Indeed, Abe has visited 13 countries in the last six months alone (a schedule that has helped him to cast aside any lingering memories of his previous tenure as Prime Minister, when ill health forced him from office after barely a year).	事实上，光是在去年六个月，安倍就出访了13个国家（这有助于打消人们对他上一个首相任期的印象，当时，健康问题使他在执政不到一年就被迫离职）。


Abe has placed particular emphasis on strengthening Japan’s alliance with the Unites States, which had atrophied as a result of the DPJ government’s feckless behavior (relations with China deteriorated as well).	安倍尤其强调增强日本与美国的联盟关系。 美日关系因为民主党政府的软弱行为而受损（于中国关系也是如此）。


More broadly, Abe envisages Japan’s future as that of a trading country that has assumed its rightful role in ensuring a free and open maritime order.	更广泛地说，安倍认为日本的未来在于成为一个贸易国家，致力于在确保自由和开放的海洋秩序上扮演正确的角色。


Abe’s diplomatic whirlwind is aimed at strengthening ties with countries that share this commitment, as well as Japan’s other values, including human rights and democracy.	安倍的外交旋风旨在增强与志同道合（不仅是这方面，也包括人权和民主等其他价值）国家的关系。


Of course, given Asia’s size and dynamism, there are many other issues that will need to be addressed in the years ahead, including improvement of the security environment in a currently unstable East Asia and amending the country’s constitution, which the LDP has considered doing for many years.	当然，从亚洲的规模和动态考虑，未来数年还需要解决其他诸多问题，包括在当前动荡的东亚中改善安全环境以及修订日本宪法（自民党有此目标已经很久了）。


But the first priority for Abe’s second government is to revive the Japanese economy.	但安倍第二次首相生涯最重要的日程是重振日本经济。


That task has already begun, and the LDP’s recent election victory will strengthen Abe’s ability to complete it.	这个任务已经开始，自民党最近的选举胜利能增强安倍完成这一任务的能力。


The Fate of Abe’s Japan	安倍日本的命运


TOKYO – As Shinzo Abe sits down this week in Seoul with South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, he does so as the leader of a country that many people around the world now seriously underestimate.	东京——当安倍晋三本周在汉城与韩国总统朴槿惠和中国总理李克强坐在一起时，全球很多人现在都严重低估了他所领导的这个国家。


That dynamic certainly will be felt during the three Northeast Asian powers’ first summit since 2012.	在三大东北亚强国2012年来首次首脑会议上，人们肯定会认识到这样的状况。


Three decades ago, many erred in the opposite direction in their assessments of Japan.	三十年前，许多人都在评价日本时犯了严重的错误。 在日本人均收入超过美国后，许多美国人担心美国会被日本拉下。


Many Americans feared being overtaken after Japanese per capita income surpassed that of the United States; Japanese manufacturing set the international standard; and some books even predicted an eventual war with a Japanese nuclear superpower.	日本制造业树立了国际标准； 有些书甚至预言与超级核大国日本最终战争的爆发。


Such views extrapolated from Japan’s impressive postwar economic growth; today, after more than two decades of malaise, they simply remind us of the danger of linear projections.	这种观点源自日本令人印象深刻的战后经济增长； 如今，经过二十多年的经济不景气，当年的推断只能提醒我们线性预测是危险的。


That danger remains with us.	这种危险性现在依然存在着。


In response to China’s rapid rise and the assertiveness of its Communist Party leadership, the current conventional wisdom portrays Japan as a country of secondary importance – which is equally mistaken.	面对中国的快速崛起和共产党领导人的自信，目前的传统智慧同样错误地将日本描绘成一个次要国家。


Despite its economic slowdown, Japan retains impressive power resources.	尽管经济放缓，日本仍拥有令人不可小觑的力量。


It is a democracy that has been at peace for 70 years, with a stable society and a high standard of living.	日本是和平建设长达70年的民主政体，拥有稳定的社会和高水平的生活。


Its per capita income is five times that of China, and Beijing residents can only envy Tokyo’s air quality and product safety standards.	其人均收入是中国的五倍，北京的居民只能羡慕东京的产品安全标准和空气质量。


Its economy remains the world’s third largest overall, sustained by highly sophisticated industry.	日本依然是高精尖工业支撑的全球第三大经济体。


While China has nuclear weapons and more soldiers, Japan’s military is better equipped in some areas (and obviously has the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons very quickly).	虽然中国在核武器和兵员数量方面占据优势，但日本军队在某些领域装备更为精良（而且显然拥有快速研发核武器的技术力量）。


Moreover, Japan’s culture (both traditional and popular), overseas development assistance, and support of international institutions are impressive sources of soft power.	此外，日本的文化（无论传统还是流行）、海外发展援助、和国际机构的支持都体现着不可小觑的软性力量。


Yes, Japan faces severe demographic problems, with the population projected to shrink from 127 million to below 100 million by 2050.	的确，日本面临着严重的人口问题，预计到2050年其人口将从1. 27亿缩减到1亿以下。


The current birth rate is 1.4 (well below the replacement rate of 2.1), and the Japanese are resistant to accepting large numbers of immigrants.	4（远低于2. 1的人口替代率），而日本人拒绝接受大量移民流入。


When Abe became Prime Minister almost three years ago, he vowed to restore Japan’s standing as a “first-tier country” by implementing an economic stimulus package, dubbed “Abenomics,” and reinterpreting Japan’s constitution to stiffen the country’s defense posture.	安倍近三年前担任首相时，曾发誓要通过实行被外界称之为“安倍经济学”的经济刺激计划让日本重新进入“第一梯队”并加强国家防御、重新解释日本宪法。


But, whereas Abenomics was enacted quickly, the Diet enacted the defense legislation only recently – and after more than a year of effort.	但虽然安倍经济学立竿见影，但议会经过一年多的努力仅仅在不久前才通过了国防法。


Many in Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party would have preferred fundamental reform of Japan’s defense doctrine, by removing the constitution’s limits on the country’s armed forces.	安倍的自民党有很多人都赞成彻底改革日本的国防理论，取消宪法限制该国的武装力量。


But public opinion and Abe’s coalition partner, Komeito, did not allow it.	但公众舆论和安倍的执政伙伴公明党都不允许这种做法。


Nonetheless, Japan’s interlocutors at the Seoul summit, China and South Korea, which suffered enormously from Japanese aggression in the last century, have protested loudly.	即便如此，日本在首尔峰会上的谈判伙伴中国和韩国因为上个世纪在日本侵略中所遭受的苦难大声抗议日本的做法。


Both are suspicious of Abe, who exacerbated tensions with nationalist rhetoric and a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine early in his current administration.	中韩都怀疑安倍的动机，后者的民族主义言论和在执政之初参拜充满争议的靖国神社也加剧了局势的紧张。


Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping has resisted meeting with Abe, as has Park, who will do so for the first time at the Seoul summit.	事实上，中国国家主席习近平一直拒绝与安倍会面，韩国总统朴槿惠也是在本次首尔峰会上才首次同意与安倍会晤。


On the other hand, Abe has repaired the strained relations with the US that Japan had under his predecessors, and President Barack Obama reiterated the strength of the bilateral alliance during Abe’s state visit to the White House last April.	另一方面，安倍前任曾经与美国的紧张关系已经得到了修复。 奥巴马总统在去年4月���倍对白宫进行国事访问期间再次强调了双边联盟的力量。


Under the new defense guidelines, US and Japanese forces are able to plan and exercise more effectively, and the alliance is in its best condition in decades.	在新的国防方针下，美国和日本军队能够更有效地进行策划及行动，并且美日联盟正处于几十年来的最佳状态。


Abe has thus been relatively successful in terms of foreign and defense policy.	因此，安倍在外交和国防政策方面一直是比较成功的。


But the situation on the economic front is more mixed.	但经济战线上的形势更为复杂。


Inflation and unemployment are low, but growth is largely flat, and few experts I spoke with in Tokyo recently expect it to accelerate significantly.	通货膨胀和失业率很低，但经济增长基本持平，而我所接触的东京专家几乎没有人认为近期的增长速度将明显加快。


The first two components (or “arrows”) of Abenomics – loose monetary and fiscal policies – helped to restore demand.	安倍经济学的前两项举措（也叫前两支“箭”）——宽松的货币和财政政策——有效地恢复了需求。


But the third arrow of structural reform has remained in the quiver.	但结构改革的第三支箭一直在颤抖。


Since his success in the Diet election last year, Abe has talked about liberalizing electricity markets, improving corporate governance, and undertaking tax reform.	去年议会选举成功后，安倍一直提倡开放电力市场、改善公司治理并推进税收改革。


In addition, he hopes to use the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement to force reform of the inefficient agriculture sector.	此外，他希望利用最近签署的泛太平洋伙伴关系贸易协定强制对低效农业进行改革。


One important constraint is labor supply.	一个重要的限制条件是劳动力供给。


Abe has proposed relaxing visa conditions for expatriate workers; but immigration on a scale that would make a major economic difference is unlikely, given the homogeneity and insularity of Japan’s traditional culture.	安倍提出放宽对外籍工人的签证条件； 但鉴于日本传统文化的一致性和狭隘性，靠大规模移民带来经济重大变化几乎没有可能。


The difficulty of loosening limits on immigration will require Japan to mobilize its underused female human resources.	难以放宽移民限制使得日本必须调动其利用不足的女性人力资源。


But that effort, too, must overcome formidable cultural obstacles.	但这一努力也必须克服巨大的文化障碍。


Abe has spoken frequently (including at the United Nations) about opportunities for women, and has called for women to make up 30% of Japan’s managers.	安倍发言（包括在联合国）时经常谈到为女性提供机会，并呼吁女性在日本管理者中占据30%的份额。


But today they account for less than 10% of managers and about 1% of senior executives.	但目前她们仅占管理人员的不到10%和高管队伍的1%左右。


The World Economic Forum’s index of gender inequality gives Japan a low rating.	世界经济论坛的性别不平等指数给日本打分很低。


Government measures like family leave and more nurseries for working mothers can help, but traditional attitudes change slowly.	为就业母亲设置家庭假和增加托儿所等政府措施可能有所助益，但传统观念的改变是非常缓慢的。


Unless it is addressed, the labor constraint implies that Japan will not reach its full potential economically – and thus in regional and global affairs as well.	除非这个问题得到解决，否则劳动力限制意味着日本将无法发挥其全部的经济潜力——在地区和全球事务中也是一样。


Japan is a successful, comfortable society, which has much to contribute to the world.	日本是个成功、舒适的社会，能对世界做出的贡献很大。


The danger is that it is so comfortable that it will look inward and prove the conventional wisdom right.	但危险在于日本社会太过舒适，以至于他们只关注国内，那样就应验了传统智慧的看法。


Japanese Foreign Policy in the Trump Era	特朗普时代的日本外交政策


TOKYO – December will be a month of reconciliation for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as he meets with leaders from two countries that fought Japan in World War II: the United States and Russia.	东京—12月将是日本首相安倍晋三的妥协之月，他将与在二战中击败日本的两个国家的领导人会晤：美国和俄罗斯。


It might seem promising that Abe is hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin and then being hosted by US President Barack Obama in such short order.	安倍将在如此短的时间内先招待俄罗斯普京总统，再被美国总统奥巴马招待，这似乎让人有所憧憬。


But these events actually presage an uncomfortable, potentially destabilizing time for Japan – and all of East Asia.	但这样的安排实际上预示着日本——以及整个东亚——将迎来令人不安甚至动荡的时刻。


On December 26, Abe will shake hands with Obama at Pearl Harbor – weeks after the US marked the 75th anniversary of the Japanese attack there – to reciprocate Obama’s visit to Hiroshima’s atomic bomb sites last May.	12月26日，安倍将与奥巴马在珍珠港握手——在此之前几周，是珍珠港被日本偷袭75周年的日子。 安倍访问珍珠港是对奥巴马去年5月访问广岛原子弹爆炸点的回访。


The mutual demonstration of forgiveness is meant to emphasize the values that Japan and the US now share.	双方互表谅解是为了强调如今日本和美国所共有的价值观。


But this gesture will come just ten days after Abe hosts Putin in his Yamaguchi prefecture hometown; and theirs will be a rather different sort of reconciliation.	但在做出这个姿态前十天，普京将在山口县家乡招待普京； 而安倍和普京的妥协与安倍和奥巴马截然不同。


Russia is one of the few countries with which Japan never signed a peace treaty after 1945, because in the war’s final days, the Soviet Union occupied four then-Japanese islands just north of Hokkaido, the country’s northernmost main island.	俄罗斯是1945年后极少数从未与日本签订和平条约的国家之一，因为在二战末期，苏联占领了当时属于日本、位于北海道以北、日本国最东北端的四个岛屿。


The four islands sit at the southern tip of the Kuril Islands chain that separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.	这四个岛坐落于千岛群岛最南端，是鄂霍次克海和太平洋的分界线。


While they are not of any particular economic value beyond providing some fishing grounds, they do have sentimental significance for Japan – as is often the case with lost territories.	除了作为渔业基地，这四个岛屿再无其他特殊的经济价值，但它们对日本的确具有重大的精神意义——失去的国土总是如此。


And for Russia, which is never keen to cede territory anyway, the islands are strategically valuable; the Kremlin recently decided to install missile-defense systems on two of them.	而对俄罗斯来说——割让领土也从来不是它的习惯——这些岛屿具有战略意义； 克里姆林宫最近决定在其中两个岛部署导弹防御系统。


While the dispute over the islands has prevented Japan and Russia from ever formalizing a peace agreement, both countries now seem to want to cuddle somewhat closer.	尽管四岛纠纷让日本和俄罗斯无从缔结和平协定，但如今两国似乎希望走得更近。 普京的到访将是十年来他第一次正式访问日本；


Putin’s trip will be his first official visit to Japan in a decade; and Abe plans to honor him with personalized treatment; their discussions will take place in the manly environment of an onsen (hot spring), rather than in dull offices.	而安倍计划用私人规格招待他； 他们的讨论将在充满阳刚气概的环境——温泉中进行，而不是在无聊的办公室进行。


These overtures reflect Russia and Japan’s respective concerns about China.	这样的安排反映出俄罗斯和日本各自关于中国的担忧。


While Russia has warmed to China in recent years, not least by entering into a big natural gas deal and engaging in joint military exercises, it has largely done so as a gesture of defiance against the US and the European Union.	近几年来，俄罗斯与中国关系回暖——比如两国签订了天然气大单，还举行联合军演——但这主要是为了摆出对抗美国和欧盟的姿态。


In the long term, Russia does not want to look as though it is dependent on its increasingly powerful southern neighbor.	从长期看，俄罗斯不想让人觉得它得依靠这个日益强大的南方邻国。


Japan, for its part, fears Chinese domination of East Asia, and is more than happy to be Russia’s new Asian friend.	而出于历史原因，日本担心中国主宰东海，成为俄罗斯的亚洲新朋友可谓求之不得。


Previously, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to invest in Russia’s Far East, owing to its participation in Western sanctions against Russia, imposed in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.	此前，日本投资于俄罗斯远东地区十分困难，甚至可以说是不可能的任务，因为它加入了西方制裁俄罗斯的行列——因为俄罗斯入侵了乌克兰。


But now that Donald Trump has been elected to the US presidency, those sanctions might be eased or eliminated.	但如今，特朗普当选美国总统，这些制裁可能松动或取消。


Indeed, this could explain why Abe broke protocol to become the first foreign leader to meet President-elect Trump in New York, on November 17.	事实上，这可以解释为何安倍打破常规，于11月17日在纽约会见当选总统特朗普，成为第一位与特朗普会晤的外国领导人。


Had Hillary Clinton won the election, Abe would have been forced to downplay expectations for his summit with Putin.	如果希拉里·克林顿赢得美国大选，安倍将被迫调低对他与普京的峰会的期望。


Now, Putin and Abe will have more room to negotiate the contested islands’ status, and to develop a future framework for economic cooperation, which will likely include regular bilateral summits.	如今普京和安倍有更多空间谈判存在争议的北方四岛地位，并制定未来经济合作框架——可能包括定期双边峰会。


But this will only be a consolation prize for Abe.	但这对安倍来说只是一个安慰奖。


Trump’s victory has sounded a death knell for the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Obama had made the centerpiece of his Asia strategy.	特朗普的胜选相当于给12个国家的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）敲响了丧钟，而TPP是奥巴马亚洲战略的核心。


Abe supported the TPP, and saw it as a means to prevent China from becoming the rule-setter in Asian trade.	安倍支持TPP，并将之视为防止中国成为亚洲贸易规则制定者的途径。


Without the TPP, it is now increasingly likely that China will step into that role.	现在，没了TPP，由中国来制定亚洲贸易规则的可能性越来越大。


That will be a big loss for Japan, and the country will lose out even more if Trump follows through on his campaign promise to make allies such as Japan and South Korea pay more for their own defense.	对日本来说，这将是沉重一击，而如果特朗普兑现竞选承诺，要求日本和韩国等盟国增加自身防御的“保护费”日本的损失还会更大。


And if Trump continues to provoke China by communicating with Taiwan and questioning America’s “One China” policy, regional tensions will escalate.	而如果特朗普继续通过联络台湾和质疑美国的“一个中国”政策来挑衅中国，地区紧张将进一步升级。


This, in turn, will only increase Japan’s defense needs, especially with respect to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which China claims as its own.	这反过来将增加日本的防御需求，特别是中国主张主权的钓鱼岛。


So, Abe faces political danger, but he also has an opportunity.	因此，安倍面临着政治风险，但也有一个机会。


Trump’s election and escalating regional tensions have created the perfect pretext for Abe to push for his ultimate political goal: to abolish Article 9 – the pacifist clause in Japan’s post-war, US-imposed constitution, which limits the Japanese military to a “self-defense force,” and has generally kept Japanese defense spending at 1% of GDP.	特朗普的当选和地区紧张的升级为安倍推行其终极政治目标创造了完美条件——废除战后由美国制定的日本和平宪法第九条，该条限制日本军队只能是“自卫队”，其国防支出一般不能超过GDP的1%。


Abe already has enough parliamentary backing to achieve this, and he could garner more with a snap election for the lower house in early 2017.	安倍已经获得了足够多的议会支持实现这一目标，在2017年提前举行的众议院选举中，他还将获得更多支持。


But, beyond a two-thirds majority in both parliamentary bodies, constitutional reforms also require a simple majority in a national referendum.	但是，除了在国会两院赢得三分之二多数，修宪还要求全民公投简单多数。


Achieving that could be harder, because pacifism runs deep in the only country to have been attacked with atomic bombs.	实现这一目标可能比较困难，因为在这个唯一一个受过核弹攻击的国家，和平主义深入人心。


By shaking Obama’s hand in Hawaii, Abe will give a nod to the country’s modern pacifist creed, and signal that, despite his reputation as a nationalist, he also harbors deep feelings about the dangers of war.	对安倍来说，夏威夷与奥巴马握手等于认同日本的现代和平主义信念，并释放出一个信号：尽管以民族主义者闻名，但他对战争的危险也有着深刻的认识。


Such peaceful assurances, against the backdrop of growing tensions in East Asia, may or may not be enough to persuade Japanese voters that it is time to expand their country’s armed forces – 75 years after their great but fateful triumph in Pearl Harbor.	在东亚局势日益紧张的背景下，这样的和平保证可能足以、也可能不足以说服日本选民，在带来不祥后果的珍珠港大胜75年后，是时候扩大日本武装力量了。


This will be one of the central questions in Asian politics over the next few turbulent years.	这将是未来动荡的几年中亚洲政坛的核心问题之一。


Abe’s Safe Bet	安倍的安全赌注


TOKYO – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has thrown out the political playbook.	东京——日本首相安倍晋三已经抛出了政治剧本。


With two years remaining in his term, and with his Liberal Democratic Party enjoying comfortable majorities in the Diet’s upper and lower houses, Abe has called a snap general election for December.	在还有两年任期、且自民党占国会上下院多数席位的情况下，安倍要求在12月提前举行大选。


Political leaders and pundits worldwide are scratching their heads at Abe’s decision to risk his extensive reform agenda with a throw of the electoral dice.	世界各地的政治领袖和专家都对安倍打出选举牌，拿自己的全面改革计划冒险摸不着头脑。


But while Abe may be known for his boldness, he is no reckless gambler.	不过安倍虽然以胆大闻名，他却绝不是个鲁莽的赌徒。


On the contrary, he would have been reckless to launch the third “arrow” of his so-called Abenomics strategy for reviving Japan’s economy – supply-side structural reforms – without a clear mandate for reform.	相反，如果他在没有明确改革授权的情况下射出供应结构改革这安倍经济战略重振日本经济的第三支“箭”才是真正的不计后果。


Fortunately, Abe is almost certain to receive that mandate – not least because he lacks credible opponents.	幸运的是，几乎可以肯定安倍能够拿到这一授权——这不仅因为他缺乏真正的竞争对手。


The main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), essentially imploded following its previous turn in government, which was characterized by economic malaise and foreign-policy blunders.	主要反对党日本民主党（DPJ）在前次执政后近乎崩溃，随处可见经济问题和外交政策的失误。


And Japan’s other political parties have done nothing to convince voters that they deserve to emerge from the political wilderness.	而日本其他政党又无法说服选民自己有能力从政治僵局中脱颖而出。


In a sense, Abe is not running against his parliamentary opponents, but against himself.	从某种意义上讲，与安倍竞争的是安倍自己，而不是议会反对党。


After the first two arrows of Abenomics – expansionary monetary and fiscal policies – raised expectations that Japan’s economy would finally escape stagnation, the country began slipping back into recession in the second quarter of this year.	在扩张性货币和财政政策这安倍经济学射出的前两支箭点燃日本经济终将摆脱停滞的希望后，日本经济在今年第二季度再度陷入衰退。


As any democratic politician will attest, disappointed expectations may well be the toughest electoral opponent of all.	任何一位民主政治家都可以证明，失望情绪或许是最难战胜的选举对手。


Just ask former French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	只要问问法国前总统萨科齐就知道了。


Of course, Abe did not face the kind of sky-high expectations that Sarkozy and, for that matter, US President Barack Obama did.	当然，安倍并没有像萨科奇和美国总统奥巴马那样面对高得不切实际的期望。


It is not that Abe’s 2012 campaign lacked ambition; he set out a bold economic-reform agenda and promised to boost Japan’s global influence.	这并不是说2012年安倍竞选缺少雄心壮志； 他制定了大胆的经济改革计划，并承诺提升日本的全球影响力。


But, after two decades of leaders who – with the exception of Junichiro Koizumi – promised little and achieved less, Japanese voters had little reason to expect that Abe would follow through on his pledges.	但在近二十年来政治领袖——小泉纯一郎除外——鲜有承诺更鲜有成就的情况下，日本选民没有什么理由期待安倍能兑现承诺。


Moreover, Japan’s powerful bureaucracy – which has a long history of impeding reform (and has taken too little of the blame for the country’s “lost decades” of stagnation) – was probably not convinced that the election had authorized Abe to push for sweeping change.	此外，日本强势官僚机构在掣肘改革方面有着悠久历史却又极少为“失去十年”的经济停滞承担罪责，这些官僚或许对选举结果已经赋予安倍推动彻底变革的权力并不认可。


Expecting Abe to show the same inertia as the DPJ premiers who preceded him, they behaved in the way they always had – advancing their own interests, instead of faithfully enacting the policies of the elected government.	他们希望安倍像前任民主党首相那样不思进取，他们则延续之前惯用的行为模式——不是忠实推动当选政府制定的政策，而是追求他们自身的利益。


But Abe was not deterred.	但安倍并没有因此却步。


In his first weeks in office, he announced a ¥10.3 trillion ($116 billion) stimulus bill and appointed Haruhiko Kuroda, a determined, dynamic, and bold thinker, to head the Bank of Japan.	他上任第一周就宣布了10. 3万亿日元（约合1，160亿美元）的刺激计划，并任命黑田东彦，一位坚定、精干、大胆的思想家担任日本央行领袖。


Kuroda wasted little time in initiating expansionary monetary policies – following in the footsteps of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England – to help reflate the economy.	黑田东彦立即步美联储和英格兰银行的后尘启动了扩张性、刺激经济的货币政策。


The first two arrows of Abenomics began to take effect almost immediately.	安倍经济学的前两支箭效果几乎立竿见影。


Japan experienced sustained inflation for the first time since the early 1990s.	日本从20世纪90年代初以来首次出现了持续通胀的态势。


The stock market boomed.	股市一片繁荣。


The yen fell to a more realistic level against other currencies.	日元与其他货币的比价也更趋合理。


Consumer confidence rose marginally.	消费者信心指数小幅攀升。


But Abe knows that all of this will be for naught unless and until the third arrow is launched.	但安倍心里明白除非而且直到射出第三支箭，所有这一切都没有任何意义。


Beyond his economic strategy, Abe has also delivered in terms of foreign policy.	除去经济战略，安倍在外交政策领域也取得了成绩。


He has visited almost all of Japan’s Asian neighbors, reinvigorating relationships that the DPJ neglected.	他几乎遍访日本的亚洲邻国，重振了被民主党忽略的关系。


In particular, his personal rapport with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has galvanized their countries’ emerging partnership, creating a new strategic center of gravity in Asia.	尤其是他与印度总理莫迪的莫逆私交已经刺激了日印两国正在兴起的伙伴关系，并在亚洲开创了新的战略重心区域。


Moreover, Abe has settled a nettlesome dispute with the United States over its military bases on the island of Okinawa, thereby fortifying Japan’s relationship with its main ally.	此外，安倍还化解了日美在冲绳军事基地问题上的棘手纠纷，从而强化了日本与其主要盟友的关系。


And, by reinterpreting Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to exercise “collective self-defense” and provide aid to an ally under attack, Abe has made Japan a far more reliable partner for the US and its Asian allies.	而且，通过重新解释宪法第9条授权日本行使“集体自卫权”并为遭受袭击的盟友提供援助，安倍已经巩固了日本与美国及亚洲盟国的伙伴关系。


Most important, Abe has initiated a realistic and coherent relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping.	最重要的是，安倍已经与中国主席习近平建立了现实并且连贯的关系。


In recent years, rising tensions with China have stripped Japan of the illusion of friendship and goodwill that led it to inject many hundreds of billions of dollars into the country.	近年来，对华关系趋紧已经让日本放弃了曾使其为中国发展注入数千亿美元的友谊和亲善幻想。


With a more pragmatic approach, however, Asia’s two largest economies can find a way to support domestic and regional stability, giving them the space to pursue economic reform at home.	但如果采取更务实的态度，亚洲两大经济体可以寻找某种方式来支持国内及地区稳定，让他们能够腾出手来进行国内经济改革。


Allowing secondary issues to jeopardize peace and progress would simply be irresponsible.	让次要问题危及和平与进步简直是不负责任的。


Unlike in the last election, Japanese voters now know exactly the kind of government Abe intends to lead.	与上次选举不同，日本选民已经对安倍想要领导的政府有了清楚的认识。


They know that he intends to follow through on his plan to include Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US-backed mega-regional free-trade deal currently being negotiated – a move that will require some sacrifices at home.	他们知道他想让日本加入 泛太平洋伙伴关系计划，他还想让日本加入由美国发起目前正在商讨的大型区域自由贸易协定——上述举措需要日本国内做出某些牺牲。


Abe has proved that reinvigorating the economy is his top priority.	安倍已经证明重振日本经济是他的首要任务。


In this sense, his decision to postpone the second round of the consumer-tax hike planned for next year is not fiscally irresponsible; on the contrary, it reflects his recognition that Japan’s economy is not yet strong enough to withstand a sharp tax increase.	从这个意义上讲，他决定推迟明年第二轮上调消费税计划并不是财政上不负责任的举措； 相反，这反映出安倍已经意识到日本经济还没有强大到能承受大幅加税的程度。


Finally, Japan’s voters know that Abe is committed to building a durable and consensual regional peace, without which the rest of his plans could not succeed.	最后，日本选民知道安倍��全力建设自愿持久的地区和平，如果这一目标无法实现他的其余计划就是不可能的。


There is no doubt about Abe’s intentions or policy commitments.	关于安倍的意图和政策目标没有任何疑议。


If the Japanese public returns him to office, he will have the mandate he needs to complete his ambitious, pragmatic, and forward-thinking agenda.	如果日本公众为他投票，他就能得到授权完成他雄心勃勃并且务实的前瞻性任务。


It is now up to the Japanese people to give him that mandate, effectively choosing to end two decades of economic malaise and geopolitical irrelevance.	现在需要日本民众赋予他这种权力，有效结束长达二十年经济停滞和地缘政治地位低下的现状。


The Second Opening of Japan	日本第二次开国


TOKYO – US President Barack Obama is visiting Tokyo at a unique moment in my country’s history, with Japan’s economy moving onto a stable new growth path that will take full advantage of its geographic position.	东京—美国总统奥巴马在我国历史上的特殊时刻访问东京，而日本经济正在走向稳定的新增长路径，充分利用其地理位置。


Japan no longer considers itself the “Far” East; rather, we are at the very center of the Pacific Rim, and a neighbor to the world’s growth center stretching from Southeast Asia to India.	日本不在自视为“远”东； 相反，我们身处环太平洋的正中央，紧邻从东南亚到印度的世界增长中心。


There can be little doubt that this growth center will continue to propel Japan’s economy for the foreseeable future.	毫无疑问，这一增长中心将在可预见的未来继续助推日本经济。


Japanese direct investment is expanding in Vietnam and India, for example, which will boost demand for Japanese machine tools and capital goods.	比如，日本对越南和印度的直接投资正在扩张，这将提振对日本机械工具和资本商品的需求。


But, to maximize its opportunities, Japan must open its economy further and become a country that actively incorporates capital, human resources, and wisdom from abroad.	但是，要实现机会最大化，日本必须进一步开放其经济，积极地与外国资本、人力资源和智慧相融合。


Japan must be a country capable of growing by channeling the vitality of a growing Asia.	日本必须有能力通过引导成长的亚洲的活力来实现自身增长。


To this end, we have sharply accelerated the pace of negotiations on economic partnership agreements, or EPAs, with various partners around the world.	在这方面，我们极大地加快了各经济合作协议（EPA）谈判的节奏。


Earlier this month, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and I reached agreement in principle on a Japan-Australia EPA.	本月早些��候，澳大利亚总理阿伯特（Tony Abbott）和我就日澳经济合作协议原则达成了一致。


Next in line is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would unite 12 countries in the world’s largest trading area.	下一个经济合作协议是跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），该协议包括了世界最大贸易区内的12个国家。


Both Japan and the United States attach great importance to rules, uphold the principles of freedom and democracy, and possess the most advanced technologies and industries.	日本和美国都强调规则、坚持自由和民主原则、拥有最先进的科技和工业。


We intend to overcome our differences and together forge, in the form of the TPP, a twenty-first-century economic order for Asia and the Pacific that will serve as an unshakable foundation for growth.	我们希望客服我们的不同，通过TPP携手共筑二十一世纪亚洲和太平洋经济秩序并使之成为不可撼动的增长根基。


My government is also pushing hard to realize an EPA with the European Union.	我的政府还在努力实现与欧盟的贸易合作协议。


Given that the US and the EU already are engaged in trade talks, an EPA between Japan and the EU, coupled with the TPP, will give rise to a truly immense market – a single enormous growth engine that will benefit the entire global economy.	美国和欧洲已经在进行贸易谈判，因此日欧贸易合作协议与TPP一起，将带来一个真正的巨型市场，一个能让全球经济受益的巨型增长引擎。


But Japan’s economic frontiers extend well beyond Asia and the Pacific, to Latin America and Africa – more reason to abandon our long-held inward-looking perspective.	但日本的经济前沿绝不仅限于亚洲合伙太平洋，而是要延伸到拉丁美洲和非洲，因此，我们更应该抛弃长期以来的内向角度。


A large number of highly motivated and ambitious young people have already come to Japan from around the world, especially from neighboring Asian countries, to study or work.	大量干劲足、志向高的年轻人从世界各地，特别是邻近的亚洲国家来到日本学习或工作。


Japan must remain their hope.	日本必须让他们保持希望。


We must not be disrespectful of them, and our arms must always be wide open towards them.	我们决不能失礼于他们，我们必须张开双臂欢迎他们的到来。


Japan, I believe, is that kind of country.	我认为，日本就是这样一种国家。


In the near future, we will designate six National Strategic Economic Growth Areas – Tokyo, Kansai, Okinawa Prefecture, and the cities of Niigata, Yabu, and Fukuoka – to serve as models for the rest of the country.	在近期未来，我们选定六大国家战略经济增长区——东京、关西、冲绳县、新泻市、养父市和福冈市作为全国榜样。


In health care, education, agriculture, and employment practices, we are identifying policies and practices that have fallen out of step with today’s needs, and we will move quickly to reform them.	在医疗、教育、农业和就业等领域，我们正在识别已不合于现时代需要的方面并迅速行动起来进行改恶。


The National Strategic Economic Growth Areas will insert the probe of reform down into our regulatory system, which has hardened into bedrock.	国家战略经济增长区将让改革直插我们铁板一块的监管制度。


Another habit that Japanese must change is our pervasive male-oriented thinking.	日本人必须改变的另一个习俗是大男子主义。


We have already resolved to ensure that at least 30% of all personnel hired by the national government are women.	我们已经成功地保证了30%的国家政府雇员来自女性。


I am also now urging publicly traded companies to add at least one woman as a board member.	现在，我还在敦促上市公司至少安排一名女性为董事会成员。


Once we reach the point at which it is no longer news to have a woman or a non-Japanese serving as a CEO, Japan will have reinvented itself and recovered its true spirit of risk-taking and innovation.	如果有朝一日女性或非日本人成为CEO不再是新闻，日本就可以说重新发现了自我并恢复了真正的冒险和创新精神。


“Womenomics” tells us that a society in which women are dynamically engaged will also have a higher birth rate.	“女性经济学”告诉我们，女性积极参与的社会生育率更高。


My government intends to address, urgently, the need to expand day-care facilities and other such infrastructure as the foundation for a society that benefits from all of its members’ skills and talents.	我的政府将尽快解决扩大日间育儿看护和其他基础设施的需要，夯实日本从所有成员的技能和才华中获益的基础。


We are fully capable of change; indeed, we relish it, as the world will see in the months and years to come.	我们完全有能力做出变化； 我们盼望着变化，世界在几个月到几年内就可以看到。


But some things about Japan are unchanging, and some must not be changed.	但有一些关于日本的情况并未发生变化，也有一些不能发生变化。


One of these is our track record, which supports our ambition to be a “proactive contributor to peace.”	其中之一便是我们的历史记录。 我们的历史记录支持我们成为“和平的积极贡献者”的雄心。


Japan has made more than its fair share of financial contributions to the United Nations and its organizations, both historically and today.	日本向联合国及其组织缴纳的会费远高于合理比例，不管是过去还是现在都是如此。


And our embrace of our global responsibilities extends to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.	我们承担全球责任的动作还扩展到日本自卫队。


Members of the Self-Defense Forces displayed exemplary cooperation with the US and Australian armed forces in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and they have earned deep appreciation and respect everywhere they have been deployed, including Haiti, Indonesia, and most recently, the Philippines.	2011年东日本大地震中，自卫队与美国和澳大利亚部队的合作堪称典范，自卫队所到之处无不广受欢迎和尊敬，包括在海地、印尼和最近的菲律宾。


To make a proactive contribution to peace means that Japan will bear its own share of responsibility for assuring the security that supports global prosperity and stability.	为和平作出积极贡献意味着日本将承担保证支持全球繁荣与稳定的安全的责任。


Working alongside countries with which we share common values and interests, we will safeguard and cultivate international public goods, ranging from space and cyberspace to the skies and the seas.	我们将于和我们有着共同价值和利益的国家合作，捍卫和养育从太空和网络空间到天空和海洋的国际公共品。


As the world will see during Obama’s visit, Japan is back and thriving.	正如世界将从奥巴马访日之旅中所看到的，蒸蒸日上的日本已经归来。


And its return is indispensable for global stability and prosperity.	它的归来是全球稳定与繁荣不可或缺的。


The Middle East Crack-Up	中东的瓦解


JERUSALEM – The horror stories emerging from northern Iraq, as well as the continuing slaughter in Syria’s civil war, point to a tectonic shift in the Middle East.	耶路撒冷—北伊拉克的恐怖事件，以及叙利亚内战屠杀的继续，表明中东正在发生结构性变迁。


Almost 100 years after World War I, the regional state system established after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is unraveling.	第一次世界大战距今已经过去了近100年，奥斯曼帝国解体后所建立的地区国家体系正在分崩离析。


The contemporary map of the Middle East was drawn by the victorious Western imperial powers, Great Britain and France, during and after WWI.	当代中东版图是由在一战中获胜的西方帝国主义列强英国和法国划定的。


While the war was still raging, they signed an agreement drafted by the diplomats Sir Mark Sykes and François George-Picot, which delineated their respective spheres of influence across the Levant – an agreement that entirely disregarded the region’s history, ethnic and religious traditions and affiliations, and the will of local populations.	一战战火仍在肆虐时，他们就签署了由外交官马克·赛克斯爵士（Sir Mark Sykes）和弗朗索瓦·乔治-皮科（François George-Picot）起草的协定，划定了各自在黎凡特的势力范围。 该协定完全不顾该地区的历史、种族和宗教传统和从属关系，也没有考虑本地居民的意愿。


The modern states of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon thus arose as separate, independent entities.	因此，现代伊拉克、叙利亚和黎巴嫩都成了不同的独立实体。


Their borders were arbitrary and artificial, and none had ever existed in such form.	它们的边界是人为武断地决定的，没有一个国家历史上以现有边界出现过。


(The case of Palestine was even more complicated, owing to Britain’s conflicting promises to Arabs and Jews.)	（拜英国向阿拉伯人和犹太人所做的互相矛盾的承诺所赐，巴勒斯坦的情况更加复杂。 ）


Eventually, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon became independent countries, modeled on the Westphalian idea of the modern nation-state.	最终，伊拉克、叙利亚和黎巴嫩成为以威斯特伐利亚思想（Westphalian idea）为基础的独立国家。


Their leaders maintained this system – and its borders – as the best available.	它们的领导人维持了这一体系以及边界。


None of these rulers, especially the authoritarian ones who emerged after independence, had an interest in rocking the boat.	局面的混乱化对这些统治者，特别是独立后所崛起的极权统治者，十分不利。


That Western-imposed system is now unraveling.	这一西方确立的体系如今正在分崩离析。


Nation-states cannot be sustained when they do not reflect the wishes of their populations.	如果不能体现人民的意愿，民族国家就无法维持。


The United States-led invasion of Iraq put an end not only to Saddam Hussein’s rule, but also to Sunni-minority control, established by the British generations ago.	美国所领导的入侵伊拉克不但结束了萨达姆·侯赛因的通知，也终结了好几十年前英国所建立的逊尼派少数群体掌权的体制。


The Shia majority, once unleashed, viewed US-backed democratic elections as a vehicle for imposing hegemonic control over the country.	获得解放的什叶派多数群体把美国所支持的民主选举作为称霸全国的手段。


Iraq today is not the unitary Arab nation-state that it was, and it is doubtful whether that state can be restored.	今天的伊拉克已不是曾经的统一的阿拉伯民族国家，是否能够重建昔日的阿拉伯民族国家已经成为一个疑问。


The Kurdish Regional Government in the north is a de facto state, with its own army, border authorities, and control (up to a point) of the natural resources located on its territory.	北部的库尔德地区政府（Kurdish Regional Government，KRG）已是一个事实国家，在国土上部署了自己的军队和出入境当局，并（一定程度上）控制了领土内的自然资源。


Foreign consulates in the KRG’s capital, Erbil, effectively function as embassies.	其首府埃尔比勒的外国领事馆实际上在行使大使馆的职能。


In Syria, what started as peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations deteriorated quickly into an armed insurrection of the Sunni majority against the hegemony of the Alawite sect, led by the Assad family.	在叙利亚，一开始以亲民主和平示威面貌出现的运动迅速演变为逊尼派多数针对以阿萨德家族为首的阿拉维派霸权的武装暴动。


As with Iraq, it is difficult to see how Syria can be reconstituted as a unitary Arab nation-state.	与伊拉克一样，很难指望叙利亚重新成为统一的阿拉伯民族国家。


The de facto dismemberment of both countries’ central state authorities gave rise to a totally new player – the Islamic State, which has announced the establishment of a caliphate straddling Iraq and Syria, totally disregarding the old Sykes-Picot arrangement.	这两个国家的核心国家政权已形成事实分裂之势，一个全新的行动方——伊斯兰国应运而生。 伊斯兰国已宣布建立了一个横跨叙利���和伊拉克的哈里发帝国，完全无视昔日的赛克斯-皮科协定。


The Islamic State, an offshoot of Al Qaeda, probably will not succeed in creating a viable, cross-border entity, but its brutal effort and Islamist ideology certainly suggest that the old borders, and the states delineated by them, are on their way out.	身为基地组织支系的伊斯兰国或许无法成功地建立一个可维持的跨境实体，但其野蛮行径和伊斯兰教意识形态显然表明旧边界及其所确定的国家正在成为过去。


Indeed, the group’s recent incursions into Lebanon may also undermine the fragile inter-communal balance there.	事实上，伊斯兰国最近入侵黎巴嫩的举动或许也破坏了后者国内脆弱的群体间平衡。


The unraveling of the Western-imposed state system is taking place elsewhere in the greater Middle East.	西方确立的国家体系的分崩离析在大中东的其他地区也在发生。


Sudan – a vast, multiethnic, and multi-confessional country, established as a political entity by the British in the 1890s – is continuing to fray.	苏丹分裂局势仍在发酵。 该国是一个广袤的多种族、多宗教政治实体，由英国在19世纪90年代建立。


The emergence, after a prolonged and bloody civil war, of an independent South Sudan in 2011, freed the local Christian and animist population from the Arab/Muslim yoke.	2011年，在经历了长期的血腥内战后，南苏丹独立，使当地的基督徒和万物有灵论者不再受到阿拉伯/穆斯林的压迫。


But Darfur is still bleeding, and South Sudan is far from being a stable polity.	但达尔富尔依然在流血，南苏丹政局距离稳定也相去甚远。


Libya, too, is disintegrating.	利比亚也处于分裂之中。


The two provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which Italy wrested from the Ottomans just before WWI, were forced together into an entity called “Libya,” despite their profound historical and cultural differences.	在一战前夕被意大利从奥斯曼帝国手中夺走的的黎波里塔尼亚和昔兰尼加两省被强迫加入了一个叫“利比亚”的实体，尽管它们的历史和文化大相径庭。


Since Muammar el-Qaddafi’s demise in 2011, Libyans have failed to establish a coherent state structure of any sort, cycling through six prime ministers.	自2011年卡扎菲倒台以来，利比亚人就一直无法建立起一个团结的国家结构，六位总理轮番执政。


Pious Western sermons about the need to form a unified, democratically elected government sound utterly irrelevant, given the extent of social and political fragmentation.	西方苦口婆心地宣传必须建立一个统一的、民主选举的政府，但考虑到利比亚社会和政治的严重分裂状态，这一宣传听起来完全与利比亚不相干。


There is one exception to this regional development: Egypt.	这一地区发展趋势有一个例外：埃及。


For all of its internal tribulations, there is no doubt that Egypt is a coherent entity, deeply anchored in history and in the consciousness of its population.	尽管埃及也经历了众多内部磨难，但毫无疑问，它仍是一个团结的实体，有其深厚的历史和人民觉悟为根基。


For all of the problems confronting the Coptic Christian community, no one doubts that they are as Egyptian as the Muslim majority.	尽管科普特基督徒社区面临各种问题，但毫无疑问，他们与穆斯林多数群体一样都是埃及人。


But Egypt, too, has followed a defining regional pattern.	但埃及也在走具有地区特征的道路。


Whereas secularism in the West arose with the emergence of liberal and democratic forces inspired by the Enlightenment, in the Muslim Middle East it has always been imposed by authoritarian rulers: the Shah in Iran, Atatürk in Turkey, Saddam in Iraq, Assad in Syria, and Nasser and Mubarak in Egypt.	在西方，世俗主义随着启蒙运动所激发的自由和民主力量的成长而崛起，但在穆斯林中东，世俗主义却是由极权统治者施加的：伊朗的沙哈、土耳其的阿塔图尔克、伊拉克的萨达姆、叙利亚的阿萨德，以及埃及的纳赛尔和穆巴拉克。


This explains why Syria’s Christian and Druze minorities now support Assad, and why the Copts in Egypt support military rule: democratic majoritarian rule means Muslim hegemony.	这就解释了为何叙利亚基督徒和德鲁兹派少数群体现在会支持巴沙尔·阿萨德，也解释了埃及科普特人支持军事统治：民主多数规则意味着穆斯林霸权。


Europe endured centuries of violent religious and national struggle, culminating in the horrors of the two world wars, before achieving its current stable state system.	欧洲经历过数百年的宗教和民族斗争，在两次世界大战达到顶峰，随后才实现了目前的稳定的国家体系。


The Middle East probably will pay less in terms of time and violence; but the idea that what emerges will necessarily be European-style nation-states may turn out to be a Western conceit.	中东也许不必付出如此长时间和暴力的代价； 但最终必然出现欧洲式民族国家的观点也许只是西方的狂妄。


The late literary theorist and public intellectual Edward Said might even have called it an example of paternalistic Orientalism.	已故的文学理论家、公共知识分子爱德华·萨义德（Edward Said）甚至有可能将其称为家长作风的东方主义例子。


The Great American Losing Streak	美国的连败魔咒


JERUSALEM – The interim agreement reached in Geneva between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) and Iran is probably the best deal to curtail Iran’s nuclear program that could be reached, given current circumstances.	耶路撒冷——鉴于当前形势，联合国安理会五大常任理事国加上德国（P5+1）与伊朗达成的日内瓦临时协议或许是遏制伊朗核计划可能的最好结果。


The United States and its Western allies were unwilling to risk a military option, and not concluding a deal would have allowed Iran to proceed unimpeded toward acquiring nuclear weapons.	美国及其西方盟国都不愿冒险动用武力，而不达成协议相当于默许伊朗随心所欲地获取核武器。


In an ideal world, Iran should have been forced to scrap its nuclear program altogether and hand over all of its enriched uranium to an outside power; but, realistically, that was unattainable.	理想世界的处理方法应当是迫使伊朗完全放弃核计划，并将浓缩铀全部移交给外部大国掌控； 但现实世界中这相当于痴人说梦。


So the outcome of the Geneva talks is that Iran has secured some international legitimation as a nuclear-threshold power, which deeply worries its regional neighbors, from Saudi Arabia and Israel to Turkey, Egypt, and the small and vulnerable Gulf states.	因此日内瓦会谈的结果是伊朗作为核国家取得了某种国际合法性，阿拉伯、以色列、土耳其、埃及和弱小的海湾国家因此而深感不安。


Western statesmen are right to congratulate themselves on averting an immediate major crisis.	西方政治家庆幸避免了一场迫在眉睫的重大危机是对的。


But they are wrong to believe that they have resolved the Iranian nuclear threat.	但认为伊朗核威胁已经解除却过于天真。


Indeed, it is naïve to imagine that a final agreement with Iran will be achieved in the coming six months: Iran’s seasoned diplomats will make sure that that does not happen.	事实上，认为能在六个月内与伊朗达成最终协议是幼稚的表现：伊朗的资深外交家们将确保这种情况不会发生。


So, while the interim agreement may not be a replay of the Munich Agreement in 1938, as many critics contend, it may have set the stage for an even more combustible future.	所以，尽管临时协议未必如批评者所言是1938年《慕尼黑协定》的翻版，但它的确可能奠定了未来频繁的冲突。


US President Barack Obama may not be in office when the fire ignites, but if things do go terribly wrong, he may be remembered as another statesman who, like Neville Chamberlain, was blind to the consequences of his peaceful intentions.	战火燃起时美国总统奥巴马可能已经离任，但如果真出大问题，他有可能像茫然不知其和平意图后果的政治家内维尔·张伯伦那样留在人们的记忆中。


The main reason for pessimism stems from the interim agreement’s wider geopolitical context, which has been ignored in favor of the regional dimension.	悲观的主要原因是临时协议忽略了广泛的地缘政治背景而只考虑地区因素。


In fact, the agreement, which alleviates much of the economic pressure on the Iranian regime, is a result of Russia’s success in delaying international sanctions against Iran and its stubborn refusal to tighten them further.	事实上，协议大大减轻了伊朗政权的经济压力，是俄国成功延缓对伊朗国际制裁及顽固拒绝收紧制裁措施的结果。


For the Kremlin, Iran’s nuclear program is only one chapter in a campaign to reassert Russia’s role as a great power.	对克里姆林而言，伊朗核计划是重塑俄国大国形象的重要步骤。


Indeed, the interim agreement should be viewed as another in a string of recent Russian diplomatic victories over the US.	事实上，临时协议应被视为俄国对美国取得一连串外交胜利中最近的一步。


The current US administration lacks the type of grand strategy that animates Russian President Vladimir Putin.	现任美国政府缺少俄总统弗拉基米尔·普京拥有的那种宏大战略。


Instead, it considers every issue separately, unsure about how to balance its role as a global power with its commitment to liberal values, and led by a president who apparently believes that soaring rhetoric is a substitute for strategic thinking.	相反，它以孤立的方式看待问题，并且因显然认为可以用慷慨陈词来取代战略思考的总统的领导，不知如何在全球大国形象和献身自由价值之间取得平衡。


There should be no illusion: The interim agreement with Iran is a resounding triumph for Putin, not for Obama and US Secretary of State John Kerry.	这个问题决不能搞错：与伊朗签订临时协议大获全胜的不是奥巴马和美国国务卿克里，而是普京。


That victory was quickly followed by another – Ukraine’s decision to reject an association agreement with the European Union, opting instead to join Putin’s pet project, a Eurasian customs union designed to reconstitute much of the Soviet Union as a single economic zone.	普京一个胜利接着另一个胜利——乌克兰拒绝与欧盟签订联合协议，而选择加入普京组建的前苏联大部分加盟共和国组成单一经济区的欧亚关税同盟宠物项目。


Meanwhile, the Syrian crisis also is going the Kremlin’s way, with President Bashar al-Assad remaining in power, despite Obama’s insistence that he leave.	此外，叙利亚危机也朝着有利于克里姆林宫的方向发展，尽管奥巴马一再坚持阿萨德总统必须离开，但他仍将继续执政。


Obama’s threat last summer to use limited force in Syria was empty rhetoric.	奥巴马去年夏天在叙利亚使用有限武力的威胁充其量是一句空话。


It might have convinced Assad to give up his chemical weapons, but Russia’s threat to veto any muscular Security Council resolution against Syria guaranteed that his murderous regime would retain control.	阿萨德的确可能因此放弃了使用化学武器，但俄国否决对叙利亚任何强力安理会决议的威胁确保了阿萨德的杀人政权将继续执政。


Even if a Geneva II meeting on Syria is convened in January, Russia will ensure that Assad remains on the throne.	即使1月将就叙利亚问题召开第二次日内瓦会议，俄国也将确保阿萨德仍留在宝座上。


America’s strategic vacuum can also be seen in Egypt in the wake of the military’s overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government.	埃及军队推翻总统穆罕默德·穆尔西的穆兄会政府后也可以看到美国的战略真空。


Obama’s uncertainty about how to deal with the coup has created an absurd situation in which most Western-oriented groups in Egypt – the military and secular elites who underpinned Mubarak’s alliance with the US – have now turned, in desperation, to Russia as a source of future military supplies.	奥巴马面对政变惊慌失措造成了目前这样的荒谬局面：包括支持穆巴拉克与美国联盟的军队及世俗精英在内的埃及多数亲西方团体现在迫于无奈转向俄国作为未来的军用物资供应商。


Decades of American strategic thinking and diplomacy, initiated by Henry Kissinger in the 1970’s, aimed at weaning Egypt from its Russian alliance, now appear in danger of going down the drain because of Obama’s inability to make up his mind about Morsi’s overthrow.	基辛格20世纪70年代创建几十年的美国战略思维和外交旨在切断埃俄联盟，现在都可能因为奥巴马无法在推翻穆尔西的问题上下定决心而彻底付诸东流。


Of course, it is not easy to support a military coup against a democratically elected president (even one who, like Morsi, undermines the democratic values and institutions that brought him to power).	当然，支持军事政变推翻民选总统绝非易事（即使像穆尔西这样的民选总统破坏令其当选的民主价值观和体制）。


But one wonders how Obama would have reacted in 1933 had the German military toppled Hitler (who, after all, was appointed Chancellor after winning an election).	但人们不禁要问奥巴马会对1933年德国军队推翻希特勒作何反应（希特勒毕竟是在赢得大选后担任了总理职务）。


One does not have to demonize Russia – or Putin – to be worried by these developments.	无需妖魔化俄国——或者普京——就会对事态的发展忧心忡忡。


Russia is entitled to its place as a leading power.	俄国有资格充当领导力量。


And the US should shun a domineering policy.	而美国也应避免飞扬跋扈的政策。


But, confronted with a resolute Russian policy of imperial re-assertion, now also visible in the Caucasus, the US seems unable to see how global developments are linked.	但面对俄国坚定不移的帝国重振政策，（现在在高加索也已清晰可见）美国似乎未能察觉全球事态发展的联系因素。


Is anyone in Washington asking how the Geneva agreements on Syria and Iran are connected to Ukraine’s refusal to move closer to the EU, much less developing a strategic response?	先不说制定战略对策，华盛顿有没有人在问叙（利亚）伊（朗）问题日内瓦协议与乌克兰拒绝靠拢欧盟之间有关系没有？


The choice facing the US is not former President George W. Bush’s megalomaniacal swashbuckling or global withdrawal.	美国所面临的选择既不是像前总统乔治·W·布什那样狂妄自大的虚张声势也不是全球性撤退。


Russia’s resurgence calls for a reasoned American response, combining its preponderant power and recognition of the inherent limits on the use of that power.	俄罗斯的重新崛起要求美国结合优势力量及针对性应用固有限制的认识做出合理的反应。


The current US administration seems incapable of this, and Tea Party isolationism certainly is not the answer.	目前的美国政府似乎没有能力做到这一点，而茶党孤立主义无疑绝非解决之道。


A rudderless US foreign policy is no response to a resurgent and neo-authoritarian Russia flexing its geopolitical muscle.	群龙无首美国的外交政策是对展示地缘政治实力的复兴的新专制俄国不做任何反应。


Nostalgia for a Metternich, or a Kissinger, may not be out of order.	人们或许有理由怀念梅特涅或者基辛格。


A Separated Peace	隔离的和平


MADRID – Back in 1996, Binyamin Netanyahu won a general election by mobilizing large constituencies against then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s alleged intention to “divide Jerusalem.”	马德里—1996年，内塔尼亚胡发动大量选民反对时任总理佩雷斯的传闻的“耶路撒冷分治”意图，并凭此赢得大选。


Nearly two decades later, Netanyahu remains committed to old, vacuous slogans about a “united Jerusalem” – a conviction that could, yet again, unravel the Israel-Palestine peace process.	近二十年后，内塔尼亚胡仍然坚持着陈旧而毫无意义的“统一的耶路撒冷”的口号——这一决心可能再次让以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程流产。


As US Secretary of State John Kerry prepares to present a framework agreement for a conclusive round of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, Netanyahu’s hardline position on Jerusalem is simply a non-starter.	美国国务卿克里准备给以巴和平谈判成果轮带来一个框架性协议，而内塔尼亚胡对耶路撒冷的强硬立场决不是良好的开端。


In a last-ditch effort to improve the proposal’s chances of success, US President Barack Obama – who has largely avoided taking a proactive role in the peace process during his second term – met with Netanyahu at the White House to urge him to moderate his position.	作为改善这一提案成功的最后努力，美国总统奥巴马——他一直避免在第二个任期中对以巴和平进程表现出积极态度——在白宫会见了内塔尼亚胡，敦促他温和化自己的立场。


But changing Netanyahu’s mind will not be easy – not least because of the domestic political pressure that he faces.	但改变内塔尼亚胡的主意决非易事——不仅是因为他所面临的国内政治压力。


Since Israel captured East Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War, the country’s political class has championed the city as Israel’s “united eternal capital” – a vision that they remain unwilling to abandon.	自以色列通过1967年六日战争占领东耶路撒冷以来，以色列政治阶层就一直在宣扬将耶路撒冷作为以色列的“统一的永久首都”，并且至今不愿放弃这一愿望。


The problem is that no serious negotiation with the Palestinians could accommodate this position.	问题在于不可能在严肃的以巴谈判中提出这一建议。


Jerusalem’s Arab population – which already accounts for more than 40% of the total – is growing by 3.5% annually, compared to 1.5% among Israelis.	耶路撒冷的阿拉伯人口——占总人口的40%以上——每年以3. 5%的速度增长，而以色列人口的增长速度只有1.


Once this sizeable swath of voters begins participating in municipal elections – which they have so far avoided, lest they be viewed as legitimizing Israeli rule – control of the city council is likely to pass to a Palestinian majority.	5%。 当如此比例的人口结构作用于市政选举时——目前仍没有举行过，唯恐给以色列的统治落下合法的口实——耶路撒冷市议会很有可能落入巴勒斯坦多数之手。


Peres understood that a Jerusalem united under exclusively Israeli rule was not feasible, assuring Norway’s foreign minister in a 1993 letter – critical to the conclusion of the Oslo accords – that Israel would respect the autonomy of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem.	佩雷斯明白，清一色以色列人治下的统一的耶路撒冷是不可能完成的任务，在1993年致挪威外长的信中，他保证以色列将尊重东耶路撒冷巴勒斯坦机构的自治，这也是奥斯陆协议最终达成的关键。


Likewise, in 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak endorsed the Clinton Parameters, which called for Jerusalem’s division into two capitals along ethnic lines.	类似地，2000年，巴拉克总理也赞同克林顿参数（Clinton Parameters），设想将耶路撒冷根据种族成分划分为两个首都。


Prime Minister Ehud Olmert followed suit in his 2008 peace proposal to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas; he also recommended internationalizing the Old City’s administration.	奥尔默特总理也步此后尘，在2008年向巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯提出了和平动议，他还建议让旧城（Old City）的管理国际化。


Yet Netanyahu and his supporters remain adamant that Jerusalem will not be split.	但内塔尼亚胡及其支持者仍固执地认为耶路撒冷不可分割。


What they fail to grasp is that the 1980 Jerusalem Law, which declared the city – “united in its entirety” – to be Israel’s capital did not actually result in unity.	他们没有领会1980年耶路撒冷法（Jerusalem Law）的精神。 耶路撒冷法宣布了该市——“保持统一完整状态”——成为以色列首都实际上没有带来统一。


The subsequent effort to “Israelize” the city, by building a network of Jewish neighborhoods in Palestinian-dominated East Jerusalem, has failed to secure a solid Jewish majority, largely owing to the unwillingness of middle-class Israelis to settle there.	随后的耶路撒冷“以色列化”政策——在巴勒斯坦人占多数的东耶路撒冷建立犹太人社区网络——也没有确保巩固犹太人多数，主要是因为中产阶级以色列人不愿住在那里。


Indeed, not only has the settlement project turned East Jerusalem into a hub of political and social tension, but the high financial cost – more than $20 billion in total – forced the diversion of limited resources from growth-oriented investment in West Jerusalem.	事实上，不但定居点工程让东耶路撒冷成为政治和社会紧张的温床，高昂的金融成本——总量超过过200亿美元——迫使有限的资源无法用于西耶路撒冷的增长导向型投资。


As a result, Jerusalem has become Israel’s poorest city.	结果，耶路撒冷沦为以色列最贫穷的城市。


Unsurprisingly, the 200,000 members of Israel’s liberal and prosperous middle class that abandoned the city in the last 20 years find Tel Aviv – Israel’s economic capital, and a center of technology-driven growth – far more appealing.	毫不奇怪，在过去二十年中，有200,000以色列自由繁荣的中产阶级成员抛弃了耶路撒冷，来到吸引力远远胜之的以色列经济首都、科技驱动创新的中心——特拉维夫。


Complicating the situation further is the division between secular Israelis and the fanatic Orthodox communities whose rejection of the secular state and yearning for a society based on the strictest interpretation of Halacha (Jewish religious law) epitomize a deep-seated fear of Arabs and an uncompromising distrust of gentiles.	让局面进一步复杂化的是世俗以色列人和狂热正教社区之间的分歧。 后者拒绝接受世俗国家，向往基于最严格的哈拉卡（犹太宗教法）的社会，这给阿拉伯人造成了深深的恐惧，也让非犹太教徒无法妥协和信任。


Such communities, which comprise 30% of Jerusalem’s population, make the notion of a united, peaceful Jerusalem farfetched, at best.	这些社区占以色列人口的30%，他们心中的统一的耶路撒冷的概念与现实格格不入。


In 1966, a year before Israeli paratroopers ostensibly united Jerusalem, the composer Naomi Shemer sang of, “the city that sits solitary, and in its heart a wall.”	1966年，即以色列伞兵从表面上统一耶路撒冷的前一年，作曲家舍莫尔（Naomi Shemer）唱道：“这座城市是单独的，在它中心有一堵墙。


Today, the wall dividing Jerusalem is not made of concrete or brick – but that does not make it any less real.	”如今，这堵分割耶路撒冷的墙并非由水泥和砖头砌成，但它仍然实实在在地存在着。


This enduring division is exemplified in the contrast between municipal services and infrastructure in the city’s Jewish and Arab neighborhoods.	这一顽固的分歧可以从犹太社区和阿拉伯社区之间市政服务和基础设施的巨大反差中一窥端倪。


Of course, to some degree, Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents benefit from Israel’s advanced social-security and health-care systems, the likes of which their brethren in the Palestinian Authority can only imagine.	当然，从某种程度上说，耶路撒冷的巴勒斯坦居民从以色列的先进社会安全和医疗系统中获益，这些东西对于巴勒斯坦权力机构来说是不可想象的。


Nonetheless, they continue to identify themselves as Palestinian, with only 10,000 of Jerusalem’s 300,000 Palestinian residents having agreed to apply for Israeli citizenship.	尽管如此，他们仍视自己为巴勒斯坦人，在耶路撒冷300,000巴勒斯坦居民中，只有10,000人同意申请以色列居民身份。


But the Jerusalem issue is subject to an even more fundamental confusion: What are Jerusalem’s actual boundaries?	但耶路撒冷问题有一个更加根本的困惑：什么是耶路撒冷的实际边界？


In the cavalier spirit that prevailed after 1967, the Israeli government extended the city’s boundaries from 10,875 acres to more than 31,000 acres.	在1967年后通行的骑士精神中，以色列政府将耶路撒冷市的面积从10,875英亩扩大到31,000多英亩。


Netanyahu’s claim that this extended Jerusalem is the biblical capital of the Jewish people is a historical travesty.	内亚尼亚胡所生成的扩大的耶路撒冷面积是圣经中记载的犹太人首都的说法简直是在开历史的玩笑。


A Jerusalem controlled by non-productive Orthodox Jewish communities and disenfranchised Palestinians is destined for economic and political collapse.	被成事不足、败事有余的正教犹太社区和没有公民权的巴勒斯坦控制的耶路撒冷注定要遭受经济和政治崩溃。


Kerry’s plan to divide the city along ethnic lines amounts to Israel’s last chance to avoid such an outcome and legitimize the city as its internationally recognized capital.	克里的计划——将耶路撒冷按种族成分一分为二——是以色列最后的避免经济和政治崩溃、让该市成为合法的国际管辖首都的最后机会。


By agreeing to a divided Jerusalem, Netanyahu would be initiating the long-overdue departure from the hubris and megalomania that has brought the city to its current state of stagnation and isolation.	如若同意分割耶路撒冷，则内塔尼亚胡将能启动迟到很久的告别妄尊自大之路。 正是这一妄尊自大让耶路撒冷陷入了如今停滞孤立的状态。


Giving up on a “united” Jerusalem is the only way to secure the city’s “eternal” status.	放弃“统一的”耶路撒冷是保证耶路撒冷“永久”地位的唯一办法。


The Rise of an Insecure Giant	一个不自信巨人的崛起


SEOUL – By the time China overtakes the United States as the world’s largest economy sometime in the next few years, it will have cemented its status as a major military power – one whose drive to assert itself strategically already is inspiring serious anxiety among its neighbors.	发自首尔——在数年后中国超过美国成为世界最大经济体之时，它也已经巩固了自身作为主要军事强国的地位——而其在战略上维护自身利益的举动已经在临近各国引发了强烈忧虑。


But the truth is that China is a solitary, vulnerable rising power – one that faces potentially crippling domestic challenges.	但事实上中国的大国崛起是一个封闭而脆弱的——还面临着潜在的破坏性国内挑战。


China is currently encircled by US military installations and allies.	中国目前处于美国军事基地和盟友的包围之下。


While Asian countries are largely willing to maintain and even expand their economic ties with China, none (except North Korea, which depends on Chinese aid) is prepared to accept it as the region’s primary power.	虽然亚洲国家大都愿意保持甚至扩大与中国的经济关系，但除了依赖中国援助的朝鲜之外，都不准备接其作为该地区的主要势力。


In fact, US allies like Indonesia and India have emerged as global players largely in response to China’s rise.	事实上，像印尼和印度这样的美国盟友在很大程度上正是为了应对中国崛起才成为了全球事务参与者。


For its part, the US has shifted substantial military power toward Asia – with high-profile military deployments in Australia and the Philippines, and 60% of America’s naval capabilities now deployed in the region – and has enhanced its defense ties with Japan and South Korea.	作为战略的一部分，美国向亚洲转移了大量的军事力量——在澳大利亚和菲律宾进行高调军事部署，目前美国60%的海军力量已经部署在该地区——以及加强与日本和韩国的防务联系。


Moreover, it is helping to spearhead the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an economic and trade agreement that excludes China but includes many of its regional neighbors.	此外，它正在与中国周边邻国建立跨太平洋伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership），而中国则被排除在这一经济与贸易协议之外。


Against this background, US claims that its strategic rebalancing is not about containing China are not particularly convincing.	在此背景下，美国声称其战略调整并非针对中国的说法就显得不是特别有说服力。


Indeed, the US is pursuing a strategy of primacy in Asia, not a partnership between equals, and this, together with China’s own internal tensions, is undermining China’s ability to participate productively in regional and global forums.	事实上，美国追求的是一个主导亚洲的战略，而不是平等关系，这与中国内部的紧张因素一道削弱了中国积极参与区域和全球对话的能力。


As it stands, China lacks the confidence and experience needed to navigate the international arena.	目前来说中国还缺乏在国际舞台上的信心和经验。


For example, it will not consider resolving in an international forum its dispute with Japan in the East China Sea over the Diaoyu Islands (called the Senkaku Islands in Japan).	例如它不会考虑在通过国际对话去解决与日本在中国东海钓鱼岛（日本称为尖阁群岛）的主权争端问题。


International law, China understands, is a double-edged sword that can be used against China in other territorial disputes, or even in its domestic affairs.	中国认为国际法是把双刃剑，可以在其他领土争端问题上，甚至在其国内事务上对自身不利。


Similarly, China’s miserly initial offer of $100,000 in aid following the recent typhoon in the Philippines demonstrates how far the country is from being a mature member of the international community.	类似的还体现在最近菲律宾台风的援助工作中，中国最初仅仅吝啬地提出10万美元的援助金额，显示该国距离一个成熟的国际社会成员尚有一段距离。


As a Chinese official admitted at a recent seminar in Seoul, concepts like “regional order” have never been a part of the country’s political vocabulary.	而正如一个中国官员在最近首尔举行的一次研讨会上承认的那样，像“区域秩序”这样的概念从未被列入该国政治词汇之中。


With regard to Japan, China faces a conundrum.	而日本则是中国的一大难题。


It is relatively content with Japan being a US security protectorate, because it fears the alternative: a Japan that expands its independent military reach.	中国对日本处于美国保护之下的状态相对感到满意，因为它担心另一种情况：一个扩展其独立军事影响力的日本。


But US efforts to avoid precisely such an outcome cannot be good news for the Chinese, either, given that they entail a deepening of the bilateral defense relationship and support for upgrading Japan’s military capabilities.	但美国努力避免出现这种局面的做法对中国也不是什么好消息，因为日美必将不断深化双边防御关系并支持日本提高自身军事实力。


In short, China’s regional exceptionalism has landed it in a strategic trap.	总之，中国的区域例外主义（exceptionalism）已经导致其落到了一个战略陷阱里。


It is unwilling to accept American leadership in Asia; but it is also reluctant to assume a more prominent role in promoting regional integration, fearing the concomitant pressure for more economic liberalization, adherence to international norms and rules, and a more transparent approach to its military buildup.	它不愿意接受美国在亚洲的领导； 但它也不愿承担更多促进区域一体化的角色，担心会因此产生更多经济自由化，国际规范规则遵守，以及军力建设透明度的压力。


Even the proliferation of China’s economic ties in Africa, the Middle East, and South America may reflect vulnerability rather than imperial ambition.	甚至连中国在非洲，中东和南美经济联系的扩散也可能反映了其脆弱性而不是帝国野心。


China’s voracious quest for new energy sources has already caused it to overstretch its limited ability to protect its sea lanes.	中国对新能源的贪婪追求已经超出其保护海上航线的有限能力。


Despite bold reform plans – outlined at the recent Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – China’s prospects remain compromised by deep-rooted contradictions.	尽管中国共产党十八届三中全会提出了大胆的改革计划，但中国的前景仍然会受到深层次的矛盾所阻碍。


For example, the inherent tension between the social change that development demands and the imperative of political stability required by authoritarian rule makes the current situation unsustainable in the long run.	例如社会变革和发展需要两者与专政统治所需要的政治稳定原则之间的内在紧张关系，使得当前形势在长期上是不可持续的。


Likewise, if the reform outline’s promise of a “decisive role” for the market ends up raising wages for poor Chinese, domestic demand might increase, but China will lose its main competitive advantage in international markets.	同样，如果改革纲要承诺发挥市场的“决定性作用”，最终提高中国贫困人口的工资，国内需求可能增加，但中国将在国际市场上失去其主要的竞争优势。


This kind of dilemma has contributed to the fall of other developing-country dictatorships.	其他专政统治下的发展中国家正是因这种困境而衰落的。


China understands that, for now, US strategic primacy is an immutable reality.	中国明白，当前美国的战略地位是不可改变的现实。


Even so, its leaders’ strategic anxiety was on display at President Xi Jinping’s June meeting with US President Barack Obama, where he demanded, with the vagueness characteristic of Chinese officials, “mutual respect” and recognition of China’s “territorial integrity.”	即便如此，其领导人的战略焦虑也在国家主席习近平六月会见美国总统奥巴马时体现了出来，带着中国官员式的含糊特质，他要求美国“相互尊重”并且承认中国的“领土完整”。


The ostensibly trivial expression “mutual respect” actually modulates China’s true desire: a return to the Westphalian principle of non-interference in states’ domestic affairs, particularly their human-rights records.	表面上看似微不足道的“相互尊重”实际上表达了中国的真实愿望：回到不干涉它国内政的威斯特伐利亚原则，尤其是人权记录方面。


China has staunchly opposed Western efforts, whether in Syria or in North Korea, to circumvent this principle with doctrines like the “Responsibility to Protect.”	中国坚决反对西方无论是在叙利亚还是朝鲜所做的努力，以“保护责任”这类信条来规避这一原则。


Similarly, Xi’s call for the US to respect its “territorial integrity” carries a specific and pointed message.	同样，习近平呼吁美国尊重其“领土完整”则蕴含了具体和明确的信息。


In China’s view, the US has increasingly been encroaching on its rights with regard to Taiwan, while refusing to recognize China’s many other territorial and maritime claims against US allies in the South China Sea.	中国认为美国已越来越多地侵蚀其对台湾的主权，并拒绝承认中国许多其他针对美国南中国海盟友的领土和领海主张。


Experience demonstrates the dangers that can arise when vulnerable powers act independently.	经验表明，当弱势权力独立行动时会产生危机。


One need look no further than Israel, with its penchant for overreaction on security matters, or Iran, with its insistence on enriching uranium, to see what can happen when an isolated power bases its actions on a sense of existential vulnerability.	不用想得太远，从以色列在安全问题上的过度反应，或是伊朗在铀浓缩问题上的坚持，就能看到一个孤立的政权在刚愎自用的基础上行动可能会导致何种状况。


China’s rise is fraught with fear and uncertainty.	中国的崛起是充满恐惧和不确定性的。


Encirclement by a foreign power that threatens to encroach on what it considers to be its inalienable sovereign rights is bound to drive it to become a revolutionary power bent on upending the status quo.	在威胁侵犯其自认不可剥夺的主权的外国势力重重包围下，必将驱使它成为颠覆现状的革命性力量。


Before China and the US overstep each other’s boundaries, they should abandon the concepts of “primacy” and “containment” in favor of a concert of Asian powers capable of resolving their differences.	在中国和美国超越彼此的边界之前，它们应该放弃“至高无上”和“遏制”的概念，以支持亚洲各国形成和谐解决分歧的能力。


The Gaza Trap	加沙陷阱


TEL AVIV – Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” against Hamas in Gaza is the kind of asymmetrical warfare that has characterized nearly all Middle East conflicts in recent years.	特拉维夫—以色列针对加沙地带哈马斯的“防护之刃行动”（Operation Protective Edge）是一场不对称战争。 这种战争几乎贯穿了近几年来中东冲突的全过程。


Victories in such wars are always elusive.	战争的结果毫无悬念。


Whatever the achievements of Israel’s superior army and its anti-missile systems, and however appalling the devastation of Gaza, Hamas will survive, if only because Israel wants it to.	不管以色列占绝对优势的军队和反导系统取得了什么战果，也不论加沙的状况是多么惨烈，哈马斯都会活下来，因为以色列希望这样。


The alternative – jihadist anarchy that would turn Gaza into a Palestinian Somalia – is simply too unbearable to contemplate.	另一条道路——将加沙变成巴勒斯坦索马里的圣战主义无政府状态——实在太可怕，根本无法想象。


Hamas leader Khaled Meshal’s boastful rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Hamas’s military power has been dealt a devastating blow.	哈马斯领导人马沙尔（Khaled Meshal）的自吹自擂无法掩盖事实——哈马斯军事实力已经遭到毁灭性打击。


But, unless Israel is ready to pay an exceptionally high price in terms of its international standing by occupying Gaza and destroying its entire military hierarchy and arsenal, Hamas can still claim victory, having survived yet another onslaught by Israel’s colossal military machine.	但是，除非以色列做好付出高昂的代价，以占领加沙、摧毁哈马斯全部军事序列和武库换取国际舆论的千夫所指，否则哈马斯仍可以宣称他们取得了胜利，又一次在以色列的强大军事机器的碾压下活了下来。


The superior power in an asymmetrical conflict always has a problem defining its objectives.	不对称冲突的压倒性实力总会造成一个目标定义的问题。


In this case, Israel aspires to achieve “quiet” with few enough Palestinian civilian casualties to minimize international criticism.	在这方面，以色列渴望的是实现“安静”，尽量减少巴勒斯坦平民伤亡，以实现国际批评最小化。


But the failure to achieve this goal is precisely where the superior power is defeated in asymmetrical conflicts.	但没能达到这一目标便是压倒性优势方在不对称冲突中的败绩。


Moreover, “quiet” is not a strategic goal; nor is Israel’s way of pursuing it – a war every two or three years – particularly convincing.	此外，“安静”并非战略目标，以色列追求它的方式——两三年打一次仗——也并不令人信服。


The real question is this: Assuming that Israel gets the quiet that it wants, what does it intend to do with Gaza in the future?	真正的问题是：假设以色列获得了它想要的安静，它会对加沙的未来做什么？


And what does it intend to do with the Palestinian problem of which Gaza is an integral part?	会对以加沙为主要部分的巴勒斯坦问题做什么？


The question of Palestine is at the root of the asymmetrical wars that Israel has been facing in recent years, not only against Hamas, Qatar’s Palestinian client, but also against Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in the region.	巴勒斯坦问题是近几年来以色列所面临的不对称战争的根源。 以色列的对手不仅包括卡塔尔的巴勒斯坦代理人哈马斯，也包括伊朗的地区代理人真主党。


These wars are creating a new kind of threat to Israel, for they add to the conflicts’ strictly military dimension the domains of diplomacy, regional politics, legitimacy, and international law, in which Israel does not have the upper hand.	这些战争正在给以色列造成新的威胁，因为它们导致冲突不再是严格的军事冲突，而是加入了外交、地区政治、合法性和国际法的成分，而在这方面以色列并不占上风。


As a result, in asymmetrical conflicts, Israel finds its military superiority vitiated.	结果，在不对称冲突中，以色列发现其军事绝对优势被抵消了。


These are political battles that cannot be won by military means.	以色列面临着无法通过军事手段取胜的政治战争。


The asymmetry between the nature of the threats and Israel’s response ends up putting the superior military power in a position of strategic inferiority.	威胁的性质与以色列的反应之间的不对称性最终让军事绝对优势方陷入了战略劣势。


The spread of violence to the West Bank – and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s support of Hamas’s objectives – means that Israel cannot avoid the conflict’s political consequences.	约旦河西岸暴力的肆虐——以及巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯对哈马斯目标的支持——意味着以色列无法避免冲突的政治后果。


Hamas, a neglected opponent of Abbas’s diplomatic strategy, is gradually becoming the avant-garde of Palestine’s struggle for liberation.	哈马斯这个阿巴斯外交战略中被忽视的成分正在转变为巴勒斯坦自由斗争的急先锋。


Contrary to what Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu believes, the main existential threat facing the country is not a nuclear-armed Iran.	与以色列总理内塔尼亚胡所认为的相反，以色列所面临的主要生存威胁不是有核武器的伊朗。


The real peril is to be found at home: the corrosive effect of the Palestinian problem on Israel’s international standing.	真正的威胁要从国内去寻找：巴勒斯坦问题对以色列国际形象的损害作用。


The devastation caused by Israel’s periodic asymmetrical confrontations, combined with the continuing occupation of Palestinian lands and the ever-growing expansion of settlements, has fueled a growing campaign to undermine Israel’s legitimacy.	以色列定期不对称冲突所造成的惨象，以及对巴勒斯坦土地的长期占领和不断扩张的定居点建设，正在助长一股不利于以色列合法性的运动。


For example, the seemingly benign Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, viewed by many of its supporters as a legitimate form of non-violent resistance, has continued to gain ground.	比如，看起来十分温和的抵制、撤资和制裁运动（Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions，BDS）——其许多支持者视其为合法的非暴力抵制——一直在不断赢得进展。


BDS’s opponents (including me) regard the movement as a political subterfuge intended to bring about the implosion of the Jewish state.	BDS的反对者（包括我）认为该运动是一个政治阴谋，旨在诱使犹太国家的内乱。


The Palestinian mainstream, represented by Abbas, made a strategic decision to opt for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.	以阿巴斯为代表的巴勒斯坦主流做出的战略决定是以1967年边界为基础建立巴勒斯坦国。


Israel’s strategic response would normally be that it aspires to be a “Jewish democratic state,” which presupposes a Jewish majority.	以色列的战略回应通常是它渴望成为一个“犹太民主国家”，这必须以犹太人占多数为前提。


But if the never-ending peace process continues to fail to produce a two-state solution, how can Israel avoid the reality of a single state in a continuous state of civil war?	但如果从未结束的和平进程一直无法产生两国���案，以色列怎样才能避免单一国家但持续内战的局面？


There is only one way out of the Gaza tragedy that can provide justice to its many victims: The parties to the conflict and the regional actors now vying to act as mediators must leverage the ongoing calamity into a grand peace agenda.	只有一个办法可以跳出加沙悲剧，并未这场悲剧的众多受害者提供正义：冲突各方和目前承诺调停的地区行动方必须因地制宜，将持续的不幸事件变为广泛的和平日程。


This would mean launching a Marshall Plan to upgrade Gaza’s infrastructure and improve social conditions.	这意味着实施一个马歇尔计划升级加沙基础设施、改善其社会条件。


It would also entail lifting the blockade and opening Gaza to the world.	此外还要打破加沙的封锁，让它想全世界敞开大门。


The price Hamas would have to pay is complete disarmament and demilitarization of Gaza under international supervision, with Abbas’s Palestinian Authority controlling the border crossings into Israel and Egypt.	哈马斯必须付出的代价是彻底取出武装，在国际监督下实现加沙的去军事化，由阿巴斯的巴勒斯坦权力机构控制加沙与以色列和埃及的边界。


Simultaneously, negotiations for a two-state solution should resume, with an unequivocal commitment by the United States and the other members of the so-called Middle East Quartet (the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia) to use all possible influence on the parties to prevent another failure.	与此同时，两国方案的谈判应该重启，美国和其他所谓中东四方（Middle East Quartet）成员（联合国、欧盟和俄罗斯）应该明确承诺竭尽所能对双方施加影响，防止再次失败。


Israel is devoid of a convincing strategy; what it has is a series of improvisations aimed at securing the nation’s physical survival on as much land as the international community might allow.	以色列缺少令人信服的战略； 它所有的是一系列旨在确保国家实体生存、占有国际社会所允许的尽可能多的土地的即兴表演。


But improvisation is simply unsustainable in the long run.	但即兴表演在长期是不可持续的。


For example, Israel has reached out to those Arab countries that are willing to subordinate the Palestinian problem to discreet bilateral relations, essentially on security matters.	比如，以色列已经与一些阿拉伯国家接触，它们愿意将巴勒斯坦问题作为从属于谨慎的双边关系（事实上即安全问题）的次要问题。


But any such “alliances” that Israel might be able to develop – say, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt – can only be circumstantial and ephemeral.	但以色列可能与（比如）沙特阿拉伯和埃及发展的如此“联盟”注定是偶然而短暂的。


The challenge for Israel is to tie its military tactics and diplomacy to a clearly defined political goal.	以色列所面临的挑战是将其军事和外交策略捆绑成明确的政治目标。


And a credible national strategy must recognize that as long as the Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, Israel’s moral foundations and international standing will be dangerously compromised.	可信的国家战略必须承认，只要巴勒斯坦冲突不解决，以色列的道德基础和国际地位就会受到严重掣肘。


Why Israel?	为什么是以色列？


TEL AVIV – Israel’s latest war in Gaza has echoed through Europe’s capitals in a powerful and destructive way.	特拉维夫—以色列最近在加沙的战争在欧洲各国掀起了一场强大的破坏性地震。


In Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, and elsewhere, Israel is being denounced as a “terrorist state.”	在柏林、伦敦、巴黎、罗马和其他地方，以色列被描述为“恐怖国家”。


Angry demonstrators burned synagogues in France and, of all places, Germany, with some even chanting “Jews to the gas!”	愤怒的示威者焚烧了法国和德国各地的犹太教堂，甚至还出现了“把犹太人送进毒气室！


The grotesque coupling of legitimate solidarity with Palestine and anti-Jewish invective seems to have forged a politically correct form of anti-Semitism – one that, 70 years after the Holocaust, is raising the specter of Kristallnacht over Europe’s Jewish communities.	”的声音。 合法地联合巴勒斯坦和反犹太谩骂的奇怪组合似乎已经构成了一种政治正确的反犹主义，在大屠杀过去70年的今天，“水晶之夜”（Kristallnacht）的幽灵再度飘荡在欧洲犹太社区上空。


Israelis are struggling to comprehend why five million refugees and 200,000 deaths in Syria mean so much less to the Western conscience than the 2,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza.	以色列一直难以理解，为何叙利亚的200,000死者和五百万难民给西方人良心的震动远远不如2,000在加沙被杀的巴勒斯坦人。


They cannot quite grasp how European demonstrators can denounce Israel’s wars as “genocide” – a term that has never been applied to the Syrian hecatomb, the obliteration of Grozny by Russia, the 500,000 casualties in Iraq since the United States-led invasion in 2003, or US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.	他们无法理解欧洲示威者如何谴责以色列的战争是“种族灭绝”——对于叙利亚的屠杀、俄罗斯对格罗兹尼的屠城、2003年美国入侵伊拉克所造成的500,000受害者，以及美国阿富汗和巴基斯坦空袭的遇难者，都没有人用上这个词汇。


In fact, the answer is simple: Defining Israel’s sins in terms borrowed from the Holocaust is Europe’s righteous way to rid itself of its Jewish complex.	事实上，答案很简单：借用犹太人大屠杀的词汇描述以色列的罪行是欧洲特色的摆脱犹太情节的方式。


“The Holocaust,” as Thomas Keneally wrote in Schindler’s Ark, “is a Gentile problem, not a Jewish one.”	“犹太大屠杀，”托马斯·肯尼利（Thomas Keneally）在《辛德勒的方舟》（Schindler’s Ark）写道，“是一个非犹太问题，而不是一个犹太问题。


Or, as the psychiatrist Zvi Rex famously quipped, “Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz.”	”或者，如精神病医生兹维·瑞斯（Zvi Rex）的名言所说，“由于奥斯维辛，德国人永远不会原谅犹太人。 ”


There is no denying that Gaza’s agony is a humanitarian disaster.	不可否认，加沙的惨象是一场人道主义灾难。


But it does not even approach other humanitarian crises of recent decades, including those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.	但它难以望近几十年来的其他人道主义危机之项背，包括民主刚果、苏丹、伊拉克和阿富汗等。


In fact, since 1882, the entire Arab-Jewish/Israeli conflict has produced barely half the number of casualties that Syria has in just three years.	事实上，自1982年以来，整个阿拉伯-犹太人/以色列冲突所造成的伤亡还比不上叙利亚在最近三年中所造成的多。


Since 1950, the Arab-Israeli conflict ranks 49th in terms of fatalities.	1950年以来，阿拉伯-以色列冲突致死人数只排在所有冲突的第49位。


This does not square with the global vilification of Israel that is drowning out legitimate criticism.	这与全世界对以色列远超合理批评的中伤形成了鲜明对比。


When other countries falter, their policies are questioned; when Israel’s behavior is controversial or problematic, its right to exist comes under fire.	其他国家动荡时，它们的政策会受到质疑； 以色列的行为引起争议或问题时，其生存权利就会受到口诛笔伐。


There are more United Nations resolutions devoted to human rights abuses committed by Israel than to abuses by all other countries combined.	谴责以色列侵犯人权的联合国决议比其他所有国家加起来还要多。


Stories about Israel focus almost exclusively on the Palestinian conflict.	关于以色列的报道几乎全部集中于巴勒斯坦冲突。


Joyce Karam, the Washington bureau chief of the Pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, believes that this is because “Muslim killing Muslim or Arab killing Arab seems more acceptable than Israel killing Arabs.”	泛阿拉伯报纸《生活报》（Al-Hayat）华盛顿记者站主任乔伊斯·卡兰（Joyce Karam）认为其原因在于“穆斯林杀害穆斯林或阿拉伯人杀害阿拉伯人比以色列杀害阿拉伯人更容易接受。


Syrian, Libyan, and Yemenite victims are faceless; the lionization of the incomparably fewer Gazan casualties makes them unique.	”叙利亚、利比亚和也门受害者默默无闻； 夸大其词的加沙报道让人数上少得多的加沙受害者鹤立鸡群。


This is not to say that Israel should be consoled by the macabre arithmetic of bloodshed.	这并不是说应该出于可怕的流血算术抚慰以色列。


The hypocrisy of some of Israel’s critics in no way vindicates its colonial encroachment on Palestinian space, which makes it the last developed, “Western” country occupying and manhandling a non-Western people.	一些以色列批评者的伪善并不能为其殖民巴勒斯坦领地开脱，殖民行为使以色列成为最后一个占领和粗暴对待非西方人民的发达的“西方”国家。


Most of today’s conflicts – in Colombia, Somalia, the DRC, Sudan, and now even Iraq and Afghanistan – are internal.	今天的发部分冲突——如哥伦比亚、索马里、民主刚果、苏丹甚至伊拉克和阿富汗——都是内部冲突。


Even a major power like Russia faces punishing sanctions for refusing to end its occupation of a foreign land.	即使是俄罗斯这样的主要强国，也因为拒绝停止占领外国领土而面临着惩罚性制裁。


Israel’s clash with Palestine represents a particularly compelling drama for the West.	对西方来说，以色列与巴勒斯坦的冲突特别引人注目。


The story of Israel extends far beyond the current conflict, to recount an extraordinary symbiosis between Jewish heritage and European civilization that ended in calamity.	以色列的故事远远超过了当前冲突的范围，而代表了犹太传统和欧洲文明之间的以悲剧收场的非凡的共生关系。


From its birth, Israel has borne the scars of the greatest crime ever committed on Europe’s soil.	以色列是带着有史以来欧洲土地上最大罪行的伤疤诞生的。


The plight of the Palestinians – the victims of Zionism’s triumph – touches another neuralgic point in the European mind.	巴勒斯坦人的苦难——锡安主义胜利的受害者——则触动了欧洲神经的另一个痛点。


Nonetheless, the Israel-Palestine tragedy is unique.	尽管如此，以色列-巴勒斯坦悲剧是独特的。


It is an absorbing odyssey of two nations with mutually exclusive claims on sacred lands and religious shrines that are central in the lives of millions of people worldwide.	这是一个关于两个民族的引人入胜的回家的故事，它们有着彼此排斥的主张，争夺着占据全世界数百万人心中神圣地位的圣地和庙宇。


It is also a war of conflicting images, in which both parties claim a monopoly on justice and martyrdom.	这也是一场形象之战，双方都宣称独占正义和苦难。


Jewish persecution, and the way that Zionism has employed it, has become a model for Palestinian nationalism.	犹太人遭遇的迫害以及锡安主义对这一遭遇的利用已成为巴勒斯坦民族主义的榜样。


Catchwords like “exile,” “diaspora,” “Holocaust,” “return,” and “genocide” are now an inextricable component of the Palestinian national ethos.	“放逐”、“流散”、“大屠杀”、“回家”和“种族屠杀”等流行语已成为巴勒斯坦民族精神不可或缺的部分。


It is important to note that the Holocaust does not give Israel immunity from criticism, nor can every attack on Israel’s policies be dismissed as anti-Semitism.	很重要的一点是认识到大屠杀并不意味着以色列不可批评，也不意味着一切对以色列政策的抨击都可以归为反犹主义。


Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s Israel is rightly perceived as a status quo state that aspires to have it all: continued control over and settlement of the Palestinian territories and “quiet for quiet” from the Palestinians.	总理内塔尼亚胡的以色列被正确地认为是渴望拥有这一切的维持现状国家：继续控制巴勒斯坦领土上的定居点以及巴勒斯坦人的“以静制静”。


But Hamas’s control within Gaza is equally problematic.	但哈马斯对加沙内部的控制同样有问题。


In order to end its fatal flirtation with jihadism and bolster stability, Gaza must pursue an economic and political deal with Israel that represses the temptation of war.	为了结束哈马斯与圣战主义极其危险地眉来眼去、促进稳定，加沙必须寻求与以色列达成经济和政治协议，抑制战争诱惑。


Just as the rehabilitation of the Egyptian towns along the Suez Canal in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war paved the way for an Israeli-Egyptian peace, a prosperous Gaza would serve the interests of all parties involved – beginning with Israel.	正如1973年赎罪日战争后苏伊士运河沿岸埃及城镇的复苏为以色列-埃及和平铺平了道路，繁荣的加沙也将符合所有参与方的利益——首先就是以色列。


Asia’s Middle Eastern Shadow	亚洲的中东阴影


TEL AVIV – In 2010, then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced America’s eastward shift in global strategy.	特拉维夫—2010年，时任美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿宣布美国将以东进作为全球战略。


The United States’ “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region was required not only because of the security threats posed by the rise of China, but also as a consequence of America’s long and costly obsession with the Middle East.	美国之所以要以亚太地区为“支点”，不仅是因为中国的崛起所构成的安全威胁，也是美国长期事倍功半地沉陷于中东的后果。


The Middle East has long confronted the US with formidable challenges, which ultimately exceeded America’s imperial capacities and sapped public support.	长期以来，中东给美国带来了可怕的挑战，最终超过了美国的霸权实力，令其失去了民众的支持。


But the real question now is whether America is still able and willing to uphold its global pretensions.	但当今的真正问题是美国是否仍能够且愿意以行动证明其全球自我标榜。


After all, Asia is no less a demanding theater than the Middle East.	毕竟，亚洲作为舞台的重要性已不亚于中东。


Indeed, dealing with it might require reconciling the pivot to Asia with an ongoing presence in the Middle East, if only because the two regions have much in common.	事实上，处理好这一问题可能要求美国调和好亚洲支点与继续在中东发挥作用之间的关系，因为这两个地区有太多的共同点。


For starters, in a region replete with territorial disputes and old rivalries that are as bitter as the Arab-Israeli conflict, America faces a geopolitical environment with no security architecture and no agreed conflict-resolution mechanism.	首先，在充满了领土争端和激烈程度不亚于阿拉伯-以色列冲突的历史恩怨的亚洲，美国面临着缺少安全结构和一致的冲突解决机制的地缘政治环境。


The division of the Korean Peninsula, the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, and the question of Taiwan (which by 2020 the US will no longer be able to defend from a Chinese attack, according to a 2009 study by the RAND Corporation) appear as intractable as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.	朝鲜半岛的分裂、印度-巴基斯坦在克什米尔问题上的冲突以及台湾问题（根据兰德公司2009年的一项研究，到2020年，美国将无法抵御来自中国大陆的袭击）的棘手程度不亚于以色列-巴勒斯坦争端。


Moreover, like the Middle East, Asia is home to an uncontrolled arms race that includes both conventional capabilities and weapons of mass destruction.	此外，与中东一样，亚洲也存在不受控制的包括常规武器和大规模杀伤性武器的军备竞赛。


Four of the world’s ten largest militaries are in Asia, and five Asian countries are full-fledged nuclear powers.	全世界十大军队中有四个在亚洲，五个亚洲国家拥有完全成熟的核武器。


Nor does the Middle East have a monopoly on Islamist extremism, ethnic tension, or terrorism.	伊斯兰教极端主义的垄断、民族矛盾和恐怖主义亦非中东所独有。


China’s restive Muslim Uighurs, the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, the secessionist Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, and the ethnic separatist insurgency in southern Thailand all highlight Asia’s complex tapestry of unresolved religious and ethnic trouble spots.	中国存在难治的维吾尔族穆斯林，印度存在印度教-伊斯兰教冲突，缅甸发生过种族清洗罗辛亚族穆斯林事件，菲律宾的分裂主义穆斯林爆发了起义，泰国南部也有种族分离主义起义，所有这些都凸显出亚洲未解决的复杂宗教和民族矛盾。


Moreover, America’s Asian pivot is occurring at a time when its international credibility has been badly eroded by domestic political dysfunction and disappointing performance in the Middle East.	此外，在美国提出亚洲支点的同时，其国际声誉因为国内政治僵局和令人失望的中东表现而大大受损。


This, for example, explains Japan’s fear that the US might eventually reach an accommodation with China over the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).	这解释了（比如）日本担心美国最终会与中国就钓鱼岛问题形成谅解。


Indeed, Japan’s quest to re-establish its own military capability is a vote of limited confidence in its US ally.	事实上，日本要求重新建立自己的军队正是对其美国盟友不放心的证明。


Obama’s recent wavering on the use of force in Syria has left many in Asia doubting whether they can rely on America not only if China forcibly asserts its maritime claims, but also if North Korea carries out its threats to attack the South.	奥巴马最近在对叙利亚动武的问题上举棋不定，这让许多亚洲人怀疑他们是否可以在中国强行推行其领海主张以及朝鲜威胁袭击韩国时依靠美国。


Conspicuously, South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s “Trustpolitik” – a soft-power approach to North Korea that calls for deeper cooperation with China, the North’s most important ally – is particularly popular.	显然，韩国总统朴槿惠的“信任政治”——寻求与中国（朝鲜最重要盟友）进行更深层次合作的对付朝鲜的软实力方针——特别受欢迎。


As in the Middle East, America’s bilateral military relationships in Asia are often with “frenemies,” countries that share an alliance with the US while deeply mistrusting one another.	与在中东一样，美国与亚洲国家的双边军事关系的对象通常是“亦敌亦友”，这些国家一方面都与美国建立了盟友关系，另一方面彼此极不信任。


US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s agreement in early October with his South Korean counterpart on a Tailored Deterrence strategy became untenable a few days later, when the US promised Japan a massive upgrading of its military capabilities.	10月初，美国国防部长哈格与韩国国防部长达成了“定制威慑”（Tailored Deterrence）协议，但不出几日，这一协议便无法维持下去，因为美国承诺日本助其大规模升级军力。


South Korea views this as tantamount to outsourcing China’s containment to an unrepentant imperial power.	韩国认为这相当于将遏制中国的任务外包给了冥顽不灵的帝国主义势力。


In any case, an American withdrawal from the Middle East is hardly a recipe for countering China’s rise in East Asia, given that the two regions are increasingly intertwined.	无论如何，美国撤出中东绝不是应对中国在东亚崛起的药方，因为这两个地区的联系日益紧密。


While the US is pivoting to the East, leaving old allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt deeply resentful, China is pivoting westward.	美国将支点移向了东方，让沙特和埃及等旧盟友牢骚满腹，而与此同时，中国的支点正在西进。


China’s exports to the Middle East are already more than twice those of the US.	中国对中东出口超过美国一倍有余。


Its annual exports to Turkey total $23 billion, and now include military supplies, such as a missile-defense system that is not compatible with those of Turkey’s NATO allies.	其对土耳其的年出口总额达到了230亿美元，目前已经包括武器供应，如与土耳其北约盟国的系统不相容的导弹防御系统。


If China’s penetration into the Middle East persists at the current pace, it might even be able to obstruct the flow of energy resources to America’s Asian allies.	如果中国对中东的渗透以当前速度维持下去，将有可能阻碍能源向美国亚洲盟友的流动。


In a global competition, a superpower’s competitors are bound to exploit its weaknesses.	在全球竞争中，超级大国的竞争对手必须利用其弱点。


The 2008 financial crisis, which destroyed the mystique of Western economic prowess, led to a marked a shift in China’s global strategy.	2008年金融危机摧毁了西方经济霸权，也令中国改变了全球战略。


The Chinese began toying with the idea of abandoning their “peaceful rise” in favor of what then-President Hu Jintao defined at a July 2009 conference of Chinese diplomats as “the democratization of international relations” and “global multipolarity.”	中国人开始放弃其“和平崛起”思想，2009年7月，时任中国国家主席胡锦涛在中国外交官会议上提出了“国际关系的民主化”和“全球多极化”的思想。


The US, as hegemon in the Middle East for many years, could not solve any of the region’s major problems single-handedly.	作为多年来中东地区霸主的美国无法单枪匹马地解决该地区的任何一个主要问题。


If its pivot to Asia is to be credible, the US will eventually have to agree to be one among a number of great powers in Asia, a co-equal partner with China, Japan, and India in shaping the region’s strategic environment.	如果其将支点转向亚洲的战略是可信的，那么美国最终将不得不同意成为亚洲多个超级大国之一，成为与中国、日本和印度平起平坐的决定亚洲战略环境的合作伙伴。


Negotiations in a Strategic Trap	战略陷阱中的谈判


TEL AVIV – The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, stymied by irreconcilable differences between the parties, has always depended on the strategic regional context.	特拉维夫—因为双方不可调和的分歧而饱受掣肘的以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程永远需要看地区战略环境的颜色。


It was born, after all, in the wake of the first Gulf War, and was facilitated by the regional consequences of the Cold War’s end.	毕竟，这一进程诞生于第一次海湾战争，并受冷战结束的地区后果成长。


These days, the process is shaped by two major regional dynamics, the so-called Arab Spring and the Iran nuclear deal.	近期以来，这一进程受两大地区动态影像，即所谓的阿拉伯之春和伊朗核协议。


The Iran deal has turned into one of the most serious crises of trust ever in the United States’ relations with its Middle East allies.	伊朗核协议已成为美国及其中东盟友之间最严重的信任危机之一。


Though they have no alternative, both Israel and the Arab states will find it difficult to trust future US commitments to their security.	尽管以色列和阿拉伯国家别无选择，但要让它们相信未来美国会保护它们的安全业十分困难。


To Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, US President Barack Obama betrayed Israel when he sacrificed Egypt’s former president, Hosni Mubarak, and paved the way for the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power.	对以色列总理内塔尼亚胡来说，美国总统奥巴马在牺牲掉埃及前总统穆巴拉克并为穆斯林兄弟会的掌权扫清障碍时已经背叛了以色列。


Now he has wielded the knife a second time by reaching a deal with Iran, supposedly behind Netanyahu’s back.	如今他又捅了以色列第二刀，背着内塔尼亚胡与伊朗达成了协议。


Israel’s conventional strategic wisdom was based on an equation of “Bushehr versus Yitzhar” – that is, a readiness to dismantle West Bank settlements if the Iranian centrifuges in Bushehr were dismantled. As far as Netanyahu is concerned, this is not taking place.	以色列的传统战略智慧的基础是“布什尔对伊扎尔”（Bushehr versus Yitzhar），即，只要布什尔的伊朗离心机拆掉，以色列就准备拆掉约旦河西岸的定居点。


Nor do the Arab revolutions counsel Israel’s strategic planners to take security risks.	阿拉伯革命也告诉以色列战略规划者不要拿安全冒险。


Israel, they would say, is now surrounded by imploding, failing states/regions (Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula), as well as by a strategically vital buffer state, Jordan, whose long-term survival cannot be taken for granted.	他们会说，如今以色列周边尽是些爆发冲突的倒灶国家/地区（黎巴嫩、叙利亚、加沙和埃及的西奈半岛），以及一个具有战略重要性的缓冲国约旦，后者的长期生存也得不到保证。


The anarchy along Israel’s borders is becoming a breeding ground for Sunni extremists for whom the Jewish state is the ultimate enemy.	以色列边境另一边的无序状态成为滋生逊尼派极端主义的温床，他们把犹太国家视为终极敌人。


To create a Palestinian state when existing Arab states are crumbling – and with a part of Palestine controlled by Hamas – does not seem like a brilliant idea.	在现有阿拉伯国家一片狼藉时建立巴勒斯坦国——并且其一部分由哈马斯控制——绝不是好主意。


Netanyahu is a conservative in revolutionary times.	内塔尼亚胡是一个在革命时刻的保守派。


Unimpressed with what others saw as the beginning of an era of democracy in the Arab world, he preferred not to budge on any front, including Palestine.	其他人认为现在是阿拉伯世界开始走向民主的时代，而内塔尼亚胡并不这么看，他不会在任何方面让步，包括巴勒斯坦问题。


Now he is faced with a strategic nightmare come true: Iran’s possible integration into the international community without having to dismantle its nuclear-weapons potential.	现在他面临一个成为现实的战略噩梦：伊朗可能在不拆毁其核武器潜力的情况下融入国际社会。


In this context, US Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative has become trapped in a paralyzing power game.	在这样的背景下，美国国务卿克里的和平动议便陷入了无解的实力博弈。


Should the process fail, Kerry warns, the US will not be able to rescue Israel from the wave of international condemnation and sanctions that would be unleashed against it.	克里警告说，如果这一进程失败，美国将无法把以色列救出蜂拥而至的针对它的国际谴责和制裁。


But Netanyahu’s card is more than a threat.	但内塔尼亚胡的牌并不只限于威胁。


His friends in the US Senate have already introduced a bill, which currently has 59 cosponsors, that would impose new sanctions on Iran; this is tantamount to torpedoing the entire Iran deal.	他在美国参议院的朋友已经炮制了一项法案，目前已争取到59人支持，这一法案将对伊朗实施新制裁——与撕毁整个伊朗协议没有什么区别。


It is this reality that has led the Americans to endorse two Israeli positions – recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and intrusive security arrangements – that the Palestinians are bound to reject.	这一现实让美国人支持以色列的两个立场——承认���色列是犹太人国家以及侵略性的安全安排——而这两个立场是巴勒斯坦人必然不会接受的。


Recognizing the “Jewish state” would be a betrayal of the constituent ethos of Palestinian nationalism, while intrusive security arrangements would be a standing invitation to radical groups to fight what would be seen as occupation in disguise.	承认“犹太国家”不啻被判巴勒斯坦民族主义的基本精神，而侵略性安全安排不啻发出邀请让极端组织对打着幌子的占领行动采取斗争。


Instead of controlling the extremists, a robust Israeli security presence in Palestine would precipitate the collapse of its institutions.	以色列在巴勒斯坦的安全行动将无法控制极端分子，反而会促使以色列机构的倒闭。


Iran will not change its regional policies overnight.	伊朗一夜之间改变其地区政策。


The nuclear deal is not the “grand bargain” that Iran proposed to the US in 2003 and that was supposed to address, in addition to the nuclear dispute, a wide array of regional issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	核协议不是2003年伊朗向美国提出的“大交易”，除了核争端之外，这一协议是为了解决一系列地区问题，包括以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突。


For Iran, a strategic partnership with the US would be the ultimate betrayal of the Islamic revolution, an inconceivable change of identity.	对伊朗来说，与美国的战略伙伴关系将是对其伊斯兰革命的终极背叛，是令人难以置信的身份转变。


With or without a nuclear deal, Iran, which was disinvited from the Geneva II conference on Syria, because of its rejection of the conference’s US-inspired terms of reference, aspires to challenge America’s policies and represent an alternative path for the region.	不管有没有核协议，因为不接受根据美国制定的会议权责范围而没有获得关于叙利亚问题的日内瓦II会议邀请的伊朗决心挑战美国的政策并代表中东地区的另一种道路。


“We did not agree to dismantle anything,” Iran’s foreign minister insisted in defiance of the US interpretation of the nuclear deal.	“我们不同意拆掉任何东西，”伊朗外交官对美国的核协议解读不屑一顾。


Such talk allows Netanyahu to persist in his doomsday rhetoric.	这样的谈判让内塔尼亚胡得以坚持其末日论。


One would expect that, with the rising Iranian threat fostering tacit security cooperation between Israel and its more stable Arab neighbors (particularly Saudi Arabia), Netanyahu would aspire to resolve the Palestinian issue, thus removing the last obstacle to an overt strategic partnership.	人们可以期待，日益增加的伊朗威胁将促进以色列及其较稳定的阿拉伯邻国（特别是沙特阿拉伯）之间静悄悄的合作，在这样的情况下，内塔尼亚胡将会下定决心解决巴勒斯坦问题，从而打消明确战略伙伴关系的最后障碍。


That was exactly the rationale behind Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s endorsement of the Oslo process from the outset.	这正是前总理伊扎尔·拉宾从一开始就支持奥斯陆进程背后的原因。


But Netanyahu’s school of thought is radically different.	但内塔尼亚胡的算盘与此有很大不同。


Not only does it advocate an Israeli presence in the West Bank (the Biblical homeland of Judea and Samaria); it also links territorial concessions to the Palestinians to the neutralization of existential threats emanating from the outer circle of the region.	他不但支持以色列在约旦河西岸（《圣经》中犹大和撒玛利亚的故乡）的占领； 还将对巴勒斯坦人的领土让步与将来自中东地区外围的威胁的中立化联系起来。


Among US presidents, George W. Bush identified most strongly with this right-wing Israeli philosophy, and his war in Iraq and policies toward Iran accorded with it perfectly.	在美国总统中，小布什的右倾以色列思维最为明确，他的伊拉克战争和对伊朗政策都十分符合以色列思维。


Indeed, both he and his father moved to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement only after their respective Iraq wars.	事实上，他和他的父亲老布什都是在各自的伊拉克战争之后才开始推进以色列-巴勒斯坦和平协议的。


The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference followed the Gulf War, while the “road map” came after the Iraq War.	1991年马德里和平会议是在波斯湾战争之后，而“路线图”产生于伊拉克战争之后。


Now, however, international acceptance of Iran as a nuclear-threshold state, together with the threat emanating from imploding Arab neighbors, flatly contradicts Netanyahu’s assumptions about the conditions that must be fulfilled for Israel to offer “painful concessions” to the Palestinians.	但是，现在，国际社会已接受伊朗是核门槛国，而阿拉伯邻国的动荡局势带来了巨大的风险，这显而易见不符合内塔尼亚胡关于要以色列做出对巴勒斯坦的“痛苦的让步”所必须具备的先决条件的判断。


Someone clearly looks likely to fall into a strategic trap, but who?	看起来显然有人要陷入战略陷阱。 那个人是谁？


A New Peace Paradigm	新和平模式


TEL AVIV – The collapse of yet another attempt by the United States to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement should do more than provoke finger-pointing.	特拉维夫——美国促成以巴和平协议的又一次失败不应只是再次引起人们的议论。


It should spur a fundamental reconsideration of a paradigm of peacemaking – direct bilateral negotiations, under US guidance – that lost its relevance long ago.	它应当从根本上推动重构和平模式——也就是早已无足轻重的美国引导的双边直接谈判。


While the US remains an indispensable global actor, it is no longer willing to use coercive diplomacy in its quest to build a new order.	虽然美国的全球作用依旧无可替代，但它已不愿在建立新秩序时再次使用强制外交手段。


But it is not just a matter of willingness; the US has lost its ability to intimidate other countries, even allies and clients like Israel and the Palestinian Authority.	但这并不仅仅是个意愿问题； 美国已不再有能力恫吓其他国家，即便像以色列和巴勒斯坦当局这样的盟友和附庸也不例外。


In the Middle East alone, the US has overstretched its capabilities in two controversial wars; repeatedly failed to broker a peace between Israel and Palestine; estranged key regional powers; and performed disappointingly on issues like Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s civil war.	仅中东一地，两场争议战争就已经令美国的军力捉襟见肘； 促成以巴和平过程中的一再失败；


All of this has diminished its capacity to shape the region’s future.	在伊朗核计划及叙利亚内战问题上表现令人失望。 所有这一切都使美国不再有那么强的能力塑造地区未来。


The problem is not limited to the Middle East.	问题并不仅限于中东。


Despite its professed strategic pivot toward Asia, US President Barack Obama’s administration has done little to address China’s increasingly assertive efforts to stake its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas or North Korea’s affronts to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.	尽管对外宣称战略支点向亚洲转移，奥巴马总统政府并未采取多少行动来阻止中国越来越高调地宣称对东南中国海的领土要求或朝鲜对朝鲜半岛现状的公开挑战。


Add to that America’s weak response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and it is no wonder that Israeli and Palestinian leaders have dismissed its peace overtures.	再加上美国对俄罗斯吞并克里米亚的怯懦反应，以色列和巴勒斯坦领导人驳回美国的和平提案也就毫不奇怪。


US Secretary of State John Kerry, in his bid for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, operated as if conflict resolution could be achieved through non-coercive solutions, deriving from the good will of the relevant parties.	美国国务卿约翰·克里在寻求以巴和解过程中的所作所为就好像各方可以凭借良好意愿，通过非强制性的解决方案来化解冲突。


According to this plainly naive approach, the negotiation process operates according to its own embedded logic, independent of considerations of power, coercion, and leverage.	上述明显幼稚的做法认为谈判过程的运行自有其逻辑，而与力量、胁迫和各种手段无关。


But treating force and diplomacy as distinct phases of foreign policy gives the negotiating parties the sense that American power lacks purpose and resolve.	但把外交政策中的武力和外交截然分开的做法令谈判双方感觉美国缺乏目的和决心。


Diplomatic ripening sometimes requires the mediator to be a manipulator and an arm-twister.	成熟的外交有时需要调解人对被调解人进行操纵，迫使被调解人违反自己的意愿。


Indeed, America’s only successful attempts at peace diplomacy in the Middle East involved a masterly combination of power, manipulation, and pressure.	事实上，美国在中东地区唯一一次成功的和平外交尝试涉及到强权、操纵和施压等巧妙手段。


Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used it to lead Israel toward groundbreaking interim settlements with Egypt and Syria following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.	美国国务卿亨利·基辛格曾在1973年赎罪日战争后引导以色列与埃及和叙利亚签订了开创性的临时解决方案。


President Jimmy Carter used it to conclude the 1978 Camp David Accords, establishing diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.	吉米·卡特总统据此签订了1978年戴维营协议，确立了埃及和以色列间的外交关系。


And Secretary of State James Baker used it to overcome the recalcitrance of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir during the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.	国务卿詹姆斯·贝克也曾借此破解了以色列总理伊扎克·沙米尔在1991年马德里和会期间的负隅顽抗。


If the US cannot provide this today, it must relinquish its monopoly on international conflict resolution.	如果今天美国已无法做到，那就必须交出对国际冲突化解的垄断权。


It is time for the US to recognize that it cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, defuse the Iranian nuclear dispute, change North Korea’s behavior, or stop the Syrian civil war on its own.	美国应该认识到单凭一己之力已无法再解决以巴冲突、化解伊朗核危机、改变朝鲜行为或停止叙利亚内战。


Over the last two decades, the world grew accustomed to US-led international coalitions for war in the Middle East.	二十年来，世界已习惯了以美国为首的国际联盟在中东战争中扮演调停的角色。


America should now try to form a different kind of coalition – one aimed at achieving peace.	美国目前的当务之急是成立新的联盟——该联盟以实现和平为目标。


Such an alliance would entail a larger role for the other three members of the so-called “Middle East Quartet” – the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations – and key Arab countries.	所谓“中东四方”中的其他三个成员——欧盟、俄罗斯和联合国——以及主要阿拉伯国家将发挥更大的作用。


Within this new peace paradigm, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would become amenable to a truly international solution.	新和平模式下，以巴冲突将要经受真正意义上国际解决方案的考验。


If Iran’s nuclear program demands negotiations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, and North Korea’s requires the so-called “six-party talks,” why should the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be left exclusively to the US?	如果伊朗核计划需要与联合国安理会五大常任理事国外加德国进行谈判，而朝鲜问题的解决需要所谓的“��方会谈”，那为什么解决以巴冲突要被美国垄断？


As if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s depth and duration were not enough to merit an international solution, there is also the issue of Palestine’s mistrust of the US.	就好像以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突的深度和持续时间还不够催生国际解决方案一样，这当中还夹杂着巴勒斯坦对美国根深蒂固的不信任。


For Palestinians, the US – a staunch ally of Israel whose leaders have strong domestic political incentives not to challenge it – cannot act as an honest broker in negotiations.	巴勒斯坦认为美国是以色列的坚定盟友，美国领导人有强大的国内政治意愿不去挑战现状，因此美国没有资格充当谈判诚实的调停人。


Under a truly international paradigm, the principles underlying a peace deal – two states along the 1967 border (with territorial swaps to accommodate Israel’s settlement blocs), two capitals in Jerusalem, an agreed solution to the refugee problem, and robust security arrangements – could be enshrined in a Security Council resolution.	在真正国际化的模式下，和平协议的基本原则——两国沿用1967年边界线（可以进行领土交换以适应以色列定居点）、两国首同在耶路撒冷、协商解决难民问题以及坚定不移的安全条款——都可以在安理会决议中体现出来。


After establishing the terms of a fair deal, the international alliance – under US leadership – could devise an implementation strategy.	在确定公平交易条款后，美国领导下的国际联盟可以制定执行策略。


Such an international approach would also require a broader peace process, aimed at achieving a regional settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.	这样的国际策略还需要更广泛的和平进程，目的是实现以色列与阿拉伯邻国间的区域和平。


This is critical, because the future Palestinian state could not offer Israel much security.	这一点至关重要，因为未来的巴勒斯坦国无法确保以色列的安全。


Even now, Palestine is a relatively minor security challenge for Israel; the more formidable threats, which have compelled Israel to build up its military considerably, come from the Arab states that surround it.	即便现在，巴勒斯坦也是以色列相对次要的安全挑战； 周边的阿拉伯国家才是迫使以色列扩大军力的更强的威胁。


The promise of a regional settlement that offers Israel the needed security guarantee – not to mention a considerable boost to its international standing – would make the painful concessions, including compromises on borders and Jerusalem, which are critical to the creation of a Palestinian state, more digestible for Israeli leaders.	为以色列提供和平保障、更不要说显著提高其国际地位的区域解决办法——会使得对建立巴勒斯坦国关键的痛苦让步，包括在边界和耶路撒冷问题上的妥协，对以色列领导人而言更容易接受。


The initiators of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative understood this; perhaps now the US will come to appreciate it as well.	2002年阿拉伯和平倡议的发起者理解这一点； 也许现在美国也能逐渐体会到。


Shock and Panic	电击和惊恐


CARDIFF – No medical therapy is treated more differently by countries, regions, hospitals, and doctors than electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).	卡迪夫-各个国家、地区、医院和医生对待其他任何医学治疗方法都没有像对待电休克疗法(ECT)这样如此之不同。


This is surprising in an era when treatments that work should supposedly be used with some uniformity.	在一个有效的治疗方法应该在一定程度上统一使用的时代，这是很令人惊讶的。


In fact, despite a consensus that ECT is the most effective treatment for severe depressive disorder, it comes at the bottom of the list in most treatment regimens for mood disorders.	事实上，尽管人们在ECT是治疗严重的抑郁障碍最有效的方法上有共识，但是，在治疗情绪障碍的大部分方法中，它是最后选择的方法。


Some of the unease about ECT stems from psychiatry’s dark past, when patients in many countries had fewer legal rights than prisoners.	有些对ECT的不安来自精神病治疗方法黑暗的过去，那时，许多国家的精神病人的法律权利比囚犯都少。


Not so long ago, physical treatments such as lobotomy and ECT could be inflicted on patients without their consent, and sometimes for punitive purposes.	在不久之前，诸如前脑叶白质切除术和ECT这样的医学治疗方法仍然可以在没有得到病人的同意下在他们身上使用，并且有时候是为了达到惩罚的目的。


But there is no comparable protest against the use of antipsychotic drugs, which have similarly been forced on people – and even used to torture prisoners.	但是，在对使用安定类药物——它们也同样被强迫使用在病人身上，甚至被用来折磨犯人——这个问题上，就没有如此多的抗议了。


And, whereas few people now get ECT involuntarily, and in all cases consent is sought, a large and growing number get antipsychotic drugs under false pretences, including children, vulnerable adults, patients with Alzheimer’s, and a host of others whose lives are shortened by treatment, with no effort undertaken to seek their consent.	而且，鉴于现在没有多少人是在不知情的情况下接受ECT治疗，并且在所有的情况下都要得到病人的同意，许多人，包括儿童、容易上当的成年人、老年痴呆症病人以及许多因为治疗而缩短寿命的人——都没人努力寻求这些人的同意，在欺骗之下接受安定类药物的治疗，而且这样的人越来越多。


Although ECT’s opponents believe that it causes brain damage, this is difficult to prove.	虽然反对ECT治疗的人认为ECT治疗会对大脑造成损害，但是，这一点很难得到证明。


Like antipsychotic drugs, antidepressants, and tranquilizers, ECT has an immediate organic effect.	像安定类药物、抗抑郁剂以及镇定剂一样，ECT能够立即产生有机效应。