As long as that remains the case, another disaster is only a matter of time.	只要这一根源不除，另一场灾难的发生就只是时间问题。


The term “too big to fail” dates back several decades, but it entered wide usage in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.	“太大而不能倒”一词可以追溯到几十年前，但在2008年9月雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）倒闭后才突然大热。


As problems spread throughout the financial system, the US authorities decided that some banks and other financial companies were so large relative to the economy that they were “systemically important” and could not be allowed to go bankrupt.	随着问题在金融系统中蔓延开来，美国当局决定一些银行和其他金融公司相对于经济而言规模太大，具有“系统重要性”，不容破产。


Lehman failed, but AIG, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bank of America, and others were all rescued through various forms of massive – and unprecedented – government support.	雷曼兄弟破产了，但AIG、高盛、摩根士丹利、花旗集团、美国银行和其他公司通过各种形式的大规模——前所未有的大规模政府支持得到了拯救。


The official line at the time was “never again,” which made sense in political and economic terms.	当时，官方的口径是“下不为例”，从政治和经济角度，这是有意义的。


These large financial firms were provided a scale of assistance that was not generally available to the nonfinancial corporate sector – and certainly not to families who found that the value of their assets (their homes) was below the value of their liabilities (their mortgages).	这些金融大企业获得了非金融企业部门一般难以获得的大规模援助——那些发现资产（房子）价值已经低于负债（按揭）价值的家庭则完全不可能获得这样的援助。


If large, complex financial institutions continue to have an implicit government guarantee, many people – on both the right and the left – would agree that this is both unfair to other parts of the private sector and an inducement for big banks to engage again in excessive risk-taking.	如果复杂的大型金融机构继续拥有隐性政府担保，许多人——不管是左派还是右派——都会同意这对私人部门的其他部分很不公平，也在刺激大银行再一次从事过度冒险。


In the jargon of economics, this is “moral hazard.”	用经济学术语讲，这是“道德风险”。


But no special training is needed to know that it is unwise and dangerous when bank executives get the upside (huge bonuses) when things go well and everyone else bears the downside risks (bailouts and recession).	但不需要任何特别训练就能看出，银行高管在一切顺利时收获好处（巨额奖金）而 下行风险（援助和衰退）由所有人一起承担，这绝对是不明智的，也是危险的。


At the heart of the Dodd-Frank law is a two-pronged approach to the too-big-to-fail problem.	多德-弗兰克法案的核心是对太大而不能倒问题的双管齐下解决办法。


The first section of the legislation, Title I, stipulates that all firms must be able to go bankrupt without causing large-scale damage to the broader financial system or the real economy.	该立法的第一部分，即第一条规定，所有企业都必须可以破产而不引起对整体金融系统或实体经济的大规模破坏。


Regulators are instructed, in no uncertain terms, to make sure that all large financial firms are structured in such a way that bankruptcy, using the standard rules and procedures of the court system, can happen without repeating the catastrophic post-Lehman cascade.	监管者被明文要求确保所有金融大企业所采取的结构能够保证破产——使用司法体系的标准规则和程序——不会重蹈雷曼兄弟倒闭所导致的风波。


In Title II of Dodd-Frank, Congress created a back-up authority through which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can take over and manage a failing financial firm and impose appropriate losses on shareholders and some creditors without creating widespread systemic damage or a global panic.	在多德-弗兰克立法的第二条中，国会规定了一个支持权，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）可根据这一权力接收和管理倒闭金融企业，让股东和一些债权人承担合理损失以避免发生广泛的系统性伤害或全球恐慌。


The good news is that, over the past half-decade, the FDIC has made some progress formulating the design of a workable Title II.	好消息是，在过去五年中，FDIC在制定可行的第二条方面取得了一定进展。


The bad news is that there has been almost no progress in terms of ensuring that large financial firms actually can go bankrupt.	坏消息是，在确保金融大企业实际可破产方面几乎没有什么进展。


In a hearing this week before a part of the Senate Banking Committee, there was complete agreement across the political spectrum on this point.	在本周举行的参议院银行委员会部分委员听证会上，就这一点达成了政治界的全体一致。


The disagreement concerns what must be done to finish this important piece of Dodd-Frank business.	不一致的地方在于必须怎样未完成多德-弗兰克立法的这一重要部分。


The Republican proposal is to modify the bankruptcy code, creating special provisions for large, complex financial institutions.	共和党的方案是修改破产法，对大型复杂金融机构专门设置条款。


There are three problems with this approach.	这一方针有三个问题。


First, all companies in the US should be able to fail under the same rules.	首先，所有美国公司都应该能够根据相同的法律破产。


Privileged treatment for anyone perpetuates the perception that it is safer to lend to some large financial firms – and further strengthens their unfair advantage.	优待任何人都会造成一种感觉，即借钱给某些金融大企业更安全，从而进一步强化了它们的不公平优势。


Second, it is fanciful to believe that the private sector would want to get involved in providing funding to a huge financial firm under court supervision, particularly during a systemic crisis.	其次，认为私人部门想要参与在法庭监督下为金融企业巨头提供资金，特别是在系统性危机期间，这样的想法纯属幻想。


The definition of such a crisis is precisely that moment when private-sector loans are not readily available.	这类危机的定义恰恰是这样的时刻：私人部门贷款不可得。


And a large loan – in the tens of billions of dollars – provided by the US Treasury to a bankruptcy court judge is unlikely to be politically acceptable or economically sensible.	而美国财政部向破产法庭判决提供巨额贷款——数十亿美元规模——在政治上无法接受，在经济上毫无意义。


Finally – and most fatally – the bankruptcy of any large US financial firm today would induce a scramble for assets by regulators around the world.	最后——也是最致命的——如今任何美国金融大企业的破产都会引起全球监管者争夺资产。


Some foreign regulators – such as the Bank of England – have agreed not to act preemptively in a resolution process run by the FDIC.	一些外国监管者——如英格兰银行——已经同意在FDIC主持的清算过程中不抢先行动。


But such agreements do not apply to a court-run bankruptcy process; authorities everywhere would move to protect local creditors and taxpayers by seizing assets in their jurisdiction.	但这类协议不适用于法庭主持的破产过程； 各国当局将采取行动，通过抢夺司法辖区内的资产保护本国债权人和纳税人。


The only reasonable alternative is to make large, complex financial institutions smaller and less complex so that it is possible for them to fail under standard bankruptcy rules.	唯一合理的方案是让大型复杂金融机构变得更小、减少其复杂性，以使其可能在标准破产规则下倒闭。


This is the intent of Dodd-Frank.	这就是多德-弗兰克立法的初衷。


The FDIC has pushed hard in this direction, whereas the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has been less enthusiastic.	FDIC正在努力朝这个方向前进，而美联储理事会则没有那么热情。


But the law is the law, and it is time to implement it.	但法律就是法律，现在是实施这一法律的时候了。


Too Big to Jail	太大而不能抓


WASHINGTON, DC – Among the fundamental principles of any functioning justice system is the following: Don’t lie to a judge or falsify documents submitted to a court, or you will go to jail.	华盛顿—运转良好的司法体系无不具有以下基本原则：不要对法官撒谎，也不要在呈堂证供上耍猫腻，要不然你就会被丢进监狱。


Breaking an oath to tell the truth is perjury, and lying in official documents is both perjury and fraud.	违反描述事实的承诺便是作伪证，而在正式呈堂证供上撒谎不但是伪证，更是欺诈。


These are serious criminal offenses, but apparently not if you are at the heart of America’s financial system.	这些都是十分严重的罪名，但显然，如果你身居美国金融体系要职，那么这些都不适用于你。


On the contrary, key individuals there appear to be well compensated for their crimes.	相反，那些要人还因为此种罪行而受到了丰厚的奖赏。


As Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets has argued, the recent so-called “robo-signing” settlement – in which five large banks “settled” their legal liability for carrying out fraudulent foreclosures on mortgages – is a complete sell-out to the financial industry.	正如Better Market的凯勒赫（Dennis Kelleher）所指出的，最近出现的“机械签名”和解——五家大银行就欺诈性剥夺按揭赎回权的法律责任“和解”一事——是对金融业彻头彻尾的背叛。


First, there was no serious criminal prosecution – meaning that no one will be charged with a felony, and no one will go to jail.	首先，该案没有导致任何严重的刑事诉讼——这意味着没有人会被判重罪，也没有人会被丢进监狱。


In terms of affecting executives’ incentives, this is the only thing that matters.	从对高管的激励的影响上说，只有一件事是值得考虑的。


Even the terminology used to frame the discussion is wrong.	就连用来定义这场讨论的术语也是不恰当的。


Kelleher, an attorney with extensive experience in private practice and the public sector, tells it like it is: “‘robo-signing’ is massive, systematic, fraudulent, criminal conduct.”	凯勒赫是一位在私人和公共领域都有着丰富经验的律师，他是这么描述的：“‘机械签名’是一种大规模、系统性的欺诈罪行。


Alternatively, as he points out, we could just call it “lying, cheating, and stealing.”	”或者——用他的话说——我们也可以称之为“撒谎、舞弊、盗窃。 ”


Second, the civil penalties in this settlement – a form of fine – are minuscule relative to the size of the companies involved.	其次，改和解案的民事处罚——一笔罚款——对涉案公司来说不啻九牛一毛。


As Shahien Nasiripour, one of the best reporters on this issue, dryly put it: “None of the five lenders have said they expect to incur a material charge due to the settlement.”	正如报道该案的记者之一纳斯里波尔（Shahien Nasiripour）所指出的，“这五家贷款人都认为不会因和解案受到实质性的惩罚。


In other words, from a corporate perspective, the penalty is a trifling affair.	”换句话说，从公司角度来说，民事处罚根本不值一提。


Third, such fines are, in any case, paid by the companies’ shareholders, not by their executives or board members (all of whom carry insurance).	第三，这笔罚款与其他案件一样，是由股东支付的，而不是由高管或董事（他们都有保险保护着呢）支付的。


In the rare cases in which fines have been levied on individuals, either their insurance policies picked up most of the bill, or the penalties were trivial relative to the cash compensation that they received while committing their crimes – or both.	即使在极少数罚款由个人承担的案件中，要么被罚者的保险支付了罚金的大头，要么罚金与犯罪带来的好处比起来不值一提，要么两者兼而有之。


As if all of this weren’t bad enough, the banks reportedly will be able to use government money to write down the value of mortgages, which amounts to subsidizing them to pay their own meaningless fines.	如果说这一切还不够糟糕的话，那么看看这一条：据报道，这些银行将可以使用政府资金来减记按揭贷款的价值，然后用减记额来补贴这笔毫无意义的罚款。


The Obama administration and its allies have worked hard to sell its roughly $20 billion settlement with the banks as one that will have a meaningful impact on the housing market.	奥巴马政府及其盟友竭尽全力把这桩价值大约200亿美元的和解案包装成能给住房市场带来积极影响的案例。


But nothing could be further from the truth.	但事实说明了一切。


As Kelleher points out, the United States has “more than 10 million homes under water” (the outstanding mortgage exceeds the house’s value).	正如凯勒赫所指出的，美国“至少有1 000万房子处于资不抵债状态”（即待缴按揭超过房屋价值）。


“Twenty billion dollars doesn’t make a dent in that: one million homes at $20,000 loan forgiveness is it.”	“两百亿美金扔下去连响都不会响一声：100万套房子，每套贷款2万，就把这笔钱给吞了。 ”


In fact, the Obama administration’s settlement with the mortgage lenders is consistent with its track record on all of its policies related to the financial sector, which has been abysmal.	事实上，奥巴马政府与五家按揭贷款人的和解与其对金融部门的一贯政策是一致的，一言以蔽之，糟糕透顶。


But it is also puzzling.	但此举又是颇为可疑的。


Why would the administration continue to bend over backwards to be lenient towards top bankers under these circumstances?	在现今的大环境下，为何奥巴马政府要一再让步，对顶级银行家如此宽宏大量？


I honestly do not believe that the administration’s stance reflects any form of corruption – payments made to individuals or even to political campaigns.	实话实说，我并不认为政府立场与腐败有关，罚款不会流入个人腰包甚至竞选活动。


And, in this case, it does not even appear to reflect the lobbying power of big financial players.	此外，就本案而言，我甚至不认为这与金融业大佬的游说能力有关。


That power certainly explains why the Dodd-Frank financial reforms enacted in 2010 were not stronger, and why there is now so much opposition to effective implementation of that legislation (for example, there is currently a huge fight around the “Volcker rule,” which would limit proprietary trading by megabanks).	2010年的多德-弗兰克金融改革之所以不够严厉，如今针对该法案的实际实施的反对声音之所以如此之多（比如，最近围绕限制大银行自营交易的“沃克尔规则”出现了相当激烈的争论）其中显而易见都有游说势力的影子。


But mortgage lenders’ criminal activities are another matter.	但按揭贷款人的犯罪行为是另一码事。


Indeed, at stake in the mortgage settlement are fundamental and systemic breaches of the rule of law – perjury and fraud on an economy-wide scale.	事实上，在按揭和解案背后是对法治精神的基础性、系统性的违背，是侵蚀了整个经济的伪证和欺诈。


The Justice Department has, without question, all of the power that it needs to prosecute these alleged crimes fully.	毫无疑问，司法部拥有充分起诉被控罪行所需要的一切权力。


And yet America’s top law-enforcement officials have consistently – and now completely – backed off.	但美国的最高执法机构却一直——现在则是完完全全地——倒行逆施。


The main motivation behind the administration’s indulgence of serious criminality evidently is fear of the consequences of taking tough action on individual bankers.	政府对严重犯罪的纵容背后的主要动机显然是害怕对银行家个人采取严厉措施所造成的后果。


And maybe officials are right to be afraid, given the massive size of the banks in question relative to the economy.	政府投鼠忌器或许无可厚非，因为有问题的银行规模相对于经济来说太大了。


In fact, those banks are bigger now than they were before the crisis, and, as James Kwak and I documented at length in our book 13 Bankers, they are much larger than they were 20 years ago.	事实上，这些银行较危机之前比起来规模变得更加庞大了，而正如郭庾信（James Kwak）和我在《13位银行家》（13 Bankers）一书的长文中所指出的，它们较20年前比起来，规模庞大了许多。


Top bankers want to make a lot of money. They also want to stay out of prison.	顶级银行家想大把赚钱，又不想蹲监狱。


Political leaders can huff and puff as much as they want, but, without a credible threat of poverty and time behind bars, bankers have no reason to comply with the law.	政治领导人可以极尽威逼恐吓，但如果没有可信的穷困潦倒、身陷囹圄的危险，银行家就没有理由依法行事。


For them, it’s all about the trade – and you can be the sucker in public policy as easily as you can be the sucker in an individual loan agreement.	对他们来说，一切都是买卖，不管你是公共政策制定者还是个人借款者，一不留神就会成为银行家刀俎下的鱼肉。


The message to bank executives today is simple: build your bank to be as big as possible – and then keep growing.	如今，银行高管获得的信息很简单：尽量把你的银行做大，然后保持增长。


If you manage to become big enough, you and your employees are not just too big to fail, but also too big to jail.	只要你成功地变得足够大，拟合你的雇员将不仅仅是太大而不能倒，而且还是太大而不能抓。


The Obama administration has just made everyone else the sucker.	而奥巴马政府把其他所有人都变成了鱼肉。


Too European to Fail	强调欧洲一体，不让成员失利


BERLIN – Among investment bankers, there is renewed speculation about the possibility of a country leaving European Monetary Union – or being pushed out.	柏林—投资银行家们现在再度思考一个国家脱离欧洲货币联盟（EMU）或是被推出去的可能性。


Rating agencies have downgraded Portugal, Greece, and Spain, owing to their poor prospects for economic growth and weak public finances.	由于葡萄牙，希腊和西班牙在经济增长方面的不利前景和脆弱的公共财政，评级机构已经下调了这三个国家的等级。


Ireland has been assigned a negative outlook and could soon suffer a downgrade as well.	爱尔兰看上去也状况不佳，可能很快也会被降低等级。


With fears mounting that one or another euro-zone country may default, yield spreads on government bonds between EMU countries have reached record highs.	由于对这个或那个欧元区国家可能会发生违约的担心持续上升，欧洲货币联盟国家之间政府债券的收益率价差已经达到了创纪录的高点。


For some time now, Greek ten-year government-bond yields have been about 300 basis points above German yields.	一段时间以来，希腊十年期政府债券的收益率比德国高出了300个基点。


This is a sign that investors now see a significant risk of a Greek default or of Greece exiting from EMU and redenominating its government bonds.	这标志着投资者现在看到了希腊发生违约，或是该国退出欧洲货币联盟，重新确定政府债券的票面利率的严重风险，


But the panic that EMU may disintegrate is overdone.	但是关于欧洲货币联盟可能会解体的恐慌夸张了。


Rather than a default and subsequent exit from the euro zone, the member states are more likely to overrule a fundamental principle of EMU and bail out a fellow member state.	成员国更有可能违背该组织的一条基本原则，帮助伙伴成员国脱离困境，而不是让它发生违约，而后退出欧元区。


Leaving EMU would be a costly option for weak-performing countries.	对于表现不佳的国家来说，选择脱离欧洲货币联盟代价高昂。


Of course, regaining the exchange rate as an instrument for competitive devaluation could help overcome competitiveness losses due to soaring unit-labor costs.	当然，重新获得用作竞争性贬值工具的汇率能够有助于克服因为高涨的单位劳动产本而产生的竞争力损失。


As Argentina showed after its default and devaluation in the winter of 2001/2002, such a move can reignite exports and economic growth.	就像阿根廷在2001/2002年冬季发生违约和贬值后显现出来的那样， 这一举措能够再度点燃出口和经济增长。


But Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland are not Argentina.	但是希腊，葡萄牙，意大利和爱尔兰不是阿根廷。


The European Union treaty does not provide for an exit from EMU.	欧盟条约不允许退出欧洲货币联盟。


As a default would demand a change in the currency involved in private contracts, business partners from other EU countries would surely sue, legal uncertainties would drag on and on, and an exiting country’s trade with its main trading partners would be impaired for years to come.	如果违约方要求改变私人契约中涉及的货币，来自欧盟其他国家的商业伙伴肯定会提起诉讼，法律上的不确定性会拖拉个没完没了，退出国与主要贸易伙伴之间的贸易会在未来好些年里遭到破坏。


So none of the countries at risk would seriously consider reintroducing a national currency.	所以身处危险的国家都不会认真考虑重新引进本国货币。


It is possible that an EMU government will come close to insolvency or illiquidity.	可能一个欧洲货币联盟国家的政府会近乎破产或是濒临缺失流动性。


Indeed, even something like a self-fulfilling debt crisis is thinkable: if market participants believe that a default or an exit from EMU is imminent, this would drive up government bond yields for the country in question.	实际上，甚至可以想象会发生自找的债务危机一类的事情：如果市场的参与者相信违约或是退出欧洲货币联盟正在逼近某国，将会迫使该国政府债券的收益上升。


At some point, yields might become so high that the government concerned could not refinance its maturing debt or finance its current expenses.	在某个时点，收益可能会变得如此之高，以致于相关的政府不能为它的到期债务重新筹措资金，或是为它目前的开支提供资金。


In this situation, a country would be faced with the sole option of default.	这种情况下，该国的唯一选择就是违约。


But even if this scenario is possible in theory, it is unlikely to occur in practice.	然而，尽管这种场景在理论上是可能的，在实践中却不会发生。


Letting one member fail would create speculative pressure on other EMU governments with weak fiscal positions or shallow domestic bond markets.	让一个成员国破产会给欧洲货币联盟中其他财政状况脆弱的政府制造冒险的压力，或是影响国内债券市场。


A widespread default of several countries in EMU would lead to serious disruptions of trade within the EU and to new problems in the banking system, which would have to write down their holdings of government bonds.	在欧洲货币联盟内部几个国家中广泛传播的违约将会导致欧盟内部严重的贸易混乱，还将导致那些被迫降低所持政府债券的帐面价值的银行系统出现新的问题。


The large EU governments are well aware of this problem and would act accordingly.	大欧盟政府对这个问题十分清楚，并将会相应行事。


With its loans to Hungary and Latvia, the European Commission has already revived a credit facility which was dormant since the European Monetary System crisis in 1992 – and for countries outside EMU. The support is huge.	随着贷款给匈牙利和拉脱维亚，欧洲委员会已经恢复使用一项自1992年欧洲货币系统危机以来暂时搁置的信用工具，而且用在欧洲货币联盟以外的国家上。


Together with the International Monetary Fund’s contribution, the EU loan to Latvia amounts to more than 33% of Latvian GDP.	帮助的力度巨大：加上世界货币基金组织，欧盟提供给拉脱维亚的贷款已经超过了该国GDP的33%。


By supporting to such a degree two new EU members that are not part of EMU, the EU countries have demonstrated a much greater commitment to mutual aid than was thinkable only a few years ago.	通过向两个尚未加入欧洲货币联盟的欧盟新成员国提供如此程度的帮助，欧盟国家表现出的互助责任感远比几年前人们可以想象的要大得多。


And more is expected to come: in November 2008, the Ecofin Council increased the ceiling for possible balance-of-payment loans to non-EMU countries to €25 billion.	而且还会有更多帮助：2008年11月，欧盟经济与财政部长委员会将非欧盟成员国的国际收支差额贷款上限提高到了250亿欧元。


Against this background, it seems inconceivable that the EU should refuse to support an EMU member in a situation similar to that of Hungary and Latvia, especially as all the countries that are currently on market watch lists are long-time EU members.	在这样的背景下，难以想象欧盟应该拒绝支持和匈牙利，拉脱维亚处在同样景况下的欧洲货币联盟成员国，尤其因为现在被列在市场观察名单上的国家还都是欧盟的长期成员。


In case of real distress, the rest of the EU will offer a bailout package.	如果发生了真正的麻烦，欧盟的其他成员将会提供一揽子应急援助计划。


Indeed, the no-bailout clause in Article 103 of the EU Treaty – according to which neither the European Central Bank, the EU, nor national governments “shall […]amp#160; be liable for or assume the commitments” for other national governments – has lost its credibility.	事实上，欧盟条约第103 条的不援助条款—即无论是欧洲央行，欧盟还是各国政府都将不“负责，或承担”其他国家政府的责任—已经失去了可信力。


The political and economic costs of letting a fellow member government fail are simply too high in the closely interconnected EMU.	对于成员相互连接紧密的欧洲货币联盟而言，让一个伙伴成员国的政府破产的政治和经济成本实在太高。


Because there is no current blueprint for this move, one can only speculate about what it would look like.	由于目前这一举措尚无蓝图，我们只能推测它将会是什么样子。


One option is for large EU countries to construct a bailout package.	对于欧盟大国而言，选择之一是建立一揽子应急援助计划。


Alternatively, the EU could create a special facility through which it borrows money in the bond market to help the member in trouble – an arrangement similar to the bonds that the European Commission has already issued for the emergency facility from which Hungary and Latvia have been borrowing.	或者，欧盟能够创立一种特殊工具，籍此在债券市场内进行借款，帮助限于困境的成员国。 这种安排类似于欧洲委员会已经为紧急救助工具发行的债券—匈牙利和拉脱维亚能从这个紧急工具里获得借款。


The EU is good at circumventing treaty obligations in times of real crisis.	在真正的危机时刻，欧盟擅长规避条约规定的责任。


There is no reason to expect this skillfulness to desert it this time around.	我们有理由期望这次这种技巧不会被丢在一旁。


Too Much Saving, Too Little Investment	储蓄太多，投资太少


Talk abounds of a global savings glut.	关于全球储蓄过量的言谈四处可见。


In fact, the world economy suffers not from too much saving, but from too little investment.	然而事实上，对全球经济造成损害的不是储蓄太多，而是投资太少。


To remedy this, we need two kinds of transitions.	为了补救，我们需要两种类型的过渡。


How well the world makes them will determine whether the strong global growth of the last few years will be sustainable.	世人实现这两种过渡的情况好坏将决定过去几年里强劲的全球增长是否能持续下去。


This is the central message of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, which will be released this week [editors: on Wednesday, September 21st 2005] on the eve of the Fund’s 2005 Annual Meeting.	这就是国币货币基金组织将在本周的2005年年会［编者按：2005年9月21日星期三］上公布的《世界经济展望》的核心内容。


First, consumption has to give way smoothly to investment, as past excess capacity is worked off and as expansionary policies in industrial countries normalize.	首先，随着过去的过剩生产力逐渐抵消，工业国家的扩张政策正常化，消费必须平稳地让位给投资。


Second, to reduce the current account imbalances that have built up, demand has to shift from countries running deficits to countries running surpluses.	其次，为了减少越积越多的经常项目不平衡，需求必须从出现赤字的国家转移到过剩的国家。


Within this second transition, higher oil prices mean consumption by oil producers has to increase while that of oil consumers has to fall.	在第二个过渡中，油价上涨意味着石油输出国的消费必须增长，同时石油输入国的必须降低。


The current situation has its roots in a series of crises over the last decade that were caused by excessive investment, particularly the bursting of the Japanese asset bubble, crises in emerging Asia and Latin America, and the collapse of the IT bubble in industrial countries.	目前状况的根源在于过去十年里由过度投资引发的一系列危机，特别是日本资产泡沫的破灭、亚洲和拉美新兴市场的危机、以及工业国家IT泡沫的破灭。


Investment has fallen off sharply since, and has since staged only a very cautious recovery.	从那以后，投资衰退了，而且复苏非常缓慢。


The policy response to the slowdown in investment differs across countries.	不同国家对投资减缓的政策反应各不相同。


In the industrial countries, expansionary budgets, coupled with low interest rates and elevated asset prices, has led to consumption- or credit-fueled growth, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries.	在工业国家，扩张性预算，加上低利率和资产价格的升高，产生了消费或信贷推动的增长，特别是在讲英语的国家。


Government savings have fallen, especially in the United States and Japan, and household savings have virtually disappeared in some countries with housing booms.	政府储蓄减少，尤其是在美国和日本，而在某些国家，随着房地产热升温，居民储蓄几乎消失。


By contrast, the crises were a wake-up call in many emerging-market countries.	相形之下，上述危机对许多新兴市场国家起到了警醒的作用。


Historically lax policies have become far less accommodative.	一直宽松的政策已经收紧。


Some countries have primary fiscal surpluses for the first time, and most emerging markets have brought down inflation through tight monetary policy.	某些国家首次出现了基本财政盈余，而大多数的新兴市场已通过紧缩的货币政策降低了通货膨胀。


With corporations cautious about investing and governments prudent about expenditure – especially given the grandiose investments of the past – exports have led growth.	随着各个公司对投资抱谨慎态度，政府在开支方面精打细算——尤其是对比过去庞大的投资规模——出口已成为增长的领先因素。


Many emerging markets have run current-account surpluses for the first time.	许多新兴市场首次出现经常项目盈余。


We should celebrate the implicit global policy coordination that enabled the world to weather the crises of recent years. However, the fact that rich countries are consuming more, and are being supplied and financed by emerging markets, is not a new world order; it is a temporary and effective response to crises.	我们可以庆祝隐性的全球政策协调促使世界安然度过近年来的数场危机，然而，富裕的国家消费更多的资源，得到新兴市场供应的产品和资金，这并不是新的世界秩序；


Now it needs to be reversed.	这是应对危机的临时且有效的办法。 现在，这种情况应该逆转。


Indeed, it is misleading to term this situation a “savings glut,” for that would imply that countries running current-account surpluses should reduce domestic incentives to save.	将这种情况称作“储蓄过量”确实容易误导人，因为这个词的隐含意思是出现经常项目盈余的国家应该减少对国内储蓄的鼓励。


But if the problem is weak investment, then a reduction in such incentives will lead to excessively high real interest rates when the factors holding back investment dissipate.	但如果问题在于投资不足，则减少鼓励会导致抑制投资的因素消失后出现过高的实际利率。


Policy, instead, should be targeted at withdrawing excessive stimulus to consumption and loosening the constraints that are holding back investment.	相反，政策应该以撤销对消费的过度刺激、放松抑制投资的限制为目标。


There are reasons to worry whether the needed transitions will, in fact, occur smoothly.	我们有理由担心上诉必要的过渡能否顺利实现。


First, with asset prices like housing fueled by global liquidity, goods prices kept quiescent by excess capacity and global trade, and interest rates held down by muted investment, domestic and external imbalances have been easily financed.	首先，随着住房等资产价格在全球市场流动性的推动下上涨，商品价格因过剩的生产力和全球贸易而低迷不振，以及利率随着投资的萎缩而下降，很容易出现国内和对外收支不平衡的现象。


The traditional signals provided by inflation expectations, long-term interest rates, and exchange rates have not started flashing.	而预期通胀、长期利率和汇率等传统信号还没有开始示警。


Instead, bottlenecks are developing elsewhere, as in oil.	相反，其他领域则出现了瓶颈，如石油。


It may well be that easy financing has given economies a longer leash.	原因很可能是融资的简化放松了对经济的制约。


The worry, then, is that when the signals change – as they must – they will change abruptly, with attendant harsh consequences for growth.	于是，让人担心的是，如果这些信号发生改变——这是必然的——改变的过程将非常突然，并给经济增长带来严重的后果。


Alternatively, prices such as that of oil will have to move more in order to effect the most pressing transitions, creating new imbalances.	或者，为了实现紧迫的过渡，石油等的价格必须进一步调整，从而造成新的不平衡。


Policymakers should not see higher oil prices as an aberration to be suppressed, but should focus on underlying causes.	政策制定者不应该把石油价格上涨看作是必须抑制的不正常现象，而应该致力于处理其根本的原因。


Second, more investment is needed, particularly in low-income countries, emerging markets, and oil producers (though less in China, the exception that proves the rule).	其次，需要更多的投资，特别是在低收入国家、新兴市场和石油产出国（中国则相反，不过这是例外）。


But the answer is not a low-quality investment binge led by government or fuelled by easy credit; we know the consequences of that.	但答案不是政府引导或宽松的信贷推动的低质量的投资； 我们知道这种投资的后果。


Instead, product, labor, and financial markets must be reformed so that high-quality private-sector investment emerges.	相反，产品、劳动力和金融市场都必须改革，以便产生高质量的私营部门投资。


It is here that the good may have been the enemy of the perfect.	正是在这里，得过且过限制了对完美的追求。


Strong exports and decent government policies have enabled some countries to generate growth without the reforms that can create the right incentives for investment.	某些国家依靠强劲的出口和有分寸的政府政策促进经济增长，而不进行可能适当刺激投资的改革。


These countries are overly dependent on demand elsewhere, which in turn is unsustainable.	这些国家过于依靠别国的需求，因此���法持续。


With the right reforms, adopted in concert, the world can make the needed transitions.	通过协调实施适当的改革，世界可以实现所需的过渡。


But one of the risks associated with the large current-account imbalances we now face is that politicians may decide to blame one or another country and espouse protectionist policies.	但是我们目前面临的大规模的经常项目不平衡带来的风险之一就是政客可能会指责别的国家，采取保护主义政策。


That could precipitate the very global economic downturn that we all want to avoid.	这样恰好会加速我们所有人都想避免的全球经济衰退。


If, instead, countries see the transitions as a shared responsibility, each country’s policymakers may be able to guide the domestic debate away from the protectionism that might otherwise come naturally.	相反，如果各国将上述过渡看作是共同的责任，那么每个国家的政策制定者或许可以引导国内舆论远离保护主义。


Each country should focus on what it needs to do to achieve sustained long-term growth.	每个国家都应该集中精力做自己应该做的事，实现持续的长期发展。


In that possibility lies the well-being of us all.	如果这样，我们所有人都将受益无穷。


Too Much “Too Big to Fail”?	对“不死巨兽”的过分关注


LONDON – Obviously, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 was partly one of specific, systemically important banks and other financial institutions such as AIG.	发自伦敦——很显然，2008~2009年全球金融危机的罪魁祸首在某种意义上其实是一系列特定的系统性关键银行以及像AIG这样的金融机构。


In response, there is an intense debate about the problems caused when such institutions are said to be “too big to fail.”	对此，人们对这类政府不得不出手救助的所谓“不死巨兽”所导致的问题进行了激烈辩论。


Politically, that debate focuses on the costs of bailouts and on tax schemes designed to “get our money back.”	在政治上来说，这场辩论主要集中在紧急援助的成本以及设计用来“把纳税人的钱取回来”的税收方案。


For economists, the debate focuses on the moral hazard created by ex ante expectations of a bailout, which reduce market discipline on excessive risk-taking – as well as on the unfair advantage that such implicit guarantees give to large players over their small-enough-to-fail competitors.	在经济上，辩论则关注由于金融机构对紧急援助的预期所导致的肆意妄为的风险，这种过度冒险的行为将破坏市场的纪律——尤其是在这种担保优势都被大企业所独揽，而那些中小竞争者则只能自求多福的情况下。


Numerous policy options to deal with this problem are now being debated. These include higher capital ratios for systemically important banks, stricter supervision, limits on trading activity, pre-designated resolution and recovery plans, and taxes aimed not at “getting our money back,” but at internalizing externalities – that is, making those at fault pay the social costs of their behavior – and creating better incentives.	许多应对这一问题的政策选项目前都在研究当中，其中包括要求这些系统性关键银行执行更高的资本比率，更严厉的监管，交易行为限制，事先设计好的决策和复原方案，以及那些不是为“把纳税人的钱拿回来”而设计，而是将外部经济效果内在化的税收政策——比如让那些犯错误的人为他们所造成的社会成本付出代价——以及用更好的动机来诱导那些经营者。


I am convinced that finding answers to the too-big-to-fail problem is necessary – indeed, it is the central issue being considered by the Standing Committee of the Financial Stability Board, which I chair.	我确信为那些“不死巨兽”所造成的问题寻找一个答案是非常必要的——事实上，这也是我担任主席的金融稳定委员会常务委员会的中心议题。


But we must not confuse “necessary” with “sufficient”; there is a danger that an exclusive focus on institutions that are too big to fail could divert us from more fundamental issues.	但我们也不能将“必要”和“足够”混为一谈； 因为只关注那些金融巨兽将导致我们忽略其他更为根本的问题。


In the public’s eyes, the focus on such institutions appears justified by the huge costs of financial rescue.	在公众看来，既然耗费如此庞大，那么盯紧这些金融机构也是理所当然的。


But when we look back on this crisis in, say, ten years, what may be striking is how small the direct costs of rescue will appear.	但当我们反思这场危机的时候，比如说10年前，许多人对当年直接救助的资金规模竟然如此之小而感到惊讶。


Many government funding guarantees will turn out to have been costless: liquidity support provided by central banks at market or punitive rates will often show a profit, and capital injections will be partly and sometimes wholly recovered when stakes are sold.	许多政府保证基金根本无须花一分钱：中央银行对市场所提供的流动性支持或者惩罚措施通常都是盈利的，而企业出售股份所获得的资本注入将在一定程度上，有时甚至能全盘救活整个企业。


Emerging estimates of the total fiscal costs of rescue vary by country, but are usually just a few percentage points of GDP.	当时虽然每个国家预留的总财政救助成本都有所不同，但一般都仅仅是GDP的几个百分点。


As a result of this crisis, however, government debt-to-GDP ratios in the United Kingdom and the United States will likely rise by 40 to 50 percentage points, and more important measures of economic harm – foregone GDP growth, additional unemployment, and individuals’ wealth and income losses – will rise as well.	但在这场危机来临之后，英国和美国的政府债务占GDP比例上升到了40%~50%，此外还有将出现更多体现经济衰退的现象——GDP不再增长，额外产生的失业，以及个人的财富和收入损失。


All of this implies that the crucial problem is not the fiscal cost of rescue, but the macroeconomic volatility induced by precarious credit supply – first provided too easily and at too low a price, and then severely restricted.	所有这些都意味着关键的问题并不是救助的财政成本，而是信用市场不稳定所导致的宏观经济萎缩——一开始提供大量太容易或者太廉价的信用，然后却大幅收紧监管和限制。


And it is possible – indeed, I suspect likely – that such credit-supply problems would exist even if the too-big-to-fail problem were effectively addressed.	而这类信用供给问题有可能——事实上，我认为很大机会——在那些“不死巨兽”的问题得到解决之后还继续存在。


In the US, this crisis has seen over-exuberant commercial real-estate lending by regional banks.	在美国，这场危机印证了地区性银行过度活跃的商业地产借贷所带来的恶果。


If such banks fail, they are resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the normal fashion, and this has always been the market’s ex ante expectation.	如果这些银行出了问题的话，那么美国联邦存款保险公司（Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation）将按照一般程序来处理，而这也是市场一直以来的预期。


In the UK, similarly, we have had problems with mid-sized mortgage banks, and with poor commercial real-estate lending by mutual building societies, as well as problems with two large banks.	同样在英国，很多中型抵押银行出现了问题，还有多个建房互助协会的商业地产贷款坏账，以及两个主要银行所出现的问题。


Ireland faces huge economic problems as a result of a commercial real-estate boom driven by banks that are relatively small by global standards.	而爱尔兰则面对着由那些在全球范围内相对较小的银行滥发商业地产贷款所导致的重大经济问题。


There is therefore a danger that excessive focus on “too big to fail” could become a new form of the belief that if only we could identify and correct some crucial market failure, we would, at last, achieve a stable and self-equilibrating system.	同样，过度关注那些“不死巨兽”将引发一种新的危险思维，认为只要我们能找到并纠正一些关键的市场失灵行为，那么我们就至少能维持一个稳定而且能够自我平衡的系统。


Many of the problems that led to the crisis – and that could give rise to future crises if left unaddressed – originated elsewhere.	但是导致危机的许多问题——如果这些问题得不到解决的话可能导致下一场危机——其实还隐藏在别处。


The Closed Marketplace of Economic Ideas	封闭的经济思想市场


MILAN – Imagine that you fell asleep in 2006 and woke up today.	米兰—想象一下，你从2006年一直沉睡到今天才起来。


The world economy would be barely recognizable.	世界经济已经变得认不出来了。


While you were dreaming of real-estate riches, the United States and Europe were hit by the most crippling financial crisis in almost 80 years, and China’s statist economy swiftly overtook Germany and Japan to become the world’s second largest (and, despite its recent slowdown, is poised to surpass the US).	你曾经梦想买房致富，但美国和欧洲遭遇了近80年来最严重的金融危机，中国的中央集权经济讯速地超越了德国和日本，成为世界老二（尽管最近有所减速，但仍然大有超越美国之势）。


Given such massive, unexpected shifts, you might be even more surprised by what didn’t change: the way economists think about themselves and their discipline.	变化如此巨大，如此出人意料，但令你更震惊的也许是未曾变化的东西：经济学家看待自身和经济学的方式。


To see this, one need look no further than the Ideas.RePEc.org website.	要想了解只一点，只消看看Ideas. RePEc.


RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) arguably provides the closest thing to a credible hierarchy of economists, not unlike the ATP’s rankings of professional tennis players.	org网站即可。 RePEc（经济学研究论文）可以说是最可信的经济学家档次指标，不亚于ATP职业网球选手排名。


The site, entirely open and free (thanks to hundreds of volunteers in 82 countries), maintains a decentralized online database of around two million items of economic research, including working papers, journal articles, books, and software.	该网站完全开放和自由（这要归功于82个国家的数百位志愿者），它是一个分散化的在线数据库，包括了大约两百万项经济学研究，有工作论文、期刊文章、书籍和软件等。


Its index of influence assesses the number of citations for each author, weighted by impact and discounted by citation age (otherwise, Adam Smith and Karl Marx would likely still top the list).	其影响力指数评估每位作者的引用次数，并进行影响力加权和年代折旧（否则亚当·斯密和卡尔·马克思可能仍然名列前茅）。


Because the ranking is updated every month, RePEc enables one to track which economists are viewed by their peers as the most influential over time.	排名每月更新，因此RePEc可以让你追踪，随着时间的推移，那些经济学家是同行眼中的最有影响力的人。


So I compared the rankings from December 2006 and September 2015 to see whether the RePEc index had evolved along with economic reality.	因此，我比较了从2006年12月到2015年9月的排名，看看RePEc指数是否与经济现实相符。


It had not.	答案是否定的。


Despite the profound – and largely unpredicted – financial and economic turmoil of the intervening decade, the intellectual influence of those whose theories suffered the most evidently remains undented.	尽管这个十年发生了影响深远——并且在很大程度上出乎意料——的金融和经济动荡，但那些所持理论遭遇现实打击最大的经济学家的智识影响力基本完好无损。


After a succession of bursting multi-trillion-dollar credit bubbles, you might wonder what to make of Robert Lucas’s view that rational expectations enable perfectly calculating “agents” to maximize economic utility.	在经历了一场数万亿美元的信用泡沫大崩盘后，你也许会奇怪，是什么让罗伯特·卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）得出理性预期能让完美推理的“行为人”实现经济效用最大化的观点的。


You might also want to rethink Eugene Fama’s efficient markets hypothesis, according to which prices of financial assets always reflect all available information about economic fundamentals.	你也许还想反思尤金·法码（Eugene Fama）的有效市场假说。 根据该假说，金融资产的价格永远反映了所有关于经济基本面的可得信息。


You must not be an economist.	你一定不是一位经济学家。


In fact, Lucas and Fama both moved up in the RePEc rankings during the period I examined, from 30 to nine and from 23 to 17, respectively.	事实上，在我所考察的时间间隔内，卢卡斯和法码的排名分别从30名和23名上升到第九和第17名。


And the persistence at the top is striking across the board.	而盘踞顶级的现象普遍存在。


Among the top ten economists in September 2015, six were already there in December 2006, and another two were ranked 11 and 13.	在2015年9月排名前十位的经济学家中，有六位在2006年12月便已进入前十，另有两人分别位居第11和第13。


Mobility in the RePEc rankings remains subdued even after widening the sample.	RePEc排行波动性在扩大样本后依然很低。


For example, of the top 100 economists in September 2015, only 14 were absent from the much wider top 5% in 2006, and only two others had advanced more than 200 spots over the previous decade.	比如，在2015年9月的前一百名经济学家中，只有14人在2006年时没有跻身范围广得多的顶尖5%，另只有两人在上一个十年中排名进步了200名以上。


Among those recently ranked from 101 to 200, just 24 were not in the top 5% in 2006, and only ten others had moved up by more than 200 places.	在目前排名101至200名的经济学家中，只有24人在2006年没有跻身前5%，另只有十人名词提高了超过200名。


The rate of renewal among the 200 most influential economists was as low as 25% – and just 16% among the top 100 – during a decade in which the explanatory power of prevailing economic theory had been found severely wanting.	在200名最有影响力经济学家的更新率只有25%——而前100名只有16%——而在这个十年中，主流经济学理论的解释力显然需要大幅增加。


What is remarkable about this is the difference between the pace of change in the ranking of economists and in the economy itself.	关于这一点，值得注意的是经济学家排名变化速度与经济本身变化速度之间的差异。


Entry barriers among the world’s ten richest people and ten most valuable companies seem to be far lower than among the top ten economists.	世界最富有前十位个人和公司的门槛比前十名经济学家低得多。


According to Forbes, only two of the ten wealthiest individuals in 2015 (Bill Gates and Warren Buffett) were in the top ten in 2006.	据《福布斯》杂志的数据，2015年最富有的十位个人中，只有两人（比尔·盖茨和沃伦·巴菲特）在2006年位居前十。


And just three companies – ExxonMobil, General Electric, and Microsoft – made the top ten in terms of market capitalization in both 2006 and 2015.	而只有三家公司——埃克森美孚、通用电气和微软——的市值在2006年和2015年都跻身前十。


In the rankings of economists, by contrast, criteria such as gender or geographic origin confirm the overall inertia.	相反，在经济学家排名中，性别和地理出身等标准也呈现出惯性。


Only four women made the RePEc top 200 in September 2015, compared to three in December 2006, and two were included on both lists.	在2015年9月RePEc排行榜前200名中只有四名女性，2006年只有三名，2006年和2015年都名列前200名的只有两人。


Likewise, emerging countries – which represent more than 90% of the world’s population, three-quarters of global GDP growth over the last decade, and nearly half of total income in current dollar terms – supplied just 11 of the top 200 economists in September 2015, up from ten in December 2006.	类似地，新兴国家——它们拥有全世界90%的人口、贡献了过去十年三分之二的全球GDP增长和近一半的收入（以当前美元计）——在2015年9月前200名经济学家榜单上只有11人，比2006年增加了1人。


And ten of those 11 – three Iranians, four Indians, two Turks, and one Chinese – have lived and worked in the US or the United Kingdom since their student days.	而在这11人中——其中有三位伊朗人、四位印度人、两位土耳其人和一位中国人——有十人从学生时代起便在美国或英国生活和工作。


The rest of the RePEC top 200 tend to be Caucasian men in their 60s and older – roughly three decades past the age when an economic or scientific author is generally most innovative, according to research by the economist Benjamin Jones.	其余RePEc经济学家200强大多是60岁以上的白人——大约比经济学或科学作者总体创新力最强的年纪老了三十岁（据经济学家本杰明·琼斯（Benjamin Jones）的研究）。


No black person, American or otherwise, is in the top 200.	没有黑人，不管是美国还是其他国家的黑人，跻身前200名。


How surprised should we be that, even after the Great Recession cast grave doubt on the rational-market theories so dominant a decade ago, the top tier of academic economics remains largely unchanged?	大衰退让十年前牢牢占据主导地位的理性市场理论饱受质疑，但经济学界的学术排位基本保持不变，这有多令人意外？


After all, many of these scholars have made tremendous, lasting contributions to understanding how markets and societies work.	���竟，这些学者中有许多为理解市场和社会如何运行做出了卓著持久的贡献。


And ideas tend to advance and retreat slowly, like glaciers, not precipitously, like armies.	而思想的进退总是像冰川一样缓慢，而不是像军队一样迅猛。


But replace the names of the leading economists with products in any other market – cars, for example, or semi-conductors – and most people probably would agree that the RePEc ranking looks like a closed, inefficient market with high entry barriers.	但用其他市场上的产品——比如汽车或半导体——代替领先经济学家的名字，那么也许大部分人会同意，RePEC排名看起来像是一个有着高进入壁垒的封闭的无效市场。


Might the world’s leading economists be so keen to protect their own ideas that they ignore (or, worse, stifle) innovation from unexpected quarters?	世界领先经济学也许太热衷于捍卫自己的思想，以致于忽略（或者更糟糕地，打压）意料外的创新？


For a group of people so committed to free markets and so enamored of “creative destruction,” that is a question that urgently needs to be addressed.	对于一个坚信自由市场、着迷于“创造性破坏”的群体而言，这是一个急需解决的问题。


The answer may hold enormous implications not only for intellectual growth, but also for human welfare.	答案不但对智识增长有着巨大影响，也对人类福祉至关重要。


To the Victors Go the Foils	成功之路雄关漫道


NEW YORK – A surprising number of elections and political transitions is scheduled to occur over the coming months.	纽约—在未来几个月中，选举和政治接班日程表惊人地满。


An incomplete list includes Russia, China, France, the United States, Egypt, Mexico, and South Korea.	拒不完全统计，俄罗斯、中国、法国、美国、埃及、墨西哥和韩国都将发生权力交接。


At first glance, these countries have little in common. Some are well-established democracies; some are authoritarian systems; and others are somewhere in between.	乍一看，这些国家基本没有共同点，它们中有的是老牌民主国家，有的是独裁制度，还有的介于两者之间。


Yet, for all of their differences, these governments – and the individuals who will lead them – face many of the same challenges.	但是，尽管差别万万千，这些国家的政府——以及它们所领导的人民——面临着许多同样的挑战。


Three stand out.	尤为显著者有三。


The first is that no country is entirely its own master.	首先，这些国家都不能完全掌握自己的命运。


In today’s world, no country enjoys total autonomy or independence.	当今世界，没有哪个国家可以享受完全的自治和独立。


To one degree or another, all depend on access to foreign markets to sell their manufactured goods, agricultural products, resources, or services – or to supply them.	各国或多或少都依赖外国市场出售或提供制造品、农产品、资源和服务。


None can eliminate economic competition with others over access to third-country markets.	没有人可以在不和其他国家竞争的情况下独享第三国市场。


Many countries require capital inflows to finance investment or official debt.	许多国家需要资本流入来为投资和官方债务融资。


Global supply and demand largely set oil and gas prices.	全球供给和需求决定了原油和天然气的价格。


Economic interdependence and the vulnerability associated with it is an inescapable fact of contemporary life.	经济上的相互依赖及其伴生的脆弱性是现代生活中无可躲避的宿命。


But economic dependence on others is not the only international reality with which governments must contend.	但经济上依赖他国并不是各国政府所需面临的唯一国际现实。


It is equally difficult – if not impossible – for countries to isolate themselves from terrorism, weapons, pandemic disease, or climate change.	想要免于恐怖主义、武器、大范围流行病和气候变化困扰同样十分困难（如果不是不可能的话）。


After all, borders are not impermeable.	毕竟，边境线并不是滴水不漏的。


On the contrary, globalization – the immense flow across borders of people, ideas, greenhouse gases, goods, services, currencies, commodities, television and radio signals, drugs, weapons, emails, viruses (computer and biological), and a good deal else – is a defining reality of our time.	相反，全球化——人口、思想、温室气体、商品、服务、货币、商品、电视和广播信号、毒品、武器、电子邮件、电脑和生物病毒和其他种种的大面积跨境流动——是当今世界的显著特征。


Few of the challenges that it raises can be met unilaterally; more often than not, cooperation, compromise, and a degree of multilateralism are essential.	上述挑战没有哪个可以由某国单枪匹马地解决，合作、妥协以及一定程度的多边主义至关重要，这与其说是特例，不如说是常态。


A second universal challenge is technology.	第二大普遍存在的挑战是技术。


George Orwell’s vision of 1984 could hardly have been more wrong, because the hallmark of modern technology is not Big Brother, but decentralization.	从这一点来说，奥威尔（George Orwell）的《1984》大错特错了，因为现代技术的标志绝非老大哥（Big Brother），而是分散化。


More computing power can now be held on a desktop or in a person’s hand than could be gathered in a room only a generation ago. 	一代人之前需要用大如房间的计算机才能实现的计算能力，现在在一台桌面电脑或个人手持设备上就能实现了。


As a result, people everywhere now have more access to more sources of information than ever before. making it increasingly difficult for governments to control, much less monopolize, the flow of knowledge.	结果，如今各国人民所能获得信息源前所未有地丰富，政府想要控制信息源越来越困难，知识流的垄断程度越来越低。


Citizens also have a growing ability through mobile phones and social networking to communicate directly and discreetly with one another. 	公民通过手机和社交网络进行直接、私密的沟通越来越容易。


One consequence of this trend is that authoritarian governments can no longer wield control over their citizens as easily as they once did.	这一趋势的一大结果是独裁政府越来越难以向从前那样将公民玩弄于股掌之间。


Technology is, no doubt, one explanation for the uprisings that we are seeing in much of the Arab world.	毫无疑问，技术是我们现在所看到的阿拉伯世界起义爆发的原因之一。


But modern technology also has implications for well-established democracies.	但现代技术对老牌民主国家同样具有影响。


It is far more difficult to generate social consensus and to govern in a world in which citizens can choose what they read, watch, and listen to, and with whom they talk.	获得社会一致更加困难了，治理一个公民可以选择读什么、看什么、听什么、和谁说的世界难于上青天。


A third widespread challenge that awaits emerging leaders is the inescapable reality that citizens’ demands increasingly overwhelm the capacity to satisfy them.	等待未来领导人的第三大广泛挑战是公民之所欲远远超过满足能力这一无可避免的现实。


This was always true in the so-called developing (and often relatively poor) world.	这一点在所谓的发展中（通常也是相对贫困）国家中是永恒的真理。


But now it is also the case in the relatively well-off mature democracies, as well as among those countries that have been growing fastest.	但如今，境况相对较佳的成熟民主国家也在日渐面临这一问题，增长最快的国家亦然。


Economic growth is slower in many cases than the historic norm.	从诸多方面看，如今经济增长不如历史正常水平。


This is readily apparent for much of Europe, Japan, and the US.	欧洲大部、日本和美国的颓势相当明显。


But growth is also slowing in China and India, which together account for more than one-third of the world’s population.	但人口总和相当于世界总数三分之一强的中国和印度也在减速。


Unemployment rates are high, especially in the US and Western Europe, and especially among the young and those nearing the end of their careers (but who are still expected to live for decades).	失业率高企，特别是美国和西欧，而年轻人和接近退休年龄（但还有几十年寿命）者又是重灾区。


More worrying still, much of this will translate into long-term unemployment.	更令人担心的是，许多失业者会沦为长期失业者。


The net result of these economic and demographic shifts is that a growing share of national income is now being directed to provide health, pensions, and other forms of basic support, while a declining percentage of citizens in nearly every society is now working to support a growing number of fellow citizens.	这些经济和人口变迁的净结果是，国民收入中越来越多的部分被用于提供卫生、养老和其他形式的基本支持； 几乎在所有国家，勉力工作供养数量与日俱增的同胞的公民比例正在下降。


This rising dependency ratio is made worse by widening economic inequality; as more wealth is concentrated in fewer hands, the promise of ever-improving standards of living for most people may not be fulfilled.	赡养比的上升之势因经济不平等性的加剧而恶化； 由于更多的财富集中在更少的人��中，因此大多数人生活水平持续改善的承诺可能将无法实现。


Together, these three trends – a loss of economic and physical autonomy, the diffusion of information technology, and slower growth against a backdrop of larger and older populations – will create enormous political challenges in virtually every country.	总而言之，这三大趋势——经济和实体独立性的丧失、信息技术的扩散以及人口增长和老化背景下的增长减速——将在几乎所有国家造成重大政治挑战。


Demands are mounting at the same time as the ability of governments to satisfy them is diminishing.	需求在不断增长，而政府满足需求的能力却在降低。


The leaders who will take power after this year’s transitions will confront this fundamental reality.	即将在明年掌权的领导人将不得不面对这一基本现实。


Leaders will also have to confront the byproducts of increased nationalism, populism, and, in some cases, extremism.	领导人还必须面对民族主义、民粹主义以及（在某些国家）极端主义的抬头。


Hostility to immigration and economic protectionism, already visible, can be projected to increase.	抵制移民和经济保护主义苗头已经清晰可见，而且可以预见将会愈演愈烈。


These developments within countries will make more difficult the challenge of generating global consensus on how to meet threats beyond borders: as governing successfully at home becomes more difficult, so will governing abroad.	这些国家内部的发展形势将使形成关于如何面对跨境威胁的全球共识变得难上加难：既然安内都在日益艰难，更遑论攘外了。


For citizens and leaders alike, tough times lie ahead.	不管对公民还是对领导人，艰苦时代正在前方等着。


Toward a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union?	迈向真正的经济和货币联盟？


FRANKFURT – Since Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was created, no progress toward political unification has been made – or even really attempted.	法兰克福—自欧洲经济与货币联盟（EMU）成立以来，从未取得迈向政治联盟的进步——甚至连真正的尝试都没有。


Now that Europe’s current crisis has convinced many that existing institutional arrangements are unsustainable, this may be about to change.	如今，欧洲危机让许多人相信，现有制度安排不可持续，即将发生改变。


But should it?	但理应如此吗？


According to the presidents of the European Commission, the Euro Summit, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank, and the European Parliament, the answer is yes.	如果你问欧盟委员会主席、欧元峰会主席、欧元集团主席、欧洲央行行长和欧洲议会主席，他们的答案是肯定的。 事实上，在一份最新报告中，他们呼吁迈向一个“深度的、真正的、公平的”EMU；


Indeed, in a recent report, they call for progress toward a “deep, genuine, and fair” EMU; economic, financial, and fiscal union; and a political union that provides the foundation for the rest “through genuine democratic accountability, legitimacy, and institutional strengthening.”	经济的、金融的、财政的联盟； 以及一个“通过真正的民主问责、合法性和制度强化”为其他人提供基础的政治联盟。


The report echoes similar proposals by academics, journalists, and other public officials, including, most notably, French President François Hollande.	这份报告在学界、新闻加和其他公共官员中间激起了共鸣，其中包括（最引人关注的）法国总统奥朗德。


In my view, however, the report, like the proposal to establish a European finance minister, is fundamentally flawed.	但是，在我看来，这份报告无异于建议成立一个欧洲财政部，它存在根本缺陷。


While the report contains a number of important observations, its underlying assumption – that steps toward all of its goals should be taken in parallel, with a genuine political union emerging at the end of the process – is problematic.	该报告包括了诸多重要观察，但其基础假设——迈向其所有目标的措施应该起头并进，最后建立一个真正的政治联盟——大有问题。


After all, establishing a political union would require amendments to national constitutions and, in most countries, referendums.	毕竟，建立一个政治联盟需要修订各国宪法，在大部分国家中还需要全民公决。


But voters are far from enthusiastic about the prospect of ceding more authority to Europe.	但选民对于让渡更多主权给欧洲的前景并无多少热情。


Initially, monetary union was supposed to propel Europe toward political union.	最初，货币联盟的意图是促使欧洲迈向政治联盟。


But the euro is no longer a strong common currency that reinforces a shared European identity.	但欧元已不再是加强欧洲共同身份的强势共同货币。


On the contrary, it is now a source of deep resentment among European peoples – resentment that, 70 years after the end of World War II, was supposed to have been eliminated.	相反，现在欧元在欧洲各民族间制造了深刻的怨恨——在二战结束已经70年的今天，这种怨恨应该早已被根除了。


To be sure, many have suggested that the current crisis represents a vital opportunity to overcome these tensions and build an ever-closer union, citing the belief of Jean Monnet, one of the European Union’s main architects, that crises are critical to spur progress toward integration.	诚然，许多人认为当前的危机是克服这些紧张局面、构建更加紧密的联盟的良机，用欧盟主要缔造者让·莫内（Jean Monnet）的信念讲，危机是刺激迈向一体化的进步的关键。


But can this approach work at a time when there is so little trust among member countries?	但这一套在成员国之间毫无信任可言的时候还管用吗？


Or would pushing forward under such circumstances create even more resistance?	在如此情况下推动一体化是否会造成更大的抵制？


The five presidents recommend launching their proposed agenda to reinvigorate integration only after 2017.	五位主席/行长建议到2017年后再开始实施他们所提出的日程。


It seems likely that this timing reflects the fear that voters in the biggest countries, where elections will be held in the next two years, will react negatively to the proposal.	看起来这一时间选择体现出他们担心最大国家（将在未来两年中举行大选）的选民对他们的方案持负面态度。


This is not a sign of great confidence in the suggested procedure.	这表明对于建议程序的信心并不充足。


The reality is that a European political union is unlikely to be established anytime soon.	现实是，欧洲政治联盟不可能在近期实现。


And without true political unification, efforts to pursue the rest of the presidents’ plan, including the transfer of fiscal competencies to the European level, would carry serious risks.	而没有真正的政治统一，追求主席/部长计划剩余部分的努力，包括将财政胜任力转移给欧洲层面，都将面临严重的风险。


Fiscal integration is high on the five presidents’ agenda.	财政一体化在五位主席/行长的日程中占据重要地位。


Although the Stability and Growth Pact has lost more and more respect (indeed, it is now to be applied, according to the European Commission, purely according to national leaders’ discretion), it would remain the anchor for fiscal stability and confidence.	尽管《稳定与增长公约》已经越来越失去尊重（事实上，据欧盟委员会的说法，该公约现在几乎完全根据国家领导人的自由裁量来执行），但将是财政稳定和信心之锚。


The report also specifies that a genuine fiscal union would require “more joint decision-making on fiscal policy.”	报告好具体说明了一个真正的财政联盟需要“更加联合的财政政策决策”。


The presidents insist that this “would not mean centralization of all aspects of revenue and expenditure policy,” with member states continuing to decide on taxation and the allocation of budgetary expenditures.	主席/行长们坚持，这“并不意味着收入和支出政策的全方位集中，”成员国将继续决定各自的税收和预算支出分配。


But “as the euro area evolves towards a genuine EMU,” they explain, “decisions will increasingly need to be made collectively,” perhaps through a eurozone treasury.	但“随着欧元区演化为真正的EMU，”他们解释说，“决策将日益需要集体做出，”也许是通过欧元区财政部来进行。


Limited or not, this is a transfer of fiscal responsibility to the European level.	不管有何限制，这事将财政责任转移给欧洲层面。


And it is difficult to imagine how the report’s call for “democratic accountability and legitimacy” in the decision-making process can be met without a full-fledged political union.	难以想象报告所呼吁的决策过程中的“民主问责和合法性”能够在没有完整的政治联盟的情况下实现。


There is a fundamental conflict between the call to give priority to European needs and the dictates of member states’ constitutions, which cannot be resolved by gradually shifting competences de facto from the national to the European level, or by expanding the EU budget.	优先考虑欧洲需求和各成员国宪法规定之间存在根本性冲突，这一冲突无法通过逐渐将胜任能力在实际上从国家层面转移到欧洲层面解决，也无法通过扩大欧盟预算解决。


Within the existing institutional framework, political responsibility for higher transfer payments among countries must remain with the national governments, controlled by national parliaments and electorates.	在现有制度框架内，提高国家间转移支付的政治责任必须仍由国家政府负担，由国家议会和选民控制。


Political union may remain possible in the distant future.	政治联盟在遥远的未来仍然是可能的。


It cannot, however, be achieved through the back door, by eroding members’ fiscal-policy sovereignty.	但是，它无法通过蚕食成员国财政政策主权的捷径实现。


Attempting to compel transfer payments would generate moral hazard on the part of the recipients and resistance from the donors, with the resulting increase in tensions possibly jeopardizing the integration that has been achieved so far.	试图强行推动转移支付将在受付者身上制造更大的道德风险，在支付者身上制造更大的抵制，由此导致的紧张局面升级可能破坏目前已经实现的一体化。


Given this, for a considerable period of time, Europe’s monetary union will have to exist without political union.	因此，在相当长的一段时间内，欧洲货币联盟都必须在没有政治联盟的情况下存在。


In other words, the EMU will remain an institutional arrangement among individual countries that retain their fiscal sovereignty.	换句话说，EMU将依然是保有财政主权的个体国家之间的制度安排。


The key to making such a system work is to ensure that national governments are held accountable for their economic policies.	让这一体系起作用的关键是确保国家政府的经济政策受到问责。


All treaties and commitments – including, crucially, the Maastricht Treaty’s “no bailout” clause – must be respected without exception.	一切条约和承诺——包括至关重要的《马斯特里赫特条约》的“无救援”条款——都必须无一例外地受到尊重。


Pacta sunt servanda – agreements must be honored.	有约必守。


If this principle is permanently violated, how can one expect a prosperous future based on a new set of treaties that are even more demanding than the existing ones?	如果这一原则被永久性破坏，你如何期待实现基于比现有条约要求更高的新条约的繁荣未来？


Toward a Peaceful Pacific	建设和平的太平洋


MELBOURNE – The Western Pacific is currently facing a difficult problem – how to accommodate China’s rising aspirations in a region where the United States has held primacy since the Cold War’s end.	墨尔本——如何在冷战后由美国占据主导地位的西太平洋地区容忍中国越来越高的期望值是该地区目前正面临的难题。


Is the US determined to maintain dominance in the Asia-Pacific region?	美国是决意保持它在亚太地区的主导地位？


Or is it willing to operate through multilateral forums that allow all involved parties to help set the rules?	还是愿意建立多边论坛，让相关国家共同制定规则？


The way this issue plays out will determine whether peace continues to prevail across the Pacific.	如何处理这一问题将决定太平洋地区能否实现持续和平。


It is difficult to see the stationing of 2,500 US Marines in Darwin, Australia – a decision announced by US President Barack Obama on his recent tour of Asia – as anything more than a symbolic gesture, a provocative reminder that the US is determined to stay in the region.	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马在最近访问亚洲时宣布了在澳大利亚达尔文派驻2，500名美国海军陆战队士兵的决定，这一决定除了象征性的姿态外很难看出其他意义，它充其量是一种挑衅性的提醒，宣布美国决心留在亚太地区。


America’s purpose, however, remains unclear.	但美国并没有明确的目的。


Across the Asia-Pacific region, China’s rise is viewed as a welcome development, but one that requires China to play within internationally accepted rules.	亚太地区所有国家都欢迎中国崛起，但这需要中国遵守国际公认的规则。


That dictum, of course, should apply to everyone.	当然，每个国家都应该遵守国际规则。


But tensions will inevitably arise if China has no say in the creation of these rules.	但如果中国在制定规则时没有发言权，就不可避免会出现紧张局势。


It is difficult to predict how America role in the region will evolve.	很难预料美国在亚太地区的角色会怎样变化。


China’s economic and military power is rising.	中国的经济和军事实力都迅速崛起。


The US, on the other hand, continues to dominate militarily, while its economic influence is waning.	而另一方面，美国则在经济实力萎缩的同时继续在军事上占据主导地位。


In any case, China will invariably respond harshly to US efforts to step up its military presence in the region.	无论如何，美国加强亚太地区军力的行为肯定会引发中国方面激烈的反应。


Containing China is not the answer to Asia’s security questions.	遏制中国无法解决亚洲安全问题。


The Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea’s islands and sea lanes are all issues of potential dispute between the US and China.	朝鲜半岛、台湾、南海岛屿及航道都是美中两国可能引起争议的问题。


But, while these issues are important, both sides should pursue diplomatic efforts to minimize Sino-American rivalry over them – and thus avoid embarking on a new cold war.	虽然这些问题至关重要，但双方都应该采取外交手段尽量控制中美敌对情绪的发展，避免爆发新一轮冷战。


Under current conditions, responding to China’s rise with military force would be unwelcome.	在现有条件下，用军事威胁来回应中国的崛起并非明智之举。


China is modernizing its military and intends to become a significant sea power, prompting many China observers to call for greater transparency.	中国正在实现军事现代化，力求成为重要的海上强国，而这导致很多中国观察家要求增加透明度。


But it is doubtful that the US offers China much transparency about its own military capabilities.	但美国是否会就其自身的军事实力向中国提供信息非常值得怀疑。


To put the issue in perspective, the US defense budget constitutes 43% of all military spending worldwide, whereas China’s expenditure represents a little over 7%.	对这一问题的正确看法是，美国的防卫预算占全世界总防卫开支的43%。 而中国的军费开支却只有7%。


No country will talk openly about its military capacity in anything but the broadest terms.	没有哪个国家愿意详细谈论自己的军力。


Too many observers forget that China’s nuclear force is a deterrent only – far too small to be a first-strike force.	太多观察家忘记了中国的核武器只是一种震摄——中国的核武器数量太少，很难发起主动攻击。


And China is among the first countries prepared to make a no-first-use pledge, provided other nuclear powers reciprocate.	而且只要其他核国家响应，中国是首批愿意承诺不首先使用核武器的国家之一。


China has demonstrated no interest in emulating either the nineteenth-century European imperial powers, or Japan’s imperial efforts in the first half of the twentieth century.	中国看似没有兴趣仿效十九世纪的欧洲列强，也无意仿效二十世纪上半世纪的日本帝国主义。


Anxiety about such ambitions ignores China’s history.	担心中国有此野心的人忽略了中国的历史。


The Chinese remember all too painfully the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers on China and Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.	中国无法忘记十九及二十世纪早期西方列强强加给中日两国的不平等条约带来的痛苦回忆。


An alliance between the US, Japan, Australia, and possibly India designed to contain China would be greeted by the Chinese with that history firmly in mind.	中国在对美、日、澳、或许还有印度的遏制中国联盟作出反应时会牢牢记住这段历史。


China will most likely regard the cooperation agreement recently announced by the Japanese and Indian defense ministers as a response to US pressure.	最近日印两国防务部长公布的合作协议很可能被中国视为来自美国的压力。


Its leaders will again suggest that a policy of containment is being pursued, and that this Cold War strategic concept is inimical to peaceful development in the Western Pacific.	中国领导人将再次想起目前实施的遏制政策，这种冷战战略思维对西太平洋的和平发展非常不利。


While the historical background is important, the West’s strategic position depends on today’s actions.	虽然历史背景非常重要，但西方的战略立场取决于今天的行为。


For example, China has helped – maybe not enough – with the problems presented by North Korea.	比如，虽然可能还做得不够，但中国已经试图协助解决朝鲜问题。


To reduce tensions in the region, perhaps the US should initiate long-avoided direct talks with North Korea, which could help to resolve the security issues posed by that country’s regime.	为了缓和地区紧张局势，或许美国应该启动其一直逃避的与北朝鲜的直接会谈，这或许有助于解决该国政权造成的安全问题。


Furthermore, the Spratly Islands dispute should be resolved through international adjudication.	此外，南沙群岛争端应通过国际管辖权加以解决。


The islands, claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, are valuable because of their oil reserves and commercial fishing industry.	中国、台湾、越南、菲律宾、马来西亚和文莱都宣称对南沙岛屿拥有主权，这些小岛因其石油储量和商业渔业价值而显得弥足珍贵。


It is critical that the countries claiming sovereignty over the islands abide by international law and commit to keeping the area’s sea-lanes open.	重要的是主权争议国家应该遵守国际法，承诺保持区域航道畅通无阻。


Diplomacy, not force of arms, is the best way to pursue these objectives.	外交斡旋而非武力打击是实现上述目标的最佳方式。


Of course, diplomacy needs to be backed by strength, but the US has plenty without militarizing the Asia-Pacific region more than it already has.	外交斡旋当然要以实力为后盾，但美国拥有足够的实力，而不用依靠亚太地区进一步军事化。


Peaceful resolution of these conflicts requires giving China a role in the decision-making process, which implies that the US and China alike relinquish any desire for regional primacy.	这些冲突的和平解决取决于能否在决策过程中给予中国发言权，但这意味着美中两国都必须放弃地区称霸的野心。


During the first Taiwan Straits crisis in 1954, China began shelling the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu, threatening to “liberate” Taiwan.	1954年首次台海危机期间，中国扬言要“解放”台湾，并开始炮轰近海的金门和马祖等岛屿。


As the US contemplated a possible nuclear attack on China, Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies quietly told US President Dwight Eisenhower, “If there is a war over Taiwan, it is your affair and not ours.”	在美国考虑对中国发动核打击时，澳大利亚总理罗伯特·孟席斯悄悄对美国总统艾森豪威尔说，“如果目的是争夺台湾，这场战争和我们无关，只是你们自己的问题。


Menzies was right.	”孟席斯是对的。


He understood the distinction between US objectives and Australia’s national interests.	他清楚美国目标和澳大利亚国家利益之间的区别。


The US will never place a large land army on the Asian mainland again.	美国永远也不可能在亚洲大陆进行大规模登陆作战。


Wars cannot be won from the air alone, and the US will not start a nuclear contest.	仅靠空袭无法赢得战争，而美国不会挑起核战争。


The stationing of US Marines in northern Australia thus appears pointless: these troops have no conceivable reason to be there.	因此在澳大利亚北部派驻美国海军陆战队员看起来毫无意义。 这些部队根本没有理由待在那里。


In addition, they have divided Australian public opinion unnecessarily on the vital issue of the country’s security.	此外，他们还引发了澳大利亚公众舆论对国家安全关键问题的不必要的争议。


Asia today presents a completely new and unique set of circumstances.	今天的亚洲给我们出了一道全新而独特的难题。


The dilemmas arising from these circumstances demand new solutions, not obsolete Cold War-era concepts.	这种局势造成的困境需要全新的解决方案，而不是老掉牙的冷战思维方式。


Towards an Asia-Europe Partnership	迈向亚欧合作


BERLIN amp#45;amp#45; Asia’s rise as an economic and political player exemplifies what globalization is all about.	柏林——亚洲在经济和政治上扮演重要角色很好地表明了全球化所带来的影响。


By the decade’s end, China’s economy will be larger than Germany’s.	到2010年，中国的经济总量将超过德国。


By 2040 three of the world’s five largest economies – China, India, and Japan – will be in Asia.	到2040年，世界上最大的五个经济体中有三个即中国、印度和日本将是在亚洲。


That is one side of the Asian picture.	这仅仅是亚洲整体面貌的一面。


The other side is persistent poverty, lack of development, massive environmental degradation, a widespread rural-urban divide, demographic problems, and troubled banking systems.	另一面是长期的贫困、发展的缺乏、严重的环境退化、广泛存在的城乡差别、人口问题以及存在严重问题的银行体系。


The picture is further complicated by security risks such as nuclear arms proliferation, fundamentalism, and weak or failing governance.	这些问题因为核武器扩散、原教旨主义和低能或者缺乏管制等等的安全风险而变得愈加复杂。


The sweeping changes underway in Asia are not just economic, but have also created new political realities that cannot be ignored.	亚洲正在面临的巨大变化不仅仅是经济上的，它们同时还制造出了我们无法忽视的政治现实。


Asian countries now act with much greater self-assurance than in the past.	亚洲国家现在比过去表现得要自信得多。


Their military budgets are expanding, and there are regional rivalries.	它们的军费开支不断在增长，并且还存在地区竞争。


Thus, along with tremendous opportunities implied by globalization, political risks must also be addressed.	因此，尽管全球化带来了巨大的机遇，它所带来的政治风险也是必须注意的。


German and European policymakers must make clear what Europe has to offer Asia, and can do so at this month’s EU/ASEAN and EU/China summits.	德国和欧洲的政策制定者必须弄清楚欧洲可以给亚洲带去什么，这正是他们可以在本月的欧盟-东盟峰会以及欧盟-中国峰会上提出来的。


The “soft power” of Europe’s political and social model is well known.	欧洲政治和社会模式的“软实力”是众所周知的。


As an Asian leader once told me, Europeans have what many Asian societies aspire to: democratic government, advanced infrastructure, civil rights, world-class companies, high educational and social standards, and a rich cultural heritage.	正如一位亚洲领导人曾经告诉我的，欧洲有着许多亚洲社会所渴望拥有的东西：民主的政府、先进的基础设施、公民的权利、世界级的企业、很高的教育和社会水准以及丰富的文化遗产。


This gives us considerable standing.	这些使我们拥有了很高的地位。


It is crucial to ensure that our European model, with its emphasis on a fair deal for everyone, remains competitive.	重要的是确保我们强调人人平等的欧洲模式保持竞争力。


Nevertheless, Germany stands to lose more than any other country from any protectionist-minded retreat from globalization.	然而，德国比任何其他国家都更可能因为任何保守主义而拒绝全球化的思想而遭受损失。


In the first six months of 2007 alone, the value of German exports nearly passed €500 billion.	仅仅是在2007年的前六个月中，德国的出口额就几乎超过了5000亿欧元。


But free trade is a two-way street.	但是自由贸易是一条双行道。


Artificially low exchange rates, restrictions on capital flows, and excessively large currency reserves all create global imbalances.	人为制造的低汇率、对资本流动的限制以及过分庞大的外汇储备都制造了全球经济的不平衡。


Any strategic partnership between Europe and Asia must encourage global economic responsibility based on cooperation and transparency.	欧洲与亚洲之间任何战略性的伙伴关系都必须鼓励基础合作和透明的全球经济责任。


Europe and Asia must jointly commit to an agenda underscoring global resources and sustainability.	欧洲和亚洲必须携手把强调全球资源和可持续性发展提到议事日程上来。


Environmental, climate, and energy issues concern everyone.	环境、气候和能源问题与每一个人都密切相关。


China is already a top carbon dioxide emitter.	中国已经成为最大的二氧化碳排放国。


Environmental degradation in Asia not only harms its population’s health, but will become an impediment to growth.	亚洲环境的退化不仅影响其人口的健康，同时也会阻碍经济的增长。


Growth is important to us in Europe, and it is even more important to Asia‘s emerging economies.	增长对我们欧洲非常重要，而对亚洲的新兴经济体则更加重要。


But, as European experience shows, it is often worth sacrificing short-term benefits for the sake of longer-term gain.	但是，正如欧洲过去的经验所表明的，为了长期的利益而牺牲一些短期的利益通常是很值得的。


The history of European integration suggests that regional cooperation, give and take, the pursuit of shared goals, and even in some areas the transfer of sovereignty are the best ways to overcome tensions and promote peaceful problem-solving.	欧洲一体化的历史表明地区的合作、互谅互让、追求共同的目标甚至在某些地区转移主权是抑制地区紧张以及促进和平解决矛盾的最佳方式。


Certain elements of this European path may be relevant to Asia’s own regional cooperation.	这种欧洲道路的某些因素也许非常适合亚洲自己地区的合作。


Indeed, Asian trade and commodity flows are increasingly interlinked.	事实上，亚洲内部贸易和商品流通的关系已经变得越来越紧密了。


ASEAN members conduct almost 50% of their trade within Asia.	东盟成员国与亚洲国家的贸易额占了它们贸易总额几乎50%。


Economic relations between major players such as China and Japan are increasingly close – owing not only to booming trade, but also to direct investment and regional production networks.	中国和日本这些大国的经济联系变得越来越紧密——不仅仅是贸易额的持续增长，还有直接投资和地区产品网络的加强。


Economic links pave the way for political rapprochement and closer ties.	经济上的联系为政治上的友好关系和更紧密的纽带关系铺平了道路。


ASEAN, together with its affiliated bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, is the driving force behind the intensification of Asian cooperation, in which security, too, is a factor.	东盟以及它的附属机构，如东盟地区论坛和东亚峰会，是推动亚洲合作的重要力量，在这方面，安全也是推动合作的重要因素。


ASEAN is working with its partners to tackle global issues such as security, energy, and climate change, and its plans for a charter on enhanced cooperation is an encouraging first step toward creating a political architecture.	东盟正与它的合作伙伴一道共同应对安全、能源和气候变化这样的全球问题，并且它计划就加强合作制定一部宪章，这将是朝创建一个政治体迈出的令人鼓舞的第一步。


This year, the EU’s contacts with ASEAN and its members have become much closer.	今年，欧盟与东盟及其成员国之间的联系变得更加紧密。


The foreign ministers’ meeting held during Germany’s EU Council presidency produced the Nuremberg Declaration, which established a framework for closer EU-ASEAN partnership.	在德国召开欧盟首脑峰会期间举行的外长会议发表了《纽伦堡宣言》，为欧盟与东盟之间的更紧密的伙伴关系制定了框架。


Europe must become a stakeholder in Asia if both sides are to gain maximum benefit from cooperation and help shape the world of the future.	如果欧洲和亚洲希望从相互合作中获得最大的利益以及为世界未来的发展制定走向，那么欧洲就必须成为亚洲的利益相关者。


In Asia, people increasingly realize that sharing in global prosperity also means sharing responsibility for global peace and development.	在亚洲，人们越来越认识到分享全球经济的繁荣同时也意味着要共同承担对全球和平和发展的责任。


We see this in the higher profile that China has taken in defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis and in drafting the recent Security Council resolution on Darfur.	我们在中国缓和朝鲜核危机以及草拟了安理会最近在达尔富尔问题的决议上看到了它们在这方面越来越好的表现。


With Japan’s upcoming G-8 presidency and the Beijing Olympic Games next year, Asia will be under a spotlight as never before.	随着即将在日本召开的八国峰会以及明年将在北京��开的奥运会的临近，亚洲将会受到前所未有的关注。


In the light of developments such as in Myanmar, ASEAN must state clearly where it stands.	在诸如缅甸等国家的发展问题方面，东盟必须清楚地表明它的立场。


This recalibration of global responsibility will have to be a step-by-step process fostering dialogue and stability.	这种对全球责任的重新校正肯定会是一个推动对话和稳定的逐步的过程。


Here, too, it would be wrong to take an all-or-nothing approach.	在这方面采取决不妥协的方式同样是不可取的。


Europe must take Asian views on global governance seriously.	欧洲必须重视亚洲在全球治理上的观点。


By the same token, the new Asian players must take into account the progress achieved in this regard in the latter half of the twentieth century.	同样地，新兴的亚洲大国必须考虑在这方面它们在二十世纪后半叶所取得的进展。


The challenge for twenty-first century statecraft will be to devise joint solutions to common problems.	对于二十一世纪治理国家的挑战是设计出应对共同面临的问题的集体解决方案。


This was what inspired the Heiligendamm Process launched at this year’s G-8 Summit, which for the first time brought G-8 leaders together with leaders of the world’s major emerging economies, including China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa.	这正是在今年的八国峰会上启动海利根达姆进程的动因，它第一次使八国的领导人以及世界主要的新兴经济体，包括中国、印度、巴西、墨西哥和南非的领导人走到了一起。


There is no inevitable contradiction between European values, on the one hand, and what are deemed Asian values, on the other.	在欧洲的价值观与被认为是亚洲的价值观之间并不存在不可避免的对立。


Where interests conflict and opportunities coexist with tensions, a readiness and capacity for dialogue is the only way forward.	当利益冲突和机遇与关系进展共同存在时，准备进行对话和对话的能力是取得前进的唯一途径。


We have mutually enriching Euro-Asian traditions that could serve as a basis for such a dialogue.	我们共同拥有的丰富的欧亚关系的传统就是这种对话的基础。


It is in this context that Europe’s commitment to internal reform, human rights, international law, and responsible governance should be seen.	正是在这方面欧洲在内部改革、人权、国际法和负责任的治理上的努力应该受到大家的重视。


Global values are a cause that Europe intends to promote worldwide.	全球价值观是欧洲希望在全球推广的一项事业。


Obviously, that means meeting the standards that we expect of others.	显然，那意味着达到我们希望其他人达到的标准。


In this progressive transformation of the international system, German and European foreign policy will play an active role.	在这一国际体系的逐步转变中，德国和欧洲的外交政策将扮演一个积极的角色。


What is needed is not rhetoric, but levelheaded efforts to find practical and forward-looking solutions to key issues on which regional and international cooperation is urgently required.	我们需要的不是夸夸其谈，而是为找到地区和国家合作所迫切需要解决的重要问题的实际并且前瞻性的解决方案而付出头脑清醒的努力。


Toxic Tests	有毒测试


CAMBRIDGE – The United States government is now permitting ten of America’s biggest banks to repay about $70 billion of the capital injected into them last fall.	剑桥——美国政府同意，美国最大的银行中的10家可以逐步偿还去年秋天政府注资的700亿美元，原因是这些银行通过美国财政部要求的“压力测试”。


This decision followed the banks having passed the so-called “stress tests” of their financial viability, which the US Treasury demanded, and the success of some of them in raising the additional capital that the tests suggested they needed.	压力测试的目的是检测银行的金融生存情况。 根据测试的结果，另外一些银行则被允许在市场上融资。


Many people have inferred from this sequence of events that US banks – which are critical to both the American and world economies – are now out of trouble.	一些人由此判断，美国银行——这个和美国人和美国经济生死攸关的行业——已经摆脱了困境。


But that inference is seriously mistaken.	显然，这些想法是非常错误的。


In fact, the US stress tests didn’t attempt to estimate the losses that banks have suffered on many of the “toxic assets” that have been at the heart of the financial crisis.	实际上，此次“压力测试”并没有涉及到“有毒资产”所遭造成的损失，这才是导致此次金融危机的罪魁祸首。


Nevertheless, the US model is catching on.	更为糟糕的是，很多国家愿意效仿“美国模式”。


In a meeting this month, finance ministers of G-8 countries agreed to follow the US and perform stress tests on their banks.	在本月的8国财长峰会上，大家一直同意要对本国的银行进行“压力测试”。


But, if the results of such tests are to be reliable, they should avoid the US tests’ fundamental flaw.	如果要想使得测试的结果更有说服力，他们就应该避免“美国模式”中的一些基本错误。


Until recently, much of the US government’s focus has been on the toxic assets clogging banks’ balance sheets.	目前，美国政府对有毒资产的注意力还大多停留在银行的资产负债表上。


Although accounting rules often permit banks to price these assets at face value, it is generally believed that the fundamental value of many toxic assets has fallen significantly below face value.	虽然根据会计准则，银行可以将资产按照帐面价格来统计。 实际上，很多有毒资产的实际价格已经远远不是帐面价格了。


The Obama administration came out with a plan to spend up to $1 trillion dollars to buy banks’ toxic assets, but the plan has been put on hold.	奥巴马政府计划用1万亿美元来购买银行的有毒资产，但目前，该计划被暂时搁置起来。


It might have been hoped that the bank supervisors who stress-tested the banks would try to estimate the size of the banks’ losses on toxic assets.	银行管理者在进行“压力测试”时候，应该考虑到有毒资产的因素。


Instead, supervisors estimated only losses that banks can be expected to incur on loans (and other assets) that will come to maturity by the end of 2010.	他们目前只是考虑到2010年之前银行因为贷款而受到的损失。


They chose to ignore any losses that banks will suffer on loans that will mature after 2010.	2010年之后的损失都没有考虑在内。


Thus, the tests did not take into account a big part of the economic damage that the crisis imposed on banks.	而这个对银行来说，是它们受到经济重创的主要原因。


Although we don’t yet have an estimate of the economic losses the stress tests have chosen to ignore, they may be substantial.	虽然本次测试不涉及到这部分损失，但其实它们数额巨大。


According to a recent report by Deutsche Bank, for example, borrowers will have difficulty refinancing hundreds of billions of dollars of commercial real estate loans that will mature after 2010.	根据德国银行近期的一项报告，很多商业房地产贷款项目在2010年到期以后，很难再获得数千亿美元的贷款。


Rather than estimate the economic value of banks’ assets – what the assets would fetch in a well-functioning market – and the extent to which they exceed liabilities, the stress tests merely sought to verify that the banks’ accounting losses over the next two years will not exhaust their capital as recorded in their books.	本次压力测试忽视了银行资产的经济价值——也就是资产是否能在有效的市场环境中运行——和他们可以承受的程度，它仅仅测试银行在未来的两年中，如果继续亏损，能否顺利渡过难关而存活下来。


As long as banks are permitted to operate this way, the banks’ supervisors are betting on the banks’ ability to earn their way out of their current problems – even if the value of their assets doesn’t now significantly exceed their liabilities.	按照这样的测试结果，为了摆脱目前的经济困境，银行的高管们就会放手一博，而不顾及实际真实资产的状况。


But doesn’t the banks’ ability to raise new equity capital indicate that, regardless of whether the stress tests are reliable, investors believe that their assets’ value does significantly exceed their liabilities?	抛开压力测试是否有效不谈，是不是只要 银行有能力进行新的融资，就意味着它的净资产就是正数了么？


Not at all.	显然不是。


Consider a bank with liabilities of $1 billion. Suppose that the bank has assets with long maturity and a face value of $1.2 billion but whose current economic value is only $1 billion.	例如，一家银行有10亿美元的债务，帐面资产虽然有12亿美元，而折合成当今的经济价值只有10亿美元。


Although the value of the bank’s assets doesn’t exceed its liabilities, depositors won’t flee as long as the government backs the bank by guaranteeing its deposits.	虽然银行净资产不是正数，但由于有了政府的信用保证，储户还不至于挤兑提款。


If in two years the bank’s assets have a 50-50 chance of appreciating to $1.2 billion or declining to $0.8 billion, the bank will be able to raise new equity capital: new investors will be willing to pay for the prospect of sharing in the excess of the value of assets over obligations if things turn out well.	如果两年之后，银行的资产升值到12亿美元，或贬值到8亿美元，以上两种情况的概率是50对50。 银行就可以进行新一轮的融资：如果有了资产会升值的期望值，新的投资者当然愿意进行投资。


To get a good picture of banks’ financial health, estimating the value of their toxic assets is unavoidable.	为了全面了解银行金融健康状况，我们不能不考虑到有毒资产这个因素。


Regulators could encourage each bank to sell part of its toxic portfolio and extrapolate the portfolio’s value from the price obtained in such a sale, or they could attempt to estimate the portfolio’s value as well as they can on their own.	政府应该鼓励银行出售有毒资产，并预估可能卖出的价格，或者是现在就估算有毒资产的实际价格。


Either way, the true value of banks’ toxic assets must be estimated before concluding that banks are armed with sufficient capital to carry out their critical roles.	不管以上的哪一种可能性出现，银行的实际资产都应该考虑到有毒资产的因素，这样银行才真正拥有足够的资本来扮演它的重要职能。


The kind of stress tests that the US conducted, and that other countries are being urged to emulate – and the ability of banks to raise additional equity capital – cannot provide a basis for such a conclusion.	压力测试的目的是检测银行融资的能力。 如果美国政府按照目前的压力测试模式，而其他国家随后争相效仿的话，我们就不可能得到一个正确的结论。


The Trade Numbers Game	贸易数字游戏


CAMBRIDGE – The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a mega trade deal covering 12 countries that together account for more than one-third of global GDP and a quarter of world exports – is the latest battleground in the decades-long confrontation between proponents and opponents of trade agreements.	坎布里奇—几十年来，自由贸易支持派和反对派争论不断，跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）是这一争论的最新战场。 TPP由12个国家组成，它们加起来占了三分之一以上的全球GDP和四分之一的世界贸易。


As usual, the pact’s advocates have marshaled quantitative models that make the agreement look like a no-brainer.	和往常一样，该协议的支持者拿出量化模型，让这一协议看上去应该获得无脑支持。


Their favorite model predicts increases in real incomes after 15 years that range from 0.5% for the United States to 8% in Vietnam.	他们最喜欢用的模型预测，15年后真实收入将上升0. 5%（美国）到8%（越南）不等。


Moreover, this model – developed by Peter Petri and Michael Plummer, from Brandeis and Johns Hopkins Universities, respectively, building on a long line of similar frameworks by them and others – foresees relatively insignificant cost to employment in affected industries.	此外，该模型——由分别来自布兰迪斯大学（Brandeis University）和约翰霍普金斯大学的彼得·彼特里（Peter Petri）和迈克尔·普卢默（Michael Plummer）提出，基于他们和其他学者的众多类似框架——预测，受影响行业的就业损失相对较小。


The TPP’s opponents have latched on to a competing model, which generates very different projections.	TPP的反对者提出了一个针锋相对的模型，做出了截然不同的预测。


Produced by Jeronim Capaldo of Tufts University and Alex Izurieta of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (along with Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General), this model predicts lower wages and higher unemployment all around, as well as income declines in two key countries, the US and Japan.	该模型由塔夫茨大学（Tufts University）的杰罗尼母·卡帕尔多（Jeronim Capaldo）和联合国贸易与发展会议的亚历克斯·伊祖里耶塔（Alex Izurieta）以及前联合国助理秘书长约莫·基瓦姆·桑德拉姆（Jomo Kwame Sundaram）提出，预测TPP成员国都将出现工资下降和事业上升，两大关键国家美国和日本的收入也会下降。


There is no disagreement between the models on the trade effects.	这些模型对于贸易的影响没有分歧。


In fact, Capaldo and his collaborators take as their starting point the trade predictions from an earlier version of the Petri-Plummer study.	事实上，卡帕尔多和他的合作者将彼特里-普卢默的研究的一个早期版本的贸易预测作为出发点。


The differences arise largely from contrasting assumptions about how economies respond to changes in trade volumes sparked by liberalization.	区别主要来自关于经济体如何应对自由化所带来的贸易量的变化的不同假设。


Petri and Plummer assume that labor markets are sufficiently flexible that job losses in adversely affected parts of the economy are necessarily offset by job gains elsewhere.	彼特里和普卢默假设劳动力市场具有充分弹性，经济中受到负面影响的部分的就业损失必然会被其他部分的就业增长所抵消。


Unemployment is ruled out from the start – a built-in outcome of the model that TPP proponents often fudge.	失业从一开始就被排除——这一该模型的内生结果常常被TPP支持者所回避。


The Peterson Institute for International Economics, which published the pro-TPP study, inexplicably states in its brief: “The agreement will raise US wages but is not projected to change US employment levels…” The result on wages is a conclusion of the study, whereas the employment “projection” could have been made before the computer crunched a single number.	发布支持TPP的研究的彼得森国际经济学研究所在其简报语焉不详地指出：“该协议将增加美国的工资，但未必能改变美国的就业水平……”这一工资影响是该研究的一个结论，而就业“预测”也许在向计算机输入任何数据之前就已经决定了。


Capaldo and his collaborators offer a starkly different outlook: a competitive race to the bottom in labor markets, with a decline in wages and government spending keeping a lid on aggregate demand and employment.	卡帕尔多及其合作者提出了一个截然不同的展望：劳动力市场的逐底竞争，工资和政府支出的下降将一直遏制总需求和就业。


Unfortunately, however, their paper does a poor job of explaining how their model works, and the particulars of their simulation are somewhat murky.	不幸的是，他们的文章在解释模型如何起作用方面写得很差，而他们的仿真计算的细节也有些拙劣。


The Petri-Plummer model is squarely rooted in decades of academic trade modeling, which makes a sharp distinction between microeconomic effects (shaping resource allocation across sectors) and macroeconomic effects (related to overall levels of demand and employment).	彼特里-普卢默模型完全来自几十年的贸易学术建模，严格区分微观经济效应（决定不同部门间的资源配置）和宏观经济效应（与需求和就业的总体水平有关）。


In this tradition, trade liberalization is a microeconomic “shock” that affects the composition of employment, but not its overall level.	根据这一传统，贸易自由化是一个微观经济学“冲击”，影响就业的成分而不影响其总体水平。


Economists tend to analyze trade agreements in such terms, rendering the Petri-Plummer model more congenial to them.	经济学家总是用这些方法分析贸易协议，因此与彼特里-普卢默模型更加相投。


By contrast, the Capaldo framework lacks sectoral and country detail; its behavioral assumptions remain opaque; and its extreme Keynesian assumptions sit uneasily with its medium-term perspective.	相反，卡帕尔多的框架缺少部门和国家细节，其行为假设非常模糊； 其极端凯恩斯主义假设也与其中期视角不太“搭调”。


The trouble is that the real world has not lined up so neatly with trade economists’ assumptions.	麻烦在于真实世界并不非常配合贸易经济学家的假设。


Critics of trade agreements have marshaled countless anecdotes about the adverse effects of imports on wages and employment in affected communities.	贸易协议的批评者们提出了数不胜数的掌故来说明进口对受影响社区的工资和就业的消极效应。


Recent empirical work by three academic economists – David Autor (MIT), David Dorn (University of Zurich), and Gordon Hanson (UC-San Diego) – shows that the critics have a point (and then some).	三名经济学者——MIT的大卫·奥拓尔（David Autor）、苏黎世大学的大卫·多恩（David Dorn）和加州大学圣迭戈分校的戈登·汉森（Gordon Hanson）的最新实证工作表明批评者在某一（然后是某些）方面颇��中肯。


Autor, Dorn, and Hanson document that the expansion of Chinese exports has produced “substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences” in the US.	奥拓尔、多恩和汉森指出，中国出口的扩张给美国造成了“巨大的调整成本和分配后果”。


In regions with industries hit hard by competition from Chinese imports, wages have remained depressed and unemployment levels elevated for more than a decade.	在产业因为中国进口品的竞争而遭受重创的地区，十多年中工资一直保持低迷，失业水平很高。


Falling employment in such industries was expected; the surprise was the absence of offsetting employment gains in other industries.	这些产业的就业下降是意料中事，意料之外的是其他产业并没有出现补偿性就业增长。


Advocates of trade agreements have long maintained that deindustrialization and the loss of low-skill jobs in advanced economies have little to do with international trade; they are the product of new technologies.	长期以来，贸易协议支持者坚持认为，发达经济体的去工业化和低技能就业岗位损失与国际贸易关系不大； 这些现象是新技术的产物。


In the current TPP debate, many prominent proponents still cling to this line.	在当前的TPP争论中，许多地位显耀的支持者仍持有这一观点。


In light of the new empirical findings, such nonchalance toward trade has become untenable.	从新实证发现看，如此忽视贸易的立场是站不住脚的。


(The Petri-Plummer model does indicate that the TPP will accelerate the movement of jobs from manufacturing to services, a result that the pact’s advocates do not trumpet.)	（彼特里-普卢默模型确实表明TPP将加速就业岗位从制造业向服务业的转移，而该协议的支持者并未宣扬这一结果。 ）


Economists do not fully understand why expanded trade has produced the negative consequences for wages and employment that it has.	经济学家没有充分理解为何贸易扩张给工资和就业带来如此负面的后果。


We do not yet have a good alternative framework to the kind that trade advocates use.	他们尚未提出好框架替代贸易支持者所使用的框架。


But we should not act as if reality has not severely tarnished our cherished standard model.	但我们不能装作我们所钟爱的标准模型与现实没有发生严重抵触。


It would be far better to consider the full range of possibilities highlighted by the models on offer, instead of putting all the weight on a single one.	考虑现有模型所强调的所有可能性，而不是将所有关注都集中到一点，这样会好得多。


The uncertainties do not end with macroeconomic interactions.	不确定性并不只限于宏观经济互动。


The Petri-Plummer study predicts that the bulk of the economic benefits of the TPP will come from reductions in non-tariff barriers (such as regulatory barriers on imported services) and lower obstacles to foreign investment.	彼特里-普卢默研究预测TPP的大部分经济效益将来自非关税壁垒的降低（如对进口服务的监管壁垒）和贸易投资障碍的消除。


But the modeling of these effects is an order of magnitude more difficult than in the case of tariff reductions.	但对这些影响的建模比降低壁垒难不止一个数量级。


The assumptions needed to do so are not standard and require many arbitrary short cuts.	建模所需要的假设不标准，需要做许多自由发挥的捷径处理。


The bottom line is that neither side’s models generate numbers reliable enough on which a case for or against the TPP can be made.	说到底，双方的模型都没有拿出足够可靠的数字证明应该支持还是反对TPP。


Just about the only thing we can say with some certainty is that there will be winners and losers.	我们可以带着一定确定性做出的唯一结论是TPP将产生赢家和输家。


Perhaps the agreement will galvanize investment and knowledge flows across the Pacific, giving the world economy a much-needed boost.	也许该协议将刺激太平洋地区的投资和知识流，给世界经济带来急需的提振。


Perhaps not.	也许不能。


But those who believe that this trade agreement, like previous ones, will provide lopsided benefits have ample reason to be concerned.	但如果你认为这一贸易协议和以往的贸易协议一样，将带来不对称的好处，那么你有充分的理由表示担心。


The Fraught Politics of the TPP	令人担心的TPP政治


TOKYO – This month, 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific finalized the historic Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.	东京—本月，12个太平洋两岸的国家完成了历史性的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）贸易协定。


The scope of the TPP is vast.	TPP的范围十分广泛。


If ratified and implemented, it will have a monumental impact on trade and capital flows along the Pacific Rim.	如果获得批准并实施，它将给环太平洋贸易和资本流带来极大的推动。


Indeed, it will contribute to the ongoing transformation of the international order.	事实上，它将有助于正在发生的国际秩序变迁。


Unfortunately, whether this will happen remains uncertain.	不幸的是，是否能够实现还远未可知。


The economics of trade and finance that form the TPP’s foundations are rather simple, and have been known since the British political economist David Ricardo described them in the nineteenth century.	构成TPP基础的贸易和金融经济学十分简单，早在十九世纪就由英国政治经济学家大卫·李嘉图阐述得一清二楚。


By enabling countries to make the most of their comparative advantages, the liberalization of trade and investment provides net economic benefits, although it may hurt particular groups that previously benefitted from tariff protections.	贸易和投资自由化让各国最大程度地利用其比较优势，因此能够带来净经济收益，尽管它可能不利于之前从关税保护中获益的特殊利益群体。


But the politics of trade liberalization – that is, the way in which countries proceed to accept free trade – is much more complex, largely because of those particular groups it hurts.	但贸易自由化的政治学——即各国怎样接受自由贸易——要复杂得多，这主要是因为受到冲击的特殊利益集团从中作梗。


For them, the overall economic benefits of trade liberalization matter little, if their own narrow interests are being undercut.	对他们来说，贸易自由化的总体经济利益不值一提，如果他们自身的狭隘利益受到侵蚀的话。


Even if these groups are relatively small, the discipline and unity with which they fight trade liberalization can amplify their political influence considerably – especially if a powerful political figure takes up their cause.	即使这些群体规模相对较小，但在于贸易自由化对抗的过程中，他们表现出极强的纪律和团结，这能大大增加他们的政治影响力——特别是如果某权势政治人物站在他们这一边的话。


That is what is now happening in the United States.	今天的美国就是如此。


Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton undoubtedly understands the economics of the TPP, which she once called the “gold standard” in trade agreements.	前国务卿希拉里·克林顿毫无疑问明白TPP的经济学，她曾称之为贸易协定的“金本位”。


But now that she is on the presidential campaign trail, she has changed her tune.	但如今她正在角逐总统候选人提名，因此改变了口风。


The reason is apparent: she has judged that she cannot afford to lose the support of American trade unions such as the United Automobile Workers, whose members fear a reduction in tariffs on car and trucks.	原因显而易见：她判断她不可以失去汽车工人联合会（United Automobile Workers）等美国工会的支持，而这些组织的成员担心TPP降低汽车和卡车的关税。


This shift may make sense politically, but it is abysmal economics.	这一转变在政治上不无道理，但从经济角度糟糕透顶。


In reality, the TPP is a great bargain for the US.	现实是，TPP非常有利于美国。


The concessions it contains on manufactured products like automobiles are much smaller than those on, say, agricultural products, which will involve profound sacrifices from other TPP countries, such as Japan.	在汽车等制造商品上做出的让步要远小于（比如说）农产品，而农产品方面的让步将导致其他TPP国家（比如日本）做出巨大牺牲。


After all, existing tariff levels on manufactured goods are already much lower than those on agriculture or dairy products.	毕竟，从现有关税水平看，制造商品比农产品或乳制品低得多。


In short, with the TPP, the US is catching a big fish with small bait.	简言之，美国在TPP上所得大于所失。


But the increased trade and investment flows brought about by the TPP’s ratification and implementation will benefit even the countries that must make larger sacrifices.	但批准和实施TPP带来的贸易和投资流的增加将让必须做出更大牺牲的国家也能够受益。


Japan, for example, will find that the TPP enhances “Abenomics,” the three-pronged economic-revitalization strategy introduced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2012.	比如，日本将发现TPP增强了“安倍经济学”。 安倍经济学是日本首相安倍晋三在2012年推出的三管齐下的重振经济战略。


The third component, or “arrow,” of Abenomics – structural reforms – aims to restore growth by raising productivity.	该战略的第三个部分，或者说“第三支箭”——结构改革的目标是通过提高生产率重塑增长。


But increasing efficiency in a wide variety of sectors, as Japan must do, can be a long, difficult, and piecemeal process, as it involves the upgrading of virtually every technology and process.	但日本必须在众多部门增进效率，这需要一段漫长、艰难和渐进的过程，因为几乎所有技术和过程都要更新。


By connecting Japan’s industries more closely with those of other countries, the TPP can accelerate this process considerably.	TPP让日本各行业与其他国家联系更加紧密，将大大加速这一过程。


Moreover, it can spur faster administrative reform.	此外，TPP还能刺激更快的行政改革。


Simply put, the TPP will amount to a powerful tailwind for Abenomics.	简言之，TPP将成为安倍经济学的东风。


It should be noted that liberalization does involve some economic tradeoffs, as protection can, in some areas, serve an important purpose.	应该指出，自由化确实包含了一些经济权衡，因为在某些领域，保护有助于实现重要目的。


As the economist Jagdish Bhagwati points out, maintaining increased protections for, say, intellectual property may encourage research and innovation.	经济学家贾格迪什·巴格瓦蒂（Jagdish Bhagwati）指出，保持增加对（比如）知识产权的保护可以鼓励研究和创新。


At the same time, however, excessive IP protections can deter the proliferation of existing knowledge and the development of high-tech products.	但是，与此同时，过度知识产权保护可能延缓现有知识的扩散和高科技产品的开发。


In the case of pharmaceuticals, for example, this tradeoff can be difficult to navigate.	比如，在制药行业，这一权衡就很难规避。


Nonetheless, Bhagwati maintains, when it comes to overall trade and capital movements, freer is better.	尽管如此，巴格瓦蒂认为，对于总体贸易和资本流动而言，越自由越好。


Given all of this, one hopes that opposition from political figures like Clinton amounts to naught – an entirely plausible outcome, in Clinton’s case, because the TPP should be enacted before the presidential election in November 2016.	考虑到这些方面，我们希望来自克林顿等政治人物的反对不要产生效果——在克林顿的例子中，这是完全可能的，因为TPP应在在2016年11月总统选举之前生效。


This would, to some extent, be in line with the TPP negotiation process, in which the political challenges associated with trade liberalization have been handled remarkably well.	在某种程度上讲，这也符合TPP的谈判过程——在此过程中，与贸易自由化相关的政治挑战处理得非常得体。


It seems that involving so many sectors in so many countries actually made it easier to overcome resistance, as it diffused the opposition and prevented any single specific interest from getting the upper hand.	看起来，将如此多国家的如此多的部门包括进来更有利于克服抵制，因为这样能分散反对意见，防止任何一个特殊利益集团取得上风。


Of course, that does not mean that the negotiations were easy.	当然，这并不意味着谈判很容易。


On the contrary, trade representatives had to display impressive endurance and patience – for more than five years, for some countries.	相反，各国贸易代表表现出令人印象深刻的忍力和耐力——某些国家甚至保持了五年多。


To enable progress, confidentiality was vital (despite US negotiators’ claims that the discussions were wholly transparent).	为了取得进展，保密性至关重要（尽管美国谈判员声称讨论是完全透明的）。


Failure to ratify the TPP in all 12 countries would be a major disappointment, not just because of the tremendous amount of effort that has gone into it, but also – and more important – because of the vast economic benefits it would bring to all countries involved.	TPP不能在所有12个国家获得批准将令人无比失望，不仅仅因为此前花费了大量谈判努力，也因为——更重要地——它能给所有相关国家带来巨大的经济收益。


In Japan, as long as most of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party stands firm in supporting the TPP, it should be ratified.	在日本，只要执政的自民党中大部分人坚定支持TPP，TPP应该就能获得批准。


But the situation in the US Congress is more dubious.	但美国国会的状况并不那么确定。


One hopes that America’s leaders do not miss a golden opportunity to give US businesses – and thus the US economy – a significant boost.	我们希望美国领导人不要错失这次让美国企业——因此美国经济也是如此——获得重大提振的黄金机会。


Japan’s TPP Transformation	日本的TPP转型


TOKYO – On October 5, after years of exhausting – and exhaustive – haggling, a dozen Pacific Rim countries finally signed up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an agreement that promises everything from more trade to a cleaner environment.	东京—10月5日，在经历了多年令人心疲力竭、事无巨细的讨价还价后，12个环太平洋国家终于签署了跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）。 TPP协定包括了从更多贸易到更清洁的环境的一系列承诺。


The negotiations were such that the hair of Akira Amari, Japan’s economic and fiscal policy minister, turned completely grey.	旷日持久的谈判让日本财政经济大臣甘利明早生华发。


His solace, however, is that the TPP will prove to be a key foundation stone of the “Asian Century.”	但是，令他欣慰的是，TPP将成为“亚洲世纪”的关键基石之一。


The TPP’s origins, pre-dating Amari’s involvement, go back to a 2006 trade agreement among only Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei – the so-called “Pacific 4.”	TPP的原型可以追溯到甘利明加入谈判之前的2006年的所谓“太平洋4”（P-4）贸易协定。 该协定只包括了新加坡、新西兰、智利和文莱。


The United States, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam, seeing the prospect of a rules-based international order in Asia, joined the talks in March 2010, and in an instant the P-4’s small boat became a great ocean liner.	美国、澳大利亚、秘鲁和越南看到有望在亚洲建立基于规则的国际秩序，于2010年3月加入了谈判，于是，P-4的小船立刻变成了巨大的远洋巨轮。


And then it became a convoy, as Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and finally – in 2013 – Japan joined the negotiations.	然后，它有变成了一支船队，马来西亚、墨西哥、加拿大纷纷加入，2013年，日本也终于加入了谈判。


Combined, the TPP economies account for some 40% of world GDP, outstripping the largest existing free-trade area, the European Union.	TPP经济体总共占了世界GDP的40%左右，超过了现有最大自由贸易区欧盟。


Once the TPP enters into effect, its impact on the global economy will undoubtedly be monumental – even without the participation of China, which on a purchasing-power-parity basis is now the world’s biggest economy.	一旦PPT进入生效阶段，其对全球经济的影响无疑将是巨大的——即使没有从购买力平价衡量已成为世界第一大经济体的中国的参与。


China’s exclusion was no accident.	将中国排除在外不是偶然。


Its huge and complex economy would have injected insuperable problems into the talks.	其巨大而复杂的经济将给谈判带来无法克服的问题。


In response, China has launched its “Silk Road” initiative to create an economic zone that will favor its own priorities.	为了应对TPP，中国启动了它的“丝绸之路”计划，试图建立一个有利于其自身重点的经济区。


It is also seeking greater trade cooperation with European countries.	它还在寻求与欧洲国家进行更大的贸易合作。


One example is President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the United Kingdom – which in essence is also an attempt to weaken Britain’s “special relationship” with the US by creating a cat’s cradle of trade, financial, and investment ties with Britain.	一个例子是中国国家主席习近平最近对英国的访问——从本质上说，这也是中国通过与英国建立一系列贸易、金融和投资联系削弱英美“特殊关系”的尝试。


It is worth noting that Xi had already lured the UK into supporting – against American advice – the new, China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	值得关注的是，习近平已经促使英国支持——不顾美国的建议——由中国领导的新的亚洲基础设施投资银行。


But, as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent call for talks with China on the issue confirm, the TPP is not off-limits to China – or to other Asian economies.	但是，日本首相安倍晋三最近呼吁与中国就这一问题进行谈判，这表明TPP并未对中国——或其他亚洲经济体关死大门。


South Korea is warming to the idea of the TPP, as is Indonesia, following President Joko Widodo’s recent visit to Washington, DC.	韩国正在向TPP的概念示好，印度尼西亚在其总统佐科·维多多最近访问华盛顿后也是如此。


For Japan, the TPP is vital to achieve economic liberalization – the third arrow of “Abenomics,” the government’s program to revitalize the country’s ailing economy.	对日本来说，TPP对于实现作为政府重振萎靡经济的计划——“安倍经济学”的第三支箭至关重要。


The legislation to enact the TPP will simply push aside the lobbies and vested interests that have been so effective in slowing down or diverting piecemeal reforms.	实施TPP的立法将打破一直以来长于拖延或消磨零散改革的游说集团和既得利益。


The promise of greater exchange of goods, services, and capital across the Pacific, as well as the creation of international standards (for example, for intellectual-property rights), is simply too appealing to ignore.	加强商品、服务和资本的跨太平洋交换以及建立国际标准（如知识产权方面）的前景吸引力巨大，不容忽视。


When Japan and other Asian countries weigh the risk of implementing the TPP against the risk of not participating, the risk of not participating is overwhelmingly higher.	当日本和其他亚洲国家衡量是否参与和实施TPP的风险时，不参与的风险要高得多。


Japan’s political challenge will be to sell the TPP to its voters, especially the farm lobby.	日本的政治挑战将是让选民接受TPP，特别是农业游说集团。


The customs duty on beef imports, for example, is currently 38.5%.	比如，进口牛肉关税目前为38. 5%。


It will be 27.5% in the first year after the TPP takes effect, and will then be gradually lowered to 9% in the agreement’s 16th year.	TPP生效后五年将降至27. 5%，生效第16年将逐渐下降到9%。


That should surely provide more than enough time for Japanese beef ranchers to prepare themselves for foreign competition (of the 870,000 tons of beef imported annually, 520,000 tons come from Australia, the US, and New Zealand).	显然，日本牛肉农场主有足够的时间做好准备迎接外国竞争（日本每年进口牛肉870,000吨，其中520,000吨来自澳大利亚、美国和新西兰）。


And it will certainly be a boon for consumers, as the price of their beef-noodle soup and sukiyaki falls dramatically.	而消费者显然将获益，因为牛肉面和寿喜烧的价格将大幅下降。


Japan’s ranchers do need time to adjust.	日本农场主确实需要时间作出调整。


Because they deal with animals, shortcuts cannot be taken, and there are limits to mechanization, particularly in creating the type of beef that Japanese consumers demand.	他们面对的是动物，不能走捷径，机械化程度也十分有限，特别是在生产日本消费者需求的牛肉方面。


Whereas ranchers in Australia and the US have huge herds of cattle, Japanese ranchers raise each individual cow on beer and massages.	澳大利亚和美国的农场主拥有巨大的牛群，而日本农场主的牛是单独饲养，喝啤酒、享受按摩。


As a result, they will never be able to compete on price, and thus will need to emphasize quality, most likely through much improved branding and marketing.	因此，日本牛肉不可能从价格上竞争，而需要强调质量，最可行的办法是通过大大改进的品牌宣传和营销。


The same applies to rice.	大米也是如此。


Rumor has it that when the wife of a certain Chinese leader visited Japan, she bought a delicious variety of Japanese rice by the ton.	有传言称，某中国领导人的妻子访问日本时购买了成吨的美味日本大米。


Taking advantage of the worldwide sushi boom, Japan needs to emphasize that “real sushi requires Japanese rice,” branding it an exclusive product.	借寿司风靡世界之东风，日本需要强调“正宗寿司必用日本大米”，把它包装成独家产品。


Skeptics should note that Italy has already succeeded in this, with top-tier restaurants around the world advertising that they use genuine Italian pasta.	质疑者将指出，意大利早就这么做了，全世界顶级餐厅都宣传说它们使用正宗意大利面。


In fact, regardless of whether or not the TPP is implemented, Japan’s farmers must pursue this approach to secure their futures, rather than hoping that protective subsidies continue ad infinitum.	事实上，不管TPP是否实施，日本农民都必须用这种方法确保未来，而不是寄希望于永久的保护性补贴。


Under the logic of the TPP, the terraced rice fields that make up Japan’s beautiful landscape cannot be protected.	根据TPP的逻辑，构成美丽风景的日本水稻梯田不能予以保护。


So why not protect our landscape as a resource for tourism – and even as a way of combating climate change?	因此，为什么不保护这些景观作为旅游景点——甚至作为遏制气候变化的方法？


But now comes the truly hard part.	但现在必须面对真正的困难。


The TPP has been signed – but it will not be implemented unless and until it is ratified by the legislatures of countries such as the US and Canada.	TPP已经签署——但在美国和加拿大等签署国立法机构批准前，它无法进入实施阶段。


That process could well be enough to turn Amari’s gray hair white.	这一过程足以让甘利明须发尽白。


The TPP’s Missing Ingredient	TTP缺失的成分


WASHINGTON, DC – Looking for ways to stimulate economic growth and create jobs, US President Barack Obama’s administration is seeking to press ahead with the mega-regional free-trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).	华盛顿—为了刺激经济增长、创造就业岗位，美国总统奥巴马政府正在寻求推进被称为跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership ，TPP）的巨型自由贸易区。


But is the US going about it the right way?	但美国的算盘合理吗？