Though the election system is purely proportional and the S&D won the popular vote, the reason that it ended up with fewer seats is simple: its affiliated parties won relatively more votes in the larger countries, where it “costs” more voters to gain a single seat.	尽管选举制度完全按比例定胜负，而S&D在民众投票中获胜，但其在欧洲议会中获得的席位反而更少，原因很简单：其所属政党在大国赢得的选票相对较多，而获得一个欧洲议会席位所需要的选票“成本”在大国也更大。


Conversely, the EPP performed relatively better in small countries, where the vote cost per seat is much lower.	反之，欧洲人民党在获得议席选票成本低得多的小国表现较好。


The most extreme example is Luxembourg, Juncker’s home country, where the EPP received almost 38% of the popular vote, versus 11% for the S&D – a difference, in absolute terms, of only about 52,000.	最极端的例子是容克的祖国卢森堡。 欧洲人民党在卢森堡获得了近38%的群众选票，而S&D为11%——从绝对数目衡量，仅仅是52,000票。


But the EPP obtained two more MEPs than the S&D, which implies a per seat cost of roughly 26,000 votes.	但欧洲人民党比S&D多获得两个欧洲议会席位，这意味着每个席位的成本大概是26,000票。


The other extreme is Italy, where the S&D won 41% of the votes, versus 22% for the EPP.	另一个极端是意大利。 在意大利，S&D赢得41%的选票，而欧洲人民党为22%。


In absolute terms, the difference was more than five million votes, but the S&D won only 14 more MEPs than the EPP.	从绝对数目衡量，差距在500万票以上，但S&D只比欧洲人民党多获得14个欧洲议会席位。


In Italy, the S&D needed about 370,000 voters to gain one MEP, more than 14 times as many as the EPP needed in Luxembourg.	在意大利，S&D需要大约370,000票才能获得一个欧洲议会席位，比欧洲人民党在卢森堡的成本大14倍。


The EPP’s “victory” was thus due mainly to the fact that the ratio of voters per MEP varies greatly across countries.	因此，欧洲人民党的“胜利”主要要归因于欧洲议会席位平均选票比率在不同国家之间大相径庭这一事实。


A single vote in Italy (and in other large countries) is worth much less than a vote in smaller countries.	意大利（以及其他大国）的一票的价值远不如小国的一票。


The German Constitutional Court recently relied on this fact in a controversial decision striking down the 3% electoral threshold for parties to gain European Parliament seats in Germany (the small far-right National Democratic Party picked up one seat in the European Parliament as a result).	德国宪法法院最近根据这一事实做出了一项争议裁决，取消了政党在德国获得欧洲议会席位所需要的3%选票门槛（结果，极右翼小党派——国家民主党（National Democratic Party）也赢得了一个欧洲议会席位）。


The German court’s rationale was that the European Parliament election is not a true election, because the principle of “one person, one vote” is not respected.	德国法院的理由是欧洲议会选举不是真正的选举，因为“一人一票”的原则没有受到尊重。


This is not only a problem from the standpoint of democratic principles; the results of the recent election have shown the extent to which it can influence political outcomes.	这不仅是民主原则的问题； 最近的选举结果表明它可以极大地影响整治结果。


Juncker came out ahead in the MEP count for only one reason: he obtained his votes in small countries, and votes are de facto weighted by country size.	容克能够在欧洲议会算术中脱颖而出的原因只有一个：他在小国赢得了选票，而选票实际上是按国家规模加权的。


Thus, the claim that the European Parliament directly represents Europe’s people and that the people have given the EPP’s candidate a direct popular mandate that the member states’ representatives in the European Council should respect rings hollow.	因此，欧洲议会直接代表了欧洲人民、是人民给予了欧洲人民党候选人直接的群众授权因而应该获得成员国的欧洲委员会代表的尊重的观点是站不住脚的。


The S&D obtained more votes, giving its Spitzenkandidat, Martin Schulz, a claim to greater democratic legitimacy.	S&D获得了更多的选票，因此其首席候选人舒尔茨（Martin Shultz）拥有更大的民主合法性。


Europe Is Still Standing	欧洲没有趴下


BRUSSELS – Judging from the headlines, one might get the impression that the 400 million citizens eligible to participate in the recent European Parliament elections voted massively against the European Union.	布鲁塞尔—从新闻报道看，你或许会得到这样的印象：4亿合格选民在最近的欧洲议会选举中大量投票给了反欧盟阵营。


True, anti-establishment, mostly Euroskeptic, parties won about one-fifth of the vote.	诚然，反现状阵营政党——主要是欧洲质疑派——赢得了大约五分之一的选票。


But to characterize the election result as a rejection of Europe simply is not quite accurate (or fair).	但要说产生了拒绝欧洲的选举结果实在有失偏颇（或者不公平）。


For starters, although much has been made of the argument that the EU is too far removed from its citizens, opinion polls have shown consistently that public trust in the major European institutions remains higher than trust in national institutions.	首先，尽管许多人指出欧盟与其公民距离太远，但民调一直显示，对主要欧洲机构的公共信任度仍比国家机构高。


Across the EU, the European Parliament still has higher approval ratings, on average, than national parliaments.	放眼欧盟，平均而言欧洲议会的通过率仍比国家议会高。


Although the trust gap has narrowed somewhat in recent years, even the continuing recession, which is often blamed on EU-imposed austerity and the crisis in the eurozone, has only marginally reduced the European Parliament’s advantage over national parliaments.	尽管信任度差距在近几年中有所缩小，但即使最近的衰退——这通常被归咎于欧盟所实施的紧缩和欧元区危机——也只是略微降低了欧洲议会对国家议会的优势。


Recent polls suggest that, across Europe, about 40% of the population still trust the European Parliament, whereas only 25% trust their national parliaments.	最近民调表明，在整个欧洲，大约40%的人仍信任欧洲议会，而只有25%的人信任本国议会。


Moreover, the European Parliament retains much higher trust than the US Congress, which has approval ratings that are now below 10%.	此外，欧洲议会的信任度也仍然高于美国国会，后者的通过率如今低于10%。


Given the general loss of trust in parliamentary institutions on both sides of the Atlantic, the European Parliament is doing relatively well.	考虑到大西洋两岸的代议机构都在丧失信任度，欧洲议会还算相对更优。


Moreover, not all protest parties reject the EU.	此外，并非所有反对党都拒绝欧盟。


In Europe’s crisis-affected countries, young people, who have been hardest hit, voted en masse for leftist “anti-austerity” parties, most notably in Greece.	在受危机影响的欧洲国家中，年轻人——他们是受冲击最大的群体——一致支持左翼“反紧缩”政党，最明显的要数希腊。


But these parties do not reject the EU.	但这些政党并不拒绝欧盟。


On the contrary, they want more solidarity from the EU, which would enable their governments to spend more.	相反，它们希望欧盟能够更加团结，以使其政府能够增加支出。


The anti-austerity protest vote is strongest where governments have been unable to implement reforms effectively (for example, in Greece), in contrast to Portugal and Spain, whose economies are recovering on the back of strong exports.	反紧缩反对票在政府无法有效实施改革的国家（如希腊）最多，而葡萄牙和西班牙正好相反，它们的经济正在强劲的出口的带动下复苏。


In Italy, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s new government has been able to stem the tide of Euroskepticism by undertaking concrete reforms and not blaming the EU for every problem the country faces.	在意大利，总理伦齐的新政府能够通过采取渐进改革而不把所有其所面临的问题归咎于欧盟而抵挡住了欧洲怀疑主义声浪。


The rejection of the EU seems more fundamental in parts of northern Europe, where the elderly tend to vote for right-wing populist parties.	拒绝欧盟似乎在北欧更加根深蒂固，北欧老龄人口更倾向于投票给右翼民粹主义政党。


Especially in the United Kingdom and France, unemployment and a perceived lack of control over borders have played a large role in fostering disaffection with the EU.	特别是在英国和法国，对欧盟不满情绪的重要原因是失业状况和失去边境控制的感觉。


This is particularly worrying, given that both countries’ problems have little to do with EU policies.	这令人特别担心，因为这两国的问题与欧洲政策关系甚小。


France’s economic malaise cannot be blamed on austerity imposed from Brussels, and the UK is not even in the eurozone.	法国经济不振不能归咎于布鲁塞尔所施加的紧缩，欧洲甚至不在欧元���内。


Populists in both countries campaigned successfully on non-issues.	两国的民粹主义者成功地用无关痛痒的问题进行选战宣传。


All available studies show that “welfare tourism” is a limited phenomenon, and that immigration fosters economic growth.	所有可见研究都表明，“福利旅游”（welfare tourism）只是个别现象，总体而言移民涌入有利于经济增长。


But these facts do not count when wages are stagnating (as in the UK) or unemployment continues to rise (as in France).	但这些事实抵不过工资停滞（英国）和失业继续攀升（法国）。


Populists can easily project these problems onto “Europe,” which in this case merely represents fear of the outside world in general.	民粹主义者轻松地将这些问题引导到“欧洲”身上，但这其实只能表明他们对外部世界的恐惧。


The EU is thus caught between demands for more solidarity from the young in its southern members and dissatisfaction with open borders among the elderly in the north.	因此，欧盟陷入了一场拉锯：南欧成员国年轻人要求更加团结，而北欧年长者不满于边境开放。


It is tempting to try to mollify both groups by relaxing austerity and ditching the border-free Schengen area.	一个很有诱惑力的解决办法是放松紧缩并取消自由越境的申根区，以此两头讨好。


But that is unlikely to swing the political pendulum back toward Europe, especially in countries like France and the UK.	但这根本无助于让政治氛围朝有利于欧洲的方向发展，特别是在法国和英国等国家。


The deeper roots of the surge of Euroskeptic and other protest parties originate with the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and dysfunctional national political systems.	欧洲怀疑派和其他反对党崛起的深层次根源来自对经济状况和功能失调的国家政治制度的普遍不满。


Tinkering with austerity or the fundamental right of free movement within the EU will not make much of a difference.	用紧缩或欧盟内部自由迁徙的基本权利来进行小修小补无法造成重大区别。


Reform is needed at home, in national capitals.	是国家层面需要改革。


In this context, the selection of the European Commission’s next president – now the focus of considerable attention – is a sideshow.	在这样的背景下，现在饱受关注的欧盟委员会下任主席人选问题并不重要。


Whoever is chosen will be able to make the EU work only if French President François Hollande can build a domestic pro-reform consensus and British Prime Minister David Cameron can convince his electorate that immigrants (only one-third of whom come from the poorer EU member states) benefit the UK economy.	不管选谁，都只能在法国总统奥朗德形成国内亲改革共识和英国首相卡梅伦说服选民移民（其中只有三分之一来自较穷的欧盟成员国）有利于英国经济的条件下才能让欧盟运转起来。


The EU does not have a significant budget, and it sets at most a general framework for economic and social rules that vary widely across a large and diverse continent.	欧盟没有庞大的预算，充其量只是为这个广袤而多元化的大洲设置了总体经济和社会规则框架。


Success and failure are largely determined at the national level.	成败与否主要取决于国家层面。


That is where the problems lie and where they must be solved.	问题的发生和解决也在于国家层面。


What has taken the form of an anti-EU vote constitutes in reality a protest against socio-economic problems at home.	以反欧盟选票面目出现的现象代表的是反对国内社会经济问题的现实。


The System is Working	系统在运转


MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS – As the latest G-20 meeting of finance ministers starts in Cairns, Australia, the Legion of Gloom is at it again.	梅福德，马萨诸塞州—随着二十国集团财政部长会议在澳大利亚凯恩斯召开，忧郁军团（Legion of Gloom）再次齐聚。


Their conventional wisdom is that “the system” – global governance structures ranging from the World Trade Organization and the G-20 to the major central banks – is badly broken and in desperate need of repair.	他们的传统智慧是，“系统”——从世界贸易组织和二十国集团到各主要中央银行的全球治理结构——遭到了严重破坏，急需修补。


In fact, the global economic order has worked remarkably well since 2008.	事实上，全球经济秩序在2008年以来运转的相当良好。


True, the first year of the Great Recession was more severe than the first year of the Great Depression.	诚然，大衰退的第一年要比大萧条的第一年严重得多。


But, despite this initial shock, the system responded in a surprisingly nimble fashion.	但是，尽管第一波冲击十分猛烈，但系统的反应出人意料地敏捷。


Compared to previous global downturns triggered by a financial crisis, the global economy bounced back robustly.	与前几次金融危机触发的全球衰退相比，此次全球经济反弹得相当强劲。


Trade and output levels exceeded pre-crisis levels in most countries a few years ago, and global poverty continues to decline rapidly.	大部分国家的贸易和产出水平几年前就已经超过危机前水平，全球贫困也在继续迅速减少。


One key to this rebound was that, in contrast to the 1930s, the global economy maintained existing conditions: trade barriers remained low, as did restrictions on foreign direct investment, and cross-border exchange continued to spread with the Internet.	如此反弹的一个关键是，与20世纪30年代相反，全球经济维持着现有环境：贸易壁垒和对外国直接投资的限制仍然很小，跨国贸易在互联网上继续扩张。


As the McKinsey Global Institute noted, with the exception of cross-border finance, global flows are just as robust now as they were before the crisis.	麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）指出，除了跨国金融，全球流动与危机前一样强劲。


There has even been a partial revamping of key global institutions, from the rise of the G-20 to reform of the International Monetary Fund.	全球机构做出了局部改进，如二十国集团的崛起和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的改革。


Indeed, the resiliency of markets to geopolitical tensions in Ukraine or the South China Sea has begun to worry some Fed officials.	事实上，市场对乌克兰或南中国海地缘政治紧张局势冲击所表现出来的恢复力已开始令一些美联储官员表示担心。


By any reasonable metric, multilateral institutions and great-power governments did what was necessary to preserve the global economy’s openness.	从一切合理指标看，跨国机构和大国政府做了保持全球经济开放所应该做的事。


So why the widespread misperception that the system failed?	既然如此，关于系统失灵的误解为何如此广泛呢？


Here, we run into a dirty little secret of world politics: many commentators on international politics do not know much about economics or economic policy.	在这里，我们陷入了一个肮脏的世界政治小秘密：许多国际政治评论家并不十分了解经济学和经济政策。


International-affairs professionals frequently talk about “high politics” and “low politics,” and they usually relegate economic issues to the latter category.	国际事务教授总是大谈“高端政治”和“低端政治”，而经济问题往往被归于后者。


This ignorance matters when political commentators try to write about the global economy.	当政治评论家评述全球经济时，这一无知就会带来问题。


They will naturally rely on the most accessible facts as their guide.	他们自然会以最容易获得的事实为指导。


To be fair, some of the most obvious data have indeed suggested fragmentation of the global economic order.	平心而论，某些最显而易见的数据确实表明全球经济秩序正在分裂。


The dormancy of the Doha Round of WTO talks, the public deadlock of some G-20 summits, and stalemates at the United Nations Security Council seem like sufficient evidence to proclaim that the status quo is imperiled – even if facts beyond the headlines belie that consensus.	世贸组织谈判多哈回合陷入冻结，二十国集团峰会频现僵持，联合国安理会也处于僵局之中，这些证据似乎已足以证明现状岌岌可危的观点——即使新闻标题背后的事实与这些共识并不相符。


Consider the kerfuffle over “currency wars.”	以“货币战争”问题上的骚动为例。


In 2010, the Fed began hinting at a second round of quantitative easing, or QE2.	2010年，美联储开始暗示第二轮量化宽松（QE2）。


One of the policy externalities of QE – the Fed’s purchase of long-term financial assets – was a depreciating dollar.	量化宽松——美联储购买长期金融资产——的一个政策外部性是美元贬值。


Fearing domestic asset-price bubbles and upward pressure on their currencies from an inward rush of capital, many emerging-economy leaders complained loudly about what Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega called an “international currency war.”	许多新兴经济体领导人担心本国资产价格出现泡沫和资本涌入导致货币升值压力，一时间怨声四起，巴西财政部长曼特加（Guido Mantega）称之为“国际货币战争”。


Lost in all of the hype was the fact that neither markets nor financial analysts were terribly perturbed about excessive exchange-rate volatility or the possibility of an actual currency war.	在���肆宣传之下被忽视的一个事实是，市场和金融分析师都没有对汇率的过度波动和真正货币战争的可能性感到不安。


After the autumn of 2008, exchange-rate volatility slowly receded toward pre-crisis levels.	2008年秋天以来，汇率波动逐渐减弱至危机前水平。


Another common reason for the collective misperception is misplaced nostalgia.	另一个集体误判的共同原因是用错地方的怀旧情感。


Former US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft encapsulated the post-crisis conventional wisdom in 2012: “The postwar leaders set up the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to develop rules of the road.	2012年，前美国国家安全顾问斯考克罗夫特（Brent Scowcroft）概括了后危机时代的传统智慧：“战后领导人建立了IMF、世界银行和关贸总协定，以此建立了前进规则。


The new G-20 is but a pale reflection of that once-brilliant institution building.”	新二十国集团只不过是这一曾经光芒四射的机构建设运动的回光返照。 ”


But past efforts at building a global order have had their share of futility.	但过去建设全球秩序的努力可谓事倍功半。


Anyone familiar with the history of the Bretton Woods institutions knows that they experienced as many misses as hits.	任何熟悉布雷顿森林机构历史的人都知道，这些机构的失误和成就一样多。


Compared to the past, the current order performed well above average.	与过去相比，目前的秩序总体而言表现更好。


Perhaps the deepest explanation for the Legion of Gloom’s strength is where they live.	也许对于忧郁军团得势的最深刻的解释是他们来自哪里。


According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the OECD economies averaged annual GDP growth of 0.5% from 2008 to 2012, whereas non-OECD economies averaged 5.2% growth.	根据《经济学人》智库（Economist Intelligence Unit）的数据，2008年至2012年期间，经合组织经济体平均年GDP增长率为0. 5%，而非经合组织经济体为5.


This matters because analysis of the international order remains anchored in the West.	这非常重要，因为对国际秩序的分析仍然以西方为基准点。


It is a general rule of political science that a faltering economy causes greater distrust in institutions.	政治学有一个一般规则：经济衰退造成机构内部的不信任。


A weak economy feeds perceptions that the system is broken, and that those in authority are not to be trusted.	疲软的经济产生系统破坏的感觉，使人们认为掌权者不值得信任。


So greater skepticism about all levels of governance in the OECD economies is not surprising.	因此，经合组织经济体各层次怀疑论日嚣尘上丝毫不令人奇怪。


Analysts might be looking first at their local circumstances, and then extrapolating from that to their assessments of global institutions.	分析师也许首先要看局部环境，然后将其外推形成他们对全球机构的评估。


Pessimism about slow national recoveries in the developed world is causing analysts to conflate poor domestic and regional governance with poor global governance.	在发达世界，对国家复苏迟缓的悲观导致分析师将糟糕的国内和地区治理等同于糟糕的全球治理。


But the primary causes for domestic economic weakness in Japan, the US, the United Kingdom, and the eurozone are not global in origin.	但日本、美国、英国和欧元区国内经济疲软的主要原因从根本上并不是全球性的。


Japan’s economy had been stagnating for almost two decades when the 2008 crisis erupted.	2008年危机爆发时，日本经济已经停滞了近20年。


Likewise, domestic policy stalemates and political uncertainty acted as a significant drag on the US recovery from the Great Recession.	类似地，美国从大衰退中复苏一个重大拖累因素也在于国内政策僵局和政策不确定性。


Does the system’s remarkable resiliency since 2008 mean that it can withstand the next crisis?	自2008年以来，系统表现出令人瞩目的恢复力，这是否意味着它可以抵御下一次危机？


In theory, yes – many of the post-2008 reforms have been designed to add shock absorbers to the global economy.	理论上，答案是肯定的——2008年后的许多改革设计就是为了给全球经济增加冲击吸收。


But, in international relations, collective misperceptions can create their own reality.	但是，在国际关系中，集体误判可以制造其本身的事实。


If pundits continue to insist that the system failed, wonks will devote time and effort to figuring out how to fix what is not broken.	如果专家继续坚持认为系统失灵，学究们就会花大量时间和精力用于寻找如何修复被破坏的东西。


Moreover, it is extremely difficult to correct misperceptions once they ossify – particularly if the topic in question is outside a pundit’s range of expertise.	此外，一旦误判根深蒂固地竖立起来，要想纠正就变得极其困难——特别是在问题的主题并不在专家专业知识范围内的时候。


Ironically, the only thing that might stop the system from continuing to work is the low confidence of its greatest proponents.  	讽刺的是，唯一可能阻止系统继续运转的东西乃是对其最伟大组成部分的信心不足。


Rethinking Democracy	反思民主


PRINCETON – By many measures, the world has never been more democratic.	普林斯顿—从很多标准看，世界从未变得更加民主。


Virtually every government at least pays lip service to democracy and human rights.	基本上每一个政府都是言必称民主和人权。


Though elections may not be free and fair, massive electoral manipulation is rare and the days when only males, whites, or the rich could vote are long gone.	尽管选举可能并不自由和公正，但大规模操纵选举很少见，只有男人、白人或富人参与的选举也早已成了历史。


Freedom House’s global surveys show a steady increase from the 1970s in the share of countries that are “free” – a trend that the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington dubbed the “third wave” of democratization.	自由之家（Freedom House）的全球调查表明自20世纪以来，“自由”国家的比例在稳步增加，已故哈佛政治学家亨廷顿（Samuel Huntington）将这一趋势称为民主的“第三波”。


The dissemination of democratic norms from the advanced countries of the West to the rest of the world has been perhaps the most significant benefit of globalization.	民主范式从西方发达国家向全世界其他地区的扩散也许是全球化最重大的好处。


Yet not all is well with democracy.	但民主也不是只有优点。


Today’s democratic governments perform poorly, and their future remains very much in doubt.	今天的民主政府表现得十分平庸，未来也颇可质疑。


In the advanced countries, dissatisfaction with government stems from its inability to deliver effective economic policies for growth and inclusion.	在发达国家，对政府的不满来自政府无力提供有效的经济政策实现有效的增长和包容性政策。


In the newer democracies of the developing world, failure to safeguard civil liberties and political freedom is an additional source of discontent.	在历史较短的发展中民主国家，无法保证公民自由和政治自由造成了进一步的不满。


A true democracy, one that combines majority rule with respect for minority rights, requires two sets of institutions.	结合了少数服从多数和尊重少数派权利的真正的民主需要两套制度。


First, institutions of representation, such as political parties, parliaments, and electoral systems, are needed to elicit popular preferences and turn them into policy action.	首先是代表（representation）制度，如政党、议会和选举制度，这样才能引出人民的选择、让人民参与到政治活动中来。


Second, democracy requires institutions of restraint, such as an independent judiciary and media, to uphold fundamental rights like freedom of speech and prevent governments from abusing their power.	其次，民主需要约束（restraint）制度，如独立的司法和媒体，以保证言论自由等基本权利并防止政府滥用权力。


Representation without restraint – elections without the rule of law – is a recipe for the tyranny of the majority.	没有约束的代表——即没有法治精神的选举——只能带来多数人的暴政。


Democracy in this sense – what many call “liberal democracy” – flourished only after the emergence of the nation-state and the popular upheaval and mobilization produced by the Industrial Revolution.	从这个角度讲，民主——许多人所谓的“自由民主”——只有在工业革命引起民族国家的出现和群众剧变和动员后才可能发生。


So it should come as no surprise that the crisis of liberal democracy that many of its oldest practitioners currently are experiencing is a reflection of the stress under which the nation-state finds itself.	因此，许多自由民主的最老牌实践国目前正在经历自由民主的危机并不令人惊奇，这只是民族国家发现自己身处压力中的反映。


The attack on the nation-state comes from above and below.	对民族国家的攻击来自上层和下层。


Economic globalization has blunted the instruments of national economic policy and weakened the traditional mechanisms of transfers and redistribution that strengthened social inclusion.	经济全球化让国民经济政策工具不再效果显著，也削弱了增强社会包容性的传统转移和再分配机制。


Moreover, policymakers often hide behind (real or imagined) competitive pressures emanating from the global economy to justify their lack of responsiveness to popular demands, and cite the same pressures when implementing unpopular policies such as fiscal austerity.	此外，决策者往往以（实际的或想象的）来自全球经济的竞争压力为由为其对群众要求反应不力开脱，并以同样的借口实施不受欢迎的政策（如财政紧缩）。


One consequence has been the rise of extremist groups in Europe.	一个后果是欧洲极端主义组织的崛起。


At the same time, regional separatist movements such as those in Catalonia and Scotland challenge the legitimacy of nation-states as they are currently configured and seek their breakup.	与此同时，地区分裂运动——如加泰罗尼亚和苏格兰——渐成气候，寻求独立，挑战民族国家的合法性。


Whether they do too much or too little, many national governments face a crisis of representation.	不管做得太多还是做得太少，许多国家的国民政��正在面临代表危机。


In developing countries, it is more often the institutions of restraint that are failing.	在发展中国家，约束制度失灵的情况更加常见。


Governments that come to power through the ballot box often become corrupt and power-hungry.	通过选票箱问鼎权力的政府常常会变得腐败和渴望权力。


They replicate the practices of the elitist regimes they replaced, clamping down on the press and civil liberties and emasculating (or capturing) the judiciary.	它们会复制它们所取代的精英治国制度，抑制言论和公民自由，阉割（或绑架）司法。


The result has been called “illiberal democracy” or “competitive authoritarianism.”	结果是所谓的“不自由民主”或“竞争性极权主义”。


Venezuela, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand are some of the better-known recent examples.	委内瑞拉、土耳其、埃及和突尼斯是比较著名的最近的例子。


When democracy fails to deliver economically or politically, perhaps it is to be expected that some people will look for authoritarian solutions.	当民主无法从经济上或政治上实现时，或许你就可以看到有人会寻求极权主义了。


And, for many economists, delegating economic policy to technocratic bodies in order to insulate them from the “folly of the masses” almost always is the preferred approach.	对许多经济学家来说，将经济政策权授予技术官僚机构以使其免于“乌合之众”几乎永远是更佳选择。


With its independent central bank and fiscal rules, the European Union has already traveled far along this road.	拥有独立央行和财政规则的欧盟在这条路上已经走得相当远。


In India, businessmen look wistfully at China and wish their leaders could act just as boldly and decisively – that is, more autocratically – to address the country’s reform challenges.	在印度，商人对中国羡慕不已，祈愿印度领导人能够像中国领导人那样坚决果断地——即更独裁地——解决印度的改革挑战。


In countries like Egypt and Thailand, military intervention is viewed as a temporary necessity in order to put an end to the irresponsibility of elected leaders.	在埃及和泰国等国家，军事干预被视为结束当选领导人担责不力的必要的权宜措施。


These autocratic responses are ultimately self-defeating, because they deepen the democratic malaise.	这些独裁应对措施说到底是自我毁灭的，因为它们深化了民主的弊端。


In Europe, economic policy needs more democratic legitimacy, not less.	在欧洲，经济政策需要更多而非更少的民主合法性。


This can be achieved either by significantly strengthening democratic deliberation and accountability at the EU level, or by increasing the autonomy of the member states to set economic policy.	这可以通过两种方法实现：大大加强欧盟层面的民主审查和问责，或者增加成员国在经济政策方面的自主性。


In other words, Europe faces a choice between more political union and less economic union.	换句话说，欧洲面临着在更多政治联盟和更少经济联盟间的选择。


As long as it delays making the choice, democracy will suffer.	这一选择拖延得越久，民主受伤就越深。


In developing countries, military intervention in national politics undermines long-term prospects for democracy, because it impedes the development of the necessary “culture,” including habits of moderation and compromise among competing civilian groups.	在发展中国家，军方对国家政治的干预破坏了民主的长期前景，因为这阻碍了必要的“文化”的发展，包括互相竞争的公民组织之间的节制和妥协。


As long as the military remains the ultimate political arbiter, these groups focus their strategies on the military rather than one another.	只要军方继续充当终极政治仲裁者，公民组织的战略就会一直以军方而不是彼此为核心。


Effective institutions of restraint do not emerge overnight; and it might seem like those in power would never want to create them.	有效的约束制度不是一夜建成的； 当权者或许永远不想建立这一制度。


But if there is some likelihood that I will be voted out of office and that the opposition will take over, such institutions will protect me from others’ abuses tomorrow as much as they protect others from my abuses today.	但如果我有可能被选票赶下台、让反对派上台执政，这样的制度可以保护我在日后免受其他人的折磨，正如制度现在保护他们免受我的折磨一样。


So strong prospects for sustained political competition are a key prerequisite for illiberal democracies to turn into liberal ones over time.	因此，强烈的持续政治竞争预期是不自由民主逐渐转变为自由民主的关键先决条件。


Optimists believe that new technologies and modes of governance will resolve all problems and send democracies centered on the nation-state the way of the horse-drawn carriage.	乐观者相信新的治国技术和模式能够解决所有问题，让以民族国家为核心的民主成为明日黄花。


Pessimists fear that today’s liberal democracies will be no match for the external challenges mounted by illiberal states like China and Russia, which are guided only by hardnosed realpolitik.	悲观者担心今天的自由民主无法应对中国和俄罗斯等以蛮横的现实政治为指导原则的不自由国家所造成的外部挑战。


Either way, if democracy is to have a future, it will need to be rethought.	无论如何，民主想要有未来，就必须反思。


A Class of Its Own	自在阶级


PRINCETON – The very rich, F. Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote, “are different from you and me.”	普林斯顿—菲茨杰拉德（F. Scott Fitzgerald）有一句著名的话，说超级富豪“和你我不一样。


Their wealth makes them “cynical where we are trustful,” and makes them think “they are better than we are.”	”他们的财富让他们“在我们相信的时候怀疑”，让他们认为“他们比我们强”。


If these words ring true today, perhaps it is because when they were written, in 1926, inequality in the United States had reached heights comparable to today.	如果说这番话恰如其分地形容了当下，那么可能是因为，当菲茨杰拉德在1926年写这番话时，美国的不平等性之严重与现今不相上下。


During much of the intervening period, between the end of World War II and the 1980s, inequality in the advanced countries was moderate.	在平静期的大部分时间里，即在第二次世界大战结束到20世纪80年代，发达国家的不平等性相当温和。


The gap between the super-rich and the rest of society seemed less colossal – not just in terms of income and wealth, but also in terms of attachments and social purpose.	社会中的超级富豪和其他人之间的差距并不特别大——不仅用收入和财富衡量是如此，用地位和社会目标衡量也是如此。


The rich had more money, of course, but they somehow still seemed part of the same society as the poor, recognizing that geography and citizenship made them share a common fate.	当然，富人的钱更多，但或多或少仍与穷人同处一个社会，认同地理和公民身份让他们同呼吸共命运。


As the University of Michigan’s Mark Mizruchi points out in a recent book, the American corporate elite in the postwar era had “an ethic of civic responsibility and enlightened self-interest.”	密歇根大学的马克·米兹路奇（Mark Mizruchi）在其新书中指出，美国战后公司精英有“一套社会责任和开明自利的伦理观”。


They cooperated with trade unions and favored a strong government role in regulating and stabilizing markets.	他们与工会合作，支持政府在监管和稳定市场方面的强势角色。


They understood the need for taxes to pay for important public goods such as the interstate highway and safety nets for the poor and elderly.	他们理解应该为了重要的公共品——如州际高速公里和穷人和老人社会安全网——而纳税。


Business elites were not any less politically powerful back then.	当时的商业精英政治权力并不亚于现在。


But they used their influence to advance an agenda that was broadly in the national interest.	但他们将影响力用于推动与国家利益大体一致的日程。


By contrast, today’s super-rich are “moaning moguls,” to use James Surowiecki’s evocative term.	相反，用詹姆斯·索罗维基（James Surowiecki）的妙语讲，今天的超级富豪堪称“呻吟大亨”。


Exhibit A for Surowiecki is Stephen Schwarzman, the chairman and CEO of the private equity firm the Blackstone Group, whose wealth now exceeds $10 billion.	索罗维基举出的首屈一指的例子是私募股权公司百仕通集团（Blackstone Group）主席兼首席执行官史蒂芬·施瓦茨曼（Stephen Schwarzman），他的财富目前超过100亿美元。


Schwarzman acts as if “he’s beset by a meddlesome, tax-happy government and a whiny, envious populace.”	施瓦茨曼的表现好像“他饱受凡是都要插手、见税眼开的政府和带着嫉妒聒噪不停的大众的困扰”。


He has suggested that “it might be good to raise income taxes on the poor so they had ‘skin in the game,’ and that proposals to repeal the carried-interest tax loophole – from which he personally benefits – were akin to the German invasion of Poland.”	他建议“���许应该提高穷人的所得税，让他们有‘切肤之痛’，还把取消他本人受益其中的利息税漏洞比作德国入侵波兰。


Other examples from Surowiecki: “the venture capitalist Tom Perkins and Kenneth Langone, the co-founder of Home Depot, both compared populist attacks on the wealthy to the Nazis’ attacks on the Jews.”	”另一个索罗维基的例子：“风险资本家汤姆·珀金斯（Tom Perkins）和家得宝（Home Depot）联合创始人肯尼斯·兰根（Kenneth Langone）都把对富人的民粹主义抨击比作纳粹迫害犹太人。 ”


Surowiecki thinks that the change in attitudes has much to do with globalization.	索罗维基认为，态度的转变与全球化有很大关系。


Large American corporations and banks now roam the globe freely, and are no longer so dependent on the US consumer.	美国大公司和银行现在能够自由地在全世界做生意，而不再主要依靠美国消费者。


The health of the American middle class is of little interest to them these days.	美国中产阶级的健康如今已对他们没有什么关系。


Moreover, Surowiecki argues, socialism has gone by the wayside, and there is no need to coopt the working class anymore.	此外，索罗维基还指出，社会主义已经靠边站，也没有必要在拉拢工作阶级。


Yet if corporate moguls think that they no longer need to rely on their national governments, they are making a huge mistake.	但如果公司大佬认为他们以不再需要依赖国民政府，那就大错特错了。


The reality is that the stability and openness of the markets that produce their wealth have never depended more on government action.	现实是，成就了他们的财富的市场的稳定与开放从未如此依赖政府行为。


In periods of relative calm, governments’ role in writing and upholding the rules by which markets function can become obscured.	在相对平静的时期，政府制定和支持市场赖以运转的规则的作用可能不那么清晰。


It may seem as if markets are on autopilot, with governments an inconvenience that is best avoided.	市场会表现出自动巡航模式，政府成为最好敬而远之的不受欢迎者。


But when economic storm clouds gather on the horizon, everyone seeks shelter under their home government’s cover.	但当经济风暴来临时，所有人都会向本国政府寻求卵翼。


It is then that the ties that bind large corporations to their native soil are fully revealed.	这时，大公司与其母国的关系就凸显无疑了。


As former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King aptly put it in the context of finance, “global banks are global in life, but national in death.”	前英格兰银行行长默文·金（Mervyn King）恰当地做过一番金融领域的总结：“全球银行生是全球的，死是国家的。 ”


Consider how the US government stepped in to ensure financial and economic stability during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.	想想美国政府是如何在2008—2009年全球金融危机期间介入确保金融和经济稳定的。


If the government had not bailed out large banks, the insurance giant AIG, and the auto industry, and if the Federal Reserve had not flooded the economy with liquidity, the wealth of the super-rich would have taken a severe blow.	如果政府不出手援助大银行、保险巨头AIG和汽车业，如果美联储不向经济注入巨量流动性，超级富豪的财富可能遭受重创。


Many argued that the government should have focused on rescuing homeowners; instead, the government chose to support the banks – a policy from which the financial elite benefited the most.	许多人指出政府应该专注于拯救屋主； 但政府选择了支持银行——金融精英在这一政策中获益最大。


Even in normal times, the super-rich depend on government support and action.	即使在正常时期，超级富豪也依赖政府支持的行为。


It is largely the government that has financed the fundamental research that produced the information-technology revolution and the firms (such as Apple and Microsoft) that it has spawned.	信息技术革命及其所催生的公司（如苹果和微软）的背后是基础研究，而基础研究大部分是政府出资的。


It is the government that enacts and enforces the copyright, patent, and trademark laws that protect intellectual property rights, guaranteeing successful innovators a steady stream of monopoly profits.	政府建立并执行版权、专利和商标法，保护知识产权，保证成功的创新者能够获得稳定的垄断利润。


It is the government that subsidizes the higher-education institutions that train the skilled work force.	政府补贴培训高技能劳动力的高等教育机构。


It is the government that negotiates trade agreements with other countries to ensure that domestic firms gain access to foreign markets.	政府与其他国家谈判贸易协定以确保本国企业能够进入外国市场。


If the super-rich believe that they are no longer part of society and have little need of government, it is not because this belief corresponds to objective reality.	如果超级富豪认为他们以不再是社会的一部分，不再需要政府，那么这不是因为这一信念符合客观现实。


It is because the prevailing story line of our time portrays markets as self-standing entities that run on their own fuel.	这是因为现时代的媒体大肆宣传市场是自我产生、自我运转的实体。


This is a narrative that afflicts all segments of society, the middle class no less than the rich.	这一宣传让社会所有层面都蒙受折磨，其中中产阶级所遭遇的打击不亚于富人。


There is no reason to expect that the super-rich will act less selfishly than any other group.	没有理由认为超级富豪应该比其他群体少点自私。


But it is not so much their self-interest that stands in the way of greater equality and social inclusion.	但他们的自私并非挡在更平等、社会更包容面前的主要障碍。


The more significant roadblock is the missing recognition that markets cannot produce prosperity for long – for anyone – unless they are backed by healthy societies and good governance.	更重要的障碍是没有认识到市场不可能长期提供繁荣——不管是为谁——除非它们背后有健康的社会和良好的治理的支持。


The Real Heroes of the Global Economy	全球经济的真英雄


PRINCETON – Economic policymakers seeking successful models to emulate apparently have an abundance of choices nowadays.	普林斯顿—如今，寻找可供模仿的成功模式的经济决策者有大把的选择。


Led by China, scores of emerging and developing countries have registered record-high growth rates over recent decades, setting precedents for others to follow.	以中国的为首的诸多新兴和发展中国家在近几十年来频频创出高增长新纪录，为他人树立了可供追随的先例。


While advanced economies have performed far worse on average, there are notable exceptions, such as Germany and Sweden.	尽管发达经济体表现远远不及平均水平，但也有显著的例外，比如德国和瑞典。


“Do as we do,” these countries’ leaders often say, “and you will prosper, too.”	“向我们这样做，”这些国家的领导人经常说，“你也能繁荣。 ”


Look more closely, however, and you will discover that these countries’ vaunted growth models cannot possibly be replicated everywhere, because they rely on large external surpluses to stimulate the tradable sector and the rest of the economy.	但是，更仔细地考察一下你会发现，这些国家引以为傲的增长模式绝非放之四海而皆准，因为它们依赖巨额外部盈余刺激可贸易部门和经济的其他部分。


Sweden’s current-account surplus has averaged above a whopping 7% of GDP over the last decade; Germany’s has averaged close to 6% during the same period.	在过去十年中，瑞典的经常项目盈余平均可达GDP的7%以上； 同期的德国平均可达近6%。


China’s large external surplus – above 10% of GDP in 2007 – has narrowed significantly in recent years, with the trade imbalance falling to about 2.5% of GDP.	中国的巨额外部盈余——2007年超过GDP的10%——在最近几年大幅收窄，贸易失衡程度已下降至GDP的约2. 5%。


As the surplus came down, so did the economy’s growth rate – indeed, almost point for point.	随着盈余的减少，中国经济的增长率也随之下落——事实上，两者的下降几乎是一比一关系。


To be sure, China’s annual growth remains comparatively high, at above 7%.	平心而论，比较而言中国的年增长依然很高，超过7%。


But growth at this level reflects an unprecedented – and unsustainable – rise in domestic investment to nearly 50% of GDP.	但这一水平的增长反映了前所未有——也不可持续——的国内投资增加，现已接近GDP的50%。


When investment returns to normal levels, economic growth will slow further.	当投资回到正常水平时，经济增长也会进一步减速。


Obviously, not all countries can run trade surpluses at the same time.	显然，并不是所有国家都能同时出现贸易盈余。


In fact, the successful economies’ superlative growth performance has been enabled by other countries’ choice not to emulate them.	事实上，成功经济体能有超凡经济表现是因为其他国家没有选择模仿它们。


But one would never know that from listening, for example, to Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, extolling his country’s virtues.	但你永远不可能从（比如）德国财长朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）吹嘘德国美德时听说这一点。


“In the late 1990’s, [Germany] was the undisputed ‘sick man’ of Europe,” Schäuble wrote recently.	“20世纪90年代末，[德国]是毫无争议的欧洲‘病夫’，”朔伊布勒最近写道。


What turned the country around, he claims, was labor-market liberalization and restrained public spending.	他指出，让德国焕然一新的是劳动力市场自由化和约束公共支出。


In fact, while Germany did undertake some reforms, so did others, and its labor market does not look substantially more flexible than what one finds in other European economies.	事实上，德国确实实施了一些改革，但其他国家也这么做了，且德国的劳动力市场看上去并不比任何一个其他欧洲经济体更灵活。


A big difference, however, was the turnaround in Germany’s external balance, with annual deficits in the 1990’s swinging to a substantial surplus in recent years, thanks to its trade partners in the eurozone and, more recently, the rest of the world.	但是，一个重大��别是德国外部收支平衡的转变，从20世纪90年代的赤字一变而为近几年巨大的盈余，而这要归功于其欧元区（最近则是全世界）贸易伙伴。


As the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf, among others, has pointed out, the German economy has been free-riding on global demand.	正如《金融时报》的沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）和其他人所指出的，德国经济搭了全球需求的顺风车。


Other countries have grown rapidly in recent decades without relying on external surpluses.	其他国家在不依赖外部盈余的情况下在近几十年取得了快速的经济增长。


But most have suffered from the opposite syndrome: excessive reliance on capital inflows, which, by spurring domestic credit and consumption, generate temporary growth.	但大部分国家染上了正好相反的综合症：过度依赖资本流入，而资本流入通过刺激国内信用和消费产生了暂时的增长。


But recipient economies are vulnerable to financial-market sentiment and sudden capital flight – as happened recently when investors anticipated monetary-policy tightening in the United States.	但外围经济体十分容易受到金融市场情绪和资本突然外逃的影响，最近投资者预期美国将收紧货币政策时的表现就是明证。


Consider India, until recently another much-celebrated success story.	就拿印度来说，前不久，它还是又一个著名的成功故事。


India’s growth during the past decade had much to do with loose macroeconomic policies and a deteriorating current account – which recorded a deficit of more than 5% of GDP in 2012, having been in surplus in the early 2000’s.	过去十年，印度增长与宽松的宏观经济政策和恶化的经常项目——2012年报告赤字超过GDP的5%，但在21世纪初期是有盈余的——不无关系。


Turkey, another country whose star has faded, also relied on large annual current-account deficits, reaching 10% of GDP in 2011.	土耳其则是另一颗逐渐暗淡的明星，它也依赖于巨大的年度经常项目赤字，其中2011年达到了GDP的10%。


Elsewhere, small, formerly socialist economies – Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Lithuania, and Kosovo – have grown very rapidly since the early 2000’s.	在其他地区，小型前社会主义经济体——亚美尼亚、白俄罗斯、摩尔多瓦、格鲁吉亚、立陶宛和科索沃——在21世纪最初几年均以很快的速度增长。 但看看它们在2000—2013年间平均经常项目赤字——最低是立陶宛，为GDP的5.


But look at their average current-account deficits from 2000 to 2013 – which range from a low of 5.5% of GDP in Lithuania to a high of 13.4% in Kosovo – and it becomes evident that these are not countries to emulate.	5%，最高是科索沃，为GDP的13. 4%——马上就能发现这些国家不能作为模仿对象。


The story is similar in Africa.	非洲的情况也类似。


The continent’s fastest-growing economies are those that have been willing and able to allow yawning external gaps from 2000 to 2013: 26% of GDP, on average, in Liberia, 17% in Mozambique, 14% in Chad, 11% in Sierra Leone, and 7% in Ghana.	这片大陆上增长最快的经济体正是那些在2000—2013年能够忍受巨大外部赤字的经济体——利比里亚平均为GDP的26%； 莫桑比克17%，乍得14%，塞拉利昂11%，加纳7%。


Rwanda’s current account has deteriorated steadily, with the deficit now exceeding 10% of GDP.	卢旺达的经常项目稳步恶化，如今赤字已超过GDP的10%。


The world’s current-account balances must ultimately sum up to zero.	世界经常项目收支最终必须归零。


In an optimal world, the surpluses of countries pursuing export-led growth would be willingly matched by the deficits of those pursuing debt-led growth.	在最优世界中，追求贸易拉动型增长的盈余国家应该有追求债务拉动型增长的国家的赤字与之匹配。


In the real world, there is no mechanism to ensure such an equilibrium on a continuous basis; national economic policies can be (and often are) mutually incompatible.	在现实世界中，不存在可以连续确保这一均衡的机制； 国家经济政策可能（也经常）互不相容。


When some countries want to run smaller deficits without a corresponding desire by others to reduce surpluses, the result is the exportation of unemployment and a bias toward deflation (as is the case now).	当一些国家想减少赤字但没有国家想减少盈余时，结果就是输出失业和通缩倾向（现在的情况就是如此）。


When some want to reduce their surpluses without a corresponding desire by others to reduce deficits, the result is a “sudden stop” in capital flows and financial crisis.	当一些国家向减少盈余但没有国家想减少赤字时，结果就是资本流的突然“断流”和金融危机。


As external imbalances grow larger, each phase of this cycle becomes more painful.	随着外部失衡的加剧，这一循环的每一阶段都会变得更加痛苦。


The real heroes of the world economy – the role models that others should emulate – are countries that have done relatively well while running only small external imbalances.	世界经济的真英雄——其他国家应该效仿的榜样——是做得相对较好且外部失衡较小的国家。


Countries like Austria, Canada, the Philippines, Lesotho, and Uruguay cannot match the world’s growth champions, because they do not over-borrow or sustain a mercantilist economic model.	奥地利、加拿大、菲律宾、莱索托和乌拉圭无法与世界增长冠军相媲美，因为它们没有过度借贷来维持重商主义经济模式。


Theirs are unremarkable economies that do not garner many headlines.	它们是不起眼的经济体，很少出现在标题中。


But without them, the global economy would be even less manageable than it already is.	但没有它们，全球经济将比现在更加难以治理。


In Praise of Foxy Scholars	对狐狸学者的褒奖


PRINCETON – We live in a complicated world, so we are forced to simplify it.	发自普林斯顿——我们生活在一个复杂的世界，因此不得不努力将其简化。


We categorize people around us as friends or foes, classify their motives as good or bad, and ascribe events with complex roots to straightforward causes.	我们把周围的人归类为朋友或敌人，将他们的动机分成善意或恶意，并将拥有复杂根源的事件归咎于直接的原因。


Such shortcuts help us navigate the complexities of our social existence. They help us form expectations about the consequences of our and others’ actions, and thereby facilitate decision-making.	这些捷径帮助我们游弋于自身社会存在的复杂性之中,协助我们对自己和他人的行为后果进行预测，从而促进决策。


But, because such “mental models” are simplifications, they are necessarily wrong.	但由于这种“思维模型”是一种简化，它们必然会出错。


They may serve us well as we navigate our daily challenges, but they leave out many details and can backfire when we find ourselves in an environment in which our categorizations and ready-made explanations fit less well.	它们可能有助于我们迎接日常的挑战，但它们遗漏了很多细节，当我们发现自己处于一个经验分类和已有解释都不太适合的环境中时就会适得其反。


The term “culture shock” refers to situations in which our expectations about people’s behavior turn out to be so wrong that we find ourselves jolted by the experience.	“文化冲击”这个词指的就是我们对他人行为的期望与实际是如此南辕北辙，以致感觉被这种体验所颠覆了。


And yet, without these shortcuts we would be either lost or paralyzed.	然而，没有这些捷径，我们将会迷失或者瘫痪。


We have neither the mental capacity nor the understanding to decipher the full web of cause-and-effect relations in our social existence.	我们既缺乏心智能力也没有足够的知识去破译社会存在中因果关系的完整网络。


So our daily behavior and reactions must be based on incomplete, and occasionally misleading, mental models.	所以我们的日常行为和反应必须基于不完整的，偶尔误导性的思维模型。


The best that social science has to offer is in fact not much different.	社会科学所能提供的最好东西实际上也没多大差别。


Social scientists – and economists in particular – analyze the world using simple conceptual frameworks that they call “models.”	社会科学家——特别是经济学家——使用简单的概念框架——他们口中的“模型”——来分析世界。


The virtue of such models is that they make explicit the chain of cause and effect, and therefore render transparent the specific assumptions on which a particular prediction rests.	这种模型的优点在于能展现出清晰的因果链条，从而使一个特定的预测可以明确构建于一个特定的假设之上、。


Good social science turns our unexamined intuitions into a map of causal arrows.	好的社会可以会把我们未经检验的知觉转化成一个满是各方向箭头的地图。


Sometimes it shows how those intuitions lead to surprising, unanticipated results when extended to their logical conclusions.	有时它会展示出当那些直觉延伸到其逻辑结论时是如何产生出一些令人吃惊的意外结果。


Fully general frameworks, such as economists’ beloved Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium, are so broad and encompassing that they are totally unhelpful for real-world explanation or prediction.	全面通用型框架，比如经济学家喜欢使用的阿罗-德布鲁一般均衡模型，是如此宏观而包罗万象，以致根本无法用于任何现实世界的解释或者预测。


Useful social-science models are invariably simplifications.	有用的社会科学模型都是不含变量的简化。


They leave out many details to focus on the most relevant aspect of a specific context. Applied economists’ mathematical models are the most explicit example of this.	它们舍弃了许多细节去聚焦在某一特定背景下最为关联的方面，而应用经济学家的数学模型就是体现这一点的最精确例子。


But, whether formalized or not, simplified narratives are social scientists’ bread and butter.	但不管是否以固定模式存在，社会科学家就是靠把某项事件不断简化来谋生的。


Stylized historical analogies often play a similar role.	程式化的历史类比往往也是如此。


For example, international-relations scholars use the famous meeting between Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler in Munich in 1938 as a model of how appeasing a power bent on expansionism can be futile (or dangerous).	比如国际关系学者就用1938年英国首相张伯伦和希特勒在慕尼黑的会议作为一个模型来解释对一个扩张主义政权使用绥靖政策可能会是无效（或危险）的。


But, as inevitable as simplification is for explanation, it is also a trap.	但虽然简化对于解释一项事务来说必不可少，但它也可能会是一个陷阱。


It is easy to get wedded to particular models and fail to recognize that changed circumstances require a different model.	你很可能会固守一个模型却未能意识到变化了的情境需要另一个不同的模型。


Like other humans, social scientists are prone to over-confidence in their preferred model of the day.	正如其他人一样，社会科学家倾向于过度信任他们偏爱的模型。


They tend to exaggerate the support for the model and discount new evidence that contradicts it – a phenomenon known as “confirmation bias.”	他们往往会夸大那些证明该模型的因素同时贬低那些与模型相抵触的新证据——这种现象叫做“证实性偏见”。


In a world of diverse and changing circumstances, social scientists can do real harm by applying the wrong model.	在这个存在多种变化情况的世界上，如果社会科学家使用了错误的模型可能会产生严重的后果。


Neoliberal economic policies, predicated on well-functioning markets, misfired in developing countries – just as planning models, presuming competent and capable bureaucrats, failed in an earlier era. The efficient-markets theory led policymakers astray by encouraging them to undertake excessive financial deregulation.	基于完善市场的新自由主义经济政策在发展中国家就碰了钉子——正如从前让那些假定称职有能力的官员去制订计划模型那样。


It would be costly to apply the analogy of Munich in 1938 to a specific international conflict when the underlying situation is more reminiscent of Sarajevo in 1914.	而有效市场市场理论鼓励政策制定者���去实施过度的放松管制，最终导致他们误入歧途。


So how should we choose among alternative simplifications of reality?	那么我们应该如何在简化和现实这两者之间做出选择？


Rigorous empirical tests may eventually settle questions such as whether the US economy today is suffering more from Keynesian lack of demand or from policy uncertainty.	严谨的实证测试可能最终能解答当今美国经济最大的问题究竟是凯恩斯式的需求不足还是政策的不确定性。


Yet often we need to make decisions in real time, without the benefit of decisive empirical evidence.	但我们经常要在缺乏决定性实证依据的情况下实时做出决策。


My research on growth diagnostics (with Ricardo Hausmann, Andrés Velasco, and others) is an example of this style of work, showing how one can identify in a specific context the more binding among a multitude of growth constraints.	笔者（连同里卡多·豪斯曼，安德烈斯·瓦拉斯科以及其他研究者）针对增长状况诊断方式的研究就是这类工作的例子，展现出如何在一个特定背景下从多个增长制约性因素中筛选出其中较为相关的。


Unfortunately, economists and other social scientists get virtually no training in how to choose among alternative models. Neither is such an aptitude professionally rewarded.	不幸的是，经济学家和其他社会科学家实际上没有受过如何在不同模型中做出选择的训练，也没有同行会赞赏他们在这方面的能力。


Developing new theories and empirical tests is regarded as science, while the exercise of good judgment is clearly a craft.	创建一个新理论和实证测试被认为是科学，而一个好的判断力显然属于一门艺术。


The philosopher Isaiah Berlin famously distinguished between two styles of thinking, which he identified with the hedgehog and the fox.	哲学家以赛亚•柏林（Isaiah Berlin）的著名理论是对两种思维方式进行区分，并比喻为刺猬和狐狸。


The hedgehog is captivated by a single big idea, which he applies unremittingly.	刺猬会沉迷于一个宏大的想法，并坚持不懈。


The fox, by contrast, lacks a grand vision and holds many different views about the world – some of them even contradictory.	狐狸则相反，它缺乏一个宏大的视野，对世界拥有许多不同的看法——其中一些看法甚至是自相矛盾的。


We can always anticipate the hedgehog’s take on a problem – just as we can predict that market fundamentalists will always prescribe freer markets, regardless of the nature of the economic problem.	我们总是可以预见到刺猬会遇到的问题——正如我们可以预测，市场原教旨主义者总是要求更自由的市场，而不顾经济问题的本质。


Foxes carry competing, possibly incompatible theories in their heads.	狐狸的脑袋里可能会有互不相容的理论在进行竞争。


They are not attached to a particular ideology and find it easier to think contextually.	它们并未依附于到特定的思想，也乐于依据不同的情境来进行思考。


Scholars who are able to navigate from one explanatory framework to another as circumstances require are more likely to point us in the right direction.	那些能够依据情境需要从一个解释框架过渡到另一个的学者更能为我们指出正确的方向。


The world needs fewer hedgehogs and more foxes.	由此可见，世界需要更少的刺猬，和更多的狐狸。


Erdoğan’s Self-Inflicted Crisis	埃尔多安的自作孽


PRINCETON – The dramatic battle between Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its erstwhile ally, the “Hizmet” religious movement led by the self-exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen, has begun to expose the massive rule-of-law violations that these two groups employed to consolidate their power.	普林斯顿—土耳其执政党正义和发展党（AKP）与其昔日盟友、自愿流亡的传教士法土拉·葛兰（Fethullah Gülen）领导的“服务”（Hizmet）宗教运动之间的恶斗已开始暴露出大量违反被双方用来巩固权力的法治精神的行动。


Prosecutors widely thought to be Gülen sympathizers have launched a wide-ranging corruption probe that has so far ensnared four ministers and reaches all the way to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son.	被广泛视为葛兰同情者的检察部门发动了一场波及面极大的反腐调查，到目前为止已有四名部长被捕，并剑指总理埃尔多安之子。


Erdoğan and his advisers have now hit back.	埃尔多安和他的顾问已开始反击。


They accuse the Gülenists of mounting a “bureaucratic coup” and engaging in a wide range of dirty tricks, from “planting evidence” against generals who were convicted last year of plotting to overthrow Erdoğan’s government to “extensive unauthorized wiretap[ping].”	他们指责葛兰主义者实施“官僚政变”，并参与了一系列肮脏勾当，包括“罗织证据”以密谋推翻埃尔多安政府的罪名栽赃多名将军和“大规模非法监听”。


Turkey’s landmark trials of the alleged military-coup plotters are now widely recognized for what they were – witch hunts based on evidence that was flimsy at best, and often simply concocted.	土耳其对军事政变策划者的里程碑式的审判如今被广泛认为是冤假错案——是基于脆弱甚至完全捏造的证据的政治迫害。


The trials were stage-managed by Gülenist police, prosecutors, and media.	这场审判由葛兰主义警察、检察官和媒体炮制。


But they had crucial support from Erdoğan’s government, which put its weight behind them.	但他们背后是来自埃尔多安政府的重要支持。


The Erdoğan camp’s current effort to wash its hands of these trials and put the full blame on the Gülenists is disingenuous to say the least.	埃尔多安阵营目前急切地要从这些审判中脱身，把所有责任都推给葛兰主义者不可不谓狡猾。


Erdoğan once famously declared that he was the prosecutor on the “Ergenekon” case, which was supposedly aimed at exposing and combating the Turkish “deep state” composed of military officials and secular nationalists, but that targeted a wide range of political opponents.	埃尔多安曾经宣布，他是“埃尔盖内孔”（Ergenekon）案的起诉者，该案原本的目标是揭发和批斗由军官和世俗民族主义者组成的土耳其“黑暗势力”，但实际上针对的是大量政治反对派。


When the horrifying – but entirely fabricated – documents behind the generals’ fictitious “Sledgehammer” coup plot came out, Erdoğan lent credence to them by saying that he had been aware of such plots.	当关于将军们子虚乌有的“大锤”（Sledgehammer）政变图谋的骇人听闻——但完全是拼凑而成——的档案公之于众时，埃尔多安声称自己早就掌握了这些政变，以此为证据背书。


His ministers attacked the defendants and pilloried the lone judge who issued a pre-trial ruling in their favor.	他的部长们攻击被告，并抨击唯一一名做出有利预审裁决的法官。


Beyond such public statements, the Erdoğan government did everything in its power to ensure that these and other political trials (including a massive one involving hundreds of Kurdish activists) would proceed to their preordained conclusion.	除了这些公开资料，埃尔多安政府利用了一切权力确保这些和其他政治审判（包括针对库尔德人活跃分子的涉及几百人的大案）能以他们预定的结果结案。


In particular, the higher echelons of the judiciary were filled with judges who were either Gülenists or ready to do their bidding.	特别是，司法部门高层被葛兰主��者或准备纳投名状加入葛兰阵营的法官把持着。


Endless complaints about flagrant violations of the rule of law fell on deaf ears.	关于赤裸裸地破坏法治精神的投诉不绝于耳，但他们充耳不闻。


Erdoğan and his advisers sound very different these days.	如今，埃尔多安及其顾问口风大变。


The new line is that these trials were marred by irregularities, that there had been a plot against the military, and that the Gülenists have established a state within the state.	新说辞是这些审判受到了非法行为的阻滞，存在针对军方的阴谋，葛兰主义者建立了国中之国。


The reason for the conversion is clear: Erdoğan needs to isolate and embarrass the Gülenists, with whom he is now engaged in a bitter struggle for power.	如此转变，原因很清楚：埃尔多安需要孤立和抹黑葛兰主义者，目前他正在与葛兰主义者进行艰苦的权力斗争。


The Gülenists have dressed up their campaign against Erdoğan in the guise of a corruption probe.	葛兰主义者以反腐调查为幌子开展反埃尔多安运动。


No one who is familiar with Turkey would be surprised to learn that there was large-scale corruption surrounding construction projects.	对于熟悉土耳其的人来说，决不会吃惊于建筑工程存在大规模腐败现象。


But the corruption probe is clearly politically motivated, and Erdoğan is right to question the prosecutors’ motives.	但腐败调查背后显然有政治动机，埃尔多安也正确地质疑了检察官动机不纯。


The current round of judicial activism is as much about rooting out corruption as previous rounds were about prosecuting the “deep state” and real coups – which is to say, not much at all.	当前根除腐败的司法活跃正如此前针对“黑暗势力”和真正的政变的起诉风潮，是醉翁之意不在酒。


But Erdoğan is the one who gave a free pass to the Gülen movement in the first place.	但是埃尔多安当初为葛兰运动的行为开了绿灯。


More than three years ago, Erdoğan had a golden opportunity in the aftermath of the August 2010 constitutional referendum.	三年多前，在2010年8月的修宪全民公决后，埃尔多安有一次黄金机会。


His handy win confirmed that he was securely in power and had little to fear from the military and other elements of the ultra-secularist old guard.	他的大获全胜保证了他大权在握，不需要担心军方和其他极端世俗主义的旧卫道士。


He could have renounced the judicial dirty tricks and media manipulation that had enabled his regime to take hold.	他可以宣布与助他掌权的司法肮脏勾当和媒体操纵决裂。


At the time, I wrote that if he did not change course, “the country will descend deeper into authoritarianism, political divisions will become irreconcilable, and yet another political rupture may become inevitable.”	当时，我写道，如果他不改变现状，“土耳其将朝着集权主义越滑越深，政治分歧将变得不可调和，新的政治决裂可能将不可避免。


Alas, that prediction has now been fulfilled.	”呜呼，这一预言如今终于实现了。


Today, Erdoğan has fewer good options, but he could still turn the situation around.	如今，埃尔多安已无多少好选择，但仍能扭转局势。


Gülenist machinations in the judiciary and other parts of the bureaucracy have created a broad spectrum of opposition; pretty much everyone – nationalists, Kurdish activists, secularists, traditional Islamists, socialists, and liberals – has been at the receiving end of these intrigues at one time or another.	葛兰主义者在司法界和官僚集团的其他部分的阴谋已经造就了为数甚众的反对派； 几乎所有人——民主主义者、库尔德人活跃分子、世俗主义者、传统伊斯兰教徒、社会主义者和自由派——都成为过这一阴谋的拉拢对象。


Erdoğan could, in principle, mobilize a coalition that transcends his own AKP to support reforms aimed at returning the judiciary to its proper role.	理论上，埃尔多安可以动员超越AKP范畴的联盟以支持旨在让司法系统回归正常角色的改革。


Of course, none of these groups would mind watching Erdoğan go down in flames; so all of them would want something in return for joining such a coalition.	当然，这些集团都不会介意目睹埃尔多安的下台； 因此要让这些集团加入联盟就必须给予好处。


Those concessions would be the necessary price for Erdoğan to pay – and just desserts for leading Turkey into its present mess.	这些让步是埃尔多安必须付出的代价，也是领导土耳其走出当前乱象所必须付出的代价。


But at least he would have the chance to ameliorate the harsh judgment that historians will pass on his leadership.	但至少他将可以拥有改写后世史书对其领导力的评价的机会。


Unfortunately, Erdoğan seems intent on missing this opportunity as well.	不幸的是，埃尔多安似乎打算连这次机会都要错过。


He has chosen to respond by tightening his autocratic grip, with the body that appoints prosecutors and judges set to become a mere appendage of the justice ministry.	他选择了以收紧其独裁统治为应对手段，任命检察官和法官的机构将成为司法部的附属物。


His supporters have been launching smear campaigns against Gülenists that are reminiscent of Gülenist tactics.	他的支持者发动了针对葛兰主义者的抹黑运动——和葛兰主义者如出一辙。


He seems to believe that he can retain enough popularity to ride out the crisis without expanding his coalition.	他似乎认为他可以赢得足够的支持在不扩大联盟的情况下走出危机。


The battle between Erdoğan and the Gülen movement has escalated to the point where it is hard to imagine a reconciliation.	埃尔多安和葛兰运动之间的斗争已经升级到难以调和的程度了。


The good news is that this tooth-and-nail fight is laying bare the corruption and judicial manipulation on which Erdoğan’s regime was based.	好消息是全力以赴的斗争将让埃尔多安政权赖以建立的腐败和司法操纵暴露无遗。


The bad news is that regardless of who wins, Turkish democracy will be the loser – at least in the short run, until truly democratic forces emerge.	坏消息是不管谁赢，输家都将是土耳其民主——至少在短期、真正的民主力量形成之前是如此。


How the Rich Rule	富人如何统治


PRINCETON – It is hardly news that the rich have more political power than the poor, even in democratic countries where everyone gets a single vote in elections.	普林斯顿—富人比穷人拥有更大的政治权力，这不是新闻，即使在一人一票选举的民主国家也是如此。


But two political scientists, Martin Gilens of Princeton University and Benjamin Page of Northwestern University, have recently produced some stark findings for the United States that have dramatic implications for the functioning of democracy – in the US and elsewhere.	但两位政治学家——普林斯顿大学的马丁·吉伦斯（Martin Gilens）和西北大学的本杰明·佩奇（Benjamin Page）最近发现了关于美国的一些冷酷的结论，他们的发现对于美国和其他国家的民主的运作具有重要影响。


The authors’ research builds on prior work by Gilens, who painstakingly collected public-opinion polls on nearly 2,000 policy questions from 1981 to 2002.	两位作者的研究基于吉伦斯之前的工作的基础上。 吉伦斯费尽心思收集了从1981年到2002年间近2,000个政策问题的民意调查。


The pair then examined whether America’s federal government adopted the policy in question within four years of the survey, and tracked how closely the outcome matched the preferences of voters at different points of the income distribution.	接着，两人考察了美国联邦政府是否在调查后四年内采取了被调查政策，并追踪了结果与位于收入分配不同区位的选民的偏好的匹配程度。


When viewed in isolation, the preferences of the “average” voter – that is, a voter in the middle of the income distribution – seem to have a strongly positive influence on the government’s ultimate response.	单独看来，“普通”选民——即位于收入分配中端的选民，他的偏好对政府最终反应具有强大的积极影响力。


A policy that the average voter would like is significantly more likely to be enacted.	普通选民所喜欢的政策具有极大的可能成为现实。


But, as Gilens and Page note, this gives a misleadingly upbeat impression of the representativeness of government decisions.	但是，吉伦斯和佩奇指出，这会形成一个关于政府决定代表性的错误的乐观印象。


The preferences of the average voter and of economic elites are not very different on most policy matters.	普通选民和经济精英的偏好在大部分政策事务上并无重大差异。


For example, both groups of voters would like to see a strong national defense and a healthy economy.	比如，两个群体的选民都希望看到强大的国防和健康的经济。


A better test would be to examine what the government does when the two groups have divergent views.	更好的检验政府做了什么的办法是考察这两组人群观点相左时的情形。


To carry out that test, Gilens and Page ran a horse race between the preferences of average voters and those of economic elites – defined as individuals at the top tenth percentile of the income distribution – to see which voters exert greater influence.	在检验中，吉伦斯和佩奇比较了普通选民和经济精英（定义为收入分配最顶端10%的人群）的偏好，研究哪类选民施加的影响更大。


They found that the effect of the average voter drops to insignificant levels, while that of economic elites remains substantial.	他们发现，普通选民的影响力下降到次要地位，而经济精英仍具有很大影响力。


The implication is clear: when the elites’ interests differ from those of the rest of society, it is their views that count – almost exclusively.	含义很明显：当精英的利益与社会其他阶层相左时，他们的观点最重要——几乎可以无视其他阶层的看法。


(As Gilens and Page explain, we should think of the preferences of the top 10% as a proxy for the views of the truly wealthy, say, the top 1% – the genuine elite.)	（吉伦斯和佩奇解释说，我们应该将顶层10%的人的偏好作为真正的富人的观点的指标。 真正的富人是最顶尖的1%，他们是精英中的精英。


Gilens and Page report similar results for organized interest groups, which wield a powerful influence on policy formation.	对于有组织利益集团，吉伦斯和佩奇的结论也是如此。 有组织利益集团对政策形成具有强大影响力。


As they point out, “it makes very little difference what the general public thinks” once interest-group alignments and the preferences of affluent Americans are taken into account.	他们指出，如果将利益集团联盟和美国丰裕阶层的偏好考虑进来，则“普罗大众想什么基本上没有什么区别”。


These disheartening results raise an important question: How do politicians who are unresponsive to the interests of the vast majority of their constituents get elected and, more important, re-elected, while doing the bidding mostly of the wealthiest individuals?	这些令人沮丧的结果引出了一个重要问题：对绝大部分群众的利益视为不见、而对最富有个人几乎有求必应的政客是如何当选——更重要的是，是如何连任的呢？


Part of the explanation may be that most voters have a poor understanding of how the political system works and how it is tilted in favor of the economic elite.	部分原因也许在于大部分选民并不能很好地理解政治制度是如何作用的，也不理解政治制度是如何为经济精英服务的。


As Gilens and Page emphasize, their evidence does not imply that government policy makes the average citizen worse off.	吉伦斯和佩奇强调，他们的证据并不表明政府政策让普通公民的境况变坏了。


Ordinary citizens often do get what they want, by virtue of the fact that their preferences frequently are similar to those of the elite.	普通公民常常确实能够获得他们想要的，这是因为他们的偏好往往与精英阶层相似。


This correlation of the two groups’ preferences may make it difficult for voters to discern politicians’ bias.	这两个群体的偏好的相关性使得选民很难察觉政客的歧视。


But another, more pernicious, part of the answer may lie in the strategies to which political leaders resort in order to get elected.	但另一个更危险的答案在于政治领袖为当选而所采取的战略。


A politician who represents the interests primarily of economic elites has to find other means of appealing to the masses.	代表主要是经济精英的利益的政客需要找到其他途径吸引大众。


Such an alternative is provided by the politics of nationalism, sectarianism, and identity – a politics based on cultural values and symbolism rather than bread-and-butter interests.	这条途径可以通过民族主义、宗派主义和身份政治找到——即基于文化价值和符号而不是面包和黄油利益的政治。


When politics is waged on these grounds, elections are won by those who are most successful at “priming” our latent cultural and psychological markers, not those who best represent our interests.	当政治建立在这些基础上时，赢得选举的将是最能“激发”我们的潜在文化和心理标签的政客，而不是最能代表我们的利益的政客。


Karl Marx famously said that religion is “the opium of the people.”	卡尔·马克思有一句名言，宗教是“人民的鸦片”。


What he meant is that religious sentiment could obscure the material deprivations that workers and other exploited people experience in their daily lives.	这句话的含义是，宗教情绪可以让工人和其他被剥削人民的日常所遭到的物质匮乏模糊化。


In much of the same way, the rise of the religious right and, with it, culture wars over “family values” and other highly polarizing issues (for example, immigration) have served to insulate American politics from the sharp rise in economic inequality since the late 1970s.	同样地，宗教右翼的兴起以及随之而起的针对“家族价值观”和其他高度极端化的问题（如移民问题）的文化战争被利用来将美国政治与20世纪70年代末以来的经济不平等性的急剧上升隔离开来。


As a result, conservatives have been able to retain power despite their pursuit of economic and social policies that are inimical to the interests of the middle and lower classes.	结果是保守派得以保持权力，尽管他们所追求的经济和社会政策与中产阶级和下层人民的利益根本不相符。


Identity politics is malignant because it tends to draw boundaries around a privileged in-group and requires the exclusion of outsiders – those of other countries, values, religions, or ethnicities.	身份政治危害极大，因为它会画一个圈，圈出享有特权的圈内人并要求排斥圈外人——即外国人、持有不同价值观的人、宗教信仰不同的人和其他种族的人。


This can be seen most clearly in illiberal democracies such as Russia, Turkey, and Hungary.	这在非自由民主国家，如俄罗斯、土耳其、匈牙利等国特别明显。


In order to solidify their electoral base, leaders in these countries appeal heavily to national, cultural, and religious symbols.	为了巩固选举基础，这些国家的领导人严重依赖民族、文化和宗教符号。


In doing so, they typically inflame passions against religious and ethnic minorities.	这样做往往能够煽动针对宗教和民族少数派的敌对。


For regimes that represent economic elites (and are often corrupt to the core), it is a ploy that pays off handsomely at the polls.	对于代表经济精英的政权（这样的政权往往从内到外都腐败透顶）来说，这是一个能带来可观民意好处的策略。


Widening inequality in the world’s advanced and developing countries thus inflicts two blows against democratic politics.	世界发达国家和发展中国家间不断扩大的不平等性因此造成了对民主政治的两大冲击。


Not only does it lead to greater disenfranchisement of the middle and lower classes; it also fosters among the elite a poisonous politics of sectarianism.	它不但导致中产阶级和下层人民选举权日益被剥夺，也在精英阶层中间酝酿了极其危险的宗派主义政治。


Africa’s Structural Transformation Challenge	非洲的结构转型挑战


PRINCETON – Long viewed as an economic basket case, Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing its best growth performance since the immediate post-independence years.	普林斯顿—长期被视为经济不健全者的撒哈拉以南非洲地区正在经历自独立后的几年以来的最强的经济增长。


Natural-resource windfalls have helped, but the good news extends beyond resource-rich countries.	自然资源禀赋起到了提振作用，但好消息并不只限于资源丰富国。


Countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, among others, have grown at East Asian rates since the mid-1990’s.	埃塞俄比亚、卢旺达和乌干达等国家自20世纪90年代中期以来以东非速度增长着。


And Africa’s business and political leaders are teeming with optimism about the continent’s future.	非洲的商业和政治领导人对非洲大陆的未来充满了乐观。


The question is whether this performance can be sustained.	问题在于这样的表现能否持续。


So far, growth has been driven by a combination of external resources (aid, debt relief, or commodity windfalls) and the removal of some of the worst policy distortions of the past.	目前，增长的驱动力来自外部资源（援助、债务豁免和商品资源禀赋）以及取消过去的一些最糟糕的政策扭曲。


Domestic productivity has been given a boost by an increase in demand for domestic goods and services (mostly the latter) and more efficient use of resources.	国内生产率因国内商品和服务需求的增长（特别是后者）以及资源的高效使用而获得了提振。


The trouble is that it is not clear from whence future productivity gains will come.	麻烦在于未来生产率改进之源来自何方。


The underlying problem is the weakness of these economies’ structural transformation.	根本问题是这些经济体结构转型不力。


East Asian countries grew rapidly by replicating, in a much shorter time frame, what today’s advanced countries did following the Industrial Revolution.	东亚国家的快速增长来自短时间内复制了当今发达国家在工业革命后所做的事情。


They turned their farmers into manufacturing workers, diversified their economies, and exported a range of increasingly sophisticated goods.	农民转变为制造业工人，经济实现多元化，并开始出口一系列日益成熟的商品。


Little of this process is taking place in Africa.	而非洲几乎看不到这一幕。


As researchers at the African Center for Economic Transformation in Accra, Ghana, put it, the continent is “growing rapidly, transforming slowly.”	位于加纳阿克拉（Accra）的非洲经济转型中心（African Center for Economic Transformation）的研究者指出，非洲大陆“增长很快，转型很慢”。


In principle, the region’s potential for labor-intensive industrialization is great.	理论上，该地区的劳动密集型工业化潜力是巨大的。


A Chinese shoe manufacturer, for example, pays its Ethiopian workers one-tenth what it pays its workers back home.	比如，一家中国制鞋公司向埃塞俄比亚工人支付的薪水只有其支付本国工人薪水的十分之一。


It can raise Ethiopian workers’ productivity to half or more of Chinese levels through in-house training.	经过内部培训，埃塞俄比亚工人的生产率可以达到中国水平的一半或以上。


The savings in labor costs more than offset other incremental costs of doing business in an African environment, such as poor infrastructure and bureaucratic red tape.	节约下来的劳动力成本足以抵消在非洲环境下做生意的额外成本，如拙劣的基础设施和官僚主义障碍。


But the aggregate numbers tell a worrying story.	但加总数字表现出完全不同的情景。


Fewer than 10% of African workers find jobs in manufacturing, and among those only a tiny fraction – as low as one-tenth – are employed in modern, formal firms with adequate technology.	只有不到10%的非洲工人在制造业找到了工作，而他们之中又只有一小部分——大概只有十分之一——受雇于拥有先进技术的正规现代企业。


Distressingly, there has been very little improvement in this regard, despite high growth rates.	糟糕的是，尽管非洲增长率很高，这方面却鲜有赶紧。


In fact, Sub-Saharan Africa is less industrialized today than it was in the 1980’s.	事实上，如今撒哈拉以南地区的现代化程度还不如20世纪80年代。


Private investment in modern industries, especially non-resource tradables, has not increased, and remains too low to sustain structural transformation.	现代行业，特别是非资源可贸易行业的私人投资并未增长，不足以维持结构转型。


As in all developing countries, farmers in Africa are flocking to the cities.	和所有发展中国家一样，非洲农民也在涌向城市。


And yet, as a recent study from the Groningen Growth and Development Center shows, rural migrants do not end up in modern manufacturing industries, as they did in East Asia, but in services such as retail trade and distribution.	但哥廷根增长和发展中心（Groningen Growth and Development Center）的最新研究表明，农民工最终并未像东亚那样流入现代制造业，而是流入了零售贸易和分销等服务业。


Though such services have higher productivity than much of agriculture, they are not technologically dynamic in Africa and have been falling behind the world frontier.	尽管这些服务业的生产率比大部分农业要高，但它们在非洲并不具有技术活力，也落后于世界标准。


Consider Rwanda, a much-heralded success story where GDP has increased by a whopping 9.6% per year, on average, since 1995 (with per capita incomes rising at an annual rate of 5.2%).	卢旺达可谓成功的先驱，自1995年以来其GDP平均年增长率高达令人诧异的9. 6%（人均收入增长年率为5.


Xinshen Diao of the International Food Policy Research Institute has shown that this growth was led by non-tradable services, in particular construction, transport, and hotels and restaurants.	2%）。 国际食物政策研究所（International Food Policy Research Institute）的刁新生（Xinshen Diao）指出，这一增长受不可贸易的服务部门的拉动，特别是建筑业、运输业和餐饮饭店业。


The public sector dominates investment, and the bulk of public investment is financed by foreign grants.	公共部门主导了投资，而大部分公共投资通过外国援助筹资。


Foreign aid has caused the real exchange rate to appreciate, compounding the difficulties faced by manufacturing and other tradables.	外国援助导致真实汇率升值，加剧了制造业和其他贸易部门所面临的困境。


None of this is to dismiss Rwanda’s progress in reducing poverty, which reflects reforms in health, education, and the general policy environment.	所有这些都不能抹杀卢旺达在减贫方面的进步，这些进步体现在健康、教育和总体政策环境方面的改革中。


Without question, these improvements have raised the country’s potential income.	毫无疑问，这些改善提高了该国的潜在收入。


But improved governance and human capital do not necessarily translate into economic dynamism.	但改善的治理和人力资本并不一定能带来经济活力。


What Rwanda and other African countries lack are the modern, tradable industries that can turn the potential into reality by acting as the domestic engine of productivity growth.	卢旺达和其他非洲国家缺少可以通过充当生产率增长的国内引擎将潜力转化为现实的现代可贸易行业。


The African economic landscape’s dominant feature – an informal sector comprising microenterprises, household production, and unofficial activities – is absorbing the growing urban labor force and acting as a social safety net.	非洲经济图景的主要特征——由微型企业、家庭生产和非官方活动组成的非正式部门在吸收日益增长的城市劳动力并充当社会安全网。


But the evidence suggests that it cannot provide the missing productive dynamism.	但证据表明非正式部门无法带来缺失的生产活力。


Studies show that very few microenterprises grow beyond informality, just as the bulk of successful established firms do not start out as small, informal enterprises.	研究表明，极少有微型企业可以通过成长超越非正式性质，正如大部分成功企业并非从小型非正式企业起步。


Optimists say that the good news about African structural transformation has not yet shown up in macroeconomic data.	乐观者说，关于非洲结构转型的好消息还没有在宏观经济数据中有所体现。


They may well be right.	他们很有可能是对的。


But if they are wrong, Africa may confront some serious difficulties in the decades ahead.	但如果他们错了，那么非洲可能将在未来几十年里面临严重困难。


Half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under 25 years of age.	撒哈拉以南非洲一半人口不到25岁。


According to the World Bank, each year an additional five million turn 15, “crossing the threshold from childhood to adulthood.”	根据世界银行的数据，每年都有500万新增15岁以上人口，而15岁是“告别童年，进入成年的门槛”。


Given the slow pace of positive structural transformation, the Bank projects that over the next decade only one in four African youth will find regular employment as a salaried worker, and that only a small fraction of those will be in the formal sector of modern enterprises.	由于积极结构转型速度缓慢，世界银行预测，在未来十年中，只有四分之一的非洲年轻人能找到固定的有薪工作，而这些人中又只有一小部分可以进入现代企业正式部门。


Two decades of economic expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa have raised a young population’s expectations of good jobs without greatly expanding the capacity to deliver them.	撒哈拉以南非洲二十年的经济扩张提高了年轻人对好工作的预期，但并没有很大地提升供应这类工作的能力。


These are the conditions that make social protest and political instability likely.	这就带来了社会游行和政治动荡的危险。


Economic planning based on simple extrapolations of recent growth will exacerbate the discrepancy.	基于将现有增长趋势简单外推的经济规划会加剧分歧。


Instead, African political leaders may have to manage expectations downward, while working to increase the rate of structural transformation and social inclusion.	相反，非洲政治领导人或许应该抑制预期，同时致力于加快结构转型速度和增加社会包容度。


The Perils of Economic Consensus	经济共识的危险


PRINCETON – The Initiative on Global Markets, based at the University of Chicago, periodically surveys a group of leading academic economists, of varying political persuasions, on the issues of the day.	普林斯顿—芝加哥大学的全球市场计划（Initiative on Global Markets）定期调查一组政治观点各异的顶尖经济学家，询问他们对当前问题的意见。


Its latest roundup asked whether President Barack Obama’s stimulus plan helped to reduce unemployment in the United States.	最近一期的问题是奥巴马的刺激计划是否有助于美国降低失业。


Officially known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the plan entailed government spending of more than $800 billion on infrastructure, education, health, and energy, tax incentives, and various social programs.	这一正式名为2009年美国复苏和再投资法（American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009）的计划包括政府投入8,000多亿美元用于基础设施、教育、卫生、能源领域； 税收激励；


Implemented in the midst of an economic crisis, it was the classic Keynesian response.	以及众多社会项目。 该计划在经济危机期间实施，是一项经典的凯恩斯主义应对措施。


The economists were virtually unanimous.	受调查经济学家的意见几乎是一边倒。


Thirty-six of the 37 top economists who responded to the survey said that the plan had been successful in its avowed objective of reducing unemployment.	在回答调查的37名顶尖经济学家中，有三十六人表示该，就减少失业的目标而言，该计划是成功的。


The University of Michigan economist Justin Wolfers cheered the consensus in his New York Times blog.	密歇根大学经济学家贾斯丁·沃尔夫斯（Justin Wlofers）在其《纽约时报》博客上为这一共识喝彩。


The virulent public debate about whether fiscal stimulus works, he complained, has become totally disconnected from what experts know and agree on.	他抱怨说，关于财政刺激是否有效的公共政策贻害良多，并且与专家所了解和形成了一致的东西完全脱节。


In fact, economists agree on many things, a number of which are politically controversial.	事实上，经济学家在诸多问题上都形成了一致，其中不乏颇具政治争议者。 哈佛经济学家格雷格·曼昆（Greg Mankiw）在2009年列举了其中的一些。


The Harvard economist Greg Mankiw listed some of them in 2009.	以下意见至少获得了90%的经济学家的支持：进口关税和配额降低总体经济福利； 租金管制减少住房供给；


The following propositions garnered support from at least 90% of economists: import tariffs and quotas reduce general economic welfare; rent controls reduce the supply of housing; floating exchange rates provide an effective international monetary system; the US should not restrict employers from outsourcing work to foreign countries; and fiscal policy stimulates the economy when there is less than full employment.	美国不应该限制雇主将工作外包给外国； 财政政策可以在就业未达充分状态时刺激经济。


This consensus about so many important issues contrasts rather starkly with the general perception that economists rarely agree on anything.	在如此多重要问题上都有共识，这与普遍的观点——经济学家极少在任何问题上行促成一致相悖。


“If all the economists were laid end to end,” George Bernard Shaw famously quipped, “they would not reach a conclusion.”	“如果把所有经济学家放到一起，”萧伯纳曾经做过著名的总结，“他们不会得到任何结论。


Frustrated by the conflicting and hedged advice that he was receiving from his advisers, President Dwight Eisenhower is said to have asked once for a “one-handed economist.”	”艾森豪威尔受够了顾问们彼此冲突和对立的建议，据说他曾经要求“单面经济学家”做顾问。


No doubt, there are many public-policy questions that economists debate vigorously.	毫无疑问，在许多公共政策问题上，经济学家间有着激烈的争论。


What should the top income-tax rate be?	最高所得税率应该是多少？


Should the minimum wage be raised?	应该提高最低工资吗？


Should the fiscal deficit be reduced by raising taxes or cutting spending?	财政赤字应该通过增税还是减支来减少？


Do patents stimulate or impede innovation?	专利刺激还是阻碍���创新？


On these and many other issues, economists tend to be good at seeing both sides of the issue, and I suspect that a survey on such questions would reveal little consensus.	在这些和其他许多问题上，经济学家擅长分析问题的两面，我怀疑对这些问题的调查不会出现任何共识。


A consensus among economists can arise for both good and bad reasons.	经济学家间的共识有利也有弊。


Sometimes a consensus is innocuous enough, as when you hear economists argue that one ignores the role of incentives at one’s peril.	有时，共识无伤大雅，比如，经济学家们指出，忽略激励的作用是危险的。


Can anyone really disagree with that?	你这能反驳这一点吗？


Sometimes it is restricted to a particular episode and is based on evidence accumulated after the fact: Yes, the Soviet economic system was hugely inefficient; yes, the Obama fiscal stimulus of 2009 did reduce unemployment.	有时，共识限定于特定场景，其背后是事实积累起来的证据：是的，苏联经济制度效率极低； 是的，奥巴马的2009年财政刺激确实降低了失业。


But when a consensus forms around the universal applicability of a specific model, the critical assumptions of which are likely to be violated in many settings, we have a problem.	但如果共识来自具体模型的普遍适用性，而该模型的假设很容易被违反，那么我们就会面临问题。


Consider some of the areas of widespread agreement that I listed above.	考虑我在上文中列举的存在广泛共识的领域。


The proposition that trade restrictions reduce economic welfare is certainly not generally valid, and it is violated when certain conditions – such as externalities or increasing returns to scale – are present.	贸易限制降低经济福利的意见显然不是放之四海而皆准的，当出现某些特定状况时（如外部性和规模报酬递增），它就不成立。


Moreover, it requires that economists make value judgments on distributional effects, which are better left to the electorate itself.	此外，经济学家还需要做出分配效应的价值判断，而这留给选民本身来做更加合适。


Likewise, the proposition that rent controls reduce the supply of housing is violated under conditions of imperfect competition.	类似地，租金控制降低住房供给的意见在不完美竞争条件下也不成立。


And the proposition that floating exchange rates are an effective system relies on assumptions about the workings of the monetary and financial system that have proved problematic; I suspect a poll today would find significantly less support for it.	而浮动汇率是有效体系的意见需要依赖关于货币和金融体系运转的假设，而这些假设已被证明是有问题的； 我怀疑如在今天做一个调查，支持浮动汇率的人会少得多。


Perhaps economists tend to agree that certain assumptions are more prevalent in the real world.	或许经济学家们会同意，某些假设在现实世界中更普遍。


Or they think that one set of models works better “on average” than another.	或者他们认为某些模型“平均而言”比另一些更有效。


Even so, as scientists, should they not adorn their endorsements with the appropriate caveats?	即是如此，难道他们不应该和科学家一样装模做样地表示对合理警告的支持？


Shouldn’t they worry that categorical statements such as those above may prove to be misleading in at least some settings?	他们难道不应该担心上述绝对论断至少在某些条件下会起到误导作用？


The problem is that economists often confuse a model for the model.	问题在于经济学家常常混淆模型（a model）和合意模型（the model）。


When that happens, a consensus is certainly not something to cheer about.	若是如此，共识就绝不值得喝彩。


Two kinds of mischief may then follow.	这可能造成两大弊端。


First, there are errors of omission – cases in which blind spots in the consensus prevent economists from being able to see troubles looming ahead.	首先是遗漏错误（errors of omission）——共识中的盲点让经济学家难以看到未来的麻烦。


A recent example is the failure of economists to grasp the dangerous confluence of circumstances that produced the global financial crisis.	最近的例子是经济学家没有看到各种危险状况的聚集并导致全球金融危机。


The oversight was not due to the lack of models of bubbles, asymmetric information, distorted incentives, or bank runs.	疏忽的原因不在于缺少关于泡沫、信息不对称、激励扭曲和银行挤兑的模型。


It was due to the fact that such models were neglected in favor of models that stressed efficient markets.	疏忽的原因在于这样的事实：为了给强调有效市场的模型让路，这些模型被忽略了。


Then there are the errors of commission – cases in which economists’ fixation on one particular model of the world makes them complicit in the administration of policies whose failure could have been predicted ahead of time.	其次是处理错误（errors of commission）——经济学家顽固地依赖某个特定的关于世界的模型，只看到了那些早就可以预料到失败的政策。


Economists’ advocacy of neoliberal “Washington Consensus” policies and of financial globalization falls into this category.	经济学家鼓吹新自由主义“华盛顿共识”政策和金融全球化就是这样的例子。


What happened in both cases is that economists overlooked serious second-best complications, such as learning externalities and weak institutions, which blunted the reforms and, in some cases, caused them to backfire.	在这两个例子中，经济学家忽略了严重的次优副作用，如学习外部性和制度弱点，这些副作用阻碍了改革，有时甚至让改革适得其反。


Disagreements among economists are healthy.	经济学家间的分歧是有益的。


They reflect the fact that their discipline comprises a diverse collection of models, and that matching reality to model is an imperfect science with a lot of room for error.	这反映了一个事实：经济学是由多元化的模型组成的，匹配现实与模型是一项不完美的科学，很容易犯错。


It is better for the public to be exposed to this uncertainty than for it to be lulled into a false sense of security based on the appearance of certain knowledge.	公众更应该直面这一不确定性，而不是沉溺于某些知识的外表所带来的虚假的安全感。


South Korea’s Japanese Mirror	韩国的日本镜像


SEOUL – Given the daunting challenges facing Japan, one can only admire Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s determination to end the country’s two-decade-long period of economic stagnation.	首尔—考虑到日本所面临的艰巨挑战，我们对日本首相安倍晋三结束日本二十年经济停滞的决心只能抱有敬仰之情。


His strategy – the “three arrows” of massive monetary expansion, increased government spending, and structural reform – is theoretically sound.	他的战略——由大规模货币扩张、政府增支和结构性改革组成的“三支箭”——在理论上是可行的。


But only one and a half arrows have been launched so far.	但到目前为止只射出了一支半。


The stimulus package is being offset by consumption-tax hikes aimed at reducing Japan’s massive debt burden – a process that will lead many Japanese consumers to adjust their spending downward.	刺激计划的效果因为旨在减少日本巨额债务负担的增加消费税计划而被抵消不少。 增加消费税将令日本消费者减少消费支出。


The promised structural reforms of the energy sector, labor market, and competition policy have yet to be introduced, and appear unlikely to take effect anytime soon.	能源部门、劳动力市场和竞争政策方面的结构性改革似乎也无法立刻就起到效果。


Even more worrisome are larger immutable realities – like a rapidly aging and shrinking population – that will limit Japan’s economic growth in the coming decades.	更令人担忧的是难以改变的现实——如快速老龄化且不断减少的人口，这些现实将成为未来几十年中日本经济增长的制约因素。


But Japan’s problems are not unique.	但日本的问题并不是独一无二的。


Indeed, its neighbor and historical rival, South Korea, is headed down a similar path.	事实上，它的近邻和历史上的对头韩国也处在相似的轨迹上。


The difference is that South Korea may still have time to ameliorate these trends, and avoid a Japanese-style quagmire of permanent low growth and long-term decline.	区别在于韩国可能仍有时间改善这些趋势并避免日本式的持久低增长和长期衰退的泥淖。


South Korea – the seventh-largest trading country in the world, and one of the most prominent economic success stories of the last 50 years – is at risk of such a bleak future as a result, first and foremost, of demographics.	作为世界第七大贸易国和过去50年来最令人瞩目的经济成功国家，韩国有可能面临着萧条的未来，主要原因就在于其人口。


South Korea’s working-age population is falling by 1.2% annually – the fastest decline among OECD countries.	韩国的工作适龄人口以每年1. 2%的速度下降，是经合组织国家中下降速度最快的。


While there are many reasons for South Korea’s low fertility rate, two economic factors stand out.	韩国的低出生率原因很多，但两大经济因素十分突出。


First, household-debt levels are enormous, capturing a quarter of income, with mortgage payments taking the lion’s share.	首先，家庭债务水平很高，吞噬了四分之一的家庭收入，其中最重的负担在于按揭贷款。


The ratio of housing prices to incomes is more than double that of the United States.	房价/收入比是美国的两倍多。


Second, South Korean families feel compelled to spend a large share of their income (10%, on average) on education.	其次，韩国家庭被迫将收入的一大块（平均为10%）用于教育。


With households already saving only around 4% of their disposable income, compared to 20% in 1988, there is little room for additional expenditure.	考虑到家庭储蓄占可支配收入之比只有4%（1988年为20%），韩国家庭增加支出的空间已经极为有限。


A concomitant feature of South Korea’s labor market is that women’s labor-force participation rate – a paltry 33% for women aged 30-39 – is among the lowest in the OECD.	韩国劳动力市场的一个伴随特征是女性劳动力参与率是经合组织国家中最低的之一，30—39年龄段女性只有33%参加工作。


This partly reflects the difficulty of balancing child rearing with work in South Korea, compared to, say, Europe or the US.	这部分是因为与欧洲和美国相比，韩国人在育儿和工作之间更加难以取得平衡。


South Korea’s female labor-force participation rate is even lower than in Japan, where there are waiting lists for childcare.	韩国的女性劳动力参与率甚至比育儿需求强劲的日本还低。


Moreover, South Korea has underinvested in day-care centers, with firms rarely offering childcare support.	此外，韩国在托儿所方面的投资不足，企业很少提供日托服务。


Given that South Korean women tend not to hold lucrative jobs, the cost of childcare is often prohibitive.	韩国女性通常不会从事待遇优渥的岗位，因此育儿服务对她们来说往往成本太高。


The recent increase in South Korea’s minimum normal retirement age has done little to improve the labor-market outlook.	最近，韩国提高了最低正常退休年龄，但这对改善劳动力市场前景来说只是杯水车薪。


Wages in the small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) that employ 88% of workers still lag behind those of major conglomerates, the chaebols; and the middle class is shrinking in terms of its share of earnings.	中小企业雇用了88%的工人，但其薪水远低于财阀（大型集团公司），中产阶级占国民收入的比重也在下降。


But South Korea does have some advantages over Japan.	但相比日本，韩国存在一些优势。


Although the government’s stimulus policies have increased the national debt, the debt/GDP ratio remains relatively low, at roughly 37%.	尽管政府的刺激政策提高了国民债务，但债务/GDP比率仍相对较低，约为37%。


Public debt in Japan, by contrast, exceeds 220% of GDP.	相比之下，日本的公债水平超过GDP的220%。


Moreover, despite South Korea’s dependence on exports, domestic consumption is robust.	此外，尽管韩国对出口的依赖度很高，但国内消费水平也很强健。


And ample spending on research and development, together with an unrelenting drive to be at the forefront of technological innovation, implies a brisk pace of innovation.	充足的研发支出以及对科技创���前沿的不懈追求为韩国带来了强劲的创新速度。


This creates room to address one of the economy’s two main challenges: low productivity in services.	这有助于应对经济的两大主要挑战：服务业的低生产率。


As it stands, productivity in services is six times lower than in manufacturing.	服务业的生产率比制造业低六倍。


The operations of South Korea’s chaebols – which dominate production, if not employment – should be adjusted to support productivity gains in the increasingly dominant services sector.	主导生产（而不是就业）的韩国财阀的经营应该做出调整以支持日益重要的服务部门的生产率的提高。


The key here, as in Japan, is to foster greater competition in services.	与日本一样，这方面的关键是增加服务业的竞争性。


If the chaebols continue to do their own advertising, financing, and IT, they will starve SMEs.	如果财阀继续自己包揽广告、融资和IT等业务，就会对中小企业的生存空间形成挤压。


A review of industrial concentration is warranted, as is a major government effort to foster SME growth in new ventures by offering incentives, ensuring access to capital, and lowering barriers to market entry.	此外，韩国需要对产业集中度进行检视，政府应该花大力气提供激励、确保资本获得渠道和降低市场进入壁垒以支持新领域的中小企业成长。


More employment in higher-end service jobs, especially for women, would also improve South Korea’s prospects considerably.	增加高端服务岗位就业（特别是女性就业）也能极大地改善韩国的前景。


In the longer term, however, South Korea’s prospects hinge largely on the labor force.	但是，从长期看，韩国的前景的关键在于劳动力。


The rising dependency ratio – expected to exceed 50% by 2030, when 36% of the population will be above the age of 65 – could spell disaster for the country.	依赖比率的上升——预计到2030年将突破50%，到那时，韩国人口中65岁以上比例将达到36%——可能成为韩国的灾难。


Health-care costs will rise, increasing the strain on budgets.	医疗成本将上升，导致预算吃紧。


While increased immigration could help to ease labor-force pressures, it would be met with public resistance.	增加移民有利于缓解劳动力压力，但会受到公众的抵制。


In this context, potential growth may well fall back to the predicted 2.5% annual rate, even though the economy’s capital stock is in good shape.	在这样的背景下，潜在增长率将回落到2. 5%的预测年率水平，即使韩国资本存量形势依然有利。


South Korea has learned numerous positive lessons from Japan.	韩国从日本身上汲取了大量有益教训。 它夺走了大量日本出口市场；


It captured many of Japan’s export markets; it imported and adapted Japanese technologies; it employed similar planning methods; and the chaebols are an outgrowth of Japan’s zaibatsu corporate model.	它采取了与日本类似的规划方法； 它的财阀也来自日本的财阀模式。


Now, however, South Korea must learn from Japan’s negative experiences.	但是，如今，韩国必须汲取日本的有害教训。


Structural reform cannot wait.	结构性改革不能拖。


Nationalism should be channeled toward securing public support for deep economic and social reforms.	民族主义必须予以引导，使其有利于确保深度经济和社会改革的公共支持。


South Korea’s leaders do not have to look far to find out what will happen if they fail to address looming challenges quickly and resolutely.	如果不能快速果断地解决眼前的挑战后果会是怎样？ 韩国领导人应该一眼就能看出。


Can Palestine Win the Peace?	巴勒斯坦能赢得和平吗？


RAMALLAH – The rollout of the war-ending ceasefire agreement between Israel and Palestine last month was impressive.	拉马拉—上个月，以色列和巴勒斯坦首次达成结束战争的停火协议，这令人瞩目。


With almost perfect synchronization, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced the end of the war on Gaza in a televised broadcast from his Ramallah headquarters, while Hamas leaders called on Palestinians in Gaza to take to the streets to celebrate their supposed victory.	几乎是在同时，巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯通过电视广播在其拉马拉总部宣布加沙战争结束，而哈马斯领导人号召加沙巴勒斯坦人走上街头庆祝他们所想象的胜利。


Of course, with more than 2,200 Palestinians – mostly civilians – killed, over 10,000 injured, and thousands of homes, schools, mosques, and other structures destroyed, the war’s outcome can hardly be called a victory.	当然，这场战争的结果绝不是“胜利”：2,200多巴勒斯坦人——大部分是平民——死亡，超过10,000人受伤，数千房屋、学校、清真寺和其他建筑被毁。


Nonetheless, this is the first time that Palestinians have been able to create something close to mutual deterrence with the Israelis.	尽管如此，这是巴勒斯坦人首次能够接近于实现对以色列人的互相威慑。


Strengthening Palestine’s position further is the United Nations General Assembly’s recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state, which Palestinian diplomats can use to exert political pressure on Israel to take their national aspirations seriously.	进一步加强巴勒斯坦地位的是联合国大会承认巴勒斯坦为非成员观察国，巴勒斯坦外交人权能够利用此地位向以色列施加政治压力，要求后者严肃对待自己的民族自尊。


Palestine’s membership in UN agencies, not to mention the possibility of joining the International Criminal Court, has also boosted its leaders’ bargaining power.	巴勒斯坦在国际刑事法庭（International Criminal Court）等联合国机构的成员资格也增加了其领导人的讨价还价实力。


All of these levers – not to mention the tremendous sympathy and support Palestinians have received from international observers – will be essential to ensure that the high price Palestinians paid during the 51-day war was not in vain.	所有这些有利形势——更不用说巴勒斯坦人所获得来自国际观察家的巨大的同情了——对于保证巴勒斯坦人在这场51天的战争中所付出的的高昂代价不会打水漂。


But the levers will be useless if the leaders of Hamas and Fatah, the two dominant Palestinian factions, fail to maintain a united front.	但如果巴勒斯坦两大主要派系——哈马斯和法塔赫不能维持统一战线，这些有利形势将是徒劳无益的。


The effectiveness of such a cooperative approach was apparent in the Egypt-sponsored indirect talks with Israel.	这一合作方针的效果在埃及所牵线的与以色列的间接对话中表露无遗。


The unified Palestinian delegation was convenient for Egypt and Israel, both of which consider Hamas a terrorist organization, and for Palestine, because it helped to bring an end to the violence.	将哈马斯视为恐怖组织的埃及和以色列乐于见到统一的巴勒斯坦代表团，巴勒斯坦也能从中获益，因为这有助于结束暴力。


And it was a political boon for Abbas, who was able to field a delegation headed by one of his confidants, Azzam al-Ahmad, and thus claim the right to announce the ceasefire.	对阿巴斯来说，这也是一个政治大礼，他得以组建一个以其亲信艾哈迈德（Azzam al-Ahmad）为首的代表团，从而获得宣布停火的权利。


Having withstood the test of war, the Palestinian unity government that was created less than two months before the conflict began will now become the main vehicle for Gaza’s reconstruction.	在经受了战争考验后，成立于冲突爆发前不到两个月的巴勒斯坦联合政府现在将成为加沙重建的主要机构。


But Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah will face considerable challenges – beginning with Gaza, where his executive authority is severely limited.	但总理哈马达拉（Rami Hamdallah）将面临巨大的挑战——首先是来自其行政权力饱受限制的加沙的挑战。


More broadly, the unity government’s success depends on the ability of the Fatah-led Palestinian government and Hamas – and, to whatever extent possible, Islamic Jihad – to cement their cooperation by agreeing on a path toward liberation and freedom.	更广泛地说，联合政府的成功取决于法塔赫领导的巴勒斯坦政府和哈马斯——以及不论何种程度上的伊斯兰圣战组织——有多大能力在通往自由和解放的道路的问题上形成一致，从而巩固它们的合作。


A clear, realistic strategy will be integral to Palestine’s efforts to win support from regional and international actors eager to end the decades-old conflict with Israel.	一个明确、务实的战略将有利于巴勒斯坦赢得急切地期盼结束已有几十年之久的巴以冲突的地区和国际行动方的支持。


This will, of course, require compromises from all sides.	当然，这一意愿需要协调各方。


Hamas must reconsider its refusal to recognize Israel.	哈马斯必须重新考虑其拒绝承认以色列的立场。


For its part, the Palestinian leadership must pursue active resistance alongside negotiations with Israel, while defending more vigorously Palestinians’ right of return, which it has often ignored in an effort to appease the Israelis.	在这方面，巴勒斯坦领导层必须在谈判期间积极反抗以色列，同时更有力地捍卫巴勒斯坦人回家的权利——为了抚慰以色列，这方面的主张常常被忽视。


But establishing a unified strategy is only the first step.	但建立统一战略只是第一步。


Ordinary Palestinians, who will undoubtedly have to make sacrifices, must be brought on board – especially given the heavy price they incurred during the recent conflict, in which they had no say.	普通巴勒斯坦人毫无疑问必须做出牺牲，但他们也必须在被考虑到——特别是考虑到他们在最近的冲突中付出了高昂的代价，但却从未发出声音。


With broad public support, Palestine’s unity government will be able to rally the international community behind its fair and reasonable demands for a truly independent state, free of sieges, separation barriers, and foreign settlements – demands that fall squarely within the realm of basic human rights.	在广泛的公众支持下，巴勒斯坦联合政府将能够让国际社会支持其公平合理的要求——建立真正独立的国家，免受包围、隔离墙和外国定居点影响，这些都是基本人权要求。


Just as the international community isolated South Africa until it abandoned apartheid, it can put pressure on Israel through boycotts, divestment, and sanctions, while calling upon Israel’s allies to stop providing aid and arms.	正如国际社会对南非采取孤立政策直至其放弃种族隔离，也可以通过抵制、撤销投资和制裁向以色列施压，同时要求以色列盟友停止为其提供援助和武器。


If Palestine’s leaders truly want to end the cycle of violence in Gaza, they must begin by resolving their own internal disagreements and present themselves as a cohesive, reliable, and committed negotiating party.	如果巴勒斯坦领导人真的希望结束加沙的暴力循环，就必须从解决自身内部争端，形成一个团结、可靠、有担当的谈判方开始。


They must band together behind the simple but powerful goal expressed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the General Assembly in New York: “We will build again, but this must be the last time to rebuild.”	他们必须团结在一个简单而强大的目标身后——用联合国秘书长潘基文（Ban Ki-moon）在纽约联合国大会上的发言讲，“我们将再次开始建设，但这次必须是最后一次重建。 ”


For Palestine’s unity government, the time to begin the rebuilding process is now.	对巴勒斯坦联合政府来说，现在就是开始这一重建过程的实际。


If Fatah and Hamas are willing to do what it takes to achieve peace, this may well be their best chance.	如果法塔赫和哈马斯愿意竭尽全力实现和平，现在就是他们最好的机会。


Today’s Dark Lords of Finance	当代金融黑暗之王？


LONDON – In his Pulitzer-Prize-winning book, Lords of Finance, the economist Liaquat Ahamad tells the story of how four central bankers, driven by staunch adherence to the gold standard, “broke the world” and triggered the Great Depression.	伦敦—在普利策奖获奖作品《金融之王》（Lords of Finance）中，经济学家利雅卡特·艾哈迈德（Liaquat Ahamad）讲述了四位央行行长因为坚持金本位而“打碎世界”、引发大萧条的故事。


Today’s central bankers largely share a new conventional wisdom – about the benefits of loose monetary policy.	今天的央行行长基本上有了一套新的传统智慧——关于宽松货币政策的智慧。


Are monetary policymakers poised to break the world again?	货币决策者会再一次打碎世界吗？


Orthodox monetary policy no longer enshrines the gold standard, which caused the central bankers of the 1920s to mismanage interest rates, triggering a global economic meltdown that ultimately set the stage for World War II.	正统货币政策不再奉金本位为圭臬。 金本位导致20世纪20年代各大央行利率管理失当，引起全球经济萧条并成为第二次世界大战的祸根。


But the unprecedented period of coordinated loose monetary policy since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 could be just as problematic.	但自2008年金融危机爆发以来，我们经历了一段前所未有的合作货币宽松时期，它的问题也许不亚于金本位。


Indeed, the discernible effect on financial markets has already been huge.	事实上，它对金融市场的巨大影响早已清晰可辨。


The first-order impact is clear.	一阶影响显而易见。


Institutional investors have found it difficult to achieve positive real yields in any of the traditional safe-haven investments.	机构投资者难以在任何传统安全投资中获得正实际收益率。


Life insurers, for example, have struggled to meet their guaranteed rates of return.	比如，寿险公司为了兑现保证回报率而焦头烂额。


According to a recent report by Swiss Re, had government bonds been trading closer to their “fair value,” insurers in America and Europe would have earned some $40-$80 billion from 2008 to 2013 (assuming a typical 50-60% allocation to fixed income).	据瑞士再保险公司（Swiss Re）的最新报告，如果政府债券以接近于“公平价值”的价格交易，2008—2013年美国和欧洲保险公司可以赚得400—800亿美元（假设其50—60%的投资配置给固定收益证券，这也是典型的做法）。


For public pension funds, an additional 1% yield during this period would have increased annual income by $40-50 billion.	对公共退休基金来说，这段时间增加1%的收益率每年能新增收益400—500亿美元。


Investors have responded to near-zero interest rates with unprecedented adjustments in the way they allocate assets.	投资者对近零利率的反应是对资产配置方式进行前所未有的调整。


In most cases, they have taken on more risk.	在大部分情况中，他们增加了冒险规模。


For starters, they have moved into riskier credit instruments, resulting in a compression of corporate-bond spreads.	首先，他们进入了风险更高的信用工具市场，导致公司债券利差缩小。


Once returns on commercial paper had been driven to all-time lows, investors continued to push into equities.	当商业票据回报率被压低到历史低点时，投资者又进入股市。


Approximately 63% of global institutional investors increased allocations in developed-market equities in the six months prior to April 2015, according to data from a recent State Street survey – even though some 60% of them expect a market correction of 10-20%.	据最新的 道富银行（State Street）调查，在截至2015年4月的六个月中，大约63%的全球机构投资者增加了发达国家股票的配置比例——尽管其中60%的机构投资者认为股市会出现10—20%的回调。


Even the world’s most conservative investors have taken on unprecedented risk.	即使是世界上最保守的投资者也承担了前所未有的风险。


Japan’s public pension funds, which include the world’s largest, have dumped local bonds at record rates.	日本公共退休基金——包括全球规模最大的一家退休基金——以创纪录的利率甩卖本地债券。


In addition to boosting investments in foreign stocks and bonds, they have now raised their holdings of domestic stocks for the fifth consecutive quarter.	除了增加对外国股票和债券的投资外，它们还连续第五季度增持本国股票。


These allocation decisions are understandable, given the paltry yields available in fixed-income investments, but the resulting second-order impact could ultimately prove devastating.	这些配置决定不难理解，因为固定收益投资收益率低迷； 但由此造成的二阶影响可能是灾难性的。


The equity bull market is now six years old.	如今，股市走牛已经六年。


Even after the market volatility following the crisis in Greece and the Chinese stock market’s plunge, valuations appear to be high.	虽然市场因为希腊危机和中国股市崩盘而波动陡增，但估值仍然很高。


The S&P 500 has surpassed pre-2008 levels, with companies’ shares trading at 18 times their earnings.	标准普尔500指数已经超过了2008年前的高点，市盈率高达18倍。


As long as the tailwinds of global quantitative easing, cheap oil, and further institutional inflows keep blowing, equities could continue to rally.	只要全球量化宽松、廉价石油和机构资金流入的东风继续，股市就会继续上涨。


But at some point, a real market correction will arrive.	但总有一天真正的市场回调会到来。


And when it does, pension funds and insurance companies will be more exposed than ever before to volatility in the equity markets.	而当回调到来时，退休基金和保险公司将比以往任何时候都更加严重地暴露于股市波动之下。


This overexposure comes at a time when demographic trends are working against pension funds.	股市过热恰逢人口趋势不利于退休基金。


In Germany, for example, where 20% of the population is older than 65, the number of working-age adults will shrink from about 50 million today to as few as 34 million by 2060.	比如，在德国，20%的人口年龄超过65岁，工作年龄成年人将从今天的5,000万左右下降到2060年的3,400万。


Among emerging markets, rapidly rising life expectancy and plunging fertility are likely to double the share of China’s over-60 population by 2050 – adding roughly a half-billion people who require support in their unproductive years.	而在你新兴市场，预期寿命的快速增长和生育率的下降可能让中国60岁以上人口比例在2050年翻一番——这意味着五亿不事生产的退休者需要支持。


If the combined effect of steep losses in equity markets and rising dependency ratios cause pension funds to struggle to meet their obligations, it will be up to governments to provide safety nets – if they can.	如果股市的严重损失和赡养比的增加所形成的合力导致退休基金难以兑付，那么就必须由政府提供安全网——如果它们可以的话。


Government debt as a percentage of global GDP has increased at an annual rate of 9.3% since 2007.	2007年，政府债务占全球GDP之比年化增长率高达9. 3%。


In Europe, for example, Greece is not the only country drowning in debt.	比如，在欧洲，希腊绝非唯一一个不堪债务重负的国家。


In 2014, debt levels throughout the eurozone continued to climb, reaching nearly 92% of GDP – the highest since the single currency’s introduction in 1999.	2014年，整个欧元区的债务水平继续攀升，达到GDP的近92%——是1999年开始使用欧元以来的最高值。


If pensions and governments both prove unable to provide for the elderly, countries across the continent could experience rising social instability – a broader version of the saga playing out in Greece.	如果退休基金和政府都无法为老年人提供养老金，那么整个欧洲大陆的各国可能面临日益严重的社会动荡——即希腊闹剧的放大版。


The new Lords of Finance have arguably been successful in many of their objectives since the financial crisis erupted seven years ago.	自七年前金融危机爆发以来，新金融之王在诸多目标上都取得了成功。


For this, they deserve credit.	因此他们理应得到赞美。


But, when an emergency strikes, large-scale policy responses always produce unintended consequences typically sowing the seeds for the next full-blown crisis.	但是，当仅仅情况发生时，大规模政策应对措施永远会产生意料外的后果，这些后果常常成为下一场大危机的祸根。


Given recent market turmoil, the question now is whether the next crisis has already begun.	从最近的市场动荡看，现在的问题是下一场危机是不是已经开始了。


Darkness at Darfur	达尔富尔的黑暗


Darfur is shorthand for the latest example of a recurring international problem, one that gained headlines a decade ago in Rwanda.	达尔富尔成了国际问题重复出现的最新代名词，同样的问题10年前在卢旺达就登上了头版头条。


What should the world do when a large number of people are the victims of violence originating from within their own country?	如果很多人成了国内暴力活动的牺牲品，那么世界应该做何反应？


Darfur itself is a region of Western Sudan comprised of Arab and African Muslims.	达尔富尔位于苏丹西部，其人口由阿拉伯和非洲穆斯林构成。


Conflict erupted in early 2003 when rebels of the Sudan Liberation Movement attacked government troops in an effort to gain greater autonomy and resources for their region.	2003年初这里爆发了冲突，苏丹解放运动的起义军对政府军发动了袭击，以扩大自治权，为该地区争取更多的经济利益。


Sudan government aircraft and government-supported troops (known as jangaweed) retaliated against not only armed rebels but also against civilians deemed to be supporting them.	苏丹政府的飞机管辖的军队（外界称之为Jangaweed）不仅报复性地袭击了武装叛乱分子，还殃及了本该支持他们的达尔富尔平民。


Villages have been emptied, women raped, non-Arab men killed.	无数村庄被清洗、妇女被强奸、非阿拉伯种族被屠杀。


The origins of the current crisis may be in some dispute, but the costs are not.	目前的危机可能源于某些冲突，可代价却并非如此。


More than 50,000 men, women and children have lost their lives; more than 1.5 million have been made homeless.	已经有50，000多名男子、妇女和儿童丢掉了性命，150多万人无家可归。