Indians are more part of Africa’s social tapestry than are the Chinese, a fabric that has been strengthened through opportunity and adversity through the ages.	印度和非洲的联系比中国更加有根基，原因是双方通过长期的“荣辱与共”而形成的。


Consider Olam, a Singapore-headquartered but Africa-centric global agribusiness company.  From the soybean farms of Brazil’s Matto Grosso to the granaries of Ukraine, Olam is prized for its ability to add value in disparate conditions.	现在来看看总部位于新加坡，业务面向非洲的Olam国际农业公司，从巴西的马托格罗索的大豆农场到乌克兰的谷物，Olam公司在不同的领域都表现非凡。


Olam was started by Indians in Nigeria and remains a world-beating trader in cotton, coffee, cashews and the like.	Olam公司的起源是在尼日利亚的印度人，如今在棉花，咖啡，腰果等领域还保持有着世界级的贸易水平。


To succeed, Olam has had to work “up-country” – a euphemism for difficult conditions far from comfortable port cities – requiring it to rely on Indians’ familiarity with, and willingness to work in, Africa’s interior.	为了成功，Olam国际不能不和一些“内陆国家”——其实就是“远离港口的内陆城市”的代称——由愿意在这里工作的印度人开展工作。


Indeed, so competent is Olam that when Wilmar, a Southeast Asian firm run by overseas Chinese and a force in its own right in China and across Asia, sought to expand in Africa, it sought out Olam in a joint venture.	实际上，和Olam公司一样的模式就是�丰益国际公司，由一名来自南亚的海外华人创办，进军非洲后和Olam组成了合资公司。


The connection between Nigerian cashew farmers and Devi Shetty’s pediatric cardiac surgery is that they both represent decentralized private activity, undertaken through the market, unlike the operations of the China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec, and others in Darfur and elsewhere.��They all add value, but decentralized market-based activity appears likelier to engender additional goodwill.	尼日利亚腰果农场主和黛非•舍蒂的儿科心脏手术计划一样，共同代表了分权制度的私人公司。 通过市场的竞争，而不是象由在达尔富尔及其他地区的那些中国政府控制的中石油和中石化这样的公司模式。


But there is more reshaping to come, again fostered by mutual self-interest, rather than by fiat.	内在的互利互惠的原则导致很多变化正在悄然发生，不是来自政府的行政命令。


The Olam and Wilmar joint venture is, in a sense, symptomatic of the combination of assets from across Asia that can catalyze productive change in Africa.	Olam和Wilmar合资公司的成立，在某种意义上来说，就是亚洲的资产对非洲经济的一种催化组合。


It is fitting that Olam, in Hebrew, means “transcending boundaries.”	这正是“Olam”这个单词在希伯莱语的意思：“超越国界”


Failures will result, surely. But, to my mind, for the most part, decentralized experimentation beats Africa’s partial addiction to aid.	以上新生事物可以看作是对传统的挑战，当然，失败也是再所难免的，不过，在我看来，这种分权的实验模式要好与对国外援助的依赖。


Asian Nationalism at Sea	亚洲民族主义的海上争端


CAMBRIDGE – Will war break out in the seas of East Asia?	剑桥——东亚海域会不会爆发战争？


After Chinese and Japanese nationalists staged competing occupations of the barren landmasses that China refers to as the Diaoyu Islands and Japan calls the Senkaku Islands, angry demonstrators in the southwestern Chinese city of Chengdu chanted, “We must kill all Japanese.”	在中日民族主义者针锋相对地占领中国称为钓鱼岛而日本称为尖阁列岛的不毛之地后，中国西南城市成都的示威者愤怒地高呼：“杀光所有日本人。 ”


Likewise, a standoff between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea led to protests in Manila.	同样，中菲船只在南海斯卡伯勒礁（黄岩岛）的对峙引发了马尼拉的抗议风潮。


And a long planned step forward in cooperation between South Korea and Japan was torpedoed when the South Korean president visited the barren island that Korea calls Dokdo, Japan calls Takeshima, and the United States calls the Liancourt Rocks.	韩国总统对韩国称为独岛、日本称为竹岛、而美国称为利扬库尔岩的荒芜岛礁的访问粉碎了韩日深化合作的希望。


One should not be too alarmist.	但对局势的危险性也不应过分夸张。


The US has declared that the Senkaku Islands (administered by the Okinawa Prefecture when it was returned to Japan in 1972) are covered by the US-Japan security treaty.	美国已经宣布《美日安保条约》涵盖尖阁列岛（1972年归还日本后由冲绳县负责管辖）。


Meanwhile, the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal has calmed down, and, while Japan recalled its ambassador from South Korea over the Dokdo incident, it is unlikely the two countries would come to blows.	与此同时，斯卡伯勒礁的对峙也已经渐趋平静，而且虽然日本在独岛事件后召回了驻韩国大使，但两国开战的可能性不大。


But it is worth recalling that China used lethal force to expel Vietnamese from the Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1988.	但值得一提的是中国曾在1974年和1988年两次以致命武力驱走了西沙群岛的越南人。


And China prevailed upon the Cambodian host of this year’s ASEAN summit to block a final communiqué that would have called for a code of conduct in the South China Sea – the first time in the ten-member association’s four-decade history that it failed to issue a communiqué.	中国还在今年柬埔寨召开的东盟峰会上成功阻止了呼吁制定南海行为准则的最后公报——这是东盟十成员国四十年历史上首次未能发表公报。


The revival of extreme nationalism in East Asia is both worrisome and understandable.	东亚极端民族主义的复兴既令人担忧但又在情理之中。


In Europe, while Greeks may grumble about the terms of German backing for emergency financing, the period since World War II has seen enormous progress in knitting countries together.	虽然希腊可能会抱怨德国的紧急融资支持计划，但二战后欧洲国家的联系已经比之前密切了许多。


Nothing similar has happened in Asia, and issues dating back to the 1930’s and 1940’s remain raw, a problem exacerbated by biased textbooks and government policies.	但亚洲并没有出现类似的情况，二十世纪三四十年代的争端仍然悬而未决，满是偏见的教科书和政府政策又使争议问题进一步恶化。


The Chinese Communist Party is not very communist any more.	中国共产党已经不太信奉共产主义了。


Instead, it bases its legitimacy on rapid economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism.	相反，快速经济增长和汉民族主义已经成为其合法统治的基础。


Memories of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Japanese aggression in the 1930’s are politically useful and fit within a larger theme of Chinese victimization by imperialist forces.	1894－1895年中日战争和二十世纪三十年代日本侵华在政治上非常有用，因为它与帝国主义迫害中国的宏观主题相切合。


Some American defense analysts view China’s maritime strategy as being clearly aggressive.	美国某些国防分析人士认为中国的海洋战略显然具有攻击性。


They point to increasing defense expenditures and the development of missile and submarine technology designed to cordon off the seas extending from China’s coast to “the first island chain” of Taiwan and Japan.	该战略试图扩大国防开支，推进导弹和潜艇技术的研发，以封锁从中国沿海到台湾日本的“第一岛链”所属海域。


Others, however, see a Chinese strategy that is confused, contradictory, and paralyzed by competing bureaucratic interests.	也有人认为中国战略矛盾、混乱，充斥着自相矛盾的官僚利益。


They point to the negative results of China’s more assertive policies since the economic crisis of 2008.	他们指出了2008年经济危机后中国高调政策的负面结果。


Indeed, China’s policies have damaged its relations with nearly all of its neighbors.	实际上，中国政策已经损害了它与几乎所有邻国的关系。


Consider the Senkaku incident in 2010, when, after Japan arrested the crew of a Chinese trawler that had rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, China escalated its economic reprisals.	比方说2010年的尖阁事件，在日本逮捕了撞击海岸警卫队舰艇的中国船长之后，中国进一步升级了经济报复。


The result, as one Japanese analyst put it, was that “China scored an own goal,” immediately reversing what had been a favorable trend in bilateral relations under the ruling Democratic Party of Japan.	结果正像一位日本分析人士所说的那样，“中国自摆乌龙”，即刻扭转了执政民主党温和的双边政策。


More generally, while China spends billions of renminbi in efforts to increase its soft power in Asia, its behavior in the South China Sea contradicts its own message.	总体而言，尽管中国耗资数十亿人民币提高其在亚洲的软实力，但它在南海的所作所为却与自己试图传递的信息相冲突。


I have asked Chinese friends and officials why China follows such a counterproductive strategy.	我也曾问过中国的朋友和官员中国为什么奉行如此适得其反的政策。


The first and formal answer is that China inherited historical territorial claims, including a map from the Nationalist period that sketches a “nine-dotted line” encompassing virtually the entire South China Sea.	他们给出的正式答案是中国沿袭了民国时期的地图画法和领土要求，图上的九条虚线几乎将整个南海囊括为中国领土。


Today, with technology making underwater as well as fisheries resources more exploitable in the area, it is impossible to abandon this patrimony.	如今，随着水下技术的发展和相关海域渔业资源的开发，更不可能放弃这笔继承得来的财富。


In 2009-2010, some mid-ranking officials and commentators even referred to the South China Sea as a sovereign “core interest” like Taiwan or Tibet.	2009-2010年，有些中层官员和评论员甚至将南海像台湾或西藏那样纳入中国核心利益的范畴。


But China’s leaders have never been clear about the exact location of the “nine-dotted line,” or about whether their claims refer only to certain land features, or also to more extensive continental shelves and seas.	但中国领导人从未划定过“九条虚线”的确切位置，也没有明确过他们的要求是仅仅针对某些地貌，还是更为宽泛的海洋和大陆架。


When asked why they do not clarify their claims, my Chinese interlocutors sometimes say that to do so would require difficult political and bureaucratic compromises that would provoke domestic nationalists.	当被问及中国为什么不澄清要求时，中方对话者有时会说这需要艰难的政治和官僚妥协，还有可能刺激国内的民族主义者。


Moreover, sometimes they say that they do not want to give away a bargaining chip prematurely.	此外，他们有时会说中方不愿过早放弃筹码。


In 1995, and again in 2010, the US declared that the waters of the South China Sea should be governed by the 1982 United Nations Law of the Seas Treaty (which, ironically, the US has not yet ratified), but that the US takes no position on the territorial claims.	1995和2010年，美国宣布南海应服从《1982年联合国海洋公约法》的管辖（讽刺的是美国至今尚未批准这一公约），但美国不对领土要求表明态度。


Instead, the US urged that competing claims be resolved through negotiation.	相反，美国敦促通过谈判解决冲突的领土要求。


In 2002, China and ASEAN agreed on a legally non-binding code of conduct for managing such disputes, but, as a large power, China believes that it will gain more in bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations with small countries.	2002年，中国和东盟达成了不具有法律约束力的冲突管理准则，但作为大国，中国认为与小国进行双边而非多边谈判能够获取更多利益。


That belief was behind China’s pressure on Cambodia to block ASEAN’s final communiqué this summer.	本着这种信念，中国对柬埔寨施压阻止东盟夏天发表最后公报。


But this is a mistaken strategy.	但这是一项错误的政策。


As a large power, China will have great weight in any circumstance, and it can reduce its self-inflicted damage by agreeing to a code of conduct.	身为大国的中国在任何情况下都有很大的影响力，签署行为准则能够控制自我损伤。


As for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the best proposal comes from The Economist.	在尖阁/钓鱼岛问题上，最好的建议来自《经济学家》。


China should refrain from sending official vessels into Japanese waters, and use a hotline with Japan to manage crises generated by nationalist “cowboys.”	中国应避免派遣官方船只进入日本海域，并开设对日热线管理民族主义“牛仔”造成的危机。


At the same time, the two countries should revive a 2008 framework for joint development of disputed gas fields in the East China Sea, and Japan’s central government should purchase the barren islands from their private owner and declare them an international maritime protected area.	与此同时，两国应重新启动东海争议油气田共同开发框架，日本中央政府应向私人所有者购买这座荒岛，并宣布为国际海洋保护区。


It is time for all countries in East Asia to remember Winston Churchill’s famous advice: “To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.”	东亚各国应牢记丘吉尔的名言：“吵吵总比打打好。 ”


Asia Adrift	亚洲随波逐流


NEW DELHI – The year 2012 began with festering Chinese sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas, but also with hope that a code of conduct brokered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would enable them to be resolved peacefully.	新德里——2012年在中国对东海和南海的恼人的主权要求中开始，但同时也存在着在东盟斡旋下达成行为准则，和平解决分歧的希望。


The year is ending, however, with those hopes dashed and ASEAN more divided than it has ever been.	现在2012年已将近年尾，但希望却已成泡影，东盟国家也比以往更加四分五裂。


Indeed, a handful of its members now seem eager to subordinate their national interests – and the interests of ASEAN – to those of China.	其实，极少数东盟成员国现在似乎迫不及待地要在中国面前交出自己的国家利益和东盟利益。


China’s increasing assertiveness in staking its claims contributed to the landslide victory of the defense-minded Liberal Democrats in Japan, and to the conservative Park Geun-hye’s election as South Korea’s first-ever female president.	中国在提出领土要求时不断增强的自信造成以防御为核心的自民党在日本取得压倒性胜利，同时也导致保守的朴槿惠当选韩国有史以来第一任女总统。


Rising regional tensions also provided the backdrop to US President Barack Obama’s trip to Southeast Asia shortly after his re-election.	在地区紧张局势加剧的大背景下，奥巴马总统重新当选后不久就展开了对东南亚国家的访问。


Obama announced the United States’ strategic “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region in January 2012, and a whirlwind of activity there – from Australia to Indonesia to India – marked America’s security diplomacy throughout the year.	2012年1月奥巴马宣布美国战略“支点”向亚洲转移，以及从澳大利亚到印尼再到印度的一系列旋风式活动突显出贯穿全年的美国安全外交政策。


In Japan, too, worries about Chinese assertiveness have become so powerful that a government that showed considerable hostility to the US-Japan alliance when it came to power three years ago had, by November, begun to trumpet the alliance’s mutual-defense commitments as it confronted China’s claim to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.	同样在日本，由中国自信所引发的忧虑变得如此强大，以致在三年前执政期间曾对美日同盟表现出相当大敌意的日本政府在面对中国对尖阁群岛（钓鱼岛）的主权要求时也开始四处宣扬同盟的共同防御承诺。


The security concerns that have animated this diplomacy are forging a broad coalition, bringing in not only the region’s democracies, but also countries like Vietnam, which is embroiled in its own territorial dispute with China that centers on maritime oil exploration.	促成这一外交政策的安全担忧引发了广泛的联盟，参与的不仅有区域民主国家，还有同样卷入以海上石油勘探为核心的对华领土争端的越南等国。


Even India, which has been cautious about deepening its security ties with the US, has now embraced the idea of regional mutual defense – not only with America, but also with Japan and other East Asian countries.	就连一向对深化与美国安全关系持谨慎态度的印度现在也已接受地区双边防御的理念——结盟对象不仅包括美国，也包括东亚国家和日本。


This new emphasis on regional security is not confined to governments.	类似对地区安全的全新关注不仅局限于政府。


Popular support for the creation of a pan-Asian security structure can be found not only in the election outcomes in Japan and South Korea, but also in the ecstatic crowds that greeted Obama in Myanmar (Burma) during his recent tour.	对建立泛亚安全结构的公众支持不仅透过日韩选举可以看出端倪，透过最近奥巴马访问时缅甸欣喜若狂的群众也能够有所感悟。


Ordinary Burmese well understand that their country’s democratic transition is the direct result of its recoil from China’s excessive demands on its natural resources.	普通缅甸民众非常清楚中国对其自然资源过度需求所造成的反弹直接导致了该国的民主过渡。


So far, China’s reaction to all of this new activity has been to dig in its heels and insist on addressing its territorial disputes with ASEAN’s militarily inferior members on a bilateral basis.	迄今为止，中国对所有新情况的反应是毫不妥协，坚持与在军事上远逊于自己的东盟成员国在双边基础上解决领土争端。


In November, China foiled ASEAN members’ efforts to create a multilateral forum and an agreed code of conduct to govern economic and security activity in the South China Sea.	11月，中国挫败了东盟成员国成立多边论坛并签订共同行为准则规范南海经济安全活动的努力。


By doing so, it split the group and may well have thwarted ASEAN’s ambition to transform itself into a European Union-like regional bloc by the end of 2015.	这样不仅导致东盟集团陷入分裂，同时沉重打击了东盟到2015年底转化为类似欧盟的区域性集团的信心。


China succeeded by winning over Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the host of November’s ASEAN summit, who cut off discussion of China’s assertive role in the South China Sea by falsely claiming that ASEAN’s members had reached a “consensus” against “internationalizing” the issue.	中国争取到十一月东盟峰会主办国柬埔寨首相洪森，并借此成功达到了自己的目标。 洪森中断了对中国在南海高调表现的讨论，假称东盟成员国“一致同意”避免将上述问题“国际化”。


(Ironically, in 1984, when Hun Sen was Foreign Minister, the ministry published a book entitled The Chinese Rulers’ Crimes against Kampuchea, which documented China’s backing for the genocidal Khmer Rouge.)	（颇具讽刺意味的是1984年洪森任外长时，外交部曾出版一本名叫《中国统治者在柬埔寨所犯罪行》的书籍，一一历数了中国对奉行种族灭绝政策的红色高棉的支持。 ）


That ASEAN debacle has had serious consequences.	东盟此次崩溃造成了严重的后果。


The foreign minister of the Philippines, which is also currently engaged in a heated territorial conflict with China, called on Japan to rearm itself to balance China militarily, notwithstanding his country’s bitter legacy of Japanese occupation.	目前也正和中国发生激烈领土冲突的菲律宾外长不顾本国曾在日本占领中所受的痛苦，要求日本重新武装以维持对华的军事平衡。


The landslide election of Shinzo Abe, who campaigned on a robust defense platform, may well lead to a serious Japanese push to invigorate the country’s military capabilities.	主张建立强大防御平台的安倍晋三在选举中获得压倒性的胜利，很可能导致日本不顾一切采取重建该国军事能力的举措。


A recent announcement by the provincial government in Hainan, China, which has responsibility for the South China Sea territories claimed by China, has probably reinforced that impulse.	中国负责管理所谓南海主权的海南省政府最近发表一项声明，可能进一步强化了上述冲动。


According to the Hainan authorities, from January 1, 2013, China’s police will be authorized to board and detain ships that are suspected of “illegal activities” in what China claims are its territorial waters.	按照海南省政府的说法，从2013年1月1日起，中国警方将有权登船并扣留在所谓中国领海涉嫌“非法活动”的船舶。


What constitutes “illegal” activity in the eyes of the Hainan authorities was not spelled out, but many worry that the order will give carte blanche to the maritime police to interfere with commercial activity in the South China Sea.	海南省政府并没有明确列出具体哪些将构成“非法”活动，但很多人担心这项命令将全权委托海警干涉中国南海的商业活动。


This approach, according to Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt of the International Crisis Group, appears to be “part of an overall strategy by Beijing to more forcefully defend its sovereignty claims” by “operational means.”	按照国际危机集团斯蒂芬妮·克莱阿尔布兰特的说法，这种作法似乎隶属于北京从“执行层面”更有力捍卫主权要求的总体战略。


As a result of China’s hardening stance, Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN’s outgoing secretary-general has said that Asia is entering its “most contentious” period in recent years.	随着中国立场的渐趋强硬，东盟即将离任的秘书长素林·比素万表示亚洲正逐渐进入近年来“最有争议”的时期。


Indeed, he warns that “the South China Sea could evolve into another Palestine,” unless countries try harder to defuse rather than inflame tensions.	事实上，他警告“南海问题可能演化为另一个巴勒斯坦”，除非各国更加努力地去化解，而不是加剧紧张局势。


One reason to hope that matters will not get out of hand is China’s deep integration into the global economy.	期望局面不会失控的理由之一是中国与全球经济的深度整合。


But, within China, as the American political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell argued recently in Foreign Affairs, there is growing tension between domestic economic priorities and Chinese leaders’ belief that “China’s political stability and territorial integrity are threatened by foreign actors and forces.”	但在中国国内，正如美国政治学家安德鲁·内森和安德鲁·史考贝尔最近在《外交事务》上评论的那样，国内经济重点和中国领导人认为“中国的政治稳定和领土完整正受到国外势力威胁”之间的矛盾正日益加深。


The fears of China’s rulers, I suspect, do not bode well for reaching a peaceful resolution of its territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.	我怀疑中国领导人的担心对和平解决东海及南海海域的地区争端不是个好兆头。


A country that is “unstable at the grass roots, dejected in the middle strata and out of control at the top,” as a group of Chinese scholars recently put it, may see adventurism abroad as the best means of maintaining unity at home.	某些中国学者最近所描述的一个“底层动荡、中产阶级心灰意冷、权力阶层失控”的国家可能将对外冒险看作维持国内团结的最佳手段。


Asian Women on Top	身居高位的亚洲女性


NEW YORK – India’s Indira Gandhi, Sri Lanka’s Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Pakistan’s Benazir Bhutto, Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia – these women leaders dominated South and South East Asia for much of the past four decades.	发自纽约——印度的英吉拉·甘地，斯里兰卡的班达拉奈克夫人，巴基斯坦的贝·布托，菲律宾的阿基诺夫人以及印尼的梅加瓦蒂——这些女性领袖在过去四十年内的大部分时间统治着南亚和东南亚地区。


Each belonged to a special class of women whose husbands or fathers were their country’s recognized founding father or longstanding political leader. But, while their dynastic links brought them to power, they were not the sole factor keeping them there.	她们的父亲或者丈夫都曾是其所在国的创建者或者长期领导者，而当这种类似王朝传宗继位的联系将她们送上政治舞台时，支撑她们掌权的却不但是这一个因素。


When first elected, none of these women had any serious professional or political qualifications.	在第一次当选时，这些女性中无一人拥有任何过硬的专业或者政治资历。


For some, this “shortcoming” was seen as an advantage, enabling some of them to project an image of innocence and purity, even martyrdom, as they stood in the place of their deceased husbands or fathers.	对于其中一些女性来说，这个“短板”可以被视为优点，使她们可以在自己丈夫或父亲曾经的位置上塑造一个清白而纯洁，甚至是殉道者的形象。


None was particularly focused on a women’s agenda (at least not in their first terms in office), and studies show that rural women did not fare particularly well under their rule.	（至少在第一个任期内）也没有一位女性特别关注与妇女有关的议程，而研究证实农村妇女的地位在她们治下也缺乏改善。


But something very different emerged in Asia in 2011.	但2011年的亚洲却涌现了一些完全不同的事物。


We still have women leaders who came to power at least partly because of their family ties. But they now seem to use their positions with far more confidence in putting women and their concerns squarely at the center of their agendas.	虽然仍有一些女性领导人是在某种程度上利用家族影响力登台，但她们如今却开始更自信地将妇女事务直接列为自身政治议程的核心。


And perhaps more importantly, a growing number of women are reaching for the highest political echelons in their countries by dint of their political talents alone.	而或许更重要的是，有越来越多的女性凭借着自己的政治天赋跻身各国政治高层。


Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born wife of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and daughter-in-law of the late Indira Gandhi, became India’s most powerful woman for dynastic reasons but she has consistently demonstrated that she is a shrewd behind-the-scenes political operator.  For her, the main task at hand is to strengthen the Congress Party, which in early 2011 she was elected to lead for an unprecedented fourth term.	索妮娅·甘地，这位出生在意大利的印度前总理拉吉夫·甘地之妻，已故领导人英迪拉·甘地的儿媳凭借着家世成为印度权力最大的女性，但同时也不断表现出自己也是一位精明强干的幕后政治能手。 她的主要任务增强印度国大党的力量，而她在20011年初再次当选党主席后已经是史无前例地第四次连任了。


But she has also expended considerable energy on promoting women, particularly their representation in politics.	但索尼娅·甘地把相当大的精力放在推动妇女事务，尤其是推动妇女选举自身政治代表方面。


Indeed, she pushed hard in backing Pratibha Patil to become India’s first woman president.	事实上她也对普拉蒂巴·帕蒂尔成为印度第一位女性总统出力甚多。


Similarly Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s prime minister, who carries the mantle of her assassinated father, has become a keen advocate of development issues, with a special emphasis on women and their needs.	类似的还有孟加拉总理谢赫·哈西娜，在遇刺父亲谢赫·拉赫曼的光环下，她成为了一位发展事务的热心推动者，并且特别将重点放在妇女及其需要方面。


That agenda, missing in her first term, has dominated her current period in office.	这个议程虽然没有在她的第一个任期中出现，却占到了当前第二个任期的极大部分。


In East Asia, too, women are on the rise politically.	东亚地区的妇女也在政治上不断崛起。


Park Geun-hye, daughter of Park Chung-hee, President of South Korea from 1961 to 1979, is now one of the two likely candidates to succeed President Lee Myung-bak.	韩国前总统朴正熙之女朴槿惠目前是李明博卸任后的两大总统热门人选之一。


While Park derives some of her power from her family pedigree, she has proven to be an astute and seasoned politician – one who climbed the Grand National Party’s leadership ladder over the last two decades to emerge as a national figure.	虽然继承了祖荫，但朴槿惠已经证明了自己是个机敏而老练的政治家——她历经20年才爬上韩国大国家党最高领导层并成为全国知名人物。


Her role in championing an inclusive agenda for women provides a new lens through which to assess the power of Asia’s new leaders.	她在推动一个大型妇女事务议程方面的作为使人们对亚洲新领袖权力的评估又增添了一个新视角。


Compare Park to Corazon Aquino, who, when elected President of the Philippines, famously remarked that she was simply a housewife, not a professional politician or an experienced leader. It was clear that voters elected her because she was the widow of the slain opposition hero Benigno Aquino.	阿基诺夫人当选菲律宾总统时曾自称“只是一个家庭主妇，不是职业政治家或者老资格领导人”，而选民之所以投票给她也仅仅因为她是遇害反对派英雄贝尼尼奥·阿基诺的遗孀。


By contrast, no one would deny Park’s professional credentials.	相比之下朴槿惠的专业资历则无可置疑。


She is taken seriously more for her own experience and political power than for her family connections.	她对自身的经验和政治实力的关心也比家族的政治人脉更多。


Even in Japan, a similar change is in the air, but with no hint of dynastic trappings.	即使是在日本也出现了类似的趋势，但却没有像往常那样插上家族势力的标签。


Yuriko Koike, a former defense minister and national-security adviser, is one of the country’s most powerful figures; indeed, she could become Japan’s next prime minister.	曾任国防大臣和国家安全顾问的小池百合子就是该国政坛的其中一个实力派； 事实上她有望成为下任日本首相。


Unlike many other leaders of her Liberal Democratic Party, Koike has no real family connection to any major political figure.	与她所在的自民党其他成员不同的是，小池与各大政治人物都没有特别的亲缘关系。


Instead, her standing reflects her unique political talents: an academic background in Arabic studies (she studied at Cairo University) and fluency in English, which give her a global perspective that most of her male colleagues lack.	相反，她所持有的立场反映了其自身的特殊政治天赋：开罗大学阿拉伯研究的教育背景以及流利的英语，而这也赋予了小池百合子其同僚所缺乏的全球视野。


Koike is not the only Asian woman without family ties forging a political career that may lead to the top.	小池百合子并不是第一个没有家族背景却有望跻身最高权力的亚洲女性。


Indonesia’s Sri Mulyani Indrawati, a former finance minister and currently a managing director of the World Bank, is often mentioned as a leading presidential candidate in her country.	曾任印尼财政部长，现为世界银行常务总监的斯莉•穆尔雅妮•英德拉瓦蒂就经常被认为是最受欢迎的总统人选。


Indeed, a party has been formed specifically to entice her to run for president in 2014. 	事实上，印尼国内人士已经专门成立了一个政党以确保她能在2014年参选总统。


In Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, is making a sustained and powerful challenge to the incumbent president in the election due in January 2012.  Having helped to draft Taiwan’s special state-to-state act that regulates relations with China, and then having headed the country’s Ministry for Mainland Affairs Council, she is well positioned to manage the thorniest issue any Taiwanese leader will face: the relationship with China.	在台湾，蔡英文对即将在2012年1月卸任的现任总统构成了持续而有力的威胁。 有了参与起草规范两岸关系的“特殊国与国法案”并领导大陆事务委员会的经历，蔡英文有能力处理所有台湾领导人都会面对的棘手问题：与中国大陆的关系


Another newcomer to political leadership is Yingluck Shinawatra, Thailand’s Prime Minister.	另一个新近就任的领导人则是泰国女总理英拉·西那瓦。


Clearly, one reason she swept to power this year were her ties to her brother, exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who controls the country’s strongest political party.	很显然，她能在今年就任的一个原因就是她的哥哥，前总理他信·西那瓦，以及后者控制下的全国第一大政党。


But she made it clear during the campaign that she is her own person, a seasoned business leader with appropriate professional degrees.	但在选举过程中英拉已经明确显示了出自身的独立性：一位拥有专业学历的老练商界领袖。


Then, of course, there is the Burmese Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.	当然还有诺贝尔和平奖获得者，缅甸国父的女儿昂山素姬。


The daughter of the founder of independent Burma, Suu Kyi is now engaged in perhaps the most delicate task of her remarkable political career – trying to engineer a true democratic transition from decades of military dictatorship.	她目前或许正在进行自己光辉政治生涯中的一个最为精巧微妙的任务——尝试在这个经历了数十年军政府独裁的国家推动真正的民主转型。


Unlike the first generation of Asian women leaders, who gained power primarily because of their familial connections, the emerging crop are strong, confident, and ready to take on the challenge of leading their nations on their own terms.	与借助家族势力登台的第一代亚洲女性领导人不同，新的一代更强势，更具自信，并准备用自己独有的方式来迎接领导国家的挑战。


Their followers appear to see in them harbingers, unjaded by history, of the change for which their societies are clamoring.	她们的追随者似乎将其视为没有历史包袱的预言家，并将为他们的社会带来渴望已久的变革。


At a time when, despite economic growth in Asia, there is much social and income inequality, as well uncertainty about the durability of peace in the region, the desire to find fresh solutions to problems has given a powerful boost to women leaders.	在这个亚洲一方面实现经济增长，另一方面却出现大量社会和收入不平等，同时地区和平前景也充满不确定性的年代，用新方法解决问题的渴望极大地推动了女性领导人的崛起。


They are poised to take their seats at the top table – and perhaps to change its shape.	她们也已经安定自若地在最高权力的圆桌旁占据了自己的位置——甚至有望最终改变桌子的形状。


The Trials of Asian Democracy	亚洲民主的审判


TOKYO – These are times of trial – literally in the courts – for a growing number of Asia’s democracies.	东京—这是对越来越多的亚洲民主国进行审判的时刻——在法庭上的真正审判。


The list of major national political leaders in the region who have faced, or are about to face, criminal charges has grown so extensive that it is plausible to wonder whether democracy itself can survive in a number of these countries.	该地区大国政治领导人面临着——或即将面临——刑事指控，其罪名之大足以让人怀疑民主本身能否在这些国家中生存下去。


Perhaps the gravest allegations have been leveled at Bangladesh’s opposition leader Khaleda Zia, who has been charged with murder in a case going back many years.	也许最严重的指控针对的是孟加拉国反对派领导人齐亚（Khaleda Zia）。 他被指控一宗多年前的谋杀。


India’s former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who lost power less than a year ago, is being questioned by prosecutors in connection with allegations of corruption in the privatization of coalmines under his government.	不到一年前下台的印度前总理辛格（Manmohan Singh）正在接受检方质询，他卷入了其政府管理的煤矿私有化过程中的腐败弊案。


Following a military coup that overthrew her democratically elected government, Thailand’s former prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, is facing charges of official malfeasance over rice subsidies.	民选的泰国前总理英拉被军事政变推翻后，现在正面临大米补贴问题上的渎职指控。


Then there is the long-running saga of Malaysia’s opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.	还有马来西亚多年来的反对派领袖、前副总理安瓦尔·易卜拉欣（Anwar Ibrahim）。


His conviction on sodomy charges will effectively ban him from politics for five years, at a moment when the opposition is posing the most serious challenge to Malaysia’s ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) since the country gained its independence from the British Empire in 1958.	他因鸡奸而被定罪，五年内无法从政，而这正逢1958年马来西亚从大英帝国独立以来反对派对执政党马来民族统一组织（United Malays National Organization，UMNO）构成最严重的挑战之时。


Moreover, Anwar’s daughter has now been detained for questioning the integrity of her father’s trial in a speech in the Malay parliament, in which she is an elected member in her own right.	此外，安瓦尔之女也因为在马来西亚议会发表演讲质疑父亲判决的合理性而被羁押。 她凭借自己的努力当选为马来西亚议员。


Each of these politically tinged trials has different origins, of course.	当然，这些政治上存在污点的审判原因各不相同。


And each was or will be conducted in court systems that vary greatly in terms of their development and independence.	每一次审判都是或将是在司法系统中执行，但这些司法系统的发达程度和独立程度大不相同。


Yet all of them have called into question, to varying degrees, the rule of law and the prospect for a democratic future in each country.	但所有这些审判都或多或少都有问题，是各自国家法治和民主未来前景的阴影。


Singh’s questioning by government prosecutors is perhaps the least worrying case, because India’s democracy is rock-solid, and its judiciary is fearsomely jealous of its independence.	辛格被政府检方质询也许是最不令人担心的，因为印度的民主很稳固，其司法系统也以独立性为世人所称道。


His supporters at home and abroad should have no fear for his rights, or that his case will become some political plaything to keep the opposition Congress party down.	辛格的国内外支持者不必担心他的权利，也不必担心他的案子成为拖垮反对党国大党的工具。


Indeed, the politically shrewd Prime Minister Narendra Modi is far too smart to even contemplate attempting to distort the investigation of Singh for partisan gain.	事实上，政治上相当精明的总理莫迪绝不会蠢到为了党派利益扭曲对辛格的调查，连想都不会这样想。


Sadly, fidelity to judicial independence and the rule of law cannot be guaranteed as thoroughly in the other cases.	不幸的是，忠诚于司法独立和法治的情况在其他案子中难以彻底贯彻。


Bangladesh, the world’s fourth largest Muslim democracy, has historically had a patchy record in this regard, suggesting scope for political intervention in the case against Zia, if only by officials eager to curry favor with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.	世界第四大民主穆斯林国家孟加拉国在这方面的历史记录颇不检点，这表明齐亚案的政治干预可能很大，只要有官员想讨好总理哈希纳（Sheikh Hasina）。


Indeed, the two leaders’ mutual loathing is long and legendary.	事实上，两位领导人的对立既久且盛。


Each has been Prime Minister, and both have sought, while in office, to use the courts to keep the other out of power, even out of politics altogether – seemingly without regard to the cost.	两人都当过总理，在执政期间都试图利用法庭将另一位逐出权力甚至政坛——并且大有不惜一切代价之势。


The murder charges leveled against Zia have already spurred protests, and could incite massive civil disturbances if a trial actually takes place, jeopardizing the economic success that the country has had under Hasina’s rule.	针对齐亚的谋杀指控已经导致了示威游行，如果真的进入庭审，有可能导致大规模民变，破坏哈希纳治下孟加拉国所取得的经济成功。


And yet government prosecutors who are ultimately responsible to the prime minister are pressing ahead with the case.	但最终需要对总理负责的政府检察官仍在推进这宗案子。


Shinawatra’s looming trial in Thailand and Ibrahim’s repeat conviction in Malaysia lack even the fig leaf of judicial independence.	泰国即将到来的英拉审判和马来西亚易卜拉欣的再度定罪甚至连司法独立的遮羞布也不要了。


Shinawatra’s overthrow by the military was clearly a bid by the country’s generals to end by force the electoral lock that she and her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra – himself a former prime minister who was deposed by a military coup in 2006 – have had on Thailand for almost 15 years.	英拉被军方推翻显然是泰国将军们用武力结束英拉及其兄他信近15年来在泰国选举制度中不可撼动局面的措施。 他信本人亦曾担任总理，2006年被军事政变推翻。


So now the generals and their allies in the Bangkok elite seem determined to turn back the clock; Yingluck’s looming trial appears to be a signal that the Thaksins’ popularity rules out anything more than “managed” democracy in Thailand.	因此，如今将军们和他们的曼谷精英盟友似乎决定要开倒车； 即将到来的英拉审判将表明他信的支持率将彻底揭开泰国“有管理的”民主的真面目。


But the current quiescence of the pro-Thaksin forces should not encourage anyone to think that the military can suppress Thai democracy forever or without a fight.	但目前他信方力量的沉默不应该让任何人认为军方能够永远镇压泰国的民主而不受抵抗。


Sadly, Malaysia may soon become prone to the same type of violent protest and economic decline that have gripped Thailand in recent years.	不幸的是，马来西亚可能很快就陷入与近几年来的泰国同样的暴力示威和经济衰退。


Here, it seems clear that UNMO’s political interests have been allowed to dictate that the country’s key opposition leader should be tried on charges that no real democracy that embraces the rule of law would even consider leveling, and convicted on evidence that no truly independent court would accept.	在马来西亚，UNMO的政治利益显然能够决定该国关键反对派领导人可以遭遇法治的真正民主根本不会考虑的指控，并根据独立的法庭绝不会接受的证据定罪。


Political leaders in Thailand and Malaysia, and in other countries in the region, frequently tout the model pioneered by Singapore’s founder and longtime leader Lee Kuan Yew, who died this month.	泰国和马来西亚，以及该地区其他国家的政治领导人常常标榜新加坡国父和长期领导人、本月刚刚逝世的李光耀所创立的模式。


Yet the path on which both countries have embarked was not Lee’s path.	但泰国和马来西亚所走的道路绝非李光耀的道路。


Yes, Lee’s system enabled him to remain in power for 31 years, and he did use the civil – not criminal – courts to harry his opponents.	诚然，李光耀的制度让他能够掌权31年，他也确实用民事——而非刑事——法庭打击反对者。


But Lee, more importantly, also relied on elements of democratic contestation to ensure that meritocracy triumphed over patronage.	但更重要的是，李光耀也依靠民主竞争的要素保证英才制度胜过裙带关系。


This formula underpinned the rapid consolidation of good government, based on rigorous standards of official conduct that limited the elite’s arbitrary power.	这一模式有助于快速巩固好政府，其基础是能够限制精英阶层“任性”权力的严格的官员行为准则。


Putting one’s opponents in the criminal dock seems unlikely to produce a similar result.	将反对派送上刑事法庭不可能达到相同的结果。


Asia’s Age of Thaksin?	亚洲的他信时代要到了？


The retirements from frontline politics of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed have deprived Southeast Asia of its senior leaders.	新加坡总理李光耀和马来西亚首相马哈蒂尔· 穆罕默德（Mahathir Mohamed）退出政治第一线后，东南亚失去了资深领导人。


Can Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra fill the regional leadership vacuum?	泰国总理他信（Thaksin Shinawatra）能够填补这一地区领袖的真空状态吗？


A series of bold foreign-policy strokes – the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Economic Cooperation Strategy for the development of mainland Southeast Asia, and America’s designation of Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally” – turned the international spotlight on Thaksin during his first term.	在第一次任期内，他信推出了一系列外交政策方面的大胆举措，其中包括亚洲合作对话（ACD）、东南亚大陆发展经济合作战略(ECS)、及美国指定泰国为其“非北约主要盟国”，这些使他信成为了全球瞩目的中心。


Violence in Thailand’s predominantly Muslim south seemed to dent his ambitions last year, but his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party’s landslide victory last February gave his bid for regional leadership a new lease on life.	去年,泰国南部地区(该地区以穆斯林人口为主)的暴力事件似乎对他信的雄心壮志有所打击，但其领导的泰爱泰党（TRT）在去年二月取得的压倒性胜利又重新鼓起了他争取地区领导人地位的信心。


With the TRT capturing over 75% of the seats in the lower house of parliament, Thaksin is now politically invincible at home.	由于泰爱泰党取得了下议院75%的席位，现在，他信在国内的政治地位也变得不可动摇。


Indeed, he has become the first elected Thai leader to finish a four-year term, be re-elected, and preside over a one-party government.	事实上，他信在四年任满后，又再度被选为总理，领导着一党政府，这在泰国政坛上尚属首次。


Thaksin’s dominance of Thai politics is unprecedented, and his resilient popularity in the face of a fickle electorate is unparalleled.	在泰国政坛上，他信的统治地位可说是前无古人。 面对着变化莫测的选民，他总能重获人心，这一能力也无人可及。


Apart from his complete control of domestic politics, Thaksin commands other prerequisites of regional leadership.	除了对国内政治的绝对控制外，他信还具备其他一些成为地区领袖不可或缺的条件。


Already eyeing a third term, he can count on political longevity on the order of Mahathir’s 22-year rule.	在再度连任指日可待的情况下，他信还可依恃其政治寿命的优势，这点与马哈蒂尔22年的统治优势类似。


Notwithstanding the one-party system that the TRT is cultivating, Thaksin is armed with democratic legitimacy in a global arena bent on democracy promotion, and he speaks English decently enough to articulate his views and vision to a global audience.	尽管泰爱泰政党正在搞一党制，但在致力于民主促进的世界政坛里，他信还拥有民主合法性这一武器。 此外，他信英语说得也颇为地道，足以对全球听众宣扬他的观点和对未来的展望。


He even has his own development strategy, dubbed “Thaksinomics,” a self-styled approach that blends neo-liberal export-led growth with grassroots-based domestic demand.	他信甚至还有一套自己的发展战略，称为“他信经济学”。 “他信经济学”自称能将新自由主义的出口导向型经济增长与国内基层民众的需要融为一体。


The Thai economy emerged out of its post-1997 crisis doldrums under Thaksin’s watch, and is now firmly positioned on a 6% annual growth trajectory.	在他信的监控下，泰国经济走出了1997年东南亚金融危机后的萧条状态，正以年增长率6%的速度稳步增长。


While it relies on profligate subsidies and cash handouts, Thaksinomics also banks on structural reforms to propel economic growth.	在依赖高额补贴和现金发放的同时，“他信经济学”也把希望建立在进行结构改革以推动经济增长上。


The strategy’s most promising prospects include the promotion of industrial upgrading, niche industries, and competitiveness-boosting cluster projects that aim to make Thailand a global and regional hub for food, fashion, tourism, automobiles, and healthcare.	“他信经济学”最理想的前景是推动产业升级，促进利基产业的发展，推广以竞争为推动力的集群项目，这些项目目的是将泰国建设成为食品、时尚、旅游、汽车、保健方面的地区中心和国际中心。


A vibrant economy – GDP growth is second only to China’s in Asia – is indispensable for regional leadership.	蓬勃繁荣的经济（在亚洲，泰国的国内生产总值增长仅次于中国）也是地区领导人不可或缺的条件之一。


Of the policies that will determine his future role in the region, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue and Economic Cooperation Strategy stand out.	在所有决定他信将在东南亚地区扮演什么角色的政策中，亚洲合作对话和经济合作战略脱颖而出。


Based on the concept of “Asia for Asians,” the nascent ACD’s membership straddles the Asian landmass from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East, with Thailand at the geographic center.	新生的亚洲合作对话以“亚洲人的亚洲”这一理念为基础，其成员国横跨了亚洲大陆，从朝鲜半岛到中东地区。 而泰国地理位置正好居中。


Although its future directions are uncertain, this 26-member forum trumps Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN Plus Three, which includes China, Japan, and South Korea.	尽管未来的方向还不明确，但这一拥有26个成员国的论坛已经胜过了亚太经合组织、东盟及包括中国、日本、韩国在内的东盟加三国。


The region-wide crisis in 1997, weak progress on free trade, and the region’s security vulnerabilities have made Thaksin aware of ASEAN’s limitations.	1997年横扫整个东南亚的经济危机，自由贸易的迟滞不前，以及该地区脆弱的治安情况都让泰国意识到了东盟的局限性。


As Indonesia’s size makes it a natural leader of ASEAN, the ACD lends Thaksin a broader platform that stresses Thailand’s geographical advantages.	印度尼西亚因为面积优势，自然成为了东盟领袖。 而亚洲合作对话则为他信提供了更为广阔的舞台，泰国的地理优势也在此舞台上得到了强调。


It allows him to trumpet Thailand’s strategic objectives and the region’s major issues, sometimes in confrontation with the interests and the demands of the West.	亚洲合作对话使他信可以大声宣扬泰国的战略目标和东南亚的主要问题。 有时，这些目标和问题会与西方的利益和要求相冲突。


Within the ACD framework, Thaksin launched the $1 billion “Asia Bond” last year in an effort to match Asia’s financial capital with its financing requirements.	去年，在亚洲合作对话框架内，他信发行了10亿美元的“亚洲债券”，以努力使亚洲金融资本适应亚洲的融资要求。


In a smaller sphere of operations, the ECS envisages economic development in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.	在规模较小的行动中，经济合作战略就柬埔寨、老挝、缅甸、和越南的经济发展提出了构想。


Under Thaksin, Thailand graduated from aid recipient and became a donor country for the first time, having turned away development assistance from countries like Japan.	在他信的领导下，泰国逐渐摆脱了受援国的地位，首次成为赞助国，并拒绝了日本等国的发展援助。


A Thai fund of 10 billion baht was established to provide outright aid and soft loans to the ECS members.	泰国还成立了100亿泰铢的援助基金，为经济合作战略成员国提供直接援助和低息贷款。


Like the ACD, the ECS shifts Thai foreign policy priorities to the Southeast Asian mainland, highlighting Thailand’s role and Thaksin’s canny leadership.	与亚洲合作对话一样，经济合作战略也将泰国的外交重点转移到了东南亚大陆，并强调泰国在其中扮演的角色和他信的精明领导。


Two major obstacles stand in Thaksin’s way.	还有两大障碍挡在他信面前。


The raging violence in southern Thailand over the past 15 months has made him look bad, as his myriad strategies and tactics have failed repeatedly.	过去15个月以来，泰国南部的大规模暴力冲突让他信非常难看，他提出了无数的战略、战术，却一再失败。


Nor have his bluster and ill temper improved matters.	他的咆哮和坏脾气也于事无补。


Thaksin initially dismissed the violent attacks as the work of bandits.	开始时，他信把这些暴力袭击当成土匪行为草草了事。


Only late last year did he admit that southern Muslim separatism was the cause.	直到去年年末，他才承认南部穆斯林分裂主义才是引��这些暴力行动的原因。


Signs of a symbiotic relationship between local separatists and regional terrorists have emerged.	现在已经出现了一些迹象，表明地方分裂分子与地区恐怖分子具有共生性关系。


If the attacks widen beyond the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, Thaksin’s regional leadership chances will be dimmed.	如果暴力袭击从泰国最南部的三个省也拉（Yala）、北大年（Pattani）和陶公府（Narathiwat）蔓延开去，他信成为东南亚领导人的机会将会减小。


Thaksin knows this.	对这一点，他信非常清楚。


Since his sweeping re-election, he has been surprisingly modest and magnanimous.	自从以压倒性优势连任后，他信就变得惊人地谦虚、大度。


He has appointed Anand Panyarachun, a former Thai prime minister who recently headed a United Nations reform panel, to select and direct a blue-ribbon national commission to seek reconciliation with the southern separatists.	他指定泰国前总理，现为联合国改革小组组长的阿南·班雅拉春（Anand Panyarachun）组成全国蓝带委员会，并领导该委员会与南部分裂分子协商，以期重修旧好。


In addition, Thaksin will have to do something about Myanmar if the international community is to accept his wider role.	此外，如果国际社会打算接受他地区领袖的角色，他信愿意采取一些与缅甸有关的行动。


To many, Thai-Myanmar relations are too cozy.	很多人认为，泰缅关系太过谨慎。


Critics accuse Thaksin of conflicts of interest, as his family-owned telecommunications conglomerate holds sizeable investments in Myanmar.	批评者指责他信是出于利益冲突考虑，因为其家族拥有的电信集团在缅甸有巨额投资。


It is now largely up to Thaksin himself.	现在一切在很大程度上取决于他信自己。


If he is enlightened enough to make amends with disaffected southerners and move beyond his vested interests in Myanmar, he retains a good shot at becoming Asia’s next spokesman.	如果他信足够开明，能改进与南部地区心怀不满的穆斯林之间的关系，能超越自己在缅甸的既得利益，那他还是大有机会成为亚洲的下一个代言人。


Asia’s BRICs Hit the Wall	碰壁的亚洲金砖国家


NEW DELHI –India’s democratic credentials do not impress Francis Fukuyama, who two decades ago prophesied the “end of history,” as being a catalyst for the country’s economic growth.	发自新德里——美国学者弗朗西斯·福山在二十多年前预言了“历史的终结”，认为人类将最终走向自由民主制度，但却对作为印度经济增长催化剂的民主制度印象不佳。


Fukuyama finds excessive “patronage politics and fractiousness” in India – flaws that stand in stark contrast to China’s speedier, though not necessarily cleaner, political system.	相反，他在印度看到了大范围的“庇护政治和顽固作风”——而这些缺点恰恰与中国那种更具效率（但也谈不上廉洁）的政治系统形成鲜明对比。


The reality is, however, somewhat different.	但现实却与他的观点有些出入。


China’s local governments have been accumulating mountains of debt to fund their construction binges, raising serious concerns about potential defaults.	中国的地方政府在基建狂潮中欠下了堆积如山的债务，使人不得不忧心其潜在的债务违约风险。


Premier Wen Jiabao himself recognizes the urgent need to address the country’s inequitable growth, calling for means to be found to “share prosperity evenly,” and thus to reduce the widening gaps between “rich and poor, cities and countryside.”	连中国国家总理温家宝自己都承认必须尽快解决本国的不公平发展问题，呼吁设法“公平分配财富”，并以此弥补“夫人和穷人之间，城市和农村之间”不断扩大的贫富不均现象。


The economist Nouriel Roubini has predicted that China’s economy will most likely slow sometime between 2013 and 2015, the point at which its fixed-asset investments of nearly 50% of GDP will demand social and monetary returns.	经济学家纽里埃·鲁比尼预测中国的增长将在2013至2015年间放缓，依据是该国占GDP近50%的固定资产投资需要收取社会和经济回报。


Until now, says Roubini, China’s export-led growth has depended on “making things that the rest of the world wants, at a price that no other country can match,” a consequence of cheap labor and economies of scale. This cost advantage is diminishing fast.	鲁比尼认为，目前为止中国的出口导向型增长都依赖于“以世界其他地方无法比拟的价格，生产世界其他地方需要的东西”这一原则，而这也是廉价劳动力和世界经济产业链所催生的结果，但这种成本优势也正在迅速消失。


India is facing severe difficulties as well, but of a different nature.	而印度面临的严重困难则与中国性质不同。


For example, outward investment by Indian companies is expanding fast.	比如说印度企业的对外投资正不断扩大。


Some believe that this is a natural development for a rising power, but critics view outward investment as a reflection of the scarcity of opportunities at home.	有人认为这是国家崛起的自然现象，但有也批评认为对外投资恰恰反映了国内投资机会的匮乏。


Rising interest rates, high inflation, and severe policy gridlock amid a spate of government corruption scandals have impeded both foreign and domestic investment in India, thus slowing economic growth to a level that is below its potential.	印度不断提升的利率，高通胀以及严重的政策瓶颈，再加上大量的政府腐败丑闻都让国内外投资者望而却步，以致经济增长未能充分发挥其潜力。


An unpredictable regulatory environment, inadequate infrastructure, and a sluggish, monsoon-dependent agricultural sector are adding to the economy’s problems.	朝令夕改的法律法规环境，落后的基础设施以及一个步履蹒跚，靠天吃饭的农业都使得经济雪上加霜。


Clearly, economic turbulence is roiling both of Asia’s major economies, the giants of the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).	很显然，经济寒流正在席卷作为金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯，印度和中国）巨头的两大亚洲经济体。


Consider inflation. On July 6, the People’s Bank of China raised its benchmark interest rate for the fifth time since October 2010.	在通胀方面，中国人民银行在7月6日再次提升其基准利率，也是自2010年10月以来的第50次调整。


This has generated apprehension about property markets, and fear that local governments could default on part of their staggering debt of $1.65 trillion.	而此举在房地产市场引发了忧虑，害怕地方政府将可能拖欠其1. 65万亿美元债务中的一部分。


In India, the government’s failure to contain rising prices, pursue structural economic reforms vigorously, attract foreign direct investment, advance infrastructure development, manage expenditure, and avoid liquidity crunches underscores the many challenges it faces.	在印度，政府既无法控制物价，同时又没能推动积极经济结构改革、吸引外国直接投资、推动基础设施建设，控制支出并避免流动性紧缩，使之面对的诸多挑战进一步恶化。


Moreover, a continued standoff between the government and the opposition has weakened political effectiveness, further undermining India’s growth prospects.	此外政府和反对派之间的长时间僵持也拉低了政治效率，并随之危害到印度的增长前景。


Indeed, India’s core challenge remains political.	事实上，印度的核心挑战依然是在政治方面。


With food prices rising sharply, the poor are being hit the hardest, fueling greater poverty, inequality, and resentment.	随着食品价格不断飙升，贫困人口受害最深，催生了更大程度的贫困，贫富不均和社会仇恨。


But the same is true in China: anti-inflation protests are now roiling both countries, owing mainly to rising energy, food, and raw-material prices, with food accounting for one-third of household spending in China and around 45% in India.	而中国也存在着同样的问题：由于能源，食品和原材料价格上升，加上食品占家庭支出的比例在中印两国分别达到了33%和45%，反通胀示威行动如今正在各地不断上演。


The fear now in both countries is that inflation shocks could turn into a self-reinforcing price spiral.	如今两国最害怕的就是这种通胀冲击将演变成自我强化的物价螺旋形上升。


As the IMF cautions, “core inflation – excluding commodities – has risen from 2% to 3.75%, suggesting that inflation is broadening.”	正如国际货币基金组织警告的那样：“排除商品之外的核心通胀率已经从2%增加到3. 75%，意味着通胀的影响正不断扩大。


One reason that Indian prices are rising is that infrastructure growth remains sluggish.	印度物价上升的其中一个原因就是基础设施增长依旧停滞不前。


Progress on roads, railways, and power projects – all of which could prevent food from perishing prematurely, and energy and commodities from being unnecessarily wasted – is essential to stabilizing prices.	公路，铁路和发电项目都是稳定物价的要素，因为这些设施都有助于防止食品过早腐烂变质以及能源和商品不至于白白浪费。


China, meanwhile, finds itself at a critical juncture.	而与此同时中国正站在一个关键的关口上。


Its leadership will change next year – at a time when income inequality is on the march and the Party lacks any consensus on how to stop it.	该国最高领导层将在明年换届，而偏偏收入不均状况又不断恶化，党内对如何制止这一态势缺乏共识。


Given that less than 9% of China’s ruling communist party members are actually “workers” nowadays, the regime’s leaders must be even more uncomfortable with growing inequality.	考虑到执政的中国共产党如今只有不到9%的党员是真正的“工人”，该政权的领导人面对收入分配不均状况显然更加如坐针毡。


But, in the absence of serious political reform, income inequality will widen as crony capitalism sinks its roots more deeply.	但如果缺乏切实的政治改革，收入不均现象将随着权贵资本主义的逐渐扎根而更加恶化。


India and China both need a renewed commitment to structural reform to sustain their economic growth.	印中两国都需要重新推动体制改革来维持经济增长。


Cheap labor and monetary management will not do the trick on their own.	廉价劳动力和货币管理本身并不能带来成功。


The credibility that both governments gained after their countries avoided the worst of the global financial crisis of 2008 is beginning to wear thin.	而两国政府在2008年成功避过金融危机后攒下的信誉已经开始流失。


For, as inflationary fears in the BRIC giants grow, second thoughts about the shift in the world economy’s center of gravity are beginning to gain currency.	随着通胀恐惧在这两大金砖国家巨头不断滋长，人们开始质疑世界经济的中心是否真的能成功向两国转移。


What both countries need are short-term corrections and long-term structural changes.	印中两国一方面需要进行短期的纠错性调整，另一方面则需要实施长期的结构改革。


China needs to prepare itself for an economy whose performance is not dependent on exports and low domestic wages.	中国必须建设一个不依赖出口和低工资的经济。


India must find other drivers of economic modernization than new information technologies (as welcome as these are).	印度则要找到除了新信息科技（虽然依然欢迎）之外的经济现代化驱动力。


Workers in both countries are now demanding better living standards – a demand that even China’s tightly controlled political system cannot ignore.	两国的工人如今都希望改善生活水平——连中国这个对社会高度控制的政治系统都无法忽视这类呼声。


India, for its part, needs to open up its economy further in order to take advantage of its continuing rapid population growth and the ongoing changes in the structure of the global economy.	而印��需要的是进一步开放其经济来利用人口快速增长以及全球经济结构性变革所带来的优势。


It must recommit itself to feeding its population – and thus to attaining its stated objective of a “Second Green Revolution” in agriculture.	它必须再次承担起实现人民温饱的责任——并因此实现其农业“第二次绿色革命”的既定目标。


China and India have used very different political models to achieve their ambitious GDP-growth targets.	中国和印度分别使用了不同的政治模式去实现自己的GDP增长野心。


Nonetheless, as their economies mature, both will need to embrace structural change – and to address the challenges of overdue political reforms.	随着两国经济逐步走向成熟，结构性变革变得势在必行——同时还要应对那些拖延已久的政治改革所带来的挑战。


Dynastic Asia	世袭的亚洲


SINGAPORE – To the extent that culture matters in politics, the recent spate of leadership changes in Northeast Asia suggests that Asian societies are more tolerant – if not supportive – of dynastic succession.	新加坡——从文化对政治影响的角度，东北亚近期频繁的领导层更迭表明亚洲社会即使不支持、也更能容忍世袭继承。


South Korea’s recently elected president, Park Geun-hye, is the daughter of Park Chung Hee, who ruled the country from 1961 to 1979.	最近当选的韩国总统朴槿惠是朴正熙之女，朴正熙在1961至1979年间曾在韩国执政。


China’s incoming president, Xi Jinping, is the son of Xi Zhongxun, a former vice premier.	中国的新任主席习近平是前副总理习仲勋之子。


Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is the grandson and grandnephew of two former Japanese prime ministers, and the son of a former foreign minister.	而日本新任首相安倍晋三则是两任前日本首相的孙子和侄孙。


Kim Jong-un is the son and grandson of his two predecessors in North Korea.	金正恩分别是朝鲜两位前任元首的子和孙。


This pattern is not confined to Northeast Asia.	这种模式并不是东北亚的专利。


President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines is the son of former President Corazon Aquino.	菲律宾总统阿基诺三世是前总统科拉松·阿基诺之子。


Prime Ministers Najib Abdul Razak and Lee Hsien Loong of Malaysia and Singapore, respectively, are also sons of former prime ministers.	马来西亚和新加坡总理纳吉布·阿卜杜勒·拉扎克和李显龙的父亲都曾担任过总理一职。


In India, Rahul Gandhi is waiting in the wings, preparing to step into the shoes of his great-grandfather (Jawaharlal Nehru), grandmother (Indira Gandhi), and father (Rajiv Gandhi).	印度的拉胡尔·甘地正伺机而动，准备接过曾祖父贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁、祖母英迪拉·甘地和父亲拉吉夫·甘地的衣钵。


In Pakistan, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari – son of President Asif Ali Zardari and the assassinated former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, and grandson of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – recently made his political debut.	在巴基斯坦，阿西夫·阿里·扎尔达里总统和遭遇暗杀的前总理贝·布托之子，同时也是前总理佐勒菲卡尔·阿里·布托之孙比拉瓦尔·布托·扎尔达里不久前刚刚上演了自己的政治首秀。


Is dynastic succession becoming the norm throughout Asia?	世袭继承是否已成为整个亚洲地区的标准？


There is no denying that a distinguished lineage gives political candidates an advantage over rivals.	无可否认，显赫的家世使政治候选人有优势战胜对手。


But it is also clear that having distinguished relatives is no guarantee of success.	但拥有知名亲属显然也不能保证成功。


Consider the checkered record of former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.	菲律宾前总统格洛丽亚·马卡帕加尔·阿罗约一波三折的经历就是最好的证据。


Her father was a respected president; yet she could well be remembered as one of the country’s most corrupt.	她的父亲是一位受人尊敬的总统，但她却很可能作为该国最腐败的总统之一而留名青史。


The key issue is leaders’ attitude when they assume office.	关键问题是执政时领导者的态度。


If they do so with a sense of entitlement from their lineage, they are likely to fail, as Arroyo did.	如果上任时自诩为前任领导人的后裔，那么他们的执政生涯就很可能像阿罗约那样以失败而告终。


Fortunately for East Asia, most seem to approach power with a keen sense of duty and a commitment to strengthening their countries.	幸运的是多数东亚领导人在执政时都秉承强烈的责任感和使命感来振兴自己的国家。


The term “princeling” is probably an unfair description of China’s Xi.	用“太子党”来形容中国的习近平可能并不恰当。


After all, he hardly can be said to have led a charmed life.	毕竟，他曾经的生活轨迹很难说令人羡慕。


After his father was purged by Mao Zedong, he went to work in the countryside, even before the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, experiencing firsthand all of the hardships that many of his generation endured.	其父遭毛泽东清洗后，他在1966-1976年的文化大革命爆发前就开始到乡下工作，并因此亲身体验到与他同代的很多人都曾经体验过的艰辛。


Having risen to the top, he feels no sense of entitlement.	身居高位后他并没有感觉理所当然。


From all accounts, he feels an even greater sense of responsibility to prove that he gained his position on the basis of merit, not privilege.	无论从哪方面讲，他都感觉有责任证明自己是凭借实力身居高位，而不是仰赖父辈的余阴。


Xi must also be aware that the children of the People’s Republic’s second generation of leaders face considerable public resentment, owing to their rapid accumulation of wealth.	习肯定已意识到中华人民共和国第二代领导人的子女已经因快速敛财而引起相当大的公愤。


That explains his focus on combating corruption.	这也解释了他着力反腐倡廉的原因。


If he fails to do so, he will be deemed a failure, and the Chinese Communist Party’s political monopoly may end sooner than anyone anticipates.	如果没能完成任务他会被看作失败者，中国共产党的政治垄断也可能比任何人预期的都提早结束。


Xi carries a huge burden on his shoulders.	习近平的肩上担子很重。


So does Park Geun-hye.	朴槿惠的状况也非常相似。


Like Xi, she had to struggle to reach the top.	她凭借个人努力登上最高领导人的宝座。


Her father lifted South Korea out of poverty and turned it into an economic tiger.	她的父亲帮助韩国脱贫并将其造就为经济小虎。


But his rule was also brutally repressive.	但他执政时也进行了残酷的镇压。


To make matters worse for Park, many of her predecessors are perceived as failures.	众多前任被认定为执政失败，更是令朴槿惠的境况雪上加霜。


Two former presidents, Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan, were prosecuted; another, Roh Moo-hyun, committed suicide.	两位前总统卢泰愚和全斗焕遭到起诉； 还有一位卢武铉自杀身亡。


There are also unkind rumors swirling around outgoing President Lee Myung-bak.	围绕着即将离任的总统李明博也有很多并不友善的传言。


South Korea is clearly a successful country that is struggling to define itself.	韩国显然是个竭力寻找定位的成功国家。


In theory, it should be celebrating its economic and cultural achievements.	理论上韩国应当庆贺自己的经济文化成就。


In practice, as a small country in a troubled neighborhood – and with North Korea a constant source of tension – it lives in existential anxiety.	但实际上，作为身处混乱的一介小国，且与朝鲜长年关系紧张，致使韩国陷入深深的生存焦虑。


And Park, whose victory has not diminished her people’s ambivalent attitude toward her father, must know that healing the obvious divisions in South Korean society will not be easy.	朴槿惠的获胜并未减弱民众对她父亲的矛盾态度，她肯定知道弥合韩国显而易见的分歧绝非一项轻而易举的工作。


The most difficult job is the one that awaits Rahul Gandhi.	摆在拉胡尔·甘地面前的是一项最艰巨的任务。


No single party can dominate Indian politics as the Congress Party has done since independence, implying a future of difficult and quarrelsome coalitions.	没有哪个党能像国大党那样主宰独立后的印度政治，这意味着印度未来必须走一条艰难而充满争吵的联盟之路。


In these circumstances, India needs, above all, decisive leadership.	在这种情况下，印度最需要一位果敢的领袖。


Yet, like Hamlet, Rahul seems uncertain.	但拉胡尔却像哈姆雷特一样游移不定。


He could have taken the job several years ago, if he had chosen to do so.	如果下定决心，他几年前就可以担任这个职务。


His hesitation must reflect a deep anxiety.	他的犹豫不决肯定反映出深深的焦虑。


Yet his reluctance is understandable.	不过他的犹豫也在情理之中。


Again, dynastic succession does not ensure success.	必须再次强调世袭继承并不能确保成功。


Malaysia’s Razak, for example, has made an enormous effort to reunify his country with his “1Malaysia” message.	比方说马来西亚的拉扎克为将国家重新统一在“一个马来西亚”的旗帜下付出了巨大的努力。


Yet all the indications are that he will face an extremely hard-fought election in 2013.	但所有迹象表明2013年他将面对一场选举恶战。


Though unlikely, his Barisan Nasional coalition could fall apart.	尽管机率不大，但他所在的国民阵线联盟的确存在土崩瓦解的可能。


No such prospect faced his predecessors.	他的前辈从未面临过这样的问题。


In Japan, Abe is universally regarded to have performed badly in his first stint as Prime Minister in 2006-2007, despite his distinguished lineage.	尽管家世显赫，但人们普遍认为日本的安倍在其2006-2007年的首届首相任期中并无上佳表现。


Now he takes over an even more troubled country with huge domestic and external challenges.	而现在他接手的国家面临着巨大的国内国际挑战。


Few are betting on his succeeding.	极少有人押宝他能成功。


In short, Asia’s pattern of dynastic leadership does not render it immune from the challenges that the rest of the world faces.	总之，亚洲世袭继承的领导模式无法助其躲避世界其他地区所面临的挑战。


As Asia creates the world’s largest middle class – projected to grow more than three-fold, from 500 million to 1.75 billion, by 2020 – it will also have to cope with demands for more competent and more accountable governments.	值此亚洲创造全球最大的中产阶级之时——预计到2020年中产阶级人数将增长超过三倍（从5百万增长到17. 5亿），公众要求更能干、更有责任心的政府的呼声亚洲也必须面对。


In Asia today, uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.	在当今亚洲，当权者都生活在惴惴不安之中。


Asia’s Hard Road	亚洲的前途


MANILA – Next year will present significant challenges and new responsibilities – political, economic, and social – for developing Asia.	马尼拉—对发展中亚洲来说，明年将出现重大挑战和新的责任，有政治上的，有经济上的，也有社会上的。


The path to sustainable, inclusive economic growth will be difficult, but it will also entail exciting opportunities for Asia and the rest of the world.	通往可持续包容性增长的道路是艰难的，但也意味着亚洲和世界其他地区的令人振奋的机会。


Five years into the Great Recession, recovery remains elusive in advanced economies.	进入大衰退五年已逾五年，但发达国家的复苏依然萎靡不振。


Europe’s leaders must make tough decisions in order to resolve the euro crisis and revive growth.	欧洲领导人必须做出艰难决定，以解决欧元危机、重振增长。


And, although the United States is beginning to show signs of economic recovery, the country faces a political stalemate over the so-called “fiscal cliff.”	而尽管美国开始显露出经济复苏信号，但它仍面临着所谓“财政悬崖”的政治僵局。


Indeed, while leading indicators may be stronger than they were a year ago, risks have only intensified.	事实上，尽管先行指标比前几年略有好转，但风险仍然极高。


In Asia, fiscal prudence allowed the stimulus measures that were needed to revive global economic growth in 2010.	在亚洲，财政审慎使得重振2010年全球经济增长的刺激措施得以实施。


But the economic transformation that has occurred over the last several decades has reached a crossroads.	但过去几十年来的经济转型来到了十字路口。


Notwithstanding a few low-income economies catching up, the years of double-digit GDP growth are unlikely to continue – particularly in China and India – owing to the anemic external environment, together with internal weaknesses.	一些低收入经济体赶了上来，但由于外部环境恶化和内部低迷，多年来两位数的GDP增长率将难以维系，特别是印度和中国。


Asia needs to adjust to a new era of more moderate growth, while addressing widespread inequality and improving sustainability.	亚洲需要调整适应增长放缓的新时期，同时解决普遍存在的不平等问题、改善稳定性。


The unprecedented economic expansion that has lifted millions out of poverty has been accompanied by widening income disparities, as well as serious environmental damage.	前所未有的经济扩张让千百万亚洲人摆脱了贫困，但也伴随着日益加剧的收入分化和严重的环境破坏。


As a result, Asia now has two faces: a prosperous and growing middle class, and those who have yet to benefit from the region’s rapid economic development – and whose health and well-being is being adversely affected by acute problems like air and water pollution.	结果，如今的亚洲出现了两副面孔：繁荣的、不断成长的中产阶级； 以及地区快速经济发展的弃儿，他们的健康和福利因空气和水污染等严峻问题而每况愈下。


In short, the key challenges facing Asia today are to sustain economic growth – at lower, but still enviable, rates – and to improve its quality.	简言之，今日亚洲面临的关键挑战是维持经济增长——以有所降低但仍令人羡慕的速度，并改善增长质量。


Asia needs strong, inclusive, green, knowledge-led growth, which implies the need to rebalance the sources of economic dynamism to emphasize domestic, regional, and inter-regional “South-South” demand.	亚洲需要强大的、包容性的、绿色的、知识推动的增长，这意味着需要实现经济动态资源的再平衡，强调国内、地区和跨地区“南南”需求。


Economic relations with the West would not be diluted by this shift.	与西方的经济关系不会因这一变化而削弱。


Just as the West has provided exports and expertise to bolster Asia’s economic expansion, Asia offers opportunities for advanced economies to transform their growth models to cope with the challenges of globalization.	正如西方为亚洲经济扩张提供了出口和专家，亚洲也为发达经济体提供了转变增长模式以应对全球化挑战的机会。


Indeed, the coming year will mark a seminal moment for developing Asia in terms of advancing its own agenda, which, in turn, will give developed economies the flexibility and opportunities that they need to fulfill their own economic potential.	事实上，从升级自身日程的问题看，明年将是发展中亚洲的良机，而这反过来将给予发达经济体所需要的满足其自身经济潜力的灵活性和机会。


To be successful, Asia’s leaders must not allow diplomatic distractions – including territorial disputes in the region, which intensified in 2012 – to destabilize further an already uncertain economic and geopolitical environment.	要想成功，亚洲领导人就必须排除外交干扰——包括2012年有所加剧的地区领土纠纷——进一步动摇已然不确定的经济和地缘政治环境。


Given current global economic uncertainties, there is no room for this kind of disruption.	在当前全球经济充满不确定性的环境下，没有空间处理此类破坏。


Continued geopolitical volatility will delay, if not obstruct, the emergence of a new, world-class Asia.	持续的地缘政治动荡将推迟（如果不是阻挠的话）世界级新亚洲的崛起。


In this context, Asian leaders ascending to power in 2013 – for example, in China, Japan, and South Korea – must prioritize enhanced regional economic and political cooperation.	在这样的环境下，将在2013年掌权的亚洲新领导人——如中国、日本和韩国领导人——必须将加强地区经济和政治合作放在首位。


Such relationships will be all the more crucial if global economic conditions deteriorate.	若全球经济环境恶化，这类关系将更加关键。


Political disputes must not be allowed to hinder the adjustments needed to ensure long-term sustainable development.	不能让政治纠纷妨碍确保长期可持续发展所需要的调整。


And those adjustments are many.	这样的调整有很多。


Over the last two decades, Asia’s economic boom was largely driven by intra-regional manufacturing linkages, in which intermediate goods and parts were sourced from within Asia to be assembled into final goods for export to developed markets – earning the region the moniker “factory Asia.”	过去20年来，亚洲经济繁荣主要由地区内制造业联系推动，中间产品和零部件由亚洲内部提供，组装成最终产品后出口发达市场，这让该地区获得了“亚洲工厂”的名声。


But the protracted global slowdown has highlighted the risks of excessive reliance on exports.	但受全球放缓拖累，过度依赖出口的风险已显露无疑。


In order to ensure long-term stability, Asia must find new sources of growth, increase productivity, and improve efficiency.	为了确保长期稳定，亚洲必须找到新的增长之源，提高生产率，改善效率。


Expanding South-South trade and investment links could enhance the region’s growth potential and contribute to global economic stability by promoting worldwide rebalancing.	扩大南南贸易和投资联系能够增强地区增长潜力、刺激全球再平衡，从而有助于全球经济稳定性。


To facilitate this, developing Asia must work to reduce internal trade and investment barriers – which remain higher than those in place vis-à-vis industrialized nations – and continue to promote global and regional integration.	为了为此提供便利，发展中亚洲必须设法降低内部贸易和投资壁垒——目前仍比工业化国家之间高——并继续推进全球和地区一体化。


Developing a vibrant service sector is also crucial.	发展充满活力的服务部门也很关键。


As manufacturing wages rise and labor intensity falls, Asia will need to rely more on services to create jobs for the millions of people who join the workforce each year.	随着制造业工资上升、劳动密集程度下降，亚洲需要更多地依赖服务业为每年新增的数百万劳动新军创造就业岗位。


While little investment is needed to upgrade the service sector, dismantling excessive regulations will require strong political will.	升级服务部门不需要多少投资，但取消过多的监管规定也需要强大的政治意愿。


Moreover, recent natural disasters have highlighted the importance of climate resilience as a means to improve quality of life.	此外，最近的自然灾害凸显气候弹性作为改善生活质量方式的重要性。


Protecting the poor and managing urban migration would help in this regard, and requires a subtle mixture of innovation and public fortitude.	保护穷人、治理城市移民将对这方面有所裨益，而这需要创新和公共韧性的巧妙组合。


Measures should include issuing land titles, removing slumlords, and providing basic services.	这方面的措施包括授予土地所有权、打倒恶地主、提供基本服务。


Asia’s ongoing transformation – rooted in the long-term conviction that more equitable, inclusive, and increasingly knowledge-led growth will help to reduce poverty and offer greater prosperity to its citizens – requires a short-term commitment to mitigating any global economic slowdown caused by new shocks. It also demands determined efforts to reduce global imbalances by rebalancing Asia’s own sources of growth.	亚洲的未竟转型——其根源在于对公平、包容、越来越依靠知识推动的增长有助于减少贫困、为人民带去更大繁荣的长期认识——要求旨在缓和由新冲击导致的全球经济减速的短期承诺，也要求通过再平衡亚洲自身增长资源减轻全球失衡的坚决措施。


If successful, the Asia that emerges from this transformation will not only be prosperous; it will also be a bulwark of world peace – the ultimate global public good.	若能成功，那么从转型中新生的亚洲将不但繁荣，还将是世界和平——终极全球公共商品的有力保障。


Asia’s Fragile Special Relationship	脆弱的亚洲特殊关系


NEW DELHI – “Tzu-Ch’in asked Tzu-Kung a few questions; Tzu-Kung answered: …Our Master gets things (done) by being cordial, frank, courteous, temperate, deferential.	发自新德里——《论语》里记载，子禽问于子贡曰：“夫子至于是邦也，必闻其政，求之与？


That is our…way.”	抑与之与？


But will Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao live up to that standard, as conveyed in the Analects of Confucius, on his current visit to India?	”子贡曰：“夫子温、良、恭、俭、让以得之。 ”那么中国国家总理温家宝又是否能在最近对印度的访问中遵照这部中国古代经典的准则行事呢？


The world has a variety of “special relationships.”	这个世界上存在着许多“特殊关系”。


The United States’ partnership with the United Kingdom is one forged in war – and a pillar of the West for more than a half-century.	在二战中孕育出来的美英伙伴关系算是其中之一，并成为了西方半个世纪以来的政治基础。


The US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War era was special in that relations between those two countries shaped the fate of the world until the USSR imploded.	冷战期间的美苏敌对关系则影响了整个世界的命运，直到苏联解体为止。


The US and China are said to be forging a new special relationship.	而据说如今中美两国之间也开始培育一种新的特殊关系。


But, in looking toward the future of Asia – and, indeed, the future of world diplomacy – it is the relationship between the world’s two most populous countries and largest emerging economies, India and China, which will increasingly set the global agenda.	但在展望亚洲的未来（以及世界外交的未来）之时，真正能决定全球议程的其实是印度和中国——两个世界上人口最多，同时也是最大的新兴经济体——之间的关系。


Japan’s change of military doctrine for the first time since the start of the Cold War – a shift that implicitly makes China the greatest threat – suggests that the Chinese leadership needs to take a hard look at its regional grand strategy.	日本近日出台的新防卫大纲对其军事原则做出了自冷战开始以来的首次修订——这清晰地暗示中国已经成为该国最大的威胁——这意味着中国领导人也是时候仔细审视一下自己的区域性战略了。


Wen’s priorities for his trip to India are clear: trade, security, and, far behind, the territorial disputes between the two countries.	温家宝此次访印的议题有着非常明确的先后次序：首先是贸易，其次是安全……最后才是两国间的边界争端。


Such an approach might make tactical diplomatic sense, as long as there is no background clatter.	如果没有幕后的那些摩擦的话，这样的安排在外交上堪称精妙。


But it lacks a sense of strategic urgency, which, given rising international tensions across Asia, amounts to a serious strategic blunder.	但这样做却显然缺乏一个战略紧迫性，因为这种避重就轻的举动将不断加剧亚洲各国之间的紧张局势，并最终导致一起严重的战略失误。


The sources of those tensions are clear: North Korea’s shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island and its flaunting of a modern, previously unknown, nuclear plant; the US-led armada now cruising through the South China and Yellow Sea; and China’s claim that the South China Sea is an area of vital national interest akin to Tibet.	这些紧张局势的根源其实很清晰：朝鲜一方面对韩国延坪岛进行炮击，另一方面又明目张胆地披露自己的现代化核设施； 以美国为首的舰队在南中国海和黄海横冲直撞；


In its bilateral relations with India, China’s shift in focus from its claims on the Northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh to Jammu and Kashmir is enormously worrisome.	在与印度的双边关系方面，中国的焦点从其宣称拥有主权的印度北部阿鲁纳恰尔邦（即中国藏南地区）延伸到查漠和克什米尔地区的动向也引起了广泛忧虑。


Indeed, around Gilgit in Kashmir, China’s People’s Liberation Army has greatly enhanced its troop presence.	事实上，中国人民解放军已经大幅增加在该地区的军事存在。


Small wonder that, on the eve of Wen’s visit, China’s ambassador in New Delhi finds relations between the two countries to be “very fragile, easily damaged, and difficult to repair.”	因此也不难想象：在温家宝访印前夕，中国驻新德里大使已经发现两国之间关系“非常脆弱，一触即溃，而且难以修复了”。


But, despite all this diplomatic friction, Wen’s entourage for his visit is dominated by a large business delegation.	但即便存在着如此程度的外交摩擦，温家宝依然带来了庞大的商业代表团。


Currently, both countries’ economies are thrusting confidently forward; both are thirsty for more and bigger markets.	当前两国经济都在突飞猛进地发展，双方都渴望能拥有更多更大的市场。


India is growing at an annual rate of around 9%; China at around 10%.	印度的年增长率维持在9%左右，而中国则有10%。


So the opportunities for trade between the two are certainly enormous.	因此两国之间的贸易机会其实极为庞大。


But, for both countries, economic growth is not hurdle-free.	但两国的经济增长却不是没有隐忧的。


India’s economy is continuing to grow, but faces rising inflation, fiscal and current-account deficits, a slowdown in agricultural growth, and infrastructure bottlenecks.	印度经济持续增长，但正面对着不断增加的通货膨胀，财政和经常账户赤字，农业发展减缓以及基础设施瓶颈。


China’s problems arise mainly from widening income disparities, which are inciting hitherto unheard of levels of labor unrest – though this should not be viewed as a precursor to change of the sort that marked the rise of the Solidarity trade union and the end of communism in Poland.	而中国的问题则是不断加剧的贫富差距，并因此爆发的前所未有的劳工骚乱——虽然这不能被视为类似波兰团结工会的崛起以及共产党统治走向终结的先兆


But labor unrest and the desire to maintain 10% growth suggest that China should be taking the lead in ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and preventing other political developments from derailing its economy.	但劳工骚乱和维持10%增长率的意愿意味着中国应该带头解决朝鲜半岛和平问题并遏制任何有损经济发展的政治因素。


After all, as the Chinese leadership knows, only continued strong growth will provide the government with the wriggle room it needs to begin to revalue the renminbi.	毕竟中国的领导人也明白只有持续的经济发展才能给政府留出足够的回旋余地，以便继续对人民币汇率进行调整。


Revaluation of its currency is necessary in part because the undervalued renminbi has become yet another a source of friction in Asia, as many in the region now believe the Chinese are using their currency as a “policy weapon.”	人民币的重新估值是非常有必要的，这在某种程度上是因为人为压低的人民币汇率已经成为亚洲地区的另一个冲突因素，许多国家如今都认为���国将其货币当作一个“政策武器”来东征西讨。


To untangle the complex policy web surrounding the renminbi’s value will demand greater regional stability, not less.	而解开这团缠绕着人民币币值的乱麻则需要更加稳定的地区局势，而不是反其道而行之。


Yet China’s international grand strategy does not appear to reflect this.	但中国目前的国家战略却似乎没有反映到这一点。


Instead, it remains focused on Northeast Asia, Tibet, Taiwan, and on its aspirations to move into the Indian Ocean, that great global highway of trade in the twenty-first century.	相反，中国继续将重点放在东北亚、西藏，台湾和进军印度洋——这条21世纪的全球贸易高速公路——的野心之上。


China’s leaders recognize that their country needs time, space, and peace for economic development.	中国领导人明白自己的国家需要时间，空间和和平来发展经济。


Yet their pursuit of a dominant position on the strategic chokepoints in the Indian Ocean undermines these goals by raising tensions not only with India, but with Asia’s other powers and the US.	但他们寻求主宰印度洋沿岸某些战略要点的举动却与发展经济的目标背道而驰，因为此举不但会导致与印度关系紧张，还牵动了亚洲其他势力和美国的神经。


Their focus on inhibiting India seems particularly misguided, given that China’s core interests (Tibet, Taiwan, and the heartland of the Chinese mainland) are far beyond the reach of most of India’s military capabilities.	中国遏制印度的战略尤其是错误的，因为中国的核心利益（西藏，台湾和中国大陆中部地区）根本就不在印度大多数军事力量的打击范围之内。


By contrast, India’s most important national security concerns – the unsettled border between the two countries, and Beijing’s ties with Pakistan, which often operates as a Chinese surrogate – are closely connected to China: Both factors are directly linked to China’s perceived threat to India’s Himalayan territory and its rapid development of strategic infrastructure in that region.	与此相反，印度最重要的国家安全利益——两国之间的边界争议，以及北京当局与巴基斯坦（经常以中国代理人的面目出现）的暧昧关系——都与中国紧密相关：这两大因素都与中国对印度喜马拉雅地区的潜在威胁以及在该区域大肆建设的战略基础设施直接相关。


India’s concerns also focus on China’s ongoing supply of arms, including missiles and nuclear weapons technology, to Pakistan.	印度同时也密切关注着中国对巴基斯坦源源不断的武器供应，其中就包括了导弹和核武器技术。


No amount of discussion over trade can obscure the true issues of vital concern between China and India.	再多的贸易会谈也无法回避中印两国之间的上述重大事务。


China may take comfort in remaining focused on non-core issues, because such an approach suggests tactical cooperation with India.	中国可能依旧满足于讨论非核心议题，因为这意味着可以和印度展开一般层面的合作。


That is a convenient international ploy, but it leaves the sources of bilateral discord unattended.	这是个外交上的便宜之策，但却未能彻底根除两国之间摩擦冲突的源头。


The idea of collaboration only in areas of interest to China while neglecting issues of substance to India is untenable, even in the short term.	这种只在对中国有利的领域进行合作，却忽视印度实质利益的理念是无法持久的，甚至在短期之内都不行。


Indeed, neglect of the core disputes is what has resulted in the relationship’s “extreme fragility.”	事实上，对核心冲突的忽视就是导致两国关系“极端脆弱”的原因。


India cannot and will not abandon its territorial sovereignty, or its pursuit of secure land borders or a greater balance in trade.	须知印度不可能为了实现贸易平衡而放弃其领土主权或者边境安全。


These are challenges that cry out for clarity, not diplomatic fudges.	所有这些挑战都亟需中国去认真面对，而不靠那套外交辞令来虚与委蛇。


But surely two great and ancient civilizations can find their way to the type of “cordial, frank, courteous, temperate, deferential…” relations that would have pleased Confucius.	但我敢肯定的是，两大文明古国必能共同找到一条符合孔子“温、良、恭、俭、让”理念的道路。


Asia’s Giants Colliding at Sea?	亚洲巨人的海上碰撞？


NEW DELHI – Even in an age of 24-hour globalized news, some important events only come to light well after the fact.	新德里——即使是消息能在一日之间就能传遍全球的时代，一些重要事件还是得等到过去很久才会展现在人们眼前。


Something of this sort happened several months ago in the South China Sea – and may shape how relations between the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, develop in the years ahead.	几个月前在南中国海就发生过一次这样的事件，可能决定未来数年全世界人口最多的两个国家——中国和印度——的关系走向。


While returning in late July from a goodwill visit to Vietnam in waters recognized as international, an Indian naval ship was “hailed” on open radio and advised to “lay off” the South China Sea.	7月末，一艘印度海军船只沿着被认为是国际水道的航线对越南进行了友好访问，但被公开电台“问候”，并被建议“离开”南中国海。


Although naval incidents between China and its near neighbors – particularly Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines – are not unusual, this is the first one to involve India.	尽管中国及其近邻——特别是越南、日本和菲律宾——发生海事争端并不罕见，但将印度卷入其中还是第一回。


Why did China attempt to interfere with a ship sailing in open seas?	中国为何要干涉在公海航行的船只？


Was this “merely” another of China’s unwarranted assertions of sovereignty over the whole South China Sea, or was something more malevolent afoot?	中国“仅仅”是在宣告其对南中国海再一次莫须有的主张，还是另有不可告人的目的？


At China’s Foreign Ministry, a spokesperson explained: “[W]e are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction.”	中国外交部发言人解释说：“我（们）反对任何在中国管制水域内进行油气勘探和开发的行为。


Then, in passing, he added that “countries outside the region, we hope…will respect and support countries in the region” in their efforts “to solve…dispute[s] through bilateral channels.”	”接着他又顺带加了一句：“对于此区域之外的国家，我们希望……尊重和支持此区域之内的国家”“通过双边渠道解决纠纷”的努力。


India’s government responded promptly: “Our cooperation with Vietnam or any other country is always as per international laws, norms, and conventions,” it declared, stating that “cooperation with Vietnam in the area of energy is very important.”	印度政府立刻予以回应：“我们与越南或其他任何国家的合作一向遵循国际法律、规范和传统，”并宣称“与越南在能源领域的合作是十分重要的。


Indeed, Indian companies already have invested heavily there, and are seeking to expand their operations.	”事实上，印度公司在越南已有了大量投资，并在寻求进一步扩张经营范围。


Although India’s statement is explicit enough, doubts persist.	尽管印度的态度已经表达得非常明显了，但仍有人抱有疑虑。


Is the two countries’ argument merely about who will develop the South China Sea’s untapped energy resources, or are we dealing with the beginning of a struggle for spheres of influence?	中印两国的争论仅仅是关于谁来开发南中国海无尽的能源资源吗？ 还是说，我们已经开始了势力范围的争夺？


To find an answer requires confronting civilizational norms, which are reflected in the intellectual games that the countries favor.	为了找到这个答案，需要对比两国的文明范式，这体现于两国所喜欢的博弈游戏。


India has traditionally favored the game of chaupad (four sides), or shatranj (chess), concentrating on contest, conquest, and subjugation.	传统上，印度喜欢查帕德（chaupad，四人博弈游戏）和沙特兰伊（shatranj，国际象棋），这些游戏的核心是竞争、征服和镇压。


China, on the other hand, has wei qi (known in Japan as go), which focuses on strategic encirclement.	而中国人所喜爱的围棋以战略包围为核心。


As Sun Tzu advised many centuries ago, “Ultimate excellence lies…not in winning every battle, but in defeating the enemy, without ever fighting.”	正如孙子在2 000年前所说的：“百战百胜，非善之善者也； 不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也。


A recent US Defense Department paper, “China’s Military and Security Developments – 2011,” argued that “China’s ‘near sea’ politics has seriously disturbed not only India, but Japan, Australia, the US, and the ASEAN countries.”	最新的美国国防部文件《中国的军事和安全发展：2011年》指出，“受中国的‘近海’政策严重干扰的不仅有印度，还包括日本、澳大利亚、美国和东盟国家。


In response, China’s Defense Ministry proclaimed that “China and India are not enemies, not opponents, but neighbors and partners.”	”中国国防部则回应说“中国和印度不是敌人，也不互相反对，而是邻居和伙伴。 ”


So where do things stand?	那么事实又是怎样？


It is clear that India, given its years of cooperation with Vietnam on oil and gas development, is not about to acquiesce in China’s claim to the South China Sea.	显然，印度与越南在油气开发方面有着多年的合作，并不准备默许中国对南中国海的主张。


Moreover, as energy extraction begins, a new memorandum of understanding between India and Vietnam is scheduled to be signed later this year.	此外，随着能源开采的开展，印度和越南已将签署新的谅解备忘录提上日程并将于今年晚些时候完成。


China was most likely reacting to these developments by accusing India of violating its territorial waters.	中国很可能因此指责印度侵入了它的领海。


For India, the sense that a struggle for regional mastery is occurring has become increasingly keen.	印度则感到，争夺地区领导权的斗争越来越迫在眉睫。


Chinese activity in Pakistan and Myanmar, the expansion of China’s port agreements in the Indian Ocean (the so-called “string of pearls”), and heightened Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean have jangled India’s security antennas.	中国在巴基斯坦和缅甸的行动、中国在印度洋的港口协议的扩张（所谓的“珍珠链”战略），以及中国在印度洋令人瞩目的海军行动极大地触动了印度的安全神经。


Indeed, the official Chinese publication Global Times, altering its previous stance, recently called for putting a stop to India’s energy plans in the region. “Reasoning may be used first, but if India is persistent in this, China should try every means possible to stop this…from happening.”  	事实上，中国官方报纸《环球时报》最近改变了一贯立场，提出阻止印度在南中国海地区的能源计划：“首先当然是讲道理，但如果印度一意孤行，中国应该动用一切可能的办法阻止……这一幕发生。


The same article then threw Tibet into the stew of accusations. “Chinese society,” it continued, “has…been indignant about India’s intervention in the Dalai [Lama] problem,” cautioning India to “bear in mind” that “its actions in the South China Sea will push China to the limit.”	该文随后又提到了西藏问题：“中国社会无不对印度干预达赖问题义愤填膺，”并提醒印度“注意其在南中国海的行径正在挑战中国的底线。


According to Global Times, “China cherishes the Sino-Indian friendship, but this does not mean China values it above all else.”	”《环球时报》指出，“中国珍视中印友好，但这并不意味着中国将中印关系置于最高地位。 ”


There was a more broader, more ominous message as well, one that belies China’s official rhetoric of harmony: “We should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development, nor should we pursue the reputation” of being a “peaceful power, which would cost us dearly.”	还有口气更大、更令人不安的说法，显然与中国官方的和谐论背道而驰：“我们不能让世界产生中国只关注经济发展的印象，也不能追求‘和平大国’的名声，这样做对我们来说成本太大了。 ”


It is this “triumphalist” foreign policy, as Henry Kissinger calls it, with which India has to contend.	印度必须面对的就是这一亨利·基辛格所谓的“必胜信念”外交政策。


The “Chinese approach to world order,” writes Kissinger in his new book On China, is dissimilar to the Western system of “balance of power diplomacy,” primarily because China has “never engaged in sustained contact with another….” on the basis of the concept of the “sovereign equality of nations.”	基辛格在其近著《论中国》（On China）中写道“中国对世界秩序的看法”与西方的“外交均势”不同，这主要是因为中国“从未”在“国家主权平等”的基础上“与他国建立持久关系”。


As Kissinger, a committed Sinophile, points out: “That the Chinese Empire should tower over its geographical sphere was taken virtually as a law of nature, an expression of the Mandate of Heaven.”	作为中国通，基辛格指出：“中华帝国应该在世界诸邦中卓尔不群这一观念被视为自然规律，是上天的安排（Mandate of Heaven）。 ”


Perhaps India and others should contend with China’s assertiveness by heeding Sun Tzu’s counsel: “Contain an adversary through the leverage of converting the neighborhood of that adversary into hostiles.”	或许印度和其他国家可以借鉴孙子兵法来对抗中国的独断：“让敌人的周围形势对敌人不利，从而战胜敌人。


Just as China has cultivated Pakistan, is India’s growing embrace of Vietnam a counter-move on Asia’s strategic chessboard?	”印度是在效仿中国栽培巴基斯坦，将与越南越走越近作为其在亚洲战略棋盘上与中国争锋相对的一招吗？


Perhaps.	也许是吧。


After all, just as India recognizes China’s vital interests in Tibet and Taiwan, there must be reciprocal recognition of India’s national interests.	毕竟，正如印度承认中国在西藏和台湾问题上的核心利益一样，中国也必须承认印度的国家利益。


China must fully accept that any effort at strategic encirclement of India will be countered.	中国必须充分认识到，任何将印度进行战略包围的举动都会遭到反击。


That is an Indian national-security imperative.	这是印度国家安全的需要。


So is restraint and mutual cooperation – as is true for China as well.	同样，克制和共同合作也是印度——以及中国——国家安全的需要。


Asia’s Next Axis	亚洲新轴心


SEOUL – Last month, the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea agreed to begin negotiations later this year on a trilateral free-trade agreement.	发自首尔——中日韩三国领导人已经在上个月达成共识，同意在今年晚些时候启动与一项三边自由贸易有关的协议。


If the talks succeed, the global trade map will need to be redrawn.	一旦该谈判取得成功，全球贸易版图都将被改写。


An FTA that encompasses, respectively, the world’s second, third, and 12th biggest economies (in purchasing power parity terms in 2011), with a population of 1.5 billion, would dwarf the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, comprising the United States, Canada, and Mexico.	这项包含世界第二大，第三大和第十二大经济体（以2011年购买力平价计算），覆盖15亿人口的自由贸易协议将使欧盟以及涵盖美国，加拿大和墨西哥的北美自由贸易区相形见拙。


Indeed, Northeast Asia would become the third major axis of regional economic integration, following the EU and NAFTA.	事实上，东北亚将成为继欧盟和北美自贸区之后全球区域经济整合的第三个主要轴心。


Until now, the region has been unable to institutionalize economic cooperation as vigorously as Europe and North America have.	但迄今为止，该区域都未能实现像欧洲和北美那样强大的制度化经济合作。


But if the proposals discussed in Beijing last month are realized, the resulting FTA could surpass NAFTA in its degree of integration and importance to the world economy.	如果上个月在北京讨论的方案能够实现的话，因此产生的自贸协议将在整合程度以及对世界经济的重要性方面超越北美自贸协议。


In addition, the formation of a China-Japan-South Korea FTA would most likely trigger a chain-reaction.	此外，中日韩自贸协议将很可能引发一个连锁反应。


For example, the momentum could expand southward and stimulate ASEAN, which has bilateral FTAs with all three countries, to join the group.	例如这股势头可能会向南发展并刺激与三国都分别签订有自贸协议的东南亚联盟加入这个更大的自贸协议。


Such a turn of events would be equivalent to establishing the East Asia Free Trade Area, which the ASEAN+3 envisioned about a decade ago.	而这样的事件将等同于建立一个东亚自由贸易区——正如“东盟+3”会议在十年前设想的那样。


If that happened, other countries – Australia, New Zealand, and, most importantly, India – might seek to jump on the bandwagon.	如能实现这一点，其他国家——澳大利亚，新西兰，以及最重要的：印度——都会尝试投入这股大潮之中。


The US would, of course, need to respond to the conclusion of any trilateral Northeast Asian FTA in order to preserve its own role in global trade – and in the supply chains that dominate the Asian economies.	当然，美国也需要对任何三边东北亚自贸协议的实现做出回应，以维护自身在全球贸易——以及主宰亚洲经济的供应链中的角色。


It would likely seek to expand and deepen the infant Trans-Pacific Partnership, the trade agreement that President Barack Obama committed the US to last year.	该国很可能会试图扩大和深化目前尚处于襁褓之中的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协议》（Trans-Pacific Partnership）——总统奥巴马去年已经开始将美国导入其中。


In particular, the US would strongly encourage Japan to join the TPP, because the US might want a united Asia-Pacific economic community, rather than a division between Asia and the Pacific.	美国尤其会大力鼓励日本加入这一伙伴关系协议，因为前者希望构建一个联合的亚太经济体，而不是在亚洲和太平洋之间各自为政。


Because Japan would not want to be disconnected from the US for strategic reasons, it might indeed accept America’s invitation.	而日本出于战略原因不会希望与美国断绝关系，它可能确实会接受美国的邀请。


In this scenario, both Japan and South Korea would have to find some means to bridge a Sino-centric Asia and a US-centered Pacific.	在这个情况下，日韩两国都必须寻找一些方法来把以中国为中心的亚洲和以美国为中心的太平洋地区连接起来。


Despite its smaller economy, South Korea seems to be better prepared than Japan to play this critical role.	虽然经济规模较小，但韩国似乎比日本更有准备去承担这一关键角色。


South Korea has already concluded an FTA with the US, after years of difficult negotiations, and plans to negotiate a bilateral FTA with China this year.	在数年的艰苦谈判后，韩国已经与美国签订了自贸协议，并准备在今年与中国洽谈一份双边自由贸易协议。


Thus, the key question is whether and how much Japan will be willing to take on a similar bridging role.	因此，关键问题就是日本是否愿意，同时愿意在多大程度上承担一个类似的桥梁角色。


Robust Japanese participation would mitigate Asia-Pacific polarization and contribute to building momentum for regional integration.	日本的积极参与可以减轻亚太地区的多极化分裂态势，并为区域整合贡献构建的动力。


But the magnitude of domestic challenges that Japan faces nowadays seems too great for its political leaders to play a proactive international role.	但日本当前面对的国内挑战是如此之艰巨，使其领导人无力在国际上扮演一个积极的角色。


Japan’s governments have been fragile and short-lived for close to a decade, and the current debate over raising the value-added tax could cause another change of administration.	近十年来的日本历届政府都非常脆弱短命，而目前针对提高增值税的讨论将为现任政府带来另一大挑战。


Moreover, Japan’s powerful agricultural interest groups, especially the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, may strengthen their opposition to both a trilateral FTA with China and South Korea and the TPP with the US.	此外，日本国内强大的农业利益集团，尤其是日本全国农业协同组合中央会（Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives）会加强阻挠与中韩达成三边协议以及与美国构建跨太平洋伙伴关系。


But Japan’s leaders are being squeezed from both directions.	但日本领导人也受到了来自两个方面的压力。


If they do nothing while South Korea continues to conclude FTAs, Japan will lose markets in the US and China.	如果坐视韩国继续签定自贸协议，那日本就将丢掉美国和中国的市场。


But if they act, domestic political opposition would likely be so severe as to drive them from power.	一旦有所行动，国内反对派又会把他们赶下台。


This is the main reason why it will be difficult for Japan to conclude the proposed trilateral FTA, despite Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s recent endorsement of it.	这就是为何日本首相野田佳彦最近为三边自贸协议鼓与呼，却难以达成该方案的主要原因。


Indeed, only a looser FTA that would exclude each country’s sensitive economic sectors appears to be viable.	事实上，只有一个不包含各国敏感经济部门的松散自贸协议才似乎是可行的。


For China, political considerations seem to be the strongest motivation for pursuing a Northeast Asian FTA.	对中国来说，政治考虑似乎是寻求达成东北亚自贸协议背后最强的动机。


But using the trilateral FTA to expand its economic and political influence would require China to increase transparency, open its service sector, and remove non-tariff barriers.	但利用这个三边自贸协议来扩大其经济和政治影响力将需要中国增加其政治透明度，开放服务领域并撤销非关税壁垒。


In essence, it would have to accept a rules-based system for its relations with its two neighbors, something of which China’s government has been wary.	从根本上来说，它必须采用一个以规则为基础的机制来处理与两个邻国的关系，而也是中国政府对此患得患失的原因。


One advantage for China, however, in pursuing an FTA strategy is that it is still an authoritarian state, and thus could overrule domestic opposition far more easily than could governments in Japan or South Korea.	但中国在实现自贸协议战略方面有一个优势，它依然是一个专制国家，因此也能比日韩政府更轻易地压制国内的反对声音。


Finally, South Korea, which has concluded FTAs with almost every important economic actor in the world – the US, the EU, ASEAN, India, and others – may be better prepared to conclude a trilateral FTA than Japan.	最后，韩国这个几乎和全球所有重要经济参与者——美国、欧盟、东盟，印度等各方——都签订了自贸协定的国家，也比日本更好地做好了达成三方自贸协议的准备。


But it, too, will have to face strong opposition from domestic agricultural interest groups and manufacturing sectors, which might mobilize even more strongly than they did in opposing the FTA with the US.	但它也必须面对来自国内农业利益集团的强硬反抗，而且后者为此动员的力量可能要比当年反对与美国签订自贸协定时更强大。


If a trilateral Northeast Asian FTA can be concluded, the three countries would be able to generate more market demand domestically at a time of weak demand from the West, and would gain greater influence in the global political economy.	如果东北亚三边自贸协议能达成的话，中日韩三国就可以在西方需求疲软的情况下创造更多的国内市场需求。


A trilateral FTA would also most likely contribute to stabilizing the three countries’ troublesome political relations with each other, and could provide a better environment for North Korea’s eventual economic reconstruction.	这一三方自贸协议也有助于稳定三国互相之间麻烦不断的政治关系，并为朝鲜最终的经济结构调整提供一个更优质的环境。


The myriad benefits of a Northeast Asian FTA are clear.	东北亚自贸协议的巨大好处是显而易见的。


The question is whether it is an ambition too far.	问题在于，这是否有点太过好高骛远了？


Asia’s Overlooked Great Power	被忽略的亚洲强国


Mention Asia, and most people think of the region’s fascinating, rising giants, China or India – or both.	谈及亚洲，大多数人认为这一地区令人神往，中国或印度这样的大国正在这里崛起。


Or people think about North Korea’s nuclear program, some terrorist incident, or the humanitarian consequences of the latest earthquake or tsunami.	也可能有人会想到朝鲜的核计划、一些恐怖事件，或者最近的地震、海啸带来的人道主义后果。


But often overlooked – or at least underestimated – is Japan.	但人们往往忽视了日本，或至少是低估了日本。


This is odd, given that Japan is still the world’s second largest economy, with a GDP of $5 trillion – more than China and India combined.	考虑到日本依然是世界第二大经济强国，GDP达到50,000亿美元，比中国和印度加起来还要多，忽视或低估日本就令人奇怪了。


Despite Japan’s relatively modest rate of economic growth, its GDP per capita is roughly $38,000, more than ten times that of either China or India.	尽管日本经济增长比率相对不高，但其人均GDP大约是3. 8万美元，是中国或印度的十倍以上。


Moreover, there are important stirrings in Japan that suggest change on both the economic and security fronts.	另外，日本在一些重要问题上争论非常激烈，这就意味着经济和安全领域可能会发生变化。


The 1990’s may have been a lost decade, but Japan’s economy has begun to recover, now growing at more than 2% a year and boasting several firms that are truly global and hugely successful.	二十世纪九十年代可能是迷失的十年，但日本的经济已开始复苏，现在以每年2%以上的速度增长，日本出现了若干真正意义上的全球化企业，这些企业全都获得了巨大成功。


Changes in foreign and defense policy are more considerable.	对外政策和国防政策的变化更为显著。


Japan’s self-defense agency was upgraded in January to a full ministry.	日本自卫队于今年1月升级为一个完整的部门。


Japan now spends more than $40 billion a year on defense and maintains one of the world’s most diverse and modern militaries.	如今，日本每年的国防开销在400亿美元以上，并且依然是世界上兵种最多、装备最现代化的国家之一。


Approximately 1,000 Japanese forces serve in and around Iraq.	将近1,000名日本军人驻扎在伊拉克及其周边地区。


Intellectuals, journalists, and politicians are now saying and writing things about Japan’s role in the world that were unthinkable a decade ago.	知识分子、记者和政治家都热衷于谈论日本在世界上的作用或撰写相关文章，如果倒退十年，很难想象日本的作用会有这么大。


It is a question of when, not if, the Japanese amend Article IX of their constitution, which limits the role of Japan’s armed forces to self-defense.	现在的问题不是日本是否需要修改宪法第9条，而是何时加以修改，在第九条的限制下，日本军队只能发挥自卫作用。


Not everyone will welcome these changes.	并非每个人都对这些变化表示欢迎。


Japan’s neighbors, who continue to harbor concerns stemming from World War II and Japan’s failure to deal adequately with its history, will worry about Japanese nationalism.	日本的邻国依然为第二次世界大战和日本不能正确对待历史问题而深感忧虑，日本民族主义的兴起令他们感到焦虑不安。


Nevertheless, a more active and more capable Japan, with a robust democracy and a thriving economy, is in its neighbors’ best interests.	然而，日本主动性的增强，能力的发展，再加上健全的民主和蓬勃的经济，对其邻国倒是大有裨益。


The danger is not renewed Japanese militarism, but rather a Japan that is unable and unwilling to do its share to meet the regional and global challenges facing Asia.	危险的不是日本军国主义的复兴，而是日本不能或不愿为迎接亚洲所面临的地区和全球性挑战而承担起自己的责任。


Japan, for its part, needs to continue to open and reform its economy, improve its military, and make its forces available for the sort of low-intensity but manpower-intensive missions, ranging from genocide prevention to nation-building to peacekeeping, that are increasingly required in the greater Middle East and Africa.	日本自身需要继续推进经济改革和开放，提高军事能力，使军队能够承担强度小但人员密集的军事任务，这样的任务从预防种族屠杀、建设国家到维持和平，这些需求在泛中东和非洲地区正变得越来越迫切。


Japanese leaders also need to act with sensitivity.	日本领导人还需要在采取行动时更加关注外界的反应。


Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is off to an uneven start.	首相安倍晋三上任之初实行的政策很不均衡。


On one hand, he is wise not to have visited the Yasukuni shrine, which honors millions of Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class A war criminals.	一方面，他做出了不去参拜为纪念数百万日本阵亡人员而修建的靖国神社的明智决定，因为敬国神社里供奉着14名甲级战犯。


On the other hand, Abe’s public statements denying Japan���s coercion of “comfort women” in China and Korea have been clumsy at best, insensitive at worst.	而另一方面，安倍却公开否认日本曾强迫中国和朝鲜妇女充当“慰安妇”，这样的做法往好里说是愚蠢，往差里说是对外界的反应漠不关心。


It is essential that Japan and China forge a modern relationship.	至关重要的是，日本和中国建立了现代关系。


The increasing frequency of high-level visits – Prime Minister Abe went to China in October, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was just in Japan – is a welcome development.	日益频繁的高层互访—安倍首相十月份访华，中国总理温家宝刚刚访问日本—显示出可喜的发展势头。


But more is needed.	但还需要做更多工作。


Trade and investment flows can and should be expanded, which is likely only if political relations improve.	两国可以也应当扩大贸易和投资，这只有在政治关系改善的情况下才能实现。


Both countries should commit themselves to a diplomatic resolution of competing claims to offshore resources.	两国应致力于通过外交手段解决对近海资源控制权要求相互冲突的问题。


Exchanges of every kind – military, educational, touristic – should be facilitated.	军事、教育和旅游等各个领域的交流也应该得到促进。


The world also needs to take into account Japan’s importance.	世界还要考虑到日本的重要性。


Japan should no longer be denied fair treatment because of events more than 60 years ago.	日本不应该再由于六十多年以前的事件而受到不公正的对待。


There is no reason Japan should not hold a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.	不允许日本在联合国安全理事会获得常任理事国席位是没有道理的。


Japan should also be a full participant in Asian regional arrangements.	日本还应全面参与亚洲的地区活动。


Asia is rich in dynamism, but relatively thin in influential political, economic, and security-related institutions, in contrast to Europe, which often lacks dynamism but is institution-heavy.	亚洲富于变化和活力，但相对欧洲而言，其政治、经济和安全机构的影响都比较薄弱； 亚洲机构往往缺乏活力，而且复杂繁琐。


The Franco-German relationship, central to much twentieth-century conflict, now forms the core of modern Europe.	法德关系一直是二十世纪冲突中最重要的事件，如今也依然是现代欧洲关系的核心。


The goal should be the same for China and Japan.	中国和日本也应该朝着这样的目标努力。


The agenda is virtually limitless, including trade and investment, energy and climate change, and confidence-building in the security sphere.	实际上有无数的问题需要探讨，包括贸易和投资、能源和气候变化以及安全领域的信心建设。


A new regional institution could be based on an existing one (such as the six-party arrangement used to manage North Korea’s nuclear challenge) or start afresh.	新的地区机构既可以以现有机构为基础（如处理朝鲜核问题的六方会谈），也可以白手起家，重新建设。


Moreover, just as the United States continues to play a major role in Europe, so, too, should it act as a guarantor of Asia’s stability and a source of regional prosperity.	另外，就像继续在欧洲发挥重要作用一样，美国也可以成为亚洲稳定的保障者和地区繁荣的源泉。


The US-Japan alliance is central to America’s position in Asia.	美日联盟是美国在亚洲的地位中最为核心的部分。


The goal is not to enlist Japan in any anti-Chinese coalition, but rather to increase the depth and breadth of US-Japanese cooperation.	美日联盟的目的不是使日本加入反华联盟，而是加深美日合作的深度和广度。


Both countries have many reasons to pursue this goal, considering North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, terrorism, and the numerous challenges to stability around the world.	考虑到朝鲜的导弹和核计划、恐怖主义以及威胁世界稳定的诸多挑战，两国都有太多的理由来实现这一目标。


Abe’s visit to Washington in late April is an opportunity to continue to modernize a relationship conceived in an earlier geopolitical era.	安倍四月底对华盛顿的访问是继续使形成于地缘政治时代的关系现代化的机遇。


It is to be hoped that it will not be overshadowed by calls in Congress for Japan to apologize more formally than it already has for the comfort women.	希望此次访问不会在国会要求日本为慰安妇问题道歉的呼声中变得黯然失色。


Rather, the focus should be on the future and on welcoming the emergence of a Japan that is increasingly able and willing to act as a partner of the US in addressing regional and global challenges.	相反，我们应该把重点放在未来，欢迎一个日益能够并愿意在应对地区和全球挑战中充当美国合作伙伴的日本的兴起。


Asia’s Post-Tsunami Future	海啸后的亚洲未来


There can be no underestimating the scale of the human devastation wrought by Asia’s horrific tsunamis.	发生在亚洲的海啸给人类造成了巨大破坏，程度不可低估。


Family members have been lost, homes destroyed, and livelihoods ruined.	亲人离散，房屋遭毁，生灵涂炭。


As is often the case in natural disasters, the poor are suffering the most.	正如以往所有的自然灾害一样，受难最深的还是穷苦百姓。


And yet, even with damage to infrastructure such as road and rail links, the tsunamis’ overall economic impact is expected to be minor.	虽然海啸破坏了诸如马路、铁路等基础设施，但对经济的整体影响预计不大。


In the worst hit parts of India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, the immediate interior was unaffected, while the tourism and fishing industries – the lifeblood of wrecked coastal areas – account for only a tiny share of these countries’ GDP, as liberalizing reforms have fueled economic diversification and rapid growth.	在印度、印度尼西亚、斯里兰卡和泰国的重灾区，内陆地区未受到影响，而受影响的海滨旅游业和养殖业只占这些国家国民生产总值的一小部分，因为自由化改革增进了经济的多元化进程，推进经济快速增长。


It was not always this way.	情况并非一直如此。


Historically, it has been difficult to convince Asians that international trade is not a zero-sum-game, with Asia invariably the losers.	一直以来，尽管亚洲人常常是游戏的输家，但要说服亚洲人使他们明白国际贸易不是零和游戏却是件很困难的事情。


This is one reason why, after Mao Zedong’s communists triumphed in China in 1949 and other Asian nations gained independence, most Asian countries adopted protectionist inward-looking economic policies aimed at building domestic strength, keeping the “imperialists” out, and achieving self-reliance.	这也解释了为何自毛泽东带领下的共产党1949年建国以来以及其他亚洲国家独立以后，大多数亚洲国家都采取了带有保护主义色彩的内需导向型经济政策，一心增强国力，排挤帝国主义，坚持自力更生。


Historical experience incites this suspicion.	但是历史事实引发了这个疑问。


In 1820, Asia’s share of global GDP was 60%, with China accounting for slightly more than half. That was two decades before the first Opium War.	1820年，也就是鸦片战争爆发前的20年，亚洲占全球国民生产总值的60%，其中中国占了一半以上。


With the emergence of truly global world trade over the ensuing century and a half, Asia’s economic dominance withered.	在随后的150年里，国际贸易兴起，亚洲的经济主导地位逐渐衰退。


By 1950, China’s share of world GDP had fallen to under 5%, while all of Asia accounted for just 18%, the biggest chunk of which was attributable to Japan, despite its defeat in WWII.	到1950年底，中国占世界国民生产总值的份额已经降到了5%以下，全亚洲也不过18%，其中大部分还要归功于二战的战败国日本。


The winds of global change began sweeping through Asia roughly two decades ago, first in East Asia, then engulfing China, and in the course of the 1990’s blowing on to South Asia, most importantly India.	约20年前，全球改革之风开始席卷亚洲，起于东亚，后至中国，并在20世纪90年代时登陆南亚，对印度影响尤为巨大。


What we are witnessing is thus not “emerging” Asia, but the “re-emergence” of a continent that comprises 60% of humanity.	我们所见证的不是崛起中的亚洲，而是这一占全人类人口60%的大陆的伟大复兴。


Its two giants, India and China, are especially determined, as Indian author Ashutosh Sheshabalaya recently put it, “to return to their nineteenth-century status, when they accounted for well over half of world economic output.”	这块大陆上的两个巨人——印度和中国，正如印度作家Ashutosh Sheshabalaya近日所说的那样“注定要回到他们在19世纪时的模样，占领世界经济出口的一半以上”。


One result of this is that China and India are seeking to make a bigger impact on global economic policy.	为此，中国和印度正谋求对全球经济施加更大影响。


Both countries were signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the precursor to today’s World Trade Organization) in 1948, but China under Mao subsequently left.	这两个国家都是1948年关贸总协定的签署国（现在世界贸易组织的前身），但是后来毛泽东的领导下的中国退出了协定。


Although India remained a member, it was often a recalcitrant one.	尽管印度仍是关贸总协定的成员，但是常常扮演反叛角色。


Asia’s current share of global GDP (about 38%) is still far from what it was in 1820, but both countries feel that they can – and must – participate in calling the global shots.	目前，亚洲占全球国民生产总值38%，与它在1820年的份额相比，相差甚远。 但两个国家都觉得他们能够，而且必须参与到主导世界的行列中来。


It took China’s government a protracted sixteen years to negotiate its re-entry into the GATT/WTO, but it soon showed its mettle by assuming joint leadership (along with Brazil, India, and South Africa) of the G-20, a group of primarily dynamic developing countries that threw down the gauntlet to the industrialized powers at the Cancún WTO ministerial meeting in September 2003.	中国政府花了漫长的16年进行谈判，申请重新加入世贸组织，而且很快与巴西、印度和南非一起领导20国集团，足见其决心勇气。 20国集团主要由充满活力的发展中国家组成，在2003年9月坎昆举行的世贸组织部长级会议上，他们向工业化强国提出挑战。


So the Asians are coming: as markets, as states, as consumers, as financiers (Asian central banks, for example, are responsible for financing America’s whopping budget deficits), as scientists and engineers, and as corporations.	因此，亚洲正在向我们走来：亚洲市场、亚洲国家、亚洲消费者、亚洲金融家（比如，亚洲中央银行负责为美国巨额预算赤字筹集资金）、亚洲科学家、亚洲工程师和亚洲公司。


Is the West ready?	西方国家准备好了吗？


In an article in the Financial Times in July 2004, Standard Chartered CEO Mervyn Davies wrote, “westerners are realizing how big Asia’s corporate ambitions are.”	在《金融时报》2004年7月刊登的一篇文章中，英国渣打银行首席执行官 Mervyn Davies写道“西方社会开始认识到亚洲公司的野心如何巨大”。


There is, however, a large difference between recognizing that change may be coming and making the necessary adjustments.	然而，在意识到可能的变化和做出相应的调整这两者之间还有很大的差别。


In contrast to the emergence of the West in the nineteenth century, which proved such an economic disaster for most of Asia, the continent’s re-emergence can have an immensely positive effect on the twenty-first century’s global economy, including, needless to say, the West.	19世纪西方社会的崛起对亚洲大多数国家的经济而言是一个灾难。 相反，如今亚洲的复兴却能够给21世纪全球经济带来巨大的积极影响。


But this requires careful preparation, adjustment and management.	毋庸置疑，西方社会也是受惠者之一。 但是这需要细致的准备、调整和管理。


This is of vital importance, especially in light of the fact that Asia’s populations are still booming: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will see an increase in the next fifteen years from 1.4 billion to 1.73 billion inhabitants, while China’s population will grow from 1.3 billion to 1.42 billion.	这点极为重要，尤其在持续增长的亚洲人口问题方面。 在下一个15年中，印度、巴基斯坦和孟加拉国的居住人口将从14亿增长到17.


Little wonder, then that these countries accept the imperative of a dynamic, open, growth-oriented, and job-creating global environment.	2亿。 难怪这些国家亟需建立一个充满活力、开放、发展和创造就业的国际环境。


Yet despite these gales of change, institutional atavism prevails.	尽管到处遍吹改革之风，旧制度仍然盛行。