And it is why bullying Japan is always a good option: China’s rulers do not necessarily hate Japan, but they are afraid to look weak in the eyes of their citizens, who are taught from kindergarten that foreign powers want to humiliate China.	这也是为什么欺负日本总是外交手段的一个好选择：中国的统治者不一定恨日本，但他们不能接受被国人视为软弱无能，因为国人从小就被教导国外势力都企图欺负中国。


This suggests that if Liu Xiaobo and like-minded dissidents ever got their wish, and democracy came to China, the problem of Chinese nationalism would not go away.	这就意味着，即便刘晓波和类似的异见人士得偿所愿，民主真的降临中国，但中国民族主义的问题仍将如影随形地存在。


After all, if the people feel persecuted by Japan or the United States, then the people will demand chauvinistic policies.	毕竟，如果人们感到遭受了日本或美国的迫害，那么他们就会强烈要求国家采取大国沙文主义政策。


Democracy has not tempered South Korean chauvinism much, either, since the demise of the military dictatorship in the 1980’s.	20世纪80年代，虽然韩国推翻了国内的军事独裁，但民主并没有缓和其沙文主义政策。


But nationalism may not be a political constant.	不过，民族主义不是一个政治常态。


Nationalism is often fed by a sense of impotence.	民族主义通常都由软弱无力的感受所激发。


When citizens feel disempowered by an authoritarian government, the next best thing is to feel empowered by national prowess.	当公民感到被权威政府剥夺了权利时，为避免民族主义抬头，接下来最好还是让他们为国家强大的实力而自豪。


In a multi-party democracy, on the other hand, citizens are concerned with other interests, material, social, even cultural ones, and thus less likely to be drawn into aggressive chauvinism.	另一方面，在一个多党制民主国家里，民众可以选择关注其他别的利益，物质的，社会的，甚或是文化的，因此很少会投入侵略性的沙文主义怀抱之中。


Or so we must hope.	或者说，我们希望是这样的。


The state of many democracies today is not the best advertisement for political freedom. But the Chinese should have the right to decide about that themselves.	尽管当今世界许多民主国家的情况并不能最好地体现政治自由的好处，但中国人应该有选择的权利。


And Liu Xiaobo should be honored for saying so.	从这个角度讲，刘晓波获得诺奖，当之无愧。


Why is France Burning?	法国为何在燃烧？


The urban disturbances in France have been called the most severe since the riots by students and workers in 1968.	法国的城市骚乱被称为1968年学潮和工潮以来最为严重的事件。


The analogy is misleading.	这个比喻是不恰当的。


While the 1968 protests challenged the French Republican model to live up to its finest aspirations, today’s crisis challenges the French Revolution’s model of citizenship and integration itself.	1968年的抗议要求法兰西共和国实现其最高的理想，而今天的危机则挑战法国大革命的公民资格和融入模式本身。


The French Republican model asserts that all French citizens have the same cultural identity.	法兰西共和国模式宣扬所有的法国公民都有相同的文化特征。


Indeed, this is the only acceptable identity.	实际上，这是唯一可以接受的特征。


To achieve this shared identity, all citizens have to speak the one official language and be educated according to a common curriculum.	为了实现这一共同特征，所有的公民都必须讲唯一的官方语言并按照相同的课程接受教育。


But they also enjoy equal rights, and have the same duties, in the public arena.	但是在公共场合，他们也享有平等的权利和同样的义务。


All this is not only fostered by the state, but also requires the kind of uniformity that only a centralized state can impose.	这一切不仅由国家予以扶持，而且要求一种只有中央集权国家才能施行的统一。


Indeed, the French Revolution’s ideological commitment to unity was so strong that during parts of the nineteenth century, advocating federalism was a capital offense.	实际上，法国大革命对于团结的意识形态上的承诺十分严肃，以致于在十九世纪的某些时候，鼓吹联邦主义是死罪。


Three components of this model incited today’s crisis and make it difficult for the French Republic to address it effectively.	这一模式的三个要素引发了今天的危机，并且使得法兰西共和国难以有效地加以解决。


The first component is the classic French Republican prohibition on gathering data in the official census – or by government agencies or public or private enterprises – on ethnicity, religion, and even social class.	第一个要素是，法兰西共和国素来禁止在官方人口普查中，或者由政府机构或私营企业收集有关种族、宗教甚至是社会阶层的数据。


Collecting these data would, it is argued, violate the Republican tenet that France is “one and indivisible.”	法国认为，收集这些数据会违反共和国的信条，也就是，法兰西是“统一不可分割的”。


But the absence of a secondary breakdown of such data, like the UK-style, four-fold class analysis (plus examination of patterns of unemployment by ethnicity or religion), makes it hard for social workers, public heath officials, and economic planners to diagnose new problems.	但是，如果没有像英国模式那样对此类数据进行第二层分析以及四层社会阶层分析（加上按照种族或宗教区分进行的失业模式分析），使得社会工作者、政府卫生官员以及经济规划者很难诊断新的问题。


Without the necessary data for analysis, public health policies, for example, cannot be directed toward groups that are especially disadvantaged or otherwise at risk.	举例说，没有进行分析所必要的数据，就难以针对特别弱势或有危险的群体制定公共卫生政策。


The second factor is the classic French Republican rejection of, and legal norms against, any form of “affirmative action,” or positive discrimination, even of the most inoffensive kind.	第二个因素是，法兰西共和国一向拒绝任何形式的、哪怕是最无伤害的“肯定行动”或积极性区别对待，并且在法律上予以禁止。


Like the prohibition of fine-tuned data – without which positive discrimination is in any case impossible – affirmative action is seen as damaging to the Republican model because it is based on recognition of ethnic differences.	没有对数据的精确分析就不可能有积极性区别对待。 肯定行动和精确分析一样基于承认种族区别而被视为有害于共和国模式。


The third component is the post-welfare state, which is now part of the French model of citizenship and guarantees all full-time employees one of the highest minimum wages in the world and high employer-paid benefits.	第三个因素是后福利国家。 这是法国公民资格模式的一部分，并且保证给所有全职雇员全世界最高的最低工资和很高的雇主支付的福利。


This makes it extremely difficult to let workers go, which makes employers reluctant to hire new people in the first place.	这样就很难解雇工人，而且使得雇主不愿意招募新的雇员。


Many of the social-democratic countries of Europe, like Sweden, Holland, and Denmark, created similar norms in their full-employment eras.	瑞典、荷兰和丹麦等众多欧洲社会民主主义国家在它们全面就业时期建立了类似的规定。


Unlike France, however, they also used census data to identify pockets of new unemployment, and to invest socially and politically, not only in excellent job-training programs, but in job creation, and, just as importantly, in job-placement schemes.	但是，和法国不同的是，它们也使用人口普查数据来确定新的失业人口的经济状况，在社会福利和政治上不仅建立良好的职业培训项目，而且也创造就业机会，同时更为重要的是，建立职业介绍规划。


France is now very bad at creating new jobs.	法国目前在创造就业机会上无所作为。


It has few training programs, but high benefits for the unemployed and strong restrictions against firing workers.	基本上没有培训项目，而失业福利很高，解雇限制重重。


Put all of this together, and it is like slamming a door in the face of young minority men looking for work.	凡此种种，就如同在找工作的少数族裔年轻人面前关上大门一样。


This is the primary cause of the 30-50% unemployment rates among minorities aged 16-24 in many French “urban zones of sensitivity.”	法国的许多“敏感城市地带”中16岁至24岁少数族裔人口失业率达到30％到50％，这是首要原因。


Thus, the riots that France is now seeing emerge from French policies, not from instigations by Islamists.	因此，法国现在看到的骚乱源于法国的政策，而不是穆斯林煽动。


France has simply failed to incorporate minority citizens – many of them third-generation immigrants who have been educated for twenty years in assimilationist public schools.	法国根本上没有融合少数族裔公民，他们中的许多人都是第三代移民，在同化主义的公共学校中接受了二十年的教育。


But few political leaders accept that the crisis has anything to do with the French model of citizenship.	但是，很少有政治领导人承认这场危机和法国的公民资格模式有关。


Indeed, they confidently wait for assimilation to kick in.	实际上，他们都充满信心，等待同化奏效。


But in today’s high unemployment, low job-creation, and now multicultural France, assimilation will not occur without big changes.	但是，在当今高失业率、低就业机会以及多元文化的法国，没有巨大的变革就不会有同化。


France is only now beginning to come to grips with the crisis of its Republican model of equal citizenship.	法国目前刚刚开始应付共和国平等公民资格模式的危机。


A newly created Minister of Social Cohesion has begun to commission studies documenting discrimination.	新近成立的社会凝聚部已经开始委托进行有关歧视的研究。


One study showed that for similarly qualified job applicants, those with an Islamic-sounding name, and an address in an ethnically segmented suburb, had only one-fifth the chance of even getting an interview as people with a French-sounding name and a “safe” address.	其中一项研究发现，对于大体同样合格的求职者，那些听起来像伊斯兰的名字和种族分离郊区的地址的人得到哪怕是面试的机会只有那些听起来像法国人的名字和“安全的”地址的人的五分之一。


Two hundred and fifty of the largest private and public enterprises have created an organization aimed at working with the government to allow them, for the first time ever, to document, and then redress, their discriminatory employment practices.	二百五十家最大的私营和公营企业建立了一个组织，旨在和政府合作让它们第一次记述歧视性的雇用做法并加以矫正。


Fortunately, organized Muslim leaders so far have not aggravated the rioting.	所幸的是，有组织的穆斯林领导人目前为止并没有加重骚乱。


Of course, the government’s reduction of community policing in favor of paramilitary forces stationed in quasi-military barracks, and the Minister of Interior’s description of the young rioters as “scum” who should be washed away with an industrial power hose, has not helped.	当然，政府减少社区警力而将半军事化部队驻扎在半军事化营房内、内政部长将年轻的骚乱份子称为应当用强力工业水笼冲刷掉的“人渣”则于事无补。


The French Republican model enshrines the laudable abstract principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.	法兰西共和国崇仰值得称赞的、���象的自由、平等和博爱的原则。


However, so long as second- and third-generation minority citizens are taught that the only acceptable cultural identity is French, but are not in fact accepted as French – indeed, are blocked from enjoying the full rights of French citizenship – the Republican model will fuel alienation rather than democratic integration.	但是，只要第二和第三代少数裔公民被教化说唯一可以接受的文化特征是法国式的，而实际上并不被接纳为法国人，却无法享受作为法国公民所理应享受的完整的权利，那么，这一共和国模式将会激起分离，而非民主化融合。


Why ISIS Persists	为何ISIS能持久存在


NEW YORK – Deadly terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Dhaka, and Baghdad demonstrate the murderous reach of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia.	纽约—伊斯坦布尔、达卡和巴格达的致命恐怖袭击表明伊斯兰国（ISIS）的魔爪已经触及欧洲、北非、中东和亚洲多部。


The longer ISIS maintains its strongholds in Syria and Iraq, the longer its terrorist network will create such carnage.	ISIS在叙利亚和伊拉克保持强势越久，其恐怖网络炮制此类大屠杀的日子也越久。


Yet ISIS is not especially difficult to defeat.	但ISIS并不特别难以根除。


The problem is that none of the states involved in Iraq and Syria, including the United States and its allies, has so far treated ISIS as its primary foe.	问题在于牵涉伊拉克和叙利亚的各国，包括美国及其盟国，都没有将ISIS作为主要敌人。


It’s time they do.	这一点应该改变了。


ISIS has a small fighting force, which the US puts at 20,000 to 25,000 in Iraq and Syria, and another 5,000 or so in Libya.	ISIS有一支小规模战斗力量，美国预测其在伊拉克和叙利亚有20,000到25,000人，在利比亚还有5,000人左右。


Compared to the number of active military personnel in Syria (125,000), Iraq (271,500), Saudi Arabia (233,500), Turkey (510,600), or Iran (523,000), ISIS is minuscule.	与叙利亚（125,000）、伊拉克（271,500）、沙特阿拉伯（233,500）、土耳其（510,600）和伊朗（523,000）现役军队人数相比，ISIS根本不值一提。


Despite US President Barack Obama’s pledge in September 2014 to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel (behind the scenes), have been focusing instead on toppling Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.	2014年9月，美国总统奥巴马承诺“打击并最终消灭”ISIS，但美国及其盟国，包括沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和以色列（在幕后），一直专注于颠覆叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德。


Consider a recent candid statement by Israeli Major General Herzi Halevy (quoted to me by a journalist who attended the speech where Halevy made it): “Israel does not want to see the situation in Syria end with [ISIS] defeated, the superpowers gone from the region, and [Israel] left with a Hezbollah and Iran that have greater capabilities.”	最近，以色列陆军少将赫尔齐·哈勒威（Herzi Halevy）直言不讳地声称（由一位哈勒威讲话现场的记者向我转述）：“以色列不想看到叙利亚局势以（ISIS）被击败、超级大国退出该地区、（以色列）面对实力更强的真主党和伊朗结束。 ”


Israel opposes ISIS, but Israel’s greater concern is Assad’s Iranian backing.	以色列反对ISIS，但以色列更大的担忧是阿萨德背后的伊朗。


Assad enables Iran to support two paramilitary foes of Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas.	阿萨德让伊朗得以支持以色列的两大准军事对手——真主党和哈马斯。


Israel therefore prioritizes the removal of Assad over the defeat of ISIS.	因此，以色列的重点是推翻阿萨德，而不是击败ISIS。


For the US, steered by neoconservatives, the war in Syria is a continuation of the plan for global US hegemony launched by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz at the Cold War’s end.	受新保守主义影响，对美国来说，叙利亚战争是国防部长切尼（Richard Cheney）和副国务卿保罗·沃尔福威茨（Paul Wolfowitz）在冷战结束时所提出的全球美国霸权计划的延续。


In 1991, Wolfowitz told US General Wesley Clark:	1991年，沃尔福威茨对美国将军韦斯利·克拉克（Wesley Clark）说：


“But one thing we did learn [from the Persian Gulf War] is that we can use our military in the region – in the Middle East – and the Soviets won’t stop us.	“但我们（从海湾战争中）确实学到了一件事，那就是我们可以在该地区——在中东——使用武力，而苏联人不会阻止我们。


And we’ve got about 5 or 10 years to clean up those old Soviet regimes – Syria, Iran (sic), Iraq – before the next great superpower comes on to challenge us.”	在下一个超级大国出现挑战我们之前，我们有大约5到10年时间清理旧苏联政权——叙利亚、伊朗（原文如此）、伊拉克。 ”


The multiple US wars in the Middle East – Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others – have sought to remove the Soviet Union, and then Russia, from the scene and to give the US hegemonic sway.	美国在中东的多场战争——阿富汗、伊拉克、叙利亚、利比亚，等等——是为了让苏联以及随后的俄罗斯退出竞争，让美国独树霸权。


These efforts have failed miserably.	这些“努力”遭到了惨败。


For Saudi Arabia, as for Israel, the main goal is to oust Assad in order to weaken Iran.	对沙特阿拉伯，以及对以色列来说，主要目标是颠覆阿萨德以削弱伊朗。


Syria is part of the extensive proxy war between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia that plays out in the battlefields of Syria and Yemen and in bitter Shia-Sunni confrontations in Bahrain and other divided countries in the region (including Saudi Arabia itself).	叙利亚是什叶派伊朗和逊尼派沙特阿拉伯之间规模浩大的代理战争的一部分，这场战争在叙利亚和也门等��场展开，也在巴林和其他该地区有分裂倾向的国家（包括沙特阿拉伯本身）更加激烈的什叶派-逊尼派对峙前沿展开。


For Turkey, the overthrow of Assad would bolster its regional standing.	对土耳其来说，推翻阿萨德将加强它的地区地位。


Yet Turkey now faces three foes on its southern border: Assad, ISIS, and nationalist Kurds.	但土耳其现在在其南部边境面临三个对手：阿萨德、ISIS以及民族主义库尔德人。


ISIS has so far taken a back seat to Turkey’s concerns about Assad and the Kurds.	到目前为止，ISIS对土耳其来说不如阿萨德和库尔德人重要。


But ISIS-directed terrorist attacks in Turkey may be changing that.	但ISIS炮制的土耳其恐怖袭击可能改变这一局面。


Russia and Iran, too, have pursued their own regional interests, including through proxy wars and support for paramilitary operations.	俄罗斯和伊朗也追求自身的地区利益，通过代理战争和支持准军事行动实现。


Yet both have signaled their readiness to cooperate with the US to defeat ISIS, and perhaps to solve other problems as well.	但两国都表态准备与美国合作打击ISIS，并且可以在解决其他问题方面也进行合作。


The US has so far spurned these offers, because of its focus on toppling Assad.	到目前为止，美国一直无动于衷，因为它的关注点是颠覆阿萨德。


The US foreign-policy establishment blames Russian President Vladimir Putin for defending Assad, while Russia blames the US for trying to overthrow him.	美国外交政策界谴责俄罗斯总统普京袒护阿萨德，而俄罗斯谴责美国试图推翻阿萨德。


These complaints might seem symmetrical, but they’re not.	这些抱怨看上去针锋相对，实则不然。


The attempt by the US and its allies to overthrow Assad violates the UN Charter, while Russia’s support of Assad is consistent with Syria’s right of self-defense under that charter.	美国及其盟国颠覆阿萨德的尝试违反了联合国宪章，而俄罗斯支持阿萨德符合宪章规定的叙利亚的自卫权。


Yes, Assad is a despot, but the UN Charter does not give license to any country to choose which despots to depose.	诚然，阿萨德是一位暴君，但联合国宪章并没有授予任何国家选择推翻哪位暴君的权力。


The persistence of ISIS underscores three strategic flaws in US foreign policy, along with a fatal tactical flaw.	ISIS的持久存在彰显出美国外交政策的三大战略缺陷，以及一个致命战术缺陷。


First, the neocon quest for US hegemony through regime change is not only bloody-minded arrogance; it is classic imperial overreach.	首先，新保守主义要求通过颠覆政权实现美国霸权不但是血腥思维的无知； 更是经典的帝国主义不自量力。


It has failed everywhere the US has tried it.	凡是美国如此尝试的地方，无一不以失败告终。


Syria and Libya are the latest examples.	叙利亚和利比亚是最新的例子。


Second, the CIA has long armed and trained Sunni jihadists through covert operations funded by Saudi Arabia.	其次，中央情报局长期以来通过沙特阿拉伯出资的秘密行动武装和培训逊尼派圣战者。


In turn, these jihadists gave birth to ISIS, which is a direct, if unanticipated, consequence of the policies pursued by the CIA and its Saudi partners.	反过来，这些圣战者催生了ISIS，这是中央情报局及其沙特合作者所追求的政策的同一个直接（或许是意料外的）后果。


Third, the US perception of Iran and Russia as implacable foes of America is in many ways outdated and a self-fulfilling prophecy.	第三，美国将伊朗和俄罗斯视为美国不可和解的敌人在很大程度上是一个自我实现的过时预言。


A rapprochement with both countries is possible.	与两国重塑关系是可能的。


Fourth, on the tactical side, the US attempt to fight a two-front war against both Assad and ISIS has failed.	第四，在战术层面，美国试图打赢对阿萨德和ISIS的双线战争已经失败。


Whenever Assad has been weakened, Sunni jihadists, including ISIS and al-Nusra Front, have filled the vacuum.	凡是阿萨德被削弱时候，逊尼派圣战者，包括ISIS和努斯拉阵线（al-Nusira Front）就会填补真空。


Assad and his Iraqi counterparts can defeat ISIS if the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran provide air cover and logistical support.	如果美国、俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯和伊朗提供空中掩护和物流支持，阿萨德及其伊拉克同道能够击败ISIS。 诚然，阿萨德将继续掌权；


Yes, Assad would remain in power; yes, Russia would retain an ally in Syria; and yes, Iran would have influence there.	诚然，俄罗斯将继续是叙利亚的盟国； 诚然，伊朗将在那里获得影响力。


Terrorist attacks would no doubt continue, perhaps even in the name of ISIS for a while; but the group would be denied its base of operations in Syria and Iraq.	恐怖袭击毫无疑问将继续存在，也许在一段时间里仍将打着ISIS的旗号； 但该组织将被驱逐出其在叙利亚和伊拉克的行动基地。


Such an outcome would not only end ISIS on the ground in the Middle East; it could lay the groundwork for reducing regional tensions more generally.	这一结果不但可以在中东大地上根除ISIS； 还能为更加全面地缓解地区紧张打下基础。


The US and Russia could begin to reverse their recent new cold war through shared efforts to stamp out jihadist terrorism.	美国和俄罗斯可以通过共同驱逐圣战恐怖主义开始扭转最近的新冷战。


(A pledge that NATO will not offer admission to Ukraine or escalate missile defenses in Eastern Europe would also help.)	（北约承诺不让乌克兰入盟或不升级东欧弹道导弹防御也能有所裨益。 ）


There’s more.	还有其他好处。


A cooperative approach to defeating ISIS would give Saudi Arabia and Turkey reason and opportunity to find a new modus vivendi with Iran.	采取合作方针打击ISIS将给沙特阿拉伯和土耳其理由和机会寻找与伊朗的新权宜之计。


Israel’s security could be enhanced by bringing Iran into a cooperative economic and geopolitical relationship with the West, in turn enhancing the chances for a long-overdue two-state settlement with Palestine.	以色列的安全可以通过让伊朗构建与西方的合作性经济和地缘政治关系、反过来增加一拖再拖的以巴两国和解的机会而得到强化。


The rise of ISIS is a symptom of the shortcomings of current Western – particularly US – strategy.	ISIS的崛起是当前西方——尤其是美国——战略缺陷的表征。


The West can defeat ISIS.	西方能够击败ISIS。


The question is whether the US will undertake the strategic reassessment needed to accomplish that end.	问题在于美国是否会进行实现这一目标所需要的战略重估。


Why Is Physics Beautiful?	物理学为何是美？


CAMBRIDGE – The nineteenth-century physicist Heinrich Hertz once described his feeling that James Clerk Maxwell’s equations, which depict the fundamentals of electricity and magnetism, “have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser…even than their discoverers, that we get more out of them than was originally put into them.”	纽约剑桥—十九世纪物理学家赫兹曾经描述道，他觉得构成电磁学基础的麦克斯韦方程组“拥有独立存在和自己的智能，它们甚至比其他发现者……都跟聪明，我们从它们身上得到的比我们最初投入它们身上的更多。


Not long after, Albert Einstein called Niels Bohr’s atomic model “the highest form of musicality in the sphere of thought.”	”此后不久，爱因斯坦将玻尔的原子模型称为“思想界最高的音乐形式。


More recently, the late Nobel laureate Richard Feynman, describing his discovery of new laws of physics, declared, “You can recognize truth by its beauty and simplicity.”	”更晚近一些，已故诺贝尔物理学奖获得者费曼这样描述他所发现的物理学新定律：“你可以从它的美和简单中认识真理。


Similar sentiments are all but universal among modern physicists.	”类似的感觉在现代物理学家中间无处不在。


Wishful thinking could never produce working iPhones, photographs of Pluto, or atomic bombs.	想当然永远无法创造出能用的iPhone、冥王星照片和原子弹。


Physics, as summarized in a handful of mathematically precise laws, indisputably works.	被总结为一小撮数学上精确的定律的物理学毫无争议是有效的。


Yet many things that “work” do not inspire the kind of admiration that the fundamental laws of nature do.	但许多“有效”的东西并没有激起类似于对自然基本定律的崇拜的情感。


Their beauty is rooted, first, in the laws’ symmetry, here meaning the possibility of change without change – a precise yet almost mystical concept.	物理学定律的美首先植根于它们的对称性（symmetry）——这里意味着不变之变的可能性——一个精确的，但几乎是神秘的概念。


Just as a circle can be rotated about its center at any angle, changing the position of each of its points without changing its form, symmetric laws apply to changed situations without changing or losing validity.	正如圆可以绕其圆心旋转任意角度，让圆上所有的点改变位置而不改变圆本身的形状，对称定律适用于变化的情况而不必作出变化或失去有效性。


For example, special relativity asserts that the fundamental laws of physics remain the same when we view the world from a platform moving at constant velocity.	比如，狭义相对论认为，当我们从匀速运动的平台看世界时，物理学基本定律不会发生改变。


Similarly, so-called time translation symmetry encodes the uniformity of physical law in time: Even as the universe ages, the laws remain the same.	类似地，所谓的时间平移对称性描述了物理学定律在时间上的一致性：就算天荒地老，定律依然不变。


The second source of beauty in the laws of physics is their productivity – what I call their exuberance.	物理学定律之美的第二个来源是其生产力（productivity）——我称之为繁茂（exuberance）。


Just a handful of basic principles generates an astonishing wealth of consequences – everything in the physical world!	少数几个基本原理就能衍生出令人震惊的大量结果——物理学世界的一切！


You can write the equations of the core theories of physics – known as the standard model – quite comfortably on a T-shirt.	你可以轻松地在一件T恤衫上写下物理学核心理论的方程组——所谓的标准模型。


To paraphrase Hertz, they give back far more than we put in.	用赫兹的话说，它们给我们的东西比我们投入它们的东西更多。


It is important to note that the laws of physics need not necessarily have such marvelous properties.	物理学定律不一定具有如此非凡的性质，认识到这一点很重要。


Consider this hypothetical situation: Developments in computer power, virtual reality, and artificial intelligence enable the creation of self-aware beings whose “world” is, from our perspective, a programmed simulation.	考虑以下假想情形：计算机能力、虚拟现实和人工智能的发展让我们得以创造出一种有自我意识的物种，它们的“世界”在我们看来是一种编程仿真。


If a self-aware Super Mario began to analyze the laws of his world, he would find very little symmetry or productivity.	如果有自我意识的超级马里奥开始分析他的世界的定律，他不会发现多少对称性和生产力。


Instead, he would find a vast collection of loosely connected, quirky rules, reflecting the whims of the programmer.	相反，我们会发现大量联系松散的古怪规则，它们反映出编程者的奇思妙想。


The beauty of physical law is too impressive to be accidental.	物理定律之美实在太炫目，它不可能是偶然的。


It has led people throughout history to believe that some tasteful higher being created us, and that we inhabit a consciously designed world, like our notional Super Mario.	这让历史上的人们相信，是一些情趣高雅的高等生物创造了我们，我们定居在一个刻意设计的世界中，就像我们的抽象的超级马里奥。


But this is an extravagant hypothesis, which goes far beyond the facts it is meant to explain.	但这是一个夸张的假说，远远超过了它意在解释的事实。


Before adopting it, we should explore more economical alternatives.	在接受它以前，我们应该考察一下，更划算的替代方案。


The answer likely lies within us.	答案可能在我们中间。


Beautiful things are those in which we find pleasure and seek out.	美丽的东西是我们可以从中找到并获得愉悦的东西。


They are, in neurobiological terms, things that stimulate our reward system.	用神经生物学的术语讲，它们是刺激我们的犒赏系统的东西。


That explains why parents tend to find their young children beautiful, and adults are attracted to nubile models and their images.	这解释了为何父母亲总是认为他们的小孩很美，成年人总是被性感模特和他们的照片吸引。


It makes evolutionary sense to reward such feelings.	犒赏这些感觉具有进化意义。


The evolutionary utility of the beauty of physical laws is somewhat less obvious, but no less real.	物理学之美的进化效用也许不那么明显，但也是实实在在的。


Given the usefulness of accurately assessing the consequences of our actions, our reward system has evolved so that we derive joy from making successful predictions.	准确评估我们的行为的后果十分有用，因此，我们的犒赏系统进化出一种能力，让我们从做出成功的预测中感到乐趣。


Understanding the forces and patterns defining our world, and especially principles that apply (without changing) to a wide variety of situations, can help to improve our predictions.	理解决定我们的世界的力量和模式，特别是（无需变化）适用于各种情况的原理，有助于改善我们的预测。


The fact that we can often infer the behavior of complex objects or systems from knowledge of their parts – that we get back more than we put in – can help us to hone our predictions further.	我们常常可以从关于复杂对象或系统的某些部分的知识中推断它们的行为——获得比我们的投入更多的东西——这一事实有助于我们进一步精炼我们的预测。


In short, because evolution predisposes us to find beautiful those things that help us understand the world correctly, it is no accident that we find the correct laws of nature beautiful.	简言之，由于进化让我们倾向于认为有助于我们正确理解世界的东西是美丽的，因此，我们发现自然定律之美并非偶然。


Viewed from this perspective, the apparent beauty of the laws of physics – our attraction to their symmetry and exuberance – is not surprising.	从这个角度看，物理学定律的显而易见的美——我们被它们的对称性和繁茂所吸引——并不令人奇怪。


What remains mysterious is why they are comprehensible.	依然神秘的是为何它们可以被理解。


A profound link between beauty and comprehensibility is an increasingly important source of scientific progress.	美和可理解性之间的意义深远的联系是科学进步日益重要的源泉。


Today’s frontiers of fundamental physics are far removed from everyday experience.	今天的基础物理学前沿早已不是来自日常生活。


They are difficult and expensive to access experimentally, and we cannot rely on our intuition to fill in the blanks.	要想用实验接近它们困难又昂贵，我们也不可能依靠直觉填补空白。


The patient accumulation of fact recommended by Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and Sherlock Holmes is thus no longer practical.	因此，培根、牛顿和福尔摩斯所建议的耐心地积累事实已不再具有实践意义。


Instead, we reverse the process, using guesswork to motivate experiment.	相反，我们倒转了这一过程，用猜测驱动实验。


We first construct beautiful equations, then derive their consequences, and, finally, craft experiments to test them.	我们首先构造美妙的方程组，然后导出结果，最后设计实验验证它们。


In recent decades, that strategy has proved remarkably successful.	近几十年来，这一战略取得了令人瞩目的成功。


It has given us quantum chromodynamics, which resolves the central problem of nuclear physics, as well as predicting the Higgs particle and much else.	它给我们带来了量子色动力学，该学科解决了核物理学的核���问题，并预言了希格斯粒子和其他许多成果。


Rather than recognizing the beauty of laws otherwise discovered, we use principles of beauty – vast symmetry and a high ratio of output to input – to enable discovery.	我们不是去认识发现的定律的美，而是用美的原理——高度对称和高投入产出比——来促成发现。


When this works, we have an “anthropic” explanation of the laws’ beauty: If they were not beautiful, we would not have found them.	当这起作用时，我们就有了关于美的定律的“人类”解释：如果它们不美，我们就不会发现它们。


Why is the US Presidential Race So Close?	美国总统竞争为何如此接近？


WASHINGTON, DC – Many people around the world are probably wondering why Hillary Clinton – who is obviously more prepared and better suited for the American presidency than her opponent, Donald Trump – isn’t waltzing to victory.	华盛顿—全世界很多人可能正在奇怪为何希拉里·克林顿——她显然比她的对手唐纳德·特朗普准备更充分，也更适合当美国总统——没有势如破竹。


Many Americans share the world’s bewilderment.	许多美国人也有这样的疑惑。


National opinion polls may well continue to fluctuate until the election on November 8.	在11月8日的大选开始前，全国民调很可能将继续摇摆。


But Trump has been closing in on Clinton in recent weeks, even threatening to catch up with her in the Electoral College vote, where the Democrats’ control of some of the most populous states (New York and California) give Clinton an advantage.	但最近几周，特朗普一直在追近希拉里，甚至有望在选举人团（Electoral College）投票中追上她。 民主党控制着一些人口最多的州（纽约州和加利福尼亚州），这给了克林顿优势。


Why is this happening?	为什么会这样？


For starters, Trump, despite knowing almost nothing about governance or public policy, has managed to consolidate most Republicans behind him.	首先，特朗普尽管对于治国和公共政策几乎一无所知，但他成功地将大部分共和党人团结在自己背后。


One motivation is Republicans’ long-held hatred of Clinton.	一个动机是共和党对克林顿由来已久的恨意。


Another is the Supreme Court; the court already has one vacant seat for the next president to fill and is likely to have more over the next four years.	另一个动机是最高法院； 最高法院已经空出了一个席位，将由下任总统来填补，并且在未来四年中可能还有更多空位。


Trump has also exploited many Americans’ economic anxieties, tapping the same anti-immigrant, anti-elite rage that is sweeping across European countries.	特朗普还利用了许多美国人的经济焦虑，煽动与横扫欧洲诸国类似的反移民、反精英愤怒。


But Trump cannot win by appealing only to white men without a college degree.	但特朗普不可能只凭借诉诸没有大学文凭的白人男性赢得选举。


So he has been clumsily trying to suggest that he also cares about African Americans and Latinos – not by talking to African-American and Latino voters, but by speaking in exaggerated stereotypes about them to white audiences.	因此他一直在笨拙地试图证明他也顾及非洲裔美国人和拉丁裔——不仅仅通过与非洲裔美国人和拉丁裔选民对话，也通过以夸张的语调在白人听众前谈及他们。


Not surprisingly, African-Americans and Latinos consider his comments insensitive and patronizing; white women – his real target audience – haven’t yet been persuaded, either.	毫不奇怪，非洲裔美国人和拉丁裔认为他的评论愚蠢又傲慢； 白人女性——他的真正目标听众——也没有被说服。


Meanwhile, Clinton is having her own difficulties reconstructing President Barack Obama’s coalition of women, African Americans, Latinos, and millennials.	与此同时，克林顿在重建奥巴马总统的女性、非洲裔美国人、拉丁裔和千禧一代联盟方面也遇到了困难。


Many young people who passionately supported Clinton’s Democratic primary opponent, Senator Bernie Sanders, have ignored Sanders’s own admonitions to support Clinton, and are saying that they’ll vote for third-party candidates, which would help Trump.	许多年轻人热烈支持克林顿的民主党初选对手、参议员伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders），现在他们忽视桑德斯本人支持克林顿的劝诫，称他们将投票给其他党派候选人，这将有助于特朗普。


Since the two major parties’ national conventions in July, each candidate has alternately made gains and suffered losses.	自7月份两党召开全国大会以来，两位候选人彼此有得有失。


This month, just as Trump was rising in the polls, he attempted to separate himself from the racist “birther” movement, which falsely claims that Obama – America’s first black president – wasn’t born in the United States, and thus was ineligible for the presidency.	本月，在特朗普在民调中得势的同时，他试图将自己与种族主义“出身论”运动划清界线，后者子虚乌有地宣称美国首任黑人总统奥巴马并非出生在美国，因此没有资格当美国总统。


Trump’s remarks, terse and grudging, reminded everyone that he himself was one of the loudest “birthers” of all.	特朗普简短而勉强的声明提醒所有人，他本人便是最顽固的“出身论”者之一。


His damage-control effort further backfired, because he falsely claimed that Clinton and her 2008 presidential campaign had started the birther rumor.	他的止损举动带来了更多的副作用，因为他错误地宣称克林顿及其2008年总统选战是从出身论流言开始的。


Many news outlets finally used the word “lie” in their coverage of Trump, who had gone essentially unchallenged on past fabrications.	许多新闻媒体最后都用“说谎”一词来报道特朗普，他过去的诸多信口开河基本上都没有受到过挑战。


Trump’s recent polling gains say less about his improvement as a candidate than they do about Clinton’s own weaknesses and bad luck.	特朗普最近在民调中得势与其说是因为他作为候选人有所进步，不如说是因为克林顿自己的弱势和倒霉。


Outside her base of passionate loyalists, Clinton has always had a voter-enthusiasm problem.	除了她的基本盘，克林顿一直面临着选民热情问题。


She comes across to many as a packaged know-it-all, the super-smart girl who put off the boys in school.	对许多人来说，她的形象是万事通，就像学校里令男生汗颜的“学霸”。


And she confronts a fair amount of sexism, even among her supporters.	她还面临着相当大的性别歧视，即使在她的支持者中也是如此。


(A former Democratic governor recently declared that she should smile more.	（一位前民主党州长最近宣称她应该更多地微笑。


Would he have said that about a man?)	他会这样评论男候选人吗？ ）


But Clinton has also created some of her own problems.	但克林顿自己也给自己制造了一些麻烦。


Her poor judgment in using a private email server as Secretary of State, thereby risking the disclosure of classified material, has become a chronic burden for her campaign.	她在担任国务卿期间使用私人邮件服务器，从而导致保密材料有可能泄露，这表明她判断力糟糕，也是她选战中的一个永远的污点。


She compounded the problem when she claimed, falsely, that her predecessors had done the same thing, and that State Department security officials had cleared it.	她错误地宣称她的前任也这么做过，并且国务院安全官员已经清理了邮件，这让问题更加复杂化了。


And, unlike Trump, she received no deference from the press on this issue.	此外，与特朗普不同，在这个问题上，她没有获得媒体的尊重。


The email saga added to voters’ long-held impression that Clinton isn’t “honest and trustworthy,” and it exposed her to attacks from adversaries on the right.	“邮件门”加强了选民由来已久的克林顿不“诚实可信”的印象，也让她饱受右翼对手的攻讦。


The highly conservative advocacy group Judicial Watch has continually called attention to the issue, forcing the disclosure of emails that Clinton hadn’t turned over to the State Department.	高度保守的游说团体司法观察（Judicial Watch）一直在鼓吹关注这一问题，施压披露克林顿没有转交国务院的邮件。


(The FBI found nearly 15,000 emails on Clinton’s server that she hadn’t provided.)	（联邦调查局在克林顿的服务器上找到了近1,500封她没有提供的邮件。


Numerous as-yet-undisclosed emails with the potential to damage Clinton may well be released before the election.	）为数巨大的尚未披露邮件可能在选举前公之于众，危及克林顿的选情。


While FBI Director James Comey decided not to recommend prosecution of Clinton for the email issue, he hurt her campaign by commenting that she’d been “extremely careless.”	尽管联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科梅（James Comey）决定不建议就邮件问题起诉克林顿，但仍评论说她“非常不谨慎”，这将危及克林顿的选情。


In any case, the choice not to prosecute had Republicans and conservative commentators howling that she’d received preferential treatment from the Democratic administration.	无论如何，不起诉的选择让共和党和保守派评论家猛烈评级她从民主党政府中获得特殊优待。


Polls showed that 56% of respondents agreed that Clinton should have been prosecuted.	民调显示56%的受访者同意克林顿应该被起诉。


A new issue for Clinton arose in August, when the Associated Press reported that numerous donors to the Clinton Foundation had received special treatment by the State Department during Clinton’s tenure there, mainly by winning an appointment with her.	8月份，克林顿又有了一个新问题。 美联社报道众多克林顿基金会捐赠者在克林顿任职国务卿期间获得了国务院的特殊对待，主要形式是通过她获得任命。


But many of these people would have received an appointment anyway; and there is no evidence that State Department policies were changed as a result.	但这些人中有许多本来就可以获得任命； 并无证据表明国务院政策因此被改变。


Meanwhile, the Washington Post has begun to report on questionable – possibly illegal – expenditures by Trump’s own charitable foundation.	与此同时，《华盛顿邮报》开始报道特朗普本人的慈善基金会的可疑——有可能非法——支出。


Trump, who hadn’t donated to his foundation since 2008, subsequently used its funds to buy personal items (including a six-foot portrait of himself) and to pay legal settlements.	特朗普自2008年以来便再未向基金会捐资，但使用基金会资金购买个人物品（包括衣服他本人的六英尺画像）和支付法律和解费用。


Previously, it had also been disclosed that funds from the Trump Foundation had been used to contribute to the election campaigns of attorneys-general in Florida and Texas, which would also be illegal.	此前，据披露特朗普基金会资金还被用于佛罗里达州和德克萨斯州检察长的竞选活动，这也是非法的。


Finally, Clinton had the bad luck of falling ill, with cellphone video showing her nearly collapsing as she left early a ceremony in New York City commemorating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack.	最后，克林顿不幸生病，手机视频显示，在9月11日出席纽约市恐怖袭击纪念仪式时她在离开时险些跌倒。


This added further fuel to right-wing media speculation that she is in poor health; Trump added the sexist charge that she lacks the “stamina” to be president.	这进一步助长了右翼媒体猜测她健康有问题； 特朗普更是发动性别攻击，说她缺少当总统的“耐力”。


The press covering Clinton were furious to learn that two days earlier she had been diagnosed with pneumonia and had kept it to herself.	克林顿团队先是说她太疲劳了，后来又披露她两天前被诊断为肺炎。 许多媒体对她不早点披露这一信心感到愤怒。


But American presidential elections are brutal marathons, and it’s understandable that she did not want to cancel planned events.	但美国总统选战是一场残酷的马拉松，她不想取消计划行程完全可以理解。


A later poll showed that the majority of the public agreed.	随后的民调显示大部分公众也同意这一点。


Clinton’s four-day convalescence came just as she was preparing to make the case for why people should vote for her, rather than why they shouldn’t vote for Trump.	克林顿为期四天的康复期正逢她准备向人们解释为什么要投票给她，而不是不投票给特朗普。


Just as she resumed campaigning, there were bombings in New York and New Jersey, and two more police shootings of unarmed African Americans, which spurred demonstrations in North Carolina, a swing state.	她一回归选战，纽约和新泽西就爆发了爆炸事件，更有两起警察枪击未携带武器的非洲裔美国人事件，导致摇摆州加利福尼亚北部爆发游行示威。


The events took over the national dialogue, with Trump, as usual, playing on racial divisions and blaming Obama and Clinton.	这些事件占据了全国对话的焦点，而特朗普像往常一样利用种族分歧并指责奥巴马和克林顿。


This is the background against which the candidates will head into face-to-face debates, which tend to play a large (even excessive) role in shaping US elections.	在这样的背景下，两位候选人将进行面对面辩论，而辩论将给美国选情造成巨大（甚至过度）的影响。


It would be unwise to call this election over before it is.	在此之前就宣布选举结束是不明智的。


Pulling the OMT Trigger	扳下OMT扳机


CHICAGO – Europe has been experiencing a period of calm after the storm since European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech in July and the ECB’s decision in September to proceed with its “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) program to purchase distressed eurozone members’ government bonds.	芝加哥—自欧洲央行行长德拉吉7月“竭尽所能”演讲以及欧洲央行9月决定采取“直接货币交易”（OMT）买入受困欧元区成员国政府债券后，欧洲经历着稳定期。


The interest-rate spreads for Italian and Spanish government bonds have dropped dramatically, corporate-bond issues have resumed, and a sense of normalcy is slowly pervading the continent.	意大利和西班牙政府的利差大幅下降，公司债券发行重现江湖，欧洲大陆也开始逐渐弥漫恢复正常的感觉。


But it would be foolish to conclude that the euro’s problems have been solved.	但这样就认为欧元问题已被解决是愚蠢的。


The economic fundamentals are far from stable, while the reduced financial tension is the fortunate outcome of an expectation game.	经济基本面远远称不上稳定，尽管预期游戏产生了财政压力纾解的幸运效果。


As long as investors believe that Italy and Spain will eventually be rescued by the OMT, these countries’ borrowing costs will be low, and the rescue will not be needed.	只要投资者认为意大利和西班牙最终能够被OMT所救，这些国家的借贷成本就将保持低位，救援也就没有必要实施。


If, however, the slightest doubt about the OMT’s effectiveness arises, the expectation game will shift into reverse, and both countries’ bonds will quickly come under attack.	不过，如果人们对OMT的作用产生哪怕是最轻微的质疑，预期游戏就将向相反的地方发展，两国债券将马上受到攻击。


One such source of doubt may be the OMT’s safety catch.	质疑原因之一的OMT的安全阀装置。


To become operational, all European governments must approve it.	为了使其可操作，所有欧洲国家政府都必须批准它。


The rules vary among EU countries, but, in Germany, “government approval” implies parliamentary approval.	各个欧盟国家的规则各不相同，但在德国，“政府批准”意味着议会批准。


In an emergency situation, it is difficult to imagine that Germany will not prefer approval to the disaster of an Italian or Spanish default.	在紧急情况下，很难想象德国会放任意大利或西班牙违约而不批准OMT。


Still, any delay could be enough to trigger a bank run in either country.	但是，任何拖延都有可能足以出发意大利或西班牙的银行挤兑。


By the time the German Bundestag decided, it could be too late.	到德国议会作出决定的时候，说不定一切都太晚了。


To eliminate this uncertainty, Italy and Spain should ask for the OMT intervention before it is desperately needed – a request that the Bundestag would most likely approve, viewing it as an insurance scheme rather than a pure transfer.	为了消除这一不确定性，意大利和西班牙应该要求OMT在不得不出手之前就进行干预——这一要求德国议会很可能会批准，将其视为一种保险机制，而不仅仅是转移支付。


Doing so would also eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the program itself and its implementation mechanisms.	如此还能消除围绕在OMT计划本身及其实施机制的不确定性。


Identifying and addressing problems when intervention is not urgently needed is much easier than working them out under the threat of a pending sovereign default.	在干预并非迫切需要的时候识别并纠正问题要比受到迫在眉睫的主权违约的威胁时才动手更容易。


Finally, an early request for OMT intervention would not only reduce the Italian and Spanish governments’ borrowing costs (and thus their fiscal deficits), but would also lower the cost of capital for local firms, which currently find it difficult to borrow and invest.	最后，早早要求OMT干预不但可以降低意大利和西班牙政府的借贷成本（从而降低它们的财政赤字），还可以降低本地企业的资本成本，后者目前陷入了借贷和投资困境。


Thus, it would provide a much-needed boost to these countries’ struggling economies.	如此，OMT可以对这些深陷麻烦的国家提供急需的提振。


So, if triggering OMT intervention would be so beneficial, why are the Spanish and Italian governments so reluctant to do so?	那么，既然触发OMT干预的好处是如此之大，为何西班牙和意大利政府不愿这样做？


The main reason is political.	主要原因在于政治。


In the 1930’s, all European governments feared that breaking from the gold standard would be perceived as a sign of weakness.	20世纪30年代，所有欧洲政府都害怕与金本位脱钩将被视为疲软的信号。


As a result, they waited too long.	结果，它们等待了太长时间。


The same is true of the OMT program: elected politicians fear that triggering it would be perceived as a sign of weakness, implying a cost that they have a strong incentive to delay paying.	OMT也是如此：当选政客害怕触发OMT被视为示弱，这就构成了一种成本，他们有强烈的激励推迟该成本的发生。


But why is Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, who is not an elected politician (and has promised not to run for election), so hesitant?	但为何作为非当选（并承诺不参加竞选）的政客的意大利总理蒙蒂也如此犹豫？


Given that he does not have to fear electoral defeat, he could help Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy by filing first, which would weaken the political stigma for Rajoy’s government were it to file subsequently.	他不用担心在选举中被击败，可以成为第一个要求OMT干预者，从而助西班牙首相拉霍伊一臂之力——如果拉霍伊政府在意大利之后才要求OMT干预，则它就不会面临多少政治难堪。


Triggering OMT now would also be a safe play for Italy in the face of an imminent general election with a highly uncertain outcome.	到现在，触发OMT也是意大利在面临即将到来的结果极不确定的大选时的安全之选。


What is not uncertain is that an anti-euro party, run by a professional comedian, Beppe Grillo, will gain at least 20% of the Italian vote.	确定的是，以职业喜剧演员格里洛（Beppe Grillo）为首的反欧元政党至少将在意大利大选中赢得20%的选票。


The political instability that could ensue would not provide a good opportunity to ask Germany for help.	这可能引发政治动荡，不利于寻求德国的帮助。


In fact, if one were to imagine reasons why Germany might not approve a request by Italy to trigger the OMT, political turmoil would top the list.	事实上，如果你思考一下德国不批准意大利触发OMT的要求的原因，那么政治乱象肯定是首先冒出来的内容。


By contrast, triggering the OMT in advance would promote political stability in the face of uncertainty, because it would tie the hands of any future Italian government.	相反，提前触发OMT将增加面临不确定性时的政治稳定性，因为这能够束缚未来意大利政府的手脚。


Why, then, is Monti not acting?	既然如此，为什么蒙蒂无所作为？


One possible reason is personal pride.	一个可能的原因是个人尊严。


Monti wants to be remembered as the prime minister who saved Italy from disaster.	蒙蒂希望以带领意大利走出灾难的总理被人铭记。


He does not want to go down in history as the prime minister who had to surrender Italy’s sovereignty to save the country from default.	他不愿意在历史上留下将为避免主权��约而将意大利主权拱手出让的总理的名声。


An alternative explanation is that Monti does indeed have political ambitions.	另一个解释是蒙蒂确实怀有政治野心。


While Monti’s mandate was set to last until the election, he might be trying to extend it with the support of the new parliament.	尽管其执政只能维持到大选，但他可能会在新议会的支持下谋求留任。


Delay for either of these reasons would be a very selfish act.	不管出于哪种原因，不作为都是自私的行为。


Monti should not risk European stability for his personal benefit.	蒙蒂不应该因为个人好处而将欧洲稳定性置于风险之中。


He should trigger OMT before it is too late.	他应该在犹未为晚时触发OMT。


Italy’s French Temptation	意大利的法国诱惑


FLORENCE – Italy is once again being gulled by the false hope that if it can just “fix” its institutions, its politics will normalize.	佛罗伦萨—意大利再一次受了错误希望的骗，认为只要能够“修正”其制度，其政治就会正常化。


This time, it is the French model that is enticing Italy’s leaders.	这一回，迷惑意大利领导人的是法国模式。


Since February’s inconclusive general election, Italian lawmakers have managed to agree on only one thing: the reelection of 88-year-old President Giorgio Napolitano, which makes him the first two-term president since Italy abolished the monarchy in 1946.	自2月份大选没有产生决定性结果以来，意大利立法者只在一个问题上形成了一致：88岁的纳波利塔诺再一次当选总统，成为自1946年意大利放弃君主制以来第一个连任的总统。


The main center-left and center-right parties that supported Napolitano – despite the protests of Beppe Grillo and his anti-establishment Five Star Movement, which won a quarter of the parliamentary vote – hope that he can oversee the creation of a broad-based coalition government.	支持纳波利塔诺的主流中左翼和中右翼政党希望，在他的监督下，意大利能形成获得广泛支持的联合政府。 不过格里洛（Beppe Grillo）及其反对现状的五星运动党（Five Star Movement，该党赢得了议会选举的四分之一选票）反对纳波利塔诺。


But addressing Italy’s myriad institutional weaknesses – which have led to ungovernability, endemic fragmentation, disfattismo (defeatism), and widespread public frustration with the establishment – will require an overhaul of the country’s political system.	但纠正意大利为数众多的制度弱点——它们导致意大利无从治理，地方各自为政，失败主义盛行，以及公众对现状的普遍沮丧感——要求改变该国的政治制度。


Given that France overcame similar weaknesses and political deadlock with the creation of the Fifth Republic, which includes a robust executive led by a powerful president, the French model seems like an effective one to follow.	法国曾以建立第五共和国的方式——其中包括强势总统领导下的稳健执政——克服了类似的弱点和政治僵局，因此法国模式似乎是可供遵循的善例。


Indeed, at first glance, pursuing such a change in Italy appears simple.	事实上，咋一看，意大利追求类似变化好像易如反掌。


Perhaps it is not surprising that Italians admire France’s Fifth Republic.	也许意大利仰慕法国第五共和国并不令人奇怪。


After all, its governments – unlike those in Italy – have been remarkably stable and relatively durable, lasting 643 days, on average.	毕竟，其政府——与意大利政府不同——令人注目地稳定和相对持久，平均执政时间为643天。


Moreover, no one party or figure has dominated French politics for too long, with power alternating regularly between parties of the left and the right, at least since François Mitterrand’s first victory in 1981.	此外，没有哪个政党或个人能主宰法国政治太长时间，权力定期在左翼和右翼政党之间交替，至少自1981年密特朗首次获选以来是如此。


But, for many Italians, the French political system’s most attractive feature is that the president is the true head of the executive – and, since the presidential and legislative terms were aligned in 2000, that authority has run for five years at a time.	但是，对许多意大利人来说，法国政治制度最吸引人的特征是其总统乃是真正的执政首脑——而自2000年总统和立法任期统一以来，每五年选举一次。


To Italian lawmakers, mired in stalemate and indecision, the French executive’s considerable influence over the parliament is appealing.	对陷于僵局和犹豫的意大利立法者来说，法国行政影响力远高于议会的状态吸引力极大。


That influence is bolstered by the electoral rules’ inherent bias in favor of powerful parties.	这一影响力来自选举规则有利于强势政党的内在偏向性。


Indeed, no electoral system creates a greater vote-seat distortion than France’s two-round majoritarian system.	事实上，没有哪种选举制度能比法国的两轮多数制度更能制造选票-席位扭曲的了。


For example, in 2012, the Socialists obtained nearly 50% of the seats in the National Assembly, despite having won only 29% of the vote in the first round.	比如，2012年法国社会党在国民大会（National Assembly）中赢得近50%的席位，尽管它在第一轮选举中只获得了29%的选票。


The right-wing RPR-UDF coalition did even better in 1993, when it won 38.5% of the vote in the first round but obtained an astonishing 82% of the seats.	右翼的PDR-UDF联盟在1993年的表现甚至更加出色，它在第一轮选举中赢得38. 5%的选票，但最终赢得了惊人的82%的议席。


In France, smaller parties can gain parliamentary seats only if they manage to negotiate a pre-election agreement with one of the major parties to secure for them some constituencies.	在法国，小政党要想获得议院席位，必须设法在选举前与某大政党达成协议，以确保拿下一些选区。


One could argue that this system facilitates more efficient governance, and thus could potentially save Italy from its debilitating gridlock.	你可能会说，这一制度有利于更高效的治理，因此可能把意大利从令人疲敝的僵局中拯救出来。


But it is difficult to see how it is good for democracy.	但很难看到这对民主有什么好处。


Before becoming overly enamored of French institutions, Italians should consider what the French think of their own system.	在过度沉迷于法国制度之前，意大利应该考虑一下法国人如何看待自己的制度。


In fact, the French are extremely frustrated with their country’s politics, particularly with their presidents.	事实上，法国人对自己国家的政治感到无比失望，特别是对他们的总统。


This dissatisfaction does not reflect a failure of François Hollande, whose approval rating stands at only 26% one year into his presidential term; his two immediate predecessors, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, also left office in disgrace.	这一不满不光体现在奥朗德的失败上——在问鼎总统宝座仅仅一年后，他的支持率只有26%； 他的两位前任，希拉克和萨科齐，离职时���颇不体面。


According to Eurobarometer data collected over the last two decades, Italy’s political system, its leaders, and its democratic institutions have the lowest level of citizen satisfaction among the first 15 European Union countries.	根据欧洲晴雨表（Eurobarometer）在过去二十年中所收集的数据，以人民满意度衡量，意大利的政治制度、它的领导人以及它的民主机构在第一批15个欧盟国家中叨陪末座。


But France is a close second.	但法国也只是倒数第二。


Likewise, France is second only to Italy when it comes to the desire to reform and restructure its political institutions.	类似地，在人民改革和重组政治制度意愿排名上，意大利名列第一，而紧随其后的也正是法国。


At the end of the day, there is no institutional reform that could miraculously “save” Italy.	所到底，没有哪种制度改革能奇迹般地“拯救”意大利。


While a semi-presidential system like France’s could enable Italy to suppress symmetric bicameralism and reform the worst aspects of its electoral law (known as porcellum, or “the crap law”), thereby improving governability, it would create as many problems as it would solve.	尽管类似法国的半总统制能让意大利遏制其对称两院制并改革其选举法中最糟糕的的部分（被称为“porecellum”，即“废话法律”），从而改善其可治理性，但也它所带来的问题一点也不比它所解决问题少。


French history demonstrates that excessive presidential power is likely to create an almighty and, at times, politically feckless executive, alongside a weak parliament that chronically under-represents a significant proportion of the population.	法国历史表明，总统权力过大可能会形成人造神，有时也会造成政治上软弱的执政者，以及长期无法代表人口大部的弱势议会。


Beyond the incantatory formulas, Italians should reflect carefully on the desirability of adopting such a system.	意大利应该破除迷信，认真考虑是否应该追求这样一套制度。


Why Mexico is Sick	墨西哥病在何处


Mexico City – As I reflect on my troubled country, the lyrics of a Bruce Springsteen song come to mind: “We are far, far away from home.	墨西哥城——故乡墨西哥层出不穷的问题让我不禁想起布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀的一句歌词——“我们离家乡很远很远；


Our home is far, far away from us.”	家乡在那很远很远的远方。


That’s how it feels to live in Mexico nowadays: far from democratic normalcy; far from a health system that inspires confidence; far from a government that builds trust; far from home and close to everything that imperils it.	”这句歌词正是今天墨西哥人的真实感受：正常的民主、可靠的医疗卫生体系、可信的政府都已远去，不见了家乡，只剩下危机重重。


My homeland has become a place where too many people are victims, succumbing to a virus, or gunned down by a drug-trafficker; assaulted by a robber, shot by an ill-trained policeman, or kidnapped by a member of a criminal gang.	今天的墨西哥，病毒肆虐、毒贩猖獗、盗贼横行，再加上警察训练无素，有太多人为此丢了性命，太多人被犯罪团伙所挟持绑架。


The flu epidemic, which probably began in the southern state of Veracruz, is yet another sign that all is not well in Mexico.	这场可能源自南部韦拉克鲁斯州的猪流感疫情则给墨西哥目前一团糟的局面雪上加霜。


The country seems to be caught in a permanent, uneasy tug-of-war between the past and the future, between change and the actors who seek to place obstacles in its path.	墨西哥似乎陷入了一场过去与未来、变革与阻碍之间的、永久的、令人不安的拉锯战中。


For example, when initial reports surfaced about the first swine flu cases, it took three weeks for the information to reach federal health authorities, because state governments were reluctant to report cases quickly due to political and electoral considerations.	从这场猪流感疫情暴发来看，各州政府出于政治选举考虑，不愿尽快向上报告疫情，因此直到第一批猪流感病例出现三周以后，墨西哥联邦医疗卫生部门才得到消息。


Mexico faces mid-term elections for Congress in the fall, and President Felipe Calderón’s National Action Party is trailing slightly in the polls over its main rivals, who would like nothing better than to see a health emergency translate into a political defeat.	今年秋天，墨西哥国会将迎来中期选举，总统费利佩·卡尔德龙所在的国家行动党在民意调查中目前略微落后于主要竞争对手。 这些竞选对手最希望看到的莫过于国家行动党在医疗卫生事件上政治行动的失败。


In the face of a public health system that seemed incapable of diagnosing and treating the outbreak quickly, the government felt it had little choice but to shut down Mexico City, dealing a severe blow to an already crippled economy.	疫情暴发后，墨西哥的公共医疗卫生体系似乎无力迅速诊治患者、控制疫情，政府不得不下令“关闭”墨西哥城，给原本已举步维艰的经济带来重创。


In contrast with Mexico’s authoritarian past, when an “imperial presidency” constituted a major obstacle to modernization, power has been dispersed.	与过去阻碍现代化进程的“帝王总统”式独裁统治不同，如今墨西哥权力已不再集中。


What the executive branch has relinquished, or been forced to give up, vested interests have seized.	行政部门放弃或被迫放弃的一部分权力如今已被各既得利益集团所掌控。


The problem is no longer too much power in the president’s hands, but too much power in the hands of “veto centers” – including public-sector unions – that are blocking much-needed reforms, including in the health system.	现在权利过大的不是总统，而是包括公共部门工会在内的各 “否决中心”，正是它们阻挠了医疗卫生体制改革等一系列亟需推进的改革。


In all likelihood, the 22 reported dead from swine flu reflect a social safety net falling to pieces due to lack of public investment and union recalcitrance.	由于公共投入不足和工会的反对阻挠，墨西哥的社会安全网已千疮百孔，这次疫情中22人死亡就是明证。


The flu also revealed some of Mexico’s other fundamental flaws.	这场猪流感疫情同样也暴露出墨西哥其他根本性缺陷。


The political system has become a peculiar hybrid of authoritarian remnants and newly established mechanisms for transparency.	其特有的政治体制中既含有独裁主义的残余也包括新建立起来的透明机制。


The electoral process has been unable to guarantee decent democratic governance, rein in predatory practices among the political class, or make public officials follow established rules, keep them responsive to citizen preferences, and deter them from channeling public funds into private hands.	现行选举程序下，正当的民主治理得不到保证，政治阶级的掠夺行为屡禁不止，政府官员有章不循、中饱私囊、对民众诉求无动于衷。


Lack of accountability has both encouraged corruption and fed perceptions that abuse remains unpunished. Impunity, in turn, erodes the credibility of the country’s institutions, including public hospitals and clinics.	问责制度的缺失滋生了腐败，滥用职权好像总能逃脱惩罚，这反过来又损害了公立医院、诊所等国家机构的公信力。


Today, conspiracy theories abound in Mexico about the origins of the virus, because government officials are viewed with such ingrained suspicion.	关于疫情病毒的起源，目前在墨西哥有很多传言，民众莫衷一是，因为他们对政府官员早已不再信任。


Throughout the epidemic, citizens have largely obeyed government guidelines and followed public health prescriptions. But that doesn’t mean they trust the government.	猪流感疫情暴发后，墨西哥民众虽然基本上遵照了政府的指示 和公共医疗卫生指南，但这并不意味着他们信任政府。


Public-opinion polls reveal that more than 50% of the population believe that political parties are “not necessary” for the good of the country.	民意调查表明，超过50%的人认为政党间的竞争并不符合国家利益。


Disapproval of Congress is growing, and people’s satisfaction with representative democracy has decreased.	民众对国会的支持率越来越低，对代议民主制度的满意程度也出现了下降。


In the midst of the epidemic, 66% of Mexicans believe that the country is regressing.	疫情暴发后，多达66%的墨西哥人认为墨西哥正在退步。


Seventy-five percent of crimes are not reported due to lack of trust in the authorities, and 98% of crimes are never resolved or punished.	由于民众对当局缺乏信心， 75% 的犯罪案件没有上报； 98%的犯罪案件无果而终，犯罪分子仍逍遥法外。


Public opinion seems disenchanted with a democracy incapable of offering tangible solutions to problems, the flu crisis being the most recent example.	民众对于现行民主政体似乎已不抱希望，不指望看到切实的解决方案，而这场猪流感疫情危机则再次证明了这一点。


Saddled by a viral infection, drug-related insecurity, and rising crime, Mexico feels like a besieged place.	病毒的蔓延、毒品的泛滥、社会的动荡、不断上升的犯罪率，墨西哥似乎已四面楚歌、走投无路。


The noted columnist Miguel Angel Granados Chapa wrote last week: “All that’s missing is for Mexico to get peed on by a dog.”	著名专栏作家Miguel Angel Granados Chapa上周就曾写道：“现在墨西哥就差受狗的胯下之辱了。 ”


Mexico’s bad health is a symptom of problems that run deeper and are more widespread than swine flu.	墨西哥生病了，其症状的根源比猪流感疫情来得更深更广。


Over the past ten years, political and economic actors intent on preserving the status quo have blocked further democratic change and economic reform, condemning Mexico to move sideways, even as other emerging markets surge ahead.	过去十年中，政界和商界人士为维持现状，阻挠民主和经济的进一步改革，使墨西哥的发展偏离了方向。 而与此同时，其他新兴市场则纷纷崛起。


Lately, political battles among key actors have not been about how to build a more effective of representative political system or a more equitable, dynamic economy, but about how to maintain control of accumulated power or distribute it among their allies.	最近，墨西哥政坛激烈争论的焦点并不是如何建立更有效、更具代表性的政治体系，或更公平、更具活力的经济体系，而是如何继续掌控手中的权利，如何与同盟分配这些权利。


Political parties appear far removed from citizen demands, beset by internal divisions, incapable of addressing deep-rooted inequality and lawlessness, and prone to populist or authoritarian leadership that promises quick fixes to entrenched problems.	各政党忙于处理内部纠纷，无力实现公平、法治，指望善作承诺的民粹主义或独裁主义领导者瞬间把根深蒂固的问题消弭于无形。 对于民众的诉求，它们早已无暇顾及。


Mexico’s current quandary is the flu, but it faces more important challenges than a mutating microbe.	墨西哥当前面临的难题是控制猪流感疫情��但这远远不是其挑战的全部。


With more than 40 million people living in poverty and 7,000 killed in drug-related violence last year, Mexico will need to reform quickly to address what the virus has brought to light: a government far removed from the suffering of ordinary people and too frequently insensitive to their plight.	墨西哥仍有4000万贫困人口，仅去年一年就有7000余人死于毒品相关的暴力事件。 墨西哥需要迅速推进改革，以解决由猪流感疫情所暴露出的根源性问题——即政府对普通民众的疾苦不闻不问、无动于衷。


In this national crisis, Mexico’s people have closed ranks, collaborated, and showed that they are capable of working together to achieve common goals in the public interest.	面对这场全国性的危机，墨西哥人民齐心协力、共克时艰，展现出为公共利益团结奋斗的能力。


But their political and economic elites frequently seem incapable of doing so.	然而，墨西哥政界和商界的精英们似乎常常无法做到这一点。


That is why home seems far, far away for so many Mexicans.	因此，许多墨西哥人才会觉得家乡还在那很远很远的远方。


Natural-Born Pianists?	天生钢琴家？


LONDON – The editor of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, has written a book about how he decided to practice the piano 20 minutes a day.	伦敦 一 《卫报》编辑艾伦·拉斯布里哲（Alan Rusbridger）写了一部关于他如何决定每天弹20分钟钢琴的书。


Eighteen months later, he played Chopin’s fearsomely difficult Ballade No. 1 in G Minor to an admiring audience of friends.	18个月后，他弹出了肖邦难度极高的G小调一号叙事曲，围观亲友为之倾倒。


Could anyone have done this?	任何人都能做到这一点吗？


Or did it require special talent?	还是说着需要特别的天分？


The nature-versus-nurture debate has been around a long time. It is unresolved because the scientific question has always been entangled with politics.	先天-后天争论由来已久，至今仍未解决，因为这一科学问题总是与政治纠结不清。


Broadly speaking, those stressing inborn capacity have been political conservatives; those emphasizing nurture have been political radicals.	大体说来，强调天赋异禀的是政治保守派，强调后天的是政治激进派。


The nineteenth-century philosopher John Stuart Mill was of the “anyone can do it” school.	19世纪哲学家约翰·穆勒是“人人都是天才”派成员。


He was convinced that his achievements were in no way due to superior heredity: anyone of “normal intelligence and health,” subjected to his father’s educational system – which included learning Greek at the age of three – could have become John Stuart Mill.	他相信他的成就跟基因优良毫无关系：任何“智力和健康状况正常者”在其父的教育制度下——包括从三岁开始学习希腊文——都可以变成约翰·穆勒。


Mill was part of his century’s liberal attack on aristocratic privilege: achievement was the result of opportunity, not birth.	穆勒是当时对贵族特权发起攻击的人之一：成就来自机会，而不是出身。


The practice of the faculties (education) unleashes potential that would otherwise remain dormant.	学校（教育）实践能激发隐藏的潜能。


Charles Darwin seemingly overturned this optimistic view of the potential beneficial effects of nurture.	查尔斯·达尔文似乎扭转了这一后天努力潜在积极影响的乐观观点。


Species evolve, Darwin said, through “natural selection” – the random selection, through competition, of biological traits favorable to survival in a world of scarce resources.	达尔文说，物种通过“自然选择”进化——即通过竞争随机选择生物特征有利于在资源稀缺的世界生存的物种。


Herbert Spencer used the phrase “survival of the fittest” to explain how societies evolve.	赫伯特·斯宾塞用“适者生存”来解释社会演化。


Social Darwinists interpreted natural selection to mean that any humanitarian effort to improve the condition of the poor would impede the progress of the human race by burdening it with an excess of drones.	社会达尔文主义者对自然选择的解读是，这意味着改善穷人条件的人道主义努力会产生过多的懒汉，从而阻碍人种进步。


Society would be spending scarce resources on losers rather than winners.	社会将把稀缺资源用于输家而不是赢家。


This fit the ideology of a brand of capitalism that was “red in tooth and claw.”	这符合“野蛮”资本主义观念。


Indeed, social Darwinism provided a pseudo-scientific justification for the American belief in laissez-faire (with the successful businessman epitomizing the survival of the fittest); for eugenics (the deliberate attempt to breed superior individuals, on the model of horse-breeding, and prevent the “over-breeding” of the unfit); and for the eugenic-cum-racial theories of Nazism.	事实上，社会达尔文主义为美国人的自由放任信仰（成功商人即生存下来的适者）、优生学（按照育马模式有意识地选育超级个人，防止不适者的“过度繁育”）以及纳粹的优等人种理论提供了伪科学的论据。


In reaction to social Darwinism’s murderous tendencies, Mill’s view became dominant after World War II in the form of social democracy.	为了对付社会达尔文主义这残暴倾向，穆勒的观点在二战后以社会民主的形式成为主流。


State action to improve diet, education, health, and housing would enable the poor to realize their potential.	改善饮食、教育、卫生和住房条件的国家行动能让穷人实现自己的潜能。


Competition as a social principle was downgraded in favor of cooperation.	竞争作为社会原则，其重要性不如合作。


Differences in innate ability were not denied (at least by the sensible).	先天能力的差别并没有被否认（至少理智者没有否认）。


But it was rightly felt that there was a huge amount of work to be done to raise average levels of achievement before one needed to start worrying that one’s policies were promoting the survival of the unfit.	但一种正确的观念是可以通过大量工作提高成就的平均水平，然后再开始担心某政策会有利于不适者的生存不迟。


Then the mood began to shift again.	接着，情绪又开始了转变。


Social democracy was attacked for penalizing the successful and rewarding the unsuccessful.	社会民主受到了抨击，因为它惩罚成功者，奖励不成功者。


In 1976, the biologist Richard Dawkins identified the unit of Darwinian selection as the “selfish gene.”	1976年，生物学家理查德·道金斯识别出达尔文主义选择单元，称之为“自私的基因”。


The evolutionary story was now recast as a battle of genes to secure their survival over time by means of mutations, which create individuals (phenotypes) best adapted to pass on their genes.	如今，进化的故事被演绎成基因生存战，随着时间的推移，各种基因通过突变保证其生存，于是产生了最适于传递基因的表型。


In the course of evolution, the inferior phenotypes disappear.	在进化过程中，劣等表型消失了。


Although this view of evolution would not have been possible before the discovery of DNA, it is no coincidence that it rose to prominence in the age of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.	尽管这一进化观点在DNA发现之前根本不可能出现，但其在里根和撒切尔时代成为主流并非巧合。


To be sure, the selfish gene needs to be “altruistic” insofar as its survival depends on the survival of the kinship group.	平心而论，在生存取决于亲族的生存时，自私的基因需要“利他”。


But it need not be that altruistic.	但此利他非彼利他。


And, although Dawkins later regretted calling his gene “selfish” (he says that “immortal” would have been better), his choice of adjective was certainly best adapted to maximizing sales of his book at that particular time.	此外，尽管道金斯后来又后悔将他的基因称为“自私”（他说，“不朽”更合适），但他对形容词的选择毫无疑问最适合在当时的特定时期最大化其著作销��。


Since then, we have turned away from advocacy of selfishness, but we have not recovered an independent moral language.	此后，我们开始远离自私论，但尚未重新找到新的独立道德规则。


The new orthodoxy, suitable for a world in which the unrestrained pursuit of greed has proved economically disastrous, is that the human species is genetically programmed to be moral, because only by acting morally (caring for the survival of others) can it ensure its long-term survival.	新正统——适合不受约束的贪婪已被证明市场灾难的世界——是人类基因程序设定是让其符合道德，因为有道德（关心他人生存）能保证其自身的长期生存。


The “hard-wiring” metaphor dominates contemporary moral language.	 “硬接线”比喻主导着当代道德观念。


According to the United Kingdom’s chief rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, religious beliefs are useful for our survival, by inducing us to act in socially cooperative ways: “We have mirror neurons that lead us to feel pain when we see others suffering,” he recently wrote. Consideration for others is “located in the prefrontal cortex.”	根据英国首席拉比乔纳森·萨克斯（Jonathan Sachs）的说法，宗教信仰有利于我们的生存，因为它让我们的行为变成社会合作：他最近写道“我们拥有镜像神经元，这让我们在目睹他人遭难时感同身受。


And religion “reconfigures our neural pathways.”	”而宗教“重新配置了我们的神经通路。


In short: “Far from refuting religion, the Neo-Darwinists have helped us understand why it matters.”	”简而言之，“新达尔文主义绝不排斥宗教，反而有助于我们理解为何宗教很重要。


So we need not fear that it will decline.	”因此我们不必担心宗教衰落。


Atheists might not agree.	无神论者可能不会同意。


But it is an extraordinary statement for a religious leader to make, because it sets to one side the question of the truth or falsehood, or the ethical value, of religious beliefs.	但宗教领袖作此言论是极不寻常的，因为这集中于真理和谬误，或宗教信仰的道德价值问题的一面。


Or rather: all that wiring in the prefrontal cortex must be ethical, because it is good for survival.	或者说，所有前额皮质内的通路都是道德的，因为这有助于我们的生存。


But, in that case, what ethical value is there in survival?	但是，既然如此，那里生存着什么道德价值呢？


Does the continued survival of the human race have any value in itself, independent of what we achieve or create?	人类的持续生存自有其价值，不论我们的成就和创造吗？


We need to rescue morality from the claims of science.	我们需要从科学角度拯救道德。


We need to assert what philosophers and religious teachers have at all times asserted: that there is something called the good life, apart from survival, and our understanding of it has to be taught, just as Mill’s father taught him the elements of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.	我们需要维护哲学家和宗教导师时刻教导的——有一种东西叫美好生活（good life），它独立于生存之外，对它的理解需要有人教导，正如穆勒的父亲教他亚里士多德《后分析篇》的内容。


Our nature may predispose us to learn; but what we learn depends on how we are nurtured.	我们的天性或许能驱使我们学习，但学习什么取决于后天接受。


Obama’s Rocky Path to Success in Syria	奥巴马在叙利亚艰难的成功之路


NEW YORK – In my experience, if you are attacked for your diplomacy from both left and right, by doves and hawks, and by internationalists and isolationists, you probably have it just right.	纽约——以我的经验，如果左右翼势力、鸽派和鹰派、国际主义者和孤立主义者同时攻击你的外交政策，那么你的政策可能恰到好处。


In the avalanche of commentary on this month’s US-Russia deal on Syria’s chemical weapons, few have been prepared to call it a “win-win-win” outcome for the United States, Russia, and the Syrian people.	在对本月美俄叙利亚化武交易雪片般的评论中，很少有人认为这是美国、俄国和叙利亚民众共赢的结果。


But – at least so far – that is what it is.	但至少从目前看，恰恰出现了这样的状况。


President Barack Obama and his team, despite some missteps, deserve most of the credit.	虽然有些失误，但大部分功劳应当归结于奥巴马总统及其团队。


The charge sheet against Obama over Syria is long.	奥巴马在叙利亚有很多可以指责的东西。


The US, it is said, took no decisive action while 100,000 Syrians were dying, and it had no strategy to end the conflict.	人人都说美国在100,000叙利亚民众面临死亡时没有采取果断行动，也没有拿出结束冲突的策略。


Obama created expectations that the US would act if chemical weapons were used, only to stall when the time came.	奥巴马创造了启用化学武器就会招致美国军事行动的预期，但那一刻真正到来时却又找出各种托辞。


Then, when a response became unavoidable, he threatened both too much and too little military force.	之后，当不可避免要做出反应时，他总是言辞威胁，却极少诉诸武力。


He paid too little, then too much, attention to domestic opponents of intervention.	他先是太不注重、之后又太过注重国内反对干预的势力。


Above all, he allowed an ever-cynical Kremlin to outplay the US diplomatically.	最重要的是，他让玩世不恭的克里姆林在外交上抢占了先机。


But consider the constraints.	但我们必须考虑到其中的诸多限制。


There was never a time in the crisis, until the chemical-weapons issue erupted, when US military intervention in any form seemed likely to save more lives than it would endanger.	直到化武问题爆发之前，美国军事干预在危机中害人的机率从来都大于救人的机率。


The increasing influence of jihadists in the rebel ranks made support for an outright opposition victory increasingly untenable.	圣战者在叛军队伍中的影响日益扩大让反对派获得全胜的可能性越来越小。


There simply was not enough hard evidence of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, at least before the Ghouta massacre in August, to pressure Russia – either in the United Nations Security Council or the court of global opinion – to reconsider its reflex support of the regime.	至少在叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德在8月的古塔（Ghouta）大屠杀中使用化学武器之前，无论是在联合国安理会还是全球舆情领域，根本没有足够的铁证能够迫使俄国重新考虑其对阿萨德政权的习惯性支持。


Moreover, while the Obama administration remained determined to preserve US leadership in responding – with force, where necessary – to mass atrocity crimes (the global “responsibility to protect” agenda), a decade of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan has left Americans desperately war-weary.	此外，虽然奥巴马政府依然决心维护美国在应对大规模暴行（全球“保护责任”议程）（必要的话不排除武力应对）中的领导地位，十年的伊拉克和阿富汗战争已经让美国人感到极度疲惫。


That is true in the West generally, as shown by the United Kingdom’s parliamentary vote against participating in any intervention.	这种情绪在西方非常普遍，比如英国议会就投票反对参与任何干预行动。


For almost everyone, George W. Bush’s “decisiveness” made vacillation seem like a better option.	几乎所有人都认为乔治·W·布什的“果断”还不如犹豫。


Against this background, consider what Obama has achieved.	在这样的背景下再看看奥巴马取得的成绩。


A descent into chemical-weapons hell has been averted, almost certainly permanently: the Assad regime knows that it has no friends or protectors left should it cross that red line again.	堕入化武地狱的恐怖局面已经避免，而且几乎肯定具有永久性：阿萨德政权知道如果再次越过红线朋友和保护伞都将不复存在。


Military intervention, with all of its problems, has been avoided for now; but Assad knows that the US will have no option but to attack – with or without explicit Security Council and Congressional resolutions – should he perpetrate another such horror.	能造成诸多问题的军事干预至少目前得以避免； 但阿萨德知道不管有没有明确的安理会和国会决议，如果他再次进行这样的恐怖活动，美国将别无选择只能干预。


Above all, diplomatic cooperation on chemical weapons has opened the door at last to a negotiated settlement of the underlying conflict in Syria.	最重要的是，化武外交合作最终打开了谈判解决叙利亚冲突的大门。


And the UN is back at center stage, as a rules-based international order demands that it should be on such issues, with both its weapons inspectors and the Security Council regarded as central to future developments.	联合国也像以规则为基础的国际秩序所要求的那样回到了舞台的中央，武器核查人员和安理会被视为未来形势发展的核心角色。


Yes, there were some things that could and should have been done differently.	是的，总有些问题可以而且应当采取不同的处理方式。


There always are.	永远会有改进的余地。


If the justified intervention in Libya by the US, the UK, and France had not later been conducted with such cloth-eared indifference to Russian, Chinese, and developing-country concern about mandate overreach, greater unity on Syria could have been achieved in the Security Council in 2011, when a united message might have stopped Assad cold.	如果美、英、法等国的正当干预后来没有以无视俄、中和其他发展中国家对越权干预担心的方式进行，安理会在2011年或许就能在叙利亚问题上更加团结，各方发出的联合讯息或许已经阻止了阿萨德的胡作非为。


Going to Congress for approval was always going to involve more risks than rewards.	报请国会批准所伴随的风险几乎肯定要大于收益。


Secretary of State John Kerry’s description of the planned US military response to the Ghouta massacre as likely to be “unbelievably small” almost derailed the utility of the US threat in concentrating Syrian and Russian officials’ minds.	约翰·克里国务卿有关美国对古塔大屠杀的军事应对计划可能“令人难以置信的微不足道”的描述几乎彻底消灭了美国在叙利亚和俄罗斯官员眼中的威胁。


And the administration could have helped itself by better explaining that a cooperative response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons had long been on the table, and was not just the result of deftly opportunistic Russian diplomacy in response to a Kerry thought-bubble.	而奥巴马政府更好地解释对阿萨德政权使用化武的合作策略其实一直存在，而并非俄国对克里思想泡沫所做出的灵光一现的机会主义外交反应可能会有所帮助。


What has trumped these missteps, and enabled each side to focus on opportunities rather than excuses, is that both the US and Russia now understand that they have common interests in Syria.	美国和俄罗斯现在清楚他们在叙利亚拥有共同利益掩盖了这些失误，使得各方对机会而不是借口更加关注。


Both sides want not only to preclude the Assad regime’s further use of chemical weapons, but also to find a route to sustainable peace in Syria, and to reestablish the authority and utility of the UN in these situations.	双方想要的不只是杜绝阿萨德政权进一步使用化学武器，而且要找到叙利亚持久和平之路，并且重建联合国在类似情况下的权威和效用。


Of course, optimism must be tempered.	当然，还必须逐步培养乐观主义。


Plenty can go wrong in the period ahead.	今后还有很多��以犯的错误。


Either a beleaguered Assad or an increasingly desperate opposition might destroy the deal on the ground.	身处困境的阿萨德或者越来越绝望的反对派都有可能破坏已经达成的协议。


The fragile rapprochement between the US and Russia may not hold, particularly if the US again insists – breaking its recent helpful silence – that Assad has no place at the negotiating table.	美俄之间的脆弱和解可能无法坚持，特别是如果美国打破近来有益的沉默，再次提出谈判桌上没有阿萨德的位置。


But when the major powers cooperate in a just cause, the world is a safer and saner place.	不过当大国合作完成正义的事业，世界就会变得更加安全和理智。


That is where both the US and Russia – and on this issue China as well – want to be.	那是美国、俄国（在叙利亚问题上还有中国）希望看到的结果。


If Obama’s caution and flexibility have been the key to getting us here, let us give praise where it is due.	如果奥巴马的谨慎和灵活是我们实现目标的关键所在，那么让我们不吝给予它应有的评价。


The US with Iran in Syria	美国和伊朗在叙利亚


PRINCETON – The prospect of a US military strike on Syria has dimmed following President Barack Obama’s embrace of an international initiative to take control of Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpile.	普林斯顿——继美国总统奥巴马接受控制叙利亚化学武器库存的国际倡议之后，美国军事打击叙利亚的可能性已经越来越小。


The eleventh-hour U-turn on the push for military action has come against a backdrop of intensifying diplomatic pressure from the international community to avoid escalation of the violence in Syria.	国际社会呼吁避免叙利亚暴力活动升级的外交压力越来越强，直接导致了此次军事行动在最后时刻调头。


And that outcome is not possible without Iran.	没有伊朗的参与根本不可能实现这一目标。


In a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart, Walid al-Moallem, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov tabled a proposal, originally agreed with Iran, calling for Syria to “place chemical weapons storage sites under international control.”	在与叙利亚外长瓦利德·穆阿利姆的联合新闻发布会上，俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫提出了一份最初与伊朗达成一致的议案，呼吁叙利亚“将化学武器的储存点置于国际控制之下。


The stockpiles would then be destroyed and Syria would fully join the international Chemical Weapons Convention.	”化学武器库存将会被销毁，同时叙利亚将全面加入国际《禁止化学武器公约》。


The second component of the Russian-Iranian proposal calls for international efforts, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, to rein in Syrian rebel forces’ chemical-weapons capabilities.	俄伊提案的第二部分呼吁在联合国安理会主持下展开国际努力，以遏制叙利亚叛军使用化学武器。


Moallem immediately embraced the proposal.	穆阿利姆立即接受了这项提议。


Hours later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did as well, while Obama said that “I fervently hope that this can be resolved in a non-military way.”	几小时后，联合国秘书长潘基文也表示赞同，奥巴马则表示“我热切希望能够以非军事方式解决这一问题。 ”


This initiative would allow Obama to escape from a messy political and foreign-policy predicament.	这项倡议能使奥巴马摆脱杂乱无章的政治和外交政策困局。


But the matter is far from settled: Obama has not ruled out a military strike.	但问题还远远没有解决：奥巴马并没有彻底放弃军事打击。


So here are 12 reasons why America should grasp the opportunity for a diplomatic resolution afforded by the Russian-Iranian plan.	因此有12条理由支持美国抓住俄伊计划所带来的叙利亚问题的外交解决机会。


First, there is evidence that the Syrian opposition has amassed chemical weapons.	首先，有证据表明叙利亚反对派已经积聚了化学武器。


In December 2012, Iran officially informed the US about chemical weapons, including sarin gas, being transferred to Syria.	2012年12月，伊朗正式通知美国有迹象表明沙林毒气等化学武器正在运往叙利亚国内。


The US declined to cooperate with Iran to press ahead on the case.	美国拒绝与伊朗合作解决这一问题。


Second, US military strikes on Syria have the potential to engulf the entire region – and perhaps the US – in a broader war.	其次，美国军事打击叙利亚有可能引燃大规模战火吞噬整个地区——甚至可能包括美国自己。


After its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past decade, the US can hardly afford a Syrian quagmire.	有了过去10年在阿富汗和伊拉克的经历，再次陷入叙利亚泥潭超出了美国的承受能力。


Third, with the regional Sunni-Shia conflict intensifying, the prospect of tens of billions of petrodollars backing terrorist extremists has already destabilized the region.	第三，在逊尼派和什叶派冲突加剧的大背景下，数以亿计的石油美元支持恐怖主义极端分子的预期已经破坏了地区的稳定局势。


US military strikes against Syria would further fuel extremism and result in widespread atrocities by the rebels against Syrians of all faiths.	美军事打击叙利亚将进一步助长极端主义，导致叛军对所有信仰的叙利亚人发动大规模暴行。


Reports point to the execution and mutilation of Syrian-government prisoners.	报告直指对叙利亚政府囚犯的处决和酷刑。


There is no doubt that the fate of Syria’s Christian and Jewish communities is now extremely precarious.	叙利亚基督教和犹太教群体的命运现在无疑极不稳定。


Fourth, America’s decision to back extremists in Syria contradicts its “war on terrorism” and will erode international support for it.	第四，美国决定支持叙利亚极端分子与它的“反恐战争”自相矛盾，并将削弱国际社会对反恐的支持。


The prospect of Iranian cooperation to root out Al Qaeda extremists, which it provided in Afghanistan and Iraq, would be unlikely following any intervention.	如果真的进行军事干预，几乎不可能指望伊朗像在阿富汗和伊拉克那样协助消灭“基地”极端分子。


Fifth, it is wrong to assume that without Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Iran would lose its influence in the Muslim world as well as its link to Hezbollah in Lebanon.	第五，假设没有叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德，伊朗就会失去在穆斯林世界的影响力和与黎巴嫩真主党的联系根本就没有依据。


America’s regional position weakened, and Iran’s strengthened, following the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; US intervention in Syria could reproduce that pattern.	在以美国为首的阿富汗及伊拉克入侵行动后，美国的地区地位有所削弱，而伊朗则反之。


Sixth, a US attack on Syria would leave the US isolated internationally and end any hope of a diplomatic resolution.	第六，袭击叙利亚将导致美国在国际上陷入孤立，而且再没有希望通过外交途径解决问题。


There is no domestic or international appetite for another US military adventure – NATO, the G-20, the Europeans, Russia, China, and 60% of Americans oppose a unilateral US military strike.	美国国内或国际社会都不愿看到美国再次进行军事冒险——北约、G-20、欧洲、俄罗斯、中国和60%的美国人都反对美国单方面发动军事打击。


Seventh, the civilian casualties arising from a military strike would be high.	第七，军事打击将造成大量的平民伤亡。


If the main justification for an attack is humanitarian – to end the senseless slaughter of Syrian civilians – US military intervention would do more harm than good.	如果发动袭击的主要理由是人道主义（结束对叙利亚平民的毫无意义的屠杀），美国军事干预将弊大于利。


Eighth, US involvement in Syria will breathe new life into efforts to press for a wider war between the US and Iran.	第八，美国卷入叙利亚内战将为游说美伊大规模开战的势力注入新的生命力。


Al Qaeda affiliates will target US regional interests in the hope that the blame falls on Iran and its militant proxies – providing a pretext for US military confrontation.	基地组织分支机构将针对性打击美国的地区利益，希望将责任推给伊朗及其好战代理——进而为美国军事对抗创造托辞。


Ninth, a US military strike against a third Muslim-majority country would demolish the credibility of Obama’s efforts to repair America’s image in the Islamic world.	第九，美国第三次对以穆斯林为主的国家发动军事袭击将摧毁奥巴马政府修复美国在伊斯兰世界形象努力的可信性。


Indeed, it would most likely prove to be a strategic boon to the “resistance axis” – Iran and Hezbollah.	事实上，最后袭击很可能被证明是对伊朗和真主党等“抵抗轴心”的战略福音。


Tenth, any US unilateral military strike against Syria would ratchet up tensions between the US and Russia.	第十，美国对叙利亚的任何单边军事打击都可能加剧美俄两国间的紧张关系。


This, in turn, would strengthen the Russia-Iran alliance.	这将反过来增强俄伊联盟的实力。


Eleventh, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued permission for President Hassan Rouhani’s new administration to enter into direct talks with the US.	十一，伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊许可新组建的哈桑·鲁哈尼总统政府与美国直接会谈。


No better opportunity to end decades of bilateral hostility is likely to come along.	恐怕不会有比这更好的机会结束几十年的双边敌对关系。


In these circumstances, a US attack on Syria would almost certainly dash any hope of a US-Iran rapprochement for years to come.	在这种情况下，美国对叙利亚的袭击几乎肯定将使今后几年的美伊和解希望完全破灭。


Finally, with the moderate Rouhani now installed as President, a US military strike could undermine a golden opportunity for America and Iran to reach a face-saving solution (for both sides) on Iran’s nuclear program.	最后，因为温和派的鲁哈尼目前担任总统，美国的军事打击可能破坏美伊双方就伊朗核计划达成能为双方保存颜面的方案的黄金机会。


Both Iran and the US consider the use of weapons of mass destruction a grave crime.	伊朗和美国都认为使用大规模杀伤性武器是一种严重的罪行。


Indeed, Iran was a major victim of chemical-weapons attacks during its 1980-1988 war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.	事实上，伊朗曾经是1980-1988年与萨达姆·侯赛因的两伊战争中化学武器袭击的主要受害者。


Iran can be a major partner to halt proliferation of WMDs in Syria, the Middle East, and beyond.	伊朗可以成为制止大规模杀伤性武器在叙利亚、中东和全世界扩散的主要合作伙伴。


Iran maintains that the Security Council is the only body legally authorized to verify allegations concerning the use of such deadly weapons and to decide on the appropriate response.	伊朗认为安理会是验证与使用上述致命武器相关指控并决定合理对策的唯一的合法授权机构。


One promising avenue for US-Iran cooperation on Syria could be joint support for a fact-finding mission by the Security Council to identify the perpetrators.	美伊就叙利亚问题合作的唯一正当途径是联合支持安理会事实调查团，明确真正的肇事者。


Obama has his “red line” on the use of chemical weapons.	奥巴马的“红线”是不容许使用化学武器。


So does Khamenei.	哈梅内伊也同样如此。


Why Pay More for Fairness?	为何为公平多付钱？


Marks & Spencer, a supermarket and clothing chain with 400 stores throughout Britain, recently announced that it is converting its entire range of coffee and tea, totaling 38 lines, to Fairtrade, a marketing symbol of “ethical production.”	玛科斯和斯宾塞是一家超级市场和服装连锁店，在英国具有400家分店。 它最近宣布将把它整个咖啡和茶产品总计38条线转到公平贸易。


The chain already sells only Fairtrade tea and coffee in its 200 Café Revive coffee shops.	公平贸易是“符合伦理产品”的市场营销标志。 这家连锁店已经在其200个“咖啡馆复兴”咖啡店中只销售公平贸易的茶和咖啡。


It is also boosting its purchases of shirts and other goods made with Fairtrade cotton.	它还大幅增加购买使用公平贸易棉花的衬衣和其他产品。


The announcement came during “Fairtrade Fortnight,” a two-week promotion of Fairtrade products that included speaking tours by farmers from developing countries, telling Britons how Fairtrade has assisted their communities.	这一宣布是在“公平贸易双周”期间作出的。 这一双周活动促进公平贸易产品，包括来自发展中国家的农民的演讲，他们告诉英国人公平贸易如何援助了他们的社区。


The movement toward more ethical consumption has made significant gains in the United States as well, as consumers increasingly turn to organic, locally produced foods, and eggs from hens not kept in cages.	随着美国的消费者们愈发购买有机的和当地生产的食品以及不是由在笼子里的鸡产下的鸡蛋，这一朝向更为符合伦理消费的运动在那里也取得了重大进展。


In the UK, a survey has found that half of those shown the Fairtrade symbol recognized it and understood that it refers to products that give a better deal for Third World farmers.	在英国，一项调查显示，看到公平贸易标志的人有一半认识这一标志而且知道它指的是能够给第三世界的农民带来更多利益的产品。


There is no comparable US research, but related data, and discussions with my own students, suggests that the figure would be much lower.	在美国并没有类似的研究，但是相关数据以及和我自己的学生们的讨论可以显示这一数字要低很多。


Traders seeking Fairtrade certification must pay producers a price that covers the costs of sustainable production and provides a living wage.	想要公平贸易认证的贸易商必须给生产者支付能够涵盖可持续生产成本并且提供生活必要工资的价格。


For example, the minimum price for coffee is $1.26 per pound, no matter how low the market price may fall.	例如，无论市场价格如何下跌，咖啡的最低价格都是每磅1. 26美元。


If the market price rises above that figure, the fair trade price will increase so that it remains five cents per pound higher.	如果市场价格高于这一数字，那么，公平贸易的价格也将上升，高于市场价格每磅5分钱。


Small farmers, for their part, are required to be organized in cooperatives or other groups that allow democratic participation.	对于小农场主而言，他们必须以合作社或者其他组织等允许民主参与的形式组织起来。


Plantations and factories can use the Fairtrade label if they pay their workers decent wages, comply with health, safety, and environmental standards, allow unions or other forms of workers’ associations, provide good housing if workers are not living at home, and do not use child labor or forced labor.	农业种植园以及工厂如果给工人支付合理的工资、符合医疗、安全以及环境标准、允许工会或者其他形式的工人社团、为不在家居住的工人提供良好的宿舍以及不使用童工或强迫劳工的话，就可以使用公平贸易标志。


Not every one approves of Fairtrade.	并非所有人都赞同公平贸易。


Brink Lindsey, director of the pro-market Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, believes that the campaign for Fairtrade coffee is a “well-meaning dead end.”	亲市场的卡托贸易政策研究中心主任林德赛认为，为公平贸易咖啡造势是一个“用心良苦的死胡同”。


With some justification, he argues that the real cause of the fall in coffee prices was not the profiteering of multinationals, but big increases in coffee production in Brazil and Vietnam, combined with new techniques that make it possible to grow coffee with less labor and hence more cheaply.	他不无道理地指出，咖啡价格下跌的真正原因并非是跨国公司的巧取豪夺，而是巴西和越南咖啡产量的激增，加之新技术可以让使用较少的劳力进而更低的价格成为可能。


In Lindsey’s view, if we want to assist coffee growers, we should encourage them either to abandon coffee and produce more profitable crops – and here he rightly points to rich nations’ trade barriers and subsidies as obstacles that must be dismantled – or to move into higher-value products, like specialty coffees, that bring higher prices.	根据林德赛的观点，如果我们想要援助咖啡种植者，那么我们就应当鼓励他们要么放弃种植咖啡并且生产更为有利可图的作物（他在这一点上正确地指出了富有国家的贸易壁垒以及补贴等障碍必须解除），要么转向可以得到更高价格的更高价值的产品，例如特色咖啡。


What is curious about Lindsey’s argument, however, is that the Fairtrade coffee campaign can be seen as doing just what he recommends – encouraging coffee farmers to produce a specialty coffee that brings a higher price.	但是，林德赛主张的奇怪一面是，公平贸易咖啡运动就是在做他所推荐的事情，也就是鼓励咖啡农场主们生产可以带来更高价格的特色咖啡。


Pro-market economists don’t object to corporations that blatantly use snob appeal to promote their products.	亲市场的经济学家们并不反对公司用招摇的手段吸引势利的顾客来对其产品加以促销。


If people want to pay $48 for a pound of Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee because that’s what James Bond prefers, economists don’t object that the market is being distorted.	如果人们由于帮德喜欢牙买加蓝山咖啡而愿意花48美元一磅购买的话，经济学家并不因市场受到扭曲而加以反对。


So why be critical when consumers choose to pay $12 for a pound of coffee that they know has been grown without toxic chemicals, under shade trees that help birds to survive, by farmers who can now afford to feed and educate their children?	那么，如果消费者们花12美元一磅购买他们知道由现在可以供得起他们的孩子们上学的农民们采用无毒化学品、在让鸟类存活的绿茵树下种植的咖啡时，经济学家们为什么要提出批评呢？


Economists might reply that if you want to help people feed and educate their children, you can pay $10 for a pound of non-Fairtrade coffee that tastes the same and give the $2 you save to an aid agency that provides food and education to poor children.	经济学家们可能会说，如果你想要帮助农民养育他们的孩子并且供他们上学的话，你可以花10美元一磅来购买味道一样的非公平贸易的咖啡并且把你节省下来的2美元交给为贫困儿童提供食品和教育的援助机构。


That’s a possible strategy, but there are advantages to Fairtrade.	这一战略是可能的，但是，公平贸易是有利可图的。


The growers know that they have to provide a product that consumers like, both for its taste and for the way it is grown.	种植者们知道，他们必须提供一种为消费者们所喜欢的产品，不仅是味道，而且种植方式也要如此。


If their product sells well, they can take pride in having produced something that is sought after around the world.	如果他们的产品畅销，他们就可以因为提供了一种在全世界热销的产品而自豪。


From the growers’ perspective, receiving a premium by selling a Fairtrade product is preferable to receiving a charitable handout that they would get whether they worked or not and regardless of the quality of what they produce.	从种植者的角度而言，通过销售平贸易产品而得到溢价要比无论他们是否工作或者他们的产品质量如何而得到慈善捐助更为可取。


Paying more for a Fairtrade label is no more “anti-market” than paying more for a Gucci label, and it reflects better ethical priorities.	为公平贸易标签支付更多的钱并不比为Gucci品牌多付钱更为“非市场化”，而且它反映的是更好的伦理取向。


Fairtrade is not a government subsidy.	公平贸易并非一种政府补贴。


Its success depends on market demand, not political lobbying.	它的成功取决于市场需求，而非政治游说。


Fortunately, in Europe, that market demand is growing rapidly.	幸运的是，这一市场需求正在欧洲快速增长。


One hopes that it will soon reach similar levels throughout the developed world, and wherever people can make choices about their discretionary spending.	人们希望在所有发达国家以及在人们对他们自主决定的消费中都能够达到相似的水平。


Why Putin Makes a Bad Ally	普京为什么是糟糕的盟友


STANFORD – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian conflict has been welcomed by some as a moment for the Kremlin to “come in from the cold.”	斯坦福——俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京对叙利亚冲突的干预一直深受某些人的欢迎，认为这是克里姆林宫“摆脱孤立”的时刻。


Russia’s conflict with the Islamic State, the argument goes, has aligned the country’s interests with those of the West.	这种观点认为俄罗斯与伊斯兰国的冲突已经把俄罗斯的利益绑在了西方的战车上。


Even Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane does not seem not to have deflated this optimism.	就连土耳其击落俄罗斯战机似乎也没有让这种乐观情绪受到影响。


Indeed, at a recent press conference, US President Barack Obama again urged Putin to join the alliance against the Islamic State.	事实上，在最近一次新闻发布会上，美国总统奥巴马再次敦促普京加入反对伊斯兰国的联盟。


And French President François Hollande billed his recent visit to Moscow as an effort to build a broad international coalition against the terrorist group.	而法国总统奥朗德则将不久前对莫斯科的访问标榜为试图建立反对恐怖组织的广泛的国际联盟。


At first blush, the idea that Russia is a natural ally against Islamist terrorists seems to make sense.	乍一看，俄罗斯是打击伊斯兰恐怖分子天然盟友的说法似乎颇有道理。


The country has suffered horrific terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists, including the bombing in November of a plane above the Sinai Peninsula, which killed 224 passengers and crew, nearly all of them Russian.	该国遭受过伊斯兰极端分子可怕的恐怖主义袭击，其中包括十一月西奈半岛上空发生的飞机爆炸，造成224名乘客和机组人员死亡，几乎所有人都是俄罗斯公民。


Around 20 million Muslims, most of them Sunni, live within the Russian Federation, and the country’s security officials report that some 7,000 fighters from the former Soviet republics and Russia have joined the Islamic State.	约有2，000万穆斯林，多数是逊尼派，在俄罗斯联邦境内生活，据该国安全官员报告，来自前苏联加盟共和国和俄罗斯的大约7，000名武装人员已经加入了伊斯兰国。


On deeper examination, however, it becomes clear that an anti-terror alliance with Russia is wishful thinking.	但只要深入分析形势，就会明白与俄罗斯建立反恐联盟不过是一厢情愿的想法。


Putin has not gone into Syria to defeat the Islamic State.	普京进入叙利亚不是为击败伊斯兰国。


He has intervened to save the regime of Russia’s client, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.	他的介入是为挽救俄国的附庸政权，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德。


Putin may sometimes give the appearance that he is ready to abandon Assad, but ultimately he will defend him.	普京有时可能看似做好了放弃阿萨德的准备，但最终他会保护阿萨德。


Leaving Assad to his fate would be a sign of weakness – and thus anathema to Putin.	让阿萨德听任命运的安排将是一种软弱的表现——因此对普京来讲根本无法接受。


Ordinary Russians may be in danger of attacks by Islamic extremists, but they pose little threat to Putin or his allies.	普通俄国人可能会受到伊斯兰极端分子的袭击，但他们对普京及其盟友构不成太大的威胁。


Russia has indeed suffered a number of terrorist attacks, including the 2004 Beslan massacre, in which 334 people, most of them schoolchildren, were killed.	俄罗斯实际上的确遭遇了若干次恐怖袭击，包括2004年的别斯兰惨案，造成334人，多数是学生死亡。


In nearly every case, the response to the attacks was brutal, inept, and costly in terms of civilian lives lost.	几乎在所有情况下，对袭击采取的反制措施都残酷、无能，让民众付出了惨重的生命代价。


And yet the Putin regime has emerged unscathed each time.	但每次普京政权却都能安然渡过、毫发无伤。


Indeed, terrorist attacks at the turn of the century solidified public opinion against Chechen rebels and gave Putin the public support he needed to raze Grozny, Chechnya’s capital.	事实上，发生在世纪之交的恐怖袭击巩固了反对车臣叛军的公众舆论，并赋予了普京夷平车臣首都格罗兹尼所需的公众支持。


Putin’s confidence in dealing with terrorism reflects the design of Russia’s security state.	普京应对恐怖主义的信心反映了俄罗斯的安全国家设计。


Russia spends more on internal security than it does on national defense.	俄国在国内安全上的开支甚至超过国家防御。


It has interior ministry troops, federal security agency (FSB) special forces, OMON (mobile special service) troops, military intelligence troops, and a vast network of internal spies and informants.	它组建了内政部部队、联邦安全局（FSB）特种部队，内政部特种（机动特服）部队、军事情报部队和由国内间谍和线人组成的庞大网络。


Regime opponents are not allowed to run for office, their rights to demonstrate are restricted, and they are subject to a legal arbitrariness in the courts.	政权反对者不得竞选公职，他们的示威权利受到限制，并在法庭面对法律强制。


Citizens have virtually no protection from wiretaps or the interception of their electronic communications.	公民的谈话遭到监听，他们的电子邮件遭到拦截。


Every society must balance civil rights against national security.	所有社会都必须平衡国家安全和公民权利。


Putin’s Russia has swung to one extreme of the spectrum, while the United States and Europe (despite the protests of civil libertarians) have chosen to occupy the other end.	普京的俄罗斯走到了其中一个极端，而美国和欧洲（尽管不时发生公民自由抗议活动）则选择了相反的一头。


Indeed, Russia is an example of the upper limit of what state power can do to control terrorist activity.	事实上，俄罗斯代表了国家政权控制恐怖活动所能达到的上限。


It would be a rare extremist group that had not been infiltrated with an informant who reports to Moscow.	鲜有极端主义团体从未被向莫斯科汇报的线人渗透。


There is even evidence that those who carried out the Beslan massacre were infiltrated by Russian intelligence.	甚至有证据表明别斯兰惨案的制造者也已遭到俄罗斯情报部门的渗透。


Moreover, any terrorist group knows that their operations will be met with the most extreme use of force.	此外，任何恐怖组织都知道他们的行动将遭到极端的武力镇压。


In Beslan, for example, Russian special forces used thermobaric weapons.	比方说在别斯兰，俄罗斯特种部队就使用燃料空气弹作为武器。


As the reaction to the attacks in Paris illustrates, the seemingly random murder of 130 civilians has monumental resonance in the West – especially when the religious and ideological motives are difficult to understand.	对巴黎袭击事件的反应说明，貌似随意的130名平民屠杀事件却在西方掀起了巨大的波澜——尤其当宗教和意识形态动机很难理解的时候。


But the Kremlin places a lower value on human lives than Western societies do.	但克里姆林宫不像西方社会那样珍视人的生命。


In Putin’s calculations, the loss of lives in extremist attacks is unwelcome, but ultimately acceptable if it does not threaten the regime.	在普京看来，极端分子袭击造成人员伤亡令人不快，但如果不威胁政权那么最终可以接受。


The Russian people might be horrified and frightened.	俄罗斯民众可能感到非常惊恐。


But the Russian regime is primarily concerned with its own survival – and with how it might use the public’s horror to its benefit.	但俄罗斯政权主要关心其自身的生存——以及如何利用公众恐惧为自己谋求好处。


Working with the West to combat the Islamic State serves neither of those purposes.	与西方合作打击伊斯兰国不符合他们的目标。


Hard to be Easing	难以宽松


NEW YORK – The United States Federal Reserve’s decision to undertake a third round of quantitative easing, or QE3, has raised three important questions. Will QE3 jump-start America’s anemic economic growth?	发自纽约——美联储实施第三轮量化宽松（QE3）的决定引出了三大重要问题：QE3能否紧急启动美国当前乏力的经济增长？


Will it lead to a persistent increase in risky assets, especially in US and other global equity markets?	它是否会导致风险资产的持续增长，尤其是在美国以及其他全球股票市场？


Finally, will its effects on GDP growth and equity markets be similar or different?	最后，其对GDP增长和股票市场的影响将会相似还是有所不同？


Many now argue that QE3’s effect on risky assets should be as powerful, if not more so, than that of QE1, QE2, and “Operation Twist,” the Fed’s earlier bond-purchase program.	许多人如今认为QE3对风险资产的影响应该与第一轮（QE1），第二轮量化宽松（QE2）以及美联储早前的债券购买计划“扭曲操作（Operation Twist）”具备同样威力（如果不是更大的话）。


After all, while the previous rounds of US monetary easing have been associated with a persistent increase in equity prices, the size and duration of QE3 are more substantial.	毕竟以股票价格计算的话，QE3的规模和持续时间都更具实质性。


But, despite the Fed’s impressive commitment to aggressive monetary easing, its effects on the real economy and on US equities could well be smaller and more fleeting than those of previous QE rounds.	但尽管美联储实施积极货币宽松的许诺非常引人注目，但此举对实体经济和美股的影响可能比前两轮的都要更小也更短暂。


Consider, first, that the previous QE rounds came at times of much lower equity valuations and earnings.	首先，考虑到以往的宽松政策都是在股票估值和收益都更加低的时候推出。


In March 2009, the S&P 500 index was down to 660, earnings per share (EPS) of US companies and banks had sunk to a financial-crisis low, and price/earnings ratios were in the single digits.	在2009年3月，标准普尔500指数下跌到660点，美国企业和银行的每股收益率都降到了危机以来的最低点，市盈率降到了单数。


Today, the S&P 500 is more than 100% higher (hovering near 1,430), the average EPS is close to $100, and P/E ratios are above 14.	如今，标准普尔500指数已经翻了超过一番（接近1430点），平均每股收益率约有100美元，市盈率超过了14。


Even during QE2, in the summer of 2010, the S&P 500, P/E ratios, and EPS were much lower than they are today.	即便是2010年夏的QE2期间，标普500指数，市盈率和每股收益率都比今天要低得多。


If, as is likely, economic growth in the US remains anemic in spite of QE3, top-line revenues and bottom-line earnings will turn south, with negative effects on equity valuations.	倘若（而且很可能）美国的经济增长在QE3之下依然疲软，营业收入和实际利润将下降，并对股票估值也会产生负面的影响。


Moreover, fiscal support is absent this time: QE1 and QE2 helped to prevent a deeper recession and avoid a double dip, respectively, because each was associated with a significant fiscal stimulus.	此外，本次宽松也缺乏财政支持：QE1和QE2分别防止了陷入更严重衰退并阻以及二次下滑，因为每次宽松都是与一个大型财政刺激计划联系在一起的。


In contrast, QE3 will be associated with a fiscal contraction, possibly even a large fiscal cliff.	相比之下，QE3将会与一轮财政收紧联系在一起，甚至很可能是一场财政大幅削减。


Even if the US avoids the full fiscal cliff of 4.5% of GDP that is looming at the end of the year, it is highly likely that a fiscal drag amounting to 1.5% of GDP will hit the economy in 2013.	即便美国避免了可能在今年年末出现的相当于GDP4. 5%的全面财政削减，也很有可能会有一场相当于GDP1.


With the US economy currently growing at a 1.6% annual rate, a fiscal drag of even 1% implies near-stagnation in 2013, though a modest recovery in housing and manufacturing, together with QE3, should keep US growth at about its current level in 2013.	美国经济目前的年均增长为1. 6%，即便住宅和制造业都已经出现温和复苏，加上QE3，都能将美国2013年的增长保持在这一水平，但即便是1%的财政拖累都将意味着经济增长会在2013年近乎停滞。


But there is no broader rebound underway.	但目前没有更大范围的反弹出现。


In both 2010 and 2011, leading economic indicators showed that the first-half slowdown had bottomed out, and that growth was already accelerating before the announcement of monetary easing.	在2010和2011年，一些前导经济指数显示上半年的经济放缓已经触底反弹，且增长在货币宽松宣布之前就已经开始加速。


Thus, QE nudged along an economy that was already recovering, which prolonged asset reflation.	因此当时宽松助推了一个已经开始复苏的经济，并因此延长了资产的再膨胀。


By contrast, the latest data suggest that the US economy is performing as sluggishly now as it was in the first half of the year.	相比之下，最近的数据显示美国当前的经济表现正如上半年一样步履维艰。


Indeed, if anything, weakness in the US labor market, low capital expenditures, and slow income growth have contradicted signals in the early summer that third-quarter growth might be more robust.	事实上，更可能表现出来的是，美国劳动力市场的疲软，低资本支出以及缓慢的收入增长都反映出第三季度是不可能出现更强劲增长的。


Meanwhile, the main transmission channels of monetary stimulus to the real economy – the bond, credit, currency, and stock markets – remain weak, if not broken.	与此同时，货币刺激向实体经济传导的主要渠道——债券，信贷，货币和股票市场——都依然疲软——如果不是千疮白孔的话。


Indeed, the bond-market channel is unlikely to boost growth.	事实上，债券市场渠道不太可能去刺激增长。


Long-term government bond yields are already very low, and a further reduction will not significantly change private agents’ borrowing costs.	长期政府债券收益已经非常低下，即便进一步下调，也不会对私人机构的借贷成本产生太大影响。


The credit channel also is not working properly, as banks have hoarded most of the extra liquidity from QE, creating excess reserves rather than increasing lending.	而信贷渠道同样不甚通畅，因为银行已经囤积了来自量化宽松的大部分额外流动性，不但没有增加贷款，反而还产生了多余的储备。


Those who can borrow have ample cash and are cautious about spending, while those who want to borrow – highly indebted households and firms (especially small and medium-size enterprises) – face a credit crunch.	那些有资格贷款者都拥有充足的现金并小心控制支出，而那些急需贷款者——高负债的家庭和企业（尤其是中小企业）——都在面对着信贷紧缩。


The currency channel is similarly impaired.	货币渠道同样也存在缺陷。


With global growth weakening, net exports are unlikely to improve robustly, even with a weaker dollar.	当全球增长减弱之时，即便美元贬值也难以使净出口出现极大改善。


Moreover, many major central banks are implementing variants of QE alongside the Fed, dampening the effect of the Fed’s actions on the dollar’s value.	此外，许多主要中央银行都在和美联储一样实施某些量化宽松政策的变体，抵消了美联储行动对美元价值的影响。


Perhaps most important, a weaker dollar’s effect on the trade balance, and thus on growth, is limited by two factors.	或许更重要的是，一个弱势美元对贸易平衡的作用以及因此对增长的影响会受到两个因素的限制。


First, a weaker dollar is associated with a higher dollar price for commodities, which implies a drag on the trade balance, because the US is a net commodity-importing country.	首先，一个弱势美元是与一个更高的大宗商品美元采购价格联系在一起的，而这也意味着会对贸易平衡产生拖累，因为美国是一个大宗商品的净进口国。


Second, any improvement in GDP derived from stronger exports leads to an increase in imports.	其二，任何源自于更强劲出口的GDP改善都会引发进口增加。


Empirical studies estimate that the overall impact of a weaker US dollar on the trade balance is close to zero.	观察研究预计弱势美元对贸易平衡的总体影响接近于零。


The only other significant channel to transmit QE to the real economy is the wealth effect of an equity-market increase, but there is some circularity in the argument that QE3 will lead to a persistent rise in equity prices.	量化宽松向实体经济传导的另外唯一一个重要渠道就是股市上涨所带来的财富效应，但在QE3将引发股票价格持续上涨的观点中存在着某种自相矛盾的东西。


If persistent asset reflation requires a significant GDP growth recovery, it is tautological to say that if equity prices rise enough following QE, the resulting increase in GDP from a wealth effect justifies the rise in asset prices.	如果持续的资产再膨胀需要GDP增长显著复苏来实现的话，那么声称如果股票价格能在量化宽松之后出现足够上涨，而因此产生的由财富效应所引发的GDP上涨就证明资产价格上升是合理的说法就是一个有逻辑的废话罢了。


If monetary policy’s transmission channels to the real economy are broken, one cannot assume that QE will have a significant effect on economic growth.	如果货币政策向实体经济的传导渠道出了问题，人们也不能假设量化宽松会对经济增长产生较大影响。


Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has recently emphasized the importance of an additional channel: the confidence channel, through which the Fed’s commitment to maintaining generous monetary conditions for longer could improve private spending.	美联储主席本·伯南克最近强调了另一条额外渠道的重要性：信心渠道，美联储维持大量货币供应状况的承诺可以改善私人消费。


The issue is how substantial and durable such effects will be.	问题是这些措施就能有多大实质性，又能维持多长时间？


Confidence is fragile in an environment characterized by ongoing deleveraging, macro uncertainties, weak labor-market growth, and a fiscal drag.	在一个不断去杠杆化，充满宏观不确定因素，劳动市场增长疲弱以及财政拖累的现状下，信心是极为脆弱的。


In short, QE3 reduces the tail risk of an outright economic contraction, but is unlikely to lead to a sustained recovery in an economy that is still enduring a painful deleveraging process.	简而言之，QE3减少了立刻出现经济收缩的尾部风险，但也不可能为一个依然承受着痛苦去杠杆化过程的经济体立刻带来持续复苏。


In the short run, QE3 will lead investors to take on risk, and will stimulate modest asset reflation.	在短期内，QE3会令投资者敢于承担风险，并会刺激温和的资产价格再膨胀。


But the equity-price rise is likely to fizzle out over time if economic growth disappoints, as is likely, and drags down expectations about corporate revenues and profitability.	但如果经济增长令人失望的话——这情况很可能出现，股票价格的上升也会随着时间逐渐消弭，并拖低对企业收入和盈利的预期。


Shinzo Abe’s Monetary-Policy Delusions	安倍晋三的货币政策迷思


NEW HAVEN – The politicization of central banking continues unabated.	发自纽黑文——中央银行政治化的趋势有增无减。


The resurrection of Shinzo Abe and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party – pillars of the political system that has left the Japanese economy mired in two lost decades and counting – is just the latest case in point.	而安倍晋三以及日本自民党的卷土重来——它们都是使日本经济从20多年前至今依然陷入停滞的政治系统的核心元素——只是这一现象的最新注解而已。


Japan’s recent election hinged critically on Abe’s views of the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy stance.	日本近期的选举与安倍对日本银行货币政策立场的见解紧密联系在一起。


He argued that a timid BOJ should learn from its more aggressive counterparts, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.	他指出过于谨慎的日本央行应该向它更为激进的同行——美联储和欧洲央行——学习。


Just as the Fed and the ECB have apparently saved the day through their unconventional and aggressive quantitative easing (QE), goes the argument, Abe believes it is now time for the BOJ to do the same.	而正如美联储和欧洲央行显然通过非常规且激进的量化宽松政策挽救了大局一样，安倍认为日本央行也是时候该采取相同的行动了。


It certainly looks as if he will get his way.	而如今看来安倍似乎也将如愿以偿。


With BOJ Governor Masaaki Shirakawa’s term ending in April, Abe will be able to select a successor – and two deputy governors as well – to do his bidding.	随着日本央行行长白川方明（Masaaki Shirakawa）的任期于明年四月份届满，首相就可以另选一位继任者——以及两个副行长——来执行他的命令。


But will it work?	但这种政策能起作用吗？


While experimental monetary policy is now widely accepted as standard operating procedure in today’s post-crisis era, its efficacy is dubious.	尽管在后危机时代的今天，实验性的货币政策被当作标准的操作流程进得到大范围推广，但其有效性依然值得怀疑。


Nearly four years after the world hit bottom in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, QE’s impact has been strikingly asymmetric.	世界经济在全球金融危机冲击下触底后的近四年里，量化宽松政策的影响明显不对称。


While massive liquidity injections were effective in unfreezing credit markets and arrested the worst of the crisis – witness the role of the Fed’s first round of QE in 2009-2010 – subsequent efforts have not sparked anything close to a normal cyclical recovery.	大量流动性的注入的确在解冻信贷市场上取得成效并阻止了危机深度恶化——这在美联储2009-2010年度首轮量化宽松政策中得到了证明——然而随后的措施都未能催生任何常见的周期性复苏。


The reason is not hard to fathom.	其中原因并不难理解。


Hobbled by severe damage to private and public-sector balance sheets, and with policy interest rates at or near zero, post-bubble economies have been mired in a classic “liquidity trap.”	由于私营及公共企业的资产负债表受到严重破坏，政策利率又几近为零，后泡沫经济已经陷入了典型的“流动性陷阱”。


They are more focused on paying down massive debt overhangs built up before the crisis than on assuming new debt and boosting aggregate demand.	相对于进一步举债或刺激总需求，人们更加关心如何偿还危机之前积累的巨额债务。


The sad case of the American consumer is a classic example of how this plays out.	美国消费者的悲剧正是这种政策后果的典型例子。