Mental-health problems tend to arise early in life, with the first episode occurring during adolescence or early adulthood – a critical phase of development, when people are completing their education, joining the work force, building key relationships, and forming health habits.	心理健康问题常常在生命早期就会出现，第一次发作通常发生于青春期或刚成年时——这是发展的关键时期，而个人正在完成教育、走上工作岗位、建立关键的人际关系和形成健康习惯。


Without a strong support system, mental-health problems can disrupt these developments, damaging the future prospects of those whom they affect.	没有强大的支持系统，心理健康问题可能破坏这些发展，伤害受影响者的未来前景。


While the Mental Health First Aid course’s rapid expansion has helped to improve the situation in many communities, there is much left to do.	心理健康紧急救助课程的快速扩张帮助改善了许多社区的状况，但如此还远远不够。


In the short term, all developed countries should aim to achieve 1% participation rates in mental-health first-aid courses, as Australia has.	在短期，所有发达国家都应该致力于像澳大利亚那样实现1%的心理健康紧急救助课程参与率。


In the longer term, countries should aim to match participation rates in conventional first-aid courses.	在长期，各国应该把目标定在匹配常规紧急救助课程参与率上。


In the last three years, 11% of Australia’s population has completed such a course, partly owing to requirements that people in certain positions, such as child-care workers, have a first-aid certificate.	在过去三年中，11%的澳大利亚人口完成了这一课程，部分是因为工作岗位要求（如儿童看护工作）持有紧急救助资格。


Requiring that people in particular occupations – including high-school teachers, nurses, and police officers – acquire a mental-health first-aid certificate would significantly enhance participation, thereby strengthening support for those who are struggling with mental-health problems.	要求特殊岗位的工作者——包括高中教师、忽视和警察官员——具有心理健康紧急救助资格将极大地提高参与率，从而增强对陷于心理问题的人的支持。


Such certifications are even more important in the developing world, given the limited availability of mental-health professionals.	这些资格对于发展中世界来说更加重要，因为那里缺少心理健康专业人士。


Pilot work in rural India shows that the mental-health first-aid approach can be successfully adapted to the needs of communities with limited resources.	印度农村地区的试点工作表明，心理健康紧急救助方法可以成功地与资源有限的社区的需要协调起来。


In developed and developing countries alike, the scope of the problem is too large to be left exclusively to mental-health professionals.	不管是发展中国家还是发达国家，这个问题都无法光靠心理健康专业人士解决。


Every member of the community must be empowered to protect and improve their own mental health, and that of those around them.	社区的每一个成员都必须由保护和改善自身和周边人群心理健康的能力。


The Globalization of Protest	抗议的全球化


NEW YORK – The protest movement that began in Tunisia in January, subsequently spreading to Egypt, and then to Spain, has now become global, with the protests engulfing Wall Street and cities across America.	纽约——1月肇始于突尼斯、随后蔓延到埃及和西班牙的抗议运动已经波及到了全球，抗议活动已经席卷了华尔街和美国各大城市。


Globalization and modern technology now enables social movements to transcend borders as rapidly as ideas can.	如今，全球化和现代技术使得社会运动如同思想一样可以迅速地跨越国界。


And social protest has found fertile ground everywhere: a sense that the “system” has failed, and the conviction that even in a democracy, the electoral process will not set things right – at least not without strong pressure from the street.	世界各地都是社会抗议运动的温床：“体系”已经失败的感觉、即使在民主国家，选举也无法保证一切对头的观点，等等，都可以催生抗议活动——至少可以让人们走上街头施压。


In May, I went to the site of the Tunisian protests; in July, I talked to Spain’s indignados; from there, I went to meet the young Egyptian revolutionaries in Cairo’s Tahrir Square; and, a few weeks ago, I talked with Occupy Wall Street protesters in New York.	7月，我和西班牙的“愤怒者”们交谈； 接着，我从西班牙启程前往埃及，与开罗解放广场上的年轻革命者面对面；


There is a common theme, expressed by the OWS movement in a simple phrase: “We are the 99%.”	几周前，我又与纽约“占领和华尔街”运动抗议者交谈。 这些运动有个共同点，即“占领华尔街”运动所打出的简单标语：“我们是99%。


That slogan echoes the title of an article that I recently published, entitled “Of the 1%, for the 1%, and by the 1%,” describing the enormous increase in inequality in the United States: 1% of the population controls more than 40% of the wealth and receives more than 20% of the income.	这一口号与我最近发表的一篇文章的标题异曲同工：《成为1%，为了1%，依靠1%》（Of the 1%, for the 1%, and by the 1%）。 这篇文章描述了美国愈演愈烈的不平等：1%的人口控制着超过40%的财富，赚取着20%的收入。


And those in this rarefied stratum often are rewarded so richly not because they have contributed more to society – bonuses and bailouts neatly gutted that justification for inequality – but because they are, to put it bluntly, successful (and sometimes corrupt) rent-seekers.	而这一撮极少数人获得如此优厚的待遇，并非因为他们对社会的贡献更大——奖金和援助轻易地摧毁了不平等的合理性，而是因为（恕我直言）他们是成功（有时是腐败）的寻租者。


This is not to deny that some of the 1% have contributed a great deal.	我并不是否认这1%中有一部分人确实对社会贡献卓越。


Indeed, the social benefits of many real innovations (as opposed to the novel financial “products” that ended up unleashing havoc on the world economy) typically far exceed what their innovators receive.	事实上，许多真正的创新（绝非最终给世界经济带来巨大浩劫的新奇金融“产品”）所带来的社会益处远远超过了创新者自己所获得的好处。


But, around the world, political influence and anti-competitive practices (often sustained through politics) have been central to the increase in economic inequality.	但是，放眼全球，政治势力和反竞争行为（通常通过政治得以持续）已成为经济不平等性愈演愈烈的主因。


And tax systems in which a billionaire like Warren Buffett pays less tax (as a percentage of his income) than his secretary, or in which speculators, who helped to bring down the global economy, are taxed at lower rates than those who work for their income, have reinforced the trend.	在我们的税收体系中，像巴菲特这样的亿万富豪所支付的税收（以占收入百分比衡量）比他的秘书还少； 把全球经济搞得一团糟的投机客所支付的税率也要低于勤劳致富者。


Research in recent years has shown how important and ingrained notions of fairness are.	近年来的研究表明，公正是一个极其重要且已深入人心的概念。


Spain’s protesters, and those in other countries, are right to be indignant: here is a system in which the bankers got bailed out, while those whom they preyed upon have been left to fend for themselves.	西班牙和其他国家的抗议者的愤怒可谓名正言顺：在现行体系中，银行家获得了援助，而被他们玩弄的人却得自力更生。


Worse, the bankers are now back at their desks, earning bonuses that amount to more than most workers hope to earn in a lifetime, while young people who studied hard and played by the rules see no prospects for fulfilling employment.	更糟糕的是，银行家现在踌躇满志地坐在自己的座位上，赚着大多数工人一辈子都不敢想的奖金，而努力学习、循规蹈矩的年轻人却面临着失业的前景。


The rise in inequality is the product of a vicious spiral: the rich rent-seekers use their wealth to shape legislation in order to protect and increase their wealth – and their influence.	不平等情况的恶化是一个恶性循环的结果：富有的寻租者用他们的财富左右立法，以保护和增加他们的财富以及势力。


The US Supreme Court, in its notorious Citizens United decision, has given corporations free rein to use their money to influence the direction of politics.	美国最高法院在其臭名昭著的公民联合会（Citizens United）判决中授予公司随心所欲地使用手里的金钱影响政治动向的权利。


But, while the wealthy can use their money to amplify their views, back on the street, police wouldn’t allow me to address the OWS protesters through a megaphone.	但是，富人可以动用手里的金钱来放大自己的声音，可警察却不允许我在街上用高音喇叭宣扬“占领华尔街”抗议者的口号。


The contrast between overregulated democracy and unregulated bankers did not go unnoticed.	过度监管的民主和不���监管的银行家之间的矛盾并非没人关注。


But the protesters are ingenious: they echoed what I said through the crowd, so that all could hear.	但抗议者可谓别出心裁：他们回应着我急匆匆穿越人群时所说的话，这样，所有人都能听见我说什么了。


And, to avoid interrupting the “dialogue” by clapping, they used forceful hand signals to express their agreement.	此外，为了避免“对话”被掌声所干扰，他们使用了给力的手势来表示他们对我的赞同。


They are right that something is wrong about our “system.”	他们说，我们的“体系”出了问题，这是对的。


Around the world, we have underutilized resources – people who want to work, machines that lie idle, buildings that are empty – and huge unmet needs: fighting poverty, promoting development, and retrofitting the economy for global warming, to name just a few.	放眼世界，我们拥有未曾使用的资源——渴望工作的人群、被闲置的机器、空荡荡的大楼——也存在为满足的需求：比如消除贫困、促进发展、为全球变暖改变经济模式等等。


In America, after more than seven million home foreclosures in recent years, we have empty homes and homeless people.	在美国，近几年有数百万房子被取消了按揭赎回权，我们有大量的空房，同时又有大量无家可归者。


The protesters have been criticized for not having an agenda.	人们批评抗议者缺乏计划。


But this misses the point of protest movements.	但这样的批评没有抓住抗议运动的重点。


They are an expression of frustration with the electoral process.	他们在表达对选举程序的不满。


They are an alarm.	他们在敲打警钟。


The anti-globalization protests in Seattle in 1999, at what was supposed to be the inauguration of a new round of trade talks, called attention to the failures of globalization and the international institutions and agreements that govern it.	1999年的西雅图反全球化抗议后把人们的关注点吸引到了全球化及治理全球化的国际机构和协定的失灵之处，并成为新一轮贸易谈判的起始点。


When the press looked into the protesters’ allegations, they found that there was more than a grain of truth in them.	媒体在认真解读抗议者的指责时，发现他们所说的不乏真理。


The trade negotiations that followed were different – at least in principle, they were supposed to be a development round, to make up for some of the deficiencies highlighted by protesters – and the International Monetary Fund subsequently undertook significant reforms.	随后的贸易谈判有所不同——至少在原则上，这些谈判被认为属于发展回合（development round），补偿了抗议者所提出的某些不足之处——而IMF后来也实施了重大改革。


So, too, in the US, the civil-rights protesters of the 1960’s called attention to pervasive institutionalized racism in American society.	与此类似，20世纪60年代的美国民权运动引起了人们对美国社会普遍存在的制度性种族主义的注意。


That legacy has not yet been overcome, but the election of President Barack Obama shows how far those protests moved America.	这一问题早已被克服，但奥巴马总统的当选表明，这次抗议活动对美国产生了多大的推动力。


On one level, today’s protesters are asking for little: a chance to use their skills, the right to decent work at decent pay, a fairer economy and society.	从某种层面上说，今日的抗议者并没有提出什么过分要求：无非是想有个施展技能的机会，找到个收入不错的体面工作，以及生活在一个更加公正的经济和社会中。


Their hope is evolutionary, not revolutionary.	他们的愿望是渐近性的，不是革命性的。


But, on another level, they are asking for a great deal: a democracy where people, not dollars, matter, and a market economy that delivers on what it is supposed to do.	但是，从另一个层面讲，他们要求得很多：一个由人民而不是金钱说话的民主国家，一个能按人们意愿运转的市场经济。


The two are related: as we have seen, unfettered markets lead to economic and political crises.	这两点是相互关联的：我们已经看到，不受约束的市场会导致经济和政治危机。


Markets work the way they should only when they operate within a framework of appropriate government regulations; and that framework can be erected only in a democracy that reflects the general interest – not the interests of the 1%.	只有受恰到好处的政府管制框架的束缚，市场才能最好地运转； 而这样的框架只有在反映普世利益——而不是1%的人的利益——的民主中才能产生。


The best government that money can buy is no longer good enough.	能用金钱收买的最佳政府早已无法担此重责了。


The Global Jobs Challenge	全球就业挑战


NEW YORK – Over the past three decades, hundreds of millions of new workers have entered the global economy.	纽约——过去30年来，数以亿计的新工人进入了全球经济中。


They arrived with various levels of education and skill, and over time have generally gained in terms of “human capital” – and in terms of value added and income.	他们教育程度和技能水平各不相同，但随着时间的推移，从“人力资本”——以及附加值和收入——的角度来说，他们都获得了好处。


This has brought a tremendous, and ongoing, growth in income levels, opportunities, and the size of the global economy.	这带来了收入水平、机会和全球经济规模的持续大升。


But these new workers have also brought more employment competition and significant shifts in relative wages and prices, which is having profound distributional effects.	但这些新工人也带来了更多的就业竞争以及相对工资和价格的剧变，产生了深远的分配效应。


These massive structural changes in the global economy present three great employment challenges worldwide, with different countries facing their own variants.	全球经济的这些重大结构性变化表明，全世界面临着三大就业挑战，当然每个国家的具体实际各不相同。


The first challenge is to generate enough jobs to accommodate the inflow of new entrants into the labor market.	第一大挑战是创造足够的就业岗位来容纳劳动力市场新军。


Clearly, a wide range of advanced and developing countries is failing to do so.	显然，众多发达国家和发展中国家在这方面都失败了。


Youth unemployment is high and rising.	年轻人失业率高企，而且在不断上升。


Even in fast-growth developing countries, surplus labor is awaiting inclusion in the modern economy, and the pressure is on to sustain job creation.	即使是高增长发展中国家，也有剩余劳动力等待着现代经济的吸收，如何保持就业岗位创造趋势成了一个大问题。


The second challenge is to match skills and capabilities to the supply of jobs – an adjustment that takes time.	第二大挑战是将技能和能力与岗位供给相匹配——一个需要时间来完成的调整。


It is also a moving target.	这也是一个移动目标。


Globalization and major labor-saving technologies have thrown labor markets in many countries into disequilibrium.	全球化和节约劳动力的重大技术进步使许多国家的劳动力市场陷入了不均衡状态。


Skills mismatches abound.	技能错配大量出现。


Moreover, with continuing rapid growth in developing countries, the global economy’s structure is far from static, and it seems clear that the pace of market adjustment is lagging that of structural change.	此外，在发展中国家经济持续快速增长的背景下，全球经济结构早已不再是静态的了，现在看来，市场调整显然大大落后于结构性变化。


The third challenge is distributional.	第三大挑战是分配挑战。


As the tradable part of the global economy (goods and services that can be produced in one country and consumed in another) expands, competition for economic activity and jobs broadens.	随着全球可贸易部分（可以在甲国生产但在乙国消费的商品和服务）的扩张，经济活动和就业岗位的战场也扩大了。


That affects the price of labor and the range of employment opportunities within all globally integrated economies.	这使得整个全球一体化经济内的劳动力价格和就业机会都受到了重大影响。


Subsets of the population gain, and others lose, certainly relative to expectations – and often absolutely.	有的地方得到了好处，有的地方受到了打击——从相对于预期的角度看是如此，但通常从绝对数量上看也是如此。


Many advanced countries – in fact, most of them – have experienced limited middle-income growth.	许多（事实上，是绝大多数）发达国家经历了有限的中等收入增长。


In some European countries, where income inequality has remained in check, this has been a component of a deliberate strategy to maintain employment growth and competitiveness in the tradable part of the economy, with wage restraint partly shared across the income distribution.	在一些收入不平等程度仍然较小的欧洲国家，维持就业增长和可贸易部分的竞争力已成为有意为之的战略，工资限制在一定程度上是由所有收入水平阶层共同承担的。


In the United States, income inequality has risen as the upper end of the income and education spectrum benefits from globalization, while the rest experience declining employment opportunities in the tradable sector.	在美国，高端收入和教育人群受益于全球化，而其他阶层则因可贸易部门就业机会不断减少而受到了打击，因此收入不平等性增加了。


For two decades prior to the 2008 crisis, employment levels were maintained – and downward pressure on incomes mitigated – by creating jobs in non-tradable sectors.	在2008年危机爆发前的20年时间里，就业水平得以维持，收入水平的下降压力也得到了缓解，这要归功于非贸易部门所创造的就业岗位。


In some cases, this took the form of rapid growth in government; in others, like the US, a pattern of excessive, debt-fueled consumption underpinned a large shift in employment to (non-tradable) services and construction.	在一些国家，这是由政府部门的快速扩张实现的； 而其他国家（比如美国）则走了一条债务驱动的过度消费模式，用（不可贸易的）服务和建筑部门吸收大量就业。


Indeed, government and health care (both largely non-tradable) accounted for almost 40% of net employment growth in the US between 1990 and 2008.	事实上，1990—2008年间，政府和医疗部门（均为不可贸易部门）创造了美国就业岗位净增量的近40%。


That pattern came to a sudden stop in the financial crisis of 2008.	2008年金融危机的爆发让这一模式戛然而止。


Private-sector leverage declined and public-sector leverage reached – and exceeded – sustainable limits, with Greece being only the most extreme example.	私人部门的杠杆降低了，而公共部门的杠杆已经触及（并超过）了可持续的最大规模，希腊只是一个较极端的例子。


But expectations created by pre-crisis growth patterns adjust slowly.	但产生于危机前增长模式的预期的调整速度并没有那么快。


Because the dominant narrative still maintains that the pre-crisis period was normal, at least in terms of the growth pattern in the real economy, the perceived challenge is to restore growth according to the pre-crisis pattern.	主流观点仍认为危机前的时期属于常态，至少从实体经济增长模式的角度看是如此，因此人们认定当前挑战在于用危机前模式重塑增长。


Unfortunately, this narrative cannot explain why, particularly in the advanced countries, growth is faltering and the employment engines have largely shut down.	不幸的是，这一观点无法解释（特别是发达国家）为何增长迟迟得不到提振，与此同时，就业引擎早已停止运转了。


Part of the answer consists in the long, lingering impact of financial crises and deleveraging, well documented by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their book This Time is Different.	部分原因在于金融危机和去杠杆化的长期而缓慢的影响。 卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）在《这次不一样》（This Time is Different）一书对此做了精到的描述。


At the same time, the financial imbalances and distortions that precede a crisis delay appropriate and necessary responses to technological and global market forces in the real economy as well.	与此同时，危机爆发前所存在的金融不平衡和扭曲让应对实体经济中的技术和全球市场推动力的必要措施推迟了。


In short, economies and policies adjusted in an unsustainable fashion, to some extent obscuring the need for a more sustainable pattern of adaptation.	简言之，经济和政策调整在以一种不可持续的方式进行，在一定程度上蒙蔽了人们的眼睛，让人们无法看到可持续的适应模式。


What does it mean – for individuals, businesses, and governments – that structural adjustment is falling further and further behind the global forces that are causing pressure for structural change?	结构性调整正在日益落后于造成结构性变革压力的全球推动力，这对于个人、企业和政府来说意味着什么？


Above all, it means that expectations are broadly inconsistent with reality, and need to adjust, in some cases downward.	首先，这意味着人们的预期与现实并不一致，需要调整，在某些方面应该向下调整。


But distributional effects need to be taken seriously and addressed.	但分配效应问题需要认真对待并予以解决。


The burden of weak or non-existent recoveries should not be borne by the unemployed, including the young.	复苏不振甚至停滞的负担不应该由包括年轻人在内的失业者来承担。


In the interest of social cohesion, market outcomes need to be modified to create a more even distribution of incomes and benefits, both now and in inter-temporal terms.	为了保持社会凝聚力，市场结果需要有所调节，以造成更均等的收入和利益分配，不管从现期角度还是跨期角度看都是如此。


After all, underinvestment now implies diminished opportunity in the future.	毕竟，今天的投资不足意味着明天的机会缺乏。


The imperative of structural adjustment also implies that individuals, governments, and other institutions (especially schools) need to focus on increasing the speed of adjustment to meet rapidly shifting market conditions.	结构性调整的紧迫性还意味着个人、企业和其他机构（特别是学校）需要致力于加快调整速度以适应快速变化的市场条件。


Attention to both the demand and supply sides of job markets is required.	就业市场的供求两端都需要���顾到。


This means not only matching skills to jobs, but also expanding the range of jobs to match skills.	这意味着不仅要让技能与就业岗位相匹配，也必须扩大就业岗位的范围，使之与技能相匹配。


Finally, global economic-management institutions need to address whether the pace of globalization, and its implied structural change, is faster than the capacity of individuals, economies, and societies to adjust can withstand.	最后，全球经济管理机构就需要判断全球化（及其所隐含的结构性变化）的速度是否超过了需要做出调整的个人、经济和社会的承受力。


If so, the next challenge will be to find non-destructive ways to moderate the pace in order to bring capacity to adjust and the need for adjustment into closer alignment.	果真如此的话，下一个挑战就将是找到减缓全球化速度的非破坏性方式，从而让调整能力和调整需要更加接近。


None of this will be easy.	没有一项是简单的任务。


We do not now have well developed frameworks for understanding structural change.	目前我们还没有发展出理解结构性变革的好框架。


Nevertheless, the unemployed and underemployed, especially younger people, expect their leaders and institutions to try.	尽管如此，失业和半失业者，特别是年轻人，仍期望领导人和机构尽力尝试。


The Global Roots of Euro-Jitters	欧元危机警告全球汇率体系：此路不通


FLORENCE – It is too simplistic to explain the current wave of concern about the euro in terms of Greece’s problems.	佛罗伦萨 —— 当前市场对于欧元的担忧源自希腊危机，这种观点太简单化了。


Greece has massive fiscal and competitiveness problems, but Greece (2.25% of the population of the European Union) is smaller than California (12% of the population of the United States).	希腊的财政状况和经济竞争力的确存在严重问题，但希腊的国土面积、经济规模和经济重要性都远逊于美国加利福尼亚州； 希腊人口仅占欧盟人口的 2.


And California, too, is suffering massive fiscal difficulties and declining competitiveness in some of the industries in which Californians were once pioneers.	25% ，加州人口则占美国人口的 12% 。 加州一样饱受财政危机之苦，并且正在丧失某些产业里的领先优势。


The euro’s current problems are, instead, a reflection of unresolved Europe-wide and global problems.	欧元眼下的问题，其实反映了欧洲乃至全球层面上一些尚未得到解决的难题。


The common currency is the canary in the mine of the global exchange-rate system.	欧洲共同货币是全球汇率体系的危机预警器。


The euro precisely measures international tensions in that it is a bold experiment: a currency that is not linked to a state, but rather follows from international rules and treaties.	欧元是一次大胆的尝试，正因如此，它成了国际矛盾的灵敏指标。 它不受单个国家的控制，而受一系列国际规则和条约的制约。


It is a creature of the intellect rather than a product of power.	它是理智的作品，而非权力的产物。


It is a post-modern or post-sovereign currency.	它是一种后现代货币、一种后主权货币。


But in the aftermath of a crisis, countries put national interests above their willingness to go along with international rules.	但在全球经济危机的冲击下，各国都把国家利益置于国际规则之上。


The creation of money is often thought to be the domain of the state: this was the prevalent doctrine of the nineteenth century, reaching its apogee in the German economist Georg Friedrich Knapp’s The State Theory of Money .	人们常常认为，创造货币是国家的事情，这是 19 世纪的主流学说，在德国经济学家克纳普（ Georg Friedrich Knapp ）的著作《国家货币论》中登峰造极。


In the New Testament, Christ famously answers a question about obedience to civil authorities by examining a coin and telling the Pharisees, “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.”	在《新约圣经》里，耶稣对是否要服从世俗权威这个问题有一个著名的回答，他拿出一枚罗马帝国的货币端详一番，对法利赛人说，“让凯撒的归凯撒”。


Unlike most banknotes and coins, there is no picture of the state or its symbols – no Caesar – on the money managed by the European Central Bank.	跟大多数纸币和硬币不同，在欧洲央行所管理的这种货币上，没有代表国家的图像和符号 —— 没有凯撒。


There has always been a close relationship between European monetary integration and global problems.	欧洲货币一体化和全球问题紧密相连。


Europeans thought that their close geographic proximity and shared cultural inheritance might enable them to produce answers where global debates had become stalled.	欧洲人认为，接近的地理位置和共享的文化遗产可以让他们在陷入僵局的全球议题上率先给出答案。


When things did not work out globally, a regional solution might be possible.	如果某个议题在全球层面上暂时行不通，也许可以先在区域层面上给出一套办法。


The impetus to the first act of European monetary integration, the 1970 Werner Report, stemmed from awareness that there were major difficulties in the fixed exchange-rate system established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference.	欧洲货币一体化的最初蓝图是 1970 年的《维尔纳报告》，当时的欧洲共同体之所以发起这份报告，就是因为意识到， 1944 年在布雷顿森林会议上建立起来的固定汇率体系存在严重问题：美国以外的任何势力都无法对美国的货币和财政政策形成制约。


Nobody outside the US could force it to restrain either its monetary policy, which was becoming increasingly expansive under President Richard Nixon, or its fiscal policy, marked by mushrooming deficits due to the costs of the Vietnam war.	在时任美国总统尼克森治下，美国货币政策日趋扩张； 由于越南战争成本高昂，美国财政政策则表现为疯涨的赤字。


Policymakers in France loved to quote a remark by the French poet Paul Valéry, who in the middle of the chaos of the Great Depression had written that “Europe visibly aspires to be governed by an American committee.”	法国的政治家喜欢引用法国诗人瓦莱里（ Paul Val é ry ）的一句话，他在大萧条的乱世中写道：“显然，欧洲巴不得让一个美国委员会来统治自己。


To Europeans, the International Monetary Fund, which supervised exchange-rate arrangements in the post-Bretton Woods world, looked like a perfectly American committee, and France did not like that.	”在欧洲人看来，监督着布雷顿森林汇率安排的国际货币基金组织，正是这样一个“美国委员会”的绝佳代表，法国人不喜欢被它统治。


The Werner Report’s ideas were too feeble to deal with the currency turmoil of the early 1970’s, and it was almost a decade before Europe produced a new response.	《维尔纳报告》中的理念过于苍白无力，不足以应对 20 世纪 70 年代早期的汇率乱局。 将近 10 年之后，欧洲才拿出来一套新方案。


The European Monetary System began as a high-level reaction to global currency chaos, and in particular to the depreciation of the dollar in 1977 and 1978, which seemed to threaten its continued role as the major international reserve currency.	1979 年启动的欧洲货币体系最初是对全球汇率混乱局面的一种高层次反应，尤其是针对 1977 、 1978 年的美元大贬值，那一轮大贬值差一点威胁到美元的主要国际储备货币地位。


The process that began with the report of the Delors Committee in 1989 and led to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the establishment of the euro in 1999, and the introduction of the physical currency in 2002 was rooted in an attempt to devise mechanisms that would generate a more stable global exchange-rate regime.	以 1989 年德洛尔（ Jacques Delors ）领导的欧洲委员会发布报告为起点，中经 1992 年《马斯特里赫特条约》的签署、 1999 年欧元的建立，��到 2002 年欧元硬币和纸币正式进入流通，欧元的整个缔造过程，追根溯源，是为了创造一种机制，让全球汇率体系更加稳定。


The critical policy innovators of the late 1980’s, in particular the highly activist French Finance Minister Edouard Balladur, took an international answer and started to advocate its realization on the European level.	20 世纪 80 年代推动政策创新的关键人物，尤其是非常活跃的法国财政部长巴拉迪尔（ Edouard Balladur ），动员欧洲主要大国协同出台了一套方案，并在整个欧洲力促其实施。


At the G-7 meeting of finance ministers in Louvre in February 1987, Balladur suggested a system of currency target zones; when its realization proved problematic, he pushed on with a more definitive and tighter European version of the scheme.	1987 年 2 月，七国集团财政部长会议在法国卢浮宫召开，会上，巴拉迪尔倡议建立一个汇率目标区体系，虽然后来这个计划没被采纳，他还是努力推动欧洲各国接纳一个更明确和更严谨的蓝图。


What resulted was a partly flawed answer to the problem.	后来实际得到采纳的方案局部上包涵着某些缺陷。


That was because France and Germany, the principal protagonists in the drama of monetary integration, had different visions of how the problem should be solved.	这些缺陷的根源在于，欧洲货币一体化进程中的关键角色法国和德国，各自有不同的思路。


The Germans pressed for clearly defined fiscal rules, but other countries wanted more wiggle room.	德国力主出台一套明确的财政纪律，而其他国家希望有较大的自主空间。


The French argued for European economic governance alongside the monetary union, but that looked to others as imposing too much French planisme .	法国主张欧洲经济治理与货币同盟齐头并进，但其他国家觉得那过分体现了法国式的计划主义。


A watered-down version of the German solution was eventually adopted.	最终得到采纳的是经过折中以后的德国版本。


Today, as in the 1960’s or 1970’s, we face a fundamentally global problem of inconsistent monetary policies.	今天的局面跟 20 世纪 60 、 70 年代相似，摆在我们面前的是全球层面上货币政策各自为政的老大难问题。


Back then, Europeans complained that low interest rates in America were driving global inflation; now low US interest rates are blamed for driving irresponsible asset-price booms.	当年，欧洲抱怨美国的低利率导致全球通货膨胀； 如今人们抨击美国的利率政策不负责任地催生资产价格泡沫。


Indeed, low US interest rates, though an appropriate domestic response to the financial crisis, have pushed a global carry trade in which people borrow in dollars to fund investments in the apparently less crisis-hit large emerging-market economies.	说真的，美国的低利率虽然作为一种应对金融危机的国内措施无可厚非，但它加剧了全球套息交易 —— 投机者借入美元，投向受危机冲击较小的主要新兴市场经济体。


These large transactions are funneled through the international banking system.	通过国际银行体系，此类交易大行其道。


The answers to a global problem of this kind cannot be found on a European level.	这类全球性问题局限于欧洲层面是无解的。


It will demand global coordination of monetary policies, and some form of global economic governance.	它需要全球货币政策的协调，加上某种形式的全球经济治理。


Europe tried this combination, and found that even in a regional setting it could not be fully realized.	这个组合，欧洲已经尝试过一遍，发现就连在一个区域范围内都无法将其完全实现。


Instead, an imperfect answer produced heightened vulnerability.	退而求其次的办法则会加剧波动性。


The result is that Europe has made itself into the primary victim of the financial crisis.	实验的结果是，欧洲把自己变成了金融危机的头一批牺牲品。


The God of Suffering?	苦难之神？


PRINCETON – Do we live in a world that was created by a god who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all good?	普林斯顿——我们是生活在一个由无所不能，无所不知和完美无缺的上帝创造的世界里吗？


Christians think we do.	基督徒认为是这样的。


Yet a powerful reason for doubting this confronts us every day: the world contains a vast amount of pain and suffering.	然而，我们每天都面对令人怀疑这个观点的一个有力的证据：这个世界有大量的痛苦和苦难。


If God is all-knowing, he knows how much suffering there is.	如果上帝无所不知，他就知道有多少苦难。


If he is all-powerful, he could have created a world without so much of it – and he would have done so if he were all good.	如果他无所不能，他就已经创造了一个没有如此多苦难的世界——并且他应该已经这样做了如果他完美无缺。


Christians usually respond that God bestowed on us the gift of free will, and hence is not responsible for the evil we do.	基督徒通常回应说上帝赠与我们自由意志的能力，因此他对我们的作恶不负责任。


But this reply fails to deal with the suffering of those who drown in floods, are burned alive in forest fires caused by lightning, or die of hunger or thirst during a drought.	但是这个回答没能解释那些在洪水中淹死的人，在闪电引起的森林火灾中活活烧死的人或者在干旱时饿死或渴死的人的不幸。


Christians sometimes attempt to explain this suffering by saying that all humans are sinners, and so deserve their fate, even if it is a horrible one.	基督徒有时候试图通过这样的说法来解释这样的不幸：所有的人都是罪人，因而他们命该如此，即使这样的命运非常可怕。


But infants and small children are just as likely to suffer and die in natural disasters as adults, and it seems impossible that they could deserve to suffer and die.	但是婴儿和小孩与成年人一样都有可能在自然灾害中遭遇不幸和死亡，并且他们好像不太可能罪该遭遇不幸和死亡。


Once again, some Christians say that we have all inherited the original sin committed by Eve, who defied God’s decree against eating from the tree of knowledge.	再一次地，有些基督徒会说我们所有的人都继承了夏娃的原罪，她违抗了上帝的不得吃智慧树果实的命令。


This is a triply repellant idea, for it implies that knowledge is bad, disobeying God’s will is the greatest sin of all, and children inherit the sins of their ancestors, and may justly be punished for them.	这是一个三重排斥的观点，因为它暗示知识是有害的，不遵守上帝的意志是最大的罪恶以及儿童从他们的祖先那里继承了罪恶并应当为他们接受惩罚。


Even if we were to accept all this, the problem remains unresolved.	即使我们接受所有的这些观点，问题仍然没有得到解决。


For animals also suffer from floods, fires, and droughts, and, since they are not descended from Adam and Eve, they cannot have inherited original sin.	因为动物也会因为洪水、火灾和干旱遭受不幸，并且，既然它们不是亚当和夏娃的后代，它们不可能继承原罪。


In earlier times, when original sin was taken more seriously than it generally is today, the suffering of animals posed a particularly difficult problem for thoughtful Christians.	在更早的年代里，当原罪被比以现在更严肃的态度来看待的时候，动物遭遇的不幸对擅于思考的基督徒来说是一个非常困难的问题。


The seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes solved it by the drastic expedient of denying that animals can suffer.	十七世纪法国哲学家勒奈·笛卡尔通过强烈否认动物能感觉痛苦这样一个权宜之计来解决这个问题。


Animals, he maintained, are merely ingenious mechanisms, and we should not take their cries and struggles as a sign of pain, any more than we take the sound of an alarm clock as a sign that it has consciousness.	他认为动物只是机灵的机械装置，我们不应该把它们的嚎叫和挣扎视为痛苦的表现，就像我们不应该把闹钟的响声作为闹钟有意识的表现一样。


People who live with a dog or a cat are not likely to find that persuasive.	但是，和狗或猫一起生活的人不大可能认为这个观点具有说服力。


Last month, at Biola University, a Christian college in southern California, I debated the existence of God with the conservative commentator Dinesh D’Souza.	上个月在拜欧拉大学——一个位于南加州的教会学院，我和保守的评论员丹尼希·杜泽（Dinesh D’Souza）就上帝是否存在的问题进行了辩论。


In recent months, D’Souza has made a point of debating prominent atheists, but he, too, struggled to find a convincing answer to the problem I outlined above.	在最近的几个月里，杜泽在与一些卓越的无神论者辩论的时候有力的阐述了自己的观点，但是他也对为我上面列出的问题找一个令人信服的答案感到吃力。


He first said that, because humans can live forever in heaven, the suffering of this world is less important than it would be if our life in this world were the only life we had.	他首先说，因为人可以永远生活在天堂里，所以，与我们在这个世界的生命是我们拥有的唯一的生命的情况比起来，我们在这个世界遭遇的不幸就不是那样重要。


That still fails to explain why an all-powerful and all-good god would permit it.	这同样没有解释为什么一个无所不能完美无缺的上帝会允许这样的事情发生。


Relatively insignificant as this suffering may be from the perspective of eternity, the world would be better without it, or at least without most of it.	从永恒的角度来看这样的不幸相对无关紧要，可是如果没有不幸，或者至少没有大部分不幸，这个世界将更美好。


(Some say that we need to have some suffering to appreciate what it is like to be happy.	（有些人说我们需要遭遇一些不幸以使我们更好的欣赏幸福是什么样的。


Maybe, but we surely don’t need as much as we have.)	这也许是对的，但是可以肯定的是我们不需要我们现在拥有的那么多不幸。 ）


Next, D’Souza argued that since God gave us life, we are not in a position to complain if our life is not perfect.	接着，杜泽辩称说既然上帝给了我们生命，我们就不能因为生活不完美而抱怨上帝。


He used the example of a child born with one limb missing.	他举了一个一出生就少了一只手臂的小孩作为例子。


If life itself is a gift, he said, we are not wronged by being given less than we might want.	他说，如果生命本身就是一个礼物，那我们就没有因为得到的比自己想要的少而受到不公正的对待。


In response I pointed out that we condemn mothers who cause harm to their babies by using alcohol or cocaine when pregnant.	作为回应，我指出我们谴责那些在怀孕时使用酒精和可卡因而给胎儿造成伤害的母亲。


Yet since they have given life to their children, it seems that, on D’Souza’s view, there is nothing wrong with what they have done.	然而按照杜泽的观点，既然她们给了孩子生命，那么她们做的事情就好像没有什么错误。


Finally, D’Souza fell back, as many Christians do when pressed, on the claim that we should not expect to understand God’s reasons for creating the world as it is.	最后，和许多基督徒遇到尖锐问题时的反应一样，杜泽转而声称我们不应该希望去了解上帝把世界创造成现在这个样子的原因。


It is as if an ant should try to understand our decisions, so puny is our intelligence in comparison with the infinite wisdom of God.	这样做就像是 一只蚂蚁试图了解我们人类的决定一样，因为我们的智力和上帝无限的智慧相比是如此的微不足道。


(This is the answer given, in more poetic form, in The Book of Job .)	（ 这是在约伯记中以更诗意的形式给出的答案。


But once we abdicate our powers of reason in this way, we may as well believe anything at all.	）但是一旦我们用这种方式放弃了思考问题的权力，我们就可能相信任何事情。


Moreover, the assertion that our intelligence is puny in comparison with God’s presupposes just the point that is under debate – that there is a god who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all good.	而且，断言我们的智力和上帝的智慧比起来微不足道预先假定了辩论中的观点——世界上存在着一个无所不知，无所不能和完美无缺的上帝。


The evidence of our own eyes makes it more plausible to believe that the world was not created by any god at all.	我们亲眼看见的证据使我们相信这个世界根本不是由上帝创造的观点更加合理和可信。


If, however, we insist on believing in divine creation, we are forced to admit that the god who made the world cannot be all-powerful and all good.	但是，如果我们坚持相信上帝创造世界，那我们就被迫承认创造这个世界的上帝不可能是无所不能和完美无缺的。


He must be either evil or a bungler.	他一定不是邪恶的就是经验不足的。


The Gold Bubble and the Gold Bugs	黄金泡沫黄金虫


NEW YORK – Gold prices have been rising sharply, breaching the $1,000 barrier and in recent weeks rising towards $1,200 an ounce and above.	纽约——金价一路飙升，突破1000美元大关，近几周更是企及1200美元，且还在上涨。


Today’s “gold bugs” argue that the price could top $2,000.	那些一味看多黄金的投资客——所谓“黄金虫”——断言金价可摸高2000美元。


But the recent price surge looks suspiciously like a bubble, with the increase only partly justified by economic fundamentals.	然而，近来的金价涨势颇有泡沫嫌疑，因为经济基本面并不完全支持如此高价。


Gold prices rise sharply only in two situations: when inflation is high and rising, gold becomes a hedge against inflation; and when there is a risk of a near depression and investors fear for the security of their bank deposits, gold becomes a safe haven.	但凡金价飙升，无非是两种情形：要么通货膨胀严重且仍在加剧，这时黄金成为对冲通胀的一种工具； 要么经济存在准萧条（near-depression）风险，投资者对银行存款安全忧心忡忡，这时黄金成为一个避风港。


The last two years fit this pattern.	过去两年的金价走势符合上述规律。


Gold prices started to rise sharply in the first half of 2008, when emerging markets were overheating, commodity prices were rising, and there was concern about rising inflation in high-growth emerging markets.	2008年上半年，金价开始猛涨，当时，新兴市场经济过热，大宗商品价格不断走高，人们担心新兴市场在高增长的同时出现高通胀。


Even that rise was partly a bubble, which collapsed in the second half of 2008, when – after oil reached $145, killing global growth –the world economy fell into recession.	即便是这种由对冲通胀导致的金价上涨也不乏泡沫成分，到了2008年下半年，当高达145美元的油价开始扼杀全球增长势头之时，世界经济滑入衰退。


As concerns about deflation replaced fear of inflation, gold prices started to fall with the correction in commodity prices.	对通缩的担忧取代了对通胀的恐惧，金价也随其他大宗商品价格一道开始向下调整。


The second price spike occurred when Lehman Brothers collapsed, leaving investors scared about the safety of their financial assets – including bank deposits.	雷曼兄弟破产引发恐慌，投资者担忧其金融资产——包括银行存款的安全，于是金价开始二度走高。


That scare was contained when the G-7 committed to increase guarantees of bank deposits and to backstop the financial system.	直到七国集团承诺增强存款担保力度并为金融体系担保之后，那种恐慌才有所缓解。


With panic subsiding towards the end of 2008, gold prices resumed their downward movement.	2008年年末，恐慌情绪逐渐消散，金价再度下行。


By that time, with the global economy spinning into near-depression, commercial and industrial gold use, and even luxury demand, took a further dive.	而且与此同时，随着全球经济滑入准萧条，黄金的商业、工业乃至奢侈品方面的使用需求进一步走弱。


Gold rose above $1,000 again in February-March 2009, when it looked like most of the financial system in the United States and Europe might be near insolvency, and that many governments could not guarantee deposits and backstop the financial system, because banks that were too big to fail were also too big to be saved.	2009年2、3月，金价再次破千，这一次是因为，市场认为美国和欧洲的金融体系大都处于近乎资不抵债的状态，许多国家的政府无力再为存款或金融体系进行担保——那些“大到不能倒”的银行，同时也是“大到救不了”。


That panic subsided – and gold prices started to drift down again – after US banks were subjected to “stress tests,” America’s Troubled Asset Relief Program further backstopped the financial system by removing bad assets from banks’ balance sheets, and the global economy gradually bottomed out.	随着美国对银行进行“压力测试”，推出问题资产剥离计划（TARP），剥离银行坏账以进一步支持金融体系等一系列措施的见效，全球经济衰退逐渐接近底部，那一轮恐慌也慢慢消散了，于是金价再度掉头向下。


So, with no near-term risk of inflation or depression, why have gold prices started to rise sharply again in the last few months?	问题是，既然最近几个月不存在通胀或萧条的短期风险，为什么金价又再次飙升呢？


There are several reasons why gold prices are rising, but they suggest a gradual rise with significant risks of a downward correction, rather than a rapid rise towards $2,000, as today’s gold bugs claim.	支持金价上升的确有若干理由，但是根据那些理由，金价应当缓慢上升，并且存在下行调整的巨大风险，而不是像黄金虫们所鼓吹的那样“飙升至2000美元”。


First, while we are still in a world of global deflation, large, monetized fiscal deficits are fueling concerns over medium-term inflation.	首先，由于世界经济仍处于全球通货紧缩阶段，财政赤字大规模货币化在所难免，这导致中期通胀忧虑。


Second, a massive wave of liquidity, via easy monetary policy, is chasing assets, including commodities, which may eventually stoke inflation further.	第二，由于银根过度宽松，一波流动性大潮正在满世界追捧资产，其中也包括大宗商品，这有可能最终推高通胀。


Third, dollar-funded carry trades are pushing the US dollar sharply down, and there is an inverse relation between the value of the dollar and the dollar price of commodities: the lower the dollar, the higher the dollar price of oil, energy, and other commodities – including gold.	第三，套息交易（carry trade，买入高息��币而卖出低息货币，将买入的高息货币存入该国银行，以赚取其中高于低息货币国家的利息的一种市场投机行为——译者）带动美元迅速走软，而美元汇率同以美元计价的大宗商品价格之间又存在一种负相关关系，即美元汇率越低，以美元计价的石油、能源和其他大宗商品的价格就越高，包括黄金价格。


Fourth, the global supply of gold – both existing and newly produced – is limited, and demand is rising faster than it can be met.	第四，不论是从存量和增量来讲，全球范围内的黄金供给都是很有限的，而需求的增长远远高于供给的增长。


Some of this demand is coming from central banks, such as those of India, China, and South Korea.	一部分需求来自各国中央银行，例如印度、中国和韩国的央行。


And some of it is coming from private investors, who are using gold as a hedge against what remain low-probability “tail” risks (high inflation and another near-depression caused by a double-dip recession).	另一部分则来自一些私人投资者，他们用黄金来对冲概率虽小但一旦发生损失很大的所谓“肥尾”风险（例如高通胀、经济二次触底导致准通胀等等）。


Indeed, investors increasingly want to hedge against such risks early on.	的确，投资者趁早对冲此类风险的心态有所加强。


Given the inelastic supply of gold, even a small shift in the portfolios of central banks and private investors towards gold increases its price significantly.	而且，由于黄金供应缺乏弹性，各国央行和私人投资者只要稍稍调整一下资产配置，就会对金价产生显著影响。


Finally, sovereign risk is rising – consider the troubles faced by investors in Dubai, Greece, and other emerging markets and advanced economies.	最后，主权风险在加剧——在迪拜、希腊和其他一些新兴市场乃至发达经济体投资的人眼下正是焦头烂额，看看他们就知道啥叫主权风险了。


This has revived concerns that governments may be unable to backstop a too-big-to-save financial system.	这些例子也再度加剧市场忧虑，担心各国政府无力为大到救不了的金融体系担保。


But, since gold has no intrinsic value, there are significant risks of a downward correction.	但是，黄金毕竟缺乏内在价值，因此市场向下调整的风险巨大。


Eventually, central banks will need to exit quantitative easing and zero-interest rates, putting downward pressure on risky assets, including commodities.	各国央行终将择机退出量化宽松和零利率阶段，这会对高风险资产包括大宗商品资产价格形成向下压力。


Or the global recovery may turn out to be fragile and anemic, leading to a rise in bearish sentiment on commodities – and in bullishness about the US dollar.	此外，全球经济复苏有可能是脆弱乏力的，这会导致大宗商品市场的熊市情绪，并加强美元的看多预期。


Another downside risk is that the dollar-funded carry trade may unravel, crashing the global asset bubble that it, together with the wave of monetary liquidity, has caused.	另一大风险是，美元套息交易之路可能会走到尽头，而由美元套息交易会同流动性货币化一起推高的资产泡沫可能会崩溃。


And, since the carry trade and the wave of liquidity are causing a global asset bubble, some of gold’s recent rise is also bubble-driven, with herding behavior and “momentum trading” by investors pushing gold higher and higher.	在一定程度上，金价最近的升势也是泡沫，投资者的跟风和追涨行为把金价越推越高。


But all bubbles eventually burst.	但是，是泡沫终究会破。


The bigger the bubble, the greater the collapse.	泡沫越大，跌得越惨。


The recent rise in gold prices is only partially justified by fundamentals.	近期金价的上升只能从基本面得到部分支持。


Nor is it clear why investors should stock up on gold if the global economy dips into recession again and concerns about a near depression and rampant deflation rise sharply.	再退一步讲，就算投资者真的担心全球经济面临二次触底风险，担心准萧条和恶性通胀，把宝押在黄金上也未见得是明智的。


If you truly fear a global economic meltdown, you should stock up on guns, canned food, and other commodities that you can actually use in your log cabin.	如果你对全球经济大崩溃的害怕挥之不去，你应该趁早准备一个求生小屋，储备枪支弹药、罐头食品和其他一些你能用得到的东西。


The Goldstone Reversal	戈德斯通大逆转


NEW YORK – Justice Richard Goldstone was condemned by many apologists for Israel’s human-rights record for his conclusion that Israel intentionally targeted Palestinian civilians as a matter of policy during the 2008-9 Gaza war.	纽约——理查德·戈德斯通法官因判决指出以色列在2008－09年加沙战争期间政策性地故意把巴勒斯坦平民作为攻击目标而受到很多以色列人权记录捍卫者的指责。


Goldstone’s United Nations-backed report accused both Israelis and Palestinians of war crimes, and called on both sides to investigate, prosecute, and punish their own personnel.	以联合国为后盾的戈德斯通报告指控以巴双方均犯有战争罪，并呼吁交战双方对己方人员进行调查、起诉和惩罚。


The Israeli government reacted furiously to Goldstone’s efforts.	戈德斯通的做法让以色列政府火冒三丈。


Now he is being condemned by some critics of Israel’s human rights record for retracting his finding of intentionality.	现在他又因收回故意袭击的结论而遭到以色列人权记录批评者的谴责。


The controversy illustrates the care that is required in publishing human-rights reports.	这场风波表明公布人权报告时需要采取慎重的态度。


What is not in dispute about the “Goldstone Report” is the fact-finding on which its conclusions are based.	“戈德斯通报告” 结论所依据的事实部分是没有争议的。


In difficult circumstances, and with no cooperation from the Israeli government, Goldstone documented in substantial detail a large number of Israeli attacks that killed many hundreds of civilians, injured thousands, and destroyed a significant part of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure.	在完全得不到以色列政府配合的困难情况下，戈德斯通翔实地记录了大量以色列袭击行动，上述行动杀害了数百名平民，导致数千平民受伤，并毁坏了加沙大部分民用基础设施。


Goldstone also documented attacks against Israeli civilians by Hamas, and did not restrict himself to a discussion of the notorious rockets indiscriminately fired from Gaza.	戈德斯通也记录了哈马斯对以色列平民发起的攻击，而且记录内容不仅限于讨论从加沙胡乱发射的臭名昭著的火箭弹。


Goldstone included in his report a detailed discussion of Hamas’s seizure of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and its refusal even to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to see him.	戈德斯通在报告中详细记录了哈马斯扣押以色列士兵吉拉德·沙利特事件，该组织甚至拒绝国际红十字会的探望要求。


It is extremely difficult to prove a policy of intentionality when conducting human rights investigations.	在人权调查中证明存在政策故意性难度极大。


That is why Human Rights Watch, which covered much of the same ground as Goldstone in its own reporting on Gaza – and was also vigorously denounced by apologists for Israeli human rights abuses – did not reach such a conclusion.	这也是加沙报告内容与戈德斯通大体相似的人权观察组织没有做出上述结论的理由，这家组织也受到以色列人权批评者的强烈谴责。


But that does not make it wrong for a seasoned investigator like Goldstone, reviewing the evidence that he collected, to infer intentionality from the pattern and quantity of abuses.	但这并不能证明像戈德斯通这样的资深调查员在审核所搜集证据的基础上，从侵权事件的模式和数量中得出的故意性结论是错的。


In certain cases, the evidence requires a judgment on such a question.	有些情况下，证据要求对上述问题做出判断。


The original Goldstone Report could have limited its conclusory judgment to an assertion that Israel did not meet its obligation under the international laws of armed conflict to take all feasible measures to minimize harm to civilians.	戈德斯通提交的原始报告本可以只做出以色列没有在武装冲突中履行国际法规定义务，采取一切措施尽可能减少对平民伤害的论断。


Yet, because Goldstone went further and found a policy of intentionality, before revising that judgment, he should have insisted on additional evidence that his finding was not warranted.	但因为戈德斯通进一步指出了政策的故意性，在改变结论之前，他本该继续寻找仅凭之前的调查结果无法得出的其他证据。


Instead, Goldstone says that his revised judgment is based on the fact that “Israel has dedicated significant resources to investigate over 400 allegations of operational misconduct in Gaza.”	相反，戈德斯通却说改变结论只是因为“以色列花费大量人力物力调查400多起加沙不当行为指控。 ”


That sounds impressive.	这就很有意思了。


Yet, to my knowledge, none of those investigations so far has resulted in the criminal prosecution and punishment of any Israeli soldier or official for a human-rights abuse committed against a civilian in Gaza.	但据我所知，那些调查目前还没有导致任何以色列官兵因侵犯加沙平民人权而受到指控和惩罚。


Only three have resulted in indictments.	只有三起案件进入到诉讼程序。


Moreover, there is no indication that any of the Israeli investigations address questions of policy.	此外，也没有任何迹象表明以色列的调查活动涉及到政策层面。


In other words, Goldstone’s retraction is either not warranted by the evidence on which he says that he now relies, or it is premature.	换句话说，戈德斯的看法改变或者并非依据他自称所掌握的证据，或者并非在时机成熟的情况下所采取的举措。


At the very least, it alleviates much of the pressure on the Israeli authorities to go forward with good-faith prosecutions.	最低限度它消解了以色列当局启动诚意指控的大部分压力。


It would have been better to wait for the outcome of the Israeli authorities’ investigations.	如果等以色列当局的调查结果出来可能取得更好的效果。


The most important part of human-rights reporting is collecting the facts of abuses accurately.	人权报告的核心问题是准确搜集侵权事实。


This must be done fairly, so that disproportionate focus on one side’s abuses does not create distortions.	搜集证据时要确保公平，才不会因过度关注其中一方的侵权行为而歪曲事实。


And it must be done as quickly as is consistent with accuracy and fairness, so that the information can be used effectively to help prevent additional abuses.	在保证准确和公平的同时还必须尽快，这样才能有效利用搜集到的信息防止发生其他侵害事件。


In withdrawing his conclusion that there was a policy of intentional targeting of civilians by Israel, Goldstone has not said that his judgment, based on the evidence before him at the time, was wrong.	在撤回以色列政策故意袭击平民的结论时，戈德斯通并没有承认根据当时证据所做出的判断是错的。


Rather, he has said that subsequent investigations by the Israeli authorities have made him change his judgment.	他反而说是以色列当局的后续调查改变了他的看法。


The evidence available to him and to us about those investigations is clearly too paltry to warrant such a shift.	戈德斯通和我们掌握的有关调查证据导致这样的立场转变显然过于苍白了。


In recanting on this basis, Goldstone conveys to the Israelis that they can receive absolution from a highly respected voice of the international community by making a show of investigations.	在这种情况下公开放弃原则，戈德斯通告诉以色列人他们可以借上演调查秀获得德高望重的国际机构的赦免。


Yet his distinguished record in ensuring that human-rights abuses are reported fairly and accurately remains untarnished.	同时他自己确保公正准确报告侵权行为的光荣记录也能够得以保持。


The Good Fallout from Iraq	来自伊拉克的正面影响


Reconciling morals with how a society is organized - in other words, reconciling ethics with politics - is one of humanity's oldest ambitions.	使道德与社会的组织方式和解-换句话说，使道德规范与政治和解-是人类最古老的雄心壮志之一。


Hammurabi, Raamses II, Solon, Confucius, and Pericles were among the first great figures to embark on this effort.	汉莫拉比、拉莫斯二世、梭伦、孔夫子和伯里克利都是致力于达成这一目标的伟大先行者。


The emergence of the nation-state in the eighteenth century, and the extreme level of barbarism reached in the twentieth century, may have created the impression that an ethical politics was an unrealizable dream, or that it was a dream growing ever more distant as it receded into the future.	单一民族国家在18世纪的出现和暴虐在20世纪的登峰造极可能使人们认为伦理政治是一个无法实现的或日渐迷失在未来之中的梦想。


Yet, despite the rivalry of nations and the bloodiness of modern warfare, democracy is spreading.	然而，尽管有国家之间的竞争和现代战争的血腥，民主还是在散播着。


Indeed, in but half a century, Latin Americans rid themselves of all of that continent's military and civilian dictatorships, and Africa has eliminated more than half of the despots that have blighted its era of independence.	的确，在仅仅半个世纪的时间里，拉丁美洲就推翻了这块大陆上所有军事和文官的独裁统治，非洲也铲除了毁灭其独立时代的半数的暴君。


Compared with all the other political regimes known to mankind, democracy represents ethical progress twice over: first, because it is based on respect for human rights; and secondly, because the universal suffrage that modern democracy embraces prohibits neglecting or oppressing minorities.	与人类所知的其他所有政体相比，民主代表着两方面的超越性进步：首先，因为它是建立在尊重人权的基础之上； 其次，因为现代民主所倡导的普选权禁止忽视或压迫少数派。


Of course, progress towards more democracy and morality in international public affairs remains extremely slow.	当然，国际公共事务在民主和道德方向上的进展仍然十分缓慢。


Yet the year 2004 may leave to history some of the greatest progress in this area that humanity has seen.	但2004年可能会在历史上书写一笔人类至今在这方面最大的进步。


Signs of hope and progress abound.	希望和进步的迹象层出不穷。


A Spanish government was overthrown because it lied to its public about the origin of the terrorist bombs that ripped apart Madrid's train station last spring.	一届西班牙政府因为向公众谎报了去年春天马德里火车站恐怖炸弹袭击的原由而被推翻。


Tony Blair and George W. Bush are having huge problems with their electorates, also because they lied about the reasons they gave to justify their war in Iraq.	布莱尔和布什同样由于在出兵伊拉克的原因方面撒谎而在争取选民上遇到了大问题。


Democracy is alive and well in the developing world, too.	民主在发展中国家也是方兴未艾。


The electoral process in Indonesia is reaching a level of equity and accountability hitherto unknown in that country.	印度尼西亚的大选程序的公正和有效达到了该国前所未有的水平。


Morocco and Algeria are working to strengthen women's rights.	摩洛哥和阿尔及利亚正努力加强女性的权利。


Turkey has committed itself to a vast legislative effort to improve human rights, freedom of thought, treatment of prisoners, and civilian control over the military.	土耳其启动了庞大的立法程序以改善其在人权、思想自由、囚犯待遇和军队的文官控制方面的现状。


Even China, though highly insensitive to democratic principles, is discovering, with the dangerous spread of AIDS, an obligation to listen to popular clamor, and the need for public support to justify government actions.	甚至连对民主原则高度迟钝的中国在艾滋病蔓延的过程中也发现了倾听公众呼声的义务和为政府行为赢得公众支持的必要性。


The US, owing to its horrific treatment and torture of prisoners in Baghdad, has had no option but to search for international legitimacy after denying and defying it for so long, in order to extricate itself from the chaos and drama of what is now Iraq.	美国由于在巴格达的虐囚事件也不得不寻求国际社会的谅解以求从伊拉克目前的混乱闹剧中解脱出来。 而在此之前，美国长期以来一直对国际合法性持拒绝和挑衅的态度。


Israel has seen both the legitimacy of its "security wall," as well as the wall's proposed path through Palestinian territory, called into question - differently, but in a parallel manner - by both its own Supreme Court and by the International Court of Justice in The Hague.	以色列的"安全墙"和其穿越巴勒斯坦领土的计划路线的合法性受到了来自本国最高法院和海牙国际法庭的不同方式的同时质询。


Israel will not be able to ignore completely the rulings of either court.	以色列不能对两个法院的裁决完全置之不理。


In replacing the Organization of African Unity with the African Union, Africa, for its part, is making a huge effort to control conflict on the continent, as well as to spread observance of human rights and pursue the struggle against poverty.	对非洲而言，以非洲联盟代替非洲统一组织是在控制该大陆上的争端，贯彻尊重人权的理念和继续反贫困反面的巨大努力。


Moreover, capitalism itself is feeling pressure in every direction.	此外，资本主义本身也感受到了来自各方面的压力。


It sees ever increasing anger against bloated payments to bosses, risky speculation, and outright fraud.	它感到了人们对老板膨胀的薪酬、高风险的投机和明目张胆的欺诈行为日益增长的愤懑。


The creation of the International Criminal Court strengthens all of these efforts to bring abuses of power by the powerful to book.	国际刑事法庭的创建强化了将强权者滥用权力的行为绳之以法的努力。


So, despite the Iraq war and the seeming impotence of world institutions, the beginning of the twenty-first century could well bring faster global improvement in political ethics than at any time in the past.	因此，虽然有伊拉克战争和国际机构的无能，21世纪的开端可能会在政治伦理方面带来比在以往任何时候都要迅速的全球性进步。


But for this trend to truly take hold, good politics needs something more than morals alone.	但要这种趋势成为真正的潮流，良好的政治局面需要的不仅仅是道德。


States must begin to explain their toughest actions, those deeds that the search for security and the inevitable mistrust among states make necessary.	所有国家都必须开始解释其为了国家安全和由于国与国之间的不信任而必须采取的强硬行动。


"Reason of State" will not disappear entirely.	"国家理性（Reason of State）" 不会完全消失。


But for democracy to continue its march of ethical progress, reasons of state must be submitted to greater public accountability and justification.	但要让民主继续其道德进步，国家理性 必须服从更大程度上的公众义务和理由。


The Gospel According to Gates	盖茨眼中的福音


Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, the richest and second richest person in America, and perhaps the world, are often described as admirers of Andrew Carnegie’s famous 1889 essay “The Gospel of Wealth.”	比尔·盖茨和埃伦·巴菲特名列美国富豪第一和第二，可能也是全球富豪前两名。 他们时常被人说成是卡内基著名的1889年“财富的福音”一文的崇拜者。


Carnegie’s treatise, an American classic, provides a moral justification for the concentration of wealth that capitalism tends to create by arguing that immense wealth leads to well-spent charitable contributions and support of the arts and sciences.	卡内基的这篇论文是美国经典之作。 它认为大量财富可以导向慈善捐款的善举以及对艺术和科学的支持，因而为资本主义所趋向创造的财富集中提供道义上的理由。


In short, Carnegie thought that great personal wealth leads to great civilizations.	简而言之，卡内基认为，巨大的个人财富导致伟大的文明。


”The Gospel of Wealth” is based on the premise that business competition results in “survival of the fittest” – the fittest being those endowed with the most “talent for organization.”	“财富的福音”一文是建立在导致“适者生存”的商业竞争的前提之上。 所谓适者，就是那些具备最佳“组织才能”的人。


Carnegie argued that those who thrive in business and acquire huge personal fortunes are better at judging how the world really works, and thus are better qualified to judge where resources should be directed.	卡内基认为，那些在商界脱颖而出并获得巨大个人财富的人比别人更加能够判断世界的运转方式以及应当将资源导向哪里。


Successful people, according to Carnegie, should retire from business while they still retain those talents and devote their remaining years to spending their fortunes on philanthropy.	卡内基认为，成功人士是应当在他们仍然具备那些才能的时候从商界引退，并且把他们的余生致力于为慈善事业散财。


Carnegie also advocated an inheritance tax as an incentive, arguing that it would “induce the rich man to attend to the administration of wealth during his life.”	卡内基还支持设立遗产税作为一种激励。 他为此解释说，这将“引导富人们注意在世的时候管理财富”。


Encouraging the rich to spend their fortunes on good causes while still alive, Carnegie maintained, is far better than leaving the disposition of their wealth to the care of their (probably untalented) children.	卡内基认为，鼓励富人们在世的时候把他们的钱财花在良好的事业上要比把其财富交给他们（可能才能平平的）子女管理好得多。


Last month, Bill Gates announced that he will do what Carnegie recommended: in two years, he will change his priorities so that he can work full time for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which he and his wife founded.	上个月，盖茨宣布他将实践卡内基的建议，也就是说，他将在两年内改变他的工作重点，这样就可以为他和他的夫人创办的比尔和梅林达·盖茨基金会全职工作。


Even earlier than Carnegie, who quit at 65, Gates will devote his life to spending his huge fortune on philanthropy.	卡内基65岁退休，而盖茨则比他还要早，将他的生命贡献给把他的巨大财富用于慈善事业。


Warren Buffett, by contrast, is 76, so he has missed his chance to apply his talents to running a charitable foundation.	和盖茨相比，埃伦·巴菲特今年76岁，已经错过了把他的才能用于管理慈善基金会的机会。


But, by leaving the bulk of his fortune, approximately $31 billion, to the Gates Foundation, he will have done the next best thing.	但是，他通过将大约310亿美元，也就是其财富的绝大部分捐赠给盖茨基金会，也就做了退而求其次的善举。


Bill Gates is a controversial figure, but few doubt that he is smart.	盖茨是一个富有争议的人物，但是很少有人怀疑他很聪明。


Even so, whereas Carnegie’s theory makes some sense (which is why his essay is remembered so well more than a century later), it isn’t obvious that he was right to believe that successful business people are the best administrators of charitable foundations.	卡内基的理论不无道理（这也是为什么过了一百多年人们还是清楚地记得他的文章），他相信成功的商业人士是慈善基金会最好的管理者。 他的这一信条是否正确尚不得而知。


Useful traits in business, like aggressiveness or political savvy, might be poorly suited to philanthropy.	生意上的某些有用的特性，例如积极进取或者政治上敏感，对于慈善事业而言可能并不适合。


Likewise, running a foundation may well require studying social problems or the arts and sciences – activities that may not accord with former capitalists’ inclinations and talents.	同样地，管理一个慈善机构可能会要求研究社会问题或者艺术和科学，这些活动可能与前任资本家的意向和才能并不吻合。


The deeper flaw in Carnegie’s theory may be that it is just too difficult psychologically for business people to make the mid-life career transition to philanthropy.	卡内基理论中更为深刻的缺陷在于，工商界人士人到中年后把事业转移到慈善事业在心理上可能过于困难。


Having accumulated great wealth as “survivors” of the business world, will they really turn their talents to the task of giving it away?	他们在商场上作为“适者”积累了巨大的财富，真的会把他们的才能转向散财吗？


Regardless of whether Gates lives up to his promise, are people like him the exception that proves the rule?	无论盖茨是否履行诺言，像他这样的人们是否证明这一规则的例外呢？


It is easy to be skeptical that his example will spur a new wave of early retirements to run philanthropies.	他的这一榜样之举是否会引发提前退休并经营慈善组织的浪潮还是令人怀疑。


The public-spirited justification of the concentration of wealth offered in “The Gospel of Wealth” has more support in the United States than elsewhere, which reflects Americans’ relatively greater admiration of business people.	“财富的福音”一文所包含的、为财富集中提出的基于公众精神的理由在美国得到了比其他地方更多的支持。 这反映了美国人对工商界人士相对更高的敬重。


But Carnegie’s argument never became received doctrine even in America, because most people reject the view that rich business people are smarter and morally superior.	但是，卡内基的论点即使在美国都从来没有成为广为接受的信念，因为，大多数人拒绝这一观点，即有钱的工商人士更为聪明并在道德上更为高尚。


Certainly, Gates and Buffett claim nothing of the sort.	当然，盖茨和巴菲特并不宣称拥有这些东西。


Similarly, even in America, movies and TV shows do not dramatize the lives of great tycoon philanthropists.	同样地，即使在美国，电影和电视节目并不将巨商富贾慈善家的生活戏剧化。


Americans, like everyone else, prefer portrayals of business people who are truly evil and in the end receive their just deserts.	正如其他人一样，美国人更为喜欢把工商人士描绘成为十足邪恶之徒并在最后得到报应。


And yet there is more charitable giving in the US than in other countries, reflecting a greater sense in America that private benevolence is an obligation.	美国的慈善捐款要比其他国家都多，这反映了美国的一种更为强烈的信念，那就是个人乐善好施是一种义务。


According to the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, headed by Lester Salamon, the US leads major countries in private contributions to nonprofits.	根据莱斯特·萨勒门领导的约翰·霍普金斯大学比较非营利部门研究项目的数据，美国在非营利机构的私人捐款上领先于其他主要国家。


Excluding donations to churches, such contributions amount to 1% of GDP in the U.S., which is six times higher than in Germany or Japan, and 30 times higher than in Mexico.	不计教会捐款，这些捐款占美国国民生产总值的1％，是德国或日本的六倍，比墨西哥要高出30倍。


However, 1% of GDP is still not a very big number, and the Gates Foundation, with about $60 billion after Buffett’s bequest, now accounts for a substantial share of the total.	但是，国民生产总值的1％仍然不是一个很高的数字。 盖茨基金会在巴菲特捐款后资产达到600亿美元，占据总数的很大份额。


Of course, Gates and Buffett deserve praise, and we should certainly wish them well.	当然，盖茨和巴菲特值得称颂，而且我们当然应当祝愿他们。


But we should not yet consider their example a vindication of “The Gospel of Wealth.”	但是我们还是不应当把他们的例子视为是证明“财富的福音”的正确。


The Gospel of Growth	增长福音


CANBERRA/SEOUL – Almost four years after the start of the global financial crisis, the world economy remains fragile and unemployment is unacceptably high.	堪培拉/首尔—全球金融危机爆发已经四年了，世界经济仍然十分脆弱，失业率仍然高居难以承受的书评。


There are roughly 200 million unemployed people worldwide, including nearly 75 million young people.	全世界大约有2亿人找不到工作，包括近7500万年轻人。


Growth is weakening in many countries, risks are mounting, and uncertainty has intensified, owing especially to events in Europe.	许多国家的增长都在疲软，风险都在增加，不确定性都在恶化，欧洲发生的一系列事件难逃干系。


Only swift and sustained recovery can stem the rise in the human cost of economic stagnation.	只有快速且可持续的复苏可以阻止经济停滞的人道成本继续攀升。


When the G-20 meets in Los Cabos, Mexico, on June 18-19, its challenge will be to shift public perceptions from pessimism and concern about the future to an optimistic mindset of growth and stability.	G20将于6月18—19日在墨西哥洛斯卡沃斯召开会议，这次会议的挑战是将公共认知从对未来的悲观和忧虑引导为对增长和稳定的乐观。


We need resolute action to address the uncertainty confronting the global economy and to chart a path toward self-sustaining recovery and job creation.	我们需要采取果断措施消除全球经济所面临的不确定性，并绘出自我可持续复苏和就业创造的蓝图。


We see two components to such a strategy.	我们认为，这个战略由两个部分组成。


First, we need a clear message from Europe – the immediate source of global economic concern – that it is taking decisive steps to stabilize and strengthen its banks, and that it is focused on restoring growth while credibly committing itself to fiscal consolidation.	首先，欧洲必须给出明确的信息——这是全球经济最为紧迫的忧虑原因，让我们知道它正在采取果断行动稳定和巩固其银行，并在做出可信财政整合承诺的同时专注于重塑增长。


A crucial element of restoring confidence in Europe is agreement on a “roadmap” for the eurozone to underpin its monetary union with a fiscal union and a banking union, including pan-European supervision and deposit insurance.	欧洲重塑信心的一大关键要素是就欧元区“路线图”问题达成一致，以财政联盟和银行联盟（包括泛欧洲监督和存款保险机制）巩固其货币联盟。


It is essential that Europe move quickly to ensure that its banks are adequately capitalized and backstopped.	一个关键点是欧洲迅速行动，确保其银行资本充足、并有强力支撑。


In this regard, we welcome the recent decision by Spain to seek financial assistance from the European Union to recapitalize its banks as required.	在这个问题上，我们欢迎西班牙最近寻求欧盟协助其对银行进行必要资本重组的决定。


Decisive steps to safeguard the banking sector’s health are necessary not only to reduce some of the risks that are preoccupying markets, but also because healthy financial institutions are vital for economic growth.	保卫银行部门健康的果断措施之所以必不可少，不但是因为这样能够减轻困扰市场的风险，也因为健康的金融机构是经济增长的基石。


Europe must have credible fiscal-consolidation plans to restore debt sustainability, but it is also essential that it has a growth strategy that includes policies aimed at boosting investment, freeing up product and labor markets, deregulating business, promoting competition, and building skills.	欧洲必须出台可信的财政整合计划以重塑债务可持续性，但包括旨在提振投资、解放产品和劳动力市场、减少商业监管、促进竞争以及培养技能的政策在内的增长战略也是必不可少的。


These reforms, including deeper institutional integration, will be politically difficult and their benefits will take time to become fully apparent; but setting a clear pathway will underpin public confidence in Europe’s long-term growth and cooperation.	这些改革——包括深化制度一体化——在政治上困难重重，且其好处要很长时间才能完全显露； 但制定明确路线图能提振公众对欧洲长期增长和合作的信心。


We do not underestimate the magnitude of the reforms that Europe has achieved in recent years.	我们并没有低估欧洲在近几年来所取得的改革成就。


Since the G-20’s meeting at Cannes last November, for example, Europe has increased its financial firewalls by €200 billion ($252 billion), restructured Greek debt, taken steps towards strengthening its banks and banking regulations, established rules for fiscal discipline, and implemented a range of labor- and product-market reforms.	比如，去年11月G20戛纳峰会以来，欧洲将金融防火墙的规模增加了2000亿欧元，对希腊债务进行了重组，并采取了诸多措施强化其银行和银行监管，制定了财政纪律规则，并实施了一系列劳动力和产品市场改革。


But the magnitude of the challenges confronting Europe implies an urgent need for far more decisive reforms.	但欧洲所面临的挑战极其艰巨，迫切要求它采取更加果断的改革。


We are confident that Europe will act together to meet these challenges, and we will continue to support such efforts, because European stability and growth matter for us all.	我们有信心，欧洲会团结起来共同行动应对这些挑战，我们也将继续支持欧洲的努力，因为欧洲稳定和增长与我们所有人息息相关。


Second, we need a clear message from the G-20 that all of its members are delivering policies for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.	其次，G20需要给出明确的信号，所有成员都会出台强有力、可持续的平衡增长政策。


To be meaningful, the message must be backed up with action: G-20 members must demonstrate that their policies are clearly directed toward restoring economic growth and creating jobs, and that they will be accountable for meeting their commitments in full.	光说不练假把式，G20给出的信号必须有行动支持：其成员国必须证明它们的政策明确指向重塑经济增长和就业创造，证明它们愿意就完全履行承诺接受监督。


And world leaders must be unambiguous about resisting protectionism and opening trade and investment.	世界领导人必须明确无误地反对保护主义，开放贸易和投资。


In particular, we believe that an international agreement on trade facilitation is the right step, as it would reduce export and import costs and restore momentum to global trade liberalization.	特别地，我们认为应该达成便利贸易的国际协议，因为这能减轻进出口成本、形成全球贸易自由化趋势。


The G-20 must demonstrate in Los Cabos that reform of the International Monetary Fund is continuing.	G20必须在洛斯卡沃斯证明，IMF改革将继续深化。


That means that countries must deliver on their commitment to increase IMF resources by more than $430 billion, and that the Fund’s quota and governance structure must reflect the ongoing global shifts in economic influence.	这意味着各国必须兑现让IMF资源增加4300亿美元的承诺，IMF投票和治理结构必须反映全球经济影响力的变迁。


Economic growth and new jobs are crucial to improving people’s livelihoods now and to ensuring the prosperity of future generations.	经济增长和就业创造是改善当下人民生活水平、确保子孙后代繁荣的关键。


The reforms needed to secure these objectives are not easy, and change will not happen overnight.	保证这些目标的改革绝不会轻松，改变也不可能在一夜之间形成。


But the world expects the G-20 to deliver.	但全世界都在期望G20交出满意的答卷。


The Great American Mirage	美国大幻象


NEW HAVEN – In September 1998, during the depths of the Asian financial crisis, Alan Greenspan, the United States Federal Reserve’s chairman at the time, had a simple message: the US is not an oasis of prosperity in an otherwise struggling world.	纽黑文—1998年9月，在亚洲金融危机最危险的时候，时任美联储主席格林斯潘的立场很简单：在步履蹒跚的世界中，美国无法成为繁荣的绿洲。


Greenspan’s point is even closer to the mark today than it was back then.	时至今日，格林斯潘的观点比当时还要正确。


Yes, the US economy has been on a weak recovery trajectory over the past three years.	诚然，美国经济在过去三年中已经走上了疲软复苏的轨道。


But at least it’s a recovery, claim many – and therefore a source of ongoing resilience in an otherwise struggling developed world.	但很多人都认为，无论如何至少在复苏，在发达世界步履蹒跚的环境下，美国称得上坚韧之源。


Unlike the Great Recession of 2008-2009, today there is widespread hope that America has the capacity to stay the course and provide a backstop for the rest of the world in the midst of the euro crisis.	与2008—2009年的大衰退不同，如今，人们普遍希望美国有能力成为中流砥柱，为世界提供支持，战胜欧元危机。


Think again.	让我们深思一番。


Since the first quarter of 2009, when the US economy was bottoming out after its worst postwar recession, exports have accounted for fully 41% of the subsequent rebound.	2009年一季度，美国经济在战后最严重的衰退中触底，此后，出口在此轮反弹中贡献了足足41%。


That’s right: with the American consumer on ice in the aftermath of the biggest consumption binge in history, the US economy has drawn its sustenance disproportionately from foreign markets.	这就对了：在经历了历史上最大的消费狂欢后，美国消费者再也无力回天，美国经济需要大量依靠外国市场过活。


With those markets now in trouble, the US could be quick to follow.	现如今外国市场麻烦重重，美国可能很快也无法独善其身。


Three regions have collectively accounted for 83% of America’s export-led growth impetus over the past three years – Asia, Latin America, and Europe.	亚洲、拉美和欧洲加起来要占美国过去3年出口导向增长势头的83%。


(Since regional and country trade statistics assembled by the US Department of Commerce are not seasonally adjusted, all subsequent comparisons are presented on the basis of a comparable seasonal comparison from the first quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2012.)	（美国商务部所做的地区和国家贸易统计并不进行季节调整，以下比较均以2009年一季度至2012年一季度可比季节比较为基础。 ）


Not surprisingly, Asia led the way, accounting for 33% of the total US export surge over the past three years.	毫不奇怪，亚洲在其中首屈一指，贡献了美国过去三年出口增加量的33%。


The biggest source of this increase came from the 15-percentage-point contribution of Greater China (the People’s Republic, Taiwan, and Hong Kong).  Needless to say, China’s unfolding slowdown – even under the soft-landing scenario that I still believe is most credible – is taking a major toll on the largest source of America’s export revival.	其中最大的需求源是贡献了15个百分点的大中华区。 不消说，中国的日渐减速——即使是我相信最有可能出现的软着陆情形——正在威胁美国最大的出口复兴源。


The remainder of the Asian-led US export impetus is spread out, led by South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan – all export-led economies themselves and all heavily dependent on a slowing China.	其他以亚洲为首的美国出口动力——特别是韩国、日本和中国台湾，它们本身都是出口导向经济，且严重依赖减速中的中国——也在受到影响。


Latin America provided the second-largest source of America’s export resurgence, accounting for another 28% of the total gains in US foreign sales over the past three years.	拉美是美国出口复兴的第二大源头，贡献了美国过去三年中对外销售的28%。


Brazil and Mexico collectively accounted for 19 percentage points of that increase.	巴西和墨西哥加起来贡献了出口增长的19个百分点。


Growth in both economies is now slowing significantly, especially in Brazil.	这两个国家的增长均在显著放缓，特别是巴西。


But, given the close linkages between Mexican production and US consumption (which is now sputtering again), any resilience in the Mexican economy could be short-lived.	但是，由于墨西哥生产和美国消费（目前复燃势头重现）之间存在紧密联系，其经济的任何反弹都不会长久。


Finally, there is the sad case of Europe, which has accounted for 21% of the cumulative growth in US exports over the past three years.	最后，欧洲（占美国过去三年累计出口增长的21%）的状况可谓悲惨。


Here, the US Commerce Department statistics are not as helpful in pinpointing the source of the impetus, because only a partial country list is published.	在欧洲问题上，美国商务部的统计数字在描绘动力源方面的效能要差一些，因为只有部分国家的数字被公布了。


What we do know is that the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – the so-called core economies – collectively accounted for just 3.5% of total US export growth since early 2009, with the UK grabbing the bulk of that increase.	我们所知道的是，英国、德国和法国——即所谓的核心国——加起来只贡献了美国2009年初至今总出口增长的3.


That suggests that most of America’s European export gain was concentrated in the region’s so-called peripheral economies.	5%，其中贡献最大的是英国。 这表明美国的欧洲出口增量集中于所谓的外围国。


And that is clearly a serious problem.	显然，这是一个严重的问题。


Forecasts are always hazardous, but some “what-if” scenarios shed considerable light on what all of this means for the world’s largest economy.	做预测总是有风险的，但不少“假定”情景有助于我们一窥世界第一大经济体的前途。


Since the second quarter of 2009, US annualized real GDP growth has averaged 2.4%.	2009年二季度以来，美国年化真实GDP增长率平均为2. 4%。


With roughly 40% of that increase attributable to exports, that means the remainder of the economy has grown at an anemic 1.4% pace.	其中大约40%由出口贡献，这意味着美国经济的其他部分增长率只有区区1. 4%。


Under a flat-line export scenario, with no rise in US exports, and if everything else remains the same (always a heroic assumption), overall real GDP growth would converge on that 1.4% bogey.	如果美国出口持平，即没有增长，且其他条件保持不变（相当大胆的假设），总体真实GDP将趋向1. 4%。


That is a weak growth trajectory by any standard – likely to result in rising unemployment and further deterioration in consumer confidence.	不管用什么标准衡量，这样的增长率都不可不谓疲软——可能造成失业增加和消费信心的进一步受损。


Alternatively, in a moderate export-downturn scenario, with real exports falling by 5% over a four-quarter period, real GDP growth could slip below the 1% “stall speed” threshold – leaving the US economy vulnerable to a recessionary relapse.	另一个情形是出口温和下降，在四个季度的时期内真实出口下降5%。 在该情形下，真实GDP增长将滑到1%的“失速速度”临界值之下，美国经济随时都有可能再现衰退。


By way of reference, the assumption of a 5% export downturn pales in comparison with the precipitous 13.6% decline in real exports that occurred in 2008-2009.	作为参考，5%出口下降的假设与2008—2009年期间所发生的真实出口猛降13. 6%一比只能算小巫见大巫。


As such, this “what if” is a cautiously optimistic assessment of the downside risks stemming from weak external demand.	这样说来，这一“假定”倒称得上对外部需求疲软导致的下行风险的谨慎乐观的估计了。


All of this underscores one of the more obvious, yet overlooked, implications of an increasingly interdependent world: we are all in it together.	所有这些都体现了日趋相互依赖的世界所带来的一大显而易见却被忽视的影响。 欧元危机是一次严重冲击，正在全世界制造连锁反应。


The euro crisis is a serious shock, and is now producing ripple effects around the world.	欧洲是出口导向的中国最大的外部需求源；


Europe is export-led China’s largest source of external demand; as China goes, so goes the rest of China-centric Asia; and, from there, the ripples reach the shores of an increasingly export-dependent US economy.	中国不好，以中国为中心的其他亚洲国家就不会好； 而从这里出发，反应环还将延伸到日渐依赖出口的美国经济。


As recent weakness in employment and retail sales suggests, that may already be happening.	最近的就业和零售数字的疲软状况显示，这一反馈环已经发生了作用。


Greenspan’s warning in 1998 came at a time when US exports accounted for only about 10.5% of GDP.	1998年格里斯潘发出警告时，出口只占美国GDP的10. 5%。


Today, that share stands at a record-high 14%, as post-crisis America has made a big bet on an export-led revival.	如今，随着后危机时代的美国将宝押在出口导向复苏，这一比重上升为历史最高的14%。


The current global slowdown is not on a par with what occurred in the late 1990’s or the more wrenching shocks of 3-4 years ago – at least not yet.	当前的全球减速与20世纪90年代末不同，与三四年前破坏性更大的冲击也不同（或至少还没有趋同的迹象）。


But today’s global downturn can hardly be dismissed as unimportant for the US or anyone else.	但绝不能认为当下的全球减速对美国或其他任何国家不重要。


In an era of globalization, there are no innocent bystanders.	在全球化的时代，没有人能充当独善其身的旁观者。


There are certainly no oases of prosperity in the face of yet another major shock in the global economy.	在面临全球经济出现又一次重大冲击的情况下，没有哪个国家可以称为繁荣的绿洲。


America’s growth mirage is an important case in point.	美国的增长幻象便是重要一课。


The Great Bank Robbery	银行大劫匪


NEW YORK – For the American economy – and for many other developed economies – the elephant in the room is the amount of money paid to bankers over the last five years.	纽约——对美国（以及其他许多发达国家）经济来说，一个显而易见的事实是，过去5年来，银行家得到了巨量资金。


For banks that have filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the sum stands at an astounding $2.2 trillion.	在美国，向美国证券与交易委员备案的银行所获得的资金多达惊人的2.


Extrapolating over the coming decade, the numbers would approach $5 trillion, an amount vastly larger than what both President Barack Obama’s administration and his Republican opponents seem willing to cut from further government deficits.	2万亿美元。 照此来算，在未来十年中，这一数字将达到5万亿美元，远远高于奥巴马总统及其共和党反对者所愿意削减的政府赤字数量。


That $5 trillion dollars is not money invested in building roads, schools, and other long-term projects, but is directly transferred from the American economy to the personal accounts of bank executives and employees.	这5万亿美元不会投资于公路、学校和其他长期项目，而是将直接从美国经济转入银行高管和职员的个人账户。


Such transfers represent as cunning a tax on everyone else as one can imagine.	如此转移支付与向其他所有人征税别无二致。


It feels quite iniquitous that bankers, having helped cause today’s financial and economic troubles, are the only class that is not suffering from them – and in many cases are actually benefiting.	银行家对如今的金融和经济困境有着不可推卸的责任，但却是唯一不用因危机遭受冲击的群体（从很大程度上讲，反而会因此受益），这真是天大的不公。


Mainstream megabanks are puzzling in many respects.	从跟多方面看，主流巨型银行是个谜团。


It is (now) no secret that they have operated so far as large sophisticated compensation schemes, masking probabilities of low-risk, high-impact “Black Swan” events and benefiting from the free backstop of implicit public guarantees.	（如今）人人都知道，它们运作着十分复杂的报酬机制，掩饰低概率、高影响的“黑天鹅”事件，并从隐性公共担保安全网中免费渔利。


Excessive leverage, rather than skills, can be seen as the source of their resulting profits, which then flow disproportionately to employees, and of their sometimes-massive losses, which are borne by shareholders and taxpayers.	过度负债，而不是高超的技艺，才是它们的利润源泉，雇员因此获得了高得离谱的报酬，而当它们出现巨额损失时，又有股东和纳税人替他们兜着。


In other words, banks take risks, get paid for the upside, and then transfer the downside to shareholders, taxpayers, and even retirees.	换句话说，银行们承担风险，成功了获得奖赏，失败风险则转移给了股东、纳税人甚至退休人士。


In order to rescue the banking system, the Federal Reserve, for example, put interest rates at artificially low levels; as was disclosed recently, it also has provided secret loans of $1.2 trillion to banks.	为了保卫银行体系，美联储将利率维持在人为的低水平； 而最新的披露表明，它还向银行提供了1.


The main effect so far has been to help bankers generate bonuses (rather than attract borrowers) by hiding exposures.	2万亿美元的秘密贷款。 到目前为止，这些措施的主要功能是替银行家隐瞒了风险暴露，从而获得巨额奖金（而不是吸引借款者）。


Taxpayers end up paying for these exposures, as do retirees and others who rely on returns from their savings.	最终为这些风险暴露掏腰包的是纳税人、退休者以及其他靠储蓄回报生活的人。


Moreover, low-interest-rate policies transfer inflation risk to all savers – and to future generations.	除此以外，低利率政策还将通胀风险转移给所有储蓄者以及下一代。


Perhaps the greatest insult to taxpayers, then, is that bankers’ compensation last year was back at its pre-crisis level.	或许最令纳税人感到不齿的是，银行家去年的薪酬已经回到了危机前的水平。


Of course, before being bailed out by governments, banks had never made any return in their history, assuming that their assets are properly marked to market.	当然，在被政府救援之前，如果银行资产价值被恰当地按市值计算，那么其资产将不会产生任何回报。


Nor should they produce any return in the long run, as their business model remains identical to what it was before, with only cosmetic modifications concerning trading risks.	从长期看，它们也不会产生回报，因为其业务模型与从前并无区别，无非是在粉饰交易风险。


So the facts are clear.	如此一来，真相已经显而易见了。


But, as individual taxpayers, we are helpless, because we do not control outcomes, owing to the concerted efforts of lobbyists, or, worse, economic policymakers.	但是，作为个体纳税人，我们根本毫无办法，因为在游说团体（甚至经济政策制定者）的一致行动面前，我们根本不能控制结果。


Our subsidizing of bank managers and executives is completely involuntary.	我们对银行管理层和高管的补贴完全是被逼无奈。


But the puzzle represents an even bigger elephant.	但这个谜团代表着更大的内幕。


Why does any investment manager buy the stocks of banks that pay out very large portions of their earnings to their employees?	为什么所有投资经理都在买入将利润的绝大部分用于给雇员发工资的银行股。


The promise of replicating past returns cannot be the reason, given the inadequacy of those returns.	复制过去回报的承诺绝不是理由，因为过去的回报根本就不怎么样。


In fact, filtering out stocks in accordance with payouts would have lowered the draw-downs on investment in the financial sector by well over half over the past 20 years, with no loss in returns.	事实上，若用薪酬来筛选股票，那么过去20年来对金融部门的投资应该有所降低，与此同时回报不会减少。


Why do portfolio and pension-fund managers hope to receive impunity from their investors?	为什么资产组合经理和退休基金经理希望他们的投资者对此毫无怨言？


Isn’t it obvious to investors that they are voluntarily transferring their clients’ funds to the pockets of bankers?	对投资者来说，这些经理们难道不是自己贴上去将客户的资金送到银行家的口袋中去的吗？


Aren’t fund managers violating both fiduciary responsibilities and moral rules?	基金经理难道没有违背信托责任和道德准则吗？


Are they missing the only opportunity we have to discipline the banks and force them to compete for responsible risk-taking?	他们丧失了约束银行、迫使他们争相合理承担风险的机会了吗？


It is hard to understand why the market mechanism does not eliminate such questions. A well-functioning market would produce outcomes that favor banks with the right exposures, the right compensation schemes, the right risk-sharing, and therefore the right corporate governance.	很难理解为何市场机制没有消除这些疑问��正常运转的市场应该产生这样的结果：风险暴露合理、薪酬机制对头、风险分担适度从而公司治理良好的银行应该获益。


One may wonder: If investment managers and their clients don’t receive high returns on bank stocks, as they would if they were profiting from bankers’ externalization of risk onto taxpayers, why do they hold them at all?	你也许会感到奇怪：如果投资经理及其客户不能在银行股上获得很高回报——如果他们从银行家将风险外部化到纳税人头上的过程中获利的话，回报应该很高才对——为什么他们还要死抱着银行股不放？


The answer is the so-called “beta”: banks represent a large share of the S&P 500, and managers need to be invested in them.	但就在于所谓的“贝塔”：银行代表着标普500的大头，投资经理必须投资银行股。


We don’t believe that regulation is a panacea for this state of affairs.	我们不相信有了监管就可以让这类事情一去不返。


The largest, most sophisticated banks have become expert at remaining one step ahead of regulators – constantly creating complex financial products and derivatives that skirt the letter of the rules.	最大、最老到的银行早就练成了道高一尺魔高一丈的本事——它们不断地创造可以绕过规则文字的复杂金融产品和衍生品。


In these circumstances, more complicated regulations merely mean more billable hours for lawyers, more income for regulators switching sides, and more profits for derivatives traders.	在这样的环境下，更复杂的监管规则的唯一意义是让律师赚更多的钱，让相关监管者赚更多的钱，让衍生品交易员赚更多的钱。


Investment managers have a moral and professional responsibility to play their role in bringing some discipline into the banking system.	投资经理应该给银行体系带去一些约束，这既是道德责任，也是职业责任。


Their first step should be to separate banks according to their compensation criteria.	为此，第一步应该是按薪酬标准区分各银行。


Investors have used ethical grounds in the past – excluding, say, tobacco companies or corporations abetting apartheid in South Africa – and have been successful in generating pressure on the underlying stocks.	过去，投资者使用过伦理标准——比如拒买烟草股和煽动种族隔离的南非股——并成功地给相关股票造成了压力。


Investing in banks constitutes a double breach – ethical and professional.	投资银行股具有两方面的意义——伦理的和职业的。


Investors, and the rest of us, would be much better off if these funds flowed to more productive companies, perhaps with an amount equivalent to what would be transferred to bankers’ bonuses redirected to well-managed charities.	如果基金将钱投资于生产率更高的公司，投资者以及我们其他人都将大大获益，或许这样还可以让本来流进银行家奖金池的资金悉数流入管理完善的慈善基金中去。


The Great Brain Race	高智商竞赛


WASHINGTON, DC – For decades, research universities in the United States have been universally acknowledged as the world’s leaders in science and engineering, unsurpassed since World War II in the sheer volume and excellence of the scholarship and innovation that they generate.	发自华盛顿特区——数十年以来，美国的研究型大学都被举世公认为科学和工程界的领头羊，自二战结束之后，这些学校无论在发表学术著作，培养学术大师以及创新方面的成就都傲视同侪。


But there are growing signs that the rest of the world is gaining ground fast – building new universities, improving existing ones, competing hard for the best students, and recruiting US-trained PhDs to return home to work in university and industry labs.	但如今，越来越多的迹象显示出其他国家的同行们也正奋起直追——他们兴建新的大学，提高原有院校的素质，争夺最优秀的学生，并征召那些在美国拿到博士学位的学者们回到国内高校和科研院所效力。


Is the international scholarly pecking order about to be overturned?	而这是否就意味着各国之间学术能力的强弱次序即将被颠覆呢？


There is no question that the academic enterprise has become increasingly global, particularly in the sciences.	毫无疑问，学术产业正越来越走向国际化，特别是在科学研究方面。


Nearly three million students now study outside their home countries – a 57% increase in the last decade.	如今大概有300万学生在国外求学——在过去十年内增长了57%。


Foreign students now dominate many US doctoral programs, accounting for 64% of PhDs in computer science, for example.	外国学生已经统治了许多美国博士研究项目，比如在计算机科学方面，64%的博士生都是外国人。


Tsinghua and Peking universities together recently surpassed Berkeley as the top sources of students who go on to earn American PhDs.	而如果把北京大学和清华大学两所高校加在一起的话，那么这个联合体最近已经成功超越了加州大学伯克利分校，成为攻读美国博士学位学生的最大来源了。


Half of the world’s top physicists no longer work in their native countries. And major institutions such as New York University and the University of Nottingham are creating branch campuses in the Middle East and Asia.	各大学的下属院系也没有闲着，如今全世界有一半的顶尖物理学家不在本国任教，而纽约大学和诺丁汉大学这样的知名学府也在中东和亚洲开办了分校。


There are now 162 satellite campuses worldwide, an increase of 43% in just the past three years.	事实上各大院校已经在全世界设立了162所分校，相比3年前激增了43%。


At the same time, growing numbers of traditional source countries for students, from South Korea to Saudi Arabia, are trying to improve both the quantity and quality of their own degrees, engaging in a fierce – and expensive – race to recruit students and create world-class research universities of their own.	而与此同时，韩国和沙特阿拉伯这样的传统留学生输出国都正努力增加和提高本国学术学位的数量和质量，奋力投身于一场激烈（且极为昂贵）的招募学生以及建设自身国际级科研大学的竞争当中。


All this competition has led to considerable hand-wringing in the West.	所有这些竞争都令西方感到了相当大的压力。


During a 2008 campaign stop, for instance, then-candidate Barack Obama spoke in alarmed tones about the threat that such academic competition poses to US competitiveness.	在2008年的某站大选活动中，当时还是候选人的奥巴马就以警告的口吻强调这类学术竞争可能会威胁到美国的竞争力。


“If we want to keep on building the cars of the future here in America,” he declared, “we can’t afford to see the number of PhDs in engineering climbing in China, South Korea, and Japan even as it’s dropped here in America.”	他当时是这样说的：“如果咱们将来还想让美国汽车工业维持下去的话，我们就不能无视工程类博士学位在中、日、韩这些国家的增长，即便这些学位都是在美国授予的。 ”


Nor are such concerns limited to the US.	不过担惊受怕的也不仅仅是美国。


In some countries, worries about educational competition and brain drains have led to outright academic protectionism.	在某些国家，对教育竞争和人才枯竭的忧虑已经导致了赤裸裸的学术保护主义。


India and China are notorious for the legal and bureaucratic obstacles they place in front of Western universities that want to set up satellite campuses catering to local students.	印度和中国都在西方大学设立分校的问题上设置了重重法律和行政障碍，并因此落下了坏名声。


And sometimes students who want to leave face barriers.	而一些试图出国留学的学生也受到了阻挠。


Several years ago, the president of one of the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology effectively banned undergraduates from accepting academic or business internships overseas.	在几年前，某所印度著名工程技术大学的校长就禁止本校学生取得涉及国外学术或者商科方面的实习机会。


There are other impediments to global mobility, too, not always explicitly protectionist, but all having the effect of limiting access to universities around the world.	同时，在人员的国际流动方面还存在着另外一些障碍，虽然不都是以保护主义的形式存在，但都起到了阻止学生奔赴全世界各大学府的作用。


In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, legitimate security concerns led to enormous student-visa delays and bureaucratic hassles for foreigners aspiring to study in the US.	比如说“9·11”事件爆发之后，安全方面的考虑就导致大量学生签证延迟并遭到政府部门的百般刁难。


Student numbers have since rebounded, despite intermittent problems, but there remain severe limits on work and residency visas, which should serve as an enticement for the best and brightest to study in the US.	虽然后来学生数量在磕磕碰碰中有所反弹，但在工作和居留签证方面依然卡得很死，而这两项签证却恰恰是吸引那些最优秀学生留学美国的最大诱惑。


Perhaps some of the anxiety over the new global academic enterprise is understandable, particularly in a period of massive economic uncertainty.	或许某些针对新全球学术产业的忧虑是可以理解的，尤其是在当今全球经济面临极大不确定性的时候。


But educational protectionism is as big a mistake as trade protectionism.	但教育保护主义其实跟贸易保护主义一样都是谬误之举。


The globalization of higher education should be embraced, not feared – including in the US.	高等教育的全球化应该得到欢迎，而非恐惧——包括在美国国内。


There is every reason to believe that the worldwide competition for human talent, the race to produce innovative research, the push to extend university campuses to multiple countries, and the rush to train talented graduates who can strengthen increasingly knowledge-based economies will be good for the US as well.	我们有足够理由相信：这种在全世界范围内对人才的争夺，在推动创新性研究方面的竞争，各大学在各地设立分校的举措，以及那种努力培养有天赋的毕业生，从而为知识经济进一步提供驱动力的努力，都将同时对美国有所裨益。


Above all, this is because the expansion of knowledge is not a zero-sum game.	尤其要强调的是，知识的扩展并不是一场零和博弈。


More PhD production and burgeoning research in China, for instance, doesn’t take away from America’s store of learning; on the contrary, it enhances what we know and can accomplish.	比如中国博士数量以及研究门类的增长并不会掏空的美国的知识储备； 相反，这提升了我们的知识和能力范围。


Because knowledge is a public good, intellectual gains by one country often benefit others.	因为知识是一种公共物品，一个国家所取得的智力成果往往会使其他国家受益。


Chinese research may well provide the building blocks for innovation by US entrepreneurs – or those from other countries.	中国的研究就可能会为美国乃至全世界企业的创新构筑了基础。


Indeed, the economic benefits of a global academic culture are significant.	事实上，全球学术培育所产生的经济效益是极为巨大的。


Just as free trade provides the lowest-cost goods and services, benefiting both consumers and the most efficient producers, global academic competition is making free movement of people and ideas, on the basis of merit, more and more the norm, with enormously positive consequences for individuals, universities, and countries.	正如自由贸易提供了最低成本的商品和服务，令消费者和最有效率的生产者双双得益，全球学术竞争则使得人才和新理念得以自由流动，公平竞争，并越来越成为常态，最终无论对个人，学员还是国家都产生了正面的影响。


Today's swirling patterns of mobility and knowledge transmission constitute a new kind of free trade: free trade in minds.	而如今这种人员和知识循环流动传播的模式也催生了一种新形式的自由贸易——思维的自由贸易。


The US should respond to the globalization of higher education not with angst but with a sense of possibility.	面对高等教育的全球化，美国不应感到忧虑，而应当看到其中蕴含的机遇。


Neither a gradual erosion in the US market share of students, nor the emergence of ambitious new competitors in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East means that American universities are on an inevitable path to decline.	不论是美国在留学生市场所占份额的下滑，还是那些雄心勃勃的亚洲，欧洲和中东竞争者的崛起，都不意味着美国的大学正不可避免地走向衰落。


By resisting protectionist barriers at home and abroad, by continuing to recruit and welcome the world’s best students, by sending more students overseas, by fostering cross-national research collaboration, and by strengthening its own research universities, the US can sustain its well-established academic excellence while continuing to expand the sum total of global knowledge and prosperity.	通过与国内外的保护主义壁垒进行抗争，继续招募和欢迎全世界最优秀的学生，将更多的学生送到海外，培育跨国研究合作，以及增强本国研究型大学的实力，美国将在能够继续维持其世界学术先锋的地位，并为全球知识和繁荣的增长作出自己的贡献。


The Great Debt Scare	债务大恐慌


NEW HAVEN – It might not seem that Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis and growing concern about the United States’ debt position should shake basic economic confidence.	纽黑文——欧洲主权债务危机以及对美国债务状况的日渐担忧似乎还不应该动摇基本经济信心。


But they apparently have.	但显然，信心已经动摇了。


And loss of confidence, by discouraging consumption and investment, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing the economic weakness that is feared.	而信心缺失会不利于消费和投资，从而演变成一场自我实现的预言，造成令人恐慌的经济疲软。


Significant drops in consumer-confidence indices in Europe and North America already reflect this perverse dynamic.	欧洲和北美的信心指数出现了剧烈下降，便是这一恶性循环的反映。


We now have a daily index for the US, the Gallup Economic Confidence Index, so we can pinpoint changes in confidence over time.	如今，我们有了跟踪美国且每日更新的盖洛普经济信心指数（Gallup Economic Confidence Index），因此随时都能看到信心的变化。


The Gallup Index dropped sharply between the first week of July and the first week of August – the period when US political leaders worried everyone that they would be unable to raise the federal government’s debt ceiling and prevent the US from defaulting on August 2.	盖洛普指数在7月第一周到8月第一周的这段时间里出现了暴跌——这段时间也正是人们担心美国政治领袖无法提高联邦政府债务上限、美国将在8月2日违约的时候。


The story played out in the news media every day.	这个故事每天在电视媒体上大讲特讲。


August 2 came and went, with no default, but, three days later, a Friday, Standard & Poor’s lowered its rating on long-term US debt from AAA to AA+.	8月2日早已经过去，违约并没有发生，但在3天后的星期五，标准普尔将其美国长期债务评级从AAA降低到了AA+。


The following Monday, the S&P 500 dropped almost 7%.	接下来的星期一，标普500指数暴跌近7%。


Apparently, the specter of government deadlock causing a humiliating default suddenly made the US resemble the European countries that really are teetering on the brink.	显然，政府陷入僵局从而造成令人蒙羞的违约的阴影在一夜之间让美国变得和真正在悬崖边苦苦挣扎的欧洲国家没什么两样了。


Europe’s story became America’s story.	欧洲的故事变成了美国的故事。


Changes in public confidence are built upon such narratives, because the human mind is very receptive to them, particularly human-interest stories.	公共信心的变化就是建立在这样的故事上的，因为人类本性对它们——特别是关系到人类命运的故事——没有抵抗力。


The story of a possible US default is resonant in precisely this way, implicating as it does America’s sense of pride, fragile world dominance, and political upheavals.	美国可能违约，这个故事引起了广泛的共鸣，暗示着美国的自大、岌岌可危的世界领导着地位以及政治变局。


Indeed, this is arguably a more captivating story than was the most intense moment of the financial crisis, in 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed.	事实上，这个故事如此迷人，大有超越2008年雷曼兄弟倒闭将危机推向高潮之势。


The drop in the Gallup Economic Confidence Index was sharper in July 2011 than it was in 2008, although the index has not yet fallen to a lower level than it reached then.	盖洛普经济信心指数在2011年7月的跌势比2008年更剧烈，尽管距离当初的低点还有一段距离。


Most confidence indices today are based on survey questions that ask respondents to assess the economy today or in the near future.	如今，大多数信心指数都是基于调查问题得出的，受访者被要求评估现今或不久将来的经济局势。


George Gallup, the pioneer of survey methods and creator of the Gallup poll, created a confidence index in 1938, late in the Great Depression, when he asked Americans, “Do you think business will be better or worse six months from now?”	1938年大萧条晚期，调查方法先驱、盖洛普调查创始人乔治·盖洛普（George Gallup）创造了一个信心指数。 当时他问美国人：“你认为半年后，商业局面会比现在更好还是更差？


He interpreted the answers as measuring “public optimism” and “the intangible mental attitude which is recognized as one vital element in the week-to-week fluctuations of business activity.”	”他对回答做了分析，用以衡量“公共乐观”和“被视为商业活动周际波动关键影响因素的无形的主观态度”。


But it hardly seems likely that big changes in people’s confidence (the kind of confidence that affects their willingness to spend or invest) are rooted in expectations over so short a time horizon.	但是，公众信心（即印象他们支出或投资意愿的信心）的大改变似乎并不植根于对短期未来的预期。


When George Gallup wrote, almost nine years after the Great Depression began, a sense of ultimate futility – a belief that high unemployment would never end – was widespread.	乔治·盖洛普调查公众信心时，大萧条已经开始了9年，当时社会上弥漫着一切都是徒劳（ultimate futility，即高失业将永久持续下去）的情绪。


That sentiment probably held back consumption and investment far more than any opinions about changes in the next six months.	这样的情绪可能会让任何关于未来半年消费和投资会如何变化的观点大打折扣。


After all, consumers’ willingness to spend depends on their general situation, not on whether business will be a little better in the short term.	毕竟，消费者的支出意愿取决于他们的整体情况，而不是商业局面在短期内会不会有所改善。


Likewise, businesses’ willingness to hire people and expand operations depends on their longer-term expectations.	同样，企业的雇人和扩张意愿取决于它们的长期预期。


The Consumer Sentiment Survey of Americans, created by George Katona at the University of Michigan in the early 1950’s, and known today as the Thomson-Reuters University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, has included a remarkable question about the reasonably long-term future, five years hence, and asks about visceral fears concerning that period:	20世纪50年代早期，乔治·盖洛普在密歇根州立大学创造了美国消费者情绪调查，即今天的汤森路透密歇根州立大学消费者调查。 该调查包括了一个关于较长期（5年）未来的引人注目的问题，询问受众在此期间内的发自内心的担忧：


“Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely – that in the country as a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?”	 “放眼未来，你认为最有可能发生什么——作为一个国家，我们将在未来5年继续过好日子，还是将步入大面积失业或萧条的阶段，还是其他？ ”


That question is usually not singled out for attention, but it appears spot-on for what we really want to know: what deep anxieties and fears do people have that might inhibit their willingness to spend for a long time.	这一问题通常乍看上去很不起眼，但却恰到好处地触及了我们实际上想知道的东西：抑制人们长期支出意愿的深层次焦虑和担心是什么。


The answers to that question might well help us forecast the future outlook much more accurately.	这一问题的回答可能有助于我们更加正确地预测未来前景。


Those answers plunged into depression territory between July and August, and the index of optimism based on answers to this question is at its lowest level since the oil-crisis-induced “great recession” of the early 1980’s.	7月和8月间，这些问题的答案指向萧条，而给出这一问题答案的乐观指数下跌到了20世纪80年代初由石油危机导致的“大衰退”以来的最低点。


It stood at 135, its highest-ever level, in 2000, at the very peak of the millennium stock market bubble.	2000年，这一指数曾到达过135的历史最高点，当时正是千禧年股市大泡沫顶峰。


By May 2011, it had fallen to 88.	2011年5月，该指数跌至88。


By September, just four months later, it was down to 48.	9月，也就是4个月后，该指数又跌到了48。


This is a much bigger downswing than was recorded in the overall consumer-confidence indices.	这一跌幅要比整体消费信心指数跌幅更大。


The decline occurred over the better part of a decade, as we began to see the end of debt-driven overexpansion, and accelerated with the latest debt crisis.	在最近十年较好的阶段，即我们开始意识到债务驱动的过度扩张迟早会结束时，该指数就一直在下跌，最近的债务危机则加速了下跌。


The timing and substance of these consumer-survey results suggest that our fundamental outlook about the economy, at the level of the average person, is closely bound up with stories of excessive borrowing, loss of governmental and personal responsibility, and a sense that matters are beyond control.	这些消费者调查结果的时机和内容表明，从普通人水平看，我们对经济的基本看法与过度借贷的故事、政府和个人的责任缺失以及事态将要失控的感觉密切相关。


That kind of loss of confidence may well last for years.	此类信心缺失可能会持续好多年。


That said, the economic outlook can never be fully analyzed with conventional statistical models, for it may hinge on something that such models do not include: our finding some way to replace one narrative – currently a tale of out-of-control debt – with a more inspiring story.	如此说来，经济前景永远不可能被传统统计模型所分析，因为推动经济发展的因素——我们用某些更令人激动的故事取代另一些故事，最新的故事是债务失控——可能并不为统计模型所包含。


The Great Escapism	现实大逃避


NEW YORK – Barack Obama, however mixed his accomplishments to date as US president, has sought to rebrand America and reclaim its former signature asset: its ability to embody universally admired values.  As popular culture is usually the way those values are transmitted, it is worth considering what it is about American cinema, music, and popular literature that makes them so compelling to many other parts of the world.	发自纽约——作为美国总统，虽然巴拉克·奥巴马目前所取得的成绩好坏参半，但他依然在努力重新包装美国并擦亮这个国家从前的金字招牌：那种实现普世价值的能力。 鉴于这些价值的载体通常都是流行文化，因此我们有必要探究一下，这些美国电影，音乐以及流行文学令世界其他地方的人们如此难以抗拒的原因，究竟是些什么。


After all, much of what America once monopolized in Hollywood movies and other pop-culture exports is now being reproduced locally.	毕竟，大部分一度由美国好莱坞和流行文化输出所垄断的东西如今都变成了世界各地的“本地制造”。


Bollywood competes with California in terms of glamorous stars and big production numbers; Japan and South Korea mint their own pop singers and fashion trends.	在打造超级巨星和大制作方面，宝莱坞正在向加利福尼亚（好莱坞所在地）叫板； 而日本和韩国也正努力打造属于自己的流行明星和时尚潮流。


But consider Entourage, the American TV show that centers on a rising male film star and his posse of dudes.	不过，让我们瞧瞧《明星伙伴》这部以一位新生代男电影明星和他一帮哥们为主题的美国电视节目。


Or a recent article in The New Yorker about two scruffy young chefs who have set out across the country to start the great adventure of running their own crazy restaurant, called Animal.	或者看看最近在《纽约客》杂志上发表的一篇关于两名衣衫褴褛的年轻厨师穿越整个美国，试图创立属于自己的名为“动物”的餐厅的疯狂历程的文章。


Or Swingers, the 1996 worldwide hit movie about a twenty-something guy in Hollywood and his band of male friends who drag him to Las Vegas to mend his broken heart.	或者回想一下《全职浪子》，这部在1996年风靡全世界，讲述好莱坞一位20来岁的年轻人和一帮把他弄到拉斯维加斯治疗心灵创伤的兄弟的电影。


One of America’s last competitive cultural exports, it seems, is the post-adolescent male escape fantasy.	由此可知，美国文化输出的最后竞争力之一似乎就是某种后青春期男性逃避现实的幻想。


Ever since Huck Finn took his friends down the Mississippi River on a raft, American men have created and consumed fantasies of setting out with their males friends for parts unknown, or of traveling in an all-male group to have adventures closer to home.	远自赫克·芬恩带着一帮哥们，撑着木筏沿密西西比河顺流而下开始，美国人就已经创造并消费着一种与男性同伴一起探索无名之地，或一群男人共同在家园附近历险的幻想。


In the 1950’s, Jack Kerouac took his buddy careening across the country in On the Road.	在1950年的小说《在路上》中，杰克·凯鲁亚克与几个弟兄横越了美国大陆。


A decade later, Ken Kesey took his buddies, the Merry Pranksters, across the country in the other direction in their painted bus (granted, with female hangers-on).	十年以后，肯·凯西与他那帮自称“快乐调皮鬼”的哥们开着一辆自己粉刷过的巴士（当然车上也不乏搭便车的美女）又从相反的方向穿越了这个国家。


From Easy Rider in the 1960’s to the Harold and Kumar movies today, the “buddy film” – typically involving travel-based adventure – has become an established genre. Savvy American politicians even make use of it for their own purposes.	从1960年的《逍遥骑士》到今天的《寻宝奇遇》系列，“伙伴片”——即以旅行冒险为典型题材的电影片——已经成为了一种成熟的流派。


Both John McCain and George W. Bush cleverly tapped into this fantasy – with its easy bonhomie and absence of wives and kids – to capture the hearts of the male journalists aboard their campaign buses, who could imagine themselves once again as tough, unfettered, and venturesome Kerouac figures.	聪明的美国政治家甚至会利用它来达到自己的目的，比如约翰·麦凯恩和小布什就巧妙地利用了这种幻想——和一帮兄弟在路上，而且没有老婆孩子烦着——俘获了那些乘坐他们全国竞选巡游车的男性记者的心。 在这种幻想中，那些男记者们可以再次把自己想象成为如凯鲁亚克那样彪悍，自由自在且爱好冒险的角色。


President Obama even gave the actor who played Kumar a job in the White House (which he has now left to return to Hollywood).	而奥巴马总统更是为曾经在《寻宝奇遇》中饰演库玛一角的那位演员在白宫找了份工作（不过，现在他已经辞职回好莱坞去了）。


As you survey the rest of global culture, the male-escape scenario is hard to spot emerging from any other place.	如果你考察一下世界其他地方的文化，你将很难在他们那里找到这种男性逃避现实的文化类型。


Save for the recent hit film 3 Idiots, Bollywood doesn’t send groups of Indian guys off on merry, irresponsible adventures.	除了最近的热门电影《三个白痴》外，宝莱坞可没有安排任何印度人去开始一段愉快且毫无压力的冒险旅程。


Male protagonists in French films don’t take off together in convertibles for the Pyrenees; they stay home and urbanely have affairs.	而法国电影中的男主角也没有一起开着敞篷车去比利牛斯山冒险，相反，他们都待在家里从容地处理着各种事情。


Nor does Japanese pop culture manufacture escape fantasies aimed at Japanese men.	同样的是，日本的流行文化也没有为其男性制造一种逃避现实的幻想。


Yet men all over the world tune in to American-made fantasies of male bonding and male escape – escape from the bonds of work and domesticity, and, if only for a youthful period of the male lifespan, from long-term commitment to women themselves.	因此全世界男人都会向往这种“美国制造”的兄弟友谊和男性逃避现实的幻想——这是一种对工作关系和家庭生活的逃避，而对处于年轻时期的男性来说，那也是对与女性维持长期关系承诺的逃避。


This fantasy, derived, no doubt, from American history – from westward expansion and Manifest Destiny, from the Gold Rush and a settlement policy that valorized staking a claim to the wilderness and subduing it – is powerfully appealing to men in general, and to many women as well.	毫无疑问，这样一种源自于美国历史传统的幻想——即源自西部大开发和所谓天定命运论的领土扩张，淘金热以及那种鼓励占领并征服自然的定居政策——强有力地迎合了普通男性以及大部分女性的需要。


Indeed, American women have recently begun to film and export their own versions of this fantasy – starting with the groundbreaking 1991 film Thelma and Louise and continuing in a growing trend of girl-group travel and escape packages.	没错，美国女性最近也开始录制和出口这种幻想的女性版本——这以1991年拍成的电影《末路狂花》为奠基之作，随后以女性群体出逃为主题的电影就不断呈现增长之势。


Other countries’ lack of male escape fantasies in their popular culture may be no less historically rooted: less transient, more traditional societies will not warmly welcome homegrown films and pop songs about local young men taking off and fleeing their responsibilities.	至于在其他国家的流行文化中不存在这种男性逃避现实幻想的原因当然也有其历史根源：那些流动性较少而更为传统的社会都不会喜欢这些以本地年轻人离家出走，抛弃自身责任为主题的电影和流行歌曲。


But, judging by the appetite shown worldwide for this narrative, it seems clear that identification with such adventures is almost universal.	但是，从世界各地对这样一种逃避所表现出来的好恶来看，很明显大部分人还是认同这样一种历险的。


It seems to speak to a deep longing in men – and in the women who also enjoy these films and TV shows – for a time in one’s life when one could dash toward freedom, adventure, and self-reinvention, unencumbered by social ties and family obligations.	它仿佛喊出了在生命某一阶段中男性内心深处的渴望——当然也表达了那些喜欢这类电影和电视节目的女性的内心渴望，那是一个人可以投奔自由，冒险和重塑自我的人生阶段，同时也是不受社会关系和家庭责任束缚的阶段。


At its best, this genre is part of America’s gift to the rest of the world.	从其最好的方面看，这种文化类型可以说是美国带给世界各国的一份礼物。


At its worst, it is part of America’s curse.	而从其他最坏的方面看，它也是美国式诅咒的一部分。


That whiff of careening, heedless adolescent fecklessness is part of what makes the archetypal American male presence alarming when he is equipped with a global cudgel.	青年人的这种摇摆不定，漫不经心，不负责任的特征都能典型美国男人身上看到，而当他们拥有在全球范围内使用暴力的能力时，这种特征使他们变得令人十分担心。


To the rest of the world, those same qualities are part of his charm only so long as he stays safely up on the screen.	因此对其他国家来说，这样的一种特质确实具有其自身的魅力，但这只能是在电视荧幕上而已。


The Great Firewall of China	中国的防火墙长城