In all of its decentralized modes of operation, Bin Laden mainly played the role of inspirational guide and iconic figurehead – a role better played when dead by American guns than alive, hiding from them.	在所有这些分散化的运作模式中，本·拉登主要担任负责引导和鼓舞人心的标志性代表人物——死于美军之手比活着东躲西藏更有利于完成这样一项任务。


Consider Sayyid Qutb, the Islamist intellectual who influenced Bin Laden and others.	比如影响本·拉登和其他势力的伊斯兰知识分子赛义德·库特布。


Qutb was executed by Gamel Abdel Nasser’s dictatorship in Egypt in August 1966, in an attempt to reduce his influence.	为削弱其影响，库特布于1966年8月在埃及被加梅尔·纳赛尔的独裁政权执行死刑。


That tactic backfired badly.	这一举动产生了惊人的反作用。


Of the 98 fellow Muslim Brotherhood prisoners with whom Qutb discussed his new confrontational ideology in 1964, 35 were strongly supportive, 23 strongly opposed, and 50 hesitant.	在1964年与库特布讨论其全新对抗理念的共98名穆斯林兄弟会犯人中，35人强烈支持，23人坚决反对，其余50人举棋不定。


Despite his intellectual status and prestige, Qutb had failed to persuade the majority of like-minded inmates under conditions of repression.	尽管拥有知识份子的威望和地位，库特布仍然未能在高压环境下说服绝大多数与他志同道合的犯人。


But, no sooner was Qutb the intellectual executed than Qutb the grand martyr was born.	但就在知识分子库特布被处决之日，伟大的烈士库特布浴火重生。


His supporters soon numbered in the thousands, rather than the dozens, and he came to inspire generations, not just individual inmates.	他的支持者很快就从区区几十发展到数以千计，而受他鼓舞的也从几名囚犯发展到几代人。


Moreover, Qutb was executed by an Arab Nationalist Muslim leader, whereas Bin Laden was killed by US Navy Seals.	此外，库特布被阿拉伯民族主义穆斯林领袖处决，而杀死本·拉登的则是美国的海豹突击队。


That makes a significant difference in the Muslim world.	这在穆斯林世界中有着很大的不同。


Imprisonment, followed by recantation of violence, has become almost a trend in several jihadist groups, notably the 20,000-strong Egyptian Islamic Group, factions of the al-Jihad Organization in Egypt, and smaller groups like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.	遭到监禁后公开宣布放弃暴力，已近乎成为几个圣战组织，特别是拥有20，000多人的埃及伊斯兰组织、埃及圣战组织分部和利比亚伊斯兰战斗组织等小型组织的一种倾向。


Leading figures in armed Islamist movements have not only abandoned political violence, but have also de-legitimized it as a means for social and political change after spending periods in prison.	伊斯兰运动领导人不仅放弃政治暴力，而且在度过一段铁窗生涯后承认以暴力实现社会和政治变革为非法。


For example, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl), an Al Qaeda ideologue for a decade, published several books denouncing armed activism, both theologically and on tactical grounds, after spending several years in prison.	比如在数十年时间里一直扮演基地组织理论家角色的赛义德·伊玛目·谢里夫被关押几年后就出版了几本在宗教和技术层面谴责激进武装的著作。


The same applies to the Islamic Group, a movement implicated in violent acts in almost a dozen countries throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, including armed insurgency in Egypt, bombings in the United States and Croatia, assassination attempts in Ethiopia, and training camps in Afghanistan.	20世纪80到90年代曾牵涉到十几个国家的暴力活动（包括埃及的武装叛乱、美国和克罗地亚的炸弹爆炸、埃塞俄比亚的暗杀行动和阿富汗训练营）的好战组织伊斯兰集团也属于这种情况。


In the 2000’s, the imprisoned leadership of the Group produced more than 25 books aimed at de-legitimizing political violence as a method for change.	21世纪，该组织被监禁领袖出版了超过25本旨在谴责以政治暴力为变革手段的著作。


Eliminating the “spiritual guide” (as opposed to the organizational leaders) of a militant group might be perceived as a political victory for a government in the short term, but it probably makes a comprehensive de-radicalization process less likely, and it will not necessarily mean the end of the organization in question.	消灭好战组织的“精神领袖”（而不是组织首脑）可能被政府视为一种短期的政治胜利，但这也许会令全面的去激进化进程更加被动，而且也不一定就意味着这个恐怖组织的结束。


For long-term results, capture is almost always more effective than killing.	要想取得长期的效果，抓捕几乎总比杀死更为有效。


Wasting Food in a Hungry World	在饥饿的世界中浪费粮食


OTTAWA – One-quarter of all the food in the world is lost each year, owing to inefficient harvesting, inadequate storage, and wastage in the kitchen.	渥太华——由于收割低效、仓储不足和厨房浪费，世界每年都有四分之一的粮食被白白浪费掉。


Halve that waste, and the world could feed an extra billion people – and make hunger yesterday’s problem.	如果能让浪费减半，世界可以额外养活10亿人——让饥饿成为昨天的记忆。


The extent of food loss is particularly galling in view of a new global study on food security from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.	新发布的联合国粮农组织粮食安全全球研究显示粮食损失的程度是极其惊人的。


According to the FAO, 57 developing countries have failed to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of hungry people by this year.	据联合国粮农组织统计，57个发展中国家未能实现今年饥饿人口比例减半的千年发展目标。


One in every nine people on the planet – 795 million in all – still goes to sleep hungry.	地球上有九分之一的人口——总数高达7. 95亿——仍然每天饿着肚子睡觉。


Of course, there has also been remarkable progress: over the last 25 years, the world has fed an extra two billion people, and – for all the 57 failures – the developing world as a whole has almost halved its hunger rate.	其间当然也不乏显著的进步：过去25年里，世界多养活了20亿人口——尽管有57个国家未能实现目标——但发展中国家整体饥饿率已经下降了近一半左右。


But the challenge is to sustain the progress: by 2050, demand for food will have nearly doubled.	但难就难在要保持这种进展：到2050年，世界将出现接近翻番的粮食需求。


One reason is that by then the world will have added another two billion mouths to feed; a second reason will be the growing appetite of a surging new middle class.	原因之一是届时世界将额外增加20亿人需要供养； 另一个原因是快速增长的新兴中产阶级胃口越来越高。


At the moment, the UN is considering 169 new development targets to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (hunger is one target area, among many).	目前，联合国正在考虑接替千年发展目标的169个全新发展目标（饥饿是其中一个目标领域）。


These targets are vitally important, because they will determine how more than $2.5 trillion in development money is spent on everything from climate change to malaria.	这些目标极为重要，因为它们将决定超过2. 5万亿美元的发展资金如何分配给从气候变化到疟疾等诸多发展目标。


My think tank, the Copenhagen Consensus Center, therefore asked 60 teams of top economists to assess which proposed targets will do the most good – and which will not.	我所在智库哥本哈根共识中心因此邀请由60位顶尖经济学家组成的团队来评估拟议中的哪些目标能发挥最大作用——以及哪些发挥的作用较小。


Our research on food security shows that there are smart ways to feed many more on the planet – but they have little to do with the campaigns against waste seen in most of the rich world.	我们对粮食安全的研究显示有更明智的方式来养活地球上的更多人口——但这与多数富裕国家开展的反浪费运动关系不大。


In the rich world, the focus is on food wasted by the consumer.	富裕国家重点关注被消费者浪费的食品。


This makes sense: more than half of the rich world’s losses take place in its kitchens (basically because we can afford it).	这样做是有道理的：富裕国家超过一半的损失来自于厨房（主要因为我们承受得了）。


In Britain, for example, the greatest waste is in salads, vegetables, and fruits – luxuries when compared with the cheap calories contained in the grains and tubers consumed throughout the developing world.	比方说在英国，沙拉、蔬菜、水果等构成最大的浪费——相比整个发展中世界所消费的谷物及薯类所含的廉价热量堪称奢华。


Smaller households in rich countries waste more per person, because it is harder to put everything to use, while richer households add waste when they can afford to buy extra “just to be on the safe side.”	富裕国家小家庭人均浪费更多，因为很难做到物尽其用，而富裕家庭“仅为安全起见”额外采购导致了浪费的增加。


By contrast, the world’s hungry poor waste very little, simply because they cannot afford to.	相比之下，世界上饥饿的穷人浪费非常之少，仅仅因为这样的浪费他们无法承受。


In Africa, daily food waste averages 500 calories per person – but consumers account for only 5% of this loss.	在非洲，餐厨垃圾每天人均浪费500卡路里的热量——但消费者仅占上述浪费总额的5%。


More than three-quarters of the waste occurs well before the kitchen, in inefficient agriculture, because birds and rats eat crops during harvest, for example, or pests spoil grain stores.	超过四分之三的浪费发生在厨房之前，因为农业效率低下，收割期鸟类和老鼠偷吃农作物，或者粮食储备被害虫糟蹋。


There are many remedies for this kind of waste – from the “curing” of roots and tubers to minimize damage, to more expensive refrigeration.	此类浪费有诸多补救办法——从腌制根茎以期减少损失，到更加昂贵的冷藏。


So why aren’t these technologies – widely used in richer countries – adopted in the developing world?	那么为什么这些在富裕国家被广泛采用的技术并没有运用到发展中国家？


The answer is a lack of infrastructure.	答案是基础设施的缺乏。


If there are no proper roads linking fields to markets, farmers cannot easily sell their surplus produce, which may then spoil before it can be eaten.	如果没有恰当的道路连接田头和市场，农民就不能轻松出售自己的剩余产品，以致于它们在被食用之前就可能腐败掉。


Improving road and rail capacity enables farmers to reach buyers – and fertilizer and other agricultural inputs to reach farmers.	改善公路及铁路运力使农民能够接触到购买者——也有利于化肥和其他农业生产资料被运送到农民手中。


Supplying reliable electricity permits grains to be dried and vegetables to be kept cool.	可靠的电力供应确保谷物得到干燥、蔬菜得到冷藏。


Economists from the International Food Policy Research Institute estimate that the overall cost of approximately halving post-harvest losses in the developing world would be $239 billion over the next 15 years – and would generate benefits worth more than $3 trillion, or $13 of social benefits for every dollar spent.	国际粮食政策研究所的经济学家预测在发展中国家实现后收获期损失减半的总成本今后15年将达2，390亿美元——但能带来超过3万亿美元（也就是1美元成本比13美元社会效益）的收入。


This would make food more affordable for the poor.	这样穷人就更能买得起食物。


By 2050, better infrastructure could mean that 57 million people – more than the current population of South Africa – would no longer be at risk of hunger, and that about four million children would no longer suffer from malnutrition.	到2050年，改建后的基础设施可能意味着5，700万人——超过南非目前人口的总和——将不再忍受饥饿，并且约400万儿童将摆脱营养不良。


Most of these gains would be in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the world’s most deprived regions.	世界最贫困的撒哈拉以南非洲和南亚地区将是最大的受益者。


But there is an even better investment.	但还有更好的投资方向。


We can achieve three times the economic benefits, and even larger reductions in the number of people at risk of hunger, if we focus on improving food production rather than just on preventing food losses.	如果着眼于提高粮食产量而非仅仅预防粮食损失，我们就可以实现三倍的经济效益，并进一步减少受饥饿威胁的人口数量。


Today, only $5 billion is spent annually on research to improve the seven major global food crops, and just one-tenth of that is targeted to help small farmers in Africa and Asia.	如今，每年只有50亿美元被用于研究改良全球七大主要粮食作物，这当中又仅有十分之一被用来定向帮助非洲和亚洲的小农。


Investing an extra $88 billion in agricultural research and development over the next 15 years would increase yields by an additional 0.4% each year.	未来15年在农业研发领域额外投入880亿美元能额外增加每年0. 4%的产量。


That might not sound like very much, but the reduction in prices and improvements in food security would help almost everyone.	这听上去似乎微不足道，但粮价下降及粮食安全改善将为所有人带来好处。


It would be worth nearly $3 trillion in social good – yielding an enormous $34 of benefits for every dollar spent.	这能产生近3万亿美元的社会效益——即单位美元投入能够带来34美元的巨额回报。


Hunger is a complex problem, exacerbated by financial pressures, volatile commodity prices, natural disasters, and civil wars.	饥饿的问题非常复杂，财政压力、商品价格波动、自然灾害和内战都会导致其恶化。


But we could take an enormous step toward winning the global campaign against malnutrition, simply by investing in improved infrastructure and in agricultural research and development.	但只要坚持对改善基础设施和农业研发投资，我们就可以在赢得全球反营养不良的战争中迈出重要的一步。


Water for All	全民水源


This month, water once again takes center stage at the Fourth World Water Forum in Mexico City.	水的问题再次成为本月在墨西哥城举行的第四届世界水资源论坛的中心议题。


It is an opportune moment: while much of the world’s attention has been fixed on issues of energy supply and security, hundreds of millions of people in the developing world continue to see the supply and security of fresh water as equally, if not more, important.	这是一个有利时机：虽然全球大多数人的注意力集中在能源供应和安全问题上，但发展中国家仍有数以亿计的人口同样关注（甚至更加重视）淡水的供应和保障问题。


Surveys undertaken by the World Bank in developing countries show that, when poor people are asked to name the three most important concerns they face, “good health” is always mentioned.	世界银行在发展中国家进行的调查显示，在要求贫穷人口说出他们面临的三大重要问题时，他们总是提到“健康”。


And a key determinant of whether they will have good health or not is access to clean water.	而他们是否拥有健康的关键就在于能否获得清洁的用水。


More than a billion people around the world today do not.	目前，全世界10多亿人都无法得到清洁的用水。


As a result, they are increasingly vulnerable to poor health.	因此，他们的健康日益受到威胁。


The World Bank estimates that by 2035, as many as three billion people, almost all of them in developing countries, could live under conditions of severe water stress, especially if they happen to live in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia.	世界银行估计，到2035年，多达30亿人可能在严重缺水的条件下生活，这些人几乎全部来自发展中国家，特别是非洲、中东或南亚。


This will cause obvious hardship, but it will also hold back the economic growth needed for millions of people to escape poverty.	这显然会带来苦难，还会阻碍经济发展，而发展正是成百上千万人摆脱贫困的关键。


In Latin America, about 15% of the population – roughly 76 million people – do not have access to safe water, and 116 million people do not have access to sanitation services.	在拉丁美洲，大约15%的人口—约7,600万人—无法得到安全的水源，而且有1. 16亿人享受不到卫生服务。


The figures are worse in Africa and parts of Asia.	在非洲和亚洲部分地区，这个数字更大。


This is a situation that few people in rich countries face.	这种情况富裕国家的人民是不会遇到的。


Generally, these countries’ citizens enjoy services that provide for all water needs, from drinking to irrigation to sanitation.	一般说来，这些国家的公民可以享受一整套的供水服务，从饮用到灌溉到卫生设备。


In addition, other water-related issues, such as the risks posed by flooding, have been reduced to manageable levels.	此外，其他有关水的问题，如洪灾所造成的风险，已经降低到了可以控制的水平。


Rich industrial countries have invested early and heavily in water infrastructure, institutions, and management capacities.	富裕的工业国家很早就在水利基础设施、机构和管理能力方面投入大笔资金。


The result, beyond the health benefits for all, has been a proven record of economic growth; one only has to look at investment in hydropower to see the positive impact of water management projects on many economies.	除了给全民健康带来的好处外，另外一个结果是切切实实的经济发展。 人们只要看看在水力发电方面的投资，就能够看到水利管理项目对很多国家产生的积极影响。


Granted, rich countries have a certain advantage: they benefit from generally moderate climates, with regular rainfall and relatively low risks of drought and flooding.	诚然，富裕国家有一些优势：它们一般气候适宜，雨量均匀，并且干旱和洪涝风险相对较低。


Even so, they are not immune to water-related disasters, as Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of New Orleans taught us.	即便如此，它们也并非不受与水有关的灾害影响，飓风卡特里娜对新奥尔良的破坏就是我们得到的一个教训。


But the impact of such events on poor countries is much greater.	可是，诸如此类事件对贫穷国家的影响要大得多。


Extreme rainfall variations, floods, and droughts can have huge social and economic effects and result in the large-scale loss of life.	极端的雨量变化、洪灾和干旱可能产生巨大的社会和经济影响，并导致很多人丧生。


The Gulf coast of Mexico and Central American countries has repeatedly experienced such tragedies, with poor communities the most vulnerable and the least able to cope.	墨西哥湾沿岸和中美洲国家多次经历了这种悲剧，贫困地区受到的损害最为严重，而其应对危险的能力却最低。


Ethiopia and Yemen are equally stark examples.	埃塞俄比亚和也门同样是典型的例证。


Ethiopia’s development potential is closely tied to seasonal rains, so high rainfall variation, together with lack of infrastructure, has undermined growth and perpetuated poverty.	埃塞俄比亚的发展潜力与季节性降雨密切相关，因此，极大的雨量变化和基础设施缺乏已经阻碍了发展，造成了持久的贫困。


A single drought can cut growth potential by 10% over an extended period.	仅一次干旱就可能使发展能力在很长一段时期内降低10%。


Yemen, for its part, has no perennial surface water; its citizens depend entirely on rainfall, groundwater, and flash flooding.	而也门没有可供常年使用的地表水，其公民用水完全依靠降雨、地下水和急流。


To move forward, developing countries need new water infrastructure and better management.	为了向前发展，发展中国家需要新的水利基础设施和更好的管理。


Any approach must be tailored to the circumstances of each country and the needs of its people, but there is no fundamental constraint to designing water development investments that ensure that local communities and the environment gain tangible and early benefits.	必须针对各国的具体情况及人民需求采取适当的措施，但是，在确保当地社会和环境及早取得切实利益方面，发展中国家规划水利发展的投资并没有根本性的束缚。


In some countries, new water infrastructure may mean canals, pumping stations, and levees.	在一些国家，新的水利基础设施可能指运河、抽水站和防洪堤。


Still others might need deeper reservoirs, more modern filtration plants, or improved water transport schemes.	而另一些国家则可能需要深挖水库、改进滤水设备或完善输水计划。


These can all potentially be designed to improve and expand water supplies for power generation, irrigation, and household and industrial use, while providing security against droughts and protection from floods.	这些措施都可以改善和增加发电、灌溉和家庭及工业用水的供应，同时提供防旱和防洪保障。


The key to successful increased investment in water infrastructure is an equally increased investment in water institutions.	成功增加水利基础设施投资的关键是同时增加对水利机构的投资。


Badly managed infrastructure will do little to improve peoples’ health or support economic growth, so water development and water management must go hand in hand.	管理不善的基础设施对改善人们的健康或支持经济增长毫无益处，因此，水利开发和水利管理必须齐头并进。


Water infrastructure can and must be developed in parallel with sound institutions, good governance, great attention to the environment, and an equitable sharing of costs and benefits.	水利基础设施能够而且必须与完善的机构、良好的管理、对环境的关注以及公平分担管理成本、享受管理效益实现同步发展。


A water investment policy that reduces the vulnerability of the poor and offers basic water security for all will require customized planning and an effective partnership of donor countries, developing country governments, the private sector, and local communities.	减轻贫困人口脆弱性和提供全民基本用水保障的水务投资政策需要捐助国、发展中国家、私营部门和地方社会的合理规划和有效合作。


Delegates to the World Water Forum will have ample opportunity to forge and/or strengthen these partnerships.	参加世界水资源论坛的代表将有足够的机会建立和/或加强这种合作关系。


If they succeed, the rewards for the world’s poor will be immense.	如果合作成功，对世界贫困人口的回报将是巨大的。


War and Peace and Water	战争、和平与水资源


WASHINGTON, DC – India is currently facing its worst water crisis in years, with an estimated 330 million people – one-quarter of its population – affected by severe drought.	华盛顿——印度正面临多年来最严重的水资源危机，约有3亿3000万人（占全国人口的1/4）面临严重干旱的影响。


Ethiopia is also dealing with its worst drought in decades, which has already contributed to the failure of many crops, creating food shortages that now affect around a tenth of the population.	埃塞俄比亚也面临着几十年来最严重的干旱，导致许多农作物歉收、由此造成的粮食短缺威胁着该国1/10左右的人口。


Under such circumstances, the risk of tension over resources is high.	在这样的情况下，为争夺资源造成局势紧张的危险性非常之高。


In the past, droughts of this severity have led to conflict and even wars between neighboring communities and states.	过去，如此程度的严重干旱曾导致临近社区与国家间爆发冲突乃至战争。


One of the first in recorded history erupted around 4,500 years ago, when the city-state of Lagash – nestled between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in modern-day Iraq – diverted water from its neighbor, Umma.	有记录历史以来的首次战争爆发于约4，500年前，当时位于现代伊拉克境内底格里斯和幼发拉底河之间的拉加什城邦曾想从其邻国乌玛引水。


Competition for water sparked violent incidents in ancient China and fueled political instability in Pharaonic Egypt.	古代中国曾因为争水引发了暴力事件，水资源短缺也在法老统治的古埃及助长了政治上的不稳定。


Today, actual wars between countries over water resources are uncommon, owing to improved dialogue and cross-border cooperation.	今天，因为争夺水资源而引发实际战争的情况已经十分罕见，因为对话和跨界合作的效率已经大幅提高。


But, within countries, competition for scarce water is becoming a more common source of instability and conflict, especially as climate change increases the severity and frequency of extreme weather events.	但在国家内部，争夺稀缺水资源正在成为动荡和冲突比较常见的来源，特别是当气候变化加剧了极端天气事件的频率和严重程度。


As we detail in our new report “High and Dry: Climate Change, Water and the Economy,” limited and erratic water availability reduces economic growth, induces migration, and ignites civil conflict, which fuels further potentially destabilizing migration.	正如我们在新报告“高纬度和干旱：气候变化、水资源和经济”中所提到的那样，有限和不稳定的水资源供应限制经济增长、诱发移民潮并导致内部冲突，而这又助长了可能进一步造成动荡的移民潮。


This cycle has been apparent in some regions for decades.	数十年来在某些地区这种循环已经显性化。


In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, periods of low rainfall over the last 20 years have often been followed by spikes in violence, civil wars, and regime change.	例如在撒哈拉以南非洲地区，过去20年中降雨量稀少期过后往往伴随着内战、政权更迭和暴力活动抬头。


And in many parts of rural Africa and India, a decline in rainfall has acted as a “push factor” for internal or cross-border migration to more water-abundant places, often cities, creating new social pressures as the numbers of displaced people grow.	在非洲和印度农村的许多地区，降雨量下降已经成为向城市等水资源较为丰富地区展开内部或跨境移民的“推动因素”，而随着流离失所人数的不断增加，新的社会压力由此产生。


In our report, we predict that water scarcity could act as a conflict-risk multiplier, fueling cycles of resource-driven conflict, violence, and displacement, especially in already water-stressed regions, such as the Middle East and the Sahel in Africa, where agriculture remains an important source of employment.	在我们的报告中，我们预测水资源短缺有可能成为爆发冲突的风险乘数，进而推动由资源驱动的流离失所、暴力和冲突，尤其是在水资源已经紧缺的地区，例如中东地区和非洲萨赫勒。 在上述地区，重要的就业来源依然是农业。


Fortunately, there is a way to avoid the cycle of poverty, deprivation, and conflict.	幸运的是，避免贫困、匮乏和冲突的恶性循环我们并非束手无策。


If countries take action now to implement effective water-management policies and practices, backed by well-designed incentives, they can not only reverse the slide toward water scarcity, but also raise their rates of economic growth by as much as six percentage points per year.	如果各国现在采取措施实行有效的水资源管理政策及方法，再辅之以精心设计的激励机制，他们不仅可以扭转堕入水资源短缺的窘境，而且可以让经济增长每年加快6个百分点之多。


One water-scarce country that has taken action to improve its resilience to climate change is Morocco.	采取措施改善其气候变化适应性的一个水资源短缺的国家是摩洛哥。


In years of low rainfall, Morocco’s river-basin authorities give the lowest priority to crop irrigation, the largest consumer of the country’s water.	在降雨量不足的年份，摩洛哥的河流流域管理部门并未将重点放在其国内居首的耗水大户农作物灌溉上。


But, of course, agriculture remains critical to feed the population.	当然，农业依然是养活民众的关键所在。


So the government has been investing in modernizing irrigation infrastructure to provide farmers with more efficient water services that enable them to adjust more easily to variations in water availability.	因此政府坚持投资进行灌溉基础设施现代化建设，为农民提供高效的水资源服务，从而使他们能轻松适应水资源供应的变化。


The Moroccan authorities are also working to improve groundwater governance, to avoid over-extraction.	摩洛哥当局同时也在改善地下水治理以避免过度开采现象。


Farmers engaged in rain-fed agriculture receive support that helps them to make better use of rainfall – such as through the introduction of climate-resilient practices like direct seeding – resulting in higher yields than traditional practices produce during dry years.	采用雨水灌溉的农户能够得到支持，以帮助他们对降雨进行更好的利用——例如通过引入直播等适应气候的先进方法——采用上述方法后，干旱年份的产量能比采用传统方法出现显著的提高。


The message from Morocco – and from our report – is that, with smart water policies and interventions, countries can ensure a climate-resilient, water-secure future.	来自摩洛哥——和我们报告——的信息显示，借助明智的水资源政策和干预手段，各国能够保证实现适应气候变化的安全的水资源未来。


At the core of effective water-management strategies will be improved planning for water-resource allocation, the adoption of incentives to increase efficiency, investment in infrastructure for improved water security, and better urban planning, risk management, and citizen engagement.	有效水资源管理战略的核心是改善水资源分配规划、通过激励机制提高效率、投资改善水资源安全的基础设施、制定更为完善的城市规划、风险管理和民众参与机制。


The recently created International High-level Panel on Water, comprising ten heads of state, will be promoting precisely this agenda to foster better water management globally.	最近组建的由十国首脑组成的国际高级水资源委员会就是负责推进上述议程，并在全球范围内促进更完善的水资源管理办法。


Of course, not every country will follow the same path in safeguarding a water-secure future.	当然，每个国家在捍卫资源安全的未来时所走的道路各不相同。


But, as countries develop their strategies, they can look to one another for ideas and insights into what works – and what doesn’t.	但在各国制定本国战略的时候，他们可以相互参考哪些理念和见解能产生实际效果——哪些不能。


With strong and prudent action, governments around the world can cope effectively with the natural limitations and uncertainties affecting water resources, ensuring that their people and economies are prepared for what might lie ahead.	世界各国政府可以采取谨慎有力的行动有效应对影响水资源安全的自然限制和不确定性，确保本国民众和国内经济为应对未来的形势做好准备。


Hard Wisdom for Scarce Water	稀缺的水的硬智慧


CAMBRIDGE – In California, residential consumers are being fined for wasting water.	剑桥—在加利福尼亚州，住宅消费者会因为浪费水而被罚款。


The goal is to combat a severe drought by reducing residential consumption by 20%.	这一规定的目标是通过将居民用水削减20%来对抗严重干旱。


The trouble is that residential water use accounts for less than 15% of total consumption.	麻烦在于居民用水只占总消费量的15%弱。


The rest is used mainly for agriculture.	其余用途主要是农业。


Even if the desired cuts are achieved, they will account for less than 3% of total demand – a drop in an otherwise empty bucket.	即使实现了预期的削减量，它们仍然只占总需求的不到3%，只不过是杯水车薪罢了。


Meanwhile, in China, some 30,000 workers are trying to change the weather, attempting to seed clouds from airplanes or using anti-aircraft guns to shoot shells into the air, hoping to coax some rain from the sky.	与此同时，在中国，30,000名工人正在试图改变天气，实施飞机人工降雨或用高射机枪发射凝结核，以期从天上“骗”点雨水下来。


There is no statistical proof that this type of weather manipulation works, but cloud seeders are also busy in the United States, mainly in the west.	没有统计证据表明这种天气操控方式有效，但人工造雨者在美国特别是美国西部也是十分繁忙。


These pointless policies are what I have come to call “political placebos”: attempts by governments to demonstrate to their citizens that they are doing something – anything! – to alleviate water shortages.	这些无用政策我称之为“政治安慰剂”：政府采取措施向公民证明他们正在做些什么——一切！ ——缓和水短缺。


Placebos may have their place in medicine, but when they distract from efforts to address the underlying malady, they can do more harm than good.	安慰剂在医学中有用，但如果影响到根治病灶的努力，它们就弊大于利了。


Measures like those in California are like instructing police officers to blare their sirens wherever they drive to create the impression that crime is being fought.	加州采取这样的措施就好比是让警察在开警车时大鸣警笛以营造他们正在于犯罪活动斗争的印象。


As climate change leads to deeper and more frequent droughts, the resulting water shortages will require new, sometimes difficult, solutions that go beyond futile attempts to placate the public.	是气候变化引起了更深、更频繁的干旱，由此造成的水短缺需要可能相当困难的新解决方案，光是抚慰公众是不够的。


The challenges are daunting.	挑战十分艰巨。


In many places, underground water is considered the property of the owner of the land where the water is extracted, even when a well’s user is tapping an aquifer that spreads across thousands of square miles.	在许多地区，地下水被视为属于采水地土地拥有者的产权，尽管水井用户是在绵亘数千平方英里的含水层上打水。


As a result, there is little incentive to conserve.	结果是人们几乎没有动力保护地下水。


Meanwhile, widespread pumping lowers the level of the entire aquifer, potentially allowing salt water to encroach.	与此同时，大量钻井降低了整个含水层，可能导致盐水入侵。


And, because this arrangement is tied to property rights, only the bravest of politicians dare to address it.	此外，由于这一安排与产权挂钩，只有最勇敢的政客才敢于解决它。


In some parts of California and Texas, a portion of the water supply is provided to consumers for almost nothing – delivered by a network of dams, reservoirs, and aqueducts that were built decades ago.	在加州和德克萨斯州的一些地方，部分水以几乎免费的形式供应给消费者——通过几十年前建造的水坝、水库和水渠供水。


The Hoover Dam, for example, which created Lake Mead, the largest reservoir in the US, was built in 1936 during the Great Depression as part of the New Deal.	比如，胡佛大坝（Hoover Dam）创造了美国最大的水库米德湖（Lake Mead），它建于大萧条期间，是罗斯福新政的一部分。


Even if the federal government had intended to get a return on its investment by selling the water from Lake Mead, the dam’s construction costs have long since been amortized.	即使联邦政府曾经想通过出售米德湖水获得投资回报，大坝的建设成本也早已收回。


Unlike other commodities, the price of water is very often a political decision, subject to the influence of interest groups that lobby for subsidies.	与其他大宗商品不同，水价常常是一个政治决定，受补贴游说利益集团的影响。


For example, most of the water used in agriculture in Texas and California is sold at a price below its cost.	比如，德州和加州大部分农业用水以低于成本的价格出售。


As a result, it is frequently wasted.	结果是浪费现象严重。


The cost for an acre-foot of water in Dallas or Austin is at least $150.	在达拉斯和奥斯丁，一英亩尺（acre-foot）水的成本至少为150美元。


Texas rice farmers, however, pay just $10, and every year they consume the equivalent of a five-foot flood.	但德州稻农只需要付10美元，而他们每年消费的水量相当于一场5英尺高的洪水。


Such a large quantity of water is not even necessary for rice farming; most of it is used to drown weeds.	即使是种稻，也不必消耗如此大量的水； 它们大部分被用来你淹死杂草了。


The US federal government needs to intervene in the water industry.	美国联邦政府需要干预水行业。


As long as these distortions persist, new technologies will struggle to compete.	只要这些扭曲状况存在，新技术就难以竞争。


Rationalizing the water sector would allow new investors to enter the market.	水部门的合理化将吸引新投资者进入市场。


Farmers in Texas and California need to stop growing rice, which should be imported from water-rich countries like Vietnam.	德州和加州农民需要停止种植水稻，而转为从越南等富水国家进口。


Instead, US farmers should be encouraged to shift to other crops, such as sesame, with the government sharing the cost of replacement machinery needed to cultivate and harvest them.	相反，美国应该鼓励农民转向芝麻等其他作物，由政府分担耕种和收获芝麻所需要的机器更换成本。


The adoption of technologies like drip irrigation would make current water use seem primitive and outdated.	滴管技术等科技的采用让当前的用水方式显得原始而陈旧。


The water sector should follow the example of the electric-power industry, where changes to federal regulations in the second half of the twentieth century allowed independent power producers to use existing transmission lines.	水部门应该效仿电力业的例子。 20世纪下半叶联邦电力监管改革允许独立发电商使用现有输电线路。


The deep price cuts and improved service ushered in by these regulatory changes prompted other countries to adopt the American model.	这些监管变化促使其他国家采取了美国模式，大减价和服务改善随之而来。


It is time to turn off the tap on subsidized water and find a real cure for persistent water shortages.	如今，我们应该关上补贴之水的龙头，为持久水短缺找到真正的药方。


Water as a Force for Peace	水，和平的力量


MUMBAI – The changing of the guard on the 38th floor of the United Nations building in New York, with António Guterres taking over for Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General, has taken place at a time when notions about peace and conflict are undergoing a subtle change.	孟买——纽约联合国大厦38层卫兵更换，以及安东尼奥·古特雷斯接替潘基文出任联合国秘书长，发生在一个和平与冲突理念正在发生微妙变化的时刻。


In particular, the role of resources – and especially water – is getting the recognition it deserves.	特别是资源——尤其是水资源的作用，正在逐步得到应有的认可。


This has been a long time coming.	我们为这一刻已经等了很久。


Both Ban and his predecessor, Kofi Annan, have argued for some two decades that protecting and sharing natural resources, particularly water, is critical to peace and security.	潘基文及其前任科菲·安南二十年前就已经提出保护和共享自然资源——尤其是水资源——对和平和安全起到至关重要的作用。


But it was not until last November that the issue gained widespread acknowledgement, with Senegal – that month’s UN Security Council president – holding the UN’s first-ever official debate on water, peace, and security.	但直到去年11月这个问题才得到广泛认可，当月联合国安理会轮值主席国赛内加尔主持召开了联合国有史以来首次有关水资源、和平与安全问题的正式辩论。


Open to all UN member states, the debate brought together representatives of 69 governments, which together called for water to be transformed from a potential source of crisis into an instrument of peace and cooperation.	辩论向所有联合国成员国开放，汇集了69国政府代表，他们共同呼吁将水资源从潜在的危机来源转变为和平合作工具。


A few weeks later, Guterres appointed Amina Mohammed, a former Nigerian environment minister, as his deputy secretary-general.	几个星期后，古特雷斯任命前尼日利亚环境部长阿米娜·穆罕默德担任副秘书长职务。


The growing recognition of water’s strategic relevance reflects global developments.	全球进步体现在对水资源战略重要性的认识不断深入。


In the last three years, the Islamic State (ISIS) captured the Tabqa, Tishrin, Mosul, and Fallujah dams on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.	过去三年来，伊斯兰国（ISIS）夺取了底格里斯和幼发拉底河流域的泰巴盖、提歇利、摩苏尔和费卢杰水坝。


ISIS subsequently lost control of all of them, but not before using them to flood or starve downstream populations, to pressure them to surrender.	伊斯兰国不久后失去了对所有这些水坝的控制，但却在失控前成功地利用它们来淹没或者饿死下游人口，迫使他们投降。


Many analysts hope that ISIS will finally be eliminated from Iraq and Syria in the next few months.	许多分析家希望今后几个月能将伊斯兰国从伊拉克和叙利亚消灭掉。


But that does not mean that the group will disband; on the contrary, it may well relocate to the border areas between Libya and Chad, putting West African cities and water installations at risk.	但这并不意味着该团体会解散； 恰恰相反，它可能迁移到利比亚和乍得边境地区，从而威胁到西非城市及其水利设施。


This tactic is not exclusive to ISIS.	并非只有伊斯兰国才使用这一策略。


Extremist groups in South Asia have also threatened to attack water infrastructure.	南亚极端势力团体同样威胁要袭击水利设施。


And of course state actors, too, can use water resources to gain a strategic advantage.	当然还有国家主体也可以利用水资源来夺取战略优势。


The importance of water in the twenty-first century – comparable to that of oil in the twentieth – can hardly be overstated.	21世纪水资源的重要性堪与二十世纪石油相媲美，其战略意义怎么强调都不为过。


Yet some strategic experts continue to underestimate it.	但某些战略专家却仍然对其予以低估。


The reality is that oil has alternatives like natural gas, wind, solar, and nuclear energy.	现实是石油具备像天然气、风能、太阳能和核能那样的替代品。


By contrast, for industry and agriculture as much as for drinking and sanitation, the only alternative to water, as former Slovenian President Danilo Türk once put it, is water.	而相比之下，就工业、农业、饮用和卫生等用途而言，就像斯洛文尼亚前总统达尼洛·蒂尔克曾经说过的那样，水资源的唯一替代品就是水资源。


The same is true for trade.	贸易的情况也同样如此。


Consider the Rio Chagres.	例如里约查格雷斯河。


While it may not be widely known, it is vitally important, as it feeds the Panama Canal, through which 50% of trade between Asia and the Americas flows.	虽然这条河可能不太出名，但却极其重要，因为它是巴拿马运河的水源，而巴拿马运河则承担着亚洲和美洲间50%的贸易运输任务。


There is no risk of the natural depletion of the river flow for the next hundred years, but, in the event of a security crisis in Central America, it could be taken over by rogue forces.	未来100年这条河没有自然干枯的危险，但如果中美地区爆发安全危机，它完全有可能被流氓势力所掌握。


The impact on the global economy would be enormous.	果真如此，对全球经济造成的影响将是巨大的。


The consensus on the need to protect water resources and installations in conflict zones is clear.	人们就保护冲突地区资源和水利设施所达成的共识是明确的。


What is less clear is how to do it.	不那么明确的是该怎么做。


Unlike medicines and food packets, water cannot be airdropped into conflict zones.	与药品和食品不同，无法通过空投的方式为冲突地区补水。


And UN Peacekeeping Forces are badly overstretched.	联合国维和部队保护水资源的力量严重不足。


The International Committee of the Red Cross does negotiate safe passage for technicians to inspect and repair damage to water pipes and storage systems in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine; but each passage needs to be negotiated with governments in conflict and rebel commanders – a long and cumbersome process.	红十字国际委员会确实通过谈判为技术人员开辟安全通道，以检查和修复伊拉克、叙利亚和乌克兰等国被损坏的水管和储水系统； 但��次通过都需要与冲突政府和叛军指挥官谈判——这是一个漫长而又繁琐的过程。


A better approach would be for great powers, with their considerable influence, to negotiate short-term ceasefires in areas experiencing protracted conflict, specifically to repair and restore water systems.	更好的方法是由大国利用自身影响力在长期冲突地区谈判实现短期停火，特别是为修理和恢复供水系统。


To pave the way for such an approach, however, the UN Security Council will have to declare water a “strategic resource of humanity” and adopt a resolution to protect water resources and installations, similar to Resolution 2286, adopted last May to protect medical facilities in armed conflicts.	但要为这样的策略铺路，联合国安理会必须宣布水资源为“战略人道主义资源”并通过像去年五月保护武装冲突地区医疗设施的2286号决议那样的法案来保护水资源和供水设施。


In the longer term, countries that share riparian systems will need to establish regional security arrangements to preserve and protect their resources.	从长远看，共享河流体系的国家需要达成地区安全协议，对共有的水资源进行维持和保护。


With collaborative management underpinning collective protection, water, often a source of competition and conflict, could become a facilitator of peace and cooperation.	通过以合作管理为基础的集体保护，时常沦为竞争和冲突源泉的水资源就会对和平与合作发挥促进作用。


Denis Sassou-Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, is at the forefront of this movement, by leading a group of eight governments toward the establishment of the Blue Fund for the Congo Basin.	刚果共和国总统德尼·萨苏-恩格索就处在水资源保护运动的前列，领导由八国政府组成的团体共同建立刚果盆地蓝色基金。


If successful, the Fund will help to mitigate climate change, create new avenues of river-based employment, and promote collective security in an unstable region.	如果他的努力取得成功，该基金将有助缓解气候变化、创造全新的河流就业岗位，并促进动荡地区的集体安全。


The Africa Action Summit in Marrakesh two months ago described the Fund as one of the four key ideas that can transform the continent.	两个月前马拉喀什举行的非洲行动峰会将该基金誉为能够改变非洲大陆的四大理念之一。


Last March, on World Water Day, Jordan’s Prince Hassan bin Talal and I called for the establishment of a Marshall Fund for the world’s shared river basins.	去年3月的世界水日，我和约旦哈桑·本·塔拉勒王子呼吁为全球共有的流域盆地建立马歇尔基金。


The Blue Fund for the Congo Basin is a step in that direction.	刚果盆地蓝色基金是向这个方向迈出的重要步骤。


Now, we need similar funds to emerge to protect all of the world’s 263 shared river basins and lakes.	现在我们需要成立类似的基金来保护全世界263个共有的流域盆地和湖泊。


It is a huge challenge; but, given the power of water to sow conflict and support peace, we must confront it head-on.	这是一个巨大的挑战； 但鉴于水资源制造冲突和支撑和平的能力，我们必须勇敢地面对它。


Water Wars.	水资源之战


What is more vital for the future of humanity – and life in general – than water?	对于人类和所有生命形式的未来，还有什么比水更重要的呢？


Water abounds in nature, and most of humanity will have lived more than ten millenniums without ever wondering about it.	自然界的水资源十分丰富，大多数人即便再活一万年也不会认真考虑水的问题。


We draw it, use it, throw it away, most often back into rivers or oceans.	我们抽取水、利用水，再把废水排放到江河海洋。


But we could very soon end up not having enough of the fresh water that accounts for just 3% of all the water available on our planet.	但很快我们就会缺少淡水，因为淡水只占全球水资源总量的3%。


When one considers the fights we are capable of having over oil, one shudders to imagine where a lack of water could lead.	只要想一想石油会引发什么样的争斗，缺水所带来的灾难就会令人不寒而栗。


While Latin America seems well endowed, the situation is very different elsewhere.	尽管拉丁美洲的水资源比较丰富，但其它地方的情况却没有那么乐观。


Europe is nearing its limits, and water scarcity is already a pressing issue in Africa, Central Asia, and China.	欧洲正处在缺水的边缘，而水资源短缺的问题在非洲、中亚和中国已经迫在眉睫。


Over the last 20 or 30 years we have begun to comprehend what is at stake, owing to initiatives like the World Water Forum, which held its fourth annual meeting in March.	近二三十年来我们才开始意识到问题有多么严重，而这要归功于像世界水资源论坛这样的节水组织，该组织第四届年会今年3月刚刚召开。


Unfortunately, the Forum is not yet an official body and has no decision-making power.	遗憾的是，该论坛还算不上官方组织，也没有决策权。


But providing an arena for thought and debate has brought at least one huge benefit: greater awareness about water issues among the public and policymakers.	但它为思想和辩论提供的土壤至少有一项极大的好处：那就是使公众和决策者意识到水资源问题的严重性。


Water management is an inherently difficult challenge, and experience counts for a lot.	水资源管理注定是一项艰巨的挑战，经验在其中能起到很大的作用。


Practice shows that local levels of government provide the most efficient water management, even if regulations must necessarily be national in scope.	实践告诉我们：即使全国需要实行统一的节水政策，但由地方政府对水资源进行管理却最为有效。


But this is a division of labor that few national governments are ready to accept.	但在实际上，没有几个国家的政府愿意接受这样的分工。


Nor do most states seem prepared to start a real dialogue over water policy with civil society groups.	多数国家也没有做好准备就水资源政策与民间组织展开真正的对话。


At one extreme of exclusion, for example, consider that decisions about water management are largely taken by men, though in most of the world it is women who use the water.	举例来讲，一种极端状况是和水资源管理有关的决策都是由男人做出的，而在世界多数国家用水最多的却往往是女人。


Moreover, interference is constant, and inevitable, between the public and the private sectors. A subtle mix of official regulation and private contracting is required.	这还不算，公有和私有部门之间的相互影响长期存在，也不可避免，这就需要在官方管制和私人约定间达到微妙的平衡。


But not all jurisdictions respond in the same way.	但并非所有国家都采取了同样的对策。


The multiplicity of interlocutors inevitably creates a multiplicity of water systems with vastly unequal levels of efficiency.	谈判方的多种多样不可避免地导致了水资源管理系统的多种多样，而不同系统的管理效率也大不相同。


Initiatives like the World Water Forums thus inevitably highlight debates about what constitutes good water management, as well as elaborating useful concepts.	于是确定什么才是有效的水资源管理和宣传实用理念就成了像世界水资源论坛这样组织理所当然的工作重点。


One casualty of such debates has been the myth that water is free.	水资源没有成本的观点在这样的辩论中备受抨击。


Water has a cost, and someone, either end-users or taxpayers, has to pay it.	水资源有成本，不管是最终用户还是纳税人，反正水资源的成本需要有人来承担。


It is possible, of course, to envision sharing the costs, but it is no longer possible not to charge for water.	当然，我们可以用某种方式来分摊水资源成本，但免费用水却不再成为可能的选择。


The most recent World Water Forum debated two issues that will confront policymakers in the years ahead.	不久前举行的世界水资源论坛讨论了两个问题，这两个问题是决策者们在未来必须要面对的。


The first concerns the so-called “right to water.”	首先是所谓的“用水权利”。


The urgency of the needs, with a billion people lacking access to drinking water and two billion without proper sewer systems, together with the vast number of diseases that result, underscore the need to recognize such a fundamental human right.	10亿人缺乏饮用水、20亿人缺乏合理的污水处理系统所带来的迫切需求，再加上随之而来的大量疾病，使这项基本人权的认定变得非常重要。


A consensus was reached at the Forum that such a right makes sense only if it is formulated in such a way that particular policymaking entities, be they water companies or local governments, face an affirmative duty to respect this right.	人们在论坛上达成一致，无论是自来水公司还是地方政府，只有当尊重这项权利成为特定决策机构的当然义务，这样的权利才有意义。


Only the state can be made responsible here.	只有国家才能承担这样的责任。


But the acknowledged responsibility of states in implementing the right to water cannot turn them into the sole paying authority.	但国家落实水资源权利的当然义务也并不意味着它们是唯一的出资机构。


The state must be charged with ensuring an effective water system that meets the basic needs of all, but the balance of this system remains to be defined.	国家必须出资建立能满足所有人基本需求的有效用水系统，但如何平衡这一系统还有待进一步研究。


These uncertainties, indeed, led the Forum to avoid acknowledging a formal right to water in its final resolution.	正是由于存在上述不确定之处，水资源权利才没有正式载入水资源论坛的最终决议。


The second issue concerned the role of local authorities.	第2个问题与地方政府有关。


Despite the political and administrative centralization of most of the countries represented at the Forum, there was widespread agreement that the most efficient water systems are managed as close as possible to the resource and its users.	尽管参加水资源论坛的多数国家都实行政治和行政集中管理，但人们都认可最有效的水资源管理方式要尽可能贴近源头与用户。


Agreement on this provided a real breakthrough for the future of water policy.	达成这样的一致使水资源政策在未来的突破成为可能。


Naturally, conflicts among governments or local authorities and private enterprises resurfaced.	于是，政府、地方管理机构和私有企业之间的矛盾自然而然再次成为关注的焦点。


Inevitably, the cruel lack of means was pointed out time and again.	于是，每个人都清醒地意识到我们在这个问题上束手无策。


And, unsurprisingly, the lack of solidarity among water haves and have-nots was openly on display at the Forum.	不仅如此，论坛也再次公开暴露了有水国和无水国之间的不团结。


As we grapple with our joint water future, we will face a time of trial and error in finding workable solutions.	在与共同的水资源未来抗争的同时，我们在寻找有效的解决方法时面临着严峻的考验。


But humanity already seems to be making more progress on matters related to drinking water than other global threats, such as climate change.	但与其它全球问题，比如气候变化相比，人类在与饮用水相关的问题上似乎已经取得了更大的进展。


We should all drink to that.	所有人都应该为此干杯。


Breakthrough Vaccines	突破疫苗


NEW YORK – Vaccines are one of the great success stories in the history of individual and public health.	纽约—疫苗是个人和公共健康史上最伟大的成功之一。


They have helped rid the planet of the scourge of smallpox, are poised to eliminate polio, and each year prevent millions of deaths, reducing the suffering and costs caused by infectious diseases.	它们帮助地球摆脱了天花，即将消灭脊髓灰质炎，并且每一年能挽救数百万人的生命，减轻传染病造成的痛苦和负担。


But there are still many diseases for which vaccines do not yet exist.	但仍有许多疾病我们没有疫苗可用。


Moreover, strategies that have previously led to the successful development of vaccines are unlikely to work against more complex bacteria or viruses, such as HIV, which have evolved multiple mechanisms to evade the immune system.	此外，早前带来成功疫苗开发的策略不再适用于更加复杂的细菌和病毒，比如可通过多种机制削弱免疫系统的艾滋病毒。


The history of vaccinology is one in which biomedical and technological advances usher in the “next generation” of vaccines.	疫苗学的历史是一部生物化学和技术进步带来“下一代”疫苗的历史。


In the 1950’s, a breakthrough that enabled viruses to grow in tissue cultures led to the development of both live attenuated vaccines and inactivated vaccines for measles, polio, and other diseases.	20世纪50年代，能让病毒在培养基中生长的突破带来了麻疹、脊髓灰质炎和其他疾病的减毒活疫苗和灭活疫苗的发展。


In the 1980’s, recombinant DNA technology led to the development of vaccines against hepatitis B and human papillomavirus.	20世纪80年代，DNA重组技术带来了乙肝和人乳头瘤病毒疫苗的发展。


Around the turn of the century, the first sequencing of the human genome led to “reverse vaccinology.”	在世纪之交，人类基因组的首次测序带来了“逆向疫苗学”（reverse vaccinology）。


This approach, whereby computational analysis of a pathogen’s genome enables identification and screening of a great many more potential vaccine targets than was previously possible, was used in the successful development of a vaccine against meningitis B.	这一方法——对病原体基因组进行计算机分析以识别和筛选潜在疫苗目标，数量之大远远超过了以前的可坑范围——被用于乙脑疫苗的成功开发。


The past decade has already yielded major advances in structure-assisted vaccine discovery, synthetic biology, systems biology, and immune monitoring.	过去十年产生了结构辅助疫苗发现、合成生物学、系统生物学和免疫监测的巨大进步。


However, successfully translating these advances into the development of next-generation vaccines continues to be impeded by gaps in our understanding of the human immune response that protects against specific bacteria, viruses, or parasites.	但是，成功地将这些进步转化为下一代疫苗的开发仍受到我们关于人体对具体细菌、病毒和寄生虫的免疫反应的了解不足的制约。


That is why I, along with eight fellow scientists, have proposed the establishment of a new human-immunology-based clinical-research initiative, the Human Vaccines Project.	这就是我和其他八位科学家同事提出成立新的基于人体免疫学的临床研究计划——人类疫苗工程（Human Vaccines Project）的原因。


In February 2014, leading scientists and public-health specialists will gather in La Jolla, California, to craft a scientific plan to identify, prioritize, and, most important, solve the major problems currently hindering development of vaccines against diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.	2014年2月，主要科学家和公共健康专家将齐聚加州拉荷亚（La Jolla）起草一份科学计划来对目前阻碍艾滋病、肺结核和疟疾等疾病的疫苗的开发的主要问题进行识别、决定优先顺序以及（最重要的）予以解决。


Such a project would represent a paradigm shift in vaccine development.	该工程代表疫苗开发的范式变化。


The current process is long (often spanning decades from concept to licensure), has a low probability of success (because of the limitations of animal models in predicting immune response and efficacy in humans), and is costly (often requiring hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a single vaccine).	当前的开发过程很长（从提出概念到获得许可要走几十年）、成功概率低（因为动物模型在预测人类免疫反应和效果方面作用有限）、而且成本高昂（通常一种疫苗的开发就要耗费几亿美元）。


Consider this: In just the past few years, many candidate vaccines against HIV, dengue, herpes, tuberculosis, and staphylococcus aureus have failed, at a cost of more than $1 billion.	想一想：在过去几年中，许多候选HIV、登革热、疱疹、肺结核和金黄葡萄球菌疫苗遭遇了失败，超过10亿美元随之��流。


Investing that amount over the next decade in a coordinated effort to address the major questions facing vaccine development would rapidly accelerate our search for effective solutions, implying a transformative impact on individual and public health.	投资相同数量的资金用于在未来十年合作解决疫苗开发的所面临的主要问题能够大大加速我们对有效解决方案的搜索，给个人和公共健康带来变革性影响。


HIV presents perhaps the greatest challenge, because the virus leverages its extensive genetic variability to hide from the immune system.	HIV大概是最大的挑战，因为这种病毒利用其多种多样的遗传变异而不被免疫系统所识别。


Using recent advances, however, scientists have now identified highly conserved regions of this variable virus, determined their molecular structure, and begun designing next-generation vaccine candidates to elicit antibodies that target these regions to prevent HIV infection.	但是，如今科学家已可以利用最新的进步识别多变病毒的高度保守区（conserved region）、确定它们的分子结构，并开始设计下一代候选疫苗以触发针对这些区域、防止HIV传染的抗体。


But HIV vaccine development, like that for several other diseases, is still impeded by the limitations of what animal models can tell us about how to elicit the necessary immune responses in humans.	但与其他几种疾病的疫苗一样，HIV疫苗的开发仍受制于动物模型对如何触发必须的人类免疫反应的预测力的局限性。


Two recent advances could accelerate vaccine development and reduce its costs dramatically.	两大最新进步有望加速疫苗开发、大大降低成本。


In synthetic biology, the rapid engineering of nucleic acid-based vaccines means more candidates move more quickly from concept to trial.	在合成生物学领域，基于核酸的疫苗的快速工程意味着更多的候选疫苗可以更快地从概念阶段进入试验阶段。


In systems biology, high-throughput technologies have increased the number of genetic and immunologic parameters assessed in trials.	在系统生物学领域，高通量技术增加了在试验中被评估的遗传和免疫参数的数量。


This approach has helped predict the efficacy of potential new-generation vaccines against yellow fever and influenza within days of immunization, compared with the usual timeframe of months or years.	这一方法有助于预测潜在的下一代黄热病和流感疫苗的有效力，只需几天的免疫期即可，而通常的时间框架是几个月甚至几年。


Vaccines already prevent the deaths of 2-3 million people every year, preempt human suffering, lighten the burden placed on health-care systems, and enable more rapid economic and social development.	疫苗每年能够挽救200—300万条生命，预防人类苦难，减轻医疗系统负担，并促进更快的经济和深灰发展。


Models show that adding even a partly effective AIDS vaccine to the current range of prevention and treatment procedures could dramatically lower the rate of HIV infection.	模型表明，即使是部分有效的艾滋病疫苗，如果用于当前预防和治疗过程，也可以大大降低HIV传染率。


As the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu, one of the world’s great campaigners against HIV/AIDS, wrote recently: “We must make the most of scientific advances over the last half-century, which have made vaccines for other preventable diseases the most powerful and cost-effective health-care investment that currently exists.”	正如诺贝尔和平奖获得者、世界最著名的HIV/艾滋病斗士图图（Desmond Tutu）所说，“我们必须让过去半个世纪中的大部分科学进步——这些进步已经形成了其他可预防疾病的疫苗——成为目前所能找到的最有力、成本效率最高的健康投资。 ”


That is the idea behind the Human Vaccines Project – a concept that would have been unimaginable even a decade ago.	这就是人类疫苗工程背后的思想——这一概念在十年前还不可想象。


Today, technological advances in vaccine discovery and immune monitoring allow us realistically to explore this potentially game-changing approach to disease prevention.	如今，疫苗发现和免疫监测方面的技术进步让我们能够在实际中探索这一有望改变疾病预防局面的方法。


February’s gathering in California may take us a giant step closer to a world without deadly and debilitating infectious diseases.	2月的加州会议或许是我们迈向没有致死和致衰传染病的世界的一大步。


The G-20 to the Rescue?	G-20集团来救援？


BRISBANE – The G-20’s upcoming meeting in Brisbane, Australia, comes at a time when a precarious global economy requires big decisions to be made.	布里斯班——G-20会议即将在澳大利亚的布里斯班召开，恰逢此时，我们需要为拯救摇摇欲坠的全球经济做出重大决策。


But it is far from clear who will provide the decisive voice needed to set a bold agenda – and then shepherd its implementation.	但由谁来制定大胆的日程计划，并且指导计划的实施目前尚不清楚。


Economic data reveal that the global economy is shakier than at any time in the past two years.	经济数据显示全球经济比过去两年中的任何时候都更加不稳定。


Capitalism is struggling to generate adequate demand.	资本主义正竭力创造足够的需求。


Wealth and income have become increasingly concentrated, while middle-class incomes in the developed world have stagnated.	财富和收入越来越集中，而发达国家中产阶级的收入增长却陷入停滞状态。


Tax avoidance by multinational companies is draining developing-country incomes, limiting their ability to invest in education and infrastructure.	跨国公司的避税行为正快速榨干发展中国家的收入，令发展中国家无力投资于教育和基础设施建设。


And much more action is needed to address the largest and most urgent structural weakness of all – climate change.	需要采取进一步措施解决最大最紧迫的结构性弱点——气候变化。


Many leading economists and policymakers are forecasting continued economic gloom.	众多著名经济学家和决策者都对持续经济发展做出了悲观的预测。 史蒂芬·罗奇认为后危机时代全球经济“衰退才是王道”；


Stephen Roach has suggested that in the post-crisis global economy “relapse is the rule”; economist Brad DeLong, speaking of the “consequences of our lesser depression,” argues that the pretense of a eurozone recovery has collapsed; and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has acknowledged the need not only for structural reform, but also fiscal expansion to boost aggregate demand.	经济学家布拉德·德隆则探讨“小规模衰退带来的后果”，并提出欧元区经济复苏的假象已经破灭； 而欧洲央行行长德拉吉则承认不仅需要进行结构改革，还需要实施财政扩张以刺激总需求。


At the heart of their concerns is the lack of sustained demand needed to drive growth.	他们忧虑的核心是缺乏推动增长的持续性需求。


While structural reforms – particularly on the supply side – are required in developed and developing countries, they are not sufficient to address what former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has called “secular stagnation” – that is, the difficulty of sustaining sufficient demand to permit normal levels of output.	虽然结构性改革——尤其是供应改革在发达和发展中国家同样必要，但单纯的结构改革还不足以解决前任美国财长拉里·萨默斯所谓的“长期停滞” 问题——也就是难以找到足够的需求允许产能正常释放。


The G-20’s central task, therefore, must be to establish a framework for strong and sustainable growth.	因此建设强劲的可持续发展框架理当是G-20峰会的核心任务。


Member states need to introduce reforms aimed at achieving a 2% annual growth target, as agreed earlier this year by finance ministers.	会员国需要像年初财长协议所要求的那样推进改革以确保实现每年2%的增长。


One structural reform that could drive global growth is substantial infrastructure investment in developing and developed countries alike.	在发达和发展中国家同时进行大规模基础设施投资是有能力推动全球增长的一项结构性改革。


Unfortunately, no G-20 leader has seriously articulated this need, let alone lobbied for a solution.	遗憾的是，没有哪位G-20领导人认真提出过这方面的需求，更不用说为解决方案进行游说了。


Apart from a World Bank presentation for a possible pilot infrastructure program, there is little to suggest how the 2% target could be met over the medium term.	除世行与试点基础设施项目有关的演示外，没有任何迹象表明如何在中期实现2%的增长目标。


G-20 governments, especially those with strong balance sheets, should be calling for large-scale public and private infrastructure investment to expand the productive capacity of member economies.	G-20成员国政府，特别是那些资产负债表相对强劲国家的政府，应当呼吁进行大规模公共及私人基础设施投资，以期在成员国经济内部实现产能扩张。


In the area of tax avoidance, discussion needs to broaden beyond developed economies; as the International Monetary Fund recently pointed out, developing economies’ budgets are disproportionately affected by multinational companies’ savvy accounting strategies.	避税方面的讨论不能仅局限在发达经济体； 国际货币基金组织最近指出，发展中经济体的预算在极大程度上受到跨国公司精明会计策略的影响。


Unfortunately, judging by the initiatives already on the Brisbane agenda, the summit looks set to take a business-as-usual approach.	不幸的是，从布里斯班计划决定探讨的举措看，本届峰会仍将一切照旧。


If the G-20 fails to put policy meat on its rhetorical bones, it will risk looking weak and irrelevant.	如果G-20集团只是夸夸其谈而没有相应的政策出台，就会在世人面前显得脆弱且无关紧要。


Its very credibility is on the line.	人们会质疑它的可信度。


Indeed, some in the developed world would prefer a smaller, more exclusive body – a G-14 or even a new G-7.	事实上，发达国家某些人���要缩小20国集团到14国甚至7国。


Such a move would hurt the developing world, especially the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia.	这样的举措会伤害发展中国家，特别是亚太地区，包括澳大利亚。


One reason why some want a tighter group is that the G-20 struggles to achieve consensus.	某些人想要缩小决策圈的原因是G-20很难达成共识。


But this misses the point: It is harder to reach agreement precisely because all of the key leaders (representing around two-thirds of the world’s population and 80% of global GDP), whose support is needed for any truly global decision, are in the room.	但这种做法忽略了一点：即难以达成一致恰恰因为所有重要领导者（约占世界总人口的三分之二和全球GDP的80%）都在场。 达成真正意义上的全球决策需要所有与会者。


The Brisbane Summit therefore needs to rediscover the activism that it displayed in 2008 and 2009, during the height of the financial crisis.	布里斯班峰会因此必须重新找到它曾在金融危机高潮的2008及2009年所表现出活跃度。


It must be led by the United States and other advanced economies, and backed up by major emerging economies.	布里斯班峰会必须由美国和其他发达经济体领导，同时得到主要新兴经济体的拥护。


Australia, as host, also has a role to play.	身为东道国的澳大利亚也必须发挥作用。


The country is respected by developed and developing countries alike, often bridging the interests of both, and is widely viewed as an honest broker.	澳大利亚深受发达及发展中国家的尊敬，往往会成为两者之间的利益桥梁，并广泛树立起诚实可靠的中间人形象。


Unfortunately, the current government has had little to say about the big structural problems that underlie the world’s economic malaise.	不幸的是，现政府绝少提及世界经济低迷背后的严重结构性问题。


The modest initiatives on the table reflect the government’s anti-public-sector rhetoric.	摆在桌面上的温和举措反应了政府反对公共部门的说辞。


Worse, as developed and developing countries are starting to take climate change seriously, Australia is moving in the opposite direction.	更遭的是，在发达和发展中国家开始认真对待气候变化问题时，澳大利亚却反其道而行之。


The Brisbane summit will be a crucial test for Australia, the G-20, and the possibility of truly global policy coordination.	布里斯班峰会是对澳大利亚、G-20集团和真正全球协调政策可能性的一次关键测试。


Weak America = Weakened Europe	一损俱损的美国与欧洲


America’s power has been so overwhelming for so long that many think it has survived George W. Bush’s presidency unscathed.	美国压倒性的威势已经保持得太久，以致许多人以为她在经历了乔治·W·布什执政的任期后还能毫发无损。


That this is untrue is demonstrated by those, from Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who are exploiting America’s loss of standing and influence.	这种想法的错误性可以从那些利用美国声誉和影响力的削弱来大肆捞取利益的人身上可以看出来，从俄罗斯的弗拉基米尔·普京、委内瑞拉的雨果·查维斯，到伊朗的艾哈迈迪·内贾德和津巴布韦的罗伯特·穆加贝。


This is no cause for schadenfreude .	这可不是幸灾乐祸的时候。


On the contrary, it is high time for friends of the United States, particularly in Europe, to realize that America’s weakness undermines their international influence as well.	相反，美国的盟友，特别是欧洲，应该意识到，美国的衰落也会削弱他们自己的国际影响力。


The evidence of America’s weakness is clear enough.	美国衰落的迹象已经十分明显。


At the height of America’s power, Russia had resigned itself to the apparently unstoppable encroachment of NATO on the Soviet Union’s former sphere of influence.	在美国的威势达到巅峰的时期，北约对前苏联影响下的地区的蚕食似乎不可阻挡，俄罗斯只能黯然退避。


President Putin tolerated a US presence in Central Asia to assist in the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan and raised no serious objections when the US trashed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibiting strategic missile defenses.	美国进军中亚，参与打击阿富汗塔利班的行动，普京总统予以默许； 美国撕毁限制战略性导弹防卫系统的“反弹道导弹条约”，他也没有提出严肃的抗议。


America, eager to bring both Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, felt scant need to consider Russian concerns, convinced that the Kremlin would have no choice but to bow to the inevitable.	美国急于将乌克兰和格鲁吉亚纳入北约时不觉得有必要考虑俄罗斯的想法，认为克里姆林宫面对必然的结果根本没有选择，只能接受现实。


That was yesterday.	时过境迁。


Today, Putin seeks to regain the influence Russia lost in previous years.	如今，普京正试图重新建立俄罗斯前几年失去的影响力。


He is skillfully playing the anti-America card across Europe while putting pressure on the Baltic states, a clear warning not to extend Nato any further.	他一边对波罗的海三国施加压力，明确警告北约不得继续扩张，一边在整个欧洲巧妙地打着反美牌。


In Ukraine, political forces resisting closer strategic links to the West have gained ground.	在乌克兰，反对与西方加强战略联系的政治力量已经站稳脚跟。


And the Kremlin is aggressively portraying the planned establishment of a modest US missile defense installation in Poland and the Czech Republic as a threat to Russia’s vital security interests.	克里姆林宫将美国在波兰和捷克共和国建立小型导弹防御基地的计划渲染成对俄罗斯重大安全利益的威胁，态度咄咄逼人。


Or consider Iran, another power exploiting American weakness.	再来看看伊朗，另一个利用美国的衰落获益的国家。


Only a few years ago, Iran’s government seemed sufficiently in awe of the US to inch toward an agreement on its nuclear program that would have interrupted, and perhaps even halted, its enrichment activities.	仅仅几年前，伊朗政府还看似对美国十分敬畏，一步步走向会打断、甚至终止其核浓缩活动的协议。


There was talk of possible bilateral contacts with the US, which, if successful, would have ended almost three decades of hostile relations.	传言他们会和美国进行双边接触，如果成功，就能结束近三十年的敌对关系。


Today, Iran’s enrichment program is going ahead despite the United Nations Security Council’s warnings of new sanctions, while Iranian officials publicly ridicule threats of US military action.	如今，伊朗不顾联合国安理会实施新一轮制裁的警告，执意推行核浓缩计划，伊朗的官员还公开嘲笑美国的军事威胁。


These examples reflect the same message: America is losing clout around the world.	这些例子反映了一个信息，即美国正在全球范围内失去影响力。


The Bush administration is internationally exposed in both the arrogance of its concepts and the limits of its power. It lacks support at home and respect abroad.	布什政府傲慢的观念和有限的实力暴露在全世界面前，于内缺乏支持，于外则得不到尊重。


Never since the US became the world’s predominant power during World War II has there been a similar decline in its international influence.	自从美国在二战中崛起，成为世界上的主导力量，其国际影响力还从未经历过类似的衰落。


Even during the Vietnam War and following its humiliating withdrawal from Southeast Asia, there was never any serious doubt about America’s authority and ability to deal with what was then the central strategic challenge, the Cold War.	即使在越战期间，以及从东南亚狼狈地撤退之后，人们也从未真正怀疑过美国应对冷战这个当时的核心战略挑战的权威和能力。


In today’s interdependent world, however, it is no longer the number of nuclear warheads that bestows influence, but a country’s ability to get others to go along with policies that it regards as serving its major interests.	然而，在今天这个互相依赖的世界上，影响力的来源不再是核弹头的数量，而是一个国家让他国追随她认为符合自己主要利益的政策的能力。


Bush’s America has forfeited that influence– in the Middle East, in Asia and Africa, and in much of Europe.	布什治下的美国丧失了这样的影响力——在中东、亚洲和非洲，以及欧洲的大部分地区。


Many in the US like to think that this is a temporary state of affairs that will vanish with the election of a new president and Congress in 2008.	美国国内的许多人一厢情愿地认为这个势态只是暂时的，在2008年新的总统和国会选举之后就会烟消云散。


But they are neither sufficiently aware of the damage done nor realistic enough about the chances of Bush’s potential successors – many of whom initially supported his adventurism – to revive the trust and respect their country once enjoyed.	但他们要不是对已经造成的损害缺乏充分的认识，就是对布什潜在的继任者——这些人当初大多支持他的冒险主义——重获这个国家曾经享有的信任和尊重的机会认识不够清醒。


To achieve that will take more than a new face in the White House. It will require years of hard work to reconcile America’s resources and requirements, and to ensure that its initiatives can once again be seen as designed not to serve narrow US ideologies, but to advance a fair international order.	要实现这样的目标，仅靠白宫里换一张新面孔是不够的，还需要通过多年的努力，协调美国的资源和要求，并且让人们能够再次相信美国的行动是为了推进公平的国际秩序，而不是为狭隘的美国意识形态服务。


The result of protracted US weakness is also a weaker Europe.	美国长时间衰落将导致欧洲也会变弱。


In the heyday of American dominance, European governments profited doubly: they were part of a powerful West and courted as a potential counterweight to US dominance by third countries.	在美国优势地位的全盛期，欧���各国政府获得了双倍的利益：他们既是强大的西方社会的一分子，又被第三世界国家视为牵制美国的潜在势力。


If they dissented from US positions, this did not seriously impair the West’s strategic efficacy because American power was more than sufficient to compensate.	即便他们不附和美国的立场，也不会严重削弱西方的战略效力，因为美国的力量够强，完全能够弥补。


That arrangement no longer works.	这样的机制已不再起作用。


If European governments today distance themselves from America, as their citizens frequently demand, they will both antagonize and further weaken the US.	如果现在欧洲各国政府按照民众频繁的要求疏远美国， 会和美国对立起来，使美国进一步衰落。


At the same time, they will undermine their own international influence, allow others to play off Europe against America, destroying as well what chance remains for rebuilding the West with a reformed America.	同时，他们也会削弱自身的国际影响力，使其他势力在欧美的争斗中渔翁得利，还会断送通过改革后的美国重建西方社会的最后机会。


European leaders, even when they are unhappy over US positions, therefore need to combine forceful support for the transatlantic community of interests with discrete, if firm lobbying in Washington not to strain it to the breaking point.	因此，欧洲的领导人即便对美国不满，也应该联合起来，给予这个跨大西洋利益团体审慎的支持，如通过在华盛顿进行强大的游说攻势，告诉美国物极必反的道理。


Whether they can successfully perform this difficult act, remains to be seen.	他们是否能成功地完成这项困难重重的任务尚未可知。


Fortunately, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Gordon Brown understand the challenge, and at least some parts of the Bush government seem aware of the problem.	幸运的是，安格拉·默克尔、尼古拉·萨科奇和戈登·布朗明白这个挑战的重要性，而且布什政府中至少有一部分人已意识到了问题所在。


In the long period of American weakness, European leaders will have to demonstrate statesmanship for the West as a whole. It is a role for which decades of US supremacy have scarcely prepared them.	在美国长期的衰弱中，欧洲领导人将不得不表现出以整个西方为重的政治家才能，而这样的角色是在美国数十年的霸主地位下他们极少有机会担当的。


Europe’s German Ball and Chain	欧洲的德国桎梏


BRUSSELS – A storm-tossed ship near dangerous cliffs needs a strong anchor to avoid finishing on the rocks.	布鲁塞尔—在危险的悬崖边上遭遇风暴的船只需要强大的锚才能避免触礁。


In 2012, when a financial storm engulfed the eurozone, it was Germany that kept the European ship off the shoals of financial disaster.	2012年，一场金融风暴席卷欧元区，是德国让欧洲之穿免于驶入金融灾难。


But now Europe’s anchor has become a brake, hindering forward movement.	但如今，欧洲之锚变成了一个阻碍，阻碍欧洲的前进。


Of course, German Chancellor Angela Merkel acted in 2012 only when she could tell her domestic constituency that there was no alternative.	当然，2012年德国总理默克尔是在告诉国内选民已经别无选择之后才采取行动的。


But in the end, Merkel agreed to a permanent bailout fund for the eurozone.	但最终默克尔同意了永久性欧元区援助基金。


She also backed the formation of a banking union, which remains incomplete but still represents a key step toward a financial system supervised by the European Central Bank.	她还支持建立银行联盟，这一联盟目前仍未完成，但仍是迈向由欧洲央行承担监督责任的金融制度的重要一步。


Thanks to these measures, and ECB President Mario Draghi’s vow, which Germany tacitly approved, to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro, the financial storm abated.	有了这些措施，再加上欧洲央行行长德拉吉在德国默许的情况下承诺“不惜一切代价”拯救欧元，金融风暴消停了。


But now the eurozone seems incapable of escaping near-deflation, with little economic growth and prices barely moving upwards.	但如今，欧元区似乎无力摆脱接近通缩的状态，经济几乎没有增长，物价也没有表现出向上的趋势。


That was not supposed to happen.	本不应该如此。


When the crisis struck, the economies of the eurozone periphery were buffeted by the twin shocks of spiking risk premiums and a collapsing housing market.	当危机袭来时，欧元区外围经济体受到风险溢价飙升和房地产市场崩盘的双重打击。


At the same time, the German economy benefited from the return of capital fleeing the periphery.	与此同时，德国经济因为资本逃出外围的回流而受益。


Real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in Germany became substantially negative, triggering a housing boom.	德国真实（经通胀调整）利率降到了远低于零的水平，引起了房地产泡沫。


It was assumed that this would generate strong domestic demand in Germany, helping the periphery to export more.	人们认为这会在德国形成强大的内需，有助于外围增加出口。


Instead, the German economy has barely grown; indeed, weaker world trade threatens to put it in recession.	相反，德国经济几无增长； 事实上，国际贸易的走弱有可能导致德国陷入衰退。


The current-account surplus, which was supposed to decline sharply, has actually increased, as savings have remained higher – and investment lower – than expected.	被认为会暴跌的经常项目盈余实际上有所增加，因为储蓄保持比预期更高的水平（而投资保持着比预期更低的水平）。


Another problem, at least from the point of view of the rest of the eurozone, is that inflation in Germany remains too low.	另一个问题——至少从欧元区其他部分看来——是德国的通胀水平仍然太低。


With German prices rising at less than 1% annually, the eurozone periphery needs falling prices in order to regain the competitiveness lost during the pre-2008 boom years.	德国物价每年升高不到1%，这意味着欧元区外围需要价格下降才能重新获得2008年危机前的几年中所失去的竞争力。


This lack of dynamism at the core of the eurozone has now become its key problem.	欧元区核心活力不振已成为关键问题。


With no growth in Germany, the rest of the eurozone might not be able to reduce debt via external surpluses.	德国不增长，欧元区其他部分也许就无法通过外部盈余减少债务。


And there might be no solution short of a magic button to increase German domestic demand.	而要增加德国内需，目前看来似乎只能寄希望于魔术了。


Obviously, the German government is in charge of the country’s public finances.	显然，德国政府控制着德国的公共财政。


But fiscal policy has been roughly neutral in recent years, and thus cannot be blamed for the German economy’s lack of dynamism.	但财政政策在近几年中基本上保持中性，因此不能把德国经济缺少活力归咎于财政政策。


This year, the public-sector budget might move from a small deficit to what German officials call a “black zero” – a very small surplus.	今年，德国公共部门预算可能从略有赤字变为德国官方所谓的“零或略有盈余”（black zero）。


But this tightening by a fraction of a percentage point of GDP implies no adverse effect on growth.	但这一相当于零点几个百分点GDP的紧缩对增长没有什么消极影响。


The root cause of Germany’s sluggish economic performance in recent years is the continuing unwillingness of its households and enterprises to consume and invest.	德国经济近几年表现呆滞的根源在于德国家庭和企业一直不愿消费和投资。


And it is difficult to see what the government can do about this.	我们也看不到政府可以就此做些什么。


Indeed, investment has fallen despite financing conditions for enterprises that have never been easier, both in terms of ultra-low interest rates and banks’ willingness to lend.	事实上，尽管企业的融资条件堪称史上最宽松（不管从超低的利率还是银行的放贷意愿看都是如此），但投资仍在下降。


Yet Germany’s corporate sector remains reluctant to borrow and invest in the country, because it sees little reason to expect long-term economic growth, given that the population is set to decline and productivity gains remain anemic.	而德国公司部门仍不愿再国内借钱和投资，因为它们看不到长期经济增长的希望，这又是因为人口即将减少且生产率增长停滞不前。


With investment unlikely to become a motor for the German economy, consumption holds the key to stronger demand growth in Germany.	在投资不可能成为德国经济引擎的情况下，消费就成为提高德国内需的关键。


Its weakness is somewhat surprising: real incomes are up, and the coalition government that came to power last year has introduced a series of generous welfare measures, including a large increase in the minimum wage, a reduction of the retirement age, and a special top-up pension for women with children.	从某种程度上说，消费的疲软令人惊奇：真实收入水平在上升，去年上台的联合政府也引入了一系列慷慨的福利措施，包括大幅增加最低工资、降低退休年龄以及面向有孩妇女的特别追加养老金。


But even these measures, which foreign observers have largely overlooked, have failed to boost consumer demand.	但这些很少有外国观察者注意到的步骤也没能提振消费需求。


So what more could the German government do to wean the Germans off their abstemious habits?	那么，德国政府应该怎样做才能改变德国人节约的习惯？


Public investment is the one area where the government could act.	公共投资是政府可以有所作为的领域之一。


But the growth fillip from public-sector infrastructure spending can only be modest.	但来自公共部门基础设施投资的增长刺激将十分有限。


Increasing infrastructure spending by a quarter, which would represent a huge administrative effort, would lift GDP growth by just 0.4 percentage points.	将基础设施支出提高四分之一已是了不起的行政手笔，但只能让GDP增长提高0. 4个百分点。


The main danger now is political.	现在的真正威胁是政治。


A weak German economy makes the necessary structural adjustments in the eurozone periphery much more difficult.	疲软的德国经济让欧元区外围所必须采取的结构性改革变得更加艰难了。


That, in turn, fuels the perception that responsibility lies with the German government, which is seen as unwilling to take the steps needed to strengthen domestic demand – even as it prohibits the periphery governments from spending more themselves.	这反过来强化了一种感觉，即德国政府需要对此负责，因为人们觉得它不愿采取必要措施强化内需——即使它禁止外围国政府自己来增加支出。


As unemployment remains stubbornly high and incomes stagnate in much of the eurozone, the temptation to blame “the Germans” is becoming ever stronger.	欧元区大部失业率依然高企，而收入一直停滞不前，因此更有理由指责“德国人”。


The German government, no surprise, does not even acknowledge that there is a problem.	毫不奇怪，德国政府甚至不承认有问题存在。


With unemployment remaining near record lows, the lack of demand growth is simply dismissed, and the absence of inflation is taken as a sign of success.	在失业率保持近乎历史最低水平的情况下，需求增长萎靡根本不受关注，而没有通胀也被视为是成功的象征。


This is a mistake.	这是一个错误。


Europe’s German anchor has become stuck, and the rising tide of anxiety among Germany’s partners should not leave its government indifferent.	欧洲的德国之锚被卡住了，而德国伙伴国日益上涨的焦虑之潮理应让德国政府无法坐视不理。


Weak Labor, Strong Securities Markets	弱小的劳工，强大的证券市场


A vital distinction between market economies is the degree to which ownership of large firms is separate from a firm's day-to-day management.	大公司的所有权与日常管理的分离程度是市场经济的重要特征。


What makes a company's owners willingly hand over control to professional managers?	是什么让公司的所有者自愿将权力移交给职业经理人？


That question is increasingly urgent as wealthy countries-as well as many transition and developing economies-attempt to create the robust securities markets needed to boost investment, productivity, and growth.	随着发达国家和发展中转型经济繁荣证券市场，促进投资、生产率和经济增长的努力，这个问题变得愈加紧迫。


Separation of ownership from management and effective securities markets reinforce each other.	所有权和管理权分离与有效的证券市场相辅相成。


The underlying theory is straightforward: if bosses can steal, distant owners will not buy shares.	潜在理论非常明显：如果老板可以窃取公司资产，外界股东就不会购买股票。


The formalistic civil-law systems that prevail in continental Europe supposedly provide inadequate protection, so ownership remains concentrated.	人们认为欧洲大陆现行的形式主义民法体系提供不了足够的保护，因此所有权仍旧掌握在少数人手中。


By contrast, Anglo Saxon common-law systems empower judges to interpret open-ended fiduciary rules on a case-by-case basis, thereby establishing legal precedents that are binding on managers.	与此相反，安格鲁萨克逊的普通法体系赋予法官按不同情况解释开放性信用规则的权力，并由此建立了约束公司经理的司法先例。


But this is a weak explanation.	但这种解释不够强大。


Before World War I, Europe's civil-law countries were developing securities markets as fast as the US and the UK.	一次大战前，欧洲民法国家证券市场的发展速度与美英两国相当。


Indeed, regulatory agencies like the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) arose because common-law fiduciary duties failed to protect distant owners.	的确，由于普通法的信用义务不能保护外界所有者，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）这样的监管机构才应运而生。


Insider trading, for example, was generally legal under the rules governing fiduciary duties in America's states, which back then played a dominant role.	比如内部交易在美国各州管理信用义务的法律中大多为合法，这在彼时彼刻占据了统治地位。


By contrast, the SEC is a rule-generating institution of the type that civil-law countries like France or Germany would have little difficulty creating if they wished to .	与此相反，如果法德这样的民法国家真想建立美国证交会这样的立法机构，也应该没有什么困难。


Moreover, fiduciary duties only aspire to prevent insiders from stealing. They do not control the main costs that shareholders face when they do not manage the company themselves, such as unprofitable expansion, shirking, retention of free cash flow, and empire building.	不仅如此，信用义务仅限于防止内部盗窃，而不能控制股东不亲自管理公司时面临的主要支出，包括非赢利性扩张、收缩、阻碍现金自由流动和创建独裁帝国。


Unless there is a conflict of interest between a company's management and its board, owners in common-law countries have no legal recourse when managers' operational or strategic decisions are bad, stupid, or otherwise harmful to shareholders.	除非公司管理层与董事会之间存在利益冲突，否则如果经理做出错误、愚蠢的经营或战略决策，或者伤害到股东利益的时候，普通法国家的所有者可谓求诉无门。


Throughout the rich world, institutions that raise the costs to shareholders of turning over control to professional managers play a powerful role in determining outcomes.	在整个财富世界，确定股东对职业经理权力移交成本的管理机构对最终结果起着非常重要的作用。


But these institutions reflect the political power of social forces, not the differences between civil-law and common-law systems.	但这些机构是社会力量政治权力的反映，而不能代表民法和普通法两种体系的分歧。


In particular, ownership separation in the wealthy continental European nations and the US can be linked with the role of labor inside the firm and within society.	具体地讲，富有的欧洲大陆国家和美国的所有权分离与公司和社会内部的劳工作用有密切的联系。


In some nations, labor greatly influences the firm through politics-i.e., opposing mass lay-offs and resisting restructuring plans that change the nature of the workplace.	在有些国家，劳工通过政治对公司产生很大影响¾即反对大规模裁员，抵制改变工作特性的重组方案。


Consider a simple scenario: a nation bars firms and owners from laying off employees for economic reasons. Faced with a no-fire rule, shareholders have reason to be very cautious: if expansion is not profitable, they cannot reduce labor costs.	想像一副简单的情景：国家禁止公司和所有者出于经济原因进行裁员，那么面对禁止解雇的规定，股东们有理由更小心谨慎：如果扩张不能盈利，他们就不能削减劳动力成本。


France, for example, is notorious for forcing foreign firms like Britain's Marks and Spencer to keep redundant workers on the payroll.	比如法国就因为强迫英国Marks and Spencer这样的外国企业保留富余劳力而臭名昭著。


Of course, no nation completely bans lay-offs, but flexibility varies greatly and can be central to profitability.	当然，没有国家完全禁止裁员，但灵活度却大相径庭，对盈利的作用也至关重要。


In a nation like the US, where employees can be fired easily, shareholders have less to fear.	在美国这样解雇劳工相对容易的国家，股东们就不太会害怕。


But in a labor-strong society, dominant shareholders-those with the most to lose if expansion goes awry-have reason to keep managers on a short leash.	但在劳动力相对强势的社会，那些如果扩张失误面临最惨重损失的主要股东，当然有理由捆住职业经理的手脚。


Italy's Fiat illustrates the problem: even a conservative government seeks to impede downsizing.	意大利的菲亚特对这个问题说明如下：即便是保守的政府也希望阻止裁员。


A second factor should also make owners want to stay close to the firm if labor is politically strong.	劳工取得政治强势的情况下，所有者希望保守经营还有另外一个因素。


Bargaining over the economic surplus is often open-ended, especially if competition is weak.	对经济盈利的讨价还价不受限制，在竞争较弱的情况下更是如此。


Where employees have high bargaining power, the profits pie is constantly up for re-division, both within the firm and at the national level.	哪里的员工讨价权利更大，那里的利润蛋糕就经常要重新分配，在公司和国家内部都是如此。


If managers are only loosely tied to shareholders, they could more willingly give up a bigger share of the pie to labor.	如果管理者与股东的联系不那么紧密，他们就可能乐意将更大的蛋糕分给劳动力。


Similarly, where shareholder interests do not come first, say, in a corporatist system, dominant owners have greater reason to keep financial information private, lest labor use it to press for more favorable terms.	与之相似，如果在组织体系中不优先考虑股东的利益，主要所有者��更有理由对财务信息严格保密，唯恐被劳动者利用，成为增加报酬的筹码。


Both considerations support concentrated ownership and work against securities markets.	这两种考虑都会导致所有权更加集中，对证券市场颇为不利。


So, where political and social values strongly favor labor, managers' loyalty to shareholder interests will be weaker.	因此，如果政治和社会价值观明显倾向于劳动力，经理对股东利益的忠诚度就会受到影响。


Managers in such "left" societies are no less technically capable, but their organizational constraints, incentives, and goals are less pro-shareholder.	如此"左倾"社会中的经理不仅在技术上能力受限，其组织约束、动机和目标也更少为股东考虑。


When forced to cut employment, they are more likely to think that they are destroying lives rather than raising economic efficiency and increasing wealth.	被迫裁减员工时，他们更倾向于认为是在摧残生命，而不是提高经济效益和增加财富。


Such societies should have fewer public firms, and narrower or no ownership separation.	这样的社会中上市公司的数量减少，很少或几乎不存在所有权的分离。


So they do.	情况的确如此。


The OECD has indexed how easy it is to fire an employee in member countries.	经合组织统计了各成员国裁员的难易程度。


Employees enjoy the least protection in the US, and a high degree of protection in Italy, France, and Germany.	美国对劳动力的保护最少，意大利、法国、德国保护程度较高。


The correlation with ownership separation is striking: a sample of the 20 largest firms in each country shows that, whereas 90% of the US companies have no shareholder with more than a 20% stake, none of the Italian, French, or German firms have such highly dispersed ownership.	统计结果与所有权分离的关系令人吃惊：对各国名列前20位大公司的抽样调查显示，90%的美国公司股东持股不超过20%，而意、法、德三国都不具备这样高度分散的所有权体系。


True, with only 16 countries rich enough to be included in the survey, the correlation isn't perfect.	当然，由于仅有16个发达国家达到了调查标准，使得找到的联系并不精确。


The United Kingdom is in seventh place in terms of labor-market flexibility, but a higher proportion of its largest companies have widely dispersed ownership than sixth-place Switzerland-and double the share of fifth-place Denmark and fourth-place Australia.	在劳工市场灵活度方面英国排名第七位，但却比排名第六的瑞士有更多的国内大型公司分散所有权¾甚至达到了第五名丹麦和第四名澳大利亚的两倍。


But whatever measures of "political" qualities and ownership separation we use, the index of employment protection appears to be the best predictor of ownership separation in the wealthy West.	但无论采用何种"政治"性质和所有权分离手段，雇用保护指数似乎是富有西方国家所有权分离的最佳晴雨表。


More fundamentally, creating the regulatory institutions conducive to ownership separation may be impossible unless a society's political orientation towards labor and capital is more favorable to capital.	更为重要的是，除非社会对劳资双方的政治倾向更偏于资方，否则不可能建立起有利于所有权分离的管理机构。


The Failed State of Egypt?	失败之国埃及？


CAIRO – The aggrieved supporters of ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the jubilant protesters who pushed the military to remove him have divided Egypt into two irreconcilable camps, both reflecting and reinforcing the country’s deeper problems.	开罗—愤愤不平的被推翻总统穆尔西的支持者和欢呼雀跃的促使军队推翻穆尔西的反对者形成了埃及不可调和的两大阵营，双方都反映并恶化着埃及深层次的问题。


Indeed, Egypt is now largely an ungovernable country that subsists on generous foreign handouts.	事实上，如今埃及已成为很大程度上不可治理的国家，只能靠慷慨的外国施舍过活。


Morsi never appreciated his tenuous position.	穆尔西从来不曾满意过自己脆弱的地位。


Though elected democratically, he chose to govern undemocratically.	尽管他是民选总统，却选择了不民主的治国方式。


He was bent on purging the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office, claiming that they were aligned with the protesters opposing his government and their military backers, who had been overthrown in 2011.	他热衷于更换司法系统和公共检察官，声称他们与他的政府的反对者及其军队支持者（于2011年被打倒）沆瀣一气。


Morsi brooked little opposition in pushing through a controversial draft constitution.	穆尔西不能容忍对其所推行的保守主义宪法草案的反对。


In doing so, he neglected to focus on the structural problems that propelled a docile society to pour into the streets two and a half years ago to bring down his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak.	如此作风表明，他早已忘记了两年半前让温顺的埃及人民走上街头、推翻其前任穆巴拉克的结构性问题。


Just as damaging as Morsi’s governing style was the Muslim Brotherhood’s go-it-alone mentality.	与穆尔西的治国风格一样为害甚深的是穆斯林兄弟会的孤家寡人思维。


Decades of persecution have instilled in its leaders the belief that the world is aligned against them.	几十年的迫害史给穆兄会的领导人灌输了一个观念——全世界勾结起来和他们作对。


Assuming power only stoked their paranoia.	掌权让他们的偏执狂思维愈演愈烈。


The Brotherhood’s leaders believed that the United States and Egypt’s elite were bent on ensuring their failure.	穆兄会领导人相信，美国和埃及精英处心积虑要使他们失败。


For this reason, they refused to reach out to their secular opponents to offer them a piece of the political pie.	因此，他们拒绝与世俗反对者接触，让他们也能从政治蛋糕上分一杯羹。


Even members of the more puritanical Islamist Nour Party were not invited to join the government.	即使是更严格恪守教规的伊斯兰光明党（Nour Party）也没有参与政府组建。


But it was not only Brotherhood politicians – inexperienced in the ways of democracy (and skeptical of them) – who stumbled.	但马失前蹄的并不只有对民主缺乏经验（也持怀疑态度的）穆兄会政客。


The debate in the US, long Egypt’s primary ally and donor, did not center on strengthening Egypt’s embattled institutions, but focused instead on how to ease the military out of power by withholding aid.	埃及长期盟友和赞助人美国国内的争论的核心并非强化埃及陷入重围的制度，而是如何通过撤除援助让军队交还权力。


Multilateral lenders like the International Monetary Fund were fixated on fiscal reforms such as reducing costly subsidies rather than shoring up a beleaguered economy.	IMF等多边贷款机构则关注减少埃及大规模补贴等财政改革，而不是巩固其四面楚歌的经济。


Today, a democratic transition that the West sought to portray as a model that other Arab nations could emulate lies in tatters.	如今，西方试图打造成其他阿拉伯国家应该效仿的民主转型已经轰然倒下。


Egypt’s economy, bruised by the outflow of foreign investment and a dearth of tourists, is on life support.	资本外流和游客锐减让埃及经济遭受重创，已在垂死挣扎。


Rebuilding the country will require much more than the cheering from the sidelines that Western countries have offered so far.	重建埃及所需要的远不只是对西方国家已经给出的援助欢呼雀跃。


Egypt has always relied on munificent benefactors to sustain its patchy state and economy.	埃及一直依靠慷慨的捐助维持其千疮百孔的国家和经济。


After the military coup in 1952, the Soviets provided much of the needed aid.	1952年军事政变后，苏联提供了大量所需援助。


Their “technical” experts turned the country’s second city, Alexandria, into a Russian country club.	苏联“技术”专家将埃及第二大城市亚历山大港变成了俄罗斯乡村俱乐部。


After Egypt pivoted to the West in the wake of the 1973 war against Israel, America became its main patron.	1973年对以战争结束后，埃及倒向西方，美国成为其主要金主。


But America’s ritual annual gift of roughly $1.5 billion could only dull the pain of Egypt’s problems, not resolve them.	但美国礼仪性的每年15亿美元左右的资助只能暂时止住埃及经济的痛苦，而不无法根除顽疾。


The country can no longer provide enough government stipends in the form of bureaucratic posts for college graduates.	国家已无力以官僚职位的形式给大学毕业生提供足够的政府津贴。


Egypt can only hope for cash infusions to offset its internal hemorrhaging.	埃及只能寄希望于注资抵消经济的内出血。


By making aid conditional on economic reform and democratic transition, however, the international community risks political triage.	但是，国际社会提出援助需以经济改革和民主转型为条件，这造成了政治混乱风险。


It should instead focus on financial assistance that blunts Egyptians’ frustrations and that contributes to building the institutions that will facilitate the transition toward democracy.	国际社会应该将注意力放在能减轻埃及人沮丧感、有助于建立促进民主转型的机构的金融援助。


But, of the $1.56 billion that the US State Department requested for Egypt in 2013, only $250 million is earmarked for non-military programs.	但是，在美国国务院许诺给埃及的15. 6亿美元2013年援助中，只有2.


The US should increase funding for projects that focus on governance, civil society, and strengthening the rule of law.	5亿美元会用于非军事项目。 美国应该增加对着重于治理、公民社会和强化法治精神的项目的融资。


Such programs receive a paltry $25 million in the 2013 budget.	这些项目的2013年预算只有区区2500万美元。


To bolster the economy, the US needs to shift its aid policies away from funding projects toward providing immediate budgetary relief.	为了提振埃及经济，美国需要将援助政策从提供项目资金转变为提供即刻预算纾困。


Though financing water-efficiency schemes certainly helps society, its effects are felt years after the aid is initially dispensed.	尽管为节水项目提供融资必然有助于社会，但其效果要在援助给出后好几年才能被��觉到。


The US, and other Western donors, should instead help Egypt to husband its resources, which are often misspent in an effort to placate its people.	美国和其他西方赞助者应该转而帮助埃及节省使用其资源，埃及常常为了安抚人民而滥用资源。


Egypt is the largest wheat importer in the world, and food subsidies account for approximately 2% of GDP.	埃及是世界最大的小麦进口国，食品补贴占了GDP的约2%。


To preserve its precious foreign-currency reserves, Egypt needs the US and its allies to provide foodstuffs.	为了保护其宝贵的外汇储备，埃及需要美国及其盟友提供食品。


Such a policy was adopted in the aftermath of the 1973 war, when America offered $200 million annually for wheat procurement.	这一政策市1973年战争后采用的，当时美国提供每年2亿美元的小麦采购量。


Embracing such policies will give institutions and the democratic process the time and space they need to plant firm roots.	采取这类政策将给埃及机构和民主进程时间和空间打下扎实基础。


Beyond such questions lies the fate of democracy in one of civilization’s most ancient lands.	除了这些问题，还有最古老文明之地的民主前途问题。


Whoever triumphs in future elections will lack the legitimacy that only a majority can provide.	不管在未来选举中谁能胜出，都将缺少只有多数人才能提供的合法性。


Such a majority spoke last year, when it elected Morsi.	去年，多数人的意见是选择穆尔西。


To strip him of his post negates a basic pillar of democracy and sets a dangerous precedent.	把他轰下台无异于毁掉了民主的一大支柱，也树立了危险的先例。


But, in a country that faces so many problems, the paradox of Morsi’s removal from power and the dilemmas of democracy that occasioned it are not among them.	但是，在这个面临如此之多问题的国家中，穆尔西被推翻的悖论和随之而来的民主两难并不在其中。


Shocking things like the massacre at Charlie Hebdo in Paris happen, and they seem to be happening more frequently than ever.	类似于巴黎《查理周刊》大屠杀的冲击性事件时不时地发生，并且似乎比以往任何时���都发生得更加频繁。


Weimar Russia Revisited	重游魏玛俄国


The phrase “Weimar Russia” first appeared about 13 years ago, at the height of the confrontation between then President Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet that ended when Yeltsin’s tanks shelled the parliament.	“魏玛俄国”一词最早出现于13年前当时的鲍里斯·叶利钦（Boris Yeltsin）总统和最高苏维埃的高度对峙状态，后来叶利钦的坦克炮轰国会从而结束了最高苏维埃的存在。


The meaning was clear to all: Weimar Russia, like Weimar Germany, signified a weak republic attacked from within by nationalists yearning to restore authoritarian ways.	所有人都明白这个词的意义：魏玛俄国，和魏玛德国一样，表示一个软弱无力的共和国遭到那些渴望恢复独裁主义的民族主义分子的内部进攻。


In the late 1990’s and the early years of this decade, the problems that incited fears of a dysfunctional state seemed to fade.	上世纪九十年代后期和本世纪初，那些会引发人们对国家垮台的恐惧的问题看起来都消失了。


But over the past 18 months, the specter of Weimar has once again begun to haunt Russia.	但是在过去18个月中，魏玛幽灵再一次开始萦绕在俄罗斯人心头。


If taken to extremes, Russian society’s response to its wrenching modernization could degenerate into a nationalist revolution led by xenophobes.	俄罗斯社会对其痛苦的现代化的反应如果走极端的话，就可能会沦为一场惧外者领导的民族主义革命。


A different and healthy conservative response is possible if the tattered remnants of old threads, torn apart in the course of postcommunist modernization, can reconnect and grow together in a new way.	如果在后共产主义现代化事业中被扯得粉碎的破桐之叶能够以一种新的方式合而为一并一起生长，那么就有可能出现另外一种不同但却有利的保守的反应。


The problem is that everyone writes history in their own manner, and that there are no scales that can fix the precise point at which the remedy of unifying patriotism turns into the lethal poison of rabid nationalism.	问题在于，每个人对历史的看法各有不同，也没有尺度可以精确地测量出统一爱国主义的救药会在什么时候变成了致命的狂热民族主义毒药。


Weimar Germany blindly poisoned itself.	魏玛德国就是这样轻率地毒害了自己。


In the period from 1991 to 1993, nationalism was on the rise because Yeltsin’s infant democracy seemed weak, with the country in the throes of a deep economic crisis, as well as an acute confrontation between different branches of government.	从1991年到1993年期间，由于叶利钦尚处于婴儿阶段的民主体制还十分微弱，同时俄罗斯正痛苦挣扎于经济危机，面临政府内部不同派系之间的尖锐斗争，民族主义逐步抬头。


But what explains today’s resurgence of nationalism, when the regime and economy are strong, and all branches of government appear to operate in total unity?	但是当政权稳定，经济走势良好，政府内部派系也看起来团结如一体的时候，是什么引发了民族主义的复兴呢？


Indeed, there are no practical reasons for Russia’s current system of governance to fall into crisis (although such reasons may emerge in the event of an economic downturn).	事实上，俄罗斯现行的政治体系没有什么理由会陷入危机（尽管这种原因可能会在经济萎靡不振时候出现）。


But there is another reason, no less important, that concerns morals and ideology.	但是还有另外一个同样很重要的理由，它涉及到道德和意识形态。


Challenges to established political authority have been chilled, fairly effectively, by means of state-sponsored patriotism.	国家发起的爱国主义运动十分有效地减少了对已建立的政治权威的挑战。


But the virus of nationalism has survived and multiplied.	但是民族主义的病毒却幸存下来并开始繁殖。


Opinion polls, for example, indicate that 50% of Russians support the slogan “Russia for Russians.”	例如，民意测验显示，50%的俄罗斯人支持“俄罗斯人的俄罗斯”口号。


Moreover, nationalism has spread from the streets into the elite.	此外，民族主义已经从平民阶层蔓延到精英阶层。


Nationalist statements that would have been confined to the extremist newspaper Den in the early 1990’s are now considered normal, “centrist,” even commonplace.	在上世纪九十年代早期只有在极端主义报纸 Den 上才看得到的民族主义言论现在被认为是十分正常、“中立”、甚至是普通的言论。


Today’s hardcore Russian nationalists consider Putin’s regime too soft, too pragmatic, too reasonable – in their language, “weak and indecisive.”	今天的俄罗斯民族主义的核心力量认为普京政府过于软弱，过于务实、过于理性——用他们的话来说，“软弱而不果断”。


They loathe it for its “surrender” in Ukraine to the “Orange Revolution,” and they condemn the decision to give land along Siberia’s Amur River to China.	他们憎恶普京政府，因为它在乌克兰向“橙色革命”“投降”，并且他们严厉谴责普京政府将西伯利亚阿穆尔河畔的土地给与中国的决定。


The “Putin Center” can be displaced.	“普京中心”有可能会被取代。


Recall that Russia’s pro-Western liberals, ascendant a decade ago, have been relegated to the ideological fringe, with the very word “democrat” (let alone “pro-West”) now a term of abuse.	回想起十多年前俄罗斯内地位优越的亲西方自由主义者，现在已经被人们用“民主人士”（更不用说“亲西方”）——一个已经被滥用的术语称呼，被归到了意识形态的边缘。


Fortunately, there is no sign yet (not even on the horizon) of a charismatic leader capable of forging the scattered energies of national-socialist grievances into a critical mass of hatred and “national revival.”	幸运的是，把还没有什么（即使连已露端倪的都没有）迹象显示会出现一名极具魅力的领导人，能够将一盘散沙的民族社会主义分子愤愤不平的力量结合起来转化为一个充满仇恨的“民族复兴”团体。


Stalin’s ghost is no substitute for a real live leader; he will never leap out of his portraits, no matter how often they are waved.	斯大林的灵魂代替不了一个活生生的真正领导人，不管人们多少次向他的肖像挥手致意，他也不会跳出相片。


Moreover, times have changed.	此外，时代已经改变。


For example, no one even mentions the idea of introducing a dictatorship, abolishing elections, and so on.	例如，没有什么人会提及引入独裁政权、取消选举等想法。


No matter how harshly Russia’s “democrats” are abused, the word “democracy” remains a sacred cow.	不管俄罗斯的“民主人士”遭到如何苛刻尖锐的攻击，“民主”这个词仍然神圣不可侵犯。


Instead, a populist-nationalist revolution might resemble the attempt to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, or a Russian version of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.	事实上，一个平民-民族主义的革命也许就像1991年8月推翻米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫（Mikhail Gorbachev）的尝试一样，或者就是一个乌克兰橙色革命的俄罗斯版。


It might be some sort of “democratic nationalist revolution” – spontaneous, and not made by any one political party but by a popular mass movement.	它也许既是“民主主义”同时也是“民族主义”革命，不是由任何一个政党发起而是由群众运动引发的。


It would be anti-bureaucrat, anti-oligarch, anti-West, and staunchly pro-nationalist.	它将是反官僚、反寡头、反西方的，而且坚定地拥护民族主义。


These are the key ingredients in the nationalist stew that seems to appeal to Russians nowadays.	这些正是如今民族主义吸引俄罗斯人的的基本要点。


Judging by Putin’s most recent address to parliament, his regime is fully aware of the danger posed by populist nationalists.	从普京最近一次对国会发表的演讲判断，普京政府现在十分担忧平民主义民族分子引起的危险。


It is likely that the regime will attempt to counter this eruption of nationalism while maintaining its strong statist rhetoric.	政府很有可能会试图阻止民族主义爆发，同时维持中央集权下经济统治的论调。


But, in order to defeat the far right, Putin’s regime will be forced to take its stand on more or less liberal ideological grounds.	但是，为了打击极右翼分子，普京政府必须多多少少站在自由意识形态的立场上。


This won’t be easy for a regime based on the twin pillars of bureaucracy and the security apparatus.	这对一个建立在官僚主义和安全仪器两大支柱上的政权而言，可非易举。


What liberals should do in these circumstances is obvious: support Putin’s regime insofar as it maintains the foundation and institutions of a liberal order.	在这样的环境下自由主义者应该有何作为显而易见：只要普京政权保持自由秩序的基础和制度，自由主义这就应该支持普京。


The populist nationalists, because they reject these fundamentals, are the unremitting political antagonists of all liberals.	由于平民民族主义分子反对这些基本原则，因此他们是所有自由主义者永久的敌人。


Yet an alliance with the nationalists against Putin currently tempts many Russian liberals.	然而，一个由民族主义分子组成、反对普京的联盟还是吸引了许多俄罗斯自由主义者。


Indeed, the most popular tactic among liberals nowadays is to unite with all opponents of the regime.	实际上，如今最受自由主义者欢迎的战术是与政府所有的敌人团结一致。


That scheme is both absurd and dangerous.	这项计划荒谬且危险。


After all, the word “Weimar” draws its infamy from the pact with the devil that German conservatives and royalists made by backing Hitler.	毕竟，“魏玛”一词的恶名来源于那份德国保守派与皇室为支持希特勒而与恶魔签订的公约。


Welcome to the Era of Incompetence	欢迎进入执政无能的时代


Two diametrically opposed scenarios exist for what will happen to global real interest rates over the next generation.	对于未来二十五至三十年中全球实际利率的走向有两种截然不同的预测。


Those who predict generally low interest rates over the next generation point to rapid growth of productivity and potential output in the world economy.	认为低实际利率会主导未来二十五到三十年的人，其预测的依据是世界经济的生产率和潜在产能的快速增长。


According to this view, the principal problem faced by central banks will not be restraining demand as it shoots above potential, but boosting demand as it lags behind potential.	根据这种观点，各国央行将会面临的首要问题不是在需求超过产能时对其进行抑制，而是在需求滞后于产能时对其进行拉动。


They point to the fact that the world's major central banks - the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan - have so firmly established their anti-inflation credibility that the inflation risk premium has been wrung out of interest rates.	他们指出，世界主要的中央银行-美联储、欧洲央行和日本银行-已经筑起了一道反通货膨胀坚固防线，从而将通货膨胀的风险差额从利率中挤出去了。


Believers in low interest rates also emphasize shifts in income distribution in the United States away from labor and toward capital, which have greatly boosted firms' resources to finance investment internally and reduced their dependence on capital markets.	相信低利率的人们还强调美国的收益分配从劳力向资本的转移。 这种转移已经极大地增强了企业内部融资的能力，从而减低了它们对资本市场的依赖程度。


They point to rapid technological progress, which has boosted output from new and old capital investments.	他们还指出急速的技术进步使得新旧资本投资的收益都有所增加。


With competition strong across the economy, they say that we can look forward to a generation of relatively high asset prices and relatively low real interest rates worldwide.	他们表示随着经济领域中竞争的强化，我们可以预见在未来的二十五至三十年中全世界范围内的较高资产价格和较低实际利率。


By contrast, those who predict generally high real interest rates over the next generation point to low savings rates in the US, high spending driven by demographic burdens in Europe, and feckless governments running chronic deficits and unsustainable fiscal policies.	相形之下，认为高实际利率会主导未来二十五到三十年的人则另有一套依据：美国的低储蓄率，欧洲在人口统计负担驱动下的高消费和政府在应对长期财政赤字和不可持续的财政政策方面的不力。


Imagine a bunch of irresponsible Bush-like administrations making fiscal policy, forever.	设想一下，要是永远让不负责任的布什政府之流来制定财政政策会出现什么样的结果。


They also cite investment opportunities in emerging markets, and make the obvious point that if China and India stay on track, their economies' relative weight in the world will double in the next decade or so, as rapid real growth is accompanied by appreciation in their real exchange rates.	他们还援引新兴市场的投资机会作为预测依据，并明确指出如果中国和印度沿着现有轨道发展，其经济总量在世界经济中的比重会在未来十年左右翻一番，因为货币的实际升值总是伴随着经济的实际快速增长。


Sooner or later, the Chinese and Indian central banks' desire to hold down exchange rates to boost exports and their rich citizens' desire to keep their money in accounts at Bank of America will be offset by the sheer magnitude of investment opportunities.	中国和印度的央行压低汇率以促进出口的愿望和其富有的国民将钱存入美洲银行的意愿迟早会被巨大的投资机会所抵消。


In this scenario, bond prices in post-industrial countries are heading for a serious fall - as are real estate prices in California, New York, and London.	在这种情况下，后工业化国家的债券价格会严重下跌-正如加州、纽约和伦敦的不动产价格下跌那样。


What, then, is an economist to do?	那么，经济学家们应该如何作为呢？ 我们可以仿效J.


One could emulate J.P. Morgan, whose standard response to questions about stock prices, bond prices, and interest rates was to say simply, "The market will fluctuate."	P. 摩根公司的做法，对股价、债券价格和利率方面的问题都只有一句标准的回应："市场会波动。


Another alternative is to recall the late Rudi Dornbusch, who taught that any economist who forecasts interest rates based on fundamentals is a fool, because fundamentals are complex and unstable, shifting suddenly and substantially.	另一个选择是回忆已故的Rudi Dornbusch的教诲。 他教导我们说任何以基本的经济指标为依据预测利率的经济学家都是愚蠢的，因为基本的经济指标十分复杂并且变化无常。


Even if an economist correctly understands fundamentals, Dornbusch warned, that doesn't mean that markets do.	他警告说，即便经济学家对基本经济指标的理解正确也并不意味着市场对这些指标有同样的理解 。


In forecasting interest rates one is engaged not in examining fundamentals, but in predicting what average market opinion expects average market opinion about fundamentals to be.	在预测利率时，我们并不是要对基本的经济指标进行分析，而是预测市场对基本经济指标的变化会有怎样的判断。


But Rudi never followed his own advice.	但Rudi 从来也没有遵循自己的建议。


So let me place my bet - which I think is only 60% likely - and say that my best guess is that world real interest rates will be high over the next generation, and that current bond prices (and real estate prices) are not sustainable.	那么就让我来预测一下-我认为这一预测结果成为现实的可能性只有60%--我认为最大的可能性是全世界的利率在未来二十五到三十年会保持在较高的水平，且现有的债券价格（和不动产价格）是不可持续的。


Four features of modern politics in the world's post-industrial core lead me to this conclusion:	世界后工业核心国家的现代政治的四大特点让我得出了这一结论：


· In the US, the collapse of "grownup" Republicans in Congress - the extraordinary failure of fiscal conservatives to mount any effective opposition to the Bush administration's renewed destabilization of American government finances.	n 在美国，"成熟的"共和党在国会倒台-财政保守派们面对布什政府重新扰乱美国财政居然束手无策。


The deficit orgy of the Reagan era is looking less like a freak political accident and more like a structural feature of Republican Party governance - what the modern Republican governing coalition tends to do whenever it gains power;	里根时代对财政赤字的放纵现在看起来越来越不像是一种古怪的政治事故而更像是共和党治理的结构性特点-现代共和党执政联盟只要大权在握就会这样做；


· The parallel collapse of a grownup Republican presence in the executive branch.	n 与前者并行的是成熟的共和党人在行政领域的失势。


As Ron Suskind reports in his recent biography of Bush's first Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, former Bush Budget Director Mitch Daniels once whispered to himself at the end of a disastrous meeting, "Not a typical Republican package.	正如罗恩·萨斯凯德在最近为布什的第一任财政部长保罗·奥尼尔所著的传记中描述的那样，布什的前预算委员会主任米奇·丹尼尔斯在一次灾难性的会议结束后自言自语道："这不是典型的共和党的一揽子方案。


Definitely not."	绝对不是。


But Daniels decided he would rather run for office in Indiana than take a stand in support of sound fiscal finance;	"可丹尼尔斯宁可去竞选印第安那州州长也不愿出面支持一个合理的财政方案；


· The failure of Western European governments to even begin to think about how to address the coming fiscal crisis of the social-insurance state as a result of their aging populations;	n 西欧各国的政府甚至未能开始考虑如何应对人口老龄化即将给它们的社会保障国家带来的财政危机；


· The inability of Western European governments to enact sufficiently bold liberalizing reforms to create the possibility of full employment, together with the failure of western European monetary policy to be sufficiently stimulative to create the reality of full employment.	n 西欧各国的政府在制定足够大胆的自由化改革方案以创造充分就业的可能性方面的不力，再加上西欧温吞的货币政策在创造充分就业的现实方面的失败。


The arguments for low interest rates seem to me to require a degree of government competence that is unlikely, given political parties' current positions and the existing structure of the institutions that make fiscal policy.	在我看来，低利率的论点需要一定的政府执政能力来支持。 而就各政党目前的立场和财政政策的决策机构的现行结构来看，这种能力要求是不现实的。


I hope to be surprised.	我希望会有意外。


I hope to see governments in Western Europe and the US face up to their responsibilities and conduct sensible, sustainable fiscal policies.	我希望看到西欧和美国的政府勇敢面对它们的责任并贯彻明智、可持续的财政政策。


But that is my hope, not my forecast.	但这只是我的希望而不是我的预测。


Power to the Poorest	让穷人用上电


BREMEN – An estimated 1.2 billion people worldwide, including 550 million in Africa and 400 million in India, have no access to electricity.	不来梅——全世界估计有12亿人，包括5. 5亿非洲人和4亿印度人用不上电。


Most live in rural areas where the population is sparse and incomes are low, making it uneconomical to connect homes and businesses to a grid.	这些人大都生活在人口少、收入低的农村。 将农村家庭企业连入电网产生不了经济效益。


Nor is it feasible to generate power locally with a diesel unit, owing to high fuel costs and the need for substantial initial investment.	因为燃油价格高、初始投资大，在当地安装柴油机组发电也不可能。


A stable supply of affordable electricity is a prerequisite for economic development.	廉价而稳定的电力供应是经济发展的先决条件。


In fact, the consequences for people living without electricity can be dire: they may be deprived of adequate health care, or be unable to store fresh food.	事实上，没有电的后果也许非常可怕：人们可能无法享受充分的医疗保健，或者无法储存新鲜食物。


But one solution, based on the local use of renewable energy, requires minimal initial investment and can be expanded over time.	不过利用当地可再生能源的方案需要最低限度的初始投资，随着时间的流逝还可以逐步扩展。


This “boot-strap” approach is based on the use of photovoltaics – a simple, universal, and scalable technology that is easy to maintain.	这种“自给自足”的方法基于光伏技术的应用——这是一种简单、普遍、容易维护和拓展的技术。


Typically, in the first stage of this process, consumers would use a renewable energy source such as LED lighting, selling any surplus until they save enough money to buy lamp oil (on which Africans spend around $20 billion annually).	通常过程的第一阶段消费者会使用一种可再生能源（如LED照明），并将多余能源出售攒钱购买灯油（非洲人每年要花200亿美元购买灯油）。


The additional revenue might initially come from selling small electricity surpluses to local farmers to recharge their mobile phones (thereby allowing them to work out the optimal prices for their crops), or to help them irrigate farmland using small electric pumps.	额外收入最初或许来自将很少的多余电量出售给当地农民给手机充电（这样他们就能将农作物卖到最优的价格），或者帮他们用小型电泵灌溉农田。


This is a new opportunity.	这是一次全新的机会。


Until three or four years ago, photovoltaics were prohibitively expensive.	直到三、四年前，光伏发电还极其昂贵。


But advances in the industry and over-production have reduced their price by as much as 75%.	但行业进步和产能过剩使价格出现了高达75%的降幅。