Reflecting the freebooting financial zeitgeist that prevailed at the time, the International Monetary Fund declared in 2006 that “the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse group of investors…has helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient…” As a result, “the commercial banks may be less vulnerable to…shocks.”	2006年，IMF宣布“信贷风险通过银行分散给各式各样的投资者……这让银行业乃至整个金融体系更加稳定……”可谓金融业强盗时代精神的写照。 结果，“商业银行似乎……在冲击面前不堪一击。


It is impossible not to hear in such nonsense the cocksure drumbeat of the Money Power, which has never failed to identify the public interest with its own.	想要对大银行的这些自吹自擂之声充耳不闻是很困难的，因为银行家最擅长的事情就是将自身利益说成与公共利益完全一致。


For 50 years after the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the Money Power was held to account by the countervailing power of government.	20世纪30年代大萧条之后的50年里，大银行一直是政府动刀的对象。


At the heart of the political check was America’s Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.	最厉害的一刀便是1933年美国格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案（Glass-Steagall Act）。


Glass-Steagall aimed to prevent commercial banks from gambling with their depositors’ money by mandating the institutional separation of retail and investment banking.	格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的目的是为了预防商业银行用储户的钱去赌博，因此该法案强制将零售银行业务和投资银行业务分离。


The result was 65 years of relative financial stability.	结果，金融业经历了65年的太平盛世。


In what economists later called the “repressed” financial system, retail banks fulfilled the necessary function of financial intermediation without taking on suicidal risks, while the government kept aggregate demand high enough to maintain a full-employment level of investment.	在后来被经济学家称为“抑制”的金融体系中，零售银行承担金融中介的必要职能而不能去冒自杀性风险； 与此同时，政府会保证总需求，以维持充分就业水平的投资。


Then the Money Power struck back, aided and abetted by its apologist cohort of economists.	接着，在经济学家的摇旗呐喊下，大银行开始了逆袭。


The Big Bang of 1986 in London ended the separation of banking functions in the United Kingdom.	1986年伦敦“大爆炸”（Big Bang）改革终结了英国银行功能分离的历史。


After prolonged lobbying by the financial-services industry, US President Bill Clinton repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999.	在金融业长期不懈的游说活动下，美国总统克林顿在1999年废除了格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案。


From that point on, commercial and investment banks could merge, and the composite entities were authorized to provide a full range of banking services, including underwriting and other trading activities.	从此，商业银行可以和投资银行合并，混业综合实体也被获准提供包括承销和其他交易活动在内的全能金融服务。


This was part of a wave of deregulation that swept away Franklin Roosevelt’s promise to “chase the money changers from the temple.”	这是将富兰克林·罗斯福“将货币兑换商从庙堂中赶出去”之誓抛诸脑后的风潮的一部分。


Clinton also refused to regulate credit-default swaps, and the US Securities and Exchange Commission allowed banks to triple their leverage.	此外，克林顿还拒绝将信用违约互换纳入监管范围，而美国证券与交易委员会将银行杠杆率水平限制提高了两倍。


These three decisions led directly to the sub-prime extravaganza that brought down the US banking system in 2007-2008.	这三大决定直接导致了次贷大繁荣，并在2007—2008年拖垮了美国银行体系。


Since that crash, efforts have been made to reconstruct the dismantled system of financial regulation in order to prevent the “over-lending” that led to the collapse.	自危机以来，人们就开始致力于重建被摧毁的金融监管体系，以预防导致崩盘的“过度借贷”。


The new doctrine is called “macro-prudential regulation.”	新的信条是所谓的“宏观审慎规则”。


Under an international agreement known as Basel III, banks are to be required to hold a higher ratio of equity capital against “risk-weighted assets,” and leverage is to be limited to a smaller percentage of such assets.	在被称为巴塞尔III的国际协议中，银行将被要求持有更高的用于抵抗“风险加权资产”的权益资本比例，杠杆率则被限制在此类资产的较低比例。


National regulators are exploring ways to vary ratio requirements over the business cycle, and have started subjecting banks to regular “stress tests.”	各国监管者正在探索根据商业周期调整比例要求的方案，并以开始对银行进行“压力测试”。


In the UK, a Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of England is to monitor the “systemic risk” of financial failure, with a Prudential Regulatory Authority supervising systemically important institutions.	在英国，英格兰银行附属的金融政策委员会（Financial Policy Committee）负责监控金融业失灵的“系统风险”，审慎监管局（Prudential Regulatory Authority）负责监管具有系统重要性的机构。


According to monetary economist Charles Goodhart, a significantly faster-than-normal growth rate for bank credit, house prices, and leverage will give the authorities sufficient warning of impending crisis.	根据货币经济学家查尔斯·古德哈特（Charles Goodhart）的说法，银行信贷、房价和杠杆率的增长大大高于常规水平的现象将会给监管当局带来充分的警示信号，提醒它们要注意防范危机了。


The new orthodoxy places its faith in regulators’ ability to improve on banks’ measurement of risk, while leaving the structure of the banking system unchanged.	新的正统观念相信监管者有能力改善银行的风险测量手段，与此同时又保留银行体系的现有结构。


But, when it comes to upping equity requirements against “risk-weighted assets,” who is to do the weighting, and according to what methodology?	但是，就提高抵抗“风险加权资产”损失的权益资本要求这一问题而言，由谁来做加权工作？ 根据什么来决定权重？


Goodhart concedes that banks’ “risk weightings” in the pre-recession period were subject to political pressure and “financial-industry capture and manipulation.”	古德哈特坦言，在衰退发生之前的时期，银行的“风���加权”须服从政治压力和“金融业的俘虏和操纵”。


This is inevitable, because, as John Maynard Keynes pointed out, the “riskiness” of many investments, being subject to inherent uncertainty, is immeasurable.	这是不可避免的，因为正如凯恩斯所指出的，有很多投资的“风险”源自内在不确定性，根本无法测量。


In short, the new regulatory philosophy replaces the illusion that banks can safely be left to manage their risks with the illusion that regulators will do it for them.	简言之，新的监管哲学是在用幻觉替代幻觉：既然银行不能安全地管理它们的风险，那么就由监管者代劳吧。


Meanwhile, initial enthusiasm for restoring Glass-Steagall – breaking up banking functions into separate institutions – has fallen by the wayside.	与此同时，一度重燃的重启格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的热情——分拆银行功能，让不同的机构行使不同的功能——又熄灭了。


It is only logical that banks with state-guaranteed deposits should be safe and boring, with other necessary, but risky activities hived off to separate companies.	存款有国家担保，因此银行应该是安全又无趣的，再考虑到其他一些必要性，应该把风险活动分离出来组成另外一类公司——逻辑上，这再自然不过了。


But little progress has been made in (re)implementing this idea.	但我们却几乎看不到任何（再度）实施这一思想的努力。


The “Volcker rule,” whereby commercial banks would be barred from trading on their own account, and from owning hedge funds and private-equity firms, languishes in Congress.	所谓的“沃尔克规则”—即商业银行应该被禁止用自己的账户做交易以及组建自己的对冲基金和私募股权公司——在美国国会迟迟得不到进展。


In the UK, an Independent Commission on Banking, headed by Sir John Vickers, rejected separation of retail from investment banking, recommending instead “ring-fencing” deposits from the investment arms of universal banks.	在英国，以约翰·威克斯（John Vickers）为首的银行业独立委员会（Independent Commission on Banking）否定了将零售银行和投资银行业务相分离的政策，而是建议采取“围篱”（ring-fencing）政策——将存款从全能银行的投资银行部门剥离。


Trust-busters argue that such “Chinese walls” always break down under pressure, owing to huge shareholder demand for universal banks to boost profits at the expense of a sound commercial banking core. And senior executives will still have a legal obligation to maximize profits.	信用投机者指出，这类“中国墙”根本顶不住压力，因为全能银行承受着巨大的股东要求，将不得不以牺牲可靠的商业银行核心为代价追求高利润。


The Vickers commission’s proposals also depend on sophisticated regulation, which assumes, against history, that regulators will always be one step ahead of bankers.	威克尔委员会的方案也需要依赖成熟的监管——假设监管者总能领先银行家一步，但历史表明，事实正好相反。


The Money Power never surrenders easily.	大银行从来不会束手待毙。


Whether relying on regulation, or gesturing towards institutional separation, most proposals for banking reform remain at the drawing-board stage, and are sure to be emasculated by financial lobbies.	监管也好，分业经营也好，大部分银行业改革方案仍然停留在纸上作业阶段，金融游说集团一定会竭尽所能削弱它们的功效。


Moreover, whatever their intrinsic merits, none of these proposals addresses the global economy’s most immediate problem: undersupply, not oversupply, of credit.	此外，不管这些方案具有多大的内在合理性，都不可能解决全球经济最紧要的问题：信贷供给不足（而不是供给过量）。


In other words, the challenge is to revive lending growth in full awareness that we must begin devising ways to rein it in.	换句话说，我们面临的挑战是重振贷款增长，与此同时又要清醒地认识到必须开始设计驾驭贷款行为的办法。


Redefining Sustainable Development	重新定义可持续发展


MELBOURNE – Albert Einstein once said that if he had just one hour to find a solution on which his life depended, he would spend the first 55 minutes defining the problem.	墨尔本—爱因斯坦曾说，如果他只有一个小时时间用来寻找赖以救命的解决方案，那么他会把前55分钟用来定义问题出在哪里。


Once he knew the right question to ask, he could solve the problem in less than five minutes.	只要知道正确的问题是什么，他就可以在五分钟内解决它。


Today, humanity faces such a life-threatening problem: How are we to provide adequate nutrition and a decent quality of life to a global population that is set to surpass nine billion by 2050, without irreparably damaging our planetary life-support system?	如今，人类就面临着这样的生死攸关的问题：如何在不破坏地球生命支持系统的情况下为全世界人口提供足够的营养和体面的生活？ 到2050年，全球人口将突破90亿。


To find a solution, we must start by clarifying the problem.	为了寻找答案，我们必须从厘清问题开始。


Humans have fundamentally altered Earth’s ecosystems.	人类从根本上改变了地球的生态系统。


By interfering with the carbon, nitrogen, water, and phosphorus cycles, human activity changes the atmosphere, oceans, waterways, forests, and ice sheets, and diminishes biodiversity.	人类活动改变了碳、氮、水和磷的循环，从而改变了大气、海洋、水路、森林、冰盖，还减少了生物多样性。


Indeed, the effects of human behavior on the planet’s ecosystems have become so significant in the last few centuries that many scientists now believe that the planet has entered a new geological epoch, dubbed the Anthropocene.	事实上，人类行为对地球生态系统的影响在过去几百年来是如此明显，以至于许多科学家现在认为地球已经进入了新的地质年代——人类纪。


As the environmental consequences of human activity become increasingly apparent, so does humanity’s responsibility to mitigate them.	人类活动的环境后果正变得日益明显，人类减轻这一后果的责任也变得日益重大。


Last year, at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders agreed to create a set of universal Sustainable Development Goals, which would change the playing field for future economic policy to safeguard our life-support system.	在去年的联合国里约热内卢地球峰会上，全球领导人同意建立全球可持续发展目标，这将改变未来经济政策，以捍卫我们的生命支持系统。


That’s easy to say. But where does one start?	说去来容易，但从何处着手？


For almost three decades, sustainable development has been defined as development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their needs.	近三十年来，可持续发展的定义一直是：既满足当前需求，又兼顾子孙后代满足他们的需求的能力的发展。


Related policies have reflected the view that sustainable development rests on three equal pillars: the economy, society, and the environment.	相关政策表明，可持续发展有三大基石：经济、社会和环境。


But this view is no longer tenable.	但这一思想已经站不住脚。


As the United States Global Change Research Program’s recently released draft report on climate change points out, some kinds of weather events have become more common, and more intense, in recent years.	美国全球变化研究计划最新公布的气候变化报告草案指出，近几年来，一些类型的天气事件变得越来越常见、越来越猛烈。 2012年，北冰洋海冰数量降至历史新低，融化面积相当于美国国土；


In 2012 alone, Arctic sea-ice dipped to a new low, as an area larger than the US melted; unprecedented heat waves struck Australia, and other areas; record floods hit China and Japan; and the United Kingdom had its wettest year on record.	澳大利亚和其他地区遭遇前所未有热浪袭击； 中国和日本遭遇创纪录的洪水；


But global responses remain inadequate.	英国遭遇有记录以来最湿年份。 但全球应对措施仍然不充分。


A new approach is needed.	我们需要新方法。


Rather than separate pillars of sustainable development, the economy must be seen as servicing society, which in turn thrives within a secure natural environment.	经济不应该视为可持续发展的单独基石，而应该用来服务社会，而社会职能在安全的自然环境中实现繁荣。


Viewed this way, sustainable development should be redefined as “development that meets the needs of the present while safeguarding the Earth’s life-support system, on which the welfare of current and future generations depends.”	从这个角度看，可持续发展应该定义为“满足当前需求，同时保护当前和子孙后代所依赖的地球生命支持系统的发展”。


After all, a healthy, thriving planet is a prerequisite for healthy, prosperous lives.	毕竟，一个健康、兴盛的地球是健康、繁荣的生活的先决条件。


The process of identifying the Sustainable Development Goals, which are intended to enter into force in 2015, has begun in earnest.	定义可持续发展目标的过程已经热切启动，将于2015年完成。


Last week, representatives from 69 countries met at the UN in New York, and an expert group meets this week.	上周，69个国家的代表齐聚纽约联合国，本周，一个专家组将举行会议。


The goals must have measurable, achievable objectives that extend beyond national policy; they must inspire regional and local administrations, businesses, civil society, and individuals everywhere to change their behavior.	可持续发展目标必须具有可测量、可实现的目标，并且超越国家政策层面； 它们必须能够启发地区和地方政府、企业、公民社会和世界各地的个人改变他们的行为。


They should create goals for humanity that are grounded in shared values – and in relevant science.	它们应该形成基于共同价值、符合相关科学的人类目标。


This week, my colleagues and I published a report called Sustainable Development Goals for People and Planet, which outlines what is required.	本周，我的同事和我公布了名为《为了人民和地球的可持续发展目标》的报告，该报告列出了所需要的内容。


We identified six universal goals for sustainable development: lives and livelihoods, food security, water sustainability, clean energy, healthy ecosystems, and good governance.	我们为可持续发展定义了六个全球目标：生活和生活方式、食品安全、水的可持续性、清洁能源、健康的生态系统和良好的治理。


The next step is to define measurable targets, such as better lives for slum dwellers or reduced deforestation.	下一步是给出可测量目标，比如棚户区生活改善和遏制森林砍伐。


Genuine progress in any of the six target areas will require a comprehensive approach, with policies that span the economic, social, and environmental domains.	六大目标区域的任何真正进展都要求全面的安排，所涉政策包含经济、社会和环境诸领域。


For example, eradicating poverty entails the provision of food, water, energy, and access to gainful employment.	比如，减贫包括了供应食品、水、能源以及提供有酬工作等方面。


But providing energy to all will require governments to discontinue subsidies for fossil fuels and unsustainable agriculture.	但向所有人提供能源要求政府停止化石燃料和不可持续农业的补贴。


And achieving food security is impossible without agricultural systems and practices that not only support farmers and produce enough food to meet people’s nutritional needs, but that also preserve natural resources by, for example, preventing soil erosion and relying on more efficient nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers.	而要达到食品安全目标，农业体系和行为就不但要支持农民、生产出足够的食物满足人们的营养需求，还必须通过（比如）防止水土流失、依靠高效氮肥和磷肥等方式保护自然资源。


The Millennium Development Goals, due to expire in 2015, succeeded because they marshaled international resources and funding to address a focused set of poverty-related issues.	2015年到期的千年发展目标是成功的，因为它们引导了国际资源和资金纠正了一系列与贫困相关的问题。


The Sustainable Development Goals must go a step further.	可持续发展目标必须在此基础上更进一步。


Like Einstein’s thought experiment, many lives depend on it.	就像爱因斯坦的思想实验一样，这是许多人性命攸关的事情。


The Next Social Contract	新的社会契约


PARIS – Around the world nowadays, persistent unemployment, skill mismatches, and retirement frameworks have become central to fiscal policy – and to the often-fierce political debates that surround it.	巴黎—如今，放眼全球，持久的失业、技能失配和退休框架已成为财政政策的核心，也是动不动就激烈上演的围绕财政政策的政治争论的核心。


The advanced countries are facing an immediate “aging” problem, but most of the emerging economies are also in the midst of a demographic transition that will result in an age structure similar to that of the advanced economies – that is, an inverted pyramid – in just two or three decades.	发达国家面临着迫在眉睫的“老龄化”问题，但大部分新兴国家也处于人口结构转型中，不出二三十年便将步入与发达经济体想死的年龄结构（即倒金字塔结构）。


Indeed, China will get there much sooner.	事实上，中国达到这一步会早得多。


Multiple problems affect employment.	诸多问题影响着就业。


Weak demand in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that began in 2008 remains a key factor in Europe, the United States, and Japan.	2008年开始的全球金融危机的后果仍在欧洲、美国和日本起着主要作用。


But longer-term structural issues are weighing down labor markets as well.	但更长期的结构问题也在压抑着劳动力市场。


Most important, globalization results in a continuous shift of comparative advantage, creating serious adjustment problems as employment created in new activities does not necessarily compensate for the loss of jobs in old ones.	最重要的是，全球化导致了比较优势的持续变化，由于新活动所创造的就业不足以补偿旧活动损失的就业，于是形成了严重的调整问题。


In any case, most new jobs require different skills, implying that workers losing their jobs in dying industries have little hope of finding another one.	无论如何，大部分新岗位需要不同的技能，这意味着因行业衰落而失业的工人难以找到新工作。


Moreover, technological progress is becoming ever more “labor-saving,” with computers and robots replacing human workers in settings ranging from supermarkets to automobile assembly lines.	此外，技术进步变得越来越“节约劳动力”，从超市到汽车流水线，电脑和机器人取代了人工。


Given the volatile macroeconomic outlook, many firms are reluctant to hire new workers, leading to high youth unemployment throughout the world.	由于宏观经济前景波动不已，许多企业不愿意招聘新员工，这导致全世界年轻人失业率高企。


At the same time, aging – and the associated cost of health care for the elderly – constitutes the main fiscal challenge in maturing societies.	与此同时，老龄化——以及相应的老年人健康支出成本——构成了高龄社会的主要财政挑战。


By the middle of this century, life expectancy at age 60 will have risen by about ten years relative to the post-World War II period, when current retirement ages were fixed.	但在本世纪中叶，60岁年龄段的预期寿命将比二战后时期增加十年，而当前的退休年龄就是那时候制定的。


Marginal changes to existing arrangements are unlikely to be sufficient to respond to technological forces, reduce social tensions and young people’s fears, or address growing fiscal burdens.	对当前安排予以微调不可能足以应对技术力量、降低社会紧张和年轻人恐慌，或解决日益增长的财政负担。


A radical reassessment of work, skill formation, retirement, and leisure is needed, with several principles forming the core of any comprehensive reform.	必须对工作、技能形成、退休和闲暇予以彻底的重新评估，任何全面的改革都必须包括几大原则。


For starters, skill formation and development must become a life-long process, starting with formal schooling, but continuing through on-the-job training and intervals of full-time education at different points in life.	首先，技能形成和开发必须成为一生的过程，从正式入学开始，并在一生的时间里参与数次在职培训和脱产全职教育。


Special youth insertion programs should become a normal part of public support for employment and career formation, with exemption from social-security contributions for the first one or two years of employment.	年轻人特别干预计划应该成为支持就业和职业形成的公共支持的常规部分，在职业生涯刚开始的一两年中，应该免于缴纳社会保障费用。


A second principle is that retirement should be a gradual process.	第二个原则是退休应该是一个渐进的过程。


People could work an average of 1,800-2,000 hours per year until they reach their 50’s, taper off to 1,300-1,500 hours in their early 60’s, and move toward the 500-1,000 range as they approach 70.	在50岁之前，人们每年平均可以工作1800—2000小时，60岁出头时可以降低到每年1300—1500小时，在70岁时再降低到每年500—1000小时。


A hospital nurse, an airplane crew member, or a secondary-school teacher, for example, could work five days a week until her late fifties, four days a week until age 62, three days until age 65, and perhaps two days until age 70.	比如，医院护士、飞机空乘和初中教师可以每周五天工作到近60岁，每周四天工作到62岁，每周三天工作到65岁，然后每周两天工作到70岁。


Employers and workers should negotiate such flexibility, but they should do so with incentives and financial support from government – for example, variable social-security and income taxes.	雇主和工人应该就这一灵活性进行谈判，但政府应该提供激励和财政支持——比如可变的社会保障和所得税。


Paid holidays can be 3-4 weeks until age 45, gradually increasing to 7-8 weeks in one’s late 60’s.	带薪假期可以每年3—4周直至45岁，然后逐渐增加，到近70岁时达到每年7—8周。


Maternity and paternity leave should be increased where it is low, such as in the United States.	母亲和父亲的育儿假较短的国家（比如美国）应该增加。


Public policies should also encourage greater scope for individual choice.	公共政策还应该鼓励扩大个人选择范围。


For example, every ten years, a worker should be able to engage in a year of formal learning, with one-third of the cost paid by the employer, one-third by public funds, and one-third by personal savings (these proportions could vary by income bracket).	比如，每隔十年，工人应该能够参加一年的正式学习，其中三分之一的费用由雇主承担，三分之一的费用由公共资金承担，三分之一的费用由个人储蓄承担（具体比例可以随收入档次调整）。


The overall objective should be a society in which, health permitting, citizens work and pay taxes until close to the age of 70, but less intensively with advancing age and in a flexible manner that reflects individual circumstances.	总目标应该是建设这样的社会：只要身体健康允许，公民可以工作和纳税到将近70岁，但随着年龄的增长，工作环境应该根据个人状况增加弹性。


In fact, gradual and flexible retirement would in many cases benefit not only employers and governments, but also workers themselves, because continued occupational engagement is often a source of personal satisfaction and emotionally enriching social interaction.	事实上，在很多情形中，渐进、弹性的退休不但有利于雇主和政府，也有利于工人本身，因为继续工作通常可以带来个人满足感和有益于身心的社会关系。


Using the Gallup World Poll, my colleagues at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, Carol Graham and Milena Nikolova, have found that the happiest cohorts are those who work part-time voluntarily.	我的华盛顿布鲁金斯研究所同事格雷厄姆（Carl Graham）和尼科洛娃（Milena Nikolova）通过盖洛普全球民调（Gallup World Poll）的数据发现，最幸福的人群是那些自愿参与兼职工作的人。


In exchange for longer work lives, citizens would have more time for both leisure and skill formation throughout their lives, with positive effects on productivity and life satisfaction.	作为延长工作寿命的交换，公民终其一生将拥有更长时间的闲暇和技能形成，有利于生产率和生活满意度的提高。


The new social contract for the first half of the twenty-first century must be one that combines fiscal realism, significant room for individual preferences, and strong social solidarity and protection against shocks stemming from personal circumstances or a volatile economy.	21世纪上半叶的新社会契约必须兼顾财政现实、个人偏好的巨大空间以及强大的社会凝聚力和对个人情况和经济波动的冲击的保护。


Many countries are taking steps in this direction.	许多国家正在朝这个防线努力。


They are too timid.	它们的步子迈得不够大。


We need a comprehensive and revolutionary reframing of education, work, retirement, and leisure time.	我们需要对教育、工作、退休和闲暇来一个全面的、革命性的再安排。


Redesigning Capitalism	重塑资本主义


PARIS – When the heads of state of the world’s 20 largest economies come together on short notice, as they just did in Washington, D.C., it is clear how serious the current global crisis is.	巴黎—当世界20个最大经济体的首脑紧急聚首华盛顿，当前全球危机的严重性就可见一斑。


They did not decide much, except to call for improved monitoring and regulation of financial flows.	除了呼吁加强对金融业的监管之外，他们没有做出什么重大决定。


More importantly, they committed themselves to launching a lasting process to reform the world’s financial system.	但更为重要的是，他们都承诺将启动一次对世界金融体系的长期改革。


Of course, those who dreamed of a Bretton Woods II were disappointed.	当然，那些冀望建立“布雷顿森林体系 II”的人就大失所望了。 但原来的“布雷顿森林体系”的建立也非一日之功；


But the original Bretton Woods framework was not built in a day; indeed, the 1944 conference was preceded by two and a half years of preparatory negotiations, which is probably the minimum needed to decide such weighty issues.	的确，在1944年的那次会议之前是长达两年半的准备性谈判。 这可能是要在这些重量级问题上做出决策的起码前提。


The recent G-20 summit occurred with virtually no real preliminary work.	而最近的G-20峰会是在几乎没有任何真正意义上的前期准备的情况下召开的。


Three tasks must now be addressed.	有三项任务有待完成。


First, a floor must be put under the international financial system in order to stop its collapse.	首先，必须给国际金融体系“垫底”以阻止其崩溃。


Second, new regulations are needed once the system revives, because if it remains the same way, it will only produce new crises.	其次，该体系一旦复苏就需要有新的监管机制。 因为如果它还是一成不变，那么就只可能造成新的危机。


Finding the right mix will not be easy.	而要找到一套行之有效的监管体系并非易事。


For 25 years, the world has experienced a huge financial crisis every five years, each seemingly with its own cause.	在过去的25年以来，世界每五年就要经历一次巨大的金融危机，而每次爆发都有各自的原因。


The third task is to focus on real economic activity, end the recession, sustain growth, and, above all, reform the capitalist system to make it be less dependent on finance.	第三项任务是关注实体经济活动，终止衰退，维持增长，最重要的是还要改革资本主义制度以降低其对金融的依赖。


Long-term investments, not short-term profits, and productive work, rather than paper gains, need to be supported.	我们需要支持的是长期投资而不是短期利润，是生产性的工作而不是纸上收益。


The first task is already being tackled.	第一项任务已在解决之中。


But, although the United States and some European countries have gone a long way toward restoring the lending capacity of banks, that may not be enough.	然而，虽然美国和一些欧洲国家已经在恢复银行的放贷能力方面不遗余力，但这可能还是不够。


After all, if the economy is to grow again, banks need borrowers, but the recession has led entrepreneurs to cut their investments.	毕竟，如果经济要再次增长，银行就需要借款人，而（经济）衰退已经让企业家们缩减了投资。


The second task remains open.	第二项任务仍是悬而未决。


Disagreements about how to re-regulate the financial markets are deep, owing to countless taboos and the huge interests at stake. Moreover, there can be no comprehensive agreement that does not take into account the relationship between finance and the real economy.	由于无数的禁忌和受到威胁的巨大利益，在如何对金融市场重新监管方面仍存在着深刻的分歧。


The essential problem in addressing the third task is to find out precisely what is going on in the real economy.	应对第三项要务的关键问题是准确地了解实体经济的现状。


Some states (Iceland and Hungary) are clearly bankrupt.	有些国家（冰岛和匈牙利）显然已经破产。


Some merely face a hazardous financial situation (Denmark, Spain, and others).	有一些则只是面临着严峻的金融形势（丹麦、西班牙和其他一些国家）。


Their financial crisis is the main reason for their weakness.	金融危机是他们国力衰弱的主要原因。


All of these problems are so difficult to resolve because they have been festering for so long.	所有这些问题之所以如此棘手是因为它们都是陈年痼疾。


It is now increasingly evident that today’s crisis has its roots in February 1971, when US President Richard Nixon decided to break the link between the dollar and gold.	现在越来越明晰的一点是当前的危机发端于1971年2月，尼克松总统决定打破美元与黄金的联系机制之时。


Until that point, America’s pledge to maintain the gold standard was the basis for the global fixed-exchange-rate system, which was the heart of the Bretton Woods framework.	在那之前，美国对维持金本位的承诺是全球固定汇率体系的基础。 而该体系正是“布雷顿森林”框架的核心。


During the 27 years that it lasted, huge growth in international trade, supported by non-volatile pricing, was the norm, and large financial crises were absent.  	在其执行的那27年中，以非变动定价支持的国际贸易大幅增长成为一种模式，大规模的金融危机也没有发生。


Since then, the international financial system has been highly volatile.	而自那时起，国际金融体系就变得极不稳定。


The era of floating exchange rates that followed the end of the gold standard required the development of products that could protect international trade from price volatility.	金本位终结之后的浮动汇率时代需要开发出一些可以保护国际贸易不受价格波动影响的产品。


This opened the way to options, selling and buying on credit, and derivatives of all kinds.	这就为期权、信贷沽售和各种各样金融衍生产品的诞生铺平了道路。


These innovations were considered technical successes.	这些创新被看作技术上的成功。


Prices were (mostly) stabilized, but with a slow, if continuous, rising trend.	价格（在很大程度上）得到稳定，但却似乎呈缓慢而持续上扬的趋势。


The market for these financial products grew over 30 years to the point that they delivered huge opportunities for immediate gain, which provided a strong incentive for market participants to play with them more and more.	这些金融产品的市场在过去30年里已经发展到了一种为短期获利提供巨大机会的程度。 这就为市场参与者提供了强大的投机动力。


During this time, capitalism – smooth and successful between 1945-1975 (sustained high growth, low unemployment, and no financial crises) – weakened.	此时，在1945-1975年间平稳而成功的资本主义（持续的高增长、较低的失业率并且没有金融危机）被弱化了。


Through pension funds, investment funds, and arbitrage (or hedge) funds, shareholders became well organized and seized power in developed countries’ firms.	通过养老基金、投资基金和套利（或对冲）基金，股东们变得更有组织并掌控了发达国家的公司。


Under their pressure, more and more processes were “outsourced.”	在他们的压力下，越来越多的流程被“外包”。


In real terms, wages no longer rose (indeed, the average real wage has been stagnant for 25 years in the US), and a growing share of manpower (currently around 15%) was without steady employment.	在实际情况下，工资不再提高（的确，在美国平均实际工资已经滞胀了25年）。 而比例日增的劳动力（目前占总量的15%）也不能够稳定就业。


Everywhere, the share of wages and incomes began to fall as a proportion of GDP.	在各地，工资和收入占GDP的比例也开始下降。


As a result, consumption weakened, unsteady employment grew, and unemployment stopped declining.	其结果是消费疲软、非稳定就业增加而失业率停止下降。


Under such circumstances, the upper middle classes in developed countries increasingly came to look for capital gains instead of improving their living standards through productive work.	审时度势，发达国家的上中产阶级开始越来越多地寻求资本收益而不是通过生产性的工作来提升生活水平。


This promoted inequality, and led to the under-regulated financial system’s seizure of power over the entire economy, destabilizing the real economy by fatally weakening its capacity to react to external shocks.	这就加剧了不平等，并导致监管不足的金融体系篡夺了整体经济的控制权，并通过致命性地削弱实体经济对外部震荡的反应能力使其变得不稳定。


Today’s crisis marks the end of economic growth fueled only by credit.	当今的危机标志着仅由信贷驱动的经济增长模式的终结。


But untying the knot that an overweening financial sector has drawn around the economy will take time.	但是要化解虚假繁荣的金融产业在经济中造成的各种问题需要时间。


Indeed, there is still no consensus that this needs to be done. Yet the G-20 has opened the way to discussion of these fundamental issues.	的确，我们在是否需要解决这些问题方面仍然没有达成共识。 但G-20为我们启动了针对这些根本性问题的讨论。


Today’s recession will be a long one, but it will compel everybody to consider its root causes.	虽然目前的衰退将会是一次长期的过程，但它会迫使所有的人去探究其发生的根本原因。


Connecting the Red Sea	连接红海


KING ABDULLAH ECONOMIC CITY – The Red Sea has played a pivotal role in global trade for millennia.	阿卜杜拉国王经济城—几千年来，红海在全球贸易中扮演着关键角色。


In the time of the pharaohs, it was at the heart of the global spice trade.	在埃及法老时代，它是全球香料贸易的中心。


Today, it is an essential global artery, feeding Western demand for hydrocarbons and facilitating the flow of goods between Europe and booming Asian markets.	如今，它是至关重要的全球动脉，满足着西方对碳氢化合物的需求，便利着欧洲和新兴亚洲市场之间的商品流。


More than 10% of world trade moves through the Red Sea basin every year, a figure that is set to increase as Egypt doubles the capacity of the Suez Canal.	每年，10%以上的世界贸易需要穿越红海盆地，随着埃及将苏伊士运河运力提升一倍，这一数字还会继续升高。


And yet, with a few exceptions, most of the modern wealth generated by that trade sails rapidly onward, leaving little to show for its passage.	但是，除了少数例外，贸易航海所产生的现代财富大部分立刻就流走了，只有极少数留下了痕迹。


There is no reason that should continue to be the case.	没有理由认为未来仍然应该如此。


A regional effort to facilitate trade and build infrastructure has the potential to reposition the countries surrounding the Red Sea as destinations for global investment and international trade.	便利贸易、基础设施的地区级措施有望改写红海沿岸国家的地位，使它们成为全球投资和国际贸易目的地。


The Red Sea region, comprising the 20 countries that use the route as their primary trading corridor, is the largest, fastest-growing, and least exploited emerging market in the world.	红海地区坐落着20个国家，红海是它们的主要贸易走廊。 红海也是世界上最大、增长最快、开发最少的新兴市场。


Over the next 35 years, the United Nations expects the region’s population to rise more than twofold, from 620 million today to 1.3 billion.	联合国预计，在未来35年中，红海地区人口将增加一倍多，从今天的6. 2亿增加到13亿。


This population growth will be accompanied by one of the world’s highest urbanization rates, creating a burgeoning middle class, which the Brookings Institution estimates will grow from 136 million today to 343 million by 2050.	这一人口增长将伴随着世界上最高的城市化率之一，制造一个蓬勃发展的中产阶级，据布鲁金斯研究所估计，其数量将从今天的1. 36亿人增加到2050年的3.


Over the same period, according to current projections, the region’s GDP will triple, from $1.8 trillion to $6.1 trillion, while trade will increase fivefold, from $881 billion to $4.7 trillion.	8万亿美元增加到6. 1万亿美元，而贸易将增加五倍，从8,810亿美元增加到4.


And yet, as encouraging as these numbers may be, the region has the potential to do much better.	但是，这些数字看起来固然鼓舞人心，实际上红海地区有能力做得更好。


Long-term forecasts for the Red Sea region’s share of global trade are comparatively flat.	关于红海地区占全球贸易比重的长期预测基本保持不变。


According to HSBC, for example, trade within the Middle East and Africa will account for 10% of the global total in 2050, up only slightly from 9% today.	比如，据汇丰银行的数据，到2050年，中东和非洲内部贸易将占全球总量的10%，只是略高于今天的9%。


There are good reasons for this conservative outlook.	这些保守预计有其很好的理由。


Many of the countries in the Middle East and Africa have comparatively limited infrastructure; there are few world-class deep-water ports in the Red Sea or nearby.	许多中东和非洲国家基础设施相对有限； 红海及周边缺少世界级深水港。


Levels of economic development vary widely, from the wealthy countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the emerging economies of sub-Saharan and East Africa.	经济发展水平差异很大，既有富裕的海湾合作委员会成员国，也有撒哈拉以南和东非的新兴经济体。


And, unfortunately, political and cultural differences do not always encourage cross-border cooperation.	此外，不幸的是，政治和文化差异并不总是有利于跨国合作。


A coordinated initiative to facilitate trade within the Red Sea region would have a significant impact on future development, boosting GDP by about 10% to $6.6 trillion and increasing trade by nearly 35% to $6.3 trillion, according to research commissioned by King Abdullah Economic City.	据阿卜杜拉国王经济城受命进行的研究的数据，采取合作方案便利红海地区内部的贸易将给未来发展造成重大影响，让GDP提高10%左右至66亿美元【原文如此，疑应是6. 6万亿美元】，让贸易量增加近35%至6.


By providing greater access to international trade for small and medium-size enterprises, the core drivers of growth and job creation, such an initiative would diversify exports and significantly enhance the local share of the global value chain.	3万亿美元。 这样的方案能够让中小企业——增长和就业创造的核心推动力——更多地参与国际贸易，从而实现出口多元化和大幅增强本地占全球价值链的比重。


Achieving this would require significant improvement of logistics capabilities in the region.	实现这一目标需要大幅改善红海地区物流能力。


The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) scores most of the countries in the Red Sea economic region below 2.6 on its five-point scale.	在世界银行物流表现指数（LPI）上，红海经济区大部分国家得分低于2. 6分（总分5分）。


The most logistics-friendly market in the region, the United Arab Emirates, has a score of 3.54, placing it just within the top 20% of countries in the LPI.	该地区物流最完善的市场是阿联酋，得分3. 54分，勉强跻身LPI指数前20%。


The private sector should be at the forefront of the effort to build the infrastructure and logistics links that form the backbone of global trade, install the technologies and systems that maximize efficiency, and provide the training and skills to boost performance.	在建设作为全球贸易支柱的基础设施和物流联系、部署能让效率最大化的技术和系统，以及提供刺激经济表现的培训和技能方面，私人部门应该站在前沿。


This process alone will create jobs, open career paths, and improve access to education across the region.	光是这一过程就可以在整个地区创造就业、打开职业路径、改善教育普及。


National governments will also need to participate, streamlining customs controls, border management policies, and regional trade regulations.	国家政府也必须参与进来，改革海关控制、边境管理政策和地区贸易监管。


A good place to start would be the formation of a Red Sea Trade Agreement, similar to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, outlining specific measures to reduce the costs of cross-border trade and mechanisms to settle disputes between investors and governments.	一个很好的入手点是签订红海贸易协议，效仿跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），列出具体措施降低跨境贸易成本、制定解决投资者和政府间纠纷的机制。


Another potential initiative would be the formation of a regional infrastructure bank, modeled on China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	另一个潜在方案是效仿中国的亚洲基础设施投资银行成立地区基础设施银行。


Such an institution would facilitate the efficient distribution of capital to infrastructure development around the region, enhancing national trade capabilities and promoting sustainable economic growth.	这一机构能够便利资本有效地分配到整个地区的基础设施开发，加强国家毛一能力，促进可持续经济增长。


The Red Sea region has a unique opportunity to develop into a global center of excellence in trade facilitation, strengthening economic ties throughout the region and building a new growth engine for the global economy.	红海地区拥有独一无二的机会发展成为贸易便捷化全球中心，增强整个地区的经济联系，为全球经济打造新的增长引擎。


All that is needed is the will to seize it.	所需要的全部只是抓住这一机会的意愿。


Democratic national governments look more and more impotent, and the EU is not a democracy.	民主国家政府看似越来越无���，而欧盟又并非民主体系。


Reforming Japan’s Constitution	改革日本的宪法


“Reform with no sacred cows” was Junichiro Koizumi’s slogan when he became prime minister five years ago, and no cow here is more sacred than our “peace” constitution.	“改革要毫无敬畏”是小泉纯一郎五年前成为宰相时候的口号，现在没有任何东西能比我们的“和平”宪法来的更为神圣。


So it should be no surprise that, as Koizumi moves toward the end of his second and final term in office, his efforts to reform the constitution to allow Japan more effectively to defend world peace are gathering pace.	所以，当小泉第二个也是最后一个任期快接近尾声的时候，他力图改革宪法以使日本更有效地保卫世界和平的努力也加快了步伐，对此我们不该感到诧异。


In mid-April, the Constitution Review committee of Japan’s House of Representatives issued a final report on the fundamental problems facing Japan’s Constitution and submitted it to the Chair of House of the Diet.	四月中旬，日本众议院宪法研究委员会发表了关于日本宪法所面临的基本问题的最终报告，并提交给众议院议长。


Soon the House of Councillors will submit its final report.	很快参议院将提交它的最终报告。


Moreover, concrete discussions on constitutional reform are underway within both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (with Koizumi himself in charge) and the opposition Democratic Party.	此外，执政党自民党（由小泉领导）与其反对党民主党之间正在就宪法改革展开具体讨论。


The private sector and media outlets like the influential Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper have also joined in.	私营机构和媒体出版物，诸如深具影响力的《读卖新闻》也加入了这场讨论。


The Liberal Democrats aim to have their draft constitutional amendments ready for the 50th anniversary of the party’s founding this November.	自民党打算在今年十一月庆祝该党五十周年派对之际完成他们的宪法修改草案。


Although almost everyone concedes that some amendments to the constitution are necessary, agreement on what needs to be done has been difficult to reach.	虽然几乎每个人都同意宪法必须有所修正，但是究竟应该做什么却是众口难调。


Indeed, the Liberal Democrats are as divided as everyone else.	事实上，自民党内部的意见和其他人一样四分五裂。


In addition to these divisions, there are problems concerning how to amend the constitution.	除了这些分歧之外，还有如何修正宪法的问题。


New legislation will be needed to enable amendments to the constitution, and this will take time and even more debate.	要对宪法进行修正首先要通过新的立法，这需要时间，甚至更多的辩论。


Yet the pressure for fundamental change – particularly of Article 9, which putatively pledges that Japan will never maintain armed forces – is such that there is a real chance that these obstacles can and will be overcome.	然而，重大改革的压力——尤其是对公开宣称日本永远放弃使用武力的第九条进行改革的压力——如此巨大，使得这些障碍能够并且将被克服的真正机会已经来临。


Fundamental change, indeed, is needed as soon as possible, because current interpretations of the constitution have consistently distorted Japan’s security and defense policies.	其实，这些重大改革应当越快越好，因为现行的宪法版本长期以来歪曲了日本的安全和防卫政策。


Across Japan, there is a growing view that some of these policies cannot wait for constitutional amendment.	在全日本，越来越多的人认为，某些安全和防卫政策不能光等着宪法修正。


Up to now, issues related to national defense have been regulated by the administrative judgments of the time or by Diet resolutions based on the prevailing interpretation of Article 9.	目前为止，与国防有关的问题都由当时候的行政判决控制或由国会根据对第九条的普遍理解所作出的决议掌握。


But this ad-hoc approach has been, and remains, a recipe for paralysis.	但是这种治标不治本的方法已经埋下了防卫政策瘫痪隐患。


The myriad rulings that have resulted from this process have left the exercise of national defense without any clear position under the Constitution and impede Japan from exercising its “collective self-defense” rights and treaty obligations with its allies (principally the United States).	这个过程所产生的无数条规定使得国防行动在宪法框架下毫无明确立场可言，并阻止日本使用“集体自卫”权利以及实施同盟之间（尤其是美国）履行条约规定的义务。


Tortured reasoning about phrases like “use of force” or “exclusively defense-oriented policy” amounts to an open invitation to confusion, both in the military and to countries in the region.	对诸如“使用武力”或者“专守防卫政策”这些词语曲解的推理，结果给该地区的军队和国家带来重重疑云。


And the so-called “three principles on arms exports” have placed absurd limits on what may be sold or supplied abroad, as even flying boats used for sea rescue have been viewed as banned from export.	所谓的“武器出口三大原则”对那些原本可以出售或向国外提供的武器作了荒谬的限制，甚至连用于海上救援的水上飞机也被禁止出口。


Given the current regional security environment– international terrorism tied to local, Asian-based terrorists, various challenges to the security of vital sea lanes, North Korea’s search for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and China’s rapid enhancement of its naval power–, Asia today is far less stable and more complex than it was when Japan's constitution was written.	在当前地区安全环境下——全球恐怖主义与亚洲本地的恐怖主义分子关系紧密，重要海上通道的安全面临多种挑战，朝鲜寻求发展核武器和弹道导弹，中国迅速扩张的海军力量——比起日本制定宪法的那个时候，如今的亚洲已没有那么稳定了， 局势也复杂得多。


By revising the country’s National Defense Program Guideline (conventionally called an Outline) last December, Koizumi’s government began the process of clarifying some of these debilitating ambiguities.	去年十二月，通过修改《国家防卫计划大纲》（以前称之为概要），小泉政府开始澄清某些削弱日本实力、模棱两可的条例。


The Guideline lifted some of the more foolish limits on arms exports by ending the “all-out prohibition policy” maintained since the Miki Administration of 1976.	《概要》结束了自1976年三木武夫政府起保留至今的“全面禁止政策”，取消了一些愚蠢的武器出口禁止。


For example, it clearly determined that the ongoing Japanese-US joint technical research to develop and produce the SM-3 sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an exception.	例如，它明确规定，为发展并生产SM-3海域弹道导弹防卫体系而进行的日-美联合技术研究是个例外。


More generally, the government may now review requests for weaponry from friendly governments on a case-by-case basis, according to whether the sale risks instigating or fueling international conflicts.	更普遍而言，政府现在也许能根据销售风险是否会引发或加剧国际争端，一个一个回顾友好国家政府所提出的武器需求。


As a result, the sale or supply of used or new surface combat vessels by the Japan Coast Guard or even Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to ASEAN countries, say, Malaysia, Indonesia or Singapore, to help them fight maritime terrorism and piracy more effectively will now likely be permitted.	结果，日本海上保安厅乃至于日本海上自卫队（JMSDF），现在很有可能得到允许，能够向ASEAN国家，例如马来西亚、印度尼西亚或新加坡等国销售或者提供或旧或新的海面战舰，以帮助他们更有效地抵御海上恐怖主义活动或海盗。


Supplying European countries as well ASEAN countries with JMSDF flying boats for sea rescue, patrol, and fire fighting will also now likely be approved.	向欧洲国家和ASEAN国家提供日本海上自卫队的海上救援、巡逻和救火战舰现在也很有可能被批准。


These favorable and appropriate actions will allow Japan, for the first time in its postwar history, to meet the international community’s requests in a timely way.	这些有利的得当行动将会使日本有史以来第一次能够适时地满足国际社会的需求。


Yet, without fundamental constitutional reform, Japan’s position in Asia and the world will remain anomalous.	但是，没有重大宪法改革，日本在亚洲和全世界的地位仍然难以正常化。


It should be remembered that, after the US, Japan is the largest contributor to the United Nations, and to its peacekeeping budget.	人们应该记住，日本是仅次于美国的对联合国及其维和预算最大的捐赠国。


Yet its constitution severely constrains its ability to send combat units for the Security Council’s peacekeeping operations.	尽管它的宪法严格限制了它向联合国安理会维和行动派遣战斗小组的能力。


Japan needs to be able to back up the Security Council with men, and hence share the political risk, as well as the cost, of the UN’s efforts to maintain world peace.	日本需要能够用自己的人支持安理会，并因此分担联合国为维护世界和平所承担的政治风险以及费用。


President Xi’s Singapore Lessons	习主席的新加坡教训


NEW YORK – China is at a crucial point today, as it was in 1978, when the market reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping opened its economy to the world – and as it was again in the early 1990’s, when Deng’s famous “southern tour” reaffirmed the country’s development path.	纽约—如今，中国正站在关键点上，一如1978年邓小平的市场经济改革将中国经济的大门朝世界打开，又如20世纪90年代初邓小平以著名的“南巡”确认中国的发展道路。


Throughout this time, examples and lessons from other countries have been important.	在此期间，来自其他国家的先例和教训十分重要。


Deng was reportedly substantially influenced by an early visit to Singapore, where accelerated growth and prosperity had come decades earlier.	据报道，邓小平深受其早先赴新加坡访问的影响。 新加坡的快速增长和繁荣要早于中国几十年。


Understanding other developing countries’ successes and shortcomings has been – and remains – an important part of China’s approach to formulating its growth strategy.	了解其他发展中国家的成功和不足是——现在仍是——中国制定增长战略的重要组成部分。


Like Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in their first few decades of modern growth, China has been ruled by a single party.	与新加坡、日本、韩国和台湾省在现代增长的最初几十年一样，中国也是一党执政。


Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) remains dominant, though that appears to be changing.	新加坡的人民行动党仍是第一大党，尽管情况似乎在发生变化。


The others evolved into multi-party democracies during the middle-income transition.	其他国家则在中等收入转型中发展为多党制民主国家。


China, too, has now reached this critical last leg of the long march to advanced-country status in terms of economic structure and income levels.	从经济结构和收入水平来说，中国现在也快走完其迈向发达国家的长征之路，之差关键的临门一脚了。


Singapore should continue to be a role model for China, despite its smaller size.	新加坡可以继续成为中国的榜样，尽管其规模很小。


The success of both countries reflects many contributing factors, including a skilled and educated group of policymakers supplied by a meritocratic selection system, and a pragmatic, disciplined, experimental, and forward-looking approach to policy.	两国的成功均反映了诸多因素，包括精英指定制度输送的高技能、高文化层次的决策群体以及政策的务实性、自律性、试验性前瞻性。


The other key lesson from Singapore is that single-party rule has retained popular legitimacy by delivering inclusive growth and equality of opportunity in a multi-ethnic society, and by eliminating corruption of all kinds, including cronyism and excessive influence for vested interests.	新加坡的另一个关键教训是一党执政的民众合法性来自包容性增长和为多民族社会提供平等机会，以及消灭包括裙带关系和利益集团影响力过大的各种腐败。


What Singapore’s founder, Lee Kwan Yew, and his colleagues and successors understood is that the combination of single-party rule and corruption is toxic.	新加坡国父李光耀及其同事和继任者明白，一党执政若与腐败相结合，将是死路一条。


If you want the benefits of the former, you cannot allow the latter.  	如果你想从前者获益，就绝不能允许后者发生。


Coherence, long time horizons, appropriate incentives, strong “navigational” skills, and decisiveness are desirable aspects of continuity in governance, especially in a meritocratic system managing complex structural shifts.	凝聚力、长期视角、适当激励、强大的“引导”能力以及果敢坚决是可贵的治国品质，特别是对需要管理复杂结构变化的精英指定制度来说。


To protect that and maintain public support for the investments and policies that sustain growth, Singapore needed to prevent corruption from gaining a foothold, and to establish consistency in the application of rules.	为了保护和维持对持续增长的政策和投资的公共支持，新加坡不得不从根本上防止腐败，并建立执法的一视同仁。


Lee did that, with the PAP supplying what a full formal system of public accountability would have provided.	李光耀做到了这一点，人民行动党交出了一个公众问责所能给出的完整的正式制度。


China, too, most likely wants to retain, at least for a while, the benefits of single-party rule, and delay the transition to “messier” governance influenced by multiple voices.	中国也是如此，至少在一段时间内，它仍希望获得一党执政的好处，推迟向受多种声音影响的“混乱”治国的转型。


In fact, a pluralistic system is already evolving under the umbrella of the Chinese Communist Party – a process that may eventually lead to citizens gaining an institutionalized voice in public policy.	事实上，多元体系已经在中国共产党的名义下展开——这一过程可能最终使公民在公共政策中的声音制度化。


For now, however, those representative elements that have been added incrementally are not powerful enough to overcome the growing corruption and excessive influence of vested interests.	不过，目前，这些逐渐增加的代表要素还不足以克服日益增长的腐败和利益集团的过度影响。


To maintain single-party legitimacy – and thus the ability to govern – those narrower interests must be overridden in favor of the general interest.	为了维持一党执政的合法性——以及治国能力——这些狭隘利益集团必须被打倒，以保证一般利益。


That is the challenge that China’s new leadership faces.	这就是中国新领导层所面临的挑战。


If China’s leaders succeed, they can then have a sensible and nuanced debate about the evolving role of the state in their economy, a debate on the merits.	如果中国领导人获得了成功，那么接着他们可以就国家在经济中的角色演变及其优点展开明智而微妙的争论。


Many insiders and external advisers believe that the state’s role must change (not necessarily decline) to create the dynamic innovative economy that is key to navigating the middle-income transition successfully.	许多内部和外部顾问认为，为了建设成功引导中等收入转型所必须的充满活力的创新型经济，国家的角色必须改变（并不一定要淡化）。


But there remain many areas in which further debate and choice are needed.	但在诸多领域，还需要做进一步的争论和选择。


Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and Mao Zedong and Deng in China gained their peoples’ trust as founders and initial reformers.	新加坡的李光耀和中���的毛泽东和邓小平均以开国领袖和改革家获得了人民的信任。


But that trust dissipates; succeeding generations of leaders do not inherit it completely, and must earn it.	但这一信任会消散； 后继领导人无法完整继承这种信任，而需要靠自己争取。


That is all the more reason for them to heed the lessons of history.	这就是他们必须留心历史教训的最重要原因。


China’s new leaders should first reassert the Party’s role as defender of the general interest by creating an environment in which narrow interests, seeking to protect their growing influence and wealth, do not taint complex policy choices.	中国的新领导人首先应该创造让寻求保护其日益增长的影响力和财富的狭隘利益集团无从染指复杂政策决定的环境，以此强调党作为一般利益捍卫者的角色。


They must demonstrate that the Party’s power, legitimacy, and substantial assets are held in trust for the benefit of all Chinese, above all by fostering a pattern of inclusive growth and a system of equal opportunity with a meritocratic foundation.	他们必须证明党的实力、合法性和最本质的财富是受全体中国人民的信任为全体中国人民造福，其中最重要的是创造包容性增长模式以及在精英指定基础上的平等机会制度。


And then they should return to the task of governing in a complex domestic and global environment.	接着，他们应该转向在复杂国内外环境下治国的任务。


There are times when muddling through – or, in the Chinese version, crossing the river by feeling the stones – is the right governing strategy, and there are times when a bold resetting of values and direction is required.	有时，得过且过——用中国的话讲，叫摸石头过河——是正确的治国战略； 有时，对价值和方向的果断推倒重建才是正确的道路。


Successful leaders know what time it is.	成功的领导人知道自己处在哪个时候。


Feeling the stones may seem like the safest option for China’s next president, Xi Jinping, and China’s other new leaders; in fact, it is the most dangerous.	摸石头似乎是中国下任主席习近平和其他新领导人最安全的选择； 而事实上，这是最危险的选择。


The only safe option is a radical realignment of the Party with the general interest.	唯一安全的选择是彻底治党，使之与一般利益一致。


The issue, then, is whether the reformers who carry the real spirit of the 1949 revolution will win the battle for equitable and inclusive growth.	于是，问题变为拥有真正的1949年革命精神的改革者是否能够赢得公平、包容的增长之争。


The optimistic (and I believe realistic) view is that the Chinese people, through a variety of channels, including social media, will weigh in, empowering reformers to push through a progressive agenda.	乐观的（我认为也是现实的）看法是中国人民——通过包括社会媒体在内的多种渠道——也将加入争论，给予改革者力量实施进步日程。


Time will tell.	时间会告诉我们答案。


But it is hard to overstate the outcome’s importance to the rest of the world.	但结果对于世界其他国家的重要性怎么估计也不为过。


Virtually all developing countries – and, increasingly, the advanced countries as well – will be affected one way or another as they, too, struggle to achieve stable and sustainable growth and employment patterns.	几乎所有发展中国家——越来越多的发达国家也是如此——都会在竭力追求稳定可持续的增长和就业模式的道路上或多或少地受到影响。


Reforming Repo Rules	改革回购规则


CAMBRIDGE – Sometimes, we just don’t learn.	美国剑桥——有时候，我们真是吃苦不记苦。


After the financial crisis, the United States enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to overhaul American financial regulation, with the aim of reducing the risk of another financial meltdown.	金融危机后，美国出台了多德-弗兰克法案修订美国的金融监管，目的是消除发生另一次金融崩盘的风险。


But it did nothing to reform “repo” lending – arguably the weakest link in the financial chain.	但该法案并未改革到很可能是金融链条中最弱一环的“回购”贷款。


And we have just seen another major financial firm collapse as a result.	而我们已经看到，其结果是又一家主要金融公司的倒闭。


A repo, or repurchase agreement, is a sale of a security (often a US Treasury obligation) that the seller promises to buy back later – often the day following the original sale – at a slightly higher price.	回购协议即卖方卖出一种证券（通常是美国国债），并承诺在不久后以略高的价格买回（通常在卖出交易后一天）。


The repo buyer thus lends to the seller, with the difference between the immediate “spot” price of the obligation and the “forward” repurchase price representing the interest on the loan.	因此，在回购交易中，买方是在向卖方贷款，即期的债券“现货”价格与“远期”回购价格之间的差额便是这笔贷款的利息。


These repo loans give firms – typically financial firms – access to vast pools of cheap financing (often emanating from US money-market funds).	回购协议贷款给了公司（通常是金融公司）获得大笔廉价融资的机会（通常来自美国货币市场基金）。


It is a market measured in the trillions of dollars.	这是一个规模以万亿美元计的市场。


MF Global, the global financial firm that filed for bankruptcy in October, is just the most recent noteworthy example of how repo lending can go wrong.	今年10月破产的全球金融公司曼氏金融（MF Global）是回购协议贷款可能出现大问题的最新案例。


Like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers before they failed, MF Global had huge short-term, repo-based debt.	正如贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟在倒闭前情况一样，曼氏金融有着巨额基于回购协议的短期债务。


Bear failed in 2008 as its mounting real-estate losses prevented it from quickly rolling over its repo debt, which made up fully one-quarter of its balance sheet.	2008年，贝尔斯登因房地产损失剧增使其无法对回购协议债务（相当于其资产负债表规模的整整四分之一）展期而倒闭。


Then, a year later, Lehman failed with one-third of its balance sheet in repo.	一年后，雷曼也因为占其资产负债表三分之一的回购协议而倒闭。


Repo debt seems to have made up an astounding one-half of MF Global’s balance sheet.	而曼氏金融的回购协议债务占资产负债表规模的比重达到了惊人的一半。


The rules of the financial game privilege repo financing over other kinds, and Dodd-Frank did nothing to fix this.	金融界的游戏规则把回购协议融资置于比其他融资更优先的地位，多德-弗兰克法案并没有修正这一问题。


First, normal bankruptcy rules don’t apply to repos.	首先，普通破产规则不适用回购协议债务。


Second, much repo financing flows into large risk-taking financial firms like MF Global, Lehman, and Bear Stearns through money-market funds, which must invest very short-term, because their depositors want immediate liquidity.	其次，大量回购协议融资通过货币市场基金（此类基金必须进行极短期投资，因为其储户要求即刻的流动性）流入了曼氏金融、雷曼和贝尔斯登等大型风险承担金融公司。


In the US, the usual bankruptcy rules allow regulators and courts to hold a bankrupt company’s operations together long enough to determine if the firm is worth more dead than alive.	在美国，普通破产规则允许监管者和法庭维持破产公司的经营，直到确定该公司破产要比活下去更有价值。


The law stops creditors from grabbing assets after the company enters bankruptcy, and it recalls many payments made to favored creditors in the 90 days before bankruptcy was declared, so that all creditors facilitate the firm’s survival.	破产法禁止债权人在公司进入破产程序后抢夺公司资产，并会召回大量在破产宣布前90天内有利于债权人的债务偿付，以便让所有债权人都作出努力让公司生存下去。


Repo creditors’ exemption from these rules privileges them over the failed firm’s other creditors.	回购协议债权人不适用这些规定，这使得他们拥有比破产公司其他债权人更优先的地位。


The original rationale was that allowing repo creditors to cash out fast would reduce runs, contagion, and credit freezes.	如此规定的初衷是，允许回购协议债权人快速结账有利于减少挤兑、传染和信用冻结。


But the opposite seems to be the case: if the regular rules applied, repo players would be more careful.	但实际效果似乎正好相反：如果监管规则适用，那么回购协议贷款人就会更加谨慎。


They would be wary of firms like MF Global with massive short-term liabilities and only a thin equity buffer to absorb losses.	他们会担心曼氏金融等公司巨大的短期债务规模和极少的吸收损失的资本缓冲。


They would charge more, curtail some short-term lending, or both, and they would insist that firms like MF Global maintain a larger equity cushion.	他们会要求更高的利息，或削减部分短期贷款，或双管齐下，还会要求像曼氏金融这样的公司保证较大的资本缓冲。


If they charged more, other capital sources – long-term debt and equity – would become more attractive.	如果他们要求更高的利息，那么其他资本来源——长期债务和权益融资——就会变得更有吸引力。


The result is that the economy gets too much overnight repo, and the rest of us pay a price for it, because favoring such short-term debt means that more financial firms like Bear, Lehman, and MF Global fail.	结果，经济中出现了太多的隔夜回购协议，而我们其他人都为此付出了代价，因为偏好这种短期债务意味着更多的像贝尔斯登、雷曼和曼氏金融的公司倒闭了。


True, failed firms’ creditors, owners, and managers bear the brunt of the losses initially.	诚然，倒闭公司的债权人、所有人和管理人首当其冲。


But when systemically vital firms overdose on repo, we all pay, first as taxpayers when the government bails them out, and then as we suffer from the resulting economic disruption and downturn.	但当具有系统重要性的公司持有了过量回购协议债务时，我们所有人都要付出代价，首先是作为纳税人（当政府出手援助这些公司时），然后又经受了由此导致的经济破坏和低迷的打击。


The second financial rule that privileges repos is that money-market funds must keep their portfolios extremely liquid, because their customers draw checks on their deposits.	第二种给予回购协议债务优先地位的金融规则是，货币市场基金的投资组合必须是具有高度流动性的，因为其客户需要用他们在货币市场基金中的存款签发支票。


The cash therefore goes into short-term investments – often via repos to financial firms with risky investments.	因此，这笔钱流入了短期投资中，通常是贷给进行风险投资的金融公司的回购协议贷款。


We cannot do without this short-term financing channel, but it need not be as big as it is.	彻底堵上这一短期融资渠道是不行的，但凡事都得有个度。


When shocks hit a fragile financial system, as in 2007 and 2008, the government has reason to guarantee the money market funds, as US authorities did.	但脆弱的金融体系遭受冲击时（比如2007年和2008年），政府就有理由站出来为货币市场基金提供担保，美国当局正是这么做的。


These implicit government guarantees attract more money into these financial channels from nonguaranteed channels, and more “hot money” flows into firms like MF Global, Lehman, and Bear via repo.	这一隐性政府担保吸引了更多的钱从无担保渠道流入了有担保渠道，导致更多的“热钱”通过回购协议流入了曼氏金融、雷曼和贝尔斯登这样的公司。


There is no easy way out of this problem, but we must try to find one.	解决这一问题绝非易事，但我们必须找到一个解决方案。


One improvement would be to reform the bankruptcy rules that favor repos.	一种可能的改善方式是改革偏袒回购协议的破产规则。


Another would be to increase financial institutions’ capital requirements.	另一种是增加金融机构的资本要求。


But these steps must be taken in tandem, because firms and creditors will try to circumvent capital requirements if they see attractive alternative sources of funds – like rule-exempt repo financing.	但这两大措施是相辅相成的，因为如果公司和债权人能找到有吸引力的替代资金源（比如免于规则约束的回购协议融资），它们就会试图绕过资本要求。


There is another solution as well: repo users could be made to pay for their privileges and the costs that they impose on the rest of the economy.	还有一种解决方案：回购协议使用者必须为债权的优先地位和他们给经济中的其他人带来的成本买单。


They could be charged a few basis points per annum in government fees in order to align repos’ private price with their social cost.	可以以政府费用的形式对他们课以每年几个基点的利息，从而使回购协议的私人价格与社会成本相匹配。


Doing so could bring more market discipline to this part of the financial market without extensive regulation.	这样做既可以为金融市场的这个部分带来更严格的市场纪律，又不会要求更多的监管。


The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers exacerbated the US and global recession.  MF Global’s failure stands as a warning that only three years later, and even after the major Dodd-Frank financial reforms, the US still has not fixed key problems that brought them down.	贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟的倒闭加剧了美国和全球衰退。 不出三年，曼氏金融的倒闭再次敲响了警钟，虽然多德-弗兰克重大金融改革已经推出，但美国仍没有修正令它吃尽苦头的关键问题。


Reforming Russia’s Military Industrial Complex	改造俄国的军工产业


Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has launched a comprehensive program to restructure its defense industry, which has shrunk dramatically since the Soviet era.	自苏联时代以来，俄罗斯的国防工业大幅度萎缩。 在普京统治下，俄国发起了对其重组的全面规划。


This process has achieved some progress, but fundamental structural problems persist that lead Russia to export large quantities of advanced weapons to conflict-prone regions, placing the Kremlin at odds with Europe, the United States, and other countries.	这一进程取得了某些进展，但是根本性的结构性问题依旧存在，导致俄国向冲突易发地区出口大量的先进武器，从而使得克里姆林宫与欧洲、美国以及其他国家交恶。


Over the last six years, the Putin administration has encouraged the nationalization and consolidation of private-sector defense firms into large, vertically integrated, state-controlled holdings.	在过去六年里，普京政府鼓励对私营部门的国防公司进行国有化并且将它们合并成为大型的、垂直领导的国家控制的控股公司。


In November 2000, Putin approved the creation of a single government-supervised arms exporting agency, Rosoboronexport, to end the self-destructive competition that had developed between the country’s major weapons-exporting enterprises.	2000年11月，普京批准成立了由政府监管的垄断武器出口机构俄罗斯国防出口公司，从而结束了该国主要武器出口企业间形成的恶性竞争。


Earlier this year, the agency gained the exclusive right to sell Russian weapons to foreign countries.	今年早些时候，该公司获得了向外国出口俄国武器的独家权利。


At present, the government is promoting the creation of a similar institution in the aviation sector, the new United Aircraft Building Corporation (UABC), which includes major state and private manufacturers of fixed-wing aircraft.	目前，俄国政府正在航空部门促成建立一个类似的机构即联合飞机制造公司。 该公司包含主要的国营和私营固定机翼飞机的制造厂商。


Proponents of the merger believe it will improve the efficiency of the Russian aircraft industry and, by lowering costs, make Russian planes more attractive to foreign buyers.	这一合并的支持者们认为这将会提高俄国飞机产业的效率，而且，通过降低成本，可以让俄国飞机对外国买家更具有吸引力。


Under Putin, Russian military spending has also rebounded.	在普京的统治下，俄国军事开支也实现了反弹。


This year, the Russian government will provide the Ministry of Defense almost 5 trillion rubles ($189 billion) under the 2007-2015 State Armaments Program. The percentage of the defense budget allocated to purchasing military equipment will rise from 44% in 2006 to 50% by 2011.	今年，俄国政府将根据2007至2015年度的国家武装规划向国防部提供5万亿卢布（合1890亿美元）的经费，用于购买军事装备的国防预算比例将会从2006年的44％上升到2011年的50％。


The primary purpose of this increased spending is to push new weapons systems from the research and development stage to actual procurement for Russia’s armed forces.	增加经费的主要目的在于把新武器系统从研发阶段推向俄国军队的实际采购。


Over the course of 2007-2015, Russia’s army and navy will replace almost half (45%) of their military equipment.	在2007年至2015年期间，俄国陆军和海军将会替换几乎一半（45％）的军事装备。


In the past, poor government and industry practices frustrated similar plans to supply large numbers of advanced conventional weapons to Russia’s armed forces.	过去，政府和军工业措施不力阻碍了类似的向俄国军队提供大量先进常规武器的计划。


The country’s military-industrial sector suffers from limited domestic orders and extensive overcapacity.	该国的军工部门由于国内订单有限和产量大量过剩而受到挫折。


Purchases for the Russian army and navy have been increasing, but still only sustain about one-fourth of Russia’s existing military production capacity.	俄国陆海军的订购在增加，但是依旧维持俄国现有军事产量的大约四分之一。


The Russian government now spends more on new Russian-made conventional weapons than do foreign purchasers.	俄国政府现在用于新的国产常规武器的费用要超过外国购买者。


Yet, persistent inefficiencies in the Russian defense procurement system result in foreign buyers receiving more new systems than the Russian military.	但是，俄国国防采购体系持久的低效率造成外国买家收到的新武器系统要超过俄国军队。


As a result, Russia’s leading defense firms remain heavily dependent on foreign sales.	结果，俄国主要的国防公司严重依赖于向外国的出口。


Although Russia’s arms exports have decreased considerably since the Soviet period, its revenue per transaction is now greater because Russian firms have yielded much of the lower-end market to less expensive suppliers like China, India, and other former Soviet bloc allies.	尽管俄国的武器出口自苏联时代以来大为减少，但是，由于俄国公司将其大部分低端市场转向较为便宜的供货者，例如中国、印度和其他前苏联集团盟国，其每笔交易的收入反而更大了。


Moreover, where the USSR transferred much weaponry under easy commercial terms or without charge (e.g., under long-term loans not expected to be repaid), Russia now discounts arms only for its closest allies.	而且，苏联往往以优惠的条件或者免费（也就是不指望归还的长期贷款）转让许多武器，俄国现在只向最为紧密的盟国提供折扣。


On March 27, 2007, the Defense Ministry announced that Russia’s annual arms exports increased by 50%, from $4 billion to $6.5 billion, from 2001 to 2006.	2007年3月27日，俄国国防部宣布，从2001年到2006年俄国的年度武器出口增加50％，从40亿美元增加到65亿美元。


In an effort to both maximize foreign revenue and strengthen Russia’s own military potential, former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who now oversees Russia’s military-industrial complex and is one of the two leading candidates to succeed Putin as president, stressed the need for “the national defense industry to find a balance between a commitment to arm the Russian military and an opportunity to export arms to countries not subject to UN sanctions.”	俄国前任国防部长伊万诺夫现在主管军工产业，也是接替普京成为总统的两位主要人选之一。 为了最大程度地实现外国收入以及加强俄国自身的军事潜力，他强调需要让“国防产业在保证武装俄国军队以及向不受联合国制裁的国家出口武器的机遇之间找到平衡。


Besides helping to sustain the health of Russia’s military industrial complex, many Russian officials think that arms sales will promote Russia’s diplomatic interests by strengthening ties with recipient states.	”许多俄国官员认为，除了帮助维持俄国军工产业的健康之外，武器出售将会通过加强其与购买国的联系而促进俄国的外交利益。


These transactions, however, have complicated Moscow’s relations with foreign governments, particularly the United States.	但是，这些武器交易却让莫斯科与外国政府、特别是美国的关系复杂化了。


American officials complain that Russia’s self-imposed restrictions on arms sales are much weaker than those of Western countries, especially with regard to authoritarian governments accused of committing human rights violations or states seeking weapons of mass destruction.	美国官员抱怨说俄国自行实施的武器销售限制要比西方国家的要软弱许多，特别是对于那些被指控违反人权以及寻求大规模杀伤性武器的独裁政府而言尤其如此。


Washington has protested against Russian military sales to Belarus, China, Iran, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.	华盛顿已经抗议俄国向白俄罗斯、中国、伊朗、叙利亚、乌兹别克斯坦以及委��瑞拉出口武器。


In early January 2007, the US government imposed economic sanctions on three Russian companies, including Rosoboronexport, for selling missiles and other prohibited military technologies to Iran and Syria.	2007年1月上旬，美国政府对三家俄国公司因向伊朗和叙利亚销售导弹和其他违禁军事技术而实施了经济制裁，包括俄罗斯国防出口公司。


Russian officials insist that their military exports conform to all applicable international laws and involve primarily defensive weaponry that will not disrupt regional power balances.	俄国官员坚持说，它们的军事出口符合所有适用的国际法，而且主要是不会破坏地区实力平衡的防御性武器。


They add that the US and its allies also transfer large volumes of weapons to areas of conflict, including South Asia and the Middle East.	他们还说，美国及其盟国也向冲突地区转移大量的武器，包括南亚和中东。


Russian officials also contend that US and other foreign objections often reflect a desire to eliminate unwelcome Russian competition or curtail the Kremlin’s influence in important regions, such as Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.	俄国官员还说，美国和其他国家的反对反映出它们想要消除不受欢迎的俄国竞争或者限制克里姆林宫在重要地区的影响力，例如东欧、亚洲以及中东。


In 2005, the head of Rosoboronexport, Sergei Chemezov, said: “Let’s have no illusions: if we stop sending arms to export, then someone else will do it.”	俄罗斯国防出口公司的负责人切梅佐夫在2005年曾说：“还是不要有幻觉吧。 如果我们停止出口武器，那么还会有别人去这样做的。


Russia seems prepared to negotiate on some security issues, including such sensitive questions as Iran and Kosovo.	俄国看起来准备在某些安全问题上进行谈判，包括伊朗和科索沃等敏感问题。


Achieving limitations on Russian arms sales, however, will prove much harder.	但是，限制俄国的武器销售将会是远远更为困难的。


Given the condition of Russia’s military-industrial complex, considerations of national pride, geopolitical influence, and entrepreneurial profits will likely sustain Russian interest in selling weapons to almost any client no matter how distasteful to Western governments.	鉴于国军工业的现状、民族自豪感的考虑、地缘政治的影响以及企业利润将会有可能维持俄国向几乎所有的客户出售武器的利益所在，而无论这样做对于西方政府是多么地厌恶。


Reforming the Arab Security State	改革阿拉伯国家的安全部门


WASHINGTON, DC – Experience across the Arab world demonstrates that when it comes to security-sector reform, technocratic approaches are inadequate.	发自华盛顿——阿拉伯世界的经验表明，在涉及到安全部门改革问题的时候，光靠技术官僚的手段是不够的。


Simply put, a technocratic focus on upgrading skills and operational capability, in the absence of improved governance of the security services, can be easily subverted by anti-reform coalitions, resulting in the continuation of regressive patterns of behavior.	简而言之，如果只是像技术官僚那样将重点放在提高技能和行动能力上，却未能改善安全部门的治理水平，最终就很容易被反改革联盟推翻，导致这种开倒车的行为模式一直延续下去。


This is especially true in polarized political and social environments – the most obvious cases today being Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, not to mention Bahrain and Syria.	而这点在两极化的政治和社会环境下显得尤为突出——最明显的例子莫过于如今的埃及、 伊拉克、 利比亚和也门，更别提巴林和叙利亚了。


But even in countries where there is some degree of political pluralism and an absence of civil strife or domestic armed conflict – such as Lebanon and Tunisia, and potentially the Palestinian Authority and Algeria – incremental approaches can achieve only partial success.	但即使那些存在某种程度的政治多元化且并未发生内乱或国内武装冲突的国家——比如黎巴嫩和突尼斯，以及可能成立的巴勒斯坦权力机构和阿尔及利亚等 ——渐进的手段仅能实现一部分成功。


Creating a fully modernized and accountable security service requires more than technocratic tinkering.	创建一个完全现代化和负责任的安全服务需要的可不仅仅是技术官僚式的修修补补。


Regardless of formal legal frameworks, barriers to effective audits prevent the monitoring of financial flows to and within the police and internal security agencies.	无论是否存在正式的法律框架，但将有效审计隔离在外的壁垒令外界无法监察警察部门和安全机构内的资金流动。


Moreover, such institutions are often able to absorb formal anti-corruption training and yet continue with business as usual.	此外，这类机构往往会一边接受正式反腐败培训，一边照常收受钱财。


For effective security-sector reform in the Arab world to occur, the shroud of secrecy surrounding the sector must be removed.	如果要在阿拉伯世界实现有效的安全部门改革，就必须扯掉包裹着保密部门的那块遮羞布。


But among the Arab states, only Yemen drafted a Freedom of Information law after 2011.	但在阿拉伯各国中只有也门在2011年后起草了《信息自由法》。


Conversely, several state institutions blocked a proposal by Egypt’s Central Auditing Agency for legislation stipulating citizens’ right to access information regarding corruption in any governmental agency.	相反，一些国家机构联手阻止了埃及中央审计机构提出的规定公民有权获取任何政府机构中腐败信息的一项立法提案。


The problem, as Egyptian researcher Dina El-Khawaga has argued, is that it may be impossible “to introduce reform on a structurally corrupt basis.”	这一问题，正如埃及研究员迪娜·埃尔哈瓦贾（Dina El-Khawaga）所指出的那样，在于可能无法“在结构性腐败的基础上引入改革”。


What is needed is broad and effective oversight of public procurement, fuller transparency regarding budgets and routines, and substantially upgraded, multi-agency monitoring of national borders to dismantle illicit networks involving the security sector.	而如今需要的则是针对公共采购广泛而有效监督，提高预算和日常运作的透明度，以及对国家边界地区的大幅度监控系统升级以及多部门监控，以最终拔除涉及安全部门的非法行动网络。


Arab states like Jordan have shown that reducing corruption in the security sector enables significant improvements, even in a challenging environment comprising long borders, extensive black market trade fed by wars in neighboring states, and large refugee populations.	约旦这样的阿拉伯国家已经表明，减少安全部门的腐败现象可以带来边境管理状况的极大改善，即使在拥有漫长边界，由周边国家战争冲突催生的黑市，以及大量难民人口这种极具挑战性的环境下也能实现。


Effective governance of the security sector requires sustained political will at the top of the government, particularly a readiness to push reforms to sectors of the government and economy with which the security sector interacts.	安全部门的有效治理需要政府高层拥有持续的政治意愿，尤其得准备对与安全部门有交集的政府和经济部门进行改革。


But change of this order of magnitude is highly contentious, and its path and outcome cannot be easily predicted or steered, no matter how determined the governmental leadership is.	但在这种层面上的变革往往极具争议，且无论政府领导的决心是如何坚定，都难以最终预测或操纵其路径和成果。


There is a grim paradox at work here.	这里面存在着一个深刻的悖论。


The move toward more pluralist politics in Arab states has unleashed deep social divides over the nature and purpose of policing – divides that invariably complicate the reform process.	阿拉伯国家向更多元政治发展的走向令社会对警务工作的性质和宗旨产生了严重分歧——而这些分歧对又反过来令改革进程变得复杂化。


For example, some demand that the security services should enforce religious values.	比如说有些人就要求安全服务应当推行宗教价值观。


The specific dynamics of security-sector reform varies among states, depending on past modes of policing and the circumstances in which the authorities are challenged and forced to change existing structures.	各国安全部门改革背后的具体推动力也各不相同，而且往往取决于过去的警务工作模式以及令当局遭遇挑战且被迫改变现有架构的环境。


But, in most cases, people either look to the state and its officially mandated agencies to resolve problems and provide basic law enforcement, or would prefer to do so rather than resort – or just as often submit – to alternative, non-state providers.	但在大多数情况下，人们要么寻求国家及其正式授权的机构来解决问题并提供基础执法服务，要么宁愿自己动手而非求助——或只是服从于——替代性的，非国家性质的安全供应商。


As a result, governments can claim a powerful legitimacy in embarking on reform efforts.	因此政府在着手推行改革措施时就拥有强大的合法性。


Despite support for the state as the ultimate arbiter of law, increasing social polarization in many Arab states over the last two decades has impeded consensus on how to restructure and reform policing.	尽管支持国家作为法律的最终仲裁者，但许多阿拉伯国家在过去二十年中的社会两极分化状况使得人们难以就如何重组和改革警务工作达成共识。


Marginalization of up to 40% of the population, who live at or below the poverty line, has fueled political challenges, in turn subjecting entire social segments to targeting by official security bodies.	40%的人口遭到了边缘化且生活在贫困线或以下的现状催生了政治上的挑战，因而也令整个社会阶层成为了官方安全机构的监控目标。


Furthermore, the determination to crush dissent affects the urban middle classes, which might otherwise be the strongest proponents of security-sector reform in this area.	此外，镇压异见势力的决心也影响到了城市的中产阶层，不然的话他们可能是该领域安全部门改革的最强烈支持者。


Both Egypt and Syria are prime examples of this.	在此埃及和叙利亚都是极佳范例。


The sectarian nature of Iraq’s security sector and partisan polarization in the Palestinian Authority imply similar risks.	伊拉克安全部门的宗派本质以及巴勒斯坦权力机构的党派分化也潜藏着类似的风险。


Severe political and constitutional breakdown, as well as extensive social and institutional fragmentation, also hampers – or, in cases like Libya or Yemen, blocks – reform.	严重政治和宪政崩溃以及大规模的社会和体制碎片化也限制——或是像利比亚或也门那样阻碍——改革。


Even Egypt, with its highly centralized and bureaucratized state, has devolved certain policing and security functions in marginalized urban communities or rural areas to baltagiyyeh (thugs) and to former henchmen of the ruling party, village headmen, and clan elders.	即便是埃及这种高度集中和官僚化的国家也在那些边缘化的城市社区或农村地区发展出了应对那些匪帮（baltagiyyeh）和前执政党党员，村庄首领和部族长老的特定警务和安全部门。


Clearly, formalizing policing and adjudication on the basis of clan, sectarian, or ethnic identity –as has happened with the revolutionary militias of Libya, the Shia Hashd militias in Iraq, or sectarian party militias in Lebanon – can be highly damaging.	显然，在宗族、 宗派或族裔认同的基础上去正式规定警务和裁决——正如利比亚革命阵营民兵，伊拉克什叶派民兵或黎巴嫩各派系民兵的做法——可能造成极坏的影响。


But the past emphasis on centrally managed security sectors has made them a crucial asset in political contests, enabling them to escape oversight and benefit from de facto legal impunity.	但过去注重集中托管的安全部门使这些民兵成为了政治斗争中的一项重要资产，使他们能够逃避监管并从事实上的法律豁免权上得益。


So a better balance is needed to mitigate the concerns of diverse social and political actors whose participation is needed to renew constitutional frameworks, strengthen the rule of law, and revive national identity and state institutions in a context of democratic transition.	因此就需要更好的平衡来调和不同社会和政治行为者的关注点，因为在民主转型的大背景下修订宪政框架、 加强法治，重振民族认同和国家机构等都需要各方的参与。


The bottom line is that security-sector reform cannot be undertaken in isolation from the wider process of democratic transition and national reconciliation.	也就是说安全部门改革不能孤立于更广泛的民主转型和民族和解进程之外。


Today’s Arab states in transition are discovering how difficult it is to replace deep-seated authoritarian practices and relationships with sustained democratization, a process that depends crucially on transforming their security sectors.	当今这些转型中的阿拉伯国家都会发现用持久的民主化来替换根深蒂固的独裁操作和关系是多么困难，而这一进程则严重取决于安全部门的转型。


The added focus on counter-terrorism is further impeding reform, though the failure of unreformed security sectors to fulfill this role effectively, such as in Egypt and Tunisia, should cause it to have the opposite effect.	额外增添的反恐要点也进一步阻碍了改革，虽然未经改革的安全部门在这方面的低效运作——比如在埃及和突尼斯——反而会产生推动效果。


Those who advocate both democracy and security-sector reform must show consistent unity of purpose, build societal consensus and political coalitions for their programs, and formulate coherent, sustainable policies.	那些主张民主和安全部门改革的人必须展现出统一的目标，为这些改革项目建立社会共识和政治联盟，并制订协调而可持续的政策。


Only then might the political, economic, and social roadblocks to creating modern, accountable security services be overcome.	只有到那时候才可能克服政治，经济和社会的障碍去创造一个现代化且负责任的安全服务。


The New Frontiers of Loyalty	忠诚的新前沿


LONDON – This is a tricky time to be a state, and an even trickier time to be a citizen.	伦敦—眼下，国家不好做，公民更难做。


The nation-state, the classic provider of security and basic wellbeing in exchange for citizens’ loyalty, is under threat – both at home and as the fundamental unit of international affairs.	民族国家——经典用提供安全和基本福利换取公民忠诚的例子——岌岌可危，不管在国内还是作为国际事务的基本单元都是如此。


New types of loyalty and association are challenging the state’s traditional role.	新形式的忠诚和团结正在挑战国家的传统角色。


Some are geographic.	其中一些是地理性的。


In Europe alone, there at least 40 would-be Scotlands seeking separation of some kind from the countries in which they now find themselves.	光是在欧洲，就至少有40个潜在的苏格兰寻求以某种方式从现在所处的国家独立。


Other loyalties are based on other kindred identities – not just religious or ethnic, but based on shared commercial, political, or other interests.	其他类型的忠诚基于其他的相似身份——不仅仅是宗教和种族，也包括共同的商业、政治或其他利益。


Today, many more of us are supporters of NGOs than are members of political parties.	如今，支持非政府组织的人比政党党员多得多。


In short, our allegiances, particularly in the West, have rarely seemed more divided than they do now.	简言之，我们的忠诚，特别是在西方，比从前更加分散。


Amartya Sen, the Nobel laureate economist, has argued that we can learn to live with these multiple identities and even thrive with the diversity of citizenship and loyalties that they allow us.	诺贝尔经济学奖得住阿玛蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）指出，我们可以学会带着这些多重身份生活，甚至与这些身份所带来的公民身份和忠诚的多样性共同繁荣。


But this diversity is not entirely benign.	但这一多样性并不完全是良性的。


Many of us work for or hold stock in commercial organizations that seem to pay scant regard to national tax or regulatory authorities.	我们中许多人为不把国家税收和监管当局放在眼里的商业组织卖命或持有股份。


And, in much of the West, states adhere to models of welfare provision that increasingly disappoint their citizens and are often unaffordable.	而在西方，许多国家所采取的福利提供模式日益令公民失望，并且常常不堪重负。


A global reordering of economic growth is punishing the developed countries’ high-cost, high-tax, high-benefits governance model.	全球经济增长重构正在惩罚发达国家的高成本、高税收和高福利治理模式。


The Western state’s shortcomings are strikingly apparent when compared with robust survivors and adapters in other parts of the world.	若与世界其他地区的强大生存者和适应者相比，西方国家的短处凸显无疑。


China represents what might be called the Economic Security State: seeking to channel domestic savings into household consumption to sustain GDP growth and popular support, while using its investment power abroad to secure the commodities and energy that underpin its industrialization.	中国可以代表可称为“经济安全国家”（Economic Security State）的国家：试图将国内储蓄引向家庭消费以维持GDP增长和民众支持，同时在海外利用其投资实力确保作为其工业化基础的商品和能源。


Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, India may prove to be a semi-admiring imitator of China.	在总理莫迪的领导下，印度也许会成为中国的半崇拜模仿者。


Russia, by contrast, is a more classic National Security State, now playing Western anxieties like a fiddle to consolidate its tightening grip on Ukraine and suppress domestic opposition with a tide of official nationalism.	相反，俄罗斯是更典型的民族安全国家（National Security State），撩拨西方的焦虑以巩固其对乌克兰的控制，以官方民族主义镇压国内反对者。


So we live in a world of evolutionary state disorder.	因此，我们生活在一个渐进的国家失序中。


While some in the West may yearn for the return of the strong, unifying state, most of us recognize that it is not coming back.	一些西方人也许渴望强大的统一国家的重现，但我们大多数人明白它不会回来。


Indeed, some argue that the inventiveness and internationalism of a world networked by interests and shared causes is likely to be more resilient than one crammed into the artificial – and increasingly constraining – box of the national state.	事实上，一些人指出，通过利益和共性联系起来的创造性和世界的国际主义也许比人为制造、日益受到掣肘的民族国家更加坚韧。


In that sense, economic success in China or India may be those states’ undoing, as middle-class political aspirations render current arrangements dysfunctional.	从这个角度讲，中国或印度的经济成功也许是这些国家分裂的原因，因为中产阶级的正值渴望将使当前制度安排无法正常运转下去。


Conversely, we may find ourselves in a world whose eastern half is organized into strong authoritarian state structures, with the West embracing post-state models of association.	相反，我们也许生活在这样一个世界中：东方由强大的极权国家组成，西方则进入后国家联合模式。


The question for international governance is how to provide a framework of institutions and rules in a world of competing organizational structures.	国际治理的问题在于如何为由相互竞争的组织结构所组成的世界提供机构和规则框架。


The politicians’ answer is depressingly predictable: in the face of a resurgent Russia and China, this is no time to abandon our own states and diplomacy to their fate.	政客的答案不难推断，一定令人沮丧：面临复苏的俄罗斯和中国，现在绝不是放弃我们自己的国家和外交的时刻。


Yet the old systems no longer offer useful answers, as Russia has demonstrated by brushing aside the United Nations Security Council – the high altar of the state-based international system – over Ukraine and stalemating it over Syria.	但旧体系已不再能够提供有用的答案，俄罗斯通过无视联合国安理会（基于国家的国际制度的最高形式）关于乌克兰问题的决议以及在安理会叙利亚决议上从中作梗证明了这一点。


And, away from the din of their ranting politicians, what Russians, as much as Americans or Chinese, probably want most is a peaceful, predictable international order that allows them to provide for their families and enjoy the benefits of a golden age of global commerce and technology.	此外，与其不停叫嚣的政客不同，俄罗斯人——也许美国人和中国人也是如此——最希望的是和平、可预测的国际秩序，能让他们的家庭生活在其中并享受全球商业和科技黄金时代的好处。


A world, in which states’ hard power is contending with the soft power of transnational ideas, invention, and finance, needs rules.	一个国家的硬实力与跨国思想、发明和金融角力的世界需要规则。


We will all pay dearly – in defense budgets and, more important, in lost global opportunities – if we do not summon the courage to design a global order in which non-state actors have a formal role. Otherwise, we would be inviting states to continue pursuing a might-makes-right approach and to shirk the coordinated action on, say, financial regulation and the environment that the world now requires.	如果我们不拿出勇气设计一个非国家行动者也可以获得正式角色的全球秩序，将付出沉重代价——巨大的国防预算开支，更重要的，还有丧失全球机会���否则，我们就会促使各国继续追求“拳头最大”方针，回避（比如）世界目前所需要的金融监管和环境方面的合作行动。


Of course, states do not have a monopoly on bad behavior.	当然，并不只有国家会做出坏行为。


Transnational economic activity has been an opportunity not only for business, but also for organized crime and others to liberate themselves from effective regulation.	跨国经济活动不但是商业机会，也是有组织犯罪和其他行为摆脱有效监管的机会。


At the moment, the United States has stepped into the breach, relying on often-Draconian extraterritorial use of its justice system and control of the international banking system to impose a crude frontier justice.	目前，美国已经开了先河，依靠往往相当严厉的治外法权和对国际银行系统的控制施加原始的前沿正义（frontier justice）。


That is not good enough.	这还不够。


What is needed is a legitimate system of rules, norms, and institutions, devised by private as well as government stakeholders, that reflects the emerging global nature of economic, political, and social activity as the old state loses its dominance and must coexist with a patchwork of non-state structures of association.	我们需要的是一套关于规则、范式和机构的合理制度，由私人和政府相关利益方共同制定，反映新兴的经济、政治和社会活动的全球性质，因为旧国家已经失去了主导地位，必须与非国家联合结构共存。


Reform or Divorce in Europe	欧洲：改革，还是分裂


NEW YORK – To say that the eurozone has not been performing well since the 2008 crisis is an understatement.	发自纽约——如果说欧元区自2008年金融危机以来的表现不尽人意，那简直是在夸他们了。


Its member countries have done more poorly than the European Union countries outside the eurozone, and much more poorly than the United States, which was the epicenter of the crisis.	事实上欧元区国家的表现比欧元区外的欧盟国家更差，甚至比位处危机中心的美国更加糟糕。


The worst-performing eurozone countries are mired in depression or deep recession; their condition – think of Greece – is worse in many ways than what economies suffered during the Great Depression of the 1930s.	那些表现最差的欧元区国家都深陷萧条或严重衰退之中； 他们的状况——试想希腊——在许多方面都比上世纪30年代大萧条时期的经济体更糟。


The best-performing eurozone members, such as Germany, look good, but only in comparison; and their growth model is partly based on beggar-thy-neighbor policies, whereby success comes at the expense of erstwhile “partners.”	而那些表现最佳的欧元区成员国——如德国——虽然看似光鲜，但也只是矮子里面拔将军而已； 因为这些国家的增长模式都在某种程度上基于以邻为壑的政策，所有的成就都来自于昔日“合作伙伴”的牺牲。


Four types of explanation have been advanced to explain this state of affairs.	各方已经提出了四种不同类型的解释来解释这种状况。


Germany likes to blame the victim, pointing to Greece’s profligacy and the debt and deficits elsewhere.	德国喜欢责怪受害者，指责希腊挥霍无度以及其他国家的债务和赤字。


But this puts the cart before the horse: Spain and Ireland had surpluses and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the euro crisis.	但这属于本末倒置：西班牙和爱尔兰在欧元危机前都拥有盈余和较低的负债相对GDP比率。


So the crisis caused the deficits and debts, not the other way around.	因此是危机导致了赤字和债务的产生，而不是反过来。


Deficit fetishism is, no doubt, part of Europe’s problems.	赤字迷恋无疑是欧洲问题的一部分。


Finland, too, has been having trouble adjusting to the multiple shocks it has confronted, with GDP in 2015 some 5.5% below its 2008 peak.	芬兰也一直在自身面临的多重冲击前疲于奔命，而该国2015年的GDP相对于2008年的高峰期则下跌了5. 5%。


Other “blame the victim��� critics cite the welfare state and excessive labor-market protections as the cause of the eurozone’s malaise.	其他“责怪受害者”的指责都认为福利国家以及对劳动力市场的过度保护是欧元区萎靡不振的原因。


Yet some of Europe’s best-performing countries, such as Sweden and Norway, have the strongest welfare states and labor-market protections.	然而一些欧洲表现最佳的国家（如瑞典和挪威）却拥有最完善的福利国家和劳动力市场保护体制。


Many of the countries now performing poorly were doing very well – above the European average – before the euro was introduced.	许多当前表现低迷的国家在引入欧元之前都做得很好——甚至高于欧洲平均水平。


Their decline did not result from some sudden change in their labor laws, or from an epidemic of laziness in the crisis countries.	他们的衰退并非源于在劳动法上的突然变故，或者人一下子变懒了。


What changed was the currency arrangement.	真正改变了的东西是货币的安排。


The second type of explanation amounts to a wish that Europe had better leaders, men and women who understood economics better and implemented better policies.	第二种类型的解释寄望于欧洲能有更好地领袖，更了解经济并推行更合理的政策。


Flawed policies – not just austerity, but also misguided so-called structural reforms, which widened inequality and thus further weakened overall demand and potential growth – have undoubtedly made matters worse.	那些有缺陷的政策——不仅是紧缩政策，而且还错误导向的所谓结构性改革，导致社会不平等状况加剧从而进一步削弱了总需求和潜在增长——无疑令情况变得更糟。


But the eurozone was a political arrangement, in which it was inevitable that Germany’s voice would be loud.	但欧元区是一个政治安排，因此德国人说话的调门肯定是最高的。


Anyone who has dealt with German policymakers over the past third of a century should have known in advance the likely result.	任何在过去三十多年间与德国政策制定者打过交道的人都应该早就预料到这样的结果。


Most important, given the available tools, not even the most brilliant economic czar could have made the eurozone prosper.	最重要的是，由于手中可用的工具有限，即便最睿智的经济领导人都无法实现欧元区的繁荣。


The third set of reasons for the eurozone’s poor performance is a broader right-wing critique of the EU, centered on eurocrats’ penchant for stifling, innovation-inhibiting regulations.	第三类分析欧元区糟糕表现的说法是右翼对欧盟的大肆抨击，集中火力指责欧盟官员偏好制定一些令人窒息且压制创新的规定。


This critique, too, misses the mark.	但这种批评也跑偏了。


The eurocrats, like labor laws or the welfare state, didn’t suddenly change in 1999, with the creation of the fixed exchange-rate system, or in 2008, with the beginning of the crisis.	欧盟的官员跟劳动法和福利国家制度一样，并不是突然在1999年创立固定汇率制度或者2008年金融危机爆发后就立马换了个人。


More fundamentally, what matters is the standard of living, the quality of life.	更重要的其实是生活水平和生活质量。


Anyone who denies how much better off we in the West are with our stiflingly clean air and water should visit Beijing.	任何否认西方在“令人窒息”的空气和水质方面都好得多的人都应该到北京看看。


That leaves the fourth explanation: the euro is more to blame than the policies and structures of individual countries.	这就剩下了第四个解释：欧元的问题要比个别国家的政策和架构更大。


The euro was flawed at birth.	欧元自诞生以来就是存在缺陷的。


Even the best policymakers the world has ever seen could not have made it work.	即使是有史以来最好的政策制定者也无法令其顺利运行。


The eurozone’s structure imposed the kind of rigidity associated with the gold standard.	欧元区的架构会产生一种与金本位类似的刚性。


The single currency took away its members’ most important mechanism for adjustment – the exchange rate – and the eurozone circumscribed monetary and fiscal policy.	而单一货币剥夺其成员国最重要的调整机制——汇率——同时欧元区又限制了其货币和财政政策。


In response to asymmetric shocks and divergences in productivity, there would have to be adjustments in the real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate, meaning that prices in the eurozone periphery would have to fall relative to Germany and northern Europe.	如果要应对遭受冲击程度和生产率两方面的差异问题，就必须对真实（排除通胀因素）汇率进行调整，意味着欧元区周边国家的价格将不得不相对于德国和欧洲北部进行下调。


But, with Germany adamant about inflation – its prices have been stagnant – the adjustment could be accomplished only through wrenching deflation elsewhere.	但由于德国在通货膨胀问题上的立场一贯坚定——它的价格就一直处于停滞状态——调整只能通过其他地区的痛苦通缩来实现。


Typically, this meant painful unemployment and weakening unions; the eurozone’s poorest countries, and especially the workers within them, bore the brunt of the adjustment burden.	通常情况下，这意味着惨痛的失业状况和工会力量的削弱； 那些欧元区最贫穷国家的民众（尤其是工人阶层）首当其冲地承担了调整的重压。


So the plan to spur convergence among eurozone countries failed miserably, with disparities between and within countries growing.	因此这一计划在弥合欧元区国家之间差距方面遭遇了彻底的失败，国家之间及各国内部的分化都进一步扩大了。


This system cannot and will not work in the long run: democratic politics ensures its failure.	该系统无法也不会长期运行下去：民主政治早就决定了其失败的命运。


Only by changing the eurozone’s rules and institutions can the euro be made to work.	只有改变欧元区的规则和体制才能让欧元顺利运行。


This will require seven changes:	为此需要实施以下七种变革：


· abandoning the convergence criteria, which require deficits to be less than 3% of GDP;	·放弃要求赤字必须控制在相对GDP3％以内的收缩差距条件;


· replacing austerity with a growth strategy, supported by a solidarity fund for stabilization;	·用一个互助稳定基金支持下的增长战略去代替紧缩;


· dismantling a crisis-prone system whereby countries must borrow in a currency not under their control, and relying instead on Eurobonds or some similar mechanism;	·废除国家必须用不受自身控制的货币来借贷这种容易催生危机的制度，转而依赖欧洲债券或类似的机制;


· better burden-sharing during adjustment, with countries running current -account surpluses committing to raise wages and increase fiscal spending, thereby ensuring that their prices increase faster than those in the countries with current-account deficits;	·更合理地分配调整负担，让拥有经常账户盈余的国家提高工资和增加财政支出，从而确保他们的价格上涨比与经常账户赤字国更快;


· changing the mandate of the European Central Bank, which focuses only on inflation, unlike the US Federal Reserve, which takes into account employment, growth, and stability as well;	·修改欧洲央行（ECB）只关注通胀的委任目标，像美国联邦储备委员会那样同时兼顾就业，经济增长和稳定;


· establishing common deposit insurance, which would prevent money from fleeing poorly performing countries, and other elements of a “banking union”;	·建立共同存款保险以阻止资金逃离表现不佳的国家——以及构建其他与“银行联盟”相关的架构;


· and encouraging, rather than forbidding, industrial policies designed to ensure that the eurozone’s laggards can catch up with its leaders.	·鼓励而不是禁止旨在确保欧元区的落后国能赶上其他先进国的产业政策。


From an economic perspective, these changes are small; but today’s eurozone leadership may lack the political will to carry them out.	从经济角度来看，这些变化都算不上大； 但当前的欧元区领导人可能缺乏政治意愿去推行。


That doesn’t change the basic fact that the current halfway house is untenable.	这并不能改变这一基本事实：目前这种半吊子体制是站不住脚的。


A system intended to promote prosperity and further integration has been having just the opposite effect. An amicable divorce would be better than the current stalemate.	如果一个旨在促进繁荣和欧洲进一步整合的系统一直都导致了适得其反的效果，那么友好分手就比当前的僵局更好。


Of course, every divorce is costly; but muddling through would be even more costly.	当然，每一场分裂都是成本极大的； 但得过且过的成本则更高。


As we’ve already seen this summer in the United Kingdom, if European leaders can’t or won’t make the hard decisions, European voters will make the decisions for them – and the leaders may not be happy with the results.	正如今年夏天在英国发生的一切那样，如果欧洲领导人不能或不会作出艰难的决定，那么欧洲选民将做出他们自己的决定——并带来领导人不会满意的结果。


Reform the UN Security Council	改革联合国安理会


Human progress can be measured by the fact that we are living in a century where unilateral military operations based on power alone are intolerable. But the spread of the ideology of peace does not mean that threats to security have disappeared.	衡量人类进步的标尺是：我们生活的世纪不容许采取单纯基于武力的单边军事行动，但和平理想为人们所广泛认可并不意味着威胁安全的因素已经消失。


At times, preventive action may be necessary.	有些情况下，采取防范措施是非常必要的。


Many lives would have been saved in Africa, for example, if the international community could have acted decisively and quickly.	比如，如果国际社会果断迅速地采取行动，本可以拯救非洲众多的生命。


The events in Iraq also have demonstrated that the key issue for world security is really the relationship of the big powers to the UN Security Council.	伊拉克事件也向世界表明：大国和联合国安理会的关系实际是世界安全的关键所在。


The need for an effective UN Security Council reflects the central strategic certainty of the post-Cold War period: security threats are no longer likely to take the form of war between states, but will instead consist in acts of terror, civil wars, and massacres of civilian populations.	对有效联合国安理会的需求反应了冷战结束后勿庸置疑的中心战略：安全威胁可能的表现形式不再是国与国之间的交战，而变成了恐怖行动、内战和屠杀平民。


These threats are often related to economic chaos and basic failures in national governance, and international military action will often be needed to meet them head on.	上述威胁时常与经济混乱和国家管理的根本性失败密切联系，常需要采取国际军事行动来进行应对。


But the legitimacy of any international military action that goes beyond immediate self-defense requires broad international approval - and action without legitimacy is bound to fail.	但对任何超越纯粹自卫范畴的国际军事行动来说，其合法性都要得到国际社会的广泛认可¾缺乏合法性的军事行动注定难逃失败的厄运。


The international community must therefore accept the need for a fundamental link between such military action and the UN.	正因如此，国际社会必须意识到：上述军事行动和联合国之间需要建立起根本的联系。


Peacekeeping and crisis prevention are accepted functions of the UN.	维持和平和防范危机是联合国的公认职能。


But broad international support will not be forthcoming if military operations are perceived as some form of Western neo-imperialism.	但如果军事行动被视作某种形式的新西方帝国主义，就很难获得广泛的国际支持。


This last point has been at the heart of the problems in Iraq.	最后一点构成了伊拉克问题的核心。


Augmenting US and British troops with other "Western" forces would not, particularly at this late stage, change the fundamental perception of that intervention, both in the Arab world and beyond it.	向美英联军中增派其它"西方"军队改变不了国际社会的基本看法：即这次行动是对阿拉伯世界和国际社会的入侵，特别到了现阶段更是如此。


Only the explicit, up-front approval of a reformed UN Security Council can provide the legitimacy and international support that military action - with the exception of clear self-defense - requires.	除去明显的自卫行动外，只有事先得到改革后联合国安理会的明确授权才能确保拥有合法性和国际支持。


This is true for actions contemplated by individual nations, temporary alliances, or more permanent alliances such as NATO.	在这个问题上，单个国家、临时联盟或北大西洋公约组织这样的永久性联盟无一能够例外。


For the Security Council to be effective in providing global governance in the domain of security, it must be reformed to reflect the realities of the twenty-first century.	为使安理会能在安全领域进行有效的全球管理，就必须对其进行改革，以适应21世纪的现实需求。 世界各国广泛参与的加权投票系统应当取代现行制度，即在二战后实力格局基础上衍生出来的大国否决权。


A system of	否决体系的实质是由大国做出最终决定，而不去考虑世界各国的意愿。


The new system must, of course, reflect not only the size of populations but also the differing economic and military capabilities of nations.	当然，新体系必须不仅反应人口数量，还要反应国家间不同的军事和经济实力。


The degree of "internal legitimacy" of governments in terms of human rights and democracy could become another factor determining voting weights or voting rights.	各国政府在人权和民主方面"国内合法性"可以作为决定投票权重或权利的另一个砝码。


Countries such as India and Japan must gain a strong voice.	印度、日本这样的国家必须得到更大的发言权。


Latin America, Africa, and the Arab world also must see an increase in their influence.	拉丁美洲、非洲和阿拉伯世界也必须增加各自的影响力。


There should be permanent global participation in the Security Council through regional constituencies, although the number of seats at any one time should remain in the neighborhood of 15 in order to permit constructive debate and a degree of cohesion.	通过地区选举应该建立对安理会的全球性参与，尽管任何时候都须保持15个左右的席位数量，以确保建设性对话并拥有一定的凝聚力。


It is only within this kind of renewed UN that NATO or other military alliances can obtain legitimized effectiveness .	只有改革后的联合国才能赋予北约或其它军事联盟合法的效力。


Ideally, NATO should provide troops to UN-sponsored operations together with forces from other regional security organizations that could be established in Latin America, Asia, or Africa.	理想状况下，北约应该与拉美、亚洲或非洲可能建立的其它地区安全组织一道为联合国行动派驻军队。


These organizations would cooperate with explicit UN guidance and endorsement.	上述所有组织都将依据明确的联合国原则和授权开展合作。


The High Level Panel on Security Reform appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan is looking at the various options.	联合国秘书长柯非·安南任命的安全改革高级小组正在对各种可能性开展研究。


A far-reaching reform will be difficult, and some may regard it as beyond our reach.	意义深远的改革将会非常困难，有些人甚至认为永远不能实现。


But it is time to think big, to escape from the constraints of the past, and to try to tackle the problems of our age if we truly want to prevent catastrophic events and achieve genuine and long-lasting global peace and security.	但如果我们真想避免灾难再次降临、实现真正持久的全球和平与稳定，那么现在是时候从大局着眼，甩开过去的羁绊，努力解决时代所面临的问题。


Housing versus Habitat	住房还是栖身之所


CAMBRIDGE – Peter Drucker, the influential management guru, famously said, “What does not get measured, does not get done.”	美国剑桥—管理学一代宗师彼得·德鲁克有句名言：“不能测量的东西就做不出来。


He might have added that what gets measured poorly gets done poorly.	”这句话还可以扩展一下，测量不力的东西做出来也不会好。


Consider low-income housing.	就拿低收入住房问题来说吧。


Most developing countries, and many rich ones, define their housing deficit according to the number of families living in units deemed socially unacceptable.	大部分发展中国家以及许多发达国家用居住在被认为从社会角度不可接受的单元中的家庭的数量来定义住房赤字。


But what is meant by unacceptable varies greatly from country to country.	但什么是“不可接受”，国与国之间标准大相径庭。


Piped water, sewerage, and electricity are seen as essential in the Americas, but not in India.	自来水、下水道和电力在美洲被认为是基本条件，但在印度则不是这样。


The problem is that people do not demand houses; they demand habitats.	问题在于人们不需要房子，他们需要栖身之所。


A house is an object; a habitat is a node in a multiplicity of overlapping networks – physical (power, water and sanitation, roads), economic (urban transport, labor markets, distribution and retail, entertainment) and social (education, health, security, family, friends).	房子是目标； 栖身之所是重合网络多样性——实物（电、水、环境卫生和道路）、经济（城市交通、劳动力市场、分销和零售、娱乐）和社会（教育、医疗、安全、家庭、朋友）——的节点。


The ability to connect to all of these networks makes a habitat valuable.	能够与所有这些网络连通就是栖身之所的价值。


Cities, for example, can be highly productive spaces, because they allow people to combine their different skills to make things that none of them could make individually.	比如，城市是生产率极高的空间，因为城市让人们将不同的技能组合起来生产他们无法独自生产的东西。


People can exchange their knowhow, learn from each other, and trade.	人们可以交换技能、互相学习，还能从事交易。


Jane Jacobs’s insights on this, published more that 40 years ago, have been confirmed by more recent studies summarized in books by Edward Glaeser and Enrico Moretti.	雅各布斯（Jane Jacobs）在四十年前就发表了这一洞见，并被总结在格雷泽（Edward Glaeser）和莫雷蒂（Enrico Moretti）书中的更新的研究所证实。


So, if the deficit being measured is one of houses rather than one of habitats, the solutions often do not solve the real problem.	因此，如果住房赤字的测量指标是住房而不是栖身之所，据此提出的解决方案通常解决不了真正的问题。


A housing minister who is told to build a certain number of houses will likely fail to build an equivalent number of well-connected habitat nodes.	被建议建造一定数量住房的住房部长很可能无法建设同样多数量的连接良好的栖身节点。


After all, much of what makes a house a habitat lies outside of his department’s purview.	毕竟，什么可以让住房成为栖身之所很大程度上并不由住房部门左右。


Moreover, if the housing deficit is diagnosed as a dearth of adequate housing, then the solution is to build more houses for those who lack it – that is, the poor.	此外，如果住房赤字被理解为宽裕住所的不足，那么解决方案将是为缺少宽裕住所的人（也就是穷人）建造更多的房子。


But this is like assuming that new cars should be built for those without them – that is, for people who could buy second-hand cars from those seeking to upgrade.	但这好比是认为应该为没车的人（也就是会从换车的人手里买下二手车的人）制造新车。


It confuses the construction industry, which builds new homes, with the much larger housing market, which includes all homes.	这会将建造新房的建筑业和包括所有房子的范围大得多的房地产市场混淆起来。


It gets worse.	还有更糟糕的。


Because the poor cannot buy adequate housing on their own, public resources must be used.	由于穷人无法自力更生购买宽裕住所，因此必须动用公共资源。


In order to target these subsidies to low-income households, governments typically treat families of different income levels differently: the rich must fend for themselves, middle-class families are provided with assistance to secure mortgage loans, and the poor are offered public housing.	为了将补贴定向发给低收入家庭，政府通常会区别对待不同收入水平的家庭：富裕家庭自力更生，中产阶级可以获得自助以确保按揭贷款，穷人则获得公共住房。


To maximize the number of units built, housing ministries make sure that projects meet minimum specifications below a certain per-unit cost threshold.	为了让建成单元数量最大化，住房部长要确保工程在满足最低规格要求的同时不超过某个每单元成本限额。


As a result, developers look for the cheapest land, which is obviously the least connected to the networks that would make it more valuable.	结果，开发商寻找最廉价的土地，与更贵的房子比起来，这些土地与网络的连通性显然要差得多。


This approach has ended up exacerbating the segregation of the poor.	最终，这套办法加剧了穷人的分隔状态。


It artificially creates – as in France – socially homogenous poor neighborhoods where the unskilled live among themselves, disconnected from others, making it harder for them to benefit from the agglomeration economies that would boost their productivity.	它人为造成了社会同质的穷人社区，你的四邻都是���技能人士，你们与其他群体隔绝，因而难以从能提高生产率的凝聚经济中获益。 法国就是如此。


Indeed, because many of these developments are so remote, residents often face a long, uncomfortable, and costly daily commute to reach good jobs.	事实上，由于这些开发项目中有很多位于偏远地带，要获得好工作，居民通常面临着长途、难受、昂贵的日常通勤。


No wonder so many prefer to stay home and work on their own, which may explain why so many developing countries are becoming more urbanized but not more productive.	毫不奇怪，如此多的人宁可呆在家里干个体户，这就解释了为何如此多的发展中国家虽然城市化不断地推进，生产率并未提高。


Confusing the construction of new homes with the housing market is most absurd when dealing with displaced families.	混淆建设新屋与住房市场最令人啼笑皆非之处在于处置流离失所者。


For example, the Venezuelan and Colombian governments were confronted with the need to relocate tens of thousands of families displaced by floods in 2010.	比如，2010年，委内瑞拉和哥伦比亚政府需要重新安置因为洪水而流离失所的数万家庭。


Although the two governments are far apart politically, both promised the displaced families new houses in new urban developments.	尽管两国政府在政治上相去甚远，但都承诺流离失所家庭在新的城市开发项目中获得住房。


In the meantime, people were left for years waiting in shelters.	与此同时，他们得在临时居所中等待数年。


And, once again, these new urban developments have few of the networks that would make them a habitat.	再则，这些信城市开发项目配套网络很少，不足以成为栖身之所。


The burden of creating integrated communities has been placed on a randomly assembled group comprising some of the least connected members of society.	建立融合社区的负担压在了由社会联系最差群体随机构成的人群身上。


Instead, displaced families should quickly be given vouchers so that they can obtain an appropriate home without delay.	相反，流离失所家庭应该马上获得代金券，以使他们立刻能得到合适的住房。


They are bound to choose older homes in established neighborhoods that have already been connected to the many networks that make them a habitat.	他们一定会选择老牌社区里的旧房子，这些房子已经建立了与许多网络的连通性，因此可以成为栖身之所。


Large new housing developments should naturally attract those who already have ample social connections, making it easier to kick-start more integrated communities.	大型新房开发项目应该自然地吸引那些已经建立了充分的社会联系的人群，这样才便于建设新的融合社区。


In order to separate the problem of the overall housing deficit from the problem of families with inadequate housing, policymakers need to address both supply and demand.	为了区分总体住房赤字和住房不足家庭的问题，决策者需要从供给和需求两端入手。


On the supply side, urban land – with all its physical and social infrastructure – must expand quickly enough.	在供给端，城市土地的扩大必须充分快——实体和社会基础设施必须跟上。


On the demand side, subsidies should focus on helping families choose from the entire housing market.	在需求端，补贴应该集中于帮助家庭在整体住房市场中做出选择。


This approach would promote socially diverse and productive neighborhoods, rather than segregation and pockets of economic stagnation.	这一方法有利于社会多样性和高生产率社区，而不会仅仅造成分裂和一个个经济停滞社区。


But this goal cannot be achieved unless the construction industry is prevented from dictating low-income-housing policy.	但这一目标只有在阻止建筑业主宰低收入住房政策的条件下才能实现。


The Night-Watchman State’s Last Shift	政府应为市场构筑产权基础设施