The EU supports politically uncontroversial confidence-building measures that can reap results only in the long term, if ever.	欧盟支持的政治上无争议的建立信任的措施只会在长期产生效果，如果能够产生效果的话。


The Georgian government views the Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts as the country’s principal security threat and impediment to development.	而格鲁吉亚政府把阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯地区的冲突视为这个国家首要的安全威胁以及阻碍发展的问题。


It expects bolder moves from the EU, such as explicit endorsement of the Georgian-Ossetian working group, which includes the alternative, pro-autonomy South Ossetian government of Dmitri Sanakoyev, but is boycotted by the pro-Russian separatist government in Tskhinvali.	它期望欧盟能够采取更果敢的行动，比如明确支持格鲁吉亚奥塞梯工作组的行动，它包括替代的、赞成自治的南奥塞梯的萨那科耶夫政府，但是却遭到亲俄罗斯的茨欣瓦利分离主义者政府的抵制。


The EU has avoided any such gesture, seeking to avoid further tension with Russia.	欧盟因为担心与俄罗斯的关系进一步紧张，而一直避免作出任何此类姿态。


On the other hand, there are better prospects for strengthening the EU’s role in democracy development.	另一方面，加强欧盟在民主发展上的角色却有着更好的前景。


“Strengthening the Rule of Law, Building State Institutions, Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” occupies first place in the ENP Action Plan.	在欧洲邻国政策行动计划中，摆在第一位的就是“加强法制，建设国家机构，保护人权和基本的自由”。


Though judicial independence and protection of human rights remain conspicuously weak, Saakashvili’s government has increased the civil service’s efficiency, improved public infrastructure, fought corruption, reduced crime, and created an attractive investment environment.	尽管在司法独立和人权保护方面显然还做得很不够，但是萨卡什维利政府在提高政府部门的效率、加强公共设施的建设、打击腐败、减少犯罪和创建一个有吸引力的投资环境等方面还是表现得很出色。


However, the opposition’s shortcomings pose a further obstacle to democratic development.	不过，反对派的缺点妨碍了民主的进一步发展。


The government’s opponents can mobilize public protests, as they did in November, but they are much less capable of formulating alternative policy agendas and attracting support for them.	政府的反对派能够发动群众抗议，就像他们在11月份所做的那样，但是在制定替代的政策议程以及吸引对他们的支持方面还缺乏足够的能力。


With no internal system of checks and balances in Georgia – the only way to sustain democratic institutions – the international community becomes a compensating actor, with the EU well placed to take the lead.	因为格鲁吉亚缺乏制约平衡的内部机制这一维持民主制度的唯一方式，使得国际社会必须出面进行协调，而欧盟在这一方面可以发挥主导作用。


In fact, while the Saakashvili government’s clampdown showed the structural weaknesses of Georgia’s democracy, the aftermath has also shown that Georgia’s Western ambition remains intact, because the government understands that it cannot afford any long-term deviation from democratic norms.	事实上，尽管萨卡什维利政府的压制行动显示了格鲁吉亚民主在结构上的弱点，其后续行动还是表明了格鲁吉亚的西方梦并没有动摇，因为政府认识到它不能够长期偏离民主标准。


The EU’s special representative in the South Caucasus, Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby, played a crucial role in bringing back Imedi TV in time to restore media balance ahead of the presidential election – possibly the first time that the EU took a leading role in seminal political events in Georgia.	欧盟在南高加索的特派代表瑞典人Peter Semneby在让伊梅季电视台及时重新开播以便在总统选举前保持媒体的平衡方面发挥了关键的作用，这或许是欧盟第一次在格鲁吉亚的重要政治事件中发挥主导作用。


This was not part of any prefigured Action Plan, but it shows that, given the political will, the EU can play an active role in promoting democracy and stability.	这并不是任何预先设想的行动计划的一部分，但是它却显示了只要有政治意愿，欧盟是可以在推动民主和稳定方面发挥积极作用的。


Reviving Muslim Democracy	恢复穆斯林民主的活力


DAKKA – As fears about the Islamization of politics in the Muslim world grow, Bangladesh, with the world’s fourth-largest Muslim population (126 million), has moved dramatically in the opposite direction.	达卡 -正如人们对穆斯林世界的伊斯兰政治的担心日益加剧之时，有着世界第四大穆斯林人口（ 一亿二千六百万人口）的孟加拉国，却已朝着相反的方向戏剧性地前进了。


Bangladesh is usually heard about only when cyclones and tsunamis ravage its low coastline, but the country’s relatively anonymous international stature belies its strategic importance.	孟加拉国通常只有当龙卷风和海啸肆虐于这个国家的低海岸线时才被人们听说，但该国国际地位的相对的次要性掩盖了其战略地位的重要性。


Its secular politicians’ ability to defeat the country’s Islamists decisively in the recent parliamentary election may, indeed, have revived the viability of “Muslim democracy” around the world.	其非宗教政治家们在最近举行的议会选举中决定性地战胜了该国的伊斯兰教徒们的能力，事实上已经激活了世界各地“穆斯林民主”的可行性。


The recent landslide victory (with a huge turnout) for the Awami League in Bangladesh’s first election in seven years, after two years of a military-backed caretaker government, has moved the country to the forefront of the battle between secular democrats and Islamists that is now underway across South Asia.	在由军方支持的看守政府统治两年后，人民联盟党在最近举行的孟加拉国七年来的首次选举中的取得了压倒性的胜利（且是高票获胜），它已经将该国推向了非宗教的民主人士和伊斯兰分子之间战斗的前沿，这种战斗目前正席卷南亚地区。


The election was a credit to the country's democratic yearnings – and I say that as the chairman of the European Parliament's short-term election observation mission to Bangladesh.	这次选举是对该国人民的民主憧憬的承认-作为欧洲议会派到孟加拉国的短期选举观察团的主席，我可以这么说。


The new electoral register was more robust than in many Western countries, with a photo ID picture alongside each elector.	新的选举登记表要比许多西方国家更严格，上面有每名选民带照片的身份证。


The violence that had been widespread in previous Bangladeshi elections was entirely absent, with the security services’ professionalism in policing the elections – and the army’s willingness to return voluntarily to its barracks – playing a key role.	在以往孟加拉国选举中泛滥的暴力事件此次完全没有出现，专业的安全服务为选举保驾护航-以及军队自愿返回军营-也发挥了关键作用。


In Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh now has a charismatic leader whose massive electoral mandate augurs well for creating the type of strong, secular government that the country needs.	孟加拉国现在有了一位充满魅力的领袖，总理谢赫·哈西娜，她的大规模的选民的认可度显然预兆着一个强大的非宗教的政府的成立，这是这个国家需要的。


She returned to Bangladesh from exile, which the army had imposed on her.  After her return she still had to endure imprisonment and trumped-up murder charges.	在军队让她被迫流亡后，她又回到孟加拉国，可此后她还不得不忍受被监禁的命运以及或被诬陷犯有谋杀罪。


Hasina’s enormous popularity as a former prime minister, and her status as one of only two surviving daughters of Bangladesh’s founder, Sheikh Mujib Rahman, always ensured that she would be a leading contender in the election.	作为前总理的哈西娜享有极高的声望，加上她是孟加拉国的创始人谢赫·穆吉布·拉赫曼两名幸存的女儿女儿之一，这些始终保证了她在选举中领先于她的对手们。


Her overwhelming triumph has vindicated her belief that ordinary Bangladeshis want a secular and stable future for their country – one that, in contrast to Pakistan, is characterized by warm relations with their giant neighbor, India.	她压倒性的胜利已经证实了她的信仰，即普通的孟加拉国人民希望他们国家前途是非宗教的且是稳定的- 与巴基斯坦相反，人们要他们的国家与其巨大的邻国印度保持温和关系。


The comprehensive defeat of the Islamist parties that sought to take Bangladesh away from its democratic and secular roots, and which had sought in 1971 to impose Urdu as a national language and suppress Bengali language and culture, is the real story of the election.	伊斯兰政党在竞选中全面失利是这次选举的大戏。 这些伊斯兰政党力求使孟加拉国脱离民主和非宗教的根基，它们曾在1971年力求将乌尔都语作为全民语言并压制孟加拉的语言和文化。


The vote demonstrated that Bangladesh’s 153 million people have little appetite for bringing Islamism into politics.	投票的结果表明，1. 53亿孟加拉国人民没有什么胃口使伊斯兰教进入政坛。


Bangladesh needs only to look west to India and Pakistan to see the threat posed by Islamist terrorism.	孟加拉国只需要向西看看印度和巴基斯坦，就可以看到伊斯兰恐怖主义所造成的威胁。


But if Hasina is to succeed in continuing to blunt Islamism, she must address the fundamental problems that have destabilized Bangladeshi society for decades.	但是，如果哈西娜要成功地继续阻击伊斯兰教，她必须解决几十年来破坏孟加拉国社会稳定的根本问题。


Chief among these is the poverty endured by the majority of her country’s population.	其中主要的问题是她的祖国的大部分人口所遭受的贫困。


To some extent, it is surprising that the Islamist parties did not do better, considering their success elsewhere in mobilizing the most marginalized and vulnerable in society.	在某种程度上，伊斯兰政党没有做的更好是令人惊讶的，这是因为考虑到他们在其它地方成功地调动了社会中最边缘化和弱势的群体。


If the Awami League is unable to address the country’s systematic poverty and social inequality, Islamism may well yet succeed in rallying the impoverished to its banner.	如果人民联盟党不能够处理好该国制度性的贫困和社会不平等的问题，伊斯兰教可能还会成功地把贫困人群召集到他们的旗帜下。


The Jamaat-e-Islami Party, indeed, told me during my stay that they had a 30-year agenda to introduce Sharia law into Bangladesh.	事实上，在我逗留该国期间，杰马伊斯兰党人告诉我，他们制定了一个30年计划要把伊斯兰教法引进到孟加拉国。


The example of Hamas and Hezbollah provide a salutary reminder of the challenges faced by the new government in Bangladesh.	哈马斯和真主党给孟加拉国新政府所面临的挑战做了一个有益的提醒。


Although these terrorist groups are better known internationally for atrocities against Israel, they have established strong political support by providing organized social services such as schools and clinics for poor people.	虽然这些恐怖组织因其对以色列所犯下的暴行而在国际上更加有名，但他们通过为穷人提供如学校和诊所等社会服务的方式获得了强有力的政治支持。


Hamas and Hezbollah prospered in this way because the governing authorities were either unable or unwilling to address grassroots poverty.	哈马斯和真主党这种方式的繁荣，是因为执政当局无法或不愿解决基层的贫困问题。


In the case of Hamas, this displacement was due largely to the massive corruption of the Palestinian Authority under Yassir Arafat, whose cronies pocketed billions of dollars intended to alleviate poverty and suffering in the Gaza Strip.	对于哈马斯，这种情况主要是由于在阿拉法特领导下的巴勒斯坦权力机构中出现的大量腐败行为，阿拉法特的亲信们侵吞了本该用于为减轻加沙地带的贫困和痛苦的数十亿美元。


Given that endemic corruption in Bangladesh is perhaps the primary obstacle to providing essential services for poor people, it is essential that Hasina adopt a tough approach to corruption from the outset.	鉴于腐败的盛行也许是孟加拉国为贫困人口提供基本服务的主要障碍，从一开始克哈西娜便须采取强硬的反腐败态度便显得至关重要。


Corruption is also a potential trigger for intervention by the military, a recurring feature of Bangladesh’s history that has consistently impeded the country’s development.	腐败也是一个潜在的触发干预军事的因素，这是孟加拉国历史反复出现的特征，并一直阻碍了该国的发展。


Beyond fighting corruption, Hasina must also ban all foreign donations to political parties, in particular the “Wahhabi gold” that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states use to fund Islamist parties.	除了反腐败，哈西娜还必须禁止一切外国对政党的捐款，特别是沙特阿拉伯和海湾国家用来资助伊斯兰政党的“瓦哈比黄金” 。


The challenges facing the Awami League are many and varied, but it is not without resources.	人民联盟党面临的挑战是多种多样的，但它并非没有任何资源。


Bangladesh is in a better position to weather the global financial storm than most Asian countries, because its banks are not over-exposed and its garment industry focuses on the lower end of the market, which, so far, appears to be holding up.	比起大多数亚洲国家，孟加拉国处在能够更好地抵御全球金融风暴的地位，因为它的银行没有过度暴露的风险以及它的服装业主要针的是至今看来还能挺住的低端市场。


But chief among Bangladesh’s opportunities is the chance to show the world that a Muslim-majority country can freely embrace liberal democracy and make it work by confining religion to the private sphere.	孟加拉国最主要的机会是向世界显示，一个穆斯林人占多数的国家可以自由地拥抱自由民主制度，把宗教限制在私人领域中。


With its constitutional majority, the government should ensure this outcome by restoring the 1972 Constitution, which established Bangladesh as a secular democratic state.	有了宪法承认的大多数，政府应恢复使孟加拉国成为一个非宗教的民主国家的《1972年宪法》，以确保上述需要达到的结果。


Bangladesh is a country rich with human potential, but that potential can only be realized by making poor people’s needs – which Islamists around the world have previously made their own political territory – the new government’s top priority.	孟加拉国是一个拥有丰富人力资源潜力的国家，但只有当新政府把贫困人口的需求作为头等大事的时候，这种潜力才能释放，而世界各地的伊斯兰教徒过去是把他们自己的政治领土作为头等大事的。


A Europe of Solidarity, Not Only Discipline	团结与纪律并重的欧洲


BERLIN – Originally, the European Union was what psychologists call a “fantastic object,” a desirable goal that inspires people’s imaginations.	柏林——欧盟原本被心理学家称为“如梦似幻的目标”，如此这般的理想目标可以彻底激发人们的想象。


I saw it as the embodiment of an open society – an association of nation-states that gave up part of their sovereignty for the common good and formed a union dominated by no one nation or nationality.	我认为它是开放社会的化身——民族国家为了共同的利益而放弃部分主权，结成任何国家或民族都无法操纵的联盟。


The euro crisis, however, has turned the EU into something radically different.	但欧元危机后的欧盟已变得截然不同。


Member countries are now divided into two classes – creditors and debtors – with the creditors in charge.	会员国现在割裂为债权国和债务国两大阵营——这两大阵营由债权国占据主导。


As the largest and most creditworthy country, Germany occupies a dominant position.	德国作为最大也最有信誉的债权国占统治地位。


Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums to finance their debt, which is reflected in their high economy-wide borrowing costs.	债务国为筹资还债被迫支付高额的风险溢价，导致其经济借贷成本一直居高。


This has pushed them into a deflationary tailspin and put them at a substantial – and potentially permanent – competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis creditor countries.	他们也因此陷入通货紧缩的失控状态，这使他们在与债权国的竞争中处于明显——或许会是永久的劣势之中。


This outcome does not reflect a deliberate plan, but rather a series of policy mistakes.	导致如此结果的并不是深思熟虑的计划，而是一系列的政策失误。


Germany did not seek to occupy a dominant position in Europe, and it is reluctant to accept the obligations and liabilities that such a position entails.	德国并不想在欧洲占据主导地位，也不愿承担由上述地位所带来的责任和义务。


Call this the tragedy of the European Union.	我们可以将这称为欧盟的悲剧。


Recent developments seem to offer grounds for optimism.	近来的事态发展似乎让我们有理由感到乐观。


The authorities are taking steps to correct their mistakes, especially with the decision to form a banking union and the outright monetary transactions program, which would allow unlimited intervention by the European Central Bank in the sovereign-bond market.	当局正采取措施纠正自己的错误，特别是决策成立银行工会和完全货币交易计划，以便欧洲央行借此不受限制地干预主权债务市场。


Financial markets have been reassured that the euro is here to stay.	金融市场得到了欧元将继续存在的保证。


That could be a turning point, provided it is adequately reinforced with additional steps toward greater integration.	只要进一步充分落实一体化政策，这有可能成为欧元危机的重要转折。


Unfortunately, the EU’s unfolding tragedy characteristically feeds on such glimmers of hope.	遗憾的是，欧盟正在逼近的悲剧总是会扼杀希望的曙光。


Germany remains willing to do the minimum – and nothing more – to hold the euro together, and the EU’s recent steps have merely reinforced German resistance to further concessions.	德国仍然只愿为保住欧元付出最低限度的努力（仅此而已、别无其他），而欧盟近来的举措只是强化了德国对更多让步要求的抵触立场。


This will perpetuate the division between creditor and debtor countries.	这会导致债权国和债务国的鸿沟成为永久现象。


A widening gap in economic performance and political dominance is such a dismal prospect for the EU that it must not be allowed to become permanent.	对欧盟而言，经济表现和政治地位差距拉大的前景是如此可怕，绝不能任其发展为一种永久现象。


There must be a way to prevent it – after all, history is not predetermined.	一定能找到阻止噩梦成真的方法——归根结底，历史不是预先注定的。


The EU, originally conceived as an instrument of solidarity, is today held together by grim necessity.	原本被设想为团结利器的欧盟，今天依然存在仅仅是因为别无选择。


That is not conducive to a harmonious partnership.	这种情况不利于和谐伙伴关系的建立。


The only way to reverse the trend is to recapture the spirit of solidarity that animated the European project from the start.	力挽狂澜的唯一方法是重新找回欧洲计划伊始就令其充满活力的团结精神。


To that end, I recently established an Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE).	为此我最新成立了欧洲开放社会计划（OSIFE）。


In doing so, I recognized that the best place to start would be where current policies have created the greatest human suffering: Greece.	在此过程中，最好从现行政策造成痛苦最深的地方开始，这个地方就是希腊。


The people who are suffering are not those who abused the system and caused the crisis.	受苦受难的并非那些滥用制度、引发危机的罪魁祸首。


The fate of the many migrant and asylum seekers caught in Greece is particularly heart-rending.	陷入困境的众多移民和寻求庇护者的命运尤其令人感伤。


But their plight cannot be separated from that of the Greeks themselves.	但我们没办法将他们的困境与希腊人分开。


An initiative confined to migrants would merely reinforce the growing xenophobia and extremism in Greece.	仅限于移民的援助计划只会给希腊正在滋长的排外和极端主义火上浇油。


I could not figure out how to approach this seemingly intractable problem until I recently visited Stockholm to commemorate the centenary of Raoul Wallenberg’s birth.	直到最近访问斯德哥尔摩纪念罗尔·瓦伦堡诞辰一百周年之前，我都找不到这个看似棘手问题的解决方法。


This reawakened my memories of World War II – the calamity that eventually gave birth to the EU.	这唤起了我对二战灾难的记忆，正是这场灾难导致了欧盟的诞生。


Wallenberg was a hero who saved the lives of many Jews in my home city of Budapest by establishing Swedish safe houses.	瓦伦堡是位英雄人物，他在我的家乡布达佩斯建立瑞典安全屋，挽救了众多犹太人的生命。


During the German occupation, my father was also a heroic figure.	德国占领期间我父亲也是位英雄人物。


He helped to save his family and friends and many others.	他挽救了家人、朋友和其他很多人。


He taught me to confront harsh reality rather than to submit to it passively.	他教会我要面对残酷的现实，而不是被动地屈服于它。


That is what gave me the idea.	我因此有了这样的想法。


We could set up solidarity houses in Greece, which would serve as community centers for the local population and also provide food and shelter to migrants.	我们可以在希腊设立团结屋，在充当当地居民社区中心的同时为移民提供食物和住所。


There are already many soup kitchens and civil-society efforts to help the migrants, but these initiatives cannot cope with the scale of the problem.	已经有不少舍粥场和民间力量在帮助移民，但这些计划应对如此规模的问题还远远不够。


What I have in mind is to reinforce these efforts.	我要做的是强化这些力量。


The EU’s asylum policy has broken down.	欧盟的庇护政策已经陷入瘫痪。


Refugees must register in the member country where they enter, but the Greek government cannot process the cases.	难民必须在入境成员国进行注册，但希腊政府却无力应对他们的情况。


Some 60,000 refugees who sought to register have been put into detention facilities where conditions are inhumane. Migrants who do not register and live on the street are attacked by the hooligans of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn party.	大约60,000名寻求注册的难民被投入条件很不人道的拘留中心，没有注册的移民则露宿街头，成为新法西斯金色黎明党流氓的袭击对象。


Sweden has made migration and asylum policy a high priority, while Norway is concerned about the fate of migrants in Greece.	瑞典优先重视移民和庇护政策，而挪威则非常关注希腊的移民状况。


So both countries would be prime candidates to support solidarity houses.	因此上述两国可以作为援建团结屋的主要候选力量。


And other better-off countries could join them.	其他富裕国家也可以助他们一臂之力。


OSIFE is ready to provide support for this initiative, and I hope other foundations will be eager to do the same.	欧洲开放社会计划愿意支持这项行动，我希望其他基金会也热忱参与这项行动。


But this has to be a European project – one that eventually must find its way into the European budget.	但这必需成为一项欧洲计划——也就是说这项计划必需纳入欧洲预算之中。


Currently, Golden Dawn is making political headway by providing social services to Greeks while attacking migrants.	目前，金色黎明借着为希腊人提供社会服务和袭击移民来为自己捞取政治资本。


The initiative that I propose would offer a positive alternative, based on solidarity – the solidarity of Europeans with Greeks and of Greeks with migrants.	我所提议的计划可以提供一项建立在团结（欧洲与希腊人的团结和希腊人与移民的团结）基础上的积极选择。


It would provide a practical demonstration of the spirit that ought to infuse the entire EU.	它可以让人们在现实中看到本应渗透整个欧盟的团结精神。


As soon as possible, I will dispatch an OSIFE needs-assessment team to Greece to contact the authorities – and the people and organizations already helping the needy – to work out a plan for which we can generate public support.	我会尽快派遣一支欧洲开放社会计划需求评估团队到希腊与当局（及已经在帮助需要者的民众和组织）联系，以便制定一项能争取公众支持的计划。


My goal is to revive the idea of the EU as an instrument of solidarity, not only of discipline.	我的目标是重新唤起欧盟的团结作用，而不让欧盟仅仅沦为执行机构。


Revolts of the Righteous	公义的反抗


It has become fashionable in certain smart circles to regard atheism as a sign of superior education, of a more highly evolved civilization, of enlightenment.	一段时间以来，聪明人的圈子里时兴把无神论视为一种高人一等的教育、一种向更高程度演进的文明以及启蒙的标志。


Recent bestsellers suggest that religious faith is really a sign of backwardness, the mark of primitives stuck in the dark ages who are yet to catch up with scientific reason.	最新的畅销书籍提出，宗教信仰实际上是一种落后的标志，表明了陷于黑暗年代原始人还需要追赶上科学理性。


Religion, we are told, is responsible for violence, oppression, poverty, and many other ills.	我们被告知说，宗教造成了暴力、压迫、贫穷以及其他罪恶。


It is not difficult to find examples to back up such assertions.	人们并不难以发现支持这些主张的证据。


But can religion also be a force for good?	但是宗教能否成为一种好的势力呢？


Indeed, are there cases where religious faith comes to the rescue even of those who don’t have it?	实际上，有没有这样的事例，也就是宗教信仰挽救了那些即使没有信仰的人呢？


Since I have never had either the benefits or misfortunes of adhering to any religion, it might smack of hypocrisy for me to defend those who have.	由于我没有信仰某种宗教的好处和坏处，让我来为那些有宗教信仰的人辩护可能听起来有点伪善。


But watching the Burmese monks on television defy the security forces of one of the world’s most oppressive regimes, it is hard not to see some merit in religious belief.	但是，看到电视上的缅甸僧侣们不顾世界上最为压制政权的安全部队，人们就很难不看到宗教信仰的某些好处。


Burma is a deeply religious country, where most men spend some time as Buddhist monks.	缅甸是一个信仰深厚的国家，大多数男子都会出家一段时间。


Even the most thuggish Burmese dictator must hesitate before unleashing lethal force on men dressed in the maroon and saffron robes of their faith.	即使最为凶残的缅甸独裁者在杀戮身穿粟色和桔黄色僧袍的人之前也要三思。


The Burmese monks, together with nuns in pink robes, were soon joined by students, actors, and others who want to be rid of the military junta.	学生、演员和那些想要摆脱军人集团的人加入了缅甸的僧侣和身穿粉红袍子的尼姑。


But it was the monks and nuns who took the first step; they dared to protest when others had mostly given up.	但是，是那些和尚和尼姑迈出了第一步； 他们在别人都放弃的时候敢于示威。


And they did so with the moral authority of their Buddhist faith.	而且，他们这样做具有佛教信仰的道义权威。


Romantics might say that Buddhism is unlike other religions – indeed, more a philosophy than a faith.	浪漫的人会说佛教不像其他宗教，确实，佛教更像是一种哲学而非信仰。


But Buddhism has been a religion in different parts of Asia for many centuries, and, like any other belief, it can be used to justify violent acts.	但是数百年来佛教一直是亚洲不同国家的宗教，而且，像其他信仰一样，佛教可以被以来为暴力行为提供理由。


One need only look at Sri Lanka, where Buddhism is lashed to ethnic chauvinism in the slow-burning civil war between Buddhist Singhalese and Hindu Tamils.	人们只要看一看斯里兰卡就可以了。 那里，在佛教僧伽罗人和印度教的坦米尔人慢燃的内战中，佛教被用作种族沙文主义。


Just as the Buddhists risked their lives to stand up for democracy in Burma, Christians have done so in other countries.	正如佛教徒冒着生命危险在缅甸支持民主一样，基督徒在其他国家也是如此。


The Marcos regime in the Philippines was doomed in the mid-1980’s from the moment the Catholic Church turned against it.	八十年代中期，菲律宾的马科思政权在罗马天主教反对它的时候就不可救药了。


Thousands of ordinary citizens defied the tanks when Marcos threatened to crush “People Power” with force, but the presence of priests and nuns gave the rebellion its moral authority.	当马科思用武力威胁镇压“人民权力”运动的时候，数以千计的普通民众不顾坦克的镇压，但是，在场的牧师和修女们给了起义以道义权威。


Many political dissidents in South Korea were inspired by their Christian beliefs, and the same is true in China.	南韩的许多政治异议人士受到其基督教信仰的鼓舞，中国也是一样。


And no one can deny the religious authority of Pope John Paul II as a spur to Poland’s rebellion against Communist dictatorship in the 1980’s.	而且，没有人可以否认教皇保罗二世的宗教权威在二十世纪八十年代波兰反抗共产独裁主义的时候的推动力量。


True believers would no doubt see the hand of God in these stirring events.	真正的信仰者无疑看到了这些激动人心事件中的上帝之手。


Ferdinand Marcos’s main opponent, Cory Aquino, actually boasted of having a direct pipeline to the Lord.	马科思的主要对手阿基诺实际上吹嘘他与上帝直接通话。


As a non-believer, I am bound to treat such claims with skepticism.	作为非信仰者，我对这样的说法都抱以怀疑。


But the moral power of religious faith does not need a supernatural explanation.	但是宗教信仰的道义力量并不需要超自然的解释。


Its strength is belief itself – belief in a moral order that defies secular, or, indeed, religious dictators.	其力量是信仰本身，也就是信仰一种不顾世俗或者宗教独裁者的道义秩序。


Active resisters to the Nazis during World War II were often devout Christians.	二战期间积极反抗纳粹的抵抗者经常是虔诚的基督徒。


Some sheltered Jews -- despite their own prejudices -- simply because they saw it as their religious duty to do so.	有些人不顾其自身的偏见保护了犹太人，就是因为他们认为这样做是自己的宗教责任。


Nor does faith have to be in a supernatural being.	而信仰也不必存在于超自然之中。


Men and women who found strength in their belief in Communism resisted the Nazis with equal tenacity.	在共产主义信仰中发现力量的人们以同样的韧性抵抗纳粹。


Despite the horrific violence of Islamist fanatics, it should not be forgotten that the mosque can also be a legitimate basis for resistance against the mostly secular dictatorships in the Middle East today.	尽管伊斯兰狂热份子可怕的暴力，人们不应当忘记，清真寺也可以成为反抗当今中东地区大多数世俗独裁统治的合法根据地。


In a world of political oppression and moral corruption, religious values offer an alternative moral universe.	在一个政治迫害和道德腐化的世界里，宗教价值提供了一种可供选择的道义空间。


This alternative is not necessarily more democratic, but it can be.	这一选择并不一定更为民主，但是却可以这样。


Nevertheless, the danger of all dogmas, religious or secular, is that they lead to different forms of oppression.	但是，所有无论是宗教还是世俗的教条的危险在于它们会导致不同形式的压迫。


The revolt against Soviet domination in Afghanistan was led by holy warriors who then imposed their own form of misrule.	圣战者们领导了阿富汗反抗苏联的压迫，随后他们自己又施行了恶劣的统治。


Moreover, charismatic leadership can be problematic even when it takes a benign form.	而且，富有个人魅力的领导即使采用好的形式也是存在问题的。


The Madonna-like status of Cory Aquino in the Philippines was inspiring in the heady days of People Power, but did little to bolster the institutions of a secular democracy.	阿基诺在菲律宾麦当娜式的地位在人们权力运动激动人心的日子里是令人鼓舞的，但��却并没有巩固世俗民主的机制。


In Poland, once the battle against Communism was won, the Solidarity movement was soon sundered by conflicts between secular democrats and believers who looked to the Church for guidance.	在波兰，一旦赢得了反对共产主义的战斗，团结工会运动就马上在世俗民主派人士和向教会寻求指导的人之间分裂。


Faith has an especially important role to play in politics in circumstances where secular liberals are rendered impotent, as in the case of Nazi occupation, Communist rule, or military dictatorship.	当世俗民主派人士无所作为的情况下，信仰在政治中可以发挥极为重要的作用，正如纳粹占领、共产统治或者军事独裁这些情况。


Liberals are most needed when compromises have to be made, but not nearly as useful when faced with brute force.	在需要达成妥协的时候，最为需要民主派，但是在面对无情的暴力的时候就不是这样了。


That is when visionaries, romantics, and true believers are driven by their beliefs to take risks that most of us would regard as foolhardy.	这时候，具有远见的人、浪漫主义者以及真正的信徒们受到其信仰的驱动承担我们大多数人认为是愚蠢的风险。


It is, on the whole, not beneficial to be ruled by such heroes, but it is good to have heroes around when they are needed.	总体而言，接受这些英雄的统治并不有益，但是，当需要英雄的时候出现英雄是一件好事。


The Struggle for Middle East Mastery	中东控制战


BERLIN – The last illusions about what was called, until recently, the “Arab Spring” may have vanished.	柏林—对此前被称为“阿拉伯之春”的最后幻想可能也已经消失了。


Egypt’s military coup has made the simple, depressing alternatives for the country’s future crystal clear: The question is no longer one of democracy versus dictatorship, but rather one of (Islamist) revolution versus (military) counter-revolution – dictatorship or dictatorship.	埃及政变毫无疑问将使该国走上简单粗暴的镇压之路。 问题不再是民主和独裁之争，而是（伊斯兰）革命和（军队）反革命之争——独裁与独裁之争。


This applies not only to Egypt, but to almost all of the wider Middle East.	不仅埃及是如此，整个中东几乎都是如此。


And, because both sides have opted for armed struggle, the outcome will be civil war, regardless of what well-intentioned European Union foreign ministers decide in Brussels.	而由于双方都选择了武装斗争之路，结果将是内战，不管心怀好意的欧盟外交部长们将在布鲁塞尔做出什么决定。


The Islamists cannot win militarily, just as the generals cannot win politically, which all but ensures the return of dictatorship, significant violence, and a series of humanitarian disasters.	伊斯兰教无法在军事上取胜，一如将军们无法再政治上取胜，这将确保独裁、严重暴力和一系列人道主义灾难卷土重来。


For both sides, full mastery and control is the only option, though neither has even a rudimentary understanding of how to modernize the economy and society.	对双方来说，完全的控制和掌握是唯一的选择，尽管双方都对如何现代化经济和社会没有哪怕是最基本的见解。


So, whichever side gains the upper hand, authoritarianism and economic stagnation will prevail once again.	因此，不管哪一方占据上风，独裁主义和经济停滞将再次盛行。


In Egypt, the army will be the victor, at least in the medium term.	在埃及，军队将是胜出者，至少在中期是如此。


With the support of old elites, the urban middle class, and religious minorities, Egypt’s military leaders have clearly adopted an all-or-nothing strategy.	在旧精英、城市中产阶级和宗教少数派的支持下，埃及军队领导人采取了明确的要么全胜、要么全输的战略。


Moreover, financial support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states has made the army impervious to outside pressure.	此外，来自沙特和其他海湾国家的金融支持使军队没有外来压力。


Thus, Egypt is reenacting the Algerian scenario.	因此，埃及在重蹈阿尔及利亚的覆辙。


In 1992, with the Islamic Salvation Front poised to win Algeria’s general election, the country’s military staged a coup and immediately canceled the election’s second round.	1992年，伊斯兰救世阵线（Islamic Salvation Front）眼看就要获得阿尔及利亚大选的胜利，该国军队发动了一场政变，马上取消了第二轮选举。


In the subsequent eight-year civil war, waged with appalling brutality by both sides, up to 200,000 people lost their lives.	随后的八年内战双方都打得相当残暴，近20万人因此丧生。


Military rule in Algeria continues de facto to this day.	阿尔及利亚的军事统治事实上一直延续到今日。


But, with the role of political Islam still unanswered, none of the country’s fundamental problems has been addressed seriously, and its leaders have been unable to take advantage of promising opportunities (for example, in contrast to Egypt, Algeria has large oil and gas reserves).	但是，由于政治伊斯兰的角色问题一直没有得到答案，因此该国的根本问题迟迟没有被严肃解决，其领导人也一直无法利用阿尔及利亚的天然优势（比如，与埃及不同，阿尔及利亚拥有大量石油和天然气储备）。


In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s older generation is accustomed to prison and life underground, but there are many reasons to believe that its younger adherents will respond with terror and violence.	在埃及，老一代穆斯林兄弟会习惯于监狱和地下生活，但有充分的理由认为，年青一代信众将以恐怖和暴力为应对之道。


Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, and soon perhaps other countries in the region will serve as fertile grounds for a new, more militarily oriented Al Qaeda, which will become a more powerful factor in the Middle East’s cacophony of interests and ideologies.	埃及、叙利亚、也门、突尼斯——可能很快该地区的其他国家也将包括近来——将成为新的、更加军事化的基地组织的温床，它将成为更具实力的中东利益和意识形态冲突因素。


The West in general, and the United States in particular, has little influence or real leverage.	总体而言，西方（特别是美国）对此几无影响力或真正的控制力。


So it will complain, threaten, and deplore the horrors to come, but ultimately will follow its interests, not its principles.	因此，西方会抱怨、威胁和谴责恐怖行为，但最终将根据利益而不是原则行事。


For example, Egypt, with its control of the Suez Canal and its cold peace with Israel, is too important strategically to be simply abandoned.	比如，掌握着苏伊士运河并且与以色列维持冷和平的埃及���略意义十分重大，不可能弃之不顾。


Taken in isolation, the Egyptian situation is bad enough; but it is by no means a unique case.	孤立地看，埃及局势已经够坏； 但它绝不是独一无二的情形。


Rather, it is part of a regional drama characterized primarily by a massive loss of order.	相反，埃及只是以大面积无序为主要特征的地区乱象的一部分。


The US-backed order in the Middle East is breaking down, yet no new order is emerging.	美国支持的中东秩序正在崩溃，但新秩序并没有出现。


Instead, there is only a spreading chaos that threatens to reach far beyond the region’s borders.	相反，有的只是不断蔓延、可能远远溢出地区边界的混乱。


Following the spectacular failure of President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, with their neoconservative go-it-alone illusions, the US is no longer willing or able to shoulder the burden of being the last force for order in the Middle East.	在小布什总统和切尼副总统及其新保守主义单独行动幻想破灭后，美国不再愿意或能够承担起充当维持中东秩序的最后力量的责任。


Having overstretched its forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and facing economic retrenchment at home, the US is withdrawing, and there is no other power to take its place.	美军深陷阿富汗和伊拉克泥淖，国内又面临着经济拮据，因此美国正在推出中东，同时也没有其他大国能顶替它。


Withdrawal is one of the riskiest military maneuvers, because it can easily degenerate into panicky retreat and chaos.	撤退是最危险的军事动作之一，因为它很容易演变成溃逃和混乱。


With the upcoming withdrawal of the US and NATO from Afghanistan, the potential for turmoil in the region between North Africa and the Hindu Kush will increase significantly on its eastern edge.	美国和北约即将从阿富汗撤军，北非和兴都库什山之间区域的潜在动荡将在其东沿显著升级。


What we can learn today from the prolonged crisis in the Middle East is that regional powers are increasingly trying to replace the US as a force for order.	我们可以从当今中东长期危机中汲取的教训是，地区大国开始跃跃欲试取代美国成为秩序维持力量。


This, too, will fuel chaos, because none of these powers is strong enough to shoulder the American burden.	这也会增加混乱，因为这些国家中没有一个强大到足以承担起美国的角色。


Moreover, the Sunni-Shia divide frequently leads to contradictory policies.	此外，逊尼派-什叶派分裂频繁地导致互相矛盾的政策。


In Egypt, for example, Saudi Arabia is supporting the military against the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas in Syria the Saudis are backing Salafists against the military, which receives support from Saudi Arabia’s main enemies, Shia Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.	比如，在埃及，沙特支持军队反对穆斯林兄弟会，而在叙利亚，沙特支持沙拉菲派反对军队，后者又受到了沙特的主要敌人什叶派伊朗及其黎巴嫩代理人真主党的支持。


But the region’s struggle for power and its sectarian-ideological antagonisms also create an opportunity for cooperation once scarcely thought possible.	但该地区的实力之争以及宗派-意识形态对抗也为曾经希望渺茫的合作创造了机会。


Seen from this perspective, any US-Iranian talks over the nuclear issue in the wake of Hassan Rouhani’s victory in Iran’s presidential election could have much broader significance.	从这个角度看，鲁哈尼在伊朗总统选举中获胜背景下的美伊核问题谈判可能产生更广的影响力。


In Egypt, the military counter-revolution will prevail, but the Islamist revolution eventually will return as long as its causes have not been eliminated.	在埃及，军队反革命将继续盛行，但伊斯兰革命最终将卷土重来，只要其根源没有被根除。


At the moment, there is virtually no indication of progress on this front.	此时此刻，在这方面看不到任何前进的迹象。


So, when the Islamist revolution does return, it is likely to be even more powerful and violent.	因此，当伊斯兰革命真的卷土重来时，可能比此前更强大、更暴力。


A similar dynamic is evident in European history, particularly in the revolutions and counter-revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.	类似的动态在欧洲历史上也有迹可循，特别是19世纪和20世纪的革命和反革命。


Indeed, the legacy of that dynamic was fully overcome in Europe only two decades ago.	事实上，这一动态的遗留问题欧洲直到20年前才解决。


Now it seems to be recurring, largely unchanged, in the Middle East.	如今，这一幕似乎又要在中东几乎一模一样地重演。


Revolution in a Vacuum	真空中的革命


MADRID – The Cold War is long over, but superpower rivalry is back.	马德里—冷战也许已经结束了，但超级大国的对抗又回来了。


As a result, the international community’s capacity to unite in the face of major global challenges remains as deficient as ever.	结果，国际社会联合起来应对全球挑战的可能性与以前一样小。


Nowhere is this more clearly reflected than in the case of Syria.	这一点在叙利亚表现的最为清楚。


What was supposed to be a coordinated effort to protect civilians from ruthless repression and advance a peaceful transition – the plan developed by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan – has now degenerated into a proxy war between the United States and Russia.	本应是旨在保护公民不受残酷镇压、促进叙利亚走向和平过渡的联合行动——由联合国前秘书长科菲·安南主导——目前已经沦为了一场美国和俄罗斯之间的代理战争。


Russia’s leaders (and China’s) seek to uphold an international system that relies on the unconditional sovereignty of states and rejects the Western-inspired, humanitarian droit d’ingérence.	俄罗斯（和中国）领导人赞成以无条件国家主前为基础的国际制度，拒绝西方提出的人道主义“干涉有理”（droit d’ingérence）说。


Concerned that the Arab rebellions would radicalize their own repressed minorities, they refuse to allow the UN Security Council to be used to promote revolutionary changes in the Arab world.	由于担心阿拉伯起义会刺激本国被压迫的少数民族，他们拒绝接受通过联合国安理会促进阿拉伯世界的革命性变革。


And Syria, the last Russian outpost of the Cold War, is an asset the Kremlin will do its utmost to maintain.	而叙利亚作为俄罗斯最后的冷战前哨战，将受到克里姆林宫不惜一切的捍卫。


But Russia and China are not the only problem.	但俄国和中国并不是仅有的问题。


Major emerging democracies like Brazil, India, and South Africa have been especially disappointing in their response to the Arab Spring.	新兴民主大国，如巴西、印度和南非，均对其在阿拉伯之春中的反应特别失望。


All are outspoken paladins of human rights when it comes to condemning any Israeli defensive attack in Gaza as “genocide,” but are equally united in opposing Security Council action on Syria, even as the repression there grows ever more appalling.	它们在以色列对加沙的自卫反击事件中大谈人权，称之为“大屠杀”，而对于叙利亚的安理会行动，它们却一致表示反对，即使叙利亚的镇压行为耸人听闻。


The Arab uprisings either clashed with their commitment to the inviolability of national sovereignty, or stoked their fear that “humanitarian intervention” would merely be another tool of Northern dominance.	阿拉伯起义不是与它们国家主权非暴力性的承诺相悖，就是激起了它们对“人道主义干预”将沦为有一个北方主导工具的担忧。


The West’s response has been far more supportive of Arabs’ aspirations, but it has also been contradictory and erratic.	西方的反应是压倒性地支持阿拉伯人的愿望，但也不乏矛盾之处，且极不稳定。


For years, both the US and Europe engaged in a monumental exercise in political hypocrisy, preaching the gospel of democratic change while supporting Arab tyrants.	多年来，美国和欧洲在政治舞台上极尽伪善之能事，一边散布民主变革福音，一边支持阿拉伯暴君。


Not surprisingly, they found themselves with no tools to deal with the Arab revolutions.	毫不奇怪，它们发现手里根本没有工具能应对阿拉伯革命。


Indeed, at no time since the Arab Spring began has one been able to discern a coherent Western strategy to address its many challenges and uncertainties.	事实上，阿拉伯之春一开始，你就可以领会到西方在解决其中诸多挑战和不确定性方面实行的是一致战略。


Each case has elicited a different response, owing either to the constraints of international power politics, as is now the case with respect to Syria, or to economic and strategic considerations, as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.	每场革命都引发了不同的应对措施，要么根据国际实力政治约束做出（如现在的叙利亚），要么根据经济和战略条件做出（如沙特和巴林）。


The US, for its part, did not abandon authoritarian allies such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali immediately.	至于美国，它从未立刻抛弃过埃及的穆巴拉克和突尼斯的本·阿里这样的独裁盟友。


Had they been swifter and more effective in repressing the mass protests, they might still be in power today – with America’s blessing.	要是他们在镇压群众游行方面行动更迅速、效率更高，他们也许现在还在台上掌权——有美国在背后挺着他们呢。


The US turned against them not because they were autocrats, but because they were inefficient autocrats.	美国抛弃他们，并不是因为他们是独裁者，而是因为他们是无能的独裁者。


Meanwhile, Europe finds itself paralyzed by a financial crisis that threatens the European Union’s very existence.	与此同时，欧洲因金融危机威胁欧盟的生存而步履维艰。


The EU’s traditional foreign-policy tools – “promoting civil society” and “encouraging trade” – are no substitute for a strategy to confront the new power game in the Mediterranean.	欧盟的传统��交武器——“促进公民社会”和“鼓励贸易”——并不能充当应对地中海新实力博弈的替代战略。


And yet Europe has proven utterly incapable of developing an appropriate response to conditions in which Islamist regimes are independently shaping their priorities and external actors – Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and perhaps even Iran – are vying for influence with an extraordinary combination of financial firepower and political muscle.	伊斯兰政权独立地决定着自己的优先事项，外部行动者——卡塔尔、沙特、土耳其、俄罗斯、中国，也许还有伊朗——也正在虎视眈眈，意欲用手上的金融武器和政治势实力形成超强组合施加影响，而欧洲根本无力针对这样的环境实施合适的应对措施。


Europe cannot afford to remain on the sidelines.	欧洲经不起袖手旁观了。


NATO’s “Operation Unified Protector” in Libya was a major success for the alliance, but America’s decision to let Europe assume the leading role also signaled its intention to “rebalance” its global priorities.	北约在利比亚的“联合保护行动”（Operation Unified Protector）是该联盟的一次大获全胜，但美国决定让欧洲承担领导责任也表明其意在“再平衡”其全球优先级。


With the US intent on shifting its attention from Europe’s sphere of vital interests, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, to Asia and the Pacific, it can no longer be expected to take the lead in resolving crises in Europe’s backyard.	美国意在将注意力从欧洲关键利益区——地中海和中东地区——转向亚太地区，不用指望它会继续担当解决欧洲后院危机的领导角色。


Indeed, grand designs for the Middle East are no longer on America’s agenda.	事实上，中东总方针的制定以不再是美国日程上的事项了。


Since its victory in the Cold War, America’s hegemony in the Middle East has been a story of frustration and unrewarded investment of blood, sweat, and treasure.	自冷战获胜以来，美国在中东的霸权便陷入了尴尬，美国人投入了鲜血、汗水和金钱，却从未获得回报。


A shift to foreign-policy realism is now expected, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent meeting with Egypt’s Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, is a clear indication of America’s new orientation.	如今，美国将转向外交政策现实主义，国务卿希拉里·克林顿最近与埃及伊斯兰主义者总统穆尔西的会面清楚地标明了美国的新方向。


The implications of such a shift are far-reaching.	如此变局的影响是巨大的。


Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US viewed the Islamic world almost exclusively through the prism of the “global war on terror.”	2011年9月11日恐怖袭击发生后，美国的“全球恐怖战争”望远镜中就只有伊斯兰世界。


Now, however, policymakers admit that it was precisely the persistence of secular Arab autocracies that encouraged Islamist terrorism.	但是，如今，决策者承认，正是世俗阿拉伯独裁者给了伊斯兰恐怖主义生长的温床。


As a result, the major premise of current US policy is that a loss of trust by the Islamists in the democratic process would have adverse consequences, and that the restoration of the old regimes could threaten Western interests more than a Muslim Brotherhood government would.	因此，美国当前政策的主要假设是在民主过程中失去伊斯兰主义者的信任会产生反面效果，重建旧制度可能比穆斯林兄弟会政府更能损害西方利益。


America is now wisely building working relations with the new Islamist leaders, in the hope that they will not endanger the region’s US-brokered peace agreements (Israel-Jordan and Israel-Egypt) or interfere with America’s drive to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions.	如今，美国正在聪明地建设与新伊斯兰主义领导人的关系，希望他们不会威胁该地区美国主导的和平协议（以色列-约旦协议和以色列-埃及协议），也不要干涉美国组织伊朗核野心的努力。


Realizing that hope is no easy task.	认识到这一希望不是个容易完成的任务。


Turmoil in Arab societies is bound to persist for years to come, and emerging regional and world powers can be expected to exploit the international order’s fragmentation to advance their interests in the region.	阿拉伯社会乱象注定将维持多年，不难预计，新兴地区和世界强国将利用国际秩序的破碎谋求自身在该地区的利益。


With Europe in disarray, and Iran’s nuclear crisis still resistant to diplomatic resolution, America’s new foreign-policy realism could well imply that the US, however reluctantly, will ultimately be forced to revisit its “rebalancing strategy.”	欧洲仍处于一片混乱，伊朗危机仍无法靠外交手段解决，在这样的情况下，美国的新外交政策现实主义必然意味着美国不管有多不情愿，最终都将被迫重新祭出“再平衡战略”。


Revolutionizing Arab Economies	革命中的阿拉伯经济


ISTANBUL – The ongoing showdown in Egypt between the country’s Islamists and its military rulers is a clear reminder of how difficult democratic transitions in the Arab world are likely to be.	伊斯坦布尔—希腊伊斯兰主义者和军方执政者正在摊牌，这清晰地反映出阿拉伯世界的民主转型会有多困难。


Obviously, failure to reach a power-sharing agreement will prolong political instability.	显然，不能形成权力共享协议将会延长政治不稳定局面。


But the resulting economic inaction would be just as damaging to the consolidation of democratic rule.	但由此产生的经济失活对民主规则的巩固同样有害。


Emerging Arab leaders, from Islamists to re-invented former regime officials, are keenly aware of the need to improve their countries’ economic prospects.	阿拉伯新领导人——从伊斯兰主义者到摇身一变的旧体制官员——敏锐地意识到国家需要改善经济前景。


They know full well that their popularity can be sustained only if they are able to deliver growth, employment, and higher living standards.	他们十分清楚，只有拿出增长、就业和更高生活水平才能维持自己的支持度。


This would be a difficult challenge under any circumstances – and is all the more daunting against the backdrop of the Arab Spring’s destabilization of the economic systems across the Middle East and North Africa.	这在任何环境下都是一项艰巨的挑战，而在整个中东和北非的经济制度因阿拉伯之春而摇摇欲坠的背景下，要获得这样的成绩尤为艰难。


Even in countries like Tunisia and Egypt, where the transition to democracy is more advanced, political uncertainty has tended to plague economic achievements.	即使在突尼斯和埃及等民主转型较为领先的国家，政治不确定性仍会有碍于经济成就。


For the first time since 1986, Tunisia’s economy shrank in 2011, by 1.8%.	2011年，突尼斯经济出现了自1986年以来第一次衰退。


Unemployment reached 18% last year, up from 13% in 2010.	去年失业率高达18%，而2010年为13%。


Meanwhile, the Egyptian economy contracted by 0.8%, and one million Egyptians lost their jobs.	与此同时，埃及经济收缩了0. 8%，100万埃及人丢掉了工作。


Egypt’s foreign-investment inflows have also dried up, falling from $6.4 billion in 2010 to a mere $500 million in 2011.	埃及外国投资流入也出现了剧减从2010年的64亿美元跌到了2011年的5亿美元。


The combination of these negative trends is affecting these countries’ fiscal as well as external balances.	这些不利趋势的综合效应是对这些国家的财政和外部平衡形成了冲击。


Egypt’s budget deficit reached 10% of GDP, while its foreign-exchange reserves have fallen to $15 billion – barely enough to cover the country’s import bill for the next three months.	埃及预算赤字达到了GDP的10%，而外汇储备下跌至150亿美元——大概只够支付未来三个月的进口账单。


In Tunisia, too, the budget deficit has widened sharply in the wake of the revolution, rising from 2.6% of GDP in 2010 to 6% in 2011.	突尼斯也是如此，自革命以来预算赤字迅速增加，占GDP的比重从2010年的2. 6%上升为2011年的6%。


This rapid economic deterioration, combined with the high expectations raised by the onset of political transition, is creating a sense of urgency.	经济的迅速恶化与政治过渡肇始时所形成的高期望一起，正在形成紧迫感。


Emerging political actors feel compelled to develop more detailed economic programs and to address their populations’ growing material grievances.	新崛起的政治活动家感到了出台更详细经济计划、满足国民日益增长的物质诉求的压力。


For example, whereas the Islamists had essentially focused on political themes, highlighting participation, inclusiveness, and democratic reforms, the recent election campaigns witnessed a rhetorical shift to economic aspirations.	比如，尽管伊斯兰主义者的注意力主要集中在政治话题上，强调参与、包容和民主改革，但其最近的选举拉票活动正在向经济愿景方面靠拢。


Overall, the emerging political players – particularly the Islamist parties – have adopted a rather conciliatory tone regarding engagement with international actors.	总的来说，新崛起政治势力——特别是伊斯兰政党——对国际合作采取了颇具妥协性的态度。


These parties’ economic programs are by and large pro-market, emphasizing the private sector’s role in driving growth and the need to attract foreign capital.	这些党派的经济计划总的来说是走的是市场经济道路，强调私人部门在提振增长方面的作用以及吸引外国投资的必要性。


The state is seen as a vehicle for ensuring social justice, and there are scant references to sharia principles.	国家被视为是保证社会公平的载体，伊斯兰教规鲜被提及。


Both in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, Islamist politicians have given assurances that the economically critical tourism sector will not be hindered by restrictions related to Islamic law.	比如，在突尼斯和埃及，伊斯兰政客保证对经济具有关键性作用的旅游业将不会因与伊斯兰法条有关的限制而受到拖累。


The Islamists’ economic programs also foresee a role for international institutions in helping their countries to overcome the challenges that they face.	伊斯兰主义者的经济计划还考虑到了国际机构在帮助国家克服挑战方面所能起到的作用。


Indeed, whereas resistance to foreign intervention and assistance has been strong with respect to democratic reforms, new Arab leaders seem more receptive to a partnership with the West on economic objectives.	事实上，尽管在民主改革方面对外国干预和援助的抵制声音仍然很强，但新阿拉伯领导人似乎更愿意与西方在经济问题上展开合作。


Economic weakness thus provides an unprecedented opportunity for international engagement with the new Arab leadership, which should incorporate short-, medium-, and long-term goals.	于是，经济疲软就为新阿拉伯领导层提供了前所未有的融入国际社会的机会。 与国际社会的合作应该包括短期、中期和长期目标。


Short-term goals must have priority, because many Islamist parties are being pressed to produce positive results within a single electoral cycle.	短期目标必须作为重中之重，因为许多伊斯兰党派需要在一个选举周期内拿出积极的成果。


The new governments will face the immediate challenge of creating jobs, for which the only available recipe is investment in large-scale public-works projects.	新政府面临的紧迫挑战包括创造就业岗位——在这方面，唯一可开出的药方是大规模公共设施项目投资。


This type of government spending can create labor-intensive jobs that will help to stem rising unemployment.	此类政府支出能够创造出劳动密集型岗位，有助于抑制失业率的上升。


The international community can help the Arab governments to launch and sustain such initiatives in several ways.	国际社会能够在诸多方面帮助���拉伯政府推行和维持此类项目。


First, it can increase the amount of promised financial assistance.	首先，国际社会可以提升金融援助承诺。


It can also provide technical expertise to Arab policymakers on debt management.	其次，国际社会可以派技术专家支援阿拉伯决策者管理债务。


Without first-rate expertise in debt management, an economy implementing large-scale public outlays risks crowding out private investment through overreliance on domestic savings.	没有一流债务管理专家，开展大规模公共项目的国家就会有因过度依赖国内储蓄而挤出私人投资的风险。


Finally, the international community can help Arab governments to establish a secure and predictable legal and regulatory framework for public-private partnerships for large-scale infrastructure projects.	最后，国际社会可以帮助阿拉伯国家建立安全、透明的大规模基础设施工程公私合作法律和监管框架。


International actors, jointly with Arab governments, can then help to market these opportunities, allowing Arab economies to benefit from infrastructure-focused long-term international financing.	国际参与者可以和阿拉伯国家一起合作推销这些机会，让阿拉伯经济从专注基础设施的长期国际融资活动中获得好处。


Only a combination of these options would allow Arab economies to create jobs in the short term, while avoiding the risks of destabilizing fiscal imbalances or a lack of financing for private-sector investment.	只有这些方案多管齐下才能让阿拉伯经济在短期内创造出就业岗位，同时又不会有损于已经摇摇欲坠的财政平衡并避免私人部门投资融资难。


The West, for its part, stands to gain in myriad ways from a solid partnership with the Arab world to improve its societies’ economic future.	西方也可以从与阿拉伯世界精诚合作、帮助它们改善社会经济前景的过程中获得诸多好处。


Even in the midst of a protracted currency crisis, European governments can surely sign on to an agenda that prioritizes transfers of know-how over cash infusions.	即使是身处持久货币危机而在注资方面存在的欧洲，也可以替之以知识转移协议。


The Real Raw Material of Wealth	财富的真正原材料


TIRANA – Poor countries export raw materials such as cocoa, iron ore, and raw diamonds.	地拉那—穷国出口可可、铁矿石和生钻石等原材料。


Rich countries export – often to those same poor countries – more complex products such as chocolate, cars, and jewels.	富国出口——目的地常常就是这些穷国——巧克力、汽车和珠宝等更复杂的产品。


If poor countries want to get rich, they should stop exporting their resources in raw form and concentrate on adding value to them.	如果穷国想要变富，它们就应该停止出口原始形式的资源，集中精力提高它们的附加值。


Otherwise, rich countries will get the lion’s share of the value and all of the good jobs.	否则，附加值的大头和所有优渥工作都会被富国攫走。


Poor countries could follow the example of South Africa and Botswana and use their natural wealth to force industrialization by restricting the export of minerals in raw form (a policy known locally as “beneficiation”).	穷国可以效仿南非和博茨瓦纳，通过限��出口原始形式的原材料（这一政策在当地被称为“矿物增效”（beneficiation））利用自然财富强行推动工业化。


But should they?	但它们应该这样做吗？


Some ideas are worse than wrong: they are castrating, because they interpret the world in a way that emphasizes secondary issues – say, the availability of raw materials – and blinds societies to the more promising opportunities that may lie elsewhere.	一些观点比错误更加可怕：它们让你失去雄风，因为它们总是强调次要问题——如是否可以获得原材料——而让社会无法看到存在于别处的良机。


Consider Finland, a Nordic country endowed with many trees for its small population.	以芬兰为例。 这个北欧国家人口很少，并且拥有大量林木。


A classical economist would argue that, given this, the country should export wood, which Finland has done.	古典经济学家会说，考虑到这一条件，芬兰应该出口木材。 芬兰也这么做了。


By contrast, a traditional development economist would argue that it should not export wood; instead, it should add value by transforming the wood into paper or furniture – something that Finland also does.	相反，传统发展经济学家会说，芬兰不应该出口木材； 而应该将木材转化为纸和家具，以此获得附加值。


But all wood-related products represent barely 20% of Finland’s exports.	芬兰也这么做了。 但所有木材相关产品加起来只占芬兰出口的20%左右。


The reason is that wood opened up a different and much richer path to development.	原因在于木材开启了一条不同并且富裕得多的发展之路。


As the Finns were chopping wood, their axes and saws would become dull and break down, and they would have to be repaired or replaced.	芬兰人砍树，这会导致斧子和锯子生锈开口，因此不得不进行修补和替换。


This eventually led them to become good at producing machines that chop and cut wood.	这最终让他们长于生产砍伐和切割木材的机械。


Finnish businessmen soon realized that they could make machines that cut other materials, because not everything that can be cut is made out of wood.	芬兰商人很快意识到，他们可以生产切割其他材料的机械，因为并不是只有木材才需要切割。


Next, they automated the machines that cut, because cutting everything by hand can become boring.	接着，他们又实现了切割机械的自动化，因为不管切什么，手工劳动都是十分无聊的。


From here, they went into other automated machines, because there is more to life than cutting, after all.	从这里他们又进入了自动化机械领域，因为毕竟生活不仅仅是切割来切割去。


From automated machines, they eventually ended up in Nokia.	从自动化机械中最终产生了诺基亚公司。


Today, machines of different types account for more than 40% of Finland’s goods exports.	今天，各种不同类型的机械占芬兰商品出口的40%以上。


The moral of the story is that adding value to raw materials is one path to diversification, but not necessarily a long or fruitful one.	这个故事告诉我们，提高原材料附加值是一条多样化之路，但并不一定是一条可以长期产生丰硕成果的道路。


Countries are not limited by the raw materials they have.	国家并不局限于它们所拥有的原材料。


After all, Switzerland has no cocoa, and China does not make advanced memory chips.	说到底，瑞士并不生产可可，中国也不生产先进存储芯片。


That has not prevented these countries from taking a dominant position in the market for chocolate and computers, respectively.	但这并不能阻止它们在巧克力和计算机市场上占据主导地位。


Having the raw material nearby is only an advantage if it is very costly to move that input around, which is more true of wood than it is of diamonds or even iron ore.	只有在投入品运输成本很高的情况下，就近拥有原材料才是一项优势。 从这个角度，木材比钻石甚至铁矿石都更加符合。


Australia, despite its remoteness, is a major exporter of iron ore, but not of steel, while South Korea is an exporter of steel, though it must import iron ore.	澳大利亚尽管地处偏远，却是主要铁矿石出口国，但它不出口钢材。 而韩国是钢材出口国，尽管它必须进口铁矿石。


What the Finnish story indicates is that the more promising paths to development do not involve adding value to your raw materials – but adding capabilities to your capabilities.	芬兰的故事告诉我们，更有前途的发展道路并非提高你的原材料的附加值，而是提高你自己的能力。


That means mixing new capabilities (for example, automation) with ones that you already have (say, cutting machines) to enter completely different markets.	这意味着将新能力（如自动化）与已拥有的能力（如切割机械）相结合，从而进入完全不同的市场。


To get raw materials, by contrast, you only need to travel as far as the nearest port.	相反，要想获得原材料，你只需要到距离最近的港口去买就是了。


Thinking about the future on the basis of the differential transport-cost advantage of one input limits countries to products that intensively use only locally available raw materials.	根据一种投入品的微小的运输成本优势考虑未来会让一国局限于密集使用只能在本地获得的原材料的产品上。


This turns out to be enormously restrictive.	这会带来严重的掣肘。


Proximity to which particular raw material makes a country competitive in producing cars, printers, antibiotics, or movies?	接近某种原材料市场就能让一国具有生产汽车、打印机、抗生素或电影的竞争力？


Most products require many inputs, and, in most cases, one raw material will just not make a large enough difference.	大部分产品需要多种投入品，而在大部分情形中，一种原材料并不能造成很大的差别。


Beneficiation forces extractive industries to sell locally below their export price, thus operating as an implicit tax that serves to subsidize downstream activities.	矿物增效迫使炼化行业以低于出口的价格内销，从而成为一项用于补贴下游活动的间接税。


In principle, efficient taxation of extractive industries should enable societies to maximize the benefits of nature’s bounty.	理论上，炼化行业的有效征税应该能让社会实现自然禀赋收益的最大化。


But there is no reason to use the capacity to tax to favor downstream industries.	但没有理由用课税权力让下游行业获益。


As my colleagues and I have shown, these activities are neither the nearest in terms of capabilities, nor the most valuable as stepping-stones to further development.	正如我的同事和我所指出的，这些活动从产能上说并不是最接近的，也不是通向进一步发展的最有价值的垫脚石。


Arguably, the biggest economic impact of Britain’s coal industry in the late seventeenth century was that it encouraged the development of the steam engine as a way to pump water out of mines.	我们大多认为，十七世纪末英国煤炭业的最大经济影响是它鼓励了蒸汽机的开发，以此作为矿井抽水的办法。


But the steam engine went on to revolutionize manufacturing and transportation, changing world history and Britain’s place in it – and increasing the usefulness to Britain of having coal in the first place.	但蒸汽机的影响超越了煤炭业，刺激了制造业和运输业革命，改变了历史和英国的历史地位——一开始也给英国带来了从本地获得煤炭的好处。


By contrast, developing petrochemical or steel plants, or moving low-wage diamond-cutting jobs from India or Vietnam to Botswana – a country that is more than four times richer – is as unimaginative as it is constricting.	相反，发展石化或钢铁厂，或将低薪钻石切割岗位从印度或越南转移到博茨瓦纳——后者比前两者富裕四倍——是不可想象的，也具有很大的制约性。


Much greater creativity can be found in the UAE, which has used its oil revenues to invest in infrastructure and amenities, thus transforming Dubai into a successful tourism and business hub.	阿联酋将其石油收入用于基础设施和康乐设施投资，你可以在这里看到较多的创新力，迪拜也成为成功的旅游和商业枢纽。


There is a lesson here for the United States, which has had a major beneficiation policy since the 1973 oil embargo, when it restricted the export of crude oil and natural gas.	在这方面，美国可以提供一个教训。 自1973年石油禁运以来，美国采取了矿物增效政策，限制出口原油和天然气。


As the US increasingly became an energy importer, its leaders never found any reason to abandon this policy.	随着美国能源进口日益增加，其领导人找不到任何理由放弃这一政策。


But the recent shale-energy revolution has dramatically increased the output of oil and gas in the last five years.	但最近的页岩能源革命极大地增加了过去五年的石油和天然气产量。


As a result, the domestic natural-gas price is well below the export price.	结果，美国国内天然气价格显著低于出口价格。


This is an implicit subsidy to the industries that use oil and gas intensively and may attract some inward foreign investment.	这是密集使用石油和天然气的行业的隐性补贴，并可能吸引一些外国投资。


But is this the best use of the government’s capacity to tax or regulate trade?	但这是政府课税和监管贸易权力的最佳使用方法吗？


Would the US not be better off by using its capacity to tax natural gas to stimulate the development of the contemporary technological equivalent of the revolutionary engine?	美国如果将其对天然气课税的权利用于刺激开发与革命性引擎相媲美的当代技术进步，效果不会更好吗？


Should Venezuela Default?	委内瑞拉应该违约吗？


CAMBRIDGE – Will Venezuela default on its foreign bonds?	美国剑桥—委内瑞拉会对其外国债券违约吗？


Markets fear that it might.	市场担心有这种可能。


That is why Venezuelan bonds pay over 11 percentage points more than US Treasuries, which is 12 times more than Mexico, four times more than Nigeria, and double what Bolivia pays.	正因如此，委内瑞拉债券需要比美国国债多付11个百分点的利息，其利差比墨西哥高12倍，比尼日利亚高四倍，比玻利维亚高一倍。


Last May, when Venezuela made a $5 billion private placement of ten-year bonds with a 6% coupon, it effectively had to give a 40% discount, leaving it with barely $3 billion.	去年5月，委内瑞拉以6%的息票利率进行了50亿美元十年期债券的私人配售，结果折价40%才配售成功，筹资总额只有30亿美元。


The extra $2 billion that it will have to pay in ten years is the compensation that investors demand for the likelihood of default, in excess of the already hefty coupon.	十年后，除了丰厚的票面利息，它还必须多支付20亿美元，这是投资者所要求的对其违约风险的补偿。


Venezuela’s government needs to pay $5.2 billion in the first days of October.	10月初的几天中，委内瑞拉需要支付52亿美元。


Will it?	它会支付吗？


Does it have the cash on hand?	它有这么多现金吗？


Will it raise the money by hurriedly selling CITGO, now wholly owned by Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA?	它会通过紧急出售CITGO筹资吗？ CITGO目前为委内瑞拉国有石油公司PDVSA独有。


A different question is whether Venezuela should pay.	一个与此不同的问题是委内瑞拉是否应该支付。


Granted, what governments should do and what they will do are not always independent questions, because people often do what they should.	乍一看，政府应该做什么和它们会去做什么并不总是两个互相独立的问题，因为人们常常会去做应该做的事情。


But “should” questions involve some kind of moral judgment that is not central to “will” questions, which makes them more complex. 	但“应该”的问题包含了某种形式的道德判断，而道德判断并不是“会去”问题的核心，这就让它们更加复杂了。


One point of view holds that if you can make good on your commitments, then that is what you should do.	一个观点是，如果你能够履行承诺，那么这就是你应该做的。


That is what most parents teach their children.	很多家长就是这么教导孩子的。


But the moral calculus becomes a bit more intricate when you cannot make good on all of your commitments and have to decide which to honor and which to avoid.	但当你无法履行承诺，不得不选择兑现哪些承诺、回避哪些承诺时，道德算计就变得更加复杂了。


To date, under former President Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has opted to service its foreign bonds, many of which are held by well-connected wealthy Venezuelans.	如今，在前总统查韦斯及其继任者马杜罗治下，委内瑞拉选择了偿付其外国债券（其中有很大一部分持有在关系深厚的委内瑞拉富人手中）。


Yordano, a popular Venezuelan singer, probably would have a different set of priorities.	委内瑞拉流行歌星约达诺（Yordano）或许认为其他事情更加要紧。


He was diagnosed with cancer earlier this year and had to launch a social-media campaign to locate the drugs that his treatment required.	今年早些时候，他被诊断出癌症，不得不发动一场社交媒体运动寻找治疗所需药物。


Severe shortages of life-saving drugs in Venezuela are the result of the government’s default on a $3.5 billion bill for pharmaceutical imports.	委内瑞拉严重缺乏救命药物，这是拜政府对35亿美元药品进口账单违约所赐。


A similar situation prevails throughout the rest of the economy.	同样的局面在其他经济领域也广泛存在。


Payment arrears on food imports amount to $2.4 billion, leading to a substantial shortage of staple goods.	粮食进口偿付拖欠已达24亿美元，导致日常用品的大量短缺。


In the automobile sector, the default exceeds $3 billion, leading to a collapse in transport services as a result of a lack of spare parts.	在汽车业，违约规模超过30亿美元，由此导致的零部件缺乏让交通服务陷入瘫痪。


Airline companies are owed $3.7 billion, causing many to suspend activities and overall service to fall by half.	航空业也欠债37亿美元，导致许多航空公司停业，航班数量下降了一半。


In Venezuela, importers must wait six months after goods have cleared customs to buy previously authorized dollars.	在委内瑞拉，进口商必须在商品清关后等待六个月才能买到此前已获批的美元。


But the government has opted to default on these obligations, too, leaving importers with a lot of useless local currency.	但政府对于这些义务也选择了违约，致使进口商手里只有大量无用的本国货币。


For a while, credit from foreign suppliers and headquarters made up for the lack of access to foreign currency; but, given mounting arrears and massive devaluations, credit has dried up.	在一段时间里，来自外国供应商和总部的信用可以补救缺少获得外币途径的问题； 但是，随着拖欠的积累和大规模贬值，信用逐渐干涸。


The list of defaults goes on and on.	违约清单还可以列得更长。


Venezuela has defaulted on PDVSA’s suppliers, contractors, and joint-venture partners, causing oil exports to fall by 45% relative to 1997 and production to amount to about half what the 2005 plan had projected for 2012.	委内瑞拉对PDVSA的供应商、承包商和合资企业合作商违约，导致其石油出口较1997年下降了45%，2012年产量只有2005年所制定的计划产量的一半。


In addition, Venezuela’s central bank has defaulted on its obligation to maintain price stability by nearly quadrupling the money supply in 24 months, which has resulted in a 90% decline in the bolivar’s value on the black market and the world’s highest inflation rate.	此外，委内瑞拉央行无视其稳定物价的义务，在24个月内将货币供应量增加了近三倍，导致玻利瓦尔价值在黑市上贬值了90%，委内瑞拉利率也成了世界之最。


To add insult to injury, since May the central bank has defaulted on its obligation to publish inflation and other statistics.	雪上加霜的是，自5月以来，中央银行连发布通胀和其他统计数据的义务也不履行了。


Venezuela functions with four exchange rates, with the difference between the strongest and the weakest being a factor of 13.	委内瑞拉存在四套汇率，最高和最低汇率之间相差13倍。


Unsurprisingly, currency arbitrage has propelled Venezuela to the top ranks of global corruption indicators.	毫不奇怪，货币套利和腐败指数一道让委内瑞拉“傲”视全球。


All of this chaos is the consequence of a massive fiscal deficit that is being financed by out-of-control money creation, financial repression, and mounting defaults – despite a budget windfall from $100-a-barrel oil.	所有这些乱象都是拜用失控的货币创造、金融抑制和反复违约为巨量财政赤字融资所赐——尽管上天赐予委内瑞拉100美元/桶的石油财富。


Instead of fixing the problem, Maduro’s government has decided to complement ineffective exchange and price controls with measures like closing borders to stop smuggling and fingerprinting shoppers to prevent “hoarding.”	马杜罗政府没有试图纠正问题，而是决定以关闭边境以阻止走私和对购物者实行指纹识别以防止“囤积居奇”等手段补充收效甚微的汇率和价格管制。


This constitutes a default on Venezuelans’ most basic freedoms, which Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua – three ideologically kindred countries that have a single exchange rate and single-digit inflation – have managed to preserve.	这构成了对委内瑞拉人民最基本自由的违约，而意识形态相似的玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔和尼加拉瓜只有一个汇率和一位数的通胀，并且没有产生这些现象。


So, should Venezuela default on its foreign bonds?	那么，委内瑞拉应该对其外国债券违约吗？


If the authorities adopted common-sense policies and sought support from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral lenders, as most troubled countries tend to do, they would rightly be told to default on the country’s debts.	如果当局采取常识政策，并像大部分受困国通常做的那样寻求国际货币基金组织（IMF）和其他多边贷款人的支持，就会得到正确的建议，对国家债务违约。


That way, the burden of adjustment would be shared with other creditors, as has occurred in Greece, and the economy would gain time to recover, particularly as investments in the world’s largest oil reserves began to bear fruit.	这样，调整负担就将由其他债权人共同承担（如同希腊那样），经济将赢得复苏时间，特别是在对世界最大石油储备的投资即将产生结果的当口。


Bondholders would be wise to exchange their current bonds for longer-dated instruments that would benefit from the upturn.	债券持有人的明智之选是用当前债券换取可以从形势好转中获益的长期金融工具。


None of this will happen under Maduro’s government, which lacks the capacity, political capital, and will to move in this direction.	在马杜罗政府治下，所有这些都不可能发生。 马杜罗政府缺少能力、政治资本和决心朝这一方向努力。


But the fact that his administration has chosen to default on 30 million Venezuelans, rather than on Wall Street, is not a sign of its moral rectitude. It is a signal of its moral bankruptcy.	但他的政府选择向3,000万委内瑞拉人民而不是华尔街违约这一事实绝非其道德正直的标志，而是其道德破产的信号。


Turning Good Economic Luck into Bad	从前途无量到误入歧途


CAMBRIDGE, MA – It is often difficult to understand how countries that are dealt a pretty good economic hand can end up making a major mess of things.	发自马萨诸塞州剑桥市——人们往往很难理解，为何那些原本把经济处理得相当好的国家最终会把局面搞得一片混乱。


It is as if they were trying to commit suicide by jumping from the basement.	这一切似乎跟在地下室跳楼自杀一样荒谬。


Two of the most extreme cases (but not the only ones) are Argentina and Venezuela, countries that have benefited from high prices for their exports but have managed to miss the highway to prosperity by turning onto a dead-end street.	这其中两个最极端（却非唯一）的例子就是阿根廷和委内瑞拉。


They will eventually have to make a U-turn and backtrack over the terrain of fictitious progress.	这两个国家得益于其昂贵的出口产品价格，却错过了走向繁荣的高速轨道而拐进了死胡同，最终还必须掉头原路返回到貌似进步的领域中去。


The puzzling thing is that this is not the first time either country has veered into an economic cul-de-sac.	令人费解的是，这两个国家已经不是第一次在经济上走入歧途。


It has been said that only barbers learn on other people’s heads, but some countries seem unable to learn even from their own experience.	人们说，只有理发师才需要从别人的脑袋上学习经验，但一些国家似乎无法从自己的经验中得到教训。


The ultimate reason for such self-destructiveness may be impossible to identify.	这种自我毁灭的最深层原因或许无法定义。


But it is certainly possible to describe how the road to hell is paved, whatever the intentions.	但它肯定可以描述出通向地狱之路是如何铺就的，无论其最初意图是什么。


It all starts when some imbalance causes overall inflation or some key price – typically the exchange rate, but also power, water, and gasoline – to come under upward pressure.	这一切都始于当一些不平衡导致整体通胀和某些关键价格——通常情况下是汇率，也包括电力、水和汽油——面临上行压力的时候。


The government then uses its coercive power to keep a lid on price growth.	然后政府动用其强制力来控制物价增长。


For example, Brazil has wreaked havoc on the financial health of its national oil company, Petrobras, in order to keep gasoline prices low.	例如，为了使汽油价格保持在低位，巴西肆意损害其国家石油公司（Petrobras）的财务健康。


Argentina destroyed its natural-gas sector with price controls.	阿根廷通过价格控制破坏了了本国的天然气行业。


Many countries have kept power and water prices too low and have ended up with shortages.	许多国家都把电力和水的价格控制得太低，最终导致能源短缺。


But things become really nasty when the government opts for foreign-exchange controls.	当政府实行外汇管制时情况变得更糟。


The usual story, nicely summarized by the late Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, is that lax fiscal and monetary policies cause a flood of freshly printed currency to chase more dollars than the central bank can provide at the going exchange rate.	已故麻省理工大学教授鲁迪格·多恩布什(Rüdiger Dornbusch)和塞巴斯蒂安·爱德华兹（Sebastian Edwards）很好地总结了这种常见现象，正是宽松的财政和货币政策导致大量新印制的货币追逐更多的美元，以致于超过了中央银行在现行汇率条件下所能提供的数量。


Rather than let the currency depreciate, or tighten its policies, the government opts for foreign-exchange controls, limiting access to dollars to those who “really” need it and thus preventing “speculators” from hurting “the people.”	对此政府选择进行外汇管制而不是让货币贬值或经济紧缩，限制那些“真正”需要的人去获取美元，从而防止“投机者”伤害“人民”。


Foreign-exchange controls, typically accompanied by price controls, give the government the sense that it can have its cake (lax policies) and eat low inflation.	外汇管制通常伴随着价格管制，让政府感觉自己可以在低通胀情况下享受到宽松政策的蛋糕。


But controls lead to a parallel exchange rate, which can be either legal, as in Argentina, or illegal and even unpublishable, as in Venezuela.	但管制催生了一个平行的双重汇率，这可以是合法的,如阿根廷，也可以是非法或地下的,如委内瑞拉。


But having two prices for an identical dollar creates enormous arbitrage opportunities.	但一种货币两种价格的存在创造了巨大的套利机会。


A dollar purchased at the official rate can be sold for almost twice as much in the “blue” market in Argentina and a whopping ten times more in Venezuela.	官方汇率价格购买到的一美元，在阿根廷黑市可以以2倍的价格出售，在委内瑞拉黑市甚至可以卖到十倍以上。


Repeat that game a few times and you will be able to afford a corporate jet.	重复这个游戏几遍你就能买得起一架喷气式飞机。


Nothing becomes more profitable than over-invoicing imports and under-invoicing exports.	因此没有什么是比报高货价的进口和报低货价的出口更好赚了。


In Venezuela, importing spoiled food and letting it rot is more profitable than any investment anywhere else in the world (disregarding, of course, the bribes needed to make it happen).	在委内瑞拉，进口变质食物让它腐烂掉比世界上其他任何投资更有利可图（当然，还要考虑需要实现这种投资所需的贿赂成本）。


The dual-exchange-rate system ends up distorting production incentives and causing the effective supply of imported goods to decline, leading to a combination of inflation and shortages.	双重汇率制度最终扭曲了生产激励因素并造成进口商品有效供给的下降，导致通胀和短缺同时发生。


But here things turn interesting.	但这也是事情的有趣之处。


Public spending tends to rise with inflation more than government revenues do, because revenues depend on the tax on exports, which is calculated at the pegged official exchange rate.	公共开支往往会随着通胀而超过政府收入，因为收入依赖出口税，而该税率又是依照官方固定汇率来计算的。


So, over time, fiscal accounts worsen automatically, creating a vicious circle: monetized fiscal deficits lead to inflation and a widening gap in the parallel exchange-rate market which worsens the fiscal deficit.	因此随着时间的推移，财政账户自动走向恶化并形成恶性循环：财政赤字货币化导致平行双重汇率市场下的通货膨胀和贫富差距不断扩大，并使财政赤字进一步恶化。


Eventually, a major adjustment of the official rate becomes inevitable.	最终就必须要实施官方汇率的重大调整。


For example, when Hugo Chávez was first elected President in 1998, the Venezuelan bolívar could be exchanged for 2,610 Colombian pesos.	例如，当雨果·查韦斯在1998年当选总统之时，委内瑞拉货币玻利瓦尔与哥伦比亚比索的汇率是1:2610。


Today, despite a raft of foreign-exchange controls, a bolívar is worth barely 300 pesos at the official exchange rate (which is soon to be readjusted); one would be lucky to get 30 pesos at the black-market rate.	如今尽管实施了大规模的外汇管制，1玻利瓦尔的官方汇率仅值300比索（这很快就要调整）； 而在黑市里最多也只能换到30比索。


Not surprisingly, prices in Venezuela rise in one month more than they do in two years in neighboring Colombia.	因此毫无意外，委内瑞拉一个月的价格上涨就超过其邻国哥伦比亚两年的上涨量。


Why do countries opt for such a strategy?	为什么国家选择这样的策略？


Any system creates winners and losers.	因为任何系统都会创造赢家和输家。


In Argentina and Venezuela, the winners are those who have preferential access to foreign exchange, those who benefit from the government’s profligacy, those who can borrow at the negative real interest rates that lax policies create, and those who do not mind waiting in long lines to buy rationed items.	在阿根廷和委内瑞拉，赢家是那些有优先获得外汇的人，那些受益于政府肆意挥霍的人，那些能在宽松政策创造的负利率下借到钱的人，以及那些不介意排长队等候购买配给物品的人。


Such a system can generate a self-reinforcing set of popular beliefs, which may explain why countries like Argentina and Venezuela repeatedly drive down dead-end streets.	这样的系统可以生成一套自我强化的民众观念，也许可以解释为什么像阿根廷和委内瑞拉这样的国家一再拐进了死胡同。


Because so many businesses make money from the rents created by the rationing of foreign exchange, rather than by creating value, it is easy to believe that markets do not work, that entrepreneurs are speculators, and that governments need to control them and impose “fair” prices.	因为很多企业通过外汇配给创造的寻租机会赚钱而不是去创造价值，这容易使民众相信市场是无效的，企业家都是些投机者，所以政府需要管制和实施“公平”的价格。


All too often, this allows governments to blame the car, and even the passengers, for getting lost.	而最常见的结果，就是令政府这个驾驶者把迷路的责任推到汽车，甚至是乘客身上。


CAMBRIDGE – One puzzle of the world economy is that for 200 years, the world’s rich countries grew faster than poorer countries, a process aptly described by Lant Pritchett as “Divergence, Big Time.”	美国剑桥—一个关于世界经济的谜题是，200年来，世界上的富国增长比穷国更快，兰特·普莱切特（Lant Pritchett）恰如其分地称之为《分化，大时代》（Divergence, Big Time）。


When Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776, per capita income in the world’s richest country – probably the Netherlands – was about four times that of the poorest countries.	1776年亚当·斯密协作《国富论》时，世界最富裕国家——大概是荷兰吧——人均收入约为最贫穷国家的四倍。


Spotting this reversal, the Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence has argued that the world is poised for The Next Convergence.	观察道这一趋势逆转的诺贝尔奖获得者迈克尔·斯宾塞（ Michael Spence）指出，世界将走向《下一次大趋同》（The Next Convergence）。


An apt metaphor is a game of Scrabble: Goods and services are made by stringing together productive capabilities – inputs, technologies, and tasks – just as words are made by putting letters together.	一个恰当的比喻是拼字游戏：商品和服务是通过串联各种产能制造出来的——投入品、技术和任务等——正如词汇是将字母组合在一起产生的。


The last two centuries have seen an explosion in technologies – letters – and in the complexity of goods and services that can be made with them.	过去两个世纪是技术——即字母——大爆发的世纪，商品和服务的复杂性也随之急剧增加。


Known as the North Korea of Europe until the early 1990s, when Albania abandoned its quixotic quest for autarky, it started cutting and sowing garments and shoes for Italian manufacturers, gradually evolving its own fully integrated companies.	20世纪90年代前，阿尔巴尼亚被称为欧洲的朝鲜，后来阿尔巴尼亚放弃了对自给自足的狂热追求，开始为意大利制造商缝衣裁鞋，并逐步有了自己的 完全整合的公司。


Other countries that started in garments – for example, South Korea, Mexico, and China – ended up reusing the accumulated letters (industrial and logistical capabilities) while adding others to move into the production of electronics, cars, and medical equipment.	其他从制衣业起步的国家——如韩国、墨西哥和中国——也最终开始重新利用所积累的字母（工业和物流产能），与新增字母一起用于电子产品、汽车和医疗设备生产。


Once upon a time, IBM asked a Chinese manufacturer to assemble its Thinkpad – using the components that it would supply and following a set of instructions – and send the final product back to IBM.	从前，IBM要求一家中国制造商组装Thinkpad——使用它所提供的元件并按照现成说明——并把最终产品返回IBM。


But this does not imply laissez-faire; on the contrary, it requires activist policies in many areas, such as education and training, infrastructure, R&D, business promotion, and the development of links to the global economy.	但这并不意味着自由放任； 相反，它需要多个领域的积极政策，如教育和培训、基础设施、研发、促商以及发展与全球经济的联系。


But, as the famous astronomer Carl Sagan once said: “If you want to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe.”	但是，正如著名天文学家卡尔·萨根（Carl Sagan） 所言，“如果你想凭空做出苹果派，首先你得发明宇宙。 ”


The Tacit-Knowledge Economy	隐性知识经济


CAMBRIDGE – Almost all rich countries are rich because they exploit technological progress.	坎布里奇——所有富裕国家富有几乎都是利用了技术进步的关系。


They have moved the bulk of their labor force out of agriculture and into cities, where knowhow can be shared more easily.	他们把大部分劳动力从农村移到城市，从而更轻松地共享知识。


Their families have fewer children and educate them more intensively, thereby facilitating further technological progress.	他们的家庭少生孩子并为子女提供更深入的教育，从而深入推动技术进步。


Poor countries need to go through a similar change in order to become rich: reduce farm employment, become more urban, have fewer children, and keep those children that they have in school longer.	穷国要想致富就必须经历类似的变化：增加非农就业人数、推进城市化、少生孩子、延长孩子的学校教育。


If they do, the doors to prosperity will open.	这样做就能打开繁荣之门。


And isn’t that already happening?	这不已经是摆在我们面前的现实？


Let us compare, for example, Brazil in 2010 with the United Kingdom in 1960.	比方说，我们来比较一下2010年的巴西和1960年的英国。 2010年巴西的城市化率为84.


Brazil in 2010 was 84.3% urban; its fertility rate was 1.8 births per woman; its labor force had an average of 7.2 years of schooling; and its university graduates accounted for 5.2% of potential workers.	这些社会指标超过了英国1960年的水平。 当时英国的城市化率只有78.


These are better social indicators than the United Kingdom had in 1960.	4%； 生育率为每名妇女2.


At that time, the UK was 78.4% urban; its fertility rate was 2.7; its labor force had six years of schooling on average, and its university graduates accounted for less than 2% of potential workers.	7胎； 劳动力平均受教育年限为6年，大学毕业生仅占潜在劳动力的不到2%。


Brazil is not a unique case: Colombia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Indonesia in 2010 compare favorably to Japan, France, the Netherlands, and Italy, respectively, in 1960.	巴西的情况并非特例：2010年哥伦比亚、突尼斯、土耳其和印尼的相关指标都好于1960年的日本、法国、荷兰和意大利。


Not only did these countries achieve better social indicators in these dimensions; they also could benefit from the technological innovations of the past half-century: computers, cellphones, the Internet, Teflon, and so on.	这些国家不仅在上述领域指标领先； 而且可以从过去半个世纪的电脑、手机、互联网和铁氟龙等技术创新中受益。


This should allow higher productivity than was feasible in 1960.	这应该能实现比1960年更高的生产率。


So today’s emerging-market economies should be richer than today’s advanced economies were back then, right?	这么说，今天的新兴市场经济体岂不应该比当时的发达经济体更加富裕？


Wrong – and by a substantial margin.	但这个结论其实大错特错。


Per capita GDP at constant prices was 140% higher in Britain in 1960 than in Brazil in 2010.	1960年英国按不变价格计算的人均GDP比2010年的巴西高140%。


It was 80% higher in Japan back then than in Colombia today, 42% higher in old France than in current Tunisia, 250% higher in the old Netherlands than in current Turkey, and 470% higher in old Italy than in current Indonesia.	当时的日本比现在的哥伦比亚高80%，当时的法国比现在的突尼斯高42%，当时的荷兰比现在的土耳其高250%，当时的意大利比现在的印尼高470%。


Why is it that today’s smaller and more educated urbanized families in emerging-market economies are so much less productive than their counterparts were a half-century ago in today’s rich countries?	是什么原因导致今天新兴经济体规模更小、教育程度更高的城市化家庭比今天富裕国家半个世纪前的同等群体的生产率低那么多？


Why can’t today’s emerging markets replicate levels of productivity that were achieved in countries with worse social indicators and much older technologies?	今天的新兴市场为什么无法实现各项社会指标都相去甚远、技术也更加陈旧的国家都能实现的生产率？


The key to this puzzle is tacit knowledge.	破解这一难题的关键是隐性知识。


To make stuff, you need to know how to make it, and this knowledge is, to a large extent, latent – not available in books, but stored in the brains of those who need to use it.	制造商品必须先掌握制造方法，而相关知识在很大程度上是隐性的——即人们在书本中找不到答案，答案都藏在使用者的头脑中。


Getting it there is really tough.	掌握上述知识并非易事。


Tacit knowledge is acquired mostly through learning by doing.	边干边学是获得隐性知识的主要途径。


That is how we train musicians, barbers, doctors, and scientists.	音乐家、理发师、医生和科学家的培养都是采用这种方法。


Consider how long it takes an adult to learn to speak a language or a musician to master the violin.	只要想想成年人学习一门语言或音乐家掌握小提琴需要多长时间就知道了。


Moreover, tacit knowledge is vast and growing, so that only a miniscule fraction of it fits in anybody’s head.	此外，隐性知识为数巨大且不断增长，因此任何个体都只能掌握其中九牛一毛的信息。


But most products require much more knowledge than fits in anybody’s head, so that making them requires teams of people with different pieces of knowledge, not unlike a symphonic orchestra.	但多数产品都需要不止一个人所掌握的知识，因此制造过程需要掌握不同知识的人组成团队，这和交响乐团的运作非常相似。


Getting more tacit knowledge is easier said than done, because economies can offer experience only on the basis of current jobs.	掌握更多的隐性知识说来容易做来难，因为经济体只能在当前岗位的基础上提供经验。


How do people learn to do jobs that do not yet exist?	人们怎么可能掌握还不存在的工作？


How do they create and mobilize coherent teams of people in new economic activities if the requisite tacit knowledge is missing?	如果缺乏必要的隐性知识，他们又怎能在新经济活动中创建并动员有凝聚力的团队？


Recent research at Harvard University’s Center for International Development (CID) suggests that tacit knowledge flows through amazingly slow and narrow channels.	哈佛大学国际发展中心（CID）的最新研究表明隐性的知识流通渠道令人意想不到的狭窄和缓慢。


The productivity of Nuevo León, Mexico, is higher than in South Korea, but that of Guerrero, another Mexican state, resembles levels in Honduras.	墨西哥新莱昂州的生产率超过了韩国，但另一个墨西哥州格雷罗州的生产率却只相当于洪都拉斯的水平。


Moving knowledge across Mexican states has been difficult and slow.	在墨西哥各州推广知识既缓慢又艰难。


It is easier to move brains than it is to move tacit knowledge into brains, and not only in Mexico.	让掌握技术的人移民比让人掌握技术更容易，无论是在墨西哥还是其他地方。


For example, as the CID’s Frank Neffke has shown, when new industries are launched in German and Swedish cities, it is mostly because entrepreneurs and firms from other cities move in, bringing with them skilled workers with relevant industry experience.	例如像哈佛大学国际发展中心的Frank Neffke 所证明的那样，当德国和瑞典城市出现新产业时，大多是因为企业家和公司从其他城市涌入，并随之带来了相关行业的技术工人。


They seldom hire locals.	他们很少雇佣当地人。


The recently deceased economist Steven Klepper argued that industries tend to cluster in particular cities simply because new firms are formed mainly by workers who leave other successful firms, taking the relevant tacit knowledge with them.	刚去世不久的经济学家史蒂芬·克莱伯认为行业往往聚集在特定的城市，因为组成新企业的主要是离开其他成功企业、并随之带走相关隐性知识的工人。


Indeed, a large literature on knowledge spillovers points to their remarkably narrow geographic range.	事实上，知识传播的众多文献显示出极其狭窄的地理范围。


The exceptions often confirm the rule.	仅有的特例往往能够证明这项规则。


The US would not have been able to build the first atomic bomb in just four years had Hitler not encouraged so many key scientists to leave Europe.	如果希特勒没有鼓励如此之多的重要科学家离开欧洲，美国也不可能在短短四年时间里制造出首枚原子弹。


The bottom line is that urbanization, schooling, and Internet access are woefully insufficient to transmit effectively the tacit knowledge required to be productive.	最低限度是城市化、教育和互联网接入远远满足不了提高生产率所必须的有效传播隐性知识的要求。


That is why today’s emerging markets are so much less productive than rich countries were in 1960, even though the latter were less urban, had higher birth rates and less formal schooling, and used much older technologies.	今天的新兴市场也因此比1960年的富裕国家生产率更低，即使后者的城市化程度更低、生育率更高、正式教育更少，并且使用的是更加陈旧的技术。


The policy implications are clear.	这项研究成果有着明确的政策含义。


Knowhow resides in brains, and emerging and developing countries should focus on attracting them, instead of erecting barriers to skilled immigration.	人才是知识的载体，新兴及发展中国家应该着眼于吸引人才，而不是阻碍技术移民。


They should tap into their diasporas, attract foreign direct investment in new areas, and acquire foreign firms if possible.	他们应该利用散居的外国移民，在新行业吸引直接外资，可能的话收购外国企业。


Knowledge moves when people do.	人才的流动带来知识。


A Brain’s View of Economics	用大脑角度看经济


CAMBRIDGE – In his pathbreaking 2005 book On Intelligence, Jeff Hawkins proposed an alternative paradigm of how the human brain works.	美国剑桥—在起开创性著作《论智力》（On Intelligence）中，杰夫·霍金斯（Jeff Hawkins）提出了一个新的人脑工作范式。


In his view, the brain is not a Turing machine that manipulates symbols according to a table of rules, which is the model on which computers and artificial intelligence have been based.	在他看来，大脑不是根据一系列规则操纵信号的图灵机（图灵机是电脑和人工智能的工作原理）。


Instead, the brain is a giant hierarchical memory that is constantly recording what it perceives and predicting what will come next.	相反，大脑是一个巨大的层级记忆，不停地记录它所感觉到的东西并预测即将发生的东西。


The brain makes predictions by finding similarities between patterns in recent sensory inputs and previous experiences stored in its vast memory.	大脑通过寻找最近的知觉输入和存储在其广袤记忆中的前期经验之间的相似性来做出预测。


It matches current fragmentary sounds in a sea of noise with a known song, or the face of a person in disguise with that of your child.	它将当前的大量噪音中的碎片化声音与已知的歌曲相匹配，或将戴着面具的人脸与你的孩子相匹配。


The idea is similar to the auto-complete function in, say, the Google search box – constantly guessing what you will enter next based on what you have already typed in.	这一观点类似于自动完成的谷歌搜索功能——不停地根据你已经输入过的内容猜测你下一次输入什么。


To see the hierarchy in this mechanism, consider that by perceiving just a few letters, you can predict the word; by looking at a few words, you can predict what the sentence means, or even the paragraph.	要想理解这一机制中的层级性，想象一下，你可以在看到几个字母后便猜测单词；


In fact, right now you must be guessing where it is that I am going with this entire commentary.	在看到几个单词后，你可以预测出句子甚至段落的意思。


The hierarchy allows you to understand meaning, whether the input got to your brain by reading or listening.	层级性让你能够理解含义，不管信息是通过阅读还是聆听进入你的大脑的。


The brain is thus an inductive machine that predicts the future based on finding similarities, at many different levels, between the present and the past.	因此，大脑是一部归纳机器，根据寻找诸多不同层次的现在和过去的相似性推测未来。


Hawkins’ alternative model of how the brain works has important implications for many fields, including the one that I spend most of my time thinking about: economic-development strategy.	霍金斯提出的关于大脑工作的新模式在诸多领域都有重要影响，包括我花大部分时间所思考的领域：经济发展战略。


By definition, development is not just more of the same, just as an adult is not just a big baby.	根据定义，并不是让一样的东西变多，正如成年人并不是大一点的婴儿。


The process involves adding and combining new and existing capabilities to support more diverse and complex activities.	发展过程包括增加和结合新的和已有的能力以支持更多样、更复杂的行为。


But finding new things that can be done successfully is tricky, because it requires knowing what you will need and whether you will be able to procure it.	但寻找可以成功做成的东西绝非易事，因为这需要了解你将会需要什么以及你能不能得到它。


This is why Jeffrey Sachs’s Millennium Villages project has faltered, as the journalist Nina Munk’s recent book shows.	这就是记者妮娜·芒克（Nina Munk）的新书所指出的杰弗里·萨克斯（Jeffrey Sachs）的千年村（Millennium Village）计划失败的原因。


In trying to move farmers from subsistence to commercial agriculture, Munk argues, there are just too many missing pieces.	芒克指出，千年村试图让农民从生计农业专项商业农业，在此过程中忽略了太多东西。


Traditional thinking in economic development has followed a Turing-like approach, trying to specify a general model of the world – based on first principles – and then use that model to think about a country’s predicament or a policy’s potential impact.	经济发展的传统思维遵循图灵式方针，试图确定一个基于首要原则的一般的世界模式，然后用这一模式思索一国的困境或一项政策的潜在影响。


But the world is often too complex and nuanced for such an approach.	但世界往往太复杂，太微妙，这一方针难以奏效。


Would it not be a great improvement if, when looking at a particular place, we could have in mind all of the world’s previous experiences and automatically identify the most relevant ones, in order to infer what to do next?	如果当我们看到某处时脑海里能调出所有此前的经验，然后自动地识别出与之最相关的经验，通过这样来决定下一步做什么会是一个重大改进吗？


Would it not be useful to see the development possibilities just as our brain, according to Hawkins, sees the world?	将发展可能性看成是霍金斯所提出的大脑看世界的方式会没有用吗？


An alternative, Hawkins-like approach to economic development would take massive amounts of data about the world and ask what is likely to succeed next in a country or a city at a given point in time, given what is already present and in light of the experience there and everywhere else.	霍金斯式的经济发展替代方针将利用大量关于世界的数据，根据关于目前已经发生的事情，在那里或其他地区以往经验的指导下，研究在给定时点的一个国家或一个城市中接下来怎样才有可能成功。


It would be like Amazon’s recommendation system, proposing books you may like based on your and everybody else’s experience.	它将类似于亚马逊公司的推荐系统，根据你和所有其他人的经验向你推荐可能喜欢的书籍。


In a recent paper, my colleagues and I showed that such an approach to economic development actually works.	在一片最近的论文中，我的同事和我指出，这样的经济发展方针确实是可行的。


In a particular city or country, you can predict, even a decade in advance, which industries will appear or disappear or grow or wane just by knowing the history of what has been there and everywhere else.	在特定的诚实或国家，你可以预测哪些产业会出现、消失、成长、衰落，只要你知道那里和其他地区曾经发生过什么，预测时间可以达到十年。


Countries tend to move into industries that are related to the ones they already have or that are present in locations that are similar to them.	国家总是会看重与它们已有的产业或出现于与它们相近的地区的产业有关系的产业。


We have made the approach user-friendly for countries in our recent Atlas of Economic Complexity.	在最新论文《经济复杂性的阿特拉斯》（Atlas of Economic Complexity）中，我们已经让这一方针变得用户友好，可供许多国家使用。


The idea of looking at previous experiences to inform future action is as old as civilization.	根据此前经验指导未来行动的思想和文明史一样悠久。


Following this intuition, Justin Yifu Lin, the former chief economist of the World Bank, has suggested that when countries choose what to do next, they should look at a successful country that was similar to them two decades ago.	前世界银行首席经济学家林毅夫在这一思想的引导下指出，在国家选择未来该如何做时，应该把目光投向20年前情况与自己相似的成功国家。


But we should be able to do much better than that by looking at many more experiences in much more detail, using a much bigger memory that can find many more patterns across much more of the relevant human experience.	但如果能看到更多更细致的经验、使用更大的记忆找出更多的跨越更多相关人类经验的模式，那么我们应该能够做得更好。


Imagine that Sachs’s Millennium Villages project had known the sequence of all previous successful moves out of subsistence agriculture, rather than relying only on guesswork or deduction.	试想，如果萨克斯的千年村计划事先了解过关于走出生计农业的所有获得成功的历史案例，而不是只根据猜测和演绎会怎样。


Would it not be useful to understand the paths to industrial development – and the dead ends – that are most relevant to a particular country today?	了解与某个特定国家现在的情形关系最紧的产业发展路径和死路难道会没用吗？


This alternative approach can empower many more people to seek successful routes to prosperity by lowering the perils and risks involved in the search – in the same way that maps empower people to get to where they want to go with much more information than they would otherwise have.	这一替代方针可以通过降低搜寻过程中的风险让更多的人寻找成功的繁荣路径——正如地图可以让人们拥有比没有地图时更多的信息前往他们想去的地方。


Just as augmented-reality technologies make our experience of the world richer (imagine a sports match today without instant replay), putting the development experience of the world at the fingertips of those engaged in promoting development is now perfectly feasible.	正如加强现实（augmented-reality）技术让我们关于世界的经验更加丰富了（想象一下在今天观看一场没有马上回放的体育比赛），让促进发展的人获得世界发展经验也是完全可行的。


We should seize this opportunity.	我们应该抓住这一机会。


The Still-Emerging Markets	仍在兴起的市场


SAN FRANCISCO – Today’s turbulence in emerging-market equity markets has triggered a wave of obituaries for their growth miracles of recent decades.	旧金山——目前的股市动荡让人们纷纷猜测几十年来新兴市场的增长奇迹已经走到了尽头。


But confusing short-term wobbles with terminal decline is a gross misreading of what is happening.	但令人困惑的短期动荡和最终的经济衰落是对目前情况的严重误读。


The wave of industrialization and urbanization that is boosting the incomes of millions of people in emerging economies has not run its course.	新兴经济体内部推动成百上千万人收入增加的工业化城市化浪潮并没有走到尽头。


Indeed, emerging-market bears are missing an important new driver of continued growth in these countries: their increasingly powerful and dynamic companies.	事实上，新兴市场空头忽略了这些国家持续增长的一项新的重要动力：那就是它们日渐强大和活跃的公司。


Emerging economies today are much more than a collection of new consumer markets and plentiful (and increasingly skilled) labor.	如今的新兴经济体已经不再只是集合了新兴消费市场和充足（而且越来越熟练的）劳动力。


They are also home to thousands of new companies, many of which are quickly becoming large, global leaders in their fields.	它们同样集中了成千上万家新兴企业，其中不少正迅速成长为相关领域的全球领袖。


Twenty years ago, who would have guessed that Mumbai’s Tata Group would be the largest private-sector industrial employer in the United Kingdom; or that Mexican companies Cemex and Bimbo would become the United States’ market leaders in cement production and bread-making, respectively; or that Beijing-based Lenovo would be on a par with Hewlett-Packard as the world’s largest seller of personal computers?	二十年前，谁能想到孟买的塔塔集团能成为英国私营领域最大的工业雇主； 或者墨西哥公司Cemex and Bimbo能成为美国水泥生产和面包制造业的市场领导者；


Moreover, the transformation in the world’s business landscape is in its early stages and should bolster growth in emerging markets for years to come.	谁又能想到总部设在北京的联想集团能与惠普并驾齐驱成为世界最大的个人电脑销售企业？ 不仅如此，目前仍处于全球商业格局转型阶段的初期，应当能在未来若干年内支撑新兴市场的经济发展。


The MGI CompanyScope, a new database of all companies with revenues of $1 billion or more, reveals that there are about 8,000 large companies worldwide.	据收录营收超10亿美元企业的最新数据库MGI CompanyScope显示，全世界约有8，000多家大型公司。


Three-quarters of them are still based in developed regions.	其中四分之三仍然处于发达地区。


By 2025, however, there are likely to be an additional 7,000 large companies, with seven out of ten based in emerging regions.	但截止2025年可能又会产生7，000家大型企业，其中百分之七十将来自新兴地区。


The share of global consolidated revenue generated by these emerging-market corporate giants is set to increase from 24% today to 46% in 2025.	这些新兴市场企业巨头所产生的全球合并营收比例将从今天的24%增长到2025年的46%。


The composition of the Fortune Global 500 is a case in point.	全球财富500强的组成就很能说明问题。


From 1980 to 2000, the share of companies on the list that were based in the emerging world remained relatively flat, at 5%.	1980到2000年间，来自新兴市场的500强企业比例相对平稳，保持在企业总数的5%左右。


By 2013, this share had soared to 26%, and, even on the most pessimistic assumptions for emerging-market growth, we expect it to rise to 39% by 2025 and to as high as 50% on more bullish assumptions.	但是到2013年，这一比例一举飙升至26%，而且即使按照对新兴市场增长最为悲观的假设，我们预计该比例将在2025年达到39%，更乐观的估计甚至可能达到50%的份额。


In fact, the shift in the business landscape thus far has lagged behind the shift in the weight of global GDP toward emerging markets.	事实上，商业格局的改变到目前为止仍然落后于全球GDP向新兴市场的转移。


Between now and 2025, the GDP of emerging markets could increase by a factor of 2.5 – but the number of large companies based in these regions could more than triple.	从现在到2025年，新兴市场GDP的增长系数可能达到2. 5倍——但新兴地区大企业数量可能增长3倍之多。


By 2025, some of the leading global names in many industries could be companies we have not yet heard of – and some will likely be based in cities that few today could point to on a map.	到2025年，很多行业全球领导企业的名字或许我们都从未听说过——某些企业所在的城市今天或许也很少有人能够从地图上指出。


We have mapped the MGI CompanyScope to Cityscope, our database of the world’s cities, giving us a detailed picture of where large companies locate their head offices and foreign subsidiaries.	为了详细了解大企业的总部及海外子公司都设在哪里，我们已经把MGI CompanyScope标注在我们的Cityscope世界城市库中。


Headquarters are extraordinarily concentrated.	大企业的总部非常集中。


The top 20 host cities are home to around one-third of all large companies’ headquarters and account for almost half of these companies’ combined revenue.	排名前20的城市拥有占全球三分之一的大型企业总部，而且占上述企业总营收近乎半数的份额。


Just five of these top 20 cities are in emerging regions today.	目前排名前20位的城市在新兴地区仅有5座。


But this, too, is changing fast.	但这种情况的改变也十分迅速。


The number of large-company headquarters in São Paolo, for example, is expected to rise more than three-fold by 2025, while Beijing and Istanbul could have 2.5 times as many head offices as they do today.	比方说圣保罗的大公司总部预计到2025年将增加三倍以上，而北京和伊斯坦布尔的大公司总部也有可能是今天的2. 5倍还多。


We estimate that about 280 cities – among the candidates are Campinas (Brazil), Daqing (China), and Izmir (Turkey) – could host large companies for the first time.	我们预计巴西的坎皮纳斯、中国的大庆和土耳其的伊兹密尔等约280座城市可能首次迎来大公司的进驻。


More than 150 of these up-and-coming business cities are likely to be in China.	这些未来商业城市中可能有超过150座将位于中国。


If we look at telecoms companies, for example, Bandung (Indonesia) and Hanoi (Vietnam) already host large firms’ headquarters – despite the fact that their GDP is relatively small, at $6 billion and $12 billion, respectively.	以电信公司为例，印尼的万隆和越南的河内已经设立了大型公司总部，虽然从GDP来看它们仍然相对较弱，分别只有60亿和120亿美元的规模。


Fast-growing home markets have been the launchpad for globally competitive emerging-market companies partly because these firms have learned to compete at very different income levels.	快速增长的国内市场将诞生具有全球竞争力的新兴市场企业，部分原因是这些企业学会了如何在截然不同的收入水平上展开竞争。


Moreover, they know how to work around inadequate infrastructure.	另外，他们清楚该怎样应对基础设施不足。


McKinsey research suggests that these companies are growing more than twice as quickly as their counterparts in developed economies.	麦肯锡研究表明这些公司的增长速度是发达经济体同类企业的两倍还多。


Emerging-market large companies’ growing global clout is reflected in flows of foreign direct investment.	外商直接投资的数量反映了新兴市场大公司不断增长的全球影响力。


As recently as 2001, only 5% of outward FDI came from non-OECD countries; by 2011, that share had soared to 21%.	就在2001年，还仅有5%的对外直接投资来自非经合组织国家； 而到了2011年，上述比例一举飙升至21%。


China’s outward FDI rose by almost 50% per year from 2004 to 2010; Brazil, Singapore, and Hong Kong have been major investors in Europe.	中国的对外直接投资2004年至2010年每年以近50%的速度增长； 巴西、新加坡和香港已经是欧洲的主要投资者。


Those who have been writing obituaries for the emerging-market boom should give serious consideration to these trends.	为新兴市场繁荣撰写讣告的人应该认真考虑上述趋势。


The new breed of emerging-market multinational is diversifying its revenue around the world.	新一代新兴市场跨国企业正在实现多元化的全球收入。


If growth in these companies’ home markets slows, they will diversify even more aggressively.	如果这些公司所在国的经济放缓，它们的多元化努力将更加主动。


The global economy is now their platform.	它们将在全球经济舞台上发挥作用。


When Easy Money Ends	当低价货币终结之时


LONDON – The departure of US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke has fueled speculation about when and how the Fed and other central banks will wind down their mammoth purchases of long-term assets, also known as quantitative easing (QE).	发自伦敦——美联储主席本·伯南克的离任增加了外界关于美联储及其他央行将在何时用何种方式减少对长期资产的大笔收购行动——即所谓量化宽松——的踹测。


Observers seize upon every new piece of economic data to forecast QE’s continuation or an acceleration of its decline.	观察者们也不放过任何一条新发布的经济数据来预测该政策的延续或加速规模缩减。


But more attention needs to be paid to the impact of either outcome on different economic players.	但我们应该把更多的注意力放在不同经济参与者所产生的任意后果之上。


There is no doubting the scale of the QE programs.	量化宽松的范围和规模已无需赘述。


Since the start of the financial crisis, the Fed, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan have used QE to inject more than $4 trillion of additional liquidity into their economies.	自金融危机爆发以来，美联储，欧洲央行，英格兰银行以及日本银行都利用量化宽松手段向本国经济体注入了超过4万亿美元的额外流动性。


When these programs end, governments, some emerging markets, and some corporations could be vulnerable.	一旦这些政策走向终结，一些国家政府，新兴市场国家以及企业都可能变得弱不禁风。


They need to prepare.	它们需要早作打算。


Research by the McKinsey Global Institute suggests that lower interest rates saved the US and European governments nearly $1.6 trillion from 2007 to 2012.	一项麦肯锡全球研究中心的研究显示低利率在2007至2012年间为美国和欧洲政府节省了近1. 6万亿美元。


This windfall allowed higher government spending and less austerity.	这笔横财让它们可以增加政府支出并减少紧缩政策。


If interest rates were to return to 2007 levels, interest payments on government debt could rise by 20%, other things being equal.	如果利率回到2007年的水平，在其他因素不变的情况下政府债务中的利息支出将增加20%。


Governments in the US and the eurozone are particularly vulnerable in the short term, because the average maturity of sovereign debt is only 5.4 years and roughly six years, respectively.	美国和欧元区各国政府在短期内尤其脆弱，因为两者主权债务的平均偿付期分别仅有5. 4年和6年。


The United Kingdom is in better shape, with an average maturity of 14.6 years.	英国的情况较好，平均为14. 6年。


As interest rates rise, governments will need to determine whether higher tax revenue or stricter austerity measures will be required to offset the increase in debt-service costs.	随着利率上涨，各国政府就得决定是否需要加税或是执行更严厉的紧缩措施来抵消增加的债务成本。


Likewise, US and European non-financial corporations saved $710 billion from lower debt-service payments, with ultra-low interest rates thus boosting profits by about 5% in the US and the UK, and by 3% in the eurozone.	同样，欧美的非金融企业也在低利率下节省了7100亿美元，而超低利率分别令美英两国企业利润上涨了5%，欧洲企业也上涨了3%。


This source of profit growth will disappear as interest rates rise, and some firms will need to reconsider business models – for example, private equity – that rely on cheap capital.	这一利润来源将随着利率上升而消失，某些企业——比如私募基金——也需要重组其依赖廉价资本的经营模式


Emerging economies have also benefited from access to cheap capital.	新兴经济体也从廉价资本中受益。


Foreign investors’ purchases of emerging-market sovereign and corporate bonds almost tripled from 2009 to 2012, reaching $264 billion.	从2009至2012年间外国投资者购买新兴市场主权和企业债券的规模增加了3倍，达到2640亿美元。


Some of this investment has been initially funded by borrowing in developed countries.	一些投资起初是由发达国家的借款所资助的。


As QE programs end, emerging-market countries could see an outflow of capital.	随着量化政策走向终结，新兴市场国家将面对资本外流的状况。


By contrast, households in the US and Europe lost $630 billion in net interest income as a result of QE.	相比之下，欧美家庭在量化宽松政策下损失了6300亿美元的净利息收入。


This hurt older households that have significant interest-bearing assets, while benefiting younger households that are net borrowers.	那些拥有大量存款的成熟家庭成为了受害者，而身为净贷款者的新家庭则得到了实惠。


Although households in many advanced economies have reduced their debt burdens since the financial crisis began, total household debt in the US, the UK, and most eurozone countries is still higher as a percentage of GDP (and in absolute terms) than it was in 2000.	虽然许多发达国家家庭自从金融危机以来就降低了自身债务负担，但美国，英国和大多数欧元区国家的家庭总负债规模依然比2000年时增加了1%（相对于GDP，以绝对价值计算）。


Many households still need to reduce their debt further and will be hit with higher interest rates as they attempt to do so.	许多家庭依然需要进一步降低其债务，并将在这一过程中遭受高利率的冲击。


Some companies, too, have been affected by QE and will need to take appropriate steps if such policies are maintained.	一些企业也受到了量化宽松的影响并需要采取适当的步骤来应对这些政策的延续。


Many life-insurance companies and banks are taking a considerable hit, because of low interest rates.	许多人寿保险企业和银行都将在高利率下遭受相当的冲击。


The longer QE continues, the more vulnerable they will be.	量化宽松政策延续越长，这些企业就会越脆弱。


The situation is particularly difficult in some European countries.	一些欧洲国家的情况尤其艰难。


Insurers that offer customers guaranteed-rate products are finding that government-bond yields are below the rates being paid to customers.	那些承诺固定回报率的保险产品会发现政府债券的回报低于它们支付给顾客的利率。


Several more years of ultra-low interest rates would make many of these companies vulnerable.	超低利率如果继续这样延续几年，许多这类企业就将变得极为脆弱。


Similarly, eurozone banks lost a total of $230 billion in net interest income from 2007 to 2012.	同样，欧元区银行在2007至2012年间总共损失了2300亿美元净利息收入。


If QE continues, many of them will have to find new ways to generate returns or face significant restructuring.	如果量化宽松政策延续下去，许多银行将需要开发新的利润增长点或是对其业务模式进行大规模重构。


We could also witness the return of asset-price bubbles in some sectors, especially real estate, if QE continues.	如果量化宽松持续，我们也将见证某些部门的资产价格泡沫回调，尤其是房地产领域。


The International Monetary Fund noted in 2013 that there were already “signs of overheating in real-estate markets” in Europe, Canada, and some emerging-market economies.	国际货币基金组织在2013年提到欧洲，加拿大和某些新兴市场国家已经出现了“房地产市场过热的迹象”。


In the UK, the Bank of England has announced that in February it will end its mortgage Funding for Lending Scheme, which allowed lenders to borrow at ultra-low rates in exchange for providing loans.	在英国，英格兰银行已经宣布将在1月结束其抵押贷款融资换贷款计划（Funding for Lending Scheme）——该计划允许银行等出借方以超低利率获得融资来发放贷款。


Of course, QE and ultra-low interest rates served a purpose.	当然，量化宽松和超低利率都是为了特定目的服务的。


If central banks had not acted decisively to inject liquidity into their economies, the world could have faced a much worse outcome.	如果当年各大央行没能果断向经济中注入流动性，全球都将面对一个更加恶劣的局面。


Economic activity and business profits would have been lower, and government deficits would have been higher.	经济活动和经营利润将会更低，政府赤字则会增加。


When monetary support is finally withdrawn, this will be an indicator of the economic recovery’s ability to withstand higher interest rates.	等到对抵押贷款的支持完全撤销之时，它就将成为经济复苏承受更高利率能力的一个指标。


Nevertheless, all players need to understand how the end of QE will affect them.	但是，所有参与者都必须知道量化宽松结束将对自身造成何种影响。


After more than five years, QE has arguably entrenched expectations for continued low or even negative real interest rates – acting more like addictive painkillers than powerful antibiotics, as one commentator has put it.	在执行了超过5年之后，该政策已经在人们脑中植入了根深蒂固的持续低利率甚至负实际利率预期——正如一位评论家所指出，这更像一剂上瘾的止痛药而非治病救人的抗生素。


Governments, companies, investors, and individuals all need to shake off complacency and take a more disciplined approach to borrowing and lending to prepare for the end – or continuation – of QE.	政府，企业，投资者和个人都必须摆脱这种安于现状的自满情绪并采取一个更加规范的放贷借贷手段来应对量化宽松政策的终结——或者是延续。


Richard Dawkins’ Law Delusion	理查德•道金斯的法律错觉