If it allows the officials implementing the program to define which sins are eligible, and what timing makes them “original,” it could create new rent-seeking opportunities, augmenting the burden on entrepreneurs, rather than removing uncertainty.	如果让实施该计划的官员来定义哪些原罪可以赦免，以及什么时间之前的罪才可以称为“原罪”，就会制造新的寻租机会，增加企业家的负担而不是消除不确定性。


Moreover, the guidelines will not eliminate the state-owned sector’s advantages.	此外，意见无法消除国有企业的优势。


Despite the new, more equal terms established in the guidelines, a financial system that is dominated by state-owned banks will give an edge to SOEs in terms of access to funding and the cost of capital.	尽管意见制定了更加平等的新条款，但由国有银行主导的金融系统仍将让国有企业在资金源和资本成本方面拥有优势。


Similarly, local governments, which own a majority of the SOEs, may struggle to adjudicate fairly disputes that arise between their own firms and private companies.	类似地，国有企业的主要所有者地方政府未必能够公正地裁决自己的企业与民营公司之间的纠纷。


To ensure genuinely equal status for SOEs and private firms will require reforming the financial system, as well as government divestment from those SOEs lacking a strong national-security dimension – that is, the majority of them.	为了确保国有企业和民营企业真正做到地位平等，就必须改革金融系统，并要求政府从非重要国家安全领域的国有企业撤资——也就是从大部分国企撤资。


China’s new legal framework for protecting property rights holds a lot of promise.	中国的新产权保护法律框架带来了诸多憧憬。


But its success will depend heavily on how it is implemented, as well as on the extent to which the government pursues complementary reforms.	但其成功在很大程度上取决于如何实施，以及政府采取多少补充性改革。


For the sake of the entire global economy, one hopes that China gets it right.	为了全球经济的命运，我们希望中国能够做出正确决定。


Chinese Coal Cuts	中国减煤


HONG KONG – In the fight to limit global warming, no country matters more than China – a massive coal-dependent country, which is responsible for 30% of global carbon-dioxide emissions.	香港—在限制全球变暖的斗争中，没有哪个国家像中国那样重要。 中国严重依赖煤炭，其二氧化碳排放量占全球的30%。


Fortunately, it is moving to improve its environmental record.	幸运的是，中国正在改善环境记录。


But is it doing enough?	但它做得足够了吗？


If China could pursue only one goal, it should be cutting its reliance on coal energy.	如果中国智能追求一个目标，那就是减少对煤炭能源的依赖。


The country is home to one-sixth of the world’s people, yet it accounts for almost one-half of global coal consumption.	中国人口占全球的六分之一，但却消费了全球近二分之一的煤炭。


If China does not reduce that share and cut its greenhouse-gas emissions, keeping global warming in check will prove impossible.	如果中国不降低这一比例并减少温室气体排放，那么遏制全球变暖就无从实现。


The good news is that coal use in China seems to have fallen slightly last year – a trend that is expected to continue.	好消息是去年中国煤炭使用量略有下降——预计这一趋势将会持续。


The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis estimates that the share of coal-generated electricity in China will decline from 72.5% in 2014 to 60% in 2020.	能源经济学和金融分析研究所（Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis）估算，中国煤电比例将从2014年的72. 5%下降到2020年的60%。


While last year’s drop in coal use may have been a technical blip, Chinese coal consumption is expected to peak very soon – probably next year.	去年的煤炭使用量下降也许只是技术上的波动，但预计中国煤炭消费量很快就会见顶——有可能就在明年。


That means that CO2 emissions – the largest component of the greenhouse-gas emissions that cause global warming – will begin falling, too, enabling China to fulfill its pledge, made last November as part of a landmark climate agreement with the United States, that emissions would peak around 2030.	这意味着二氧化碳排放量——导致全球变暖的温室气体排放的最大成分——也将开始下降，使中国兑现其在去年11月与美国达成的标志性气候协议中所做的排放量在2030年左右达到最高峰的承诺。


In fact, if China’s leaders act boldly, the peak could be reached even sooner, in the early 2020s.	事实上，如果中国领导人采取果断行动，排放高峰还会来的更快一些，在21世纪20年代初就能达到。


As China’s coal use begins to fall, its renewables sector is growing rapidly.	随着中国煤炭用量的下降，其可再生能源部门正在快速成长。


Last year, China spent a massive $90 billion on renewable energy – far more than the $52 billion invested by the second-largest spender, the US.	去年中国将900亿美元巨资投于可再生能源——远远高于第二大投资国美国的520亿美元。


China now has the world’s largest installed base of wind power, and its solar power capacity is second only to Germany’s.	如今，中国拥有全球规模最大的风电基地，其太阳能发电能力也仅次于德国。


From humble beginnings at the turn of the century, Chinese wind and solar companies have grown into some of the world’s largest and most efficient.	自世纪之交崛起以来，中国的风能和太阳能公司已跻身全球规模最大、效率最高的行列。


The government’s efforts to promote renewables are driven partly by growing pressure from middle-class Chinese, who are increasingly frustrated with pollution levels.	中国政府推进可再生能源部分是因为来自中国中产阶级的压力日益增加。 他们对污染感到日益不满。


Indeed, the environment is a hot topic in China today, exemplified by the response to the documentary film “Under the Dome,” which takes a critical look at air pollution and the role of the country’s coal and petrochemical companies.	事实上，如今环境是中国的一个热点话题，纪录片《穹顶之下》即时明证。 该片以批判的角度讲述了空气污染和中国煤炭和石化公司在其中所起的“作用”。


More than 300 million Chinese saw the film after its late-February release, which was timed to coincide with the annual meeting of China’s National People’s Congress in early March.	该片在2月底发布，时间恰逢每年一度的人大会议，自发布以来观看人数已超过3亿。


The 103-minute production, by the prominent journalist Chai Jing, highlights the health risks posed by the thick smog shrouding China’s most productive cities.	这部103分钟长的影片由著名记者柴静制作，突出强调了严重的雾霾对中国生产率最高城市所在成的健康威胁。


The film begins with the story of Chai’s own newborn daughter being diagnosed with a benign tumor.	影片以柴静一出生就被诊断出良性肿瘤的女儿开头。


Though Chai never directly links her daughter’s tumor to air pollution, “Under the Dome” delivers a compelling message.	尽管柴静从未将女儿的肿瘤与空气污染直接联系起来，但《穹顶之下》仍传达的引人注目的信息。


The public reaction was overwhelming.	《穹顶之下》引起了极大的热议。


The film even drew support from the incoming environment minister, Chen Jining, who compared it to Rachel Carson’s influential book Silent Spring.	该片甚至得到了即将上任的环保部长陈吉宁的支持，他将该片与蕾切尔·卡尔森（Rachel Carson）的名著《寂静的春天》（Silent Spring）相提并论。


Despite – or perhaps because of – this response, “Under the Dome” and related commentary have been removed from China’s media.	尽管反响如此热烈——或许正因如此——《穹顶之下》以及相关评论已被中国媒体禁播。


But, though the government may not want not to draw attention to its pollution problem, it certainly is trying to address it.	但是，尽管政府也许不愿吸引注意力集中至环境问题，但显然也在采取措施解决环境问题。


Its investments have already helped to lower global prices of renewables.	中国政府投资让全球可再生能源价格有所下降。


Researchers at Harvard University and Tsinghua University say that wind power could, in theory, produce all of China’s electricity for the price of coal by 2030.	哈佛大学和清华大学的研究者指出，理论上，到2030年风能就可以以煤电的价格生产出中国的所有电力。


Still, China should be acting even more aggressively.	尽管如此，中国应该加大行动力度。


The authorities should focus not only on producing renewable energy, but also on improving the energy efficiency of existing systems.	当局的重点不但应该包括生产可再生能源，还应该包括改进现有体系的能源效率。


As it stands, China’s economy is about three times as energy-intensive as America’s (a country that is not particularly energy-efficient itself).	目前，中国经济的能源密集程度大约是美国的三倍（而美国本身的能源效率并不十分出色）。


As renewable energy becomes increasingly cost-competitive with fossil fuels and energy consumption becomes more efficient, China will become better able to reduce emissions without undermining economic growth.	随着可再生能源相对于化石燃料的成本竞争力的增加以及能源消费效率的提高，中国将能够更好地降低排放而不破坏经济增长。


According to a recent study by the Tsinghua/MIT China Energy & Climate Project, a combination of carbon taxes – especially on coal – and continued support for renewable power would enable China to reach its carbon-emissions peak in the early to mid-2020s.	根据清华大学/麻省理工学院中国能源和气候项目（China Energy & Climate Project）的一项最新研究，碳税（特别是煤炭碳税）与继续支持可再生能源双管齐下可以让中国在21世纪20年代早期或中期达到碳排放高峰。


Such an outcome would bolster global emission-reduction efforts considerably.	这一结果大大有利于全球减排。


In fact, new data from the International Energy Agency show that, in 2014, global CO2 emissions did not rise, suggesting that efforts to mitigate climate change may already be having a more significant effect than previously thought.	事实上国际能源署的新数据表明，2014年全球二氧化碳排放量没有增加，这表明减轻气候变化的努力可能正在产生比以往所认为的更大的效果。


This is particularly notable because the recent pause in emissions growth, unlike the other three that have occurred in the last 40 years, occurred amid economic expansion at a respectable annual rate of 3%.	这一点尤其令人瞩目，因为最近的排放停止增长与过去40年中所发生过的三次不同，它是在经济扩张仍能达到相当出色的3%的年率的情况下实现的。


As greenhouse-gas emissions become decoupled from economic growth, the world’s chances of successfully mitigating climate change become much higher.	随着温室气体排放与经济增长的脱钩，世界成功遏制气候变化的机会大大增加了。


As IEA Chief Economist (and future Executive Director) Fatih Birol put it, this development “provides much-needed momentum to negotiators preparing to forge a global climate deal in Paris in December.”	国际能源署首席经济学家（以及未来主任）法蒂赫·毕罗尔（Fatih Birol）指出，这一发展趋势“给了准备在12月的巴黎达成全球气候协定的谈判者急需的动力。 ”


China still has a long way to go.	中国仍有很长的路要走。


But its recent progress in reducing emissions shows that, with the right combination of government policies, corporate initiatives, and public pressure, even the largest and most polluted countries can clean up their economies and help fight global warming.	但其最近在减少排放方面所取得的进步表明，在政府政策、公司计划和公共压力的正确组合下，哪怕是污染程度最大最严重的国家也可以让经济变得干净，并助力遏制全球变暖。


Containing China’s Slowdown	遏制中国减速


SEOUL – Pundits love debating the Chinese economy’s growth prospects, and nowadays the pessimists are gaining the upper hand.	首尔—专家们喜欢争论中国经济的增长前景，如今是悲观派占据上风。


But many are basing their predictions on other economies’ experiences, whereas China has been breaking the mold on economic growth for the last three decades.	但许多人的预测是基于其他经济体的经验，而在过去三十年中，中国一直在打破经济增长的常规。


So, are China’s economic prospects as bad as prevailing wisdom seems to indicate?	那么，中国经济前景真如主流观点所认为的那么糟糕吗？


And, if they are, how can they be improved?	果真如此的话，怎样改善其经济前景？


China’s situation is certainly serious.	中国的状况毫无疑问是严重的。 去年经济增长率为7.


The economy grew by 7.4% last year, the lowest rate since 1990; it is unlikely to meet the official target of 7% this year, and, according to the International Monetary Fund, will probably grow by a mere 6.3% in 2016.	今年也不可能达到7%的官方目标。 此外，据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，2016年经济增长率只有6.


Clearly, weak domestic activity and diminished external demand are taking their toll.	3%。 显然，国内活动疲软和外部需求下降的影响正在显现。


China is also losing long-term growth momentum, as falling fertility rates and returns on investment weaken labor-force expansion and capital accumulation.	中国还在失去长期增长动力，生育率和投资回报率的下降抑制了劳动力扩张和资本积累。


And it is becoming increasingly difficult for China to take advantage of technology-driven productivity gains.	并且中国利用技术驱动的生产率进步也越来越困难。


All of these challenges have led former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and his Harvard colleague Lant Pritchett to argue that China’s growth could slow to 2-4% over the next two decades, as the country succumbs to the historically prevalent growth pattern implied by “regression to the mean.”	所有这些挑战让美国财政部前部长劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）及其哈佛大学同时兰特·普利切特（Lant Pritchett）认为，根据“回归均值”理论所隐含的历史增长模式，中国增长在未来二十年可能下降至2—4%。


But, given that China’s growth pattern has, so far, been exceptional, the notion that it will suddenly start following a common trajectory seems unlikely.	但是，到目前为止，中国的增长模式一直是“不走寻常路”，因此它一夜之间回归常规轨道似乎也不太可能。


Similarly flawed is the view of Justin Lin, former Chief Economist of the World Bank.	类似地，世界银行前首席经济学家林毅夫的观点也有缺陷。


Lin argues that China can achieve 8% annual growth for another two decades, owing to its enduring “latecomer advantage,” which, among other things, entails rapid productivity gains brought about by technological catch-up with the United States.	林毅夫认为，中国可以继续以每年8%的速度增长二十年，因为它拥有持久的“后发优势”，这一优势与其他因素一起，通过技术赶超美国带来生产率的快速提高。


But this fails to account for the standard growth theory of “conditional convergence”: only economies with comparable structural characteristics, such as labor skills and institutional quality, converge to similar per capita income levels.	但这一观点没有考虑“条件趋同”的标准增长理论：只有拥有可比结构特征（比如劳动力技能和制度质量）的经济，它们的人均收入水平才会趋同。


For these reasons, I take a more moderate view, predicting that China’s average potential GDP growth will fall to 5-6% by 2030.	出于这些原因，我提出一个较为中庸的观点。 我预测，到2030年，中国平均潜在GDP增长率将下降至5—6%。


This expectation is based on a conditional convergence framework that relies on data generated by China’s unique growth experience, as well as those of other economies, over the last three decades.	这一预期基于一个条件趋同框架，而该框架又基于过去三十年中国独特的增长经验以及其他经济体的增长经验所产生的数据。


Unlike Lin, I believe that China’s inevitable economic slowdown is coming soon.	和林毅夫不同，我认为难以避免的中国经济减速很快就会到来。


But, unlike Summers, I do not believe that it has to be dire.	但是，和萨默斯不同，我不认为前景必然苍凉。


The key to this scenario is that China’s leaders move the economy onto a more balanced and sustainable growth path, based on realistic expectations.	这一情景的关键是中国领导人让中国经济转向更平衡、可持续的增长路径，以现实的预期为基础。


They cannot afford to mishandle unavoidable challenges, such as those stemming from domestic institutional weaknesses, political uncertainty, and external shocks.	他们决不能错误地处理不可避免的挑战，比如那些来自国内制度缺陷、政治不确定性和外部冲击的挑战。


The first step in any effective strategy must be to recognize that, in such a large and unpredictable economy, the government cannot rely on direct intervention or macroeconomic policies.	任何有效战略的第一步都必须承认，对于如此庞大和不可预测的经济体，政府不能依赖直接干预或宏观经济政策。


Instead, it must implement reforms that boost productivity and offset downward pressure on growth.	相反，政府必须实施改革以刺激生产率、抵消增长的下行压力。


Reforms in factor markets – labor, land, and finance – are essential.	要素市场——劳动力、土地和金融——改革十分关键。 中国领导人必须改善劳动力市场灵活性和劳动力流动性；


China’s leaders must improve labor-market flexibility and labor mobility; make land use, acquisition, and compensation more efficient; and build a more market-based financial system.	提高土地使用、兼并和补偿效率； 并构建一个更加市场化的金融体系。


As it stands, China’s financial system is highly regulated and dominated by banks, many of which are state-owned.	目前，中国的金融体系受到严格监管并由银行（其中许多为国有银行）主导。


To change this, the government needs to promote market-based credit allocation.	要改变这一点，政府需要推进基于市场的信用配置。


China needs a flexible and efficient financial sector, underpinned by an effectively supervised and regulated capital market, to avoid asset bubbles and support productive and innovative firms.	中国需要灵活高效的金融部门，以有效监督和监管的资本市场为基础，以此避免资产泡沫、支持生产性和创新性企业。


Similarly, policies to promote continuous technological innovation and industrial upgrading can increase productivity.	类似地，促进持续技术创新和产业升级的政策可以提高生产率。


And measures that increase domestic research capacity – for example, by strengthening protection of intellectual property rights – can nurture innovation.	而增加国内研究能力——比如通过强化知识产权保护——能够培育创新。


Reform of China’s massive state-owned-enterprise (SOE) sector would also boost productivity.	改革中国巨大的国有企业部门也能够刺激生产率。


The recently announced SOE reforms are a promising step.	最近宣布的国企改革是令人振奋的一步。


Beyond promoting mixed ownership involving private capital, strengthening corporate governance, and facilitating commercial operations, the reforms promise to open up the energy, resources, and telecom industries to non-state investors.	除了促进包括民营资本在内的混合所有制、强化公司治理和便利商业经营，国企改革还承诺向非国有投资者开放能源、资源和通讯业。


This new round of SOE reform should be pursued diligently.	新一轮国企改革应该坚决贯彻下去。


Such efforts to increase productivity are all the more important as China moves to shift from investment- and export-led growth to a more sustainable model based on domestic consumption and services.	随着中国从投资和出口拉动型增长转向基于国内消费和服务德尔更加可持续的增长模式，这些提高生产率的措施是至关重要的。


Reallocating resources from export-oriented industries to service activities could cause an irreversible drop in productivity.	重新配置资源，使其从出口导向型行业流向服务业可能导致生产率不可逆转地下降。


Likewise, while policies that encourage firms to increase wages will raise household income and domestic consumption, wage increases can erode export competitiveness and choke off inflows of foreign direct investment.	类似地，鼓励企业提高工资的政策将增加家庭收入和国内消费，但涨工资也可能侵蚀出口竞争力，阻碍外国直接投资的涌入。


With rebalancing policies alone unlikely to increase average output growth substantially, enhancing productivity is crucial to China’s long-term prosperity.	光靠再平衡政策无法大幅提高平均产出增长率，因此，对于中国的长期前景，强化生产率至关重要。


The final piece of the puzzle for China is realism.	中国之谜的最后一块拼图是现实主义。


As it stands, the Chinese government is keen to maintain decent growth of about 7% annually while pushing for rebalancing and reform.	目前，中国政府急切地要保持每年7%的漂亮增长数字，同时又要推进再平衡和改革。


The risk is that, until reform measures take effect, the authorities may rely on short-term stimulus to meet growth targets, aggravating resource misallocation and structural vulnerabilities.	风险在于，在改革措施起效前，当局仍可能需要依赖短期刺激以实现增长目标，从而加剧资源配置不当和结构性弱点。


Considering that China’s total debt reached 282% of GDP last year – surpassing America’s debt level – further reckless lending to local governments and private enterprises from the shadow banking sector would hold the economy hostage to the growing risk of a financial crisis.	考虑到去年中国总债务水平已达GDP的282%——已经超过了美国——影子银行部门继续鲁莽地向地方政府和民营企业借贷可能给经济带来金融危机的危险。


To avoid such an outcome, China should lower its growth target to about 6% in the coming years.	要避免这一结果，中国应该在未来几年将增长目标降至6%左右。


That way, it could pursue the deep reforms that are needed to move the economy onto a more balanced and sustainable long-term growth path.	这样一来，它就可以追求让经济走上更平衡和可持续的长期增长之路所需要的深度改革。


China’s Reform Stalemate	停滞的中国改革


BEIJING – China’s reform program has reached an impasse, with fundamental conflicts of interest and subtle resistance mechanisms blocking progress.	北京—中国的改革走入了死胡同，根本利益的冲突和微妙的阻力机制阻碍了进步。


Until these barriers are removed, there is little hope that China’s slowing economy – which grew by 7.4% in 2014, its lowest rate in nearly a quarter-century – can rely on reform to give it the push it needs.	在这些障碍被排除前，陷入减速的中国经济——2014年增长率为7. 4%，是近四分之一世纪以来的最低值——几乎没有希望依靠改革给自己带来需要的推力。


Chinese leaders are well acquainted with how difficult it can be to implement drastic reforms.	中国领导人很熟悉实施彻底改革可能面临的困难。


When Deng Xiaoping launched his radical program of “reform and opening up” in 1978, he faced fierce opposition – mostly from fervent ideologues and revolutionary diehards.	1978年，邓小平果断启动“改革开放”时，他也面临着激烈的反对——大多来自思想顽固的理论家和革命到底派。


Just as Deng’s status and forcefulness enabled him to face down his opponents and keep China’s economic modernization on course, President Xi Jinping’s determined leadership can overcome vested interests and implement the needed reforms.	正如邓小平的地位和铁腕让他能够战胜反对者、让中国经济走上现代化进程，现任国家主席习近平的果断领导也能克服既得利益，实施必要的改革。


Of course, reconciling the fundamental misalignment of interests in China will not be easy – not least because interest groups will not discuss, much less oppose, reforms in an open and transparent manner.	当然，协调中国的根本性利益不合绝非易事——因为利益集团不会公开透明地讨论改革，更不会反对。


Instead, they argue that the reforms are too risky or purge their substantive provisions.	相反，他们指出改革风险太高，或者清除改革的具体规定。


Only small concessions have been made to scaling back government intervention, affecting powers that are either irrelevant or never actually existed.	迄今为止，在减少政府干预方面只做出了很小的妥协，所影响到的权力要么无关紧要，要么实际上根本不存在。


There are two types of conflicts of interest among the government bodies.	政府机构之间存在两类利益冲突。


First, China’s powerful bureaucracy is disinclined to cede its powers in the name of liberalization and a shift toward a more market-oriented economy.	首先，中国强大的官僚体系不愿因自由化和向市场经济转型的原因让出自己的权力。


For example, the Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) is the ministry-level government institution responsible for state-owned enterprises.	比如，国资委是一个负责国有企业的部级政府机构。


Its task now includes eliminating the SOEs’ monopoly power, which is hampering market competition.	目前其任务包括清理国有企业的垄断权力，因为这阻碍了市场竞争。


But reducing the SOEs’ power would also mean a diminished role for SASAC – and, most likely, its eventual obsolescence.	但削减国有企业的权力也意味着降低国资委的作用，也很有可能导致其最终被取消。


As a result, efforts to fight monopoly are lagging, and the next stage of reform – the transition to a “blended ownership system” – remains distant.	因此，治理垄断的努力十分缓慢，而下一阶段的改革——向“混合所有制”转型——依然任重道远。


Similarly, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the subsidiary of the People’s Bank of China that controls the foreign-exchange transactions of commercial banks and households, derives its power from controlling capital inflows and outflows.	类似地，外管局是中国人民银行下属管理商业银行和家庭外汇交易的机构，其权力来自对资本流进流出的管制。


Recognizing that progress toward capital-account liberalization would imply its eventual demise, SAFE has made numerous excuses (to which the recent financial crises in the West have lent credence) for retaining tight control over foreign-exchange transactions.	外管局明白向资本账户自由化迈进意味着它最终将被解散，因此以各种借口（最近的西方金融危机让这些借口看起来颇有道理）继续保持对外汇交易的严格管制。


So, despite the government’s stated commitment to liberalize the capital account, the PBOC has yet to make observable progress.	因此，尽管政府言之凿凿要实现资本账户自由化，但人民银行仍没有作出显而易见的进展。


The second major conflict of interest in China is between the central and local governments, which are supposed to be adjusting their revenue-sharing model.	中国的第二大利益冲突是中央和地方政府。 两者理应调整收入分享模式。


The problem lies in a mismatch between their respective shares of tax revenues and mandatory expenditures.	问题在于它们各自的税收收入分成和强制性支出比例之间的不匹配。


With local governments forced to cover a large proportion of public spending with a disproportionately low share of revenues, local-government debt has swelled.	地方政府被迫在获得低收入比例的情况下承担高公共支出比例，因此债台高筑。


But the central government remains reluctant to make significant changes to the revenue-sharing model, wary not only of the effects on its coffers, but also of conferring more authority on local officials.	但中央政府仍不愿对收入分成模式作出重大调整，原因不但在于其担心国库，也在于地方官员权威的增加。


Moreover, they doubt local governments’ ability to manage their budgets properly and to use the additional tax revenues efficiently.	此外，中央政府怀疑地方政府是否有能力管好预算、高效地使用增加的税收收入。


The fundamental contradiction, as these examples show, is between the goals of the reform process and the incentives that underpin them.	这些例子表明，根本矛盾存在于改革过程的目标与支撑这些目标的激励之间。


Nowhere is this clearer than in the “mixed ownership system” envisaged by the Third Plenary of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.	最能表明这一问题的莫过于中共十八大三中全会所提出的“混合所有制”。


Encouraging the private sector to take stakes in SOEs in strategic areas like energy, power, and finance is supposed to increase competition, boost efficiency, and reduce pressure on the government to invest.	按设想，鼓励民营部门在能源、电力和金融等战略性领域入股国有企业能够增加竞争、提高效率、减少政府的投资压力。


But why should private investors put their money in SOEs?	但民营投资者为何要把钱投向国有企业？


As minority shareholders in firms whose managers are appointed by the Central Personnel Ministry, private actors cannot influence decision-making.	作为管理层由组织部指派国有企业的少数股东，民营行动方根本不能影响决策。


Until the central government is willing to yield its control over SOE management, ownership reforms are likely to spark only tepid interest from the private sector.	除非中央政府愿意放弃其对国有企业管理层的控制，否则所有权改革无法引起民营部门的多大兴趣。


If implemented fully, the current round of reforms would have a far-reaching impact on China’s political economy, because they shift the balance of power from officials to markets.	如果能够充分实施，当前的改革措施将对中国政治经济产生深远影响，因为它们改变了权力平衡，让它从官员手中转移到市场手中。


This would enable China to continue its ascent toward high-income status, improving the wellbeing of millions of its citizens along the way.	这可以让中国继续朝高收入国家行列迈进，并在此过程中改善数百万人民的福利。


But vested interests will not back down.	但既得利益不会善罢甘休。


Though they will not oppose reforms outright, they will continue to procrastinate and spread fear about economic instability and social tension to prevent changes that threaten to diminish their status and prerogatives.	尽管他们不会公然反对改革，但他们将继续消极应对并传播对经济动荡和社会对立的恐慌，以阻止威胁他们地位和特权的的变化。


Unless and until China’s top leaders overcome such resistance, progress on reform will remain sluggish.	除非中国最高领导层克服这些阻力，否则改革无法取得进展。


China’s Exchange-Rate Trap	中国汇率陷阱


NEW YORK – For months now, China’s exchange-rate policy has been roiling global financial markets.	纽约—几个月来，中国汇率政策一直在冲击全球金融市场。


More precisely, confusion about that policy has been roiling the markets.	更准确地说，是中国汇率政策的模糊性一直在冲击全球金融市场。


Chinese officials have done a poor job communicating their intentions, encouraging the belief that they don’t know what they’re doing.	中国官员在沟通他们的意图方面做得太差，导致人们认为他们不知道他们在干什么。


But criticizing Chinese policy is easier than offering constructive advice.	但批评中国政策容易，提出建设性意见很难。


The fact is that China’s government no longer has any good options.	事实是，中国政府已经没有什么好选择。


No question, the country would be better off with a more flexible exchange rate that eliminated one-way bets for speculators and acted as an economic shock absorber.	毫无疑问，如果采取更具弹性的汇率，将打消投机者的单边押注，成为经济冲击吸收器，中国也将因此获益。


But the literature on “exit strategies” – on how to replace a currency peg with a more flexible exchange rate – makes clear that the moment when China could have navigated this transition smoothly has now passed.	但“退出战略”方面的文献——即关于如何以更具弹性的汇率取代货币盯住——清楚地表明，中国已经错失平稳过渡的时机。


Countries can exit a pegged rate smoothly only when there is confidence in the economy, encouraging the belief that the more flexible exchange rate can appreciate as well as weaken.	一国要想平稳取消盯住汇率，唯有在人们对其经济充满信心时着手，让人们相信根据弹性的汇率既可以贬值，也可以升值。


This may have been true of China once; it is no longer true today.	中国曾经拥有这样的机会，但今时已不同往日。


This puts Chinese policymakers in the position of the Irish tourist who asks for directions to Dublin and is told, “Well, sir, if I were you, I wouldn’t start from here.”	如今，中国决策者就好比是一位爱尔兰游客，他想去都柏林，而他得到的回答是“先生，如果我是你，我不会从这里出发。 ”


What, then, is China’s least bad option?	那么，中国最不坏的选择是什么？


The authorities could continue with their current strategy of pegging the renminbi to a basket of foreign currencies, and push ahead with their agenda of restructuring and rebalancing the economy.	当局可以继续当前战略——让人民币盯住一揽子外币，同时推进经济重组和再平衡日程。


But convincing skeptical observers that they are committed to this strategy will take time, given recent missteps.	但考虑到最近的失误，让持怀疑态度的观察者相信他们将坚决执行这一战略需要时间。


Meanwhile, investors will bet against them.	与此同时，投资者也会在相反的方向上下注。


They already are.	已经如此了。


Capital outflows have been running at $100 billion a month.	资本外流保持在每月1,000亿美元。


Simple arithmetic suggests that with $3 trillion of reserves, the authorities can hold out for at least a couple of years.	不难算出，拥有3万亿美元外汇储备的中国当局还可以支撑数年。


But capital flight tends to rise dramatically as the end draws near.	但资本外逃总是在最后阶段急剧扩大。


A two-year window is an illusion.	因此，两年的窗口期只是个幻觉。


Alternatively, the renminbi could be allowed to fluctuate more freely.	另一个选择是让人民币更加自由地波动。


The People’s Bank of China can permit it to depreciate against the reference basket by, say, 1% a month, in order to enhance the competitiveness of Chinese exports and address concerns that the currency is overvalued.	中国人民银行可以允许人民币兑参考货币篮汇率每月贬值（比如）1%，以提振中国出口商的竞争力并打消人民币被高估的担忧。


But, given weak global demand, this kind of modest depreciation won’t do much to boost exports and support economic growth.	但是，在全球需求疲软的情况下，这一温和贬值不会对刺激出口和支持经济增长起到多大作用。


Moreover, with the renminbi losing 1% of its value each month, capital flight would accelerate further.	此外，如果人民币每个月都要失去1%的价值，资本外逃也会进一步加速。


A third option is a one-time devaluation of, say, 25%.	第三个选择是一次性贬值（比如）25%。


This would enhance export competitiveness at a stroke.	这将大大增强出口竞争力。


Depreciate the currency to the point where it is significantly undervalued, the argument goes, and investors will expect it to recover.	这一观点认为，让货币贬值到大幅低估的程度后，投资者就会预期反弹。


Capital will then flow in, not out.	资本将流入，而不是流出。


This assumes, of course, that everyone buys into the idea that one devaluation doesn’t augur another.	当然，这需要假设所有人都认为一次贬值不会引发另一次贬值。


It assumes that investors would be unperturbed by the authorities’ abandonment of their prior vow to shun a mega-devaluation.	它假设投资者不会因为当局不再信守此前绝不大幅贬值的承诺而受到影响。


It ignores the fact that Chinese enterprises, already in dire straits, have as much as $1 trillion of foreign-currency debt that would become significantly more difficult to service.	它忽视一个事实，即已经深陷重重困境的中国企业背负着多大1万亿美元的外币债务，贬值将让它们维持债务的难度大大增加。


And it minimizes the devastating economic impact of a mega-devaluation on countries with which China competes.	它还假设大幅贬值对于中国的竞争对手国家的破坏性经济影响是最低的。


By process of elimination, the only option that remains is tightening capital controls.	在排除过程中，唯一留下的选项是收紧资本管制。


Strict controls can prevent residents and foreigners from selling renminbi for foreign currency on onshore markets and transferring the proceeds abroad.	严格的管制可以防止居民和外国人在在岸市场上卖出人民币买入外汇，然后将所得汇往国外。


Protected by this financial Great Wall, the authorities could let the exchange rate fluctuate more freely and allow it to depreciate gradually without provoking capital flight.	在这一金融长城的保护下，当局可以允许汇率波动更加自由、逐渐贬值，而不引发资本外逃。


They would gain the time needed to implement confidence-building reforms.	当局将赢得所需要的时间实施构建信心的改革。


They could curtail the provision of liquidity to loss-making enterprises, forcing firms to eliminate excess capacity.	他们可以削减对亏损企业的流动性供给，迫使企业砍掉过剩产能。


They could restructure problematic debts.	他们可以重组有问题的债务。


They could recapitalize banks that suffered inadvertent balance-sheets damage as a result of these reforms.	他们可以对因为这些改革而受到附带资产负债表冲击的银行进行资本重组。


They could repair their damaged credibility.	他们可以修复受到损害的信誉。


A few observers, like Bank of Japan head Haruhiko Kuroda, have suggested that China might consider tightening controls.	日本银行行长黑田东彦等少数观察者认为中国可以考虑收紧管制。


But most economists are reluctant to contemplate this option.	但大部分经济学家不愿意将这一选项纳入考虑范围。


Capital controls would undermine China’s efforts to internationalize the renminbi and would embarrass the International Monetary Fund, which recently added the currency to the basket of four major currencies underpinning its unit of account, the SDR.	资本管制会破坏人民币国际化的努力，让IMF下不了台——它最近才将人民币纳入决定其账户单位特别提款权（SDR）的货币篮子中。


The most powerful objection, though, is that reimposing controls would remove the pressure to reform.	但是，最有力的反对意见是，重启管制将去除改革的压力。


Freed of pressure from international capital markets, the Chinese authorities would defer to state-owned enterprises and local officials who prefer continued easy provision of liquidity and would rather see the banks simply roll over their loans.	摆脱国际资本市场压力后，中国当局将顺从国有企业和地方官员，他们更想继续保持宽松的流动性供给，想让银行为他们的债务展期。


This risk of backsliding is real.	这一倒退风险是实实在在的。


If it materializes, the time bought by capital controls will be squandered.	如果成为现实，资本管制所赢得的时间将白白浪费。


The problem would then metastasize, at some point, from an exchange-rate crisis to a growth collapse.	在某一点上，问题将从汇率危机演变为增长崩溃。


China’s best hope – and the world’s – is that the Chinese authorities understand that a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.	中国——以及世界——面临的最好的局面是中国当局明白危机是可怕的浪费。


China’s SDR Distraction	中国的特别提款权误区


WASHINGTON, DC – At the start of October, China’s currency, the renminbi, was added to the basket of currencies that make up the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights, or SDR.	发自华盛顿特区——10月初，人民币被纳入到由多种货币组成的国际货币基金组织特别提款权（SDR）序列中。


Previously, the SDR had been defined as a weighted average of the dollar, euro, British pound, and Japanese yen. Now that the renminbi has been added, it can claim to be one of just five truly global currencies.	而在此之前SDR仅被定义为美元、欧元、英镑和日元的加权平均值，现在人民币加入并终于可以称自为五大全球性货币之一了。


Should we care? The Chinese certainly do.	不管外界对此有何观感，但中国人确实非常在意这一点。


In Beijing, where I was late last month, joining the rarefied SDR club was all people wanted to talk about. (Okay, truth be told, they also wanted to talk about Donald Trump.)	在我上个月末访问北京期间，加入那个清高的SDR俱乐部是所有的人都想谈论的话题（好吧，说实话，他们也很想聊聊唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）。


Seeing the renminbi added to the SDR basket was a matter of national pride.	人民币加入SDR篮子是个事关民族自豪感的问题。


It symbolized China’s emergence as a global power.	它象征着中国成为全球大国。


And it vindicated the government’s efforts to encourage use of the renminbi in cross-border transactions, freeing China and the rest of the world from over-dependence on the dollar.	它证明了政府鼓励在跨境交易中使用人民币的努力，使中国和世界其他国家免于过度依赖美元。


But the fact of the matter is that adding the renminbi to the SDR basket has little practical significance.	但事实是，将人民币加入SDR篮子没有什么实际意义。


The SDR is not a currency; it is just the unit in which the IMF reports its financial accounts.	SDR不是货币，它只是基金组织通报其财务账目所使用的单位。


Only a small handful of international bonds are denominated in SDRs, because banks and firms do not find this option particularly attractive.	因为银行和公司没有发现这个选项特别有吸引力，所以只有少数国际债券会用特别提款权来发行。


The main issuer of SDR bonds is the IMF’s sister organization, the World Bank (the Fund itself is not authorized to issue bonds).	SDR债券的主要发行者是国际货币基金组织的姊妹组织——世界银行（基金本身没有授权发行债券）。


The only practical implication of adding the renminbi to the SDR basket is that it now becomes a currency that countries can draw, along with the SDR’s other four constituent currencies, when they borrow from the IMF.	将人民币加入特别提款权篮子的唯一实际意义是，人民币与特别提款权的其他四种货币一样，当各国向国际货币基金组织借款时，它们可以借人民币。


Only time will tell how many wish to do so.	到时候我们可以看看究竟有多少国家愿意这样做。


The Chinese argue that the renminbi’s addition to the SDR basket should be seen in a broader context.	这个议程包括中国人民银行和各外国央行之间的货币互换协议谈判，而目前已签署超过24项。 它还包括指定中国金融机构为每个主要金融中心的人民币交易提供清算和结算服务（例如9月份中国银行就被选为纽约的官方清算银行）。


It is one of a series of steps to encourage use of the renminbi in international transactions.	外国实体也被授权在中国发行人民币计价债券。 截止8月底，波兰成为第一个在中国发行人民币计价债券的欧洲政府。


This agenda includes negotiating currency swap agreements, now more than two dozen, between the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and foreign central banks.	中国人认为，应该在更广泛的背景下看待人民币加入特别提款权篮子。


And foreign entities are being authorized to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in China itself. Toward the end of August, Poland became the first European government to do so.	它是鼓励在国际交易中使用人民币的一系列步骤之一。


But the reality, again, is that these steps are more about symbolism than substance.	但再次现实的说，这些步骤更多的是象征而非实质。


The PBOC’s renminbi swaps are almost entirely unused.	中国人民银行的人民币互换几乎没有被使用过。


Designated clearing banks have not exactly been flooded with business.	指定的清算银行依旧门可罗雀。


Offshore renminbi bank deposits are falling.	离岸人民币银行存款额正在下降。


The proportion of China’s merchandise trade settled in renminbi has been declining since mid-2015.	中国以人民币结算商品贸易的比例自2015年中以来一直在下降。


And there is no sign that where the Polish government has so boldly ventured, other governments will soon follow.	也没有迹象表明波兰政府如此大胆地冒险会引发其他政府的快速跟进。


The fault, to paraphrase Shakespeare, lies not in the stars but in China’s own financial markets.	借用一句莎士比亚的名言，错不在命运，而在于中国的金融市场本身。


Since mid-2015, the country’s stock market has been on a rollercoaster.	自2015年中以来，该国的股票市场就像过山车一样。


Every international organization worth its salt, from the IMF to the Bank for International Settlements, has been warning of problems in China’s corporate bond market.	从国际货币基金组织到国际清算银行，每一个忠于职守的国际组织都一直对中国企业债券市场的问题发出警告。


And if defaults on loans to corporations are widespread, as these organizations predict, the implications for the banks could be dire.	正如这些国际组织预测的一样，一旦公司贷款出现大批违约，那么就将对银行造成可怕的影响。


The problem is mistaken tactics by the Chinese government.	问题在于中国政府的错误策略。


The government and the PBOC believe that relaxing capital controls and allowing financial capital to flow more freely in and out of the country will force financial market participants to up their game.	政府和中国人民银行相信，放松资本管制，允许金融资本更自由地流入和流出国家将迫使金融市场参与者们提高自身水平。


Companies will have to upgrade their accounting standards, and banks their risk-management practices, to cope with the faster pace of financial transactions.	公司必须升级其会计标准，并加固其风险管理手段以应付更快的金融交易步伐。


The result will be more liquid and stable financial markets, in turn making the renminbi more attractive as a unit of account, means of payment, and store of value for residents and foreigners alike.	结果将是更具流动性和稳定的金融市场，并反过来令人民币作为一个结算货币单位、支付方式、为居民和外国人的保值手段而变得更具吸引力。


Unfortunately, assuming a result doesn’t make it so.	但不幸的是假设并不成真。


If Chinese banks and firms are slow to adjust, liberalizing international capital flows will lead only to more volatility, fewer offshore deposits, and less reliance on the renminbi for settling merchandise transactions – exactly as has been the case recently.	如果中国的银行和企业调整的步伐过慢，放开国际资本流动就只会导致更多的波动，更少的离岸存款，更少依赖人民币去结算商品交易——正如最近的情况一样。


Chinese policymakers must now put the horse before the cart.	中国的政策制定者现在必须分清主次。


The most important steps they can take to foster renminbi internationalization are to strengthen domestic financial markets, modernize regulation, and streamline contract enforcement.	他们选择的最重要促进人民币国际化步骤应当是加强国内金融市场，使监管现代化，并简化合同执行。


If China wants to transform the renminbi into a first-class global currency, it should pay less attention to renminbi trading in New York and the currency’s weight in the SDR basket, and more to the development of deep, liquid, and stable financial markets at home.	如果中国想将人民币转变成一流的全球货币，它应该更少关注纽约的人民币交易和货币在特别提款权篮子里的权重，而是聚焦于构建一个具备深厚基础，流动性和稳定性的国内金融市场。


The Risks of China’s Failure – and Success	中国失败和成功的风险


NEW DELHI – As the world’s financial leaders gather in Washington, DC, for the annual spring meeting of the International Monetary Fund, their hopes – and fears – center on China.	新德里—全世界金融领导人正准备齐聚华盛顿参加国际货币基金组织（IMF）春季年会，他们的希望——以及恐惧——都集中在中国身上。


After all, China is the one country that might be able to jump-start the sputtering global economy’s recovery; and yet its own economic growth is based on a foundation that is increasingly showing signs of strain.	毕竟，中国是可能有能力让全球经济复苏全力启动的国家； 但其自身经济增长的基础正在日益表现出吃紧的信号。


The dilemma is that both Chinese failure and success carry risks for the world economy.	困境在于不管中国的失败还是成功都会给世界经济带来风险。


A failure scenario would be unique in post-World War II history.	失败情景将是二战后历史上前所未有的。


Because China’s economy is so large, the consequences would reverberate worldwide.	中国经济规模巨大，其后果将蔓延全世界。


But, unlike in 2008, when the US dollar appreciated, allowing emerging markets to revive quickly, the renminbi would likely depreciate should China’s economy experience a serious downturn, spreading deflation far and wide.	2008年，美元升值使得新兴市场得以迅速复兴，与此不同的是，如果中国经济遭到严重衰退，人民币可能贬值，把通缩输出到全世界。


Other currencies might depreciate as well, some as a result of deliberate policy.	其他货币也可能贬值，其中不乏有意为之的情况。


Consequently, a China failure scenario could resemble the events of the 1930s, characterized by competitive devaluation and plummeting real economic activity.	因此，中国失败的情景可能类似于20世纪30年代，其特征为竞争性贬值，实体经济活动剧减。


But what if China succeeds in its current transition to a consumption-based economic model?	但如果成功实现当前向基于消费的经济模式的转型会如何？


When the Chinese current-account surplus reached 10% of GDP in 2007, saving exceeded 50% of GDP and investment surpassed 40% of GDP.	2007年，当中国经常项目盈余达到GDP的10%时，其储蓄突破了GDP的50%，投资超过GDP的40%。


These numbers seemed far too high to be dynamically efficient or welfare enhancing.	这些数字看起来过高，无法带来动态效率或增进福利。


As a result, a consensus rapidly emerged: Saving and investment should be reduced and brought into better balance.	结果，一个共识迅速迅速产生：储蓄和投资应该降低，并实现更好的平衡。


Investment should be reined in by imposing greater financial discipline on wayward public enterprises, while the social safety net should be strengthened, so that households would not have to save so much to meet the costs of having children and growing old.	投资应该通过向“任性”的上市公司施加更严格的财务纪律来遏制，而社会安全网应该得到加强，从而家庭不必大量储蓄来抵御失孩和变老的成本。


Fast forward a decade, and what do we see?	很快，十年过去了，我们看到了什么？


The government has built safety nets, and the current-account surplus has receded, exactly as hoped.	政府已经建成安全网，经常项目赤字也已经减少，一如人们的希望。


Last year, the surplus amounted to less than 3% of GDP, a fraction of its 2007 level.	去年，经常项目盈余还不到GDP的3%，只有2007年水平的几分之一。


But this hardly validates the theory.	但这绝不意味着这套理论是有效的。


About half of the reduction in the current-account surplus has occurred because investment has actually increased as a share of GDP.	经常项目盈余的降幅中大约有一半发生的原因是投资占GDP之比实际上升了。


Meanwhile, there has been some decline in national saving, by perhaps 3.5 percentage points of GDP compared to 2007 (according to IMF estimates, as official data end in 2013).	与此同时，国民储蓄有所下降，占GDP之比与2007年相比下降3. 5个百分点（据IMF估计，2013年底官方数据）。


But this reduction is quite modest compared to the 15-percentage-point increase that occurred during 2000-2007.	但这一降幅与2000—2007年间15个百分点的升幅相比相当温和。


Even more striking, all of this modest reduction in saving seems to have come from the corporate sector; household saving is roughly the same, relative to GDP, as it was in 2007.	更引人注目的是，这一储蓄的温和下降似乎全部来自公司部门； 家庭储蓄相对GDP相较2007年大体保持稳定。


In other words, what went up during the boom has failed to come down.	换句话说，繁荣期的增量没有降下来。


This is a real puzzle, and resolving it is important not only for China’s future, but for that of the world.	这是一个真正的谜题，解决这个谜题不仅对中国的未来很重要，对世界的未来也很重要。


There are two broad possibilities.	有两种大致的可能性。


It could be that the theory is basically correct, but needs more time to show results.	可能理论基本上是正确的，但需要更多时间表现结果。


In that case, as long as China’s rulers continue to strengthen social safety nets, the decline in saving could match the envisaged decline in investment, keeping the current-account surplus low.	果真如此的话，只要中国执政者继续强化社会安全网，储蓄的下降就能匹配设想中的投资下降，保持较低水平的经常项目盈余。


But what happens if the theory is wrong, or incomplete?	但如果理论是错误的货不完全的话会怎样？


For example, the beneficial effects of safety nets on saving may have been overestimated.	比如，社会安全网对储蓄的福利效应被高估了。


Or those effects may be offset by the negative effects of population aging.	或者，这些效应可能被人口老龄化的负面效应所抵消。


Over the next 15 years, the Chinese population aged 60 and above will increase by two-thirds.	未来15年，中国60岁及以上人口将增加三分之二。


These aging workers might now be saving as much as they possibly can, to build up a financial cushion for impending retirement.	这些老龄化工人现在正竭尽全力储蓄，为即将到来的退休构筑财务缓冲。


If some version of this scenario is realized, the household saving rate may continue to decline only gradually.	如果这一情景以某种形式实现，家庭储蓄率可能只能缓慢持续下降。


In the meantime, the government would be closing unprofitable plants, which might boost corporate saving.	与此同时，政府将关闭无利可图的工厂，这可能刺激公司储蓄。


As a result, overall saving could remain high, even as investment falls sharply, causing the current-account surplus to surge again.	因此，即使投资骤降���总储蓄也可能保持高位，导致经常项目盈余再次飙升。


This would not be a pleasant prospect for the world economy.	这对于世界经济来说可不是好消息。


As China slowed, so would global growth, and the remaining demand would be redistributed toward China, aggravating other countries’ already-severe shortfalls.	随着中国的放缓，全球增长也会放缓，而剩下的需求再分配将有利于中国，加剧其他国家已然十分严重的短缺。


This would be very different from the previous episode of global imbalances when large Chinese current-account surpluses were at least offset to some extent by rapid Chinese growth.	这与此前中国巨大的经常项目盈余至少部分能被中国高速增长所抵消的全球失衡情况截然不同。


In short, whereas a hard economic landing for China could spur global deflation, avoiding that outcome could mean the return of global imbalances.	简言之，尽管中国经济硬着陆可能刺激全球通缩，但避免这一结果可能意味着全球失衡回归。


These are the stark possibilities that leaders need to ponder as they gather gloomily at the IMF in Washington.	在全球领导人怀着抑郁的心情前往华盛顿赴IMF年会时，他们需要思考这些严峻的可能性。


The Sino-Russian Marriage	中俄联姻


LONDON – The Chinese are the most historically minded of peoples.	伦敦—中国人是最有历史意识的民族。


In his conquest of power, Mao Zedong used military tactics derived from Sun Tzu, who lived around 500 BC; Confucianism, dating from around the same time, remains at the heart of China’s social thinking, despite Mao’s ruthless attempts to suppress it.	在其权力征程中，毛泽东采取了生活在公元前500年左右的孙子的兵法。 而产生于差不多时期的儒家思想至今仍占据中国社会思想核心地位，尽管毛泽东对其进行了无情的镇压。


So when President Xi Jinping launched his “New Silk Road” initiative in 2013, no one should have been surprised by the historical reference.	因此，当中国国家主席习近平2013年发起他的“新丝绸之路”时，你不必为其历史参照感到震惊。


“More than two millennia ago,” explains China’s National Development and Reform Commission, “the diligent and courageous people of Eurasia explored and opened up several routes of trade and cultural exchanges that linked the major civilisations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road by later generations.”	“两千多年前，”中国发改委解释说，“勤劳勇敢的欧亚大陆人民探索和开发了多条连接亚洲、欧洲和非洲的贸易和文化交流通道，被后人统称为丝绸之路。


In China, old history is often called to aid new doctrine.	”在中国，古老的历史常常被新新思维所用。


The new doctrine is “multipolarity” – the idea that the world is (or should be) made up of several distinctive poles of attraction.	今天的新新思维便是“多极”，即世界由（也应该由）多个不同的引力极组成。


The contrast is with a “unipolar” (that is, an American- or Western-dominated) world.	与此相对的思维是“单极”（即美国或西欧主导的）世界。


Multipolarity is a political idea, but it is about more than power relations.	多极是一个政治思想，但范畴不只限于实力关系。


It rejects the notion that there is a single civilizational ideal to which all countries should conform.	它否认存在一个所有国家都感到合适的单一文明理想。


Different world regions have different histories, which have given their peoples different ideas about how to live, govern themselves, and earn a living.	不同的世界地区有不同的历史，给它们的民族带来不同的关于如何生活、如何管理自己、如何生存的思想。


These histories are all worthy of respect: there is no “right” road to the future.	这些历史都值得尊重：不存在“正确”的未来之路。


Eurasia is an idea whose time, it is said, has come around again.	据说欧亚（Eurasia）思想的时代即将再次到来。


Recent historical research has rescued the old Silk Road from historical oblivion.	最新的历史研究让古老的丝绸之路不再被遗忘。


The late American sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod identified eight overlapping “circuits of trade” between northwest Europe and China that, under the aegis of a Pax Mongolica, flourished between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.	已故的美国社会学家珍妮特·阿布-路高德（Janet Abu-Lughod）认为在西北欧和中国之间存在八个互相重叠的“贸易回路”，这八个贸易回路受蒙古和平（Pax Mongolica）的保护，繁荣于十三和十四世纪。


According to Abu-Lughod, Western imperialism superimposed itself on these older circuits, without obliterating them.	根据路高德的说法，西方帝国主义只是凌驾于这些古老贸易回路之上，并没有抹除它们。


Islam continued to spread across geographic and political boundaries.	伊斯兰教继续着它的跨地理和跨政治的传播。


Chinese and Indian migrations did not stop.	中国和印度的移民从未停止。


Now a unique conjuncture of economic and political developments has created an opportunity for Eurasia to emerge from its historical slumbers.	如今，一个独特的经济和政治发展趋势给欧亚创造了一次从历史休眠中醒来的机会。


In recent years, Western self-assurance was humbled by the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and political catastrophes in the Middle East.	近几年来，西方的自信因为2008—2009年金融危机和中东政治灾难而大受打击。


At the same time, the interests of the two potential builders of Eurasia, China and Russia, seem – at least superficially – to have converged.	与此同时，欧亚的两大潜在构建者——中国和俄罗斯的利益表面上出现了趋同之势。


China’s motive for reviving Pax Mongolica is clear.	中国恢复蒙古和平的动机显而易见。


Its growth model, based largely on exporting cheap manufactured goods to developed countries, is running out of steam.	它的增长模式主要建立在向发达国家出口廉价制造品的基础上，如今已颓势尽显。


Secular stagnation threatens the West, accompanied by rising protectionism sentiment.	长期停滞威胁着西方，加之贸易主义情绪日趋高涨。


And, although Chinese leaders know that they must rebalance the economy from investment and exports to consumption, doing so risks causing serious domestic political problems for the ruling Communist party.	而尽管中国领导人知道必须实现经济再平衡，从投资和贸易转向消费，但这样做有可能给执政的中共带来严重的国内政治问题。


Reorienting investments and exports toward Eurasia offers an alternative.	将投资和出口方向引向欧亚提供了一个替代方案。


As China’s labor costs rise, production is being re-located from the coastal regions to the western provinces.	随着中国劳动力成本的提高，生产从沿海地区转向西部省份。


The natural outlet for this production is along the New Silk Road.	这一生产格局的天然出口便是新丝绸之路。


The development of the road (actually several “belts,” including a southern maritime route) will require huge investments in transport and urban infrastructure.	丝绸之路的开发（实际上是数条“带”，包括一条南方海路）将需要巨大的交通和城市基础设施投资。


As in the nineteenth century, reduction in transport costs will open up new markets for trade.	如同十九世纪，交通成本的降低将打开新的贸易市场。


Russia, too, has an economic motive for developing Eurasia.	俄罗斯也有开发欧亚的经济动机。


It has failed to modernize and diversify its economy.	它没能实现经济现代化和多样化。


As a result, it remains predominantly an exporter of petroleum products and an importer of manufactured goods.	结果，它仍然主要是石化产品出口国和制造品进口国。


China offers a secure and expanding market for its energy exports.	中国提供了一个稳定且不断扩大的能源出口市场。


The big transport and construction projects needed to realize Eurasia’s economic potential may help Russia recover the industrial and engineering might it lost with communism’s fall.	实现欧亚经济潜力所需要的巨大的交通和建设投资有助于俄罗斯复苏其因共产主义崩溃而失去的工业和工程实力。


This year Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have joined together in a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a customs union with a defense component.	今年，俄罗斯、亚美尼亚、白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦共同加入了欧亚经济联盟（Eurasian Economic Union，EEU）。 EEU是一个关税联盟，也带有防御性质。


The EEU is seen by its advocates as a step toward re-establishing the old Soviet frontiers in the form of a voluntary economic and political union, modeled on the EU – a project to take the sting out of the West’s “victory” in the Cold War.	在支持者眼中，EEU是以自愿的经济和政治联盟为形式重建昔日苏联边界的一步。 EEU以欧盟为样板，是对西方在冷战中的“胜利”的刺激。


Official Russian opinion looks forward to “the interpenetration and integration of the EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt” into a “Greater Eurasia,” which will afford a “steady developing safe common neighborhood of Russia and China.”	俄罗斯官方观点着眼于“EEU和丝绸之路经济带互相渗透、互相融合”，形成一个“大欧亚”，为“俄罗斯和中国提供稳定发展的安全的共同周边环境。


On May 8, Putin and Xi signed an agreement in Moscow that envisages the establishment of coordinating political institutions, investment funds, development banks, currency regimes, and financial systems – all to serve a vast free-trade area linking China with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.	”5月8日，普京和习近平在莫斯科签署了旨在成立协调政治机构、投资基金、开发银行、货币机制和金融体系的协议——所有这些都可以服务于连接中国、欧洲、中东和非洲的广袤的自由贸易区。


How realistic is this dream?	这个梦想有多少现实性？


Russia and China both feel “encircled” by the United States and its allies.	俄罗斯和中国都感到被美国及其盟友“包围”。


China’s anti-hegemonic aim, expressed in almost inscrutable prose, is to secure “tolerance among civilizations” and respect for the “modes of development chosen by different countries.”	中国的反霸权目标浅显而模糊地表达为确保“文明宽容”，尊重“各国发展模式的选择”。


Putin, meanwhile, has ratcheted up his much more explicit anti-American rhetoric since the Ukraine crisis, which he sees as a prime example of Western interference in Russia’s domestic affairs.	与此同时，自乌克兰危机以来，普京加强了其比中国直白得多的反美立场。 他认为乌克兰危机时西方干预俄罗斯内政的明证。


Boosting trade flows between Russia and China, and strengthening political and security coordination, will reduce their vulnerability to outside interference and signal the emergence of a new center of world power.	提振俄罗斯与中国的贸易流、增强政治和安全合作将增强两国对外部干预的抵抗力，并释放世界实力新中心崛起的信号。


It may be considered a singular success for Western statesmanship to have brought two old rivals for power and influence in Central Asia to the point of jointly seeking to exclude the West from the region’s future development.	西方用政治手段让两大实力和中亚影响力的老对手联合起来试图将西方逐出中亚地区未来发展事务，这堪称巨大的“成功”。


The US, especially, missed opportunities to integrate both countries into a single world system, by rebuffing reforms of the International Monetary Fund that would have strengthened China’s decision-making influence, and by blocking Russia’s overtures for NATO membership.	特别是美国，它断然拒绝国际货币基金组织改革（改革将加强中国对IMF决策的影响力），阻挠俄罗斯对北约成员资格的建议，因此错失了将中俄两国纳入单一世界体系的机会。


This led both countries to seek an alternative future in each other’s company.	这导致两国携手寻找另一种未来可能。


Whether their marriage of convenience will lead to an enduring union – or, as George Soros predicts, a threat to world peace – remains to be seen.	中俄因势利导的联姻是否能产生一个持久的联盟——或者如乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）预言的那样形成世界和平的威胁——仍有待观察。


There is an obvious sphere-of-influence issue in Kazakhstan, and the Chinese have been squeezing the Russians for all they can get in bilateral deals.	哈萨克斯坦存在显而易见的势力范围问题，中国也在双边协议中竭尽所能逼迫俄罗斯。


For the time being, though, squabbles over the New Silk Road seem less painful to the two powers than enduring lectures from the West.	但是，从目前看，在新丝绸之路上的争吵给中俄两强造成的痛苦似乎不如没完没了的西方聒噪。


China’s $3.2 Trillion Headache	中国的3. 2万亿美元大麻烦


BEIJING – While the downgrade of United States government debt by Standard & Poor’s shocked global financial markets, China has more reason to worry than most: the bulk of its $3.2 trillion in official foreign reserves – more than 60% – is denominated in dollars, including $1.1 trillion in US Treasury bonds.	北京——标准普尔降低美国政府债务评级之举重创了全球金融市场，对此最紧张的应该是中国：其3. 2万亿美元的官方外汇储备的绝大部分（超过60%）是美元资产，其中包括1.


So long as the US government does not default, whatever losses China may experience from the downgrade will be small.	只要美国政府不违约，降级带给中国的损失总归是有限的。


To be sure, the dollar’s value will fall, imposing a balance-sheet loss on the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC, the central bank).	美元固然会下跌，从而有损于中国人民银行的资产负债表。


But a falling dollar would make it cheaper for Chinese consumers and companies to buy American goods.	但贬值的美元会降低中国消费者和企业买美国商品的成本。


If prices are stable in the US, as is the case now, the gains from buying American goods should exactly offset the PBC’s balance-sheet losses.	如果美国物价保持稳定（现状正是如此），购买美国商品成本降低的好处将正好抵消人民银行资产负债表的损失。


The downgrade could, moreover, force the US Treasury to raise the interest rate on new bonds, in which case China would stand to gain.	此外，降级将迫使美国财政部提高新债利率，这也能使中国获利。


But S&P’s downgrade was a poor decision, taken at the wrong time.	但标普给美国国债降级是个糟糕的决策，选择的时机不对。


If America’s debts had truly become less trustworthy, they would have been even more dubious before the agreement reached on August 2 by Congress and President Barack Obama to raise the government’s debt ceiling.	如果美国国债真的已不如过去那样信誉卓著，那么在8月2日奥巴马总统和国会就提高政府债务上限问题达成一致的时候，美国国债应该更加值得怀疑。


That agreement allowed the world to hope that the US economy would embark on a more predictable path to recovery.	债务上限协议给了全世界一个希望：美国经济将沿着可预测的道路走向复苏。


The downgrade has undermined that hope.	降级打破了这个希望。


Some people even predict a double-dip recession.	一些人甚至预测将出现二次探底。


If that happens, the chance of an actual US default would be much higher than it is today.	如果二次探底真的发生，美国真的发生违约的可能性将远高于现在。


These new worries are raising alarm bells in China.	这些新担忧为中国敲响了警钟。


Diversification away from dollar assets is the advice of the day.	外汇储备多元化、告别美元独大的状态是中国应该选择的策略。


But this is no easy task, particularly in the short term.	但这并不容易，从短期看尤是如此。


If the PBC started to buy non-dollar assets in large quantities, it would invariably need to convert some current dollar assets into another currency, which would inevitably drive up that currency’s value, thus increasing the PBC’s costs.	如果人民银行开始以更大手笔买入非美元资产，则必须将一些现有美元资产转换为其他货币，而这将不可避免地引起该货币升值，从而推高人民银行的成本。


Another idea being discussed in Chinese policy circles is to allow the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar.	中国决策层正在讨论的另一种策略是允许人民币对美元升值。


Much of China’s official foreign reserves have accumulated because the PBC seeks to control the renminbi’s exchange rate, keeping its upward movement within a reasonable range and at a measured pace.	中国官方外汇储备有一大部分是因为人民银行试图控制人民币汇率而积累起来的——在人民币升值过程中，人民银行一直在强调渐进性和可控性。


If it allowed the renminbi to appreciate faster, the PBC would not need to buy large quantities of foreign currencies.	如果人民银行允许人民币以更快速度升值，那么它将不需要购买如此大量的外汇。


But whether renminbi appreciation will work depends on reducing China’s net capital inflows and current-account surplus.	但人民币升值能否见效取决于是中国净资本流入和经常项目盈余是否减少。


International experience suggests that, in the short run, more capital flows into a country when its currency appreciates, and most empirical studies have shown that gradual appreciation has only a limited effect on countries’ current-account positions.	国际经验表明，在短期，货币升值会吸引更多的资本流入，而大多数实证研究表明，渐进升值对一国经常项目水平只有有限影响。


If appreciation does not reduce the current-account surplus and capital inflows, then the renminbi’s exchange rate is bound to face further upward pressure.	如果升值没有减少经常项目盈余和资本流入，那么人民币汇率将承受更大的升值压力。


That is why some people are advocating that China undertake a one-shot, big-bang appreciation – large enough to defuse expectations of further strengthening and deter inflows of speculative “hot” money.	这就是为什么一些人建议中国采取一次性大幅升值的策略——一次升足，打消人民币进一步走强的预期，阻止投机性“热钱”的涌入。


Such a revaluation would also discourage exports and encourage imports, thereby reducing China’s chronic trade surplus.	如此规模的升值还将抑制出口、鼓励进口，从而减少中国长期存在的贸易盈余。


But such a move would be almost suicidal for China’s economy.	但这样的动作对中国经济来说不啻自杀。


Between 2001 and 2008, export growth accounted for more than 40% of China’s overall economic growth.	从2001年到2008年，出口增长要占中国总体经济增长的40%强。


That is, China’s annual GDP growth rate would drop by four percentage points if its exports did not grow at all.	也就是说，如果出口增长被完全消除，那么中国的GDP年增长率将下降4个百分点。


In addition, a study by the China Center for Economic Research has found that a 20% appreciation against the dollar would entail a 3% drop in employment – more than 20 million jobs.	此外，中国经济研究中心的研究表明，人民币对美元升值20%将导致就业人口下降3%，相当于2000万人。


There is no short-term cure for China’s $3.2 trillion problem.	解决中国3. 2万亿美元难题没有速效药。


The government must rely on longer-term measures to mitigate the problem, including internationalization of the renminbi.	中国政府必须依靠长期手段来解决这个问题，包括人民币国际化。


Using the renminbi to settle China’s international trade accounts would help China escape America’s beggar-thy-neighbor policy of allowing the dollar’s value to fall dramatically against trade rivals.	用人民币来结算中国的国际贸易账户能助中国免受美国以邻为壑政策（即允许美元对其贸易对手大幅贬值）的冲击。


But China’s $3.2 trillion problem will become a 20-trillion-renminbi problem if China cannot reduce its current-account surplus and fence off capital inflows.	但如果中国不能减少其经常项目盈余和资本流入问题，那么3. 2万亿美元的问题将转变为20万亿人民币的问题。


There is no escape from the need for domestic structural adjustment.	国内结构调整在所难免。


To achieve this, China must increase domestic consumption’s share of GDP.	为了进行结构调整，中国必须增加国内消费在GDP中的呃比重。


This has already been written into the government’s 12th Five-Year Plan.	这一点已经写入了中国政府的十二五规划。


Unfortunately, given high inflation, structural adjustment has been postponed, with efforts to control credit expansion becoming the government’s first priority.	不幸的是，由于通胀高企，结构调整已经中止，控制信贷扩张成了中国政府的第一要务。


This enforced investment slowdown is itself increasing China’s net savings, i.e., the current-account surplus, while constraining the expansion of domestic consumption.	投资收缩强化本身就能增加中国的净储蓄，即经常项目盈余，同时约束国内消费。


Real appreciation of the renminbi is inevitable so long as Chinese living standards are catching up with US levels.	只要中国的生活水平在赶超美国，那么人民币的实际升值就是无可避免之事。


Indeed, the Chinese government cannot hold down inflation while maintaining a stable value for the renminbi.	事实上，中国政府无法既保持低通胀，又维持人民币币值稳定。


The PBC should target the renminbi’s rate of real appreciation, rather than the inflation rate under a stable renminbi.	人民银行应该把目标定在人民币的实际升值速度上，而不是币值稳定前提下的通货膨胀率上。


And then the government needs to focus more attention on structural adjustment – the only effective cure for China’s $3.2 trillion headache.	在此基础上，中国政府还需要更加关注结构调整，这才是医治中国3. 2万亿美元麻烦的唯一有效的药方。


China’s Aborted Openness	中国的开放半途而废


China’s state-run Xinhua news agency recently reported on a government investigation into a string of forced sterilizations and abortions in the village of Linyi, Shandong province.	中国官方新华社最近报道了政府调查山东临沂村发生的一系列强制结扎和堕胎事件。


The speed of the investigation – said to have begun days after the kidnapping of Chen Guangcheng, a blind activist who had been a public advocate for the victims – and the candor of the report created the impression of greater government responsiveness and bolder official media.	据说调查开始于为受害者仗义直言的盲人活动份子陈光诚遭绑架后的几天，其速度以及报道的坦率给人的印象是政府的应对措施更为积极有效、官方媒体更为大胆。


Is this impression right?	事实果真如此吗？


The story in Linyi is the kind of news that propaganda officials usually bury in the Communist Party’s secret files.	通常，中国的宣传干部会将临沂的事态埋藏于中共的机密文件中。


According to reports, local authorities in Linyi, seeking to avoid exceeding birth quotas under China’s “one-child” policy, forced several women to undergo abortions and forcibly sterilized many couples with more than one child.	报道说，临沂的地方政府为了避免超生，迫使妇女堕胎并将许多超生的夫妇强制结扎。


Villagers who hid to avoid the campaign reportedly saw their family members jailed.	据说，躲避这一运动的村民的家人被囚禁。


Some in Linyi alleged degrading treatment, torture, and extortion.	临沂还有人痛诉辱没人格、酷刑以及敲诈等事件。


Why investigate and report this scandal?	为何调查及报道这一丑闻？


The Xinhua reports, I believe, are best read as damage control.	我相信，新华社的报道至多可以理解为控制损害。


China is trying to secure funding from the United Nations to improve reproductive health – an effort that has been set back by reports of forced abortion.	中国正在争取联合国资金用以改善生育健康，因强制堕胎的报道而遭到挫折。


Central authorities did not investigate the Linyi abuses until news of the harassment of Chen Guangcheng – and his abduction with the help of Beijing police – spread into international media.	直到有关陈光诚遭到骚扰乃至在北京警方协助下被绑架的新闻被国际媒体曝光，中央政府方才调查临沂的滥用职权事件。


Chen had reported the abuses to officials and asked a non-governmental organization, the Citizens’ Rights Defense Group, to investigate.	陈光诚将滥用职权事件报告给了领导，并要求非政府组织公民维权网进行调查。


The group went to Linyi in May.	该组织于五月份前往临沂。


A month later, the network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported the group’s findings and demanded the intervention of the central government’s Family Planning Commission (FPC).	一个月后，中国维权网报道了该组织的调查结果并且要求国家计划生育委员会干预此事。


As a volunteer for the network, I was in touch with Chen and followed events closely.	我作为中国维权网的志愿者同陈光诚保持联系并密切跟踪事态的发展。


In July, having failed to elicit any government response, Chen began seeking legal aid from prominent lawyers to prepare lawsuits on behalf of the victims, causing alarm among local officials.	七月份，由于无法得到政府回应，陈光诚开始从知名律师那里寻求法律援助，代表受害者准备诉讼，从而引起了地方干部的恐慌。


Pursued by police, Chen went into hiding.	在警方的追捕下，陈光诚隐藏了起来。


My “personal safety was threatened,” he wrote on August 30 in the last email I received from him.	在8月30日我收到他的最后一封电子邮件中，他说他的“个人安全受到了威胁。 ”


Following strenuous international protests over Chen’s kidnapping, the FPC decided to investigate.	在国际社会强烈抗议陈光诚被绑架事件的情况下，计生委决定予以调查。


Xinhua announced that local officials responsible for the violence might be prosecuted.	新华社宣布，对暴力事件负有责任的地方干部或被起诉。


Central authorities seemed to sense an immediate need to quell criticism of its controversial population-control efforts.	中央政府似乎感觉到有必要立即平息对其充满争议的人口控制措施的批评。


And Xinhua wasted no time in claiming that the abuses were limited to a few towns.	新华社还不失时机地宣称暴力事件局限于几个村庄。


However, central government authorities have done little to halt intimidation of Linyi’s villagers.	但是，中央政府并没有做什么事情来制止对临沂村民的恐吓。


Chen was released from detention but remains under house arrest and was dragged back to the police station on September 2 for unknown reasons.	陈光诚从拘留中获得释放，但是仍然被软禁，并且在9月2日莫名其妙地被带到警察局。


Police refuse to return Chen’s personal computer and cell phone.	警方拒绝交还陈光诚的个人电脑和手机。


The village, too, is mysteriously without phone service.	该村的电话也被神秘地切断。


Meanwhile, through arrests, threats, and bribery, authorities are forcing villagers to withdraw accounts of abuse and back out of their lawsuits, warning of the dire consequences of cooperating with Chen and the lawyers.	同时，当局通过逮捕、威胁和贿赂，强迫村民撤回滥用职权的指控以及撤诉，并警告说，同陈光诚和律师们合作会有严重后果。


The FPC declines to intervene, citing lack of law-enforcement powers.	国家计生委说是没有执法权而拒绝干预。


On October 10, the villagers’ lawyers were told that the court hearing scheduled that day was canceled.	10月10日，村民的律师们被告知说原订于当天举行的法院听政会取消了。


On their way back to Beijing, thugs reportedly assaulted the lawyers.	在律师们返回北京的路上，据说遭到了歹徒的袭击。


Viewed in this context, the belief that the government’s approach to Linyi reflects a new responsiveness to human-rights abuses seems naïve.	由此可见，如果相信政府对临沂事态的措施反映了政府对损害人权事件予以新的反应看起来未免天真。


If the government were truly becoming more responsive, why have we not seen similar responses to other disputes over the theft of farmland, compromised investors’ rights, or high-level corruption?	如果政府果真更为积极，那么为什么我们没有见到对其他争议，例如盗取农田、投资者权利受损或者高层腐败等的类似的反应呢？


In all these cases, authorities have responded with repression, including the hiring of plain-clothes militias to kidnap or beat up people who attempt to publicize problems.	所有这些事件中，政府用压制手段予以回应，包括雇用便衣民兵绑架或殴打敢于公开问题的人士。


China’s belated bouts of openness about the rural spread of AIDS and the SARS epidemic clearly indicate that the central government regards transparency solely as a matter of expediency.	中国对于农村艾滋病泛滥以及萨斯传染病几度姗姗来迟的公开报道清楚地表明中央政府只不过把公开透明视作权宜之计。


Others argue that China’s government is simply losing its grip over local authorities.	有人认为中国政府开始对地方当局失去控制。


This prospect is hardly encouraging.	这一前景并不妙。


If abuses and repression in the provinces continue no matter how attentive the central government, or how assertive the press might have become, what then?	如果无论中央政府如何关注，或者媒体如何直言，地方上滥用权力和压制事件我行我素，那么将会怎样？


More likely, however, the central authorities are following a policy that most Chinese know well: neijin waisong, or “controlled inside, relaxed outside.”	但是，中央当局更为可能采取大多数中国人熟悉的“内紧外松”的政策。


Applied here, the policy means consolidating power at home while disarming critics abroad.	这个政策用在这里，就意味着对内巩固权力，对外平息指责。


I believe that the government’s loss of control in the provinces has been stage-managed.	我相信，各省政府失去控制是幕后安排好的。


Chaos provides a cover for crackdowns.	混乱可以为打压提供借口。


It is too convenient when unidentified strongmen beat and harass activists who question Party rule, and it is too easy for officials to blame an out-of-control “criminal society” when international media start asking questions.	身份不明的强人殴打和骚扰质疑中共统治的活动人士再方便不过，而当国际媒体开始提问时，各级官员可以把责任推到失去控制的“犯罪团伙”上。


Suspiciously targeted “criminal” assaults have, indeed, occurred in places other than Linyi.	在临沂以外的地方也发生了目标可疑的“罪犯“攻击事件。


Thugs thrashed civil rights activist Lu Banglie in the Guangdong town of Taishi in early October.	十月上旬，歹徒在广东省的太石村用棍棒殴打民权活动人士吕帮列。


Six villagers in the Hebei village of Dingzhou, protesting government seizure of their land, died after bloody clashes with a gang of toughs in July.	七月，河北省定州村的六名村民因抗议政府剥夺他们的土地，与一群歹徒发生流血冲突后死亡。


The list goes on.	此类事件举不胜举。


State media recently started releasing year-end “mass incident” statistics.	国家媒体最近开始发布年终“群体事件”统计。


Last year, the government said, there were 74,000 such incidents.	政府说，去年有74,000起此类事件。


Observers marvel that China’s leaders admit to such a staggering number of protests.	观察家们对于中国领导人承认这样惊人的抗议数字感到惊讶。


But here, again, the government is hiding in plain sight.	但是，在这里，政府又在自圆其说。


State-run media organs have been forced to admit that these protests test the Party’s will to maintain power.	国营媒体机关不得不承认这些抗议在测试中共维护权力的意志。


They neglect to tell the real story of how the Party exercises that will, trusting that the admission itself will satisfy us.	但是它们并未说出中共如何实施这一意志，而是相信承认本身就可以让我们满意。


We should not be so quick to play along.	我们不应轻���随波逐流。


China’s Afghan Game Plan	中国的阿富汗博弈


MADRID – In his latest book, On China, Henry Kissinger uses the traditional intellectual games favored by China and the West – weiqi and chess – as a way to reveal their differing attitudes toward international power politics.	马德里—在其新著《论中国》（On China）中，亨利·基辛格用中国和西方的传统博弈游戏——围棋和象棋——来说明双方在国际权力政治方面的不同态度。


Chess is about total victory, a Clausewitzian battle for the “center of gravity” and the eventual elimination of the enemy, whereas weiqi is a quest for relative advantage through a strategy of encirclement that avoids direct conflict.	象棋的目标是完全胜利，争夺的是克劳塞维茨所谓的“重心”，旨在最终完全消灭敌人，而围棋追求的是通过避免直接冲突的包围战略获得相对优势。


This cultural contrast is a useful guide to the way that China manages its current competition with the West.	这一文化反差可以作为观察中国如何管理当前与西方之争的指南。


China’s Afghan policy is a case in point, but it also is a formidable challenge to the weiqi way.	中国的阿富汗政策便是竞争中的一项，且颇为符合围棋之道。


As the United States prepares to withdraw its troops from the country, China must deal with an uncertain post-war scenario.	在美国准备从阿富汗撤军的同时，中国必须处理好不确定性很大的战后状况。


Afghanistan is of vital strategic interest to China, yet it never crossed its leaders’ minds to defend those interests through war.	阿富汗对中国具有关键性的战略利益，但中国领导人从未想过要通过战争维护这一利益。


A vital security zone to China’s west, Afghanistan is also an important corridor through which it can secure its interests in Pakistan (a traditional ally in China’s competition with India), and ensure its access to vital natural resources in the region.	阿富汗是中国西陲的关键安全区域、中国确保其在巴基斯坦（中印之争中中方的传统盟友）利益的重要走廊，也是中国获得该地区关键性自然资源的通道。


Moreover, China’s already restless Muslim-majority province of Xinjiang, which borders on Afghanistan, might be dangerously affected by a Taliban takeover there, or by the country’s dismemberment.	此外，在与阿富汗接壤的新疆自治区，穆斯林占据着人数优势，局势很不稳定，很容易受到塔利班和中国分裂分子的渗透。


The US fought its longest-ever war in Afghanistan, at a cost (so far) of more than $555 billion, not to mention tens of thousands of Afghan civilian casualties and close to 3,100 US troops killed.	阿富汗战争是美国打得最久的战争，花费（到目前为止）超过了5550亿美元，更有上千万阿富汗人民和近3100名美国士兵丧命。


But China’s strategy in the country was mostly focused on business development, and on satiating its vast appetite for energy and minerals.	但中国在阿富汗的战略大体上集中于商业开发，以满足其对能源和矿产的需求为目标。


The US Defense Department has valued Afghanistan’s untapped mineral deposits at $1 trillion.	据美国国防部估计，阿富汗待开发矿产存量大约价值1万亿美元。


But it is China that is now poised to exploit much of these resources.	而如今欲在阿富汗攫取其中大部分资源的正是中国。


Indeed, China’s development of the Aynak Copper Mine was the largest single foreign direct investment in Afghanistan’s history.	事实上，中国的艾娜克（Aynak）铜矿开发项目阿富汗历史上最大的单一外国直接投资项目。


China was also engaged in constructing a $500 million electric plant and railway link between Tajikistan and Pakistan.	中国还参与了5亿美元的电厂项目和塔吉克斯坦-巴基斯坦铁路项目。


Last December, China’s state-owned National Petroleum Corporation signed a deal with the Afghan authorities that would make it the first foreign company to exploit Afghanistan’s oil and natural-gas reserves.	去年12月，中石油与阿富汗当局签署了一项协议，成为首家开采阿富汗原油和天然气储备的外国公司。


Once China’s enormous economic and security interests in Afghanistan are left without America’s military shield, the Chinese are bound to play an even larger role there, one that Afghans hope will reach “strategic levels.”	一旦中国在阿富汗巨大的经济和安全利益没有了美国军力的约束，中国肯定会在阿富汗扮演更重要的角色，一种阿富汗人希望达到“战略水平”的角色。


China would prefer to accomplish this the Chinese way – that is, essentially through a display of soft power – or, as the Chinese government put it on the occasion of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s official visit to Beijing in early June, through “non-traditional security areas.”	中国将用中国的方式完成这一步——即通过展示软实力，也可能通过“非传统安全区”来达到这一目的——这也是中国政府在阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊6月初正式访问北京时的说法。


Judging by China’s behavior in other parts of the world, any military cooperation is likely to be extremely modest and cautious.	以中国在世界其他地区的行为来判断，军事合作可能会非常温和和小心翼翼。


China has already made it clear it will not contribute to the $4.1 billion multilateral fund to sustain Afghan national security forces.	中国已经明确表态不会在维持阿富汗国防军的41亿美元多国资金中出力。


Rather, the two countries’ recently signed bilateral cooperation agreement is about “safeguarding Afghanistan’s national stability” through social and economic development.	两国最新签署的双边合作协议将通过社会和经济发展“捍卫阿富汗国家稳定”。


China is especially keen on combating drug trafficking, as Badakhshan, the Afghan province bordering on Xinjiang, has become the main transit route for Afghan opium.	中国特别热心于打击毒品运输，因为与新疆接壤的阿富汗巴达赫尚省已成为阿富汗鸦片的主要运输路线。


But preventing the spillover into Xinjiang of Taliban-inspired religious extremism remains a high priority as well.	防止塔利班宗教极端主义向新疆的渗透也依然是最重要的任务之一。


China went to great lengths to present the recent summit in Beijing of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China, Russia, and major Central Asian countries, as an attempt to create a fair balance of interests among regional stakeholders.  Moreover, the SCO sought a consensus on how, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, to guard the region “against shocks from turbulence outside the region.”	在最近的上合组织（成员包括中国、俄罗斯和主要中亚国家）北京峰会中，中国竭尽全力营造地区利益相关者的利益均衡局面。 此外，上合组织还寻求在防止该地区遭受“区域外动荡冲击”（胡锦涛主席语）方面达成共识。


Yet, however focused it is on soft-power projection in Afghanistan, China will likely find it difficult not to be drawn into the role of policeman in an extremely complex and historically conflict-ridden region.	但是，不管中国如何集中精力于在阿富汗战事软实力，都可能发现难以在这个极端复杂且充满着历史冲突的地区充当警察角色。


China’s regional outreach, moreover, clashes with that of other regional powers, such as Russia and India.	此外，中国的地区动作会与该地区的其他大国（比如俄罗斯和印度）发生冲突。


Nor is its own ally, Pakistan, particularly eager to confront terrorist groups that threaten the security of its neighbors, China among them.	其自身盟友巴基斯坦也并不急于清除威胁邻国（中国也是其中之一）安全的恐怖主义集团。


Pakistan might find it extremely difficult to reconcile the security of its Chinese ally with its de facto proxy war with India.	巴基斯坦或许会发现，协调其中国盟友的安全与其与印度的事实上的代理战争是十分困难的。


China might then be forced to bolster its military presence in Pakistan and in tribal areas along the Afghan border in order to counter terrorist groups such as the Pakistan-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which the Chinese believe is responsible for attacks in Xinjiang.	因此，中国或许被迫增强其在巴基斯坦以及阿富汗边境部落区域的军力部署，以对付恐怖主义集团，比如巴基斯坦的东突厥斯坦伊斯兰运动组织（中国认为它是新疆暴乱的罪魁）。


The preferred Chinese way would be that of cooptation and dialogue.	中国喜欢的方式是合作与对话。


Indeed, Chinese diplomacy has been busy lately in trilateral talks with Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed at achieving reconciliation with the Taliban.	事实上，中国外交官最近忙于和巴基斯坦和阿富汗开战旨在与塔利班和解的三边对话。


Nor is China interested in stirring up the conflict between its Pakistani allies and its Indian rivals.	中国也无意搅合其盟友巴基斯坦和其对手印度之间的冲突。


On the contrary, China has argued for years that the main problem affecting Afghanistan’s stability is the India-Pakistan proxy fighting, and that peace in Kashmir is therefore the key to peace in Afghanistan.	相反，多年来中国一直指出影响阿富汗稳定的主要问题是印度-巴基斯坦代理战争，因此克什米尔和平才是阿富汗和平的关键。


The task of defending its interests in Afghanistan after US withdrawal is a truly formidable challenge for Chinese diplomacy.	如何在美国撤军后捍卫其在阿富汗的利益才是中国外交所面临的真正重大挑战。


It is inconceivable, though, that the Chinese would enter into the kind of massive US-style military intervention to which the world has grown accustomed in recent years.	但是，没有迹象表明中国会像美国那样部署大规模军事干预（而在近几年中，世界逐渐习惯了美国的做法）。


For China, the Afghan contest will most likely turn out to be a very measured combination of chess and weiqi.	对中国来说，阿富汗的考验很有可能兼具了象棋和围棋的特点。


China’s African Mischief	中国的非洲恶行


TOKYO – As Libya’s National Transitional Council attempts to establish a functioning government for a newly liberated country, the truth about what went on under Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime is starting to come to light.	发自东京——随着利比亚国家过渡委员会试图在这个新近解放的国家建立政府，卡扎菲执政时的种种黑幕也逐渐被公诸于世。


Various treasures have been unearthed from Tripoli mansions that were hastily vacated by their owners, and what happened to the tortured, the murdered, and the missing is beginning to be revealed.	在的黎波里各处都发现了一些金库和储藏室，但这些地方已经被原来的主人匆忙地搬空了，而那些被虐待，被谋杀以及失踪者的遭遇也逐渐曝光。


So, too, are some of Qaddafi’s dirtiest diplomatic secrets being exposed.	与此同时，卡扎菲的某些最肮脏的外交秘密也被揭发出来。


On September 2, the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reported on recent negotiations between the embattled Qaddafi regime and Chinese armaments companies with direct ties to China’s government for contracts worth $200 million.	加拿大《环球邮报》在9月2日披露了陷入混战的卡扎非政权与一些和中国政府有直接联系的军火公司的谈判细节，其合同总值高达2亿美元。


Such contracts were in flagrant violation of the arms embargo instituted under UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which China approved.	这些合同粗暴践踏了1970年联合国安理会通过的利比亚武器禁运决议，而中国也是签署国之一。


China’s rulers have denied that the secret arms deals were valid, and insist that the government did not authorize them.	中国领导人否认这些秘密武器交易的有效性，并坚持说政府并未批准这类行为。


But a travel report explicitly states that Qaddafi’s security officials met with three Chinese arms manufacturers: China North Industries Corp. (Norinco), the China National Precision Machinery Import & Export Corp.	但一份出差报告明确显示卡扎菲手下的安全官员曾分别与中国3个武器制造商会面，其中包括中国北方工业集团（Norinco），中国精密机械进出口总公司（CPMIC）和中国新兴进出口总公司。


(CPMIC), and China XinXing Import & Export Corp. The agenda included not only these companies’ available weapons stockpiles, but also the Chinese firms’ promise to provide additional weapons if required.	会面日程不但包括了这些公司的现有武器库存，还包括了中方在有需要的情况下额外提供武器的承诺。


Qaddafi’s turn to China in his hour of desperation is somewhat surprising.	卡扎非在绝望时向中国求救的行为多少有点出人意料。


After all, he reacted to China’s growing activities in Africa – which his officials maintained was “reminiscent of imperialism” – by receiving an official visit in 2006 from Taiwan’s then-President Chen Shui-bian.	毕竟他本人对中国在非洲日渐频繁的活动——其下属坚称是“帝国主义行为”——的反应就是在2006年接待了时任台湾总统陈水扁的正式访问。


As the pressure from the rebels grew, Qaddafi’s last hope for maintaining power became China, and so fear of its influence in Africa was brushed aside.	随着起义势力所造成的压力越来越大，卡扎菲把维持权力的最后希望放在了中国身上，而对后者染指非洲的忧虑也只能靠边站了。


For decades, Qaddafi had behaved as if he were, as his propagandists proclaimed him, “King among African Kings,” using his country’s abundant oil revenues to provide aid to his neighbors.	数十年以来，卡扎菲的所作所为就仿佛是他是其吹鼓手们所说的“非洲之王”，凭借手中的大量石油收入，他不断向邻国给予援助。


He announced investments of $97 billion to “free Africa from the West.”	他宣称已经为“将非洲从西方手中解放出来”资助了970亿美元。


President Compaoré of Burkina Faso (initially rumored to be a likely destination for Qaddafi’s exile) received military training from Libya in the 1980’s before rising to power in a coup d’état.	布基纳法索总统孔帕奥埃曾在1980年代发动军事政变上台前接受过利比亚的军事训练（谣传该国也是卡扎菲的逃亡目的地）。


President Idriss Déby of Chad also brought about political change in 1990 with Qaddafi’s backing.	乍得总统伊德里斯·代比同样也是在卡扎非支持下于1990年上台。


Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou, who is now harboring Qaddafi’s third son, Saadi, was able to win his country’s presidential election last March thanks to financial support from Qaddafi.	目前正为卡扎非第三子沙阿迪提供庇护的尼日尔总统马哈马杜·伊素福正是依靠卡扎菲的金钱才能在今年3月赢得选举。


But, in recent years, China became an obstacle to Qaddafi’s African ambitions, and China did so by copying his methods: buying the support of dictators with weaponry and finance.	但近年中国逐渐成为卡扎菲非洲野心的一大障碍，何况还照搬了他的做法：用金钱和武器收买那些独裁者们。


Since 2000, China has actively courted Africa’s unstable and dictatorial countries with offers of aid and a refusal to back United Nations sanctions against them.	自2000年以来中国向非洲那些局势不稳和实施独裁的国家大献殷勤：一方面利用援助，另一方面承诺可以阻止联合国对这些国家实施制裁。


Indeed, China has blithely entered into business with African countries that Europe and America refuse to engage with, owing to sanctions.	事实上，中国正肆无忌惮地染指那些欧美出于制裁而不愿涉及的非洲国家交易。


International sanctions, it now seems, were the door through which China rushed to gain access to Africa’s mineral wealth for its voracious industries.	看上去国际制裁似乎已经成为中国为满足本国企业需求而大量开发非洲矿产资源的方便之门。


For example, instead of making an effort to foster peace in Sudan, as a permanent, veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council should, China’s deep involvement with Sudan, through the provision of oil infrastructure and weapons, actually prolonged the Darfur conflict.	比如说中国非但没有致力于维护苏丹和平，相反作为一个联合国安理会常任理事国，中国借助石油设施和武器而对苏丹的深度介入实际上延长了达尔富尔冲突。


A letter to Chinese officials, signed by many members of the US Congress, and a report by Amnesty International state that China exported weapons to Sudan in violation of UN resolutions.	一封由多位美国国会议员联名签署的致中国官员的信，以及由大赦国际所撰写的报告都表明中国违反了联合国禁止向苏丹提供武器的决议。


The Oscar-winning film director Steven Spielberg embarrassed China by resigning from an advisory post for the 2008 Beijing Olympics because of its support for the government in Khartoum, calling the Chinese games the “genocide Olympics.”	由于中国支持喀土穆政府，奥斯卡奖得主斯皮尔伯格不但辞去了2008年北京奥运会的顾问一职，使中国蒙羞，还将这场运动会称之为“种族灭绝奥林匹克”。


As Qaddafi fought his opponents this summer, ten states in southern Sudan broke away, claiming independence as the 54th country on the African continent.	在今年夏天卡扎菲与反对派混战的时候，南部苏丹的十个州也宣布独立，成为非洲大陆的第54个国家。


Roughly 80% of Sudan’s oil production of 490,000 barrels per day is concentrated in South Sudan.	苏丹每日49万桶的石油产量中有80%来自南部。


In 2010, China imported almost half of this output, roughly 250,000 barrels per day, which accounts for about 5% of China’s oil imports.	2010年中国从苏丹进口了25万桶石油，约占其总产量的一半，相当于中国石油总需求量的5%。


Given its support for the brutal national government in Khartoum, China is now desperately trying to repair relations with South Sudan, so that it can continue to exploit the new country’s oil reserves.	鉴于其过去对残暴的喀土穆政府的支持，中国目前正想尽办法与南苏丹修复关系，以确保能继续开发这个新生国家的石油储备。


Like Sudan, Angola, Africa’s second largest oil producer, has experienced continued conflict for decades.	跟苏丹类似的还有安哥拉这个曾经陷入数十年武装冲突的非洲第二大石油生产国。


It was subject to UN sanctions until 2002.	该国在2002年遭到联合国制裁。


Yet, during the years of Angola’s pariah status, China provided large-scale infrastructure finance in return for oil.	但在安哥拉混乱期间，中国用大笔基础设施建设资金换取了大量石油。


Today, China is the second biggest destination for Angolan oil (the US, which jumped on the bandwagon after sanctions were lifted, is the largest).	如今中国也是安哥拉石油的第二大出口目的地（在制裁撤消之后的石油开采热潮中美国得以介入并晋身第一大进口国）。


Indeed, Angola produces more oil for China than Saudi Arabia does, and, at times, as many as 100,000 Chinese workers have been working on Angolan infrastructure projects.	事实上安哥拉向中国提供的石油供应超过沙特阿拉伯，而与此同时，超过10万名中国工人也在参与安哥拉基础设施建设。


China has chosen a high-risk path – ignoring human rights and violating UN sanctions – to secure the energy and other resources needed to sustain its economy’s rapid growth.	中国选择了一条高风险的道路——将人权和联合国制裁置诸脑后——以此来确保本国工业迅速增长所需的能源以及其他资源供应。


It is a choice that neither befits one of the permanent members of the Security Council, nor demonstrates China’s readiness to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community.	这不是一个跟安理会常任理事国地位相称的选择，也无法体现中国作为国际社会中负责任成员的角色。


China’s willingness to arm and defend African dictators, even in the teeth of UN sanctions, as in Libya, undermines its claim to a “peaceful rise.”	中国武装和维护非洲独裁者的意愿，甚至像在利比亚那样罔顾联合国制裁的行为将使其宣称的“和平崛起”大打折扣。


Given China’s Libyan duplicity, the world should now determine whether it is a country that obeys international rules only when doing so suits its interests.	鉴于中国在利比亚的两面派行为，全世界如今都应当思考它是否只是个在国际规则符合其利益时才服从这些规则的国家。


China’s AIDS Crisis	中国的艾滋病危机


It is rare for a foreign doctor to get to China’s rural areas, where its AIDS epidemic was born and takes a horrible toll.	外国医生一般很少会到中国的农村，传染性爱滋病在那里流行肆虐，夺去了很多无辜的生命。


But recently, two nurses and I ventured into a poor farming area, Nizui in Hubei Province, as part of a Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) team to visit the Liu family and evaluate their 7-month-old baby.	但不久前，我和两位护士随无国界医生组织的医疗队来到了湖北泥嘴的贫困山村，走访了那里一户刘姓家庭，看望了他们只有7个月大的小孩。


The child was the size of a two month old, but his eyes held the gaze of an 80-year-old man long acquainted with extreme suffering.	那孩子身材只有两个月大，可眼神却像八旬老翁一样充满了极度的苦痛。


The baby was dying of AIDS.	他正在艾滋病的边缘垂死挣扎。


His parents, aunts, and uncles were also HIV-positive.	他的父母、阿姨和叔叔的HIV检测也都呈阳性。


The Liu family is one of thousands of poor farming families in China’s interior who contracted HIV through contaminated blood donations during the 1990’s, when under-regulated for-profit blood banking companies reused needles and transferred blood from infected donors to clean donors after extracting the plasma.	刘姓家庭不过是20世纪90年代在被污染的献血过程中感染艾滋病的成千上万穷苦农民家庭中的一员，那个时候，管理不善的赢利性血库组织重复使用针头，在血浆采集后把感染者身上的血液输到了健康的献血者身上。


The Chinese Health Ministry recently put the total number of HIV/AIDS cases at 840,000, although most experts believe that the true number is much higher.	中国卫生部最近公布了总数达840，000例的HIV/艾滋病汇总结果，但多数专家相信，实际的数字比这还要大的多。


Some believe that by 2010, the number of infected Chinese may reach 10 million.	有人甚至认为到2010年，中国人的感染总数可能会达到1000万。


After years of taking a passive, low-profile approach to the epidemic, health officials have stepped up their anti-HIV campaign.	在连续多年采取消极、低调的策略之后，卫生部官员终于加大了反艾滋病的力度。


Since 80% of HIV/AIDS patients reside in the countryside, greater access to health care in these areas has become a priority.	由于80%的HIV/艾滋病患者处在乡下，对这些地区的卫生保健工作就成了当务之急。


This past July, during the highly publicized 15th International AIDS Conference in Bangkok, Premier Wen Jiabao declared all-out war against the burgeoning epidemic.	今年7月，受到高度关注的曼谷第15届国际艾滋病大会召开期间，温家宝总理宣布中国将全力制止艾滋病的蔓延。


Earlier this year, the government promised blood-products screening, free voluntary HIV testing, and free medicine for the poor.	今年早些时候，政府承诺要开展血液制品检测、提供自愿免费的HIV病毒测试，以及为贫困人口免费发放治疗艾滋病的药品。


This new anti-HIV/AIDS campaign, which the international community has lauded, is more open and proactive than before.	此次新的反HIV/艾滋病攻势得到了国际社会的广泛赞誉，它们确实比以前显得更加开放和积极。


But it must still operate in the context of a closed society, where government control over the media limits the flow of information necessary to deal with any public health epidemic.	可这次行动也还是在封闭的社会环境中进行，而在这样的环境下，政府对媒体的控制限制了有效应对公众健康传染病所必需的信息流通。


Moreover, it is unclear how care will be delivered to the rural front lines, where the old system of clinics based in Peoples’ Communes collapsed with the de-collectivization of agriculture.	不仅如此，我们还不清楚中国预备怎样把医疗护理送到农村的艾滋病前沿，因为人民公社解体后，老的卫生防疫站体系早就随着农业集体化的崩溃不复存在了。


To be effective, clinics in areas where HIV/AIDS is prevalent must provide patients with the same standard of care that is offered for other health conditions.	为了确保治疗效果，HIV/艾滋病流行地区的卫生防疫站必须给艾滋病人提供和其它人一样的医疗条件。


Unfortunately, the door to such access remains largely closed, partly because China was initially reluctant to allow overseas groups into their hinterlands to assist.	可不幸的是，这在多数情况下的确很难实现，其中的部分原因是中国开始时并不希望海外组织进入自己的内陆地区提供协助。


Nonetheless, local and foreign NGO’s are now starting to play a role in filling the gap between government policies and front-line healthcare delivery.	不过，当地和国外的非政府机构现在也开始在弥合国家政策和一线医疗条件的差距中发挥作用。


In May 2003, MSF was authorized to set up an HIV/AIDS clinic in Xiangfan, Hubei Province.	2003年5月，无国界医生组织得到许可，在湖北省襄樊地区设立一家HIV/艾滋病诊所。


On my recent visit, I met Mr. Du, a thin-framed, HIV-positive farmer who lost his wife to AIDS last year and was desperate to prevent his infected 7-year-old son from meeting the same fate.	不久前到那里时，我碰到了杜先生，一位HIV检测呈阳性的瘦瘦的中国农民。 他的妻子去年刚死于艾滋病，他拼命想保住感染的7岁儿子，不让他也遭受同样的厄运。


He had been taking the boy all over China by train, bus, and truck in search of help.	为了寻求帮助，他带着孩子、坐着火车、汽车和卡车走遍了全中国。


Last month alone, they visited five large cities without success.	仅仅在上月一个月，他们就走访了五大城市，可并没有收到任何效果。


The chance that Mr. Du, and those like him, will find help in China is slim; at present, most clinics and hospitals are not adequately prepared to treat HIV-infected patients.	杜先生和像他一样的人在中国得到帮助的可能性是微乎其微的，目前，多数诊所和医院都还没有做好准备，收治艾滋病毒感染的病人。


Treatment is extremely limited where it is available.	就算能治的地方，条件也非常有限。


For example, Xiangfan’s Infectious Diseases Hospital is the prefecture’s only health facility where HIV/AIDS patients can be admitted.	举例来讲，襄樊传染病医院是该地区唯一一家能接收HIV/艾滋病患者的医疗机构。


On paper, the hospital appears well staffed and adequately equipped, but on my rounds there, I found the halls and wards deserted and barren.	单从纸面上看，这家医院似乎人员充足，设备先进，可我一到那里，就发现大厅和病房几乎空无一人。


Few therapeutic and diagnostic options were available.	那里总共也没有几种诊断和治疗的设备。


Even a basic test like a CAT scan would require transport to another regional hospital.	即使像断层扫描这样最基本的检查，也需要转到该地区的其它医院来进行。


But under-equipped hospitals may not be the greatest obstacle to controlling China's AIDS crisis.	可医院设备不全还不是控制中国艾滋病危机的最大障碍。


Equally harmful are the government’s sensitivity to its own policy failures and the stigma attached to a disease that is often sexually transmitted.	同样有害的还有政府对政策失误的敏感和艾滋病通过性行为传播的恶名。


Indeed, information is so limited and the stigma so strong that ordinary people – and sometimes medical personnel – often ostracize AIDS patients.	实际上，信息匮乏和与艾滋病相关的恶名已经到了令人发指的程度，以致于艾滋病人受到普通人乃至医务人员的排斥都成了家常便饭。


Patients who do receive care are often treated with substandard, even harmful, medicine.	接受治疗的病人用药一般不合规范，甚至可能有害。


According to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, patients in China can have a 40-50% chance of being sold fake over-the-counter remedies and an even higher chance of being sold fake prescription drugs.	据国际制药工业协会联合会统计，中国病人有40-50%的机会在药店里买到假药，而处方药造假的比例比这还要高。


Some of these counterfeit products contain toxic ingredients.	有些假药中甚至含有一些有毒的物质。


Foreign NGOs such as MSF insist on using medications that are up to World Health Organization standards, but the Chinese government insists that such restrictive measures are excessive.	像无国界医生组织这样的国外非政府组织坚持使用的药品必须达到国际卫生组织的标准，但中国政府坚持这样的限制措施根本无法实现。


Although MSF uses its own drug supply, Chinese patients still often buy medicine with unknown ingredients and efficacy on the street.	尽管无国界医生组织启用了自己的药品库，但中国病人还是经常在街上买到成分和药效不明的产品。


Safety regulations must, at a minimum, be applied to the prescription of the anti-retroviral medications that fight HIV, because such drugs are extremely sensitive to dosage changes and interactions with other medicines.	最低限度要对治疗HIV病毒的抗逆转录酶药物采取安全措施，因为这种药对剂量变化和与其它药的相互作用极其敏感。


Improper use of these medicines fosters HIV resistance and provides little therapeutic value for patients.	不恰当的用药会导致艾滋病毒产生耐药性，对病人的临床治疗也没有任何好处。


There is no quick-fix solution to ending China’s AIDS crisis.	结束中国的艾滋病危机没有任何捷径。


Officials there must focus not only on developing a pragmatic, realistic healthcare infrastructure in rural areas, but also on bringing about greater openness in China’s media in order to spread life-saving public information.	那里的官员不仅要关注在农村地区建立起切实可行的医疗卫生体系，同时还要加大中国媒体的开放程度，只有这样，拯救生命的公众信息才能��到有效的传播。


Like all epidemics, HIV/AIDS in China is a public health crisis that can only be solved with the mass dissemination of accurate information.	和所有传染病一样，中国的HIV/艾滋病流行是一场公众健康的危机，这场危机只有通过准确信息的广泛传播才能得以遏制。


Transforming promises and policies into patient rights, awareness, and effective health care will undoubtedly take time, especially for a country as massive and lacking in transparency as China.	把承诺和政策转变为患者权利、认识和有效的医疗护理肯定需要时间，在中国这样庞大且缺乏透明度的国家恐怕尤其如此。


For the hundreds of thousands of HIV sufferers, this is likely to be more time than they have left.	对成百上千万艾滋病患者来讲，他们很可能已经等不了那么长的时间。


Kowtow or Cooperation in Asia?	亚洲：屈服还是合作？


TOKYO – When an American president’s first overseas trip following his re-election is to Asia, one can be sure that something big is afoot in the region.	东京—美国总统获得连任后的第一次出访来到了亚洲，这可以让你肯定，亚洲一定有大事在发生。


Indeed, Barack Obama’s decision to go first to impoverished and long-isolated Myanmar (Burma) attests to the potency of the changes underway in that country – and to US awareness of China’s efforts to shape an Asia that kowtows to its economic and foreign-policy interests.	事实上，奥巴马决定首先访问长期孤立的贫困国家缅甸证实了该国正在发生的深远变化，也证实了美国明白中国正在设法让亚洲屈服于其经济和外交政策利益。


Events at the ASEAN and East Asian leadership summits in Phnom Penh, the other key stop on Obama’s tour, confirmed this.	金边东盟和东亚领导人峰会——奥巴马亚洲之行的另一重要一站——证实了这一点。


At the ASEAN summit’s conclusion, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander who has ruled his country with an iron fist for three decades, closed the meeting by proclaiming that all of the leaders had agreed not to “internationalize” sovereignty disputes over islands in the South China Sea.	在东盟峰会上，前红色高棉指挥官、三十年来对柬埔寨实施着铁腕统治的首相洪森在闭幕词上说，所有领导人都同意不将南海岛屿主权争端“国际化”。


Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, present at the summit to sign new multi-million-dollar aid agreements with Cambodia, smiled and nodded in agreement at this apparent acceptance of Chinese wishes.	中国总理温家宝对这一显然让中国得偿所愿的决定微笑着点头。 在峰会中，温家宝签署了数千万美元的援助柬埔寨新协议。


Not so fast, said Filipino President Benigno S. Aquino III.	没有这么快，菲律宾总统阿基诺三世说。


No such agreement had been made.	并未达成这样的协议。


Hun Sen had mischaracterized the discussions among ASEAN’s leaders.	洪森对东盟领导人讨论结果的描述是错误的。


Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who was also present in Phnom Penh, agreed with Aquino.	也在金边现身的日本首相野田佳彦同意阿基诺的说法。


At the summit’s end, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore joined with Aquino in demanding that Hun Sen’s statement be amended.	峰会结束时，越南、马来西亚、印尼、文莱和新加坡都加入了阿基诺的行列，要求洪森改口。


All six of these states have been pushing China to negotiate with ASEAN a multilateral process to resolve the South China Sea territorial disputes.	这六个国家均在敦促中国与东盟展开多边谈判，解决南海领土争端。


China, dwarfing all of them, prefers bilateral talks.	而比它们大得多的中国则偏好双边谈判。


As Hun Sen’s behavior demonstrates, countries that are overly dependent on Chinese aid and diplomatic backing will harmonize their policies accordingly.	洪森的行为表明，过度依赖中国援助和外交支持的国家会据此调整政策。


For two decades, Myanmar behaved likewise, until Chinese overreach, particularly the now-abandoned Myitsone dam project, revealed in full the subservient relationship that China envisioned.	二十年来，缅甸的行为与柬埔寨别无二致，直到中国玩得太过火——特别是在最近废除的密松大坝项目上——其追求主导的野心昭然若揭。


Indeed, China’s arrogance – 100% of the power from the proposed dam was to be exported to China – was probably the key factor in precipitating Myanmar’s democratic political transition and new openness to the world.	事实上，中国的傲慢——要求密松大坝发电量100%输往中国——也许是促使缅甸发生民主政治转型、重新开放走向世界的关键因素。


But Asians must not misconstrue Obama’s visit.	但亚洲也不能曲解奥巴马的访问。


Although the US is certainly undertaking a strategic “pivot” to Asia, America alone cannot construct a viable security structure for the region.	尽管美国肯定会将亚洲作为战略“重点”，但光靠其一国是无法建立有效的地区安全结构的。


From India to Japan, every Asian country must play its part.	从印度到日本，每个亚洲国家都必须加入其中。


There is no alternative to this approach, because China’s rise has been accompanied by massive social and economic changes – in some instances dislocation – across the entire region.	没有替代方案，因为中国的崛起伴随着整个地区的大规模社会和经济变化——在某些情况下甚至是混乱。


Asia’s economies have, of course, become much more integrated in recent decades, particularly through production for global supply chains.	当然，亚洲经济体在近几十年中大大地一体化了，特别是通过全球供应链的产生。


But economic integration has not been matched diplomatically.	但外交并没有跟上经济一体化进度。


Even two of the region’s great democracies, Japan and South Korea, which have nearly identical strategic interests, have allowed an old territorial dispute – itself reflecting older unresolved animosities – to block closer cooperation.	即使两个战略利益几乎相同的亚洲民主大国——日本和韩国——也陷入了由来已久的领土争端——反映了由来更久的冲突——无法进行紧密合作。


China’s prolonged – and apparently contentious – leadership transition, punctuated by the purge of Bo Xilai, suggests that its leaders’ ability to continue to manage the country’s emergence as a great power is not entirely certain.	中国漫长——显然仍未完结——的领导权交接过程——被薄熙来事件打断——表明其领导人继续引导中国崛起为超级大国的能力并不板上钉钉。


That makes the absence of a widely accepted regional structure of peace all the more dangerous.	这使得能被广泛接受的亚洲地区和平结构的缺位变得尤其危险。


International orders emerge either by consensus or through force.	国际秩序的产生要么通过共识，要么通过武力。


The great task for Obama, incoming Chinese President, Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the new Japanese and South Korean leaders who will come to power following elections in December, and all ASEAN members is to ensure that consensus prevails in Asia without stoking China’s greatest strategic fear – encirclement.	奥巴马、即将上任的中国主席习近平、印度总理辛格、12月大选后上台的日本和韩国领导人、以及所有东盟成员国必须确保在亚洲形成共识的同时不让中国最大的战略隐忧——岛链——恶化。


As everyone in Asia should recognize, whenever communist China has deemed that it faced such a threat, it has resorted to war – in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979.	所有亚洲人都应该认识到，不管共产主义中国什么时候认为它面临威胁，它都会付诸武力解决——1950年的朝鲜、1962年的印度、1969年的苏联、1979年的越南都是如此。


But fear of provoking China should not stop Asia’s leaders from seeking a regional security consensus, such as the proposed code of conduct for disputes in the South China Sea.	但害怕挑衅中国���应该阻止亚洲领导人寻求地区安全共识，比如处理南海争端的解决方案。


Only the weakest of Asian states will submit willingly to Chinese hegemony – or, for that matter, to a Cold War-style US-led containment strategy.	只有最软弱的亚洲国家才会甘愿屈服于中国的霸权——或者与此相对的冷战式美国领导的遏制战略。


Indeed, the idea that Asian countries must choose between a Chinese or American future is false.	事实上，亚洲国家必须选择中国未来还是美国未来的观点是错误的。


But can Asia’s fear of hegemony and China’s fear of military encirclement be reconciled?	但亚洲对霸权的担忧以及中国对军事包围的担忧可以调和吗？


Only a shared sense of common purpose can prevent regional militarization.	唯有认识到共同追求才能避免地区军事化。


Some early steps in the right direction are visible.	正确方向的最初步骤已经可以看到。


The United States has joined several other countries in embracing a Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade pact linking the Americas with Asia.	美国与其他一些国家加入了泛太平洋合作伙伴关系协定，这是一个联系美洲和亚洲的自由贸易契约。


Japan’s ruling party and leading opposition party are coming around to support the idea, and Obama’s invitation to China to join suggests that the US is trying to forge regional consensus where it can.	日本执政党和最大反对党均支持该协定，奥巴马邀请中国加入的举动表明美国在可行的时候也在试图打造地区共识。


For now, however, China has other ideas.	不过，在当下，中国又其他想法。


It has pressed ASEAN to establish a trade zone that would include China but exclude the US and Japan.	它敦促东盟建立一个包括中国但不包括美国和日本的贸易区。


In any case, trade agreements, however beneficial, can do little to defuse Asia’s sovereignty disputes, and it is here – the greatest current source of regional tensions – that a shared common enterprise is not only possible, but also necessary if peace is to be preserved.	无论如何，贸易协定不管好处多大，都无法消弭亚洲主权争端，而在主权争端问题——地区紧张局势的罪魁祸首——上，共同目标不但可行，而且是维持和平的必要条件。


After all, no government in the region – whether a democracy like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, a one-party state like China and Vietnam, or a tiny monarchy like Brunei – can acquiesce on such issues and hope to survive.	毕竟，亚洲地区没有哪个国家——不管是日本、韩国、中国台湾、菲律宾这样的民主政体，还是中国和越南这样的一党执政国家，抑或文莱这样的微型君主国家——可以在默许这类问题的情况下生存下去。


Such diplomatic realism need not lead to zero-sum outcomes, as the example of European integration demonstrates.	如此外交现实主义并不一定导致零和结果，欧洲一体化进程就是明证。


Just as the European Coal and Steel Community preceded today’s European Union, all of Asia would benefit from embracing shared development (without any renunciation of sovereignty claims) of the rich maritime resources that, in several cases, are fueling the sovereignty disputes.	正如欧洲煤炭和钢铁共同体成为了今天的欧盟，所有亚洲都能从共同开发丰富的海洋资源（不抛弃任何主权主张）中获益，尽管这一再成为地区争端的导火索。


China’s Antifragile Ambitions	中国的抗脆弱之路


HONG KONG – China has once again reached a crossroads on its journey toward inclusive, sustainable prosperity.	香港——中国实现包容性可持续繁荣的征程再次面临十字路口。


At the Chinese Communist Party’s congress in November, the new leadership was tasked with plotting the country’s path for the next ten years, which entails modernizing China’s social, political, and economic systems within the constraints of its history and changing geopolitical context.	去年十一月中国共产党代表大会上选出的新一届领导班子，一方面必须面对中国历史和千变万化的地缘政治的限制， 另一方面必须描绘中国未来十年蓝图，并担当实现中国社会、政治和经济体制现代化的重任。


By any standards, the reform agenda is ambitious – especially given a fragile and unaccommodating external environment.	无论以何种标准衡量，用雄心勃勃来形容中国的改革目标都毫不过分——尤其是考虑到冷漠而脆弱的外部环境。 今后十年，中国领导人必须设计并贯彻改革来打击腐败；


Within the next decade, China’s leaders must design and implement reforms to combat corruption; support migration to cities (such as liberalizing the house-registration system); promote technological innovation; rebalance sources of economic growth; raise environmental and labor standards; and build the country’s social-welfare system, including health care, education, and social security.	提高环境和劳工标准； 建立包括医疗、教育和社会保障在内的全国社会保障体系。


To ensure a system’s sustainability, its design must account for what Nassim N. Taleb called rare “black swan” events – which, as the global economic crisis demonstrated, do occur, with devastating consequences.	为确保实现可持续发展，设计制度时必须考虑到纳西姆•塔勒布提出的所谓罕见的“黑天鹅”事件。 全球经济危机爆发证明“黑天鹅”事件的确会发生，并造成灾难性后果。


But measures to make systems more “resilient” or “robust” would be incomplete.	但仅有增强系统“弹性”或“活力”的措施是远远不够的。


They should not only be able to withstand volatility; they should be primed to profit from stress and chaos.	系统不仅应该能够承受波动，还应该在压力和混乱中不断成熟。


Recently, Taleb coined the term “antifragile” to describe a system that benefits from inherent uncertainty, volatility, and disorder.	塔勒布发明的“抗脆弱性”一词，是形容在本质上不确定、波动和无序的环境中可以不断自我完善的系统。


He pointed out that, while rigid systems may seem more stable, they are not equipped to cope with unexpected shocks, making them fragile in the long run.	他指出，尽管僵硬的系统看似更稳定，但却无法经受住意外的冲击，因而从长远来看其实很脆弱。


By contrast, frequent exposure to localized, temporary volatility forces systems to become more dynamic and flexible, enhancing their capacity to thrive under pressure.	相反，经常性的局部及临时波动会迫使系统变得更加灵活高效，从而获得在压力下实现繁荣昌盛的能力。


Given this, rather than allowing demands for maximum efficiency to push structures to their limits, redundancies (equivalent capabilities implemented in multiple ways) should be built into systems.	有鉴于此，与其为追求效率最大化而将结构推向极限，还不如在系统中事先留出弹性空间（以多种方式体现出同样的功能）。


These low-cost measures nurture long-term antifragility, while capturing future upside gains that could compensate for black swan events.	上述低成本的措施不仅能够逐渐培育出长期的抗脆弱能力，同时能够获得足以��补黑天鹅事件的正面收益。


Antifragility is crucial in large economies like China, where administration is largely centralized, but activities are dispersed among families, civil society, markets, and the various levels of government.	抗脆弱性对中国这样的大国至关重要，因为中央政府行政权力相对集中，但日常活动主体却分散在家庭、民间团体、市场和各级地方政府。