But, according to the American Psychiatric Association, people with mental disorders, who account for roughly one-quarter of the population in a given year, commit only 4-5% of violent crimes.	但是，根据美国精神病协会的数据，在任意给定年份，精神失常者约占总人口的四分之一，但只占暴力犯罪比重的4—5%。


Indeed, while mentally ill people may be more likely to commit violent acts if they are not treated, or are misusing alcohol or drugs, the risk is small.	事实上，精神病患者如若得不到治疗，或者滥用酒精和毒品，他们确实更容易做出暴力行为，但这一风险很小。


Personal experience usually refutes the link between mental illness and violence.	个人经验通常与精神病和暴力之间存在联系的观点不符。


A survey of the American public found that, while 68% of adults knew at least one person who had been hospitalized with a mental illness and 10% knew five or more people, only 9% had ever been threatened or physically harmed by such a person.	一份美国公众调查发现，68%的成年人至少认识一位曾就诊精神科的人，10%认识5个甚至更多，但只有9%曾受过这类人的威胁或人身伤害。


People in close contact with the mentally ill, such as mental-health professionals and family members of people affected, are the least likely to believe that they are dangerous.	与精神病患者密切接触的群体，比如精神健康专业人士和反常人士家属，最不相信他们有危险的说法。


The discrepancy between experience and perception is largely caused by the media, which frequently link mental illness with acts of violence.	引起这一经验和感知之间的矛盾的罪魁是媒体。 媒体频繁地将精神病与暴力行为联系起来。


One study of American newspaper reports found that 39% of reports concerning mental illness were focused on violence or danger.	一份对美国报纸报道的研究发现，39%的精神病报道的中心点是暴力和危险。


In Germany, extensive reports on violent attacks against prominent politicians by two people suffering from schizophrenia in 1990 bolstered the German public’s belief that mentally ill people are dangerous.	在德国，1990年关于两名精神分裂症患者暴力袭击著名政客的详细报道导致德国公众认为精神病患者是危险的。


Coverage of violent acts that result in multiple deaths is particularly extensive.	对导致多人死亡的暴力行为的报道往往会特别详尽。


The public inevitably seeks some explanation, and the media will explore any potential link to mental illness to provide one – for example, acquaintances’ reports of “odd” behavior and social withdrawal or accounts of previous interactions with mental-health professionals.	公众免不了要寻找某种解释，而媒体会深入挖掘任何案件与精神病之间的潜在关联以提供解释——熟人对他“怪异”行为的报告啦，离群索居啦，曾经与精神卫生专业人士有来往啦，如此等等。


Meanwhile, defense attorneys may try to lessen their client’s culpability by claiming insanity, as Breivik’s lawyers attempted to do after he killed 77 people to protest the multiculturalism that he claims threatens Norway.	与此同时，辩护律师会试图通过精神错乱来为当事人争取轻判，比如布雷维克的律师就试图这样做。 布雷维克杀了77人，以此抗议他认为对挪威形成威胁的多元文化论。


Although this approach is rarely successful – Breivik received a 21-year sentence – it is widely reported, linking crime to mental illness in the minds of the public.	尽管这样的策略很少成功——布雷维克被判入狱21年——但会被广为报道，在公众脑海中形成犯罪与精神病之间的关联。


The perception that mentally ill people are dangerous is global. But it is more prevalent in developing countries than in the developed world.	认为精神病人有危险的现象是全球性的，但发展中国家的这一情况比发达国家更普遍。


The major exception is the US, where the ready availability of firearms contributes to one of the highest homicide rates – and the highest gun homicide rate – among developed countries.	主要的例外是美国，由于容易搞到军火，美国的杀人率——以及持枪杀人率——在发达国家名列前茅。


Given that multiple homicides in the US draw international interest, media reports highlighting a perpetrator’s mental illness or describing insanity pleas inform perceptions of mental illness worldwide.	美国的多起杀人案引起了国际关注，媒体报道总是强调袭击者的精神病或精神失常状况，这形成了世界对精神病的感知。


Loughner’s shooting of 19 people in 2011, including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, attracted global attention, as did the court-ordered evaluation of his mental competency.	拉夫纳在2011年枪击了19人，包括女国会议员吉福兹（Gabrielle Giffords），这吸引了全世界的目光，法院下令对其精神能力的评估也被全世界所熟知。


Indeed, on the other side of the world, the newspaper The Australian mentioned Giffords 160 times in the six months following the shooting, compared to just one mention in the previous 12 months.	事实上，在地球的另一边，《澳大利亚人报》（The Australian）在枪击后的半年时间里160次提及吉福兹，而在枪击前的一年中总共只提到了1次。


Though mass shootings are extremely rare even in the US, the media’s coverage continually reinforces negative perceptions at home and abroad.	尽管大规模枪击在美国是极其罕见的事件，但媒体报道持续强化着国内外的消极感知。


In this manner, the US may well be exporting the mental-illness stigma to the rest of the world.	就这样，美国也许在向全世界出口精神病歧视。


Similarly, Cho’s history of mental illness was widely discussed.	类似地，赵承熙的精神病史也被广泛讨论。


Moreover, his mental-health records were released to the public two years later, reviving the link between his crime – killing 32 people and wounding 17 others before committing suicide – and his mental illness.	此外，他的精神卫生记录在两年后被公之于众，再一次将他的罪行——杀害32人，致伤17人，然后自尽——和他的精神病联系起来。


In this context, US President Barack Obama’s gun-control efforts – which include intensifying background-check requirements and increasing financing for mental-health programs for young people – hold global significance.	在这样的环境下，美国总统奥巴马的枪支管制措施——包括加强背景审查要求、增加年轻人精神卫生项目资金支持——具有全球重要性。


While expanding the scope of mental-health services is a positive step, with the potential to contribute to the physical safety of US citizens, it is crucial that this link not be allowed to feed the perception that people with mental illnesses are dangerous.	扩大精神卫生服务范围是一个积极的步骤，可能有利于美国公民的人身安全，但关键之处在于不能让这一联系滋生精神病人是危险的感觉。


Rather, American legislators and media outlets must use their international influence to reduce the stigma experienced by people suffering from mental illnesses worldwide.	美国立法者和媒体机构必须利用其国际影响力减轻饱受精神病折磨的人们所受到的波及全球的恶名。


The Media War on Terror	媒体的反恐战争


“More than half of this battle is taking place on the battlefield of the media, [for] we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of [Muslims].”	“这场斗争超过一半的部分发生在媒体战场，因为我们处于一场争取穆斯林人心的媒体战争之中。


The speaker was not some public relations executive, but Osama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri.	”说这话的并不是某些公关主管人员，而是本拉登的二号人物扎瓦西里。


Terrorists have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but, for the most part, America and the governments of the other democracies have not.	恐怖分子已经娴熟地适应了在当今的媒体时代作战，但是，美国和其他民主国家的政府大部分却还没有做到这一点。


Consider that the violent extremists have their own “media relations committees” aimed at manipulating elite opinion.	看看那些凶残的极端分子居然有他们自己的所谓“媒体关系委员会”，致力于操纵精英舆论。


They plan and design headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communications to intimidate and break the collective will of free people.	他们使用所有的通讯手段来筹划和设计被报纸头条新闻报道的攻击事件，以便恐吓、打破自由人民的集体意志。


They know that communications transcend borders, and that a single news story, handled skillfully, can be as damaging to our cause – and as helpful to theirs – as any military attack.	他们知道，通讯超越边境，一个单一的新闻事件如果处理得当就可以像任何军事攻击一样给我们的事业造成损害并希望有助于他们的事业。


And they are able to act quickly with relatively few people, and with modest resources compared to the vast, expensive bureaucracies of democratic governments.	而且他们能够以相对较少的人员、与巨大花费昂贵的民主国家政府的官僚体系相比简单的资源采取迅速行动。


Today we are fighting the first war in the era of e-mail, blogs, blackberries, instant messaging, digital cameras, the Internet, mobile phones, talk radio, and 24-hour news.	今天，我们正在一个充斥着电子邮件、博客、黑梅、即时短信、数码相机、互联网、移动电话、电台访谈以及全天新闻的时代进行第一场战争。


In Tunisia, the largest newspaper has a circulation of roughly 50,000 in a country of 10 million people.	在突尼斯的1000万人口中，该国最大报纸的发行量是大约5万份。


But even in the poorest neighborhoods, you see satellite dishes on nearly every balcony or rooftop.	但是，即使是在最为贫困的地方，你也几乎可以在在每个阳台和屋顶看见卫星电视接收器。


A few years ago, under Saddam Hussein, an Iraqi could have his tongue cut out if he was found in possession of a satellite dish or used the Internet without government approval.	几年前在萨达姆统治时期，如果某人被发现未经政府允许就私自拥有卫星电视接收器或者使用互联网就会被割掉舌头。


Today, satellite dishes are ubiquitous in Iraq as well.	今天，卫星电视接收器在伊拉克也是无处不在。


Regrettably, many of the news channels being watched through these dishes are hostile to the West.	令人遗憾的是，通过这些卫星电视观看的许多新闻频道都对西方怀有敌意。


Media outlets in many parts of the world often serve only to inflame and distort – rather than to explain and inform.	世界许多地方的媒体单位经常只是煽动和歪曲，而不是解释和提供消息。


While al-Qaeda and extremist movements have used this forum for many years, further poisoning the Muslim public’s view of the West, we in the West have barely even begun to compete.	当基地组织和极端分子运动多年来使用这一论坛、进一步毒化穆斯林公众对西方的见解之时，我们在西方的人还基本上没有开始与之竞争。


We saw this with the false allegations of the desecration of a Koran last year.	去年媒体报道亵渎古兰经的假新闻。


First published in a weekly news magazine, the story was then posted on Web sites, sent in e-mails, and repeated on satellite television and radio stations for days before the facts could be discovered.	这一消息最早出现在一本新闻周刊上，然后被张贴在了互联网网站上，从电子邮件中被发送出去，又连续几天在卫星电视和电台中重复之后才发现了事实真相。


That false story incited deadly anti-American riots in Afghanistan and Pakistan.	这一虚假新闻煽动了阿富汗和巴基斯坦的反美骚乱。


The United States military, appropriately and of necessity, took the time needed to ensure that it had the facts before responding that the charges were untrue.	美国军队恰如其分而且出于必要沉着确保掌握了事件真相才反应指出指控是虚假的。


In the meantime, innocent lives were lost.	与此同时，无辜的人丧失了生命。


But we have begun to adapt.	但是，我们已经开始适应。


In Iraq, for example, the US military, working closely with the Iraqi government, has sought non-traditional means to provide accurate information to the Iraqi people.	例如在伊拉克，美国军队与伊拉克政府紧密合作，寻求非传统的手段来向伊拉克人民提供准确的信息。


Yet this has been portrayed as “buying news.”	但是这却被描述成为“有偿新闻”。


The resulting explosion of critical press stories then causes everything – all activity, all initiative – to stop.	报章抨击性报道接踵而来，使得所有的活动和计划都停止。


This leads to a “chilling effect” among those serving in the military public affairs field, who conclude that there is no tolerance for innovation.	这导致在美军公共事务部门服务的人的“激冷效应”，他们得出结论说人们不容忍创新。


Consider for a moment the vast quantity of column inches and hours of television devoted to the allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.	稍微看看有关伊拉克阿布哈里卜虐待战俘指控长篇累牍的专栏文章以及长时间的电视报道。


Compare that to the volume of coverage and condemnation associated with, say, the discovery of Saddam Hussein’s mass graves, which were filled with hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis.	和那些发现萨达姆埋葬数十万无辜伊拉克百姓的万人坑的报道数量以及谴责比较一下吧。


Free governments must make communications planning a central component of every aspect of this struggle.	自由国度的政府必须把交流规划列为这场斗争各个方面的中心内容。


Indeed, the longer it takes to put a strategic communications framework into place, the more the vacuum will be filled by the enemy.	实际上，建立战略交流框架拖得越长，敌人就会填补越多的真空。


There are nonetheless signs of modest progress.	我们看到了某些温和的进展迹象。


Soon after the devastating earthquake in Pakistan, a public affairs team was deployed with our sizable military forces in the disaster area.	巴基斯坦大地震之后不久，美国就连同我们在该灾区的大量的部队一起布署了一个公共事务团队。


They worked to help focus media attention on America’s commitment to help the Pakistani people.	他们努力把媒体的注意力集中到美国帮助巴基斯坦人民的承诺之上。


Public opinion surveys conducted by private groups before and after the earthquake suggest that attitudes in Pakistan regarding the US changed dramatically because of this new awareness.	由私营组织在地震前后进行的民意调查表明，巴基斯坦民众有关美国的态度由于知道了这些情况而大变。


Government public affairs and public diplomacy efforts are slowly beginning to reorient staffing, schedules, and bureaucratic culture to engage the full range of today’s media.	政府公共事务以及公共外交行动正在缓慢地重新部署人员、计划以及官场文化来全面接触当今的媒体。


Still, government must develop the institutional capability to anticipate and act within the same news cycle.	但是，政府必须发展制度性的能力来在同一个新闻周期中预计和行动。


That requires instituting 24-hour press operations centers and elevating Internet operations and other channels to the status of traditional twentieth-century press relations.	这就要求建立全天候的新闻行动中心，以及把互联网行动和其他渠道提升到传统的二十世纪新闻关系的地位。


It will require less reliance on the traditional print media, just as the publics of the US and the world are relying less on newspapers.	正当美国和世界的公众正在减少对报纸的依赖一样，这就要求对传统的印刷媒体减少依赖。


This also will mean embracing new ways of engaging people throughout the world.	这还意味着采取同全世界人民接触的新方式。


During the Cold War, institutions such as Radio Free Europe proved to be valuable instruments.	在冷战期间，像自由欧洲电台那样的机构被证明是有价值的手段。


We need to consider the possibility of new organizations and programs that can serve a similarly valuable role in the War on Terror.	我们需要考虑可以在反恐战争中发挥同样有价值作用的新组织以及项目的可能性。


We are fighting a war in which the survival of our way of life is at stake.	我们正在进行一场关乎我们的生活方式的战争。


And the center of gravity of that struggle is not just the battlefield.	而这场斗争的重心并非仅仅是战场。


It is a test of wills and it will be won or lost in the court of global public opinion.	这是一场考验意志的斗争，而且在全球舆论法庭上分出胜负。


While the enemy is skillful at manipulating the media and using the tools of communications to their advantage, we have an advantage as well: truth is on our side, and, ultimately, truth wins out.	敌人操纵媒体、使用通讯工具为其所用，技法娴熟，尽管如此，我们也具备优势，那就是真相在我们一边，而且最终真相会获胜。


The Mediterranean Crucible	地中海的熔炉


BERLIN – For most Europeans, the Mediterranean is an annual object of longing – the holiday idyll where they spend the best weeks of the year.	柏林——在多数欧洲人看来，地中海代表着一年一度的期待和向往——这里是他们渡过一年中最愉快几周假日的田园生活之地。


But many Europeans’ sunny view of the region has yielded to lowering clouds of pessimism.	但不少欧洲人对地中海撒满阳光的记忆已经逐渐被日益迫近的悲观主义阴霾所取代。


Inside the European Union, the ugly term PIGS (Portugal, Italy/Ireland, Greece, Spain) is now a commonplace, denoting countries that have endangered the euro’s stability and are forcing northern Europeans into costly bailouts.	PIGS（葡萄牙、意大利/爱尔兰、希腊、西班牙）这一丑恶的名词在欧盟内部已经广为流传，指的是威胁欧元稳定，并迫使北欧人采取昂贵救援行动的国家。


Where not long ago sunshine and solidarity were the order of the day, depression and confrontation are now the rule.	不久前明媚的阳光和休戚与共的情感还是欧洲的主宰，而现在却是抑郁和对抗渐渐成为主流。


Worse still, Europe’s debt and confidence crisis is also the EU’s gravest political crisis since its inception: at stake is nothing less then the future of the European project itself.	更糟的是，债务和信心危机也是欧盟自创立以来最严重的政治危机： 这次危机能否化解直接关系到欧盟本身的未来。


And now the crisis has reached the southern shore of the Mediterranean, in the form of a revolution in Tunisia and a political showdown in Lebanon that has once again brought the country to the verge of war and disaster.	现在这场危机已经波及到地中海南岸，突尼斯爆发革命，黎巴嫩的政治决战也再次将这个国家推向战争和灾难的边缘。


With the EU’s Mediterranean member states simultaneously faltering, great changes are afoot in Europe’s southern neighborhood.	在欧盟地中海成员国同时陷入衰退的情况下，欧洲南部邻邦正在孕育巨大的变革。


So it is time to think geopolitically, not just fiscally, about the Mediterranean.	因此现在是时候撇开财政视角，从地缘政治的角度来看待地中海问题。


What the EU is facing in the Mediterranean isn’t primarily a currency problem; first and foremost, it is a strategic problem – one that requires solutions urgently.	欧盟在地中海面对的首先是战略而非货币问题，我们迫切需要针对这一问题拿出解决方案。


The overthrow of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is the first such spontaneous democratic uprising in the Arabic world, showing that in an age of satellite television and the Internet, suppression of information and free expression by individual governments doesn’t really work anymore.	突尼斯的因•阿比丁•本阿里被推翻是阿拉伯世界首次自发的民主起义，这次起义表明在卫星电视和互联网时代，某个政府压抑信息和言论自由的企图已经很难再收到效果。


Add to this the fact that the Arab world’s nationalist regimes, which have calcified into militarized dictatorships, lost their popular legitimacy long ago.	更有甚者，阿拉伯世界的民族主义政权早已蜕变为军事独裁统治，并在很久以前就已经失去了民众的支持。


The “Chinese option” – economic rights and prosperity in exchange for public quiescence – is not feasible, owing to these regimes’ ineptness and rampant corruption.	由于专制政权的无能和腐败现象猖獗，这里并不适用以公众沉默换取经济权利和市场繁荣的“中国模式”。


As a result, their inability to reform, combined with rapid population growth and a rising cohort of young people, is placing them under pressure, creating a possibility of explosive change.	结果是专制政权在改革中的无能，加之人口迅速增长和年轻人数量激增，为独裁统治带来了巨大的压力，并使爆发式的变革成为可能。


Whether a development will occur in the Arab world similar to that in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain is impossible to predict for the time being.	现在还无法预测像铁幕落下后东欧那样的变化是否会在阿拉伯世界发生。


In Eastern Europe, with the withdrawal and eventual disappearance of the Soviet hegemon, the floodgates were opened, and a torrent of change washed over the region.	在当年的东欧，随着苏联霸权主义的撤退和最终的销声匿迹，闸门就此打开，整个地区都被改革的洪流所淹没。


In the Middle East and the Maghreb, this external factor is missing; democratic change must come from within each society.	而中东和马格里布并不存在这样的外部因素，因此民主改革必须来源于社会的内部。


Tunisia shows that no government that has lost its legitimacy and is supported only by bayonets is sustainable in the long term.	突尼斯革命表明没有哪个丧失合法性的政府能够长期依靠刺刀来维持自己的统治。


Whether Tunisia becomes a democratic, economic, and social success story or, instead, sees its revolution end in chaos, civil war, and a new authoritarian regime will have consequences far beyond the country’s borders.	突尼斯是成为民主、经济和社会成功的典范还是走向反面，以混乱、内战和新的独裁政权来结束这场革命，其影响将远远超越这个国家边境。


Europe, as Tunisia’s northern neighbor, will be directly affected either way, and should therefore become seriously involved in terms of promoting democracy and aiding economic progress.	无论结果如何都将对毗邻突尼斯北部的欧洲产生直接的影响，因此欧洲应该认真参与推动民主和经济发展的进程。


Whatever mistakes Europe may have made vis-à-vis the region’s authoritarian regimes in the past, it can now correct them by providing decisive help.	无论欧洲过去曾经对该地区独裁政权犯下什么样的错误，现在都可以通过提供决定性的帮助来加以纠正。


Indeed, Tunisia is a stern test of the EU’s “Mediterranean partnership” – a long-promoted policy that so far consists of little more than empty phrases.	事实上，突尼斯是对欧盟“地中海伙伴关系”一次严峻的考验，虽然上述政策宣传已久，但迄今为止还看不到多少空谈以外的内容。


Tunisia’s revolution is a unique historical opportunity, and the EU’s stake in the outcome can hardly be overestimated.	突尼斯革命是一次独一无二的历史机遇，而其结果对欧盟产生的影响无论如何评估都不过分。


European officials in Brussels and the major EU governments should not go for political and economic half-measures.	布鲁塞尔和主要欧盟国家政府官员不应满足于在政治和经济方面采取折衷计划。


Specifically, beyond direct help for Tunisia at this critical moment, the EU must breathe new life into the Mediterranean partnership.	具体地讲，除去在这样的关键时刻为突尼斯提供直接帮助外，欧盟必须为地中海伙伴关系注入新的生命。


Projects for strategic cooperation in energy – say, production of solar and wind energy in the Sahara for sale to Europe – would be especially valuable.	在能源领域进行战略合作（比方说在撒哈拉生产太阳能和风能，而后销售到欧洲）将会尤其重要。


The EU and its member states – particularly Spain, France, Germany, and Italy – should make this new form of energy production and cooperation the key project of the Mediterranean partnership, and must ensure the necessary political conditions to accomplish it rapidly.	欧盟及其成员国——特别是西班牙、法国、德国和意大利——应当把这种新的能源生产及合作形式作为地中海伙伴关系的关键项目，而且必须保证采取能迅速实现目标的必要的政治举措。


This would create new prospects for the countries in the EU’s southern neighborhood, and thus give the transformation process an economic and technological impetus.	这样可以为欧盟南部邻国创造新的发展前景，进而从经济和技术两方面推动民主转型过程。


Moreover, such projects would promote cooperation between the states in the EU’s southern neighborhood, potentially boosting investments in education, infrastructure, and industrial development.	此外，上述项目还将促进欧盟南部邻国之间的合作，有可能推动教育、基础设施和工业发展等领域的投资。


This would create the most important thing that these states and their rapidly growing young populations need to produce stability within the framework of democratic development: grounds for hope of economic and social progress.	这样可以创造这些国家及其快速增长的青年人口在民主发展框架内创造稳定所需的最重要因素： 即对经济和社会进步寄予希望的理由。


If the Europeans continue to look inward, allowing accountants to dominate discussions of Europe’s future, they will miss a historic opportunity – one that will directly affect Europe’s security.	如果欧洲人继续延续内向型思维，任由会计人员在关乎欧洲未来的讨论中唱主角，他们就会错过一次将直接影响欧洲安全的历史性机遇。


In that case, the costs tomorrow would be far higher than the savings today.	如果真是这样，明天的代价将远非今天的节约所能相比。


The Mexican Muddle	墨西哥的浑浑噩噩


MEXICO CITY – This month, Mexico’s Felipe Calderón celebrates his second anniversary as president.	墨西哥城－本月，墨西哥的费利佩·卡尔德龙将庆祝其担任总统两周年。


Calderón took office in December 2006 under adverse circumstances.	卡尔德龙于2006年12月在不利的情况下就职。


Elected with 35% of the vote, he lacked a majority in Congress, and the opposition refused to acknowledge his victory.	他以35%的选票当选，没有在议会取得多数席位，并且反对党拒绝承认他的选举胜利。


He has also had to govern in a persistently difficult environment: a lame-duck president next door in the United States, a severe economic downturn, and the legacy of corruption, negligence, and complicity handed down by his predecessors since 1968, when Mexico’s old one-party political system began to crumble.	他也不得不在持续困难的环境下管理国家：邻国美国即将离任的总统，严重的经济下滑以及从1968年以来其前任流传下来的腐败、失职和共谋的后遗症——从1968年开始，墨西哥旧的一党政治体制开始解体。


Most immediately, Calderón had to address his immediate predecessor’s failure to implement any of the major reforms that Mexico needed.	当选后，卡尔德龙不得不立即关注其直接前任没有进行墨西哥所需的重大改革的失败。


Vicente Fox took office in 2000 with a broad mandate, but, like Calderón, without a majority in Congress.	文森特·福克斯在2000年带着许多使命就职，但是，和卡尔德龙一样，他在议会中也不拥有多数席位。


He proved unable to forge lasting legislative coalitions, leading Calderón to decide that his first break with the past should consist in building alliances to enact reform.	事实证明福克斯无法缔造持久的立法联盟，这使卡尔德龙觉得，他对过去的第一个突破应该是建立联盟来制定法律进行改革。


Soon, however, this became an end in itself, and Calderón proved adept at constructing short-lived coalitions for largely inconsequential reforms.	但是，很快，这本身变成了目的，并且卡尔德龙为在对很大程度上不合逻辑的改革建立短期的联盟上，表现得很拿手。


This watered-down gradualism has become his trademark.	这种打折的渐进主义已经成了他的标志。


Given this, it is no surprise that the list of question marks attached to Calderón’s administration is longer than that of his achievements.	有鉴于此，对卡尔德龙政府的问号清单比他取得的成就的清单要长，就没什么好惊奇的了。


His poll numbers reflect this ambivalence.	他的民意测验数据反映了这种矛盾的心态。


He remains personally popular and well regarded, but the public is increasingly dissatisfied and disappointed with his government’s actual performance.	他个人仍然很受欢迎，并且深受尊敬，但是，公众越来越对其政府的实际表现感到不满和失望了。


Among his few successes are state-employee pension fund reforms, which will save the system from bankruptcy.	他的少数几个成功包括国家雇员养老金改革，这一改革使养老金系统免予破产。


Another lies in having weakened and neutralized the left-wing opposition, and being able to govern without major confrontations in the streets or Congress.	另一个成功是削弱和压制了左翼反对派，使他能在在街上以及议会里没有重大对抗的情况下管理国家。


Other changes – a counter-productive electoral reform, a minor revenue-enhancing tax reform, and hypothetical oil-sector reform – all suffer from Calderón’s penchant for minimalism: enacting legislation seems more important to him than the content.	其他的变化——一个达不到目的的选举改革，一个较小的增加税收的税费改革以及假想的石油部门改革——都受到了卡尔德龙极简主义倾向的不利影响：对他来说，似乎制定法律比法律的内容更加重要。


Indeed, Mexico’s monopoly structures and immense concentration of power remain untouched – as they were under Calderón’s only two democratic predecessors, Ernesto Zedillo and Fox.	事实上，墨西哥的垄断结构和权力的巨大集中仍然未被触及——和卡尔德龙唯一的两位民主前任欧内斯托·塞迪略（Ernesto Zedillo）和福克斯时期一样。


Public monopolies like Pemex, private monopolies like Telmex and Cemex, labor monopolies like the teachers’ union, media monopolies like Televisa, and the iron political lock the country’s three parties have on every level of electoral representation, are all stronger than before.	像墨西哥国家石油公司(Pemex)这样的公共垄断，墨西哥电话公司（Telmex）和墨西哥水泥公司(Cemex)这样的私营垄断，教师联合会这样的劳工垄断，Televisa这样的媒体垄断，以及墨西哥的三大政党对每个层级的选举代表的政治铁锁控制，都比以前加强了。


Calderón has refused to touch these power structures, even though everyone, from the World Bank to left-wing rabble-rouser and former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, agree that they are the main impediments to Mexico’s progress.	即使从世界银行到左翼煽动者和前总统候选人安德森·曼纽尔（Andrés Manuel López Obrador）在内的所有人，都认为这些垄断是墨西哥发展的主要障碍，卡尔德龙还是拒绝触动这些权力结构。


Because of this enduring status quo, Mexico’s people do not blame Calderón for today’s harsh economic downturn; it is business as usual, they think.	因为长期以来的这种状态，墨西哥人民没有因为现在严峻的经济低迷情况而责怪卡尔德龙； 他们认为，只是一切照旧而已。


But public opinion is becoming more skeptical about the wisdom of the president’s signature policy: using the armed forces to launch an all-out drive against drug dealers.	但是，公众舆论对总统特有的政策的明智程度变得越来越怀疑了：使用武装力量来对毒贩进行全力的打击。


Ultimately, this is what he will be judged by.	最终，人们会用这些行为来评判他。


Mexico’s government and military had established a tacit, semi-violent, corrupt, but effective modus vivendi with the drug cartels since the early 1970’s.	从20世纪70年代早期开始，墨西哥政府和军队就和毒品卡特尔建立了一个默示、半暴力、腐败但是有效的暂时妥协。 当时，墨西哥是海洛因和大麻的生产国，并且是从南美国家来的可卡因的中转国。


Mexico was then a producer of heroin and marijuana, and a transit country for cocaine from South America.	在2006年年底，卡尔德龙认为，对毒贩的妥协再也不能容忍了：暴力行为已经失控了；


Calderón decided, in late 2006, that accommodation was no longer tolerable: the violence had gotten out of control; the corruption and complicity had infected the nation’s police and political elite; and Mexico had become a major producer of methamphetamines for the US, as well as a significant consumer of cocaine.	腐败和共谋已经侵蚀了墨西哥的警方和政治精英； 墨西哥已经成为美国甲基苯丙胺的主要生产国，也是可卡因的重要消费国。


Thus, his declaration of war.	因此，他对毒品宣战了。


But the new president kicked over the narcotics beehive with neither a fumigator nor protective netting on hand.	但是，新总统卡尔德龙在踢翻毒品马蜂窝的时候，手中既没有烟熏器，也没有保护网。


So he couldn’t defend himself.	所以，他无法保护自己。


The bees have overwhelmed him, and violence, corruption, complicity, and contamination of the state have all skyrocketed.	出来的马蜂淹没了他，并且暴力、腐败、共谋和对国家的侵染都在飞速上升。


The reasons for Calderón’s rejection of the former arrangements now appear less self-evident than before.	现在，卡尔德龙拒绝从前的安排的原因似乎不像以前那样不言自明了。


It is unclear that drug use in Mexico is extending more widely into the population: alarming rates of addiction growth are misleading, because addiction starts from an extremely low base.	毒品在墨西哥的使用是否在向更广大的人群扩散，还不明确：毒品成瘾增长的速度惊人具有误导性，因为成瘾的数字是从极低的基数开始的。


Calderón had tried to sell his “war on drugs” by insisting that he is waging it to “save our children.”	卡尔德龙通过强调他发动“禁毒战”是为了“挽救我们的孩子”的方式，来兜���其“禁毒战”。


If that connection proves faulty, it will not work, and Mexicans may question the point of a “war” that has more than doubled the number of gangland executions, from 2,000 in 2006 to 5,000 in 2008, when their children, statistically at least, are not in harm’s way.	如果前述联系证明是错误的，那么，它就不会起作用，而且，墨西哥人也会质疑，当他们的孩子——至少统计上如此，并没有处在危险之中时，对犯罪组织死刑执行人数从2006年的2,000人到2008年的5,000人的人数翻番的“战争”的意义。


Moreover, the capacity of Mexico’s security machinery appears diminished.	而且，墨西哥安全机器的能力似乎降低了。


The police are at best useless and at worst outright employees of the drug lords; the army is less tainted, but unprepared for the role.	警察在最好的情况下是无能的，在最糟糕的情况下完全就是毒枭的雇员； 毒枭对军队没有像对警察那样深的渗透，但是，军队对完成这一任务还没有准备。


It will take years and billions of dollars to change this state of affairs; Calderón does not have the time, and only the US has the money.	需要几年时间和花费几十亿美元来改变这种态势； 卡尔德龙没有这个时间，并且只有美国有那么多钱。


But Calderón doesn’t want American aid on American terms.	但是，卡尔德龙不想要按照美国的条件提供的美国援助。


He rejects the Colombian model, which would put American advisers, instructors, mechanics, agents, and maintenance personnel on the ground in Mexico.	他拒绝了哥伦比亚模式——该模式会将美国的顾问、指导、组织、特工以及维护人员置于墨西哥的土地上。


He may be right, but the alternative is no military makeover, and no likelihood of winning a war that perhaps should not have been declared in the first place.	他可能是对的，但是，替代的选择不应该是军事粉饰，以及不可能取胜的一场一开始或许就不应该宣战的战争。


Had it not been for the world economic crisis, or if it ends up being short and shallow, many observers, including me, remain convinced that Mexico can continue to muddle through, as it has done since 1996.	如果不是因为全球经济危机，或者如果危机持续时间很短，而且影响层面很浅，包括我在内的许多观察人士，仍然会深信墨西哥可以继续胡乱应付过去，就像它从1996年以来一直做的那样。


These past 13 years have been fair-to-middling for the country: mediocre economic growth, but no collapse; democratic rotation in power, with no uprisings or massacres; a slow but steady expansion of the middle class; and a slow but steady drop in corruption.	过去13年对墨西哥来说马马虎虎：普普通通的经济增长，没有发生经济崩溃； 权力的民主交替，没有起义或屠杀；


Given 15 to 20 more years of this unsatisfactory progress, Mexico will become a lower-middle class country like Portugal, Greece, or Poland.	如果这种令人不满意的发展再持续15 到 20年，墨西哥就会变成一个像葡萄牙、希腊或波兰这样的下层中产阶级国家。


But we realistic optimists are no longer holding our breath: we may be disappointed, once again.	但是，我们这些现实主义的乐观派不会再屏息以待了：我们可能会再次感到失望。


The Microfinance Catalyst	小额信贷催化剂


CAMBRIDGE – So-called “impact investors” – providers of capital to businesses that solve social challenges while generating a profit – are the current rage in economic development.	坎布里奇——所谓的“影响投资者”（impact investor）——即为解决社会挑战的企业提供资本并获取利润的投资者——是当前经济发展的新晋推动力。


US President Barack Obama’s Office for Social Innovation and Civic Participation recently convened more than 100 practitioners to discuss how impact investing could be unleashed in the United States and the developing world.	美国总统奥巴马的社会创新和公民参与办公室（Office for Social Innovation and Civic Participation）最近召集了100多位影响投资者，讨论影响投资如何在美国和发展中国家开展。


The United Nations Foundation and the US State Department have launched a $50 million public-private partnership to promote clean cooking stoves in poor countries.	联合国基金会和美国国务院成立了一个5亿美元的公私合作计划，用以在穷国推广清洁厨灶。


In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France, development agencies are looking to reposition some of their funding to businesses serving the poor.	英国、荷兰和法国的发展机构正在考虑将部分资金配置于扶贫事业。


According to the World Bank, roughly 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty (earning less than $1.25/day), and 2.6 billion in moderate poverty (less than $2/day).	据世界银行统计，大约14亿人生活在极端贫困中（每天收入不足1. 25美元），26亿人生活在一般贫困中（每天收入不足2美元）。


More than a billion of the moderately poor – a number that exceeds Africa’s total population – live in South Asia.	10亿多一般贫困人口——比整个非洲的总人口还要多——生活在南亚。


Can impact investing do more to reduce global poverty than so many previous efforts, all of which have struggled to have any impact at all?	影响投资能够在消除全球贫困方面胜过收效甚微的老办法吗？


Impoverished populations desperately require lighting, fuel for cooking, affordable and accessible health care, clean water, elementary education, and financial services.	贫困人口急需照明、烹饪用燃料、可负担且易获得的医疗、清洁水源、基础教育以及金融服务。


Government programs to supply these needs are plagued with corruption (by some estimates 50-70% of all welfare spending in India is stolen) and unable to provide quality services.	供给这些需求的政府计划深受腐败困扰（有人估计，印度大约50—70%的福利支出被盗用了），而且无法提供高质量的服务。


Moreover, large companies have been unable to serve these populations’ needs, because to do so would require them to reinvent their existing business models around new product, distribution, and pricing paradigms.	此外，大公司则无法满足这些人口的需要，因为这要求它们围绕新产品、新物流和新定价体系重新规划已有的商业模式。


This type of disruptive innovation usually comes from entrepreneurs.	这类破坏性创新通常由企业家来完成。


But entrepreneurs face daunting barriers, such as inadequate logistics, lack of consumer financing, poorly trained workers, consumer distrust of new technologies, high-cost marketing channels, backlash from existing merchants or moneylenders, and under-developed regulation.	但企业家面临着令人望而生畏的障碍，比如物流不力、消费金融缺乏、工人技能低下、消费者对新技术不信任、营销渠道成本过高、已有商家和贷款者倾轧，以及监管不善。


Surmounting these business challenges is an expensive and slow process, and new ventures require many years to become cash-positive.	克服这些商业挑战是一件费时费力的事情，新企业得等上好几年才能实现正的现金流。


As a result, commercial providers of debt or equity cannot get the high returns and quick exits that they seek.	因此，商业债权和股权投资者无法获得他们所追求的高回报和快速退出。


When both governments and markets fail, impact investors can stimulate change.	当政府和企业都失灵的时候，还有影响投资者可以刺激变革。


Microfinance – its advent, rise, and recent crises – shows how.	小额信贷——它的产生、崛起以及最近的危机——向我们展示了具体的过程。


The microfinance industry began in the 1980’s in Bangladesh with the non-profit Grameen Bank and BRAC Bank.	小额信贷发轫于20世纪80年代的孟加拉国，由非盈利的格莱珉银行（Grameen Bank）和BRAC银行发起。


Donors soon helped launch other microfinance institutions in Mexico, India, Peru, Indonesia, and many African countries, where they could offer loans at 25-30% interest rates – well below traditional moneylender rates of 60-100% – and still generate strong profit margins.	出资人很快在墨西哥、印度、秘鲁、印尼和许多非洲国家也协助成立了不少小额信贷机构，贷款利率为25—30%，比传统放款人索要的60—100%低得多，尽管如此，小额信贷机构仍能获得很好的收益。


Today, the microfinance industry serves about 150-200 million borrowers around the world, and has grown rapidly by securing access to several billion dollars in equity financing.	如今，小额信贷业在全世界大约拥有1. 5—2亿借款人，而且正在通过动辄数十亿美元的股权融资迅速发展着。


Banco Compartamos in Mexico and SKS Microfinance in India illustrate impact investors’ catalytic role.	墨西哥康帕多银行（Banco Compartamos）和印度SKS小额信贷公司说明了影响投资者的催化剂作用。


Both started as NGOs (following the Grameen model) and received millions in grant money from development institutions to start lending operations.	这两家银行开办时均为非政府机构（参照格莱珉模式），从开发机构中筹得数百万资金开始放款业务。


They also got access to low-cost lending from government banks and multilateral institutions such as the International Finance Corporation (the World Bank’s commercial-lending arm) and the US Agency for International Development.	它们也可以以较低的成本从政府银行和跨国机构（如世界银行的商业贷款部门国际金融公司和美国国际开发署）那里获得贷款。


Within a few years, as their loan books began to grow rapidly, Compartamos and SKS created for-profit businesses that were owned by their respective NGOs.	不出几年，它们的贷款规模就开始快速增加，康帕多和SKS成立了由各自非政府机构所有的盈利业务部门。


Subsequently, they raised equity capital from investors seeking to make a social impact – Compartamos from Accion and the IFC, and SKS from Unitus, Silicon Valley venture capitalist Vinod Khosla, and an Indian government development agency.	接着，它们向寻求社会影响的投资者募集股本——康帕多的股东来自Accion和IFC，而SKS的股东则来自Unitus、硅谷风险投资家科斯拉（Vinod Khosla）以及印度政府开发署。


An initial public offering in 2007 followed for Compartamos, valuing the company at $2.2 billion.	2007年，康帕多成功IPO，估值达22亿美元。


SKS raised more equity from investors such as Sequoia and Odyssey Capital, before going public on the Indian stock exchange in 2010, raising about $358 million at a valuation exceeding $1.6 billion.	SKS从红杉（Sequoia）和奥德赛（Odyssey）资本等投资者处筹集了更多的股本，并于2010年在印度证交所上市，筹资3. 58亿美元，估值超过16亿美元。


Impact investors’ support eventually led to flows of commercial capital – both VC funding and IPO investors – into Compartamos, SKS, and many other microfinance institutions.	影响投资者的支持最终吸引了商业资本（包括风险投资基金和IPO投资者）流入康帕多、SKS和其他许多小额信贷机构。


Despite these successes, however, microfinance has struggled recently in India.	但是，尽管有这些成功的例子，但小额信贷目前在印度举步维艰。


Credit histories cannot be shared, because a credit bureau is just getting started.	信用记录无法共享，因为信用档案才刚刚开始建立。


Moreover, an appropriate consumer-protection code and a nationwide regulatory framework are still lacking.	另外，合适的消费者保护法和全国性的监管框架也有待建立。


Not surprisingly, some have sought to exploit the poor as a result, which has put pressure on the authorities to “do something.”	毫不奇怪，已经有人开始打起了穷人的主意，使得当局不得不“有所作为”。


Unfortunately, this often results in inadvertent harm.	不幸的是，这样做通常会造成无心之失。


For example, the Andhra Pradesh state government passed a restrictive ordinance making it difficult for microfinance institutions to recover their loans from their clients.	比如，安德拉邦政府通过的一项严格的法令使小额信贷机构难以从其客户那里收回贷款成本。


As a result, many institutions had to write off much of their loan portfolios and take heavy losses, sending shock waves through the industry and the investor community – and causing the poor to suffer.	结果，许多小额信贷机构不得不大量减记贷款，承受巨额损失，影响波及整个小额信贷业，令投资者受惊，更令穷人遭罪。


The lesson is that markets simply cannot work without accompanying public goods and high-quality government supervision.	小额信贷的教训是，没有公共品和高质量的政府监管，光靠市场是无法良好运转的。


Although impact investors can lay the groundwork for commercial investors, they must also work in unison with government authorities to ensure well-functioning market systems.	尽管影响投资者可以为商业投资者打好前哨战，但他们必须与政府当局密切合作才能确保市场机制起作用。


Only when such systems are firmly established will the poor be able to participate in today’s vast global economy.	只有这样的机制被很好地建立起来，穷人才能参与到全球经济的广阔天地中。


The Middle East Awakening	中东的觉醒


BERLIN – When the democratic revolt in Tunisia successfully ousted the old regime, the world reacted with amazement. Democracy from below in the Arab world?	发自柏林——当突尼斯民主革命成功推翻了旧政权之时，整个世界都为之震惊不已：莫非由下至上的阿拉伯民主时代已经降临了？


After the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s 30 year-old regime in Egypt, the heartland of the Middle East, amazement has turned into certainty.	这股浪潮随后蔓延到位处中东心脏地带的埃及，胡斯尼·穆巴拉克30年统治的垮台使所有的震惊都转化成了确信。


The Middle East has awakened and begun to enter the globalized world of the twenty-first century.	中东已然觉醒并着手投身到21世纪的全球化世界当中。


Up to now, the region (excluding Israel and Turkey) had more or less missed out on the epochal process of worldwide modernization.	事实上，迄今为止该区域国家（以色列和土耳其除外）都在某种程度上与宏伟的现代化进程脱节了。


Whether the Arab and wider Islamic world’s democratic awakening will actually prevail or produce only change at the top of authoritarian regimes, whether it will lead to a stable order or sustained chaos and radicalization, still remains unclear.	但阿拉伯地区或更广大伊斯兰世界的民主觉醒是否只是一场高层政权更替，而最终实现的是稳定的秩序还是持续的混乱和极端主义化，这些都是未知之数。


One thing, however, is already clear: the era when this vast region slept while others modernized has ended.	但有一点可以确定：那个全球现代化唯独中东沉睡的时代已经过去了。


The grassroots revolt will, of course, continue.	这场草根革命无疑将继续延续下去，该区域任何国家都无法置身事外。


Virtually no country in the region will escape it, though when and where the next eruption will occur remains uncertain. Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are all candidates, with the latter probably posing the most difficulties.	虽然下一场革命爆发的时间和地点尚未明朗，但伊朗，叙利亚和沙特等国都有潜在可能，虽然发生在后者身上的革命可能是最为艰难的。


Israel, too, would be well advised to prepare for epochal change in the region and try to reach a peace settlement with the Palestinians and Syria as quickly as possible.	而与此同时，全球各方也会对以色列加以劝告，要求其准备好迎接该区域的巨变，并借机与巴勒斯坦和叙利亚两方尽快达成和平协议。


There is, however, little indication that Israel’s government has the vision required for such an undertaking.	然而目前的迹象却表明以色列政府缺乏足够的战略眼光去完成这一任务。


The problems are the same almost everywhere (with the exception of Israel and Turkey): political suppression, economic underdevelopment and grinding poverty (except in the smaller oil states), a lack of education, high unemployment, and huge demographic pressures, owing to a very young and rapidly growing population.	除了以色列和土耳其两国外，中东各国所遇到的困难几乎都是一个模子出来的：政治压迫，经济落后以及难以承受的贫困（那些小产油国除外），教育缺乏，失业居高，还有由一个非常年轻且快速增长的人口所来带来的巨大压力。


These problems have been cited, year after year, in the United Nations Development Program’s reports.	上述问题在联合国发展计划署的年度报告中已是屡见不鲜。


Moreover, the situation was exacerbated by the incompetence of the region’s authoritarian regimes, which have been unable to provide their young people with any prospects beyond repression.	同时区内各政权的低能又进一步加剧了情况的恶化，它们无法给本国的年轻人带来任何希望，只有无尽的沮丧。


So it was only a matter of time until this powder keg was ignited.	因此这个矛盾积压的火药桶被点燃只是一个时间问题。


The fuses were the new information technologies of the Internet and satellite television, such as Al Jazeera.	而火药桶上的导火索则是新信息技术和类似半岛电视台这样的卫星电视频道。


Indeed, one historical irony is that it wasn’t American hard power – as applied, for example, in the Iraq war – that furthered this democratic revolution, but rather its soft power – Twitter and Facebook – which was much maligned under George W. Bush and his neocon advisers.	如果将来回顾历史的话，估计最讽刺的一点莫过于助推这场民主革命的并非美国的硬实力——比如施加于伊拉克身上的一切——而是软实力——Twitter（推特）和facebook（脸谱）网站——而这些东西恰好是小布什和他手下那帮准保守主义顾问最为痛恨的。


Silicon Valley, it seems, has more potency than the Pentagon.	由此看来硅谷似乎比五角大楼更具威力。


These digital tools from the United States became the instruments for a trans-Arabian/Iranian youth revolt for freedom and democracy.	这些来自美国的数码玩意成为了泛阿拉伯/伊朗年轻人争取自由和民主的利器。


And, although many things in the Middle East are in short supply, there is no dearth of hopeless young people, whose numbers will continue to grow in the coming years.	中东地区什么都缺，独不缺乏对前途沮丧失望的年轻人，而他们的数量在未来还不继续增加。


Indeed, whatever resemblance events on Cairo’s Tahrir Square bear to May 1968 in Paris and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it would be premature to proclaim that freedom has prevailed.	事实上，不管开罗解放广场上发生的事件与1968年5月巴黎学生运动以及1989年柏林墙倒塌的事件如何相似，现在依然不是宣布自由已经实现的时候。


Whether it does will depend to a large degree on how the West responds now, because what is at stake is not just the ousting of tyrants, but also the profound transformation and modernization of entire societies and economies. It is a staggering task.	自由的到来在很大程度上将取决于西方目前的反应，因为最重要的不仅仅是推翻暴政，还有整个社会经济的深刻转型和现代化，而后者将是一个无比艰巨的任务。


Moreover, compared to Eastern Europe in 1989, the Middle East in 2011 lacks any stabilizing external structures, such as NATO and the European Union, that could influence domestic reforms by holding out the prospect of membership.	此外，相对于1989年的东欧剧变，2011年的中东革命缺乏任何像北约和欧盟这样的外部稳定性架构，而这些组织可以用获取成员国资格的前景来影响地方改革。


The efforts involved in this great transformation must come from within these societies, and this in all likelihood is asking too much.	虽然这场大转型中所包含的力量必须来自于这些社会的内部，而要求这些社会仅凭自身力量去实现这一点显然要求过高了。


Eastern Europe’s transformation after 1989 took a lot longer and was much more costly than originally envisaged.	1989年后的东欧转型过程比原先预想的耗时更长，代价也更大。


There were many people who lost out during this transformation, and the democratic revolution’s organizers were not necessarily those who could push through the democratic and economic development.	许多人成为了转型的受害者，而那些民主革命的组织者们也不一定能胜任民主和经济发展推动者的角色。


And there is the experience of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004, which failed a few years later due to the estrangement, incompetence, and corruption of its leaders.	这也是乌克兰2004年“橙色革命”所带来的教训，这场革命在领导者的内部分裂，无能和腐败之下终于在几年后宣告失败。


Taken together, these constraints and analogies suggest that the West, particularly Europe, should focus on long-term assistance for the democratic and economic development of the Middle East’s reborn countries, and also on partnerships with all forces that support their countries’ democratization and modernization. The West can no longer continue with Realpolitik as usual.	总的来说，这一系列限制因素和类似案例都说明西方（尤其是欧洲）必须将注意力集中在这些中东“新生国家”的长期民主建构和经济发展之上，同时要也与所有支持该地区民主化和现代化进程的力量通力合作，也不能再像以往那样操弄权力政治手段了。


These tasks call for largesse, both financial and otherwise (opportunities to travel, for example, were of vital importance in locking in the democratic aspirations of East Europeans after 1989), and they require decades, not years, of persistence.	这些任务都需要慷慨的援助，既在金融方面，也包括其他方面（比如旅行签证机会就是1989年后锁定东欧地区民主渴望的极端重要因素），并且需要数十年如一日的坚持。


In other words, success will be expensive – very expensive – which will be anything but popular in the current economic downturn.	换句话说，成功的代价不菲——而且是非常昂贵——在这个经济低迷时期甚至要欧洲领导人付出民望为代价。


But a democracy that does not translate into regular dinners is a democracy that is bound to fail.	但一个无法形成日常规律的民主制度是注定无法延续的。


Economic aid, the opening of the EU and US markets, strategic energy projects, legal and constitutional advice, and cooperation between universities are among the resources that the West must supply if it wants to contribute to the success of the Middle East’s democratic awakening.	如果想为中东的民主觉醒做出贡献的话，西方必须提供一系列资源，包括经济援助、欧盟和美国市场的开放、战略能源计划，法律和宪政建议以及大学之间的合作等等。


Should this awakening fail, the result will be a radicalization throughout the region.	而假如这场觉醒最终破产的话，后果就会是整个区域的极端主义化。


There can be no return to the status quo ante. The genie is out of the bottle.	到时想亡羊补牢已是太迟，因为恶魔早已逃出了神灯，再也无法收服了。


The Middle East in Motion	中东在行动


BERLIN – Great speeches are all too often underestimated as being mere words.	柏林——人们经常低估伟大的演讲，认为那不过是空话而已。


In fact, they can have powerful consequences.	实际上，这些话可以产生巨大的影响。


This is obviously the case with President Barack Obama’s recent address to the Muslim world in Cairo, because – mere coincidence or excellent timing? – things in the Middle East have been in flux ever since.	巴拉克·奥巴马总统不久前在开罗对穆斯林世界的讲话显然就属于此类（无论是纯属巧合还是精心选择的时机），因为中东局势从此就变得动荡不安。


Since Obama’s Cairo speech, there have been elections in Lebanon where, surprisingly, the alliance of pro-Western parties scored a clear victory against Hezbollah and its allies.	奥巴马开罗讲话后，黎巴嫩进行选举，出人意料的是，亲西方政党联盟以明显优势战胜了黎真主党及其盟友。


Also noteworthy in that election is that the losing side immediately accepted defeat and that Syria is now obviously serious about building a new rapport with Lebanon.	值得一提的还有选举中落败的一方立即接受了失败，叙利亚显然真想与黎巴嫩建立新的友好关系。


Iran’s recent “election” saw blatant manipulation in favor of the incumbent president incite a democratic mass uprising.	现任总统操纵伊朗不久前的“选举”明显激起了一场民变。


One is astonished by the fact that Iran’s government did not opt for transparency immediately, by promptly and comprehensively providing the facts about the voting, facts that it alone possesses.	人们吃惊地看到伊朗政度没有立即选择公开信息，迅速全面地提供由它单方面掌握的投票的事实数据。


After all, if President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has genuinely won by a margin of 2:1, there is nothing to fear.	毕竟，如果马哈茂德•艾哈迈迪－内贾德总统真的以2：1的优势比例获胜，那就没什么值得害怕的。


What is happening, however, is precisely the opposite, and for this there is only one explanation: the election was rigged.	但实际发生的情况却恰恰相反，而对此仅有选举舞弊这一种解释。


The election fraud in Iran has caused a mass movement in the country’s cities, which – this much is clear even now – will fundamentally change the country.	伊朗发生的选举欺诈在城市里引发了群众抗议运动，这将从根本上改变伊朗的国内局势，即使在现阶段这也是不言自明的事实。


Indeed, either the regime will resort to brute force to suppress the protests, thus abandoning any pretense of democratic legitimacy in favor of de facto military dictatorship, or it will find it impossible to beat the subversive genie of democracy back into its bottle, and Iran will increasingly open up and reform itself.	实际上伊朗政权或者借助暴力镇压抗议群众，并自此撕下民主合法性的伪装露出军事独裁的本来面目，若非如此，它将不可能降服颠覆性的民主妖怪，重新把它装回到瓶子里，伊朗也会慢慢走向开放和改革。


In the case of violent suppression, the West will find it a lot harder to hold talks with Iran over its nuclear program, because the regime will be able to rely for its survival solely on isolation and confrontation with the outside world.	如果发生暴力镇压事件，西方与伊朗的核问题谈判会遭遇更大的困难，因为与外界的隔离和对抗将成为伊朗政权赖以生存的基础。


Moreover, talks with the regime would give rise to substantial legitimacy problems in the West.	此外，与伊朗政权的谈判将在西方国家引发严重的合法性问题。


The Islamic Republic will not be able to get away with the Chinese option – to combine political suppression at home with economic reform and greater openness to the outside world – because its structures are too weak and brittle for this.	因为伊朗的政治结构过于脆弱，这个伊斯兰共和国不可能像中国那样侥幸成功，把国内的政治压迫、经济改革和对外开放混合在一起。


The ruling ideology, moreover, is unlikely to survive such a step unharmed.	此外，现在处于统治地位的意识形态不大可能完好无损地逃过此劫。


Indeed, aside from matters of domestic policy and the issue of internal freedom, the choice between the major candidates hinges on the question of whether Iran should seek greater international integration.	实际除了国内政策和内部自由问题以外，主要竞选者的选择围绕伊朗是否应寻求更多的国际融合展开。


Ahmadinejad stands for a policy of confrontation and partial isolation; Moussavi stands for more openness.	艾哈迈迪－内贾德支持对抗和部分孤立的政策，而穆萨维则支持更多的开放。


A policy of opening the country would therefore quickly put the regime’s existence at risk.	开放政策因此将迅速对政权的生存造成威胁。


If Ahmadinejad prevails, the dilemma for the West will be that it will have to deal with a regime discredited by election fraud, but still indispensable for resolving almost all of the Middle East’s important problems: Iran’s own nuclear program and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.	如果艾哈迈迪－内贾德获胜，西方将面临着被迫与在选举欺诈中丧失信誉的政府打交道的尴尬局面，在解决伊朗自身核计划、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、伊拉克、黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦等中东几乎所有的重要问题中，伊朗政府的作用都不可或缺。


Iran is also a key player in cooling the hot spots in the Caucasus and Central Asia.	伊朗在解决高加索和中亚热点问题时也发挥着重要作用。


A regime in Tehran that must demonstrate external strength to survive its shattered legitimacy at home would therefore make the comprehensive, negotiated settlement that the West seeks much more difficult and risky, if not impossible, to achieve.	德黑兰政权必须展示对外力量，才能闯过国内合法性遭到破坏的难关，这会使西方力求达到的综合谈判解决方案更难更危险，甚至根本不可能实现。


Things have also started to move in a third area: the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.	第三方问题的解决也开始启动：那就是以色列和巴勒斯坦争端。


Obama wants a two-state solution, but, unlike Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, he hasn’t postponed tackling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until the end of his second term in office.	奥巴马致力于达成两国解决方案，但不同于比尔·克林顿及乔治·W·布什总统的是，他没有等到第二届总统任期临近结束时才着手解决以巴冲突。


Instead, Obama has energetically confronted the issue from the start.	相反，奥巴马从一开始就选择积极面对。


He also doesn’t shy away from a limited conflict with Israel’s government concerning the West Bank settlements.	他同样没有回避在西岸定居点问题上与以色列政府的有限度的冲突。


The conditions for serious negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, are anything but good, owing to a lack of partners on both sides.	但由于在巴以双方同样缺乏伙伴，无法用好来形容以巴冲突正式谈判的条件。


Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has now committed himself to a Palestinian state, and the Hamas leadership, which rejects Israel’s right to exist, has agreed to a Palestinian state within the borders prior to June 5, 1967.	本杰明·内塔尼亚胡总理已承诺支持巴勒斯坦建国，而拒绝承认以色列生存权的哈马斯领导人也已原则同意在1967年6月5日的边界范围内建立巴勒斯坦国。


But the provisos that each side would demand of the other put into question the sincerity of their commitment to a two-state solution.	可是双方向对方提出的附加条件让人们怀疑他们是否真��诚意地支持两国解决方案。


Yet only a government of the Israeli right can end the expansion of the settlements, and only Hamas can stop the violence against Israel.	但只有以色列右翼政府才能结束扩建定居点，也只有哈马斯才能停止对以色列的暴力袭击。


These two questions – settlements and security – will have to be simultaneously resolved in a practical manner if the peace process is to be restarted.	如果和平进程想要重启，定居点和安全这两大问题必须以务实的方式同时得到解决。


If Obama wants to make serious progress in this conflict, he will have to get the Netanyahu government and Hamas to negotiate.	如果奥巴马想在冲突中真正取得进展，他必须让内塔尼亚胡政府和哈马斯谈判。


This may seem impossible from today’s perspective, but appearances can deceive.	从当前情况看这似乎可能性甚微，但只看表象可能会产生错觉。


Such negotiations will be possible if and when both sides – Israel and the Palestinians – form governments of national unity.	只有当以色列和巴勒斯坦双方成立民族团结政府，才有可能启动这样的谈判。


Today’s flux in the Middle East is a highly ambivalent affair, because the situation can improve or (more likely) deteriorate.	今天中东地区的变化充满矛盾，因为中东局势可能因此改善，但更可能因此恶化。


But one thing is certain: if the present impasse continues, the situation will only get worse.	但有一点可以肯定：如果当前的僵局持续下去，局面只会进一步恶化。


So it is right to take the risks that change requires.	因此甘冒变化所须的风险是正确的选择。


The Middle East’s Five Crises	中东的五大危机


The region between Egypt and Pakistan is a cauldron of five discrete, explosive components: Iraq’s civil strife, Afghanistan’s insurgency, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the longstanding Israel-Arab conflict, and the risk of clashes between extremist groups and corrupt, repressive governments.	在埃及与巴基斯坦之间的地区融合着五个互不相干、爆炸性的元素，即伊拉克内乱、阿富汗的叛乱、伊朗的核野心、旷日持久的以阿冲突以及在极端主义团体与腐败、压迫的政府之间冲突的危险。


A comprehensive policy is needed, yet the threats are so diverse and complex that separate approaches have to be applied simultaneously.	需要采取一个全面性的政策来解决这些问题，然而威胁的种类是如此多样化并且复杂，各种措施必须要多管齐下才会有效果。


In Iraq, America’s policy of building a semi-federal state of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds runs a high risk of failure because of Shiite domination, Sunni and Shiite terrorism, Kurdish separatism, and meddling by Iran.	在伊拉克，美国关于建立一个由什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人组成的半联邦政府的策略因为什叶派的支配地位、逊尼派和什叶派的恐怖活动、库尔德人的分裂主义以及伊朗的干涉而极有可能走向失败。


The cost in lives is already unbearably high.	生命的代价已经到达难以容忍地高的程度。


The United States cannot sustain the current rate of casualties (either American or Iraqi), or the expense.	美国无法承受目前的伤亡率（不管是美国的还是伊拉克的）以及费用。


To create the conditions for long-term stability, a negotiated separation may be needed, comparable to the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in former Yugoslavia.	为了给长期稳定创造条件，也许需要一种与结束前南战争的戴顿和平协议相类似的通过谈判对国家进行分割。


Separating Iraq’s populations would be painful.	把伊拉克的人民分割开是令人痛苦的。


The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the US-led coalition forces should help people who want to move to other parts of the country.	联合国难民事务高级专员公署和美国领导的联合部队应当帮助那些想要搬到国家的其他地区去的人们。


One may object that to facilitate internal relocation is to collaborate with “ethnic or religious cleansing”; but the toll of prolonged war in Iraq, which could lead to its dismemberment anyway, is much worse.	也许有人会反对说实施内部的重新安置无异于在迎合“种族或宗教清洗”。 但是伊拉克长期战争的代价无疑会不管如何都会导致它的分割，是比这更糟糕的结果。


The principle of pluralism is valuable, but curbing bloodshed deserves priority.	多元化的原则是有价值的，但是制止流血冲突是应该被优先考虑的问题。


A Dayton-like agreement can be achieved only if the UN Security Council backs it.	一份与戴顿和平协议类似的协议只有在联合国安理会支持的情况下才能达成。


It would be in the long-term interest of the permanent members to do so.	这样做符合常任理事国的长期利益。


Russia and China would, however, be helpful only if America changes the current Bush administration’s approach.	然而，俄罗斯和中国只有在美国在改变目前布什政府的做法时才会进行帮助。


Such an initiative would need to be supported strongly by the European Union.	这样的一种倡议需要得到欧盟的强力支持。


Perhaps tri-partite mediation, backed by the US, the EU, and Russia would increase the chances.	也许由美国、欧盟和俄罗斯三方共同进行的调停会增加成功的机会。


The Arab League and the Conference of Islamic States should be consulted and involved.	阿盟和伊斯兰国家委员会也应该被咨询和参与进来。


The US and other coalition forces would have to withdraw gradually, beginning from the south of Iraq.	美国和其他联合国家的联合部队必须逐步地撤离，首先从伊拉克的南部开始。


Foreign forces would still be needed to help protect the Sunni population west of Baghdad and in the middle of Iraq against the Shiite south, as well as in the Kurdish north to keep Turkey from intervening.	依然需要外国军队来帮助保护巴格达西部和伊拉克中部的逊尼派部落不受南部的什叶派侵犯，同时保护北部的库尔德人不会受到土耳其的干涉。


A peaceful separation agreement would require international peacekeepers with contributions from many powers, including Islamic states, India, China, and Japan.	一份和平分割协议需要由多个大国，包括伊斯兰国家、印度、中国和日本组成的国际维和部队的介入。


As stability in the Middle East is essential to them, this is a matter of enlightened self-interest.	因为中东的稳定对于它们来说非常重要，这完全符合它们的自身开明的利益。


Those of Iraq’s neighbors that are potential spoilers would need to be restrained by a Security Council mandate for such a Dayton-type settlement.	那些可能成为破坏者的伊拉克邻国需要受到安理会对于这样一种戴顿式安排的指令的约束。


In Afghanistan, NATO-led military operations against the neo-Taliban and other opponents of state-building offer only a partial and temporary solution.	在阿富汗，北约领导的打击新塔利班和其他反对建立国家的人的军事行动只能给问题带来部分和暂时的解决。


The influx of insurgents from Pakistan will not stop.	从巴基斯坦来的叛乱分子会源源不断地进来。


The population sees little improvement in living conditions and expects Western forces to leave after a few years.	当地的人民没有看到生活条件有多少改善，并且希望西方军队过几年会离开。


Most Afghans will then be ruled again by tribal leaders, Islamists, drug barons, and warlords.	到那时大多数阿富汗人会被部落首领、伊斯兰教徒、毒品大亨和军阀所统治。


The Western aim of building Afghanistan up as a stable and more or less democratic state is extremely ambitious; it may be wiser to help stabilize Kabul and the relatively quiet northern part of the country.	西方关于把阿富汗建成一个稳定和多多少少民主的国家的目标需要极大的努力才能实现； 更理智的也许是帮助稳定喀布尔和这个国家相对平静的北部地区。


The difficult south will sooner or later return to Pashtun politics.	而困难的南部地区早晚会回到普什图部族的统治下。


The outside world’s chief interest is to curb heroin production and destroy terrorist training camps.	外部世界主要关心的是制止海洛因的生产以及捣毁恐怖分子的训练营。


But destroying poppy crops has been turning Afghan farmers against NATO.	但是捣毁罂粟作物使阿富汗的农民站在了北约的对立面。


So it is smarter to go after the heroin bosses and their foreign networks, and in the meantime buy the poppy crop from farmers to destroy it.	所以更明智的做法是打击制造海洛因的老板和他们的海外网络，同时从农民手上购买罂粟作物然后将之毁灭。


Encouraging a shift to legal cash crops and food requires time and heavy investment.	鼓励转向合法的经济作物和食品需要时间和巨大的投资。


This will only work where there is security for the local population.	这只有在当地人感觉安全时才会实现。


Meanwhile, international sanctions are unlikely to dissuade Iran’s government from pursuing nuclear weapons, while a preventive strike by Israel – which would not sit idly by when Iranian nuclear forces become operational – or by the US, would encourage terrorist attacks against their populations.	与此同时，国际制裁不太可能劝说伊朗政府放弃追求核武器，而以色列不会坐视伊朗的核力量达到可操作的水平——或美国的预防性攻击只会促使恐怖分子攻击他们的人民。


The most promising approach might be sanctions against leading personalities, and against transfers of technology and funding, as well as covert operations, to delay Iran’s nuclear weapons program.	最有希望的方式也许是制裁领导人、技术和资金的转移以及隐蔽的行动，以延缓伊朗的核武器计划。


In the meantime, Iran’s youthful population may become more politically active and demand democratization and improved living conditions.	与此同时，伊朗的年轻一代在政治上会变得更活跃，要求民主和改善生活条件。


It is uncertain how long the old clerical leadership and the country’s nationalist politicians can hold on to power, although high oil and gas prices have been shielding them so far.	目前并不清楚老一代的教权领导层和这个国家的民族主义政治家在权利的位置能够呆多久，尽管高昂的石油和天然气到目前为止一直在保护着他们。


Gaining time before a disastrous confrontation between Israel and Iran becomes inevitable would be smarter than taking an aggressive approach now.	在以色列与伊朗之间灾难性的冲突变得不可避免前赢得时间比现在就采取攻击性的行动要明智得多。


As for Israel and its neighbors, an agreement on the Golan Heights has already been prepared, but needs external mediation and pressure if it is to be signed.	至于以色列和它的邻居，一份戈兰高地的协约已经被准备好了，但是需要外部的调解和压力才能最终被签订。


State-building in Lebanon will require strong UN and EU support, and the courage to curb Hezbollah’s influence.	在黎巴嫩建立国家需要联合国和欧盟强有力的支持以及约束真主党的影响力的勇气。


The Israeli government and Palestinian political leaders are locked in a ruinous struggle, which merely aids extremists on both sides.	以色列政府和巴勒斯坦政治领导人正陷于一场毁灭性的战争中，这只会帮助两方的极端分子。


The mutual struggle will therefore continue until there is strong enough external pressure to accept a peace agreement.	相互的战争因此将持续下去直到有足够强大的外部压力使双方接受一份和平协议。


Israel will have to vacate a large number of Jewish settlements on Palestinian territory, and accept joint international administration or division of Jerusalem.	以色列将不得不搬出位于巴勒斯坦领土上的大量犹太人定居点，并且接受对耶路撒冷的联合国际管制或划分。


Israel will never agree to this unless forced by the US.	除非受到美国的强迫以色列永远不会接受这样的协议。


A US-brokered peace agreement would need to be supported by the UN Security Council and implemented by peacekeeping troops with large contributions from many members of the UN.	一份由美国担当中间人的和平协议需要得到联合国安理会的支持，以及由联合公司多个成员国充分参与的维和部队来进行具体的实施。


Of course, it is unlikely that the Bush administration would bring this about.	当然，指望布什政府去做这样的事情是不太现实的。


The EU is still too slow and fragmented.	欧盟的发展依然很缓慢，也没有做到团结一致。


So the new American president will have to take the lead in 2009.	所以新的美国总统必须在2009年来带这个头。


In the meantime, the EU should get its act together and take clear decisions on a joint Middle East policy.	与此同时，欧盟应该采取联合的行动，并且在统一的中东政策问题上做出明确的决策。


The Middle East’s Hair Trigger	一触即发的中东局势


TEL AVIV – Across the Middle East, a fatalistic conventional wisdom is taking hold: war is unavoidable.	特拉维夫 —— 宿命论的传统智慧正在中东各国抬头：战争一定会不可避免的爆发。


Some see war as a way of resolving an increasingly deadlocked situation, shaking up a dysfunctional regional order whose main actors are not only at loggerheads, but are also incapable of resolving the legitimacy deficits of their respective regimes.	有人把战争看作打开僵持局面的唯一方法，依靠战争彻底调整不正常的地区秩序，因为目前各主要势力不仅分歧严重，并且无法解决各自政府在合法性方面的危机。


A volley of incendiary remarks between Israel and both Syria and Hezbollah has fueled anxieties about the possibility of war on Israel’s northern border.	以色列和叙利亚以及真主党之间新一轮密集的煽动性言论已经引发了对于以色列北部边境可能爆发战争的担忧。


The level of sensitivity is such that the latest tension was initiated by the Syrians, who misinterpreted as a threat Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s call to start peace negotiations precisely in order to prevent “an all-out regional war.”	局势非常敏感，而叙利亚人的误解则让紧张局势进一步加剧，他们将以色列国防部长 埃胡德·巴拉克启动和平谈判的呼吁错误地理解为威胁，而巴拉克启动和谈的目的正是要防止“爆发全面的地区战争。 ”


Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, for the first time explicitly warned the Israelis that a new round of conflict would no longer be confined to an Israeli-Lebanese showdown, but would involve the entire regional “axis of confrontation” – Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.	真主党领导人 哈桑·纳斯鲁拉首次公开警告以色列，新一轮冲突将不仅再局限于以色列－黎巴嫩之间的对决，而会牵扯到整个地区的“对峙轴心” —— 叙利亚、伊朗、真主党和哈马斯。


This would also be the case if Israel unleashed its Air Force against Iran’s nuclear installations.	如果以色列对伊朗核设施发动空袭也将爆发全面冲突。


Moreover, Nasrallah made it clear that Israel’s “Dahyia Doctrine” of total devastation of Lebanon in case of war would be answered in kind.	此外，纳斯鲁拉明确指出以色列在战争中彻底摧毁黎巴嫩的“达伊亚主义”将招致同样的报复。


The prospect of a Middle East conflagration has prompted an airlift of senior American officials to Israel to warn of the devastating consequences that an Israeli attack on Iran might have.	中东可能燃起的这场大火促使大量美国高官飞赴以色列，警告以色列袭击伊朗可能带来的毁灭性后果。


Indeed, the Obama administration’s main challenge these days is not peacemaking, but regional conflict management and preemption.	实际上，奥巴马政府目前所面临的主要任务不是签署和平协定，而是地区冲突管理和事先采取措施。


CIA Director Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen have already come and gone, with Vice President Joe Biden and a high-level delegation of the State Department and the National Security Council due in Jerusalem in early March.	中央情报局局长 里昂·帕内塔和 参谋长联席会议主席迈克·马伦上将已经造访以色列，副总统乔·拜登、国务院和国家安全委员会的高级代表团也定于三月初到访耶路撒冷。


But preventing war will not be easy, because Barack Obama’s mystique has worn off in the Arab world.	但阻止这场战争绝非易事，因为巴拉克·奥巴马身上的神秘色彩已经在阿拉伯世界逐渐消失。


The expectation that he would allow the Arabs, particularly the Syrians and the Palestinians, to recover their land without resorting to arms has been proved, by his own admission, to be unrealistic.	他能让阿拉伯、特别是叙利亚和巴勒斯坦无需动用武力即可收复失地的愿望已经从他本人的口中承认是不现实的。


Nor has he been able to rein in Iran’s relentless drive for regional hegemony, or convince it to abandon its quest for nuclear arms.	他也无法阻止伊朗对地区霸权的不懈追求，无法说服伊朗放弃研制核武器的努力。


Israel will most likely listen to America’s advice and consider a preemptive attack on Iran only after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, and after whatever sanctions are agreed upon fail to cut short Iran’s march toward possessing the bomb.	以色列极有可能听从美国的劝告，只有在所有外交手段全部用尽、各方同意实施的所有制裁都无法阻止伊朗拥有核武器的努力后才会考虑实施先发制人的打击。


No matter how unjustified Israel’s traditional military behavior seems in the eyes of its enemies and critics, it has always aspired to base its military actions on grounds that can be justified.	无论以色列传统的军事行动在敌人和批评家的眼里看来有多不正当，但以色列一直希望在正当的状况下采取军事行动。


This would seem to be particularly true when it comes to an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.	针对伊朗核设施的袭击尤其如此。


Israel would not like to be seen as the spoiler of a diplomatic solution to a dispute that in any case cannot be resolved by military means alone.	以色列不愿被视为外交解决希望的破坏者，因为这场冲突无论如何无法单纯依靠军事手段来加以解决。


Wars in the Middle East, it should be recalled, have started even when the parties did not really want them.	我们应该记得，中东地区的战争即使在违背各方初衷的情况下也曾经有过爆发的记录。


The 1967 war is one example.	1967 年的战争就是实例。


Today’s anxieties, too, are fed by perceptions and fears, by real and imagined concerns.	而成见和恐惧、现实和虚妄的担心也在滋长着今天的忧虑。


The Iranian challenge to Israel’s strategic hegemony is presented as a Holocaust-style existential threat, and Israel’s other enemies – Hezbollah, which believes that it can bring about “the end of the Zionist entity,” and Syria, which publicly boasts of its ballistic missiles’ capacity to destroy Israel’s main urban centers – are similarly viewed as irrational actors.	伊朗对以色列战略霸主地位的挑战被涂上了大屠杀般生存威胁的色彩，而以色列的其他敌人 —— 相信能结束“犹太复国组织”的真主党，还有公开吹嘘其弹道导弹有能力摧毁以色列主要城市的叙利亚 —— 都被同样看作是失去理智的势力。


A covert war between Israel and Iran has been going on for some time now.	以色列和伊朗之间的秘密战争已经持续一段时间了。


The assassinations – allegedly by Israel – of Imad Mughniyah, Hezbollah’s military chief and Iran’s closest ally in the organization, two years ago, and more recently of Mahmoud al-Mahbouh, Hamas’s liaison officer with the Al-Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggest that an unplanned chain of events could trigger a real war.	真主党最高军事统帅兼伊朗最亲密的伙伴 伊马德·慕尼耶在两年前被杀 —— 据称元凶是以色列，以及离现在更近的哈马斯在伊朗革命卫队圣城旅的联络官马哈茂德·马赫博被杀，都表明一连串的意外事件也可能引发一场真正的战争。


The Lebanese front may ignite if Hezbollah seeks to avenge Mughniyah’s death, or simply as a result of a knee-jerk reaction to a provocation, as in 2006.	如果真主党对慕尼耶之死实施报复，或者只是像 2006 年那样在遭到挑衅之后本能地予以反击，都有可能在转瞬之间点燃黎巴嫩前线的战火。


If Iran and Syria then decide to back Hezbollah, a direct Israeli-Iranian showdown could follow.	如果伊朗和叙利亚此后决定支持真主党，一场以色列和伊朗之间的决战就可能不期而至。


What Israel planned as a preemptive attack on Iran might then be presented as an act of self-defense .	以色列抢先对伊朗发动攻击可能会被视为必要的自我防御。


General James Jones, President Obama's national security adviser, recently put forward a different, albeit equally ominous, prediction.	奥巴马总统的国家安全顾问詹姆斯·琼斯将军不久前曾经提出过一种截然不同，但却同样不祥的预测。


Iran's response to the mounting international pressure might be, he said, to launch an attack on Israel through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas.	他说，越来越强的国际压力可能导致伊朗通过其代理组织（真主党和哈马斯）对以色列发动袭击。


Such attacks might trigger a wider regional conflagration.	类似的袭击可能引发大规模的地区冲突。


War threats in the Middle East should never be dismissed as hollow. Prophecies of war, moreover, have too frequently proven themselves to be self-fulfilling.	我们永远也不能轻视来自中东地区的战争威胁。 此外，已经有太多经验证明关于战争的预言有极强的自我应验能力。


But America’s extraordinary efforts to rein in Israel might not be enough to avert a calamity.	但美国遏制以色列的非凡努力可能无法阻止这场灾难的发生。


The days of Pax Americana in the region are over, which means that avoiding a regional explosion will require mobilizing the major international actors that favor diplomatic solutions for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for Iran’s quest to become a legitimate partner in a new regional system.	中东地区在美国治下的和平已经结束，这就意味着避免地区战争的爆发需要动员希望促成阿以冲突外交解决、以及伊朗在新的地区系统中成为合法伙伴的主要国际力量的参与。


The Middle East’s Military Delusions	中东的军事幻觉


The paradox of the current violence in Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon is that the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not hard to see.	当前以色列、加沙和黎巴嫩暴力的自相矛盾之处是，巴以冲突的解决之道并不难以看到。


A large majority of Israelis and Palestinians favor a two-state solution essentially along the pre-1967 boundaries.	以色列和巴勒斯坦的大部分人都赞同基本上沿着1967年之前的边界的建立两个国家的解决途径。


The major Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others, share that view.	主要的阿拉伯国家，包括埃及、沙特阿拉伯以及其他国家都持有这一观点。


The problem lies not in seeing the solution, but in getting to it, because powerful and often violent minorities on both sides oppose the majority-backed solution.	问题并不是发现方案，而是实现方案，因为两方面强大而经常是暴力的少数派反对大多数人支持的方案。


Perhaps three-quarters of Israelis and Palestinians are eager for peace and compromise, while a quarter on each side – often fueled by extreme religious zeal – wants a complete victory over the other.	大约四分之三的以色列人和巴勒斯坦人渴望和平和妥协，而各方四分之一的人经常受到极端宗教狂热的怂恿，想要彻底战胜对方。


Radical Palestinians want to destroy Israel, while radical Israelis demand control over the entire West Bank, through either continued occupation or even (according to a tiny minority) a forcible removal of the Palestinian population.	激进的巴勒斯坦人想要摧毁以色列，而激进的以色列人则要求通过要么继续占领或者甚至是强行驱逐巴勒斯坦人口（极少数人这样认为）而控制整个西岸地带。


When peace appears to be close at hand, radicals on one side of the conflict or the other provoke an explosion to derail it.	当和平看起来垂手可得的时候，冲突一方或者另一方的激进者挑起爆炸性事件进行破坏。


Sometimes this involves overt conflict between moderates and radicals within one side, such as when an Israeli religious zealot assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin when peace negotiations were making progress.	有时候是一方内部温和派和激进派之间的公开冲突，例如正当和平谈判取得进展之际，一名以色列宗教狂热分子暗杀了以色列总理拉宾。


Sometimes this involves a terrorist attack by radical Palestinians against Israeli civilians, in the hope of provoking an exaggerated violent response from Israel that breaks the process of trust building among moderates on both sides.	有时候是激进的巴勒斯坦人对以色列的平民进行恐怖主义攻击，籍以挑起以色列的过激暴力性反应，从而打破双方温和派之间建立信任的进程。


The moderates are in a daily battle with their own extremists, who claim that compromise is impossible.	温和派每天都在与其自己一方的极端主义者斗争。 这些极端主义者宣称妥协是不可能的。


Israeli extremists insist that all Palestinians are intent on destroying the state of Israel itself.	以色列的极端主义者坚持说，所有的巴勒斯坦人都有意摧毁以色列国家。


They take the Palestinian suicide bombings and kidnappings as proof that peace with the other side is impossible.	他们把巴勒斯坦人的自杀爆炸和绑架事件视为无法与对方媾和的证明。


“There are no partners for peace,” goes the refrain.	陈词老调说：“没有什么和平伙伴”。


Palestinian extremists insist that Israel is simply plotting to maintain its occupation over all of Palestine and that withdrawal from Gaza or announced plans to withdraw partly from the West Bank are merely tactical, without giving up real control over land, transport, water, defense, and other attributes of sovereignty.	巴勒斯坦极端主义者坚持说，以色列只不过是打算维持其对所有巴勒斯坦领土的占领，而且从加沙撤军或者宣布从约旦河西岸部分撤军只不过是战术性的，并没有放弃对陆上、交通、水、国防以及主权的其它特征的控制。


The extremists have been able to block peace because any attack from one side has systematically provoked a violent counterattack from the other.	极端主义者有能力阻碍和平，因为来自一方的攻击有步骤地挑起了另一方的暴力反攻。


Moderates are repeatedly made to look weak, naïve, and idealistic.	温和派不断地被搞得看起来软弱、天真以及理想化。


The extremists also peddle the appealing fantasy that total victory is somehow possible, often by personalizing the battle.	极端主义者还经常通过把战斗个人化而鼓吹引人入胜的幻觉，那就是全面胜利是可能的。


Israeli forces regularly try to “decapitate” the violent opposition by killing Palestinian leaders, as if the problem were a few individuals rather than ongoing political stalemate.	以色列军队定期地试图通过杀害巴勒斯坦领导人来将暴力抵抗运动予以“斩首”，好像问题是几个人而不是贯穿全局的的政治僵局。


Violent Palestinians, for their part, propagandize that Israel will lose its nerve in the face of another terrorist attack.	而暴力的巴勒斯坦人则在他们那方面则宣传说，只要再有一次恐怖主义攻击，以色列就会在意志上垮掉。


In an environment as deadly as this, the details and symbolism of a possible settlement are bound to loom very large.	在这样一种致命的环境中，可能的解决的细节和象征意义肯定会十分巨大。


Israelis and Palestinians came close to agreement on “land for peace” in the context of the Oslo peace process.	以色列和巴勒斯坦在奥斯陆和平进程的条件下几乎达成了“土地换和平”的协议。


Both sides endorsed something like the pre-1967 borders, yet the deal was not quite struck, with each side claiming intransigence by the other on one or another point.	双方都同意1967年以前的边界，但是协议并没有达成，各方都宣称对方在这一点或那一点上不让步。


Such a deal can be struck now, but only by avoiding the useless debate over who blocked peace in the past.	现在，这样的一个协议可以达成了，但是只有避免有关谁在过去阻碍了和平的毫无用处的辩论方才可以。


An insight of Nobel Prize-winning game theorist Tom Schelling is especially useful in this context.	诺贝尔奖得主、博奕论理论家切灵的一项洞察观点在这一局面中极为有用。


Schelling identified the practical importance of a bargaining “focal point” as the way forward for negotiators who are in range of an agreement.	切灵指出了作为将要达成协议的谈判者推向前进的谈判“焦点”的实际重要性。


The pre-1967 boundaries are the inevitable focal point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	1967年以前的边界在巴以冲突中是不可避免的焦点。


Both sides should agree to the pre-1967 boundaries in principle, and then swap small land parcels and definitions of control (especially regarding Jerusalem) in slight and mutually convenient deviations from the 1967 boundaries.	双方都应该在原则上同意1967年以前的边界，然后交换小块土地以及���1967年边界中轻微地、对双方都是方便的对控制的定义（特别是有关耶路撒冷）。


In other words, quibbling over details should come after both sides agree on the principle of respect for the pre-1967 borders, which are recognized by key countries throughout the region and around the world, and are enshrined in numerous UN resolutions.	换句话说，只有双方同意对1967年以前的边界尊重的原则后才对细节进行推敲。 这一边界得到了整个地区中的主要国家以及世界范围的承认，同时也在大量的联合国决议中得到确认。


Today’s tragedy is that we are receding from this possible agreement.	当今的悲剧是，我们从这一可能的协议中退缩。


Israel is rightly aggrieved by the abduction of its soldiers by Hamas-backed insurgents in Gaza and Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon, but Israel’s massive and disproportionate military response plays into the hands of the extremists.	以色列由于加沙地带受到哈马斯支持的反叛人员以及南黎巴嫩的真主党力量绑架其士兵而受到冤屈，但是以色列大规模失去比例的军事回应却正中极端分子的下怀。


Indeed, each side says that the other struck first.	确实，各方都说另一方首先开火。


Israel refused even to negotiate with the Hamas-led Palestinian government, trying to squeeze it financially and make it capitulate.	以色列甚至拒绝同哈马斯领导的巴勒斯坦政府谈判，试图在财政上压迫它并让它屈服。


Hamas refused to acknowledge a two-state solution except obliquely, and then under considerable pressure.	哈马斯只有在拐弯抹角和巨大压力的情况下，否则拒绝认同两个国家的方案。


Yet broad Palestinian public opinion is on the side of compromise.	但是广大巴勒斯坦舆论站在妥协的一边。


Blame is easy enough to assign, but misses the point.	指责很容易，但是却不得要领。


Compromise based on the pre-1967 borders is the way to peace.	建立在1967年之前的边界基础上的妥协是通往和平之路。


Nor is the United States playing a stabilizing role.	美国也没有发挥稳定性作用。


It, too, is playing into the hands of extremists by fighting terrorism with military rather than political means.	它自己也由于使用军事力量而非政治手段打击恐怖主义而正中极端分子的下怀。


Just as the war in Iraq was a mistaken response to the threat of al-Qaeda, the Bush administration’s green light to Israel’s military assaults in Gaza and Lebanon offers no real solution.	伊拉克战争是对极地组织威胁的错误反应，布什政府同意以色列对加沙和黎巴嫩的军事攻击并不能提供实际解决方案。


The US and other powerful outside parties should be pressing both sides to the focal point solution, not sitting on their hands as the violence spirals out of control.	美国以及其他的外界大国应当向两方面提供焦点解决方案，而不是在暴力失去控制的时候坐视不管。


The most powerful ideology in the world today is self-determination.	当今世界最为强大的意识形态是自决。


Until there is a Palestinian state and an Iraq free of US occupation, Islamic extremists will win recruits.	在巴勒斯坦建国以及伊拉克摆脱美国占领之前，伊斯兰极端分子都会赢得拥戴者。


Military reprisals will swell their ranks still further, and, until political grievances are addressed, the spread of democracy will not change that equation, because the extremists will win at the ballot box.	军事报复将会进一步扩大范围，而且，只有解决了政治上的冤屈，否则扩散民主并不会改变状况，因为极端分子会赢得选举的胜利。


In short, specific terrorist threats should be fought through narrowly targeted counter-terrorist operations, while moderates should undercut extremism through the politics of compromise rather than the false and dangerous delusions of military victory.	简而言之，应当通过目标明确的反恐措施来打击具体的恐怖主义威胁，而温和派则应当通过妥协的政治、而非虚假而又危险的军事胜利幻觉来削弱极端主义。


The Problem is Authoritarianism, Not Islam	问题在于集权，不在于伊斯兰教


PRINCETON – Is Islam fundamentally incompatible with democracy?	普林斯顿—伊斯兰教从根本上与民主不相容吗？


Time and again events compel us to ask this question.	一次又一次，发生的事件迫使我们作此之问。


And yet it is a question that obscures more than it illuminates.	而这个问题与其说让我们更明白，不如说让我们更困惑。


Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia are very different countries, but one thing that they share are Islamist governments (at least until recently in Egypt’s case).	土耳其、埃及和突尼斯是非常不同的国家，但有一点是相同的，他们都有伊斯兰政府（至少在埃及最新事件之前是如此）。


To varying degrees, these governments have undermined their democratic credentials by failing to protect civil and human rights and employing heavy-handed tactics against their opponents.	这些政府或多或少拖累了它们的民主性质——不能保护公民权和人权，对示威者采取强硬措施。


Despite repeated assurances, Islamist leaders have shown little interest in democracy beyond winning at the ballot box.	尽管伊斯兰领导者一再做出保证，但并没有表现出对除选票箱之外的民主的兴趣。


So those who believe that the removal of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s government was justified have a point.	因此那些认为推翻埃及总统穆尔西是合理的人倒也不无道理。


As the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule became increasingly authoritarian, it trampled on the ideals and aspirations of the Tahrir Square revolution that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.	穆斯林兄弟会的统治变得日渐集权，践踏了2011年推翻前总统穆巴拉克的解放广场革命的理想和渴望。


Nonetheless, the support that the military coup received from many Egyptian liberals is difficult to fathom.	尽管如此，军事政变获得众多埃及自由派的支持仍令人十分费解。


Clever word games cannot hide the essence of what happened: a government that came to power in a fair election was overthrown by the army.	聪明的文字伎俩无法掩盖事件的本质：通过公证选举上台掌权的政府被军队推翻。


Some believe that military interventions can serve as a useful course correction.	有人认为军事干预可以成为有用的事态纠正器。


US Secretary of State John Kerry said that the Egyptian army was “restoring democracy.”	美国国务卿科里说，埃及军队在“重塑民主”。


And the former US ambassador James Jeffrey drew on Turkey’s experience, and the 1980 coup in particular, to argue that the military could help in “moderating Islamist movements.”	前美国大使杰弗里（James Jeffery）援引土耳其的经验——特别是1980年政变——论证军队可以有助于“遏制伊斯兰运动”。


The notion that a politically transcendent impartial arbiter can step in to prevent abuse of power and reinvigorate democracy is an attractive one.	政治卓越的无党派仲裁者可以介入防止权力滥用、复兴民主，这个概念相当具有吸引力。


But it is belied by Turkey’s own history.	但这与土耳其本身的历史不符。


True, the Turkish military was not interested in governing directly, and handed power back to civilian governments after its coups.	诚然，土耳其军队对直接治国不感兴趣，并在政变后将权力还给了文职政府。


Even so, its repeated interventions greatly harmed the development of a democratic political culture.	尽管如此，其一再干预大大地损害了民主政治文化的发展。


Ultimately, democracy relies on an implicit quid pro quo among contending groups, according to which each agrees to protect the others’ rights in exchange for recognition of its entitlement to govern should it win an election.	说到底，民主取决于竞争集团之间隐含的交换，每一方都同意保护其他方的权利，以此交换本方赢得选举后治国权能够被承认。


Constitutional provisions alone cannot ensure such an outcome, for those in power can easily override them.	光靠宪法条文不足以确保这一结果，因为掌权者可以随心所欲地践踏宪法。


Instead, norms of proper political behavior must become embodied in the polity’s enduring institutions – its political parties, parliaments, and courts – in order to prevent abuse of power.	相反，正常政治行为的规范必须嵌入政体的长期制度——政党、议会和法院——以防止权力滥用。


What sustains these norms is the knowledge that undermining them will have consequences that are damaging to all.	维持这些规范的是这样的认识：破坏他们将造成一损俱损的后果。


If I do not protect your rights while in power today, you will have little reason to respect mine when you come to power tomorrow.	如果我在掌权时不保护你的权利，那你也没有理由在有朝一日获得权力后尊重我的权利。


When an outside force such as the military interrupts this game, either directly or because one of the parties can rely on its intervention, the dynamics of political behavior change irrevocably.	当军队这样的额外部势力介入这场游戏时——不管是直接介入还是因为某一政党可以依靠其介入——政治行为的动态都将发生不可逆转的变化。


The loss of continuity in political parties, parliamentary procedures, and judicial processes encourages short-term calculation and spawns illiberal practices.	政党、议会流程和司法程序���持续损失鼓励了产生不自由行为的短期算计。


This is exactly the malady of young democracies.	这就是年轻民主国家的通病。


It is also the problem that plagues Turkish democracy, despite its longer track record.	这也是贻害土耳其民主的问题，尽管它的民主历史更长。


When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, it not only lacked a democratic culture, but also had much to fear about how the secularist-military old guard might react.	当总理埃尔多安的正义与发展党（AKP）于2002年上台时，它不但缺少民主文化，还颇可担心世俗-军队保守派如何反应。


So it behaved exactly according to its fear, launching a series of show trials targeting senior military officials and other perceived opponents.	因此它的所作所为完全是依照其担心，发动了一系列以高级军官和其他它所认定的反对派的审判。


When Erdoğan’s government eventually lost the support of liberals who had initially supported it, it cracked down on the media and freedom of expression.	当埃尔多安政府最终失去了一开始支持它的自由派的支持时，它又破坏了媒体和言论自由。


Given this backdrop of repression and punctuated democracy, the failure of Islamists in Egypt and Turkey tells us less about Islam’s compatibility with democracy than we might think.	在这一镇压和干预民主的背景下，伊斯兰教在埃及和土耳其的失败所揭示的伊斯兰教与民主的兼容性问题并不像我们想象的那样严重。


Did Morsi and Erdoğan behave as they did because of their religious ideologies, or would most political leaders seeking to retain power have acted in similar ways in their position?	穆尔西和埃尔多安之所以这样做，是因为他们的宗教思想吗？ 或者说，大部分寻求保持权力的政治领袖在任上都会这样做吗？


Latin America, where Islam plays no political role, has no shortage of populist strongmen who routinely violate civil liberties and political rights.	伊斯兰教没有政治作用的拉美也不乏一再破坏公民自由和政治权利的民粹主义强人。


None of this is to condone the abuse of power by Islamist leaders.	所有这些都不能为伊斯兰领导人滥用权力开拓。


But, just as the Turkish military’s repeated interventions against a perceived Islamist threat have impeded democracy, so the Egyptian military’s toppling of Morsi will not help to restore it.	但是，正如土耳其军队一再干预被认为的伊斯兰威胁妨碍了民主，埃及军队推翻穆尔西也无助于重建民主。


An entity that is authoritarian and hierarchical in nature cannot be relied on to protect and promote a democratic transition.	一个集权主义的层级制实体是不可靠的，不能指望它推进民主转型。


A case can be made for military intervention when a country finds itself on the edge of civil war, as Turkey was in 1980 (and as Egypt arguably was in July); but one should not confuse restoring order with restoring democracy.	当一国走在内战边缘时（比如1980年土耳其战争，7月份的埃及也大有这一势头），军事干预有理可据； 但你不能把重建秩序和重建民主混淆起来。


While the battle for democracy must be won or lost at home, outsiders do have a role to play.	民主执政是成是败都只关国内，但外部因素也能起作用。


International actors such as human-rights organizations can usefully document and publicize rights violations and other abuses of power.	国际行动方，比如人权组织，可以记录和出版权利践踏和权力滥用状况，这是非常有用的。


Democratic countries – particularly the United States and members of the European Union – can denounce authoritarian practices with a clear voice and resist the temptation of cozying up to regional bullies for short-term strategic advantage.	民主国家——特别是美国和欧盟成员国——可以用明确的声音谴责集权主义行为，抵制用取悦地区不法分子换取短期战略好处的诱惑。


Given economic globalization and global communications, autocratic rulers derive almost as much strength from their international standing as they do from their control of domestic institutions.	在经济全球化和全球通讯的背景下，集权统治者源于国际立场的优势不少于来自控制国内机构的优势。


What does not help – and in fact backfires – is for outsiders to view the political crisis of Middle Eastern societies as the result of an Islamist-secularist divide.	外部把中东社会的政治危机视为伊斯兰-世俗分歧的结果，这无助于事，甚至会帮倒忙。


This perspective plays directly into the hands of authoritarian rulers like Erdoğan, who can leverage the perceived Islamophobia of foreign powers to mobilize their political base.	这一观点直接帮助了埃尔多安等集权统治者，他们利用外国势力的伊斯兰恐惧症动员自己的政治基础。


Human-rights abuses and violations of the rule of law should be denounced for what they are – without linking them to culture or religion.	侵犯人权和践踏法治精神必须因为侵犯人权和践踏法治精神而受到谴责，而不应该与某种文化和宗教挂钩。


Arab States of Uncertainty	不确定的阿拉伯国家


MADRID – The revolutions that swept the Arab world during the last two years have exposed the extraordinary fragility of key Arab states.	马德里—过去两年中席卷阿拉伯世界的革命暴露了重要阿拉伯国家的极度脆弱性。


With the exception of historical countries such as Egypt or Morocco, most Arab states are artificial constructs of European colonialism, which combined disparate tribes and ethnicities into unitary states that could be held together only by authoritarian rule and a common enemy – Zionism and its Western patrons.	除了历史文明古国是例外（比如埃及和摩洛哥），大部分阿拉伯国家是欧洲殖民主义的人工产物，迥异的部落和种族被组成了单一的国家，只有独裁统治和共同的敌人——犹太复国主义及其西方后台——能让他们团结起来。


Today’s turmoil, however, is no longer driven by anger at foreign forces; instead, it marks a second phase of the de-colonization process: the assertion of the right of self-determination by peoples and tribes united only by a dictator’s yoke.	但是，今天的乱象不再因针对外国势力的愤怒而起； 而是反映了去殖民地过程的第二阶段：被独裁者拧在一起的诸民族和部落开始意识到自主决定的权利。


Indeed, it is not entirely farfetched to anticipate the emergence of new Arab states from the debris of the old, artificial ones.	事实上，在人工早就的旧阿拉伯世界废墟上崛起新的阿拉伯国家也不是完全没有可能。


The American invasion of Iraq set the pattern, for it broke the central government’s power and empowered ethnic and religious enclaves.	美国入侵伊拉克就是榜样——这打破了中央政府的权力，让种族和宗教飞地获得了权力。


What happened in Yugoslavia, an ill-conceived product of Wilsonian diplomacy, could happen in the more cynical imperial creations in the Middle East.	南斯拉夫——威尔逊主义外交政策的拙劣产物——所发生的事情可能中东更加互相怀疑的诸帝国间重演。


What Sigmund Freud defined as “the narcissism of minor differences” caused Yugoslavia to split into seven small states (including Kosovo), following the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War II.	弗洛伊德所谓的“差异细微的自我陶醉”导致南斯拉夫分裂为七个小国（包括科索沃），在此期间还经历了二战以来欧洲最严重的流血。


Can the Arab states avoid a similar fate?	阿拉伯国家可以避免类似的命运吗？


Democratization in the Arab world is not only about toppling dictators; it is also about redressing the politico-ethnic map of the region, which has kept too many minority groups dissatisfied.	阿拉伯世界的民主化不但事关推翻独裁者，也事关重画地区政治-种族地图，这个地区有太多的心存不满的少数群体。


Consider the Kurds, who were split among Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran.	就拿库尔德人来说吧，他们分居于伊拉克、土耳其、叙利亚和伊朗。


But the Kurds are hardly alone.	但库尔德人绝不是个例。


Libya was created out of three former Italian colonies, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, each essentially comprising different tribal confederations (the Sa’adi in Cyrenaica, the Saff al-Bahar in Tripolitania, and the Tuareg in Fezzan).	利比亚由三块前意大利殖民地组成——的黎波里塔尼亚、昔兰尼加和费赞，三者从本质上说都是由不同部落妥协形成的联邦（昔兰尼加的Sa’adi； 的黎波里塔尼亚的Saff al-Barhar，费赞的Tuareg）。


The fall of Muammar el-Qaddafi opened a Pandora’s box of old rivalries, with Cyrenaica developing into a semi-autonomous region known as Barqa.	卡扎菲的倒台开启了旧仇的潘多拉魔盒，昔兰尼加已经发展为半自治地区Barqa。


Likewise, long-standing tensions between Bahrain’s ruling Sunni minority and Shia majority have worsened since the country’s Shia-led pro-democracy movement was crushed in 2011.	类似地，巴林执政的少数派逊尼派和多数派什叶派之间长期存在对立，2011年，什叶派领导的民主运动的爆发让这一对立跟家紧张了。


As for Jordan, the precarious balance between the Palestinian majority and the Bedouin minority was difficult enough to maintain in stable times; it is a far more precarious undertaking now.	还有约旦，多数派巴勒斯坦人和少数派贝多因人之间的微妙平衡在稳定时期便已极难维持； 如今更是岌岌可危。


Other states in the region have been teetering on the brink of failure from the outset.	该地区的其他国家也从建国伊始就开始摇摇欲坠。


Yemen emerged in 1990 from the reunification of South Yemen and North Yemen, which fought bitter wars in 1972 and 1979.	1990年，1972—1979年间打过苦仗的南也门和北也门重新统一为也门。


But its leaders have never been able to integrate the tribes, the primary units of Yemen’s social structure, into the political system in a manner that generates their unequivocal acceptance of the sovereign state.	但也门领导人从未能够将部落以促使它们明确接受主权国家的形式纳入政治体系，而部落乃是也门社会结构的基本单元。


Syria powerfully demonstrates how a fight against a dictator can soon turn into a sectarian struggle for survival or mastery.	叙利亚有力地说明了针对独裁者的斗争如何迅速地演变为生存和主宰的宗派之争。


Notwithstanding the worldwide legitimacy now enjoyed by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, a disorderly collapse of the regime might yet lead to the country’s division into autonomous ethnic enclaves.	尽管叙利亚国民革命联盟（National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary）和反对军（Opposition Forces）获得了全世界的承认，但巴沙尔政权的无序倒台仍可能导致该国分裂为多个自治领地。


The rebels, mostly Sunnis assisted by jihadi groups such as the Nusra Front, an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq, have never truly attempted to reach out to the country’s minorities – Christians, Shia, Druze, and Kurds – which have repudiated the National Coalition as being “obedient to Turkey and Qatar.”	叛军——特别是伊拉克基地组织的分支Nusra Front等圣战组织支持的逊尼派——从未试图接触叙利亚少数派——基督徒、什叶派、德鲁兹派和库尔德人，后四者认为国民革命联盟“对土耳其和卡塔尔俯首帖耳”。


The Kurds, under the yoke of Arabs, Turks, and Iranians, saw in the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq – and now see in the dismemberment of other Arab autocracies – an opportunity to join the new Great Middle Eastern Game. That means realizing the dream of uniting their dispersed nation in an independent Kurdish state.	受阿拉伯人、土耳其人和伊朗人压迫的库尔德人将萨达姆政权在伊拉克的倒台——以及眼下其他阿拉伯独裁者的倒台——视为参与大中东弈局的良机���这意味着统一这个分散的民族，组成一个独立的库尔德人国家。


The Kurdish militias in northern Syria, which sought to stay out of the civil war while preparing their own autonomous enclave should Bashar al-Assad’s regime be toppled, are now being drawn into the fighting; the Iraqi Kurds, who have been training their Syrian kin, may well follow.	叙利亚北部的库尔德人武装——他们在内战中寻求中立，但若巴沙尔政权被推翻，他们也准备建立自己的自治领地——正在被吸引加入战团； 伊拉克库尔德人——他们一直在为叙利亚同胞提供训练——极有可能会步其后尘。


Turkey inevitably views Kurdish activism in northern Syria – led by the Democratic Union party, an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey – as a direct threat to its stability, and will do its utmost to prevent it from sparking rebellion among Turkey’s own restive Kurdish minority.	土耳其难免将叙利亚北部的库尔德激进主义——以土耳其起义党库尔德工人党分支民主联盟党为首——视为其国家稳定的直接威胁，并将竭尽全力遏制它，以免激发土耳其本国难以驾驭的少数派库尔德人揭竿起义。


Lebanon is yet another ethnic tapestry that cannot be immune to events in Syria.	黎巴嫩是难逃叙利亚局势影响的多民族国家。


Already, signs of spillover effects can be seen in clashes between Sunni and Alawite militias.	溢出效应已经显现：逊尼派和阿拉维派武装已经发生了冲突。


However hegemonic Hezbollah may now seem, its power in Lebanon depends heavily on the support of the Assad regime.	尽管真主党目前仍支配着局面，但其在黎巴嫩的实力严重依赖于巴沙尔政权。


Should Assad fall, and the Sunni-led opposition rise to power, the ensuing balance of power in Syria is bound to reshape the balance of power in Lebanon.	若巴沙尔倒台而逊尼派领导的反对派掌权，则叙利亚的新实力平衡必将改写黎巴嫩的实力平衡。


Might South Sudan, the mostly Christian state that seceded in 2011 from the Muslim Arab North after a long civil war, become the new paradigm for non-historical Arab states riven by ethnic and tribal rivalries?	2011年，以基督徒为多数的南苏丹在长期内战后脱离穆斯林阿拉伯国家苏丹独立，这会是没有历史的阿拉伯国家因种族和部落对峙而分裂的新范式吗？


As former Prime Minister of China Zhou Enlai supposedly said of the impact of the French Revolution, “It is too early to tell.”	据说中国前总理周恩来曾评论法国革命的影响“下结论为时尚早”，中东亦是如此。


But there can be no doubt that the post-colonial status quo in the Middle East is crumbling.	但毫无疑问，中东后殖民地时代的现状是不稳定的。


A multifaceted region has yet to crystallize into more definitive political constructions.	这个多层次的地区还没有形成明确的政治结构。


The Middle East’s Springtime of Democracy	中东民主的春天


Election results around the Middle East mark a new trend: Islamist political parties – those that base their platforms on Islamic law – are highly popular.	中东地区的选举结果预示着一种新趋势，即把政治纲领建立在伊斯兰教法基础上的伊斯兰政党大获人心。


Where elections are held, Islamists do well: Hamas among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; the religiously-oriented Shi’ite coalition in Iraq; a parliamentary faction in Morocco and, most significantly, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey.	但凡选举举行之处，伊斯兰政党都能无往不利：哈马斯在约旦河西岸和加沙地带受到广大巴勒斯坦人的支持。 同样的还有伊拉克宗教性政党什叶派联合政党，摩洛哥的国会内部派系，以及最具代表性的土耳其执政党正义与发展党。


Democracy movements in Lebanon, Egypt, and elsewhere in the region must face the challenge of incorporating Islamist parties into democratic systems.	黎巴嫩、埃及和中东其他地区的民主运动都面临着同样的挑战——如何使伊斯兰政党融入民主体系。


But can the Islamists be trusted?	但是，这些伊斯兰主义者值得信赖吗？


If they rise to power, will they respect the rights of minorities and women and leave office when voted out?	如果他们掌权，他们能够尊重少数民族和妇女的权利吗？ 在选举失败时，他们会愿意下台吗？


Will they tolerate dissent?	他们能够容忍不同政见吗？


Or will such elections be based on “one man, one vote, one time?”	或者，这些民主选举能够建立在“一人一次投一票”的基础上吗？


As a sociologist, I have been studying these issues for 30 years.	作为社会学家，我研究这些问题已经有30年了。


As an inmate of an Egyptian prison, I discussed them with my fellow prisoners, many of whom were imprisoned as supporters of Egypt’s Islamic movement.	当我身陷埃及监狱时，我曾和我的狱友们讨论过这些问题，他们多是由于支持埃及伊斯兰运动而身陷囹圄。


My conclusion?	我的结论？


Islamist parties are changing.	那就是：伊斯兰党派正在改变中。


These parties understand the social transformations underway in the Middle East that are leading toward democracy, and they want to take part.	这些政党都很了解中东地区正在经历的一系列走向民主的社会变革，并且他们也想加入其中。


In my view, we may be witnessing the emergence of Muslim democratic parties, much like the rise of Christian Democratic parties in Europe in the years after World War II.	在我看来，我们可能正在见证穆斯林民主政党的出现，就像第二次世界大战后基督教民主党派的崛起一样。


The Islamists’ popularity is not difficult to understand.	我们不难理解伊斯兰党派为何获得高支持率。


Since autocratic regimes in the Middle East left little room for free expression, the mosque emerged as the only place where people could freely congregate.	由于中东地区的专制政权极大地限制了言论自由，清真寺成为了唯一人们能够自由聚集的场所。


Religious groups responded to this opportunity, emerging first as social welfare agencies, and then becoming the equivalent of local politicians.	在这种情形下，宗教团体首先作为社会福利机构出现，之后逐渐成为当地的政党。


In the process, they gained credibility as trustworthy advocates of the people – a real distinction from repressive and corrupt governments.	在这一过程中，人们对他们的信任与日俱增，视这些政党为可信的人民拥护者——这完全不同于那些暴政腐败的政府。


In principle, it would be hypocritical to advocate democracy and at the same time the exclusion of Islamists from peaceful political participation.	从原则上来讲，拥护民主的同时却将伊斯兰党派排除在和平参与政治的大门外，这可有点前后矛盾。


But the practice of electoral politics also gives us reason for optimism.	但是选举政治的实现还是给了我们乐观的理由。


By my count, some two-thirds of the 1.4 billion Muslims in the world now live under elected governments in which Islamist parties are players.	据我统计，世界上共有14亿穆斯林，其中约三分之二生活在伊斯兰党执政的选举政府下。


When Islamist groups are denied access to electoral politics, their cause takes on a mythic aura.	当伊斯兰教团体被阻挡在通往选举政治之路上时，他们的事业也带上了神秘色彩。


Their principles remain untested ideals, never forced to confront the practical realities of governance.	他们的信念仍是未被验证的理想，也从未被迫与管理的现实正面冲突。


The late King Hussein took up this challenge in 1989, after bread riots in the southern Jordanian city of Ma’an.	然而在1989年约旦南部城市马安发生了面包暴乱后，已去世的约旦国王侯赛因接下了这一挑战。


The King brought all the political forces together to draft a national charter for political participation.	他号召所有的政治力量聚集一堂，共同起草了一项有关政治参与的国家宪章。


The Islamists signed on, pledging their respect for the rules of the game.	伊斯兰教党派也签署了这份章程，誓言尊重游戏规则。


In the years since, Islamists have participated in four Jordanian elections.	从那时起，伊斯兰政党参与了四次约旦大选。


The first time, they gained a governing plurality, put their slogans into practice, and failed to maintain their popular support.	第一次，他们赢得了压倒性多数票，并将他们的政治口号付诸实施。 但是，他们没有能够保持住民众的支持。


In the four ministries the Islamists ran, they imposed restrictions on female staff members, triggering widespread protests that ultimately forced the four ministers to resign.	在伊斯兰政党政府的四个部门中，他们对女性工作人员强加诸多限制，引发了大规模的抗议，最终这四个部门部长被迫辞职。


Their share of the vote in subsequent elections declined sharply.	在此后的选举中，这些政党的得票率大幅下滑。


By contrast, it is a mistake to believe that force can eliminate Islamist movements.	反之，认为武力就能消灭伊斯兰教运动的想法也是错误的。 正确的做法应是在以下前提下，把伊斯兰政党吸收到政治改革进程中去。


Instead, political reform ought to include them – under the following conditions: Respect for the national constitution, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary; Acceptance of the rotation of power, based on free, fair and internationally monitored elections; Guaranteed equal rights and full political participation for non-Muslim minorities; Full and equal participation by women in public life.	接受政权更替，政权交替应建立在自由、公平以及国际监督的选举基础上； 非穆斯林的少数党派享有公民的平等权利和参与政治活动的权利；


The role of external actors in promoting democracy in the Middle East is also critical.	外部力量在推进中东和平进程中也扮演了重要角色。


Much has been said of President George W. Bush’s American-led “crusade” to bring democracy to the Muslim world.	最多说到的就是美国总统乔治·布什带领下、以美国为首的、旨在将民主带到穆斯林世界的“十字军”。


Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were predicated, at least in part, on spreading freedom; similarly, the Middle East Partnership Initiative is supposed to make democracy the centerpiece of American assistance in the region.	阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争的目的至少有一部分是为了传播自由。 同样，中东伙伴关系行动计划的实施也是为了使民主政治成为美对中东援助的核心内容。


It is important to remember, though, that democracy was on the international agenda before the United States was attacked in September 2001.	尽管如此，我们还是需要记住一点，在美国遭遇911袭击之前，民主就已经被列在国际日程表上。


Under the Barcelona Accord of 1995, the European Union offered aid and trade to several Arab countries, in exchange for progress on democratic reform.	在1995年巴塞隆纳合约框架下，欧盟向一些阿拉伯国家提供援助并开展贸易往来，作为交换条件，这些国家也要进行民主改革。


The trade improvements have been delivered, but little has been accomplished on Arab domestic reform.	贸易发展有了长足进步，但是民主改革却是步履缓慢。


In the 1970’s, the Helsinki Accord helped bring down the Soviet Empire.	上世纪70年代，赫尔辛基条约加速了苏联王朝的分崩离析。


We need a comparable formula for the Middle East.	现在我们也需要为中东制定出一套类似的公式。


Whatever one thinks of American military intervention, one must concede that it has altered the region’s dynamics.	不管人们如何看待美国的军事干涉，都必须承认这的确改变了这个地区。


Domestic opposition forces, while distancing themselves from the US, have been markedly emboldened in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere.	尽管黎巴嫩、埃及、沙特阿拉伯及其他地方的国内反对派力量与美国保持着一定距离，但这增加了他们的勇气。


We are all watching for signs of opening among our neighbors.	我们都期待看到邻国之间开放的信号。


I know that stirrings of democracy have been crushed before: in Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, and in Tiananmen Square in 1989.	我知道民主的辉煌时代曾被践踏，1956年在布达佩斯，1968年在布拉格，以及1989年在天安门广场。


Yet something about the last few months feels new and irreversible.	然而，最近几个月来发生的事情令人感觉耳目一新，势不可挡。


Too many people in too many places are defying their oppressors and taking risks for freedom.	那么多的人在那么多地方反抗着压迫，为争取自由甘愿冒险。


To a long-time activist, today’s climate feels like spring.	对一个长期的积极分子来说，现在的政治气候宛若春天。


The Mind’s New Eye	对撞机能让人类看到什么？


CAMBRIDGE – Modern physics and cosmology suggest that basic truths about how nature operates, and how our universe arose, are visible only to those who can see events that occur faster than the time it takes for light to cross a proton, and whose vision can resolve sub-nuclear distances.	麻省剑桥 —— 根据现代物理学和宇宙学可以推论，要看见自然界运行和宇宙生成的基本真相，必须具有一双超级眼：能看清比光穿过质子还快的动作、比原子还小的距离。


Fortunately, that does not rule out humans, for we can augment the eyes we were born with.	幸运的是，人类没有被排除在外，因为我们的肉眼可以“升级”。


The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) rises to the opportunity.	大型强子对撞机（ LHC ）应运而生。


By smashing protons together with unprecedented energy, monitoring the many particles that emerge from the collisions, and reconstructing the primary events that produced them, physicists will in effect have constructed the fastest, highest-resolution microscope ever, with each proton taking a snapshot of the other’s interior.	这种设备令质子以极大能量对撞，通过观测那些由对撞产生的粒子，重构这些物质的产生过程，物理学家必将发明出有史以来速度最快、解析度最高的显微镜 —— 在这个显微镜里，每个质子都成为反映另一个质子内部结构的影像。


The LHC is a magnificent engineering project, whose many “gee-whiz’’ features have been widely reported.	LHC 是一个宏伟工程，有许多了不起的看点，这些媒体都已经广泛报道过了。


I will forego all that, and skip to the chase: what can we hope to see?	我对这些都不再复述，直接跳到我们的目标： LHC 究竟能让我们看到什么？


We  will see what the universe was like when it was a thousandth of a second old, in the earliest moments of the Big Bang.	我们能看到的是宇宙其在诞生千分之一秒时的样子、大爆炸的初始阶段。


The primary events at the LHC are in effect Little Bangs, tiny fireballs that reproduce Big Bang conditions, albeit over very small volumes.	在 LHC 里发生的初始事件实际上就是一场微型大爆炸，许多微小的火球再现宇宙大爆炸的条件，只不过其规模非常小而已。


This re-creation of the early universe opens up an exciting possibility.	宇宙开端的这种重构开启了全新的可能性，非常令人兴奋。


We know that the universe today contains a form of matter, the so-called dark matter, that is different from anything we have ever observed.	我们知道今日之宇宙包涵着一种物质形式，即所谓暗物质，它迥异于我们之前观察到的任何物质。


The dark matter is actually not dark in the usual sense, but utterly transparent.	暗物质的“暗”并不是通常意义上的暗，而是彻底透明。


It neither emits nor absorbs light significantly, which is why astronomers failed to notice it for millennia, even though dark matter contributes five times as much to the total mass of the universe as normal matter.	它既不释放也不吸收光，因此几千年以来的天文学家一直忽略了这些物质的存在。


It was only in the late twentieth century that careful study of the motion of normal, visible matter revealed the gravitational influence of lots of otherwise invisible stuff.	直至 20 世纪后期，对普通可见物质运动规律的研究才揭示了大量不可见物质的重力影响。


Because the original Big Bang produced dark matter, the LHC’s Little Bangs might produce some more.	由于宇宙初始大爆炸产生了大量暗物质， LHC 的微型大爆炸也可能产生出一些来。


So experimenters will be looking for new particles with the right properties to provide the astronomical dark matter: very long-lived and very feebly interacting with ordinary matter or light.	科学家可以通过对撞实验寻找那些能够产生暗物质的粒子：一些长期以来就存在，然而同普通物质和光只有微弱的相互作用的粒子。


There is a good chance, then, that we will learn what that ubiquitous, abundant, yet elusive substance is.	这是一个好机会，可以让我们了解那些无处不在、极其丰富然而看不见摸不着的物质到底是什么。


Imagine a race of intelligent fish that start to think deeply about the world.	试想有一种具有智慧的鱼类开始对世界进行深刻的思考。


For millennia, their ancestors took their watery environment for granted; to them, it was “emptiness” as empty as they could conceive.	几千年来，它们的祖先已经习惯了它们所生活于其中的物质 —— 水，因此认为水是“真空”。


But, after studying some mechanics and using their imaginations, the physicist-fish realize that they could deduce much simpler laws of motion by supposing that they are surrounded by a medium (water!) that complicates the appearance of things.	但是，通过研究一些力学现象并且发挥一些想象力，这种鱼类中的物理学家意识到，如过假定它们周遭并非真空，而是被一种介质（水 !  ）包围着，而这种介质影响了事物的表现，那它们所了解的运动定律可以被大大简化。


We are those fish.	我们就是那些鱼。


We have discovered that we can get a much simpler set of equations for fundamental physics by supposing that what we ordinarily perceive as empty space is actually a medium.	我们发现，假定我们平常所认为的空间实际上是一种介质，就可以大大简化基本的物理学方程。


We have observed the effects of the “water” that we use to simplify our equations – it slows down particles, and makes them heavy – but we do not know what it is made out of.	我们观察到了“水”的效应 —— 它使物体运动减缓，增加了物体的重量等等，但我们还不知道它是由什么东西构成的。


The LHC will allow us to discern the microscopic structure of the universal medium.	LHC 可以让我们透视宇宙介质的微观结构。


The simplest idea is that it is made out of one new kind of particle, the so-called “Higgs particle,” but I suspect that there is more to it.	最简单的一种猜测是，它是由一类新的粒子构成，所谓的“希格斯粒子”（ Higgs particle ）。 但我认为还有其他物质。


(One gets prettier equations with five new particles, and there might be even more.)	（有的物理学家提出了包涵物种新粒子的精美方程，不过可能还会有更多种类的新粒子）。


In the 1860’s, James Clerk Maxwell assembled the equations for electricity and magnetism, as they were then known, and discovered an inconsistency.	19 世纪 60 年代，詹姆斯·麦克斯韦（ James Clerk Maxwell ）提出了我们今日所知道的电磁方程组，并发现了一个内在缺陷。