Rising income inequality, by redistributing income from those who spend more to those who save more, has exacerbated the demand shortfall.	收入不平等的加剧——拜收入从支出更多者转移到储蓄更多者所赐——放大了需求短缺。


So has the asymmetric adjustment between over-saving creditor economies that face no market pressure to spend more, and over-spending debtor economies that do face market pressure and have been forced to save more.	过度储蓄又没有面临增加支出的市场压力的债权经济体，以及过度支出并面临市场压力、被迫增加储蓄的债务经济体，它们之间的不对称调整也放大了需求短缺。


Simply put, we live in a world in which there is too much supply and too little demand.	简言之，当今世界供给过多而需求太少。


The result is persistent disinflationary, if not deflationary, pressure, despite aggressive monetary easing.	结果是持续反通胀甚至通缩压力，尽管货币当局正在积极采取宽松政策。


The inability of unconventional monetary policies to prevent outright deflation partly reflects the fact that such policies seek to weaken the currency, thereby improving net exports and increasing inflation.	非常规货币政策无法阻止通缩肆虐，这部分反映了一个事实，即这些政策追求货币贬值从而改善进出口、增加通胀。


This, however, is a zero-sum game that merely exports deflation and recession to other economies.	但这是一场零和博弈，只是将通缩和衰退输出到其他经济体。


Perhaps more important has been a profound mismatch with fiscal policy.	也许更重要的是财政政策的大幅错配。


To be effective, monetary stimulus needs to be accompanied by temporary fiscal stimulus, which is now lacking in all major economies.	要想产生效果，货币刺激必须辅之以暂时性财政刺激，而这一点所有主要经济体都没有做到。


Indeed, the eurozone, the UK, the US, and Japan are all pursuing varying degrees of fiscal austerity and consolidation.	事实上，欧元区、英国、美国和日本都在追求不同程度的财政紧缩和整合。


Even the International Monetary Fund has correctly pointed out that part of the solution for a world with too much supply and too little demand needs to be public investment in infrastructure, which is lacking – or crumbling – in most advanced economies and emerging markets (with the exception of China).	就连IMF也正确地指出，对供给过多、需求过少的世界来说，部分解决办法在于基础设施公共投资，而大部分发达经济体和新兴市场（中国除外）正缺乏基础设施投资或基础设施过于陈旧破损。


With long-term interest rates close to zero in most advanced economies (and in some cases even negative), the case for infrastructure spending is indeed compelling.	大部分发达经济体的长期利率都接近于零（有一些甚至为负），在这样的情况下，基础设施投资是非常划算的。


But a variety of political constraints – particularly the fact that fiscally strapped economies slash capital spending before cutting public-sector wages, subsidies, and other current spending – are holding back the needed infrastructure boom.	但各种政治约束——特别是囿于财政困难的经济体首先削减资本支出，然后才减少公共部门工资、补贴和其他当前支出——让经济所需要的基础设施繁荣无从发生。


All of this adds up to a recipe for continued slow growth, secular stagnation, disinflation, and even deflation.	所有这些造成了持续慢增长、长期停滞、通货不通胀甚至紧缩。


That is why, in the absence of appropriate fiscal policies to address insufficient aggregate demand, unconventional monetary policies will remain a central feature of the macroeconomic landscape.	正因如此，在缺乏合适财政政策解决总需求不足的情况下，非常规货币政策将一直成为宏观经济大局的核心特征。


Resurrecting Glass-Steagall	重建格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案


WASHINGTON, DC – A major shift in American politics has taken place.	发自华盛顿——美国政治已经发生了一项重大转变。


All three of the remaining mainstream Democratic presidential candidates now agree that the existing state of the financial sector is not satisfactory and that more change is needed.	当前三位继续参选的主流民主党总统候选人都认为，金融业的现状不如人意且应当实施更多的变革。


President Barack Obama has long regarded the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation as bringing about sufficient change.	总统奥巴马一直认为2010年多德-弗兰克金融改革立法已经引发了足够的变革。


Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Senator Bernie Sanders, and former Governor Martin O’Malley want to do even more.	前国务卿希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton），参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和前州长马丁·奥马利（Martin O’Malley）的想法却不止于此。


The three leading Democratic candidates disagree, however, on whether there should be legislation to re-erect a wall between the rather dull business of ordinary commercial banking and other kinds of finance (such as issuing and trading securities, commonly known as investment banking).	不过这三位排名前列的民主党候选人在是否应立法来在一般常规商业银行业务与其他各类金融业务（如证券发行和交易，俗称投资银行）之间重新建立一堵隔离墙的问题上也有分歧。


This issue is sometimes referred to as “reinstating Glass-Steagall,” a reference to the Depression-era legislation – the Banking Act of 1933 – that separated commercial and investment banking.	这个问题有时被称为“复原格拉斯-斯蒂格尔（Glass-Steagall）法案”，是引用了大萧条时期的立法——1933年的银行法案——将商业银行和投资银行业务各自区分开来。


This is a slight misnomer: the most credible bipartisan proposal on the table takes a much-modernized approach to distinguishing and making more transparent different kinds of finance activities.	不过这有点用词不当：当前摆在谈判桌上的最靠谱两党提案需要一个更现代化的方式来区分和厘清不同类型的金融活动。


Sanders and O’Malley are in favor of this general idea; Clinton is not (yet).	桑德斯和奥马利都赞成这一总体思路； 而希拉里则（尚）未点头。


There are three main arguments against a modern version of Glass-Steagall. None is convincing.	同时针对一个现代版的格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案也存在三种主要反对意见，但没有一个能令人信服。


First, some prominent former officials argue that not all of the financial firms that got into trouble in 2008 were integrated commercial-investment banking operations.	首先，一些知名离任官员指出，不是所有在2008年陷入困境的金融企业都是商业-投资银行业务相结合的。


For example, Lehman Brothers was a standalone investment bank, and AIG was an insurance company.	比如雷曼兄弟只是家独立投资银行，而AIG则是一保险公司。


This argument is, at best, irrelevant.	往好了说，这种说法是不恰当的。


What happened “last time” is rarely a good guide to fighting wars or anticipating future financial crises.	那些“上次出现的情况”绝少能成为是指导作战或预测未来金融危机的良方。


The world moves on, in terms of technology and risks. We must adjust our thinking accordingly.	这个世界在技术和风险方面不断变化发展，我们也必须相应调整自己的的思维。


At worst, the argument is just plain wrong.	往坏了说，则该说法是完全错误的。


Some of the greatest threats in 2008 were posed by banks – such as Citigroup – built on the premise that integrating commercial and investment banking would bring stability and better service.	2008年所面临一些最大威胁都是由花旗这类银行造成，而他们此举的前提是整合商业和投资银行业务将带来稳定和更好的服务。


Sandy Weill, the primary architect of the modern Citigroup, regrets that construction – and regrets lobbying for the repeal of Glass-Steagall.	桑迪·韦尔（Sandy Weill），现代花旗集团的主设计师，为自己的建构感到后悔——也后悔曾经参与游说废除格拉斯 - 斯蒂格尔法案。


(As James Kwak and I argued in our book 13 Bankers, what really mattered was the decades-long bipartisan process of deregulation, for which the end of Glass-Steagall was a prominent symbol.)	正如郭庾信（James Kwak）和我合著的《13位银行家》一书中所说，真正重要的是两党长达几十年的放松管制进程，并以格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的终结为明确标志。


Second, leading representatives of big banks argue that much has changed since 2008 – and that big banks have become significantly safer.	其次，各大银行的首席代表们认为，自2008年以来情况已经有了很大转变——大银行要��过往安全多了。


Unfortunately, this is a great exaggeration.	不幸的是，这又是一种夸张之辞。


Ensuring a financial system’s stability is a multifaceted endeavor – complex enough to keep many diligent people fully employed.	确保金融体系的稳定需要多方面的努力——复杂到足以使令许多勤勉的人日夜工作。


But it also comes down to this: how much loss-absorbing shareholder equity is on the balance sheets of the largest financial firms?	但这也可以归结为：那些最大金融机构的资产负债表上究竟有多少股东资产净值是可以用来吸收损失的？


In the run-up to the 2008 crisis, the largest US banks had around 4% equity relative to their assets.	在迈向2008年危机的过程中，美国几家大银行的净值/资产比率约为4％。


This was not enough to withstand the storm. (Here I’m using tangible equity relative to tangible assets, as recommended by Tom Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and a beacon of clarity on these issues.)	这是不足以抵御风暴的——在此我使用美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）副主席汤姆·霍恩（Tom Hoenig）推荐的有形净值相对有形资产概念，这也是阐明这类问题的明灯。


Now, under the most generous possible calculation, the surviving megabanks have on average about 5% equity relative to total assets – that is, they are 95% financed with debt.	如今就算以最宽松的方法来计算，幸存下来的大银行也只有相对总资产约5％的净值——也就是说，他们还有95％的债务。


Is this the major and profound change that will prove sufficient as we head through the credit cycle?	这是否就是足以让我们安然度过信贷周期的重大深刻变革呢？


No, it is not.	不，这可不是。


Finally, some observers – although relatively few at this point – argue that the biggest banks have greatly improved their control and compliance systems, and that the mismanagement of risk on a systemically significant scale is no longer possible.	最后，一些观察家——虽然在一点上较少——认为，各大银行已经极大提升其管控及规管体系，不再可能出现系统性的大规模风险管理失误。


This view is simply implausible.	这种观点简直毫无说服力。


Consider all the instances of money laundering and sanctions busting (with evidence against Credit Agricole last week, Deutsche Bank this week, and almost every major international bank in the past few years).	请回想一下所有洗钱和违反制裁禁令（比如上周法国农业信贷银行，本周德意志银行以及在过去几年中几乎每一家主要国际性银行的所作所为）。


This is the equivalent of near misses in aviation.	这种情况几乎等同于航空上的飞机失踪事件。


If the US had the equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board for finance, we would receive detailed public reports on what exactly is – still, after all these years – going wrong.	如果美国在金融上有等同于美国国家运输安全委员会的机构，我们会收到关于究竟是哪里出错了的详细公开报道——但现在还没有。


Sadly, what we actually get is plea bargains in which all relevant details are kept secret.	可悲的是，我们实际得到的是所有相关细节保密的讨价还价。


The regulators and law-enforcement officials are letting us down – and jeopardizing the safety of the financial system – on a regular basis.	长期以来监管机构和执法官员都令人失望——同时还危及到了金融体系的安全性。


The best argument for a modern Glass-Steagall act is the simplest.	一个推行现代版格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的最佳论点是最简单的。


We should want a lot more loss-absorbing shareholder equity.	我们应该希望有更多可以吸收损失的股东净值。


And, to reinforce this, we should want to make the largest banks simpler and more transparent, with “strong structural firewalls” as Dennis Kelleher, of Better Markets, puts it.	同时为了强化这一点，我们应该用丹尼斯·凯莱赫（Dennis Kelleher）在更好的市场网站中提到的“强大结构性防火墙”来让各大银行变得更加简单透明。


Of course, in that context, we should ensure that various activities by “shadow banks” (structures that operate with bank-like features, as Lehman Brothers did) are properly regulated.	当然在这个背景下，我们应该确保那些“影子银行”（那些与银行类似的特征来操作的架构，比如雷曼兄弟）的各项活动能得到妥善规管。


Building support for legislation to simplify the biggest banks would greatly strengthen the hand of those regulators who want to require more shareholder equity and better regulation for the shadows.	如果想极大增强那些致力于提升股东净值和加强监管影子银行的监管者的手段，就必须为简化大型银行的立法所提供支持。


These policies are complements, not substitutes.	这些政策都将是补充物，而非替代品。


Conflict Management and Economic Growth	冲突管理与经济增长


NEW DELHI – One of the most interesting aspects of the prolonged economic crisis in Europe, and of the even longer crisis in Japan, is the absence of serious social conflict – at least thus far.	新德里——至少到目前为止，欧洲日本长期经济危机最有意思的方面是缺少严重的社会冲突。


Yes, there have been strikes, marches, and growing anger at political leaders, but protests have been largely peaceful.	虽然工人罢工、群众游行、民众对政治领袖的愤怒越来越强烈，但抗议活动基本都采用和平的方式。


While that may change, the credit for social peace must go to institutions such as elections (“throwing the rascals out” is a non-violent way to vent popular anger), responsive democratic legislatures, and effective judiciaries.	尽管上述情况可能改变，但社会的和平必须归功于选举（“把无赖丢出去”是发泄民愤的一种非暴力方式）、灵活的民主立法和有效的司法制度。


All of these institutions have successfully mediated political conflict during a time of great adversity in advanced countries.	当发达国家面临逆境时，上述制度成功地调解了政治冲突。


This suggests that a major reason for underdevelopment may be that such institutions, which allow countries to cope with distress, are missing in poor economies.	由此表明发展速度慢的主要原因或许是贫穷国家缺少应对困境的制度。


Economic growth permits conflict between social actors to be papered over.	经济增长掩盖了社会阶层间的矛盾。


A downturn, however, usually exposes or sharpens latent social tension.	但潜在的社会紧张情绪往往在经济低迷时期激化或者暴露。


Why do the benefits of growth seem to be easier to share than are the burdens of adversity?	为什么共患难比共富贵难度更大？


This is not a trivial question.	这绝不是一个简单的问题。


Perhaps the answer lies in human psychology.	也许应该从人类心理中寻找答案。


If consumption is shaped by habit, an income loss is very hard to bear and one might fight to avoid it, while fighting for additional gain when one is doing well is less important.	如果消费是一种习惯，那么收入损失就很难承受，人们因此可能想竭力避免，而境况较好时争取额外收益则显得没那么重要。


Also, because conflict may destroy growth opportunities, it may be seen as costlier when growth is strong.	此外，因为冲突可能破坏发展机会，增长势头强劲时人们会觉得损失难以承受。


For example, squabbling between workers and management may drive away investors – and thus the chance to start new projects.	比方说，工人与管理层争吵可能吓跑投资者，进而丧失启动新项目的机会。


But if there are no new investment opportunities on the horizon, squabbling is less costly, because the existing plant and machinery are already sunk costs.	但如果根本不存在新的投资机会，争吵的成本就会因此降低，因为现有的厂房机器已经属于沉没成本的范畴。


Regardless of why conflicts are greater in times of economic adversity, how a society deals with them depends on the scope and quality of its conflict-management institutions.	不管冲突为什么在经济不景气时尤为突出，社会以何种方式应对取决于冲突管理制度的能力和质量。


The Oxford University economist Paul Collier has shown that years of weak economic growth typically precede civil war in poor countries.	牛津大学经济学家保罗·科利尔已经证明多年增长疲软往往在穷国成为内战的先兆。


Even after establishing peace, the probability that these countries will relapse into conflict is high.	即使在和平确立后，这些国家再次陷入冲突的可能性也非常高。


Not surprisingly, these states typically have weak conflict-management institutions – patchy law enforcement, limited adherence to democratic principles, and few meaningful checks and balances on the government.	不出所料，这些国家往往冲突管理制度薄弱，表现在执法不严、无法坚决执行民主原则，以及缺乏对政府的有效制衡。


Similarly, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University has found that the countries that experienced the sharpest declines in growth after 1975 had divided societies and weak conflict-management institutions.	同样，美国哈佛大学的丹尼•罗德里克研究发现1975年后增长大幅下降的国家其共同问题是社会分裂和冲突管理制度不健全。


Societies with well-functioning institutions allocate the burden of distress in predictable ways.	机制运行顺畅的社会将贫困的负担用可以预期的方式进行分配。


For example, people who suffer the most adversity can fall back on an explicit social safety net – a minimum level of unemployment insurance, for example.	比方说，身处逆境的民众可以依傍明确的社会安全网络——比如最低限度的失业保障。


In the United States in recent years, federal and state legislatures prolonged unemployment benefits as joblessness persisted.	近年来，美国联邦及州立法机构随着失业状况的持续允许在更长一段时期内领取失业救助。


Similarly, debtors and creditors can rely on credible bankruptcy proceedings to determine their relative shares.	同样，债务人和债权人可以依赖可靠的破产程序来确定相对的损失份额。


With an explicit institutional mechanism in place to dictate the division of pain, there is no need to take to the streets.	有了明确的制度性机制决定以何种方式分担痛苦，就没有上街游行的必要。


By contrast, when institutions are too weak to offer predictable and acceptable settlements, or to protect existing shares, everyone has an incentive to jockey for a larger slice of the pie.	相反，如果体制过于薄弱无法提供可以接受的常规解决方法或保护现有利益，人人都按捺不住多分一杯羹的冲动。


Outcomes will be mediated more by actors’ relative bargaining power than by pre-existing implicit or explicit contracts.	此时结果就取决于各方的相对议价能力，而并不取决于预先存在的隐性或显性的合同。


Often, bargaining will break down.	但谈判往往陷入破裂。


Everyone is made worse off by strikes, lockouts, and even violent conflict.	每个人的境况都因为罢工、停工、甚至暴力冲突而变得更加糟糕。


Can countries without a reliable and effective legislature or legal system do better to protect against downturns?	没有可靠有效立法或法律制度的国家能否更好地预防经济衰退？


One answer may be to use arrangements that depend in a limited way on the legal system for enforcement.	一种方法是执行有限依赖法律制度的解决之道。


For example, labor contracts in many developing countries effectively prohibit employers from firing workers.	比方说，许多发展中国家的劳动合同实际禁止雇主解雇工人。


This is regarded as inefficient because firms cannot adjust quickly to changing business conditions.	这被视为低效之举，因为企业在变化的商业环境中无法及时调整。


Often, such prohibitions are attributed to overly strong unions that hold the economy hostage.	人们往往将类似的禁令归咎于裹挟了经济的强势工会。


But, if slow or corrupt courts mean that a worker who is wrongfully dismissed has no legal recourse, perhaps the prohibition on firing – enforced by mass protests against violations, which are easily and publicly observable – is the only way to protect workers from arbitrary decisions by employers.	可如果迟缓腐朽的法院让遭到无理解雇的劳动者失去了法律追索权，或许由针对违规行为的大规模抗议活动实际执行的解雇禁令是保护工人免受雇主专断损害的唯一方式。


Job tenure may also serve as a form of social security, because the government performs miserably on providing a safety net and private insurance markets do not exist.	因为政府安全网络建设滞后且私人保险市场尚未成形，岗位任期也可以���为某种形式的社会保障。


Thus, an inflexible contract can protect workers when the preponderance of bargaining power is with firms.	这样，一份缺乏灵活性的合同可以在企业拥有议价优势的情况下对工人起到保护作用。


Such inflexible arrangements are not without cost.	这种僵化的做法也并非没有任何代价。


In a downturn, too many firms will fail, because they cannot shed labor.	一旦经济低迷，太多企业将会倒闭，因为它们无法甩掉包袱。


Alternatively, knowing that they cannot fire permanent workers, firms may remain tiny in order to remain below the authorities’ radar.	此外，明知道不能解雇固定工，企业就会选择不扩大规模以躲避政府机构的监控。


Or they may hire informal workers who have no rights, or pay inspectors to look the other way (a related point could be made about workplace safety in Bangladesh’s garment factories).	或者他们可能雇佣没有权利的非正式工人，再或者贿赂检查人员睁一只眼闭一只眼（孟加拉服装厂的生产安全就是很好的例子）。


Thus, the attempt to protect workers with rigid labor laws may have the unintended consequence of generating too few protected jobs.	因此，用僵化的劳动法保护工人可能造成受保护岗位奇缺的意外后果。


This may be the situation in India, where most workers have few rights, and the few large firms that are established in the formal sector tend to use a lot of labor-saving capital in order to avoid hiring protected workers.	印度应当就属于这种情况，那里多数工人没有权利，而少数正规部门根深蒂固的大企业则愿意大笔投资减少人员雇佣，以避免雇佣受保护的劳动者。


Change is not easy.	改革绝非易事。


Protected workers have no reason to give up their benefits.	受保护工人没有理由放弃他们的好处。


Moreover, removing rigid protections without offering alternative, contingent safety nets and judicial redress is a recipe for conflict.	此外，在尚未建成替代应急安全网和司法补偿制度的情况下撤掉刚性保护无疑会导致冲突。


At the same time, some protection is better than none, and if most workers are unprotected, change becomes necessary to avoid even worse conflict.	另外，有一些保护总比什么都没有好，大多数工人不受保护就需要改革以避免更激烈的冲突。


Sustainable change in developing countries requires reforming not only specific arrangements, such as rigid labor laws, but also more basic institutions, such as the legislature and the judiciary, to make them more responsive to people’s needs.	发展中国家的可持续改革不仅需要改变僵化劳动法等具体举措，还需要改革立法和司法等基本制度，以使其更适应民众的需求。


If developed countries’ citizens want to feel slightly better about their economies’ slow growth and high unemployment, they should contemplate how much worse matters could be without the institutions that they have.	如果发达国家民众想在经济增速缓慢和高失业面前聊以自慰，那么他们应该想想没有现有制度，情况该多么糟糕。


The view expressed here are the author’s own.	此处所述仅代表作者个人观点。


Trump’s Global Strength	特朗普的强势全球计划


HONG KONG – Much effort has been expended to explain Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the United States’ presidential election.	香港—对于唐纳德·特朗普出人意料地赢得美国总统竞选的现象，人们已经投入了相当多的精力寻找解释。


But perhaps the simplest explanation is the most accurate: Trump’s opponents got played.	但也许最简单的解释最准确：特朗普的对手被耍了。


From former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was by virtually all accounts the favorite to win, to the Republicans who opposed his candidacy, people vastly underestimated the US president-elect.	从几乎所有人都预期会获胜的前国务卿希拉里·克林顿，到反对让特朗普充当候选人的共和党，都低估了这位美国当选总统。


World powers, particularly in Asia, should not make the same mistake.	世界强国，特别是亚洲强国，不可犯同样的错误。


During the campaign, Trump knew exactly who Clinton was: smart and experienced, but lacking his cunning and showmanship.	选战期间，特朗普十分清楚克林顿是谁：有智慧、有经验，但不如他有心计和善于表演。


So he played the fool, campaigning in states that many claimed were a waste of time, while Clinton followed a data-driven strategy.	因此他装扮了蠢人的角色，在许多人认为纯属浪费时间的州拜票，而克林顿采取了数据推动策略。


Her approach won her over 2.7 million more votes than Trump. His approach won him the presidency.	虽然克林顿的方法让她比特朗普多获得了270万张选票，特朗普的方法却让他通过赢得足够多的各州选举人票赢得了总统宝座。


Now preparing to take power, Trump is using many of the same tactics he used during the campaign, prioritizing rallies over press conferences, weighing in on the US comedy show “Saturday Night Live” instead of focusing on, say, the escalating crisis in Syria.	如今，正在准备接任总统的特朗普使用着他在选战期间所使用的战术，重视庆功会而不是新闻发布会，现身《周末夜场》（Saturday Night Live）等戏剧秀而没有特别关注类似叙利亚危机升级等问题。


Meanwhile, he is upending US diplomacy, perhaps most notably by taking calls from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.	与此同时，他也在改变美国外交，也许最引人瞩目的是与菲律宾总统杜特尔特和台湾领导人蔡英文通电话。


Rather than allowing Trump to shock the world yet again, we must learn to read him.	为了不让特朗普再次震惊全世界，我们必须学会读懂特朗普。


The bottom line for anyone dealing with Trump is that he is the ultimate Machiavellian prince, operating almost exclusively on ruthless self-interest.	需要记住与特朗普打交道的一条底线：他是一位终极版的马基雅维利式君主，完全只关注冷血的自利。


According to Machiavelli, “the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he has around him.”	用马基雅维利的话说，“人们评估君主智慧与动向的首要方法是观察他周边的人。


So, to determine Trump’s plans, we should start with his appointments.	”因此，要窥探特朗普的计划，我们应该从他任命的官员开始。


Among Trump’s picks for national security, defense, and foreign policy positions, a pattern quickly emerges: all are Middle East and Russia specialists.	在特朗普所提出的国家安全、防务和外交政策职位人选中，我们很快可以看到一个模式：所有人都是中东和俄罗斯专家。


Trump, it seems, plans to reverse his predecessors’ approach of isolating Russia.	看起来特朗普计划逆其前任孤立俄罗斯的方针而行。


Instead, he will use Russia to help him manage the Middle East.	相反，他将利用俄罗斯帮助他管理中东。


For Trump, who is first and foremost a businessman, letting a competitor take care of his enemies appears good for the bottom line.	对首先是一位商人的特朗普来说，让竞争对手来看管敌人看上去颇有利可图。


(It also perfectly complements his declared intention to charge US allies for protection.)	（这也是对他公开宣称的要向美国的盟国收取保护费的完美补充。


It helps that Trump seems to have some affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom most US intelligence services believe intervened in the election to help Trump.	）特朗普似乎与俄罗斯总统普京私交不错——大部分美国情报机构相信普京干预了美国大选，助特朗普上台——这对他的中东策略很有裨益。


But the reasons for – and implications of – Trump’s pivot toward Russia extend beyond the Middle East.	但特朗普转向俄罗斯的原因——以及影响——绝不仅限于中东。


Both the US and Russia benefit from higher oil prices, whereas countries like China and Japan suffer.	美国和俄罗斯都可以从油价上涨中获益，而中国和日本等国家将受损。


Russia can also put geographic pressure on China – and, indeed, the rest of Asia.	俄罗斯还可以对中国——事实上也包括其他亚洲国家——在地理上构成安全压力。


(Notice how quickly Japan is sidling up to China.)	（注意日本正在迅速倒向除了中国外的各个列强，包括美国与俄罗斯。


And, finally, Russia may be the force that finally spurs Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense.	）最后，俄罗斯可能成为最终促使欧洲为其自身防务承担更大责任的因素。


Trump’s economic policies will also reverberate around the world, including in Asia.	特朗普的经济政策也将在全世界造成影响，包括亚洲。


And, again, his cabinet appointments are revealing.	在这方面，他的内阁人选也很有指导意义。


Trump has selected three former employees of Goldman Sachs – yes, the same Goldman Sachs that Trump railed against during the election campaign – to lead his economic team.	特朗普选择了三位前高盛高管——是的，就是那个特朗普在竞选期间大肆抨击的高盛——来领导他的执行团队。


His promise to “drain the swamp” of cronyism and corruption, was thus tactical, rather than genuine.	因此，特朗普承诺要对裙带主义和腐败“清理门户”只是一个伎俩，不可当真。


It also indicates that deregulation, along with tax cuts, will be among the only campaign promises on which Trump will deliver.	这还表明，去监管与减税一起将成为特朗普会兑现的唯一竞选承诺。


Policies aimed at constraining “too big to fail” banks – most notably, the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation – are unlikely to survive a Trump presidency.	而旨在约束“太大而不能倒”的银行的监管改革——最主要的是2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革立法——将不可能在特朗普的任期内存活。


In fact, Trump and his team don’t see the problem with being too big to fail.	事实上，特朗普及其团队并不认为“太大而不能倒”是什么问题。


On the contrary, they’re applying the same logic to the US budget.	相反，他对美国预算的计划持有相同的逻辑。


Recognizing that the world has no choice but to continue lending to the US, Trump is comfortable building up US deficits and debts, by simultaneously cutting taxes and spending on infrastructure.	特朗普认识到世界别无选择，只能继续借钱给美国，因此他心安理得地增加美国赤字和债务——并同时采取减税和增加基础设施支出的撒钱政策。


Contrary to the claims of some doomsayers, Trump’s economic policies might actually work.	与一些末日论者的观点相反，特朗普的经济政策很有可能真的会见效。


With enough investment in infrastructure – and with the help of negative real interest rates – Trump may well manage to revive productivity and GDP growth enough to reduce America’s debt overhang in real terms.	如果基础设施投资充分，那么在负实际利率的助力下，特朗普很有可能在短期内成功提振生产率和GDP增长，让美国债务积压的实际值有所下降。


The key to success may well be controlling the appreciation of the US dollar, which has reached a 13-year high since the election.	成功的关键将是控制美元升值带来的风险，自选举以来，美元已经触及13年来的高点。


A strong dollar is not good for Asia, either.	强势美元也不利于亚洲。


When the dollar is weak, multinationals borrow in dollars to finance their business in emerging markets, which yield higher returns in local currency.	当美元处于弱势时，跨国公司借入美元为新兴市场业务融资，从而提高以当地货币计价的回报率。


The positive carry – higher returns in local currency and declining costs for US dollars – benefits everyone, especially the emerging markets, which gain from higher exports and growing capital inflows.	正利差交易——更高的当地货币回报率与更低的美元借贷成本——让所有人都获益，特别是新兴市场，它们得益于更多的出口和更多的资本流入。


But when the dollar begins to strengthen, the cycle reverses.	但当美元开始升值时，相反的事情发生了。


Both foreign-currency and credit spreads widen for emerging-market currencies, making trade expensive.	新兴市场的外汇成本和信用成本双升，导致国际贸易与投资成本上升。


(At least 40% of global physical trade is conducted in US dollars, which account for at least 60% of financial flows.)	（全球实物国际贸易至少40%用美元进行，而美元占金融资产交易的比例至少达到60%。 ）


Eventually, emerging markets may start investing in dollars, because the rate of appreciation is higher than the profit on trade, pushing up the dollar’s value still further.	最终，新兴市场将被迫开始投资更多的美元，因为美元资产升值速度比贸易利润还要快，而这进一步推高了美元及美元资产的价值。


Rising geopolitical tensions reinforce the cycle, as the dollar represents stability, especially at a time when the US Federal Reserve is signaling faster normalization of interest rates.	地缘政治关系恶化增强了这一周期性波动，因为美元代表安全与稳定资产，特别是在美联储表态将加快利率正常化的背景下。


As it stands, almost all Asian currencies, including the yen and the renminbi, are under downward pressure; indeed, both the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China have taken steps to try to curb that depreciation, with little impact.	目前，几乎所有亚洲货币，包括日元和人民币，都承受着贬值压力； 事实上，日本银行和中国人民银行都采取了措施试图遏制贬值，但收效甚微。


And emerging economies more broadly are suffering from low commodity prices, which are being suppressed by reduced demand.	从更广泛及长期的趋势看，新兴经济体正在受到大宗商品价格低迷的影响，而大宗商品价格低迷主要是由于全球需求不振。


The dollar’s continued climb will exacerbate these problems.	美元继续升值将恶化这一系列问题。


But, as Trump and his right-wing colleagues understand, when emerging markets get into trouble, only the Fed can provide the liquidity to ease the pressure.	但是，特朗普及其右翼同事们明白，当新兴市场陷入麻烦时，只有美联储能够提供缓解压力的美元流动性。


In other words, here, too, Trump is working from a position of strength.	换句话说，在这方面特朗普也拥有强势谈判地位。


The rest of us need to avoid underestimating him – or we will all risk becoming collateral damage.	亚洲及其他国家必须避免低估特朗普——否则就有可能成为其新政的误伤受害者。


Is Globalization Really Fueling Populism?	全球化是否真的助长了民粹主义？


BRUSSELS – On both sides of the Atlantic, populism of the left and the right is on the rise.	布鲁塞尔——在大西洋的两岸，左翼及右翼民粹主义都在呈现崛起之势。


Its most visible standard-bearer in the United States is Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s presumptive presidential nominee.	共和党假定总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普是民粹主义在美国最鲜明的棋手。


In Europe, there are many strands – from Spain’s leftist Podemos party to France’s right-wing National Front – but all share the same opposition to centrist parties, and to the establishment in general.	欧洲的民粹主义势力则分很多种——从西班牙左翼政党Podemos到法国右翼政党国民阵线——他们的共同点是反对中间党派，并且反对总体制度。


What accounts for voters’ growing revolt against the status quo?	究竟什么应该为选民不断增长的对现状的反抗负责？


The prevailing explanation is that rising populism amounts to a rebellion by “globalization’s losers.”	普遍为人接受的解释是民粹主义崛起是由“全球化失败者”的反抗所导致的。


By pursuing successive rounds of trade liberalization, the logic goes, leaders in the US and Europe “hollowed out” the domestic manufacturing base, reducing the availability of high-paying jobs for low-skill workers, who now have to choose between protracted unemployment and menial service-sector jobs.	这种逻辑认为，欧美领导人连续多轮的贸易自由化谈判“掏空”了国内生产基地，削减了低技能工人可以找到的高薪岗位数量，导致这些人被迫在长期失业和琐碎的服务性岗位之间作出选择。


Fed up, those workers are now supposedly rejecting establishment parties for having spearheaded this “elite project.”	这些人受够了这样的现状，据称现在正因为当权党派领衔开展上述“精英工程”而对其抱有一种抗拒态度。


This explanation might seem compelling at first.	这种解释乍听上去似乎很有说服力。


It is true, after all, that globalization has fundamentally transformed economies, sending low-skill jobs to the developing world – a point that populist figures never tire of highlighting.	毕竟，全球化的的确确从根本上改变了经济现状，实现了低技能工作向发展中国家的转移——民粹主义分子对这一点的强调永远都是不厌其烦的。


Moreover, educational attainment correlates strongly with income and labor-market performance.	不仅如此，受教育程度与劳动力市场表现有着极强的相关性。


Almost everywhere, those with a university degree are much less likely to be unemployed than those without a secondary education.	几乎在所有国家，拥有大学学历的劳动者都比那些没有受过中等教育的人失业的几率低很多。


In Europe, those with a graduate degree are, on average, three times as likely to have a job as those who have not finished secondary school.	在欧洲，拥有研究生学历的劳动者平均而言在岗的几率比那些没有受过中等教育的人高3倍之多。


Among the employed, university-educated workers earn, on the whole, much higher incomes than their less-educated counterparts.	而在就业劳动者中，受过大学教育的劳动者总体而言收入比那些低学历的同行要高很多。


But if these factors account for the rise of populism, they must have somehow intensified in the last few years, with low-skill workers’ circumstances and prospects deteriorating faster vis-à-vis their high-skill counterparts.	但如果是这些因素导致了民粹主义的崛起，那么它们必然在过去几年中表现出某种程度的加剧的倾向，即低技能劳动者的状况和前景相对于高技能同行出现了快速的下降。


And that simply is not the case, especially in Europe.	但这种情况根本没有出现，尤其是在欧洲。


In fact, higher education has provided significant labor-market advantages for a long time.	从现实情况看，受教育程度高一直在劳动力市场上占据显著优势。


Judging from the available data, the “wage premium” for workers in occupations that require high levels of education has been roughly constant in Europe over the last decade.	从现有数据来看，高学历岗位工人的“工资溢价”过去10年来在欧洲其实从未改变过。


While it has increased in some countries (Germany and Italy), it has decreased in others (France, Spain, and the United Kingdom).	虽然在德国和意大利等某些国家工资溢价有所上升，但法国、西班牙和英国等其他国家却出现了下降。


The difference in employment rates of the highly educated and the less educated has also remained relatively constant, with the less educated actually closing the gap slightly in recent years.	高学历及低学历员工之间的就业率差异也保持了相对稳定，而且近年来低学历与高学历劳动者的实际差距还略有缩小。


A comparison between trends in the US and Europe further weakens the “losers of globalization” argument.	比较美欧之间的发展趋势进一步削弱了“全球化失败者”的论调。


The wage premium is substantially larger in the US (300-400%) than in Europe (50-80%).	美国的工资溢价（300-400%）比欧洲（50-80%）要大得多。


Other labor-market statistics, such as unemployment rates, show a similar pattern, indicating that higher education is more valuable in America’s labor market.	失业率等其他劳动力市场统计数据也显示出类似的趋向，表明教育程度高在美国劳动力市场的价值更大。


Yet the US economy is less open to – and less affected by – trade than the European economy is.	但美国经济不像欧洲经济那样开放——受贸易的影响也相对较小。


The final nail in the coffin of the globalization-based explanation for the rise of populism in Europe is the fact that the share of low-skill workers (who have not completed a secondary education) is declining rapidly.	压垮“全球化是导致欧洲民粹主义上升原因”的最后一根稻草是低技术工人（指没有完成中学教育的工人）占比正在快速下降。


At the turn of the century, there were more than 50% more low-skill workers than university graduates.	世纪之交时，低技术工人比大学毕业生多50%。


Today, university graduates nearly outnumber low-skill workers in the work force; following the prevailing logic, the share of voters supporting anti-globalization parties should be shrinking.	而今天，劳动力队伍中的大学毕业生数量已经几乎超过了低技术工人； 因此按照人们普遍接受的逻辑，支持反全球化政党的选民比例应当持续下降。


A clear-cut economic explanation for a complicated political phenomenon is certainly appealing.	针对复杂政治现象给出明确的经济解释无疑是颇具吸引力的。


But such explanations are rarely accurate.	但这样的解释鲜有准确度。


The rise of populism in Europe is no exception.	欧洲民粹主义的崛起也是这样。


Consider the situation in Austria.	以奥地利的情况为例。


The economy is relatively strong, underpinned by one of Europe’s lowest unemployment rates.	那里的经济相对强劲，此外还有欧洲最低失业率的支持。


Yet Norbert Hofer, the leader of the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) managed to defeat his competitors from both of the centrist establishment parties in the first round of the presidential election last month. Hofer’s main area of focus was immigration.	但右翼民粹主义自由党（FPÖ）领袖诺伯特·霍费尔在上月举行的首轮总统选举中击败了两大中间党派的竞争对手，其中移民问题是霍费尔的主要关注领域。


The attraction to Hofer’s anti-immigrant rhetoric is telling, and mirrors a broader pattern across northern Europe.	霍费尔反移民言论的吸引力很能说明问题，并反映出整个北欧地区普遍存在的模式。


Amid relative economic stability, rising real wages, and low unemployment rates, grievances about the economic impacts of economic globalization are simply not that powerful.	在经济相对稳定、实际工资增长及失业率低企的情况下，经济全球化冲击所造成的不满根本没有那么强大。


Instead, right-wing populist parties like the FPÖ, Finland’s True Finns, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland are embracing identity politics, playing on popular fears and frustrations – from “dangerous” immigration to the “loss of sovereignty” to the European Union – to fuel nationalist sentiment.	相反，像民粹主义自由党、芬兰的正统芬兰人党和德国的新选项党这样的右翼民粹主义党派正在利用身份政治，借助从“危险”的移民问题到因欧盟而“丧失主权”的民众的恐惧和挫折感来煽动民族主义情绪。


In the southern European countries, however, the enduring impact of the euro crisis makes populist economic arguments far more powerful.	但在南欧国家，欧元危机的持久影响导致民粹主义经济论调说服力增大。


That is why it is left-wing populist parties that are winning the most support there, with promises of, say, tax credits for low-paid workers.	左翼民粹主义政党因此在那里赢得了最大规模的支持，比方说承诺为低收入工人抵免税收。


The most extreme case is Greece’s leftist Syriza party, which rode to victory in last year’s elections on pledges to end austerity.	最极端的例子是希腊左翼的极左翼联盟党，承诺结束紧缩政策是它在去年选举中获胜的唯一理由。


(Once in power, of course, Syriza had to change its tune and bring its plans in line with reality.)	（当然一旦真正掌权，极左翼联盟党不得不改变论调，修改计划以适应现实的需要。 ）


Calling the rise of populism in Europe a revolt by the losers of globalization is not just simplistic; it is misleading.	将欧洲民粹主义兴起称为全球化失败者的反抗绝不是那么简单的； 这种说法能够误导民众。


If we are to stem the rise of potentially dangerous political forces in Europe, we need to understand what is really driving it – even if the explanation is more complex than we would like.	要想遏制具有潜在危险性的政治力量在欧洲崛起，我们需要了解其背后真正的驱动力量——即使真正的解释比我们所希望的要更加复杂。


How to Move China	如何影响中国


DENVER – “Insanity,” Albert Einstein is reported to have said, is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”	丹佛——阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦说过，“一遍遍重复同样的事，却期待出现不同的结果就叫精神错乱。


For those who have long scoffed at the possibility that China might be willing to deal decisively with its pesky North Korean neighbor, the results of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent visit to Beijing will be all too predictable.	”在一直认为中国不可能果断处置麻烦不断的邻国朝鲜的人看来，美国国国务卿约翰·克里最近北京之行的结果非常容易预见。


But, for those who watch China’s ever-changing internal political landscape carefully, there is much happening that more than justifies Kerry’s trip.	但在用心研究中国国内变幻莫测的政治局势的人看来，克里的访问却很有必要。


Indeed, if US President Barack Obama’s administration is to be criticized for its handling of the latest North Korean “crisis,” the main problem has not been too much reliance on China, but too little.	事实上，如果说奥巴马政府理应为其对最新朝鲜“危机”的处理方式而受到批评，那么主要问题并不是对中国过于依赖，而是过分地忽视中国。


Theories about China’s attitude toward North Korea often begin and end with the view that what the country fears, above all, is an inflow of refugees in the event of a North Korean collapse – a spillover that could rend the delicate ethnic quilt of China’s northeast provinces.	有关中国对朝态度的理论往往推崇这样的观点，即中国最害怕朝鲜一旦崩溃，大量朝鲜难民涌入会打破东北三省微妙的种族平衡。


The problem is that, while some Chinese do worry about refugees, “China” cannot be regarded as a collective noun with a singular view about anything; like any complex modern state, China contains many different views about many different issues.	关键在于虽然有些中国人的确担心难民问题，但就像任何复杂的现代国家一样，“中国”并不是一个有统一见解的集合体，而是在很多问题上观点都不尽相同。


Of course, there are those in Beijing who worry day and night about North Korean refugees; but there are also many in Beijing, Shanghai, and elsewhere who worry about the chronic crisis that North Korea’s periodic outbursts cause in an otherwise stable region of the world.	当然，北京有些人日夜担心朝鲜的难民问题，但北京、上海和其他省份也有不少人担心朝鲜的周期性动荡可能在原本平静的亚洲导致怎样的长期危机。


As President Xi Jinping eloquently put it at the annual Boao business forum on Hainan Island earlier this month: “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.”	习近平主席本月初在一年一度的海南博鳌亚洲商业论坛上意味深长地说：“我们不允许任何人为一己私利而将地区甚至整个世界推入混乱之中。 ”


Xi is no dictator who can impose his will on China.	习并不是能将自身意愿强加给中国的独裁者。


Indeed, for all the characterization of China as a despotic state that one hears from the political right in the United States, its president enjoys fewer powers than his American counterpart.	实际上，虽然美国右翼势力一直将中国描绘成专制国家，但中国主席手握的实权却比不上美国总统。


Gaining consensus in China is a glacial process that will not be accomplished in a single speech.	在中国达成共识需要长期的努力，不可能依靠一次演讲就取得成功。


Xi’s comments obviously extend beyond a concern about refugees.	习的说法显然不只是对难民问题的关注。


North Korea is, strangely, a domestic issue for China.	朝鲜问题已莫名其妙地成为中国的内部事务。


For starters, it is a historic ally for which many Chinese fought and died, their memory enshrined not only on monuments throughout China (though precious few in North Korea), but also in families.	首先，朝鲜是中国人为之战斗和牺牲的历史盟友，烈士们光辉业绩在遍布各地的纪念碑和烈士家属当中传诵（但同样的纪念碑在朝鲜却十分罕见）。


Second, despite a supposed lack of ideology in contemporary China, there is, in fact, a raging debate – often taking place below the radar – about the future of China’s political system and its relationship to the economy.	其次，尽管普遍认为当代中国缺乏信仰，但其实中国人暗中对政治体制及其对经济的影响进行着激烈的辩论。


And, while North Korea’s communist system and that of China have become profoundly dissimilar, some Chinese worry that a collapse of North Korea’s order could shift the battle lines of that debate.	尽管朝鲜的共产主义制度已经与中国有着本质的不同，但仍有些中国人担心朝鲜秩序崩溃可能会改变这场辩论的走向。


Finally, there are those who would view a North Korean collapse as a boon to US strategic interests and a setback for Chinese interests.	最后，仍有人认为朝鲜崩溃能推进美国的战略利益，对中国来讲则是一种挫折。


Such hardline, zero-sum thinking is not the exclusive preserve of American think tanks.	这种强硬的零和思维并不是美国智囊团独有的想法。


Some Chinese ask what the rules of the game would be in the event that the Korean peninsula is united under South Korea.	有些中国人担心韩国统一朝鲜半岛后会奉行何种游戏规则。


Could they expect to see US troops and bases along the Chinese border on the Yalu River, or perhaps a string of listening posts to gather intelligence?	美军是否会在鸭绿江沿岸部设立基地，是否会设立一连串监听站搜集情报？


Though such deployments would be inconceivable to most thinking Americans (indeed, the real task would be to maintain budget support in Congress and elsewhere for any deployments in a united Korea), Chinese security experts worry about it.	尽管这样的部署在多数美国人看来纯属不可思议（其实在国会及其他机构维持对统一朝鲜的预算支持才是真正的挑战），但中国的安全专家们却不能不害怕。


Though the US and China do not lack issues to discuss, the bilateral dialogue in the security field lacks depth and follow-up.	尽管美中两国不乏议题，但安全领域的双边对话却缺乏深度和后续行动。


The Chinese have never been eager to discuss with their US counterparts what the two countries should do in the event of a North Korean implosion.	中国人从不热衷与美国探讨朝鲜内爆情况下的措施和行动。


But, if such talks were held more frequently, and the issue were addressed seriously (and repeatedly), surely progress could be made in overcoming suspicion on this question.	但如果更频繁地举行会谈，问题也（一再）得到认真解决，对于消除在这个问题上的疑虑肯定会有益处。


Indeed, Kerry’s main task is to begin an effort to reduce the strategic distrust between the two countries, which is a significant factor underlying China’s reluctance to do more on North Korea.	事实上，克里的主要任务是缓解中美两国的战略不信任，这也是中国不愿在朝鲜问题上采取行动的重要因素。


This will require that both sides focus on the issue at hand – a challenge especially for the Americans, whose official discussions with the Chinese inevitably become an effort to plow through a laundry list of issues often advanced by single-issue constituencies.	这需要双方集中力量解决手头的问题，这对美国而言似乎尤其困难，因为与中国人的正式谈判肯定会分解为由单一问题选区推进的一系列事务。


Focus and establishment of priorities should be the watchwords for the US side.	保持专注并确定优先顺序应当是美国方面的口号。


Kerry’s first trip to China was a start in this direction, but it must be followed by a regular pattern of telephone calls and additional visits, with a view to ridding the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons.	克里首次访华是向这个方向迈出的首要一步，但必须继之以常规的电话及其他访问模式，以实现消除朝鲜半岛核武器的目标。


Paradoxically, North Korea’s Kim Jung-un, a leader apparently undistinguished by any accomplishment or sign of wisdom, could catalyze a new start in US-Chinese relations.	奇怪的是，朝鲜领导人金正恩无论在成就还是智慧方面均表现平平，却能够促使美中关系进入新的阶段。


Heeding History in East Asia	留心东亚历史细节


SEOUL – Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese diplomats recently took to the podium of the United Nations General Assembly to reassert their countries’ positions on the territorial issues surrounding several small islands in the seas of East Asia.	首尔—中国、韩国和日本外交官最近纷纷走上联合国大会的讲台，申述各自国家在东亚海域诸小道的领土主张。


But the composed manner in which they delivered their remarks belied their countries’ long-simmering tensions over the islands, which have come to a near boil in the last few months.	但他们陈述的方式掩盖了各自国家在这些岛屿问题上由来已久的怨气，在过去几个月中，这种怨气几乎喷发。


At the center of one heated dispute, between China and Japan, are the Senkaku Islands, which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands.	中国和日本的争论中心是钓鱼岛列岛，日本称之为尖阁列岛。


In September, Japan’s government announced its purchase of three of the islands from their private Japanese owner, inciting protests across China.	9月，日本政府宣布从日本私人所有者手中收购钓鱼岛列岛的三个岛屿，这在中国掀起了反日示威潮。


Soon after, hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels approached the islands to assert China’s sovereignty.	不久，数百艘中国渔船驶近钓鱼岛宣示中国主权。


These vessels have lately been joined by an increasing number of Chinese surveillance forces, which periodically enter the waters surrounding the islands, sometimes leading to direct confrontation with Japanese patrol ships.	最近，越来越多的中国海事巡逻船只也加入了这些渔船的行列，定期在钓鱼岛附近水域巡航，有时与日本巡逻舰只发生冲突。


With the situation threatening to escalate further, both sides need to contain the conflict quickly and restore the status quo.	事态有继续升级之势，故中日双方需要快速消弭冲突，重塑现状。


Indeed, the situation is all the more volatile in view of the political transition now underway in China.	事实上，在目前中国正在经历政治过渡的情况下，如此形势显得愈加动荡了。


Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea and Japan are engaged in a territorial standoff over the islets of Dokdo (called Takeshima in Japanese).	与此同时，韩国和日本陷入了独岛（日本称为竹岛）之争。


In early August, Lee Myung-bak became the first South Korean president to visit the islets; Japan’s government responded by proposing to take the sovereignty issue to the International Court of Justice.	8月初，李明博称为第一位访问该列岛的韩国总统，日本政府的反应是将主权问题上诉到了联合国国际法庭。


But the ICJ cannot exercise jurisdiction in the dispute without both countries’ consent, and South Korea has rejected Japan’s proposal, maintaining that Lee was within his authority to visit the islets, given that Dokdo is unquestionably South Korean territory.	但国际法庭无权在没有获得双方国家的同意下做出纠纷仲裁，而韩国拒绝了日本的建议，坚持李明博访问独岛属于权限内行为，因为独岛毫无疑问是韩国领土。


Indeed, South Korea’s government denies that there is any dispute over the islands.	事实上，韩国政府否认两国在独岛问题上有任何争议。


Historical context is crucial to assessing the Dokdo issue.	在评估独岛问题上，历史是关键。


Like the rest of Korea, Dokdo was annexed by Japan in the early twentieth century, and restored to Korean control after World War II, when Korea regained its independence.	与韩国的其他地区一样，独岛在20世纪初被日本吞并，而在二战结束、韩国赢得独立后回归韩国。


Thus, while outsiders might view the desolate islands as insignificant, for Koreans, Japan’s position on Dokdo is tantamount to a challenge to their country’s independence and a denial of its right to exercise sovereignty over its own territory.	因此，尽管外人也许认为这几个荒凉的小岛并不重要，但对韩国人来说，日本在独岛问题上的立场不啻挑战其国家的独立性、否认其在自身领土上行使主权的权利。


As a result, Dokdo has been a thorn in relations between the two countries for decades.	结果，几十年来，独岛一直是两国关系的绊脚石。


In 2005, the creation of a so-called “Takeshima Day” by a local government in Japan triggered a public uproar in South Korea.	2005年，某日本地方政府所谓的“竹岛日”引发了韩国民众大游行。


But Japan has not shied away from the issue, with prominent political figures joining Takeshima Day celebrations each year.	但日本从未回避过独岛问题，政治要人每年都会参加竹岛日庆典。


Furthermore, Japan’s habit of distorting facts in its history books – for example, denying that its former colonial subjects were forced into sexual slavery – has fueled distrust and anger in South Korea and elsewhere in East Asia, including China.	此外，日本有在历史教科书中扭曲事实的习惯——比如否认侵略活动中强迫被侵略者称为慰安妇的行为——这样的做法激怒了韩国和包括中国在内的其他亚洲国家，也让日本失去了这些国家的信任。


Dokdo is situated midway between the Korean peninsula and Japan’s main island, roughly 115 nautical miles from each.	独岛位于朝鲜半岛和日本本土之间，距离双方大约均为115海里。


But the islets are much closer to the nearest Korean island, Ulleungdo, than to Japan’s Okishima.	但就距离最近的岛屿来说，独岛距离韩国（郁陵岛）比日本（冲岛）近得多。


A survey of historical documents shows a distinct shift in Japan’s position on Dokdo.	纵观历史文献就会发现，日本在独岛问题上的立场发生过重大转变。


For example, in the late seventeenth century, when conflict between Korea and Japan erupted over the passage of Japanese fishermen to Ulleungdo, Tottori-han (one of Japan’s feudal clans) told Japan’s central government that Ulleungdo and Dokdo did not fall within Japanese territory.	比如，在17世纪末，朝鲜和日本之间因日本渔民登上郁陵岛而爆发冲突，鸟取藩（日本封建家族之一）向日本中央政府报告说，郁陵岛和独岛并非日本领土。


Likewise, a report in 1870 by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “A Confidential Inquiry into the Particulars of Korea’s Foreign Relations,” shows that the ministry recognized Dokdo as Korean territory.	类似地，1870年日本外务省报告《关于朝鲜对外关系细节的秘密调查》显示，外相将独岛认作朝鲜领土。


Indeed, the report includes the subject title “How Takeshima and Matsushima Came to Belong to Joseon” (later renamed Korea).	事实上，该报告的主题之一是《竹岛和松岛是如何为朝鲜王朝所有的》。


Moreover, the Dajokan, Japan’s highest decision-making body in 1868-1885, denied any claims of sovereignty over Dokdo through its Order of 1877.	此外，在1877年政令中，太政官（1868—1885年间日本最高决策机构）否认任何关于独岛的主权主张。


Yet, in 1905, Japan took measures to incorporate Dokdo in order to use it as a strategic military site for its war with Russia.	但是，在1905年，日本采取措施将独岛纳为日本领土，利用其作为日俄战争的战略军事基地。


The final text of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ended WWII in the Pacific, makes no mention of Dokdo.	1951年旧金山和平条约（该条约标志着第二次世界大战太平洋战事的结束）最终文本没有提到独岛。


But earlier versions identified the islets as Korean territory.	但早先的版本将独岛列岛认作韩国领土。


The reference in the final version, drafted by the United States, was removed in light of US interests in building strategic partnerships with both South Korea and Japan.	起草最终版本的美国之所以删去这一条，是为了同时与韩国和日本建立战略合作伙伴关系，以符合美国利益。


However, the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which stipulated the Allied Powers’ basic position on Japan’s territorial boundaries after WWII, stated that Japan would be expelled from all territories that it had annexed through violence.	但是，确定同盟国战后对日领土疆界的基本立场的1943年开罗宣言中规定，日本必须强迫归还所有通过暴力占领的领土。


In this context, the unconditional return of Dokdo to Korea – and Korea’s continued sovereignty over Dokdo – is indisputable.	根据开罗宣言，无条件将独岛归还韩国——以及韩国继续行驶独岛主权——是毫无争议的。


In an increasingly interconnected world, significant challenges can be addressed only through regional and global partnerships.	在一个日渐互联的世界，重大挑战只有通过地区和全球合作才能解决。


But, in order to build a meaningful framework for cooperation, enduring distrust among East Asian countries must be dispelled.	但是，为了建立有意义的合作框架，东亚国家之间持续的不信任必须消除。


Regional leaders must not get caught up in finger-pointing or avoid taking responsibility for past transgressions.	地区领导人必须停止相互指责，必须承担起过去侵略行为的责任。


An honest evaluation of history is crucial to establishing lasting peace and prosperity in East Asia.	诚实地面对历史是建立东亚地区持续和平和繁荣的关键。


Understanding the Frankenstein Tradition	理解科学怪人的传统


PALO ALTO – “It’s alive, it’s moving, it’s alive...	发自帕洛阿尔托——“活了，它在动，活了. .


IT’S ALIVE!”	. 它真的活过来了！


So said Dr. Victor Frankenstein when his “creation” was complete.	”，在“大作”完成之际，维克托·弗兰肯斯坦医生兴奋地高叫着。


Researchers have long been fascinated with trying to create life, but mainly they have had to settle for crafting variations of living organisms via mutation or other techniques of genetic engineering.amp#160;	正如电影《科学怪人》（Frankenstein）的情节那样，医学研究者都渴望去创造生命，但在大多数情况下，他们所能做的只不过是用突变或其他基因工程手段来将各种活体组织拼凑起来罢了。


In May, researchers at the J. Craig Venter Institute, led by Venter himself, synthesized the genome of a bacterium from scratch using chemical building blocks, and inserted it into the cell of a different variety of bacteria.	今年5月，在J·克雷格·文特尔研究所，由创办人文特尔亲自率领的研究团队利用化学模块合成了一种全新的细菌基因，并将其植入了另一种细菌的细胞内。


The new genetic information “rebooted” its host cell and got it to function, replicate, and take on the characteristics of the “donor.”	新植入的遗传信息“重新激活”了受体细胞，新细胞生理机能如常，可以自我复制，并呈现出“供体”的相关特征。


In other words, a sort of synthetic organism had been created.	换句话说，一种新的人工合成生命正式诞生了。


Reactions in the scientific community ranged from “slight novelty” to “looming apocalypse.”	科学界对此可谓众说纷纭，有人觉得“有点新奇”，有人惊呼“末日先兆”。


The former is more apt: Venter’s creation is evolutionary, not revolutionary.	或许前者更为明智：文特尔的成果只不过将目前的技术有所推进，还算不上是革命性的。


The goal of “synthetic biology,” as the field is known, is to move microbiology and cell biology closer to the approach of engineering, so that standardized parts can be mixed, matched, and assembled – just as off-the-shelf chassis, engines, transmissions, and so on can be combined to build a hot-rod.	其实“合成生物学”这一研究领域的目标，就是利用工程手段将微观生物学，细胞生物学更紧密地结合起来，从而实现将标准化的生物组件互相混合，配对和组装——犹如用现成的底盘，引擎，变速器等部件组装成一辆新车一样。


Achieving this goal could offer scientists unprecedented opportunities for innovation, and better enable them to craft bespoke microorganisms and plants that produce pharmaceuticals, clean up toxic wastes, and obtain (or “fix”) nitrogen from the air (obviating the need for chemical fertilizers).	科学家在实现这一目标的过程中将获得空前巨大的创新机会，使他们能更容易地合成某些特定的微生物和植物，并以此生产某些药用成分，清理有毒废料以及从空气中获取（或“固定”）氮气以缓解对化肥的需求。


During the past half-century, genetic engineers, using increasingly powerful and precise tools and resources, have achieved breakthroughs that are opening up new opportunities in a broad array of fields.	在过去的半个世纪中，在更为有效和精确的研究工具和资源推动下，基因工程领域取得了突破性的进展，并随之在更为广泛的领域里开启了许多新发展机会。


The Venter lab’s achievement builds on similar work that began decades ago.amp#160; In 1967, a research group from Stanford Medical School and Caltech demonstrated the infectiousness of the genome of a bacterial virus called ΦΧ174, whose DNA had been synthesized with an enzyme using the intact viral DNA as a template, or blueprint.	而文特尔实验室的研究成果其实是奠基于早在几十年前就已启动的一项类似研究之上。 早在1967年，来自斯坦福大学医学院和加州理工学院的一个研究团队就公开展示了一种叫名为“ΦΧ174”的细菌病毒基因组的传染性，该DNA是利用一个完整的病毒DNA作为模板（蓝图），在生化酶的作用下合成的。


That feat was hailed as “life in a test tube.”	当年这一创举被誉为“试管中的生命”。


In 2002, a research group at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, created a functional, infectious poliovirus solely from basic, off-the-shelf chemical building blocks.amp#160;Their only blueprint for engineering the genome was the known sequence of RNA (which comprises the viral genome and is chemically very similar to DNA).	2002年，另一个来自纽约州立大学石溪分校的研究团队也利用现有的基础化学模块合成了具有传染性的小儿麻痹病毒。 而他们合成这一病毒的蓝本仅仅是已知的RNA序列（病毒基因的组成部分，在化学上与DNA类似）而已。


Similar to the 1967 experiments, the infectious RNA was synthesized enzymatically.	与1967年的那个研究相类似的是，这个具有传染性的RNA也是在酶的作用下合成的。


It was able to direct the synthesis of viral proteins in the absence of a natural template.	这说明即使在缺少天然模板的情况下，我们也能直接合成病毒的蛋白质。


Once again, scientists had, in effect, created life in a test tube.	科学家也再一次在试管里创造了生命。


Venter’s group did much the same thing in the recently reported research, except that they used chemical synthesis instead of enzymes to make the DNA.	而除了使用化学合成法而非酶类来合成DNA之外，文特尔团队最近的成果与前人研究并无实质区别。


But some of the hype that surrounded the publication of the ensuing article in the journal Nature was disproportionate.amp#160;	因此《自然》期刊对文特尔研究论文的炒作就显得有点过分了。


Along with the Venter paper, Nature published eight commentaries on the significance of the work.	在文特尔发表的研究论文末尾，《自然》发表了八篇称赞该研究重要性的评论。


The “real” scientists were aware of the incremental nature of the work, and questioned whether the Venter group had created a genuine “synthetic cell,” while the social scientists tended to exaggerate the implications of the work.	其实行内人早就知道这一研究仅是对前人成果的一种改进，并质疑文特尔团队是否真的创造了一个“合成细胞”。 不过，社会科学家则倾向于夸大这一成果的弦外之音。


Mark Bedau, a professor of philosophy at Reed College, wrote that the technology’s “new powers create new responsibilities.	里德学院的哲学教授马克·贝多这样写到，该项技术的“新潜能创造了新的责任。


Nobody can be sure about the consequences of making new forms of life, and we must expect the unexpected and the unintended.	没有人能够预知制造新形式的生命所带来的后果，我们必须准备好应对意外与不测。


This calls for fundamental innovations in precautionary thinking and risk analysis.”	这意味着我们需要对自身的预防性思维和风险分析能力加以革新。 ”


But, with increasing sophistication, genetic engineers using old and new techniques have been creating organisms with novel or enhanced properties for decades.	但其实几十年来，技术日趋炉火纯青的基因工程师一直在使用新旧技术来制造具有增强或者新机能的生命体。


Regulations and standards of good practice already effectively address organisms that may be pathogenic or that threaten the natural environment. (If anything, these standards are excessively burdensome.)	而那些诱人向善的规则和标准也早就拥有足够能力去应付那些致病或威胁自然环境的人造生命（若说有什么不足之处的话，那就是这些条文实在是太繁琐了）。


On the other hand, Swiss bioengineer Martin Fussenegger correctly observed that the Venter achievement “is a technical advance, not a conceptual one.”	而另一方面，瑞士遗传学家马丁·弗森尼格明智地点明文特尔的成果“只是一个工具性的创新，不是概念性的革命”。


Other scientists noted that the organism is really only “semi-synthetic,” because the synthetic DNA (which comprises only about 1% of the dry weight of the cell) was introduced into a normal, or non-synthetic, bacterium.	还有一些科学家则指出文特尔合成的生命严格来说只能算是个“半合成品”，因为合成后的DNA（仅占了整个细胞干重的1%）被植入了一个正常的（或者说非合成的）细菌中。


Understanding the history of synthetic biology is important, because recognizing the correct paradigm has critical implications for how governments regulate it, which in turn affects the potential application and diffusion of the technology.	我们有必要了解一下生物合成的历史，因为确定正确的研究范式对政府如何对这一领域进行管制是非常关键的，反过来，政府的管制又会影响该技术的潜在应用和扩散。


Thirty-five years ago, the US National Institutes of Health adopted overly risk-averse guidelines for research using recombinant DNA, or “genetic engineering,” techniques. Those guidelines, based on what has proved to be an idiosyncratic and largely invalid set of assumptions, sent a powerful message that scientists and the federal government were taking seriously speculative, exaggerated risk scenarios – a message that has afflicted the technology’s development worldwide ever since.	35年前，美国国立卫生研究院制订了关于DNA重组或“基因工程”技术的研究指导原则，而这份过分谨小慎微，并建立在特殊和无效臆测之上的指导方针也钻凿无误地显示出，科学家和联邦政府都过度臆测和夸大了这方面的风险——这也使得生物技术在世界各地的发展自此步履蹒跚。


Synthetic biology offers the prospect of powerful new tools for research and development in innumerable fields.	在无数的领域中，生物合成技术为无数领域的研究发展提供了强大的新工具。


But its potential can be fulfilled only if regulatory oversight is based on science, sound risk analysis, and an appreciation of the mistakes of history.	但彻底释放这一技术的潜能则要求政府的监管要建立在科学严格的风险分析，以及对过去谬误的正确评估之上。


The Debt-Growth Controversy	债务-增长之争


STANFORD – The recent controversy over errors in a 2010 paper by the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff is a sad commentary on the demands of the 24/7 news cycle and the politically toxic atmosphere surrounding fiscal policy in the United States, Europe, and Japan.	斯坦福—最近，经济学家莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）2010年论文中的错误引起了一番争论，这对于24/7新闻周期需求和围绕美国、欧洲和日本的财政政策的不利政治环境来说是个悲剧。


In their paper, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” Reinhart and Rogoff estimated large declines in growth associated with public-debt/GDP ratios above 90%.	在他们的论文《债务时期的增长》（Growth in a Time of Debt）中，莱因哈特和罗格夫估算，当公共债务/GDP比率高于90%时将伴随增长的大幅下降。


But it contained coding errors discovered by a University of Massachusetts graduate student.	但这一结论存在代码错误，这一错误被麻州大学一位研究生发现了。


When corrected, the effect is substantially smaller, but nonetheless economically consequential.	纠正之后，这一效应小了很多，但仍具有经济学意义。


The Reinhart/Rogoff paper is just a small part of a voluminous academic literature that shows high debt levels to be economically risky.	莱因哈特/罗格夫论文只不过是揭示高债务水平带来高经济风险的大量学术文章的一小部分。


A more fundamental question is causality: the state of the economy certainly affects the fiscal position, just as taxation, spending, deficits, and debts may affect economic growth.	一个更为根本的问题是因果关系：经济的状态显然影响着财政状况，正如税收、支出、赤字和债务可以影响经济增长。


Research errors in economics are not uncommon, but they are usually caught at an early stage, as happened once to me in a prepublication draft.	经济学中的研究错误并非稀罕事，但它们通常在早期阶段就被发现了，我的付梓前草稿也出现过这种情况。


Sometimes errors are not discovered until later, when they are working papers, as with Reinhart and Rogoff, or after publication, as with Nobel laureate Ken Arrow, who had to correct a mistake in the proof of his famous impossibility theorem.	有时错误直到成为工作论文之后才被发觉，莱因哈特和罗格夫的论文就属于这种情形； 也有可能在发表后才被发觉，诺贝尔奖获得者阿罗（Ken Arrow）就遇到过这种情形，他在证明他著名的不可能定理时犯了一个错误，不得不做出纠正。


Economists use different methods to analyze fiscal issues: stylized analytical models; macroeconometric models fitted to aggregate data, such as those used by the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO); empirical estimation of key parameters, such as spending multipliers; vector autoregressions; and historical studies.	经济学家使用不同的方法分析财政问题：固定风格的分析模型、适用加总数据的宏观计量模型（比如美联储、欧洲央行和美国国会预算办公室（CBO）所用的）、关键参数的实证估计（比如支出乘数）、矩阵自回归、历史研究，等等。


Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, and serious economists and policymakers do not rely on a single study; rather, they base their judgments on complementary bodies of evidence.	每种方法都有优势和劣势，严肃的经济学家和决策者不会依赖单一的研究； 他们的会以全面证据为判断依据。


Thus, there is no excuse for the outrage, the exaggerated claims for one paper’s influence, and the attempt to use the error to discredit legitimate concerns over high levels of debt (let alone to vilify the authors).	因此，没有理由大做文章，过度渲染一篇论文的影响力，并试图利用其错误质疑对高水平债务的合理担忧（更不用说中伤作者了）。


While large deficits are usually undesirable, sometimes they can be benign or even desirable, such as in recession, wartime, or when used to finance productive public investment.	大量赤字通常是不受欢迎的，但有时赤字可以是良性甚至受欢迎的，比如在衰退、战争期间或是被用于为生产性公共投资融资时。


In normal times, deficits crowd out private investment (and perhaps crowd in private saving and/or foreign capital), and hence reduce future growth.	在正常时期，赤字会挤出私人投资（也可能挤入私人储蓄和/或外国资本），从而抑制未来增长。


By contrast, in a deep, long-lasting recession, with the central bank’s policy rate at the zero lower bound (ZLB), a well-timed, sensible fiscal response can, in principle, be helpful.	相反，在深度、长期的衰退中，在央行政策利率处于零下限（zero lower bound，ZLB）时，理论上时机恰当的合适财政反应将是有所裨益的。


But the political process may generate poorly timed or ineffective responses – focused on transfers rather than purchases, infra-marginal tax rebates, and spending that fails cost-benefit tests – that do little good in the short run and cause substantial harm later.	但政治过程可能导致不恰当的时机或不合适的反应——专注于转移支付而不是购买、超边际退税（infra-marginal tax rebate）和无法通过成本-收益测试的支出——在短期毫无成效，并在随后造成严重伤害。


America’s 2008 stimulus barely budged consumption upward, and the 2009 fiscal stimulus cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per job – many times higher than median pay.	美国在2008年实施的刺激并没有让消费提高多少，而2009年的财政刺激花好几十万美元才能制造一个就业岗位——比中位工资高出几倍。


We should adopt policies that benefit the economy in the short run at reasonable long-run cost, and reject those that do not.	我们应该实施对经济短期有益切长期成本合理的政策，否则就应该拒绝实施。


That sounds simple, but it is a much higher hurdle than politicians in Europe and the US have set for themselves in recent years.	这听起来很简单，但这比欧洲和美国政客近年来为自己设定的障碍高多了。


I estimated the impact on GDP of America’s recent and projected debt increase (in which the explosive growth of public spending on pensions and health care looms largest), using four alternative estimates of the effect of debt on growth: a smaller Reinhart/Rogoff estimate from a more recent paper; a widely used International Monetary Fund study, which finds a larger impact (and which deals with the potential reverse-causality problem); a related CBO study; and a simple production function with government debt crowding out tangible capital.	我估计了美国当前和计划中的债务增加（其中在退休金和医疗卫生方面的支出的爆炸性增加占了大头）对GDP的影响。 我采用了四种不同的方法估计债务对增长的效应：一项取自更新论文的更小的莱因哈特/罗格夫估计；


The results were quite similar: unless entitlement costs are brought under control, the resulting rise in debt will cut US living standards by roughly 20% in a generation.	以及一个关于政府债务挤出有形资本的生产函数。 结果相当接近：除非福利成本得到控制，否则由此导致的债务上升将在一代人的时间里让美国生活水平下降20%左右。


Corroborating statistical evidence shows that high deficits and debt increase long-run interest rates.	确认性统计证据表明，高赤字和债务会增加长期利率。


The effect is greater when modest deficit and debt levels are exceeded and current-account deficits are large.	该效应在赤字和债务水平超过温和程度以及经常项目赤字较大时较大。


The increased interest rates are likely to retard private investment, which lowers future growth in employment and wages.	上升的利率可能阻碍私人投资，而这回降低就业和工资的未来增长。


Numerous studies show that government spending “multipliers,” even when large at the ZLB, shrink rapidly, then turn negative – and may even be negative during economic expansions and when households expect higher taxes beyond the ZLB period.	大量研究表明，政府支出“乘数”虽然在ZLB时较大，但下降很快并会由正转负——甚至在经济扩张期和家庭预期ZLB时期后税收提高时保持负值。 与增加支出或暂时性、超边际退税相比，持久性减税和边际税率降低更有可能提高增长；


Permanent tax cuts and those on marginal rates have proved more likely to increase growth than spending increases or temporary, infra-marginal tax rebates; successful fiscal consolidations have emphasized spending cuts over tax hikes by a ratio of five or six to one; and spending cuts have been less likely than tax increases to cause recessions in OECD countries.	成功的财政整合更强调支出削减，其重要性五倍或六倍于增税； 在经合组织国家，支出削减导致衰退的可能性比增税更小。


Some argue that fiscal consolidation by gradual permanent reductions in spending would be expansionary for high-debt countries, as occurred in some historical episodes.	有人指出，通过渐进式持久减支进行的财政整合对高债务国家来说是扩张性的，有历史先例为证。


Others maintain that a temporary increase in spending now would boost growth.	也有人坚持认为目前暂时性增支能提振增长。


Both could be expansionary – or not, depending on details and circumstances.	两者都有可能是扩张性的——也有可能都不是，取决于细节和环境。


Because many countries have been consolidating simultaneously, interest rates are already low; and, for the US, which accounts for more than 20% of the global economy and issues the global reserve currency, caution in generalizing from other fiscal episodes is highly advisable.	由于许多国家在同时实施整合，利率已经处于低位； 而对美国来说——它占据着全球经济总量的20%多，并发行着全球储备货币——谨慎地从其他财政历史经验中归纳教训才是明智的。


Nonetheless, the evidence clearly suggests that high debt/GDP ratios eventually impede long-term growth; fiscal consolidation should be phased in gradually as economies recover; and the consolidation needs to be primarily on the spending side of the budget.	尽管如此，证据清晰地表明，高债务/GDP比率最终会阻碍长期增长； 财政整合应该随着经济复苏逐渐实施；


Finally, the notion that we can wait 10-15 years to start dealing with deficits and debt, as economist Paul Krugman has suggested, is beyond irresponsible.	且整合应该主要落在预算的支出面上。 最后，经济学家克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）所提出的的我们可以等10—15年再开始处理赤字和债务问题的观点是极不负责任的。


Understanding America’s Electoral College	了解美国选举人团制度


WASHINGTON, DC – Anyone watching the United States’ presidential race needs to understand that national opinion polls do not provide an accurate picture of how the election might turn out.	华盛顿——关注美国总统大选的人都必须了解全国民意调查无法准确描述选举可能的结果。


Thanks to America’s Electoral College, it’s not who wins the most votes nationwide that matters in the end, but who wins in which states.	由于美国实行总统选举团制度，因此重要的不是谁能在全国赢得最多选票，而是谁能赢得哪个州。


Each state is awarded a certain number of votes in the Electoral College, depending on the size of its population.	总统选举人团赋予各州特定的选举人票，具体数量取决于该州的人口规模。


The candidate who crosses the threshold of 270 electoral votes wins the presidency.	越过270张选举人票门槛的候选人最终将赢得总统宝座。


In almost every state, a candidate who wins 50.1% of the popular vote is awarded 100% of its electoral votes.	几乎在所有州，赢得50. 1%民众投票的总统候选人将会赢得该州100%的选举人票。


(Only Maine and Nebraska don’t follow the winner-take-all rule; they divide the Electoral College vote by congressional district.)	（不遵循赢家通吃规则的只有缅因州和内部拉斯加州； 上述两州会按照国会选区来划分选举人票。


As a result, the votes of millions of people who cast their ballot end up not counting.	）结果导致数百万投票选民的票数最终对选举结果并不产生影响。


If you’re a Republican in New York or California, which are dominated by the Democrats, or a Democrat in Wyoming or Mississippi, which are reliably Republican, you can forget about your vote for president mattering.	如果你是生活在民主党占主导地位的纽约或加利福尼亚州的共和党支持者，或者是传统上一直是共和党大本营的怀俄明州或密西西州的民主比党支持者，让自己的投票发挥作用想都不用想。


One peculiar result of this peculiar system is that a candidate can win a majority of the national popular vote but lose in the Electoral College, by losing narrowly in populous states and winning in some smaller states.	上述奇特制度可以产生某候选人赢得国内多数民众投票但却因为在人口众多的州惜败而在某些人口较少的州获胜而丧失选举人票的奇特结果。


It doesn’t happen often, but whenever it does, the US goes through a paroxysm of hand-wringing over this seemingly undemocratic mechanism.	这种情况并不经常发生，但每次只要发生，美国就会因为这种表面上反民主的机制表现得束手无策。


In the most recent case, Al Gore won a majority of the popular vote in 2000, but George W. Bush won the presidency.	最近的一个实例是戈尔在2000年赢得了多数民众选票，但乔治·W·布什却最终当选总统。


Due to the Electoral College, voters cast their ballots not for a candidate but for a slate of electors – party activists, including friends and allies of the contender – who will support their choice.	由于存在选举人团制度，选民投票选举的对象是支持他们选项的党派积极分子（包括竞争者的朋友和盟友）选举人团，而不是直接为候选人投票。


The role of the electors is a brief formality; they meet in their state capitol and cast the vote.	选举人仅仅发挥一种形式上的作用； 他们汇聚在本周首府并投下选票。


But we already know how it’s going to turn out, because the presidential election results are reported at the time in terms of who won each state.	但我们已经知道总统选举过程是怎么回事，因为每次大选都是以谁赢得哪个州的方式来报告总统选举结果。


At this point, the national vote count is meaningless.	至此阶段，全国计票是没有任何意义的。


Congress convenes and “counts” the electoral votes; but this, too, is a mere formality.	国会召集会议并“清点”选举人票； 但这同样仅仅是一种形式。


(The Bush-Gore contest was unusual in that it wasn’t settled until December 12, more than a month after the election, when the Supreme Court, in a partisan and highly controversial decision, voted 5-4 to end the recount in Florida, handing the presidency to Bush.)	（布什戈尔竞选其非同寻常之处在于直到选举投票一个多月后的12月12日才确定选举结果，当时最高法院做出了一个有浓重党派色彩并引发高度争议的决定，以5票对4票终止佛罗里达州的重新计票工作，并将布什送上了总统宝座。 ）


Now, here’s where it can get convoluted, and possibilities for mischief arise: if no one wins 270 Electoral College votes, the election goes to the House of Representatives, where each state delegation casts a single vote, regardless of how many voters the delegation represents.	现在，我们谈谈令人费解、并可能带来麻烦的规则：如果没有一个候选人赢得270张选举人票，那么选举将移师众议院继续进行，由各州代表各投一票，而不考虑他们所代表的选民人数。


Wyoming (population 585,000) and California (population 39 million) each get one vote.	（拥有585,000人口的）怀俄明州和（拥有3900万人口的）加利福尼亚州按规定各投一票。


And the delegations aren’t bound to vote for the candidate who won the most votes in their state.	而且此时代表们不必再为在本州获得多数选票的候选人投票。


Then, after the House elects the president, the Senate picks the vice president, with each senator getting one vote.	而后，在众议院选出总统后，由参议院挑选副总统，每位参议员可以投下一票。


It’s theoretically possible that Congress could elect a president and vice president from different parties.	因此理论上由国会选出的总统和副总统可以来自不同的政党。


This labyrinthine system for choosing the president reflects the ambivalence of America’s founders about popular democracy.	这种迷宫般的总统选举体制反映了美国奠基人对人民民主的矛盾态度。


They were suspicious of the rabble – the public – having its way on the basis of misinformation or a lack of understanding of the issues.	他们不信任乌合之众——民众——在存在误解或缺乏充分理解的基础上决定国家事务。


The United Kingdom’s vote in June to leave the European Union – against the advice of experts and allies – appears to validate this concern.	英国6月不顾专家和盟友的反对投票退出欧盟似乎证实了这种担忧。


From the outset, America’s founders were aware of the dangers of government by plebiscite.	从一开始，美国的奠基人就意识到通过公民投票推选政府具有危险性。


Alexander Hamilton worried about giving power to the people because “they seldom judge or determine right.”	亚历山大·汉密尔顿担心授权于民，因为“他们很少做出正确的判断或决策。


Fearing “an excess of democracy,” they interposed institutional buffers between the popular will and government decisions.	”由于担心“民主过度”，他们在普遍民意和政府决策之间设置了制度缓冲。


Until 1913, senators were chosen by state legislatures, not directly elected by the voters.	直到1913年，参议员还由各州立法机构选定，而不是由选民直接选出。


And they gave us the Electoral College.	他们还给我们留下了选��人团制度。


This system has an enormous impact on the actual campaign for the presidency, because it determines where the candidates spend their time and money.	上述系统对总统实际竞选产生了巨大的影响，因为它决定了候选人时间和资金的分配状况。


Only about ten states are considered “swing” states that could go for either party; the rest are considered “safe” states for one party or the other.	可能支持任何一方的“摇摆”州大约仅有10个左右； 而其他州对一方或另一方而言则属于“安全”范畴。


Of course, sometimes the political wisdom can be wrong and a state bounces out of its category.	当然，有时政治智慧也可能出错，其中某个州可能超越界限去支持另一个政党。


But these ten “battleground” states are the ones to watch for clues as to how the election will turn out.	但上述10个“主战场”州却是寻找选举结果线索的方向。


They are much more indicative of the final result than national polls.	它们远比全国民调更能反映最终结果。


For example, California and New York are so routinely Democratic that the only reason candidates turn up in either one is to raise money.	举例而言，加州和纽约历来都是民主党大本营，以致筹集资金成为候选人出现在那里的唯一理由。


By contrast, Ohio – the jewel in the crown of swing states, because tradition has it that no Republican can win the presidency without winning there – is well trodden by the candidates.	恰恰相反，作为摇摆州皇冠明珠的俄亥俄州因为一直以来登上总统宝座的共和党候选人都必须在那里获胜——因此经常得到双方候选人的光顾。


The other states considered most important to victory for either side are Florida and Pennsylvania.	对任何一方取胜最重要的还有佛罗里达州和宾夕法尼亚州。


Because such populous states, along with a handful of others, routinely go Democratic, the Democrats have a built-in advantage in the Electoral College.	因为上述人口大洲和其他几个州一样，传统上都倾向于民主党，因此民主党在选举人团制度下具有先天的优势。


So Donald Trump is widely believed to have more limited options for accumulating 270 votes.	因此，人们普遍认为唐纳德·特朗普累积270张选举人票的可能性相对小得多。


Maybe the Electoral College isn’t such a peculiar idea, after all.	毕竟，选举人团理念或许并没有那么特殊。


Unfreezing Credit	解冻信贷


CHICAGO – Little political enthusiasm exists for further support to the banking sector.	芝加哥－对银行业进行进一步支援的政治热情已经没有多少了。


One reason is that banks that received money in the initial rescues do not seem to have increased their lending, without which monetary and fiscal stimulus are unlikely to be effective.	造成这一现象的原因之一是，在最初的救助行动中获得资金的银行似乎并没有增加它们的贷款，而没有这一点，货币和财政刺激就不大可能有效。


For banks to start lending again, even more intervention may be needed.	为了让银行再次开始贷款，可能需要更多的干预。


To see why, we need to understand why banks are still so reluctant.	要明白为什么会这样，我们就要明白银行为什么仍然如此不愿意贷款。


One possibility is that they worry about borrowers’ credit risk, though this would have to be extremely high to justify the complete cessation of long-term lending.	一种可能是它们担心借款者的信贷风险，虽然这样的风险要非常高，才能证明银行完全停止长期贷款是正当的。


A second possibility is that banks worry about having enough resources to meet their own creditors’ demands if they lock up funds in long-term loans.	第二种可能是，银行担心，如果冻结长期贷款，它们就有足够的财力来满足自己债权人的要求。


But the many central bank lending facilities that have been opened around the world should assuage these concerns, especially for large and well-capitalized banks.	但是，世界各地许多中央银行公开的借贷工具，应该能缓和这些担忧，特别是对大型而且资产良好的银行来说更是如此。


On the other hand, perhaps banks’ reluctance to lend reflects a fear of being short of funds if investment opportunities get even better.	另一方面，银行不愿意贷款可能反映了银行担心投资时机变得更好时，自己缺乏资金。


Citicorp CEO Vikram Pandit said as much when he indicated that it was cheaper to buy loans on the market than to make them.	花旗集团首席执行官克拉姆·潘伟迪（Vikram Pandit）在指出购买贷款比贷款更便宜时，也是这样说的。


And buying may get cheaper still!	而且，购买贷款可能会变得更便宜！


Consider, for example, the real possibility that a large indebted financial institution faces a run on its deposits, as Lehman did, and starts dumping loans onto the market.	例如，想象一下一家大型负债金融机构像雷曼兄弟那样面临挤兑存款，并开始向市场倾销贷款的现实可能性。


Not only will those loans’ price fall if only a few entities have the spare funds to buy them, but other distressed entities’ scramble to borrow also will make it hard for any institution without funds to obtain them.	如果只有几家机构有多余的资金去购买这些贷款，那么，不仅这些贷款的价格会下跌，而且，其他资金困难的实体对借款的争夺也会使没有资金的机构很难得到它们。


Anticipating the prospect of such future fire sales (of loans, financial assets, or institutions), it is understandable that even strong banks will restrict their lending to very short maturities, and their investments to extremely liquid securities.	预想到将来这样降价出售（降价出售贷款、金融资产或者机构）的前景，就连资金雄厚的银行也对短期贷款和流动性非常好的证券的投资进行了限制，就是可以理解的了。


This may also explain why markets for some assets have dried up.	这也解释了为什么有些资产的市场已经枯竭了。


Some distressed banks clearly possess large quantities of mortgage-backed securities, and are holding onto them in the hope that their prices will rise in the future, saving them from failure.	显然，有些资金困难的银行拥有大量抵押贷款证券，而且，怀着这些资产的价格在未来还会上升，可以使自己免于破产的希望，将它们紧紧握在手中而不加以出售。


At the same time, buyers expect even lower prices down the line.	同时，这些资产的买方却希望更彻底的低价。


While there is a price today that reflects those expectations, it is not a price at which distressed banks want to sell.	虽然现在的价格反映了这些期望，但是，这个价格却不是资金困难的银行想出售这些资产的价格。


As a result, there is an overhang of illiquid financial institutions, whose holdings could be unloaded if they run into difficulties.	结果，缺乏流动性金融机构的威胁（overhang）产生了——如果这些金融机构遇到困难，它们就可以剥离所持有的流动性不足的资产。


For some, low prices would render them insolvent.	对有些金融机构来说，低价可能使它们破产。


For others, low prices would be a tremendous buying opportunity, whose prospective return far exceeds returns from lending today.	对另一些金融机构来说，低价可能会是一个巨大的购买机会，购买贷款的预期收益远远超过了现在贷款的收益。


Political exhortations to lend can have some, albeit limited, impact.	要银行进行贷款的政治说教会有一些影响——虽然影响有限。


Any voluntary resumption of lending will necessitate reducing both fears and potential opportunities.	为了使银行自愿恢复贷款，减少它们的担忧和降低它们潜在的购买机会，都是必要的。


Here are some ways to reduce the overhang.	 在这里有一些减少威胁（overhang）的办法。


First, the authorities can offer to buy illiquid assets through auctions and house them in a government entity, much as was envisaged in America’s original Troubled Asset Relief Program.	首先，当局可以承诺用拍卖的方式购买流动性不足的资产，并将它们纳入一个政府实体，就像美国《问题资产救助计划》（Troubled Asset Relief Program）最初所设想的那样。


This can reverse a freeze in the market caused by distressed entities that are unwilling to sell at prevailing market prices. 	这会逆转市场上由不愿意按照市价出售资产的资金困难实体所造成的交易冻结。


The fact that the government is willing to buy in the future (and now) should raise prices today, because it reduces the possibility of low prices in a future fire sale.	政府在将来（以及现在）愿意购买资产的事实，会在现在使这些资产的价格上涨，因为这降低了在将来的降价销售中出现低价的可能性。


Moreover, once a sufficient number of distressed entities sell their assets, prices will rise simply because there is no longer a potential overhang of future fire sales.	而且，一旦有足够数量资金困难的实体出售它们的资产，价格就会仅仅因为在将来的降价销售中不再有潜在的威胁，而出现上涨。


Both effects can lead to increased trade in illiquid assets today, and unlock lending, though this outcome may require significant government outlays.	这两种影响现在都会导致流动性不���的资产交易的增加，并释放贷款——虽然出现这种结果可能需要大量的政府开支。


A second approach is to have the government ensure the stability of significant parts of the financial system that hold illiquid assets by recapitalizing regulated entities that have a realistic possibility of survival, and merging or closing those that do not.	第二个办法是，通过调整有存活现实可能性的受监管实体的资本，合并或关停那些不能存活下来的实体，让政府确保金融系统中大部分拥有流动性不足资产的机构的稳定性。


For those entities that are closed down, this would mean moving illiquid assets into a holding entity that would gradually sell them off.	对那些被关停的实体，这意味着将缺乏流动性的资产转移到一个可以将它们逐渐卖掉的控股实体内。


One problem is that the public’s appetite for a bailout of the unregulated and hemorrhaging “shadow” financial system, consisting of institutions like hedge funds and private equity firms, is rightly small, yet it too can serve to hold back bank lending if a large proportion of the distressed assets are held in weak institutions there.	在这里有个问题是，公众对援救不受监管并且极度“灰色”的金融体系——像对冲基金和私募股权公司这样的机构——的兴趣，相当的小，然而，如果大部分的问题资产都由弱小的机构所持有，那么，这也会对银行贷款起到抑制作用。


Perhaps, therefore, a mix of the two approaches can work best, with the authorities buying illiquid assets, which can help even unregulated entities, even while cleaning up the regulated financial sector, focusing particularly on entities that are likely to become distressed.	因此，或许这两种办法在当局购买流动性不足的资产的同时，结合起来使用能够起到最好的效果； 这一途径即使在清理受到监管的金融部门，特别是集中清理那些有可能出现资金问题的实体的同时，也会对那些不受监管的实体起作用。


This differs substantially from the current approach (in which well-capitalized entities are given even more capital), which does not deal with the overhang of illiquid assets that more distressed entities hold.	这种方法和当前不处理资金更困难的实体持有的流动性不足的资产所带来的威胁的做法非常不同（在当前的做法中，国家给予资本良好实体的资金更多）。


Unless the regulated financial system is systematically audited, with weak entities stabilized through capital injections, asset purchases, or mergers, or liquidated quickly, the overhang of distressed institutions will persist, constraining lending.	除非受监管的金融体系被进行系统地审计，同时通过资本注入、资产购买、合并或者快速清算，稳定弱小的金融实体，否则，资金困难机构的威胁会继续存在，并会因此而造成对贷款的抑制。


One lesson from Japan’s experience in the 1990’s is that the sooner the authorities bite the bullet and clean up the financial system, the sooner the economy will be on the road to recovery.	人们从日本20世纪90年代的经历中得到的一个教训是，当局越快面对现实并清理金融体系，经济就会越快地回到复苏的道路之上。


The longer officials remain paralyzed, hoping that the financial system will right itself, the higher the eventual cost of the cleanup will be.  	官员们希望金融体系自己纠正自己，不采取行动拖延的时间越久，最终理顺金融体系的代价就会越大。


A Future of Happiness, Tolerance, and Youth	幸福、宽容与青年的未来


DUBAI – Over the past two weeks, I have heard and read many questions, comments, and news stories regarding recent changes to the government of the United Arab Emirates.	迪拜——过去两周来，我听到和看到了有关阿拉伯联合酋长国政府最新变革的诸多问题、评论和新闻报道。


Why, everyone seems to want to know, did we establish a Ministry of Happiness, Tolerance, and the Future, and why did we appoint a 22-year-old Minister of Youth?	似乎每个人都想知道我们为什么设立幸福宽容和未来部，以及我们为什么任命一位年仅22岁的青年部长？


The changes reflect what we have learned from events in our region over the past five years.	过去5年来我们所吸取的地区教训就反映在上述变革当中。


In particular, we have learned that failure to respond effectively to the aspirations of young people, who represent more than half of the population in Arab countries, is like swimming against the tide.	尤其是我们已经认识到，无法有效满足青年人的愿望就是逆潮流而行。 没有青年人所特有的活力和乐观，社会无法发展壮大；


Without the energy and optimism of youth, societies cannot develop and grow; indeed, they are doomed.	事实上，它们注定难逃厄运。


When governments spurn their youth and block their path to a better life, they slam the door in the face of the entire society.	当政府抛弃年轻人，阻碍他们走上美好生活之路，他们就对整个社会关上了大门。


We do not forget that the genesis of the tension in our region, the events dubbed the “Arab Spring,” was squarely rooted in the lack of opportunities for young people to achieve their dreams and ambitions.	我们不能忘记地区紧张局势的起源，被称为“阿拉伯之春”的这起事件其根源恰恰在于青年人缺乏实现其梦想和抱负的机会。


We are proud that the UAE is a young country.	我们骄傲阿联酋是个年轻的国家。


And we are proud of our youth.	我们自豪地拥有如此多的年轻人。


We invest in them and empower them precisely because they are our future.	我们投资于他们、授权与他们，恰恰因为他们是我们的未来。


We believe that they are faster than us in acquiring and processing knowledge, because they have grown up with tools and techniques that we lacked at their age.	我们相信，他们能比我们更快地学习和处理知识，因为我们在他们那个年纪缺乏伴随他们成长的工具和技术。


We entrust them with driving our country to new levels of growth and development, which is why we have now appointed a cabinet minister of their age and created a special council of youth.	我们把推动社会进入新增长和发展层次的重任交付与他们，我们因此任命了一位年龄与他们相仿的内阁部长，并且设立了青年特别委员会。


We have also learned from hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of refugees in our region that sectarian, ideological, cultural, and religious bigotry only fuel the fires of rage.	本地区数十万死难者和数百万难民让我们知道，宗派、思想、文化和宗教偏见只会为愤怒火上浇油。


We cannot and will not allow this in our country.	我们不能也不会允许这种情况发生。


We need to study, teach, and practice tolerance – and to instill it in our children, both through education and our own example.	我们需要研究、教授和践行���容——通过教育和我们自身树立的榜样，将宽容的理念灌输到我们的子孙后代心中。


That is why we have appointed a Minister of State for Tolerance.	我们因此任命了一位宽容部部长。


We believe that a legal framework should formalize the tolerance our society already displays, and that our policies and initiatives will provide an outstanding example to our neighbors.	我们相信法律框架应该可以规范我们社会已经展现出来的宽容，我们的政策和举措将为我们的邻国起到示范作用。


When the Arab world was tolerant and accepting of others, it led the world: From Baghdad to Damascus to Andalusia and farther afield, we provided beacons of science, knowledge, and civilization, because humane values were the basis of our relationships with all civilizations, cultures, and religions.	当阿拉伯世界宽容并接受他人时，我们曾经是世界的领袖：从巴格达到大马士革、再到安达卢西亚和更远的疆土，我们曾经是科学、知识和文明的灯塔，因为人文价值是我们与一切文明、文化和宗教关系的基础。


Even when our ancestors left Andalusia, people of other faiths went with them.	甚至当我们的祖先离开安达卢西亚，其他信仰的民众仍在追随他们的脚步。


Tolerance is no catchphrase, but a quality we must cherish and practice.	宽容不是简单的口号，而是我们必须拥有和践行的品质。


It must be woven into the fabric of our society to safeguard our future and maintain the progress we have made.	我们必须确保宽容能够融入社会结构，才能捍卫我们的未来、保持我们已经取得的进步。


There can be no bright future for the Middle East without an intellectual reconstruction that re-establishes the values of ideological openness, diversity, and acceptance of others’ viewpoints, whether intellectual, cultural, or religious.	如果没有重建思想开放、多元化和接受他人思想、文化或宗教见解价值观的思想体系重构，中东地区就不可能拥有光明的未来。


With every lesson we learn comes a decision that will shape our future.	我们学到的点点滴滴都将重塑我们的未来。


But we also know that we can learn by looking to the future, not just the past or present.	但我们也知道未来同样可以成为学习的源泉，而不仅局限于过去或现在。


Simply put, we must think of what life will be like in a post-oil economy.	简言之，我们必须思考后石油经济的生活状态。


That is why we have invested heavily – more than 300 billion dirhams ($81.5 billion) – in establishing a focus for the UAE’s path ahead, with the aim of preparing for a diverse economy that frees future generations from dependence on the ever-fluctuating oil market.	我们为此投入了巨额资金——超过3，000亿迪拉姆（合815亿美元）——明确阿联酋前进道路的焦点，目的是实现经济多元化，解除子孙后代对不断波动的石油市场的依赖。


Achieving that goal requires reconsidering our legislative, administrative, and economic system fully to move away from dependence on oil.	实现这一目标需要重新思考我们的立法、行政和经济制度，以便解除对石油的依赖。


We need a strong and appropriate regulatory infrastructure to build a sustainable and diverse national economy for our children and their children.	我们需要建立强大、恰当的管理基础设施，为我们的子孙以及子孙的子孙建立可持续和多样化的国民经济。


In writing this commentary, I want to send a clear message to others in our region that change happens by our hands only.	在写这篇评论时，我想明确告诉地区其他国家，我们只能通过自身的力量来寻求改变。


Our region does not need a super-strong external power to stop its decline; we need the power from within that can overcome the hatred and intolerance that has blighted life in many neighboring countries.	本地区无需超强的外部力量来阻止衰退； 我们需要能克服仇恨和偏狭的内在力量，正是仇恨和偏狭让诸多邻国的生活逐渐枯萎。


I am writing to send a message that governments in our region and elsewhere need to revise their roles.	我写这篇文章就是要让外界知道，本地区和其他地方的政府需要改变自身的作用。


The role of government is to create an environment in which people can achieve their dreams and ambitions, not to create an environment that government can control.	政府的作用是要创造环境让民众实现梦想和抱负，而不是创造政府可以控制的环境。


The point is to empower people, not to hold power over them.	关键是要授权于民众，而不是试图压制他们。


Government, in short, should nurture an environment in which people create and enjoy their own happiness.	总之，政府应培育民众可以享受幸福的环境。


We are not new to this talk about the government’s role in promoting happiness.	对于谈论政府在促进幸福感方面的作用我们并不陌生。


Since the dawn of history, happiness is all that humanity has sought.	有史以来幸福就一直是一切人文追求的核心。


Aristotle said the state is a living being which develops in seeking the achievement of moral perfection and happiness for individuals.	亚里士多德曾说，国家是实现个人道德完善及幸福的有生命的存在。


Ibn Khaldun said the same thing.	伊本·赫勒敦也曾有过类似的表述。


Likewise, the United States Declaration of Independence upholds the pursuit of happiness as every person’s right.	同样，《美国独立宣言》规定追求幸福是每个人应有的权利。


In our own time, the United Nations is now calling for changes in the criteria used to measure governmental success from economic indicators to measures related to human happiness and wellbeing.	在我们这个时代，联合国呼吁将人类幸福和福祉而非经济指标作为衡量政府成功的标准。


It has dedicated the UN International Day of Happiness to emphasize the importance of this shift.	联合国已经设立了国际幸福日来凸显这一转变的重要性。


Focusing on happiness is both feasible and fully justified.	把幸福作为关注焦点既合理也完全可行。


Happiness can be measured, and its evaluation is already the subject of many programs and studies.	幸福与否可以衡量，对于幸福的评估已成为众多计划和研究的课题。


Moreover, it can be developed and its achievement linked to material objectives. Studies have shown that happy people produce more, live longer, and drive better economic development in their communities and countries.	研究表明，幸福的人效率更高、寿命更长，能在推动社区和国家经济发展中发挥更大的作用。


The happiness of individuals, families, and employees, their satisfaction with their lives and optimism for the future, are crucial to our work, which cuts across every sector of government.	个人、家庭和员工幸福，他们对生活的满意度以及对未来乐观与否涉及到政府工作的方方面面，对我们的工作起着至关重要的作用。


That is why there must be a minister to guide and follow up with all government institutions (as well as provide leadership to the private sector).	因此必须有一位部长负责所有政府机构的引导和跟进工作（同时负责领导私营部门）。


Ours is no empty promise.	我们所做的绝不是空洞的承诺。


We will seek to create a society where our people’s happiness is paramount, by sustaining an environment in which they can truly flourish.	我们将力求创造民众幸福至高无上的社会，创造能使民众真正蓬勃发展的环境。


And we hope our formula benefits others in the region.	我们希望我们的方法能够惠及区域内其他邻国。


The formula is straightforward: national development based on core values, led by youth, and focused on a future in which everyone achieves happiness.	我们的方法非常简单：争取以青年为领导、核心价值观为基础的国家发展，以便在未来让每个人都能得到幸福。


The UN at 70	联合国70周年


NEW YORK –The United Nations will mark its 70th anniversary when world leaders assemble next month at its headquarters in New York.	纽约——当世界领导人下月会聚联合国纽约总部，联合国将迎来其70周年纪念日。


Though there will be plenty of fanfare, it will inadequately reflect the UN’s value, not only as the most important political innovation of the twentieth century, but also as the best bargain on the planet.	虽然少不了一番大张旗鼓，但仍无法充分反映联合国20世纪最重要政治创新和全球最优制度安排的巨大价值。


But if the UN is to continue to fulfill its unique and vital global role in the twenty-first century, it must be upgraded in three key ways.	但要继续履行二十一世纪独一无二的重要全球作用，联合国必须在三个关键方面实现升级。


Fortunately, there is plenty to motivate world leaders to do what it takes.	幸运的是，世界领袖有充足的理由采取必要的措施。


Indeed, the UN has had two major recent triumphs, with two more on the way before the end of this year.	事实上，联合国近来已经取得了两次重大胜利，今年年底前还有两次将变为现实。


The first triumph is the nuclear agreement with Iran.	第一次胜利是与伊朗签署核协议。


Sometimes misinterpreted as an agreement between Iran and the United States, the accord is in fact between Iran and the UN, represented by the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US), plus Germany.	虽然有时被误会为伊美协议，但协议缔约方实际是伊朗和以联合国安理会五大常任理事国（中、法、俄、英和美）再加德国为代表的联合国。


An Iranian diplomat, in explaining why his country will scrupulously honor the agreement, made the point vividly: “Do you really think that Iran would dare to cheat on the very five UN Security Council permanent members that can seal our country’s fate?”	一位伊朗外交官在解释为什么他的国家将严格履行协议时生动地表示：“你真的认为伊朗有胆量欺骗能决定我们国家命运的联合国安理会五大常任理事国？ ”


The second big triumph is the successful conclusion, after 15 years, of the Millennium Development Goals, which have underpinned the largest, longest, and most effective global poverty-reduction effort ever undertaken.	第二大胜利是经过15年的努力，圆满完成了支撑有史以来规模最大、时间最长、效果也最显著的全球扶贫行动的千年发展目标。


Two UN Secretaries-General have overseen the MDGs: Kofi Annan, who introduced them in 2000, and Ban Ki-moon, who, since succeeding Annan at the start of 2007, has led vigorously and effectively to achieve them.	两任联合国秘书长曾负责千年发展目标的监督工作：2000年制定千年发展目标的科菲·安南，以及2007年初接替安南、为实现该目标做出积极有效努力的潘基文。


The MDGs have engendered impressive progress in poverty reduction, public health, school enrollment, gender equality in education, and other areas.	千年发展目标已经在扶贫、公共卫生、入学率和教育性别平等等方面取得了显著的进步。


Since 1990 (the reference date for the targets), the global rate of extreme poverty has been reduced by well over half – more than fulfilling the agenda’s number one goal.	20世纪90年代（千年发展目标基准日）以来，全球极端贫困率已经减少了超过一半——超额完成了千年发展计划的头号目标。


Inspired by the MDGs’ success, the UN’s member countries are set to adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which will aim to end extreme poverty in all its forms everywhere, narrow inequalities, and ensure environmental sustainability by 2030 – next month.	在千年发展目标成功的鼓舞下，联合国各成员国下月一定会采纳可持续发展目标(SDG)——目的是消灭全球一切形式的极端贫困、压缩不平等以及确保到2030年持续实现环境保护。


This, the UN’s third triumph of 2015, could help to bring about the fourth: a global agreement on climate control, under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Paris in December.	上述2015年联合国第三大胜利或许有助于实现第四大胜利：12月在联合国气候变化框架公约支持下在巴黎签署全球气候控制协议。


The precise value of the peace, poverty reduction, and environmental cooperation made possible by the UN is incalculable.	我们无法估量联合国和平、扶贫及环境合作可能带来的准确价值。


If we were to put it in monetary terms, however, we might estimate their value at trillions of dollars per year – at least a few percent of the world economy’s annual GDP of $100 trillion.	但如果以货币形式计算，我们或许可以估算出每年价值高达数万亿美元——至少在世界经济每年100万亿美元的GDP总额中占百分之几的比例。


Yet spending on all UN bodies and activities – from the Secretariat and the Security Council to peacekeeping operations, emergency responses to epidemics, and humanitarian operations for natural disasters, famines, and refugees – totaled roughly $45 billion in 2013, roughly $6 per person on the planet.	但花在所有联合国机构和活动上的开支——从秘书处及安理会维和行动、疫情紧急应对到为自然灾害、饥荒和难民提供人道主义援助——2013年总额约为450亿美元，约合全世界人均6美元。


That is not just a bargain; it is a significant underinvestment.	这不是什么花小钱办大事； 而是严重的投资不足。


Given the rapidly growing need for global cooperation, the UN simply cannot get by on its current budget.	鉴于全球合作需求快速增长，联合国目前的预算根本不够。


Given this, the first reform that I would suggest is an increase in funding, with high-income countries contributing at least $40 per capita annually, upper middle-income countries giving $8, lower-middle-income countries $2, and low-income countries $1.	有鉴于此，我所提议的第一项改革就是增加资金，高收入国家每人每年至少贡献40美元，中高收入国家8美元、中低收入国家2美元，低收入国家1美元。


With these contributions – which amount to roughly 0.1% of the group’s average per capita income – the UN would have about $75 billion annually with which to strengthen the quality and reach of vital programs, beginning with those needed to achieve the SDGs.	凭借这些资金——约占联合国成员国人均收入的0. 1%——联合国每年将可筹集到750亿美元，从实现可持续发展目标所需的计划开始，强化重要项目的覆盖范围和质量。


Once the world is on a robust path to achieve the SDGs, the need for, say, peacekeeping and emergency-relief operations should decline as conflicts diminish in number and scale, and natural disasters are better prevented or anticipated.	一旦世界走上实现可持续发展目标的正轨，冲突的数量和规模就会减少，自然灾害将得到更好的预测或预防，从而导致维和及紧急救援行动的需求下降。


This brings us to the second major area of reform: ensuring that the UN is fit for the new age of sustainable development.	我们由此进入到改革的第二个主要领域：确保联合国适应可持续发展新时代的要求。


Specifically, the UN needs to strengthen its expertise in areas such as ocean health, renewable energy systems, urban design, disease control, technological innovation, public-private partnerships, and peaceful cultural cooperation.	具体地讲，联合国海洋健康、可再生能源系统、城市设计、疾病控制、技术创新，公私伙伴关系及和平文化合作领域的专业知识需要进一步加强。


Some UN programs should be merged or closed, while other new SDG-related UN programs should be created.	我们要在关闭或合并某些联合国项目的同时，创设新项目实现与可持续发展相关的目标。


The third major reform imperative is the UN’s governance, starting with the Security Council, the composition of which no longer reflects global geopolitical realities.	当务之急的第三大改革是联合国治理，首先应该从安理会入手，安理会的组成已无法反映全球地缘政治的现实状况。


Indeed, the Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG) now accounts for three of the five permanent members (France, the United Kingdom, and the US).	事实上，西欧和其他国家团体（WEOG）目前占据联合国常任理事国的五分之三（法、英、美）。


That leaves only one permanent position for the Eastern European Group (Russia), one for the Asia-Pacific Group (China), and none for Africa or Latin America.	东欧集团因此只剩下一个席位（俄国）、亚太集团一个（中国）、非洲或拉美一个都没有。


The rotating seats on the Security Council do not adequately restore regional balance.	安理会轮值席位不足以恢复地区平衡。


Even with two of the ten rotating Security Council seats, the Asia-Pacific region is still massively under-represented.	即便占据10个安理会轮值席位中的两个，亚太地区的代表情况仍严重不足。


The Asia-Pacific region accounts for roughly 55% of the world’s population and 44% of its annual income but has just 20% (three out of 15) of the seats on the Security Council.	亚太地区约占世界人口的55%，全球年收入的44%，但在安理会席位中仅仅占据20%（15席中的3席）。


Asia’s inadequate representation poses a serious threat to the UN’s legitimacy, which will only increase as the world’s most dynamic and populous region assumes an increasingly important global role.	亚洲席位不足严重威胁到联合国的合法性，这一问题随这个世界人口最多、也最具活力的地区全球地位不断攀升势必会不断增加。


One possible way to resolve the problem would be to add at least four Asian seats: one permanent seat for India, one shared by Japan and South Korea (perhaps in a two-year, one-year rotation), one for the ASEAN countries (representing the group as a single constituency), and a fourth rotating among the other Asian countries.	一个可能的解决办法是至少增加4个亚洲席位：一个常任理事国席位给印度、一个给日本和韩国（也许可以采取两年、一年轮换制）、一个给东盟国家（将东盟作为单一区划）、还有第四个轮值席位给亚洲其他国家。


As the UN enters its eighth decade, it continues to inspire humanity.	随着联合国进入第八个十年，它继续鼓舞人类前进的步伐。


The Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains the world’s moral charter, and the SDGs promise to provide new guideposts for global development cooperation.	世界人权宣言仍然是世界的道德准则，可持续发展目标继续为全球发展合作指明方向。


Yet the UN’s ability to continue to fulfill its vast potential in a new and challenging century requires its member states to commit to support the organization with the resources, political backing, and reforms that this new era demands.	但联合国在充满挑战的新世纪发挥潜能需要其成员国提供新世界所需要的更多资源、政治和改革支持。


The Children’s Revolution	儿童的革命


LONDON – Two tragic and haunting images have emerged this year: hooded Islamic State executioners holding their knives to the necks of innocent victims, and masked medical workers bravely fighting an uphill battle against an Ebola outbreak for which the world was not prepared.	伦敦—今年有两幅挥之不去的悲剧图景：蒙面的伊斯兰国（Islamic State）刽子手将手中的刀朝着无辜受害者的脖子砍去； 以及带着面罩的医护人员勇敢地与令世界措手不及的埃博拉大爆发进行卓绝的斗争。


But the year’s lasting legacy will be an even more extensive disaster, with recovery taking years, if not decades: nearly two million newly displaced children, trapped in conflict zones across Iraq, Syria, Gaza, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere.	但今年的持续影响将是一场更加严重的灾难，这场灾难需要好几年甚至好几十年才能恢复：近两百万新近流离失所的儿童陷于伊拉克、叙利亚、加沙、中非共和国和其他地区的冲突区域。


These children have joined the ranks of 25 million displaced boys and girls worldwide – a number equivalent to the population of a midsize European country and the largest in the 70 years since the end of World War II.	这些儿童是全世界2,500万无家可归男孩和女孩的一部分——这一数字相当用户中等欧洲国家的人口数量，也是自二战结束以来无家可归儿童的最高数字。


Images of vulnerable, desolate refugee children – likely to be displaced for a decade or more – have become so common that the world seems unable to comprehend what it is seeing.	孱弱、孤独的难民儿童——可能流离失所已逾十年——已经司空见惯，以至于世界似乎无法理解这意味着什么。


But the plight of child refugees is only one reason why a new approach to children’s rights is needed.	但难民儿童的困境只是需要采取新的儿童权利方针的原因之一。


This year, an estimated 15 million school-age girls will become child brides, forced into marriage against their will.	据估计，今年有1,500万学龄女孩成为童婚新娘，被迫在不情愿的情况下结婚。


Some 14 million boys and girls below the age of 14 are child laborers, many forced to work in the most hazardous of conditions.	大约1,400万14岁以下男孩和女孩沦为童工，其中许多被迫在最危险的条件下工作。


And 32 million girls are denied the basic right to attend school, owing to gender discrimination; around 500,000 of them are trafficked each year.	3,200万女孩因为性别歧视而无法获得上学的基本权利； 每年都有大约50万女孩遭遇人口贩卖。


In the 1950s, the fight against colonialism dominated world politics.	20世纪50年代，反殖民主义斗争主导着世界政治。


In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, great civil-rights battles were waged against racial discrimination and apartheid, followed by struggles to advance the rights of the disabled and sexual minorities.	60年代、70年代和80年代，大规模民权斗争磨刀霍霍向种族歧视和种族隔离，此后则是主张残疾人和性小众（sexual minorities）权利的斗争。


It is our generation’s task to tackle the civil-rights movement’s unfinished business, by ending the exploitation of children, especially girls, and ensuring compulsory universal education.	我们这一代人有义务继续未竟的民权运动事业，结束虐待儿童特别是女孩的时代，确保普世义务教育。


To mark the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), I, along with this year’s Nobel Peace Prize winner, Kailash Satyarthi, and the head of the United Kingdom’s Overseas Development Institute, Kevin Watkins, am calling on the world community to offer practical support to the burgeoning civil-rights struggle of young people.	为了纪念联合国儿童权利公约（Convention on the Rights of the Child，CRC）25周年，我和今年诺贝尔和平奖获得者凯拉什·萨蒂亚尔希（Kailash Satyarthi）以及英国海外发展研究所（Overseas Development Institute）主管凯文·沃特金斯（Kevin Watkins）一起呼吁全球社会为方兴未艾的年轻人民权斗争提供实际支持。


We can do more to end child labor, child marriage, child trafficking, and discrimination against girls, by not only demanding the proper policing of domestic laws, but also by establishing a new International Children’s Court, buttressed by a credible reporting and sanctions system.	我们可以为消灭童工、童婚、人贩和重男轻女贡献更大的力量，我们不但可以要求合理的国内法律监督，还可以成立新的国际儿童法院（International Children’s Court）并辅之以可信的报告和制裁制度。


Violations of children’s rights are now so rampant that there simply is no alternative.	如今，违反儿童权利的情况猖獗，我们别无选择。


Indeed, though no human-rights treaty has been more widely ratified than the CRC, which requires governments to report on their compliance once every five years, its work lacks adequate resources and enforcement.	事实上，尽管CRC堪称签署者最多的人权条约，并且要求政府每五年报告一次遵守情况，但相关工作缺少足够的资源和执法力度。


Only one in seven countries submit compliance reports on time, and one-third do not submit even a year late.	只有七分之一的国家及时递交遵守情况报告，三分之一的国家迟交一年以上。


Meanwhile, the scantly funded offices that manage the information have a two-year backlog.	与此同时，资金匮乏的信息管理部门的工作已经落后了两年。


Another promising initiative – the “optional protocol on communications,” aimed at enabling children and their advocates, for the first time, to bring cases before the UN Human Rights Committee – has been similarly weakened by a lack of strong support, authority, and resources.	另一个大有希望的计划——“可选沟通协议”（optional protocol on communications）旨在让儿童和他们的支持者向联合国人权委员会（UN Human Rights Committee）提交诉状，这是历史性突破。 这一计划也因为缺少强力支持、权威和资源而大受削弱。


Indeed, only 14 countries have ratified the protocol since it was agreed in 2011.	事实上，自该协议2011年达成一致以来，只有14个国家在上面签了字。


Moreover, states are not legally bound to change the policies or laws that are deemed to be violating their international human-rights obligations.	此外，各国没有法律义务改变被认为违反其国际人权义务的政策或法律。


And a shortage of investigative resources has led to an emphasis on problematic legislation, instead of the larger issue of inadequate enforcement of laws that promote the CRC’s principles.	而调查资源不足又导致了着重问题立法而非执行推进CRC原则的法律不力这一更大的问题。


So there is a case not only for an International Children’s Court, but also for children and their representatives to be granted the right to petition it.	因此这个问题不仅事关国际儿童法院，也事关儿童及其代表被授予请愿的权利。


Such a court should have the capacity to receive and investigate individual complaints, the power to monitor independently the enforcement of laws, and the resources to devote to investigations into relevant areas, including child labor, child marriage, child slavery, genital mutilation, and child rape.	这一法院应该有能力收取病调查个人投诉，有权力独立监督执法情况，有资源进行相关领域（包括童工、童婚、童奴、割礼和儿童性侵）的调查。


Over time, a reporting system could be implemented to facilitate an examination of the impact of health and education policies on the world’s most marginalized boys and girls.	假以时日，可以实施报告制度以便利考察卫生和教育政策对全球最边缘男孩和女孩的影响。


Such research could provide compelling evidence to support compulsory universal education as the ideal mechanism not just for ending educational exclusion, but also for bringing an end to child labor and trafficking, early marriage, and discrimination against girls.	这一研究能够提供充分的证据支持将普世义务教育作为理想机制——不仅对结束教育排斥是如此，对结束童工和人贩、早婚以及重男轻女也是如此。