Moreover, the digital revolution in media has elevated the role of business news, one of the few profit centers for print and broadcast journalism in many countries.	其次，媒体的数码化革命抬高了商业新闻的重要程度。 而商业新闻则是许多国家印刷和广播媒体中仅有的几个利润来源之一。


Central bankers’ pronouncements are of interest to businesspeople – especially in the financial sector – and businesspeople are of interest to advertisers.	中央银行家的声明关乎商界人士的利益——尤其是金融部门——而商界人士则关乎广告发布商的利益。


Finally, and perhaps least appreciated, is the fact that central-bank policy pronouncements are almost unique in having clear and predictable effects on financial markets, at least in the very short run (which can be a day or less).	最后，或许也是人们最少认识到的一���。 就是中央银行的政策声明会对金融市场产生几乎独一无二的明确且可预测的效应（可能会持续一天或者更少时间）。


If Fed officials surprise markets by making more “hawkish” statements (suggesting an upward bias to policy interest rates) than investors were expecting, the dollar will usually appreciate; long-term dollar interest rates will usually rise; and the stock market typically will decline.	如果美联储的官员通过发表比投资者原先预计更多的“鹰派”声明（暗示可能调高政策利率）而令市场感到震惊，美元经常会因此升值； 长期美元利率往往会上涨，而股票市场则一般会下跌。


True, these effects may be small and transitory.	虽然这些效应通常较小且持续时间较短。


But, unlike most of the reams of macroeconomic information with which we are bombarded every day, central bankers’ speeches and opinions have relatively foreseeable effects, especially when the bank’s chair, president, or governor speaks, or other officials speak in concert.	但于每天轰炸我们的大多数海量宏观经济信息不同的是，中央银行家的言论和观点拥有相对可预测的效应，尤其是当这些银行的主席，总裁，行长发话，或者其他官员一致表态的时候。


And, with trillions of dollars swirling around global financial markets, this predictability creates a fat target, with investors willing to make massive bets when they are pretty sure they are right, even if the profit per dollar is small.	同时由于有数万亿美元围绕着全球金融市场流动。 这一可预见性也创造出一个庞大的目标，因为投资者们在自信自身是正确的时候才愿意下极大的赌注，即便每一美元所获得的利润都极为微小。


If you think I am exaggerating, consider the coverage of other economic news, say, unemployment, GDP, or the trade balance.	如果你觉得我是在夸大其词，可以看看其他经济新闻，比如针对失业率，GDP，或者贸易平衡所做的报道。


Virtually every story quickly shifts its focus to what the data mean for monetary policy.	基本上每一篇报道都会迅速将自身关注点转移到这些数字对货币政策的意义上。


Some economic indicators, such as unemployment or inflation data, are indeed immediately important for central banks, because they may directly concern their mandates, and therefore have rather predictable effects.	一些经济指数，比如失业率或者或者通胀数据，事实上会对中央银行产生直接的重要影响，因为这些与他们的政策目标直接相关，也拥有相当可以预测的效应。


But much information is simply noise.	但过多的信息与噪音无异。


This makes policy opinions that come straight from the horse’s mouth almost uniquely valuable.	这使得由政策制定者直接发布的政策观点变得几乎不同寻常地珍贵。


In short, there are many good reasons why central bankers receive so much media focus, including their relative independence and generally solid performance.	简而言之，有许多理由可以说明为何中央银行家们获得了如此多的媒体关注，包括他们的相对独立性，以及总体可靠的表现。


But there are also other reasons having to do with politicians’ need for scapegoats, the media’s struggle to reinvent itself in the Internet age, and central-bank pronouncements’ predictable short-term effects on financial markets.	而同时也存在着其他的原因，比如政客们寻找替罪羊的需要，媒体在互联网时代重新改造自身的努力，以及中央银行声明对于金融市场的可预测的短期效应。


These other factors have combined to create a bubble around central-bank pronouncements and decisions that grossly exaggerates their economic significance.	这些其他因素结合起来围绕着中央银行的声明和决定创造了一个光鲜明亮的肥皂泡，显而易见地夸大了他们在经济上的重要性。


Is this a bubble that central bankers should worry about?	那我们是否应该担忧这个围绕着中央银行家的泡沫？


The answer is clearly yes.	答案显然是肯定的。


The news bubble is of particular concern, because it reinforces the idea that central bankers somehow care disproportionately about financial markets, which is generally not the case.	其中最应该关注的是新闻的泡沫，因为这不断强化了那种认为中央银行家在某种程度上会对金融市场作出超出合理程度关注的观念，而这显然不是真的。


Most central bankers really are targeting growth, inflation, and financial stability, if not necessarily in that order.	大多数中央银行家事实上都把目标放在增长，通胀和金融稳定上，虽然关注的重点可能有先后之别。


The political bubble is an inevitable product of central-bank independence, and preventing monetary policy from becoming a target for elected officials requires constant effort.	政治泡沫是中央银行独立性的一个不可避免的产物，因为避免货币政策沦为选举官员的目标需要持续的 努力。


The predictability bubble is perhaps the trickiest to navigate, though my instinct is that less would be more.	可预见性泡沫或许是最难探索的，虽然我的本能告诉我不必过度解读。


Exaggerated importance is one kind of bubble that central bankers should always be eager to burst.	而过度的重要性则是某种中央银行家们应当经常努力去戳破的泡沫。


The Trouble With Financial Bubbles	金融泡沫的难题


LONDON – Very soon after the magnitude of the 2008 financial crisis became clear, a lively debate began about whether central banks and regulators could – and should – have done more to head it off.	发自伦敦——在2008年金融危机的严重性逐渐明晰了之后，针对央行和监管者是否可以——以及应当——有更多举措去以阻止危机的辩论也逐渐升温。


The traditional view, notably shared by former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, is that any attempt to prick financial bubbles in advance is doomed to failure.	由美国前联邦储备委员会主席艾伦·格林斯潘为代表的传统观点认为，任何试图提前刺破金融泡沫的举动都是注定失败的。


The most central banks can do is to clean up the mess.	各国中央银行的大部分工作还是如何收拾残局。


Bubble-pricking may indeed choke off growth unnecessarily – and at high social cost. But there is a counter-argument.	刺破泡沫确实可能在不必要的情况下扼杀增长——并带来高昂的社会代价。


Economists at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have maintained that the costs of the crisis were so large, and the cleanup so long, that we should surely now look for ways to act pre-emptively when we again see a dangerous build-up of liquidity and credit.	然而也人对此不以为然：国际清算银行的经济学家认定，鉴于此次危机成本如此之大，善后工作如此漫长，一旦下次再看到流动性和信贷出现风险性积聚时，我们就必须采取一些先发制人的措施，。


Hence the fierce (albeit arcane and polite) dispute between the two sides at the International Monetary Fund’s recent meeting in Lima, Peru.	对此两派人马在国际货币基金组织近日于秘鲁首都利马召开的会议上展开了激烈（但隐晦而礼貌）的交锋。


For the literary-minded, it was reminiscent of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels.	对于那些文学爱好者来说，这让人想起乔纳森·斯威夫特的著名小说《格列佛游记》。


Gulliver finds himself caught in a war between two tribes, one of which believes that a boiled egg should always be opened at the narrow end, while the other is fervent in its view that a spoon fits better into the bigger, rounded end.	格列佛发现自己夹在了两个部落的煮鸡蛋战争中间，其中之一认为应该从尖头一端敲开来吃，另一个则一心认定地只有蛋屁股才是勺子的绝配。


It is fair to say that the debate has moved on a little since 2008.	可喜的是争论自2008年以来已经有了新的进展。


Most important, macroprudential regulation has been added to policymakers’ toolkit: simply put, it makes sense to vary banks’ capital requirements according to the financial cycle.	其中最重要的就是宏观审慎监管已被添加到政策制定者的工具箱中：简而言之，就是有必要根据金融周期来改变银行的资本金要求。


When credit expansion is rapid, it may be appropriate to increase banks’ capital requirements as a hedge against the heightened risk of a subsequent contraction.	一旦信贷迅速扩张，就当增加银行资本金要求以对冲不断累加的信贷收缩风险。


This increase would be above what microprudential supervision – assessing the risks to individual institutions – might dictate. In this way, the new Basel rules allow for requiring banks to maintain a so-called countercyclical buffer of extra capital.	但这一增加措施将超出宏观审慎监管——只评估单个机构的风险——的规定，因此新的巴塞尔规则也允许要求银行维持一笔额外的所谓反周期缓冲资金。


But if the idea of the countercyclical buffer is now generally accepted, what of the “nuclear option” to prick a bubble: Is it justifiable to increase interest rates in response to a credit boom, even though the inflation rate might still be below target?	但如果反周期缓冲的理念如今被普遍接受的话，采用“核选项”刺破泡沫的做法又该如何认定：在通胀率可能仍然低于既定目标的情况下，提高利率以应对信贷热潮是否合理？


And should central banks be given a specific financial-stability objective, separate from an inflation target?	是否应在原有通胀目标之外赋予央行一个特定的金融稳定目标？


Jaime Caruana, the General Manager of the BIS, and a former Governor of the Bank of Spain, answers yes to both questions.	曾任西班牙央行行长的国际清算银行总经理海梅·卡鲁阿纳（Jaime Caruana）认为上述两个举措都有必要。


In Lima, he argued that the so-called “separation principle,” whereby monetary and financial stability are addressed differently and tasked to separate agencies, no longer makes sense.	在利马会议上，他指出所谓的“分离原则”——即必须以不同手段保证货币和金融稳定，并将此任务各自分配给独立机构——已经不再有意义了。


The two sets of policies are, of course, bound to interact; but Caruana argues that it is wrong to say that we know too little about financial instability to be able to act in a preemptive way.	两套政策势必出现交集； 但卡鲁阿纳反对那些觉得我们对金融动荡���解太少以致无力预先行动的观点。


We know as much about bubbles as we do about inflation, Caruana argues, and central banks’ need to move interest rates for reasons other than the short-term control of consumer-price trends should be explicitly recognized.	他认为我们对泡沫的认知跟通货膨胀一样多，同时应该明确认定央行调整利率的理由不能仅限于短期控制消费价格走势等目标。


At the Lima meeting, the traditionalist counterview came from Benoît Cœuré of the European Central Bank.	而来自欧洲央行的伯努瓦·科赫（Benoît Cœuré）则在会上提出了传统派反对观点。


A central bank, he argued, needs a very simple mandate that allows it to explain its actions clearly and be held accountable for them.	他认为中央银行需要一个非常简单的任命，以允许它清楚解释其行为并为此负责。


So let central banks stick to the separation principle, “which makes our life simple. We do not want a complicated set of objectives.”	因此，让央行坚守分离原则“让我们更明白自己该怎么做，我们不希望被下达一组复杂的目标。


For Cœuré, trying to maintain financial stability is in the “too difficult” box.	在科赫看来，尝试维护金融稳定属于“过分困难”的范畴。


Even macroprudential regulation is of dubious value: supervisors should confine themselves to overseeing individual institutions, leaving macro-level policy to the grownups.	宏观审慎监管本身的价值也很可疑：监管者应仅限于监督单一机构，把宏观层面的政策留给更高层次的人去管。


Nemat Shafik, a deputy governor of the Bank of England, tried to position herself between these opposing positions. She proposed relying on three lines of defense against financial instability.	英国央行的副行长内玛·沙菲克（Nemat Shafik）则试图从中调和，提议构建应对金融不稳定的三道防线。


Microprudential regulation, she argued, is the first line of defense: if all banks are lending prudently, the chances of collective excesses are lower.	她认为宏观谨慎监管是第一道防线：如果所有银行都谨慎放贷，出现集体过激行为的可能性就较低。


But the second line of defense is macroprudential manipulation of capital requirements, to be applied across the board or to selected market segments, such as mortgages.	但防御的第二行是对资本金要求的宏观审慎操作，可以全面应用或针对抵押贷款这类特定的细分市场。


And, if all else fails to achieve financial stability, central banks could change interest rates.	如果这些方法都无法实现财政稳定，央行就调整利率。


Because British law assigns capital regulation and interest-rate policy to two separate committees – with different members – within the Bank of England, the Shafik strategy would require some clever political and bureaucratic maneuvering.	由于英国法律将资本监管与调整利率政策的任务委任给英格兰银行内部拥有不同成员的两个独立委员会，因此沙菲克的策略需要展现一些聪明的政治手腕。


Industrial quantities of research, analysis, and debate have been devoted to the causes of the 2008 crisis and its consequences; so it seems odd that senior central bankers are still so sharply divided on the central issue of financial stability.	针对2008年金融危机及其后果的研究，分析和讨论已经汗牛冲栋； 因此资深央行官员依然在金融稳定的核心问题上如此尖锐对立让人感觉很意外。


All those days spent in secret conclave in Basel, drinking through the BIS’s legendary wine cellar, have apparently led to no consensus.	可见在巴塞尔召开的所有那些秘密会议除了消耗掉国际清算银行珍藏的大量名酒之外并未达成任何共识。


My view is that Caruana had the best of the arguments in Lima, and Cœuré the worst.	我的看法是，利马会议上卡鲁阿纳的观点最合理，而科赫的最糟糕。


Sticking to a simple objective in the interests of a quiet life, even if you know it to be imperfect, is an inelegant posture at best.	即便认识到这一举动是不完美的，却依然为了少被其他事情滋扰而维持一个简单的目标，也是一种无法得到他人尊重的姿态。


We need our central bankers to make complex decisions and to be able to balance potentially conflicting objectives.	我们需要央行行长们做出复杂的决策，并能在可能产生冲突的目标间找到平衡。


We accept that they will not always be right. However, it is surely incumbent on them to learn from the biggest financial meltdown of the last 80 years, rather than to press on, regardless, with policy approaches that so signally failed.	我们可以接受他们犯一些错误，但是这他们有责任从这场80年来最严重的金融危机中学习，而非不管不顾地继续执行那些已被明确证明是错误的方针。


Central Bankers under Siege	四面楚歌的央行行长


CHICAGO – Poor Ben Bernanke!	芝加哥—可怜的本·伯南克！


As Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, he has gone further than any other central banker in recent times in attempting to stimulate the economy through monetary policy.	作为美国联邦储备委员会主席，在最近一段时间里，他比其他任何央行行长更加积极地试图使用货币政策刺激经济。


He has cut short-term interest rates to the bone.	他已将短期利率调低到了极限水平。


He has adopted innovative new methods of monetary easing.	他已经采用了创新性货币宽松办法。


Again and again, he has repeated that, so long as inflationary pressure remains contained, his main concern is the high level of US unemployment.	他一次又一次地重复说，通胀压力能够被控制，他的主要担忧在于美国失业率。


Yet progressive economists chastise him for not doing enough.	但激进派经济学家仍然炮轰伯南克做得不够。


What more could they possibly want?	他们还想伯南克怎么样呢？


Raise the inflation target, they say, and all will be well.	提高目标通胀率，他们说，这样世界就太平了。


Of course, this would be a radical departure for the Fed, which has worked hard to convince the public that it will keep inflation around 2%.	当然，这将与美联储的立场背道而驰，后者一直在努力让公众相信它将把通胀维持在2%左右。


That credibility has allowed the Fed to be aggressive: it is difficult to imagine that it could have expanded its balance sheet to the extent that it has if the public thought that it could not be trusted on inflation.	这一立场的可信度是美联储采取积极举措的基础：很难想象，美联储将其资产负债表扩张到让公众不再相信其通胀目标的程度会怎么样。


So why do these economists want the Fed to sacrifice its hard-won gains?	既然如此，那些经济学家为什么还希望美联储牺牲掉好不容易得来的成果呢？


The answer lies in their view of the root cause of continued high unemployment: excessively high real interest rates.	答案在于他们对持续高失业根源的看法：过高的真实利率。


Their logic is simple.	此种逻辑十分简单。


Before the financial crisis erupted in 2008, consumers buoyed US demand by borrowing heavily against their rising house prices.	2008年金融危机爆发以前，消费者利用上涨的房价大量举债，撑起了美国的需求。


Now these heavily indebted households cannot borrow and spend any more.	如今，这些负债累累的家庭不再能够通过借钱来应付开支了。


An important source of aggregate demand has evaporated.	总需求的一大重要源头已经蒸发殆尽。


As consumers stopped buying, real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates should have fallen to encourage thrifty households to spend.	随着消费者不再买东西，真实（经通胀调整的）利率应该下降以鼓励节俭家庭增加支出。


But real interest rates did not fall enough, because nominal interest rates cannot go below zero.	但真实利率没有降到位，因为名义利率不可能低于零。


By increasing inflation, the Fed would turn real interest rates seriously negative, thereby coercing thrifty households into spending instead of saving.	美联储可以通过增加通胀率将真实利率拉低到远低于零的水平，从而强迫节俭家庭停止储蓄、开始消费。


With rising demand, firms would hire, and all would be well.	随着需求的增加，企业将开始招聘新人，一切都睡随之好起来。


This is a different logic from the one that calls for inflation as a way of reducing long-term debt (at the expense of investors), but it has equally serious weaknesses.	与将通胀作为降低长期债务的办法（以投资者蒙受损失为代价）比起来，这是个完全不同的逻辑，但一样站不住脚。


First, while low rates might encourage spending if credit were easy, it is not at all clear that traditional savers today would go out and spend.	首先，低利率在信贷宽松时也许能够刺激支出，但在今天的环境下传统储蓄者会不会出去花钱很难说。


Think of the soon-to-retire office worker.	以快要退休的员工为例。


She saved because she wanted enough money to retire.	他之所以储蓄，是为了存足够的钱退休后用。


Given the terrible returns on savings since 2007, the prospect of continuing low interest rates might make her put even more money aside.	自2007年以来，储蓄的回报率低得可怜，利率持续保持低位可能促使他储蓄更多的钱。


Alternatively, low interest rates could push her (or her pension fund) to buy risky long-maturity bonds.	低利率也可能促使他（或他的退休基金）购买高风险长期债券。


Given that these bonds are already aggressively priced, such a move might thus set her up for a fall when interest rates eventually rise.	这些债券的定价本来就较为激进，当利率最终开始升高时，买入操作可能会给他带来损失。


Indeed, America may well be in the process of adding a pension crisis to the unemployment problem.	事实上，美国很可能正走在失业问题未了、退休危机即来的路上。


Second, household over-indebtedness in the US, as well as the fall in demand, is localized, as my colleague Amir Sufi and his co-author, Atif Mian, have shown.	其次，我的同事苏菲（Amir Sufi）与合作者米安（Atif Mian）指出，在美国，家庭过度负债和需求下降都是本地化的。


Hairdressers in Las Vegas lost their jobs partly because households there have too much debt stemming from the housing boom, and partly because many local construction workers and real-estate brokers were laid off.	拉斯维加斯的理发师之所以失业，部分是因为家庭在房地产繁荣中背上的债务负担太过沉重，部分则是因为许多当地建筑工人和地产经纪丢掉了工作。


Even if we can coerce traditional debt-free savers to spend, it is unlikely that there are enough of them in Las Vegas.	即便我们可以强迫传统无债务储蓄者增加支出，也不能保证拉斯维加斯有足够多的这类人。


If these debt-free savers are in New York City, which did not experience as much of a boom and a bust, cutting real interest rates will encourage spending on haircuts in New York City, which already has plenty of demand, but not in Las Vegas, which has too little.	如果这批无债务储蓄者生活在纽约市——那里并未经历大规模枯荣循环——那么真实利率的降低将能鼓励已然充足的纽约市理发支出，但不能鼓励严重不足的拉斯维加斯理发支出。


Put differently, real interest rates are too blunt a stimulus tool, even if they work.	换句话说，即使真实利率能起作用，作为一种刺激工具，它也不够精准。


Third, we have little idea about how the public forms expectations about the central bank’s future actions.	第三，我们对公众如何形成关于央行未来行动的预期一无所知。


If the Fed announces that it will tolerate 4% inflation, could the public think that the Fed is bluffing, or that, if an implicit inflation target can be broken once, it can be broken again?	如果美联储宣布可以接受4%的通胀率，那么公众是会把这当做美联储在虚张声势，还是认为既然通胀目标可以提高一次，那么就能提高第二次？


Would expectations shift to a much higher inflation rate?	公众预期会指向通胀率大大提高吗？


How would the added risk premium affect long-term interest rates?	增加的风险升水如何影响长期利率？


What kind of recession would the US have to endure to bring inflation back to comfortable levels?	美国要经历怎样的衰退才能将通胀压回适宜水平？


The answer to all of these questions is: We really don’t know.	所有这些问题的答案都是：我们实在不知道。


Given the dubious benefits of still lower real interest rates, placing central-bank credibility at risk would be irresponsible.	既然进一步降低真实利率的好处并不确定，那么为此将央行信誉置于风险之中绝不是负责任的做法。


Finally, it is not even clear that the zero lower bound is primarily responsible for high US unemployment.	最后，利率低于零是不是美国高失业的主要原因还未可知。


Traditional Keynesian frictions like the difficulty of reducing wages and benefits in some industries, as well as non-traditional frictions like the difficulty of moving when one cannot sell (or buy) a house, may share blame.	传统凯恩斯主义摩擦（比如难以降低某些行业的工资和福利）以及非传统摩擦（比如当你无法卖掉（或买到）房子时就没办法搬家）或许也起着同样重要的作用


We cannot ignore high unemployment.	我们不能忽视高企的失业率。


Clearly, improving indebted households’ ability to refinance at low current interest rates could help to reduce their debt burden, as would writing off some mortgage debt in cases where falling house prices have left borrowers deep underwater (that is, the outstanding mortgage exceeds the house’s value).	显然，改善负债家庭以较低的当前利率获得再融资的能力有助于减少他们的债务负担，对借款人因房价大跌而导致按揭严重资不抵债者（即未偿还按揭高于住房价值）给予一定的按揭债务减记也可以起到相同的效果。


More could be done here.	在这方面还可以做得更多。


The good news is that household debt is coming down through a combination of repayments and write-offs.	好消息是，在偿还和减记的双重作用下，家庭债务正在下降。


But it is also important to recognize that the path to a sustainable recovery does not lie in restoring irresponsible and unaffordable pre-crisis spending, which had the collateral effect of creating unsustainable jobs in construction and finance.	但同样重要的是认识到可持续复苏之路并不在于重塑不负责任、无法负担的危机前支出水平，这样做会导致副作用，在建筑业和金融业形成不可持续的就业改善。


With a savings rate of barely 4% of GDP, the average US household is unlikely to be over-saving.	美国的储蓄率只有GDP的4%左右，平均而言，美国家庭的储蓄绝非过剩。


Sensible policy lies in improving the capabilities of the workforce across the country, so that they can get sustainable jobs with steady incomes.	有效的政策在于改善全国劳动力的能力，从而让他们获得可持续的工作和稳定的收入。


That takes time, but it might be the best option left.	这需要时间，但是可以找到的最佳选择。


Central Banks and the Revenge of Politics	中央银行和政治反弹


FRANKFURT – The reputation of central banks has always had its ups and downs.	发自法兰克福——各大中央银行的名声总免不了起起伏伏。


For years, central banks’ prestige has been almost unprecedentedly high. But a correction now seems inevitable, with central-bank independence becoming a key casualty.	虽然多年以来各央行的声誉几乎达到前所未有的高度，但如今似乎不可避免地要出现回落，而中央银行的独立则因此成为了牺牲品。


Central banks’ reputation reached a peak before and at the turn of the century, thanks to the so-called Great Moderation.	得益于所谓的“大温和”，中央银行的声誉在世纪之交前后达到了高峰。


Low and stable inflation, sustained growth, and high employment led many to view central banks as a kind of master of the universe, able – and expected – to manage the economy for the benefit of all.	低水平和稳定的通货膨胀，持续增长和高就业水平让许多人觉得中央银行犹如某种宇宙主宰，能够（并被认定）为所有人的福祉而管理经济。


The depiction of US Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan as “Maestro” exemplified this perception.	那种将美国联邦储备委员会主席格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）尊为“大师”的描述正是体现了这种观念。


The 2008 global financial crisis initially bolstered central banks’ reputation further.	2008年全球金融危机起初进一步推高了中央银行的声誉。


With resolute action, monetary authorities made a major contribution to preventing a repeat of the Great Depression.	由于行动果断，货币当局对防止大萧条重演作出了重大贡献。


They were, yet again, lauded as saviors of the world economy.	他们也再一次地被称之为世界经济的大救星。


But central banks’ successes fueled excessively high expectations, which encouraged most policymakers to leave their monetary counterparts largely responsible for macroeconomic management.	但中央银行的成功也催生了过高的期望，这促使大多数政策制定者放手让货币部门去承担起宏观经济管理的主要责任。


Such “expectational” and, in turn, “operational” overburdening has exposed monetary policy’s true limitations.	这种“期望”和“运营”上的过度负担则暴露了货币政策真正的局限性。


In other words, central banks’ good reputation now seems to be backfiring.	换句话说，中央银行的良好声誉如今仿佛取得了适得其反的效果。


And “personality overburdening” – when trust in the success of monetary policy is concentrated on the person at the helm of the institution – means that individual leaders’ reputations are likely to suffer as well.	并且“个人过度依赖”——当对成功货币政策的信任集中在机构的掌舵人上——这意味着领导者的声誉也可能受损。


Yet central banks cannot simply abandon their new operational burdens, particularly with regard to financial stability, which, as the 2008 crisis starkly demonstrated, cannot be maintained by price stability alone.	然而中央银行不应轻易抛弃这一新运营负担，特别是金融稳定不能仅靠价格稳定来维持——正如2008年危机所显示的那样。


On the contrary, a period of low and stable interest rates may even foster financial fragility, leading to a “Minsky moment,” when asset values suddenly collapse, bringing down the whole system.	相反，维持一段时期的低水平和稳定利率甚至可能加剧金融脆弱性，导致“明斯基时刻”——当资产价值突然崩溃，整个系统立马瘫痪。


The limits of inflation targeting are now clear, and the strategy should be discarded.	设置通胀目标这一手段的局限性如今早已明确，应该被放弃。


Central banks now have to reconcile the need to maintain price stability with the responsibility – regardless of whether it is legally mandated – to reduce financial vulnerability.	如今中央银行现在必须在维持价格稳定以及降低金融脆弱性——无论其是否获得了法律授权——的责任之间取得平衡。


This will not be easy, not least because of another new operational burden that has been placed on many central banks: macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision.	这可不是一件容易的事，尤其是许多中央银行又背上另一个新运营负担：宏观审慎和微观审慎监管。


Micro-prudential supervision, in particular, implies the risk of political pressure, interference with central banks’ independence, and policy conflicts, all of which could influence the behavior of financial intermediaries, by encouraging them to assume greater risk.	微观审慎监管尤为意味着承受政治压力，对央行独立性的干预和政策冲突的风险，所有这些都可能通过鼓励金融中介机构承担更大风险来影响它们的行为。


They know that their supervisor has powerful tools at its disposal – for example, it can lower borrowing costs, thereby protecting banks (at least for a while) – and a strong interest in protecting its reputation.	这些机构都知道自己的主管部门手里握着强大工具——例如它可以降低借款成本，从而（至少在一段时间内）为银行提供保护——也存在维护自身声誉的强烈动机。


But, given the overburdening of central banks, reputational defense may be beyond their capacity.	但鉴于中央银行已经负担过重，可能最终无力捍卫自己的声誉了。


While this is a global phenomenon, the European Central Bank is exceptionally weighed down.	虽然这是一个全球现象，但欧洲中央银行的负担尤其沉重。


As the central bank of the 19 member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the ECB also faces “extra-institutional overburdening.”	作为欧洲货币联盟（EMU）19个成员国的中央银行，欧洲央行也面临着“超出本机构的过度负担”。


This became apparent in May 2010, when the ECB assumed the responsibility of purchasing the government bonds of countries that otherwise would have experienced substantial increases in long-term interest rates.	该问题从2010年5月开始凸显，当时欧洲央行出手承担了购买某些国家政府债券的责任，不然这些国家的长期利率就将大幅增加。


That intervention was a lose-lose proposition for the ECB.	对欧洲央行来说这种干预是双输的。


It was essentially driven by politics: the ECB was picking up the slack for policymakers who were unwilling to fulfill their obligations.	这主要是由政治驱动的：欧洲央行正在为那些不愿意履行其义务的政策制定者收拾残局。


But if the ECB had refused to intervene, financial markets could have faced substantial turmoil, for which, rightly or wrongly, it would have been blamed.	但如果欧洲央行拒绝介入，金融市场可能会面临重大动荡，无论正确与否，它都要遭受责备。


From that moment on, however, the ECB took on the political role of guaranteeing not only the survival of the euro, but also the continued inclusion of every EMU member country.	然而从那一刻起，欧洲央行就扮演了一个政治角色：不仅要保证欧元的生存，还要维系每个欧洲货币联盟成员国。


In 2012, ECB President Mario Draghi cemented this responsibility, pledging to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro.	2012年，欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）巩固了这一责任，承诺会“用尽一切手段”以保全欧元。


“And believe me,” he asserted, “it will be enough.”	“相信我，”他断言，“这样做就足够��”。


This stance led many to accuse the ECB of exceeding its mandate and violating European treaties.	这一立场导致许多人指责欧洲央行超越其授权并违反欧洲条约。


But the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court have, all in all, rejected that view.	不过欧洲法院和德国宪法法院都完全不赞同这一观点。


Nonetheless, further litigation regarding the ECB’s unconventional monetary-policy measures is underway.	然而针对欧洲央行非常规货币政策措施的进一步诉讼仍在进行中。


Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that central-bank independence – de jure or de facto – is once again up for debate.	在这种背景下，中央银行的独立性——无论法律上还是事实上——再次出现争议就毫不奇怪了。


The purpose of central-bank independence has always been to enable monetary policy to focus on maintaining price stability, without being subject to political pressure.	一直以来维持中央银行独立性的目的就是使货币政策能够在不受政治压力的情况下专注于维持价格稳定。


While this approach has always been controversial, given that it implies handing substantial control over the economy to unelected technocrats, past inflationary episodes have fostered broad acceptance of central-bank independence.	虽然这种方法一直备受争议，因为它意味着将经济的实质控制权交给非由选举产生的技术官僚，但过去的通货膨胀事件已经令中央银行的独立地位得到了广泛认同。


When central-bank mandates exceed price stability, however, their independence may seem increasingly out of place in a democratic society.	但是当中央银行的授权超越价格稳定时，它们的独立性在民主社会中似乎显得越来越不合时宜。


This is particularly true for the ECB: the stronger the perceived link between the extension of the ECB’s mandate and politics becomes, the more criticism its independent status will confront.	欧洲央行尤其如此：欧洲央行的任命延长与政治之间的联系越强，其独立地位所面临的批评就越多。


The failure of elected politicians to act appropriately – particularly in some eurozone countries – has turned central banks into the “only game in town.”	由于民选政治家未能采取适当行动——特别是在一些欧元区国家，中央银行因此成为了“唯一的选项”。


And this is turning out to be less a boon to their prestige than a threat to their independence.	而这对央行独立性的威胁显然比对其声誉的助推作用更大。


The ECB, especially, is set to face growing pushback against its independent status, regardless of whether it manages to “save” the EMU.	尤其是欧洲央行，无论其是否设法“保存”欧洲货币联盟，都将面临对其独立地位不断增加的抵制。


After all, it would have to be quite powerful to succeed – too powerful for any democracy to abide.	毕竟，它必须足够强大才能成事——强大到任何民主都不能约束的程度。


Central Banking Deflowered	央行失节


FLORENCE – After the European Central Bank announced on May 9 that it would buy the government bonds of Mediterranean countries experiencing severe fiscal strains, critics complained that the Bank had “lost its virginity.” The actions looked like a clear contravention of Article 21 of the ECB’s Statute, which forbids credit facilities to governments or to European Union institutions.	佛罗伦萨——


Similar comments were made about the US Federal Reserve in 2008, after it began large-scale purchases of non-conventional assets, including agency debt and mortgage-backed securities, in order to support the collapsing US housing market.	地中海国家正在经历严重的财政危机，5月9日，欧洲央行宣布它将购买这些国家的政府债券，之后批评人士就抱怨称欧洲央行“失去了贞洁”。


Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, for example, complained that the institution was operating at the bounds of legality.	此举看上去似乎明显违反了欧洲央行相关法律第21条，该条规定禁止给政府或欧盟机构提供信贷便利。


In both cases, the central bank looked as if it was doing something other than traditional monetary policy.	2008年，人们对美联储也作出了类似的评论。


In the past 30 years, a remarkable degree of consensus had been established that the primary, if not sole, responsibility of central banks was to ensure price stability.	当时，为了支持即将崩溃的美国楼市，美联储开始大规模购买包括代理机构债务和抵押债券在内的非传统资产。


Increasingly, since the early 1990’s, it had become fashionable to define price stability more precisely through the use of inflation targets.	比如，前美联储主席保罗•沃克尔抱怨说，美联储是在合法范围内运营。


Keeping prices roughly constant was a very different mission from the historical role of central banks.	在这两个例子中，央行看上去似乎采取的不是一些传统的货币政策。


In the original vision of central banking, price stability was not at all an obvious purpose, since the value of money was cast in terms of specific weights of precious metals.	在过去30年里，达成了一项显著的共识，即央行的主要责任，如果不是唯一责任的话，是维持价格稳定。 自上个世纪90年代以来，根据通胀目标更加确切地定义价格稳定日益盛行。


Instead, central banks were established for two major purposes. First, they were to manage the state’s credit, almost inevitably in the wake of costly major wars.	与央行过去扮演的角色相比，保持价格基本不变是一项完全不同的任务。


This was how the oldest central banks, the Swedish Riksbank (1668) and the Bank of England (1694), came into being. Likewise, another wave of central banks was founded in the early nineteenth century, with the Norwegian and Finnish banks following the example of the Banque de France (1800).	在起初央行的任务中，维持价格稳定根本不是一个明显的目的，这是因为货币的价值是由贵金属比值来衡量的。


In each case, the new bank was closely tied to the interests and influence of a narrow political elite.	相反，成立央行有两大目的。 第一大目的是，它们管理国家信贷，这在损失惨重的大战后几乎是无法避免的。


The banks looked as if they were devices to harness financial power to an existing but controversial and threatened political order.	最古老的央行瑞典央行（成立于1668年）和英格兰银行（成立于1694年）就是这样成立的。 于此类似，又有一批央行成立于19世纪初，挪威和芬兰银行效仿法兰西银行（成立于1800年）。


More democratic regimes were, consequently, rather suspicious of the political implications of institutional innovation.	在每个例子中，新成立的银行与少数政治精英的利益和影响力息息相关。


It was suspicion of the politics behind a designated state-oriented central bank that led to the non-renewal of the charters, and the demise, of the First and Second Bank of the United States. Resistance to the process of political capture led in some countries (such as Switzerland) to opposition to establishing any central bank at all.	在一个现存但富有争议和具有威胁的政治秩序中，各银行看上去似乎是行使金融权力的机构。


A second historical motivation for the creation of central banks involved the safeguarding of financial systems.	因此，越是民主的政权对体制创新中的政治内涵越是怀疑。


In the mid-nineteenth century, a new generation of central banks was established essentially to manage payments systems and stabilize fragile banking systems.	正是指定的国家导向型央行背后的政治猜忌导致宪章无法更新，美国第一大和第二大银行破产。 在一些国家（如瑞士），抵制政治俘虏进程导致反对成立任何央行。


This was the motivation behind the founding of the German Reichsbank (1875), which was a response to the stock-market and financial collapse of 1873, and the US Federal Reserve System (1914), which was established in the wake of the major financial crisis of 1907.	在19世纪中叶，新一代央行成立的实质是管理支付系统和稳定脆弱的银行系统。 这就是德意志帝国银行（成立于1875年）成立背后的动机，它是对1873年股市和金融崩溃作出的一次回应。


In these cases, too, there was an obvious suspicion that the central bank was a tool of the financial elite.	美国联邦储蓄系统（成立于1914年）是在1907年金融大危机之后建立的。 在这些例子中，央行是金融精英的一种工具这一怀疑也同样显而易见。


The ECB is the first and purest example of a modern central bank that is concerned only with the issuance of money and price stability.	欧洲央行只关注保证货币和价格稳定，在现代央行中尚属首例，也是一个最专一的现代央行。 它继承了德国联邦银行的很多政治遗产。


It absorbed much of the political inheritance of Germany’s Bundesbank, whose establishment after World War II reflected Allied insistence on breaking with German central banking’s past traditions, in which political subservience and close ties to the financial establishment undermined monetary stability, leading to inflation and the destruction of the currency.	德国联邦银行成立于二战后，反映出联盟对脱离德国央行的过去传统坚定不移。 在过去那种传统中，政治谄媚和与金融机构成立的密切关系破坏货币稳定，导致通货膨胀和货币毁灭。


There had been a prior attempt to create an institution that would deal with short-term support mechanisms for member states: the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, launched in 1973 and governed by a board of central bank governors.	为成员国处理短期支持机制，之前曾试图创建一个机构：欧洲货币合作基金，成立于1973年，由各成员国央行行长组成的董事会管理。


Designated as a European Community institution, it was regarded as being dangerously political.	作为一个欧洲社会机构，人们认为它具有危险的政治性。


The ECB was also unlike older central banks in that it was not seen as a source of support for an integrated but potentially vulnerable banking system.	与较古老的央行相比，欧洲央行的不同之处还在于它不被视为支持统一但极易遭到破坏的银行系统的一种来源。


In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, there were debates about whether the ECB should be responsible for banking supervision and regulation.	在上个世纪80年代末，90年代初，出现了欧洲央行是否应该负责银行监管的辩论。


The answer was no – a decision that, in the wake of the 2007-2008 credit crisis, appears to have been a fundamental mistake.	得出的结论是不应该——2007年至2008年的信贷危机发生后，这一决定似乎一直就是一个根本性的错误。


In other words, in the face of the crisis, the ECB needs to behave much more like the older central banks.	换句话说，在危机面前，欧洲央行需要更像较古老的央行那样有所作为。


In the first place, it is becoming an institution concerned with state debt, particularly with its term structure, and with ensuring that the market for that debt continues to operate smoothly, without episodes of breakdown and panic.	首先，它正逐渐成为一个关注国家债务，尤其是其期限结构的机构，致力于保证该债务市场继续运营顺利，不出现崩溃和恐慌事件。


Second, it has become clear that, whether they like it or not, central banks bear major responsibility for financial-sector stability.	其次，有一点已经日益明朗，不管他们喜欢与否，央行都要为金融部门的稳定承担主要责任。


There are obvious risks: non-conventional monetary policy might be considered a sort of fiscal policy, in which the central bank is allocating or redistributing resources to a particular constituency: the housing market in the case of the US, or recipients of government largesse in the European case.	风险显而易见：非传统的货币政策或许可以当作一种财政政策，根据这种政策，央行可以为特定的地区配置资源：美国的楼市或欧洲政府援助的接受者。


The transition to the new stance will involve a broader and much more political role for the central bank.	过渡到这种新的立场需要央行发挥更广泛和更多的政治作用。


Hence there will inevitably be a demand for greater accountability, and even for the involvement of political authorities in the process of setting central-bank policies.	因此肩负更大的责任，甚至在制定央行政策过程中让政治机构参与是不可避免的。


Permanent virginity is a recipe for permanent sterility.	永保贞洁是永绝生育的一种方法。


The choice for European central banking is now open: should it play around with multiple political partners, or should it settle down to stable marital bliss with a well-defined mechanism for responsibility and accountability?	欧洲央行现在的选择是开放：它应该与各类政治伙伴四处玩弄呢？ 还是应该下定决心与一个责任制和问责制的明确机制喜结连理呢？


Central Bankers Gone Wild?	不羁的央行行长？


PRAGUE – Sweeping criticisms of developed-country central banks have lately become all the rage.	布拉格—最近，一边倒地批评发达国家央行风靡一时。


The main line of attack goes something like this: monetary policymakers have been far too activist since 2008, overstepping their mandates and damaging the economy.	主要攻击点大致如下：2008年以来，货币决策者太活跃了，他们的权限扩张太快，正在危害经济。


This narrative – which, bizarrely, is equally popular among otherwise irreconcilable ideological adversaries, such as libertarians and neo-Marxists – is patently wrong.	这一说法——很奇怪，它们在理应不可协调的意识形态阵营之间，比如自由主义者和新马克思主义者，同样流行——大错特错。


What the critics fail to understand is that modern central banks are responsible not just for fighting inflation, but for maintaining long-term price stability.	批评者没能理解，现代央行不仅要负责遏制通胀，还要负责维持长期物价稳定。


Like a person’s body temperature, price levels can go neither too high nor too low without causing serious complications.	物价水平好比人的体温，可以在不过高和不过低的范围内波动而不引起严重的症候。


Central banks must be as “activist” when combating deflation caused by weak demand as they are when fighting high inflation driven by excessively strong demand.	在打击因需求疲软引起的通缩和遏制受需求过强推动的高通胀时，央行必须同样“积极”。


Though the battle is completely symmetric, the public assessment of it is bafflingly lopsided, especially in countries with financially conservative populations.	尽管战斗完全是对称的，但公众对此的评估却莫名其妙地严重偏颇，特别是人民在财务上十分保守的国家。


This includes my own country, the Czech Republic, a nation of small savers where the loan-to-deposit ratio remains well below 100%.	这其中包括我的祖国捷克。 捷克储蓄者储蓄规模很小，贷款-存款比仍远低于100%。


Czechs fear inflation, even though it hit a 13-year low last year and the Czech National Bank, of which I am Vice-Governor, has been fighting to avert the risk of deflation since 2013.	捷克人担心通货膨胀，即使捷克通胀率去年达到了13年来的低点，并且自2013年以来我担任副行长的捷克国民银行一直在致力于消除通缩风险。


Another common complaint about developed-country central banks’ policies since 2008 is that they have redistributive effects.	其他对2008年以来发达国家央行政策的共同抱怨是这些政策引起了再分配效应。


They certainly do, but so what?	当然会这样，但那又如何呢？


Any and all monetary-policy actions redistribute wealth.	任何货币政策行动都会重新分配财富。


An interest-rate hike pleases savers, whereas a rate cut is a boon to borrowers.	提升利率让储蓄者高兴，而削减利率有利于借款人。


Importers prefer a strong exchange rate; exporters prefer a weak one.	进口商喜欢强势汇率； 出口商喜欢弱势汇率。


To make any sense at all, monetary policy must have different effects on different groups at different times.	要想有效果，货币政策就必须在不同时间对不同群体产生不同影响。


That is no mistake; it is the essence of monetary policy.	这不是错误； 这是货币政策的本质。


Some critics add that central banks are failing to hit their inflation targets anyway, so their activism is not only unwarranted, but also ineffective.	一些批判者还说，央行无论如何没有实现通胀目标，因此它们的积极主义不但没有必要，而且没有效果。


Sometimes they even manage to fit these contradictory criticisms in the same sentence, as though they were accusing someone of firing blanks, but somehow leaving people dead and wounded.	有时他们甚至将这些自相矛盾的批评放在一个句子中，好像他们在指责某人放空枪却造成了人员伤亡似的。


The reality is that central banks in the developed world have – in a truly fascinating way – succeeded in maintaining price stability and the purchasing power of money during and after the global financial crisis.	现实是，发的发世界央行在全球金融危机期间和之后保持物价稳定和货币购买力方面取得了成功——而且是不折不扣的了不起的成功。


Had they not intervened, their economies would have faced catastrophic deflation, major asset-price slumps, and a complete meltdown of the financial and real sectors.	若不是它们的干预，它们的经济就将面临灾难性通缩、资产价格大跳水以及金融和实体部门的完全崩溃。


Clearly, strong action was the right response to the crisis (the extent to which central banks might have contributed to its outbreak is another matter).	显然，强力行动是应对危机的正确做法（央行在金融危机的爆发中起到了什么作用是另一个问题）。


In a system of elastic money with no intrinsic value, the quantity of money has to change over time if the purchasing power of money is to stay broadly constant.	在一个采用不具有内在价值的弹性货币的体系中，要想让货币购买力大致保持不变，货币数量就必须随时间而变化。


So price stability, not the quantity of money, is what matters.	因此，物价稳定，而不是货币数量，才是重要的问题。


Central banks’ ballooning balance sheets reflect the depth of the problems that many economies faced after 2008.	央行资产负债表的扩张反映了许多经济体在2008年后所面临的问题的深度。


In that context, central banks did what was necessary to maintain purchasing power and price stability.	在这一背景下，央行采取了必要措施保持购买力和物价稳定。


There was no “activism” on their part; there was only a permanent mandate to fulfill.	对它们来说，这里不存在“积极主义”； 只有需要实现的永远地位使命。


If that sounds arrogant, let me offer some evidence.	如果你觉得这一论断有傲慢之嫌，那么让我提供一些证据。


People vote with their wallets.	人民用荷包投票。


If the purchasing power of their money had been dealt a blow after 2008, they would naturally have sought substitutes for their home currencies (other currencies, precious metals, or alternative forms of saving).	如果他们的钱的购买力在2008年后遭遇重创，他们自然会寻求将本币换掉（换成其他货币、贵金属或其他储蓄方式）。


This rarely happened in the developed world.	这在发达世界罕有见到。


Of course, it is true that central banks in many countries are now undershooting their inflation targets.	当然，许多国家的央行没有实现通胀目标。


(Central bankers usually define the ideal “temperature” of the economy as annual inflation of about 2%.)	（央行通常将理想的经济“温度”定义为年通胀率在2%左右。


But while that is unpleasant, it is not disastrous, especially given that the decline in prices is partly a result of a supply – not demand – shock, in the form of very low oil prices.	）但这固然令人不快，却并不会导致灾难，特别是考虑到物价下跌部分是源自供给——而非需求——冲击，如一跌到底的石油价格。


That shock is benefiting consumers and poses no threat to price stability, at least in countries that are net oil importers.	这一冲击有利于消费者，对物价稳定没有威胁，至少对石油净进口国是如此。


Consider this scenario.	考虑这一情形。


A firm plans to increase sales by 2%, but manages to achieve only 1% growth for two years in a row.	某企业计划增加2%的销售额，但管理者只是以连续两年、每年增加1%的形式实现。


Would you consider the firm a failure?	你会认为这个企业失败吗？


Hardly.	恐怕不会。


After all, the planned and actual profits and turnovers of private companies can easily differ by 10% or more.	毕竟，私营公司计划和实际利润和收入很容易就会产生10%或以上的偏差。


Most firms operate in a simpler environment with fewer variables than central banks.	大部分企业的经营环境变量都要少于央行。


So how can one expect central banks always to meet precise inflation targets, regardless of the economic circumstances?	既然如此，你如何期望不管经济环境如何，央行总能实现精准的通胀目标？


To be clear, I am not saying that central banks should not be working hard to get closer to their targets.	必须澄清，我并没有说央行不应该努力工作接近它们的目标。


They obviously should.	它们绝对应该如此。


Moreover, they should certainly not allow inflation expectations to be destabilized.	此外，它们也绝对不应该让通胀预期变得不稳定。


But, when judging central banks, people need to maintain a proper sense of proportion.	但是，在评判央行时，人们需要保持恰当的分寸。


And they really need to stop saying things that are untrue – for example, that central banks’ policy arsenal is not just exhaustible, but also nearly exhausted.	它们确实需要停止说不真实的东西——比如，央行政策武器库不但可能耗尽，而且已经接近耗尽了。


Monetary policymakers have plenty of weapons and an endless supply of ammunition at their disposal.	货币决策者有充足的武器和无限量的弹药可以随意使用。


Those weapons have various calibers and different degrees of effectiveness at different times.	这些武器口径不同，在不同时间的效果程度也各异。


Not every weapon is right for every occasion or every economy.	不是所有武器都适合所有经济体的所有情况。


But central banks’ ability to create and destroy money is theoretically unlimited.	但央行创造和销毁货币的能力理论上是无限的。


Central bankers should say “enough” to the ignorant criticism we face.	央行行长应该对他们所面临的无知的批评说“够了”。


None of our critics has been able to explain with any clarity or credibility why price stability is the wrong goal, which key objectives central banks should pursue instead, or what we could have done radically differently after 2008.	我们的批评者没有一人能够以清楚和可信的方式解释为何物价稳定是错误的目标、央行应该追求什么关键目标； 以及2008年以来他们本应该采取什么截然不同的做法。


There is a simple reason for that: The approach taken by developed-country central banks since the crisis was the right one.	对此 有一个很简单的原因：危机以来发达国家央行所采取的方针是正确的方针。


Indeed, it brought our economies back from the brink.	事实上，该方针把我们的经济从悬崖边上拉了回来。


You’re welcome.	不用谢。


Central Europe’s Digital Freedom Struggle	中欧的数字自由斗争


PRAGUE – A quarter-century ago, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Iron Curtain rose, the people of Central Europe chose capitalism over communism and democracy over dictatorship.	布拉格——四分之一世纪以前，当柏林墙倒塌、铁幕升起，中欧人选择了资本主义和民主，抛弃了专制及共产主义。


Today, however, citizens of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – the region's four ex-communist countries – are turning in a disappointingly mixed performance when it comes to promoting and protecting Internet freedom.	但时至今日，该地区捷克、匈牙利、波兰和斯洛伐克等四个前共产主义国家的民众在促进和保护互联网自由的问题上令人失望地表现不一。


A recent study in these four countries by our organizations shows that all of them can – and should – play a powerful role in promoting the free flow of information.	我所在机构在上述四国的近期研究表明，这些国家完全能够而且应该在促进信息自由流通领域发挥重要作用。


But much needs to be improved.	但还有很多地方需要改进。


The Czech Republic has a strong record of supporting free expression, curbing surveillance, and promoting transparency, but Hungary persecutes bloggers and publishers with heavy fines and other sanctions.	捷克共和国在支持言论自由、遏制监视和提高透明度方面表现一直不错，但匈牙利却以巨额罚款和其他制裁措施迫害博主和出版社。


Poland and Slovakia fall somewhere in between.	波兰和斯洛伐克介于其间。


The four countries are poised to benefit greatly from the new digital world.	四国注定要从全新数字世界中获益匪浅。


Each has the prerequisites for open and lively online communities: decent Internet penetration and democratic, plural political systems.	各国都具备开放活跃网络社区的先决条件：不错的互联网普及率及民主、多元的政治制度。


The region's “high level of mathematical education, low overheads, and a globalized, westernized young generation makes for a heady and successful mix," the Financial Times recently reported.	《金融时报》近期报道，该地区“高水平的数学教育、较低的成本开支和全球化、西方化的青年一代构成了令人兴奋的成功组合。 ”


Indeed, the FT's “New Europe 100" list of innovators from Central and Eastern Europe includes many examples of Internet success stories.	其实，《金融时报》有关中东欧创新的“新欧洲百强”榜就包含众多成功的网络故事。


There is “a Hungarian doctor who has created a medical advice website driven by social media, a team of Polish students who have built an award-winning robot that could operate on Mars, and a Slovak inventor of a flying car."	比方说“一位匈牙利医生在社交媒体驱动下创建了医疗咨询网站，一群波兰学生制造的获奖机器人可以在火星上工作，还有一名斯洛伐克人发明了会飞的汽车。 ”


And yet, despite their own experiences under communism and the outcry within their borders over Edward Snowden's revelations of Internet snooping, the governments of Central Europe have not taken a strong stand to rein in their own authorities.	但尽管有过共产主义经历且斯诺登披露的网络侦听事件引起舆论哗然，中欧政府都没有就遏制自身权力采取有力的措施。


The police file thousands of requests each year to monitor Internet use, and local courts almost always grant them.	警方每年提交上千份申请以监控互联网应用，并且总能得到当地法院的批准。


Users are rarely notified of such requests, and the basis on which they are made is often unclear.	用户极少得到相关通知，并且申请监控的依据往往不清不楚。


Too often, laws ensuring Internet freedom are ignored or bent.	保障互联网自由的法律往往遭到忽视或扭曲。


Debates rage over whether content should be blocked and which copyright protections apply to Internet publications.	人们激烈地辩论内容是否应该禁止以及互联网出版物适用哪些版权保护规则。


Bureaucrats drag their feet on requirements to make information accessible online, and the courts are over-eager to initiate cases that should be settled with notice-and-takedown procedures specifically devised for online content.	官僚对在线信息访问的要求不置可否，而法院则对本该适用在线内容专项通知解决程序的案件表现出过强的立案冲动。


In all four countries, the legal framework is badly in need of reform to clarify the boundaries of freedom of expression for bloggers and journalists.	四国都迫切需要改革法律框架，以明确博主和记者言论自由的边界。


Legislation must to be modernized to reflect developments in the online world and to recognize the enormous shift in personal communication and news delivery.	必须推进立法现代化，以适应网络世界的发展和个人沟通及新闻投放的巨大变革。


In Slovakia, online journalists do not enjoy the same legal protection as print journalists.	斯洛伐克的网络记者无法享受与报社记者同等的法律保护。


Court rulings on Internet content have favored politicians over the press.	针对互联网内容的法���裁决一直向政客而非记者倾斜。


In Poland, judges demand quick removal of offensive online content; defamation is subject to criminal prosecution.	波兰的法官要求迅速删除有攻击性的网络内容； 而诽谤需要受到刑事制裁。


Transparency needs to be increased throughout Central Europe.	整个中欧地区都需要增加透明度。


Current legislation is vague enough to allow government agencies to refuse freedom-of-information requests on the basis of claims of commercial confidentiality or privacy concerns.	目前的立法过于含混，以致政府机构能以商业机密或隐私问题为由对信息公开申请加以拒绝。


Hungary is the region's single worst performer.	匈牙利在该地区表现最差。


In 2010, its right-wing government adopted media legislation that requires all news organizations to register with the state and stipulates that the stories they report should be “balanced," of “relevance to the citizens of Hungary," and “respect[ful of] human dignity."	2010年，其右翼政府通过媒体立法，要求所有新闻机构必须在政府注册，并规定新闻报道应“平衡”、“关乎匈牙利民众”和“尊重人类尊严”。


The law also weakened the protection of journalists' sources.	该法同时削弱了对记者消息来源的保护。


Penalties for violating the rules include fines, suspension, or shutdowns.	违法处罚包括罚款、停业整顿或彻底取缔。


The European Commission, the Council of Europe, and press watchdog groups were unanimous in criticizing the legislation, but the Hungarian government persists in its media crackdown.	欧盟委员会、欧洲理事会和媒体监督组织都不约而同地批评这项法律，但匈牙利政府仍坚持其媒体镇压路线。


A new criminal code leaves room for abuse of authority, including the possibility of filtering online content.	新刑法为滥用权力、包括过滤网络内容大开方便之门。 去年秋，政府曾想征收每十亿字节0.


Last fall, the government attempted to introduce an “Internet tax" of €0.50 euros ($0.60) per gigabyte, the moral equivalent of a tax on reading a book or conversing with a friend.	5欧元（合0. 6美元）的 “互联网税”，这在道德上与对读书或与朋友交谈征税是一回事。


After more than 100,000 protesters gathered in Budapest, the proposal was withdrawn – at least for now.	100,000多名示威者在布达佩斯抗议游行后该提案才暂时取消。


These ex-communist countries have a unique opportunity to become global leaders in Internet freedom.	上述前共产主义国家有独一无二的机会引领互联网自由。


At the International Telecommunications Union summit in Dubai in December 2012, Michał Boni, a former Polish minister of administration and digitization, played an important role in blocking efforts to impose government controls on Internet use.	在2012年12月迪拜举行的国际电信联盟峰会上，波兰前行政及数字化总理米哈尔·博尼在抵制政府控制互联网应用领域发挥了重要作用。


And yet, in the meantime, Poland's foreign ministry has not made Internet freedom a priority.	但与此同时，波兰外长并未优先关注互联网自由。


Unlike the Czech Republic, for example, Poland still has not joined the Freedom Online Coalition.	比方说，与捷克共和国相比，波兰迄今仍未加入自由网络联盟。


Two decades ago, the people of Central Europe rose up to bring down secretive, authoritarian governments.	二十年前，中欧人民奋起打倒遮遮掩掩的独裁政府。


Today, the region's ex-communist countries have made considerable progress.	今天，该地区前共产主义国家已经取得了长足的进步。


But much hard work remains to be done.	但仍有许多艰苦工作有待完成。


A good place to start would be to lead the fight for Internet freedom.	领导互联网自由之战将是很好的开端。


Central Europe’s Misguided War on Drugs	中欧被误导的毒品战争


WARSAW – It was two decades ago this summer that communist rule began to implode from Tallinn in the Baltic to Tirana in the Adriatic, ushering in free elections, market reforms, and expanded civil liberties.	华沙——20年前的夏天，从波罗的海塔林到亚得里亚海蒂拉纳的共产主义统治全线瓦解，迎来了自由选举、市场改革和蓬勃发展的公民自由。


Since then, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have come a long way.	自那以后，中东欧国家已经取得了令人瞩目的成就。


Many are now members of the European Union.	其中很多国家已经加入了欧盟。


My homeland, Poland, has a steady economy and a thriving media.	我的祖国波兰也实现了经济稳定和媒体繁荣。


Yet Poland, like many of the other new democracies in our region, remains stuck in the past when it comes to the humane treatment of drug users.	但波兰和中东欧地区其他新兴民主国家一样，在人道对待吸毒人员的问题上仍然停留在过去。


Indeed, throughout the former Soviet bloc, there is a disturbing trend in using outdated, conservative, and heavy-handed policies to address drug abuse.	实际上，在整个前苏联集团，使用过时、保守而又严厉的政策对待毒品滥用已经成为一种令人不安的趋势。


For example, Gdansk – the birthplace of the Solidarity movement – does not have a single methadone treatment center.	举例来讲，找遍团结运动的发祥地格但斯克也找不到一个美沙酮治疗中心。


People must travel for three hours to get the medicine that is proven to control cravings and reduce the harms of drug use.	人们为获取事实证明能够控制毒瘾的药物、减轻吸毒的危害必须经受三个小时的鞍马劳顿。


And they are the lucky ones.	即便如此他们也还算幸运。


Only 5% of opiate users in Poland have access to methadone at all, compared to 40% in Germany.	波兰只有5%的鸦片吸食人员能够接触到美沙酮，而德国这一比例为40%。


Instead of focusing on treatment that works, the Polish government chooses to give priority to long-term rehabilitation centers located in the depths of the countryside that have little, if anything, to do with evidence-based medicine.	波兰政府不关心真正有效的治疗方法，而选择重点发展位于农村偏远地区的长期康复中心，这些所谓的康复机构几乎不提供任何被实践证明有效的药物。


Poland also chooses to treat possession of even the smallest quantities of drugs as criminal, as evidenced by the fact that 60% of people sentenced for drug possession in Poland are marijuana smokers.	波兰还把哪怕是持有最小剂量的毒品定为刑事犯罪，波兰因拥有毒品被判刑的人中60%不过大麻瘾君子就是证明。


Addressing drug use through criminalization and rehabilitation centers does nothing to curb demand, however, and usage rates have failed to decline.	可借助刑事化和康复中心来解决吸毒问题根本无助于遏止需求，因此毒品吸食率一直居高不下。


By driving users underground, criminalization contributes to a deepening public-health crisis.	以刑事手段解决毒品问题迫使吸毒人员转入地下，从而进一步加剧了公共健康危机。


This pattern persists across Central and Eastern Europe, where governments have also opted to imprison drug users.	中东欧国家几乎都采用这种模式，这些国家的政府不约而同地选择囚禁吸毒者。


In Hungary, for example, the penal code calls for two years imprisonment for personal possession by a drug-dependent person.	比如在匈牙利，刑法规定瘾君子私人藏毒须处以两年监禁。


In neighboring Slovakia, the penalty for personal possession is, as in Poland, up to three years.	而在临近的斯洛伐克，个人藏毒的刑罚与波兰一样，最高可处以三年徒刑。


This approach is not only inhumane, but also economically untenable: leaders in these countries should be encouraged to redirect scarce law enforcement, court, and prison resources towards more pressing causes.	这样的处罚方式不仅缺乏人道，而且在经济上也不可持续：应当鼓励这些国家的领导人把稀缺的执法、审判和监狱资源用来惩治性质更严重的犯罪。


Simply put, governments can no longer afford to drain precious time and money that could be better spent elsewhere by locking up people for drug-related offenses.	简言之，政府已经无法承受由于对吸毒人员实施监禁而耗费时间和金钱，而这些资源本来可以被更有效地用在别处。


If Poland and its neighbors are to chart a new way forward, at least three things must happen.  First, these countries should look West for alternative, and more humane, drug policies.	波兰及其邻国要想开辟一条新路，至少需要具备三个条件。 其一，上述国家必须向西方学习更人道的替代性毒品政策。


A report released recently by the United Kingdom’s Drug Policy Commission correctly calls for a “smarter” drug policy that focuses on addressing associated violence rather than simply making arrests.	英国毒品政策委员会不久前发布的一份报告呼吁实行“更明智”的毒品政策，重点解决与毒品相关的暴力问题而不是简单逮捕吸毒者。


Officials in Central and Eastern Europe should pay heed to recent comments by the UK’s Home Office, which said that “harm reduction underpins every element of our approach to tackling this complex issue.”	中东欧国家的官员应当关注英国内政部最近的一次讲话，核心意思是“我们解决这一复杂问题的所有目的就是为了减轻危害。 ”


Portugal recently went a step further in voting to decriminalize recreational drugs, including heroin and cocaine – a move that has led to a significant decline in drug-related deaths and a fall in new HIV infections.	葡萄牙不久前采取了进一步措施，投票确认消遣性质的吸毒，包括吸食海洛因和可卡因不属于刑事犯罪。 这项举措已使因吸毒造成的死亡人数大幅度降低，减少了新增艾滋病感染病例。


Second, law-makers should listen to their constituents: a recent public awareness campaign by Gazeta Wyborcza , a leading Polish daily newspaper, collected more than 23,000 signatures in five days for a petition calling for changes to the current drug law.	其二，立法者应当听取选民的意见：波兰最大的日报 《选举日报》 在五天时间内搜集了超过23，000个民众签字，呼吁修改现行的反毒品法律。


The changes, modeled after Germany’s progressive policies, would stop punishing people for possessing small amounts of drugs for their own use, impose stricter penalties for dealers and provide more effective treatment for drug-dependent people.	上述修改仿效德国的进步政策，将不再惩罚藏匿少量毒品自吸的瘾君子，加重处罚毒贩，并为瘾君子提供更有效的救治。


In a step forward, a debate in the Polish parliament on the proposed drug law is set to start in September.	下一步，与拟议中反毒品法有关的波兰议会辩论定于9月开始。


Young people should not start their working lives with criminal records because of personal possession.	年轻人不该由于个人藏毒而在开始职业生涯前就带上刑事犯罪记录。


Finally, at the European level, EU policymakers can help by encouraging member states to decriminalize possession of small amounts of drugs.	最后，欧盟层次上的决策者可以发挥作用，鼓励成员国免除对少量藏毒行为的刑事处罚。


By freeing up resources devoted to enforcing policies against low-level users, countries can better tackle serious drug-supply issues and provide people with the effective treatment that they need and deserve.	这样做可以腾出低层次吸毒者占用的资源，使国家能够更好地解决严重的毒品供应问题，并为人们提供他们需要也应该得到的有效治疗。


Central Europe’s Unsentimental Education	中欧的理性教育


BUDAPEST – This month marks the 20th anniversary of the reburial of Imre Nagy, the leader of Hungary’s failed anti-Soviet revolution of 1956.	布达佩斯-本月是1956年被镇压的的匈牙利反苏运动领导人伊姆雷·纳吉被重新安葬的20周年纪念。


The reinternment, organized by Hungary’s anti-communist opposition on the 31st anniversary of his execution, drew more than 100,000 attendees, heralding the beginning of the end of the country’s sclerotic regime.	与此同时，匈牙利的反共产主义党派发起了纪念纳吉遇害31周年活动，动员了超过10万名参加者一起来纪念这个标志着僵化制度走向瓦解的开创性事件。


We Hungarians, and Central Europe in general, have come far since those heady times, but the past 20 years have also given us much cause to question the path we took.	虽然对于匈牙利人以及中欧人来说，那些铁幕专制的年代早已远去，但过去20年所经历的一切，仍呼唤我们去反思自己选择的道路。


Hungary played a special role in the collapse of Communism, accelerating the process by opening its borders for East German refugees.	匈牙利在共产主义的瓦解过程中扮演了非常特殊的角色，它通过对东德难民开放边界，加速了瓦解的整个进程。


But democratic transformation in Hungary required an opposition strategy throughout the 1980’s: revolution wouldn’t work, as the Soviet invasion in 1956 showed.	但在1980年代，匈牙利的民主变革要求反对派必须找到某种新的斗争策略：靠革命运动是行不通的，1956年那场苏联入侵证明了这点；


Nor would internal reforms work, because the Soviets would intervene to save the system, as they did in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.	内部改革也是行不通的，因为苏联阵营各国势必会像1968年针对捷克斯洛伐克那样插手干预，以挽救整个苏维埃制度。


Instead, the new strategy was to sideline the issue of political power. Rather than attacking Communist rule directly, we would create small islands of freedom, inter-connected social circles and associations, which, when the moment came, could all be connected in order to change the system.	对此，反对派采取的新策略则是退出对政治权力的争夺——与其直接与共产党统治硬碰硬，不如选择去建立许许多多自由，且互相关联的小圈子和社会组织，这样只要时机一到，反对派就能够迅速聚集起足够的力量去改变整个体制。


In Hungary, several youth organizations existed and were aware of each other, so the political community that took part in the political changes in Hungary in 1989 was organized on this basis.	而当年在匈牙利就存在着许多关系密切的青年组织，许多1989年参加政治变革的政治团体也正是脱胎于此。


History also played a part in the success of the Hungarian transition.	同时历史也对匈牙利的成功变革也发挥了作用。


The 1956 revolution was a real one, with barricades. In no other Central European country did Communists experience the possibility of paying with their own lives for the suffering and oppression that they inflicted on others.	1956年革命运动是真正意义上的流血革命，也只有在匈牙利，中欧共产主义者才可能要用自己的生命来偿还强加在他人身上的苦难和压迫。


This historical experience was good for reform capability.	这种历史教训对改革显然是有利无害的。


A new generation was also needed.	而新一代匈牙利人的产生也是必要条件之一。


It appeared symbolically on June 16, 1989, when I had the opportunity to speak on behalf of the young generation.	当我在1989年6月16日得到机会作为青年一代的代言人发表政见时，这一代人就具有象征意义地诞生了。


A whole generation felt that the moment had come when Hungarians could at last determine their own future.	我们整一代人都感觉到，匈牙利人有权决定自己未来的时刻终于到了。


So, what kind of future did they determine?	但是，人们又决定了一个什么样的未来呢？


The past 20 years can be divided into three phases.	这过去的20年可以分为三个阶段。


First, a market economy was created, the rule of law established, and democratic institutions built.	首先，匈牙利人分别建立了自己的市场经济，法制以及民主体制。


Next, we applied for admission to NATO and prepared for European Union membership, with all of the institutional reforms that these goals implied.	接着我们申请加入北约，并准备申请欧盟成员国资格，所有的体制改革也都围绕着这些目标展开。


The third phase was one of economic catch-up, which, unlike the first two phases, has not really been successful in Hungary, which today may even be falling back.	第三阶段则和前两个阶段有所不同，我们谋求在经济上追赶欧洲其他国家，但这个阶段进行得不但不太成功，如今甚至有点倒退。


But, for Central Europe as a whole, the past 20 years have been the best since the Peace of Westphalia, with Slovakia and Slovenia even joining the euro zone.	但对于整个中欧来说，过去20年堪称是自威斯特伐利亚和约签订以来最好的时期，斯洛伐克和斯洛文尼亚甚至成功地加入了欧元区。


Nevertheless, the 20th anniversary of the collapse of communism is overshadowed by the global financial and economic crisis.	然而，当下的全球金融和经济危机却给欧洲共产主义瓦解的20周年纪念日蒙上了阴影。


And it is now clear that the biggest winners of globalization are no longer the Europeans or the Americans, but the Asians.	很显然这场全球化运动的最大赢家已经不再是欧洲人或美国人，而是亚洲人。


The world market is being re-divided – peacefully, because territories and markets are separated, so that no power occupies another power’s territory.	世界市场也正被和平地重新划分，之所以说是“和平”，则是因为一个国家的领土在全球化之下早已和它的市场分离，再没有任何一方需要为打入另一方的市场而占领别国的领土了。


But Europe must nonetheless recognize the need to distinguish clearly between partners, competitors, and opponents, and to formulate a more sophisticated and articulated policy towards Russia, in particular.	但即便如此，欧洲人依然有必要去明确划分谁是伙伴，谁是竞争对手，谁是敌人。


For example, we Central Europeans are opponents when we do not accept Russia’s policy of renewing “spheres of interest” and “security zones.”	特别是要专门针对俄罗斯去制定一个更为成熟严密的政策：比如说当我们对俄罗斯试图重建前苏联“利益圈”和“防御区”的政策感到不满时，中欧人就应该把自己定义为俄罗斯人的对手。


Moreover, after all that has happened in the past six months, Central Europeans can no longer look up to old countries representing the moral values of Western civilization. This crisis was not caused by bad luck or some professional misunderstanding, but by character problems, especially in the United States and later Western Europe.	此外，过去六个月发生的金融危机也迫使中欧人对那些曾经代表西方道德价值观的国家擦亮了眼睛——这场危机的发生并不是因为碰巧倒霉或某些专业上的失误，而是来源自于道德品质的迷失，这点在美国以及后来的西欧国家尤其严重。


Money was stolen, not merely “mismanaged.”	人们的财富是被盗走了，而不仅仅是“管理不善”。


Investments were not simply bad, but unacceptably risky.	投资策略也不仅仅是失误，而是罔顾风险的赌博。


The moral state of business leaders caused this crisis, and you cannot find Central Europeans among those leaders.	是企业领导人的低劣道德酿造了这一危机，所幸他们没有一个来自中欧。


Central Europe has found itself in a completely new situation. Crisis management measures undertaken in the Western world are practically cutting our countries off from the EU market.	而事实上，中欧人发现自己已经处于一种全新的形势之下：西方世界的危机处理方式几乎将我们国家与欧盟市场的联系完全切断。


In this situation, Central European countries must cooperate to defend their own interests, as well as their dream of a common Europe.	在这种情况下，中欧国家必须紧密合作，不仅为了维护自身利益，更为了维护一个欧洲大同的梦想。


The question for the European elite is whether we believe in the work of the past 20 years, whether we believe in an integrated European market and an ever-widening European Community.	目前欧洲精英们面临问题,就在于能否坚信过去20年来所付出的努力，能否坚信一体化的欧洲市场和不断扩大的欧洲共同体。


If not, then first the biggest and the strongest countries, and then the Central Europeans, will turn away from the European dream.	如果我们失去了信心，那么首先是那些最大和最强的国家，其次是中欧所有的国家，都将弃欧洲大同之梦于不顾。


Those of us who believe that the past 20 years made sense, and that we are on the right track, are still the majority in Hungary.	许多匈牙利人依然坚信过去20年是没有白费的，并坚信自己走的是一条正确的道路。


Everyone in Europe and the world needs a unified, robust Europe.	世界和欧洲的每个人都需要一个统一的，强大的欧洲。


If our faith is strong enough, we can survive this crisis without destroying what we have built together by opening our borders, destroying the Wall, unifying Germany, and completing our democratic transitions.	只要我们的信仰足够强大，我们就能渡过这次危机，也只有这样，我们当年开放边界迎接难民，推倒柏林墙，统一德国以及完成民主改革时所做出的一切努力，才不会付诸东流。


Stopping Women’s Next Biggest Killer	阻止夺去女性生命的第二大杀手


GENEVA – For women, the act of bringing life into this world has historically meant risking their own lives, with the real prospect of death during childbirth.	日内瓦——对女性而言，将生命带到这个世界意味着用自己的生命冒险，分娩过程中不得不面对真实的死亡威胁。


But, though great strides are being made in reducing maternal deaths in poor countries, those gains could be undone by a growing threat to women’s health.	虽然降低贫困国家孕产妇死亡率已经取得长足的进步，但女性健康领域所取得的进步正在遭受严重的威胁。


For the first time, the number of deaths caused by cervical cancer every year is poised to outstrip the total caused by childbirth.	每年因宫颈癌造成的死亡人数首次有望超越分娩而位居第一。


The trend partly reflects the success of efforts to reduce maternal deaths.	上述趋势在一定程度上反映了孕产妇死亡人数的成功降低。


Since 1990, the number of women dying as a result of childbirth has been nearly halved, to 289,000 per year.	20世纪90年代后，死于分娩的女性人数为289,000人，相比之前减少了将近半数。


Over the same period, however, annual deaths from cervical cancer have increased by almost 40%, to 266,000.	然而同期宫颈癌致死人数却攀升至266,000人，每年骤增近40％。


Even as better standards of care continue to cut maternal mortality, cervical cancer deaths are expected to rise further.	虽然医疗标准提高不断降低孕产妇死亡率，但宫颈癌的死亡人数预计仍将延续升势。


By 2035, the disease is expected to cause 416,000 women to die slowly and painfully every year – virtually all of them in developing countries (mostly Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia).	截止2035年，预计该病每年将造成发展中国家（其中大部分生活在撒哈拉以南非洲和南亚）的416，000名女性缓慢而痛苦地死去。


The tragedy is that these deaths are almost entirely preventable.	悲剧在于这些死亡几乎完全可以防止。


Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines, coupled with screening and treatment, could prevent the vast majority of cervical cancer cases.	人乳头状瘤病毒（HPV）疫苗辅之以筛查和治疗即可预防绝大多数宫颈癌病例。


But almost 90% of the women who die from cervical cancer are in developing countries, where, for too many of them, screening services are unavailable, and treatment even less so.	但死于宫颈癌的女性近90％生活在发展中国家，那里有太多人无法享受到筛查，更不要说治疗服务。


As former Additional Secretary at the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in India, the country with the largest number of cervical cancer deaths in the world, I have seen the impact of the disease with my own eyes.	作为宫颈癌死亡人数列世界首位的印度卫生及家庭福利部前任辅助部长，我曾亲眼目睹过宫颈癌所造成的悲剧。


What is particularly devastating is how it also quashes hope.	尤为严重的是这种病能将希望碾得粉碎。


Women with HIV, for example, are particularly prone to the disease.	比方说感染艾滋病毒的女性特别容易感染宫颈癌。


Yet, with better treatments for HIV becoming available, women are now surviving HIV only to die from cervical cancer.	随着艾滋病治疗越来越普及，那些劫后余生的女性之后却死于宫颈癌。


In 2010, the total global cost of cervical cancer was estimated to be around $2.7 billion per year.	2010年，宫颈癌造成的全球损失总额估计约为每年27亿美元。


By 2030, this is expected to increase to $4.7 billion, unless we do something about it now.	除非采取果断措施，否则截止2030年上述损失总额将增至47亿美元。


Vaccines, fortunately, are becoming increasingly available.	所幸的是宫颈癌疫苗越来越普及。


Safe and effective HPV vaccines have been on the market since 2006, protecting against HPV types 16 and 18, which cause 70% of all cervical cancer cases.	安全有效的HPV疫苗2006年后已经上市，对16和18型HPV提供防护，感染以上两种病毒所导致的宫颈癌占全部病例的70%。


Newly approved vaccines provide even greater protection.	新批准的疫苗效果更为显著。


In wealthy countries, HPV vaccines are often priced at more than $100 per dose.	富裕国家HPV疫苗的价格高达上百美元一剂。


But Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, has worked with manufacturers to reduce prices in developing countries.	但疫苗联盟Gavi已经与制造企业合作使发展中国家的疫苗售价更加便宜。


Recently, we secured a record-low price for HPV vaccines of $4.50 a dose, opening the door for millions of the poorest girls to be vaccinated in 27 countries.	不久前，我们实现了HPV疫苗单剂4. 5美元的创纪录低价，让生活在27个国家的数百万贫困女孩能有接种的机遇。


By 2020, we estimate that Gavi will have helped over 30 million girls in more than 40 developing countries receive vaccinations against HPV.	截止2020年，我们预计Gavi将能帮助40多个发展中国家超过3，000万名年轻女性完成抗HPV疫苗的接种任务。


The economic benefits of vaccines are substantial.	疫苗的经济效益十分显著。


It takes time and significant investment to set up effective screening and treatment services.	需要花很长时间和大笔投资才能提供有效的筛查治疗服务。


And, given that even high-income countries struggle to meet the cost of cancer treatments, prevention is clearly a far more efficient option.	并且，考虑到即使高收入国家都难以承担癌症的治疗费用，预防显然是更为有效的措施。


Moreover, cervical cancer strikes women during their most economically productive years, when their contribution to society and the economy is greatest.	此外，女性多在盛年——对社会和经济贡献最显著的时期遭受宫颈癌的侵袭。


The disease does not just destroy lives; it also impoverishes families and undermines economic growth.	这种病不仅摧毁生命； 而且破坏经济增长并让家庭一贫如洗。


A recommendation last year by the World Health Organization’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization promises to boost vaccines’ cost-effectiveness further, by calling for just two doses of the HPV vaccine, rather than the three doses previously thought to be required.	世卫组织免疫战略咨询小组专家去年提出了进一步提升疫苗成本效益的建议。 他们呼吁仅注射两剂HPV疫苗，而不是之前认定的三剂。


This will not only reduce the overall cost of vaccine procurement and delivery; it will also make it easier for health-care workers and the girls themselves.	这不仅能降低疫苗的采购注射成本； 还能让医疗工作者和年轻女性接种变得更加容易。


A study published by WHO and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in June predicts that vaccinating 58 million girls in 179 countries would prevent 690,000 cases of cervical cancer and 420,000 deaths from the disease.	世卫组织和伦敦卫生与热带医学院6月发表的一项研究预测，为179个国家的5，800万女童接种疫苗将防止690,000人感染宫颈癌，以及由此造成的420，000致死病例。


Unfortunately, the study also found that of the 33 countries where HPV vaccines are most likely to have the greatest effect in preventing cancer, 26 had not yet introduced the vaccine.	不幸的是，该研究还发现，在HPV疫苗预防癌症最有可能取得显著效果的33个国家中，有26个还没有引入疫苗接种机制。


There is much work to be done.	还有许多工作要做。


We should congratulate ourselves for nearly halving the maternal death rate since 1990. But we must keep the threat of cervical cancer firmly in our sights.	20世纪90年代后孕产妇死亡率降低近一半无疑值得庆祝，但宫颈癌所造成的威胁必须引起我们的高度重视。


It is imperative to act now to ensure that every girl has access to HPV vaccines and a healthy future free from cervical cancer, no matter where she lives.	当务之急是立即采取行动确保每位女孩都能接种HPV疫苗，从而在花样年华不受宫颈癌的困扰，而不管她生活在哪里。


The Poverty Line’s Battle Lines	贫困线战线


WASHINGTON, DC – For a long time, as a college professor and then as the chief economic adviser to the Indian government, I was a happy user of the World Bank’s data on global poverty, tracking trends and analyzing cross-country patterns.	华盛顿—我曾经是一位大学教授，后来担任印度政府首席经济顾问，长期以来，我愉快地使用着世界银行全球贫困数据，追踪趋势，分析跨国模式。


I seldom paused to think about how those numbers were computed.	我很少停下来想一想这些数字是怎么计算出来的。


Then, three years ago, I joined the World Bank as its Chief Economist.	后来，三年前，我成为世界银行首席经济学家。


It was like a customer, happily ordering dinner in a favorite restaurant, suddenly being asked to go into the kitchen and prepare the meal.	这种感觉就像你原先是一位在最喜欢的饭店预定晚宴的快乐客户，突然之间被要求进入厨房准备晚宴。


Being in the business of measuring poverty is a challenge for the World Bank.	衡量贫困这个责任对世界银行来说是一项挑战。


If poverty declines, critics accuse us of trying to showcase our success.	如果贫困减少，批评者会指责我们是在炫功。


If it rises, they say we are ensuring that we stay in business.	如果贫苦增加，他们又说我们在“刷存在感”。


And if it stays the same, they accuse us of trying to avoid these two charges.	如果贫困保持不变，那么我们就会同时受到这两种批评。


Fortunately, there is something liberating in knowing that you will be criticized for any outcome.	幸运的是，知道不论结果如何都会被批评倒也让你觉得有些自由。


Still, as our team set about defining the global poverty line this year (and thus the incidence of poverty), I was acutely aware of the note of caution from Angus Deaton, this year’s Nobel laureate in economics: “I am not sure it is wise for the World Bank to commit itself so much to this project.”	但是，在我们的团队即将定义今年的全球贫困线（从而确定贫困率）之际，我强烈地感到今年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者安格斯·迪顿的谨慎观点：“我不知道世界银行花这么大力气搞这项工作是否明智。 ”


I could see his point: This year’s poverty calculation was particularly momentous.	我可以理解他的观点：今年贫困情况的计算特别关键。


In 2011, new purchasing power parities (or PPPs, which essentially estimate how much $1 dollar buys in different countries) had been computed, and the data became available in 2014.	2011年，我们计算了新购买力平价（简称PPP，其实质是估算1美元在不同国家可以买到多少东西），并在2014年公开。


This was one reason to take stock of how we would adjust the global poverty line, estimate new poverty numbers, and publish them in our Global Monitoring Report, which was released in October.	这是评估我们如何调整全球贫困线、估算新贫困数据并将它们发表在今年10月发布的《全球监测报告》（Global Monitoring Report）中的一个原因。


A second reason is that the UN has included the eradication of chronic poverty in its new Sustainable Development Goals.	第二个原因是联合国将根除长期贫困列入了其可持续发展目标。


This means that our decision on where to draw the poverty line probably will influence not just the World Bank’s mission but also the development agenda of the UN and all countries around the world.	这意味着我们决定将贫困线画在哪里可能不但会影响世界银行的使命，也会影响联合国及世界全体国家的发展日程。


Clearly, as we crunched the numbers, we had a special, and daunting, responsibility to fulfill.	显然，在我们计算数字时，肩负着特殊的艰巨任务。


Our first task was to see how the global poverty line had been determined earlier.	我们的第一个任务是研究此前的全球贫困线是如何决定的。


In 2005, when the previous round of purchasing power parities was estimated, the method used was to take the national poverty lines of the 15 poorest countries, compute their average, and treat that as the global line.	2005年上一次购买力平价计算时，所使用的方法是选取15个最贫困国家的国家贫困线，计算它们的平均值作为全球贫困线。


This led to a global poverty line of $1.25.	这样算出来的全球贫困线是1. 25美元。


The idea was that a poor person was anyone whose PPP-adjusted daily consumption fell short of $1.25.	其背后的思想是，任何经PPP调整的每日消费额低于1. 25美元的人都是穷人。


The validity of this method has been questioned – and I have had my own reservations.	这一方法的合理性收到了质疑——我也有自己的保留意见。


But where the line is drawn in the initial year is in some sense not that important.	但��某种意义上讲，第一年将这条线划在何处并不那么重要。


Because there is no unique definition of poverty, what matters is to draw a line at some reasonable place and then hold the line constant in real (inflation-adjusted) terms so that we can track the performance of the world and individual countries over time.	因为贫困没有独一无二的定义，重要的是将贫困线划在合理的位置，保持这条线的真实（经通胀调整的）水平不变，以便我们追踪世界和个体国家不同时间的表现。


Some critics argue that the 2005 poverty line of $1.25 was too low.	一些批评指出，2005年的贫困线（1. 25美元）太低了。


But what should alarm them is that in 2011, some 14.5% of the world’s population – one in every seven people – lived below it.	但他们应该警觉地认识到，2011年全世界有14. 5%的人口——也就是七分之一——生活在这条线以下。


Given that we are already committed to the goal of ending extreme, chronic poverty by 2030, our first decision was to hold the yardstick for measuring poverty constant.	我们已经许下了在2030年终结极端长期贫困的承诺，我们的第一个决定是保持衡量贫困的基准线不变。


Since there had been inflation between the two rounds of the PPP computation, in 2005 and 2011, we would obviously have to raise the nominal poverty line to keep the real line constant.	2005和2011年两次PPP计算期间存在通胀，因此我们显然必须提高名义贫困线以保持真实贫困线不变。


However, doing this for the world as a whole is far from easy.	但是，对整个世界做这件事绝不容易。


Which countries’ inflation should we use?	我们应该用哪些国家的通胀率？


We ran two experiments: one was to inflate the poverty lines of the 15 countries used in 2005, using their respective inflation rates and then taking an average; the other was to do the same for 101 countries for which we had the necessary data.	我们做了两个实验：其一是用2005年所选取的15个国家来调整贫困线，用它们各自的通胀率取平均值； 其二方法相同，但选取101个有必要数据的国家。


These two methods raised the line to $1.88 and $1.90, respectively.	这两种方法将贫困线分别提高到1. 88美元和1.


However, a third approach was possible: to raise the poverty line with the new PPP indices so that the incidence of global poverty remained unchanged (because PPP arguably tells us about parity across countries and should not change the absolute level of global poverty).	但是，还有第三种方法：根据新的PPP指数提高贫困线，以保持全球贫困率不变（因为PPP实际上是跨国平价，不会改变全球贫困的绝对水平）。


This exercise – and it was beginning to look like a strange alignment of the stars – resulted in a poverty line just above $1.90.	这一方法——看起来像是星球的怪异对齐方式——所产生的贫困线略高于1. 90美元。


In short, by keeping to one decimal place, all three methods led to $1.9.	简言之，如果保留一位小数，那么三种方法都是1. 9美元。


And that is the line we adopted.	这就是我们所采用的贫困线。


We will not always have the good fortune to be able to use different methods and still arrive at virtually the same line.	我们并不总能那么幸运，可以用不同方法得到几乎相同的贫困线。


Furthermore, poverty can and should be measured by many metrics other than money: life expectancy, educational attainment, health, and various other measures of human “functionings and capabilities” (as Amartya Sen calls them) are all important.	此外，贫困可以也应该用除了钱以外的诸多标准衡量：寿命预期、教育程度、健康以及各种其他人类“机能和能力”指标（阿玛蒂亚·森语）都很重要。


To tackle these problems in the future and broaden the World Bank’s poverty research, we have established the 24-member Commission on Global Poverty – chaired by Sir Tony Atkinson of the London School of Economics and Nuffield College, Oxford – which will submit its report next spring.	要想在未来解决这些问题并扩展世界银行的贫困研究，我们成立了一个24人的全球贫困委员会，由来自伦敦经济学院和牛津大学纳菲尔德学院的阿特金森爵士（Sir Tony Atkinson）担任委员长。 委员会将在明年春天递交报告。


Measuring poverty attracts attention from both politicians and academic researchers – and we had an ample amount of both.	衡量贫困问题吸引了政客和学者的关注——在这两方面我们都不缺人手。


We were attentive to the politics of poverty, but we resisted political lobbying.	我们关注贫困的政治学，但拒绝政治游说。


We took account of the suggestions of researchers, but we used our judgment.	我们考虑研究者的建议，但使用我们自己的判断。


One researcher was adamant that the poverty line should be $1.9149.	一位研究者坚决要求贫困线应该是1.


I decided that those last three digits were a bit excessive.	9149美元。 我说后三位小数有点多余了。


Change Africa from Within	从内部改变非洲


ROME – A severe food crisis currently threatens southern Sudan.	罗马——严重的粮食危机正在威胁着苏丹南部。


In East Africa, where millions of people already are dependent on food aid, a sharp rise in the cost of staple crops looms.	在已经有成百上千万人依赖粮食援助生活的东非，主食作物成本的飙升令人担忧。


These are just the latest sources of concern in a turbulent period that began two years ago when food shortages hit many countries in Africa and Asia due to a worldwide spike in prices.	这只是动荡时期最新出现的忧虑因素，粮食动荡始于两年前，当时全球范围的价格猛涨导致非洲和亚洲的很多国家面临着粮食短缺的袭击。


Higher food prices meant that poor people, already struggling to meet basic human needs, were pushed deeper into poverty.	粮食价格上涨意味着已经难以满足人类基本需求的穷人被更深地推入了贫困的境地。


On its heels came the global financial crisis, which also hit the poorest the hardest.	不久全球金融危机又接踵而来，贫困人口再次受到了最沉重的打击。


Agriculture is the main employer, job creator, and export in most developing countries.	农业在绝大多数发展中国家是最重要的雇主、就业机会创造者和出口拉动领域。


Historically, agriculture has driven economic performance in many countries, generating growth that has been shown to be at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth in other sectors.	从历史角度看，农业曾经推动了许多国家的经济发展，事实证明由农业推动的增长其消除贫困的效果是其他行业增长的两倍。


Investment in agricultural and rural development is therefore vital to food security and sustainable economic development.	因此对农业和农村发展的投资对确保粮食安全和可持续经济发展能够起到至关重要的作用。


Indeed, the vast majority of today’s developed countries grew from strong agricultural foundations, where surplus production generated wealth and prosperity.	实际上，当前绝大多数发达国家都拥有坚实的农业基础，享受着产能过剩所带来的繁荣和财富。


This is what is happening today in Vietnam, and it is the path that China and India took on their way to becoming engines of economic growth.	越南目前的状况就是这样，中国和印度在成为经济发展的引擎之前也走过了同样的道路。


Poverty is predominantly rural.	贫困主要集中在农村地区。


Globally, three-quarters of people living in extreme poverty are in rural areas and depend on agriculture and related activities for their livelihoods.	全球范围内，约有四分之三的极端贫困人口生活在农村，依靠农业和相关活动维持生计。


About 380 million women, children, and men in sub-Saharan Africa live on less than $1.25 a day.	撒哈拉南部非洲的大约3亿8千万妇女、儿童和男人每天仅靠不到1. 25美元维持生活。


Many are malnourished or hungry.	很多人营养不良，整天饿着肚子。


But, with some 80 million small farms in sub-Saharan Africa producing 80% of agricultural goods, smallholder farmers have a key role to play in resolving the financial and food crises and unleashing Africa’s potential to feed itself.	但是在撒哈拉以南非洲8千万小农产出80%农产品的情况下，这些小农在化解金融和粮食危机、释放非洲的自给自足潜能方面发挥着至关重要的作用。


In order to lift people out of poverty and ensure food security, a sustained effort is needed to develop Africa’s agriculture and the associated infrastructure – notably roads, telecommunication, and energy – needed to unleash agricultural potential.	为确保粮食安全、实现脱贫，需要为发展释放农业潜能所必须的非洲农业及相关基础设施——特别是道路、通讯和能源——付出不懈的努力。


Strengthening agriculture is one of the best investments any African country can make.	加强农业建设是任何非洲国家最好的投资之一。


Members of the African Union recognized this in 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique, pledging to increase spending on agriculture to at least 10% of national budgets.	非盟成员国2003年在莫桑比克的马普托就此达成一致，承诺至少拿出10%的国家预算用于追加农业投资。


Although eight countries have met or surpassed that target, the continent as a whole has not.	虽然有8个国家都达到或者超越了这一目标，但非洲大陆作为一个整体却没有完成任务。


But reaching this target is not enough.	而仅仅达到这一目标也还远远不够。


Governments must create the right policy environment to allow for appropriate investments in research and development to enhance productivity and increase production.	政府必须创造出合适的政策环境，允许在研究和发展领域的恰当投资提高生产率并增加产量。


Investment in agriculture in Africa must focus on creating a dynamic smallholder sector.	非洲农业投资必须致力于打造一个充满活力的小农部门。


A vibrant rural sector generates local demand for locally produced goods and services.	生机勃勃的农村部门创造出土产商品和服务的当地需求。


In turn, this can spur sustainable non-farm employment growth in services, agro-processing, and small-scale manufacturing.	这反过来又会刺激可持续的非农就业增长，这些增长来自服务业、农产品加工和小规模制造。


This is crucial for rural employment, without which poor rural young people will be driven away from their communities in search of work in the cities.	这对于农村就业至关重要，若非如此，贫困的农村青年就会被迫背井离乡，到城里去寻找工作。


Agriculture, predominantly on a small scale, accounts for about 30% of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and at least 40% of export value.	农业、主要是小农农业，占到了撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲各国国内生产总值的约30%，出口商品总值的40%以上。


In a number of small countries in Africa, agriculture plays an even greater role, representing 80% or more of export earnings.	在几个非洲小国，农业发挥的作用甚至更大，占到出口收入的80%甚至更多。


The potential in these numbers will remain untapped unless African countries put the right policies in place to help agriculture to develop and flourish.	除非非洲国家出台合适的政策帮助农业发展和繁荣，否则将无法发挥以上数据中埋藏的潜力。


But transformation of African agriculture will not happen until the private sector is fully engaged in agricultural production, processing, and marketing.	但除非私有部门充分进入农业生产、加工和销售领域，否则非洲农业将无法成功转型。


Governments must become more investor-friendly to attract greater private-sector interest.	政府必须更多地为投资者着想，以便吸引私有部门更多的兴趣。


More broadly, African countries need to put their political and economic houses in order.	从更广义的角度讲，非洲国家需要规范自己的政治和经济秩序。


They must continue to deepen the foundations of democracy and ensure the political stability that is so critical to economic growth.	他们必须继续深化民主的基础，并确保对经济增长起关键作用的政治稳定。


It is also crucial that they continue to improve their systems to create an enabling environment for dynamic rural growth to transform subsistence farmers into entrepreneurs.	还有一点至关重要，那就是他们继续完善体制建设，为农村经济发展创造出有利的环境，实现从自耕农到企业家的转型。


Given their central role not only as mothers and caregivers, but also as farmers, rural women hold the key to food security.	由于不仅是母亲和照顾者，同时也承担着耕种者的任务，能否确保粮食安全在很大程度上取决于农村妇女。


That is why any nation that does not provide opportunities for women will not reach its full potential.	因此不给妇女提供机会的国家永远不会发挥出所有的潜力。


Significant progress must be made in Africa to advance both women’s empowerment and their status in society – particularly with regard to land and credit.	非洲必须在推动妇女授权及其社会地位，特别是在土地和信贷方面取得重大的进步。


Finally, although investment in development assistance is key to supporting Africa’s advancement, nations will ultimately have to take responsibility for their own development.	最后，尽管发展援助投资是支持非洲发展的关键所在，但国家终究要为自己的发展负责。


No nation, no people, ever experienced growth that sprang solely from external support.	没有哪国的国家和人民所经历的发展完全来自于国外的援助。


So Africa’s development must be made in Africa, by Africans, for Africans.	因此非洲发展必须发生在非洲、由非洲人推动、为非洲人服务。


Every tree, every plant, must be fully rooted in its own soil to flourish.	每棵树、每株小苗，都必须完全植根于自己的土壤，才能生根���芽、茁壮成长。


Change cannot be imposed from outside, it must be cultivated from within.	变革不可能来自外力的作用，而必须是来源于内部自发的要求。


Waking from the Middle East Nightmare	走出中东噩梦


MADRID – The Middle East is caught in a seemingly endless spiral of instability.	马德里—中东似乎陷入了没完没了的动荡循环。


The possibility of military intervention in Syria, together with the deteriorating situation in Egypt since the army’s coup, has placed the region on a razor’s edge.	对叙利亚进行军事干预的可能性，以及军事政变以来埃及局势的恶化，都让该地区走在剃刀边缘。


Moreover, despite the changes in Iran since its presidential election in June, international negotiations over its nuclear ambitions remain a dead letter.	此外，尽管6月总统选举令伊朗有所改观，但关于其核雄心的国际谈判仍难以取得进展。


Paradoxes abound, as the United States’s traditional Middle East allies (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf states) have taken opposing – and sometimes seemingly contradictory – positions on the region’s key conflicts.	奇怪的是，美国传统中东盟友（沙特、以色列、土耳其、埃及和海湾国家）在地区关键冲突中采取了反对——有时似乎是矛盾的——立场。


And, in all of today’s hotspots, the assertion of interests by neighboring or nearby countries has complicated matters further.	而在当今所有热点中，邻国或周边国家的利益主张让情况进一步复杂化了。


Saudi Arabia, fearing severe domestic consequences from the Muslim Brotherhood’s empowerment in Egypt, does not want to see an Islamist movement legitimized democratically.	沙特担心穆斯林兄弟会在埃及的掌权会引起其国内的严重后果，不愿意看到伊斯兰运动民主地获得合法性。


So it has taken a consistently harsh position against the Brotherhood, despite the latter being more moderate than the Saudis’ own brand of Islam.	因此它对穆兄会的立场一贯强硬，尽管后者倒是比沙特国内的伊斯兰教政党更为温和。


Israel, for its part, is exerting pressure in two ways.	以色列通过两个侧面施加影响。


First, it is supporting the Egyptian coup and international recognition of the military regime, thereby ensuring – it hopes – greater stability along the Sinai border.	首先，它支持埃及政变和对军事政权的国际承认，从而确保——它希望如此——西奈半岛边境的进一步稳定。


Second, it is making progress in its negotiations with the Palestinians dependent on events in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, such as Iran.	其次，其与巴勒斯坦的谈判的进展取决于埃及和地区其他国家（如伊朗）事件的走向。


US Secretary of State John Kerry has invested considerable political capital in the revival of peace negotiations, and Israel can use that to its advantage as well.	美国国务卿克里对重启和平谈判投入了极大的政治资本，以色列也可以利用这一点。


The civil war in Syria, meanwhile, has inflamed the Sunni-Shia fault line that traverses the entire region, and that defines, for example, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.	与此同时，叙利亚内战点燃了贯穿整个地区的逊尼派-什叶派裂痕，比如沙特与伊朗。


In fact, while Saudi Arabia opposes elected Islamists in Egypt, it supports insurgent Islamists in Syria, owing entirely to Iran’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	事实上，沙特尽管反对伊斯兰教在埃及获得选举胜利，但却支持伊斯兰教在叙利亚的反抗，这完全是因为伊朗支持叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权。


The Egyptian coup has already proved to have been a mistake.	埃及政变已经证明是个错误。


The military seems to be reverting to the governing methods – and even the feared security institutions – of former President Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule.	军队似乎想要重回前总统穆巴拉克在过去30年所走的统治之路，甚至恢复人心惶惶的安全制度。


Even Mubarak himself has now been released from prison.	穆巴拉克本人也从监狱中被释放。


The army’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood is more a question of competition for power than of religion.	军队对穆斯林兄弟会的镇压与其说是宗教问题，不如说是权力斗争。


As the only organized force in the country that could seriously challenge the military, the Brotherhood is the greatest threat that the Army faces, as demonstrated by Mohamed Morsi’s victory in the election that made him president a year before he was overthrown.	作为埃及唯一能对军队构成挑战的有组织力量，穆兄会是军队面临的最大威胁，穆尔西在被推翻一年前获得总统选举胜利就说明了这一点。


And, on top of it all, the problem posed by Iran’s nuclear program remains unresolved.	而位居所有这些问题之上的伊朗核计划问题仍没有得到解决。


That may not be surprising, given the violence and turmoil elsewhere in the region.	这或许并不奇怪，因为该地区处处都是暴力和动荡。


But, since Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, took office at the beginning of August, the West, to put it bluntly, has not demonstrated sufficient will to explore possible openings.	但是，自伊朗新总统鲁哈尼8月就职以来，坦白说西方并没有拿出足够的意愿试图打开局面。


That is a grave mistake, because progress in the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program would create a more propitious climate for resolving the region’s other problems.	这是一个严重的错误，因为与伊朗就其核计划的谈判的进展将为解决该地区其他问题创造有利条件。


Moreover, the negotiations will now be under the jurisdiction of Iran’s presidential administration, which gives Rouhani greater room for maneuver.	此外，如今谈判将由伊朗总统办公厅负责，这给了鲁哈尼更大的施展空间。


The new foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is well known and respected by the leaders of all of the countries participating in the negotiations, and he will assume important responsibilities in any talks that take place.	新任外交部长扎里夫（Javad Zarif）在所有参与谈判的国家领导人中间拥有极高的知名度和尊敬度，他将在任何谈判中起到重要作用。


While caution is certainly in order, the importance of Rouhani’s election must be recognized.	尽管谨慎为上，但鲁哈尼当选的重要意义不容忽视。


If a window of opportunity has opened, the West should do everything possible to take advantage of it.	如果机会窗口打开，西方应该尽可能加以利用。


Rouhani, it should be remembered, won a surprising victory in an election with roughly 75% voter turnout, despite expectations of widespread apathy.	我们也不应该忘记，鲁哈尼的胜利是以出人意料的约75%的优势获得的，虽然他在投票前被普遍看低。


Rouhani mobilized Iranians by offering a clear program for economic renewal, which hinges on Iran’s engagement with the international community – and thus on progress in nuclear negotiations.	鲁哈尼通过明确的经济复兴计划受到了伊朗人民的支持，该计划暗示伊朗将参与国际社会——因此也包括核谈判。


Since taking office, Rouhani has responded quickly to the Iranian public’s demands.	自上任以来，鲁哈尼快速地响应了伊朗公众的要求。


His cabinet, in terms of its members’ positions on economic reform and international relations, is one that few observers believed he would be capable of assembling.	从成员的经济改革和国际关系立场看，他能够组成如此内阁着实令观察者大跌眼镜。


Thus, two important steps have been taken: one by the people of Iran, who have shown that they understand the challenges they face, and the other by their new president, who has assembled the best team available to undertake an enormously difficult program.	因此，两个重要步骤已经完成：其中一步由伊朗人民跨出，他们证明了他们清楚他们所面临的的挑战； 另一步由他们的新总统跨出，他组成了可获得的最佳团队来承担非常困难的任务。


There is an expression in Iran that applies to the international community: “You can wake only someone who is sleeping, not someone who is pretending to be asleep.”	伊朗的一种观点也适用于国际社会：“你永远无法唤醒一个装睡的人。


Whether Iran’s international interlocutors act on the importance of Rouhani’s election is a matter of choice, not of ignorance.	”伊朗的国际谈判员是否能借鲁哈尼的当选有所作为是一种选择，而不是撞大运。


In a Middle East so full of uncertainty, a more predictable Iran – one that behaves like a regionally important state, not a destabilizing Shia movement whose ambitions exceed what international law permits – would be in everyone’s interest.	在充满了不确定性的中东，更加可预料的伊朗——像地区大国那样作为，而不再是一场野心突破了国际法允许范围的破坏性什叶派运动——符合所有人的利益。


There can be no path from the Middle East’s agony without the participation, commitment, and determination of all parties.	只有所有各方都拿出参与、承诺和决心，中东才有可能找到走出困境的道路。


The Rowhani Front	鲁哈尼前线


WASHINGTON, DC – On June 17, at his first press conference as Iran’s President-elect, Hassan Rowhani broke little new ground in the Islamic Republic’s relations with the West.	华盛顿—6月17日，在其作为伊朗当选总统后的第一次新闻发布会上，哈桑·鲁哈尼并未开启伊朗伊斯兰共和国与西方关系的新篇章。


On nuclear policy, he said that the “era of suspension is over”: Iran will not accept the suspension of uranium enrichment in upcoming negotiations but will seek to make its nuclear activities more transparent in order to build international confidence.	在核政策方面，他说“暂停期已经过去”：伊朗不会在即将进行的谈判中接受暂停铀浓缩计划，但会寻求让其核活动更加透明以建立国际信心。


Moreover, Iran would welcome direct negotiations with the United States if the US stopped attempting to meddle in Iran’s internal affairs and abandoned its “bullying attitude.”	此外，只要美国停止试图干涉伊朗内部事务并停止“恃强凌弱”，伊朗欢迎与美国进行直接谈判。


None of these statements is new.	所有这些说法都无甚新意。


Does that mean that the world should not expect meaningful change in Iran’s official behavior following Rowhani’s victory?	这意味着世界不必指望鲁哈尼当选后伊朗官方行为会有实质性改变吗？


The general impression before the election was that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, supported either Saeed Jalili or Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. In recent years, Jalili has been the leading Iranian representative in international negotiations over the country’s nuclear program.	大选前的总体印象是伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊支持贾里里（Saeed Jalili）或卡利巴夫（Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf）。 近几年来，贾里里一直是伊朗核计划问题国际谈判伊方首席代表。


That made him the main target of criticism by Rowhani and another candidate, Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s adviser on international affairs.	这让他成为鲁哈尼和另一位候选人维拉雅迪（Ali Akbar Velayati，哈梅内伊国际事务顾问）的批评目标。


According to Rowhani and Velayati, while Iran in recent years has increased the number of centrifuges in use in its nuclear research program, the cost has been an economically devastating array of international sanctions.	按照鲁哈尼和维拉雅迪的说法，尽管近几年来伊朗增加了核研究计划中离心机的使用数量，其成本之高在国际制裁下成为一场经济噩梦。


Rowhani promised to sustain progress on the nuclear program while adopting stronger and wiser diplomatic measures to prevent the imposition of new sanctions and pave the way for lifting the existing ones.	鲁哈尼承诺在推进核计划的同时采取更强硬、更睿智的外交手段防止新制裁的实施并为取消现有制裁铺平道路。


Jalili had not been a high-profile figure within the country.	贾里里在伊朗国内并非要人。


For the first time, average Iranians saw him at public events and in the media, discussing not only nuclear policy, but also his ultra-conservative policy agenda for women, youth, and cultural issues.	伊朗人此前从未看到他在媒体上谈论公共事件，不但讨论核政策，也讨论他关于女性、年轻人和文化问题的极端保守政策。


He ended up appearing even more radical on these topics than outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.	最终，他在这些事务上表现得比卸任总统内贾德更加激进。


As for Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran, he proudly confessed that he was directly involved in the violent crackdown on student protesters in 2003.	卡利巴夫是德黑兰市长，他骄傲地承认自己直接参与了2003年对学生游行的暴力镇压。


Indeed, he described sitting on the back of a motorcycle with a stick to command police forces to suppress the massive demonstrations.	事实上，他自称坐在一辆摩托车上，挥舞指挥棒指挥警察部队镇压群众示威。


Rowhani used this against him very effectively.	鲁哈尼充分利用了这一点反对他。


Conservatives tried to convince their candidates to unite behind a single figure, but weaker candidates did not drop out in favor of a unity candidate.	保守派试图说服他们的候选人团结在一个人物背后，但较弱的候选人并没有退出而为统一候选人让路。


In particular, there is strong evidence that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) split into two major factions, with one supporting Jalili and the other backing Qalibaf.	特别是，有大量证据表明伊斯兰革命卫队（Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ，IRGC）分裂成两大派别，一派支持贾里里，另一派支持卡利巴夫。


For example, Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, a branch of the IRGC, endorsed Qalibaf, who he hoped would receive Khamenei’s full support.	比如，IRGC圣城旅（Quds Force）指挥官苏雷玛尼（Qassem Suleimani）支持卡利巴夫，认为后者能获得哈梅内伊的全力支持。


The infighting among conservatives and within the IRGC increased in the last few days before the election.	保守派和IRGC内部的暗斗在大选前数日愈演愈烈。


And, with Rowhani’s surprising first-round victory – and Khamenei’s refusal to endorse either candidate – both IRGC factions lost.	随着鲁哈尼出人意料地赢得第一轮胜利——以及哈梅内伊拒绝支持两人中的任何一人——IRGC两大派别都吃了败仗。


Khamenei was probably wise to step aside and let popular opinion prevail.	哈梅内伊的置身事外、让公众选择获胜或许是明智的。


Had either Jalili or Qalibaf been elected, the tension within the IRGC might have worsened, becoming difficult for Khamenei to control.	如果贾里里或卡利巴夫当选，IRGC内部的紧张之势可能会恶化，让哈梅内伊难以控制。


And, by remaining on the sidelines, Khamenei may have been seeking to show the IRGC that there are limits to its power.	而通过保持中立，哈梅内伊得以让IRGC明白其权力是有限的。


Though well connected to the military and security community, Rowhani was clearly considered an outsider.	鲁哈尼与军方和治安力量关系良好，但他显然被认为是外部人士。


Indeed, he was not a political figure until now, serving in the military during the Islamic Republic’s first decade and spending the last two mostly in the Supreme National Security Council.	事实上，此前他一直不是政治人物，在伊斯兰共和国第一个十年中任军职，其中最后两年的大部分时间在最高国家安全委员会任职。


When Ahmadinejad came to power, Rowhani lost his position as the Council’s secretary, but became Khamenei’s personal representative to it – a post that he has held until now.	内贾德掌权后，鲁哈尼失去了委员会秘书的职务，但成为哈梅内伊在委员会的个人代表并一直担任这一角色至今。


Whether Khamenei seriously planned for Rowhani’s victory, or simply calculated that the cost of preventing it would be too high, Rowhani can serve Khamenei’s agenda at least as well as any other candidate.	不管哈梅内伊是认真策划了鲁哈尼的胜利，还是他只是认为阻止这一幕成本太高，鲁哈尼至少可以在推进哈梅内伊的日程方面不亚于任何其他候选人。


Rowhani’s victory created the impression of a democratic process and relieved the popular anger that has accumulated during the last eight years, especially since the rigged presidential election in 2009.	鲁哈尼的胜利创造了一种民主过程的印象，也缓解了过去八年、特别是2009年总统选举操纵案后累积起来的公共怒气。


Indeed, his triumph exposed a rift among Iran’s democratic forces, which were divided over whether to participate in the election, and rendered irrelevant the Green Movement born in 2009.	事实上，他的胜利暴露了伊朗民主力量的裂缝——按是否参与此次大选以及是否表现得与2009年出现的绿色运动（Green Movement）有关分为两个阵营。


Rowhani’s efforts to portray Iran’s foreign policy in a democratic light are less convincing.	鲁哈尼用民主的外衣来粉饰伊朗的外交政策并不令人信服。


For example, his call for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to remain in power until the scheduled 2014 elections is risible, given that Assad typically “wins” Syria’s presidential elections by Soviet-like margins, with more than 95% of the popular vote.	比如，他呼吁叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德继续掌权直至2014年如期大选，这是可笑的，因为巴沙尔总是会以苏联式的优势“赢得”叙利亚总统选举，公众支持率在95%以上。


More important for the regime, Rowhani’s victory has bought Iran time on the nuclear issue.	对伊朗政权来说，鲁哈尼的胜利为伊朗赢得了在核问题上的时间。


Not only is there less chance of new sanctions, but Rowhani’s electoral legitimacy may well force the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) to offer Iran better terms in any nuclear deal.	不但新制裁的机会更小了，鲁哈尼当选的合法性可能还可以迫使P5+1（五大联合国安理会常任理事国加上德国）在核问题上向伊朗开出更优厚的条件。


But Khamenei will face two main challenges related to nuclear policy in the next four years.	但哈梅内伊将在未来四年中面临与核政策有关的两大主要挑战。


First, Rowhani’s victory has delegitimized the policy of resistance that Jalili championed.	首先，鲁哈尼的胜利打消了贾里里所支持的抵制政策的合法性。


Iran’s government can no longer claim that the nuclear program is a national cause with broad support.	伊朗政府不再能够宣称核计划是有广大群众支持的国家行为。


Rowhani’s supporters want a better economy and integration into the international community more than they want nuclear glory.	与核光荣相比，鲁哈尼的支持者更希望经济好转和融入国际社会。


Second, even if Khamenei hands the nuclear portfolio to Rowhani (which is not certain, given that he retained it under Ahmadinejad), the new president must come to terms with the IRGC, whose support – at least tacit – is necessary for any nuclear deal.	其次，即便哈梅内伊将核家底交给鲁哈尼（不一定会如此，因为他仍让内贾德保管核家底），新官上任的鲁哈尼也必须与IRGC合作，任何核协议都离不开IRGC的支持（至少是保持缄默）。


To date, Iran’s nuclear program and regional policies have been run by the IRGC and the country’s hard-liners.	到目前为止，伊朗核计划和地区政策仍由IRGC和国内强硬派把持。


They did not win the election, but they have not gone away.	他们没有硬的大选，但也没有远离权力。


Changing Climate Change	改变气候变化


The 10 warmest years on record have all occurred since 1990, and 2005 is likely to be the warmest ever.	记载中最温暖的十年都出现在1990年以后，而2005年很可能成为最暖的一年。


This year, we’ve gotten a taste of the many kinds of dangers that lie ahead: more extreme hurricanes, massive droughts, forest fires, spreading infectious diseases, and floods.	今年，我们初尝了未来将会面对的许多危险的况味：更为极端的飓风、大面积的干旱、森林火灾、传染病的蔓延和洪水。


The climate is changing, and more is yet to come.	气候正在变化，而更多的变化即将发生。


The world’s governments will meet in Montreal at the end of November to plot the next steps, including specific measures that the world could adopt if the Bush administration abandoned its willful neglect of this critical issue.	世界各国的政府将在11月底汇集蒙特利尔，制定下一步的应对方案。 其中包括在布什政府放弃有意忽视该问题的态度之后，世界各国可能采取的具体步骤。


Climate change is equated with “global warming,” but much more than warming is involved.	气候变化被等同于“全球变暖”，但其实质内容要比变暖多得多。


The rising concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is leading to more extreme storms, higher-intensity hurricanes, rising ocean levels, melting glaciers and ice sheets, droughts, floods and other climate changes.	二氧化碳等温室气体的浓度越来越高，正导致着更为极端的风暴、更高强度的飓风、海平面上升、冰川和冰盖融化、干旱、洪灾和其他气候变化。


Even the chemistry of the land and ocean is changing, with the ocean becoming more acidic – thus threatening coral reefs – as a result of higher carbon dioxide.	甚至连土地和海洋的化学成分也发生着变化。 海水的酸性日益增强—进而威胁着珊瑚礁—就是二氧化碳含量增加的结果。


The specific patterns of change are not known precisely, but the risks of continuing on our current global course are widely appreciated.	气候变化的详尽模式还不得而知，全球继续朝着这个方向发展的风险正引起广泛的重视。


Yet the United States has refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, which does little to change the long-term course of events on the planet, since it calls for only small steps up to the year 2012.	然而美国却拒绝签署《京都议定书》。 由于该协议只呼吁在2012年之前采取有限的举措，所以它对改变地球长期的状况几乎产生不了什么作用。


Under the terms of the UN treaty on climate change, the signatories – virtually the whole world - are to gather each year to discuss the treaty’s implementation.	在联合国这项关于气候变化的条约规定下，签约各方—实际上是全世界—每年都要聚首讨论该协定的执行。


The conference in Montreal - the 11th such meeting - should look beyond 2012, so that the world gets onto a safe and sustainable long-term climate path.	在蒙特利尔召开的大会—第十一次这样的会议—应该将目光越过2012年，以使世界走上一条安全和可持续的长期气候轨道。


The actions that are needed are difficult to introduce, because they go to the heart of the world’s use of energy, particularly its use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), which, when burned, release carbon dioxide – the key source of rising greenhouse gases – into the atmosphere.	必需举措的出台是困难的，因为这关系到世界使用能源的核心问题，特别是对化石燃料（煤、石油和煤气）的使用。 这些燃料在燃烧时释放出二氧化碳—温室气体的重要来源—并排放到大气中。


Yet the world economy depends on fossil fuels, and developing countries will need to use more, not less, of them as their economies grow.	然而世界经济依赖于化石燃料，发展中国家的经济增长需要使用更多而不是更少的化石燃料。


Even if the world runs out of oil and gas in the coming years, coal will prove to be plentiful, and solid coal can be converted at relatively low cost to liquid fuels for automobiles and other uses.	就算是世界上的石油和天然气在不久的将来耗尽，煤却仍然有足够的储量。 固体的煤以相对较低的成本就可以被转化成供应汽车和其他用途的液体燃料。


Unfortunately, clean, renewable energy sources that do not emit carbon dioxide, such as wind power and geothermal power, are not yet sufficient.	不幸的是，不会释放二氧化碳的，清洁、可再生的能源，如风能和地热，还不能满足我们的需要。