While a broad and abrupt sell-off by major foreign holders of dollars – for example, China – appears unlikely, a cataclysmic event, similar to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, could prompt a search for a new international medium of exchange.	尽管主要的外国美元持有者例如中国突然间大范围抛售美元看起来不大可能，但是，某一类似于1914年第一次世界大战爆发那样的灾难性事件有可能促使人们寻求一种新的国际交易媒介。


In the modern era of automated payments, the upheaval might come from a terrorist attack that undermines the computerized transfer facilities of the world’s banking system.	在现代自动支付年代里，这一动荡可能来自某一破坏世界银行体系计算机化的转移设施的恐怖主义袭击。


A catastrophic loss of electronic records could surely destroy the credibility of the dollar as the international medium of exchange.	电子记录灾难性的丢失几乎会摧毁美元作为国际交易媒介的信誉。


But exactly what would replace the dollar under such circumstances remains an open question.	但是在这种情况下什么会取代美元还是一个没有答案的问题。


After all, a loss of computer records would make the euro equally suspect.	毕竟，丢失计算机记录也会让欧元也一样可疑。


Perhaps gold, a store of value impervious to physical distortion, could make a comeback.	黄金是可以抵御物理变形的价值储备，也许它会卷土重来。


Of course, one can only hope that such a scenario remains pure conjecture.	当然，人们只能希望这种情形只是一种臆测而已。


Will the Euro Survive the Current Crisis?	欧元经得住当前的危机吗？


CAMBRIDGE – The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro are about to celebrate their tenth anniversary.	剑桥－欧洲经济与货币联盟(EMU)和欧元快要进行十周年庆了。


The euro was introduced without serious problems and has since functioned well, with the European Central Bank delivering the low inflation that is its sole mandate.	欧元的引进没有产生严重的问题，并且此后运行良好，与此同时欧洲中央银行将低通胀作为其首要任务


But the current economic crisis may provide a severe test of the euro’s ability to survive in more troubled times.	但是，当前的经济危机可能对欧元在更困难时期继续运行下去的能力提出了严峻的考验。


While the crisis could strengthen the institutions provided by the EMU, it could also create multiple risks, of which member countries need to be aware if they want to avoid them.	虽然当前的经济危机可能加强欧洲经济与货币联盟提供的制度机构，但是也可能产生多重风险。 如果欧洲经济与货币联盟的成员国想要避免这些风险，它们就必须意识到这些风险。


The primary problem is that conditions in individual EMU members may develop in such different ways that some national political leaders could be tempted to conclude that their countries would be better served by adopting a mix of policies different from that of the other members.	主要问题是，单个的欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国国情的发展可能非常不同，以至于一些国家的政治领导人可能倾向于认为，他们的国家通过采取和其他成员国不同的各种政策，对国家更为有利。


The current differences in the interest rates of euro-zone government bonds show that the financial markets regard a break-up as a real possibility.	目前欧元区政府债券利率的差异表明，金融市场认为欧洲经济与货币联盟的分裂是一个现实的可能。


Ten-year government bonds in Greece and Ireland, for example, now pay nearly a full percentage point above the rate on comparable German bonds, and Italy’s rate is almost as high.	例如，希腊和爱尔兰的十年期政府债券现在支付的利率，和可比较的德国政府债券比起来，几乎整整高了一个百分点，而意大利的债券利率几乎也一样高。


There have, of course, been many examples in history in which currency unions or single-currency states have broken up.	当然，历史上有很多货币联盟或单一货币国家分裂的例子。


Although there are technical and legal reasons why such a split would be harder for an EMU country, there seems little doubt that a country could withdraw if it really wanted to.	虽然对欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国来说，因为技术和法律上的原因，这样的分裂更为困难，但是，如果欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国真地想退出，就可以退出，人们对此的疑问似乎很少。


The most obvious reason that a country might choose to withdraw is to escape from the one-size-fits-all monetary policy imposed by the single currency.	欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国可能选择退出的最明显的原因，是为了避免因为单一货币所造成的不区分具体情形而适用于所有成员国的货币政策。


A country that finds its economy very depressed during the next few years, and fears that this will be chronic, might be tempted to leave the EMU in order to ease monetary conditions and devalue its currency.	一个发现其经济在未来几年会很萧条而且担心萧条会延续很长时间的成员国，可能会为了缓和其货币状况并且使其货币贬值，而倾向于离开欧洲经济与货币联盟。


Although that may or may not be economically sensible, a country in a severe economic downturn might very well take such a policy decision.	虽然这样做在经济上可能是明智的，也可能是不明智的，但是，一个遭受严重经济下滑的国家极有可能做出这样的政策决策


The Stability and Growth Pact, which limits euro-zone members’ fiscal deficits, is another reason why a country might want to leave the EMU.	限制欧元区成员国财政赤字的《稳定和增长公约》，是另一个欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国想退出联盟的原因。


In a serious downturn, a country may wish to pursue a traditional Keynesian policy through large-scale, deficit-financed fiscal stimulus.	在经济严重下滑的时候，一个国家可能希望通过大规模的扩大财政赤字的财政刺激方案，来实施传统的凯恩斯政策。


Although the Stability and Growth Pact may be elastic enough to permit some deficit stimulus, a country may feel constrained from acting as aggressively as it wants.	虽然《稳定和增长公约》可能有足够的弹性来允许一些成员国的赤字刺激方案，但是，有些国家仍然可能会觉得不能像自己想的那样采取激进的措施。


The current financial crisis raises yet another problem: the lack of a clear “lender of last resort.”	当前的金融危机还提出了另一个问题：缺少一个明确的“最后贷款人”。


It remains to be seen how willing the ECB will be to provide national central banks with the volume of euros needed to play this role fully.	欧洲中央银行给欧洲经济与货币联盟成员国的中央银行提供完全扮演这一角色所需的欧元数量的意愿，还有待观察。


If a country sees its banks failing because its national bank cannot lend them enough, it may chose to leave the EMU so that its central bank can provide whatever amount of local currency it deems necessary.	如果一个国家因为它的国家银行不能借给它足够的钱，而认为其银行不起作用，它可能会选择退出欧洲经济与货币联盟，以便其中央银行能够提供其认为必要的无论多大数量的本国货币。


Moreover, the current economic crisis has led to renewed talk about the need for the European Union to have taxing authority.	而且，目前的经济危机导致了对欧盟拥有征税权力必要性的重新讨论。


Whatever the logic of that proposition, it would open the door to much greater income redistribution.	不管这种必要性主张的逻辑是什么，它都会为更大的收入再分配打开大门。


High-income countries might find that reason enough to want out.	高收入国家可能会发现这个理由对退出欧洲经济与货币联盟来说，已经足够了。


Even if officials do not want to abandon the euro, they may come to do so as a result of a strategy of trying to get other countries to agree to a policy change.	即使官员们不想放弃欧元，但是，作为使其他成员国同意进行政策变化的策略的结果，他们也有可能这样做。


A country that believes that monetary or fiscal policy is too tight may threaten to leave if policy is not changed.	一个认为货币或财政政策太紧的国家，可能会扬言如果不改变政策，就退出欧洲经济与货币联盟。


That is clearly a substantial risk if the country is Germany or France.	如果上述国家是德国或法国的话，这显然是一个重大的风险。


But even if it is one of the smaller countries, it might be a serious threat because it could be seen as the beginning of the end.	但是，即便是欧洲经济与货币联盟中的一个小国，这也可能是一个严重的威胁，因为它会被看成是结束的开始。


So either type of country could make the threat in the hope that it would be enough to cause their EMU colleagues to agree to their desired change in policy.	因此，大国和小国都能发出威胁，并希望这些威胁就足够使其欧洲经济与货币联盟中的同事同意他们想要的政策变化。


The risk, of course, is that the other countries may not be intimidated.	当然，这样做的风险是其他国家可能不受胁迫。


The threatening country would then have to choose whether to accepting a humiliating defeat and stay, or stand on “principle” and leave.	那么，发出威胁的国家将不得不选择是接受羞辱性的失败留下来，还是坚持“原则”退出。


All of this assumes that political leaders would select only a policy change that they think will be in their nation’s long-term interest.	所有这些，都是假设政治领导人只选择了他们认为符合其国家长远利益的一个政策变化。


But there is also a risk that some politicians act solely out of self-interest, seizing on the economic downturn as an opportunity to get elected by promising to withdraw the country from the EMU, or by saying that they will threaten to do so if the other member countries do not agree to their proposed policy changes.	但是，也有一些政治家仅仅出于自身利益，通过承诺使国家退出欧洲经济与货币联盟，或者声称如果其他成员国不同意他们提议的政策变化他们就扬言退出的方式，抓住经济下滑问题，将其作为使自己当选的机会。


None of these risks implies that the monetary union will inevitably be a victim of this severe economic downturn.	这些风险中的任何一个都不意味着，货币联盟将不可避免的成为此次严重经济下滑的牺牲品。


But the downturn will be a more severe test for the euro than any that it faced during its first ten years.	但是，经济下滑和欧元在其第一个十年中面临的其他考验相比，要严峻得多。


Will the IMF Stand Up to Europe?	IMF会力挺欧洲吗？


CAMBRIDGE – As the eurozone crisis continues to deepen, the International Monetary Fund may finally be acknowledging the need to reassess its approach.	坎布里奇——随着欧元区危机的继续深化，IMF或将不得不承认有必要反思其作为了。


New Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s recent call for forced recapitalization of Europe’s bankrupt banking system is a good start.	新总裁拉加德最近提出应该对欧洲已经破产的银行体系强行予以重组，这是个不错的开始。


European officials’ incensed reaction – the banks are fine, they insist, and need only liquidity support – should serve to buttress the Fund’s determination to be sensible about Europe.	欧洲官员被激怒了，他们坚持说，银行们一切都好，需要的只是流动性支持。 欧洲官员的态度应该能够支持IMF对欧洲的判断的可靠性。


Until now, the Fund has sycophantically supported each new European initiative to rescue the over-indebted eurozone periphery, committing more than $100 billion to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland so far.	到目前为止，对于欧洲所提出的任何救助债务深重的欧元区外围国家的方案，IMF无不大力支持，其热情程度甚至有阿谀奉承之嫌。 希勒、葡萄牙和爱尔兰已经获得了超过1000亿美元援助承诺。


Unfortunately, the IMF is risking not only its members’ money, but, ultimately, its own institutional credibility.	不幸的是，IMF这么做不仅是在拿其成员国的钱冒险，更严重的是，归根到底，它所押上的赌注是自己的机构名誉。


Only a year ago, at the IMF’s annual meeting in Washington, DC, senior staff were telling anyone who would listen that the whole European sovereign-debt panic was a tempest in a teapot.	一年前，在IMF华盛顿年会上，只要你愿意听，高级官员就会告诉你，整个欧洲主权债务危机纯属小题大做。


Using slick PowerPoint presentations with titles like “Default in Today’s Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely,” the Fund tried to convince investors that eurozone debt was solid as a rock.	IMF制作了精美的PPT，打着《今日发达经济体的违约：没有必要、不受欢迎、断无可能》之类的标题，试图让投资者相信，欧元区坚如磐石。


Even for Greece, the IMF argued, debt dynamics were not a serious concern, thanks to anticipated growth and reforms.	即使对于希腊，IMF也认为其债务动态并无值得深虑的必要，因为该地区增长强劲，而且会实施改革。


Never mind the obvious flaw in the Fund’s logic, namely that countries such as Greece and Portugal face policy and implementation risks far more akin to emerging markets than to truly advanced economies such as Germany and the United States.	IMF这么说存在明显的逻辑漏洞：希腊和葡萄牙这样的国家，它们所面临的政策和实施政策的风险更接近于新兴市场，而不是德国和美国这样的真正发达国家。 但那又怎么样呢。


As the situation deteriorated, one might have guessed that the IMF would mark its beliefs to market, as it were, and adopt a more cautious tone.	随着情况的恶化，你也许会认为IMF将向往常一样信赖市场，并在放话时采取更加谨慎的语调。


Instead, at the IMF’s April 2011 interim meeting, a senior official declared that the Fund now considers troubled Spain to be a core eurozone country like Germany, rather than a peripheral country like Greece, Portugal, or Ireland.	但是，在2011年4月的IMF中期会议上，一位高级官员宣称，IMF将陷入困境的西班牙视为和德国同等的欧元区核心国家，而不是像希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰这样的外围国家。


Evidently, investors were supposed to infer that for all practical purposes they should think of Spanish and German debt as identical – the old hubris of the eurozone.	显然，他们认为务实的投资者会因此推断，西班牙和德国债务完全等价——此乃欧元区固有的傲慢。


My own sarcastic reaction was to think, “Oh, now the IMF thinks that some of the core eurozone countries are a default risk.”	我不无讽刺地想：“哦，现在IMF认为某些欧元区核心国家也存在违约风险了。 ”


Having served as the IMF’s chief economist from 2001 to 2003, I am familiar with the Fund’s need to walk a tightrope between building investor confidence and shaking up complacent policymakers.	作为2001—2003年IMF首席经济学家，我十分熟悉IMF的处境——它需要在提振投资者的信心和威慑踌躇满志的政客之间走钢丝。


But it is one thing to be circumspect in the midst of a crisis; it is quite another to spew nonsense.	但在危机中保持细心周到是一回事，信口胡说则是完全不同的另一回事。


The late Chicago-school economist George Stigler would have described the IMF’s role in Europe as reflecting acute “regulatory capture.”	已故的芝加哥学派经济学家乔治·斯蒂格勒会把IMF在欧洲的角色称为病入膏肓的“监管俘虏”。


Simply put, Europe and the US control too much power in the IMF, and their thinking is too dominant.	在IMF，欧洲和美国把持了太多的权力，在行为方式中占据了太大的主导地位。


What European leaders may want most from the Fund are easy loans and strong rhetorical support.	欧洲领导人最希望从IMF手中获得的是宽松的贷款和给力的口头支持。


But what Europe really needs is the kind of honest assessment and tough love that the Fund has traditionally offered to its other, less politically influential, clients.	但欧洲实际上需要的是诚实的评估和苦口良药，即IMF传统上对政治影响力较低的客户所做的那些事。


The IMF’s blind spot in dealing with Europe until now is only partly due to European voting power.	在应对欧洲问题上，IMF至今仍存在盲区，欧洲在IMF所拥有的投票权只是原因之一。


It also stems from an “us” and “them” mentality that similarly permeates research at the top Wall Street investment houses.	“我们”和“他们”有别的心态也是IMF不能客观行事的原因，这一点在华尔街顶级投资机构的研究中也存在。


Analysts who have worked their entire lives only on advanced economies have learned to bet on things going well, because for the couple of decades prior to the crisis, things mostly did go well – very well.	一辈子都在研究发达经济体的分析师得到的经验是凡事朝好的方向看，因为从危机前的20年来看，一切都会好的——是大好不是小好。


That is why, for example, so many keep assuming that a normal rapid recovery is just around the corner.	这就是为什么很多人认为正常的快速复苏马上就会到来的原因。


But the financial crisis should have reminded everyone that the distinction between advanced economies and emerging markets is not a bright red line.	但金融危机提醒所有人，发达经济体和新兴市场之间的区别并不是不可跨越的鸿沟。


In his recent speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke forcefully complained that political paralysis has possibly become the principal impediment to recovery.	在最新的俄怀明州杰克森霍尔讲话中，美联储主席伯南克大力抨击了政治僵局，指出这可能已经成为复苏的最大障碍。


But analysts accustomed to working on emerging markets understand that such paralysis is very difficult to avoid after a financial crisis.	但习惯于研究新兴市场的分析师早就明白，类似的政治僵局在金融危机爆发后是很难避免的。


Rather than slavishly believing policymakers’ assurances, emerging-market researchers have learned to be cynical about official promises.	新兴市场研究员才不会盲信政客的信誓旦旦，他们早就学会了对官方承诺持怀疑态度。


All too often, everything that can be done wrong will be done wrong.	只要是可能做错的事，最后无一幸免地都出了错，这样例子发生得还少吗？


The IMF needs to bring much more of this brand of skepticism to its assessment of eurozone debt dynamics, instead of constantly seeking strained assumptions that would make the debt appear sustainable.	IMF需要更多地怀疑它对欧元区债务动态所做的评估，而不是不遗余力地寻找站不住脚的假设证明债务仍然可持续。


Anyone looking closely at Europe’s complex options for extricating itself from its debt straightjacket should realize that political constraints will be a huge obstacle no matter which route Europe takes.	任何近距离观察欧洲为将自己救出债务缠身状态所面临的复杂选择的人都应该意识到，不管欧洲选择哪条路，政治约束将成为巨大障碍。


Even outside Europe, the IMF has long given too much credence to sitting governments, rather than focusing on the long-term interests of the country and its people.	即使在欧洲之外，IMF也总是过分迁就在任政府，而不是专注于一国及其人民的长期利益。


The Fund is doing Europe’s people no favor by failing to push aggressively for a more realistic solution, including dramatic debt write-downs for peripheral eurozone countries and re-allocating core-country guarantees elsewhere.	为欧洲人民着想，IMF应该大力推行更现实的解决方案，包括对外围欧元区国家的大规模债务减记并重新分配核心国家对其他国家的担保。


Now that the Fund has squarely acknowledged the huge capital holes in many European banks, it should start pressing forcefully for a comprehensive and credible solution to the eurozone debt crisis, a solution that will involve either partial breakup of the eurozone or fundamental constitutional reform.	如今，IMF已经承认大量欧洲银行存在巨大的资本漏洞，那么，它应该开始大力推行全面可信的欧元区债务危机解决方案了。 这一方案包括部分分解欧元区以及基础宪政改革。


Europe’s future, not to mention the future of the IMF, depends on it.	欧洲的未来（更不用说IMF了）便系于此。


Will the Polluters Pay for Climate Change?	污染者会为气候变化付出代价吗？


I am writing this in New York in early August, when the mayor declared a “heat emergency” to prevent widespread electricity outages from the expected high use of air conditioners.	我八月上旬在纽约写这篇文章，当时，纽约市长宣布实行“高温紧急状态”来防止由于预期的大量使用空调而造成的大范围停电。


City employees could face criminal charges if they set their thermostats below 78 degrees Fahrenheit (25.5 Celsius).	市政雇员如果把他们的空调温度调到华氏78度 (摄氏25. 5度) 以下就会面临刑事指控。


Nevertheless, electricity usage has reached near-record levels.	但是，用电量还是接近历史最高记录。


Meanwhile California has emerged from its own record-breaking heat wave.	与此同时，加利福尼亚刚刚走出该州自己的破记录的热浪。


For the United States as a whole, the first six months of 2006 were the hottest in more than a century.	美国全国而言，2006年的头六个月是一个多世纪内最热的。


Europe is experiencing an unusually hot summer, too.	欧洲也在经历一个不同寻常的酷暑。


July set new records in England and the Netherlands, where weather data go back more than 300 years.	英国和荷兰的七月份气温都创下新高，这两个国家的天气数据记录超过300年。


The hot northern summer fits well with the release of An Inconvenient Truth, a documentary film featuring former US Vice-President Al Gore.	北半球的酷暑与美国前副总统戈尔主持的电影纪录片“烦恼的真相”不谋而合。


Using some remarkable graphs, images, and other information, the film makes a compelling case that our carbon dioxide emissions are causing global warming, or, at the very least, contributing to it, and that we must urgently address the issue.	这部电影使用一些生动的图表、画面以及其他信息，有力地阐明了人类的二氧化碳排放造成全球气候变暖，或者至少是促进气候变暖，并且大力呼吁处理这一问题是当务之急。


Americans tend to talk a lot about morality and justice.	美国人趋向于对道德和正义高谈阔论。


But most Americans still fail to realize that their country’s refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol, and their subsequent business–as-usual approach to greenhouse gas emissions, is a moral failing of the most serious kind.	但是大多数美国人依然没有认识到他们的国家拒绝签署京都议定书、对温室气体排放采取一切照旧的做法是最为严重的道德败坏事情。


It is already having harmful consequences for others, and the greatest inequity is that it is the rich who are using most of the energy that leads to the emissions that cause climate change, while it is the poor who will bear most of the costs.	这已经给其他人造成了有害的影响，而最大的不公平就是，富人使用绝大部分导致排放的能源造成气候变化，而穷人将会承担大部分代价。


(To see what you can do to reduce your own contribution, go to www.climatecrisis.net.)	(如果想要了解自己如何做来减少气体排放，请访问网站www. climatecrisis.


To see the inequity, I merely have to glance up at the air conditioner that is keeping my office bearable.	我只要看一下让我的办公室呆得住人的空调就可以知道这一不公了。


While I’ve done more than the mayor requested, setting it at 82F (27C), I’m still part of a feedback loop.	尽管我做的比市长要求的还要好，把温度设定在82华氏度(摄氏27度)，我仍然是反馈回路的一部分。


I deal with the heat by using more energy, which leads to burning more fossil fuel, putting more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and heating up the planet more.	我通过使用更多的能源来对付酷热，导致燃烧更多的矿物燃料、把更多的温室气体排入大气层并且让地球更加炎热。


It even happened when I watched An Inconvenient Truth: on a warm evening, the cinema was so chilly that I wished I had brought a jacket.	即使是我在观看“烦恼的真相”的时候也是如此。 那是一个炎热的晚上，电影院冷气逼人，以至于我希望我带来一件夹克。


Heat kills.	酷热可以致命。


A heat wave in France in 2003 caused an estimated 35,000 deaths, and a hot spell similar to the one Britain had last month caused more than 2,000 deaths, according to official estimates.	根据官方估计，2003年法国的一场热浪造成大约35000人死亡，上个月英国一场类似的热浪造成2000多人死亡。


Although no particular heat wave can be directly attributed to global warming, it will make such events more frequent.	尽管没有一场特别的热浪可以直接归咎于全球变暖，但是它将会让这样的事件更为频繁。


Moreover, if global warming continues unchecked, the number of deaths that occur when rainfall becomes more erratic, causing both prolonged droughts and severe floods, will dwarf the death toll from hot weather in Europe.	而且，如果对全球变暖继续不加以节制，那么，当降雨变得更为不规则，造成持续的干旱和严重的洪灾时所发生的死亡人数将会让欧洲炎热天气而致命的数目小巫见大巫。


More frequent intense hurricanes will kill many more.	更为频繁的强烈飓风将会让让更多的人死亡。


Melting polar ice will cause rising seas to inundate low-lying fertile delta regions on which hundreds of millions of people grow their food.	融化的极地冰川将会造成海平面上升，淹没数以亿计的人口种植粮食的低洼地带三角洲良田。


Tropical diseases will spread, killing still more people.	热带疾病将会扩散，让更多的人死亡。


Overwhelmingly, the dead will be those who lack the resources to adapt, to find alternative sources of food, and who do not have access to health care.	死亡者中的绝大多数人将是那些缺乏资源适应、寻找替换食物资源以及那些没有医疗保障的人。


Even in rich countries, it usually isn’t the rich who die in natural disasters.	即使在富国，通常也不是那些富人死于自然灾害。


When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, those who died were the poor in low-lying areas who lacked cars to escape.	当卡特琳娜飓风袭击奥尔良的时候，那些遇害的人都是在低洼地带缺少汽车逃命的穷人。


If this is true in a country like the US, with a reasonably efficient infrastructure and the resources to help its citizens in times of crisis, it is even more evident when disasters strike developing countries, because their governments lack the resources needed, and because, when it comes to foreign assistance, rich nations still do not count all human lives equally.	如果这发生在像美国这样具有大体有效的基础设施以及在危难时候帮助其国民的资源的国家，那么，当灾难袭击发展中国家之时，由于它们的政府缺少必需的资源，而且由于富国在对外援助时并不平等看待人命，情况就会更为明显了。


According to United Nations figures, in 2002 per capita emissions of greenhouse gases in the US were 16 times higher than in India, 60 times higher than in Bangladesh, and more than 200 times higher than in Ethiopia, Mali, or Chad.	根据联合国的数据，2002年美国的人均温室气体排放高出印度16倍，孟加拉国60倍，比埃塞俄比亚、马里或者乍得高出200倍以上。


Other developed nations with emissions close to those of the US include Australia, Canada, and Luxembourg.	排放水平接近美国的其��发达国家包括澳大利亚、加拿大以及卢森堡。


Russia, Germany, Britain, Italy, France, and Spain all have levels between a half and a quarter that of the US.	俄国、德国、英国、意大利、法国以及西班牙的排放水平都只是美国的四分之一到一半之间。


This is still significantly above the world average, and more than 50 times that of the poorest nations in which people will die from global warming.	这还是比世界平均高出很多，比最贫困国家高出50倍以上。 这些国家的人死于全球气候变暖。


If a polluter harms others, those who are harmed normally have a legal remedy.	如果一个污染者损害了他人，受害者往往有法律救济。


For example, if a factory leaks toxic chemicals into a river that I use to irrigate my farm, killing my crops, I can sue the factory owner.	例如，如果一家工厂向我用来灌溉农田的河流渗漏了有毒化学品，杀死了我的作物，那么我可以起诉工厂的主人。


If the rich nations pollute the atmosphere with carbon dioxide, causing my crops to fail because of changing rainfall patterns, or my fields are inundated by a rise in the sea level, shouldn’t I also be able to sue?	如果富国用二氧化碳污染大气，让我的作物由于降雨模式改变而歉收，或者我的农田由于海平面上升而被淹没，那么，我难道就不能起诉吗？


Camilla Toulmin, who directs the International Institute for Environment and Development, a London-based NGO, was present at a lecture on climate change that Al Gore gave in June.	国际环境和发展研究所是一家总部设在伦敦的非政府组织。 今年6月份，戈尔作气候变化演讲的时候，该所主任图明也在场。


She asked him what he thought about compensation for those who are hit hardest by climate change, but who have done the least to cause it.	她问戈尔如何看待给那些受到气候变化打击最大、但却对气候变化作用最小的人予以补偿的问题。 她在www.


The question, she reports on www.opendemocracy.net, seemed to take him by surprise, and he did not support the idea.	opendemocracy. net网站上汇报说，这一问题让戈尔措手不及，而且他也不支持这一观点。


Like Toulmin, I wonder if this is a truth that is just too inconvenient, even for him.	向图明一样，我不知道这一真相即使对戈尔来说也是太过烦恼。


Will the Rumsfeld Revolution Continue?	拉姆斯菲尔德的革命会继续吗？


America’s defense policy is at a crossroads.	美国的国防政策正处于转折点上。


Since 1997, the United States Congress has required the Department of Defense to undertake a major defense review every four years.	自1997年以来，美国国会就要求国防部每隔四年进行一次全面的国防评估。


The department is currently developing the third such review and will release it later this year.	国防部目前正在进行第三次这样的评估，评估结果将在年底揭晓。


The review promises to be nothing short of a watershed.	这项评估据称将会具有分水岭式的意义。


The last Quadrennial Defense Review was published a few weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.	上一次四年一度的评估在2001年9月11日恐怖袭击以后的数周发布。


As a result, it gave only hints of the counterterrorism strategy to come.	所以它只对未来的反恐战略做了些许提示。


The 2005 review, by contrast, will represent several years of thinking by the Bush administration, and thus will serve as a key indicator of the future course of American defense policy.	相较之下，2005年的评估将会代表布什政府几年以来的思考成果，因而会成为美国未来国防政策的一项重要指标。


The grand strategy that serves as the foundation for American defense policy has not undergone major change since 2002.	作为美国国防政策基础的大方向战略自2002年以来没有发生重大变化。


Focusing on terrorism, the strategy calls for strengthening the network of international partners seeking to eradicate transnational terrorism, and for direct action against terrorist organizations and their sponsors.	以恐怖主义为重心，该战略呼吁加强寻求根除跨国恐怖主义的国际伙伴网络，同时还呼吁对恐怖组织及其赞助者采取直接行动。


Ultimately, it seeks to address what President Bush considers the root causes of terrorism, particularly the absence of open political systems and economic opportunity.	最终，这一战略的目的是要根治布什总统认为的恐怖主义发生的根源，特别是开放的政治体系和经济机遇的缺失。


What is changing is the way that US military power is used to implement this grand strategy.	正发生着变化的，是美国用于实施这一宏大战略的军事力量。


There is little doubt that the 2005 Defense Review will formalize the change in focus underway since September 11, 2001.	几乎可以肯定，在《2005国防评估》中会正式确认自2001年“9. 11”以来的这种变化。


Before that, the American military concentrated on swift victory in a major theater war against another state’s military forces.	在此之前，美国军方的注意力主要放在针对他国军力的速战速决的做秀式的战争。


Today, however, the US military is more likely to be used to stabilize and rebuild failed states, assist partners in countering insurgency and terrorism, control nuclear weapons when regimes collapse, or directly eradicate terrorist organizations and their supporters.	但现在，美国的军力更可能会被用来稳定和重建战败国，帮助伙伴国对抗叛乱和恐怖主义，在政权崩溃时控制核武器，或直接铲除恐怖组织及其支持者。


This requires a different type of force, and one capable of running a marathon rather than a sprint, sustaining major deployments for extended periods.	这就需要另一种军事力量，一种可以跑马拉松而不是100米的军事力量，以适应长期性的重要部署。


The global configuration of America’s military is also changing.	美军的全球部署也发生着变化。


The goal is to keep most of the force stationed at home in the US, with a network of lightly-manned bases abroad that can serve as forward operating locations during a crisis or war.	其目标是将大部分的军力驻扎在美国本土，同时在国外保持驻军不多的基地网络以便在危机或战争时期作为前沿运作地点。


Rather than being miniature Americas, many of these bases will be operated in conjunction with or by the host nation.	许多基地都会由美国和所在国一起运营，而不仅仅是作为美国的延伸。


This will capitalize on the US military’s ability to project force around the world quickly, while providing a more flexible and politically palatable way of doing so.	这样就能够充分发挥美军向世界各地快速派遣军队的能力，同时也使这种做法更为灵活、更符合当今的政治潮流。


But, beyond the ongoing changes, major strategic questions persist.	然而，在这些进行中的变化之外，重大的战略问题依然存在。


First, how much conventional war-fighting capability should the US military retain?	首先，美军需要保持多强的常规战斗力呢？


The goal is to maintain enough to deter aggressors, but not so much that it detracts from other, more likely missions.	目标是保持足以阻止进攻者的常规战斗力，但又不至于强到拖累其它类似使命执行的程度。


Second, what will America’s relationship with its traditional allies be?	其次，美国和其传统的盟友要保持怎样的关系？


Will formal alliances such as NATO remain the centerpiece of American strategy, or will they be superseded by mission-specific coalitions?	像“北约”这样的正式联盟会依然是美国战略的核心，还是会有以具体使命为目的组成的联盟来替代它们？


Third, how much should the US continue to invest in advanced, high-tech weapons more appropriate for conventional enemies than for fighting terrorists or insurgents?	再者，相对于反恐怖和反叛乱的投入，美国还需要在应对常规敌人的先进高科技武器上多投入多少呢？


Systems such as the F/A-22 Raptor aircraft and the Army’s Future Combat System are extraordinarily expensive.	像F/A-22“猛禽”战斗机和“未来战斗系统”等装备都极为昂贵。


At a time when deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan are straining the defense budget and much of the military’s existing equipment needs repair or replacement, questions arise as to whether such programs are a good investment.	在向伊拉克和阿富汗派军使美国国防预算吃紧，且许多现役设备都需要维修和更新的时候，在这些项目上投资是否明智就是值得考量了。


Fourth, what is the appropriate size of the US military?	还有，美军的规模究竟需要多大？


Many defense intellectuals, former military leaders, and politicians believe that America’s military, particularly the ground forces, are too small to implement Bush’s grand strategy.	许多国防专家、前美军领导人和政治家都认为要实施布什的宏大计划，美军，特别是陆军的规模太小了。


Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on the other hand, believes the size of the military is adequate if it is re-organized for maximum efficiency.	但另一方面，国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德认为如果通过重组使效能最大化，那么美军现有的规模足够了。


He is also concerned that an increase in the size of the military will diminish funds available for advanced technology and systems.	他还担心扩军会使在先进技术和系统方面的投入减少。


Because Rumsfeld is the primary architect of the upcoming defense review, it is very unlikely to recommend an increase in the size of the force.	由于拉氏是即将出台的国防评估的首要负责人，所以这份评估不大可能会建议扩大军队规模。


The changes underway in American defense policy reflect planning assumptions.	美国国防政策正在发生的变化反映了一些规划性的假设。


The strategy that emerges will be only as strong as these assumptions are accurate.	这些假设的准确度将会决定该战略的有效性。


The upcoming defense review will mandate changes based on events of the past five years, focusing especially on Iraq, Afghanistan, and other aspects of the war on terror.	即将出台的国防评估将会以过去五年所发生的事件，特别是以伊拉克、阿富汗和反恐战争的其它方面为基础，要求进行改革。


The question is whether future American military missions will replicate those of the past five years.	问题是未来的美国军事使命是否会照搬过去五年以来的先例。


If not, the US might be preparing for the last war rather than the next one.	如果答案是否定的，那么美国可能就会为其最后一场而��是下一场战争做准备了。


One hopes that the 2005 Defense Review will address this issue, although it is certain to answer some strategic questions and leave others open to continued debate.	我们希望《2005国防评估》会着手解决这一问题，虽然它肯定会回答一些战略问题而将其他的留在日后商榷。


In any case, the new review will serve as a roadmap for future US defense policy, thus affecting America’s partners and adversaries alike.	无论如何，新的评估报告会成为美国未来国防政策的路线图，从而对美国的伙伴和敌人都产生影响。


Will the Sun Still Rise?	日本能否再次崛起？


TOKYO – The scale of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March was far greater than even the authorities’ worst scenarios foresaw.	发自东京——3月那场地震海啸灾难的破坏程度比日本当局的最悲观预计还要严重。


Nearly six months later, the total damage remains difficult to estimate.	虽然灾难发生至今已近6个月，但总损失却依然无从统计。


Social unrest and confusion, as well as radiation leaks from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, continue.	同时社会的动荡则与福岛核电站放射性泄露一样无法遏制，愈演愈烈。


And now the country has absorbed another huge blow: another downgrade of its bond ratings. Both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s now rate Japanese bonds at only their fourth-highest level.	如今这个国家再遭重创，穆迪和标准普尔两大国际评级机构都将日本国债评级调整到第四高的级别。


So what policies should be implemented in response to these economic blows?	那么面对接踵而来的经济冲击，日本又该采取何种政策应对呢？


Last year, Japan’s economy grew at a relatively healthy 3% annual rate, higher than in the United States or the European Union, owing mainly to the fiscal expansion undertaken after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.	得益于2008年雷曼兄弟破产后采取的扩张性财政政策，去年日本经济实现了相对健康的3%年增长率，高于美国和欧盟。


But growth in 2011 had been predicted to slow even before the earthquake.	但2011年的增长预计会比地震前更差。


Indeed, the economy shrank by 3.5% year on year in the first quarter.	事实上第一季度经济较去年同期下滑了3. 5%。


Now, with so much fixed capital and infrastructure destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami, the economy’s productive capacity has fallen by an estimated 2% of GDP.	如今又有如此海量的固定资产和基础设施遭到地震和海啸蹂躏，使日本企业的产能萎缩，其损失相当于2%的GDP。


But that may not be a bad thing: Prior to the earthquake, Japan had a demand-supply gap of approximately 5% of GDP.	但这或许并不是件坏事：地震之前日本经济已经供大于求，而供需缺口约等于GDP的5%。


While reducing this gap to 3% of GDP has led to higher prices, this is exactly what Japan needs after years of persistent deflation.	对于长期持续遭遇通货紧缩的日本来说，缺口下降到3%并引发物价上升的状况真是求之不得。


Meanwhile, higher public spending on capital investment and other special procurements will boost domestic demand.	与此同时，在资本投资和其他特殊采购项目方面的高额公共支出将刺激日本内需。


The Hanshin earthquake in 1995 destroyed capital stock worth 2% of GDP.	1995年的阪神大地震毁坏了相当于当年GDP2%的相关资产。


This time, the loss is estimated at 3.4% of GDP, implying a larger increase in domestic demand if the right public policies are pursued.	而这次的损失则想当于GDP的3. 4%，意味着只要推行合理的公共政策，就能更大地提升国内需求。


On the downside, confidence among consumers and investors alike has taken a hit, mainly owing to fears about radiation leakages and power shortages.	而负面因素则是出于对核泄漏的恐惧以及供电不足，消费者和投资者的信心也遭受重挫。


According to the Japan Center for Economic Research, power-supply disruptions could negatively affect the Japanese economy for the next three years.	日本经济研究中心的报告认为电力短缺将影响未来三年的经济发展。


If the Tokyo metropolitan area’s power supply were to decrease by 10% this year, for example, Japan’s GDP would fall by 2%.	如果东京大都市圈内的电力供应在今年内下降10%的话，日本的GDP就将下滑2%。


Soon after the disaster, the government announced that reconstruction demand and higher prices would bring about relatively rapid economic recovery.	灾后日本内阁府宣称重建需求和物价上涨将带来相对较快的经济复苏。


I think this view is too optimistic, because I suspect that the government wants to finance its new expenditure with a tax hike.	但笔者认为这个观点可能过于乐观，因为政府可能会加税来填补新的支出项目。


Moreover, the extremely sharp contraction in first-quarter GDP may indicate that the disaster’s negative impact on the economy was more significant than expected.	此外今年第一季度GDP增长的极度萎缩可能意味着灾难对经济的影响要远超预期！


Indeed, the economy is expected to have shrunk by another 2.6% year on year in the second quarter, with growth set to resume only in July-September.	日本经济预计将在今年第二季度继续遭遇2. 6%的同比下滑，直到7~9月才能恢复增长。


And, contrary to the government’s outlook, the start of economic recovery could be delayed until the end of this year, with medium-term annual growth reaching 1.5- 2%.	但相对于政府的预测，经济复苏的启动时间将推迟到年末，中期年增长率则会维持在1. 5%到2%之间。


A key question has been the disaster’s impact on global supply chains.	而另一个问题则关于这场灾难对全球供应链的影响。


According to Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, which surveyed firms roughly a month after the earthquake, more than 60% of production sites in affected areas had already recovered as of April 15.	据日本经济产业省在灾难爆发一个月后所进行的调查，受灾地区超过60%的生产场所已经在4月15日前恢复运作。


Almost 30% expected to recover by the summer, and the remaining 10% foresaw normal operations after the autumn.	还有30%预计将在今年夏天复工，而剩下的10%则有望在秋后恢复生产。


But the impact of even a small number of disruptions to supply chains can be highly significant, particularly for the Asia-Pacific region.	但即便是供应链的其中一个小环节受损，所造成的影响都可能极为严重——分布在亚太地区的产业链尤甚。


Consider Renesas Electronics, a medium-size company, with ¥150 billion ($1.9 billion) in annual sales, which accounts for more than half of worldwide production of essential micro-computing components for automobiles.	以日本瑞萨电子为例，这个年销售额1500亿日元（约合19亿美元）的中型企业负责为汽车提供某个必不可少的微电脑部件，供应量占全球一半以上。


Partly as a result of the damage at Renesas, Toyota’s capacity-utilization rate dropped to 50% at the beginning of May.	由于该企业受灾，丰田汽车5月初的产能利用率下降了超过50%。


Likewise, the chemical manufacturer Kureha (¥130 billion in annual sales) has a 70% share of the global market for adhesive materials for lithium-ion batteries – a small but essential component of cell phones.	同样，Kureha这个年销售额1300亿日元的化工企业负责供应全球70%的锂电池黏性材料——锂电池虽小，却是手机不可或缺的部件。


Nokia in Finland, for example, imports 12% of its cell-phone components from Japan, and thus could be indirectly affected by the disaster.	芬兰的诺基亚公司有12%的锂电池需要从日本进口，并因此受到了地震海啸灾害的间接影响。


As a result, more companies are likely to create and implement business continuity plans.	因此更多日本企业都在着手制定和实施“持续经营计划”。


Indeed, “BCP” is set to become a key term in the region’s economic discourse.	事实上，这类计划将成为受灾区域经济的关键议题。


Using BCPs to determine alternative producers means that regional economies will be integrated in a new form, with companies establishing cooperative relationships even with their competitors.	利用持续经营计划来确定其他的可替代供应商意味着该区域经济将以一种新的形势重新整合，而企业甚至会和自己的竞争对手建立合作关系。


Unfortunately, Japan’s public officials appear incapable of similar flexibility.	但不幸的是，日本的官僚们却似乎缺乏类似的弹性。


The disaster confirmed the traditional view of Japan as a country that combines a dynamic private sector with an anemic public sector and central administration.	这次大灾其实证实了一个观点：日本就是一个极富活力的私人部门与死气沉沉的公共部门与中央政府的结合体。


The government’s mistakes in so-called “risk communication” regarding the Fukushima nuclear plant, and its slowness in getting necessary aid to people displaced by the disaster, have once again put the stereotype on full display.	政府在福岛核电站事故中的所谓“危机沟通”中所犯的错误以及在救助灾民时的迟钝表现都一再印证了这个老观点。


In terms of international relations, however, the disaster could improve Japan’s bilateral ties with influential countries.	但在国际关系方面，这场灾难将改善日本与周边主要国家的双边关系。


For example, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak met with outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan in Fukushima, near the damaged plant – helping to ease neighboring countries’ concerns about radiation leakage.	例如中国国家总理温家宝和韩国总统李明博最近都在福岛附近地区与时任日本首相菅直人进行了会晤——也有助于缓解邻近各国对核泄漏的担忧。


Moreover, Japan’s relations with the US, which had suffered since the Democratic Party of Japan came to power two years ago, appear to have emerged from the disaster stronger than ever.	此外，自从两年前日本民主党上台后就步入低谷的日美关系似乎在灾后有所巩固。


Japan’s Self-Defense Forces played an important role in rescue and restoration activities, with about half of its 200,000 personnel dispatched to the damaged area.	日本自卫队在灾后拯救和修复方面扮演了重要角色，派遣了全部20万兵力中的一半进入灾区。


While this severely weakened Japan’s defenses, the US ensured East Asia’s security by deploying an aircraft carrier and cruisers, and American forces also searched for missing victims together with the JSDF.	而此举虽然严重削弱了日本的防御能力，但美国专门派遣了一艘航空母舰和巡洋舰来维护东亚安全局势，同时美军也与自卫队一道搜索灾难失踪者。


But Japan’s neighbors expect rapid reconstruction and normalization, and for that, stronger political leadership is needed.	周边邻国都希望日本能尽快实现重建和经济正常化，而这意味着我们需要一个强大的政治领导。


The earthquake and tsunami have confronted Japan with a profound crisis – but also with a rare opportunity to undertake the comprehensive reforms that the country has postponed for far too long.	地震和海啸无疑使日本遭遇了深刻危机——但也提供了一个绝佳的契机，使其能够推行拖延已久的全面改革。


Will the US-Japan Alliance Survive?	美日同盟会继续吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, a central feature of stability in East Asia for half a century.	坎布里奇——明年是《美日安全条约》五十周年纪念日，半个世纪以来它一直是东亚稳定的核心特色。


But now, with the Japanese experiencing a period of domestic political uncertainty, and North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches increasing their anxiety, will Japan reverse its long-standing decision not to seek a national nuclear-deterrent capability?	但现在当日本国内政治前途未卜，北朝鲜的核试验和导弹发射又使他们更加焦虑的时候，日本会不会改变不寻求国家核威慑力的决策？


Is the US-Japan alliance coming to an end?	美日同盟是否正面临解体之厄？


In the early 1990’s, many Americans regarded Japan as an economic threat.	20世纪90年代初，许多美国人视日本为经济威胁。


Some people – in both countries – viewed the security alliance as a Cold War relic to be discarded.	美日两国都有人认为应当作为冷战遗物摒弃安全同盟。


These trends were reversed by the Clinton administration’s 1995 “East Asia Strategy Report.”	克林顿政府1995年的《东亚策略报告》扭转了这种趋势。


In 1996, the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration stated that the US-Japan security alliance was the foundation for stability that would allow growing prosperity in post-Cold War East Asia.	1996年，克林顿－桥本声明提出美日安全同盟为保障后冷战时期东亚日渐繁荣起到了稳定基石的作用。


That approach has continued on a bipartisan basis in the US, and polls show that it retains broad acceptance in Japan.	这种姿态继续在美国被两大政党所接受，且民意测验显示这种观点也被日本人广泛接受。


Most close observers of the relationship agree that the US-Japan alliance is in much better shape today than 15 years ago.	美日关系的多数密切观察者认定，今天的美日同盟比15年健康得多。


Nonetheless, the alliance faces three major challenges in a new external environment.	尽管如此，同盟还是在新的外部环境中面临三大挑战。


One is North Korea, whose recent behavior has been clever and deceptive.	其一是北朝鲜，它最近的举动既聪明又有欺骗性。


The North Koreans have violated their agreements, knowing that China, the country with the greatest potential leverage, is most concerned about regime collapse in North Korea, and thus the threat of chaos on its borders.	北朝鲜违反协定，因为他们知道潜在影响力最大的中国最担心北韩政权崩溃，进而在中朝边境上造成混乱。


Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America’s extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China).	日本官方赞同实现无核世界的目标，但却依赖于美国的延伸核威慑，希望避开来自北朝鲜（或中国）的核敲诈。


The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the US decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China.	日本人害怕如果美国将核力量降低到与中国对等，美国延伸威慑的可信度将会减弱。


It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons.	但认为延伸威慑有赖于核武器数量对等是一种误解。


Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility.	相反，它取决于核能力与核信用的结合。


During the Cold War, the US was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack.	在冷战期间，美国能够保护柏林是因为北约联盟和美军进驻使我们的承诺真实可信，如果苏联进攻，美国士兵的生命将处在危险之中。


Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support).	实际上，美国对日延伸威慑的最佳保障依然是近50，000名美军的进驻（这支部队的存在也有赖于日本慷慨的东道支持）。


Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.	发展地区弹道导弹防御等联合项目也提高了同盟的可信度。


Equally important are American actions that show the high priority that the US gives to the alliance, and its guarantees not to engage in what Japan fears will be “Japan-passing” in its relations with Asia.	表明美国重视美日同盟的行动以及不像日本人担心的那样在对亚洲关系中“忽略日本”的保证也同等重要。


That is why it was so important that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first trip was to Asia, and her first stop in Japan.	它解释了希拉里·克林顿国务卿上任后首访亚洲、而首访亚洲时又将首站定为日本为什么如此重要。


It is also why it is mistaken to speak of a formal G-2 with China, rather than multilateral cooperation.	它还解释了探讨中美两国正式峰会，而不是多边合作为什么是错的。


A second challenge for Japan is the dramatic rise of China’s economy.	中国经济的戏剧性崛起是日本面临的第二大挑战。


Although an important trade partner, China’s growing power makes Japan nervous.	虽然是日本重要的贸易伙伴，但中国日渐强大的力量令日本感到不安。


When re-negotiating the US-Japan security alliance in the 1990’s, Japanese leaders sometimes privately asked me if the US would desert Japan in favor of China.	20世纪90年代重新谈判美日安全同盟时，日本领导人有时私下问我美国是否会抛弃日本转而与中国交好。


I responded then (and today) that there is little prospect of such a reversal, for two reasons.	我当时回答说发生这种逆转的可能性极小（现在我的回答还是一样），原因有两个。


First, China poses a potential threat, whereas Japan does not.	第一，中国会带来潜在威胁，而日本不会。


Second, the US shares democratic values with Japan, and China is not a democracy.	第二，美日之间拥有共同的民主价值观，而中国不是民主国家。


Moreover, China’s internal evolution remains uncertain.	此外，我们也无法确定中国的内部变化。


While Chinese are more free today than at any time in their history, China’s political evolution has lagged behind its economic progress.	尽管今天的中国比历史上任何时候都更加自由，但中国的政治改革已经落后于经济发展。


Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation.	和印度不同的是，参政问题在中国并没有得到解决。


There is always a residual danger that China will embrace nationalism to ward off domestic problems.	因此中国借民族主义逃避国内问题的危险永远存在着。


At the same time, it is in the interest of the US, Japan, and China that China’s rise be peaceful and harmonious (in the words of Chinese leaders).	与此同时，中国和平和谐（用中国领导人的话说）的崛起符合美、日、中三方的利益。


Treat China as an enemy, and you guarantee enmity.	把中国当成敌人注定会收获仇恨。


That is why the strategy of integration, plus a hedge against uncertainty, makes sense for both the US and Japan.	这也解释了融合策略，再加上对不确定性防范，为什么适用于美日两国。


Indeed, there are strong grounds for the US, Japan, and China to engage in areas of trilateral and other regional cooperation.	实际上，美国、日本和中国有充分的理由在三边及其他地区合作中互相配合。


Third, the US-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states.	第三，美日同盟将不得不面对传染病、恐怖主义和失败国家人口流出等对我们根本利益的新一轮跨国挑战。


Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the US as the leading producer of carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms).	在这些挑战中居于首要地位的是全球变暖，中国已经超越美国成为二氧化碳第一大排放国（虽然从人均角度衡量并非如此）。


Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan’s strengths.	幸运的是，这个领域是日本的强项。


Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance’s security components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a stronger partner.	尽管某些日本人由于日本接受了运用武力的限制条款而抱怨同盟安全条款不平等，但在这些新领域中，日本是更强有力的伙伴。


Japan’s overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in anti-piracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in dealing with the new transnational challenges.	日本的海外发展援助遍及从非洲到阿富汗的各个角落，它对全球健康计划的支持、对联合国的支持、派海军参与打击海盗行动、以及它在能效方面的研发工作使其处在应对新跨国挑战的前沿。


Given today’s agenda, there is enormous potential for an equal partnership, working with others, in the provision of global public goods that will benefit the US, Japan, and the rest of the world.	在今天的大背景下，建立平等的伙伴关系、为全球公共利益相互合作从而使美、日和世界其他国家从中受益的潜力巨大。


That is why I remain optimistic about the future of the US-Japan alliance.	这也解释了我为什么对美日同盟的未来持乐观态度。


Renminbi Rising?	人民币崛起？


SHANGHAI – China is increasingly debating whether or not the renminbi should be internationalized, possibly joining the US dollar and the euro as an international vehicle currency (IVC) – that is, a currency that other countries use to denominate the prices of their traded goods and international loans.	上海—在中国，一场日益激烈的争论是人民币是否应该国际化，加入美元和欧元的行列成为国际媒介货币（international vehicle currency，IVC），即其他国家用来为贸易商品和国际贷款计价的货币。


Related to this is a debate about whether Shanghai can become a first-tier international financial center (1-IFC) like London and New York.	与此有关的一场争论是上海是否能够成为顶级国际金融中心（first-tier international financial center ，1-IFC），与伦敦和纽约相抗衡。


Financial history can help to answer these questions.	金融史可以帮助回答这些问题。


First, a city can become a 1-IFC only if its national currency is an IVC.	首先，一个城市只有在所在国货币成为IVC时才可能成为1-IFC。


But, as London’s status shows, a longtime 1-IFC can retain its position in the international financial system even if its currency is no longer an IVC.	但是，正如伦敦的地位所表明的，即使所在国货币已不再是IVC，老牌1-IFC仍可以保有其在国际金融体系中的地位。


Second, the transaction cost of using a foreign currency as a medium of exchange is inversely proportional to the extent to which that currency is used globally.	其次，使用外国货币作为交易媒介的交易成本与这种货币的全球使用程度成反比。


Similar economies of scale characterize foreign investors’ use of a particular international financial center.	外国投资者使用某一特定国际金融中心具有类似的规模经济特征。


As a result, there cannot be more than three or four IVCs and 1-IFCs.	因此，IVC和1-IFC的数量不会超过三四个。


Third, a country’s financial sector must be both open, with no capital-flow restrictions, and sophisticated, with a wide range of instruments and institutions.	第三，一国的金融部门必须是开放的，没有资本管制，并且十分成熟，具备各种工具和机构。


It must also be safe, with a central bank maintaining economic stability, prudential regulators keeping fraud and speculation in check, macro-prudential authorities displaying adequate financial fire-fighting capabilities, and a legal system that is predictable, transparent, and fair.	它还必须是安全的，有一家维持经济稳定的中央银行，有监督欺诈和投机的审慎监管者，有足够的金融救火能力的宏观审慎当局，有可预测、透明、公正的司法体系。


Last – and most important – successful convergence to IVC and 1-IFC status requires the national economy to be strong relative to other economies for a substantial period of time.	IVC和1-IFC的第四个（也是最重要的一个）成功秘诀是，在相当长的一段时间里，其国民经济相对其他经济体保持优势。


The United Kingdom occupied a position of global economic leadership for more than a century.	英国占据全球经济领导地位超过一百年。


In 1914, the US/UK GDP ratio was 2.1, but the US dollar was not an IVC, suggesting that America’s relative economic strength was inadequate.	1914年，美国/英国GDP之比为2. 1，但美元仍不是IVC，这表明美国的相对经济实力仍不够强大。


A decade later, in 1924, the ratio was 3.2 and rising – and the US dollar had eclipsed the British pound as the most important IVC.	十年后的1924年，美国/英国GDP之比变为3. 2，并呈现继续上升之势，美元也超过英镑成为最重要的IVC。


Relative economic strength explains why the Japanese yen failed to develop into an IVC, and why Tokyo – whose financial markets satisfied the relevant requirements – failed to become a 1-IFC.	相对经济强势解释了为何日元没有发展成为IVC，以及东京——其金融市场已满足相关条件——没有能够成为1-IFC。


With its GDP reaching only about 60% of America’s at its peak in 1991, Japan never attained the critical mass required to induce foreigners to use the yen to lower transaction costs.	在1991年的最高峰，日本GDP只有美国的60%，因此日本从未达到过促使外国人使用日元来降低交易成本的临界值。


Determining the future international status of the renminbi and Shanghai must begin with a calculation of China’s expected relative economic strength vis-à-vis the US under two plausible scenarios.	确定人民币和上海的未来国际地位必须从计算两种大概率情形下中国对美国的相对经济强度开始。


In the first scenario, China becomes caught in a middle-income trap, with per capita GDP stuck at 30% of America’s – an outcome that has characterized Latin America’s five largest economies since at least 1960, and Malaysia since 1994.	在第一种情形中，中国将陷入中等收入陷阱，人均GDP停留在美国的30%——拉美最大的五个经济体自1960年以来便处于这一状态，马来西亚则从1994年开始处于这一状态。


This would put China’s economic strength relative to the US at 1.1 – well below the necessary ratio.	这意味着中国对美国的相对经济强度为1. 1，远远低于必要条件比率。


In the second, more favorable scenario, China’s per capita GDP would reach 80% of America’s – higher than the 70% average rate for the five largest Western European countries since 1960 – and its economic strength relative to the US would amount to roughly 2.8.	在第二种较有利的情形中，中国人均GDP将达到美国的80%——高于西欧最大的五个经济体自1960年以来的平均水平70%——其对美国的相对经济强度将达到2. 8左右。


This would make the renminbi eligible for IVC status and enable Shanghai to choose whether to become a 1-IFC.	这意味着人民币有资格获得IVC地位，上海也有资格选择是否成为1-IFC。


But China’s economy still would not be strong enough relative to the US for natural market forces to ensure the renminbi’s international success.	但中国经济相对美国的强度不足以保证通过自然市场力量让人民币获得国际成功。


Given this, the Chinese government would have to implement decisive measures to encourage international traders and creditors to price their transactions in renminbi.	基于此，中国政府必须采取果断措施鼓励国际交易者和债权人用人民币为交易定价。


Specifically, China would have to use its market power to promote pricing in renminbi for relevant manufactured exports and raw-material imports, and encourage renminbi denomination of foreign financial assets that China purchases (which the country’s status as a net creditor should facilitate).	具体而言，中国必须利用其市场实力促使用人民币为相关出口制造品和原材料进口品定价，并鼓励用人民币为中国购买的外国金融资产计价（在这方面，中国的净债权人地位应能有所助益）。


But there are serious pitfalls to avoid in this process.	但在此过程中需要规避诸多陷阱。


As the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 demonstrated, capital-account liberalization could lead to financial meltdowns – a danger that opponents of internationalizing the renminbi often cite.	正如1997—1998年亚洲金融危机所标明的，资本账户自由化可能导致金融崩溃——这也是人民币国际化的反对者经常提到的危险。


But these risks do not outweigh the potential benefits of financial openness, and they can be minimized with effective monitoring and regulation, including requirements for large capital buffers and low leverage ratios, together with strong crisis-response mechanisms, like a resolution trust corporation.	但这些风险尚不足以胜过金融开放的潜在好处，也可以通过有效监控和监管实现最小化，包括提高资本缓冲、降低杠杆率以及成立清算信托公司等强大的危机反应机制。


In fact, effective financial-monitoring and prudential-regulation systems do not have to precede opening the capital account.	事实上，有效的金融监控和审慎管理体系并不一定要先于资本账户开放。


On the contrary, developing and enacting financial regulation must be a gradual process, shaped by both existing knowledge and firsthand experience.	相反，发展和实施金融监管必须是渐进过程，根据现有知识和第一手经验改进。


After all, no financial market is either completely open or completely closed forever; the degree of openness at a given moment depends on policy choices.	毕竟，不存在永远完全开放或封闭的金融市场，给定时刻的开放程度根据政策选择而定。


The recent establishment of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone will allow for the emergence of an offshore international financial center that offers real-world training to China’s regulators.	最近成立的上海自由贸易区将允许离岸国际金融中心的出现，中国监管者将受到真实世界的训练。


This will give them the tools they need to recognize the signs of a developing crisis, defuse the threat, and efficiently handle the recapitalization and reorganization of failed financial institutions.	这将让他们获得识别危机发展信号、扼杀风险、有效处理倒闭金融机构资本重组所需要的工具。


China’s pursuit of an IVC and a 1-IFC city would serve not only its own interests.	中国对IVC和1-IFC的追求不仅符合其自身利益。


Allowing the renminbi to help meet global demand for international reserves and risk diversification would also strengthen global financial stability.	让人民币帮助满足世界对国际储备和风险多元化的需求能加强全球金融稳定。


There is little time to waste in internationalizing the renminbi.	人民币国际化刻不容缓。


Given the limited number of currencies that can serve as IVCs, the failure of the renminbi to achieve IVC status before, say, the Indian rupee, the Russian ruble, or the Brazilian real could mean that the renminbi is denied IVC status – and that Shanghai fails to achieve 1-IFC status – for generations, if not forever.	能成为IVC的货币数量极为有限，如果人民币不能抢在印度卢比、俄罗斯卢布或巴西雷亚尔之前成为IVC将意味着在几代人的时间里（如果不是永远的话）人民币都将失去IVC地位，上海也将无法获得1-IFC地位。


Winners and Losers in the Post-9/11 Era	后9/11时代的赢家和输家


September 11, 2001, is one of those dates that mark a transformation in world politics.	2001年9月11日是标志世界政治转折的日子之一。


Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signified the Cold War’s end, al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States opened a new epoch.	正如1989年11月9日柏林墙倒塌标志着冷战的结束，基地组织对美国的袭击开创了一个新的时代。


A non-governmental group killed more Americans that day than the government of Japan did with its surprise attack on another transformative date, December 7, 1941.	一个非政府组织在那天杀死的美国人比日本政府在另一个具有转折意义的日子，1941年12月7日，发动突然袭击杀害的人数还要多。


While the jihadi terrorist movement had been growing for a decade, 9/11 was the turning point.	尽管杰哈德恐怖运动10年来一直快速发展，9/11仍然是一个重要转折。


Five years into this new era, how should we characterize it?	在如今离新时代开启已满5年之际，我们又该如何定义这个时代呢？


Some believe that 9/11 ushered in a “clash of civilizations” between Islam vs. the West.	有人认为9/11导致了伊斯兰和西方之间“文明的碰撞”。


Indeed, that is probably what Osama bin Laden had in mind.	没错，那也许正是奥萨马·本·拉登袭击美国的初衷。


Terrorism is a form of theater.	恐怖主义是一种戏剧化的模式。


Extremists kill innocent people in order to dramatize their message in a way that shocks and horrifies their intended audience.	恐怖分子杀害无辜群众，以此来增强其信息的戏剧化效果，惊吓和恐吓他们的目标受众。


They also rely on what Clark McCauley and others have called “jujitsu politics,” in which a smaller fighter uses the strength of the larger opponent to defeat him.	他们还必须依赖克拉克·麦考利和其他人所说的“柔道政治”，其核心是小个子斗士利用大个子对手的力量来击败他。


In that sense, bin Laden hoped that the US would be lured into a bloody war in Afghanistan, similar to the Soviet intervention two decades earlier, which had created such a fertile recruiting ground for jihadists.	在这种意义上，本·拉登期望美国会禁不住引诱，像20年前苏联一样，在阿富汗发动一场血腥的战争。 苏联那次入侵为圣战分子创造了甚为肥沃的人员招募土壤。


But the Americans used a modest amount of force to remove the Taliban government, avoided disproportionate civilian casualties, and were able to create an indigenous political framework.	但美国只派小股部队推翻了塔利班政府，避免了大规模的平民伤亡，还建立起了本土的政治框架。


While far from perfect, the first round in the fight went to the US.	尽管远远称不上完美，但美国赢得了战争的第一个回合。


Al-Qaeda lost the sanctuaries from which it planned its attacks; many of its leaders were killed or captured; and its central communications were severely disrupted.	基地组织失去了策划袭击活动的庇护所，很多高层领导人物命丧黄泉或锒铛入狱，其核心领导层的消息传递也严重受阻。


Then the Bush administration succumbed to hubris and made the colossal mistake of invading Iraq without broad international support.	接着布什政府被傲慢自大冲昏了头脑，没有赢得国际社会的普遍支持就贸然入侵伊拉克。


Iraq provided the symbols, civilian casualties, and recruiting ground that the jihadi extremists had sought in Afghanistan.	杰哈德极端分子在阿富汗未能得到的象征标志、平民伤亡和人员招募土壤，都在伊拉克战争中如愿以偿。


Iraq was George Bush’s gift to Osama bin Laden.	伊拉克是布什送给奥萨马·本·拉登的一份厚礼。


Al-Qaeda lost its central organizational capacity, but it became a symbol and focal point around which like-minded imitators could rally.	基地组织失去了核心组织能力，却成了号召思想极端的模仿者们的旗帜和焦点。


With the help of the Internet, its symbols and training materials became easily available around the world.	通过互联网络，基地组织的标志和训练材料可以在全球范围内轻易得到。


Whether al-Qaeda had a direct role in the Madrid and London bombings, or the recent plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic, is less important than the way it has been transformed into a powerful “brand.”	无论基地组织是否直接参与了马德里和伦敦爆炸案，或者前不久在大西洋上空炸毁航班的阴谋，与它已经转型为恐怖主义最大“品牌”的事实相比都显得无关紧要。


The second round went to the extremists.	极端分子赢得了第二回合。


The outcome of future rounds in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will depend on our ability to avoid the trap of “jujitsu politics.”	反抗杰哈德恐怖主义今后斗争的结果将取决于我们能否避开“柔道政治”的重重陷阱。


That will require more use of the soft power of attraction rather than relying so heavily on hard military power, as the Bush administration has done.	这需要更多利用吸引力等软性力量，而不能像布什政府那样过多地依赖强硬的军事实力。


For the struggle is not a clash of Islam vs. the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of non-violent believers.	因为这场斗争的双方不是伊斯兰和西方世界，而是伊斯兰内部矛盾，对立双方是少数恐怖分子，以及作为主流的伊斯兰非暴力信徒。


Jihadi extremism cannot be defeated unless the mainstream wins.	只有主流获胜，才能击败杰哈德极端主义。


Military force, intelligence, and international police cooperation needs to be used against hardcore terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaeda, but soft power is essential to attracting the mainstream and drying up support for the extremists.	这需要军队、情报和国际警察部门通力合作，打击基地组织下属、或在其感召下成立的强硬恐怖分子。 然而，在吸引伊斯兰主流民众、铲除对极端分子的支持方面，软性力量起着至关重要的作用。


US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said that the measure of success in this war is whether the number of terrorists we are killing and deterring is larger than the number that the terrorists are recruiting.	美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德曾经说过：这场战争胜负的衡量标准是看我们杀死和遏制的恐怖分子是否超过了他们所吸收的新鲜血液。


By this standard, we are doing badly.	按照这样的标准，我们的成绩不容乐观。


In November 2003, the official number of terrorist insurgents in Iraq was given as 5,000.	2001年，伊拉克叛乱分子的官方统计数字是5，000。


This year, it was reported to be 20,000.	今年，据称这个数字已经增加到20，000。


As Brig. General Robert Caslen, the Pentagon’s deputy director for the war on terrorism, put it, “We are not killing them faster than they are being created.”	正如五角大楼副主任罗伯特·凯斯伦准将所说的那样，“我们消灭他们的速度远远比不上他们自我复制的速度。 ”


We are also failing in the application of soft power.	在软性力量的应用方面，我们也做得非常不够。


According to Caslen, “We in the Pentagon are behind our adversaries in the use of communication – either to recruit or train.”	凯斯伦说，“五角大楼在宣传沟通的运用上不及我们的对手¾在人员招募和训练方面都是如此。 ”


The manner in which we use military power also affects Rumsfeld’s ratio.	我们使用军事力量的方式也影响到“拉姆斯菲尔德比”。


In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding around the world for America’s military response against the Taliban.	9/11事件后，全世界都对美国对塔利班的军事打击表示理解和同情，而美国入侵与9/11袭击毫无瓜葛的伊拉克将世界人民的同情挥霍殆尽。


The US invasion of Iraq, a country that was not connected to the 9/11 attacks, squandered that good will, and the attractiveness of the US in Muslim countries like Indonesia plummeted from 75% approval in 2000 to half that level today.	美国在印度尼西亚等穆斯林国家的吸引力指数已经从2000年的74%大幅下降至上述比例的一半。


Indeed, occupying a divided nation is messy, and it is bound to produce episodes like Abu Ghraib and Haditha, which undercut America’s attractiveness not just in Iraq, but around the world.	实际上，占领一个四分五裂的国家本身就非常棘手，像阿布格莱布和哈迪塞这样的事件几乎肯定会发生，它们使美国在伊拉克、乃至全球的吸引力都大受影响。


The ability to combine hard and soft power is smart power.	硬性和软性力量的结合需要智慧。


When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, it undercut the soft power that it had enjoyed in Europe in the aftermath of World War II.	苏联在冷战期间对匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克的侵略破坏了二战结束时它在欧洲国家中曾经有过的软性力量。


When Israel launched a lengthy bombing campaign in Lebanon last month, it created so many civilian casualties that the early criticisms of Hezbollah by Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia became untenable in Arab politics.	以色列上月在黎巴嫩的长时间轰炸造成了太多的平民伤亡，使得埃及、约旦和沙特阿拉伯从前对真主党的批判在阿拉伯政治中丧失了根基。


When terrorist excesses killed innocent Muslim civilians such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad did in 1993 or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi did in Amman in 2005, they undercut their own soft power and lost support.	如果毫无节制的恐怖分子再像伊斯兰杰哈德1993年在埃及或者扎卡维2005年在安曼那样去杀害无辜的穆斯林民众，损害的将是他们自己的软性力量，失去的是民众对他们的支持。


The most important lesson five years after 9/11 is that failure to combine hard and soft power effectively in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will lead us into the trap set by those who want a clash of civilizations.	9/11事件发生五年后最重大的教训是：如果不能在应对杰哈德恐怖主义的斗争中将硬性和软性力量有效地结合在一起，我们就会落入文化冲突论者早已设置好的陷阱。


Muslims, including Islamists, have a diversity of views, so we need to be wary of strategies that help our enemies by uniting disparate forces behind one banner.	穆斯林，包括伊斯兰教徒在内，有着多种不同的观点，因此我们必须对能够帮助我们的敌人联合各种力量的策略保持警惕。


We have a just cause and many potential allies, but our failure to combine hard and soft power into a smart strategy could be fatal.	我们拥有正义的事业和很多潜在的盟友，但如果不能将硬性和软性力量结合成明智的策略，将可能给我们带来致命的打击。


The Middle East’s Lost Decade	中东失去的十年


BERLIN – The United States has waged three wars since Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001: against Al Qaeda, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.	柏林——2001年9月11日的“基地”组织恐怖袭击后美国已发动对“基地”组织、阿富汗和伊拉克的三次战争。


The first two were forced upon the US, but the third was the result of a willful, deliberate decision by former President George W. Bush, taken on ideological grounds and, most likely, for personal reasons as well.	前两次美国是因为迫不得已，但第三次则是前总统乔治·W·布什出于意识形态、极可能还有个人理由做出的故意决定。


Had Bush, former Vice President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and their neocon allies been forthright about their intentions – to bring down Saddam Hussein by means of war, thereby creating a new, pro-Western Middle East – they never would have received the support of Congress and the American public.	假使布什、前副总统迪克·切尼、国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德及其新保守派盟友将借助战争手段推翻萨达姆·侯赛因并建设亲西方新中东的真正意图公之于众，他们永远也得不到美国国会和公众的支持。


Their vision was both naive and reckless.	他们的理想鲁莽而且非常幼稚。


So a threat – Iraqi weapons of mass destruction – had to be created.	因此必须捏造出来自伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器威胁。


As we now know, the threat was based on lies (aluminum tubes for a nuclear-weapons program, for example, meetings between the 9/11 plot leader, Mohamed Atta, and Iraqi officials in Prague, and even glaring forgeries like supposed Iraqi orders for yellowcake uranium from Niger).	我们现在知道这种威胁纯属谎言（核武器计划的铝管、9/11阴谋领导者穆罕默德·阿塔跟伊拉克官员在布拉格会面、甚至令人发指地伪造出所谓伊拉克从尼日尔订购铀“黄饼”的订单）。


Such were the justifications for a war that was to claim the lives of almost 5,000 US soldiers and more than 100,000 Iraqis.	这就是发动夺去近5,000名美军士兵和100,000多伊拉克人生命的战争的理由。


Add to that the millions more who were injured and displaced from their homes, as well as the destruction of one of the world’s oldest Christian communities.	这场战争还造成数百万人受伤和流离失所，并对世界最古老的基督教群体造成了毁灭性的破坏。


For this, the US alone spent up to $3 trillion.	仅美国在伊战中的花费就高达3万亿美元。


Bush’s war against Saddam did radically change the Middle East, though not as he envisaged.	布什对萨达姆的战争的确从根本上改变了中东局势，尽管这种改变完全出乎他自己的预料。


For starters, if the US had set out to destabilize Iraq, its efforts could hardly have been more successful: ten years later, the country’s viability as a single state has never been in greater doubt.	首先，如果美国的初衷是破坏伊拉克稳定，那恐怕这一目标已经完美实现：10年后，伊拉克能否作为统一国家存在都充满了变数。


With Saddam gone, Iraq’s Shia majority assumed power after a horrendous civil war, leaving Iraq’s defeated Sunnis longing for revenge and waiting for an opportunity to regain their ascendancy.	萨达姆被推翻后，伊拉克的什叶多数派在恐怖内战后上台，而被打败的逊尼派则渴望报复、等待夺回优势的机会。


The Kurds in the north cleverly and adeptly used the window of opportunity that opened before them to seize de facto independence, though the key question of control over the northern city of Kirkuk remains a ticking time bomb.	北方的库尔德人巧妙地利用这次机会实现了事实上的独立，尽管北部城市基尔库克关键的控制问题依然是一枚定时炸弹。


And all are fighting for as large a share of Iraq’s enormous oil and gas reserves as they can get.	所有人都竭尽全力争夺伊拉克庞大的石油和天然气资源。


Taking stock of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” a decade later, the Financial Times concluded that the US won the war, Iran won the peace, and Turkey won the contracts.	英国《金融时报》十年后盘点“伊拉克自由行动”，认为美国赢得了战争、伊朗赢得了和平而土耳其赢得了合同。


I can only agree.	我只能表示同意。


In political terms, Iran is the big winner of Bush’s war.	伊朗是布什战争在政治意义上最大的赢家。


Its number-one enemy, Saddam, was dispatched by its number-two enemy, the United States, which presented Iran with a golden opportunity to extend its influence beyond its western border for the first time since 1746.	其头号敌人萨达姆被二号敌人美国推翻，伊朗也由此看到了1746年以来首次将影响力扩大到西部边境以外的黄金机会。


Bush’s war, with its poor strategic vision and worse planning, increased Iran’s regional standing in a way that the country was unlikely ever to have achieved on its own.	布什的战争因其蹩脚的战略眼光和糟糕的计划从某种意义上提升了伊朗的区域地位，这种提升伊朗靠自己的力量永远不可能做到。


The war enabled Iran to assert itself as the dominant power in the Gulf and the wider region, and its nuclear program serves precisely these ambitions.	战争使伊朗成为海湾及更大范围内的主导力量，而核计划恰恰满足了伊朗在这方面的野心。


The losers in the region are also clear: Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, which feel existentially threatened, and have come to regard their own Shia minorities as an Iranian fifth column.	中东地区的输家也非常明确：感觉生存受到威胁、开始将国内什叶派���数族裔视为伊朗第五纵队的沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家。


They have a point: with the Shia in power in Iraq, Iran will seek suitable opportunities to use local Shia populations as proxies to assert its hegemonic claims.	他们其实有一定道理：由于什叶派在伊拉克掌权，伊朗会寻找适当时机利用当地什叶派人口代理维护其霸权要求。


This is what is fueling Bahrain’s domestic turmoil, beyond the Shia majority’s local grievances.	这是除什叶多数派对当地的不满之外激起巴林国内动乱的理由。


Leaving aside the lies, fictions, and questions of morality and personal responsibility, the critical mistake of America’s war against Iraq was the absence of either a viable plan or the necessary strength to enforce a Pax Americana in the Middle East.	除去谎言、虚构、道德问题和个人责任等因素，美国对伊战争最致命的失误是缺乏可行计划及必要势力在中东贯彻美国治下的和平。


America was powerful enough to destabilize the existing regional order, but not powerful enough to establish a new one.	美国的强大足以摧毁原有的地区秩序，但却不足以建立新的秩序。


The US neocons, with their wishful thinking, grossly underestimated the scale of the task at hand – unlike the revolutionaries in Iran, who quickly moved in to reap what the US had sowed.	一厢情愿的美国新保守主义者严重低估了这项任务的难度——而伊朗革命党人却恰恰相反，他们迅速行动夺走了美国种下的果实。


The Iraq war also marked the beginning of America’s subsequent relative decline.	伊拉克战争也成为美国相对衰落开始的标志。


Bush squandered a large part of America’s military strength in Mesopotamia for an ideological fiction – strength that is sorely missed in the region ten years later.	布什在美索不达米亚的意识形态谎言中浪费了美国很大一部分军力——十年后这些军力在该地区还根本无法补充。


And there is no alternative to be seen without America.	美国的力量仍然无法代替。


While there is no causal link between the Iraq war and the Arab revolutions that began in December 2010, their implications have combined in a malign manner.	尽管伊拉克战争和2010年12月开始的阿拉伯革命间不存在因果关系，但两者的影响已经以恶性的方式互相结合。


Since the war, the bitter enmities between Al Qaeda and other Salafist and Sunni Arab nationalist groups have given way to cooperation or even mergers.	战后“基地”组织和其他萨拉菲斯特和逊尼派阿拉伯民族主义团体间苦涩的仇恨已经被合作、甚至兼并所取代。


This, too, is a result brought about by the American neocon masterminds.	这同样是美国新保守主义操纵者所带来的苦果。


And the regional destabilization triggered by the Arab revolutions is increasingly converging on Iraq, mainly via Syria and Iran.	由阿拉伯革命引发的地区动荡通过叙利亚和伊朗越来越集中到伊拉克。


Indeed, the gravest current danger to the region is a process of national disintegration emanating from the Syrian civil war, which is threatening to spread not only to Iraq, but also to Lebanon and Jordan.	事实上，地区目前最严重的威胁是叙利亚内战导致的国家解体，它不仅有可能威胁到伊拉克，也有可能威胁到黎巴嫩和约旦。


What makes Syria’s civil war so dangerous is that the players on the ground are no longer its driving forces.	令叙利亚内战如此危险的是其实际参与者已不再是战争的驱动力量。


Rather, the war has become a struggle for regional dominance between Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey on the other.	相反，这场战争已经演变为伊朗和沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔和土耳其之间对地区霸权的争夺。


As a result, the Middle East is at risk of becoming the Balkans of the twenty-first century – a decline into regional chaos that began with, and was largely the result of, the US-led invasion ten years ago.	中东也因此有可能沦为二十一世纪的巴尔干——陷入到十年前以美国为首侵略所造成的区域动荡之中。


Winning the Confidence Game	信心是胜利的根本


NEW HAVEN – On April 2, the G-20 will hold a summit in London to discuss what we may hope will be an internationally coordinated plan to address the world economic crisis.	纽海文——4月2日，20国集团将在伦敦举行峰会，会议的主题是，为了应对目前面临的经济危机，如何建立一个国际间相互合作协调的方案。 这正是我们目前所关心的问题。


But can such a plan really work?	难道这方案真的会管用么？


The basic problem, of course, is confidence.	当然，问题的关键还是信心问题。


People everywhere, consumers and investors alike, are canceling spending plans, because the world economy seems very risky right now. The same thing happened during the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	面临着波及全球范围的经济危机，世界各地的人们，不管是消费着还是投资者，都在削减开支，就象1930年代的大萧条那样。


A contemporary observer, Winthrop Case, explained it all in 1938: economic revival depended “on the willingness of individual and corporate buyers to make purchases that necessarily tie up their resources for a considerable length of time.	当时的亲历者温思罗普·凯斯在1938年这样写到：经济的复苏靠的是“企业和个人愿意投资和消费，而且需要持续相当长的一段时间。


For the individual, this implies confidence in the job, and in the end comes equally back to the confidence of industry leaders.”	对个人来说，就是要对自己的工作有信心，对企业来说，就是老板对所从事的行业有信心。


Unfortunately, confidence did not return until World War II ended the depression.	”不幸的是，直到第二次世界大战结束，信心才开始恢复，萧条真正得以结束。


If the leaders meeting in London are to succeed where governments failed in the 1930’s, they must commit themselves to a fiscal target that is sufficient to restore full employment under normal credit conditions.	伦敦参会的领袖们必须有一个清晰的财政目标，那就是保证充分的就业和信贷市场的正常化；


They must also commit themselves to a credit target that will restore lending to normal.	同时，保证借贷市场的正常化也很重要。


People will not spend normally unless they have both a job and normal access to credit.	人们只有在有了工作，有了借贷信用的时候，才会正常的消费。


During the Great Depression, such targets were not used on a large enough scale, merely fueling public despair that stimulus policies would ever work.	这样才不会重导大萧条时代的覆辙。 仅仅依靠财政刺激方案是不可能获得成功的。


The G-20 Summit should also be an occasion for affirming some basic principles.	20国峰会同样要重申一些基本的准则。 信心不是靠消费和借贷才能恢复的。


Confidence isn’t built up on the basis of spending or lending alone.	人们要了解金钱不仅仅是由政府经济刺激方案来提供，而是要有一个稳定的来源。


People need to believe that the money represents something more lasting than stimulus measures, which may eventually end in failure.	如果只依靠政府的经济救助方案，最终不能达到恢复经济的目的。


After all, the Great Depression did not end simply because of the massive stimulus of war-related expenditures.	毕竟，大萧条时代的结束并不是仅仅因为战争导致的大量支出。


Why should World War II have produced any confidence in the future?	然后，为什么二战后大家会有信心呢？


To be sure, World War II reduced the unemployment rate in the United States dramatically, from 15% in 1940 to 1% in 1944, and had a similar effect in other countries.	应该看到，二战显著地减少了失业率。 例如，美国失业率从1940年的15%下降到1944年的1%。


But this was not because of a revival in business confidence.	其他国家也有类似的现象。


It was because of a nasty war, plain and simple, with people drafted into fighting, or into industries supplying the war effort.	失业率减少的原因很简单，当然不是由于商业信心恢复，而是那场该死的战争本身：大量的人员或是被直接卷入战争，或是为战争相关产业服务。


The real recovery of confidence did not occur until after World War II, when the world did not sink back into depression.	市场信心的真正恢复是发生在二战之后。 当时的世界并没有重新回到经济萧条之中。


The US Council of Economic Advisors warned of this possibility in 1949, and it was not alone.	而在1949年，美国国家经济委员曾认为世界经济会重新回到萧条之中。 这当然不是偶然的。


There appears to be more than one reason why, on the contrary, confidence came roaring back.	信心恢复的原因比较复杂。


First, there was a general perception of “pent-up demand.”	首先是因为“被压抑的需求”的爆发。


After years of privation (and in many countries the physical destruction of war), people just wanted to live normally – to rebuild, own a home, a car, and other consumer goods.	由于战争而导致的多年物质极度匮乏，因此，人们想要过一种正常的生活，战后的废墟需也要重新建立——重建自己的家园，拥有自己的车和其他生活用品。


The widespread impression that there was such pent-up demand also led people to believe that there could not be another depression.	基于由于以上的共同认识，人们普遍认为不会再会有另一次经济萧条。


The perception of pent-up demand was like a powerful economic stimulus package, and it had the advantage that people believed it would be long-lasting.	如此强大的需求就如同经济刺激方案，特别是大家都认为这会是一种长久的需求。


Indeed, the same long-term confidence triggered the post-war “baby boom.”	同样的信心也导致了战后“婴儿潮”的出现。


According to some contemporary observers, however, “pent-up demand” was only part of the story.	对当时的一些观察者来看，“被压抑的需求”只是经济复苏的原因之一。


During the brief but deep recession of 1949, the financial commentator Silvia Porter reflected on the attitudes that led to the 1929 crash: “We saw nothing wrong – in fact, we saw everything right – with the wild speculative boom and credit inflation that…culminated in the now almost unbelievable gambling orgy of 1929.”	1949年出现了短暂的经济萧条，在回顾1929年大萧条��期人们的表现时，当时的金融评论家塞尔威·波特说道：“那时候投机盛行，信贷膨胀，我们当时觉得一切都很正常，大家都沉浸在一时的狂欢盛宴之中，没有人意识到危险的到来。 ”


But now, Porter wrote, after the depression and war, “We began to listen to the idea that a hundred million citizens, acting through a central government, could achieve much more than a hundred million acting as separate selfish units.	但现在，波特写到：“现在，我们一亿公民的心声通过一个中央政府来集中体现，这比我们各自为政而产生的效果要好的多。


We developed, in short, a new attitude toward the responsibilities of government.”	因此，我们需要对政府职责重新认识了。


She concluded that the positive effect of “pent-up demand” and government measures can “make sense only when viewed against the background of our changed economic and political philosophy.”	” 只有在我们的 社会政治观念发生改变之后，她对“压抑的需求”和“政府职责”的积极方面才能体现出来。


The Marshall Plan, which operated from 1947 to 1951, became a symbol of this new attitude.	1947—1945年的马歇尔计划正是这样改变的标志。


The US gave billions of dollars of aid to rebuild war-ravaged countries in Europe.	美国拿出数十亿美元重建战后的欧洲。


The plan was widely viewed as reflecting a new kind of enlightenment, a recognition of the importance of supporting people who needed help.	此举显示出一种全新的理念，那就是关注那些需要救助的人们。


Europe would not be allowed to languish, and the stimulus came from abroad.	为了防止欧洲的衰败，救助的力量必须来自欧洲大陆之外。


After the war, Keynesian economic theory, which was generally not accepted or understood during the Great Depression, became the basis of a new social compact. It was a theory that was perfectly suited to a generation that had just endured exceptional sacrifices, for it reaffirmed a belief in our responsibility for each other.	大萧条时代不能接受凯恩斯主义的经济理论，而在二战后以后，凯恩斯主义开始流行起来，经过二战之后，大家都已经付出了超出寻常的牺牲，为了战后的重建，大家仍然需要同舟共济，共同面对问题。


The effect of economic stimulus is redoubled by this kind of inspirational belief.	有了这种共识，再加上政府的经济刺激方案，所达到的效果就事半功倍了。


That is why all of the commitments made and intentions expressed at the upcoming G-20 summit matter.	以上所阐述的就是20国领导峰会所要达到的目标。


The countries represented must show a generous spirit and make the world economy work for all people.	参加的国家代表必须有着宽阔的胸襟，目的是为了整个人类的经济而努力。


Seemingly peripheral issues, like aid to the developing world and the poor, who suffer the most from a crisis like this one, will be part of the primary story of the renewal of confidence, just as the Marshall Plan was part of that story after World War II.	就如同救助那些发展中国家和贫穷人口的那些方案那样，对于那些深陷经济危机的国家来说，重新建立信心是一个最重要的基础，这也就是“马歇尔计划”在二战后所发挥的作用。


Winning the European Confidence Game	夺取欧洲信心战的胜利


CHICAGO – If any solution to the European crisis proposed over the next few days is to restore confidence to the sovereign-bond markets, it will have to be both economically viable and politically palatable to rescuers and rescued alike.	芝加哥——如果未来几天内出台的欧洲危机解决方案想要重塑人们对主权债券的信心的话，那么该计划就必须在经济上可行，而且在政治上可以让救援者和被救援者双方接受。


This means paying attention not just to the plan’s technical details, but also to appearances.	这意味着我们不仅要关注解决方案的技术细节，也要注意它的包装。


There is growing consensus about any solution’s key elements.	对于解决方案的关键点，人们越来越有了共识。


First, Italy and Spain will have to come up with credible medium-term plans that will not just restore their fiscal health, but also improve their ability to grow their way out of trouble.	首先，意大利和西班牙必须给出可信的中期计划，不仅要重塑财政健康，还必须改善它们走出困境的能力。


While any plan will involve pain for citizens, the markets must deem the pain politically tolerable, at least relative to the alternatives.	不管是什么计划，公民肯定会经受一些痛苦，与此同时，市场必须认为这些痛苦在政治上是可接受的，至少要比替代方案好。


It is important that these plans be seen as domestically devised (though voters will have no illusions about the external and market pressures that have forced their governments to act).	有一点很重要：这些计划应该被视为是由本国设计的（尽管选民们会对迫使本国政府采取行动的外部和市场压力心知肚明）。


At the same time, an external agency such as the International Monetary Fund could render the plan more credible by evaluating it for consistency with the country’s goals and monitoring its implementation.	与此同时，外部机构，比如IMF，可以通过评估计划与该国目标的一致性以及监督计划的实施来加强计划的可信度。


Second, some vehicle – the IMF or the European Financial Stability Facility, with either entity funded directly by countries or the European Central Bank – has to stand ready to fund borrowing by Italy, Spain, and any other potentially distressed countries over the next year or two.	其次，在未来一两年中，某些机构——IMF或欧洲金融稳定基金（由欧洲各国直接提供资金或由欧洲央行提供资金的实体）——必须时刻准备着为意大利、西班牙和其他具有潜在风险的国家提供贷款融资。


But there is an important caveat, which has largely been ignored in public discussions: if this funding is senior to private debt (as IMF funding typically is), it will be harder for these countries to regain access to markets.	但这里有一个在公众讨论中往往被忽视的重要警告：如果该融资比私人债务级别高（IMF融资通常如此），那么这些国家重回资本市场将难上加难。


After all, the more a country borrows in the short term from official sources, the further back in line it pushes private creditors.	毕竟，一国从官方渠道借入的短期融资越多，私人债权的比重就越低。


That makes private lenders susceptible to larger haircuts if the country eventually defaults – and thus more hesitant to lend in the first place.	这使得私人贷款人会怀疑如果该国最终违约，则其损失会更大，从而在一开始就对贷款犹豫不决。


In other words, private markets need to be convinced both that there is a low probability of default (hence the importance of credible plans), and that there is some additional loss-bearing capacity in the new funding, so that, if there is a default, outstanding or rolled-over private debt does not have to bear the full brunt.	换句话说，你必须让私人市场相信，你的违约概率很低（因此可信计划非常重要），且新融资会有增加的损失吸收能力，万一违约发生，未偿还或展期的私人债务不会受到完全的损失。


This may seem unfair.	这可能有些不公平。


Why should the taxpayer accept a loss when they are bailing out the private sector by providing new funding?	为什么纳税人要在他们通过提供新融资拯救私人部门的同时接受损失？


In an ideal world, distressed countries would default as soon as private markets stopped funding them, and they would impose the losses on private bondholders.	理想的情况是，受困国将在私人市场停止提供融资时立刻违约，损失将由私人债权人承担。


In the real world, however, if Italy and Spain are viewed as being solvent, or too big to fail, official funding should be structured so that it gives these countries their best chance to regain market confidence.	但是，在现实世界中如果意大利和西班牙被认定破了产（或太大而不能倒），就必须组织官方融资，以便这些国家能尽可能地赢回市场信心。


This does not mean that official funding should be junior to private debt in any restructuring, for that would require substantially more loss-bearing capacity from the official sector – capacity that is probably not available.	这并不意味着官方融资应该在重组中获得比私人债务更低的地位，因为将要求官方部门拥有极大的损失吸收能力，而这有可能是不现实的。


Indeed, if official funding were junior, it would be providing a larger cushion to private creditors – and thus bailing them out to an even greater extent.	事实上，如果官方融资地位较低，那么它相当于在为私人债权人提供更大的损失缓冲垫，从而更多地拯救私人债权人。


The simplest solution is to treat official funding no differently from private debt – best achieved if official lenders buy sovereign bonds as they are issued (possibly at a predetermined yield) and agree to be treated on par with private creditors in a restructuring.	最简单的解决办法是对官方融资和私人债务一视同仁，最佳实现方式便是在发行主权债券时由官方贷款人购买（可以固定收益率），官方贷款人同意在重组中与私人债权人具有同等地位。


As the country regains market confidence, the official funding can be reduced, and eventually the bonds can be sold back to the markets.	当该国重新赢得市场信心时，官方融资可以削减，其买入的债券最终可以卖回给市场。


The bottom line is that official funding must be accompanied by loss-bearing capacity.	要点是官方融资必须具有损失吸收能力。


If the funding is channeled through the IMF, and is to be treated on par with private debt, the Fund will need a guarantee from the EFSF or strong eurozone countries that it will be indemnified in any restructuring.	如果官方融资走IMF渠道并与私人债务一视同仁，那么IMF需要EFSF或欧元区坚挺国家的担保，它可以在重组中获得保护。


Of course, the IMF’s member states might be willing to accept some burden sharing if a sufficient buffer provided by the eurozone were eroded, but that cannot be taken for granted.	当然，如果欧元区所提供的充分缓冲遭到破坏的话，IMF成员国可能也会愿意接受一定责任共担，但不能把这一点视为理所当然。


Once the first two elements of the plan are in place, there should be little need for the third – bond purchases by the ECB in the secondary market in order to narrow interest-rate spreads and provide further confidence.	当解决方案的前两大要素具备后，第三大要素——欧洲央行在二级市场购买债券以缩小利差并提供更多的信心——是否具备已经无关紧要了。


Indeed, if the ECB intends to claim preferred-creditor status for any bonds that it buys, it is probably best that it buy very few.	事实上，如果欧洲央行欲使其所买入的债券拥有优先债权地位，那么它最好不要大量买入。


Of course, the ECB will have to continue to provide support to banks until confidence about their holdings returns.	当然，欧洲央行将不得不继续向银行提供支持，直到市场对它们所持有的债券恢复信心。


But there is one more element that is needed to assure markets that the solution is politically viable.	但要让市场相信解决办法在政治上可行，还需要另一大要素。


Citizens across Europe, whether in rescued countries or rescuing countries, will be paying for years to clean up a mess for which they were not responsible.	欧洲各国公民，不管是救援国还是被救援国，将在多年内为清理并非由他们引起的乱象买单。


Not all banks voluntarily loaded up on distressed government bonds – some were pressured by supervisors, others by governments – but many have made unwise bets.	并非所有的银行都是自愿买入受困国政府债券的——一些是迫于监管者压力，一些是迫于政府要求——但确实有很多银行做出了不明智的投资决策。


If they are seen as profiting unduly from the rescue, even as they return to their bad old ways of paying for non-performance, they will undermine political support for the rescue – and perhaps even for capitalism.	如果它们被认为从救援行动中不正当地得利了，那么就算它们回到为不良贷款买单的错误老路上去，也会破坏对救援行动——乃至资本主义——政治支持。


So a final element of the package ought to be a monitored pledge by eurozone banks that they will not unload bonds as the official sector steps in; that they will raise capital over time instead of continuing to deleverage (if this hurts bank equity holders, they should think of this as burden sharing); and that they will be circumspect about banker bonuses until economies start growing strongly again.	因此，解决方案的最后一大要素应该是欧元区银行作出受监控的承诺，它们不会在官方部门介入是卸去手上持有的债券； 它们将不断筹集资���，而不是不断去杠杆化（如果银行股东因此受害，那么他们应该把这想象为责任共担机制）；


Cries that this is not capitalism should be met with a firm retort: “Nor are bailouts!”	它们必须谨慎发放奖金，直到经济再次开始强劲增长。 对于那些“这不是资本主义”的嚷嚷，我们可以大声地回应：“救援也不是！


Winning the Peace	实现和平


Afghanistan’s future hangs in the balance as its weak national government struggles to maintain support and legitimacy in the face of a widening insurgency, warlords, the heroin trade, and a disappointed populace.	在叛乱规模越来越大、军阀越来越多、海洛因贸易猖獗、人民大失所望的情况下，阿富汗虚弱的国民政府拼命想要维持自身的合法性和民众的支持，阿富汗国内局势摇摇欲坠。


Across an arc extending from Afghanistan to East Africa, violence now also surges in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and beyond, to Sudan’s Darfur region.	从阿富汗到东非一线，战火在伊拉克、黎巴嫩、索马里甚至苏丹的达尔富尔地区肆虐燃烧。


Everywhere, politicians, generals, and even diplomats talk of military strategies and maneuvers, but everywhere something utterly different is needed.	政治家、将军甚至外交家有关军事策略和调动的谈论声不绝于耳，但真正符合这些地区需要的政策却截然不同。


Stability will come only when economic opportunities exist, when a bulging generation of young men can find jobs and support families, rather than seeking their fortune in violence.	只有经济机会才能催生稳定，当越来越多的年轻人能找到工作、养家糊口，而不是靠暴力斗争来改变命运时，才能实现真正的稳定。


We are seeing again and again that a foreign army, whether NATO’s in Afghanistan, America’s in Iraq, Israel’s in occupied Palestine, or Ethiopia’s in Somalia, may win a battle, or even a war, but never the peace.	我们一再看到无论是阿富汗的北约部队、伊拉克的美国驻军、巴勒斯坦的以色列占领者还是索马里的埃塞俄比亚人，所有这些外国军队能够打胜一场战役，甚至赢得整个战争，但却永远无法实现和平。


Peace is about dignity and hope for the future.	和平是尊严，是未来的希望。


Military occupation saps dignity, and grinding poverty and economic disarray sap hope.	军事占领一点一点地消磨人的尊严、折磨人的贫穷和经济混乱慢慢使希望丧失殆尽。


Peace can be achieved only with a withdrawal of foreign troops, and the arrival of jobs, productive farms and factories, tourism, health care, and schools.	只有撤出外国军队、创造工作机会、建设高效率的农场、企业、发展旅游、医疗和教育，才能最终实现和平。


Without these, military victory and occupation quickly turn to ashes.	如果没有这些，军事胜利和占领的喜悦很快就会灰飞烟灭。


The United States government has proven itself blind to these facts, but the international community also remains ill equipped to assist in the restoration of peace following conflicts in impoverished countries.	事实证明美国政府对这一切视而不见，而国际社会也依然对战后贫困国家重建和平束手无策。


Repeatedly, a fragile peace has broken down because of the lack of economic follow-up.	因为没有后续的经济发展，脆弱的和平一而再、再而三地遭到破坏。


Despite grand promises of foreign aid, economic reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere, the actual record of international assistance to post-war reconstruction is gravely deficient.	尽管阿富汗、伊拉克、黎巴嫩等地无一例外地得到了国外援助、经济重建和发展的慷慨承诺，但真正用于战后重建的国际援助却少得可怜。


The scenario has become painfully familiar. A war ends.	情况令人心痛地相似。


An international donors’ conference is called. Pledges of billions of dollars are announced.	战争结束后召集国际捐助大会，会上承诺捐赠成百上千亿美元。


A smiling new head of state graciously thanks the international community, including the occupying power.	面带笑容的新国家元首礼貌地向包括占领国在内的国际社会致谢。


Months pass. World Bank teams from Washington start to arrive.	数月以后，来自华盛顿的世界银行特派小组陆续抵达。


But actual reconstruction and recovery is delayed, perhaps for years.	但真正的重建或恢复工作却一拖再拖，也许长达数年之久。


Crony businesses from the US and Europe, which are utterly unfamiliar with local conditions, squander time, aid funds, and opportunities.	来自美国和欧洲的企业任人唯亲，完全不了解当地的情况，将时间、援助款项和机会浪费殆尽。


Two or three years pass.	两三年过去了。


The grand pronouncements become a pile of out-of-date World Bank studies.	义正词严的声明变成了一堆过时的世界银行调研报告。


Recriminations fly, the occupying army remains, and a new insurgency spreads.	到处能够听到相互指责，占领军还在耀武扬威，新一轮的叛乱又蔓延开去。


Many factors contribute to this disarray, beginning with the shocking inability of the US, Europe, and the international organizations to understand things from the perspective of poor and displaced people.	造成这种混乱的原因非常复杂，但归根结底，美国、欧洲和国际机构根本不愿为流离失所的穷人考虑是一切混乱的源泉。


Their lack of empathy is deplorable, but there are conceptual problems as well.	他们不会换位思考令人可悲可叹，但与理念有关的问题也急待解决。


The international agencies involved in post-conflict reconstruction have so far failed to understand how to start or restart economic development in a low-income setting.	参与战后重建的国际机构到目前为止还没有学会如何在低收入环境中启动经济的发展。


It’s important to distinguish four distinct phases of outside help to end a conflict.	找出外来援助结束冲突的四个步骤至关重要。


In the first phase, during the war itself, aid is for humanitarian relief, focusing on food, water, emergency medicine, and refugee camps.	在第一阶段，也就是战争阶段，援助是为了人道主义目的，重点放在食物、水、急救药品和收容帐篷。


In the second phase, at the war’s end, aid remains mainly humanitarian relief, but now directed towards displaced people returning home, and to decommissioned soldiers.	到了第二阶段，也就是战争结束阶段，援助仍然以人道主义目的为主，但现在要侧重于流离失所的百姓和退伍军人重返家园。


In the third phase, lasting three to five years, aid supports the first phase of post-war economic development, including restoration of schools, clinics, farms, factories, and ports.	第三阶段一般会持续3到5年，援助的任务是启动首阶段的战后经济发展，包括重建学校、诊所、农场、企业和港口。


In the fourth phase, which can last a generation or more, assistance is directed to long-term investments and the strengthening of institutions such as courts.	而第四阶段则需要整整一代人或更长时间的努力，重点更多地放在长期投资，以及加强以法院为首的机构建设。


The international community, and the US in particular, is dreadful at the third stage.	国际社会，特别是美国，在第三阶段的表现简直糟糕透顶。


Once a conflict is over, aid agencies seem paralyzed.	一旦战争结束，援助机构似乎就变得束手无策。


Instead of sending help, they send study groups.	他们送去的不是援助，而是派去调研小组。


There is often a lag of years before moving from humanitarian relief to real economic development.	通常从人道主义援助到真正的经济建设需要花去几年的时间。


By the time such help actually arrives, it is often too late: war has been re-ignited.	等援助真正到位的时候常常已经太迟了：战火已经被再次点燃。


In fact, it is possible to restart economic development through targeted “quick-impact” initiatives.	实际上，通过目标明确的“快速起效”方案来迅速启动经济是完全可能的。


Since the economies of most impoverished post-conflict countries are based on agriculture, restarting farm output is vital.	因为多数贫困战后国家的经济主要依赖农业，恢复农业生产是至关重要的。


Impoverished farmers should receive a free package of seeds, fertilizers, and low-cost equipment (such as pumps for irrigation).	应该向贫困农民免费发放种子、化肥和低成本的器械（比如灌溉用的水泵）。


When such aid is made available quickly, former soldiers will return to their farms, and can establish a livelihood by the beginning of the first growing season following the end of hostilities.	一旦这些援助迅��到位，从前的士兵就会返回到自己的故里，并在敌对状态结束后通过种植第一季庄稼开始新的生活。


This type of aid does not require long studies, but quick action.	这种援助根本不需要长时间的调研，它所需要的是迅速采取行动。


Similar quick-impact measures should be undertaken to control disease.	应该采取同样的迅速起效方案来控制疾病的蔓延。


Small rural clinics can be built or rebuilt very quickly, within the first year of peace.	小型的乡村诊所能够在停火后一年内迅速建设或者重建。


Solar panels and wind turbines can provide off-grid power in isolated rural areas.	无须建设电网，太阳能电池板和风车也能为偏远的乡村地区提供能源。


Wells and cisterns can be put in place to ensure safe drinking water.	可以修建水井和水塔，确保饮用水的安全。


These and similar efforts can mean the difference between famine and food security, epidemic disease and health, income and utter poverty, and, most importantly, hope and despair.	上述措施和类似的努力能够避免饥荒，提供安全食品、消除流行病、确保人民健康、给普通人带来收入，消灭极端贫困，最重要的是，为人们驱除绝望，带来希望的曙光。


Yet the window of opportunity closes quickly.	但如果没有好好利用，机遇的大门很快就会关上。


Quick-impact economic development is exactly what is needed now to help end the horrific violence and suffering in Darfur.	迅速见效的经济发展是结束达尔富尔恐怖暴力和灾难的必由之路。


Sanctions, threats, and peacekeepers are only short-term measures, whereas real progress there against extreme poverty is not only achievable, but also is something that the government and rebels can agree on.	制裁、威胁和维和部队都只是短期的办法，而消除极端贫困的真正进展不仅可以实现，而且能够得到政府和叛乱势力的一致赞同。


The same applies in Somalia.	索马里的情况也是一样。


But the window of opportunity closes quickly in these and other post-conflict regions.	但在上面提到的战后地区和其他遭受战火蹂躏的土地，机会的大门很快就会关上。


Only by taking quick, meaningful action to fight hunger, poverty, and disease can there be a chance of creating conditions for long-term peace.	只有采取迅速、有效的措施来战争饥饿、贫困和疾病，才有机会为长久的和平创造条件。


Winning the Transition	实现转型成功


WASHINGTON, DC – Is the Arab Spring turning into a gloomy autumn?	华盛顿——阿拉伯春天之后阴沉的秋天是否正在来临？


With brutal crackdowns in Syria, a bloody civil war in Libya, and Yemen teetering on the brink of chaos, the number of skeptics is growing.	随着叙利亚的残酷镇压、利比亚的血腥内战和也门在混乱边缘摇摇欲坠，持怀疑态度的人数正迅速攀升。


Although Egypt and Tunisia’s pro-democracy movements achieved rapid regime change, uncertainties remain in those countries, too.	虽然埃及和突尼斯的民主运动快速实现了政权更替，但这两个国家同样存在不确定性。


After a brief period of hope, many observers now wonder whether the region is capable of producing viable, and economically vibrant, democracies.	在短暂的希望过后，不少观察家现在怀疑该地区能否诞生能独立发展、充满经济活力的民主国家。


Revolutions and their aftermaths, of course, are always fluid and fickle times, and the outcome is often perched on a knife’s edge.	当然，革命和革命的结果往往都非常善变，而最终的结果往往系于千钧一发之间。


Bridging the vast gap between high expectations and the reality of limited budgets and capabilities is a test in itself.	弥合殷切希望和有限预算和能力之间的鸿沟本身就是一种考验。


Redressing past injustice and building an economy that offers opportunity to all are major challenges as well, fraught with volatility, uncertainty, and the dangers of political opportunism.	纠正既往不公和建设机会均等的经济也是一项充满波动、变数和政治机会主义风险的严峻挑战。


But transitions are also times of great opportunity.	但转型往往也伴随着巨大的机遇。


In the 1990’s, I was among those Indonesians who demanded and celebrated the departure of our own autocrat, Suharto, and I joined the new government when he left.	20世纪90年代，我曾经是要求并且庆祝独裁统治者苏哈托下台的印尼民众的一员，苏哈托离开后我加盟了新的政府。


Many observers predicted that Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, would be unable to sustain democracy and would ultimately decline into chaos.	当时很多观察家预测全世界人口最多的穆斯林国家印尼将无法保持民主制度，并最终陷入到混乱当中。


The task ahead of us was daunting.	令人生畏的任务摆在我们面前。


But we proved the skeptics wrong, and learned some fundamental lessons.	但我们证明了怀疑论者的错误，从中汲取了某些基本的经验。


Perhaps most importantly, we learned that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for democratization.	或许最重要的是，我们体会到没有放之四海皆准的通用民主化方案。


Each of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa will face unique challenges, which will have to be addressed on their own terms.	中东和北非的每个国家都面临各自的问题，这些问题的解决必须根据其自身的条件。


Even so, they all must make a real and symbolic break with the past.	即使如此，他们都必须从真正意义上与过去决裂。


The new authorities must send strong signals that the old ways are finished.	新政府必须明确旧的方式已经不复存在。


Change must be formally manifested, with new laws that are widely publicized.	改革和新的法律必须得到广泛宣传。


Legislation that empowers citizens with freedom of expression, free and independent elections, and freedom of association is crucial, and it must be made clear to the public that no one is above the law. Anything less will undermine the transition.	赋予公民言论自由、独立自由选举权和集会自由的法案至关重要，必须让公众明白没有人能凌驾于法律之上，否则转型就有可能遭到破坏。


Moreover, corruption is the bane of development everywhere, so new governments should move fast to establish institutions and procedures to fight it.	此外，腐败无论在哪里都是发展的祸根，因此新政府必须建立起与之斗争的机构和程序。


Transparency and accountability are powerful ideas with near-universal support, which means that new leaders should not give up when the fight becomes difficult.	透明制和问责制是近乎受到普遍支持的强大思想，也就是说新领袖不应放弃艰苦的斗争。


Civil-society organizations, local communities, representatives of the poor and vulnerable, and women play a vital role in this regard, and they should be included at every level of decision-making.	民间社会组织、地方社团、穷人和弱势群体代表及妇女在这方面所起的作用至关重要，他们必须参与到所有层次的决策当中。


In Indonesia, we signed a hundred laws in less than 18 months, covering everything from media freedom to elections, corruption, decentralization, and anti-trust rules.	印尼在不到18个月时间里签署了一百部法律，这些法律涉及媒体选举自由、腐败、权力下放和反垄断规则的方方面面。


We ratified new public-finance legislation and ensured the independence of the country’s central bank.	我们批准了新的公共财政立法，保障印尼央行的独立管理权。


New leaders must also expect and manage setbacks.	新领导人还必须预想并管理各种困难。


In post-revolutionary times, expectations are high, and the obstacles to meeting them are enormous.	在后革命时代人们的期望值空前高涨，而实现这些期望却面临着巨大的障碍。


I know from personal experience that we did not always have the luxury of getting the best outcomes.	我从亲身经历中得知我们并不总能得到最好的结果。


We had to compromise and settle for the best possible results.	我们必须学会妥协，接受最有可能的结果。


Security threats are among the most serious setbacks in transitions.	安全威胁是转型过程中最严重的障碍。


Nationalistic sentiment is strong, and politicians and interest groups can exploit it.	民族主义情绪空前高涨，政客和利益团体可能利用民族情绪达到自己的目的。


Often, the security forces are holdovers from the old regime, and there is no independent judicial system.	通常安全部队都来自旧政府的残余势力，独立的司法制度也没有建立。


Reforms will take time, and the old bureaucracies may not be able to implement them.	改革需要时间，而指望旧的官僚机构推进改革可能并不现实。


In Indonesia, we used various innovations to work around such dilemmas.	在印尼，我们采取各式各样的创新措施来解决这种两难局面。


For example, we appointed an independent judge to take over the bankruptcy and corruption courts, because career judges were too tainted.	比方说，我们指定一名独立法官接手破产和腐败法庭，因为职业法官已经染上了污点。


Likewise, when we started cash-for-work programs as part of our pro-poor agenda, we asked communities to run these initiatives.	同样，当我们启动穷人支持计划付现工作方案的时候，我们请求社会团体来推行这项计划。


More broadly, new leaders are well advised to ensure that the economy performs well.	更广泛的说，新领导人将得到充分的建议，以确保经济能够进入良性循环。


It is important to restore economic activity and create a favorable environment for entrepreneurs, particularly small and medium-size businesses, which constitute the main engine of job creation.	恢复经济活动并为企业家（特别是中小企业家）创造有利的环境非常重要，因为中小企业是创造就业机会的主要来源。


The recent revolutions, it should be recalled, started with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor, who was harassed and insulted by the authorities.	我们应该记得一位突尼斯水果商人的自焚引发了最近这场革命���这名商人自焚是因为不堪忍受政府的侮辱和骚扰。


But economic success without accountability and social inclusion is not sustainable, and new governments often must face tough choices in order to protect the poor and vulnerable.	但是不具备责任和包容的经济成功不是持久的成功，新政府往往会为保护穷人和弱势群体而面临艰难的抉择。


They might have to abolish mis-targeted subsidies to free up resources for more targeted and efficient anti-poverty and job-creation programs.	他们可能需要取消错误的补贴，以节省更多资源用于更有针对性、更加高效的扶贫和就业创造计划。


In Indonesia, we had to draw a line between the very poor and the near-poor.	在印尼，我们不得不区分贫困和近贫人口。


We could not afford to raise salaries or provide subsidies for everybody.	我们没有能力提高工资，或为所有人发放补贴。


Our help had to be targeted.	我们的帮助必须有针对性。


So, while we helped the neediest, we excluded others who were not poor enough to benefit.	因此，我们在为最贫困群体提供帮助的同时，也把不够资格享受补贴的人群排除在外。


This was a tough and unpopular choice.	这项工作既不受欢迎又非常艰难。


Finally, countries in transition need support – not only money, but also technical know-how to implement highly complex reforms.	最后，转型国家需要支持——其中不仅包括资金，也包括推进高度复杂改革的技术知识。


When I became Indonesia’s finance minister, I had 64,000 employees.	我担任印尼财政部长期间，手下拥有64，000位员工。


But when we had to modernize our tax system, we could not find the required expertise anywhere in our country.	但当我们需要改革税收系统的时候，却找遍全国都没有找到所需的专业人才。


Yes, we needed external assistance, but we never surrendered “ownership” of the reform process; we made it work for us.	是的，我们需要外部支持，但我们从未放弃对改革的“所有权”。 我们的改革取得了成功。


If we Indonesians had not been in charge of our own transition, it could easily have failed.	如果印尼人没有领导我们自身的改革，那么改革很有可能会陷入失败。


That lesson, too, is one that all countries in transition should bear in mind.	所有处于转型时期的国家都应该汲取相关的经验。


Winning with Opium in Afghanistan	以鸦片制胜阿富汗


Despite considerable effort by the international community in Afghanistan since 2001 to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda, the insurgency in the south of the country has gathered momentum at breakneck speed in recent months.	尽管国际社会自2001年以来在铲除塔利班和“基地组织”方面付出了巨大的努力，但近几个月来，该国南部叛乱的形势还是以非常危险的速度发展着。


Our field research shows that we are not winning the campaign for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people – the Taliban are.	实地调查表明，我们正在赢得阿富汗民心的较量中落败—而塔利班却正在胜出。


Indeed, the international community’s methods of fighting the insurgency and eradicating poppy crops have actually helped the insurgents gain power.	的确，国际社会对抗叛乱和铲除罂粟作物的方式其实助长了叛乱分子的力量。


The international community has so far pursued policies of destruction, rather than the promised reconstruction.	国际社会到目前为止推行的是摧毁政策，而不是所承诺的重建。


The aggressive United States-led counter-narcotics policy of crop eradication has failed to win the support of Afghans, because it has triggered a chain reaction of poverty and violence in which poor farmers, with their only livelihood destroyed, are unable to feed their families.	美国领导下的激进的铲除种植的反毒品政策没有赢得阿富汗人民的支持，因为它引发了一系列贫困和暴力的连锁反应。 当贫穷农民唯一的生计被破坏以后，他们就连养家糊口也成了问题。


This has been exacerbated by the failure to provide even the most basic aid and development in the country’s poorest areas.	由于未能在该国最贫穷的地区提供哪怕最基本的发展援助，更加剧了这一局面的恶化。


At the same time, communities have been torn apart as a result of bombing campaigns, which have destroyed the very homes we came to protect.	同时，由于轰炸攻势使得居民社区支离破碎。 我们摧毁了本应受到保护的目标。


This, in addition to four years of drought, has forced entire families to leave their villages for makeshift internal refugee camps.	这一因素，加上长达四年的干旱，迫使许多家庭背井离乡，安顿到国内难民营的临时棚户中。


You do not win people over by bombing them, but by helping them.	轰炸得不了人心，而援助才是正道。


The Taliban have exploited the failures of the international community in extremely effective anti-Western propaganda that has fueled significant doubt in the minds of the public concerning the reasons justifying the international presence in Afghanistan.	塔利班在他们极为有效的反西方宣传战中利用了国际社会的失败。 这些宣传加深了公众对在阿富汗的国际干预合法性的质疑。


Sadly, our troops are often the first to pay the price – sometimes with their lives.	悲哀的是，我们的部队常常是首先付出代价的人—有时是生命的代价。


It is not too late to win back the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.	现在要赢得阿富汗的民心还为时不晚。


International troops are excelling in an exceptionally hostile environment, but this is not a war that will be won by military means alone.	国际部队在极端敌对的环境中保持着优势，但这场战争单靠武力是不能获胜的。


With public perception a crucial factor in winning the war, and the Taliban poised to launch a large military initiative next spring, failure to adopt a successful local strategy could signify the last chance the international community will have to build a secure and stable Afghanistan.	在民意成为制胜的关键因素，而塔利班又做足准备在明年春季发动一场大规模军事行动的情况下，如果不能采取成功的本地战略，那么就意味着国际社会将失去在阿富汗建立安全和稳定的最后机会。


But a successful strategy – one that responds to Afghanistan’s extreme poverty crisis –requires that the international community reverse course on crop eradication.	但是一个成功的战略—一个应对阿富汗的极端贫困危机的战略—需要国际社会在铲除鸦片的问题上反其道而行之。


In fact, the eradication of poppy crops not only damage local communities and undermines the international community’s goals, but it is also failing: opium production last year was at an all-time high.	实际上，铲除罂粟作物不但破坏了当地民生、阻碍了国际社会实现其目标，而且也是失败的：去年的鸦片生产创历史新高。