But if Israel forces Hamas to accept its conditions for border controls and a formal ceasefire, Hamas’s image as the guardian of Palestinian resistance will be severely damaged.	但是，如果以色列迫使哈马斯接受其边境控制和正式停火的条件，哈马斯作为巴勒斯坦抵抗运动守护人的形象就会遭到严重的破坏。


Palestinians will ask if it was really necessary to fight this war and pay such a high price.	巴勒斯坦人就会怀疑，是否真的有必要进行这场战争并付出如此高昂的代价。


Abbas will be able to argue that he advised Hamas to renew the truce and to end its missile fire on Israeli towns, but that Hamas insisted on exposing Palestinian civilians to devastation.	阿巴斯就可以声称，他已经建议哈马斯续订停火协议并结束对以色列城镇的导弹袭击，但是，哈马斯却坚持使巴勒斯坦平民遭受战争的荼毒。


One indicator to watch for: the length of that ceasefire.	对此次战争要关注的一个指标是：停火时间的长短。


Palestinians will recognize Hamas’s acceptance of a multi-year truce with Israel as a sign of defeat, which would also underscore Palestinian feelings of humiliation and abandonment.	巴勒斯坦人会将哈马斯接受与以色列达成为期几年的停火协议视为哈马斯战败的标志，而这也会增强巴勒斯坦人遭到羞辱和被抛弃了的感觉。


Hezbollah, despite its rhetoric, has taken no steps to support Hamas, and the Arab states seemed more than willing to support its defeat.	尽管发表了种种言论，但是真主党却没有采取措施支持哈马斯，而且，阿拉伯国家似乎非常乐意看到哈马斯失败。


It is in rebuilding Gaza that the stakes of the competition will increase.	哈马斯和阿巴斯竞争的厉害关系，在加沙战后重建中会增加。


Abbas, supported by the United States and the European Union, may have control over significant funding.	得到美国和欧盟支持的阿巴斯，可能对大量的资金有控制权。


The test for him will be to deliver quickly.	对阿巴斯的考验是快速分配资金进行重建。


Hamas will also have resources for reconstruction.	哈马斯也有进行重建的资源。


Qatar, a Hamas supporter, has already announced an investment fund for Gaza and contributed $250 million.	支持哈马斯的卡塔尔，已经宣布建立一个加沙投资基金，并且捐助了2. 5亿美元。


Hamas will have to make a convincing case that Gaza’s near destruction is a price that had to be paid.	哈马斯必须提供有说服力的实例，来证明加沙的近乎毁灭是一个必须付出的代价。


Many Palestinians believe that Israel inflicted this damage on Gaza to drive a wedge between the people and the “resistance.”	许多巴勒斯坦人认为，以色列对加沙造成这样的破坏是为了分化巴勒斯坦人民和“抵抗运动”。


There is a precedent for this argument: Hezbollah described the destruction of Beirut’s southern suburbs in exactly these terms at the end of the Lebanon War in July 2006.	这样的观点有一个先例可考：在2006年6月份黎巴嫩战争结束的时候，真主党将贝鲁特南部郊区遭到破坏，正是用这样的语言加以解释的。


More importantly, Hamas can demonstrate that its leaders have been on the front lines during this war, sharing Palestinian suffering; many have been killed, along with their families.	更重要的是，哈马斯可以证明在此次战争中，其领导人到战争前线参加战斗，分担巴勒斯坦人的痛苦； 许多哈马斯成员和他们的家人一起牺牲了。


The biggest question is whether the war will alter Hamas’ political goals.	最大的问题是，此次战争是否会改变哈马斯的政治目标。


Two weeks ago, Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, praised Jimmy Carter in The Los Angeles Times as the only American president who had brought true peace in the Middle East.	两个星期前，哈马斯高级官员穆萨·阿卜·马祖卡（Musa Abu Marzouk）在《洛杉矶时报》上称赞吉米·卡特是给中东带来真正和平的唯一一位美国总统。


This is a radical departure from Hamas rhetoric, which has always portrayed the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt as a betrayal of the Islamic world.	这和哈马斯总是将以色列和埃及签订的戴维营协议描绘成为对伊斯兰世界的背叛的观点，有巨大的差异。


It remains to be seen whether Abu Marzouk’s view is merely a tactic intended to encourage the Obama administration to reach out to Hamas, or whether the war convinced Hamas that the two-state solution is the only viable option to settle the conflict with Israel.	阿卜·马祖卡（Musa Abu Marzouk）的观点是否只是一个为了刺激奥巴马政府接近哈马斯的策略，或者战争是否使哈马斯认识到两国共存方案是解决与以色列冲突的唯一可行选择，还有待观察。


The Framing of MH-17	MH-17事件的框架


PHILADELPHIA – US President Barack Obama called the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 an “outrage of unspeakable proportions,” whereas Russian President Vladimir Putin termed it an “accident” and a “terrible tragedy.”	费城——美国总统奥巴马称马航17航班被击落所引发的“愤怒难以言表”，而俄罗斯总统普京则用“意外”和“可怕的悲剧”来形容。


Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko branded it an “act of terrorism,” and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak called it an “inhumane, uncivilized, violent, and irresponsible act.”	乌克兰总统波罗申科称之为一次“恐怖事件”，而马来西亚总理纳吉布·拉扎克则称上述行为“反人道、反文明、暴力且不负责任。 ”


All of these descriptions may be accurate, but each carries different rhetorical weight and legal implications.	上述所有说法可能都有道理，但其修辞重点和法律内涵则各有不同。


The time has come for governments and international organizations to call the attack on MH17 a probable war crime.	政府和国际组织是时候将MH17遇袭事件定性为潜在的战争罪行。


This rhetorical shift is needed, first and foremost, because framing the moral reprehensibility of this despicable act within a common language will help to align public perceptions of it.	这种说法上的转变很有必要，因为用所有人都听得懂的语言指出这种卑劣行径的道德错误对统一公众看法很有帮助。


As it stands, the public narrative in Russia and the West diverges sharply.	目前俄罗斯和西方的公众说法截然不同。


Russian media and officials portray the episode as, at best, a terrible mistake, and, at worst, an American plot to undermine support for the rebels.	俄罗斯媒体和官员充其量把此次事件说成是可怕的错误，甚至说成是美国人削弱对叛军支持的阴谋。


Americans and Europeans, for their part, increasingly blame Russia for possibly equipping or assisting the rebels.	而美欧则越来越多地指责俄罗斯可能为叛军提供装备或者协助。


As a result, the possibility of achieving a common understanding of the act is being lost – and, with it, whatever potential there may be for meaningful cooperation.	结果是就上述行为达成共识的可能性越来越小——开展有意义合作的机会也正在消失。


But, by recognizing the downing of MH17 as a war crime, governments may be able to create an opening to reconcile these narratives.	但如果认定击落MH17属于战争罪行，各国政府或许可以打破坚冰，统一态度。


Whatever the perpetrators’ underlying motives, there is no denying the moral and legal wrongdoing that occurred.	无论肇事者出于何种潜在动机，此次事件是道德和法律犯罪都是无可否认的。


Calling the offense by its legal name acknowledges this, thereby preempting a rhetorical battle to frame the attack as terror, tragedy, or conspiracy.	用合法名称来形容此次事件承认了这一基本事实，并对恐怖、悲剧和阴谋论进行了有力的反驳。


Even the Russians may be willing to accept this framing, because it avoids finger-pointing against particular actors and affirms that a court of law – not a series of media statements – will determine what occurred and who is responsible.	就连俄国人都有可能愿意接受这一框架，因为这样做避免了指责特定人员，并确保将由法院而不是媒体来决定事实真相和责任者。


In fact, another important reason to characterize the downing of MH17 publicly as a war crime is that it may prove beneficial in apprehending the perpetrators.	事实上，将击落MH17公开定性为战争罪的另一重要原因是这样做或许有利于逮捕肇事者。


There is a real danger that those responsible for pressing the launch button – and, perhaps, for ordering the launch – will disappear into the chaos of eastern Ukraine, the vast expanses of Russia, or elsewhere.	按下发射按钮——或者也许是下达发射命令的人的确有可能消失在混乱的乌克兰东部和俄罗斯广袤的国土当中。


There is also a danger that the perpetrators, if found, might avoid trial if the local authorities label the crime political, and thus exempt from normal extradition requirements.	此外，还有可能即便找到了凶手，地方当局也会以政治犯罪为由让凶手逃避审判，避开正常的引渡请求。


All of the relevant states in the region have accepted the legal obligation to assist in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.	该地区所有相关国家都认可协助战争罪调查和起诉的法律义务。


The obligation to prosecute suspected war criminals, or extradite them to face prosecution elsewhere, becomes more compelling in accordance with the seriousness of the alleged crime.	所谓战争罪越严重，起诉犯罪嫌疑人、或将其引渡到其他地方接受审判的义务就愈加引人注目。


While the full details of the attack on MH17 remain unknown, shooting a surface-to-air missile at a civilian airliner flying over a war zone is most likely a violation of the law of war – by which the Ukrainian government, the Russian government, and the rebels are all bound.	虽然MH17遇袭的全部细节尚不清楚，但用地空导弹袭击飞越战区上空的民航客机无疑违反了战争法——乌克兰政府、俄罗斯政府和叛军均应受到该法的约束。


Indeed, the conflict in eastern Ukraine constitutes a non-international armed conflict (a war between a government and rebel movement) governed by international humanitarian law, which categorically bans the intentional targeting of civilians.	事实上，乌克兰东部冲突属非国际性武装冲突（政府和反叛运动作战）性质，需要遵守国际人道主义法，其中明确禁止蓄意袭击平民目标。


In other words, if whoever launched the missile did so with the intent of killing the civilian passengers aboard MH17, the act was unmistakably a war crime.	换句话说，如果导弹发射者想要杀害搭乘MH17的平民乘客，那么该行为明白无误属于战争罪的范畴。


Even if the objective was to strike a Ukrainian transport aircraft, the act likely constitutes a war crime.	即使原定目标是击落乌克兰运输机，上述行为仍有可能属于战争罪的范畴。


Fundamental to the law of war, including the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts, is the principle of distinction – the requirement that fighting parties distinguish between civilian and military targets.	战争法，包括非国际性武装冲突法的基本原则是要区别对待，要求交战方分清平民和军事目标。


In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that duty of care includes doing “everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.”	用红十字国际委员会的话说，这项义务包括“尽一切可能确认目标是否是军事目标。 ”


In this case, many steps could easily have been taken to differentiate MH17 from a military-transport plane, including visual identification (perhaps with binoculars), radar-signature analysis, and a check of the civilian aircraft transponder-code broadcast.	在这种情况下，有很多手段可以轻松区分MH17和军事运输机，其中包括视觉识别（或许采用双筒望远镜）、雷达信号分析和民用飞机应答码广播核查。


If, as seems likely, these basic steps were not taken, even an accidental strike on MH17 would constitute a war crime.	如果看似并未采取这些基本措施，那么即使误中MH17也有可能划入战争罪的范畴。


A Dutch or Malaysian court, or even a special tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations (like the one that prosecuted the 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie bombing), will ultimately determine who bears legal responsibility for the downing of MH17.	一家荷兰或马来西亚法院，甚或是联合国授权的一家特别法院（比如1988年起诉泛美洛克比空难的法院）将决定在法律层面谁来为击落MH17航班负责。


Framing the attack as a likely war crime now – as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has done – may help to reconcile the conflicting narratives that are emerging.	像联合国高级人权专员皮莱那样将此次袭击作为潜在的战争罪行对待可能有助于统一不断出现的矛盾叙述。


And, perhaps more important, doing so can play a key role in securing the political, diplomatic, and legal support needed to bring the perpetrators to justice.	而且，更重要的是，这样做能在争取将肇事者绳之以法所需的政治、外交和法律支持中起到关键的作用。


China’s New Reforms in Theory and Practice	中国新改革：理论与实践


HONG KONG – On November 12, the Third Plenary of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a major turn to market-oriented policies: interest-rate and currency liberalization, reform of banks and state enterprises, clearer land ownership for rural inhabitants, and a better deal for urban migrants.	香港—11月12日，中国十八大三中全会宣布了一组重大的市场化转向政策：利率和货币自由化、银行和国有企业改革、更清晰的农村居民土地所有权、以及更好的城市农民工待遇。


Behind this landmark decision was a potential crisis.	隐藏在这一划时代决定背后的是一场潜在危机。


China’s success has been driven by cheap exports based on cheap labor, infrastructure built by state enterprises with low-cost bank funding, and government budgets funded by land sales.	中国的成功一直是由基于廉价劳动力的廉价出口、廉价银行资金支持的国有企业建设的基础设施以及土地销售提供资金的政府预算推动的。


But labor is no longer cheap, road construction to connect major cities has given way to building large shopping malls in small towns, and land sales based on rezoning are reaching both economic limits and the limits of villagers’ tolerance.	但劳动力不再廉价、连接主要城市的道路建设已经变成了在小城镇建设大型购物城，基于重新规划的土地销售已经达到了经济和村民容忍力的双重极限。


Cheap money with limited investment outlets now risks fueling property bubbles and industrial overcapacity.	如今，廉价的资金加上投资渠道受限有可能助长房地产泡沫和工业产能过剩。


Without fundamental change, China faces slower economic growth, inadequate job creation and innovation, and popping bubbles.	如果没有根本性变化，中国面临着经济增速减慢、就业创造和创新不足和泡沫破裂的风险。


The solution is a rapid shift from China’s export-based growth model to one based on domestic demand; from infrastructure to consumption; from the dominance of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to that of small and medium-size private enterprises; from industry to services; and, more broadly, from bureaucratic control to market control.	解决办法在于迅速地从基于出口的增长模式转变为基于内需； 从基础设施转变为消费；


All successful Asian countries have made this shift; South Korea and Taiwan are models.	所有亚洲成功经济体都做过这一转变； 韩国和中国台湾堪称榜样。


But rapid change entails immense pain.	但快速变化意味着阵痛。


SOEs will lose their low-interest loans, subsidized land, monopoly protection, and privileged housing.	国有企业将失去低息贷款、受补贴土地、垄断保护和福利住房。


Party and state bureaucracies will lose power (and income).	党和国家官僚将失去权力（以及收入）。


Local governments are particularly desperate.	地方政府尤其着急。


They have huge debts, which they amortize by rezoning and selling land.	它们背负着巨额债务，对于这些债务，它们通过再规划和销售土地摊销。


Already squeezed by exorbitant property prices and popular resistance to land takings, they now face higher interest rates, property taxes, villagers empowered by stronger rights, and expensive new requirements to provide social services to migrants.	除了房价过高、群众对征地的抵制之外，地方政府现在还面临利率提高、房产税、村民力量和权利增加以及为农民工提供社会保证的需要大笔开支的新要求。


The desperation of local potentates and SOE executives has created powerful resistance to reform.	地方执政者和国有企业掌门人的焦急构成了对改革的重大阻碍。


At a plenary reportedly marked by acrimony, China’s political leaders sided with reform.	据说三中全会中充满了斗争，最终中国政治领导人站在了改革一边。


As one economic planner said, when asked about resistance before the decisive meeting, “In the end, all of our leaders understand numbers.	一位经济计划官员在这次决定性会议前被问及遭遇的抵制时回答说：“说到底，我们的领导人都明白数字。


The implications of the numbers are clear.”	数字的影响力是毫不含糊的。 ”


The Third Plenum’s announcement of its decisions took the form of a statement of broad principles, leaving many observers concerned by the lack of detail.	三中全会的决定以提纲挈领的形式公布，让许多观察者担心缺少细节。


But the CCP’s role is to set the direction of policy; executing the Party’s decisions is the government’s job.	但中共的角色是决定政策方向； 执行党的决定是政府的责任。


And the Plenum did establish a top-level group to coordinate and enforce implementation of its decisions.	三中全会确实成立了顶层领导小组协调和强制其决定的实施。


While implementation will be a long struggle, with occasionally fierce resistance, key reforms are already underway.	实施将是一场长期斗争，会遇到一些激烈抵制，但关键改革已经上路。 当前的十二五规划要求工资增长平均至少为13.


The current 12th Five-Year Plan calls for annual wage increases to average at least 13.4%; this year, wages are rising at an average rate of 18%, which will squeeze out industries characterized by obsolescence or overcapacity.	4%； 今年，工资增长平均率为18%，这将挤压过时和产能过剩的行业。


Moreover, the government’s anti-corruption campaign is targeting some of the most powerful industry groups, such as the petroleum faction, thereby weakening their resistance to reform.	此外，政府的反腐运动将目标定向一些权力最大的工业集团，比如石化行业，从而削弱了对改革的抵制。


Most important, economic outcomes are becoming increasingly aligned with the authorities’ goals.	最重要的是，经济结果日益与当局的目标相一致。


Services already account for more output and employment than industry – the Internet company Alibaba, for example, is empowering both consumers and smaller companies on a previously unimaginable scale – and recent growth has been driven by domestic demand rather than net exports.	服务业对产出和就业的贡献已超过工业——比如，互联网公司阿里巴巴以此前难以想象的规模壮大了消费者和小公司——且近期的增长受内需而不是出口推动。


Reform is not just a plan; it is already happening.	改革不仅仅是计划，而是正在进行时。


Economic openings to Central Asia and to ASEAN (specifically to Vietnam) are well underway, and reform will include further international opening.	向中亚和东盟（特别是越南）开放经济也在积极展开，而改革将包括进一步的国际开放。


The Third Plenum’s decisions follow the launch in September of the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone, which will open new sectors to foreign investment and permit largely market-based financial transactions and capital flows.	在三中全会的决定之前，9月份在上海成立了自由贸易区，自贸区将向外国投资开放新部门，允许基本由市场决定的金融交易和资本流。


The liberalization of capital flows is intended to be a gradual national policy, channeled through trusted institutions in Shanghai.	资本流动自由化将成为常规国家政策，由上海的可信机构作为渠道。


For trade in goods, the new free-trade zone is intended to compete directly with Singapore and Hong Kong.	对于商品贸易，新自贸区将直接与新加坡与香港竞争。


China fears dependence on those entrepôts in the event of conflict.	中国担心在面临冲突事件时过度依赖香港和新加坡等中转站。


For foreign investors, the policy will be to expand greatly the range of opportunities while curtailing foreign control; foreign companies, for example, may hold minority stakes in the telecoms sector, while dominant foreign companies like Monsanto will face constraints.	对外国投资者来说，这一政策将极大地扩大机会，同时限制外国控制； 比如，外国公司可以成为电信部门的少数股东，但孟山都等国际大公司将面临约束。


President Xi Jinping faces the politically risky task of pushing the CCP’s reform agenda against fierce opposition while the economy slows.	在经济放缓的背景下战胜反对者、推动中共的改革日程是习近平主席面临的高风险政治任务。


By emphasizing Party control – through a crackdown on SOEs, government opponents, and critics in the media and academia – Xi seeks to maximize his ability to impose economic reforms while minimizing the risk of a challenge from conservative forces.	习近平强调党的控制——通过打压国有企业、政府反对派和媒体和学界的批评——以此寻求推动改革能力最大化和保守派挑战风险最小化。


Above all, he is determined to avoid the fate of previous Chinese leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who lost their jobs after a critical mass of their opponents came to believe that economic and political reform jeopardized Party control.	总之，习近平要避免前任中国领导人胡耀邦和赵紫阳的命运。 胡耀邦和赵紫阳因为反对者认为经济和政治改革威胁到了党的控制而被迫下台。


So, at least for now, China will focus on another great wave of economic reform, whereas political reform will mostly be limited to reorganization of government agencies to boost efficiency and strengthen efforts to reduce corruption.	因此，至少从现在看，中国将专注于新一轮伟大的经济改革，而政治改革最有可能将局限于重组政府机构以增进效率以及打击腐败。


(There have been some steps toward reform, including a decision to remove judges from local political control.)	（改革之路已经跨出了一些步骤，包括取消地方政治控制法官。 ）


And yet China will find it increasingly difficult to postpone stronger measures that would appease popular demands for fairness, including the establishment of an independent judiciary, which could prove to be no less an imperative than structural economic reforms.	但中国将会发现，中止迎合公众对公正的要求的更强有力的措施将变得越来越困难，建立司法独立就是其中之一，这将是不亚于结构性经济改革的当务之急。


Likewise, the leaders must either accept much of the information revolution’s swamping of controls or engage in far more costly repression.	类似地，领导人要么接受信息革命对控制力的颠覆，要么实施代价高昂的打压。


Hopes for political reform rest on the possibility that Xi’s second term will see the accession to top leadership of reformers like Politburo member Wang Yang and Vice President Li Yuanchao.	政治改革的希望在于，在习近平的第二个任期，政治局委员汪洋和国家副主席李源潮等改革派能进入最高层。


For now, however, China will focus on another great wave of economic reform.	但是，眼下中国将专注于新一轮伟大的经济改革。


China’s Xi Factor	中国的习因素


HONG KONG – Before China’s leadership transition earlier this year, experts said that the Chinese Communist Party was intent on preventing a larger-than-life personality from assuming power.	香港—在今年早些时候中国领导层交接之前，专家们纷纷表示中共决意要避免英雄人物掌权。


The CCP, it was argued, wanted someone more like the bureaucratic outgoing leader, Hu Jintao, rather than a charismatic successor like, say, the former Chongqing provincial governor Bo Xilai.	他们指出，中共希望新领导人更像即将卸任的胡锦涛是一个官僚，而不要像前重庆市委书记薄熙来那样是一个强人。


Yet the new president and CCP leader, Xi Jinping, is hardly dull.	但新国家主席和中共总书记习近平绝非平庸之辈。


He began his term by paying homage to Deng Xiaoping at his statue in Shenzhen, where, more than three decades ago, the former Communist Party leader had launched the campaign to convert a reluctant Party to free-market reforms.	一上任他就前往深圳朝邓小平雕像致意，三十年前，作为前中共领导人的邓小平在深圳拉开了改革的序幕，让顽固的中共接受了自由市场。


In a top-level November meeting, Xi set out the details of a fundamental change in economic direction, overshadowing his colleagues.	在11月的顶层会议中，习近平制定了经济方向根本性变革的细节，光芒盖过了它的同事。


Xi now leads a new economic group that will coordinate and impose his reforms on fractious colleagues.	如今，习近平领导的新经济小组将协调他心存不满的同事，实施他的改革。


And, unlike Hu, he immediately became head of the military and now runs a parallel national security council.	与胡锦涛不同，习近平马上就成为军队首脑，现在还领导着国家安全委员会。


At first glance, a new “paramount leader” appears to be emerging.	咋一看，一位“最高领袖”（paramount leader）正在冉冉升起。


Recent history explains this re-concentration of power.	近期历史解释了这一权力的再集中。


In 1993, central-government leaders enjoyed relatively limited powers: they did not control the money supply and had difficulty firing provincial governors or relocating top generals.	1993年，中央政府领导人的权力相对有限：他们控制不了货币供给，也很难更换省级领导人或高层军官。


Central government revenue was low; indeed, proportionately smaller than that of central governments in any other major economy.	中央政府收入很低； 事实上，按比例计算，中国中央政府是主要经济体中规模最小的。


This changed when then-Party leader Jiang Zemin and his prime minister, Zhu Rongji, centralized authority in order to stave off economic crisis at a time of growing risk to China’s banks.	这一状况在时任总书记江泽民和国务院总理朱镕基任上发生了改变，江泽民和朱镕基通过权力集中避免了中国银行风险上升带来的经济危机。


In the process, the labor force of China’s state enterprises declined by 50 million, China lost 25 million manufacturing jobs, and central-government employment was slashed.	在此过程中，中国国有企业职工人数减少了5 000万，全国减少了2 500万个制造业岗位，中央政府工作人员数量也大幅下降。


These measures saved China’s economy, but at the price of widespread social stress, which made Zhu widely disliked when he left office.	这些措施挽救了中国经济，但代价是社会压力的全面增加，也导致朱镕基在离任后非常不受欢迎。


Popular reaction against the cosmopolitan, coastal, and market-oriented reforms of Zhu and Jiang brought to power leaders whose formative experiences were in the inland provinces of Gansu and Tibet.	针对朱镕基和江泽民的城市、沿海和市场导向改革的群众反对情绪带来的是从政经历来自内陆省份甘肃和西藏的领导人。


Riding a wave of resentment against inequality and social tensions, Hu and his prime minister, Wen Jiabao, promised a “harmonious society,” without the stresses of Zhu’s agenda.	面临对不平等性的怨恨和社会紧张局面的胡锦涛和他的总理温家宝提出了“和谐社会”。 不再强调朱镕基的日程。


They slowed economic reform and ceased political reforms.	他们减缓了经济改革，暂停了政治改革。


The bureaucracy expanded from 40 million to 70 million, and power devolved to provinces, bureaucracies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	官僚人数从4 000万膨胀到7 000万，权力则下放到各省、官僚机构和国有企业。


The somnolent Hu/Wen era, fortunately, did not dampen the economic growth triggered by the earlier reforms undertaken by Jiang and Zhu.	幸运的是，令人昏昏欲睡的胡温时代并没有让江朱时代实施的改革所开启的经济增长减慢速度。


But the economic-growth model that those reforms created was running out of steam.	但江朱改革所形成的经济增长模式正在失去动力。


Low-cost exports were struggling as labor costs rose.	随着劳动力成本���上升，低成本出口难以为继。


Investment in infrastructure was shifting from growth-enhancing projects, such as inter-city highways, to less productive shopping malls in second- and third-tier cities.	基础设施投资对象不再是城际高速公路等强化增长的项目，变成了生产率更低的二三线城市购物城。


Productivity plummeted in SOEs, whose privileged access to financing crowded out private-sector investment.	国有企业生产率大幅下降，同时它们优先获得融资的特权又挤出了私人部门投资。


Local-government funding, through the seizure and resale of property, was reaching its limits.	地方政府通过征地和卖地进行融资的做法也已经趋于极限。


Thus, it became essential to launch a new wave of far-reaching reforms, including liberalization of interest rates, securities markets, and foreign-exchange controls, in order to fund the more productive private sector and reduce excess capacity in SOEs.	于是，实施新一轮深层次改革就变得至关重要，包括利率、证券市场和外汇管制的自由化，这样才能为生产率更高的私人部门提供资金并削减国有企业的过剩产能。


In particular, the reforms were needed to deflate an emerging property bubble resulting from huge savings and foreign capital inflows that had no other profitable investment outlet.	特别地，中国需要改革抑制房地产泡沫。 房地产泡沫的罪魁是找不到其他可盈利投资渠道的巨额储蓄和外国资本流入。


The government planned to liberalize interest rates and the capital account to encourage investment in modern, high-value industries, rather than continue to subsidize low-value exports.	政府计划实施利率和资本账户自由化以鼓励对现代高价值行业的投资，不再继续补贴低价值出口部门。


It started to shift the economy’s base from export-oriented industries to domestic growth, and from manufacturing to services.	政府开始将经济的基础从出口导向型行业专项国内增长，从制造业专项服务业。


And it announced its intention to slow local governments’ seizures of farmland and excessive borrowing through captive enterprises.	政府还宣布将抑制地方政府征用农地和通过政府控制企业过度借贷。


Unsurprisingly, opposition to reform was implacable.	毫不奇怪，改革的反对之声不绝于耳。


SOEs were determined to defend their privileges.	国有企业决意捍卫它们的特权。


Highly leveraged local governments could not tolerate higher interest rates or an appreciating currency, and they were adamant about continuing land sales and opposing property taxes.	高杠杆的地方政府无法忍受提高利率或货币升值，坚持继续卖地和反对房产税。


They feared the financial burden of new requirements to provide social services to urban migrants.	它们担心向农民工提供社会服务的新要求所带来的财政负担。


As a result, a new, lean leadership team had to be mobilized.	因此一个精干的领导团队必须动员起来。


The number of top leaders was cut from nine to seven.	最高领导层人数从九人减少为七人。


The new lineup eliminated the most powerful voice on the left (Bo) and relegated the “extreme reformers” on the right (Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang) to the second tier.	新阵容排除了最强硬的左派（薄熙来），而右派“极端改革者”（李源潮和汪洋）只能位居次等。


To reduce elders’ interference, Hu stepped down as head of the military and Jiang Zemin promised to step back.	为了减少老干部的干扰，胡锦涛卸任军队首脑，江泽民也承诺力挺习近平。


Moreover, a leading economic group was established to enforce bureaucratic compliance, as was a national security council (similar to that in the United States) to coordinate foreign policy.	此外，习近平成立了一个经济领导小组迫使官僚屈服，还成立了国家安全委员会（与美国国家安全委员会类似）协调外交政策。


Previously, the military often kept the foreign ministry in the dark; and the party’s foreign-affairs office, which handled North Korea, often failed to coordinate its activities with the foreign ministry, which handled South Korea.	此前，军方常常让外交部无所适从； 而中共外事办公室（负责朝鲜事务）往往不能协调其与外交部（负责韩国事务）的行动。


An anti-corruption campaign weakened opposition, and Zhu re-emerged as a hero.	反腐行动减弱了改革的反对力量，朱镕基以英雄形象再次出现在公众视野。


This set the stage for Xi’s arrival.	这些都是在为习近平的上台铺路。


In short, the new-style leadership, a form of managed charisma, was collectively designed to serve national needs.	简言之，中共集体设计了一种新的领导风格——有管理的领袖形式（managed charisma）来满足国家需要。


And it implies that Xi is unlikely to emerge as paramount leader.	这意味着习近平不可能成为最高领袖。


The Chinese presidency’s authority has certainly increased; but Xi is powerful only when he has the votes.	中国国家主席的权威显然增加了，但习近平只有在掌握选票的情况下才能得到权力。


On contentious issues, he has but one of seven.	在存在争议的问题上，他只是七人中的一人。


Desperate Women’s Dangerous Moves	绝望女性的危险运动


GENEVA – One of the most significant recent trends in migration has been the rise in the number of women using dangerous routes previously used mainly by men.	日内瓦—当前移民活动的一个重大趋势是越来越多的女性采用了此前主要由男性采用的危险办法。


More and more women – fleeing discrimination, violence, or poverty – are now taking the same risks as men in search of a better life for themselves and their children.	越来越多的女性为了摆脱歧视、暴力或贫困而甘愿像男性一样冒险为自己和孩子争取更好的生活。


This is desperation migration.	这就是绝望的移民。


Indeed, while many women travel with their families, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is seeing an increasing number of women migrating on their own to an unknown, unpredictable, and often dangerous future.	事实上，尽管许多女性跟随家庭迁徙，但国际移民组织（IOM）发现独立地为了未知的、不可预测的并且往往是很危险的未来而移民的女性数字正在增加。


Women and children migrants are dying with increasing frequency at sea, crossing deserts, and on other hazardous routes.	女性和儿童移民越来越多地丧生于渡海、穿越沙漠和其他危险途径中。


What has changed?	是什么发生了改变？


Among the many factors pushing women to migrate are pervasive gender bias and social prejudices against single mothers or widows in their country of origin.	促使女性移民的因素包括原住地无处不在的针对单身母亲或寡妇性别歧视和社会偏见。


But poverty is almost always the strongest force driving women to leave.	但贫困几乎永远是促使女性迁徙的最重要动力。


In most poor countries, women are poorer than men, owing to the systematic discrimination that they face in education, health care, employment, and control of assets.	在大部分穷国，女性比男性更穷，这是因为她们在教育、医疗、就业和资产控制中处于系统性的被歧视地位。


Of course, most migrant women do not encounter mistreatment or die on their journeys; in fact, many derive real benefits from migration.	当然，大部分女性移民在迁徙过程中没有遇到虐待或死亡； 事实上，许多人因为移民而境况大为改善。


But, among the world’s estimated 111 million migrant women (half the total), violence and abuse can occur at any time, starting from the very outset of the migration process.	但是，据估计，全世界有1. 11亿女性移民（大约占总数的一半），而在移民过程中，随时可能发生暴力和虐待，几乎从移民过程的一开始就是如此。


Throughout the migration cycle, women are more at risk from physical violence by fellow migrants, smugglers, and state officers, and can be forced to exchange sex for transportation, food, or accommodation.	在整个移民过程中，女性更容易受到来自同伴、走私贩和国家官员的人身伤害，并有可能被迫用性换取放行、食物和住宿。


Unsurprisingly, migrant women are often victims of human trafficking, finding themselves enslaved as laborers, prostitutes, or participants in organized begging operations.	毫不奇怪，女性移民往往是人口贩子的受害者，最后沦为奴役劳工、娼妓、或乞讨集团成员。


This is true regardless of why women migrate.	这就是事实，不管女性移民原因为何。


When women run for their lives because of natural or man-made disasters, gender-based violence is one of the great risks they face.	当女性因为自然或认为灾难而为生命而迁徙时，基于性别的暴力就成为她们所面临的的一个大威胁。


Displaced women, often destitute, are easy prey for criminals.	流离失所的女性往往身无分文，很容易成为犯罪对象。


This was one of my immediate concerns when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, and at my request a special program was instituted to alert and help women in peril.	当海燕台风袭击菲律宾时，我最担心的事情之一也在于此，在我的要求下成立了一个特别计划帮助受灾女性。


Even when women migrants find a job in a host country, it is rarely easy for them.	即使有女性移民在东道国找到了工作，也决不轻松。


They are predominantly employed in domestic work, care-giving, agriculture, and entertainment – all low-paid, largely unregulated sectors that are rarely covered by national labor laws.	她们大多从事家政、看护、农业和娱乐工作——都是低薪工作，并且往往属于得不到国家劳动法覆盖的不受管制的部门。


They are often subject to punishingly long working hours, non-payment of wages, forced confinement, starvation, beating, sexual abuse, and threats and intimidation.	她们往往必须承受极长的工作时间、工资克扣、强制监禁、挨饿、挨打、被性虐待，还饱受威胁和恐吓。


Many women migrants are unskilled or undocumented domestic workers.	许多女性移民是无技能、无合同的家政工人。


This makes them more vulnerable to violence, because they typically depend on a single employer and in many countries face deportation if they attempt to change jobs.	这让她们更容易遭到暴力，因为她们往往得依靠单一雇主，并且在许多国家如果试图换工作就要面临遣返。


Moreover, social integration in a new country can be more difficult for women than for men.	此外，在新国家融入社会对于女性也比男性更难。


This is partly because women are often subject to harmful traditional practices, such as early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and so-called “honor” crimes, enforced by families who want to maintain a link with their country of origin.	这部分是因为女性通常需要被迫接受伤害性风俗，比如强制性童婚、割礼以及由试图坚守国家传统的家庭强制实施的所谓的“荣誉犯罪”。


And it is especially difficult for women migrants to navigate between the tantalizing freedom of choice and expression in their host society and the traditional roles expected of them at home.	女性移民想要在东道国诱人的选择和言论自由和母国期待她们的传统角色之间游刃有余更是难上加难。


The rising number of migrant deaths – both women and men – at sea and in deserts is a wake-up call for the international community to act.	死于海中和沙漠中的移民数量——不管是男性还是女性——的上升是警世钟，国际社会应该行动起来。


IOM has called on all relevant actors – including countries of origin, transit countries, and destination countries – to address the plight of migrants attempting life-threatening journeys and find solutions.	IOM呼吁相关行动方——包括来源国、中转国和目的国——改变移民尝试有生命危险的旅程的现象并找出解决方案。


Protecting women migrants – often the most desperate of the desperate – should top their priorities.	保护女性移民——她们通常是绝望者中的绝望者——应该被列为重中之重。


In 2014, the international community will review the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which expire next year, and decide on a post-2015 development agenda.	2014年，国际社会将评估明年到期的联合国千年发展目标并决定2015年后的发展日程。


IOM believes that migrants, and in particular women migrants, who in the past have been largely invisible in the language of development, must be a part of this.	IOM认为，移民，特别是女性移民，应该位列其中，她们过去的发展问题上往往受到忽视。


We must no longer ignore half the world’s migrants.	我们再也不能忽视世界移民人口中的这一半了。


Like all migrants, women on the move are entitled to personal security and basic dignity.	和所有移民一样，运动中的女性有权获得个人安全和基本尊严。


Will NATO’s Prodigal Son Return?	法国会重回北约怀抱吗？


PARIS -- Few state visits have lasting results.	巴黎—很少有国事访问能产生持久的成效。 而萨科齐对华盛顿刚刚进行的访问可能是个例外。


Nicolas Sarkozy’s just completed trip to Washington may be an exception, because the French President may be preparing to bring NATO a highly valued present for its 60th anniversary in the spring of 2009: France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure, from which Charles de Gaulle withdrew in 1966.	因为这位法国总统可能正准备为北约在2009年春的60周年诞辰献上一份厚礼：法国将重返北约统一军事架构。 在1966年戴高乐执政时期法国退出了北约。


In retrospect, de Gaulle’s decision proved to be much more detrimental for France than for the Alliance.	回头看来，戴高乐的决定对法国造成的伤害比对北约造成的更大。


By withdrawing from NATO’s integrated military command, France excluded itself from political decision-making within the Alliance and thus became the equivalent of the “Harkis”– the local soldiers who served with the French army during the Algerian war: fine soldiers, but with virtually no reward for their service.	由于退出了北约的统一军事指挥体系，法国将自己排除在该联盟内部的政治决策之外，成为与“Harkis”军人类似的身份—这是些在阿尔及利亚战争中与法国军队并肩战斗的当地军人：勇猛的战士，但却几乎没有因为服役而获得任何犒赏。


How realistic is the possibility of scenario French return to NATO’s military fold?	法国重返北约军事体系的可能性究竟有多大？


Historically, aborted moves and faux pas abound on both sides in the French/NATO relationship, the latest being Jacques Chirac’s failed attempt to patch up France’s relations with NATO upon his arrival in power in 1995.	从法国—北约关系的历史上看，许多类似的举措要么不了了之、要么马失前蹄。 最近的一次失败是希拉克在1995年上台以后企图修补法国与北约关系的努力。


Success is not guaranteed this time, either, but the chances are much higher now, because France, the United States, and the world have changed.	虽然这次也不能保证成功，但机会却很大，因为法国、美国和世界都发生了变化。


For starters, the US now has a real friend and ally in the Élysée Palace.	首先，美国现在在爱丽舍宫有了一个真正的朋友。


To speak of Sarkozy as a substitute for Tony Blair in Europe would be premature – and unhelpful, given Blair’s inability to exert significant influence on US policy.	虽然鉴于布莱尔在对美国政策施加重大影响方面的无能，就说萨科齐会在欧洲取代他还言之过早—也于事无补。


But Sarkozy is both eager to transform France’s relations with the Alliance and has a strategy to do so.	但萨科齐不但有转变法国与北约关系的热情，还有相应的战略。


Moreover, the French army supports such a move, while only a small segment of the Foreign Ministry is opposed.	此外，法国军方也支持这一举动，只有外交部的一小部分人反对。


Sarkozy’s strategy is to link progress in building a common European defense and security structure with a redefinition of NATO.	萨科齐的战略是将建立欧洲共同安全与防务架构的进展与对北约的重新定义联系起来。


More Europe in security terms means more Alliance.	更安全的欧洲也意味着结盟程度更高的欧洲。


So, because Sarkozy wants to be seen as a convinced European, he must normalize France’s relations with a new Alliance based on two pillars – European and American.	所以，由于萨科齐希望被看作是一个满怀信心的欧洲人，他就必须使法国与新联盟的关系正常化。 新联盟的两大支柱是欧洲人与美国人。


Moreover, financial and human resources for military affairs are scarce and cannot be duplicated, while France and Britain want to restart the Saint-Malo process of bilateral defense efforts launched nearly ten years ago.	另外，尽管法国和英国想要重新启动近十年前开始实施的双边防务的Saint-Malo进程，但军事的财政和人力资源是稀缺并不可复制的。


As a result, for the sake of Europe, France must move closer to the Alliance.	所以，为了欧洲，法国必须与北约走得更近。


Sarkozy has also fully integrated into France’s approach to Europe a reckoning with the new balance of power within the European Union following the accession of Eastern European states.	萨科齐也完全融入了法国对欧洲的策略，在东欧诸国加入欧盟以后承认新的权力平衡。


Unlike Chirac, he understands that it is counterproductive and unrealistic to ask countries like Bulgaria or Romania to choose between their European or Atlantic loyalties.	与希拉克不同，他明白让保加利亚或罗马尼亚这样的国家在对欧盟或北约的忠诚之间做出抉择是不现实的，其后果会适得其反。


Here, again, strengthening Europe requires strengthening the Alliance.	这一点再次说明强化欧洲需要巩固北约。


Sarkozy’s approach may work, because America, too, has changed.	萨科齐的策略可能会行得通，因为美国也改变了。


In American eyes, the Kosovo war in 1999 demonstrated NATO’s glaring and myriad shortcomings, while the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, moved America still further away from the Alliance, particularly after President George W. Bush disparagingly rejected NATO’s offer of help.	在美国人的眼中，1999年的科索沃战争反映了北约的种种软肋，而2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击更使得美国与北约渐行渐远，特别是在布什总统轻蔑地拒绝了北约的援助之后。


Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even tried to use divide-and-rule tactics by pitting “New” Europe against the “Old” Europe led by France and Germany, which opposed the Iraq war.	前防长拉姆斯菲尔德甚至试图采用“分而治之”的办法，在“新”欧洲和法、德领导的，反对伊拉克战争的“老”欧洲之间制造对抗。


Those divisions are now history, and American reservations about a European security pillar cannot trump America’s pressing needs for allied support.	这种分化现已成为历史，美国对欧洲安全支柱的迟疑远不如其对盟友支持的需求来得急迫。


Confronted with disaster in Iraq, the risk of Afghanistan following Iraq into chaos, and the escalating crisis with Iran, the US can no longer treat the NATO allies with disdain.	面对伊拉克的灾难，阿富汗步其后尘陷入混乱的风险和伊朗危机的升级，美国不能再轻视北约盟国了。


Although Europe remains militarily weak, America’s power is now in doubt.	虽然欧洲的军力依然虚弱，但美国的实力也令人怀疑。


If a European pillar within NATO is needed to strengthen the Alliance, why not accept it?	如果北约内部需要一个欧洲支柱来强化联盟，为什么不接受呢？


Beyond the changes in France and the US, the decisive factor behind the possible reinvention of NATO is the transformation of the international system itself.	在法国和美国的变化之外，重塑北约的可能性背后还有一个决定性因素，那就是国际体系本身的变化。


Aside from the explosive situation in the Middle East and the threat of Islamist terrorism, the West is now confronted with the rise of Asia, the return of a more assertive Russia, and new energy and environmental challenges.	除了中东一触即发的局势和伊斯兰恐怖主义的威胁，西方现在还面临着亚洲的崛起、一个更为自负的俄罗斯和新的能源及环境挑战。


Both France and America have a key role to play in addressing these issues effectively.	法国和美国在有效应对这些问题方面都要扮演关键性的角色。


Sarkozy’s trip to Washington, and his address to a receptive US Congress, was one more step toward ensuring that they do so together.	萨科齐的华盛顿之行和他受到美国国会欢迎的演讲是确保两国走向合作的第一步。


Bankers with Borders	有边界的银行家


LONDON – When Mark Carney replaces Mervyn King as Governor of the Bank of England in July 2013, the world will be deprived of King’s witty public utterances.	发自伦敦——等到马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）在2013年7月接替默文·金（Mervyn King）成为英格兰银行行长之后，我们就再也听不到后者诙谐幽默的公开发言了。


My personal favorite came when, commenting on strong retail-sales figures during one Christmas period, he cast doubt on their significance for assessing the state of the economy.	我很喜欢他对圣诞期间零售业强劲数据的评论，这些数据对评估经济状况的重要性在他看来都值得怀疑。 “圣诞节的真正意义，” 他严肃地吟诵道，“要到复活节或更晚之后才能揭示。


“The true meaning of the story of Christmas” he solemnly intoned, “will not be revealed until Easter, or possibly much later.” A new career on the stage, or in the pulpit, surely beckons.	”（一语双关，暗指耶稣显圣和经济真相的最终昭示都需要时间）可见一份在舞台或圣坛上的新事业会非常适合他。


King’s most quoted phrase is that “global banking institutions are global in life, but national in death.”	金被引用得最多的观点是“跨国银行机构因全球而生，却以国家而亡。


They trade globally, across porous borders, attaching little significance to the geographical location of capital and liquidity.	”这些机构渗透各国边界进行全球交易，并不在乎资本和流动性的地理位置。


But, when the music stops, it is the home regulator, and the home central bank, that picks up the tab, even if the losses were incurred elsewhere.	可一旦环境恶化，即使这些损失产生于别处，却是其所在国监管机构和央行为之买单。


By the same token, a failing bank may leave behind a mess in third countries, which its home authorities may not clean up.	同样地，一个破产银行可能会在第三国留下一个烂摊子，但其所在国内当局可能并不会出面收拾残局。


Icelandic banks, for example, took deposits in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and swept them back to Reykjavik, leaving the host countries out of pocket.	以冰岛各银行为例，它们把英国和荷兰的存款卷回雷克雅未克，却让两国去承担损失。


Likewise, the collapse of Lehman Brothers left European creditors more exposed than those in the US, whose funds had been wired home to New York on the Friday before the end.	同样，雷曼兄弟的倒闭将欧洲债权人置于比美国债权人更危险的境地，因为美国人的钱在一切结束前的那个星期五已经被汇回纽约了。


Regulators have been wrestling with this problem for years, without conspicuous success.	监管机构过去几年一直与这一问题搏斗，却未能取得明显成效。


In mid-December, the Bank of England (BoE) and the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced what seemed like a breakthrough, at least concerning the major banks headquartered in the US or the UK – that is, 12 of the 28 institutions regarded by the Financial Stability Board as globally systemic.	11月中旬，英格兰银行和美国联邦存款保险公司公布了一个似乎是突破的举措——至少对总部设在美国和英国的大银行而言，也就是被金融稳定委员会视作28个全球系统性机构中的其中12个。


In their case, a resolution authority, in London or Washington, would take control of the parent company, remove senior management, and apportion losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors.	对它们来说，一个在华盛顿或伦敦的解决方案机构将会接管母公司，炒掉高级管理层，把损失摊派给股东和未受保护的债权人。


It sounded plausible.	这听起来似乎可行。


BoE officials declared firmly that they were prepared to trust their American counterparts, and would not step in to grab subsidiaries or assets based in the UK.	英国央行官员坚称他们已经做好准备相信美国同行，不会插手夺取位于英国的子公司或资产。


“This is a journey that involves trust,” said BoE Deputy Governor Paul Tucker.	英格兰银行副行长保罗·塔克（Paul Tucker）说：“这是一个包含着信任的过程。


But the Anglo-American love-in quickly soured when the FDIC chairman was asked to give the same assurances of confidence in the British authorities.	”但是当美国联邦存款保险公司总裁被要求对英国当局作出同样的信心保证时，这场英美之恋立刻变了味。


According to the Financial Times, he “laughingly declined.”	根据《金融时报》的说法，他“笑着拒绝了。 ”


Indeed, while the FDIC and the BoE were working on their plan, the US Federal Reserve was developing proposals that will expose overseas banks in the US to a far tighter set of controls, and closer supervision, than they have hitherto experienced.	事实上，当联���存款保险公司和英格兰银行研究其计划之时，美联储正在研究一种在美外资银行处于比当前更牢固掌控和严密监管之下的提案。


The Fed is seeking to oblige foreign banks to create a holding company to own their separately capitalized subsidiaries, effectively giving the Fed direct oversight of their business.	美联储正试图迫使外国银行建立一个控股公司，下属各单独资本化了的子公司，这能有效地让美联储直接监督他们的业务。


They will also be required to maintain stronger capital and liquidity positions in the US.	这些公司也将会被要求在美国保持更强大的资本和流动性头寸。


The justification offered for these new impositions is that overseas banks have moved beyond their traditional lending business to engage in substantial and often complex capital-market activities.	这些新规定产生的理由是外资银行已经越过了它们传统的贷款业务，参与到了实质性且通常比较复杂的资本市场活动之中。


“The crisis revealed the resulting risks to US financial stability,” said Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo.	“这场危机揭露了由此产生的美国金融稳定风险，”美联储理事丹尼尔·塔鲁洛（Daniel Tarullo）说到。


The UK’s Financial Services Authority has been invoking the same rationale for requiring foreign banks to establish local subsidiaries, rather than taking deposits or lending through a branch of the parent bank.	英国金融服务管理局已经使用相同的理由来要求外资银行建立当地子公司，而不是通过母公司下属的分公司来进行存款或贷款。


On the face of it, these moves appear to be well justified, given the mayhem created by poorly regulated banks in the major financial centers.	表面看来，考虑到监管不力的银行在全球各主要金融中心引起的混乱，这些举措似乎很合乎情理。


But we should be clear that these changes are not just tinkering at the edges.	但我们应该清楚这些变化并不是在边缘修修补补。


They amount to a reversal of decades of policy by American and British regulators.	它们相当于是美国和英国监管机构几十年政策的逆转。


Ernest Patrikis, a former Fed supervisor, points to the clear implication that in the US domestic banks will have a strong advantage over foreign banks.	美联储前主管欧内斯特·帕特里基斯（Ernest Patrikis）指出美国国内银行将会比外资银行拥有很强大的优势。


More dramatically, he asserts that “subsidiarization would be the end of international banking.”	更引人注目地是，他断言“子公司化将是国际银行业的归宿。 ”


Larry Fink, the CEO of the multinational investment-management firm BlackRock, takes a similar view: “It really throws into question [the] whole globalization of these firms,” with “each country for [itself].”	跨国投资管理公司黑石集团的总裁拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）也持有类似的观点：“这些公司的整个全球化都遭到了质疑，每个国家都是为了自己的利益”。


He adds: “I wouldn’t call it a trade war, but I would certainly call it a high level of protectionism.”	他补充到：“我不会把这称之为贸易战，但肯定会将其称之为高层次的保护主义。


One delicious irony in Europe is that Chinese banks are contesting the requirement to subsidiarize in London on precisely those grounds.	”而在欧洲最有趣的讽刺就是中国各大银行恰恰是基于这些理由质疑在伦敦设立子公司的要求。


For now, high-octane worries about protectionism are probably overdone.	目前对保护主义政策的强烈担忧或许有些过虑了。


And it is difficult to deny that the Fed should take a close interest in the funding strategies of foreign banks operating in the US.	但也难以否认美联储应该更加关注在美外资银行的融资策略。


Another Fed governor, Jeremy Stein, has pointed out that foreign banks have dollar liabilities of roughly $8 trillion, much of it short-term wholesale funding.	另一位美联储理事——杰里米·斯坦因（Jeremy Stein）曾指出外资银行有大约8万亿的美元债务，其中大部分是短期的大规模融资。


But there is a risk that these interventions are the thin end of a dangerous wedge.	但是存在着这样一个风险——即这些干预是一个危险的端倪。


Forced subsidiarization causes capital and liquidity to be trapped in local legal entities, reducing the effectiveness with which that capital is used.	强制外资银行设立子公司会导致资本和流动性被困在当地的法律实体里，这降低了资本的有效性。


At a time when bank capital is scarce, that impediment carries significant economic costs.	在银行资本匮乏之时，这种阻碍就将承担着极大的经济成本。


Moreover, tools that may be used wisely and well by institutions with a global outlook, like the Fed and the Bank of England, could take on a different character in countries where a commitment to free and open markets cannot be taken for granted.	此外，能被具有全球视野的机构——比如美联储和英格兰银行——明智并合理使用的工具在某些国家里可能会呈现不同的特点，因为无法保证这些国家一定会致力于建立自由开放的市场。


So we must hope that the US and British authorities move carefully and do not use their new powers to freeze out foreign competition.	所以我们不得不希望美英当局小心行事且不要运用它们的新权力来排斥国外竞争。


“Be careful what you wish for” is wise advice in the regulatory world, as it is elsewhere.	“注意你自己的愿望”的忠告不仅适用于别处，对监管者来说也是如此。


Will Next Time Be Different?	下次会不一样吗？


CHICAGO – Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, in their excellent, eponymous book on debt crises, argue that the most dangerous words in any language are “This time is different.”	发自芝加哥——卡门·莱因哈特与肯尼思·罗格夫这两位经济学家曾合著了一本关于债务危机的大作，书中认为最危险的说辞莫过于“这次跟以前不同了。


Perhaps the next most dangerous words are “Next time will be different.”	”而或许危险程度排名第二的句子则是“下次肯定不会像以往那样。 ”


These words are often uttered when politicians and central banks want to bail out some troubled segment of the economy.	每当那些政客和中央银行试图拯救某些陷入麻烦的经济部门时，类似的说辞就会从他们嘴里蹦出来。


“Yes,” one can almost hear them saying, “we understand that bailing out banks will subvert market discipline. But you cannot expect us to stand by and watch the system collapse, causing millions of innocent people to suffer.	人们几乎可以猜到讲话内容：“我们明白拯救银行会破坏市场纪律，但你也不能让我们眼睁睁看着整个系统崩溃，让数百万无辜民众受苦受难吧，事已至此，也只能硬着头皮去面对了。


We have to live with the hand we are dealt.	不过我保证下次肯定不会像以往那样的。


But next time will be different.” They then use every tool they have to prevent economic losses on their watch.	”然后他们就用尽手中一切手段去制止自己当政期间的一切经济损失。


The government’s incentives are clear.	政府的动机其实相当明确。


The public rewards them for dealing with the problem at hand – whether building levees to protect houses built on a flood plain or rescuing banks that have dodgy securities on their balance sheets.	公众总会对他们应对当前问题的作为大加赞赏——无论是兴建堤坝保护洪泛区民居还是拯救那些拥有有毒资产的银行。


Politicians and central bankers gain little by letting the greedy or careless face the full consequences of their actions, for many innocent people would suffer as well.	而倘若政客和中央银行官员们坐视那些始作俑者自食其果的话（这也会导致许多无辜民众受害），他们自己却捞不到什么好处。


A sympathetic press would amplify their heart-rending stories of lost jobs and homes, making those counseling against intervention appear callous.	一个同情心泛滥的媒体将大肆渲染那些失业和无家可归者的辛酸故事，使得那些反对干涉的意见显得残忍且麻木不仁。


Democracies are necessarily soft-hearted, whereas markets and nature are not; government inevitably expands to fill the gap.	民主制度总是心太软，而市场和大自然则太过残酷； 于是政府便无可避免地挺身而出，填补了双方之间的空白。


To the extent that the rough justice meted out by markets or nature teaches anyone to behave better, it has consequences far beyond the horizon of anyone in power today.	在某种程度上，正是市场和大自然那些粗暴而公正的惩罚教会了人们谨慎行事，同时这些惩罚也会带来超出当权者预料之外的成果。


When asked to choose between the risk of being known to posterity as the central banker who let the system collapse and the intangible future benefits of teaching risk takers a lesson, it does not take genius to predict the central banker’s decision.	但倘若要二者选其一：一是作为一个任由系统崩溃的中央银行官员遗臭万年，二是在给那些风险玩家一个教训之后收获不知何时降临的善果，估计很多中央银行家的答案都无法预测。


Democracy tends to institutionalize moral hazard in sectors that are economically or politically important, such as finance or real estate, allowing them to privatize gains and socialize losses.	民主制度倾向于用政策把那些在政治经济上具有重要意义的部门（比如金融或地产）所面临的道德风险包揽起来，让他们一面私有化其收益，另一面却将风险社会化。


Even though the authorities insist that the next time will be different, everyone knows that they will make the same decision when confronted with the same choice again.	即便当局坚称下不为例，所有人都知道他们下次肯定还会做出同样的决定。


So, knowing that next time will not be different, the authorities try their best to prevent a “next time.”	因此在明知下一次不会跟以往不同的情况下，政府会想尽办法避免“下一次”。


But risk takers have every incentive to try their luck again, knowing that, at worst, they will be bailed out.	但那些金融冒险家们肯定有无数借口继续冒险，因为他们知道就算局面最终无法收拾，还是有人会出手拯救他们。


In this cat-and-mouse game, risk takers have the upper hand.	可见在这场猫鼠游戏中，冒险家们无疑占了上风。


For one thing, risk takers are typically small, cohesive interest groups that, once rescued, have a powerful incentive, as well as the resources, to buy the political influence needed to ensure a return to the status quo ante.	首先，这些冒险家属于一个极具凝聚力的小团体，一旦起死回生，他们就有极强的动机（以及资源）去换取所需的政治影响力，好让自己能回复到从前的状况。


If risk takers were allowed to face more serious losses, they would have fewer resources to fight political attempts to constrain their risky activities.	如果能让这些人面对更严重损失的话，他们就无法拥有那么多资源去抵抗那些限制其冒险行为的政治行动。


Moreover, the public does not have a long memory, a long time horizon, or an appetite for detail.	此外，公众往往是健忘，短视而且不关注细节的。


Even as the United States’ voluminous Dodd-Frank bill tried to ensure that bankers never subjected American taxpayers to undue risk again, public attention had moved on to the state of the real economy and unemployment.	当长篇大论的多德-法兰克法案还在试图确保银行家们不再把美国纳税人置于危险中时，公众的注意力早就转移到了实体经济和就业之上。


Why focus on financial regulation when the risks of an immediate collapse are small, and when the details are so tedious?	在公众眼中既然迅速崩溃的风险已经很小，法律规章的细节又是如此冗长乏味，又何必再着眼于金融管制呢？


As technical experts and lobbyists took over, and the public lost interest, Dodd-Frank became friendlier and friendlier to the banks.	于是技术官员和国会游说者占据了上风，公众又逐渐失去了兴趣，多德-法兰克法案最终也逐渐向银行利益倾斜。


So how can this one-way betting be stopped?	那么这种一面倒的情况何时才是尽头？


The scary answer may be that it does not end until governments run out of money (as in Ireland) or the public runs out of sympathy (as in Germany vis-à-vis the rest of Europe).	最令人心惊的答案莫过于直到政府都没钱了（爱尔兰那样）或者公众没有了同情心（正如德国人对欧洲其他地区的态度）的那一天。


To avoid that fate, governments should start by recognizing that the system is programmed to respond to deep distress, and that they can do nothing about it.	为了避免这一命运，各国政府应当逐步认识到整个系统早已有了应对深刻危机的一套方法，而且任何人力都无法改变。


But they must try to ensure that they do not destroy incentives by doing too much. And they must offset the distortions created by intervention in other ways.	但他们必须努力确保不会因为过度作为而损害了市场的内在动力，同时也必须补偿由其他干涉行为而导致的市场扭曲。


For example, the US Federal Reserve has essentially guaranteed the financial sector that if it gets into trouble, ultra-low interest rates will be maintained (at the expense of savers) until the sector recovers.	比如说，美国联邦储备委员会（简称美联储）就向金融部门保证，一旦后者陷入麻烦就将维持极低利率直到该部门复苏为止。


In the early to mid-1990’s, rates were kept low because of banks’ real-estate problems.	在1990年代中早期为了解决银行的地产问题而一直压低利率。


They were slashed again in 2001 and kept ultra-low after the dot-com bust.	随后2001年互联网泡沫爆破，于是利率又再次下滑并维持在极低水平。


And they have been ultra-low since 2008.	如今的低利率已经从2008年维持至今。


Senior Fed policymakers deny that their interest-rate policy bears any responsibility for risk taking, but there is much evidence to the contrary.	美联储高级政策制定者否认自身利率政策对冒险行为负有任何责任，但许多证据却告诉了我们一个相反的事实。


It would be difficult for the Fed to respond differently if the financial sector gets into trouble again.	倘若金融部门再度惹祸上身的话，估计美联储的做法还会是老一套。


But it does not have to maintain ultra-low interest rates after the crisis has passed, especially if those rates have little impact on generating sustainable economic activity.	但它没必要在危机过后继续维持极低利率，尤其是当这些利率对促进可持续经济活动的作用已经很小的时候。


Doing so merely rewards banks for their past excesses – and taxes savers.	这种做法���仅是便宜了那些曾经过度放肆的银行——还有那些避税的富人。


More importantly, if the Fed wants to restore incentives for risk takers and savers, it should offset the effects of staying “low for long” in bad times by increasing interest rates more rapidly than is strictly necessary as the economy recovers.	更重要的是，如果美联储想要恢复冒险者以及储蓄者的动力，就必须停止那在危机时期维持“长期低利率”的做法，转而在复苏时更迅速地升高利率。


This will, of course, be politically difficult, because the public has been programmed to think that ultra-low rates are good, and higher rates bad, for growth, without any consideration for the long-term sustainability of growth.	这在政治上当然会相当艰难，因为公众早就有了思维定势，认为极低利率肯定好，高利率肯定不好，却根本没有考虑到长期增长的可持续性。


Finally, the pressure on governments to intervene would be lower if individuals had access to a minimum safety net.	最后，如果民众个人能加入基本的社会安全网络的话，那些要求政府干涉的压力也会得到缓解。


Official US policy is so activist in downturns (regardless of its effectiveness) partly because unemployment is so costly to workers – who have little savings, unemployment benefits that run out quickly, and health care that is often tied to a job.	美国官方政策之所以在经济不景时如此活跃，某种程度上就是因为劳动阶层对失业极为敏感——他们没有储蓄，失业救济也很快花光，而医疗往往又和工作挂钩。


A stronger safety net for individuals might allow politicians to accept more corporate or financial-sector distress, and help bolster their claim that next time really will be different.	一个更强大的个人社会安全网将使得政治家能容许企业和金融部门承担更大的压力，并帮助他们实现“下回真的跟以往不一样”的诺言。


Will Olmert Survive?	奥尔默特能否涉险过关？


After Israel’s inability last summer to achieve a conclusive victory over Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, public pressure forced Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government to appoint a commission to examine the causes of this surprising failure.	以色列军队去年夏天未能在南黎巴嫩对真主党取得决定性胜利之后，公众压力迫使总理奥尔默特政府任命一个委员会调查这一出人意料的失败的原因。


How could a small militia, numbering less than a few thousand combatants, survive the onslaught of the Middle East’s most formidable military machine?	一个人数不过几千人的小小民兵武装何以能够在中东地区最为强悍的军事机器的扫荡中存活下来？


The commission, headed by retired Supreme Court judge Eliyahu Winograd, has just published its interim report.	由退休的最高法院法官维诺格拉特领导的这一委员会刚刚发表了其临时报告。


Its criticism of Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and Chief-of-Staff Dan Halutz – set forth in a detailed and meticulous 117-page assessment – is harsh, but not surprising.	这一报告严厉批评奥尔默特、国防部长佩雷茨以及总参谋长哈卢茨，并不出人所料，同时还提出了具体而又精确的长达117页的评估。


The Winograd Commission articulated what most Israelis already think: Olmert and Peretz lacked the military, security, and policy experience to confront a terrorist organization that raided Israeli territory, killed a number of soldiers and kidnapped two, and then launched thousands of rockets on civilian targets for over a month.	维诺格拉特委员会表达了大多数以色列人已经存在的看法，那就是奥尔默特和佩雷茨缺乏军事、安全以及政策经验来面对真主党恐怖组织。 这一恐怖组织袭击以色列领土，杀害数名以色列士兵并且绑架两名士兵，然后又在一个多月的时间里向平民目标发射数以千计的火箭。


Indeed, the inexperience of the prime minister and the defense minister are unprecedented in Israel’s history.	确实，总理和国防部长经验不足在以色列历史上是前所未有的。


Olmert, who stepped into Ariel Sharon’s shoes as leader of the new Kadima Party, was considered a competent but lackluster parliamentarian – and later mayor of Jerusalem – who was known more for his polemical style than for his political stature or gravitas.	奥尔默特顶替沙龙成为新组建的前进党领导人，他被认为是一个称职而又没有魅力的议会议员。 他后还作过耶路撒冷市长，其好辩的风格为人所知，要超过其政治地位或实力。


For most Israelis, even those who voted for him as the bearer of Sharon’s legacy after the Gaza disengagement, Olmert thus remained the accidental prime minister.	对于大多数以色列人而言，即使他们在加沙地带撤军后投票选举奥尔默特作为沙龙的遗产的继承人，他也只还是一个意外的总理。


Likewise, Peretz, a rabble-rousing but effective trade unionist, surprised all when he won the Labor Party’s leadership primary and then chose the defense portfolio over the treasury.	同样，佩雷茨是一个有效的工会人士，颇能煽动人心。 当他赢得工党领导人初选后没有选择成为财政部长而选择国防部长的时候，大家都感到惊讶。


To many, the duo of Olmert and Peretz seemed to invite trouble.	对于很多人而言，奥尔默特和佩雷茨这一对组合看起来就会引来麻烦。


Precisely because Israelis are aware of the constant security threat facing their country, they have always believed that their leaders should be able to lead Israel in war – but also to ask the military tough questions when diplomacy may fail.	正是由于以色列人清楚他们的国家时刻面临安全威胁，他们总是相信，他们的领导人能够在战争中带领以色列，同时，在外交努力失败的时候，他们也能够提出严厉的军事问题。


When such a moment arrived, totally out of the blue (or so it seemed) with Hezbollah’s raid on July 12, 2006, Israel’s two top politicians were completely out of their depth, stumbling into a war for which neither they nor the Israeli Army were prepared.	当这一时刻来临之际，也就是2006年7月12日真主党完全出乎意料地（或者看起来如此）发动袭击的时候，以色列两位最高的政治人物完全不知所措，匆忙之中应战，他们本人以及以色列陆军都没有做好准备。 在历史上第一次，以色列军队由一名空军将军哈卢茨领导。


The military was led – for the first time in its history – by an Air Force general, Dan Halutz, who believed that everything could be solved by air power, creating a combustible combination of civilian ignorance and military arrogance.	他相信空中力量可以解决一切问题，从而造成文职领导人的无知以及军队的傲慢。 二者结合就导致局势极度危机。


In measured but devastating prose, the Winograd Commission gives failing marks to all three leaders.	维诺格拉特报告以克制而又严厉的笔调对所有三位领导人都评定为不及格。


Olmert decided to go into battle recklessly and unaware of the consequences.	奥尔默特决定仓促作战，不知后果。


Peretz was unable to gauge the strategic implications of his decisions.	佩雷茨无法预测其决定的政治后果。


And Halutz failed to present the civilian leadership with the full panoply of military options at the army’s disposal.	而哈卢茨则没有向文职领导人提出军队所有的所有军事选择。


Halutz already resigned a few months ago.	哈卢茨已经在几个月前辞职。


But both Olmert and Peretz have declared that, despite the Commission’s conclusions, they would not quit: instead, they have vowed to implement the report’s many far-reaching substantive recommendations about policy, strategy, and decision-making processes.	但是奥尔默特和佩雷茨二人都宣称，尽管委员会作出了这些结论，他们都不会辞职。 相反，他们发誓要落实该报告提出的许多有关政策、战略以及决策过程的范围广泛的实质性建议。


Will Olmert and Peretz be able to stay on?	奥尔默特和佩雷茨能否留任？


Their coalition government enjoys a comfortable parliamentary majority; nor does the political arithmetic imply a viable parliamentary alternative.	他们的联合政府在议会中占据较大的多数席位。 政治算术也并不表明可以有能够存活下来的其他的议会组成选择。


But public opinion – volatile and angry – calls for both to resign: a public-opinion poll conducted after the Commission published its report indicated that only 14% of Israelis believe that Olmert should keep his job, while less than 11% support Peretz.	但是舆论是不定的而又愤怒，要求二人都辞职。 委员会发表其报告后所作的民意调查表明，14％的以色列人相信奥尔默特应当留任，而支持佩雷茨的人不到11％。


Later this week, demonstrations calling for the government's resignation are planned, and it will become obviously more difficult for the government to continue to function.	现在已经有人计划在本周晚些时候举行要求政府辞职的游行示威，而这将明显地让政府更加难以继续运作。


There are already rumors about a palace coup within Kadima, aimed at replacing Olmert with either the deputy prime minister, the veteran Shimon Peres, or the popular foreign minister, Tzipi Livni.	现在已经有传言说前进党内部要有宫廷政变，目的在于用副总理、元老佩雷斯或者广受欢迎的外长利夫尼取代奥尔默特。


But it does not appear that Olmert will allow himself to be pushed out.	但是看起来奥尔默特是不会允许然自己被赶走的。


In fact, Olmert’s weak and discredited government may yet survive.	实际上，奥尔默特软弱而又饱受垢病的政府可能还是可以存活下来。


If the government were to fall and new elections held, there are strong indications that the winner might be Binyamin Netanyahu, of the right-wing Likud, which was decimated in the 2006 elections, but is now patiently waiting in the wings.	如果政府倒台，举行新的选举，获胜者很有可能是右翼利库德集团的内塔尼亚胡。 该党在2006年的选举中一败涂地，但是现在却耐心等待时机。


Many who want Olmert to go would still not welcome a Netanyahu comeback, which may also explain what appears to be an indirect endorsement of Olmert by the United States.	许多想要奥尔默特下台的人还是不会欢迎内塔尼亚胡卷土重来，这也就是为何美国间接地支持奥尔默特的原因了。


Only a strong Israeli government can make the painful decisions necessary for negotiations with the Palestinians to succeed.	只有一个强大的以色列政府才能够作出并实施与巴勒斯坦谈判所必要的痛苦决定。


As a result, the prospects for meaningful continuation of Israeli-Palestinian talks look even dimmer than they did before.	结果，���以会谈有意义地进行下去的前景要比过去看起来还要暗淡。


Indeed, the real loser of the 2006 Lebanon war was neither Israel nor Hezbollah, but, at least for the time being, the peace process.	确实，2006年黎巴嫩战争中真正的失败者既不是以色列也不是真主党，而是中东和平进程，至少目前如此。


Will Rising Interest Rates Torpedo Stock and House Prices?	利率上升会危及股价和房价吗？


Interest rates around the world are poised to rise.	世界范围内的银行利率都呈上升之势。


Short-term rates have gone so low since the worldwide recession of 2001 - 1% and 2%, respectively, in the United States and the Eurozone, and practically zero in Japan - that a strengthening world economy will force central banks to tighten the monetary reins.	短期利率自2001年世界经济不景气以来已降到如此之低-美国和欧元区的利率分别为1%和2%，日本的利率几乎为零-以至于正在走强的世界经济会迫使各国央行收紧货币政策。


Australia's central bank has already been raising rates since May 2002, and Great Britain's since November 2003.	澳大利亚中央银行自2002年5月以来就一直在调高利率，英国自2003年11月以来也一直在这么做。


In the US, the two-day Federal Open Market Committee meeting on June 29-30 is likely to mark a major turning point, reversing the steady decline of the benchmark federal funds rate since Alan Greenspan began loosening monetary policy in 2001.	在美国，即将于6月29-30日召开的联邦开放市场委员会会议可能会标志一个重要的转折点。 它会扭转自格林斯潘2001年放松货币政策以来基准联邦基金利率持续降低的趋势。


This is likely to be followed by rate increases in China, the Eurozone, and elsewhere.	这有可能进一步带动中国、欧元区和其它地区调高利率。


Given the tendency of central banks to change interest rates gradually, any change of direction likely means more changes in the same direction later.	由于各国央行通常会逐渐调整利率，所以某一大方向上的调整往往意味着一种持续而来的趋势。


What will this landmark change mean for prices of such assets as stocks and homes?	这一重大调整对诸如股票和住房一类的资产又意味着什么呢？


In theory, when interest rates go up, there is reason to believe that asset prices will go down.	从理论上讲，当利率提高时，人们就有理由相信资产价格会走低。


The higher interest rates go, the better are investments in bonds, which compete with investments in other assets such as stocks or homes.	利率越高，债券的投资行情就越被看好。 投资债券与投资股票和房产是一种竞争的关系。


Higher interest rates also raise the cost of borrowing to buy these assets, which may diminish demand for them, exerting downward pressure on their prices.	更高的利率还会使用于购买这些资产的贷款成本增加。 增加的贷款成本可能会减少人们对这些资产的需求，并给这些资产施加降价的压力。


When interest rates fall, the opposite effect on asset prices may be predicted.	而当利率调低时，人们就能预测其会对资产价格产生相反的作用。


In fact, the history of the stock market's reactions to changing interest rates is mixed.	从实际上看，股票市场对利率变化的反应是混合的。


Sometimes interest rate changes have the predicted effect, sometimes they don't.	有时利率变化会带来人们意料之中的影响，而有时却不尽然。


For example, the NASDAQ stock price index made a spectacular 14% jump upwards on the day (January 3, 2001) when America's Fed began its latest series of interest rate cuts.	例如，在美联储开始其最近的一系列降息的那一天（2001年1月3日）纳斯达克股价指数暴涨14%。


A jump in the market is what one might have expected.	股价急升也许是人们意料之中的。


But then the NASDAQ index fell 22% over the following year, although the Fed continued to cut interest rates aggressively.	可虽然美联储继续大幅调低利率，纳斯达克指数在次年却下滑了22%。


Does that experience suggest that the NASDAQ index will drop sharply if the Fed raises interest rates on June 30?	根据以往的经验，纳斯达克指数会在美联储6月30日调高利率之后急剧下滑吗？


No.	答案是否定的。


The timing of the 2001 rate decrease stunned the market.	2001年的降息让市场措手不及。


By contrast, the Fed is widely expected to raise rates at the end this month, so there will be no surprise element.	相比之下，美联储在这个月底调高利率已在人们的意料之中，所以其中不存在突然性的元素。


The market may know, not just from the experience of 2001-2, that interest rate movements do not have predictable effects on stock prices.	市场可能会明白（不光从2001-2的经验当中）利率的波动对股价的影响是不可预测的。


But, there are reasons to believe that higher interest rates, even though expected, can have a negative impact on home prices.	但人们却有理由相信较高的利率，即便在人们的预料之中，也能对房价产生负面影响。


That is because home buyers are mostly ordinary people with little financial sophistication, unlike the professionals who trade in stocks.	这是因为与从事股票交易的专业人士不同，购房者大都是不谙金融之道的普通人。


Untrained people with other things on their minds can make serious economic errors.	怀有其它顾虑的非专业人士可能会犯严重的经济错误。


Home values have soared to high levels in many countries as irrational exuberance grips the markets.	由于市场被非理性的繁荣所控制，���多国家的房地产都已大幅增值。


High home prices are already putting great stress on many families, which are struggling to make their mortgage payments.	高昂的房价已经给很多正艰难地偿还按揭贷款的家庭增加了巨大的压力。


When interest rates go up, these payments will (when the rate is variable) also go up, possibly becoming unsustainable.	当利率增加时，还款额也会增加（在可变利率的情况下），并可能变得难以负担。


If one borrows the equivalent of three years' income to buy a house, a mortgage rate of 6% means that 18% of one's income goes to interest payments, which may be tolerable.	如果某人以6%的按揭利率贷了相当于其三年总收入的购房款，这就意味着其收入的18%将会用于偿还利息，这样的负担也许还能承受。


But if the rate rises to 8%, mortgage interest payments rise to 24%, which, together with amortization, taxes, other debts, and necessary expenditures, may claim too much of the family budget.	但如果利率上升至8%，按揭还款利息的比例就会上升到24%，再加上分期付款、杂税、其它债务和必要支出，这样的负担可能就会超出一个家庭的还款能力。


Some will then try to sell their overpriced homes, and the resulting market imbalance will cause prices to fall.	在此情况下，有些人可能就会出售其标价过高的住房，由此带来的市场不平衡就会导致房价下跌。


People with fixed-rate mortgages are also vulnerable to rate increases, though less directly.	办理了固定利率按揭贷款的人同样容易受利率上升的影响，只不过这种影响不那么直接罢了。


This is because if they have to move and sell their house, there may be no buyers who can afford higher interest payments, unless the home's price also falls.	这是因为如果他们不得不搬迁并出售住房，却可能没有买家能够负担得起更高的利息，除非房价也下跌。


By contrast, sophisticated investors, such as big stock market players, are unlikely to fall prey to this trap.	相比之下，如股市大户一类的久经世故的投资者就不大容易跌入这样的陷阱。


But homebuyers are not as savvy, so they may not see the change coming or they may fail to plan for it.	但购房者却没有那么精明，所以他们要么可能会发现不了即将到来的市场变化，要么可能会没有做好应对措施。


As psychologists have shown, people are susceptible to "wishful thinking bias," wishing away possible future problems that they would rather not think about.	心理学家们指出许多人都容易罹患"妄想偏见"，不愿设想自己所不愿考虑但却极可能发生的事。


They may overemphasize the likelihood of economic success ("I will be making a lot more money in a few years") and underemphasize the commonplace problems that regularly challenge family budgets ("I will be losing my job or getting a divorce").	他们可能会过度强调经济成功的可能性（"我会在未来几年赚很多钱"）但却对时时威胁家庭预算的问题考虑不足（"我会失业或离婚"）。


This blithe attitude is ultimately behind real estate bubbles where they are occurring.	正是这种盲目乐观的态度造成了房地产泡沫的出现。


Low interest rates did not cause the bubbles.	低银行利率并没有造成泡沫。


They only made it easier for people, in those areas of the world where there is a half-believable story about a fabulous future economy, to indulge their fantasies.	低利率只是让那些生活在经济前景仿佛一片光明的地区的人们更容易沉浸在他们的幻想之中。


Interest rate increases will deliver a fresh dose of reality: the interest expense of owning a home is going to claim a larger share of family budgets, a hard fact that will eventually sink into our thinking.	利率的上升会让他们面对现实：购房的贷款利息将会占家庭预算的更大一部分，这是我们最终必须面对的严峻现实。


But declines in home prices will not occur quickly when central banks begin to raise interest rates.	但房价下跌不会在各国央行开始调高利率之后很快出现。


After two years of rate increases, Australia's home price boom only recently shows signs of abating.	在利率上升的两年之后，澳大利亚住房价格上涨的趋势才出现缓和迹象。


Dominated by amateur investors, home markets do not turn on a dime.	在业余投资者的主导下，房屋市场对利率变化并不敏感。


In places where home prices have been rising rapidly, the upward trend may continue or level off for a while.	在房价上涨过快的地方，这种上升趋势会在一段时间内保持或趋缓。


In most high-priced places, a real decline may not come for some time.	在大多数高房价地区，真正的房价下跌可能要在相当一段时间之后才会出现。


Will Russia Save the West?	俄国将会拯救西方？


MOSCOW – Rapid changes in the global economy and international politics are raising, once more, an eternal issue in Russia: the country’s relations with Europe, and with the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole.	莫斯科 —— 全球经济与国际政治的快速变革，使得一个永恒的话题又一次在俄罗斯被人提起，这便是俄国与欧洲以及整个“欧洲 - 大西洋地区”之间的关系问题。


Of course, Russia partly belongs to this region.	当然，俄国也部分属于这一地区；


Yet it cannot and does not want to join the West wholeheartedly – at least not yet.	但至少迄今为止，该国既无法、也不愿全心全意地加入西方。


Meanwhile, this choice looks very different now compared to just a few years ago.	同时，与短短几年前相比，这一选择如今看上去已经发生了很大的改变。


It is becoming obvious that the Euro-Atlantic world, whose economic and political model seemed so triumphant 20 years ago, is now lagging somewhat behind China and other Asian countries.	欧洲 - 大西洋世界的经济与政治模式在二十年前看上去大获成功，但它如今已稍稍落后于中国以及其他亚洲国家，这种颓势正变得日益明显。


So is Russia, where, despite encouraging talk about innovation-based development, the economy continues to de-modernize as corruption has been allowed to metastasize, and as the country relies increasingly on its natural-resource wealth.	俄罗斯同样如此，尽管不乏鼓舞人心的言论（如建立在创新基础上的发展），但随着贪腐弊病被允许向着各处蔓延、加上该国愈加依赖于自然资源这一财富，如今的俄罗斯经济之现代化程度正在继续下降。


Indeed, it is Asia that has turned out to be the true winner of the Cold War.	的确，亚洲已证明自己才是冷战的真正胜利者。


These rising powers raise problems regarding Russia’s geo-strategic choices.	这些崛起中的大国，为俄罗斯的地缘战略抉择带来了问题。


For the first time in decades, the values gap between Russia and the EU appears to be increasing.	数十年来头一回，俄国与欧盟之间的价值 隔阂 看起来正在加大。


Europe is overcoming state nationalism, while Russia is building a nation state.	欧洲正在克服国家民族主义，而俄罗斯却在构建一个民族国家。


Broken by history and not wishing to be ravaged by war again, Europeans have embraced compromise and renounced the direct use of force in international relations.	为历史恩怨搅得身心俱疲、且不愿再受战争之苦的欧洲人，已经接受了妥协这种方式，并放弃了在国际关系中对武力的直接使用。


Russians, on the other hand, emphasize their “hard power,” including military force, because they know that they live in a dangerous world and have no one to hide behind.	而俄国人正好相反，他们继续强调包括军事力量在内的“硬实力”，因为他们明白：自己身处一个危机四伏的世界之中，且没有靠山可供求助。


And, because of the country’s comparative lack of “soft power” – social, cultural, and economic attractiveness – it stands ready to use the competitive advantages (i.e., its resource wealth) available to it.	而且，由于该国社会、文化以及经济方面的吸引力等“软实力”相对缺乏，它只得做好准备，将其竞争力高的现有优势（比如其资源领域的财富）加以应用。


Internal political developments in Russia are also pushing the country in a different direction from the West.	俄国国内政治的发展也使该国与西方渐行渐远。


Quite simply, Russia is moving away from democracy.	道理很简单，俄罗斯正在远离民主制度。


This emerging values gap is not an insurmountable obstacle to geostrategic rapprochement.	对于地缘战略层面的和解而言，这一逐步浮现的价值隔阂并非一道不可逾越的鸿沟。 但与之相伴的还有俄国与西方的相互刺激（这一点在俄国尤为强烈），这使得消除隔阂的难度增大了许多。


But,	因为尽管俄国精英从未认为自己在冷战中落败，但西方的做法从本质上说，就是在以对待战败国的方式对待俄罗斯； 而北约东扩便是这种态度的典型表现，这一做法为目前的紧张状态埋下了很深的伏笔。


NATO expansion is nothing more than the extension of its zone of influence – and in the most sensitive, military-political sphere .	北约东扩其实就是自身势力范围的扩张（这还是在最为敏感的军事与政治领域）。


And yet the West’s unwillingness to abandon that effort is coupled with a repeated refusal to recognize Russia’s right to have its own zone of interest.	而且西方在不愿放弃扩张努力的同时，还三番五次地拒绝承认俄罗斯也有获得其自身利益范围的权利。


So NATO expansion has left the Cold War unfinished.	因此，北约东扩使得冷战仍未结束；


The ideological and military confrontation that underlay it is gone, but the geopolitical rivalry that it entailed has returned to the fore.	作为冷战基础的意识形态与军事对抗已然不见踪影，但随之而来的地缘政治竞争却重返舞台中央。


Thus, the old mentality survived on both sides.	这样，传统思维在俄国与西方都重现生机。


Energy debates are another example of this.	能源争论则是另一个例证。


Non-Russian Europe should thank the Almighty for the presence of energy-rich Russia at its borders, while Russia should be thankful for having such wealthy customers.	俄国以外的欧洲应该感谢上帝，因为后者安排能源丰富的俄罗斯与它为邻； 而俄国也应为拥有这样一批富有的主顾而心存感激。


But the natural differences in the interests of energy consumers and producers have been given a political/security twist – witness the discussions about an “Energy NATO.”	但能源消费者与生产者之间利益的天然分歧，又被打上了政治与安全方面的色彩，于是便出现了关于“能源北约”的讨论。


F aced with the impossibility of advantageous accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions, Russia is drifting fast towards alignment with China – a “younger brother,” though a respected one. Russia’s “Asian choice” of today is not the same as the Slavophile/Eurasian choice of the past.	俄国在眼见无望以有利条件加入欧洲 - 大西洋机制后，便向着与中国这个“小兄弟”（不过却是一个令人敬重的后辈）结盟的方向快速转变。 如今，俄国的“亚洲选择”已不同于往日那种斯拉夫主义 / 欧亚主义之选择。


On the surface, it looks like a choice in favor of a rapidly rising civilization. But the current estrangement from Europe – the cradle of Russian civilization and modernization – threatens Russia’s identity and will increase its geostrategic risks in the future.	从表面上看，这似乎是一个有利于快速崛起之文明的选择，但当前俄国与欧洲（这是俄国文明与现代化的摇篮）的疏离，却对前者的身份产生了威胁，并会增加其未来的地缘战略风险。


Europe does not benefit from this estrangement either. It will continue to move towards beautiful decay – Venice writ large.	欧洲也不会从这一疏离中获益，它将继续其优雅的衰败过程 —— 威尼斯便是很好的例子；


The United States also loses. Without Russia, which will remain the world’s third strongest power for the foreseeable future, it is impossible to solve the key problems of international security.	美国同样未能幸免，它若失去了在可预见的未来中、继续身为全球第三强国的俄罗斯之协助，也将无法解决国际安全领域的关键问题。


The current Euro-Atlantic security architecture seems to suit the majority of Americans and Europeans, though it is becoming increasingly fragile and counterproductive.	当前的欧洲 - 大西洋安全体系，尽管正变得日渐脆弱，其效果也愈加事与愿违，但看起来它却仍令大部分美欧人士中意。


So Russia will struggle to create a new architecture largely on its own – whether through a new treaty on collective European security, or even through its accession to NATO.	因此，俄罗斯将主要依靠自己的力量，努力创建出一个新的体系 —— 无论是通过欧洲集体安全方面的新条约，还是甚至通过加入北约。


This is not only in Russian political and civilizational interest, but it also reflects our duty to the entire community of Euro-Atlantic nations, which is being weakened by the “unfinished Cold War.”	这不单符合俄国的政治与文明利益，也反映出我们对于整个欧洲 - 大西洋诸国共同体的义务，后者正被“尚未完结的冷战”所削弱。


The idea of a “Union of Europe” between Russia and the EU should be put on the long-term agenda.	而在俄国与欧盟之间建立一个“欧洲联合体”的设想，也应被列入长期日程安排之中。


That Union should be based on a common human, economic, and energy space.	这一联合体应当建立在共同的人员、经济与能源范围基础之上。


The combination of a new security arrangement for the Euro-Atlantic community and the establishment of the Union of Europe could arrest the decline in the international weight of the West.	在欧洲 - 大西洋共同体的新型安全制度、以及欧洲联合体的建立这两大因素的共同作用之下，西方国际影响力的下滑趋势将得以终止。


Will Success Spoil Brazil?	成功会不会让巴西骄纵？


RIO DE JANEIRO – Brazil has been making international headlines of late, but not for traditional stories about urban violence, natural catastrophes, political corruption, or deforestation in the Amazon.	巴西最近登上了国际新闻的头版头条，但却不是因为城市暴力、自然灾害、政治腐败或亚马逊地区森林砍伐等传统的报导。


At the G-20 Summit in London last April, for example, US President Barack Obama called for the world to pay heed to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the “most popular politician on earth,” and shook hands with him, saying: “My man right here.	去年4月召开的伦敦二十国峰会上，美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马呼吁世界关注巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦，称他为“地球上最受欢迎的政治家”，奥巴马同达席尔瓦握手，说：“这是我的偶像。


I love this guy.”	我爱他。 ”


In September, the ousted president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, reappeared in the country inside the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa after three months of exile.	9月，遭到驱逐的洪都拉斯总统曼努埃尔·塞拉亚在经历了三个月的流亡生活后在巴西驻特古西加尔巴大使馆再度露面。


Although his presence dramatically fuelled the situation for a time, Brazilian diplomats, working with the US, were able to reach agreement with Honduran authorities to allow Manuel Zelaya to return to office.	虽然他的现身一度给本已混乱的局势火上浇油，但巴西外交人员与美国合作，成功地与洪都拉斯当局达成协议，允许曼努埃尔·塞拉亚重新执政。


Then came the news that Brazil will host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games – this coming on top of hosting the 2014 World Cup.	随后传来消息说2016年夏季奥运会将在巴西举办——巴西也同样是2014年世界杯的主办国。


As for the global – and fortunately now abating – economic crisis, Brazil has shined throughout, recording a fast and strong recovery.	在正在趋于缓和的全球经济危机中，巴西自始至终一直表现出色，出现了快速强劲的经济复苏。


And, as if this good news were not enough, Brazil’s giant state oil company, Petrobrás, is already at work developing two huge deep-water oil fields discovered in the sea off the coast of Rio de Janeiro.	这还不算，巴西的巨型国家石油企业巴西石油公司（Petrobrás）已经着手实施沿里约热内卢海岸线发现的两块巨型深水油田的开发工作。


For these and other reasons, Brazil is gaining the world’s attention.	上述以及其它原因让巴西受到世界的瞩目。


Brazilian democracy, at long last, is working well, following many years of military government, and its economy seems more robust than ever.	巴西的民主制度在历经多年的军政府统治后，终于得以修成正果，巴西经济也比以往任何时刻更加繁荣。


As a result, many people are enthusiastically pointing to an increased international role for Brazil in the future.	因此，许多人热情地指出巴西将在未来发挥更大的国际作用。


But two connected and major challenges lie ahead for Brazil and its government: the need to build a far more equal society and to resist the temptation to use nationalism to mask whatever domestic failures may manifest themselves.	但巴西及其政府面临着两项相互关联的重大挑战：建设更为平等的社会，以及经受住利用民族主义掩盖任何国内失败的诱惑。


Brazil’s current success is rooted not only in Lula’s two terms, which must end in 2010.	不仅是必须在2010年结束两届任期的卢拉造就了巴西目前的成功。


The economic stabilization program enacted by Fernando Henrique Cardoso since 1994 (the Real Plan), first as finance minister and then as president for two terms, solidified a structure that made it possible for Lula’s tenure to be so prosperous.	1994年来先任财政部长再任两届总统的费尔南多·恩里克·卡多佐推行的经济稳定计划（即雷亚尔计划）奠定了坚实的结构性基础，使得卢拉在其任期内有可能实现经济繁荣。


This is not meant to take anything away from Lula.	但这丝毫也不能抹杀卢拉的贡献。


His presidency has guaranteed political stability and strengthened social cohesion.	他在总统任期内保障了政治稳定，加强了社会凝聚力。


Indeed, by managing the political process to make the government work for Brazil’s people, Lula’s administration has made Brazil a truly stable and consensual democracy.	事实上，卢拉内阁通过管理政治程序实现了政府为巴西人民服务，并使巴西成为真正稳定团结的民主国家。


There is nothing modest about that achievement, given Brazil’s traditional institutional instability and the series of major corruption scandals that engulfed Lula’s government in 2005 and 2006.	考虑到一直困扰着巴西的制度动荡和2005、2006年几乎吞噬卢拉政府的系列重大腐败丑闻，这一成绩的取得绝非易事。


Lula survived those scandals and did not move to amend the constitution in order to seek a third term, though some in Brazil pressed him to do so.	卢拉在那场丑闻中幸免于难，而且也顶住了来自巴西某些势力的压力，并未修改宪法谋求第三次连任。


Lula also enacted critically important social policies.	卢拉还推行了至关重要的社会政策。


Under his government, two million homes received electric power for the first time, 11 million very poor families gained the support of a minimum income (the Bolsa Família), the minimum salary grew 45% in real terms, thus benefiting 42 million people.	在以他为首的政府领导下，有两百万家庭首次用上了电，一千一百万极端贫困家庭获得了最低工资补助（家庭补助金计划），最低薪酬按实值计算增长了45%，并因此惠及了四千二百万民众。


Moreover, eight million jobs were created, 17 million people escaped poverty, and the income of the poorest 50% grew 32% – twice as fast as the income of the richest 10% in the same period.	此外，政府还创造了八百万个就业岗位，帮助一千七百万人实现脱贫，最贫困的半数人口收入增长了32%——这一比率相当于同时期10%最富裕人口收入增长速度的两倍。


And Lula achieved all this without triggering inflation, which he knows – perhaps a result of his own impoverished childhood – wreaks havoc on the poor most of all.	卢拉在不引发通胀的前提下实现了上述所有目标，因为他知道——这或许来自于他本人贫困的童年经历——通胀带给穷人的灾难最为深重。


This vast transformation has not only generated a virtuous circle that strengthened institutional stability and social capital. It has also differentiated Brazil from other countries in Latin America, putting the country in the forefront in the region in terms of dealing with traditional social and economic injustices in a democratic way.	如此巨大的转变不仅创造了强化制度稳定和社会资本的良性循环，同时也让巴西从诸多南美国家之中脱颖而出，使其站在了拉美地区以民主方式应对传统社会和经济不平等现象的最前沿领域。


Yet the remaining challenges are huge, for Brazil remains the seventh most unequal society in the world – and severe violence persists.	但余下的挑战也非常巨大，因为巴西仍然是世界第七大最不平等社会——仍然存在着严重的暴力冲突。


Sixty-four percent of Brazilian homes lack electricity and sanitation, and only 22% have electricity, a telephone, a computer, a refrigerator, a television, and a washing machine.	百分之六十四的巴西家庭缺少电和卫生设备，只有22%的家庭能用上电、电话、电脑、冰箱、电视和洗衣机。


In the poorest region, the North and Northeast, the numbers fall to 8.6% and 8.3%.	在最贫困的北部和东北部地区，这一数字下降到8. 6%和8.


Among the young, almost 37% of 18-24-year-olds do not finish high school.	3%。 有几乎37%的18到24岁的年轻人没有念完高中。


Only half the population over age 25 has more than eight years of formal education.	25岁以上人口中只有半数接受过8年以上的正规教育。


As for Brazil’s international role, a subtle competition is emerging with the US.	巴西在国际作用领域正在同美国进行着微妙的竞争。


America wants to conclude as many free-trade agreements in the region as it can, while Brazil favors expanding its custom union, Mercosul/Mercosur.	美国希望能在区域内尽可能多的签订自由贸易协议，而巴西则更愿意进一步拓展其关税联盟和南方共同市场（Mercosul/Mercosur）。


The entrance of Venezuela into the Brazilian bloc, Brazilian leadership at the United Nations mission in Haiti, and Brazil’s role in the Honduran affair are all part of this emerging competition.	委内瑞拉加入巴西集团、巴西人领导联合国的海地维和行动、以及巴西在洪都拉斯问题上所起的作用都构成了这种正在形成的竞争关系。


If Brazil is to remain on its prosperous path, it must continue to give higher priority to its social and economic programs than to foreign adventures.	如果巴西想在繁荣大道上走得更远，就必须继续给予社会和经济计划比外资企业更多的支持。


The construction of a major egalitarian, free, and democratic society that respects and works with the international institutions is the best thing that Brazil can give to the world right now.	建设尊重国际体系并与之合作的平等、自由和民主的社会是巴西能够献给世界的最好的礼物。


Will Technology Kill Convergence?	技术会扼杀趋同吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – At last week’s annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Lima, Peru, one topic that dominated discussions was the slowdown in emerging-economy growth.	华盛顿—在上周世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）在秘鲁利马举行的年会上，一个主导了讨论过程的话题是新兴经济体增长放缓。


Hailed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis as the new engines of the world economy, the emerging economies are now acting as a drag on global growth, and many argue that their era of rapid expansion – and their quest to achieve convergence with advanced-country income levels – is over.	2008年金融危机爆发后，新兴经济体被誉为世界经济体的新增长引擎，但如今，新兴经济体成了全球增长的拖累因素，许多人认为，它们的快速扩张期已经结束，它们对实现向发达国家收入水平趋同的努力也已经结束。


Are the doomsayers right?	这些末日论者说得对吗？


There is certainly reason for concern – beginning in China.	当然，担忧的理由是存在的——从中国开始。


After decades of nearly double-digit growth, China appears to be experiencing a marked slowdown – one that some argue is actually worse than official statistics indicate.	在经历了几十年的近两位数的增长后，中国似乎开始经历显著放缓——有人认为放缓幅度之大实际比官方统计数字更加糟糕。


As China’s growth slows, so does its demand for oil and commodities, with severe effects for other emerging economies that depend on commodity exports.	随着中国增长的放缓，其对石油和大宗商品的需求也放缓了，这给其他依赖大宗商品出口的新兴经济体造成了严重影响。


Moreover, the benefits of lower commodity prices do not seem to have materialized among net importers, except perhaps India; if they have, they have been far from adequate to offset other growth-damaging forces.	此外，大宗商品价格下跌的好处并没有体现在净出口国身上（也许印度是个例外），即使获得了好处，也远不足以抵消其他不利于增长的力量。


Meanwhile, the advanced economies are tentatively recovering from the 2008 crisis.	与此同时，发达经济体正在从2008年的危机小心翼翼地复苏。


As a result, the differential between growth in the emerging and advanced economies – aggregated from IMF data, and including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan in the emerging group – has declined considerably.	结果，新兴和发达经济体之间的增长差异——据IMF数据加总，香港、新加坡、韩国和台湾被归为新兴经济体组——显著收缩。 事实上，二十年来，这一差异平均值为三个百分点，2010年上升到4.


Indeed, after averaging three percentage points for two decades and rising to 4.8 percentage points in 2010, the percentage-point differential fell to 2.5 last year and is expected to amount to just 1.5 this year.	8个百分点，去年下降到2. 5个百分点，今年预计将继续下降到1.


The question, then, is whether the growth differential will remain as low at it is today.	因此，问题是这一增长差异是否会保持在今天那么低的水平。


Those who believe that it will, typically rely on three arguments, all of which require some qualification.	相信答案是肯定的人通常基于三个原因，这三个原因都值得商榷。


First, they argue that much convergence has already taken place in manufacturing.	首先，他们认为趋同的大部分发生在制造业。


This is true, but it neglects the increasing interconnectedness of manufacturing and services, and the changing nature of many services.	确实如此，但他们忽视了制造业和服务业日益互通的趋势和许多服务业性质的变化。


An iPad, for example, must not just be built; it also needs coding services.	比如，一个iPad不仅仅包括制造过程，还需要编程服务。


In a sense, it is actually more the product of the modern services sector than of manufacturing.	从某种程度讲，iPad实际上更多地是现代服务业产品，而不是制造品。


And there are plenty of untapped opportunities for technological catch-up in, say, health, education, and financial services.	而在（比如）医疗、教育和金融服务方面，有大量技术赶超机会等待新兴市场去把握。


Second, emerging-market bears point out that these economies have gained major productivity benefits from the migration of surplus rural labor to urban areas, a surplus that will soon be exhausted.	其次，新兴市场悲观派指出，这些经济体生产率大提高主要来自农村剩余劳动力向城镇的迁移，而这一剩余劳动力很快就会耗尽。


This, too, is true.	的确如此。


But it ignores the fact that there still is a huge reservoir of urban labor in the informal sector that, upon shifting to the formal sector, would provide an additional boost to productivity.	但它忽视了一个事实：非正式部门仍存在巨大的城镇劳动力储备，只要他们进入正式部门，就能带来新的生产率刺激。


The pessimists’ third argument is that emerging economies are not implementing fast enough the structural reforms needed to support long-term growth.	悲观者的第三个观点是新兴经济体实施支持长期增长所需要的结构改革的步伐不够快。


Again, there is some truth to this argument: structural reforms are needed everywhere.	这一论点也有些道理：结构改革哪里都需要。


But there is no proven way to measure the pace of their implementation.	但没有经受过检验的方法可用于衡量结构改革实施的节奏。


As a result, it is difficult to argue that the emerging economies have collectively slowed in their structural-reform efforts.	因此，很难认为新兴市场在结构改革方面集体滞后了。


But there may be a fourth mechanism at work, related to the changing – and seriously disruptive – nature of new technologies.	但也许还有第四个因素在起作用，即新技术的多变性——以及严重的破坏性。


A major driver of past catch-up, if only in terms of incremental growth, was the shift of many activities in both the services and manufacturing sectors from advanced economies to developing countries with lower wages.	在过去，赶超的一大动力——如果用增量增长衡量的话——是服务业和制造业的许多活动从发达经济体转移到低工资的发展中国家。


Now, however, a growing array of activities can be automated.	但是，如今，越来越多的这些活动可以自动化。


And coding-supported products often have lower costs per unit of output than even very cheap labor can provide.	代码支持的产品的单位产出成本通常比极低价劳动力所能提供的还要低。


So, whereas call centers, for example, used to be mostly staffed in low-wage countries, now the computer-robot that does most of the talking can be located in New York.	因此，尽管（比如）呼叫中心大多在低工资国家运行，但如今，用电脑机器人进行大部分对话的呼叫中心也可以坐落在纽约。


That observation should not, however, overshadow fundamental economic insights – specifically, that trade and the location of production are determined by comparative, not absolute, advantage.	但是，这一观察无法压倒基本经济学洞见——具体而言，就是贸易和生产地由比较优势而非绝对优势决定。


A country will always have a comparative advantage in something; but that something changes.	一国总会在某些方面拥有比较优势； 但“某些方面”是会变化的。


Many advanced countries, for example, now have a comparative advantage in high-value-added activities.	比如，许多发达国家现在的比较优势是高增加值活动。


In other words, thanks to their highly skilled labor forces, they are better equipped than their developing-country counterparts for activities like the production of made-to-measure specialized goods or, indeed, anything that requires a highly trained team to work in close proximity.	换句话说，由于它们拥有高技能劳动力，因此比发展中国家更适合生产定制专业化产品或一切需要受过良好训练的团队紧密合作的活动。


But the technology-induced shifts that are underway could portend big disruptions in global value chains – disruptions affecting both developed and developing countries.	但技术导致的正在发生的变迁可能预示着全球价值链的大幅扰动——这些扰动既影响发达国家，也影响发展中国家。


In fact, we may have entered a period of fundamental change that could weaken growth everywhere, as the “old” shrinks before the “new” can occupy sufficient space.	事实上，我们可能已经进入了一个根本性变革时代，“旧”东西已经破坏而“新”东西尚未占据足够大的空间，所有国家的增长率都可能遭到削弱。


To be sure, the creative destruction that is taking place seems to be affecting developing-economy growth proportionately more than advanced-economy growth, largely because the new technologies are being put to work where they were invented, and developing countries have not yet managed sufficient imitation.	平心而论，正在发生的创造性破坏对发展中经济体的影响似乎相对来说大于发达经济体，这主要是因为，新技术正在发明它们的地方启用，而发展中国家尚无法进行足够的模仿。


But I am not convinced that “catch-up” opportunities will remain diminished – not least because it will always be easier to imitate than to invent.	但我不确定“赶超”机会会一直减少下去——因为模仿总是比发明容易。


In fact, it could be argued that new “leap-frogging” may become possible.	事实上，可以说，新的“蛙跳”会成为可能。


As experience in the telecommunications sector shows, the ability to adopt new technologies without first having to dismantle old systems can enable rapid progress.	通讯业的经验表明，在不必破坏旧体系的情况下采取新技术的能力可以带来快速进步。


The key to enabling continued convergence – even at a fairly rapid pace – is good political governance.	（甚至以相当快的速度）带来持续趋同的关键是良好的政治治理。


Developing-country governments must implement policies aimed at managing the impending transformation, while maintaining social solidarity and cohesion.	发展中国家政府必须实施旨在管理即将到来的转型的政策，同时保持社会团结和凝聚。


That is the challenge they must meet at this time of great disruption.	这是它们在大干扰时代所必须面对的挑战。


Will the EU Keep Faith with Turkey?	欧盟会兑现对土耳其的承诺吗？


EMBARGO 6 SEPTEMBER 2004	2004 年 9 月 ， 6 号禁令


More than forty years ago, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community.	四十多年前，土耳其申请了欧共体候补成员。


With the Association agreement of 1963, a special relationship was established, culminating in the customs union of 1996.	双方的特殊关系从1963年签订候补协议时开始，并于1996年订立关税联盟时达到了高潮。


During all these years, European governments consistently confirmed Turkey's eligibility for full membership, making accession dependent on compliance with membership criteria.	这些年来，欧洲政府一直承认土耳其的完全会员资格，条件是土耳其要遵守成员国的行为准则。


Turkey's formal recognition as a candidate state in 1999 led Turkey to undertake unprecedented reform efforts in the area of human and minority rights, including abolition of the death penalty, safeguards against torture, promotion of religious freedoms, gender equality, and restriction of the military's role in political life.	1999年正式承认候补资格后，土耳其在人权和少数民族权利领域开始了前所未有的改革，包括取消死刑、反对酷刑、推动宗教自由、性别平等和限制军队在政治生活中的作用。


Should the EU consider the accession criteria as having been fulfilled, it must decide to open negotiations in early 2005.	如果欧盟认为达到了准入条件，就必须在2005年初开始谈判。


Not to do so would mean to renege on political commitments and to severely damage the EU's credibility in the world.	不这么做就意味着不履行政治承诺，会严重损害欧盟的国际信誉。


In many parts of Europe, however, Turkey's admission to the EU is viewed with skepticism owing to its size, relatively poor economy, fears of massive immigration, and, above all, cultural and societal differences - a euphemism for Islam. It would be foolish to deny that some of these factors represent serious challenges.	但欧洲许多国家都对土耳其的加入持怀疑态度，因为它疆域辽阔、经济也欠发达，他们害怕土耳其进入欧盟会引发大规模移民潮，更重要的是，土耳其与欧洲国家存在着文化和社会方面的巨大差异－说得再直接点，土耳其是个伊斯兰国家。


However, they are often exaggerated and certainly not insurmountable.	否认这些因素会带来挑战是愚蠢的，但也不能过分夸大，甚至夸大到无法克服。


Negotiations with Turkey would be lengthy and accession may not occur before 2015.	与土耳其的谈判过程也许会很漫长，2015年前也可能不会有结果。


This period of time would offer both Turkey and the Union an opportunity to come to terms.	但这段时间却给了土耳其和欧盟机会进行自我调整，以便最终达到要求。


With 80 million people, Turkey would be one of the largest EU states.	有着8000万人口，土耳其会是欧盟最大的国家之一。


But the size of a country plays only a limited role in the EU's decision-making process, because political influence within the Union depends more on economic power.	但在欧盟的决策过程中，国家的大小起不了决定作用，因为欧盟内部的政治影响更多地取决于经济方面的实力。


Moreover, for decades Turkey has been a responsible member of many European institutions, and there is no reason to believe that it would act differently in the EU.	此外，几十年来，土耳其一直是很多欧洲机构最忠实的成员，我们没有理由相信加入欧盟会改变这一切。


Because of its weak economy, Turkey would be eligible for substantial EU assistance.	因为经济欠发达，土耳其会得到欧盟的大量援助。


The size of these transfers, however, would depend on the EU's financial policies at the time of admission, the outcome of accession negotiations, and economic developments in Turkey.	但拨款的具体数额要看欧盟当时的金融政策、进入谈判的结果和土耳其自身的经济状况。


In any case, the EU's practice of "capping" its budget would prevent an explosion in the financial costs entailed by Turkey's accession.	不管怎样，欧盟的财政限额政策会防止土耳其加入带来的财政开支大幅增长。


Immigration should not be a cause for undue concern, either.	移民问题也无须引起过多的担心。


Human mobility is limited, and Turkey workers' would probably be allowed to move freely within the EU only after a long transition period, possibly not before 2025.	人员流动是有限的，而且土耳其劳工只有在很长的过渡期后才可以在欧洲自由流动，这种过渡可能一直延续到2025年。


Given the expected upswing of Turkey's economy and its declining birthrate, experts predict a figure of around 2.7 million immigrants by that point.	考虑到土耳其的经济发展和出生率下降，专家预计届时的移民数量可能在270万人。


Meanwhile, diminishing and aging populations in most of Europe will have made immigration a necessity.	与此同时，欧洲多数国家人口数量的减少和年龄的老化有必要依靠移民来补充。


Among the countries from where immigration to the EU is probable, Turkey has the best prospects for successful adaptation.	可能移民到欧盟的国家中，土耳其人最有可能融合成功。


It is Turkey's Muslim population that creates the strongest emotions.	但激起最强烈反对的是土耳其的穆斯林们。


Many feel that Turkey simply does not fit into a European society based on Christian traditions and culture.	很多人认为土耳其根本不可能融入建立在基督教传统和文化基础上的欧洲社会。


It is also feared that Islamists may one day turn Turkey into a fundamentalist state.	人们害怕有一天，伊斯兰份子会把土耳其变成原教旨主义国家。


Unlikely as it may be in view of Turkey's deeply rooted secularism, such a risk cannot be totally excluded.	虽然根深蒂固的世俗主义使这种转变不太可能发生，但毕竟不能完全排除这样的危险。


But the same is true for any other democracy, where radical groups could well misuse the democratic process for their purposes.	但反过来想想，其它民主社会也有同样的问题，激进组织完全可能利用民主进程为自己的目标服务。


Surely, the best protection against such a calamity is to strengthen Turkey's democratic system, which can best be achieved by anchoring it firmly in a bloc of similarly democratic countries.	当然，对这种灾难的最好保护是加强土耳其的民主系统，而最好的办法就是让它在类似的民主国家中深深地扎根。


As for the EU, it must decide whether it wants to be a closed "Christian club" or an open and inclusive society, drawing strength from cultural and religious diversity.	至于欧盟，它必须选择想成为封闭的"基督教俱乐部"，还是开放、包容的社会，从文化和宗教的多元性中汲取力量。


Turkey's accession to the Union would give a powerful answer, one that would be heard with particular clarity in the Islamic world.	土耳其加入欧盟会做出有力的回答，伊斯兰世界会更清楚地感受到这种影响。


The need to refute arguments against Turkey's admission to the EU leaves the advantages rarely mentioned: its unique geopolitical position at the crossroads of the Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East - vitally important regions for Europe's security; its role as mayor transit country for energy supplies; its military capabilities at a time when the EU is developing its new European Defense Policy; and the great potential of the Turkish economy, with its young and dynamic labor force.	对反对土耳其入盟论调的驳斥常常使人们忽略了它真正的优势：它地处巴尔干、南高加索、中亚和中东交叉点的独特地理位置－这些地区都对欧洲安全起着至关重要的作用； 它还是能源供应的中转站；


At the same time, the risks of rejecting Turkey must also be taken into account: the likelihood that the reform process would collapse, bringing radical currents to the fore and leading to instability and political unrest at the EU's doorsteps.	与此同时，也必须考虑拒绝土耳其的危险：改革进程可能半途而废、极端势力可能走到前台，在欧洲大门口造成局势不稳和政治动荡。


Turkish EU membership presents both opportunities and challenges.	土耳其成为欧盟成员既是机遇、又是挑战。


On balance, however, the advantages far outweigh the risks.	但权衡利弊，利益会远远超过风险。


Will the Euro Dethrone the Dollar?	欧元会取代美元的位置吗？


Much of America’s dominance in world finance comes from the dollar’s status as international money.	美国在世界金融中的霸主地位很大一部分来自于美元作为国际货币的地位。


America’s commitment to free capital markets, the rule of law, and price stability confer credibility on the dollar as a store of value.	美国对自由的资本市场、法治以及价格稳定的承诺带给美元作为价值储备的可信度。


But American spending habits have undermined the dollar’s reputation, with the excess supply of dollars on world markets depressing its price.	但是，美国人的消费习惯破坏了美元的声誉，而美元在世界市场上的过度供应又压抑了它的价格。


This spring, the euro’s exchange rate against the dollar reached an all-time high, and central banks have increased the euro share of their international reserves.	今年春天，欧元与美元的汇率达到了历史新高，各国的中央银行也增加了欧元在其国际储备中的份额。


Is the dollar about to lose the crown of world finance to the euro?	美元是否要将世界金融的皇冠拱手让给欧元呢？


History suggests otherwise, despite a vulnerable dollar.	历史表明，尽管美元软弱，但是情况还是相反。


American financial supremacy in the twenty-first century resembles Britain’s position in world finance a century ago.	美国在二十一世纪的金融霸主地位和英国在一个世纪前的地位相似。


Before the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, the pound sterling served as the currency of choice for international transactions, just as the dollar does today, and the world’s borrowers visited the City of London to raise capital.	在1914年8月第一次世界大战爆发之前，英镑正如当今的美元一样是国际交易的首选货币，全世界的借款者都造访伦敦时来筹集资本。


The British economist John Maynard Keynes worried that countries would not use sterling to settle trading balances with each other if the pound were not viewed as a reliable store of value.	英国经济学家凯恩斯担心，如果人们不把英镑看作可靠的价值储备，那么，各国就不会用英镑来结算各自的交易结余。


The “future position of the City of London,” according to Keynes, depended on the pound sterling continuing to serve the business world as the equivalent of gold.	凯恩斯认为，“伦敦市的未来地位”取决于英镑继续作为黄金的等价物为工商界服务。


Britain maintained the pound’s convertibility into gold at the outbreak of the Great War to preserve its credibility as the international medium of exchange.	英国在第一次世界大战爆发之际维持英镑可兑换为黄金来维持其国际交易媒介的信誉。


The dollar could not challenge sterling’s role as the world’s currency without matching its reputation.	美元不追赶上英镑的声誉就无法挑战英镑世界货币的作用。


August 1914 provided the opportunity.	1914年8月提供了这样的一个机遇。


The biggest gold outflow in a generation imperiled America’s ability to repay its debts abroad.	在整整一代人中最大的一次黄金外流破坏了美国偿还海外债务的能力。


Fear that the US would abandon the gold standard sent the dollar plummeting on world markets.	人们担心美国将会放弃金本位制，美元在世界市场上暴跌。


But Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo secured American financial honor in August 1914 by remaining true to gold while everyone else, except for the British, abandoned their obligations.	但是，正当除了英国以外的其他所有国家都放弃其义务之际，美国财政部长麦克阿杜在1914年8月坚持金本位不变，从而为美国赢得了金融信誉。


Despite the dollar’s instant credibility, however, it took more than a decade for America’s currency to match Britain’s as an international medium of exchange.	但是，尽管美元声誉日隆，美国货币追赶上英镑作为国际交易媒介还是花了十年多的时间。


Payment habits melt at a glacier’s pace.	支付习惯改变决非一朝一夕。


Britain’s transformation from international creditor to international debtor during the Great War gave the dollar a second wind in its battle with sterling.	英国在第一次世界大战中从国际债权人沦为国际债务人，从而给了美元在与英镑的较量中的第二次生机。


The British were forced to abandon gold convertibility in April 1919 – a tactical withdrawal intended to pave the way for Britain’s return to the former $4.8665 parity with the American dollar.	英国被迫在1919年4月放弃黄金兑换，这是英国准备回到从前一英镑兑换4. 8665美元等价的战术性撤退。


Six years later, in April 1925, Britain confirmed its monetary credibility and returned to the gold standard.	六年之后，在1925年4月，英国确认其货币信誉并且返回金本位制。


But the pound had already suffered irreparable damage.	但是英镑已经遭受了不可弥补的损害。


The experience of 1914 implies that a credible alternative can replace an entrenched world currency, especially after an unfavorable balance of trade has weakened it.	1914年的经验表明，具有可信度的替换货币可以取代地位牢靠的世界货币，特别是在不良贸易平衡削弱这一货币之后。


But even then, dethroning the reigning king of international exchange takes time.	但是即使在那时，夺取国际交易国王宝座还是要假以时日。


Today, the euro – a currency without a country – lacks a long track record of credibility.	如今，欧元这一没有国度的货币缺乏长久的信誉历史记录。


Thirteen countries in the European Union use the euro as money.	欧盟的十三个国家使用欧元作为货币。


But the commitment of these independent political entities to the euro cannot match the history of America’s commitment to the dollar.	但是这些独立政治实体对欧元的承诺却无法与美国对美元的承诺历史相提并论。


The European Central Bank, established in 1998, has a mandate to manage the new currency to maintain price stability.	欧洲中央银行建立于1998年，其使命是管理这一新货币来维持价格稳定。


But the ECB needs time to establish its inflation-fighting credentials.	但是欧洲央行需要时间来建立其与通货膨胀作斗争的资格。


It cannot hitch a ride on gold, the way America did a century ago.	它无法像美国在一个世纪以前那样搭黄金的车。


So the euro must earn its reputation crisis by crisis to confront the dollar’s dominance as the currency of choice for international transactions.	所以欧元必须通过一个又一个危机来赢得其声誉来对抗美元作为国际交易首选货币的霸主地位。


Recent experience with the euro as an official reserve asset is instructive.	欧元作为官方储备资产近来的经历颇能说明情况。


Between 2000 and 2005, the dollar lost more than 25% of its value against the euro.	2000年至2005年期间，美元对欧元贬值25％。


Meanwhile, the fraction of international reserves held in euros grew from 18% to 24%, and the dollar’s share dropped from 71% to 66%.	与此同时，欧元在国际储备中持有率从18％上升到24％，而美元则从71％下降到66％。


In short, the euro has clearly made some headway during this period of US balance of payment deficits, but this reflects an evolutionary decline in the dollar’s dominance, not a revolutionary regime shift.	简而言之，欧元在美国收支平衡赤字期间显然取得了进步，但是这反映出美元霸主地位的演变性下降，而非革命性的大局变动。


What might trigger a fatal run on the dollar in world markets?	有什么事件可能会触发国际市场上致命性的挤兑美元呢？