Of course, it is always very hard for leaders to relinquish power.	当然，领导人放弃权利总是非常困难的。


Some have done so, more or less voluntarily, only to re-emerge suddenly from oblivion.	有些领导人在某种程度上主动退位，随后又突然从被人忘却的角落东山再起。


Can it be the same President Oscar Arias who (barely) won the recent presidential election in Costa Rica and now returns to power after 20 years?	奥斯卡·阿里亚斯经过20年后艰难地赢得最近哥斯达黎加总统选举胜利重又执掌大权，是不是同一个人呢？


And was not Silvio Berlusconi’s candidate for the presidency of the Italian Senate, Giulio Andreotti, a junior member of one of Italy’s first post-1945 governments?	贝鲁斯科尼推举的意大利参议院主席候选人安德雷奥蒂不就是1945年后首届政府中的一个低级别部长吗？


Did Portugal’s Cavaco Silva, the successful Prime Minister of the 1990’s, have to reappear as President in 2006?	葡萄牙的席尔瓦二十世纪九十年代担任总理风头甚健，是不是也必须在2006年再度出山担任总统呢？


Who can forget Margaret Thatcher’s tears when her “friends” told her that her time was up?	谁能忘记，当撒切尔夫人的“朋友们”告诉她气数已尽的时候她所流下的眼泪呢？


When Prime Minister Harold Wilson suddenly resigned in 1976 and left No. 10 Downing Street to the late James Callaghan, people became suspicious: had he been forced out by some secret service plot concerning South Africa?	当威尔逊在1976年突然辞职，把唐宁街10号交给已故的卡宁汉时，人们开始怀疑：他是否被与南非有牵连的特工密谋所赶下台呢？


It appears that there is no way for political leaders to leave the scene gracefully.	看起来，政治领导人无法体面下野。


Even if there is an “orderly transition” – a term much used about Tony Blair and Gordon Brown at the moment – it is accompanied by sorrow, or at least by pain.	即使有所谓“有秩序的移交”（现在布莱尔和布朗之间经常使用这一名词），也是伴随着悲伤，至少是痛苦。


Political office, it seems, is more addictive than heroin.	看起来，政治职位要比海洛因还要让人上瘾。


Abandoning the habit involves not only the inconvenience of losing perks and a certain lifestyle, but also the loss of power.	放弃这一习惯不仅有失去特权以及某种生活方式的不便，更是失去权力。


Power may be increasingly illusory in a globalized world, but it is an illusion that is shared by others, and the longer one inhabits it, the more one’s circle consists of others who share the belief.	在全球化的世界中，权力可能越发看似梦幻一般，但是，他人也有这一幻觉，而且某人怀有这种幻觉时间越长，其身边的人就越发具有相同的信念。


The addiction to political office is always worrisome, because democracies turn into autocracies when leaders cease to recognize the limits of their power.	对政治职位上瘾总是令人担忧的，因为当领导人不再认识到权力限制的时候，民主就会变成专制。


Disconnection is the beginning, followed by the belief that one is the only person who knows what is right and good.	与社会脱节是起点，然后是相信只有他（她）自己才知道好坏善恶。


When Tony Blair says that the most important liberty is security from terrorist attacks, he has forgotten the first principles of his party and his country.	当布莱尔说最重要的自由就是免于受到恐怖攻击时，他已经忘却了他的工党以及他的国家的首要原则。


Overstaying one’s welcome may be the professional disease of political leaders, but it is above all incompatible with democracy as a framework for bringing about change without violence.	恋饯可能是政治领导人的职业病，但是它首先是与作为非暴力改良框架的民主制度格格不入。


The question, then, is whether there is any way to ensure that political leaders leave in time.	那么问题就是是否有途径可以确保政治领导人适时隐退。


While the US Constitution shows the limits of institutional safeguards, the role of political parties is clearly significant when it comes to limiting terms in power.	美国宪法表现的是制度性保障的限制，而政党在限制任期发挥的作用却是明显巨大的。


Like Thatcher, Blair now hears from his party that he should go and replies that “the people” still want him.	像撒切尔夫人一样，布莱尔听到他的工党说他应当下台，而他却回答说“人民”还需要他。


Yet the party might have a better sense of what is viable not just today, but also tomorrow – at the next election, for example.	但是，工党可能更为知道什么东西今天可以存活，而且也知道明天什么东西可以存活，例如下一次选举。


In the end, there is no foolproof method to guarantee that political leaders leave without tears.	最终，没有什么万能���法可以保证政治领导人不流泪地下野。


What matters is that mechanisms are in place that do make them leave, probably rather too late, and certainly with some pain and unhappiness, but in time for the constitution of liberty to remain intact.	重要的是能够有机制让他们离开，有可能太晚，而且还有某些痛苦和不愉快，但是足够让自由体制完整无缺。


Two and a Half Cheers for the Mediterranean Union	对地中海联盟的赞扬


Maybe it is time to be a bit more generous to French President Nicolas Sarkozy and look at the outcome of what he does rather than the way that he does it.	或许，现在是对法国总统尼古拉斯·萨科齐更有气度以及关注他行为的结果而不是他行为的方式的时候了。


The original launch of the Mediterranean Union almost sank the whole enterprise.	他在最初启动地中海联盟时几乎使整个计划覆没。


Appearing to speak without giving the issue much thought, Sarkozy initially proposed a club of European and mostly Arab states along the Mediterranean’s shore.	萨科齐似乎在论及这个问题时没有给予足够的考虑，他最初提议建立一个欧洲以及大部分地中海沿岸阿拉伯国家组成的俱乐部。


It would have been in essence a French-run enterprise that the rest of Europe would have paid for.	其实质就是，一个所有其它欧洲国家付钱而由法国人管理的机构。


This did not go down well, particularly with the Germans.	这不为其他国家所接受，特别是不为德国人所接受。


There was also a strong suspicion that the French were trying to find a way to buy off Turkey with a relationship falling well short of European Union membership.	也有人强烈怀疑法国人正在寻找用一个没有欧盟成员资格的关系来收买土耳其的方法。


So the auguries for an attempt to revitalize Europe’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners were not good.	所以，试图恢复欧洲与其地中海伙伴的关系的前景不妙。


But by the time of the grand Paris Summit in July to send the new club on its way, the initial suspicions had largely been overcome.	但是，在七月份盛大的巴黎首脑聚会将新俱乐部启动的时候，最初的怀疑大部分都被消除了。


Sarkozy bowed to his European critics and enjoyed a diplomatic triumph.	萨科齐俯视了欧洲对他的批评并享受了一个外交胜利。


We shall soon see whether there is substance to the initiative, or whether it is just a coat of fresh paint on an old and tired idea.	我们将很快看到这个倡议是否有实质性的东西，还是它只是对过去观点的换汤不换药。


The original Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, was an excellent scheme.	1995年启动的最初的巴塞罗那进程是一个优秀的计划。


Intended to provide an economic and political backdrop to peace-making through confidence-building in the Middle East, it was an admirable recognition of Europe’s historical, commercial, cultural, and political ties with its neighbors to the south of the sea which has brought us all together over the years.	它是为了在中东通过建立信任来提供调停的经济和政治背景，也是一个对欧洲与其直到地中海南部的邻居历史、商贸、文化以及政治联系的极好的承认，而就是这个海将我们这么多年连在一起。


There were people-to-people links. There was a forum where Israelis and their long-term Arab foes could sit together and discuss other matters than the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.	有人渴望到2010年产生一个自由贸易区，因为有基于共同的价值观而进行政治一体化的保证，有民族间的联系，有以色列人可以和他们长期以来的阿拉伯敌人坐在一起讨论除约旦河西岸和加沙地带之外的问题的论坛，有发展预算，以及会议——许许多多会议。


The effort was far from worthless.	这个努力具有相当的价值。


Development projects were funded through grants or cheap loans, and these have probably played at least some part in increasing the attractiveness of the Maghreb and the Mashraq to foreign investors.	通过拨款和低息贷款资助的开发项目，至少可能在增加马格里布和玛莎拉克（Mashraq）对外国投资者的吸引力上起到了一部分作用。


There was some lowering of agricultural and other tariffs by the EU.	欧盟在农产品关税和其他关税上有一些降低。


Dialogue on political reform, and euros to support it, helped further the process in some countries, notably Morocco and Jordan.	在政治改革和欧元支持上的对话帮助在一些国家——特别是摩洛哥和约旦——深入了这一进程。


There was some co-operation on common problems like drugs and illegal immigration.	在诸如毒品和非法移民这样的共同问题上有一些合作。


But, as a significant component of Europe’s policy toward its most crucial neighbors, the successes of the Barcelona Process were modest: a great idea on the launch pad had difficulty getting off the ground.	但是，作为欧洲对其最重要的邻邦政策的一个重要组成部分，巴塞罗那进程的成功是有限的：一个好主意要实行起来有点困难。


So Sarkozy deserves at least two and a half cheers for trying to revitalize it.	所以，萨科齐恢复这个进程至少值得赞扬。


But if the Mediterranean Union is to achieve more than was managed in its first manifestation, a number of things will need to happen.	但是，如果地中海联盟要取得比其第一次表现更大的成果，还有许多事情要做。


First, Europe is better at talking about free-trade areas than delivering free trade.	首先，欧洲更善于谈论自由贸易区而不是进行自由贸易。


For example, there are still too many barriers to agricultural trade between the North and the South.	例如，在北方和南方之间仍然还有许多农产品贸易障碍。


And guess which country leads the opposition to any significant opening up of European agriculture.	猜猜哪个国家会带头反对欧洲农业进行的重大开放。


Step forward, France, and take a bow.	法国，向前一步，鞠躬。


Second, however slow we have been in opening up a real Mediterranean market, the barriers to freer trade between Arab League countries are just as great.	其次，不管我们在开放一个真正的地中海市场上是多么缓慢，然而，阿拉伯联盟国家之间对自由贸易的障碍也同样很大。


Third, it was excellent that in Paris Sarkozy began the process of bringing Syria in out of the diplomatic cold.	第三，在巴黎，萨科齐开始了将叙利亚从外交低谷中引进来的过程，这是很了不起的。


We must also hope that his attempts to act as a peace-broker between West Bank Palestinians and Israel are blessed with success.	我们也必须希望，上天保佑他试图作为约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦人和以色列之间的和平中间人的角色能够取得成功。


But the truth is that Europe, for all the gallant efforts of Javier Solana, has been absent from serious politics in the Middle East.	但是，事实是，尽管有加威尔·索拉纳（Javier Solana）的巨大努力，欧洲依然缺乏在中东的认真的政见。


We have not dared to cross America.	我们不敢反对美国。


A largely non-existent European policy toward the region has been dictated by the absentee monopolists of policy in Washington.	一个在很大程度上对该地区不存在的欧洲政策被在华盛顿的缺位的政策独占者所摆布。


Europe should get more seriously involved, even at the risk of occasionally irritating America, which may be less likely to happen once the Bush administration is history.	欧洲应该对中东进行更认真地介入，即使冒着偶尔激怒美国的风险，而一旦布什政府成为历史，这可能就不大可能发生。


For a start, we should recognize that there will be no political settlement in Palestine without including Hamas.	��为开始，我们应该承认如果不将哈马斯纳入谈判中来，在巴勒斯坦就不会有政治解决。


What would incredibly have been former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s first visit to Gaza in his first year of peace-making had to be canceled recently because of security concerns.	令人难以置信的是，最近，前英国首相汤尼·布莱尔在他调停的第一年对加沙的第一次访问因为安全考虑被取消了。


Enough said.	其意思说得够明白了。


Finally, Europe has to decide how serious it is about all the admirable stuff in the Barcelona Process on pluralism, civil society, the rule of law, and democracy.	最后，欧洲还要确定它对巴塞罗那进程中关于多边主义、公民社会、法治以及民主这些美妙的东西的认真程度。


Is Europe serious that a shared concept of human rights should be one of the foundations of our Mediterranean partnership?	一个共同的人权观念应该是地中海伙伴关系的基础之一的观点， 欧洲是认真的吗？


If so, what are we in Europe proposing to do about it?	如果是这样的，我们应提议在欧洲做些什么呢？


If this is just blah-blah, better not say it.	如果这只是夸夸其谈，最好就不要说它。


We discredit ourselves and important principles when we say things that we do not mean.	当我们言不由衷的时候，我们使自己和一些重要原则失去了人们的信任。


Two Cheers for the Rhineland Model	莱茵兰模式的两项可喜之处


Not so long ago, Germans and other Continental Europeans pointed to America's "working poor," as well as to the sorry state of public services in Britain, as defects that supposedly reflected the inevitable price Anglo-Saxon countries must pay for their ruthless form of capitalism.	不久前，德国和其它欧洲大陆国还指责美英，说美国的"贫困劳动者"和英国公共服务的糟糕状况恰恰反映了安格鲁·萨克逊国家为无情资本化付出的不可避免的代价。


Europeans (Germans in particular), on the other hand, enjoyed the "Rhineland model": a market economy that harnesses economic success to the cause of social justice.	另一方面，欧洲国家（特别是德国）则尽情享受着"莱茵兰模式"：也就是在社会公正的基础上获取经济成功的一种市场经济模式。


So when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, early in his first term, signed the so-called Blair-Schröder paper, which pledged agreement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on liberalizing reforms, he made certain that it was published in London and played down in Berlin.	因此，格哈特·施罗德总理首任期间与英国首相托尼·布莱尔签署所谓的布莱尔-施罗德文件，承诺在自由化改革方面与英国合作。 这在英国宣扬得大张旗鼓，而在德国却鲜为人知。


Similarly, the European Union's Lisbon agenda of economic liberalization was never really taken seriously in Germany, France, or most other countries on the Continent.	与此相似，宣传欧盟经济自由化的《里斯本备忘录》在德、法或其它多数欧洲大陆国家根本就没人当真。


How things have changed in the last five years!	过去5年的变化有多大！


Today, few people - if any - refer to the Rhineland model with such satisfaction.	今天，很少有人（如果还有）再以那么满意的口吻说起莱茵兰模式了。


As things stand now, the German economy lags behind most others in Europe, and almost all European economies trail Britain and the United States.	今天的状况是：德国经济已经落后于大多数欧洲国家，而欧洲各国几乎都在仿效英美模式。


Unemployment is high and growing, as German companies move production to low-wage countries in Eastern Europe or Asia.	随着德国公司把生产线转移到低成本的东欧和亚洲地区，国内的失业率始终居高不下，而且还在持续增长。


In Germany, "capitalism unmodified" has begun its reign.	德国国内，"赤裸裸的资本主义"开始抬头。


Profitable companies are closed if their returns fall below international standards.	如果回报达不到国际标准，即便是盈利的公司也难逃倒闭的厄运。


Managers' salaries - including bonuses for failed or departing directors - have reached new highs.	经理人的薪水－包括管理失败、被迫撤离的管理者，都再次创下了历史新高。


If all this leads people to conclude that social justice is being sacrificed to profits, cuts in public expenditure harden that conclusion even more.	如果人们由此推论利润扼杀了社会的公正，那么公共开支的大幅缩减更证实了这种推论的确凿无疑。


Social entitlements are being reduced, while individual contributions to cover the cost of health care, pensions, education, and basic welfare programs rise - not just in the Rhineland and neighboring länder, but in other countries that follow a similar model.	社会权利日益减少，而个人支付卫生、养老、教育和基本福利的开支却日益增加¾这样的问题不仅在莱茵兰及周边地区始终存在，那些模式相近的国家也面临着同样的问题。


One reason is straightforward and increasingly widely understood.	原因很明显，也日益被人们广泛接受。


The old system of social justice, the welfare state, was based on assumptions which no longer hold true. Some may never have been viable.	福利国家旧的社会正义体制赖以生存的土壤现在已不复存在，有的甚至根本就没存在过。


For example, the Rhineland model used many measures of social policy that had built-in growth trends that were bound to make them unaffordable.	举例来讲，莱茵兰模式衡量社会政策的很多标准都有着内在的增长趋势，早晚会让人们无法承受。


This is true for health care.	这样的情况在卫生保健领域也同样存在。


In addition, demographic changes reduced the number of contributors while increasing the demand for services.	不仅如此，人口结构的变化使挣钱的人越来越少，等候供养的人却大大增加。


Unsurprisingly, high payroll taxes strained the capacity of working people and mounting non-wage labor costs eroded companies' international competitiveness.	劳动者在高额所得税的压迫下不堪重负，日益增长的非薪成本也损害了企业的国际竞争力。


For a while, borrowing hid the extent of the problem; but today the extent of the burden that the accumulated debt that resulted from this borrowing is placing on future generations - a grave injustice in its own right - is clear.	有段时间，借款掩盖了这种矛盾，但今天，累积欠款的沉重负担都要由未来几代人偿还，这是对他们自身权益的严重摧残。


Thus, the Rhineland model's once-robust institutions of social justice were bound to be squeezed. But the capitalism that formed the Rhineland model's other component also changed, and here it is not wrong to blame globalization.	因此，莱茵兰模式曾经繁盛的社会公义制度注定要付出代价，而构成其它部分的资本主义也已发生了变化，而这只能责怪所谓的全球化。


Companies formed international links in order to remain competitive.	为了保持竞争力，企业都建立了密切的国际联系。


Many of these links were with British or American companies, which led to a profound change in business culture.	联系的对象有很多英美公司，这给企业文化带来了深远的影响。


The old notion that large companies are responsible for their employees' welfare from cradle to grave - providing not only wages and bonuses, but sports facilities, cheap holidays, and generous retirement benefits - fell into desuetude.	旧的观念是，大公司要负责从摇篮到坟墓的员工福利，不仅要发工资和奖金，还要提供运动设施、廉价的休假和慷慨的退休补助。


Overseas owners were less than understanding of the German custom of paying a thirteenth monthly salary at Christmas.	这种观念早已被人们抛弃。 海外所有者甚至都不理解圣诞节要发13个月工资的德国惯例。


Beyond business culture, there is the fact that manufacturing, until recently the major source of strength of the German and other European economies, has begun to emigrate in a big way.	企业文化外，还有另外的重要原因：一直是德国实力来源的制造行业，开始了大规模的向外迁徙。


Soon not only our refrigerators and television sets, but even our cars and machine tools, will come largely from China.	要不了多久，不仅是我们的冰箱和彩电，就连我们的汽车和机床，都会打上中国制造的标签。


There is no obvious substitute for such industries at home.	而德国国内还没有找到真正的替代产业。


Does this mean the end of the Rhineland model?	这是否意味着"莱茵兰模式"结束了？


In the first instance, it does mean that reforms are necessary.	首先，我们说改革势在必行。


People have become weary of the word reform, because for most it means a reduction in entitlements and living standards.	人们已经厌倦了空喊口号，因为多数口头改革都意味着权利的减少和生活水平的下降。


Still, constructing a welfare state fit for new economic conditions is a task that must be undertaken.	即便如此，建设适合崭新经济条件的福利国家也是一项势必须完成的任务。


This will be a welfare state based on a new balance of solidarity and individual effort.	新的福利国家将在团结和个人努力中达到新的平衡。


It may mean that after a decades-long economic miracle, people must accept a modest reduction in their standard of living.	这可能意味着几十年的经济奇迹后，人们必须接受生活水平有小幅度下降。


The more difficult task will be to transform traditional economies into truly modern ones.	把传统经济改造成真正现代经济的任务更为艰巨。


No one has yet managed this process, not even the Anglo Saxons.	没有人有这方面的经验，安格鲁·萨克逊国家也不例外。


A truly modern economy will be a service economy that combines high-productivity knowledge activities with indispensable personal service jobs.	真正意义上的现代经济将是一种结合了高效率知识活动和必不可少的个人服务内容的服务型经济。


Such economies need not follow the same blueprint.	新经济不一定要有同样的蓝图。


It is possible - indeed, likely - that modern service-based economies will look very different in the Rhineland, Southeast England, Lombardy, and the Île-de-France.	实际上，莱茵兰、英格兰东南、伦巴底和法兰西以服务为基础的新经济很可能会大不相同。


Such diversity may include varying degrees of social justice, if people choose to pay more or less for that purpose.	如果人们选择了不同的付费，这种多样性就可能包括不同程度的社会公义。


So there is no reason for despair in the Rhineland - or for gloating by the enemies of its economic model.	因此，莱茵兰没有必要感到绝望，对手们也没必要沾沾自喜。


Even in an increasingly globalized economy, diversity will continue to be the hallmark.	即便经济越来越全球化，多样化的特点也还会继续下去。


The New “Two Chinas” Question	新“两个中国”问题


NEW YORK – To anyone over the age of 60 who follows world affairs, the term “two Chinas” recalls the post-1949 competition for diplomatic recognition waged by mainland (“Red”) China and Taiwan, or, more formally, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China.	纽约—如果你年过六旬又关注国际时事，那么“两个中国”一词会让你想起1949年后的外交承认竞争，一边是中国大陆（“红色”中国），另一边是台湾； 或者更正式地说，一边是中华人民共和国，另一边是中华民国。


By the early 1970s, just about every country fell in line with the People’s Republic’s demand that it alone be recognized as the legitimate sovereign government of China.	到20世纪70年代初，几乎所有国家都接受了中华人民共和国的要求，只承认它是合法的中国主权政府。


The mainland was simply too large and too important economically and strategically to alienate.	大陆在经济和战略上太大太重要，你无法孤立它。


Today, a new, but very different, “two Chinas” question is emerging.	如今，一个全然不同的新的“两个中国”问题正在浮现。


It centers on whether China is best understood as a strong country, with a promising future despite some short-term difficulties, or as a country facing serious structural problems and uncertain long-term prospects.	其核心是中国应该被理解为一个强国，尽管存在一些短期困难但前途光明，还是应该被理解为一个面临严重结构问题、长期前景不确定的国家。


In short, two very different Chinas can now be glimpsed.	简言之，现在可以瞥见两个截然不同的中国。


But which one will prevail?	但哪一个会成为现实？


Until recently, there was little reason to ask such a question.	这是一个直到最近才值得有此一问的问题。


China’s economy was growing at an astounding average annual rate of 10% or higher for more than three decades.	三十多年来，中国经济一直以令人咋舌的年均10%或以上的速度增长。


China had overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy.	中国已经取代日本成为世界第二大经济体。


Hundreds of millions of Chinese had entered the middle class.	数亿中国人跻身中产阶级。


China’s model of authoritarian efficiency seemed attractive to many other developing countries, particularly in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, which began in the United States and thus seemed to discredit American-style liberal capitalism.	中国的极权效率模式似乎对许多其他发展中国家很有吸引力，特别是在2008年全球金融危机后。 2008年全球金融危机源于美国，因此令美国式自由资本主义信誉大损。


But the question of China’s future has become unavoidable.	但中国的未来问题现在已是无可规避。


Officially, economic growth has slowed to near 7%; but many believe the real number is below 5%.	官方经济增长数据已放缓至7%附近； 但许多人认为真实数字不到5%。


The slowdown should come as no surprise; all developing economies experience something similar as they grow and mature.	减速并不令人奇怪； 所有发展中经济体在增长和成熟的过程中都要经历类似的过程。


Nonetheless, the speed and degree of change have caught the authorities off guard, and have stoked official fears that growth will fall short of the rate needed for the country to modernize as planned.	尽管如此，变化的速度和幅度令当局猝不及防，并让官员担心增长速度跟不上中国按计划实现现代化的需要。


The government’s alarm at the sharper-than-expected economic slowdown was reflected in its heavy-handed intervention in July to freeze stock markets in the midst of a dramatic price correction.	政府对比预期更剧烈的经济减速的警惕体现在其7月份大手笔干预在大幅回调中丧失了流动性的股市中。


That move was followed this month by a surprise devaluation of the renminbi, which suggests that the shift away from export-led growth is not working as hoped.	随后是本月出人意料的人民币贬值，这表明从出口拉动型增长的转型没有如希望的那样见效。


Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign increasingly looks like a strategy to consolidate power, rather than an effort to reform China’s state for the benefit of its economy and society.	与此同时，中国国家主席习近平的反腐运动也越来越像是巩固权力的战略，而不是为了经济和社会改革中国的努力。


Corruption is pervasive, and Xi’s campaign remains broadly popular.	腐败无处不在，习近平的反腐运动也得到了广泛支持。


But the wave of prosecutions that Xi has unleashed is discouraging Chinese officials from making decisions, owing to their fear that they could face criminal charges in the future.	但习近平所发动的大量起诉导致中国官员不敢做决定，因为他们担心可能因此在未来面临刑事指控。


As a result of these developments, one hears much less of late about the Chinese model and more about the Chinese reality.	拜这些发展趋势所赐，你现在听到关于中国模式的声音远少于中国现实。


Aside from slowing growth, that reality includes severe environmental damage, one result of decades of rapid, coal-fueled industrialization.	除了增长放缓，现实还包括严重的环境破坏——几十年煤炭驱动的高速工业化的后果之一。


According to one estimate, air pollution is killing 1.6 million Chinese per year.	根据一项估计，空气污染每年夺走160万中国人的生命。


China’s aging population, an unintended consequence of its draconian one-child policy, poses another threat to long-term prosperity.	严格的计划生育导致了中国人口不断老化这一意外后果，对其长期前景构成了另一个威胁。


With the dependency ratio – the proportion of children and pensioners relative to working-age men and women – set to rise rapidly in the coming years, economic growth will remain subdued, while health-care and pension costs will increasingly strain government budgets.	赡养比——即儿童和退休者相对工作年龄男性和女性的比率——将在未来几年中迅速上升，因此，经济增长将保持低水平，而医疗和养老成本将日益影响政府预算。


What is increasingly apparent is that China’s leaders want the economic growth that capitalism produces, but without the downturns that come with it.	一个日益明显的现象是中国领导人希望获得资本主义所制造的经济增长，但不想获得随之一起到来的减速。


They want the innovation that an open society generates, but without the intellectual freedom that defines it.	他们希望获得开放社会所产生的创新，但不想获得随之一起到来的作为其标志的知识自由。


Something has to give.	中国必须付出一些代价。


Some observers, fearing a rising China, will breathe a sigh of relief at its current difficulties.	一些担心中国崛起的观察家也许会因为中国当前遇到的困境而大舒一口气。


But that may prove to be a shortsighted reaction.	但这也许过于短视了。


A slow-growth China would undermine the global economic recovery.	低增长的中国会拖累全球经济复苏。


It would be a less-willing partner in tackling global challenges such as climate change.	中国将不再是应对气候变化等全球挑战的热情伙伴。


Most dangerous of all, a struggling China could be tempted to turn to foreign adventurism to placate a public frustrated by slower economic growth and an absence of political freedom.	最危险的是，陷入困境的中国有可能转向对外冒险主义安抚因为经济放缓和缺乏政治自由而沮丧不已的公众。


Indeed, there are some signs that the authorities are doing just this in the South China Sea.	事实上，一些信号表明中国当局已经在南海这么做了。


Nationalism could become the primary source of legitimacy for a ruling party that can no longer point to a rapidly rising standard of living.	对于一个无法继续带来生活水平迅速提高的执政党来说，民族主义可能成为其主要的执政合法性源泉。


The US and others will need to push back to ensure that China does not act on such a temptation.	美国和其他国家需要确保中国抵挡住这一诱惑。


But these countries would be equally wise to signal to China that it is welcome to take its place among the world’s leading countries if it acts responsibly and according to the rules set for all.	但这些国家应该同样明智地想中国释放一个信号，如果中国负责任地行动，并遵守为所有人制定的规则，就欢迎它跻身世界领导国家。


But the bigger policy choices will be China’s to make.	但做出更大的政策抉择的是中国。


The government will need to find the right balance between government interests and individual rights, between economic growth and environmental stewardship, and between the role of markets and that of the state.	中国政府需要在政府利益和个人权利之间、经济增长和环境保护之间以及市场角色和国家角色之间找到正确的平衡。


The choices China faces are as difficult as they are unavoidable.	中国所面临的抉择是艰难的，也是无法规避的。


Major social unrest cannot be ruled out.	不排除爆发大规模社会动乱的可能。


The one certainty is that the next three decades will not mirror the last three.	可以确定的是未来三十年不会是过去三十年的镜像。


Two Decades from Warsaw	华沙二十年


WARSAW – “Poland – ten years, Hungary – ten months, East Germany – ten weeks, Czechoslovakia – ten days.”	华沙－“波兰——用了十年，匈牙利——用了十个月，东德——用了十个星期，捷克斯洛伐克——用了十天。


So chirped many in Prague in November 1989, reflecting the pride and the joy of the Velvet Revolution, but also the sustained effort that was needed to end communism, whose demise began in Warsaw the previous February.	”1989年11月，在布拉格有许多人如是说，这种说法反映了天鹅绒革命（Velvet Revolution）带来的自豪和喜悦，也反映了各国结束共产主义所需的持续努力的时间——在华沙，共产主义早在1988年2月份就开始了其走向消亡的历程。


Indeed, communism’s breakdown began ten years earlier in Poland, during Pope John Paul II’s first pilgrimage to his homeland, a visit that shook communist rule to its foundation.	事实上，在波兰，共产主义在布拉格天鹅绒革命发生十年前就开始走向衰败了——1979年教皇约翰·保罗二世首次访问了自己的祖国波兰，他的访问从根本上动摇了波兰共产党的统治。


Within a year, Polish workers were striking for the right to establish independent trade unions, staging two weeks of sit-ins at state-owned factories to achieve their goal.	在教皇访问波兰后的一年内，波兰工人开始举行罢工，要求获得建立独立工会的权利，并用在国有工厂进行两个星期的静坐的方式，来实现他们的目标。


Karl Marx would have been proud of them, but it was the Pope’s portrait that hung on the gate of Gdansk’s Lenin Shipyard during the strike.	卡尔·马克思可能会为这些工人感到自豪，但是，在波兰工人罢工期间，悬挂在格但斯克的列宁造船厂门上的，却是教皇的头像。


The Solidarity union that was born in 1980 broke the Communist Party‘s monopoly on power.	诞生于1980年的波兰团结工会，打破了波兰共产党对权力的垄断。


The movement united ten million people: workers and professors, peasants and students, priests and freethinkers among them – all of civil society.	团结工会运动使一千万波兰人团结起来了，这些人中既有工人也有教授，既有农民也有学生，既有牧师也有自由思想家——波兰社会各个阶层的人都有。


This infant democracy was harshly interrupted when martial law was imposed in December 1981, with Solidarity outlawed and dissidents arrested.	波兰1981年颁布的戒严令，使这一新生的民主遭到了严重的破坏，团结工会也被宣布为非法，持不同政见的人士遭到了逮捕。


But this totalitarian blitzkrieg could not last.	但是，波兰共产党的这种极权主义闪电战不可能持久。


Democracy did not die; it merely went underground.	波兰的民主力量没有死亡； 它只是转到了地下。


For the next seven years, Solidarity fought for re-legalization, building the biggest underground network of resistance Europe had seen since Hitler’s war.	在接下来的七年里，团结工会为再次获得合法身份进行了斗争，并建立起欧洲自希特勒战争以来最大的地下抵抗网络。


But this was non-violent resistance. Its main weapon was the language of freedom.	但是，团结工会的抵抗是非暴力的，它的主要武器是宣扬自由。


In the mid-1980’s, there were about 1,000 independent, uncensored journals in Poland. They represented a full range of ideas and editorial styles – from factory leaflets and bulletins to intellectual magazines.	在20世纪80年代中期，波兰大约有1000家独立的未经当局审查的刊物，它们代表了从工厂传单和公告到学术杂志的不同的观点和编辑风格。


Hundreds of books prohibited by Communist censors (for example, Gunther Grass’s The Tin Drum ) came to light.	而且，在此期间，被波兰共产党审查机关封禁的几百本著作（例如，君特·格拉斯的《铁皮鼓》），变得公众所知。


Solidarity’s leader, Lech Wałęsa, did not surrender in prison and retained his national esteem.	团结工会领导人莱赫·瓦文萨（Lech Wałęsa）在监狱里没有屈服，他获得了国民的尊重。


With the economy in steep decline, Poland’s rulers began to seek to stabilize the political system and reestablish relations with the West.	随着波兰经济的急剧下滑，波兰的共产主义统治者开始努力稳定波兰的政治体制，并试图和西方重新建立联系。


In 1986, the government released political prisoners – a precondition for talks with the opposition.	1986年，波兰政府开始释放政治犯——这是和反对派会谈的前提条件。


But it took the Communists two more years to realize that they could not introduce economic reform without Solidarity’s assent.	但是，波兰共产党又用了两年的时间才认识到，没有团结工会的支持，他们无法进行经济改革。


So talks began.	接着，波兰共产党和反对派的会谈开始了。


The reason they were possible at all was that the opposition’s goal was not the violent overthrow of party rule. Instead, its democratic goals were to be fulfilled by a compromise with the authorities.	使这些会谈成为可能的根本原因是，波兰反对派的目标不是要暴力推翻共产党的统治，相反，他们的民主目标可以通过与波兰当局达成妥协来实现。


Wałęsa and his closest advisers – Bronisław Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki – pushed this moderate policy, demanding liberation while recognizing the political reality of Soviet domination.	瓦文萨和他最亲密的顾问——盖雷梅克（Bronisław Geremek）和马佐维耶茨基（Tadeusz Mazowiecki）——推行了这一温和的政策，他们在要求自由的同时也认识到了苏维埃统治的政治现实。


Two waves of strikes in 1988 forced General Jaruzelski’s government to negotiate with Solidarity, which, after a few months of hedging, was legalized.	1988年波兰爆发的两次罢工浪潮，迫使雅鲁泽尔斯基（Jaruzelski）将军的政府和团结工会进行谈判，在进行了几个月的较量之后，团结工会被合法化了。


The “Roundtable” talks to change the political system could begin.	改革波兰政治体制的“圆桌”会谈可以开始了。


The haggling continued from February until April 1989.	圆桌会谈双方从1989年2月份一直争论到1989年4月份。


The main issues were legalization of the opposition, partially free elections, and creating the office of president to replace the Communist Party chief.	争论的焦点是波兰反对派合法化、部分自由选举以及设立总统办公室取代波兰共产党总书记的问题。


The Communists were guaranteed a majority in parliament.	圆桌会谈的结果是，波兰共产党得到了保证，他们在议会中占多数席位。


While the election to the newly created Senate was entirely free, the opposition could compete for only one-third of the seats in the Sejm (the lower house).	虽然波兰新设立的上议院选举是完全自由的，但是，波兰反对派在下议院中，只能竞争三分之一的席位。


But the key point was that the party’s monopoly on power was jettisoned.	但是，这一变革的关键之处是，波兰共产党的权力垄断被抛弃了。


Solidarity gained the opportunity to create independent media and a grassroots political organization.	团结工会获得了开办独立的媒体和成立基层政治组织的机会。


Finally, the Communists agreed that the elections to be held in four years would be entirely free.	最终，波兰共产党同意四年之后在波兰进行完全自由的选举。


The road to democracy was open.	波兰通向民主的道路打开了。


But the dictatorship’s end came sooner then anyone expected.	但是，波兰独裁统治结束的比人们预期得还要快。


In June 1989, the opposition won the parliamentary election in a landslide. It was impossible to form a government without its participation.	1989年6月，波兰反对派以压倒性多数赢得了议会选举，因此，没有反对派的参加，波兰不可能组成政府。


Jaruzelski was elected president, but he had to accept the new division of power.	雅鲁泽尔斯基当选为波兰总统，但是，他不得不接受权力的新分化。


The decisive political maneuver – building a coalition with allies of Communists – was carried out by Lech Wałęsa.	这时，莱赫·瓦文萨采取了决定性的政治策略——和共产党建立联盟。


A Solidarity representative, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became prime minister.	最后，团结工会的代表马佐维耶茨基当选为总理。


In September 1989, Poland had the first government ever led by democratic parties in the Soviet bloc.	1989年9月，波兰成为 苏联集团中第一个拥有由民主政党领导的政府的国家。


It was a revolution, but with a difference: the political system changed without a body count.	这是一场革命，但是又与革命有所不同：政治体制在没有任何人员伤亡的情况下发生了。


This was due, above all, to Solidarity’s prudent policy.	这样的成果主要归功于团结工会的审慎政策。


But it was civic activity - resistance movements, strikes, and other manifestations of social support – that buttressed Solidarity.	但是，是波兰民众的活动——抵抗运动、罢工以及其他社会支持活动——对团结工会构成了强大的支持。


Mikhail Gorbachev was important; his non-intervention policy toward Eastern Europe meant that Soviet tanks would not annul the changes, as they had done with the Prague Spring.	米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫在这里也起了重要作用：他对东欧实行不干涉政策，这意味着苏联坦克不能像在布拉格之春中那样，逆转波兰的政治变革。


The Polish Communists did not intend to build democracy; their plan was to absorb moderate opposition groups into a partially modified political system.	波兰共产党不想建立民主； 他们的计划是将温和的反对团体吸收到经过部分改良的政治体制之中来，将权力移交给团结工会是他们最后的选择。


Handing over power to Solidarity was the last thing they had in mind. Yet the Roundtable compromise turned out to be good even for them, as communist “reformers” began to build new careers in business and politics (one, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, became Poland’s second democratically elected president).	然而，圆桌会谈达成的妥协，对他们也是有好处的，因为波兰共产党的“改革家”开始在商业和政治领域开创新的职业生涯（例如，亚历山大·克瓦希涅夫斯基成为波兰第二任民主选举的总统）。


The Roundtable also provided the Communists with a sense of safety that diminished their fear of democratic change. A hangman’s noose did not await them.	圆桌会谈也为波兰共产党提供了安全感，这种安全感可以减少他们对民主变化的担忧，他们知道，没有绞刑在等着他们。


This was an important sign for Poland’s neighbors in the Soviet bloc, which took its example to heart.	这向苏联集团中的波兰邻国发出了一个重要的信号，这些国家牢牢记住了波兰的例子。


In a few months, talks between Communist bosses and their democratic opponents (often in the form of a roundtable) paved the way to free elections and new democratic governments in Budapest, Prague, East Berlin, and Sofia.	在此之后的几个月内，共产主义统治者和他们追求民主的反对派进行了一系列会谈（通常是以圆桌会谈的方式进行的），这些会谈为布达佩斯、布拉格、东柏林和索非亚的自由选举和新民主政府铺平了道路。


By 1989’s end, the post-Yalta Europe was free.	到1989年年底，后雅尔塔欧洲完全自由了。


Since then, the symbol of the great revolution of 1989 has been the fall of the Berlin Wall.	此后，1989年大革命的象征一直都是柏林墙的倒塌。


But the Roundtable talks in Warsaw 20 years ago this month is where the Iron Curtain began to be dismantled.	但是，20年前的这个月在华沙开始的圆桌会谈，是铁幕被拆除的开始。


Two Funerals and Our Freedom	两场葬礼与我们的自由


MOSCOW – My great-grandfather, Nikita Khrushchev, has been on my mind recently.	发自莫斯科——最近，萦绕在我脑际的总是我的曾祖父尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫，我猜首先挑动我思绪的也许是他同尼克松总统的所谓“厨房辩论”刚好过去了整整50周年。


I suppose it was the 50th anniversary of the so-called “kitchen debate” which he held with Richard Nixon that first triggered my memories.	然而最近两周在布达佩斯和华沙举行的两场葬礼使我重新思考起了曾祖父所留下来的遗产。


But the funeral last week in Budapest of General Béla Király, who commanded the Hungarian Revolution’s freedom fighters in 1956, and this week’s funeral in Warsaw of the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, whose break with Stalinism that year inspired many intellectuals (in Poland and elsewhere) to abandon communism, made me reconsider my grandfather’s legacy.	两位逝者分别是贝拉·基拉里将军（曾于1956年指挥匈牙利革命的自由战士反对苏军入侵）； 另一位是波兰哲学家柯拉科夫斯基，其于1956年同斯大林主义决裂，并以此激发了波兰和其他国家的众多知识分子，抛弃了共产主义理念。


The year 1956 was the best of times and the worst of times for Khrushchev.	对于赫鲁晓夫来说，1956年是最好的一年，也是最坏的一年。


His “secret speech” that year laid bare the monumentality of Stalin’s crimes.	在这一年他的秘密讲话成为揭露斯大林罪行的标志性事件。


Soon, the gulag was virtually emptied; a political thaw began, spurring whispers of freedom that could not be contained.	此后不久，苏联古拉格劳改营里的犯人几乎都被释放，一股政治解冻的暖流开始在苏联出现，但却也激发了许许多多这个政权所不能容忍的，与自由有关的秘密言论。


In Poland and Hungary, in particular, an underground tide burst forth demanding change.	尤其在波兰和匈牙利，一股要求变革的地下思潮突然席卷而来。


Hungary, of course, had its short and glorious revolution.	对于匈牙利来说，这场革命无疑是短暂而辉煌的。


That first war among socialist states shattered the myth of inviolable “fraternal” bonds between the Soviet Union and the captive nations of Eastern Europe.	这场首次发生在社会主义国家之间的战争打破了苏联同其东欧附属国之间所谓牢不可破的“兄弟般的”联盟的神话。


But Khrushchev never envisioned the breakup of the Soviet empire as part of his thaw.	但赫鲁晓夫从没料想到庞大苏联的解体也是他解冻政策中的一部分。


So the Red Army invaded Hungary – on a scale larger than the Allies’ D-Day invasion of Europe in 1944.	于是苏联红军出兵入侵了匈牙利——这场行动的规模甚至比盟军1944年诺曼底登陆入侵欧洲的“D日”还要大。


Béla Király, released from a sentence of life in prison (one of the four death sentences he received from the communists having been commuted) was offered the job of commander of the Hungarian National Guard and the defense of Budapest.	当贝拉·基拉里将军于1956年被释放出狱时（共产党判了他的四个死刑，其中一个被减为无期），他被任命为匈牙利国家卫队司令，负责保卫首都布达佩斯。


His task was to knock the rag-tag freedom fighters into an army, but there wasn’t time to stop the Soviet advance.	而基拉里的任务则是要把一群素质参差不齐的自由战士训练成一支像样的军队。 但这一点点时间显然不足以去阻止苏联进军。


So, after a week of heroism he and a few thousand of his men crossed the border into Austria and exile.	在一周的英勇抵抗之后，将军和他手下几千人越过国界进入奥地利，开始了流亡生活。


Over the years, a mutual friend often tried to introduce me to General Király, but, to my regret, that meeting never happened.	许多年来，一位熟识我和将军的朋友几次试图介绍我们认识，但令我遗憾的是，这一想法却始终没能成为现实。


Any man who would frame the four death sentences he had received (one signed by Khrushchev, another by Yuri Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest in 1956) and hang them in his drawing room has the sort of quirky humor I relish.	我想一个会将自己四张死刑判决书（其一由赫鲁晓夫签发，另一份则由1956年时任苏联驻布达佩斯大使的尤里·安德罗波夫签发）用画框框起来放在画室里的人，肯定拥有某种异乎寻常的幽默感吧。


And from what I know of the man and his history, particularly his work in Hungary after 1989, I can only wish that my great-grandfather could have met him.	而在我了解了将军这个人和他的过去，尤其是1989年之后他在匈牙利所取得的成就之后，我就十分希望曾祖父能他见上一面。


Certainly, Király would not have hesitated to meet the man who ordered the invasion.	可以肯定的是，基拉里将军会很乐意见到这个当年下达入侵指令的人。


After all, when he learned that one of the Russian generals who had led the invasion was still alive in 2006, Király invited him to Budapest to join the 50th anniversary celebrations.	因为在2006年，当他得知当年指挥入侵的苏联将军中的其中一位还健在时，他就邀请对方出席在布达佩斯举行的50周年庆典活动。


When General Yevgeni Malashenko declined in fear that he might be arrested, the 94-year-old Király flew to Moscow, where he spent a long weekend reminiscing and going to a banya for retired Red Army generals.	而在耶夫杰尼·马拉申科将军由于惧怕被当场逮捕而婉拒了邀请之后，94岁高龄的基拉里飞赴莫斯科并在那儿度过了一个长长的周末，跟退休的红军将领们一同追忆往事，还和他们一同泡了个热水澡。


Kolakowski, on the other hand, was someone I knew.	与将军不同的是，柯拉科夫斯基确是与我相识的。


We frequently met at conferences, where it was always a delight to hear him speak Russian – a Russian that had the accent and elegance of Tolstoi and Pushkin, not the degraded Russian bark of Vladimir Putin.	我们常常在各种会议上相遇，听他说俄语是一件令人愉快的事情——那是有着托尔斯泰和普希金式优雅的俄国口音，而不是普京式的粗鲁咆哮。


Like Király, in 1956, Kolakowski turned against the Communist party he had once joined in the hope, formed in the charnel house that the Nazis had wrought in Poland, that it would build a better world.	如同基拉里一样，柯拉科夫斯基于1956年转而反对他曾经满怀希望加入的共产党，这种希望在纳粹波兰集中营的停尸间里成型，并许诺要构建一个更美好世界。


Kolakowski, modern Poland’s most acclaimed philosopher, quickly learned that mendacity was the true building block of Communism, and he withdrew from it in horror.	而当柯拉科夫斯基这位现代波兰最受人称道的哲学家迅速意识到，整个共产主义其实都是建立在谎言之上的时候，他只得惊恐的从中抽身。


By 1968, the Polish regime could no longer tolerate his presence. He was expelled from his post at Warsaw University and, when he went to teach abroad, the government forced him into exile by never allowing him to return.	直至1968年，波兰当权者再也无法容忍他的存在，他们将柯拉科夫斯基逐出华沙大学，柯拉科夫斯基只得到国外执教，政府随之迫使他走上了流亡之路，永远不能回到祖国。


The question for me is how these three men with such different backgrounds and trajectories – Khrushchev, a Russian peasant turned proletarian who became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party; Király, a Magyar soldier of old world Europe, steeped in aristocratic traditions; and Kolakowski, a gentleman scholar from Warsaw more attuned to Jansenist heresies than the perverse logic of Leninist dialectics – could ultimately contribute to the same goal: the resurrection of liberty in Europe.	基拉里，一个老欧洲做派的，贵族传统浓厚的匈牙利军人； 还有柯拉科夫斯基，一位来自华沙，对天主教詹森派教义比列宁辩证法更感兴趣的文弱书生——能最终为同一个目标作出自己的贡献：那就是自由在欧洲的重新降临。


Khrushchev did not really know anything other than Communism.	除了共产主义，赫鲁晓夫并不真正知晓其他什么东西。


He tried to humanize it and undo the cruelty of Stalinist orthodoxy, but never doubted that the Leninist system was the way of the future.	他试图使共产主义变的更人性化，并把正统斯大林主义者的残酷行径矫正过来。 但他从不怀疑列宁主义就是通向未来的道路。


Király, who subscribed to the old codes of military honor (he would be named a Righteous Gentile at Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust memorial, for the hundreds of Jews he saved by keeping them with his army during WWII), saw that very system as the enemy of his country and its liberty.	而基拉里，这个战功赫赫的老兵（单凭他在二战期间利用自己的军队所救下的成千上万的犹太人，就足以令其在耶路撒冷的亚德瓦谢姆犹太人大屠杀纪念馆的外国友好人士纪念碑上名留千古了）却认为整个体系就是威胁他祖国及其自由的敌人。


But today, Khrushchev is remembered mostly for his contribution to the demise of Stalinism – and, via Mikhail Gorbachev, whose hero he was, ultimately for helping to bring about communism’s demise.	到如今，赫鲁晓夫因为被世人铭记的原因是他瓦解了斯大林主义——并通过戈尔巴乔夫，最终实现了共产主义体系的解体。


Király and Kolakowski became voices of moderation and reconciliation in the Hungary and Poland that emerged out of communism’s darkness at noon.	基拉里和柯拉科夫斯基则代表了在那段共产主义黑暗统治如日中天的岁月里，匈牙利和波兰国内要求进步和协商的声音。


Király will be remembered not merely as a warrior, but as a humanist, the conciliator who called for no reprisals after 1989, and a liberal model for many Hungarians.	基拉里将军将不仅仅作为一个勇士，而是一个人道主义者被世人所牢记。 作为调解人，他在1989年之后没有任何报复性举动。


Kolakowski, in upholding the sanctity of truth in the empire of the lie, connected the new democratic Poland to the old Poland of intellect and culture.	他是匈牙利自由主义者的最佳典范。 而柯拉科夫斯基，通过在一个充斥谎言的帝国里坚持真理，将智慧文明的老波兰与民主的新波兰成功地联系在了一起。


Király, Kolakowski, and Khrushchev: each in his own way is a symbol of today’s new and uniting Europe, a Europe of rapprochement and forgiveness among erstwhile opponents.	基拉里、柯拉科夫斯基和赫鲁晓夫：这三人各自的人生都是如今新欧洲团结趋势下的典型，在这个欧洲里，那些昔日对手之间洋溢着的，是和睦和谅解的气氛。


Two Models for Europe	摆在欧洲面前的两条路


MUNICH – Interest rates for public debt within the eurozone have spread once again, just as they did before the introduction of the euro.	慕尼黑——欧元区内部公债利息再次出现了差异，这一幕在欧元引入前夕曾经发生过。


Balance-of-payment disparities are steadily increasing.	收支平衡之间的差异正在逐渐拉大。


The sovereign-debt crisis is eating its way from the periphery to the core, and the exodus of capital is accelerating.	主权财富危机正在从外围向核心蔓延，资本外逃正在加速。


Since the summer, €300 billion, in net terms, may well have fled from Italy and France.	夏季以来，意大利和法国的净资本流出高达3 000亿欧元。


The printing presses at the Banque de France and the Banca d’Italia are working overtime to make up for the outflow of money.	法国央行和意大利央行的印钞机开足了马力以应对资金外逃。


But this only furthers the exodus, because creating more money prevents interest rates from rising to a point at which capital would find it attractive to stay.	但这只能令外逃加速，因为创造更多的钱阻止了利率的上升，使得两国的利率不足以吸引资本留在国内。


If Europe had the same rules as the United States, where the Federal Reserve’s regional banks have to pay the Fed for any special money creation with securities collateralized in gold, they would not create this much supplementary money, and capital flight would be limited.	如果欧洲能有如同美国那样的规则——地区联邦储备银行要创造货币，必须向美联储支付用黄金作为抵押的证券——那么它们就不会造出那么多额外的货币了，资本外逃也可以得到遏制。


Instead, local printing of money is essentially aiding and abetting the exodus.	与此相反，地方央行的印钞行为本质上是在助长和加速资金外逃。


If the eurozone does not want to embrace capital controls, it has only two alternatives: make the local printing of money more difficult, or offer investment guarantees in countries that markets view as insecure.	如果欧元区不想引入资本管制，那么只有两条路可走：遏制地方印钱行为，或者为被市场认为是不安全的国家提供投资担保。


The first option is the American way, which also demands that the buyers bear the risks inherent in public or private securities.	前一种选择是美国式的，它同时要求买房承担公共和私人证券所固有的风险。


The taxpayer is not called upon, even in extreme cases, and states can go bankrupt.	该选择不会动用纳税人的钱，即使在极端情况下也不行，而且州可以破产。


The second option is the socialist way.	后一种选择是社会主义式的。


Investment guarantees will lead, via issuance of Eurobonds, to socialization of the risks inherent in public debt.	投资担保将通过欧元债券的发行导致公共债务固有风险的社会化。


Because all the member states provide one another with free credit guarantees, interest rates for government securities can no longer differ in accordance with creditworthiness or likelihood of repayment.	由于所有成员国都互相提供自由信贷担保，因此各国国债利率将不再会因信誉和偿付能力而出现差别。


The less sound a country is, the lower its effective expected interest rate.	国家越疲软，其有效预期利率就越低。


The socialist way follows necessarily from the free access to the printing press that has so far characterized the eurozone.	社会主义式选择是当前欧元区各国自由印钞现状的必然结果。


As long as banks – and thus governments, which sell their debt to the banks – can draw cheap credit up to any amount from the European System of Central Banks, Europe will remain volatile.	只要银行——政府亦然，它们的债务都被银行买去了——可以从欧洲央行体系中获得任意数量的低成本信贷，欧洲就将维持高波动性的状态。


The exodus of capital will continue, and enormous compensation claims of the European core’s central banks, particularly the German Bundesbank and the Dutch central bank, will pile up.	资本外逃将持续，欧洲核心国央行（特别是德国央行和荷兰央行）将发出大量的补偿要求。


In Germany, these compensation claims amount to half of the country’s entire net foreign wealth, or €500 billion ($653 billion).	在德国，这些补偿要求总量达到了其净外国财富总量的一半，即5 000亿欧元。


Since these claims would probably be lost should the euro collapse, the political pressure to give way finally to Eurobonds is becoming overwhelming.	如果欧元崩溃，那么这些补偿要求有可能成为水漂，因此最终同意欧元证券的政治压力越来越大。


But German acquiescence would be a disastrous result for Europe.	但德国的同意对欧洲来说将是个灾难性后果。


The European Financial Stability Facility in Luxemburg would become a socialist planning agency, organizing flows of public capital in Europe and thwarting markets’ allocative function.	位于卢森堡的欧洲金融稳定基金将成为社会主义计划机构，组织欧洲内部的资本流，妨碍市场的配置功能。


The consequence would be reduced growth, owing to a misallocation of scarce capital, and economic stagnation in the core areas.	结果将是增长疲软（因稀缺资本的配置失当所致）以及核心国家的经济停滞。


Matters are made no better by controlling credit flows via a fiscal government, which is what the eurozone countries have now decided they want.	通过财政政府来控制信贷流也绝不是好办法，而欧元区国家现在已决定要这样做了。


As long as the debtors co-determine the rules, more capital will flow under such an arrangement than markets would permit.	只要规则是由债务人联合决定的，资本流规模就会大于市场配置情形。


That distortion will become apparent even within the countries that benefit from the additional credit, because Eurobonds will, for the time being, provide security only for government debt.	即使是从更多信贷中获益的国家，也会出现明显的扭曲，因为随着时间的推移，欧元债券将只会对政府债务提供安全保障。


Private debtors will continue to have difficulties finding capital, so the state will expand relative to the private sector.	私人债务人将继续陷入融资困境，因此国有部门会相对私人部门有所膨胀。


The ECB’s founding chief economist, Otmar Issing, has referred to this as a road to serfdom.	欧洲央行的创始首席经济学家伊兴（Otmar Issing）将这成为通往奴役之路。


But it is not a smooth road, because it threatens resistance by the capital-exporting countries’ taxpayers and trade unions against the outflow of capital.	但这条路不会平坦，因为存在资本出口国纳税人和反对资本外流的贸易联盟的阻力。


In Germany, in particular, enormous resistance will build up if the country – via the introduction of Eurobonds – is driven back into the crisis that it underwent as a result of the interest-rate convergence that followed the introduction of the euro.	特别是在德国，如果国家（因欧元债券的引入）被迫回到因引入欧元后出现的利率趋同而导致危机的前车之鉴上，德国国内将出现巨大的抵制力量。


Only the American alternative is viable.	只有美国式选择才是可行的。


Short- and long-term interest-rate spreads are determined by the economy’s creditworthiness, and whoever wants low interest rates has to provide real collateral.	短期和长期利差由经济体的信誉决定，要想得到低利率，就必须提供真实抵押品。


The American route does not necessarily imply a heavy-handed approach vis-à-vis the crisis countries.	美国式选择并不一定意味着对危机国家的严厉措施。


It can be combined with a system of measured, limited help in the sense of partial coverage of investors against a country’s insolvency.	该选择可以辅之以谨慎而有限度的援助体系，为投资者因一国无法偿付而遭受的损失予以部分补偿。


This model, contemplated by the European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo, would retain the disciplinary effects of interest-rate spreads while capping them in order to limit panicked extremes in the capital markets.	CESifo欧洲经济顾问团所提出的这一模式在保持了利差的约束性效果的同时对利差做了限定，以免资本市场出现极端恐慌的情形。


It offers the last chance to avoid debt socialism.	这是避免债务社会主义的最后机会。


Europe’s Two-Speed Future	欧洲的两速未来


PARIS – For three years, the euro crisis has threatened not only to unravel the eurozone, but to bring down the entire European Union with it.	巴黎—年来，欧元危机的深化不但威胁到了欧元区的生存，也威胁到了整个欧盟。


Although the pressure from financial markets has moderated, for now, a long-term resolution to the crisis remains an existential priority for the EU.	尽管金融市场的压力有所减轻，但就现在而言，为这场危机寻找长期解决方案仍是事关欧盟生死存亡的紧迫问题。


In today’s highly competitive global economy, European countries’ relatively small size, aging populations, and excessive indebtedness, combined with a lack of energy resources and insufficient investment in research and development, mean that their high living standards and generous social-welfare states are in jeopardy.	在当今高度竞争的全球经济中，欧洲国家相对来说规模较小，人口老龄化严重，负债过度，且能源资源缺乏，研究和发展的投资也不足，这意味着它们的高生活标准和慷慨的社会福利国家难以为继。


Individually, they cannot compete with emerging markets; they need a strong EU to face the challenges posed by globalization.	就个体国家而言，它们无法与新兴市场抗衡； 它们需要一个强大的欧盟来面对全球化带来的挑战。


But the eurozone’s architecture – in which monetary policy is centralized, but budgetary and economic policies are left up to individual governments – is not viable in the long term.	但欧元区的基础制度——货币政策集中，但预算和经济政策仍有各国政府自行决定——从长期看是不可行的。


Although Europe’s leaders have made some progress on institutional reform, the measures taken so far will not lead to real convergence of economic and budgetary policies, or to genuine economic union.	尽管欧洲领导人在制度改革方面取得了一定进步，但目前所采取的措施无法形成经济和预算政策的真正趋同，也无法产生真正的经济联盟。


As a result, they will fail to reassure financial markets.	因此，金融市场无法安心。


Given that treaty change is politically unfeasible, establishing a “two-speed Europe” – in which a core group of countries pursues deeper integration more quickly than the rest – is the EU’s best option for reaching the level of cooperation needed to escape the crisis intact.	修改条约在政治上不可行，因此建设“两个速度的欧洲”——核心国家比其他国家追求加快一体化深入步伐——是欧盟寻求达到从危机中全身而退所需的合作水平的最佳选择。


This can be accomplished in two ways.	这可以通过两方面完成。


The first option would be to progress de facto toward a two-speed EU without establishing further legal commitments.	第一种选择是将现状改造为两速欧盟，而不进行进一步的法制建设。


Eurozone countries, together with others willing to join the euro in the future (the “eurozone plus”), could simply decide to use the legal means already available to increase cooperation.	欧元区国家以及准备在未来加入欧元区的国家（“准欧元区国家”）可以选择利用现有法律途径加强合作。


Ideally, this cooperation would take place within the EU’s institutional framework.	在理想情形中，这一合作将在欧盟制度框架内发生。


If all eurozone members participated, Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU could be used to support their action.The scope of this provision – which says that, “the [European] Council shall…adopt measures specific to [euro] Member States,” and that “only [euro] Member States…shall take part in the vote” – is wide.	如果所有欧元区成员国都参与进来，欧盟运行条约（Treaty on the Functioning of the EU）第136条可以用来支持它们的行动。 该条规定，“（欧洲）委员会应该……采取专为（欧元）成员国设计的措施”，“只有（欧元）成员国……可以参与投票”，适用面极为广泛。


In addition, Article 138 would allow unified representation of the eurozone in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.	此外，第138条规定欧元区可以在IMF和世界银行中采用联合代表。


The group could then extend cooperation to three other policy areas:	接着，欧元区可以在其他三大政策领域扩展合作：


·         Minimal harmonization of tax laws (such as a common basis for assessing corporate taxation) and social policy (such as further liberalization of national labor markets to encourage labor mobility);	·         税法和社会政策的最低限度融合，前者如计算公司税的共同基准，后者如国家级劳动力市场的进一步自由化以鼓励劳动力流动。


·         Common policy measures on immigration, linked to labor-market needs;	·         和劳动力市场挂钩的移民问题上的共同政策。


·         Closer judicial cooperation – again aimed at encouraging mobility – in civil matters with cross-border implications, specifically concerning contracts and family law.	·         具有跨国效应的民法问题上加强法律合作，特别是合同法和家庭法方面，其目的也是为了鼓励流动性。


The group could also take some measures outside the EU framework.	欧元区还可以采取一些欧盟框架之外的政策。


Indeed, if all eurozone countries did not participate, such outside cooperation would be crucial, given that Articles 136 and 138 would no longer apply.	事实上，如果并非所有欧元区国家都参与其中，那么这类外部合作就会相当关键，因为第136条和第138条将不再适用。


This could include measures to strengthen the European Stability Mechanism and the Euro Plus Pact (designed to enhance economic policy coordination among member states), de facto cooperation within the Bretton Woods institutions, and voluntary approximation of national laws in certain areas.	这方面的措施可以包括加强欧洲稳定性机制和欧元附加条约（Euro Plus Pact，为加强成员国经济政策合作而设）、加强布雷顿森林体系下的现有合作，以及加强某些特定领域各国法律的自愿趋同。


Participating countries would have to decide whether to commit to a common set of policies, or to reserve the right to opt in on a case-by-case basis.	参与过将必须决定是否做出共同政策承诺，也可以保留权利，选择逐项参与。


Cooperation on matters related to the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (discipline and solidarity) should be obligatory.	与欧盟的经济和货币联盟（纪律和团结）相关的问题上的合作应该是义务的。


The involvement of most, or all, current and future eurozone countries would enhance the group’s coherence, making it easier to win public support for cooperation in other areas.	大部分（甚至所有）欧元区国家和准欧元区国家的参与能增强欧元区的凝聚力，更容易获得其他领域合作的公众支持。


Pursuing this option would require that the decision-making process be legitimate.	追求这一选择要求决策过程的合法性。


In the Council, as in all cases of “enhanced cooperation,” only participating members have the right to vote.	在欧洲委员会，和所有“加强合作”的情形一样，只有参与国有投票权。


In the European Parliament, by contrast, all 27 EU members participate in the decision-making process, even concerning measures that will affect only the 23 “eurozone plus” countries (the 17 eurozone members and the six that have agreed to the Euro Plus Pact) – a method that could pose a political problem.	相反，在欧洲议会，所有27个成员国都参与决策过程，即使相关措施只牵涉到23个“扩大化的欧元区”国家（17个欧元区成员国和6个同意加入欧元附加条约的国家），这可能造成政治问题。


In any case, national parliaments should become involved in order to enhance the legitimacy of decisions.	无论如何，国家级议会应该参与其中，以增强决定的合法性。


The second option would imply an international agreement, in addition to the EU treaties, which would legally bind participating countries, enabling them to commit to establishing a genuine economic union, and to define the organs and rules that will govern their cooperation.	第二种选择意味着欧元条约之外的国际协议，该协议将对参与过产生合法约束，促使它们承诺建立真正的经济联盟，并确定约束合作行为的规则。


Such a treaty would take time to be negotiated, ratified, and implemented.	如此条约的谈判、批准和实施需要时间。


But a clear, precise announcement of the decision to pursue it, together with a bold European Central Bank policy in line with its recently announced bond-purchasing program, might be enough to convince both financial markets and EU citizens that a lasting solution is within sight.	但明确宣布决定向这一方向前进并辅之以与最近宣布的债券购买计划相辅相成的大胆的欧洲央行政策将足以让金融市场和欧盟民众确信，持续性解决方案就在眼前。


The eurozone’s path to genuine economic union will be fraught with political and institutional challenges – from determining substantive areas of cooperation to protecting the rights and interests of all EU countries and safeguarding the unity of both the internal market and foreign relations.	欧元区迈向真正经济联盟之路布满了政治和制度挑战——从决定真正的合作领域到保护所有欧盟国家的权利和利益并捍卫内部市场和对外关系上的团结。


But navigating that path is the EU’s only option.	但克服这些挑战完成这一旅途是欧盟的唯一选择。


Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right at the IMF and World Bank	国际货币基金组织和世界银行两错相加不等于正确


One has go back to the “Year of Three Popes” (1978) to find a succession drama as strange as what has been happening at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the two pillars of the global financial system.	只有回到“三教皇更替之年”（1978年）才能找到与国际货币基金组织和世界银行这两大全球金融支柱刚刚发生的领导人更替同样怪诞的继承戏剧。


Two months ago, Bank President Paul Wolfowitz resigned amidst an extraordinary staff mutiny and governance debacle.	两个月前，世行行长保罗·沃尔福威茨（Paul Wolfowitz）在异乎寻常的员工反抗和管理崩溃中宣布辞职。


Now, his counterpart at the International Monetary Fund, the former Spanish Finance Minister Rodrigo Rato, has shocked major stakeholders by announcing that he, too, will leave in October.	如今，他在国际货币基金组织的同事，前西班牙财长罗德里戈·拉托（Rodrigo Rato）也宣布将于10月离任，这接踵而来的变故令主要利益相关人士惊诧不已。


To lose one international lending institution head is misfortune, to lose two looks like carelessness (my apologies to Oscar Wilde).	失去一位国际信贷组织领袖是不幸，而失去两位则是疏忽（我向奥斯卡·王尔德深表歉意）。


Coming on the tenth year anniversary of the Asian financial crisis, the caldron in which today’s ultra-liquid capital markets were forged, conspiracy theories abound.	在锻造今天过度流动资本市场的大熔炉¾亚洲金融危机爆发10周年之际，传统的派系理论仍然甚嚣尘上。


Frankly, sticking to the public record, the two resignations seem like night and day.	坦率地说，从公众记录的角度来讲，两位的辞职可谓大相径庭。


When Wolfowitz was finally pushed out after a bruising battle, Bank staff were beside themselves with joy.	沃尔福威茨在经过一场激烈争斗终于被赶下台时，世行员工简直欣喜若狂。


By contrast, most IMF staff seem genuinely depressed by Rato’s departure.	而与此形成鲜明的对照，多数国际货币基金组织的员工似乎由衷地为拉托的离去感到惋惜。


Wolfowitz’s pre-Bank claim to fame was his role as an architect of the Iraq war, arguably one of the greatest strategic debacles since Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.	让沃尔福威茨入主世行的主要功绩是一手制造了伊拉克战争，虽然现在仍有争论，但这场战争被视为自拿破仑入侵俄国之后最严重的战略失败。


Rato, by contrast, was Spain’s finance minister during the country’s best economic era since the sixteenth century.	而拉托的经历则恰好相反，他在西班牙16世纪以来的最佳经济发展期内担任西班牙财政部长。


Under Wolfowitz, the World Bank failed to introduce any serious governance reforms to reflect the rising economic power of Asia.	在沃尔福威茨的领导下，世界银行未能进行任何真正的管理改革，以适应亚洲日益增长的经济实力。


Under Rato, the IMF at least took some modest steps towards giving China and other rapidly emerging markets more say in running the place.	而在拉托的领导下，国际货币基金组织至少向着给予中国和其他快速崛起的新兴市场国家更多的管理发言权迈出了最初的一步。


At the same time as Rato pushed reluctant European nations to yield some of their power in the Fund, he introduced reforms that clarified and strengthened the Fund’s role in managing exchange rates.	在拉托敦促心不甘情不愿的欧洲国家放弃一些对基金组织权力的同时，他也推行了加强和明确国际货币基金组织在汇率管理中所起作用的改革。


Indeed, a week before Rato’s resignation announcement, the Fund asserted that it had the right to censure countries whose intervention policies threaten to undermine global economic stability.	事实上，在拉托发出辞职公告前，国际货币基金组织宣布有权谴责那些实施可能对全球经济稳定造成破坏的干预政策的国家。


The Fund’s policy change drew the ire of Chinese officials, who have been intervening on a biblical scale to hold down the value of their currency, the Yuan.	基金组织政策的改变引来了中国官员的愤怒，他们一直采用大规模干预的方式来压制本国货币¾人民币的价格。


When the Fund gets the big boys to complain by saying perfectly sensible things, it must be doing something right.	当国际货币基金组织完全合理的声明招来大国怨恨的时候，它的所作所为必然含有某些正确的因素。


True, the Fund has been notably soft on the United States of late, downplaying the continuing vulnerabilities posed by the gaping US current account and trade deficits.	没错，基金组织近来对待美国的态度十分软弱，对美国经常帐户和贸易赤字缺口造成的持续疲软采取视而不见的态度。


One imagines this compelling theme will return soon enough.	很多人认为这一迫在眉睫的问题很快就��被重新提出来。


Although there are vast differences surrounding the departure of the IMF and Bank heads, there are some worrisome similarities.	尽管国际货币基金组织和世界银行领袖的离职有着本质的区别，但同时也有着令人忧虑的相似之处。


First, there is every sign that the Europeans will use Rato’s sudden announcement as an excuse to avoid a serious debate about relinquishing their privilege of always appointing the Fund’s head True the US was able to essentially blackmail the world into choosing yet another American to replace Wolfowitz, by balking at efforts to push him out peaceably.	首先，所有迹象都表明欧洲人会把拉托的突然决定作为逃避就放弃其一直以来指定基金组织首脑的特权进行严肃探讨的借口。 没错，美国可以通过阻止要求沃尔福威茨和平辞职的努力，在事实上要挟世界另选一位美国人来接替沃尔福威茨的位置。


But the Europeans have no such leverage at the Fund, where Rato has elected to go out under his own steam.	但对于拉托主动提出辞职的国际货币基金组织，欧洲人能却还没有具备那么大的影响力。


There is ample time between now and October for the IMF to install an open and fair selection process that will lead to the best person being chosen, regardless of nationality.	从现在开始到今年10月，国际货币基金组织有足够的时间实施公开公平的选拔过程，从所有国籍的候选人中选出基金组织的最佳领袖。


Central banks around the world have been enormously successful by choosing technocrats and people with proven knowledge and experience to head their institutions, rather than accepting purely political appointments.	世界各国央行都通过选拔技术人员和有实际知识和经验的人士来领导它们的机构，而不是接受纯粹的政治任命获得了巨大的成功。


On merit, some of the obvious candidates for the Fund job, such as Brazilian Arminio Fraga, and Egyptian-born Mohamed El-Erian, are not European.	从资质上来讲，有些显而易见的基金组织领袖候选人，比如巴西的阿米尼奥·弗拉格（Arminio Fraga）和出生在埃及的穆罕默德·埃尔-埃利安（Mohamed El-Erian）都不是来自欧洲。


A second similarity is that both institutions face deep existential crises.	另一个相似之处是两家机构都面临着很深的生存危机。


In today’s world of deep and liquid global financial markets, the main lending instruments of the IMF and and the Bank are largely unnecessary and redundant.	在今天变幻莫测、时刻流动的全球金融市场，国际货币基金组织和世界银行的信贷工具大多都冗长繁复，毫无必要。


Absent serious reform, both are on tract to go into deep hibernation as the Bank for International Settlements did for forty years prior to its recent resurgence.	在没有进行认真改革的情况下，这两家机构都将像最近复苏之前沉睡了40年的国际清算银行那样陷入深深的冬眠之中。


The BIS, founded in 1930 to help manage German reparation payments and to coordinate activities among central banks, served as little more than repository for gold reserves in the years following World War II.	国际清算银行于1930年成立，目的是协助管理德国重建资金和协调央行的各项活动，它在二次大战后多年之中也不过起到了黄金储备保管箱的作用。


As central banks have gained status in recent years, and thanks to imaginative leadership, the BIS has reawakened and taken on a number of important roles, including setting international regulatory standards for global banking.	随着近年来中央银行地位的回升，也多亏有充满想象力的正确领导，国际清算银行已经从沉睡中苏醒过来，并发挥了几种重要作用，其中包括为全球银行业制订国际制度标准。


While it is encouraging to know that a hibernating IMF and World Bank may some day reawaken, it would be far better to see them invigorated now.	尽管沉睡的国际货币基金组织和世界银行也许某一天会重新苏醒的想法令人感到振奋，但看到它们现在就生龙活虎无疑是更好的选择。


A more globalized world needs global financial institutions, but ones that focus on coordination, supervision and technical advice, not redundant lending mechanisms.	全球化程度更高的世界需要全球金融机构，但只有关注协调、监督和技术建议的机构、而不是沉闷繁冗的信贷机制才会有利于经济的发展。


Before any real change can place, both institutions require fundamental governance changes.	真正的变化发生之前，这两家机构都需要进行根本性的管理改革。


The puzzling circumstances of the IMF head’s sudden departure announcement do not justify a business as usual approach to his replacement.	国际货币基金组织主席突然辞职事件中扑朔迷离的前前后后使我们无法采用惯常的方式来确定他的接替人选。


Nor does the closed-door succession process at the Bank, where the US continued its sixty year lock on the Presidency, justify continuing European monopolization of the Fund job.	而导致美国60年来独霸行长职位的世界银行闭门造车式的任命政策也不能为欧洲继续把持国际基金组织的领导地位提供理由。


Two wrongs do not make a right.	两错相加并不意味着正确。


A Quantum of Happiness	幸福的量子


DUBAI – I’m delighted to join in the celebration of this year’s International Day of Happiness.	迪拜——我很高兴参加今年国际幸福日的庆祝活动。


But, to be honest, my focus is on the other 364 days of the year.	但说实话，我更关注一年中其他364天。


After all, I am in the happiness business.	毕竟，我本人是幸福行业的从业人员。


There have been a number of initiatives and efforts around the world to move beyond GDP and data on schools or hospital beds in measuring a country’s success in governance and development.	世界各地已经开展了若干项计划和工作，从超越GDP及学校或医院病床数的视角来衡量一国的执政和发展是否成功。


In a country that has spent the past five decades building an economy from a standing start, the government in which I serve knows only too well that such figures, while showing that our development is progressing, do not tell the whole story – or anything like it.	因为来自一个过去50年都在试图从零建设经济的国家，我所供职的政府非常清楚这样的数字虽然显示了我们的发展，但却根本无法反映现实的全部。


In 2011, the United Nations called on member states to place more emphasis on happiness and wellbeing when working to achieve and measure social and economic development.	2011年，联合国呼吁各成员国在为实现及衡量社会经济发展目标奋斗时应更加注重福祉和幸福。


Since then, many countries have come to realize that placing happiness at the heart of their governance objectives makes perfect sense.	自那以后，很多国家开始意识到将幸福视为执政目标的核心是合情合理的举措。


Here in the UAE, we have recognized, as others are recognizing, that we need benchmarks for governance that truly express what we mean by success.	像很多人一样，在我的国家阿联酋，我们已经开始认识到需要制定能真正体现成功含义的执政标杆。


The question we ask is not whether we are providing adequate services and sound economic policy to our people, but whether we are making our people happy.	我们关注的问题不再是是否为民众提供了充分的服务及合理的经济政策，而是是否让民众实现了幸福。


Of course, the latter requires delivering the former; but it also means going beyond statistics, to comprehend that we are all individuals with our own hopes, fears, and aspirations.	当然，后者需要以前者为基础； 但同时也意味着要超越统计数据的羁绊，从有希望、有恐惧和有抱负的鲜活的人的角度来理解民众的需求。


Happiness is serious business in the UAE, where attention to it permeates everything we do in government, including efforts to encourage private-sector companies to place a value on it in their everyday operations.	幸福在阿联酋是项严肃的事业，对它的关注渗透到政府的方方面面，包括鼓励私营部门企业在日常经营活动中关注相关各方的幸福。


It entails formulating national strategies, programs, and policies to increase happiness and then measuring our achievements on an ongoing basis.	它需要制定国家战略、计划和政策，来增强幸福感，并不断衡量我们所取得的成就。


But what exactly is this indicator we are calling happiness?	但我们所谓的幸福指标究竟是什么？


It is neither a transitory moment of delight nor a constant condition.	它既不是转瞬即逝的愉悦也不是永恒的状态。


It is a state of being beyond satisfaction, a flourishing and ambient joy.	它的层次比满意更高，代表着一种蓬勃向上、无所不在的快乐。


Happiness is knowing that you and your family are safe; that there is opportunity open to you and your children; and that you can depend on a high degree of care, dignity, and fairness in your society.	幸福是知道你和家人非常安全，你的子女拥有机会； 你能够指望社会高度的关怀、尊重和公正。


Happiness is not something that is bestowed from on high; we all must work to achieve it.	幸福并不是高高在上的赐予； 我们都必须努力去实现它。


But, as I see it, our role in government is to create an environment that enables happiness and a positive attitude toward life to flourish.	但在我看来，政府的职能是创造一种幸福的环境，让积极的生活态度不断向外扩张。


Setbacks or frustrations in one’s life do not necessarily imply a loss of happiness, which depends on how you – and others who are helping you – go about overcoming obstacles.	人生中的困难和挫折并不一定意味着幸福的失去，而是取决于你和其他协助你的人如何去克服困难。


Happiness thus entails a commitment to helping others, as well as taking responsibility for your own decision to proceed constructively and optimistically.	因此幸福意味着全心全意帮助他人，以及为自己乐观、建设性的决策负责。


In my ten years working in government, I have personally encountered no situation that could not be handled with a smile, a little consideration, and a touch of positivity.	在政府工作的10年中，我个人从未碰到过不能以微笑、关怀和积极的态度来处理的事务。


Happiness is something I take personally and believe in passionately.	幸福是我所热情信奉的个人理想。


Happiness can’t be mandated, demanded, or enforced. It must be encouraged and nurtured.	幸福无法硬性规定、要求或者强加，而是必须耐心鼓励和培养。


It requires a change of mindset, with a focus on seeking constructive outcomes.	它需要做出心态上的改变，一心一意关注寻求建设性的成果。


It is experienced at both the individual and collective levels.	无论个人还是群体都能够体验到幸福。


So how are we going about it in the UAE?	那么我们在阿联酋如何去追求它？


It is still early days – my post is just over a month old.	现在做出结论还为时尚早——一个月前我刚才就任职务。


But we already have a 100-day plan in place and a clear set of tasks ahead of us.	但我们已经有了一项百日计划，以及一系列需要完成的明确任务。


We have defined guidelines for shaping policy across government, and we have started to create structures for coordinating among government entities and for defining new approaches to services and service delivery.	我们已经明确了各政府机构制定政策的指导方针，建立了各机构间的协调构架，确定了服务和提供服务的全新渠道。


We are also developing benchmarks and assessment tools, in order to formulate and monitor measurable performance indicators for happiness.	我们还在制定基准和评估工具，以便确定并且监控可以衡量的幸福绩效指标。


Alongside our efforts to place the quest for happiness at the core of the national agenda, we need to encourage the private sector to join us.	在将追求幸福作为国家核心议程的同时，我们必须鼓励私营部门的加入。


In one of the world’s most diverse labor markets – the UAE is home to people representing up to 200 nationalities – we must ensure that, beyond maintaining appropriate legislative and regulatory frameworks, our country’s entrepreneurs act on the basis of enlightened self-interest.	阿联酋是200多个民族民众的家园，也是全世界一块最多样化的劳动力市场——我们必须确保在维护恰当的立法和监管框架之外，我国企业家能以开明的自我利益为基础来采取行动。


Just as GDP is not the only benchmark to define a country’s success, profit alone cannot define a company’s success.	正如GDP并非衡量一个国家成功的唯一标准，单凭利润也不能确定企业的成功。


In our connected and social world, where opinion, news, and information travel at the speed of light, happiness is a competitive advantage; indeed, it is central to a company’s brand.	在我们这个观点、新闻和信息以光速传播的相互联系的世界里，幸福是一种竞争优势； 事实上，它是企业品牌的核心内容。


We live in a tough neighborhood.	我们生活在艰苦的环境当中。


The Middle East is usually not associated with happiness; at times, the bad news from our region seems to drown out the good.	中东往往无法与幸福联系在一起； 有时，我们地区的好消息似乎淹没在坏消息当中。


And yet we are all bound by the desire to see ourselves and our loved ones thrive and be the best we can be.	但我们都愿意看到我们所爱的人和我们自己茁壮成长，并最大限度地发挥自己的潜能。


That spirit is within us all, and by celebrating it and strengthening it, we can aspire to offer peace, security, tolerance, positivity, and respect.	所有人都怀有这种精神，通过强化并将其发扬光大，我们可以期待实现和平、安全、宽容、积极和尊重。


We can work together to create an environment where people can truly flourish and aspire to fulfill their human potential.	我们可以合作营造民众真正能够蓬勃发展的环境，并让他们能够期待发挥他们的潜能。


We can all be part of a community brought together by the desire to share the quality of happiness.	我们都可以成为怀着共享幸福的愿望欢聚一堂的社会的一部分。


The End of Work as We Know It	我们所熟悉的打工时代的结束


PARIS – In 1983, the American economist and Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief made what was then a startling prediction.	巴黎——1983年，美国经济学家兼诺贝尔经济学奖得主瓦西里·列昂惕夫做出了在当时称得上是令人震惊的预测。


Machines, he said, are likely to replace human labor much in the same way that the tractor replaced the horse.	他说就像拖拉机取代马匹那样，人力最终可能会被机器所取代。


Today, with some 200 million people worldwide out of work – 30 million more than in 2008 – Leontief’s words no longer seem as outlandish as they once did.	今天，全球失业人口约为2亿——2008年这一数字仅有3，000万——列昂惕夫的预言似乎已经不像从前那样荒诞了。


Indeed, there can be little doubt that technology is in the process of completely transforming the global labor market.	事实上，技术正在彻底改变全球劳动力市场已经没有任何疑问。


To be sure, predictions like Leontief’s leave many economists skeptical, and for good reason.	可以肯定，许多经济学家有理由对像列昂惕夫那样的预言持怀疑态度。


Historically, increases in productivity have rarely destroyed jobs.	从历史上看，提高生产力极少消灭工作。


Each time that machines yielded gains in efficiency (including when tractors took over from horses), old jobs disappeared, but new jobs were created.	每次机器提高效率（包括当时由拖拉机接替马匹），在旧工作消失的同时又创造出新的工作。


Furthermore, economists are number crunchers, and recent data show a slowdown – rather than an acceleration – in productivity gains.	此外，经济学家擅长与数字打交道，而最近的数据显示生产率提高导致经济放缓而不是加速。


When it comes to the actual number of jobs available, there are reasons to question the doomsayers’ dire predictions.	谈到现有工作的实际数量，我们有理由对灾难预言家的可怕预言持怀疑态度。


Yet there are also reasons to think that the nature of work is changing.	但同时也有理由认为工作的性质正在发生变化。


To begin with, as noted by the MIT economist David Autor, advances in the automation of labor transform some jobs more than others.	首先，正如麻省理工学院经济学家大卫·奥托尔所说，有些工作受劳动自动化的影响要大于其他工作。


Workers carrying out routine tasks like data processing are increasingly likely to be replaced by machines; but those pursuing more creative endeavors are more likely to experience increases in productivity.	负责数据处理等常规任务的工人越来越有可能被机器取代； 但从事更具创造性工作的劳动者则更有可能感受到生产力的提高。


Meanwhile, workers providing in-person services might not see their jobs change much at all.	此外，面对面服务者的工作可能不会有多大变化。


In other words, robots might put an accountant out of work, boost a surgeon’s productivity, and leave a hairdresser’s job unaltered.	换言之，机器人可能会让会计失去工作、提高外科医生的工作效率，而理发师的工作则不会有任何变化。


The resulting upheavals in the structure of the workforce can be at least as important as the actual number of jobs that are affected.	由此带来的劳动力结构剧变至少和实际受影响的工作数量一样重要。


Economists call the most likely outcome of this phenomenon “the polarization of employment.”	经济学家称这种现象最有可能的结果是 “就业结构的两极分化”。


Automation creates service jobs at the bottom end of the wage scale and raises the quantity and profitability of jobs at its top end.	自动化创造出工资层级底部的就业岗位，而顶部岗位的数量和赚钱能力也有所提高。


But the middle of the labor market becomes hollowed out.	但劳动力市场的中间部分出现空心化。


This type of polarization has been going on in the United States for decades, and it is taking place in Europe too – with important consequences for society.	这种类型的两极分化已经在美国持续了几十年，同时也在欧洲发生着——并对社会产生了重要的影响。


Since the end of World War II, the middle class has provided the backbone of democracy, civil engagement, and stability; those who did not belong to the middle class could realistically aspire to join it, or even believe that they were part of it, when that was not the case.	自二战结束后，中产阶级逐渐成为民主、公民参与和稳定的中坚力量； 中产阶级以外的人能够切实期望加入中产阶级，甚至误以为自己已经是中产阶级的一部分。


As changes in the job market break down the middle class, a new era of class rivalry could be unleashed (if it has not been already).	随着就业市场的变化瓦解了中产阶级队伍，新的阶级斗争时代可能会被释放（如果现在还未被释放的话）。


In addition to the changes being wrought by automation, the job market is being transformed by digital platforms like Uber that facilitate exchanges between consumers and individual suppliers of services.	除了自动化带来的变化，Uber这样的数字平台正在通过促进消费者和个人服务供应商之间的交流改变就业市场。


A customer calling an Uber driver is purchasing not one service, but two: one from the company (the connection to a driver whose quality is assured through customer ratings) and the other from the driver (transport from one location to another).	呼叫Uber司机的顾客购买的不是一种而是两种服务：其中一种来自企业（联系一位由客户评价来确保品质的司机），另外一种则由司机提供（从一地到另一地的交通服务）。


Uber and other digital platforms are redefining the interaction among consumers, workers, and employers.	Uber 和其他数字平台重新定义了消费者、工人和雇主之间的相互作用。


They are also making the celebrated firm of the industrial age – an essential institution, which allowed for specialization and saved on transactions costs – redundant.	它们还使工业时代的著名公司——其本质是实现专业化和节约交易成本的关键机构——变得无关紧要。


Unlike at a firm, Uber’s relationship with its drivers does not rely on a traditional employment contract.	与企业不同的是， Uber和司机之间的关系并不依赖于传统的雇佣合同。


Instead, the company’s software acts as a mediator between the driver and the consumer, in exchange for a fee.	相反，该公司软件充当司机和消费者的中间人，并因此收取一定的费用。


This seemingly small change could have far-reaching consequences.	这个看似微小的变化可能产生深远的影响。


Rather than being regulated by a contract, the value of labor is being subjected to the same market forces buffeting any other commodity, as services vary in price depending on supply and demand. Labor becomes marked to market.	劳动力价值不再受制于一纸合同，而是随服务价格决定于供需变化，受制于控制其他商品的同样的市场力量。


Other, less disruptive changes, such as the rise of human capital, could also be mentioned.	此外还提到人力资本崛起等其他不那么颠覆性的变化。


An increasing number of young graduates shun seemingly attractive jobs in major companies, preferring to earn much less working for start-ups or creative industries.	越来越多的年轻毕业生不选择大公司看似诱人的工作，宁愿少赚很多钱也要为创业企业或创意产业工作。


While this can be explained partly by the appeal of the corresponding lifestyle, it may also be a way to increase their overall lifetime income.	虽然这可以借助相应生活方式的魅力部分地得到解释，但也可能是增加终生收入的一种方法。


Instead of renting their set of skills and competences for a pre-set price, these young graduates prefer to maximize the lifetime income stream they may derive from their human capital.	这些年轻的毕业生不愿再以预先设定的价格出租自己的技术和能力，而是追求自身人力资本终生收入流的最大化。


Again, such behavior undermines the employment contract as a basic social institution and makes a number of its associated features, such as annual income taxation, suboptimal.	上述行为再度破坏了劳动合同这一基本的社会制度，导致按年收入征税等一系列相关功能适用性变差。


Whatever we think of the new arrangements, we are unlikely to be able to stop them.	无论怎样看待新的机制，我们都不太可能阻止它。


Some might be tempted to resist – witness the recent clashes between taxi and Uber drivers in Paris and the lawsuits against the company in many countries.	有些人可能忍不住加以抵制——我们亲眼目睹了近期出租车和Uber司机在巴黎爆发的冲突，以及很多国家对这家公司的起诉。


Uber’s arrangement may be fraudulent according to the existing legal framework, but that framework will eventually change.	Uber的运营机制可能在现行法律框架下确有欺诈嫌疑，但那些框架终将发生变化。


The transformative impacts of technology will ultimately make themselves felt.	技术的变革性影响最终会让所有人感受到。


Rather than try to stop the unstoppable, we should think about how to put this new reality at the service of our values and welfare.	与其试图逆转不可阻挡之势，应该想想如何让新现实为我们的价值观和福祉服务。


In addition to rethinking institutions and practices predicated on traditional employment contracts – such as social security contributions – we will need to begin to invent new institutions that harness this technology-driven transformation for our collective benefit.	除了反思作为传统就业合同前提的制度和惯例——比如社会保障缴费——我们需要开始发明利用这种技术驱动型转变服务我们共同利益的新制度。


The backbone of tomorrow’s societies, after all, will be built not by robots or digital platforms, but by their citizens.	毕竟明天社会的中坚力量不是机器人和数字平台，而是我们的民众。


Is Uber a Threat to Democracy?	Uber是不是对民主的威胁？


AIX-EN-PROVENCE – Every July, economists, business leaders, NGOs, and politicians from around the world gather in Aix-en-Provence, France, for the three-day Rencontres Économiques forum, organized by the Cercle des Économistes.	普罗旺斯艾克斯——每年7月，来自世界各地的经济学家、商界领袖、非政府组织和政治家聚集在法国普罗旺斯艾克斯，参加由 Cercle des Économistes组织的为期三天的经济论坛会议。


This year’s forum focused on the changing nature of work.	今年的论坛会议重点探讨工作性质变化的主题。


The timing of the meeting, which coincided with a heated debate in France about the innovative ride-sharing service Uber, could not have been more apt.	此次会议的召开正值法国国内就打车共享软件Uber展开热烈的讨论，真可谓天衣无缝地契合主题。


The forum’s theme was undoubtedly selected partly in response to fears that technological advances will lead to widespread unemployment, as machines become advanced enough to replace humans in performing an increasing number of tasks.	随着机器能代替人执行越来越多的任务，担心技术进步将导致大规模失业无疑在一定程度上影响了论坛主题。


As MIT’s Andrew McAfee pointed out, historically, technological revolutions have “eventually led to more, if different, jobs”; but, with machines becoming increasingly intelligent, “this time may be different.”	麻省理工学院的安德鲁·迈克菲指出，从历史上看，技术革命“最终创造出更多、但有可能不同的工作机会”，但随着机器越来越聪明，“这次带来的结果可能存在差异。 ”


Given this possibility, McAfee suggests, we may need to re-build our societies so that, as intelligent machines increase productivity, the declining demand for human work has welfare-enhancing outcomes like higher (and more equitably distributed) incomes and more leisure time.	鉴于存在这种可能性，迈克菲建议可能需要重构社会，目的是在智能机提高生产力的同时，对人类工作需求的下降能够增加人类福利，比方说增加收入（改善公平分配），同时创造出更多闲暇时间供个人支配。


He is not alone: John Maynard Keynes predicted this possibility 85 years ago.	无独有偶，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯早在85年前就做出了同样的预测。


Uber, which enables people to connect with available drivers through a smartphone app, is precisely the kind of disruptive company that is driving the shift.	Uber恰恰是推动上述转变的颠覆性企业，它让人们透过智能手机应用享受出租车服务。


Taxi drivers in France and around the world are particularly incensed about UberPOP (called UberX outside Europe), a no-frills service.	法国和世界各地的出租司机无一例外对只提供基本服务的UberPOP（在欧洲以外被称为UberX）异常愤怒。


Uber has since withdrawn UberPOP from France, at least temporarily – though not before two of its top managers were arrested for ignoring the government’s injunction to suspend UberPOP.	从那以后UberPOP就退出了法国市场，至少是暂时退出——但在此之前法国政府还是以无视政府暂停UberPOP运营的禁令为由逮捕了两位高层管理者。


But the kind of innovation that Uber exemplifies will not be stopped so easily.	但Uber所代表的创新不会那么容易停止。


Uber’s software, in a sense, does the job of thousands of Walrasian auctioneers acting locally in space and time, leading to almost perfect price discrimination.	Uber软件在某种意义上取代了特定时间和空间内导致近乎完美价格歧视的成千上万名瓦尔拉斯拍卖人的工作。


Airlines have long employed such price discrimination, offering multiple prices for the same distance flown, depending on date and time.	航空公司一直坚定奉行上述价格歧视政策，在不同的日期和时间为同样的飞行距离提供多重价格。


But Uber price setting is unique in its immediacy, which it has achieved by taking full advantage of modern communications technology.	但Uber的价格设定具有即时性，并通过充分利用现代通信技术实现了这一目标。


In terms of work, Uber creates more jobs than it destroys.	但就工作机会而言，Uber创造的工作机会比它破坏的还要多。


This leads to a clear increase in efficiency and provides overall income gains.	这款软件显著提升了效率，并带来总体收入增加。


Even if losers were fully compensated, the sum of the gains – shared by the firm, its mostly part-time workers, and its customers – would far outweigh the losses.	即使输家也能从中获益，公司、兼职者和客户共享的收入远远超过了这些人的损失。


Nevertheless, there are real problems that must be addressed.	不过，还有些实际问题需要解决。


For starters, there are the losers: traditional taxi drivers, who often have had to pay large license fees and thus cannot compete with Uber’s low prices.	首先是失败者：传统的出租车司机往往不得不支付巨额的牌照费，因此无法与Uber展开低价竞争。


While this problem always arises when disruptive new technologies appear, innovation and adoption are occurring faster than ever.	尽管类似问题在颠覆性新技术出现时总不可避免，但创新和实际应用的速度却已经今非昔比了。


Taxi drivers are being asked to adjust in a matter of days, rather than years, leaving democratic systems little time to determine how much compensation they should receive, and how it should be distributed.	出租司机需要在几天而不是几年时间里做出调整，导致民主制度几乎没有时间来决定他们应该获得多少补偿，以及补偿该如何分配。


Another problem is regulation.	此外还有监管问题。


Taxis produce not only income tax, but also value-added or sales taxes.	出租车不仅要交所得税，还要交增值税或销售税。


But the UberPOP software, at least so far, has made it impossible to collect value-added tax.	但UberPOP软件，至少到目前为止，已经让增值税变得不可能征收。


To level the playing field, local or national authorities should require the company to integrate tax-collection software into its app.	为创造公平的竞争环境，地方和国家主管部门应该要求该公司把税收软件集成到其程序当中。


The fact that UberPOP drivers, unlike taxi drivers, do not cover passenger insurance also amounts to unfair competition, and must be remedied.	UberPOP司机不像出租司机那样缴纳乘客险同样构成了必须加以纠正的不正当竞争。


Moreover, in France, taxi drivers must undergo regular health and professional tests, to which UberPOP drivers are not subject.	此外，UberPOP司机不像法国出租司机那样必须定期接受健康和职业检查。


Like all Uber drivers, they are “monitored” by users, who evaluate them through the app after each ride.	普通出租司机像Uber司机一��接受乘客“监督”，乘客在到达目的地后通过软件给他们打分。


This may be a useful innovation; but it is not really a valid replacement for, say, an eye exam.	这或许是一项有用的创新，但却不能有效地代替眼科检查。


The final problem with innovative companies like Uber is that the financial returns overwhelmingly accrue to the company’s leadership, rather than to the service providers.	像Uber这样创新企业的最后一个问题是财务收益多数归公司领导所有，而非服务供应商。


Whether or not that is justified, such companies’ contribution to rising income inequality – and thus to regulatory capture, media bias, and disproportionate influence in elections – cannot be ignored.	无论上述状况是否合理，这样的企业都加剧了收入不平等的上升——进而造成制度绑架、媒体偏见和对选举不可忽视的影响。


Uber is just one example of disruptive innovation that brings huge increases in efficiency, as well as real social and regulatory challenges, a point that French Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron emphasized in his speech at Rencontres Économiques.	Uber只是颠覆性创新大幅提高效率、同时带来实际社会和制度挑战的一个实例。 法国经济部长伊曼纽尔·马克隆在经济论坛会议讲话中重点强调了这一问题。


And, in fact, Uber is one of the less problematic innovations, because it is a net job creator; the rise of computers capable of replacing call-center workers, by contrast, is resulting in large net job losses.	事实上，Uber还只是问题较少的创新之一，因为它无疑是净就业机会的创造者； 相反，能够取代呼叫中心工作人员的电脑崛起正在造成大规模的就业净损失。


In a democratic system, the challenges that such disruptive technologies bring must be confronted in a way that ensures fairness, without impeding progress.	在民主制度下，面对上述颠覆性技术所带来的挑战必须找到一种公平、不阻碍进步的方式。


The creative destruction of the so-called “second machine age” cannot and should not be stopped.	所谓“第二次机器时代”的创造性颠覆不能、也不应该被阻止。


But to think that markets alone can manage its transformative impact is pure folly – a fact that the recent global economic crisis, which was rooted in unbridled financial innovation, made clear.	但如果认为仅靠市场就可以管理其革命性影响是纯粹的荒唐事——事实上，这一点在最近发生的植根于肆无忌惮金融创新的全球经济危机中已经得到了证实。


What is needed now are new social and regulatory policies, often global in nature, that embody a new social contract for the twenty-first century.	现在所需要的是体现21世纪全新社会契约精神的新的全球性社会及监管体制。


Uganda’s Smart Protectionism	乌干达妙用保护主义


KAMPALA – On a balmy afternoon, I met Dr. Gilbert Bukenya at his home on the shores of Lake Victoria, where we talked about the future of farming in Uganda.	坎帕拉—在一个风和日丽的午后，我与Gilbert Bukenya博士在他位于维多利亚湖岸边的家里会面。 我们交流的话题是乌干达农业的未来。


“By farming smarter,” he said, “Ugandans not only can grow more, they can earn more money.”	他说：“通过更聪明的耕种，乌干达人不仅能种植更多，还能赚更多的钱。 ”


Working smarter is no empty slogan; it is the key to modernizing African agriculture.	更聪明地工作并不是一句空泛的口号； 它是非洲农业现代化的关键。


An advocate of food self-sufficiency for Uganda, Bukenya wants Ugandans to eat more homegrown rice, thereby boosting local farmers and rice millers while freeing hard cash for higher uses.	作为乌干达粮食自给自足的倡导者，Bukenya想让乌干达人吃更多自产的大米，从而促进农民和碾米业者的生产，同时又能将节省下来的现金用到更需要的地方。


Bukenya has long promoted a new strain of African rice that grows in uplands (as opposed to wetland paddies) and requires less water.	Bukenya长久以来就一直推广在高地（相对于湿地稻田）种植一种新品种的非洲稻。 它的需水量更小。


Embracing the new rice is part of the working-smarter formula.	推广新稻种是“更聪明地工作”配方的一部分。


Once rice output began to expand, Bukenya and other Ugandan politicians played another smart card: they lobbied successfully for a 75% duty on foreign rice, which stimulated rice production further.	一旦大米的产量开始提升，Bukenya和其他的乌干达政客们又打出另一张聪明牌：他们通过成功的游说，对外国大米征收了75%的关税，这一政策进一步刺激了大米的生产。


Rice output has risen by two and a half times since 2004, according to the Ministry of Trade, to 180,000 metric tons, while consumption of imported rice fell by half from 2004 to 2005 alone.	据贸易部统计，自2004年以来大米的产量增加了2. 5倍达到180，000吨，而同时进口大米的消费仅在2004至2005年之间就下降了一半。


Uganda’s importers, seeing the shift, have invested in new mills in the country, expanding employment and creating competition for farmers’ output, improving prices.	乌干达的进口商们看到这一转变，就投资在该国建立新的碾米厂，扩大了就业并在农户的产量上造成竞争从而改善价格。


New mills, meanwhile, lowered the cost of bringing domestic rice to market, so that consumers now still pay about the same for rice as they always have.	而新的碾米厂降低了国内大米上市的成本，因此消费者所承受的米价与原来基本相当。


And Uganda is poised to start exporting rice within East Africa and beyond.	并且乌干达已经准备开始向东非及以远地区出口大米。


“It’s a very important crop for raising income and commercializing agriculture,” says Nelson Gagawala Wambuzi, Minister of State for Trade.	“这是一种对提高收入和农业商业化都非常重要的作物”，贸易部部长Nelson Gagawala Wambuzi如是说。


Uganda’s success in expanding rice production is especially interesting given that the people of sub-Saharan Africa spend nearly $2 billion a year on rice grown outside of Africa.	鉴于撒哈拉以南的非洲地区每年要为非洲以外的大米付出近20亿美金，乌干达在扩大大米生产方面的成功就有了特殊的意义。


The amount of spending on rice alone by Africans equals the combined national budgets of Ghana and Senegal.	非洲人仅在大米这一项上的支出就等于加纳和塞内加尔两国国家预算之和。


As more Africans move to cities, they acquire a taste for rice, which is easy to store and can be cooked quickly.	随着非洲人向城市迁移，他们需要食用大米，因其便于储藏且烹饪时间也短。


But such spending on imported rice is a scandal, because, with the help of wise policies, African farmers could grow much more rice, perhaps enough to eliminate virtually all imports.	但在进口大米上的如此花费是种耻辱，因为在英明政策的帮助下，非洲农民可以种植更多的稻米，很可能多到完全不需进口。


Much of the rice grown in Pakistan, Vietnam, and especially America is stimulated by subsidies, and then dumped into African markets at low prices – sometimes below the cost of production.	在巴基斯坦、越南和（特别是）美国种植的稻米是补贴刺激的结果。 这些大米又以低价向非洲市场倾销—有时甚至低于生产成本。


These rice exporters, including the US, also maintain stiff import duties, thereby protecting domestic farmers from global competition.	这些大米出口国，包括美国在内，还维持着坚挺的进口关税，从而保护本国农民不受全球竞争的影响。


African governments sharply reduced or eliminated duties on imported rice in the 1990’s, urged on by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and influential free-market economists.	在世界银行、国际货币基金组织和具有影响力的自由市场派经济学家的敦促下，非洲各国政府都在上世纪90年代大幅降低或取消了针对进口大米的关税。


The assumption was that rich countries would reciprocate by curtailing subsidies to their farmers.	此举的假设前提是富国们会以限制对本国农民的补贴作为回报。


But they haven’t.	但它们并没有这样做。


In response, a few African countries have raised duties on rice, violating a key tenet of neo-liberal trade philosophy.	作为回应，几个非洲国家已经提高了大米的关税，违反了新自由主义贸易哲学的一条关键原则。


But rice duties are working in Uganda – and in Nigeria, where rice output is also soaring and the value of imported rice is declining – and policymakers rightly believe that they must be maintained.	但大米关税在乌干达和尼日利亚是有效的。 两国的大米产量正急速提升且进口大米的价格正不断下降。


The big exporters, such as the US and Vietnam, continue to supply massive subsidies to their rice farmers.	政策制定者们有理由认为这些关税必须维持。


Without protection, African farmers would once again be harmed by imports.	如果美国、越南等大的出口国继续对国内米农实施大量的补贴，那么在没有保护的情况下，非洲农民会再一次受进口之害。


Indeed, African governments might wish to look selectively at other crops.	的确，非洲各国政府可能想要有选择性地考量其它的农作物。


They need to rely on a mix of economic tools, including farm protectionism, aimed at helping indigenous producers.	他们需要依靠一系列的、旨在帮助本土生产者的混合经济手段，这其中也包括农业保护主义。


Virtually every successful Asian economy was built on selective trade barriers – and in China and India, the world’s two fastest growing economies, such barriers remain in place.	几乎每一个成功的亚洲经济体都建立在某些选择性贸易壁垒之上—在中国和印度，这两个世界上发展最快的经济体中，这样的壁垒仍然存在。


Even Korea and Japan maintain massive duties on imported rice simply to protect the livelihoods of their own rice farmers.	甚至韩国和日本为了保护国内米农的生计也仍然维持着针对进口大米的高额关税。


Uganda and other African countries need to be careful that protectionism doesn’t become a cover for inefficiency or corruption.	乌干达和其它非洲国家需要小心的是不要让保护主义成为效率低下和腐败的遮羞布。


And selective protectionism is of course no panacea for Africa, even when such policies effectively aid local producers.	当然，即便是在这样的政策能够有效帮助当地生产者的情况下，选择性保护主义也不是非洲的万灵药。


But economic self-reliance is a worthy goal for most African countries, and Uganda’s experience suggests the potential of an approach long denigrated by the international community.	但经济自立对大多数非洲国家而言都是个值得为之奋斗的目标。 乌干达的经验揭示了一种长期被国际社会诟病的手段的潜力。


For too long, African governments have listened to the siren song of free trade – and have suffered from too much openness, not too little.	非洲各国政府聆听自由贸易的高歌猛进已经太久了—他们也受害于过度而不是过少的开放。


With the US and the European Union unwilling to slash their farm subsidies, Uganda’s rice experiment deserves wider attention, if only because it shows that Africans aren’t merely passive victims of international economic forces.	由于美国和欧盟不愿缩减其农业补贴，乌干达的大米试验就值得更多的关注，哪怕只是因为它显示了非洲人并不仅仅是国际经济强权的被动受害者。


They are fighting back and, at least in the rice fields of Uganda, they are winning.	他们正在反击，至少在乌干达的稻田里，他们正在获得胜利。


David Cameron’s Europe	大卫·卡梅伦的欧洲


STOCKHOLM – The next 18-24 months are likely to decide the shape of Europe for decades to come, and the United Kingdom has now started the clock on that process.	斯托克霍姆—未来18—24个月可能将决定欧洲未来几十年的格局，而英国已经开启了这一过程的发条。


Reelected with a resounding – and entirely unexpected – majority in the House of Commons, Prime Minister David Cameron must now use his increased mandate to set out an EU reform package that is attractive to all member states.	首相大卫·卡梅伦令人大跌眼镜，在下议院赢得绝对多数，成功实现连任，现在，他必须利用增加的权力制定一套可以吸引所有成员国的欧盟改革方案。


In recent years, the tail has tended to wag the dog in the UK, with Cameron kowtowing to the fanatically anti-European wing of his Conservative Party, if only to hold the pro-withdrawal UK Independence Party at bay.	近几年来，卡梅伦在英国可谓低三下四，摇尾乞怜于他所在的保守党中的反欧洲死硬派，以此阻止主张退出欧盟的英国独立党（UK Independence Party）得势。


But now that his own authority has been strengthened significantly by his victory, with the UKIP emerging as the election’s biggest loser, he can now step forward as the pragmatic but committed European that he truly is.	但如今，选举胜利让卡梅伦自身的权力大大得到了加强，而英国独立党成为选举的最大输家。 他可以更进一步，表明自己务实但“欧洲”的真实立场。


In a series of speeches over recent years, Cameron has spoken about a European reform agenda centered on increasing the EU’s competitiveness and improving its institutions’ transparency.	在近几年来的一系列讲话中，卡梅伦提出了一套以增加欧盟竞争力、改善其机构透明度为核心的欧洲改革议程。


In the wake of Russian revanchism and the mayhem spreading across the Middle East, were Cameron to speak today of the changes that Europe needs to make, I would hope that he would add his support for more effective common foreign and security policies.	在俄罗斯复仇主义兴盛、中东冤冤相报不止的环境下，如果卡梅伦要讨论当今欧洲需要做出什么讨论，我希望他能提到更有效的共同外交和安全政策。


If Cameron sets out such a reform agenda at the European Council in June and is prepared to listen as well as to talk, he could set in motion a process that benefits all of Europe.	如果卡梅伦在6月份的欧洲理事会上提出这样一套改革议程，在做好阐述准备的同时也做好聆听准备，那么他可以发动一个让全体欧洲都受益的过程。


Then, it will be primarily up to EU Council President Donald Tusk, under the Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Malta presidencies of the EU over the next two years, to move a reform package forward by early 2017.	接着，要在2017年初推动改革方案，主要就要看欧盟理事会主席图斯克以及未来两年的轮值主席国卢森堡、荷兰、斯洛伐克和马耳他的了。


This will be a process in which the EU’s 28 member states, rather than the European Commission, must be in command.	在这个过程中，其主导作用的必须是欧盟28个成员国而不是欧盟委员会。


Only by appealing to and involving the EU’s national political institutions can EU reform succeed.	只有吸引欧盟中国家政治机构的参与，欧盟改革才能成功。


Next year should be a period of intense debate on a reform package that, when put together, will, it is hoped, be agreed by all of the EU’s members, because Cameron needs to hold his promised in-or-out referendum on the EU before the UK takes over the rotating presidency on July 1, 2017.	明年或将成为激烈的改革方案争论之年，我们希望，改革方案可以得到所有欧盟成员国的肯定，因为在2017年7月1日英国担任欧盟轮值主席国之前，卡梅伦需要进行他所承诺的“走或留”的欧盟成员地位公投。


At the moment, opinion polls indicate that the UK electorate would vote for continued EU membership.	目前，民调表明英国选民将继续支持保留欧盟成员国资格。


Then again, no opinion polls predicted that the general election would result in a majority Conservative government.	但是，没有一项民调预测大选会以保守党政府大获全胜告终。


So no one should be under any illusion about the risks inherent in any British referendum on EU membership.	因此，对于英国欧盟成员地位公投的内在风险，我们切不可抱有幻想。


Of course, the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome.	当然，欧盟也不是毫无办法影响结果。


The Union can do its part in the coming 18 months by demonstrating its ability to deliver not only a potent reform package, but also implement other key policies, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States and the Digital Single Market.	欧盟可以在未来18个月中做好该做的，证明不但有能力实施强力改革方案，还能实施其他关键政策，如与美国的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系和数字单一市场。


Success in such areas, and the economic benefits they will bring, will make leaving the EU even more unattractive for the UK.	在这些领域的成功，以及成功所带来的经济好处，将进一步削弱退出欧盟对英国的吸引力。


But a UK decision to leave, should it come to that, would initiate a painful and complicated process of negotiating an exit and agreeing on some sort of new relationship.	但如果英国真的决定退出欧盟，则会带来一个痛苦而复杂的退出谈判过程，并形成一个新的关系。


There would be no attractive options, and the result – regardless of how much goodwill both sides bring to the talks – would leave both the UK and the EU visibly diminished, not least on the world stage.	其中将不存在有吸引力的选项，而结果——不论双方带着多大的谈判诚意——将让英国和欧盟到遭到国际地位的显著削弱。


Moreover, it would be naive to expect that the rest of the EU could just go on as before.	此外，指望欧盟其他成员国可以与过去一样可谓天真。


On the contrary, British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment.	相反，英国退出可能促使其他国家也采取类似的行动，已然孱弱不堪的欧盟有可能开始崩溃。


And, given his current efforts to divide Europe, one can be sure that Russian President Vladimir Putin would do all that he can to encourage, and finance, such a split.	而俄罗斯总统普京最近频出分裂欧洲的动作，他必��会竭尽全力鼓动和出资支持分裂。


During this period, the EU would also have to address the ongoing challenges to its eastern neighbors, particularly Ukraine, posed by Putin’s revisionism, as well as the meltdown of much of its southern neighborhood in the Middle East and North Africa.	在此期间，欧盟还必须解决其东部邻国所带来的挑战——特别是普京修正主义威胁下的乌克兰——以及其南部中东和北非邻国崩溃的危险。


In this context, a weakened and fractured Europe – unable to confront threats stemming from its immediate environment – would be a more dangerous place to live.	再这样的环境下，削弱而分裂的欧洲将无法面对近邻所造成的威胁，不再是安全之所。


Cameron’s remarkable victory should be viewed as an opportunity to launch a renewed and reformed EU in the next two years.	卡梅伦的大获全胜应该被视为启动两年后改革一新的欧洲的机会。


The UK’s European partners expect Cameron to frame the debate that must now begin if a truly stronger EU – one that can face up to its future and its future challenges – is to emerge.	英国的欧洲伙伴期待卡梅伦安排好必须现在就开启的争论，以使真正强大的欧盟——一个可以面对未来和未来挑战的欧盟——得以实现。


But there is also the possibility of it all going terribly wrong.	但也有可能一切都变得无比糟糕。


In these dangerous times, the consequences of Europe’s disintegration must not be underestimated.	在这个危险时期，欧洲解体的后果是难以想象的。


Leading, not Leaving, Europe	引领、而不是离开欧洲


EDINBURGH – Can the United Kingdom ever reconcile itself to being part of Europe?	爱丁堡——英国能否认同自身是欧洲的组成部分？


If recent British newspaper headlines about the June 23 referendum on continued European Union membership are any guide, the answer appears to be a decisive “no.”	如果近期有关6月23日是否保留欧盟成员资格全民公决的英国报纸头条能够带来任何启示，那么答案似乎肯定是“不认同”。


Proponents of leaving the EU have campaigned on fear of runaway immigration and a cascade of purported dangers – whether delivered by boat or bomb – to the British way of life.	退欧支持者以移民问题失控和一系列传说中的危险可能影响英国人的生活方式（无论是以船舶还是炸弹为载体）来宣扬退出欧盟。


Their opponents, who want the UK to remain part of Europe, highlight another fear: the loss of jobs that are dependent on European trade.	希望英国留在欧盟的反对者则强调另一种恐怖景象：那就是失去欧洲贸易所带来的就业机会。


The nonstop sloganeering around these platforms has exposed conflicting worldviews.	围绕上述平台从未间断的标语和口号暴露出相互矛盾的世界观。


The rhetoric of the “Leave” supporters conjures up the spirit of Dunkirk in 1940 – a nation standing alone, impervious to invading armadas and armies, and always fiercely independent of Europe.	“退欧”支持者将退欧比做20世纪40年代的敦刻尔克精神——一个民族独自岿然屹立、抵挡住入侵的舰队和武装，同时始终完全独立于欧洲。


In theory, the “Remain” campaign stands for a different Britain: outward-looking, engaged, and internationally minded.	理论上，“留欧”运动代表着一个不同的英国：外向、积极参与、同时拥有国际眼光。


But the Conservative Party is bitterly divided on the issue, and many of its most prominent spokesmen have wilted under fire from a hostile Euroskeptic media.	但保守党在这个问题上分歧严重，很多最突出的代言人都已经在敌对的欧洲怀疑论媒体发起的狂轰滥炸中退缩。


As a result, they often seem to be advocating for a half-in, half-out relationship with Europe – for a Britain that is semi-detached, rather than fully engaged.	结果他们似乎往往倡导一脚在内、一脚在外的对欧关系——宣扬英国对欧的半脱离状态，而不是全心全意地参与其中。


A positive, principled, and progressive case for British membership in the EU has yet to be made.	迄今为止，尚未有人阐明英国保留欧盟成员资格积极、合乎原则且进步的理由。


Positive arguments are the sharpest arrows in the quiver of those who want Britain to remain in Europe.	积极论调是那些希望英国留欧者武器库中最锋利的箭头。


Meeting the needs and aspirations of the British people in the twenty-first century requires us to let go of the past, acknowledge that the present is defined by globalization, and recognize that the future is filled with opportunity.	满足21世纪英国民众的需求和愿望要求我们忘记过去、承认当代社会以全球化为特色的现实并承认未来充满着机遇。


Our increased interdependence suggests the need for greater international cooperation and coordination, and that is precisely what the EU offers.	人类日益增强的相互依赖意味着有必要扩大国际协调与合作，而这恰恰是欧盟所能带给我们的。


Because “Leave” voters view globalization as a liability, they look for protection and insulation, demanding that “control” be brought back home.	因为“退欧选民”将全球化视为负债，他们要求保护和隔离，呼吁将“控制权”收回英国。


One recent, but not necessarily representative, poll found that 43% of those certain to vote favored bringing control back to the UK by leaving the EU – even if they were to become financially worse off as a result.	近期的一次并不一定具有代表性的民意调查发现，43%的确定参与投票者青睐通过退出欧盟将控制权收回英国——即使这样做要承担财政状况恶化的后果。


Only 23% did not.	只有23%的人持相反态度。


A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that forging a post-referendum national consensus on a European future is impossible.	我们可以原谅三心二意的观察者误以为达成后公投期欧洲未来的全国共识是不可能的。


But there is a way forward.	但前进的道路无疑是存在的。


We must start by recognizing that in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world, each country needs to strike the right balance between the national autonomy that it desires and the international cooperation that it requires.	但我们首先必须意识到在一体化和相互依赖程度不断增强的世界里，各国都需要在所期望的民族自治和必要的国际合作间找到恰当的平衡。


Britain should not have to choose between two absolutes: total autonomy, which would undervalue the need to cooperate with our nearest neighbors, and complete integration into a European superstate, which would fail to recognize the continuing importance of national identities and decision-making.	英国不应当在两种极端情况间作出选择：要么是低估与最亲密邻国合作必要性的完全主权，要么是忽视民族身份和决策权重要性而毫无保留地融入欧洲超级大国。


Issue by issue, there is a way forward that will make both Britain and Europe more competitive, democratic, and accountable.	通过���决问题、层层推进，我们可以让英国和欧洲更具竞争力、并强化民主和问责。


If we can show that opportunity, fairness, safety, and security can be enhanced in Europe – and that we can be a proud leader of the EU’s reform agenda – a British consensus might begin to emerge.	如果我们能证明欧洲可以强化机遇、公平、安全和防卫——证明我们能骄傲地领导欧盟改革议程——那么英国人的共识或许能够开始达成。


Take the economy.	以经济发展为例。


By balancing autonomy and cooperation, Britain could create 500,000 more jobs during the next decade.	通过平衡自主与合作之间的关系，英国可以在未来10年内创造500,000个就业机会。


Because it has not adopted the euro, the UK has retained the autonomy to set interest rates; but integration into Europe’s single market has yielded clear gains in terms of growth and employment.	英国并未采用欧元，因此保留了自主设定利率的权利； 但融入欧洲单一市场在经济发展和就业领域创造了显而易见的机会。


Similarly, if Britain were to lead efforts to establish a level playing field for digital, energy, and services – particularly financial services – it could ensure greater competitiveness for Europe as a whole.	同样，如果英国能够引领为数字、能源和服务——尤其是金融——等行业创造公平竞争环境的努力，那么就能确保欧洲整体的竞争力得以加强。


Economic reforms are only the beginning.	经济改革仅仅是个开始。