Why this paradox?	这一悖论是如何造成的呢？


A vote that meant saying “no” to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 now means saying “no” to the leaders of the French left and right.	在2005年想要拒绝欧盟宪法的选票现在想要拒绝左右两翼的领导人。


In the 2002 presidential election, frustration with the system fueled strong support for the extremes, with Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the far right, qualifying for the second-round runoff.	在2002年的总统大选中，人们对于法国体制的挫折感加剧了对极端份子的强大支持，极右翼领导人勒庞赢得了第二轮投票的资格。


In 2007, by contrast – and this constitutes real progress – a large segment of the French population is expressing its frustration with the system by being tempted to vote for the “extreme center,” i.e., Bayrou.	在2007年，与此相反，法国民众的很大一部分通过把票投给“极中间派”，也就贝鲁来表达对体制的不满，而这就构成了切实的进步。


Bayrou has been in politics for a long time, including as a presidential candidate in 2002.	贝鲁从政多年，包括在2002年作为总统候选人。


But, while his record as education minister is far from impressive, he has successfully reinvented his image in the last few months, becoming the “new man” of French politics.	但是，他在教育部长的任期内乏善可陈，他却在最近几个月内成功地重新创造了自己的形像，成为法国政治的“新人”。


He looks more reassuring than Sarkozy and sounds more competent than Royal.	他比萨尔科奇看起来更为让人信服，比罗雅尔更为有能力。


This would not be enough for Bayrou in ordinary times, but today, on both sides of the political divide, opponents of the main candidates seem ready to join forces with him and betray their respective camps.	在平常时候这对于贝鲁是不够的，但是今天，在政治派别的两端，主要候选人的对手们看起来准备加入他的势力并且背叛他们各自的阵营。


What makes Bayrou potentially so strong is the fact that widespread reservations about the two leading candidates are influencing the calculus of militants and politicians alike.	让贝鲁的潜力如此强大的原因是法国民众对两大主要候选人大范围的保留意见正在影响到激进份子和政客们的算计。


On the conservative side, Jacques Chirac now officially supports Sarkozy, but he may also secretly encourage his most loyal supporters to vote for Bayrou, even if there is no love lost between the two men.	在保守派一边，希拉克已经正式支持萨尔科奇，但是他可能也暗地里鼓励他最为忠诚的支持者们投贝鲁的票，即使这在两个人之间不会丧失情义。


On the left, the social democratic wing of the Socialist party, which backed Dominique Strauss-Kahn against Royal, may be tempted to align with Bayrou, too, owing to the prospect of a post-electoral alliance between the center left and the center right.	在左翼一边，社会党的社会民主派曾经支持斯特劳斯·卡恩而反对罗雅尔，他们也可能由于在大选结束后中左翼和中右翼有可能结盟而受到诱惑与贝鲁结盟。


That said, surveys of the electorate demonstrate that a large proportion is still undecided, particularly among Bayrou’s supporters.	这样，对选民的调查显示，一大部分人还是举棋不定，特别是贝鲁的支持者们。


So it is too early to say whether Bayrou can reach the second round.	因此，评判贝鲁是否能够进入第二轮还为时尚早。


But if he does, he is likely to prove irresistible.	但是如果他果真进入第二轮，那么，他就可能无法抵制。


A Bayrou victory, which is unlikely but not impossible, would constitute a triple revolution.	贝鲁赢得大选胜利并非完全没有可能。 这将造成一场三重革命。


It would lead first to the end of the Socialist Party created by François Mitterrand.	首先，这将会导致由密特朗建立的社会党的终结。


Following Lionel Jospin’s humiliating defeat in 2002, the Socialists simply would not survive a second consecutive failure to reach the second round.	在2002年若斯潘一败涂地之后，社会党人根本无法再挺过连续第二次无法进入第二轮的结局。


Moreover, a Bayrou victory could signify the end of the conservative party created by Chirac, as well as of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic.	而且，贝鲁获胜也可能标志著由希拉克建立的保守党以及戴高乐创立的第五共和国的终结。


But de Gaulle’s legacy would most likely be snuffed out gently, with nostalgia for both Mitterrand and Chirac possibly proving very tempting for a people disaffected with the political system but desiring to be reassured.	但是戴高乐留给世人的东西最有可能温柔地消亡，而法国民众对政治体制不满而又想要得到安心，这就可能让他们对密特朗和希拉克二人十分怀旧。


France wants the illusion of change, but is continuity what she truly desires?.	法国想要的是变革的幻觉，但是她真的想要一成不变吗？


Finally, while this election was expected to usher in a new generation of politicians, few were prepared to anticipate the peaceful political tsunami that a Bayrou victory would bring.	最后，这一选举预计将会带来新的一代政客，但是他们之中很少有人对由贝鲁获胜将会带来的和平的政治海啸做好了准备。


Yet that would be the outcome if the attraction towards the center proves to be as irresistible for significant segments of the Socialists and conservative parties as it now seems .	但是，如果中间派对很大一部分社会党和保守派人士的吸引力就像现在这般难以抵抗， 那么，这就会成为结局。


France is a marvelously paradoxical country, so the search for novelty, if not modernity, could lead to the reinvention of the Fourth Republic, a parliamentary regime characterized by its weaknesses and instability.	法国如此惊人地矛盾，因此，即使不是追寻现代，而只是新颖，也可能导致重新建立第四共和国。 第四共和国采用议会制度，其特征是软弱和不稳定。


That will depend in part on whether the perception of Sarkozy as a risky candidate will prove greater than the very real institutional risk represented by Bayrou.	这将在某种程度上取决于萨尔科奇作为有风险的候选人的印象是否会大于由贝鲁所代表的机制性风险。


There is maybe less of a French presence in the world today than there was twelve years ago when Jacques Chirac came to power, especially since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.	与十二年前希拉克上台相比，法国在世界上的存在可能降低了，特别是2005年否决欧盟宪法以来。


But the world’s interest in the French presidential campaign is greater than ever, and can be compared only with the attention generated by Mitterrand’s election in 1981.	但是世界对于法国总统竞选的兴趣却比以往更为浓厚，其程度只能与1981年密特朗获选所产生的关注相比。


Much may change in the few weeks left before the first round of the presidential vote.	在总统大选第一轮投票前的几个星期前还有很多变数。


But the campaign has now become a question of numbers: will the Third Man bury the Fifth Republic?	但是这场竞选已经变成一个数字的问题，那就是，这第三人是否会埋葬第五共和国？


A Meeting of Minds on HIV/AIDS	艾滋病毒/艾滋病研究殊途同归


GENEVA – An ounce of prevention, Benjamin Franklin famously said, is worth a pound of cure.	日内瓦——本杰明·富兰克林有句名言，一盎司的预防顶得上一磅治疗。


But that is not always true when it comes to research into infectious diseases.	但具体到传染病研究领域这句话却并不尽然。


Though scientists have traditionally tended to focus on either prevention or cure, defeating the HIV/AIDS virus will require researchers – and their funders – to collaborate to address the challenge from both directions.	虽然科学家们传统上往往侧重于预防或治疗两者之一，征服艾滋病毒/艾滋病却需要研究人员——及其资助者——合作解决来自双方面的难题。


Advances in prevention and treatment have reduced annual HIV infections by one-third over the past decade, and cut AIDS-related deaths by 30% over the past five years.	预防和治疗的进步10年来已经使年艾滋病毒感染病例减少三分之一，还使过去5年与艾滋病相关的死亡率降低了30%。


Yet 35 million people still live with the virus.	但依然有3，500万人带毒存活。


Last year, 2.1 million became infected, and 1.5 million died from AIDS-related causes.	去年，有210万人被病毒感染，150万人死于艾滋病相关原因。


Even in the best-case scenario for maximizing existing prevention and treatment, at least a half-million new HIV infections would occur annually in low- and middle-income countries by 2050.	即便现有的预防和治疗措施效果达到最好，到2050年中低收入国家每年至少还会新增50万人感染艾滋病毒。


The world needs a vaccine and a cure to get ahead of the disease, and great progress is being made in both areas.	世界需要疫苗和治疗方法战胜这一疾病，而两个领域的进展都十分显著。


But, though research in these two distinct fields is beginning to overlap, too many scientists still see themselves as being strictly on one side or the other.	但尽管两个独立领域的研究正在趋向重合，太多科学家仍然孤立地从预防或者治疗领域来看待自己的工作。


The mechanisms for funding HIV/AIDS research reinforce this separation, because they rarely allow for – much less invite – the kind of innovative cross-field approaches that will be needed to translate recent breakthroughs into testable products.	艾滋病毒/艾滋病研究的出资机制强化了这种孤立，因为现有机制极少容许——更不用说积极探索——将近期突破转化为可测试产品的创新性跨领域方法。


The divide is apparent even among activists and advocates for HIV/AIDS research.	就连在艾滋病毒/艾滋病研究活动人士和支持者中分歧也非常显著。


It must not be allowed to prevent further progress.	我们不能容许这种现状阻碍诞生进一步的研究成果。


Because HIV/AIDS is already the world’s most studied infectious disease, an HIV diagnosis is no longer a death sentence.	因为艾滋病毒/艾滋病已经是世界上研究最多的传染病，感染艾滋病毒的诊断不再是死刑判决书。


Yet we are still far from defeating the virus.	但我们距战胜艾滋病毒依然相去甚远。


Infection rates continue to rise in specific regions and populations, and more than half of the people living with HIV worldwide do not even know that they have it.	感染率在特定地区和群体中不断攀升，而且全世界超过半数的艾滋病毒携带者根本不知道自己携带病毒。


Three of five HIV-positive people still are not receiving antiretroviral therapy.	每五个艾滋病毒检测呈阳性的带毒者中有三个仍未接受抗逆转录病毒治疗。


Moreover, long-term treatment is not the same as a cure, and no public-health tool (apart from clean drinking water) has ever matched the preventive power of a vaccine.	此外，长期治疗和治愈并不是一回事。 此外也没有任何公共卫生工具（清洁饮用水除外）能比得上疫苗的预防作用。


HIV is an extremely complex virus.	艾滋病毒的结构极为复杂。


It mutates rapidly within an individual and among geographic locations, establishing latent reservoirs within cells that enable it to emerge and replicate months or even years later.	它能在人体和地理区域内快速变异，在细胞层面建立起潜伏库，为几个月甚至几年后重新出现和复制打下基础。


It evades the immune system, so the body’s natural ability to fight or clear it is limited.	它能够避开免疫系统，导致人体自然的抵抗力无法将其清除。


Although there are no precedents that might guide us to a vaccine or cure, we have learned a lot about how HIV works – and its weaknesses – in the last five years.	虽然艾滋病疫苗或治疗方法的研究没有先例可以借鉴，但过去五年来我们已经在很大程度上掌握了艾滋病毒的弱点及其工作机制。


In 2009, for example, researchers found so-called “proof of concept” when a clinical trial showed that a vaccine could prevent HIV infection in humans, and Timothy Ray Brown (known as “the Berlin patient”) was cured of HIV via a bone-marrow transplant.	比方说在2009年，当临床试验显示疫苗可以防止艾滋病毒感染人类、身患艾滋病的蒂莫西·瑞·布朗（也被称为“柏林病人”）在接受骨髓移植后奇迹般地痊愈，这些都在证明研究人员的理念是对的。


Researchers are also learning a great deal from the responses of three groups of patients.	对三组患者的研究也让研究人员学到了很多东西。


The first group comprises “post-treatment controllers,” in whom early treatment allowed for long-term control of the infection even after antiretroviral therapy was stopped.	首先是“治疗后控制组”，该组患者的早期治疗即使在抗逆转录病毒治疗停止后也能维持长期控制感染的效果。


The second group are “elite controllers,” who can carry HIV for ten years or more without treatment and without falling ill.	第二组是所谓“精英控制组”，该组可以在不接受任何治疗的情况下携带艾滋病毒长达10年以上而不发病。


The third group, “elite neutralizers,” includes patients who naturally produce antibodies against a wide range of HIV variants.	第三组是“精英中和组”，该组患者能对多种艾滋病毒变种形成天然抗体。


With the insights gained from following these patients, researchers are increasingly beginning to recognize that the same science may bring us to both a vaccine and a cure.	凭借跟踪这些病人获得的真知灼见，研究人员逐渐意识到同样的研究既能带来疫苗也能带来治疗方法。


The two research paths, long pursued in separate labs and discrete projects, have been converging in several exciting areas.	长期以来在独立实验室和独立项目中探索的这两条研究途径在不止一个领域出现了令人振奋的融合。


For example, scientists working to design a vaccine that will induce production of broadly neutralizing antibodies to protect people from HIV infection have found that these antibodies also control and even clear infection by the simian version of the virus in monkeys.	比方说，以研制疫苗诱发形成广谱中和抗体，保护人类免遭艾滋病毒感染为研究目的的科学家已经发现这些抗体也可以控制甚至清除猿猴身上感染的猴版病毒。


A similar result, dubbed a “functional cure,” has been achieved with a simian vaccine aimed at inducing a response by the monkeys’ “killer T-cells,” another weapon in the immune system’s arsenal.	旨在激活免疫系统武器库中又一种武器——猴子身上“杀手T细胞”的猴版疫苗也取得了被称为“功能性治愈方法”的相似结果。


Meanwhile, cure-focused studies of elite controllers are yielding clues about regions of the virus that mutate less, which could hold important lessons for vaccine researchers.	此外，精英控制组以治疗为重点的研究已经找到了病毒变异较小区域的线索，该结果可以在很大程度上帮助疫苗研究者。


As science advances across disciplines and diseases in ways that were unimaginable even five years ago, the research walls that divide prevention and cure must fall.	随着科学研究以五年前还无法想象的方式跨越学科和病种，预防和治疗研究之间的隔离必须取消。


We must stop weighing pounds against ounces, and collaborate to develop the tools needed to eliminate the HIV/AIDS scourge once and for all.	我们不能再继续权衡英镑和盎司孰轻孰重，而是要合作开发一种工具，一劳永逸地消除艾滋病毒/艾滋病之祸。


François Hollande Meets the World	奥朗德面对全世界


PARIS – When François Hollande, fresh from his election as France’s next president, was asked by a journalist which language he would use when he meets US President Barack Obama for the first time, his answer was revealing. “I speak English more fluently than the former president,” the Socialist leader insisted, referring to the outgoing Nicolas Sarkozy.	巴黎—当刚刚当选为法国下任总统的奥朗德被记者问及将用何种语言与美国总统奥巴马进行第一次会晤时，他的回答颇有些耐人寻味：“我的英语比前总统更溜，”这位社会主义领导人说，当然，他针对的是即将卸任的萨科齐，“但是，法国总统当然得说法语！


“But a French president must speak French!”	”


In proclaiming his mastery of the lingua franca of global affairs, Hollande was asserting himself as a modern statesman, while also suggesting that France will remain as influential as possible on the international scene.	奥朗德向全世界宣布能够熟练掌握全球事务通用语言，从而给自己披上了现代政治家的外衣，同时，他又暗示法国将尽力维持自己在国际社会中的影响力。


Indeed, he was proclaiming his commitment to internationalism and multilateralism.	事实上，奥朗德是在向全世界宣布他的国际主义和多边主义承诺。


In order to remain a country that punches above its weight diplomatically, it is in France’s interest to operate through international organizations rather than to rely on bilateral relationships.	为了维持一个在外交上已不堪重负的国家，通过国际组织进行操作而不是依赖双边关系更符合法国的利益。


Hollande is also aware that, for historical and cultural reasons, France’s international role must be different from that of other countries.	奥朗德也认识到，出于历史和文化的原因，法国在国际社会中有着与其他国家不同的作用。


In his book Changer de destin (Changing Destiny), published in February, he affirms that France’s message will continue to be a universal one – a stance reminiscent of the birth in 1789 of the French Republic, which, like the United States, was originally conceived as the triumph of liberty and democracy.	在其2月出版的新书《变化的命运》（Changer de destin）中，奥朗德说，法国的声音将继续是普世的——这一立场自1789年法兰西共和国诞生以来便一以贯之，并与美国一样，从一开始就被认为是自由和民主的胜利。


Unlike in France, however, the word “socialist” is an epithet for most Americans.	但是，与法国不同，“社会主义”一词对大多数美国人来说是一个别有用意的修饰语。


But this could be a source of strength for Hollande, who, as a new leader with no foreign-policy experience, will have to prove his ability through action.	但这也许是奥朗德优势的来源之一，作为没有外交政策经验的新晋领导人，他必须用行动证明自己的能力。


And here, Obama, in particular, will soon understand that Hollande has no intention of bringing sweeping change.	在这里，奥巴马尤其重要，他很快就会明白，奥朗德无意带给美国彻底的变革。


On the contrary, his intention will be to appear as a reliable and unsurprising partner.	相反，他其实想成为不会令你惊诧的可靠伙伴。


Hollande is unlikely to be less friendly with America than was Sarkozy, regarded by many as France’s most pro-US president.	奥朗德对美国不可能比萨科齐更不友善，而后者被很多人认为是法国历史上最亲美的总统。


Hollande supported the military intervention in Libya in 2011, and has joined the condemnation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	2011年，奥朗德支持对利比亚进行军事干预，也加入过叙利亚总统巴沙尔的声讨大军。


One of his close political allies recently declared that should the United Nations Security Council approve military intervention in Syria, France “could envision” participating in that effort.	他的一位紧密政治盟友最近宣称，只要联合国安理会批准对叙利亚进行军事干预，法国“可以考虑”参与行动。


Hollande also supports a tough line on Iran and, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, his book indicates that he subscribes to the “Clinton parameters” – two states with secure borders and a status for Jerusalem that is acceptable to both sides.	在伊朗和以巴冲突方面，奥朗德也支持采取强硬路线，他的书表明，他支持“克林顿参数”——以安全线分割的两个国家以及双方都能接受的耶路撒冷地位。


With regard to relations between France and the Arab world, one can be certain that Hollande would agree with the pro-engagement thrust of Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech.	在法国和阿拉伯国家关系方面，可以肯定地说，奥朗德同意奥巴马2009年开罗演讲的提倡包容（pro-engagement）的观点。


Last but not least, Hollande is not likely to call into question Sarkozy’s decision in 2009 to reintegrate France into NATO’s military command.	最后，奥朗德也不会动摇萨科齐在2009年做出的法国重回北约军事指挥集团的决定。


That decision remains controversial in France, including among Socialists, but Hollande is well aware of the weaknesses of a European defense policy that simply cannot compete with NATO.	这一决定在法国（包括���社会主义者之间）仍有争议，但奥朗德很明白，以欧洲防务政策之孱弱是断然无法与北约抗衡的。


Nevertheless, at the NATO Summit in Chicago at the end of May, Hollande will confirm his pledge to withdraw French troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2012, two years ahead of the NATO timetable (though he recognizes the need to negotiate the practical details).	尽管如此，在5月底的北约芝加哥峰会中，奥朗德将确认其关于2012年底从阿富汗撤出法国军队的承诺，这比北约时间表提前了两年（尽管他仍认为实施细节还有待商议）。


This will be an important test of Hollande’s ability to deal effectively with allies.	这将是奥朗德能否自如应付盟友的一次重大考验。


The second test of his ability to negotiate with other leaders will be within Europe.	对其与其他领导人谈判能力的第二项考验在于欧洲内部。


One of the highest-flying proposals of his electoral platform was a call for renegotiation of the European Union’s new “fiscal pact,” endorsed by all member states with the exception of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic.	其竞选纲领中最高调的计划便是呼吁就欧盟的新“财政公约”进行重新谈判，这一动议获得了除英国和捷克之外所有成员国的支持。


Inspired by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, approval of the pact was a precondition for Germany’s participation in the financial rescue plan for Greece and the other distressed eurozone countries.	根据德国总理默克尔的说法，批准该公约是德国参与对希腊及其他受困欧元区国家财政援助计划的先决条件。


Hollande’s proposal was initially regarded as lèse-majesté against Germany.	一开始，奥朗德的计划被认为是对德国的不恭。


Now all European leaders – from Mario Monti in Italy to Mariano Rajoy in Spain and Elio Di Rupo in Belgium – agree on the need to revive the European economy.	如今，所有欧洲领导人——从意大利的蒙蒂到西班牙的拉霍伊和比利时的劳普——都认为必须重振欧洲经济。


So do Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy, and, indeed, Merkel herself.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉、欧洲委员会主席巴罗佐、欧盟委员会主席范龙佩亦然，事实上，默克尔本人也同意。


Merkel and Hollande will discuss the main question – how to spur economic growth without increasing public debt – on May 15 in Berlin.	默克尔和奥朗德将于5月15日在柏林讨论主要问题——如何在不增加公共债务的情况下刺激经济增长。


While Merkel opposes Hollande’s proposal to create Eurobonds with a view to financing industrial projects, they cannot afford to waste time in reassuring jittery markets with a message of cohesion.	默克尔反对奥朗德着眼于为实业项目提供融资的欧元债券计划，但他们已经没有时间可以浪费，必须尽快摆出团结的姿态安抚风声鹤唳的市场。


Merkel has already welcomed Hollande’s ideas for a growth plan for Europe.	默克尔已经对奥朗德的欧洲增长计划表示了欢迎。


Hollande, too, will have to make concessions.	奥朗德也必须做出让步。


For the French, as for all Europeans, the EU is not a foreign entity, and its decisions are an integral part of domestic policies.	对法国人（以及对全体欧洲人）而言，欧盟并不是外交实体，其决定只是各国政策的考虑项之一。


In this regard, Hollande has a chance to succeed on the international scene as a truly pro-European leader.	如此看来，奥朗德有机会以真正亲欧的领导人身份在国际社会取得成功。


Only a stronger Europe will ensure fair trade with emerging countries, especially China.	唯有坚挺的欧洲能保证与新兴国家的公平贸易，特别是中国。


Only a stronger Europe will at last implement the principle of reciprocity in order to protect European businesses and prevent them from relocating, which has been the main cause of unemployment.	唯有坚挺的欧洲能最终推行互惠原则以保护欧洲企业，防止它们迁出欧洲——这正是造成失业的主要原因。


In a recent interview, Hollande declared that, “France is not just any European country, and its president is not just any world leader.”	在最近的一次采访中，奥朗德宣称“法国不是一个普通欧洲国家，其总统不是普通世界领导人。


The French are happy to hear that.	”法国人听到这句话很高兴。


But that affirmation also represents Hollande’s main challenge: ensuring that this remains true in the context of twenty-first-century globalization.	但这一论断也代表了奥朗德面临的主要挑战：在21世纪全球化环境中保证这句话的正确性。


François Hollande’s Wrong Idea of France	奥朗德错误的法国观念


LONDON – France’s new president, François Hollande, has achieved a remarkable series of political victories – at home and in Europe – since his election in May.	伦敦—自5月份当选以来，法国新总统奥朗德在国内和欧洲已经取得了一系列令人瞩目的政治胜利。


Unfortunately, his streak of success will inevitably call forth an economic reckoning that will shock France’s apparently unsuspecting citizens and doom the French elite’s approach to the “construction of Europe.”	不幸的是，他的春风得意将不可避免地引起人们的经济反思，而这将冲击显然是毫无戒心的法国公民，也将给法国精英“建设欧洲”的计划蒙上一层阴影。


Since winning the presidency, Hollande has won a parliamentary majority and pushed Germany toward accepting joint liability for eurozone countries’ debts.	自从赢得总统大选以来，奥朗德还赢得了议会多数席位、敦促德国走向接受欧元区国家债务共同化。


But forebodings of crisis have become widespread in French business and economic circles.	但在法国商界和经济界，危机的预感已经开始弥漫。


But the real danger – which even Hollande’s sternest critics may be underestimating – is not so much his individual policy failings (serious though they may be) as his approach to the twin challenges posed by France’s economic imbalances and the eurozone crisis.	但真正的危险——即使是对奥朗德最为严苛的批评者也低估了这一危险——并不完全在于个别政策会因奥朗德追求应对法国经济失衡和欧元区危机双重挑战的计划而失败（尽管这很严重）。


On each front separately, he might manage to muddle through; together, they look likely to cement France’s loss of competitiveness.	单独地看，这两个方面他都可以蒙混过关； 但合在一起，它们可能会恶化法国竞争力下降的状况。


Declining competitiveness is best captured in a single indicator: unit labor costs, which measure the average cost of labor per unit of output.	竞争力的下降可以从一个指标中一览无余：单位劳动力成本，该指标衡量一单位产出所需要的平均劳动力成本。


In a monetary union, discrepancies in wage growth relative to productivity gains – that is, unit labor costs – will result in a chronic accumulation of trade surpluses or deficits.	在一个货币联盟中，工资增长相对于生产率提高方面的差异——即单位成本差异——会造成长期的贸易盈余或赤字积累。


Since the euro’s introduction, unit labor costs have risen dramatically faster in France than they have in Germany.	欧元诞生以来，单位劳动成本在法国的增长远快于德国。 根据2011年4月发布的欧洲统计局数字，法国的每小时劳动成本为34.


According to Eurostat data published in April 2011, the hourly labor cost in France was €34.2, compared to €30.1 in Germany – and nearly 20% higher than the eurozone average of €27.6.	2欧元，德国只有30. 1欧元，比欧元区平均水平27.


France’s current-account deficit has risen to more than 2% of GDP, even as its economic growth has ground to a halt.	6欧元则要高出近20%。 噶过经常项目赤字已升至GDP的2%以上，尽管其经济增长几近停止。


The high cost of employing workers in France is due not so much to wages and benefits as it is to payroll taxes levied on employers.	法国雇用工人成本高企与工资和福利关系并不大，与雇主承担的工资税关系更大。


The entire French political class has long delighted in taxing labor to finance the country’s generous welfare provisions, thus avoiding excessively high taxation of individuals’ income and consumption – though that is about to come to an end as Hollande intends to slap a 75% tax on incomes above €1 million.	长期以来，整个法国政界都热衷于向劳动征税来为法国慷慨的福利融资，从而避免征收过高的所得税和消费税——尽管随着奥朗德计划对100万欧元以上收入部分征收75%的所得税，这一状况将走向终结。


This is a version of the fallacy that taxing companies (“capital”) spares ordinary people (“workers”).	这是犯了对公司（“资方”）课税而放过普通人（“劳方”）的错误。


Of course, such taxes on firms are always passed on to households – usually through straightforward price hikes, and, in France, also through unemployment.	当然，这类企业税总是会被嫁接到家庭头上——通常是通过直接的提价，在法国，失业也是嫁接渠道之一。


High tax rates on labor – together with rigid regulation of hiring and firing – make employers extremely reluctant to recruit workers.	高劳动税率与刚性的雇用和解雇监管一起使得雇主极其不愿雇用工人。


As a result, France has had chronic long-term unemployment – forecast to reach 10.5% by 2013 – for many years.	结果，多年来一直法国存在顽固的长期失业问题，预计2013年将达到10. 5%。


Hollande’s predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, tried to address this problem.	奥朗德的前任萨科齐试图纠正这一问题。


He exempted voluntary overtime pay from employment tax and shifted some of the burden of labor taxation onto consumption (via a hike in VAT).	他免去了自愿加班费的劳动税，并将一部分劳动税负担转接给消费（通过提高增值税）。


But Hollande quickly reversed both of these reforms.	但奥朗德很快将这两项改革都来了个一百八十度转弯。


The repeal of the tax break on overtime reflects another economic fallacy to which French Socialist politicians are deeply attached: the “lump of labor” notion that underlay the most disastrous of their economic policies – the 35-hour workweek, introduced in 2000.	加班费税收优惠的取消反映了法国社会党政客深陷其中的另一个���济学谬误：他们最具破坏性的经济政策——2000年实行的每周35小时工作制——体现了“劳动合成”（lump of labor）这一概念。


The idea behind the policy is that demand for labor is a constant, and that this fixed number of aggregate working hours required by employers to meet final demand can be spread more evenly among workers to reduce unemployment.	这一政策背后的思想是劳动力需求是不变的，而雇主为满足最终需求所需要的这一固定数量的总劳动时间可以在工人之间更加平均地分配，以减少失业。


Such measures, designed to create jobs by freeing up work hours, are futile at best, and are often detrimental.	这些措施的本意是释放劳动时间从而创造就业岗位，但其结果往好了说也只是毫无用处，事实上，它们通常有害无益。


French Socialists should recall their school physics lesson about communicating vessels: when a homogeneous liquid is poured into a set of connected containers, it settles at the same level in all of them, regardless of their shape and volume.	法国社会党人应该好好回忆一下物理课上的连通器原理：当均匀液体被注入一系列连通的容器时，最终所有容器的高度将是一致的，这与容器的形状和体积无关。


Generating more “liquid” (jobs) requires not discouraging the entrepreneurs on whose activities sustainable job creation ultimately depends.	创造更多“液体”（就业岗位）是不能靠抑制企业家来得到的，因为后者才是可持续就业创造活动的最终提供者。


The effect of fiscal and regulatory pressure on employment is to encourage French firms to invest and hire outside France.	就业的财政和监管压力的效果是鼓励了法国公司到海外去投资和招人。


Hollande’s apologists praise his gradualist and consensual approach to addressing the economy’s structural distortions.	奥朗德的拥护者大肆赞扬他使用渐进和共识而后动的办法纠正法国经济的结构性扭曲。


They argue that his penchant for setting up consultative commissions is the best way to forge the consensus required for structural reform, whereas Sarkozy’s combative style was counterproductive.	他们指出，奥朗德热衷于成立协商委员会，这是形成结构性改革所必须的共识的最佳方法，而萨科齐的战斗风格是反生产的。


Even banishing skepticism and assuming that Hollande could over time persuade his supporters to embrace competitiveness-boosting policies, the eurozone crisis is denying France the time that such gradualism requires.	即使能够堵上怀疑者的嘴，并认为奥朗德总有一天能够说服其支持者接受刺激竞争力的政策，欧元区危机仍不允许法国用必要的渐进策略达到这一目的。


A simple, effective way to buy time would be to abandon the euro and restore competitiveness through a devalued national currency.	有一个办法可以简单有效地赢得时间，那就是抛弃欧元，用国家货币的贬值重塑竞争力。


But this expedient is incompatible with mainstream French politicians’ devotion to the “European project,” which amounts to a projection of French soft power; indeed, building Europe lies at the heart of the French establishment’s version of what Charles de Gaulle used to call “a certain idea of France.”	但这一方案与“欧洲工程”——法国需要用它来塑造软实力——这一法国主流政客的理想格格不入； 事实上，建设欧洲与法国的核心观点是一致的，即戴高乐所谓的“法国的必然思维”。


For mainstream French politicians, renouncing the European project to buy the time required to restore competitiveness is as unthinkable as is the logical alternative: an all-out push for full European political union.	对法国主流政客而言，放弃欧洲工程从而为重塑竞争力赢得必须的时间与其逻辑上的替代方案——孤注一掷推进完全的欧洲政治联盟——一样是不可想象。


This would reestablish monetary sovereignty and create a normal central bank (like the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England) at the European level.	这将重新建立货币主权并成立普通类型的欧洲级别中央银行（像美联储和英格兰银行那样的）。


But it would also mean abandoning France’s republic in favor of a federal European government – anathema to that “certain idea of France.”	但这也意味着为了欧洲联邦政府放弃法兰西共和国，这简直是对“法国的必然思维”的诅咒。


The combination of gradualism (on the most generous interpretation) in domestic economic reform and the paralyzing effect of the eurozone crisis will lead to a massive shock.	国内经济改革的渐进性（以最大胆的假设）与欧元区危机的破坏性效果相结合将形成巨大的冲击。


Remaining in a currency union with the much more competitive German economy will require wrenching and rapid reforms, for which Hollande’s tepid approach will fail to prepare the complacent French.	留在货币联盟中与竞争力更强的德国经济相争要求不破不立的迅速改革，在这方面，奥朗德不温不火的方法是无法让踌躇满志的法国人做好准备的。


The result will be even more support than was seen in last April’s presidential election for extremist political parties that reject both Europe and competitive market capitalism.	做后的结果将是，拒绝接受欧洲和竞争市场资本主义的极端政党将获得比去年4月总统大选时更高的支持度。


Freedom, Blasphemy, and Violence	自由、渎神和暴力


PARIS – Violent attacks on US diplomatic outposts across North Africa and the Middle East have once again raised the question of how to respond when Americans and other Westerners engage in provocative expression that others consider blasphemous.	巴黎—北非和中东地区袭击美国使领馆事件再次激起了一个问题：当美国和其他西方人做出其他人所认为的渎神言论时应该作何反应？


Though the attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi, in which Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three members of his staff were murdered, may well have been planned, as the State Department has maintained, the killers clearly exploited the opportunity created by outrage at an anti-Muslim film produced in the US.	美国驻班加西领事馆遭袭导致大使史蒂文斯（J. Christopher Stevens）和三名工作人员被杀，但美国国务院认为，杀手显然是利用了一部美国拍摄的反伊斯兰影片所引起的激愤情绪。


There have been several episodes in recent years in which perceptions of blasphemy have led to threats of violence or actual killings, starting with the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses more than two decades ago, and including the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.	近年来，因认为渎神而引起的暴力威胁甚至杀戮发生了多起，首先是二十多年前萨尔曼·拉什迪（Salman Rushdie）的《撒旦诗篇》（The Satanic Verses）的出版，此外还包括丹麦报纸《日尔兰邮报》（Jyllands-Posten）刊登先知穆罕默德漫画事件。


In the Netherlands, Theo Van Gogh was murdered on an Amsterdam sidewalk in retaliation for his film Submission, which criticized Islam’s treatment of women.	在荷兰，西奥·梵高（Theo Van Gogh）在阿姆斯特丹针对其批评伊斯兰教虐待妇女的电影《屈服》（Submission）的示威中被杀。


Even some who defended freedom of expression in those cases may be disinclined to do so now.	即使某些在这些事件中支持言论自由的人，现在也不再作如是观了。


This time, the film that triggered riots in Cairo, Benghazi, Sana, and elsewhere is so crude and inflammatory as to seem clearly intended to elicit the outrage that it produced.	这一回，这部在开罗、班加西、萨那（Sana）引发了动乱的影片实在太过赤裸裸和煽动性，似乎其目的就是为了制造愤怒。


Yet judgments about literary or artistic merit should not be the basis for decisions about freedom of expression.	但文学和艺术方面的成就并不应该作为言论自由决定的基础。


The proclivity of some elsewhere to react violently to what they consider blasphemous cannot be the criterion for imposing limits on free expression in the US, the United Kingdom, Denmark, or the Netherlands (or anywhere else).	其他地区以暴力应对被视为渎神行为的倾向不能作为美国、英国、丹麦和荷兰（以及其他地区）言论自由边界的标准。


It is important to differentiate blasphemy from hate speech.	将渎神和仇恨言论区分开来是很重要的。


What is objectionable about hate speech, and makes it punishable by law in countries around the world, is that it is intended to incite discrimination or violence against members of a particular national, racial, ethnic, or religious group.	仇恨言论之所以应被禁止，之所以应在全世界国家受到法律严惩，是因为它意在煽动针对某个特定国家、种族、民族或宗教群体的歧视和暴力。


Even in the US, where freedom of expression is zealously protected, such incitement may be prosecuted and punished in circumstances in which violence or other unlawful behavior is imminent.	即使是在言论自由受到严格保护的美国，此类煽动性言论也会遭到起诉和严惩，只要它与暴力和其他非法行为扯上关系。


By contrast, in cases of blasphemy, it is not the speaker (or the filmmaker) who is directly inciting discrimination or violence. Rather, it is those who are enraged by the expressed views who may threaten or actually engage in violence, either against the speaker, or against those, like US government officials, whom they believe have facilitated (or failed to suppress) the blasphemer’s activities.	相反，在渎神的问题上，煽动歧视和暴力的并不是说话者（或影片制作者），相反，是那些被说话者的观点激怒的人可能发出威胁或实际参与暴力，攻击目标可能是说话者，也可能是他们所认定的为渎神行为提供便利（或没能予以阻止）的美国官员。


It is, of course, impossible to be certain what will arouse such anger.	当然，什么会引起如此愤怒绝不是显而易见的。


At times, as seems to be the case with the video that triggered the current protests in cities across North Africa and the Middle East, a long period may elapse between the offensive material’s dissemination and an outpouring of popular rage.	在很多案例中——目前在北非和中东引发示威的视频就是其中之一——在冒犯性材料的散播和公众愤怒的爆发之间会有很长的时间间隔。


The rage, it seems, is not spontaneous; rather, it is an artifact of local or regional politics.	愤怒并不是自发的，而是地方或地区政治的产物。


This does not diminish the irresponsibility of those who gratuitously engage in such offensive behavior, but it does make clear that outrage against their actions should not be a basis for abandoning our commitment to freedom of expression.	这并不是要降低平白卷入冒犯性行为的人的无辜性，但这毫无疑问确实表明针对他们的行为的愤怒不应该作为我们放弃言论自由承诺的理由。


What, then, is to be done?	那么，对此我们能够做些什么？


The only appropriate response is the one chosen by the US Embassy in Cairo, which denounced the film and said that the American government condemns those who offend others’ religious beliefs.	唯一正确的反应是美国驻开罗大使的选择：谴责这部影片，声明美国政府谴责冒犯他人宗教信仰的行为。


And Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced the condemnation when she called the film “disgusting and reprehensible.”	国务卿希拉里·克林顿也进一步表示了谴责，她说这部影片“令人厌恶，应该批评”。


Plainly, that was not enough to deter those who sought an occasion to attack the US Consulate in Benghazi.	显然，这并不足以阻止那些蓄意寻找袭击美国驻班加西领事馆的人。


If they had not grasped this opportunity, they would have sought another.	如果他们不抓住这次机会，也会寻找其他机会。


Simply condemning a film will not mean much to those who believe that, as may be true in their own countries, a powerful government like that of the US can simply decide whether a film should be made or broadcast.	仅仅谴责影片对于那些相信像美国政府权力无边，完全可以决定影片是否可以制作和上映的人（他们自己国家的情况也许正是如此）来说并没有什么意义。


Though the statement from the US Embassy in Cairo has become the target of political criticism, it warrants praise for exemplifying American values.	尽管美国驻开罗大使的声明已经成为政治批判的目标，但也受到了赞誉，被称为彰显了美国价值。


Contrary to the criticism, condemnation of the film is not censorship.	与批评所认为的相反，谴责影片绝不是审查。


While rejecting censorship, the US government should not renounce its authority to speak sensibly and condemn an appalling and apparently intentional provocation that produced such tragic consequences.	美国政府不会审查影片，但也不应该放弃说聪明话以及谴责可怕的、显而易见的、造成如此悲剧后果的国际挑衅行为的权威。


Freedom, Not Democracy, For Russia	俄罗斯需要自由而不是民主


Twenty years ago this month, Mikhail Gorbachev began his policies of perestroika and glasnost , which led to the end of the Cold War.	二十年前的这个月，米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫开始实施其“重建与开放”政策，导致冷战结束。


Now, however, a new chill has entered relations between Russia and the West.	然而，目前另一股寒流注入了俄罗斯与西方的关系。


President Vladimir Putin is frequently criticized for taking Russia in the wrong direction.	弗拉基米尔·普京总统常常受到指责，将俄罗斯领往错误的方向。


The very people who in 2000 called Putin a man they could do business with are having second thoughts.	正是在2000年称可与普京交往的那些人如今举棋不定。


People once fascinated by Putin now publicly rebuke him.	曾经痴迷普京的人现在公开谴责他。


Putin is shooting back, accusing the West of trying to weaken and dismember Russia.	普京予以还击，指责西方国家试图削弱和分裂俄罗斯。


As politicians in the West compare him to Mugabe or Mussolini, Putin’s Kremlin aides invoke the Munich appeasers who tried to push Hitler eastward.	当西方政治家将其比做穆加贝或墨索里尼时，普京的克里姆林宫官员搬出了竭力将希特勒推向东方的慕尼黑调解人。


Putin himself once blamed the West for trying to channel Muslim radicalism toward Russia.	普京本人曾指责西方国家试图将穆斯林激进主义引入俄罗斯。


Why this sharp change in tone?	为何会发生如此剧变？


Initially, most nations exiting from Communism reached out, almost instinctively, to their immediate pre-Communist period.	起初，大多数脱离共产主义的国家几乎自然而然地回到了其共产主义前期。


The Baltic states revived their constitutions of the 1930’s, the Armenians and the Azeris revived their political parties of the late 1910’s, and Eastern Europe, with the exception of East Germany, which reunited with the Federal Republic, suddenly became once again Mitteleuropa.	波罗的海国家重新启用了二十世纪三十年代的宪法，亚美尼亚人和阿塞拜疆人恢复了二十世纪初期的各种政党，东欧（除东德与联邦德国统一外）突然再次成为中部欧洲。


This revival of the past was a big worry for West Europeans and Americans, who feared the re-emergence of historical enmities and tensions, which did indeed come to the fore in the former Yugoslavia.	历史的复活是西欧与美国人的心腹大患，他们担心历史仇恨与紧张关系再现，这些的确曾在前南斯拉夫涌现出来。


These fears underpinned the dual enlargement of NATO and the European Union.	害怕出现诸如此类的状况促使北约和欧盟同时扩张。


Russia, for its part, also went backwards, to tsarism.	在这股浪潮中，俄罗斯也回到了沙皇专制状况。


Initially, this was not obvious to all.	起初，各方面情况均不明显。


Boris Yeltsin was friendly to the West, tolerated open debate, and appointed a few individuals as oligarchs.	波瑞斯 叶利钦对西方很友好，他对公开辩论表示宽容并指定一些人成为寡头政治成员。


He was given the benefit of the doubt, and his anti-Communism was elevated to a surrogate of democracy.	他从人们无法确信的心态中受惠，并且他的反共已上升为民主的替代品。


Russia was doubtless freer than ever before, in virtually all respects, good and bad.	无疑，无论是好是坏，这时的俄罗斯实际上在各方面比以往更为自由。


But the picture Russia presented to others and to itself was massively distorted.	但俄罗斯向他人及其自身展示的形象却极大地扭曲了。


Parliament was lively, but essentially powerless.	议会生气勃勃，但根本毫无权力。


The electronic media were routinely critical of the authorities, but were owned by a handful of people and depended on their owners’ taste, interests, and fate.	电子媒体对于各主管当局照例很关键，但为少数人所拥有，其作用取决于拥有者的品味、兴趣和命运。


Yeltsin’s handover of power to Putin, like a king with his dauphin, tells us more about his regime than almost anything else.	叶利钦将权力移交给普京，如同国王将王位传给皇太子一样，这比任何东西更能说明其政权的实质。


Putin’s regime is openly tsarist.	普京公然采用了沙皇主义专制制度。


His Duma is much like the Duma of Nicholas II, docile and acquiescent.	其议会与尼古拉斯二世的杜马非常相像，既听话又顺从。


His governors are also like Nicholas’s; many are governor-generals.	其地方长官也与尼古拉斯的地方长官一样；


The capitalism now being practiced is dependent on the authorities, and plays no independent role in politics.	多数为总督。 正在实行的资本主义依赖于主管当局，在政治上无法起独立作用。


Of course, this does not mean that there is no difference between the Russia of Vladimir Putin and Nicholas Romanov.	诚然，这并不意味着弗拉基米尔·普京和尼古拉斯·罗曼诺夫统治的俄罗斯之间不存在差异。


What it means is that Russia is back on its historical path of development, back at the point where things started to go wrong.	其意义在于俄罗斯已回到其历史发展的道路，回到事情开始出错的地方。


The domestic situation, the global environment, and the historical memory of its people all militate against Russia being bound to relive its own tragic history.	国内局势、全球环境及其人民的历史记忆均影响了俄罗斯，令其不得不重新体验其悲惨历史。


But Russia is like Western Europe, in the sense that it will have to advance in stages.	但俄罗斯和西欧有相同之处，即俄罗斯必须分阶段发展。


It is not like Central Europe, which could leapfrog over some of them by jumping on the NATO/EU springboard.	与中欧不同的是，俄罗斯通过跃上北约/欧盟的跳板而超越了中欧一些国家。


This means that we need to be more careful in using the language of democracy when talking about Russia.	这意味着我们在谈论俄罗斯时使用民主语言需要更加小心。


Democracy almost everywhere has been a fairly late child of capitalism, for it requires a self-conscious middle class to take root and flourish.	几乎所有地方的民主都是资本主义晚期的产物，因为它要求具有自我意识的中产阶级生根发芽、蓬勃发展。


This can only be produced by successful and sustained capitalist development.	而这只能通过成功与持久的资本主义发展得以产生。


Russia is generating it, but the process will take time.	俄罗斯正在形成民主，但这一过程需要时间。


Meanwhile, politics belongs to the elites.	同时，政治属于精英分子。


If Russia is to move forward, its high and mighty must agree about who owns what, who makes the rules, and how to change the rules.	俄罗斯要前进，其领袖人物必须就谁拥有什么、谁制定规则以及如何改变这些规则达成一致。


Rather than calling for democracy, this calls for a genuine constitutional rule of law.	这就要求实行真正合乎宪法的法治，而不是民主。


In other words, the task is to turn tsarist Russia into a version of the Kaiser’s Germany.	换句话说，这项任务是将俄国沙皇转变为凯撒德国的翻版。


This won’t be easy, but there are good reasons for optimism.	这并不容易做到，却仍有充分理由感到乐观。


With so much being written about Putin’s Russia, the rest of the country is often overlooked.	由于对有关普京领导下的俄罗斯的描述泛滥，该国的其他方面往往被忽略。


Putin’s Russia is essentially about the Kremlin and the bureaucracy.	普京领导下的俄罗斯本质上是克里姆林宫主导的官僚主义国家。


They are dominant, no doubt, but they are not Russia in its entirety.	官僚政治无疑居统治地位，但却并不是俄罗斯的全部。


The millions of consumers exercising their right to choose in the rapidly growing supermarket chains; the planeloads of business travelers converging on London, Zurich, and Frankfurt daily; the holiday-makers who, having lost the Crimea, have rediscovered the Mediterranean – all are part of a Russia beyond Putin’s Russia, one that will grow and develop even when Putin is history.	满载商务旅行者的飞机每日聚集在伦敦、苏黎世和法兰克福； 度假者丧失了克里米亚半岛，却重新发现了地中海—所有这一切都超越了普京的统治���即便普京成为历史，俄罗斯的这一部分仍然要发展和进步。


So Russia’s current agenda must be more about freedom than democracy.	因此，俄罗斯目前的议程涵盖的内容更多地涉及到自由而非民主。


Even now, Russia, though undemocratic, is largely free.	即使在当前，尽管俄罗斯并不民主，它在很大程度上却是自由的。


What it needs is to institutionalize that freedom by building a modern state to replace the antiquated tsarist system.	俄罗斯所需要的是通过建立现代化国家以取代过时的沙皇制度使这种自由制度化。


It also needs a modern civil society to consolidate its multi-ethnic post-imperial population.	它还需要现代化的公民社会来统一其多民族的后帝制人民。


This calls for a kind of liberalism that is now lacking in Russia, one that stands for freedom, reform, and the nation-state.	这要求一种自由主义，这种自由主义目前在俄罗斯很缺乏，它代表自由、改革和民族国家。


Neither the government nor the current opposition possesses it, which means that Russians must look beyond Putin’s Russia.	政府和现有的反对派均不拥有这种自由主义，这意味着俄罗斯必须考虑普京不再领导俄罗斯之后的状况。


As for the West, it is fruitless to try to bring Putin and his team back to democracy, where Russia does not belong, or to punish Russia with sanctions, which won’t work.	对于西方而言，努力引领普京及其内阁成员回到民主或利用制裁处罚俄罗斯均毫无成效，俄罗斯不属于民主，这些方法也都不起作用。


The West must recognize where Russia stands on history’s timeline and not seek to wish this away.	西方必须认识到俄罗斯站在历史的时间线上，不要企图希望它脱离历史。


The political gap can be narrowed only by indigenous capitalist development.	政治差距只有通过本国资本主义的发展才能缩小。


In the meantime, America and Europe should base their policies toward Russia on mutual interests, not the expectation of mutual values.	与此同时，美国和欧洲应该把共同利益作为自己对俄政策的基础，而不要寄希望于共同的价值观。


Freedom of Religion or Freedom of Speech?	信仰自由还是言论自由？


PRINCETON – Last month, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning “defamation of religion” as a human rights violation.	普林斯顿——上个月，联合国人权理事会通过了一项决议，谴责“宗教诽谤”是一种侵犯人权的行为。


According to the text of the resolution, “Defamation of religion is a serious affront to human dignity” that leads to “a restriction on the freedom of [religions’] adherents.”	决议内容认为“宗教诽谤是一种对人类尊严的严重侮辱”，可以致使“宗教信徒的自由受到限制”。


The resolution was originally proposed by the 56-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and was put to the Human Rights Council by Pakistan.	该决议由56个国家组成的伊斯兰会议组织（OIC）最先提出，而后由巴基斯坦提交人权理事会进行表决。


It supports that it was aimed at such things as the derogatory cartoons of the prophet Mohammad published in a Danish newspaper three years ago.	该决议声称其目标是反对诸如三年前丹麦一家报纸发表的贬损先知默罕默德的漫画。


Germany opposed the resolution.	德国对这项决议投了反对票。


Speaking on behalf of the European Union, a German spokesperson rejected the concept of “defamation of religion” as not valid in a human rights context, because human rights belonged to individuals, not to institutions or religions.	代表欧盟的一名德国发言人认为“宗教诽谤”的概念在人权背景下应视为无效，因为人权应当隶属于个人，而非隶属于机构或者宗教。


Many non-government organizations, both secular and religious, also opposed the resolution.	许多世俗和宗教性质的非政府组织也反对这项决议。


Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress, said that that body saw the resolution as weakening “the rights of individuals to express their views.”	世界犹太人大会会长罗纳德·洛德说该机构认为这项决议削弱了“个人表达观点的权利”。


This seems like a sound argument.	这种观点似乎能站得住脚。


While attempts to stir up hatred against adherents of a religion, or to incite violence against them, may legitimately be suppressed, criticism of religion as such should not be.	尽管煽动针对宗教信徒的仇恨或者暴力的行为可以依法遭到镇压，但对宗教的批评言论却不在此列。


The resolution is non-binding, but if nations were to enact laws putting it into effect, there can be no doubt that it would interfere with freedom of expression.	这项决议不具有强制性，可如果国家制定贯彻此项决议的法律，那么无疑将会破坏言论自由。


For a start, what counts as “defamation of religion” is contested.	首先，人们对何种行为算是“宗教诽谤”存在着很大的争议。


For example, the OIC said in its statement that “Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism.”	比如，伊斯兰会议组织在声明中提出“伊斯兰教常常被错误地与破坏人权和恐怖主义联系在一起。


Are those associations wrong?	”这种联系果真有误吗？


If the OIC wishes to change many people’s perception that Islam violates human rights, suppressing freedom of speech is hardly the best way to go about it.	如果伊斯兰会议组织希望改变人们心目中伊斯兰教侵犯人权的看法，压制言论自由恐怕并不是达到目的的最佳方式。


The way to change such a perception would be to marshal evidence against it, and to make the case that human rights – including the rights of women – are as well protected in Islamic countries as they are in non-Islamic countries.	改变这种看法可以通过搜集相反的证据，并证明人权——包括妇女权利在内——在伊斯兰国家与非伊斯兰国家得到了同样的保护。


To demonstrate that it is wrong to associate Islam with terrorism, the OIC might begin to compile statistics on the religious affiliations of those who engage in terrorism.	为证明把伊斯兰教与恐怖主义联系在一起的看法有误，伊斯兰会议组织或许可以搜集参与恐怖活动者宗教信仰的统计数据。


By contrast, suppressing the freedom of speech of Islam’s critics merely gives rise to the suspicion that evidence and sound argument cannot show their arguments to be mistaken.	压制伊斯兰教批评者言论自由的做法恰恰使人们心生疑虑，怀疑证据和可靠的论据无法证明公众的说法有误。


Coincidentally, in the same week that Germany and the World Jewish Congress rejected the idea that defamation of religion is an affront to human dignity, and upheld the right to freedom of expression, Germany’s highest court issued its ruling on a case brought by a Jewish organization, and two Jewish individuals.	巧合的是，在德国和世界犹太人大会否认宗教诽谤是对人格尊严的侮辱、并坚持维护言论自由权利的同一个星期，德国最高法院对由一个犹太人组织及两名犹太个人提起的一桩诉讼做出了裁决。


The court ruled against the right of the United States-based animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals to exhibit posters that juxtapose photographs of victims of the Holocaust with photographs of animals in factory farms and at slaughterhouses.	法院判决总部设在美国的动物权利组织人道对待动物协会无权张贴并列印有大屠杀死难者照片和工业化农场和屠宰场中动物照片的大幅海报。


The posters bear the heading: “To Animals, All People are Nazis” – a line from the Polish-born Jewish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer.	海报的标题是：“对于动物来讲，所有人都是纳粹”——这是在波兰出生的犹太作家艾萨克·巴什维斯·辛格的一句话。


According to the court, Germany’s laws on freedom of speech did not protect PETA’s campaign, because to make “the fate of the victims of the Holocaust appear banal and trivial” was an offense against human dignity.	法庭认为德国有关言论自由方面的法律不保护人道对待动物协会的宣传活动，因为使“大屠杀死难者的命运��得平庸和琐碎”是对人类尊严的一种伤害。


PETA was, of course, not arguing that Holocaust victims’ fate was banal or trivial.	当然，人道对待动物协会并没有认为大屠杀死难者的命运平庸或者琐碎。


On the contrary, it was using the Holocaust – which we would all agree was utterly horrific – to suggest, as Isaac Bashevis Singer did, that there are parallels between the way the Nazis treated Jews and the way we treat animals.	恰恰相反，这个组织利用大屠杀——这个被人类公认的极端恐怖事件——像艾萨克·巴什维斯·辛格那样表明纳粹对待犹太人和人类对待动物的方式有相同之处。


The conclusion PETA wants us to reach is that both the Holocaust and the mass confinement and slaughter of animals are horrific.	人道对待动物协会希望我们做出的结论是大屠杀和大规模圈养和屠杀动物都非常恐怖。


A free society should be open to discussing such a claim.	一个自由的社会应当对探讨这样的观点抱有一种开放的态度。


Irrespective of the merits of PETA’s campaign, however, those who stood up for free speech at the UN Human Rights Council should be able to see that the fact that some forms of speech cause offense is not sufficient reason to censor them.	但抛开人道对待动物协会宣传的功过不论，在联合国人权理事会坚持言论自由的人应当认识到这样一个事实，即某种形式的言论造成某些人的反感并不是审查这些言论的充分理由。


If PETA is not allowed to state its case against our abuse of animals in the way that they judge best, because doing so might offend some people, then criticism of religion could also be prohibited on the same grounds.	如果人道对待动物协会无权按照他们认为最有力的方式抗议我们对于动物的虐待，仅仅是因为这样做可能会冒犯某些人，那么对于宗教的批评也可以出于同样的原因被禁止。


If, on the other hand, a religion’s adherents have no right to protection against criticism of their religion, then, even in Germany, Holocaust victims and their descendants (I am one) should not be protected against advertising campaigns that, though not intended to incite hatred or violence, may cause them offense.	另一方面，如果宗教信徒无权受到免于宗教批评的保护，那么，即便在德国，大屠杀死难者及其后裔（我就是其中之一）也无权受到保护避开尽管并非旨在煽动仇恨或者暴力，但可能令他们受到冒犯的宣传攻势。


Free-Market Babies?	自由市场婴儿？


LONDON – Does India need a new independence struggle?	伦敦——印度是否需要一场新的独立斗争？


The fight this time would not be against British colonialism, but rather against the United Kingdom’s approach to regulating reproductive medicine.	这次的对象不是英国殖民主义，而是与英国生殖医学的管理方式展开斗争。


At a time when India is considering a sort of matchmaking service for Western couples seeking to hire Indian surrogate mothers, the UK government has announced the abolition of two leading medical regulatory agencies.	就在印度考虑设立婚介机构为西方夫妇寻找印度代孕母亲时，英国政府宣布取消了两家最大的医疗管理机构。


Meanwhile, as these countries move farther down the road to free markets in reproductive medicine, France is debating all of its bioethics laws – and continuing to stand up for a different model, focused on social justice and protection of vulnerable women.	此外，随着各国生殖医学自由市场化程度的不断深入，法国正在探讨生物伦理方面的法律，并继续对关注社会正义和弱势女性保护的个性化模式加以维护。


There is an alternative simply to letting the market decide, the French Assembly insists.	法国议会坚持认为代孕与否应当交由市场决定。


At some point, many countries are likely to find themselves embroiled in similar debates and controversies over reproductive rights and obligations.	总有一天，很多国家都可能陷入到由生殖权利义务引发的类似辩论和纠纷中。


So it is necessary to clarify what is at stake in how we regulate – or de-regulate – in vitro fertilization (IVF), egg sales, and surrogacy.	因此有必要就体外授精（IVF）、卵子出售和代孕方面加强或取消监管意味着什么加以澄清。


It may come as a surprise to American observers, in particular, that the UK approach could be considered “free market.”	在美国观察家看来，英国的做法与“自由市场”没有任何瓜葛。


After all, the UK forbids outright payment for eggs, whereas in the United States, a highly differentiated market has grown up around “consumer demand.”	毕竟英国完全禁止买卖卵子，而在美国围绕“客户需求”，高度差异化的市场已经形成。


And the UK has a national regulatory agency for IVF, whereas the US has a patchwork of state regulations (or a lack thereof).	同时英国设立了专门的体外授精国家管理机构，而美国则只有东拼西凑的各州立法（或者连这都没有）。


But the UK’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) might not be around for much longer.	不过英国的人类受精和胚胎管理局（HFEA）可能即告寿终正寝。


Prime Minister David Cameron’s government announced last July that it intended to abolish the HFEA by 2014, along with the Human Tissue Authority, which deals with non-reproductive tissues.	首相大卫·卡梅伦政府于去年10月宣布HFEA和管理非生殖组织的人体组织管理局将于2014年取消。


Already, the HFEA appears to be attempting to preempt the government by softening its regulatory touch.	而HFEA则似乎已先于政府放松了自己的监管力度。


Last month, the HFEA finished a consultation on increasing the level of “expenses” payable for eggs used in IVF.	上个月，HFEA刚刚结束了一次有关提高体外授精卵子“收费”标准的磋商。


European law forbids outright payment for eggs, but the Authority suggests that increasing “expenses” considerably would not constitute an impermissible inducement.	欧洲法律禁止直接买卖卵子，但当局认为大幅提高“收费”并不构成不能容许的因素。


The HFEA is merely “removing disincentives,” not “creating incentives.”	HFEA不过是在“消除不利因素”，而没有在“创造有利因素”。


You could be forgiven for missing the difference.	没有注意到这两者的区别可以原谅。


Proponents of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Regulation Bill 2010, now before the Indian Parliament, employ a similar rhetorical twist.	《2010年辅助生殖技术监管法》的支持者现在在印度议会面前也提出了类似歪曲事实的狡辩。


They say that the bill actually protects surrogate mothers – for example, by limiting the number of pregnancies they can undergo.	他们认为比方通过限制怀孕次数，该法案实际上保护了代孕母亲。


But the law would make surrogacy contracts legally binding, requiring the mother to give up the baby even if she changes her mind.	但法律将使代孕协议具有法律效力，即使母亲改变主意也必须将婴儿拱手相让。


Opponents say that the agencies making the arrangements will be the biggest winners – that the huge profits they reap will dwarf the fees paid by foreign couples to the women bearing their children.	反对者称牵线机构将成为最大的赢家——它们赚取的巨额利润会使外国夫妇付给代孕妇女的酬劳相形见绌。


As N.B. Sarojini and Aastha Sharma wrote in the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, “The Bill actively promotes medical tourism in India for reproductive purposes.”	正如萨罗吉尼和阿丝莎·夏尔马在《印度医学伦理杂志》上所写的那样，“该法案会对以生殖为目的的印度游起推动作用。 ”


France, like most European countries, has a problem with reproductive tourism: a yearly shortage of about 700 egg donors sends some couples over the Pyrenees to Spain, where private IVF clinics pay providers more in “expenses” than the UK allows.	法国和多数欧洲国家一样，对生殖旅游持否定态度：每年约700名卵子捐献者的缺口迫使一些夫妇翻越比利牛斯山来到西班牙，那里的私人体外授精诊所为卵子供体提供的“费用”比英国允许的要高。


Even so, the draft bill continues to prohibit payment for eggs.	即便如此，卵子买卖依然是草案禁止的内容。


And it’s not just France’s official ethics committee that takes an anti-commodification stance.	坚持反对商业化立场的不只是法国官方伦理委员会一家。


The French have recently conducted a series of two-day meetings in several provincial cities.	法国最近在若干省级市组织了几次为期两天的会议。


In Rennes, the panel debating reproductive medical issues supported the policy of not paying for eggs or sperm – not even by the back door of increasing the level of “expenses.”	在雷恩，讨论生殖医疗问题的专家组支持不允许为卵子或精子付费的政策——甚至连提高“费用”标准的后门也要取消。


While the HFEA document calls for ethical concerns to be “balanced” against increasing egg supply, French Assembly members insist that law, morality, and progress are compatible.	尽管HFEA文件呼吁应“平衡”伦理问题和不断扩大的卵子供应，法国议员仍然认为法律、道德和现有状况基本平衡。


They reject the view that ethics is optional, even though some influential professors, like René Frydman, who helped to create the first French IVF baby, have warned that France will fall behind in the science race unless it abandons its principles.	他们不同意伦理问题可以忽略的观点，即便有些像勒内·弗里德曼这样曾参与创造法国首个体外授精婴儿的知名教授警告说除非法国放弃原则，否则将在科学研究中落后。


The upper house, the Senate, was much more minded to listen to that view, so the outcome is still uncertain.	作为上院的法国参议院更倾向于听取这种意见，因此最终结果如何尚不明朗。


France is not a Shangri-La, isolated from global markets or the pressures of international research.	法国不是香格里拉，可以摆脱全球市场或国际研究压力的影响。


In the words of Emmanuel Hirsch, professor of medical ethics at the University of Paris-XI, “How long can our bioethical standards continue to resist the rise of other logics – particularly financial ones?”	用巴黎第十一大学医学伦理学教授伊曼纽尔·赫希的话说，“我们的生物伦理学标准究竟能在多长时间内抵御其他逻辑，特别是财务逻辑的崛起？ ”


To be sure, French regulation can be heavy-handed – for example, IVF is restricted to heterosexual couples who are married or in long-term relationships.	可以肯定，法国的管制或许相当严格——比方说，只允许对已婚或长期同居的异性伴侣进行体外授精操作。


The official rationale was that eggs and sperm are not commodities, but gifts from a fertile couple to an infertile one.	官方的理由是卵子和精子不属于商品，而是有生育能力的夫妇给予没有生育能力夫妇的帮助。


That is also one reason why the French restricted egg donation to women who had already had at least one baby (though this is being changed).	这也是法国只允许至少已经生过一个孩子的妇女捐献卵子的一个因素（尽管现在这项政策已经有所松动）。


But the limitation to heterosexual couples was rightly condemned as homophobic by the French public in the consultations.	可是异性伴侣限制有理由被法国公众斥之为同性恋恐惧症。


So the draft bill has been amended to allow lesbian women to receive donated eggs.	因此该法律草案已经进行了修改，允许女同性恋者接受卵子捐赠。


(Gay men will still be barred, because they would require a surrogate, and surrogacy remains prohibited.)	（男同性恋者仍然没有这种权利，因为他们需要找人代孕，而针对代孕的禁令并没有取消）。


That sort of responsiveness to popular sentiment in the legislative process gives the lie to the canard that French regulation is inflexible and hopelessly bureaucratic.	像这样在立法过程中照顾公众情绪的做法让法国式管制缺乏灵活性、官僚得一塌糊涂的谎言不攻自破。


In fact, the free-market “Anglo-Saxon” attitude sounds like nothing so much as the old prejudices about the French that have been around since the novelist Thackeray told English readers: “The Frenchman has after his soup a dish of vegetables, where you have one of meat.	事实上，“安格鲁·撒克逊”式的自由市场管理方式还不如小说家萨克雷灌输给英国读者的关于法国人的老套偏见：“法国人在喝完汤后吃一盘蔬菜，而你们则吃肉。


You are a different and superior animal – a French-beating animal.”	你们比法国人高贵——是能打败法国人的动物。 ”


Of course, we now know that a diet of bully beef is likely to result in hardening of the arteries, whereas the vegetable-centered Mediterranean diet is much better for human health.	当然，我们现���知道吃牛肉罐头可能会导致动脉硬化，而以蔬菜为主的地中海式膳食则对人体健康更有好处。


Enough said?	我有没有说清？


Free Speech on Trial	言论自由经受考验


Not so long ago, there was jubilation that the free world and its values had prevailed in the Cold War.	不久前，人们为自由世界及其价值观在冷战中的胜利而弹冠相庆。


When the Communist empire collapsed, some even announced that the victory of liberty and democracy implied the “end of history.”	当共产主义帝国崩溃之时，有些人甚至宣称自由和民主的胜利预示着“历史的终结”。


But history never bowed out; at most, it only took a decade-long intermission, with its next act heralded by the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001.	但是，历史从不退出舞台； 它最多有了一个长达十年之久的幕间休息，而2001年9月11日对美国的恐怖主义攻击则宣告历史新的一幕。


And here the plot has thickened.	而如今，情节模糊不清。


Instead of rejoicing in the liberal order, those of us who have the pleasure of living under it have had to struggle to keep it intact and strong.	愉快地生活在自由秩序下的人们不仅没有因此而喜悦，反而不得不努力抗争来维护它的完整和强大。


Since 9/11, more and more freedoms are being restricted in the name of defending liberty.	自9/11以来，越来越多的自由被以维护自由的名义受到限制。


New visa requirements and other obstacles to travel, more intimate data collected by governments, and the presence of video cameras everywhere – at once benign and intrusive – remind one more of George Orwell’s Big Brother than of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.	实行新的签证限制以及其他旅行限制，政府收集更多的个人隐私信息以及摄像镜头遍布各处。 这些良性的措施打扰人们的隐私，让我们想起了乔治·奥维尔的<<大哥>>以及约翰·米勒的<<论自由>>。


Britain is not the only country where ancient rights of habeas corpus, of the inviolability of the person, are to be restricted by new legislation that, for example, extends the permissible length of detention without charge.	人身保护令、不得侵犯人身等古老的权利受到新的立法的限制，例如，延长拘押时限而不经指控等。 英国并非是唯一发生这种情况的国家。


Now, even the fundamental right of a liberal order, free speech, is under pressure.	如今，即使是言论自由，这一自由秩序中的基本权利也受到了压力。


Some restrictions are understandable legacies of the past, but must nevertheless be re-examined.	某些限制是过去的遗产，可以理解。 但是，必须予以重新审视。


In Austria, the historian David Irving was arrested recently because he has denied that the Holocaust happened.	在澳大利亚，历史学家大卫·欧文由于否认发生过二战时期纳粹对犹太人的大屠杀而在最近被捕。


In the prison library, however, Irving found two of the books he had written that had led to his arrest!	但是在监狱图书馆里，欧文发现了他自己写的、让他入狱的两本书！


In Berlin, there is much concern about the possible desecration of the Holocaust Memorial, although its author, the American architect Peter Eisenmann, takes a relaxed view of what is said and done about his creation.	在柏林，尽管很多人担忧犹太人大屠杀纪念馆会遭到亵渎，但是，这一纪念馆的美国设计师彼得·爱森曼对他的设计会被如何评论以及动作并不以为然。


Other restrictions of free speech have more recent triggers.	更为最近的事件触发了对言论自由的限制。


In the Netherlands, the shock that arose over the killing of the film maker Theo van Gogh runs deep and has led to demands for legislation against hate speech.	在荷兰，电影制片人凡高遇害所引发的社会震惊触及深处，使得有人要求立法取缔仇恨性言论。


In Britain, proposed legislation concerning incitement to religious hatred and terrorism has led to emotional parliamentary debates – and to doubts about the liberal credentials of Tony Blair’s government.	在英国，有关煽动宗教仇恨和恐怖主义的立法建议引起了议会中带有感情色彩的辩论，同时，令人对布莱尔政府奉行自由主义感到怀疑。


Can such demands for restricting free speech ever be legitimate?	这种限制言论自由的要求能够是合法合理的吗？


The first and principled answer must surely be no.	首要、也是符合原则的回答是：不。


All freedoms can be abused by liberty’s enemies, but in the case of speech, the risk posed by restricting freedom is surely greater.	自由的敌人可能会滥用自由，但是就言论而言，限制言论自由所带来的风险肯定更为巨大。


Moreover, the benefits of tolerating free speech outweigh the harm of abusing it.	而且，容忍言论自由的利益要大于滥用言论自由的害处。


Indeed, the Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen has demonstrated that free speech even helps mitigate seemingly natural catastrophes like famines, because it reveals the ways in which a few haves exploit the many have-nots.	实际上，诺贝尔经济学奖得主Amartya Sen表明，由于揭示少数权贵对贫穷大众的巧取豪夺，言论自由甚至可以减轻类似饥荒那样的自然灾害。


As the watchdog organization Transparency International reminds us, corruption exposed is in many cases corruption prevented.	正如监督组织透明国际提醒我们的那样，在许多情况下，揭露腐败就可以防止腐败。


These practical consequences are above and beyond the liberating effect of allowing the “marketplace of ideas,” rather than state authorities, to judge people’s expressed views.	这些实际功效超出于允许“观念集市”的自由化效应，而非国家机关来评判人们所表达的观点。


Are there really no exceptions to this rule?	这一规则难道没有例外吗？


The classic example comes to mind of the man who shouts “Fire!” in a crowded theatre.	人们所想到的经典的例子是有人在拥挤的剧院大喊：“着火了”。


In the resulting panic, people may be hurt or even killed.	在随之而来的恐慌中，人们可能受伤甚至死亡。


Nowadays, we worry about incitement – using free speech to provoke violence.	现在，我们担心煽动，也就是利用言论自由来挑起暴力。


I do not know how many Islamic leaders preach murder and mayhem in mosques and help recruit suicide bombers from among their congregants; but even if it is only a handful, they pose a question that must be answered.	我不知道有多少伊斯兰领导人在清真寺布道谋杀和重伤，并且帮助从教友中招募自杀爆炸者。 但是，即使这仅仅是一小撮，他们仍然提出一个必须解答的问题。


That answer must be given carefully.	这一问题必须予以小心回答。


For free societies to flourish, the boundaries of free speech should always be widened rather than narrowed.	自由社会想要繁荣，言论自由的界限就应该加宽而不是缩小。


In my view, Holocaust denial should not be outlawed, in contrast to the demand for all, or any, Jews to be killed.	在我看来，与要求屠杀所有或者任何犹太人的要求相反，否定屠杀犹太人并不应当立法取缔。


Similarly, attacks against the West in mosques, however vicious, should not be banned, in contrast to open encouragement to join suicide death squads.	同样地，与公开鼓励参加自杀式敢死队相反，不应当禁止在清真寺中攻击西方社会，无论这种攻击有多么恶毒。


What about the mere praise of “martyrs” who have died while murdering others?	那么，对于仅仅是颂扬谋杀他人而死亡的“烈士们”又当如何呢？


The boundary between implicit and explicit incitement is not easily drawn, but, again, it should be wider rather than narrower.	隐含和明显的煽动之间的界限是不容易划定的，但是，这一界限应当更宽而不是更窄。


Free speech is immensely precious, and so is the dignity and integrity of humans.	言论自由极为珍贵，人类的尊严和完整也是如此。


Both require active and alert citizens who engage what they do not like rather than calling for the state to clamp down on it.	它们都要求积极和警觉的公民能够对付他们所不喜欢的东西，而不是要求国家予以镇压。


Direct incitement to violence is regarded – as it should be – as an unacceptable abuse of free speech; but much that is disagreeable about the David Irving’s and the hate preachers does not fall into this category.	直接煽动暴力应当被视为是不能接受的滥用言论自由； 但是，大卫·欧文以及仇恨布道者让人不悦的地方大部分并不属于这一范畴。


Their rants should be rejected with argument, not with police and prisons.	应当用辩论来拒绝他们的叫嚷，而非使用警察和监狱。


Free Tilly – and all Circus Animals	给Tilly以及所有马戏团动物以自由


MELBOURNE – Last month, at the Sea World amusement park in Florida, a whale grabbed a trainer, Dawn Brancheau, pulled her underwater, and thrashed about with her.	发自墨尔本 —— 上个月，在美国佛罗里达州的海洋世界游乐园里，一条鲸鱼把一位名叫黛安·布兰切（ Diane Brancheau ）的训练员扯到了池底，还肆意蹂躏她。


By the time rescuers arrived, Brancheau was dead.	在救援到达之时，布兰切已经断气了。


The death of the trainer is a tragedy, and one can only have sympathy for her family.	这位训练员的遇害是一场悲剧，我们除了对其家人表示同情外，别无他法。


But the incident raises broader questions: was the attack deliberate?	但这场意外却引出了一些更深层次的问题：这条鲸鱼的攻击行为是蓄意的吗？


Did the whale, an orca named Tilikum and nicknamed Tilly, act out of stress at being held captive in a sterile concrete tank?	这条名叫 Tilikum ，大家都昵称叫 Tilly 的逆戟鲸是否是由于长期被囚禁在一个空荡荡的水泥池子里，承受不了巨大的压力才做出了这种行为？


Was he tired of being forced to perform to amuse the crowds?	它是否厌倦了为讨好观众而被迫表演呢？


Is it right to keep such large animals in close confinement?	圈养如此庞大的动物是否合理呢？


Tilly had been involved in two previous human deaths.	在这桩事件之前， Tilly 还牵涉到另外两起人员死亡事件。


In one episode, a trainer fell into the pool and Tilly and two other whales drowned him.	在其中一幕里，一位训练员失足掉进了池内， Tilly 和其他两条鲸鱼把他给淹死了。


In another, a man who appears to have gotten into the enclosure at night, when Sea World was closed, was found dead in the pool with Tilly.	在另一幕里，一位男士似乎在某个晚上闯进了已经关门的海洋世界游乐园，后来被发现死在了 Tilly 所呆的那个池子里。


An autopsy showed that he had a bite mark.	验尸报告显示他身上有被咬过的伤口。


One of Tilly’s offspring, sold to an amusement park in Spain, has also killed a trainer, as have orcas in other parks.	而 Tilly 的后代也都被卖到其他游乐园，其中被卖到了西班牙游乐园的一条也杀死过一位训练员。


Richard Ellis, a marine conservationist at the American Museum of Natural History, believes that orcas are smart and would not do such a thing purely on impulse.	理查德·埃里斯（ Richard Ellis ）是在美国国家自然博物馆工作的海洋自然资源保护者，他认为逆戟鲸是十分聪明的动物，它们不会因为一时冲动而做出上述行为的。


“This was premeditated,” he told The Associated Press.	他在接受美联社采访时说“那是早有预谋的。 ”


We will never know exactly what was going on in Tilly’s mind, but we do know that he has been in captivity since he was about two years old – he was captured off the coast of Iceland in 1983.	当然，虽然我们永远都无法确切了解 Tilly 大脑在想些什么，不过，我们知道它自大概两岁起就被囚禁起来了 —— 它是在 1983 年在冰岛沿海被捕的。


Orcas are social mammals, and he would have been living with his mother and other relatives in a pod.	逆戟鲸是一种具有社交性需要的哺乳动物，如果不是被抓住了， Tilly 应该是和它母亲以及其他外貌类似的亲戚一起生活的。


It is reasonable to suppose that the sudden separation was traumatic for Tilly.	由此，我们可以合理地推断，与亲人的骤然分离给 Tilly 的心灵造成了难以弥补的巨大创伤。


Moreover, the degree of confinement in an aquarium is extreme, for no tank, no matter how large, can come close to meeting the needs of animals who spend their lives in social groups swimming long distances in the ocean.	而且，对逆戟鲸来说，游乐园用来圈养的那种水泥池给它们造成了一种极端的幽闭感。 因为对于这种习惯在广阔无垠的海洋里成群结队地长途迁徙的动物来说，再大的池子也是无法满足需要的。


Joyce Tischler, of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, described keeping a six-ton orca in Sea World’s tanks as akin to keeping a human in a bathtub for his entire life.	在动物合法权益保护基金会工作的乔伊斯·提斯勒（ Joyce Tischler ）指出，把一条 6 吨重的逆戟鲸囚禁在海洋世界游乐园的水池子无异于把一个人困在浴盆里一辈子。


David Phillips, director of the International Marine Mammal Project for the Earth Island Institute, which led the efforts to rehabilitate the orca Keiko – made famous by the movie Free Willy – said “Orcas deserve a better fate than living in cramped pools.”	而地球岛屿研究所（即致力于使那条因电影《人鱼的童话》而出名的叫做 Keiko 的逆戟鲸重新恢复正常生活的机构）的国际海洋哺乳动物研究项目的主管大卫·菲利普斯（ David Phillips ）则指出“逆戟鲸应该生活在更好的环境里，而不应该在狭窄的池子中。 ”


But if we are pointing the finger at Sea World for what it does to its captive animals, we should also look more broadly at the way we confine performing animals.	但如果我们要指责海洋世界游乐园如此对待其所圈养的动物的话，我们同时也应更深一层地反思我们囚禁驯养动物的方式。


In most countries, it is possible to visit zoos and see bored animals pacing back and forth in cages, with nothing to do but wait for the next meal.	在大多数国家里，我们去动物园玩时都能看到那些百无聊赖的动物在笼子里毫无生气地来回游荡，除了等吃下一顿外，它们无所事事。


Circuses are even worse places for animals.	而对动物来说，马戏团则是更糟糕的地方。


Their living conditions are deplorable, especially in traveling circuses where cages have to be small so that they can go on the road.	在那里它们的生存条件糟糕得令人发指，尤其是在那些四处表演的流动马戏团，为了路上运输方便，他们用来装载动物的笼子必须设计得非常小。


Training animals to perform tricks often involves starvation and cruelty.	而为了训练动物表演节目，他们又经常让动物吃不饱并虐待它们。


Undercover investigations have repeatedly shown animals being beaten and given electric shocks.	秘密调查反复向我们表明那些动物经常遭受毒打和电击。


Several countries – among them Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, India, Israel, and Sweden – ban or severely restrict the use of wild animals in circuses.	现在，部分几个国家 —— 如奥地利，哥斯达黎加，丹麦，芬兰，印度，以色列和瑞典 —— 禁止或严格限制马戏团使用野生动物。


In Brazil, a movement to ban wild animals from circuses started after hungry lions managed to grab and devour a small boy.	而在饥饿的狮群咬死和分食了一个小男孩后，巴西也发起了一场禁止马戏团使用野生动物的运动。


Several major cities and many local governments around the world do not permit circuses with wild animals.	世界上部分主要的城市和许多地方政府都禁止拥有野生动物的马戏团进行表演。


Last year, Bolivia became the first country to ban all animals, wild or domestic, from circuses.	去年，玻利维亚成为首个禁止马戏团驯养动物 —— 无论是野生和驯养 —— 的国家。


That decision followed an undercover investigation by Animal Defenders International, which exposed shocking abuse of circus animals.	这个决定是在国际动物保护者协会进行了一次秘密调查之后做出的，而这次调查揭露了马戏团是如何丧心病狂地虐待动物。


Now the British government is holding a public online consultation on the use of animals in circuses.	现在，英国政府就马戏团使用动物的问题在网络上咨询公众。


Many hope it will be a first step towards a ban.	许多人希望这会成为发布禁令的第一步。


Attempts to defend amusement parks and circuses on the grounds that they “educate” people about animals should not be taken seriously.	我们无须太在意那些以“教导”人们认识动物为由来为游乐园和马戏团辩护的意图。


Such enterprises are part of the commercial entertainment industry.	因为持有这种意图的公司都是些商业娱乐行业机构。


The most important lesson they teach impressionable young minds is that it is acceptable to keep animals in captivity for human amusement.	而就是它们能教给那些年少无知的年轻人所谓最重要的东西，无非就是些诸如“为了人类的娱乐而把动物囚禁起来是合理的”的鬼话。


That is the opposite of the ethical attitude to animals that we should be seeking to impart to children.	而这是跟我们努力想灌输给小朋友们对待动物的伦理态度背道而驰的。


Nor should we be swayed by the argument that circuses provide employment.	我们也不必因马戏团提供了就业这种观点而举棋不定。


The human slave trade also provided employment, but that was no argument for perpetuating it.	奴隶贸易同样提供了就业，但我们没有理由让其存在下去。


In any case, in many countries that have restrictions or bans on circuses with animals, human-only circuses have flourished.	在任何情况下，在许多限制或禁止拥有动物的马戏团的国家里，只有人类表演节目的马戏团也照样能够蓬勃发展。


There is no excuse for keeping wild animals in amusement parks or circuses.	毫无疑问，游乐园或马戏团没有任何理由为表演而拥有动物。


Until our governments take action, we should avoid supporting places where captive wild animals perform for our amusement.	在我们的政府采取行动之前，我们应该抵制去那些囚禁和利用野生动物表演来取悦我们的地方。


If the public will not pay to see them, the businesses that profit from keeping animals captive will not be able to continue.	如果公众拒绝给钱去看那些表演，那么以圈养动物来盈利的生意就无以为继了。


When our children ask us to take them to the circus, we should find out if the circus uses wild animals.	当孩子们要我们带他们去马戏团时，我们要事先弄清楚这个马戏团是否有利用野生动物来表演节目。


If it does, we should explain to our children why we will not take them there, and offer to take them to a circus that does not.	如果有，我们就该向孩子解释清楚为什么不能带他们去那里，并建议他们去看那些没有野生动物表演的马戏团。


Free Trade Ad Nauseam	苦口婆心话自由贸易


NEW YORK – So much has been written, by so many, against the muddled ideas that have now overwhelmed good sense on trade policy in the United States government that one wonders whether there is anything left to say.	纽约—美国政府的贸易政策可谓一团乱麻，让人对什么才是明智判断这一点不知如何是从——关于这方面，已有太多的人写了太多的文章，以至于你已经看不到有什么方面还有话要说了。


Yet it is worth recalling what Pierre-Joseph Proudhon reportedly told the Russian intellectual Alexander Herzen: “And do you imagine that once a thing has been said, it is enough?....It has to be dinned into people, it has to be repeated over and over again.”	但我们仍然值得回忆一下下面这句话，据说这句话是蒲鲁东（Pierre-Joseph Proudhon）对俄罗斯知识分子赫尔岑说的：“你想想看，有没有过觉得一件东西已经被说尽了的时候？ ……这个东西已经被三番五次地告诉众人，被反复地说了又说。


What we need now is a primer on the major misconceptions in the hope that, unlike Gresham’s Law, which says that bad money drives out good money, good economics will drive out bad economics.	我们现在需要的是厘清几项重大误解，希望格雷欣法则（劣币驱逐良币）在经济学领域能够逆转。


Four, in particular need to be corrected.	特别是，有四个观念需要被纠正。


The first misconception is that exports create jobs, while imports do not – a fallacy that the great trade economist Harry Johnson traced to mercantilism, and which the US has resurrected.	第一个错误观念是出口创造就业，而进口则否。 这个谬误由伟大的贸易经济学家哈里·约翰逊（Harry Johnson）提出，其源头可以追溯到重商主义，然后又在美国死灰复燃。


In fact, in a world where parts and components come from everywhere, interference with imports imperils competitiveness.	事实上，当今世界，零部件来自世界各地，干预进口不啻于自毁长城。


The success of parcel-delivery companies, for example, depends on imports, which must be brought from the borders inland, as well as on exports.	比如，快递公司的成功取决于进口——需要从边境运输到内陆的进口——的程度不逊于出口。


Second, the credo “Trade, not aid” has given way to the mistaken belief that trade matters less than foreign assistance.	第二个错误观念是“要贸易，不要援助”的口号。 这一口号给了人们贸易不如对外援助重要的错误观念。


The labor constituency, ever fearful of import competition, has undermined trade policy.	劳动选民总是担心来自进口品的竞争，他们在破坏贸易政策。


It has also shifted aid policy in directions that assign priority to areas where the returns to US efforts are relatively minuscule.	这一口号还改变了援助政策，将给美国带来的回报相对较少的地区列为援助首选地区。


Thus, the US State Department has ceased being an advocate of multilateral trade liberalization, despite decades of massive gains from the removal of trade barriers.	于是，美国国务院不再是多边贸易自由化的支持者，尽管几十年来，贸易壁垒的消除给美国带来了无穷的好处。


Instead, its aid arm, the US Agency for International Development, has now retreated into low-yield programs conceived as randomized experiments.	相反，国务院的对外援助部门美国国际开发署如今已开始进行被认为是随机试验的低收益项目。


That technique impresses Bill Gates, and the new USAID administrator, Rajiv Shah, has experience with it.	这一做法吸引了比尔·盖茨的注意，新任美国国际开发署主任拉吉夫·萨哈（Rajiv Shah）也拥有这方面的经验。


But, even if all such programs succeeded, their benefits would not add up to a fraction of the documented gains that have accrued from trade and other macro-level policies in which the US has lost interest.	但是，即使这些计划化都获得了成功，它们的好处也无法弥补美国在得自贸易和其他宏观层面政策的好处上损失的利益。


Third, many believe that manufactures deserve preferential support.	第三，许多人认为制造业应该获得优先支持。


This is practically the mantra of US President Barack Obama’s administration, and it has cost him the support not only of much of the economics profession, but also of Christina Romer, who chaired his Council of Economic Advisers.	这实际上也是奥巴马政府所信奉的箴言，但这不仅引起了经济学界的普遍反对，甚至连其经济顾问委员会主席克里斯蒂娜·罗默（Christina Romer）也不支持。


In a recent newspaper commentary, she refuted virtually all of the arguments advanced by manufacturing lobbyists for special treatment.	在一篇最新的报纸评论文章中，罗默反驳了几乎所有制造业游说者所要求的特殊待遇。


Add to the critiques that of Nobel laureate Robert Solow, a staunch supporter of Obama’s Democratic Party.	诺贝尔奖获得者、奥巴马的民主党的坚定支持者罗伯特·索洛（Robert Solow）也提出了批评。


He agrees that there are activities that yield higher social returns than private returns.	他指出，确实有社会回报高于私人回报的活动。


The problem, he notes, is that neither he nor anyone else can possibly know which ones they are, whereas the lobbyists claim that they know this precisely.	问题在于，不管是他还是其他人，都不知道哪些活动属于这一类，但游说者却坚称他们一清二楚。


Proponents of a “manufacturing first” policy argue that “clusters” of businesses are more productive than individual businesses are.	 “制造业第一”政策的支持者指出，企业“集群”要比个体企业更具生产力。


But big clustering effects are hard to find.	但你很难找到集群效应有多么巨大。


The economists Glenn Ellison and Edward Glaeser have found that clustering is only marginally greater than if businesses are allocated randomly.	经济学家格伦·埃里森（Glenn Ellison）和爱德华·格雷泽（Edward Glaeser）发现，比较企业集群和随机分布，集群只有极微小的优势。


Besides, it is hard not to accept that, in the economist Frances Cairncross’s famous words, we are increasingly seeing the “death of distance.”	此外，用经济学家弗朗西斯·凯恩克罗斯（Frances Cairncross）的名言讲，越来越多的人已经看到了“距离之死”（death of distance），理解这一点并不困难。


Finally, the financial sector has come to be viewed as the bane of morality.	最后，金融部门已经被视为道德堕落的源头。


In a world of financial fraud and insider trading, it is easy enough to believe this, and to accept that the financial sector must be taxed.	当今世界，金融欺诈和内幕交易盛行，持有这种观点不足为奇，认为金融部门应该被课税也十分正常。


But morality cuts across sectors.	但道德堕落在所有部门都存在。


There are plenty of honest people in all walks of life, and crooks as well.	不论哪个行业，都有恶棍，也都有诚实的人。


The quasi-Marxist view that our morality stems from our economic position overlooks the moralizing role of family, religion, culture, and art.	道德水平由经济地位决定这种马克思主义式的观点忽视了家庭、宗教、文化和艺术在道德培养方面的作用。


Given these misconceptions, protectionism has re-emerged as a formidable foe.	由于这些错误观念的存在，保护主义得以死灰复燃，成为我们前进的大敌。


In 1999, when the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization erupted into bomb threats and mayhem, I asked then-Director-General Mike Moore whether we ought not to be prepared to die for the great cause of free trade.	1999年，世界贸易组织部长级会议上惊现炸弹威胁和蓄意破坏，我问时任总干事麦克·摩尔（Mike Moore），我们到底应不应该时刻准备着为自由贸易的伟业献身。


I should have said: we ought at least to be prepared to live for it.	我当时应该这样说：至少我们应该时刻准备着为这项伟业而活着。


Between old and new muddle, and the certain prospect that the demolition of each bad idea merely allows others to take root and grow in its place, the task of the free trader is never finished.	在新旧乱象层出不穷之时，在旧坏主意的铲除徒然为新坏主意腾出生根发芽空间之际，自由贸易人任重道远。


Free-Trade Blinders	自由贸易的迷信者


CAMBRIDGE – I was recently invited by two Harvard colleagues to make a guest appearance in their course on globalization.	发自剑桥——最近我受邀到两位哈佛同事的全球化课程中客串嘉宾。 “我必须警告你。


“I have to tell you,” one of them warned me beforehand, “this is a pretty pro-globalization crowd.”	”其中一位事先提醒我说：“这帮学生都是全球化的强烈拥护者。


In the very first meeting, he had asked the students how many of them preferred free trade to import restrictions; the response was more than 90%.	”他曾在第一堂课请在座学生在自由贸易和进口限制之间做出选择，结果有超过90％赞成前者。


And this was before the students had been instructed in the wonders of comparative advantage!	而且还是在尚未开始教授比较优势的神奇效应之前。


We know that when the same question is asked in real surveys with representative samples – not just Harvard students – the outcome is quite different.	我们知道在真实调查中用同样的问题询问那些具有代表性的样本——而非哈佛学生——会得到一个截然不同的结果。


In the United States, respondents favor trade restrictions by a two-to-one margin.	在美国，限制贸易的反对者与支持者之比为2：1。


But the Harvard students’ response was not entirely surprising.	但哈佛学生的答案不会令人感觉特别意外。


Highly skilled and better-educated respondents tend to be considerably more pro-free trade than blue-collar workers are.	因为那些拥有更高技术及更好教育的人往往比蓝领工人更加倾向于支持自由贸易。


Perhaps the Harvard students were simply voting with their own (future) wallets in mind.	而或许这些哈佛学早已对自己的前（钱）途有所预期，并以此作出了决定。


Or maybe they did not understand how trade really works.	又或者，他们其实并不明白贸易是如何运作的。


After all, when I met with them, I posed the same question in a different guise, emphasizing the likely distributional effects of trade.	毕竟，当我和他们见面的时候，我特意换了另一种形式来询问同样的问题，并强调贸易所可能产生的分配效应。


This time, the free-trade consensus evaporated – even more rapidly than I had anticipated.	结果支持公平贸易的共识彻底消失无踪，甚至比我预想的还要迅速。


I began the class by asking students whether they would approve of my carrying out a particular magic experiment.	一开场，我先询问了大家是否同意我以一个特别神奇的实验。


I picked two volunteers, Nicholas and John, and told them that I was capable of making $200 disappear from Nicholas’s bank account – poof! – while adding $300 to John’s.amp#160; This feat of social engineering would leave the class as a whole better off by $100.	我选了尼古拉斯和约翰作为志愿者，然后告诉他们，我有办法令尼古拉斯帐户里的200美元消失——变！ ——同时让约翰的帐户增加300美元，社会工程的伟业可以令这个班级作为一个整体额外增加100美元的价值。


Would they allow me to carry out this magic trick?	那么他们会允许我来玩这个小把戏吗？


Those who voted affirmatively were only a tiny minority. Many were uncertain.	结果坚决同意的只占很小一部分，许多人犹豫不定，甚至有更多的人反对实施这个转变。


Clearly the students were uncomfortable about condoning a significant redistribution of income, even if the economic pie grew as a result.	很显然学生们都难以容忍这种大幅收入再分配的形式，即使在整个经济蛋糕被做大了的情况下。


How is it possible, I asked, that almost all of them had instinctively favored free trade, which entails a similar – in fact, most likely greater – redistribution from losers to winners?	我接着问，为何他们中的大多数人又近乎本能地拥护自由贸易，而自由贸易其实也会导致一种类似的——事实上甚至更大幅度的——由输家到赢家的财富重新分配。


They appeared taken aback.	学生们看上去都被震住了。


Let’s assume, I said next, that Nicholas and John own two small firms that compete with each other.	我接着说，让我们假设尼古拉斯和约翰两个人都开了一家相互竞争的小公司。


Suppose that John got richer by $300 because he worked harder, saved and invested more, and created better products, driving Nicholas out of business and causing him a loss of $200.	约翰工作更努力，更多地进行储蓄投资，并生产出更好的产品，于是他不但比尼古拉斯多300美元，而且把后者的公司挤出市场并导致其损失200美元。


How many of the students now approved of the change?	那么又有多少学生赞成这一转变？


This time a vast majority did – in fact, everyone except Nicholas approved!	这次绝大部分都投了赞成票——事实上只有尼古拉斯一个人不同意！


I posed other hypotheticals, now directly related to international trade.	我紧接着提出了另一个与国际贸易直接相关的假设。


Suppose John had driven Nicholas out of business by importing higher-quality inputs from Germany?	如果约翰是通过从德国进口高质量产品的方式把尼古拉斯挤出市场？


By outsourcing to China, where labor rights are not well protected?	或是将业务流程外包到劳工权益尚未完善的中国？


By hiring child workers in Indonesia?	又或是在印尼雇佣童工？


Support for the proposed change dropped with each one of these alternatives.	这次对转变的赞同度则随着上述选项依次递减。


But what about technological innovation, which, like trade, often leaves some people worse off.	此外科技革新也会像贸易一样导致某一部分人处于更加弱势的地位，你们对此是什么态度？


Here, few students would condone blocking technological progress.	对此只有很少的学生愿意遏制科技的发展。


Banning the light bulb because candle makers would lose their jobs strikes almost everyone as a silly idea.	对几乎所有人来说，为了保住蜡烛工匠的工作而禁止生产电灯泡简直是一个愚蠢的想法。


So the students were not necessarily against redistribution. They were against certain kinds of redistribution.	因此学生们反对的不一定是再分配，只是反对某些特定形式的再��配而已。


Like most of us, they care about procedural fairness.	跟我们大多数人一样，他们都关注程序的公正性。


To pass judgment on redistributive outcomes, we need to know about the circumstances that cause them.	如果要对再分配的结果作出判断的话，我们就必须知道产生这种结果的客观环境。


We do not begrudge Bill Gates or Warren Buffett their billions, even if some of their rivals have suffered along the way, presumably because they and their competitors operate according to the same ground rules and face pretty much the same opportunities and obstacles.	我们不会对比尔·盖茨或者沃伦·巴菲特的巨额财富愤愤不平，即便他们的某些对手日子一直都不好过，这大概是因为他们及其竞争者们都依据同样的基本法则进行运作，也面对着极为相似的机遇和挑战。


We would think differently if Gates and Buffett had enriched themselves not through perspiration and inspiration, but by cheating, breaking labor laws, ravaging the environment, or taking advantage of government subsidies abroad.	但如果盖茨和巴菲特不是依靠自己的才智和努力，而是通过诈骗、违反劳动法，破坏环境或者利用国外政府的补贴来致富的话，我们的想法也会截然不同。


If we do not condone redistribution that violates widely shared moral codes at home, why should we accept it just because it involves transactions across political borders?	如果我们无法容忍那些通过违反国内普遍遵守的道德准则而实现的再分配的话，又凭什么能因为其涉及了跨国交易而心安理得呢？


Similarly, when we expect redistributive effects to even out in the long run, so that everyone eventually comes out ahead, we are more likely to overlook reshufflings of income.	同样，当我们预期再分配效应会在长期内实现均等，所有人都将因此最终获益之时，我们将很可能不会在意收入的转移。


That is a key reason why we believe that technological progress should run its course, despite its short-run destructive effects on some.	这也是为何我们相信即便科技会对某些人带来短期的负面相应，却依然愿意促进其发展的关键原因。


When, on the other hand, the forces of trade repeatedly hit the same people – less educated, blue-collar workers – we may feel less sanguine about globalization.	而另一方面当贸易不断地冲击着同样的一群人——低教育程度蓝领工人——我们又会对全球化感到忧心忡忡。


Too many economists are tone-deaf to such distinctions.	但许多经济学家却对这些明显区别充耳不闻。


They are prone to attribute concerns about globalization to crass protectionist motives or ignorance, even when there are genuine ethical issues at stake.	他们总倾向于把对全球化的烦恼归因于那些愚蠢自私的贸易保护主义动机或者无知，而不知道其中最要紧的其实是道德问题。


By ignoring the fact that international trade sometimes – certainly not always – involves redistributive outcomes that we would consider problematic at home, they fail to engage the public debate properly.	由于无法意识到国际贸易有时——当然不是常常——会导致一些我们在国内无法接受的再分配后果，这些经济学家也无法恰当地介入公众讨论。


They also miss the opportunity to mount a more robust defense of trade when ethical concerns are less warranted.	而既然在道德方面都站不住脚，他们又如何能为贸易大力辩护呢？


While globalization occasionally raises difficult questions about the legitimacy of its redistributive effects, we should not respond automatically by restricting trade.	当全球化偶尔引发一个与再分配效应的合法化相关的棘手问题时，我们不应不假思索地用限制贸易来作为回应。


There are many difficult trade-offs to consider, including the consequences for others around the world who may be made significantly poorer than those hurt at home.	对此还有许多利弊需要艰难权衡，包括全球化可能对其他地方的人们造成比美国本国受害者更严重的财富剥夺。


But democracies owe themselves a proper debate, so that they make such choices consciously and deliberately.	但民主国家应该对此有一个更恰当的讨论，并以此做出有意识且更加深思熟虑的决定。


Fetishizing globalization simply because it expands the economic pie is the surest way to delegitimize it in the long run.	而那种仅仅因为全球化做大了蛋糕就对其迷恋不已的做法，则必将在长期之内腐蚀全球化本身的其合法性。


Free Trade Breakdown	自由贸易的崩溃


COPENHAGEN – Last month, the Doha negotiations, promising freer trade, broke down, ostensibly over a small technicality in safeguard rules.	哥本哈根—上个月，旨在实现更自由贸易的多哈回合谈判破裂了，表面上看这是由保障措施规则方面的一些细微技术性问题导致的。


In reality, the talks collapsed because nobody – not Europe, not the United States, China, India, or the other main developing countries – was willing to take the political short-term hit by offending inefficient farmers and coddled domestic industries in order to create greater long-term benefits for virtually everyone.	实际上，谈判的崩溃是因为没有任何一方—不论是欧洲、美国、中国、印度或是其他主要的发展中国家—愿意为了给几乎所有各方创造更大的长久利益而承担得罪效益低下的农民和温室里的国内产业所带来的短期政治后果。


And they broke down because we really don’t care.	谈判的破裂还因为我们其实真的漠不关心。


After a few exasperated editorials, the world has pretty much dropped the subject and gone back to its usual concerns.	在几篇措词严厉的社论之后，世人就几乎将这个话题抛诸脑后，各自忙活去了。


This is foolish.	这是愚蠢的。


Establishing significantly freer trade would help the world combat almost all of its biggest problems.	建立更为自由的贸易（体制）可以帮助我们应对世界上几乎所有最大的问题。


For an astonishingly low cost, we could improve education and health conditions, make the poorest people richer, and help everybody become better able to tackle the future.	只用付出极低的成本，我们就能改善教育和医疗条件，让最贫穷的人变得更富裕并帮助所有人更好的应对未来的挑战。


We have known for centuries that free trade almost always benefits both parties.	几个世纪以来我们都明白自由贸易几乎总是双赢的。


The economist David Ricardo pointed out in 1817 that both Great Britain and Portugal would benefit if they exploited their comparative advantages.	经济学家David Ricardo在1817年就指出如果英国和葡萄牙都能发挥各自的比较优势，那么这对双方都会是有利的。


Portugal could produce wine cheaply, whereas Great Britain could produce cloth much more cheaply than wine.	葡萄牙可以酿造价廉物美的葡萄酒，而英国纺织布料的成本比酿酒还低。


By selling cloth and buying wine, Great Britain obtains more of both, as does Portugal.	通过卖出布料并买入葡萄酒，英国可以获得足够多的两种商品，而葡萄牙亦然。


The same holds true today, when countries, doing what they do best, produce more and exchange it for more of all other goods.	这一道理现在仍然适用，当每个国家都做好它最擅长的产业，它就会生产出更多的相关商品并用以交换更多的其他所有商品。


Yet today, with international trade talks stalled and protectionist rhetoric rising, we are instead moving toward building bigger trade barriers.	然而今天，随着国际贸易谈判停滞不前，保护主义论调日渐抬头，我们正朝着设立更大贸易壁垒的方向前行。


These barriers are supported by deep-pocketed, self-serving corporations and lobby groups, and defended by politicians who are scared that the redistribution of jobs, income, and wealth resulting from freer trade will reduce their chances of remaining in power.	这些壁垒的支持者是那些财力雄厚、自私自利的公司和游说集团，而其捍卫者则是那些害怕更自由的贸易所导致的工作、收入和财富的重新分配会危及他们乌纱帽的政客们。


When the Doha trade round was launched shortly after September 11, 2001, there was plenty of international goodwill.	当多哈回合贸易谈判在2001年9月11日后旋即展开时，国际间对此充满了期望。


But a recent Financial Times/Harris poll in the US, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain found people nearly three times more likely to say that globalization is negative than positive.	但最近《金融时报》/哈里斯民意调查在美国、德国、法国、英国、意大利和西班牙的结果却显示，认为全球化利大于弊的人数上升了近三倍。


Recently, the Copenhagen Consensus project gathered some of the world’s leading economists to decide how to do the most good for the planet in a world of finite resources.	最近，“哥本哈根共识”计划聚集了一些世界顶尖的经济学家来商议如何在这个资源有限的世界为我们这个星球贡献最大的利益。


The panel – including five Nobel laureates – found that one of the single best actions the planet could take would be completing the Doha negotiations.	该专家组—包括五名诺贝尔奖得主—认为这个世界能采取的最重要的一个举措就是完成多哈回合的谈判。


They based their conclusions on new research for the Copenhagen Consensus project by Australian economist Kym Anderson.	他们的这一结论是建立在澳大利亚经济学家Kym Anderson为“哥本哈根共识”计划所做的一项新的研究之上。


Anderson showed that if developing countries cut their tariffs by the same proportion as high-income countries, and services and investment were also liberalized, the annual global gains could climb to $120 billion, with $17 billion going to the world's poorest countries by 2015.	Anderson的研究显示如果发展中国家降低关税的幅度和高收入国家相当，并同时让服务和投资自由化，那么到2015年全球的年收益将会达到1200亿美金，而其中的170亿美金将会流向世界上最贫穷的国家。


This is a respectable sum, and certainly a benefit that the international community should try to achieve.	这是相当可观的一笔收益，当然也是国际社会应该尽力获取的。


But what we often fail to realize is that the story only starts here.	但我们却往往未能意识到这只是故事的开始。


As economies open up, as countries do what they do best, competition and innovation drive up rates of growth.	随着各经济体愈渐开放，随着各国各展其长，竞争和创新将会驱动经济增长率的提升。


More competition means that previously sheltered companies must shape up and become more productive, innovating simply to survive.	更多的竞争意味着此前备受庇护的公司必须改革并为生存而提高生产效率、积极创新。


Having more open economies allows more trade in innovation, so that new companies can almost instantly use smart ideas from around the globe.	更开放的经济能催生更多的创新贸易形式，以便新兴的公司能够即时地采用来自全球的奇思妙想。


Instead of every closed market having to re-invent the wheel, once is enough to get everyone’s economy going.	一次发明创造就能让所有的经济体获益，而不用在每个封闭的市场上从头开始。


This means that over time, the advantage of moving toward freer trade grows dramatically bigger: the $120 billion benefit in 2015 grows to many trillions of dollars of annual benefits by the end of the century.	这就意味着随着时间的推移，迈向更自由贸易的优势也与���俱增：2015年时1200亿美金的年收益到本世纪末将会达到数万亿的规模。


And the benefits would increasingly accrue to the developing world, which would achieve the biggest boosts to growth rates.	而这些收益会更多地产生在发展中国家，从而实现对经济增长率的最大推动。


We have seen three very visible cases of such growth boosts in three different decades.	我们在三个不同的十年里见证了三次非常显著的如此推动增长的例子。


South Korea liberalized trade in 1965, Chile in 1974, and India in 1991; all saw annual growth rates increase by several percentage points thereafter.	南韩在1965年实行了贸易自由化，而智利在1974年，印度在1991年也相继实施。 上述国家的年经济增长率从那以后都实现了几个百分点的提升。


If we recast these benefits as annual installments, a realistic Doha outcome could increase global income by more than $3 trillion every year throughout this century.	如果我们将这些收益重新计为年度的分期偿付，那么多哈回合谈判的一个最现实的成果就能够在这个世纪中的每一年为全球增加超过3万亿美元的收入。 而每年流向当今发展中国家的数额近2.


And about $2.5 trillion annually would go to today’s developing countries every year, or $500 a year on average for each individual in the third world, almost half of whom now survive on less than $2 a day.	5万亿，即第三世界国家人均每年会得到500美金。 对于那些现在的日收入不足2美金的人而言，这几乎是他们年收入的一半了。


There would, of course, be costs.	当然，这也是有成本的。


Freer trade would force some industries to downsize or close, although more industries would expand, and for some people and communities, the transition would be difficult.	尽管更多的产业会扩张，但更自由的贸易将迫使某些产业缩减规模或是被淘汰。 对于某些人们和团体而言，这种转型将是艰难的。


Yet the overall benefits of a successful Doha Round would likely be hundreds of times greater than these costs.	但成功的多哈回合谈判所带来的总体收益完全可能比这些成本高出百千倍。


It is interesting to contrast global skepticism about free trade with support for expensive, inefficient methods to combat global warming.	将对于自由贸易的全球性怀疑主义与阻止全球变暖的昂贵而低效的方法的支持进行比较是非常有趣的。


Many argue that we should act, even if such action will have no benefit for the next decades, because it will help lessen the impact of global warming by the century’s end.	许多人认为，即便某些行动对未来几十年毫无益处，我们还是应该采取，因为它会有助于在本世纪末前减低全球变暖的影响。


But free trade also promises few benefits now and huge benefits in the future.	但自由贸易同样是远功大于近利。


Moreover, if we could stop global warming (which we can’t), the benefit for future generations would be one-tenth or less of the benefit of freer trade (which we certainly can achieve).	另外，如果我们能够阻止全球变暖（其实做不到），其对未来世代的利益也只会是更自由的贸易（我们完全能够实现）所能带来的十分之一或更少。


Still, there are few celebrity campaigners calling on politicians to sort out the Doha Round.	然而即便如此，也甚少有名流活动家呼吁政客们让多哈回合善始善终。


Global fear about free trade leaves the planet at risk of missing out on the extraordinary benefits that it offers.	对自由贸易的全球性恐惧让世界处在错过可能获得的巨大收益的风险中。


Free trade is good not only for big corporations, or for job growth.	自由贸易不仅仅有利于大公司或就业增长。


It is simply good.	它根本就是件大好事。


Free Trade, Free Labor, Free Growth	自由贸易、自由劳工和自由增长


ADELAIDE – Protectionist sentiment and fear of globalization are on the rise.	阿德莱德--保护主义情绪和对全球化的恐惧正在上升。


In the United States, presidential candidates appeal to anxious voters by blaming the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for the erosion of the country’s manufacturing base.	在美国，总统侯选人把美国制造业基础受到侵蚀归咎于北美自由贸易协议而赢得选民。


Liberal trade initiatives have run into trouble in Congress, while new trade barriers have been mooted for products flooding in from China.	自由派贸易议程在国会受阻，而对从中国涌入的产品设置了新的贸易壁垒。


Things are no better in Europe.	在欧洲情况也并不好。


France has dealt the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations a blow by rejecting the outline deal on agriculture.	法国拒绝了农产品框架协议，给了世界贸易组织多哈回合谈判一击。


European Commission President José Manuel Barroso believes that protectionist pressures are increasing.	欧盟委员会主席巴罗索相信保护主义正在加剧。


When the Doha trade round was launched shortly after September 11, 2001, there was plenty of international goodwill.	当多哈回合贸易谈判在2001年9月11日不久之后启动的时候，到处都是国际善意。


But disenchantment with globalization – and, in some regions, fear of immigration– has since set in.	但是对全球化的不满以及某些地区对移民的恐慌从那时以来就出现了。


A recent Financial Times/Harris poll in the US, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain found people nearly three times more likely to say that globalization is negative than positive.	最近在美国、德国、法国、英国、意大利以及西班牙进行的一次金融时报和哈里斯民意调查显示，民众认为全球化是消极的要超过说它是积极的三倍。


Free trade would lead to an overwhelming boost to welfare everywhere, but especially in the developing world.	自由贸易极大地提高世界各地的福祉，尤其是在发展中国家。


Grasping these benefits is potentially one of this generation’s greatest challenges.	抓住这些利益有可能是这一代人最大的挑战。


Increased negative sentiment could have the worst possible result: not just Doha’s failure, but also the raising of trade and immigration barriers.	消极情绪增加或许会产生最恶劣的结果，也就是，不仅多哈回合谈判失败，而且也提高贸易和移民壁垒。


These barriers remain largely because further liberalization would redistribute jobs, income, and wealth in ways that governments fear would reduce their chances of remaining in power – and their own wealth in countries where corruption is rife.	这些壁垒依旧存在，主要是因为进一步自由化将会重新分配工作机会、收入以及财富，而政府则担心其方式将会削弱其继续执政机会，而在腐败盛行的国家中，政府则担心其自身的财富。


The greatest hope is thus getting the Doha round back on track.	最大的希望就是重新进行多哈回合。


But there is a big difference between a low-quality result and one that is more comprehensive.	但是，低质量的结果和全面结果之间有着巨大不同。


If little more is achieved than phasing out farm export subsidies and a modest reduction in agricultural domestic support, our analysis shows that developing countries as a group would gain nothing, while high-income countries would gain just US$18 billion per year by 2015.	我们的分析显示，如果除了逐渐消除农产品出口补贴以及稍微减少国内对农业的支持之外没有取得什么进展的话，发展中国家作为整体将一无所获，而高收入国家则将在2015年每年仅仅多收入180亿美元。


By contrast, if developing countries cut their tariffs by the same proportion as high-income countries, and services and investment were also liberalized, the global annual gains could climb as high as US$120 billion, with US$17 billion going to the world’s poorest countries. Moreover, the long-term impact of free trade is huge.	与此相比，如果发展中国家以高收入国家同样的幅度降低关税，同时实现服务和投资的自由化，那么，全球年度增��可能攀升到1200亿美元，而世界最穷国家则将会受益其中的170亿美元。


Recast as after calculating the net present value of the stream of future benefits, a realistic Doha outcome could increase global income by more than $3000 billion per year, $2500 billion of which would go to the developing world.	如果人们重新计算将来收益的当前净值，多哈回合现实的结果可能会每年增加全球收入3万亿美元，其中的2万5千亿美元将会流入发展中国家。


In addition, the experiences of successful reformers like Korea, China, India, and Chile suggest that trade liberalization immediately boosts annual economic growth rates by several percentage points for many years.	此外，韩国、中国、印度以及智利等成功的改革国家的经验表明，贸易自由化可以在许多年中迅速提升年度经济增长率几个百分点。


Eliminating subsidies and trade barriers would mean that resources could be used more efficiently, so there would be more scope to reduce inequality and poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, malnutrition, and disease.	消除补贴和贸易壁垒意味着资源将会更为有效地得以利用，就会有更多的手段来减少不平等和贫困、社会紧张关系、环境破坏、营养不良以及疾病。


There would, of course, be costs.	当然，这会有代价。


Firms and workers would need to adjust as reform forces some industries to downsize or close and allows others to expand.	改革迫使某些产业减产和关闭并让另外一些增长，企业和工人就必须调整适应。


In addition, there are social costs to consider.	此外，还要考虑社会代价。


Yet the benefits of a successful Doha round are between 45 and 440 times higher than these costs.	但是多哈回合取得成功带来的利益将会是这些代价的45倍到440倍。


This is clearly an extremely sound investment.	这显然是极为明智的投资。


An “alternative” to Doha, whereby other high-income countries would follow the European Union’s offer of duty-free access to products from Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) small countries, would involve only a tiny fraction of global gains from trade reform.	而多哈回合的所谓”替代品“，也就是其他高收入国家效仿欧盟向最不发达国家、非洲、加勒比海以及太平洋小国提供产品的免税准入则只会从贸易改革中获得一小部分的全球性收益。


Moreover, it may well hurt other poor countries – thereby worsening inequality – by encouraging resources to be allocated to activities that become uncompetitive following the next World Trade Organization agreement.	而且，这也可能在下一个世界贸易组织协议通过之后通过鼓励资源分配到并不具有竞争力的活动中而打击其他贫穷国家，从而加剧不平等现象。


If trade liberalization in goods and services proves too politically difficult to achieve in this decade, the benefits of liberalizing international labor flows is worth contemplating – not least because otherwise illegal migration is likely to increase.	如果商品和服务的贸易自由化在这一十年中由于政治原因而难以达到，那么，就值得考虑一下解除国际劳工流动限制的益处，这不仅仅是因为如果不是这样非法移民就会增加。


Historical experience shows that migration is the fastest way to bring about a convergence in living standards.	历史经验表明，移民是生活水平拉平的最快的途径。


We examined the costs and benefits of an expansion in international migration over a 25-year period, amounting to a 3% boost in host countries’ labor forces by 2025.	我们对25年期间内国家移民增加的代价和效益进行了分析，发现在2025年前将会提高接收国劳力3%。


The costs would include one-off expenses to migrants: transport, obtaining visas and permits, and finding housing, schooling, and employment, as well as the emotional cost of separation from family.	代价则是一次性移民费用，包括交通、取得签证和许可、寻找住房、学校和工作，以及与家庭分离的情感代价。


There are also one-off costs to host-country governments, such as processing applications and providing initial help with housing and welfare.	接收国家也有一些一次性的成本，例如处理申请并且提高初始的住房和福利援助。


These costs have been estimated at between $14,000 and $42,000 per worker and family (shared equally by migrants and host governments).	据估计，这些成本是每个工人和家庭14000美元到42000美元(移民和接收国政府平摊)。


The global net benefit of the increased flow of migrants for 25 years is between $13 trillion and $39 trillion – close to the median estimated gains from the Doha round.	全球在25年时间里增加移民流动的净收益是13万亿和39万亿美元之间，接近于多哈回合预计收益的一半。


The benefits are between 28 and 220 times higher than the costs.	收益要高出成本28倍到220倍。


Even if freeing up immigration multilaterally seems too difficult to include as part of a Doha round agreement, individual countries could do so unilaterally with the stroke of a pen.	即使难以把实现多边移民自由化作为多哈回合协议的一部分，各国还是可以提笔就做到单边移民自由化。


The economic logic is compelling: removing trade and migration barriers would be an exceptionally wise investment.	经济逻辑是毫无疑问的。 解除贸易和移民壁垒将会是一项极为明智的投资。


The real hurdle is getting this message across to politicians and voters.	真正的阻碍是把这一信息传递给政治人物和选民。


Free Trade or Freebies for the Powerful?	是自由贸易还是给强权者的赠品？


As the United States Congress begins to debate the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), a titanic struggle between the forces of free trade and protectionism promises to unfold.	随着美国国会对美国-多米尼加-中美洲自由贸易协定(DR-CAFTA)辩论的开始，自由贸易和保护主义之间可能会展开一场大规模斗争。


But that debate should not be allowed to mask the truth behind this treaty: the DR-CAFTA is more a pleading of special interests than a free-trade deal.	但不能让这一辩论掩盖了该协定背后的真相：DR-CAFTA与其说是一项自由贸易协议，不如说是特定利益集团的请求。


It manages simultaneously to fleece the people of six poor countries and to put US workers in harm’s way.	该协议在剥削六个贫困国家的人民的同时，对美国劳工的利益也造成了伤害。


To be sure, expanded trade holds great promise for promoting development and democracy.	扩大贸易确实很有可能会促进民主与发展。


But the trade rules inscribed in DR-CAFTA promote profits for a few at the expense of the well being of the many.	但DR-CAFTA规定的贸易规则是以大多数人的福利为代价来为少数人谋取利益。


Ironically, the pact even limits market competition to protect powerful special interests, undercutting the core principles of free trade.	讽刺的是，为了保护强大的特定利益集团的利益，该协定甚至限制市场竞争，从而颠覆了自由贸易的核心原则。


Consider pharmaceuticals.	让我们来看看药品。


For American drug companies, this agreement extends the time period during which brand-name pharmaceuticals have exclusive access to markets, postponing the entry of generic drugs and thus limiting competition.	对美国的医药公司来说，这一贸易协定延长了品牌药品拥有的市场专属通道的时间期限，延迟了非专利药进入市场的时间，从而限制了竞争。


For Central Americans, the cost of drugs will soar, straining budgets and gutting health care.	对中美洲大众而言，药物成本会急剧上升，造成预算紧张，医疗保健严重破坏。


The result may be a death sentence for many.	其结果对很多人来说，可能无异于死刑。


In agriculture, small farmers would be placed on a collision course with US agro-business and their heavily subsidized farm exports.	农业方面，协议将小农场主与美国的农业商务置于同一轨道上，造成撞车。 而后者的农产品出口有高额补贴。


The US exported paddy rice, for example, at a price almost 20% lower than the cost of production in 2003, making it impossible for Central Americans to compete.	如，2003年，美国出口的稻米价格比生产成本还低近20%，中美洲的小农场主根本不可能与之竞争。


As for labor rights, the agreement makes a devil’s bargain: it opens trade while locking in a status quo that is appalling.	劳工权益方面，协议无异于魔鬼交易：协议打开了贸易，但却困于可怕的现状。


Workers face everything from rampant discrimination against older people (those over 35) to physical abuse, lack of bathroom breaks, no overtime pay, and poverty wages.	工人面临着种种困境：从对大龄人员（35岁以上者）的极端歧视到身体虐待，上卫生间的时间不足，没有加班费，工资也少得可怜。


In principle, workers can seek remedies by joining a union and bargaining collectively.	原则上说，工人可以加入工会，通过集体谈判的方式来改善这一状况。


But this option is all but foreclosed, because union membership or organizing can lead to dismissal, blacklisting, violence, or worse.	但这一选择事先就被封死了，因为加入工会或组织工会的工友会被开除、列入黑名单、遭到暴力袭击，甚至更糟。


In Guatemala, the largest economy, less than 3% of workers are unionized and their unions are marginal.	在中美洲最大的经济国危地马拉，加入工会的工人不足3%，工会地位也无足轻重。