freedom and equality, courageous young South Africans invariably looked to his example and felt his presence.	南非种族隔离政权可能已经囚禁了他近30年，但在大规模索韦托抗议和其他争取自由和平等的示威行动里，勇敢的南非年轻人不约而同地学习他的榜样、感受他的存在。


Around the world, most people now rightly celebrate the gentle dignity with which Mandela led South Africa out of the political wilderness.	世界各地多数民众现在理所当然地赞美曼德拉领导南非走出政治旷野的温和与尊严。


Even here, behind prison bars and 24-hour surveillance of the type that he experienced for so long, I can conjure the warmth of his broad smile, merry eyes, and those colorful Hawaiian-style shirts that he wore with such panache.	即使在监狱铁窗和他长期经历的24小时监控背后，我一样能想象出他灿烂温和的笑容、快乐的眼神和身上五颜六色的夏威夷衬衫。


And I can admire his unyielding – and, yes, sometimes wily – commitment to reconciliation, which saved his country from the race war that those who refused to accept the end of white-minority rule saw as inevitable.	但我最欣赏他不屈不挠，有时甚至透露出些许狡黠的和解原则，正是这些原则让南非避免陷入种族内战，而在拒绝接受白人少数统治末日的人看来内战是必然的结果。


How wrong they were, and how miraculous was Mandela’s achievement in making even his most implacable enemies feel at home in post-apartheid South Africa.	他们实在错得离谱，因为曼德拉奇迹般地让最不共戴天的敌人也在后种族隔离时代的南非找到了家一般的感觉。


But here, in this place, it is not Mandela the statesman who touches my soul and fires my imagination.	但此时此刻，触动我的灵魂、激发我的想象力的却不是政治家曼德拉。


“My” Mandela is the prisoner, the Mandela of Robben Island, who endured 27 years behind bars (18 of them on a rock in the South Atlantic) and yet emerged with his spirit intact, brimming with a vision of a tolerant South Africa, a country liberated even for apartheid’s architects and beneficiaries.	“我的”曼德拉是罗本岛上忍受了27年铁窗生涯但仍然不改初衷的囚犯（其中18年他被关押在南大西洋岛礁）。 曼德拉眼前充斥着宽容南非的愿景，即使是种族隔离的设计和受益者同样能够享受这里的自由。


No purges marked the end of white rule.	白人统治结束没有带来种族清洗。


There were no witch-hunts, nor was there summary justice.	没有政治迫害，也没有简单执法。


All that Mandela demanded was that the truth about the past be revealed.	曼德拉只要求公布过去的真相。


Through the unique innovation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mandela found the only viable bridge between his country’s racist legacy and its multi-racial present and future – a combination of political genius and humane wisdom that only the greatest of leaders possess.	通过真相与和解委员会的独特创造，曼德拉找到了南非种族主义传统和多种族现在与未来间唯一的桥梁——他的所作所为融会了最伟大领袖才具备的人文智慧和政治天才。


Mandela was able to guide South Africa to freedom, because he was able to see its future more clearly than those who lived through the apartheid years outside of prison.	曼德拉能引导南非走向自由，因为他比狱外渡过种族隔离年代的人更能清楚预见到南非的未来。


Indeed, he possessed that rare clarity of moral vision that prison – perhaps like no other environment – can nurture.	在他身上，监狱比其他任何环境更能勾画出清晰的道德目标。


Imprisonment brought Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn this clarity as well.	亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴眼中的清晰愿景同样源自于监禁生活。


“Gradually it was disclosed to me that the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties, either – but right through every human heart – and through all human hearts,” he wrote in The Gulag Archipelago.	他在《古拉格群岛》中写道，“我逐渐意识到善恶的分界线不在于国家、不在于阶级、也不在于政党，而在于我们每个人的内心之中。


“This line shifts….And even within hearts overwhelmed by evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained.	这条线不断变化…即使已不堪邪恶重负的心灵也保留着小小的善的桥头堡。


And even in the best of all hearts, there remains...an un-uprooted small corner of evil.”	而即使是在���善良的内心，仍留有未曾连根拔起的小小的恶的角落。 ”


The ability to begin to see more clearly than most the inner workings of the human soul is one of the few gifts that imprisonment can bestow.	监狱生活恰恰可以带来超乎多数人类灵魂的认识清晰度。


Forced to reckon with your own vulnerability, isolation, and losses (and seemingly lost cause), you learn to look more carefully into the human heart – yours and that of your jailers.	被迫对自身的弱点、孤立、损失（以及看似迷失的事业）进行思考，你学会了如何审视人类（你和你的看守）内心的欲望。


Mandela epitomized this rare gift.	曼德拉身上汇聚了这种难得的天赋。


How else could he have personally invited one of his Robben Island jailers to attend his inauguration as South Africa’s first democratically elected president?	否则他怎么会亲自邀请他在罗本岛上的监狱看守出席他担任南非首任民选总统的就职典礼？


Of course, behind Mandela’s generous spirit was a character of steel.	当然，在曼德拉慷慨精神的背后是他刚强的性格。


He bore his imprisonment for the sake of his cause.	他为了自己的事业忍受着监禁生活。


And he bore the anguish of the suffering imposed on his family.	他独自承受着亲人遭受折磨的痛苦。


And yet he neither broke nor surrendered to the rage that would have consumed most people.	但他在足以吞噬大部分人的愤怒面前既没有崩溃，也没有投降。


As usual, Mandela’s own words about his day of personal liberation show how well he understood this: “As I walked out the door toward the gate that would lead to my freedom, I knew if I didn’t leave my bitterness and hatred behind, I’d still be in prison.”	像以往一样，曼德拉对个人解放日的话语显示出他深刻的理解：“当我走向通往自由的大门时，我知道如果我不放下过去的仇恨和痛苦，我就仍然是一名囚徒。


And just as Mandela knew in his prison cell that apartheid would one day fall, I know in my solitude that Ukraine’s ultimate triumph as a European democracy is certain.	”正如监狱里的曼德拉知道种族隔离终有一天会土崩瓦解，我在孤独的牢狱生涯中也知道乌克兰最终必将成为成功的欧洲民主国家。


Sweet Caroline in Tokyo	亲爱的卡洛琳来到东京


TOKYO – Fifty years have passed since the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy, with official ceremonies held in Washington, DC, and Dallas to commemorate the anniversary.	东京—美国总统约翰·肯尼迪遇刺已经过去了五十年，华盛顿和达拉斯都举行了正式的仪式纪念这一时刻。


But JFK’s eldest daughter, Caroline Kennedy, was not present at either event; she had just taken up her post in Tokyo as the 29th US Ambassador to Japan.	但肯尼迪的长女卡洛琳·肯尼迪没有现身于这两个场合； 她刚刚履新第29任美国驻日本大使。


On November 19, thousands of people lined the streets to catch a glimpse of Kennedy as she made her way from Tokyo Station to the Imperial Palace, around a kilometer away, by horse-drawn carriage to present her credentials to the emperor.	11月19日，肯尼迪乘坐马车从东京站前往一千米外的日本皇宫，向天皇递交自己的任命状，数千人聚集在街道两侧，争相一睹肯尼迪的风采。


Waving to the onlookers, she looked like Snow White.	肯尼迪朝群众挥手致意，看起来就像是白雪公主。


November 22, 1963, was also the day satellite broadcasting from the United States to Japan began, and many Japanese got up early to watch a speech by JFK in Dallas that began at 5:30 a.m.	1963年11月22日是美国-日本卫星广播开通的日子，许多日本人早早起床，只为收看清晨5:30开始的肯尼迪达拉斯演讲。


But, rather than airing the speech, the broadcast brought the shocking news of the assassination.	但是，广播并没有送出肯尼迪的声音，而是传来了肯尼迪遇刺的惊天噩耗。


The image of young Caroline – the inspiration for Neil Diamond’s famous song – solemnly standing beside her three-year-old brother as he saluted his father’s coffin is deeply engrained in the hearts of Japan’s people.	年轻的卡洛琳肃穆地站在朝父亲棺椁敬礼三岁的弟弟身边——受尼尔·戴蒙德（Neil Diamond）名曲的启发——这一形象深深地刻在日本人民心头。


So there probably is not a single Japanese who would not welcome her as US Ambassador.	因此，恐怕没有一位日本人会不欢迎她成为美国大使。


US ambassadors to Japan have come in three types.	美国驻日本大使有三种类型。


There have been academic experts on Japan, like the acclaimed scholar Edwin Reischauer.	一种是日本学专家，如广受欢迎的赖肖尔（Edwin Reischauer）。


There have also been political heavyweights, such as Michael Mansfield, a long-time Democratic majority leader of the US Senate, former Vice President Walter Mondale, former Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas Foley, and Senator Howard Baker, who also served as President Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff.	一种是重磅政治人物，如长期担任美国参议院民主党多数领袖的曼斯菲尔德（Michael Mansfield）、前副总统蒙代尔（Walter Mondale）、前众议院发言人弗雷（Thomas Foley）和参议员、罗纳德·里根总统幕僚长贝克尔（Howard Baker）。


The third type are presidential political appointees, such as Thomas Schieffer, a former business partner of President George W. Bush, and John Roos, a noted Silicon Valley lawyer.	第三类来自总统的政治任命，如谢佛（Thomas Schieffer）是小布什的前商业伙伴； 罗斯（John Roos）是前硅谷律师。


Clearly, Caroline Kennedy, an important early supporter of President Barack Obama, is in this category.	显然，作为奥巴马重要的早期支持者，卡洛琳·肯尼迪也属于这一类。


Indeed, her backing for Obama in the Democratic Party primaries in 2008, when he was still a relatively unknown senator from Illinois, gave his campaign credibility among party insiders who remain loyal to her family’s legacy.	事实上，她在2008年民主党预选时就支持奥巴马，当时他还只是个相对无名的伊利诺伊州参议员。 卡洛琳使奥巴马的竞选赢得了仍忠于肯尼迪家族的民主党内人物中间的信誉。


Kennedy’s address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing elicited bipartisan support – a rare occurrence nowadays, given America’s highly polarized national politics – and she received unanimous approval.	在参议院对外关系委员会的任命确认听证会演讲中，肯尼迪获得了来自两党的支持——者在当下美国高度两极分化的国内政坛中时不多见的——赢得了一致通过。


Although she lacks formal political or diplomatic experience, her personal connections, particularly to Obama, will have great significance for US-Japan relations.	尽管她缺少正式的政治和外交经验，但她的个人关系，特别是与奥巴马的关系，将极大地影响美日关系。


And there are pressing issues that need the new ambassador’s attention.	这位新大使需要关注一些紧迫问题。


For example, there are security questions related to strengthening the alliance between Japan and the US, including the relocation of the Futenma Air Station, the base of operations for the US Marine Corps on Okinawa.	比如与强化美日安全同盟有关的问题，包括处置普天间空军基地和美国冲绳海军基地。


There are also issues related to economic cooperation, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the proposed mega-regional free-trade treaty covering Pacific Rim economies.	还有与经济合作有关的问题，比如谈判中的覆盖环太平洋经济体的巨型地区自由贸易协定——跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）。


Although powerful domestic interest groups, particularly those representing the agricultural sector, have objected to Japanese participation in the TPP negotiations, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government chose to join the talks late in the day.	尽管强大的国内利益集团，特别是代表农业部门的利益集团反对日本加入TPP谈判，但安倍晋三政府最后还是选择加入谈判。


Instead of banking the political capital that his high approval ratings had given him, he chose to spend some of it on an initiative that his predecessors had rejected, but that will help to transform myriad aspects of Japan’s economy.	安倍晋三没有选择巩固高支��率给他带来的政治资本，而是选择拿出一些政治资本用于追求被他的前任所拒绝，但有助于日本经济各个方面转型的计划。


Of course, given today’s hyper-partisan environment in the US, there is a danger that fast-track negotiating authority – under which Congress binds itself to an up-or-down vote on trade agreements (thereby precluding amendments and filibusters) – will not be given to the president.	当然，考虑当当今美国高度党派化的政治环境，美国总统未必能够获得“快车道”谈判权——国会对贸易协定仍坚持要么否决要么通过的态度（从而排除了修正和拖延的空间）。


If this roadblock cannot be overcome and the agreement stalls, the Abe government’s approval ratings will suffer, despite progress in the negotiations.	如果这一障碍无法克服，TPP谈判陷入僵局，那么安倍政府的支持率将受到影响，即便谈判取得进展。


Given the unanimity with which Kennedy was confirmed, she may be able to use her own political capital to help sell fast-track authority in Congress.	肯尼迪的任命获得了一致肯定，因此她有望利用其自身政治资本帮助国会授予奥巴马快车道谈判权。


The Abe government is banking on its high approval rating not only to participate in the TPP, but also to address the need to escape from 15 years of deflation and strengthen Japan’s national-security posture, which has been hamstrung for decades.	安倍政府不但依赖其高支持率参与TPP，还依赖高支持率解决走出15年通缩、强化日本国家安全姿态（几十年来一直处于瘫痪状态）的需要。


Given the nexus of issues that tie vital US interests to Japan’s reform process, Kennedy, with her character and skills, could well prove to be an essential link between the countries at a crucial point in their relationship.	这些问题将美国的关键利益与日本的改革过程捆绑在了一起，而肯尼迪的人格和技能能够让她成为两国关系关键点上的关键连接。


Who Lost Thailand?	谁输掉了泰国？


TOKYO – Thailand, Southeast Asia’s most developed and sophisticated economy, is teetering on the edge of the political abyss.	东京—泰国，东南亚最发达、最成熟的经济体，正在政治悬崖边沿徘徊。


Yet most of the rest of Asia appears to be averting its eyes from the country’s ongoing and increasingly anarchic unrest.	但亚洲大部分国家并没有把目光放在泰国日益高涨的无政府主义骚乱上。


That indifference is not only foolish; it is dangerous.	如此冷漠不但愚蠢，更十分危险。


Asia’s democracies now risk confronting the same harsh question that the United States faced when Mao Zedong marched into Beijing, and again when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ousted the Shah in Iran.	亚洲民主国家现在面临着美国在毛泽东入主北京和霍梅尼推翻伊朗国王时相同的紧迫问题。


Who, they will have to ask, lost Thailand?	他们必须问一问，谁输掉了泰国？


Much of the world is wondering how such a successful economy could allow its politics to spin out of control.	世界上很多国家奇怪于为何如此成功的经济体会让政治失控。


What accounts for the armies of protesters – distinguished, gang-like, by the color of their shirts – whose mutual antipathy often borders on nihilistic rage?	是什么让衣服颜色显著易辨、如黑帮般的游行大军上了街？ 而他们所表达的共同愤怒又往往是虚无的？


The roots of the current unrest extend back more than a decade, to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s first electoral victory in 2001.	当前乱象的根源可以追溯到十多年前。 2001年，前首相他信第一次在选举中获胜。


Thaksin’s triumph did not represent the normal alternation in power that one finds in a democracy.	他信的胜利并没有带来民主国家常见的权力更迭。


Instead, his victory heralded the political rise of the country’s poor, long-silenced rural majority.	相反，他的胜利标志着泰国长期处于分割状态的贫穷农村大众的政治崛起。


Bangkok’s entrenched elite recoiled in alarm.	曼谷的老牌精英成了杯弓蛇影。


But, instead of learning to compete with Thaksin for the votes of Thailand’s rural poor, the country’s urban elite (including the powerful military) sought to delegitimize his rule.	但是，泰国城市精英（包括强大的军方）并没有通过选票和泰国困苦农民竞争，而是选择推翻他信的合法执政地位。


When he was re-elected by an even larger majority, his government was overthrown, his political party was banned by the Supreme Court, and he was forced to flee the country after corruption charges against him led to a criminal conviction.	在他信以更大的优势获得连任后，他的政府遭到了颠覆，他的政党被最高法院取缔，他也被迫在因为腐败指控被判有罪后逃亡。


Yet Thaksin’s supporters did not abandon him.	但他信的支持者并没有抛弃他。


When Thailand’s military returned to their barracks, many Thai citizens voted for Thaksin at one remove, with his sister – Yingluck Shinawatra, a long-time executive at Thaksin’s communications firm – becoming Prime Minister, supported by a powerful parliamentary majority.	当泰国军方回归军营后，许多泰国公民坚定地支持他信，因此其妹、长期担任他信的通信公司首席执行官的英拉在议会压倒多数的支持下成为总理。


For much of her term in office, Yingluck garnered praise for her pragmatism, and for seeking to ameliorate the antagonism of her opponents.	在执政的大部分时间里，英拉凭借其实用主义作风以及试图缓解反对派反应而赢得赞誉。


But that praise and success appears to have bred a form of hubris.	但她获得的赞誉和成功也催生了自大。


She proposed an amnesty law that would have not only pardoned opposition leaders, including Abhisit Vejjajiva, her predecessor as prime minister (who faces murder charges), but allowed her brother to return to the country.	她所提出的的大赦法不但将原宥她的前任、面临谋杀指控的阿披实（Abhisit Vejjajiva）等反对派领袖，也将允许她的兄长他信回国。


And, in defiance of a Supreme Court ruling, she sought a constitutional amendment that would make the Senate, whose members are appointed, an elected body.	此外，她无视最高法院的裁决，寻求通过修宪让参议院议员由制定变为选举产生。


The opposition, sensing that its moment had arrived, launched a wave of street protests.	反对派认为时机已到，发动了一系列街头游行。


Yingluck, in an effort to defuse the situation, called for a parliamentary election in February.	为了平息事态，英拉宣布在2月举行议会选举。


But the opposition has rejected this and says that it will boycott the vote.	但反对派拒绝了这一方案，表示将抵制选举。


It fears – rightly, most people suspect – that the Thaksin camp will be returned to power in any free and fair vote.	反对派担心——大部分人认为确实需要担心——自由公平的选举会让他信阵营重新掌权。


So, in essence, what is happening in Thailand is an attempted nullification of democracy by the opposition and the country’s entrenched elite.	因此，从本质上说，泰国发生的其实是反对派和老牌精英试图推翻民主。


Unable to compete successfully with Thaksin for votes, they now want to dilute Thai democracy in order to prevent the electorate from ever again choosing a government that goes against their will.	他们无力在选举中与他信一决雌雄，因此希望推翻泰国的民主制度，以防止当选者选择与他们的意愿作对的政府。


If Thailand were an insignificant country with little geostrategic weight, its problems might not matter as much as they do to the rest of Asia.	如果泰国是一个在地缘战略上无关紧要的小国，那���它的问题对亚洲其他国家或许并没有什么大不了的。


But Thailand is Southeast Asia’s lynchpin economy.	但泰国是东南亚至关重要的经济体。


It is a key partner for Myanmar (Burma) as it makes its own political and economic transition, and it is a hub for trade with neighboring Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.	它是缅甸在其自身政治和经济过渡阶段的重要伙伴，也是邻国柬埔寨、老挝和越南的贸易枢纽。


But the biggest reason that Thailand matters for Asia’s democracies is fierce competition for influence between a rising China and the democratic world.	但泰国对亚洲民主国家之所以重要，最大的原因是崛起的中国和民主世界之间正在进行激烈的竞争。


Until now, Thailand has been a firm member of the democratic camp.	到目前为止，泰国一直坚定地站在民主阵营。


Its military is mostly trained by the United States; indeed, it was the key staging point for the US during the Vietnam War.	泰国军队大多由美国训练； 事实上，泰国也是越南战争期间美国在的重要驻军地点。


Likewise, Japan and India have long regarded Thailand as a democratic bulwark in a neighborhood where some regimes – Cambodia and Laos – are firmly under China’s hegemonic sway.	类似地，日本和印度也一直视为周边国家中的民主堡垒，在它们的邻国中，柬埔寨和老挝等国家一直被中国的霸权主义牢牢地控制着。


Indeed, its government has proved to be a strong supporter of Myanmar’s president, Thein Sein, as he seeks to free his country from China’s tight embrace.	泰国政府是缅甸总统吴登盛的强大支持者，而吴登盛正在寻求让缅甸摆脱中国的牢牢控制。


By standing aside as Thailand’s opposition and traditional elite seek to undermine the country’s democracy in the name of a permanent right to rule, Asia’s democracies risk driving some elements of the Thaksin camp into the arms of China, which would happily accept the role of patron to so potent a political force.	泰国反对派和传统精英正在打着永久执政权利的名号破坏泰国的民主，如果亚洲民主国家袖手旁观，将有可能让他信阵营中的一些部分倒向中国的怀抱，而中国也将乐于接受为强如他信阵营的政治势力提供保护。


But this need not happen.	但这并非不可避免。


Thailand’s military has long and respectful ties not only with the US military, but with officers in Japan as well.	长期以来，泰国军方不但与美国军方有着良好关系，与日本军官关系也不错。


Thailand’s opposition politicians, many of whom were educated at top Western universities, may also be open to quiet advice that they are pushing things too far, not only putting Thailand’s stability at risk, but also jeopardizing regional security.	不少泰国反对派政客在顶尖西方大学受过教育，他们能够接受安静的建议——行动有些过火，不但威胁了泰国的稳定，也影响了地区安全。


Just as, a decade ago, the West objected to the efforts of Turkey’s entrenched secular elite to rob Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s mildly Islamist AKP party of its democratic victory, it needs to speak clearly today in defense of Thai democracy.	正如十年前西方拒绝土耳其老牌精英推翻埃尔多安温和派AKP党的民主胜利的图谋，如今西方也需要旗帜鲜明地捍卫泰国民主。


The opposition’s claim that it is acting in the interests of the world’s democracies needs to be rebutted.	必须剥去反对派所宣称的他们是在为全世界民主需要而奋斗的说法的画皮。


Thaksin may be no saint, and some constitutional reform will be needed if political reconciliation is to come about.	他信不是圣人，要形成政治妥协也需要做出一些宪政改革。


But Thaksin’s governments, like that of his sister, have kept China at one remove from influence.	但他信政府和英拉政府都一致地抵制着中国的影响力。


That is the key strategic interest that is now at stake.	这才是如今最重要的战略利益。


Should Yingluck be ousted in a coup, or should the country’s democracy be hollowed out to preclude her return to power, the Shinawatras may be left with no choice but to seek support from Thailand’s giant neighbor to the north.	如果英拉被政变推翻，或泰国民主因为阻止她重新掌权而被架空，那么他信和英拉所属的西那瓦（Shinawatra）家族将别无选择，只能向中国寻求支持。


If that happens, we will all know who lost Thailand.	果真如此的话，我们所有人都将知道谁输掉了泰国。


We did.	我们。


Equality or Estrangement	平等还是隔阂


TOKYO – Those whom the gods would destroy, they grant their wishes.	东京—神要毁灭一个人，就会给他希望。


Will that bit of ancient wisdom now hold for the United States and Japan?	这一古老智慧对现在的美国和日本成立吗？


For a half-century, the US, which wrote Japan’s postwar “peace” constitution, has pressed the Japanese to play a greater role in maintaining Asian and global stability.	半个世纪以来，替日本制定了战后“和平”宪法的美国一直要求日本在维持亚洲和全球稳定方面扮演更重要的角色。


But now that Japan finally has a leader who agrees, the US is getting nervous, with Secretary of State John Kerry supposedly calling Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “unpredictable.”	但如今日本终于有了一位愿意这样做的领导人，而美国却开始紧张了，据说其国务卿约翰·克里称首相安倍晋三治下的日本“难以预测”。


These strains in the US-Japan relationship – surely the foundation stone of Asian stability – first became noticeable in December, when Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which houses the “souls” of (among others) Class A war criminals from the Pacific War.	美日关系——毫无疑问，这一关系是亚洲稳定的基石——的这些掣肘首次进入公众视线是去年12月，当时安倍晋三访问了供奉太平洋战争甲级战犯（及其他）“灵位”的东京靖国神社。


The US has always criticized Japanese officials’ visits to the shrine, but through diplomatic channels.	美国一直对日本官员拜访靖国神社持批评态度，但都是通过外交渠道表达的。


This time, America voiced its displeasure openly.	而这一回美国公开表示了不满之情。


The US is rightly concerned about the negative impact of such pilgrimages on Japan’s relations with its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.	美国担心惨败靖国神社会妨碍日本与邻国（特别是中国和韩国）的关系，这是正确的。


But the harsh tone publicly adopted by President Barack Obama’s administration raised serious concerns among some in Abe’s government who question Obama’s commitment to the alliance and suspect that he was using the Yasukuni issue as a pretext to signal a weakening of America’s defense commitment.	但美国总统奥巴马政府公开的强硬语调让安倍政府中的不少人产生了审慎的忧虑，质疑奥巴马关于美日同盟的承诺，并怀疑他准备把靖国神社问题作为弱化美国防务承诺的借口。


Such suspicions were sharpened after China declared its new Air Defense Identification Zone, which overlaps Japanese sovereign territory.	中国宣布其新的防空识别区的举动加深了这一质疑。 中国的防空识别区与部分日本领土重叠。


The US tried to have it both ways: though the Obama administration sent US bombers through the new ADIZ to demonstrate its refusal to recognize China’s move, it also told US commercial airliners to acknowledge the zone and report their flight plans to the Chinese authorities.	美国试图持两端：尽管奥巴马政府派遣美国轰炸机进入防空识别区以表明拒绝接受中国的举动，但它同时又通知美国商业航空公司承认防空识别区，向中国当局报告飞行计划。


Likewise, US acquiescence in China’s de facto ouster of the Philippines from the Scarborough Shoal (a disputed outcropping in the South China Sea) raised questions in Japan about the two countries’ supposed harmony of interests.	类似地，美国对中国将菲律宾人驱逐出黄岩岛（位于南海的争议岛礁）的事实举动采取了默许态度。 ，这让日本怀疑这两个国家有利益协调。


In fact, although the US extols the virtues of its partnership with Japan, successive American presidents have been vague about the details.	事实上，尽管美国大肆赞颂与日本的合作伙伴关系，但历届美国总统从来不对此做详细阐述。


Ultimately, the idea always seemed to be that Japan would pay more for defense, but the US would set the partnership’s objectives.	说到底，这一思想永远是日本为防务出钱，而美国则为其合作伙伴制定目标。


Abe’s conception of the US-Japan partnership presupposes much greater equality.	安倍晋三的美日合作伙伴关系概念以更大的平等为前提。


After all, a society like Japan, trying to escape two decades of economic malaise, cannot feel completely comfortable outsourcing its national-security strategy, even to an ally that is as respected and reliable as the US.	毕竟，对于日本这样的正在试图摆脱二十年经济低迷的社会，不可能心安理得地将其国家安全战略外包给他国，哪怕这个“他国”是最令人尊敬、最可靠的美国。


Far from being based on chest-thumping nationalism, Abe’s national-security strategy reflects, above all, a deep awareness of how a lost generation of economic growth has affected the Japanese.	安倍晋三的国家安全战略决非民族主义空头许诺，而是首先植根于深刻地理解失去的二十年对日本人的影响。


His bravura diplomatic performances sometimes give the impression that a self-confident Japan has been a normal feature of the global landscape.	他的大胆的外交举措有时会给人造成一种印象，认为自信的日本已经成为全球图景中的常规元素。


Strangely, it is all but forgotten – particularly by the Chinese – that for two decades Japan has watched China’s rise quietly from the sidelines (even supportively, to the extent that Japanese investors have poured in billions of dollars in the three decades since Deng Xiaoping opened the economy).	奇怪的是，人们——特别是中国人——似乎都忘了二十年来日本一直静静地旁观着中国的崛起（甚至起着支持作用，自邓小平采取改革开放政策以来，三十年里日本投资者向中国投资了数十亿美元）。


Indeed, Abe has succeeded so well in returning Japan to the world stage that his US and Asian critics act as if the only problem now is to moderate Japanese self-confidence – a notion that would have been laughable just two years ago.	事实上，安倍晋三在让日本回归世界舞台方面做得十分成功，就连他的美国和亚洲批评者似乎也认为现在唯一的问题是如何抑制日本的自信心——换做两年前，这样的观点还显得颇为可笑。


But the fact remains that one of Abe’s primary worries is the spiritual malaise that accompanied Japan’s long economic stagnation.	但事实依然是安倍晋三首先要担心伴随日本长期经济停滞而生的精神不振。


Those who see in his patriotic rhetoric a desire to whitewash history miss his real concern: economic revival is meaningless if it does not secure Japan’s position as a leading Asian power.	认为安倍晋三的爱国言论是为了洗白历史是错判了他的关注点：如果不能保证日本作为亚洲���先国家的地位，那么经济即使复苏了也没有意义。


The US, however, regards Abe’s worries about Japan’s spirit as peripheral to its efforts to forge a lasting relationship with China and overhaul its strategic presence in the Pacific.	但是，美国将安倍晋三对日本精神的担忧视为次要因素，而把构建它和中国的持续关系以及改观其在太平洋的战略面貌作为首要目标。


For example, the US views the Trans-Pacific Partnership – the huge trade agreement involving it, Japan, and 10 other leading Pacific Rim countries – as a technical scheme that will bring economic benefits through greater trade.	比如，美国把跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP，包括美国、日本和其他十个环太平洋国家在内的大型贸易协定）视为一项通过贸易给经济带来好处的技术安排。


But, for Abe, the TPP’s value for Japan’s sense of identity – that it is now a more outward-looking nation – is just as important.	但是，对安倍晋三来说，TPP对日本作为一个更加外向的国家的身份感的价值也同样重要。


In Abe’s view, Japan needs to regain, wherever possible, the right of independent decision-making if it is to manage successfully the challenge posed to it by China.	在安倍晋三看来，日本需要尽一切可能重新实现独立决策，这样才能成功地应对中国带来的挑战。


This does not mean that Abe’s Japan will become an ally like France under Jacques Chirac, spurning US leadership for the sake of it; instead, Abe seeks a policy of cooperation with the US that reflects the alliance's voluntary nature.	这并不意味着安倍晋三的日本会变成像希拉克治下的法国那样的盟友并敦促美国为了它而担起领导之责； 相反，安倍晋三寻求反映自愿原则的与美国合作的政策。


He believes that, given the new balance of power in Asia, the alliance will be meaningful only if each partner has a real choice, and the wherewithal, to act autonomously or with regional allies.	他认为，在亚洲新实力平衡的环境下，美国和日本都必须拥有自主或与地区盟友联合行动的真正的选择权和手段，惟其如此，联盟才会有意义。


Fortunately, Japanese and American analyses of Chinese trends are not very different.	幸运的是，日本和美国对中国趋势的分析并无多少不同。


Both generally view China as having embarked on a probing strategy in search of weak spots where it can expand its geopolitical reach.	总体而言，两国都认为中国采取的是试探战略，寻找其可以扩张地缘政治影响的薄弱点。


And both believe that only when China is convinced that such probes will yield no lasting benefit can serious negotiations about a comprehensive security structure for Asia take place.	两国也都认为，只有中国相信这样的试探战略起不了持续性的效果，亚洲才有可能展开全面安全结构的严肃谈判。


But even here, there is a difference.	但即使在这方面也仍然存在一个不同点。


The US, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, believes that once China recognizes the limits to its power, a structure of peace will follow naturally.	美国认为在外交政策中，意图是一个很重要的因素，它相信，只要中国认识到其实力的极限在哪里，就会自然而然地产生和平结构。


Abe, by contrast, believes that only a favorable balance of power can be relied upon, and he is determined that Japan play its part in constructing that balance.	相反，安倍晋三相信，只有有利的实力平衡才是可靠的，他决心要让日本在构建这一平衡上起作用。


Although Abe has lifted Japan’s sights and self-confidence, he recognizes that Japan faces real limits.	尽管安倍晋三提升了日本的视界和自信，但他也承认日本面临现实的局限。


The US, too, should recognize that there are limits to the extent of the subordination that it can ask of an ally.	美国也明白，其盟友对其的屈从是有限度的。


Some wishes really are better left unfulfilled.	一些愿望还是不要实现的好。


Securing Japan	保护日本


TOKYO – Shinzo Abe’s second term as Japan’s prime minister began with a laser-like focus on economic revitalization.	东京—安倍晋三的第二次日本首相生涯以激光式地聚焦于经济复兴开始。


That policy, almost instantly dubbed “Abenomics,” comprises what have been called the three “arrows”: bold monetary policy, an expansionary fiscal stance, and structural reforms to stimulate private investment.	这一几乎从一开始就被称之为“安倍经济学”的政策由所谓的三 “支箭”组成：积极的货币政策、扩张的财政立场以及刺激私人投资的结构性改革。


Hosting the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 2020 has added a fourth arrow to this quiver in the form of increased infrastructure investment and tourism revenue in the years leading up to the Games.	东京举办2020年奥运会又在其上增加了第四支箭——奥运会之前的基础设施投资和旅游收入增长。


To be sure, after 15 years of deflationary recession, revitalization of the Japanese economy remains far from complete.	坦白说，在经历了15年的通缩性衰退后，日本经济的复苏仍有很长的路要走。


Nonetheless, the effects of Abe’s reforms are becoming visible in areas such as equity prices and exchange rates.	尽管如此，安倍改革的效果已经在股市和汇率等领域开始显现。


But Abe also confronts a security environment in Asia that is every bit as brittle as Japan’s economy was before his government took office last December.	但安倍还面临着亚洲安全环境问题，这一问题之棘手一点都不亚于安倍去年12月成为首相时面临的经济问题。


Indeed, he confronted many of the same issues during his first administration seven years ago.	事实上，他面临着诸多与七年前首次出任首相时相同的问题。


His efforts back then were halted by his own resignation, and he is now making a second attempt to establish a national-security governance system to meet Japan’s needs – and those of its allies – in twenty-first-century Asia.	当时，他的措施因为他自身的辞职而夭折，而如今他要第二次试图建立能满足日本（以及盟友）在21世纪亚洲所需要的国家安全治理体系。


In a speech to a plenary session of the lower house of Japan’s Diet on October 25, Abe emphasized that, given the current security situation in Asia, “It is essential to strengthen command functions for implementing the prime minister’s national security policy.”	在10月25日日本下议院全体会议讲话中，安倍晋三强调，考虑到目前亚洲安全局势，“加强指挥功能对于落实首相国家安全政策至关重要。


Now that split control of the Diet’s upper and lower houses has been resolved, with Abe’s Liberal Democrats in strong control of both chambers, a bill to modernize Japan’s national-security governance is certain to pass.	”如今，对日本国会上下议院控制权分裂的情况已不复存在，安倍的自民党牢牢控制着两院，因此现代化日本国家安全治理的法案肯定将获得通过。


The bill that Abe has submitted aims to establish a Japanese National Security Council, based on lessons from the successes and failures of similar institutions in other countries, such as the NSC in the United States.	安倍晋三所提交的法案旨在成立日本国家安全委员会（Japanese National Security Council，NSC），该委员会将综合参考其他国家类似机构（如美国的国家安全委员会）的成败经验组建。


The Security Council of Japan – something of a stopgap measure created to provide advice from relevant cabinet members to the prime minister in times of crisis – will now be reorganized as a formal institution.	日本安全委员会（Security Council of Japan，在危机期间由相关内阁成员向首相提供建议的权宜性设置）将被重组为正式机构。


The new NSC’s membership will be limited to the prime minister, the cabinet secretary, and the foreign and defense ministers, with relevant ministers added on an ad hoc basis.	新的NSC成员将限制在首相、内阁官房长官、外相和防相，必要时还将纳入相关大臣。


A permanent National Security Secretariat, headed by a person with abundant diplomatic experience, will be established in the prime minister’s office, with 60 security specialists from various fields laying the policy groundwork for medium- and long-term national security strategy.	首相办公室将常设一个国家安全秘书处，由外交经验丰富的人员充当首脑，并包括60名各个领域安全专家，他们将制定中长期国家安全战略的政策框架。


This strategy will then be reflected in guidelines issued to Japan’s defense bodies and diplomats.	接着，该战略将被制作成指导原则发给日本防务和外交机构。


Japan, like other countries, has faced jurisdictional disputes among foreign-policy, defense, and police agencies that have hindered the aggregation and analysis of intelligence information.	与其他国家一样，日本也面临着外交政策、防务和政策机构之间的管辖权限范围之争，妨碍了情报的汇总和分析。


But, with the creation of the NSC, each ministry and agency will report important national-security information to the new secretariat, which will then carry out integrated analysis and issue reports to the prime minister and others.	但是，随着NSC的组建，各省和各机构将向新的秘书处报告重要国家安全情报，由后者进行综合分析，写成报告呈送首相和各部门。


Of course, as in other countries, bureaucracies are creatures of habit.	当然，与其他国家一样，官僚主义是一种痼疾。


As we can already see, it will not be easy to overcome the obstacles posed by vertically integrated ministries and agencies.	正如我们已经看到的，克服垂直整合的省和机构所带来的障碍绝非易事。


Institutionalization will take time – and the importance of its success cannot be understated.	制度化需要时间，并且决不能低估其成功的重要性。


For example, the new NSC will be responsible for sharing intelligence with other countries, including the US, Japan’s most important ally.	比如，新的NSC将负责与其他国家（包括日本最重要盟友美国）共享情报。


As a result, ensuring the protection of information will be a key issue, particularly given the old habit of leaking security information to the press.	因此，确保情报得到保护将是关键问题，特别是在考虑到有将安全情报泄漏给媒体的陋习的情况下。


That is why the Diet is also considering a bill on the protection of classified information that would impose harsher punishment on government officials who leak secrets, particularly those concerning national security.	这就是国会同时也在考虑保密情报保护法的原因。 该法将对泄漏机密、特别是事关国家安全的机密的政府官员课以更加严厉的惩罚。


The trauma of gag laws that were imposed on the press before and during World War II resulted in the elimination of all restraints afterwards, which had the effect of making Japan a spy’s paradise, with insufficient counterintelligence measures and poor secrecy.	在二战之前和之间所实施的限制言论自由的法律所造成的创伤使得战后取消了所有的言论约束，这让日本成了间谍的天堂，反间谍手段和保密性严重不足。


Moreover, the long decades of peace since 1945 have served to lower awareness among politicians of the need for confidentiality.	此外，自1945年以来，和平已经持续了好几十年，这降低了政客的保密意识。


For example, Japanese newspapers always report when, where, and with whom the Prime Minister met for dinner in the following day’s editions.	比如，日本报纸总是在第二天就报��首相在几点钟、哪里和谁共进了一次晚餐。


In contrast to the US system of presidential government, Japan has a parliamentary form of government.	与美国政府的总统制相反，日本政府是议会制。


Yet the goals of national security and crisis management are the same in both systems – indeed, one of British Prime Minister David Cameron’s first acts when he came to power was to establish an NSC to improve coordination of policymaking.	但这两套制度的国家安全和危机管理目标是一致的——事实上，英国首相卡梅伦在当选后的第一批动作之一便是成立NSC以改进决策协调。


Although the establishment of the Japanese NSC is long overdue, it is not too late for Japan to benefit from the improvement in policy direction and coherence that it seems certain to bring.	尽管日本NSC长期缺位，但对日本来说，现在成立NSC、获得它几乎必将带来的政策方向和一致性改进为时未晚。


How to End an Insurgency	怎样结束起义


TOKYO – When the Moro Islamic Liberation Front guerrilla movement took up arms in the Philippines in the 1960’s, Ferdinand Marcos had yet to become the country's president – let alone dictator.	东京—20世纪60年代，当莫洛伊斯兰解放阵线（Moro Islamic Liberation Front，简称MILF）游击队在菲律宾揭竿而起时，费迪南德·马科斯（Ferdinand Marcos）还没有成为总统，更不用说变成独裁者了。


Despite the country’s many political transformations in the last half-century, the MILF’s campaign to achieve independence for the Bangsamoro nation – whose territory, they claim, covers the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Sulu, and Sabah – remained constant, until President Benigno Aquino III resolved to change it.	尽管在过去五十年中，菲律宾发生了许多政治变化，但追求邦萨摩洛（Bangsamoro）国家独立的MILF运动一直在继续进行——其领土主张包括苏禄、棉兰老、巴拉望和沙巴诸岛——直到总统阿基诺三世决心改变这一情况。


The MILF was not deterred by the popular overthrow of Marcos’s 20-year dictatorship in 1986, following the assassination of the opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr.	MILF并没有因为1986年继反对派领袖小贝尼诺·阿基诺（Benigno Aquino, Jr. ）遇刺而起的群众推翻马科斯20年独裁统治事件而有所退缩。


Nor did the establishment of democracy – now deeply entrenched – inspire the group’s leaders to reconsider their approach.	现已深入民心的民主制度的建立也没有促使MILF领导人反思其方针。


The MILF remained engaged in a brutal campaign of beheadings, assassination, kidnappings, and indiscriminate butchery.	MILF仍然保持斩首、刺杀、绑架和无差别屠杀的野蛮政策。


Then, last January, Aquino managed to achieve a landmark deal that finally ended Mindanao’s agony.	接着，在去年1月，阿基诺三世成功地实现了终结棉兰老岛痛苦局面的里程碑式的协议。


This is one of the most remarkable feats of peacemaking in Asia since World War II, and at least as worthy of international recognition as former Finnish President and 2008 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Marti Ahtissari’s role in brokering peace in Aceh, Indonesia, in 2005.	这是自第二次世界大战以来亚洲所取得的最令人瞩目的和平协议，其价值绝不亚于前芬兰总统、2008年诺贝尔和平奖获得者马提·阿赫蒂萨里（Marti Ahtissari）在2005年印尼亚齐省和平中的调停作用。


In fact, given the myriad security and political risks that Aquino ran in concluding a peace deal with the MILF, he may be an even worthier Nobel laureate.	事实上，考虑到阿基诺三世在与MILF达成和平协议中所需要面临的安全和政治风险，他更有资格获得诺贝尔奖。


Aquino’s approach to the negotiations reflected his recognition that the MILF had twice used peace talks – once brokered by Libya’s Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi – as a cynical ploy to buy time to regroup and raise funds (including from Al Qaeda). With freshly restocked arsenals, they would relaunch their campaign to seize Mindanao by force.	阿基诺三世在谈判中所采取的方针反映出他对MILF的清醒认识——MILF两次利用和平谈判的机会——其中一次是由利比亚的卡扎菲撮合的——获得喘息，重新组织人手和筹集资金（包括来自基地组织的资金），接着再凭借重新获得的武装重新试图武力夺取棉兰老岛。


Against this background, it is no surprise that, when Aquino relaunched stalled peace talks in 2012, the Filipino people were highly skeptical.	在这样的背景下，毫不奇怪，当2012年阿基诺三世重启陷入停滞的和平谈判时，菲律宾人对此十分怀疑。


But, over time, the effort gained credibility.	但是，随着时间的推移，阿基诺三世的努力取得了信誉。


Though questions about the peace agreement’s durability remain, with full disarmament yet to take place, the political autonomy granted to the country’s Muslim areas seems to have persuaded most MILF fighters that the time has come to end the carnage.	尽管和平协议能维持多久仍然存疑，MILF也没有完全放弃武装，但授予菲律宾穆斯林地区政治自治权似乎已经让大部分MILF战士认为是时候结束杀戮了。


For the people of Mindanao, this is a life-changing development.	对棉兰老人民来说，这是一个改变生命的变局。


In the few short months since the peace deal was reached, Filipino and foreign investment has been flowing into the island.	自和平协议达成以来的几个月里，菲律宾和外国投资持续流入棉兰老岛。


With nearly half of Mindanao’s population living below the poverty line, these funds could not be more critical.	棉兰老岛人口有近一半生活在贫困线以下，因此这笔流入可谓无比重要。


But the benefits of Aquino’s leadership are not limited to Mindanao.	但获得阿基诺三世领导力好处的并不只有棉兰老岛。


His entire presidency, which began in 2010, has been characterized by the creativity and doggedness that made peace with the MILF possible.	在2010年开始的总统生涯中，他以创新和顽强使得与MILF的和平成为可能。


Whereas other Filipino leaders – including Aquino’s mother, Corazon Aquino, who was elected president after Marcos’s overthrow – spoke out against corruption, Aquino has attacked it at its roots.	其他菲律宾领导人——包括阿基诺三世之母、在推翻马科斯后当选为总统的柯拉蓉·阿基诺（Corazon Aquino）在内——只是口头反腐，而阿基诺三世直击腐败的根源。


He has brought to justice not only small-time wrongdoers – or “flies,” as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calls such people – but also “tigers” like Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who helped overthrow Marcos and bring Corazon Aquino to power two decades ago.	他不但将位卑权小的犯错者——即中国国家主席习近平所谓的“苍蝇”送上法庭，也没有放过参议员胡安·旁斯·恩里莱（Juan Ponce Enrile）这样的“老虎”。 二十年前，恩里莱在推翻马科斯和柯丽蓉·阿基诺问鼎权力过程中立下过汗马功劳。


As a result, the Philippines has dramatically improved its ranking in Transparency International’s annual corruption index, rising from a 134th-place tie with Nigeria in 2010, to 94th place, alongside India, last year.	而菲律宾也得以大大提高了其在透明国际（Transparency International）年度腐败排行榜上的排名，从 2010年的134名（与尼日利亚相当）上升到去年的第94名（与印度并列）。


Aquino’s efforts to fight corruption and rebuild his country’s economic foundations has enabled the Philippines – at long last – to become Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing economy, with annual GDP growth of 7.2% last year.	阿基诺三世打击腐败、重建国家经济基础的努力让菲律宾在多年后终于成为东南亚增长最快的经济体，去年GDP增长率达到了7. 2%。


While growth is expected to slow slightly this year, to 6.5%, the Philippines can now be counted among Asia’s “tiger” economies.	尽管今年增长率预计将略有放缓（6. 5%左右）但仍可以名列亚洲“小龙”行列。


Of course, the country still has a long way to go.	当然，菲律宾仍有很长的路要走。


Some ten million Filipinos – one-quarter of the workforce – are compelled to seek employment overseas, owing to inadequate opportunities at home.	一千万菲律宾人——相当于劳动力的四分之一——被迫远赴海外寻找工作，因为国内机会太少。


If the Philippines is to attract enough investment to achieve living standards comparable to Malaysia and Thailand, Aquino must remain persistent in his efforts to open the economy and curtail corruption.	如果菲律宾想要吸引足够的投资以实现与马来西亚和泰国相当的生活水平，阿基诺三世就必须在任期内继续开放经济和打���腐败的政策。


Fortunately, he seems determined to do so.	幸运的是，他似乎也决心要这样做。


Aquino’s foreign policy has also been characterized by the same resoluteness.	阿基诺三世的外交政策也带有同样的决心。


Nowhere is this more apparent than in his willingness to stand up to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.	最能说明这一点的莫过于他坚定抵制中国在南海的领土助长。


Indeed, the Philippines is challenging China’s claims in the International Court of Arbitration, using provisions from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.	事实上，菲律宾正在援引联合国海洋法公约（Convention on the Law of the Sea）向国际仲裁法院起诉中国。


Aquino’s stern criticism of China’s expansionist policies has certainly not endeared him to the Chinese.	阿基诺三世对中国扩张主义政策的严厉批评当然让中国人十分不欢迎。


But regional powers like the United States and Japan have supported his stance, with Japan promising to deliver enhanced equipment for the Philippine Coast Guard.	但美国和日本等地区大国都支持他的立场，日本还承诺为菲律宾海岸警卫队提供加强装备。


And the Filipino people undoubtedly appreciate his tenacity in protecting their interests.	菲律宾人民毫无疑问也很欣赏他在捍卫国家利益上的坚定。


Aquino’s success in bringing the decades-old MILF rebellion to a peaceful end highlights a courage and tenacity that will enable him to play a key role in reining in China’s regional ambitions.	阿基诺三世成功地将维持了几十年的MILF起义引向和平结束，这充分表现出令他能够在遏制中国地区野心中扮演关键角色的勇气和韧性。


Just as David’s ingenuity enabled him, against all odds, to defeat Goliath, Aquino’s bold and calculated leadership can succeed in bolstering stability and security throughout Asia by bringing China, perhaps against its will, into a rules-based regional order.	正如大卫（David）的巧思让他能够破除万难战胜歌利亚（Goliath），阿基诺三世有勇有谋的领导也能够对中国敲山震虎，从而促进整个亚洲的稳定与安全。


Japan’s Russian Dilemma	日本的俄罗斯困境


TOKYO – For Japanese leaders and citizens, President Vladimir Putin’s brutal annexation of Crimea was an unsurprising return to the normal paradigm of Russian history.	东京—对日本领导人和日本人民来说，普京总统的悍然吞并克里米亚只不过是对俄罗斯历史常规范式的正常回归。


Indeed, most Japanese regard the move as having been determined by some expansionist gene in Russia’s political DNA, rather than by Putin himself or the specifics of the Ukraine crisis.	事实上，大部分日本人这一举动是由存在于俄罗斯政治DNA中的扩张主义基因决定的，而不是由普京本人或乌克兰危机的具体环境决定的。


Japan is particularly concerned with Russian expansionism, because it is the only G-7 country that currently has a territorial dispute with Russia, which has occupied its Northern Territories since the waning days of World War II.	日本特别担心俄罗斯的扩展主义，因为日本是七国集团中唯一目前与俄罗斯存在领土纠纷的国家，自二战末期以来，北方四岛便一直由俄罗斯占领。


That occupation began between August 28 and September 5, 1945, when the Soviet Union hurriedly nullified the existing Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and invaded not only Japanese-occupied Manchuria, but also southern Sakhalin Island and the ancient Japanese territories of Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan Island, and the Habomai Islands.	其占领史始于1945年8月28日至9月5日期间，当时苏联匆忙撕毁苏日中立条约，不但入侵了日占满洲，还攻占了库页岛南部和日本固有领土择捉岛、国后岛、色丹岛和齿舞群岛。


Concerned that America’s development and use of atomic weapons against Japan would deprive the Soviet Union of any territorial gains in the east, Stalin ordered the Red Army to invade.	由于担心美国开发和对日本动用原子弹将导致苏联在东线获得领土尽失，斯大林下令红军入侵。


But Japan, having already endured the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, meaning that the war was already over when the Red Army marched in.	但已在广岛和长崎经历了两次原子弹轰炸的日本在8月14日接受了波茨坦公告，这意味着在红军开进时，战争已经结束了。


Since then, these islands have been controlled by either the Soviet Union or its successor state, Russia.	至此以后，这些岛屿一直被苏联及其继承国俄罗斯控制。


And, as elsewhere in Russia, their residents have been impoverished by consistently incompetent and corrupt government, whether run by Communists or today’s crony capitalists.	和俄罗斯的其他地区一样，这些岛屿上的居民因为无能和腐败的政府而遭受着贫穷，不管统治者是以前的共产党还是今天的权贵资本家。


In a strange historical twist, given the Crimean annexation, after the Japanese citizens native to the Northern Territories were killed or expelled, many Ukrainians were brought to the islands during the Soviet years, and still live there.	这是一个奇怪的历史扭曲。 在日本北方四岛被占领后，岛上的日本原住民或者被杀，或者被逐，而许多乌克兰人在苏联时代移民到这些岛上，至今仍生活在那里。


If an independence referendum were to be held on Etorofu Island, where some 60% of the inhabitants have roots in Ukraine, I wonder whether Putin would accept the result as readily as he did the ballot in Crimea, undertaken at the barrel of a gun?	而现在，克里米亚也被吞并了。 如果在乌克兰裔居民占60%的择捉岛举行独立公投，我怀疑普京还能不能像接受拿枪顶着的克里米亚公投结果那样踌躇满志。


After coming to power at the end of 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had sought to improve relations with Putin in the hope of beginning serious talks on the Northern Territories.	自2012年底执政以来，日本首相安倍晋三一直在寻求改善与普京的关系，希望开启关于北方四岛的严肃谈判。


But now that Putin has made his project of imperial restoration crystal clear, those hopes are stillborn.	但如今普京的重建帝国工程已是人所共知，安倍的希望也已胎死腹中。


Recognizing this, Abe condemned the annexation of Crimea, calling it “a violation of Ukraine’s integrity and the integrity of its sovereignty and territory.”	认识到这一点，安倍谴责了对克里米亚的吞并，称之“破坏了乌克兰统一和主权和领土完整”。


Abe added that “attempts to change the status quo by force cannot be overlooked,” and that Japan would consider further economic sanctions against Russia in cooperation with the G-7.	安倍还说，“用武力改变现状的企图决不可忽视”，日本将考虑与七国集团合作进一步对俄罗斯实施经济制裁。


Needless to say, these remarks underscored the fact that Japanese territory and territorial waters are being threatened “by force” in the East China Sea by China.	不消说，这一评论遥相呼应了一个事实：日本在东海的领土和领海正在被中国“武力”威胁。


The lesson now being drawn is that, where territorial disputes are concerned, Japan must not kowtow to “attempts to change the status quo backed by force.”	现在的教训是，在领土纠纷问题上，日本决不可屈服于“用武力改变现状的企图”。


China’s response to the crisis in Ukraine was particularly revealing.	中国对乌克兰危机的反应很能说明问题。


For three decades, China has proclaimed “non-interference” in the internal affairs of sovereign states as the most important rule governing international relations.	三十年来，中国一直强调“不干预”主权国家内部事务是最重要的国际关系准则。