Because of the cultural links they and their descendants have maintained with the mother country for more than 120 years, the city excels at advanced manufacturing of products that had not been invented when the migrants came.	由于这一层他们及子孙后代与祖国维持了120多年的关系，儒安维尔市擅长制造先进产品，包括那些移民到来时还没有发明出来的产品。


Morocco is full of French-language call centers that get their contracts through a cousin in Paris.	摩洛哥有很多法语呼叫中心，它们通过巴黎的远亲获得合同。


East Asian industrialization exploited the links created by the network of overseas Chinese.	东亚工业化也利用了华侨所构建的网络。


India’s high-tech industries were to a large extent created by returning migrants and are deeply connected to the diaspora.	印度高科技行业在很大程度上是由归国移民建立起来的，并且与侨民关系深厚。


Israel is an entire country created by its diaspora, and its thriving high-tech sector, too, has benefited from sustained ties.	以色列则完全是由侨民建立的国家，其欣欣向荣的高科技行业也大大受益于连续不断的侨民关系。


By contrast, many Latin American countries have substantial diasporas abroad, but few equivalent success stories.	相反，许多拉美国家拥有大量侨民，但却鲜有可相提并论的成功故事。


A country’s diaspora, and the diasporas it hosts, can be a huge asset for its development.	一国的侨民，以及它所接收的其他国家的侨民，可以成为其发展的巨大财富。


Diasporas are not gusanos or worms, as Fidel Castro refers to Cubans abroad.	侨民可怜虫和寄生虫（菲德尔·卡斯特罗这样称呼海外古巴人）。


They are a channel through which not only money, but also much tacit knowledge, can flow, and they are a potential source of opportunities for trade, investment, innovation, and professional networks.	他们是一个渠道，资金和隐性知识可以通过这条渠道流动； 他们也是贸易、投资、创新和专业网络机会的潜在源泉。


But a diaspora can work its economic magic only if the host country tolerates it and the home country appreciates it.	但侨民只有在东道国接受他们、祖国赏识他们的情况下才能实现他们的经济魔力。


Governments should have a diaspora strategy that builds on natural feelings of identity and affection to cultivate this social network as a powerful source of economic progress.	政府应该制定侨民战略，构建天然的身份感和亲近感，从而让这一社会网络成为经济进步的重要来源。


Renewing Europe’s Security Dialogue	重启欧洲安全对话


ATHENS – The year 2009 has been one of great change, taking place amidst even greater uncertainty.	雅典——2009年是剧烈动荡的一年，在这种动荡中又隐藏着更大的不确定性。


Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the resilience of the post-Cold War security system in Europe is being tested.	柏林墙倒塌20年后，世界局势正考验着冷战后建立的安全体系。


Longstanding conflicts remain unresolved and complex new challenges are emerging.	长期存在的冲突还没有得到解决，复杂的新挑战又开始出现。


Energy security, organized crime, terrorism, absolutism and fundamentalism, climate change, and cybercrime are acute concerns for every country.	能源安全、有组织犯罪、恐怖主义、专制主义、原教旨主义、气候变化以及网络犯罪是每一个国家强烈关注的问题。


The economic crisis has left many people far less prosperous, and perhaps less inclined to be ambitious in our efforts to address Europe’s security challenges.	经济危机让许多人不再像从前那样富裕，或许也不再愿意关注解决欧洲安全问题。


But we must also keep in mind that crisis brings with it opportunities for change.	但我们必须记住危机也带来了变化的机遇。


This year has also seen a number of positive developments, including a “reset” in relations between two key players in the European security dialogue: Russia and the United States.	今年也取得了一些积极进展，包括欧洲安全对话中俄美两大对手关系的重启。


The European Union has recently taken important steps towards greater cohesion and unity with the appointment of a President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs.	随着欧盟总统和外交政策高级代表的任命，欧盟在不久前朝着团结和统一迈出了重要的一步。


We should celebrate these achievements even as we recognize that serious problems remain to be resolved.	我们应当庆祝已经取得的成绩，虽然同时也必须承认，还有重要的问题拯待解决。


There are different perspectives on how Europe’s security architecture should be designed, but we all agree on the urgent need to tackle this critical challenge through constructive dialogue.	针对欧洲安全体系该如何设计有着各式各样的见解，但我们在一个问题上达成了共识，那就是需要通过建设性对话来应对关键问题。


It is in this spirit of cooperation and bridge-building that 56 foreign ministers – representing the US, Canada, and European countries, including the Russian Federation and the rest of the former Soviet Union – will meet in Athens on December 1-2 on my invitation to discuss the future of European security.	正是本着这种合作和搭桥精神，来自美国、加拿大、俄罗斯联邦及前苏联其它加盟共和国等欧洲国家的56国外长将应我邀请于12月1到2日在雅典召开会议，探讨欧盟安全未来等议题。


The talks mark the continuation of the “Corfu Process,” anchored in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began with an informal ministerial meeting on Corfu in June.	这次会谈标志着“科孚进程”的延续，该进程在欧洲安全与合作组织支持下，始于6月在科孚岛召开的非正式部长会议。


An attempt to address Europe’s unfinished business, the Corfu Process is an opportunity for us to come together to assess the gaps in our common security, to craft more effective responses to existing challenges, and – most importantly – to generate new political will for joint action.	科孚进程是解决欧洲遗留问题的一次尝试，它让我们有机会聚在一起，评估共同安全事业存在的缺陷，更有效地应对现有的挑战，更重要的是，我们可以借此机会缔造共同行动的全新政治意愿。


This includes action to preserve arms-control regimes, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; to accelerate the resolution of protracted conflicts; to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to assess and address traditional and new threats.	科孚进程包括签订《欧洲常规武装力量条约》等保持武器控制制度的行动； 还包括加速解决况日持久的地区冲突；


We cannot afford to leave the region’s protracted conflicts such as the ones in Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria on the back burner, as last year’s war in Georgia made abundantly clear.	去年的格鲁吉亚战争已经清楚地表明，我们不能对区域内类似纳卡－卡拉巴赫和德涅斯特河沿岸的旷日持久的冲突置之不理。


People living in these areas need peace and stability, not a fragile	上述地区的民众需要的是和平与稳定，而不是一纸脆弱的


Security challenges in neighboring regions also require a joint response.	我们需要对临近区域的安全挑战做出统一的回应。


Afghanistan is a case in point.	阿富汗就是个很好的例子。


And threats like terrorism, trafficking of arms, drugs, and people, and climate change are borderless and complex.	恐怖主义、武器、毒品和人口贩卖以及气候变化都是超越国界的复杂问题。


Only a joint response can be effective.	只有采取统一行动才有可能有效地应对。


The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of an era of mistrust and division, and opened the way for cooperation aimed at a peaceful and stable Europe.	柏林墙的倒塌标志着猜疑和分裂时代的结束，开创了同心协力建设和平稳定欧洲的坦途。


Europe has come a long way from those years of division, but we have not yet fully reaped the benefits promised by the wave of change of 1989.	欧洲已经将分裂年代远远抛在了身后，但我们还未能充分收获1989年变革浪潮所带来的全部胜利果实。


The OSCE meeting in Athens comes at a critical time, when Europeans must move into the twenty-first century more united than ever before.	雅典的欧洲安全与合作组织会议值此关键时刻召开，欧洲必须比以往更加团结地走入21世纪。


We must take this opportunity to restore the full capacity of the OSCE and make a fresh commitment to an indivisible European security system.	我们必须抓住这次机遇恢复欧安组织的全部功能，重新为建立不可分割的欧洲安全体系而努力。


Renewing the News	新闻的革新


NEW YORK – Last week, rumors from the world of print media were rife: a hundred reporters from The New York Times news desk to be bought out – or to lose their jobs if they refuse; steep cutbacks at British newspapers; staffs slashed at Condé Nast – eight respected editors axed at Glamour magazine.	发自纽约——上周平面媒体界弥漫着各种各样的传言：100名《纽约时报》新闻部门的记者将被买断工龄——如果不接受这个处理结果的话，他们就得被直接解雇； 英国各报章急剧削减预算；


In the United States and elsewhere, there is a sense that the long-foreseen implosion of news publishing is accelerating, having reached a kind of critical mass.	康泰纳什出版公司大幅裁员——8位在《Glamour》杂志任职的资深编辑丢掉了饭碗。 不管是美国国内还是国外，人们都能感到先期预见的新闻出版界内部动乱正在加剧，甚至已经达到某种临界值了。


The head of a famous journalism school, echoing sentiments common among her peers, told me recently, “We are preparing students to enter a profession that won’t exist as we know it by the time they graduate.”	而在最近，一所著名新闻学院的校长向我回应某些在她的同行中普遍存在的共识，她说：“我们正在培养学生进入一个等他们毕业时已经不复存在的专业领域。 ”


There is no way to disguise the reality: newspaper readers, in the West at least, are getting older; younger readers prefer to get their information online, where readers spend far less time actually reading news than print readers do; and, most agonizingly of all for the industry, people who were willing to pay for newspapers are unwilling to pay for the same content on a screen.	而那些更年轻的读者则喜欢从网上获取信息，这些人花在读新闻上的时间比平面媒体读者要少得多； 最让整个平面媒体产业苦恼的是，原来愿意买报纸的人们如今却不愿为出现在电脑显示屏上的同样内容付钱。


But does this mean the death of news, or its evolution?	但这是否就意味着新闻业正在走向衰亡，还是正经历一场革新？


I think we are witnessing something new being born.	依我之见，我们正在见证着某些新事物的诞生。


There is a great deal to mourn about the passing of the older news model.	关于旧新闻模式的逝去，人们能够哀悼的实在太多了。


I had the honor of attending the premiere of The Most Dangerous Man in America , the new documentary about Daniel Ellsberg and his daring release of the Pentagon Papers – against the will of the US government – to The New York Times back in 1971.	我曾有幸参加了纪录片《美国最危险男子》的首映式，这部新片讲述了早在1971年，丹尼尔·埃尔斯伯格大胆地将五角大楼文件——这当然美国政府不愿看到的——泄露给《纽约时报》的故事。


At that time, newspapers held the public’s focus and could be a powerful gadfly.	当时的报纸操纵着公众的注意力并成为一种令政府十分头痛的角色。


If you were President Richard Nixon, there was no ignoring what appeared on the front page of The New York Times .	假如你是当时的尼克松总统，那么《纽约时报》的头版新闻可是一条也不能漏掉的。


The blessings of the Internet are many, but one casualty of our segmentation into online subcultures is the loss of a common focal point.	虽然网络拥有众多优点，但新闻业介入网络次文化之后的一大牺牲则是失去了公众共同关注的焦点。


It is easy for a president or prime minister to ignore a thousand Web sites; the multiplicity of outlets and voices online, paradoxically, has weakened the media’s power to force accountability from leaders.	一位总统或一名首相可以很容易地忽略掉一千个网站； 而更荒谬的是，网络传播渠道和声音的多样性却反而削弱了媒体监督政治领导人履行其义务的能力。


But the passing of the old news model has also had a salutary effect.	然而旧新闻模式的终结同样产生了一些积极的影响。


People’s relationship to authority figures – doctors, politicians, religious leaders, or, indeed, journalists – is no longer slavishly deferential.	公众跟那些“权威”人物——比如医生，政治家，宗教领袖，或者事实上还有记者们——已不再是盲目崇拜的关系。


But this means that newspapers, in order to survive, will have to abandon their top-down tone, their “we decide what's important” sense of hierarchy, and create more collaborative kinds of documentation and feedback with citizens.	这就意味着报纸为了自身生存，将不得不放弃他们那种居高临下的口吻，他们那种类似“什么重要由我们说了算”的统治阶级观念，并同普通公民一道创造更多具有协作性的文献资料和信息反馈。


This does not mean merely permitting comments on an article that is published online; it means creating more opportunities for citizens to document, record, curate, and edit news from their own communities.	但这样做并不仅仅意味着允许人们对网上发布的文章发表评论； 而是意味着提供更多机会给公民去用文字记录、去摄像、去描绘以及编辑发生在他们自己社区内的新闻事件。


A new form could evolve from this changed power relationship between editors and citizens, potentially becoming as powerful as traditional journalism, if not more so.	一种新的新闻形式将从编辑/读者关系的权力关系转换中衍生出来，并很可能成长为跟传统新闻采编业一样强有力的模式，甚至可能更强大。


First, online news outlets will have to link not just to sources, but to live footage, ideally shot by citizens.	首先，网络新闻提供商链接的不仅是新闻资源，还要链接到现场片段（最好是公众所拍摄的）。


I have created op-eds in partnership with a citizens’ video news collective, The Glass Bead collective.	比如我就和一个叫做“玻璃珠”的市民新闻视频团体合作开设了一个评论专栏。


There is a potent immediacy to documents that have hyperlinks to footage of veterans being trodden underfoot by mounted police at a demonstration at the US presidential debates, or students being gassed in their rooms during the recent G-20 summit.	因为这些视频，比如在美国总统竞选辩论的游行中退伍老兵是如何被骑警践踏，或者最近G20峰会期间学生们在他们的房间内遭到警方催泪瓦斯攻击的片段，都将给那些记录这些事件并超链接到这些视频的文字材料提供拥有极大说服力的现场证据。


As more citizens become documentarians, online newspapers will have to curate their work to reflect reality on a level of visual urgency that new readers take for granted.	当越来越多的公民成为新闻事件的记录者的时候，网络报纸就必须调整自身的工作方向，力求通过有现场紧迫感的视频这种新读者喜闻乐见的方式来反映新闻现实。


Second, news outlets will have to be interactive: they should regularly teach citizens op-ed writing, for example, so that editors can receive a truly diverse set of submissions – well sourced, well written, and well argued – from people from all walks of life.	其次，新闻模式必须是交互式的：比如说，应该定期教市民们怎么写专栏，因此编辑们就可以接收到真实而多样的意见——优秀的资源，优美的文笔，加上充分的辩论——这些都来自于身处各行各业的人们。


Finally, citizens should be able to continue to curate a news story.	最后，公民应该有能力继续去描述一个新闻故事。


On Facebook, of all places, I experienced the amazing potential of posting an item and then inviting my “community” to continue the research as well as the debate.	在Facebook以及所有网络社区里，我通过发出一篇帖子并邀请“好友团”继续深入调查和讨论体验到了这种模式令人惊叹的巨大潜力。


To be sure, I have been exposed to flimsy sources, and newspapers of the future should help readers learn what a good source is, and what good citizen journalism requires.	可以肯定的是，我会公开揭穿那些不可信的新闻来源，而未来的新闻业应当帮助读者学习认识什么才是好的新闻资源，以及作为一个优秀的公民记者需要一些什么样的品质。


But I have also had many eye-opening experiences as people from around the world and from every background deepen my understanding and sourcing about issues as far-ranging as military law, religious practices, and swine flu.	而同样让我大开眼界的是，来自世界上各地、各种不同背景的人们对于军法、宗教活动以及猪流感等范围甚广的话题的探讨也加深了我对这些问题的理解，并扩大了我获取新闻线索的来源。


With every shift in medium, there is a period of mourning for the old one.	虽然随着媒体业中的每一步转变，我们在很长一段时间内都会哀悼旧新闻模式的消亡。


I don’t pretend to possess journalism’s Holy Grail: a sustainable business plan for the newspaper of the future.	而我也不愿意假装自己拥有新闻业的“圣杯”：比如一个关于未来新闻业的可持续商业计划。


But I do know that that goal is far more likely to be achieved if newspapers take their readers seriously and train them as documentarians of their own communities and of their own moments.	但我的确知道，如果报界能严肃认真地对待读者，并把这些人训练成他们所在社区以及某些属于他们自己的时刻的记录者的话，那么目标就更加有可能实现。


If newspaper publishers continue merely to rearrange the deck chairs, their elegant, elitist – and currently sinking – ship will deserve its fate.	但如果那些报纸出版人还是在那里高枕无忧的话，那么这艘优雅的但却正在沉没的“精英之船”就将不得不接受自己覆亡的命运。


America’s Pacific Rebalance	美国的太平洋战略调整


WASHINGTON, DC – The United States military has entered a period of historic change after more than a decade of war following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.	华盛顿——2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后，美国军方历经十余年战争后已开始进行历史性的变革。 我们结束了伊拉克战争；


We ended the war in Iraq; we are implementing an effective transition and drawdown in Afghanistan; and we have seriously weakened Al Qaeda’s leadership in the fight against terrorism.	我们正在阿富汗有效落实过渡和裁军； 我们在反恐斗争中严重削弱了“基地”组织的领导层。


As a result of these efforts and the reality of budget constraints, the US has developed a new defense strategy for the twenty-first century, one that emphasizes agility, technology, and force projection.	鉴于已经取得的成果和预算紧张的现状，美国已经制订了二十一世纪新的国防战略，强调灵活性、技术和力量投射。


We have begun to focus on the challenges and opportunities of the future, and it is clear that many of them lie in Asia.	我们已开始关注未来的挑战和机遇，很明显未来有众多的决胜因素存在于亚洲。


After all, the global center of gravity is steadily shifting toward the Asia-Pacific, tying America’s future prosperity and security ever more closely to this fast-growing region.	毕竟，全球重心正逐步向亚太地区转移，美国未来的繁荣安全与这个快速增长地区的联系比以往任何时候都更为紧密。


At the same time, increasing military spending, challenges to maritime security, non-traditional threats ranging from piracy to terrorism, and the destruction wrought by natural disasters are making the region’s security environment more complex.	与此同时，追加军费开支、海上安全难题、从海盗到恐怖主义等非传统安全威胁以及自然灾害造成的破坏正进一步恶化这一地区的安全环境。


For these reasons, the US Department of Defense is implementing a “rebalance” of America’s strategic focus and posture to the Asia-Pacific.	美国国防部因此正试图“调整”美国在亚太的战略重心和态势。


The vast majority of America’s rebalance comes in non-military areas like trade and development.	美国的调整绝大部分是在贸易发展等非军事领域。


This is part of a broad effort directed by President Barack Obama to deepen our diplomatic, development, economic, security, and cultural engagement across the region.	这是奥巴马总统深化我国外交、发展、经济、安全和与整个地区文化交往的广泛努力的组成部分。


For the Department of Defense, the rebalance is about helping to ensure that the US and all countries in the region continue to benefit from a secure and prosperous Asia-Pacific – as we have for nearly 70 years.	就国防部而言，调整有助于确保美国和该地区所有国家像过去70年那样继续受益于安全繁荣的亚太环境。


This effort rests on four pillars.The first is America’s longstanding commitment to a set of principles that helped to advance peace and security in the region in the twentieth century.	四大支柱支撑着亚太战略调整的努力。 首先是美国对20世纪成功推动该地区和平安全的一整套处事原则的长期坚持。


As a Pacific power, the US has an abiding national interest in a just international order that emphasizes states’ rights and responsibilities and their fidelity to the rule of law; open access for all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and cyberspace; unimpeded economic development and commerce; and resolving conflict without the use of force.	美国身为一个太平洋大国，在强调国家权利责任和法治忠诚度； 开放全球公共海洋、天空、太空和网络空间；


These principles can and should underpin strong economic, diplomatic, and military relationships throughout the region today.	以及避免使用武力解决冲突的公正的国际秩序中拥有永恒不变的国家利益。 上述原则可以并且应当支持今天整个地区强劲的经济、外交和军事关系。


The second pillar is a special priority of mine: modernizing and strengthening America’s alliances and partnerships in the region, and developing new ones.	我重点关注第二根支柱：即升级、加强和新建美国在亚太地区的联盟和伙伴关系。


That mission has led me to travel to Asia four times since becoming Secretary of Defense in July 2011.	2011年7月我就任国防部长后，为完成这项任务已经四次出访亚洲。


It has led us to devote more resources and effort to building our partners’ capabilities and improving interoperability between the US military and forces in the region.	我们为此投入更多资源精力用于合作伙伴的能力建设，提高美军和区域军队之间的综合协同能力。


We are also working to identify opportunities to deepen our cooperation in information security, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and other high-tech frontiers – from cyberspace to outer space.	我们还努力寻找机会深化信息安全、情报、监视侦察及其他高科技前沿领域（从网络空间到外太空）的合作。


For example, we are developing a new bilateral plan for the US-Japanese alliance’s future roles, missions, and capabilities, and reached an agreement to position an additional missile-defense radar to protect against the North Korean threat.	比方说，我们正在制定美日同盟未来角色、使命和能力的全新双边计划，并就为防止朝鲜威胁安装新的导弹防御雷达达成了协议。


On my recent visit to Australia, we signed an agreement to relocate a space surveillance radar to Western Australia.	我最近访问澳大利亚时签署了一项将空间防御雷达迁移至西澳大利亚州的协议。


And, in South Korea, our Strategic Alliance 2015 agreement charts a course for the future across a range of fronts, including cooperation in space and cyberspace, intelligence and information sharing, and command arrangements.	而我们与韩国签订的2015年战略同盟协议在多个领域规划了未来发展的蓝图，包括在太空和网络空间、智能化和信息共享及指挥安排方面进行合作。


Moreover, America is focused like never before on working with our allies and partners in South and Southeast Asia.	此外，美国以前所未有的力度与我们在南亚和东南亚的盟友及合作伙伴展开合作。


With India, we have developed an unprecedented bilateral initiative that will streamline our export processes and deepen our defense trade and co-production.	我们已同印度制定了前所未有的双边计划，旨在简化出口程序并深入推进两国的国防贸易及合作生产项目。


We are also pursuing new areas of cooperation in defense exercises, such as submarine salvage and rescue, reflecting this key partnership’s growing dynamism.	我们也在海底打捞和救援等防御演习方面寻找新的合作领域，这反映出印度这一关键伙伴的活力正处于不断增长之中。


In Southeast Asia, we are expanding our engagement with the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), increasing bilateral engagement with traditional allies and partners like Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, and developing our cooperative partnerships with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.	在东南亚，我们正加强与东南亚国家联盟（东盟）的合作，强化与泰国、菲律宾、新加坡等传统盟国及合作伙伴的双边接触，并和越南、马来西亚和印度尼西亚等国建立合作伙伴关系。


One of the most important ways to enhance alliances and partnerships is through joint training and exercises.	强化联盟及伙伴关系最重要的方法之一是通过联合训练和演习。


During 2012, the US increased both the size and the number of bilateral and multilateral exercises across the Asia-Pacific region.	2012年，美国增加了整个亚太地区双边和多边演习的规模和数量。


For example, the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise was the largest ever, including more than 42 ships and 25,000 personnel from 22 countries, while the US and China staged their first-ever maritime counter-piracy exercise near the Horn of Africa.	例如举行了有史以��规模最大的环太平洋演习（RIMPAC），来自22个国家和地区的超过42艘舰艇和25，000名人员参与其中，而美中两国也在非洲之角附近举行了首次海上反海盗演习。


In 2013, we will engage for the first time in multilateral military exercises led by ASEAN, while China has been invited to send ships to RIMPAC 2014.  	2013年，我们将首次参与东盟领导下的多边军事演习，而中国已应邀派军舰参与2014的环太平洋演习。


In support of this increased engagement – aimed not at establishing new permanent bases, but rather at building stronger allies and partners through a greater rotational presence – the third pillar of America’s rebalancing is to enhance our presence across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 	以上频繁接触的目的不是建立新的永久性基地，而是通过强化地区存在缔造更强大的联盟和伙伴关系。 美国亚太战略调整的第三根支柱是加强我们在太平洋和印度洋的影响力。


In Northeast Asia, where the US military has traditionally maintained a strong presence, we are modernizing our posture.	在美国军方传统的强势地区东北亚，我们正在进行现代化升级。


This year, we deployed F-22s and MV-22 Ospreys to Japan and reached an important agreement to relocate our forces on Okinawa.	今年我们向日本部署了F-22和MV-22直升机，并达成重新部署冲绳军队的重要协议。


We continue to develop Guam as a strategic hub, and plan to establish fully capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii.	我们继续将关岛建设成重要的战略中心，并计划在日本、关岛和夏威夷组建完整的陆战队陆空特遣队。


Meanwhile, we are retaining and upgrading US Army capabilities in Korea.	此外，我们正在保持并提高美军在韩国的战斗力。


The US military is also rebalancing within the Asia-Pacific region to place more emphasis on new partnerships in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.	美国军方也在重新调整亚太地区部署，重点发展在东南亚和印度洋的全新伙伴关系。


Last spring, 200 US Marines arrived in Darwin, Australia, for the first six-month rotation to serve and train alongside Australian troops and operate with regional partners.	去年春天，200名海军陆战队士兵抵达澳大利亚的达尔文市，参与和澳军为期六个月的首场轮训并与区域伙伴展开联合行动。


We also increased the number and frequency of US Air Force aircraft rotating through Northern Australia.	我们还增加了美国空军飞机横穿澳大利亚北部的轮飞次数和频率。


Finally, we agreed with Singapore to deploy up to four Littoral Combat Ships there on a rotational basis to join it and other countries in the region for exercises, training, and responses to challenges.	我们与新加坡达成一致轮流派遣不超过四艘濒海战斗舰参与新加坡和该地区其他国家的演习、训练和应急处置行动。


The final pillar of the US rebalance is force projection.	力量投射是美国战略调整的最后一根支柱。


We plan to have 60% of our naval fleet based in the Pacific by 2020, and America’s defense budget has preserved, and even boosted, investment in new and more capable assets needed in the Pacific theater.	到2020年我们计划将60%的海军舰队派遣到太平洋，其后美国的国防预算仍将持续甚至加大对太平洋地区所需更新更强资产的投入力度。


Our spending plan prioritizes the development and fielding of the newest, most capable technology, including Virginia-class submarines, fifth-generation F-22 and F-35 fighters, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, new electronic warfare and communications capabilities, and improved precision weapons and cruise missiles.	我们的支出计划将优先研发部署最新最强的技术，包括弗吉尼亚级潜艇、第五代F-22和F-35战斗机、P-8海上巡逻机、全新电子战及通信能力、制导准确度进一步增强的武器和巡航导弹。


These are some of the capabilities that will maintain our forces’ ability to project power should our access and freedom of action be challenged.	一旦我们的行动范围和自由受到威胁，上述武器将确保我们部队的武力投射能力。


These four pillars reflect the Department of Defense’s comprehensive approach to contributing to a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century.	这四大支柱部反映了国防部建设二十一世纪和平繁荣亚太地区的综合方案。


This rebalance is a long-term strategy, and in 2012 we laid a foundation for its long-term success. 	上述调整属于长期战略，2012年我们为长期成功打下了坚实的基础。


Nevertheless, questions and misperceptions remain.	然而依然存在着问题和误解。


Some have concluded that the rebalance is directed at China. It is not.	有人认为调整以中国为假想敌，但实际情况并非如此。


A key component of the rebalance is a healthy, stable, and continuous military-to-military relationship with China, based on sustained and substantive dialogue that enhances our ability to work together and to avoid any kind of miscalculation.	调整的重要组成部分是建设基于持续性实质对话的健康、稳定和持续的对华军事关系，增强我们的合作能力，避免任何形式的误解发生。


I had a successful visit to China in September, and I am clear-eyed but optimistic about the future of this important military-to-military relationship.	我曾于9月成功访华，我对美中重要军事关系的未来保持着清醒乐观的认识。


As the US seeks stronger defense ties with China and countries throughout the region, we expect and welcome other countries’ efforts to build ties with China and the US alike.	在美国寻求与中国和区域其他国家加强防御关系的同时，我们期待并欢迎其他国家同时加强与中美两国的关系。


Some argue that instability and turmoil in the Middle East will prevent us from implementing the rebalance.	有人认为中东地区的动荡和混乱将阻碍我们完成调整任务。


Our new defense strategy and budget makes clear that it will not.	我们新的国防战略和预算明确显示没有这种可能。


The US military is a global force that can walk and chew gum at the same time.	美军是一支能从容应对多种突发情况的全球力量。


Even as we rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, we will retain a significant presence in the Middle East to deter aggression and promote stability.	即使在调整亚太地区战略的同时，我们也可以在中东保持影响力，在遏制侵略的同时促进稳定。


Finally, some question whether, given America’s fiscal constraints, the US military can make the investments necessary to implement the rebalance.	最后有人质疑鉴于美国的财政限制，美军是否有充足的资金完成战略调整计划。


To be sure, the US is facing a new fiscal reality, and the defense budget must be reduced by $487 billion over the next decade.	美军无疑面临着新的财政现实，必须在今后十年实现削减4780亿美元国防预算的目标。


But budgets are about priorities, and we have clearly made the Asia-Pacific region a priority.	但预算可以优先配置，我们已经明确将亚太地区作为我们的重点目标。


We have a detailed plan for the rebalance in our budget, and we have made decisions that will make our military more cost-effective, efficient, and productive.	我们制定了调整预算的详细计划，并已经采取措施让我们的军队更加节约和高效。


America is and always will be a Pacific nation.	不管现在还是将来，美国将永远是一个太平洋国家。


The US has fought and spilled precious blood to give the nations in the Asia-Pacific the opportunity to achieve prosperity and security.	美国曾为赋予亚太国家实现繁荣安全的机会而在战斗中洒下热血。


We remain committed to improving the lives of all of those who are part of the Pacific family of nations.	我们现在仍将改善所有太平洋国家生活视为自己的目标。


The purpose of the rebalance is to fulfill that commitment to the dream of a better and more secure twenty-first century.	战略调整的目的是要实现建设更安全美好的二十一世纪的梦想。


Steady on the Renminbi	人民币需要稳健


NEW HAVEN – Currency wars are raging worldwide, and China is bearing the brunt of them.	纽黑文—放眼全球，货币战争肆虐，而中国可谓首当其冲。


The renminbi has appreciated sharply over the past several years, exports are sagging, and the risk of deflation is growing.	人民币在过去几年中大幅升值，出口出现下滑，通缩风险日益增加。


Under these circumstances, many suggest that a reversal in Chinese currency policy to weaken the renminbi is the most logical course.	在这样的环境下，许多人认为中国改变货币政策、促使人民币贬值是最合乎逻辑的动作。


That would be a serious mistake.	大错特错。


In fact, as China pursues structural reforms aimed at ensuring its continued development, forced depreciation is about the last thing it needs.	事实上，随着中国开始追求旨在确保后续发展的结构改革，强迫贬值是最不该做的事情。


It would also be highly problematic for the global economy.	对于全球经济，人民币贬值也十分不妥。


On the surface, the situation certainly appears worrisome – especially when viewed through the currency lens, which captures shifts in Chinese prices relative to those in the rest of the world.	表面上，当前的局面颇可忧虑——特别是从货币角度，即中国价格相对世界其他地区价格的变化看。


According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), China's real effective exchange rate – an inflation-adjusted trade-weighted average of the renminbi's value relative to the currencies of a cross-section of China's trading partners – has increased by 26% over the last four years.	根据国际清算银行（BIS）的数据，中国实际有效汇率——经通胀调整的、贸易加权的人民币相对中国贸易伙伴的横截面价值——在过去四年中升值了26%。


China's currency has appreciated more than any of the other 60 countries that the BIS covers (apart from dysfunctional Venezuela, where the figures are distorted by multiple foreign-exchange regimes).	人民币比BIS所覆盖的所有其他60种货币升值幅度都要大（混乱的委内瑞拉除外，该国数据因为多重外汇机制并存而被扭曲）。


By comparison, the allegedly strong US dollar is up just 12% in real terms over the same period.	相比而言，号称强势的美元在相同期间内实际价值只升高了12%。


Meanwhile, China's emerging-market counterparts have experienced sharp currency depreciations, with the Brazilian real falling by 16%, the Russia ruble by 32%, and the Indian rupee by 12%.	与此同时，中国的新兴市场同侪经历了货币大幅贬值，巴西里亚尔实际汇率下降了16%，俄罗斯卢布下降32%，印度卢比下降12%。


This currency shift is, of course, the functional equivalent of a large hike in the price of Chinese exports.	当然，这一货币变迁在功能上等同于中国出口品价格的大幅攀升。


Add to that continued sluggishness in global demand, and the once-powerful Chinese export machine is suffering, with total exports down by 3% year on year in January.	此外，全球需求的持续停滞，曾经强大无比的中国出口机器正在遭遇困境，1月份总出口同比下降3%。


For an economy in which exports account for about 25% of GDP, that is not a trivial development.	对出口占GDP25%左右的中国经济来说，这绝不是无关紧要的发展趋势。


At the same time, a stronger renminbi has made imports less expensive, putting downward pressure on China's price structure.	与此同时，强势人民币让进口不再昂贵，对中国的物价结构造成了下降压力。


Unsurprisingly, this has exacerbated the fear of deflation, with the consumer price index (CPI) rising by just 0.8% year on year in January, and the annual decline in producer prices steepening, to 4.3%.	毫不奇怪，这加剧了通胀担忧，1月份消费者物价指数（CPI）同比涨幅仅0. 8%，而生产者物价降幅扩大至4.


While these trends are undoubtedly being amplified by plummeting world oil prices, China's core CPI inflation rate (which excludes volatile food and energy prices) was near 1% in January.	3%。 这些趋势毫无疑问受世界油价暴跌的驱动，但1月中国核心CPI通胀率（剔除波动性较高的食品和能源价格）也接近1%。


Against this background, it is easy to see why many anticipate a tactical adjustment in China's currency policy, from appreciation to depreciation.	在此背景下，很容易理解为何很多人预测中国货币政策将进行战术性调整，从升值转为贬值。


Such a move would certainly seem appealing as a way to provide temporary relief from downward pressure on growth and prices.	这一转变当然是有吸引力的做法，可以缓解增长和物价下行压力。


But there are three reasons why such a move could backfire.	但有三个理由认为这一做法可能适得其反。


First and foremost, a shift in currency policy would undermine – indeed, undo – the progress that China has made on the road to reform and rebalancing.	首先也是最重要的，货币政策的变化会影响——事实上，是破坏——中国的改革和再平衡大计。


In fact, a stronger renminbi is consistent with China's key objective of shifting from export-intensive growth to consumer-led development.	事实上，强势人民币与中国从出口密集型增长转向消费驱动型发展的转型目标一致。


The generally steady appreciation of the renminbi – which has risen by 32.6% against the US dollar since mid-2005 – is consistent with this objective and should not be reversed.	总体平稳的人民币升值——自2005年以来兑美元升值32. 6%——与这一目标一致，不应该改变。


It strengthens Chinese consumers' purchasing power and reduces any currency-related subsidy to exports.	这增强了中国消费者的购买力，降低了所有与货币有关的出口补贴。


During the recent financial crisis, the authorities temporarily suspended China's renminbi-appreciation policy, and the exchange rate was held steady from mid-2008 through early 2010.	在最近的金融危机中，当局曾暂停人民币的升值政策，汇率自2008年年中至2010年初一直保持稳定。


Given that current circumstances are far less threatening than those in the depths of the Great Crisis, the need for another tactical adjustment in currency policy is far less acute.	目前的环境远不如大危机深度发酵时那么危险，再次采取战术性货币政策调整的需要也远没有那时那么尖锐。


Second, a shift to currency depreciation could inflame anti-China sentiment among the country's major trading partners – especially the United States, where Congress has flirted for years with the prospect of imposing trade sanctions on Chinese exporters.	其次，转向货币贬值可能在中国主要贸易伙伴中间点燃反华情绪——特别是美国，美国国会多年来一直想对中国出口商进行贸易制裁。


A bipartisan coalition in the House of Representatives recently introduced the so-called Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, which would treat currency undervaluation as a subsidy, allowing US companies to seek higher countervailing duties on imports.	众议院两党联盟最近引入了所谓的公平贸易货币改革法（Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act），该法将货币低估视为一种补贴，允许美国公司要求更高的抵消性进口关税。


Similarly, President Barack Obama's administration has just brought yet another action against China in the World Trade Organization – this time focusing on illegal subsidies that China provided to exporters through so-called “common service platforms" and “demonstration bases."	类似地，总统奥巴马政府刚刚在世界贸易组织中采取了针对中国的新行动——这回的目标是中国通过所谓的“公共服务平台”和“示范基地”向出口商提供的非法补贴。


If China intervenes to push its currency lower, US political support for anti-China trade actions will undoubtedly intensify, pushing the world's two largest economies closer to the slippery slope of protectionism.	如果中国采取干预措施使人民币贬值，美国对反华贸易行动的政治支持毫无疑问会有所加紧，让世界前两大经济体朝着保护主义越走越近。


Finally, a renminbi-depreciation policy would lead to a sharp escalation in the global currency war.	最后，人民币贬值政策将导致全球货币战争的大升级。


In an era of unprecedented quantitative easing, competitive currency devaluation has become the norm for the world's major exporters – first the US, then Japan, and now Europe.	在前所未有的量化宽松时代，竞争性货币贬值已成为世界主要出口国的标准做法——首先是美国，接着是日本，现在则是欧洲。


If China joined this race to the bottom, others would be tempted to escalate their actions and world financial markets would be subject to yet another source of serious instability.	如果中国也加入这场贬值竞赛，其他人就有可能扩大动作，世界金融市场可能陷入又一场大动荡。


Just as China resisted the temptation of renminbi depreciation during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 – a decision that may have played a pivotal role in arresting regional contagion – it must stay the course today.	1997—98年亚洲金融危机期间，中国曾抵挡住人民币贬值的诱惑——这一决定在阻止地区金融传染方面起到了中流砥柱的作用——如今也必须这样做。


That is all the more important in a disorderly climate of QE, where China's role as a currency anchor may take on even greater importance than it did in the late 1990s.	在炼化宽松的无序环境中，这一点尤为重要——中国的货币锚作用比20世纪90年代末更加重要。


Strategy is China's greatest strength.	战略是中国最大的优势。


Time and again, Chinese officials have successfully coped with unexpected developments, without losing sight of their long-term strategic objectives.	中国官员曾一再成功应对了意料之外的状况而没有丧失长期战略目标眼光。


They should work to uphold that record, using the strong renminbi as an incentive to redouble efforts at reform and rebalancing, rather than as an excuse to backtrack.	他们应该继续努力保持这一纪录，用强势人民币作为一种激励让改革和再平衡措施如虎添翼，而不是将它作为倒退的借口。


This is no time for China to flinch.	中国绝不应该退缩。


For now, China is focused on winning the renminbi’s inclusion, even with a small share, in the SDR currency basket.	现在，中国���关注点是成功将人民币进入SDR货币篮子，哪怕比重很小。


The Renminbi Goes Forth	人民币，向前进


LONDON – The Nobel laureate Robert Mundell once said, “great powers have great currencies.”	伦敦—诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·蒙代尔（Robert Mundell）曾说，“大国有大货币”。


China, whose government Mundell long advised, seemed to take this notion to heart, prodding the International Monetary Fund for years to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that determine the value of the IMF’s reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right (SDR).	长期向蒙代尔取经的中国政府似乎深谙这一概念，多年来一直要求国际货币基金组织（IMF）将人民币加入决定其储备资产特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子中。


And now the IMF has decided to do just that, in what amounts to a huge vote of confidence in China’s capacity to play a major role in international finance.	如今，中国得偿所愿，这是对中国在国际金融中扮演主要角色能力的信心的巨大一票。


Many market participants, however, remain skeptical about the decision.	但是，许多市场参与者仍然对IMF的这一决定表示怀疑。


Does the renminbi really belong in the same category as the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the British pound in the international monetary system?	人民币真的可以和美元、欧元、日元和英镑在国际货币体系中平起平坐吗？


No doubt, China has made remarkable progress over a relatively short period.	毫无疑问，中国在相对较短的时间内取得了举世瞩目的进步。


Since 2009, the share of China’s trade settled in renminbi has increased from less than 1% to more than 20%.	2009年以来，以人民币结算的中国贸易比重从不到1%增加到20%以上。


And the renminbi now ranks fourth among the world’s currencies used for international payments.	如今，人民币是在国际支付中使用第四多的货币。


But the renminbi’s 3% share in global payments lags far behind that of the dollar (45%) and the euro (27%).	但人民币占全球支付的比重只有3%，远低于美元（45%）和欧元（27%）。


Moreover, growth in the use of the renminbi to settle trade has been concentrated largely in the Asia-Pacific region, and specifically in transactions between China and its neighbors.	此外，使用人民币结算贸易的增量基本上集中在亚太地区，特别是中国与其周边国家的交易中。


And demand for renminbi-denominated assets remains relatively low, with a mere 1.5% of total renminbi bank deposits held outside China.	人民币计价资产的需求仍然相对较低，只有1. 5%的人民币存款总量存在海外。


The contrast between the renminbi and its SDR counterparts is stark.	人民币及其他SDR货币的对比十分鲜明。


The renminbi offshore bond market amounts to just 0.5% of the world’s total, with 40% issued in dollars, 41% in euros, nearly 10% in pounds, and 2% in yen.	人民币离岸债券市场只占世界总量的0. 5%，美元占40%，欧元占41%，英镑占近10%，日元占2%。


The value of loans denominated in renminbi – CN¥188 billion ($29.2 billion) – is tiny, especially when one considers that almost 50% of total international banking liabilities are denominated in dollars, approximately 30% in euros, 5% in pounds, and about 3% in yen.	人民币计价贷款总值——1,880亿元（292亿美元）——微乎其微，特别是与美元（50%的全球银行总负债为美元计价）、欧元（约30%）、英镑（5%）和日元（3%）。


And the renminbi accounts for 0.6-1% of global foreign-exchange reserves held by central banks, whereas the dollar and the euro account for 62% and 23%, respectively.	人民币只占全球央行持有外汇储备总量的0. 6—1%，而美元和欧元分别占了62%和23%。


In short, unlike the rest of the currencies in the SDR basket, the renminbi is an international currency in the making, just as China is an economic and financial power in the making.	简言之，和其他几种SDR篮子中的货币不同，人民币还在成为国际货币的路上，正如中国还在成为经济和金融大国的路上。


Indeed, like most developing countries, China remains an “immature creditor” that lends mainly in dollars; and if it needed to borrow in international markets, it would have to issue most of its debt in dollars, not renminbi.	事实上，和大部分发展中国家一样，中国仍然是“不成熟的债权人”，主要用美元贷款； 而如果它需要从国际市场上借钱，大部分债务也必须用美元而不是人民币发行。


Clearly, China’s standing in international finance does not match its status in international trade.	显然，中国在国际金融中的地位与其在国际贸易中的地位不匹配。


Nonetheless, there is a distinct sense that the renminbi will become a key player in global financial markets.	尽管如此，显然人们认为人民币将会成为国际金融市场上的关键货币。


After all, unlike other developing countries – even large ones like Brazil, India, and Russia – China has an economy that is large enough to provide critical mass to its currency’s development.	毕竟，与其他发展中国家不同——即便是巴西、印度和俄罗斯等大国——中国经济足够大，可以为其货币的发展提供临界规模。


Furthermore, Chinese leaders are determined to push through reforms – especially of the banking sector and state-owned enterprises – that will help drive forward this development.	此外，中国领导人决心推行改革——特别是银行业和国有企业改革——以帮助推动其货币的发展。


They have made it clear that one of their key goals for the next five years is to narrow the gap between the international standing of the renminbi and that of the world’s “great currencies,” as they promote use of the renminbi far beyond the Asia-Pacific region.	他们明确表示，未来五年的关键目标之一是缩小人民币的国际地位与“大货币”的差距，他们将大力推动人民币在亚太地区之外的使用情况。


It is important to note, however, that China’s leaders do not seem to be angling for the renminbi to replace the dollar as the dominant international currency.	但是，必须注意到，中国领导人似乎并没有在争取让人民币取代美元成为主宰性国际货币。


Their approach – based on the belief that a more diversified, and thus more liquid, international monetary system would contribute to a more balanced and less volatile global economy – is more pragmatic.	他们的方针更加务实，其基础是这样的信念：更加多样化，从而更具流动性的国际货币体系有利于更加平衡、更少波动的全球经济。


Anticipating a shift from a dollar-based (and, more broadly, US-dominated) system toward a multi-currency, multipolar system, China’s leaders are laying the groundwork for their country (and its currency) to grasp one of the positions at the top, alongside other great powers.	中国领导人期待一个从基于美元（从更广义上说，由美国主导）的体系向一个多货币的多极体系的转变，他们将中国（及其货币）的立足地点定在与其他大国一样占据一个顶尖部位。


This goal certainly seems attainable.	这一目标似乎是可实现的。


Indeed, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s assessment of the renminbi’s chances of joining the SDR basket earlier this year – the question is “not if, but when” – seems to apply to China’s broader financial rise.	事实上，IMF总裁克里斯汀·拉加德今年早些时候对人民币加入SDR篮子机会的评估——这不是一个“是否的问题，而是一个何时的问题”——似乎也适用于更广义的中国金融崛起。


While some countries – the United States and Japan, in particular – are far from enthusiastic about that, it is difficult to deny what seems inevitable (neither country formally opposed the SDR decision when it came).	一些国家——特别是美国和日本——对此并不热衷，但是你无法否认必然会发生的事情（当IMF做出让人民币加入SDR的决定时，美国和日本都么有提出正是反对）。


And, as China gains more financial clout, its role in global economic governance will undoubtedly grow as well.	此��，随着中国金融实力的进一步增加，其在全球经济治理方面的作用毫无疑问也会水涨船高。


Given all of this, it is unsurprising that the reform of the international monetary system and its governance will feature prominently at next year’s G-20 summit, hosted by China, which will hold the group’s rotating presidency.	考虑到所有这些因素，毫不奇怪国际货币体系及其治理的改革将成为明年在轮值主席国中国举行的G-10峰会的主要主题。


It is not yet clear how China will shape the debate.	尚不清楚中国准备如何安排这一争论。


But the mere fact that it will happen at the G-20, rather than at the long-dominant G-7, sends a clear message that the global economic and monetary system is changing for good.	但这一争论将在G-10而不是长期主宰世界的G-7进行，光是这一事实已经释放出一个明确的信号，即全球经济和货币体系正在越变越好。


Great Expectations for the Renminbi	人民币的大期望


SHANGHAI – The International Monetary Fund’s recent decision to add the Chinese renminbi to the basket of currencies that determine the value of its reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right, has captured headlines around the world.	上海—国际货币基金组织（IMF）最近决定将人民币纳入决定其储备资产——特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子中，这吸引了全世界的目光。


But the SDR itself has not exactly dominated discussions – much less transactions – since its creation in 1969.	但自1969年创设以来，SDR本身从未成为讨论的焦点，也鲜有交易。


So does the decision really matter?	因此，这一决定真的很重要吗？


In fact, given the SDR’s very limited role in the global economy, the move will have few concrete effects in the short term.	事实上，SDR在全球经济中的作用十分有限，因此IMF的决定几乎没有任何短期实质影响。


In the longer term, however, the attention the decision has attracted could spur wider use of the SDR.	但从长期看，这一决定所吸引的注意力能够刺激SDR得到更广泛的使用。


More important, at least for now, the decision amounts to an endorsement by the IMF of the progress China has made toward renminbi internationalization, while reflecting – and reinforcing – China’s growing economic clout.	更重要的是，至少在现在，这一决定证明了IMF对中国在人民币国际化方面取得的进步持肯定态度，同时也反应——并加强了——中国日益增加的经济实力。


Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, its GDP has surged from about CN¥20 trillion ($3.1 trillion) to CN¥60 trillion.	自2001年中国加入世界贸易组织以来，其GDP从20万亿元人民币左右增长到60万亿元人民币。


In 2009 China became the world’s largest exporter.	2009年中国成为世界最大的出口国。


And last year, according to the IMF, China overtook the United States to become the world’s largest economy (in purchasing power parity terms).	而据IMF数据，去年中国已超过美国成为世界第一大经济体（以购买力平价衡量）。


The acknowledgement by the IMF board, which represents all 188 of the Fund’s member countries, that the renminbi meets “all existing criteria” for inclusion in the SDR basket is another step forward along this path of progress.	代表所有188个成员国的IMF理事会承认人民币满足纳入SDR篮子的“所有现有条件”，这是沿着这一进步之路所迈出的又一步。


It is important to note, however, that meeting “all existing criteria” does not place the renminbi on par with, say, the US dollar – or, indeed, with any of the other SDR currencies (the euro, the British pound, or the Japanese yen) – in terms of international usage.	但是，必须指出，满足“所有现有条件”并不能让人民币在国际使用方面与（比如）美元等量齐观——事实上，所有与其他SDR货币（欧元、英镑和日元）也是如此。


On the contrary, despite China’s massive GDP and trade volume, the renminbi’s share in the global foreign-exchange market remains negligible.	相反，尽管中国GDP和贸易量巨大，但人民币在全球外汇市场中的份额仍可忽略不计。


And the process of internationalizing the renminbi is far from complete.	其国际化的过程也远未完成。


Given this, the IMF could easily have rejected the renminbi’s bid for inclusion in the SDR basket, as it did five years ago.	因此，IMF可以轻松地拒绝人民币进入纳入SDR篮子的要求，一如五年前那样。


But the IMF seemed eager (especially in the last few months) to bring China on board this time around.	但这一次IMF似乎急切地想让人民币“入篮”（特别是在过去几个月中）。


What brought about the Fund’s change of heart?	是什么让IMF的想法发生了改变？


The explanation, I believe, lies largely in the August 11 devaluation of the renminbi, after a decade of appreciation.	我认为原因在于8月11日人民币的贬值上。 这是十年升值后人民币第一次贬值。


By moving away from the renminbi peg to the US dollar – an undoubtedly risky move – China demonstrated its willingness to allow market forces to establish the exchange rate in the long term.	通过取消人民币盯住美元——毫无疑问，这是一个高风险的举动——中国表明了其在长期允许市场力量决定汇率的意愿。


Of course, now that the renminbi has been accepted into the SDR basket, China must prove that it can manage dramatic currency depreciation effectively and continue to make progress toward internationalization.	当然，如今人民币已被纳入SDR篮子，中国必须证明它可以有效管理货币大幅贬值并继续想国际化迈进。


This will be no easy feat, especially at a time of slowing economic growth.	这不是一个简单的任务，特别是在其经济增长减速时。


A gradual depreciation would create expectations of further exchange-rate weakening, thereby fueling capital outflows and undermining companies’ willingness to use renminbi in exports and imports.	逐步贬值会制造出汇率继续疲软的预期，从而助长资本外流，不利于公司在进出口活动中使用人民币的意愿。


The renminbi offshore market, which has strengthened considerably over the last few years, would lose value, forcing the People’s Bank of China to channel foreign-exchange reserves toward that market to offset the decline.	在过去几年中大大增强的人民币离岸市场将失去价值，迫使中国人民银行向其投入外汇储备以阻止下跌。


Already, China’s reserves have declined considerably – by $87.2 billion last month alone.	目前中国外汇储备已经大幅下降——光是上个月就减少了872亿美元。


Despite these challenges, China’s leaders anticipate that, in the longer term, the renminbi’s inclusion in the SDR basket will help to bring about the currency’s steady appreciation and, by serving as a kind of certification of credibility, support its continued internationalization.	尽管又这些挑战，但中国领导人认为，从长期看，人民币纳入SDR篮子有助于人民币的稳步升值，并且可以充当某种形式的信誉证明从而支持其继续国际化。


They are probably right.	也许他们是对的。


Nonetheless, what will really drive the renminbi’s continued rise will not be the SDR (though it will help), but China’s own long-term economic performance.	尽管如此，真正驱动人民币继续升值的不会是SDR（尽管它能起到助推作用），而是中国自身的长期经济表现。


Indeed, as Arvind Subramanian has argued, China’s share of global GDP and trade is what makes the renminbi likely to become a global reserve currency.	事实上，阿文德·萨布拉曼尼安（Arvind Subramanian）指出，中国GDP和贸易占世界之比才是让人民可能成为全球储备货币的因素。


The question is when.	问题在于什么时候。


According to Subramanian, it could occur as early as 2020.	据萨布拉曼尼安的观点，有可能早至2020年。


Chinese researchers are somewhat less optimistic.	中国研究者没有那么乐观。


Five years ago, Pan Yingli of Shanghai Jiao Tong University projected that, without accounting for other currencies’ incumbency advantage, the renminbi’s share of foreign-exchange reserves worldwide could reach 26% by 2025 (about the current level of the euro).	五年前，上海交通大学的潘英丽预测，不计其他货币的先发优势，人民币占全球外汇储备之比可能在2025年达到26%（与目前欧元的比重相当）。


Accounting for the incumbency advantage, the share falls to 10%.	计入先发优势，这一比重将下降到10%。


But even at that level, the renminbi could be the world’s third reserve currency, after the dollar and the euro, by 2030.	但即使是后者，人民币仍将在2030年成为世界第三大储备货币，仅次于美元和欧元。


In short, the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR basket does matter, and not just symbolically.	简言之，将人民币纳入SDR篮子确实重要，绝不是象征性动作。


By demonstrating its confidence in the renminbi’s continued rise, the IMF has reinforced global expectations of – and lent implicit support to – the renminbi’s progress toward internationalization.	IMF以此表明对人民币继续崛起的信心，也增强了人民币迈向国际化的全球预期——并给与了间接支持。


Whatever challenges China faces, its steady march to the forefront of the global economy is set to continue.	不管中国面临什么挑战，其稳步迈向全球经济最前沿的征程必将继续下去。


Japan cannot reflate because of its aging population and irresolute implementation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic plan, so-called Abenomics.	日本因为人口老龄化和首相安倍晋三的经济计��（所谓的“安倍经济学”）实施不力而无法实现再通胀。


An Economic Ultimatum for the Arab World	阿拉伯世界经济的最后通牒


WASHINGTON, DC – If Middle Eastern countries do not start making real progress on fundamental political and economic reforms, further regional turmoil is inevitable.	华盛顿——如果中东国家无法开始在根本的政治和经济改革领域取得真正的进展，那么地区进一步陷入动荡是不可避免的。


With the rentier systems that governments have maintained for decades now at a breaking point, policymakers must begin the difficult, but not impossible, process of establishing new social contracts.	随着政府维持了几十年的食利体制处在崩溃的边缘，决策者必须启动虽然艰难、但并非完全不可能的全新社会契约的制定过程。


That contract in Arab countries started to erode at the turn of the century, when governments with inflated budgets and bloated bureaucracies could no longer provide an adequate supply of basic services such as health care and education, create a sufficient number of jobs, or sustain food and fuel subsidies.	阿拉伯国家的社会契约早在本世纪之交就开始衰落，当时预算膨胀和官僚机构臃肿的政府无力再提供医疗和教育等充分的基础服务、创造足够数量的就业机会或维持粮食和燃油补贴的数额。


But, despite diminished state benefits, most leaders have continued to insist that their countries’ people uphold their end of the contract by not participating meaningfully in public life.	但尽管国家福利不断减少，多数领导人继续要求本国民众履行他们不真正参与公共生活的契约义务。


Arab governments were able to sustain inefficient economies for decades because they were propped up by oil revenues.	因为石油收入的支撑，阿拉伯政府得以在数十年内一直维持着低效的经济制度。


In recent decades, most Arab countries have benefited in some way from the Middle East’s abundant oil and gas reserves.	近数十年来，多数阿拉伯国家都在以某种方式从中东丰富的石油和天然气储备中得到好处。


Hydrocarbon-producing countries used their profits to buy their citizens’ loyalty and establish what were effectively welfare states; and non-oil producers enjoyed the benefits of aid, capital inflows, and remittances sent back by their nationals working in resource-rich countries.	碳氢化合物生产国利用丰厚的利润来购买民众的忠诚并建立起实质上的福利国家； 而非石油生产国则享受着援助、资本流入和在资源富集国工作的本国国民汇款等好处。


Because the governments of oil-producing countries used revenues to provide for most of their people’s needs – including jobs, services, and favors – these governments fostered a culture of dependency, rather than encouraging self-reliance and entrepreneurship to expand the private sector.	因为产油国政府利用石油收入来满足就业服务和福利等多数民众需求，因此培养出一种依赖文化，而不是鼓励自力更生和企业家精神来拓展私营业务。


What’s more, because they did not need to tax their citizens to generate revenues, people had little recourse to challenge authoritarianism.	更有甚者，因为他们不需要对公民征税来创造收入，民众几乎没有机会来挑战独裁主义。


The political culture reflected a simple principle: “no taxation, no representation.”	政治文化反映了一个简单的原则：“没有税收、也没有代表制度。 ”


Now that oil prices are declining and will likely continue to remain low for several years, if not permanently, the Middle East’s rentier systems face a significant challenge.	现在石油价格正不断下降，而且这种下降即使不是永久性的，也极有可能持续几年之久，这导致中东的食利体系面临重大挑战。


Saudi Arabia, for example, is raising taxes, cutting domestic subsidies, and shifting its foreign-aid paradigm away from grants and toward investments.	如沙特阿拉伯正在提高税收、削减国内补贴，并将对外援助模式从赠款向投资过渡。


The kingdom has long provided financial support to Egypt, Jordan, and other countries in the region, so this shift will put pressure on those governments to pursue private-sector growth to improve their own countries’ economic performance.	沙特王国长期以来一直为埃及、约旦和地区其他国家提供财政援助，因此这样的转变将给上述政府施压促进私营部门增长，以改善本国的经济表现。


But, while the Arab world’s governments have reached the limits of their ability to employ more people, raise public debt, and attract outside grants, members of these countries’ political and economic elite, whom the current rentier system privileges, will likely resist efforts at substantive reform.	但尽管阿拉伯世界政府在雇佣民众、提高公共债务和吸引外部赠款方面已经达到了极限，但上述国家的政治和经济精英（这些人在当前食利系统中分得的好处最多）却将极有可能抵制任何实质性的改革。


And we should expect to see further opposition from state bureaucracies, which lack any vision for a transition to an inclusive and sustainable economic model.	而且我们应当会看到国家官僚机构进一步跳出来反对，因为他们缺乏向包容性和可持续经济模式过渡的任何愿望。


Still, Middle Eastern countries cannot hope to develop prosperous economies without such a transition.	但中东国家不进行上述过渡就不可能实现经济繁荣。


After relying on resource rents for decades, these governments must switch not only to new growth models, but also to more representative governance.	在长达数十年依赖资源租金后，这些政府必须不仅转向新的增长模式，而且转向更具代表性的治理制度。


When Arab societies are asked to accept reduced subsidies, fewer government jobs, and less from the state in general, they will demand a larger share in the decision-making process.	如果要求阿拉伯社会接受补贴降低、政府岗位下降和总体国家福利��少，民众就会要求在决策过程中拥有更大的发言权。


As it stands, the Arab world is stuck between an unsustainable economic and political status quo and the inclusive, merit-based economic system that less myopic people in the region know must replace it.	现在的情况是，阿拉伯世界在难以持续的经济政治现状和稍有远见的地区群众知道必将取而代之的包容性、基于业绩的经济制度之间陷入到两难之中。


Too many Arab governments have put themselves in this untenable situation, having given little consideration to building the governance institutions their states need.	太多阿拉伯政府将自己置于这种无法持续的境地，几乎从未考虑过建设本国需要的治理系统。


The first wave of Arab uprisings, which began in December 2010 and led to the 2011 Arab Spring, was a response to the breakdown of the old social contracts.	2010年12月开始并引燃2011年阿拉伯之春革命的第一波阿拉伯起义浪潮是对原有社会契约崩溃的回应。


In today’s perfect storm of declining oil prices and closed political systems, a new wave of protest could well emerge, particularly where governments have not recognized that the end of rentierism marks the end of the old social contract.	在今天油价下跌和政治体系封闭的完美风暴中，新一轮抗议浪潮可能会随时涌现，尤其如果政府仍未意识到食利主义的终结标志着社会契约的结束。


For these governments, economic reform is now a matter of survival.	对这些政府而言，经济改革意味着生死存亡。


In a more open system, Arab governments will need to privatize many state-controlled companies, and make it far easier for entrepreneurs to register start-ups and launch new businesses.	在更加开放的体系中，阿拉伯政府需要实现国有控股企业私有化，同时大大降低企业家注册初创企业和开创全新业务的难度。


And, ultimately, Arab states’ economic reforms will succeed only if citizens gain a more powerful voice in governance.	最终，只有民众在治理中获得更大的发言权，阿拉伯国家的经济改革才能取得成功。


Tunisia is the one country where a new social contract has begun to replace rentierism.	突尼斯就是一个全新社会契约已经开始取代食利主义的国家。


The rest of the Arab world faces two alternatives.	其余阿拉伯国家面临着两种选择。


Its leaders can begin fighting the cancer of an unsustainable status quo, with all the pain and uncertainty that such a struggle entails; or they can wait for the cancer to become a terminal condition, and be devoured by it.	其领导人可以开始对抗不可持续现状带来的癌症，并承受上述斗争所带来的全部不确定性和痛苦； 或者他们可以等待癌症进入终末期，之后被它吞噬掉。


Re-Orienting America	美国重新向东转


NEW YORK – Some 40 years ago, when I entered Oxford University as a graduate student, I declared my interest in the Middle East.	纽约——大约40年前，我进入牛津大学开始研究生学业时，兴趣是中东。


I was told that this part of the world came under the rubric of “Oriental Studies,” and that I would be assigned an appropriate professor.	我被告知，世界的这个部分属于 “东方学”，将会有一位合适的教授来指导我。


But when I arrived for my first meeting at the professor’s office, his bookshelves were lined with volumes bearing Chinese characters.	但当我走进这位教授办公室和他初次会面时，我看到他的书架上堆满了汉字著作。


He was a specialist in what was, at least for me at the time, the wrong Orient.	至少在当时的我看来，他所专长的是彼东方学，非此东方学。


Something akin to this mistake has befallen American foreign policy.	这位教授身上的错误在美国外交政策上重演了。


The United States has become preoccupied with the Middle East – in certain ways, the wrong Orient – and has not paid adequate attention to East Asia and the Pacific, where much of the twenty-first century’s history will be written.	美国在中东上倾注了太多精力——从某种意义上说，此乃此东方学，非彼东方学——而对东亚和太平洋关注太少，而后者才是美国21世纪史的重要组成部分。


The good news is that this focus is shifting.	好消息是美国的关注点正在改变。


Indeed, a quiet transformation is taking place in American foreign policy, one that is as significant as it is overdue.	事实上，美国外交政策正在悄然转向，这是一个姗姗来迟的重大转变。


The US has rediscovered Asia.	美国重新发现了亚洲。


“Rediscovered” is the operative word here.	在这里，“重新发现”是一个关键词。


Asia was one of the two principal theaters of World War II, and again shared centrality with Europe during the Cold War.	亚洲是二战的两大主战场之一，也是冷战中与欧洲并驾齐驱的中心战场。


Indeed, the period’s two greatest conflicts – the wars in Korea and Vietnam – were fought on the Asian mainland.	事实上，冷战期间的两次最主要的冲突——朝鲜战争和越南战争——均发生在亚洲大陆。


But, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Asia receded from American interest.	但是，随着冷战的结束和苏联的解体，亚洲逐渐淡出了美国的利益圈。


In the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the US trained much of its attention on Europe.	在冷战结束后的第一个十年中，美国将大量精力放在了欧洲。


American policymakers focused primarily on enlarging NATO to encompass many of the former Warsaw Pact countries, and on contending with the post-Yugoslav wars.	美国政客的首要目标是扩大北约并纳入大量前华约国家，以及处理南斯拉夫解体之后的战争。


The second phase of the post-Cold War era began with the 9/11 terror attacks.	后冷战时代的第二阶段始于9·11恐怖袭击。


What followed was a decade of US focus on terrorism and the large-scale commitment of American military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.	在此后的十年中，美国的焦点是恐怖主义以及驻伊拉克和阿富汗美军的大规模伤亡。


The two conflicts have claimed more than 6,000 American lives, cost more than $1 trillion, and consumed countless hours for two presidents and their senior staff.	这两场冲突导致6 000多名美国人丧生，经济损失超过了1万亿美元，两人总统及其高级官员为之殚精竭虑。


But now this phase of American foreign policy is ending.	但如今，美国外交政策的这一阶段正在告终。


President Barack Obama has announced that US armed forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.	奥巴马总统宣布美军将于2011年年底撤出伊拉克。


In Afghanistan, US force levels have peaked and are declining; the only questions concern the pace of withdrawal and the size and role of any residual US military presence after 2014.	在阿富汗，美军数量也已经从高峰期有所下降； 唯一的问题是撤军的节奏以及2014年之后驻阿富汗美军的规模和作用。


This is not to argue that the Middle East is irrelevant or that the US should ignore it.	这并不是说中东已经不再重要，也不意味着美国应该忽略中东。


On the contrary, it is still home to massive oil and gas reserves.	相反，中东仍拥有巨量石油和天然气储备。


It is a part of the world where terrorists are active and conflicts have been common.	中东的恐怖主义依然猖獗，冲突依然频繁。 伊朗正日渐向有核国家迈进；


Iran is moving ever closer to developing nuclear weapons; if it does, others may well follow suit.	如果伊朗实现了拥有核武器，那么将有许多国家效而仿之。


And it is a region now experiencing what could prove to be historic domestic political upheavals.	此外，中东正在经历有史以来最剧烈的国内政治变动。


There is also the unique American tie to Israel.	更不用说美国与以色列的独特关系了。


Nevertheless, there are grounds for the US doing less in the greater Middle East than it has in recent years: the weakening of al-Qaeda; the poor prospects for peacemaking efforts; and, above all, the mounting evidence that, by any measure, massive nation-building initiatives are not yielding returns commensurate with the investments.	维和行动收效甚微； 更重要的是，大量证据表明，不管采取什么措施，大规模国家建设运动都无法产生与投资相匹配的回报。


At the same time, there are strong arguments for greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region.	与此同时，美国有充足的理由更多地涉足亚太地区。


With its large populations and fast-growing economies, it is difficult to exaggerate the region’s economic importance.	亚太地区有着大量人口和高速增长的经济，该地区的经济重要性怎么强调都不过分。


American companies export more than $300 billion in goods and services to countries in the region each year.	美国公司每年向该地区各国的商品和服务出口超过3 000亿美元。


Meanwhile, Asian countries are a critical source of investment for the US economy.	同时，亚洲国家也是美国经济重要的投资来源。


Maintaining regional stability is thus critical for US (and global) economic success.	因此，维持地区稳定事关美国（以及全球）经济成功大局。


The US has multiple alliance obligations – with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand – which are needed, in part, to deter North Korean aggression.	美国身上背负着诸多盟友义务——对日本、韩国、澳大利亚、菲律宾还有泰国——部分是出于防止朝鲜入侵的需要。


Moreover, US policy must create an environment in which a rising China is never tempted to use its growing power coercively – within or outside the region.	此外，美国的政策还必须创造一种环境，能够防止中国永远不会利用其崛起的实力在亚太地区内外大行压迫之能事。


For this reason, recent US efforts to strengthen ties with India and several Southeast Asian countries make good sense.	因此，最近美国与印度和东南亚数国加强联系实乃明智之举。


The US is right to shift its focus from the Middle East to the Far East.	美国将焦点从中东转向远东是正确的。


The good news is that this conclusion seems to be shared across the US political spectrum.	好消息是，这一决策受到了美国政坛的一致支持。


Mitt Romney, the likely Republican nominee for president, pledges to increase the rate of shipbuilding – a commitment linked to an increased US presence in the Pacific.	极有可能成为共和党总统候选人的罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）承诺要振兴造船业，这显然与美国更加关注太平洋有关。


And US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks of America pivoting away from the greater Middle East: “The world’s strategic and economic center of gravity is shifting east, and we are focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region.”	美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿也说，美国的中心点正在从大中东地区移开：“世界战略和经济重心正在东移，我们也更加关注亚太地区。 ”


Regardless of whether the twenty-first century will be another “American century,” it is certain that it will be an Asian and Pacific century.	不管21世纪是否会成为又一个“美国世纪”，可以肯定的是，21世纪将是一个亚太世纪。


It is both natural and sensible that the US be central to whatever evolves from that fact.	不管这一事实会带来怎样的结果，美国必然占据中心位置，这一点再自然不过了，人人都能感觉到。


The World Without America	没有美国的世界


NEW YORK – Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change.	纽约—我来做一个极端的设想：美国当前和在可预见的未来内所面临的最关键的威胁不是中国的崛起、鲁莽的朝鲜、有核的伊朗、现代恐怖主义和气候变化。


Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power.	所有这些都构成了潜在或实际的威胁，但美国最大的挑战是迅速膨胀的债务、破败的基础设施、落后的小学和初中、过时的移民制度以及缓慢的经济增长——简言之，是美国实力的国内基础。


Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties.	他国读者对于这一判断或许会感到幸灾乐祸，对美国所遇到的困难或多或少感到高兴。


Such a response should not be surprising.	这样的反应并不奇怪。


The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy.	美国和美国的代表人犯了狂妄的戒条（美国总是必不可少的国家，但这一点由其他国家提出来更好），美国的行为和它的信条之间的冲突免不了会引起伪善的指责。


When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment.	当美国没能做到它要求他人做到的原则时，就会埋下怨气。


But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted.	但是，和大多数诱惑一样，急于盯住美国的不完美性和麻烦应该被克制。


People around the globe should be careful what they wish for.	世界各国应该对自己的愿望持谨慎态度。


America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price.	美国在应对内部挑战方面的失败可能带来极大的代价。


Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself.	事实上，美国的成功对它自身和对世界其他国家的意义几乎一样大。


Part of the reason is economic.	部分原因是经济上的。


The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output.	美国经济仍占世界总产出的四分之一左右。


If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world.	如果美国的增长加速，则美国消费他国商品和服务的能力就会增加，从而提振世界增长。


At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery.	当欧洲正在衰落、亚洲正在减速的时期，只有美国（或者更广义地说，只有北美）有能力驱动全球经济复苏。


The US remains a unique source of innovation.	美国仍是独一无二的创新之源。


Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America.	世界大部分人民都在用基于硅谷开发的技术的移动设备通信； 类似地，互联网也诞生在美国。


More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations.	最近，美国开发的新技术极大地增加了从地下岩层提炼石油和天然气的能力。


This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions.	这一技术目前正在全球推广，让其他社会得以增加能源产量，既降低了它们对昂贵进口能源的依赖，也降低了它们的碳排放量。


The US is also an invaluable source of ideas.	美国还是无价的思想来源。


Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders.	其世界级的大学教育了大部分未来世界领袖。


More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish.	从更根本的意义上说，长期以来美国一直是最突出的市场经济和民主政治成就榜样。


People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding.	如果美国模式能够让人们感到能够延续，全世界人民和政府都会变得更加开放。


Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts.	最后，世界面临诸多严峻挑战，从需要阻止大规模杀伤性武器扩散、气候变化斗争和维持世界经济秩序运转以促进贸易和投资，到监管网络空间行为、改善全球卫生和阻止武装冲突。


These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out.	这些问题不可能轻易地小时或自动解决。


While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics.	亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”或许能够确保自由市场的成功，但对于地缘政治却无能为力。


Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges.	秩序需要领导力的看得见的手来规范和实现全球挑战的全球应对。


Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own.	不要误解我的意思：所有这些都不意味着美国可以单枪匹马地有效解决世界问题。


Unilateralism rarely works.	单边主义很少有效。


It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding.	不仅仅是因为美国缺少方法； 当代全球问题的本质决定了只有集体相应才能获得最大的成功机会。


But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement.	但多边主义说起来容易，设计和实施起来就难了。


Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US.	眼下只有一个扮演这一角色的候选人：美国。


No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook. 	没有其他国家拥有必须的能力和远见的组合。


This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world.	这将我带回了以下观点：美国必须把自己家收拾整齐——经济上、物质上、社会上和政治上——才能有必要的资源去促进世界的秩序。


Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all.	每个人都应该希望如此：美国领导的世界的替代方案不是中国、欧洲、俄罗斯、日本、印度或其他任何国家领导的世界，而是没有领导的世界。


Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict.	这样一个世界几乎必然会陷入没完没了的危机和冲突。


That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants.	这是个糟糕的消息，不但对美国如此，对地球上绝大部分居民都是如此。


Libya’s Anti-Military Militias	利比亚的反军队民兵武装


NEW YORK – As the United States struggles to understand last September’s attack on its diplomatic mission in Benghazi, which took the lives of four Americans, including US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, a formal investigation has not even been opened in Libya – and likely never will be.	纽约——一方面美国拼命想弄清去年九月致美驻班加西外交使团遭袭及美驻华大使克里斯托弗·史蒂文斯等四名美国人身亡的恐怖事件的原因，另一方面利比亚并未就此展开正式调查，而且调查可能永远也不会开始。


The country’s leaders face myriad challenges – from a vocal federalist movement in the East, aimed at usurping the central government’s prerogatives, to a wave of assassinations targeting security officials – which leaves them few resources to allocate to a case that poses no immediate threat to their domestic standing.	利比亚领导人面临着诸多挑战——从东部旨在夺取中央政府特权的声势浩大的联邦运动，到以安全官员为目标的暗杀潮——利比亚政府手中掌握的资源本已捉衿见肘，根本无力对不会立即威胁其国内地位的案件进行调查。


Instead, they are focusing on rebuilding the state that former leader Muammar el-Qaddafi destroyed.	相反，重建被前领导人穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲摧毁的国家才是他们的首要任务。


They have been grappling with the need to create effective administrative institutions and foster an independent judiciary.	他们竭力建立有效的行政机构并培育独立的司法体系。


While the National Transitional Council (NTC), the interim governing body that replaced Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime, failed to lay the groundwork for a modern state, it is too soon to pass judgment on the elected leadership that took power in November 2012.	尽管取代卡扎菲政权的临时执政机构全国过渡委员会（NTC）未能为现代国家建设打下基础，但据此对2012年11月继任的当选领导层做出判断的时机还并不成熟。


The litmus test will be progress on security.	能否在安全领域取得进展是新领导层面临的决定性考验。


The Benghazi attack, and the lack of a credible Libyan response, demonstrated that the country is neither governed by the rule of law nor in a position to impose it.	班加西袭击事件及事件发生后未能采取可靠的应对措施显示利比亚既不受法治管辖也无力执行法治措施。


The new government must change this situation by disbanding militias and integrating their members into official Libyan security forces.	新政府必须解散民兵并将其编入利比亚官方安全部队才能改变这种局面。


For starters, the government must stop coddling the militias, and focus on building the national army – something that the NTC neglected.	首先，政府必须停止纵容民兵，全力组建国家军队，而这一点恰恰曾被全国过渡委员会所忽视。


To be sure, persuading the militias to transfer their loyalties to the state will not be easy, especially given the fighters’ strong, often ideological connections to their individual units.	说服民兵转而效忠国家肯定并非易事，尤其考虑到民兵战士与所属部队间往往有着坚不可摧的意识形态联系。


But it is a crucial step toward establishing order and enhancing the newly elected government’s legitimacy.	但这却是建立秩序及强化新政府合法性的关键步骤。


Brigades in eastern Libya, or Cyrenaica, for example, are strongly rooted in traditional Islamist ideology.	比方说，利比亚东部部队昔兰尼加笃信传统伊斯兰教义。


Fighters in the region have been organized into powerful units, such as the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, the large government-allied force that was hired to protect the US mission in Benghazi, and the Libya Shield Force, the widely deployed coalition of militias that assisted the US mission on the night of the attack.	该地区战士被集结成战斗力极强的部队，如2月17日烈士旅、受雇保卫美国驻班加西使团的大规模政府联军，以及在袭击发生当晚协助美国使团的部署广泛的民兵联盟利比亚之盾部队。


By contrast, militias in western Libya, or Tripolitania, tend to emerge in individual cities, with the most powerful brigades based in Misrata and Zintan.	相反，利比亚西部民兵的黎波里塔尼亚（Tripolitania）往往组建于某座城市，其中最有战斗力的部队驻扎在米苏拉塔和津坦等地。


These groups want to join the security services as units, rather than as individual fighters, in order to retain their communal bonds and, in turn, to prevent their full integration into a national army.	这些团体希望成建制而非以个人为单位加入政府安全部队，以保护他们的集体联系，并借此防止被国家军队完全同化。


For its part, the government has treated the creation of national armed forces as an afterthought.	就其自身而言，政府事后才想起组建国家武装部队。


During the revolution, NTC leaders funneled resources and funding to the Islamist brigades with which they shared a common ideology, rather than to the fledgling Libyan National Army (LNA).	革命期间，全国过渡委员会领袖向秉承同样意识形态的伊斯兰部队拨付资金和物资，而并未武装当时初出茅庐的利比亚国民军部队。


After Islamist fighters killed the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces, Abdul Fattah Younes, in July 2011, the military was sidelined.	2011年7月伊斯兰武装杀死叛军指挥官阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·尤尼斯后，军队就开始被置于边缘地位。


Indeed, the NTC willingly facilitated the military’s demise.	其实，全国过渡委员会故意造就了军队的困境。


When tribal clashes erupted in the remote desert town of Kufra early last year, the council dispatched the Libya Shield Force, not LNA units, to quell the unrest.	去年初当偏远沙漠小镇库夫拉爆发部族冲突时，委员会指派利比亚之盾部队、而非利比亚国民军去平息叛乱。


Moreover, the military receives inadequate financing, with officers forced to use their personal funds to purchase gas for military vehicles.	此外军方资金严重不足，军官们被迫自掏腰包为军车加油。


Meanwhile, the governments of the wealthy Gulf States provide funding directly to militias, allowing them to purchase new vehicles and cutting-edge communications equipment.	不仅如此，富裕海湾国家政府还为民兵直接拨款，用于购置新车和尖端的通讯设备。


Libyans complain that the new government has continued the NTC’s policy of favoring revolutionary brigades over institutionalized security services.	利比亚民众不满新政府继续沿用全国过渡委员会偏好革命部队胜于制度化安全部队的政策。


After the September 11 attack in Benghazi, frustrated Libyans poured into the streets shouting anti-militia slogans.	9月11日班加西袭击发生后，心灰意冷的利比亚民众涌上街头高呼反民兵口号。


Ten days later, protesters overran the base of Ansar al-Sharia, the Islamist militia suspected of masterminding the attack, as part of a sweep of raids on militia compounds throughout the city.	十天后，示威者占领了涉嫌策划袭击的伊斯兰民兵组织安萨尔伊斯兰教义组织的基地，而这仅仅是袭击全市民兵驻地行动的一部分而已。


Only a few hours after the demonstrations began, government authorities sent a mass text message that urged the protesters to return to their homes, adding that “the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, the February 17 Brigade, and the Libya Shield Force are legal, and are subject to the authority of the [military] general staff.”	示威行动开始仅几小时后，政府当局即群发短信敦促示威者回家，并补充宣布“Rafallah al-Sahati旅、2月17日旅和利比亚之盾均为合法部队，并归属[军队]总参谋部节制。


President Mohamed Magariaf later confirmed this view.	” 这种说法其后得到了总统穆罕默德·马贾里亚夫的证实。


In response, a former NTC member lamented that the government had “lost a chance to finish off all of the militias,” stating that the groups responsible are backed by Qatar, and that the government did not want to interfere with their agenda.	作为回应，全国过渡委员会前委员感叹政府已“失去了消灭所有民兵的机遇��，称为此负责的团体背后有卡塔尔势力支持，而政府则不想干扰上述团体的议程。


Such patronage extends to the military establishment itself.	这样的庇护也牵涉到军事编制本身。


Chief of Staff Yousef al-Manqous is said to favor Cyrenaican militias over the military units under his command, while government officials complain about the lack of an effective chain of command.	Yousef al-Manqous参谋长据传偏向手下昔兰尼加民兵更胜于军队，而政府官员则抱怨缺乏有效的指挥体系。


For example, in June, Defense Minister Osama al-Juwali attacked the NTC for failing to consult with the appropriate officials on its decisions, stating that his role had been reduced to “signing the plans of the chief of staff.”	比方说六月，国防部长朱瓦利即攻击全国过渡委员会决策时并未与有关官员商议，并称他的作用仅仅是在“参谋长的计划书上签字”。


With ample foreign funding and preferential treatment from the government, the militias have no incentive to disband.	坐拥充足的外国资金和政府优惠待遇，民兵根本没有解散的意愿。


Furthermore, they are wary of turning over control of their brigades to military commanders whom they claim supported Qaddafi or, at least, failed to oppose him.	此外，他们不愿将部队交给军队指挥官，称这些人都曾支持卡扎菲，至少也没有站出来和卡扎菲作对。


While there is no shortage of challenges facing Libya’s new government, disbanding the militias must be at the top of its agenda.	尽管利比亚新政府面前不乏各种挑战，但解散民兵必须列入其首要议事日程。


Otherwise, the aspirations that drove the anti-Qaddafi revolution – an end to corruption, stability, and shared prosperity – will never be fulfilled.	如若不然，推动反卡扎菲革命的结束腐败、实现稳定和共同繁荣的愿望将永远无法实现。


A New Climate-Policy Paradigm	新气候政策范式


BERLIN – Let’s be serious: the ongoing United Nations climate negotiations will probably fail.	柏林—认真说，正在进行的联合国气候谈判有可能失败。


To be sure, as with the recent gathering in Bonn, expectations for the November climate conference in Warsaw are so low that there is almost no room for failure.	平心而论，在最近的波恩会议上，人们对11月的华沙气候会议期望极低，几乎说已经败无可败。


But, with climate negotiators promising to deliver the global agreement that they could not deliver in Copenhagen in 2009, the December 2015 summit in Paris is almost certain to be another debacle.	但是，在2009年的哥本哈根会议上，承诺形成全球协定的气候谈判各方食言了，因此，2015年12月的巴黎峰会几乎也必将沦为又一场灾难。


For the European Union, the leading authority in international climate policy, the outcome of the Copenhagen summit was particularly disappointing.	对国际气候政策领导权威欧盟来说，哥本哈根峰会的结果特别令人失望。


After years of negotiation and numerous scientific-assessment reports, delegations had the highest expectations for concluding a comprehensive climate treaty.	在多年谈判和大量科学评估报告的基础上，代表团被人们寄予了最厚的期望能够达成全面气候条约。


Those expectations turned out to be illusory.	最终，这一期望被证明只是镜花水月。


This time will not be different.	这次也不会不同。


While an agreement might be reached in 2015, it will probably not cover all major emitters, and it definitely will not be ambitious enough to achieve the overarching goal of international climate cooperation, which is to prevent global temperatures from rising more than 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels.	尽管2015年可能达成协定，但或许不会覆盖所有排放国，力度肯定不足以实现国际气候合作的全面目标——防止全球气温在前工业化水平的基础上升高2℃以上。


Moreover, negotiators will not get another chance.	此外，谈判各方不再会有另一次机会。


After more than two decades of largely fruitless debate, during which CO2 emissions have continued to rise, another failed summit will trigger a profound crisis for international climate diplomacy, forcing its proponents either to change the rules of the game or accept that it cannot be won.	在经历了20多年几无成果的争论后——在此期间二氧化碳排放量节节升高——又一次失败的峰会将触发深远的国际气候外交危机，其支持者要么修改游戏规则，要么接受不可能赢的现实。


The first victim of such a crisis will be the top-down approach to climate policy pursued by the EU and many prominent scientists.	如此危机的首当其冲的受害者是欧盟和许多著名科学家追求的自上而下的气候政策观。


This policy-making model begins with the limit for tolerable climate change; the world’s remaining emissions budget until 2050 is calculated from the agreed boundary, then divided among the 193 UN member states.	这一决策模式的出发点是气候变化忍受极限，根据确定的边界计算2050年之前世界仍然可以排放的规模，然后再分配给193个联合国成员。


Should the Paris summit fail (and it likely will), the resulting collapse in confidence in the top-down approach could lead to one of two outcomes.	如果巴黎峰会失败（很有可能），由此造成的对自上而下办法的信心崩溃可能引起两种结果。


In the worst-case scenario, the very concept of global climate policy would lose all value, with decades of climate alarmism giving way to fatalism.	在最坏情形中，全球气候政策这一概念将价值全无，几十年的气候警告将让位给宿命论。


Given that the UN formally accepted the 2°C limit as the starting point for the top-down approach in 2010, the well-practiced strategy of obscuring current failures by announcing more ambitious future efforts would become unsustainable.	联合国已在2010年正式接受将2℃极限作为自上而下方法的出发点，通过宣布更有雄心壮志的未来计划掩盖当前失败这一屡试不爽的战略将不可持续。


At that point, the EU’s role as global climate-policy leader would be weakened, as would its emphasis on building a green economy.	到了这一步，欧盟作为全球气候政策领袖的地位将受到削弱，其对建设绿色经济的强调亦然。


With the EU forced to promote second- and third-rate strategies, countries would lose confidence in international climate policy’s problem-solving potential and become unwilling to pursue shared solutions.	随着欧盟被迫推行第二套甚至第三套战略，各国将对国际气候政策的解决问题能力失去信心，不再愿意追求共同解决方案。


As a result, international climate policy would become unrecognizable, ineffective, and, ultimately, irrelevant.	结果，国际气候政策将变得无法获得承认、无法形成效果，最终沦为无关紧要的问题。


Countries would begin to focus almost entirely on enhancing their own ability to adapt to climate change, with ambitious emissions-reduction agreements giving way to exclusively national initiatives in areas ranging from regulatory policy to geo-engineering.	各国将开始几乎完全专注于自身适应气候变化的能力，雄心勃勃的减排协定将让位于从监管政策到地质工程诸领域的排他性国家政策。


This would leave the EU no choice but to change its internal plans, undermining its ability to stay on track to meet emissions-reduction aspirations for 2050 and diminishing member states’ willingness to agree to ambitious and legally binding climate and energy targets for 2030.	这将让欧盟别无选择，只能改变其内部计划，削弱其坚持到底实现2050年减排目标的能力和成员国同意雄心勃勃、具有法律约束力的2030年气候和能源目标的意愿。


Furthermore, the loss of legislative continuity beyond 2020 would create considerable insecurity for businesses in the EU, leading to diminished investment and interrupting – if not terminating – Europe’s advance toward a low-carbon economy.	此外，2020年后合法持续性的降低将导致欧盟企业安全感大幅降低，造成投资减少并干扰甚至扼杀欧洲迈向低碳经济的前进之路。


Once such a process begins, the politically fragile EU will be unable to stop it, at least in the foreseeable future.	一旦这一过程开始，政治上四分五裂的欧盟将无力停止它，至少在可预见的未来无力停止。


The other, more promising scenario involves a fundamental shift in how the problem of climate change is understood, and thus in how potential solutions are framed.	另一个较有希望的情景是对气候变化问题的理解发生了根本性转变，潜在解决方案位于何处亦然。


A new bottom-up approach, whose contours are only just emerging, is predicated on the basic principle that the less emissions, the better.	可以预见新的自下而上的方法将在排放越少越好这一基本原则的基础上出现——但也才仅仅初露端倪。


In order to ensure this outcome, the EU must begin preparing a Plan B that accounts for the coming climate-policy paradigm shift.	为了确保这一结果，欧盟必须开始准备B计划，着重于即将到来的气候政策范式变迁。


Such a plan would prioritize measurable progress toward decarbonizing the world’s largest economies over the establishment of global climate treaties or long-term global targets.	该计划将强调通过建立全球气候条约或长期全球目标实现重大进展——世界最大经济体减少碳排放。


While the new paradigm would safeguard the legitimacy of existing regulatory and diplomatic instruments, such as emissions trading, the EU would have to reconsider the framework for applying them.	新范式能捍卫现有监管和外交工具（比如碳排放交易）的合法性，但欧盟还必须重新考虑应用框架。


Plans for flexible, incentive-led cooperation between developed and developing countries (so-called “clubs”) would become increasingly important, with progress depending on the cooperation of major emitters like the United States, China, and India.	发达和发展中国家（所谓的“俱乐部”）之间灵活的、基于激励的合作计划将日益重要，能否取得进展取决于美国、中国和印度等排放大户的合作。


In the future, the EU will have to approach climate change primarily as a matter of politics, rather than in terms of scientifically defined objectives.	未来，欧盟必须把气候变化首先作为政治问题，而不是最为科学目标来抓。


Only by adjusting to the international system’s practical constraints can the EU stay the course of economic transformation, remain relevant internationally, and help to contain global warming.	只有调整国际制度的实践约束才能让欧盟坚持经济转型、保持国际影响力，为遏制全球变暖贡献力量。


The Republican Bankruptcy Illusion	共和党破产幻觉


WASHINGTON, DC – There is now near-unanimity that the United States’ Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, enacted in 2010, did not end the problems associated with some banks being “too big to fail.”	华盛顿—现在，人们几乎形成了一致，认为美国2010年实施的多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革立法并没有结束与某些银行“太大而不能倒”有关的问题。


When it comes to proposed solutions, however, no such consensus exists.	但是，在建议方案方面并没有类似的一致。


On the contrary, financial regulation has become a key issue in November’s presidential and congressional elections.	相反，金融改革已成为11月总统和国会选举的一个关键问题。


So who has the more plausible and workable plan for reducing the risks associated with very large financial firms?	那么，对于如何减少与非常庞大的金融企业有关的风险这个问题，谁的计划更加可靠和可行？


The Democrats have an agreed and implementable strategy that would represent a definite improvement over the status quo.	民主党有一个一致的可执行战略，肯定可以在现状的基础上有所改善。


The Republican proposal, unfortunately, is a recipe for greater disaster than the US (and the world) experienced in 2008.	不幸的是，共和党的方案对于美国（和全世界）来说是比2008年还要糟糕的灾难。


On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton’s campaign materials and the party platform point to a detailed plan to defend Dodd-Frank and to go further in terms of pressing the largest firms to become less complex and, if necessary, smaller.	民主党方面，希拉里·克林顿的竞选文宣和党的政纲提出了一项具体计划捍卫多德-弗兰克立法，并在敦促大企业减少复杂性并（如有必要）减小规模方面更进了一步。


Banks must also fund themselves in a more stable fashion.	银行还必须以更稳妥的方式为自己融资。


If Clinton wins, she will draw strong support from Congressional Democrats – including her rival for the Democratic nomination, Bernie Sanders, and his fellow senator, Elizabeth Warren – when she pushes in this direction.	如果克林顿获胜，她在这个方向上的工作推进将赢得国会民主党的强烈支持——包括她的民主党提名对手伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）及其参议员同事伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）。


Some commentators claim that Clinton has been “pulled to the left” on financial regulation during the campaign.	一些评论者称，选战期间的克林顿已经在金融改革“站在了左派一边”。


But if you look carefully at her statements during this election cycle, they have been, from the very beginning, almost identical to what Warren has been seeking for the past half-dozen years.	但如果你仔细看看她在这一选举周期中的言论，就会发现它们从一开始 就几乎与沃伦在过去六年中一直在寻求的目标别无二致。


And these goals are perfectly aligned with what all responsible officials want.	这些目标是任何负责任的官员都想要的。


Everyone in their right mind wants to prevent the largest banks from getting out of control, shifting risk into shadowy, unregulated activities (on or off their balance sheet), and fleecing consumers.	任何人，只要头脑正常，都会希望阻止大银行失控，将风险转移到不受监管的影子行为（不论是否在资产负债表上体现），吸消费者的血。


This is an entirely responsible and sensible agenda.	这是一个非常负责任和明智的日程。


It is opposed, of course, by people who are paid – one way or another – to represent the largest banks.	当然，它受到了收钱——以各种名目——代表大银行的人的反对。


On the Republican side, Donald Trump’s precise intentions are less clear, though he proudly calls himself the “king of debt,” which is not particularly encouraging.	共和党方面，唐纳德·特朗普的确切意图不那么明确，尽管他自豪地自称为“债务之王”，这可不是什么激动人心的事情。


Huge mountains of debt may help enrich individual property developers or financiers, but they typically add up to trouble for the macroeconomy.	巨大的债务或许有助于个别房地产开发商或金融家致富，但常常给宏观经济添麻烦。


It was precisely those mountains that collapsed on the US and global economy in 2008.	2008年，正是这些债务大山倒在了美国和全球经济头上。


Many were buried in the Great Recession that followed; many more are still digging out.	许多人在随后的大衰退中血本无归； 更多的人至今仍深陷债务无法自拔。


Unlike Trump, House Republicans have formulated and published detailed plans that can fairly be compared to what the Democrats have presented.	和特朗普不同，众议院共和党制定并公布了完全可以与民主党相媲美的详细计划。


And, in the event of a Trump presidency, financial policy would likely be crafted in large part by the House Financial Services Committee, whose chairman’s clearly stated priorities are to reduce consumer protection and remove any effective constraints on big banks’ activities.	如果特朗普成为总统，金融政策可能大部分由众议院金融服务委员会起草，委员会主席明确表示重点是减少消费者保护和取消一切对大银行行为的有效约束。


At the heart of the House Republican strategy is a simple idea: all financial firms should be able to go bankrupt without damaging the rest of the economy and without the government becoming involved.	众议院共和党战略的核心是一个简单的思想：所有金融企业都应该可以破产而不会伤及经济的其余部分，政府也不必卷进来。


That is fine as a campaign slogan.	作为竞选口号，这没有问题。


But there is a major problem with the logic.	但其逻辑有很大问题。


In September 2008, Lehman Brothers did go bankrupt – and no form of government support was provided.	2008年9月，雷曼兄弟公司确实破产了——并且政府没有提供任何形式的支持。


There were catastrophic consequences for the rest of the financial sector, for the non-financial economy, and for employment.	金融部门的其他部分、非金融经济以及就业都遭到了灾难性后果。


The House Republicans propose to fix that by amending the bankruptcy code.	众议院共和党提出通过修订破产法来解决这个问题。


This, too, sounds good, but what exactly does it mean?	这听起来也相当靠谱，但到底是什么意思？


Just promising not to provide a bailout is not credible.	仅仅承诺不提供援助是不可信的。


The US is a large and powerful country and, when danger hits, investors buy up federal government debt – driving down interest rates.	美国是一个庞大而强大的国家，当危机来袭时，投资者就会买入联邦政府债务——驱使利率下降。


America has a “fortress” balance sheet, as well as one of the most credible central banks in the history of the world.	美国拥有一个“堡垒”式的资产负债表，以及世界历史上信誉最高的中央银行之一。


If the policymakers of the moment think that government or central-bank support will help prevent a global economic meltdown, they will act accordingly.	如果现在的决策者认为政府或中央银行支持有助于防止全球经济衰退，就会据此行动。


That is what Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, and President George W. Bush (all Republicans) did after the full impact of the Lehman collapse became apparent.	财政部长亨利·鲍尔森、美联储主席本·伯南克和总统小布什（都是共和党）在雷曼兄弟破产的全部影响已经显露无疑时正是这么做的。


The viability of the Republican bankruptcy proposal boils down to this: who will provide financing to a large complex financial institution – operating globally – while it is being restructured in bankruptcy?	共和党破产方案的可行性可以归结如下：谁来给正在破产重组的复杂的大金融机构——全球经营的机构——提供融资？


The private sector won’t provide it.	私人部门不会提供。


The courts themselves cannot borrow.	法院本身也不能借贷。


If there is no financing, the scheme collapses – and we have another “Lehman moment,” or worse.	如果没有融资，这套机制就会破产——我们将迎来又一个“雷曼时刻”，或者更糟。


So we must be talking about a scenario in which some part of the federal government, with or without express legislative approval, scrambles to provide an ad hoc loan in the range of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars, via a judge.	因此，我们必须讨论一下这样的情形：联邦政府的某些机构，不论有没有明确的立法授权，将通过法官匆忙提供数百亿乃至上千亿美元的临时贷款。


This is mind-boggling and deeply disturbing.	这一情形难以想象，也具有深刻的破坏性。


Think of the business mistakes that will be made and the political backlash.	想象一下可能产生的业务错误和政治反对。


Add the economic distortions implicit in providing so much free downside insurance.	再加上提供如此多免费消极结果保险所隐含的经济扭曲。


The Democrats are lined up behind an approach to finance that will make the financial system safer, so that it never comes to this point again.	民主党团结在一套能让金融体系变得更加安全、从而永远不必走到需要这笔融资这一步的融资方针背后。


The Republicans’ plan would only help too-big-to-fail banks.	共和党的计划只能帮助太大而不能倒的银行。


And that help would make them more dangerous.	而这种帮助将让它们更加危险。


The End of Republican Obstruction	共和党不再是障碍


CAMBRIDGE – What a difference two months make.	美国剑桥—两个月间，斗转星移。


When the Republican Party scored strong gains in last November’s US congressional elections, the universally accepted explanation was that voters were expressing their frustration with disappointing economic performance.	去年11月，当共和党在美国国会选举中大获全胜时，人们一致认为原因在于选民们对令人失望的经济表现感到不满。


Indeed, when Americans went to the polls, a substantial share thought that economic conditions were deteriorating; many held President Barack Obama responsible and voted against his Democratic Party.	事实上，当美国人走向投票箱时， 相当大一部分认为经济状况正在恶化，许多人认为总统奥巴马应该对此负责，并投出了反对民主党的选票。


Now, suddenly, everyone has discovered that the US economy is doing well – so well that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has switched from blaming Obama for a bad economy to demanding credit for a good one.	如今，猛然间所有人都发现美国经济表现相当好——好到参议院多数领袖麦康奈尔（Mitch McConnell）从抨击奥巴马搞砸了经济转变为大力赞扬奥巴马搞活了经济。


Recent favorable economic data were, he claimed, the result of “the expectation of a Republican Congress.”	最近的有利经济数据，他说，是“共和党国会期待”的结果。


But the improvement in US economic performance began well before the November election.	但美国经济表现的改善在11月选举前便早已开始。


Indeed, it began well before September, when polls started to indicate that the Republicans were likely to do exceptionally well, taking control of the Senate and enlarging their majority in the House of Representatives.	事实上，它不到9月份时就开始了，当时民调开始表明共和党也许会大出风头，控制参议院并扩大在众议院的多数优势。


The fact is, job growth was vigorous throughout 2014, averaging 246,000 per month – three million for the year – bringing the unemployment rate down to 5.6% in December 2014 (from 6.7% a year earlier).	事实上，就业增长在整个2014年表现强劲，平均每个月达到246,000个岗位——也就是每年三百万个岗位——这使得2014年12月失业率（从一年前的6. 7%）下降至5.


This represented an acceleration relative to the monthly average of 185,000 in 2011-2013, and it looks even better compared to the previous economic expansion of 2002-2007, when monthly job creation stood at 102,000.	6%。 这代表就业创造相对2011—2013年平均月度水平（185,000个岗位）有所加速，与上一个经济扩张期——2002—2007年（每月创造102,000个岗位）相比则更加出色。


Indeed, the recent numbers recall the halcyon days of Bill Clinton’s presidency.	事实上，最近几个月让人们想起了克林顿总统任职期间的好日子。


Similarly, GDP growth began to pick up in the spring of 2014, running above the rate of the preceding three years.	类似地，GDP增长也在2014年春开始复苏，比此前三年的速度都要快。


Partly as a result of income growth, the US budget deficit last year was lower than forecast, at about 2.8% of GDP.	部分受收入增长推动，去年美国预算赤字低于预期，为GDP的2. 8%左右。


This represents a record improvement relative to 2009, when the budget deficit amounted to nearly 10% of GDP.	这是相对2009年水平的最大改善，当时的预算赤字接近GDP的10%。


The mystery, until recently, was why economic performance had been so weak.	到目前为止，问题在于此前经济表现为何如此低迷。


There were four types of explanations.	解释有四种。


The first account relied on the view, most closely associated with the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, that recovery from a recession takes longer if the cause was a crash in housing and financial markets.	第一种解释的观点主要与经济学家卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）有关。 这一解释认为如果衰退原因是房地产和金融市场崩盘，那么从衰退中复苏就需要花更长时间。


But this historical pattern is more a statement about the magnitude of the initial decline and the time needed to recover fully than a prediction about the annual rate of growth during the recovery phase.	但这一历史模式更多是关于初始下跌程度和充分复苏所需时间的描述，而不是关于复苏阶段年增长率的预测。


The second explanation was that the slow recovery was part of a longer-term trend, attributable to secular stagnation or a dearth of important technological innovations.	第二种解释是缓慢的复苏是更长期趋势的一部分，要归因于长期停滞或重要技术创新的缺乏。


It is true that productivity growth and labor-force growth have slowed since 1975.	诚然，生产率增长和劳动力增长自1975年以来有所放缓。


Still, the economy should have been able to achieve a stronger recovery than the 2.1% growth rate recorded in 2011-2013.	但是，经济仍应该可以以2011—2013年的增长率（2. 1%）更强劲的水平复苏。


The third interpretation for slow growth during these three years is that the depressed investment and long-term unemployment caused by the deep recession of 2008-2009 had taken a toll on the capital stock and the size and skills of the labor force.	第三种解释是这三年间的缓慢增长是拜投资萎靡和长期失业所赐，而后两者的原因在于2008—2009年的深度衰退严重影响了资本存量和劳动力的规模和技能。


But the fourth explanation seems the simplest: America’s dysfunctional fiscal politics in 2011-2013 – years that featured the “fiscal cliff,” debt-ceiling standoffs, flirtation with federal default, a government shutdown, and budget sequesters.	但最简单的解释还是第四种：2011—2013年间美国混乱不堪的财政政治——“财政悬崖”、债务上限僵局、联邦违约闹剧、政府关门、自动减赤等事件层出不穷。


One does not need to assume big Keynesian “multiplier effects” to conclude that the combined impact of these conflicts shaved at least one percentage point from growth each year, especially if one believes that the risk created by such behavior discourages firms from hiring or investing.	你不必假设存在巨大的凯恩斯主义“乘数效应”就能看出，这些冲突的合力每年至少拖累了一个百分点的增长，特别是如果你认为这一模式让企业不愿雇人和投资的话。


(According to one measure, the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis and the 2013 government shutdown caused uncertainty comparable to that sparked by the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers.)	（根据一项指标，2011年债务上限危机和2013年政府关门所导致的不确定性可以与2001年9月恐怖袭击和2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭相提并论。 ）


This explanation also accords with stronger US economic performance in 2014, which was the first year since the Republicans gained a House majority in November 2010 that dysfunctional fiscal policy did not actively impede economic recovery.	这一解释也与2014年美国经济表现有所增强相符。 2014年时是2010年11月共和党赢得众议院多数以来第一��混乱的财政政策没有大幅阻碍经济复苏。


Having borne the brunt of the blame for the government shutdown of October 2013, Republican leaders decided to stifle their more radical “Tea Party” members and refrain from similar dead-end showdowns in 2014.	共和党领导人背上了2013年10月导致政府关门的骂名，它们决定阻止更极端的“茶党”成员，不让2014年重现类似的僵局。


One could have predicted that a year in which Congress stopped actively impeding economic recovery would be a year in which the pace of expansion in output and employment picked up.	你或许已经预测到，国会不再大力妨碍经济复苏的年份理应是产出扩张速度和就业抬头的时候。


If the new Congress in 2015 refrains from standoffs, sequesters, and shutdowns, there is no reason why the economy cannot continue to do well.	如果2015年的新国会仍能避免僵局、自动减赤和政府关门，就没有理由怀疑经济能继续表现抢眼。


Of course, shortcomings remain.	当然，缺陷仍然存在。


Wage growth continues to be slow.	工资增长更依然缓慢。


Median household income has barely begun to recover, and is still well below its 2000 level.	中位家庭收入几乎没有复苏，并仍远低于2000年的水平。


This is because most of the gains from economic recovery have gone to people at the top of the income distribution.	这是因为你经济复苏的大部分好处都流向了收入分配顶层人群。


Indeed, of the various possible reasons why the electorate in 2014 did not perceive the economic recovery that was underway, the most plausible is that the typical American had not benefited from it.	事实上，2014年的选民没有感到复苏正在发生，原因有许多，最可靠的一个是普通美国人没有从复苏中获益。


The irony is that rising inequality is usually thought to play to the Democrats’ electoral advantage.	讽刺之处在于，不平等性加剧通常被认为有利于民主党的选举优势。


Re-Repairing Bosnia	重整波斯尼亚


Bosnia’s future is becoming increasingly uncertain.	波斯尼亚的未来正变得越来越模糊不清。


An ethnic veto has long made the central government ineffective, and, most recently, Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Serb-controlled entity, Republika Srpska, has responded to efforts at reform with a threat to hold a referendum on independence.	一个种族否决权已经使得中央政府长期陷于瘫痪，而就在最近，塞族控制的政治实体塞族共和国的领导人 米洛拉德·多迪克则用发动独立全民公决的威胁来回应改革的要求


Many consider secession unlikely, but Dodik’s threat does heighten fear that today’s fragile status quo could break down.	许多人都认为塞族共和国独立不太可能，但多迪克的威胁却令人增加了目前脆弱的现状可能走向破裂的忧虑。


While nobody expects the mass violence of the 1990’s to recur, that does not justify diplomatic indifference and inaction.	虽然没人希望 1990 年代的大规模暴力事件重演，但这也不能因此说外交上的冷漠和不作为是合理的。


The Dayton Accords of 1995 ended Serb-instigated ethnic cleansing and established peace in Bosnia.	1995 年的代顿条约终止了塞族发动的种族清洗，并在波斯尼亚建立了和平。


But that agreement did not create a functional Bosnian central government with the capacity to undertake the reforms needed to meet the terms of accession to the European Union.	但这一协定并没有产生一个用实际作用的，有足够能力推动符合加入欧盟条件的改革的波斯尼亚中央政府。


To appease Bosnian Serbs led by Slobodan Milosevic (who died while on trial for war crimes), Radovan Karadzic (who remains on trial for war crimes) and Ratko Mladic (who was indicted for war crimes and is still on the run in Serbia), the West accepted the territorial division of Bosnia at the war’s end.	为了安抚由 斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇（此人在战争罪行的审判过程中去世），拉多万·卡拉季奇（依然在接受战争罪行的审判过程中）以及拉特科·姆拉迪奇（同样被控以战争罪行，在逃）这三人所领导的波斯尼亚塞族人，西方在战争结束后同意进行区域分治。


This acceptance was manifested in a constitutional structure that gave the Bosnian Serb region quasi-independence and the power to obstruct the emergence of an effective central government in Sarajevo.	而这种容忍则通过一个给予波斯尼亚塞族区域准自治权以及遏制出现一个强有力的萨拉热窝中央政府的权力的宪法架构体现出来。


The EU, having helped rescue Bosnia from its past by mortgaging its future, seems in no hurry to change the country’s purgatory-like status.	而通过抵押了波斯尼亚的未来来帮助拯救它的过去的欧盟，则似乎不急着改变该国炼狱般的现状。


European leaders have allowed their most useful tool for preserving the peace and leveraging change – the once-respected office of the High Representative – to be diminished to the point that many Bosnian officials treat the incumbent with disdain.	欧洲领导人放任他们最有用的维持和平以及促成变革的工具 —— 那个一度受到尊敬的 高级代表办公室 —— 无所作为，以致许多波斯尼亚官员都带着蔑视来看待这些代表。


But it should be recognized that, in post-Cold War Europe, it has proven highly dangerous to allow disrespect for European purpose and resolve to take root.	但也应该认识到，在后冷战时代的欧洲，允许对欧洲的决心和决议的不敬情绪生根发芽是非常危险的。


If the Bosnians lack the capability to modify the iron corset bequeathed to them at Dayton, the EU remains indifferent, and the United States is preoccupied with the Middle East, South Asia, and China, what lies ahead?	如果波斯尼亚真的无力去摆脱代顿协议所遗留下来的紧箍咒，欧盟又漠不关心，而美国又困身于中东，东南亚和中国，那么将来该怎么办？


Leaving Bosnians to explore the options that befall a failed state (with a Muslim plurality) – located within Europe but on the margins of its prosperity, unity, and relative social cohesion – is to acknowledge policy bankruptcy and let others roll the dice on ways to end the current stalemate.	坐视波斯尼亚去尝试成为一个失败国家的可能性（而且穆斯林占大多数） —— 位于欧洲却无法享受到这片大陆的繁荣，团结以及相关的社会凝聚力 —— 等于告诉大家自己的政策已经破产，而把打破僵局的可能性拱手让给其他人。


Some in Europe assert that over time the parties may eventually see the benefits of greater cooperation, that dissolution will not occur, or that, if it does, it will likely be relatively tranquil.	欧洲的一些评论员认为到了一定时候各方都会最终意识到进行更多合作的好处，分裂也不会发生，或者，有可能的话，会迎来相对的平静。


Such assumptions do not inspire confidence.	这些假设可不会激发信心。


Violence has been the traditional agent of change in the Balkans, and the level of frustration in Bosnia is growing.	暴力已经成为巴尔干地区推动变革的惯用手段，而波斯尼亚的沮丧程度也有增无减。


Faute de mieux , the Americans have allowed the burden of dealing with these issues and sorting out the unfinished business of Dayton to fall to the EU.	不得已之下，美国人会把处理这些事务以及整理代顿协定未完成事务的责任甩给欧盟。


Indeed, it is past time for the EU to take the diplomatic lead in fixing what Dayton left undone.	事实上，欧洲已经失去了在外交上牵头处理代顿协定未完成事业的时机。


While the new EU’s governance structure seems, at least on paper, to lend itself to more robust efforts in the Balkans, diplomatic habits die hard, and the Union will need to overcome its continuing legacy of relying on carrots without sticks to deal with knotty Balkan problems.	当新的欧盟管治架构似乎，在纸面上，要在巴尔干问题上发挥更强大的作用，就必须慨然改变自己外交习气，而联盟将必须克服那种长期以来只依靠胡萝卜而不依靠大棒来处理棘手巴尔干问题的遗产。


Regardless of the EU’s unhappy diplomatic past in the Balkans, the most practical way forward is to seek political reform in Bosnia rather than hoping for the US to resume its leadership role.	不管欧盟外交在巴尔干地区有多么不愉快的过去，最实际的前进之路就是在波斯尼亚寻求改革而不是寄往美国能重树其领导地位。


Any EU effort should be based on the following reinforcing elements:	欧盟的任何努力都将以下列增强因素为基础：


·         A conference of the three Bosnian parties this spring to fix the Dayton agreement by strengthening the central government sufficiently to enable Bosnians to fulfill the requirements of the EU accession process while maintaining the existing entities.	·          在今年春天组织波斯尼亚三方团体会谈，通过加强中央政府效率，令波斯尼亚人既能维持现在的政治现状，又能满足加入欧盟进程所需的要求。


This gathering should include both the US and Serbian governments as active observers.	这个会谈必须包含美国和各塞尔维亚政府作为积极观察员。


European and US leaders would have to convey to the Bosnians and others that failure is not an option and convince them of the EU’s bottom-line unwillingness to accept opposition from those in Bosnia who impede the EU accession process.	欧洲和美国的领导人必须向波斯尼亚人以及其他各方传达一个信息，那就是只许胜利不许失败，并使之确信欧盟是不愿意接受那些波斯尼亚某些人试图阻挠欧盟入盟进程的人的反对意见的


·         Since Serbia is essential to the continued existence of Republika Srpska, pressure must be brought to bear on its government, which seeks EU membership, to make clear to obstructionist Bosnian Serb leaders that they cannot hold a referendum on independence, and that they must accept enhanced central-government powers.	·          由于塞尔维亚是塞族共和国继续存在所必须的，就必须向也在寻求欧盟成员国资格的塞尔维亚政府施加压力，令其向阻挠进程的波斯尼亚塞族领导人表明他们不能发动独立全民公决，并必须接受一个权力更大的中央政府。


·         Support for civil-society groups and democratic parties prior to elections throughout Bosnia this October.	·          在今年十月波斯尼亚境内选举前对公民社会团体以及民主党派给予支持。


The EU and the US should underscore the need for political change and for candidates who support EU accession as indispensable to Bosnia’s economic and political progress.	欧盟和美国应当强调政治变革以及支持加入欧盟的候选人对于波斯尼亚的经济和政治进步都是必不可少的。