For most of the past generation, and looking into the future, the message of the market is that the benefits of international capital mobility do not include a relaxation of the capital constraint, and thus an acceleration of growth in the global periphery.	在过去的绝大部分时间以及展望将来，市场的讯息是国际资本流动不包括资本制约的缓解以及由此给全球经济外围地区带来经济加速增长。


The reason is not that the periphery offers an attractive labor force from which capital profits, but rather that the core – especially the United States – offers a form of protection for capital against unanticipated political disturbances.	原因不是外围地区提供了资本可以从中获利的具有吸引力的劳动力，而是核心地区－特别是美国－为资本免于没有预料到的政治动乱提供了一种保护。


But even though net international capital flows are going the wrong way, there are still substantial gross capital flows outward from the world economy’s core to its periphery.	但是即使净国际资本流动在沿着一个错误的方向进行，仍然有大量的毛资本流动从世界经济核心地区进入世界经济外围地区。


And we can hope that these capital flows will carry with them the institutions and managerial expertise that have made the core so wealthy.	我们希望这些资本流动可以带着使核心地区如此富裕的制度和管理经验进入外围地区。


Nevertheless, a dispassionate observer might point out that for someone with limited resources and opportunities for policy reform to keep betting double-or-nothing on neo-liberalism is a strategy that has a well-deserved name: “Gambler’s Ruin.”	然而，一个冷静的观察者可能会指出，对只有有限的资源和政策改革机会的人来说，不断的以要么翻倍要么一笔勾销为赌注在新自由主义上打赌，是一个该当有这样名字的策略：“赌徒的毁灭”。


Gaming US Fiscal Reform	美国财政改革博弈


NEWPORT BEACH – It sounded like a really clever idea: Use a very public and sizeable threat to get bickering politicians to collaborate and compromise.	纽波特海滩—听起来绝对是个好主意：用公开的大威胁迫使吵得不可开交的政客妥协和让步。


Well, it has not worked so far, and the already-sizeable stakes just got bigger.	呃，到目前为止这一招并不管用，而已经很大的赌注倒是变得更大了。


No, I am not talking here about Europe’s debt crisis, decisive resolution of which still requires greater cooperation and shared responsibility, both within individual eurozone member states and between creditor and debtor countries.	我说的不是欧洲债务危机，要解决它还得靠更多的合作和责任共担，不管是在欧元区各成员国内部还是债权国和债务国之间。


I am referring to the complex fiscal situation in the United States – a fluid problem that has just been rendered more consequential by the recent warning from the ratings agency Moody’s that the US could lose its top credit rating next year if Congress fails to make progress on medium-term fiscal reforms.	我说的是美国的复杂财政状况——这个问题相当飘忽不定，最近，评级机构穆迪公司威胁说，如果国会不能在中期财务改革问题上取得进展，那么明年美国可能失去顶级信用评级，让这个问题更加戏剧化了。


Hobbled by the self-inflicted wounds of the debt-ceiling debacle in the summer of 2011 – which undermined economic growth and job creation, and further damaged Americans’ confidence in their political system – the US Congress and President Barack Obama’s administration recognized the need for a measured and rational approach to fiscal reform.	在被自作孽式的2011年夏债务上限闹剧弄得很受伤之后——这场闹剧不但破坏了经济增长和就业创造，还进一步损害了美国人对其政治制度的信心——美国国会和奥巴马政府终于认识到理性、慎重的财政改革办法的必要性了。


To increase the likelihood of this, they agreed on immediate spending cuts and tax increases that would automatically kick in (the “fiscal cliff”) if agreement on a comprehensive set of fiscal reforms eluded them.	为了增加这种改革的可能性，他们同意立刻削减开支、增加税收，只要关于全面财政改革计划的协议不对此问题作出新安排，就会立刻实施（即“财政悬崖”）。


On paper, at least, this sizeable threat – involving blunt fiscal contraction amounting to some 4% of GDP – should have properly aligned incentives in Washington, DC.	至少从纸面上看，这一大威胁——其中包括最高可达GDP的4%的大规模财政紧缩——应该与华盛顿是激励相容的。


After all, no politician would wish to go down in history as being responsible for pushing the country back into recession at a time when unemployment is already too high, income and wealth inequalities are increasing, and a record number of Americans live in relative poverty.	毕竟，没有政客愿意在历史上留下在失业仍然高企、收入和财富不平等性不断加剧、创纪录的美国家庭陷入相对贫困时让经济重新打回衰退的名声。


Yet, so far, the threat has not worked.	但是，到目前为止，这一威胁并未奏效。


To understand why, we can appeal to game theory, which provides economists and others a powerful framework with which to explain the dynamics of both simple and complex interactions.	为了理解其中的原因，我们可以用博弈论来分析。 博弈论给了经济学家和其他人强大的框架以解释简单或复杂互动动态。


The objective of threatening a fiscal cliff was to force a “cooperative outcome” on an increasingly “non-cooperative game.”	财政悬崖威胁的目的是迫使一个越来越“非合作”的博弈出现“合作结果”。


But, in the absence of a credible enforcer (and lacking sufficient mutual assurances), participants felt that they had more to gain from continuing their non-cooperative behavior.	但是，由于缺少可信的强制者（以及充分的共同保证），政客会认为继续非合作行为对他们更有利。


Politicians on both sides of America’s political divide have generally felt that compromise would be viewed as a sign of weakness.	总的来说，美国政治分歧双方的政客都认为妥协无异于示弱。


Moreover, too many have made prior commitments – for example, promising never to increase taxes – that they find hard to break, especially ahead of elections that both sides deem to be of defining significance for the country’s future, reflected in the candidates’ campaigns, which are getting nastier by the day.	此外，太多政客此前已经做出了承诺——比如永不增税——而食言是个艰难的决定，特别是在双方都认为会对美国的未来形成重大影响的大选临近之际，只可以从候选人的日益激烈的竞选口号中一窥端倪。


The cost-benefit calculations will likely evolve after the election in November.	成本-收益计算或许会在11月大选之后发生。


At that point, the cost of being singled out as collaborating with members of the other side – and thus the risk of being unseated by more extreme forces in one’s party – may well decline.	那时，因与对方成员勾结而被孤立而可能被本党极端势力驱逐的成本会大大下降。


Moreover, since early September, the potential benefits of cooperation now include avoiding an embarrassing credit-rating downgrade next year if medium-term fiscal reform does not materialize.	此外，从9月上旬开始，合作的潜在好处有增加了一项：避免在无法实现中期财政改革的情况下被调降信用评级搞得灰头土脸。


I suspect that some will be quick to dismiss the consequences of a Moody’s downgrade.	我认为，一些人很快就会对穆迪降级的后果不屑一顾。


And it certainly is tempting to do so.	显然，这么做具有相当充分的理由。


After all, the global financial crisis badly damaged the credibility of ratings agencies as a whole.	毕竟，全球金融危机大大伤害了评级机构的整体信誉。


Moreover, one would be hard pressed to identify any meaningful hit to the US from the decision by another major agency, Standard & Poor’s, to downgrade America’s sovereign rating in August 2011.	此外，另一家主要评级机构标准普尔在2011年曾降低过美国主权评级，结果并没有产生有意义的后果。


On the contrary, rather than spiking higher following S&P’s unprecedented move, US market interest rates continued to fall, reaching record-low levels.	相反，美国市场利率并没有随着标普前所未有的动作而大幅走高，反而继续下降，创出了历史新低。


This seemingly contradictory fall in financing costs reflected an abundance of foreign capital seeking to invest in the US, including money fleeing from Europe.	这一看似反常的融资成本下降反映出有大量外国资本正在寻求美国的投资，其中就包括从欧洲逃离的资金。


The absence of any adverse impact on government finances may thus lead some to dismiss the impact of a potential Moody’s downgrade in 2013.	既然标普的动作没有对政府融资造成负面影响，那么有人就会认为穆迪在2013年的降级动作也是如此。


Yet, those of us who are exposed on a daily basis to the inner workings of financial markets would caution against too upbeat an attitude toward a second downgrade by a major ratings agency.	但是，对于我们这些天天暴露在金融市场内部运转情况风险的人来说，对主要评级机构第二次降级的影响过于乐观是值得引起警惕的。


Moreover, the potential impact certainly is not linear.	此外，潜在影响显然不是线性的。


Owing to the way that investment contracts are written and guidelines specified, there is a meaningful difference between a single and multiple rating downgrades.	投资合同的具体条款和准则决定了单起降级和多���降级的意义具有重大差别。


Were Moody’s to follow S&P in stripping the US of its triple-A rating, the most likely outcome is that the universe of global investors who are both able and willing to increase their holdings of US government securities would shrink over time.	如果穆迪步标普的后尘，剥夺美国的AAA评级，那么最后可能的结果是有能力也愿意增加美国政府证券持有量的全球投资者会逐渐减磅。


Fortunately for the US, the immediate adverse impact on borrowing costs would be alleviated, if not nullified, by investors’ lack of readily available alternatives to US government bonds, as well as a Federal Reserve that has been buying large volumes of US Treasuries.	对美国来说，幸运的是融资成本的即期负面影响会因为投资者缺乏能够替代美国国债的现成投资目标以及美联储大量购买美国国债而有所减轻（即使不是完全消除的话）。


But this is not a long-term risk worth taking.	但从长期看就难说了。


Historically, it has taken countries many years of difficult fiscal-policy efforts to regain a triple-A status.	历史表明，重新获得AAA地位需要为此付出多年的艰辛财政政策努力。


And, while no one can be certain about where the limits lie, there are both theoretical and operational bounds to how many government bonds can (and should) be placed on the balance sheet of a modern, well-functioning central bank.	不管从理论上还是操作上，运转正常的现代央行资产负债表上可以（以及应该）出现多少国债是存在界限的。 尽管没人可以这一界限在哪里。


All of this suggests that, whether in the lame-duck congressional session following the elections or in the first few months of the new Congress, US politicians will likely dismantle the fiscal cliff.	所有这些都表明，要么是大选后的跛脚鸭国会会议上，要么在新国会产生后的最初几个月，美国政客可能会消除财政悬崖。


Based on an assessment of potential commonality among the political parties, such a compromise would limit the contractionary fiscal impact to some 1.5% of GDP.	基于政党间存在一定的潜在共性，这样的妥协能把财政冲击的衰退效应限制在GDP的1. 5%以内。


Such a mini-bargain would go a long way toward reducing the risk of a serious US recession.	这样的迷你讨价还价可以显著降低美国发生严重衰退的风险。


But it would fall short of the type of fiscal reforms that would satisfy Moody’s.	但对于穆迪来说，财政改革仍将是不够的。


Such reforms require a grand bargain between America’s political parties, which in turn presupposes visionary leadership by both of them.	穆迪所要的改革要求美国政党间进行大规模的讨价还价，而这又必须以两党领导层都具有远见卓识为前提。


The Emancipation Gap in Arab Education	阿拉伯教育的自由差距


PARIS – Discussion of education in the Arab world has focused only rarely on the role of schooling in changing social and political mores.	巴黎—关于阿拉伯世界的教育的讨论很少关注上学在改变社会和政治习惯方面的作用。


This is unfortunate, because educated citizens of Arab countries tend to be much less emancipated politically and socially, on average, than their peers in other parts of the world.	这是不幸的，因为平均而言，与世界其他部分的公民相比，受过教育的阿拉伯国家公民的政治和社会束缚要大得多。


If Arab societies are ever to become more open and economically dynamic, their education systems will have to embrace and promote values appropriate to that goal.	如果阿拉伯社会要想变得更加开放，经济上更有活力，它们的教育系统就必须接受并推进与这一目标相符的价值。


The gap is reflected in the World Value Survey (WVS), a global opinion poll that allows for the comparison of a broad range of values in different countries.	差距反映在世界价值调查（WVS）中。 WVS是一项全球观点调查，可用来比较不同国家的各种价值。


Recently, the WVS surveyed 12 Arab countries – Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen, Kuwait, and Libya – along with 47 non-Arab countries.	最近，WVS调查了12个阿拉伯国家——约旦、埃及、巴勒斯坦、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、摩洛哥、阿尔及利亚、突尼斯、卡塔尔、也门、科威特和利比亚——和47个非阿拉伯国家。


The results allow us for the first time to compare the residents of a sizable share of the Arab world to citizens elsewhere.	结果让我们第一次得以将阿拉伯世界中相当大比例的居民与世界其他地区的公民相比较。


The WVS measures four revealing political and social values: support for democracy, readiness for civic engagement, obedience to authority, and support for patriarchal values that underpin discrimination against women.	WVS衡量四种颇能揭示问题的政治和社会价值：对民主的支持、对公民参与的准备、对威权的服从，以及对作为性别歧视基础的父权价值的支持。


As a typical country becomes richer, more educated, and more politically open, support for democracy and readiness for civic engagement rise, and obedience to authority and support for patriarchal values fall.	一个典型的国家，随着它日益富裕、教育程度日增、政治日益开放，对民主的支持和对公民参与的准备也会增加，而对威权的副总和对父权价值的支持则会降低。


The data, however, reveal that Arab countries lag behind countries at similar levels of development.	但是，数据揭示，发展水平相近的阿拉伯国家落后了。


Arabs have a lower preference for democracy (with a gap of 11%), are less civically active (a gap of 8%), respect authority more (by 11%), and embrace patriarchal values much more strongly (by a whopping 30%).	阿拉伯人对民主的偏好较低（差距为11%），公民活跃程度较低（差距8%），更尊重威权（差距11%），也更强烈地接受父权价值（差距为惊人的30%）。


Two characteristics of the Arab world could explain this: its predominantly Muslim population and the autocratic governments that have ruled much of the region for the past 50 years.	阿拉伯世界的两个特征能够解释这一差距：穆斯林人口占主要地位，以及过去50年来该地区大部为极权政府所统治。


According to the WVS, religiosity does indeed promote conservatism, but not more so in Arab countries than in the rest of the world.	据WVS，笃信宗教确实增加了保守主义，但在阿拉伯国家比世界其他地区更甚。


Still, given that Arabs’ religiosity score is about double that of people elsewhere, this factor does partly explain the region’s conservatism.	虽然，考虑到阿拉伯人宗教信仰得分是其他地区人民的两倍左右，这一因素确实部分解释了该地区的保守主义。


But what is more interesting is the role that education plays – or does not play – in promoting social and political openness in the Arab world.	但更有趣的是教育在促进阿拉伯世界社会和政治开放中所起到——或未起到——的作用。


The biggest differences between Arab countries and the rest of the world can be found among the educated.	阿拉伯国家和世界其他地区最大的差异可以在受教育人群中找到。


Consider preference for democracy.	以民主偏好为例。


On that measure, the gap between Arabs and non-Arabs with a university degree is 14%, while the gap between those with secondary degrees is only 5%.	在这一指标中，拥有大学学位的阿拉伯人和非阿拉伯人之间的差距为14%，拥有中学学历的群体之间只有5%。


And similar effects can be seen for the other three values.	类似的效应在其他三种价值上也可以遇见。


Education, it seems, has a weaker effect on social values in Arab countries than elsewhere – by a factor of about three.	看起来，教育对阿拉伯国家社会价值的影响要低于其他地区——大约低三倍。


Thus, those seeking to foster openness in the Arab world should focus not on the impact of Islam, but on the education to which the region’s residents are exposed.	因此，寻求促进阿拉伯世界开放的人不应该将重点放在伊斯兰教的影响，而应该放在该地区居民所接受的教育上。


Indeed, one likely explanation of the observed gap in social values is that education is being deliberately used as a tool of indoctrination, with the purpose of consolidating autocratic governments.	事实上，对于社会价值上所观察到的差距的一个可能的解释是教育被用意地利用为灌输工具，其目的是巩固独裁政府。


Indeed, with the introduction of mass education in the 1960s, education in the Arab world was placed in the service of top-down nationalist projects.	事实上，20世纪60年代引入平民教育后，阿拉伯世界的教育的目的是为自上而下的民族主义工程服务。


Then, in the 1970s, after state-led modernization pushes had failed and governments had become increasingly repressive, education policies were infused with conservative, religious values – first in order to fight leftist opposition groups, and later to compete with Islamic groups on their own terrain.	接着，20世纪70年代，在国家领导的现代化措施失败、政府日益高压化后，教育政策被注入保守的宗教价值——首先是为了对抗左倾反对派，后来是为了与本土伊斯兰教集团竞争。


A review of the pedagogical literature on the region’s education systems reveals the extent to which they have been designed for indoctrination.	对该地区教育体系的教育学文献综述揭示了这些教育体系在多大程度上是为了灌输而设计。


Most of them are characterized by rote learning, disregard for analytical capabilities, an exaggerated focus on religious subjects and values, the discouragement of self-expression in favor of conformism, and students’ lack of involvement in community affairs.	它们大多具有机械学习的特点，不重视分析能力，过度注重宗教主题和价值，遏制自我表达因而有利于盲从，学生也不参与社区事务。


These features are all geared to promote obedience and discourage the questioning of authority.	这些特征无不有利于增加服从，制约对威权的质疑。


It may seem paradoxical that secular regimes were responsible for Islamicizing education.	一个矛盾之处是世俗政权负责进行伊斯兰化教育。


But it makes sense if it is recognized as an attempt to exploit local cultural characteristics to reinforce the indoctrination effort (as has been done in China).	但如果将此视为利用地方文化特征强化灌输政策（和中国的做法一样）的尝试，那么它也是有意义的。


Blaming local culture, which societies largely inherit, is not constructive.	指责社会所传承的地方文化无济于事。


Recognizing that autocratic regimes purposefully neutralize the modernizing potential of education for the sake of their survival offers a road forward.	认识到专制政权为了自身生存而有意地中和教育的现代化潜力指出了一条前进道路。


Unfortunately for the Arab world, it is a rather narrow road.	对阿拉伯世界来说，不幸的是这是一条非常窄的道路。


Elites will not willingly reform education if doing so puts their survival at risk.	精英不会愿意进行教育改革，如果这样做会让他们的生存受到威胁的话。


Civil-society activists will need to fight to change the values underpinning their education systems, by encouraging civic engagement, inculcating democratic principles, supporting gender equality, and promoting diversity and pluralism.	公民社会活动需要通过斗争改变作为教育体系基础的价值，方法可以是鼓励公民参与、传播民主原则、支持性别平等和促进多样化和多元主义。


Only by ensuring that these values take root in every school will they grow strong enough to change the course of Arab societies.	只有通过确保这些价值在每一所学校深根发芽，它们才能茁壮成长，改变阿拉伯社会的进程。


The Right Iraqi Intervention	恰如其分的伊拉克干预行动


CANBERRA – US President Barack Obama deserves unconditional support for his decision to use military force to protect the persecuted Yezidi minority from threatened genocide by marauding Islamic State (IS) militants in northern Iraq.	堪培拉——我们应当无条件地支持美国总统奥巴马动用军事力量保护受迫害的雅兹迪少数民族免遭在伊拉克北部烧伤抢掠的“伊斯兰国”（IS）武装份子种族灭绝的决策。


The United States’ action is completely consistent with the principles of the international responsibility to protect (R2P) people at risk of mass-atrocity crimes, which was embraced unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005.	美国此次行动完全符合联合国大会2005年一致通过的保护平民免遭大规模暴行的国际责任原则（R2P）。


The US military intervention touches all of R2P’s bases of legality, legitimacy, and likely effectiveness in meeting its immediate objectives.	美国军事干预行动所要达成的近期目标完全符合保护责任的合法性、合理性及有效性原则。


In contrast to the original military intervention in Iraq – which touched none of these bases – the current US action, though lacking Security Council authorization, is being taken at the request of the Iraqi government, so there is no question of a breach of international law.	与原有的伊拉克军事干预行动不同——该行动根本不符合任何一项条件——目前的美国军事行动虽然没有得到安理会授权，但是应伊拉克政府要求，因此从这个角度讲与国际法没有冲突。


And it would clearly seem to satisfy the moral or prudential criteria for the use of military force, which, though not yet formally adopted by the United Nations or anyone else, have been the subject of much international debate and acceptance over the last decade.	而且此次行动显然满足使用武力的道德或审慎准则，虽然上述准则尚未被联合国或其他组织所正式采纳，但过去10年来一直受到国际舆论的争议及认可。


The criteria of legitimacy are that the atrocities occurring or feared are sufficiently serious to justify, prima facie, a military response; that the response has a primarily humanitarian motive; that no lesser response is likely to be effective in halting or averting the harm; that the proposed response is proportional to the threat; and that the intervention will do more good than harm.	判定合法与否的标准是现实或者担心发生的暴行是否严重到足以采取军事行动； 军事行动必须主要出于人道主义动机；


The available evidence is that the many thousands of men, women, and children who have sought refuge in the Sinjar mountain range of northern Iraq are indeed at risk.	现有证据是数千名在伊拉克北部辛贾尔山脉避难的男女老幼确实面临着死亡的威胁。


They face death not only from starvation and exposure, but also from genocidal slaughter by the rapidly advancing IS forces, who regard the Yazidis as apostates and have already perpetrated atrocities unrivaled in their savagery.	他们不仅可能死于饥饿和寒冷，而且可能死于快速推进的“伊斯兰国”势力的种族屠杀。 “伊斯兰国”势力将雅兹迪人视为变节者，而且已经犯下了前所未有的野蛮罪行。


The US motive in mobilizing air power to protect them is unquestionably humanitarian.	美国动用空中力量实施保护的动机无疑是出于人道主义。


It is clear that no lesser measures will be sufficient, and the only question about proportionality that arises is whether the air strikes and supply drops will do too little, rather than too much, to address the emergency.	显然非如此不足以震慑“伊斯兰国”的暴行，唯一的问题是空袭和空投是否足以控制紧急事件，而不至因为力度不够而几乎不起作用。


Unlike the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, it cannot be argued that external military intervention will be likely to cause more harm than good.	与2003年以美国为首的伊拉克入侵行动不同，此次不能简单地认为外部军事干预可能产生弊大于利的后果。


It should be at least as effective in protecting the Yezidis (and Kurds and others in nearby Erbil) as was the intervention in Libya in 2011 to stop the threatened massacre by Muammar el-Qaddafi’s forces of the people of Benghazi.	此次行动保护雅兹迪人（还有附近埃尔比勒的库尔德人和其他民族）的效果至少可以和2011年阻止卡扎菲部队屠杀班加西民众的利比亚干预行动相媲美。


Whether it will contribute to reversing the major gains already made by IS forces in northern Iraq, and to re-establishing the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state, is a different question.	此次干预行动能否扭转“伊斯兰国”势力在伊拉克北部的重大胜利、恢复伊拉克国家的领土完整仍然有待观察。


As the Obama administration has made clear, that will depend, above all, on whether the disastrously divisive leadership of Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s Shia prime minister, gives way to a more inclusive regime, and whether, in that context, the ineffectual Iraqi army can regroup and rally.	正如奥巴马政府所明确表示的那样，能否实现上述目标归根结底将取决于伊拉克什叶派总理马利基灾难性分裂的领导班子能否让位于更加包容的政府，以及在这种情况下，低效的伊拉克军队能否成功重组和集结。


Though some conservative American voices are already calling for more to be done, no compelling case can be made in the US, Europe, or my own country for sacrificing further blood and treasure in an effort to prop up a regime so demonstrably unable and unwilling to help itself hold the country together.	尽管某些美国保守势力已经在呼吁采取进一步的��动，但美国、欧洲或我自己的国家都找不到充分理由为扶植如此明显不能也不愿靠自身力量实现统一的政权付出进一步的鲜血和财富。


As I have argued previously, the only possible justification – moral, political, or military – for renewed external military intervention in Iraq is to meet the international responsibility to protect victims, or potential victims, of mass atrocities.	恰如我之前曾指出的那样，再度军事干预伊拉克在道德、政治或军事方面唯一可能的理由是履行保护大规模暴行实际或潜在受害者的国际责任。


It is a little frustrating to those of us who have worked to embed R2P principles in international policy and practice that US leaders remain reluctant to use that terminology – a reluctance that partly reflects the perceived domestic political risk in relying on anything that comes from the UN.	我们这些努力在国际政策和惯例中融入“保护原则”的人对美国领袖不愿使用这一词汇感觉有些失望——这种不情愿部分反映出依赖联合国元素可能给国内政治带来的危险因素。


But it would be churlish to complain when, as here, Obama talks of “upholding international norms,” and in practice moves to do exactly what the R2P norm requires.	但在奥巴马已经谈及“贯彻国际规范”的情况下继续喋喋不休未免过于小气，因为“保护原则”所提的一切要求实际已经满足。


There are also, of course, American voices – like that of the foreign-policy realist Stephen Walt – arguing for less to be done, on the ground that US interests are insufficiently engaged to justify any military intervention, however limited.	当然，也有些像外交政策现实主义者斯蒂芬·沃尔特那样的美国人主张不要采取行动，理由是美国利益并未受到威胁，因此不需要采取哪怕是有限的军事行动。


But this is to adopt a narrowly traditional view of the national interest – focusing only on direct security and economic advantage – and to ignore a third dimension, reputational advantage, which increasingly determines the extent to which countries respect and relate to one another.	但沃尔特宣扬的是对国家利益的狭隘传统观点——即只关注直接的安全和经济优势——而忽略了信誉优势这第三维度，而恰恰是信誉优势越来越多地决定国家间的关系和相互尊重。


It is in every country’s national interest to be – and to be seen as – a good international citizen.	争当良好的国际公民符合所有国家利益。


There can be no better demonstration of good international citizenship than a country’s willingness to act when it has the capacity to prevent or avert a mass atrocity crime.	最能展现负责任国际公民形象的莫过于一个国家在有能力预防或避免大规模暴行的情况下愿意采取行动。


Obama has recently been criticized, in the context of his attitude toward the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, as being “cerebral in part of the world that’s looking for the visceral.”	奥巴马最近由于对巴以和平进程的态度而饱受诟病，称他在“凭本能行事的世界中过于强调理性的作用。


His response to the plight of the Yezidis in Iraq has been both cerebral and visceral, and both America and the world are better for it.	”他对伊拉克雅兹迪人困境做出的反应及理性又感性，此次行动对美国和全世界都有好处。


Sorry is the Hardest Word	道歉并不容易


CANBERRA – Apologies, or the lack of them, have been back in the news, raising questions again about how useful they are in resolving international problems.	堪培拉——道歉、或者拒绝道歉再次成为新闻，让人们再次怀疑道歉在解决国际争端中所起的作用。


The efficacy of timely and sincere apologies in defusing personal tensions cannot be doubted.	及时并真诚的致歉在缓和个人紧张关系中所起的作用是毋庸置疑的。


Is the same true for diplomacy?	但道歉是否适用于外交领域？


In some recent cases, the issue has been not much more than an irritating sideshow, as when Afghan President Hamid Karzai demanded an apology from the United States late last year for causing unintended civilian deaths – at the price, bizarrely, of allowing the Americans to continue defending him and his country (the US understandably refused).	近期的某些事件中，道歉问题不过是恼人的插曲，比方说阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊要求美国为去年底意外造成平民伤亡道歉——之后才能，这一点非常奇怪，允许美国继续为阿富汗和他本人提供保护（不难理解，美国拒绝了他的要求）。


But in other cases, the stakes have become very high indeed.	但有些情况下付出的代价也非常惨重。


Bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia since last November have become more frigid than they have been in decades, owing to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s very real anger at Australia’s refusal to offer an apology for tapping his private telephone (and his wife’s).	去年11月来印尼和澳大利亚的双边关系就已经跌落至数十年来的低点，苏西洛·班邦·尤多约诺总统因澳大利亚拒绝就窃听他（和他妻子）的私人电话道歉而倍感愤怒。


And Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit in December to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead – including, since 1978, its most serious convicted war criminals – has re-opened long-festering wounds among Japan’s neighbors, who perceive a lack of sincere contrition for waging aggressive war and committing wartime atrocities.	日本首相安倍晋三12月参拜靖国神社重新撕开了日本邻国从未愈合的伤口，靖国神社供奉着日本战争死难者，包括1978年来最臭名昭著的战犯。 邻国认为日本对发动侵略战争及犯下战争暴行缺乏忏悔。


It has certainly added tension to Japan’s already-fraught standoff with China over their competing claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.	而这无疑让日中之间因为对东中国海尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛针锋相对的主权要求本已令人忧虑的关系变得更加紧张。


In the case of Indonesia’s reaction to former US intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden’s revelations of Australian spying on its first family, a personal apology from Prime Minister Tony Abbott would have made all the difference.	在印尼对前美国情报承包商爱德华·J·斯诺登爆料澳大利亚监视其第一家庭的反应问题上，由澳大利亚总理托尼·阿博特出面做出个人道歉会使整个局面大为不同。


He had merely to follow the playbook of President Barack Obama’s response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel when the US was similarly caught out.	他所要做的只是模仿美国被爆出类似丑闻时奥巴马总统对德国总理默克尔做出的反应。


Had he coupled this with a simple promise to “review our collection processes and priorities,” there might even have been no need to pledge explicitly, as the US now has, to end all monitoring of “the leaders of our close friends and allies.”	如果他在此之外再加上“检讨我们的情报搜集过程和重点”的简单承诺，甚至可能都无需像美国那样做出结束对“我们的亲密朋友和盟国领导人一切监控活动”的明确承诺。


I was in Jakarta at the time, and formed that judgment after speaking to very senior officials, and I advised the Australian government accordingly.	事情发生时我正在雅加达，在与印尼高层沟通后做出了这样的判断，并据此建议澳大利亚政府。


But the government took the view that when it comes to intelligence matters, apologies are for wimps.	但澳政府认为在涉及情报事务问题上道歉的都是懦夫。


With elections looming in Indonesia, and nationalist sentiment there strong, Australia will be paying the diplomatic price for a long time unless it changes course.	随着印尼选举的临近和民族主义情绪愈演愈烈，除非澳大利亚改弦更张否则将会付出长期的外交代价。


The case of Japan is more complex.	日本的情况则更为复杂。


Under strong international pressure in the 1980’s and 1990’s – to which I hope I contributed as Australia’s foreign minister – a series of powerful apologies were in fact offered.	在二十世纪八九十年代强大的国际舆论压力下（我希望时任澳大利亚外长的我也在其中发挥了作用），日本其实曾经作出过一系列诚恳的道歉举动。


Notable among them was then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono’s statement in 1993 on the issue of Korea’s “comfort women,” and Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s expression, on the 50th anniversary of the end of the World War II, of “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology.”	其中最著名的是时任内阁官房长官河野洋平1993年就韩国“慰安妇”问题发表的声明，以及首相村山富市在二战结束五十周年之际所表达的“深刻的反省”和“由衷的歉意”。


There has been no subsequent outright disavowal of these apologies; indeed, this month Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said that Abe’s cabinet members “have never denied” the Kono and Murayama statements.	其后日本从来没有对上述道歉做出过直接的否认； 事实上，就在这个月外交部长岸田文雄还表示安倍的内阁成员“从未否认过”河野和村山的声明。


But, save for a gracious acceptance by South Korea’s then-President Kim Dae-jung in 1998, Japan’s apologies simply have not resonated much in the region, because they have regularly been accompanied by apparent side-stepping or backsliding.	但除了1998年时任韩国总统金大中礼貌地接受了日本的道歉外，日本的道歉根本没有在该地区其他国家引起任何的共鸣，因为日本在道歉的同时还不乏明显的越界或倒退举动。


Japan’s Diet, for example, failed to endorse Murayama’s statement in 1995, agreeing only to express “a deep feeling of remorse” (and even then 241 MPs abstained).	比方说1995年日本国会就未能批准村山的说法，而仅同意表示“深深的悔恨之情”（ 当时甚至还有241名议员投了弃权票）。


Above all, there have been Japanese leaders’ recurring pilgrimages to Yasukuni.	最重要的是，其后日本领导人仍频繁参拜靖国神社。


The shrine not only records war criminals in its “Book of Souls”; it also contains the Yushukan museum, where Japan’s conquests in the 1930’s and 1940’s are glorified as “just wars fought for survival and self-defense” or for the “liberation of Asia.”	神社的灵魂之书上不仅赫然列有���犯的名字； 还建有“游就馆”，把日本二十世纪三四十年代的侵略行为和政府美化成“为生存和自卫”或“解放亚洲”的正义战争。


Certainly some of the outraged reaction by Japan’s neighbors is of questionable sincerity.	当然，日本邻国的某些愤怒反应真诚与否尚有待商榷。


South Koreans have often failed to acknowledge the number and intensity of statements about comfort women (who were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers) and the amount of compensation on offer.	韩国无法明确慰安妇（被迫为日军提供性服务女性）数量及问题的严重性，也没有明确公布目前的拟定赔偿。


China, for its part, periodically mobilizes nationalist sentiment to divert attention from internal problems, and partly encouraged Abe’s recent assertiveness by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone beyond its acknowledged national airspace in the East China Sea – a move that, while not illegal, was certainly provocative.	而中国则定期利用民族主义情绪转移对国内问题的注意力，宣布在东中国海其公认领空以外划定防空识别区，由此在某种程度上鼓励了安倍近来的嚣张态度。 中国划定航空识别区的行为虽然并不违法，但在日本看来无疑属挑衅性质。


But Japan could and should have done much more to give real substance to its apologies, as the Germans have done.	但日本原本可以像德国一样赋予其道歉更多的实质内容。


At least since 1970, Germany has taken a comprehensive and credible approach to atoning for its Nazi past, fully acknowledging its horrors in school curricula, graphically commemorating them in museums, monuments, and ceremonies, and employing official discourse that has been unfailingly contrite.	至少从20世纪70年代以后，德国已采取全面可信的方式来为其纳粹历史赎罪，在学校课程中充分收录纳粹恐怖行径、在博物馆、纪念碑和纪念活动中用图片展示纳粹暴行，并且在官方讲话中从不间断地表达悔罪态度。


Harvard’s Ezra Vogel, while not sparing China from his prescriptions, recently mapped some strategies by which Japan could defuse historical issues.	尽管在解决方案中同样提到了中国，哈佛大学傅高义最近也为日本提供了一些化解历史遗留问题的策略。


Vogel recommends a full and objective official account of the suffering Japan’s military aggression caused, lengthening the time that students must devote to modern Japanese history, and including regional reactions and criticism in that study.	傅高义建议对日本军事侵略带来的苦难进行全面客观的描述，延长学生修习日本现代史的时间，并在其中收录地区反应和批评等内容。


Diplomats can learn from examples of transformative national apologies.	外交官们可以从具有革命性意义的国家道歉中学到很多。


The reconciliation of indigenous and white Australians was hugely advanced by Prime Minister Paul Keating’s Redfern speech in 1992, in which he declared: “We committed the murders.	1992年保罗·基廷总理的雷德芬讲话极大地推进了澳大利亚土著居民与白人的和解，他在讲话中宣布：“我们进行了谋杀。


We took the children from their mothers.	我们将孩子从母亲身边夺走。


We practiced discrimination and exclusion.	我们实施了歧视和排斥政策。


It was our ignorance and our prejudice...” Likewise, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offered a strong apology in 2008 to the “stolen generations” of Aboriginal children taken from their families by welfare officers.	所有这一切都是因为我们的无知和我们的偏见……”同样，2008年前总理陆克文也对福利人员带离家庭的“被偷走的一代”原住民儿童做出了令人信服的道歉。


There are many situations in which apologies are not necessary, because both sides agree to move on.	有很多情况其实无需道歉，因为双方都同意继续向前走。


And “non-apology apologies” – for example, “I’m sorry if you feel I have offended you” – are often worse than nothing, although they are a familiar diplomatic stock-in-trade of which I, too, have been guilty of using.	而且“不是道歉的道歉“——比方说，“我很抱歉你觉得我得罪了你”——往往比不道歉还糟，虽然它们是惯用的外交伎俩，而且这样的方法其实我也用过。


It is also conceivable that genuine apologies may be counterproductive, because they trigger a backlash from local extremists, which may in turn fuel even more flames on the other side.	真正的道歉也可能适得其反，因为道歉可能激起当地极端分子的反弹，进而为对方的情绪火上浇油。


I would, however, resist the conclusion that Japan’s apologies have been a net negative in this respect.	但我不同意日本的道歉会带来纯粹的副作用。


These arguments will continue.	类似的争论仍将继续。


But it is difficult to believe that when a wrong has been done, a sincere apology will not have some restorative impact.	但很难相信犯下错误后，真正的道歉无法起到某种修复效果。


In public, as in private life, honest apologies are a powerful tool, and should be used less nervously and more often.	真诚的道歉无论在公共还是私人场合都是一种强大的工具，我们应该消除恐惧心理，并且更频繁地加以运用。


Cambodia’s Violent Peace	柬埔寨的暴力和平


CANBERRA – Cambodia’s government has been getting away with murder.	堪培拉—柬埔寨政府又卷入了谋杀。


Not the kind of genocidal slaughter conducted by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970’s. Nor the scale of killing that has been roiling Syria, or that has put Ukraine, Venezuela, Thailand, and Bangladesh in the global headlines of late.	不是20世纪70年代的红色高棉宗族灭绝大屠杀，也不是动荡不已的叙利亚那种规模的杀戮，也不是乌克兰、委内瑞拉、泰国和孟加拉国最近登上全球新闻头条的杀戮。


But murder nonetheless, with Cambodian citizens deliberately targeted by their country’s security forces.	但终究是谋杀，柬埔寨安全部队蓄意地将目标对准了柬埔寨人民。


On January 3, five striking garment workers were shot dead in Phnom Penh while peacefully demanding a minimum livable wage.	1月3日，三名罢工的纺织工人在金边参加要求增加最低生活工资的和平示威时被射杀。


Many others were severely injured by gunfire and beatings.	还有许多人因枪击和击打严重受伤。


More than 20 have been detained without trial.	20多人在未经审判的情况下遭到囚禁。


This followed deadly violence against unarmed demonstrators protesting last year’s deeply flawed national election, won, yet again, by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party, which has dominated political life for more than three decades.	而在此前曾发生过针对反对去年存在严重问题的全国选举的手无寸铁的示威者的致死暴力时间。 在去年的选举中，首相洪森的执政党——柬埔寨人民当再度获胜，该党已主宰柬埔寨政坛超过三十年。


The recent killings repeat a pattern of political violence that has recurred all too often at crucial moments in Cambodia’s history – even after the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which were intended to bring not only peace, but also democracy and human-rights protection to the country’s long-suffering people.	最近的杀戮行为不过是柬埔寨历史关键时期反复发生的政治暴力的重演，甚至在1991年巴黎和平协定（Paris Peace Agreement，旨在为柬埔寨长期遭遇苦难的人民带来和平、民主和人权）后，柬埔寨依然是暴力不断。


No country in the world deserved all three more, ravaged as it was for two decades by massive United States bombing, civil war, a genocidal reign of terror by the Khmer Rouge, invasion by Vietnam, and more civil war – with some two million dead as a result.	柬埔寨经历了二十多年的大动乱，美国的大规模轰炸、内战、红色高棉的种族灭绝政策、越南入侵、更多内战接踵而至，两百万人因此丧生，这个国家不应该继续发生杀戮事件，哪怕只有三个人遇难。


Hopes were high that Cambodia had been set on a transformative path by the success of the United Nations peace plan, the huge peacekeeping operation that followed, and the remarkably peaceful election of 1993 (in all of which Australia played a leading role during my time as Foreign Minister).	人们热切地希望柬埔寨已经在联合国和平计划的成功及随后的维和行动以及令人瞩目的1993年和平选举（当时由我担任外交部长的澳大利亚在所有这些事情中都起到了领导作用）走上了转型之路。


In some respects, those hopes have been realized.	从某种角度讲，这些愿望已经实现了。


The Khmer Rouge did wither away, and with it the lingering threat of renewed civil war.	红色高棉已经幻灭，新内战的威胁也随之而去。


The Cambodian economy – strongly supported in recent years by aid and investment from China – has grown steadily (though it lags behind most of its regional neighbors, and concerns about corruption and political instability are preventing it from reaching its full potential).	柬埔寨经济——近几年来得到了中国在援助和投资方面的鼎力支持——稳步增长（尽管仍落后于大部分地区邻国，并且人们仍十分担心腐败和政治动荡可能让它无法充分实现经济潜力）。


But Cambodia’s record on democracy and human rights since the Paris Peace Agreements has not been a good one.	但自巴黎和平协定以来，柬埔寨民主和人权纪录并不出色。


A grenade attack on an opposition rally led by Sam Rainsy in March 1997 killed 16 people and injured more than a hundred.	1997年3月，沈良西（Sam Rainsy）领导的反对运动遭遇手榴弹袭击，造成16人死亡、一百多人手上。


That July, after an uneasy period of sharing power with Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s royalist party, Hun Sen launched a bloody coup in which his opponents were exiled, arrested, tortured, and in some cases summarily executed.	当年7月，在经历了和拉那烈亲王的保皇党分享权力的艰难时期后，洪森发动了流血政变，驱逐、逮捕、拷打甚至就地处决了他的反对者。


Neither episode generated much international reaction: Hun Sen still had enough political capital from his fight against the Khmer Rouge and his cooperative role in the peace process, while Sam Rainsy was regarded as deeply flawed, and the royalist leadership as feckless.	所有这些事件都没有引起多少国际反响：洪森因为与红色高棉的斗争以及在和平进程中的合作态度而依然掌握着足够大的政治资本，而沈良西被认为缺陷重重，保皇党领导层则碌碌无为。


Cambodia-fatigue among policymakers also played a role.	决策者的柬埔寨疲劳���是原因之一。


At the time, I wanted to believe that these reverses would be temporary, and there were too many like me.	当时我宁愿相信这些都是暂时性的倒退，和我观点一样的人有很多。


Since then, while preserving a democratic façade, Hun Sen has ruled, for all practical purposes, as an autocrat, showing scant regard for rights of free expression and association – and resorting to violent repression whenever he has deemed it necessary to preserve his and his party’s position.	自此以后，洪森一直披着民主的外衣行独裁之实，对言论和结社自由的权利置若罔闻，在认为需要捍卫自己和所在政党地位时亦不惜回归暴力镇压。


This has been accompanied by staggering levels of corruption, with Cambodia ranked 160th by Transparency International, out of 175 countries.	伴此而生的是令人咋舌的腐败，在透明国际（Transparency International）的排名中，柬埔寨在175个国家中位列地160名。


There are stories, unverifiable but plausible, that 20 or more of Hun Sen’s closest associates have each amassed more than $1 billion through misappropriation of state assets, illegal economic activity, and favoritism in state procurement and contracting.	不少无从考证但听起来颇为可信的传闻指出，洪森亲信圈的20多人没人都通过侵吞国有资产、非法经济活动和国家采购和招标舞弊中敛财10亿多美元。


There has also been political patronage bordering on parody, with one recent count putting the government’s size at 244 ministers and secretaries of state.	政治庇护也是横行无碍，最新数据表明柬埔寨政府有244名部长和国务委员。


For far too long, Hun Sen and his colleagues have been getting away with violence, human-rights abuses, corruption, and media and electoral manipulation without serious internal or external challenge.	长期以来，洪森及其同党肆无忌惮地使用暴力、侵害人权、公行腐败、操纵媒体和选举，并且从未受到过严重的国内外挑战。


But things are beginning to change.	但局面已经开始改变。


A credible new opposition party – the Cambodia National Rescue Party – has emerged under Sam Rainsy (who looks a little more like a national leader now than just a monochromatic anti-Vietnamese crusader), gaining significant popular support.	一个信誉卓著的新政党——柬埔寨救国党（Cambodia National Rescue Party）在沈良西的领导下崛起（如今，沈良西更像是一位国家领袖，而不是仅仅是一位单纯的反越南斗士），获得了大量民众支持。


A large number of social-media-savvy young voters have been turning out in the streets demanding a change of government.	大量善于使用社交媒体的年轻选民开始走上街头，要求改选政府。


Internationally, too, some pressure has been building, but not enough.	国际压力也开始形成，但分量还不够。 美国众议院外交事务委员会主席艾德·罗伊斯（Ed Royce）要求洪森辞职；


Ed Royce, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, has called on Hun Sen to resign; condemnatory resolutions have been passed in a number of parliaments; and many states entered criticisms of one kind or another into the record when the UN Human Rights Council reviewed Cambodia’s human-rights record in Geneva a few weeks ago.	不少国家的议会都通过了惩罚议案； 几周前，在联合国人权委员会咋日内瓦审议柬埔寨人权纪录时，许多国家都做出了这样或那样的批评。


But the tone of too many of these statements has been muted.	但这些态度的语气往往是轻描淡写的。


Australia’s statements have been typical – falling over backward to avoid giving offense, and too anxious to balance criticism with praise.	澳大利亚的声明就是典型——为了避免冒犯而用词过于谨慎，太纠结于在褒贬之间的平衡。


Officials are “concerned” about “recent disproportionate violence against protesters” but “welcome the Government’s stated commitment to undertake electoral reforms.”	官员对“最近发生的针对示威者的严重暴力”表示“关注”，但“欢迎柬埔寨政府所作出的实施选举改革的承诺”。


Australia’s new foreign minister, Julie Bishop, has talked, as foreign ministers often do, of the need to avoid unproductive “megaphone diplomacy” and to “engage, not enrage” her counterparts.	澳大利亚新外交部长朱莉·毕晓普（Julie Bishop）打着外交部长惯用的官腔大谈需要避免无效果的“扩音器外交”，要“延请而不是激怒”其他国家的外交部长。


But, it seems that no robust critique was delivered when she met privately with Hun Sen in Phnom Penh on February 22 – even though Australia’s high standing in Cambodia (not least owing to its historical role in the peace process) means that its voice certainly would have been listened to.	但是，当2月22日她和洪森在金边进行私人会晤时，她并没有表达强硬的批评，尽管澳大利亚在柬埔寨所拥有的很高的地位（因为它在和平进程中起到过历史性作用）意味着它的声音一定会被柬埔寨听进去。


There is a place for quiet diplomacy that relies on genuine engagement to encourage significant behavioral change.	应该给依赖于真正的延请和鼓励重大行为变化的静默外交一席之地。


But when states behave badly enough for long enough, loud megaphones can also be in order.	但当一国在相当长的时间里一直行为相当不当，也可以应该使用扩音喇叭。


I know Hun Sen and worked well with him in the past.	我熟悉洪森，过去我们合作得很好。


I have resisted strong public criticism until now, because I thought there was hope for both him and his government.	直到最近，我忍不同意激烈的公共批判，因为我认为他和他的政府仍是游戏王的。


But their behavior has now moved beyond the civilized pale.	但如今，他们的行为已经越过了文明的界线。


It is time for Cambodia’s political leaders to be named, shamed, investigated, and sanctioned by the international community.	柬埔寨政治领袖应该被指名道姓地批评、调查并受到国际制裁。


Abe’s Asian Gambit	安倍的亚洲开局


CANBERRA – With the world producing more history than most of us can consume right now, it is easy to lose sight of recent developments that could have even greater consequences for long-term peace and stability than recent alarming events in eastern Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria-Iraq.	堪培拉—世界产生的历史太多，我们消费历史的能力太小，因此，我们很容易忽视一些近期局势发展，它们给长期和平与稳定带来的后果可能比最近在东乌克兰、加沙和叙利亚-伊拉克所发生的紧急事件更加严重。


The outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran, the change of leadership in India and Indonesia – two of the world’s three largest democracies – and the re-energizing of the BRICS group of major non-Western states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) may all be such game-changers.	与伊朗的核谈判的结果、三大民主国家之二——印度和印尼领导人交接，以及由主要非西方国家组成金砖国家集团（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）重装上阵都有可能成为这类局面改变事件。


But Japan’s international muscle-flexing under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may be even more significant.	但首相安倍晋三领导日本在国际舞台上耀武扬威可能会带来更加重大的后果。


Unless it is very carefully managed by all concerned, including the United States and Japan’s other closest Asia-Pacific allies, Abe’s makeover of Japanese foreign policy could undermine the fragile power balances that have so far kept the Sino-American rivalry in check.	除非各方（包括美国和日本的其他亚太地区紧密盟友）小心处置，否则安倍的日本外交政策大变脸可能破坏到目前为止控制着中美对抗的脆弱实力平衡。


Japan is right to be concerned about China’s new regional assertiveness, and Abe’s recent diplomatic push to strengthen Japan’s relations in Southeast Asia, and with Australia and India, is understandable in that context.	日本对中国新出现的地区强势表示担忧是正确的，而安倍最近的外交举动——强化日本与东南亚、澳大利亚和印度的关系——也不难理解。


Nor is it inherently unreasonable – despite opposition at home and abroad – for his government to seek to reinterpret Article 9 of Japan’s “peace constitution” to permit wider engagement in collective self-defense operations and military cooperation with allies and partners.	也不能说安倍政府重新解释日本“和平宪法”第九条、允许日本参与集体自卫行动并与盟友和伙伴开战军事合作的举动是毫无道理的——尽管国内外反对声音很大。


But the risks in all of this must be openly acknowledged.	但所有这些举动的风险应该被公开承认。


Opposition to any perceived revival of Japanese militarism is hard-wired in Northeast Asia.	在东北亚，因为感到日本军国主义死灰复燃而发起的反对坚定而强烈。


Abe is an intensely conservative nationalist, still deeply reluctant to accept the extent of Japan’s World War II guilt (even when acknowledging, as he did in Australia recently, “the horrors of the past century’s history” and offering gracious condolences for “the many souls who lost their lives”).	安倍是一个极度保守的民族主义者，至今仍坚决不接受日本的二战罪行（尽管在最近的澳大利亚之行中他承认了“过去一个世纪的恐怖”，并向“许多失去了生命的灵魂”表示诚挚慰问）。


His refusal to rule out future visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, with its war-glorifying Yushukan Museum alongside, fuels hardline skepticism in China.	他拒绝承诺未来不去参拜靖国神社及其美化战争的游就馆，这助长了中国的强硬怀疑派。


It also makes common cause with South Korea much more difficult, and heightens the risk of maritime territorial disputes becoming explosive.	这也让日本更难与韩国寻找共同点，大大增加了海洋领土争端可能激化的可能。


Less noticed, but possibly more important in the long term, have been Japan’s efforts to reshape regional security arrangements, which for many years have had three key elements.	较少被人关注到但也许长期重要性更大的是日本试图重新安排地区安全构架。 多年来，这一构架有三大关键因素。


First, there have been the hub-and-spoke alliances of the US with Japan, South Korea, and Australia (and more loosely with Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines).	第一，美国与日本、韩国和澳大利亚构成中心辐射型联盟（外围还有关系松散一些的新加坡、泰国和菲律宾）。


These alliances are accepted and well understood, if not loved, by China.	中国已经接受并能够很好地理解这类联盟（尽管并不情愿）。


Second, there are national defense efforts, encouraged by the US, increasingly aimed at greater self-reliance in the event that China’s rise becomes a military threat.	第二，在美国的鼓励下，国家防御政策日益将目标放在自力更生应对成为军事威胁的崛起的中国。


This, too, has been accepted reasonably calmly, if not always quietly, by China, and has not undermined the continuing growth in bilateral economic relationships that every country in the region is developing with China.	这也被中国相当冷静（尽管未必平静）地接受了，并且没有破坏地区内任何国家与中国日益发展双边经济关系。


Finally, there have been multilateral security dialogues – the ASEAN Regional Forum and now the East Asia Summit the most prominent among them – designed to be vehicles for confidence building, and conflict prevention and management.	最后是多边安全对话——以东盟安全论坛（ASEAN Regional Forum）和最近的东亚峰会（East Asia Summit）最为重要。 这些多边完全对话的目的是建立信心、预防和管理冲突。


These mechanisms have so far promised more than they have delivered, though not for want of continuing efforts to give them more clout.	目前这些机制都是雷声大雨点小，但并不缺乏让它们日后变得更加有力的努力。


For all of the hype that has accompanied the US “pivot” to Asia – announced by President Barack Obama in the Australian Parliament in November 2011 – the delicate balances involved in this basic architecture have changed little for decades.	美国在大肆宣传其“转向”亚洲的决定——2011年11月奥巴马总统在澳大利亚议会宣布了这一政策——但这一基本构架对应的精巧平衡已经几十年没有改变。


But now Japan, with overt support from Australia in particular, seems determined to change the balance by establishing, as a counterweight to China, a much denser alliance-type relationship with selected partners.	但如今，日本在（尤其是）澳大利亚的公开支持下决定改变这一平衡，与精心选择的伙伴建立更加紧密的联盟，以制���中国。


Abe spoke repeatedly in the Australian Parliament earlier this month of Japan’s new “special relationship” with Australia – terminology normally associated only with the strongest of alliance partnerships – and followed his address by signing an agreement for the transfer of defense equipment and technology.	本月早些时候，安倍在澳大利亚议会重申，日本将与澳大利亚建立新的“特殊关系”——这样说的意思通常是建立最紧密的盟友关系——并在演讲后签署了一项国防设备和技术的转让协议。


Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who earlier this year described Japan as both our “best friend in Asia” and a “strong ally,” has warmly embraced the “special relationship” language.	澳大利亚总理阿伯特在今年早些时候称日本为我们“在亚洲的好朋友”和“强大盟友”，他热烈欢迎“特殊关系”这一说法。


He consummated the love-in by expressing his admiration for “the skill and sense of honor” of the Japanese submariners who died attacking Sydney Harbor in 1942, while saying of Japan’s waging of aggressive war and wartime atrocities only that “we disagreed with what they did.”	在安倍演讲后，他总结陈词， 表示很敬仰死于1942年袭击悉尼港战斗的日本潜水艇指战员，对于日本发动侵略战争以及战时暴行，他只是轻描淡写地表示“我们不同意他们的所作所为”。


We have not yet seen any renewed attempt to re-establish the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” comprising Japan, Australia, the US, and India, which conducted joint military exercises in 2007 and was seen by China as a hostile containment enterprise.	我们尚未看到任何试图重新建立由日本、澳大利亚、美国和印度参与的“四方安全对话”。 2007年，四国进行了联合军事演习，并把中国作为假象敌对遏制对象。


But it is not hard to imagine that this is still very much on Abe’s wish list.	但不难想象，安倍的如意算盘里肯定包括了这一项。


The dangers should not be exaggerated.	我们不应该夸大危险。


But, with strategic competition between the US and China as delicately poised as it is, and with the economic interests of Australia, Japan, and many others in the region bound up just as intensely with China as their security interests are with the US, rocking the boat carries serious risks.	但是，美国与中国的战略竞争十分微妙，而澳大利亚、日本和其他许多地区国家与中国有着紧密的经济利益联系，正如它们与美国的安全利益联系，因此凿船会带来很大的风险。


Countries like ours should take a clear stand when China overreaches externally (as it has in the South China Sea with its indefensible “nine-dashed line” asserting historical rights with no known justification in international law).	对于我们这样的国家来说，当中国向外延伸过度时（如在南海以“九段线”主张没有已知国际法依据的历史权利），我们应该拿出鲜明的立场。


The same applies when China does not behave like a good international citizen on the UN Security Council, or should it commit egregious human-rights violations at home.	当中国没有在联合国安理会上起到国际好公民的作用，或当中国国内出现骇人听闻的违反人权行为时，我们也应该这样做。


But we should be cautious about moving beyond taking stands to taking sides in the region to a greater extent than has been the norm for decades.	但我们要小心不要让挑明立场演变为站队，超出几十年的范式之外。


Kishore Mahbubani has argued recently that we need to recognize that in China, as elsewhere, a significant internal contest between hard- and softer-liners is taking place.	马凯硕（Kishore Mahbubani）最近指出，我们需要认识到，中国与其他国家一样，国内也有强硬派与温和派的冲突。


To the extent that this is the case, it is smart policy for every state in the region to speak and act in a way that helps the doves and gives no encouragement to the hawks.	考虑到这一点，对地区内各国来说，明智的政策是以有助于鸽派的方式说话和行动，而不要煽动鹰派。


MH370’s Beacon of Hope	MH370的希望灯塔


MELBOURNE – The harrowing mystery of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared on March 8 with 239 people aboard, may be at least partly resolved within a matter of days.	墨尔本——近几天内或许可以至少部分揭开3月8日失踪的载有239名乘客的马航370航班的悲惨谜底。


Underwater search vehicles are homing in on an area just a few kilometers wide in the vastness of the southern Indian Ocean, some 2,000 kilometers northwest of Perth.	水下搜索装置在浩瀚的南印度洋上距珀斯西北约2，000公里处锁定了方圆仅仅数公里的水域。


This is where the Boeing 777-200 is likely to have run out of fuel and crashed, according to the analysis by the UK company Inmarsat and British aviation experts of hourly signals sent automatically from the aircraft to Inmarsat’s orbiting space vehicle.	总部设在英国的国际海事卫星组织及英国航空专家对失联航班每小时自动发射到其轨道空间飞行器的信号分析表明，失联的波音777-200航班很可能就在这里耗尽燃料坠毁。


More promising still, it is where signals, assumed to have come from the locator beacons attached to the aircraft’s “black box” flight recorders, were picked up on April 5 and over the following days by an American “pinger locator” being towed by an Australian navy vessel, the Ocean Shield.	更令人燃起希望的是，澳大利亚军舰海洋盾号拖曳的美制声波发射定位仪于4月5日及其后几天内在这片海域探测到定位信标所发出的信号，而上述信号被认为是由俗称客机“黑匣子”的飞行记录仪所发出的。


The Australian defense authorities now coordinating the search still say that to discover wreckage probably lying 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles) deep, on so remote a seabed, will be like “finding a needle in a haystack.”	目前负责协调搜索工作的澳大利亚防务部门依然表示在如此偏僻的海底寻找可能位于水下4. 5公里（约合2.


And any subsequent recovery operation will obviously still be a huge challenge.	8英里）深处的残骸就像是“大海捞针”一样。 不仅如此，任何后续的打捞行动都将难度巨大。


But officials are confident that they have at least found the haystack.	但官员们至少相信 “捞针”的这片大海已经找到。


During the early days of the search, almost everything that could go wrong did – from overlooked or misunderstood data to poor communication and uncoordinated and misallocated resources – as attention remained focused on the aircraft’s scheduled route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.	在这次搜索行动早期，所有能出问题的地方都出了问题——从忽视误读数据、到通讯不畅和资源错配——究其原因是航班从吉隆坡到北京的既定航线吸引了人们的注意力。


And there were huge frustrations even when the search shifted to the Indian Ocean, as massive naval and air resources failed to find any trace of relevant surface debris.	即使搜索工作转移到印度洋后也曾遭遇到重大挫折，因为动用大规模海上及空中资源却找不到表面碎片的任何痕迹。


But, whatever the past frustrations, and possibly even bigger disappointments yet to come, the bigger and much more significant story of the search for MH370 is what has gone right.	但无论经历过多少挫折，今后还可能经历多少失望， MH370航班搜索任务最重要的还是它给世界带来了希望。


Simply put, it has been a magnificent demonstration of how response to human tragedy can unite rather than divide, reinforcing the impulse to cooperate rather than confront.	简言之，它告诉我们人类悲剧怎样才能带来团结而不是分裂，从而让人们不愿意对立，而愿意合作。


And it has testified to the good sense of those who have been arguing for years, in a variety of Asian and wider global contexts, that maritime search, rescue, and disaster relief is an ideal place to start in creating confidence building mechanisms aimed at laying the foundations for conflict prevention and resolution.	这证明若干年前有人在一系列亚洲及全球论坛上提出的主张自有其道理，他们认为海上搜索、援助、救灾是启动以冲突预防及解决为目标的信任建立机制的理想场所。


The search has involved unprecedented international cooperation, first in the South China Sea and then in the Indian Ocean, from a total of 26 countries.	此次搜索先在南海后在印度洋涉及到26个国家前所未有的国际合作。


What is extraordinary is that many of these countries (like China, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, and Vietnam) have been at one another’s throats over territorial and other disputes, while others (not least China and the US) are abidingly suspicious of each other’s geopolitical motives and intentions.	不同凡响的是其中很多国家（比如中国、日本、菲律宾、马来西亚、韩国和越南）都因为领土和其他纠纷争端不断，还有些国家（比如中国和美国）一直怀疑对方的地缘政治动机和企图。


Australia’s close cooperation throughout the search with China – whose citizens comprised nearly two-thirds of those aboard the ill-fated flight, and whose naval and air resources have been unceasingly devoted to the common effort – has borne immediate fruit: a highly successful visit earlier this month by Prime Minister Tony Abbott.	澳大利亚搜索全过程与中国密切合作——中国公民在这架命运多舛的飞机上几乎占乘客总数的三分之二，中国抽调海空资源不间断地参与航班搜救的联合行动——立即收到了效果：本月初托尼·阿博特总理的对华访问取得了成功。


An important trade deal advanced, and no issue was made of the new Abbott government’s embarrassingly fulsome embrace of US leadership in the region, and its rookie mistake in describing Japan as “our best friend in Asia” (the right formula in these cases being “We have no better friend than…”).	签署重要贸易协议的工作取得了进展，中国没有过多地理会新任阿博特政府令人尴尬地过度参与美国地区领导政策、以及把日本说成“我们在亚洲最好朋友”（这种情况下正确的说法是“我们没有比…更好的朋友了）等诸如此类的菜鸟级错误。


It’s a reach, but tempting, to suggest that Australia’s long-term security might even be better guaranteed by spending a few million dollars on towed pinger locators and unmanned Bluefin-21 mini-submarines, with their sonars and cameras, and some serious naval infrastructure to support them, rather than the $20-40 billion currently being contemplated to renew and extend Australia’s aging combat-submarine fleet.	虽然不乏个人猜测意味，但有人提出花几百万购买拖曳式声波发射定位装置及配备声纳和摄像装置的无人驾驶蓝鳍-21小型潜艇并修建为其提供支持的海上基础设施远比目前尚在谋划之中的耗资200-400亿美元升级澳大利亚老化的作战潜艇部队更有利于保障澳大利亚的长期安全。


It is not quite as naive as it may seem to think that the peace and security of the whole Indo-Pacific region, not to mention other equally volatile parts of the world, might be better advanced by devoting far more resources and effort to common security strategies rather than traditional military ones.	有人提出投入更多资源精力到共同安全领域远比投入到传统军事策略领域更有利于整个印度-太平洋地区、更不要说世界其他动荡地区的和平安全。


Finding security with others, rather than against them, and concentrating on cooperative approaches to achieving global and regional public goods, seems more productive than giving free rein to crude nationalist sentiment and planning ever more sophisticated and expensive ways to destroy one another.	与他人一道、而非以损人利己的方式去寻求安全并致力于以合作方式实现全球及地区公共利益似乎比任由原始民族主义情绪自由发展、以及策划更复杂、更昂贵的方式彼此破坏更有效果。


The search for MH370 has shown in microcosm how much there is to be gained through peaceful cooperation.	MH370搜索行动向人们昭示了和平合作能够取得的成果。


It should also help focus our attention on just how much there is to be lost in today’s world – a world that is far more interdependent than the one that exploded in 1914 – if we fail to apply these lessons to our broader international relationships.	如果不能把学到的东西运用于更广泛的国际关系，当今世界的相互依赖度和可能的损失远比1914年一战爆发时更大。


The world is a much safer and saner place when states search for and find common ground on which to work together.	各国寻找共同利益开展合作能使世界更加安全和理智。


Protecting Civilians Responsibly	负责任地保护平民


BEIJING – Would China ever be willing to host an international policy discussion about the conditions that would legitimize invading another country to stop genocide or other mass-atrocity crimes from being committed within its borders?	北京—中国会愿意成为东道主，举办一场关于将侵入他国以停止该国国内大屠杀及其他大规模暴行的行为合法化的国际政策讨论吗？


Given China’s long history of antagonism to “interference in internal affairs” in general, and to “humanitarian intervention” in particular, and in view of its contribution to the UN Security Council’s long paralysis over much less coercive measures in Syria, you would be in good company if you answered, “No.”	长期以来，中国一直坚决抵制“干涉内政”，特别是“人道主义干预”，在联合国安理会上，中国也一直使强制性低得多的针对叙利亚的措施无法施行，在这样的情况下，如果你对上一个问题的回答是否定的，那你一定赞同者甚众。


But you would be wrong.	但你的答案将是错误的。


I have just been at a two-day meeting in Beijing that wrestled with just this topic.	我刚刚在北京参加了一个关于这个话题的为期两天的会议。


The meeting, hosted by the foreign ministry’s think tank, the China Institute of International Studies, brought together specialist scholars and practitioners from China and the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa).	该会议由中国外交部智库中国国际问题研究所主办，中国和其他金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和南非）的专家学者和实践家参加了会议。


And this month, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy will host a conference in Moscow, with local and international experts discussing the same subject.	本月，俄罗斯外交部下属的外交学员也将在莫斯科主办一次会议，来自当地和国际的专家将讨论同样的话题。


Both meetings are, to my knowledge, the first of their kind.	就我所知，这两次会议都是同类型会议的第一次。


The fact that they are happening at all – and, if my Beijing experience is any guide, in a constructive, problem-solving spirit – is an encouraging development.	它们举办起来这一事实——从我的北京之行体验来看，它们的举办是建设性的，以解决问题为基本精神——便已令人欢欣鼓舞。


Although no outcome was formally agreed or made public, several themes emerged from the Beijing meeting.	北京的会议尽管未达成正式一致或公开的结果，但仍有几大主题浮出了水面。


Taken together, they offer reason for confidence that it may be possible to recreate international consensus, so long missing in Syria, about how to deal with the hardest mass-atrocity cases.	综合看来，这让我们有理由相信在关于处理最严重大规模暴力的叙利亚问题上缺位已久的国际一致能够得到重塑。


First, there was widespread acceptance that the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine, unanimously agreed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, is here to stay.	首先，在2005年联合国大会上一致通过的“保护责任（R2P）”思想在北京会议上得到了广泛接受。 R2P认为主权国家有责任保护其人民免受大屠杀、种族清洗、人权侵犯和战争罪行的伤害；


R2P recognizes that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; that other states have a responsibility to assist them to do so; and that if a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its people, the wider international community has a responsibility to step in with “timely and decisive action,” which might in an extreme case include military action if approved by the UN Security Council.	其他国家有责任帮助它们实现这一目标； 如果一国“显然无法”保护其人民，更广泛的国际社会有责任采取“及时果断的行动”，在极端情形中甚至包括军事行动（经联合国安理会批准）。


True, some Chinese scholars remain inclined to argue that the entire R2P enterprise – particularly its sanction of military action in exceptional cases– is just “old neo-interventionist wine in a new bottle.”	诚然，一些中国学者仍习惯性地指出整个R2P思想——特别是其在极端情形下的军事行动制裁——无非是“新瓶装旧酒的新干预主义”。


But this did not appear to be a majority sentiment, nor did it stop anyone from engaging in lively discussion of how the R2P doctrine could be most effectively implemented in practice.	但这一观点并不占据多数，也无法阻止任何人参与关于R2P思想如何最有效地应用于实践的活跃讨论。


Second, there was widespread agreement about what had caused the breakdown of consensus in the Security Council concerning how to respond to events in Syria (at least until the use of chemical weapons in August proved to be a game changer).	其次，对于什么导致了安理会在如何应对叙利亚发生的事件（至少在8月份化学武器的使用让局面出现逆转之前）上迟迟无法达成一致，北京的会议形成了广泛的一致意见。


The cause was not an attempt by the global South to revive outdated notions of unlimited sovereignty; rather, it was a reaction to the perceived overreach of the NATO-led military intervention in Libya in 2011.	其原因不在于南方国家试图让早已过时的无限制主权概念死灰复燃； 而在于人们认为北约领导的2011年利比亚军事干预过度而引起了反弹。


The Security Council’s three Western permanent members – France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the P3) – had sought and been given a limited mandate to protect civilians, specifically invoking R2P.	安理会的三个西方常任理事国——法国、英国和美国（P3）——寻求并得到了保护平民的有限行动权，并明确规定必须符合R2P。


But they were perceived as then ruthlessly pursuing full-scale regime change, without securing any further agreement from the Council.	但人们认为当时P3在没有征得任何安理会后续同意的情况下不恰当地寻求彻底颠覆政权。


If the P3 (now often privately, and rather more acerbically, described as FUKUS) were going to take a mile after being given an inch, then no more inches would be offered.	如果P3——如今人们私下里将P3戏称为FUKUS（分别是法国、英国、美国的首字母缩写，发音类似于国骂）——继续如此得寸进尺，那么它们将连“寸”也得不到。


Third, and most important, there was widespread agreement about how consensus within the Security Council on the hardest cases might be recreated.	第三也是最重要的，对于如何重塑安理会关于最棘手问题的一致，北京会议也形成了一致意见。


The idea was that R2P should be “enriched” by the acceptance of a complementary principle, called “Responsible Protection.”	北京会议提出的思想是R2P应该通过接受补充性的“责任保护”（Responsible Protection）原则得到“强化”。


Floated by the Chinese scholar Ruan Zongze in a journal article last year, and evidently the subject of much internal discussion since, Responsible Protection builds upon “Responsibility While Protecting,” an approach earlier proposed by Brazil that has already gained some traction at the UN.	中国学者阮宗泽在去年的一篇期刊文章上提出了这一原则，此后便成为许多内部讨论的主题。 责任保护原则建立在早先由巴西提出并已在联合国赢得一些支持的“保护过程中的责任”（Responsibility While Protecting）方针基础上。


The core elements of Responsible Protection, as articulated by Chinese participants in the Beijing debate, won strong support around the table.	如北京会议的中国参与者所描绘的，保护责任的核心要素在讨论中赢得了强烈的支持。


Tough criteria – specifically, legitimate intention, last resort, proportionality, and balance of consequences – should be clearly satisfied before any military mandate is granted, with every effort made to exhaust diplomatic solutions before more robust alternatives are embraced.	任何���事行动得到授权之前都应该满足严格的标准——具体而言，需满足动机合法、最后手段、比例原则和平衡结果——在采取更强硬的替代方案之前，必须先尽力尝试外交解决方案。


There should be better methods of supervision and accountability to ensure that the “protection” objective remains at the heart of any response.	。 应该改善监督和问责方式，以确保“保护”目标一直作为任何应对措施的核心。


And the primary emphasis of the entire R2P enterprise should continue to be prevention of mass-atrocity crimes – both their occurrence and their recurrence.	整个R2P思想的根本点应该一直是防止大规模暴力犯罪——包括初发和复发。


Some in the P3 and elsewhere will see all of this as a mere spoiling operation with a more sophisticated face.	P3和其他国家的一些人将把此视为只是带着更精美面具的破坏行动。


But they will do so at their peril.	但他们将自取其辱。


The idea of Responsible Protection – like the Brazilian initiative that preceded it – reflects genuinely and widely felt concerns.	责任保护的思想——如同此前的巴西动议——反映了真正的、广泛感受到的问题。


If not addressed, they will make Security Council resolutions in support of military action in R2P cases almost impossible to obtain in the future.	如果这些问题得不到解决，安理会支持R2P情形军事行动的决议就几乎不可能通过。


It remains to be seen whether China – and the other BRICS countries – will now move to champion the idea of Responsible Protection in a formal way.	仍有待观察中国——以及其他金砖国家——现在是否会正式支持责任保护思想。


If they do, it should not be viewed as a rearguard action designed to undermine the R2P norm, but rather an effort to assume co-ownership of it.	如果答案是肯定的，这就不能被视为破坏R2P范式的顽抗，而应该被视为假设R2P范式共有的举措。


In terms of getting serious about saying “never again” to mass-atrocity crimes, that is about as positive a development as anyone could hope for.	从严肃地说出“再也不发生”大规模暴力犯罪的角度而言，这是人人都应追求的积极发展趋势。


Mandela for the Ages	这些年的曼德拉


MELBOURNE – Without Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s apartheid nightmare eventually would have come to an end.	墨尔本——即使没有曼德拉，南非种族隔离制度的噩梦最终也将结束。


Its enforcers were beyond the civilized pale, and the world’s patience with them had run out.	其实施者在文明的映衬下显得异常苍白，世界对他们的耐心也已经走到了尽头。


But, without Mandela’s towering moral and political leadership, the transition would have been long, ugly, and bloody beyond measure.	但如果没有曼德拉杰出的道德和政治领导，或许过渡期将无法言喻地漫长、血腥和丑陋。


One Afrikaner leader, F.W. De Klerk, came to understand – late, but not too late – what the times demanded, and he thoroughly deserved to share the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize with Mandela.	南非白人领袖德克勒克很晚才理解——但还不算太晚——时代的要求，因此他当之无愧地与曼德拉一同成为1993年诺贝尔和平奖得主。


But it was Madiba – the tribal name by which South Africans of every caste and color now affectionately call him – who made the crucial difference.	但关键改革者却是马迪巴，这是各个种姓和肤色的南非民众对他的亲切称呼。


I was lucky enough, as Australia’s foreign minister at the time, to be one of the first foreign officials to greet him after his release from prison in February 1990 – just a few days later, in Lusaka, where he had flown to meet his African National Congress colleagues in exile.	1990年2月曼德拉出狱几天后就飞赴卢萨卡会晤流亡的非国大同事，时任澳大利亚外长的我幸运地成为迎接他的首批外国领袖。


Approaching the meeting, I was excited but nervous.	会面之前我既紧张又兴奋。


Could the reality of the man possibly match my expectations?	现实中的曼德拉能否合乎我的期望？


Mandela had long been my personal hero, from my student days in the 1960’s, when – like so many others of my generation – I was an anti-apartheid activist.	和许多同龄人一样，从20世纪60年代我的学生时代起，曼德拉就一直是积极反对种族隔离制度的我心目中的英雄。


We knew that the risks we ran of being roughed up or arrested while demonstrating against visiting Springbok rugby teams were entirely trivial compared to the risks that he and his colleagues had been prepared to face.	我们知道比起他和他的同事承担的风险，我们在向来访的跳羚橄榄球队示威时所冒的被打和被捕的风险其实微不足道。


We could recite by heart the last words of his 1964 Rivonia Trial speech, one of the most thrilling affirmations of the human spirit ever uttered: “a free society…is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve.	我们可以在心中默默记诵曼德拉1964年里沃尼亚审判讲话中的最后字句，这是有史以来对人类精神最惊心动魄的诠释：“自由社会…是我希望能为之奋斗并实现的理想。


But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”	但假使有必要，我也准备为理想而献身。


But how much of that dignity and idealism could possibly have survived the ordeal of 27 years in prison, most of that time on Robben Island in the South Atlantic?	”但究竟有多少尊严和理想能逃脱南大西洋罗本岛上27年牢狱生活的折磨？


I need not have worried.	我不必有所顾虑。


Like so many others before and since, I was captivated from the first moment by Mandela’s huge, luminescent smile, by his unending charm and grace, and by the lucid intelligence with which he discussed his country’s transition problems.	像之前和之后很多别的人一样，我从第一刻起就被曼德拉咧着大嘴的温暖笑容、无休无止的魅力风度和他探讨自己国家过渡问题时清晰的智慧所彻底俘获。


But, above all, there was his extraordinary, almost unbelievable, lack of bitterness toward his Afrikaner jailers.	但最令我赞叹的是他对南非白人狱卒令人难以置信的宽容态度。


Mandela was, in fact, as keen to talk to me as I was to meet him.	其实，曼德拉想和我谈话的心情也同样迫切。


He wanted to thank Australia for the very significant role our country had played in sustaining the pressure for change, particularly under Bob Hawke’s government, and in leading the global charge for financial sanctions on the apartheid regime.	他想感谢澳大利亚在变革中的重要作用，尤其是霍克政府主导的对种族隔离政权的全球金融制裁。


So, sitting face to face across the Zambian president’s dining table, it was just the two of us, for an hour or more, chatting away comfortably about everything from United Nations sanctions to the end of the Cold War to our children’s careers.	于是，我俩面对面坐在赞比亚总统的餐桌两侧谈了一个多小时，轻松地从联合国制裁、冷战结束一直聊到子女未来。


Of all the meetings with all the leaders and other international figures around the world that I have had during all my years in public life, there is no question about which one gave me the most joy.	纵观我任职期间与各国领导人及其他国际人士的所有会晤，只有这次最让我愉快。


Mandela is simply the most impressive and decent human being I have ever met, or am ever likely to meet.	曼德拉在我见过、或者是可能遇到的人中最令人难忘也最正派。


This was an impression, moreover, that did not fade with familiarity.	此外，这种印象并没有随着深入交往而消退。


We met a number of times in the years that followed, on his visits to Australia and in South Africa – at his home in Soweto – and on one memorable occasion when I accompanied him to the opening match of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, at Newlands Stadium in Cape Town.	后来我们又见过几面，在他南非索韦托的家中和他访澳期间，我有一次还陪他出席了1995年在开普敦新地体育场举行的世界杯橄榄球赛揭幕战。


More than 50,000 South Africans – Afrikaners almost to a man, with hardly a black face in sight – were there to see their country play mine.	到场观看南非和澳大利亚揭幕战的50,000多南非民众全部是白人，几乎看不到一张黑人面孔。


And, as their new president walked out onto the ground to greet the players, every single one of them seemed to bellow in enchanted union “Man-del-a!	但是，当南非新任总统出来迎接球员时，在场所有人都齐声高喊：“曼-德-拉！


Man-del-a!”	曼-德-拉！


If Mandela’s leadership can be argued, as I think it can, to have been of a once-in-a-century quality, the opportunity to experience it first-hand was a once-in-a-lifetime privilege.	”如果说曼德拉是一位百年一遇的难得领袖，那么有机会亲身感受则是一种令人终身难忘的特权。


When it comes to national leadership at a time of fragility and transition, so much seems to depend on the luck of the draw.	挑选脆弱和过渡时期的国家领袖似乎对运气有着过多的依赖。 一个国家会选出米洛舍维奇还是穆加贝；


Will a country find itself with a Milošević or a Mugabe; an Atatürk or an Arafat; a Rabin who can see and seize the moment, and change course, or someone who never will?	阿塔图尔克还是阿拉法特； 发现并抓住机会走改革路线的拉宾，还是不撞南墙不回头的顽固派？


South Africa was lucky – almost miraculously so – to have had Nelson Mandela.	南非奇迹般幸运地有曼德拉的存在。


His memory will be cherished for as long as history continues to be written.	只要历史延续下去，对他的记忆就会珍藏在人们心间。


The Limits to Fighting the Islamic State	与伊斯兰国斗争的界限


CANBERRA – There is a long history of misconceived and over-reaching foreign military intervention in the Middle East, and it is to be hoped that US President Barack Obama’s decision to wage war against the Islamic State will not prove to be another.	堪培拉—对中东的误解性过度军事干预由来已久，但愿美国总统奥巴马决定向伊斯兰国宣战不会重蹈覆辙。


No terrorist group more richly deserves to be destroyed outright than these marauding, genocidal jihadists.	没有哪个恐怖组织的作恶和屠杀可以和这群圣战主义者相比，他们应该被毁灭。


But as the US-led mission is currently conceived and described, it is not clear whether its objectives are achievable at acceptable costs in terms of time, money, and lives.	但美国所领导的任务目前已经成立并作了说明，其目标是否可以以可接受的代价（时间、金钱和生命等）实现仍不清楚。


The basic problem is that the Islamic State’s territorial gains are being approached from three completely different perspectives, demanding three different types of operational responses.	基本问题是伊斯兰国的开疆辟土是通过三个截然不同的角度实现的，需要三种不同类型的行动反应。


There is the humanitarian mission to protect civilian populations in Iraq and Syria from mass-atrocity crimes.	保护伊拉克和叙利亚平民不受大面积暴行侵害，这是人道主义的需要。


There is the need to protect other states’ citizens from Islamic State terrorism.	还需要保护其他国家公民免遭伊斯兰国恐怖主义影响。


And there is the desire to restore states’ integrity and stability in the region.	此外，还有重塑该地区各国统一和稳定的需要。


Obama’s rhetoric, and that of his most enthusiastic partner so far, Australia’s Prime Minister Tony Abbott, has wobbled between the first two objectives and hinted at the third, creating hopes and expectations that all three will be effectively pursued.	从奥巴马以及目前响应最热烈的合作伙伴、澳大利亚总理阿伯特的言辞看，目前他们正摇摆于前两个目标，同时暗示了第三个目标，这让人们希望和期待所有三个目标都能够有效实现。 但目前正在商谈的四部战略至多只能实现人道主义目标。


But only the humanitarian mission has any realistic chance of being delivered through the four-part strategy now on the table: air strikes against Islamic State forces; training, intelligence, and equipment for Iraqi and Kurdish military forces and Syria’s non-extremist opposition; intensified international counterterrorism efforts; and humanitarian assistance to displaced civilians.	所谓四部是打击伊斯兰国军队； 为伊拉克和库尔德军事力量和叙利亚非极端主义反对派提供训练、情报和装备；


It is obvious that Western-led military operations cannot by themselves re-establish the territorial integrity of Iraq or Syria, or restore wider regional stability.	显然，西方领导的军事行动自身无法重建伊拉克和叙利亚领土，也无法重塑更广泛的地区稳定。


Military intervention may help to hold the line against Iraq’s further disintegration and the spread of the Islamic State cancer into countries like Jordan.	军事干预或许有助于守住底线，不使伊拉克进一步分裂、伊斯兰国之癌蔓延到约旦等国家。


But if 150,000 US troops could not stabilize Iraq in the absence of an inclusive and competent government, the limited measures on offer now simply will not suffice.	但既然15,000美军无法稳定缺少有胜任能力的包容性政府的伊拉克，目前所提出的有限措施也无法实现目标。


And we should know by now that any Western military intervention with overtly political, rather than clearly humanitarian, objectives runs a real risk of inflaming sectarian sentiment.	现在我们应该知道，公然带政治而非明确的人道主义目标的西方军事干预极有可能点燃宗派情绪。


Things might be different if the US and other key players could simultaneously embark on a broad regional stabilization enterprise, but there are too many competing agendas to make this realistic for the foreseeable future.	如果美国和其他重要行动方能共同构建一个广大的地区稳定机构，情况或许会有所不同，但在可以预见的将来，有太多的矛盾日程阻止这一幕成为现实。


The Sunni-Shia rivalry means that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries will concede no meaningful role to Iran.	逊尼派-什叶派对立意味着沙特阿拉伯和海湾国家不会对伊朗做出任何有意义的让步。


Nor will the West acknowledge Iran’s centrality to any multilateral process, for fear of losing negotiating leverage with respect to Iran’s nuclear program.	西方也不会承认伊朗在任何多边进程中的核心地位，担心因此失去在伊朗核计划谈判中的筹码。


Few are willing to accept that Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, despite his abominable record, now almost certainly must be part of the solution.	没有人愿意接受这样的事实：劣迹斑斑的叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德几乎肯定必须成为解决办法的一部分。


And the open sore of the Israel-Palestine conflict plays into every other rivalry.	而以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突之痛不亚于任何其他对立。


The counter-terrorism objective is more inherently plausible than that of political stabilization, and domestic politics in the US, Australia, and elsewhere probably require the prominence that it has received from Western leaders.	反恐目标比政治稳定目标具有更大的内在合理性，而美国、澳大利亚和其他国家的内政或许也需要反恐目标所得到的西方领导人的重视。


To the extent that their breeding ground can be destroyed, as Al Qaeda’s was in Afghanistan, there will be fewer newly minted terrorists to worry about.	恐怖分子的大本营不是不能摧毁——阿富汗基地组织就是明证——因此不必担心滋生新的恐怖分子。


But it is difficult to believe that a military campaign of the kind now contemplated, even with substantial support from Arab countries, can achieve that objective any time soon, or at an acceptable cost, in both Iraq and in the Islamic State’s Syrian havens.	但不管是在伊拉克还是在伊斯兰国的叙利亚避风港，都很难相信目��所计划的军事行动能在短时间或以可接受的成本实现这一目标，即使有阿拉伯国家的鼎力相助。


The real burden will have to be borne, as now, by effective international cooperation in intelligence and policing.	从目前看，真正的负担必须由有效的国际情报和政策合作承担。


The competence of Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces – crucial if territory is to be taken and held – will take time to build up, and may never be achievable with the so-called moderate forces within Syria.	伊拉克和库尔德地面部队的能力——若要捍卫领土，这将十分关键——需要时间培养，如果通过叙利亚的所谓温和武装（moderate forces）可能永远无法实现。


Airstrikes anywhere risk civilian casualties – and thus the possibility of inflaming the very sentiments one is trying to counter.	空袭不论怎样都有可能伤及平民——从而煽起原本意欲压制的情绪。


Moreover, airstrikes in Syria without the government’s consent or Security Council authorization will be manifestly in breach of the United Nations Charter.	此外，不经政府同意和联合国安理会授权就对叙利亚进行空袭将是对《联合国宪章》的践踏。


The prospect of Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks in the US are not remotely real or imminent enough to justify reliance on the self-defense exception.	伊斯兰国在美国发动恐怖袭击绝不是不可能的，甚至可以说随时都有可能发生，这样才能证明依靠自卫例外（self-defense exception）的合理性。


Hearts and minds matter in counterterrorism, and they become harder to win whenever the US and its supporters embark upon military action clearly in breach of international law.	在反恐问题上，人心和观念很重要，而在美国及其支持者采取显然违反国际法的军事行动时，获胜的难度就会增加。


The slow buy-in so far of Arab states to Obama’s campaign attests to the nervousness that many of them feel on all of these grounds.	阿拉伯国家对于奥巴马的决定迟迟不予响应证明其中不少国家顾虑这一点。


By far the most defensible rationale for military action is – and has been from the outset – the humanitarian objective: the responsibility to protect populations at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other major crimes against humanity and war crimes.	目前，军事行动最有力的理由——一开始就是如此——是人道主义目标：保护人民免受种族灭绝、种族清洗或其他严重人道和战争罪行的伤害。


I have argued that all of the conditions necessary in this context have been satisfied, and this will continue to be the case so long as the Islamic State maintains its horrifying modus operandi.	我已经指出，这方面的所有必要条件都已满足，而只要伊斯兰国继续其恐怖作案，这些条件就会一直满足。


Operating within this framework, US and coalition forces would clearly be entitled to disrupt, degrade, and seek to destroy the Islamic State’s capability in a way that would also serve the counter-terrorist objective.	若在此框架内行动，美国和联军就必然能得到授权以同时满足反恐目标的方式干扰、破坏并寻求摧毁伊斯兰国的国力。


But the primary objective for intervention would remain unequivocally humanitarian, and as such would be much less susceptible to anti-Western blowback than any other mission.	但干预的首要目标仍必须是旗帜鲜明的人道主义，这样能使干预任务受到的反西方制约最少。


There may even be considerable international tolerance for some carefully defined and limited action in Syria in the event of an obvious imminent humanitarian threat.	如果存在紧迫的人道主义威胁，国际社会甚至可能相当大地容许在叙利亚采取小心界定和限制的行动。


If the campaign against the Islamic State is defined and conducted with humanitarian protection as its primary and overwhelming objective, it should succeed not only in stopping further atrocities, but also in making large inroads into curbing the wider terrorist threat at its source.	如果针对伊斯兰国的行动将人道主义保护作为首要和压倒一切的目标，那么它不但成功阻止进一步的暴行，还能极大地有助于遏制根源上的恐怖主义威胁。


If the West strays from that primary goal, the enterprise is likely to end in tears, like so many others in the Middle East.	如果西方偏离这一首要目标，那么行动的结局很有可能是眼泪，中东军事行动已经一再证明过这一点。


The Right Time to Reform Fuel Pricing	改革燃料定价正当时


CAMBRIDGE – World oil prices, which have been highly volatile during the last decade, have fallen more than 50% over the past year.	美国剑桥—世界油价在过去十年中波动剧烈，而在去年下跌超过50%。


The economic effects have been negative overall for oil-exporting countries, and positive for oil-importing countries.	其经济效应对石油出国来说总体为负，而对石油进口国来说总体为正。


But what about effects that are not directly economic?	但间接经济影响如何？


If we care about environmental and other externalities, should we want oil prices to go up, because that will discourage oil consumption, or down because that will discourage oil production?	如果我们关注环境和其他外部性，那么我们是应该希望油价上涨（因为这会遏制石油消费）还是油价下跌（因为这将遏制石油生产）？


The answer is that countries should seek to do both: Lower the price paid to oil producers and raise the price paid by oil consumers, by cutting subsidies for oil and refined products or raising taxes on them.	答案是各国应该同时追求这两个目标：降低支付给石油生产商的价格并提高消费者所支付的价格，办法可以是降低石油和石化产品补贴或提高税收。


Many emerging-market countries have taken advantage of falling oil prices to implement such reforms.	许多新兴市场国家利用下跌的石油价格实施了这方面的改革。


The United States, which is now surprisingly close to energy self-sufficiency, so that the macroeconomic effects roughly balance, should follow suit.	如今令人意外地接近能源自给、因此宏观经济效果总体平衡的美国也应该赶上来。


Consider this: America’s roads and bridges are crumbling, and the national transportation infrastructure requires investment and maintenance.	想想这一点：美国公路和桥梁破败不堪，全国交通基础设施需要投资和维护。


And yet the US Congress shamefully continues to evade its responsibility to fund the Federal Highway Trust Fund and put it on a sound long-term basis, owing to disagreement over how to pay for it.	但美国国会可耻地一直逃避为联邦高速公路信托基金（Federal Highway Trust Fund）提供资金并为它奠定可靠的长期基础的责任，原因就在于如何出资问题得不到解决。


The obvious solution, which economists have long advocated, is an increase in America’s gasoline taxes.	显而易见的方案——也是经济学家长期呼吁的方案——是提高美国汽油税。


The federal gas tax has been stuck at 18.4 cents a gallon since 1993, the lowest among advanced countries.	联邦汽油税自1993年以来一直维持在每加仑18. 4美分，是发达国家中最低的。


And yet, on July 30, Congress adopted only a three-month stopgap measure, kicking the gas can down the road for the 35th time since 2009.	但在7月30日，国会只采取了为期三个月的临时措施，自2009年以来第35次回避此问题。


Fossil-fuel pricing is a striking exception to the general rule that if the government has only one policy instrument, it can achieve only one policy objective.	一条一般的规则是，如果政府只有一个政策工具，那么只能实现一个政策目标。 化石燃料定价是这一规则的一个显著例外。


For starters, the money saved from a reduction in subsidies or an increase in taxes in the oil sector could be used either to reduce budget deficits or to fund desirable spending (such as US highway construction and maintenance).	首先，从降低石油部门补贴或提高石油部门税收中获得的资金可以用于降低预算赤字或投入合意的支出（如美国高速公路建设和维护）。


At the same time, lower oil consumption would reduce traffic congestion and accidents, limit local air pollution and its adverse health effects, and lower greenhouse-gas emissions, which lead to global climate change.	与此同时，石油消费的降低将减少交通拥堵和事故，遏制局部空气污染及其负面健康影响，以及减少导致气候变化的温室气体排放。


Fuel taxes are a more efficient way to achieve these environmental goals than most of the alternatives.	燃料税能够比其他大部分措施更有效地实现这些环境目标。


There is also a national-security rationale.	此外还有国家安全原因。


If the retail price of fuel is low, domestic consumption will be high.	如果燃料零售价格很低，国内消费就会很高。


High oil consumption leaves a country vulnerable to oil-market disruptions arising, for example, from instability in the Middle East.	高石油消费让一国很容易受到（比如因中东动荡引起的）石油市场波动的干扰。


If gas taxes are high and consumption is low, as in Europe, fluctuations in the world price of oil have a smaller effect domestically.	如果汽油税很高而消费很低（如欧洲），世界石油价格的波动所造成的国内影响就会较小。


Subsidies to US oil producers have often been sold on national-security grounds; in fact, a policy to “drain America first” reduces self-sufficiency in the longer run.	美国石油生产商的补贴常常打着国家安全旗号； 事实上，“先耗尽美国”的政策从长期看降低了能源自给率。


Finally, although fuel subsidies are often misleadingly sold as a way to improve income distribution, the reality is more nearly the opposite.	最后，尽管燃料补贴常常被误导性地包装为改善收入分配的方式，但现实更接近于相反的方向。


Worldwide, fossil-fuel subsidies are regressive: far less than 20% of the payments benefit the poorest 20% of the population.	全球而言，化石燃料补贴是累退的：给人口中最穷的20%的好处远远不到价格的 20%。


Poor people are not the ones who do most of the driving; rather, they tend to use public transportation (or walk).	穷人绝非驾车最多的人群，相反，他们总是乘坐公共交通（或步行）。


The conventional wisdom is that it is politically impossible in the US to increase the gas tax.	传统智慧认为美国提高汽油税在政治上不可行。


But other countries have political constraints, too.	但其他国家也有同样的整治约束。


Indeed, some developing-country governments have faced civil unrest, even coups, over fuel taxes or subsidies.	事实上，一些发展中国家政府面临着针对燃料税或补贴的社会动荡乃至政变。


Yet Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates have all reduced or abolished various fuel subsidies in the last year.	但埃及、加纳、印度、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、墨西哥、摩洛哥和阿联酋都在去年降低或取消了各种燃料补贴。


Besides raising taxes on fuel consumption, the US should also stop some of its subsidies for oil production.	除了提高燃料消费税，美国还应该取消一些石油生产补贴。


Oil companies can immediately deduct a high percentage of their drilling costs from their tax liability, which other industries cannot do with their investments.	石油公司可以立刻将很高比例的钻井成本从应税收入中扣除，这是其他行业的投资无法实现的。


Likewise, the oil industry has often been able to drill on federal land and offshore without paying the full market rate for the leases.	类似地，石油业常常能够在联邦土地或离岸进行钻井活动而不必支付足额市场租金。


Most politicians know that sound economics would call for these benefits to be eliminated; but those who complain the loudest that the government must not pick corporate winners and losers seem to be the least able to summon the political will to act.	大部分政客都知道，靠谱的经济学家都会要求取消这些福利； 但那些声嘶力竭地疾呼不可由政府来挑选公司赢家和输家的人似乎在召唤行动的政治意愿方面无能为力。


A recent study by the International Monetary Fund estimated that global energy subsidies are running at more than $5 trillion per year, while fossil-fuel subsidies in the US have been conservatively valued at $37 billion per year (not including the cost of environmental externalities).	国际货币基金组织（IMF）的最新研究估算，全球能源补贴每年超过5万亿美元，而美国化石燃料补贴保守估计每年为370亿美元（不包括环境外部性的成本）。


As leaders in emerging-market countries have recognized, falling oil prices represent the best opportunity to implement reform.	正如新兴市场国家领导人所认识到的，油价下跌是实施改革的良机。


Governments that act now can reduce energy subsidies or increase taxes while sparing consumers an increase in the retail price from one year to the next.	现在采取行动的政府能够在不让消费者面临零售价格年复一年上涨的情况下降低能源补贴或提高税收。


For the US and other advanced countries, it is also a good time for reform from a macroeconomic standpoint.	对美国和其他发达国家来说，从宏观经济角度，这也是改革良机。


In the past, countries had to worry that a rising fuel tax could become built into uncomfortably high inflation rates.	过去，各国需要担心提高燃料税可能导致畸高的通货膨胀率。


Currently, however, central bankers are not worried about inflation, except in the sense that they want it to be a little higher.	但是，最近央行并不担心通胀——倒是希望通胀稍微高一些。


The US Congress will have to come back to highway funding in September.	美国国会将在9月重新回到高速公路筹资问题。


If other countries have found that what was politically impossible has suddenly turned out to be possible, why not the US?	既然其他国家已经发现曾经的政治不可能突然变成了可能，美国为什么不能如此呢？


Promises to Keep in 2016	2016年要兑现的承诺


DAVOS – We live in extraordinary times.	达沃斯——我们生活在一个非常时期。


Each day seems to bring fresh headlines about an unfolding crisis – whether it is migration, economic volatility, security, or climate change.	每天的头条似乎都有危机发生——无论是移民、经济波动、安全还是气候变化。


One factor common to all these complex and unprecedented challenges is poverty; so eliminating it will make overcoming them significantly easier.	这些前所未有的复杂挑战共同的因素是贫困； 因此消除贫困会降低战胜危机的难度。


There is good reason for optimism about progress on reducing inequity.	有充分理由对控制不平等问题的进展持乐观态度。


Since the turn of the century, remarkable strides have been taken toward a world in which every person has the chance to lead a healthy, productive life.	从世纪之交开始，我们就朝着人人过健康、丰富生活的社会迈出了坚实的一步。 产妇死亡人数减少近一半；


Maternal deaths have almost halved; child mortality and malaria deaths have halved; extreme poverty has more than halved.	儿童和疟疾死亡人数减少近一半； 极端贫困人口的减少已经超过半数。


And last year, the world signed up to finish the job.	去年，世界各国决定完成这项任务。


The centerpiece of the Global Goals to which the United Nations’ 193 countries agreed in September is to end poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030.	联合国193个国家9月一致同意的全球目标核心是到2030年结束世界各地一切形式的贫困。


We are confident that this is not only possible, but that we will see major breakthroughs along the way, which will provide unprecedented opportunities to people in poor countries.	我们相信完成这项任务不仅可能，而且执行过程中我们将会看到为贫困国家民众提供前所未有机会的重大突破。


Indeed, we think their lives will improve faster in the next 15 years than at any other time in history – and that their lives will improve more than anyone else’s.	事实上，我们认为今后15年贫困人口的生活改善将超过以往任何时候——而且他们的生活改善也会超过其他人的幅度。


But while progress is possible, it is not inevitable.	不过虽然进展并非不可能，但也不是坐在那里什么都不用做。


Success will require political will, global cooperation, and human ingenuity – a message we are taking into our various meetings and engagements at the World Economic Forum in Davos this week.	成功需要政治意愿、全球合作和人类智慧——我们将在本周达沃斯举办的世界经济论坛各项会议和活动中宣传我们的观点。


For our part, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation will focus on the areas of greatest need and take risks that others can’t or won’t.	具体到比尔及梅林达·盖茨基金会而言，我们将重点关注最需要的领域，承担其他人不能或不愿承担的风险。


This year, we are concentrating our efforts in three broad areas.	今年，我们的努力集中在三大方面。


First, we will continue to support the institutions that helped get us to where we are now.	首先，我们将继续支持对实现当前目标做出贡献的机构。


Since 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has unlocked an unprecedented wealth of human and financial resources to combat infectious diseases that disproportionately affect the poorest.	2002年来，全球抗击艾滋、结核和疟疾基金已经解放了前所未有的金融资源和人类财富，用于主要影响贫困人口的传染病防治工作。


By providing medicines, training doctors and nurses, and building stronger health-care systems, the Global Fund has so far helped save 17 million lives.	通过提供药品、培训医护人员并建设更牢固的医疗卫生制度，全球基金迄今已挽救了1700万人的生命。


That is some achievement.	这的确是令人激动的成果。


And the Fund’s pledge conference later this year will be another opportunity to help build a better world.	基金今年晚些时候召开的承诺会议将再次让我们有机会建设更美好的世界。


We need to make the most of it – not only to help save up to eight million more lives, but also to support health systems in low-income countries and thereby reduce the risk of future health crises.	我们必须充分加以利用——不仅能挽救800多万人的生命，而且还要支持低收入国家的卫生系统，从而降低未来健康危机的风险。


Similarly, since the start of the decade, nearly four million more people are alive today because they were immunized against infectious diseases, thanks in large part to the work of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.	同样，近10年来，多亏免疫全球联盟，近400万人因为接种了传染病疫苗今天仍然活着。


In the next five years, Gavi and its partners are positioned to immunize another 300 million people, helping millions more children and young people survive and thrive – and thereby boosting developing-country economies.	今后五年，免疫全球联盟及其合伙人确定要为另外3，000万人提供免疫接种，帮助成百上千万儿童和年轻人生存和发展——从而促进发展中国家的经济发展。


Second, women and girls will be at the heart of our endeavors.	其次，妇女和女童将是我们工作的核心受益者。


By any measure, the world is a better place for women and girls than ever before.	无论从哪个角度，妇女和女童的生活条件都大为改善。 但仍然不乏改进的空间。


But it’s still not nearly good enough.	她们需要更好地获取医疗、特别是计划生育服务；


They need better access to health care, especially family-planning services; expanded economic opportunities; and more decision-making power over their own lives (which in turn requires greater social participation and public leadership).	把握更多经济机会； 并更多掌握涉及自我生活的决策权（这反过来又需要扩大社会参与和加强公共领导）。


Empowering women and girls to transform their lives is one of the smartest investments we can make.	让妇女和女童改变她们的生活是我们最明智的投资项目。


Improving their health and wellbeing, ensuring they get a good education, and unleashing their economic potential are fundamental to building more prosperous communities and countries.	改善她们的健康和福祉、确保她们受到良好的教育和释放她们的经济潜力是建设更繁荣社会和国家的根本因素。


But we need to improve our understanding of how best to empower women to succeed.	但我们需要更好地理解怎样帮助妇女取得成功。


And in order to overcome centuries of gender inequity, we need more momentum behind this agenda.	为了战胜有数百年历史的性别不平等，我们需要更积极地推动这项议程。


The Women Deliver conference in May is the next global opportunity to push for more action and for donors to demonstrate their commitment.	今年五月召开的女性分娩会议是促进行动和捐助者展现决心的又一次全球性机会。


Third, we will invest in innovation.	第三，我们将投资于创新项目。


Scientific and technological advances – from new vaccines and hardier crops to much cheaper smartphones and tablets – are among the greatest drivers of poverty reduction.	科技进步——从新疫苗和耐寒作物到更廉价的智能手机和平板电脑——构成减贫最有效的推动因素。


In just the last few weeks, the world has shown that it is prepared to spend more to find new ways to provide reliable, affordable, clean energy sources.	过去几周，世界已经表示愿意投入更多资源来寻找提供可靠、廉价和清洁能源的全新方式。


This is one of the most important ways to help poor people cope with climate change.	这是帮助穷人应对气候变化一种最重要的方式。


Meanwhile, innovations in health care have already brought the world close to wiping out polio, and we expect to see dramatic results from a new triple drug therapy that could eradicate elephantiasis, which affects 120 million people.	此外，医疗卫生领域的创新已经让世界各国接近消灭小儿麻痹症，我们希望看到新的三联药物疗法取得显著疗效，将为1. 2亿人造成影响的纤维性象皮病彻底消除。


But the hard truth is that current funding for research and development to address the health needs of the world’s poorest people is insufficient.	但残酷的现实是目前用于解决世界最贫困人口医疗需求的研发资金还远远不够。


And the tools and technologies we have now aren’t enough to get us to where we need to be.	我们现在掌握的工具和技术并不足以实现我们的目标。


If we want to achieve the targets established by the Global Goals for maternal health, child health, and infectious disease, we will have to double R&D funding by 2020.	要想实现全球目标机构制定的孕产妇保健、儿童保健和传染病控制政策，2020年的研发经费必须是现在的两倍。


That is why we must ensure that R&D is on the agenda at the G7 summit in Japan in May, with a focus on developing and deploying products that both save lives and dramatically improve the economic prospects of the poorest.	因此我们必须确保研发工作列入5月日本七国集团峰会的讨论议程，重点关注那些既能挽救生命又能大幅改善最贫困群体经济前景产品的研究和部署。


Sustained support for institutions like the Global Fund and Gavi, for the empowerment of women and girls, and for innovation is crucial to accelerating progress for the world’s poorest people.	全球基金和免疫联盟等机构对妇女及女童授权运动和创新运动的持续支持对加快世界最贫困人口的进步至关重要。


But much more can and should be done.	但还有更多事需要去做。


The world must unite behind all efforts to eradicate poverty as a vital first step toward overcoming the many other challenges – from migration to terrorism – that we face today.	世界必须团结起来战胜贫困，这是战胜人类今天所面临的从移民到恐怖主义等诸多其他挑战至关重要的首要步骤。


The daily headlines all too often reflect the gap between today’s world and a world without poverty.	当今世界与没有贫困世界之间的差距往往体现在每天的新闻头条。


But what the headlines don’t reveal is all the ways life is already getting better for those in greatest need.	但这些头条并未反映这些需求最迫切者在哪些方面正在生活得更好。


If we keep our promises to them, it will be front-page news.	我们兑现对上述群体的诺言将会登上新闻的头版头条。


LGBT at Work	工作场所中的LGBT


DAVOS – When Apple CEO Tim Cook announced last year that he is gay, I was inundated by emails and telephone messages from executives around the world.	达沃斯—当苹果公司CEO库克（Tim Cook）在去年宣布他是同性恋的时候，我收到了来自全球各地的企业高管的电邮和电话短信的狂轰滥炸。


As an “out” executive at Ernst & Young (EY), everyone seemed to want to know what I thought this meant for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) inclusion on a global scale.	作为“出柜”的安永高管，所有人都希望了解我如何看待这对于女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋和变性人（lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender，LGBT）的全球包容意义。


Apple, after all, resides in fifth place on the Fortune 500 list of the world’s largest companies.	毕竟，苹果公司高居《财富》500强企业第五位。


Was this the end of the “lavender ceiling”?	这标志着“薰衣草天花板”（lavender ceiling）的结束吗？


In his Bloomberg Businessweek article, Cook describes how being gay has affected him: “I’m proud to be gay, and I consider being gay among the greatest gifts God has given me.	在其《彭博商业周刊》的文章中，库克描述了成为同性恋是如何影响他的：“我是同性恋，我骄傲，我认为成为同性恋是上帝赐予我的最大礼物。


Being gay has given me a deeper understanding of what it means to be in the minority and provided a window into the challenges that people in other minority groups deal with every day.”	身为同性恋让我能够更深地理解这对少数群体意味着什么，也为我提供了一个窗口一窥其他少数群体在应对日常生活中的挑战。 ”


My own experience of being “different” is multifaceted.	我自己关于“与众不同”的体验是多样的。


Like Cook, being in the minority informed my propensity to be an inclusive leader.	和库克一样，身为少数群体启发了我做包容性领导的倾向。


Unlike Cook, in addition to being closeted, I was a woman and an introvert, and my politics tended to differ from those of my peers in my heavily male, extrovert-dominated profession.	与库克不同，从前，除了没有出柜，我还是女人和内向者，我的政治学总是与我在男性外向者主导的职业中的同事不同。


Since coming out in 2011, I have been publicly truer to myself and more authentic with others.	自2011年出柜以来，我就可以公开地做真自我，也对他人更加真诚。


That has made me a better leader.	这让我成为更好的领导。


And being out in a leadership position in a global organization has provided me a platform to talk openly on a wide range of issues.	而在一个全球组织的领导岗位上出柜也为我提供了一个公开讨论一系列广泛问题的平台。


There is no question about it: Cook’s announcement was a huge step forward.	这毫无疑问：库克的宣布出柜是向前迈出的一大步。


And international organizations have made considerable progress in LGBT inclusion by relying on external and employee networks and non-discrimination policies.	国际组织在通过依靠外部和员工网络和无歧视政策，在LGBT包容方面取得了可观的进步。


But most of today’s available statistics reflect progress in Europe and the United States.	但当今大部分容易获得的数据体现了欧洲和美国的进步。


According to a recent study by the women’s advocacy organization Catalyst, 62% of Fortune 500 companies now offer health insurance to domestic partners, while 87% of Fortune 500 companies – and 94 of the top 100 – have non-discrimination policies that include sexual orientation.	根据支持女权组织催化剂（Catalyst）的最新研究，62%的《财富》500强公司目前为本国合伙人提供医保，而87%的《财富》500强公司——和前100名中的94家——采取了包容性取向的无歧视政策。


By contrast, Todd Sears, founder of Out Leadership, an advocacy group for LGBT employees, estimates that 90% of LGBT workers in Asia are closeted.	相反，LGBT职员权利组织出柜领导力（Out Leadership）创始人托德·西尔斯（Todd Sears）估计90%的亚洲LGBT员工没有出柜。


In 78 countries, including Uganda and Nigeria, being gay is still illegal.	在包括乌干达和尼日利亚在内的78个国家，同性恋仍是非法的。


Singapore recently upheld its stringent anti-homosexuality law.	新加坡最近坚持保留其严厉的反同性恋法律。


In Russia, on the same day Cook made his announcement, a memorial to Apple founder Steve Jobs was dismantled, ostensibly to comply with a law prohibiting “gay propaganda.”	俄罗斯在库克宣布出柜的同一天取消了纪念苹果公司创始人乔布斯的活动，表面理由是要遵守禁止“同性恋宣传”的法律。


Even in the US, where members of the same sex can marry in 35 states (as I did in New York last April), in 29 states it is still legal to fire someone solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.	美国已有35个州承认同性婚姻（我也于去年4月在纽约结婚），但仍有29个州，光凭性取向原因就可以合法地解雇员工。


In 34 states, it is legal to fire a transgender employee.	有34个州可以合法解雇变性人雇员。


That said, multinational companies can take several steps to further their LGBT inclusion strategies on a global scale.	尽管如此，跨国公司可以采取一系列步骤推进全球层面的LGBT包容战略。


For starters, they can strengthen the “ally effect.”	首先，它们可以强化“结盟效应”。


Research conducted by the Center for Talent Innovation shows that allies – people who support LGBT colleagues or work as advocates – play a decisive role in creating an inclusive community.	人才创新中心（ Center for Talent Innovation）的研究表明，盟友——支持LGBT同事或拥护支持的人——在创造包容社会方面起着决定性作用。


In fact, 24% of the LGBT workers surveyed attribute their decision to come out professionally to their network of allies.	事实上，24%的受访LGBT员工表示他们的出柜要归功于盟友网络。


Employers can create networks that invite straight colleagues to support their LGBT co-workers and sponsor LGBT individuals and groups.	雇主可以营造这种网络，让“直”同事来支持他们的LGBT共事者，并赞助LGBT个人和组织。


Likewise, senior executives being visibly out makes a huge difference.	类似地，公开出柜的高管也可以带来大不同。


Cook is a great example.	库克就是一个显著的例子。


LGBT employees are 85% more likely to be out at companies where senior executives are out (24% versus 13%).	LGBT员工在高管出柜的公司中出柜比例要高得多（24%对13%）。


At EY, our LGBT leadership participated in the “It Gets Better” video project in 2011, sharing stories for the benefit of at-risk LGBT youth. I took advantage of the opportunity, and, with the full support of EY’s leadership, officially came out.	在安永，我们的LGBT领导层在2011年参与了“会好起来”（It Gets Better）视频的录制，分享经验，希望以此给身处风险的LGBT青年带来助益。


I not only talked openly about my own experiences; I also shared how my organization’s philosophy played an important role in my decision.	我不但公开谈论了我自己的经验； 也分享了我的组织的哲学如何对我的决定起到了重要作用。


That leads to a more general point: The more people hear, see, and know about what is going on in an organization, the more quickly cultural change takes place.	这引出了一个更一般的要点：有更多的人听到、看到和了解到一个组织内部的情况，文化变迁就发生的越快。


Speaking up is an important part of that, because people not only listen to what is said, but also notice what passes without being challenged.	用于发声是其中一个重要部分，因为人们不但聆听说了什么，还会注意到什么在没有受到挑战的情况下获得了通过。


Too often, when an organization does not correct a misstatement, it is taken as agreement.	一个组织往往采取不纠正就是同意的做法，这种情况太多了。


Customized solutions also help.	个性化解决方案也有所助益。


Companies should meet with LGBT groups at other organizations, both locally and globally, and implement policies from the more progressive regions in which they do business (say, Europe and the US).	公司应该与地方和全球层面的LGBT群体和其他组织会晤，实施来自它们有业务的更进步的地区(如欧洲和美国)所采取的政策。


But one size does not fit all.	但这并不是万灵丹。


Strategies work best when they are tailored to fit the requirements of specific conditions, such as geographic locations, business unit type, or department function.	根据具体情况（如地理区位、企业单位类型或部门职责）作出调整的战略才能起到最好的作用。


Finally, companies should continue to facilitate an inclusive workplace for everyone, not just LGBT employees.	最后，公司应该继续推进为所有人提供包容性工作场所，而不仅是LGBT雇员。


That means shifting from a culture of diversity, with its implicit focus on “them,” to an inclusiveness-centered culture of “us.”	这意味着从多样性文化——暗含以“他们”为中心的焦点——转变为以包容为中心的“我们”文化。


Cook and I share many of the same attitudes about our LGBT identity.	库克和我在许多关于我们的LGBT身份方面的态度都是相同的。


And I find that his announcement accords with my own experience: “[Being gay has] made me more empathetic, which has led to a richer life.	我发现，他的出柜宣言与我自己的经验十分相符：“[身为同性恋]让我更能与他人感同身受，这丰富了我的人生。


It’s been tough and uncomfortable at times, but it has given me the confidence to be myself, to follow my own path, and to rise above adversity and bigotry.”	有时这很艰难、很难过，但这给了我做自己、走自己的路、战胜灾难和顽固的信心。 ”


The lavender ceiling has been cracked, but there is nowhere in the world today where inclusiveness has been fully achieved.	薰衣草天花板已经裂纹毕现，但当今世界还远未到达充分实现包容的程度。


There is still much more to do.	仍有很多事情要做。


Gaza Shrugs	加沙不领情


GAZA CITY – Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has now personally presented Palestine’s bid for full United Nations membership to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.	加沙——巴勒斯坦主席阿巴斯已经以个人身份向联合国秘书长潘基文递交了巴勒斯坦成为联合国完全会员国的动议。


What remains to be seen is whether Hamas, which has controlled the Gaza Strip since June 2007, will eventually support this initiative by its bitter rival, Abbas’s West Bank-based Palestinian Authority.	目前还有待观察的是，从2007年6月开始控制加沙地带的哈马斯会不会支持这一由其死对头、阿巴斯领导的位于约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构提出的动议。


The failure for more than a year to make any progress in negotiations with Israel has convinced Abbas and his colleagues to pursue the UN option.	与以色列的谈判在一年多的时间里没有任何进展，这使阿巴斯及其同事相信，只有追求联合国会员国资格才能解决问题。


And Israel’s continuing settlement construction on the West Bank has sharpened their sense that negotiations would not be productive, whereas the raft of UN resolutions supporting a two-state solution could now be put to the test.	以色列仍在约旦河西岸不断地建设定居点，这使得阿巴斯及其同事愈加认定靠谈判无法达成建设性成果，只能寄希望于联合国一地两国的解决方案了。


Moreover, it is widely believed that the Arab Spring has encouraged the Palestinian leadership to seek to change the rules of the game.	此外，人们广泛认为，阿拉伯之春鼓舞了巴勒斯坦领导人去寻求游戏规则的变化。