In fact, the new consensus is shared by most of Labour and the main opposition within Likud.	实际上，新共识被工党的多数成员和利库德集团内的主要反对人士所广泛接受。


The dream of peace, the nationalist fervor, and the purported religious redemption that animated Israel’s political combatants for a half-century are gone, replaced by a resigned pragmatism.	半个多世纪来支持以色列政治斗士的和平之梦、民族主义狂热和传说中的宗教救赎都已经幻灭，取而代之的是一种实用主义的态度。


That may inspire little enthusiasm, but the Israel that Olmert has now won a firm mandate to lead is by no means demoralized.	这样做虽然缺乏激情，但有了奥尔默特的坚定领导，以色列的斗志丝毫也没有受到影响。


On the contrary, public opinion polls show that citizens remain highly patriotic and optimistic about their personal lives.	恰恰相反，民意调查显示市民的爱国热情仍然很高，对个人未来的生活也抱有很大的希望。


They have merely concluded that politics will not bring miracles, and that the most they can expect is to keep external threats to a minimum.	他们只是得出结论：政治不能创造奇迹，他们所能期望的就是把外来威胁控制到最小。


That is Sharon’s legacy. And, in Israel, fulfilling it will be no small achievement.	这就是沙龙留给我们的财富，在以色列，实现这个目标就是巨大的成功。


Israel’s Nuclear Option in Iran	以色列的伊朗问题核方案


LOS ANGELES – Revelations in former President George W. Bush’s recently published memoirs show that he declined an Israeli request to destroy Syria’s secret nuclear reactor in the spring of 2007.	洛杉矶——前任总统乔治·W·布什不久前出版的回忆录披露2007年春他曾拒绝了以色列摧毁叙利亚秘密核反应堆的要求。


While the revelation may appear merely to be a historical footnote, more profoundly it raises new uncertainty about whether Israel now thinks that it can rely on the United States to apply military force to stop Iran’s nuclear program should diplomacy fail.	虽然这则消息似乎仅仅是历史的注脚，却深刻凸显了外交努力失败后以色列能否依赖美国采取军事行动阻止伊朗核计划的新的不确定结果。


The Syrian episode suggests that it cannot, which means that Israel may decide to go it alone once again, this time to eliminate Iran’s nuclear facilities.	叙利亚这则插曲表明以色列不能依赖美国，也就是说以色列可能再次决定单独行动，不过这次是摧毁伊朗核设施。


If Israel did so, however, it would confront a conundrum.	但如何以色列这么做，就不得不面对一道难题。


Unlike the attack on Syria’s nuclear plant, Israel’s conventional forces do not have the capacity to destroy Iran’s suspect installations.	与袭击叙利亚核电厂不同，以色列常规部队不具备摧毁伊朗疑似核设施的能力。


Portions of Iran’s nuclear program may be too heavily bunkered, dispersed, or concealed.	伊朗核计划的组成部分其掩护、分散及隐蔽工作非常严密。


This raises the question of whether Israel’s repeated refrain that “all options are on the table” implies that even a nuclear strike is possible.	由此产生的问题是以色列“所有方案都摆在桌面上”的一再克制意味着甚至核打击的可能性也不能排除。


Israel’s nuclear history provides no clear answer, but the future may force the issue.	从以色列的核历史中找不到明确的答案，但未来可能必须迅速采取行动。


Israel has never acknowledged having nuclear weapons, let alone the size and scope of its arsenal.	以色列从未承认掌握核武器，更不用说公布核武器的范围和规模。


Israeli policymakers refuse to talk about the subject.	以色列的决策者拒绝就此话题发表评论。


Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, never discusses the program or appropriates money for it.	以色列议会克奈赛从未讨论过核计划或就拨款问题进行过审议。


Military censors quash public discourse about it.	军事监察员压制相关的公众舆论。


Yet American and other intelligence services and strategic-research institutes around the world all agree that Israel possesses nuclear weapons.	但美国及其他情报部门和世界各地的战略研究院都一致认定以色列拥有核武器。


They disagree about how many, with estimates ranging broadly, from 40 to more than 400 warheads.	对数量的估计方面各国差距很大，具体估计数从40到超过400枚核弹头。


Israel’s reluctance to rattle its nuclear saber, even in dire circumstances, adds to the mystery.	即使在严峻条件下以色列也对核武器讳莫如深进一步加深了这个问题的神秘性。


In the Yom Kippur War, as Syrian forces threatened to break the country’s defensive lines, Israeli decision-makers recoiled even from threatening to use nuclear weapons.	赎罪日战争中，即使叙利亚军队威胁撕开以色列防线的时候，以色列决策者甚至都没有威胁使用核武器。


While Israel keeps its bomb in the basement, it has a long history of stopping its adversaries.	尽管以色列把核弹藏得严严实实，却一直竭尽全力阻止对手拥有核武器。


As Iraq moved to complete the Osirak reactor by the early 1980’s, Israel applied diplomatic pressure and actions against foreign nuclear vendors, sabotaged atomic exports, and assassinated Iraqi scientists, before finally settling on the June 1981 air strike on the plant.	20世纪80年代伊拉克建设奥西拉克反应堆的时候，以色列对其外国供应商施加外交压力并采取措施，破坏其原子武器出口，并行刺伊拉克科学家，最后决定于1981年6月空袭核工厂。


In the Syrian case, with one caveat, Israel decided to dispense with the preliminaries and simply destroy the reactor.	在叙利亚问题上警告过一次后，以色列决定跳过预备步骤，直接摧毁反应堆。


The caveat consists in a plea that Israel made to the US.	警告信息包含在以色列对美国提出的请求中。


According to Bush’s memoir, in the spring of 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made a blunt request of the US president regarding Syria’s reactor: “George, I am asking you to bomb the facility.”	据布什回忆录记载，2007年春，埃胡德·奥尔默特总理径直就叙利亚核反应堆请求美国总统： “乔治，我请你轰炸核电厂。 ”


After consultation with his staff, Bush responded that, absent a plutonium extraction facility, US intelligence could not confirm that the plant comprised a nuclear weapons program.	与手下人商量后，布什回答说，除钚提取设施外，美国情报人员无法确定该工厂包含核武器计划。


“I told him [Olmert] I had decided on a diplomatic option backed by force” to stop Syria, Bush writes.	“我告诉他[奥尔默特]我决定采用武力支持的外交方案”来阻止叙利亚，布什写道。


An apprehensive Olmert responded, “I must be honest with you.	忧心忡忡的奥尔默特回答说，“我必须坦率的告诉你。


Your strategy was very disturbing to me.”	你的策略让我感到不安。 ”


Within months, Israel struck.	没过几个月，以色列就发动了袭击。


One year later, it followed up by assassinating Mohammed Suleiman, the Syrian general in charge of resurrecting the nuclear enterprise.	一年后，以色列又刺杀了穆罕默德·苏莱曼，他是负责重建核工厂的叙利亚将军。


Given its efforts to fend off an attack, Iran represents a far more difficult target for Israel than Iraq and Syria did.	鉴于其躲避打击的能力，袭击伊朗远比伊拉克和叙利亚难度大得多。


As a result, Israel ceded to the US and others responsibility to move the Iranian regime from its current path.	因此，以色列把阻止伊朗政府的责任交给了美国和其他国家。


Since 2002, the US has applied a multi-pronged approach.	2002年后，美国一直实行多管齐下的政策。


It pressed the International Atomic Energy Agency for greater scrutiny.	一方面迫使国际原子能机构加强审查。


It got the United Nations Security Council to agree to impose increasingly onerous economic sanctions – and roped allies into even stronger sanctions.	让联合国安理会同意实施更苛刻的经济制裁——并迫使盟国进一步加大制裁力度。


It adulterated nuclear-related exports from European vendors to perform poorly during operation.	美国还在欧洲供应企业出口的核货物中掺假，破坏其在使用中的性能。


It may have inserted computer worms into Iran’s atomic infrastructure.	美国还可能在伊朗的原子能基础设施中植入了电脑蠕虫。


The result of all these efforts has been to slow, but not halt, Iran’s nuclear progress.	上述努力的结果是延缓，而非阻止伊朗的核进程。


And, even as the US and its allies attempt to restrain Iran, its regime continues to goad Israel, calling for its extinction and exporting military wares to its Lebanese and Gazan adversaries.	但即便美国及其盟国试图控制伊朗，伊朗政权仍继续激怒以色列，一边号召将以色列彻底消灭，一边向其黎巴嫩和加沙反对势力出口军事用品。


In May 2010, Israel responded with a new wrinkle.	2010年5月，以色列做出了新的回应。


It leaked to the London Sunday Times that it had placed nuclear-armed submarines off Iran’s coast.	它向伦敦《星期日泰晤士报》透露已在伊朗海岸线���部署核潜艇。


In the months before and after, it continued to hold war games and practice air strikes on Iran.	在之前和之后的几个月，以色列继续举行空袭伊朗的军事演习。


And it repeatedly uttered threats that “all” options are on the table.	同时反复发出威胁，警告“所有”方案都已经摆在桌面上。


Iran remains unmoved.	但伊朗仍旧不为所动。


Concerned that President Barack Obama will be less likely than Bush to use force to stop Iran, Israel must now contemplate its next steps should diplomacy continue to stall.	由于担心巴拉克·奥巴马总统比布什更不情愿使用武力阻止伊朗，以色列现在必须考虑外交调停继续遇阻之后所能采取的步骤。


One option would be to pursue a policy of “opacity plus”: a further lifting of the veil over its nuclear arsenal in order to caution Iran’s rulers about the potential consequences of their actions.	方案之一是实施所谓的“模糊升级”政策。 进一步揭开其核武器计划的面纱，以此警告伊朗统治者其自身行为的潜在后果。


Another option would be to bring the country’s nuclear arsenal out of the basement altogether.	另一项方案是向外界彻底公开以色列核武器状况。


Israel could then mimic other nuclear-armed states by flexing its capacity through announcement and transparent nuclear deployment on land and sea, thereby promoting deterrence.	这样以色列就可以模仿其他有核国家，借助公告和陆地及海洋上的透明核部署炫耀自己的力量，从而促进核威慑。


But, for a country that has had little faith in deterrence when it comes to existential nuclear threats, relying on it now would mark a new, uncomfortable bet.	可是对一个从不相信威慑能对现有核威胁产生作用的国家，现在依靠这种方法实际是一个新的，并不情愿的赌注。


That leaves nuclear use as the final option.	于是使用核武器就成为最后的方案。


But nuclear attack carries its own heavy burden.	但核攻击的后果也非常严重。


Given Iran’s placement of strategic sites in or near population centers, the deaths of many thousands of people would forever tar Israel.	鉴于伊朗战略基地的选址都位于或靠近人口中心，数千人伤亡的恶果会成为以色列挥之不去的痛。


The only worse stain on Israel would be if survivors of an Iranian nuclear strike were to lament that, had their country acted proactively, “the third destruction of the Temple” – the end of the Jewish state – could have been avoided.	对以色列来讲更糟的结果是伊朗核袭击的幸存者痛心疾首，后悔如果自己的国家主动采取行动，“圣殿第三次被毁”——犹太国家的灭亡——本来是可以避免的。


These sobering prospects should prompt all involved to seek a peaceful resolution.	上述发人深省的可能性应当提醒所有参与者寻求和平解决问题的方法。


Time is growing short.	时间越来越紧了。


Israel’s Political Earthquake	以色列的政治地震


Israeli politics is undergoing its most dramatic changes in 30 years.	以色列政坛正在经历30年来最为剧烈的振荡。


The realignment of parties and leaders is all the more remarkable because the latest developments – Ariel Sharon’s decision to leave the ruling Likud party, the defeat of Shimon Peres as the Labor party’s chairman, and Labor’s withdrawal from Sharon’s grand coalition government – were utterly unexpected.	各政党和及其领导人的重新组合更为引人注目。 沙龙决定离开执政党利库德党、西蒙·佩雷斯的工党主席被人取而代之以及工党退出沙龙的大联合政府，这些最新进展都令人始料不及。


So it is all the more important to comprehend the significance of these changes for the future of Israel, the region, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.	因此，理解这些变化对于以色列、中东地区和巴以冲突未来的意义也就更为重要了。


Israel’s political system is, to put it simply, coming to the end of its second era.	简而言之，以色列第二代政治体制正在终结。


From independence in 1948 until 1977, the Labor party was dominant, before giving way to an opposition coalition of conservative, nationalist, and centrist parties allied in the Likud bloc.	从1948年独立直到1977年，工党一直独霸，然后让位给结盟在利库德集团的保守份子、民族主义份子以及中间党派的反对派联盟。


Since then, the two parties have taken turns in power, sometimes in grand coalitions and often in partnership with smaller parties.	从此以后，两党轮流执政，有时侯是以大联合政府的形式，有时侯经常与小党派组成伙伴。


On the surface, party competition has been between “left” and “right,” or “hawks” and “doves.”	表面上看，政党之间的竞争在“左”和“右”，或者“鹰派”与“鸽派”之间。


The truth, of course, is more complex.	当然，事实远更为复杂。


Social class and economic issues, overshadowed by the persistence of more existential concerns – physical security and the continued existence of the state – have played a much less important role in Israel than in other societies.	在更为悠关生死存亡，也就是生命安全以及国家继续生存的笼罩下，社会阶层和经济问题与其他社会相比在以色列扮演的角色无足轻重。


Here, the political divide could be defined as “optimists” versus “pessimists.”	这里，政治分歧可以定义为“乐观主义”和“悲观主义”。


The former, as in Labor, believed that some day a force would emerge among Arabs and Palestinians ready to make peace on a reasonable basis; the latter, as in Likud, were more doubtful.	前者，正如工党，相信终有一天，阿拉伯人和巴勒斯坦人中会涌现出一股势力准备在合情合理的基础上媾和； 而后者，正如利库德党，则更为怀疑。


For years, the argument remained an abstraction, a debate over what might happen in the future, until the Oslo agreement with the PLO in 1993 put the competing perspectives to the test.	多年来，直到1993年与巴解组织的奥斯陆将针锋相对的意见付诸考验，这是一个有关未来会发生什么的抽象的争论。


Since 2000, when PLO leader Yasir Arafat rejected a political settlement and instead launched a five-year war of terrorism, there have been few optimists left.	2000年以来，巴解组织领导人阿拉法特拒绝政治解决方案，反而发动了为期五年的恐怖主义战争，乐观主义者已经为数不多了。


The subsequent intellectual realignment in Israel has given rise to a new national consensus.	以色列随后在理智上的重新组合形成了新的全国性一致意见。


It is now generally accepted that, as the left has always insisted, Israel should be ready to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and accept a Palestinian state in exchange for real peace.	现在，正如左翼所一直坚持的那样，以色列国民大体上接受了以色列应当从西岸和加沙地带撤军并承认巴勒斯坦国用来换取真正的和平；


But it is also accepted that, as the right has always maintained, there is no partner ready to make real peace.	但是，也正如右翼所坚持的那样，接受了没有合作伙伴愿意实现真正的和平。


In this context, Sharon gained two landslide election victories as a hardliner, but implemented a moderate policy, including a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.	在这种背景下，沙龙作为强硬派在两次选举中大获全胜，但是却实施了温和的政策，包括从加沙地带全部撤军。


This is where Israel stands today, facing a political upheaval fueled by two developments.	以色列由于两大局面而造成政治动荡，这就是目前以色列的局势。


First, Sharon moved the Likud to the center, making it the hegemonic party, while destroying every stereotype about his personality, methods, and worldview.	首先，沙龙将利库德党带到中间地带，使得其无可匹敌，同时打破世人有关其个性、方式以及世界观的固有观念。


For the same reason, though, many within Likud view Sharon – who helped found the party – as a traitor.	但是，出于同样原因，利库德党的许多人把建党元老的沙龙视为叛徒。


Sharon now needs to institutionalize his reforms, even if he now needs to establish another party to do so.	沙龙即使现在需要建立新党，也要将他的改革体制化。


Second, the Labor party has proven politically bankrupt, with its only conceivable leader being the 82-year-old Shimon Peres and its anachronistic dovish optimism the source of much ridicule.	第二，工党唯一可信的领导人是82岁高龄的西蒙·佩雷斯，而且其落伍的鸽派乐观主义成为笑柄，因此工党在政治上已经破产。 结果，由于投票率低，阿米尔·佩雷茨赢得该党领导人初选胜利。


As a result – and helped by low voter turnout – the party’s leadership primary was won by Amir Peretz, an outsider and populist who wants to revitalize Labor by putting social and economic issues at the forefront, which means withdrawing from the national unity coalition with Likud.	佩雷茨是该党的圈外人士，民粹主义者。 他想通过突出社会和经济问题来重新振兴工党，这也就意味着退出和利库德党的全国联合政府。


Despite having to form a new party, Sharon will probably win the next election, which he has called for February.	沙龙尽管要组建新党，但是仍然可能赢得下次大选胜利。 沙龙已经宣布在明年二月举行大选。


Peretz’s strategy may draw voters from other parties on the left, but Labor will most likely lose centrist voters (and those for whom national security is paramount) to Sharon.	佩雷茨的战略可能是从左翼政党争取选民，但是工党几乎肯定会失去中间派别选民（以及那些视国家安全为首要任务的人士）的支持而流向沙龙。


Paradoxically, all of this will mean both a great deal in principle and perhaps little in practice.	相互矛盾的是，所有这些在原则上意义重大而在实际上却无足轻重。


With Sharon enjoying a strong public mandate for a moderate policy, Israel will be more ready than ever to make a deal with the Palestinians, Syria, and the Arab world in general for a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the conflict.	沙龙享有坚定的民意授权采取温和政策，以色列与以前相比将更为可能同巴勒斯坦人、叙利亚以及整个阿拉伯世界达成协议，为巴以冲突找到全面外交解决方案。


Yet, given the chaos and paralysis that increasingly characterize Palestinian politics, that opportunity will go untaken.	但是，鉴于巴勒斯坦政坛不断明显的混乱和瘫痪，这一机遇可能会付诸东流。


The rising power of Hamas, which openly proclaims its strategy of increasing terrorism and its goal of destroying Israel, reinforces that trend.	哈马斯公开宣称其增强恐怖主义的战略以及摧毁以色列的目标，其势力日益膨胀，结果增强了这一趋势。


The same can be said of Syria, whose hardline government is turning toward a dangerously adventurous militancy.	叙利亚也是一样，该国的强硬政府趋向于危险的冒险军事好战。


Sharon might decide on partial withdrawals and dismantling of settlements on the West Bank.	沙龙可能会决定从西岸部分撤军并消除定居点。


But it is now widely recognized that such changes are a response to dim prospects of real progress toward peace.	但是，很多人承认这些变化是对迈向和平真正进程的微弱希望的反应。


Holding onto territory as a bargaining chip makes less sense if there is no one with whom to bargain.	如果没有人可以谈判，那么，把占有领土作为谈判筹码就毫无疑义。


Instead, Israel will continue to prioritize its own security, strengthening its defenses against terrorism and consolidating control over the relatively small portions of the West Bank that it intends to claim as part of an eventual diplomatic settlement.	相反，以色列将继续把它的安全作为优先目标，加强国防，防范恐怖主义，并且巩固对相对狭小的西岸部分地带的控制。 以色列打算将这些地带作为最终外交解决的一部分。


A byproduct of this strategy, combined with ongoing Palestinian attacks, has been growing international sympathy with Israel.	连同持续不断的巴勒斯坦人攻击事件，这一战略的副产品是国际社会对以色列的同情不断增加。


That, too, could continue if the current political realignment proves permanent, enabling Sharon to win over the center and even moderate left for his program.	如果目前的政治重组确定下来，这一情况将持续，使得沙龙赢得中间人士乃至温和左翼人士对其政策的支持。


Nothing is assured, of course.	当然，没有什么事情是确定无疑的。


The still popular Benjamin Netanyahu could emerge as a powerful rival on his right, and Peretz might yet shape Labor into a serious contender on his left.	沙龙退出利库德党的威胁可能仅仅是一个姿态，依然广受欢迎的本杰明·内塔尼亚胡可能崛起，成为其右翼强大的对手，而佩雷茨有可能将工党建造成为其左翼的不容忽视的竞争者。


Nevertheless, the national consensus has shifted, shaking all assumptions about Israeli politics.	但是，以色列民意已经转移，打破了有关以色列政坛的所有假设。


The February elections will put those assumptions to their severest test in decades.	明年二月的选举将把这些假设付诸几十年来最为严峻的考验。


The Observer State of Palestine	观察员国巴勒斯坦


NEW YORK – Palestine is no longer an “entity,” but a state – or, to be precise, a non-member observer state of the United Nations, just like the Holy See.	纽约—巴勒斯坦不再是一个“实体”，而是一个国家——确切地说，是联合国非成员观察员国，和梵蒂冈一样。


The Palestinian bid received the support of 138 member countries (Germany, Britain, and 39 other countries abstained), while only seven, including the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Panama, joined the US and Israel in opposing it, leaving both more isolated than ever.	巴勒斯坦的议案得到了138个成员国的支持（德国、英国和其他39国投了弃权票），只有7个成员国表示反对，马绍尔群岛、帕劳和巴拿马加入了美国和以色列的反对行列，后两个国家的孤立愈加深刻了。


Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was furious; he called Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas a liar, and gave permission for 3,000 new Jewish homes to be constructed on occupied Palestinian territory.	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡怒不可遏，他称巴勒斯坦权力机构主席阿巴斯为骗子，并批准在巴勒斯坦被占区建设3 000个新犹太新家园。


His foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, had already threatened to crush the PA government on the West Bank if the UN vote went ahead.	他的外交部长利伯曼（Avigdor Lieberman）威胁说，如果联合国举行投票，以色列将摧毁约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构政府。


But Israel has only itself to blame for what happened.	但以色列才是现状的罪魁祸首。


Abbas and his prime minister, Salam Fayyad, have been more moderate, and more open to serious negotiations with Israel, than any Palestinian leaders before.	阿巴斯及其总理法耶兹（Salam Fayyad）比他们之前的各任巴勒斯坦领导人都更加温和，对与以色列展开严肃对话的态度也更开放。


The Palestinian police have cooperated with the Israelis to contain violence on the West Bank.	巴勒斯坦警察与以色列人展开合作阻止约旦河西岸暴力。


Improving the economy, rather than violent confrontation, has been the PA’s main concern.	巴勒斯坦权力机构的主要关注点是改善经济，而不是武装冲突。


But, by continuing to build settlements on Palestinian land, the Israeli government has undermined the authority of Abbas and his Fatah government almost to the point of impotence.	但是，通过继续在巴勒斯坦土地上建设定居点，以色列政府已经让阿巴斯及其法塔赫政府威信扫地。


More and more Palestinians, fed up with the futility of what is still called the “peace process,” believe that Fatah’s fierce rival, Hamas, the Islamist movement that rules Gaza, has more effective ways to break the current impasse.	越来越多的巴勒斯坦人领教了仍被称为“和平进程”的东西的无能，他们认为法塔赫的死对头哈马斯——统治加沙的伊斯兰运动——更能打破当前僵局。


The failure of Abbas’s peaceful methods has made the alternative of violence look increasingly attractive.	阿巴斯的和平方式让暴力替代方案变得越来越有吸引力。


Hamas also emerged as the moral victor after the latest – but surely not the last – military clash.	哈马斯也是最近——显然绝不会是最后一次——军事打击的道德胜利方。


Far from intimidating the Palestinians by bombing Gaza and mobilizing troops, the Israelis made Hamas look heroic in its resistance.	以色列轰炸加沙和动员军队的动作并没有吓倒巴勒斯坦人，反倒让坚持抵抗的哈马斯披上了一层英雄色彩。


Once again, Abbas looked feeble in comparison.	在这里，阿巴斯再一次相形见绌。


This is why he desperately needed his victory at the UN.	这就是为何它急切地需要在联合国的胜利。


The diplomatic promotion of Palestine offered him a lifeline.	巴勒斯坦外交地位的提升给了他一线生机。


Did the Israelis really want a resurgence of Islamist violence in Gaza, the potential collapse of peaceful politics on the West Bank, and now the right of a recognized Palestinian state to take Israel to the International Criminal Court for war crimes?	以色列真的愿意看到加沙伊斯兰暴力重新抬头、约旦河西岸和平政治遭受崩溃危险、而如今得到承认的巴勒斯坦国有权以战争罪将以色列送上国际刑事法庭？


If not, why are they so ham-fisted?	若非如此，以色列为什么如此鲁莽？


It appears that Israel is making the same mistake that others have made in the past.	以色列似乎在重蹈其他人在过去犯过的错误。


It has been proven repeatedly that military intimidation of civilians does not break their morale and turn them against their own leaders, however terrible the regime.	历史一再证明，对平民的军事恐吓并不会让他们吓破胆，让他们反对自己的领袖，不管他们面临怎样的体制。


On the contrary, shared hardship usually strengthens the ties between citizens and their rulers.	相反，共患难通常能够加强公民与其统治者的联系。 在二战中遭到轰炸的德国城市是如此；


So it was in bombed German cities during World War II; so it was in Vietnam; and so it is turning out to be in Gaza.	越南是如此； 这一回，加沙也是如此。


But there is another way of looking at the situation.	但我们可以换一个方式看待局势。


To call the Israeli government clumsy is to miss the point.	说以色列政府愚钝显然不适合。


Israel has few illusions about Palestinians toppling their own leaders.	以色列并不幻想巴勒斯坦人会推翻他们自己的领袖。


In fact, a strengthened Hamas may play into the hands of the Israeli hardliners currently in power.	事实上，实力增强的哈马斯也许正是目前掌权的以色列强硬派所故意培养的。


They can point to the violent, anti-Zionist, and, yes, anti-Semitic rhetoric of radical Islamists, and argue that no deal with the Palestinians is possible.	他们可以把矛头指向暴力的反犹太复国主义者——以及的确存在的激进伊斯兰教徒的反闪族论调——指出与巴勒斯坦达成协议是不可能的。


The threat of a large stick is the only language that the natives understand.	大棒威胁是唯一能够让本地人明白的语言。


Keeping the Palestinians divided between Islamist revolutionaries and the more business-minded Fatah suits Israeli purposes admirably.	让巴勒斯坦人在伊斯兰教革命分子和更具商业头脑的法塔赫之间分裂最符合以色列的目的。


As long as Fatah keeps things more or less under control on the West Bank, and all Hamas can do is periodically lob missiles across the Israeli border or occasionally blow up a bus, Israel can easily live with the status quo.	只要法塔赫或多或少掌握约旦河西岸的局面，哈马斯所能做的充其量无非是不定期地向以色列境内射几枚火箭，或是偶尔引爆几辆公交车，而以色列可以在现状中逍遥存活。


Those Israelis who believe that a two-state solution cannot be achieved feel vindicated; those who simply do not want two states to coexist are equally well served.	相信两国方案无法实现的以色列人自认无责； 而不愿看到两国共存的以色列人也能满意。


From the current Israeli government’s perspective, then, the correct strategy is to keep the Palestinian government on the West Bank weak and off balance, without quite bringing it down, and to contain Hamas with periodic displays of military power (while destroying long-range missiles that can do serious damage to Israel).	因此，从当前以色列政府的角度看，正确的策略是维持约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦政府的弱势和无序，但不让它垮台，同时以不定期的武力炫耀遏制哈��斯（与此同时，要摧毁可能给以色列带来重大伤亡的长程导弹）。


Israeli policies are not genocidal, as some commentators, not always free from anti-Semitic animus, like to claim.	以色列的政策不是一些评论者所说的大屠杀，也从未摆脱过反闪族敌意。


Many Palestinians have been killed under Israeli rule, but their number is not even close to the number of Muslim civilians who are still being tortured, murdered, and maimed by Muslim governments every day.	许多巴勒斯坦人死于以色列统治，但其数量远低于被穆斯林政府虐待、谋杀和致残穆斯林平民。


Israel is, however, a semi-imperial power, using traditional colonial methods: ruling by proxy, dividing potential rebels, rewarding obeisance, and punishing opposition.	不过，以色列算得上半帝国主义，它使用的是传统殖民伎俩：用代理人统治，分裂潜在叛乱者，奖赏合作者，惩罚反对者。


Colonial history shows that this type of rule is fragile.	殖民历史表明，这种类型的统治是脆弱的。


Humiliation is not a firm basis for long-term stability.	羞辱感绝非长期稳定的坚固基石。


There comes a point when promises of independence no longer convince anyone.	总有一天，独立的承诺无法让任何人相信。


Fomenting violent resistance by demoralizing those who might still listen to reason is an invitation to disaster.	通过让仍相信理性之人泄气来煽动暴力抵抗不啻制造灾难。


The chances of a peaceful settlement vanish.	和平解决的可能由此灰飞烟灭。


Violence is all that is left.	剩下的唯有暴力一途。


It is one thing for colonies to blow up on the other side of the world.	殖民统治在世界另一头被推翻是一回事。


It is quite another if the colony is just next door, and the colonial power is surrounded by countries with limited sympathy for a mess that is largely of its own making.	但殖民地就在隔壁、殖民者被对其自己造成的混乱同情有限的国家包围是完全不同的另一回事。


The Arab Spring’s Unlikely Winner	阿拉伯之春运动貌似不可能的赢家


PARIS – The war in Iraq – which led in 2003 to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime – had one clear winner: Iran.	巴黎——2003年致使萨达姆·侯赛因政权倒台的伊拉克战争只有伊朗一个确实的赢家。


The United States-led military intervention resulted in the weakening of the Middle East’s Sunni regimes, America’s traditional allies, and the strengthening of America’s principal foe in the region, the Islamic Republic.	以美国为首的军事干预削弱了美国在中东的传统盟友逊尼派政权，同时却增强了美国在该地区的主要敌人伊朗伊斯兰共和国的实力。


Ten years later, we may be witnessing yet another ironic outcome in the region: At least for the time being, Israel seems to be the only clear winner of the “Arab Spring” revolutions.	事隔十年，我们似乎见证了该地区另一个颇具讽刺意味的结果：至少到现在为止，以色列似乎成了“阿拉伯之春”革命运动中唯一确实的赢家。


Most Israelis would strongly object to this interpretation.	多数以色列人肯定会强烈反对这样的解释。


Their regional environment has become much more unstable and unpredictable.	他们面临着更加动荡且前途未卜的地区环境。


Only a few days ago, Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system intercepted a rocket fired from Sinai that was aimed at the port of Eilat.	就在几天前，以色列的铁穹导弹防御系统刚刚拦截了一枚西奈半岛袭击埃拉特港的火箭弹。


In contrast to the past, no Israeli border is now secure, especially the long frontier with Egypt.	以色列边境，尤其是漫长的以埃边境和过去相比都不再安全。


No implicit alliance can be taken for granted.	现在无法确定谁是绝对的盟友。


All scenarios are open.	一切可能性全都存在。


Can Israel remain an oasis of stability, security, modernity, and economic growth in such a volatile environment?	以色列能否在如此动荡的环境中继续成为一块稳定、安全、现代化的经济发展绿洲？


The answer, of course, is no.	答案当然是否定的。


Israel may be tempted to regard itself as some kind of latter-day Noah’s ark, but it is not.	以色列或许以当代的诺亚方舟自诩，但实际情况并不是这样。


Tel Aviv has become a cross between San Francisco, Singapore, and São Paulo, but it is still less than 300 kilometers from Damascus.	特拉维夫或许已成为旧金山、新加坡和圣保罗之间的枢纽，但它依然距大马士革不到300公里。


For the pessimists (or realists, depending on your perspective), Israel must remain on maximum alert to minimize the risks that it faces.	悲观主义者（或者现实主义者，完全取决于你怎么看）认为以色列必须保持最高戒备状态才能最大限度地降低风险。


Above all, many Israelis (if not most) believe that this is no time to be imaginative and daring.	总之，许多（乃至绝大多数）以色列人认为没有时间发挥想象力进行冒险尝试。


The resumption of the peace process with the Palestinian Authority can be only a fig leaf.	与巴勒斯坦民族权力机构恢复和谈也许只是一块遮羞布。


Israel simply cannot ignore the Americans in the way that the Egyptian army has as it massacres its Islamist opponents.	以色列不过是不能像埃及军队屠杀伊斯兰反对派那样完全不顾及美国的意愿。


But a very different reading of the current situation is possible.	但面对当前形势可能会有完全不同的解释。


What started as a revolution in the eighteenth-century meaning of the term is becoming a reproduction of the religious wars that ravaged Europe from 1524 to 1648, pitting Catholics and Protestants against each other in the same way that Sunnis and Shia are pitted against each other today.	18世纪开始的一场革命正演变为1524年到1648年曾肆虐欧洲的宗教战争的翻版，导致天主教和新教教徒陷入对立，颇有些今天逊尼派和什叶派对立的味道。


(In Egypt, however, we are seeing simply the return of a military police state.)	（但我们只是看到埃及回归军警政府）。


One may disagree with this Euro-centric interpretation, but what is clear is that the Muslim Middle East will be too preoccupied with internecine struggle to worry about the Palestinians or the existence of Israel.	有人也许不同意这种以欧洲为中心的解释，但中东穆斯林显然太过忙于自相残杀而无瑕顾及巴勒斯坦或以色列。


War with Jews or Christians has necessarily taken a back seat (except where, as in Egypt and Syria, Christian minorities are perceived to be allied with the regime).	（除普遍认为与政府结盟的埃及和叙利亚基督教少数派以外，）与犹太人或者基督徒的战争显然已经退居二线。


In some cases, there is explicit cooperation with Israel.	有些政府甚至与以色列进行明确的合作。


Because it is fighting for its own survival in a highly challenging environment, the Jordanian regime needs Israel’s security collaboration.	因为在极具挑战性的环境中为自身的生存而战，约旦政府需要得到以色列的安全合作。


Indeed, Israeli and Jordanian forces are now working together to secure their respective borders against infiltration by jihadists from Iraq or Syria, while Egypt and Israel now share the same objective in Sinai.	事实上，以色列和约旦部队正在合作防止各自边境被伊拉克或叙利亚圣战份子渗透，而埃及和以色列在西奈半岛的目标也是共同的。


So the paradox of the Arab revolutions is that they have contributed to Israel’s integration as a strategic partner (for some countries) in the region.	于是阿拉伯革命就自相矛盾地促成了以色列作为该地区战略伙伴（对某些国家而言）的融合。


At this point, more Arab lives have been lost in Syria’s civil war alone than in all of the Arab-Israeli wars combined.	此时此刻，仅仅是死于叙利亚内战的阿拉伯人就比历次阿以战争加起来还要多。


Of course, one should not draw the wrong conclusions from this.	当然，人们不应当由此得出错误的结论。


Israel may have become, more than ever, a key strategic partner for some Arab regimes, or a de facto ally against Iran (as it is for Saudi Arabia).	以色列对某些阿拉伯政权而言或许已成为比以往任何时候都更重要的战略合作伙伴，或者成为事实上反对伊朗的盟国（比方说沙特阿拉伯）。


But this does not imply that Israel’s neighbors have resigned themselves, in emotional terms, to its continued existence in their midst.	但这并不意味着以色列的邻国已经从感情上接纳以色列长期在中东建国。


Nor does it mean that Israel can do whatever it wants, whenever and wherever it wants.	这同样不意味着以色列可以随时随地为所欲为。


On the contrary, the Israeli government should not use the region’s turmoil as justification for doing nothing to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians.	相反，以色列政府不应以地区动荡为由不理会与巴勒斯坦人的冲突。


Current conditions, though admittedly confusing, can be seen as opening a window of opportunity – a moment to consider making serious sacrifices for the sake of long-term survival.	虽然目前情况的确混乱，但也可以视为一次机会——应当为了长久的生存考虑做出真正的牺牲。


Israel should be addressing the Arab world in the following terms: “You may not like me, and you may never like me, but I am not – and never should have been – your first concern.	以色列应当告诉���拉伯世界：“你们可以不喜欢我，也可能你们永远都不会喜欢我，但我不是你们应该首要关注的对象。


Now it is clear that you have other priorities to worry about.”	现在你们显然应该操心更重要的事。 ”


The Arab quagmire may not be creating conditions for peace and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.	阿拉伯泥潭或许不能为巴勒斯坦和以色列人之间的和平和解创造条件。


But it has turned the “strategic truce” favored by many Arab leaders into the only conceivable alternative.	但当前的混乱局势已经把很多阿拉伯领导人赞同的“战略性休战”变成了唯一可行的选择。


Arabs cannot be at war with themselves and with Israel at the same time.	阿拉伯人无法同自己和以色列人双线作战。


The chaotic events unfolding in the Middle East will – and should – change the approach and perceptions of the protagonists.	中东目前的混乱局面将会——也应当改变相关主体的方法和认知。


Short-term considerations will not suffice.	仅有短期考虑是不够的。


Israeli leaders must adjust their long-term strategic thinking to the new Middle East that ultimately emerges from the current disarray.	以色列领导人必须调整自己对将从混乱中诞生的新中东的长期战略思维。


That means not exploiting today’s opportunity to build more settlements on Palestinian land, or to expand existing ones, as Binyamin Netanyahu’s government appears determined to do.	这意味着不利用今天的机会在巴勒斯坦领土上兴建或扩建定居点，内塔尼亚胡政府似乎已决意执行扩建定居点计划。


Israel may well be the current winner in the Arab Spring; but, if it is wise, it will leave the spoils of victory on the ground.	以色列也许是阿拉伯之春目前的赢家； 可如果它足够明智，它不会带走此次获胜的战利品。


Israel’s Wrong Friends	以色列的损友们


JERUSALEM – Israel has been welcoming some rather peculiar visitors of late.	发自耶路撒冷——以色列最近迎来了一批颇为特殊的客人。


The Dutch populist, Geert Wilders, is a frequent caller, telling sympathetic audiences that Israel is on the front line of the Western war against Islam.	荷兰民粹主义者格尔特·怀尔德斯作为其中的常客，最擅长的就是向支持者们大讲以色列是如何奋战在西方与伊斯兰冲突第一线的。


And, in December, a delegation of European far-right politicians toured Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank, pleasing their hosts by reassuring them that this was “Jewish land.”	而去年12月又有一个欧洲极右翼政客代表团参观了西岸占领区的犹太人定居点，并确信这就是“犹太人的土地”，令东道主庆幸不已。


Some of these “friends of Israel” represent political parties whose supporters, to put it mildly, have not traditionally been noted for their fraternal feelings towards Jews.	委婉地说，其中一些“以色列友人”背后的政党其实在历史上对犹太人也是不甚友善的。


Heinz-Christian Strache, for example, leads the Freedom Party of Austria, which began, under its late leader, Jörg Haider, by actively courting former Nazis.	比如海因茨-克里斯坦·斯塔齐所代表的奥地利自由党，其已故创始人和领袖荣格·海德尔本身就是个前纳粹活跃分子。


“More strength for our Viennese blood,” one of his election slogans, gives an idea of Strache’s typical tone.	我们可以从斯塔齐其中一句竞选口号“维也纳血统更强！ ”看出他的典型政治语调。


His Belgian colleague, Filip Dewinter, represents a Flemish nationalist party tainted by wartime collaboration with the Nazis.	而他的比利时同路人菲利浦·德文特背后则是一个在二战期间曾与纳粹狼狈为奸的佛兰德民族主义政党。


To be sure, nowadays even right-wing politicians in Europe are careful not to sound openly anti-Semitic.	无可否认，今日欧洲即便是右翼政客也会小心避免发出任何反犹太言论。


Wilders, for one, is ostentatiously philosemitic, and all the New Rightists like to stress the importance of what they call “Judeo-Christian values,” which must be defended against “Islamofascism.”	格尔特总是大肆表现自己的亲犹太立场，而所有欧洲新右派都喜欢强调所谓的“犹太-基督教价值观”，并以此抵御“伊斯兰法西斯主义”的侵袭。


Leftist and liberal critics of Israeli politics like to point out that anti-Zionism is not the same thing as anti-Semitism.	那些关注以色列政治的左派和自由派评论家常常指出：反犹太复国主义和反犹太主义其实是两个不同的概念。


But it is just as true that being a friend of Israel is not necessarily the same thing as being a friend of the Jews.	同样，与以色列为友并不意味着和犹太人亲如一家。


Richard Nixon, for example, said of Jews that “you can’t trust the bastards,” but was a great admirer of Israel.	美国前总统理查德·尼克松曾称犹太人为“可信任的混蛋”，但却对以色列无比赞赏。


And, of course, the last 2,000 years have shown that anti-Semitism is perfectly compatible with the worship of a Jew called Jesus of Nazareth.	当然，最近2000年的历史也表明反犹太运动与对一个叫耶稣的拿撒勒犹太人的崇拜并存不悖。


In the United States, some of the fiercest defenders of hardline Zionism are evangelical Christians who firmly believe that Jews who refuse to convert to Christianity will one day face terrible retribution.	在美国。 某些最激进的犹太复国主义者竟然是新教徒，他们甚至坚信那些不愿意改信基督教的犹太人最终将受到上天的严厉惩罚。


Sometimes, the wrong friends can be useful.	当然，有些时候这些损友也是有利用价值的。


When Theodor Herzl was making the rounds of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, trying to gain support for the establishment of a state for the Jews, he was often rebuffed by rich and powerful Jewish grandees, who saw him as a troublemaker.	当西奥多·赫兹尔在19世纪末奔走于欧洲各国，尝试为犹太建国运动争取支持时，迎接他的常常是那些犹太财阀的粗暴回绝——这些人认为他是个捣乱分子。


Instead, he found eager supporters among pious Protestants, for whom Jews belonged in their own holy land rather than in Europe.	而最后他却从那些虔诚的的新教徒那里得到了热心的支持，因为那些人相信犹太人就该离开欧洲，回到他们的圣地（巴勒斯坦）去。


Once the Jewish state was established, the earliest European friends of Israel were often people on the left, who admired the communal life on the kibbutzim, and saw Israel as a great socialist experiment, led by wise old left-wing idealists, such as David Ben-Gurion.	在以色列建国以后，最早的一批欧洲支持者往往是些左派民众，他们羡慕那种集体农场的公共生活，并将以色列视为一个由戴维·本·古里安这些睿智的老左派理想主义者领导下的伟大社会主义实践。


Residual guilt about the Holocaust bolstered this attitude.	而对犹太人大屠杀所遗留下来的愧疚感更助长了这种态度。


Things began to change after the 1967 Six Day War, and even more after the 1973 “Yom Kippur” war, when it became clear that Israel was not going to let go of the Palestinian territories that it had conquered.	谁知情况却在1967年的6日战争（第三次中东战争）以及1973年的“赎罪日战争”后发生了变化，因为左派意识到以色列是不会放弃那些被占领的巴勒斯坦领土的。


Later, when Israel began to build settlements all over the occupied territories, admiration even turned into active hostility from Europe’s left.	随后当以色列开始在占领区兴建犹太人定居点之时，欧洲左派对该国的敬意甚至变成了极大的敌意。


To many people on the right, however, the very things deplored by the European (and Israeli) left became reasons to admire Israel.	对右派人士来说，那些欧洲（和以色列）左派深恶痛绝的东西反而变成了尊敬以色列的理由。


These new friends liked the ruthless use of force, the ethnic nationalism, the continued humiliation of the Palestinians.	新朋友们喜欢那种对暴力的肆意使用，种族民族主义，以及对巴勒斯坦人的持续羞辱。


Keen to revive a more militant form of nationalism in their own countries, politicians like Strache, Wilders, and Dewinter see Israel as a kind of model – a model discredited for a long time in Europe, owing to bad memories of fascism and Nazism.	斯塔齐，怀尔德斯和德文特这些希望进一步挑起本国激进民族主义情绪的政客们都将以色列视为楷模——一个由于法西斯主义和纳粹主义的惨痛回忆而被欧洲蔑视许久的楷模。


Indeed, anti-Zionist leftists frequently attempt to discredit Israel by comparing its actions in Gaza and the West Bank to Nazi atrocities.	事实上，反犹太复国主义的左派经常将以军在加沙和西岸地区的行径与纳粹暴行相提并论，以实现贬低以色列的目的。


This is a cheap trick, aimed to give maximum offense.	但这其实是个十分下作的伎俩，目的就是为了尽可能地冒犯对方。


Contrary to what the Nobel Prize-winning author José Saramago once said, the Israeli army’s attacks in Gaza are not comparable in any way to Auschwitz.	与诺贝尔奖获得者若泽·萨拉马戈的评论恰好相反，以军对加沙地区的袭击在任何方面都无法和纳粹奥斯维辛集中营相提并论。


But the view, espoused by Israel’s new right-wing friends, that Israel is on the front line against Islamic fascism, is equally mendacious.	但以色列的新右派朋友所持的另一种观点——认为以色列正站在反对伊斯兰法西斯主义的第一线——也是同样荒谬的。


By comparing Islam in general – not only Islamist terrorism – to fascism, as the right-wing populists do, and to suggest that Europe faces a threat comparable to the Nazis, is not just wrong, but dangerous.	右派民粹主义者这种将伊斯兰教（不仅仅是伊斯兰恐怖主义）比作法西斯主义，并以此认为欧洲正面临着与纳粹同等威胁的观点不但错误，而且是��险的。


For, if it were true, any and all measures taken against Muslims, however brutal, would be justified, and Israel would indeed be a frontline state, resisting “Islamofacism” to prevent another Auschwitz.	因为如果这是真的话，任何以及所有针对穆斯林的行为，无论多么残忍，都可以被认为是正义的，而以色列也真的成为了一个对抗“伊斯兰法西斯主义”以防止下一个奥斯维辛集中营出现的前沿阵地。


This is certainly how many Israeli right-wing politicians explain things.	这恰恰就是许多以色列右翼政客阐述问题的方式。


And they find eager parrots among some of Europe’s most retrograde political forces.	而他们却得到了欧洲某些最为愚昧落后的政治势力的附和。


It is a view that carries the grave implication that a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is almost impossible.	这种观点包含着一种严重错误的暗示，认为以色列和巴勒斯坦之间是不可能达成和平方案的。


The longer Israel, cheered on by the wrong European friends, continues to humiliate the Palestinians and occupy their lands, the more likely it will be that hatred and violence will stand in the way of compromise, without which there can be no peace.	这些欧洲朋友鼓吹下的以色列越长久地羞辱巴勒斯坦人并占领他们的土地，妥协就越可能被仇恨和暴力所破坏，而没有妥协，就没有和平。


There is another potential consequence, however.	此外这还有另一个潜在后果。


False analogies with the past trivialize history.	错误的推断会模糊过去的历史。


If the Israelis, or the Palestinians, are like Nazis, then the horror of what the real Nazis did has been greatly diminished.	如果把以色列人或者巴勒斯坦人比作纳粹，那么真纳粹的所作所为就会被大大淡化。


But exploiting history to justify current violence will not work forever.	这种借用历史去为现行暴力找借口的行为是不能长久的。


Once people stop believing that Israel is defending the West against fascism, Israel will be blamed for all the violence in the Middle East.	一旦人们不再相信以色列是在为西方抵御法西斯主义，以色列就会因其在中东地区的所作所为而遭到谴责。


And Jews everywhere else will be blamed by association.	而世界各地的犹太人都会被指为同谋。


In short, the wrong friends of Israel are even worse friends of the Jewish people.	简言之，以色列这些损友对于犹太人民来说更是有百害而无一利。


Israel Votes for Violence	以色列投票选择暴力


War and violence always have a direct effect on elections.	战争和暴力总是对选举产生直接影响。


Wars account for dramatic shifts in voter preferences, and radical leaders and parties often poll much higher after a round of sharp violence than in normal times.	战争导致选民倾向的巨大转变，而在剧烈暴力后，激进的领导人和政党得票经常要比平时高出许多。


Minority ethnic groups are therefore often able to sway the balance of power between major competing forces.	因此，少数族裔团体经常可以在主要竞争势力之间左右平衡。


This appears to have been precisely what has happened in Israel’s recent election.	以色列最近的选举就几乎完全说明了这一点。


Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud Party and the even harder right Avigdor Lieberman and his Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is Our Home) party achieved a dominant result that saw Labor, the dominant party throughout Israel’s history, consigned to a lowly fourth place.	内塔尼亚胡的右翼利库德党以及更为坚决的右翼利伯曼及其以色列家园党获得了大多数选票，使得以色列老牌工党屈居第四。


Throughout the campaign, Israeli leaders competed over who would deal more firmly (read: violently) with the Palestinians.	在整个竞选中，以色列领导人们竞相表明谁可以更为坚定地、也就是用更多的暴力对付巴勒斯坦人。


In the aftermath of Israel’s assault on Gaza, Palestinians hoped that Israel would choose a leader who would focus on the need to end the suffering, lift the siege, and begin rebuilding.	以色列攻击加沙后，巴勒斯坦人希望以色列将会选择一位致力于结束苦难、解除包围并且开始重建的领导人。


It appears that just the opposite has happened.	看来，相反的事情发生了。


The last time that Israeli elections were so obviously affected by violence was in 1996, when polling results shifted wildly in the run-up to the vote, finally allowing Netanyahu a razor-thin win over acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres.	上一次以色列选举如此明显地受到暴力影响是在1996年。 当时，在投票前夕民意测验的结果大幅度摇摆不定，最后让内塔尼亚胡险胜代理总理佩雷斯。


Competing against an older Peres (who had taken over after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin) Netanyahu dyed his hair white to appear more mature, and then took advantage of a badly handled mini-war and the anger of Israel’s Arab voters.	为了与佩雷斯竞争(佩雷斯是在拉宾总理遇刺身亡后接替总理职位的)，内塔尼亚胡把他的头发染白以便看起来更为成熟。 他还利用了一场处置不当的小型战争以及以色列的阿拉伯选民的愤怒。


Now Peres is Israel’s president, while Netanyahu heads Likud.	现在，佩雷斯是以色列总统，而内塔尼亚胡领导利库德。 但是形势基本没有改变，也就是作战不力，和谈未竟以及以色列阿拉伯选民地址选举。


But not much has changed: badly handled wars, incomplete peace talks, and a boycott by Israel’s Arab voters made this 2009 election seem almost like a carbon copy of 1996, when Rabin’s assassination ended the Palestinian-Israeli talks at a crucial time and Peres’ ill-advised war on South Lebanon reduced his large lead almost to a tie with Netanyahu.	这些造成了2009年的选举看起来就是1996年选举的翻版。 当时，拉宾遇刺身亡在关键时刻结束了巴以和谈，佩雷斯鲁莽地发动南黎巴嫩战争使得其大幅领先优势减少为与内塔尼亚胡几乎持平。


The anger of northern Israel’s Arab citizens at the killing of their brethren across the border led to a boycott that cost Peres the few thousand votes he needed to win.	以色列北部阿拉伯民众对于边境另一边兄弟遭到杀戮愤恨不已，使得他们抵制选举，从而让佩雷斯失去了赢得大选所需要的几千张选票。


Israel’s 2009 election is similar in many ways.	以色列2009年的选举在许多方面都是相像的。


It follows two controversial wars (although the current nominees were not directly involved in the 2006 war with Hezbollah).	它在两场充满争议的战争后举行(尽管当前的候选人并没有直接卷入2006年与真主党的战争) 。


It also follows serious negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, which are said to have moved both sides much closer to each other.	而且它也是在以色列总理奥尔穆特与巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯严肃认真的谈判后举行。 他们的会谈把双方的立场大大地拉近了。


But wars and violence move electorates to the hawkish right, and Israel’s operation in Gaza was no exception.	但是战争和暴力把选民推向了右翼鹰派一边，以色列在加沙的军事行动也不例外。


Many Palestinian citizens of Israel, disgusted by the large-scale casualties inflicted on their brethren – and believing that to vote would mean to endorse the political system responsible for the carnage – stayed home once again.	许多以色列的巴勒斯坦公民对于其兄弟大批被害感到厌恶，而且相信去投票就是赞成对屠杀负责的政治制度，因此再一次没有去投票。


The most important element now is the new administration in the United States.	现在最为重要的因素就是美国的新政府。


The decisive victory of a candidate who opposed the Iraq war and favors direct talks with Iran will no doubt have a major influence on US-Israel relations and the peace process.	反对伊拉克战争并且赞成与伊朗直接对话的候选人赢得决定性的胜利无疑将会对美以关系以及和平进程产生关键的影响。


The appointment of George Mitchell, who opposes Israel’s West Bank settlements, and Mitchell’s decision to open an office in Jerusalem, speaks volumes about what the new Israeli government should expect from the Obama administration.	反对以色列在西岸建造定居点的米歇尔被任命为中东特使，而且他决定在耶路撒冷开设办事处。 新的以色列政府将会从奥巴马政府听到什么从这两件事中就可以知道了。


The Arab world is also in a state of flux after an emotional 22 days of Israel’s televised bombardment of Gaza.	以色列对加沙进行了22天令人情绪激动的、由电视转播的轰炸后，阿拉伯世界也处于一个飘忽不定的状态。


Millions of Arabs throughout the Middle East took to the streets, so angered by the inability of anyone to stop the bloodshed that a huge schism has been created.	中东数以百万计的阿拉伯人上街游行示威，他们对于没有任何人可以阻止流血感到愤怒，因此造成了巨大的分裂。


Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority beat a hasty retreat from their moderate and accommodating positions.	埃及、约旦、沙特以及巴勒斯坦当局匆忙从其温和和宽容的立场中后撤。


The major stumbling block for the world in trying to relieve the suffering in Gaza is how to finesse the biggest bloc in the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ismael Hanieh’s Islamist list of Reform and Change.	国际社会难以解决加沙苦难的主要障碍是如何巧妙处置巴勒斯坦立法委员会中最大的集团。


This challenge has become more interesting with European countries’ willingness to deal with a united Palestinian government that includes Hamas’ Hanieh.	随着欧洲国家表示愿意与包括哈马斯在内的巴勒斯坦联合政府打交道，这一挑战变得更加有趣。


President Barack Obama’s pragmatism and refusal to embrace the Bush administration’s “war on terror” will also be a key determinant of the outcome.	奥巴马总统的现实主义以及拒绝接受布什政府的“反恐战争”也将会对结果产生关键的影响。


But, beyond band-aid solutions for the deep injuries inflicted on Gaza, Palestinians’ biggest concern is to ensure that Israel’s attempt to split Gaza from the West Bank does not become permanent.	但是，除了匆忙解决在加沙造成的深深创伤以外，巴勒斯坦人最大的担忧就是确保以色列把加沙同西岸分裂开来的企图不能得逞。


Egypt and the Palestinian Authority have been made to look bad in the eyes of the Arab world, owing to their refusal to make Egypt responsible for Gaza and possibly Jordan for the West Bank.	埃及和巴勒斯坦当局在阿拉伯世界的眼里很糟糕，这是因为它们拒绝让埃及对加沙负责并可能让���旦对西岸负责。


But that proposal was a trap that would have destroyed the possibility of an independent, contiguous Palestinian state.	但是这一建议是一个陷阱，将会破坏建立独立和临近的巴勒斯坦国家的可能性。


Despite the election results, Palestinians still hope to re-establish momentum in resolving the remaining points of disagreement with Israel.	尽管选举结果已经出来，但是巴勒斯坦人还是希望重新建立势头，解决与以色列之间悬而未决的问题。


While an international consensus now supports a two-state solution, settling the status of Jerusalem and of Palestinian refugees will be the main obstacles facing the two sides.	尽管国际社会一致支持两个国家的方案，但是解决耶路撒冷地位以及巴勒斯坦难民将会是双方面临的主要障碍。


The only hope now for resuming negotiations is the old “only Nixon could open up China” argument, meaning that only a truly hard-right Israeli leader would have the credibility to make peace with the Palestinians.	现在恢复谈判的唯一希望就是“只有尼克松才能够打开中国大门”这一老观点，也就是只有一位真正坚定右翼领导人才有威信来与巴勒斯坦媾和。


But it is now clear to historians that Richard Nixon was determined to make his overture to China from the moment he began his presidency.	但是现在历史学家们知道，尼克松一上台就决心向中国示好。


Sadly, the signs that any of Israel’s potential prime ministers are truly prepared to take so bold a step are few.	不幸的是，没有什么迹象表明以色列未来的总理真正愿意采取如此大胆行动。


Is Regulation Really for Sale?	监管可以被收卖吗？


LONDON – Relationships between London banks and their regulators are not especially warm just now.	发自伦敦——最近伦敦各大银行与其监管者之间的关系似乎并不特别融洽。


The latest bonus rules issued by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (soon to morph into the European Banking Authority), have left those sensitive souls on the trading floors feeling rather bruised and unloved. In the future, 70% of their bonuses will have to be deferred.	因为欧洲银行监管委员会（即将转制为欧洲银行局）最新出台的薪酬管理条例令银行家们备感失落——该条例规定他们未来薪酬的70%将被暂缓发放。


Imagine living on only $3 million a year, with the other $7 million paid only if the profits you earned turn out to be real?	试想每年只有300万英镑维持生活，另外700万磅要等到你所赚的利润真正实现时才能发给你。


It is a shocking turn of events.	这是多么令人难以接受的事啊！


Yet, in narratives of the financial crisis, regulatory capture is often an important part of the story.	但在人们对金融危机的叙述当中，规制俘虏理论(Regulatory Capture，指为公共利益服务的政府机构沦为私人机构的保护伞)经常会成为其中一个重要内容。


Will Hutton, a prominent British commentator, has described the Financial Services Authority, which I chaired from 1997-2003 (the date things began to go wrong!) as a trade association for the financial sector.	比如英国著名时事评论员威尔·赫顿就将我于1997~2003年（危机起始之年！ ）主管的金融服务局比作为企业利益张目的“金融同业公会”。


Even more aggressive criticism has been advanced about American regulators – and, indeed, about Congress – alleging that they were in the pockets of investment banks, hedge funds, and anyone else with lots of money to spend on Capitol Hill.	而对美国监管部门——以及国会——的某些抨击则更为辛辣，直接把他们说成是投资银行，对冲基金以及所有大财阀在国会山的走狗。


How plausible is this argument?	但这些言论中有多少是正确的？


Can benign regulation really be bought?	正规的监管真的可以被收买吗？


When I was a regulator, I would certainly have denied it.	当我还是个监管者的时候，我可以断然否认上面第二点指控。


I had never worked in the financial industry, and knew few people who did. (Full disclosure: I am now an independent Director of Morgan Stanley.)	那时我没有任何金融界工作经验，也没认识几个金融界的人（完全信息披露：现在我是摩根士丹利的独立董事）。


My successors have all come from the financial sector, however, which, until recently, was regarded as a sign that they were street-wise.	我的继任者们全都来自金融行业，当时大家都认为这些人是政府和企业两边都游刃有余的人才。


Now we are not so sure.	如今我们就不能如此确定了。


The consultation processes on rules and regulations were highly structured, and much effort was devoted to ensuring balanced representations from providers and users of financial services.	执行规章制度的咨询过程是高度结构化的，而其中大部分工作都集中如何确保金融服务的提供者和用户的利益都能平等地体现出来。


We funded research for a Consumer Panel in an effort to ensure “equality of arms.”	我们为此专门资助了一个消费者研究小组以确保双方“力量平等”。


Of course, regulatory staff had more informal links with the industry than with consumers.	当然相对于消费者来说，监管官员和金融界两者之间拥有更多地非正式联系。


But that is inevitable in any country.	这在任何国家都是无法避免的。


The industry’s voice was more often heard in Parliament as well.	金融界的声音也经常在议会中出现。


The most effective lobbyists were Independent Financial Advisers, who seemed to be especially active in the local Conservative Party associations.	其中最高效的游说者莫过于那些独立理财顾问，他们在本地保守党组织中尤其活跃。


Goldman Sachs could learn a lot from their tactics!	我想高盛公司大概能从他们的做法中学到一点东西。


I have no first-hand knowledge of the legislative process in the United States.	我这里并没有关于美国立法过程的第一手资料。


But, as an outsider, I am amazed at the apparent intensity of lobbying, and at the amounts of money that firms and their associations spend.	但作为一个外国人，该国游说团体那种明目张胆的程度，还有企业及其同业公会所花费的巨额资金都令我感到非常吃惊。


Is it effective?	那么这种游说有效吗？


The media seem to think so, though with relations between government and industry still only a notch below open warfare, it is difficult to be sure.	媒体大概是这样认为的，但鉴于政府和金融行业之间劲拔弩张的紧张关系，这很难确定。


An intriguing sidelight on the relationship between Congress and business is provided in a study by Ahmed Tahoun of the London School of Economics on “The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors.”	不过我这里有一个关于国会与商界之间关系的有趣注脚，来自于伦敦经济学院学者艾哈迈德·塔霍针对“美国国会议员所持股份在政治偏好市场中所扮演的角色”所做的研究。


Tahoun analyzed the relationship between stock owned by congressmen and contributions their political campaigns by the relevant firms, and found a powerful positive association.	塔霍分析了国会议员持有的股份以及相关公司对其政治活动所做贡献之间的联系，并得出了一个有说服力的正相关关系。


In particular, Tahoun’s research shows that US congressmen systematically invest more in firms that favor their own party, and that when they sell stock, firms stop contributing to their campaigns.	特别要指出的是，塔霍的研究显示美国国会议员们会更多地购买支持本党派的企业的股票，而一旦他们抛出这些股票，那些企业就不再向他们提供竞选资金了。


Moreover, firms with more stock ownership by politicians tend to win more and bigger government contracts.	此外，那些政界人士持股较多的公司也更容易赢得政府合同。


The data are not from financial firms alone, and Tahoun has not disaggregated them by sector.	研究数据并不局限于金融企业，事实上塔霍根本没有按行业来划分这些企业。


But the results are of interest nonetheless. They suggest a less-than-healthy relationship between lawmakers’ political and pecuniary interests.	但研究出来的结果依然精彩：它揭示了立法者的政治利益和金钱利益之间的某种不健康关系。


Regulators are typically not subject to those temptations.	监管者一般都不会沾染这些东西。


They are not normally allowed to own stock in financial firms (at least in the jurisdictions that I know).	通常他们都不允许拥有股票（至少在我所知道的几个国家是这样）。


But can they nonetheless be captured?	那么他们是否也一样会被俘虏呢？


I see two potential grounds for concern.	我发现两个值得注意的潜在重点。


The first is the revolving door between the industry and regulatory bodies.	第一个是金融界和监管机构之间的跳槽行为。


This is more prevalent in the US, where regulators’ salaries are very low, especially in the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.	这个问题在美国尤其严重，当地监管人员通常薪水极低，尤其是那些美国证券交易委员会和商品期货交易委员会的雇员。


Turnover among senior – and not so senior – people in these agencies is very high.	因此这些机构的高层（以及中低层）官员流动性极大。


The Fed folk are paid a little better, and stay rather longer.	而其他联邦政府部门的待遇就稍好一点，员工也干得更久一点。


The United Kingdom pays its regulators more, but there is still a lot of “in and out” activity, and more than there used to be.	相比之下英国监管部门的薪资水平更高，但依然不断有人从监管部门跳槽到金融机构，而且情况有愈演愈烈之势。


Singapore and Hong Kong have a different model.	新加坡和香港执行的是另一套模式。


Their regulators are given market-related compensation packages, and continuity of senior staff is more effectively maintained.	政府给于监管者与企业报酬相当的一笔补贴，也以此有效地保证了高级监管人员的工作持续性。


My view is that the Asian financial centers have it right.	在我看来这些亚洲金融中心的做法是有道理的。


The second concern is what one might call intellectual capture.	第二个问题可以称之为“思维俘虏”。


While I would strongly argue that the FSA in my day did not favor firms unduly, it is perhaps true that we – and in this we were exactly like US regulators – were inclined to believe that markets were generally efficient.	虽然我可以坚定地声称当年我治下的英国金融服务局并未偏袒过金融企业，但我们或许（在这方面跟美国极为相似）都倾向于相信市场一般都是有效的。


If willing buyers and willing sellers were trading claims happily, then, as long as they were “professional” investors, there was no legitimate reason to interfere in their markets.	如果买卖双方都是自愿，而且都是“专业”投资者，那么也没有理由去干涉他们的市场行为。


These people were “consenting adults in private,” and the state should avert its gaze.	这些行为都是“出于自愿的成年人私下进行的”，因此国家也不应该管那么多。


We now know that some of these market emperors had no clothes, and that their activities, far from benign, could result in severe financial instability and generate serious losses for taxpayers, not to mention precipitating a global recession.	如今我们明白某些市场霸主其实都像《皇帝的新衣》中那样一丝不挂，而他们的行为也极为危险，足以导致极大的金融动荡并给纳税人带来极大损失，更别说突如其来的全球性衰退了。


That has been a grave lesson for regulators and central banks.	这对各国监管者和中央银行来说都是一个深刻的教训。


So intellectual capture is a charge hard to refute.	因此思维俘虏是一个更难以反驳的指控。


But were regulators surrogate lobbyists for the financial industry?	但监管者能否替代游说者在金融行业中的位置？


I do not think so, and to argue as much devalues the efforts of many overworked and underpaid public servants around the world.	我可不这样认为，而继续争辩只能再度贬低全世界那些拿着低工资却超负荷工作的公务员们所付出的努力而已。


Japan’s Nationalist Turn	日本的民族主义转向


TOKYO – Japan has been in the news lately, owing to its dispute with China over six square kilometers of barren islets in the East China Sea that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu Islands.	东京——最近，日本因就日称尖阁列岛、中国称钓鱼岛的6平方公里的荒芜小岛与中国爆发争端而频频登上媒体头条。


The rival claims date back to the late nineteenth century, but the recent flare-up, which led to widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, started in September when Japan’s government purchased three of the tiny islets from their private Japanese owner.	双方的对立主张可以追溯到十九世纪末，但近来导致中国大规模反日游行的矛盾爆发却是始于9月日本政府从私人手中购买了三座小岛。


Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has said that he decided to purchase the islands for the Japanese central government to prevent Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara from purchasing them with municipal funds.	首相野田佳彦表示他决意代表日中央政府购岛的初衷是防止东京都知事石原慎太郎利用市属资金购岛。


Ishihara, who has since resigned from office to launch a new political party, is well known for nationalist provocation, and Noda feared that he would try to occupy the islands or find other ways to use them to provoke China and whip up popular support in Japan.	自此之后辞去公职筹划新政党的石原因惯于民族主义挑衅而广为人知，野田担心他会试图占据小岛，或找出其他方法刺激中国以掀起日本民众的支持。


Top Chinese officials, however, did not accept Noda’s explanation, and interpreted the purchase as proof that Japan is trying to disrupt the status quo.	而中国高官并不接受野田的解释，并认定购岛行为证明日本企图破坏现状。


In May 1972, when the United States returned the Okinawa Prefecture to Japan, the transfer included the Senkaku Islands, which the US had administered from Okinawa.	1972年5月美国将冲绳县归还日本治下，随之归还的也包括尖阁列岛。


A few months later, when China and Japan normalized their post-World War II relations, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the Senkakus, and was told that rather than let the dispute delay normalization, the issue should be left for future generations.	几个月后，中国和日本实现战后关系正常化，时任日本首相田中角荣询问中国总理周恩来对尖阁列岛的看法，得到的答复是与其让争议延缓双边关系正常化，不如将这个问题留待后人解决。


So both countries maintained their claims to sovereignty.	因此双方都坚持自己的主权要求。


Though Japan had administrative control, Chinese ships would occasionally enter Japanese waters to assert their legal position.	虽然由日本实际行政控制，但中国船只偶尔也会进入日本领海以宣誓自己的合法要求。


For China, this was the status quo that Japan upended in September.	这就是9月被日本打破的中国所谓的现状。


In Beijing recently, Chinese analysts told me that they believe that Japan is entering a period of right-wing militaristic nationalism, and that purchasing the islands was a deliberate effort to begin eroding the post-WWII settlement.	不久前北京的中国分析家告诉我他们认为日本正走向右翼军国民族主义，而购岛行为则是蓄意破坏二战后和解协议的企图。


While Chinese rhetoric is overheated, there is certainly a rightward shift in mood in Japan, though it would be difficult to describe it as militaristic.	尽管中国方面有言辞过激之嫌，但日本民族情绪的确有右移的倾向，只不过这种右移不大适合用军国主义来形容。


A large group of students at Waseda University recently were polled on their attitudes toward the military.	早稻田大学的很多学生不久前接受了调查，询问他们对发展军力的态度。


While a significant number expressed a desire for Japan to improve its ability to defend itself, an overwhelming majority rejected the idea of developing nuclear arms and supported continued reliance on the US-Japan Security Treaty.	尽管很多人表示希望日本改善自卫能力，但占压倒多数的受调查者否决了发展核武器的想法，而是支持继续依赖《美日安保条约》。


As one young professional told me, “we are interested in conservative nationalism, not militaristic nationalism.	一位年轻的专业人士告诉我，“我们感兴趣的是保守民族主义，不是军国民族主义。


No one wants to return to the 1930’s.”	没有人愿意重蹈1930年代的覆辙。 ”


And, of course, Japan’s Self Defense Forces are professional and under full civilian control.	当然，日本自卫队是专业人士，且处于日本民众的控制之下。


Japan faces parliamentary elections in the near future, by August 2013 at the latest, but perhaps as early as the start of the year.	日本最晚将于不久后的2013年8月举行议会选举，但最早也有可能提前到今年初。


According to public-opinion polls, the governing Democratic Party of Japan, which came to power in 2009, is likely to be replaced by the Liberal Democratic Party, whose president, Shinzo Abe, would become prime minister – a position he has already held.	民调结果显示自由民主党很可能取代2009年上台的执政民主党，自民党总裁安倍晋三则很可能再次出任首相。


Abe has a reputation as a nationalist, and recently visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a Tokyo war memorial that is controversial in China and Korea.	安倍是著名的民族主义者，刚刚参拜过在中韩两国引发争议的东京战争纪念馆靖国神社。


In addition, Toru Hashimoto, the young mayor of Osaka, Japan’s second-largest city, has built a new party and also developed a reputation as a nationalist.	此外，日本第二大城市大阪的年轻知事桥下彻已经成立了新的政党，桥下同样是知名的民族主义者。


Japanese politics, it seems, is showing signs of two decades of low economic growth, which has led to fiscal problems and a more inward-looking attitude among younger people.	日本政治似乎进入了二十年的低速增长期，由此引发了财政问题并促成了年轻人的内向态度。


Undergraduate enrollment of Japanese students in US universities has fallen by more than 50% since 2000.	日本学生在美国大学的本科入学率自2000年来出现了逾50%的降幅。


Thirty years ago, Harvard professor Ezra Vogel published Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America, a book that celebrated Japan’s manufacturing-fueled rise to become the world’s second-largest economy.	30年前，哈佛大学教授傅高义（Ezra Vogel）出版了《日本后来居上：美国应当吸取的教训》一书，这本书纪念日本在制造业的推动下崛起，并最终发展为世界第二大经济体的过程。


Recently, Vogel has described Japan’s political system as “an absolute mess,” with prime ministers replaced almost every year and the youngest generation’s expectations sapped by years of deflation.	傅高义不久前用“完完全全一团糟”来形容日本的政治制度，首相几乎年年更换，持续多年的通缩击垮了年轻一代的希望。


Yoichi Funabashi, former Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, also is worried: “There’s a sense in Japan that we are unprepared to be a tough, competitive player in this global world.”	《朝日新闻》前主编船桥洋一同样忧心忡忡：“日本人感到我们还没有做好准备在全球化世界中成为坚强、有实力的竞争者。 ”


Despite these problems, Japan still has remarkable strengths.	尽管存在种种问题，日本仍具有显著的优势。


Although China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy two years ago, Japan is a comfortable society with a much higher per capita income.	虽然两年前中国就已超越日本成为世界第二大经济体，但日本却是人均收入更高的小康社会。


It has impressive universities and a high education level, well- managed global companies, and a strong work ethic.	日本社会教育程度高、大学令人印象深刻、全球性企业管理完善、员工具有良好的职业道德。


It is a society that has reinvented itself twice in less than 200 years – in the nineteenth-century Meiji Restoration and after defeat in 1945.	19世纪明治维新期间和1945年战败后，日本社会在不到200年的时间里实现了两次彻底的变革。


Some analysts hoped that last year’s earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe would spark a third effort at national reinvention, but that has not yet occurred.	有分析家希望去年爆发的地震、海啸及核灾难能够点燃第三次重塑国家的热情，但这样的预言迄今为止尚未实现。


Many younger Japanese have told me that they are “fed up” with stagnation and drift.	不少日本年轻人告诉我他们已经“受够了”停滞和漂泊。


When asked about the rightward trend in politics, some young Diet (parliament) members said they hoped that it might produce a realignment among political parties that would lead to a more stable and effective national government.	当被问及政治上的右倾趋势时，有些年轻的国会（议会）议员表示希望右倾趋势有助于实现党派调整，建立更加稳定有效的国家政府。


If a moderate nationalism is harnessed to the yoke of political reform, the results could be good for Japan – and for the rest of the world.	如果能够利用温和的民族主义来推进政治改革，可能会为日本——和世界其他国家带来好的结果。


But if Japan’s deepening nationalist mood leads to symbolic and populist positions that win votes at home but antagonize its neighbors, both Japan and the world will be worse off.	但如果日本民族主义不断发展所带来的是在国内赢得选票却在邻国丧尽人心的象征主义及民粹主义立场，那么日本和全世界的局势都将因此而恶化。


What happens in Japanese politics over the coming months will ripple far beyond the country’s shores.	日本政坛未来几个月内所发生变化的波及范围将远远超出日本国内的范畴。


Is Russia’s National Character Authoritarian?	专制是俄罗斯的民族性吗？


NEW HAVEN – Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the Russian public’s acquiescence in direct government control of news media have many people wondering if Russians are predisposed to authoritarianism.	发自纽黑文——俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略和俄罗斯公众对政府直接控制新闻媒体的默许令许多人不禁怀疑俄罗斯人是否本性就倾向于专制。


It seems like a sensible question.	这个问题似乎也是合情合理的。


But I have learned from experience that we have to be very careful about drawing conclusions about national character from isolated events.	但是我的经验告诉我：如果想利用任何孤立的事件来得出概括某些民族性的话，可得非常小心。


In 1989, I was invited to an economic conference in Moscow, then in the Soviet Union, sponsored jointly by the Soviet think tank IMEMO (now called the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations) and the United States’ National Bureau of Economic Research.	1989年，我应邀赴莫斯科参加经济会议，当时苏联还未垮台，主办方则是苏联的IMEMO（现为普里马科夫世界经济和国际关系的学会）和美国国家经济研究局这两大智库机构。


Such joint conferences were part of a historic breakthrough, resulting from a thaw in US-Soviet relations.	这种联合会议是一个因美苏关系解冻而产生的历史性突破的一个环节。


The Soviet economists seemed enthusiastic about a transition to a market economy, and I was struck by how openly they spoke to us during coffee breaks or at dinner.	苏联经济学家们似乎热衷探讨如何向市场经济过渡，而我则每每被他们在咖啡茶歇或吃饭时的大胆言论所震惊。


But, significantly, the Soviets expressed serious doubts at the conference that their public could ever allow free markets to function.	但令人印象深刻的是，苏方在会上强烈质疑本国公众是否会允许自由市场进行运作。


Individual market actions, they said, would strike the public as wrong, unfair, and intolerable.	他们指出单一的市场行为将对公众造成冲击，并为视为错误，不公且无法容忍的。


I met one of the younger IMEMO economists, Maxim Boycko, and was impressed by his sincerity and intellect. (He later became Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Property under President Boris Yeltsin, left the Russian government before Vladimir Putin came to power, and recently came to the US, where he is lecturer in economics at Harvard and Brown.)	我认识了IMEMO的其中一位年轻经济学家，马克西姆·博科（Maxim Boycko），并对他的真诚和睿智留下了深刻印象（他后来成为了叶利钦总统的副总理和国有资产部部长，在普京上台前离开了政府，最近来到了美国，在哈佛和布朗大学任经济学讲师）。


We had a lively conversation.	我们进行了一场热烈的交谈。


I told him that many Americans also think capitalist practices are unfair.	我告诉他说许多美国人也认为资本主义的做法是不公平的。


Were attitudes in the two countries really different?	那么这两个国家的人民对此的态度是否真的有什么不同？


It appears no one had ever conducted a survey about such attitudes.	似乎从来没人针对这些态度做过调查。


In 1989, however, it was possible to do just that.	但在1989年却有可能做到这一点。


We decided on the spot to carry out a careful questionnaire survey comparing attitudes toward free markets.	我们当场决定开展一场对比两国对自由市场态度的严肃问卷调查。


After laboring over subtleties of translation and possible extraneous associations that might bias respondents’ answers, we arrived at a set of virtually identical questionnaires in both Russian and English.	在仔细研究了两种语言之间的微妙翻译差异并排除了可能导致受访者答案产生偏差的不相干关联后，我们拿出了两份几乎相同的俄语和英语问卷。


We administered the survey (with the help of Ukrainian survey expert Vladimir Korobov) in New York and Moscow in 1990 and published our results in the American Economic Review in 1991 and in the IMEMO journal MEIMO in 1992.	我们（在乌克兰调查专家弗拉基米尔·科罗波夫（Vladimir Korobov）的帮助下）在1990年于纽约和莫斯科进行了调查，并于1991年和1992年先后在《美国经济评论》和IMEMO的研究刊物《MEIMO》上发表了调查成果。


The differences we found in attitudes toward free markets were often small, and it was hard to make sense of them in terms of authoritarianism and democracy.	我们发现两国对自由市场的态度差异往往很小，也很难以专制或者民主这样的概念来区分。


For example, we asked, “On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up.	例如我们问，“在过节的时候对鲜花的需求量会变大，其价格也会通常上涨。


Is it fair for flower sellers to raise their prices like this?”	那么花店提高鲜花价格是公平的吗？


Just as the IMEMO economists predicted, most (66%) of those who answered this question in Moscow thought it was unfair.	”正如IMEMO经济学家预测的那样，大多数莫斯科人（66％）认为这是不公平的。


But there was a surprise: New York yielded virtually identical results (68% thought it was unfair).	但令人意外之处在于纽约的调查也取得了几乎相同的结果（68％的人认为这是不公平的）。


So we decided last year to find out whether the same similarity between Moscow and New York persists today, or whether, given the revival of authoritarianism in Russia today, attitudes toward markets there had become more negative.	因此，我们决定在去年再次研究莫斯科和纽约之间的相似之处在今天是否依然存在，因为随着权威主义在俄罗斯的复兴，外界对俄罗斯市场的态度已变得更加负面。


We administered the identical questionnaire in the two cities in 2015. We presented the results at the American Economic Association’s annual meeting this January.	我们去年又在上述两个城市进行了相同的问卷调查，并在今年一月召开的美国经济学会年会上发表了研究成果。


In the flower question, we found very little change in attitude in Moscow (67% said raising prices on holidays was unfair).	在鲜花问题上，我们发现在莫斯科的态度变化非常小（67％的人表示节假日提价是不公平的）。


In New York, by contrast, public opinion had become somewhat more pro-market (55% said raising prices was unfair).	而相比之下纽约的公众舆论已经变得较为亲市场（55％的人表示提价是不公平的）。


For our 2015 survey, Boycko and I decided to examine attitudes toward democracy itself.	对于我们2015年的调查，博科和我决定研究民众对民主本身的态度。


Fortunately, we were able to find a study conducted in 1990 by the political scientists James Gibson, Raymond Duch, and Kent Tedin (GDT), which asked questions in Moscow that, like ours, got past slogans to assess basic values.	幸运的是，我们能够找到政治学家詹姆斯·吉布森（James Gibson），雷蒙德·杜赫（Raymond Duch）和肯特·泰廷（Kent Tedin）在1990年进行的一项研究，该研究在莫斯科询问的问题跟我们的类似，摒弃政治口号以评估基本价值观。


Though they did not do a comparison with New York, we thought to add it in 2015.	虽然他们并未与纽约民众做比较，但我们在思考后将其成果纳入到了2015年的报告中。


Surprisingly, most of the results concerning democratic values do not support the idea that Russians prefer strong authoritarian government.	出人意料的是，大多数关于民主价值观的调查结果并不支持俄罗斯人喜欢强势独裁政府的想法。


For example, GDT asked in 1990 if respondents agreed with the statement “The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the government.”	例如，上述三位政治学家在1990年询问受访者是否同意“媒体应受法律保护免遭政府迫害”的说法，当时只有2％的人表示不同意；


Only 2% disagreed in 1990; in 2015, Russians were substantially more likely to disagree (20% did), suggesting a decline in democratic values.	到了2015年，表示不同意的俄罗斯人显著增加（占20％），显示民主价值观的下滑。


But the real surprise is our 2015 results in New York for the same question: 27% disagreed.	但真正令人惊讶的是我们于2015年在纽约问了同一个问题的结果：27％不同意。


New Yorkers appear less supportive of a free press than Muscovites today!	现今的纽约人似乎比莫斯科人更不支持媒体自由！


The biggest difference of all between Moscow and New York came from the GDT statement “It is better to live in a society with strict order than to allow people so much freedom that they can bring destruction to the society.”	莫斯科和纽约人之间的最大区别来自于三位政治学家的这条问题：“与其允许人们享有过多自由并因此为社会带来毁灭，不如生活在一个拥有严格秩序的社会。


In 1990, 67% of the Muscovites agreed, and 76% agreed in 2015, while in New York in 2015 only 36% agreed.	”1990年时表示同意的莫斯科人有67％，2015年则有76％，而在2015年的调查中只有36％的纽约人表示赞同。


Maybe this is important, but it is an outlier – the most extreme difference between Moscow and New York in our entire survey.	这也许是很重要的，但它是一个异常值——在我们的整个调查中莫斯科和纽约之间最极端的差异。


Overall, while there are differences, the results do not lend strong support to the idea that recent events have a simple explanation in terms of differences in deep attitudes toward free markets or authoritarianism.	总体而言，虽然存在差异，但这些研究结果并不能有力支持那种用对自由市场或威权的深层次态度差异来简单解释最近事件的观点。


It’s wrong to write Russia off as fundamentally different from the West.	宣称俄罗斯与西方之间存在根本性差异进而将其排除在外是错误的。


In 1991, we concluded that the Russian national character was not an obstacle to creating a market economy in Russia – and were proven right.	在1991年，我们的结论是，俄罗斯的民族性并不是在俄罗斯建立市场经济的障碍——并被证明是正确的。


We hope we are right again, and that national character will not prevent Russia from becoming a truly democratic society someday.	我们希望我们这次也是对的——民族性不会阻碍俄罗斯终有一天成为一个真正的民主社会。


Is Russia’s Economic Crisis Over?	俄罗斯的经济危机结束了吗？


MOSCOW – Has Russia’s economic crisis ended?	发自莫斯科 —— 俄罗斯的经济危机结束了吗？


That depends on who you ask.	答案取决于你向谁提出这个问题。


Ask Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, or any official of his United Russia party, and you will be told, “Of course it is over.”	如果你问的是俄罗斯总理 弗拉基米尔·普京，或任何一位其统一俄罗斯党官员的话，他们会告诉你：“当然结束了。


They will even produce proof in the form of an unemployment rate that does not rise, unprecedented increases in pensions, and strong growth in construction and metal-working.	”他们甚至可以提出编造出来的证据，如失业率没有上升，养老金空前的增加，以及建筑和金属加工行业的强劲增长。


Of course, all these comparisons are made with how things stood last month rather than with the country’s pre-crisis economic performance.	但当然，所有这些成绩都是与上个月的情况相比，而不是与该国危机前的经济相比较而言的。


Then there is another “miracle” that the government is starting to trumpet, one discovered in August 2009: an increase in Russia’s population.	如此的话，还有另外一个“奇迹”政府准备大肆吹嘘的，这是在 2009 年 8 月发现的奇迹：俄罗斯人口的增长。


Unfortunately, in no month before or since have births outpaced deaths.	不幸的是，在此之前或之后都没有哪个月出现过出生率超过死亡率的情况。


Ask a member of the opposition whether the crisis has ended, and you will be told that it is only just beginning.	当你问到反对党的人士危机是否已经结束了，他们却会告诉你危机现在才开始。


Gazprom’s production is falling at a dizzying pace; the country’s single-industry “mono-towns” are dying.	俄罗斯天然气工业公司的产量正以令人震惊的速度下滑； 在国内，那些只依靠一种产业存活的“单一城镇”正在衰亡。


There is truth in both views about the state of Russia’s economy, but because the government controls all the major television channels, it is succeeding in enforcing its view of the situation.	事实上，这两种说法都包含了对俄罗斯经济的真实描述，只是因为控制了所有主要的电视频道，政府才成功地把自己的观点强加推广了而已。


Indeed, the opposition has access only to a few newspapers and radio stations, leaving the Internet the sole remaining space of freedom in Russia.	反对派只能接触到的只有少量的报纸和电台，从而使得互联网成为了俄罗斯自由的最后乐土。


But there you can read very pessimistic estimates of the country’s economic future.	然而，在互联网上，你能读到的却是关于俄罗斯未来经济情况十分悲观的估计。


So the Kremlin blinds its citizens with rosy scenarios, while the Internet over-dramatizes reality.	由此看来，克里姆林宫极力用美好的情景来蒙蔽广大的俄罗斯民众，而互联网则把现实过度夸大了。


The truth, it is clear, is somewhere in the middle.	很明显，事实在这两者之间。


What is beyond dispute is that Russia’s economic health depends on external factors.	而始终没有被提到的一点是俄罗斯的经济健康也取决于外部因素。


But, outside Russia, no responsible economists can even begin to say whether the crisis is truly over.	而在俄罗斯之外，还没有哪一位经济学家敢下结论说经济危机真的结束了。


They know that relatively calm markets do not mean that strong economic growth is around the corner.	因为他们深知市场的相对平静并不意味着经济的强劲增长即将到来。


Russia ’s economy is now hostage to potential global growth.	现在，俄罗斯的经济已经被全球经济增长绑架了。


It is clear why: the state budget depends almost totally on energy prices.	原因很明显：该国的预算几乎完全依赖于其能源价格。


Now that oil price has reached $80 per barrel, Russia’s central bank can start buying foreign currency again.	鉴于当前油价已经升到 80 美元每桶，俄罗斯的中央银行又可以再次开始买入外币。


Gold and foreign currency reserves are increasing, implying appreciation of the ruble.	黄金和外汇正在增加，暗示着卢布要升值了。


But Russia’s budget for 2010 is still headed for a serious deficit, owing to high spending.	但是由于其高额的支出，俄罗斯 2010 年的预算仍然会出现巨大的赤字。


The rapid income growth of the early Putin years is a thing of the past.	在早年普京当政时的那种收入快速增长已是明日黄花了。


While it persisted, expenditures swelled but were manageable – until, suddenly, energy prices collapsed.	尽管当时支出持续膨胀，但还在控制范围内 —— 直到能源价格突然崩塌。


The Kremlin, devoted to its key fetish –Putin’s approval ratings – proved completely unprepared to curtail public spending in the wake of falling state revenues.	而把普京的支持率奉若神明的克里姆林宫则完全没有在国家收入下降的情况下为削减支出做好准备。


The budget deficit, unsurprisingly, ballooned.	因此毫不奇怪，预算赤字极速膨胀了。


The late Yegor Gaidar, Russia’s first pro-reform prime minister, warned the government about the consequences of inflated oil prices, repeatedly arguing that excessive spending growth would undermine the political will for retrenchment when it became necessary.	俄罗斯改革后上任的首位总理盖达尔就虚高的油价所带来的后果曾向政府提出过警告，他反复强调支出的过度增长会在必要的时候削弱政府削减支出的意志。


Gaidar died last year, his unheeded warnings having come true, proving once again that no man is ever a successful prophet in his own country.	盖达尔在去年离世，而他那未被关注的警告却正在成为事实，这再度证实了在他的国家内永远没有人能成为一个成功的预言家。


In recent months, Russia’s government finally brought inflation down to 8%.	在最近几个月里，俄罗斯政府最终成功地把通胀降到了 8 ％。


Sometimes this is presented as another milestone demonstrating that the crisis is near its end.	有时这一成绩会与其他具有里程碑意义的成绩一起用来证明危机正在结束。


But that is wrong.	但这是错的。


Inflation fell as a result of the crisis, which reversed the direction of capital flows.	通胀下降是经济危机的结果，经济危机使得资本流动的方向倒转了过来。


Whereas inward investment reached $20 billion in 2008, capital outflows totaled $20 billion in 2009.	在 2008 年，国内投资额达到 200 亿美元，而在 2009 年，资本外逃总量也达到了 200 亿美元。


The central bank buys less foreign currency, and thus issues fewer rubles, reducing inflation.	中央银行减少了外币的购买数量，也因此减少了卢布的发行，从而降低了通胀。


A far more inertial indicator is unemployment, which experts predict will grow in 2010.	一个更具有惯性的指标则是失业率，专家估计失业率会在 2010 年上涨。


The problem is that Russian labor is less mobile than in the Europe and the United States.	但问题是俄罗斯的劳动力相比欧洲和美国的更少流动。


Russians prefer lower wages – or simply waiting with no wages at all – to moving in search of a new job.	俄罗斯人宁愿要更低的工资 —— 或完全没有工资，坐在那里等 —— 也不愿意出去找一份新的工作。


The situation at carmaker AUTOVaz is a striking example.	在俄罗斯伏尔加汽车厂内的情况就是十分典型的一例。


Last year, output fell to 300,000 cars, from 800,000 in 2008.	去年，该厂的汽车产量从 2008 年的 80 万辆下降到了 30 万辆。


Such a dramatic fall in sales would normally require massive layoffs or lower wages.	销售如此巨大的下降一般都意味着要大量裁员或减薪。


Yet, of the company’s 102,000 employees, only 27 favored layoffs.	然而，在该公司的 102 ， 000 名员工中，只有 27 ％的人愿意下岗。


As a result, wages were cut by half.	结果，该厂的工资减少了一半。


The state, which is seeking to rescue the domestic automobile industry, allocated to the firm more credits through state-owned banks.	国家努力拯救国内的汽车行业，通过国有商业银行为该厂注入了更多的信贷资金。


But how long can such a situation last?	但是这种情况可以维持多久呢？


One day, it will no longer be possible to disguise unemployment through shorter working weeks, forced leaves of absence, and decreases in wages.	总有一天，他们将再不能用缩短工作时间，强制放假以及降薪的手段来掩饰失业率。


When that happens – and there is a strong probability that it will happen next year – the crisis will only just be beginning for Russia.	当那一天到来的时候 —— 且这一天很有可能在明年就会到来 —— 俄罗斯的危机才正式开始。


All over the world – in the US, Europe, and China – stimulus programs have paid off, as expected.	全球 —— 包括美国，欧洲和中国在内 —— 的刺激计划正如预期一样凑效了。


But it is not yet certain whether the engine of the global economy will be able to run without additional liquidity, possibly undermining fiscal stability worldwide.	但我们还无法肯定全球经济是否能够在没有额外流动性补充（可能因此削弱了全球的财政稳定性）的情况下再次启动。


Elsewhere, that will become clear in the first half of 2010; in Russia, signs of recovery, if they appear at all, will lag well behind the rest of the world.	在世界其他地方，情况将在 2010 的上半年变得明朗； 在俄罗斯，复苏的迹象，如果出现的话，也将比世界其他国家要延后许多。


Is Sadness a Disease?	悲伤是疾病吗？


NEW YORK – Sadness is one of the small number of human emotions that have been recognized in all societies and in all time periods.	纽约 —— 悲伤是为所有社会及时代认可的少数几种人类情绪之一。


Some of the earliest known epics, such as The Iliad and Gilgamesh , feature protagonists’ intense sadness after the loss of close comrades.	某些最早期的史诗著作，比方说《伊利亚特》和《 吉尔伽美》，都描述了主人公在失去亲密同志后所产生的悲伤情绪。


Likewise, anthropological work across a great range of societies clearly describes emotions of sadness that develop in response to frustration in love, humiliation by rivals, or the inability to achieve valued cultural goals.	同样，来自众多社会形态的人类著作也明确描绘了因爱情受挫、被对手羞辱或未能实现有价值的文化目标所引发的悲伤情绪。


Even primates display physiological and behavioral signs after losses that are unmistakably similar to sadness among humans.	就连灵长类动物在遭受损失后也明显会产生出与人类悲伤类似的行为和心理。


There is little doubt that evolution designed people to have a propensity to become sad after such situations.	有一点几乎没有疑问，那就是生物进化促使人类更有可能在上述情况下产生悲伤情绪。


Depressive mental disorders also have been known for as long as written records have been kept.	自从有文字记载以来，就有了对抑郁心理疾病的描述。


Writing in the fifth century b.c., Hippocrates provided the first known definition of melancholia (what we now call “depression”) as a distinct disorder: “If fear or sadness last for a long time it is melancholia.”	希波克拉底在公元前五世纪提出了有史以来第一个精神忧郁症（也就是我们现在所说的“抑郁”）的概念，希波克拉底认为这是一种独特的疾病：“如果恐惧和悲伤情绪持续时间很长，就构成了忧郁症。


The symptoms that Hippocrates associated with melancholic disorder – “aversion to food, despondency, sleeplessness, irritability, restlessness” – are remarkably similar to those contained in modern definitions of depressive disorder.	”希波克拉底与忧郁症联系在一起的症状包括 —— “不思饮食、意志消沉、失眠、易怒、烦躁” —— 无不与现代抑郁症的定义有着惊人的相似。


Like Hippocrates, physicians throughout history have recognized that the symptoms of normal sadness and depressive disorder were similar.	与希波克拉底一样，历史上有许多医生都认为正常悲伤和抑郁症的症状十分相似。


Depressive disorders differed from normal reactions because they either arose in the absence of situations that would normally produce sadness or were of disproportionate magnitude or duration relative to whatever cause provoked them.	抑郁症之所以不同于正常反应，是因为患者或者在发病时并没有正常状况下会导致悲伤的诱因，或者与导致悲伤的诱因相比，悲伤情绪的深度和持续时间不成比例。


Such conditions indicated that something was wrong with the individual, not with his environment.	这种状况表明是个人、而不是环境出现了问题。


Traditional psychiatry thus adopted a contextual approach to diagnosing a depressive disorder.	传统的精神病学因此采用 因果关系法 来诊断抑郁症。


Whether a condition was diagnosed as disordered depended not just on the symptoms, which might be similar in normal sadness, and not just on the condition’s severity, for normal sadness can be severe and disordered sadness moderate, but on the degree to which the symptoms were an understandable response to circumstances.	某个病例是否被确诊为抑郁症不仅取决于它的具体症状（这可能与正常的悲伤情绪很难区分），也不仅取决于症状的严重程度（正常的悲伤情绪可能非常严重，而病态的悲伤情绪也可能相对轻微），而恰恰取决于症状是否是对环境做出的正常反应。


The distinction between contextually appropriate sadness and depressive disorders remained largely unchanged for two and a half millennia.	环境引发的正常悲伤和抑郁症之间的界限在约 2500 年时间里一直没有发生大的变化。


But the psychiatric profession abandoned this distinction in 1980, when it published the third edition of its official diagnostic manual, the DSM-III.	但精神治疗领域在 1980 年放弃了这种界限，发表了 DSM-III ，即第三版官方诊断手册。


The definition of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) became purely symptom-based.	新版诊断手册对抑郁症的定义单纯与症状相关。


All conditions that display five or more of nine symptoms – including low mood, lack of pleasure, sleep and appetite difficulties, inability to concentrate, and fatigue – over a two-week period are now considered depressive disorders.	所有表现出 9 种症状中 5 种或 5 种以上的状况 —— 包括情绪低沉、缺乏乐趣、睡眠和进食困难、难以集中注意力和感觉疲劳 —— 只要持续超过两周以上就都被认定为抑郁症。


The sole exception is "uncomplicated" grief-related depression.	唯一一个例外是“单纯性”悲痛抑郁症。


Symptoms otherwise meeting the DSM criteria are not considered disorders if they arise after the death of an intimate, do not last more than two months, and do not include certain particularly severe symptoms.	符合第三版诊断手册标准的症状如果出现在亲人去世之后、持续时间为两个月以下且不包含某些特别严重的症状则不被诊断为抑郁症。


Yet, comparable symptoms that arise after, say, dissolution of a romantic relationship, loss of a job, or diagnosis of a life-threatening illness are not excluded from diagnosis of disorders.	但是，恋爱关系解体、失业或被诊断出致命疾病等却并没有被排除出抑郁症的诊断标准。


The DSM-III’s confusion of normal intense sadness and depressive mental disorder, which persists to the present, emerged inadvertently from psychiatry’s response to challenges to the profession during the 1970’s.	第三版诊断手册混淆正常的剧烈悲痛和延续至今的抑郁症精神疾病，这种情况是在精神医生应对 20 世纪 70 年代出现的职业挑战时无意中造成的。


A powerful group of research psychiatrists was dissatisfied with the definitions of depression and other common mental disorders in the earlier, psychoanalytically-influenced diagnostic manuals.	一群颇有实力的精神病研究专家不满于此前受心理分析影响的诊断手册对抑郁症和其他常见精神疾病的定义。


These earlier definitions separated feelings of sadness proportionate to contextual loss from those excessive to their contexts, and defined only the latter as disordered.	上述早期定义将合乎所受损失的悲痛感与过度悲痛区别开来，而只把后者定义为精神疾病。


But they also assumed that unconscious, unresolved psychological conflicts caused depression.	但早期定义也提出假设，认为无意识、无法消除的心理冲突会导致抑郁症。


In order to abolish this unwarranted psychoanalytic assumption, the researchers abandoned the attempt to distinguish natural from disordered conditions by context or etiology and assumed that all conditions that met the symptom-based criteria were disordered.	为取消这种没有根据的心理分析假设，研究人员放弃了按因果关系或病源学理论区分自然反应和病理现象的尝试，并假定符合症状标准的所有病例均属于心理疾病。


The new definition of depression has resulted in extensive medicalization of sadness.	抑郁症的新定义导致广泛采用医疗方法来处理悲伤情绪。


Parents whose child is seriously ill, spouses who discover their partners’ extramarital affairs, or workers unexpectedly fired from valued jobs are defined as suffering mental disorders if they develop enough symptoms to meet the DSM criteria.	孩子病情严重的父母、发现对方外遇的夫妻、或意外遭到解雇的工人如果出现符合诊断手册标准的足够症状，均被诊断为患有精神���病。


This is so even if the symptoms disappear as soon as the child recovers, the spouses reconcile, or a new job is found.	即便孩子病好、夫妇破镜重圆或找到新工作后症状消失，精神疾病的诊断也无法改变。


The medicalization of sadness has proven to be of tremendous benefit to the mental health and medical professions.	事实证明，对悲伤情绪的广泛治疗为精神和医疗行业带来巨大的利益。


Millions of people now seek professional help for conditions that fall under the medicalized, overly inclusive definition of depression.	数百万人现在因为符合需要适用医疗手段的、过度宽泛的抑郁症定义而寻求专业协助。


Indeed, depression is now the most commonly diagnosed condition in outpatient psychiatric treatment.	事实上，抑郁症是目前经心理门诊确诊的最为常见的心理疾病。


The medicalization of depression has proven to be even more profitable for pharmaceutical companies, whose sales of anti-depressant medications have soared.	事实证明，对抑郁症的广泛治疗能为制药企业带来更多利润，这些企业生产的抗抑郁药物销量大增。


While it is impossible to know what proportion of these people are experiencing normal sadness that would go away with the passage of time or a change in social context, it is almost certainly very high.	虽然无法确定服药者中有多大比例只是出现了正常的悲伤，将会随着时间的流逝或社会环境的改变而自行消失，但有一点几乎可以肯定，那就是上述状况占有很高的比例。


It would not be hard for psychiatry to develop a more adequate definition of depressive disorder that de-medicalizes natural emotions of sadness.	由精神治疗领域确定抑郁症的充分定义，避免为自然的悲伤情绪提供治疗并非难事。


The diagnostic criteria could simply extend the current bereavement exclusion to cover conditions that develop after other losses and that are not especially severe or enduring.	只需将诊断标准从目前的丧亲之痛扩展到因遭受其他损失而出现的悲伤状况，只要上述状况并非特别严重或长时间难以痊愈。


Such a change would acknowledge what humans have always recognized: intense sadness after loss is a painful and perhaps inevitable aspect of the human condition, but it is not necessarily a mental disorder.	这样的变化不过认可了人类一直以来就承认的事实：在遭受打击后出现剧烈的悲伤情绪虽然痛苦，但却是人类不可避免会出现的状况，而不一定是一种精神疾病。


Is South Korea Turning Japanese?	韩国正在成为日本吗？


SEOUL – South Korea’s recent economic performance has been disappointing.	首尔- 最近，韩国的经济表现令人失望。 在经历了40年年均高达7.


After 40 years of astonishing 7.9% annual GDP growth, the average growth rate dropped to 4.1% in 2000-2010, and has stood at a mere 3% since 2011.	9%的GDP增长后，2000—2010年平均增长率下降到4. 1%，自2011年以来更是只有3%。


This has many wondering whether South Korea is headed for the kind of protracted deflation and stagnation that characterized Japan’s so-called “lost decades,” from which it is just beginning to emerge.	这让很多人质疑韩国是否正在迈向日本所谓的“失去的几十年”——长期通缩和停滞。 这一苗头刚刚开始浮现。


The similarities between South Korea today and Japan 20 years ago are undeniable.	今天的韩国和20年前的日本具有不容否认的相似性。


And, in fact, on economic matters, South Korea has, for better or worse, often followed Japan’s example.	事实上，从经济角度看，不论好坏，韩国常常在日本身后亦步亦趋。


In this case, Japan’s example can save South Korea – if, that is, South Korea’s leaders take it as a lesson in what not to do.	在这方面，日本的经验可以拯救韩国——如果韩国领导人将日本经验视为应该规避的教训的话。


Japan’s woes are rooted in real-estate and equity bubbles, which were fueled by monetary expansion aimed at stimulating domestic demand after the 1985 Plaza Accord drove up the yen’s value and hurt Japan’s exports.	日本的乱象根源在于房地产和股票泡沫。 1985年的广场协议导致日元升值、损害了日本的出口，因此日本采取了货币扩张刺激内需，结果助长了这些泡沫。


In the early 1990s, the bubbles burst, leaving the private sector with a huge debt overhang.	20世纪90年代初，泡沫破裂，给私人部门留下了巨大的积压债务。


Add to that sluggish productivity growth, weak demand, and rapid population aging, and Japan’s situation was dire.	除此之外，日本生产率增长停滞不前、需求疲软、人口快速老龄化，呈现出一片衰败迹象。


At first, Japan’s authorities turned again to fiscal and monetary expansion.	一开始，日本当局再次转向财政和货币扩张。


But fiscal policies often targeted unproductive projects, such as rural infrastructure construction, and weaknesses in the banking system dampened the effectiveness of monetary stimulus.	但财政政策常常以非生产性项目为目标，如农村基础设施建设，而银行体系的疲软妨碍了货币刺激的效果。


As a result, the economy grew by just 1.1%, on average, in the 1990s, far below the 4.5% of the 1980s.	结果，20世纪90年代平均经济增长率只有1. 1%，远低于80年代的4.


In the early 2000s, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s government took aggressive action to tackle underlying problems in the financial and corporate sectors.	21世纪初，日本首相小泉纯一郎政府采取了激进措施解决金融和公司部门的根本问题。


Despite these efforts – not to mention the boost provided by rapid GDP growth in China, Japan’s economy expanded by just 0.75% annually, on average, for the entire decade.	尽管如此——更不用说中国GDP高速增长带来的刺激作用——2001—2010年日本经济年均扩张幅度仍然只有0. 75%。


Things have been looking up since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in 2012 and launched his three-pronged recovery strategy, dubbed “Abenomics,” which entailed bold monetary easing, fiscal expansion, and structural reforms.	2012年安倍晋三出任首相并启动其被称为“安倍经济学”的三管齐下复苏战略以来，情况似乎有所好转。 安倍经济学包括积极的货币宽松、财政扩张和结构改革。


Stock prices have climbed more than 80%.	股价上涨了80%多。


The yen’s depreciation – from ¥78 to ¥123 against the US dollar – has boosted exports of industrial products and, in turn, corporate profitability.	日元兑汇率从78贬值至123，刺激了工业产品出口，并反过来提振了公司利润。


Consequently, employment and wages have also increased.	于是，就业率和工资也开始升高。


Now, Abe is preparing to augment these efforts with initiatives to address major drags on Japan’s economy.	现在，安倍正准备扩大这些措施，解决日本经济的主要拖累因素。


So-called “Abenomics 2.0” entails efforts to raise the fertility rate (free preschool education, support for fertility treatments, and greater assistance for single-parent families) and to mitigate problems associated with population aging (boosting social security and providing more employment opportunities for retirees).	所谓的“安倍经济学2. 0”包括提高生育率（免费学前教育、支持受孕治疗、扩大单亲家庭支持）和减轻人口老化相关问题（提高社会保障、为退休者提供更多就业机会）方面的政策。


But Japan’s economy is by no means out of the woods.	但日本经济还远未走出困境。


On the contrary, GDP contracted by 0.1% last year, and is expected to grow by just 0.6% this year.	相反，去年GDP收缩0. 1%，预计今年GDP增长也只有0.


Moreover, despite continued purchases of ¥80 trillion per year in government bonds, the Bank of Japan has failed to achieve its 2% inflation target.	6%。 此外，尽管日本银行仍在以每年80万亿日元的规模购买政府债券，但仍未能实现2%的通胀目标。


And Japan’s public debt-to-GDP ratio, at 240% (and rising), remains the highest in the world.	日本债务-GDP之比高达240%（并且还在上升），仍是世界最高水平之一。


And Abenomics 2.0 may not succeed, not least because young people, unconvinced that they can support larger families, are increasingly delaying marriage and children.	安倍经济学2. 0没有成功，因为年轻人没有信心能够支持规模扩大的家庭，结婚生育越来越晚。


Against this background, many believe that preventing the current population of 127 million from falling below 100 million – Abe’s official goal – will require Japan to accept more immigrants.	在这一背景下，许多人认为要想阻止日本人口从当前的1. 27亿减少到1亿人以下——安倍的官方目标——日本就必须接受更多的移民。


That is no small matter in a country that places such a high value on homogeneity.	对于十分珍视同一性的日本来说，这绝不是一件小事。


Simply put, while Japan has some reason for hope, its position is not enviable.	简言之，日本有一些保持希望的理由，但其状况并不令人羡慕。


And, if South Korea is not careful, it could end up in much the same place.	而如果韩国稍有差池，就会陷入同样的状况。


Employing many of the same development strategies – including export-oriented policies and a conglomerate-dominated industrial system – South Korea has been catching up with Japan for four decades.	韩国采取了许多与日本一样的发展战略——包括出口导向型政策和大集团主导的工业体系——在四十年中一直在赶超日本。


Its per capita income (in terms of purchasing power parity), just one-fifth of Japan’s in 1970, amounts to almost 95% of Japan’s today.	其人均收入（用购买力平价衡量）在1970年时只有日本的五分之一，现在已达到日本的95%。


Over the same period, South Korea’s share of global exports jumped from 0.3% to 3% – very close to Japan’s 3.6%.	在此期间，韩国占全球出口之比从0. 3%上升到3%——十分接近于日本的3.


To be sure, significant differences between the two countries remain.	平心而论，两国之间仍存在巨大的不同。


South Korea still lags behind Japan in international influence and institutional quality.	韩国在国际影响力和制度质量方面仍落后日本。


South Korea ranks 26th on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, whereas Japan ranks sixth.	韩国在世界经济论坛全球竞争力指数上名列第26，而日本名列第六。


Based on the gap in GDP per worker with that of the US, South Korea is more than 20 years behind Japan.	用与美国之间的平均每工人GDP差距衡量，韩国落后日本20多年。


Nonetheless, the reality is that South Korea has been experiencing many of the same problems Japan did in the early 1990s, including high levels of household and corporate debt, labor- and financial-market inefficiencies, and low productivity in the service sector.	尽管如此，现实是韩国已经开始经历许多日本在20世纪90年代早期所经历的问题，包括高企的家庭和企业债务水平、劳动力和金融市场效率低下、服务业生产率低下等。


Given a fertility rate of just 1.2 births per woman – among the lowest in the world – South Korea’s labor force is set to shrink by a quarter by 2050, with people aged 65 and over accounting for 35% of the total population, up from 13% today.	韩国生育率为每位妇女生育1. 2胎——为世界最低之一——到2050年，其劳动力规模将缩小四分之一，65岁及以上人群将占总人口的35%，而今天只有13%。


This will put serious strain on public budgets.	这将给公共预算造成极大的压力。


If South Korea is to avoid Japan’s fate, it must take steps to reduce its household and corporate debt.	如果韩国想要避免重蹈日本的覆辙，就必须采取措施降低家庭和公司债务。


It also should continue to implement structural reforms aimed at strengthening its labor and financial markets, improving institutional quality, and boosting productivity in services and small and medium-size enterprises.	它还应该继续实施结构改革以强化劳动力和金融市场、改善制度质量、提振服务业和中小企业生产率。


Taking a cue from Abenomics 2.0, South Korea would do well to provide a better environment for child rearing, including flexible working environments, affordable and high-quality childcare and after-school programs, and paid maternal and paternal leave.	韩国可以汲取安倍经济学2. 0的经验，出色地提供更好的育儿环境，包括灵活的工作环境、价廉物美的儿童看护和困难班服务以及带薪育儿假（父母皆能享受）。


Financial support, such as low-interest loans for newlyweds, could also promote marriage and childbirth.	金融支持——如为新婚夫妇提供低息贷款——也能刺激结婚率和生育率。


Japan’s lost decades highlight the importance of treating economic ills with the right medicine, before they become chronic and difficult to cure.	日本失去的几十年突显出必须在经济症候长期化、变得难以治愈之前对症下药的重要性。


If South Korea takes this lesson, and implements the right policies and reforms, being like Japan won’t have to mean sharing its economic fate.	如果韩国汲取这一教训，并实施正确的政策和改革，那么和日本相似并不一定意味着必须重蹈日本的经济覆辙。


Is the Bank Crisis Over?	银行危机结束了吗？


MUNICH – As America’s various rescue plans take hold, stock markets are recovering somewhat.	慕尼黑——随着美国各项救市措施陆续出台，股票市场多少有些复苏。


The S&P 500 price/earnings ratio is gradually climbing back to its long-term average of 16.	标准普尔500市盈率正逐渐攀升到16倍的长期均值。


Bank shares in particular are rebounding, and some banks have even succeeded in repaying at least part of their government-provided capital.	尤其是银行的股价正在回升，一些银行已经成功偿还了一部分政府注入的资本。


But, as I point out in my new book Kasino-Kapitalismus , this may only be a temporary improvement in expectations rather than a sign of permanent recovery, as the size of the banks’ hidden losses on their balance sheets is probably enormous.	但是，就如同我在本人的新书《赌场-资本》中指出的，这些现象只是境况暂时好转，而并非全面复苏。 因为银行资产负债表上的隐形亏损可能很大。


According to the International Monetary Fund’s most recent estimates, the total write-offs on financial claims in this crisis will be $4.05 trillion for the United States, Japan, the euro zone and the United Kingdom, of which the US alone will have to absorb $2.7 trillion.	根据国际货币基金组织最近的估算，在美国、日本、欧元区和英国，债权的总销账金额将达到40. 05万亿美元，仅美元这一币种就将占到27万亿美元。


But according to my calculations of Bloomberg data, just $1.12 trillion had actually been written off worldwide by February, 2009.	据我对彭博数据的分析，截至2009年2月，全球范围内实际销账的仅为11. 2万亿美元。


This suggests that only a quarter of the necessary write-offs have been realized.	这意味着，在所有必需的销账中，目前只完成了四分之一。


For the US and Switzerland, this is particularly bad news, as in both countries the realized write-offs already amount to 53% and 54% of the aggregate balance sheets of their national banking systems, which corresponds to 4.4% or 15.0% of GDP, respectively.	对于美国和瑞士来说，情况尤其糟糕，因为在这两个国家，所实现的销账比例已经占据了国家银行系统的总资产负债表的53%和54%，分别占GDP的4. 4%或15.


The Netherlands, the UK, and Germany should also be concerned, as they come next in the ranking of countries whose banking systems have been hit hardest by the crisis.	荷兰、英国和德国也应该担心了，因为他们的排名紧随其后，他们银行系统遭受了巨大的打击。 这三个国家的销账比例分别占GDP的2%、4.


Their write-offs were 2.0%, 4.2% and 2.8% of GDP, respectively, which corresponds to 11%, 16% and 22% of the aggregate equity stock of their banking systems.	2%和2. 8%，对应着其银行系统总股值的11%、16%和22%。


These frightening numbers raise doubts about the stability of the West’s financial system, and they dwarf all measures, such as “bad banks” and government guarantees, that attempt to solve a mere liquidity crisis.	这些惊人的数字引发了人们对西方金融系统稳定性的普遍忧虑。 这几乎抵消了之前我们所作出的一切努力，例如包括建立“坏帐银行”和用政府的信用担保来解决信贷市场的问题等。


The banking system is not primarily suffering from a temporary breakdown of the inter-bank market and a transitory decline in asset values that could be overcome simply by waiting for recovery.	银行系统所遭受的还不仅仅是银行间市场的瘫痪和资产的暂时缩水，这不是单单靠时间就能够盼来的复苏。


Rather, the banking system is at the brink of insolvency, with a permanent loss in equity capital.	相反的，银行系统会彻底失去股权资本，正处在破产的边缘。


The prices of structured securities such as collateralized debt obligations have come down, because the institutional fraud of a multi-fold chain of securitizations has been detected.	目前，由于多方面的债券链出现系统性缺陷，诸如抵押债券等的结构性债券的价格已经下降。


Cash-back loans to NINJA (No Income, No Job, and No Assets) customers that included voluminous fees to brokers and were securitized and structured up to 60 times do not represent any value.	银行对那些三无（无收入无工作无资产）客户的贷款，包括那些经纪人的大量费用，已经被证券化放大了60倍，这部分钱看来是血本无归了。


And if the structuring process created 70% triple-A rated paper out of what on average were B-value loans, there must have been fundamental flaws in the rating process, which will not disappear simply because the economy or the stock market recover.	如果重组过程就是从B级的贷款中创造出70%的3A级的企业，那么这样的评级是毫无意义的，因为这些“窟窿”不会仅仅因为经济或是股市复苏就会自行消失。


Moreover, defaults on securitized credit card debt and commercial loans to companies that are driven to bankruptcy are still to come.	而且，证券化的信用卡债务以及给破产公司的商业贷款违约会在未来将进一步暴露出来。


They will continue to deprive the banking system of its equity capital, with little chance of it being recouped in the near future.	这些将进一步削减银行系统的股权资本，看来，银行系统近期复苏的希望很渺茫。


Accounting rules are generous enough to allow banks to keep many losses under the carpet for the time being. But it is only a matter of time until banks are forced to reveal the truth.	目前，会计规则过于宽松，这使得银行可以暂时把亏损隐藏起来，但只是个时间问题，银行迟早都要公布真相。


Thus, there is no point in waiting for miracles.	期盼奇迹的发生是没有意义的。


That mistake was made by the Japanese, who tried, unsuccessfully, to muddle through, only to end up with 18 years of stagnation.	日本就犯过这个错误，曾经试图“混”过去，但没有成功，最终的结果就是长达18年的经济停滞。


In today’s crisis, muddling through would be a recipe for a continuation of the crisis and secular stagnation of the type once described by Alvin Hansen, a contemporary of Keynes.	面对当下的经济危机，采取“混”下去的方式将使危机继续，经济长期停滞不前。 这正是凯恩斯同时代的经济学家埃尔文·汉森所描述的情况。


Hansen predicted that capitalism would suffer from a permanent underinvestment crisis.	汉森预测资本主义将面临永久性的投资不足危机。


Banks would scale down their balance sheets in proportion to their reported equity losses and exacerbate the credit crunch from which the world is already suffering today.	由于其股权��损，银行将按比例减少其资产负债，这更将加重全球业已发生的信贷危机。


Bad banks that are constructed generously enough to provide banks with hidden equity injections are one way to avoid or mitigate the credit crunch.	“坏帐银行”的建立就是慷慨地给银行隐性地注入资本，目的是避免或是缓和信贷危机。


But establishing them would be a bad idea, because to do so would imply that government subsidization of banks, thereby creating incentives for imprudent behavior in the long run.	但这并不是一个好主意，因为如果这样做，将暗示着政府对银行给予补贴，银行将来还会再一次地犯错。


After all, one reason for the banking crisis was that banks expected governments to bail them out in case of trouble.	毕竟，金融危机发生的原因之一就是银行一直幻想着政府在困难时能拉他们出来。


A better way to help banks and prevent them from simply deleveraging their business would be to establish full transparency and provide fresh money from taxpayers.	帮助银行一个更好的办法是建立完全的透明制度，从纳税人那里融资。


But governments should not make gifts. Instead, they should become partners of private shareholders, endowing the banks temporarily with new equity capital until the crisis is over.	政府不能一味给予，相反的，政府应该成为私人股东的合作伙伴，向银行暂时性地提供股权资本，直到金融危机结束。


This rescue strategy has a double advantage.	这种救助措施有两个优点。


It helps banks immediately, and it creates the right incentives for future behavior, as banks will know that the government will not prevent private equity capital from being destroyed in a crisis.	一是能够给予银行急需的资助； 另外还能激励银行在未来有好的表现，因为只有这样，银行才能明白，在危机发生时，政府不会再施以援手、阻止私人股权资本的破产。


This type of rescue strategy also makes it possible to increase the required supervisory equity-asset ratios of banks in the midst of the crisis without risking a credit crunch.	这种救助措施还有一个好处，就是可以在危机发生时提高所需要的监管性股本比例，避免信贷紧缩的发生。


If government becomes a partner, it may well endow the banks immediately with the equity required to sustain their business.	只有政府及时介入，银行才能获得急需的股权，得以生存下去。


Banks would again trust each other, and the inter-bank market would be re-established.	银行之间也会再次彼此信任，市场也将重新建立起来。


Of course, from a political perspective, reforms such as these can best be carried out when the crisis is acute, not when Wall Street believes it can go back to business as usual.	当然，从政治的角度考虑，类似这样的改革只有在经济危机最激烈的时期进行，而不是当华尔街认为局面已经恢复到正常的时候。


The time for reform is now.	现在，就是改革的时候了。


Is the Boss Overpaid?	老板们是否挣得太多？


Ever since 2001, when France enacted a law requiring listed companies to reveal their executives’ pay packages, newspapers have had a field day denouncing greedy bosses.	当法国在2001年制定法律，要求上市公司披露其主管的薪金报酬以来，各个报纸就大肆谴责那些贪得无厌的老板们。


Not only are fixed salaries revealed, but so are bonuses, fees for serving on boards of directors, returns on stock options, pension packages, and other perks, such as corporate jets or chauffeur-driven cars.	报纸不仅报道了他们的固定工资，而且还有奖金、董事会成员费用、期权收益、养老金以及公司提供的喷气飞机或者专职司机的汽车等其他特权。


But executive remuneration has usually faded from view once the journalistic spotlight shifts elsewhere – that is, until now.	但是，直到现在，当报章的注意力转移到其他地方后，主管们的薪金问题脱离了人们的视野。


This year, executive heads have started to roll.	今年，企业高层主管们开始引人关注。


In June, Antoine Zacharias, chairman and CEO of Vincy, France’s biggest public concessions and construction company, was obliged to resign when a majority of the board of directors judged his remuneration to be outrageous: €4.3 million in salary, a €13 million retirement bonus, a €2.2 million pension, and an estimated €173 million in stock options.	六月份，法国最大的公共特许和建设公司范希公司的董事长和首席执行官扎沙里拉斯被迫辞职，原因是董事会的大多数成员认为其薪金高得离谱。 他的年薪是430万欧元，退休奖金1300万欧元，养老金220万欧元，还有价值大约1亿730万欧元的期权。


But the focus of debate was a €8 million exceptional bonus that he requested after successfully executing a financial operation at the end of his tenure.	但是争论的焦点是他在任期结束前成功地进行了一项金融运作，要求8百万欧元的额外奖金。


More recently, Noel Forgeard, the French co-CEO of the Franco-German aeronautical and defence company EADS, was forced to resign under a cloud of suspicion: he sold his EADS shares in March, before the company announced a costly delay in production of the Airbus A380.	更晚些时候，法德联合欧洲航空防务及航天公司的法国籍副首席执行官福尔杰拉德由于饱受质疑而被迫辞职。 原因是他在今年三月该公司宣布代价巨大的空中客车A380推迟生产前出售了他的公司股票。