At one moment he is the “responsible” world leader who speaks charmingly to the international media about moderate Islam; at the next, he is the cunning conspirator who rigs elections, destroys political opponents, breaks promises on relinquishing power, enters into mutually beneficial relationships with mullahs, and castigates human-rights activists as “Westernized fringe elements” that “are as bad as the Islamic extremists.”	他一会儿是那位“负责”的世界级领袖，魅力十足地向国际传媒侃谈温和的伊斯兰教； 时而，他又是那个狡猾的阴谋家，操纵选举，消灭政治对手，不信守放权的承诺，与毛拉们建立互利关系，严惩人权活动分子，视之为“和伊斯兰主义者一样坏”的“西方化的残渣余孽。


To forestall the possibility of a coup, the army is being cleansed of hardline Islamists.	为了防范可能发生的政变，强硬派的伊斯兰主义者已经被清除出军队。


Soldiers charged with mutiny have received the death penalty.	受到兵变指控的士兵被判处死刑。


This process has deepened pro- and anti- US divisions within the army, both among commissioned and non-commissioned officers, but nothing in Pakistan today suggests that radical change is imminent.	这一行动更加深了现役和非现役军官中亲美和反美派系之间的裂痕。 但没有迹象表明激进的变革即将在巴基斯坦发生。


To be sure, more incidents of global terrorism associated with Pakistan, such as July’s London bombings, will bring new pressures.	的确，更多全球性的恐怖主义都和巴基斯坦相关，例如今年7月的伦敦爆炸案。 这势必带来新的压力。


The US and Europe will make their usual demands to close down the country’s hate-spewing madrassas, and to reform a public-school system that, unhindered by the government, churns out young militants burning to kill and die for Islam.	美国和欧洲会如常要求巴基斯坦关闭灌输仇恨情绪的伊斯兰学校，并对目前不受政府约束，培养敢于为伊斯兰教杀戮和献身的年轻武装分子的公立学校体系实��改革。


For Musharraf, this means that continuing to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares might get harder.	对穆沙拉夫而言，这意味着亦敌亦友的策略实施可能会更加困难。


But the current constellation of forces suggests that, barring unforeseen developments, his survival instincts will serve him well for years to come.	但就巴基斯坦目前的力量构成来看，除非发生不可预见的情况，穆氏的求生本能在未来相当一段时间里还会使他平安无事。


How New is Egypt’s “New” Foreign Policy?	埃及的“新”外交新在何处？


CAIRO – In the months since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, his successors have signaled a shift in foreign policy by reaching out to former adversaries. Egypt’s government has welcomed Iranian diplomats and embraced the Palestinian group Hamas. Many interpret such moves as clear evidence of Egypt’s desire for a diplomacy that is not subordinate to American interests.	发自开罗——自从埃及前总统穆巴拉克辞职这几个月来，他的继任者不断通过与过往敌对势力接触的方式来释放外交政策转向的信号。 政府一方面欢迎伊朗外交官员，另一方面又与巴勒斯坦哈马斯组织交好。


But Mubarak never entirely fit his detractors’ portrayal of him as an American lackey. In fact, Mubarak’s need to please his Saudi Arabian benefactors, not the United States, was paramount in his thinking. Although he sometimes supported American policies, Mubarak frequently rebuffed the US when its positions did not align with his own.	事实上，这位前总统真正放在首位的是如何讨好自己的沙特阿拉伯赞助者，而不是美国。 虽然有时他也会支持美国的政策，但在美国的立场与自己的态度不符时，穆巴拉克也经常会拒绝美国人。


Since the end of the October 1973 war, Arab-Israeli peace has been a cornerstone of America’s Middle East agenda. The US often looked to Egypt, the most important and influential Arab country, to play a leading role in promoting this goal. And, when it suited him, Mubarak played his part. When the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat humiliated Mubarak before the US secretary of state and the international media by refusing to sign an annex to an Israeli-Palestinian accord brokered in Cairo, Mubarak told him, “Sign it, you son of a dog!”	自从1973年的十月战争（即第四次中东战争，以色列称“赎罪日战争”）结束至今，阿拉伯-以色列双方的和平就一直是美国中东议程的奠基石。 美国常常希望埃及这个最重要也最有影响力的阿拉伯国家带头推动这一目标。


On the other hand, when Arab public opinion opposed Palestinian concessions, Mubarak remained aloof from US peace initiatives. For example, in 1996, he declined President Bill Clinton’s invitation to come to Washington, along with Arafat and the leaders of Israel and Jordan, to settle a bout of Palestinian violence. And when Clinton asked Mubarak to pressure Arafat to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal during negotiations at Camp David in 2000, he refused.	比如1996年他就回绝了美国总统克林顿的邀请，没有赴华盛顿与阿拉法特以及以色列和约旦领导人共同调解巴勒斯坦暴力行动。 而当克林顿要求穆巴拉克在2000年的戴维营谈判中促成一份以巴和平协议时，巴拉克也拒绝了这一要求。


Mubarak had a rocky relationship with Israel, and held America’s closest Middle East ally at arm’s length throughout his presidency. For almost ten of his 30 years in office, Egypt had no ambassador in Tel Aviv. Mubarak never made an official state visit to Israel, and he frequently refused Israeli prime ministers’ requests to come to Cairo. When the US sought to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994, Mubarak mobilized the Arab world against the initiative, because Israel refused to sign the NPT.	穆巴拉克从来没有对以色列进行过正式访问，还经常拒绝以色列总理访问埃及的意愿。 当美国试图在1994年扩大《不扩散核武器条约》覆盖范围时，穆巴拉克甚至动员整个阿拉伯世界反对该意向，原因是以色列拒绝签署该条约。


Instead, Mubarak’s relationship with the Saudis usually determined his foreign policy. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened to attack Saudi Arabia, Mubarak quickly dispatched troops to defend the kingdom. He was keen to support the Saudis and their Persian Gulf allies, who provided him with a steady flow of aid and an outlet for surplus Egyptian labor.	与此相反的是，穆巴拉克与沙特的关系却常常会决定其外交政策。 当伊拉克在1990年入侵科威特并威胁要进攻沙特时，穆巴拉克迅速派兵前去保卫。


Though Mubarak’s opposition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 happened to align with US policy, he was unwilling to back other American campaigns against Arab leaders. When President Ronald Reagan���s deputy national security adviser, John Poindexter, asked Mubarak to launch a joint US-Egyptian attack against Libya in 1985, the Egyptian president scolded his visitor, saying, “Look, Admiral, when we decide to attack Libya, it will be our decision and on our timetable.”	虽然穆巴拉克反对伊拉克入侵科威特的行动恰好与美国政策步调一致，但他却不愿意去支持美国反对阿拉伯国家领袖的其他行动。 当美国总统罗纳德·里根的国家安全顾问助理约翰·波因德克斯特海军中将要求穆巴拉克与美国在1985年对利比亚发动联合进攻时，埃及总统立刻拉下脸说：“听着，将军阁下，当我们决定要进攻利比亚的时候，必须是我们自己的决定，而且按我们的时间表行事！


Mubarak again refused to acquiesce in US plans to isolate Libya in the 1990’s for its involvement in the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Instead of ostracizing Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, Mubarak welcomed him to Cairo. After the United Nations imposed an international flight ban against Libya in 1992, its land crossings with Egypt proved crucial to Libya’s economy (and possibly Qaddafi’s political survival). Libya withstood the sanctions in part by importing food and oil infrastructure supplies via Egypt, and by exporting petroleum and steel with Mubarak’s help.	在1990年代穆巴拉克拒绝加入美国因利比亚参与泛美航空公司洛克比空难而对其执行的孤立政策，同时不但没有排斥利比亚领导人卡扎菲，甚至还邀请他到开罗访问。 在联合国在1992年禁止一切国际航班进出利比亚后，该国与埃及的陆地边界就成为了利比亚的经济命脉（或许也是卡扎菲没有倒台的原因），利比亚在某种程度上通过从埃及进口食品和石油生产设施挺过了制裁，并在穆巴拉克的帮助下出口汽油和钢���。


In fact, Mubarak’s Libya policy was driven largely by economic and security concerns, and rarely took US interests into consideration. More than one million Egyptians worked in Libya, which was also a large export market. And Qaddafi was eager to help Mubarak subdue Islamist threats to the Egyptian regime. Unlike neighboring Sudan, which harbored Egyptian radicals, like al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who were bent on destabilizing the country, Libya turned them over to Mubarak.	同时卡扎菲也愿意协助穆巴拉克镇压对其构成威胁的伊斯兰极端势力。 在苏丹这样的邻国为埃及极端势力提供庇护所时，对基地组织领导人艾曼·扎瓦赫里这样一心要颠覆埃及政权的人，利比亚都会将其押解回埃及。


While Qaddafi delivered terrorists to Mubarak, the Egyptian president declined American requests to do the same. After Palestinians in 1985 hijacked the Italian ship Achille Lauro, killed an American, and berthed in Egypt, the US asked Mubarak to extradite them. But Mubarak refused, saying that Secretary of State George Shultz was “crazy” if he believed that Egypt would betray the Palestinian cause.	在巴勒斯坦武装分子于1985年劫持了意大利邮轮“阿齐利·劳罗”号，杀死一名美国人并将船停泊在埃及港口时，美国要求穆巴拉克引渡这些人。 但穆巴拉克却拒绝了这一要求，还声称如果美国国务卿乔治·舒尔茨认为埃及会背叛巴勒斯坦斗争事业的话就一定是“疯了”。


Egypt’s new leaders have inherited Mubarak’s dilemma – how to realize the country’s aspiration to lead the Arab world without angering its Saudi benefactors. For this reason, the Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement will yield more photo opportunities than tangible results. On opposite sides of religious and ethnic divides, a close bilateral relationship would seem unlikely under even the best circumstances. And, with Egypt in need of massive financial aid to offset the economic losses caused by its February revolution, its leaders can ill afford to alienate the Saudis, who view Iran, not Israel, as the gravest threat to regional stability.	在两国民族和宗教派别差异巨大的情况下，一个紧密的双边关系即便在最乐观的环境下都难以实现。 而随着埃及需要大笔的经济援助来弥补其“2月革命”所造成的损失，新领导人更加不可能激怒沙特，因为在后者看来，伊朗（而非以色列）才是对区域稳定的最大威胁。


Egypt is entering a new era. But the radical policy upheavals predicted by analysts will prove to be small tremors. Saudi interests will continue to weigh heavily on Egyptian foreign policy.	埃及正在进入一个新的历史时期。 而分析家们所预期的极端政策将只有很小的影响力。


And that, above all, means preserving the status quo.	沙特的利益将依然在埃及外交政策中占据极大权重，而这个现实意味着一切都将维持原状。


America’s Fiscal Cliff Dwellers	美国的财政悬崖居民


WASHINGTON, DC – In early 2012, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke used the term “fiscal cliff” to grab the attention of lawmakers and the broader public.	华盛顿—2012年初，美联储主席伯南克用“财政悬崖”一词抓住了立法者和公众的眼球。


Bernanke’s point was that Americans should worry about the combination of federal tax increases and spending cuts that are currently scheduled to begin at the end of this year.	伯南克的出发点是美国人应该担忧联邦税增加和支出削减的双重挤压，按照日程，财政悬崖将在今年年底到来。


But there is not really any kind of “cliff” in the sense that if you stepped over the edge, you would fall fast, land on something hard, and not get up for a long time.	但这并不是真正意义上的“悬崖”——迈过界就会跌入万丈深渊，狠狠摔在硬地上，很长一段时间无法恢复元气。


In the modern US economy, the scheduled changes constitute more of a fiscal “slope” – meaning that the full effect of the tax increases would not be felt immediately (income withholding takes time to adjust), while the spending cuts would also be phased in (the government has some discretion regarding implementation).	在现代美国经济史上，安排好的变化所组成的更多地是财政“斜坡”——增税的全部效应并不会马上感觉得到（收入扣减需要时间来调整），而支出削减也是逐步显现威力（政府在实施方面拥有一定的自由裁量权）。


This slope offers President Barack Obama a real opportunity to restore the federal government’s revenue base to what it was in the mid-1990’s.	这一斜坡给奥巴马总统提供了现实机会，重塑联邦政府收入基础，达到20世纪90年代中期的水平。


The choice of words to describe America’s fiscal situation matters, given the hysteria that has been whipped up in recent months, primarily by people who want to make big cuts in the country’s two main entitlement programs, Social Security and Medicare.	用什么词来形容美国的财政状况是很重要的，因为近几个月来，人们几乎已经变得歇斯底里，因为有人想对美国的两大福利计划——社会保险和医疗保险实施大幅削减。


Their logic is that if we are about to rush off a cliff, we need to take extreme measures.	他们的逻辑是，快要跌落悬崖的当口需要非常措施。


And cutting pensions and health care for the elderly certainly qualifies as extreme – as well as completely inappropriate and unnecessary.	削减养老金和老年人医保显然属于“非常”范畴——当然也完全是不合适、不必要的。


If, instead, the US faces a fiscal slope, then people who refuse to consider raising taxes – namely, Republicans in the US Congress’s House of Representatives – have a very weak hand indeed.	相反，如果美国面临的是财政斜坡，那么拒绝考虑增税之人——即美国众议院的共和党——就不会那么强硬了。


It has become clear that the House Republicans will steadfastly refuse to vote for any increases in tax rates during the current lame-duck congressional session.	显然，在当前的跛脚鸭国会中，众议院共和党将一直拒绝支持任何增税方案。


House Speaker John Boehner, who offered relatively conciliatory remarks immediately after the election, now says that he would accept higher revenue with lower rates – precisely what the temporary tax cuts enacted by George W. Bush’s administration were supposed to deliver, but manifestly did not.	在大选刚结束时发表过相对妥协性评论的众议院发言人约翰·博纳（John Boehner）现在表示，他将接受更高的收入和更低的税率——这正是小布什政府的暂时减税政策所欲达到而未能达到的目标。


It is very unlikely that congressional Democrats and Republicans can reach an agreement on extending the Bush-era tax cuts for the middle class, while allowing them to expire for the rich.	国会中的两党能够达成关于延长布什时代的中产阶级减税政策同时取消富人的减税政策的一致几乎是完全不可能的。


They will spar with each other for another six weeks, then go to the brink of the purported “cliff” and see who blinks at the last moment.	在未来六周内，它们将展开激烈争论，然后在濒临所谓的“悬崖”时看谁在最后时刻让步。


The sensible course of action for Obama would be to step off the “cliff” by vetoing any extension of the Bush-era tax cuts, which would then expire at the end of 2012.	奥巴马的上计是通过否决任何延长布什减税政策的方案步下“悬崖”，让布什政策在2012年底结束。


Once tax rates were restored to their previous levels, Obama could present his own tax-cut package to Congress – for example, with a proposal in early January that provided greater benefit to lower-income Americans, as he promised during his re-election campaign.	在税率回到此前水平后，奥巴马可以向国会提交自己的减税政策——比如在1月初提出向低收入美国人提供更多的福利——他连任竞选的承诺之一。


These tax cuts should also be linked to the state of the economy, so that they would wind down as employment recovers (for example, to its level in 2007, relative to total population).	这一减税方案应该与经济状况挂钩，随着就业的复苏（比如就业人口占总人口比例恢复到2007年水平时）而降级。


If the economy looks weaker than anticipated in early 2013, the proposed tax cuts could be larger (as long as they were phased out during the economic recovery).	如果在2013年初经济比预想的更疲软，则减税方案可以扩大（只要在经济复苏期间取消即可）。


This approach would significantly transform America’s longer-run fiscal prospects.	该方案将极大地改善美国长期财政前景。


Then, as America heads steadily down the fiscal slope in early 2013, the House Republicans would have a choice.	于是，随着美国在2013年初稳步走下财政斜坡，众议院 共和党将做出选择。


Do they vote, week after week, against tax cuts that would help 100 million Americans, while the economy deteriorates around them?	他们会在经济恶化继续影响1亿多美国人的时候周复一周地反对能够帮助他们的减税政策吗？


Or do they embrace a deal that cuts taxes and tax rates relative to where they would be otherwise?	还是接受相对不作为有所减税和降低税率的方案？


In effect, the House Republicans can be forced to sign onto a deal that both supports the economy and restores revenue to the level that prevailed before the disastrous experiment of Bushonomics.	事实上，众议院共和党可能被迫签署一项既能支持经济、又能将收入回到灾难性的布什经济学实验之前水平的方案。


Obama has already put spending cuts on the table – probably to a greater extent than would please his electoral base (he does have a tendency to do this).	奥巴马已经将支出削减提上了台面——其程度可能会令他的选民基础不满（他有这样做的前科）。


The big question is whether the US can strengthen revenue in an appropriate manner that is consistent with renewed economic growth.	大问题是，美国是否能够以与经济复苏不相符的速度提振收入。


America should aim to return to the tax rates of the mid-1990’s, when the economy was booming and the federal budget was in much better shape.	美国应该将目标定在让税率回到20世纪90年代中期的水平，当时经济处于繁荣期，联邦预算状况要好得多。


But it should do this fully only once the economy has completely recovered.	但这只能在经济完全复苏的情况下实行。


Ordinarily, partisan political gridlock in Washington would prevent any such sensible change.	通常，华盛顿的党派政治僵局会阻挠明智的变革。


Fortunately, the fiscal slope gives Obama the opportunity to bring it about – and even to write some history in the process.	幸运的是，财政斜坡给了奥巴马实现明智变革、甚至在此过程中书写历史的机会。


That means vetoing any extension of the Bush-era tax cuts, and then working to enact the Obama tax cuts.	这意味着否决任何延长布什时代减税方案的动议，然后推出奥巴马减税方案。


How Obama Leads	奥巴马怎样领导


CAMBRIDGE – Two years ago, Barack Obama was a first-term senator from a mid-western state who had declared his interest in running for the presidency.	剑桥－两年前，巴拉克·奥巴马还是一位来自中西部州宣称对竞选总统感兴趣的首任参议员。


Many people were skeptical that an African-American with a strange name and little national experience could win.	许多人都对一个名字古怪几乎没有治国经验的非洲裔美国人能够当选总统，表示怀疑。


But as his campaign unfolded, he demonstrated that he possessed the powers to lead – both soft and hard.	但是，当奥巴马的竞选活动展开的时候，他证明了他拥有领导的能力——不管是软领导力还是硬领导力。


Soft power is the ability to attract others, and the three key soft-power skills are emotional intelligence, vision, and communications.	软领导力是吸引其它人的能力； 三个关键的软领导力技巧是情商、洞察力和沟通。


In addition, a successful leader needs the hard-power skills of organizational and Machiavellian political capacity.	此外，一位成功的领导人还需要组织和政治权谋能力的硬领导力。


Equally important is the contextual intelligence that allows a leader to vary the mix of these skills in different situations to produce the successful combinations that I call “smart power.”	同样重要的，是可以让一个领导人在不同的情况中变换这些不同的技巧，从而产生成功组合的被我称为“聪明能力”的情景智力。


During his campaign, Obama demonstrated these skills in his calm response to crises, his forward-looking vision, and his superb organizational ability.	在其总统竞选期间，奥巴马在其对危机的冷静反应，前瞻性的观点以及卓越的组织能力中，展示了这些技巧。


In addition, his contextual intelligence about world politics has been shaped from the bottom up with experience in Indonesia and Kenya, and his understanding of American politics was shaped from the bottom up as a community organizer in Chicago.	而且，奥巴马对世界政治的情景智力从头到尾都受到其在印尼和肯尼亚的经历的影响，而他对美国政治的理解则完全受到他在芝加哥作为社区组织者的经历的影响。


Obama continued to demonstrate these leadership skills in his almost flawless transition.	奥巴马在其几乎完美无缺的过渡阶段继续展现这些领导技巧。


By selecting his primary opponent, Hillary Clinton, as his Secretary of State, and reaching across party lines to retain Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense, he showed openness to strong subordinates.	将主要对手希拉里·克林顿任命为国务卿，以及超越党派界限将罗伯特·盖茨留任为国防部长，奥巴马显示了对重要下属的开放态度。


In his inaugural address, he sounded the themes of smart power – a willingness “to extend an open hand to those who unclench their fists” – but also stressed themes of responsibility as Americans confront sobering economic problems.	在奥巴马的就职演说中，他奏响了聪明能力的旋律——愿意为“那些松开拳头的人伸出双手”——但是，因为美国人面临着严重的经济问题，所以他也强调了责任的主题。


Moreover, Obama has started his term in decisive fashion.	而且，奥巴马用果断的方式开始了其任期。


In his first weeks in office, he began to fulfill his campaign promises by outlining a massive economic stimulus plan, ordering the closure of the Guantánamo Bay prison, promoting new fuel-efficiency standards to save energy, giving an interview to Al Arabiya, and sending a top emissary to the Middle East.	在奥巴马就任总统后的开始几个星期里，他通过提出大规模的经济刺激计划，命令关闭关塔纳摩监狱，推进新型节能标准节省能源，接受阿拉比亚（Al Arabiya）电视台的采访以及向中东派出高级特使的方式，开始实现其竞选承诺。


George W. Bush once said that his role as leader was to be “the decider.”	乔治·沃克·布什曾经说过，他作为领导人的角色是成为“决策者”。


But even if Bush had been better as a decider, people want something more in a leader.	但是，即使布什在作为决策者上干得更好一点，人们也希望在一个领导人身上得到更多的东西。


We want someone who reinforces our identity and tells us who we are.	我们希望有人来强化我们的身份并告诉我们是谁。


We judge leaders not only by the effectiveness of their actions, but also by the meanings that they create and teach.	我们不仅要通过领导人行动的有效性来评价他们，而且要通过他们创造和教导的意义来评价他们。


Most leaders feed upon the existing identity and solidarity of their groups.	大多数领导人都依赖于现存的身份和所在团体的团结。


But some leaders see moral obligations beyond their immediate group and educate their followers.	但是，有些领导人对道德责任的看法超越了其直接所在的团体并教育其支持者。


Nelson Mandela could easily have chosen to define his group as black South Africans and sought revenge for the injustices of Apartheid and his own imprisonment.	尼尔森·曼德拉能够轻易地选择将自己的团体定义为南非黑人，并对种族隔离的不公和自己遭受的牢狱之灾采取报复措施。


Instead, he worked tirelessly to expand the identity of his followers both by words and deeds.	然而，为了扩大其支持者的范围，曼德拉却通过语言和行动不知疲倦地工作。


When Obama was faced with a campaign crisis over incendiary racial remarks by his former pastor, he did not simply distance himself from the problem, but made use of the episode to deliver a speech that served to broaden the understanding and identities of both white and black Americans.	当奥巴马面临其前牧师煽动性的种族言论的竞选危机时，他并没有简单地让自己和这个问题划清界限，而是利用这一事件来发表一篇致力于扩大美国白人和黑人的见解和身份的演讲。


The crisis on September 11, 2001, produced an opportunity for Bush to express a bold new vision of foreign policy.	2001年9月11日的危机为布什提出大胆的外交政策新观点提供了机会。


But he failed to produce a sustainable picture of America’s leadership role in the world.	但是，布什没能为美国在世界上的领导角色描绘出一个可持续的图画。


A successful vision is one that combines inspiration with feasibility.	一个成功观点是结合了灵感和可行性的观点。


Bush failed to get that combination right.	布什没能把这两者结合好。


Obama will need to use both his emotional and contextual intelligence if he is to restore American leadership.	如果奥巴马要恢复美国的领导地位，他就要利用其情商和情景智力。


Contextual intelligence is the intuitive diagnostic skill that helps a leader align tactics with objectives to produce smart strategies in different situations.	情景智力是帮助一个领导人将战略和目标结合起来，从而在不同的环境中能产生明智的战略的直观判断技巧。


A decade ago, the conventional wisdom was that the world was a uni-polar American hegemony.	十年前，传统的观点是世界是单极的美国霸权。


Neo-conservative pundits drew the conclusion that the United States was so powerful that it could do whatever it wanted, and that others had no choice but to follow.	新保守主义学者断定，美国强大到可以做它想做的任何事情，而其它国家没有选择，只能跟随。


This new unilateralism was based on a profound misunderstanding of the nature of power – that is, the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants – in world politics.	这一新单边主义是建立在对世界政治中实力的性质——也就是说，影响其他人来获得一个人想要的结果的能力——非常严重的误解之上的。


The US may be the only superpower, but preponderance is not empire.	美国可能是唯一的超级大国，但是，优势不是绝对统治。


America can influence but not control other parts of the world.	美国可以影响但是不能控制世界的其它地区。


Whether certain resources will produce power depends upon the context.	某些资源是否会产生权力取决于一定的背景。


To understand power and its contexts in the world today, I have sometimes suggested the metaphor of a three-dimensional chess game.	为了理解当今世界的实力 和实力背景，我曾打过三维象棋游戏的比喻。


On the top board of military power among countries, the US is the only superpower.	在最上层的各国间军事实力的棋盘上，美国是唯一的超级大国。


On the middle board of economic relations among countries, the world is already multipolar.	在中间各国间经济关系的棋盘上，世界已经多极化了。


America cannot get the outcomes it wants in trade, antitrust, or other areas without the cooperation of the European Union, China, Japan, and others.	没有欧盟、中国、日本和其它国家的合作，美国无法在贸易、反托拉斯和其它的领域内得到其想要的结果。


On the bottom board of transnational relations outside the control of governments – pandemics, climate change, the drug trade, or transnational terrorism, for example – power is chaotically distributed.	在最下面的国家政府控制之外的跨国关系的棋盘上——例如，流行疾病、气候变化、毒品买卖以及跨国恐怖主义——实力是无序地分布的。


Nobody is in control.	没有人能够进行控制。


This is the complex world in which Obama takes up the mantle of leadership.	这是一个奥巴马获得了领导衣钵的复杂世界。


He inherits a global economic crisis, two wars in which US and allied troops are deployed, crises in the Middle East and South Asia, and a struggle against terrorism.	他继承了一场全球经济危机，部署了美国和盟国军队的两次战争 ，中东和南亚危机以及反对恐怖主义的努力。


He will have to deal with this legacy and chart a new course at the same time.	他将不得不在处理这些遗留问题的同时开启 新的方向。


He will have to make difficult decisions while creating a larger sense of meaning in which America once again exports hope rather than fear.	他也将不得不在创造美国再次输出希望而不是恐惧的更有意义的意念的同时，作出艰难的决定。


That will be the test of his leadership.	这将是对奥巴马领导能力的考验。


Oily Dirt	油砂


EDMONTON – Calm discussion of the environment nowadays is about as plausible as reasoned dialogue on witchcraft in colonial Massachusetts.	埃德蒙顿——就好比马塞诸塞殖民地民众不可能理性地探讨巫术一样，今天的人们也不可能平心静气地探讨环境问题。


Consider the hyperbolic debate over the Keystone XL pipeline, which would funnel oil from Canada’s Athabasca tar sands in northeastern Alberta to refineries on the Texas Gulf Coast.	从加拿大东北部阿尔伯塔省阿塔巴斯卡油砂公司向得州海湾炼油厂运送石油的拱心石XL输油管道计划引发的夸张争论就是实例。


The Alberta government – and the oil companies that influence it – would upgrade “tar sands” to “oil sands,” apparently thinking that a better name somehow silences environmental critics.	阿尔伯塔省政府和背后的石油公司把“焦油砂”改叫“油砂”，似乎改个好听点的名字就能摆脱环保主义者的批评。


Environmentalists opposing the pipeline refer, with equal deftness, to “dirty oil.”	而反对输油管项目的环保者也出于同样的心态将其称之为“脏油”。


Bystanders understandably wonder which is worse – awkward rebranding or awkward puns.	难怪旁观者质疑哪种做法更不可取——是蹩脚的更名还是蹩脚的俏皮话。


Neither gaucherie is entirely deceptive.	虽然笨手笨脚，但政府和环保主义者的说法的确都有真实的成份。


The tar sands are hundreds of square kilometers of bitumen, a viscous and corrosive tarlike deposit.	焦油砂其实是绵延数百平方公里的沥青矿层，不但黏度高而且具有腐蚀性。


Bitumen permeates the dirt at the surface or, where thin layers of compost and sediment intervene, somewhat below basement levels.	土壤的表层浸透了沥青，尤其在有沉淀物的地方埋得更深。


Grasping a handful of dirt from a riverbank does leave one’s hand more oily than tarred, and the greasy dirt is somewhat sandy.	抓一把河岸边的泥土手上确实能沾上不少油脂，而油质粘土的确也含有沙质成份。


This highlights the real deception by both sides.	这才是双方都想掩盖的关键所在。


Awkwardly for oil companies, bitumen is not ordinary oil.	沥青和普通石油不是一回事，这让石油公司感到有很大麻烦。


Awkwardly for environmentalists, Nature put corrosive bitumen in the dirt.	而大自然将具有强腐蚀性的沥青掺入土壤则让环保主义者觉得难以解释。


Had BP spilled hundreds of billions of barrels of bitumen across hundreds of square kilometers, environmentalists would rightly demand that no expense be spared to rid the dirt of every trace of oil.	如果是英国石油公司（BP）把数千亿桶沥青洒在方圆数百平方公里的土地上，环保主义者会理直气壮地要求不惜一切代价把油从土壤中清理出去。


A double standard applies, because, whatever Nature does is, well, natural, and therefore good.	这里显然涉及双重标准，因为自然的一切作为是自然的，因此也就没有问题。


Environmentalists’ awkwardness is, or ought to be, disconcerting.	环保主义者的麻烦令人不安，而石油公司的麻烦则更为本质。


But oil companies’ awkwardness is more substantial. They remove bitumen from the dirt in two ways.	石油公司通常采用两种方法从土壤中提取沥青。


An older technology features vast strip mines, huge diggers, and trucks carting oily dirt to industrial-scale pressure cookers that drain off the bitumen.	原有技术需要建设巨型露天矿，还要配备大型挖掘机、卡车将油砂运往工业压力容器中提取沥青。


A newer technology leaves the surface untouched by pumping steam into the subsoil.	而新技术则在不破坏土壤表层的前提下向土壤底层注入蒸汽。


This heats the bitumen, making it runny enough to be pumped out.	待沥青受热成为流质后再行抽取。


Both processes leave toxic residues and somewhat less oily dirt.	这两种方法在降低土壤油性的同时，都无法避免有毒物质残留问题。


Environmentalists make several arguments for leaving the bitumen in the dirt.	环保主义者列举了几项理由，反对提炼土壤中的沥青。


They disparage hideous strip mines and toxic tailing ponds that even superstar marketers cannot “greenwash.”  The scale is unusual, but open-pit mines and tailing ponds are normal mining operations everywhere.	他们批评可怕的露天矿和有毒的尾矿池，这些东西即使是营销巨星再世也无法“漂绿”。 虽然规模前所未有，但露天矿和尾矿池在常规采矿作业中却是随处可见。


Moreover, the newer bitumen technology does without strip mines.	此外，新发明的沥青技术也不涉及露天矿建设。


Environmentalists correctly note that producing heat for either process uses more energy than does overcoming gravity to pump up ordinary oil.	环保主义者指出这两种方法产热的能耗都比克服重力、提炼普通石油多。


Burning natural gas to heat oily dirt releases large amounts of carbon dioxide, exacerbating global warming.	燃烧天然气加热油砂释放出大量二氧化碳，导致全球变暖进一步恶化。


Unfortunately, biodiesel from soy is little better on this count; and California heavy oil and farm ethanol are both far worse.	不幸的是，提炼自大豆的生物柴油在这个问题上也好不到哪去； 加州重油和农场乙醇的效果还不如天然气。


We are running a global experiment while living in a test tube.	我们在进行全球试验的同时自己还生活在试管里。


Given this, the oil industry’s defense – “I’m no worse a scoundrel” – seems dishonorable.	有鉴于此，石油业“我不比无赖更坏”的辩白似乎显得苍白可耻。


US President Barack Obama has a limited opportunity to preserve the bitumen companies’ integrity.	美国总统奥巴马没有能力保证沥青公司恪守诚信原则做事。


They want to access the American market and use Gulf Coast ports to export more widely, but Keystone XL is not their only option.	这些公司想打入美国市场并利用墨西哥湾沿岸港口扩大出口业务，但拱心石XL输油管道计划并不是他们手上唯一的方案。


If Obama blocks the pipeline, they will build others, and other export facilities – if not on Canada’s environmentally delicate Pacific coast, then at some already-industrialized Atlantic port.	如果奥巴马阻止修建管道，他们就会选择在加拿大脆弱的太平洋沿岸或某些已经工业化的大西洋港口修建其他出口设施。


These developments will come anyway, and, once they do, the United States will become a mere bystander.	修建输油设施是迟早的事，而一旦设施修好，美国就会被挤出局外。


By offering conditional approval of the Keystone XL, Obama could advance the pipeline’s very genuine diplomatic and economic benefits, while reducing its environmental costs.	奥巴马有条件批准拱心石XL输油管计划不仅可以切实推进外交和经济利益，而且可以尽可能控制环境代价。


The benefits are huge.	批准该计划的好处不言而喻。


Flooding global markets with Canadian oil would constrain global oil prices. More important, it would advance the cause of peace.	大批加拿大原油流入全球市场不但能抑制全球油价，还可以推动和平事业。


Addiction to Middle East oil distorts foreign policies, causes wars, and ravages the environment.	对中东原油的高度依赖扭曲外交政策、引发战争，并造成环境破坏。


Recall how Iraqi soldiers retreating from Kuwait in 1991 set hundreds of wellheads ablaze.	还记不记得1991年从科威特撤离的伊拉克士兵是怎样点燃数百口科威特油井的。


The infernos spewed CO2 into the air and flaming oil across delicate desert ecosystems for months.	数月不息的大火向空中喷出大量的二氧化碳，而烧着的原油破坏了本已脆弱的沙漠生态。


War is not green.	战争和环保无关。


America cannot realistically expect its allies – let alone countries like Iran and Venezuela, with which its relations are strained – to adopt principled foreign policies when Middle East Realpolitik distorts its own foreign policy.	在自身外交政策都受到中东现实政治扭曲情况下，美国更无法指望盟国，更何况伊朗和委内瑞拉等关系紧张的国家坚持有原则的外交政策。


In the short term, Canadian oil would liberate the US from this hypocrisy.	短期看加拿大原油能帮助美国摆脱这样的伪善面目。


In the longer term, were shale gas and oil to satisfy US demand, Canadian oil could wean America’s allies from their Middle East oil addiction, giving them new foreign-policy options, too.	而从长远看，如果页岩油和页岩气能够满足美国的能源需求，那么加拿大原油则可以阻断盟国对中东原油的依赖，也给盟国带来新的外交政策方案。


Obama’s approval should be conditional on Canada enforcing serious environmental safeguards.	要求加拿大认真执行环保措施应当是奥巴马批准管道建设计划的先决条件。


Many bitumen companies claim that they already abide by such safeguards; but environmentalists’ skepticism is justified.	很多沥青公司称已经执行相关保护措施； 但环保主义者的怀疑是有道理的。


Competition presses each company to keep its costs down.	竞争迫使所有公司压低成本。


Only strong regulations, transparency, and severe penalties can create a level playing field.	只有健全的法规、透明的环境和严厉的处罚能够造就公平的赛场。


One obvious condition is mandatory CO2 “sequestration” (removing CO2 from the air and storing it deep underground).	明摆的条件之一是强制“封存”二氧化碳（提取空气中的二氧化碳并将其深埋地下）。


Mandatory sequestration could make net CO2 emissions from bitumen extraction no worse than those from conventional oil wells, and perhaps even better.	强制封存可以让提取沥青时的净二氧化碳排放与常规油井相当，甚至可以低于常规油井的排放水平。


Another obvious condition is mandatory timetables for restoring strip mines and tailing ponds to their natural condition.	另一个明摆的条件是强制规定时间表要求露天矿和尾矿池复原到自然状态。


The companies want the bitumen that Nature put in the oily dirt.	公司要的是自然界存储在油砂中的沥青。


Let them take it, but let’s also ensure they leave no worse a mess than Nature intended.	让他们放手去做，但同时务必保证不让他们破坏环境。


The Political Economy of 2013	2013年的政治经济学


NEWPORT BEACH – Watching America’s leaders scramble in the closing days of 2012 to avoid a “fiscal cliff” that would plunge the economy into recession was yet another illustration of an inconvenient truth: messy politics remains a major driver of economic developments.	发自纽波特滩——眼看着美国领导人在2012年最后那几天奋力挣扎着避免出现“财政悬崖”以免经济陷入衰退的状况，恰好体现出一个令人沮丧的事实：混乱的政治依旧是经济发展的主要驱动力。


In some cases during 2012, politics was a force for good: consider Prime Minister Mario Monti’s ability to pull Italy back from the brink of financial turmoil.	对某些国家来说，2012年的政治是一股积极力量：例如意大利总理马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）将自己的国家从金融风暴边缘力挽狂澜的能力。


But, in other cases, like Greece, political dysfunction aggravated economic problems.	然而在别的国家，比如希腊，政治体制功能失调则导致了经济问题的进一步恶化。


Close and defining linkages between politics and economics are likely to persist in 2013.	政治经济两者之间这种密切和清晰的关系很可能在2013年依然延续。


Having said this, we should also expect much greater segmentation in terms of impact – and that the consequences will affect both individual countries and the global system as a whole.	尽管如此，我们也会估计在影响力上会出现更为明显的割裂——而其后果则会同时影响到单个国家以及整个全球经济系统


In some countries – for example, Italy, Japan, and the United States – politics will remain the primary driver of economic-policy approaches.	在一些国家——比如意大利、日本和美国——政治仍然是实施经济政策手段的主要驱动力。


But elsewhere – China, Egypt, Germany, and Greece come to mind – the reverse will be true, with economics becoming a key determinant of political outcomes.	然而在另一些国家——像中国、埃及、德国以及希腊——情况则刚好相反，经济成了决定政治成果产出的关键因素。


This duality in causation speaks to a world that will become more heterogeneous in 2013 – and in at least two ways: it will lack unifying political themes, and it will be subject to multi-speed growth and financial dynamics that imply a range of possible scenarios for multilateral policy interactions.	这种因果之间的二元性提醒我们2013年将会是一个更加混杂的世界——并至少以两种方式：首先是缺乏统一的政治主题，其次是世界受到多种增长速度与金融动力的支配，意味着可能出现各种各样的多边互动局面。


With an election looming in Italy, the country’s technocratic interim administration will return the reins of power to a democratically elected government.	随着意大利选举临近，该国的技术官僚临时政府将会把政权交还给民选政府。


The question, both for Italy and Europe as a whole, is whether the new government will maintain the current economic policy stance or shift to one that is less acceptable to the country’s external partners (particularly Germany and the European Central Bank).	对意大利和整个欧洲来说，问题在于新政府是会维持目前的经济立场还是会转向一个不大为该国外部合作伙伴（尤其是德国和欧洲央行）所接受的立场。


Monti may or may not be involved in the new government.	蒙蒂不一定会参与新政府。


The further removed from it he is, the greater the temptation will be to alter the policy approach in response to popular pressures.	他越不参与新政府，那么改变政策以回应民众压力的诱惑就会更大。


This would involve less emphasis on fiscal and structural reforms, raising concerns in Berlin, Brussels, and Frankfurt.	这导致对财政及结构改革的强调降低，并随之引发柏林、布鲁塞尔和法兰克富的忧虑。


Japan’s incoming government has already signaled an economic-policy pivot, relying on what it directly controls (fiscal policy), together with pressure on the Bank of Japan, to relax the monetary-policy stance, in an effort to generate faster growth and higher inflation.	依靠其直接控制的（财政政策）连同施加于日本央行的压力，日本新政府已经发出了经济政策的核心信号，旨在放宽货币政策方面所持有的立场以激发更快增长和更高通胀。


In the process, officials are weakening the yen.	在这个过程中，官员们一直在削弱日元。


They will also try to lower Japan’s dependence on exports and rethink sending production facilities to lower-wage countries.	他们也会尝试降低日本对出口的依赖并重新考虑把生产设施转移到工资成本较低的国家。


The economic impact of politics in the US, while important, will be less dynamic: absent a more cooperative Congress, politics will mute policy responses rather than fuel greater activism.	美国政治对经济影响尽管很重要，但将不再那么有活力:由于缺乏一个较为合作的国会，政治宁愿选择不作任何政策回应而不是支持更激进的行动。


Continued congressional polarization would maintain policy uncertainty, confound debt and deficit negotiations, and impede economic growth.	持续存在的国会两极对立将使政策继续陷入不确定，导致债务和赤字谈判陷入混乱并阻碍经济增长。


From stymieing medium-term fiscal reforms to delaying needed overhauls of the labor and housing markets, congressional dysfunction would keep US economic performance below its capacity; over time, it would also eat away at potential output.	从妨碍中期改革到推迟劳动力和住房市场所需的改革，国会功能失调会让美国经济表现低于其潜能； 随着时间的推移，它也会侵蚀其潜在产出。


In other countries, the causal direction will run primarily from economics to politics.	在其他国家，这种因果方向主要从经济转向政治。


In Egypt and Greece, for example, rising poverty, high unemployment, and financial turmoil could place governments under pressure.	比如，在埃及和希腊，贫穷状况恶化，高失业率和金融危机压迫着政府 。


Popular frustration may not wait for the ballot box.	民众的沮丧可不会等待选举才爆发。


Instead, hard times could fuel civil unrest, threatening their governments’ legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness – and with no obvious alternatives that could ensure rapid economic recovery and rising living standards.	相反，困难时期可能会加剧社会动荡，危及政府的合法性，信誉和效能——没有明显的可替代方案能保证快速的经济复苏并提高生活水平。


In China, the credibility of the incoming leadership will depend in large part on whether the economy can consolidate its soft landing.	在中国，新一届领导人的信誉很大程度上将取决于中国经济能否承受其软着陆政策。


Specifically, any prolonged period of sub-7% growth could encourage opposition and dissent – not only in the countryside, but also in urban centers.	具体来说，任何长期低于7%的增长都会——不仅在农村，也在中心城市——激起反对和异议。


Then there is Germany, which holds the key to the integrity and unity of the eurozone.	然后是德国，它是维持欧元区完整与统一的关键。


So far, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been largely successful in insulating the German economy from the turmoil elsewhere in Europe.	迄今为止，德国总理安吉拉·默克尔（Angela Merkel ）在很大程度上已经成功把德国经济与欧洲其他地区的经济动荡隔绝开来。


Unemployment has remained remarkably low and confidence relatively high.	德国失业率一直保持在显著的低水平而该国人民对经济的信心相对较高。


And, while growth has moderated recently, Germany remains one of Europe’s best-performing economies – and not just its paymaster.	尽管德国的经济增长近来放缓，德国仍然是欧洲表现最好的经济体之一——而不仅仅只是个后台老板。


While some would have favored greater policy activism, Merkel’s Germany has provided a steady anchor for a eurozone struggling to end bouts of financial instability and put an end to questions about its survival as a well-functioning monetary union (one that aspires to becoming much more).	虽然有些人一直青睐更激进的政策行动，默克尔领导下的德国已经以其稳定的表现为一直努力结束金融危机的欧元区指明了前进的方向，并以其表现打破了人们对欧盟是否能够作为一个运行良好的货币联盟（它立志成就更多）所存在的疑虑。


A change in German leadership would, therefore, raise questions about Europe’s policy underpinning.	德国领导层的变化因而会对欧洲政策基础提出了一个挑战。


How politics and economics interact nationally and globally is one of the important questions for 2013 and beyond.	政治与经济如何在国内及全球范围内互动对2013年及以后的形势来说是个重要问题。 这将产生三种前景：良好的经济和有效的政治为一个不断成长和更合作的全球经济提供稳固的基础；


There are three scenarios: good economics and effective politics provide the basis for a growing and more cooperative global economy; bad economics interact with dysfunctional politics to ruin the day; or the world muddles through, increasingly unstable, as a tug of war between economics and politics plays out, with no clear result or direction.	不良的经济与功能失调的政治相互作用毁掉一切； 或者整个世界勉强应付过去，由于经济与政治之间展开的激烈竞争，变得越来越不稳定，最终也没有一个明确的结果或是方向。


Part of the answer depends on what happens in three countries in particular – China, Germany, and the US.	答案部分取决于三个特定的国家所发生的变化——中国、德国和美国。


Their economic and political stability is essential to the well-being of a world economy that has yet to recover fully from the 2008 global financial crisis.	它们的经济和政治稳定对于尚未从2008年全球金融危机中完全恢复过来的世界经济来说是必不可少的。


Current indications, albeit incomplete, suggest that the three will continue to anchor the global economy in 2013.	目前的迹象表明（尽管并不完全），这三个国家将在2013年继续引领全球经济。


That is the good news.	这是好的方面。


The bad news is that their anchor may remain both tentative and insufficient to restore the level of growth and financial stability to which billions of people aspire.	坏的一面是它们的表现可能只是试探性的，并不足以恢复数十亿人们所向往的增长水平和金融稳定。


The Siren Song of “Strongmania”	“强人狂热”的迷魂曲


CLAREMONT – Political strongmen are back in style.	克莱蒙特—政治强人潮流回归。


Not long ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the only leaders worthy of the label.	不久前，俄罗斯总统普京还是唯一一个带有这一标签的领导人。


Today, he has much more competition.	如今，他有了很多对手。


The trend can be seen in traditionally autocratic regimes.	这一趋势可见于传统极权政权。


Chinese President Xi Jinping is arguably the country’s most powerful leader since the death of Mao Zedong four decades ago.	中国国家主席习近平可以说是毛泽东死后四十年来权力最大的中国领导人。


But something similar can be seen in countries that had been touted as model young democracies.	但同样的情况也见于被吹捧为年轻民主国家榜样的国家。


In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had long been moving toward autocracy, has concentrated power further in the wake of last month’s failed military coup.	在土耳其，总统埃尔多安早已转向独裁，上个月的未遂政变让他进一步集中了权力。


Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has reversed a post-communist success story with a sharp turn toward illiberalism.	匈牙利总理欧尔班让后共产主义的成功故事急转直下为反自由主义。


Even in the Philippines, where the People Power Revolution overthrew Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, voters have just elected as their president Rodrigo Duterte, an avowed populist strongman and trigger-happy warrior against drug lords.	就连1986年人民力量革命推翻了费迪南德·马科斯的菲律宾，选民也刚刚选择了公开宣称的民粹主义强人、以敢于向毒枭开枪著称的杜特尔特。


Even the world’s most stable democracies have been infected by strongmania.	就连世界上最稳定的民主国家，也受到强人狂热的渗透。


In Austria, Norbert Hofer, leader of the far-right Freedom Party, is likely to be elected to the presidency in October.	在奥地利，极右翼的自由党（Freedom Party）党魁诺尔伯特·霍费尔（Norbert Hofer）可能在10月当选为总统。


And in the United States, Donald Trump has capitalized on the frustration and prejudices of parts of the American electorate to gain a chance – fortunately, weakening by the day – of becoming the country’s next president.	在美国，唐纳德·特朗普利用部分美国选民的沮丧和偏见赢得了竞选下任美国总统机会——幸运的是他的机会日益渺茫。


This embrace of leaders who promise that they alone can fix society’s problems and restore some idealized past reflects widespread ignorance of the nature and consequences of populist rule.	这些领导人承诺他们可以当枪匹马解决社会问题、重建理想化的过去，他们受到拥戴体现了人们对民粹主义统治的性质和后果的广泛忽视。


In fact, history has not been kind to such rulers.	事实上，历史对这些统治者并不友善。


Like today’s leaders, they would often ride to power on a wave of public anger against the perceived failures of democracy – failures that they had no intention of fixing.	和今天的领导人一样，他们常常借助民众对他们所感到的民主的失败的愤怒上位——而他们根本不准备修正这些失败。


Instead, once in office, they would often pursue an entirely different agenda – one that usually made things much worse.	相反，一旦当选，他们常常会实施完全不同的日程——往往是让情况雪上加霜。


One need look no further than Venezuela, where today’s economic meltdown can be traced back to the disastrous rule of populist par excellence Hugo Chávez.	只要看看委内瑞拉便可一窥端倪。 委内瑞拉今天的经济崩溃可以溯源到民粹主义完人查韦斯的灾难性政策。


People loved Chávez’s social-welfare schemes, seemingly unconcerned that they were based on oil revenues and foreign debt.	人民爱戴查韦斯的社会福利制度，丝毫不担心这些制度基于石油收入和外债。


As long as the benefits flowed, Chávez was free to expropriate industries and otherwise discourage private competition.	只要福利能维持，查韦斯就可肆无忌惮没收产业，打击私人竞争。


Unsurprisingly, economic diversification stalled, and when oil prices collapsed, so did the economy.	毫不奇怪，委内瑞拉经济多元化陷入停顿，而当石油价格崩盘时，其经济也跟着崩溃。


This highlights a key reason why strongmen nearly always lead their countries toward catastrophe.	这突显出强人几乎总会带领国家走向崩溃的原因。


After winning over voters with their apparent decisiveness and directness, such leaders capture enough authority to make quick decisions and demonstrate short-term results – thereby keeping voters on their side as they claim still greater authority.	在凭借出众的果断和坦率赢得选民后，这些领导人获得了足够的威权做出快速决定并带来短期成果——从而保持选民的支持，获得更大的威权。


But decisiveness carries a high cost.	但果断带来了高昂的成本。


With nobody checking their behavior, strongmen rarely account for long-term risks.	没有人制衡他们的行为，强人很少顾及长期风险。


In the end, the prosperity they promised never arrives, at least not for long.	最终，他们所承诺的繁荣从未到来，至少长期是如此。


Instead, the economy usually ends up in ruins.	相反，经济往往以遭到破坏收场。


And that’s not the worst of it.	而这尚不是最糟糕的情况。


Voters surrender freedoms for that promised prosperity, as Russia under Putin illustrates.	选民为了承诺的繁荣不惜放弃自由，普京治下的俄罗斯就是明证。


Putin promised stability and order, and consolidated his power by taking down his political opponents, liberals and oligarchs alike.	普京承诺带来稳定和秩序，并通过打击政治反对派、自由派和寡头巩固权力。


Then he began methodically destroying Russia’s fragile democratic institutions, stifling the press, and curtailing civil liberties, including freedom of assembly.	然后，他开始系统性地破坏俄罗斯脆弱的民主制度、压制媒体、收紧公民自由，包括集会自由。


Less than a decade later, he had erected a personal autocratic regime on the ruins of a flawed new democracy.	不出十年，他就在漏洞百出的新经济的废墟上建立起个人独裁体制。


And, as in Venezuela, the absence of economic modernization and diversification tied the economy’s fate to the global oil market.	而与委内瑞拉一样，经济缺少现代化和多元化导致俄罗斯经济的命运与全球石油市场捆绑在一起。


The ability to criticize the government freely is the core difference between democracy and dictatorship.	自由批评政府的能力是民主与独裁的核心区别。


So how can anyone believe that a leader who curtails people’s right to speak out can save a flawed democracy?	因此，对于抑制人民发出声音的权利的领导人，如何相信他能拯救有缺陷的民主？


In fact, the combination of freedom of expression and electoral competition is the key to improving democracies, because it enables systemic failures – not to mention leaders’ missteps – to be subjected to public scrutiny.	事实上，言论自由和竞选竞争的组合是改善民主的关键，因为这样能让系统性失败——更不用说领导人的失策——受到公共监督的约束。


China’s autocratic government is famous for avoiding such scrutiny by suppressing freedom of information.	中国的独裁政府以通过压制信息自由避免这一约束而闻名。


Its many elements of Internet censorship – from blocking politically sensitive Wikipedia articles to filtering certain key words out of online searches – come together to form the so-called Great Firewall of China.	其互联网审查的诸多要素——从屏蔽政治敏感的维基百科文章到过滤在线搜索关键词——一起构成了所谓的防火长城。


That firewall, together with press censorship, enables China’s leaders to conceal their failures and highlight their achievements, however dubious.	防火长城，再加上言论审查，使得中国领导人能够隐瞒失败、突出成就，不管多么可疑。


Putin behaves similarly, using the press to emphasize, say, how Russia’s annexation of Crimea has reminded the country’s Western opponents of its “greatness.”	普京的行为亦然，利用媒体强调（比如）俄罗斯吞并克里米亚之举如何提醒了西方对手俄罗斯的“伟大”。


Orbán and Erdoğan seem to be operating from the same playbook.	欧尔班和埃尔多安似乎也在用同样的剧本行事。


Moreover, like China, Russia has embraced extravagant spectacles like the Olympic Games, in an effort to showcase the country’s magnificence and the beneficence of its leaders.	此外，和中国一样，俄罗斯也大操大办奥运会等盛会，目的是展示国家的壮丽和领导人的仁义。


Coverage of such events fills the media space that should be used to discuss serious governance issues.	对这些盛会的报道占领了本应用于讨论严肃的治理问题的媒体空间。


If that were not enough to convince voters of the dangers posed by populist autocrats, one might also consider the human toll of living under their rule.	如果这还不足以让选民领教民粹主义独裁者的危险，还可以考虑一下他们统治下失去生命的人。


Perhaps the dozens of journalists who have been arrested in Turkey since the coup attempt, or the families of Putin’s many opponents who have ended up dead, could provide some insight into the cost of living in constant fear of the government.	也许土耳其未遂政变以来被逮捕的几十名记者，或众多死于非命的普京反对者的家庭能提供一些关于生活在永恒的政府恐惧下的洞见。


The growing popularity of strongmen in much of the world may or may not herald the dawn of a new autocratic age.	世界上许多地方强人支持率日渐高涨，这也许预示着独裁时代的开始，也许不是。


Strongmen tend to self-destruct, owing to colossal mistakes that doom their grandiose ambitions.	强人具有自我毁灭倾向，因为他们的浮夸野心注定会因为巨大的错误而失败。


Unfortunately, they tend to leave a severely compromised democracy and a derelict economy in their wake.	不幸的是，他们总身后留下的往往是受到严重损害的民主和满目疮痍的经济。


Ultimately, the best defense against such outcomes is to prevent populist autocrats from getting elected in the first place.	说到底，防止这样的结果的最佳办法是从一开始就阻止民粹主义独裁者赢得选举。


Countries that have elected such leaders should stand as a warning to others tempted to go down a similar path.	选出了民粹主义独裁者的国家应该作为警示信号，警告有可能步后尘的国家。


The Competition Factor	竞争因素


BRUSSELS/MEXICO CITY – Since the global economic downturn began in 2008, debate has centered on the macroeconomic strategies and instruments used to address the crisis and foster recovery.	布鲁塞尔/墨西哥城—2008年全球经济衰退开始以来，争论一直集中在解决危机、创造复苏的宏观经济战略和工具上。


But correcting imbalances and addressing short-term slowdowns or recessions, while important, should not be allowed to overshadow the need to establish long-term conditions for solid and sustainable economic growth.	但纠正失衡和解决短期减速或衰退虽然重要，并不应该压倒为稳健可持续的经济增长创造长期条件的需要。


So far, macroeconomic policy has borne both the blame for economic malaise and the hope that it can be overcome.	目前，宏观经济政策既被指为经济问题的罪魁，也是克服经济问题的希望。


But we should be devoting as much attention to the microeconomic problems – such as poor incentives, market failures, and regulatory shortcomings – that led us into the crisis in the first place.	但我们应该把同样多的注意力放在微观经济问题上，比如激励不振、市场失灵和监管短缺，这是导致衰退的最初原因。


Indeed, just as microeconomic problems in the financial sector triggered a credit crunch and fueled a global recession, so microeconomic factors hold the key to recovery.	事实上，正如金融部门的微观经济问题触发了信贷动荡、助长了全球衰退，微观经济因素也是复苏的关键。


Many economies need to fix the financial sector and restore credit, while many more need to raise productivity in order to boost growth and create jobs.	许多经济需要修正金融部门、重塑信用，更多的国家需要提升生产率以提振增长、创造就业。


Some industries suffer from counterproductive and ill-conceived regulation; others are ailing as a result of monopolistic behavior by dominant firms, or because they face a lack of effective competition and transparency in utilities and financial services.	有的产业因不利于生产率提高的拙劣监管而遭受损失； 也有的产业因主导企业的垄断行为或面临公用事业和金融服务的缺乏有效竞争和透明度而步履维艰。


Fixing these problems would help us to return to a path of growth and prosperity for all.	纠正这些问题有助于我们回到共同的增长和繁荣之路。


To achieve this, we first must follow the Hippocratic oath and avoid doing more harm.	为了实现这一点，我们首先应该遵守希波克拉底誓言，避免进一步的伤害。


Governments around the world should ignore the temptation to relax competition in order to provide relief to particular industries or economic groups.	全球政府应该克服放松竞争的诱惑，从而让某些产业和经济集团松一口气。


The renowned American economist Mancur Olson argued that stagnation in developed economies results from cartels and lobbies becoming more numerous and powerful over time, until they eventually drain a country’s economic dynamism.	著名美国经济学家曼瑟·奥尔森（Mancur Olson）认为，发达国家的停滞是因为卡特尔和游说集团数量日增、力量日强，终于耗尽了一国的经济活力。


Preserving a competitive environment in which markets remain open and contestable is the best tonic, because firms must constantly innovate and perform better under such conditions.	保护市场开放可争的竞争性环境是最好的药方，因为在这样的环境下，企业必须不断地创新、表现更好。


This, in turn, makes our societies more creative and, ultimately, more prosperous.	这反过来又让我们的社会更有创新力，最终更加繁荣。


Efforts to relax competition have many faces.	放松竞争的努力包括多个方面。


But all of them make an economy less productive and redistribute wealth to small, coordinated groups with vested interests and a strong inclination to lobby the government.	但不论如何，它们都会让经济生产率更低，让财富再分配偏向身为既得利益、惯于游说政府的少数合作集团。


The most common approach is protectionism, which has been part of the political discourse in various countries in recent years.	最常见的做法是保护主义，近几年来，保护主义一再出现在众多国家的政治话语中。


But official measures to help national producers at the expense of domestic business customers and consumers are always short-sighted, for they fail to help producers to address the challenges that they will have to face sooner or later anyway.	但牺牲国内商业客户和消费者提携本国生产者的正式措施总是短视的，因为这些措施无法帮助生产者克服它们迟早要面对的挑战。


Similarly, old-fashioned dirigisme – such as attempts to “pick winners,” foster national “champions,” or keep failed business models alive through state subsidies – is both harmful and doomed to fail.	类似地，老式“政府干预”——比如“选择赢家”措施、打造国家“冠军”，或通过国家补贴让失败的商业模式继续生存——既充满了危害，也不可能成功。


And misplaced regulation – for example, in the service sector – remains a barrier to healthy competition in many countries.	失配的监管——比如对服务部门的监管——依然是许多国家健康竞争的壁垒。


Once we have stopped doing harm, we must start doing the right things.	一旦停止有害政策，我们必须开始做正确的事。


Economic policy is like gardening: pulling on plants will not make them grow faster, but a successful gardener can provide them with the right environment in which to flourish.	经济政策就像是园艺：揠苗并不能助长，但成功的园丁能够为它们提供正确的环境，让它们枝繁叶茂。


Relying on competition can help societies to unleash well-functioning markets’ power to provide goods and services.	依靠竞争可以有助于社会利用运转良好的市场力量提供商品和服务。


To achieve this, policymakers must have a sound enforcement framework at their disposal, take an economy-wide approach, and attract the participation of all stakeholders.	为了实现这一点，决策者必须有可供支配的良好的执行框架，采取着眼于整个经济的办法，吸引各方的参与。


Sound enforcement implies legal tools and resources to pursue and implement an economic policy, along with an institutional design that reduces meddling by vested interests.	良好的执行包括追求和实施经济政策的法律工具和资源，同时也包括减少既得利益干预的制度设计。


Consider, for example, the importance of impartial and effective antitrust authorities, or subsidy schemes that are sufficiently well designed to ensure that they truly serve the public interest.	比如，想想中立有效的反垄断当局或者设计巧妙能够确保切实服务于公共利益的补贴机制。


An economy-wide approach is needed because markets are interconnected.	着眼于整个经济的办法之所以必要，是因为市场是相互联系的。


Misguided regulation or market failures that harm competition anywhere can burden the entire economy.	误导的监管或有害于竞争市场失灵会对整个经济造成负担。


The global crisis erupted because major problems in the functioning of the banking sector had been left unaddressed.	全球危机爆发是拜银行部门功能问题迟迟得不到解决所赐。


The poor functioning of input markets, such as markets for energy or intermediary products, can also do a lot of economic harm, not least because it hampers external competitiveness.	投入品市场（如能源市场和中间产品市场）运行不畅也可以造成诸多经济伤害，其中一个原因是他损害了外部竞争。


Finally, strengthening competition throughout the economy requires broad support.	最后，在整个经济中增强竞争需要广泛的支持。


This cannot be achieved without bridging ideological divisions and overcoming political pressures from particular economic groups.	这只有在弥合思想分歧、克服特殊经济集团政治压力的情况下才能实现。


Advocacy can play a key role, by educating not only policymakers, but also citizens and businessmen, about the benefits of competition.	拥护可以起到关键作用——不仅要教育决策者，也要教育公民和商人，让他们知道竞争的好处。


There should be a wide consensus that a pro-competitive environment is one of the keys to economic prosperity.	应该形成广泛的共识，利于竞争的环境是经济繁荣的关键之一。


Australia provides a good example of how pro-competitive policies deliver results.	关于利于竞争的政策如何产生效果，澳大利亚是个好例子。


Its economy was one of the OECD’s worst in terms of productivity growth in the 1980’s; a decade later, Australia was in third place.	20世纪80年代，澳大利亚经济的生产率增长在经合组织中垫底； 十年后，澳大利亚已经跃居第三。


In the interim, all of the country’s economic regulation was examined from the standpoint of maximizing competition, and a national pro-reform consensus was forged.	在此期间，澳大利亚的所有经济监管都会从最大化竞争的角度予以考察，国内也形成了支持改革的共识。


Currently, significant efforts are underway in several countries, including Mexico.	最近，一些国家做出了巨大努力，包括墨西哥。


Structural reforms to boost productivity will also be crucial to ensure Europe’s economic recovery and the survival of its social model.	提振生产率的结构性改革也是确保欧洲经济复苏、其社会模式生存的关键。


The “Single Market Acts I & II” provide a comprehensive agenda to tap fully the potential of an integrated and competitive market of 500 million consumers to catalyze growth and prosperity in the European Union.	《单一市场法案I、II》提供了一个全面的日程充分开发拥有5亿消费者的一体化的竞争性市场的潜力来催化欧盟的增长和繁荣。


We know from experience that competition works.	从经验中我们知道，竞争是有效的。


By basing economic policy on this experience, we could not only avert Olson’s grim prophecy. We could also accelerate economic recovery, increase the pace of innovation, and raise livelihoods for millions of people worldwide.	以这一经验作为经济政策的基础，我们不但可以规避奥尔森的悲观预言，还可以加速经济繁荣，提高创新速度，提升全世界数百万人的生活质量。


Financial Inclusion Now	金融包容，从现在开始


KUALA LUMPUR – Making the financial system accessible to the world’s poorest people can unlock their economic potential, improve their lives, and benefit the wider economy. So it is no surprise that financial inclusion of the poor has become an important component of public policymaking.	吉隆坡—让金融系统可以为世界最穷的人所用能够解放他们的经济潜力、改善他们的生活、有利于整个经济。 因此，毫不奇怪，对穷人的金融包容已成为公共决策的重要组成部分。


Central banks and regulators worldwide are taking the lead in making financial inclusion a priority, in addition to their traditional mandates of maintaining monetary and financial stability.	全球中央银行和监管者是把金融包容作为当务之急的领导者，把它作为维持货币和金融稳定的传统指责之外的新使命。


Financial inclusion is about providing an opportunity for the world’s 2.5 billion unbanked and financially underserved to participate in the formal financial system, thereby helping to lift them out of poverty and enter the economic mainstream.	全球有25亿人得不到周到的银行和金融服务，金融包容正是向他们提供参与正式金融系统的机会、从而帮助他们走出贫困、进入经济主流。


Greater financial inclusiveness promises a more cohesive society and more balanced growth and development.	金融包容度的增加有利于社会更加团结、增长和发展更加平衡。


Moreover, financial systems themselves stand to benefit from becoming more comprehensive and progressive.	此外，金融系统本身也可以变得更完善。 更进步，从而从中获益。


The additional consumers participating in the formal financial system will strengthen national economies and, in turn, enrich the global economy.	参与正式金融系统的新消费者将增强国民经济，并进一步提振全球经济。


Indeed, as developing countries move toward middle-income status, financial inclusion is a key component of continued progress.	事实上，随着发展中国家向中产阶级社会迈进，金融包容已成为继续进步的一大关键要素。


In countries with high levels of financial exclusion, consumers are left to rely on unregulated informal services.	在金融排斥水平较高的国家，消费者不得不依赖不受监管的非正式服务。


These inferior substitutes often imply exorbitant costs for borrowers – and financing that is usually too short term for productive investment activity.	这些劣等替代品通常意味着借款人需要面临极高的成本，而且融资期限极短，不足以支持生产性投资活动。


Moreover, the lack of consumer protection and regulatory and supervisory frameworks exposes informal activities to vulnerabilities that can harm borrowers and jeopardize financial stability.	此外，缺少消费者保护和监督管理框架让非正式金融行为很容易出现状况，伤害借款人、危及金融稳定。


Increasing the availability of formal financial services to those who have long been denied them requires establishing a balanced regulatory framework.	让长期得不到正式金融服务的群体得到它们需要建设平衡的监管框架。


Oppressive, blanket regulation, which may be necessary in complex and unpredictable financial markets, may not be relevant in a rural community – or, worse, it may stifle efforts to promote financial inclusion.	抑制性的一刀切时监管或许是复杂而不可预测的金融市场的必须，但农村社会与此关系不大，更糟糕的是，这可能扼杀促进金融包容的努力。


Indeed, proportionality is an important aspect of regulation, enabling prudential measures that, rather than exceed or underestimate, are commensurate with the risks that need to be addressed.	事实上，适度原则是监管的一个重要维度，审��的措施应该既非过度，也非不足，而是与需要解决的风险相一致。


Little wonder, then, that high levels of exclusion in developing and emerging countries have prompted policymakers to embrace proportionate regulation, thereby gaining the flexibility to encourage innovation in the provision of financial services while preserving financial stability.	因此，毫不奇怪，发展中和新兴国家的高度金融排斥促使决策者采取适度监管，从而获得在鼓励金融服务创新的同时维持金融稳定。


Bangladesh, for example, has adapted its financial regulations for microfinance institutions.	比如，孟加拉国调整了其金融监管以适应微观金融机构。


This has helped to catalyze the growth of sustainable microfinancing to local women-owned enterprises.	这有助于提振面向本地女性所有企业的可持续微观金融的增长。


Kenya’s “test and learn” approach to regulation has unleashed the potential of mobile-phone-based financial-service delivery through M-PESA, which offers consumers a safe and convenient alternative to cash.	肯尼亚的“测试和学习”监管方式通过M-PESA解放了基于移动电话的金融服务，向消费者提供安全而方便的现金替代物。


There are many other examples of successful implementation of proportionate regulation that have resulted in greater financial inclusion without compromising financial stability.	成功地实施适度监管、实现在不牺牲金融稳定的情况下增强金融包容的其他例子还有很多。


In Malaysia, agent-banking regulation (which safeguards consumers’ interests while supporting financial institutions’ business models) has led to the expansion of branchless banking to reach previously unserved rural areas.	在马来西亚，代理银行监管（保护消费者利益，同时支持金融机构的业务模式）帮助无分支银行业务进入此前无法提供服务的农村地区。


Similarly, Mexico’s “tiered” approach to financial access – according to which requirements for opening bank accounts are proportionate to risk, with low-value accounts subject to higher transaction restrictions – has expanded access to basic accounts, while mitigating the risk of money laundering.	类似地，墨西哥的“分层布置”方式——开设银行账户的要求与风险匹配，低价值账户受到较大的交易限制——扩大了基本账户的普及面，同时也减少了洗钱风险。


And Pakistan and Indonesia, by basing capital requirements for microfinance institutions on the size of the population that they expect to serve, are enabling these institutions to serve distinct market niches sustainably.	巴基斯坦和印度尼西亚根据微观金融机构预期服务人口规模来确定对它们资本要求，从而促使这些机构能够可持续地服务偏远利基市场。


Policymakers in many countries have recently been considering the role of financial standard-setting bodies (SSBs) in advancing financial inclusion.	许多国家的决策者最近都在考虑金融标准设置机构（SSB）在推进金融包容方面的作用。


In particular, they are focusing on the specific challenges that arise when applying supervisory standards in a developing country that is pursuing financial stability and inclusion.	他们专门注意了在追求金融稳定和包容的发展中国家实施监督标准时所出现的具体挑战。


Although global standards supposedly reflect the principles of proportionality, they provide insufficient guidance for the national regulators, banking institutions, and financial-sector assessors who are trying to apply them effectively in diverse environments.	尽管全球标准是为了体现适度原则，但它们对国家层面的监管者、银行机构和金融部门评估者（他们试图在多样化的环境中有效地使用这些标准）所提供的指导是不充分的。


This lack of contextual clarity has led to excessively conservative interpretations of the regulations – and thus to the creation of unintended barriers to financial inclusion.	所处环境的不清晰导致了对监管的过度保守的解读——从而产生了意料之外的金融包容壁垒。


Addressing this will require input from policymakers with practical experience applying international standards, particularly in emerging economies.	纠正这一问题需要决策者投入（特别是在新兴经济体）实施国际标准实践经验。


At the same time, in order to ensure continued progress toward financial inclusion, representatives from developing and emerging economies must play a greater role in shaping future standards.	与此同时，为了确保能持续迈向金融包容，来自发展中和新兴经济体的代表必须在制定未来标准上扮演更大的角色。


The Alliance for Financial Inclusion, a network of central bankers and financial policymakers from more than 80 developing countries, is already contributing to more effective and proportionate global regulation by facilitating increased engagement with SSBs. This September, Malaysia’s central bank will advance the process by hosting AFI’s Global Policy Forum.	金融包容联盟（Alliance for Financial Inclusion，由80多个发展中国家央行行长和金融决策者组成的网络）已在通过协助进一步参与SSB促进更有效、更适度的全球监管。


Such collaborative efforts among developing countries ultimately foster closer cooperation between them and their developed counterparts.	这些发展中国家的联合努力最终会产生它们之间以及它们与发达国家之间更紧密的合作。


This will lead to better outcomes for the global financial system, the global real economy, and, most important, the people who have been excluded from both for far too long.	这将为全球金融系统带来更好的结果，最重要的是，被排除在金融系统之外的人不会等太久了。


Occupy QE	占领量化宽松


NEW HAVEN – The Federal Reserve continues to cling to a destabilizing and ineffective strategy.	发自纽黑文——美联储依然在沿用着一个毫无效果且破坏稳定的策略。


By maintaining its policy of quantitative easing (QE) – which entails monthly purchases of long-term assets worth $85 billion – the Fed is courting an increasingly treacherous endgame at home and abroad.	通过维持其量化宽松政策（QE）——这需要每月购买价值85亿美元的长期资产——美联储无论是在国内还是国外都面临越来越凶险的残局。


By now, the global repercussions are clear, falling most acutely on developing economies with large current-account deficits – namely, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa.	如今该政策对全球造成的影响变得显而易见，其中对拥有巨额经常账户赤字的发展中经济体影响尤为剧烈——也就是印度，印尼，巴西，土耳其以及南非。


These countries benefited the most from QE-induced capital inflows, and they were the first to come under pressure when it looked like the spigot was about to be turned off.	这些国家从量化宽松政策催生的资本流入中受益最大，一旦水闸看似即将关闭，它们也会首当其冲受到压力。


When the Fed flinched at its mid-September policy meeting, they enjoyed a sigh-of-relief rally in their currencies and equity markets.	当美联储其九月中旬的政策会议上犹豫不决时，这些国家的本币汇率和股票市场也出现了喘息性反弹。


But there is an even more insidious problem brewing on the home front.	但有一个更加隐蔽的问题就在家门口酝酿。


With its benchmark lending rate at the zero-bound, the Fed has embraced a fundamentally different approach in attempting to guide the US economy.	在贷款基准利率接近于零的做法之下，美联储采取了一个根本不同的方法去尝试引导美国经济。


It has shifted its focus from the price of credit to influencing the credit cycle’s quantity dimension through the liquidity injections that quantitative easing requires.	它已将其重点从信贷价格转向通过注入宽松政策所需的流动资金去影响信贷周期的数量方面。


In doing so, the Fed is relying on the “wealth effect” – brought about largely by increasing equity and home prices – as its principal transmission mechanism for stabilization policy.	通过这种做法，美联储其实依托于“财富效应”——很大程度上通过提高股票和房屋价格来实现——作为其稳定政策的最主要传动机制。


There are serious problems with this approach.	这种方法存在一系列严重问题。


First, wealth effects are statistically small; most studies show that only about 3-5 cents of every dollar of asset appreciation eventually feeds through to higher personal consumption.	第一，从统计来看，其产生的财富效应较小； 大多数研究表明，每一美元的资产升值中只有约3~5美分最终会转化为更高的个人消费。


As a result, outsize gains in asset markets – and the related risks of new bubbles – are needed to make a meaningful difference for the real economy.	因此只有在资产市场上取得巨额收益——因此也伴随着产生新泡沫的风险——才能对实体经济产生足够大的影响。


Second, wealth effects are maximized when debt service is minimized – that is, when interest expenses do not swallow the capital gains of asset appreciation.	其次，只有在债务最小化——也就是说，当资产增值的资本收益高于利息支出之时——财富效应才会最大化。


That provides the rationale for the Fed’s zero-interest-rate policy – but at the obvious cost of discriminating against savers, who lose any semblance of interest income.	这为美联储的零利率政策提供了理论基础——但显然也付出了歧视储户的成本，令这些人失去了任何形式的利息收入。


Third, and most important, wealth effects are for the wealthy.	第三，也是最重要的，财富效应是为富人而设的。


The Fed should know that better than anyone.	美联储应该比任何人都清楚这点。


After all, it conducts a comprehensive triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which provides a detailed assessment of the role that wealth and balance sheets play in shaping the behavior of a broad cross-section of American consumers.	毕竟，它进行了全面的三年一度的消费者财务状况调查（SCF），这个调查详细的评估了财富和资产负债表对广大美国消费者行为的塑造作用。


In 2010, the last year for which SCF data are available, the top 10% of the US income distribution had median holdings of some $267,500 in their equity portfolios, nearly 16 times the median holdings of $17,000 for the other 90%.	2010年， SCF数据最近的可用年份显示，居美国前10%的财富所有者平均持有约26. 75万美元资产权益，是其余90%人群（平均持有1.


Fully 90.6% of US families in the highest decile of the income distribution owned stocks – double the 45% ownership share of the other 90%.	在这收入最高的10%的美国家庭中有90. 6%持有有股票——而其他90%的家庭中只有45%持有股票。


Moreover, the 2010 SCF shows that the highest decile’s median holdings of all financial assets totaled $550,800, or 20 times the holdings of the other 90%.	此外，2010年度SCF调查表明，收入最高的10%平均持有金融资产总额为55. 08万美元，是其他90%人群金融资产的约20倍。


At the same time, the top 10% also owned nonfinancial assets (including primary residences) with a median value of $756,400 – nearly six times the value held by the other 90%.	同时这些人还拥有平均为75. 64万美元的非金融资产（包括自住住宅）——是其余人群的近六倍。


All of this means that the wealthiest 10% of the US income distribution benefit the most from the Fed’s liquidity injections into risky asset markets.	这一切都意味着，最富有的10%美国人才是美联储向高风险资产市场注入流动性的最大受益者。


And yet, despite the significant increases in asset values traceable to QE over the past several years – residential property as well as financial assets – there has been little to show for it in terms of a wealth-generated recovery in the US economy.	然而，尽管量化宽松政策在过去几年间令资产价值显着增加——包括住宅以及金融资产——但几乎没有什么证据显示财富增长推动了美国经济的复苏。


The problem continues to be the crisis-battered American consumer.	问题依然停留在受危机重创的美国消费者身上。


In the 22 quarters since early 2008, real personal-consumption expenditure, which accounts for about 70% of US GDP, has grown at an average annual rate of just 1.1%, easily the weakest period of consumer demand in the post-World War II era.	自2008年初至今的22个季度以来，占美国国内生产总值70%左右的实际个人消费支出年均增长率仅为1. 1%，无疑成为二战后消费者需求最弱的时期。


That is the main reason why the post-2008 recovery in GDP and employment has been the most anemic on record.	这也是为何2008年后GDP和就业率复苏是有史以来最为疲弱的主要原因。


Trapped in the aftermath of a wrenching balance-sheet recession, US families remain fixated on deleveraging – paying down debt and rebuilding their income-based saving balances.	���入资产负债表痛苦缩水之中的美国家庭仍痴迷于去杠杆化——偿还债务和重建基于收入的储蓄结余。


Progress has been slow and limited on both counts.	但这两方面的进展一直缓慢而有限。


Notwithstanding sharp reductions in debt service traceable to the Fed’s zero-interest rate subsidy, the stock of debt is still about 116% of disposable personal income, well above the 43% average in the final three decades of the twentieth century.	尽管在美联储的零利率补贴之下负债得到大幅削减，但债务存量仍是个人可支配收入的116%左右，大大高于二十个世纪最后三十年的平均43%水平。 同样，2013上半年的个人储蓄率仅为4.


Similarly, the personal saving rate, at 4.25% in the first half of 2013, is less than half the 9.3% norm over the 1970-1999 period.	25%，比1970年至1999年期间常规值9. 3%的一半还少。


This underscores yet another of QE’s inherent contradictions: its transmission effects are narrow, while the problems it is supposed to address are broad.	这凸显了量化宽松政策的另一内在矛盾：它的传输效果是狭窄的，而要解决的问题是广泛的。


Wealth effects that benefit a small but extremely affluent slice of the US population have done little to provide meaningful relief for most American families, who remain squeezed by lingering balance-sheet problems, weak labor markets, and anemic income growth.	财富效应，让一些数量稀少但极端富裕的人收益，而没有为大多数美国家庭提供真正意义的救济，这些家庭仍在承受挥之不去的资产负债压力，疲软的劳动力市场以及缓慢的收入增长。


Nor is there any reason to believe that the benefits at the top will trickle down.	此外也没有任何理由相信在顶部阶层的好处会向下传导。


With real consumption stuck on a 1% growth trajectory, the bulk of the US population understandably views economic recovery and job security very differently from those enamored of wealth effects.	在实际消费增长徘徊在1%轨道的情况下，大部分美国人眼中的经济复苏和就业保障显然与那些迷恋财富效应的人截然不同。


The Fed’s goal of pushing the unemployment rate down to 6.5% is a noble one.	美联储推动将失业率降低到6. 5%的目标无疑是高尚的。


But relying on wealth effects targeted at the rich to achieve that goal remains one of the great disconnects in the art and practice of economic policy.	但依靠只针对富人的财富效应来实现这一目标却体现了经济政策中理论与实践的巨大断层。


The Occupy Wall Street movement began two years ago this month.	占领华尔街运动始于两年前的这个月。


While it can be criticized for its failure to develop a specific agenda for action, it galvanized attention to income and wealth inequality in the US and around the world.	虽然你可以批评它制定的具体行动议程是失败的，但它令人们开始关注在美国和世界各地的收入和财富不均问题。


Unfortunately, the problem has only worsened.	不幸的是，该问题只会继续恶化。


Lost in the angst over inequality is the critical role that central banks have played in exacerbating the problem.	在不平等的焦虑中迷失导致各大中央银行在问题的恶化中起到了推波助澜的作用。


Yes, asset markets were initially ecstatic over the Fed’s decision this month not to scale back QE.	是的，资产市场最初因为美联储本月不缩减量化宽松政策而欣喜若狂。


The thrill, however, was lost on Main Street.	然而这种兴奋却不存在于在普通民众的世界里。


That is precisely the point.	这才是关键点。


The Fed’s own survey data, which underscore the concentration of wealth at the upper end of the US income distribution, fit the script of the Occupy movement to a tee.	美联储的调查数据强调，财富集中在美国收入分配的上端，正适合占领运动的口号。


QE benefits the few who need it the least. That is not exactly a recipe for a broad-based and socially optimal economic recovery.	量化宽松政策让那些最不需要它的少数人得益，也不是一个真正具有广泛基础和社会效应最优的经济复苏药方。


Russia’s European Game in Syria	俄罗斯在叙利亚的欧洲博弈


PARIS – This much is clear in Syria: There is no good solution.	巴黎—叙利亚局势已经非常明朗：不存在好的解决方案。


There has not been a good solution since that black Wednesday in August 2013, when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s war machine, by using chemical weapons, crossed the “red line” that US President Barack Obama had warned would trigger an American military response.	自2013年8月黑色星期三叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的战争机器使用化学武器，越过美国总统奥巴马所警告的、越线将导致美国军事干预的“红线”以来，就从未出现过好的解决方案。


The moderate opposition still stood, and the Islamic State had not yet emerged from the shadows.	反对依然不痛不痒，伊斯兰国也还没有从影子中现身。


Yet, in a shocking last-minute about-face, Obama declined to intervene.	但是，奥巴马的态度在最后一分钟急转直下，放弃了干预。


That lapse cannot be undone.	这是不可挽回的失策。


But in the hell of bad solutions on offer for Syria, some are worse than others.	但在叙利亚面对的各种坏的解决方案中，有一些方案比其他方案更坏。


And the one devised by Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably the most infernal of all.	而俄罗斯总统普京所选择的方案也许是所有方案中最恶劣的一个。


Russian airstrikes have been concentrated on targets around the cities of Idlib, Homs, and Hama – areas where, according to independent observers, jihad watchers, and other groups that scrutinize the videos placed online by the Russian authorities themselves, the Islamic State is not established.	俄罗斯空袭集中在伊德利卜、霍姆斯和哈马等城市周围的目标——据独立观察家、圣战者和其他仔细看过俄罗斯当局本身放在网上的视频的组织称，那里并没有伊斯兰国。


This means that the primary objective of the Russian attacks is to weaken the entire opposition, including the democratic opposition, fighting the Assad regime.	这意味着俄罗斯的袭击的主要目标是削弱全体与巴沙尔政权对抗的反对派，包括民主派。


The goal of Russia’s intervention is therefore not to contribute to the “struggle against terrorism,” as the Kremlin’s propagandists claim, but to restore political control, at any cost, to the regime that spawned the terrorism in the first place.	因此，俄罗斯干预的目的不是克里姆林宫宣传机器所称的帮助“打击恐怖主义”，而是不惜一切代价重新建立对一开始催生了恐怖主义的政权的政治控制。


More precisely, Russia’s aim is to rescue (after a long period of arm’s-length support) a dictatorship that American and French authorities describe as being responsible for causing more than 250,000 deaths since 2011.	更准确地说，俄罗斯的目标是拯救（在经历了长时间的平等支持后）一个被美国和法国当局称为必须对2011年以来250,000多人死亡负责的独裁政权。


The regime’s behavior no doubt fueled the terrifying rise of the Islamic State as well, providing Assad with a trump card in his bid for international support – and Russia with a fig leaf.	该政权的行为毫无疑问还助了伊斯兰国的崛起与一臂之力，这给了巴沙尔一张要求国际支持的王牌——也给了俄罗斯一个借口。


One might argue that the past is past and that, in view of the general disaster in Syria, Russia’s intervention will at least have the benefit of halting the country’s free fall.	你也许会说，过去的事已经过去了，并且从叙利亚遍及全国的灾难看，俄罗斯的干预至少可以阻止叙利亚一败到底的颓势。


But the first consequence of Putin’s offensive – one employing methods tested in the two Chechen wars and not burdened, to put it mildly, by the precautions observed by Western armed forces – will be to increase, not reduce, the number of civilian casualties.	但普京的攻势——他的这个做法已经经过两次车臣战争的检验，并且客气点说，他这么做时还不用像西方武装部队那样受到各种约束——的第一个结恶果将是增加而非减少贫民伤亡数量。


The world was rightly horrified by America’s recent blunder in bombing the Médecins Sans Frontières’ hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan.	美国最近错误地轰炸了阿富汗昆都士的无国界医生组织医院，全世界为此骇然。 理应如此。


But how many Syrian Kunduzes will result from Russian airstrikes if the Kremlin continues to favor unguided bombs over guided missiles?	但如果克里姆林宫继续偏好使用无制导炸弹而非制导的导弹，叙利亚将出现多少昆都士？


(This is just one example of Russia’s tactics, but one that reveals much about how Putin intends to prosecute his latest foreign adventure.)	（这只是俄罗斯策略的一个例子，但这个例子揭示了普京准备如何贯彻他最新的对外动作。 ）


And can anyone believe, even fleetingly, that Russia’s intervention will lessen, rather than aggravate, Syria’s refugee crisis?	你能相信——即��是短暂地相信——俄罗斯干预将缓解而非加剧叙利亚的难民危机吗？


Putin’s methods are forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee indiscriminate airstrikes, clearing the way for the death squads of a regime that in recent months had been showing signs of exhaustion, and dashing any remaining hope of creating effective safe zones in northern Jordan and southern Turkey.	普京的方法正在迫使数以万计的平民逃离无差别空袭，为几个月来疲态尽露的政权的杀戮小队扫清道路，并且彻底断绝任何在约旦北部和土耳其南部建立有效安全区的希望。


Now even the last holdouts among the regime’s opponents will be appearing on the roads of Europe.	如今，即使是巴沙尔政权最后的反对者，也会出现在前往欧洲的道路上。


They will not appear on the roads of Russia, mind you: Unlike Germany or France, Putin will not hesitate, while terrorizing tomorrow’s refugees, to slam the door in their faces.	他们不会出现在前往俄罗斯的道路上：和德国或法国不同，普京将毫不犹豫地向他们关闭大门，让未来难民也惊慌失措。


Nor is Putin shy about his intentions in Syria.	普京也从不惮于表露他对叙利亚的意图。


One piece of news reported by Russian media but curiously unheeded in the West is that the missile cruiser Moskva, with its dozens of anti-aircraft ordnance, has been deployed to Latakia.	俄罗斯媒体报道、但奇怪地被西方所忽略的一份新闻报道说，携带数十枚防空武器的导弹巡洋舰莫斯科号（Moskva）已经部署到拉塔基亚。


But the Islamic State has not, unbeknownst to everyone but Putin, acquired an air force that needs to be neutralized.	但伊斯兰国尚未获得需要予以制衡的空军，所有人都知道这一点，就是普京不知道。


Rather, the Kremlin evidently will view as a legitimate target any aircraft that might pass over territory that it comes to regard as being under its control.	相反，克里姆林宫显然将任何可能穿越它视为被它所控制的领土的飞行器视为合法目标。


And, because any such plane would necessarily be flying the flag of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, or another member of the coalition fighting the Islamic State, it is not hard to envisage how Russia’s involvement could lead to international escalation of Syria’s civil war.	此外，任何这样的飞机必然都会挂着美国、英国、法国、土耳其或其他打击伊斯兰国的联军国家的旗帜，因此不难想象俄罗斯的介入可能导致叙利亚内战升级为国际冲突。


Fortunately, we are not there yet.	幸运的是，我们尚未走到这一步。


But let us not pretend that Russia’s military operations, which, to date, have been aimed solely at providing Russia with mastery over Syrian airspace and protecting its interests on the ground, are bolstering efforts to defeat the Islamic State.	但我们不能装作俄罗斯的军事行动——到目前为止，这些行动的目标完全是为了让俄罗斯获得叙利亚空域的控制权并保护期地面利益——是为了打败伊斯兰国而做出的努力。


Putin is not just a fireman who sets fires; he is an old-school imperialist.	普京不仅仅是自己放火的消防员，他是老派帝国主义者。


His operation in Syria is partly designed to divert attention from his dismemberment of Ukraine.	他的叙利亚行动部分是为了分散人们对他分裂乌克兰的注意力。


And his thinly veiled threats against the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, and now Turkey – whose airspace and relations with NATO have been probed by Russian aircraft – reveal a strategy of aggression that has as its chief goal the weakening of Europe.	而他对巴尔干国家、波兰、芬兰以及现在的土耳其的几乎不加掩饰的威胁——这些国家的空域以及与北约的关系都受到俄罗斯飞机的威胁——揭示出他的一套侵略战略，其主要目标是削弱欧洲。


Europeans must wake up to Putin’s design before it is too late.	欧洲必须在为时尚早时对普京的算盘警醒。


In France, the siren song of appeasement is becoming a national rallying cry, from the far-right National Front to far-left elements – and among a growing number of mainstream politicians of all stripes.	在法国，绥靖的靡靡之音正在成为国家口号，从极右翼的国民阵线（National Front）到极左翼政党——以及越来越多的各主流政治派别人士——都是如此。


Indeed, the Kremlin has assiduously cultivated party secretariats across Europe.	事实上，克里姆林宫正在不遗余力地在全欧洲扶持党书记。


A web of invisible links has brought into being what could be called “Putin’s Party” in Europe.	一个看不见的网络正在演变为欧洲的“普京党”。


If Putin’s Party were enticing only the usual European populist demagogues, from Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom to Viktor Órban in Hungary, it would be bad enough.	如果普京党只是引诱普通的欧洲民粹主义煽动家，如英国的法拉奇（Nigel Farage）和匈牙利的奥班（Viktor Órban），便已经够坏的了。


But when even leaders who are normally considered to be responsible statesmen, such as Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, begin justifying Putin’s actions, Europe risks frittering away the very security on which its prosperity is built.	但即使是通常被认为是负责任的政治家的领导人，如意大利总理伦齐也开始为普京的行动辩护时，欧洲有可能正在自毁作为其繁荣基础的安全。


How Scary is Disruptive Technology?	颠覆性技术究竟有多可怕？


CAMBRIDGE – The steady stream of improvements in driverless cars has convinced me that before too long the roads will be filled with cars and trucks operating without humans at the wheel.	坎布里奇——熙熙攘攘的无人驾驶车流令我相信过不了多久路上就会满是无人驾驶的轿车和卡车。


Likewise, I am convinced that the revolution in artificial intelligence will allow computers and robots to do many of the tasks that white-collar workers now do.	同样，我相信人工智能革命将允许电脑和机器人完成许多现在白领员工才能完成的任务。


It’s not surprising, therefore, that many people are worried about the fate of those whose jobs are vulnerable – or have already been lost – to the latest disruptive technology.	因此，很多人为工作岗位堪忧者——或者已经被最新突破性技术所击败者忧心重重并不令人惊讶。


What will happen to the millions of men and women who now drive trucks and taxis when the trucks and taxis can drive themselves?	如果卡车和出租车实现无人驾驶，那么成百上千万现在驾驶卡车和出租车的男人和女人命运将会如何？


What will happen to the accountants and health workers when computers can do their jobs?	如果电脑能够记账和看病那么会计和医生身上将会发生什么？


Some analysts have estimated that, with many fewer employees needed to produce the current volume of goods and services, a large share of current employment could be made redundant.	有分析人士估计因为保持现有的商品和服务产量需要的员工人数大幅减少，将会有相当大比例的工作岗位成为多余的。


I hear these worries and realize that they cannot be easily dismissed.	我听说过这样的担忧，而且认为这种担忧无法被轻易解除。


But I am optimistic that the United States, at least, will adapt successfully to the new technology.	但我乐观地认为，美国至少能够成功适应新的技术。


There may be some losers as well as winners, but the American public as a whole will be better off.	或许会有一些人成为输家，另外一些人成为赢家，但美国公众作为整体将生活得更加富足。


And those who lose their jobs to the new technology will soon find other employment.	而且那些因为新技术而失去工作的人会很快找到其他工作。


I believe that there is little reason to worry that the new technology will create large-scale unemployment.	我认为担心新技术会造成大规模失业是没有理由的。


The changes in technology will increase the economy’s output and raise the potential standard of living of the population.	技术上的改变能够增加经济产出并提高民众潜在的生活标准。


Those who want to work will continue to find jobs.	那些想要工作的人可以继续找到工作。


Why am I so optimistic?	我为什么这么乐观？


Simply put: history.	一言以蔽之：是因为历史。


Rapid technical change is not something new.	快速的技术变化已经不是第一次发生了。


We have experienced technological change that substitutes machines and computers for individual workers for many years.	多年来替代个人劳动者的机器和电脑技术革命我们已经亲身经历过。


And yet, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle, the US economy continues to return to full employment.	但尽管商业周期起起落落，美国经济仍然实现了充分就业。


This has been most dramatic in manufacturing.	在制造业领域这种现象是最为显著的。


Robots and automated machines have replaced production workers in manufacturing for many years, driving employment in the sector from 13 million in 1950 to only nine million now, even as the real value of manufacturing output rose by 75%.	多年来，机器人和自动化机械旨在取代从事制造的产业工人，导致该领域就业从1950年的1300万下降到目前的900万，而同期的实际制造业产出值却上升了75%。


And those who are no longer employed in manufacturing have found jobs elsewhere in the economy.	而那些曾经在制造业就业的民众已经在经济其他领域找到了工作。


Computers have also replaced workers in a wide range of service industries.	工人也已在一系列服务业中被电脑所取代。


We no longer see many elevator operators.	我们已经看不到太多电梯操作者。


Switchboard operators are gone.	接线员也已经逐渐消失了。


Most of us get our boarding passes at airports from automated check-in machines.	多数人在机场利用自动登机设备打印登机牌。


Law firms and accounting firms use computers to do what professional employees used to do.	律师事务所和会计师事务所利用电脑来完成曾经由专业员工来完成的工作。


And yet the US unemployment rate is now just 4.9%, even lower than its average in recent decades.	而目前美国的失业率仅为4. 9%，甚至低于近几十年的平均数。


Among US college graduates – who constitute 40% of the US labor force – the unemployment rate is just 2.7%.	美国大学毕业生——占美国总劳动力的40%以上——失业率仅有2. 7%。


Because college graduates comprise a larger share of the younger age cohorts than of the older population, the overall unemployment rate will be held down as that group ages and its share of the labor force grows.	因为大学毕业生在年轻群体中所占的比重高于老年群体，随着该群体年龄增长及其在劳动力中所占份额的增加，整体失业率将被控制在低水平上。


The rising output per worker made possible by the increased use of robots and computers also will allow employees to work fewer hours and enjoy more leisure.	机器人和电脑使用增加所带来的单位工人产量增长也能缩短工作时间并使民众享受更多闲暇。


Employees in the US currently work an average of 1,790 hours a year, 30% more than their German counterparts, who average just 1,371 hours per year.	目前美国员工年平均工作1,790小时，工作时间比德国工人长30%，后者年均工作时数仅为1，371小时。


A reduction in working hours per employee translates into quality-of-life improvements like longer vacations and longer weekends.	单位员工工作时数的减少意味着生活品质的改善，包括延长休假时间和周末。


Fewer working hours will also provide more opportunities for travel, eating out, and other activities that create jobs for service workers.	减少工作时间也将为旅游、外出就餐和为服务业从业者创造更多就业岗位的其他活动提供机会。


The aging of the population will increase the need for service-sector employees in hospitals and nursing homes as well.	人口老龄化将增加对医院和养老机构服务人员的需求。


These trends will fuel higher demand for workers in the service sector, which now accounts for 81% of employment in the US.	上述趋势将会推动服务业人员需求，该行业现已占到美国就业总量的81%以上。


The share of workers in the US service sector increases year after year; it is where those who lose jobs in manufacturing or construction find new ones.	美国服务业工作人员所占比例逐年增加； 那些在制造业或建筑业失去工作的人可以在服务业找到新的工作。


And computers and robots simply cannot replace many of these jobs.	而电脑和机器人根本无法取代其中的许多工作。


Although they can provide some of the services that older people will increasingly need, for example, they cannot provide the services that involve actually touching clients and patients.	尽管它们可以提供老年人越来越需要的某些服务，但实际接触客户和患者的服务是它们所无法提供的。


People choosing careers will bear such considerations in mind as they select occupations.	进行职业选择的人应当在选择时牢记这样的原则。


That, too, will hold down the unemployment rate in the future.	这也可以实现未来控制失业率的目标。


The US unemployment rate currently is less than half the rate in the European Union.	美国目前的失业率还不到欧盟的一半。


There are many reasons for the disparity; but a critical one is the absence in the US of labor laws and union rules that prevent employees and firms from adapting to the new technologies.	之所以有这样的差异存在很多理由； 但关键问题是美国没有劳动法和工会规定，阻止员工和企业去适应新的技术。


If the US maintains a relatively free labor market, employees will adjust positively to the changing technology.	如果美国保持一个相对自由的劳动力市场，员工将能很好地适应不断变化的技术。


How Slow Will China Go?	中国的增长步伐会有多慢？


SEOUL – China’s economic performance over the last few decades has been outstanding.	发自首尔——中国经济在过去几十年中的表现一贯出色。


Despite possessing very different institutions than those seen in the advanced economies, no doubt a result of its communist system, China managed to achieve 8.7% average annual per capita GDP growth from 1980 to 2015.	尽管拥有与发达经济体差异极大，沿袭自其共产主义路线的体制，但中国依然在1980年~2015年间成功实现了8. 7％的年均人均GDP增长率。


The key has been its unique strategy of “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” whereby it has gradually tested, implemented, and adjusted reforms and growth-enhancing policies.	其成功的关键再于其独特的“摸着石头过河”战略——逐步测试，实施和调整那些改革和增长促进政策。


But, while China’s economic development has been exceptional in many ways, its growth performance is not unique.	但尽管中国的经济发展在许多方面堪称出类拔萃，其增长却并非独一无二的。


Both Japan and South Korea also transformed their economies through rapid industrialization and export-oriented policies, backed by strong investment, before experiencing slowdowns.	日本和韩国在经济减速之前也曾通过巨额投资推动下的快速工业化和出口导向政策实现了本国经济的转型。


If China is to manage its current challenges – in particular, sharply decelerating growth – it should look to these countries’ experience for guidance.	如果中国要应对其当前挑战——尤其是增长大幅减速——的话，就应当参考这些国家的经验。


All three countries have followed a similar path, but at a different time.	这三个国家都采取了类似的路径，但所处时期则不同。


Based on per capita GDP, China is more than 40 years behind Japan and about 20 years behind South Korea.	按人均GDP计，中国落后日本超过40年，落后韩国20年左右。


Specifically, Japan’s annual per capita GDP growth averaged 8.6% in the 1960s, before plummeting to 3-4% in the 1970s and 1980s.	具体而言，日本的年人均GDP增长率在1960年代平均达8. 6％，随后在1970~80年代快速下降到3~4％；


South Korea’s GDP growth dropped from 7-8% in the 1970s and 1980s to 4% in the 2000s.	韩国的GDP增长率从1970~80年代的年均7~8％下跌到2000年的4％；


China’s three-decade-long run of double-digit growth came to an end in 2010, with the annual rate now below 7%.	中国持续三十年之久的两位数增长在2010年走到了尽头，目前年均增长不足7％。


In each case, the decline in growth came when per capita income reached about $8,000.	三个国家的年增长率在人均收入达到8000美元左右就分别开始下降了。


The growth trajectory experienced by these three Asian countries can be explained by the “convergence” phenomenon – the tendency of poor countries to grow faster than rich countries, once they address certain structural and policy factors.	这三个亚洲国家所经历的成长轨迹可以通过“差距收敛”现象来解释——落后国家如果能解决某些结构性和政策性问题，它们的增长往往比发达国家更快。


The economic logic of this “catch-up” process is straightforward: for countries with lower levels of per capita output, there is a larger gap between current and potential capital stock and technology.	这种“追赶”过程的经济逻辑相当简单：对于人均产出水平较低的国家来说，当前的资本存量和技术与其发展潜力之间存在着较大的差距。


That gap can be closed rapidly through the adoption and imitation of existing technologies, which improve productivity, and through high rates of accumulation of physical capital, owing to higher returns on investment.	这一差距可以通过采纳和模仿现有技术而带来的高生产率，以及高投资回报下的实物资本积累来迅速缩小。


And, indeed, Japan, South Korea, and China all maintained high levels of investment throughout the catch-up process, peaking at nearly 40% of GDP in Japan in the 1970s.	而事实上，日韩中三国在整个追赶过程中都保持了较高的投资水平——1970年代投资占到了日本GDP近40％；


South Korea reached similar levels in the 1990s; and China’s investment spending currently stands at more than 45% of GDP.	1990年代的韩国也达到了类似水平； 而中国的投资支出目前占到了GDP的45％以上。


As countries move closer to their potential per capita output levels, the power of convergence diminishes, forcing its beneficiaries to adjust their growth models accordingly.	随着各国逐渐接近其潜在人均产出水平，收敛的力量也随之减弱，迫使其受益者相应调整自身增长模式。


Reducing investment, due to its lower returns, is an important component of that adjustment.	降低投资水平（因为回报较低）是调整的重要组成部分。


Another is increasing technological innovation, to avoid a sharp slowdown in productivity growth.	另一种是加大科技创新，以避免生产率增长大幅放缓。


A third is shifting output from low-value-added agricultural and manufacturing goods to higher-value-added domestic services.	第三个转变是从输出低附加值的农业/制造业产品向高附加值的国内服务业转型。


China, like Japan and South Korea before it, is now pursuing this adjustment.	中国，正如之前的日本和韩国那样，正在实施这一调整。


But it faces serious obstacles, beginning with limited institutional and human capabilities – a constraint that could hinder domestic innovation and efficient resource allocation.	但它面临着严重的障碍：首先是有限的体制和人力资源的潜力——这一约束可能会阻碍国内创新和有效资源分配。


China also faces diminishing labor input growth, owing to low fertility rates and rapid population aging.	由于低生育率和人口快速老龄化，中国也面临着劳动力减少的问题。


According to the United Nations, the average growth rate of the working-age population will be -0.1% in 2010-2020, a sharp decline from 1.5% in 2000-2010.	根据联合国发布的数据，劳动年龄人口数量的平均增长率将在2010~2020年达到-0. 1％，相较2000~2010年的1.


In addition, as employment moves to the services sector, overall productivity growth could fall, as it did in Japan and South Korea.	此外随着就业转移到服务业，总体生产率增长可能会下降，正如在日本和韩国出现的状况。


In China, GDP growth per worker in the services sector was only 1.3% in 1981-2010, compared to 15.1% in the manufacturing sector.	在中国，服务业劳动者人均国内生产总值增长在1981~2010年间平均仅为1. 3％，而制造业则达到15.


Of course, China should not be working to restore past rates of GDP growth. That would be a waste of time.	当然，中国不应想方设法去重拾过去的GDP增长率，这将是缘木求鱼之举。


As former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Harvard University professor Robert Barro have pointed out, a slowdown was inevitable for China, just as it was for Japan and South Korea.	正如美国前财长劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence Summers）和美国哈佛大学教授罗伯特·巴罗（Robert Barro）指出，对中国来说经济放缓是不可避免的，日本和韩国。


My work suggests that China’s GDP growth rate will decline to 5-6% in the coming decade, and 3-4% in the long run.	我的研究表明，中国的GDP增长率将在未来十年下滑到5~6%，而从长远来看将是3~4％。


With its catch-up glory days in the past, China should aim for higher incomes through steady growth and lower volatility.	随着其辉煌赶超时代渐成往事，中国应该将目光放在通过稳定增长和较低波动性更高的收入上。


To achieve this, it must focus specifically on crisis prevention and management. That is where Japan and South Korea went wrong.	为了实现这一目标，就必须特别关注危机的预防和管理，这也是日本和韩国出了问题的地方。


In the 1980s, Japan allowed asset bubbles to grow.	上世纪80年代，日本放任资产泡沫不断膨胀。


That may have spurred growth for a while, but when the bubbles burst, the financial system’s huge debts helped push the economy into a bout of deflation and stagnation from which it has still not fully emerged.	这虽然能在一段时期内刺激增长，但当泡沫破灭，金融体系的巨额债务立马将经济拖入通缩和停滞的漩涡，而且日本到现在还没有完全脱身。


Similarly, South Korea was thrown into financial crisis in 1997, when panicked foreign investors fled, hitting the over-leveraged corporate sector hard as the air was sucked out of the under-supervised financial system.	同样，韩国在1997年外国投资者恐慌逃离时陷入金融危机，原本在缺乏监管的金融体系下过度使用杠杆的企业部门纷纷遭受重创。


As it stands, China seems to be moving along a similar path.	因为它的立场，中国似乎正在沿着类似的路径前进。


According to the Bank for International Settlements, Chinese corporate debt has increased rapidly in recent years, from 99% of GDP in 2008 to 166% in 2015, with more than half of the debt owed by poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs).	按照国际清算银行的数据，中国企业债务额近年出现了快速膨胀，从2008年相当于GDP的99％上升至2015年的166％，在2015年，其中一半以上债务由经营不善的国有企业（国有企业）所欠。


This does not bode well for the corporate sector or the financial system.	这对于企业部门或金融体系都不是个好兆头。


But it is not too late to change course.	但要改变这一进程还为时不晚。


To avert a crisis, China’s leaders must act now to address the weaknesses in the corporate and financial sectors and to improve macroeconomic- and financial-policy frameworks.	要避免危机，中国领导人必须现在就采取行动，补全企业和金融部门的薄弱环节，改善宏观经济/金融政策框架。


To keep productivity – and incomes – rising, they must continue to implement structural reforms that support labor-market flexibility and the development of human capital, while privatizing SOEs and liberalizing the financial sector.	为了保持生产力——以及收入——不断上升，中国必须继续实施保持劳动力市场灵活性和人力资本发展的结构性改革，同时推进国有企业私有化并放松对金融部门的管制。


Like its neighbors, China will have to confront slower growth, and its social consequences, head-on.	中国会和其邻国一样不得不直面经济增长放缓及其社会后果。


But the country’s future is anything but predetermined.	但国家的未来是无法预先设定的。


With the right approach, it can manage a smooth transition from middle- to high-income status – a transition that would not only improve the wellbeing of China’s 1.3 billion citizens, but also reduce risks and uncertainties in the global economy.	借助正确的措施，它就能实现从中等收入到高收入状态的平稳过渡——这不仅关乎13亿中国人的福祉，也会降低全球经济风险和不确定性因素。


A Healthier Global Health Agenda	更健康的全球健康日程


LONDON – On September 25, world leaders will meet in New York at a special session of the United Nations to chart a path to a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	伦敦—9月25日，全球领导人将在纽约联合国特别大会上会晤，为新的可持续发展目标（SDG）授权开路。


Described as a “generational opportunity,” the potential is indeed great.	SDG被称为“代际机会”，其潜力不可谓不大。


But indications so far suggest that optimal health goals could be derailed.	但到目前为止的迹象表明最优健康目标可能会脱轨。


The SDGs will succeed the Millennium Development Goals, which were adopted in 2000 and expire in 2015.	SDG将是千年发展目标（MDG，始于2000年，将于2015年到期）的继任者。


The MDGs have proved instrumental in galvanizing political will and focusing financial resources on a limited set of basic needs in low- and middle-income countries.	MDG在鼓动政治意愿、将金融资源集中于中低收入国家的有限范围的基本需要方面起到了成效。


The lives of millions of people, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been improved.	数百万人的生活，特别是撒哈拉以南非洲人民，得到了改善。


The SDG framework has been the subject of a year of widespread consultation, lobbying, and debate.	SDG框架已经经历了一年的广泛咨询、游说和争论。 一些领域的共识正在形成：新目标应该解决未竟的MDG；


Consensus is emerging in a few areas: the new goals should address the unfinished MDGs; they should include not only poverty, but also planetary limits, including climate change; and they should be universal in scope, addressing challenges such as widening inequality in poor and rich countries alike.	应该不仅包括贫困，也要包括地球的极限，包括气候变化等； 应该不限范围，解决各国（不论贫富）不平等性恶化等挑战。


A universal health goal also makes a lot of sense.	普遍的健康目标意义重大。


Some conditions, such as neglected tropical diseases, are unique to developing countries, while others, like AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and maternal mortality, affect poor countries disproportionately.	一些状况——如未引起重视的热带病——为发展中国家所特有，而其他疾病，如艾滋病、结核病、疟疾和母婴死亡等，特别多发于穷国。


But, for the most part, a universal set of maladies has emerged over the past decade, accounting for the vast bulk of ill health and preventable death in all regions of the world.	但是，在很大程度上，过去十年中我们弄清楚了普遍疾病有哪些，全世界范围内的绝大多数病症和可预防的死亡都由它们引起。


Unfortunately, the proposed health agenda seems to ignore this trend.	不幸的是，预想中的健康日程忽略了这一趋势。


The Global Burden of Disease Study, conducted by hundreds of scientists collaborating over many years, provides the best comparable estimates regarding causes of death and disability and their underlying risk factors.	几百名科学家合作多年完成的疾病研究全球负担（Global Burden of Disease Study）对死亡和残疾原因及其基本风险因素的最佳可估算。


The data are clear about what makes us sick and kills us prematurely.	数据清楚地表明什么让我们得病和过早地丧命。


Non-communicable diseases accounted for two out of every three deaths worldwide in 2010, and projections indicate that by 2030, NCDs will be the most common cause of death in Africa.	2010年，三分之二的死亡由非传染性疾病（NCD）造成，据预测，到2030年，NCD将是非洲最常见的死因。


These deaths are largely driven by a few risky behaviors: tobacco smoking (second in the global ranking of risk factors), alcohol use (ranked third), obesity and poor nutrition (ranked sixth and seventh, respectively), and physical inactivity (ranked tenth).	这些死亡大多是由少数高峰限行为引起的，包括吸烟（位居全球风险因素第二）、酗酒（位居第三）、肥胖和饮养不良（分别位居第六和第七）以及精神病（位居第十）。


In late July, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon published a short report to inform the upcoming General Assembly debate.	在刚刚过去的7月，联合国秘书长给即将到来的联合国大会讨论发去一份短报告。


While clear about the need to address the existing MDGs, the report only briefly mentions the burden of NCDs.	这份报告尽管明确提出了解决现有MDG的需要，但只是略微提到了NCD的负担。


While it calls for action to “promote healthy behaviors” it does not include any measures to curb smoking, reduce excessive alcohol consumption, or improve diets; instead, the report focuses solely on water, sanitation, and hygiene (all good things, to be sure).	报告呼吁采取行动“推广健康行为”，但并未包括任何限制吸烟、减少过度酒精消费和改善饮食的措施； 相反，报告的注意力全部集中在水、环境卫生和保健上（当然，这些也很重要）。


Why do NCDs, the world’s biggest killers, have such a low profile, given the evidence concerning current and future health needs?	为什么世界第一杀手——NCD只获得了如此低的关注度？ 要知道，证据已经指出了当前和未来的健康需要。


A look at the consultative processes that shaped the Secretary-General’s report provides some clues.	看看形成秘书长报告的顾问程序就能一窥端倪。


Of the 99 papers reviewed for the health consultation, 15 came from organizations promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, while only five were from NCD-focused groups (six if a paper from a group supported by the alcohol industry is included).	在健康顾问中所综述的99篇文献中，15篇来自推动性和生殖健康和权利的组织，而只有5篇来自专注于NCD的组织（也可以说是六篇，如果把一篇来自酿酒业支持的组织的文献也算计来的话）。


Equally important, much evidence was simply ignored.	同样重要的是，许多证据被忽略了。


A review of the documents presented to the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, chaired by the Presidents of Indonesia and Liberia and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, reveals a broad range of recommendations, rooted in a deep understanding of current and future global health problems.	一篇呈给印尼和印尼总统以及英国首相为首的秘书长后2015年发展日程高级别顾问委员会（High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda）的文献综述给出了范围甚广的一系列建议，其基础是对当前和未来全球健康问题的深刻理解。


The experts recognized that the world’s health problems are shifting away from communicable diseases toward NCDs.	专家认识到，世界健康问题正在从可传染疾病转移到NCD上。


They gave a strong recommendation to include “interventions to reduce the consumption of alcohol and tobacco.”	他们强烈建议将“减少酒精和烟草消费的干预措施”纳入进来。


But the High Level Panel nonetheless arrived at a position that The Lancet, a leading medical journal, characterized as embodying a “weak” commitment to addressing NCDs.	但高级别顾问委员会最后形成了一个被领先医学杂志《柳叶刀》称为解决NCD的“弱”承诺的立场。


Relegating NCDs to a low position on the global health agenda is not new.	将NCD置于全球健康日程的较低地位并不是新鲜事。


An independent committee of experts convened by the World Health Organization found that the tobacco industry used creative, secretive, and effective tactics to divert the WHO’s focus from NCDs for years.	世界卫生组织组织（WHO）的一个独立专家委员会发现，多年来，烟草业利用创新、秘密而有效的计谋把WHO的注意力从NCD上引开。


Recent publications reveal that the food industry pursued similar strategies to influence global health policy.	最新发布的资料显示，食品业也在用类似的伎俩影响全球健康政策。


How can we overcome the role that vested interests may be playing in setting a global health agenda that fails to address key drivers of disease?	我们如何克服既得利益的作用，让全球健康日程能够解决疾病的最主要来源？


Perhaps one answer lies in listening more to the communities directly affected by major health conditions.	也许一个答案在于更多地聆听来自直接受重大健康问题的群体的声音。


For example, people living with and affected by HIV organized vibrant social movements that issued demands for change at national and global levels, dismantled legal and social barriers that exacerbated risk, and articulated norms and standards in human-rights terms.	比如，携带HIV或受HIV影响着组织了极有活力的社会运动，要求在全球和国家层面做出改变，打破增加风险的法律和社会藩篱，树立人权方面的范式和标准。


As a result, huge progress has been made in preventing infections and keeping people living with HIV alive.	结果，在防止HIV传播、让HIV携带者更好地生活方面取得了巨大的进步。


The UN General Assembly could do well to listen and learn from that experience.	联合国大会在倾听并从切身体会者身上汲取教训方面可以做到很好。


Everyone, including the most marginalized and vulnerable, has a right to good health, which is essential to human dignity and economic development.	所有人，包括最边缘化、最脆弱的人，都有权利获得良好的健康，这是人的尊严和经济发展的基础。


But upholding this right requires that policymakers focus on what makes people sick.	但支持这一权利要求决策者专注于让人们得病的原因。


An agenda that powerful corporate interests would rather stifle might be a bitter pill for world leaders, but it is one that they should swallow sooner rather than later.	强大的公司势力意欲扼杀的日程对全球领导人来说是一剂苦药，但我们迟早要吞下它。


Starved for Science	渴望科学


AMSTERDAM – In the Mekong Delta, farmers obtain 6-7 tons of rice per hectare in dry seasons and 4-5 tons per hectare in wet seasons, using fast-maturing rice varieties that allow up to three consecutive yields annually.	阿姆斯特丹—在湄公河三角洲，农民在旱季能收获6—7吨的水稻公顷产量，雨季则为4—5吨，使用快速成熟稻种，每年可以收获三季。


By contrast, West African rice farmers harvest only 1.5 tons per hectare of traditional upland rice annually, while other cereals yield no more than one ton – a figure comparable to yields in medieval Europe.	相反，西非稻农种植传统旱稻每年只能收获1. 5吨的公顷产量，其他谷类产量更是不到一吨——与欧洲中世纪产量水平相当。


Such disparities are unnecessary.	如此差异本可避免。


Indeed, the proliferation of agricultural technology – from more efficient machinery to higher-yielding or more robust crop varieties – has the potential to narrow the productivity gap considerably, even if differences between climates and producers remain.	事实上，农业技术——从效率更高的机械到更鲁棒的稻种——有潜力大量缩小产量差异，即便两地气候和生产者不同。


For example, a new variety of African upland rice, Nerica, triples annual yields.	比如，一种新的非洲旱稻——非洲新稻（Nerica）能将年产量翻三倍。


Likewise, over the last four decades, improved breeding methods, higher-quality feed, and better veterinary care have more than doubled average milk production worldwide.	类似地，在过去四十年中，改良的喂养模式、高质量饲育和更好的兽医服务让全世界平均牛奶产量增加了一倍多。


Nevertheless, regional discrepancies remain massive: cows in the Netherlands can produce roughly 9,000 liters of milk annually, while Zebu cattle in the tropics produce only about 300 liters.	尽管如此，地区差异仍然巨大：新西兰的奶牛一年可产奶9000升，而热带地区的瘤牛只能产300升。