To be sure, the TPP might help the US to advance its goal of containing China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region, exemplified in US President Barack Obama’s declaration that, “With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do.”	诚然，TPP也许有助于美国推进其遏制中国在东亚地区影响力的目标，其总统奥巴马的宣告就是明证：“有了TPP，制定地区规则的就不再是中国了； 是我们。


But the economic case is not nearly as strong.	”但经济理由就不那么强烈了。


In fact, though the TPP will bring some benefits, they will mainly accrue to large corporations and come at the expense of ordinary citizens.	事实上，尽管TPP将带来一些收益，但主要是对大企业而言，并且这些收益要以普通公民为代价。


In terms of gains, one US government study on the topic projected that, by 2025, the TPP would augment its member countries’ GDP growth by a meager 0.1% at most.	说到收益，一项美国政府对该问题的研究预测，到2025年，TPP最多只能让其成员国GDP增长提高0. 1%。


More recently, the US International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated that, by 2032, the TPP would increase America’s economic growth by 0.15% ($42.7 billion) and boost incomes by 0.23% ($57.3 billion).	此后，美国国际贸易委员会（ITC）估算，到2032年，TPP将让美国经济增长提高0. 15%（4,270亿美元），收入提高0.


But TPP advocates have largely ignored these results, preferring to cite two studies by the Peterson Institute of International Economics, a well-known cheerleader for economic globalization.	但TPP支持者基本无视这些结果，而更喜欢援引彼得森国际经济学研究所（PIIE）的两项研究。 众所周知，PIIE是经济全球化的支持者。


In 2012, the PIIE claimed that the TPP would boost total GDP in member countries by 0.4% after ten years.	2012年，它宣称十年后TPP将让成员国总GDP提高0. 4%。


In January, it declared that TPP would augment total GDP by 0.5% over the next 15 years.	1月份，PIIE宣称TPP将在未来15年将总GDP提高0. 5%。


In a World Bank study released the same month, the authors of the PIIE research projected a 1.1% average increase in GDP in TPP member countries by 2030.	在同一个月发布的世界银行研究中，PIIE研究的作者们预测到2030年TPP成员国GDP平均可以增加1. 1%。


Something is clearly amiss.	显然，某些地方有问题。


A closer look reveals that these studies’ findings concerning the TPP’s purported benefits lack supporting economic theory, credible modeling, or empirical evidence.	跟仔细的观擦表明，这些对据称的TPP收益的研究缺乏支持性经济理论、可信的建模和实证证据。


The only advantages presented that are consistent with mainstream research methodology are tariff-related trade benefits.	与主流研究方法相容的唯一好处是与关税有关的贸易收益。


But if the PIIE authors had used conventional methods to estimate total gains from trade, such benefits would comprise a very small share of the alleged gains from the TPP.	但如果PIIT作者使用传统方法估算得自贸易的总收益，那么得到的结果将只有据称的TPP收益的九牛一毛。


According to the PIIE and the World Bank, about 85% of overall growth from the TPP is due to “non-trade measures” and related foreign investments.	据PIIE和世界银行，TPP所产生的总增长中有大约85%要归因于“非贸易措施”和相关外国投资。


Meanwhile, the studies ignore employment and income distribution – where some of the leading risks of trade liberalization lie.	与此同时，这些研究忽略了就业和收入分配——而一些贸易自由化的主要风险正在于此。


Instead, they simply assume that all countries are at full employment and have a consistent income distribution, trade balance, and fiscal position.	相反，它们简单地假设每个国家都达到充分就业并有一致的收入分配、贸易收支和财政状况。


The ITC study, which used a slightly different model, predicts an increase in the trade deficit that would destroy 129,484 American jobs (yet, inexplicably, it estimates that the TPP would raise employment by 128,000 jobs).	ITC研究使用了略微不同的方法，它预测贸易赤字将增加，并将因此毁掉129,484个美国就业岗位（但是，它又莫名其妙地测算TPP将增加128,000个就业岗位）。


It also projects a net increase in exports of $25.2 billion in 2032 (in 2032 US dollars), a small fraction of the PIIE’s projection of $357 billion in 2030 (in 2015 dollars).	它还预测2032年出口净增252亿美元（以2032年美元衡量），只相当于PIIE所预测的2030年3,570亿美元（以2015年美元衡量）的一小部分。


For our study, my colleagues and I used the PIIE’s own 2012 estimates of trade-related gains, despite our reservations, along with more realistic economic specifications, including for income distribution and employment.	至于我们的研究，我的同事和我使用了PIIE自身的2012年贸易相关收益测算（尽管我们有所保留），并考虑了更加现实的具体的经济指标，包括收入分配和就业指标。


We projected downward wage pressure, which, by depressing domestic demand, would lead to lower employment and higher inequality in all country groupings.	我们预测工资将承受下行压力，并通过抑制国内需求导致更低的就业和更高的不平等性（所有国家组别都是如此）。


Projected job losses would total some 771,000 across the TPP countries, including 448,000 in the US alone.	预计所有TPP国家就业岗位总损失将在771,000个左右，其中包括美国的448,000个。


These losses would offset any growth benefits, with the US and Japan suffering small net income losses (-0.5% and -0.1%, respectively).	这些损失将抵消任何增长收益，其中美国和日本将蒙受较小的净收入损失（分别为-0. 5%和-0.


Even if the TPP is found to conflict with the national or public interest, participating countries are obliged to follow its provisions.	即使TPP被发现与国家或公共利益冲突，参与国仍有遵守其条款的义务。


Powerful lobbies, mainly from the US, made sure of that.	强大的游说集团（主要来自美国）确保了这一点。


And, unfortunately, that is not all they did.	并且，不幸的是，这并不是它们所做的全部。


Despite being portrayed as a trade deal, the TPP is not even really about trade.	尽管据称是贸易协议，但TPP甚至不是真正关于贸易的东西。


Many TPP countries are already among the world’s most open economies, with most merchandise trade among them having already been liberalized by earlier agreements and unilateral initiatives.	许多TPP国家已经位居世界最开放的经济体之列，它们之间所贸易的大部分商品已经通过早先的宪定和单边行动而实现了自由化。


The main remaining trade constraints involve non-tariff barriers, such as US agricultural subsidies, which the TPP does not address.	仍然存在的主要贸易制约因素是非关税壁垒（如美国农业补贴），TPP并未解决它们。


Instead, the TPP’s most important provisions strengthen, broaden, and extend intellectual property rights.	相反，TPP最重要的条款加强、扩大和扩展了知识产权权利。


That will give pharmaceutical companies much longer monopolies on patented medicines and keep cheaper options – both generics and alternatives that are deemed too similar – off the market, hurting both consumers and governments that provide subsidies.	这将大大延长制药公司对专利药的垄断，让更廉价的选择——不管是非专利药还是被认为过于相似的替代品——无法进入市场，对消费者和提供补贴的政府都构成了伤害。


Moreover, the TPP weakens national regulation, such as over financial services, and strengthens the rights of foreign investors, at the expense of local businesses and the public interest.	此外，TPP削弱了国家监管，如金融服务监管，并增强了外国投资者的权利，而这些都建立在牺牲本地企业和公共利益的基础上。


Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions allow foreign investors to pursue binding private arbitration against governments if new regulations reduce their expected future profits.	投资者-国家纠纷解决（ISDS）条款允许外国投资者在新监管规则降低了他们的预期未来利润时追求有法律约束力的针对政府的仲裁。


Governments that lose those lawsuits will be obliged to compensate foreign investors; but even those that win will incur high legal costs.	输掉这些官司的政府将必须补偿外国投资者； 但即使打赢了官司，也将付出高昂的法律成本。


In fact, potential ISDS compensation payments or settlements alone could far outweigh the TPP’s limited economic benefits.	事实上，光是潜在ISDS补偿或和解就可能大大超过了TPP所带来的有限的经济收益。


Fear of incurring such high costs are likely to weaken governments’ incentives to implement regulations that hurt foreign corporate interests, even if they serve the public good.	担心发生这些高昂的成本可能削弱政府实施有害于外国公司利益的监管措施的激励，即使它们有利于公共利益。


Finally, though the TPP’s biggest impact will lie outside the trade realm, the agreement has been used to undermine multilateral trade-liberalization efforts.	最后，尽管TPP最大的影响将存在于贸易领域之外，但该协定被用来破坏多边贸易自由化努力。


The most obvious victim has been the World Trade Organization’s ongoing Doha Development Round negotiations, but Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Economic Community will also suffer.	最显而易见的受害者是尚未结束的世界贸易组织多哈发展回合谈判，但亚太经合组织和东盟经济共同体也将蒙受损失。


The TPP’s advocates have, for years, been grossly exaggerating the deal’s projected benefits, while downplaying its potentially high risks and costs, most of which will be incurred by ordinary citizens.	多年来，TPP支持者竭力夸大该协议的预期收益，同时淡化其潜在的高风险和成本——其中大部分将由普通公民承受。


The reality is that the TPP will have a barely perceptible impact on GDP, benefit large corporations almost exclusively, and significantly constrain the policy space governments need to accelerate economic development and protect the public interest.	现实是TPP对GDP将不会产生可察觉的影响，其收益几乎由大公司独占，而同时将制约政府加快经济发展、保护公共利益所需要的政策空间。


Some partnership that is.	它就是这样的合作伙伴关系。


The Roots of Western Tribalism	西方部落主义的根源


ABU DHABI – In Hermann Hesse’s novel Journey to the East, the character of H.H., a novice in a religious group known as The League, describes a figurine depicting himself next to the group’s leader, Leo.	阿布扎比—赫尔曼·黑塞（Hermann Hesse）的小说《东游记》（Journey to the East）中的角色H. H.


“It seemed that, in time, all the substance from one image would flow into the other and only one would remain: Leo.	是一个叫作“联盟”（The League）的宗教团体的新鲜人，他描述了一个站在团体领导者里奥（Leo）边上的、以他自己为原型的雕塑。 “看起来，迟早有一天，一个形象的所有实质都会流入另一个，最后只剩下一个：里奥。


He must grow, I must disappear.”	他必须成长起来，我必须消失。 ”


Hesse is describing the sacrifice of an individual self for the sake of a larger cause.	黑塞描绘的是一个个体为了大事业而牺牲自己。


But he is also depicting how people create their heroes.	但他也描绘了人们如何创造他们的英雄。


Whether it is Vladimir Lenin, Che Guevara, Ruhollah Khomeini, Hugo Chávez, or even Donald Trump, “heroes” are in the eye of the beholder.	不管是列宁、格瓦拉、霍梅尼、查韦斯还是特朗普，“英雄”是旁观者的英雄。


They are idealized reflections of the self.	他们是理想化的自身的反映。


And as Hesse’s description implies, the heroic image also feeds off of the self, to the point that the individual must disappear.	黑塞的描述暗示，英雄形象会吞噬自我，以至于个体必须消失。


Tribalism is at the heart of this process.	部落主义（tribalism）是这一过程的核心。


Because mankind has a deep yearning for a sense of belonging and for leadership, humans naturally form groups with established leaders.	人类有深刻的归属感和被领导的诉求，因此人们天然会组成有现成领导者的团体。


Some groups are positive manifestations of collaboration and solidarity among individuals.	一些团体堪称个体之间合作和团结的积极写照。


But when groups are based on an ideology or a particular tribe, they can become discriminatory and oppressive toward non-members, especially if a domineering, charismatic leader is in charge.	但如果团体是基于某种身份或某个特定的部落，那么他们可能歧视并镇压非成员，特别是在一位魅力超凡的霸道领导人掌权的时候。


The emergence of populist and nationalist movements in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries suggests that tribalism is on the rise in the West.	美国、英国、法国和其他欧洲国家民粹主义和民族主义运动的崛起表明，部落主义正在西方兴起。


Populist movements have set their sights on immigrants and globalization generally.	民粹主义运动着眼于一般化的移民和全球化。


But, as with all forms of tribalism, these movements pose the greatest danger to the individual.	但是，和一切部落主义一样，受这些运动威胁最大的是个体。


Followers are obliged to pay fealty to the tribe and its chief.	追随者有义务向部落及其领袖效忠。


But because the tribe brooks no dissent, tribal parties tend to degenerate quickly into competing factions.	但由于部落容不下异见，部落中的各方很快便退化为互相竞争的派系。


Explanations of what has led to our new era of tribal politics abound.	是什么导致了新的部落政治时代？ 答案众说纷纭。


For many, the root cause is growing economic inequality.	许多人认为，根源在于日益高涨的经济不平等。


While the rich have gotten richer, rural blue-collar workers and the poor have been left to fend for themselves against immigrants, refugees, and the forces of globalization.	富人越来越富，而农村蓝领工人和穷人远远落后，只得通过反对移民、难民和全球化力量来保护自己。


But even if globalization has benefited some groups and regions more than others, it doesn’t explain today’s tribal politics; if anything, the lack of globalization in certain regions does.	但即便全球化让某些团体和宗教比其他团体和宗教获得了更大的利益，它也无法解释当今的部落政治； 倒是某些地区全球化程度不足能够解释。


It is worth remembering that most Trump voters were neither poor nor blue collar.	不要忘记，大部分特朗普的选民既不是穷人也不是 蓝领。


But they do largely reside in peripheral regions and smaller cities where the benefits of globalization – though not the costs – have been largely absent.	但他们确实生活在边远地区和小城市，这些地方没有得到多少全球化的好处，代价倒是一点不少地承受了。


This same urban-rural split is evident in every country that has experienced an uptick in tribal populism in recent years.	同样的城乡分割也见于所有近几年中部落民粹主义有所抬头的国家。


Moreover, if globalization, and specifically immigration, are drivers of inequality, then the large cities where refugees, immigrants, and poorer communities share the same space should be sites of political upheaval.	此外，如果全球化——特别是移民——推动了不平等性，那么在大城市中，难民、移民和贫穷社区享有同样的空间，因此它们应该成为政治剧变的发生地。


And yet in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and elsewhere, nationalist and populist parties tend to find their supporters outside of the main cities.	但在奥地利、法国、德国、荷兰、英国和其他国家，民族主义和民粹主义政党的支持者往往存在于主要城市之外。


Although globalization and immigration can be political pressure points, the roots of voting behavior today lie in three interrelated developments.	尽管全球化和移民可能成为政治压力点，但当今选举行为的根源是三大互相关联的发展趋势。


First, citizens in the West have gradually become less politically organized and more individualistic.	首先，西方公民政治组织性逐渐减弱，个人主义日益盛行。


Across all liberal democracies, membership in political parties has long been declining, owing to post-war changes in education, social norms, and popular culture that emphasize critical thinking and self-expression.	在所有自由民主国家，由于战后教育、社会规范和流行文化发生改变，批判性思维和自我表达得到强调，政党党员数量早已开始下降。


The result is what the American sociologist David Riesman has called “inner-directed individuals” – “Cartesian” men and women who think for themselves.	结果是美国社会学家大卫·李斯曼（David Riesman）所谓的“有主见的个体”——为自己思考的“笛卡尔派”男女。


This development would have been indisputably positive had it not overlapped with Western economies’ shift, beginning sometime in the mid-1990s, toward technology-driven growth models, which increased demand for so-called STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) skills.	如果这一发展趋势没有和西方经济变迁同时发生，那么绝对应该是一个积极的变化。 从20世纪90年代中期的某个时间开始，西方经济开始转向技术驱动的增长模式，这提高了所谓的STEM（科学、技术、工程和数学）技能的要求。


As education systems began to focus far less on the humanities, citizens, already less exposed to the political education and guidance offered by traditional political parties, were increasingly cut off from the transmission of humanistic values as well.	教育系统对人文的关注大大降低，原本受到政治教育和传统政党所提供的引导便有所减少的公民，也日益与人文价值的传播割裂。


The rationale for studying literature, history, and art – to learn empathy, develop our emotional intelligence, and reconcile critical thinking with universal values – has not disappeared with the opportunities to do so.	文学、历史和艺术——学习同理心、开发情商、将批判性思维和普世价值相调和——并没有因为学习机会的减少而变得不再有意义。


The false assumption that a humanities degree is less valuable than a STEM degree in the twenty-first-century labor market does not bode well for the functioning of liberal democracy.	一个错误的观念是，在二十一世纪的劳动力市场，人文学位没有STEM 学位有价值，这对于自由民主的运行非常不利。


The third consideration is an extension of the second: the increasing commodification and marketization of higher education in recent decades.	第三个要考虑的问题是第二个趋势的扩展：近几十年来高等教育被日益商品化和市场化。


As universities vie for accreditation and “me too” status, their programs have increasingly begun to resemble one another.	大学开始追求资格和“我也是”地位，推出的教学计划彼此日益相似。


The process of molding “test-ready individuals” recalls a line from Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: “As for this Petersburg swell, they’re turned out by machinery, all on one pattern, and all precious rubbish.”	塑造“随时准备考试的个体”的过程让人想起列夫·托尔斯泰的《安娜·卡列宁娜》中的话：“至于彼得堡的那个花花公子，这种人都是机器造出来的，都是一个模子， 都是坏蛋。


Likewise, the commodification of knowledge makes today’s graduates more disposable: vulnerable to replacement by the “machinery” that produced them.	”类似地，知识的商品化让今天的毕业生也变得如同一次性用品：很容易被生产了他们的“机器”所取代。


Taken together, these three developments help to explain the rise of a new class of voters: highly skilled, highly paid, and poorly educated in the values underpinning liberal democracy.	总而言之，这三大发展趋势有助于解释新选民阶层的兴起：高技能、高薪酬，没有受过作为自由民主基础的价值观的教育。


It is not particularly surprising that these voters, bereft of shared traditions of knowledge and understanding, coalesce around tribal identities and the surrender of self to a collective consciousness.	这些选民丧失了共同的知识传统和理解，他们联合在部落身份周围、将自己拱手交给集体意识并不特别令人惊奇。


Liberal democracies had supposedly moved beyond “primordial” politics, toward a society of empowered citizens.	自由民主理应超越“原始”政治，塑造赋权公民的社会。


But citizens’ power – their ability to identify their interests and to act individually and collectively to advance them – requires a set of skills altogether different from those being emphasized today.	但公民的权力——他们辨别自己的利益，并通过个体和集体行动推进这些利益的能力——需要完全不同于今天所强调的技能组合。


The Trump Administration’s Economic Potential	特朗普政府的经济潜力


TOKYO – President Donald Trump’s unpredictable approach to policymaking has fueled widespread concern about where the United States is headed.	东京——特朗普总统反复无常的政策制定手段引发了人们对美国国家走向的广泛关注。


Yet America’s stock market has performed well since Trump’s election, faltering only when his administration’s political future appears to be in doubt.	然而自新总统当选以来美国股市表现良好，只有当政府的政治前景遭人质疑时才出现下挫。


That is no accident: on the economic front, Trump’s approach might have some redeeming qualities.	这可不是个偶然现象：在经济方面，特朗普的做法可能还是有一些可取之处的。


From the outset, the Trump administration has maintained a pro-business attitude, exemplified by his commitment to deregulation, raising hopes among investors of a boost to the US and global economies.	自上任伊始，特朗普政府就一直保持着亲商的态度，承诺放松管制，使得投资者对美国和全球经济的提振重树信心。


To be sure, efforts to roll back, say, environmental protections will ultimately do serious harm to the US, even if they allow some companies to improve their bottom line in the short term.	当然某些倒退性的举措（比如环保措施）最终将对美国造成严重损害，即使它们会让一些公司在短期内提升其底线。


But the Trump administration’s eagerness to free financial markets of excessive regulation may ultimately prove beneficial for all.	但特朗普政府急于将金融市场从过度监管中松绑的做法可能最终会让所有人得益。


When regulations become too cumbersome, they can do more harm than good.	当规章制度变得过于繁琐时，它们就会变得弊大于利。


The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2010, is a good example.	奥巴马在 2010年签署实施的《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》就是一个很好的例子。


The Dodd-Frank legislation contains rules that have impeded the functioning of the international monetary market: by raising US dollar funding costs for foreign banks, the rule compromised so-called covered interest parity.	该法案中包含了阻碍国际货币市场运作的规则: 通过提高外国银行的美元融资成本，这一规则削弱了所谓的抛补利率平价（covered interest parity）。


For Japan, this undermined the transmission of monetary easing in international financial markets – a mechanism that was already strained by risk-averse investors flocking to the Japanese yen as a safe-haven currency.	对日本来说，这破坏了国际金融市场中货币宽松政策的传导——这一机制已经因为风险厌恶型投资者争相买入日元作为避险货币而摇摇欲坠。


With Trump removing friction-causing regulations and inspiring stock-market confidence, the Bank of Japan may finally be able to limit the yen’s appreciation, thereby spurring inflation, employment, and the stock market.	由于特朗普取消了引发摩擦的法规并激发了股市的信心，日本银行可能最终得以限制日元升值，从而刺激通胀，就业和股市。


Another reason for optimism about the US and world economies is rooted in the Trump administration’s $1 trillion plan to rebuild America’s infrastructure.	而对美国和世界经济持有乐观态度的另一个原因则是特朗普政府计划耗资1兆美元的重建美国基础设施计划。


Unfortunately, Trump’s equivocation about the white supremacist violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, earlier this month destroyed the last traces of goodwill he may have had in the US Congress.	不幸的是，特朗普对本月中于弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔发生的白人至上主义暴行闪烁其词，也因此丧失他在美国国会可能享有的最后一丝善意。


With two business advisory councils having been disbanded in the wake of the Charlottesville incident, following an exodus of CEOs critical of Trump’s response, plans for an infrastructure advisory council have now also been dropped.	在事件发生后对特朗普的反应持批评态度的大企业CEO纷纷拂袖而去，两个商业咨询委员会相继解散，建立基础设施咨询委员会的计划如今也束之高阁了。


But political disarray is far from the only potential threat to Trump’s economic success.	但政治混乱远远算不上是对特朗普经济政绩的唯一潜在威胁。


His administration’s trade policy is based on serious misconceptions.	该政府的贸易政策构建于严重的认知之上。


Trump and his advisers seem to believe that only balanced bilateral trade is fair and, therefore, desirable.	特朗普及其顾问们似乎认为只有平衡的双边贸易才是公平(并因此可取的)。


In fact, such balance is very difficult to achieve in an open trading system, and pursuing it would actually be damaging, as it would undermine the overall benefits gained through trade.	事实上在一个开放的贸易体系中这种平衡极难实现，而尝试实现这一点实际上是有害的，因为它会折损通过贸易所获得的总体利益。


After World War II, high inflation in Japan undermined confidence in the yen’s stability, leading many Japanese to barter.	二战后，日本的高通胀削弱了人们对日元币值的信心，导致许多日本人回归到以货易货的交易形式。


Tokyoites, for example, traded their precious garments, from wedding dresses to fine kimonos, with rural farmers for rice and vegetables.	比如东京人就将自己包括婚纱礼服及和服在内的贵重服饰与农民交换大米和蔬菜交。


The system worked, because, at that moment, demand and supply happened to be exactly matched.	这个体系在那时是可以顺利运转的，因为需求和供应恰好匹配。


But that balance was fundamentally coincidental; it could not be expected to endure changing economic circumstances.	但这种平衡从根本上来说种巧合； 人们无法指望其在不断变化经济环境下长期存在。


That is why barter economies are so inefficient – and thus obsolete.	这也是为何以货易货经济的效率如此低下并因此遭到了抛弃。


Modern systems use money, because, as a store of value, it serves as a kind of buffer, removing the need for a perfect balance between supply and demand, and enabling all actors to get what they need from trade.	现代经济体系使用货币，因为它作为价值的载体可以起到缓冲作用，使得供需之间无需实现完美平衡，并使所有行为者都能从贸易中得到自己想要的东西。


As Trump attempts to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico, he would do well to remember this.	当特朗普试图与加拿大和墨西哥重新谈判《北美自由贸易协定》最好记住这一点。


As it stands, his administration seems eager to impose limits on US imports from NAFTA countries.	就目前而言，他的政府似乎急于对来自北美自由贸易区国家的进口施加限制。


If the only thing that changed about NAFTA members’ behavior was that they exported less to the US, America workers could benefit, with US farmers or manufacturers – including much of Trump’s own electoral base – becoming more competitive within the US market.	但如果这些自贸区成员发生的唯一变化那就是减少了对美出口，美国的工人就可以从中受益，而美国的农民或制造商——包括许多投票给特朗普的选民——都会在本国市场上更具竞争力。


But that is not going to happen.	但这相当于痴人说梦。


Instead, America’s NAFTA partners will respond strategically to limits on their exports, adjusting their trade relationships with each other and with others, in order to mitigate the impact of US import controls.	相反，其他北美自贸协定成员国将对这一出口限制作出战略性反应，调整相互之间以及与协定国家的贸易关系以减轻美国进口管制的影响。


Protectionist behavior by the US could even trigger a trade war, as occurred after the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930, in which case everyone would lose.	美国的保护主义行为甚至可能引发一场贸易战，就像1930年出台了《斯穆特-霍利关税法案（Smoot-Hawley Tariff）》后所发生的那样，在这种情况下，没有任何人会成为赢家。


To develop a more effective trade policy, the Trump administration must acknowledge what current-account balances are and are not.	为了制定更有效的贸易政策，特朗普政府必须搞明白经常账户余额究竟有什么意义。


Trump has often condemned countries like China and Germany, because he views their surpluses as direct corollaries to America’s deficit.	特朗普经常谴责像中国和德国这样的国家，因为在他看来正是两国的盈余直接导致了美国的赤字。


He assumes that they are somehow “ripping off” the US – taking advantage of America’s market, while undermining the competitiveness of its companies.	他认定这些国家在某种程度上“抢劫”了美国——既进占了美国的市场，又削弱了其企业的竞争力。


But, as Martin Feldstein and George Shultz recently put it, “if a country consumes more than it produces, it must import more than it exports.	但正如马丁·费尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）和乔治·舒尔茨（George Shultz）最近指出的那样，“如果一个国家的消费比它生产的要多，那么它就必须进口比出口更多的货物。


That’s not a rip-off; that’s arithmetic.”	那不是敲竹杠； 这是算术。


And, in fact, if the US managed to negotiate a reduction in, say, China’s trade surplus vis-à-vis the US, the US would simply have to increase its deficit with some other country to make up for it.	”事实上，倘若美国真能跟中国谈判以减少对美贸易顺差，就得增加与其他一些国家的逆差以弥补中间的差额。


A better way to understand a current-account surplus (or deficit) is as a measure of a country’s saving (or dissaving) toward the future.	一个理解经常账户盈余 (或赤字) 的更好方式是将其作为衡量一国储蓄 (或消耗)未来发展趋势的指标 。


In other words, a country’s current account reflects how it allocates its income between the present and the future.	换言之，一个国家的经常账户反映了它如何在当前和未来之间分配自己的收入。


If the US wants to reduce its own deficits, it should start saving more.	如果美国想要减少自己的赤字，就要开始储蓄更多。


The US is undoubtedly facing serious political challenges, exacerbated by a mercurial, polarizing, and brash administration.	美国无疑正面临着严峻的政治挑战，而这一状况在一个朝令夕改、极端化和草率形式的政府手下不断恶化。


But, economically, the country remains on sound footing.	但在经济上这个国家仍然相当稳固。


If, as I believe, US policymakers genuinely want to strengthen the economy, they are in a good position to do so, benefiting not just the stock market, but ordinary Americans as well.	如果美国政策制定者跟我相信的那样真心想搞好经济，那么他们完全有能力做到这一点，不仅让股市得利，也有益于广大的普通美国人。


Trump’s Growth Charade	特朗普的增长游戏


WASHINGTON, DC – Officials in President Donald Trump’s administration frequently talk about getting annual economic growth in the United States back above 3%.	华盛顿—特朗普总统的政府官员们常说要让美国经济增长重回3%上方。


But they are doing more than just talking about it; their proposed budget actually assumes that they will succeed.	但他们可不只是说说而已； 他们提出的预算真的假设他们能取得成功。


If they do, it would represent a significant improvement over recent performance: the US economy has averaged less than 2% annual growth since 2000.	如果真的成功的话，这将是在近期表现基础上的重大改善：自2000年以来，美国年均经济增长不到2%。


And, while an increase to 3% might sound small, it would make an enormous difference in terms of employment and wages.	尽管增长提高到3%看上去增幅有限，但就业和工资局面将大为不同。


Unfortunately, left to its own devices, the economy will most likely continue to sputter.	不幸的是，放任自流的话，经济更有可能继续恶化。


And the policies that Trump’s Republican Party has proposed – for health care, taxes, and deregulation – will not make much difference.	而特朗普的共和党所提出的政策——包括医疗、税收和去监管化等方面——无法带来多少改观。


The assumption of higher growth is more of an accounting smokescreen for tax cuts than anything else.	增长提高的假设更多地是为了推行减税而打出的会计烟幕弹。


If administration officials acknowledge that a 3% annual rate is not feasible, they would need to face the reality that their forecasts for tax revenues are too high, and that their proposed tax cuts, if enacted, would dramatically increase the budget deficit and the national debt.	如果政府官员承认，3%的年增长率根本不可行，他们就需要面对一个事实：他们对税收收入的预测太高了，而他们想要实施的减税政策将大大增加预算赤字和国民债务。


The US economy used to grow at more than 3% per year; in fact, this was the norm in the second half of the twentieth century.	美国经济过去的增长率超过每年3%稀松平常； 事实上，3%以上的增长率才是二十世纪下半叶的常态。


Since then, however, the US has been forced to confront three major constraints.	但此后，美国被迫面对三大经济约束。


First, the US population is aging.	首先是美国人口的老龄化。


As the baby boom generation (born after the end of World War II) retires, the proportion of retired people in the total population increases.	婴儿潮一代（生于二战结束后）退休，退休人口占总人口比例随之上升。


Over time, this demographic shift has reduced US potential annual growth by perhaps as much as half a percentage point.	随着时间的推移，这一人口变化可能导致美国潜在年增长率下降半个百分点。


The details of what will happen to health insurance remain unclear.	医保改革的细节仍不清楚。


But making it harder or more expensive for lower-income and older Americans to get health insurance is not likely to encourage people to work.	但让较低收入和较年长美国人获得医保变得更加艰难或更加昂贵不可能起到鼓励人们工作的效果。


The best independent assessment of these policies, produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), does not predict any economic miracles – just that around 20 million fewer Americans will have health insurance.	这些政策的最好的独立评估来自国会预算办公室（CBO），它的评估表明不会发生任何经济奇迹——只是有大约2,000万美国人将失去医保。


And lurking in the background are potential policies that would restrict legal immigration.	隐藏在背景中的还有限制合法移民的政策。


The US currently allows about one million mostly working-age people per year to take up residence and work in the country.	目前，美国每年允许大约100万在美国定居和工作，其中大部分为工作年龄人口。


Moreover, immigrants’ tendency to have more children than non-immigrants do keeps the US population growing faster than in other developed countries (for example, in Europe or Japan).	此外，移民总是比非移民生更多的孩子，这一倾向让美国人口增长快于其他发达国家（比如欧洲国家和日本）。


So any move to reduce annual immigration – some Republicans are proposing 500,000 people or fewer – would make 3% annual economic growth even less likely.	因此，任何减少每年移民数量的动作——一些共和党人提出将移民人数限制在500,000或以下——将让3%的年经济增长率更加难以实现。


The second economic constraint is the slowing rate of productivity growth.	第二个经济约束是生产率增长放缓。


There was a major increase in average output per person in the post-World War II years, as better technology was developed across a wide range of sectors.	二战结束后，人均平均产出曾经有过大幅提升，这是因为更加先进的技术被用于各行各业。


And there were hopes in the 1990s that the information technology revolution would have a similar effect.	20世纪90年代，信息技术革命也大有希望形成同样的效应。


But the impact on productivity has been disappointing.	但其对生产率的影响一直令人失望。


Northwestern University economist Robert Gordon’s recent book, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, argues that, despite all the hype from the tech sector, we are unlikely to see a dramatic change on this front.	西北大学经济学家罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）的新书《美国增长的兴衰》（The Rise and Fall of American Growth）指出，尽管科技行业蓬勃兴旺，但在这一领域不太可能发生巨大的变化。


The Trump administration argues that by reducing taxes and “reforming” healthcare, it can boost productivity – for example, by encouraging capital investment.	特朗普政府认为，通过降低税收和医疗“改革”，它可以提振生产率——比如通过鼓励资本投资实现。


But the tax cuts that will soon be on the table are likely to resemble closely those implemented by President George W. Bush’s administration, which did not lead to any kind of economic boom (a point that James Kwak and I examined in detail in our book White House Burning).	但即将提上议程的减税很可能类似于小布什政府所实施的减税政策，后者并没有带来任何形式的经济繁荣（郭庾信和我在我们的书《火烧白宫》中详细讨论了这一点）。


The third constraint stems from the 2008 financial crisis.	第三个约束来自2008年金融危机。


One danger inherent in pushing for high growth is that it is always possible to juice an economy with short-term measures that encourage a lot of risk-taking and leverage in the financial system.	推动高增长的一个固有危险是，永远有可能采取鼓励金融系统大量冒险和负债的短期措施去压榨经济。


Deregulation in the 1990s and early 2000s did exactly that, leading to slightly higher growth for a while – and then to a massive crash.	20世纪90年代和21世纪初的去监管化便是如此，结果是增长在一段时间内略有提高，随后则发生了大崩盘。


The details of the Trump administration’s plans remain to be determined, but officials will most likely push in the direction of relaxing limits on leverage (thereby allowing banks to borrow more relative to equity).	特朗普政府的计划的细节仍有待确定，但官员极有可能采取放松杠杆上限的方向（从而允许银行借入相对于股本更多的资金）。


Any boom generated in this way is likely to end badly – not just financial ruin for millions of individuals, but also a long and difficult recovery.	用这种方式制造的繁荣，最终都有可能以悲剧收场——不仅仅是数百万个人惨遭财务灾难，复苏之路也有可能漫长而艰难。


The two least political and most influential official forecasts – those issued by the CBO and the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee – both foresee 2% growth, on average, for the coming decade and perhaps beyond.	两大政治性质最少、影响力最大的预测——分别由CBO和美联储公开市场委员会做出——都认为未来十年（可能更长）中平均增长率为2%。


Assuming 3% growth is, to put it generously, wishful thinking.	认为增长能够达到3%，最多只能算是痴人说梦。


Worse, it is deeply misleading – and potentially dangerous.	更糟糕的是，这具有极大的误导性——以及潜在的危害性。


If those pushing for tax cuts stick to their guns and refuse to accept reality, their agenda, if enacted, would result in a significantly wider budget deficit, which would increase the national debt to unprecedentedly high levels.	如果推动减税的人坚持不接受现实，那么，他们的议程如果实施，将导致预算赤字大幅扩大，从而让国民债务提高到前所未有的高度。


Keeping US Policymaking Honest	守护美国政策制定的诚信


BERKELEY – In a recent appearance here at the University of California, Berkeley, Alice Rivlin expressed optimism about the future of economic policymaking in the United States.	发自伯克利——在最近一场加州大学伯克利分校举办的会议中，爱丽丝·里夫林（Alice Rivlin）对美国经济政策制定的未来表示乐观。


What Rivlin – who served as Vice Chair of the US Federal Reserve, Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President Bill Clinton, and founding Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) – thinks about that topic matters a great deal.	曾任美联储副主席，克林顿总统管理及预算办公室主任以及国会预算办公室第一任主管的里夫林对这一话题显然是有极大发言权的。


Indeed, America owes its current system of “technocracy” – which ensures that policymaking follows sound analysis and empirical evidence – more to Rivlin than to any other living human.	事实上，美国现有的“技术官僚”制度——确保政策制定能遵循正确的分析和经验证据——所倚仗最多的人，莫过于里夫林了。


When she was younger, however, Rivlin was denied admission to the graduate program at Harvard University’s Littauer Center of Public Administration. Her application was rejected, she was told, because of “unfortunate experiences” with previous admissions of “women of marriageable age.”	里夫林在年轻时曾被哈佛大学里塔尔公共管理中心的研究生课程拒绝录取，而拒绝理由是该课程曾在录取“适婚年龄妇女”方面有着“不幸的经历”。


In those phrases, you can almost hear the New England Puritans’ unctuous sermonizing about the seduction of Eve by the serpent, and her subsequent temptation of Adam.	在上述字里行间你几乎可以感受到新英格兰地区清教徒那种所谓夏娃被毒蛇诱惑进而诱惑亚当的虚伪道德说教。


Of course, when Rivlin helped found the CBO in 1974 she was essentially eating from the Tree of Knowledge, and she was making the rest of us eat from it, too.	当然，当里夫林在1974年帮助创立国会预算办公室时，她实际上也是在采摘智慧之树上的果实，也帮助我们其他人都吃到了果子。


We are all better for it.	我们的事业都因此而得到了促进。


In her recent talk, Rivlin expressed confidence that, despite today’s populist attacks on expertise, high-quality policy analysis will continue to flourish in the twenty-first-century public sphere.	在最近的谈话中，里夫林坚信尽管眼下民粹主义者对专家们大肆抨击，但高质量的政策分析依然会在21世纪的公共领域继续蓬勃发展。


And she predicted that empirical evidence and expert knowledge will still carry substantial – if not full – weight in decision-making by legislators, presidents, and their advisers.	她预测经验证据和专家知识仍然会在立法者，总统及其顾问的决策过程中占据重要（就算不是全部）地位。


To be sure, the CBO has never been more influential than it is this year.	可以肯定的是，国会预算办公室的影响力在今年达到了顶峰。


Its influence has been felt not merely because of its role in congressional proceedings, but also because it offers assessments that are widely respected across government, the media, and civil society.	它的影响力不仅来自于自身在国会议事中的作用，也因为它的评估报告赢得了政府，媒体和公民社会的广泛尊重。


Its estimates of how congressional Republicans’ legislative proposals will affect the country are deeply informed, nonpartisan, and made in good faith.	它对国会共和党议员立法提案将如何影响美国的评估极为深入，不带党派偏见且满怀真诚。


So far, at least, it seems that Rivlin is right to be optimistic.	至少到目前为止，似乎里夫林的乐观还是站得住脚的。


Still, I have my doubts about the future.	不过笔者却对未来依旧存疑。


Rivlin believes that there is a general consensus within policymaking circles about basic economic principles, and that those principles will underpin the assessments, estimates, and models used in public-policy debates.	里夫林认为政策制定界普遍认同一系列基本的经济原则，而公共政策辩论中所使用的评估，预测和模型都将构建于这些原则之上。


She pointed out that no reputable economists today regard a simple monetary-policy rule as a magic bullet for avoiding depressions and inflationary spirals, whereas many once did.	她指出从前经常会有某位知名经济学家将一项简单货币政策规则视为避免萧条和螺旋式通胀的灵丹妙药，但如今已经不存在这种现象了。


That is true, as far as it goes.	截至目前来说事实确实如此。


And yet, until the announcement that Jerome Powell had been selected as the next Fed Chair, Stanford University economist John Taylor was a leading contender.	然而在特朗普宣布杰罗姆·鲍威尔（Jerome Powell）当选下一任美联储主席之后就未必了。 在此之前斯坦福大学经济学家约翰·泰勒（John Taylor）一直是大热门人选。


Taylor is known for having developed his own guideline (the “Taylor rule”) for how central banks should set interest rates.	泰勒因为制定关于央行应当如何设定利率的准则（“泰勒规则”）而闻名于世。


And he has long clung to this rule, despite a lack of evidence that it would have delivered better results than the Fed’s actual policy decisions since the 1970s.	他也一直坚守这一规则，尽管缺乏证据显示该规则会比1970年代以来美联储的实际政策决策取得更好的结果。


Moreover, when US President Donald Trump appointed former American Enterprise Institute economist Kevin Hassett to lead the White House Council of Economic Advisers, many expected that Hassett would be a “normal” CEA chairman.	此外，当特朗普总统任命前美国企业研究所经济学家凯文·哈塞特（Kevin Hassett）领导白宫经济顾问委员会时，许多人都预计哈塞特将成为一位“正常的”顾问委员会主席。


Hassett, we were told, would safeguard the CEA’s credibility, by ensuring that its estimates remained in line with those of the larger policy-analysis community.	有人告诉我们说哈塞特将确保其预测与政策分析界保持一致从而维护好委员会的信誉。


And he would understand that agencies and organizations such as the CBO, OMB, Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Policy Center (TPC), and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities have a principal allegiance to facts, not to some donor or political master.	而他也明白诸如国会预算办公室，管理及预算办公室，联合税务委员会，税收政策研究中心和预算和政策优先事务研究中心等机构和组织都效忠于事实，而非某些捐助者或政治巨头。


Yet Hassett has so far spent his time at the CEA tearing down TPC estimates, even though the organization will undoubtedly issue assessments in the future that are as inconvenient for his political adversaries as they are for him today.	然而上任后的哈塞特却把心思都放在了想方设法否定税收政策研究中心的预测上，尽管该中心今后依然将毫不迟疑地发布对他的政治对手不利的评估报告，正如他当前所遭遇的那样。


According to the near-consensus among policy analysts, the share of corporate taxes borne by labor, and the share of lost revenues from a cut in corporate income tax that will be recouped through increased investment, are both 25%. Yet the CEA, under Hassett, now assumes that both are 82%.	根据政策分析人士近乎一致的观点，劳动力所占企业总体税负的份额，以及借助投资增加来挽回的因企业所得税减免造成的政府收入损失的份额都是25％，然而哈塞特手下的经济顾问委员会却认为这两个数字都该是82％。


That claim, as well as Hassett’s recent attacks on the TPC, made former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers angrier than I can ever recall having seen him with respect to a public-policy issue.	这种说法以及哈塞特最近对税收政策研究中心的攻击令美国前财政部长拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）大为震怒，连我都从未在任何公共政策问题上看见他那么生气过。


According to Summers, Hassett’s analysis is “some combination of dishonest, incompetent, and absurd.”	如萨默斯所说，哈塞特的分析是“不诚实，无能和荒谬的集合体”。


Benjamin Franklin famously told the American people that the US Constitution would provide them with “a republic, if you can keep it.”	本杰明·富兰克林（Benjamin Franklin）曾对美国人民说，美国宪法将为他们构建“一个共和国，但（共和国的存续）则需要你们去守护”。


In her long, distinguished career, Rivlin and others like her have provided us with a rational policymaking process – if we can keep it.	里夫林和她这样的人在其漫长而杰出的职业生涯中为我们构建了一个合理的决策过程——而我们也必须去守护它。


America’s Dangerous Anti-Iran Posturing	危险的美国反伊朗姿态


NEW YORK – In recent weeks, US President Donald Trump and his advisers have joined Saudi Arabia in accusing Iran of being the epicenter of Middle East terrorism.	纽约—最近几周，美国总统特朗普和他的顾问与沙特阿拉伯联合指责伊朗是中东恐怖主义的核心。


The US Congress, meanwhile, is readying yet another round of sanctions against Iran.	与此同时，美国国会已经准备对伊朗采取新一轮制裁。


But the caricature of Iran as “the tip of the spear” of global terrorism, in Saudi King Salman’s words, is not only wrongheaded, but also extremely dangerous, because it could lead to yet another Middle East war.	但将伊朗说成是全球恐怖主义“枪尖”（沙特国王萨勒曼语）不但是个顽固的错误，更加非常危险，因为这可能导致中东再次爆发战争。


In fact, that seems to be the goal of some US hotheads, despite the obvious fact that Iran is on the same side as the United States in opposing the Islamic State (ISIS).	事实上，这似乎正是美国一些激进人士的目的，尽管显而易见的事实是伊朗在反对伊斯兰国方面与美国站在一边。


And then there’s the fact that Iran, unlike most of its regional adversaries, is a functioning democracy.	还有一个事实是，与其大部分域内对手不同，伊朗是一个运转良好的民主国家。


Ironically, the escalation of US and Saudi rhetoric came just two days after Iran’s May 19 election, in which moderates led by incumbent President Hassan Rouhani defeated their hardline opponents at the ballot box.	讽刺的是，美国和沙特口风升级之前两天，即5月19日，伊朗刚刚进行了大选，现任总统鲁哈尼领导的温和派击败了他们的强硬派反对者。


Perhaps for Trump, the pro-Saudi, anti-Iran embrace is just another business proposition.	也许对特朗普来说，亲伊朗或反伊朗的姿态，无非是另一种商业方案。


He beamed at Saudi Arabia’s decision to buy $110 billion of new US weapons, describing the deal as “jobs, jobs, jobs,” as if the only gainful employment for American workers requires them to stoke war.	他为沙特阿拉伯购买1,100亿美元美国新武器的决定而笑逐颜开，将这笔交易称为“工作、工作、工作”，好像美国工人唯一的有酬就业（gainful employment）要求他们发动战争似的。


And who knows what private deals for Trump and his family might also be lurking in his warm embrace of Saudi belligerence.	至于特朗普及其家族因为其热情支持好战的沙特而暗中获得多少私人好处么就只有天知道了。


The Trump administration’s bombast toward Iran is, in a sense, par for the course.	从某种角度讲，特朗普政府关于伊朗的夸大之词完全是意料中事。


US foreign policy is littered with absurd, tragic, and hugely destructive foreign wars that served no real purpose except the pursuit of some misguided strand of official propaganda.	美国外交政策充满了荒谬、悲剧和极大破坏性的对外战争，这些战争除了满足了一些完全错误的官方宣传目标之外，一无所获。


How else, in the end, to explain America’s useless and hugely costly entanglements in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and many other conflicts?	要不然的话，如何解释美国代价沉重又徒劳无功地卷入越南、阿富汗、伊拉克、叙利亚、利比亚、也门和其他许多冲突？


America’s anti-Iran animus goes back to the country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.	美国对伊朗的敌意可以追溯到1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命。


For the US public, the 444-day ordeal of the US embassy staff held hostage by radical Iranian students constituted a psychological shock that has still not abated.	对美国公众来说，美国外交人员被激进的伊朗学生绑架并虐待444天是一次奇耻大辱，其所造成的心理冲击至今仍未消退。


The hostage drama dominated the US media from start to finish, resulting in a kind of public post-traumatic stress disorder similar to the social trauma of the 9/11 attacks a generation later.	这场绑架风波从头到尾都主宰了美国媒体，造成了一种创伤后应激障碍，一如一代人之后的9/11恐怖袭击所造成的社会创伤。


For most Americans, then and now, the hostage crisis – and indeed the Iranian Revolution itself – was a bolt out of the blue.	对大部分美国人来说，人质危机——其实也包括伊朗革命本身——可谓晴天霹雳。


Few Americans realize that the Iranian Revolution came a quarter-century after the CIA and Britain’s intelligence agency MI6 conspired in 1953 to overthrow the country’s democratically elected government and install a police state under the Shah of Iran, to preserve Anglo-American control over Iran’s oil, which was threatened by nationalization.	很少有美国人意识到，伊朗革命之前25年，中央情报局和英国军情六处在1953年合谋推翻了伊朗的民选政府，扶植了一个伊朗沙治下的警察国家，以维持盎格鲁-美利坚对面临国有化威胁的伊朗石油的控制。


Nor do most Americans realize that the hostage crisis was precipitated by the ill-considered decision to admit the deposed Shah into the US for medical treatment, which many Iranians viewed as a threat to the revolution.	也很少有美国人意识到，人质危机的导火索是美国的决策失误——允许被废黜的沙入境美国治病。 许多伊朗人将此视为对伊斯兰革命的威胁。


During the Reagan Administration, the US supported Iraq in its war of aggression against Iran, including Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.	在里根执政时期，美国支持伊拉克入侵伊朗，包括伊拉克使用化学武器。


When the fighting finally ended in 1988, the US followed up with financial and trade sanctions on Iran that remain in place to this day.	1988年战争结束后，美国又对伊朗实施了金融和贸易制裁并一直延续至今。


Since 1953, the US has opposed Iran’s self-rule and economic development through covert action, support for authoritarian rule during 1953-79, military backing for its enemies, and decades-long sanctions.	1953年以来，美国一直反对伊朗的自治和经济发展，手段包括各种秘密行动、支持1953—1979年间的极权统治、军事支持伊朗的敌人，以及长达数十年的制裁等。


Another reason for America’s anti-Iran animus is Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, two militant antagonists of Israel.	美国仇视伊朗的另一个原因是伊朗支持真主党和哈马斯，而后两者与以色列进行着军事对峙。


Here, too, it is important to understand the historical context.	在这个问题上，理解历史背景也很重要。


In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush militant Palestinians operating there.	1982年，以色列入侵黎巴嫩，试图粉碎黎巴嫩境内活动的巴勒斯坦军事人员。


In the wake of that war, and against the backdrop of anti-Muslim massacres enabled by Israel’s occupation forces, Iran supported the formation of the Shia-led Hezbollah to resist Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.	这场战争，以及以色列占领军促成的反穆斯林大屠杀，让伊朗支持建立什叶派领导的真主党以阻止以色列对黎巴嫩南部的占领。


By the time Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, nearly 20 years after its original invasion, Hezbollah had become a formidable military, political, and social force in Lebanon, and a continuing thorn in Israel’s side.	2000年以色列从黎巴嫩撤军时，距离其第一次入侵已经过去了近20年，真主党也已经成长为黎巴嫩的一支强大的军事、政治和社会力量，也是对以色列一侧的持续性威胁。


Iran also supports Hamas, a hardline Sunni group that rejects Israel’s right to exist.	伊朗还支持哈马斯。 哈马斯是强硬的逊尼派组织，拒绝承认以色列国存在的权利。


Following decades of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands captured in the 1967 war, and with peace negotiations stalemated, Hamas defeated Fatah (the Palestine Liberation Organization’s political party) at the ballot box in the 2006 election for the Palestinian parliament.	以色列通过1967年战争占领了巴勒斯坦领土，几十年后，由于和平谈判难以取得进展，哈马斯在2006年的巴勒斯坦议会选举中击败了法塔赫（巴勒斯坦解放组织的政党）。


Rather than entering into a dialogue with Hamas, the US and Israel decided to try to crush it, including through a brutal war in Gaza in 2014, resulting in a massive Palestinian death toll, untold suffering, and billions of dollars in damage to homes and infrastructure in Gaza – but, predictably, leading to no political progress whatsoever.	美国和以色列并没有和哈马斯进行对话，而是决定粉碎哈马斯，于是在2014年在加沙发动了一场残酷的战争，导致大量巴勒斯坦人死亡，受伤更是不计其数，加沙房屋和基础设施损失高达数十亿美元——但是，不出意料，这场战争没有带来丝毫政治进展。


Israel also views Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat.	以色列还将伊朗的核计划视为生存威胁。


Hardline Israelis repeatedly sought to convince the US to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, or at least allow Israel to do so.	强硬派以色列人一再试图说服美国打击伊朗核设施，或至少让以色列这样做。


Fortunately, President Barack Obama resisted, and instead negotiated a treaty between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (plus Germany) that blocks Iran’s path to nuclear weapons for a decade or more, creating space for further confidence-building measures on both sides.	幸运的是，奥巴马总统没有让步，而是成功地让伊朗和联合国安理会五大常任理事国（再加上德国）达成了一个协议，杜绝了伊朗在至少十年内获得核武器的可能，也为双方未来构建信心创造了空间。


Yet Trump and the Saudis seem intent on destroying the possibility of normalizing relations created by this important and promising agreement.	但特朗普和沙特似乎想要破坏这一让人充满希望的重要协议所带来的关系正常化的可能性。


External powers are extremely foolish to allow themselves to be manipulated into taking sides in bitter national or sectarian conflicts that can be resolved only by compromise.	外部力量被操纵在唯有通过妥协才能解决的激烈的国家或宗派冲突上站边，这是极其愚蠢的。


The Israel-Palestine conflict, the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Sunni-Shia relationship all require mutual accommodation.	以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突、沙特阿拉伯和伊朗之间的竞争，以及逊尼派-什叶派关系都需要双方的妥协。


Yet each side in these conflicts harbors the tragic illusion of achieving an ultimate victory without the need to compromise, if only the US (or some other major power) will fight the war on its behalf.	但这些冲突中的每一方都抱有不妥协而实现最终胜利的悲剧性幻觉——只要美国（或其他主要强国）能够为自己打一仗就好了。


During the past century, Britain, France, the US, and Russia have all misplayed the Middle East power game.	在过去的一个世纪中，英国、法国、美国和俄罗斯都在中东实力博弈中栽倒过。


All have squandered lives, money, and prestige.	这些国家都付出了生命、金钱和声望的代价。


(Indeed, the Soviet Union was gravely, perhaps fatally, weakened by its war in Afghanistan.)	（事实上，苏联就是因为阿富汗战争而受到了重创，其解体或许肇因与此。


More than ever, we need an era of diplomacy that emphasizes compromise, not another round of demonization and an arms race that could all too easily spiral into disaster.	）如今，我们比以往任何时候都更加需要一个强调妥协，而不是新一轮妖魔化和军备竞赛的外交时代，否则，我们可能都会陷入灾难。


How Much Does Trump Matter?	特朗普有多重要？


CAMBRIDGE – The United States has never had a president like Donald Trump.	坎布里奇—美国从未有过像特朗普这样的总统。


With a narcissistic personality and a short attention span, and lacking experience in world affairs, he tends to project slogans rather than strategy in foreign policy.	他自恋、关注点随时变化、在国际事务方面缺乏经验，在外交政策方面他总是空喊口号而拿不出战略。


Some presidents, like Richard Nixon, had similar personal insecurities and social biases, but Nixon had a strategic view of foreign policy.	一些总统，比如尼克松，也存在和特朗普类似的不可靠个性和社会偏见，但尼克松在外交政府方面有一套战略。


Others, such as Lyndon Johnson, were highly egotistical, but also had great political skill in working with Congress and other leaders.	也有一些总统，比如约翰逊，非常自负，但同时也具备高超的政治技能与国会和其他领导人共事。


Will future historians look back at Trump’s presidency as a temporary aberration or a major turning point in America’s role in the world?	未来历史学家回顾特朗普任期的时候，会把他看作临时性的反常，还是美国在世界中的角色的重大转折点？


Journalists tend to focus too heavily on leaders’ personalities, because it makes good copy.	记者往往过于关注领导人的个性，因为能够写出好故事。


In contrast, social scientists tend to offer broad structural theories about economic growth and geographic location that make history seem inevitable.	相反，社会科学家往往会提出关于经济增长和政治区位的广泛的结构性理论，表明历史必然性。


I once wrote a book that tried to test the importance of leaders by examining important turning points in the creation a century ago of the “American era” and speculating about what might have happened had the president’s most plausible contender been in his place instead.	我曾经写过一本书，通过考察一个世纪前“美国时代”的建立过程中的重要转折点，来检验领袖的重要性，并推测假如总统被最有可能的竞争对手替代的话，会发生什么。


Would structural forces have brought about the same era of US global leadership under different presidents?	结构性力量是否可以不论谁当总统，都能产生美国领导全球的时代？


At the beginning of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt was an activist leader, but he affected mostly timing.	二十世纪初，老罗斯福是一位积极主义领袖，但他的影响主要是时机（timing）。


Economic growth and geography were the powerful determinants.	经济增长和地理是强大的决定因素。


Woodrow Wilson broke with America’s hemispheric traditions by sending US forces to fight in Europe; but where Wilson made a bigger difference was in the moral tone of American exceptionalism in his justification of – and, counterproductively, his stubborn insistence on – all-or-nothing involvement in the League of Nations.	威尔逊将美军送往欧洲，打破了美国的西半球传统； 但威尔逊带来的更大的区别，是通过论证——以及起到了相反的作用的顽固坚持——加入国联成败在此一举，而改变了美国例外论的道德含义。


As for Franklin Roosevelt, it is at least debatable whether structural forces would have brought the US into World War II under a conservative isolationist.	至于罗斯福，结构性力量是否能让保守派孤立主义者执政的美国加入第二次世界大战至少是可争论的。


Clearly, FDR’s framing of the threat posed by Hitler, and his preparation for taking advantage of an event like Pearl Harbor, were crucial factors.	显然，罗斯福所勾勒的希特勒的威胁，以及他对利用珍珠港事件所做的准备，都是关键性因素。


The post-1945 structural bipolarity of the US and the Soviet Union set the framework for the Cold War.	1945年后，美苏的二元结构性两极分化确立了冷战的格局。


But a Henry Wallace presidency (which would have occurred if FDR had not switched him for Harry Truman as vice president in 1944) might have changed the style of the US response.	但如果亨利·华莱士（Henry Wallace）当了总统（如果罗斯福没有在1944年用杜鲁门替换他做了副总统，这完全是可能的），可能会改变美国的反应风格。


Similarly, a Robert Taft or Douglas MacArthur presidency might have disrupted the relatively smooth consolidation of the containment system over which Dwight Eisenhower presided.	类似地，罗伯特·塔夫特（Robert Taft）和麦克阿瑟当总统的话，可能会破坏艾森豪威尔所主持的遏制体系（containment system）相对平稳的巩固过程。


At the end of the century, the structural forces of global economic change caused the erosion of the Soviet superpower, and Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts at reform accelerated the Soviet Union’s collapse.	到了上世纪末，全球经济变化的结构性力量导致了苏联超级大国的衰落，而戈尔巴乔夫的改革尝试加速了苏联的解体。


However, Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup and negotiating savvy, along with George H.W. Bush’s skill in managing the end of the Cold War, were important to the final outcome.	但是，里根的防御强化和谈判技巧，加上老布什管理冷战结果的技巧，对于最终结果影响巨大。


Is there a plausible story in which, owing to different presidential leadership, America would not have achieved global primacy by the end of the twentieth century?	是不是有这样一种可能，在不同的总统领导下，美国未必能在二十世纪末实现全球主宰？


Perhaps if FDR had not been president and Germany had consolidated its power, the international system in the 1940s could have realized George Orwell’s vision of a conflict-prone multipolar world.	也许，如果罗斯福没有当总统，而德国巩固了它的实力，那么20世纪40年代的国际体系可能会实现乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）笔下的冲突一触即发的多极世界。


Perhaps if Truman had not been president and Stalin had made major gains in Europe and the Middle East, the Soviet empire would have been stronger, and bipolarity might have persisted longer.	也许，如果杜鲁门没有当总统，而斯大林在欧洲和中东大获全胜，苏联帝国可能会更加强大，两极格局也会维持得更为长久。


Perhaps if Eisenhower or Bush had not been president and a different leader had been less successful in avoiding war, the American ascendency would have been driven off track (as it was for a time by US intervention in Vietnam).	也许，如果艾森豪威尔和老布什没有当总统，而另外一位领导人没能如此成功地避免战争，美国的支配地位可能已经脱轨（美国干预越南时就是如此）。


Given its economic size and favorable geography, structural forces would likely have produced some form of American primacy in the twentieth century.	考虑到美国的经济规模和有利的地理位置，结构性力量可能会在二十世纪产生某种形式的美国主宰。


Nonetheless, leaders’ decisions strongly affected the timing and type of primacy.	尽管如此，领袖的决定强烈地影响了主宰的时机和类型。


In that sense, even when structure explains a lot, leadership within the structure can make a difference.	从这个角度讲，即使是结构性因素很重要的时候，结构内部的领导力量也会造成不同。


If history is a river whose course and flow are shaped by the large structural forces of climate and topography, human agents can be portrayed as ants clinging to a log swept along by the current, or as white-water rafters steering and avoiding rocks, occasionally overturning and sometimes succeeding.	如果历史一条路径和流向由气候和地形等大型结构性力量决定的河流，那么人就是抓住浮木随波漂流的蝼蚁，也可以是弄潮的艄公，驾船躲避礁石，有时会倾覆，有时会成功。


So leadership matters, but how much?	因此，领导力是重要的，但有多重要？


There will never be a definitive answer.	这个问题永远没有确切的答案。


Scholars who have tried to measure the effects of leadership in corporations or laboratory experiments have sometimes come up with numbers in the range of 10% or 15%, depending on the context.	尝试衡量领导力在公司或实验室实验中的影响的学者，有时能得出10%—15%之间，取决于他的研究背景。


But these are highly structured situations where change is often linear.	但这些情况是高度结构化的，变化也常常是线性的。


In unstructured situations, such as post-apartheid South Africa, the transformational leadership of Nelson Mandela made a huge difference.	在非结构化的情况中，比如取消了种族隔离南非，曼德拉的变革性领导力就造成了巨大的不同。


American foreign policy is structured by institutions and a constitution, but external crises can create a context much more susceptible to leaders’ choices, for better or worse.	美国外交政策的结构因制度和宪法而定，但外部危机可能造成极易受到领袖选择影响（不论好坏）的环境。


If Al Gore had been declared president in 2000, the US probably would have gone to war in Afghanistan, but not in Iraq.	如果2000年判决阿尔·戈尔（Al Gore）赢得总统，美国可能仍然会对阿富汗开战，但不会对伊拉克开战。


Because foreign-policy events are what social scientists call “path dependent,” relatively small choices by leaders, even in the range of 10-15% early on a path, can lead to major divergences in outcomes over time.	因为外交政策事件具有社会科学家所谓的“路径依赖”的特点，因此领袖的相对较小的选择，哪怕是在路径的最初10—15%中所做出，也可能导致日后结果的重大差异。


As Robert Frost once put it, when two roads diverge in a wood, taking the one less traveled can sometimes make all the difference.	罗伯特·弗罗斯特（Robert Frost）曾说，当两条路在树林中岔开时，选择较少有人走过的路有时候会让结果完全不同。


Finally, the risks created by the personality of a leader may not be symmetrical; they may make more of a difference for a mature power than for a rising power.	最后，领袖的个性所带来的风险未必是系统性的； 给成熟力量带来的区别可能回比崛起的力量更大。


Striking a rock or causing a war can sink the ship.	触礁或开战可能导致沉船。


If Trump avoids a major war, and if he is not re-elected, future scholars may look back at his presidency as a curious blip on the curve of American history.	如果特朗普避免了一场大战，并且没有取得连任，未来学者回顾他的总统生涯时，可能会认为这只是美国历史曲线上的一次有意思的背离。


But those are big “ifs.”	但这些“如果”都仅仅是如果。


Pardons Are a Loaded Gun	赦免是一支上满子弹的枪


NEW YORK – Joe Arpaio, the former sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, who was convicted of contempt of court for defying a federal judge’s order to stop racially profiling and arbitrarily detaining Latinos in the name of catching illegal immigrants, is no stranger to controversy.	纽约——亚利桑那州马里科帕县前警长乔·阿帕约因为公然违抗联邦法官的命令，拒绝停止以抓捕非法移民为名义对拉美人进行种族区分和随意拘留而被判犯有藐视法庭罪。 阿帕约所引发的此类争议并不罕见。


But it is US President Donald Trump’s recent pardon of Arpaio that currently is spurring heated debate, as it raises fundamental questions about the presidential pardon power that has been a part of US policymaking from the country’s birth.	但目前正在引发激烈争论的是美国总统唐纳德·特朗普最近对阿帕约的赦免，因为它提出了有关总统赦免权的根本性问题，而赦免权问题从美国诞生之日起就一直是美国决策过程的一部分。


In a monarchy, a king may have the power to forgive citizens’ crimes virtually without limit.	在君主制下，国王可以有权不受限制地赦免公民的罪行。


In the US Constitution – Article II, Section 2 – America’s founders gave a similar power to the president, but with two key limitations.	而美国宪法第二条第二款规定，美国的开国元勋赋予总统类似的权力，但同时还规定了两条关键的限制因素。


One is rooted in separation of powers: it could not be used in cases of impeachment, an issue that is handled by Congress.	其一来源于权力分离原则：赦免不适用于遭受弹劾的情况，而弹劾与否的决定权由国会掌握。


The other is rooted in federalism: it could be used only for crimes “against the United States,” or federal crimes, not crimes prosecuted by one of the 50 US states.	另外一种限制来自联邦制：赦免仅限适用于“反美国”或联邦罪行，而对由美国50个州起诉的罪行不适用。


The granting of the pardon power reflected concerns among the US Constitution’s framers that the criminal code would be applied in a draconian manner, producing a surfeit of punishment.	赦免权的授予反映了美国宪法制定者担心刑法法典执行的方式可能过于严厉，从而造成过度惩罚的问题。


As Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist 74, “The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”	正如亚历山大·汉密尔顿在联邦党人文集第74篇中所论述的那样，“每一个国家的刑法法典都无法避免必要的严厉性，如果没有对不幸过失的赦免机制，司法就会摆出一副过于血腥和残酷的面孔。 ”


The power to pardon, Hamilton continued, ought to be exercised by one person, because a single person “would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for the mitigation of the rigor of the law.”	汉密尔顿继续论述上述赦免权应当由个人负责行使，因为个人“最容易服从于那些可能请求减缓法律严酷性的动机。


What the founders do not address is what happens when that one person has something other than justice on his mind.	”但开国元勋们并没有规定有哪些办法能够阻止行使豁免权的人罔顾正义。


During Arpaio’s 24 years as the sheriff of a jurisdiction that includes the rapidly growing city of Phoenix, he built his reputation on his department’s aggressive efforts to track down undocumented immigrants – and on the brutal conditions he established in the facilities where they were held.	在阿帕约在包括快速发展的凤凰城司法辖区担任治安官的24年时间里，他因为所在部门积极追踪无证移民——以及移民关押设施的恶劣条件而闻名于世。


Arpaio was directly responsible for detaining thousands of people without any reasonable suspicion that they had violated immigration law.	阿帕约在没有任何理由怀疑当事人违反移民法的情况下直接拘留了数千人。


It was enough that they looked Latino.	在这些案件中，当事人只要长得像拉丁人就足够了。


That behavior made Arpaio the subject of lawsuits that, from 1993 to 2015, cost $142 million to settle.	这种行为使阿帕约成为起诉对象，这些诉讼从1993到2015年间耗资1. 42亿美元才达成和解。


Trump and Arpaio are longtime allies.	特朗普和阿帕约是长期的盟友。


During Barack Obama’s presidency, both were prominent figures in the racist “birther” movement that insisted Obama was born outside the US, and therefore was not entitled to be president.	在巴拉克·奥巴马担任总统期间，这两者是坚称奥巴马出生在美国境外，因此不具备总统任职资格的“出生地质疑派”种族主义运动的代表人物。


During Trump’s presidential campaign, Arpaio was a poster child of the divisive immigration debate and a vocal supporter of the candidate’s extreme promises, including the construction of a wall on the border with Mexico.	特朗普竞选总统期间，阿帕约是引发分裂的移民辩论的代表人物，他同时也是候选人极端承诺，包括在美墨边境修建隔离墙的积极支持者。


Against this background, Trump’s pardon of Arpaio looks like sheer political opportunism.	在这样的背景下，特朗普赦免阿帕约似乎纯粹是政治机会主义的表现。


It certainly was not a moral act of clemency.	这样的行为肯定不是温和宽厚的道义之举。


After all, Arpaio’s conduct hardly qualifies as “unfortunate guilt.”	毕竟，阿帕约的行为与“不幸过失”很难有什么联系。


He reveled in his law-breaking, has shown no remorse for it, has never signaled an understanding of the grace of mercy.	他陶醉于自己的违法行为，丝毫没有表现出悔意，也从未表现出对仁慈神圣性的理解。


And, given that he was not to be sentenced until October, one cannot argue that he faced draconian punishment (a key concern for America’s founders).	而且鉴于他要等到10月才会宣判，所以不能认为他已经面临严厉的惩戒（这是美国开国元勋们所担心的关键问题）。


The US Constitution’s framers envisioned another key purpose for the pardon power: to help end conflicts and reconcile with political foes.	美国宪法制定者设想了赦免权的另一个重要目的：有助于结束冲突并与政治敌人和解。


In Hamilton’s words, “there are often critical moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”	用汉密尔顿的话说，“往往在关键时刻，一纸在恰当时机发出的对起义和叛乱分子的赦免书或许有可能恢复联邦的平静局面。 ”


In 1863, Abraham Lincoln issued full pardons for Confederates – with the exception of their leaders and subject to conditions “he may deem expedient for the public welfare” – in order to help reunite the country after the Civil War.	1863年，亚伯拉罕·林肯下达了对南方联邦的全面赦免——南方联邦领袖除外，并受“在他看来可能对公共利益有利的”条件约束——目的是在内战结束后帮助国家重新实现团结。


Even Gerald Ford’s 1974 pardon of Richard Nixon, who had resigned from the presidency over the Watergate scandal, was couched in terms of national healing.	就连杰拉尔德·福特1974年对理查德·尼克松的赦免也是为了实现国家团结，尼克松当时因为水门事件已经辞去了总统职务。


Recalling the ways in which the pardon power has been used in the past highlights the perversity of the Arpaio affair and its singular reactionary purpose: to denigrate and, where possible, reverse Obama’s achievements and, indeed, his values.	回顾以往赦免权的使用方式更加凸显了阿帕约事件的反常极其纯粹的反动目的：此次事件就是为了玷污奥巴马，尽可能逆转奥巴马所取得的成就，并且在实际上颠覆他的价值观。


In Trump’s hands, a constitutional power intended to mitigate the “necessary severity” of criminal justice was deployed to sanction cruelty by a sworn officer of the law.	在特朗普手中，这种本来旨在缓解刑事司法“必要严酷性”的宪法权力正在被一位正式宣誓的官员用来支持残忍。


Unsurprisingly, given its purely ideological basis, Arpaio’s pardon was not reviewed in advance by the US Department of Justice, as has become customary over the years.	毫不奇怪的是，鉴于如此纯粹的意识形态基础，阿帕约的赦免事前并未像多年以来已经形成的惯例那样得到美国司法部的核准。


Indeed, the DOJ rushed to distance itself from the decision, highlighting how easily Trump can use (or not use) the pardon power to settle his many scores: it is virtually the only power within the criminal justice system that the president can exercise unilaterally.	事实上，司法部急于与特朗普的决定划清界限，强调特朗普可以轻易使用（或拒绝使用）豁免权来解决过去的恩怨：豁免权几乎是刑事司法体系中总统有权单方面行使的唯一权力。


To be sure, Trump’s pardon of Arpaio has not created a legal basis for impunity; the pardon power’s constitutional limitations prevent that.	可以肯定，特朗普赦免阿帕约并没有成为有罪不罚的法律依据； 赦免权的宪法限制防止了这种状况最终实现。


But a serious problem will arise if Trump attempts to use it to protect his family – not a farfetched scenario, given pending FBI investigations into his inner circle’s dealings with Russia.	但如果特朗普利用赦免权来保护自己的家庭就会造成严重的问题——鉴于联邦调查局很快就要对其亲信与俄罗斯的交易展开调查，这样的状况并非杞人忧天。


Such a move would be met with a potential legal challenge, based on the impeachment clause or other constitutional limits.	如果特朗普采取这样的举动，相关机构将依据弹劾条款或其它宪法限制对他的所作所为进行挑战。


The pardon power is like a loaded gun.	赦免权就像一把装满子弹的枪。


In the hands of a leader who possesses wisdom and good character, it can strengthen the rule of law.	在智慧和正直的领导人手中，它能够加强法治。


But, in the hands of an unstable, vengeful narcissist, it can cause profound damage.	但在不稳定、睚眦必报的自恋狂手中，它也可能带来难以磨灭的伤害。


Preparing Asia for Trump	亚洲要为特朗普做好准备


CANBERRA – Whether or not US President-elect Donald Trump behaves better once in office than he did on the campaign trail, America’s global authority has already taken a battering, not least among its allies and partners in Asia.	堪培拉—不论美国当选总统特朗普在执政后的行为是否会好于选战，美国的全球权威已经遭受打击，包括在其亚洲盟友和合作伙伴中间。


Exercising soft power – leading by democratic and moral example – will not be easy for Trump, given the disdain he showed for truth, rational argument, basic human decency, and racial, religious, and gender differences, not to mention the fact that he was not actually elected by a majority of voters.	行使软实力——通过民主和道德榜样实现领导——对特朗普来说绝非易事，因为他表现出对真相、理性争论、基本人道体面，以及种族、宗教和性别差异的蔑视，更不用说他实际上并未获得多数选民支持这一事实了。


And when it comes to exercising harder power – doing what it takes to counter serious challenges to peace and security – there will be little confidence in Trump’s judgment, given that almost every statement he made during his campaign was either wildly contradictory or downright alarming.	而在行使较硬的实力方面——竭尽全力应对和平与安全的严重挑战——人们对特朗普的判断可谓毫无信心，因为他在选战期间所做出的每一项陈述要么自相矛盾，要么绝对令人警惕。


Maintaining security, stability, and prosperity in Asia requires a cooperative environment, in which countries secure their national interests through partnerships – not rivalries – and trade freely with one another.	维持亚洲的安全、稳定与繁荣需要合作的环境，其中各国通过伙伴关系——而非对手关系——和彼此之间的自由贸易保护国家利益。


The only grounds for confidence on this front after Trump’s victory is that he may actually do none of the things he said he would, such as starting a trade war with China, walking away from alliance commitments, and supporting Japan and South Korea going nuclear.	特朗普胜选后，这一方面唯一令人感到有信心的地方是他说过的话也许一句都不会照办，比如与中国开展贸易战、不兑现结盟承诺、支持日本和韩国拥有核武器等。


With little or no hard knowledge of international affairs, Trump is relying on instincts that are all over the map.	特朗普几乎没有关于国际事务的硬知识，只是依靠本能开“地图炮”。


He combines “America first” isolationist rhetoric with muscular talk of “making America great again.”	他将“美国第一”的孤立主义语调与“让美国重新伟大”的强力宣言结合在一起。


Staking out impossibly extreme positions that you can readily abandon may work in negotiating property deals; but it is not a sound basis for conducting foreign policy.	树立可以逐步抛弃的极端立场在房地产交易中可能很有效； 但对外交政策来说，这绝不是可靠的基础。


Trump’s dangerous instincts may be bridled if he is capable of assembling an experienced and sophisticated team of foreign-policy advisers.	特朗普的危险本能是可以抑制的，如果他能够组建一支经验丰富、成熟稳重的外交政策顾问团队的话。


But this remains to be seen, and the US Constitution grants him extraordinary personal power as Commander-in-Chief, if he chooses to exercise it.	但这仍有待观察，美国宪法授予他统帅地位，拥有无与伦比的个人权力，如果他选择行使这一权力的话。


US leadership in Asia is a double-edged sword.	美国在亚洲的领导地位是一柄双刃剑。


Noisy assertions of continued primacy are counterproductive.	叫嚣着要保持主导地位可能适得其反。


China’s legitimate demand to be accepted as a joint rule-maker, not just a rule-follower, has to be recognized.	中国想要被接受作为共同规则制定者不仅仅是规则遵守者，这一要求是合理的，必须予以承认。


But when China overreaches, as it has done with its territorial assertions in the South China Sea, there does need to be pushback.	但如果中国越界——比如其在南海的领土主张——也必须坚决反对。


On that front, a quiet but firm US role remains necessary and welcome.	在这方面，悄然但坚定的美国仍然是必不可少的，也将广受欢迎。


Shortly after former President Bill Clinton left office, I heard him say privately (though never publicly) that the US could choose to use its “great and unrivaled economic and military power to try to stay top dog on the global block in perpetuity.”	前总统克林顿卸任后不久，我听说他私下里（从未公开过）说美国可以选择利用其“巨大的、无敌的经济和军事实力永远充当全球领头羊。


A better choice, however, would be “to try to create a world in which we will be comfortable living, when we are no longer top dog on the global block.”	”但更好的选择是“建立一个我们不再是全球领头羊的时候也能自在生活的世界。


That kind of language seems to be anathema for anyone holding high office in the US, at least publicly.	”这样的想法对于所有美国高官都是一个诅咒，至少从公开角度是如此。


But it is what Asia wants to hear.	但这正是亚洲想听到的。


For Australia and other US allies and partners in the region, this presidential election makes it clear that we can no longer – assuming we ever could – take coherent, smart American leadership for granted.	对澳大利亚和其他美国在该地区的盟友和合作伙伴来说，这场总统竞选清楚地说明，我们不再能够——假设我们曾经能够——将连贯明智的美国领导视为理所当然。


We must do more for ourselves and work together more, while relying less on the US.	我们必须更多地自力更生、更多地精诚合作，而更少地依赖美国。


Trump will probably have more instinctive sympathy for Australia than he will for many other US allies.	特朗普可能从本能上同情澳大利亚甚于其他许多美国盟友。


We are seen as paying our alliance dues, not least by having fought alongside the US in every one of its foreign wars – for better or worse – over the past century.	我们被视为履行了我们的联盟职责，比如，我们在过去一个世纪中的每一场美国对外战争中都与它站在一边——不论是帮忙还是帮倒忙。


And, as cohabitants in the Anglosphere, we are in Trump’s cultural comfort zone.	而作为英语文化圈中的同道，我们也在特朗普的文化舒适区中。


But Australia will be anything but comfortable if the larger regional dynamics go off the rails.	但如果地区大环境动态恶化，澳大利亚绝不可能感觉良好。


We should have learned by now that the US, under administrations with far more prima facie credibility than Trump’s, is perfectly capable of making terrible mistakes, such as the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.	现在，我们应该已经领教，在表面上比特朗普信誉高得多的政府领导下的美国也照样会犯各种可怕的错误，比如发动越南和伊拉克战争。


We now have to be ready for American blunders as bad as, or worse than, in the past.	现在，我们必须准备好美国犯下和过去一样大、甚至更加糟糕的错误。


We will have to make our own judgments about how to react to events, based on our own national interests.	我们必须以自身国家利益为基础，自己判断如何对发生的事件做出反应。


This does not mean that Australia should walk away from its alliance with the US.	这并不意味着澳大利亚应该与美国渐行渐远。


But we will need to be more skeptical of American policies and actions than in recent decades.	但我们需要比近几十年来更多地怀疑美国的政策和行为。


Australia should become much more self-consciously independent, and assign much higher priority to building closer trade and security ties with Japan, South Korea, India, and especially Indonesia, our huge near-neighbor.	澳大利亚应该增加有自我意识的独立性，更加优先着重于与日本、韩国、印度以及特别是我们的巨型近邻印度尼西亚构建更加紧密的贸易和安全联系。


No one should give ground if China overreaches, and Australia should, now more than ever, work closely with our Asian neighbors to ensure that it does not.	如果中国越界，各国决不能屈服，澳大利亚现在应该比从前更加紧密地与亚洲邻国合作以确保中国不越界。


But we must also recognize the legitimacy of China’s new great-power aspirations, and engage with it non-confrontationally.	但我们也必须承认中国的新超级大国雄心的非理性，并且在不对抗的心态下与它打交道。


We will all benefit from a common regional-security framework based on mutual respect and reciprocity, not least when confronting regional threats such as North Korea’s nuclear chest-beating.	我们都将受益于以互相尊重和互利互惠为基础的共同地区安全框架，特别是在面对朝鲜核计划等地区威胁上。


We can only hope that Trump will dispel our worst fears when he is in office.	我们只能希望特朗普执政后能够消除我们最坏的担忧。


But in the meantime, Australian and other regional policymakers should adhere to a simple mantra: More self-reliance.	但与此同时，澳大利亚和其他地区决策者应该坚守一个简单原则——更加独立自主。


More Asia.	更加亚洲。


Less US.	更少美国。


Mr. Trump Goes to China	特朗普先生去中国


NEW YORK – US President Donald Trump is spending nearly two weeks in Asia, visiting Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.	纽约—美国总统特朗普正在进行为期近两周的亚洲之行，访问日本、韩国、中国、越南和菲律宾。


Putting China at the center of the trip makes sense, because it constitutes the most important stop in both strategic and economic terms.	将中国放在整个旅程的中央很有意义，因为不管从战略上还是经济上，中国都是其中最重要的一站。


North Korea will dominate much of the conversation when Trump is in China, in large part because he is counting on Chinese leaders to solve the North Korea problem for the United States.	朝鲜将是特朗普在华对话的一个重要主题，这主要是因为他指望中国领导人为美国解决朝鲜问题。


This approach is understandable, because the bulk of North Korea’s trade transits Chinese territory, and China could exert enormous pressure on the North if it so chose.	这样的方针可以理解，因为朝鲜的大部分贸易都经过中国进行，而中国如果愿意的话，可以给朝鲜施加巨大的压力。


But Trump will likely come away disappointed.	但特朗普可能会失望而归。


China will resist deploying its full leverage, lest it undermine North Korea’s stability and end up worse off as a result.	中国不会同意尽全力施压朝鲜，担心这样会破坏朝鲜稳定，从而带来更糟糕的结果。


The irony and potential tragedy of China’s position is that allowing North Korea to increase and improve its nuclear and missile arsenals could fuel momentum toward war, or lead South Korea, Japan, or both to reconsider their non-nuclear postures.	讽刺之处是，中国的立场可能带来一个悲剧，放任朝鲜增加和提升其核和导弹武器可能加速奔向战争，或导致韩国、日本或两国均重新考虑无核立场。


Any of these outcomes would be inconsistent with Chinese strategic interests; but, like many governments, China’s leaders will seek to avoid difficult decisions in the short run, even if this results in damaging outcomes over time.	这些结果的任何一个都有悖于中国的战略利益； 但和许多政府一样，中国领导人将避免短期的艰难决定，即使这会导致长期的不利结果。


The North Korea problem is but one of many on the Sino-US agenda, which includes other geopolitical matters (most notably, the situation in the South China Sea and the status of Taiwan).	朝鲜问题只是中美日程中诸多问题之一，此外还包括其他地缘政治问题（最主要的是南海局势和台湾的地位）。


There are also economic issues that need to be addressed, such as China’s failure to respect intellectual property, its large government subsidies to export-oriented firms, its restriction of access to its market, and its efforts to require foreign firms doing business in China to transfer advanced technology to Chinese firms.	还有一些经济问题也需要解决，如中国不尊重知识产权、对出口导向型企业进行大规模政府补贴、限制市场准入、要求在华经营的外资企业向中国企业转让先进技术等。


The list of issues dividing these two important and powerful countries is thus long and difficult, reinforcing the pessimism of those who predict that the bilateral relationship will continue to sour.	因此，让这两个重要且强大的国家产生分歧的问题清单又长又难，预测双边关系将继续恶化的人的悲观态度又深了一层。


One of the arguments that the pessimists marshal is the historical pattern whereby rising and established powers tend to end up competing with one another, or even fighting.	悲观派所宣扬的观点之一是历史模式：崛起力量和老牌力量难免会互相竞争甚至打起来。


One recent book, by the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, focuses on the so-called “Thucydides Trap,” named for the ancient Greek historian who chronicled the competitive relationship that ultimately produced the Peloponnesian War between a rising Athens and Sparta, the superpower of its day.	哈佛政治学家格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）的新书聚焦于所谓的“修昔底德陷阱”。 修昔底德是古希腊历史学家，他撰写了当时的超级大国——雅典和斯巴达之间的竞争关系编年史，两个城邦之间最终爆发了伯罗奔尼撒战争。


Allison portrays China and the US in these roles, and calls his book Destined for War.	艾利森将中国和美国代入其中，并将书起名为《注定的战争》（Destined for War）。


Such predictions are unwarranted.	这些预测并不靠谱。


They discount the dampening effect of nuclear weapons, which for more than four decades helped keep the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union from turning hot.	它们低估了核武器的遏制效应，四十多年来，这一效应让美国和苏联之间的冷战没有变成热战。


They also overlook the ability of the US and China to finesse their disagreement over Taiwan.	它们还忽视了美国和中国巧妙解决在台湾问题上的分歧的能力。


Diplomacy can and will matter; little is inevitable in international relations.	外交能够、也必将产生作用； 在国际关系中，没有什么是不可避免的。


Indeed, the US and China have managed to keep their ties on a relatively even keel, despite the disappearance of the original rationale for their relationship – shared antipathy toward the Soviet Union – when the Cold War ended a quarter-century ago.	事实上，美国和中国成功地保持着关系的相对平稳，尽管保持这一关系的原始理由——对苏联的厌恶——已经随着四分之一个世纪前冷战的结束而不复存在。


The extensive economic relationship that has evolved since then has given both countries a stake in maintaining good relations.	此后所产生的深远的经济关系让两国都有能从保持良好关系中获益。


And, given China’s need for external stability to pursue economic development, its leaders have acted with considerable restraint.	考虑到中国需要外部稳定来追求经济发展，其领导人应该会保持相当的克制。


Still, the pessimists’ concerns cannot be dismissed.	尽管如此，悲观派的关注点也不可等闲视之。


After all, countries often fail to act in their own self-interest, or events simply spin out of control.	毕竟，国家常常会做出不符合自身利益的事，或者自己无法控制的事。


For example, Chinese leaders may be tempted to act more assertively to placate public opinion amid a slowing economy, and to take advantage of opportunities created by a US that has retreated from regional trade accords.	比如，中国领导人可能会因为经济放缓而表现得更加独断，以安抚国内民情，并利用美国从地区贸易协定退出所创造的机会。


The stakes are high, as the history of the twenty-first century will be affected in no small part by the character of the Sino-American relationship.	兹事体大，二十一世纪的历史必将受到中美关系的性质的巨大影响。


Trump, who vacillates between tough criticism of China over trade and encomiums to President Xi Jinping, will have to balance pressing his legitimate concerns over trade with the need to avoid starting a trade war.	特朗普对中国的态度在批评贸易问题和赞美习近平主席之间摇摆，他需要在强调对贸易的合理关切和避免启衅贸易战之间实现平衡。


And Xi will have to judge what he can give to satisfy his American visitor without jeopardizing his or the Party’s standing in the eyes of the Chinese people.	而习近平需要判断他可以做出什么让步，即让美国来访者感到满意，又不会有损于他和中共在中国人民心目中的形象。


North Korea, though, will be the biggest test.	但朝鲜将是最大的考验。


Trump and Xi must find a way to defuse the looming crisis on the Korean Peninsula – or manage the consequences should diplomacy fail and war erupt.	特朗普和习近平必须找到办法化解朝鲜半岛的危机——或者在外交努力失败、战争爆发的情况下，做好后果管理。


In the latter scenario, it would be essential that a second Korean War not lead to direct US-Chinese combat, as the first one did.	如果发生了后一种情形，保证第二次朝鲜战争不会像第一次那样演变为中美直接冲突至关重要。


And cooperation would be essential to maintain control over North Korea’s nuclear materials.	此外，在保持控制朝鲜核材料方面，合作至关重要。


All of this will require deft diplomacy.	所有这些都需要高超的外交技巧。


Trump and Xi, one sincerely hopes, will soon be laying the groundwork for it.	真心希望特朗普和习近平能够尽快为此打下良好的基础。


Trump’s Opportunity in Asia	特朗普的亚洲机会


WASHINGTON, DC – A year after his election, US President Donald Trump is making his first official visit to Asia.	华盛顿—当选后一年，美国总统特朗普正准备要进行首次亚洲正式访问。


The 12-day tour of five countries – Trump’s longest foreign trip so far – will, according to official briefings, focus on easing doubts about the reliability of the United States and its leader.	根据官方简报，这次12天的五国之旅——迄今为止特朗普最长的外访——的重点是缓解关于美国及其领导力的可靠性的质疑。


Given the challenges and possibilities for the US in Asia, that is an unambitious goal.	考虑到美国在亚洲所面临的挑战和可能性，这个目标显得毫无进取之意。


Trump will start his trip by reinforcing America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea – alliances that he previously discounted and belittled, particularly during his campaign.	特朗普的出访首先要强化美国与日本和韩国的盟友关系——对这两个盟友，他此前进行了贬低和小觑，特别是在选战期间。


The aim is to buttress his demand, which he will reiterate when he reaches Beijing, that China follow through on its pledges in the United Nations Security Council to tighten sanctions on North Korea.	目的是支持他的要求——在到达北京后，他将重申这个要求，即中国要遵守它在联合国安理会做出的承诺，加紧对朝鲜的制裁。


Next, Trump will head to Vietnam and the Philippines.	然后，特朗普将访问越南和菲律宾。


Close relations with both are necessary to underpin ongoing US efforts to challenge China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia.	要巩固美国遏制中国在南海影响力不断增加的措施，与这两个国家结成紧密关系是必不可少的。


President Barack Obama’s administration had mixed results in competing for influence with China.	奥巴马政府在于中国竞争影响力方面可谓得失参半。


Trump administration officials have lately hinted that the US may, at some point, devise a new strategy for the entire Indo-Pacific region.	特朗普政府官员最近暗示，美国可能会在某个时刻抛出整个印度-太平洋地区的新战略。


Beyond foreign policy, Trump’s Asian tour should also advance some economic objectives.	除了外交政策，特朗普的亚洲之旅还应该推动一些经济目标。


A large group of US corporate leaders will accompany Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to China, where they will seek to strike deals, promote open markets, and address abuses in bilateral trade.	一个由美国企业界领袖组成的庞大代表团将和商务部长罗斯（Wilbur Ross）一起访问中国，寻求达成交易、促进开放市场和解决双边贸易中的违法行为。


Chinese officials, for their part, have indicated that they will announce new agreements and consider opening parts of the Chinese market that are now closed to outsiders.	中国官员则表示他们将宣布新协议，并考虑开放一些目前向外国封闭的市场。


So far, so good.	到目前为止都是好消息。


But so far is not far enough.	但还不够。


Talks with officials around the region reveal that America’s friends and allies have not received the sort of advance briefings that are normally used to prepare the ground for important new policies and undertakings.	与域内各国官员的对话表明，美国的友邦和盟国并未收到通常用来为重要新政策和事项打基础的事前简报。


More fundamentally, briefings and statements in the run-up to the trip have shown no regard for major political and strategic trends that are now converging – trends that must inform any comprehensive US policy toward Asia.	更为根本性的是，在此次访问前所发布的简报和声明并未提及目前正在互相靠拢的重大政治和战略趋势——全面的美国对亚洲政策少不了关于这些趋势的信息。


The first such trend is the decline of the US-led unipolar world order that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War, and the reemergence of great power rivalries.	第一个趋势是冷战结束以来美国领导的单极世界的衰落，以及强大对手的重新浮现。


China, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East are all headed in new directions, and America no longer has the capacity it once did to influence them.	中国、俄罗斯、欧洲和中东都在迈向新方向，美国不再拥有曾经拥有过的影响这些国家和地区的能力。


The Trump administration needs to abandon its complacency and pursue competitive coalition-building.	特朗普政府需要放下自满，追求竞争性的联盟构建（competitive coalition-building）。


Doing so will require Trump’s confident assertion of the benefits of the US-led liberal international order, which China and Russia are now challenging.	这样做需要特朗普充满自信地宣扬目前正受到中国和俄罗斯的挑战的美国领导的国际秩序的好处。


It will also demand that Trump display leadership in forging international cooperation, particularly on trade.	特朗普还需要表现出构建国际合作，特别是贸易合作的领导力。


Just as Trump has walked back his denigration of America’s European and Asian allies, he should stifle his inclination for protectionism and unilateral action.	正如特朗普刚刚拨乱反正，不再中伤美国的欧洲和亚洲盟友，他还应该收回保护主义倾向和单边主义行为。


Politically, Trump stands to gain much more by leading the way toward a new multilateral free-trade agreement than he would by pursuing isolationism and allowing China to assume trade leadership in Asia.	在政治上，领导达成新多边自由贸易协定，要比寻求孤立主义、放任中国成为亚洲贸易领导者可以给特朗普带来更多的收益。


And Trump has a golden opportunity to do so.	而特朗普有一个黄金机会这样做。


Though he pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership early in his term, the remaining 11 partners are moving to sustain most of the agreement.	尽管他在上任之初就率领美国退出了跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），但其他的11个伙伴国仍保持着该协定的大部分内容。


Why not get back in front of the parade and demonstrate a capacity for leadership in changing times?	为何不顺着汹涌的反对重新加入其中、彰显美国在变化时代的领导力？


Meanwhile, the Trump administration needs to be more ambitious in pressing China for greater reciprocity in market access and competition.	与此同时，特朗普政府需要更加进取地敦促中国在市场准入和竞争方面表现出更大的互惠性。


Earlier this year, Trump praised China for making promises on this front, even though it had already made – and broken – the same promises to the Obama administration.	今年早些时候，特朗普赞赏中国在这发面所做出的承诺，尽管中国在奥巴马执政期间已经做出过这些承诺——并且食言了。


The US wants access to financial-services markets in China, but appears willing to settle, at least for now, for openings in credit research services and, possibly, credit-card marketing.	美国想要进入中国的金融服务市场，但表现出的意向（至少在目前）是在开放信用研究服务以及（可能的）信用卡营销上。


Meanwhile, China leads the world in disruptive financial technologies (fintech), with payments by mobile phone replacing credit cards.	与此同时，中国在破坏性金融技术（fintech）方面领先全球，这些技术旨在让手机支付取代信用卡。


The second major trend that should be informing the Trump administration’s Asia policy is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power.	特朗普政府在制定亚洲政策时需要掌握的第二个趋势是中国国家主席习近平对权力的整合。


By not designating a successor to Xi, the Communist Party of China’s recent 19th National Congress has opened the way for him to serve a third term.	中共十九大没有为习近平指定接班人，从而为他的第三个任期扫清了道路。


With so much political capital, Xi now has the scope to adjust his stance on domestically sensitive issues, according to China’s longer-term interests and his own.	如此雄厚的政治资本在手，让习近平有空间根据中国和他本人的长期利益，调整其对国内敏感事务的立场。


China’s recent agreement to normalize relations with South Korea, after more than a year of acrimony, may reflect the effect of Xi’s liberation from succession politics.	在经历了一年的对峙之后，中国最近同意与韩国实现关系正常化这可能就是习近平摆脱了接班人政治的效果的反映。


Prior to the 19th National Congress, China insisted on punishing South Korea for allowing the US to deploy its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense antimissile system on its territory.	在十九大召开前，中国因为韩国允许美国将萨德反导系统部署在其境内而惩罚韩国。


But this approach brought China no benefits; on the contrary, it damaged China’s reputation in South Korea.	但这一方针对中国无利； 相反，这伤害了中国在韩国的名声。


Now, China is backing off.	如今，中国正在让步。


Trump should seize this moment to secure greater cooperation from China in tackling, along with South Korea, the North Korean threat.	特朗普应该抓住这一时机，确保中国更大的合作，与韩国一起应对朝鲜威胁。


China is not in a position to shut down North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.	中国没有关闭朝鲜核武器和弹道导弹计划的立场。


But it can cooperate with the US to narrow the North’s choices and reduce the potential for a conflagration on the Korean Peninsula, such as through covert cooperation and official contingency planning for the future of North Korea.	但它可能与美国合作缩窄朝鲜的选择面，降低朝鲜半岛灾难的可能性，比如通过暗中合作和制定正式的朝鲜问题应急计划实现。


When Trump meets Xi in Beijing, he should offer a path toward just such a strategic compromise.	特朗普在北京与习近平会晤时，应该提供达成这一战略性妥协的方案。


As it stands, it seems that Trump is hoping to impress critics with headlines about what are actually small-bore accomplishments.	目前，特朗普似乎想通过其实十分微不足道的成就来给批评者留下印象。


But there are historic opportunities ahead.	但他面前摆放着历史性机会。


Trump’s Asia trip is the ideal moment to begin to seize them.	特朗普的亚洲之旅是开始抓住它们的理想时机。


Trump’s Virtual Wall	特朗普的虚拟围墙


CAMBRIDGE – In many ways, the Republican Party’s plan to implement a “border adjustment tax” in the United States is the virtual complement of the physical wall President Donald Trump plans to erect on the US-Mexican border.	发自剑桥——在许多方面，共和党在美国征收一项“边境调整税”的计划都是特朗普总统计划在美墨边境修建的实体围墙的虚拟补充。


Although the border adjustment tax has not seeped into public consciousness in nearly the same way as Trump’s physical wall has, it could end up affecting the average American a lot more – and not necessarily in a good way.	虽然该税项并未像特朗普的实体墙一样渗透到公众意识中，但它可能最终会对普通美国人造成影响——而且不一定是以好的方式。


On the surface, the basic idea is to slap a tax of, say, 20% on imports, and to provide tax breaks worth a similar amount on exports.	表面上看，该计划的基本思路就是对进口征税，比如征个20％，并对出口提供类似幅度的税收优惠。


Most populists’ gut reaction is that this must be fantastic for US jobs, because it discourages imports and encourages exports.	大多数民粹主义者的直觉反应是，这对美国的就业来说是极好的，因为它会在遏制进口的同时鼓励出口。


Unfortunately, as many have pointed out, there is a loose screw in this logic, which is that the United States has a floating exchange rate.	不幸的是，正如许多人所指出的那样，这个逻辑中有一个掉链子的地方，那就是美国的浮动汇率制度。


A stronger dollar – a likely result of imposing a border adjustment tax – makes it cheaper for Americans to buy imports (because a dollar buys more foreign currency); conversely, a stronger dollar makes US exports more expensive to foreigners.	如果美元走强——可能是实施边境调整税的结果——美国人购买进口商品的成本就较低（因为1块钱美元可以兑换更多外币）； 相应的，强势美元使美国出口商品对外国人来说更昂贵。


In fact, the baseline textbook result is that the exchange-rate effect would fully offset the tax, leaving the trade balance unchanged.	事实上，经典教科书的结论是汇率效应将完全抵消税收作用，使贸易平衡保持不变。


If you think the Republicans’ proposal sounds like hocus pocus, you might be right, but let’s hold that thought.	如果你因此觉得共和党的提案听起来像是个骗局，你可能是对的，但请让我们先把这个想法放一放。


Several highly regarded academic economists favor the border adjustment idea, but for entirely different reasons.	但有几位声望极高的学术经济学家都对边界调整的理念表示赞同，只是基于完全不同的原因。


They take it as an article of faith that the exchange rate will in fact rise to neutralize the trade effects of a border adjustment tax.	他们也同意汇率实际上会上升以抵消边境调整税的贸易影响的定理。


But they like it anyway.	但他们就是赞同它。


First, the US imports a lot more than it exports, so it runs a large trade deficit, with the broadest measure (the “current account”) at around 2.5% of GDP.	首先，美国的进口量远大于出口，所以它的贸易逆差极为庞大，根据最宽泛的统计数据（“经常账户”）约相当于GDP的2.


While that is a vast improvement over the 6%-of-GDP deficits the US was running a decade ago, the US still imports considerably more than it exports, meaning the government stands to collect far more revenues from its 20% tax on imports than it would have to give in tax breaks to exporters.	5％。 虽然这相对于十年前超过6％的比例来说已经实现了巨大的飞跃，但美国的进口仍然大大高于出口，这意味着政府20%的进口税收收入要比它给出口商的减税额更多。


Indeed, the tax-subsidy schedule could, on paper at least, bring in roughly $90 billion a year.	事实上在纸面上算，税收补贴计划表至少能让政府每年多收大概900亿美元。


And the magic doesn’t stop there.	但该税项的魔力并不止于此。


Although it might surprise people who are used to thinking of imports and exports as a pure “us versus them” phenomenon, in fact roughly half of all trade is intra-firm – transactions between foreign and US divisions of the same company.	可能会让那些习惯于将进出口视为纯粹“美国人对外国人”现象的人感到惊讶的是，实际上大约一半的贸易是企业内部交易，即同一企业的外国和美国分部之间的交易。


And because US corporate taxes are among the world’s highest, firms will go to great lengths to assign as much value as they can to foreign subsidiaries, and as little as possible to US companies.	同时由于美国也是全球企业税最重的国家之一，企业都会尽力为外国子公司分配尽可能多的产值，而尽可能少地分配给美国公司。


One way to do this is by putting an artificially high bookkeeping price on intra-firm imports, and an artificially low bookkeeping price on exports.	实现这一点的其中一个方法是对企业内的进口刻意设置较高的记账价格，同时故意改低出口记账价格。


Under- and over-invoicing is a time-honored way to get around taxes and controls.	低开和虚增发票都是一直都是躲避税收和管制的手段。


When a transaction is all “in-house,” it essentially just involves accounting sleight of hand to book profits in low tax jurisdictions.	当一项交易全部归于“内部”时，就基本上只是如何将利润登记在低税率地区的会计操作罢了。


As the University of California at Berkeley’s Alan Auerbach first pointed out, the border tax adjustment is a way to push back on under- and over-invoicing in a high-tax jurisdiction such as the US.	正如加州大学伯克利分校经济学家阿兰·奥俄巴赫（Alan Auerbach）首先指出的那样，边境税调整是在美国等高率税地区打击低开和虚增发票行为的一种方式。


So, all in all, even if a border adjustment tax does not directly make US goods more competitive, it is an efficient way to raise revenues, potentially making room for other tax cuts.	因此总而言之，即使边境调整税会不直接使美国商品更具竞争力，倒也是个提高收入的有效方式，或许能为其他减税措施腾出空间。


So what could possibly be wrong with such a technocratically sound idea?	那么这样一个技术上严丝合缝的想法可能会出现哪些谬误？


First, it relies on some heroic assumptions – for example, that people cannot easily game the labyrinthine system and that foreign governments will exercise restraint in retaliating.	首先，它依赖于一些过分大胆的假设——例如说人们一定无法轻易破解这个迷宫般的系统，而外国政府也不会采取限制性手段来报复性征税。


Second, it ignores a host of difficult transition problems.	第二，它忽略了一大堆困难的过渡问题。


For starters, the overwhelming majority of US imports are priced in dollars, not foreign currency.	首先，美国绝大多数进口货物是以美元而非外币定价。


So, even if foreign currencies become cheaper, it might not help importers locked into dollar contracts. Their costs would just be 20% higher because of the import tax.	因此，即使外币相对美元贬值，对于那些已经签订美元合同的进口商也没有好处，他们的成本只会因为进口税而再高出20％。


And, despite the tax subsidy, some exporters would lose, because, as a recent New York Federal Reserve note points out, they rely on imported intermediate goods in producing their products.	而即便有税收补贴，一些出口商也将破产，因为最近一份纽约联邦储备委员会报告指出，这些出口商得依靠进口中间产品来生产自身产品。


Another problem is that a stronger dollar would mean a massive wealth loss for Americans, because the value of many foreign assets would go down, as my colleagues Emmanuel Farhi, Gita Gopinath, and Oleg Itskhoki have discussed.	另一个问题是，正如我的同事伊曼纽尔·法里（Emmanuel Farhi），吉塔·哥平纳夫（Gita Gopinath）和奥列格·伊斯科基（Oleg Itskhoki）所讨论的那样，美元走强意味着美国人财富的巨大损失，因为许多外国资产的价值会下降。


The biggest problem of all, though, is the blithe assumption that the dollar exchange rate would neatly move to offset the tax/subsidy scheme.	然而最大的问题则是那个认定美元汇率将恰当变动以抵消税收/补贴计划影响的轻率假设。


If there is anything that the past 40 years of exchange-rate research have taught us, it is that exchange rates can move wildly away from their fundamentals for many years at a time.	过去40年的汇率研究告诉我们，汇率可以在一段时间内远离其基本面。


It is thoroughly unrealistic to assume that a border tax will quickly lead to a sharp offsetting movement of the dollar.	边境税很快将引发美元汇率显著变动的假设是完全不切实际的。


The process could take many years, and the short-term effects on US unemployment easily could be negative.	这个过程可能需要许多年，而短期内则很容易对美国失业率产生负面影响。


True, high border taxes could boost US employment.	当然高额的边境税可以促进美国就业。


The scheme would require a huge increase in customs agents, and it would most likely lead to significant expansion in the underground economy as people seek to evade the taxes.	该计划将创造大量海关报关员职位，并且最有可能导致地下经济的显著扩张，因为人们纷纷设法逃税。


But are those really the types of jobs proponents of a border tax have in mind?	但是这就是边境税的支持者真正想要的就业吗？


The Trump Boom?	特朗普繁荣？


CAMBRIDGE – After years of hibernation, will the US economy rouse itself for a big comeback over the next couple of years?	坎布里奇—在经历了多年的蛰伏后，美国经济能够在未来几年中自己苏醒、东山再起吗？


With an incoming Republican administration hell-bent on reflating an economy already near full employment, and with promised trade restrictions driving up the price of import-competing goods, and with central-bank independence likely to come under attack, higher inflation – likely exceeding 3% at times – is a near-certainty.	即将上任的共和党政府铁心要让已经接近充分就业的经济再通胀，并且其所承诺的贸易限制将推高进口竞争商品的价格，央行独立性也有可能承受压力，从这些方面看，通胀提高——时不时超过3%——几乎是必然之事。


And output growth could surprise as well, possibly reaching 4%, at least temporarily.	而产出增长也可能令人惊喜，有望到达4%，至少暂时可以达到。


Impossible you say?	你说，这不可能？


Not at all.	未必。


The economy already seems to be growing at a 3% annual clip.	经济似乎已经达到了3%的年增长率。


And even steadfast opponents of President-elect Trump’s economic policies would have to admit they are staunchly pro-business (with the notable exception of trade).	即使是当选总统特朗普的经济政策的最坚定的反对者，也必须承认这些政策非常有利于企业（贸易是一个显著例外）。


Consider regulation.	以监管为例。


Under President Barack Obama, labor regulation expanded significantly, not to mention the dramatic increase in environmental legislation.	在奥巴马总统任期内，劳动力监管大大扩大，更不用说环境立法的剧烈增加了。


And that is not even counting the huge shadow Obamacare casts on the health-care system, which alone accounts for 17% of the economy.	这甚至尚未包括奥巴马医保对医疗体系的巨大影响，而医疗部门要占经济的17%。


I am certainly not saying that repealing Obama-era regulation will improve the average American’s wellbeing.	我当然不是在说撤销奥巴马时代的监管能够改善普通美国人的福祉。


Far from it.	绝非如此。


But businesses will be ecstatic, maybe enough to start really investing again.	但企业将十分高兴，也许足以让它们真正再次开始投资。


The boost to confidence is already palpable.	信心的提振也已经显而易见。


Then there is the prospect of a massive stimulus, featuring a huge expansion of badly needed infrastructure spending.	然后是大规模刺激前景，其特征是急需的基础设施支出大幅扩大。


(Trump will presumably bulldoze Congressional opposition to higher deficits.)	（想必特朗普将强迫国会反对派同意增加赤字。


Ever since the 2008 financial crisis, economists across the political spectrum have argued for taking advantage of ultra-low interest rates to finance productive infrastructure investment, even at the cost of higher debt.	）自2008年金融危机以来，不论持有何种政治立场，经济学家都认为应该利用极低利率为生产性基础设施投资融资，哪怕这将导致债务增加的代价。


High-return projects pay for themselves.	高回报项目能够自我盈利。


Far more controversial is Trump’s plan for a massive across-the-board income-tax cut that disproportionately benefits the rich.	更具争议的是特朗普的大规模全面所得税减税计划，该计划主要有利于富人。


True, putting cash in the pockets of rich savers hardly seems as effective as giving cash to poor people who live hand to mouth.	诚然，把现金装入富裕储蓄者的口袋似乎不如给勉强糊口的穷人发放现金有用。


Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, memorably spoke of “Trumped-up trickle-down economics.”	特朗普的对手克林顿令人印象深刻地大谈“特朗普炮制的涓滴经济学”。


But, Trumped-up or not, tax cuts can be very good for business confidence.	但是，不管是不是特朗普炮制，减税对于商业信心来说是非常有利的。


It is hard to know just how much extra debt Trump’s stimulus program will add, but estimates of $5 trillion over ten years – a 25% increase – seem sober.	很难了解特朗普的刺激计划会带来多少新增债务，但十年增加5万亿美元——增加25%——似乎合情合理。


Many left-wing economics commentators, having insisted for eight years under Obama that there is never any risk to US borrowing, now warn that greater borrowing by the Trump administration will pave the road to financial Armageddon.	许多左翼经济学评论家在奥巴马执政的八年中坚持认为美国借钱不会造成任何风险，现在又警告说特朗普政府增加借贷将导致金融浩劫。


Their hypocrisy is breathtaking, even if they are now closer to being right.	如此虚伪令人咋舌，即使他们现在更加接近正确。


Exactly how much Trump’s policies will raise output and inflation is hard to know.	特朗普的政策将在多大程度上提高产出和通胀难以知晓。


The closer the US economy is to full capacity, the more inflation there will be.	美国经济越接近满负荷运转，通胀就会越高。


If US productivity really has collapsed as much as many scholars believe, additional stimulus is likely to raise prices a lot more than output; demand will not induce new supply.	如果美国生产率果真如许多学者认为的那样崩溃，那么新刺激对价格的提升作用可能远大于产出； 需求不会催生新供给。


On the other hand, if the US economy really does have massive quantities of underutilized and unemployed resources, the effect of Trump’s policies on growth could be considerable.	另一方面，如果美国经济真的存在大量未利用和半利用资源，那么特朗普的政策对于增长的效果可能相当大。


In Keynesian jargon, there is still a large multiplier on fiscal policy.	用凯恩斯主义的术语讲，财政政策的乘数依然很大。


It is easy to forget the biggest missing piece of the global recovery is business investment, and if it starts kicking in finally, both output and productivity could begin to rise very sharply.	很容易忘记的是，全球复苏最大的缺失的一环便是商业投资，而如果这一环终于开始复苏，产出和生产率都有可能急剧上升。


Those who are deeply wedded to the idea of “secular stagnation” would say high growth under Trump is well-nigh impossible.	对“长期停滞”思想深信不疑的人会说，特朗普任期内实现高增长希望渺茫。


But if one believes, as I do, that the slow growth of the last eight years was mainly due to the overhang of debt and fear from the 2008 crisis, then it is not so hard to believe that normalization could be much closer than we realize.	但如果你像我一样认为过去八年的慢增长主要原因是债务积压以及2008年危机所引起的恐慌，那么就不难相信正常化也许比我们所认为的近得多。


After all, so far virtually every financial crisis has eventually come to an end.	毕竟，到目前为止，几乎每一场金融危机都有结束的那一天。


Of course, all of this is an optimistic spin on a Trump economy.	当然，所有这些是对特朗普经济的乐观看法。


If the new administration proves erratic and incompetent (a real possibility), dejection will quickly overwhelm confidence.	如果新政府被证明是反覆而不胜任的（确实存在这样的可能），沮丧很快就会压倒信心。


But beware of pundits who are certain that Trump will bring economic catastrophe.	对于笃定地认为特朗普会带来经济灾难的专家，我们要报以警惕。


On election eve, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman unequivocally insisted that a Trump victory would lead to a stock-market collapse, with no recovery in sight.	在选举前夜，《纽约时报》专栏作者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）旗帜鲜明地坚持认为特朗普的胜利将导致股市崩盘，并且看不到恢复迹象。


Investors who relied on his insights lost a lot of money.	听信他的的洞见的投资者损失惨重。


At the risk of hyperbole, it’s wise to remember that you don’t have to be a nice guy to get the economy going.	冒着夸张的风险，一个明智之举是记住让经济向前并不是只有聪明人才能做到。


In many ways, Germany was as successful as America at using stimulus to lift the economy out of the Great Depression.	从许多方面看，德国在利用刺激让经济摆脱大萧条方面与美国做得一样成功。


Yes, it still could all end very badly.	是的，仍然存在一损俱损的可能。


The world is a risky place.	世界是一个危险的地方。


If global growth collapses, US growth could suffer severely.	如果全球增长崩溃，美国增长也将遭受重创。


Still, it is far more likely that after years of slow recovery, the US economy might at last be ready to move significantly faster, at least for a while.	但是，更有可能的是，在经历了多年的缓慢复苏后，美国经济也许终于已经准备好大步向前了，至少可以维持一段时间。


The Demise of Dollar Diplomacy?	美元外交的失败


WASHINGTON, DC – Mark Twain never actually said “Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”	华盛顿—马克吐温其实从没有说过“关于我的死讯，被大大地夸张了。


But the misquote is too delicious to die a natural death of its own.	”但这段错误的引用语实在说得太好，以至于流传至今。


And nowhere is the idea behind it more relevant than in discussions of the dollar’s international role.	而其言下之意，用来描述关于美元的国际角色真是再合适不过了。


Pundits have been saying last rites for the dollar’s global dominance since the 1960s – that is, for more than a half-century now.	专家们一直在谈论美元的全球主宰地位的最后仪式——从20世纪60年代，也就是大半个世纪以前开始，美国一直享有这一地位。


The point can be shown by occurrences of the phrase “demise of the dollar” in all English-language publications catalogued by Google.	通过谷歌对所有英语出版物中所含的“美元的坠落”一次的统计，便可一窥端倪。


The frequency of such mentions, adjusted for the number of printed pages per year, first jumped in 1969, following the collapse of the London Gold Pool, an arrangement in which eight central banks cooperated to support the dollar’s peg to gold.	这种说法被频繁提及，（根据每年出版物页数进行调整后）首见于1969年伦敦黄金总库（London Gold Pool）崩溃之后。 伦敦黄金总库是由八家央行组成的联合支持美元盯住黄金的安排。


Use of the phrase soared in the 1970s, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, of which the dollar was the linchpin, and in response to the high inflation that accompanied the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter in the 1970s.	到了20世纪70年代，美元坠落论开始兴盛，原因是以美元为核心的布雷顿森林体系的崩溃，以及70年代尼克松、福特和卡特总统执政期间的通胀高企现象。


But even that spike was dwarfed by the increase in mentions and corresponding worries about the dollar starting in 2001, reflecting the shock of the terrorist attacks that September, the mushrooming growth of the US trade deficit, and then the global financial crisis of 2008.	但与2001年以来对美元坠落论的提及和相关的担忧相比，20世纪70年代的高峰也只能感叹一山更比一山高。 2001年后的美元坠落论与当年9月的恐怖袭击冲击、美国贸易赤字激增以及随后的2008年全球金融危机有关。


Yet through all of this, the dollar’s international role has endured.	但经历了所有这些看空的美元，其国际地位岿然不动。


As my coauthors and I show in a new book, the share of dollars in the foreign-currency reserves held by central banks and governments worldwide hardly budged in the face of these events.	我的合作者和我在新书中指出，面对这些事件，美元占全球央行和政府所持外汇储备中的比例几无动摇。


The greenback remains the dominant currency traded in foreign-exchange markets.	美元仍然是外汇市场中最主要的交易货币。


It is still the unit in which petroleum is priced and traded worldwide, Venezuelan leaders’ complaints about the “tyranny of the dollar” notwithstanding.	它仍然是全世界石油计价和交易用货币，尽管委内瑞拉领导人对“美元的暴政”颇有微词。


To the consternation of many currency traders, the value of the dollar fluctuates widely, as its rise, fall, and recovery in the course of the last year have shown.	许多货币交易者惊恐于美元价值的大幅波动，去年以来的上涨、下跌和恢复就是明证。


But this does little to erode the attractiveness of the dollar in international markets.	但这对于美元在国际市场中的吸引力几乎毫无影响。


Central banks still hold US Treasury bonds because the market for them is the single most liquid financial market in the world.	央行仍然持有美国国债，因为美国国债市场是全世界流动性首屈一指的金融市场。


And Treasury bonds are secure: the federal government has not fallen into arrears on its debt since the disastrous War of 1812.	美国国债也非常安全：自灾难性的1812年战争以来，联邦政府从未对其债务逾期。


In addition, US diplomatic and military links encourage America’s allies to hold dollars.	此外，美国的外交和军事关系也鼓励美国的盟友持有美元。


States with their own nuclear weapons hold fewer dollars than countries that depend on the US for their security needs.	拥有核武器的国家，持有美元的数量要少于需要依赖美国提供保护的国家。


Being in a military alliance with a reserve-currency-issuing country boosts the share of the partner’s foreign-exchange reserves held in that currency by roughly 30 percentage points.	如果一国与一个发行储备货币的国家成为军事盟国，那么其外汇储备中该国货币的比例就会提高大约30个百分点。


The evidence thus suggests that the share of reserves held in dollars would fall appreciably in the absence of this effect.	这一证据也表明，如果失去了这一效应，持有美元作为储备货币的比例将大幅下降。


This under-appreciated link between geopolitical alliances and international currency choice reflects a combination of factors.	地缘政治盟友关系和国际货币选择之间的这一不太为人知的联系是一系列因素综合作用的结果。


Governments have reason to be confident that the reserve-currency country will make servicing debt held by its allies a high priority.	政府有理由相信，储备货币国会将履行盟国所持债务的义务列为重点。


In return, those allies, by holding its liabilities, can help to lower the issuer’s borrowing costs.	反过来，这些盟国持有它的负债则有助于降低储备货币发行国的借贷成本。


Here, then, and not in another imbroglio over the federal debt ceiling this coming December, is where the real threat to the dollar’s international dominance lies.	因此，这，而不是即将到来的12月份又将出现令人尴尬的联邦债务上限问题，就是美元国际主宰地位的真正威胁所在。