How the European Union responds to this crisis matters not just for humanitarian reasons; it will also be a bellwether of the future of the Union itself.	欧盟如何应对这一危机不仅关乎人道主义； 同时预示着欧盟自身的未来。


The EU must get it right.	欧盟必须做好这件事。


Europe faces no shortage of challenges.	欧洲从来都不乏挑战。


Over the last five years, it has confronted a seemingly endless series of tests, including a eurozone-wide financial crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, renewed fears of a Greek default, and the prospect of a British exit.	过去五年来，欧盟面临着一系列看似无穷无尽的考验，包括波及整个欧元区的金融危机、俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、希腊重现违约担忧以及英国退出欧盟的隐患。


But none has raised such fundamental questions about the meaning of the EU as the current debate about migration.	但都没有像现在的移民讨论那样对欧盟的存在意义提出如此根本性的挑战。


Unfortunately, efforts so far have been inconsistent.	遗憾的是，迄今为止救援工作并不连贯。


The EU acted quickly in the aftermath of the drowning of more than 1,000 migrants in a particularly horrific episode in April, tripling the budget of its much-maligned naval surveillance operations and expanding their operational area to match Italy’s discontinued Mare Nostrum operation.	欧盟在四月1，000多名移民溺水的恐怖事件发生后迅速行动，将其饱受指责的海上监视行动预算扩大3倍，恢复了意大利已经中止的地中海行动的救援范围。


This move has already borne fruit, with record numbers of rescues late last month.	此举已经取得成果，上月底的救援数字刷新了记录。


Another initiative – the European Commission’s proposed “Agenda on Migration” – is less straightforward.	另一项举措——即欧盟委员会所提的“移民议程”——就没有那么简单。


The agenda presents a hodgepodge of measures in varying degrees of detail.	议程提出各式各样的举措，只是详尽程度有所差别。


An important and controversial offshoot of the agenda is the action plan against migrant smuggling, which may include the use of military force to stop the smugglers’ boats.	议程既重要又充满争议的一项是反移民走私行动计划，可能包括使用武力对走私船进行拦截。


Critics have questioned the plan’s legality, the risk of collateral damage, and, most important, the effectiveness of armed intervention in stemming human-trafficking operations.	批评者质疑该计划的合法性和由此带来的损失风险，而且，最重要的是，武装干预能否有效遏制人口贩运行动。


There is also the troubling prospect that such a showy initiative would, by creating the impression that the EU is taking action, enable the EU and its members to avoid the long-term commitment and politically unpopular measures that an effective crisis response would demand.	此外令人不安的是如此华而不实的举措将给人留下欧盟正在行动的印象，从而使欧盟及其成员国逃避有效应对危机所需的长期承诺和政治上不受欢迎的措施。


And, indeed, the EU has so far been focusing on a largely symbolic measure: the proposed EU-wide relocation and resettlement system for asylum seekers.	事实上，欧盟到目前为止一直专注于采取象征性举措：即为庇护寻求者提供拟议中的欧盟全境定居安置。


At first glance, the relocation system – which would move 40,000 asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU members countries, with the allocation determined according to factors such as GDP, population, and the unemployment rate – may seem like a substantial step.	乍一看，拟将40，000名庇护寻求者从意大利和希腊按GDP、人口和失业率等因素安置到欧盟其他国家的迁移制度或许看似迈出了实质性的一步。


But, with Italy alone having received more than 63,000 asylum applications and 170,000 irregular migrants last year, the program’s impact would be minimal.	但考虑到去年一年仅意大利一国就收到63，000多份庇护申请并安置 170,000多名非正规移民，该计划的实际影响是微乎其微的。


The European Commission’s proposal is intended to underscore European solidarity and burden-sharing – both core EU principles.	欧盟委员会的建议旨在强调欧洲团结和分担责任——两者都是欧盟的核心原则。


But the plan’s limited scope undermines this impression.	但计划的有限性不足以形成这样的印象。


Worse, the response to the plan – with some member states opting out of the program; others objecting to how the quotas are to be measured; and still others bristling at the idea that the EU should propose a quota at all – seems to suggest that it is every country for itself.	更糟的是，上述计划所引起的反应——某些成员国选择退出计划； 还有些反对配额的衡量标准；


Throughout these discussions, the line between asylum seekers and economic migrants, who are not protected by binding international humanitarian conventions, has been blurred.	还有些根本不同意欧盟提出的配额理念——似乎证明欧盟国家都只在乎自己的利益。 这些讨论模糊了庇护寻求者和不受国际人道主义公约保护的经济移民之间的界限。


These squabbles in the face of undeniable, large-scale human suffering controvert the EU’s core values, including its commitment to adhere to a rules-based international order.	面对着无可否认的大规模人类苦难的这些争论改变了欧盟的核心价值，包括它坚持奉行以规则为基础的国际秩序的承诺。


They also reflect a disturbing trend affecting EU institutions: individual countries’ interests are increasingly trumping unity and cooperation.	争论还反映出影响欧盟机构的令人不安的趋势：个别国家的利益越来越多地战胜了团结与合作。


The problem is that many Europeans regard the EU as either a dispenser of benefits, a bogeyman, or an albatross – not something to which they are obliged in any way.	问题是许多欧洲人将欧盟视为提款机、魔鬼或绊脚石——无论如何他们对欧盟不承担任何义务。


As the financial crisis has dragged on, and recriminations among member countries have weakened the sense of community that forms the EU’s foundations, the refugee challenge has exacerbated a dangerous divisiveness.	随着金融危机持续发酵，成员国间的相互指责削弱了欧盟赖以生存的集体意识，难民问题更是加剧了危险的分裂。


Instead of reinforcing its foundations with solidarity and compassion, the Union has fractured.	欧盟不但未能巩固团结和同情的基础，反而因此产生了分裂。


In fact, Europe’s interest in mounting an effective response to the crisis extends beyond values.	事实上，欧洲有效应对危机的利益超乎价值观之外。


As rapid population aging generates significant fiscal pressures, EU members have a strong economic incentive to accept more immigrants.	由于人口快速老龄化带来显著的财政压力，欧盟成员国拥有接收更多移民的强烈的经济动机。


The short-term challenges that doing so would pose, however, seem to be obscuring this fact.	但是这样做所造成的短期挑战似乎掩盖了这一事实。


But the refugee challenge is not a short-term issue.	但难民挑战并非短期问题。


On the contrary, with countries throughout the Middle East and Africa facing continued violence, poverty, and governmental breakdown, the crisis will only deepen.	相反，因为中东及非洲国家面临持续暴力、贫困和政府崩溃，危机只会进一步加剧。


In Libya alone, an estimated 500,000 to one million additional migrants are awaiting passage to Europe.	仅利比亚一地，估计就还有五十到一百万难民等待前往欧洲。


It is time to place principle back at the forefront of policy.	现在是时候把原则放在政策之前考虑。


EU leaders must make a clear commitment to do what it takes to address the refugee crisis – even if that means pushing through measures, such as expanded options for legal migration, that are neither expedient nor popular.	欧盟领导人必须明确承诺不惜一切代价解决难民危机——即使这意味着通过既不便利也不受欢迎的扩大合法移民方案的措施。


To facilitate implementation, the EU and its member states could initiate a campaign to educate the public about the benefits of a more supple and responsive immigration system.	为便于实施，欧盟及其成员国可以发起民众教育运动，让民众了解更灵活敏感的移民体系有哪些优势。


No response, it must be stressed, would be complete without a sustained commitment to addressing the drivers of mass immigration – and that means a complete overhaul of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.	必须强调缺少解决持续大规模移民动力持续承诺的任何应对之策都不完整——而这意味着全面改革欧盟的睦邻政策。


The new policy should focus on contributing to the creation of economic opportunities in countries with large unemployed youth populations, so that young people no longer feel that risking their lives to reach Europe is their only chance at a future.	新政策应着眼于扩大青年大规模失业国家的经济机会，这样年轻人就不会觉得冒着生命危险前往欧洲是他们未来的唯一机会。


All of this will require a sustained commitment, underpinned by a strong sense of common purpose.	所有这些都需要有强烈共同目标感支撑的某种长期承诺。


If Europeans do not stand together in addressing migration, countless more people will drown in the Mediterranean and the EU will continue to unravel.	如果欧洲人不携手合作解决移民问题，无数人还会淹死在地中海，而欧盟也将继续走上瓦解的道路。


It is as simple as that.	事实就是如此简单。


Staying the Course in Europe’s East	坚守欧洲东线


STOCKHOLM – As the European Union’s leaders gather in Riga for a summit with the six members of the EU’s “Eastern Partnership,” many recall the dramatic meeting in Vilnius of November 2013.	斯托克霍姆—欧盟领导人在里加与欧盟的六个“东方合作伙伴”（Eastern Partnership）成员举行峰会，这让很多人想起了引人注目的2013年11月维尔纽斯会议。


It was there that Ukraine’s then-president, Viktor Yanukovych, under heavy Russian pressure, refused to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that had been negotiated from 2007 to 2012.	在维尔纽斯会议上，时任乌克兰总统亚努科维奇经不起俄罗斯的强大压力，拒绝签署欧盟-乌克兰结盟协议（EU-Ukraine Association Agreement）。 该协议的谈判从2007年一直持续到2012年。


Of course, when Yanukovych returned home, he had to face thousands of protesters in Kyiv’s Maidan (Independence Square).	当然，当亚努科维奇回国时，他不得不面对基辅独立广场的成千上万示威者。


Determined to hold him to his promise to sign the EU agreement and not take Ukraine into a customs union with Russia, the protesters mobilized the country.	示威者动员了整个国家，他们决心要让亚努科维奇信守签署欧盟协议、不让乌克兰加入与俄罗斯的关税联盟的承诺。


Yanukovych, failing to crush them with his security forces, simply fled.	亚努科维奇用安全部队镇压示威，但以失败告终，于是便一走了之。


Russia’s behavior in Ukraine since then has made the Eastern Partnership more important than ever.	此后，俄罗斯在乌克兰的所作所为让东方合作伙伴变得比以往任何时候都更加重要。


The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 on the initiative of Poland and Sweden, where I was the foreign minister at the time.	东方合作伙伴始于2009年，由波兰和瑞典发起，当时我是瑞典外交部长。


The aim was to respond to the desire of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine for some of the instruments of integration that had helped transform the Central European and Baltic countries into the democracies – and now EU members – that they are today.	东方合作伙伴的目标是响应亚美尼亚、阿塞拜疆、白俄罗斯、格鲁吉亚、摩尔多瓦和乌克兰对某些一体化工具（instruments of integration）的渴望。 这些一体化工具让中欧和巴尔干国家成为今天的民主国家和欧盟成员国。


The Eastern Partnership was also seen as a way to balance the EU’s “Russia first” approach.	东方合作伙伴也被视为平衡欧盟的“俄罗斯第一”方针的办法。


Enormous resources had been invested in the relationship with Russia, but very little had gone into helping the countries in the neighborhood that the EU and Russia share – including the most important of these neighbors, Ukraine.	欧盟花了巨大的投入构建对俄关系，但其中用于帮助欧盟和俄罗斯的共同邻国——包括最重要的邻国乌克兰——的少之又少。


Until 2013, the EU’s Eastern Partnership seemed to raise no concerns in the Kremlin.	2013年前，欧盟的东方合作伙伴似乎没有引起克里姆林宫的担忧。


It was never brought up at any of the numerous high-level bilateral meetings, nor at any meeting in which I participated.	在俄罗斯与欧盟的众多高规格双边会议中，东方合作伙伴从未被提及，我所参加的所有会议也是如此。


The Kremlin probably regarded it as irrelevant.	兴许克里姆林宫认为它并不重要。


That changed after Vladimir Putin returned to Russia’s presidency in 2012.	2012年普京重新当上俄罗斯总统后，局面发生了变化。


His main geopolitical project was now the creation of the Eurasian Union, which he knew could not succeed without forcing Ukraine off of its EU path and into his embrace.	如今，他的主要地缘政治工程是建立欧亚联盟（Eurasian Union），他知道，如果不迫使乌克兰放弃欧盟道路倒向他，欧亚联盟就不可能取得成功。


While the EU’s vision of “wider Europe” relies on soft power, economic integration, and long-term institution building, Putin’s “wider Russia” policy depends on intimidation and violence.	欧盟“更广大的欧洲”的愿景依赖于软实力、经济一体化和长期制度建设，而普京的“更广大的俄罗斯”政策依赖于威吓和暴力。


The EU pursues long-term geo-economics, whereas the Kremlin plays short-term hardball geopolitics.	欧盟从长期地缘经济学着眼，而克里姆林宫玩的是短期强硬地缘政治。


That is why, soon after Yanukovych decided to flee to Russia, Putin’s “little green men” began to appear openly in Crimea, while Russian Buk anti-aircraft missiles and Russian battalion battle groups appeared in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region not long after.	因此，亚努科维奇决定逃往俄罗斯后，普京的“小绿人”马上开始在克里米亚公开露面，而俄罗斯Buk防空导弹和俄罗斯营级战斗编队不久后也出现在乌克兰东部的顿巴斯地区。


In annexing Crimea and stoking separatist violence in Donbas, the Kremlin’s aim has clearly been to destabilize Ukraine in order to bring it under Russia’s thumb.	克里姆林宫吞并克里米亚，煽动顿巴斯的分裂主义暴力，其目标显然是动摇乌克兰使之屈服于俄罗斯。


Indeed, the very notion of an independent Ukrainian state is openly questioned by Russia’s leaders, Putin included.	事实上，包括普京在内的俄罗斯领导人公开质疑乌克兰的国家独立性。


In Riga, the EU’s leaders will reaffirm the so-called deep and comprehensive free-trade agreements concluded with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.	在里加，欧盟领导人将确认与乌克兰、摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚所谓的深度全面自由贸易协定。


The most important signal will be the EU’s pledge that these agreements will take effect.	最重要的信号将是欧盟承诺这些协定将生效。


Despite massive propaganda, intense economic pressure, and overt military aggression, the EU can and will stay the course in its Eastern Partnership and its offers to its neighbors.	尽管面临大面积宣传战、紧张的经济压力和公然军事侵略，但欧盟能够也将会坚守其东方合作伙伴及其对其邻国的承诺。


Clearly, no one in Europe should underestimate the challenges ahead.	显然，欧洲人决不可低估未来的挑战。


When I left the Vilnius meeting in 2013, I could certainly see storm clouds gathering, but I did not know that Putin was prepared to unleash so much aggression and turmoil.	2013年11月，当我离开维尔纽斯会议时，我确定乌云已开始聚集，但我不知道普京准备实施如此大规模的侵略和动乱。


Now we in Europe have every reason to prepare for the long-term effort needed to help our neighbors along their chosen paths.	现在，我们欧洲人绝对有必要做好长期行动准备，在必要时帮助我们的邻国走自己选择的道路。


But this will require a greater European commitment, both politically and economically, than we have seen thus far.	但这需要更大的欧洲承诺，不管是政治上还是经济上，这个承诺比我们现在所做的还要大。


Ukraine has been misgoverned for decades, and it will have to pass through a valley of reform-induced tears before it starts to reap the benefits of association and integration with the EU.	乌克兰治理不善已经有几十年的历史，它必须战胜改革带来的痛苦，然后才有可能获得与欧盟结盟和一体化带来的好处。


Unfortunately, it is far easier for Russia to fuel short-term volatility than it is for Europe to help build long-term stability.	不幸的是，俄罗斯煽动短期动荡比欧洲帮助建设长期稳定容易得多。


But to allow the Kremlin and its proxies to succeed would not only undermine the Eastern Partnership countries; it might jeopardize peace in Europe itself.	但任由克里姆林宫及其代理人取得成功不但将削弱东方合作伙伴诸国； 还有可能破坏欧洲本身的和平。


After all, the appetite grows with eating, which might well apply to the Kremlin’s “wider Russia” strategy.	毕竟，吃得越多胃口越大，克里姆林宫的“更广大的俄罗斯”战略正是如此。


At some point, the risk of an open confrontation between NATO and Russia could grow.	到达一定程度时，北约与俄罗斯公开对抗的风险会增加。


Even China, as it poses as Russia’s friend and patron, should consider the consequences for itself of such a risk.	即使是作为俄罗斯朋友和主顾的中国，也应该为自己考虑这一风险。


Such a clash must be prevented.	必须阻止这一冲突。


By confirming the Eastern Partnership agreements, the EU’s leaders will demonstrate that they are not prepared to acquiesce in a new Yalta-style division of the continent that would deprive these countries of their right to choose their own destiny.	欧盟领导人可以通过确认东方合作伙伴协定证明他们不准备默认新的雅尔塔式欧洲大陆分割，让这些国家丧失选择自己的道路的权利。


The Riga meeting is unlikely to produce any headline-grabbing new initiatives.	里加会议不太可能产生吸引眼球的新方案。


But none is needed.	但我们不需要新方案。


With everything from massive disinformation to tanks and soldiers thrown against the Eastern Partnership since 2013, just staying the course is a powerful sign of success.	自2013年以来，东方合作伙伴受到过各种威胁，从大量虚假情报到坦克和士兵，因此，坚守现状已是强有力的成功信号。


And, in the interest of long-term stability across Europe, that should be welcomed – even in Putin’s nationalistically aroused Russia.	此外，从全欧洲长期稳定的利益出发，这应该受到欢迎——即使是对普京的民族主义兴盛的俄罗斯来说。


Brexit and King Canute	英国脱欧和克努特王


LONDON – The legend of King Canute describes how an early Anglo-Saxon King showed his subjects the limits of royal power.	伦敦—克努特王的传说讲述了盎格鲁-萨克逊先王如何向臣民展现皇家权力的极限。


Canute set his throne by the sea and commanded the rising tide to turn back.	克努特将王座设在海边，命令上涨的海潮退去。


When the sea rose as usual and soaked Canute, he told his courtiers: “Now let all men know how empty is the power of kings.”	海水和往常一样上涨并浸透了克努特，这时他对朝臣们说：“现在，让所有人知道国王的权力是多么空虚。 ”


British Prime Minister Theresa May, whose motto is “Brexit means Brexit,” seems to believe that Canute’s message was about democracy, not astronomy: he should have held a referendum.	以“英国退欧就意味着英国退欧”为口号的首相梅似乎认为克努特给人们的教训是关于民主而不是天文的：他应该举行公投。


Though May opposed the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, she now has a new mantra: “We will make Brexit a success because people voted for it.”	尽管梅反对英国从欧盟退出，但现在她有了新的口号：“我们将让英国脱欧成为一场成功，因为英国人民投票选择了它。 ”


This is nonsense.	这毫无意义。


If Britain becomes the only European country apart from Russia to exclude itself from the EU single market, it will not succeed economically, regardless of how people vote.	如果英国成为除俄罗斯之外仅有的自绝于欧盟单一市场的欧洲国家，其就不可能获得经济成功，不管人民怎么投票。


Democracy would not have prevented the ocean tides, driven by gravity, from drowning Canute if he had stayed on his throne, and a referendum will not turn back the economic tides driven by globalization.	如果克努特坐在王座上不懂，民主无法阻止重力推动的潮汐吞没克努特，而公投也无法让受全球化推动的经济潮流退却。


Businesses understand this.	企业对此心知肚明。


That is why Britain now faces what economists call “radical uncertainty,” a situation where risks cannot be rationally quantified, making changes in interest rates, taxes, and currency values largely ineffective.	因此，英国现在面临着经济学家所谓的“极端不确定性”，即风险无法合理量化，导致利率、税收和货币价值的变动基本无效。


As the Bank of England has noted, many investment and hiring decisions will now be delayed until Britain’s trading terms are clarified.	英格兰银行指出，许多投资和招聘决定会被推迟，直到英国贸易条件形势明朗。


If Brexit goes ahead, this will take many years.	如果英国进入脱欧程序，这将耗时多年。


As Britain’s economy sinks into recession, and the government’s promises of a quick “successful Brexit” prove unrealistic, public opinion will shift.	随着英国经济陷入衰退，以及政府的快速“成功脱欧”承诺被证伪，公共观点将很快发生变化。


May’s small parliamentary majority will come under pressure, not least from the many enemies she made by purging all of former Prime Minister David Cameron’s allies from office.	梅的议会微弱多数将承受压力，包括来自因为她迫使所有前首相卡梅伦的盟友去职而树的诸多对头的压力。


The main decisions on Brexit will therefore be made not in London but in Brussels and Berlin.	因此，英国脱欧事宜的主要决定不会在伦敦做出，而是在布鲁塞尔和柏林做出。


In making these decisions, European leaders must answer two questions: Should Britain keep the main benefits of EU membership if it rejects EU rules and institutions?	在做出这些决定时，欧洲领导人必须回答两个问题：如果英国拒绝欧盟规则和机构，它是否应该继续获得欧盟成员国的主要好处？


And should some of these rules and institutions be reformed to make the EU more attractive to voters, not just in Britain but throughout Europe.	是否应该改革一些规则和机构，以使欧盟对选民更具吸引力（不仅是英国，而是整个欧洲）？


The answers to both questions are obvious: “No” to the first; “Yes” to the second.	两个问题的答案显而易见。 第一个是“否”。


EU leaders should present a clear choice: either Britain remains an EU member after negotiating some additional reforms to satisfy public opinion; or it disengages completely and deals with the EU on the same basis as “any country in the World Trade Organization, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe,” which is how Britain’s Institute for Fiscal Studies describes the most plausible alternative to full membership.	欧盟领导人应该给出明确的选择：要么英国在进行了一些满足公共意见的附加改革谈判后保留欧盟成员资格； 要么完全脱离欧盟，以与“从阿富汗到津巴布韦在内的所有世界贸易组织成员”一样的标准与欧盟谈判。


By making exit conditions non-negotiable, while offering room for maneuver on the terms of continuing membership, Europe could shift attention to the second, constructive question: Can voters be persuaded to feel positive again about the EU?	表明脱欧条件不可谈判，同时为保留成员资格条件提供操作空间，这样一来欧洲可以把注意力引向第二个建设性问题：能否说服选民，让他们对欧盟持积极态度？


Addressing this question seriously would focus attention on the many tangible benefits of EU membership beyond technocratic abstractions about the single market: environmental improvements, rural subsidies, financing for science, infrastructure, and higher education, and the freedom to live and work throughout Europe.	严肃地回答这个问题要把注意力集中在欧盟成员地位的除了对单一市场的技术官僚抽象（technocratic abstractions）之外的诸多有形好处上：环境改善、农业补贴、科研资金、基础设施、高等教育以及在全欧洲生活和工作的自由。


By excluding spurious intermediate options such as the “Norwegian” or “Swiss” models – which May has, in any case, rejected, because they imply free movement of people – the EU could make Brexit’s economic implications unequivocally clear.	欧盟应该排除“挪威”或“瑞士”模式等虚幻的中间道路选项——而梅耶拒绝了这些选项，因为它们隐含人的自由迁徙——从而让英国脱欧的经济影响明确化。


London would cease to be Europe’s financial capital because regulations would be deliberately changed to shift business activities into EU jurisdictions.	伦敦将不再是欧洲金融首都，因为监管将有意识地做出改变，让商业活动转移到欧盟司法辖区。


For the same reason, many UK-based export industries would become non-viable.	出于同样的理由，许多位于英国的出口产业也将无法维持。


Facing this prospect, businesses on both sides of the English Channel would be impelled to campaign openly for Britain to keep full EU membership, instead of quietly lobbying for special deals for their own sectors.	面临这一前景，英吉利海峡两岸的企业将有动力公开支持英国保留完全欧盟成员地位，而不是静悄悄地游说自身所在部门的特殊协议。


The media might even point out the constitutional absurdity of a representative democracy treating a narrow referendum majority as permanently binding on parliamentary decisions.	媒体甚至会指出代议制民主将狭义公投多数视为议会决定的永久性约束，这样的宪政安排是荒谬的。


Hard-core nationalists might pay no attention, but enough marginal Euroskeptics would probably reconsider their positions to flip the 52%-48% Brexit majority the other way.	强硬派民族主义者也许不会关注，但足够多的边缘疑欧派可能会重新思考他们的立场，从而扭转52%-48%的脱欧公投多数。


The reversal of public opinion would become near-certain if European leaders genuinely heeded UK voters’ message, not by facilitating Brexit, but by recognizing the referendum as a wake-up call for EU reform.	如果欧洲领导人不是为英国脱欧提供便利，��是认识到脱欧公投是欧盟改革的“集结号”，以此真正重视英国选民释放的信号，那么公共观点的逆转几乎是肯定的。


Suppose EU leaders invited the British government to negotiate on the policies that dominated the referendum and are also fueling resentment in other European countries: loss of local control over immigration; the transfer of power from national parliaments to Brussels; and erosion of social models that depend on strong bonds of citizenship and generous welfare states.	假设欧盟领导人邀请英国政府就主导公投并且仍在继续助长其他欧洲国家怨念的政策进行谈判。 这些政策包括本国失去对移民的控制；


Imagine, for example, that EU leaders endorsed Denmark’s recent proposal to allow national governments to differentiate between welfare payments to citizens and recent immigrants, or that it extended to all of Europe the Swiss plan for an “emergency brake” against sudden immigration surges.	比如，想象一下欧盟领导人认可丹麦的最新方案，允许国家政府区别对待本国公民和新近移民的福利支付，或者，想象一下将瑞士“紧急叫停”移民激增的计划推广到全欧洲。


Imagine them easing the counterproductive budget and banking rules that have suffocated southern Europe.	想象它们放松扼杀南欧的反生产性预算和银行规则。


Imagine, finally, that the EU acknowledged that centralization of power has gone too far and formally ended the drive for “ever closer union.”	最后，在想象一下欧盟承认权力的集中有些过度，并正式停止推动“更加紧密的联盟”。


Such reforms are considered unthinkable in Brussels, because they would require treaty changes and could be rejected by voters.	这些改革在布鲁塞尔是不可想象的，因为它们需要更该条约，并且可能被选民拒绝。


But voters who opposed previous EU treaties for centralizing power would almost certainly welcome reforms that restored authority to national parliaments.	但反对此前集中权力的欧盟条约的选民几乎肯定会援引让国家议会重获权威的改革。


The real obstacle to reform is not the difficulty of treaty change; it is the bureaucracy’s resistance to ceding power.	改革的真正障碍不在于更该条约的困难性，而在于官僚对让渡权力的抵制。


The European Commission remains obsessed with defending the acquis communautaire, the collection of powers “acquired” by the Union, which EU doctrine dictates must never be returned to nation-states.	欧盟委员会仍沉迷于捍卫欧盟既有成果，即联盟所“收集”的权力。 欧盟的原则禁止将这些权力还给民族国家。


Jean-Claude Juncker, the Commission President, and his chief of staff, Martin Selmayr, have even welcomed Brexit as a chance to “strengthen the acquis” by centralizing power even more.	欧盟委员会主席容克及其幕僚长马丁·塞梅尔（Martin Selmayr）甚至欢迎英国脱欧，视之为通过进一步集中权力“强化既有成果”的机会。


Juncker, like May, should recall King Canute.	和梅一样，容克也应该想一想克努特王。


The tide of national democracy is rising across Europe, and slogans about “ever closer union” will not reverse it.	国家民主的潮流正在整个欧洲兴起，“更加紧密的联盟”的口号无法逆转这一潮流。


European leaders must acknowledge reality – or watch Europe drown.	欧洲领导人必须认识现实，否则将目睹欧洲沉没。


Eurobonds or Bust	欧元债还是分裂？


LONDON – The eurozone’s institutional weaknesses have been laid bare.	伦敦——欧元区的制度缺陷已经暴露无遗。


The attempt to run a common monetary policy without a common treasury has failed.	试图在缺乏统一财政的情况下实现统一货币政策的努力宣告失败。


Investors do not know what they are buying when they purchase an Italian bond – is it backstopped by Germany or not?	投资者在购买意大利债券是根本搞不懂自己买入的究竟是什么——德国会为这玩意儿兜底吗？


We now know that the best credit must stand behind the rest, or else bear runs, such as those that have derailed Greece, Ireland, and Portugal – and that now threaten to do the same to Italy and Spain – are inevitable.	我们现在知道的是，剩下的国家的信誉不能再受损了，否则的话，恐慌性挤兑——也就是已将希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙拖入万劫不复，如今又在将意大利和西班牙逼上绝路的挤兑——将是不可避免的。


Debt mutualization alone will not save the euro, but, without it, the eurozone is unlikely to survive intact.	光靠债务共同化无法拯救欧元，但如果没有债务共同化，欧元区就不可能完好无损。


The eurozone’s July 21 summit was a small step forward.	7月21日的欧元区峰会朝债务算是迈出了一小步。


Leaders agreed to lower interest rates on loans made by the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and they recognized that Greece’s debt burden is unsustainable.	欧元区领导人同意调低欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）贷款利率，并认定希腊债务负担为不可持续。


But this falls far short of what is needed to arrest the currency union’s deepening crisis.	但这与解决欧元货币联盟危机深化问题之所需尚相去甚远。


Borrowing costs remain unsustainably high for many eurozone economies – and not just those in the periphery.	许多欧元区经济体——不光是外围国家——的借贷成本仍然维持在不可持续的高水平。


The economic growth potential of Spain and Italy, for example, now hovers around 1%, but their borrowing costs exceed 6%.	比如，西班牙和意大利的经济增长潜力如今在1%徘徊，而其借贷成本已经超过了6%。


By contrast, German sovereign yields have fallen sharply, lowering public and private-sector borrowing costs.	与此相反，德国主权债务收益率出现了暴跌，拉低了公共和私人部门借贷成本。


This is a recipe for further economic divergence and insolvency in the eurozone.	这将进一步拉大欧元区经济两极分化和经济破产的情况。


To prevent this, the eurozone needs a “risk-free” interest rate.	为了阻止这一状况，欧元区需要一个“无风险”利率。


The struggling economies need lower borrowing costs, or they will suffocate economically (and political support for eurozone membership will evaporate).	陷入困境的经济体需要更低的借贷成本，否则它们的经济就难以为继（欧元区成员国地位的政治基础也将因此失去）。


Only mutualization of debt issuance can generate the low (risk-free) interest rate needed to enable these countries to put their public finances on a sound footing and lay the basis for a return to economic growth.	只有债务发行的共同化能够产生这一低（无风险）利率——让这些国家公共财政站稳脚跟、给经济恢复增长打下基础的利率。


All eurozone countries should, therefore, finance debt by issuing bonds that would be jointly guaranteed by all member states.	因此，所有欧元区国家都应该通过发行由所有成员国共同担保的债券来为财政债务融资。


The obvious problem with eurobonds is moral hazard: how to prevent fiscally irresponsible countries from free-riding on the credit-worthiness of other member states.	欧元债有一个显而易见的问题，那便是道德风险：怎样避免财政不负责任的国家搭其他成员国信誉之东风？


This is the understandable fear of countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.	毫不奇怪，德国和荷兰对这一问题颇为担忧。


One possible solution would be to permit member states to issue debt as eurobonds up to, say, 60% of GDP, and to require them to be individually responsible for any debt exceeding that level.	一种可能的解决办法是允许成员国最多发行相当于GDP的60%的欧元债，如果债务超限，就要追究个体国家的责任。


This would give countries with high levels of public debt an incentive to consolidate their public finances.	这将给公共债务水平较高的国家整固其公共财政的激励。


Had the eurozone introduced such a system from the outset, it might well have worked.	如果欧元区一开始就引入这一体系，说不定早就能见到成效了。


But it is too late for that now.	但现在亡羊补牢也为时未晚。


For several eurozone economies, the additional borrowing would simply be too expensive.	对不少欧元区经济体来说，要提高借债数量将变得极其昂贵。


A better solution would be to create a new, independent fiscal body to establish borrowing targets for individual member states, together with a European debt agency to issue eurobonds (up to a certain level) on their behalf.	一种更佳解决办法是成立一个新的独立财政机构，为个体成员国设置借贷目标，然后与一个欧洲债务机构共同代表它们发行（不超过某个限额的）欧元债。


How would the new fiscal rules be designed?	新的财政规则应该如何设计？


A dogmatic target of budgetary balance four years hence, irrespective of a country’s position in the economic cycle, would achieve little: targets are meaningless if they are impossible to implement.	武断地为各国设置预算平衡的四年大限而不考虑各国在经济周期中所处的阶段是无济于事的：无法实施的目标没有任何意义。


So the rules would have to be set with reference to each member state’s cyclically adjusted fiscal position (for which the OECD already produces estimates).	因此，新规则必须参考每个成员国经周期调整的财政状况（OECD已经为此进行了估算）。


Careful thought would need to be given to the composition of the new fiscal body.	新财政机构的组成必须慎之又慎。


A board of 17 people, one from each eurozone economy, would be unwieldy, and unlikely to win the support of the eurozone’s principal creditor countries.	每个成员国派出一人组成一个17人的委员会既冗余，又不可能获得欧元区主要债权国的支持。


At the same time, a board dominated by the creditor economies would be unlikely to win the backing of the debtor countries.	与此同时，由债权国经济体主导的委员会也不可能获得债务国的支持。


A board of nine economists, from the big eurozone members, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the OECD might form a good basis.	一个由来自大型成员国、欧洲委员会、欧洲央行和OECD的9名经济学家组成的委员会或许是更好的选择。


The eurozone, of course, has a poor record of enforcing fiscal rules, implying the need for strong penalties for non-compliance.	当然，欧元区在强化财政规则方面的历史记录非常差，这意味着需要对不遵守规则的情况施以严惩。


If a country deviated from its fiscal targets, it would be barred from borrowing additional funds at the risk-free interest rate.	如果一国没能按其财政目标行事，就应该剥夺其享受无风险利率继续借钱的权利。


It would have to borrow under its own rating, which would be prohibitively expensive for fiscally weaker countries.	该国将按其信用评级在市场上借钱——对于财政状况疲软的国家来说，利率会高到无法承受。


To provide additional incentives to abide by the rules, the ECB could refuse to accept debt issued under national ratings as collateral.	为了进一步增加遵守规则的激励，欧洲央行可以拒绝接受按国家信用评级发行的债券作为抵押品。


Alternatively, a new EU financial regulator could handicap own-country bonds by requiring banks holding them to set aside more capital.	也可以成立新的欧盟金融监管当局，通过要求银行为按国家信用评级发行的债券计提更多的资本来阻止各国发行此类债券。


Fiscal rules of the type envisaged (and a new body to enforce them) would not necessarily require a treaty change.	上面设想的财政规则（以及新的强化这些规则的机构）不需要改变欧盟条约。


And, while various creditor countries rightly fear that eurobonds would push up their borrowing costs and constitute a transfer union, opponents might eventually come around to seeing eurobonds as the least bad option.	许多债权国担心欧元债会推高它们的借贷成本并形成一个转移联盟（这种担心完全正确），但反对者最终将发现，欧元债是最不坏的选择。


The risk is that, by then, it could be too late to save the euro from a partial break-up: what might work if adopted promptly could be ineffective if adopted in six months.	迟早人们会发现，最大的风险在于未能及时采取行动导致无法挽回欧元的局部分裂：马上采取行动要比等待半年再动手有效得多。


For core countries, eurobonds would certainly be a cheaper option than underwriting loans to struggling member-states, which essentially means throwing good money after bad. They will book large losses on EFSF loans, and those losses will be even larger if, as seems possible, some of the borrowers end up leaving the eurozone and defaulting on their debt.	对核心国家来说，欧元债肯定会比为受困成员国销债成本更低，后者实际上是拿优质资金往劣等资金池中扔，将给EFSF贷款造成重大损失，而如果借款人最终脱离欧元区并违约的话（这很有可能），损失还会进一步加大。


Eurobonds without Fear	用欧元债券平息恐慌


SANTIAGO – The day of the Eurobond may be near.	圣地亚哥——欧元债券的诞生很可能已经不远了。


What was once a quack’s idea for resolving Europe’s financial crisis is now the only reliable way to save the euro.	这个用来解决欧洲金融危机的办法曾经被嗤之以鼻，现在摇身一变，成了挽救欧元唯一可靠的方法。


Having their bonds purchased by the European Central Bank did not keep Greece, Ireland, and Portugal from needing a bailout.	欧洲央行的国债买入计划并未使希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙免于救援。


It will not save Spain and Italy, either.	西班牙和意大利也一样。


But Spain and Italy are too large to be bailed out.	但西班牙和意大利太大了，没人救得了。


The new European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is not up to the task.	新的欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）无法胜任这一职责。


And enlarging the EFSF to an appropriate size would require massive additional French borrowing, which could well place France itself at the receiving end of a speculative attack.	而且将EFSF扩大到足够规模将大大增加法国的贷款，这将不利于法国，将其置于投机冲击的风险之下。


This is where Eurobonds come in.	此时就需要欧洲债券出马了。


The five countries in trouble will need to place tens of billions of euros in new debt and roll over even larger amounts of old debt.	五个受困国家需要发行数百亿欧元新债务，并对更大数额的就债务实行展期。


Markets long ago stopped buying bonds issued by Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, and might soon stop buying paper issued by Italy and Spain – or do so only at prohibitive interest rates.	市场上在很久以前就已难觅希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙发行的债务的买家了，很快，意大利和西班牙债也将无人问津（或者要求极高的利率）。


But markets would happily gorge on bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the eurozone.	但市场对于由整个欧元区的信誉作支撑的债券是不会失去兴趣的。


Eurobonds would cut borrowing costs for the European Union’s two large troubled members. And it would spare German and other taxpayers from the EU’s solvent northern countries from having to fund yet another bailout of a southern member state.	欧元债券可以降低欧盟两个受困大国的借贷成本，也可以让德国和欧盟状况良好的北欧国家的纳税人免于为南欧成员国再次掏钱施救。


The debate about whether and how to introduce Eurobonds has focused on the appropriate limits on issuance.	关于是否以及如何引入欧元债券的争论集中在如何设定合理的发行限额上。


With no limit, profligate countries could go on a spending spree at the expense of thriftier ones.	如果不设限，不知收敛的国家就会毫无节制地花钱，而成本则由节俭国家来承担。


After the advent of the euro, the eurozone’s Mediterranean members enjoyed a lending boom while piggybacking on Germany’s low interest rates.	欧元推出后，借德国低利率之东风，欧元区地中海国家出现了贷款繁荣。


There is understandable reluctance to allow that to happen again.	不难理解，人们很不愿意让这一幕再次发生。


But arguments about whether the limit should be 60% of GDP or more miss a larger point.	但在限额是否应该设在GDP的60%的问题上斤斤计较也没有抓住重点。


Nineteen years of experience with the Maastricht Treaty, which created both the EU and the euro, has shown convincingly that such limits are unenforceable.	诞生了欧元和欧盟的马斯特里赫特条约生效至今已过去了十九年，这十九年的经验令人信服地表明，这样的限额是不具有强制性的。


Countries with the clout to flaunt the limits will do so whenever it is politically convenient.	有恃无恐的国家一俟政治环境合适就会无视这一限制。


And, if a debt crisis is near, exceptions will be found, waivers will be issued, and buyers for the additional debt will be lined up.	此外，当债务危机逼近的时候，各种各样的免责条款就会应运而生，弃权声明会纷纷冒出，新债买家会排成长队。


So the question is not what to do when debt gets near its limit, however high or low.	因此，问题并不在于当债务接近限额时怎么办，不管这个限额是高还是低。


It is how to prevent debt from getting near that limit in the first place, except in very extreme and unusual circumstances.	问题在于怎样在一开始防止债务接近这个限额（当然发生了极端或反常事件时另当别论）。


And for that, you need fiscal rules.	而要解决这一问题，你需要的是财政规则。


A fiscal rule is any pre-specified mechanism that constrains spending or the deficit.	财政规则是事先确定的机制，用于约束支出或赤字。


According to a study by the International Monetary Fund, 80 countries around the world use some kind of fiscal rule.	根据IMF的研究，全世界有80个国家采用了某种类型的财政规则。


But not all fiscal rules are created equal.	但并非所有的财政规则都是一样的。


If too loose, a rule is merely ornamental.	如果规则太松，则会沦为皇帝的外衣。


If too tight – a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget, for example – the rule could create rather than solve problems: think of the economic and political chaos that would ensue if Spain, with unemployment at 21%, were forced to eliminate its huge fiscal deficit overnight.	如果太紧（比如用宪法修正案的形式规定预算必须平衡），则财政规则就会带来问题，而不是解决问题：想想看，如果失业率高达21%的西班牙被迫在一夜之间消除其巨大的财政赤字，会造成怎样的经济和政治混乱。


Sweden and Chile are almost poles apart geographically, but both have used sophisticated fiscal rules successfully.	从地缘政治上说，瑞典和智利称得上是两个极端，但两国均非常成功地运用了成熟的财政规则。


Chile sets a target for its cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance – that is, the balance that emerges after accounting for the deviations in commodity prices and domestic output from their trends.	智利设立了一个按周期调整的财政平衡目标，即，在考虑了商品价格和国内产出与趋势水平的离差之��，必须实现财政平衡。


When commodity prices boomed in the middle of the last decade, the rule called for huge budget surpluses – which Chile achieved, repaying almost all of its public debt and accumulating a sizable rainy-day fund.	2005年左右，商品价格出现了大繁荣，根据规则，智利应该保持巨大的预算盈余。 智利也的确做到了，偿还了几乎所有公共债务，还攒下了一大笔备用资金。


When the financial crisis came, Chile was able to mount an aggressive fiscal stimulus without so much as a hiccup from financial markets.	当金融危机爆发后，智利还有钱实施激进的财政刺激，抵抗金融市场的不利局面。


Of course, no fiscal rule can account for all contingencies.	当然，没有哪个财政规则可以应付所有意外事件。


That is why you need an independent fiscal council to administer it, just as you need an independent central bank to pursue an inflation-targeting monetary rule.	这就是为什么需要一个独立的财政委员会来管理财政规则的原因，正如需要一个独立的央行来实施以通胀为目标的货币政策。


Agreeing on the composition of such a council for Europe would be hard, but no harder than it was to agree on the makeup of the ECB’s board.	欧洲很难在如何组成这样一个委员会的问题上达成一致，但要在欧洲央行委员会的组成上达成一致更难。


Eurobonds plus fiscal rules: this formula is the euro’s best hope for salvation.	欧元债券加财政规则：这就是解决欧元危机的最佳之道。


Unfortunately, another crisis or two might be necessary before European leaders consider it seriously.	不幸的是，欧洲领导人是不会认真考虑这一点的，要让他们学乖，还得再来两三次危机。


Europe’s Easy-Money Endgame	欧洲的货币宽松终局


MUNICH – The euro has brought a balance-of-payments crisis to Europe, just as the gold standard did in the 1920s.	慕尼黑—欧元给欧洲带来了一场收支平衡危机，一如20世纪20年代的金本位。


In fact, there is only one difference between the two episodes: During today’s crisis, huge international rescue packages have been available.	事实上，这两场危机只有一个区别：在今天的危机中，你可以获得大量国际援助。


These rescue packages have relieved the eurozone’s financial distress, but at a high cost.	这些援助计划减轻了欧元区的金融压力，但代价是高昂的。


Not only have they enabled investors to avoid paying for their poor decisions; they have also given overpriced southern European countries the opportunity to defer real depreciation in the form of a reduction of relative prices of goods.	不但投资者避免了为糟糕决策买单，定价过高的南欧国家也获得了推迟实际贬值（通过降低商品的相对价格实现）的机会。


This is necessary to restore the competitiveness that was destroyed in the euro’s initial years, when it caused excessive inflation.	这对于重建在欧元最初几年中因为使用欧元导致过度通胀而失去的竞争力来说是必不可少的。


Indeed, for countries like Greece, Portugal, or Spain, regaining competitiveness would require them to lower the prices of their own products relative to the rest of the eurozone by about 30%, compared to the beginning of the crisis.	事实上，对希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙等国来说，重获竞争力需要降低本国产品相对于欧元区其他国家的价格，降幅（较危机开始时）应达到30%左右。


Italy probably needs to reduce its relative prices by 10-15%.	意大利可能需要让相对价格降低10—15%。


But Portugal and Italy have so far failed to deliver any such “real depreciation,” while relative prices in Greece and Spain have fallen by only 8% and 6%, respectively.	但葡萄牙和意大利目前都没有发生任何“实际贬值”，而希腊和西班牙的相对价格分别只下降了8%和6%。


Revealingly, of all the crisis countries, only Ireland managed to turn the corner.	有启迪意义的是，在所有危机国中，只有爱尔兰扭转了局面。


The reason is obvious: its bubble already burst at the end of 2006, before any rescue funds were available.	原因显而易见：爱尔兰的泡沫在2006年底还无法获得援助资金时就已经结束了。


Ireland was on its own, so it had no option but to implement massive austerity measures, reducing its product prices relative to other eurozone countries by 13% from peak to trough.	爱尔兰需要自力更生，因此它别无选择，只能实施大规模紧缩措施，降低其产品相对其他欧元区国家的价格，从最高降幅高达13%。


Today, Ireland’s unemployment rate is falling dramatically, and its manufacturing sector is booming.	如今，爱尔兰失业率正在大幅下降，其制造部门正在繁荣。


In relative terms, Greece received most of Europe’s bailout money and showed the largest increase in unemployment.	相对而言，希腊获得了大部分欧洲援助资金，失业率的攀升也最严重。


The official loans granted to the country by the European Central Bank and the international community have increased more than sixfold during the past five years, from €53 billion ($58 billion) in February 2010 to €324 billion, or 181% of GDP, now.	欧洲央行和国际社会提供给希腊的官方贷款在过去五年中增长了五倍多，从2010年2月的530亿欧元增加到如今的3,240亿欧元或GDP的181%。


Nevertheless, the unemployment rate has more than doubled, from 11% to 26%.	尽管如此，希腊失业率仍翻了一番多，从11%增加到26%。


There are four possible economic and policy responses to this state of affairs.	对于这一局面，有四种可能的经济和政策应对方式。


First, Europe could become a transfer union, with the north giving more and more credit to the south and later waiving it.	首先，欧洲可能成为一个转移联盟，北方给予南方越来越多的信用，然后予以豁免。


Second, the south can deflate.	其次，南方可能通缩。


Third, the north can inflate.	第三，北方可能通胀。


And, fourth, countries that are no longer competitive can exit Europe’s monetary union and depreciate their new currency.	第四，不再具有竞争力的国家可能退出欧洲货币联盟，然后让新货币贬值。


Each path is associated with serious complications.	每一种可能都会带来严重的副作用。


The first creates a permanent dependence on transfers, which, by sustaining relative prices, prevents the economy from regaining competitiveness.	第一种可能将导致永久性转移依赖症，通过维持相对价格阻止经济重获竞争力。


The second path drives many debtors in crisis countries into bankruptcy.	第二种可能会导致许多危机国债务人走向破产。


The third expropriates the creditor countries of the north.	第三种可能不啻掠夺北方债权国。


And the fourth may cause contagion effects via capital markets, possibly forcing policymakers to introduce capital controls, as in Cyprus in 2013.	第四中国可能会通过资本市场形成传染效应，也许将迫使决策者像2013年的塞浦路斯那样引入资本管制。


European politics has focused so far on providing public credit to the crisis countries at near-zero interest rates, which eventually may morph into transfers.	目前，欧洲政治的焦点是以近零利率向危机国提供公共信用，这笔信用最终可能变为转移。


But now the ECB is attempting to break the impasse through quantitative easing (QE).	但如今欧洲央行正在尝试通过量化宽松打破僵局。


The ECB’s stated goal is to reflate the eurozone, thereby reducing the euro’s external value, by purchasing more than €1.1 trillion worth of assets.	欧洲央行所宣称的目标是通过购买超过1. 1万亿欧元的资产让欧元区实现再通胀，从而���低欧元的对外价值。


According to ECB President Mario Draghi, the inflation rate, which currently stands at just below 0%, is to be raised to an average of just below 2%.	根据欧洲央行行长德拉吉的说法，通胀率（目前略低于0%）将提升到略低于2%的平均水平。


This would offer southern European countries a way out of their competitiveness trap, because if prices remained unchanged in the south, while the northern countries inflated, the southern countries could gradually reduce their goods’ relative prices without feeling too much pain.	这将给南欧国家一条走出竞争力陷阱的道路，因为如果南方价格维持不变而北方国家出现通胀，那么南方国家可以在不必感受太多痛苦的情况下逐步降低商品的相对价格。


Of course, in that case the north needs to inflate faster than by just 2%.	当然，在这种情况下，北方的通胀必须高于2%。


If, say, southern Europe kept its inflation rate at 0% and France inflated at a rate of 1%, Germany would have to inflate by a good 4%, and the rest of the eurozone at 2% annually, to reach a eurozone average of slightly less than 2%.	如果（比如）南欧将通胀率保持在0%而法国通胀为1%，那么德国必须通胀4%，欧元区其他地区通胀2%（均为年率），以使欧元区平均通胀水平略低于2%。


This pattern would have to continue for about ten years to bring the eurozone back into balance.	这一模式需要维持十年才能让欧元区回归平衡。


At that point, Germany’s price level would be about 50% higher than it is today.	到那时，德国价格水平将比今天高出50%左右。


I do expect QE to bring about some inflation.	我确实预期量化宽松会带来一定的通胀。


Given that an exchange rate is the relative price of a currency, as more euros come into circulation, their value has to fall substantially to establish a new equilibrium in the currency market.	由于汇率即货币的相对价格，随着更多的欧元进入流通，它们的价值将大幅下降，以使货币市场形成新均衡。


Experience with similar programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan has shown that QE unleashes powerful forces of depreciation.	美国、英国和日本的类似经验表明量化宽松会释放出巨大的贬值压力。


QE in the eurozone will thus bring about the inflation that Draghi wants via higher import and export prices.	因此，欧元区量化宽松将通过提高进口和出口价格带来德拉吉想要的通胀。


Whether this effect will be sufficient to revitalize southern Europe remains to be seen.	这一效应是否足以重振南欧则有待观察。


There is a risk that Japan, China, and the US will not sit on their hands while the euro loses value, with the world possibly even sliding into a currency war.	有一个风险是日本、中国和美国不会坐视欧元贬值，世界甚至有可能滑向货币战争。


Moreover, the southern EU countries, instead of leaving prices unchanged, could abandon austerity and issue an ever greater volume of new bonds to stimulate the economy.	此外，欧盟南方国家可能不让价格维持不变，而是放弃紧缩，发行更大量的新债券刺激经济。


Competitiveness gains and rebalancing would fail to materialize, and, after an initial flash in the pan, the eurozone would return to permanent crisis.	竞争力的提高和再平衡将无法实现，欧元区在经历最初的回光返照后将回归持久危机模式。


The euro, finally and fully discredited, would then meet a very messy end.	最终，完全失去信誉的欧元将在一片狼藉中寿终正寝。


One can only hope that this scenario does not come to pass, and that the southern countries stay the course of austerity.	但愿这一情景不会发生，但愿南欧国家能坚持紧缩。


This is their last chance.	这是它们最后的机会。


Europe, America, and the Drumbeat of War with Iran	欧洲、美国及对伊朗的战鼓声


America’s capital is once again abuzz with talk of war, not only of the latest “strategy for victory” in Iraq, but now also of military action against Iran.	战争的流言又一次在美国的首都甚嚣尘上，这不光是针对在伊拉克的最新“制胜战略”，同时也包括对伊朗的军事行动。


The harder it becomes to discern any rationality in the Bush administration’s actions, the louder the rumor mill grinds.	对布什政府行动背后的理性越难理解，流言机器也就越是开得功率十足。


Will Bush order an air and Special Forces attack on Iran?	布什会下令空军和特种兵对伊朗进行打击吗？


Ever since Bush’s State of the Union address at the end of January, hardly a day has passed without something happening in connection with Iran or without the Bush administration’s ratcheting up its rhetoric.	自从布什在一月底的国情咨文演讲以来，与伊朗相关的形势就一直在变化发展之中，而布什政府的措辞也日渐强硬。


Clearly, the US is also pressing ahead with preparations for an air strike.	显然，美国也在加紧进行空袭的准备。


(A more extensive military commitment is scarcely possible, given how overstretched US ground forces already are.)	（鉴于美国地面部队的战线已经拉得过长，实施更广泛的军事打击的可能性很小。 ）


Indeed, the confrontation with the Iranians in Iraq is visibly intensifying, and it may be gathering strength elsewhere as well.	的确，与在伊拉克的伊朗人的对峙已如箭在弦上，而其它的一些因素还可能会加强这种压力。


A bomb directed at the Iranian Revolutionary Guard recently exploded on Iran’s border with Afghanistan.	最近，一枚针对伊朗革命卫队的炸弹在伊朗与阿富汗的边界爆炸。


And there are, of course, new attempts by the United States to drum up “evidence” of an Iranian threat that may justify an attack.	当然，美国还会有新的企图来鼓吹伊朗威胁的“证据”从而为其打击找到借口。


Is this all a bluff?	这一切是虚张声势么？


The world could perhaps calmly wait for an answer, but for the fact that the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and the approaching end of President Bush’s term might create an incalculable dynamic of its own.	如果不是伊朗核计划的进展和布什总统的任期即将结束都可能使事态突然失控，国际社会大可以静观其变。


As with Iraq, America’s strength may be enough to start a war, but not to win it.	正如对伊拉克那样，美国的实力可能足够发动一场战争，但却不能赢得它。


But the consequences of a military adventure in Iran would far surpass those of the war in Iraq.	但在伊朗进行军事冒险的后果会远比伊拉克战争来的严重。


Doing things by halves yet again in the Middle East would be the worst of all possible options – bad for the region and bad for its neighbors.	又一次在中东做虎头蛇尾的事情是下下策—对于该地区及其邻居都没好处。


The first among the neighbors affected would be Europe.	首当其冲受影响的就是欧洲。


So how has Europe, with its vital security interests at stake, responded to these developments?	那么，到目前欧洲是如何在这个与自身利益攸关的安全问题上做出反应的呢？


British Prime Minister Tony Blair has already adapted to the US administration’s new confrontational rhetoric.	英国首相托尼•布莱尔已经附和了美国政府的新对峙言辞。


French President Jacques Chirac unguardedly speculated that an Iran with one or two nuclear bombs might not pose a serious a threat, given the possibility of nuclear retaliation -- his musings so startled French officials that they quickly jumped in to correct the President’s comments.	法国总统雅克•希拉克毫无防备地推测说由于存在核报复的可能性，所以拥有一两颗核弹的伊朗不会成为一个严重的威胁—他的观点令法国官员们大为震惊，并很快地纠正了总统的评论。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel gives speeches at security conferences that find favor in America, but otherwise Germany prefers to stay in the background.	德国总理安吉拉•默克尔在几次安全会议上发表了有利于美国的演说，但除此之外德国更希望待在幕后。


Across Europe, risk avoidance seems to be the order of the day, even at the expense of the common interest and NATO solidarity.	在整个欧洲，规避风险似乎是当今主流，即使是以牺牲共同利益和北约团结为代价。


The German navy is defending the Lebanese coast against Hezbollah, while other European nations bear the brunt of policing Lebanon on the ground.	德国海军正保卫着黎巴嫩沿海不受真主党侵扰，而其它的欧洲国家则负责维护黎巴嫩的地面秩序。


In Afghanistan, Germany, with its strong military presence in the north, has been turning a deaf ear to calls for help from the Canadian allies fighting a revived Taliban in the south.	在阿富汗，重兵把守北方的德国对在南方与死灰复燃的塔利班战斗的加拿大盟友的求助置若罔闻。


Germany now wants to send some Tornado jets for reconnaissance purposes – better than nothing, but not by much.	德国现在想派出几架“狂风”战斗机去执行侦察任务—聊胜于无，但又于事无补。


In terms of security policy, Europe is stagnating, if not regressing, at the very moment when unity is needed more then ever.	就安全政策而言，在团结成为当务之急的时刻，欧洲即使没在倒退，也是停滞不前。


The Big Three of Europe – and Germany, as the current EU president in particular – must find a way to act together in strategic security matters.	欧洲三大国—以及作为欧盟现任主席国的德国—必须找到在战略安全事务上统一行动的办法。


If they don’t, Europe will largely cease to matter when the going gets rough.	如果做不到，那么当事态恶化时，欧洲就没有了发言权。


And the going is now getting quite rough in Iran and the Persian Gulf.	而现在伊朗和海湾地区的事态已经非常严重了。


Should Iran be attacked this year, the consequences will be borne first and foremost by the region, but also by Europe as the Middle East’s immediate western neighbor – and they will be felt for a long time to come.	如果伊朗在今年受到攻击，其后果会首先直接由该地区承担，但欧洲作为中东最近的西方邻居也会受到影响—这些后果会长期存在。


Indeed, Europe will have to share the costs if Iran prevails and becomes a nuclear power.	的确，如果伊朗成功地成为一个核国家，那么欧洲就不得不分担代价。


So there is much at stake for the old continent.	所以现在对于古老的欧陆而言，正是利益攸关的时刻。


To be precise, two overriding EU security interests are at stake: avoiding a war with Iran and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power.	确切地说，现在危及最深的是欧盟的两大首要安全利益：避免与伊朗发生战争并防止伊朗成为核国家。


These two apparently contradictory interests can be reconciled and translated into a common strategy by adopting a three-pronged approach based on efficient isolation, effective containment, and direct negotiations.	这两项看似相悖的利益可以被和解并转化为一项共同战略。 具体做法是采取一种基于有效孤立、充分遏制和直接谈判的三头并进的策略。


The Europeans – led by Merkel, Blair, and Chirac – should agree to assure the US that Europe is ready to pay a high, perhaps very high, economic price by taking decisive action to intensify the sanctions against Iran.	欧洲人—在默克尔、布莱尔和希拉克的领导下—应该一致向美国确保欧洲准备付出高昂的、甚至是极为高昂的经济代价，采取决定性的行动加强对伊朗的制裁。


But they should offer this only on two strict preconditions: that the military option be taken off the table, and that all parties involved – including the US – enter into direct negotiations with Iran.	但他们的这项承诺只能在两个严格的前提条件下做出：军事干预不予考虑，各方—包括美国—都必须参加与伊朗的直接谈判。


The policy of isolation coupled with direct negotiations would be strengthened further by a common strategy toward Syria, aimed not at “regime change,” but at “coalition change” – that is, drawing Syria away from its close alliance with Iran.	孤立与直接谈判相结合的政策还可以进一步由一项针对叙利亚的共同战略来强化。 这项战略的目的不是“政体改革”而是“联盟改革”—即让叙利亚逐渐脱离与伊朗的紧密联盟。


It was both right and important that the EU Council of Foreign Ministers agreed on sanctions against Iran.	欧盟外交部长理事会在对伊朗实施制裁的问题上达成一致是正确和重要的。


Faced with the threat of financial sanctions, Iran’s political elite is increasingly realizing the price of its confrontational course.	面对金融制裁的威胁，伊朗的政治精英阶层会更加认识到其为对峙所付出的代价。


It is imperative to further this process in a resolute manner, while at the same time rejecting military adventurism.	在继续坚决推进这项进程的同时拒绝军事冒险主义是势在必行的。


It is up to Europe to prevent the two worst developments in Iran – war and nuclear armament – by acting jointly and with determination.	现在就要看欧洲如何下定决心、共同行动来防止两种最坏的情况发生—战争与核武器。


Vital European and transatlantic interests are at stake.	欧洲和跨大西洋的重大利益正受到威胁。


It is thus Europe’s responsibility – and especially Germany’s, as the current EU president – to act now.	因此马上行动是欧洲的责任—更是欧盟现任主席国德国的责任。


Europe Under Siege?	欧洲被包围？


BRUSSELS – Many Europeans feel like their countries are under assault, as huge numbers of migrants flow across their borders.	布鲁塞尔—因为大量移民穿越国境，许多欧洲人觉得他们的国家正在遭受袭击。


Whether they are being exposed to refugees firsthand, or just seeing images of them splashed across newspaper pages, Europeans are well aware of the vast numbers of desperate people trying to enter European Union territory by any means possible.	不论他们拥有第一手与难民打交道的经验，还只是通过报纸上的照片了解难民，欧洲人都很清楚，为数巨大的绝望人群正在试图通过各种可能方式进入欧盟领土。


But this awareness has yet to translate into a unified response.	但了解这一情况尚未转化为统一反应行动。


Tensions among member states seem to be rising, perhaps because the problem differs so greatly across countries.	成员国之间的紧张似乎正在增加，也许是因为各国所面临的问题大相径庭。


On a per capita basis, Sweden receives 15 times more asylum applications than the United Kingdom, where official policy toward refugees remains the most hostile.	从人均角度衡量，瑞士接受的避难申请是英国的15倍。 英国的难民外交政策仍然是欧盟中最不友好的。


Germany has now become the main destination overall, receiving nearly 40% of the EU total; even on a per capita basis, this is several times more than the EU average.	德国已经成为第一大目的地，接受的难民占欧盟总量的近40%； 即使用人均衡量，也比欧盟平均水平高出数倍。


Of course, there are clear rules about how responsibility for refugees is delineated: according to the so-called Dublin Regulation, the first EU member state into which a refugee crosses is responsible for that person’s asylum application.	当然，对于如何划分对难民的责任，有明确的规则：根据所谓的都柏林规则（Dublin Regulation），难民所进入的第一个欧盟成员国必须对该难民的避难申请负责。


But this is clearly problematic, as it puts the entire burden of refugees on the EU’s frontier countries.	但这显然是有问题的，因为它将所有负担都推给了欧盟边界国家。


Though this may not have been a huge problem in the 1990s, when EU countries received, in all, only 300,000 asylum applications annually, it cannot work in a year when the total is expected to be triple that number.	尽管这一问题在20世纪90年代尚不严重——欧盟国家每年总共只需要接受300,000避难申请——但如今避难申请总数增长了两倍，这一规则已不再合适。


Smaller border countries like Hungary and Greece simply do not have the capacity to register and house hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers.	较小的边界国家，如匈牙利和希腊，根本没有能力登记和为数十万计的寻求庇护者提供住宿。


And larger countries like Italy have an incentive to overlook the large numbers of refugees landing on their shores, knowing that, if nothing is done, those refugees will likely head elsewhere (mainly to northern Europe).	意大利等较大的国家有激励忽视在本国海岸登陆的大量难民，因为它们知道，如果什么都不做，这些难民有可能会去往别的地方（主要是北欧）。


Germany, recognizing that the Dublin system is untenable, has now decided to process all asylum applications from Syrians, regardless of where they crossed into the EU.	德国知道都柏林规则不可靠，现已决定处理所有来自叙利亚人的避难申请，不管他们在何地进入欧盟。


The decision was likely driven, at least partly, by how difficult it is, given the EU’s porous internal borders, to determine where a refugee first entered.	这一决定背后的动机也许是——至少部分是——欧盟内部边界错综复杂，难以确定难民最初从哪里入境。


A 2013 ruling by the European Court of Justice that Germany could not return an Iranian refugee to Greece (where the applicant was found “to face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment”) probably heightened Germany’s sense of responsibility on this issue.	欧洲法院（European Court of Justice）2013 裁定德国不能将伊朗难民遣返希腊（申请者被发现可能在那里“面临实实在在的受到非人道和不体面对待的风险”），这也许突显出德国在这一问题上的责任感。


Germany is the largest EU member country in terms of population and GDP; so, to some extent, it does make sense for it to take the lead.	从人口和GDP衡量，德国是欧盟最大的成员国； 因此，从某种程度上，确实应该由它担任领导。


But Germany still accounts for less than one-fifth of the EU’s population, and less than one-quarter of its economy.	但德国的人口还不到欧盟的五分之一，经济规模也不到欧盟的四分之一。


In other words, not even Germany can handle all of Europe’s refugees today.	换句话说，即使是德国也无法处置当今全部欧洲难民。


A few months ago, the European Commission tried its hand at resolving this problem with a courageous proposal to distribute refugees across member states according to a simple equation that accounts for population and GDP.	几个月前，欧盟委员会试图解决这一问题。 它提出了一个大胆的方案，根据一个考虑了人口和GDP的简单的公式在各成员国之间分配难民。


But the plan was rejected, with member states – particularly those with the fewest refugees – claiming that it represented an undue interference in domestic affairs.	但这一计划被拒绝，有成员国——特别是难民最少的成员国——声称这是对内政的过度干涉。


This has put the EU in its usual quandary: everybody recognizes that there is a problem, but a solution requires unanimity, which cannot be achieved, because each country defends only its own interests.	这就引出了欧盟的常见困境：所有人都知道有问题，但达成解决方案需要一致同意，而一致同意不可能达成，因为每个国家只捍卫其自身利益。


The only way forward is to leave out the countries that are most averse to accepting immigrants, at least temporarily, and create a solution involving just those that are willing to share the burden.	唯一的前进之道是剔除（至少暂时剔除）最不愿意接受移民的国家，在愿意共同承担责任的国家之间形成一个解决方案。


This may not seem “fair,” but, with more refugees landing on Europe’s borders every day, EU leaders cannot afford to delay action.	这也许不“公平”，但是，每天都有更多的难民来到欧洲边界，欧盟领导人不能再坐视不理了。


But there is another dimension to the crisis that makes addressing it all the more complicated.	但这场危机还有另一面，让解决它变得非常复杂。


The migrants are not all from conflict areas like Syria, and thus do not, according to international law, have a “right to asylum.”	移民并非全部来自冲突地区，如叙利亚，因此，根据国际法，他们不具有“避难权”。


There are also plenty of economic migrants from, say, the poorer parts of the Balkans, hoping to escape poverty at home – and willing to misuse the asylum system in the process.	有很多移民是来自（比如）巴尔干较穷地区的经济移民，他们的愿望是摆脱家乡的贫��——并准备在移民过程中滥用避难制度。


Lodging an application, even one without any chance of being accepted, is appealing, because until it is rejected, the applicant receives basic housing, social services (including health care), and pocket money in an amount that may well exceed wages in his or her home country.	提出避难申请，即使根本没有可能被接受，也颇具吸引力，因为在申请被拒绝前，申请者可以获得基本住宿、社会服务（包括医疗）和远超祖国工资水平的零花钱。


Spending a few months in northern Europe while an asylum application is processed is far more attractive than going home to a job that pays a barely livable wage, or to no job at all.	在北欧呆上几个月等待避难申请处理远比回家做一份难以糊口的工作（甚至失业）更有吸引力。


As the number of asylum-seekers increases, so does the time it takes to process their applications, making the system all the more tempting for economic migrants.	随着避难申请者数量的增加，处理申请的时间也随之延长，避难制度对经济移民的诱惑力也更大了。


And, indeed, close to half of all asylum-seekers in Germany now come from safe countries, like Serbia, Albania, or Macedonia.	事实上，如今在德国的避难申请者中有近一半来自安全的国家，如塞尔维亚、阿尔巴尼亚和马其顿。


As Europe’s populists use such cases of “welfare tourism” to sow fear and anger among the European public, reaching an agreement to accommodate actual refugees becomes increasingly difficult.	欧洲民粹主义者用这些“福利旅游”的例子煽动欧洲公众的恐慌和愤怒，在这样的情况下，达成协议收留真正的难民变得越来越困难。


Against this background, the EU needs to take action on two fronts.	在这一背景下，欧盟需要双管齐下。


First, member countries must urgently boost their capacity to deal with asylum applications, so that they can quickly identify those who deserve protection.	首先，各成员国必须立刻增加处理避难申请的能力，以便迅速识别应该获得保护的申请者。


Second, the EU needs to improve burden sharing – ideally among all countries, but perhaps among a smaller group at first – in providing shelter for those who gain asylum.	其次，欧盟需要改进负担共担机制——在理想情况下应由所有国家一起承担，但首先也许只能在较少数国家实现——为获得避难权的人提供住所。


International law – and basic morality – demands nothing less.	这也是国际法——以及基本道德——的最低要求。


Turning Off the Dividend Spigot	关上红利的龙头


NEW YORK – European banks’ high litigation and restructuring costs have resulted in major losses on their books and abysmal stock-market performance.	纽约—欧洲银行高昂的诉讼和重组成本给它们的账表造成了严重损失，也让股价一蹶不振。


As the industry and European regulators now reflect on this dismal state of affairs and search for solutions, they should consider banks’ revenue distribution – including employee bonuses and shareholder dividends – as part of the problem.	欧洲银行业和监管者目前正在反思这一窘况、寻找解决之道，它们应该考虑银行的收入（revenue）分配——包括员工奖金和股东红利——也是问题的一部分。


Revenue distribution is one primary reason for European banks’ capital shortfalls.	收入分配是欧洲银行资本短缺的一个主要原因。


To understand why, we should look back to October 2014, when the European Banking Authority began balance-sheet stress tests for the eurozone’s largest 123 banks and found a capital shortfall of €25 billion ($28 billion) in all of them.	要理解个中原因，可以回顾2014年10月欧洲银行局（European Banking Authority，EBA）对欧元区123家大银行所做的资产负债表压力测试，该测试发现所有银行存在250亿欧元的资本短缺。


At the time, the EBA required the banks to devise plans to address their respective shortfalls within 6-9 months.	当时，EBA要求银行在6—9个月内制定出解决各自资本短缺问题的计划。


Some banks took action and raised equity through rights issues, sometimes with substantial help from governments.	一些银行采取了行动，通过权益工具发行筹集股本，有时政府也提供了大量帮助。


But most banks mollified regulators by simply shedding riskier assets to improve their capital ratios.	但大部分银行只是降低了高风险资产改善资本比率，以此蒙混过关。


Needless to say, these efforts were ineffective, and European banks’ share prices have declined by 50%, on average, since the initial 2014 assessment.	不消说，这些措施毫无效果，欧洲银行自2014年首次评估以来平均下跌了50%。


Banks that failed the stress test and didn’t take the result seriously are partly to blame, but so, too, are regulators who did not sufficiently hold the banks’ feet to the fire to improve their balance sheets, and who may have applied stress tests that were too weak to detect financial frailty.	没有通过压力测试，也没有认真对待结果的银行固然需要谴责，但没有充分监督银行改善资产负债表，以及把压力测试难度定得太低以至于无法找出财务弱点的监管者也难辞其咎。


The EBA conducted another series of stress tests and reported the results in late July.	7月底，EBA组织了新一轮压力测试并公布了结果。


This latest round looked at 51 banks and, contrary to previous tests, was not designed to identify capital shortfalls, but rather to provide “a common analytical framework to consistently compare and assess the resilience of large EU banks to adverse economic developments.”	该轮测试包括51家银行，与此前的测试不同，它们的目标并不是发现资本短缺，而是提供“通用的分析框架对欧盟大银行面临不利经济发展形势时的恢复力进行持续的比较和评估。 ”


Regulators now suppose that the European banking sector is resilient to adverse shocks.	现在，监管者认为欧洲银行业面对不利冲击具备足够的恢复力。


On the same day as the EBA’s announcement, the worst performer, Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, announced €5 billion ($5.6 billion) in new funding, pursuant to its €5.6 billion capital requirement.	在EBA结果公布的当天，测试表现最差的意大利锡耶纳牧山银行（Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena）根据其56亿欧元资本要求宣布进行50亿欧元的新筹资。


Still, market reaction to the announcement was negative (the EuroStoxx Banks index fell 7.5% in two days), most likely because the EBA did not include specific estimates of European banks’ capital shortfalls or outline a recapitalization plan.	但是，市场对该公告的反应是消极的（EuroStoxx银行指数两天下跌了7. 5%），最可能的原因是EBA没有公告欧洲银行资本短缺情况的具体估算值或列出再融资计划。


In a new paper investigating this market reaction, using United States capital-requirement rules, we calculate the total capital shortfall in all 51 participating banks to be €123 billion.	我们在一份研究这一市场反应的新文章中，根据美国资本要求规则算出所有51家参与测试的银行的总资本短缺为1,230亿欧元。


Despite this large capital shortfall, 28 of the 34 publicly listed banks in the stress test paid out about €40 billion in dividends for 2015, meaning that they distributed, on average, over 60% of their earnings to shareholders.	尽管这一资本缺口十分巨大，但压力测试中34家上市银行中的28家在2015年发放了400亿欧元左右的红利，这意味着它们平均将60%的利润分配给了股东。


Dividend payments made by under-capitalized banks amount to a substantial wealth transfer from subordinated bondholders to shareholders, because it is bondholders who will suffer the losses in a crisis.	资本不足银行所支付的红利等于是财富从次级债权���转移到股东，因为在危机中蒙受损失的是债权人。


Moreover, it is potentially a wealth transfer from taxpayers to private shareholders, because under new banking rules government bailouts are possible after bondholders have covered (bailed in) 8% of a bank’s equity and liabilities.	此外，本质上这也是财富从纳税人转移到私人股东，因为根据新的银行规则，可以在债权人（自救，bail-in）了银行股本和负债的8%后进行政府援助。


By contrast, undercapitalized banks in the US are forced to halt all forms of capital distribution if they fail a stress test.	相反，在美国，资本不足银行如果不能通过压力测试，将强制停止一切形式的资本分配。


Fortunately, following the 2016 round of stress tests, the EBA is now also considering this type of regulatory sanction.	幸运的是，2016年压力测试后，EBA 现在也开始考虑此类监管制裁。


Thus, “competent authorities may also consider requesting changes to the institutions’ capital plan,” which “may take a number of forms such as potential restrictions on dividends required for a bank to maintain the agreed trajectory of its capital planning in the adverse scenario.”	因此，“胜任的当局也许还将考虑要求改变机构的资本计划”，资本计划“可以采取多种形式，比如，可以要求银行如想分红就必须在不利情景下保持议定资本计划。 ”


We estimate that if European regulators had adopted this approach and forced banks to stop paying dividends in 2010 – the start of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe – the retained equity could have paid for more than 50% of the 2016 capital shortfalls.	我们估算，如果欧洲监管者早些采取这一方针，强制银行在2010年——即欧洲主权债务爆发之年——停止发放红利，留存股本将足以支付2016年资本短缺的50%以上。


The figure above shows our calculated capital shortfalls, using the EBA stress test’s “adverse scenario” losses and the cumulative dividends these banks have distributed since 2010.	下图说明了我们所计算的资本短缺情况，使用了EBA压力测试的“不利情景”损失以及这些银行自2010年以来发放的累计红利。


Dividends paid out by some banks, such as BNP Paribas and Barclays, actually exceed the current capital shortfalls, while at others – such as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Société Générale – capital shortfalls far exceed dividends that would have been retained.	一些银行，如巴黎银行和巴克莱银行，所发放的红利其实已经超过当前资本短缺，也有一些——如德意志银行、德国商业银行和法国兴业银行——的资本短缺远超所能留存的红利。


The latter banks would still require substantial capital issuances on top of dividend restrictions to make up the difference.	除了红利限制，后面这些银行仍需要大量发行资本以弥补缺额。


Nonetheless, our findings suggest a simple first step toward preventing bank capital erosion: stop banks with capital shortfalls from paying dividends (including internal dividends such as employee bonuses).	尽管如此，我们的发现给出了迈向防止银行资本流失的简单的第一步：禁止存在资本短缺的银行发放红利（包括员工奖金等内部红利）。


Such a policy would not even require regulators to broach topics like capital issuance, bailouts, or bail-ins, and some banks have even already begun to suspend dividend payments.	这一政策甚至不需要监管者讨论资本发行、援助或自救等问题，并且一些银行甚至已经开始停止发放红利。


All that’s left now is for the European Central Bank to enforce this practice across the eurozone.	现在，所欠缺的只是欧洲央行在整个欧元区执行这一方针。


A New Year’s Banking Union	银行联盟的新年


BRUSSELS – Five years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Europe’s economic and political situation remains fragile.	布鲁塞尔—金融危机爆发五年后，欧洲经济和政治状况依然脆弱。


A mild recession is expected in Europe this year, and unemployment is on the rise.	预计今年欧洲将经历轻微衰退，失业率也早升高。


Beyond deficit reduction, we need to implement a €120 billion ($155 billion) European investment plan, and deepen the European Single Market to unleash its growth potential.	除了削减赤字，我们还需要实施1200亿欧元的欧洲投资计划，并深化欧洲单一市场以释放其增长潜力。


But we also need other structural measures.	但我们还需要其他结构性措施。


The European Union must put an end to the negative feedback loop between individual member states and their national banking systems.	欧盟必须切断个体成员国与其国内银行系统之间的负反馈环。


Between 2008 and 2011, EU taxpayers granted banks €4.5 trillion in loans and guarantees.	2008—2011年间，欧盟纳税人给了银行4. 5万亿欧元贷款和担保。


In some countries, the threat of bank recapitalization with public funds has resulted in a drop in market confidence and a huge rise in interest rates.	在一些国家，用公共资金重组银行资本的威胁已导致市场信心的大跌和利率的大增。


The European Central Bank (ECB) has taken decisive action to break this vicious circle.	欧洲央行已采取决定性手段切断这一恶性循环。


Moreover, there is now a consensus that the 17 eurozone countries need a banking union to accompany their common currency.	此外，17个欧元区成员国也已经达成一致，必须以银行联盟补充共同货币。


The European Commission has proposed a single rulebook for banks’ capital requirements; mutual support between national deposit guarantee schemes; and Europe-wide rules for resolving failing banks that place the main burden on bank shareholders and creditors, not on taxpayers.	欧盟委员会发布了单一银行资本要求规则、对各国存款保险机制的共同支持方案，以及泛欧洲清算倒闭银行规则（主要损失将由银行股东和债权人而不是纳税人承担）。


On June 29, European heads of state and government committed themselves to the creation of a single European supervisor for banks in the eurozone.	6月29日，欧洲各国和政府首脑承诺成立单一的欧元区银行监督机构。


This is good news for both financial stability and public finances: once the single supervisor is in place, supervision will be more credible and impartial, which is important for dealing with ailing banks and managing their return to viability.	这对于金融稳定性和公共财政来说都是好消息：一旦单一监督机构成立，监督就将更加可信和公正，这对于处理受困银行让它们重获活力非常重要。


The European Commission also put forward a set of legislative proposals to establish the single supervisory mechanism and confer key supervisory tasks on the ECB.	欧盟委员会还更进一步，提出了一系列立法方案，欲成立单一监督机制并将主要监督职责授予欧洲央行。


This proposal must now be amended and approved as soon as possible by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers if we are to have a chance of activating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and proceeding with the other essential pillars of a banking union.	欧洲议会和部长会议必须尽快修订和批准这一方案，如果我们想抓住机会激活欧洲稳定性机制（ESM）并打下其他银行联盟必要基础的话。


Further work, however, is still needed in several areas:	不过，在诸多领域，仍需要更多的动作：


The scope of the new supervisory mechanism.	新监督机制的范围。


Some member states favor restricting European supervision to systemically important banks.	一些成员国认为应该将欧洲监督限制在具系统重要性的银行。


But the Commission believes that it should cover all 6,000 banks in the eurozone.	但欧盟委员会认为它应该覆盖所有6000家欧元区银行。


After all, “systemically important" is impossible to define.	毕竟，“具系统重要性”难以定义。


The failures of banks like Northern Rock, Dexia, and Bankia are reminders that small and medium-size banks can endanger the entire financial system.	诺森罗克、德克夏和Bankia等银行的倒闭提醒我们，中小型银行也可以威胁整个金融系统。


And it would be inherently unstable to have two supervisory mechanisms for banks operating in the same market.The participation of non-eurozone countries in the new supervisory scheme.	而在同一市场存在两个监督机制会引起天生的不稳定性。 非成员国对新监督机制的参与。


The Commission’s proposal confers powers on the ECB for the supervision of all banks in the eurozone.	欧盟委员会的方案授予欧洲央行监督欧元区内所有银行的权力。


For non-eurozone countries, the proposals provide for a mechanism to join on a voluntary basis and submit to the ECB’s authority.	对非欧元区国家来说，这一方案提供了以自愿为基础、向欧洲央行移交权力的加入机制。


But the EU treaties make it complicated to give these non-eurozone countries full voting powers.	但欧盟条约使得给予这些非欧元区国家充分投票权的过程十分复杂。


I do not see any political problem with giving these countries a full voice in shaping the decisions of the European supervisor, but creativity will be needed to find a legally sound and fair solution.National supervisors’ role in the new system.	我认为，从政治上看，给予这些国家在决定谁是欧洲监督者的问题上的充分话语权的问题并不大，但找出合法、公正的办法就需要创造力了。 国家监督者在新制度中的作用。


Clearly, the European Council has decided on a paradigm shift: powers are moving to the ECB.	显然，欧洲委员会决定改变范式：权力将交给欧洲央行。


But national supervisors will be members of the board that will take key decisions, which they will prepare and implement.	但国家监督者将成为决定重大决策的委员会的成员，它们同时也是这些决策的准备者和实施者。


In the current negotiations, we can still fine-tune the roles of the European and national supervisors, but ultimate authority must rest with the ECB.Non-eurozone EU members that do not want to join the single supervisory mechanism.	在当前的磋商中，我们仍能够微调欧洲和国家监督者的角色，但最终权力必须授予欧洲央行。 不愿意加入单一监督机制的非欧元区欧盟成员国。


These countries have expressed concerns about the new powers conferred on the ECB.	这些国家已经表达了被授予欧洲央行的新权力的担忧。


In particular, they question the ECB's voting rights within the European Banking Authority, which will remain in charge of developing a single rulebook for all 27 countries in the EU’s single market and enhancing convergence of supervisory practices.	特别是，他们质疑欧洲央行在欧洲银行管理局（European Banking Authority）的投票权，后者仍将负责制定适用于所有27个欧盟单一市场国家的单一规则以及加强监督行为的同一化。


We need to find ways to preserve fully the influence of non-eurozone countries within the European Banking Authority.Democratic accountability for the ECB’s new supervisory powers.	我们需要找出完整保留非欧元区国家在欧洲银行管理局的影响的办法。 欧洲央行监督权力的民主可问责性。


The ECB must, of course, maintain its full monetary-policy independence, despite its new role.	当然，尽管将迎来新使命，但欧洲央行必须保持完全的货币政策独立性。


So a key question is how, in addition to giving an important role to the European Parliament, national parliaments can play their part in overseeing supervisory decisions.Timing.	因此，一个关键的问题是，除了让欧洲议会扮演更重要的角色之外，各国议会也可以在监督监督决定方面起到作用。


According to some EU countries, the Commission’s proposal is too ambitious to enter into force at the beginning of 2013.	时机。 在某些欧盟国家看来，欧盟委员会2013年就开始实施的方案有些操之过急了。


But an effective single banking supervisor is a prerequisite for the ESM’s direct recapitalization of banks.	但一个有效的单一市场监督者乃是ESM对银行直接进行资本重组的前提。


Only with this possibility and strong unified supervision will Europe be in a position to break the vicious circle between banks’ balance-sheet weakness and sovereign debt, and thus resolve the eurozone crisis.Entry into force in January 2013 would bring about supervision by the ECB of banks that have received or requested public funding.	唯有通过这条路以及强大的统一监督，欧洲才能切断银行资产负债表疲软和主权债务之间的恶性循环，从而解决欧元区危机。 从2013年就开始实施新方案将先让欧洲央行监督获得或要求公共资金的银行。


Only in July 2013 would all banks of major systemic importance be subject to ECB supervision.	直到2013年6月，所有具系统重要性的银行才会纳入欧洲央行的监督之下。


The remaining banks would be subject to the new mechanism at the start of 2014.	剩余银行将在2014年初进入新机制的管辖范围。


Intense discussions are normal for such a high-stakes project.	对于如此兹事体大的工程，激烈争论再正常不过了。


Countries like Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands are right to argue that rapid progress cannot come at the expense of the new supervisory structure’s quality.	德国、芬兰和荷兰等国家有权利争辩说快速推进不能以牺牲新监督结构的质量为代价。


But EU countries have to stick to the commitment that they made in June and strike a deal in time for a gradual entry into force in January 2013.	但欧盟国家必须兑现6月份所做出的承诺，争取按时启动2013年开始逐步实施的方案。


Europe’s Emerging Bubbles	日渐膨胀的欧洲泡沫


MUNICH – The European Central Bank’s latest policy moves have shocked many observers.	慕尼黑——欧洲央行的最新政策举动令许多观察家大跌眼镜。


While the goal – to prevent deflation and spur growth – is clear, the policies themselves are setting the stage for severe instability.	虽然目标——防通缩促增长——相当明确，但这些政策本却成为了严重不稳定态势的根源。


The policies in question include setting the interest rate on the ECB’s main refinancing operations to zero; raising monthly asset purchases by €20 billion ($22.3 billion) to €80 billion; and pushing the interest rate on money that banks deposit with the ECB further into negative territory – to -0.40%.	有问题的政策包括将欧洲央行主要再融资操作的利率设置为零； 将每月的资产购买总额从200亿欧元（折合223亿美元）提高到800亿欧元；


Moreover, the ECB has launched a new series of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations, which also carry negative interest rates.	把银行在欧洲央行的存款利率进一步推入负值区域（-0. 40％）。


Banks receive up to 0.4% interest on ECB credit that they take themselves, provided they lend it out to private businesses.	此外，欧洲央行还推出了四个一连串的新定向长期再融资操作，同时也包含了负利率。 银行只有贷款给私人企业的时候才能从欧洲央行处拿到不到0.


These policies are, in essence, the latest in a string of attempts by the ECB to address the fallout of the collapse of the massive bubble that formed in southern Europe in the early years of the euro.	欧洲央行一直都尝试收拾南欧地区在推行欧元的最初一段时期形成的大量泡沫崩溃的残局，而这些政策只是这一系列尝试中的最新一项。


It all began with the announcement of the euro’s introduction at the 1995 EU Summit in Madrid, which caused interest rates to tumble.	这一切都始于1995年马德里欧洲峰会上宣布引入欧元从而导致利率暴跌的公告。


The inflationary credit bubble spurred in southern European countries by the persistence of lower interest rates undermined their competitiveness and drove asset and property prices to unsustainably high levels.	由持续低利率所引发的南欧国家通胀信贷泡沫削弱了这些国家的竞争力，并将资产和房产价格推高到了不可持续的高水平。


When the bubble burst, the ECB tried to prevent the excessive prices from returning to their equilibrium levels by using its printing press and promising unlimited coverage to investors. The latest ECB measures are just more of the same.	当泡沫破灭后，欧洲央行试图通过使用印钞机并向投资者承诺无限保底来防止过高的价格回到均衡水平，而上述新措施也只是上述策略的翻版而已。


Of course, when the financial crisis erupted in full force in 2008, following the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers, the ECB’s interventions were justified.	当然，在金融危机在2008年美国投行雷曼兄弟倒闭后全面爆发之时，欧洲央行的干预是合理的。


But after the global economy started to recover during the latter part of the following year, the ECB’s moves became increasingly problematic, because they enabled countries to evade structural reform and hindered the necessary disinflation in the southern eurozone countries – or even halted it altogether, as in Portugal and Italy.	但当全球经济在随后一年的后半段开始复苏，欧洲央行的举措就变得越来越有问题，因为它们令各国能够逃避实施结构性改革以及南部欧元区国家必要的通货紧缩——甚至将其完全停止，正如在葡萄牙和意大利所发生的那样。


Southern Europe had succumbed to the drug of cheap credit.	南欧染上了廉价信贷的毒瘾。


But when private credit stalled and the symptoms of withdrawal began to appear, the ECB provided replacement drugs.	而当私人信贷停滞，戒毒症状开始出现时，欧洲央行又奉上了替代药物。


Instead of treating the addiction, it created junkie economies that were unable to function without a fix.	但相对于戒断毒瘾，它却创造了一堆无法自我修复的瘾君子经济体。


Japan made a similar mistake when its property bubble burst in 1990.	日本也在1990年房地产泡沫破灭时犯了同样的错误。


For over two decades, the Bank of Japan flooded the economy with money at near-zero interest rates.	在过去的二十年中，日本央行以近零利率让整个经济体充斥着钞票。


The Japanese government, for its part, has followed such a relentless policy of deficit spending that public debt jumped from 67% of GDP to 246% of GDP today, with the latest upward push provided by the dubious “Abenomics” economic strategy being pursued by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government.	日本政府一直固守赤字开支政策，令公共债务由相当于GDP的67％暴涨到246％，最近又被首相安倍晋三政府所推行的令人摸不着头脑的“安倍经济学”经济战略所再次推高。


None of this has helped, because neither monetary nor fiscal policy can substitute for structural reform.	所有这些策略都无济于事，因为无论是货币还是财政政策都无法替代结构性改革。


On the contrary, the more Keynesian and monetarist drugs are administered, the feebler the self-healing power of the markets and the weaker the willingness of policymakers to impose painful detoxification treatments on the economy and populace.	相反，随着服用越来越多的凯恩斯主义和货币主义药物，市场的自愈能力也不断减弱，政策制定者对经济和民众实施痛苦戒毒治疗的意愿也就越弱。


But the worst effects of the ECB policy may be yet to come, if the eurozone’s still-sound economies also become credit junkies.	但欧洲央行政策的最坏影响可能还尚未到来，除非那些仍然健全的欧元区经济体也成为信贷瘾君子。


There are already some worrying signs of this.	目前在这方面也出现了一些令人担忧的迹象。


Property markets in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg have practically exploded throughout the crisis, as a result of banks chasing borrowers with offers of loans at near-zero interest rates, regardless of their creditworthiness.	奥地利，德国和卢森堡的房地产市场实际上已经在危机期间大涨，因为银行在以近零利率四处贷款，却无视贷款者的信用状态。


In Austria, property prices have risen by nearly half since the Lehman collapse; in Luxembourg, they have risen by almost one-third.	在奥地利，房产价格自雷曼兄弟破产以来已经上涨了1/2； 而卢森��的房价也上升了近1/3。


Even Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has been experiencing a massive property boom since 2010, with average urban property prices having risen by more than one-third – and by nearly half in large cities.	即使是欧洲最大的经济体德国也经历了2010年以来最大规模的房地产热潮，城市住宅平均价格上升了超过1/3——大城市则升了将近一半。


The country is undergoing a construction boom not seen since reunification.	该国正经历自两德统一以来前所未有的建设热潮。


Real estate agents have only leftovers on offer.	房产中介手里只有一些尾货在售卖，其他都被抢光了。


The German property boom could be reined in with an appropriate jump in interest rates.	德国的房地产热潮本可以用适当的利率跳升来进行遏制。


But, given the ECB’s apparent determination to head in the opposite direction, the bubble will only grow.	但鉴于欧洲央行显然决心在相反的方向前进，泡沫只会越来越大。


If it bursts, the effects could be dire for the euro; the new Euro-skeptic Alternative for Germany party, which made astonishing headway in the country’s recent state elections, would make sure of that.	一旦泡沫爆裂，对欧元的影响将是灾难性的； 而最近在德国州议会选举中狂飙突进的新欧洲怀疑论政党正等待着这一天的到来。


The Eurozone’s Minsky Conundrum	欧元区的明斯基困局


BRUSSELS – Stubbornly low inflation has the European Central Bank worried.	发自布鲁塞尔——挥之不去的低通胀一直困扰着欧洲央行。


But its response – essentially just more quantitative easing – could backfire, exacerbating imbalances and generating serious financial instability.	但它对此的应对手段——本质上只是更多的量化宽松——可能只会适得其反，不但加剧了失衡状况，还将导致严重的金融动荡。


As it stands, the headline consumer price index in the eurozone hovers around zero, and even core inflation remains below 1% – too far for comfort from the ECB’s target of around 2%.	目前欧元区的整体消费物价指数一直徘徊在0附近，而核心通胀率甚至仍然低于1％ ——距离欧洲央行2％左右的目标依然太远。


While a new round of weakness in global commodity prices earlier this year contributed to these figures, it does not explain the weakness in longer-term inflation expectations, which have improved little since March, when the ECB started its massive €60 billion ($66.3 billion) per month bond-buying program.	虽然这些数字都可归因于今年早些时候的新一轮全球大宗商品价格下跌，但却无法解释较长期的通胀预期的疲软问题——即便在今年三月欧洲央行启动了每月600亿欧元（约合663亿美元）的大规模债券购买计划后出现了些许改善。


But instead of rethinking its strategy, the ECB is considering doubling down: buying even more bonds and lowering its benchmark interest rate even further into negative territory. This would be a serious mistake.	但欧洲央行并未因此重新思考其战略，而是开始考虑双倍下注：购买更多债券，并进一步将其基准利率降为负值，而这将酿成大错。


Easier credit conditions and lower interest rates are supposed to boost growth by stimulating investment and consumption demand.	更简易的信贷条款以及更低的利率本可通过刺激投资和消费需求以提振经济增长。


But in the core of the eurozone – countries like Germany and the Netherlands – credit has been plentiful, and interest rates have been close to zero for some time, so there was never much chance that bond purchases would have a significant impact there.	但欧元区的核心——如德国荷兰等国——信贷已然充足，而利率已经相当一段时间接近于0，因此购买债券也不太可能产生显著的影响。


And, indeed, the European Commission’s most recent economic forecast shows that spending in the core countries has not increased as a result of the ECB’s policies; Germany’s external surplus is actually increasing.	而实际上欧盟委员会最新发表的经济预测报告就显示，核心国家的支出并未因欧洲央行的政策而增加； 德国的外部顺差还在进一步增大。


Of course, in the highly indebted peripheral countries, there was room for interest rates to fall and for credit supply to grow – and they have, leading governments and households to increase their spending.	当然，那些债台高筑的外围国家是有足够的空间去下调利率和增加信贷供应——而它们已经在引导政府和家庭增加支出。


While the asymmetrical impact of the ECB’s policy is appropriate in principle (because unemployment is much higher in the periphery), the reality is that a recovery supported by the least solvent economies is not sustainable.	但虽然欧洲央行政策的不对称影响在原则上是合理的（因为外围国家的失业率要高得多），无奈现实告诉我们，仅靠那些个麻烦最大的国家是无法可持续支撑经济复苏的。


Back in 1986, Hyman Minsky warned about the longer-term dangers to financial stability if “Ponzi” borrowers – those who can service their debt only with new debt – become the main pillar of the economy.	早在1986年，美国经济学家海曼·明斯基（Hyman Minsky）就警告说如果“庞氏骗局式”的借款人——那些用新债偿旧债者——成为经济主要支柱的话就会对金融稳定造成长期危害。


A zero-interest-rate environment is of course ideal for such borrowers, because there is nothing to provide an indication of solvency; borrowers can just roll over their debt.	零利率的环境当然非常适合这类借款人，因为没有什么可以证明偿债能力的指示物； 借款人只需不断滚动他们的债务即可。


But it is bad for those with a strong asset position; by reducing their spending power, it spurs them to save even more.	但受害的是那些资产状况较好的人； 一方面降低了他们的消费能力，另一方面又刺激他们去储蓄更多的钱。


The standard response to Minsky’s concern – that the spenders can’t afford it and the savers aren’t spending – is that monetary policy should focus on ensuring price stability, while macroprudential policy aims to safeguard financial stability by limiting borrowing by highly indebted agents.	针对明斯基提出的问题——支出者无力偿付而储蓄者不花钱——的标准回应是，货币政策应将重点放在确保物价稳定上，而宏观审慎政策则旨在限制向高负债机构借贷来维护金融体系稳定。


But this approach does not work.	但这种方法是行不通的。


If macroprudential policy limited additional credit to marginal borrowers effectively, monetary policy would have no impact on demand (as long as the most solvent agents refuse to spend more).	如果宏观审慎政策能有效限制向边缘借款者发放额外信贷，货币政策就将无法对需求产生影响（只要最有偿付能力的机构拒绝支出更多就行）。


This problem arose in the United States after the 2001 recession.	这一问题在2001年经济衰退后开始在美国浮现。


Although the Federal Reserve kept interest rates low for a protracted period, the corporate sector did not increase its investment.	虽然美联储宣布较长时间维持低利率，但企业部门并未增加投资。


The recovery was ultimately fueled by so-called “subprime” mortgages: home-purchase loans extended to borrowers with lower credit ratings.	复苏最终是由所谓“次级贷”贷款所推动：也就是向信用评级较低的借款人发放住宅贷款。


The result, as we know, was a mega-bubble that triggered the 2008 financial crisis.	其结果，如我们所见，正是这一巨型泡沫引发了2008年的金融危机。


In the eurozone’s case, the risk is compounded by the ineffectiveness of its key macroprudential instrument, the Stability and Growth Pact, in limiting countries’ spending, as lower interest rates give debtor countries leeway to spend more.	在欧元区，风险因其主要的宏观审慎工具——稳定与增长公约——在限制各国支出上的无能而加剧，因为更低的利率给了债务国增加支出的空间。


Public debt as a share of GDP is on the rise in Italy and Spain, even though both countries, with their eurozone partners, have committed to reducing the debt ratio.	即便意大利和西班牙两国及其欧元区伙伴国都承诺要降低负债率，但其公共债务占GDP的比重却一路上升。


In fact, even without lower interest rates, the deficit limits that the Pact imposes have proved to be non-binding, exemplified by France’s flouting of them since 2009.	事实上，即使没有更低的利率，该条约规定的赤字限制也已被证明是不具约束力的，法国自2009年以来对此限制的无视就是明证。


In short, monetary policy is perpetuating the disequilibrium between creditor and debtor economies in the eurozone, and macroprudential policy is doing nothing to stop it.	简而言之，货币政策延续了欧元区债权国和债务国经济体之间的不平衡，而宏观审慎政策也对此束手无策。


When interest rates normalize, this could generate serious financial instability.	一旦利率恢复正常化就可能产生严重的金融动荡。


But – and this is the conundrum – the ECB has few options for stimulating demand among the eurozone’s more solvent agents, and thus supporting a sustainable recovery.	但——这是难题所在——欧洲央行缺乏足够的选项去刺激欧元区偿付能力较强机构的需求，也因此难以支撑经济的可持续复苏。


In deciding its next move – whether to initiate more bond purchases, lower interest rates even further, or do both – the ECB must recognize that any positive impact on demand probably will be limited to the eurozone’s weaker economies – that is, the economies that can least afford it.	在决定下一步行动前——是否发起更多的债券购买计划，进一步降低利率，或者双管齐下——欧洲央行必须认识到，任何对需求的积极影响都可能仅限于欧元区较弱的经济体——也就是至少有能力偿付的经济体。


This is a high-risk move, one that is probably not justified by the effort to bring price increases a few dozen basis points closer to the ECB’s target.	这是一个高风险的举动，可能会与使价格向着欧洲央行的目标增加几十个基点的努力背道而驰。


A recovery has already begun in the eurozone. It should be left to run its course.	欧元区已经出现了复苏的苗头，也应该让复苏在自己的轨道上运行。


An even more expansionary monetary-policy stance might strengthen the recovery marginally, but at the cost of increasing the eurozone’s already-dangerous imbalances.	一个更具扩张性的货币政策立场或许能大幅强化这场复苏，但对此付出的成本，则是加剧了欧元区本已危险的失衡状况。


Europe’s Chimerical Capital-Markets Union	欧洲的空想资本市场联盟


LONDON – The eurozone's survival is in doubt again, as Greece demands debt forgiveness and an end to austerity – or else.	伦敦—欧元区的生存再次面临威胁，希腊要求债务豁免并停止紧缩，否则……。


But, though Europe's currency union is at risk, and its banking union remains at an early stage of development, the endlessly creative European Commission is embarking on another adventure: a so-called “capital-markets union."	但是，尽管欧洲货币联盟告急，银行联盟也仍处于初级阶段，但创造力无穷的欧盟委员会正在进行另一场冒险，所谓的“资本市场联盟”。


That “so-called" is appropriate, because the project, despite being only vaguely defined at this point, is most certainly not intended to create a single European capital market.	“所谓”这个定于名副其实，因为这个工程在现阶段定义含糊，其意图绝不可能是打造单一的欧洲资本市场。


Indeed, European Union leaders know better than to announce such an ambition, which would require a new treaty – no one is prepared to open up that can of worms.	事实上，如今欧盟领导人还不至于蠢到宣布如此野心——这需要新条约额，而没人准备打开这个魔盒。


After all, European voters are in no mood to transfer more powers to Brussels.	毕竟，欧洲选民无意给予布鲁塞尔更多的权力。


The capital-markets union actually began as a slogan, coined by one of EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's acolytes.	资本市场联盟起初其实是一个口号，由欧盟委员会主席容克的一位助手提出。


Now, the new financial markets commissioner, the United Kingdom's Lord Jonathan Hill, has been assigned the unenviable task of putting flesh on bare bones.	如今，新任金融市场委员、英国的希尔勋爵（Lord Jonathan Hill）不可避免地承担了给出这一计划细节的任务。


The Commission's “Green Paper" consultation round on the subject produced more questions than answers.	欧盟委员会关于该问题的“绿皮书”咨询轮所提出的问题多于找到的答案。


Think tanks, lobby groups, and national regulators have wasted no time in trying to influence Hill's efforts, and to head off any initiatives that might damage their interests.	智库、游说集团和国家监管者立刻行动起来试图影响希尔，阻止任何可能伤害它们利益的计划。


The Bank of England has argued that there should be no replication of the banking union grant of new powers to the European Central Bank at the expense of national central banks.	英格兰银行指出，绝不应该能像银行联盟那样授予欧洲央行新的权力而削弱国家央行。


The capital-markets union, the BOE argues, “does not require institutional change," so no super-regulator should be created.	英格兰银行说，资本市场联盟“不需要机构变革，”因此没有必要成立超级监管者。


The Commission has accepted that conclusion for now, though one of Hill's aides has suggested that, “at some point…supervisory issues will pop up."	现在，欧盟委员会接受了这一论断，尽管希尔的一位助手表示“总有一天……监督问题会浮出水面。


In fact, establishing a European version of the US Securities and Exchange Commission is a longstanding aim of the Brussels Eurocracy – one that may be achieved one day, but not just yet.	”事实上，建立欧洲版本的美国证券和交易委员会一直是布鲁塞尔欧洲共同市场行政体系的长期目标——这一目标也许会实现，但不可能是现在。


But before delving into institutional issues – a favorite topic of EU veterans – one should consider what problem the capital-markets union is supposed to solve.	但在深入研究机构问题——欧盟老手们最喜欢的话题——之前，我们应该想想资本市场联盟是为了解决什么问题。


And here, there is considerable agreement.	在这方面，我们已经有了相当大的一致。


Most regulators and market participants agree that Europe's financial markets are dysfunctional.	大部分监管者和市场参与者都同意，欧洲金融市场功能不全。


With banking assets amounting to roughly 300% of EU-wide GDP, compared to some 70% in the United States, large pools of savings are being left unused.	银行资产接近欧盟GDP的300%，而美国只有70%，大量储蓄资金没有派上用场。


Moreover, European companies receive an excessive 80% of their finance from banks and less than 20% from capital markets (the proportions are roughly reversed in the US).	此外，欧洲公司融资有80%多来自银行，只有不到20%来自资本市场（美国的比例与此相反）。


The need to redress that imbalance has become increasingly evident since the recent financial crisis, as banks' efforts to rebuild their capital bases (and meet stricter regulatory requirements) has led to credit rationing.	最近的金融危机爆发以来，修正这一失衡的必要性日益凸显，银行重建资本基础（以及满足更严格的监管要求）导致了信用配给现象。


Loosening that constraint on output growth would improve the European economy's resilience, encourage risk-taking, and promote dynamism.	放松这一产出增长约束能够改善欧洲经济的恢复力、鼓励风险承担、增加活力。


The overall aim of the capital-markets union is thus relatively straightforward.	因此，资本市场联盟的总体目标相对而言相当直观。


But achieving it is not – in no small part because Europe's heavy reliance on bank finance stems from structural and cultural factors.	但实现目标则并非如此——在很大程度上是因为欧洲对银行融资的严重依赖来源于结构和文化因素。


And the remedies that the Commission has suggested so far – for example, encouraging crowdfunding and standardizing the terms of securitization – appear unlikely to promote rapid growth in non-bank finance.	欧盟委员会目前所提出的解决之道——比如鼓励众筹和证券化条件标准化——似乎无助于刺激非银行融资的快速增长。


Promoting a pan-European private placement market might help, as would aligning standards for covered bonds.	促进泛欧洲私人配置市场也许有所助益，理顺担保债券标准亦然。


But both strategies would face serious legal obstacles.	但这两大战略都面临严重的法律障碍。


Indeed, though Hill's modest initial agenda certainly would do no harm (and should be pursued as quickly as possible), any substantial measures beyond it would confront major roadblocks.	事实上，尽管希尔的初始日程相当温和，绝不会造成任何伤害（并且应该尽快实施），但任何此后的重大措施将面临严重挑战。


For example, harmonizing insolvency regimes across the continent and reducing tax incentives that favor debt over equity, while entirely logical, strike at the heart of member states' remaining sovereignty, and thus will be extremely difficult to push forward.	比如，协调整个欧洲大陆的清算机制并降低有利于债务而不利于股权的税收融资尽管十分符合逻辑，但也影响到成员国剩余主权的核心，因此极难推行。


Some of the other ideas that Hill has floated, such as relaxing the capital standards for long-term investments, run counter to the EU solvency standards for insurers and pension funds that will be implemented next year.	希尔提出的其他一些想法，比如放松长期投资的资本要求，与将在明年实施的欧盟保险商和养老基金偿债能力要求相违背。


Some old nags have also been dragged out of the stables for another run around the course.	一些老生常谈已被剔除出下一轮讨论之外。


“Streamlined" prospectuses and exemptions from some accounting standards for small companies have been tried before in individual countries – and have failed.	“改进”招股书以及豁免小公司的某些会计标准等手段此前已在个别国家做了尝试，并以失败告终。


Looser standards for issuers weaken protection for investors, and there is evidence that lax regulation of new issues may reduce investor demand for them, raising the cost of finance.	放松的发行人标准会削弱投资者保护，并且有迹象表明对新股发行监管的放松会降低投资者对新股需求，增加融资成本。


Unless the political mood changes radically in Europe – an unlikely development – it would be unrealistic to expect the capital-markets union to be anywhere near as transformational as the banking union has been.	除非欧洲的政治情绪发生快速变化——不太可能——否则期望资本市场联盟拥有可与银行联盟相比的转化力是不现实的。


It will be, at best, a small disturbance, in which few national sacred cows are slaughtered.	它充其量只是一次微小的扰动，几乎不会牺牲神圣不可侵犯的国家主权。


What began as a slogan may turn out to be helpful.	起先作为口号的东西可能最终会有所助益。


But a capital-markets union is highly unlikely to end Europe's love affair with its banks.	但资本市场联盟绝不可能结束欧洲与银行的紧密关系。


The biggest impact on market structure will continue to come from ever-rising capital requirements, which will make bank credit more expensive and encourage borrowers to look elsewhere.	对市场结构最大的影响将继续来自不断提高的资本要求，而这将让银行信用更加昂贵，促使借款人将目光投向别处。


Europe’s Dog in the Nighttime	欧洲的午夜之犬


BRUSSELS – The new European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker is off to a rocky start.	布鲁塞尔—以让-克劳德·容克为首的新欧盟委员会开局不利。


But one would not know it from reading the news headlines.	但从新闻中你看不到这一点。


As Sherlock Holmes understood, a dog that does not bark in the nighttime usually goes unnoticed.	福尔摩斯知道，不在午夜乱吠的狗往往不会引起注意。


In Europe’s case, the European Union’s fiscal rules are at issue, and the Commission – in principle the EU’s watchdog – should bark loudly when they are flouted.	在欧洲，欧盟的财政规则是问题所在，而欧盟委员会——原则上它是欧盟的看门狗——应该在问题没有得到重视时大声吠叫。


Last month, howls seemed inevitable after two large EU countries, Italy and France, submitted budget plans for 2015 that clearly violated their governments’ vows of continued austerity.	上个月，在两个欧盟大国意大利和法国上交其2015年预算计划，其政府违背继续紧缩的承诺已成定局后，谴责之声不可避免。


At first, the Commission dutifully rejected the two budgets as incompatible with the rules of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).	首先，欧盟委员会忠实地拒绝了两国预算计划，因为其不符合欧盟稳定与增长公约（Stability and Growth Pact，SGP）规则。


But then something happened that was as “curious” as in Arthur Conan Doyle’s story.	但接着发生了福尔摩斯故事中的“有趣”的事情。


Within days, both countries offered mini-adjustments to their budgets, worth about 0.2% of GDP, and their finance ministers wrote to the Commission that their budgets should now be approved.	几天后，两国对预算做了相当于GDP的0. 2%的微调，并由财政部长致书欧盟委员会表示预算现在应予通过。


The Commission did not react, leaving French and Italian leaders to claim that they, not Brussels bureaucrats, had the last word.	委员会没有对此做出反应，这使得法国和意大利领导人声称，是他们而不是布鲁塞尔官僚拥有最终决定权。


In fact, the latest forecast reflects an even worse outcome for France and Italy this year than originally promised, with France’s deficit set to increase slightly for 2015 and Italy’s cyclically adjusted deficit expected to deteriorate.	事实上，最新预测表明法国和意大利今年的表现要比最初承诺的还要糟糕，法国赤字预计将在2015年略有增加，意大利的经周期调整的赤字还将进一步恶化。


The Stability and Growth Pact prescribes an annual improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP.	增长和稳定公约规定每年的改善幅度至少要达到GDP的0. 5%。


The new Commission thus risks losing its authority from the very start of its mandate.	因此，新欧盟委员会有可能从上任的第一天就失去其权威性。


Whether it does is a crucial question, because maintaining a high degree of credibility is essential to economic policymaking in the eurozone.	是否会如此是一个关键问题，因为维持高信誉对于欧元区经济决策而言至关重要。


To see why, it is worth recalling that the SGP’s original rules were judged “stupid” by one former Commission president (Romano Prodi), because the single-minded pursuit of a deficit below 3 % of GDP could be inappropriate during recessions.	要想明白原因，不妨回忆一下，SGP的最初规则被一位前主席（罗曼诺·普罗迪（Romano Prodi））称为“愚蠢”，因为一根筋地追求赤字低于GDP的3%可能在衰退时期并不合适。


That argument was accepted, and the SGP was supposedly rendered more “intelligent” by, for example, permitting budget deficits to be adjusted for the economic cycle, adding medium-term objectives for expenditure, and introducing escape clauses.	这一批评被接受，SGP大概也因为（比如）允许预算赤字根据经济周期调整、添加支出的中期目标以及引入豁免条款而被认为变得更“聪明”了。


But the new rules obviously require a strong institution to interpret them, and whose judgment is accepted by everybody.	但显然，新规则需要强大、决定可以被所有人接受的机构来解释。 检查预算是否低于SGP的上限——GDP的3%也许是个简单的任务，但对于商业周期调整应该算作GDP的0.


Though checking whether a budget is below the SGP’s ceiling of 3% of GDP may be a straightforward matter, there can be reasonable disagreement about whether the business-cycle adjustment should be estimated at 0.5% or 0.8% of GDP, or whether a country is adhering to its medium-term expenditure objective.	5%还是0. 8%的问题，或者一国是否遵循其中期支出目标的问题，仍会引起合理的分歧。


The Commission is supposed to have the last word, thereby ensuring the rules’ credibility and consistency – and it seems to have lost this fight in the first round.	欧盟委员会应该拥有最后决定权，从而保证规则的信誉和持续性——而它似乎在第一回合就败下阵来。


One could, of course, argue that the SGP should be scrapped, because austerity makes no sense when the eurozone faces the risk of deflation.	当然，你可能会说，SGP应该废弃，因为紧缩在欧元区面临通缩风险时毫无意义。


But the Commission, not fiscally louche member countries, should be the one to decide that.	但这应该由欧盟委员会而不是财政一片狼藉的成员国来决定。


The other problem for Europe is a dog that does bark, but for no reason.	欧洲的另一个问题是狗没有原因而吠。


This is the case of the United Kingdom, which has been asked to pay an additional contribution to the EU budget of about €2 billion ($2.5 billion, which amounts to a rounding error of the UK’s own budget).	英国就是如此，它被要求支付约20亿欧元（大约相当于英国自身预算的四舍五入规模）的欧盟预算追加金。


The reason for this additional levy is that a few weeks ago the UK’s Office for National Statistics announced, proudly, that it had discovered that the country’s gross national income (GNI) had been much higher than previously assumed, not only in 2013, but also in all previous years.	这笔追加金的原因是，几周前英国国家统计局自豪地宣布，英国国民总收入（GNI）比此前估计的高出很多，不但2013年是如此，此前多年都是如此。


Including the revisions for the 2002-2012 period, the difference comes to about £350 billion ($560 billion).	在包括了2002—2012年的修正额后，这一差额大概在3,500亿英镑。


Because every EU member state is obliged to contribute about 1% of its GNI to the Union’s budget, the UK’s data revision had to lead to a back payment of billions of euros.	由于每个欧盟成员国都有义务贡献其1%的GNI作为欧盟预算，因此英国的数据修正导致它需要多缴纳数十亿欧元。


But British Prime Minister David Cameron’s government has declared that it does not intend to pay money that “the European Commission was not expecting and does not need.”	但英国首相卡梅伦政府宣布不会支付“不在欧盟委员会意料之中，也不在其需要之中”的钱。


These two cases – the dog that should have barked but did not, and the dog that barked for no reason – threaten the EU’s fundamental workings, which are based on a clear rulebook enforced vigorously by a strong Commission.	这两个例子——该吠的狗不吠，吠的狗不该吠——威胁到了欧盟的基本运转，后者的基础是有一套明确的规则并由强大的欧盟委员会得力执行。


Juncker’s Commission risks losing its authority from the start if the rules can be bent or broken to accommodate the larger member states’ domestic political priorities.	如果规则可以更改甚至打破以迁就大成员国的国内政治需要，容克的委员会有可能从一开始就失去权威。


The Commission must regain political and intellectual leadership and make its choice: either explain why the SGP rules must be followed even now, in the face of deflation, or agree with those who argue that the current environment calls for a fiscal stimulus.	欧盟委员会必须夺回政治和思想领导地位并作出选择：要么阐明为何SGP即使在面临通缩的现在也必须遵守，要么与认为当前环境需要财政刺激的国家形成一致。


It cannot avoid taking sides by insisting publicly on austerity rules but then acquiescing when member states break them.	欧盟委员会无法通过公开坚持紧缩规则而又默许成员国打破这一规则避免站队。


Leaders in member states have to play their part as well.	成员国领导人也必须做好三分三。


Pandering to populists may be attractive in terms of short-term electoral gains, but the long-term cost in terms of credibility, both their own and that of the EU, will be very high.	迎合民粹主义也许具有短期选举利益的吸引力，但需要付出信誉的长期代价，这一带价不管是对他们本身还是对欧盟都是十分高昂的。


The Coming Atlantic Century	即将到来的大西洋世纪


PRINCETON – The United States is rising; Europe is stabilizing; and both are moving closer together.	普林斯顿—美国正在崛起； 欧洲正在稳定；


That was the principal message earlier this month at the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC), a high-powered gathering of defense ministers, foreign ministers, senior military officials, parliamentarians, journalists, and national-security experts of every variety.	这是本月举行的一年一度的慕尼黑安全会议（MSC）放出的主要信息。 MSC是各国国防部长、外交部长、高级军官、议员、记者和各领域国家安全顾问参与的高规格会议。


The participants come primarily from Europe and the US; indeed, when the conference began in 1963, it was focused entirely on NATO members.	与会者主要来自欧洲和美国； 事实上，这一始于1963年的会议一开始完全是北约成员国的内部会议。


This year, however, senior government officials from Brazil, China, India, Nigeria, Singapore, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia also joined, an important sign of the times.	不过，今年巴西、中国、印度、尼日利亚、新加坡、卡塔尔和沙特的高级政府官员也参与其中，这是一个重要的时代信号。


John McCain, the US senator and 2008 presidential candidate, always leads a large congressional delegation to Munich.	美国参议员、2008年总统候选人麦凯恩（John McCain）一直是慕尼黑会议国会代表团领袖。


The US administration also typically sends the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State to deliver a ritual speech reassuring the Europeans of the strength of the transatlantic alliance.	通常美国政府还会派出国防部长或国务卿前去发表礼节式演讲，对欧洲人强调跨大西洋同盟的重要性。


This year, Vice President Joe Biden did the honors, bumping the US representation up a notch.	今年，副总统拜登亲自出马，使美国的阵容又升了一格。


The conference also featured a panel on an unusual subject – “The American Oil and Gas Bonanza: The Changing Geopolitics of Energy.”	此次MSC的另一特征是出现了一个非常规问题专家讨论会。 这一问题便是“美国石油和天然气好运：变化中的能源地缘政治”。


US Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Carlos Pascual described “the US internal energy revolution”: a 25% increase in natural-gas production, which should push down US gas prices, and enough oil output to reduce oil imports from 60% to 40% of consumption, with an additional 10% increase projected.	美国国籍能源事务特使兼协调员帕斯奎尔（Carlos Pascual）描述了“美国内部的能源革命”：天然气产量增加25%（这将拉低美国气价），石油产量足以将进口量-消费量比从60%降至40%，此外还将有10%的预计增量。


Pascual projected that the US will be able to import all of its energy needs from within the Americas by 2030.	帕斯奎尔预测，到2030年，美国的所有能源需求都将在美洲内部解决。