Ancient Greek had two words for the people: the “demos” of democracy and the “laos” of the mob.	古希腊人用两个词描述人：民主的“demo”和乌合之众的“lao”。


With his puerile call to shift the burden of his own errors and his reluctance to reform onto the shoulders of Greece’s fellow Europeans, Tsipras is leaning toward the latter manifestation – and promoting the worst version of Greek politics.	齐普拉斯幼稚地把他自己的错误和不愿进行改革的负担转移给了希腊的欧洲伙伴的肩上，这是自甘堕落为“lao”，也是希腊政治最糟糕的情况。


Tsipras might defend his approach to the referendum by asserting that his goal was not so much to sound out the people as to reinforce his position in the confrontation with Greece’s creditors.	齐普拉斯也许会这样为他的公投方针辩护：他的目标并非试探希腊人民从而加强他在面对希腊债权人时的立场。


But what is the justification for that confrontation?	但希腊与其债权人的冲突的合理性何在？


That they had the audacity to demand progress toward the rule of law and social justice, as well as efforts to tame Greece’s shipping magnates and its tax-avoiding clergy?	在于希腊能厚着脸皮要求不顾法治和社会正义？ 还是在于治伏希腊船业巨头和不用交税的神职人员？


The European Union has achieved peace precisely by learning, gradually, to replace the old logic of confrontation and conflict with that of negotiation and compromise.	欧盟之所以能实现和平，正是因为逐渐学会了用谈判和妥协取代冲突的旧逻辑。


Despite its defects, the EU has become a laboratory of democratic innovation, in which, for the first time in centuries, an attempt is being made to settle differences not by political war and blackmail but by listening, dialogue, and a synthesis of different points of view.	尽管有各种缺陷，但欧盟仍是民主创新的实验室，在这个实验室中，几个世纪以来首次有人尝试不通过政治战和勒索，而是通过倾听、对话和综合各种不同观点来调和分歧。


In this sense, the Greek referendum delivered an insult to 18 countries, including some that are in situations no less difficult than Greece’s, and yet have made considerable sacrifices to grant the country, in 2012 alone, €105 billion ($116 billion) in debt relief while remaining accountable to their own populations.	从这个角度讲，希腊公投是对18个国家的侮辱，其中一些国家情况不比希腊好，但它们做出了巨大的牺牲，光是在2012年，在仍然接受本国人民问责的情况下实现的债务减免就高达1,050亿欧元。


What twist of the mind enables one to call that an “act of resistance” or the “defense of democracy?”	怎样扭曲的思维才会让人称之为“抵制行动”或“捍卫民主”？


Yet many have.	但很多人就是这样做了。


Indeed, since the referendum, many have acted as if Tsipras were the last eurozone democrat, as if he had faced a “totalitarian” clique (as described by the far-right French politician Marine Le Pen) against which he valiantly “stood firm” (in the words of far-left politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon).	事实上，自公投以来，许多人的行为好像齐普拉斯是欧元区最后一位民主派，好像他面临“极权”派（法国极右翼政客马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）语）勇敢地“傲然挺立”（极左翼政客让-卢克·梅郎雄（Jean-Luc Mélenchon）语）。


I will not dwell on Tsipras’s parliamentary alliance with the conspiracy-minded, right-wing Independent Greeks, whose leaders do not shy away from diatribes against homosexuals, Buddhists, Jews, and Muslims.	我不会详细讨论齐普拉斯在希腊议会中的盟友——持阴谋论思维的右翼独立希腊人党（Independent Greeks，其领导人不惮于对同性恋者、佛教徒、犹太人和穆斯林恶言相向）。


Nor will I dwell on the fact that Tsipras did not refrain, when assembling parliamentary support for his referendum, from soliciting the support of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, whose help any other European leader would have rejected.	我也不会详细讨论以下事实：齐普拉斯在组织对他的公投的议会支持时甚至寻求新纳粹主义政党金色黎明党（Golden Dawn）的支持，任何其他欧洲领导人都会拒绝该党的支持。


Instead, I will emphasize the fact that Tsipras’s fellow European leaders are no less democratic or legitimate than he.	相反，我要强调一个事实：齐普拉斯的欧洲领导人同侪并不比他更不民主、更不合法。


The countries of Central Europe that endured Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism do not need lessons in legitimacy from anyone – especially not the Greek prime minister.	经历了纳粹和苏联极权主义的中欧国家不需要从任何人那里接受合法性教育——特别是希腊总理。


The brave Baltic countries – the “legality” of whose independence is reportedly being reviewed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, another unsavory pal of Tsipras – have not yielded to panic or succumbed to the temptation to burden others with their misfortune.	勇敢的巴尔干国家——据说它们的独立的“合法性”正在接受另一位令人讨厌的齐普拉斯的朋友、俄罗斯总统普京的检查——没有向恐惧屈服，也没有向把不幸转嫁给其他国家的诱惑屈服。


They are not using their struggles as a pretext to default on their duty of solidarity with Greece.	它们没有以自己也处于挣扎中为由不履行与希腊同舟共济的责任。


None of this means that we should write off Greece’s EU membership.	所有这些都不意味着我们应该取消希腊的欧盟成员资格。


In other times, the Greeks paid dearly for their “No” to Nazism and their “No” to military dictatorship.	曾几何时，希腊人为对纳粹主义说“不”和对军事独裁说“不”付出过沉重代价。


Nothing would be sadder than to see them also have to pay for last Sunday’s “No” – a farcical simulation of those earlier noble acts of defiance.	让他们因为在上周日说“不”而不得不付出代价将是一个极其悲哀的悲剧——与前两次说“不”相比，这一次不可不谓是滑稽的模仿。


May eurozone leaders have the forbearance to recognize the flawed “No” that has been delivered, and to be more Greek than the Greeks.	但愿欧元区领导人能宽容地承认这一已是既成事实的有缺陷的“不”，能宽容地比希腊人更“希腊”。


May they act in a way that prevents Greece from ever having to face the true, tragic meaning of Sunday’s vote.	但愿他们能够绕过希腊人避免面对周日公投的真正的、悲剧的含义。


Greece’s Catharsis?	希腊涅槃？


ATHENS – Sunday’s election in Greece will decide whether confrontation or negotiation will be used to change the terms of Greece’s refinancing agreement with the eurozone.	雅典—周日的大选将决定希腊将在欧元区再融资协议中采取敌对还是谈判的态度。


Rather than helping Greece to overcome its crisis, the austerity policies pursued since May 2010 have plunged it into a deep recession that perpetuates fiscal deficits and aggravates financial uncertainty.	2010年5月以来的紧缩政策并没有帮助希腊克服危机，反而把它引入了深度衰退，财政赤字迟迟不降，金融不稳定性与日俱增。


It is becoming increasingly clear that if Greece proceeds to unilateral action – whether by repealing unpopular austerity laws or renouncing the loan agreement itself – the eurozone will suspend disbursement of the loan.	越来越明确的是，如果希腊决定单方面行动——不管是抛弃不受支持的紧缩法案还是废除贷款协议——欧元区将中止贷款发放。


The government will find it impossible to fulfill basic obligations, such as paying salaries and pensions, and the country will formally default.	希腊政府将无法履行基本义务（如支付工资和养老金），希腊也将正式违约。


International banks will cease to finance Greek enterprises, including imports, creating shortages of fuel, food, and medicines.	国际银行将停止向希腊企业发放贷款（包括进口贷款），造成燃料、食品和药品短缺。


As confidence that Greece will remain in the eurozone plummets, a run on deposits will cause the banking system – and, eventually, the real economy – to collapse.	随着希腊留在欧元区的希望逐渐渺茫，将爆发存款挤兑，导致银行系统——最终将是实体经济——崩溃。


The next step will be forced exit from the euro and reintroduction of the drachma, implying a dramatic drop in living standards, owing in part to immediate devaluation of the new currency and high inflation.	下一步将是被迫退出欧元区，重新使用德拉克马，这意味着生活水平的大幅下降，因为新货币将会立即贬值，通胀将会很高。


Meanwhile, the benefits in terms of competitiveness will be very limited, owing to the country’s narrow export base, and will evaporate in a vicious circle of devaluations and rising interest rates.	与此同时，竞争力方面所获得好处将十分有限，因为希腊的出口基础薄弱，且贬值和利率上升的恶性循环将进一步削弱其竞争力。


Long-term stagnation and high unemployment are the likely result of confrontation with the eurozone, which leaves only the path of renegotiation.	与欧元区作对可能导致长期停滞和失业高企，因此重新谈判便是唯一可行之道。


The new political balance emerging in Europe after the Socialists’ victory in France’s presidential election creates scope for changes in the terms of the loan agreement that would help to boost economic growth.	法国社会党在总统大选胜出后，欧洲形成了新的政治平衡，这为有助于提振经济增长的贷款协议条件修改创造了空间。


Opting for renegotiation assumes the victory of pro-euro political forces in Sunday’s elections.	选择重新谈判将意味着支持欧元的政治力量在周日大选中获胜。


New Democracy, Pasok, and Democratic Left belong to this group, as opposed to Syriza and some smaller parties on the extreme right and left, which support a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the eurozone, eventually leading to the euro exit.	新民主党、泛希腊社会运动党（Pasok）和民主左翼党属于这个阵营，它们的对立面是，激进左翼联盟（Syriza）和其他一些极右和极左小党派，它们支持与欧元区争锋相对并最终退出欧元区。


If a pro-euro majority emerges on June 17, the new government’s main challenge will be to propose a new policy agenda, and then to negotiate a revised deal with the eurozone.	如果6月17日的大选支持欧元派获得多数选票，那么新政府的主要挑战将是拿出新的政策日程，然后与欧元区讨论修改方案。


The key to growth is increased competitiveness through higher productivity and lower production costs.	增长的关键是通过提高生产率、降低生产成本增加竞争力。


In the 1990’s, in the run-up to joining the eurozone, Greece achieved substantial gains on this front.	20世纪90年代进入欧元区后，希腊在这方面取得了长足的进步。


With inflation falling sharply, real incomes increased.	通胀迅速下降，真实收入迅速增加。


Fiscal deficits were reduced.	财政赤字得到了削减。


Important structural reforms were implemented, particularly privatization.	重要的结构性改革（特别是私有化改革）得到了实施。


Investment accelerated, and major infrastructure projects were realized.	投资出现了加速，完成了不少重大基础设施工程。


High growth rates were achieved in conditions of stability.	高增长在稳定的环境下实现了。


Unfortunately, that effort ceased over the last decade.	不幸的是，这些进步在上一个十年中停了下来。


Selfish interests prevailed.	自私自利开始盛行。


Business groups attempted to capture specific markets.	商业集团试图独吞市场。


Public-sector trade unions fought for preserving privileges.	公共部门工会忙于为特权而斗争。


Tax discipline was further weakened.	税收纪律被进一步削弱了。


The welfare state was transformed into a system of endemic waste.	福利国家制度演变成了无处不在的浪费。


A gap emerged between the economy’s productive base, which remained stagnant, and Greeks’ expectations (and demands), which were rising fast.	希腊经济的生产力基础（停滞不前）和希腊人民的期望（和需求）之间出现了差距并很快扩大。


The agreement with the eurozone attempted to close the gap in a clumsy and misguided way.	与欧元区达成的协议试图以愚蠢而错误的方式弥合这一差距。


Instead of focusing on structural reforms to liberate the economy’s productive forces, it relied on income cuts and tax increases.	该协议并没有把注意力放在解放希腊生产力的结构性改革上，而是以收入削减和税收增加为基础。


The incompetence of the governments that implemented the agreement exacerbates that defect by sidelining structural reforms and enacting only the terms concerning austerity.	实施这一协议的政府很不称职，只执行了紧缩条件而忽略了结构性改革，这放大了协议的弊端。


The renegotiation should aim at changing the policy mix in the following directions:	新的谈判应该旨在以下方面改变政策组合：


Extending the timetable of fiscal-deficit reduction in order to limit the depth of the recession.Avoiding any new cut in incomes or new taxes, with reduction in indirect taxation to start immediately.Social-protection measures, particularly for the unemployed.A European Marshall Plan, through grants from the European Union’s structural funds and loans from the European Investment Bank, in order to sustain economic activity and create new jobs.Achieving these targets presupposes that Greece’s new government implements all of the structural changes agreed with the eurozone.	社会保障措施，特别是针对失业者的措施。 一份欧洲版的马歇尔计划，由欧洲投资银行提供欧盟结构性资金和带宽授权，以维持经济活动和创造新就业岗位。


Privatization, opening up closed markets and professions, promoting entrepreneurship, and eliminating public-sector waste should proceed at a fast pace over the next few months.	实现这些目标的先决条件是希腊新政府实施所有与欧元区达成的结构性变化协议。 在未来几个月中，应大大加快私有化、开放封闭的市场和职业、鼓励企业家精神和消灭公共部门铺张浪费的步伐。


The European Marshall Plan would offer a unique opportunity to reorient growth policies.	欧洲版马歇尔计划将提供一个独一无二的机会，让希腊重新制定增长政策方向。


Greece should move beyond its traditional focus on sectors such as tourism, shipping, and construction, and search for new areas of comparative advantage in renewable energy, high-value-added services, and selected lines of manufacturing that benefit from the country’s research potential.	希腊不应该向以前那样把眼光集中在旅游、航运和建筑等几个部门，而应该在可再生能源、高附加值服务以及该国具有研究潜力的制造业细分部门等新领域寻找比较优势。


If Greece succeeds in fulfilling the requirements of a revised financing agreement with the eurozone, it may win the confidence bet by convincing financial markets that it is determined to achieve the targets.	如果希腊成功地满足了修改后的欧元区融资协议所提出的要求，那么将能使金融市场相信其实现目标的决心，从而赢得这场信心赌注。


Confidence will unlock the door to economic recovery.	信心将打开经济复苏之门。


The fear of a return to the drachma will recede.	德拉克马卷土重来的恐慌将被平息。


Consumption levels will begin to recover.	消费水平将开始复苏。


Deposit outflows will cease.	存款将不再外逃。


The banking system will be reinforced.	银行系统将会得到再融资。


Investors will reevaluate opportunities for undertaking new initiatives.	投资者将重新评估新项目的机会。


A virtuous circle may be set in motion, leading the country, eventually, to escape the crisis zone.	希腊将出现良性循环，最终走出危机区。


The outcome of Sunday’s election will determine which way Greece goes – and, also, of course, how the unfolding Greek drama affects the eurozone’s future.	周日大选的结果将决定希腊走哪条路，当然，也将决定希腊大戏的开展怎样影响欧元区的未来。


The Mirage of Structural Reform	结构改革幻象


ATHENS – Every economic program imposed on Greece by its creditors since the financial crisis struck in 2009 has been held together by a central conceit: that structural reforms, conceived boldly and implemented without slippage, would bring about rapid economic recovery.	雅典—自2009年金融危机爆发以来，希腊债权人对希腊提出的所有经济计划都围绕着一个核心的自负：大胆构思、不折不扣执行的结构改革将带来快速经济复苏。


The European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund anticipated that fiscal austerity would be costly to incomes and employment – though they significantly underestimated just how costly.	欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）预计到财政紧缩将导致巨大的收入和就业代价——尽管它们大幅低估了这一代价到底有多大。


But they argued that long-delayed (and much-needed) pro-market reforms would result in a compensatory boost to the Greek economy.	但它们认为，一拖再拖（并且急需）的亲市场改革能够给希腊经济带来补偿性提振。


Any serious assessment of the actual results produced by structural reforms around the world – particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe since 1990 – would have poured cold water on such expectations.	任何对全球结构改革——特别是1990年以来拉美和东欧的结构改革——所带来的实际结果的严肃评估都会给这一预期泼上一盆冷水。


Privatization, deregulation, and liberalization typically produce growth in the longer term at best, with short-run effects that are often negative.	私有化、去监管化和自由化通常最多只能带来长期增长，短期影响往往是消极的。


It is not that governments cannot engineer quick growth takeoffs.	并不是政府无法实现快速增长起飞。


In fact, such growth accelerations are quite common around the world.	事实上，这种增长加速在世界范围内相当普遍。


But they are associated with more targeted, selective removal of key obstacles, rather than broad liberalization and economy-wide reform efforts.	但它们伴随着针对性更强的、有选择的消除重要障碍的措施，而不是宽泛的自由化和广义经济改革措施。


The theory behind structural reforms is simple: opening the economy to competition will increase the efficiency with which resources are allocated.	结构改革背后的理论很简单：让经济开放竞争能增进资源配置效率。


Open up regulated professions – pharmacies, notaries, and taxicabs, for example – and inefficient suppliers will be driven out by more productive firms.	开放受监管行业——比如制药、公证和出租车——效率低下的供给者将被生产率更高的企业挤出。


Privatize state enterprises, and the new management will rationalize production (and shed all the excess workers who owe their jobs to political patronage).	国有企业私有化，新管理层将让生产变得更加合理（并裁掉所有依靠政治裙带关系获得工作的多余工人）。


These changes do not directly induce economic growth, but they increase the economy’s potential – or long-run – income.	这些变化并不直接带来经济增长，但它们增加了经济的潜在——或长期——收入。


Growth itself occurs as the economy begins to converge to this higher level of long-run income.	增长本身将发生在经济开始向这一更高水平的长期收入收敛时。


Many academic studies have found that the rate of convergence tends to be about 2% per year.	许多学术研究发现这一收敛速率大约在每年2%。


That is, each year, an economy tends to close 2% of the gap between its actual and potential income levels.	也就是说，经济的实际和潜在收入水平差距每年缩小2%。


This estimate helps us gauge the magnitude of growth we can expect from structural reform.	这一估计有助于我们测算可以从结构改革中期待多大程度的增长。


Let’s be hyper-optimistic and suppose that structural reforms enable Greece to double its potential income over three years – pushing Greek per capita GDP significantly beyond the European Union average.	不妨假设非常乐观，认为结构改革可以让希腊潜在收入三年翻一番——让希腊人均GDP大大超过欧盟平均水平。


Applying convergence math, this would produce an annual growth boost of only about 1.3%, on average, over the next three years.	用收敛算术，这带来的未来三年增长提振平均每年只有1. 3%左右。


To place this number in perspective, remember that Greek GDP has shrunk by 25% since 2009.	要正确评价这个数字，必须记住2009年以来希腊GDP减少了25%。


So, if structural reforms have not paid off in Greece, it is not because Greek governments have slacked off.	因此，如果结构改革未内在希腊收到回报，不是因为希腊政府懈怠了。


Greece’s record on implementation is actually pretty good.	希腊在实施改革方面的记录其实相当出色。


From 2010 to 2015, Greece climbed nearly 40 places in the World Banks’s business-environment rankings.	从2010年到2015年，希腊在世界银行营商环境排行榜上进步了近40位。


Instead, the current disappointment arises from the very logic of structural reform: most of the benefits come much later, not when a country really needs them.	相反，目前令人失望的局面正是来自结构改革逻辑：大部分改革的好处要很迟才会到来，而不是在一国真正需要它们时到来。


There is an alternative strategy that could produce significantly more rapid growth.	有一个替代战略能够带来显著更快的增长。


A selective approach that targets the “binding constraints” – those areas where the growth returns are the greatest – would maximize early benefits.	针对“绑定约束”（binding constraints，你早些增长回报最大的领域）的选择性方针能够实现早期收益最大化。


It would also ensure that the Greek authorities spend valuable political and human capital on the battles that really matter.	它还能确保希腊当局将宝贵的政治和人力资本用在真正重要的地方。


So, which binding constraints in the Greek economy should be targeted?	那么，希腊经济需要对准的绑定约束是哪些？


The biggest bang for the reform buck would be obtained from increasing the profitability of tradables – spurring investment and entrepreneurship in export activities, both existing and new.	改革计划的最重要目标应该对准可贸易商品盈利性的增加——刺激出口活动的投资和企业家精神，不论是已有的还是新增的。


Of course, Greece lacks the most direct instrument for achieving this – currency depreciation – owing to its eurozone membership.	当然，希腊缺少实现这一目标的最直接工具——货币贬值——因为它是欧元区成员国。


But other countries’ experience provides a rich inventory of alternative tools for export promotion – from tax incentives to special zones to targeted infrastructure projects.	但其他国家的经验为希腊提供了巨大的促进出口的替代工具库——从税收激励到特区和定向基础设施项目。


Most urgently, Greece needs to create an institution close to the prime minister that is tasked with fostering a dialogue with potential investors.	最紧迫的是，希腊需要建立一个权力接近总理的机构，由它来负责与潜在��资者对话。


The institution needs the authority to remove the obstacles it identifies, rather than having its proposals languish in various ministries.	该机构需要有移除它所发现的障碍的权力，以免使它的方案在各部门之间踢皮球。


Such obstacles are typically highly specific – a zoning regulation here, a training program there – and are unlikely to be well targeted by broad structural reforms.	这些障碍常常非常具体——比如区划规则和培训计划等——如果采取宽泛的结构改革难以很好地定向。


The absence to date of a single-minded focus on tradables has been costly.	目前，没有专心注重于可贸易商品带来了沉重的代价。


Different reforms have had conflicting effects on export competitiveness.	不同的改革对于出口竞争力有着互相冲突的效果。


For example, in manufacturing, the competitiveness benefits of wage cuts (“internal devaluation”) were offset by the increases in energy costs resulting from fiscal austerity measures and price adjustments by state enterprises.	比如，得自削减工资（“内部贬值”）的制造业竞争力因为财政紧缩措施和国有企业调价导致的能源成本上升而被抵消。


A more focused reform strategy could have protected exporting activities from such adverse effects.	更加专注的改革战略能够保护出口活动免受这些负面影响。


Conventional structural reform tends to be biased toward “best practices” – policy remedies that are supposedly universally valid.	传统结构改革总是偏向于“最佳实践”——被认为放之四海而皆准的政策药方。


But, as successful countries around the world have discovered, a best-practice mindset does not help much in promoting new exports.	但是，全世界成功国家的经验表明，最佳实践思维在促进新出口方面收效甚微。


Lacking its own currency, the Greek government will have to be especially creative and imaginative.	希腊政府没有自己的货币，因此必须有特别出色的创造力和想象力。


In particular, the experience of other countries suggests that a quick supply response is likely to require selective, discretionary policies in favor of exporters, rather than the “horizontal” policies that advocates of conventional structural reform prefer.	特别是，其他国家的经验表明快速的供给反应可能要求偏向于出口商的选择性自由裁量政策，而不是传统结构改革支持者所偏好的“水平”政策。


Therein lies a paradox: The more orthodox Greece’s macro and fiscal strategy is, the more heterodox its growth strategy will have to be.	这就形成了一个悖论：希腊宏观和财政战略越是正统，其增长战略就越需要异端。


Still No Exit for Greece	希腊仍然不能退出


WASHINGTON, DC – Opinion polls in the run-up to Greece’s early general election on January 25 indicate that the left-wing Syriza party is likely to win the largest share of votes.	华盛顿—1月25日，希腊将举行初期大选，民调现实，极左翼的左翼联盟党（Syriza party）可能赢得最大比例选票。


As a result, Syriza stands to earn a crucial premium under Greek electoral law, according to which the party that gains the most votes is allocated an extra 50 of the parliament’s 300 seats.	因此，左翼联盟极有可能根据希腊选举法获得关键奖励——赢得选票最多的政党可以在300个席位的议会中额外获得50个席位。


In other words, Syriza could come to power, with enormous implications for Greece and Europe.	换句话说，左翼联盟可能赢得权力，给希腊和欧洲带来重大影响。


Syriza is more a coalition than a unified party, meaning that its leader, Alexis Tsipras, must reconcile moderate socialists, including some of his economic advisers, with radical left-wing members.	左翼联盟是一个联盟而不是统一的政党，这意味着其领导人齐普拉斯（Alexis Tsipras）必须协调温和社会主义者（包括他的一些经济顾问）与激进左派成员。


The implementation and impact of Syriza’s agenda, especially its decisive economic program, will depend on the new government’s ability to maintain support at home and compromise with Greece’s creditors abroad.	左翼联盟日程的实施和影响，特别是其坚决的经济计划，将取决于新政府维持国内支持和与希腊的外国债权人形成妥协的能力。


Syriza’s economic program rejects the austerity policies supported – or, some might say, imposed – by the so-called “troika” (the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission).	左翼联盟的经济计划拒绝接受所谓的“三驾马车”（IMF、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）所支持——或如某些人所说为三驾马车所实施——的紧缩政策。


These policies require Greece to maintain a very high primary budget surplus – more than 4% of GDP – for many years to come.	这些政策要求希腊在未来多年时间里维持很大的初级预算盈余——超过GDP的4%。


Syriza also plans to demand a substantial reduction in Greece’s foreign debt, the nominal value of which remains very high – close to 170% of GDP.	左翼联盟还计划要求大幅减少希腊的外债，目前，希腊外债名义值高达GDP的近170%。


In fact, the real present value of the debt is much lower, given that most of it is now held by governments or other public entities and carries long maturities and low interest rates.	事实上，这笔债务的实际现值已经大大降低，因为大部分债务现在又政府或其他公共实体持有，期限长、利率低。


Nonetheless, repayment “spikes” this year constitute a real short-term challenge.	尽管如此，今年偿还额的“陡增”仍构成了实际短期挑战。


The problem for Greece is that its creditors may adopt a very tough stance.	希腊的问题在于其债权人可能采取非常强硬的立场。


This largely reflects the belief that, if a breakdown of negotiations triggers another Greek crisis, the systemic risks to the eurozone and the wider European Union would be far smaller than they were just a few years ago.	这大约体现了一种观念，即，如果谈判破裂导致希腊再度爆发危机，对欧元区和更广泛的欧盟的系统风险将远小于几年前。


The “acute” phase of the euro crisis is over; even if growth remains elusive, financial contagion is no longer viewed as a risk.	欧元危机的“急性”阶段已经过去了； 即使增长依然不振，金融传染也已不再被认为是一种风险。


After all, private creditors hold only a minimal share of Greek debt nowadays.	毕竟，如今私人债权人只持有很小一部分希腊债务。


In 2010-2012, by contrast, systemically important European banks were exposed, raising the risk of a domino effect that threatened the entire eurozone.	相反，2011—2012年间，许多具系统重要性的欧洲银行都有风险暴露，这就提高了可能威胁到整个欧元区的多米诺效应的风险。


Moreover, a debt reduction in the form of further interest-rate reductions and maturity extensions on foreign government-held debt would not hurt financial markets.	此外，以进一步降低外国政府持有债券利率并延长期限为形式的债务减少不会伤害金融市场。


But debt held by the European Central Bank and the IMF could pose a problem.	但欧洲央行和IMF持有的债务可能造成问题。


If Greece’s new government does not tread lightly in these discussions, withdrawal of these institutions’ liquidity support for Greek banks could follow.	如果希腊新政府不小心对待这些讨论，可能造成这些机构收回对希腊银行的流动性支持。


Despite the lack of significant financial contagion risk, a renewed Greek crisis, stemming from a lasting and serious breakdown of negotiations between the new government and EU institutions, would constitute a major problem for European cooperation.	尽管没有重大金融传染风险，新政府与欧洲机构之间的谈判的持续而严重的破裂所导致的希腊危机复萌仍将是欧洲合作的巨大问题。


The absence of financial contagion would not rule out serious political repercussions.	不发生金融传染并不能排除严重的政治影响。


Europe’s political landscape is changing.	欧洲的政治图景正在改变。


Populist parties, both on the far right and the far left, are gaining electoral traction.	极右翼和极左翼民粹主义政党正在选举中节节获胜。


Some, such as France’s National Front, oppose their country’s eurozone membership; others, such as Podemos in Spain, do not.	其中一些政党，如法国的国民阵线（National Front），反对国家加入欧元区； 也有一些，如西班牙社会民主党（Podemos）不反对。


Nonetheless, the challenge that these new parties pose to Europe could prove to be extremely disruptive.	尽管如此，这些政党给欧洲造成的挑战也许机具破坏性。


A Greek exit from the eurozone, together with financial and political turmoil inside Greece, would be perceived as a major defeat for European integration – especially after the laborious efforts made to hold together the monetary union and, with it, the European dream.	希腊退出欧元区，以及希腊国内的金融和政治动荡将构成欧洲一体化的巨大挫折——特别是在付出艰苦努力维系货币联盟及其中的欧洲梦的情况下。


Such an outcome would be even more disheartening in light of the tragic terrorist attacks in Paris, and after unity marches in France and across the continent rekindled a long-fading sense of European solidarity.	在巴黎的恐怖袭击悲剧后，以及法国及整个欧洲大陆的统一大游行重新点燃每况日下的欧洲团结热情后，这一结果更加令人心碎。


A new image of solidarity is precisely what the Greek election should produce.	新的团结形象才是希腊选举应该产生的结果。


There is little doubt that the suffering that Greeks have had to endure for the last five years is mainly attributable to the fiscal profligacy and poor public management of a procession of Greek governments.	毫无疑问，希腊人民在过去五年中被迫承受的痛苦主要要归咎于此前各界希腊政府的财政挥霍和公共管理不力。


But as most analysts, including at the IMF, now agree, the troika’s approach was also deeply flawed, as it emphasized wage and income cuts, while neglecting the reform of product markets and the dismantling of harmful public and private oligopolies.	但如许多分析师（包括IMF分析师），目前所同意的，三驾马车的方针也存在严重漏洞，它强调削减工资和收入，却忽视了产品市场改革和治理弊端重重的公共和寡头。


For the sake of Greece and Europe, the new government must work with the European institutions to revise their strategy, while taking responsibility for implementing growth-promoting structural reforms.	为了希腊和欧洲的命运，新政府必须与欧洲机构合作修订其战略，同时承担实施促增长的结构改革的责任。


Greece’s creditors and partners, for their part, must provide the fiscal space needed for the reforms to work.	希腊债权人和合作伙伴则必须提供改革起效所需要的财政空间。


Walking away from Greece because it no longer poses a threat of financial contagion is not a politically viable option.	因为希腊已不再构成金融传染的威胁而远离它不是政治可行的选项。


Both sides will have to show more foresight.	双方都必须拿出更大的远见。


The last five years have provided two clear lessons for Europe: procrastination only makes reform more difficult, and the end of financial turmoil does not necessarily mean the end of socioeconomic crisis.	过去五年给欧洲提供了两个明确的教训：拖延只能让改革变得更加艰难，以及金融动荡的结束并不一定意味着社会经济危机的结束。


It is time to use these lessons to develop a cooperative strategy that will finally enable Greece to make real progress toward a more stable future.	如今，应该利用这些教训发展合作战略，最终让希腊朝更稳定的未来迈出真正的进步。


A Greek exit from the euro is not a more viable solution today than it was three years ago.	与三年前相比，今天希腊退出欧元是并不更加可行。


Shelter from the Storm in Europe	欧洲的风暴庇护所


LAGUNA BEACH – Dark clouds are lowering over Europe’s economic future, as three distinct tempests gather: the Greek crisis, Russia’s incursion in Ukraine, and the rise of populist political parties.	拉古娜海滩—欧洲经济未来阴云密布，三大不同风暴汇聚在一起：希腊危机、俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，以及民粹主义政党的崛起。


Though each poses a considerable threat, Europe, aided by the recent cyclical pickup, is in a position to address them individually, without risking more than a temporary set of disruptions.	尽管每个风暴都是一个巨大的威胁，但借助最近的周期性东风，欧洲有望各个击破三大危机，不会引起比暂时性扰动更严重的后果。


Should they converge into a kind of “perfect storm,” however, a return to sunny days will become extremely difficult to foresee any time soon.	但是，如果它们汇聚成一个“完美风暴哦”，那么恢复晴空万里将十分困难，在近期未来很难见到。


As it stands, the three storms are at different stages of formation.	目前这三起风暴处于不同的形成阶段。


The Greek crisis, having been building for years, is blowing the hardest.	希腊危机已经持续了好几年，风头最劲。


Beyond the potential for the first eurozone exit, Greece could be at risk of becoming a failed state – an outcome that would pose a multi-dimensional threat to the rest of Europe.	希腊有可能成为第一个退出欧元区的国家，也有可能遭遇国家破产——这一结果将给欧洲其他国家造成多维度威胁。


Mitigating the adverse humanitarian consequences (associated with cross-border migration), and geopolitical impact of this storm would be no easy feat.	欧洲必须减轻这一风暴的人道主义后果（与跨境移民有关），而其地缘政治影响也不容小觑。


The second storm, rolling in from the EU’s east, is the costly military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region.	第二起风暴来自欧盟东面——代价高昂的乌克兰顿巴斯（Donbas）地区军事冲突。


The crisis in eastern Ukraine has been contained only partly by the Minsk II ceasefire agreement, and reflects the deepest rupture in the West’s relationship with Russia since the Soviet Union’s collapse.	这场东乌克兰危机已经借助明斯克II停火协议部分得到遏制，它体现了苏联解体以来西方与俄罗斯关系的最深层次的裂缝。


Further Russian interference in Ukraine – directly and/or through separatist proxies in Donbas – would present the West with a stark choice.	俄罗斯进一步干预乌克兰——直接和/或通过顿巴斯分裂主义代理人干预——将让西方面临艰难的抉择。


It would either have to tighten sanctions on Russia, potentially tipping Western Europe into recession as Russia responds with counter-sanctions, or accommodate the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions and jeopardize other countries with Russian-speaking minorities (including the EU’s Baltic members).	要么加紧对俄制裁，这有可能导致俄罗斯的反制裁，让西欧陷入衰退； 要么向克里姆林宫的扩张主义野心妥协，让其他也存在俄语少数群体的国家（包括欧盟的巴尔干成员国）陷入危险。


The third storm – political tumult brought about by the rise of populist political movements – poses yet another serious threat.	第三起风暴——因民粹主义政治运动的崛起而导致的政治骚动——是另一个严重威胁。


Energized by broad voter dissatisfaction, particularly in struggling economies, these political movements tend to focus on a small handful of issues, opposing, say, immigrants, austerity, or the European Union – essentially whomever they can scapegoat for their countries’ troubles.	这些政治运动（尤其是在陷入麻烦的经济体）因为选民的普遍不满而大受欢迎，它们往往专门针对一小撮问题，比如反对移民、紧缩或欧盟——只要能成为国家所面临的麻烦的替罪羊的，它们都不放过。


Already, Greek voters handed the far-left anti-austerity Syriza party a sweeping victory in January.	到目前为止，希腊选民在1月份的大选中一边倒地支持极左翼反紧缩的左翼联盟（Syriza）党。


France’s far-right National Front is currently second in opinion polls.	法国的极右翼政党国民阵线（National Front）在目前的民调中名列榜眼。


The anti-immigration Danish People’s Party finished second in the country’s just-concluded general election, with 22% of the vote.	反移民的丹麦人民党（Danish People’s Party）在刚刚结束的大选中位居第二，赢得22%的选票。


And, in Spain, the leftist anti-austerity Podemos commands double-digit support.	而在西班牙，左倾反紧缩政党社会民主党（Podemos）也获得了两位数的支持率。


These parties’ extremist tendencies and narrow platforms are limiting governments’ policy flexibility by driving relatively moderate parties and politicians to adopt more radical positions.	这些政党的极端化倾向和狭隘的平台促使相对温和的政党和政客不得不采取更加激进的立场，从而限制了政府政策的灵活性。


It was concern about the United Kingdom Independence Party’s capacity to erode the Conservatives’ political base that pushed Prime Minister David Cameron to commit to a referendum on the country’s continued EU membership.	有人担心英国独立党（Independence Party）有能力破坏促使首相卡梅伦决心就是否保留欧元区成员地位问题举行全国公投的保守党的政治根基。


With three storms looming, Europe’s leaders must act fast to ensure that they can dissipate each before it merges with the others, and cope effectively with whatever disruptions they cause.	三大风暴来袭，欧洲领导人必须迅速行动起来，确保在它们形成合力之前各个击破，并���效处理它们所造成的一切后果。


The good news is that regional crisis-management tools have lately been strengthened considerably, especially since the summer of 2012, when the euro came very close to collapsing.	好消息是地区性危机管理工具最近得到了大幅强化，特别是在2012年夏天欧元几近崩溃时。


Indeed, not only are new institutional circuit breakers, such as the European Financial Stability Facility, in place; existing bodies have also been made more flexible and thus more effective.	事实上，现在不但有了欧洲金融稳定机制（European Financial Stability Facility）等新的“断路保护器”机构； 现有机构也变得更加灵活，因此提高了效率。


Moreover, the European Central Bank is engaged in a large-scale asset-purchasing initiative that could be easily and rapidly expanded.	此外，欧洲央行采取了可以轻易快速扩大的大规模资产购买计划。


And countries like Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have, through hard and painful work, reduced their vulnerability to contagion from nearby crises.	而爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙等国家也进行了努力、痛苦的工作，已不再那么容易受到周边危机的传染。


But these buffers would be severely strained if the gathering storms converged into a single devastating gale.	但如果三大风暴汇聚成一个灾难性超级风暴，这些缓冲将受到重创。


Given the EU’s fundamental interconnectedness – in economic, financial, geopolitical, and social terms – the disruptive impact of each shock would amplify the others, overwhelming the region’s circuit breakers, leading to recession, reviving financial instability, and creating pockets of social tension.	欧盟从根本上是一个互联互通的实体——经济、金融、地缘政治、社会等维度都是如此——每起冲击的破坏性影响将彼此放大，击穿地区断路保护器、导致衰退、重现金融动荡、制造各种社会紧张。


This would increase already-high unemployment, expose excessive financial risk-taking, embolden Russia, and strengthen populist movements further, thereby impeding comprehensive policy responses.	这将导致已然高企的失业进一步增加、暴露过度金融冒险、给俄罗斯壮胆，并进一步加强民粹主义运动，从而妨碍全面的政策应对措施。


Fortunately, the possibility of such a perfect storm is more a risk than a baseline at this point.	幸运的是，在现阶段，形成如此完美风暴的可能性还只是个风险，而不是必然。


Nonetheless, given the extent of its destructive potential, it warrants serious attention by policymakers.	尽管如此，考虑到完美风暴的破坏潜力，决策者一定要严重关注。


Securing Europe’s economic future in this context will require, first and foremost, a renewed commitment to regional integration efforts – completing the banking union, advancing fiscal union, and moving forward on political union – that have been crowded out by a never-ending series of meetings and summits on Greece.	要想在这样的背景下保证欧洲的经济未来，首先需要加强地区一体化承诺——完成银行联盟、推进财政联盟、迈向政治联盟。 没完没了的希腊问题会议和峰会严重影响了这一承诺。


Likewise, on the national level, pro-growth economic-reform initiatives – which seem to have lost some urgency in the face of overly complacent and excessively accommodating financial markets – need to be revitalized.	类似地，在国家层面，促增长经济改革措施——似乎因为金融市场的过度自信和过度迁就而丧失了一些紧迫性——需要重新获得动力。


This would ease the policy burden on the ECB, which is currently being forced to pursue multiple ambitious objectives that far exceed its capacity to deliver sustainably good outcomes regarding growth, employment, inflation, and financial stability.	这将减轻欧洲央行的政策负担。 目前，欧洲央行被迫追求多重宏大目标，这远远超过了其保证增长、就业、通胀和金融稳定的持续好结果的能力。


The current focus on the downpour in Greece is understandable.	目前，欧洲的关注重点是希腊的暴风雨，这不难理解。


But policymakers should not be so distracted by it that they fail to prepare for the other two possible storms – and, much more worrisome, the possibility that they merge into a single more devastating one.	但决策者不应该因此而忽略其他东西，乃至无法为其他两起可能的风暴——以及更加令人担心的，为它们汇聚形成灾难性完美风暴的可能性做好准备。


Europe’s leaders must act now to minimize the risks, lest they find their shelters inadequate to the extreme weather that could lie ahead.	欧洲领导人必须立刻行动起来让风险最小化，否则他们将发现他们根本没有足够的庇护所抵御前方的极端天气。


Greece’s Aid Addiction	希腊的援助瘾


NEW YORK – The ongoing Greek debt saga is tragic for many reasons, not least among them the fact that the country’s relationship with its creditors is reminiscent of that between the developing world and the aid industry.	纽约—没完没了的希腊债务神话是一场悲剧，原因有很多，其中之一是以下事实：希腊与其债权人的关系就像是发展中世界和援助界的关系。


Indeed, the succession of bailouts for Greece embodies many of the same pathologies that for decades have pervaded the development agenda – including long-term political consequences that both the financial markets and the Greek people have thus far failed to grasp.	事实上，援助希腊的“连续剧”具备诸多几十年来充斥着发展日程的桥段——包括金融市场和希腊人民至今都没有能够抓住要领的长期政治后果。


As in the case of other aid programs, the equivalent of hundreds of billions of dollars has been transferred from richer economies to a much poorer one, with negative, if unintended, consequences.	与其他援助方案一样，价值数千亿美元的资金从较富裕经济体流向较平穷经济体，却引起了（也许是不经意的）消极后果。


The rescue program designed to keep Greece from crashing out of the eurozone has raised the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio from 130% at the start of the crisis in 2009 to more than 170% today, with the International Monetary Fund predicting that the debt burden could reach 200% of GDP in the next two years.	为了让希腊免于被踢出欧元区而设计的救援方案将希腊债务-GDP之比从2009年危机伊始时的130%增加到今天的170%以上，国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测未来两年可能达到200%。


This out-of-control debt spiral threatens to flatten the country’s growth trajectory and worsen employment prospects.	这一失控的债务螺旋有可能摧毁希腊的增长轨迹，让就业形势进一步恶化。


Like other aid recipients, Greece has become locked in a codependent relationship with its creditors, which are providing assistance in the form of de facto debt relief through subsidized loans and deferred interest payments.	和其他受助国一样，希腊陷入了与其债权人的相互依存（codependent）关系，这一关系以补贴贷款和利息偿付延期为形式的事实债务纾困为形式提供援助。


No reasonable person expects Greece ever to be able to pay off its debts, but the country has become trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of payments and bailouts – making it dependent on its donors for its very survival.	理性人不会认为希腊有能力偿还它的债务，但这个国家已经陷入了深不见底的偿付和援助循环——其生存需要仰仗其出资人。


The country’s creditors, for their part, have an incentive to protect the euro and limit the geopolitical risk of a Greek exit from the eurozone.	至于债权人，它们有激励捍卫欧元、遏制希腊退出欧元区的地缘政治风险。


As a result, even when Greece fails to comply with its creditors’ demands – for, say, tax hikes or pension reforms – it continues to receive assistance with few penalties.	结果，即使当希腊无法满足债券人的条件——比如增税或退休金改革——它仍能获得援助而几乎不受惩罚。


Perversely, the worse the country performs economically, the more aid it receives.	十分荒诞地，希腊经济表现越差，就能获得越多的援助。


The long-term consequences of this cycle of dependence could be serious.	这一依赖循环的长期后果可能十分严重。


As long as Greece’s finances are propped up by international creditors, the country’s policymakers will be able to abdicate their responsibility to manage the provision of public goods like education, health care, national security, and infrastructure.	只要希腊的金融有国际债权人支撑，其决策者就能够逃避管理公共品（如教育、医疗、国家安全和基础设施）供给的责任。


They will also face few incentives to put in place a properly functioning system to collect taxes.	他们也没有什么动力制定能合理运转的制度征税。


Dependence on aid undermines the implicit contract between citizens and their government, according to which politicians must keep taxpayers satisfied in order to stay in office.	依赖援助破坏了公民与政府之间的隐性契约，根据这一契约，政客必须令纳税人满意才能继续执政。


With foreign infusions of cash easing the need for tax revenues, politicians are likely to spend more time courting donors than caring for their constituents.	外国资金的注入缓解了对税收收入的需要，政客们可能把更多的时间花在与出资人周旋而不是关心他们的选民。


The weakened connection between public services and taxes not only makes it easier for officials to cling to power, but also increases the scope for corruption and inefficiency.	公共服务与税收之间的关系被削弱，这不但让官员更轻松地把持权力，也增加了腐败和低效的规模。


Indeed, based on the experience of aid-recipient economies in the emerging world, the Greek people may find it increasingly difficult to hold their government accountable or penalize officials for misbehavior or corruption.	事实上，从新兴世界的援助-受助经济体的经验看，希腊人民也许能发现，他们越来越难以问责政府或惩罚行为不当或腐败的官员。


So far, the Greek crisis has been treated as a recurring emergency, rather than the structural problem that it is.	目前，希腊危机仍被视为是反复出现的急症，而不是其真正的病症——结构问题。


And yet, as long as the country remains locked in a cycle of codependence with its creditors, the state of perpetual crisis is likely to persist.	同样，只要希腊仍陷在与其债权人的相互依存循环中，持久的危机状态就会继续下去。


Effective aid programs have almost always been temporary in nature, working – as was the case with the Marshall Plan – through short, sharp, finite interventions.	有效的援助方案几乎永远是暂时性的，通过短期、激烈、有限的干预起作用——马歇尔计划便是如此。


Open-ended commitments, like aid flows to poor developing countries, have had only limited success, at best.	无限期承诺——比如流向贫穷发展中国家的援助流——最多只能取得有限的成功。


As long as Greeks view assistance as guaranteed, they will have little incentive to put their country on a path toward self-sufficiency.	只要希腊笃定能够获得援助，就不会有激励迈向自力更生之路。


Whatever the way forward for Greece, if there is to be any hope of progress, the assistance provided by the European Union and the IMF must come to be regarded as temporary.	不管希腊走哪条路，要想取得进步，欧盟和IMF所提供的援助就必须被视为暂时性��。


Cutting the umbilical cord in a relationship of aid dependency is never easy, and there is no reason to expect that it will be any different with Greece.	切断援助依赖中的输血带向来不易，没有理由认为希腊会有所不同。


Phasing out transfers, even in a considered and systematic way, works only when the recipient is determined to put in place the measures necessary to survive without assistance.	停止转移支付，哪怕是以深思熟虑的系统性方式实现，要想取得成效也非得受助国决心实施在没有援助的情况下也能立足所必须的改革不可。


There are few signs that Greece is ready to walk on its own, and as long as the aid continues to flow, that is unlikely to change.	几乎没有迹象表明希腊已准备好自力更生，而只要援助继续流入，这一点就不可能改变。


In this sense, markets should view the Greek situation as an equilibrium, not a transition.	从这个角度讲，市场应该将希腊的状况视为均衡，而不是过渡。


Deescalating Europe’s Politics of Resentment	缓和欧洲的怨恨政治


ATHENS – A German television presenter recently broadcast an edited video of me, before I was Greece’s finance minister, giving his country the middle-finger salute.	雅典—一位德国主持人最近播发了一条关于我的编辑视频。 在视频中我（尚未出任希腊财政部长）朝德国竖了中指。


The fallout has shown the potential impact of an alleged gesture, especially in troubled times.	这个视频造成了轩然大波，充分表现了所谓的姿势，特别是在麻烦时期，可能造成怎样的影响。


Indeed, the kerfuffle sparked by the broadcast would not have happened before the 2008 financial crisis, which exposed the flaws in Europe’s monetary union and turned proud countries against one another.	事实上，这个视频所造成的混乱在2008年金融危机爆发前根本不会发生。 金融危机暴露出欧洲货币联盟的缺陷，让自负的国家彼此怒目而向。


When, in early 2010, Greece’s government could no longer service its debts to French, German, and Greek banks, I campaigned against its quest for an enormous new loan from Europe’s taxpayers to pay off those debts.	2010年初，当希腊政府无法维持其对法国、德国和希腊银行的债务时，我反对希腊政府要求欧洲纳税人再借给它一笔巨款用于偿付这些债务。


I gave three reasons.	我给出了三点理由。


First, the new loans did not represent a bailout for Greece so much as a cynical transfer of private losses from the banks’ books onto the shoulders of Greece’s most vulnerable citizens.	首先，这笔新贷款自私地将私人损失从银行账簿转移到希腊最脆弱公民头上，它并不是对希腊的援助。


How many of Europe’s taxpayers, who have footed the bill for these loans, know that more than 90% of the €240 billion ($260 billion) that Greece borrowed went to financial institutions, not to the Greek state or its people?	有多少为这笔贷款掏腰包的欧洲纳税人知道，希腊借来的2,400亿欧元中有90%多流向了金融机构而不是希腊国家和人民？


Second, it was obvious that if Greece already could not repay its existing loans, the austerity conditions on which the “bailouts” were premised would crush Greek nominal incomes, making the national debt even less sustainable.	其次，显然，如果希腊已经无法偿付现有贷款，“援助”所要求的紧缩条件将摧毁希腊的名义收入，让国民债务更加不可持续。


When Greeks could no longer make payments on their mountainous debts, German and other European taxpayers would have to step in again.	当希腊人不再偿付山积的债务时，德国和其他欧洲纳税人就不得不再一次站出来。


(Wealthy Greeks, of course, had already shifted their deposits to financial centers like Frankfurt and London.)	（当然，希腊富人早已将存款转移到了法兰克福和伦敦等金融中心。 ）


Finally, misleading peoples and parliaments by presenting a bank bailout as an act of “solidarity,” while failing to help ordinary Greeks – indeed, setting them up to place an even heavier burden on Germans – was destined to undermine cohesion within the eurozone.	最后，将银行援助描述为“团结”的行动，以此误导人民和议会，同时又不出手帮助普通希腊人——事实上，这给德国人造成了更大的负担——必然会破坏欧元区内部的凝聚力。 德国人开始反对希腊人；


Germans turned against Greeks; Greeks turned against Germans; and, as more countries have faced fiscal hardship, Europe has turned against itself.	希腊人也开始反对德国人； 而当更多国家开始面临财政困难时，欧洲开始反对它自己。


The fact is that Greece had no right to borrow from German – or any other European – taxpayers at a time when its public debt was unsustainable.	事实是希腊没有权利在其公共债务不可维持时向德国——或其他任何欧洲国家——的纳税人贷款。


Before Greece took any loans, it should have initiated debt restructuring and undergone a partial default on debt owed to its private-sector creditors.	希腊获得贷款之前，它应该先实施债务重组并经历拖欠私人债权人的债务的部分违约。


But this “radical” argument was largely ignored at the time.	但这一“激进”观点在当时基本无人关注。


Similarly, European citizens should have demanded that their governments refuse even to consider transferring private losses to them.	类似地，欧洲公民应该要求他们的政府拒绝把私人损失转移到他们头上，哪怕是做这样考虑都不行。


But they failed to do so, and the transfer was effected soon after.	但他们也没有这样做，而转移支付很快就实施了。


The result was the largest taxpayer-backed loan in history, provided on the condition that Greece pursue such strict austerity that its citizens have lost one-quarter of their incomes, making it impossible to repay private or public debts.	结果是史上最巨额的纳税人支持贷款，贷款条件为希腊追求严格的紧缩措施，以至于其公民损失了四分之一的收入，导致无从偿付私人或公共债务。


The ensuing – and ongoing – humanitarian crisis has been tragic.	随之而来——并且仍在发酵——的人道主义危机是悲剧性的。


Five years after the first bailout was issued, Greece remains in crisis.	第一次援助实施五年后，希腊仍在危机中挣扎。


Animosity among Europeans is at an all-time high, with Greeks and Germans, in particular, having descended to the point of moral grandstanding, mutual finger-pointing, and open antagonism.	欧洲人之间的怨恨达到了历史最高水平，希腊人和德国人之间尤甚，他们高举道德大旗互相指责，公开对抗。


This toxic blame game benefits only Europe’s enemies.	这一指责游戏贻害无穷，只能让欧洲的敌人渔利。


It has to stop.	必须停止这一局面。


Only then can Greece – with the support of its European partners, who share an interest in its economic recovery – focus on implementing effective reforms and growth-enhancing policies.	惟其如此，希腊——在对其经济繁荣有共同利益的欧洲伙伴国的支持下——才能专注于实施有效改革和刺激增长的政策。


This is essential to placing Greece, finally, in a position to repay its debts and fulfill its obligations to its citizens.	让希腊最终能够偿付债务、兑现对公民的义务至关重要。


In practical terms, the February 20 Eurogroup agreement, which provided a four-month extension for loan repayments, offers an important opportunity for progress.	从务实角度讲，2月20日的欧元集团协议给了贷款偿付四个月的宽限期，提供了取得进展的重要机会。


As Greece’s leaders urged at an informal meeting in Brussels last week, it should be implemented immediately.	希腊领导人在上周的布鲁塞尔非正式会议上敦促应该立即实施。


In the longer term, European leaders must work together to redesign the monetary union so that it supports shared prosperity, rather than fueling mutual resentment.	在长期，欧洲领导人必须齐心协力修改货币联盟，使其支持共同繁荣而不是主张互相怨恨。


This is a daunting task.	这是一个艰巨的任务。


But, with a strong sense of purpose, a united approach, and perhaps a positive gesture or two, it can be accomplished.	但是，如果有明确的目标、统一的方法，或许再加上一两个积极的姿态，这个任务是可以完成的。


This is an updated and extended version of a post at yanisvaroufakis.eu.	本文根据yanisvaroufakis. eu的文章更新修订而成。


Down and Out in Athens and Brussels	困乏的雅典和布鲁塞尔


NEW YORK – The Greek catastrophe commands the world’s attention for two reasons.	纽约—出于两个原因，希腊灾难必须引起全世界的关注。


First, we are deeply distressed to watch an economy collapse before our eyes, with bread lines and bank queues not seen since the Great Depression.	首先，我们极其痛苦地目睹一个经济体在我们眼前崩溃，食品店和银行门前的长龙是大萧条以来从未见到的。


Second, we are appalled by the failure of countless leaders and institutions – national politicians, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank – to avert a slow-motion train wreck that has played out over many years.	其次，我们惊骇地看到，无数领导人和机构——国家政客（national politician）、欧盟委员会、国际货币基金组织（IMF）以及欧洲央行——都没有能够将花了很多年才缓缓出轨的火车拉回正轨。


If this mismanagement continues, not only Greece but also European unity will be fatally undermined.	如果这一管理不善的状况维持下去，不但是希腊，欧洲的统一大业都会遭到致命破坏。


To save both Greece and Europe, the new bailout package must include two big things not yet agreed.	为了拯救希腊和欧洲，新的援助计划必须包括两项尚未达成一致的内容。


First, Greece’s banks must be reopened without delay.	首先，希腊银行必须立刻重新开张。


The ECB’s decision last week to withhold credit to the country’s banking system, and thereby to shutter the banks, was both inept and catastrophic.	上周，欧洲央行决定暂停向希腊银行系统供应流动性，导致希腊银行关门，这一做法十分不智，并且具有灾难性结果。


That decision, forced by the ECB’s highly politicized Executive Board, will be studied – and scorned – by historians for years to come.	这一决定是高度政治化的欧洲央行执行委员会强迫做出的，此后必将成为历史学家研究和唾骂的对象。


By closing the Greek banks, the ECB effectively shut down the entire economy (no economy above subsistence level, after all, can survive without a payments system).	关闭希腊银行实际上关闭了整个希腊经济（毕竟，任何在生存线之上的经济都无法在没有支付体系的情况下存在）。


The ECB must reverse its decision immediately, because otherwise the banks themselves would very soon become unsalvageable.	欧洲央行必须立即推翻这一决定，否则银行本身很快就会不可救药。


Second, deep debt relief must be part of the deal.	其次，必须将深度债务豁免纳入协议。


The refusal of the rest of Europe, and especially Germany, to acknowledge Greece’s massive debt overhang has been the big lie of this crisis.	欧洲其他纾困（特别是德国）拒绝承认规模巨大的希腊债务积压，这是本次危机中最大的谎言。


Everyone has known the truth – that Greece can never service its current debt obligations in full – but nobody involved in the negotiations would say it.	所有人都知道真相——希腊根本无法十足兑付现有债务——但在谈判中没有任何人说出这一点。


Greek officials have repeatedly tried to discuss the need to restructure the debt by slashing interest rates, extending maturities, and perhaps cutting the face value of the debt as well.	希腊官员反复试图讨论重组债务的需要——可以通过大幅降低利率、延长到期日甚至削减债务面值等方式进行。


Yet every attempt by Greece even to raise the issue was brutally rebuffed by its counterparties.	但希腊的每一次尝试尚未提出就被谈判对手断然拒绝。


Of course, as soon as the negotiations collapsed two weeks ago, the truth about the Greek debt began to be stated.	当然，两周前谈判一崩溃，关于希腊债务的真相就开始被提及。


The IMF was the first to break the silence, acknowledging that it had been urging debt relief but to no avail.	IMF首先打破沉默，承认它一直在敦促债务纾困，但毫无成效。


The United States then let it be known that President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew had been trying to convince German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble to offer debt relief to Greece, also without success.	接着，美国透露其总统巴拉克和财政部长卢（Jack Lew）一直在试图说服德国总理默克尔和财政部长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）为希腊提供债务纾困，但也没有成功。


Then even Schäuble himself, by far the staunchest opponent of debt relief, admitted that Greece needed it; but he also claimed that such relief would violate European Union treaty provisions barring bailouts of governments.	再后来，就连到目前为止债务纾困最顽固的反对者——朔伊布勒本人也承认希腊需要债务纾困；


Following Schauble’s remarkable acknowledgment (made publicly only after utter catastrophe had struck), Merkel herself opined that perhaps certain kinds of relief (such as cuts in interest rates, rather than in the debt’s face value) could do the job in a way that would be consistent with EU rules.	但他指出，债务纾困将违反禁止援助政府的欧盟条约条款���在朔伊布勒令人瞩目地承认真相后（此时灾难已经完全爆发），默克尔本人指出，也许某种形式的纾困（如削减利率，而非削减债务面值）可以不违反欧盟规则。


The fact that the Greek debt overhang was acknowledged only after negotiations had collapsed exposes the deep systemic failures that have brought Greece and Europe to this point.	希腊债务积压在谈判崩溃之后才获得承认，这一事实暴露出一个深刻的系统性缺陷，正是这一缺陷导致希腊和欧洲走到了今天这一步。


We see a European system of crisis management that is fraught with ineptitude, extreme politicization, gamesmanship, and unprofessionalism.	我们看到，欧洲危机管理体系充斥着无能、极端政治化、小算盘和外行。


I certainly do not mean to excuse Greek clientelism, corruption, and mismanagement as ultimate causes of the country’s predicament.	当然，我无意为希腊的官官相护、腐败和管理不善开脱，这些因素才是造成希腊困境的主因。


Yet the failure of the European institutions is more alarming.	但欧洲机构的失败更加值得警惕。


Unless the EU can now save Greece, it will not be able to save itself.	除非欧盟能够拯救希腊，否则它也将无法拯救它自己。


The EU today operates something like the US under the Articles of Confederation, which defined the US’s ineffectual governing structure after independence from Britain in 1781 but prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1787.	现在的欧盟就像是十三州联邦宪法（Articles of Confederation）治下的美国。 十三州联邦宪法定义了1781年脱离英国独立至1787年宪法生效前的失败的美国治理结构。


Like the newly independent US, the EU today lacks an empowered and effective executive branch capable of confronting the current economic crisis.	和当时刚刚独立的美国一样，今天的欧盟缺少得到赋权的、高效的、能够面对当前经济危机的执行机构。


Instead of robust executive leadership tempered by a strong democratic parliament, committees of national politicians run the show in Europe, in practice sidelining (often brazenly) the European Commission.	欧盟没有通过强大的民主议会调和的强力执行领导层，而是由国家政客组成的委员会领导，这导致欧盟委员会被（常常是明目张胆地）边缘化。


It is precisely because national politicians attend to national politics, rather than Europe’s broader interests, that the truth about Greece’s debt went unspoken for so long.	正是因为国家政客主要关注的是国家政治而不是欧洲的整体利益，因此关于希腊债务的真相才迟迟得不到承认。


The Eurogroup, which comprises the 19 eurozone finance ministers, embodies this destructive dynamic, meeting every few weeks (or even more frequently) to manage Europe’s crisis on the basis of national political prejudices rather than a rational approach to problem-solving.	由19个欧元区财政部长组成的欧元集团便是这一破坏性动态的体现，该集团每隔几周（或者更加频繁地）举行一次会议，以国家政治偏见而不是理性的问题解决之道为基础管理欧洲的危机。


Germany tends to call the shots, of course, but the discordant national politics of many member states has contributed to one debacle after the next.	当然，德国总是发号施令者，但诸多成员国之间不一致的国家政治导致接二连三的障碍层出不穷。


It is the Eurogroup, after all, that “solved” Cyprus’s financial crisis by partial confiscation of bank deposits, thereby undermining confidence in Europe’s banks and setting the stage for Greece’s bank panic two years later.	毕竟，是欧元集团通过部分没收银行存款“解决”了塞浦路斯金融危机，这破坏了对欧洲银行的信心，也为两年后的希腊银行恐慌埋下了祸根。


Amid all this dysfunction, one international institution has remained somewhat above the political fray: the IMF.	在这场乱局中，有一家国际机构能够在一定程度上超脱于政治争论之上：IMF。


Its analysis has been by far the most professional and least politicized.	到目前为止，IMF的分析是最专业、最少政治化的。


Yet even the IMF allowed itself to be played by the Europeans, especially by the Germans, to the detriment of resolving the Greek crisis many years ago.	但即使是IMF，其本身也由欧洲人尤其是德国人把持，以至于在你多年前没能解决希腊危机。


Once upon a time, the US might have pushed through policy changes based on the IMF’s technical analysis.	曾几何时，美国也有可能推行基于IMF技术分析的政策变化。


Now, however, the US, the IMF, and the European Commission have all watched from the sidelines as Germany and other national governments have run Greece into the ground.	而如今，美国、IMF和欧盟委员会都站在一边看着德国和其他国家政府把希腊打入地狱。


Europe’s bizarre decision-making structure has allowed domestic German politics to prevail over all other considerations.	欧洲的怪异的决策结构让德国国内政治凌驾于其他所有考量之上。


And that has meant less interest in an honest resolution of the crisis than in avoiding the appearance of being lenient toward Greece.	而这意味着对诚实解决危机的兴趣比不上对避免向希腊表现宽容的兴趣。


Germany’s leaders might rightly fear that their country will be left holding the bill for European bailouts, but the result has been to sacrifice Greece on the altar of an abstract and unworkable idea: “no bailouts.”	德国领导人担心最后德国必须为欧洲援助计划埋单，这也许是正确的，但结果是希腊沦为一个抽象的、不具备可行性的思想——“无援助”的祭品。


Unless some rational compromise is agreed, insistence on that approach will lead only to massive and even more costly defaults.	除非达成一些理性的妥协，否则坚持这一方针将导致规模更大、代价也更沉重的违约。


We are now truly at the endgame.	如今，我们真的面临着终局。


Greece’s banks have closed, its debt has been acknowledged as unsustainable, and yet the future of both the banks and the debt remains uncertain.	希腊银行已经关门，其债务已经承认是不可持续，但银行和债务的未来仍旧不确定。


The decisions taken by Europe in the next several days will determine Greece’s fate; wittingly or not, they will determine the EU’s fate as well.	未来几天欧洲所做的决定将决定希腊的命运； 在有意和无意间，也将决定欧盟的命运。


Europe’s Civil War	欧洲内战


WASHINGTON, DC – The negotiations leading up to the latest tentative deal on Greece’s debt brought into relief two competing visions of the European Union: the flexible, humane, and political union espoused by France, and the legalistic and economy-focused union promoted by Germany.	华盛顿——签署希腊债务问题初步协议的谈判挽救了两种激烈冲突的欧盟愿景：即由法国所主张的人性化的灵活政治联盟以及由德国所推崇的墨守成规的经济联合体。


As François Heisbourg recently wrote, “By openly contemplating the forced secession of Greece [from the eurozone], Germany has demonstrated that economics trumps political and strategic considerations.	正如弗朗索瓦·埃斯堡最近在文章中所写的那样，“德国公开考虑逼迫希腊[从欧元区]退出已经证明经济战胜了政治和战略方面的考虑。


France views the order of factors differently.”	法国则有着不同的排序。


The question now is which vision will prevail?	”现在的问题是哪种愿景将最终胜出？


The Greeks, for their part, have been putting their national identity ahead of their pocketbooks, in ways that economists do not understand and continually fail to predict.	希腊一直以经济学家无法理解和预测的方式将民族认同感放在民生问题之前考虑。


It is economically irrational for Greeks to prefer continued membership in the eurozone, when they could remain in the EU with a restored national currency that they could devalue.	因为留在欧盟及恢复使用可以贬值的国家货币原本可以兼得，希腊人宁愿保留欧盟成员资格的决策从经济上看并不合理。


But, for the Greeks, eurozone membership does not mean only that they can use the common currency.	但对希腊人而言，欧元区成员资格并不仅仅意味着可以使用共同货币。


It places their country on a par with Italy, Spain, France, and Germany, as a “full member” of Europe – a position consistent with Greece’s status as the birthplace of Western civilization.	他们的国家因此可以和意大利、西班牙、法国和德国对等，同样都是欧洲的“正式成员国”——这样的地位才配得上希腊这个西方文明的发源地。


Whereas that stance reflects the vision of an “ever-closer union” that motivated the EU’s founders, Germany’s narrower, economic understanding of European integration cannot inspire ordinary citizens to support the compromises necessary to keep the EU together.	尽管上述立场反映了激励欧盟创始人的“史上最紧密联盟”愿景，德国对欧洲一体化以经济为唯一考量的狭隘理念却无法激励普通民众支持维持欧盟所必要的妥协。


Nor can it withstand the inevitable attacks directed against EU institutions for every action and regulation that citizens dislike and for which national politicians want to avoid responsibility.	上述理念同样无法承受不被民众理解、国内政客也不愿承担责任的规章和行动所招致的对欧盟机构的不可避免的攻击。


The original European Economic Community, created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was, as the name indicates, economic in nature.	顾名思义，1957年罗马条约创立的初始欧洲经济共同体主要是经济性质。


The Treaty itself was hard-headed, grounded in the converging economic interests of France and Germany, with the Benelux countries and Italy rounding out the basis of a new European economy.	条约本身非常理智，以法德两国的共同经济利益为基础，与比荷卢等国及意大利共同奠定了欧洲经济的根基。


But economic integration was underpinned by a vision of peace and prosperity for Europe’s peoples, after centuries of unprecedented violence had culminated in two world wars that reinforced the seemingly eternal enmity between France and Germany.	但在数百年前所未有的暴力最终导致两次世界大战并进一步强化法德两国看似无解的敌意后，经济一体化必须得到欧洲民众和平繁荣愿景的支持。


And, indeed, the language of a larger political union was embedded in Europe’s treaties, to be interpreted by the European Court of Justice and subsequent generations of European decision-makers in ways that supported the construction of a common European polity and identity, as well as a unified economy.	事实上，欧洲条约包含着扩大政治联盟的涵义，由欧洲法院和之后几代欧洲决策者以支持欧洲共同政体、身份及统一经济建设的方式来加以解释。


My mother, a young Belgian in the 1950s, remembers the idealism and the excitement of the European federalist movement, with its promise that her generation could create a different future for Europe and the world.	我的母亲，20世纪50年代一位年轻的比利时人，还记得欧洲联邦运动的振奋人心和理想主义。 联邦运动承诺她这代人可以创造不同的欧洲和世界。


To be sure, the vision of a United States of Europe, espoused by many of those early federalists, looked backward to the founding of the US, rather than forward to a distinctive European venture.	可以肯定，早期联邦主义者信仰的建立欧洲合众国的目标参考了过去美国的建立，而并未前瞻性地规划与众不同的欧洲实体。


Nonetheless, the EU that emerged – which pools sovereignty sufficiently to benefit from being a powerful regional entity in a world of almost 200 countries while maintaining its members’ distinct languages and cultures – is something new.	即便如此欧盟依然浮出水面——该联盟在保持成员国独特语言文化的基础上充分集成了国家主权，在近200个国家组成的世界因为以强大地区实体的面目出现而从中受益——这的确称得上是新的创举。


That experiment cannot survive if supported only by economic rigor and rules.	仅靠经济体制和规则支撑的试验不可能存在下去。


What can continue to justify a political entity after the urgent realities and convictions that drove its establishment have faded to the pages of history and civics books or, at best, are the subject of grandparents’ stories?	当驱使其成立的迫切的现实和信念已经成为尘封的历史，或者充其量成为爷爷奶奶们的故事主题时，究竟哪些因素才能继续支撑一个政治实体？


For the US, those questions arose in the 1840s and 1850s, when the urgent need for a union to secure independence had faded, causing issues and conflicts that had been papered over to resurface.	美国在19世纪40年代和50年代出现了上述问题，当时独立联盟的必要性已逐渐减退，于是重新出现了之前被掩盖的冲突和问题。


In particular, slavery was allowed in some states, but prohibited in others, and the 1787 compromise to count each slave as three-fifths of a person when determining a state’s population for representation and taxation was fraying.	特别是某些州允许奴隶制存在，但其他州则严令禁止，而1787年在确定州代表及税收人口时将每名奴隶算作五分之三人的妥协日益暴露出问题。


Economic differences between the industrial north and the agricultural south meant that discussions over states’ rights were about livelihoods as well as lives.	工业化北部和农业化南部之间的经济差异意味着就各州权利展开的讨论同时关乎生活和生计。


A horrific war resulted, in which the US defeated the secessionist southern Confederacy and imposed its vision of the union.	因此爆发了一场恐怖的战争，美国打败了分离的南部联邦，并强制推行其联盟愿景。


Before the war’s end, President Abraham Lincoln created a new narrative, declaring in the Gettysburg Address that it was fought for democracy as much as equality, with the goal of ensuring that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”	战争结束前，亚伯拉罕·林肯总统创造了一个新的故事，他在葛底斯堡演说中宣布美国为民主平等而战，目的是确保“民有、民治、民享的政府永远在地球上存在下去。


This account simplified – and, in many ways, distorted – the historical record.	”这样的说法简化——并且在诸多方面扭曲了——有记录的历史。


But no matter; the speech became as important a part of American national identity as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.	但这无关紧要； 像独立宣言和宪法一样，这次演讲成为美国民族认同感的重要部分。


The EU is now facing its own civil war, though one that, fortunately, is free of physical violence.	欧盟正在面临自己的内战，虽然幸运的是这场内战并未采取暴力的形式。


Without statesmen and stateswomen able to articulate a vision of a shared future worth working and even sacrificing for, the side of unity may not win.	没有政治家阐明值得为之奋斗牺牲的共同未来愿景，联盟���一方就不可能赢得胜利。


Europe’s national anthem, a circle of stars, and talk of fiscal rectitude and structural reforms cannot compete with the potent messages of the EU’s opponents.	欧洲国歌、旗帜上围成一圈的星星以及财政清廉和结构改革的谈论无法抵御欧盟强有力的反对者。


Those opponents, on both the right and the left, are focusing on the everyday living conditions of European citizens – those who feel threatened by migrants and those who are suffering as a result of austerity.	那些反对者无论隶属左翼还是右翼，都全力关注欧洲民众的日常生活——有人感觉遭受移民威胁，还有人苦于现行的紧缩政策。


For the EU to continue its march toward a stronger and closer polity and economy –one that nevertheless falls far short of a federal state – it must offer the credible prospect of a better life for all of its citizens.	欧盟要想继续朝着强大而紧密的政治经济实体迈进（尽管还算不上真正的联邦国家）——它就必须为所有民众创造美好而可靠的生活。


Just before the final round of the recent Greek negotiations, French President François Hollande said that he did not want a Europe that “no longer progresses.”	就在不久前最后一轮希腊谈判前，法国总统奥朗德表示他不希望看到欧洲“不再进步”。


Fair enough.	说得好。


But progress toward what?	但进步体现在哪些方面？


Toward liberty, equality, and fraternity for all of Europe?	是遍布欧洲的自由、平等、友爱？


Toward the dignity and solidarity of all European citizens?	欧洲全体民众的尊严和团结？


Toward a shared European house that is kept in order?	还是井然有序的统一的欧洲？


These are the questions that a new generation of European politicians must answer.	新一代欧洲政治家必须回答这些问题。


Statesmanship and the Greek Crisis	政治家精神和希腊危机


NEW YORK – Sovereign-debt crises such as the one in Greece can be resolved only through bold steps by both debtor and creditor.	纽约——只有通过债权人和债务人双方的大胆举措才能化解像希腊这样的主权债务危机。


The debtor needs a fresh start through a debt write-off; the creditor must find a way to provide one without rewarding bad behavior.	债务人需要借助债务注销获得新的开始； 而债权人则必须在防止不良行为获益的前提下想法设法提供重新开始的契机。


For a deal to be struck, both sides must have their needs addressed.	双方的需求必须同时得到满足才能达成协议。


Thus, serious reforms and deep debt relief need to go hand in hand.	因此，真正意义上的改革和深度债务减免必须齐头并进。


It is for this reason that Greece and Germany, its largest creditor, need a new modus vivendi in order to resume negotiations.	也正因为如此，希腊及其最大的债主德国需要能够恢复谈判的新的权宜之计。


To begin with, the Greek government must be clear about the need for urgent economic reforms.	首先，希腊政府必须明确紧急经济改革势在必行。


The country’s economy has not just collapsed; it is structurally moribund.	该国经济不光只是崩溃； 它在结构上已经陷入垂死。


The roots of Greece’s problems stretch far deeper than the austerity of recent years.	希腊问题的根源之深远非近年来的紧缩政策所能解释。


In 2013, for example, resident inventors in Germany filed some 917 patent applications for every million inhabitants.	例如2013年，德国境内发明人每百万居住人口提交专利申请约917份。


Resident inventors in Greece, by contrast, filed just 69 patent applications for every million.	相比之下，希腊境内的发明人每百万人口提交的专利发明仅有69份。


If Greece wants the prosperity associated with a technologically advanced, twenty-first-century economy, it will have to earn it, by producing innovative products that are competitive on world markets, just as Germany does.	如果希腊想要拥有以先进技术为基础的二十一世纪经济繁荣，就必须为此付出努力，像德国一样制造世界市场上颇具竞争力的创新产品。


Doing so is likely to be a generational challenge.	这样做很可能需要一代人的努力。


For its part, Germany must acknowledge the enormity of Greece’s collapse.	另一方面，德国必须认识到希腊经济崩溃后果的严重性。


The Greek economy has shrunk by around 25% since 2009; unemployment stands at 27%, with youth unemployment at nearly 50%.	自2009年来希腊经济已经萎缩了约25%； 失业率维持在27%的高位，青年失业率更是逼近50%。


When Germany faced comparable conditions in the early 1930s, its creditors shrugged, and the resulting instability allowed for the rise of Adolf Hitler.	当20世纪30年代初德国面临类似情况时，当时的债主只是摊开双手，由此造成的动荡促成了希特勒的崛起。


After World War II, however, Germany’s debt was slashed, enabling it to rebuild.	但二战结束后德国债务被大幅削减，使其有能力开展重建工作。


Given this experience, it should understand the importance of cutting a country’s debt when the burden of servicing it becomes unsustainable.	由于有这样的亲身经历，德国应该明白在还债负担变得难以为继时减免一国债务有多重要。


The case for offering a country a fresh financial start is both economic and moral.	为一个国家提供新的财政开始有着经济和道义方面的双重理由。


This makes it difficult for many bankers to understand, as their industry knows no morality – only the bottom line.	不少银行家很难明白这一���，因为他们所在的行业只讲底线，不讲道德。


Politicians, too, tend to have their moral compasses calibrated to the relentless hunt for votes.	政治家往往也把自己的道德指南针调整到不择手段地攫取选票。


Finding effective and moral solutions requires genuine statesmanship – something that has been all too rare during the euro crisis.	找到有效而道德的解决方法需要真正的政治家气魄——在欧元危机期间这种气魄已经太过难得。


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and German Chancellor Angela Merkel now have the opportunity to rise to the occasion as European statesmen.	希腊总理亚历克西斯·齐普拉斯和德国总理默克尔现在有机会挺身而出成为欧洲真正的政治家。


Since Tsipras’s election in January, German officials have barely been able to contain their fury that a left-wing upstart government of a tiny, bankrupt country would dare to challenge one of the world’s great economies.	自齐普拉斯一月当选后，德国官员几乎无法遏制自身的愤怒，一个小小破产国家自命不凡的左翼政府竟然敢于挑战全世界最大的经济体之一。


Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, for example, has repeatedly sought to provoke Greece into leaving the eurozone.	比方说财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒就曾多次试图煽动希腊退出欧元区。


Tsipras’s response to these provocations has been clear and consistent: Greece should stay in the eurozone, and it needs a fresh financial start to do so.	齐普拉斯对上述挑衅的态度明确而又连贯：即希腊必须留在欧元区，但同时需要新的财政开始。


On July 5, the Greek people backed their young, charismatic leader with a decisive “No” vote on the unreasonable demands of their country’s creditors.	7月5日，希腊民众投票支持他们年轻、有魅力的领袖，对债权人的无理要求果断说“不”。


Their decision will one day be recognized as a victory for Europe over those who preferred to carve up the eurozone, rather than give Greece the chance to start anew within it.	他们的决定总有一天会被当做欧洲抗击欧元区分裂势力的胜利，而不仅仅是给希腊在欧元区内重新开始的机会。


At the likely meeting between Tsipras and Merkel this week in Brussels, the stakes could not be higher.	齐普拉斯和默克尔本周可能的布鲁塞尔会议所涉赌注之高前所未有。


The economic costs of the impasse have been catastrophic for Greece, and pose a grave threat to Europe.	僵局令希腊付出了灾难性的经济成本，并且严重威胁到整个欧洲。


The breakdown of negotiations last week sparked a bank panic, leaving Greece’s economy paralyzed and its banks on the verge of insolvency.	上周的谈判破裂引发了银行恐慌，使希腊陷入经济瘫痪且银行濒于破产。


If the banks are to be revived at all, they must be saved within days.	如果想让银行恢复功能，就必须要在几天内为其提供援助。


If Tsipras and Merkel meet as mere politicians, the results will be catastrophic.	如果齐普拉斯和默克尔仅仅以政客身份参与谈判，将会带来灾难性的后果。


Greece’s banks will be pushed to the point of failure, making the costs of saving Greece and the eurozone prohibitively high.	希腊的银行将被推向破产，导致挽救希腊和欧元区的成本高得令人无法承受。


If the two leaders meet as statesmen, however, they will save Greece, the eurozone, and the faltering European spirit.	但如果两位领袖以政治家的身份会面，他们将能挽救希腊、欧元区和摇摇欲坠的欧洲精神。


With the promise of deep debt relief for Greece and a rapprochement between Greece and Germany, economic confidence will return.	深度减免希腊债务的承诺和希腊与德国的和解将会恢复经济信心。


Deposits will flow back into Greek banks.	存款将流回希腊银行。


The economy will come back to life.	经济也将起死回生。


Tsipras needs to assure Merkel that Greece will live within its means, not as a chronic ward of Europe.	齐普拉斯要向默克尔保证希腊将在能力范围内消费，不会长期拖累欧洲。


To ensure such an outcome, debt relief and tough reforms should be phased in over time, according to an agreed schedule, with each party following through on its commitments, as long as the other does, as well.	为了确保这样的结果，债务减免和攻坚改革应按事先商定的时间表分阶段进行，只要对方承诺兑现，己方承诺的工作就应该按计划实施。


Fortunately, Greece is a country of exceptional talents, capable of building new competitive sectors from the ground up, if given the chance.	幸运的是，希腊是个才华横溢的国家，如果给它机会，它能白手起家建立新的竞争部门。


Merkel must now take a stance that is the opposite of the one her finance minister has pursued to date.	默克尔现在必须采取的立场是站在她财政部长奉行立场的反面。


Schäuble is undoubtedly one of Europe’s towering political figures, but his strategy for saving the eurozone by pushing Greece out was misguided.	朔伊布勒无疑是欧洲卓越的政治家，但其通过逼希腊退出来拯救欧元区却是一种错误的策略。


Merkel now must step in to save Greece as part of the eurozone – and that means easing the country’s debt burden.	现在默克尔必须介入挽救作为欧元区一部分的希腊——这就意味着减轻该国的债务负担。


To do otherwise at this stage would create an irreparable split between Europe’s rich and poor, and powerful and weak.	在目前阶段反其道而行之将制造欧洲贫与富、强与弱之间无可挽回的分裂。


Some – in particular, the ever-cynical bankers – argue that it is too late for Europe to save itself.	有些人——尤其是那些永远玩世不恭的银行家——提出欧洲自救为时已晚。


It is not.	事实并非如此。


In Europe, many influential leaders and citizens still view the marketplace as constrained by moral considerations, such as the need to alleviate economic suffering.	欧洲许多颇具影响力的领袖和民众依然认为市场需要受到缓解经济痛苦等道德因素的限制。


This is an invaluable asset.	这是一种非常宝贵的资产。


It makes it possible for Merkel to offer Greece a fresh start, because it is the right thing to do and because it accords with Germany’s own experience and history.	它让默克尔能为希腊提供新的开始，因为这样做合乎德国自身的经验和历史，所以这是正确的选择。


That idea of an ethical approach to the Greek crisis might sound absurd to readers of the financial press, and many politicians will undoubtedly consider it naive.	这种对希腊危机采取道德做法的思想或许在财经新闻的读者听来近乎荒谬，而且无疑会被许多政治家视为幼稚。


Yet most European citizens could embrace it as a sensible solution.	但大多数欧洲公民能够接受这是一种明智的解决之道。


Europe rose from the rubble of World War II because of the vision of statesmen; now it has been brought to the verge of collapse by the everyday vanities, corruption, and cynicism of bankers and politicians.	欧洲因为政治家的远见而从二战后的废墟上崛起； 现在它已经被银行家和政客日复一日的虚荣、腐败和愤世嫉俗带到了崩溃的边缘。


It is time for statesmanship to return – for the sake of current and future generations in Europe and the world.	现在是时候恢复政治洞察力——为了欧洲和世界现在和未来的几代人。


Don’t Lend to Your Euro Friends	不要借钱给你的欧元朋友


MUNICH – After months of games and brinkmanship, and only a week after Greek voters rejected the conditions for a €7.5 billion ($8.2 billion) rescue package, the end came swiftly.	慕尼黑—在经历了几个月的博弈和打擦边球后，在希腊选民拒绝75亿欧元救助方案条件后仅仅一周，终局快速地到来了。


The eurozone’s political leaders agreed to start negotiations on a much larger package, worth €86 billion, almost half of Greece’s GDP.	欧元区政治领导人同意开始就规模大大增加（价值860亿欧元，几乎等于希腊GDP的一半）的方案进行谈判。


Unfortunately, the deal reveals Europe’s apparent determination to reenact the same tragedy in the future.	不幸的是，这一协议表明，欧洲显然决心要在未来重演悲剧。


Over the past five years, a whopping €344 billion has flowed from official creditors like the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund into the coffers of the Greek government and the country’s commercial banks.	在过去五年中，令人咋舌的3,440亿欧元从欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）等官方债权人手中流向了希腊政府和商业银行的腰包。


But after six months of near-futile negotiations, exhaustion had set in and holidays were beckoning; so the actual conditions for a new Greek rescue were given short shrift.	但在经历了为期六个月的几乎徒劳的谈判后，大家身心俱疲，而假期开始招手； 因此，新希腊救援方案的实际条件没有收到重视。


Although the European Financial Stability Facility had officially declared Greece bankrupt on July 3, the eurozone’s leaders kicked the insolvency can down the road yet again.	尽管欧洲金融稳定基金（European Financial Stability Facility）在7月3日官方宣布希腊破产，但欧元区领导人再一次将希腊资不抵债的帽子摘掉了。


The latest agreement did halt, or at least interrupt, the eurozone’s biggest crisis to date, culminating in an unprecedented period of antipathy, opprobrium, humiliation, pestering, and blackmail within Europe.	最新协议确实中止或至少干预了欧元区迄今为止最大的危机，这场危机在欧洲内部的厌恶、诘难、羞辱、纠缠和勒索中达到了顶峰。


Indeed, Greece came within a hair’s breadth of leaving the eurozone.	事实上，希腊距离退出欧元区只有一步之遥。


Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis revealed that after taking office, he assembled a group, with the consent of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, that met in secret to prepare the introduction of a parallel currency and the takeover of Greece’s central bank – effectively an exit (or “Grexit”) from the eurozone.	前希腊财政部长雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）披露，上任后，他组建了一个团队，该团队在总理齐普拉斯的首肯下秘密召集，准备引入平行货币并接管希腊央行——这事实上就是从欧元区退出（或称“希腊退出”）。


Germany’s government also was ready to accept what appeared to be the inevitable.	德国政府也准备接受这一不可避免的结果。


Had French President François Hollande not advised Greece behind German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s back about how to negotiate, events could have taken an entirely different course.	要不是法国总统奥朗德在德国总理默克尔的支持下给了希腊一些谈判建议，事情可能会大不相同。


The bitter dispute within the Eurogroup (comprising the eurozone countries’ finance ministers) not only strained relations among the monetary union’s members, but also fueled tensions within national governments.	欧元集团（由欧元区成员国财政部长组成）内的激烈争论不但制约了货币联盟各成员国之间的关系，还加剧了国家政府内部的紧张。


Many European leaders are still smarting and licking their wounds.	许多欧洲领导人仍在剧痛之中舔舐着伤口。


But this should also be a time for them to reflect on what happened and why.	但此时此刻他们也应该反思发生了什么、为什么会发生。


The spat resulted from an attempt to set politics above the laws of economics.	口水战的根源是试图让政治凌驾于经济定律之上。


The dogma of European policymakers’ infallibility and the irrevocability of every step toward integration collided with reality.	欧洲决策者不会犯错的教条和开弓没有回头箭的一体化进程与现实发生了碰撞。


Europe will face many such conflicts in the future if it continues to apply the same approach to its debt problems that it used in the Greek case.	未来欧洲还会面临大量类似的冲突，如果它继续对其债务问题采取在希腊所采取的方针的话。


The fundamental error occurred in April and May 2010, when official lenders – in the form of other eurozone member states – replaced Greece’s private creditors.	根本性错误发生在2010年4月和5月，当时，官方贷款人——其形式为其他欧元区成员国——取代了希腊的私人债权人。


That arrangement was proposed by then-ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet, in clear breach of the Maastricht Treaty’s no-bailout rule, which had been Germany’s fundamental condition for giving up the Deutschmark.	这一安排是时任欧洲央行行长特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）提出的，它显然违反了马斯特里赫特条约的无援助条款，而该条款是德国放弃马克的基本条件。


But French President Nicolas Sarkozy threatened to leave the euro (as Spain’s former prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, later revealed to the newspaper El País) unless Germany signed on to the bailout agreement.	但法国总统萨科齐（Nicolas Sarkozy）威胁说，除非德国在援助协议上签字，否则法国就退出欧元区（这是西班牙前首相萨帕特罗（José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero）后来向��世界报》（El País）透露的）。


Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister at the time, said, “We violated all the rules because we wanted to close ranks and really rescue the eurozone.”	时任法国财政部长拉加德（Christine Lagarde）说：“我们违反了所有规则，因为我们希望团结队伍、真正地拯救欧元区。 ”


The rules were indeed violated, but whether the bailout decision rescued the euro remains to be seen.	规则确实是违反了，但援助决定是否拯救了欧元还有待观察。


It certainly rescued many commercial banks, whose exposure toward the Greek state was substantial by the first quarter of 2010.	它显然拯救了大量商业银行，它们在希腊国家上的风险暴露在2010年一季度非常大。


Greek banks had lent most to the Greek government (€29 billion), followed by French banks (€20 billion), German banks (€17 billion), and US banks (€4 billion).	向希腊政府贷款最多的是希腊银行（290亿欧元），然后是法国银行（200亿欧元）、德国银行（170亿欧元）和美国银行（40亿欧元）。


The bailout also rescued the ECB, insofar as the fiscal credit replaced some of the Bank’s Target credit that had built up from the beginning of 2008.	援助还拯救了欧洲央行，因为财政信用取代了其部分从2008年初开始积累的Target信用。


At that time, the Greek economy confronted a sudden stop of private capital inflows, and the Greek central bank financed the country’s entire current-account deficit with additional refinancing credit from its local electronic printing press.	当时，希腊经济面临私人资本流入突然告竭，希腊央行用来自本国电子印钞机的新增再融资信用为希腊全部经常项目赤字提供了融资。


But rescuing banks is not the same as rescuing the euro.	但拯救银行并不等于拯救欧元。


Moreover, rescuing the euro is not the same as rescuing the European project.	此外，拯救欧元也不等于拯救欧洲工程。


The bailout decision in 2010 transformed a normal commercial dispute between creditors and debtors – one that always arises when debtors fail to repay – into a dispute among sovereign states.	2010年的援助决定改变了债权人和债务人之间的普通商业纠纷——当债务人无法偿付时总会引起这类纠纷——使其演变为主权国家之间的纠纷。


This whipped up animosity among Europe’s peoples and provided ammunition for radical parties of all stripes, severely damaging the European integration process.	这煽动了欧洲各民族之间的敌意，也为各种激进政党的崛起创造了条件，严重危害了欧洲一体化进程。


Without the socialization of debt provided by the rescue packages, Varoufakis, or whoever led Greece’s finance ministry, would have had to declare insolvency and then confront private creditors from a variety of countries.	如果不是拯救计划提供了债务社会化，瓦鲁法基斯（或其他任何希腊财政部领导人）都不得不宣布破产，然后直面来自各个国家的私人债权人。


These countries’ governments would then have felt compelled to rescue tottering banks with their taxpayers’ money.	接着，这些国家的政府将受到压力用纳税人的钱拯救摇摇欲坠的银行。


To be sure, rescuing local banks would have been no walk in the park.	诚然，拯救本国银行绝不是在公园里散步。


But it would have spared Europe the spectacle of its member states’ governments baring their teeth at one another.	但这能让欧洲避免其成员国政府针锋相对的局面。 2008年，德国拯救了海波不动产公司（Hypo Real Estate）；


In 2008, Germany rescued Hypo Real Estate, and in 2011 Belgium, France, and Luxembourg bailed out Dexia Bank.	2011年，比利时、法国和卢森堡援助了德克夏银行（Dexia Bank）。


As these cases suggest, cleaning one’s own porch could have been done without much of a fuss, or at least without stoking international tension.	这些例子表明，将自己的房子打扫干净完全可以在不引起大混乱的情况下完成，至少可以不引起国际紧张。


Banks and their media enablers always predict disaster when write-offs loom.	银行和它们的媒体助推者总是在面临减记局面时大谈灾难。


Trembling politicians then usually acquiesce and put their taxpayers on the hook.	接着，胆战心惊的政客往往会默认这一点，让纳税人上钩。


But the more than 180 sovereign defaults that have occurred since 1945 did not push the defaulters off a cliff.	但自1945年以来的180多次主权违约都没有将违约者推下悬崖。


Instead, as a rule, they gained a fresh start.	相反，通常它们能够重新开始。


In fact, the dangers that are now facing Europe as a result of socializing debts are far greater than those posed by a mere potential financial crisis.	事实上，欧洲目前面临的危险是债务社会化的结果，这一危险远大于仅仅是潜在可能的金融危机所造成的风险。


The lesson to be drawn from the Greek debacle is that the eurozone must develop sovereign insolvency procedures as quickly as possible, thereby preventing other sovereigns from becoming creditors through debt mutualization.	从希腊危机中我们可以汲取一个教训：欧元区必须尽快制定主权破产流程，从而防止其他主权主体通过债务共同化变成债权人。


If the European Union’s national governments want to help one another in a crisis, they should unilaterally provide humanitarian aid, without conditionality and without redemption.	如果欧盟国家政府想在危机中互相帮助，就应该单方面提供人道主义援助，不设条件、不计回报。


If you lend to your friend, he will no longer be your friend.	如果你借钱给你的朋友，你们的友谊也走到了尽头。


Unless that wisdom is heeded, it will be impossible to hold Europe together.	除非认识到这一智慧，否则欧洲就不可能统一起来。


A Greek Suicide?	希腊式自杀？


LONDON – The good news is that a Greek default, which has become more likely after Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ provocative rejection of what he described as the “absurd” bailout offer by Greece’s creditors, no longer poses a serious threat to the rest of Europe.	伦敦—好消息是希腊违约不再对欧洲其他国家构成严重威胁。 在希腊总理齐普拉斯断然拒绝了他所谓“荒谬”的希腊债权人所提供的援助方案后，希腊违约可能性大大增加。


The bad news is that Tsipras does not seem to understand this.	坏消息是齐普拉斯似乎并不明白这一点。


To judge by Tsipras’s belligerence, he firmly believes that Europe needs Greece as desperately as Greece needs Europe.	从齐普拉斯的好斗姿态看，他显然认为欧洲需要希腊的迫切性不亚于希腊需要欧洲。


This is the true “absurdity” in the present negotiations, and Tsipras’ misapprehension of his bargaining power now risks catastrophe for his country, humiliation for his Syriza party, or both.	这才是最近的谈判中真正的“荒谬点”，而齐普拉斯错误估计他的讨价还价能力有可能给希腊带来灾难性后果，给他的左翼联盟（Syriza）党带来耻辱性失败，或者两者兼而有之。


The most likely outcome is that Tsipras will eat his words and submit to the conditions set by the “troika” (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) before the end of June.	最有可能的结果是齐普拉斯食言而肥，在6月底前屈服于“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和IMF）所提出的条件。


If not, the ECB will stop supporting the Greek banking system, and the government will run out of money to service foreign debts and, more dramatically, to pay Greek citizens their pensions and wages.	若非如此，欧洲央行将停止支持希腊银行体系，希腊政府也将没钱维持外债，更糟糕的是，希腊政府也将没钱支付希腊公民的退休金和工资。


Cut off from all external finance, Greece will become an economic pariah – the Argentina of Europe – and public pressure will presumably oust Syriza from power.	断绝了一切外部融资后，希腊将成为经济贱民，成为欧洲的阿根廷，公众压力极有可能让左翼联盟下台。


This outcome is all the more tragic, given that the economic analysis underlying Syriza’s demand for an easing of austerity was broadly right.	考虑到齐普拉斯要求放松紧缩的经济分析大体是正确的，这一结果更加增添了几分悲剧色彩。


Instead of seeking a face-saving compromise on softening the troika program, Tsipras wasted six months on symbolic battles over economically irrelevant issues such as labor laws, privatizations, even the name of the troika.	齐普拉斯没有向三驾马车提出的方案服软以争取颜面，而是在无关紧要的经济问题上——劳动法、私有化乃至三驾马车的名称——做出象征性斗争，白白浪费了六个月。


This provocative behavior lost Greece all potential allies in France and Italy.	这一挑衅性行为让希腊失去了所有法国和意大利盟友。


Worse still, the time wasted on political grandstanding destroyed the primary budget surplus, which was Tsipras’s trump card in the early negotiations.	更糟糕的是，在政治哗众取宠中浪费时间影响了希腊初级预算盈余——齐普拉斯在早期谈判中的王牌。


Now Tsipras thinks he holds another trump card: Europe’s fear of a Greek default.	如今，齐普拉斯以为他有另一张王牌：欧洲害怕希腊违约。


But this is a delusion promoted by his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis.	但这是他的财政部长瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）制造的幻觉。


A professor of game theory, Varoufakis recently boasted to the New York Times that “little Greece, in order to survive, [could] bring down the financial world,” and that his media image “as an irrational fool… is doing my work for me” by frightening other EU finance ministers.	身为博弈论教授的瓦鲁法基斯最近对《纽约时报》大放厥词，说“为了生存，不起眼的希腊[可以]毁掉整个金融世界，”而他的媒体形象——“一个不理性的傻瓜”正在通过让其他欧元区国家财政部长颤抖“为我服务。 ”


Apparently, Varoufakis believes that his “sophisticated grasp of game theory” gives Greece a crucial advantage in “the complicated dynamics” of the negotiations.	显然，瓦鲁法基斯认为他“对博弈论的精通”让希腊在谈判的“复杂动态”中拥有了关键优势。


In fact, the game being played out in Europe is less like chess than like tic-tac-toe, where a draw is the normal outcome, but a wrong move means certain defeat.	事实上，欧洲正在进行的博弈更像是“过三关”而非象棋，常见的结果是平局，但一步错就会导致满盘皆输。


The rules of this game are much simpler than Varoufakis expected because of a momentous event that occurred in the same week as the Greek election.	这盘博弈的规则比瓦鲁法基斯所预想的简单得多，原因就在于希腊举行选举的那个星期所发生的一件大事。


On January 22, the ECB took decisive action to protect the eurozone from a possible Greek default.	1月22日，欧洲央行采取了果断行动保护欧元区不受可能的希腊违约的影响。


By announcing a huge program of bond purchases, much bigger relative to the eurozone bond market than the quantitative easing implemented in the United States, Britain, or Japan, ECB President Mario Draghi erected the impenetrable firewall that had long been needed to protect the monetary Union from a Lehman-style financial meltdown.	欧洲央行行长德拉吉宣布了庞大的债务购买计划——相对欧元区债券市场而言，其规模远大于美国、英国和日本所实施的量化宽松——这等于竖起了不可撼动的防火墙。 这一措施早就应该实施，以便在发生雷曼兄弟式的金融崩溃时保护货币联盟。


The ECB’s newfound ability to print money, essentially without limit, to support both banks and governments has reduced Greek contagion to insignificance.	欧洲央行新获得了实质上无穷大的印钞能力，可以以此支持银行和政府，这让希腊违约的传染力大幅下降。


That represents a profound change in Europe’s financial environment, which Greek politicians, along with many economic analysts, still fail to understand.	这代表着欧洲金融环境的一个深远变化，而希腊政客以及诸多经济分析师都没有意识到这一点。


Before the ECB’s decision, contagion from Greece was a genuine threat.	在欧洲央行做出这一决定前，希腊违约的传染是一个实实在在的威胁。


If the Greek government defaulted or tried to abandon the euro, Greece’s banks would collapse, and Greeks who failed to get their money out of the country would lose their savings, as occurred in Cyprus in 2013.	如果希腊政府违约或准备放弃欧元，希腊银行将崩溃，无法将钱转移到国外的希腊人将是失去储蓄，就像2013年的塞浦路斯那样。


When savers in other indebted euro countries such as Portugal and Spain observed this, they would fear similar losses and move their money to banks in Germany or Austria, as well as sell their holdings of Portuguese or Spanish government bonds.	如果其他欧元区债务国（如葡萄牙和西班牙）储蓄者看到这一幕，他们也会害怕类似的损失，从而将钱转移到德国或奥地利的银行中，同时甩卖他们所持有的葡萄牙或西班牙政府债券。


As a result, the debtor countries’ bond prices would collapse, interest rates would soar, and banks would be threatened with collapse.	结果，债务国债券价格将暴跌，利率将飙升，银行极有可能崩溃。


If the contagion from Greece intensified, the next-weakest country, probably Portugal, would find itself unable to support its banking system or pay its debts.	如果来自希腊的传染恶化，下一个最脆弱国家——可能是葡萄牙——将发现自己无法支持本国银行系统或维持债务。


In extremis, it would abandon the euro, following the Greek example.	最终它将步希腊后尘放弃欧元。


Before January, this sequence of events was quite likely, but the ECB’s bond-buying program put a firebreak at each point of the contagion process.	在1月之前，这一连串事件发生的可能性相当大，但欧洲央行的债券购买计划扼杀了整个传染链。


If holders of Portuguese bonds are alarmed by a future Greek default, the ECB will simply increase its bond buying; with no limit to its buying power, it will easily overwhelm any selling pressure.	如果葡萄牙债券持有人收到警告，希腊有可能违约，那么欧洲央行只需要加码债券购买力度； 欧洲央行拥有无穷购买力，可以轻易地战胜任何抛压。


If savers in Portuguese banks start moving their money to Germany, the ECB will recycle these euros back to Portugal through interbank deposits.	如果葡萄牙银行储蓄者开始将钱转移到德国，欧洲央行可以回收这些欧元，通过银行间存款重新注入葡萄牙。


Again, there is no limit to how much money the ECB can recycle, provided Portuguese banks remain solvent – which they will, so long as the ECB continues to buy Portuguese government bonds.	而欧洲央行所能回收的资金量也是无穷的，只要葡萄牙银行不破产——而葡萄牙银行不会破产，只要欧洲央行一直购买葡萄牙政府债券。


In short, the ECB bond-buying program has transformed the ECB from a passive observer of the euro crisis, paralyzed by the outdated legalistic constraints of the Maastricht Treaty, into a proper lender of last resort.	简言之，欧洲央行的债券购买计划让欧洲央行从欧元危机的消极旁观者——因为过时的马斯特里赫特条约法律约束而无法采取行动——一跃成为合适的最后贷款人。


With powers to monetize government debts similar to those exercised by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England, the ECB can now guarantee the eurozone against financial contagion.	如今，欧洲央行拥有类似于美联储、日本银行和英格兰银行那样的政府债务货币化权力，可以保护欧元区免受金融传染影响。


Unfortunately for Greece, this has been lost on the Tsipras government.	不幸的是，对希腊来说齐普拉斯政府已经丧失了这一机会。


Greek politicians who still see the threat of financial contagion as their trump card should note the coincidence of the Greek election and the ECB’s bond-buying program and draw the obvious conclusion.	还在把金融传染威胁视为王牌的希腊政客应该注意到希腊选举和欧洲央行的债券购买计划之间的巧合，并领会其中显而易见的联系。


The ECB’s new policy was designed to protect the euro from the consequences of a Greek exit or default.	欧洲央行的政策就是为了保护欧元免受希腊退出或违约的后果的影响。


The latest Greek negotiating strategy is to demand a ransom to desist threatening suicide.	希腊的最新谈判战略是要求赎金以停止自杀威胁。


Such blackmail might work for a suicide bomber.	如果希腊是自杀式炸弹袭击者，这样的要挟或许有用。


But Greece is just holding a gun to its own head – and Europe does not need to care very much if it pulls the trigger.	但希腊现在的姿势是拿枪指着自己——而它扳不扳动扳机，欧洲根本不在乎。


What Is Plan B for Greece?	希腊的B计划是什么？


TOKYO – Financial markets have greeted the election of Greece’s new far-left government in predictable fashion.	东京—金融市场以可以预见的方式迎接了希腊新左翼政府的当选。


But, though the Syriza party’s victory sent Greek equities and bonds plummeting, there is little sign of contagion to other distressed countries on the eurozone periphery.	但是，尽管左翼联盟（Syriza）的胜利导致希腊股票和债券跳水，但没有迹象表明暴跌会传染给欧元区其他受困外围国家。


Spanish ten-year bonds, for example, are still trading at interest rates below US Treasuries.	比如，西班牙十年期债券利率仍然低于美国国债。


The question is how long this relative calm will prevail.	问题是这一相对平静会维持多久。


Greece’s fire-breathing new government, it is generally assumed, will have little choice but to stick to its predecessor’s program of structural reform, perhaps in return for a modest relaxation of fiscal austerity.	普遍看法是希腊新政府将别无选择，只能坚持前任的结构改革，也许作为回报可以略微放松一下财政紧缩。


Nonetheless, the political, social, and economic dimensions of Syriza’s victory are too significant to be ignored.	尽管如此，左翼联盟胜利的政治、社会和经济意义重大，不容忽视。


Indeed, it is impossible to rule out completely a hard Greek exit from the euro (“Grexit”), much less capital controls that effectively make a euro inside Greece worth less elsewhere.	事实上，不能完全排除希腊硬退出欧元区（“希腊退出”）的可能性，即少得多的资本管制事实上让希腊国内的欧元比其他地区价值更低。


Some eurozone policymakers seem to be confident that a Greek exit from the euro, hard or soft, will no longer pose a threat to the other periphery countries.	一些欧元区决策者似乎自信满满地认为希腊退出欧元——不管是硬退出还是软退出——都不再是对其他外围国的威胁。 他们也许是对的；


They might be right; then again, back in 2008, US policymakers thought that the collapse of one investment house, Bear Stearns, had prepared markets for the bankruptcy of another, Lehman Brothers.	但是，2008年时，美国决策者认为一家投资银行——贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）的倒闭将让市场为另一家投资银行——雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）的倒闭做好准备。


We know how that turned out.	我们都知道结果如何。


True, there have been some important policy and institutional advances since early 2010, when the Greek crisis first began to unfold.	诚然，自2010年初希腊危机首次爆发以来已经有了不少政策和制度改进。


The new banking union, however imperfect, and the European Central Bank’s vow to save the euro by doing “whatever it takes,” are essential to sustaining the monetary union.	新的银行联盟（不论多么不完美）和欧洲央行“不惜一切代价”拯救欧元的誓言对于维持货币联盟至关重要。


Another crucial innovation has been the development of the European Stability Mechanism, which, like the International Monetary Fund, has the capacity to execute vast financial bailouts, subject to conditionality.	另一个关键创新是欧洲稳定性机制（European Stability Mechanism），与IMF一样，它有能力执行大规模有条件的金融援助。


And yet, even with these new institutional backstops, the global financial risks of Greece’s instability remain profound.	此外，尽管有这些新制度框架兜底，但希腊动荡的全球金融风险依然极高。


It is not hard to imagine Greece’s brash new leaders underestimating Germany’s intransigence on debt relief or renegotiation of structural-reform packages.	不难想象希腊傲慢的新领导人会低估德国在债务纾困问题或重新谈判结构改革方案问题上的顽固。


It is also not hard to imagine Eurocrats miscalculating political dynamics in Greece.	也不难想象欧洲官僚（Eurocrats）可能误判希腊的政治动态。


In any scenario, most of the burden of adjustment will fall on Greece.	不论发生哪种情景，大部分调整负担都将落在希腊头上。


Any profligate country that is suddenly forced to live within its means has a huge adjustment to make, even if all of its past debts are forgiven.	任何突然被迫由奢入简的国家都必须做出巨大调整，即使其过去所有债���都得到豁免。


And Greece’s profligacy was epic.	而希腊之“奢”更是一个极端。


In the run-up to its debt crisis in 2010, the government’s primary budget deficit (the amount by which government expenditure on goods and services exceeds revenues, excluding interest payments on its debt) was equivalent to an astonishing 10% of national income.	在2010年危机爆发前，该国政府初级预算赤字（政府在商品和服务方面的支出超过收入的程度，不包括债务利息支付支出）高达国民收入的10%。


Once the crisis erupted and Greece lost access to new private lending, the “troika” (the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission) provided massively subsidized long-term financing.	危机发生后，希腊无法在获得新的私人贷款，“三驾马车”（IMF、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会）提供了有大量补贴的长期融资。


But even if Greece’s debt had been completely wiped out, going from a primary deficit of 10% of GDP to a balanced budget requires massive belt tightening – and, inevitably, recession.	但即使希腊债务完全得到豁免，从相当于10%的GDP的初级赤字转变为预算平衡仍要求大大地勒紧裤腰带——以及不可避免的衰退。


Germans have a point when they argue that complaints about “austerity” ought to be directed at Greece’s previous governments.	德国人说对“紧缩”的抱怨应该说给希腊前任政府听，这不是没有道理的。


These governments’ excesses lifted Greek consumption far above a sustainable level; a fall to earth was unavoidable.	希腊前任政府的挥霍无度让希腊的消费达到了不可持续的水平，下跌回归正常是不可避免的。


Nonetheless, Europe needs to be much more generous in permanently writing down debt and, even more urgently, in reducing short-term repayment flows.	尽管如此，欧洲需要在持久减记债务方面表现出更大的慷慨，而更紧迫的则是更快地降低短期偿付流。


The first is necessary to reduce long-term uncertainty; the second is essential to facilitate near-term growth.	前者是降低长期不确定性的必要条件，后者是促进短期增长的关键。


Let’s face it: Greece’s bind today is hardly all of its own making.	让我们面对问题：希腊目前的困境并不完全是它自己造成的。


(Greece’s young people – who now often take a couple of extra years to complete college, because their teachers are so often on strike – certainly did not cause it.)	（希腊的年轻人——他们往往需要多读几年书才能完成大学学业，因为教师总是罢工——绝非问题的原因。 ）


First and foremost, the eurozone countries’ decision to admit Greece to the single currency in 2002 was woefully irresponsible, with French advocacy deserving much of the blame.	首先也是最重要的，2002年欧元区各国决定接纳希腊进入单一货币区，这是非常不负责任的，特别是法国应该承担主要责任。


Back then, Greece conspicuously failed to meet a plethora of basic convergence criteria, owing to its massive debt and its relative economic and political backwardness.	当是时，希腊明显无法满足多条趋同条款，因为其债务十分沉重，并且经济和政治也相对落后。


Second, much of the financing for Greece’s debts came from German and French banks that earned huge profits by intermediating loans from their own countries and from Asia.	其次，大部分希腊债务融资来自德国和法国银行，这些银行通过牵线国内和亚洲贷款赚得了巨大的利润。


They poured this money into a fragile state whose fiscal credibility ultimately rested on being bailed out by other euro members.	它们把钱注入脆弱的希腊，而希腊的财政信誉最终建立在其他欧元区成员国会救它的基础上。


Third, Greece’s eurozone partners wield a massive stick that is typically absent in sovereign-debt negotiations.	第三，希腊的欧元区伙伴国在主权债务谈判时动用了罕见的大棒。


If Greece does not accept the conditions imposed on it to maintain its membership in the single currency, it risks being thrown out of the European Union altogether.	如果希腊不接受施加给它的条件以维持单一货币区的成员资格。 就有可能连欧盟资格一起被剥夺。


Even after two bailout packages, it is unrealistic to expect Greek taxpayers to start making large repayments anytime soon – not with unemployment at 25% (and above 50% for young people).	即使在两批援助计划后，期望希腊纳税人在短时间做出大额偿付仍是不现实的——特别是在失业率高达25%（年轻人更是高达50%）时。


Germany and other hawkish northern Europeans are right to insist that Greece adhere to its commitments on structural reform, so that economic convergence with the rest of the eurozone can occur one day.	德国和其他强硬的北欧国家坚持希腊遵守其结构改革，以使其有朝一日能够向欧元区其他国家趋同，这是正确的。


But they ought to be making even deeper concessions on debt repayments, where the overhang still creates considerable policy uncertainty for investors.	但是它们应该在债务偿付的问题上做出更深度的让步，债务积压仍然在给投资者造成巨大的政策不确定性。


If concessions to Greece create a precedent that other countries might exploit, so be it.	如果对希腊让步造成其他国家可能效仿的先例也没有关系。


Sooner rather than later, other periphery countries will also need help.	迟早其他外围国也会需要帮助。


Greece, one hopes, will not be forced to leave the eurozone, though temporary options such as imposing capital controls may ultimately prove necessary to prevent a financial meltdown.	我们希望希腊不会被迫离开欧元区，尽管临时性措施——比如采取资本管制——也许最终对于防止金融崩溃必不可少。


The eurozone must continue to bend, if it is not to break.	如果不想解体，欧元区就必须低头。


Reforming Greek Reform	改革希腊改革


PRINCETON – Greece's new government, led by the anti-austerity Syriza party, presents the eurozone with a challenge that it has not yet had to face: dealing with national officials who are outside the traditional European mainstream.	普林斯顿—反紧缩左翼联盟（Syriza）领导的希腊新政府给欧元区带来了一项不曾面临过的挑战：与游离于传统欧洲主流之外的国家官员打交道。


Syriza is in many ways a radical party, and its views on economic policy are often described as hard left; but the party's take on debt and austerity is supported by many perfectly mainstream economists in Europe and America.	从很多方面看，左翼联盟是一个极端政党，其经济政策观点常常被认为强硬偏左； 但该党对债务和紧缩的看法被欧洲和美国的许多如假包换的主流经济学家所支持。


So what sets Syriza apart?	那么，是什么让左翼联盟变成了非主流？


All negotiations between debtors and creditors involve bluff and bluster to some extent.	债务人和债权人之间的一切谈判都或多或少地包括一些虚张声势。


But Greece's maverick finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, has taken his case boldly to the media and the public in a way that leaves little doubt as to his willingness to play hard ball.	但特立独行的希腊财政部长雅尼斯·瓦罗法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）面对媒体和公众的果断态度表明他准备死磕到底。


One might expect that the negotiations between the Greeks and the "troika" (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) would be mainly about reaching an agreement about the economics of the situation.	你也许会认为，希腊人与“三驾马车”（欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织）之间的谈判主要是为了达成关于经济形势的一致。


But that would be wishful thinking.	但这只是一厢情愿。


The Germans, along with smaller creditor countries, are dead-set against any relaxation of austerity and are adamant that “structural reform" must remain a condition of further financing.	德国人以及其他较小规模的债权国誓死反对任何紧缩的放松，并坚决要求“结构改革”作为进一步融资的条件。


They think that offering easier terms would be economically counterproductive, not least because it would give the Greeks an opportunity to go back to their bad old ways.	它们认为放松条件不利于经济形势，因为这给了希腊走回恶劣老路的机会。


So what is unfolding before our eyes is not a rational discussion of economics but pure haggling.	因此，展现在我们眼前的不是关于经济的理性讨论，而是纯粹的讨价还价。


And just about the only bargaining chip that Varoufakis holds may be the implicit threat that Greece could leave the euro ("Grexit").	而瓦罗法基斯手里唯一的讨价还价底牌也许是希腊可能退出欧元区(“希腊退出”)的间接威胁。


The threat is only implicit; most Greeks do not want Grexit, and Varoufakis and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras have shied away of late from stating such intentions.	这一威胁只是间接的； 大部分下来人不愿意希腊退出，而瓦罗法基斯和总理齐普拉斯最近也终于没有说出这一意图。


But, without the threat, Varoufakis's claims of democratic legitimacy would most likely fall on deaf ears in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Brussels.	但是，如果没有威胁，瓦罗法基斯的民主合法性论点极有可能根本入不了柏林、法兰克福和布鲁塞尔的耳朵。


Syriza would have no choice but to continue the economic program it was elected to revoke.	左翼联盟将别无选择，只能继续实施希腊人民因为不愿再实施才选它们执政的经济政策。


The effectiveness of the Grexit threat depends on two conditions.	希腊退出威胁的效果取决于两个条件。


First, Germany and other eurozone members must regard Grexit as a significant risk to themselves.	首先，德国和其他欧元区成员国必须将希腊退出视为对自身的严重风险。


Second, a return to the drachma must offer the prospect that the Greek economy will eventually do better on its own than in the currency union (and under the existing economic program).	其次，回归德拉克马必须能够让希腊经济最终获得比留在货币联盟内（以及在现有经济政策下）更好的表现。


In the absence of the first condition, the eurozone will respond to Greece by saying, "Be our guest, leave."	如果第一个条件不成立，欧元区将这样对希腊说：“请便。


In the absence of the second condition, Greece's threat will not be credible.	”如果第二个条件不成立，希腊的威胁将不可信。


And here is where economics re-enters the picture.	而经济就在这里重新成为核心问题。


Consider the first condition.	以第一个条件为例。


Some observers seem to have convinced themselves that any Grexit spillovers would be manageable.	一些观察者似乎说服了他们自己相信希腊退出的一切溢出效应都是可以管理的。


Greece is both small and in a uniquely desperate position.	希腊很小，其窘境也只是特例。


So it is possible that other fragile members – Spain, Portugal, and Italy – would be spared from financial contagion and the euro's viability would not be dramatically affected.	因此其他脆弱成员国——西班牙、葡萄牙和意大利——也许并不会收到金融传染，欧元的生存也不会受到巨大影响。


But the consequences are so unpredictable, and the costs of any domino effect potentially so large, that Germany and other creditors have no interest in precipitating a Grexit scenario.	但结果根本无法预测，任何潜在的多米诺效应都是十分巨大的，因此让希腊退出情形发生不符合德国和其他债权国的利益。


On the contrary, presiding over the eurozone's breakup must be one of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's worst nightmares.	相反，导致欧元区解体绝对是德国总理默克尔最糟糕的噩梦。


And if it is not, it should be.	若非如此，也理应如此。


The second condition, concerning the effects on the Greek economy, is tougher to sort out.	第二个条件事关对希腊经济的影响，更加难以厘清。


Here, too, there are plenty of disaster scenarios.	在这个条件上，也有很多灾难性情景。


Grexit would require capital controls and financial isolation, at least for some time.	希腊退出将需要资本管制和金融孤立，至少在一段时间内是如此。


The resulting uncertainty about policies and prices might produce a severe adverse shock on the real economy, sending unemployment to even greater heights.	由此带来的政策和价格不确定性有可能造成对实体经济的严重消极冲击，让失业率进一步攀升。


But there are clear examples of positive economic outcomes resulting from breaking a similar currency bond.	但也存在一些明确的例子，证明打破类似的货币联系也能产生积极的经济结果。


Britain dropped out of the Gold Standard early, in 1931, so that it could ease monetary conditions and reduce interest rates, and it did better than countries that delayed the exit until later.	1931年，英国早早脱离金本位，因此得以放松货币条件、降低利率，其经济表现也要好于推迟退出金本位的国家。