If interest rates rise too far, then the collapse in housing values will lead to large-scale foreclosures and a collapse in consumption spending as well.	如果利率过度提高，那么房产价值的崩溃将导致大规模的抵押赎取权丧失和消费支出的崩溃。


This would mean a depression not just for the US, but for Asia and probably Europe as well, for the US can remain the world’s importer of last resort and guarantor of effective demand only as long as its domestic consumption is strong.	这将会意味着经济萧条的出现，不仅在美国，还会在亚洲甚至欧洲。 因为美国只有在国内消费强劲的情况下，才能够保持其世界终极进口国和有效需求保证国的地位。


But if interest rates don’t rise far enough, the value of the dollar will spiral downward and US inflation will spiral upward like in the 1970’s, setting the stage for the type of extremely painful measures imposed by then Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.	但如果利率的提升不到位，美元的价值就会螺旋式下跌，而通货膨胀则会螺旋式上升，就像70年代那样。 这样的情况一旦发生就会为实施前美联储主席保罗·沃尔克曾采用过的那种极端痛苦的措施创造条件。


In these circumstances, straight is the gait and narrow is the path that the Federal Reserve will have to walk – hardly an enviable position.	在此情况下，美联储将会别无选择地重复历史—其处境何堪。


And yet journalists – not very experienced reporters, to be sure – ask me who is likely to get the “plum job” of Fed Chair next year.	而记者们—确切地说是那些经验不足的记者们—还在问我明年谁更有望得到美联储主席这个“肥缺”。


3D Fantasies	3D幻想


NEW YORK – How will 3D printing change the world?	纽约—3D打印将如何改变世界？


Today, you can read about jewelry and custom can openers, much as three decades ago you could have read that the personal computer would enable people to keep their recipes organized.	如今，你可以读到珠宝和定制开罐器，一如三十年前你可以读到个人电脑将帮你组织食谱。


Of course, PCs became much more useful than that.	当然，个人电脑的功能远不止于此。


Many entrepreneurs and small businesspeople can now run their entire operations on a computer, and people keep their recipes not only organized, but also online.	如今，许多创业家和小企业主可以靠一台电脑做生意，人们不但可以组织食谱，还能在线完成。


They also track their workouts, monitor their babies, and amass huge collections of digital friends (for better or worse).	电脑还能追踪人们的锻炼计划，监测人们的习惯，以及招徕一大群数字朋友（有利也有弊）。


The Internet changed the balance of power between individuals and institutions.	互联网改变了个人和机构之间的实力平衡。


It enabled millions of people to have jobs without having bosses.	互联网让数百万人拜托了老板的控制。


Instead, they have agents – such as TaskRabbit or Amazon Web Services or Uber – who match providers and customers.	他们用代理——比如任务兔子（TaskRabbit）或亚马逊网络服务（Amazon Web Service）或Uber——匹配供应者和客户。


I think we will see a similar story with 3D printing, as it grows from a novelty into something useful and disruptive – and sufficiently cheap and widespread to be used for (relatively) frivolous endeavors as well.	我认为3D打印也会走这个路子——它已经从天方夜谭变成了有利有弊的现实——而且足够廉价和普及，可以用来处理一些（相对）琐碎活儿。


We will print not just children’s playthings, but also human prostheses – bones and even lungs and livers – and ultimately much machinery, including new 3D printers.	我们可以打印儿童的玩具，也可以打印假体——骨头甚至肝和肺——最终还可以打印更复杂的机器，包括新的3D打印机。


So, even as custom-manufactured goods become cheaper and people talk about local manufacture as well as local foods, other goods may get more expensive if we do it right.	因此，即使定制商品越来越便宜，人们向讨论本地食物那样讨论本地制造，其他东西也可能变得更贵，如果我们做出正确的东西的话。


“Juan got his wife Alice a real wooden chair for her birthday!” you might hear.	“胡安给他老婆爱丽丝送了一个真的木椅当生日礼物！ ”你会听到这样的消息。


But their daughter Mika got a reprinted chair made from the same old materials plus a little more, marking her growth from her last birthday.	但他们的女儿米卡得到了一张复制椅——用相同的原料在稍稍添加一点东西做成——以庆祝她又大了一岁。


Only the size and the filigree on the back are different, reflecting her new interest in space travel; last year, it was horses.	除了大小和椅背饰纹外一模一样，因为她的新兴趣是星际旅行； 而去年她着迷于马。


Like computers and the Internet, 3D printing will affect business and behavior around the world and across industries.	和电脑和互联网一样，3D打印将影响全世界各行业的商业和行为。


Already, there is a growing number of shared 3D printing services, enabling you to print something of your own design or use (a customized version of) designs that you can find in online catalogues or order through 3D design shops.	目前，共享3D打印服务正在日益增加，使你能够打印你自己设计或从3D设计商店在线分类和订单中找到的（定制版）设计。


Over time, these print shops will replace thousands of stores carrying millions of items, some of which sit around for months waiting to be bought.	假以时日，这些打印店将取代售卖各种各样玩意的各种各样的店铺，在这些店铺中，有的玩意要几个月时间才有人问津。


They will print goods using designs from online services that offer designs for both open-source, free-design goods and branded goods that may not seem very distinct except for a logo.	在线打印店可以打印商品，其设计可以使用来自提供开源免费设计商品的在线服务，也可以使用除了商标之外无甚区别的品牌商品。


Indeed, branding and intellectual property issues will become increasingly “complicated” for hardware, just as they are now for software and content.	事实上，品牌和知识产权问题对硬件来说将变得日益“复杂”，一如今天对软件和内容。


Many people will have to shift from controlling design to offering better services to make money, or perhaps band together under a particular brand known for some other quality.	许多人将不得不从控制设计以提供更好的服务转向，或者集中于某个以其他品质闻名的品牌之下。


Materials may come to be one such differentiator, as illustrated by a startup called Emerging Objects.	材料将成为区分因素，一个叫做“新目标”（Emerging Objects）对此作了说明。


As in the world of content and software, new design brands are likely to emerge and die more quickly; the pace of change will increase and it will be harder to stay on top for long.	在内容和软件的世界中，新设计品牌或将更快地崛起和衰落； 变化的节奏会加快，长时间保持领先将变得更难。


Outside the world of manufacturing, where mass-produced goods may still have a substantial cost advantage over custom-printed ones, 3D printing will have far greater impact downstream, in the market for spare parts and replacements, where demand is less predictable but more precise.	在制造业之外——在制造业，大规模生产或许仍将保持对定制打印商品的巨大成本优势——3D打印将对下游产生巨大的影响，对备用和替换零件市场也是如此——其需求将更难以预测，但更加精确。 （如果你需要一个小物件，那么只要是这个物件都符合你的要求；


(If you want a widget, any widget will do, but once you have widget 94303, only part 94303A will satisfy you.)	但如果你有了物件94303，那么只有零件94303A才符合你的要求。 ）


One early example is KeyMe.net, which makes house keys on demand.	一个早期的例子是KeyMe. net，这是一家按需制作房屋钥匙的公司。


The user needs one original, which he registers by inserting into the KeyMe kiosk; he can then store that design anonymously in KeyMe’s database, with unique access to it via his fingerprints and email (but with no reference to a physical address).	用户需要一个原件，把它插入KeyMe销售终端，就完成了注册； 接着，他可以在KeyMe数据库中匿名储存这一设计，只能通过他的指纹或电子邮件（但不会有任何实体地址信息）访问。


Then, when he loses the key or needs a spare, he can get a new copy at any location with a kiosk – of which there will soon be many, the company hopes.	接着，如果他弄丢了要是或需要一把备用钥匙，他可以在任何有KeyMe销售终端的地方得到新的复制品——该公司希望，KeyMe销售终端会很快大量铺开。


The cost in money (let alone convenience) is a fraction of that for going to an ordinary key maker – especially at the hours when such emergencies usually occur.	金钱成本（更不用说方便性了）是前往普通钥匙铺的成本的一部分——特别是在发生紧急状况时。


KeyMe does not actually use 3D printing; it cuts them out of blanks the “traditional” way, but uses the same kind of electronic design representation that a 3D printer would.	KeyMe并没有真正使用3D打印； 它只是用它们填补“传统”方式的空白，但使用了与3D打印机相同的电子设计表现形式。


In fact, I consider it a brilliant forerunner of the overall impact of 3D printing – making the occasional production of cheap copies of a specific item easy and available anywhere, anytime.	事实上，我认为它是3D打印全面影响杰出先行者——让特定物件的廉价复制品的偶然生产变得更加容易，随时随地都能进行。


Today, for example, many businesses are devoted to managing and storing spare parts.	比如，如今很多企业花大力气管理和储存备用件。


Each location needs to carry thousands of different spare parts because it is not clear which ones will be needed where.	每一处都需要存放数千件不同备用件，因为你不知道哪些备用件会在哪里用到。


But, in the future, if something breaks, you will be able to take it over to the 3D print shop to be reprinted.	但是，在未来，如果有东西坏了，你只消把它拿到3D打印店打印一个即可。


Better yet, the shop may be able to reuse the materials in your broken part – saving the costs and environmental burden of throwing things away, shipping them somewhere, and so forth.	更妙的是，3D打印店或许能够再利用损坏部件的材料——减轻了把东西丢掉、运到某处等等的成本和环境负担。


Consider Apple power cords (the item that I lose most often), which are a huge source of profit for all involved.	就拿苹果电源线来说吧（我经常把这玩意儿弄丢），这东西是各参与方的一个巨大的利润源。


That will change - hallelujah!	这一幕将会改变——哈利路亚！


Of course, my reduced cost will be someone else’s reduced revenue – and not just Apple’s.	当然，我节约的成本将是某些厂商减少的收入——不仅是苹果公司。


One big loser in this world will be the freight business (along with junkyards, logistics companies, and centralized recycling operations).	这个世���的一大输家将是货运业（以及垃圾场、物流公司和集中循环利用企业）。


When things can be made, used, broken/worn out, and recycled closer to home, the need for transport is reduced dramatically.	当我们的东西可以在家附近制造、使用、损坏/报废和回收，运输的需要就大大降低了。


Recycled materials do not need to be delivered to centralized processing centers and then forwarded to factories.	循环材料不再需要被送到集中处理中心，然后再分送到工厂。


Products will not need to be made in those factories and then shipped to customers or to inventory centers.	产品不再需要在工厂里生产出来，然后再运送到客户或库存中心。


Right now, US inventories held by manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers are valued at around $1.7 trillion – or about 10% of annual GDP.	眼下，美国生产商、批发商和零售商建立的库存估值在1. 7万亿美元左右，或年GDP的10%。


This includes many things that cannot be 3D-printed (anytime soon, at least), but it does hint at how much stuff is just sitting around.	这其中包括了许多不能3D打印的东西（至少在近期不能），但也确实反映了有多少东西屯着。


In the short run, this means greater efficiency and more and speedier recycling, happening locally rather than centrally.	从短期看，这意味着更高的效率和更快更好的循环利用，这些都将就地进行而不需要集中。


In the long run, 3D printing will allow more efficient use of physical resources and faster diffusion of the best designs, boosting living standards around the world.	从长期看，3D打印能提高实体资源利用效率和最佳设计的快速传播，提高全世界的生活水平。


How Accurate Are Your Pet Pundits?	您所宠爱的专家准确度到底有多大？


Every day, experts bombard us with their views on topics as varied as Iraqi insurgents, Bolivian coca growers, European central bankers, and North Korea’s Politburo. But how much credibility should we attach to the opinions of experts?	每天，专家们都对伊拉克叛乱、玻利维亚古柯种植、欧洲央行和北朝鲜政治局等各种各样的问题发表高见，但我们对他们的意见到底应该相信多少？


The sanguine view is that as long as those selling expertise compete vigorously for the attention of discriminating buyers (the mass media), market mechanisms will assure quality control.	乐观的看法是只要那些兜售专长的人为赢得有识之士（即大众传媒）的注意而拼命竞争，那么市场机制就一定能够控制质量。


Pundits who make it into newspaper opinion pages or onto television and radio must have good track records; otherwise, they would have been weeded out.	在报纸、电视和收音机上发表评论的专家必须有良好的历史记录，否则的话就会被无情地淘汰。


Skeptics, however, warn that the mass media dictate the voices we hear and are less interested in reasoned debate than in catering to popular prejudices.	但持怀疑态度的人警告说大众传媒决定着我们能听到些什么，与进行逻辑辩论相比，它们更愿意迎合大众固有的偏见。


As a result, fame could be negatively, not positively, correlated with long-run accuracy.	因此，某位专家的声誉高低可能与其长期观点的正确与否成反比、而不是正比关系。


Until recently, no one knew who is right, because no one was keeping score.	直到不久前，还没有人清楚到底谁对谁错，因为根本没人做过记录。


But the results of a 20-year research project now suggest that the skeptics are closer to the truth.	但一个长达20年的研究项目的结果现在表明：持怀疑态度的人更加接近真理。


I describe the project in detail in my book Expert Political Judgment: How good is it?	在《专家政治判断：到底有多准确？


How can we know?	我们又怎么知道？


The basic idea was to solicit thousands of predictions from hundreds of experts about the fates of dozens of countries, and then score the predictions for accuracy.	》一书中，我详细说明了项目的具体状况。 一个基本的想法是就几十个国家的命运向几百名专家征求数千条预测，然后打分确定预测的准确性。


We find that the media not only fail to weed out bad ideas, but that they often favor bad ideas, especially when the truth is too messy to be packaged neatly.	我们发现媒体不仅没有淘汰不正确的看法，反而经常对错误看法青眼有加，尤其当真相过于复杂，很难说清时更是如此。


The evidence falls into two categories.	证据分为两类。


First, as the skeptics warned, when hordes of pundits are jostling for the limelight, many are tempted to claim that they know more than they do.	第一类，就像怀疑论者警告的那样，当成群结队的专家竞相成为人们注目的焦点，很多人都禁不住会夸大自己的学识。


Boom and doom pundits are the most reliable over-claimers.	那些声称能够预知未来兴衰的专家最有可能是在夸大其辞。


Between 1985 and 2005, boomsters made 10-year forecasts that exaggerated the chances of big positive changes in both financial markets (e.g., a Dow Jones Industrial Average of 36,000) and world politics (e.g., tranquility in the Middle East and dynamic growth in sub-Saharan Africa).	1985到2005年间，乐观主义者发表了一份10年预测，夸大了金融市场（比如道琼斯36，000种工业平均指数）和全球政治（比如中东和平与撒哈拉以南非洲国家的快速经济增长）中发生重大积极变革的机会。


They assigned probabilities of 65% to rosy scenarios that materialized only 15% of the time.	他们认为前景令人陶醉的可能性高达65%，而目前看来他们的预言只有15%变成了现实。


In the same period, doomsters performed even more poorly, exaggerating the chances of negative changes in all the same places where boomsters accentuated the positive, plus several more (I still await the impending disintegration of Canada, Nigeria, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Belgium, and Sudan).	与此同时，悲观主义者的成绩更不容乐观，他们在乐观主义者强调积极因素的所有领域夸大了消极变化的机会，而且还不只于此（我还在静候加拿大、尼日利亚、印度、印尼、南非、比利时和苏丹的四分五裂）。


They assigned probabilities of 70% to bleak scenarios that materialized only 12% of the time.	他们认为前景凄凉黯淡的可能性高达70%，而目前看来他们的预言只有12%变成了现实。


Second, again as the skeptics warned, over-claimers rarely pay penalties for being wrong.	其次，正如持怀疑态度的人曾经警告的那样，言过其实者很少为自己的错误付出任何代价。


Indeed, the media shower lavish attention on over-claimers while neglecting their humbler colleagues.	事实上，媒体对言过其实者给予了大量的关注，却对他们谦虚谨慎的同事看都不看一眼。


We can see this process in sharp relief when, following the philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin, we classify experts as “hedgehogs” or “foxes.”	按照哲学家伯林爵士的说法，我们把专家分为两种类型¾¾“刺猬型”或者“狐狸型”，这样就能更为轻松地理解上面提到的现象。


Hedgehogs are big-idea thinkers in love with grand theories: libertarianism, Marxism, environmentalism, etc. Their self-confidence can be infectious.	刺猬型评论家醉心于自由主义、马克思主义、环境保护主义等重要的理论，他们对理论的坚定信仰很有感染力。


They know how to stoke momentum in an argument by multiplying reasons why they are right and others are wrong.	他们最了解如何通过搜罗自己正确而别人错误的理由来激起辩论的热情。


That wins them media acclaim.	这么做使他们赢得了媒体的喝彩。


But they don’t know when to slam the mental brakes by making concessions to other points of view.	但他们却不了解何时应该踩住思想的刹车，对其他的观点做出退让。


They take their theories too seriously.	他们把自己的理论看得太重了。


The result: hedgehogs make more mistakes, but they pile up more hits on Google.	结果是：“刺猬”型专家会犯更多的错误，也会在Google上掀起更大的热情。


Eclectic foxes are better at curbing their ideological enthusiasms.	折衷的狐狸型学者更善于控制自己对意识形态的热情。


They are comfortable with protracted uncertainty about who is right even in bitter debates, conceding gaps in their knowledge and granting legitimacy to opposing views.	即便是在艰苦的辩论中，他们也会对长时间无法确定谁对谁错安之若素。 他们承认自己的知识存在着漏洞、也承认对方的观点具有其合理的一面。


They sprinkle their conversations with linguistic qualifiers that limit the reach of their arguments: ‘but,’ ‘however,’ ‘although.’	他们在谈话中不时加入限制论据适用范围的修饰语，比如‘但是’、‘然而’、‘尽管’。


Because they avoid over-simplification, foxes make fewer mistakes.	因为避免一刀切的论断，狐狸型学者很少犯错误。


Foxes will often agree with hedgehogs up to a point, before complicating things: “Yes, my colleague is right that the Saudi monarchy is vulnerable, but remember that coups are rare and that the government commands many means of squelching opposition.”	狐狸型学者经常会在某种程度上赞同刺猬型的观点，这样就会使问题复杂化：“没错，我的同事说沙特君主政体非常脆弱是正确的，但大家需要注意政变只是极特殊情况，而且政府还掌握着很多压制反对意见的方法。 ”


Imagine your job as a media executive depends on expanding your viewing audience. Whom would you pick: an expert who balances conflicting arguments and concludes that the likeliest outcome is more of the same, or an expert who gets viewers on the edge of their seats over radical Islamists seizing control and causing oil prices to soar?	如果你是媒体管理者，你的工作就是吸引更多观众，那么想一想你会选择谁：是一个平衡不同观点、认为最可能的结果都大体类似的专家，还是一位声称伊斯兰教徒会控制一切、造成油价飞涨的让观众坐都坐不稳的刺猬型人物？


In short, the qualities that make foxes more accurate also make them less popular.	简而言之一句话，使狐狸型专家更为准确的特点也使他们失去了媒体的欢心。


At this point, uncharitable skeptics chortle that we get the media we deserve.	如今，毫不妥协的怀疑主义者幸灾乐祸地说我们活该有这样的媒体。


But that is unfair.	可这么说并不公平。


No society has yet created a widely trusted method for keeping score on the punditocracy.	到目前为止，还没有哪个社会成功地建立了被广泛认可的为专家预测打分的机制。


Even citizens who prize accuracy have little way of knowing that they are sacrificing it when they switch channels from boring foxes to charismatic hedgehogs.	即便是看重准确性的观众也没有几个知道：当他们看腻了乏味的狐狸型论调、转而去观看魅力四射的刺猬型论调时，准确性就已经沦为了牺牲品。


Here, then, is a modest proposal that applies to all democracies: the marketplace of ideas works better if it is easier for citizens to see the trade-offs between accuracy and entertainment, or between accuracy and party loyalty.	因此，我在这里提出所有民主国家都能够适用的建议：如果人们能亲眼看到准确性和娱乐性、或者准确性和党派效忠之间都发生了哪些交易，那么思想领域的市场机制就能更好地发挥作用。


Wouldn’t they be more likely to read pundits with better track records?	如果真是这样，人们难道不会更多地关注那些有着良好记录的学者？


If so, pundits might adapt to accountability by showing more humility, and political debate might begin to sound less shrill.	如果记录良好的学者更加受人关注，那么专家们就可能会逐渐负起责任，变得更加谦逊，而政治辩论也就不会那么刺耳了。


Granted, it is not easy to create methods of keeping score that are credible across the spectrum of reasonable opinion. But in a world where, as Yeats said, “and the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity,” it is worth trying.	当然，找到记录所有合理意见的可靠方法并不容易，但就像叶芝说过的，在一个“谬误充满热情而真理缺乏说服力”的世界，这个方法至少值得尝试。


Brexit, Voice, and Loyalty	英国退出、呼吁和忠诚


PRINCETON – Albert Hirschman, who died at the end of last year, was a great economist with a gift for producing striking insights by focusing on an element of observable behavior as a way to transform our view of a whole range of particular problems.	普林斯顿—去年底去世的阿尔伯特·赫希曼（Albert Hirschman）是一位伟大的经济学家，他擅长通过专注于可观察行为的某一要素，以此作为转变我们对一系列具体问题的看法的方式，并获得了令人瞩目的成就。


One of his most far-ranging insights was his framework of “exit, voice, and loyalty.”	他最有影响力的洞见之一是“退出、呼吁和忠诚”（exit, voice, and loyalty）框架。


Originally formulated after an experience with poor trains in West Africa, Hirschman realized that if a complex social system allowed people to leave (exit), its efficiency might deteriorate; a better solution would be to retain people (loyalty), which would give them incentives to articulate demands (voice) that would improve the system’s performance.	赫希曼发现，如果复杂的社会制度允许人们离开（退出），则其效率将会降低； 更好的方案是把人留住（忠诚），这会给他们表达需求（呼吁）的激励，而呼吁会改善制度的表现。


It is easy to see how this theory can be applied to personal relations.	在人际关系中，这一理论很容易观察。


Marriages break down if divorce (exit) is too easy; but also become unbearable if there is no sense of mutuality and discussion (voice).	若离婚（退出）很容易，则婚姻就会破裂； 但若缺少共同性或沟通（呼吁），婚姻同样难以维持。


Voice may also decrease if new possibilities emerge: a new potential partner means that there is no longer any pressure to discuss and improve relations within the existing arrangement.	如果新的可能性浮现，则呼吁会减弱：潜在的新伴侣意味着不再有在现有框架内讨论和改善关系的压力。


The schema might also be applied to political relations: Hirschman wrote a memorable article showing how the ability to exit East Germany in 1989 produced a sudden breakdown of loyalty.	这一模式或许也可以用于政治关系：赫希曼曾写过一篇著名文章，证明了在1989年退出东德的可行性是如何导致忠诚突然崩溃的。


Europeans might rethink some of their current dilemmas in the light of Hirschman’s theory.	欧洲或许应该在赫希曼理论的指导下重新思考某些当前困境。


The marriage analogy has become a rather over-used metaphor for Europe’s efforts to integrate.	对于欧洲一体化的努力，婚姻的比喻已经用滥了。


But it is clear that both voice and loyalty have become a problem for the European Union.	但显然，对于欧盟来说，呼吁和忠诚都已成了问题。


Many citizens and governments believe that they lack influence, or voice, which tends to reduce loyalty.	许多公民和政府人为他们缺少影响力（即呼吁力），而这会影响忠诚。


Now a more radical possibility has been raised.	如今，更是产生了一种更加激进的可能性。


British Prime Minister David Cameron has raised the possibility of a “Brexit,” a British exit from the European Union.	英国首相卡梅伦已经提出了“英国退出”（欧盟）的可能。


The polemics that preceded and followed Cameron’s recent speech on Europe showed that both British Euro-skeptics and Europe’s truest Europhiles – including such iconic figures as former European Commission President Jacques Delors – welcomed the British initiative.	围绕卡梅伦最近关于欧洲的演讲的讨论表明，英国的欧洲怀疑派和欧洲最正宗的统一派——包括前欧洲委员会主席德洛尔等标志性人物——都欢迎英国的提议。


Can the British exit threat shake Europe to its senses and make the United Kingdom’s effort to reform institutions more likely to succeed, or to make Europe a more stable polity?	英国的退出会让欧洲心痛并让英国制度改革更容易成功吗？ 它会让欧洲成为一个更稳定的政体？


Hirschman’s framework, which is instructive in helping us to think about how loyalty and affection can be generated, suggests that it cannot.	赫希曼的框架——有助于指导我们思考忠诚和感情如何产生——表明不会。


Countries do not like to feel isolated.	国家不喜欢被孤立的感觉。


They want to see their institutions and values mirrored and replicated in their neighbors – a dynamic that builds loyalty.	它们希望看到其制度和价值为邻国所用，这便是产生忠诚的动态。


As a result, the EU is constantly expanding, while the US likes to urge the world to democratize.	因此，欧盟在不断扩张，而美国总是喜欢在全世界推销民主。


Democratic states are not alone in seeking to expand their influence.	并不只有民主国家热衷于扩大影响力。


The Soviet Union also wanted to surround itself with a protective buffer of like-minded states, and Italy’s Benito Mussolini was proud that for a time fascism was a competitive export.	苏联也希望在周边营造由观念类似国家组成的保护圈，而意大利的墨索里尼也曾经以法西斯主义成为极有竞争力的输出品而自豪。


The recognition of an exit possibility reverses that basic process of forging bonds of loyalty.	承认退出的可能性逆转了培育忠诚感的基本过程。


Some other attraction may appear.	一些其他诱惑可能由此出现。


One of the factors driving the UK’s sense of unease in its relations with an increasingly bureaucratized Europe is the belief that its values and institutions are closer to those of the US, or of other English-speaking former colonies.	英国感到越来越难以经营与日渐官僚主义化的欧洲的关系的一个因素是英国人认为其价值和制度更接近于美国或其他前殖民地英语国家。


By the 1990’s, British Euro-skeptics coined the term “Anglosphere” to describe a model that was more successful and more expansionary than that of the EU.	20世纪90年代，英国的欧洲怀疑派创造了“盎格鲁圈”一词，用来描述比欧盟更成功、更具扩张力的模式。


The US has been the “other woman” undermining Britain’s loyalty to the EU as an attractive permanent partner.	作为极具吸引力的永久性伙伴，美国一直是破坏英国对欧盟忠诚度的“第三者”。


As a result, Britain has lost much of its ability to make an effective contribution to European reform.	因此，英国失去了为有效的欧洲改革出力的动力。


Indeed, the last time Britain had a strong European voice was more than two decades ago.	事实上，英国上一次为欧洲大声疾呼是在二十年前。


In the mid-1980’s, then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher successfully pushed the idea of an integrated internal market.	20世纪80年代中期，时任首相撒切尔夫人成功地推广了一体化内部市场的思想。


The liberalization of trade and investment implied by the Single European Act was greatly inspired by a British deregulatory vision.	单一欧洲法案所隐含的贸易和投资自由化极大地受英国去监管化观念的启发。


At the time, Delors presented the introduction of a single currency as a way to complement or complete the Single Market.	当是时，德洛尔提出引入单一货币作为补充和完善单一市场的办法。


Since then, however, both the American financial model (with powerful financial institutions thriving in lightly regulated markets) and the American model of engagement (in Iraq and Afghanistan) for some time appeared more dynamic and more in accordance with the demands of a globalizing world.	然而，至此以后，美国的金融模式（强大的金融机构在监管宽松的市场中繁荣昌盛）和美国的干预模式（在伊拉克和阿富汗）更有活力，也与全球化世界的需求更为一致。


Both elements of the American dream have now lost something of their appeal.	美国梦的这两大要素如今都失去了吸引力。


The Iraq engagement proved to be built on deception.	对伊拉克的干预被证明完全建立在伪善的基础上。


The financial house of cards collapsed.	金融业也发生了崩溃。


But Britain remains attracted to something else, and so unwilling to engage in “voice.”	但英国仍因其他原因而对美国趋之若鹜，而且极不情愿参与到“呼吁”中去。


The US is appalled by the consequences of Britain’s flirtation.	美国对英国轻浮行为的后果大惊失色。


It wants to remain engaged with the entire world, not just some islands off the European coast.	英国希望融入整个世界，而不是欧洲海岸内的一隅。


It is easier for the US to deal with Europe as a whole, especially when some European answers to common social dilemmas look as if they might provide solutions for America as well.	对美国来说，对付作为整体的欧洲更容易，特别是当欧洲对共同社会困境的答案看上去对美国同样适用的时候。


The outcome resembles a Shakespeare comedy of confused identity.	其结果就像是身份模糊的莎士比亚戏剧。


Europe and Britain are married, but Britain wants to deepen its relationship with America, while America cares more about Europe.	欧洲和英国是夫妻，但英国希望深入开展和美国的关系，而美国又更关心欧洲。


Loyalty-enhancing mechanisms are not easy to establish.	强化忠诚的机制不容易建立。


The best ones are positive, like rapid economic growth and rising prosperity, which underpinned the European dream in the past.	最佳的模式是巩固昔日欧洲梦的积极模式，如快速的经济增长和繁荣。


Restoring them is unlikely, at least for now.	重现这一局面是不可能的，至少目前是如此。


There can also be negative incentives to loyalty that induce everyone to keep up appropriate standards of behavior.	也可能发生对忠诚的消极激励，导致人人维持适当的行为标准。


The risk is that the comedy of misguided affection is resolved by punishing both the tempter and the tempted.	其中的风险在于感情出轨喜剧可能以引诱者和被引诱者双双受罚收场。


What is the modern equivalent of branding with a scarlet “A,” which was the penalty for adultery in colonial New England?	现代版“红字”——新英格兰地区殖民地时代对通奸的惩罚——会是什么？


Maybe the credit-ratings agencies have the answer.	或许评级机构知道答案。


Inside America’s Tax Battle	美国税收战的背后


BERKELEY – America’s recent presidential election answered the question of whether an increase in revenues will be part of the country’s long-run deficit-reduction plan.	伯克利——美国近来的总统选举回答了增收是否会纳入长期赤字削减计划的问题。


The answer is yes: there is now bipartisan agreement on the need for a “balanced” approach that includes revenue increases and spending cuts.	答案是肯定的：两党已经就包括增收和减支在内的“平衡”预算的必要性达成了一致。


But there are still deep political and ideological divisions about how additional revenues should be raised and who should pay higher taxes.	但在如何筹集额外收入以及谁该支付差额税收方面依然存在着深刻的政治和意识形态分歧。


If a preliminary agreement on these questions is not reached by the end of the year, the economy faces a “fiscal cliff” of $600 billion in automatic tax increases and spending cuts that will shave about 4% from GDP and trigger a recession.	如果年底仍未就此问题初步达成一致，美国经济将面临6000亿美元自动增税及减支的“财政悬崖”，可能导致国内生产总值下降4%并引发经济衰退。


The majority of citizens agree with President Barack Obama that tax increases for deficit reduction should fall on the top 2-3% of taxpayers, who have enjoyed the largest gains in income and wealth over the last 30 years.	多数民众认同奥巴马总统的观点，即降低财政赤字应对过去30年来收入和财富增长最多的前2-3%的纳税人增税。


That is why he is proposing that the 2001 and 2003 rate cuts for these taxpayers be allowed to expire at the end of the year, while the rate cuts for other taxpayers are extended.	奥巴马因此提议在今年底终止2001和2003年对上述纳税人的减税政策，而对其他纳税人的减税政策都将继续执行下去。


So far, Obama’s Republican opponents are adamant that the cuts be extended for all taxpayers, arguing that increases in top rates would discourage job creation.	到目前为止，奥巴马的共和党对手仍坚持认为对所有纳税人的减税政策都要继续执行下去，理由是增加高等级税收可能会阻碍创造就业机会。


This claim is not supported by the evidence.	但这种说法找不到相应的依据。


Recent research finds no link between tax cuts for top taxpayers and job creation.	最新研究发现对高等级纳税人减税和创造就业机会之间没有任何关系。


In contrast, tax cuts for the bottom 95% have a positive and significant effect on job growth.	相反，对剩余95%的多数民众减税对就业增长能起到积极显著的促进作用。


During the past three decades, income inequality in the United States has increased significantly; indeed, the US now has the fourth-highest level of income inequality in the OECD, behind Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.	过去30年来，美国的收入不平等增长非常显著； 实际上，美国目前的收入不平等程度在经合组织国家中仅次于智利、墨西哥和土耳其排名第四。


At the same time, as the largest tax cuts have gone to high-income taxpayers, the US tax system has become considerably less progressive.	此外，随着高收入纳税人享受了减税政策带来的绝大部分好处，美国税收系统的进步性也越来越低。


The US needs fiscal measures that both curb the deficit and contain rising income inequality – and the inequality of opportunity that it begets.	美国需要在遏制赤字的同时遏制收入差距不断扩大，以及由此引发机遇不平等的财政政策。


But how should additional revenues be raised from top taxpayers to achieve these two goals?	但如何向高等级纳税人增税才能实现这两个目的？


Most economists believe that increasing revenues by reforming the tax code and broadening the tax base is “probably” better for the economy’s long-term growth than raising income-tax rates.	多数经济学家认为通过改革税法和扩大税基来增加收入之于长期发展“或许”比提高所得税率更为有利。


The analytical case for this belief is strong, but the empirical evidence is weak.	这种想法的分析证据十分充分，但经验证据却稍显不足。


In theory, higher marginal tax rates have well known negative effects – they reduce private incentives to work, save, and invest.	从理论上看，高边际税率的负面影响众所周知——个人工作、储蓄和投资的积极性会因此而降低。


Yet most empirical studies conclude that, at least within the range of income-tax rates in the US during the last several decades, these effects are negligible.	但多数实证研究表明过去几十年来，至少在美国所得税率范围内，上述负面影响基本可以忽略不计。


A recent Congressional Research Service report, withdrawn under pressure from Congressional Republicans, found that changes in the top income-tax rate and the rate on capital gains had no discernible effect on economic growth during the last half-century.	迫于国会共和党人压力撤回的一份最新国会研究服务报告表明高等级所得税率及资本收益税率的变化对过去半个世纪的经济增长并未产生显著效果。


A recent review of the economic literature by three distinguished academics found no convincing evidence that real economic activity responds materially to tax-rate changes on top income earners, although such changes do affect their tax-avoidance behavior.	尽管三位著名学者对经济文献的最新研究发现高收入者的税收变化的确影响到他们的避税行为，但却没有令人信服的证据表明上述变化会显著影响到实际经济活动。


So Obama has evidence on his side when he says that allowing the tax cuts for high-income taxpayers to expire at the end of the year will not affect economic growth.	因此奥巴马提出年底终止高收入纳税人的减税政策不会影响经济增长并非没有依据。


Republicans have proposed tax reforms in lieu of rate hikes on high-income taxpayers to raise revenues for deficit reduction.	共和党人提出以税制改革代替对高收入纳税人征税来筹集削减赤字所需的收入。


Obama has signaled that he is willing to consider this approach, provided it increases tax revenues from the top 2-3% by at least the same amount as higher rates while protecting other taxpayers.	奥巴马已经表示在保护其他纳税人的前提下如果税收改革对排名前2-3%人群税额的提高幅度至少与税率提高相等，那么他愿意考虑这种方式。


The federal tax system is certainly in need of reform.	此外必须改革联邦税制。


Tax expenditures – which include all deductions, credits, and loopholes – account for about 8% of GDP.	包括所有扣除额、信贷额及漏洞在内的税收支出约占国内生产总值的8%左右。


Indeed, the US tax code is riddled with special preferences and contains large differences in effective tax rates across individuals and economic activities.	其实，美国税法充满了对个人和经济活动的特别优惠及有效税率的巨大差异。


These differences distort decisions about investment allocation and financing.	上述差异造成投资分配和融资决策扭曲。


Reforms that made the tax system simpler, fairer, and less distortionary would have a beneficial effect on economic growth, although economists concede that the size of this effect is uncertain and impossible to quantify.	令税制更加简单公平、减少扭曲的改革会对经济增长产生有益的影响，但经济学家也承认这种影响具有不确定性，无法给出量化的数值。


Because tax expenditures are so large, limiting them could raise a significant amount of additional revenue that could be used both for deficit reduction and to finance across-the-board cuts in income-tax rates.	税收支出数额巨大，对其进行限制可以额外筹集大量资金，用于削减赤字及支持全面降低所得税率。


Analysis of the Simpson-Bowles and Domenici-Rivlin deficit-reduction plans by the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center confirms that this approach is arithmetically feasible.	辛普森－鲍尔斯及多梅尼西－���夫林无党派税收政策中心对赤字削减计划的分析证实这种方法从数学角度看具有可行性。


Reducing large regressive tax expenditures like preferential tax rates for capital gains and dividends and deductions for state and local taxes, and replacing deductions with progressive tax credits, could generate enough revenue to finance rate cuts for all taxpayers, increase the tax code’s overall progressivity, and contribute meaningfully to deficit reduction.	减少包括资本收益和股息优惠税率以及国家和地方税减免在内的巨额递减性税收支出并以累进制税收抵免取代税收扣除可以带来充足的收入资助所有纳税人的税率减免、强化税法的总体进步性并为削减赤字做出真正的贡献。


But the odds of such an outcome are very low: what is arithmetically feasible is unlikely to be politically possible.	但出现这种结果的可能性很低：数学上的可行和政治上的可行很可能是两回事。


Efforts to cap popular tax expenditures will encounter strong opposition from Republicans and Democrats alike.	普遍限制税收支出将遭遇共和及民主两党的强烈抵制。


Nonetheless, some tax reforms are likely to be a key component of a bipartisan deficit-reduction deal, because they provide Republicans who oppose increases in tax rates for high-income taxpayers with an ideologically preferable way to increase revenue from them.	尽管如此，某种形式的税收改革可能成为两党赤字削减协议的重要组成部分，因为改革为反对提高高收入纳税人税率的共和党成员在意识形态层面提供了更好的方法来增加来自这部分人的税收。


Unfortunately, it will take time to negotiate tax reforms – more time than remains until the end of the year, when the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are scheduled to expire for all taxpayers.	遗憾的是到今年年底2001及2003年所有纳税人减税计划到期时所剩的时间已经不足以谈判税制改革。


But there is still time to negotiate an agreement that extends these cuts for the bottom 98%, and that contains temporary measures to cap deductions and credits for high-income taxpayers in 2013.	但我们仍有时间谈判延长其余98%纳税人的减税政策协议，协议中可以包括2013年限制高收入纳税人扣除和抵免的临时性措施。


Such an agreement could help to break the political impasse over whether and how much these taxpayers’ rates should rise next year, thereby preventing the US from falling over the fiscal cliff and back into recession.	这样一份协议可以打破上述纳税人税率明年是否应该提升和提升多少的政治僵局，从而防止美国跌下财政悬崖及重新陷入衰退。


Saving Syria and America	拯救叙利亚和美国


DENVER – Critics of America’s Middle East policies are reminiscent of Woody Allen’s quip in Annie Hall: “The food at this place is really terrible...and such small portions.”	丹佛—对美国中东政策的批评让人想起伍迪·艾伦在《安妮·霍尔》（Annie Hall）里的戏谑：“这里的食物难吃死了……而且还是超小份。


The United States is seen as the culprit behind many of the regions ills, and yet it is accused of not being sufficiently engaged, of “leading from behind,” of failing to support democracy, of abandoning its friends, and so on.	”美国被视为众多地区病背后的罪魁，但却被指责参与得不够，只会“在幕后领导”，没有支持民主，抛弃了自己的朋友，如此等等。


Given all the accusations that the US faces for its involvement in the region over the decades, one would think that America would be invited to stay home.	几十年来，美国在中东地区的介入面临如此多的指责，你或许会觉得，美国还是老实在家呆着算了。


But the region cries out for leadership, and the US remains the only country that can provide it.	但中东地区渴望领导，而美国仍是唯一能提供领导的国家。


The problem for the US is not the divisions in the Middle East that it must understand and navigate better, but rather the divisions within the US that have eroded domestic consensus on many foreign-policy issues.	美国的问题不在于它必须理解并更好周旋的中东地区的分裂局势，而在于美国国内的分裂，后者破坏了美国国内在诸多对外政策上的共识。


Those internal differences are what have kept the US on the sidelines during the latest Middle East upheavals.	正是这些内部分歧让美国在最近的中东乱局中冷眼旁观。


America used to have essentially two varieties of foreign-policy positions: realist and idealist.	传统上，美国有两个不同的对外政策立场：现实主义和理想主义。


But today opinions are fragmented across a broad range of positions – a situation that also cries out for leadership.	但如今，观点在众多立场之间莫衷一是——这一局面也渴望领导。


President Barack Obama’s oft-stated view that “we need some nation building at home,” combined with his antiseptic waging of drone warfare, indicates that he is erring on the side of the isolationists of both the left and the right.	总统奥巴马再三提及的观点——“我们需要在国内建设国家”，及其未雨绸缪地部署无人机，都表明他宁可走不左不右的孤立道路。


Unilateralism, it seems, is fast becoming the isolationists’ internationalism.	单方面主义似乎正在快速变成孤立主义者的国际主义。


What the US needs is to explain better to its own people why America should engage more deeply with the Middle East’s mounting problems.	美国需要更好地向美国人民解释为何美国应该更深地参与日益深化的中东问题。


This is not to say that the US should necessarily engage with every problem.	这并不是说美国必须干涉每一个问题。


But, whether America is engaged or not, it does need a policy.	但是，不管美国是否介入，都需要有政策。


Syria is a case in point.	叙利亚就是很好的例子。


The situation there, predicted by every pundit around, has metastasized and threatens to become a full-blown regional civil war.	所有专家都预计，叙利亚局势已经变质，有可能演变为全面地区内战。


The US has reacted to this international catastrophe by providing light arms to some rebel groups in order to inflict a pinprick on President Bashar al-Assad’s regime for its use of chemical weapons months before.	美国对这一国际灾难的反应是为一部分叛军提供轻武器，从而打击叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政府，惩罚其几个月前使用化学武器的行为。


This is not serious policy.	这不是严肃的政策。


Military assistance should support a political plan, not serve as a substitute for one.	军事援助应该支持政治计划，而不是作为政治计划的替代品。


A month ago, there was a brief moment of hope when US Secretary of State John Kerry began an effort to find a way forward with the Russians.	一个月前，当美国国务卿科里开始寻求从俄罗斯人哪里找到解决方案时，人们曾短暂地看到了希望。


The Kremlin’s consequential and sustained support of Assad is serious policy, and suggests that if the US is to make progress short of confrontation with Russia, it should work with Russian leaders to narrow the differences so that, at the end of the process, a peace conference is held.	克里姆林宫随后对巴沙尔的持续支持是严肃政策，这表明如果美国想取得进展又不得罪俄罗斯，就应该与俄罗斯领导人合作减小分歧，以促成整个过程最后走向和平会议。


Indeed, successful US policy in the Middle East has usually included a serious Russian track.	事实上，美国在中东的成功政策总是包括深刻的俄罗斯痕迹。


Instead, the talks with the Russians seem to have run aground on the question of calling a conference among the warring parties to agree on elections.	而与俄罗斯的谈判的障碍在于让交战各方举行会议同意选举这一问题。


But elections in sectarian conflicts tend to be merely a census, and the Assad regime and all the other players know full well that Syria is a Sunni-majority country.	但宗派冲突中的选举一般仅仅是一项共识，而巴沙尔政权和其他参与方心知肚明叙利亚是一个逊尼派占多数的国家。


There is no need for an election to determine that.	选举的结果不言自明。


What is not known is whether there is a set of future political arrangements on which the parties could agree.	尚不明白的是是否存在各方都能接受的未来政治安排。


It is not known, because it has not been tried.	这一点之所以尚不明白，是因为从未尝试。


Meanwhile, the Obama administration has made no effort to explain what it is doing and why, engaging instead in public handwringing over the complexities of the problem.	与此同时，奥巴马政府没有进行任何努力解释它正在做什么、为什么要这样做，而是任由公众对问题的复杂性抓狂。


But building monuments to difficult problems is not a policy.	但为难题树碑并不是一项政策。


As Churchill once wrote about the “Mulberry” harbors (his ingenious plan to install prefabricated floating piers a day after the Normandy landings), “the difficulties will argue for themselves.”	丘吉尔在写他的“桑葚”（Mulberry）码头（他的灵光一现的计划，在诺曼底登陆第二天架设预制浮栈桥）时如是说：“困难会为自己代言。 ”


Obama’s explanation of a Syrian policy might look something like this: “Syria is a difficult problem that, left unchecked, could threaten US interests in the region.	奥巴马对叙利亚政策的解释或许是这样的：“叙利亚是一个困难的问题，如果处理不好，将威胁美国在该地区的利益。


No side can prevail and win outright, so there must be a negotiated settlement on the political arrangements that follow the conflict.	没有哪方可以脱颖而出获得压倒性胜利，因此必须通过谈判和解形成冲突后的政治安排。


The US will work with partners in the region and internationally to assist the Syrians to find a way forward.	美国将与地区伙伴和国际合作，协助叙利亚人找到前进之路。


Syrians need to understand what their country will look like in the future, so that all sides can see a solution that can be secured through negotiation rather than violence.”	叙利亚人需要明白他们的国家未来将会如何，这样，所有各方才看得到可以通过谈判而不是暴力得到保证的解决方案。 ”


He should then announce concrete action to achieve this goal: “Today, I have directed State Department teams under Secretary Kerry to visit key international capitals – in Europe and Arab League countries, as well as Moscow – in an effort to agree on a set of principles around which Syrians can find common ground.”	然后，他应该拿出切实行动实现这一目标：“现在，我派出国务卿克里领导的国务院团队访问关键国家——欧洲国家和阿盟国家，以及俄罗斯——以期就叙利亚人可以找到共同立场的原则形成一致。 ”


The first principle could be that Syria should continue to exist within its current borders.	第一条原则可能是，叙利亚应该继续以目前的版图存在。


Another might be that Syria will be a federal state, with broad local autonomy.	另一个原则或许可以是叙利亚将成为联邦国家，地方获得广泛的自治权。


A third could concern the shape of a future parliament.	第三个原则可以是关于未来议会的。


And so forth.	如此等等。


When agreed, these principles could be announced as an international peace plan.	一旦达成一致，这些原则可以作为国际和平计划宣布。


Only when one or more parties to the conflict reject it has the moment arrived to consider a serious effort to arm some of the combatants.	��有在一个或多个冲突相关方拒绝这一计划时，才考虑采取严肃行动，为某些方面提供武装。


In the end, a solution in Syria will depend on Syrians’ agreement on future political arrangements.	最后，关于叙利亚问题的解决方案取决于叙利亚人民同意未来政治安排。


But the US demand that Assad step down or be removed from power has not been helpful; indeed, it has marginalized the US more than it has Assad.	但美国的要求——巴沙尔下台或被迫远离权力——无济于事； 事实上，这样的要求让美国边缘化的效果大于对巴沙尔。


No one can be expected to join negotiations aimed at his or her own political demise.	没人会参加旨在将他轰下政治舞台的谈判。


But all that is water under the bridge.	但这些都已无法改变。


There are those who say that the Syrian crisis could have been addressed two years ago, but that now is too late.	有人说叙利亚危机在两年前就可以解决，但现在太迟了。


Two years from now, some will say the same thing.	两年后，有人会说同样的话。


But if the US can work with partners on the specifics of a future political plan, it can still rescue Syria, not to mention itself.	但如果美国可以与伙伴国解决未来政治计划的具体内容，就依然可以挽救叙利亚，更不用说它自己了。


Rank Mysteries	排名之谜


PARIS – Gibraltar received exciting news last month.	巴黎—上个月，直布罗陀迎来了令人兴奋的消息。


The latest Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), published by the consultancy Z/Yen in London, revealed that the Rock had risen further and faster up the ranks than any other center – 17 places, from 70th to 53rd position, since the previous report in September 2013.	由伦敦Z/Yen咨询公司发布的最新全球金融中心指数（Global Financial Centres Index ，GFCI）披露，直布罗陀在排名中的上升势头比其他上榜者更快更猛——从2013年9月上一版报告发布以来上升了17位，从70位升到53位。


I can imagine the celebrations in Gibraltar Town, where, now that the British naval base has closed and Spain is being difficult at the border, financial services are crucial for employment.	我可以想象直布罗陀人的兴奋，在英国海军基地撤销、西班牙自顾不暇的时候，金融服务对就业来说至关重要。


And I can also imagine that many in Hamilton, Bermuda, which plummeted almost as far as Gibraltar climbed – 16 places, to 56th – must be crying into their rum punch.	而我还可以想见，很多百慕大人肯定非常痛心，因为百慕大排名下降得与直布罗陀上升的一样快——整整16位，今年跌至56位。


Of course, it is also possible that Gibraltar and Bermuda have chosen to ignore the results, or dispute their significance.	当然，也有可能直布罗陀和百慕大都不会在意这一结果，或者为谁更重要大吵一架。


Either way, there is no doubting the global obsession with league tables nowadays.	但无论如何，现在世界对排名榜的热衷是无可置疑的。


One can find a ranking for almost every form of human activity.	你几乎可以找到每一种人类活动的排名。


Commercial banks are ranked by assets.	商业银行根据资产被排名。


Investment banks are ranked on a variety of metrics, as are universities – from academic results to their prowess in environmental management, or their appeal to gay students.	投资银行根据多方面的指标被排名。 大学也是如此——有学术成果排名、环境管理实力排名、甚至对同性恋学生吸引力排名。


In the United Kingdom, you can find a table showing where it is best to live if you wish to win Britain’s National Lottery.	在英国，你可以找到最容易赢得不列颠国民彩票的居住地排名。


(Your chances are almost twice as good in the northeast as in Northern Ireland.)	（如果你生活在东北地区，那么中彩的机会比居住在北爱尔兰大一倍。 ）


When one looks closely, most of these tables are, as Henry Kissinger famously put it, “content-free.”	如果仔细检视，则如亨利·基辛格的名言，这些排名“内容空洞”。


For one brief shining moment, the Royal Bank of Scotland was global top dog in rankings of commercial banks, and we know how that story ended.	曾几何时，苏格兰皇家银行名列商业银行排名榜榜首，现在我们都知道最终的结果是怎样的。


Is this true of the GFCI, or does it contain valuable insights into how the global financial system is evolving?	GFCI的结果也会一样吗？ 还是说，它的确包括了关于全球金融体系如何演化的有价值的洞见？


The press headlines accompanying the release of the latest GFCI focused on the change at the top of the league: New York leapfrogged ahead of London, while Hong Kong and Singapore held on in third and fourth place, respectively.	媒体对最新GFCI发布的主要关注点集中在排名榜最靠前的位置的变化：纽约取代伦敦名列榜首，香港和新加坡分列三四。


Is this a significant switch?	这一变化很重要吗？


Much speculation has centered on the recent damage to London’s reputation stemming from the scandal surrounding banks’ manipulation of the Libor interest rate.	许多猜疑集中在最近爆出的银行操纵Libor利率丑闻对伦敦名声的影响。


Even if some of the machinations were carried out in other cities, there is no escaping the fact that Libor is the London Interbank Offered Rate.	虽然一些操纵是在别的城市做出的，但无可辩驳的事实是，Libor全名叫做伦敦银行间拆放利率。


Moreover, London is the biggest center for foreign-exchange trading, the new focus of regulatory attention.	此外，伦敦是最大的外汇交易中心，也是监管者的新关注焦点。


And, though Bruno Iksil was a Frenchman working for the American bank JPMorgan Chase, he became known universally as the “London Whale.”	而尽管布鲁诺·依克希尔（Bruno Iksil）是为美国银行摩根大通工作的法国人，但他被全世界称为“伦敦鲸”。


But GFCI’s detailed results do not bear out that explanation.	但GFCI的结果并不体现这些解释。


London’s reputational factors “are firmly above average and have not seen much change over the past five editions.”	伦敦的名声因子“稳居平均水平之上，并且在过去五次排名中没有什么变化。


Indeed, it seems that London’s small decline is attributable to negative scores on general factors such as the “business environment” and “infrastructure.”	”事实上，伦敦排名的略降似乎可以归因于一般因子——如“商业环境”和“基础设施”等——上所获得的负分。


Overcrowded Underground trains and Heathrow’s congestion are having an impact, though it is hard to understand why New York wins on these measures.	拥挤的地铁和忙到爆的西斯罗机场确实有影响，但很难理解为何纽约可以在这些指标中胜出。


Riding the Subway often brings unpleasant surprises, while JFK Airport is hardly a favorite among travelers (and there remains no fast rail link to it).	搭乘纽约地铁经常会带来意外惊吓，而肯尼迪机场也决非旅行者最喜欢的极长（而且没有快速轨道交通接驳）。


And yet these subtle switches at the top of the table are not the real story.	这些榜首位置的细微变化并不代表真实故事。


From a ten-year perspective, the big gainers have been Hong Kong and Singapore.	从十年视角看，大赢家是香港和新加坡。


It was once fashionable to argue that when China opened up to the world, Hong Kong and Singapore would suffer.	曾几何时，人们纷纷议论如果中国向世界开放，香港和新加坡将受到冲击。


Once the Chinese got their act together, these cities’ role in intermediating the region’s finances would be marginalized by Shanghai, Shenzhen, and other new centers.	一旦中国开放，这些城市的地区金融中介作用就会被上海、深圳和其他新中心边缘化。


That still may happen one day, but it has not happened yet.	或许有一天终会如此，但现在还没发生。


Hong Kong and Singapore have played their cards astutely.	香港和新加坡玩得一手好牌。


The combination of an Asian market with strong Chinese connections and a system of English law and property rights continues to provide a powerful competitive advantage.	背靠强大的中国关系争夺亚洲市场与英国法系和产权制度相结合继续提供者强大的竞争优势。


That is especially true in fund management.	资金管理方面尤其如此。


Chinese companies may increasingly raise capital in Shanghai, but wealthy Chinese with money to invest like to hold it in financial centers that are perceived as safe and non-political.	中国公司或许越来越多地在上海融资，但中国富人喜欢把钱投往被认为安全且远离政治的金融中心。


In Europe, we see a different pattern.	在欧洲，我们看到的是不同的趋势。


Over 15 consecutive surveys, London’s ranking and ratings have remained broadly constant, while Zurich, Geneva, Frankfurt, and Luxembourg have gradually narrowed the gap with it – though that gap remains wide.	在过去15版排名中，伦敦的排名和得分基本上保持不变，苏黎世、日内瓦、法兰克福和卢森堡逐渐缩小了与伦敦的距离——尽管差距仍然很大。


There is little doubt that Frankfurt has won the contest with Paris to be the eurozone’s most important financial center.	几乎毫无疑问，法兰克福已经压倒巴黎成为欧元区最重要的金融中心。


The Germans were smart to insist on putting the European Central Bank there.	德国人十分聪明地坚持要欧洲中央银行坐落在那里。


Given the ECB’s new function as the eurozone’s banking supervisor, Frankfurt can consolidate its victory.	欧洲央行将成为欧元区银行监督机构，法兰克福也将借此巩固优势。


Every European Union bank will need to bend the knee to its supervisor on the Main River, even if she does happen to be a Frenchwoman, Danièle Nouy.	每一家欧盟银行都需要对其位于美因河（Main River）畔的监督者俯首帖耳，即便其负责人恰恰是法国人丹尼勒·瑙依（Danièle Nouy）。


In the United States, Boston, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, continue to consolidate their positions as important centers for asset management and, in the last case, for regulation.	在美国，波士顿、旧金山和华盛顿继续巩固着它们资产管理重镇的地位，而华盛顿更有监管优势。


The 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation has given the Federal Reserve Board a much larger regulatory role than it had before the crisis.	2010多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革立法给了美联储比危机前更大的监管权力。


But, unless New York’s populist new mayor, Bill de Blasio, tries to run the banks out of town, Western sheriff-style, these cities do not seem likely to steal Wall Street’s crown anytime soon.	但是，除非纽约的民粹主义新市长比尔·德布拉西奥（Bill de Blasio）想把银行赶出纽约，否则上述城市就不可能在短时间夺走华尔街的皇冠。


All of the best award shows include a surprise.	所有最佳颁奖典礼都不能少了冷门。


This year’s wild card, billed as the financial center most “likely to become more significant” in the near future, is Casablanca.	今年的冷门是短期未来“最有可能成为重要金融中心”奖，获奖者是卡萨布兰卡。


I have no idea why Casablanca is an up-and-coming center, and the GFCI’s compilers do not explain.	我想不出为何卡萨布兰卡会是即将崛起的中心，GFCI排名者也没有作出解释。


Sometimes, in rankings as in life, a kiss is just a kiss.	就像在生活中一样，有时候排名无非是过家家。


Europe’s Fitful Financial Integration	欧洲的间歇性金融一体化


LONDON – The well-publicized troubles of Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo this summer have reminded us that the eurozone’s financial problems are by no means resolved.	伦敦—今年夏天引起轩然大波的葡萄牙Espírito Santo银行麻烦提醒我们，欧元区金融危机还远未的大解决。


There are, no doubt, idiosyncratic factors behind the bank’s problems, stemming from its exposure to other parts of the Espírito Santo family’s empire.	毫无疑问，Espírito Santo银行问题的背后有诸多不同因素，与Espírito Santo家族商业帝国的其他部分关系很大。


But when the bank announced a first-half loss of €3.6 billion ($4.7 billion), the sudden collapse of confidence was alarming, and nervous investors are asking whether there are similar time bombs ticking elsewhere.	但当该银行公布上半年亏损36亿欧元时，信心的突然崩溃值得警惕，紧张的投资者想弄清楚其他地方是否也有滴答走动的定时炸弹。


All eyes are now on the European Central Bank’s asset quality review, due to be completed in the next couple of months.	现在，所有的目光都对准了应于几个月后完成的欧洲央行的资产质量评估。


The AQR is the key element in a “comprehensive assessment” of Europe’s banks before the ECB formally takes on supervisory responsibility for more than 80% of the eurozone banking system in November.	资产质量评估是对欧洲银行的“全面评估”，随后，欧洲央行将在11月开始负责欧元区80%以上银行系统的监督工作。


The ECB, quite sensibly, wants all of the potential horrors to be visible before the takeover – so that it cannot be blamed.	欧洲央行相当明智地希望所有潜在问题都在它接手监督责任前暴露出来，这无可指摘。


With national supervisors, who are often inclined to present a rosy picture of their countries’ institutions, no longer in charge, we can hope that the assessment will be more robust than the earlier stress tests carried out under the auspices of the European Banking Authority (EBA). Those tests, unlike their equivalent in the United States, failed to rebuild confidence.	而国家监督者往往倾向于粉饰本国机构，由于它们不再拥有监督权，因此我们可以希望该评估将比早些时候由欧洲银行管理局（European Banking Authority，EBA）组织的压力测试更加鲁棒。


Several banks that passed with flying colors were soon obliged to raise new capital.	不少在通过压力测试的银行很快就被迫增加新资本。


But the creation of the European banking union has not been the only important change to Europe’s financial regulation since the crisis.	但建立欧洲银行联盟不仅仅对改变危机以来的欧洲金融监管具有重要意义。


The events of 2007-2009 made it clear that there were serious gaps and inconsistencies that needed to be addressed.	2007—2009年所发生的事情清楚地表明，存在严重缺口和不一致性需要解决。


So, following the recommendations of a report prepared in 2009 by former IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière, the European Commission created three new pan-European authorities charged with ensuring “consistent application” of European directives.	因此，在前IMF总裁雅克·德拉罗希埃尔（Jacques de Larosière）2009年报告的建议下，欧盟委员会成立了三个新的泛欧洲当局负责确保欧盟指令的“一致应用”。


The deal was done with a large helping of political fudge: the three biggest European Union economies – the United Kingdom, France, and Germany – were persuaded to cede some control to the center, but only if each could host an authority.	这一方案受到了政治敷衍的一臂之力：���盟最大的三个经济体——英国、法国和德国被说服向欧盟让出一些控制权，但条件是将三大机构设置在这三个国家。


Thus, the EBA was established in London, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is located in Paris, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) found a home in Frankfurt.	因此，EBA设在了伦敦，欧洲证券和市场管理局（European Securities and Markets Authority，ESMA）设在了巴黎，而欧洲保险和企业年金管理局（European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority，EIOPA）设在了法兰克福。


Collectively, they are known as the ESAs (European supervisory authorities).	这三个机构被称为欧洲监管当局（ESA）。


The road to pan-European regulation over the last two decades has been winding and rocky.	过去二十年的泛欧洲监管之路充满了曲折和坎坷。


In the early stages, it was assumed that the single financial market could work on the basis of mutual recognition: each country would accept the others’ regulation as broadly equivalent to its own and allow cross-border business to proceed on that basis.	在早期阶段，人们认为单一金融市场可以在互相承认的基础上运行：每个国家都同意其他国家的监管等同于其自身的监管，并允许以此为基础开展跨国业务。


That proved inadequate, as standards and rules remained very different from country to country, and gave way to an approach based on minimum harmonization, whereby core rules were to be the same across Europe, but local variations and additions remained permissible.	这被证明是不够的，因为不同国家的标准和规则差异太大。 于是就产生了基于最低限度协调的方针，即全欧洲都采用相同的核心规则，同时允许地方差异和附加规则的存在。


When that, too, proved ineffective at promoting competition, as countries used their national rules to block new entrants, the emphasis switched to maximum harmonization, with directives spelling out exactly how local rules must be applied across the EU.	后来发现，这一方针无法刺激竞争，因为各国都利用国家规则阻挠新进入者。 于是重点又转向了最大限度协调，出台了关于地方规则如何在全欧盟应用的详细指令。


That caused great concern in the City of London, but has been grudgingly accepted.	这引起了伦敦金融城的严重担忧，但也只能勉强接受。


Since the global financial crisis, London has become less able to argue that it is special and must be left alone.	全球金融危机以来，伦敦也不再能够宣称自己具有特殊性，可以特立独行。


Now, with the establishment of central regulatory authorities, the EU has moved to the next stage of financial integration.	如今，中央监管当局已经成立，欧盟转向了金融一体化的下个阶段。


But, so far, these agencies’ responsibilities are very limited.	但是，到目前为止，这些机构的职责相当有限。


ESMA supervises rating agencies directly; but, outside banking, national authorities retain their day-to-day oversight responsibilities.	ESMA直接监督评级机构； 但是，在银行业务之外，日常监督职责仍由国家当局承担。


Integration-minded officials at the European Commission clearly do not regard this as a satisfactory end-state.	以一体化为目标的欧盟委员会官员显然不认为这是令人满意的最终状态。


So they commissioned a thoughtful review of the three ESAs from Mazars, an accounting firm, which was published earlier this year.	因此他们委托Mazars会计师事务所对三大ESA做了深入评估，并在今年早些时候发布了评估报告。


The verdict, roughly, was “so far, so good.”	简单说，报告的结论是“目前为止一切安好。


Now the Commission has followed up by publishing its own assessment.	”现在，欧盟委员会发布了其自己的评估。


The Commission was perhaps unlikely to be hypercritical of its own creations, and it is not.	过去，欧盟委员会不可能猛烈抨击它自己成立的机构，现在也是如此。


Its report maintains that the ESAs have “quickly established well-functioning organizations aimed at contributing to restoring confidence in the financial sector,” and that market participants seem broadly satisfied with their work.	其报告认为诸ESA“以重塑金融部门信心为目标，迅速建立了功能完善的组织，”市场参与者对它们的工作普遍满意。


But the report’s authors believe that there is a need to expand the current mandates, develop a comprehensive approach to consumer protection, and reduce further the influence of national authorities.	但报告作者认为需要扩大目前的权力范围，发展全面的消费者保护方针，并进一步减小国家当局的影响。


The ESAs should have more power to impose their will in the interests of the EU as a whole.	ESA应该获得更大权力，从欧盟整体利益出发施加它们的意愿。


Their chairs should have wider discretion to act on their own initiative.	各ESA主席应该拥有执行本机构计划的更广泛的权限。


The ESAs also need more money, which probably can come from fees levied on financial firms, and consideration should be given to merging them in a single location, presumably Brussels.	ESA还需要更多地资金，资金源可以是向金融企业课费。 同时还应该考虑将各ESA合并成一家并迁往布鲁塞尔。


The general direction is clear.	大方向是明确的。


Unless the new internal market commissioner takes a different view, the European Commission plans to move further along the road to genuine pan-European regulation.	除非新任内部市场委员采取不同观点，否则欧盟委员会将继续沿着迈向真正泛欧洲监管的道路前进。


The report now goes to the European Parliament, which can be expected to push harder for more integration, as it usually does.	现在，欧盟委员会的报告已经递交欧洲议会，而后者通常比前者在推进一体化方面更加努力。


A single authority, or perhaps two or three working closely together, is a logical arrangement for the eurozone, and perhaps for the entire EU financial market.	单一当局，或两到三个紧密合作的当局，是符合逻辑的欧元区安排，也许也是符合逻辑的欧盟金融市场安排。


It would usefully complement the ECB’s new supervisory role.	它将有效补充欧洲央行的新监督角色。


But will London fall into line this time?	但这一回伦敦会点头同意吗？


The British government, after all, has embarked on a path that runs in precisely the opposite direction – reducing the functions of central bodies and repatriating powers to national capitals.	毕竟，英国政府的动作指向完全相反的方向——缩减中央机构功能，将权力还给各国政府。


Given the central role of London in EU financial markets, and its political sensitivity in the UK, there is bound to be trouble ahead.	考虑到伦敦在欧盟金融市场的核心角色，及其在英国的政治敏感性，前方的道路绝不平坦。


The JPMorgan Problem Writ Large	显而易见的JP摩根问题


PARIS – JPMorgan Chase has had a bad year.	巴黎—过去一年，JP摩根大通银行日子不好过。


Not only has the bank just reported its first quarterly loss in more than a decade; it has also agreed to a tentative deal to pay a fine of $13 billion to the US government as punishment for mis-selling mortgage-backed securities.	它不但出现了十多年来第一个亏损季度； 还达成了初步协议向美国政府支付130亿美元罚款作为不当出售按揭支持证券的处罚。


Other big legal and regulatory costs loom.	还有其他巨大的法律和监管代价等着JP摩根。


JPMorgan will bounce back, of course, but its travails have reopened the debate about what to do with banks that are “too big to fail.”	当然，JP摩根会恢复元气，但它的阵痛重新开启了关于银行“太大而不能倒”的问题的争论。


In the United States, policymakers chose to include the Volcker rule (named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker) in the Dodd-Frank Act, thereby restricting proprietary trading by commercial banks rather than reviving some form of the Glass-Steagall Act’s division of investment and retail banks.	在美国，决策者决定将沃尔克规则（以美联储前主席保罗·沃尔克的名字命名）纳入多德-弗兰克法案，从而限制商业银行的自营交易，而不是重新采用某种形式的格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案分离投资和零售银行。


But Senators Elizabeth Warren and John McCain, a powerful duo, have returned to the fight.	但手握重权的两位参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦和约翰·麦凯恩重新加入了战团。


They argue that recent events have shown that JPMorgan is too big to be managed well, even by CEO Jamie Dimon, whose fiercest critics do not accuse him of incompetence.	他们指出，最近的事件表明JP摩根规模太大，即使是CEO杰米·戴蒙也无法良好管理。 即使是最激烈的戴蒙批评者也从未指责过他的能力。


Nonetheless, the Warren-McCain bill is unlikely to be enacted soon, if only because President Barack Obama’s administration is preoccupied with keeping the government open and paying its bills, while bipartisan agreement on what day of the week it is, let alone on further financial reform, cannot be guaranteed.	尽管如此，沃伦-麦凯恩法案短期内不可能事实，因为总统奥巴马政府正忙于让政府开门和偿还债务，两党在哪天达成一致还未为可知，更不用说进一步的金融改革了。


But the question of what to do about huge, complex, and seemingly hard-to-control universal banks that benefit from implicit state support remains unresolved.	但怎样对付巨大、复杂、眼看难以控制、从隐性国家支持中获益的全能银行的问题仍没有解决。


The “school solution,” agreed at the Financial Stability Board in Basel, is that global regulators should clearly identify systemically significant banks and impose tougher regulations on them, with more intensive supervision and higher capital ratios.	在巴塞尔金融稳定委员会达成一致的“学院派方案”是，全球监管者应该明确定义系统重要性银行，并对它们课以更严格的监管，包括更大的监督压力和更高的资本比例要求。


That has been done.	这一步已经完成了。


Initially, 29 such banks were designated, together with a few insurers – none of which like the company that they are obliged to keep!	一开始，29家银行和几家保险公司被认定为具有系统重要性）——没有一家像是他们有义务维持的公司！


There is a procedure for promotion and relegation, like in national football leagues, so the number fluctuates periodically.	这里存在一套升降机制，就像是足球联赛那样，因此数量会定期波动。


Banks on the list must keep higher reserves, and maintain more liquidity, reflecting their status as systemically important institutions.	名单中的银行必须持有更多的准备金，并保持更多的流动性，以反映它们作为系统重要性机构的地位。


They must also prepare what are colloquially known as “living wills,” which explain how they would be wound down in a crisis – ideally without taxpayer support.	它们还必须准备好被通俗所谓的“生前遗嘱”，即解释它们在危机中会受到怎样的伤害——在没有纳税人支持的理想环境中。


But, while all major countries are signed up to this approach, many of them think that more is needed.	但是，尽管所有主要国家都签署了这一方针，许多国家仍认为这样是不够的。


The US now has its Volcker rule (though disputes between banks and regulators about just how to define it continue).	如今，美国出台了沃尔克规则（尽管银行和监管者关于如何定义它的争论还在继续）。


Elsewhere, more intrusive rules are being implemented, or are under consideration.	其他国家也正在实施或讨论动真格的规则。


In the United Kingdom, the government created the Vickers Commission to recommend a solution.	在英国，政府成立了维克斯委员会（Vickers Commission）起草解决方案。


Its members proposed that universal banks be obliged to set up ring-fenced retail-banking subsidiaries with a much higher share of equity capital.	其成员建议全能银行应有义务成立股本资本比例更高的独立的零售银行分支。


Only the retail subsidiaries would be permitted to rely on the central bank for lender-of-last-resort support.	只有零售分支可以允许依靠中央银行的最后贷款人支持。


A version of the Vickers Commission’s recommendations, which is somewhat more flexible than its members proposed, is in a banking bill currently before Parliament.	维克斯委员会建议的一个版本目前正在接受议会审议，这个版本比其成员所建议的复杂一些。


A number of MPs want to impose tighter restrictions, and it is difficult to find anyone who will speak up for the banks, so some form of the bill is likely to pass, and big British banks will have to divide their operations and their capital.	不少议员希望施加更严格的限制，而且很难找到会为银行说话的人，因此该法案中的一部分会被通过，英国大银行将不得不分离业务和资本。


The UK has decided to take action before any Europe-wide solution is agreed.	英国决定在泛欧洲方案敲定前采取行动。


We British are still members of the European Union (at least for the time being), but sometimes our politicians forget that.	英国仍是欧盟成员国（至少目前仍是），但有时我们的政客会忘记这一点。


Sometimes they simply lose patience with the difficulty of agreeing on changes in negotiations that involve 28 countries, which seems especially true of financial reform, given that many of these countries are not home to systemically important banks and probably never will be.	有时他们会完全失去耐心，无视28个国家讨论变化是一个艰难的过程，在金融改革问题上的谈判尤其如此，因为其中不少国家并不是系统重要性银行的母国，未来也不太可能是。


But EU institutions have not been entirely inactive.	但欧盟机构也不是完全无作为。


The European Commission asked an eminent-persons group, chaired by Erkki Liikanen, the head of the Finnish central bank, to examine this issue on a European scale.	欧盟委员会要求芬兰央行行长里卡南（Erkki Liikanen）为首的杰出专家小组在欧洲层面上考察这一问题。


The group’s report, published in October 2012, came to a similar conclusion as the Vickers Commission concerning the danger of brigading retail and investment banking activities in the same legal entity, and recommended separating the two.	该小组于2012年10月发布了报告，其结论与维克斯委员会类似——将零售和投资银行活动置于同一个法律实体之内会产生风险，建议将两者分离。


The proposal mirrors the UK plan – the investment-banking and trading arms, not the retail side, would be ring-fenced – but the end point would be quite similar.	其建议方案与英国的计划正好相反——将投资银行部门和交易部门，而不是零售部门分离，但归宿完全一样。


But the European Banking Federation has dug in its heels, describing the recommendations as “completely unnecessary.”	但欧洲银行联合会（European Banking Federation）从中作梗，称这些建议“完全没有必要”。


The European Commission asked for comments, and its formal position is that it is considering them along with the reports.	欧盟委员会要求他们做出解释，其正式立场是将会考虑两方面的意见。


That consideration may take some time; indeed, it may never end.	欧盟委员会的考虑可能需要时间；


Germany’s government seems to have little appetite for breaking up Deutsche Bank, and the French have taken a leaf from the British book and implemented their own reform.	事实上，可能永无结论之日。 德国政府似乎十分不愿拆分德意志银行，而法国人效仿英国人实施了自己的改革。


The French plan looks more like a Gallic version of the Volcker rule than Vickers “à la française.”	法国的计划看起来更像高卢版沃尔克规则，而不是“法国式”维克斯方案。


It is far less rigorous than the banks feared, given President François Hollande’s fiery rhetoric in his electoral campaign last year, in which he anathematized the financial sector as the true “enemy.”	法国的计划比银行所担心的温和得多——要知道，总统奥朗德在去年选战期间信誓旦旦地把金融部门称为真正的“敌人”。


So we now have a global plan, of sorts, supplemented by various home-grown solutions in the US, the UK, and France, with the possibility of a European plan that would also differ from the others.	于是，如今我们有一套全球计划，并且还有来自美国、英国、法国的各种国内方案作为补充，欧洲也有可能出台不同于其他地区的计划。


In testimony to the UK Parliament, Volcker gently observed that “Internationalizing some of the basic regulations [would make] a level playing field.	在向英国议会所做的听证中，沃尔克慢条斯理地观察道，“一些基本规则的国际化[将形成]公平环境。


It is obviously not ideal that the US has the Volcker rule and [the UK has] Vickers…”	美国采取沃尔克规则，[英国有]维克斯……这显然是不妥的。 ”


He was surely right, but “too big to fail” is another area in which the initial post-crisis enthusiasm for global solutions has failed.	他当然是对的，但“太大而不能倒”是最初的后危机时代全球解决方案渴望失败的又一领域。


The unfortunate result is an uneven playing field, with incentives for banks to relocate operations, whether geographically or in terms of legal entities.	不幸的结果是形成了不公平的环境，这激励银行按照地理和法律实体配置经营活动。


That is not the outcome that the G-20 – or anyone else – sought back in 2009.	这可不是G-20——或其他任何人——在2009年想要的结果。


The Banks that Ate the Economy	蚕食经济的银行


LONDON – Bank of England Governor Mark Carney surprised his audience at a conference late last year by speculating that banking assets in London could grow to more than nine times Britain’s GDP by 2050.	伦敦—英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）在去年年底的一次会议上预测伦敦银行资产将在2050年超过英国GDP的九倍，这番话令世界震惊。


His forecast represented a simple extrapolation of two trends: continued financial deepening worldwide (that is, faster growth of financial assets than of the real economy), and London’s maintenance of its share of the global financial business.	他的预测只不过是两大趋势的外推：全球范围的持续金融深化（即金融资产增长快于实体经济）以及伦敦保持在全球金融业务中的份额。


These may be reasonable assumptions, but the estimate was deeply unsettling to many.	这两个假设相当合理，但这个算盘令许多人深感不安。


Hosting a huge financial center, with outsize domestic banks, can be costly to taxpayers.	拥有巨型金融中心和庞大的本国银行对纳税人来说或许负担沉重。


In Iceland and Ireland, banks outgrew their governments’ ability to support them when needed.	在爱尔兰和冰岛，银行规模超出了政府在有必要时的支持能力。


The result was disastrous.	结果是灾难性的。


Quite apart from the potential bailout costs, some argue that financial hypertrophy harms the real economy by syphoning off talent and resources that could better be deployed elsewhere.	除了潜在援助成本外，一些人还指出金融部门过于庞大会吸走原本可以更��地配置于其他部门的人才和资源，从而伤害实体经济。


But Carney argues that, on the contrary, the rest of the British economy benefits from having a global financial center in its midst.	但卡尼认为正好相反，英国经济的其余部分可以因为身处全球金融中心而获益。


“Being at the heart of the global financial system,” he said, “broadens the investment opportunities for the institutions that look after British savings, and reinforces the ability of UK manufacturing and creative industries to compete globally.”	“身处全球金融系统核心，”他说，“扩大了追寻英国储蓄的机构的投资机会，也增强了英国制造业和创新行业的全球竞争力。 ”


That is certainly the assumption on which the London market has been built and the line that successive governments have peddled.	这显然也是建设伦敦市场的基本假设，也是一届又一届政府所宣传的假设。


But it is coming under fire.	但这一假设正在接受考验。


Andy Haldane, one of the lieutenants Carney inherited at the BoE, has questioned the financial sector’s economic contribution, pointing to “its ability to both invigorate and incapacitate large parts of the non-financial economy.”	卡尼履新英格兰银行后留任的副手之一的安迪·哈达恩（Andy Haldane）质疑过金融部门的经济贡献，认为“它可能让相当一部分非金融经济获得或失去活力。 ”他认为（在一篇标题十分吸引眼球的文章《金融部门的贡献：奇迹还是幻象？


He argues (in a speech revealingly entitled “The Contribution of the Financial Sector: Miracle or Mirage?”) that the financial sector’s reported contribution to GDP has been significantly overrated.	》（The Contribution of the Financial Sector: Miracle or Mirage? ）中）金融部门所宣传的对GDP的贡献被大大夸大了。


Two recent papers raise further doubts.	两篇最新文章进一步提出了质疑。


In “The Growth of Modern Finance,” Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein of Harvard Business School show that the share of finance in US GDP almost doubled between 1980 and 2006, just before the onset of the financial crisis, from 4.9% to 8.3%.	在《现代金融的成长》（The Growth of Modern Finance）中，哈佛商学院的罗宾·格林伍德（Robin Greenwood）和大卫·沙夫斯坦（David Scharfstein）指出金融占美国GDP的比重在1980年到2006年金融危机前夕期间翻了近一番，从4. 9%上升到8.


The two main factors driving that increase were the expansion of credit and the rapid rise in resources devoted to asset management (associated, not coincidentally, with the exponential growth in financial-sector incomes).	3%。 推动比重增加的两个主要因素是信用扩张和资产管理规模的快速扩大（金融部门收入也因此呈现出指数增长之势，这不是巧合）。


Greenwood and Scharfstein argue that increased financialization was a mixed blessing.	格林伍德和沙夫斯坦指出，金融化是一柄双刃剑。


There may have been more savings opportunities for households and more diverse funding sources for firms, but the added value of asset-management activity was illusory.	家庭或许得到了更多的储蓄机会，企业也或许能得到更多样的资金来源，但资产管理活动的增值是一个幻觉。


Much of it involved costly churning of portfolios, while increased leverage implied fragility for the financial system as a whole and imposed severe social costs as over-exposed households subsequently went bankrupt.	这大多与投资组合的高成本搅动有关，而杠杆的增加意味着作为整体的金融系统脆弱性的增加，而随着风险暴露过大的家庭随后陷入破产状态，还导致了严重的社会成本。


Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi of the Bank for International Settlements – the central banks’ central bank – go further.	国际清算银行（中央银行的中央银行）的史蒂芬·赛切蒂（Stephen G.


They argue that rapid financial-sector growth reduces productivity growth in other sectors.	Cecchetti）和恩尼塞·卡罗比（Enisse Kharroubi）更进一步，他们指出金融部门的高增长抑制了其他部门的生产率增长。


Using a sample of 20 developed countries, they find a negative correlation between the financial sector’s share of GDP and the health of the real economy.	他们使用了由20个发达国家组成的样本，发现在金融部门占GDP比重与实体经济的健康之间存在负相关关系。


The reasons for this relationship are not easy to establish definitively, and the authors’ conclusions are controversial.	这一关系的原因不容易确定，两位作者的结论也存在争议。


But it is clear that financial firms compete with others for resources, and especially for skilled labor.	但显然金融企业在与其他企业争夺资源，特别是高技能劳动力资源。


Physicists or engineers with doctorates can choose to develop complex mathematical models of market movements for investment banks or hedge funds, where they are known colloquially as “rocket scientists.”	拥有博士学位的物理学家和工程师可能选择为投资银行和对冲基金开发复杂的市场运动数学模型，这类人被称为“火箭科学家”。


Or they could use their talents to design, say, real rockets.	他们原本也可以将自己的才华用于设计（比如）真正的火箭。


Cecchetti and Kharroubi find evidence that it is indeed research-intensive firms that suffer most when finance is booming.	赛切蒂和卡罗比发现的证据证明，研究密集型企业确实是金融业兴旺的最大受害者。


These companies find it harder to recruit skilled graduates when financial firms can pay higher salaries.	由于金融企业给的薪酬更高，因此这些公司难以找到高技能的毕业生。


And we are not just talking about the so-called “quants.”	我们所说的不仅包括所谓的“宽客”（quant）。


In the years before the 2008 financial crisis, more than a third of Harvard MBAs, and a similar proportion of graduates of the London School of Economics, went to work for financial firms.	在2008年金融危机爆发前的几年中，超过三分之一的哈佛MBA以及相同比例的伦敦经济学院毕业生毕业后前往金融企业工作。


(Some might cynically say that keeping MBAs and economists out of real businesses is a blessing, but I doubt that that is really true.)	（一些愤世嫉俗的人可能会说让MBA和经济学家远离真实商业界是件好事，但我对这种说法表示怀疑。 ）


The authors find another intriguing effect, too.	两位作者还发现了另一个有趣的效应。


Periods of rapid growth in lending are often associated with construction booms, partly because real-estate assets are relatively easy to post as collateral for loans.	贷款迅速增加的时期通常伴随着建筑业繁荣，这部分是因为房地产资产相对较易作为贷款抵押品。


But the rate of productivity growth in construction is low, and the value of many credit-fueled projects subsequently turns out to be low or negative.	但建筑业的生产率增长率很低，许多信用支撑起来的工程的价值随后会变得非常低甚至是负价值。


So, should Britons look forward with enthusiasm to the future sketched by Carney?	那么，英国应该热切期盼卡尼所描绘的未来吗？


Aspiring derivatives traders certainly will be more confident of their career prospects.	有抱负的衍生品交易员肯定会对自己的职业前景更有信心了。


And other parts of the economy that provide services to the financial sector – Porsche dealers and strip clubs, for example – will be similarly encouraged.	为金融部门提供服务的经济的其他部分——比如保时捷经销商和夜总会——也会感到欢欣鼓舞。


But if finance continues to take a disproportionate number of the best and the brightest, there could be little British manufacturing left by 2050, and even fewer hi-tech firms than today.	但如果金融继续吸引大量最聪明、最优秀的人才，2050年时英国的制造业将所剩无几，高科技公司更将是凤毛麟角。


Anyone concerned about economic imbalances, and about excessive reliance on a volatile financial sector, will certainly hope that this aspect of the BoE’s “forward guidance” proves as unreliable as its forecasts of unemployment have been.	只要你担心经济失衡、担心过度依赖高波动的金融部门，你就必然会希望英格兰银行的“前瞻性指引”的这一部分就像它的失业率预测一样不靠谱。


How Asia Copes with America’s Zombie Consumers	遭遇美国僵化消费——亚洲各国何去何从


A post-crisis generation of “zombie consumers” in the United States is likely to hobble growth in global consumption for years to come. And that means that export-led developing Asia now has no choice but to turn inward and rely on its own 3.5 billion consumers.	纽黑文——


Of course, this is not the first time that Asia has had to cope with the walking economic dead.	亚洲需要一种新形势的消费者。


Japan’s corporate zombies were at the epicenter of its first “lost decade” in the 1990’s.	在美国，后经济危机时代催生出大量“消费僵尸”——受经济危机影响他们几乎无购买力。


Sclerotic companies were put on life-support credit lines by their zaibatsu – like banking partners – delaying their inevitable failure and perpetuating inefficiencies and disincentives that resulted in a post-bubble collapse in Japanese productivity growth.	而这极有可能会阻碍预期于几年后开始的全球性消费增长。 那么这就意味着以出口为重心的亚洲将被迫转向其内部市场，依靠其自身的35亿亚洲消费者来维持经济发展。


Similarly, the crisis of 2008-2009 led to zombie-creating bailouts in the West.	当然，这并非亚洲首次面临停滞僵化的经济状况。


From Wall Street to AIG to Detroit, the US was quick to rescue corporate giants that would have failed otherwise.	二十世纪九十年代，日本处于“迷失的十年”中最为极端的时期，因而日本企业受到了极大的冲击，从而变得僵化，毫无生气。


Britain and Europe did the same, throwing lifelines to RBS, HBOS-Lloyds, Fortis, Hypo Real Estate, and others.	这些僵化的企业只得依赖贷款来维持运转，而贷款多来自于日本财阀——比如一些大的银行。


In the West, the excuse was “too big to fail.” How different is that from Japan’s mindset nearly 20 years ago?	而这不但未能挽回其注定要遭受的失败，并且还使得日本企业在很长一段时间内效率降低，积极性大受挫伤，从而导致了经济泡沫后的日本生产力急剧下降。


But the most prominent zombie may well be a broad cross-section of American consumers who are still suffering from the ravages of the Great Recession.	2008至2009年的经济危机使得西方许多国家通过大量融资援助来渡过难关，然而这也会造成其经济僵化发展。 从华尔街到美国国际集团，再到底特律，美国政府通过及时的财政援助来挽救那些最终还是要倒闭的大企业。


Afflicted by historically high unemployment, massive under-employment, and relatively stagnant real wages, while burdened with underwater mortgages, excessive debt, and subpar saving, US consumers are stretched as never before.	英国，欧盟也都是如此，苏格兰皇家银行，苏格兰哈里法克斯银行，福尔蒂保险，德国不动产融资银行（Hypo Real Estate），等等，都接受到了政府的经济援助。 在西方，融资解救濒临倒闭的大企业的理由便是“这些企业要是倒闭，那造成的影响可太大了。


Yet the US government has tried virtually everything to prevent consumers from adjusting.	然而，美国的消费者将成为受此次经济危机影响最为严重的群体，他们正沦为典型的“消费僵尸”。


Going well beyond the requisite extension of unemployment-insurance benefits, the safety net has been expanded to include home-foreclosure containment programs, other forms of debt forgiveness, and extraordinary monetary and fiscal stimulus.	一直以来，美国人都受到高失业率，广泛的未充分就业覆盖率，以及并有所改善的实际工资水平影响。 同时，他们还要偿还比实际房价还要高很多房贷，大量的贷款，再加之，美国人在银行的存款较少。


Compassion is part of the moral fabric of any society. But a fine line separates it from the “creative destruction” that is essential to purge a post-crisis system of its excesses.	但是美国政府不惜一切代价的去阻碍美国人做出相应的调整。


Japan crossed that line in the 1990’s, as its corporate zombies prevented the painful but necessary adjustments in its post-bubble economy. That could happen in the US if Washington continues to favor policies that condone the reckless excesses of the recent past and inhibit the deleveraging and balance-sheet repair that America’s zombie consumers now need for post-crisis healing.	美国政府将社会保险网扩大至房屋赎回权不扩大化项目，其他形式的的债务免除，以及特殊的货币，财政刺激，这些政策已经大大的超出了失业保险救济的范畴。


Notwithstanding government life-support initiatives, US consumers seem headed for years of retrenchment.	尽管说同情心是任何一个社会道德构成的一部分，但是一些微小的差别将使得其与“创造性破坏”失之交臂，而这种创造性的转变能够在经济危机结束后将体系中极端部分剔除在外。


Consumption’s share of US GDP currently stands at a sharply elevated 70%.	日本在二十世纪九十年代便忽略了那些细微的差异。


While that’s down from the high of 71.3% in early 2009, it remains fully four percentage points above the 66% norm that prevailed in the final quarter of the twentieth century.	大量日本企业在经济泡沫后，放弃了一些痛苦但是必要的转变。 如果美国政府执意要采纳这些阻碍减债，修复资产负债的策略——这些策略正是解决美国消费僵化的方法，那么美国必将重蹈覆辙。


Reversion to that earlier share is likely as American consumers make the transition from the insanity of the boom to the sanity required of the bust.	尽管当下美国政府采取了多项救助政策来维持消费水平，但缩减消费水平多年来一直是政府考虑的问题。


That spells subdued growth in US consumption for years to come – with a predictably massive impact on global consumption.	消费在美国国内生产总值中竟然占据了70%的惊人份额。 虽然相比2009年的71.


While the US accounts for only 4.5% of the world’s population, its consumers spend $10.3 trillion annually – by far the most in the world.	3%有所下降，但是这仍然超出了二十世纪后十五年普遍消费基准（66%）四个百分点。


So, with US consumption growth likely to be restrained, who will take America’s place?	6%可能是美国消费者正经历从经济繁荣时的不理性消费逐渐向受经济衰退时必要的节制性消费的结果。 而这导致了美国预期在几年内迎来的消费增长被减缓，推迟，自然也会对全球消费增长产生巨大的影响。


Europe?	尽管美国人口只占世界的4.


Japan?	5%，但美国人每年花费10.


I wouldn’t bet on either.	3万亿美元用于消费——至今都是世界上消费开销最大的国家。


That’s where Asia fits into the equation. As an export-led region, Asia remains heavily dependent on end-market demand from consumers in the developed world.	那么，随着美国面临可能的消费缩水，谁能来替代美国的位置呢？


The export share of developing Asia’s 12 largest economies rose from 35% of pan-regional output in the late 1990’s to 45% in early 2007.	欧盟还是日本？


Little wonder that every economy in the region either fell into recession or experienced sharp slowdowns when global trade plunged in late 2008. Decoupling was not an option.	依我看，它们都难以胜任。


Nor should Asia draw a false sense of security from all the hype currently being accorded to the hopes and dreams of a so-called “two-speed world.”	作为一个出口导向型的地区，亚洲在很大程度上依赖于发达国家消费者的市场需求。 在亚洲发展中国家之中，12个最大的经济体出口份额从二十世纪九十年代末的35%增长至2007上半年的45%。


Heavily dependent on Western markets, Asia must seek support from a new source of demand.	这就解释了为何该区域的经济体在2008年末世界贸易额骤减时，不是陷入衰退便是增长减缓。 与世界脱轨并不能解决问题。


For developing Asia as a whole, internal private consumption currently stands at a record low of just 45% of GDP – down ten percentage points from the 55% share prevailing as recently as 2002.	当然亚洲各国也不能相信当下盛行的所谓“双速发展的世界”，尽管听上去充满了希望，但这纯属无稽之谈。 高度依赖西方市场的亚洲必须需求一种新的消费需求。


It’s not as if Asian consumer demand is dormant.	这首先便得从亚洲自身找起。


But at the margin, economic growth is heavily skewed toward exports and fixed investment as the primary means of absorbing surplus labor and spreading prosperity. In a post-crisis world – impaired by America’s zombie consumers – export-led Asia is in serious need of a pro-consumption rebalancing.	亚洲整体上作为一个正在发展的区域，其购买消费能力与生产总值的比例目前处于历史上最低的45%，从2002年的55%下降了十个百分点。


Nowhere is that more evident than in China.	这并不是说亚洲消费者的需求没有增长。


With private consumption having fallen to a record low of 35% of GDP in 2008 (fully ten percentage points below the Asian norm), China faces major rebalancing imperatives – all the more urgent if post-crisis consumption growth in the West remains weak.	但是，经济的增长在很大程度上依赖于出口和固定投资，而这也成为亚洲各国吸收劳动力以及扩大财富的主要方法。 在经济危机后的世界——深受美国“消费僵尸”的摧残——以出口为导向的亚洲亟待重新平衡其消费模式。


The good news is that China appears to have arrived at a similar conclusion.	而中国则是这种趋向表现最明显的国家。


Its 12th Five-Year Plan is focused on three major pro-consumption initiatives: jobs (especially labor-intensive services); wages (underscored by accelerated urbanization); and a reduction of fear-driven precautionary saving (arising out of a broadening of the social safety net).	在2008年，个人消费下降到国内生产总值的35%，这一历史新低的数据比亚洲消费基准还低了十个百分点。


If China delivers on each of these three fronts – as I suspect it will – private consumption’s share of Chinese GDP could rise by as much as five percentage points between now and 2015.	中国因而急需重新调整其经济增长模式，如果西方消费水平依然不见增长，那么这个问题则更为突出。


That would be good news for East Asia’s other economies – namely, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.	好消息是，中国看来大致也是这么计划的。 其第十二个五年计划将重心集中在三个支持消费的方向：工作（尤其是劳动密集型）；


With relatively small populations – and a declining one in the case of Japan – these countries have no choice but to rely on exports and external demand to drive economic growth.	工资（随着城市化进程加速日渐突出）； 以及减少国民为“防患于未然”的存款额（从逐渐扩大的社保体系方面）。


In all three cases, China has replaced the US as their major export market.	如果中国如期完成该计划，那么我认为在2015年其消费额占国内生产总值的比例会上升五个百分点。


That shift came just in the nick of time.	这对于东亚经济体无疑是一个好消息，即，日本，韩国，以及台湾。


If China is successful in implementing its pro-consumption agenda, the rest of Asia will be well positioned to avoid the fallout from America’s new generation of zombie consumers.	由于人口相对较少（日本的人口已经出现负增长），这些国家只能依赖出口以及外部需求来刺激经济增长。


How the United States copes is a different matter altogether.	在上述三个计划中，中国可以取代美国成为这些国家的主要出口对象。


Read more from the "What Now for Global Trade?"	这种紧要关头的转变仿佛及时雨。 如果中国如期完成其促进消费的计划，亚洲其他国家将会免于美国“消费僵尸”的余波。


Focal Point	那么，美国需要应对的则完全是另一种情况。


How Brazil Broke Loose	巴西如何摆脱贫困


CAMBRIDGE – Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s visit last week to Washington, DC, offers an occasion to consider how some once-poor countries have broken out of poverty, as Brazil has.	剑桥——上周，巴西总统迪尔玛罗塞夫访问华盛顿，这提供了一个契机令人们思考曾经像巴西一样的贫穷国家是如何摆脱贫困的。


Development institutions like the World Bank have advocated improving business law as being essential to success.	例如，像世界银行这样的发展机构呼吁提高商业法的地位，将其看作是一个摆脱贫穷的重要手段。


Are they right?	他们是正确的吗？


Such thinking goes back at least as far as Max Weber’s argument that an effective business environment requires a legal structure as predictable as a clock.	这样的想法要追溯至马克思 韦伯的观点。 他的观点认为有效的商业环境需要一套法律结构，这种结构应该像钟表一样准确。


Investors, it is thought, need clear rules and effective courts.	这种观点还认为投资者需要明确的规则和有效的法庭。


Security of contract and strong mechanisms that protect investors are, in this view, foundational for finance, which in turn fuels economic growth.	在这种观点下，保护投资者利益的合同保险和有效机制成为了支持经济增长的根基。


If a potential financier is unsure of being repaid, he or she will not invest, firms will not grow, and economic development will stall.	如果潜在的投资者不确定是否会得利，他们就不会投资，公司因此得不到发展，导致经济的发展停滞不前。


Rules and institutions come first; real economic development follows.	规则和机构处在最重要的位置； 真正的经济发展紧跟其后。


But, compelling as this logic seems, Brazil’s rise does not confirm it: financial and economic growth was not preceded by – or even accompanied by – fundamental improvements in courts and contracts.	但尽管这种逻辑似乎很有说服力，巴西的经济腾飞并没有证明这一逻辑：法庭和合同方面的根本提高并没有在金融和经济增长之前出现，甚至金融和经济的增长并没有伴随着这两方面的提高。


Growth is unmistakable: Brazil’s financial markets have expanded robustly, with stock-market capitalization rising from 35% of GDP in 2000 to 74% in 2010.	经济增长是硬道理：巴西的金融市场在蓬勃地壮大，从2000年股票市场资本占全国GDP总额的35%上涨至2010年占全国GDP总额的74%。


In the eight years prior to 2004, only six companies went public; in the eight years since, 138 have.	在2004年前的八年内，只有六家公司面向社会； 在随后的八年里，137家公司已经面向社会。


Last year, Brazil overtook the United Kingdom – often seen as an exemplar of contractual security – as the world’s sixth-largest economy.	去年巴西超越了英国成为了世界第六大经济体，而英国一直以来被视为执行合同保险的典范。


And yet legal change was not central in Brazil’s success.	然而，法律改革不是巴西成功的关键。


Brazilian courts were reputed in 2000 to handle investors’ lawsuits slowly and poorly, and they are reputed to handle them slowly and poorly today.	巴西的法院在2000年时还因处理投资者诉讼缓慢、低效而遭到恶评。 即使到了今天，他们处理这些诉讼缓慢并且低效的事实仍旧众所周知。


Even basic elements of business organization – like limiting public shareholders’ obligation for corporate debts – are said by Brazilian legal experts, such as Bruno Salama, to remain an open question, with all shareholders potentially exposed, especially in labor and tax lawsuits.	巴西的一些法律专家，例如布鲁诺 萨拉马指出，甚至商业机构的一些基本特征，例如限制股东对公司债务所承担的责任仍然是一个公开讨论的问题。 股东，尤其是在劳动和税务诉讼方面很有可能背负巨大的责任。


If courts are not protecting investors, is something else?	如果法院没有能够保护投资者，那还有其他什么能够来保护投资者呢？


New, important stock-exchange rules have strengthened outside investors’ confidence, though only for new companies.	新的股票交易规则就是一项重大的改变。 尽管这种改变只应用于为数不多的几个公司，但这种改变会时不时地会增强外部投资者的信心。


For legal scholars, most prominently Columbia University’s John Coffee, stock exchanges have historically been the first step toward protecting investors.	一些法律专家认为股票交易从历史的角度来看已经迈出了保护投资者利益所需的第一步，其中最著名的专家要数哥伦比亚大学的约翰卡费。 并且这种观点已经被罗纳德 吉尔森，亨利 瀚斯曼和马里亚纳所主持的研究所证实。


An analysis by Ronald Gilson, Henry Hansmann, and Mariana Pargendler of Brazil’s Novo Mercado – the stock exchange’s special voluntary listing segment, which provides strong protections for investors in newly listed companies – supports this view.	他们主要研究巴西的诺梅尔卡多--- 这是股票交易市场为首次公开募股公司新设立的交易平台。 他们研究这一平台是如何保护那些给新入市的公司注入资金的投资者的利益。


But stock exchanges have limits, particularly in Brazil.	但是尤其在巴西，股票交易是有限制的。


In the absence of reliable courts, they cannot sue to enforce their rules.	在没有有效、可信赖的法庭的情况下，他们是无法通过诉讼来强制执行规定的。


Their only recourse is to push recalcitrant firms off the exchange.	他们唯一的手段就是将那些桀骜不驯的公司挤出交易市场行。


The Novo Mercado dealt with this problem by subjecting disputes involving its newly-listed companies to arbitration.	诺梅尔卡多交易平台通过将涉及这些新入市公司的争端转交至仲裁来解决这个难题，而仲裁和法院并不是一个体系。


Commercial arbitration – and courts’ obligations to enforce the arbitrators’ decisions – can assure investors, even if the courts generally do not.	通过商业仲裁---然后法院有义务去执行仲裁做出的决定，从而来使投资者安心，但法院通常情况下不会这样去做。


But arbitration – which has yet to be deeply tested for resolving disputes on the Novo Mercado – does not seem to be the linchpin of Brazil’s recent success.	但是，仲裁机制在诺梅尔卡多交易平台解决争端的能力还应该接受深入地测试，而且仲裁似乎并不是巴西近来取得成功的关键。 巴西近来的成功是在其经历了一个世纪风风雨雨的经济发展后出现的。


After all, its institutional innovations apply only to the new Novo Mercado-listed companies, and not to the bulk of the Brazilian economy’s big firms, which are listed on the stock exchange’s main segment, and thus remain stuck with the old rules, old institutions, and an ineffective court system.	毕竟，这种机制革新仅仅应用于那些主动加入诺梅尔卡多交易平台的新公司，因此这种革新还不能涵盖绝大多数巴西经济体中现存的公司。 这些公司在主要的股票交易市场中运行，受到原来的规则，机制以及效率低下的法律系统所牵绊。


Two other key changes, one obvious and one surprising, were more essential to Brazil’s financial development.	两个其他的核心改变，一个明显，一个令人吃惊，对巴西的金融发展起到了更加关键的作用。


The obvious change is that economic-growth opportunities mushroomed, owing to greater monetary stability, disinflation, and natural-resource wealth.	明显的改变是由于货币更加稳定，抗通货膨胀能力增强，以及自��资源丰富而产生的大批经济增长机会。


Better macroeconomic policy led to faster GDP growth, which required financing and motivated some insiders to forego pernicious maneuvering that would scare away new outside investors.	更明智的宏观经济政策带来了更快的GDP增长。 这需要经济扶植，刺激一些内部操纵者放弃那些可能会吓跑潜在外部投资商的有害策略。


Growth plausibly drove financial development as much as, or more than, institutional development did.	增长很有可能像机制发展一样，甚至比它更能拉动经济发展。


While public and private enforcement will need to improve if Brazil’s economy is to move to the next level, dramatic legal improvement has not underpinned Brazil’s overall financial development so far.	但如果巴西的经济想要发展到下一个阶段，公共和个人执法力需要得到提高。 大幅提高法律目前为止并没有奠定巴西的整体经济增长。


The second change is both less obvious and more important: the political stability that came with the election in 2002 of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.	第二个改变更加不明显，但却更为重要：从2002年巴西总统路易斯 伊纳西奥 卢拉 达席尔瓦胜选后所带来的政治稳定。


The surprise here is that Lula, a former labor leader who had been on the far left, was widely opposed, if not despised, in business and financial circles.	令人吃惊的一点是卢拉，作为一名前工党领袖，一直以来十分左派。 在商业和金融圈内，即使不能说遭到鄙视，但也有很多人反对他。


How, then, did his victory help to fuel the financial growth of the subsequent decade?	那么，他的胜选是如何在随后的十年间帮助巴西推动经济增长的呢？


Despite his past, Lula promised not to disrupt Brazilian corporate capitalism, running with a market-oriented vice president.	尽管曾是前工党领袖，卢拉保证不会打乱巴西公司的资本主义制度，和以市场为主导的副总统一起竞选。


Why he did so is difficult to determine: quite plausibly, some combination of Lula’s realism, his reaction to stock-market declines attributed to his chances of being elected, and campaign donations was at work.	很难去断定这种情况为什么会产生：很有可能这结合了卢拉的一些现实主义的想法。 他对股票市场落寞所做出的反应增加了他当选的机会，同时竞选募捐也起到了一些作用。


Once elected, Lula governed from the pragmatic left, continuing the prior administration’s core policies.	当选后，卢拉站在事务左派的立场治理国家，延续了前任政府的核心政策。


True, Brazil still has a “hard” left, and some in Lula’s own party are comfortable with, say, Cuba’s Castro brothers and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.	诚然，巴西仍旧是一个“硬”左派国家。 譬如，卢拉党内的一些人还支持古巴的卡斯特罗兄弟和委内瑞拉总统乌戈 查韦斯。


But a consensus had emerged in Brazil that a left party could neither win nor govern with hard-left ideas, and Lula’s presidency did not challenge this view.	但是巴西内部已经达成了共识，左派党使用硬左思想是无法取大选得胜利，也无法治理国家的。 卢拉的总统胜利也没有改变这种观点。


The consensus may have reflected the success of Lula’s predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the relative success of privatization and liberal market economies around the world, and the growth of Brazil’s middle class.	这种共识可能会反映出卢拉前任总统费尔南多 恩里克 卡多佐的胜利，也能够体现出全球私有化和自由市场经济所带来的相关成就，同时也解释了了巴西中产阶级的增长。


Whatever the case, for key leaders of the Brazilian left, including Rousseff, capitalism became part of the solution, not the fundamental problem.	无论情况如何，对包括马塞夫在内的巴西左派领导者来说，资本主义是解决问题的一部分，而并非是根本问题本身。


Investors take all kinds of risks.	投资者冒着各种各样的风险。


The biggest are not always the legal ones on which the World Bank and development agencies have focused; rather, they are the business risks of a company that fails or a polity that implodes.	最大的风险不总是世界银行和其他发展机构所关注的法律风险； 而最大的风险是一个失败的公司所面临的商业风险或者是政体内部瓦解所带来的风险。


If business conditions are auspicious and there is a strong consensus in favor of liberal capitalism as the polity’s core economic principle, financial markets can develop and reluctantly absorb risks stemming from the legal system’s defects.	如果商业情况良好，大家会一致支持将自由资本主义当作是政体的核心经济原则，金融市场可以得到发展，从而不愿承担司法系统组织所带来的风险。


Institutional improvements help, but they can come later.	那些机制提高就会随后出现。


How China Is Winning Southeast Asia	中国如何赢得东南亚


WASHINGTON, DC – With preparations for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September visit to Washington, DC, underway, officials in both countries are predictably playing down their differences over China’s outsize territorial claims, backed by the construction of military facilities on previously uninhabited islands and atolls, in the South China Sea.	华盛顿——随着中国主席习近平9月访美筹备工作的展开，可以预见两国官员都在淡化因中国特大领土要求所引发的分歧。 上述要求背后是在南中国海此前无人居住的岛屿和环礁上修建军事设施。


And this diplomatic de-escalation, following months of recriminations and veiled threats, suits Southeast Asian leaders just fine.	继长达数月的指责和隐晦的威胁之后，东南亚领导人也非常愿意看到这种外交领域的事态降级。


Of course, no one in Southeast Asia is ignoring China’s strategic designs.	当然，东南亚没有人忽视中国的战略设计。


The region’s defense spending has increased by more than 50% in the last decade, and some $60 billion has been earmarked for new weapons, especially naval hardware, over the next five years.	该地区国防开支在过去十年中增长了50%以上，未来五年已预留约600亿美元采购新式武器，特别是海军武器。


The white paper on military strategy that China released in May, which touted plans to expand the country’s defense perimeter, intensified neighbors’ concerns, making even more military spending likely.	中国5月发布的军事战略白皮书鼓吹扩大国家防御边界计划，并因此加剧了邻国的担忧，很可能导致进一步扩大军费。


Leaders in the region are now welcoming a stream of US military officials and defense manufacturers to see what America’s Asian “pivot” has to offer.	该地区领袖现在都在欢迎美国军方官员和武器生产商，了解美国的亚洲“支点”能提供哪些保护。


Beyond new frigates and security guarantees, however, Southeast Asian leaders have refrained from reacting too strongly to China’s offshore ambitions.	但除了新型护卫舰和安全保障，东南亚领导人不愿对中国的海上雄心反应过于强烈。


The economic facts on the ground demand prudence.	经济现实让他们必须谨慎对待。


In only two decades, China has become Southeast Asian countries’ leading economic partner, boosting its influence throughout the region.	短短二十年间，中国已成为东南亚国家的主要经济伙伴，在整个地区提升了影响力。


Chinese leaders’ constant effort to expand economic cooperation stands in stark contrast to America’s approach to the region.	中国领导人不断努力扩大经济合作与美国的做法形成了鲜明的对比。


Consider trade.	以贸易为例。


Since 2000, bilateral trade between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has grown tenfold, from $32 billion to $350 billion last year, and could reach $500 billion in 2015.	2000年以来，中国与东盟十国的双边贸易额从320亿美元跃升至去年的3，500亿美元，增长了10倍，2015年甚至可能达到5，000亿美元。


As China has risen to become Southeast Asia’s largest trading partner, the US has slipped to fourth place, with only $206 billion in total trade with ASEAN last year.	随着中国上升至东南亚贸易伙伴的首位，美国却已滑落到第四，去年与东盟国家的贸易总额仅有2，060亿美元。


Given Southeast Asia’s growing economic importance, the implications of this trend could not be weightier.	鉴于东南亚地区经济重要性日益凸显，上述趋势的影响重得不能再重。


The ASEAN countries’ combined annual GDP is already $2.4 trillion and growing fast, owing to their rapidly expanding middle class, highly skilled workers, and increasingly upscale markets.	因为中产阶级迅速扩大、工人技术不断提升和高端市场不断发展，东盟国家年度GDP总和已超过24，000亿美元且仍在快速增加。


If the current trend holds, China’s trade with ASEAN could reach $1 trillion by 2020.	如果照目前的趋势发展下去，中国与东盟贸易额到2020年将达到1万亿美元。


The picture for direct investment – the financial flows that support the construction of factories, offices, warehouses, mines, and farms – is equally striking.	直接投资状况——支持工厂、办公楼、仓库、矿山和农场建设的资金流——也同样惊人。 从1995到2003年，中国企业在东盟国家的投资仅为6.


From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies invested a mere $631 million in ASEAN countries; in 2013, they invested $30 billion.	31亿美元； 而2013年，投资总额已经达到300亿。


Though China remains well behind Japan, Europe, and the US on this front, it certainly has the potential to catch up, as Chinese private-equity firms increasingly look abroad.	虽然中国在这方面还远远落后于日本、欧洲和美国，但随着中国私募股权投资机构越来越将目光转向海外，它肯定具备迎头赶上的实力。


Indeed, from agriculture to information technology, the Chinese are diversifying their stakes across the region and embedding their companies in ASEAN’s advanced and frontier economies.	事实上，从农业到信息技术，中国正力求实现在该地区所持股份的多元化，并让其企业越来越深地介入东盟先进和前沿的经济体。


China’s Southeast Asian partners cannot afford to ignore these efforts.	中国的东南亚伙伴无法忽视这样的努力。


That is one reason why all ten ASEAN countries signed on as founding members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, despite US opposition.	这也是为什么东盟十国不顾美国反对，成为以中国为首的亚洲基础设施投资银行创始成员国的原因之一。


China, which has pledged $100 billion in initial investment, has positioned the AIIB as a rival to the US-dominated World Bank, promising to help Asian countries meet their extensive infrastructure needs.	中国承诺初始投资1，000亿美元，将亚投行定位为美国领导的世界银行的竞争对手，并承诺帮助亚洲国家满足其巨大的基础设施投资需求。


Clearly, when it comes to its role in Asia, China is thinking big.	很显然，在亚洲作用问题上，中国有着宏大的计划。


And there is more.	而且这还不是全部。


At last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, regional leaders agreed to begin work toward possible adoption of a Chinese-backed free-trade pact – one that is clearly meant to push back against US President Barack Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, which excludes China.	在去年召开的亚太经合组织（APEC）会议上，地区领导人同意开始由中国支持的自由贸易协定的制定工作——这一行动显然是为了对抗美国总统奥巴马的泛太平洋伙伴关系，上述伙伴关系并不包括中国。


Whether or not Xi realizes his free-trade ambition, there is no denying China’s commitment to deepening its economic ties in Asia and beyond.	无论习近平的自由贸易雄心实现与否，都无法否认中国决意与亚洲和其他地区深化经济联系。


The country has pledged some $60 billion to its “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which entails the construction of a Silk Road Economic Belt running through Central Asia, and a Maritime Silk Road connecting China to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and eventually Europe.	中国承诺为其“一带一路”战略投资600亿美元，该战略将带动贯穿中亚的丝绸之路经济带、连接中国与东南亚、印度洋、中东、并最终抵达欧洲的海上丝绸之路的建设。


The US, meanwhile, is struggling to cobble together a domestic consensus on trade.	与此同时，美国还在力求达成国内贸易共识。


To be sure, China has had its setbacks, too.	可以肯定，中国也经历了不少挫折。


Canceled railway and hydroelectric projects in Myanmar, and riots in Vietnam over China’s move to drill for oil in disputed waters, reflect the backlash that the country’s resource hunger can generate.	缅甸取消了铁路和水电项目、中国在争议海域开采石油引发了越南暴动，上述事件显示出这个国家对于资源的饥渴可能带来的抵制反应。


But China is also certain to learn from its mistakes, and its leaders have a clear vision of where to place their long-term economic bets.	但中国也一定会从错误中吸取教训，并且中国领导人对将长期经济赌注下在哪里有着明确的目标。


At a time when partisan divisions are undermining America’s economic leadership, China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia should raise a question: If push comes to shove in the South China Sea, will the US find allies in its corner, or will they just be holding Uncle Sam’s coat?	在两党分歧破坏美国经济领导力的时刻，中国在东南亚日益扩大的影响力不免令人产生疑问：如果未来南海局势到了紧要关头，美国是否能够找到自己的盟友，亦或他们只是帮山姆大叔拿大衣的随从？


The HICCup Manifesto	HICCup宣言


NEW YORK – It is hard to find anyone in health care who does not believe that spending $100 now on healthy behavior – exercise and proper nutrition, counseling for pre-diabetics, risk monitoring, and so on – could yield more than $200 in reduced costs and improved outcomes later.	纽约—在卫生界，几乎人人都认为，现在花100美元用于卫生行为——锻炼和合理营养、前期糖尿病咨询、风险监测等——能够在未来节省200多美元，还能改善结果。


The numbers are fuzzy, of course, and there are plenty of methodological caveats, but there is little dispute about the desirability of such an approach.	当然，这个数字是模糊的，充满了方法论的漏洞，但对于追求这样的方式则很少人有异议。


And yet neither individuals nor communities seem to act on the basis of this knowledge.	但个人和社会均很少有根据这一认识行动者。


Individuals often lack willpower or access to healthy food or convenient exercise facilities, and are surrounded by poor examples that encourage instant gratification rather than effort and restraint.	个人通常缺少毅力或渠道实行健康饮食和身体锻炼，且周边充满了鼓励他们及时享乐的坏例子，缺少努力和克制的好例子。


And, on a broader, institutional scale, the money spent and the money to be gained do not belong to the same pocket.	此外，从更广的制度性角度来说，花钱的和获得好处的并不是同一批人。


Instead of just complaining, I recently decided to create HICCup, the Health Intervention Coordinating Council, a self-appointed counseling service aimed at persuading local institutions to embrace a long-term perspective and launch a full-scale intervention in their communities.	我没有抱怨，而是在最近决定成立HICCup，即卫生干预合作委员会（Health Intervention Coordinating Council），这是一项自己做主的咨询服务，旨在说服地方机构着眼于长期并充分干预社区。


For practical reasons, there are a few guidelines – but anyone who wants to do this without following our rules is welcome to do so.	出于现实里有，该项目有一些指导方针——但任何希望不受我们规则行事的人大可以这样做。


For starters, HICCup will focus on communities of 100,000 people or fewer.	首先，HICCup将着眼于10万人及以下的社区。


The majority of the community and its institutions must be enthusiastic.	社区的大部分人及其机构必须热情参与。


If most community members work for just a few employers and obtain health care from just a few providers, the effort of corralling the players will be easier.	如果大部分社区成员为少数雇主工作并从少数提供者处获得卫生服务，那么集中参与者的工作就会较为容易。


And, of course, community leaders – the mayor, city council members, and others – must work together rather than undermine one another.	当然，社区领袖——市长、市议员及其他——必须精诚合作而不是互相掣肘。


So, how will this be funded?	那么，HICCup的钱哪里来？


Not by HICCup.	并非来自HICCup。


The trick is to capture some of what is being spent on health care already.	我们的打算是使用正在作为卫生开支的支出。


As a rough calculation, assume $10,000 in annual per capita health-care costs, or $1 billion per year in a community of 100,000.	试做一下粗略的计算，假设每年人均卫生成本为1万美元； 或整个10万人的社区10亿美元。


(There are also all the separate costs of bad health, which are much harder to count or capture.)	（此外还有各种不健康的单独成本，这很难计算或覆盖。


That money ultimately comes from individuals and employers who pay it in taxes, insurance premiums, or direct payments, and should be intercepted somewhere between the payers and the health-care delivery system.	）这笔钱最终来自个人和雇主所支付的税收、健康保险金或直接支付，并应该在支付者和卫生服务提供系统之间抽取。


Instead of spending $1 billion a year, imagine spending $1.2 billion the first year, but, say, only $750 million in the fifth year.	假设不再每年花10亿美元，而是在第一年花12亿美元，但在（比如）第五年花7. 5亿美元。


That sounds like an attractive proposition – but someone must make the initial investment in exchange for a claim to the later savings.	这个方案看起来颇有吸引力——但必须有人出这笔初始投资，作为回报，他有权获得后来的储蓄。


(And, one way or another, the investor will need to repurpose the health-care facilities and workers to some other role, including prevention, serving outsiders, or conversion to another use entirely.)	（此外，投资者需要以某种方式改变卫生设施与工作人员的用途和角色，包括预防、服务外来者或完全转变为新用途和角色。 ）


This is where the first miracle is needed – a benevolent but ultimately profit-driven billionaire or hedge fund, or a philanthropy that sees a way to do good while earning money for future goodness.	这就需要第一个奇迹——一个慈善性质但最终受利益驱动的亿万富翁或一家对冲基金，或一家慈善基金会，它寻求在做善事的同时为未来福祉牟利。


There are a lot of billionaires out there, some with vision.	有很多亿万富翁可供选择，其中不乏远见卓识之士。


There are health-care companies that might bite, hedge funds looking for large-scale projects, and so-called social-impact bonds.	一些医疗公司也许也能胜任，一些对冲基金也许在寻找大规模项目，还有所谓的社会影响债券。


There also are large employers that might decide to work with other employers in certain communities.	还有可能决定在特定社区与其他雇主合作的大雇主。


All of these entities would be taking a substantial leap of faith.	所有这些实体将带来翻天覆地的变化。


But I think it is doable – especially if they work together to figure out the numbers, study the effects of small-scale healthy-living/preventive health-care efforts, and encourage one another to move forward.	但我认为这是可以完成的，特别是当它们齐心协力计算数字、研究小规模健康生活/预防性卫生措施的影响并互相鼓励前进时。


Regardless, each investor must work with existing institutions – if only to access revenue streams initially and benefit from the lowered costs later on.	无论如何，每位投资者必须与现有机构合作——只要能在一开始活得收入流并在随后享受低成本的好处。