Doubtless, we will learn more about Blair’s justifications for what he did, and further articulations of his interventionist creed, when he goes on the lecture circuit and, in due course, publishes his memoirs.	无疑，当布莱尔开始他的巡回演讲，并在适当时候出版他的回忆录时，我们会对他如何为其所作所为找到合理性，如何进一步阐述其干预主义者的信条有更多的了解。


The pathos of his situation, though, is that no one is listening anymore.	不过，可悲的是，没有人会听了。


Blair is the last interventionist.	布莱尔是最后一个干预主义者。


Neither his successor, Gordon Brown, nor George W. Bush’s successor, whoever he or she turns out to be, will be able to mount another intervention similar to that in Kosovo, let alone Iraq.	无论是他的继任者戈登·布朗，还是乔治·布什的继任者，都不会也没有能力再发动一场类似于科索沃，更不用说伊拉克式的干预了。


Those pressing for military intervention in Darfur would probably say that this is a bad thing.	那些力促对达尔富尔实行军事干预的人可能会说这太糟糕了。


But, as they rail against the failure of the West to take action, they should remember why such action is impossible.	但是，当他们抱怨西方没能采取行动的时候，他们应该记住为什么这样的行动不可能实现。


By putting liberal interventionism at the heart of his foreign policy, Tony Blair has made it radioactive – a political non-starter for at least a generation.	把自由主义干预作为它的外交政策核心，托尼·布莱尔已经使其造成了放射性的后果，至少在一代人中，它在政治上都无法再启动。


The Lawless Sheriff	无法无天的长官


I usually limit myself in my newspaper commentaries to my area of expertise, economics.	通常情况下，我的报章评论都限于自己专长的经济领域。


But as an American, I am so horrified by what has happened in my country - and what my country has done to others over the past two years - that I feel I must speak out.	但作为一名美国人，国内发生的一切让我感到震惊¾过去两年来美国在国外的所作所为，让我感到必须站出来说话。


I believe American abuses of human rights and the canons of civilized peoples that have come to light in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, and the more horrendous abuses that almost surely will come to light later, are not merely the act of aberrant individuals. They are the result of a Bush administration that has trampled on human rights and international law, including the Geneva conventions, and tried to undermine basic democratic protections, ever since it took office.	我相信在伊拉克、阿富汗和关塔那摩湾发生的美国对人权和文明公众信仰的践踏，以及今后几乎肯定会暴露的种种丑闻绝不仅限于有悖常理的个人行动，而是布什政府执政以来践踏人权和包括日内瓦公约在内的国际法，试图颠覆基本民主保障的种种行为的恶果。


Sadly, torture and other atrocities do happen in war - and the Iraq war is certainly not the only time torture has been used - but I believe that the Bush administration is responsible for creating a climate in which international law and democratic processes have been disregarded.	令人悲哀的是，战争确实带来折磨和暴行，伊拉克战争也绝非唯一一次采用拷问手段，但我确信：布什政府要对创造忽视国际法和民主政治的氛围承担责任。


When Vice President Dick Cheney spoke at the last World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he was asked how the administration could justify what was taking place in Guatanamo Bay, where prisoners are being kept without being charged and without counsel.	副总统迪克·切尼在上届瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛讲话时，有人问政府如何解释关塔那摩发生的一切，那里关押的囚犯未经审讯，也得不到辩护。


Cheney's answer was jarring: he said that because the detainees were captured in Afghanistan where they had been trying to kill US troops, the rules regarding prisoners of war did not apply.	切尼的回答非常刺耳：他说由于被羁押者来自阿富汗，他们试图在那里杀害美国军队，因此战俘法对他们根本就不适用。


Many in the audience were shocked by his remarks, but Cheney seemingly failed to grasp how appalled his audience was.	切尼的回答令听众震惊，他自己却似乎不以为意。


They were not concerned with legalisms, about whether, technically, the Geneva conventions did or did not apply. They were concerned about basic canons of human rights.	人们担心的并非法律条文，并非从技术上《日内瓦公约》能否适用，人们担心的是人权的基本信条。


Among the most appalled were those who had recently struggled to achieve democracy, and were continuing to fight for human rights.	深受震惊的听众中，不少人最近都力争民主，继续为人权而战。


The Bush administration has also trampled on citizens' basic right to know what their government is doing, refusing, for example, to disclose who was on the task force that shaped its energy policy - though one really doesn't need that information to see that it was shaped by the oil industry and for the oil industry.	布什政府还践踏了公民了解政府所作所为的基本权利，比如拒绝披露制定能源政策的特别工作组名单¾但人们实际并不需要上述信息，也能清楚地知道石油工业才是真正的幕后主使，攫取了大部分既得利益。


When abuses occur in one area, they can quickly spread to others.	疟俘事件在一处发生后，很容易扩散到其它地区。


For weeks the Bush administration kept the report on abuses in Iraqi prisons from the American people by pressuring CBS not to air the photographs in its possession.	一连几个星期，布什政府通过给CBS施加压力，阻止它将掌握的照片公之于众，使美国公众不能了解伊拉克监狱疟俘事件的真相。


Similarly, it was only through the use of the Freedom of Information Act that the dramatic photographs of the coffins of US soldiers coming home were finally made public.	与此相似，只有适用了《信息自由法》，装有美国士兵遗体的棺木运抵国内的戏剧性照片才被公之于众。


The American media have not emerged unscathed.	美国的媒体也并非毫发未损。


Why did CBS refuse to release information of vital concern to the public?	CBS为什么拒绝公布公众极为关注的消息？


The abuses should have been covered months ago.	疟俘事件几个月前就应该公开。


Amnesty International held a press conference on the topic in Baghdad in July 2003. And while the pictures and the story of Abu Ghraib ran on front pages in Europe and elsewhere, it was at first buried in many American newspapers, including leaders like The New York Times .	国际大赦组织2003年7月就在巴格达召开了记者招待会，而当阿布格莱布的照片和报道在欧洲及其它地区的报纸头版大幅刊载的同时，美国媒体起先却鸦雀无声，《纽约时报》这样的行业领袖也未能例外。


Were they worried about offending the Bush administration?	它们是害怕得罪布什政府吗？


Defenders of President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the military emphasize the difficulty of the task they face in Iraq, human frailty and fallibility, and the fact that there are always a few "rotten apples."	布什政府的拥护者、国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德和军方不约而同地强调在伊拉克面临的重重困难，以及人性的脆弱和易受诱惑，以及总有一小撮"害群之马"事实。


America's system of government, however, recognizes all of this, and attempts to guard against it.	美国的政府系统看到了这一切，并试图采取补救措施。


Had the letter and spirit of these safeguards been followed, we would not have been in this war at all, or at least not alone.	如果这些措施的涵义和精神得到遵守，那么根本不会爆发这场战争，至少我们也不是独自作战。


Yes, it is conceivable that Bush did not have accurate information about whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.	是的，可以想象布什没有掌握伊拉克是否存在大规模杀伤性武器的精确信息。


But under the international rules that America is supposed to follow, wars should not be undertaken based on the judgment of one individual and his cabal.	但按照美国理应遵守的国际准则，不应仅凭个人和集团的好恶就跳起战争。


The judgment of the world was that the evidence was not there - and the world was right.	世界的看法是缺乏足够的证据¾他们是对的。


Had Bush only gone along with the democratic processes enshrined in the UN Charter, the trauma of Iraq need not have occurred.	如果布什遵守了《联合国宪章》规定的民主原则，伊拉克的悲剧就不会上演。


We know that individuals and institutions make mistakes. Such mistakes are all the more likely in times of stress.	我们知道个人和机构都会失误，承受压力时失误的可能性更大。


We have to put in place rules and procedures, safeguards, a system of due process, to make it more likely that justice is done; and in times of stress it is all the more important that we respect these safeguards.	我们必须制定规则和程序，保护措施，特定的程序体系，增大公平处理的可能，预防措施在压力之下尤其应该遵守。


It is clear that the checks needed to prevent abuse in the Iraqi and Afghan prisons were not in place, and that the Bush Administration had created a climate that made such abuses more likely, if not inevitable.	很明显，防止伊拉克和阿富汗监狱疟俘事件所需的制衡力量并不存在，而布什政府创造的氛围就算不是不可避免，也更利于疟俘事件的发生。


More fundamentally, something has gone wrong with the system of checks and balances in America's democracy.	根本上讲，美国民主的制约和平衡机制发生了问题。


Congress and the press should have checked the president.	国会和媒体理应能够阻止总统。


The international community tried.	国际社会已经做出了努力。


Unfortunately, the global system of international law and governance remains too weak to prevent the determined misbehavior of the president of the world's most powerful country if he is hell bent on starting a war on his own.	遗憾的是，国际法律和管辖的全球系统还太弱小，如果世界最强大国家的总统决意独自跳起战争，上述体系阻止不了他的一意孤行。


It is at moments such as these that we realize how thin a veneer our civilization may be.	这样的时刻使我们认识到文明是如此虚弱的装饰。


As statements of shared values and principles, the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva conventions are great achievements.	《联合国宪章》、《人权宣言》和《日内瓦公约》作为国际社会共同的价值观和准则，本身确实是了不起的成就。


Whether they have the force of law is not the point; they provide guidance for civilized behavior.	它们是否具有法律效力不是关键，他们为文明的行为提供了指导。


Each of them was motivated by the horrific lessons of the past.	每个条约都源于过去可怕的教训。


Let us hope that, emerging out of today's scandals, there will be a renewed commitment to live up to these ideals and to strengthen the institutions that were designed to enforce them.	让我们共同期望：今天的丑闻能重新带来遵守理想的愿望，并赋予执法机构更大的力量。


The Lebanese Labyrinth	黎巴嫩迷宫


Lebanon is poised to hold a presidential election that none of its contending factions – indeed, none of the rival parties in the region – can afford to lose.	黎巴嫩即将举行总统选举。 所有的竞争派别以及该地区的对立派别谁都不能输掉这一选举。


Let’s start with Syria.	首先看一下叙利亚。


In 2005, President Bashar Assad’s regime was forced to withdraw its army from Lebanon, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.	在2005年，黎巴嫩前总理哈黎里遇刺身亡后，阿萨德总统的政权被迫从黎巴嫩撤军。


Syria is widely believed to have been responsible for the crime, and domestic Lebanese and international pressure helped force Syria’s pullout.	人们大多认为叙利亚应当对这一犯罪负责，黎巴嫩国内和国际社会的压力迫使叙利亚撤军。


Yet in a speech soon thereafter, Assad warned that nothing could sever the Syrian-Lebanese relationship.	但是在随后的一次讲话中，阿萨德警告说，没有任何东西可以切断叙利亚和黎巴嫩的关系。


Assad knows that the election of a president who bolsters Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence would make Syria’s return difficult – and Assad, as even his allies privately admit, wants nothing less.	阿萨德知道，如果维护黎巴嫩主权和独立的人当选总统，叙利亚重返黎巴嫩就会变得困难。 甚至阿萨德的盟友们也私下承认他不愿意将就。


Indeed, it was his decision to extend, unconstitutionally, the term of the reliably pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud as Lebanon’s president in 2004 that triggered the political crisis leading to Hariri’s murder and the emergence of a coalition of anti-Syrian groups, which included many former Syrian allies.	实际上，正是他在2004年决定违背宪法延长亲叙利亚的黎巴嫩总统拉乌德的任期，引发了政治危机，造成哈黎里被害以及各反叙利亚团体结盟的出现，这些团体中包括许多以前叙利亚的盟友。


Assad is particularly worried about the creation of a mixed Lebanese-international court to try suspects in the Hariri assassination.	阿萨德尤其担心的是会建立黎巴嫩和国际混合法庭审判谋杀哈黎里的嫌疑犯。


The court was approved under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and will be situated in Holland.	这一法庭是根据联合国宪章第八章批准建立的，将会设在荷兰海牙。


Once the trial begins, Syria may find itself in the dock.	一旦审判开始，叙利亚就会可能受到审判。


Closely allied with Syria is Hezbollah, which presides over a virtually autonomous mini-state in south Lebanon.	与叙利亚紧密结盟的是真主党。 真主党在南黎巴嫩基本上建立了一个国中之国。


Hezbollah has an armed militia that is far more effective than Lebanon’s national army, and has openly rejected UN Security Council resolutions asking for its disarmament.	真主党拥有一支武装民兵，其实力远远超出黎巴嫩国民军队之上。 这一武装公开拒绝要求其解除武装的联合国安理会决议。


Hezbollah’s priority is to maintain the military capacity to fight Israel, and also to play a pivotal role in the broader regional rivalry between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas on one side, and the United States, the Sunni-led mainstream Arab states, the Mahmoud Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, and Syria’s Lebanese foes on the other.	真主党的重点是维持与以色列斗争的军事实力，并且在更大的地区争夺中发挥关键作用。 这一争夺以伊朗、叙利亚、真主党以及哈马斯为一方，美国、逊尼派主流阿拉伯国家、阿巴斯领导的巴勒斯坦权力机构以及叙利亚在黎巴嫩的宿敌为另一方。


But there are constraints on Hezbollah.	但是真主党的行动还是受到限制。


The party’s leaders know that any crisis in Lebanon could provoke a Sunni-Shiite conflict.	其领导人知道，黎巴嫩的任何危机都可能促发逊尼派和什叶派的冲突。


Hezbollah’s patrons in Iran, like the party itself, realize that the consequences would be disastrous.	真主党在伊朗的主子和该党一样清楚其后果将会是灾难性的。


Iran would find itself the bogeyman of the Arab world’s Sunnis, while Hezbollah could be swallowed up by another debilitating Lebanese civil war.	伊朗将会成为阿拉伯逊尼派的恶魔，而真主党则将会在另一场黎巴嫩内战浩劫中被耗尽实力。


In the coming weeks, Hezbollah will have to calculate at several levels.	在今后的几周中，真主党将不得不在几个层面上做出估计。


It will, above all, take Syrian priorities into consideration.	首先，它将会考虑叙利亚的重点。


If Assad decides to scuttle the presidential election in order to strengthen Syria’s hold in Beirut, then the party will go along.	如果阿萨德决定匆忙举行总统选举从而加强叙利亚对贝鲁特的控制，那么，真主党也会跟从。


But a political vacuum in Lebanon only makes violence more likely, which Hezbollah doesn’t want.	但是黎巴嫩的政治真空只会让暴力更有可能发生，真主党并不愿意如此。


On the other side, interests vary.	在另一方面，各方利益不同。


Syria’s Lebanese enemies know that the election’s outcome will determine their fate.	叙利亚在黎巴嫩的敌人知道，选举结果将会决定他们的命运。


Given that several prominent critics of Syria have been killed since 2005, there is little room for compromise.	鉴于从2005年以来，几个著名批评叙利亚的人士都被害，所以妥协的余地不大。


The problem is that the anti-Syrian coalition, known as “March 14,” is not yet united around a single presidential candidate.	问题是，被称作为“三月十四日”的反叙利亚联盟尚未团结在某个总统侯选人周围。


That said, the leaders of March 14, which controls a parliamentary majority, will block any step that revives Syrian domination.	因此，控制议会多数的这一运动的领导人们将会组织任何让叙利亚控制卷土重来的企图。


The US has made it clear that it will not accept a president close to Hezbollah or Syria.	美国已经表明，它不会接受一个与真主党或者叙利亚亲近的总统。


While America will not bargain with Syria over the election, it would probably accept a candidate with whom Syria feels comfortable, provided he is acceptable across the political spectrum.	尽管美国不会与叙利亚在选举问题上谈判，它却可能接受一个叙利亚感到舒服的侯选人，条件是他能够为各方政治势力所接受。


The US must also calculate what the Europeans will accept.	美国还必须估计欧洲所能接受的侯选人。


France, Italy, and Spain all have large contingents in the UN force in south Lebanon that was expanded after the summer 2006 war.	法国、意大利以及西班牙在南黎巴嫩都驻扎有大量的联合国部队，2006年夏天的战争结束后部队规模扩大了。


No election, they fear, would endanger their soldiers.	它们担心，如果不举行选举，它们的士兵的生命就会受到威胁。


This makes them vulnerable to Syrian leverage, and is why they may be more amenable to dealing with Syria on the presidency.	这样就使得它们受到叙利亚的牵制，而且这也是它们为何更为可以同叙利亚在总统问题上打交道。


Another key actor is Saudi Arabia, whose relations with Syria are at an all-time low.	另一个关键国家是沙特。 沙特与叙利亚的关系处于历史上最低点。


The Saudis, deeply disturbed by the Syrian-Iranian alliance, worry that re-imposition of Syrian supremacy in Lebanon, and with it the strengthening of Iranian and Shiite power there, would threaten the Kingdom itself.	叙利亚和伊朗的结盟让沙特深感不安。 它担心如果叙利亚在黎巴嫩重新掌控以及伊朗和什叶派实力随之得到加强将会威胁到王国本身。


But, as the Saudis also want Syria to be included in King Abdullah’s regional peace plan, and with the US planning to hold a regional peace conference in November, they are not looking for an open-ended confrontation with Assad.	但是，由于沙特也想让叙利亚包括在阿卜杜拉国王的地区和平计划之中，以及美国计划在十一月举行地区和平会议，因此，沙特并不寻求与阿萨德无休止地对抗。


These clashing interests will be played out after September 25, when the two-month period during which Lebanon’s parliament must elect a president begins.	这些相互矛盾的利益将会在9月25日以后展示出来。 届时，黎巴嫩国会将开始花两个月的时间选举总统。


No side has a yearning for war, which is why compromise solutions are possible.	各方都不想要战争，因此妥协方案是可能的。


But what would such a compromise look like?	但是这样一个妥协方案是什么样子的呢？


One idea – to elect a candidate with whom everyone can live – would likely produce a weak president.	其���一个是，选举一个各方都能接受的侯选人可能会产生一个弱势总统。


So would an agreement by all sides to elect an interim president for two years, buying time until the regional balance of power changes or solidifies.	同样，各方同意选举临时总统两年以争取时间，直到地区的实力平衡改变或者得到巩固。


Whatever the outcome, the choice of Lebanon’s next president will emerge from a political maelstrom – one that he will almost certainly be powerless to allay.	无论是什么结果，黎巴嫩下一个总统将会从旋涡之中产生，而他也无力缓和这一旋涡。


The Lebanon War One Year Later	黎巴嫩战争一年回首


LONDON -- It is now almost one year since the European Union committed to stabilize Lebanon following last summer’s war.	伦敦--去年夏天黎巴嫩战争后，欧盟承诺稳定该国局势已近一年。


With its decision to send thousands of soldiers to Lebanon to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the EU took its boldest step yet in creating a common foreign and security policy.	欧盟决定向黎巴嫩派遣数千名士兵落实联合国安理会1701号决议，从而再一次在建立共同外交和安全政策上迈出了一大步。


But it remains an open question as to whether the EU will actually be able to stabilize the most fractured polity in the most dangerous area of conflict in Europe’s immediate neighborhood.	但是，欧盟是否有能力稳定这一欧洲近邻中的最为危险冲突地区最为四分五裂的国家尚且不得而知。


The Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 reminded the Union, once again, that its strategic interests do not always coincide perfectly with those of the United States.	2006年以色列和真主党之间的战争再一次提醒欧盟，其战略利益并不一定总是与美国的完全吻合。


Because the Bush administration took a “hands off” approach to the Israel-Hezbollah war in south Lebanon, and given the military straitjacket the US finds itself in because of the Iraq war, the EU had to take the lead.	由于布什政府放任南黎巴嫩战争，而且由于伊拉克战争美国的军力捉襟见肘，因此欧盟不得不采取主导立场。


The EU remains – for now – relatively uncontaminated by America’s disintegrating reputation in the Middle East.	美国在中东的声誉一落千丈，而目前欧盟则相对免受其害。


But the Union could see its reputation worsen if it allows its commitment to Lebanon to become part of the emerging US strategy of isolating Iran by hardening today’s regional Sunni-Shia divisions.	但是，如果欧盟允许其对黎巴嫩的承诺变成美国加剧如今的什叶派和逊尼派分裂、从而孤立伊朗的呼之欲出的战略的一部分，那么，其声誉就会恶化。


To avoid this fate, the EU’s commitment in Lebanon needs to be supplemented with a nuanced political strategy that seeks to avoid isolating Lebanon’s long suppressed Shia population.	为了避免这一命运，欧洲在黎巴嫩的承诺就需要辅之以一个微妙的政治战略，这一战略应当寻求避免孤立黎巴嫩长期受到压制的什叶派人口。


The threats emanating from the Middle East are diverse: regional conflicts, totalitarian religious ideologies (mainly led by Shia Iran and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia), terrorism, nuclear armament programs, obstacles to modernization, and unstable regimes.	来自中东的危险多种多样，包括地区冲突、专制的宗教意识形态(主要由什叶派的伊朗和瓦哈比的沙特领导)、恐怖主义、核军备规划、对现代化的阻碍以及政权不稳。


All of these affect Lebanon, and are aggravated by the country’s own peculiar socio-political dynamics – i.e., its Maronite, Sunni, and Shia divisions.	所有这些都影响黎巴嫩，而且该国自身特殊的社会政治格局，也就是其马龙派、逊尼派以及什叶派的分裂也使得局势雪上加霜。


The EU’s mission in Lebanon is risky.	欧盟在黎巴嫩的使命充满风险。


Neither Hezbollah nor Syria, let alone Iran, has an interest in stability without some say in creating it.	如果在建立稳定上没有发言权，真主党和叙利亚对此也就没有兴趣，更不必说伊朗了。


Resolution 1701 presupposes – in addition to separating the combatants – enforcement of the internal and external sovereignty of Lebanon’s elected government, without saying how this is to be accomplished given Hezbollah’s superior military power relative to the government’s forces.	1701号决议除了分隔交战人员之外，假定了强加黎巴嫩经过选举政府的内部和外部主权，而没有表明在真主党相对于政府军事占优的情况下如何实现这一目标。


In effect, the resolution envisaged reversing Hezbollah’s gains and ignores the deep changes that have occurred in Lebanese society, most importantly the Shia community’s growing self-confidence.	实际上，该决议着眼扭转真主党取得的优势，并且忽略黎巴嫩社会发生的深刻变化，最为重要的就是什叶派社区日益提高的自信。


Attempting to politically isolate and disarm Hezbollah is a task that the EU-led UN force cannot accomplish and should not attempt, for it would mean war, with Syria and Iran in the background.	欧盟领导的联合国力量无法实现在政治上孤立真主党和解除真主党的武装，它也不应该做这样的努力，因为这就意味着战争，而叙利亚和伊朗则在这一背景之下。


But were the EU to resign itself to mere observer status in Lebanon, the UN and Europe would lose all credibility.	但是，如果欧盟仅仅甘于在黎巴嫩做一个观察员，那么，联合国和欧洲就都会丧失所有的信誉度。


An armed peace has held for a year. But an armed peace never lasts.	武装和平已经一年。 但是武装和平从来都不会长久。


The mission must therefore walk a fine line to bridge the country’s communal divisions, which will be possible only with a clear understanding of Lebanon and the wider Middle East.	因此，该使命就必须辗转腾挪，弥合该国部落分歧。 只有清楚地理解黎巴嫩和广大中东地区才能做到这一点。


The road toward peace rather than ceasefire in Lebanon precludes the EU’s participation in America’s emerging “containment” strategy vis-à-vis Iran, at least in its current form, which is based on organizing the resistance of Sunni states to Shia influence.	通向黎巴嫩和平而非停火之路预先排除了欧盟参与美国正在成形的针对伊朗的“遏制”战略，至少是在其目前形式下是如此。 这一战略建立在组织逊尼派国家抵抗什叶派影响的基础之上。


For the Shia are the biggest of Lebanon’s three religious communities.	这是因为什叶派在黎巴嫩三大宗教社区中居首。


They also form a majority in some Gulf states, as well as in the oil-rich regions of Saudi Arabia.	他们还在某些海湾国家以及石油储量丰富的沙特地区占有多数。


So a neat Shia-Sunni dividing line cannot be drawn.	所以，精确地划分什叶派和逊尼派是办不到的。


Europe should instead push for new constitutional and institutional solutions that ensure the Shia a legitimate role in the political arrangements of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states – all places where they now regard themselves as third-class citizens.	相反，欧洲应当推动新的、确保什叶派在黎巴嫩、沙特以及海湾国家政治安排中的合法作用的宪法和机制方案。 在所有这些地方，什叶派自认为是三等公民。


Giving the Shia a real stake in the nations in which they live is the only way to satisfy the craving for empowerment that they feel after so many years of suppression.	赋予什叶派在其居住国家实际的相关利害是满足其在多年遭受迫害所感觉到的对于赋予权利的渴望的唯一途径。


Europe must also recognize why leaders like Hezbollah’s Sheikh Hasan Nasrullah are popular.	欧洲还必须认识到像真主党的纳什鲁拉为何广受欢迎。


Anti-Americanism and an aggressive foreign policy are, of course, part of the allure of men like Nasrullah.	当然，反美以及咄咄逼人的外交政策是纳什鲁拉等人吸引力的一部分。


But what has really allowed Hezbollah (and Hamas, for that matter) to win elections and cement support is their ability to provide education, health, and other social services, particularly to the poor.	但是让真主党(以及同一道理哈马斯) 赢得选举以及巩固支持的东西实际上是它们特别是向穷人提供教育、医疗以近其他社会服务的能力。


The US and the political groups that it tends to support in the region, by contrast, offer very little in this regard.	与此相比，美国及其在该地区支持的政治团体在这一方面鲜有佳绩。


The Bush administration stresses democracy and human rights, which is a good agenda as far as it goes.	布什政府强调民主和人权。 这一议程本身不错。


But it is an agenda for the region’s “haves,” not its “have nots.”	但是，这是给该地区富有之人的议程，而不是给贫困潦倒的人的议程。


In places like south Lebanon, which suffer from deep social cleavages and inequalities, free elections and free trade hold little resonance for people who are impoverished and marginalized.	在像南黎巴嫩那样的地��，社会分化和不平等深刻，自由选举和自由贸易对于贫苦和边缘化的人们而言没有多少意义。


If the EU mission is to compete successfully against Lebanon’s Islamists and populists, it must start thinking seriously about a social agenda that appeals to the poor.	欧盟的使命要想成功地与黎巴嫩的伊斯兰和民粹主义竞争，它就必须开始认真考虑吸引穷人的社会议程。


Of course, no one wants to break budgets or create dependency.	当然，没人想要破坏预算或者建立依赖。


But healing Lebanon’s wounds requires finding the means to offer alienated Shia what they want and need most, and not what outsiders think they should want or need.	但是，医治黎巴嫩的创伤要求找到途径，给那些被偏离的什叶派他们的最为想要和需要的东西，而不是外人认为他们应当想要或者需要的东西。


Europe’s Troika Should Grow Up	欧洲三驾马车需要成熟


PARIS – In early 2010, a group of men (and a few women) in dark suits landed in Athens.	巴黎—2010年初，一批身穿黑西装的男人（和少数女人）来到雅典。


They belonged to a global institution, the International Monetary Fund, and to a pair of regional ones, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.	他们中有的一个名叫国际货币基金组织（IMF）的全球机构，其他来自欧盟委员会和欧洲央行。


Their mission was to negotiate the terms and conditions of a financial bailout of Greece.	他们的任务是与希腊谈判金融援助的条款和条件。


A few months later, what became known as the “troika” was dispatched to Ireland, then to Portugal, and later to Cyprus.	几个月后，这批被称为“三驾马车”的机构的人士又先后来到爱尔兰、波兰和塞浦路斯。


This endeavor was bound to have wide implications.	如此卖力自然会引起广泛影响。


The troika negotiated what ended up being the largest financial assistance packages ever: loans to Greece from the IMF and European partners are set to reach €240 billion ($310 billion), or 130% of the country’s 2013 GDP – far more in both absolute and relative terms than any country has ever received.	三驾马车谈的是最终成为有史以来最大金融援助的计划：IMF和欧洲伙伴给希腊的贷款高达2400亿欧元，或该国2013年GDP的130%——比此前任何国家所获得的规模都要大，不管以绝对数字还是相对比例而言。


Loans to Ireland (€85 billion) and Portugal (€78 billion) are also significantly bigger than those usually provided by the IMF.	给爱尔兰（850欧元）和葡萄牙（780亿欧元）的贷款也远远超过了IMF通常提供的贷款量。


Moreover, cooperation between the three institutions is unprecedented.	此外，这三大机构之间的合作前所未有。


Back in 1997-1998, during the Asian crisis, the G-7 flatly rejected Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund.	1997—1998年亚洲金融危机期间，G7断然拒绝了日本成立亚洲货币基金的方案。


Now the IMF has even accepted a minority-lender role, with the bulk of assistance coming from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a new institution often viewed as an embryonic European Monetary Fund.	如今，IMF甚至接受了次要贷款人的角色，援助的大头将来自欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism，ESM），这是个被广泛视为欧洲货币基金雏形的机构。


It is frequently argued that the size of the assistance packages is a testament to Europe’s clout within the IMF.	常常有人认为，援助计划的规模彰显出欧洲对IMF的控制。


Perhaps, but the packages are, first and foremost, a consequence of the constraints to which Europeans were (and still are) subject.	或许如此，但这些计划首先是欧洲曾经受到（现在仍受到）的约束的产物。


Economic adjustment is necessarily slower within a monetary union than it is for countries with their own currency, because, even for very flexible economies, prices change more slowly than the exchange rate.	货币联盟内部的经济调整必然慢于拥有本国货币的国家，因为即便是灵活度极高的经济，价格变化也比汇率变化更加缓慢。


Delivering the same result therefore takes more time, and requires keeping countries in intensive care for longer – and at higher cost.	因此，达到相同效果要耗费更长时间，也要求各国做好准备接受更长时间和更高成本。


Three years later, the results are mixed at best.	三年后，结果只能说是喜忧参半。


Unemployment has increased much more than anticipated and social hardship is unmistakable.	失业远比预期增长得快，社会困境也显而易见。


There is one bright spot: Ireland, which is set to recover from an exceptionally severe financial crisis.	爱尔兰是一个亮点，它即将从极其严重的金融危机中复苏。


But there is also a dark spot: Greece, where GDP has shrunk by 20% since 2009 and where the public debt/GDP ratio is now higher than anticipated at the launch of the program, despite the debt reduction negotiated with private creditors in February 2012.	但有两点也有暗点：希腊GDP自2009年以来下降了20%，如今公债/GDP比率仍比援助计划开始时预计的高，尽管2012年2月与私人债权人进行了债务削减谈判。


This is not because of a lack of fiscal consolidation.	这并不是因为缺少财政整合导致的。


On the contrary, the Greek authorities have done more than planned on this front.	相反，希腊当局在这方面比计划的做得更加充分。


But the collapse of GDP has necessarily implied a rising debt ratio, driving the country into a recessionary spiral as economic contraction forces further spending cuts.	但GDP的暴跌免不了会导致债务比率上升，将希腊拖入衰退螺旋——经济收缩破事支出进一步缩减。


Could the troika have done better?	三��马车还能做得更好吗？


It was not responsible for existing monetary conditions – a currency union with a central bank focused on price stability.	对于现有货币条件——由一家中央银行维持价格稳定的货币联盟——它并不负责。


But European officials’ hesitant response to the crisis added to the difficulty.	但欧洲官员对危机反应的犹豫不决加剧了困难。


Prolonged controversies over the terms and conditions of assistance and the absurdly high interest rate initially set on official loans exacted a heavy toll on countries already under stress.	关于援助条款和条件的长时间争论以及最初为正式贷款设定的高得离谱的利率让已经压力重重的国家雪上加霜。


Furthermore, the troika made three mistakes.	此外，三驾马车翻了三个错误。


First, Greek debt reduction was postponed for too long.	首先，希腊债务削减计划暂停的时间太长了。


Once it became clear that the burden was unbearable, debt should have been cut expeditiously.	一旦人们认清了其负担重到难以承受的局面，债务应该迅速地削减。


Too many creditors were reimbursed at par on their maturing claims.	太多的债权人在到期时得到了十足的面值偿付。


Second, the troika based its programs on overly optimistic assumptions.	其次，三驾马车的计划基于过度乐观的假设。


It misjudged the consequences of fiscal consolidation and credit constraints, underestimating the contraction of employment and overestimating exports and privatization receipts.	它错判了财政整合和信用约束的后果，低估了就业收缩，高估了出口和私有化进账。


Finally, not unlike what happened during the Asian crisis in the late 1990’s, the troika took country cases one by one.	最后，与20世纪90年代末的亚洲危机一样，三驾马车逐一解决各国的问题。


As a result, it did not pay enough attention to cross-country spillovers and deteriorating conditions in the wider eurozone.	结果，它没有把足够的注意力放在整个欧元区的跨国溢出和环境恶化上。


Should the troika survive?	三驾马车应该继续存在下去吗？


Its three participating institutions have different mandates and different roles.	其三个组成机构有着不同的使命和角色。


It was perhaps inevitable that initially they worked jointly; but there is reason to question such an approach now.	一开始，它们免不了要合作运行； 但现在有理由质疑这一方针。


Operationally and financially, the IMF has become much more involved in Europe than its global shareholders deem sustainable.	在操作和金融层面，IMF涉入欧洲之深已经超过了其全球股东认为可持续的程度。


It should become a catalytic lender whose participation in eurozone programs remains desirable but not indispensable – giving it the possibility to disagree and walk away.	它应该是一家起催化作用的贷款机构，其对欧元区计划的残余应该是锦上添花而非雪中送炭，这样才有不同意和退出的可能性。


The ECB is in an odd position as well, but for different reasons.	欧洲央行的立场也颇为怪异，但原因不同。


As the eurozone’s central bank, rather than a lending institution, it does not have a clear role in negotiations on behalf of creditors.	作为欧元区的中央银行而不是贷款机构，它并没有明确的职责要代表债权人谈判。


If it remains in the troika, its participation should be mostly silent.	如果它继续留在三驾马车，它的参与应该是默然的。


Finally, Europe should transform the ESM into a European Monetary Fund capable of providing policy assessment and advice, as well as financial assistance – possibly drawing on European Commission staff.	最后，欧洲应该让ESM变为欧洲货币基金，让它负责提供政策评估和建议以及金融援助——可以通过欧盟委员会授权。


Beyond European specifics, the troika experiment answers a question of major importance to other parts of the world: Can the IMF cooperate with regional institutions?	除了欧洲的具体情况，三驾马车的实验也回答了世界其他地区的一个重要问题：IMF可以与地区机构合作吗？


The answer is yes – but not easily.	答案是肯定的，但并不容易。


The troika has proved functional, and Europe would have been at pains to provide conditional assistance to eurozone countries without the IMF’s participation and support.	三驾马车功能良好，而若不是IMF的参与和支持，欧洲将难以向欧元区国家提供有条件援助。


But cooperation has proved to be difficult, if only because each participating institution has rules and constraints that are not easy to reconcile with the others’.	但合作是艰难的，光是参与机构各自的规则和约束不同且难以互相调和已足够形成阻碍。


This column draws on a Bruegel report co-authored with André Sapir and Guntram Wolff.	本专栏改编自与André Sapir和Guntram Wolff合作的Bruegel报告。


The Lessons of Perestroika, 20 Years After	20年后重组的教训


Twenty years after Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika, many people have come to lament the slow pace of reform in Russia under President Vladimir Putin.	米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫重组20年后，人们开始为普京总统领导下俄国缓慢的改革进展感到忧伤。


But could it have been otherwise?	但可能有其它结果吗？


This should not be a surprise, because the tumultuous Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras left the country exhausted. So who can blame Russians for suffering from the reform fatigue?	现在的局面其实不足为怪，因为动荡的戈尔巴乔夫和叶利钦时代已经让国家不堪重负，因此谁又能责怪俄国人对改革持有的厌倦情绪？


But if Russia is to get back on its feet, more reforms are needed.	但如果俄国想重新强大，就需要进一步的改革。


Yet before a new round of reforms is to begin, some basic principles about Russia's political capacities must be understood.	但在新一轮的改革开始之前，必须理解关乎俄国政治能力的一些基本原则。


The first question that any would-be Russian reformer should ask nowadays (and which we did not ask during Gorbachev's perestroika) is the following, is society prepared to endure the short-term pains of reforms, and how willing it is to endure the pain?	时至今日，自诩为俄国改革家的人们需要理解的第一个问题是（这个问题他们在戈尔巴乔夫的重组改革中并没有弄懂）：俄国社会是否准备承受改革所带来的短期阵痛，以及他们愿意忍受到何种程度？


The experience of perestroika underscores the importance of this question.	重组改革的经历凸显了上述问题的重要性。


Perestroika took place at a unique moment in Russian history.	重组改革发生在俄国历史上的特殊时刻。


The great reforms of the past, including the liberation of the serfs in 1861, followed many years of discussions among westerners, slavophiles, and others.	过去经历过的伟大改革，包括1861年的农奴解放，都是在西方人、亲斯拉夫人和其它种族多年讨论后形成的。


The revolutions of 1905 and 1917 also came at a time when those discussions were finished, and everyone knew who stood for what.	1905和1917年的革命也发生在讨论结束后，那时人人都已经弄清了自己的立场。


Indeed, I once read that Stalin's appointment to his first key party post was a mistake.	实际上，我曾经看到过报导，说斯大林第一个党内重要职务的任命纯属错误。


But it is still obvious that the entire party knew who Stalin was.	但很显然全党都了解斯大林是怎么回事。


When they entrusted him with responsibility for convening the constituent assembly, the Bolsheviks knew what they wanted to do with the constituent assembly, because they knew Stalin as a person who would not stop at anything.	布尔什维克们把召集制宪大会的任务交给斯大林，就是看中了他不畏任何艰难险阻的性格。


Perestroika was different, because debate had not ended; indeed, countless debates were raging about what Gorbachev should do.	但重组改革却有所不同，因为讨论还没有结束； 实际上，有关戈尔巴乔夫该如何行事的探讨还在此起彼伏。


Moreover, all previous eras of Russian reform eras and revolutions were connected with some historical model.	不仅如此，俄国改革和革命年代的所有宝贵时刻都与特定的历史模式密切相关。


Perestroika had no such historic precedent.	而重组改革却没有这样的历史先例可供借鉴。


The transformation from state socialism into a postindustrial society had never occurred anywhere else.	从国家社会主义过渡到后工业社会在任何地方都没有先例。


Thus, perestroika took place in a void.	因此重组改革需要探索一条全新的道路。


Alas, this experience is being repeated.	唉，这样的情况正在重演。


Various political leaders of different political parties flash across Russia’s television screens, but there is no real national discussion about how to lead the country forward.	来自不同政党的党派领袖在俄国的电视银屏上一闪而过，却始终没有形成如何带领国家前进的真正的全国性讨论。


We are not moving toward a choice reached after countless discussions.	我们的选择并没有经历过无数次讨论的检验。


The second lesson of perestroika concerns the program of reform.	改革中应该汲取的第二个教训与改革规划有关。


After two decades of earthshaking change, Russia has still not had a real program of constructive reform.	在长达20年翻天覆地的变化之后，俄国仍然没有制定出建设性改革的真正规划。


To use a modern expression, we don’t have a road map.	用时髦的词汇说，我们缺乏一张路线图。


Practically everyone knows what is unacceptable, and what needs to be eliminated.	几乎人人都知道什么不可接受、什么必须消灭。


But we simply don’t know what should replace things that are eliminated.	但我们就是不清楚消灭了以后用什么来替代。


Of course, the exit from socialism was unprecedented.	当然，脱离社会主义的改革前所未有。


Much of what socialism built needed to be undone.	社会主义的多数成果都需要推翻重建。


But it was done using slogans, not a program of change that ordinary Russians could understand and embrace.	但现在的重建却完全依赖于口号，而不是普通俄国公民所能理解和接受的改革计划。


All we have are endless arguments, not practical alternatives to discuss and decide upon.	到处充斥着无休无止的争论，却没有可供探讨和决策的实际选择。


One reason that Russia’s reform debates are so barren is the country’s lack of coherent political parties.	俄国改革讨论成果寥寥的一个重要原因是缺乏政策连贯的国内政党。


During perestroika and the Yeltsin presidency, the legacy was a widespread hatred and fear of the Communist Party with all its force and power.	重组改革和叶利钦执政给人们留下了对强大共产党的普遍的憎恨和恐惧。


This fear extended to all political parties and all in all blocked the desire to create powerful parties.	这种恐惧渗透到所有的党派内部，完全扼杀了建立强大政党的可能。


But this suspicion of political parties as such meant that there was no organized body across the country committed to carrying out a consistent, well-thought-out reform program.	但对政党持怀疑态度就意味着全国上下都没有组织严密的团体，致力于执行前后连贯、思考成熟的改革方案。


Instead the reforms were decreed from high above, without having any grassroots support – and thus with no lasting durability.	于是改革政令的颁布变得自上而下，得不到基层的任何支持¾因此也就难以持久。


All we had were direct appeals to the street and the masses rather than encouragement of a genuine social consensus.	我们所做的是直接煽动人们上街游行，而不是鼓励他们达成真正的社会共识。


Such a direct method is the wellspring of authoritarianism.	这样直截了当的做法是催生独裁主义的源泉。


We must recognize that and understand that it emerges not only when the public is apathetic or frightened, but also when there is no apparent stable advanced guard, such as powerful political parties, which choose the leaders and control them.	我们必须对目前的弊病有所认识，并且了解造成现状的原因不仅仅包括公众的冷漠和恐惧，还包括缺乏像强有力政党那样明确稳定的先进战士，有能力选择领袖并控制他们。


As a result Russia now confronts a situation in which the election of the president is the only political issue.	结果造成了俄国目前总统选举是唯一政治事件的状况。


In reality, what Russia need are powerful independent social and political organizations that would say: in any presidential term the following things should be done to steer policy, thus making the question of who is president secondary.	实际上，俄国需要的是强大独立的社会和政治组织站出来呼吁：任何总统选举的后续步骤都应该是制定政策，这使谁是总统的问题变得不那么重要。


In this respect, Putin’s recent effort to assert tighter state control over private organizations is particularly worrisome.	在这个方面，普京最近加强国家对私人组织控制的政策尤其值得我们忧虑。


But the final and most vital lesson of perestroika concerns the pace of reforms and society’s expectations.	但重组改革最后、也最重要的教训涉及改革的速度和社会的期望。


Simply put, the government must meet the people halfway. Yet it also cannot reduce reform to a nullity in order to ingratiate itself with the masses.	简单地讲，就是政府必须基本满足人民的期望，但又不能为了讨好大众而停下改革的步伐。


This is a tricky road to pursue, but it is the only one worth taking.	要做到这一点难度很大，但这却是我们唯一能走的道路。


Indeed, perestroika and the decade of reform that followed demonstrated that just following the formal structures of the Western democratic model isn’t enough if Russia is to see reform implemented consistently.	事实上，重组和紧随其后的10年改革表明：如果俄国要一以贯之的推进改革，单靠模仿西方民主模式的成型结构是远远不够的。


For this model, as we have seen in Russia, leads to populist democracy and timid reform.	正如我们所看到的那样，这样的模式在俄国导致了大众型民主和谨小慎微的改革步伐。


The country needs a deeper commitment to reform that will come only when its institutions engage the Russian public in the sort of open debate that we have lacked.	俄国需要积极投身的民主能使国内公众真正参与到以前所缺乏的公开辩论中来。


We must jettison populist democracy and embrace what democracy has always stood for—the engagement of all citizens in running their government.	我们必须最终告别大众型民主，接受民主的核心理念¾那就是让公众参与到对政府的管理中来。


The Meaning of Cyprus	塞浦路斯危机的意义


BRUSSELS – The root of the problem in Cyprus is well known.	发自布鲁塞尔——塞浦路斯危机的根源已是非常清楚。


Its two major banks had attracted huge deposits from abroad, largely from Russia, and presumably mostly from individuals who wished to escape scrutiny at home or elsewhere.	其两大银行吸收了巨额的国外存款，大部分来自俄罗斯——据推测很有可能主要来自那些想逃避国内或其它地方审查的个人。


The proceeds were then invested in Greek government bonds and loans to Greek companies.	这些存款后来被投资到希腊政府债券或贷给希腊的公司。


When Greece imploded, the investments turned sour, and the Cypriot banks that had engaged in this strategy became insolvent.	希腊经济崩溃后，这些投资也就打了水漂，而采用这种策略的塞浦路斯银行则破产了。


Given this situation, the logical choice for the country should have been clear: if the government wanted to survive, foreign depositors must bear part of the losses.	鉴于这种情况，该国的合理选择原本应该很明显了：如果政府想要安全渡过危机，外国储户就必须承担部分损失。


It is thus difficult to understand why the Cypriot government was at first so reluctant to inflict any losses on depositors.	因此很难理解为什么当初塞浦路斯政府那么不愿意给储户造成任何损失。


But the solution that was eventually agreed makes sense: the country’s two largest banks are effectively resolved.	但最终通过的解决方案还是合理的：该国最大的两个银行被有效地解救了。


Their bad assets will be separated and wound down over time.	它们的不良资产将会被逐步剥离并得到处理。


Neither the Cypriot government nor European taxpayers will put any additional funds into these banks.	塞浦路斯政府或欧洲纳税人都不需要对这些银行投入额外的资金。


The losses that remain after the bad assets have been disposed of will thus have to be borne by the banks’ uninsured creditors, which in this case means those with deposits of more than €100,000 ($130,000).	因此在不良资产被处置后仍存在的损失将不得不由银行未保险过的债权人来承担，在这里指的是那些存款超过10万欧元（13万美元）的储户。


Although Cyprus is too small to matter for global financial markets, the crisis there could turn out to be an important precedent guiding how European policymakers deal with future banking problems.	尽管塞浦路斯太小不足以影响全球金融市场，但其危机可以成为欧洲决策者如何处理未来银行业问题的重要指导先例。


In particular, it could affect current plans for a “banking union,” which needs three elements: a single supervisor, a common resolution authority, and a credible system of deposit insurance.	尤其是它能影响目前的“银行业联盟”计划，该计划需要三个要素：一个单一的监督机构、一个共同的决议机构以及一个可靠的存款保险系统。


The Cyprus crisis holds important lessons on all three counts.	此次危机中，而塞浦路斯在这三点上都为我们带来了充分的教训。


First, the crisis has underscored the need for a single supervisor that is not captured by local interests.	首先，这场危机体现出我们需要一个不会被本地利益绑架的单一监督机构。


The European Central Bank would never have allowed Cypriot banks to attract huge deposits by paying above-market interest rates, and then to put all of their eggs in one basket (Greece).	欧洲央行绝不会允许塞浦路斯的银行通过支付高于市场的利率来吸引巨额存款并把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子（希腊）里。


This was a high-risk strategy without a safety net.	这是一个没有安全保障的高风险策略。


Second, while there is still some discussion about how to create a common resolution mechanism for eurozone banks, events have shown that the ECB already de facto fills this role.	其次，对如何为欧元区银行建立的共同解决机制还有些争议，事实表明欧洲央行实际上已经担任起了这个角色。


No bank in difficulties can survive if the ECB does not grant or renew emergency liquidity assistance.	如果欧洲央行不去给予或更新紧急流动性援助，那些有困难的银行都无法存活下去。


This accumulation of power in the hands of a completely independent institution is, of course, not ideal from the standpoint of democratic accountability.	当然，一个完全独立机构手中的这种权力积累从民主问责制的角度来看并不理想。


But this should serve as an additional incentive for the eurozone’s member states to agree to the creation of a genuine common resolution authority with enough funding to resolve even larger banks in an orderly way.	但它应该作为对欧元区成员国同意建立一个真正共同决议机构的额外刺激，这种机构应该拥有足够的资金来有序解决大型银行的问题。


Finally, the revolt of Cyprus’s small savers highlighted the need for a credible system of deposit insurance.	最后，塞浦路斯小储户的反抗强调了对可靠存款保险系统的需求。


The EU directive that stipulates the protection of bank deposits up to €100,000 does not provide a European guarantee; it only requires member states to create a deposit-insurance system at the national level.	规定保护银行存款高达10万欧元的欧盟指令并不提供欧洲保证； 它只要求成员国建立国家层面的存款保险系统。


In reality, however, there has been a widespread misperception that somehow “Europe” protects small depositors.	然而，在现实中已经广泛流传着一个误解，即“欧洲”以某种方式保护着小储户。


Yet a common deposit-insurance system had, at least so far, not even been under discussion, because the issue was not perceived as a live problem.	而共同存款保险系统至少目前为止，甚至还没有被讨论过，因为它并没有被视为一个动态的问题。


Cyprus has shattered this complacency.	塞浦路斯已经粉碎了这种自满。


Leaving deposit insurance exclusively at the national level is no longer an option.	让存款保险系统完全停���在国家水平已经不合时宜。


Cyprus also holds a more general lesson: Given the extreme reaction of financial markets to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, it had become axiomatic among European policymakers that no bank should be allowed to become insolvent.	塞浦路斯也得到了一个更普遍的教训：考虑到2008年金融市场对雷曼兄弟公司倒闭所作的极端反应，欧洲决策者达成了不能允许任何银行破产的共识。


But financial markets reacted calmly to the news that, for the first time, even depositors in a bank in the European Union will lose part of their money (and this was noted with glee in Berlin and elsewhere in northern Europe).	但金融市场第一次对欧盟某个银行的储户将会失去其部分存款这一新闻反应平静（在柏林和北欧一些地方这个消息被高兴地指了出来）。


The key lesson for European policymakers is thus that it is possible to “bail in” a bank’s creditors.	对欧洲决策者来说，关键的教训是对银行债权人进行“保释”是有可能的。


This has not been officially admitted, but Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister, expressed it clearly, saying that, after Cyprus, Europe should become more courageous in bailing in bank creditors.	这还没有得到官方承认，但荷兰财政部长兼欧洲集团主席杰隆·迪塞布洛姆（Jeroen Dijsselbloem）表达得很清楚，他说在塞浦洛斯危机之后，欧洲应该在拯救银行债权人上变得更加勇敢。


This realization – that the European taxpayer does not have to save every troubled bank – might have a very beneficial effect, because Germany’s resistance to a banking union is motivated by the fear that German taxpayers would be forced to underwrite indirectly the losses of banks in the distressed countries of the eurozone periphery.	这种理解——即欧洲纳税人并不需要拯救所有陷入困境的银行——也许会有非常有利的影响，因为德国抵制银行联盟是出于某种恐惧——它害怕德国纳税人会被迫间接承担那些面临困境的欧元区外围国家的银行损失。


This fear may now ease.	现在这种恐惧可以缓解了。


The crisis in Cyprus represents an extreme and special case in many respects.	塞浦路斯的危机在许多方面都代表了一种极端特殊的例子。


But the way that the problem arose, and the solution that was finally adopted, is likely to have very important consequences for the way that Europe will address its banking problems.	但问题出现的方式以及最终采取的解决方法很有可能对欧洲解决其银行问题的方法有很重要的影响。


America’s Flawed Election	有缺陷的美国大选


PRINCETON – No doubt many people around the world, if not most, breathed a sigh of relief over the re-election of US President Barack Obama.	普林斯顿—毫无疑问，全世界很多人（如果不是大多数的话）会因奥巴马连任美国总统而舒一口气。


A BBC World service poll of 21 countries found a strong preference for Obama everywhere except Pakistan.	BBC的21国民调显示，各国强烈地偏向于奥巴马，只有巴基斯坦是例外。


Joy over the election’s outcome, however, should not blind us to its failure to meet a series of ethical benchmarks for democratic choice.	但是，别让令人欣喜的选举结果蒙蔽了我们的双眼，它并没有满足民主选择的一系列伦理基准。


According to the US-based Center for Responsive Politics, spending on the election – for President and Congress, and including spending by outside groups as well as by the candidates and their political parties – is estimated to have exceeded $6 billion.	根据美国响应政治中心（Center for Responsive Politics）的数据，此次选举的支出——包括总统选举和国会选举，包括外部集团支出和候选人及其政党支出——估计将超60亿美元。


That makes the 2012 US election the most expensive ever held.	这使得2012年美国大选成为史上最贵大选。


The bulk of this spending is just the two opposing parties canceling each other out.	这笔支出的大头被用于两大对立党派的相互抹黑。


This benefits advertising agencies and the media, but no one else, and surely not the parties themselves, or the viewers who are bombarded with ads, especially if they happen to live in hotly contested swing states.	这肥了广告商和媒体，对其他人则毫无益处可言，对于两大政党本身以及被广告轰炸的观众（特别是住在摇摆州者）更是如此。


It is difficult to believe that, say, $200 million would not have been enough to inform the electorate adequately of the candidates’ policies.	很难相信（比如）2亿美元还不足以让一个选区充分了解候选人的政策。


In this scenario, spending limits would have saved about $5.8 billion.	假设如此，那么支出上限在58亿美元左右。


And, if such limits were combined with public financing of election campaigns, they would also help the election to meet an important ethical standard by denying the rich a disproportionate influence on outcomes, and hence on the subsequent actions of the president and Congress.	此外，如果这一上限与选举活动的公共募资相结合，那么两者将有助于大选符合重要的伦理标准——它们不会让富人影响结果，进而影响选举后的总统和国会的行为。


No one really expects political advertising to provide citizens with the information they need to assess the candidates’ merits properly.	没人真的指望政治广告能给公民提供他们所需要的用于评估候选人是否胜任的信息。


For the presidential election, however, the practice of holding three televised debates between the two major parties’ candidates should be an opportunity for a thorough airing of those issues.	不过，对总统大选来说，两大党候选人之间的三次电视辩论理应成为彻底亮出底牌的机会。


Unfortunately, the most recent debates failed to achieve that goal.	不幸的是，最近的电视辩论并没有达到这一目标。


Consider, for example, the final debate in October, which was supposed to focus on foreign policy.	就拿10月份的最后辩论来说吧，这次辩论应该以外交政策为焦点。


The US may no longer be the world’s undisputed leader, as it was in the decade following the Soviet Union’s collapse, but it nonetheless has a vital role to play in international affairs.	美国可能已不再像苏联解体最初10年那样是不可动摇的世界领袖，尽管如此，它在国际事务中仍扮演着关键角色。


Obama referred to the US as “the indispensable nation,” and that description still holds true, in part because US military spending exceeds that of the next nine countries combined – five times more than China, the world’s second-largest military spender.	奥巴马将美国称为“不可或缺的国家”，这一论断仍然成立，部分是因为美国军事支出超过其后九国之和—���比世界第二大军事支出国中国高五倍。


There was, however, no serious discussion of the conditions under which it would be right to use that military might.	但是，关于什么条件下使用武力才是正确的问题，并没有发生严肃的讨论。


Both candidates indicated that they did not favor military intervention to prevent the Syrian government from killing more of its citizens; but, neither was prepared to say when they would be prepared to accept the responsibility to protect citizens who come under attack from their own government, or from forces that their government is unwilling or unable to restrain.	两位候选人都表示无意以武力干预叙利亚政府杀戮平民的行为，但也均没有说何时准备接受保护公民不受本国政府或本国政府不愿或不能阻止的势力的袭击的责任。


Both candidates said that they would support Israel and not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, but there was no discussion of solutions to the Israel-Palestine conflict, or of the grounds on which countries that possess nuclear weapons might be justified to use force to prevent others from developing them.	两位候选人均表示支持以色列、不允许伊朗发展核武器，但没有讨论如何解决以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突的办法，也没有讨论有核国家在什么条件下可以正当地使用武力阻止其他国家发展和娶妻的问题。


Indeed, what was not discussed in the candidates’ debate on foreign policy was more significant than what was.	事实上，没有在候选人电视辩论中讨论的外交政策问题比讨论的问题更加重要。


All of the discussion focused on the region that stretches from Libya to Iran.	所有讨论内容都局限在从利比亚到伊朗的地区。


China was mentioned only in terms of its supposed “cheating” on trade and currency matters.	中国只被提到了一次，说它在贸易和货币问题上“作弊”。


Issues like the eurozone’s troubles and relations with Russia received no attention at all.	欧元区危机和对俄关系等问题则根本没有提及。


Needless to say, neither candidate thought it worthwhile to put forward a proposal to assist the more than one billion people living in extreme poverty.	不消说，两位候选人都不认为有必要提出如何帮助生活在极端贫困中的十亿多人的方案。


The gravest omission was climate change.	最重大的省略是气候变化问题。


The closest Obama got to it during a debate was to talk about “energy independence,” which implies not being reliant on oil from the Middle East.	奥巴马在某次辩论中曾经接近这个问题，说到了“能源独立”，这意味着减少对中东的石油依赖。


That, obviously, is something that every patriotic American wants.	显然，这也是爱国的美国人想听到的。


Obama also mentioned that he had raised fuel-economy standards for cars in the US, and had invested in renewable energy sources, like solar and wind power.	奥巴马还提到，他已经推出了美国的汽车节能标准，并对太阳能和风能等可再生能源投入了资金。


But, when Romney talked about increasing coal production, Obama neglected to point out that carbon dioxide from coal-fired electricity generation is already a major contributor to climate change; that we still lack the technology to produce “clean coal”; and that increasing the use of coal will impose huge burdens on people worldwide.	但是，当罗姆尼摊到煤产量的上升时，奥巴马并未指出煤电所产生的二氧化碳已成为气候变化的重要原因； 而我们仍然缺少生产“清洁煤”的技术；


It took the devastation of Hurricane Sandy to get the president to mention climate change.	飓风桑迪所造成的灾难让总统注意到了气候变化。


After that, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that he was endorsing Obama, because his policies were better on climate change.	飓风过后，纽约市长布隆伯格宣布支持奥巴马，因为他的政策在气候变化方面更出色。


In response, Obama acknowledged that climate change is “a threat to our children’s future, and we owe it to them to do something about it.”	作为回应，奥巴马承认气候变化是“对我们的孩子的未来的威胁，我们有义务为他们在这方面做些什么。 ”


Now that he has been re-elected, the question is whether he will pay that debt to our children and to the generations that follow them.	现在，他已经连任，问题变为他是否会为我们的孩子和孩子的孩子买单。


The Lessons of the World Cup	世界杯的启示


This year’s World Cup has proven once again that football is the world’s most popular sport; it has also proven that football is probably the world’s most globalized profession.	今年的世界杯赛不仅再次证明足球是全世界最为风行的体育运动，而且可能也是最为全球化的职业。


It is inconceivable that Brazilian, Cameroonian, or Japanese doctors, computer scientists, blue-collar workers, or bank tellers could move from one country to another as easily as Brazilian, Cameroonian, or Japanese football players do.	巴西、喀麦隆或者日本的医生、计算机科学家、蓝领工人或者银行出纳可以像它们的足球运动员一样在不同国家之间自由流动是不可想象的。


Indeed, London’s Arsenal football club is composed entirely of foreigners, including a French coach.	的确，伦敦的阿森纳足球俱乐部完全由外国球员组成，还包括一名法国教练。


Even the captain roles are no longer reserved for domestic players: Thierry Henry, a Frenchman, is Arsenal’s captain, Andriy Shevchenko, a Ukrainian, was often the captain of AC Milan and will play next year for the English champions Chelsea.	甚至连队长的角色也不再由本国球员占据。 法国球员亨利是阿森纳的队长；


Christiano Zanetti, an Argentine, is captain of Inter Milan.	乌克兰人舍普琴科经常是AC米兰的队长；


Similarly, dozens of South Americans and Africans play in Russian, Turkish, Polish, and various Southeast European leagues.	阿根廷人扎内地则是国际米兰的队长。 同样，几十个南美以及非洲球员在俄国、土耳其、波兰以及不同的东南欧联赛中效力。


Football thus provides a glimpse of how true globalization of labor would work.	足球因此而揭示出真正的劳务全球化如何运作。


In football, as in other occupations, restrictions on labor mobility came entirely from the demand side.	像其他职业一样，对足球领域中的劳务流动限制完全来自于需求方。


No limits were ever imposed on players’ movements, except by Communist countries.	除了共产国家外，球员的流动没有任何限制。


But the demand side was heavily regulated, owing to a rule that clubs could field no more than two foreign players in any single game.	但是，由于规则规定俱乐部不得在单场比赛中有两名以上的外籍球员上场，因此需求方受到重重管制。


The Bosman ruling, named after a Belgian player who successfully challenged the rule’s application to players from other European Union countries, eroded the limit, which collapsed altogether under the onslaught of the richest European clubs’ demand for a free hand in hiring the best players, wherever they might be found.	比利时球员博斯曼成功地挑战了这一规则适用于其他欧盟国家球员，以他的名字命名的裁决侵蚀了这一限制。 欧洲最富有的俱乐部要求自由雇佣最好的球员，而无论他们在哪里被发现，这一限制最终在它们的攻击下瓦解。


So wherever globalization and full commercialization reign supreme, there is an unmistakable concentration of quality and success.	所以，在全球化和完全商业化统治称霸的领域内，质量和成功都会毫无疑问地聚集。


Consider the number of clubs that have qualified for the European Champions’ League top eight slots.	让我们看看那些获得欧洲冠军杯前八名资格的俱乐部数量。


If we look at five-year periods between 1967 and 1986, the number of different teams that qualified for the quarterfinals varied between 28 and 30.	我们看一看1967年到1986年之间的五年期间，进入四分之一决赛的队伍数量在28到30之间。


In the next two five-year periods, however, the number fell to 26, and in the most recent period (2000-2004), there were only 21.	但是，在下一个五年期间，这一数量下降到了26个，而在最近的期间（2000年到2004年），只有21个。


The bottom line is simple: fewer and fewer clubs are making it into the European elite.	结论是简单的，那就是越来越少的俱乐部可以跻身欧洲精英行列。


National leagues are similar.	国内联赛也是一样。


Since the English Premier League was started in 1992, only one championship was not won by Manchester United, Arsenal, or Chelsea.	1992年英超问世以来，只有一届冠军不是在曼联、阿森纳或者切尔西之间产生。


In Italy, all but two Serie A championships since 1991 have been won by either Juventus or AC Milan.	在意大利，1991年以来所有的甲级联赛冠军只有两次不是被尤文图斯或者AC米兰获得。


In Spain, all but three championships since 1985 have been won by either Real Madrid or Barcelona.	在西班牙，1985年以来的所有冠军只有三次不是被皇家马德里或者巴塞罗那队获得。


The reason for this concentration at the top is obvious: the richest clubs are now able to attract the best players in the world.	这一集中于顶端的原因是明显的，那就是最富有的俱乐部能够吸引全世界最佳的球员。


Yet this has arguably been accompanied by improved quality in the game itself, owing to what economists call “increasing returns to scale.”	但是，由于经济学家所称的“渐增的回报规模”，因此集中也无疑伴随着足球运动本身质量的提高。


When the best players play together, the quality of each, and of the team as a whole, increases exponentially.	当最佳球员们同场竞技时，每人以及整个球队的水平也大为增长。


When Ronaldinho and Messi, or Kaka and Shevchenko, play together, their combined “output” (number of goals) is greater than the sum of goals that each would score if he played in a different club with less talented co-players.	当小罗纳尔多、梅西、卡卡和舍普琴科同场竞技时，其所产生的总体综合“产量”（进球数）要多于各个球员在不同的俱乐部与天赋略逊一筹的队友合作情况下所取得的单个进球数。


Free mobility of labor in other areas would probably produce the same effect.	其他领域内的劳工自由流动可能也会产生同样的效应。


If doctors, computer specialists, or engineers (let alone the proverbial Polish plumbers!) were allowed to move freely, the concentration of talent in the richest countries would most likely increase.	如果允许医生、计算机专家或者工程师（更不用提众所周知的波兰管道工！ ）自由流动，人才汇集于最富有国家几乎肯定将增加。


Inequality in the distribution of talent across countries would rise, even if total world output of goods and services, and their average quality, improved, as with football today.	即使商品和服务的世界总产量如同今天的足球一样得以增加而且平均质量得以改善，国家间的人才分配不平等仍然将会上升。


Poorer or smaller countries can hardly dream of winning a European championship, as Steaua (Romania), Red Star (Serbia), or Nottingham Forest (now languishing in the English third division) once did.	穷国或者小国几乎无法像布加勒斯特星队（罗马尼亚）、红星队（塞尔维亚）或者诺丁汉森林队（现在英国丙级球队中苦苦挣扎）那样辉煌一时，梦想赢得欧洲冠军。


But, while we see inequality and exclusion in club-level football, the opposite is true for competitions between national teams.	但是，尽管我们在足球俱乐部中发现不平等以及排斥，国家队之间的竞争却是相反。


The average winning margin among the top eight World Cup national teams has steadily decreased, from more than two goals in the 1950’s, to about 1.5 goals in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s, and only 0.88 goals in the 2002 World Cup.	世界杯国家队中前八强之间的平均获胜差距稳步下降，从二十世纪五十年代的两个球以上到六十年代、七十年代以及八十年代的1. 5个，直到2002年世界杯赛的0.


The same is true of all games played at the final tournament, not only those among the top eight national teams.	世界杯决赛阶段中所有比赛也都是一样，而不仅仅是八强。


The decrease in winning margins is all the more impressive because the World Cup has grown from 16 to 32 national teams – many of them new and rather inexperienced.	由于世界杯从16支队伍增加到32支，它们中的许多都是新近入围、没有经验，因此赢球差距缩小也就更为令人印象深刻了。


Remarkably, they are not trounced by the traditional powerhouses.	令人瞩目的是，它们并没有被传统足坛强国打得落花流水。


On the contrary, the elite eight teams of the last four World Cups have included two “newcomers ” that had never been quarterfinalists, such as Turkey and South Korea in 2002.	相反，上四届世界杯赛的八强精英包括了以前从未晋级四分之一决赛的“新来者”，例如2002年的土耳其和韩国。


There are again two reasons for this.	对此也有两个原因。


First, free movement has meant that good players from small leagues improve much more than they would had they stayed home.	首先，自由流动意味着来自弱小联赛的优秀球员的进步要比留在本国快很多。


A good Danish or Bulgarian player improves much faster if he joins Manchester United or Barcelona.	一名优秀的丹麦或者比利时球员如果加入曼联或者巴塞罗那，那么他的进步就会快很多。


Second, that improvement in quality was “captured” by national teams playing in the World Cup thanks to FIFA’s rule requiring players to play only for their national team.	第二，由于国际足联规定，球员只能为本国国家队效力，因此国家队就“获得”了质量提高。


Eto’o can play for any Spanish, Italian, or English club, but in the national competitions, he can play only for Cameroon.	埃托奥可以为任何西班牙、意大利或者英国俱乐部踢球，但是在国家队比赛中他只能为喀麦隆效力。


In other words, FIFA has introduced an institutional rule that allows small countries (in the football sense) to capture some of the benefits of today’s higher-quality game, thereby partly reversing the “leg drain.”	换句话说，国际足联引入了一种让足球小国获得当今更高水平比赛部分利益的机制性规则，因此也就部分逆转了“足球人才流失”。


The same rule could be applied to other activities.	同样的规则也可以适用到其他活动中。


Free movement of skilled labor could be accompanied by binding international requirements that migrants from poor countries spend, say, one year in five working in their countries of origin.	具有技能的劳工自由流动会带来有约束力的国际性要求，也就是来自穷国的移民要在五年中为其本国工作一年。


They would bring home skills, technology, and connections that are as valuable as the skills that Eto’o, Essien, or Messi bring back to Cameroon, Ghana, or Argentina.	这样他们就会给本国带来像埃托奥、埃森或者梅西带回给喀麦隆、加纳或者阿根廷的足球技巧一样宝贵的技能、技术以及人脉联络。


Job placement would remain a problem, but the principle is sound: the world should learn from the World Cup.	安置工作仍然是一个问题，但是原则是确定的，那就是，世界可以从世界杯中领悟到东西。


The Liars’ Last Reunion	说谎者的最后一次重逢


Next week’s G-8 summit will probably be the last such meeting for Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin.	下周的八国集团（G8）峰会很可能是布什总统和普京总统的告别演出了。


Seven years ago, at their first meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, Bush looked into Putin’s eyes and somehow spotted the soul of a Christian gentleman, not that of a secret policeman.	七年前，当他们在斯洛文尼亚的卢布尔雅那初次会面时，布什从普京的眼中似乎看到了一位基督教绅士，而不是一个秘密警察的灵魂。


Next week, they shouldn’t be surprised if they see a mirror of each other, because both men have exemplified the arrogance of power.	下周，如果他们发现彼此互为镜像也不必惊奇，因为两人都是权力傲慢的例证。


Bush and Putin both came to power in 2000, a year when their countries were scrambling to regain international respect, Russia from the chaos of the Yeltsin years and the US from the failed impeachment of President Clinton.	布什和普京同在2000年掌握大权，那一年正是两国努力重获国际社会尊重的时候：俄罗斯要从叶利钦时代的混乱中走出； 美国要摆脱对克林顿总统弹劾未遂的阴影。


Each country thought it was getting an unthreatening mediocrity.	两国都认为自己正陷入一种不尴不尬的中不溜境地。


But both men, on finding themselves in positions of authority, ruled from their default positions: Bush as an evangelical convinced that God was on America’s side, and Putin as a KGB graduate convinced that all power comes from intimidation and threats.	但这两位，一旦大权在握，就从各自默认的定位开始了统治：布什作为一个福音派信徒深信上帝站在美国一边，而普京作为克格勃的毕业生则坚信权力来自于恐吓与威胁。


And what was the result?	结果如何呢？


Convinced that he is right, and incurious to hear contrary arguments, Bush felt free to undermine the rule of law in America with warrantless domestic surveillance, erosion of due process, and defense of torture, in addition to misleading the public and refusing to heed expert advice or recognize facts on the ground.	坚信自己正确并听不进相反意见的布什肆意破坏美国的法制。 他使用的手段是未获授权的内部监视、违反正当程序、包庇逼供行为以及误导公众和拒绝采纳专家意见或拒不承认铁的事实。


From the tax cuts in 2001 to the war in Iraq, Bush’s self-righteous certitude led him to believe that he could say and do anything to get his way.	从2001年的减税到伊拉克的战争，布什自以为是的信念使他相信为了达到目的可以不择手段。


The damage Bush’s self-confidence and self-delusion has inflicted was magnified by his gross overestimation of America’s power.	布什的自信和自我错觉带来的破坏被他对美国权力的过分高估进一步放大。


Quite simply, he thought that America could go it alone in pursuing his foreign policy because no one could stop him.	他完全认为美国可以在追寻其外交政策方面我行我素，因为没人能够阻止他。


While his father lined up world support, and troops from over a dozen countries, for the first Gulf War, the son thought that allies were more hindrance than help; except for Tony Blair, he did not care to have them.	当其父广揽全世界的支持，并集结了十几国的军队来发动第一次海湾战争时，其子却视盟友为羁绊多于帮助； 除了布莱尔，他不在乎其他的盟友。


Four years later, Bush’s arrogance and mendacity have been exposed for the entire world, including the American public, to see.	四年以后，布什的傲慢和谎言在包括美国公众在内的全世界人民面前暴露出来。


Putin also succumbed to the same arrogance of power.	普京也同样屈从于权力的傲慢。


Buoyed by high oil prices, he now seeks to bestride the world as if the social calamities that bedevil Russia – a collapsing population, a spiraling AIDS and tuberculosis crisis, corruption mushrooming to levels unimagined by Yeltsin – do not matter.	在高油价的支撑下，他正企图凌驾于世界之上，似乎那些使俄罗斯痛苦不堪的社会灾难—人口的崩溃、日益严重的艾滋病和肺结核危机、连叶利钦都无法想象的腐败泛滥—无关痛痒。


At a high-level security meeting in Munich this past February, Putin, who usually draws on the secretive, manipulative, and confrontational Cold War paradigm of what constitutes Russian diplomatic behavior, lashed out at the United States with the sort of language unheard of since Khrushchev said “We will bury you.”	今年二月份在慕尼黑举行的一次高层安全会议上，一贯以一种隐蔽、操控和对峙的冷战式的俄罗斯外交风格示人的普京，居然猛烈抨击美国，其所使用的语言是自赫鲁晓夫说“我们要灭了你们”以来闻所未闻的。


American actions were “unilateral,” “illegitimate,” and had forged a “hotbed of further conflicts.”	他称美国的行为是“单边主义的”、“非法的”，并且已经营造了“未来冲突的温床”。


Putin’s assessment of US unilateralism (if stripped of its overheated rhetoric) may be correct; the trouble is that he lacks credibility to extol moderation in foreign policy.	普京对美国单边主义的评介（如果透过其过激的言辞来看）也许是正确的； 问题是他不具有褒扬外交克制的公信力。


High oil prices have helped him rebuild and centralize the “strong state” that was his goal from the outset of his presidency.	高企的石油价格帮助他重建并集权了一个“强大国家”，这一直是他担任总统以来的目标。


But his recent attempts to use Russia’s energy resources for political coercion in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and elsewhere have exposed Russia as an unreliable partner, unnerving even the Chinese, who do not wish to see a reconstituted Russian empire on their border.	但他最近以能源为筹码企图威吓格鲁吉亚、乌克兰、白俄罗斯和其它国家的做法暴露了俄罗斯是一个不可靠的伙伴的本来面目。 这甚至使中国也感到慌张，它不希望在自己的边界上看到一个重新崛起的俄罗斯帝国。


The Russian public, habituated to authoritarianism, wants Russia’s rulers to be firm.	习惯于专制统治的俄罗斯公众希望其统治者手腕强硬。


Yet the true test of a ruler is not to pander to his people’s expectations, but to peer into the future and match the country’s aspirations with its needs and capacities.	然而对一个统治者的真正考验并不是盲从于人民的期望，而是放眼未来，并将国家的雄心与其需求和实力契合起来。


In this, Putin’s arrogance is failing Russia miserably.	在这点上，普京的傲慢真是愧对俄罗斯。


His monomaniacal drive to centralize power is driving out the very expertise that the country needs to flourish.	他刚愎自用的中央集权行为正将俄罗斯繁荣所需要的专才逐出该国。


Shell and BP are being expelled from the oil industry at the very moment that Russian oil production is declining dramatically.	壳牌石油公司和BP石油公司在俄罗斯石油大幅减产之际被驱逐出石油工业。


His embittered attempts to counter American power are equally short-sighted: helping Iran develop its nuclear program and selling high-tech weapons to China are hardly in Russia’s long-term strategic interest.	他辛苦对抗美国权力的企图同样是短视的：帮助伊朗发展核项目并向中国出售高科技武器决不符合俄罗斯的长期战略利益。


As usual, history is set on fast-forward in America.	历史在美国总是以快进的方式显现。


Everyone can now see the gross and historic failures of the Bush presidency.	所有人现在都见证了布什作为总统的历史性惨败。


Indeed, the American people have preempted the historians, rebuking Bush by electing a Democratic Congress in November 2006.	美国民众先于历史学家们采取了行动，通过在2006年选出民主党主导的国会表达了对布什的谴责。


Meanwhile, Russia’s troubles remain hidden behind the strong arm tactics and oil bloated coffers of Putin’s autocratic bureaucracy.	与此同时，俄罗斯的麻烦仍���隐藏在普京专制官僚体系的强权策略和被石油充盈起来的金库之后。


But the fact that Russia’s social and economic diseases are going unaddressed has consigned the country to the long-term decline that his presidency was supposed to reverse.	但俄罗斯的社会和经济痼疾得不到医治的现实使该国陷入了长期的衰退。 而这种趋势本是普京在其总统任期内应该扭转的。


In the twentieth century, the Cold War parity between Russia and America was apparent.	在20世纪，俄罗斯与美国之间的冷战均衡是明显的。


For Russians, America was an evil empire, the world of capitalist exploitation and a nuclear superpower, but also a cradle of economic prosperity and individual freedom.	对俄罗斯来说，美国是一个邪恶帝国，是一个资本主义剥削的世界和超级核大国，但也是经济繁荣和个人自由的摇篮。


For America, Russia, too, was an evil empire, the world of communist expansionism and a nuclear superpower, but also a cradle of science, spirit, and soul.	对美国而言，俄罗斯同样是一个邪恶帝国，是一个共产扩张主义的世界和一个超级核大国，但同时也是科学、精神和灵魂的摇篮。


A similar parity characterized the Bush-Putin era.	布什—普京时代也有类似的均衡特点。


Unlike America, however, Russia’s people have not yet understood the price of arrogant power run amuck.	然而，与美国不同，俄罗斯的民众还没有认识到他们需要为傲慢权力的疯狂付出的代价。


The Libertarian and the Lobbyists	自由主义和游说


WASHINGTON, DC – In the three years since the global financial crisis erupted, two dominant views of what went wrong have emerged.	华盛顿—在全球金融危机爆发以来的三年中，关于到底是什么出了问题，人们提出了两种观点。


It is crucial that we understand each, because their implications for policymakers – and thus for the future health and stability of the global economy – could not be greater.	理解这两种观点是很重要的，因为它们对政客——从而对全球经济未来的健康和稳定——有着无与伦比的影响力。


The first view is that governments simply lost control of the situation, either through incompetence or because politicians were pursuing their own agendas.	第一种观点是，政府完全失去了对事态的控制，政府没能胜任，政客则在追求自身利益。


This is the view heard most frequently from the political right – for example, from people who think that the main problem in the run-up to the financial meltdown of 2008 was government housing policies.	持这一观点的大多是政治右派——比如那些认为2008年金融大崩坏的主要问题出在政府住房政策的人。


In the United States, among the candidates still competing for the Republican Party’s nomination to challenge Barack Obama in November’s presidential election, Ron Paul stands out for arguing consistently that government is the problem, not the answer, with regard to banking.	在美国共和党内争夺11月与奥巴马竞选总统人选的候选人中，罗恩·保罗（Ron Paul）一直宣称，对于银行业出现的状况，政府本身就是问题，而不是问题的答案。


If the government were removed more fully from the financial sector (including abolishing the Federal Reserve), he argues, the economy would function better.	他指出，如果政府能更彻底地从金融部门离开（包括撤销美联储），那么美国经济将运转得更好。


The second view is that the financial sector lobbied long and hard for deregulation in recent decades, and spent a great deal of time and money persuading politicians that it constituted the safe and modern approach to banking.	第二种观点是，近几十年来，金融部门一直在努力游说去监管化，花了大量的时间和金钱说服政客这才是安全而现代化的银行业方式。


According to this view, government policies did not fail; on the contrary, they operated exactly as intended – and as bought and paid for.	根据这一观点，政府政策并没有失灵，相反，起到了预期的效果——游说团体花钱收买所要达到的效果。


If this view is correct, the kind of policy prescription recommended by Ron Paul is less appealing.	如果这一观点正确，那么罗恩·保罗提出的政策药方就没什么吸引力了。


Unless you think that a modern financial sector really can operate with absolutely no regulation of any kind (including, presumably, the rules for banks that come with deposit insurance), the real problem is not government officials’ policy preferences, but what financial-sector lobbyists are able to persuade officials to do.	除非你认为现代金融部门真的可以在完全没有任何形式监管（包括银行不必对存款提供保险）的情况下运转，否则，真正的问题就不在于官员的政策偏好，而在于金融部门游说集团有能力说服官员出台这样的政策。


Fresh evidence supporting the second view is now available in the form of a recent study by Deniz Igan and Prachi Mishra of the International Monetary Fund.	IMF的伊甘（Deniz Igan）和米什拉（Prachi Mishra）的最新研究中提出了新的证据支持第二种观点。


In “Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street,” the authors look at the data – lots of it – on lobbying by financial-sector companies in the US.	在这篇题为《三个人的公司：华尔街、国会山和K街》（Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street）的报告中，两位作者研究了大量关于美国金融部门公司游说的数据。


Legislators, of course, have different preferences about what kinds of laws to support, which can make it hard to study mechanisms of political influence precisely.	当然，立法者关于采用何种法律给予支持的偏好是不同的，这使得精确研究政治影响机制变得十分困难。


But Igan and Mishra approach the problem in a clever way – they look for instances when elected officials switched their position on legislative proposals that surfaced more than once. And they devote a lot of effort to figuring out what caused this switch.	但伊甘和米什拉用一个十分巧妙的办法处理了这个问题——他们寻找党员官员对立法建议的立场改变超过一次的例子，并花了大量精力寻找立场改变背后的原因。


In addition to analyzing information about lobbying expenditures, the authors map out the network connections of lobbyists (known collectively as “K Street,” because so many have their Washington offices there) and legislators.	除了分析关于游说支出的信息外，两位作者还挖掘出了游说集团（被称为“K街”，因为大量游说集团的华盛顿办事处都设在那里）和立法者的关系网。


For example, lobbyists were often previously employed by legislators on their staffs.	比如，游说者通常是立法机关的前工作人员。


The results are simply staggering – although surely not a surprise to professional lobbyists.	研究结果让人难以相信——不过职业游说者大概不会感到惊奇。


A big increase in lobbying expenditures helps to persuade legislators to switch their votes.	游说支出的大量增加有助于说服立法者改变立场。


And “whether any of the lobbyists working on a bill also worked for a legislator in the past sways the stance on that bill in favor of deregulation.”	“某法案的游说者是否是从前的立法者会影响对该法案的立场，使之偏向于去监管化。 ”


It is deregulation, of course, that financial firms want – fewer rules and less oversight of any kind.	当然，去监管化正是金融公司之所欲——不管什么类型的规则和监督，越少越好。


And it really is all about whom you know, and how you know them.	这完完全全是一件你认识多少人、和他们交情如何的事情。


In particular, your value as a lobbyist seems to depend very highly on whom you worked with in the past.	特别是，你作为游说者的价值与你过去的工作背景有着非常紧密的联系。


Igan and Mishra find “spending an extra dollar is almost twice as effective in switching a legislator’s position if the lobbyist is connected to the legislator compared to the case where the lobbyist is unconnected.”	伊甘和米什拉发现“在立法机关有关系的游说者和没有关系的游说者相比，前者花钱让立法者改变立场的效果比后者好一倍。 ”


The revolving door between Congress and lobbying firms appears to have been central to how the financial sector became deregulated, which effectively allowed excessive risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis.	国会和游说集团之间的旋转门似乎是金融部门逐渐去监管化的关键，而去监管化又导致了过度的风险承担，引发了危机。


In another paper, Igan and Mishra, working with Thierry Tressel, found that firms taking more risks before 2008 were also engaged in more lobbying.	在另一篇论文中，伊甘、米什拉和特雷塞尔（Thierry Tressel）一起发现，在2008年之前承担风险越多的公司，在游说中用力也最多。


Essentially, financial firms have been buying the right to take on more risk.	从本质上说，金融公司是在用钱买承担更多风险的权利。


When things go well, executives in these firms get the upside – mostly in terms of immediate compensation, because few executives are compensated on the basis of risk-adjusted returns.	当事情朝好的方面发展时，这些公司的高官们就能平步青云——大部分体现在立刻获得的丰厚报酬中，因为很少��高管是根据经风险调整的回报获得报仇的。


That means that when the risks materialize and the firms suffer losses, the costs fall on taxpayers.	这意味着当风险成为现实，公司遭遇损失时，代价全落在了纳税人身上。


Ron Paul is right to point to imbalances of power and massive distortions within the financial sector.	罗恩·保罗指出金融部门中间存在严重的权力失衡和扭曲，这是正确的。


He is also correct that many government policies favor relatively few big firms – and favor them in a way that encourages excessive and dangerous risk-taking.	他还指出，大量政府政策的受益者是极少数大公司——使它们能够过度承担高风险——这也是正确的。


But Paul and others are wrong to argue that the government is the ultimate cause of all financial evil.	但保罗等人就此认为政府是所有金融乱象的终极根源，这就不正确了。


Executives in financial firms want to take big risks.	金融公司高管想要承担大风险。


They like arrangements under which they win even when they lose.	他们想要的安排是，即使他们失败了，仍然能得利。


Big financial firms can more readily buy the necessary political protection (in the form of deregulation), enabling them to become even bigger and more dangerous.	大型金融公司早就买通了必要的政治保护（打着去监管化的旗号），这使得它们不断壮大，也不断变得更危险。


This incentive structure has only become more extreme since the financial crisis of 2008.	这一激励结构在2008年金融危机爆发后变得更加极端了。


Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Debt?	谁在害怕巨额不良债务？


CAMBRIDGE – It has been a while since a debate among academic economists attracted so much interest from the mainstream press as has the row between Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, on one side, and Paul Krugman, on the other.	美国剑桥—一段时间以来，经济学家们被主流媒体上的一大争论吸引了大量注意力。 争论的一方是卡门·莱因哈特和肯尼斯·罗格夫，另一方是保罗·克鲁格曼。


In fact, it has even become fodder for television comedy shows.	是事实上，这次争论已经成为电视滑稽秀的素材。


At issue is an influential 2010 paper by Rogoff and Reinhart that purports to show that high levels of public debt are associated with lower long-term economic growth.	问题来自罗格夫和莱因哈特2010年的一篇著名论文。 这篇论文证明了公债水平高企与经济增长低落有关。


A new paper by Thomas Herndon, a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and two of his professors, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin, questioned this finding, and Krugman made their work famous.	麻州大学安姆赫斯特分校一名叫做托马斯·赫恩顿的研究生和他的两位教授迈克尔·阿什和罗伯特·波林发表了一篇论文质疑罗格夫和莱因哈特，而克鲁格曼让后一篇论文名声大噪。


Herndon, Ash, and Pollin argue that the results obtained by Reinhart and Rogoff are based on coding errors and questionable methodological choices.	赫恩顿、阿什和波林指出，莱因哈特和罗格夫的结果来自代码错误和有问题的方法选择。


But, after all their quibbles, their paper weakens but does not refute the Reinhart/Rogoff paper’s main result.	但是，尽管三人文字犀利，但他们的论文只是削弱而不能推翻莱/罗论文的主要结果。


So why all the fuss?	那么，为什么这会引起轩然大波？


The debate is considered important because it is supposed to have implications for the choice between cutting the deficit and stimulating the economy now.	这场争论之所以被认为很重要，是因为它事关现在削减预算还是刺激经济的选择。


But this is just not so.	但还不仅限于此。


Instead, the paper needs to be understood in the context of the debate between Keynesians and (as Krugman calls them) “Austerians” – those who propose fiscal austerity to stem spiraling government debt.	这篇论文需要放到凯恩斯主义和（克鲁格曼语，他们建议用财政紧缩防止政府债务螺旋）“紧缩派”争论的大环境下考察。


The Keynesian prescription is simple: If the economy is weak, fiscal policy should be used to stimulate it; if it is overheating, spending cuts or tax hikes should be used to cool it down.	凯恩斯主义药方很简单：如果经济疲软，就应该用财政政策刺激它； 如果经济过热，就应该用削减开支或增加税收给它降温。


Public-debt levels will rise and fall, but policymakers should not pay too much attention.	公共债务水平会出现涨落，但决策者不应该过多关注于此。


After all, look at the United States and the United Kingdom: despite high deficits and rising debt, inflation remains subdued and long-term interest rates are at historic lows.	毕竟，以美国和英国为例，高赤字和增长得债务并未使通胀抬头，长期利率也徘徊在历史低点。


Why not use this opportunity to stimulate the economy and invest in its future?	为什么不利用这一机会刺激经济、投资于它的未来呢？


Interestingly, Reinhart and Rogoff broadly agree with this recommendation (at least for the US), and they even support heterodox policies such as writing down mortgages and targeting a higher inflation rate.	有趣的是，莱因哈特和罗格夫大致上赞同这一建议（至少对美国是如此），他们甚至支持非正规政策，比如减记按揭和提高通胀目标。


But their paper is really about a different subject.	但他们的论文确实是关于不同主题的。


It is about the long-term effects of high levels of public debt, which they argue are deleterious to growth.	他们的主题是高水平公债的长期影响，他们认为有害于增长。


That conclusion implies that Krugman is wrong to claim that one can be blasé about the debt level.	这一结论意味着克鲁格曼宣称不必关注债务水平是错的。


Krugman would argue that, if the economy remains weak, interest rates will remain low, despite high and rising public debt.	克鲁格曼会同意，如果经济持续萎靡，利率应该维持低水平，尽管公债水平很高且处于升势。


Fear of a speculative attack by so-called “bond vigilantes” is unwarranted, he would claim, as the US and the UK show.	他会说，根据美国和英国的经验，担心所谓的“债券义军”的投机袭击是无稽之谈。


The Reinhart/Rogoff paper provides worldwide evidence in favor of the view that high public debt can become a problem, and that countries should beware of putting themselves in a vulnerable position.	莱/罗论文提供了世界范围内的数据支持高公债水平可能成为问题、国家应该警惕别让自己处于弱势的观点。


But the ensuing debate sheds no light on the question of whether policymakers should disregard debt levels when their economies are depressed, as Krugman recommends.	但后续争论并没有就决策者是否应该在经济萧条时无视债务水平（如克鲁格曼所建议的那样）给出洞见。


There really is a big bad debt wolf, and the world is full of examples in which it has emerged from its lair to create havoc.	债务确实是一大隐患，世界上因此发生大灾难的例子数不胜数。


Consider Spain.	就拿西班牙来说吧。


When the 2008 crisis erupted, the G-20 convened that November to coordinate a Keynesian response.	2008年危机爆发时，当年11月，G20召开会议以协调凯恩斯应对方案。


All member countries were supposed to fight the coming recession by stimulating their economies through simultaneous fiscal expansion.	所有成员国都提出通过立刻采取财政扩张刺激经济、克服衰退。


Pedro Solbes, Spain’s finance minister at the time, quickly ordered an acceleration of public investment and spending.	时任西班牙财政部长佩德罗·索尔韦斯马上下令增加公共投资和支出。


By the spring of 2009, however, Solbes was forced to reverse course.	但是，2009年春，索尔韦斯被迫调转枪头。


With tax revenue collapsing and expenditure ballooning, the government found itself running such large deficits that the markets were spooked – government-bond prices collapsed, interest rates soared, and the country found itself unable to finance its deficit.	税收收入大跌和支出膨胀让政府陷入了巨大的赤字中，市场因此恐慌——政府债券价格暴跌，利率暴涨，西班牙无法为其赤字融资。


Where were the rock-bottom interest rates that are supposed to characterize periods of weak growth and high unemployment?	标志低增长、高失业时期的最低利率水平在何处？


Financial history is full of similar examples: Mexico in 1994, Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002, the Dominican Republic in 2003, and even the UK in 1976.	金融史充满了类似的例子：1984年的墨西哥、1998年的俄罗斯、1999年的厄瓜多尔、2001年的阿根廷、2002年的乌拉圭、2003年的多米尼加、甚至1976年的英国都输此列。


All were battling recession and high unemployment, only to find themselves unable to finance their deficits.	所有这些国家都与衰退和高失业作斗争，结果发现自己无法为赤字融资。


In fact, when a country is in this predicament, fiscal contraction may end up being expansionary to the extent that it reestablishes financial confidence and lowers sky-high interest rates.	事实上，当一国陷入这一窘境时，财政收缩最终会演变成扩张，因为这样能重塑信心、降低奇高的利率。


As much as Krugman has made of the Reinhart/Rogoff paper, the debate between “Austerians” and Keynesians has limited relevance outside of the US.	正如克鲁格曼成就了莱/罗的论文，“紧缩派”和凯恩斯主义者的争论在美��之外并无多少重要性。


Krugman does not mention issues that he knows are central to fiscal choices.	克鲁格曼并未提及他所认为的财政选择的核心问题。


The level of debt does matter, and its currency composition matters even more.	债务水平并不重要，其货币性质影响要大得多。


The US is in the enviable position of issuing debt in its own currency.	美国拥有以本国货币发行债务的令人艳羡的特权。


The Federal Reserve can create as many dollars as it sees fit in order to buy government debt.	美联储可以随心所欲地创造美元，只要它认为购买政府债务是合适的。


Moreover, as the world’s reserve currency, the dollar plays a very particular role in the global economy.	此外，作为世界储备货币，美元在全球经济中扮演着非常特殊的角色。


Japan, too, can finance its deficits, despite astronomical public debt, because it borrows in yen – and overwhelmingly from Japanese institutional investors.	日本也能为其赤字融资，尽管其公债水平已达天文数字。 这是因为它借钱用日元，且债权人绝大部分来自日本机构投资者。


By contrast, Spain’s debt is in euros, a currency that it cannot print, and is held mostly by foreigners.	相反，西班牙的债务是欧元债务，它无法印刷欧元，而且其债权人大多是外国人。


And many emerging-market countries are in a similar position.	许多新兴市场国家与西班牙差不多。


In a recent paper with Ugo Panizza of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies in Geneva, we show that in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, emerging-market countries that could run the kind of counter-cyclical Keynesian policies espoused by Krugman had low levels of foreign-currency debt.	在与日内瓦发展研究研究生院的乌戈·帕尼扎（Ugo Panizza）合作的一篇论文中，我们指出，2008年危机后，能够实施克鲁格曼所信奉的反周期凯恩斯主义政策的新兴市场国家外币债务水平较低。


It is only because they were “Austerians” before the crisis that they could afford to be Keynesians afterwards.	他们之所以能在事后成为凯恩斯主义者，唯一原因是他们在危机前是“紧缩派”。


Whatever weaknesses one finds in the Reinhart/Rogoff paper, it does not follow that countries in recession should always disregard deficits and debt levels and focus on stimulus.	不管你在莱/罗论文中发现了什么漏洞，都不能说衰退中的国家一定应该无视赤字和债务水平而专注于刺激。


That might be the right recommendation for the US today, but as a universal rule of thumb, it is just plain wrong.	这对当今美国来说或许是正确的建议，但从普遍经验规则看，这大错特错。


China’s New Inflation Constraint	中国新通胀束缚


BEIJING – China’s economic-growth rate slowed in the second quarter of this year to 7.5% year on year, down from 7.7% in the January-March period, in line with Chinese economists’ forecasts in recent months.	北京——今年二季度中国的经济增速从一至三月的7. 7%放缓至年同比7.


At the start of 2013, however, economists – both at home and abroad – were much more upbeat about the prospects for Chinese growth.	5%，这与最近几个月中国经济学家的预测是一致的。 但2013年初，国内外经济学家还对中国的经济增长前景更加乐观。


So, what changed?	那么，究竟是什么因素发生了变化？


China’s growth has shown a cyclical pattern over the past two decades.	近二十年来，中国的经济增长模式一直呈现周期性特征。


Immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, China unveiled a ¥4 trillion ($650 billion) stimulus package.	就在2008年9月雷曼兄弟倒闭后，中国出台了四万亿人民币（合6500亿美元）的经济刺激计划。


The economy rebounded quickly, with the annualized growth rate soaring to 12.1% in the first quarter of 2010.	经济增速迅速反弹，年化增长率于2010年第一季度飙升至12. 1%。


To rein in a housing bubble and preempt a rise in inflation, the People’s Bank of China tightened monetary policy in January 2010.	为了遏制房地产泡沫和预防通胀上升，中国人民银行于2010年1月收紧了货币政策。


Then, to arrest the resulting loss of economic momentum, the PBOC loosened monetary policy in November 2011.	而后为了对抗由此造成的经济增长动力丧失，中国人民银行于2011年11月放宽货币政策。


Most people believed that rapid growth would quickly be restored once again. But the rebound did not come until the fourth quarter of 2012.	多数人认为快速增长的局面将很快重现，但直到2012年第四季度才出现反弹。


Worse, instead of establishing renewed economic momentum, the growth rate fell in the second quarter of 2013 and all major forecasters are now revising their projections of full-year growth downward.	更糟的是，这次经济增速不仅没有重拾升势，反而在2013年第二季度再次下降，导致所有预测机构争相调低全年的预测增长数值。


Of course, if the Chinese government wished, China’s growth rate in 2013 could still surpass 8%.	当然，如果中国政府愿意，中国在2013年仍可保持超过8%的经济增长率。


But the country’s new leaders do not wish to pursue growth at the expense of structural adjustment, which has been delayed for too long.	但中国新任领导人不愿以牺牲结构调整为代价片面追求经济增长率。


It seems that the government has established a floor for growth; as long as it is not hit, there will be no more fiscal or monetary stimulus.	政府似乎设定了经济增长下限，只要下限未曾触及，就不会推出财政或货币刺激政策。


But the new leadership’s reluctance to intervene in order to spur growth is just part of the story of China’s current slowdown.	但新领导层不愿以干预手段刺激经济增长只是中国目前经济放缓的部分因素。


Something more fundamental has happened, weakening the government’s ability to stimulate the economy.	中国已经出现某些根本性的变化，削弱了政府对经济的刺激能力。


In particular, even as the annualized growth rate in the first quarter of 2013 fell far below the average growth rate over the past 30 years, the annual increase in the consumer price index rose to a ten-month high of 3.2% in February, while house prices have been rising unabatedly.	特别是即使2013年第一季度的年化增长率远低于近30年的平均增长率，居民消费价格指数却在2月上升至10个月以来的高点3. 2% ，而房价上涨也一直没有放缓的趋势。


Slower growth and higher inflation in the expansionary phase of the economic cycle (compared with previous cycles) reflect an essential macroeconomic change.	经济周期扩张阶段的经济增长放缓和高通胀（与以往经济周期相比）反映出重要的宏观经济变化。


For many years, China’s Phillips curve – the historical inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment – was rather flat, which meant that when the government used expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to spur growth, it did not have to worry too much about price instability.	多年来中国反应通胀和失业历史反比关系的菲利普斯曲线都相当平缓，也就是说当政府采用扩张性货币和财政政策刺激经济时，不必过于担心价格的波动。


But there is now growing evidence that the Phillips curve has started to rotate since 2010.	但现在越来越多的证据表明菲利普斯曲线从2010年起已经开始改变。


Today, for a given rate of GDP growth, the corresponding inflation rate is substantially higher than it was over the past two decades.	今天，为了实现设定的GDP增速，相应的通胀率要大幅高于过去20年。


In other words, inflation – especially house-price inflation – has become an important constraint on growth.	换句话说，通胀——特别是房价通胀——已经成为经济增长的重要制约因素。


The leftward rotation of China’s Phillips curve stems from many important structural changes.	许多重要的结构性变化导致中国的菲利普斯曲线左移。


First, as a result of demographic and social changes, the marginal wage cost of production and minimum-wage levels have increased significantly.	首先，人口和社会变化导致生产边际工资成本和最低工资水平显著增加。


Second, with environmental concerns becoming more widespread, enterprises – especially those with newly installed production facilities – have been spending lavishly.	其次，随着对环境问题的担忧越来越普遍，企业，特别是新建成的生产企业与以往相比成本急剧上升。


Third, the relentless exploitation of resources has caused the prices of energy and raw materials to increase rapidly.	第三，毫无节制的资源开采已经使能源和原材料价格迅速上升。


Fourth, feverish real-estate development throughout China continues to propel land prices to new heights.	第四，中国各地的房地产开发热推动土地价格迭创新高。


Fifth, as a result of decades of catch-up growth, China is approaching the technological frontier in many areas and the latecomer’s advantage is diminishing, which means that the marginal productivity of its capital stock is diminishing, too.	第五，经过几十年的追赶式增长，中国的许多领域正在向技术前沿靠拢，后发优势也正逐渐丧失，这意味着资本存量的边际生产率也在递减。


In short, the changes in China’s microeconomic foundations, together with the weaknesses in its economic structure, imply that the economy must pay a higher cost, in the form of higher inflation, for a given increase in GDP growth.	总之，中国微观经济基础的变化及其经济结构的弱点意味着经济增长必须以高通胀的形式付出更高的代价，才能换取一定幅度的GDP增长。


The question now is whether China’s leaders will tolerate higher inflation in order to maintain an annual growth rate of more than 8%.	现在的问题是，中国领导人是否会为保持8%以上的年经济增长而容忍通胀高企。


The answer seems to be no.	答案似乎是否定的。


As a result, China’s growth has reached a new plateau.	结果导致中国经济进入了新的平台期。


The era of growth rates above 8% is over, at least for the foreseeable future.	至少在可以预见的未来，增长率超8%的时代已经过去。


After three decades of breakneck growth, the Chinese economic juggernaut needs to slow down somewhat so that the machine can be fixed; only then can it return to the fast lane and accelerate anew.	经过三十年的惊人增长，中国的经济增长需要在一定程度上放缓以便修复存在的问题，只有这样中国经济才能重回快车道，重新获得加速的动力。


But no one should bet on a Chinese crash anytime soon.	但中国经济不会很快崩溃。


China has faced much worse on numerous occasions; each time, it muddled through.	中国不止一次面临过更遭的状况，但每次都挺了过来。


There is still no compelling reason why this time should be different.	目前还没有令人信服的理由表明这次会有什么不同。


The Limits of Bonapartism	波拿巴主义的局限


PARIS – After four decades, France has returned to NATO’s unified military command.	巴黎——四十年后，法国重返北大西洋公约组织军事一体化架构。


At a stroke, President Nicolas Sarkozy overturned one of the pillars of French policy – and of the legacy of Charles de Gaulle, the founder of Sarkozy’s own political party.	总统尼古拉·萨科奇大笔一挥就推翻了法国政策的一大支柱——同时也是夏尔·德·戴高乐的一大政治遗产，而戴高乐正是萨科奇所在政治派别的创始者。


The decision is consistent with the way Sarkozy has governed since his election in 2007.	这个决定吻合萨科奇自2007年大选以来的统治方式。


Whether he is seeking to reform France’s judicial system, redrawing its administrative map, proposing a new alliance of Mediterranean countries, or seeming to end France’s ambiguous foreign policy of being both aligned and not aligned with the United States, Sarkozy is nothing if not ambitious.	无论是寻求改革法国的司法系统，重新描画它的行政地图，提议建立新的地中海国家联盟，还是似乎要终止法国模棱两可的对外政策——这一政策和美国既结盟又不结盟，萨科奇的确是野心勃勃。


The problem is that far too many of Sarkozy’s decisions have proved purely symbolic, like the ill-fated Mediterranean Union; badly conceived, such as judicial reform, which is opposed by virtually the entire legal profession; or nakedly self-serving, like the administrative reform, which somehow managed to abolish only those departments and regional administrations controlled by the opposition Socialists.	或者构思拙劣，譬如说司法改革——它几乎遭到了整个司法界的反对； 或者赤裸裸的自私，就象行政改革，它不过是力图取消那些由反对派社会党控制的部门和地区行政机构而已。


Many in Sarkozy’s governing UMP have become increasingly public in expressing their unhappiness with his decision-making method.	在萨科奇统领的“人民运动联盟”（UMP）里，许多人针对萨氏的决策方式越来越公开地表示不满。


In effect, rather than according serious room for decision-making to his prime minister, François Fillon, or to Fillon’s cabinet, Sarkozy has arrogated almost every lever of power to himself and his advisers within the Élysée Palace.	实际上，萨科奇不是把足够的决策空间留给他的总理弗朗索瓦·菲永，或是菲永的内阁，而是将差不多每一层权力都抓在自己和他在爱丽舍宫里的那帮顾问手里。


Indeed, few informed observers doubt that Sarkozy’s chief foreign policy adviser, Jean-David Levitte, has far more influence than France’s foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner.	的确，很少有消息灵通的观察家会怀疑萨科奇的首席外交政策顾问让·大卫·列维特比起法国的外交部长贝尔纳·库什内更具影响力。


Likewise, on matters of domestic policy, the interior minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, has nothing close to the agenda-setting power of Claude Guéant, Sarkozy’s longtime aide and director-general of the President’s office.	同样，在对内政策方面，内政部长米谢勒·阿利奥－马里的议程设定权也无法和萨科奇的长期助手、总统办公室主任克劳德·古林相提并论。


For all the authoritarian habits of de Gaulle or François Mitterand, Sarkozy’s personalization of the presidency is unprecedented in the history of the Fifth Republic.	就所有戴高乐式或是密特朗式集权主义的惯常行为而言，萨科奇把总统权力个人化是在第五共和国的历史上开了先例。


Sarkozy makes little secret of his disdain for members of his own party, luring Socialists like Kouchner and Rama Yade, the junior minister for foreign affairs, into his cabinet, and naming retired Socialist politicians like former Prime Minister Michel Rocard to head national commissions and represent France in international treaty negotiations.	萨科奇很少掩饰自己对于党内同志的蔑视，他引诱社会党人库什内和拉玛·雅德（外交事务次长）（ 请注意 ：我查GOOGLE，拉玛·雅德现在的头衔是： France’s secretary of state for human rights ，法国人权事务秘书，新闻稿是 3 月 19 号的，不知是不是原作者出了问题 ）进入内阁，提名退休的社会党政治家——例如前总理米歇尔·罗卡德——来挑头承担国家任务，在国际条约谈判中代表法国。


Sarkozy can afford to thumb his nose at his party, given the total collapse of the opposition Socialists, who will almost certainly lose the 2012 election.	由于反对派社会党出现全方位崩溃，很可能必然会输掉2012年的大选，萨科奇可以毫无顾忌地蔑视自己的党派。


If Sarkozy governed effectively, such political and institutional departures might seem like a breath of fresh air in a society whose institutions seem increasingly ill-suited to the challenges of a multi-ethnic and post-industrial society (even though dirigiste France has conserved its industrial base better than many other rich countries).	如果萨科奇治理有效，这些政治和机制上的背离行为也许会象往一个社会注入新鲜空气：其中的制度越来越无力应对一个多种族后工业社会所面临的挑战 （尽管法国的统制政策在保留工业基础方面比其他大多数富裕国家都做得好）。


This was how many who supported Sarkozy’s presidential bid viewed him.	这就是许多支持萨科奇竞选总统的人对他的期待。


Despite policy differences, Sarkozy would be for France what Margaret Thatcher was for Britain: someone who would lead the country out of its impasse, conserving the best aspects of dirigisme but finally giving entrepreneurs room to grow, cracking down on crime, and reforming education.	尽管存在着政策上的差异，但萨科奇之于法国，就如同玛格丽特·撒切尔之于英国：他/她将会领导国家走出困境，保留统制政策中的最佳方面，但最后也会给企业家们提供成长空间，严厉打击犯罪，实施教育改革。


But Sarkozy has not governed effectively, as his party’s disenchantment with him and polling data make abundantly clear.	但是萨科奇的执政效果不如人意，这可以从他的政党对他不抱幻想以及民意调查中很清楚地显现出来。


The manic character of his presidency – initiative spilling into initiative, each being the transformative solution to the problem at hand, all opposition denounced as lies, bad faith, and cowardice – has worn thin.	萨科奇上任后所体现出的疯狂特点已经开始弱化了：这个特点是一个动议分裂成另一个动议，每个都给手头上的问题提出了改造性的解决方案，而任何反对意见都被指责是谎言、不守诚信和怯懦。


On a number of issues, notably wages, liberalization of employment rules, and reform of the judiciary and of secondary education, programs announced with tremendous fanfare have had to be delayed or withdrawn.	在许多事务上，尤其是工资，雇用条例的自由化，司法系统和中等教育的改革，那些大肆宣传的项目已经被迫延缓或撤销了。


Almost invariably, Sarkozy has blamed the minister in question, and then moved on to the next subject to strike his interest.	萨科奇几乎总是责备倒霉的部长，然后又去关注他感兴趣的下一个问题。


In the meantime, his obsession with dominating the daily news cycle, no matter how flimsy the pretext, continues unabated.	与此同时，他继续热衷于占据日常新闻报道，丝毫不减狂热——无论托辞是多么站不住脚。


He has even appeared at crime scenes – not urban riots, but private crimes of passion, where no reason of state could possibly warrant the presence of the President of the Republic.	他甚至出现在犯罪现场——不是城市暴乱，而是私人的冲动型犯罪，其中没有任何国家方面��原因可以解释共和国总统的到来。


Given the pathetic state of the Socialist opposition, it is difficult to see what price, if any, Sarkozy will pay for his record in office.	基于反对派社会党的糟糕状态，很难看出萨科奇将会为他的执政纪录付出何种代价——如果他需要付出代价的话。


But this style of government – essentially an electoral campaign, not a government – virtually guarantees that almost nothing of real importance can be accomplished.	但是政府的这种风格——本质上是大选运动而不是政府——几乎足以确保它不会取得任何真正重要的成就。


At a recent press conference, US President Barack Obama remarked that he was loathe to comment immediately on matters of great public importance before being absolutely sure that he knew – and knew what he thought about – the subject in question.	在最近的一次新闻发布会上，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马表示，在确信自己了解有争议的事情，并且知道自己的看法之前，他不愿立刻针对那些极其重要的公共事务发表评论。


Many French wish that such self-discipline could rub off on Sarkozy.	许多法国人希望这样的自律精神能够转移到萨科奇身上来。


Given his temperament, however, that hardly seems likely.	然而，基于他的性格，这几乎是不可能的；


As a result, an administration in which many had placed high hopes is lapsing into demagoguery and ineffectiveness.	而结果就是：一个很多人寄予厚望的政府正在滑入蛊惑煽动和行动无效的深渊。


The Limits of Democracy	民主的局限性


The election of the militant and hitherto extra-parliamentary group Hamas in the Palestinian territories reminds us of what democracy cannot achieve.	一直游离在议会之外的好战组织哈马斯在巴勒斯坦地区的当选提醒我们：民主并非无所不能。


No one in a more established democratic state is surprised if one’s own side does not win.	生活在老牌民主国家的人们绝不会因为自己支持的一方没有获胜而感到意外。


Democracy is about competing parties, and, unless they form a “grand coalition,” they cannot all win.	民主的实质就是政党竞争，除非各党派结成“大联盟”，否则它们不可能全部获胜。


But what if an election’s winners have no intention of abiding by the rules that are part and parcel of the democratic process?	但如果在选举中获胜的政党根本无意遵守民主进程中最重要的规则又当如何？


One remembers Hitler, who, while his own party did not quite get 50% of the vote, could base his “seizure of power” on a parliamentary majority.	这让人们想起了希特勒，当时他的政党并没有获得50%的选票，而他却最终因为得到了议会多数而攫取了政权。


More recently, elections in the post-communist countries of Europe have brought groups to power whose democratic credentials are dubious, to say the least.	不久以前，欧洲后共产主义国家举行的大选使民主资格非常可疑的人登上了宝座，而且对这些人来讲，“可疑”已经是最委婉的说法。


This is not to compare Hamas to any of these political forces.	这里并非要在哈马斯和任何政治力量之间进行对比。


Nevertheless, one must wonder about a winning movement with quite a few elected members in Israeli prisons and others who are not likely to get permission to enter the country in which they were elected, so that the new parliament cannot function properly.	但人们一定会感到疑惑，为什么赢得选举的党派成员竟有几位被关押在以色列的监狱，而其它人也不太可能获得许可，进入自己已经当选的国家，这种情况将使新议会无法正常运转。


All of this tells us three things about democracy.	这些情况向我们揭示了民主的三大特征。


First, elections rarely solve fundamental problems. In particular, they do not create a liberal order.	首先是选举很少能解决根本问题，尤其无法创造自由的秩序。


To be effective, elections must be preceded by an extensive period of debate and argument.	要想使选举更加有效，之前就必须进行长时间的思考和辩论。


Cases have to be made and attacked or defended.	必须把正反两方的观点摆出来进行探讨。


First elections, in particular, are almost inevitably of limited value as foundations of democracy, because they take place in an emotionally charged atmosphere and largely without substantive debate.	特别是首次选举，对于建立民主基础来讲几乎无一例外地没有太多意义。 因为首次选举往往受到情绪的严重影响，而且没有进行过真正的辩论。


They are an invitation to assert who one is and where one belongs rather than to a competition of well-defined and comprehensive political programs.	首次选举的意义在于邀请政党表明自己的身份和态度，而不是邀请他们加入一场有着明确界限的全面政治竞争。


This means, secondly, that first elections, and perhaps elections more generally, are not themselves a sufficient guarantee of liberty.	其次，这就意味着首次选举，甚至更广泛意义上的选举，也许本身都不足以保证自由。


As the German constitutional court judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde famously put it, democracies cannot create the conditions of their survival and success.	德国宪法法院法官恩斯特·沃尔夫冈·博肯福德（Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde）有一句名言，民主无法创造自身生存和繁荣的必要条件。


What are these conditions, and who creates them?	那么民主的繁荣需要什么条件，谁又能创造它？


The answer to the first question is, the rule of law.	第一个问题的答案是法治。


There must be certain accepted rules of the political game that are binding on all, so that whoever does not accept or obey them is disqualified.	必须为政治游戏制定公认的特殊规则，并要求所有参与者无一例外地遵守，任何胆敢违背的党派都将丧失参与的资格。


This is, to be sure, easier said than done.	这说起来肯定要比做起来容易得多。


Who sets the rules of the game?	游戏规则由谁来制定？


There is an obvious logic to establishing a constitutional convention first and then holding elections under the rules agreed by it.	这显然是先召开制宪会议再按照公认规则进行选举的先决条件。


This is what happened in Iraq, for example.	比如伊拉克就是这种情况。


But the constitutional convention, too, must be elected, and this election may run into the very difficulties that plague first elections to parliaments in new democracies.	但制宪会议本身也要进行选举，而制宪会议选举也可能碰到新兴民主国家议会选举所面对的同样的困难。


Once the rules of the game are set, there still remains the question: who enforces them?	一旦游戏规则得以确立，接下来的问题是：这些规则由谁来执行？


Who could say to Hamas that unless they accept certain rules, their election is not valid?	由谁出面告诉哈马斯，除非他们接受特定的规则，否则选举结果将被判无效？


This requires a constitutional court of sorts, as well as a judiciary and institutions to enforce its rulings.	这需要各种各样的宪法法院，以及法官和机构来执行法院的判决。


In sovereign states and territories, this is highly unlikely to come about on its own.	在主权国家和地区，这样的制度很难自然而然地产生。


It is no accident that the democratic process has emerged most smoothly where there was some external power to back up the constitution.	如果有外来的力量来支持宪法，推行民主的过程就会变得更为顺利，这也并非是什么偶然现象。


The third lesson follows from such considerations.	从上述思考中得出了第三个结论。


Democracy in the sense of free elections within certain rules does not allow the rest of us to say that the cause of freedom has prevailed and that we can walk away.	按照特定规则进行自由选举的民主不允许我们这些旁观者说自由事业已经取得了胜利，而且从此撒手不管。


On the contrary, democracy is a long-term task.	恰恰相反，民主是一项长期的任务。


Some say that it is achieved only once a country has passed the “two-turnover test,” that is, two changes of government without violence.	有人说只有当一个国家能够通过“两次更迭测试”，也就是两次在不发生暴力的情况下更换政府，民主才算在这个国家真正生根。


One must add to this criterion a culture of debate that makes elections a genuine contest of a plurality of answers to the issues at stake.	此外还必须加上一条标准：那就是必须建立起辩论文化，使选举成为多种解决方案间真正的较量。


For the Palestinian territories, this means that people’s expectations of the elections were probably too high.	对巴勒斯坦地区来讲，这意味着人们对选举的期待有些不切实际。


By the same token, reducing expectations means that the significance of the results should not be exaggerated.	同样，降低期望值也意味着选举结果的重要性不该被过度张扬。


Who knows?	谁知道呢？


The result may yet turn out to be a stepping-stone towards an effective state that deserves international recognition.	这次选举的结果也许不过是巴勒斯坦成为值得被国际尊重的有效国家之前的一块跳板。


In the meantime, the key task is to promote the rule of law, backed by the international community.	与此同时，我们的任务是要促进由国际社会所支持的法治。


Tempering the Genetic Revolution	谨慎对待基因革命


LEUVEN – We may not be fully aware of it, but future generations will likely consider our era truly historic.	鲁汶—我们或许没有完全认识到，但子孙后代可能把我们的时代视为真正的历史性时代。


Never before has mankind been able to understand the functioning of cells, tissues, and organs, the precise molecular mechanisms of evolution, and where and how our species originated and spread throughout the world.	此前从未有人类能够明白细胞、组织和器官的功能、进化的精确分子机制以及人类在何时何处起源并遍及世界各地。


The technology that allows us to unravel cellular and subcellular processes and mechanisms, identify the causes of diseases and develop more specific and effective treatments, and determine who is biologically related to us and to what degree combines knowledge from biology, computer sciences, information technology, and material sciences.	让我们明白细胞和亚细胞过程和机制、认识疾病的原因并开发出更具体有效的治疗方法、确定谁与我们在生物上有亲缘关系的技术是生物学、计算机科学、信息技术和材料科学知识的结合。


As might be expected, such a revolution in knowledge must also have a significant societal impact, requiring answers to questions that, until recently, were considered pure science fiction.	或许你早已料到，如此知识革命必然也会造成极大的社会影响，要求我们回答在不久的过去仍被认为是纯粹科学幻想的问题。


Today, it is technically possible to sequence the 2.4 meters of DNA – present in the nucleus of every cell of our body – in only a few days.	如今，我们已能在技术上测定2. 4米长的DNA序列——在我们体内的每一个细胞内都有这样一套DNA，而且只需要花费几天时间。


And, just as the speed of reliable sequencing continues to increase, the price of sequencing has dropped precipitously, and will soon amount to just a few hundred dollars.	此外，不但可靠测序的速度在持续加快，测序的价格在迅速下降，很快就会低到几百美元的水平。


Once the function of every fragment of DNA is known, nothing will stand in the way of routine sequencing.	一旦我们获知每个DNA片段的功能，常规测序之路就能畅行无阻了。