In some ways, Germany has already moved beyond the point of no return on its path toward openness, owing to Merkel’s 2015 refugee policy.	从某些角度讲，由于默克尔在2015年所做出的难民政策决定，德国在通往开放的道路上已经没有回头路。


Yet there are enormous challenges ahead.	但前方仍有重重挑战。


Beyond the technical and social challenges associated with the successful integration of refugees, there is a need for greater tolerance toward Islam and diversity more generally on the part of all Germans.	除了与成功融合难民相关的技术和社会挑战之外，德国各地都需要对伊斯兰教和更广义的多样性更加宽容。


Further changes to family and gender policies and an overhaul of the education system will also be needed.	此外，还需要家庭和性别政策的进一步变化和改革教育体系。


As Germany continues to debate what it means to be German, the outcome of the current coalition negotiations will determine whether Merkel’s next government confronts these challenges effectively.	在德国仍在争论这对德国人意味着什么的同时，当前执政联盟谈判的结果将决定默克尔的下一届政府是否能有效面对这些挑战。


If it does, Merkel will be remembered as the architect of a new German society.	如果答案是肯定的，默克尔将以新德国社会的缔造者名垂青史。


The Middle East’s Oil-Price Problem	中东的石油价格问题


CAMBRIDGE – Between 2014 and 2016, Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries’ revenues fell by an average of more than one-third – or 15% of GDP – and their current-account surpluses have swung violently to double-digit deficits.	坎布里奇—2014至2016年间，中东石油出口国收入平均下降了三分之一强——或GDP的15%——它们的经常项目盈余也急转直下为两位数的赤字。


Notwithstanding a small recent uptick, most forecasts predict that oil prices will remain at current levels for the long term.	尽管最近略有反弹，但大部分预测仍认为石油价格将在当前水平保持很长时间。


If so, this will deliver a macroeconomic shock of historic proportions and profoundly change the Middle East.	果真如此的话，这将带来历史级别的宏观经济冲击，深刻地改变中东。


Most oil-producing countries have already started to cut expenditures, borrow, and draw down their reserves.	大部分石油生产国已经开始缩减开支、借钱和消耗储备。


But countries with large external imbalances, low reserves, or high debts will increasingly feel financially constrained, if they don’t already.	但存在巨大外部失衡、低储备或高债务的国家将日益感受到财政的捉襟见肘，有的甚至已经有这样的感觉了。


Low oil prices will hit Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Oman, and war-torn Libya and Yemen before the richer countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.	低油价将冲击阿尔及利亚、巴林、伊拉克、伊朗、阿曼以及饱受战争摧残的利比亚和也门，然后是比较富裕的海湾合作组织成员国。


But, ultimately, each country’s economic fate will depend on the choices that it makes today.	但最终，各个国家的经济命运取决于其今天所做出的选择。


Oil-producing countries can either cut consumption, or maintain it by improving productivity.	石油生产国要么减少消费，要么通过改善生产率维持消费。


Naturally, any country would prefer the latter, so the region’s governments are now trying to grow out of their problems by diversifying their economies.	自然，任何国家都偏好于后者，因此中东各国政府正在试图通过经济多样化来解决问题。


Fortunately, the region is better positioned for a growth takeoff than it was in the 1990s, owing to major education and infrastructure investments that were made during the last decade of high oil prices.	幸运的是，中东比其在20世纪90年代时更加有可能实现增长起飞，这是因为在过去十年的高油价时期，它们投入了巨大的教育和基础设施投资。


But to avoid deep cuts to current consumption, any credible growth strategy will have to put structural reforms before even macroeconomic stabilization, lest failure to deliver growth leads to a financial crisis and even deeper consumption cuts in the future.	但要避免当前消费的剧烈下降，任何可信的增长战略都必须将结构改革置于比宏观经济稳定更加重要的位置，因为不能实现增长将导致金融危机和未来更加剧烈地削减消费。


Whether the region’s governments are finally serious about implementing real change remains to be seen.	中东各国政府是否终于开始严肃对待实施真正的变革的问题仍然有待观察。


The lessons of the last oil shock, which came on the heels of a collapse in state-led industrialization in the mid-1980s, were hard to absorb.	上一次石油冲击的教训很难吸收。 那次终极紧跟着20世纪80年代国家领导的工业化失败而来。


Because governments had borrowed to avoid making necessary adjustments during the 1973-1985 oil boom, the eventual bust precipitated a debt crisis.	由于政府在1973—1985年的石油荣景期间大量借贷而没有进行必须的调整，泡沫的破灭最终导致了债务危机。


Most countries had no choice but to cut expenditures and accept a lost decade of anemic growth.	大部分国家别无选择，只能削减开支，接受增长萎靡的失去的十年。


Since then, governments across the region have resorted to crude repression to keep public discontent and political opponents at bay.	此后，中东地区各国政府依靠残酷的镇压遏制公众不满和政治反对。


By the end of the 1990s, they had restored macroeconomic balance, but implemented merely superficial structural reforms.	到20世纪90年代末，它们终于重新实现了宏观经济平衡，但只实施了相当浅层的结构改革。


And when growth did return, in the 2000s, it was driven almost entirely by another oil boom.	而当21世纪初增长真的出现转折时，几乎又是完全依赖石油荣景驱动。


As in the 1980s, the region’s governments today have tied oil revenues to consumption subsidies, public-sector employment, and public investment.	和20世纪80年代一样，中东各国政府今天将石油收入与消费补贴、公共部门就业和公共投资联系在一起。


When adjustments are needed, they generally take the form of fiscal cuts, rather than structural reforms.	当需要调整时，它们一般采取财政紧缩而不是结构改革。


And these cuts have mostly hit public investment, thus undermining future growth prospects.	而这些紧缩基本上都会影响到公共投资，从而破坏未来增长前景。


Now that oil prices have plateaued, private investment is falling, domestic firms are idling, and unemployment is rising.	如今，随着石油价格进入稳定期，私人投资节节下降，国内企业闲置，失业率节节攀升。


More fundamentally, governments in oil-producing countries are confronting a political dilemma: Stronger economic growth, though desirable, requires regimes to take risks that could endanger their very survival.	更加基本的情况是，石油生产国政府正面临政治两难：强劲的经济增长固然值得追求，但这需要体制承担威胁到其生存的风险。


Decoupling oil revenues from public subsidies will require a new social contract that is based less on guaranteed consumption and more on personal autonomy.	让石油收入与公共补贴脱钩要求全新的社会契约，新的契约将更少依靠消费保障，更多依靠个人自治。


But, while a diversified economy presupposes more space for private enterprise, governments in the region, especially during boom times, have tended to favor politically connected firms, and blocked those they view as a threat.	但是，尽管多样化的经济是私人企业赢得更大空间的先决条件，但中东各国政府，特别是在荣景时期，总是偏袒政治关系强的企业，阻挠它们视之为威胁的企业。


This practice has always impeded competition, distorted bank lending, and reduced economic dynamism; but it has helped autocrats preserve their power.	这种行为一直制约着竞争，扭曲了银行贷款，也降低了经济活力； 但有利于独裁者保证权力。


Unfortunately, this system of patronage and clientelism has become only more entrenched since the Arab Spring, as governments have increasingly had to buy political consent.	不幸的是，这套恩庇和裙带主义自阿拉伯之春以来变得更加根深蒂固了，因为政府越来越需要拿钱来买政治同意（political consent）。


Oil exporters, with the exception of Libya and Yemen, may have avoided major political changes, but the autocratic bargain – and any attempt to unravel it – has become more expensive.	石油输出国——除了利比亚和也门——也许避免了政治剧变，但专制交易——以及任何解决它的努力——变得更加昂贵了。


Some regimes will be tempted to stick with the status quo, hope for a recovery in oil prices, and crack down harder on civil society in the meantime.	一些体制将被诱使坚持现状，寄希望于石油价格复苏，与此同时以更加残酷的手段打压公民社会。


If that happens, the situation could turn out even worse than in the 1990s.	果真如此的话，情况可能比20世纪90年代还要糟糕。


The region’s people have grown even more accustomed to high levels of state spending, and the public discontent revealed by the Arab Spring has not disappeared.	中东人民比以往更习惯于高水平的国家支出，阿拉伯之春所暴露的公众不满也并没有消失。


Those countries that opt for reform will require not only political courage, but also well-crafted policies.	选择改革的国家不但需要政治勇气，还需要合理的政策。


In most Middle Eastern countries, labor-market participation is now among the lowest in the world, and energy-to-output ratios are among the highest.	在大部分中东国家，劳动力市场参与率目前为世界最低行列，而能源-产出比则为最高行列。


To increase productivity while preserving social stability, subsidies should be removed with the goal of improving efficiency, not simply to make fiscal cuts.	要提高生产率、同时维持社会稳定，就必须以改善效率，而不仅仅是削减财政开支为目标取消补贴。


And a new fiscal-transfer system should be established to support investment rather than consumption.	新的财政转移支付系统应该支持投资而不是消费。


However, governments cannot simply liberalize markets and hope for the best.	但是，政府不能只是实施市场自由化，然后坐等最好的情况出现。


The region’s private sector will need active, sustained support to grow and mature.	中东地区的私人部门需要积极、持续的支持以实现成长和成熟。


Managing mixed economies that include state-owned enterprises and an inchoate private sector will require discipline, so that productive assets are not squandered, or privatized at fire-sale prices.	管理由国有企业和尚处于雏形阶段的私人部门组成的混合经济需要纪律，以保证生产资料不被浪费或以跳楼价私有化。


External imbalances will pose the largest challenge for the region.	外部失衡将构成中东地区最大的挑战。


Exchange-rate flexibility is not particularly useful when a country has no export capacity, and establishing import or foreign-exchange controls would only generate corruption and rent-seeking.	汇率弹性在国家不具备出口产能时无法派上大用，而实施进口或外汇管制只能加剧腐败和寻租。


Still, some countries may have room to raise tariffs on certain consumer goods. And if they develop renewable-energy sources and step up their conservation efforts, they can increase their energy exports.	但是，一些国家仍有提高某些商品的关税的空间，如果它们能开发可再生能源资源，加强保护措施，能源出口也可能增长。


It is hard to predict what a future of low oil revenues will mean for the Middle East.	很难预测低油价会给中东带来什么。


The region’s elites can either embrace change, or do nothing and risk a precipitous decline.	中东地区的精英可以实施变革，也可以什么都不做而承担急速崩溃的风险。


The time to choose is running out.	选择时间正在快速耗尽。


Breaking the Middle East’s Cycle of Terror	打破中东的恐怖循环


FEZ – In July, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that the Islamic State (ISIS) had been driven out of Mosul, the country’s second-largest city, which it captured three years ago.	菲兹—7月，伊拉克总理阿巴迪宣布伊斯兰国已经被逐出伊拉克第二大城市摩苏尔。 伊斯兰国占领摩苏尔长达三年。


Sooner or later, it will also lose Raqqa, the capital of its self-styled caliphate – and the last true city under its control.	迟早，伊斯兰国还将失去其自称的哈里发首都，也是最后一座其所控制的真正城市拉卡。


But these defeats do not mean the downfall of ISIS, much less Islamist terrorism, or that the Middle East’s most acute conflicts will be resolved anytime soon.	但这些失败并不意味着伊斯兰国的灭亡，更不意味着伊斯兰恐怖主义的灭亡，也不意味着中东最激烈的冲突将在不远的将来得到解决。


To be sure, the fading dream of an Islamic caliphate will weaken the ability of ISIS and kindred groups to recruit disaffected youth.	诚然，伊斯兰哈里发梦碎将削弱伊斯兰国和相关组织招募不满的年轻人的能力。


Already, the flow of foreign would-be jihadists crossing from Turkey into Syria to join ISIS has plunged, from 2,000 per month to about 50.	目前，穿越土耳其进入叙利亚加入伊斯兰国的外国潜在圣战分子数量暴跌，从每月2,000人减少到50人左右。


But such groups still have powerful lures at their disposal.	但这些组织仍然有强大的吸引力。


Most fundamentally, they are able to offer disillusioned young people a sense of purpose and belonging.	最根本的是，它们能够为幻灭的年轻人提供一种目标感和归属感。


The fact that this purpose entails murder, terror, and mayhem may make it all the more appealing among frustrated and resentful youth.	这一目标包含了杀戮、恐怖和骚乱，这一事实使得它对失望和心怀怨恨的青年号召力更加强大了。


Despite recent setbacks, writing off the threat posed by ISIS is as unwarranted as it is premature.	尽管最近频频受挫，但消除伊斯兰国的威胁仍然充满了未知数，不可过早下结论。


Consider the history of al-Qaeda, which proves that even if a state that nourishes a terrorist group fails, a radical ideology can continue to fuel violence near and far.	从基地组织的历史看，即使滋养了恐怖组织的国家失败了，激进意识形态仍然能够继续煽动远近地区的暴力。


The group’s leaders must simply adjust their methods, in order to continue attracting recruits and planning attacks from outside the borders of a friendly sovereign state.	恐怖组织领导人只需要调整方法，就能继续吸引新加入者，身处友好邻邦边境之外计划新的袭击。


To that end, in Iraq, terrorist groups will continue to exploit sectarianism, which had divided the country long before the United States invaded it in 2003.	在这方面，伊拉克恐怖组织将继续利用宗派主义。 在2003年美国入侵伊拉克时，伊拉克早已被宗派主义所分裂。


More broadly, they can capitalize on escalating tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims to attract alienated young Sunnis.	更广泛地讲，它们可以利用逊尼派和什叶派穆斯林之间的紧张对峙，吸引异化的逊尼派青年。


This increasingly dangerous dynamic is apparent in the decision of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, owing to its alleged ties with regional terrorist groups and Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main rival for regional influence.	埃及、沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋决定中断与卡塔尔的外交关系就体现了这一越来越危险的动态。 三国与卡塔尔断交是因为卡塔尔据称与地区恐怖组织和沙特阿拉伯的主要地区影响力对手——伊朗关系密切。


It is also visible in the devastating proxy war in Yemen, which has become a key battleground in the Saudi-Iranian power struggle.	也门的灾难性的代理战争也体现了这一越来越危险的动态。 也门已经成为沙特-伊朗权力斗争的主战场。


Against this background, it seems likely that ISIS, from its scattered bases in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, will be able to continue planning and executing terrorist attacks in the Middle East and beyond.	在这样的背景下，伊斯兰国很有可能从其在埃及西奈半岛、伊拉克、利比亚和也门的零散基地中，继续计划和执行中东和其他地区的恐怖袭击。


But there are ways to avoid such an outcome – or at least minimize the damage.	但有办法避免这样的结果——或至少实现伤害最小化。


For starters, governments and non-governmental actors in the Arab world must sever all financial ties to terrorist groups.	首先，阿拉伯世界的政府和非政府行动方必须切断一切与恐怖组织的财务关系。


Beyond official transfers, this means halting private efforts by individual citizens to fund terror.	除了官方转移，这还意味着中止个别公民私下里为恐怖组织提供资金。


States in the region already have harsh legal codes; governments should enforce them more effectively against those who finance terror.	域内国家已经订立了严厉的法律，政府应该更有效地对为恐怖主义提供资金的行为展开执法。


At the same time, religious and political leaders must loudly condemn the violent Islamist ideology that nurtures jihadist movements, spurning them with the same vigor that they reserve for challengers to their own authority.	与此同时，宗教和政治领袖必须大声谴责滋生了圣战运动的暴力伊斯兰意识形态，向对待挑战他们自身权威的人那样对待这些意识形态。


Qui tacet consentire videtur (silence means consent).	Qui tacet consentire videtur（缄默意味着允许）。


In this case, tacit consent emboldens terrorist actors, with deadly results.	在这个例子中，默许壮了恐怖行动分子的胆，也带来了死亡。


The countries of the Middle East have become associated with extremist ideologies and terror the world over.	中东国家已经成为极端意识形态的温床，向全世界输出恐怖。


If they are to recover their reputations, and restore the health of their societies and economies, they must act decisively to weaken the allure of terrorist recruiters.	如果它们想要恢复名声，重塑社会和经济健康，就必须坚决扼杀恐怖招募者的诱惑力。


Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have all made some moves in this direction, but they cannot do it alone.	阿尔及利亚、摩洛哥和突尼斯都已经朝这一方向采取了一些行动，但它们需要配合。


Like these countries, others in the Middle East must not allow themselves to be lulled into complacency by the ostensible fall of ISIS as a territorial entity.	和这些国家一样，其他中东国家决不能因为作为恐怖实体的伊斯兰国的表面灭亡而陷入自满。


Ultimately, the only way to break the cycle of terror and violence in the Arab world is to resolve the conflicts within Islam.	最终，打破阿拉伯世界恐怖和暴力循环的唯一办法是解决伊斯兰教内部的冲突。


To reach that point, however, the region’s governments must urgently pursue a two-prong strategy of interdiction and condemnation.	但是，要想实现这一点域内各国政府必须依靠封杀和谴责双管齐下的策略。


The Arab World’s Coming Challenges	阿拉伯世界即将到来的挑战


LONDON – Fifty years after the Six Days War, the Middle East remains a region in seemingly perpetual crisis.	伦敦—— 标志着以色列占领东耶路撒冷和西岸的6日战争结束五年后，中东地区似乎仍然深陷永久性的危机。


So it is no surprise that, when addressing the region, politicians, diplomats, and the donor and humanitarian community typically focus on the here and now.	因此，在与该地区打交道时，政客、外交官、捐助者和人道团体往往都会关注当时当地，这一点都不稀奇。


Yet, if we are ever to break the modern Middle East’s cycle of crises, we must not lose sight of the future.	但如果我们想要打破现代中东的危机循环，就不能对未来有所忽视。


And, already, four trends are brewing a new set of problems for the coming decade.	不仅如此，四种趋势已经在为未来十年酝酿全新的问题。


The first trend affects the Levant.	第一种趋势影响黎凡特地区。


The post-Ottoman order that emerged a century ago – an order based on secular Arab nationalism – has already crumbled.	一个世纪前诞生的以阿拉伯世俗民族主义为基础的后奥斯曼秩序已经土崩瓦解。


The two states that gave weight to this system, Iraq and Syria, have lost their central authority, and will remain politically fragmented and socially polarized for at least a generation.	支撑上述制度的伊拉克和叙利亚两国已经失去了中央政府，而且至少将在一代人的时间里无法摆脱政治分裂和社会分极。


In Lebanon, sectarianism remains the defining characteristic of politics.	在黎巴嫩，政治的核心特征仍然是宗派主义。


Jordan has reached its refugee-saturation point, and continued inflows are placing limited resources under ever-greater pressure.	约旦吸收难民的能力已经饱和，而持续的难民流入正在对有限的资源施加越来越大的压力。


As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no new initiative or circumstance on the political horizon that could break the deadlock.	至于以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突，在未来可见的政治视野中根本没有新的倡议和状况可以打破现有的僵局。


The Middle East is certain to face the continued movement of large numbers of people, first to the region’s calmer areas and, in many cases, beyond – primarily to Europe.	中东无疑会面对持续大量的人口流动，首要目的地是区域内相对平静的地区，许多情况下还将流向域外——欧洲是主要目的地。


The region is also likely to face intensifying contests over national identities as well, and perhaps even the redrawing of borders – processes that will trigger further confrontations.	该地区还有可能面临越来越激烈的民族身份斗争，甚至可能重新划定边界——这一过程将引发进一步的对抗行为。


The second major trend affects North Africa.	第二大主要趋势影响北非。


The region’s most populous states – Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco – will maintain the social and political orders that have become entrenched over the last six decades of their post-colonial history.	该地区人口最多的国家——阿尔及利亚、埃及和摩洛哥——将继续沿用其在后殖民时代近60年里已经根深蒂固的社会和政治秩序。


The ruling structures in these countries enjoy broad popular consent, as well as support from influential institutions, such as labor and farmers’ unions.	这些国家的执政机构拥有广泛的民意基础和工会及农会等实力机构的支持。


They also have effective levers of coercion that serve as backstops for relative stability.	他们还拥有有效的强制力量，能够作为相对稳定的基石。


But none of this guarantees smooth sailing for these governments.	但这些都不能保证相关政府能够一帆风顺。


On the contrary, they are poised to confront a massive youth bulge, with more than 100 million people under the age of 30 entering the domestic job market in North Africa between now and 2025.	恰恰相反，他们注定要面对数量急剧膨胀的青年群体，现在到2025年间将有超过一亿30岁以下的年轻人进入北非地区的国内劳动力市场。


And the vast majority of these young people, products of failed educational systems, will be wholly unqualified for most jobs offering a chance of social mobility.	而且这些年轻人中绝大多数都是教育体制失败的产物，完全不具备得到能带来社会流动性的工作的能力。


The sectors best equipped to absorb these young Arabs are tourism, construction, and agriculture.	旅游、建筑业和农业是吸收这些阿拉伯年轻人的最佳行业。


But a flourishing tourism sector is not in the cards – not least because of the resurgence of militant Islamism, which will leave North Africa exposed to the risk of terror attacks for years to come.	但旅游业的蓬勃发展并不是注定的——尤其因为激进伊斯兰教的重新崛起，这将导致北非有可能在未来面对恐怖袭击。


Moreover, a declining share of the European food market and diminished investments in real estate undermine the capacity of agriculture and construction to absorb young workers.	此外，欧洲粮食市场份额下降和房地产投资减少将影响农业和建筑业吸纳青年劳动力。


The likely consequences of North Africa’s youth bulge are thus renewed social unrest and potentially sizeable migration flows to Europe.	北非青年潮因此可能再次造成社会动荡，以及可能有大量人移民到欧洲。


The Gulf used to provide a regional safety valve.	海湾地区曾起到区域安全阀的作用。


For more than a half-century, Gulf countries absorbed millions of workers, primarily from their Arab neighbors’ lower middle classes.	半个多世纪以来，海湾国家吸收了主要来自阿拉伯邻国中低阶层的成百上千万劳动力。


The Gulf was also the main source of investment capital, not to mention tens of billions of dollars in remittances, to the rest of the region.	海湾也曾经是投资资本的主要来源地，更不要说数百亿美元从这里汇往地区其他国家。


And many Arab countries viewed it as the lender of last resort.	而很多阿拉伯国家都将海湾国家视为终极贷款来源地。


But – and herein lies the third key trend – the Gulf economies are now undergoing an upgrade, ascending various industrial value chains.	但海湾经济体正在经历向工业价值链的升级——这当中隐含着第三个关键趋势。


This reduces their dependence on low-skill foreign workers.	这降低了他们对低技术外籍工人的依赖。


In the coming years, the Gulf countries can be expected to import fewer workers from the rest of the Arab world, and to export less capital to it.	在接下来的几年中，人们可以预期海湾国家从阿拉伯其他国家劳动力进口量减少，资本出口也将呈现减少之势。


The Gulf might even become increasingly destabilized.	海湾地区甚至可能变得越来越不稳定。


Several Gulf powers and Iran are engaged in a partly sectarian proxy war in Yemen – one that will not end anytime soon.	若干海湾国家和伊朗正在也门打一场部分宗教派别的代理战争——这场战争将不会很快结束。


And now, several Sunni powers are forcefully trying to compel one of their own, Qatar, to abandon a regional strategy it has pursued for decades.	而现在五个逊尼派国家开始攻击同属逊尼派阵营的卡塔尔，因为卡塔尔一代人以来一直在推行其自己的地区议程。


The pressures being generated across the Arabian Peninsula could produce further political shocks.	整个南阿拉伯半岛所累积的压力可能会引发进一步的政治冲突。


That is all the more likely, given mounting domestic pressure for reform from a technologically savvy and globally engaged young citizenry.	出现这种情况的可能性越来越大，因为精通技术、视野广阔的年轻人越来越迫切地要求推行国内改革。


Reforming centuries-old social and political structures will be as difficult as it is necessary.	改革已有数百年历史的社会和政治架构既是必须完成的任务，但同时又困难重重。


The fourth trend affects the entire Arab world, as well as Iran and Turkey: the social role of religion is becoming increasingly contested.	第四种趋势影响整个阿拉伯世界，以及伊朗和土耳其：那就是宗教的社会作用越来越多地受到争议。


The wars and crises of the last six years have reversed much of the progress that political Islam had made in the decade before the so-called Arab Spring uprisings erupted in 2011.	过去六年来的战争和危机扭转了政治伊斯兰教在2011年爆发所谓阿拉伯之春起义前十年所取得的大部分进步。


With radicalism becoming increasingly entrenched, on the one hand, and young Muslims putting forward enlightened understandings of their religion, on the other, a battle for the soul of Islam is raging.	一方面，随着激进主义越来越根深蒂固，另一方面，随着年轻穆斯林对宗教的认识越来越开明，阿拉伯世界正在进行一场伊斯兰灵魂争夺战。


The problems implied by these four trends will be impossible for leaders, inside or outside the Arab world, to address all at once, especially at a time of rising populism and nativism across the West.	阿拉伯世界的内外领袖不可能彻底解决这四大趋势所蕴含的问题，尤其因为西方民粹主义和本土主义的崛起。


But action can and should be taken.	但我们可以而且应当采取行动。


The key is to focus on socioeconomic issues, rather than geopolitics.	关键是要集中力量关注社会经济问题，而不是地缘政治。


The West must not succumb to illusions about redrawing borders or shaping new countries; such efforts will yield only disaster.	西方决不能屈服于重新划定边界或塑造新国家的幻想； 这样的努力只会带来灾难。


One highly promising option would be to create a full-on Marshall Plan for the Arab world.	为阿拉伯世界制定一项全面的马歇尔计划应当是一种很有希望的选择。


But, in this era of austerity, many Western countries lack the resources, much less public support, for such an effort – most of the Arab world today couldn’t make the most of it in any case.	但在这个紧缩的时代，许多西方国家缺少相应资源，更不要说公众支持，来推行这样一项工作——而且无论如何，这样一项计划在今天绝大多数阿拉伯国家都无法最大限度的发挥作用。


What leaders – both within and outside the region – can do is pursue large-scale and intelligent investments in primary and secondary education, small and medium-size businesses (which form the backbone of Arab economies), and renewable energy sources (which could underpin the upgrading of regional value chains).	地区内和地区外领导人能做的是大规模投资于中小学教育、中小企业（构成阿拉伯世界的经济支柱）和可再生能源（有可能对区域价值链升级构成支撑）。


Pursuing this agenda won’t stem the dissolution of the modern Arab state in the Levant. It won’t generate workable social contracts in North Africa.	执行这项计划无法阻止黎凡特地区现代阿拉伯国家的解体，也不会在北非制定可行的社会契约。


And it certainly won’t reconcile the sacred with the secular.	而且它肯定无法在宗教和世俗之间达成和解。


But, by attempting to address young people’s socioeconomic frustrations, it can mitigate many of the longer-term consequences of these trends.	但通过尝试解决年轻人的社会经济困难，它能够缓和上述趋势所带来的许多长期后果。


The Future of Migration Governance	移民治理的未来


DHAKA – We live in a rapidly evolving, hyper-connected world, where goods, capital, and people are more mobile than ever before.	达卡—我们生活在一个日新月异的高度互联的世界中，商品、资本和人力的流动性前所未有。


But, whereas countries have shown a willingness to cooperate on exchanging goods and capital, the international community has shown little appetite for improving how it governs human mobility.	但是，尽管各国表现出合作交换商品和资本的意愿，但国际社会对于改善其人力流动治理状况似乎没有多少兴趣。


After the wide-scale persecution and displacement of people in World War II, world leaders took the bold step of crafting the 1951 Refugee Convention.	二战中出现了大规模的迫害和驱逐，二战结束后，世界领导人采取了果断措施，起草了1951年难民公约。


In doing so, they relinquished a measure of national sovereignty – by accepting the principle of non-refoulement – in order to promote global solidarity toward refugees.	如此，为了推进难民问题上的全球团结，他们放弃了一项国家主权——接受了不驱离原则。


On the other hand, country leaders saw migration as something temporary that could be managed ad hoc, through unilateral or bilateral agreements primarily designed to fill specific labor-market needs in developed economies.	另一方面，国家领导人视难民为临时性居民，可以通过主要为了满足发达经济体的具体劳动力市场需要而制定的单边或双边协定，用权宜之计来管理。


In hindsight, it is now clear that this approach was inadequate for dealing with the upsurge in human mobility that came with global and regional economic integration.	事后看来，显然如今这一方针以不足以应对伴随全球和地区经济一体化而生的人力流动性的激增。


When writing about guest workers in Switzerland, Swiss playwright Max Frisch once observed that, “We asked for workers.	瑞士剧作家马克斯·弗里希（Max Frisch）在描述瑞士外来工作者时曾经观察道，“我们要的是工人。


We got people instead.”	但我们得到的是人。


He meant that migrants are not goods that can be exported or imported, and they should not be exploited as if they were.	”他的意思是，移民不是可以出口和进口的商品，也不应该被当成进出口商品加以利用。


Migrants are human beings with rights, and they are motivated by a complex combination of personal desires, fears, and familial obligations.	移民是有权利的人，他们迁徙的动机是复杂的，兼有个人渴望、恐惧和家庭责任等。


Many migrants are searching for jobs because they have missed out on globalization’s unequally distributed gains, and they see no future for themselves if they remain where they are; countless others have been displaced by conflicts or natural disasters.	许多移民因为全球化收益的不平等分配而被迫出国寻找工作，如果仍然呆在原来的地方，他们将看不到未来； 也有数不清的移民是因为冲突或自然灾害而流离失所。


Today, ungoverned migration is threatening geopolitical stability, burdening border controls, and creating chaos around the world.	如今，不受管制的移民正在威胁地缘政治稳定，令边境控制不堪重负，在全世界制造混乱。


The current mechanisms for managing migration have clearly failed to meet existing needs.	当前的移民管理机制无法满足存在的需要。


The world needs a new, comprehensive global-governance framework to address all issues relating to human mobility.	世界需要新的、全面的全球治理框架以解决与人力流动相关的一切问题。


Achieving such an outcome is Bangladesh’s primary objective as Chair of the 2016 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), which culminates with the Ninth Annual Forum Meeting in Dhaka on December 10-12.	实现这一目标是孟加拉国担任2016年全球移民和发展论坛（GFMD）主席国的主要目标。 12月10—12日，GFMD将在达卡召开第九次年会。


In 2015, as part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, world leaders pledged to cooperate on migration issues and to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration.”	2015年，作为联合国2030年可持续发展目标的一部分，世界领导人承诺在移民问题上进行合作并“为有序、安全、合规、负责任的移民提供便利”。


The SDGs acknowledge migrants’ positive contribution to inclusive growth and sustainable development, and it is high time that our leaders follow through on their promises.	SDG承认移民对包容性增长和可持续发展的积极贡献，我们的领导人应该兑现他们的承诺。


Sadly, governments worldwide have become preoccupied with deterring migration and restricting people’s movement, rather than creating safe, dignified channels for human mobility.	悲哀的是，全世界政府全神贯注于阻止移民、限制人力流动，而不是营造安全而有尊严的人力流动渠道。


Unsurprisingly, this obsession with control has had little impact on irregular migration flows, because it runs counter to the pull of market forces and the push of personal aspirations.	毫不奇怪，如此沉迷于控制对于非法移民流几乎毫无影响，因为它违背了市场力量的拉力和个人志向的推力。


Populist politicians have taken advantage of the current situation by politicizing migration and scapegoating migrants for socioeconomic problems such as unemployment, welfare-system strains, and deteriorating social cohesion.	民粹主义政客通过将移民政治化以及指责移民为失业、福利制度困境和社会凝聚力下降的替罪羊利用了目前的局面。


But there is still room for hope.	但我们仍应该抱以希望。


When world leaders gathered at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants on September 19, they reaffirmed migrants’ human rights and committed to strengthening global governance on this issue.	9月19日，全世界领导人齐聚联合国难民和移民峰会，重申了移民的人权，并承诺加强该问题的国际治理。


At the center of the summit’s unanimously adopted New York Declaration is a commitment to develop two global compacts: to share responsibility for taking in refugees, and to ensure orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration.	峰会一致通过了《纽约宣言》，其核心是承诺制定两个全球契约：分担接收难民的责任； 以及确保有序、安全、合规和负责任的移民。


The government of Bangladesh proposed the second compact in April 2016.	孟加拉国政府在2016年4月提出了第二个契约。


That compact, which will be adopted at an inter-governmental conference in 2018, offers an historic opportunity to improve the way governments and other stakeholders cooperate on migration.	该契约将在2018年的一次政府间会议上通过，它为我们提供了一次历史性机遇改善政府和其他相关利益方在移民问题上的合作方式。


Building walls and discriminating against migrants or refugees on the basis of ethnicity or religion is antithetical to the 2030 SDG agenda, which aims to free people from the shackles of poverty, reduce inequality, and promote shared prosperity.	筑墙和根据种族和宗教歧视移民或难民违背了2030年SDG议程，SDG议程的目标是让人类摆脱贫困的枷锁、降低不平等性以及促进共同繁荣。


The international community must now ensure that the new global compacts promote these broad ambitions.	如今，国际社会必须确保新的全球契约能够促进这些广泛的宏大目标。


This will require national governments and global-governance institutions to implement bold policies that make migration both easier and more orderly.	这需要国家政府和地方治理机构实施果断政策，让移民变得更容易、更有序。


It will also require them to protect migrants and refugees’ rights, prevent ethnic or religious discrimination, and provide emergency assistance when needed.	这还需要它们保护移民和难民权利，防止种族或宗教歧视，并在需要时提供紧急援助。


And it will encourage them to maximize migrants’ positive economic impact on both their new countries and their countries of origin, by reducing financial and human costs and integrating newcomers into the labor market.	它还鼓励它们降低金融和人力成本，让新来者融入地方市场，从而尽量扩大移民对目的国和祖国的积极的经济影响。


To achieve the best outcome, the two global compacts will need to be pursued in a coordinated fashion, and treated as two parts of a single framework for governing migration.	要实现最优结果，两大全球契约需要合作推进，并作为治理移民的单一框架的两个部分。 2017年，政府将开始谈判这一未来框架的细节。


In 2017, governments will begin to negotiate the details of this future framework.	这可能包括一份具法律约束力的公约；


This may include a legally binding convention; a political declaration of principles to guide conduct; or operational commitments with goals, targets, and indicators of success, combined with a robust monitoring mechanism.	一份指引工作的原则声明； 或具备了目标、对象和成功指标并有强大的监督机制的操作性承诺。


These options should not be seen as mutually exclusive.	这些选项不应该被视为互相排斥。


If diplomacy prevails, and international arrangements are crafted carefully, one could imagine an outcome similar to the 2015 Paris climate agreement: binding commitments in some areas, non-binding guiding principles in others, and a shared promise by member states to take concrete action and to report their progress regularly.	如果外交胜出，认真地起草了国际协定，那么可以想象一个类似于2015年巴黎气候协定的结果：在一些领域做出有约束力的承诺，在另一些领域制定无约束力的指导性原则，并且成员国共同承诺采取切实行动并定期报告进展。


Such an approach would help to guarantee effectiveness.	这一方针有助于保证效率。


As the Chair of the GFMD, Bangladesh will communicate the Dhaka summit’s recommendations to countries’ negotiators.	作为GFMD主席国，孟加拉国将就达卡峰会的建议与各国谈判员进行沟通。


We will push for an agreement among political leaders at the inter-governmental conference in 2018 that vastly improves how migration is managed.	我们将推进政治领导人在2018年的政府间会议上达成能够大大改善移民管理的协定。


With international cooperation, we can unleash the full social and economic potential of migration.	在国际合作的支持下，我们能够释放出移民的全部社会和经济潜力。


And, in doing so, we will make migrants safer, societies more harmonious, and economies more prosperous.	这样做我们也能让移民更加安全，社会更加和谐，经济更加繁荣。


The Greening of the Miners	矿业的绿化


LONDON – Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States has turned mining – and the coal industry in particular – into a political cause célèbre over the last year.	伦敦—特朗普成为美国总统让矿业——特别是煤炭业——成为去年的热点政治话题。


In June, during his first White House cabinet meeting, Trump suggested that his energy policies were putting miners back to work and transforming a troubled sector of the economy.	6月，在其第一次白宫内阁会议期间，特朗普提出他的的能源政策要让矿工们恢复工作，并给这个经济中陷入麻烦的部门带来转变。


But Trump is mistaken to think that championing the cause of miners and paying respect to a difficult profession will be sufficient to make mining sustainable.	但特朗普错误地认为，支持矿工的事业、尊重一个陷入困境的职业便足以让矿业变得可持续。


To achieve that, a far more complex set of interdependencies must be navigated.	要想实现这个目标，必须考虑更加复杂的一系列相互依存关系。


Debates about mining and the environment are often framed in terms of a “nexus” between extraction of a resource and the introduction of other resources into the extraction process.	关于矿业和环境的争论，常常集中在开采资源和将其他资源引入开采过程之间的“联系”（nexus）上。


The forthcoming Routledge Handbook of the Resource Nexus, which I co-edited, defines the term as the relationship between two or more naturally occurring materials that are used as inputs in a system that provides services to humans.	我参与编辑的即将出版的《劳特利奇资源联系手册》（Routledge Handbook of the Resource Nexus）将“联系”一词定义为两种或多种自然形成、作为服务人类的系统的投入品的材料之间的关系。


In the case of coal, the “nexus” is between the rock and the huge amounts of water and energy needed to mine it.	在煤炭的例子中，“联系”发生在石头和开采石头所需要的巨量的水和能量之间。


For decision-makers, understanding this linkage is critical to effective resource and land-use management.	对决策者来说，理解这一联系对于有效的资源和土地使用管理至关重要。


According to research from 2014, there is an inverse relationship between the grade of ore and the amount of water and energy used to extract it.	据2014年以来的研究，矿石等级和开采所用的水和能量的数量之间存在反比关系。


In other words, misreading how inputs and outputs interact could have profound environmental consequences.	换句话说，错误理解投入和产出互动可能带来深远的环境影响。


Moreover, because many renewable energy technologies are built with mined metals and minerals, the global mining industry will play a key role in the transition to a low-carbon future.	此外，由于许多可再生能源技术是建立在已开采金属和矿物的基础上，因此全球矿业将在朝向低碳未来的转型中扮演关键角色。


Photovoltaic cells may draw energy from the sun, but they are manufactured from cadmium, selenium, and tellurium.	光伏电池可以从太阳中获取能量，但制造它们要用到镉、硒和碲。


The same goes for wind turbines, which are fashioned from copious amounts of cobalt, copper, and rare-earth oxides.	风力涡轮亦然，制造它们需要大量钴、铜和稀土氧化物。


Navigating the mining industry’s resource nexus will require new governance models that can balance extraction practices with emerging energy needs – like those envisioned by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	处理好矿业的资源联系需要能够平衡开采行为和新增能源需求的新治理模式，如联合国可持续发展目标（SDG）中所构想的。


Value creation, profit maximization, and competitiveness must also be measured against the greater public good.	价值创造、利润最大化和竞争性也必须置于更大的公共品背景中分析。


Some within the global mining industry have recognized that the winds are changing.	一些全球矿业业内人士已经认识到风向的变化。


According to a recent survey of industry practices by CDP, a non-profit energy and environmental consultancy, mining companies from Australia to Brazil are beginning to extract resources while reducing their environmental footprint.	据CDP（一家非营利性能源和环境咨询公司）对行业行为的最新调查，从澳大利亚到巴西的众多矿业公司已经开始在开采资源的同时减少环境足迹。


Nonetheless, if the interests of the public, and the planet, are to be protected, the world cannot rely on the business decisions of mining companies alone.	尽管如此，要像保护公众和地球的利益，我们无法只依靠矿业公司的商业决策。


Four key changes are needed to ensure that the industry’s greening trend continues.	需要四个关键性转变来确保矿业的绿化趋势得以维持。


First, mining needs an innovation overhaul.	首先，矿业作业需要创新。


Declining ore grades require the industry to become more energy- and resource-efficient to remain profitable.	矿石等级的下降要求矿产业提高能源和资源效率以保持盈利能力。


And, because water scarcity is among the top challenges facing the industry, eco-friendly solutions are often more viable than conventional ones.	此外，由于水短缺是行业所面临的最艰巨的挑战之一，因此生态友好型（eco-friendly）方案要比常规方案具备更强的可行性。


In Chile, for example, copper mines have been forced to start using desalinated water for extraction, while Sweden’s Boliden sources up to 42% of its energy needs from renewables.	比如，智利铜矿被迫启开始使用脱盐水来进行开采作业，瑞典的Boliden公司42%的能源需求用可再生资源满足。


Mining companies elsewhere learn from these examples.	其他国家的矿业公司也从中汲取经验。


Second, product diversification must start now.	其次，生产多样化必须从现在开始落实。


With the Paris climate agreement a year old, the transformation of global fossil-fuel markets is only a matter of time.	巴黎气候协定已经签订一年，，全球化石燃料市场的转变只是个时间问题。


Companies with a large portfolio of fossil fuels, like coal, will soon face severe uncertainty related to stranded assets, and investors may change their risk assessments accordingly.	大量依靠化石燃料（如煤炭）的公司很快就将面临搁浅资产所带来的不确定性，投资者也会据此改变风险评估。


Large mining companies can prepare for this shift by moving from fossil fuels to other materials, such as iron ore, copper, bauxite, cobalt, rare earth elements, and lithium, as well as mineral fertilizers, which will be needed in large quantities to meet the SDGs’ targets for global hunger eradication.	大型矿业公司可以为此做一些准备工作，包括从化石燃料转向其他材料，比如铁矿石、铜、铝土矿、钴、稀土元素和锂，以及转向矿物肥料，SDG所提出的消灭全球饥饿的目标对矿物肥料有着巨大的需求。


Phasing out coal during times of latent overproduction might even be done at a profit.	在有可能发生产能过剩的时期摒弃煤炭甚至有可能有利可图。


Third, the world needs a better means of assessing mining’s ecological risks.	第三，我们需要更好的手段来评估开矿的生态风险。


Although the industry’s environmental footprint is smaller than that of agriculture and urbanization, extracting materials from the ground can still permanently harm ecosystems and lead to biodiversity loss.	尽管矿产业的环境足迹要小于农业和城市化，但从地下开采矿物有可能对生态系统造成永久性破坏并导致生物多样性丧失。


To protect sensitive areas, greater global coordination is needed in the selection of suitable mining sites.	要保护敏感地区，需要更大的全球协调选取一批合适的矿井。


Integrated assessments of subsoil assets, groundwater, and biosphere integrity would also help, as would guidelines for sustainable resource consumption.	综合评估地下资产、地下水和生物圈完整性将有所助益，引导可持续资源消费亦然。


Finally, the mining sector must better integrate its value chains to create more economic opportunities downstream.	最后，矿产业必须更好地将自己的价值链与创造更多下游经济机会融合起来。


Establishing models of material flows – such as the ones existing for aluminum and steel – and linking them with “circular economy” strategies, such as waste reduction and reuse, would be a good start.	建立物质流（material flows，如在铝和钢铁业中已有的那些），并将它们与“循环经济”战略（如废物减少和再利用）相结合是一个很好的起点。


A more radical change could come from a serious engagement in markets for secondary materials.	更彻底的变化可能来自市场大量参与到二手物质的流动中。


“Urban mining” – the salvaging, processing, and delivery of reusable materials from demolition sites – could also be better integrated into current core activities.	“城市挖矿”——从废物站点回收、处理和运送可重复使用物质——可以更好地融入目前的核心行动中。


The global mining industry is on the verge of transforming itself from fossil-fuel extraction to supplying materials for a greener energy future.	全球矿产业正处在改革自身、从化石燃料开采转向为更加绿色的能源未来提供物质材料的前夜。


But this “greening” is the result of hard work, innovation, and a complex understanding of the resource nexus. Whatever America’s coal-happy president may believe, it is not the result of political platitudes.	但这一“绿化”是艰苦工作、创新和对资源联系的复杂理解的结果，而不是政治陈词滥调的结果。


Misery Loves Inflation Targeters’ Company	伴随通胀目标设定者的痛苦


TOKYO – The United States, Europe, and Japan are all making positive economic strides.	发自东京——美国，欧洲和日本都取得了积极的经济发展。


In the US, the unemployment rate is falling, and now stands at just over 4%.	美国失业率一路下降，目前只有4％多一点。


Unemployment remains high in the eurozone, at close to 9%, but that still represents significant progress from the past decade or so.	欧元区失业率虽然还有9％，但相对过去十年来说已是进展重大。


And Japan has achieved virtually full employment, with labor demand so high that new graduates are able not just to find jobs, but to choose them.	日本已经基本上实现了充分就业，其国内劳动力需求如此之高，以至于那些新毕业生不仅能找到工作，而且还能挑工作。


Yet there is one key area where progress seems to be lagging: inflation.	然而有一个关键领域的进展似乎拖了后腿：通货膨胀。 美国10月份消费者价格指数达到2.


While the US consumer price index reached 2.2% in October, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have so far been unable to meet their targets of roughly 2% inflation, with the eurozone’s average annual price growth hovering around 1.5% and Japan’s firmly lodged in the 1% range.	2％，欧洲央行和日本央行迄今未能达到大致2％的通胀目标，欧元区年均物价涨幅徘徊在1. 5％左右，日本则一直盘踞在1％的范围内。


There are good reasons to strive to meet the inflation target. Money markets would be rid of near-zero interest rates.	有好些因素可证明努力达到通胀目标的必要性：货币市场将可以摆脱接近于零的利率；


Concerns about currency appreciation damaging export competitiveness would be assuaged, as globalization and artificial intelligence continue to create competition for workers.	由于全球化和人工智能不断在减少本地工人的重要性，对货币升值损害出口竞争力的忧虑将有所缓解；


And the expansionary monetary policy pursued by the world’s major central banks in recent years would be vindicated.	而近年来世界主要央行所推行的扩张性货币政策也可以得到维护。


Yet when it comes to ordinary people’s wellbeing, meeting the inflation target is not always the best option.	不过对老百姓来说，达到通胀目标并不总是最好的选择。


Of course, reining in high inflation is beneficial, as it preserves the value of existing money.	当然我们有必要去遏制高通胀，让现有货币保值。


But raising below-target inflation to 2% leaves people worse off, as it causes their savings to lose value continuously, thereby undermining their prosperity.	但将低于目标的通胀率提高到2％会使人们的生活变得更糟，因为这会导致他们的储蓄持续贬值，从而影响其兴旺发展。


The late Arthur Okun, who was one of my professors at Yale before serving as Chair of US President Lyndon Johnson’s Council of Economic Advisers, created the so-called misery index, which goes beyond headline GDP growth or the unemployment rate to provide insight into how the average citizen is faring economically.	在担任美国总统林登·约翰逊（Lyndon Johnson）的经济顾问委员会主席之前，已故耶鲁大学教授阿瑟·奥肯（Arthur Okun）创造了所谓的痛苦指数，一个超脱于GDP总体增长或失业率来评价普通公民经济境遇的指数。


Okun’s index – the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates – is based on the assumption that an increase in inflation, like an increase in unemployment, creates economic and social costs for a country.	该指数——通胀率和失业率的总和——基于这样一个假设，即通胀的上升（就跟失业率上升一样）会为一个国家带来经济和社会成本。


The reality is that the inflation target is a means to an end – to facilitate full employment and faster GDP growth – not an end in itself.	事实上，通胀目标只是一个达到目的（促进充分就业和更快GDP增长）的手段而非目的本身。


And, at least in Japan, substantial progress toward that end has been made, despite the failure to meet the Bank of Japan’s inflation target.	而且至少在日本方面，尽管日本央行的通胀目标尚未达到，但针对最终目的来说已经取得了实质性进展。


Signs of full employment in the market for permanent workers could set the stage for a moderate wage-price increase.	长期聘用职工市场上的充分就业迹象可能为适度的工资提升奠定了基础。


That was not the case before 2013, when the implementation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic-reform program, so-called Abenomics, ended a period of austere monetary policy.	但在日本首相安倍晋三在2013年实施经济改革方案（即所谓的安倍经济学）终结了紧缩货币政策的时代之前，情况可不是这样的。


But this has not deterred critics of Abenomics from harping on the non-fulfillment of the inflation target.	但这并未阻止安倍经济学的批评者在未能实现通货膨胀目标问题上絮絮叨叨。


The question is why.	问题是他们为何要坚持这一点。


Not long ago, I posed that question to a monetary-policy authority (whose name I am not at liberty to divulge).	不久前我向一个货币政策当局官员提出过这个问题（我无权泄露他的名字）。


Rather than provide a straightforward answer, he replied that it was “tricky,” finally landing on the statement that, no matter how low the unemployment rate, the inflation target should be pursued.	他没有直接回答，只是说这是一个“棘手的问题”，最终他说无论失业率多低，都应该追求通胀目标。


This kind of thinking is common among economists, particularly the generation swept up by the “rational expectations” revolution in macroeconomics.	这种思想在经济学家中是很常见的，特别是在宏观经济学中“理性预期”革命下成长的那一代。


This cohort views economics as the study of models, in which agents’ expectations can be assumed to be rational and consistent with the model.	这批人将经济学视为模型的研究，假定经济学主体的期望是理性并与模型一致的。


From this perspective, inflation expectations can be assumed to be either ideal predictions of the future, or at the very least rational ones, with their accuracy and precision undermined only by limitations in information received by economic actors.	从这个角度看来通胀预期可以被认为是对未来的理想预测，或者至少是理性的预测，其准确性和精确性只会受到经济行动者所接收信息的限制。


Older economists thought differently, assuming that most economic outcomes in the real world are the result of behavior that is at least partly irrational, meaning that expectations should be viewed more as reasonable possibilities than near-certainties.	老一辈经济学家的理念则不一样，他们假设现实世界中的大多数经济现象至少在一定程度上是非理性行为的结果，这意味着期望应该被视为合理的可能性，而不是近似的确定性。


Because I belong to the generation taught by old sages – Lawrence Klein, Franco Modigliani, and James Tobin – I think this is a worthwhile assessment – one that should be applied to today’s discussions about monetary policy and inflation.	因为我受的都是老一辈——劳伦斯·克莱因（Lawrence Klein），弗兰克·莫迪利亚尼（Franco Modigliani）和詹姆斯·托宾（James Tobin）——的教诲，我认为这是个有价值的看法——也应该应用于当前关于货币政策和通胀的讨论。


While it is important to recognize the merits of inflation targeting, the misery index, too, has a role to play in helping us to assess the state of our economies – and the success of our policies.	虽然有必要认识到设定通货目标的优点，但在评估我们自身经济状况以及政策的成败方面，痛苦指数也是有一定作用的。


Central Bankers’ Shifting Goalposts	央行规则的变化


BRUSSELS – The theme of this year’s meeting of the world’s central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, had little to do with monetary policy.	布鲁塞尔—今年怀俄明州杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）的世界央行行长会议主题与货币政策没有什么关系。


“Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy” is, of course, an important topic.	当然“构建有活力的全球经济”是一个重要话题。


But it is telling that the European Central Bank chose, for its own annual gathering, a similar “non-monetary” topic (“Investment and Growth in Advanced Countries”).	但欧洲央行为自己的年会选择了一个类似的“非货币”话题（“发达国家的投资与增长”）就很能说明问题了。


There is nothing wrong with central bankers considering challenges in areas like growth, trade, and investment.	央行行长考虑诸如增长、贸易和投资等方面的挑战，这并没有什么不对。


But central banks were made independent precisely because it was understood that they would be held accountable for achieving their own objective of maintaining price stability, regardless of the economy’s underlying growth rate.	但央行之所以要独立，正是因为人们认识到，它们要为实现自身目标——不论经济增长率如何，都要维持货币稳定——接受问责。


So why is it that central bankers would rather look at external issues than focus on their own area of responsibility?	因此，央行行长为什么要去关注外部问题，而不将注意力集中在自己的三分三上？


The answer, it seems, is that they cannot quite explain their current approach.	看起来，答案似乎是他们无法很好地解释当前的方针。


Conditions today are very favorable for monetary policymaking, particularly for the ECB – as a brief look at history makes clear.	今天的环境非常有利于货币决策，欧洲央行尤其如此——只要稍稍回顾一下历史便可清楚地看出这一点。


Since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999, the ECB has been solely responsible for determining the EMU’s monetary policy.	自1999年1月经济与货币联盟（EMU）成立以来，欧洲央行便独揽确定EMU货币政策的责任。


(Although national currencies remained in circulation until 2002, exchange rates were “irrevocably” fixed from 1999.)	（尽管国家货币一直六通道2002年，但汇率从1999年开始“不可撼动地”固定住了。 ）


The ECB’s job was hard from the beginning.	欧洲央行的责任从一开始就十分艰难。


After all, when the euro was born, global financial markets were in turmoil, owing to the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian default of 1998.	毕竟，欧元诞生时，全球金融市场因为1997年亚洲危机和1998年俄罗斯违约而处于动荡之中。


The VIX index, which measures stock-market volatility, had hit 44% in August 1998, and during the euro’s first few years, it hovered around 25-30%, compared to around 12% today.	衡量股市波动率的VIX指数在1998年8月达到了44%，在欧元流通的最初几年，VIX一直在25—30%的区间徘徊，而今天该指数只有12%。


While unemployment in the eurozone was declining, the rate was close to 10%, and it remained higher than today’s level, 9.3%, for all of 1999.	此外，尽管当时欧元区失业率正在下降，但仍接近10%，1999年全年都高于今天的水平9. 3%。


From a monetary-policy perspective, there was also a need to cope with the deflationary legacy of financial crisis.	从货币政策角度，欧洲央行还需要应对金融危机的通缩遗产。


Indeed, when the eurozone was established, prices were increasing by less than 2%, and headline inflation was stuck at around 1%.	事实上，欧元区成立时，价格涨幅不到2%，标题通胀率在1%左右徘徊。


Those two key indicators of monetary policy are at almost exactly the same levels today, but financial markets are significantly more settled now than they were then.	这两大货币政策的关键指标几乎与今天完全一样，但当时的金融市场远远不如今天那么稳定。


In 1999, despite slightly below-target inflation, high unemployment, and financial-market volatility, the ECB Governing Council did not even consider zero or negative interest rates, much less unconventional policy measures.	1999年，尽管面临着略低于目标的通胀率、高企的失业率和金融市场的高波动率，欧洲央行理事会并没有考虑零或负利率，更不用说非常规政策措施了。


Instead, its first action, in 1999, was to fix the main policy rate at 2%.	相反，1999年它的第一个动作是将主要政策利率固定在2%。


Over the course of that year, the ECB did cut the benchmark rate by 50 basis points, to the then-unprecedented level of 1.5%.	在1999年里，欧洲央行确实将基准利率下调了50个基点，至前所未有的低位1. 5%。


But it did so just to give the economy a chance to recover.	但之所以如此，完全是为了让经济有机会复苏。


After a few months, it reversed course, putting the year-end policy rate back at 2%.	几个月后，欧洲央行就进行了相反的操作，到了年底，它将利率重新上调至2%。


Over the next year, the rate was raised to 3.75%, even though inflation had not accelerated by more than a few dozen basis points.	2000年，基准利率上调到了3. 75%，即使通胀仅仅提高了几十个基点。


Today, the ECB is facing a much more comfortable situation.	如今，欧洲央行面临的局面要舒适得多。


While inflation is undershooting the 2% target by a similar amount, the labor market appears to be in much better shape.	通胀和2%的目标之间的距离和1999年时差不多，但劳动力市场的情况要好得多。


But is it?	但真是如此吗？


It is widely assumed that a deep recession induces many of the unemployed to leave the labor market, because looking for a job seems useless.	人们广泛认为，深度衰退让许多失业者离开了劳动力市场，因为找工作完全徒劳无功。


If many such discouraged workers have left the labor market, a recovery of the unemployment rate to pre-recession levels can be misleading.	如果有大量这样的沮丧工人离开了劳动力市场，那么失业率回归衰退前水平就会产生误导。


That is why the unemployment rate needs to be considered in conjunction with the labor-force participation rate.	因此，失业率需要和劳动力市场参与率结合起来考量。


By that measure, the eurozone is actually doing much better today than in 1999.	按此衡量，欧元区今天确实也比1999年好得多。


With the labor-force participation rate five percentage points higher that it was back then, it seems clear that fewer workers have been discouraged from job-seeking today than at the start of the EMU, and thus that there is less underused potential in the economy.	劳动力市场参与率要比当时高五个百分点，看上去因沮丧而不再找工作的人，在今天显然要比EMU刚刚成立时更少，因此，经济的未利用潜力也更小。


Against this background, it is difficult to explain why the ECB continues to insist that unconventional monetary-policy measures – such as negative rates and continued bond purchases – are needed.	在这样的背景下，很难解释为何欧洲央行要继续坚持非常规货币政策措施——比如负利率和不断地购买债券。


The long-term inflation outlook might be somewhat more uncertain today.	长期通胀前景在今天可能不确定性更大。


But can a few dozen basis points in (poorly measured) long-term inflation expectations justify the need for massive quantitative easing and a policy rate 250 points lower than it was at a time of weaker market fundamentals?	但（衡量不准的）长期通胀预期变动区区几十个基点就足以需要实施大规模量化宽松并让政策利率比市场基本面更加疲软的时候还要低250个基点吗？


This incongruity is not limited to Europe.	这一吊诡之处并非仅仅局限于欧洲。


In the United States, too, one finds a similar combination of inflation and unemployment today and two decades ago.	在美国，你同样可以找到类似的今天和二十年前的通胀和失业率组合。


In 1999, a core inflation rate of around 2%, combined with unemployment below 5%, justified a federal funds rate of 5% (and a “normal” balance sheet).	1999年，核心通胀率在2%左右，失业率低于5%，这让美联储设定了5%联邦基金利率（以及“常规”的资产负债表）。


Today, the Federal Reserve has kept its benchmark rate below 1.5% – 350 basis points lower than in 1999 – and has postponed any reduction in its bloated balance sheet.	如今，美联储将基准利率保持在低于1. 5%——比1999年要低350个基点——并中止了一切削减其膨胀的资产负债表的措施。


In Japan, inflation is now higher than it was in the wake of the Asian financial crisis; unemployment is at its lowest level in 50 years; and the labor-force participation rate continues to reach record highs.	在日本，今天的通胀要比亚洲金融危机爆发时更高，失业率则位于50年来的最低水平； 而其劳动力参与率更是频创新高。


Yet Japan, like the US and Europe, continues to display a quixotic tendency to tilt at deflation windmills, with rock-bottom interest rates and purchases of massive amounts of government debt.	但和美国和欧洲一样，日本仍然像堂吉诃德那样执着地向通缩的风车发动进攻，将利率设置在极低水平，买入大规模政府债务。


Central bankers surely wish for a dynamic global economy.	央行行长显然想要一个有活力的全球经济。


But that is not something they can influence much.	但这不是他们可以产生巨大影响的事情。


Rather than discussing unrelated issues, they should be focused on explaining why their goalposts have shifted so much – and whether it is time to start moving them back.	他们不应该去讨论无关话题，而是应该专注于解释为何他们的规则发生了如此大的改变——以及现在是否应该把规则改回去。


The Mystery of the Missing Inflation	失落的通胀去哪了？


NEW YORK – Since the summer of 2016, the global economy has been in a period of moderate expansion, with the growth rate accelerating gradually.	发自纽约——自2016年夏季以来，全球经济一直处于适度扩张期，增长速度也逐渐加快。


What has not picked up, at least in the advanced economies, is inflation.	但其中没有抬头向上的一个指标（至少在发达经济体）则是通货膨胀。


The question is why.	那么为何会出现这一情况呢？


In the United States, Europe, Japan, and other developed economies, the recent growth acceleration has been driven by an increase in aggregate demand, a result of continued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, as well as higher business and consumer confidence.	在美国、欧洲，日本和其他发达经济体，近期的增长加速源自于总需求的增加，而这一增加则是货币和财政政策持续扩张以及商业和消费者信心回升的结果。


That confidence has been driven by a decline in financial and economic risk, together with the containment of geopolitical risks, which, as a result, have so far had little impact on economies and markets.	信心的背后是下降了的金融和经济风险，再结合得到了遏制的地缘政治风险，但这两者迄今为止对经济和市场的影响不大。


Because stronger demand means less slack in product and labor markets, the recent growth acceleration in the advanced economies would be expected to bring with it a pickup in inflation.	由于强劲的需求意味着产品和劳动力市场将有所回暖，人们寄望近期发达经济体的增长加速能带来通胀的回升。


Yet core inflation has fallen in the US this year and remains stubbornly low in Europe and Japan.	然而今年美国的核心通胀率已然下降，欧洲和日本仍在低位徘徊。


This creates a dilemma for major central banks – beginning with the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank – attempting to phase out unconventional monetary policies: they have secured higher growth, but are still not hitting their target of a 2% annual inflation rate.	这给那些试图逐步退出非常规货币政策的各大央行——以美联储和欧洲央行为首——陷入了两难境地：它们已经锁定了更高的增长，但却未能实现2% 年的年通货膨胀率目标。


One possible explanation for the mysterious combination of stronger growth and low inflation is that, in addition to stronger aggregate demand, developed economies have been experiencing positive supply shocks.	对高增长-低通胀这一神秘组合的一个可能解释是，除了更强劲的总需求外，发达经济体还面对着一波起正面作用的供应冲击。


Such shocks may come in many forms.	这些冲击可能以多种形式呈现。


Globalization keeps cheap goods and services flowing from China and other emerging markets.	全球化使得廉价商品和服务从中国和其他新兴市场不断涌出。


Weaker unions and workers’ reduced bargaining power have flattened out the Phillips curve, with low structural unemployment producing little wage inflation.	日益弱势的工会以及更低的工人议价能力削平了菲利普斯曲线，低结构性失业率导致工资水平一蹶不振。


Oil and commodity prices are low or declining.	石油和大宗商品价格维持低位或一路走低。


And technological innovations, starting with a new Internet revolution, are reducing the costs of goods and services.	而以新互联网革命为首的技术革新正在降低商品和服务的成本。


Standard economic theory suggests that the correct monetary-policy response to such positive supply shocks depends on their persistence.	经典经济理论认为，针对这些正面性供给冲击的正确货币政策应对取决于冲击的持续时间。


If a shock is temporary, central banks should not react to it; they should normalize monetary policy, because eventually the shock will wear off naturally and, with tighter product and labor markets, inflation will rise.	如果一切只是暂时的，央行不应对此作出回应； 它们应该使货币政策正常化，因为最终冲击会自然而然地消失，同时随着商品和劳动力市场的收紧，通胀将会上升。


If, however, the shock is permanent, central banks should ease monetary conditions; otherwise, they will never be able to reach their inflation target.	倘若这种冲击是长期性的，央行应该放宽货币条件； 否则它们就永远无法实现其通胀目标。


This is not news to central banks.	这对中央银行来说并不新鲜。


The Fed has justified its decision to start normalizing rates, despite below-target core inflation, by arguing that the inflation-weakening supply-side shocks are temporary.	美联储就已经在核心通胀低于目标值的情况下决定开始实施利率正常化，因为它认定这种削弱通胀的供给侧冲击只是暂时的。


Likewise, the ECB is preparing to taper its bond purchases in 2018, under the assumption that inflation will rise in due course.	同样，欧洲央行也判定通胀率将在适当的时候回升，并为此计划在2018年缩减其债券购买量。


If policymakers are incorrect in assuming that the positive supply shocks holding down inflation are temporary, policy normalization may be the wrong approach, and unconventional policies should be sustained for longer.	如果政策制定者在抑制通胀的正面性供应冲击的暂时性判断上出现了失误，那么政策正常化可能是错误的做法，而非常规政策应维持更长时间。


But it may also mean the opposite: if the shocks are permanent or more persistent than expected, normalization must be pursued even more quickly, because we have already reached a “new normal” for inflation.	但这也可能意味着相反的做法: 如果冲击是长期性的或比预期的更持久，那么正常化就必须更快地进行，因为我们已经走到了一个通货膨胀的 “新常态”。


This is the view taken by the Bank for International Settlements, which argues that it is time to lower the inflation target from 2% to 0% – the rate that can now be expected, given permanent supply shocks.	这也是国际清算银行所持的观点，认为现在是时候将通胀目标从2% 调低到0% ——这是在长期性供应冲击下目前可预期的利率。


Trying to achieve 2% inflation in a context of such shocks, the BIS warns, would lead to excessively easy monetary policies, which would put upward pressure on prices of risk assets, and, ultimately, inflate dangerous bubbles.	该行警告说试图在这种冲击下实现2% 的通胀将导致货币政策过于宽松，给风险资产的价格带来上行压力并最终催生出危险的泡沫。


According to this logic, central banks should normalize policy sooner, and at a faster pace, to prevent another financial crisis.	根据这一逻辑，各国央行应更早启动政策正常化并以更快的步骤加以执行，以防另一场金融危机爆发。


Most advanced-country central banks don’t agree with the BIS.	但大多数发达国家央行不认同上述观点。


They believe that, should asset-price inflation emerge, it can be contained with macroprudential credit policies, rather than monetary policy.	它们认为一旦出现资产价格通胀，就可以用宏观谨慎的信贷政策而非货币政策来进行遏制。


Of course, advanced-country central banks hope such asset inflation won’t appear at all, because inflation is being suppressed by temporary supply shocks, and thus will increase as soon as product and labor markets tighten.	当然，发达国家央行希望这样的资产通胀一点都不要出现，因为通胀只是受到了暂时性供应冲击的压制，一旦产品和劳动力市场收紧就会回升。


But, faced with the possibility that today’s low inflation may be caused by permanent supply shocks, they are also unwilling to ease more now.	但考虑到当前的低通胀也可能是由长期性供应冲击所导致，它们也不愿意进一步实施宽松。


So, even though central banks aren’t willing to give up on their formal 2% inflation target, they are willing to prolong the timeline for achieving it, as they have already done time and again, effectively conceding that inflation may stay low for longer.	因此尽管各国央行不愿放弃其正式的2% 通胀目标，但也愿意延长实现这一指标的时间期限，因为它们已经反复做过几次了，也实际上承认了通胀可能会长期保持在低位。


Otherwise, they would need to sustain for much longer their unconventional monetary policies, including quantitative easing and negative policy rates – an approach with which most central banks (with the possible exception of the Bank of Japan) are not comfortable.	否则它们就得长期维持其非常规货币政策，包括量化宽松和负政策利率——多数央行 (日本央行可能例外) 对此都不会满意的。


This central bank patience risks de-anchoring inflation expectations downward.	央行的这种忍耐可能会导致着通胀预期下行的风险。


But continuing for much longer with unconventional monetary policies also carries the risk of undesirable asset-price inflation, excessive credit growth, and bubbles.	但大幅度延长非常规货币政策也会产生不良资产价格上涨，过度信贷增长和泡沫的风险。


As long as uncertainty over the causes of low inflation remains, central banks will have to balance these competing risks.	只要通胀率低迷的原因仍未查明，央行就必须在这些相互矛盾的风险之间找到平衡。


Central Banks Must Work Together – or Suffer Alone	中央银行合方能利，不合必败


NEW YORK – Global growth seems to be moving, slowly but surely, along the path to recovery.	纽约—全球经济正在朝复苏的方向走，尽管缓慢，但非常确定。


The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook predicts 3.5% global growth this year, up from 3.2% last year.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的最新世界经济展望预测今年全球增长为3. 5%，较去年的3.


But there’s a hitch: the easy monetary policies that have largely enabled economies to return to growth are reaching their limits, and now threaten to disrupt the recovery by creating the conditions for another financial crisis.	2%有所提高。 但有一个问题：让经济回归增长的宽松货币政策正在达到极限，现在，它们有可能在为新的金融危机创造条件，对复苏起到干扰作用。


In recent years, the world’s major central banks have pursued unprecedentedly easy monetary policies, including what a recent Deutsche Bank report calls “multi-century all-time lows in interest rates.”	近几年来，世界主要央行采取了前所未有的宽松货币政策，包括德意志银行最新报告中所谓的“几百年来最低水平的利率”。


That, together with large-scale quantitative easing, has injected a massive $32 trillion into the global economy over the last nine years.	这，再加上大规模量化宽松，在过去九年中为全球经济注入了32万亿美元巨资。


But these unconventional policies are turning out to be a classic game-theoretic bad equilibrium: each central bank stands to gain by keeping interest rates low, but, collectively, their approach constitutes a trap.	但这些非常规政策正在转变为经典的博弈论坏均衡：每个央行都能从保持低利率中获利，但从集体角度，它们的方针却构成了一个陷阱。


In today’s globalized world, a slight reduction in interest rates by an individual central bank can bring some benefits, beginning with weakening the currency and thus boosting exports.	在当今全球化的世界，个别央行略微调低利率能够带来一些好处，首先是货币贬值，从而提振出口。


But the more countries employ this strategy, the greater the strain on the banking sector.	但采取这一策略的国家越多，银行业的压力就越大。


This is already apparent in Europe, where bank equity prices have dropped steadily in recent months.	在欧洲，这一点已经表露无遗，欧洲银行股价在最近几个月中稳步下跌。


Moreover, low and especially negative interest rates make holding cash costly, prompting investors to seek riskier investments with higher potential returns.	此外，低利率，特别是负利率，能产生现金持有成本，促使投资者寻求通过高风险投资实现更高的潜在回报。


As a result, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have more than doubled this year, reaching an overall market value of $460 billion.	结果，抵押贷款证券（CLO）在今年翻了一番，总市值达到了4,600亿美元。


That looks a lot like the surge in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that helped to drive the 2008 financial crisis.	这看起来和导致2008年金融危机的抵押债务证券（CDO）规模飙升如出一辙。


While the world has implemented more checks and balances for CLOs than it did for CDOs before the crisis, the trend remains deeply worrying.	尽管世界对CLO的制约要比危机前的CDO更强，但这一趋势仍然令人深感不安。


Finally, persistently low interest rates can cause people to worry about their retirement funds, spurring them to save more.	最后，持续低利率可能导致人们担心自己的退休金，促使他们增加储蓄。


Far from boosting consumption, as intended, monetary stimulus may create an environment that dampens demand, weakening prospects for economic growth.	货币刺激并不能如愿提振消费，反而有可能创造一个抑制需求的环境，削弱经济增长前景。


Today, no single country can steer the world away from this trap.	如今，没有一个国家能够让世界摆脱这一陷阱。


The United States, which might have taken the lead in the past, has ceded its global leadership position in recent years – a process that has been greatly accelerated during the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency.	昔日领袖美国在最近几年中让出了全球领导地位——这一过程在特朗普担任总统的第一年里大大加速了。


Moreover, the G20 has lately lost steam in supporting closer coordination of monetary and fiscal policies among the world’s major advanced and emerging economies.	此外，G20在支持世界主要发达和新兴经济体的货币和财政政策协调方面也日益力不从心。


Perhaps a new grouping of the major players – the GMajor? – needs to step up, before it is too late.	也许需要在为时未晚之前成立新的主要行动方——G大国（GMajor）。


To gain the needed motivation, monetary policymakers should recall the “traveler’s dilemma,” a game theory parable that highlights the pitfalls of individual rationality.	要产生必要的激励，货币决策者应该回顾一下“旅行者悖论”，这个博弈论例子突显了个体理性的缺陷。


The parable features a group of travelers, returning home with identical pottery purchased on a remote island.	这个例子讲的是一群旅行者带着从遥远的小岛上买到的一样的陶器回家。


Finding that the pottery has been damaged in transit, they demand compensation from the airline.	他们发现陶器在运输过程中被损坏了，于是要求航空公司赔偿。


Because the airline manager – known as the “financial wizard” – has no idea what the price of the pottery is, a creative solution is needed to determine the appropriate amount of compensation.	航空公司经理——称为“财务高手”——不知道陶器的价格，他需要开动脑筋来确定恰当的赔偿数字。


The manager decides that each traveler should write down the price – any integer from $2 to $100 – without conferring with one another.	经理决定让每位旅行者写下价格——介于2美元和100美元的任意整数——但不能彼此通气。


If all write the same number, that figure will be understood as the price, and thus the amount of compensation each traveler receives.	如果所有人写的数字一样，那么这个数字就被认定为陶器的价格，也就是每位旅行者获得的赔偿额。


If they write different numbers, the lowest number will be taken as the correct price.	如果他们写的数字不一样，那么就以最低数字为正确价格。


Whoever wrote the lowest number would receive an additional $2, as a reward for honesty, while anyone who wrote a higher number would receive $2 less, as a penalty for cheating.	写下最低数字的人，能够额外获得2美元作为诚实的奖赏，而写的数字超过最低数字的人，将被扣去2美元作为作弊的惩罚。


So if some write $80 and some $90, they will receive $82 and $78, respectively, in compensation.	也就是说，如果有人写了80美元，有人写了90美元，那么他们分别将获得82美元和78美元赔偿金。


At first blush, the travelers are thrilled.	一开始，旅行者们非常兴奋。


The pottery has no actual monetary value, but if they each write $100, all can receive $100 in compensation.	陶器没有实际货币价值，但如果他们每个人都写100美元，所有人都能获得100美元年赔偿。


One traveler, however, quickly realizes that writing $99 would be a better option, because it would garner that extra $2 reward, and thus a total of $101.	但有一位旅行者很快认识到，写99美元是更好的选择，因为这会带来2美元额外奖励，从而让总数达到101美元。


That traveler quickly realizes, however, that others must have had the same idea, and so decides to put down $98 instead.	但这位旅行者很快又认识到，其他人肯定也有同样的想法，因此他决定把数字降低到98美元。


But what if the others had the same thought?	但如果其他人也是这么想的呢？


Better make it $97.	最好还是写97美元吧。


In the end, trapped by this inexorable logic, all travelers end up writing and receiving $2.	最后，陷在这个无懈可击的逻辑中的旅行者，每个人都写下并获得了2美元。


The outcome may seem a disaster, but it is also the most rational choice – the “Nash equilibrium” of the traveler’s dilemma game.	结果看上去是一场灾难，但也是最理性的选择——即旅行者悖论博弈的“纳什均衡”。


It is clear how the financial wizard came by his moniker.	很显然，财务高手名副其实。


The moral of the story is simple.	这个故事的道德含义很简单。


The invisible hand of the market does not always lead individually self-interested agents to a collectively desirable outcome.	市场的看不见的手并不总是能让个体的自利动因转化为集体渴望的结果。


Altruism and regard for others must play a role.	利他主义和顾及他人必须起到作用。


If they are missing, the players at least need to coordinate their decisions.	如果没了它们，行动者至少需要协调他们的决定。


Unless central bankers take that message to heart, they will find themselves sweeping up a lot of broken pottery.	除非央行认真汲取了这一教训，否则它们会发现它们得打扫无数陶器碎片。


The New Monopolists	IT正在加剧财富和收入不平等


STANFORD – For more than 30 years in advanced economies, particularly the United States, wealth and income inequality have increased, real (inflation-adjusted) wages have risen slowly, and retirees have faced declining interest rates on savings.	斯坦福—三十多年来，发达经济体，尤其是美国，财富和收入不平等有所增加，真实（经通胀调整的）工资上升缓慢，退休者面临储蓄利率下降。


This has occurred while corporate profits and stock prices have risen sharply.	与此同时，公司利润和股价大涨。


Now, research I have conducted shows that these changes were primarily caused by the rise in modern information technology (IT).	如今，我所进行的研究表明，这些变化主要来自现代信息技术（IT）。


IT has impacted the economy in myriad ways; the computer, the Internet, and mobile technology have transformed media, online retailing, the pharmaceutical industry, and countless other consumer-related services.	IT对经济的影响是多方位的：计算机、互联网和移动技术改变了媒体、在线零售、制药业以及数不清的消费者相关服务。


IT has improved life enormously.	IT显著地改善了人们的生活。


But, by enabling the rise of monopoly power, and by facilitating barriers to entry, the growth of IT has also had major negative economic, social, and political side effects, including the proliferation of “fake news.”	但IT的成长也导致了垄断力和进入壁垒，从而带来了巨大的经济、社会和政治消极副作用，包括“假新闻”的泛滥。


For starters, the very structure of the IT sector allows for the formation of monopoly power.	首先，IT行业的结构有利于垄断力的形成。


IT has improved the processing, storage, and transmission of data, and IT innovators are the sole owners of major information channels that they actively work to prevent competitors from using.	IT改善了数据的处理、储存和传输，IT创新者是重要信息渠道的独家拥有者，他们积极地阻止竞争对手使用这些渠道。


IT firms could defend their monopoly power through patents or by copyrighting intellectual property.	IT企业可以通过专利或著作知识产权保护它们的垄断力。


But these routes require making trade secrets public.	但这些方法需要公开交易秘密。


So, for strategic reasons, many firms forego legal protections, and consolidate a dominant market position by issuing ongoing software updates that, by default, serve as barriers that are difficult for competitors to breach.	因此，出于战略原因，许多企业放弃了法律保护，而是通过不断发布软件更新巩固市场主宰地位，它们将这些更新用作默认的壁垒，令竞争对手难以打破。


When potential new technologies emerge, bigger firms often acquire their challengers, either to develop the competing technologies on their own, or to suppress them.	当出现潜在新技术时，大企业常常会收购挑战者，从而自己开发竞争性技术，或者予以扼杀。


Once an innovative firm establishes platform dominance, size becomes an advantage.	一旦一家创新企业建立了平台主宰地位，规模就成为它的优势。


Because the cost of processing and storing information has declined in recent years, a firm with a size advantage has smaller operating costs, and profits rise rapidly as the number of users multiplies (Google and Facebook are good examples).	处理和储存信息的成本在最近几年大大下降了，因此，拥有规模优势的企业，运营成本会更低，而随着用户的倍增，利润也会迅速上升（谷歌和Facebook都是很好的例子）。


These cost and economies-of-scale advantages are almost impossible for competitors to overcome.	这些成本和规模经济优势是竞争对手几乎不可能克服的。


In addition, because these firms derive their power from information, their positions are enhanced by their ability to use their customers’ private information as a strategic asset.	此外，由于这些企业的力量来自信息，因此，它们可以通过将客户隐私信息作为战略资产的能力强化自己的地位。


Indeed, many IT platforms are not producers in the traditional sense; they are public utilities that enable coordination and information-sharing among users in diverse fields.	事实上，许多IT平台并非传统意义上的生产者； 它们属于公共设施，使的领域的用户能够实现协作和信息共享。


In short, IT enables the creation of barriers to market entry, and then encourages leading firms to become further entrenched.	简言之，IT使市场进入壁垒成为可能，从而鼓励领导企业深化优势。


With the pace of IT innovation increasing, monopoly power is also rising.	随着IT创新节奏的加快，垄断力也不断提高。


In a recent paper measuring the economic effects of monopoly power, I approximated normal levels above which profits or stock values are not purely chance events, but rather reflective of monopoly power.	在一篇测算垄断力的经济效应的最新论文中，我对正常水平（normal levels）进行了估算，在这个水平之上的利润和股票估值，便不属于纯粹的机会事件，而是垄断力的反映。


With these levels, I measured the monopoly component of total stock values – what I call “monopoly wealth” – and of monopoly profits or rent.	根据这些正常水平，我测算了股票总市值的垄断成分——我称之为“垄断财富”，以及垄断利润或租。


I then sought to determine how monopoly wealth and rent have evolved.	接着，我试图确定垄断财富和租是如何演化的。


The figure below shows monopoly wealth as a percentage of total stock-market value between 1985 and 2015.	下图显示了1985—2015年间垄断财富占股市总市值的百分比。


As the data show, there was no monopoly wealth in the 1980s.	数据显示，20世纪80年代不存在垄断财富。


But as the IT industry developed, monopoly wealth rose dramatically; it reached 82% of total stock-market value – equivalent to some $23.8 trillion – in December 2015.	但随着IT业的发展，垄断财富急剧增长； 到了2015年12月，垄断财富达到了股市总市值的82%——大约相当于23.


This is the extra wealth gained by rising monopoly power, and it is continuing to grow.	8万亿美元。 这是来自垄断力提高的额外财富，并且它还在继续增加。


To put in perspective the percentage of monopoly wealth, consider the related sharp rise in corporate leverage.	为了可观看待垄断财富的百分比问题，我们来看看一下公司杠杆率的相关急升情况。


In 1960, the percentage of all real corporate assets financed by debt was less than 20%. By 2015, that share had risen to about 80%, meaning that most capital held by public corporations today is owned and traded by bondholders.	1960年，真实公司资产的债务融资部分不足20%，如今，这一比例已经上升到80%左右，这意味着今天的上市公司所持有的大部分资本为债权人所拥有和交易。


In other words, investors have agreed to finance corporate debt by using monopoly wealth as collateral, and most trading in the stock market can therefore be thought of as traded ownership of monopoly wealth.	换句话说，投资者愿意以垄断财富为抵押，为公司债务提供融资，股市的大部分交易因此也可以视为是垄断财富所有权的交易。


As the table below shows, nine of the ten firms with the largest monopoly wealth in December 2015 are IT-related, focusing on mobile communications, social media, online retailing, and drugs.	下表表明，2015年12月，垄断财富最大的十家企业中有九家是IT相关企业，它们集中在移动通讯、社交媒体、在线零售和制药等领域。


Similarly, most monopoly wealth among the top 100 firms, is being created by companies transformed by IT.	类似地，垄断财富100强企业大部分也是因IT而转型的公司所创造。


Income created by firms with monopoly power is divided into three types: labor income, normal interest income paid to capital, and monopoly profits.	拥有垄断力的企业所创造的收入可分为三中类型：劳动所得、付给资本的正常利息收入，以及垄断利润。


The data show that in the 1970s and early 1980s, monopoly profits were negligible.	数据表明，20世纪70年代到80年代初，垄断利润可以忽略不计。


But since 1984, the share of monopoly profits has risen steadily; it reached 23% of total income produced by American corporations in 2015.	但从1984年开始，垄断利润的比例稳步增长； 到2015年，垄断利润已占美国公司所创造的总收益的23%。


This means that during the three decades before 2015, monopoly power caused the combined shares of wages and normal interest on capital to decline by 23%.	这意味着在截至2015年的三十年中，垄断力让工资和付给资本的正常利息的比例之和下降了23%。


Rising productivity and capital accumulation increases wages and capital income, but monopoly power reduces these income shares.	生产率的提高和资本积累增加了工资和资本收益，但垄断力降低了这些收益的比重。


This partly explains why, during the 1985-2015 period, wages exhibited sluggish growth and retirees faced declining interest rates on their savings.	这部分解释了为何在1985—2015年间工资增长表现出滞后而退休者面临储蓄利率下降的局面。


Why, then, has rising monopoly power in the IT sector caused income and wealth to concentrate in fewer hands, leading to an increase in personal income and wealth inequality?	那么，IT行业的垄断力为何导致了收入和财富向更少数人集中，从而加剧了个人收入和财富不平等？


One part of the answer is that rising monopoly power increased corporate profits and sharply boosted stock prices, which produced gains that were enjoyed by a small population of stockholders and corporate management.	答案的一部分在于增加的垄断力提高了公司利润，也大大提振的股价，从而带来一小撮股东和公司管理层才能获得的收益。


But, given that many IT entrepreneurs were young at the start of their careers, with limited ownership of stocks, a more refined explanation is needed.	但是，许多IT企业家在开始创业时非常年轻，只拥有有限的股权，因此，必然有更合理的解释存在。


Since the 1980s, IT innovations have largely been software-based, giving young innovators an advantage.	20世纪80年代以来，IT创新大多基于软件，这意味着年轻创新者拥有优势。 此外，“证明概念”（proof of concept）的研究对于软件创新来说常常无需耗费巨资（制药业除外）；


Additionally, “proof of concept” studies are typically inexpensive for software innovations (except in pharmaceuticals); with modest capital, IT innovators can test ideas without surrendering a major share of their stock. As a result, successful IT innovations have concentrated wealth in fewer – and often younger – hands.	只要有少许资本，IT创新者就能测试新概念，而不必丧失主要股东地位。 因此，成功的IT创新将财富集中在更少数——常常也更年轻——的人手里。


This was not true in the twentieth century, when major innovations in leading sectors such as automobiles required large investments of risk capital.	20世纪就不是这样。 当时，汽车等领先行业的重大创新需要大量风险资本投资。


With more investors needed, the wealth created was distributed more broadly.	由于需要更多的投资者，所创造的财富也因此分配得越广泛。


The negative side effects of IT are not well understood, and public discussion of how to regulate the sector is urgently needed.	IT的副作用尚未得到很好的认识，关于如何监管IT行业，急需大量公共讨论。


Three considerations are critical.	三个问题至关重要。


First, because most technology-based monopoly power does not violate existing antitrust laws, regulating IT will require new measures to weaken monopolies.	首先，由于大部分基于技术的垄断力并不违反现有反垄断法，因此监管IT行业需要新手段来削弱垄断。


New concepts of the public interest are also needed for regulating new public information channels such as social networks.	为了监管诸如社交网络等新公共信息渠道，还需要新的公共利益概念。


Second, standard views of business income and wealth taxation will need to be adapted to account for IT firms’ monopoly power.	其次，对企业收益和财富税收的标准观点应该作出调整，考虑IT企业的垄断力。


And, third, laws intended to protect private information should be reevaluated to ensure that IT companies are unable to profit from exploiting and manipulating it.	第三，旨在保护隐私信息的法律应该予以重新评估，以确保IT公司无法通过利用和操纵这些信息牟利。


Above all, the public must develop a deeper understanding of the economic effects of IT, particularly how technologies that have improved the lives of so many are enriching the lives of so few.	最重要的是，公众必须更加深刻地理解IT的经济效应，特别是改善了如此多的人的生活的技术如何只让如此少的人致富。


Financial Globalization 2.0	金融全球化2. 0


WASHINGTON, DC – In the decade since the financial crisis began in August 2007, the contours of global finance have shifted dramatically.	华盛顿——自从2007年8月金融危机爆发以来的十年中，全球金融形势发生了戏剧性的变化。


The total value of cross-border capital flows has shrunk by 65% over the last ten years, a decline that reflects, in particular, the sharp reduction in international banking activities.	跨境资本流动总额相比过去十年减少了65%，资本流动总额的下降尤其反映了国际银行业务的急剧萎缩。


The question for us is what figures like these can tell us about the health of global finance today.	这样的数据能够告诉我们当前的全球金融健康状况究竟如何。


Are they evidence that “financial globalization” – the international movement of capital – has lurched into reverse?	它们是否证明金融全球化——即资本国际流动——已经进入反转态势？


And if it has, would that be such a bad thing?	如果真是这样，这究竟是不是一件坏事？


The current retrenchment reflects greater risk aversion and awareness since the bubble began to burst in late 2007.	目前的紧缩反映了自2007年下半年泡沫开始破裂后民众更强烈的风险厌恶情绪和避险意识。


But, according to new research from the McKinsey Global Institute, what is emerging is a more resilient version of global financial integration.	但麦肯锡全球研究院一份新的研究报告显示，目前正在形成的是抗风险能力更强的全球金融一体化格局。


Before the crisis, cross-border banking surged as many of the world’s largest banks expanded internationally, lending more to one another and investing in other foreign assets.	危机开始前，世界最大银行拓展国际业务导致跨境银行业务激增，各大银行间更多借贷并投入其他外资。


After the creation of the euro, for example, eurozone banks expanded significantly.	例如，欧元诞生后，欧元区银行业务进入了大规模拓展时期。


Foreign claims held by eurozone banks (and their subsidiaries) soared from $6.6 trillion in 2000 to $23.4 trillion in 2007.	欧元区银行（及其分支机构）所持有的海外债权从2000年的美元6. 6万亿增长到2007年的23.


Most important, a majority of that growth was within the eurozone itself, where an integrated European banking market was emerging, leading some to believe that a common currency and shared rules meant country risk had almost disappeared.	4万亿。 最重要的是，增长主要来自欧元区内部，一体化的银行市场正在出现，导致某些人相信共同货币和共同规则意味着国家风险几乎消失。


What is clear today is that many institutions were simply engaging in herd mentality, rather than executing prudent business strategies.	人们今天才看清，许多机构并非执行审慎的商业策略，而仅仅只是本着从众心理。


Then, stung by the financial meltdown in the United States, and subsequently by the eurozone’s own crisis, the major global banks reduced their foreign presence, selling off some businesses, exiting others, and allowing maturing loans to expire.	随后，由于美国金融危机的冲击以及不久后发生的欧元区自身危机，主要全球银行减少了他们的国外业务，有些出售，有些退出，并允许到期的贷款到期。


Since 2007, global banks have sold at least $2 trillion of assets.	自2007年以来，全球银行所出售的资产至少达到美元两万亿。


Swiss, British, and American banks have all been part of the retreat, but eurozone banks are at its epicenter.	瑞士、英国和美国银行都加入了撤退大军，但欧元区银行却处在震中的位置。


Since the crisis began, eurozone banks have reduced foreign claims by $7.3 trillion, or 45%.	自危机爆发以来，欧元区银行已经削减了7. 3万亿美元的国外债权，占国外债权总额的45%。


Nearly half of that is a shrinking portfolio among eurozone borrowers, particularly banks.	其中近半数来自缩减欧元区借款人的投资组合。


The perception that lending within the currency area was quasi-domestic has fallen apart.	将货币区内借贷视为准国内贷款的看法已经分崩离析。


As the financial crisis evolved, private-sector involvement – through “haircuts” and “bailing in” – became a threatening option.	随着金融危机不断深化，私营部门通过“资产减值”和“救助”等形式的参与已经成为现实的威胁。


From a risk perspective, domestic markets – where banks had the advantage of scale and market knowledge – became comparatively more attractive.	从控制风险的角度，国内市场因为具有规模效应和熟悉情况的优势——已经变得更有吸引力。


In Germany, for example, the ratio of foreign to total assets at the three largest banks flipped, from 65% in 2007 to 33% in 2016.	例如在德国，三大银行外资占总资产的比例开始发生逆转，从2007年的65%下降到2016年的33%。


This was not simply a matter of shrinking the overall balance sheet; domestic assets grew by 70% during the same period.	这绝不仅仅是收缩整体资产负债表的问题； 因为同期国内资产增长了70%。


What has emerged in the eurozone and beyond is a potentially more stable financial system, at least where banking is concerned.	出现在欧元区及其以外的可能是更加稳定的金融体系，至少在涉及银行业务方面这个命题成立。


Banks have been required to rebuild their capital, and new rules on liquidity have reduced leverage and vulnerability.	银行业被要求重建资本，而且流动性新规已经导致杠杆和脆弱性降低。


Stress testing and resolution preparedness – the sector’s so-called living wills – have created significant disincentives to complexity.	被称为银行业生存意愿的压力测试和清算准备已经严重影响了人们对复杂状况的接受程度。


All of this has made foreign operations less attractive as well.	所有这一切已经导致外国业务的吸引力降低。


A more diverse mix of cross-border capital flows also indicates greater stability.	跨国资本流动越来越多样化也意味着更强的稳定性。


While total annual flows of cross-border lending have fallen by two thirds, foreign direct investment has held up better.	尽管跨国贷款的年度总流量下降了2/3，但外国直接投资却在很大程度上得以保持。


FDI is by far the most stable type of capital flow, reflecting long-term strategic decisions by companies.	外国直接投资当之无愧是最稳定的资本流动类型，因为它反映了企业长期的战略决策。


Equity-related positions (FDI plus portfolio investments) now account for 69% of cross-border capital flows, up from 36% in 2007.	股权相关头寸（包括外国直接投资和投资组合）目前已占到跨国资本流动的69%，而2007年这一数据仅仅为36%。


One final measure of stability is that global imbalances, including aggregate capital- and financial-account balances, are shrinking.	全球不平衡（其中包括资本和金融账户总额缩减）是稳定的最后一项衡量标准。


In 2016, these imbalances had fallen to 1.7% of global GDP, from 2.5% in 2007.	2016年，相关余额已经从2007年占全球GDP的2. 5%下降到1.


Moreover, the remaining deficits and surpluses are spread over a larger number of countries than before the crisis.	7%。 不仅如此，余下的赤字和盈余的分布国远比危机爆发前更加分散。


In 2005, the US absorbed 67% of global net capital flows.	2005年，美国吸收了全球净资本流入的67%。


By 2016, that share had fallen by half.	截止2016年，上述份额下降了一半。


China, meanwhile, accounted for 16% of the world’s net capital surplus in 2005; last year it was only 1%.	同时中国在2005年占到全球净资本盈余的16%； 而去年则仅占1%。


And, with only a few exceptions, like Germany and the Netherlands, imbalances have also declined within the eurozone.	而且，除德国和荷兰等少数例外，欧元区的不平衡也呈下降趋势。


Today, developing countries have become capital importers once more.	今天，发展中国家再次成为资本进口国。


None of this should invite complacency.	我们不应因此而洋洋自得。


A more tightly woven global financial system inevitably comes with a higher risk of contagion.	全球金融体系联系紧密不可避免地会加大传染的可能性。


Excesses can always return; indeed, equity and real-estate markets in some advanced economies are rising to new highs, despite mediocre growth prospects.	过剩随时可能再次回归； 事实上，某些发达经济体的股权和房地产市场正在创下新高，而增长前景却平淡无奇。


Volatility in gross capital flows also remains a concern.	总资本流量不断波动仍然是有待解决的问题。


Since 2010, one third of developing countries and two thirds of advanced economies have faced large fluctuations in total capital inflows.	自2010年以来，1/3的发展中国家和2/3的发达国家已经出现过资本流入总额的大幅波动。 其中借贷流量尤其不稳定；


Lending flows are particularly unstable; more than 60% of countries have experienced some degree of annual fluctuation, with the median shift equal to 7.7% of GDP for advanced economies, and 3% of GDP for developing countries.	出现过某种程度的年度波动的国家超过60%，其中发达经济体的波动中位数为GDP的7. 7%，而发展中国家则为GDP的3%。


Some observers argue that more should be done to contain risk in the system; to the extent that risk has simply shifted from banks to shadow banks, they may be right.	有观察家认为应当采取更多措施来控制金融系统的风险； 就风险仅仅从银行转移到影子银行来说，他们可能有道理。


But, overall, signs of greater resilience and increased stability are everywhere.	但总体而言，适应性和稳定性增强的迹象无处不在。


Actions taken over the last ten years therefore imply less fragility when the next crisis hits, as it surely will.	因此，过去十年所采取的行动意味着下一次危机到来时脆弱性的降低。


Killing Killer Mosquitoes	消灭杀人蚊


SINGAPORE – Mosquitoes may be tiny, but they have a powerful bite.	发自新加坡——蚊子虽细小，可一旦被它们咬了却可能麻烦很大。


They spread a number of diseases – such as chikungunya, dengue, malaria, yellow fever, West Nile fever, and Zika virus – which together kill millions of people each year. Malaria alone is one of the world’s top infectious killers (behind only tuberculosis and AIDS), responsible for 429,000 deaths in 2015.	它们会传播包括奇昆古尼亚热病、登革热、疟疾、黄热病，西尼罗河热和寨卡病毒等一系列疾病，每年夺去数百万人的生命——其中的疟疾就是世界上最大的致死性传染病之一（仅位列结核病和艾滋病之后），在2015年造成42.


Given the scale and scope of the problem, stronger action to eliminate mosquitos – and the diseases they carry – is a development imperative.	9万人死亡。 鉴于这一问题的规模和涉及范围，采取更强有力的行动去杀灭蚊子——及其所携带的疾病——就是实现发展的必行之策。


The World Health Organization ranks mosquitoes among the top threats to public health, especially in developing countries.	世界卫生组织将蚊子列为公共卫生的最大威胁之一，特别是在发展中国家。


As a graphic on Bill Gates’ blog last year highlighted, mosquitos are responsible for 830,000 human deaths annually – 250,000 more than are caused by our fellow humans.	正如比尔·盖茨去年发表在其博客上的一张图表所指出的那样，全球每年约有83万人因蚊子而死亡——这比人类造成的死亡人数还多25万。


Beyond the massive human costs, mosquito-borne diseases carry large economic costs.	除了庞大的人口损失之外，蚊子传播的疾病还会带来巨大的经济代价。


For an infected individual, those costs include treatment and hospital expenses, transportation to and from a health clinic or hospital, time spent out of work, and insect sprays or bed nets to protect against more disease-spreading mosquito bites.	对于受感染的个人来说这些费用包括治疗费和住院费用，从住所往返于医院诊所的交通费，误工时间，以及为防止更多的蚊子传播疾病而购置的灭蚊喷雾或蚊帐。


For countries, mosquito-borne diseases cost millions – even billions – of dollars each year.	在国家政府层面，每年都要蚊子传播疾病上花费数百万甚至数十亿美元。


Governments must fund mosquito-control and prevention programs, from the use of insecticides to the distribution of mosquito nets, as well as public-education campaigns and vaccination initiatives. (Although there is no widely available vaccine for malaria, three countries are set to take part in a pilot immunization program starting in 2018, and some mosquito-borne diseases – such as yellow fever, Japanese encephalitis, and dengue – are vaccine-preventable.)	各国政府都得拿出资金来资助包括灭蚊药具和分发蚊帐在内的灭蚊和预防方案，还要发起公共教育运动和推行疫苗接种（虽然至今还缺乏广泛可用的疟疾疫苗，但有三个国家将从2018年开始参加试点免疫方案，而一些蚊子传播的疾病，如黄热病，日本脑炎和登革热疫苗是可以预防的）。


Governments may also have to compensate communities affected by epidemics, fund research to treat illness or prevent future outbreaks, cover increased health-care costs, and sustain programs to help patients.	此外各国政府还可能要支援受流行病影响的社区，资助治疗疾病或预防未来疫情方面的研究，支付因此而增加的医疗保健费用以及协助患者维持生计。


Meanwhile, the economy suffers from reduced productivity.	同时，本国的经济也会因生产力下降而受损。


Eradicating mosquito-transmitted diseases must therefore be a top priority, eliciting not just effective government stewardship, but also the involvement of civil society, private-sector engagement, and the participation of affected communities.	因此消除蚊子传播的疾病当属首要任务，不仅仅要求政府实施有效组织管理，还要民间社会，私营部门和受影响社区的参与。


Beyond effective collaboration, success will demand improved surveillance and greater innovation, particularly in diagnostics, drugs and vaccines, insecticides, and vector control.	而除了有效的协作之外还需要改进疾病监控体系以及更进一步的创新，特别是在诊断，药物和疫苗，杀虫剂和病毒寄主控制方面。


The good news is that, on vector control – that is, mosquito eradication – promising innovations are already emerging.	好消息是，在病毒寄主控制方面——即蚊子杀灭——已经出现了有前景的创新。


One such innovation uses a bacterium called Wolbachia, either to stop deadly viruses from growing or to reduce mosquito populations.	其中一种创新使用名为沃尔巴克氏体（Wolbachia）的细菌，以阻止致命病毒的增殖或减少蚊子种群。


Wolbachia is present in about 60% of species of insects, including some mosquitoes.	约60%的昆虫种类身上可以找到沃尔巴克氏菌，其中包括一些种类的蚊子。


One species where Wolbachia is not present naturally is the Aedes aegypti mosquito, which is responsible for transmitting human viruses like dengue, chikungunya, yellow fever, and Zika.	其中一种并不自然携带沃尔巴克氏菌的蚊子是伊蚊，但这种蚊子会传播包括登革热，奇昆古尼亚热病，黄热病，和寨卡在内的人类病毒。


Studies show that when Wolbachia is introduced into the Aedes aegypti mosquito, it can prevent the growth of human viruses within the insect.	研究表明，如果让伊蚊感染了沃尔巴克氏菌，后者就可以防止人类病毒在昆虫体内的生长。


Another approach would be to release a large number of male mosquitos with the Wolbachia bacteria; females with which they mate would be unable to reproduce.	另一种方法是释放大量携带沃尔巴克氏菌的雄性蚊子;雌性蚊子与它们交配后将无法繁殖。


Another innovation is a vaccine called AGS-v, developed by the London-based pharmaceutical company SEEK to provide broad protection against a range of mosquito-borne diseases.	另一项创新是一种名为AGS-v的疫苗，由总部设在伦敦的SEEK制药公司开发，旨在广泛防护一系列由蚊子传播的疾病。


The vaccine is designed to trigger an immune response to mosquito saliva, thereby preventing infection from whatever virus the saliva contains.	该疫苗旨在触发对蚊子唾液的免疫应答，从而防止人类感染唾液所含有的一切病毒。


As with Wolbachia, researchers believe that AGS-v could also curb mosquito populations.	与沃尔巴克氏菌一样，研究人员认为AGS-v也可以抑制蚊子的数量。


After a mosquito takes a blood meal from a vaccinated person, the antibodies may attack the mosquito’s salivary proteins, affecting its ability to feed and to lay eggs – and thereby leading to its premature death.	蚊子从接种过疫苗的人那里吸血后，抗体可能攻击蚊子的唾液蛋白，影响其进食和产卵的能力，从而导致其提早死亡。


Phase I clinical trials of the vaccine, sponsored and funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, began in February.	该疫苗的第一阶段临床试验已经在美国国家过敏症及传染性疾病研究所的资助下于今年2月启动。


A third innovation is essentially a smart mosquito trap, capable of capturing only the mosquito species capable of spreading the Zika virus and other diseases.	第三项创新基本上是一个智能蚊子陷阱，专门捕捉那些能够传播寨卡病毒和其他疾病的蚊子种类。


Part of Microsoft’s Project Premonition research initiative, the prototype trap uses an infrared light beam to identify specific mosquito species with more than 80% accuracy.	作为微软预感计划（Project Premonition）研究的一部分，这一陷阱原型使用红外线光束来识别特定的蚊子物种并具备超过80%的准确性。


When the trap captures a mosquito of interest, it saves related data, such as the time, temperature, humidity, and light levels, in order to enhance researchers’ understanding of mosquito behavior and, thus, their ability to address potential outbreaks.	当陷阱捕捉到指定的蚊子时将同时保存相关的数据（比如时间，温度，湿度和光照水平）以提高研究人员对蚊子的行为的理解以及进一步应对潜在疫情的能力。


Such innovations promise to accelerate substantially efforts to curb deadly mosquito-borne diseases.	这些创新将加速推动对致命蚊媒疾病的实际遏制成果。


The question is the extent to which they will be applied. After all, far more basic measures that individuals can take to protect themselves and their families are not being implemented nearly enough.	问题在于它们将在多大程度上得到应用，毕竟个人可以用来保护自身和家庭的基本措施还远远不够。


For example, because mosquitos need water to breed, people should be removing puddles or other collections of standing water around their homes, puncturing unused tires, regularly cleaning birdbaths, and draining swimming pools.	比如说，因为蚊子需要水来繁殖，人们应该清理住宅附近的水洼或其他积水处，刺穿废旧轮胎，定期清洗景观水盆以及排干游泳池水。


Liquid larvicides can be applied directly to water using backpack sprayers, and introducing fish into ponds, particularly in residential areas, can also help to eliminate larvae.	喷撒液体杀虫剂，在池塘里养鱼（特别是在居民区）也可以帮助消除幼虫。


As for adult mosquitoes, keeping grass and shrubs short limits resting places, thereby helping to control populations.	至于蚊子成虫，修剪草地和灌木可以减少其栖息之处，从而有助于控制数量。


Window and door screens should be installed and maintained, and the outdoors should be avoided in the morning and evening, when mosquitos tend to be most active.	在窗户和门上安装纱窗，并在早晨和晚上这些蚊子倾向于最活跃的时候避免户外活动。


Long-sleeve shirts, long pants, and insect repellants can help minimize bites when staying inside isn’t an option.	如果必须要留在户外，穿著长袖衣裤和使用驱虫剂可以帮助减少叮咬。


But people need to use them. And, for that, information must be shared widely, and the relevant tools made available to the public.	这些技术并非万无一失，但它们可以在保护人类方面迈进一大步，前提是人们要去使用它们，为此必须广泛分享这类信息并向公众提供相关工具。


Last month marked the 120th anniversary of the discovery that female mosquitoes transmit malaria among humans.	上个月是发现疟疾由雌性蚊子在人群中传播的120周年纪念日。


Since then, malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases have been controlled and even eliminated in the developed world.	自那时以后，在发达国家，疟疾和其他由蚊子传播的疾病已经得到控制甚至根除。


Yet, in developing countries, the fight is far from over.	然而在发展中国家，这场战役还远远未结束。


The Shape of Charges to Come?	即将到来的指控？


WASHINGTON, DC – When the news broke last week about the specific documents sought by Robert Mueller, the special counsel heading the federal investigation into Russia’s role in the 2016 election and whether Donald Trump’s campaign colluded with the Kremlin, a chill fell over Trump’s already jittery White House.	华盛顿——当上周主导针对俄罗斯在2016年大选中所起的作用以及唐纳德·特朗普竞选团队是否与克林姆林宫相勾结的联邦调查活动的特别顾问罗伯特·米勒正在寻找的具体文件信息曝光时，特朗普本已战战兢兢的白宫更是惊出了一身冷汗。


The documents to be turned over covered some familiar events that could well lead to Trump being charged with obstruction of justice, or might show that his campaign was, at the very least, interested in playing with the Russians.	即将移交的文件涉及很可能导致特朗普遭到妨碍司法指控的一些熟悉的事件，这些文件至少有可能表明特朗普的竞选团队对接触俄国人兴趣浓厚。


The possible or even likely obstruction charge would derive from Trump’s various efforts to block the investigation.	可能甚至几率很大的妨碍司法指控主要来源于特朗普所开展的阻止调查的活动。


In particular, Trump asked FBI director James Comey to go easy in his investigation of retired General Michael Flynn, the former national security adviser whom Trump reluctantly fired, ostensibly because he had lied to Vice President Mike Pence about the nature of post-election telephone calls with the Russian ambassador.	特别是特朗普曾要求联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科米在调查退休将军迈克尔·弗林的过程中高抬贵手，特朗普很不情愿地解雇了这位前国家安全顾问，表面上的理由是因为他曾就选举后与俄罗斯大使通话的性质向副总统迈克·彭斯说谎。


Pence then reassured the country that Flynn and the ambassador had simply exchanged small talk, such as Christmas greetings.	彭斯之后向全国保证弗林和俄驻美大使仅仅交换了简单的寒暄，比如互致圣诞问候。


In fact, they had discussed the possibility of Trump lifting sanctions that outgoing President Barack Obama had imposed on Russia as punishment for its interference in the election.	事实上，他们探讨了特朗普取消离任总统巴拉克·奥巴马对俄制裁的可能性，奥巴马制裁俄罗斯是为惩罚该国干预美国大选的活动。


Mueller no doubt wants to know if Trump was aware of or consented to Flynn’s discussions.	米勒毫无疑问想要知道特朗普是否知晓或同意弗林的讨论。


Trump also asked senior US intelligence figures to try to convince Comey to go easy on Flynn.	特朗普还曾要求美国高级情报官员竭力说服科米高抬贵手放过弗林。


One mystery is why Trump was so anxious to protect Flynn.	人们很难理解，为什么特朗普如此急迫地向弗林提供保护。


Does Flynn have compromising information about the president?	弗林所掌握的信息是否有损于这位总统？


Then there was Trump’s firing of Comey in May, followed by misleading statements from White House aides regarding why he had done so.	之后是特朗普5月解雇科米，之前白宫助手曾就解雇原因发表误导性的评论。


But then Trump blurted out in a television interview that when he fired Comey, he had in mind “this Russia thing.”	但随后特朗普却在一次电视采访中透露当他解雇科米时，他考虑的主要是“俄罗斯事务。


The next day, at a meeting in the Oval Office, Trump told senior Russian officials that firing Comey had relieved “great pressure” on him.	”第二天，在椭圆形办公室的一次会议上，特朗普告诉俄罗斯高官解雇科米缓解了他身上承受的“巨大压力”。


It’s definitely not a good idea, as Richard Nixon learned during the Watergate scandal, for a president to fire his own investigator.	就像理查德·尼克松在水门丑闻中所发现的那样，总统解雇自己的调查局长绝没有什么好结果。


Trump’s firing of Comey saddled him with Mueller, a former FBI director in Democratic and Republican administrations, praised by politicians in both parties for his integrity.	特朗普解雇科米后却必须面对米勒，后者曾在民主和共和两党执政期间担任联邦调查局局长，其正直诚实得到了两党政治家的共同称颂。


Trump is just one of the people at risk of criminal charges as a result of Mueller’s investigation.	因为米勒的调查可能面对刑事指控的人不止特朗普一个。


Others in Mueller’s sights are Trump’s former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.	进入米勒视线的还有特朗普的前竞选主席保罗·马纳福特，以及特朗普的女婿贾里德·库什纳。


Kushner and his wife, Ivanka Trump (said to be the president’s favorite child), have offices in the White House, and Kushner is involved in an absurdly broad array of issues, from resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict to reorganizing the federal government.	库什纳及其妻子伊万卡特朗普（据说是这位总统最钟爱的子女）都在白宫拥有办公室，而库什纳曾经参与了诸多问题，从解决以巴冲突到重组联邦政府。


Mueller has hired experts on financial crime – an ominous development for other targets.	米勒专门聘请了金融犯罪专家——这在其他目标人物看来绝对是不祥的预兆。


While Mueller is investigating Kushner’s campaign activities, he is also understood to be taking a close look at Kushner’s immense real estate business.	在调查库什纳竞选活动的同时，外界普遍认为米勒也正在关注库什纳庞大的房地产业务。


A few years ago, Kushner and his father bought the most expensive building in New York City, 666 Fifth Avenue, leaving them enormously indebted and unable to finance the mortgage.	几年前，库什纳及其父购买了纽约最昂贵的建筑第五大街666号，致使他们无法偿还抵押贷款，并因此背上了巨额债务。


Jared Kushner’s eagerness to secure the large sums needed to stay afloat has led him to seek foreign lenders, including a Russian banker close to Vladimir Putin.	贾里德·库什纳急于寻找维持现金流的大笔资金导致他寻求外国贷款，其中包括一位接近弗拉基米尔·普京的俄罗斯银行家。


Mueller is also known to be putting the squeeze on Manafort, a lobbyist and political consultant with a history of helping dictators.	外界同样已知米勒施压马纳福特，马纳福特在之前的职业生涯中曾多次担任说客和政治顾问的角色。


One of his most infamous clients was the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, who, upon winning the presidency of Ukraine, imprisoned his main rival, the previous prime minister, on trumped-up charges.	他最臭名昭著的客户之一是亲俄罗斯的维克托·亚努科维奇，亚努科维奇在赢得乌克兰总统选举后曾以莫须有的罪名监禁前总理及自己的主要对手。


Mueller’s team is poring over Manafort’s business dealings – projects around the world, debts, funds stashed in foreign tax shelters, suspected money laundering, and more.	米勒的调查团队正在全面调查马纳福特的各种交易——包括其在世界各地的项目、债务、藏在国外避税场所的资金、涉嫌洗钱活动以及更多。


To put pressure on Manafort, Mueller even staged a pre-dawn raid on his home in northern Virginia and let him know that he’ll be indicted – presumably to persuade him to give up information about Trump.	为了对马纳福特施压，米勒甚至在黎明前对他在北弗吉尼亚州的住宅展开袭击行动，明确告诉他他会被起诉——这样做的目的很可能是说服马纳福特出卖特朗普。


Although Manafort was dropped from the Trump campaign last August, following embarrassing news stories about his work in Ukraine, Trump, acting against the advice of aides, continued to talk with Manafort into the early months of his presidency.	尽管在其令人尴尬的乌克兰丑闻爆出后马纳福特于去年8月被解雇，但特朗普却不顾助手的反对继续在其总统任期之初与马纳福特保持接触。


Also, it was recently revealed that in 2016, while Manafort was still campaign chair, he offered to conduct briefings for a Russian oligarch about the presidential campaign.	而且，最近有消息指出在2016年马纳福特仍担任竞选主席期间，他提出为某俄罗斯寡头提供有关总统竞选现状的情况汇报。


Campaign chairs are usually too busy for such a task.	竞选主席们通常忙得顾不上这样的任务。


Mueller obviously hopes to “flip” both Flynn and Manafort.	米勒显然希望策反弗林和马纳福特。


And the president’s son, Donald Trump Jr., is also at risk in the sprawling scandal.	而总统的儿子小唐纳德·特朗普也很可能会在这场丑闻的发酵过程中被卷入。


Of particular interest to Mueller is a meeting held in Trump Tower in June 2016, between the Trump campaign’s top brass and a Russian lawyer with close Kremlin ties, who had offered Donald Jr. some dirt on Hillary Clinton, a prospect that excited the candidate’s son.	米勒最感兴趣的是2016年6月在特朗普大厦召开的一次会议，会议的双方是特朗普竞选团队的顶级要员和与克林姆林宫关系密切的俄国律师，这位俄国律师为小唐纳德·特朗普提供了希拉里·克林顿的丑闻线索，这条线索曾令这位总统候选人的儿子异常兴奋。


(“I love it,” he emailed in response.)	（“我太高兴了，”他在电子邮件中回复说。 ）


Donald Jr. first described the meeting as having been a discussion about adoptions of Russian babies by Americans (which Russian President Vladimir Putin banned in 2012).	小唐纳德·特朗普起先将这次会议描述成就美国公民收养俄罗斯婴儿（俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京于2012年禁止了这项操作）的问题展开探讨。


In fact, there had been a discussion of the sanctions and other matters of interest to Russia.	事实上，他们探讨了制裁问题和其他俄罗斯关心的事务。


Though Kushner and Donald Jr. said nothing came of the meeting, that has not been established.	尽管库什纳和小唐纳德·特朗普坚持会议没有取得任何实际成果，但这一点还没有得到证实。


Mueller is also interested in Trump’s role in crafting, on Air Force One on his way back from Europe, a statement that once again misled the public about what was discussed at the Trump Tower meeting with the Russians.	米勒还希望了解特朗普在起草一份声明中所起的作用，当时他正乘坐空军一号从欧洲飞回美国，该声明再一次就特朗普大厦与俄国人的会议内容误导了公众。


For more than a year, Trump has been adamant that he has no business interests in Russia and has received no loans from the country.	一年多以来，特朗普一直坚称他在俄罗斯没有商业利益也没有从该国收到任何贷款。


But his softness toward Putin remains puzzling.	但他对普京的软弱立场仍然令人匪夷所思。


Recently, it was discovered that Trump’s business had been trying to build an enormous Trump Tower in Moscow, an effort that continued into his candidacy, before being dropped for lack of permits and land.	最近，人们发现特朗普企业曾试图在莫斯科修建一座巨大的特朗普大厦，这项工程一直持续到他担任总统候选人期间，后来才因为缺少许可证和土地而被放弃。


The attention paid to Mueller’s Russia investigation waxes and wanes in Washington, DC.	对米勒俄罗斯调查的关注在华盛顿特区如潮水般起起落落。


But the inquiry won’t stop until Mueller is satisfied that he knows all he needs to know.	但调查活动不会停止，直到米勒相信他掌握了所有需要掌握的情况。


Murder Unincorporated	无法定义的杀手


NEW YORK – What possessed the young French Muslim Mohammed Merah to murder three Jewish schoolchildren, a rabbi, and three soldiers, two of them fellow Muslims?	发自纽约——是什么驱使法国穆斯林青年默罕默德·默拉杀害了三名犹太儿童，一名犹太教拉比还有三名士兵——其中两名还是和他一样的穆斯林？


What possessed another man, Anders Breivik, to gun down more than 60 teenagers in a Norwegian summer camp last year?	又是什么驱使另一个人，安德斯·布雷维克去年在一个挪威夏令营中枪杀60多名青少年？


These murder sprees are so unusual that people demand explanations.	他们的疯狂屠杀行为实在是太过诡异，所有人都希望能有个解释。


To call these killers “monsters,” as some were quick to do, sheds little light on the problem.	像某些人那样迅速给凶手扣上“怪物”的帽子其实于事无补。


They were not monsters; they were young men.	他们不是什么怪物，只是些年轻人。


And to dismiss them as madmen is equally evasive.	将这两人定义为疯子同样也是回避责任的。


If they were clinically insane, nothing more would need to be explained.	如果他们真是医学意义上的疯子，那就什么都不需要解释了。


Two accounts, both broadly socio-political, stand out. One was put forward by the controversial Muslim activist Tariq Ramadan.	对此分别出现了两种拥有广泛社会政治基础的说法。


He blames French society. More specifically, he blames the fact that young Frenchmen of Muslim origin are marginalized on the grounds of their faith and the color of their skin.	一个由饱受争议的穆斯林社会活动家塔西克·拉玛丹（Tariq Ramadan）提出——他将这一切归咎于法国社会，具体来说是那些法国穆斯林青年因为其信仰和肤色而遭到了边缘化。


Even though these people have French passports, they are treated as unwanted foreigners.	即便这些人都拥有法国护照，他们依然被视为不受欢迎的外国人。