Today’s rising tide of disease, hunger, squalor, and illiteracy – more than half of the refugee children are not in school – will affect an entire generation for life.	如今，疾病、饥饿、肮脏和文盲——一大半难民儿童没有在学校上学——愈演愈烈，将影响整整一代人的生活。


Fortunately, the United States’ foreign-policy elite finally seems ready to do something to protect Syria’s people.	幸运的是，美国外交政策精英们似乎准备好要为保护叙利亚人民做些什么了。


Generals, diplomats, national-security officials, and development professionals are approaching a consensus in favor of a no-fly “safe zone” along one of Syria’s borders.	将军、外交官、国家安全官员和发展专业人士正在形成一个共识，要沿着叙利亚的一段边界设置禁飞的“安全区”。


In fact, Turkey’s government proposed such a sanctuary (calling it a “buffer zone”) four years ago.	事实上，土耳其政府在四年前就提出了建设这样一个避难所（称之为“缓冲区”）。


But the Turkish authorities never proved willing to turn words into action – not that they received any encouragement.	但土耳其当局从未表现出将说辞转化为行动的意愿——它们并非没有受到任何鼓励。


Indeed, until recently, the US and most NATO countries were resolutely opposed to the idea.	事实上，直到最近，美国和大部分北约国家仍坚决反对这一方案。


The change of heart was driven by four factors.	立场的变化受四个因素的推动。


First, there is the migrant crisis in southern Europe, a threat more diffuse but no less dangerous and challenging than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.	首先，南欧发生了移民危机，这场危机比俄罗斯入侵乌克兰更加分散，但危险程度等量齐观。


According to the International Organization for Migration, as of July, some 150,000 migrants had reached Europe by sea this year, double the number during the same period in 2014.	根据国际移民组织（International Organization for Migration）的数据，截至7月，今年有大约150,000移民抵达欧洲，比2014年同期翻了一番。


But the headline-making stories of sinking boats and drowning children are just the beginning.	但屡见报端的沉船和儿童溺水事故只是开始。


An estimated 30,000 migrants are now crossing the Serbian border into Hungary every month, spurring the country’s right-wing government to launch the construction of a 110-mile fence to keep them out.	据估计，每个月有30,000移民穿越塞尔维亚边界进入匈牙利，促使匈牙利右翼政府开始建造一条110英里长的隔离栏将他们隔离在边境线外。


And, in July alone, almost 50,000 migrants entered the European Union through Greece.	而光是在7月，就有近50,000移民经希腊进入欧洲。


While Syria is not the only country fueling this refugee crisis, it is the largest contributor.	叙利亚不是唯一一个助长这一难民危机的国家，但是难民的最大来源国。


Indeed, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 34% of the 137,000 people who arrived in the EU from January 1 to June 29 were from Syria, with the next-largest contributor, Afghanistan, accounting for 12%.	事实上，据联合国难民事务高级官员的数据，在今年1月1日到6月29日期间进入欧盟的137,000难民中，有34%来自叙利亚，位居次席的阿富汗贡献了12%。


Other notable contributors include Eritrea (12%), Somalia (5%), and Iraq (3%).	其他值得注意的难民来源国包括厄立特里亚（12%）、索马里（5%）和伊拉克（3%）。


The number of Syrians is thus essentially triple that of the next highest group, a proportion that holds true among European asylum-seekers as well.	因此，叙利亚的数字几乎是第二集团的三倍，在欧洲寻求庇护的人数比例也是如此。


With more than ten million Syrians displaced, this trend will only continue unless something is done to ensure that they can live safely within their home country.	一千多万叙利亚人流离失所，因此这一趋势还会继续下去，除非人们做些什么确保他们能够安全地生活在祖国。


The second factor that is spurring a shift in America’s attitude is the recognition that a new Syrian government is vital to defeat – or even contain – the Islamic State.	促使美国态度发生变化的第二个因素是认识到新叙利亚政府对于击败——甚至遏制——伊斯兰国至关重要。


The fact is that the Islamic State is not the only violent and destructive force in the country; Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom the militant group is committed to overthrow, is also a mass murderer and war criminal.	事实上，伊斯兰国绝非叙利亚国内唯一的暴力性破坏力量； 该军事集团决心推翻的叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德也犯有大屠杀和战争罪行。


According to the Violations Documentation Center, the leading cause of death among Syrian civilians this year has been the indiscriminate use of aerial weapons – barrel bombs and chlorine gas dropped from helicopters by the Syrian army.	据违法档案中心（Violations Documentation Center）的数据，今年叙利亚平民的主要死亡原因是无差别使用机载武器——来自叙利亚军队直升机的桶弹（barrel bomb）和氯气。


For Syria’s many rebel groups, Assad represents the greater threat, and thus will have to be removed from power before attention can be focused on defeating the Islamic State.	对叙利亚的众多叛军集团来说，巴沙尔是更大的威胁，因此必须先把他推翻，然后才能集中精力对付伊斯兰国。


Third, the nuclear deal with Iran, despite facing continued scrutiny in Iran and the US, has raised hopes that the country could play an important role in pushing for a political solution in Syria.	第三，与伊朗的核协议尽管还面临伊朗和美国的后续审议，但让人感到伊朗可以在政治解决叙利亚问题方面起到重要作用。


Not only is Iran’s policy of supplying weapons and fighters to keep Assad in power unpopular at home; the country’s leaders also recognize that fighting the Islamic State in Iraq is a half-measure at best, as long as the group controls vast swaths of Syrian territory.	不仅伊朗为巴沙尔提供武器和兵源以保证他的权力的做法在国内鲜有人支持； 伊朗领导人也认识到，只要伊拉克的伊斯兰国控制着叙利亚的大量领土，与该集团的斗争最多只能是权宜之计。


Finally, longer-term thinkers understand that a generation growing up alienated and angry in refugee camps, as several generations of Palestinians have done, is a generation of potential radicals.	最后，长期思考者知道，在难民营中带着疏离感和愤怒成长起来的一代——就像好几代巴勒斯坦人那样——有可能成为走极端的一代。


With nothing to lose, they seek revenge for their parents’ expulsion from a homeland that, over time, becomes increasingly idealized.	他们没有什么可失去的，将寻求为父母亲被迫背井离乡的遭遇复仇——假以时日，这一目标将日益理想化。


From this perspective, the current humanitarian crisis is, in the longer term, a strategic crisis.	从这个角度讲，最近的人道主义危机长期说来是一场战略危机。


Taken together, these factors are compelling the US and Europe to change course.	这几个因素合在一起，迫使美国和欧洲做出改变。


And the Western perspective is not the only one that is evolving.	而变化的不只是西方视角。


Syria’s neighbors finally seem to understand that the country could fragment into a Kurdish state that destabilizes Turkey and an Islamic State territory that destabilizes Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.	叙利亚的邻国似乎终于明白，叙利亚可能分裂形成一个动摇土耳其的库尔德国家和一个动摇伊拉克、约旦和沙特阿拉伯的伊斯兰国。


By establishing a no-fly zone – which could be defended using sea-based missile systems – the US and its partners would demonstrate to Assad that their patience has finally run out, and that they are prepared to defend Syrians within Syria.	通过设立禁飞区——可以用海基导弹系统进行防卫——美国及其伙伴国可以向巴沙尔证明，它们的耐心终究是有限度的，它们已经准备好在叙利亚境内保护叙利亚人。


This, together with the knowledge that his army is weakening and the pool of new recruits is drying up, would force Assad to reconsider his long-term prospects and, most likely, force him to the negotiating table.	这，再加上明知巴沙尔军正在削弱并且新兵兵源也在告竭，将迫使巴沙尔重新考虑其长期前景，极有可能迫使他坐到谈判桌前。


After all, the only time he has been prepared to strike any kind of deal over the last four years was when he believed that the US was prepared to intervene militarily in response to his use of chemical weapons.	毕竟，在过去四年中，他唯一一次准备妥协便是在当他相信美国准备以军事干预作为对其使用化学武器的反应时。


Syria will take decades to rebuild, with future generations scarred by the political and psychological consequences of the current turmoil – much like Bosnia, but on a much larger scale.	叙利亚需要几十年的时间重建，其未来几代人都将因为当前动荡的政治和心理创伤而受难——就像是波斯尼亚，但规模要大得多。


The arms and money flowing to self-proclaimed holy fighters over the last four years have fanned revolutionary flames that may yet lead to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East.	在过去四年中，流向自称的圣战斗士的军火和资金点燃了革命的火种，但这场火还没有达到重画中东地图的程度。


But we cannot simply write off the millions of people caught in the middle.	但我们无法一笔勾销困在中东的几百万人。


For both moral and strategic reasons, the time for a no-fly zone is now.	不管是出于道德还是战略原因，设置禁飞区正逢其时。


Masters of War in Syria and Iraq	叙利亚和伊拉克的战争狂人


DENVER – The Middle East’s tragic tale of two cities – Aleppo in Syria and Mosul in Iraq – speaks to a fundamental lack of consensus in the region and within the broader international community.	丹佛—中东的悲剧双城记——叙利亚的阿勒颇和伊拉克的摩苏尔——表明该地区乃至整个国际社会从根本上缺少共识。


The lack of order in the international order is greatly complicating the task of bringing these conflicts to an end.	国际秩序中的秩序缺位大大加深了结束冲突这一任务的复杂性。


When the bloody conflict finally ends in Syria, there will be no victory parades, no moment of national catharsis.	当叙利亚的流血冲突终于结束时，不会有胜利大游行，也不会有全民宣泄。


More likely than not, what there will be is a political arrangement that leaves Syria within its current borders but with local autonomy that reflects the diversity and – at least for the time being – the mutual distrust of its various ethnic and religious groups.	更有可能的是，将出现一个这样的政治安排，叙利亚保持当前边界，但国内实施区域自治以体现多样性以及——至少是暂时地——各个种族和宗教派系的互不信任。


No one will be happy.	没人会感到高兴。


The accoutrements of a civil state do not exist, and there are no institutions around which to build social consensus or the rule of law.	公民国家的基本条件根本不具备，也没有能够赖以建立社会共识或法治的制度基础。


Until these broad principles can be articulated, the war will never be truly over.	在这些宽泛的原则建立起来之前，战争永远不会真正结束。


Ceasefires work best – and hold the longest – when the combatants finally understand that a set of principles agreed by the broader international community will be the basis for shaping the future of their country.	停火效果最好——以及维持最长——的时候是战斗各方终于明白获得全体国际社会一致同意的一系列原则是决定叙利亚未来的基础的时候。


The Syrian war is not unprecedented in the region.	叙利亚战争是地区内前所未有的。


The Lebanese Civil War was even longer: from 1975 to 1990, that war produced a similar number of casualties and refugees, and when all is said and done, probably a similar number of unsuccessful ceasefires.	黎巴嫩内战比它更长，从1975年一直打到1990年，死伤和难民人数与叙利亚战争相当，而当一切说尽做尽时，也许不成功的停火协议数量也会相当。


The Syrian civil war is not yet even half the length of that horrific struggle; but nor is there any sign that the various combatants are fatigued by it.	叙利亚内战尚不及可怕的黎巴嫩内战长度的一半； 但没有任何迹象表明战斗各方已经厌倦了打仗。


The international community will likely be affected by Syria’s civil war more than it was by Lebanon’s, owing to its greater global impact.	叙利亚内战对国际社会的影响也许比黎巴嫩内战更大，因为它的全球冲击力更强。


The refugee tide was at first contained within the neighborhood, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and even Iraq.	一开始，难民潮被周边国家所容纳，特别是约旦、黎巴嫩、土耳其甚至伊拉克。


But soon refugees began to flow to Europe and elsewhere, causing political tensions in countries far removed from the conflict.	但很快难民开始流向欧洲和其他地方，导致距离冲突万里之遥的国家也出现政治紧张。


The huddled masses of refugees crossing one European frontier after another soon became a metaphor for what angers so many Europeans in this globalized age.	规模巨大的难民集团跨过一个又一个欧洲国家边境，成为一个引起这个全球化时代的大量欧洲人愤怒的隐喻。


The lack of international consensus on Syria, reflected in the failure of the United Nations Security Council’s permanent players to agree on a way forward, has caused the situation on the ground to worsen.	在叙利亚问题上缺乏国际共识，这体现在联合国安理会常任理事国迟迟无法就如何应对形成一致上，它导致了局势不断恶化。


Fueled by continued support of the combatants by Middle Eastern states (which seem to have no confidence in the international system), and with Russia’s direct participation in the fighting, the crisis has deepened.	中东国家（它们似乎对国际体系不抱任何信心）一直在支持战争，俄罗斯更是直接参与战斗，在这样的情况下，叙利亚危机不断深化。


Russia’s intervention on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has also caused further deterioration in US-Russian relations, which could fuel danger elsewhere in the world.	俄罗斯的干预站在叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德一边，因此还导致了美俄关系的进一步扭曲，从而影响到世界其他地区的安全。


US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov have so far failed to find any workable way forward to end the fighting.	到目前为止，美国国务卿克里和俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫仍未找到能够结束战斗的可行方法。


One longs for the day that Kerry and Lavrov emerge from a negotiating room to announce to the world that they have agreed on a set of principles that will guide Syria’s future and will work to achieve consensus among other members of the international community and with the combatants themselves.	我们期盼有一天克里和拉夫罗夫能够一起走出谈判室，向全世界宣布他们就一系列原则形成了一致，可以根据这些原则指引叙利亚的未来并能够让国际社会的其他成员以及战斗各方之间达成共识。


Only when the combatants can envision the post-war future can a ceasefire work.	只有战斗各方能够想象到战后未来的模样，停火才有可能可行。


Nobody wants to be the last person to die fighting when the future is already known.	当未来大局已定时，没人希望自己成为最后一个死在战斗中的人。


In Mosul, the fighting is not a civil war.	在摩苏尔，战斗不属于内战。


Unlike in Syria, where there must be tradeoffs among the combatants, in Mosul the struggle against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) is a war of annihilation.	在叙利亚，必须在战斗各方间进行权衡，但在摩苏尔，打击所谓的伊斯兰国的战斗是一场歼灭战。


And, in contrast to the Russian and Syrian offensive in Aleppo, the Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and their American advisers most likely worked for months to anticipate issues and to ensure success before the fighting began.	此外，与俄罗斯和叙利亚在阿勒颇的攻势不同，伊拉克阿拉伯人和库尔德人及其美国顾问们很有可能需要好几个月时间运筹帷幄以保证成功，然后再开打。


But it is already clear that there is far more at stake in the Mosul campaign than the eradication of ISIS.	但形势已经十分清楚，摩苏尔行动的意义远远不止于清除伊斯兰国。


Depending on how it ends, we will know whether Iraq emerges as a multi-sectarian state or a set of sectarian and ethnic enclaves.	根据摩苏尔战斗的结束方式，我们可以了解伊拉克将成为一个多宗派国家还是一系列宗派和种族飞地的集合。


Sunnis seem to want no part of the Shia-majority government in Baghdad, even though the Iraqi army (along with the Kurds) is playing the largest role in the fight against ISIS.	逊尼派对加入什叶派占多数的巴格达政府丝毫不感兴趣，即使伊军（以及库尔德人）在打击伊斯兰国的战斗中扮演着最重要的角色。


As if the Sunni-Shia divide within Iraq were not difficult enough, a deeper and even more problematic fissure has now emerged – Turkey’s own struggles with its identity and its externally imposed borders.	好像伊拉克国内的逊尼派-什叶派分裂问题还不够棘手似的，现在又出现了一个更深刻、甚至问题更大的裂痕——土耳其与其自身身份和外部划定的边界的斗争。


The extraordinarily harmful statement by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that his country has not reconciled itself to its 100-year-old southern border with Iraq’s Ninewa Province has greatly complicated Turkey’s ability to play a role in Iraq’s healing process.	土耳其总统盖尔多安发表了杀伤力极大的讲话，说他的国家不会屈从于有100年历史的与伊拉克尼尼微省之间的南部边界，这大大增加了土耳其在伊拉克恢复过程中扮演角色的能力的复杂性。


Arabs have long harbored deep suspicion that the Turks want more than just to protect the Turkmen minority and Sunni Arabs in the conflict.	长期以来，阿拉伯人一直深深地怀疑土耳其人想要的绝不只是保护在冲突中占少数的土耳其人和逊尼派阿拉伯人。


Now, Erdoğan has confirmed these suspicions, and in so doing has created conditions for more violence in Iraq.	如今，埃尔多安确认了这一怀疑，也为伊拉克暴力升级创造了条件。


How the fighting in Aleppo and Mosul ends will help clarify the tasks ahead.	阿勒颇和摩苏尔战斗如何结束将有助于厘清未来任务。


But until Russia, the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others (Europe, is anyone home?) can come together around a set of principles that steer the region toward peace, the carnage will continue.	但在俄罗斯、美国、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和其他相关方（欧洲，有人在家吗？ ）能够形成一系列原则共识引导中东走向和平之前，杀戮还将继续。


Who Killed the Nokia Phone?	谁杀死了诺基亚手机？


HELSINKI – It seems to be a law in the technology industry that leading companies eventually lose their positions – often quickly and brutally.	赫尔辛基——领导企业最终丧失领导地位似乎是科技行业的法则——而且其过程往往迅速而又残酷。


Mobile-phone champion Nokia, one of Europe’s biggest technology success stories, was no exception, losing its market share in the space of just a few years.	欧洲最著名的科技成功案例手机大佬诺基亚也未能例外，仅用了几年时间就丢掉了市场份额。


Can the industry’s new champions, Apple and Google – not to mention titans in other tech sectors – avoid Nokia’s fate?	苹果和谷歌等科技业新的领导企业（更不用说其他科技领域的巨头）能否避免诺基亚的悲剧？


In 2007, Nokia accounted for more than 40% of mobile-phone sales worldwide.	2007年，诺基亚曾占全球手机销量的40%以上。


But consumers’ preferences were already shifting toward touch-screen smartphones.	但消费者偏好已经开始向触屏智能手机转移。


With the introduction of Apple’s iPhone in the middle of that year, Nokia’s market share shrunk rapidly and revenue plummeted.	随着年中苹果iPhone的上市，诺基亚的市场份额迅速萎缩且收入锐减。


By the end of 2013, Nokia had sold its phone business to Microsoft.	到2013年底，诺基亚已经向微软出售其手机业务。


What sealed Nokia’s fate was a series of decisions made by Stephen Elop in his position as CEO, which he assumed in October 2010.	2010年上台的首席执行官史蒂芬·埃洛普的一系列决策导致了诺基亚的悲剧。


Each day that Elop spent at Nokia’s helm, the company’s market value declined by €18 million ($23 million) – making him, by the numbers, one of the worst CEOs in history.	埃洛普执掌诺基亚的每一天，公司的市场价值都下跌1800万欧元（合2300万美元）——这使埃洛普成为从数据上看史上最差的CEO之一。


Elop’s biggest mistake was choosing Microsoft’s Windows Phone as the only platform for Nokia’s smartphones.	选择微软Windows Phone作为诺基亚智能手机的唯一平台是埃洛普所犯最大的错误。


In his “burning platform” memo, Elop compared Nokia to a man on a burning offshore oilrig, facing a fiery death or an uncertain leap into the frigid sea.	在其“燃烧的平台”备忘录中，埃洛普将诺基亚比作某人身处茫茫海上燃烧的石油钻塔，需要在葬身火海或跳入冰冷海水的未知命运中做出选择。


He was right that business as usual meant certain death for Nokia; he was wrong to choose Microsoft as the company’s life raft.	他说一切照旧对诺基亚来讲意味着死亡没有说错； 但他选择微软作为公司的救生筏却是个错误。


But Elop was not the only person at fault.	但并不只有埃洛普犯了错误。


Nokia’s board resisted change, making it impossible for the company to adapt to rapid shifts in the industry.	诺基亚的董事会拒绝改变，导致公司无法跟上行业的变化节奏。


Most notably, Jorma Ollila, who had led Nokia’s transition from an industrial conglomerate to a technology giant, was too enamored with the company’s previous success to recognize the change that was needed to sustain its competitiveness.	最值得一提的是曾领导诺基亚成功从工业集���转型为科技巨头的约玛·奥利拉过度陶醉于公司之前的成功，却未能意识到保持公司竞争力所需要的变革。


The company also embarked on a desperate cost-cutting program, which included the elimination of thousands of jobs.	公司还启动了近乎绝望的减支计划，包括裁掉成千上万名员工。


This contributed to the deterioration of the company’s once-spirited culture, which had motivated employees to take risks and make miracles.	此举扭转了曾经意气风发的公司文化，正是这种文化造就了敢于承担风险创造奇迹的员工。


Good leaders left the company, taking Nokia’s sense of vision and direction with them.	优秀的领导者离开了公司，带走了诺基亚的目标和方向。


Not surprising, much of Nokia’s most valuable design and programming talent left as well.	不出所料，诺基亚最宝贵的设计和编程人才大多也离开了。


But the largest impediment to Nokia’s ability to create the kind of intuitive, user-friendly smartphone experiences that iPhones and Android devices offered was its refusal to move beyond the solutions that had driven its past success.	但真正阻碍诺基亚创造出iPhone和安卓机所带来的那种直观、友好的智能机用户体验的却是公司拒绝放弃曾造就其辉煌的解决方案。


For example, Nokia initially claimed that it could not use the Android operating system without including Google applications on its phones.	比方说，诺基亚最初声称无法在不用到谷歌软件的情况下使用安卓操作系统。


But, just before its takeover by Microsoft, Nokia actually built a line of Android-based phones called Nokia X, which did not include Google apps, but instead used Nokia maps and Microsoft search.	但就在被微软收购之前，诺基亚却真正开发出了名为“诺基亚X”的安卓手机系列，该系列没有采用谷歌软件，而是采用了诺基亚地图和微软搜索。


Why didn’t Nokia choose Android earlier?	诺基亚为什么没有更早地选择安卓？


The short answer is money.	简单的说是因为钱。


Microsoft promised to pay billions of dollars for Nokia to use Windows Phone exclusively.	微软承诺向诺基亚支付数十亿美元独家使用Windows Phone。


Given that Google gives away its Android software, it could not match this offer.	因为谷歌安卓软件的免费性质，谷歌无法给出同样的报价。


But Microsoft’s money could not save Nokia; it is not possible to build an industrial ecosystem with money alone.	但微软的钱救不了诺基亚； 只靠钱也不可能建立完整的行业生态系统。


Elop’s previous experience at Microsoft was undoubtedly also a factor.	埃洛普曾经的微软经历无疑也是一个因素。


After all, in difficult situations, people often turn to what is familiar.	毕竟，面对困难人们往往做出熟悉的选择。


In Elop’s case, the familiar just happened to be another sinking company.	但具体到埃洛普而言，他所熟悉的恰恰是另一家行将就木的企业。


After hearing that Nokia had chosen Windows, Google director Vic Gundotra tweeted: “Two turkeys do not make an eagle.”	在听到诺基亚选择Windows的消息后，谷歌负责人维特·刚铎在推特上评论道：“两只火鸡凑到一起也变不成一只老鹰。 ”


Apple and Google should not rest easy.	苹果和谷歌也不能高枕无忧。


Like Nokia in the mobile-phone industry – not to mention Microsoft and IBM in the computing industry – one day they will lose their leading position.	就像手机业的诺基亚——更不要说计算机业的微软和IBM一样——有一天他们将失去自己的领导地位。


But there are steps they can take to prolong their success.	但他们可以采取措施延长自己的成功。


First, companies must continue to innovate, in order to improve the chances that disruptive technologies emerge from within.	首先，企业必须不断创新，以尽可能提高颠覆性技术从内部出现的机会。


If market leaders implement a system for discovering and nurturing new ideas – and create a culture in which employees are not afraid to make mistakes – they can remain on their industry’s cutting edge.	如果市场领导者推行一套发掘和培养新理念的体制——并且创造出员工不怕犯错误的文化——就能够保持行业尖端的领导地位。


Second, major firms should keep track of emerging innovators.	其次，大公司应该了解正在崛起的创新企业。


Instead of forming partnerships with smaller companies that suit their current business model, major firms should work with inventive startups with disruptive potential.	它们应选择与具有颠覆潜力的创新企业合作，而不是与符合其目前商业模式的企业联盟。


Finally, though successful companies must constantly innovate, they should not be afraid to imitate.	最后，虽然成功企业必须不断创新，但他们也不应害怕模仿。


If Nokia had immediately begun to develop products modeled after the iPhone, while addressing related patent issues effectively, the mobile-device business would look very different today.	如果诺基亚在iPhone上市后立即在有效解决相关专利问题的前提下开始研发类似产品，那么今天手机业的格局也将截然不同。


Nokia’s experience also carries an important lesson for regulators, particularly in the European Union.	诺基亚的经历也为监管部门，特别是欧盟监管部门上了重要的一课。


Attempting to quell disruptive technologies and protect existing companies through, for example, antitrust crusades, is not an option.	想要压制颠覆性技术并通过反垄断攻势保护现有企业根本行不通。


Indeed, that approach would ultimately hurt the consumer, both by impeding technological progress and eliminating price competition – like that from Samsung’s Android devices, which forced Apple to lower iPhone prices.	事实上，这种做法终将通过阻碍技术进步和消除价格竞争等方式损及消费者——这方面的例子是三星安卓机，它迫使苹果降低了iPhone的价格。


Herein lies the most important lesson in Nokia’s fall.	这里可以找到诺基亚垮台最重要的一课。


Technology companies cannot achieve success simply by pleasing their board of directors or even striking multi-million-dollar deals with partners.	科技公司的成功无法通过取悦董事会甚至与合作企业签订数百万美元的订单来取得。


Whichever company makes the consumer happy – whether a well-established multinational or a dynamic startup – will win.	取悦消费者的公司终将胜出——无论它是成熟的跨国企业还是充满活力的创业企业。


Companies that lose sight of that are doomed.	认识不到这一点的企业注定前景不妙。


No Licenses to Kill	不能拥有杀人的执照


NEW YORK – In the last year, we endured a remarkable experience; after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial markets actually collapsed and required artificial life support.	纽约——去年，我们有了一段刻骨铭心的经历，随着2008年9月雷曼兄弟的破产，全球金融系统实际上已经崩盘，仅仅靠着人工输血才勉强维持。


Nothing like this had happened since the Great Depression of the 1930’s.	这应该是20世纪30年代大萧条以来最为严重的局面。


What made this collapse so remarkable is that it was not caused by some external factor, but originated within the financial system itself and spread from there throughout the global economy.	问题之所以如此严重，原因是本次事件的起因不是由外部因素，而恰恰是由金融系统的内部引发的，由此不断蔓延，最终导致全球的经济危机。


This was almost completely unexpected, as the prevailing view was that financial markets are self-correcting.	原先大家都认为金融市场具有自我修正的能力，没想到事情来得如此突然。


We now know that they are not.	现在我们知道，原先的判断有问题。


But, having gone too far in deregulating markets, we must resist a natural tendency to overcompensate.	但是，我们不能因此矫枉过正，对金融市场的过分监管是不可取的。


While markets are imperfect, regulators are not only human but bureaucratic and subject to political influence.	诚然，市场并不完美的，然而监管者本身也是人，监管的过程往往程序复杂，效率低下，而且很容易受到政治势力的影响。


Therefore, new regulations should be kept to a minimum.	如果要重新修订监管法规的话，也应该把应该监管的范围缩减到尽可能小的范围之内。


Three principles should guide reform. First and foremost, financial authorities must accept responsibility for preventing asset bubbles from growing too big.	改革监管法规应该遵循以下三个原则，首先，也是最重要的一点是，金融监管机构必须承担起责任，在市场繁荣的时候防止资产泡沫的出现。


Former United States Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and others have argued that if markets can’t recognize bubbles, neither can regulators.	美联储前主席阿兰·格林斯潘等人认为，如果市场本身不能发现泡沫，那么监管者也不可能觉察到。


Even so, financial authorities must accept the assignment: while they are bound to be wrong, feedback from the markets will tell them whether they have done too much or too little. They can then correct their mistakes.	即便如此，监管机构也必须承担此项任务：一旦他们采取什么行动，市场就会有相应的反馈，他们可以根据反馈作出相应的修正。


Second, controlling asset bubbles requires control not only of the money supply, but also of the availability of credit.	其次，控制资产泡沫不仅要管好资金，更要管好信贷市场。


The best-known tools for this are margin requirements and minimum capital requirements.	最耳熟能详的就是保证金制度和最低资本额的要求。


Similarly, financial authorities should vary the loan-to-value ratio on commercial and residential mortgages for risk-weighting purposes in order to forestall real estate bubbles.	同时，监管者应该根据风险的大小，区分商用和民用抵押贷款的借贷价值比例（loan-to-value ratio），划分相应的风险等级，以防止房地产泡沫的产生。


Regulators may also have to revive old tools.	监管者也应该启用一些过去常用的方法。


For example, we had no financial crises when central banks instructed commercial banks to limit their lending to particular economic sectors that they believed were overheating, such as real estate or consumer loans.	例如，当央行发现某些特殊领域，例如房地产或是消费信贷等领域出现经济过热现象，它就应该对商业银行与此相关领域的信贷作出限制。


The Chinese authorities do it today, and they also set the minimum deposits banks must maintain with the central bank.	如今的中国政府就是这么做的，他们要求商业银行在央行有最低的存款准备金。


Or consider the Internet bubble, which Greenspan recognized early but then did nothing to address.	让我们看看当年的互联网泡沫，当时的格林斯潘很早就已经察觉，但他并没有采取什么相应的措施。


He rightly believed that reducing the money supply would have been too blunt an instrument to use.	他认为，如果采取控制资金供应的方法，未免过于唐突。


But he could have devised more specific measures, such as asking the Securities and Exchange Commission to freeze new share issues, because equity leveraging was fueling the bubble.	但他当时应该采取其他的一些措施，例如要求美国证券交易委员会冻结新股的发行，正是股权杠杆作用加速了泡沫化的进程。


The Internet bubble was unusual in this regard.	由此而言，当时的互联网泡沫是不正常的现象。


Usually, it is credit that provides the leverage, and credit is by nature reflexive. That is, an increase in the willingness to lend tends to increase the value of the collateral, and also improves the borrowers’ performance, thereby encouraging a relaxation of credit criteria.	信贷通常会产生杠杆效应，有着自我放大的功能，也就是说，借贷使得抵押物增值的同时，提高了借贷者的经营能力，从而更加放大了信贷市场的能力。


Bubbles recur, especially in real estate, because this reflexive relationship is repeatedly ignored.	因为这种自我放大的过程往往不被人所察觉，泡沫，特别是房地产市场的泡沫由此产生。


This brings me to my third point: we must reconceptualize the meaning of market risk.	这就引出了我的第三个判断：我们必须重新定义市场风险的内涵。


According to conventional theory, markets tend towards equilibrium, function without any discontinuity in the sequence of prices, and deviations occur in a random fashion.	根据传统理论，市场具有自我平衡的功能。


As a result, market risks can be equated with the risks confronting individual market participants.	价格的变化具有连续性，偏差的产生也是偶然的��只要市场的参与者控制好自身的风险，整个市场的风险就是可控的。


As long as they manage their risks properly, regulators should be happy.	监管者随之可以无为而治。


But markets are subject to imbalances that individual participants may ignore if they think they can offload their positions on someone else.	但是，如果市场的参与者认为能够将风险转嫁给别人，他们往往就会大胆行事，这样就打破了市场的平衡。


Regulators, by contrast, cannot ignore these imbalances, because if too many participants are on the same side, positions cannot be liquidated without causing a discontinuity or, worse, financial collapse.	在这种情形下，监管者就不能袖手旁观了，因为如果越来越多的市场参与者都这么想的话，就会造成连锁反应，一旦出了问题，局面不可收拾，金融系统由此就会崩盘。


Thus, there is systemic market risk, and unregulated securitization of banking assets, which was the main cause of the recent collapse, adds to it.	所以说，缺乏对银行资产证券化的监管是本次市场崩盘的主因，这是一个系统性的风险。


To avert a repetition, securities held by banks must carry a much higher risk rating than they currently do.	因此，我们应该对银行证券化的资产作出更高的风险评级。


Banks must pay for their implicit government guarantee by using less leverage and accepting restrictions on how they invest depositors’ money.	政府通过对银行收取一定的保证金的措施，降低银行对金融杠杆的使用，对银行存款的使用也应该作出一些 限制，


At a minimum, proprietary trading ought to be financed by banks’ own capital.	至少，银行只能用自有资金进行职业式证券交易（proprietary trading）。


If a bank is too big to fail, regulators should go even further, and regulate proprietary traders’ compensation packages to ensure that risks and rewards are properly aligned.	如果银行大到不能倒闭时，监管者就应该出手，监管职业式证券交易的赔偿方案，以确保风险和受益正确地配置。


Hedge funds and other large investors must also be closely monitored to ensure that they don’t build up dangerous imbalances.	同时，监管机构还必须密切关注对冲基金和其他大型投资机构的动向，防止不平衡的市场行为发生。


Moreover, the issuance and trading of derivatives ought to be at least as strictly regulated as that of stocks.	更进一步来说，保险和金融衍生产品的交易也要严格监管，至少要做到对股票那样的监管力度。


Regulators should insist that traded derivatives are homogenous, standardized, and transparent.	监管者必须确保衍生产品交易应该是同质，标准而且透明的。


Some derivatives, particularly credit default swaps should not be traded at all.	像信用违约互换(credit default swap，CDS)等衍生产品的交易，应该被禁止。


To see why, note that being long and selling short in the stock market has an asymmetric risk/reward profile.	在股市的长线和短线买空交易中，风险回报的曲线是不对称的。 长线交易中的损失可以减少风险的可能。


Losing on a long position reduces one’s risk exposure, while losing on a short position increases it, so one can be more patient being long and wrong than being short and wrong.	而短线买空交易中的损失增加了风险的可能。 所以，耐心在长线投资中比短线买空更为重要。


Now, the CDS market offers a convenient way of shorting bonds, but the risk/reward asymmetry works in the opposite way.	现在，CDS市场给了卖空债券打开方便之门。 风险回报曲线的不对称就会返向逆转。


Shorting bonds by purchasing a CDS contract carries limited risk but almost unlimited profit potential, whereas selling a CDS contract offers limited profits but practically unlimited risks.	购买CDS合同来卖空债券的风险有限，而收益却是无限的。 然而，出售CDS合同的所得的利润有限，但风险是却是无限大。


This encourages short-side speculation, which places downward pressure on the underlying bonds.	这自然鼓励了买空的投机行为，从而导致优先债券下行压力加大。


The negative effect is reinforced by the fact that, because CDS contracts are tradable, they tend to be priced as warrants, which can be sold at any time, rather than as options, which would require an actual default to be cashed in.	更为糟糕的是，CDS合同是可以交易的，作为一种保证书，它们可以标上价格，随时可以出售。 而期权只能是在实际违约发生时才能变现。


People buy CDS contracts not because they expect a default, but because they expect the CDS to appreciate in response to adverse developments.	购买CDS合同的人并不指望违约的发生，而是希望市场在反向逆转的时候，靠CDS合同的升值赚钱。


That is what destroyed AIG, and what led to the recent bankruptcy of Abitibi-Bowater and the pending bankruptcy of General Motors.	这也就是导致AIG破产的原因，近期破产的全球最大白报纸生产商Abitibi-Bowater公司和已经进入破产程序的通用汽车也归于此类。


In both cases, because some bondholders owned CDS contracts, they stood to gain more from bankruptcy than from reorganization.	在上述的案例中，由于一些债券持有人拥有CDS合同，对于债券人而言，相比于企业重组来说，企业破产会使得他们获得更大的收益。


Purchasing CDS contracts is like buying insurance on someone else’s life and owning a license to kill him.	购买CDS合同行为就如同给他人买了保险后，还拥有可以杀死他的执照。


It is the job of regulators to ensure that no one is ever granted such a license.	显然，这就需要监管者来保证没有人可以拥有这样的执照。


Is China the Next Japan?	中国会重蹈日本的覆辙吗？


NEW HAVEN – Despite deepening concerns about China’s economy, the country is not heading toward “lost decades” of Japanese-style stagnation.	发自纽黑文——尽管外界对中国经济的忧虑日益加深，该国却并不会滑向“失落的十年”那样的日本式停滞。


And yet a worrisome ambiguity clouds this verdict.	不过令人担忧的不确定性依然笼罩着这一判断。


Japan’s fate was sealed by its reluctance to abandon a dysfunctional growth model.	日本的命运源自于它不愿放弃一个已经无法正常运行的增长模式。


While China’s embrace of structural rebalancing distinguishes it from Japan, it is struggling to implement that strategy.	虽然中国采纳结构性再平衡改革的举措将自身与日本区分了开来，但它必须奋力实施这一战略。


Unless the struggle is won, the endgame could be similar.	要么改革成功，要么落得和日本一样的结局。


The same conclusion emerges from a seminar on “The Lessons of Japan” that I have taught at Yale for the past six years.	同样的结论也出现在我于耶鲁大学教授了六年的《日本的教训》课程上。


The course is primarily one in forensic macroeconomics – distilling key lessons from the rise and fall of the modern Japanese economy and then figuring out the relevance of those lessons for other major economies.	该课程基本上属于一门法证宏观经济学（forensic macroeconomics）课程——从现代日本经济的兴衰中提炼一些核心经验教训，然后找出那些教训与其他主要经济体的相关性。


The seminar culminates with student research papers aimed at assessing which candidates might be the next Japan.	在课程结束时学生都要提交研究论文去评估哪些候选国可能成为下一个日本。


As recently as 2012, the United States was the top choice, as it struggled to regain its footing in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.	2012年是美国是首选，因为它正努力在2008年金融大危机的余震中站稳脚跟；


Not surprisingly, by 2013, the focus had shifted to crisis-battered Europe.	到2013年则不出意外地转移到遭危机重创的欧洲；


But this year, more than half of the students in the seminar (13 of 23) chose to examine whether China might be the next Japan.	而今年却有一半以上的学生（23人中的13位）在研讨会选择研究中国是否会成为下一个日本。


An academic setting provides a wonderful intellectual laboratory.	大学的学术环境提供了一个极好的智力实验室。


But a couple of quick trips to China after the end of the spring term gave me a different perspective.	但在春季学期结束后在中国的几趟短期访问则令我产生了一个不同的观点。


In extensive discussions with Chinese officials, business leaders, academics, and investors, I found great interest in the lessons of Japan and how they might bear on China’s conundrum.	在与中国官员，商界领袖，学者和投资者进行广泛讨论之后，我发现大家都对日本的经验教训以及如何借鉴这种教训疏解中国当前的困局表现出浓厚的兴趣。


The topic du jour was debt.	当前最热门的话题莫过于负债。


China’s nonfinancial debt has risen from 150% of GDP in 2008 to 255% today, with two-thirds of the increase concentrated in the corporate sector, largely state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	2008年时中国的非金融债务相当于GDP的150％，如今则上升到255％，而2/3的增长都集中在企业部门，且主要是国有企业。


As the world’s largest saver – with gross domestic saving averaging 49% of GDP since 2007 – surging debt hardly comes as a surprise.	作为世界上最大的储蓄国——自2007年国内储蓄总值平均相当于GDP的49%——债务的膨胀算不上意外。


High-saving economies are prone to high investment, and the lack of capital-market reform in China – exacerbated by the bursting of the equity bubble in 2015 – reinforces the disproportionate role that bank credit has played in funding China’s investment boom.	高储蓄经济体本来就容易出现高投资，同时中国缺乏资本市场改革——并因在2015年股市泡沫破裂而加剧——强化了银行信贷资金在中国的投资热潮所扮演的不相称角色。


The Japan comparison is especially instructive in assessing the risks of debt-intensive growth.	相比之下，日本的状况在评估债务密集型增长的风险方面尤其具有启发性。


At nearly 390% of GDP in late 2015, Japan’s overall debt ratio is about 140 percentage points higher than China’s.	日本在2015年末的整体负债相当于GDP的390％左右，高出中国约140%。


But, because Japan has such a high saving rate – averaging 24% of GDP since 2007 – it basically owes its debt to itself. That means it is not vulnerable to the capital flight of foreign investors that often triggers crises.	但由于日本拥有极高的储蓄率 ——自2007年以来平均相当于GDP的24％，意味着这些债务基本上都是停留在日本国内，因此该国也较少受到外国投资者资本外逃的冲击，而资本外逃往往是危机爆发的原因。


With China’s saving rate double that of Japan’s since 2007, that conclusion is all the more pertinent for its debt-intensive economy.	由于中国自2007年以来的平均储蓄率是日本的一倍，这一结论就与其债务密集型经济更加相关。


The China scare of early 2016 – stoked by hand-wringing over capital flight and currency risk – missed this point altogether.	2016年年初的中国恐慌论——人们在资本外逃和汇率风险的忧虑中变得不知所措——却完全没有认识到这一点。


Fears of a hard landing stemming from a Chinese debt crisis are vastly overblown.	结果担心中国债务危机导致硬着陆的恐慌情绪就被过度夸大了。


Zombie firms – the economic walking dead – are also a topic of intense discussion in China.	僵尸企业——经济体内的行尸走肉——也是中国内部激烈讨论的话题。


Key actors in Japan’s first lost decade during the 1990s, zombie corporates were kept alive by the “evergreening” of subsidized bank lending – masking an outsize build-up of nonperforming loans (NPLs) that ultimately brought down the Japanese banking system.	这些企业在上世纪90年代日本第一个失去的十年中扮演了关键行动者的角色，它们借助“常借常有”的受补贴银行借贷而持续存活，掩盖了存在巨额不良贷款的事实，最终银行系统不堪重负全面崩盘。


Significantly, the insidious interplay between zombie corporates and zombie banks clogged the arteries of the real economy – sparking a sharp slowdown in productivity growth that Japan has yet to reverse.	其中值得注意的一点是，僵尸企业和僵尸银行之间的邪恶勾当堵塞了实体经济的动脉 ——导致生产率增长大幅放缓，至今都未扭转这一状况。


In recent public statements, the Chinese leadership has made explicit reference to zombie SOEs.	在最近的公开发言中，中国领导层已经明确提到了僵尸国有企业的存在。


But, unlike Japan, which remained in denial over this problem for close to a decade, Chinese authorities have moved relatively quickly to rein in excesses in two key industries – steel and coal – while hinting of more to come in cement, glass, and shipbuilding.	但与日本在近十年间矢口否认问题存在的态度不同，中国当局已经较快地行动了起来，遏制在两个关键行业——钢铁，煤炭——的过剩产能，更暗示会进一步对水泥，玻璃和造船行业进行整顿。


China’s deteriorating loan quality is also reminiscent of Japan’s experience.	中国日益恶化的贷款质量也会让人联想到日本的教训。


The official NPL ratio of 1.7% for listed banks is only the tip of the iceberg.	上市银行官方发布的1. 7%不良贷款率仅是冰山一角。


Beneath the surface are “special mention loans” – where borrowers are in the early stages of repayment difficulties – along with bad credits in the shadow banking sector, both of which could raise China’s fully-loaded NPL ratio to around 8%.	潜藏其下的是“特别关注类贷款” ——借款人尚处于还款困难的初期阶段，再加上影子银行部门的不良贷款，这两者可能会中国的整体不良贷款率提升到8％左右。


In that case, the authorities will eventually need to inject capital into the Chinese banking system.	在这种情况下，当局最终肯定会被迫得向银行体系注资。


None of this is a dark secret in Beijing.	这一切在北京当局内部都不是什么机密。


On the contrary, an interview in early May with an “authoritative insider,” published in China’s flagship official newspaper, People’s Daily, underscored an increasingly open and intense debate among senior officials over how to avoid ending up like Japan.	相反，中国最权威的党政机关报《人民日报》在五月初对“权威知情人士”的一次采访就体现出政府高层之间对如何避免重蹈日本覆辙的讨论正日益公开和激烈。


The insider, purportedly close to President Xi Jinping, highlighted the insidious connection between China’s debt and zombie problems that might well culminate in a Japanese-like “L-shaped” endgame.	采访中这位据报在国家主席习近平身边工作的知情人士强调中国债务和僵尸企业问题的潜在联系可能令中国滑向日本式的“L形”结局。


This gets to the heart of the China-Japan comparison.	这正是中日两国之间的核心区别。


Two and a half lost decades (and counting) is simply an unacceptable outcome for China.	中国是完全不可能承受两个半失去的十年（并继续延续下去）的后果。


But knowing what it doesn’t want is not enough to guarantee that China won’t fall into a Japanese-style trap of its own.	但意识到这一点是不足以保证中国不会陷入日本式陷阱的。


Reforms are the decisive differentiating factor.	对此改革才是决定性的差异化因素。


Japan’s failure to embrace structural reforms was a hallmark of the 1990s, and it is an equally serious impediment to the current “Abenomics” recovery program.	日本不愿接受结构性改革的做法是1990年代的一个标志性事件，这同样也是令当前“安倍经济学”复苏计划难以推进的严重阻碍因素。


By contrast, China’s strategy emphasizes the heavy lifting of structural change and rebalancing.	相比之下，中国的战略强调结构改革和重新平衡的重任。


In the end, success or failure will hinge on the willingness of the Chinese leadership to confront the powerful vested interests resisting reform.	最终成败将取决于中国领导层在面对强大既得利益集团抵制改革时的所体现出来的改革意志。


Interestingly, of the 13 students in my seminar who chose to consider China as the next Japan, two-thirds ultimately rejected the comparison.	有趣的是，那13位在我的课程中选择研究中国会否作为下一个日本的学生最终有2/3最终撤回了这一比较结论。


They argued that the lessons of modern China – especially the reforms and opening up spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping – are more important than the lessons of Japan.	他们认为，当代中国的经验——尤其邓小平领导之下的改革开放——比日本的经验更为重要。


And they got good grades.	为此他们也得到了令自己满意的好成绩。


Jangan Tangisi Perjanjian Dagang yang Sudah Berakhir	不要为已死的贸易协定哭泣


CAMBRIDGE – Selama tujuh dekade setelah berakhirnya Perang Dunia Kedua adalah masa-masa perjanjian perdagangan.	坎布里奇—二战结束以来的七十年是贸易协定时代。


Negara-negara dengan perekonomian yang besar berada dalam masa dimana mereka secara terus-menerus melakukan perundingan perdagangan, serta menandatangani dua perjanjian multilateral utama yang berskala global, yaitu: Persetujuan Umum Tentang Tarif dan Perdagangan (GATT) dan perjanjian untuk membentuk Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO).	世界主要经济体始终处于贸易谈判中，包括两大全球性多边协议：关税与贸易总协定（GATT）和世界贸易组织成立条约。


Selain itu, terdapat lebih dari 500 perjanjian perdagangan bilateral dan regional yang ditandatangani – yang kebanyakan ditandatangani sejak WTO menggantikan GATT pada tahun 1995.	此外还有500多个双边和地区性贸易协定签署——其中绝大部分发生在1995年世贸组织取代关贸总协定之后。


Lonjakan populisme di tahun 2016 hampir pasti akan mengakhiri rangkaian kesibukan pembuatan perjanjian perdagangan.	2016年的民粹主义反动将几乎肯定宣告这一繁忙的协议时代结束。


Saat negara-negara berkembang mungkin melakukan perjanjian perdagangan dengan skala yang lebih kecil, dua perjanjian perdagangan besar, yaitu Kemitraan Trans-Pasifik (TPP) dan Kemitraan Dagang dan Investasi Trans-Atlantik (TTIP), dapat dianggap sudah berakhir ketika Donald Trump terpilih menjadi Presiden Amerika Serikat.	尽管发展中国家可能会继续追求小型贸易协定，但谈判桌上的两个主要协议——跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）在唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统后已经宣告不治。


Kita tidak perlu bersedih atas berakhirnya kedua perjanjian tersebut.	我们不应该为它们的死亡而哀悼。


Apa yang sebenarnya menjadi tujuan dari perjanjian perdagangan?	贸易协定真正的目的何在？


Jawabannya mungkin cukup jelas: berbagai negara melakukan perundingan perjanjian perdagangan untuk mencapai perdagangan yang lebih bebas.	答案似乎显而易见：各国谈判贸易协定是为了实现更自由的贸易。


Namun, kenyataannya lebih rumit daripada itu.	但现实要远远复杂得多。


Hal ini terjadi bukan hanya karena pada saat ini perjanjian perdagangan yang dilakukan juga mencakup banyak kebijakan lain seperti peraturan mengenai kesehatan dan keselamatan, paten dan hak cipta, peraturan neraca modal, dan hak-hak investor.	今天的贸易协定不但扩张到其他许多政策领域，如卫生和安全监管、专利和版权、资本账户管制、投资者权利等；


Hal ini juga terjadi karena adanya ketidak jelasan apakah hal-hal tersebut berhubungan dengan perdagangan bebas.	它们对自由贸易到底有多大好处亦未可知。


Pertimbangan perekonomian yang menjadi dasar untuk melakukan perdagangan atau tidak adalah pertimbangan dalam negeri.	关于贸易的标准经济学理论是国内贸易。


Akan ada pihak-pihak yang diuntungkan dan ada yang mendapatkan kerugian namun, secara umum, liberalisasi perdagangan akan memperbesar perekonomian negara tersebut.	贸易会产生赢家和输家，但贸易自由化扩大了国内经济蛋糕的规模。


Perdagangan adalah suatu hal yang baik dan kita harus menghilangkan hambatan atas perdagangan demi kebaikan kita sendiri – bukan demi membantu negara lain.	贸易对我们有利，我们也应该为了自己的利益——而不是为了帮助其他国家——而排除贸易障碍。


Oleh karena itu, perdagangan bebas tidak memerlukan konsep kosmopolitanisme; yang diperlukan adalah penyesuaian di dalam negeri untuk menjamin bahwa semua kelompok (atau setidaknya penguasa politik) bisa mendapatkan bagian dari keseluruhan manfaat perdagangan bebas.	因此，开放贸易不需要世界大同论； 它只需要必须的国内调整，确保所有（或至少政治势力较大的）集团都能参与分割总收益。


Bagi negara-negara dengan perekonomian yang relatif kecil, hal diatas adalah motivasi untuk melakukan perdagangan bebas.	对于世界市场中的小经济体而言，故事到这里就结束了。


Hal ini karena mereka tidak memerlukan perjanjian dagang sebab perdagangan bebas adalah suatu hal yang mereka inginkan (dan mereka tidak mempunyai posisi tawar dibandingan negara-negara dengan ekonomi yang lebih besar).	它们不需要贸易协定，因为自由贸易从一开始就最符合它们的利益（它们也没有筹码可以和大国讨价还价）。


Para ahi ekonomi mengkaji kasus perjanjian dagang negara-negara dengan ekonomi besar karena mereka bisa memanipulasi peraturan perdagangan mereka – misalnya harga global barang-barang yang mereka ekspor dan impor.	经济学家认为贸易协定对大国是有意义的 ，因为这些国家可以操纵贸易条件——它们出口和进口的商品的世界价格。


Sebagai contoh, dengan memberlakukan tarif impor untuk baja, Amerika Serikat bisa menurunkan harga baja yang dijual oleh produsen baja dari Cina.	比如，通过对（比如）钢铁征收进口关税，美国可以压制中国制造商出售产品的价格。


Atau, dengan memberlakukan pajak ekspor pesawat, Amerika Serikat bisa meningkatkan harga yang perlu dibayar oleh orang dari negara-negara lain.	或者，通过征收飞机出口关税，美国可以提高外国人买飞机的价格。


Perjanjian dagang yang melarang kebijakan-kebijakan merugikan mitra dagang seperti itu bermanfaat bagi semua negara, karena tanpa adanya kesepakatan ini, seluruh negara-negara tersebut dapat merugi.	禁止这些以邻为壑政策的贸易协定可能有利于所有国家，因为如果没有这些协定，它们可能一损俱损。


Namun untuk menerapkan penalaran diatas dalam praktek perjanjian dagang yang ada adalah perkara yang sulit dilakukan.	但在真正的贸易协定中，这样的逻辑难觅其踪。


Walaupun Amerika Serikat memberlakukan bea impor pada baja dari Cina (dan ke banyak produk Cina lainnya), namun motifnya bukan untuk menurunkan harga baja global.	尽管美国确实对中国钢材（和其他许多产品）征收进口关税，但其动机很少是为了拉低世界钢材价格。


Jika dibiarkan, Amerika akan lebih memilih untuk memberikan subsidi ekspor bagi Boeing – seperti yang sering mereka lakukan – dibandingkan memberlakukan pajak ke Boeing.	要让美国自己选的话，它宁可补贴波音公司的出口——它经常这么做——而不是对它们征税。


Memang benar bahwa peraturan WTO melarang subsidi ekspor – yang bisa dibilang akan memperkaya negara mitra dagang -  sementara tidak ada larangan untuk memberlakukan pajak ekspor.	事实上，世贸组织规则禁止出口补贴——从经济学角度讲，这是与邻为善政策——而对出口税未加直接限制。


Jadi ilmu ekonomi tidak membuat kita menjadi lebih memahami perjanjian dagang.	因此，经济学对于我们理解贸易协定的影响并不大。


Ilmi politik sepertinya lebih dapat menjelaskan hal tersebut: kebijakan perdagangan Amerika Serikat mengenai baja dan pesawat terbang dilatar belakangi lebih pada keinginan para pembuat kebijakan untuk membantu kedua industri tersebut – kedua industri tersebut mempunyai kekuatan lobi yang besar di Washington DC – daripada pengaruhnya terhadap perekonomian yang lebih luas.	政治��好像影响很大：对于美国的钢铁和飞机贸易政策的更好的解释也许是决策者想帮助特定行业——钢铁和飞机在华盛顿都有强大的游说集团——而不是为了总体经济影响。


Para pendukung perjanjian perdagangan sering berargumen bahwa perjanjian dapat mempersulit pemerintah untuk memberikan bantuan bagi industri yang memiliki hubungan politik yang erat dengan penguasa. Namun argumen ini memiliki kekurangan.	贸易协定的支持者经常说，它们能让政府更难特别关照政治关系强大的行业，从而有助于遏制浪费性政策。


Jika kebijakan perdagangan sebagian besar dipengaruhi oleh kelompok lobi politik, bukankah hal yang sama juga terjadi di perundingan perdagangan internasional?	如果贸易政策主要由政治游说决定，国际贸易谈判不也是这些游说集团的案上鱼肉吗？


Apakah peraturan perdagangan yang dibuat oleh kombinasi kelompok lobi dalam negeri dan asing akan memberikan hasil yang lebih baik dibandingkan peraturan yang hanya dibuat oleh kelompok lobi dalam negeri?	由国内和国外游说集团合作，而不是国内游说集团独自制定的贸易规则能够保证更好的结果吗？


Tentu saja, kelompok lobi di dalam negeri tidak bisa mendapatkan semua yang mereka inginkan ketika mereka berhadapan dengan kelompok lobi asing.	平心而论，当国内游说集团必须与国外游说集团抗争时，它们也许得不到所有想要的东西。


Namun, kepentingan yang sama dalam kelompok-kelompok industri di berbagai negara bisa berujung pada kebijakan yang menguntungkan industri secara global.	但是，不同国家产业集团之间的共同利益可能带来隐含全球寻租的政策。


Jika perjanjian perdagangan sebagian besar adalah tentang tarif impor, maka perundingan pertukaran atas akses pasar biasanya menghasilkan hambatan impor yang lebih rendah. Ini adalah contoh manfaat keadaan dimana kelompok-kelompok lobi saling mengimbangi satu dengan lainnya.	当贸易协定的主要内容是进口关税时，用市场准入作为交换条件一般总能让进口壁垒降低——这是游说集团的利益互相制衡的例子。


Tapi tentu banyak contoh kolusi internasional antara kelompok kepentingan.	但必然也有很多特殊利益集团进行国际串谋的例子。


Larangan subsidi impor dari WTO tidak mempunyai alasan ekonomi yang jelas, seperti yang telah dijelaskan diatas.	如我所指出的，世贸组织禁止出口补贴就没有真正的经济逻辑。


Peraturan anti-dumping juga secara jelas bermaksud untuk melakukan aksi proteksionis.	反倾销规则在内容上也是赤裸裸的保护主义。


Kolusi seperti ini semakin berkembang akhir-akhir ini.	这些负面的例子在最近频繁涌现。


Perjanjian perdagangan akhir-akhir ini memasukkan peraturan mengenai “hak intelektual”, arus modal, dan perlindungan investasi yang sebagian besar dirancang untuk menghasilkan dan mempertahankan keuntungan untuk institusi finansial dan perusahaan multinasional dengan mengorbankan tujuan kebijakan sah lainnya.	新的贸易协定中规定了“知识产权”、资本流和投资保护等规则，它们主要是用来让金融机构和跨国公司取得和保护利润，而牺牲其他合理的政策目标。


Peraturan-peraturan ini memberikan perlindungan khusus kepada investor asing yang sering bertentangan dengan peraturan kesehatan masyarakat atau lingkungan.	这些规则为时常与公共卫生或环境监管出现冲突的外国投资者提供特殊保护。


Peraturan-peraturan tersebut juga mempersulit negara berkembang untuk mempunyai akses terhadap teknologi, mengatur arus modal yang volatil, dan melakukan diversifikasi ekonomi melalui kebijakan-kebijakan sektoral.	它们让发展中国家更加难以获得技术、管理波动性很高的资本流，以及通过产业政策实现经济多样化。


Kebijakan perdagangan yang didorong oleh kelompok lobi politik dalam negeri dan kelompok kepentingan adalah kebijakan yang merugikan diri sendiri.	由国内政治游说和特殊利益集团推动的贸易政策是自残（beggar-thyself）政策。


Hal ini mungkin juga mempunyai konsekuensi yang merugikan mitra dagang, namun hal ini bukanlah motif mereka.	它们可能也会造成以邻为壑的效果，但这不是初衷。


Kondisi ini mencerminkan asimetri kekuatan dan kegagalan politik di masyarakat.	它们反映了权力不对称和社会内部的政治失败。


Perjanjian perdagangan internasional hanya mempunyai manfaat terbatas untuk memperbaiki kegagalan di dalam negeri tersebut, dan terkadang mereka justru memperparah kondisi yang sudah ada.	国际贸易政策对于纠正这些国内政策失灵的作用有限，有时还会放大这些失灵。


Menyingkapi kebijakan yang merugikan diri sendiri tentu membutuhkan perbaikan pemerintahan dalam negeri, bukan dengan membuat peraturan internasional.	解决自残政策需要改善国内治理，而不是制定国际规则。


Mari kita ingat hal ini ketika kita meratapi berakhirnya masa perjanjian perdagangan.	当我们哀悼贸易协定时代的结束时，一定不要忘记这一点。


Jika kita mengatur perekonomian kita dengan baik, perjanjian perdagangan yang baru akan menjadi lebih tidak berarti.	如果我们把经济管理好了，新的贸易协定完全是多余的。


Confronting the Next Global Health Challenge	直面下一场全球卫生挑战


ZURICH – Thanks to unprecedented international cooperation, the world is making impressive progress in the fight against malaria.	苏黎世—拜前所未有的国际合作所赐，我们在打击疟疾方面取得了引人注目的进步。


According to the World Health Organization’s just-released 2016 World Malaria Report, malaria mortality rates among children under age five have fallen by 69% since 2000.	据世界卫生组织刚刚发布的2016年《世界疟疾报告》（World Malaria Report），2000年以来五岁以下儿童疟疾致死率下降了69%。


And this progress is not limited to malaria.	并且这一进步不仅局限于疟疾。


Many countries have reduced new HIV infections by 50% or more over a similar period, and the infection rates for other debilitating tropical diseases, such as leprosy and Guinea worm, have fallen significantly in recent years.	同期许多国家将艾滋病新感染病例降低了50%或以上，其他致弱性热带疾病，如麻风和几内亚线虫病的传染率近几年来也显著下降。


But while mortality rates from infectious diseases are declining, developed countries’ sedentary lifestyles, tobacco use, and poor diets are catching on in the developing world, and noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer are increasing at an alarming rate.	但是，尽管传染病致死率在下降，发达国家的久坐习惯、吸烟和不健康饮食正在发展中国家蔓延，而糖尿病、心血管疾病和癌症等非传染性疾病（NCD）的增长速度令人警觉。


NCDs now kill 38 million people annually, with almost 75% of those deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries.	如今，NCD每年要夺走3,800万人的生命，其中75% 发生在中低收入国家。


And the outlook for developing countries is dire; for example, by 2030, NCDs are expected to cause more deaths in Africa than communicable, maternal, and nutritional illnesses combined.	并且发展中国家前景黯淡； 比如，预计到2030年，NCD导致非洲人死亡的数量将超过传染、母婴和营养性疾病之和。


Beyond threatening lives, NCDs can destabilize economies, especially in countries with limited health-care infrastructure.	除了威胁生命，NCD也有可能破坏经济，特别是对卫生基础设施薄弱的国家。


The challenge for governments and global health agencies is to continue making progress against infectious diseases, while also addressing the rising NCD threat.	政府和全球卫生机构的挑战是保持在传染病方面继续进展的同时解决日益升高的NCD威胁。


Fortunately, we can apply lessons from the successful fight against infectious diseases to the emerging fight against NCDs.	幸运的是，我们可以在即将到来的NCD斗争中借鉴打击传染病的成功经验。


Working with nonprofit agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and private companies, world leaders can have a profound impact on public health – even if foreign-aid budgets are strained.	世界领导人应该与非营利机构、政府间组织和私营公司合作，深刻地影响公共卫生——即便外部援助预算受到约束。


For starters, we need innovation.	首先，我们需要创新。


Without the great leap forward in antiretroviral therapy in the mid-1990s, we would not have the tools we have today to control HIV.	如果不是20世纪90年代中期抗逆转录酶疗法取得重大进展，就没有我们今天用来控制艾滋病毒的工具。


And without the artemisinin-based combination treatments that also emerged in that decade, malaria death rates would still be stubbornly high.	而没有基于青蒿素的联合疗法（也出现在20世纪90年代），疟疾死亡率将仍然非常高。


Policies that improve access to health care should also support innovation – and they must never undermine it.	改善医疗普及度的政策也应该支持创新——并且决不能影响创新。


Beyond innovation, we need strong partnerships to manage NCDs and ensure that patients have access to the treatment they need.	除了创新，我们需要强大的合作来治理NCD和确保患者能获得需要的治疗。


Effective HIV management has transformed that disease from a death sentence into a chronic condition in most places; but, of course, we now need sustainable solutions to provide continuous, long-term care.	有效的艾滋病毒管理让大部分地区的艾滋病从死刑变成了一种慢性病； 当然，我们现在仍需要可持续方案提供长期不断的治疗。


The private sector is increasingly committed to this approach.	私人部门对这一方针的贡献越来越大。


Novo Nordisk’s Changing Diabetes Care and Eli Lilly’s NCD Partnership are just two examples of how companies are collaborating with governments and health organizations in resource-limited countries to develop scalable, sustainable, and locally driven programs to combat diabetes.	诺和诺德公司的改变糖尿病治疗计划（Changing Diabetes Care）和礼来公司的NCD合作计划（NCD Partnership）是公司与资源紧缺国家政府和卫生组织合作开发可扩展、可持续、地方驱动的计划打击糖尿病的两个例��。


And Novartis Access, which our company launched in 2015, is a socially oriented business that works with governments, NGOs, and other public-sector customers in lower-income countries.	我公司2015年启动了诺华普及计划（Novartis Access），这是一项社会导向型计划，与政府、非政府组织和低收入国家的其他公共部门客户进行合作。


We have two goals for the program: to expand access to affordable medicines to treat NCDs such as heart disease, type-2 diabetes, respiratory illnesses, and breast cancer; and to cooperate with local and international organizations to strengthen health-care systems.	该计划有两个目标：扩大心脏病、二型糖尿病、呼吸道疾病和乳腺癌等NCD平价药物的普及； 以及与地方和国际组织合作加强卫生体系。


So far, we have observed that developing countries need to shift their paradigm for medicine procurement, and update their national essential-medicines lists.	目前，我们观察到发展中国家需要改变医药采购范式、更新国家基本药品目录。


A third lesson to take from the fight against infectious diseases is that political commitment is crucial.	来自打击传染病的第三个教训是政治承诺至关重要。


As Chatham House and other independent observers have warned, too few governments – particularly in developing countries – spend the recommended 5% of annual GDP on promoting health.	英国查塔姆研究所（Chatham House）和其他独立观察家警告，在促进卫生改善方面花费达到GDP的5%的建议目标的国家太少，特别是发展中国家。


Even when national budgets are tight, health investments are worth it; after all, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.	即使国家预算吃紧，健康投资也物有所值； 毕竟，预防花费者一，治疗花费者百。


Lower-income countries that are heavily affected by NCDs have everything to gain from investments that will make their people healthier and more productive.	受NCD影响严重的低收入国家如能投资于让人民更加健康、生产率更高的项目，将收到事半功倍之效。


As we have learned from managing HIV, investments in public health create a virtuous cycle: as people and communities begin to experience better health, they invest further in making health a priority.	从管理艾滋病毒的例子中我们可以看到，投资于公共卫生能创造良性循环：人民和社会体验到更好的健康状况，就会加大投资将健康列为重点。


Managing the rise of NCDs will require long-term thinking, and government leaders will have to make investments that might pay off only after they are no longer in office.	管理NCD的增加需要长期思维，政府领导人必须进行要在他们离任多年后才能收回成本的投资。


This is a serious challenge, especially in electoral democracies; but policymakers from around the world can come together to leverage their investments and those undertaken by the private sector.	这是一项艰巨的挑战，特别是在选举民主中； 但世界各地决策者可以精诚合作，撬动他们以及私人部门的投资。


And even if most countries reach the recommended spending of 5% of GDP, the world will still need innovative financing mechanisms and policies to enable public-private collaboration.	即使大部分国家达到了GDP的5%的卫生支出水平，世界也需要创新融资机制和政策实现公私合作。


Leaders from around the world must prioritize the global fight against NCDs.	世界各地领导人必须将针对NCD的全球斗争列为重点。


To this end, governments and global health agencies should apply lessons learned from the successful fight against infectious diseases.	在这方面，政府和全球卫生机构应该应用从成功打击传染病中获得的经验。


Through innovation, dynamic partnerships to strengthen health systems, and political will, the world can sustain the gains made against infectious disease, while also effectively combating NCDs.	通过创新，增强卫生体系的动态合作，以及政治意愿，世界能够保持从打击传染病中所获得的收益，并有效地打击NCD。


Germany’s Rash Rush for Russian Gas	德国对俄天然气的亡命追逐


BRATISLAVA – In the right circumstances, we can all be gullible fools – which will be the case if the European Union welcomes the Nord Stream 2 project to double the delivery of natural gas from Russia via the Baltic Sea to Germany.	发自布拉迪斯拉发——在特定的情景下，我们都会上当受骗——倘若欧盟同意建造俄罗斯通过波罗的海向德国增加一倍天然气供应量的北溪二期输气管工程的话，情况就是如此。


According to the five European companies involved in the project (each with a 10% stake), their partnership with Russia’s Gazprom (which owns the remaining 50%) is simply a commercial business initiative.	参与该项目的五个欧洲公司（各占10%的股份）声称它们与俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司（拥有余下50％股份）的合作伙伴关系就是个单纯的商业计划。


In fact, it is much more – dangerously more – than that.	但事实上这可不仅仅是门生意，而且情况也更加凶险。


A decade ago, when the first Nord Stream pipeline deal was announced, Poland’s then-foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, compared the venture to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (the non-aggression treaty between Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union).	当十年前宣布建造北溪管道一期的时候，时任波兰外交部长的拉德克·西科斯基（Radek Sikorski）就将其与1939年的《苏德互不侵犯条约》（纳粹德国和斯大林苏联之间的互不侵犯条约）相提并论。


As the EU signed off on the deal, Sikorski was accused of grotesque hyperbole.	在欧盟签字确认这桩交易之时，各界纷纷指责西科尔斯基言过其实，哗众取宠。


Today, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and ongoing subversion of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Sikorski’s words don’t seem so outlandish.	如今，眼看着俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并不断侵犯乌克兰主权之后，西科斯基的话好象就显得不那么荒诞了。


Indeed, Gazprom today is even more of a tool of Kremlin policy (and source of revenue), with its gas deliveries repeatedly used for political extortion, particularly to keep ex-Soviet republics like Ukraine in line.	事实上，现在的俄罗斯天然气工业股份更像是克里姆林宫的政策工具（及其收入来源），其天然气供应被反复用来实施政治勒索，特别要用来让乌克兰这类前苏联加盟共和国乖乖听话。


The argument for Nord Stream 2 is that it will meet the EU’s growing demand for gas.	提议兴建北溪二期的理由是这将满足欧盟不断增长的天然气需求。


Yet the capacity of existing pipelines between the EU and Russia is already more than double Europe’s current demand.	然而，欧盟与俄罗斯之间的现有管道容量已经超过欧洲当前需求一倍有多。


According to Gazprom’s own data, Russia in 2015 exported slightly more than 100 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas to Western Europe – far below half of existing capacity.	据俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司自己的数据，俄罗斯在2015年出口了1000多亿立方米天然气到西欧——远未达不到现有输送能力的一半。


The EU’s consumption of natural gas does not justify building a 55 bcm pipeline.	欧盟的天然气消费量并不足以支持再建设一条运力550亿立方米的管道。


In 2014, consumption fell 23%, to 387 bcm, from its 2010 peak of 502 bcm, reaching its lowest level since 1995.	2014年天然气消费量为3870亿立方米，相对2010年高峰期的5020亿立方米下降了23%，达到1995年以来的最低水平。


Indeed, Nord Stream’s capacity-utilization rate was just 43% in 2013, 65% in 2014 and 71% in 2015.	事实上北溪一期管道的运力利用率在2013年仅为43％，2014年为65％，2015年为71％。


Some will argue that Europe’s consumption of gas will grow.	有人会说欧洲的天然气消费量将持续增长。


Really?	此话当真？


Just seven West European countries (Germany being the biggest) account for some 80% of total EU gas consumption, and all have strong energy-efficiency and renewable-energy programs.	七个西欧国家（量最大的是德国）占据了欧盟总用气量的80％，且都具备极高的能源利用率和高效可再生能源项目。


Unless Europe decides to waste cheap natural gas, the decline in its consumption will continue.	除非欧洲决定把这些廉价的天然气随意浪费掉，否则其消费的下降趋势将一直持续。


On the other hand, doubling Nord Stream’s capacity to 110 bcm would in theory enable Europe to import all of Russia’s gas, via Nord Stream alone.	另一方面，将北溪管道的输送能力加倍到1100亿立方米在理论上使得欧洲仅仅通过这一条线路就可以能够输入全部所需的俄罗斯天然气。


That, of course, is the danger if Nord Stream 2 is built.	这就是建造北溪二期的危险性。


Within a very short time, both the Brotherhood and Yamal pipelines – which link Russia with, respectively, Ukraine and Poland – will almost certainly begin to collapse as businesses.	在很短的时间内，兄弟和亚马尔这两条输气管道——分别通过乌克兰和波兰连接俄罗斯——几乎肯定会在经济上破产。


Without the transit fees that are the heart of their business, lack of maintenance will quickly lead to serious decay.	如果失去了其作为业务核心的传输费，管道保养的缺乏很快就会导致严重的管道老化问题。


Poland, Slovakia, Belarus, and Ukraine – with their 100 million people – will be stripped of an important source of revenue, which will weaken them economically and make them more vulnerable to Kremlin pressure.	波兰，斯洛伐克，白俄罗斯和乌克兰——以及这些国家的1亿人口——将被剥夺掉一项收入的重要来源，这将在经济上削弱它们，使它们更容易受克里姆林宫摆布。


The only real winner is Russia, which will secure more European money for a longer period of time.	唯一的赢家只会是俄罗斯，因为这将为该国在更长的一段时期内锁定更多的欧洲收入来源。


New Western investment in new pipelines would commit Europe’s energy system to sticking with Russian natural gas, and perhaps discourage the transition to efficient energy use.	西方在新管道上的投资会令欧洲的能源系统与俄罗斯天然气更紧密地捆绑起来，或许还会阻碍向高效能源利用技术的转型。


Corporate and Russian propaganda would have the German public believe that Nord Stream 2 is to be a kind of energy cordon sanitaire, insulating Germany from the troubles of its eastern neighbors, even though they may be fellow EU members.	相关企业和俄罗斯的宣传令德国大众觉得北溪二期是一种能源绝缘网，让德国可以免遭东部邻国的滋扰——尽管它们可能同为欧盟成员国。


But Nord Stream 2 would make those troubles inevitable.	但北溪二期会使那些烦恼变得无可难免。


A poorer Ukraine would be an even easier victim of Russian aggression than it is today. And the Kremlin’s hold on Belarus would be even tighter should Yamal close down.	一个更穷苦的乌克兰显然比如今更容易遭受俄罗斯的侵略，而克里姆林宫对白俄罗斯的控制将会在亚马尔线关闭之后变得更紧。


Moreover, Germans and other Europeans would not be spared the consequences.	此外，德国和其他欧洲国家也不能独善其身。


By committing to buy more Russian gas than necessary, and for a longer time, the EU would be helping to finance Russia’s military build-up, which represents a direct threat to peace in Europe.	通过承诺在更长时期内采购超过必要购买量更多的俄罗斯天然气，欧盟实际上是在资助俄罗斯构建其军事力量，而这堪称对欧洲和平的直接威胁。


According to the Global Militarization Index of the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Russia is among the most militarized countries in the world.	根据波恩国际军事设施向民用转化研究中心（Bonn International Center for Conversion）发布的全球军事化指数，俄罗斯是全球最军事化程度最高的国家之一。


Some 37% of Russia’s federal budget in the first quarter of 2016 was spent on the country’s military and security forces – and the vast majority of that spending was financed by selling oil and gas to Europeans.	俄罗斯在2016年第一季度的联邦预算中有约37％被用于该国的军事和安全部队——而绝大多数费用来源都是向欧洲出售石油和天然气所得。


So it is we Europeans who finance Russia’s wars in Ukraine and Syria, its military occupation of Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, and the provocative flights of Russian military aircraft in the Baltic and elsewhere.	所以其实是我们欧洲人资助了俄罗斯在乌克兰和叙利亚的军事行动，以及该国对克里米亚，南奥塞梯，阿布哈兹，德涅斯特河沿岸地区的军事占领，还有俄罗斯军机在波罗的海和其他地方的挑衅性飞行。


The more Russian gas we burn, the more money Vladimir Putin has for military modernization and “hybrid warfare,” when Russia augments conventional forces with irregular troops and cyber weapons.	我们消费越多俄罗斯天然气，普京就有越多的钱投入军队现代化建设和“混合战争（hybrid warfare）”之中，让俄罗斯可以利用非正规部队和网络武器来充实常规武装力量。


The question that Germany and its leaders must ask themselves is whether they are serious about peace.	德国及其领导人必须扪心自问的问题是，他们是否确实想要和平。


If they are, it is essential that they stop financing Russia’s armies – in or out of uniform.	如果确实想要的话，他们就必须停止资助俄罗斯的军事力量——无论是穿制服的还是不穿的。


But are Germans serious about the EU, which has ensured seven decades of peace in what previously was by far the most violent part of the world?	但德国人是否有认真看待欧盟这个在上一场全球最为惨烈的战争之后保证了七十年和平的体制？


Are they serious about fighting climate change and defending the future of the planet?	是否认真看待应对气候变化并捍卫地球的未来？


If so, they must surely burn much less, not more, natural gas.	如果答案是肯定的，他们的天然气消费量只会更少——而不是更多。


Nord Stream 2 stands against everything that the German government says it values most: the survival of the EU, peace in Europe, and the environment.	北溪二期管道显然与德国政府宣称自身所看重的价值观——欧盟的存亡，欧洲的和平与环境——背道而驰。


German politicians would do well to recall the words of another Kremlin ruler: “These capitalists,” Lenin reputedly said, “will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”	德国政治家应该不会忘了另一位克里姆林宫统治者——列宁——的话：“那些资本家们如今出售给我们的绳子，”他说，“就是我们将来把他们吊死的那些”。


Globalization Is the Only Answer	全球化是唯一的答案


WASHINGTON, DC – The Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the presidential race in the United States have shown, among other things, that public distrust of global integration is on the rise.	华盛顿—英国退欧公投和美国总统选战表明，公众对全球一体化的不信任正在加剧，这是当前所面临的问题之一。


That distrust could derail new trade agreements currently in the works, and prevent future ones from being initiated.	这一不信任可能导致目前有效的贸易协定解体，也让未来贸易协定无法实施。


The danger implied by this scenario should not be underestimated.	绝不能低估这一情景所隐含的危险。


Isolationism and protectionism, if taken too far, would break the trade-based economic engine that has delivered peace and prosperity to the world for decades.	孤立主义和保护主义如果走得太远，将破坏几十年来给世界带来和平与繁荣的基于贸易的经济引擎。


As a former trade minister for Costa Rica, I know how difficult it is for countries – developed and developing alike – to craft trade policies that deliver benefits to all of their people.	作为哥斯达黎加前贸易部长，我深知对各国来说——不管是发达国家还是发展中国家——制定让全体人民受惠的贸易政策十分困难。


But just because managing the effects of globalization is difficult does not mean we should throw our hands up and quit.	但仅仅是管理全球化的影响十分困难这一事实并不意味着我们应该甩手一走了之。


In the developing world, trade has delivered high growth and technological progress.	在发展中世界，贸易带来了高增长和技术进步。


According to the World Bank, since 1990 trade has helped to halve the number of people living in extreme poverty.	据世界银行，1990年以来，贸易帮助生活在极端贫困中的人口数量下降了一半。


But these gains, while impressive, are not necessarily permanent.	但这些收益尽管令人印象深刻，却未必能够持久。


If high-income countries close themselves – and their consumers – off from global markets, the world’s poorest people will suffer the most.	如果高收入国家把自己——以及它们的消费者——关在全球市场之外，世界最贫困人口将受到最大影响。


Trade thrives in an open environment of willing participants acting in good faith and governed by clear rules.	贸易要想繁荣，必须有一个开放的环境，在这个环境中，自愿的参与者带着良好的意愿行动并受到明确的规则的管理。


Short of this, the forces of globalization can turn cooperation into conflict.	少了这个条件，全球化的力量就可能化合作为冲突。


That’s why policymakers should focus on four areas.	因此，决策者需要关注四个方面。


First, countries should dismantle protectionist measures they have in place, and make a firm commitment not to implement policies that distort global markets.	首先，各国应该取消目前的保护主义措施，并切实承诺不实施扭曲全球市场的政策。


Second, countries should come together to update the international rules governing trade to account for changing economic conditions, and effectively implement negotiated agreements.	其次，各国应该齐心协力修订管理贸易的国际规则，将变化的经济条件考虑在内，并有效地实施商定的协议。


Third, individual countries and institutions such as the World Trade Organization should work together to eliminate barriers that increase trade costs.	第三，个别国家和机构，如世界贸易组织，应该合作消除增加贸易成本的壁垒。


In particular, they must abolish agricultural subsidies, remove restrictions on trade in services, improve connectivity, facilitate cross-border trade and investment, and increase trade finance.	特别是，它们必须取消农业补贴，取消服务贸易限制，改善连通性，便利跨境贸易和投资，以及增加贸易融资。


Finally, and most important, wealthy countries should support developing countries’ efforts to integrate themselves further into the global economy.	最后也是最重要的，富裕国家应该支持发展中国家进一步融入全球经济的努力。


Given trade’s record of reducing poverty, this is a moral imperative; it is also indispensable for peace and stability.	从贸易对减少贫困的作用看，这是一项道德要求； 这也是和平与稳定的不可或缺的条件。


To be sure, trade must deliver for all countries and for all people, from factory workers suffering plant closures in Europe or the United States to subsistence farmers trapped in informal economies in Africa and South Asia.	诚然，贸易应该惠及所有国家、所有人，不管是欧洲和美国因为工厂关闭而受到损失的工人，还是陷在非洲和南非非正式经济中的自给农民（subsistence farmers）。


But those who suggest that trade is a zero-sum game are simply avoiding the hard questions: Who should bear the painful dislocation costs from trade and new technologies?	但认为贸易是零和博弈博弈的人根本就是在回避难题：应该由谁来承担贸易和新技术所造成的痛苦的错位（dislocation）成本？


What policies will enable dislocated people to pursue new opportunities?	什么样的政策能够让错位的人争取新机会？


How can countries maintain productivity-led growth in an age of frequent and sudden disruption?	各国如何在频繁遭遇突发破坏的时代保持生产率推动的增长？


The challenges of global integration are not new, but nor can they be ignored.	全球一体化的挑战并不新鲜，但也不容忽视。


Policymakers should mind the lessons of economic history.	决策者应该汲取历史的教训。


Above all, they should bear in mind that even during past periods of rapid technological change, far more people benefited from free and open trade than from protectionist barriers.	最重要的是，他们应该铭记，即便在过去的几次快速技术变革时期，人们从自由和开放贸易中所获得的好处也远大于保护主义壁垒。


No country in today’s world can seal itself off from foreign goods, services, capital, ideas, or people.	当今世界，没有国家可以隔绝外国商品、服务、资本、思想或人力。 相反，领导人应该培养包容更多人的更多的商业。


Instead leaders should foster more commerce to include more people.	他们可以通过实施国际规则管理开放性和相互依存性； 建立更强大的社会安全网；


They can do so by adopting international rules to manage openness and interdependency; establishing stronger social safety nets; investing in innovation, education and skills-training, and infrastructure; and creating a more conducive regulatory environment for businesses and entrepreneurs to foster stronger and more inclusive growth.	投资于创新、教育和技能培训以及基础设施； 以及创造传导性更好的企业和创业监管环境以培养更强、更包容的增长等措施实现这一目标。


No country can deliver long-term prosperity to its people on its own.	没有国家可以单枪匹马为人民提供长期繁荣。


Closer international cooperation and economic integration is the only way forward.	更紧密的国际合作和经济一体化是唯一的前进之道。


Big Danger at the Lower Bound	降低下限的大危险


CAMBRIDGE – Markets nowadays are fixated on how high the US Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in the next 12 months.	坎布里奇—如今，都在关注未来12个月美联储会将利率提高到多高的程度。


This is dangerously shortsighted: the real concern ought to be how far it could cut rates in the next deep recession.	这是危险的短视：真正的关注点应该是它会在下一次深度衰退中将利率降低到多低的程度。


Given that the Fed may struggle just to get its base interest rate up to 2% over the coming year, there will be very little room to cut if a recession hits.	在未来一年中，美联储可能最多只能让基准利率提高到2%，如果发生衰退，降低利率的空间将非常小。


Fed chair Janet Yellen tried to reassure markets in a speech at the end of August, suggesting that a combination of massive government bond purchases and forward guidance on interest-rate policy could achieve the same stimulus as cutting the overnight rate to minus 6%, were negative interest rates possible.	8月底，美联储主席耶伦试图在讲话中安抚市场，表示大规模政府买债和利率政策前瞻指引的组合所起到的刺激作用相当于将隔夜利率降低到负6%（如果负利率可行的话）。


She might be right, but most economists are skeptical that the Fed’s unconventional policy tools are nearly so effective.	她也许是对的，但大部分经济学家怀疑美联储的非常规政策工具根本没有那么有效。


There are other ideas that might be tried.	也可以尝试其他概念。


For example, the Fed could follow the Bank of Japan’s recent move to target the ten-year interest rate instead of the very short-term one it usually focuses on.	比如，美联储可以效仿日本银行最近的做法，以十年期利率为目标，而不是它通常紧盯的极短期目标。


The idea is that even if very short-term interest rates are zero, longer-term rates are still positive.	其中的思想是，即使极短期利率为零，较长期利率也可能为正。


The rate on ten-year US Treasury bonds was about 1.8% at the end of October.	10月底，十年期美国国债利率大约为1. 8%。


That approach might work for a while.	这一方针也许能奏效一会儿。


But there is also a significant risk that it might eventually blow up, just the way pegged exchange rates tend to work for a while and then cause a catastrophe.	但它最终可能导致一个重大风险，一如盯住汇率能奏效一会儿，但最后会导致崩溃。


If the Fed could be highly credible in its plan to hold down the ten-year interest rate, it could probably get away without having to intervene too much in markets, whose participants would normally be too scared to fight the world’s most powerful central bank.	如果美联储降低十年期利率的计划是高度可信的，那么它也许根本不必过多干预市场，市场参与者正常情况下是不敢和全世界最强大的央行对着干的。


But imagine that markets started to have doubts, and that the Fed was forced to intervene massively by purchasing a huge percentage of total government debt.	但想象一下市场开始有了怀疑，并且美联储被迫大规模干预，购买巨额比例的政府总债务。


This would leave the Fed extremely vulnerable to enormous losses should global forces suddenly drive up equilibrium interest rates, with the US government then compelled to pay much higher interest rates to roll over its debt.	如果全球形势突然推高均衡利率，这将让美联储极易蒙受巨额损失，美国政府也将被迫为债务展期支付高得多的利率。


The two best ideas for dealing with the zero bound on interest rates seem off-limits for the moment.	应对零利率区间的两个最佳办法目前似乎都属于禁区。


The optimal approach would be to implement all of the various legal, tax, and institutional changes needed to take interest rates significantly negative, thereby eliminating the zero bound.	最优方针是实施所有必须的法律、税收和制度变革，让利率显著为负，从而取消零下限。


This requires preventing people from responding by hoarding paper currency; but, as I have explained recently, this is not so difficult.	这需要防止人们采取囤积纸币的应对方式； 但是，如我在最近所解释的，这并不困难。


True, early experimentation with negative interest-rate policy in Japan and Europe has caused some disenchantment.	诚然，日本和欧洲的早期负利率政策实验让人们头脑有所冷静。


But the shortcomings there mostly reflect the fact that central banks cannot by themselves implement the necessary policies to make a negative interest rate policy fully effective.	但这些实验的缺陷主要体现了一个事实：央行无法光凭自身实施必要的政策让负利率政策充分见效。


The other approach, first analyzed by Fed economists in the mid-1990s, would be to raise the target inflation rate from 2% to 4%.	另一种方针首先由美联储经济学家在20世纪90年代中期进行了分析，即将目标通胀率从2%提高到4%。


The idea is that this would eventually raise the profile of all interest rates by two percentage points, thereby leaving that much extra room to cut.	。 其中的概念是这样做最终将让所有利率提高两个百分点，从而为未来降息创造更大的空间。


Several central banks, including the Fed, have considered moving to a higher inflation target.	包括美联储在内的一些央行已经考虑提高通胀目标。


But such a move has several significant drawbacks.	但这样做有几大弊端。


The main problem is that a shift of this magnitude risks undermining hard-won central bank credibility; after all, central banks have been promising to deliver 2% inflation for a couple of decades now, and that level is deeply embedded in long-term financial contracts.	主要的问题是如此大的动作有可能威胁到好不容易树立起来的央行信誉； 毕竟，几十年来央行一直承诺将通胀保持在2%，这一通胀水平也深深地嵌入在长期金融契约中。


Moreover, as was true during the 2008 financial crisis, simply being able to take interest rates 2% lower probably might not be enough.	此外，与2008年金融危机期间一样，只是能够让利率下降2%也许并不足够。


In fact, many estimates suggest that the Fed might well have liked to cut rates 4% or 5% more than it did, but could not go lower once the interest rate hit zero.	事实上，许多估算表明美联储希望能将利率再降低4%—5%甚至更多，但当利率已经为零时，就无法再低了。


A third shortcoming is that, after an adjustment period, wages and contracts are more likely to adjust more frequently than they would with a 2% inflation target, making monetary policy less effective.	第三个缺陷是，在经历了一段调整期后，工资和契约的调整频率很有可能会大于通胀目标为2%时，这让货币政策效果减小。


And, finally, higher inflation causes distortions to relative prices and to the tax system – distortions that have potentially significant costs, and not just in recessions.	最后，更高的通胀导致相对价格和税收制度扭曲——这种扭曲可能带来巨大的代价，不仅仅是在衰退中。


If ideas like negative interest rates and higher inflation targets sound dangerously radical, well, radical is relative.	如果负利率和提高通胀目标这样的概念听起来过于激进，那么，好吧，激进也是相对的。


Unless central banks figure out a convincing way to address their paralysis at the zero bound, there is likely to be a continuing barrage of outside-the-box proposals that are far more radical.	除非央行找到令人信服的方法解决它们在零区间功能瘫痪的问题，否则就有可能始终存在一道不可逾越的高墙阻挡更加激进的非常规方案。


For example, the University of California at Berkeley economist Barry Eichengreen has argued that protectionism can be a helpful way to create inflation when central banks are stuck at the zero bound.	比如，加州大学伯克利分校经济学家巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）提出，在央行触及零区间的南墙时，保护主义可以有助于制造通胀。


Several economists, including Lawrence Summers and Paul Krugman, have warned that structural reform to increase productivity might be counterproductive when central banks are paralyzed, precisely because it lowers prices.	包括劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）和保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）在内的一些经济学家警告说，当央行功能瘫痪时，提高生产率的结构性改革可能起到反生产的效果，原因正在于它降低了价格。


Of course, there is always fiscal policy to provide economic stimulus.	当然，提供经济刺激的永远是财政政策。


But it is extremely undesirable for government spending to have to be as volatile as it would be if it had to cover for the ineffectiveness of monetary policy.	但政府支出不得不因为必须弥补货币政策的无效而如此波动时，这是非常得不偿失的。


There may not be enough time before the next deep recession to lay the groundwork for effective negative-interest-rate policy or to phase in a higher inflation target.	也许已经没有时间在下一次深度衰退降临之前打好有效负利率政策的基础或引入更高的通胀目标了。


But that is no excuse for not starting to look hard at these options, especially if the alternatives are likely to be far more problematic.	但绝不能因此放弃仔细思考这些选择，特别是在替代方案也许问题更大的时候。


The Escalating Arab Wars	愈演愈烈的阿拉伯战争


BEIRUT – The violence unleashed in Arab countries in the last four years may turn out to be just a first taste of what is to come.	贝鲁特—过去四年中阿拉伯国家的暴力也许只是整个过程的第一阶段。


Escalating brutality and the actions of governments have put Arab citizens under immense pressure.	日益升级的残酷性和政府行动让阿拉伯人民承受了巨大的压力。


Without a change of course, the outcome could easily be further conflict and a new wave of uprisings – this time not peaceful.	如果情况不发生改变，结果极有可能是冲突深化和新一轮暴动——并且不再是和平暴动。


Not since the end of World War I have Arab countries undergone such a momentous upheaval.	自一战结束以来，阿拉伯国家从未出现过如此激烈的剧变。


Conflict has broken out in no fewer than nine Arab countries, and the carnage has reached unimaginable levels of inhumanity.	至少九个国家爆发冲突，杀戮惨绝人寰。


Tensions are mounting even in countries that are nominally at peace.	冲突在名义上仍处于和平的国家也不能幸免。


Long-standing value systems are weakening, and once-solid societal foundations are crumbling.	长期价值体系日益式微，曾经坚实的社会基础正在土崩瓦解。


Fighting in Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen has torn apart entire communities.	叙利亚、伊拉克、苏丹、利比亚和也门的战事分裂了整个社会。


Ethnic cleansing perpetuated by the Islamic State has reversed centuries of religious, ethnic, and cultural intermingling, and pushed close to two million people from their homes.	伊斯兰国所施加的种族清洗颠覆了几百年来的宗教、种族和文化结合，将近两百万人赶出家园。


Indeed, although the Middle East and North Africa is home to just 5% of the world’s population, it has produced more than one-third of its refugees.	事实上，尽管中东和北非只占世界人口的5%，但却产生了三分之一强的难民。


In Syria alone, 11 million people have been forcibly displaced within and outside the country.	光是在叙利亚就有1,100万人被迫在国内和国外流离失所。


These population movements are exacerbating preexisting social tensions across the Arab world.	这些人口流动加剧了原本就存在于整个阿拉伯世界的社会紧张。


In Lebanon, for example, the arrival of more than one million Syrians has sparked worries that the country’s sectarian balance could be altered, undermining its fragile political system.	比如，在黎巴嫩，一百多万叙利亚人的到来让人们担心该国宗派平衡可能被打破，破坏其脆弱的政治制度。


These huge demographic upheavals are irrevocably transforming the region’s social and political identity.	这些巨大的人口变化正在不可逆转地改变该地区社会和政治身份。


Indeed, throughout the region, warring parties are relying on sectarian identity politics to mobilize support, further polarizing populations along religious, ethnic, and ideological lines.	事实上，在整个地区，交战各方依靠宗派身份政治动员支持，这进一步让人口根据宗教、种族和身份分裂为几个极端。


Saudi Arabia and Iran are using Yemen’s internal divisions over historic political and socioeconomic grievances in their proxy war there, presenting the conflict as a manifestation of the historic Sunni-Shia rift.	沙特阿拉伯和伊朗利用也门历史政治和社会经济恩怨造成的内部分裂在那里进行代理战争，这场冲突堪称逊尼派-什叶派历史矛盾的写照。


Even in countries not at war, poisonous identity politics is becoming increasingly widespread and accepted.	即使在没有战事的国家，为害甚大的身份政治也日益得到扩张和接受。


In Egypt, for example, the public has been broadly supportive of a brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters.	比如，在埃及，公众广泛支持残酷打击穆斯林兄弟会及其伊斯兰支持者。


These convulsions are further impoverishing Arab countries and limiting future opportunities for their citizens.	这些动乱正在让阿拉伯国家进一步贫困化，也制约了这些国家公民的未来机会。


Some 21 million Arab children are out of school, and more than 50 million Arabs are considered poor.	大约2,100万阿拉伯儿童辍学，超过5,000万阿拉伯人处于贫困状态。


In Syria, 80% of the population is unable to meet its basic needs.	在叙利亚，80%的人口无法满足基本需要。


In Yemen, more than one-third of the population – some 11.5 million people – suffered from food insecurity prior to the conflict.	在也门，超过三分之一的人口——大约1,150万人——在冲突发生前面临粮食不安全。


Another two million have since been added to the tally.	冲突爆发后这一人数增加了两百万。


This turmoil has created a fertile breeding ground for militarized and radicalized youth.	这一动荡不啻产生军国主义激进青年的温床。


Tunisia, the fêted success story of the Arab uprisings, has contributed the largest number of foreign fighters to the Islamic State – an estimated 3,000 (mainly young) people.	阿拉伯暴动的成功典范突尼斯是伊斯兰国海外战士的最大来源——大约贡献了3,000人（大部分是青年）。


Anecdotal evidence shows that many of the parties in the various conflicts are using children to fight their wars.	小道证据表明，多起冲突中的众多方面在战斗中使用了童军作战。


In Yemen, around one-third of the fighters are children.	在也门，大约三分之一的战士是儿童。


The Islamic State boasts that it is training children for future battles.	伊斯兰国炫耀它训练儿童为未来战争做准备。


Rather than trying to ease dissatisfaction or attempt reconciliation, Arab governments are using brute force to shut down every possible space for dissent or debate.	阿拉伯政府没有试图缓和不满或尝试妥协，而是用强力取缔任何可能的异见或争论空间。


In the name of national security, citizens are stripped of their nationality, demonstrators are shot in the street, and thousands are held in arbitrary detention.	在国家安全的名义下，公民被剥夺国籍，示威者在街头被射杀，数千人遭遇肆意逮捕。


In Egypt, danger lurks in the squares, universities, football stadiums, and even bathhouses, with the security services having detained anywhere from 22,000 to 41,000 citizens in the last year.	在埃及，广场、大学、足球场甚至公共浴室都危机四伏，去年特务机构逮捕了22,000至41,000位公民。


Torture and forced disappearances are also widespread.	虐待和被失踪也无处不在。


In Syria, 85,000 individuals are said to have disappeared since the beginning of the conflict.	在叙利亚，据说自冲突爆发以来有85,000人失踪。


Another 12,000 have been brutally tortured.	另有12,000人被严刑拷打。


Shutting out citizens from formal democratic processes is forcing political discontent further into the shadows, where it risks becoming militarized.	将公民排除在民主程序之外迫使政治不满者转入更深的地下，有可能军国化。


In Egypt, there have been growing calls for more violent and radical responses to the government’s clampdown.	在埃及，越来越多的人呼吁对政府的镇压采取更暴力、更极端的反应。


In Jordan and Morocco, the authorities are facing a rising challenge in containing militant tendencies.	在约旦和摩洛哥，当局正在面临遏制军国潮流的挑战。


Indeed, as political leaders choose military repression over engagement, they will increasingly lose ground to groups like the Islamic State, the only entities in the region offering a clear – albeit brutal, and regressive – vision of the future.	事实上，由于政治领袖更偏好军事镇压而不是参与，他们将日益在伊斯兰国等组织面前失去优势。 后者是地区中唯一提供明确未来前景的实体——尽管这一前景时野蛮倒退的。


At this point, an end to current hostilities in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen requires national, regional, and international consensus.	现阶段，结束叙利亚、伊拉克和也门的战争状态需要国家、地区和国际共识。


But averting further catastrophic violence in the region will require that governments go back to basics, introduce inclusive political processes, end state-sanctioned violence, ensure due process, and address socioeconomic injustices.	但让该地区免于更多灾难性暴力需要政府回归基础，引入包容性政治程序，结束让国家受到制裁的暴力，确保程序正义，解决社会经济不公。


Obviously, that is a tall order.	显然，这是难以完成的任务。


The scale of the challenges requires courageous thinking, bold initiatives, and ingenuity by national and regional political and development leaders.	挑战规模之大要求大胆思维、果断行动以及国家和地区政治和发展领袖的巧计。


Otherwise, violence will engulf the region and far beyond.	否则，暴力将吞噬整个地区，影响则将遍及更广泛的地区。


Stage Three for the Euro Crisis?	第三阶段欧元危机？


BERKELEY – The first two components of the euro crisis – a banking crisis that resulted from excessive leverage in both the public and private sectors, followed by a sharp fall in confidence in eurozone governments – have been addressed successfully, or at least partly so.	伯克利——我们已经成功渡过、或者至少在一定程度上成功渡过了欧元危机的前两个阶段——因为公共和私营部门过度杠杆化而导致的银行业危机，以及对欧元区政府信心的急剧丧失。


But that leaves the third, longest-term, and most dangerous factor underlying the crisis: the structural imbalance between the eurozone’s north and south.	但接下来我们就不得不面对此次危机中时间最长也最危险的第三项因素：那就是欧元区南部和北部国家的结构性失衡。


First, the good news: The fear that Europe’s banks could collapse, with panicked investors’ flight to safety producing a European Great Depression, now seems to have passed.	先来说说好消息：人们对欧洲银行陷入崩溃、惊慌失措的投资者拼命逃生而导致欧洲陷入萧条的恐惧现在似乎已经过去。


Likewise, the fear, fueled entirely by the European Union’s dysfunctional politics, that eurozone governments might default – thereby causing the same dire consequences – has begun to dissipate.	同样，完全因欧盟政治运转不畅导致欧元区政府违约、进而造成同样可怕后果的担忧现在也似乎正渐渐散去。


Whether Europe would avoid a deep depression hinged on whether it dealt properly with these two aspects of the crisis.	欧洲能否避免深度衰退取决于它能否正确处理这两方面的危机。


But whether Europe as a whole avoids lost decades of economic growth still hangs in the balance, and depends on whether southern European governments can rapidly restore competitiveness.	但欧洲的总体经济增长能否避免失去的十年仍然难以预料，因为这取决于南欧政府能否迅速恢复竞争力。


The process by which southern Europe became uncompetitive in the first place was driven by market price signals – by the incentives those signals created for entrepreneurs, and by how entrepreneurs’ individually rational responses played out in macroeconomic terms.	南欧失去竞争力的过程首先由市场价格信号驱动——这些信号对企业家构成激励，而企业家个人的理性选择又反过来影响到宏观经济。


Northern Europeans with money to invest were willing to lend on extraordinarily easy terms to those in the south who wanted to spend, and ample pre-2007 spending made employers there willing to raise wages rapidly.	北欧掌握大笔资金的投资人过去愿意以极优惠的条件借钱给南欧的借款者，而2007年前火热的消费状况又导致南欧国家雇主愿意迅速提高工资。


As a result, southern Europe adopted an economic configuration in which its wage, price, and productivity levels made sense only so long as it spent €13 for every €12 that it earned, with northern Europe financing the missing euro.	结果造成南欧经济格局中工资、价格和生产率水平只有在挣12欧元花13欧元时才合乎情理，而这相差的1欧元就来自于北欧的融资。


Northern Europe, meanwhile, adopted wage and productivity levels that made sense only as long as it spent less than one euro for every euro that it earned.	同时北欧的工资和生产率水平只有在赚1欧元花不到1欧元时才合情合理。


Now, if, as appears to be the case, Europe does not want its south to spend more than it earns and its north to spend less, wages, prices, and productivity must shift.	如果像现在这样，欧洲不愿继续容许南方花钱比挣钱多而北方挣钱比花钱多，就必须相应地调整工资、价格和生产率。


If we are not to look back in a generation and bemoan “lost” decades, southern European productivity levels need to rise relative to the north, and wage and price levels need to fall by roughly 30%, so that the south can pay its way with exports and northern Europe can spend its earnings on those products.	如果我们不愿让子孙后代追悔“失去的”几十年，那南欧的生产率水平就必须相对于北欧升高，同时工资和价格水平则必须降低约30%，这样南欧才能依靠出口支撑消费而北欧则用盈利来购买南欧的产品。


If the euro is to be preserved, and if stagnation is to be avoided, five policy measures could be attempted:	可以试行五项政策措施来保护欧元、避免经济停滞：


·         Northern Europe could tolerate higher inflation – an extra two percentage points for five years would take care of one-third of the total north-south adjustment;	·         北欧可以容忍较高的通胀率，五年内通胀每年增长两个百分点可以完成南北调整三分之一的任务；


·         Northern Europe could expand social democracy by making its welfare states more lavish;	·         北欧可以推进社会民主，让福利国家消耗更多开支；


·         Southern Europe could shrink its taxes and social services substantially;	·         南欧可以大幅缩减税收及社会服务；


·         Southern Europe could reconfigure its enterprises to become engines of productivity;	·         南欧可以调整企业结构，让企业推动生产率；


·         Southern Europe could enforce deflation.	·         南欧可以强制实行通货紧缩。


The fifth option is perhaps the least wise, for it implies the lost decades and EU collapse that Europe is trying to avoid.	第五项选择或许最不明智，因为它会带来失去的十年和欧洲竭力避免的经济崩溃。


The fourth option would be wonderful; but, if anyone knew how to bring southern Europe's enterprises up to the productivity levels of the north, it would have happened already.	第四项选择也许最为理想； 可如果有人知道怎样让南欧企业生产率赶上北欧的水平，这一切就不会发生了。


So we are left with a combination of the first three options, also known as “policies to restore European growth” – a phrase that appears in every international communiqué.	因此我们只剩下前三个选项，也称为“恢复欧洲增长政策”，这个词在所有的国际公报上频繁出现。


But the communiqués never get more specific.	但公报却从来不曾提到更具体的措施。


Europe’s technocrats understand what adoption of “policies to restore European growth” means.	欧洲受过专业训练的管理者理解采取“政策恢复欧洲经济增长”意味着什么。


So do some of Europe’s politicians.	有些欧洲政治家其实也理解。


But European voters do not, because politicians fear that spelling it out would be a career-limiting move.	但欧洲的选民却被蒙在鼓里，因为政治家担心说出真相会成为职业生涯的绊脚石。


But if Europe does not adopt some combination of the first three options as policy goals over the next five years, it will face a stark choice: either lost decades for southern Europe (and perhaps northern Europe as well), or continued north-south payment imbalances that will have to be financed through fiscal transfers – that is, by taxing the north.	可如果欧洲不在今后五年内采取前三项目标政策，就无法避免做出艰难的选择：或者接受南欧失去的10年（也许北欧也无法幸免），或者通过财政转移继续让南北支付失衡存在下去——而这等同于向北欧收税。


Northern Europe’s politicians should become more explicit about what “policies to restore European growth” actually mean.	北欧政治家应该向公众说明“恢复欧洲经济增长政策”实际意味着什么。


Otherwise, ten years from now, they will be forced to confess that today’s dithering imposed enormous additional tax liabilities on northern Europe.	否则十年以后，他们将被迫承认今天的犹豫造成了北欧巨额的税务负担。


That might turn out to be the ultimate career bummer.	这或许才是真正毁掉他们的职业生涯的失误。


North Korea and Asia’s Widening Arms Race	朝鲜和东南亚日渐高涨的军备竞赛


North Korea’ test of a long range missile may have failed, but that will not relieve regional jitters.	朝鲜试射远程导弹可能失败了，但是并不会缓解地区紧张局势。


Indeed, it will only confirm what is already underway – an arms race across the region.	实际上，这只是证实了已经发生的事情，那就是整个地区的军备竞赛。


Southeast Asia’s return to prosperity since the financial crisis of 1997 has brought a region-wide splurge on new weapons.	东南亚在1997年金融危机后重归繁荣引发了该地区在新武器方面的炫耀风潮。


Most Southeast Asian countries are busily modernizing their armed forces.	大多数的东南亚国家都正忙于武装军队的现代化。


So far, most have done so without compromising their autonomy in security matters.	到目前为止，大多数国家都已经在不牺牲安全事务方面的自治权的情况下做到了这一点。


But, with China’s military build-up causing nervousness everywhere, and with North Korea a perpetual source of insecurity, many governments in the region are starting to work with outside powers.	但随着中国军事扩张在各国制造紧张气氛，该地区许多国家的政府正着手与其他强国合作。


Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has perhaps been the most assertive.	印尼总统尤多约诺可能是其中最突出的一位。


In addition to becoming more active in world diplomacy, Yudhoyono will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow this month to discuss buying Russia’s newest fighter jets.	除了在世界外交中变得更活跃之外，尤多约诺本月还将在莫斯科会晤俄罗斯总理普京，商谈购买俄罗斯最新型战斗机的事宜。


Indonesia is seeking to form an air-defense squadron of 12 jets, with eight Russian fighters to complement the two Russian Su-27SK’s and Su-30MKM’s that it has already bought.	印尼正企图构建一支由12架喷气战斗机组成的空中防卫中队，其中的8家新购战机将作为已经购买的两架苏‑27SK和苏‑30MKM的补充。


Elsewhere in the region, Singapore has apparently opted to purchase 12 new F-15SG fighter aircraft from the United States.	在该地区的其他地方，新加坡已明确表示要从美国购买12架新F‑15SG战斗机。


Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, met Putin late last year and tentatively agreed to purchase 12 Su-30MKM’s.	泰国总理他信在去年会晤普京时，也意向性地同意购买12架苏‑30MKM。


Malaysia has agreed to buy 18 Su-30MKM’s over the next two years, while Vietnam has purchased 36 SU-27SK’s, 12 of which are already in service.	马来西亚已经同意在未来两年内购买18架苏‑30MKM，而越南则已经购买了36架苏‑27SK，其中12架已经开始服役。


With the exception of Singapore, it seems that Russian fighter-attack aircraft are the region’s weapon of choice at the moment.	目前看来，除新加坡外，似乎俄罗斯的战斗机是该地区武器的首选。


Russia’s growing slice of the local arms market worries the US, the world’s biggest weapons supplier and still Asia’s greatest military power.	俄罗斯在当地武器市场上日益扩大的份额令美国担心。 美国是世界最大的武器供应国并仍然是亚洲最强大的军事存在。


Thus, for example, last November, the US lifted its six-year embargo on military sales to Indonesia, imposed in 1999 in response to human rights abuses in East Timor.	因此，美国在去年十一月就解除了1999年以来对印尼实施的武器禁运。 该禁运是针对东帝汶的人权状况做出的。


Indonesia immediately expressed its intention to purchase C-130 transport aircraft, as well as fast patrol boats to conduct “anti-terrorism and anti-piracy measures.”	而印尼也立即表示了购买C‑130运输机和用于“反恐怖和反海盗”的巡逻快艇的意愿。


Yet Indonesia is also trying to align itself with Asia’s rising power, China, by seeking greater defense and security cooperation.	然而，印尼也同时努力通过更大范围的防务和安全合作与亚洲崛起中的强国—中国结盟。


As a result of these improved relations, Indonesia has received Chinese short-range missile technology.	由于这些关系的改善，印尼已经获得了中国的短程导弹技术。


The possibility that Southeast Asia’s governments might begin to play America and China off against each other is one of the concerns that most animates the latest US quadrennial defense review, which is intended to “focus on the Pacific Ocean” in awareness of China’s growing naval power.	东南亚各国政府在中美两国之间开始采取借力打力的战略的可能性成为美国最近一次四年一度的国防评估中的热门论题之一。 这次评估在意识到中国日趋强大的海军实力的前提下，力图“关注太平洋地区”。


Undoubtedly, the US will try to build closer ties with Indonesia through greater military cooperation, because Indonesia borders the region’s key sea lines of communications.	毫无疑问，美国将会通过更大范围的军事合作与印尼建立更为密切的关系，因为印尼邻近该地区重要的海运航路。


In particular, Indonesia will inevitably become involved in the tug of war between the US and China for influence over the vitally important Malacca Strait.	印尼将会不可避免地卷入中美两国在对至关重要的马六甲海峡的影响力上的拉锯战。


Because China must import vast quantities of oil through the Malacca Strait, that sea lane has become a central element in the country’s security strategy.	因为中国必须通过马六甲海峡进口大量的石油，所以这条海上通道已经成为该国安全战略中的核心元素。


For this reason, China is attempting to use economic and military aid as leverage to improve relations even with countries with which it has had military confrontations with in the past, most prominently Vietnam and the Philippines.	出于这一原因，中国正试图以经济和军事援助为杠杆，与甚至在过去有过军事对抗的国家改善关系。 其中最明显的莫过于越南和菲律宾。


India, too, is now joining the military build-up.	印度现在也加入了军力扩张的阵营。


It has actively led regional multilateral joint exercises, such as the naval joint exercise that India’s navy hosted in the Andaman Sea, in the eastern Indian Ocean, earlier this year. Nine Asian-Pacific countries took part, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.	它已经积极地主导了地区性的多边联合军事演习，例如在今年早些时候由印度海军主持的，在安达曼海和东印度洋进行的联合军演，有包括印度尼西亚、马来西亚、新加坡和泰国在内的九个亚太区国家参加。


Both India and China are each seeking greater influence over the strategically important country of Myanmar.	印度和中国也正各自寻求增加对缅甸，这一具有重要战略地位的国家的影响力。


For example, after Myanmar signed an agreement with China in 2005 to supply natural gas, India responded by cutting its own gas deal with Myanmar.	例如在缅甸于2005年和中国签署了天然气供应协议后，印度也以和缅甸签署自己的供气协议作为回应。


South Korea has also, of course, joined the scramble.	韩国也加入了这场纷争。


President Roh Moo-hyun visited Malaysia and agreed to expand mutual economic cooperation mainly in information technology, bio-technology, and resources and energy.	卢武铉总统访问了马来西亚并同意扩展两国在信息技术、生物技术以及资源和能源方面的经济合作。


Roh reportedly also discussed exporting defense materials worth $2.3 billion, including training aircraft, destroyers, and armed vehicles.	据报道，他还就出口价值23亿美元的教练机、驱逐舰和武装车辆等国防产品和马方进行了磋商。


Moreover, in January 2006, Korean Defense Minister Yoon agreed with the Philippines to deliver two used patrol boats.	另外，在2006年一月，韩国国防部长还同意向菲律宾提供两艘退役的巡洋舰。


In this crowded power play, only Japan is left out, choosing for the most part to remain aloof and cultivate its relations with the US, which is now to supply anti-missile technology to counter the North Korean threat.	在这场拥挤的权力角力中，只有日本置身事外，在很大程度上选择了冷眼旁观，并着力培养与美国的关系。 美国现在提供反导技术来对付朝鲜的威胁。


But, despite deep historical animosity over World War II, there are increasing calls in the region for Japan to expand its influence to counterbalance China.	但是，尽管有二战中的历史积怨，该地区希望日本扩大影响以制衡中国的呼声也日渐高涨。


In reality, Japan is not ready for this, because it still strongly adheres to “self-imposed restraints” against “influence over other countries in security and defense,” including weapons exports.	而实际上，日本还没有为此做好准备，因为它仍然固执地恪守着防止“在安全和防务方面影响他国”的“自我施加的制约”。 其中也包括在武器出口方面的制约。


In the 1960’s, as its economic takeoff was proceeding, Japan initiated a serious dialogue with regional players, aiming to build stronger relations with countries that it had once conquered and occupied.	在1960年代的经济起飞之际，日本开始了和该地区主要国家的严肃对话，以求增进与这些一度被其征服和占领过的国家之间的关系。


It is no overstatement to say that those efforts, which boosted trade and investment in the region, formed the foundation of Japan’s national power today.	如果说这些努力通过推动在该地区的贸易和投资，形成了今天日本国家实力的基础也是不为过的。


But now Japan’s political and economic influence in South East Asia is gradually declining, owing in part to its failure to exert influence over security and defense matters.	但今天，日本在东南亚的政治和经济影响力渐渐式微，在一定程度上可以归结于其在安全和防务问题上施加影响力的失败。


At a time of regional uncertainty about North Korea and China – including the looming prospect of China’s first aircraft carrier – Japan’s participation in the evolving Asian security framework is fundamental to stability.	中国的第一艘航空母舰可能投入现役。 日本参与到演进中的亚洲安全框架中来，对于地区的稳定具有根本性的意义。


The time when Japan could remain on the sidelines is over.	日本可以袖手旁观的时代已经一去不返了。


The Coming Confrontation with North Korea	即将到来的朝鲜冲突


KYIV – Imagine it is 2020.	基辅—想象一下现在是2020年。


The director of the CIA requests an urgent meeting with the US president.	中央情报局局长要求与美国总统紧急会面。


The reason: North Korea has succeeded in making a nuclear bomb small enough to fit inside the tip of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States.	理由：朝鲜成功制造出小型核弹，可以装在洲际弹道导弹弹头上并打击美国本土。


The news soon leaks to the public.	这一消息很快泄露并公之于众。


High-level meetings to devise a response are held not just in Washington, but in Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow as well.	不仅在华盛顿，首尔、东京、北京和莫斯科也纷纷举行高规格会议讨论如何应对。


This scenario may seem unreal today, but it is more political science than science fiction.	这一情景今天看起来也许不现实，但它更多地属于政治科学而非科幻小说。


North Korea just carried out its fifth (and apparently successful) test of a nuclear explosive device, doing so just days after testing several ballistic missiles.	朝鲜刚刚进行了第五次（也显然是成功的）核爆装置测试，而不久前，它刚刚测试了多枚弹道导弹。


Absent a major intervention, it is only a matter of time before North Korea increases its nuclear arsenal (now estimated at 8-12 devices) and figures out how to miniaturize its weapons for delivery by missiles of increasing range and accuracy.	如果不进行大规模干预，朝鲜扩充核武库（预计现在拥有8—12枚装置）并实现核武器微缩化以增加导弹打击面和打击精度将只是时间问题。


It is difficult to overstate the risks were North Korea, the world’s most militarized and closed society, to cross this threshold.	如果朝鲜迈过这个门槛，那么这个全世界最军事化、最封闭社会的危险怎么高估都不过分。


A North Korea with the ability to threaten the US homeland might conclude it had little to fear from the US military, a judgment that could lead it to launch a conventional, non-nuclear attack on South Korea.	能够威胁到美国本土的朝鲜可能会认为它不必再忌惮美国的军力，这一判断可能导致其向韩国发动常规非核打击。


Even if such a war ended in North Korea’s defeat, it would be extraordinarily costly by any measure.	即使这场战争最后以朝鲜失败告终，获胜的代价也将极其巨大。


That said, North Korea would not have to start a war for its nuclear and missile advances to have real impact.	尽管如此，朝鲜不必发动一场战争让其核武器和导弹进步产生真正的影响力。


If South Korea or Japan ever concluded that North Korea was in a position to deter American involvement in a war on the Peninsula, they would lose confidence in US security assurances, raising the possibility that they would develop nuclear weapons of their own.	如果韩国或日本有朝一日认定朝鲜能够威慑美国不卷入朝鲜半岛战争，它们将失去对美国安全保证的信心，它们发展自身核武器的可能性也会随之提高。


Such decisions would alarm China and set the stage for a regional crisis or even conflict in a part of the world with the greatest concentration of people, wealth, and military might.	这一决定将引起中国警觉，为地区危机乃至世界人口、财富和军力最集中部分的冲突创造条件。


There is another risk as well.	还有另外一个风险。


A cash-strapped North Korea might be tempted to sell nuclear arms to the highest bidder, be it a terrorist group or some country that decided that it, too, needed the ultimate weapon.	囿于现金的朝鲜可能向出价最高者兜售核武器，买家可能是恐怖组织，也可能是同样认为自己需要这一终极武器的国家。


By definition, nuclear proliferation increases the chances of further nuclear proliferation – and with it the actual use of nuclear weapons.	顾名思义，核扩散将增加进一步核扩散的可能——也随之增加实际使用核武器的可能。


The US has options, but none is particularly attractive.	美国有不少选项，但吸引力都不甚大。


As for negotiations, there is little if any reason to be confident that North Korea would give up what it considers to be its best guarantee of survival.	如果进行谈判，很难找出理由认定朝鲜可能放弃其心目中的最佳生存保障。


In fact, it has often used negotiations to buy time for further advances in its nuclear and missile capabilities.	事实上，朝鲜利用谈判为其核与导弹能力的进一步发展赢取时间。


Another option is to continue with a version of the current policy of extensive sanctions.	另一个选项是继续目前的扩大制裁政策。


The problem is that sanctions will not be potent enough to force North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programs.	问题在于制裁不够严厉，不足以迫使朝鲜放弃其核���导弹计划。


This is partly because China, fearing large refugee inflows and a unified Korea in America’s strategic orbit should North Korea collapse, will most likely continue to ensure that it gets the fuel and food it needs.	这部分是因为中国担心朝鲜一旦崩溃将导致大量难民涌入并形成一个投靠美国的统一的韩国，因此它将继续保证朝鲜获得其所需要的燃料和粮食。


As a result, it makes more sense to focus on diplomacy with China.	因此，以对华外交为重点更有意义。


The US, after consulting closely with South Korea and Japan, should meet with Chinese officials to discuss what a unified Korea would look like, so that some Chinese concerns could be met.	在于韩国和日本进行紧密磋商后，美国应该与中国官员会晤讨论统一的韩国应该怎样，以打消中国的部分顾虑。


For example, a unified country could be non-nuclear, and any US military forces that remained on the Peninsula could be fewer and farther south than they are now.	比如，统一后的韩国可以无核，留驻朝鲜半岛的美军将削减规模并进一步南迁。


It is of course possible or even probable that such assurances would not lead to any meaningful diminution in Chinese support for North Korea.	当然，这些保证有可能甚至基本肯定无法让中国缩减对朝支持。


In that case, the US would have three more options.	在这样的情况下，美国还有三个选项。


One would be to live with a North Korea in possession of missiles that could bring nuclear bombs to US soil.	其一是接受一个拥有可以将核弹投送至美国本土的导弹的朝鲜。