A new report argues that the Chinese authorities should be skeptical about capital-account liberalization.	一份新发表的报告认为中国政府可能会对资本账户自由化持怀疑态度。


Drawing lessons from the recent experiences of other emerging countries, the report concludes that China should adopt a carefully sequenced and cautious approach when exposing its economy to the caprices of global capital flows.	通过借鉴其他新兴国家的最新经验，该报告认为中国在将自身经济暴露在全球资本洪流之前，应当采取一个周密部署且谨慎小心的步骤。


The common thread to be found in the recent history of emerging economies – beginning in Latin America and running through East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – is that capital flows are strongly pro-cyclical, and are the biggest single cause of financial instability.	而新兴经济体近来最常出现的情况——从拉美开始再延续到东亚和中东欧地区——就是资本流动会大幅强化经济周期，同时也是引发金融不稳定状况的最大单一因素。


Domestic financial instability, associated with liberalization, also has a large impact on economic performance, as does the lack of control over non-bank financial intermediaries – an issue that China is now starting to face as the shadow banking sector’s contribution to credit growth becomes more pronounced.	而与自由化相关联的国内金融不稳定状况也会对国家经济表现产生重大影响，正如对非银行金融中介机构缺乏监管所导致的那样——随着中国影子银行部门对信贷增长的不断助推，这个问题也变得日益凸显。


Most academic research also supports the view that financial and capital-account liberalization should be undertaken warily, and that it should be accompanied by stronger domestic financial regulation.	大多数学术研究也认为金融和资本账户自由化应当更加谨慎的推进，并同时伴随更为严格的国内金融监管措施。


In the case of capital flows, this means retaining capital-account regulations as an essential tool of macroeconomic policy.	在资本流动方面，这意味着保留资本账户监管措施作为宏观经济政策的一个必要工具。


Indeed, during the 1990s, China – and also India – taught the rest of the developing world the importance of gradual liberalization.	事实上在1990年代，中国——以及印度——已经让所有发展中国家了解到了逐步实施自由化的重要性。


It was a lesson that many countries fully learned only in the wake of the economic and financial crises that began in East Asia in 1997, spread to Russia in 1998, and affected most of the emerging world.	但在1997年在东亚地区爆发并在随后一年蔓延到俄罗斯，并导致大多数发展中国家的金融和经济危机后，许多国家才真正领会到了这一点。


By maintaining strong capital-account regulation, China avoided the contagion.	当年中国之所以能置身事外，就是通过保持严格的资本账户监管。


Even the International Monetary Fund, in late 2012, adopted a cautious approach.	即便是国际货币基金组织，也在2012年年末采用了一项谨慎策略。


The IMF now recognizes that capital-account liberalization comes with risks as well as benefits, and that “liberalization needs to be well planned, timed, and sequenced in order to ensure that its benefits outweigh the costs.”	该组织认为，资本账户自由化有利有弊，因此“自由化需要进行周密策划，制定时间表，并循序渐进以保证其利大于弊”。


Moreover, the Fund now regards capital-account regulations as part of the broader menu of macro-prudential measures that countries should be free to use to prevent economic and financial instability.	此外该组织也认为，资本账户监管属于国家为避免出现经济和金融不稳定状况而应当自由实施的更广泛宏观计划手段的一部分。


To the extent that capital-account volatility is the major pro-cyclical financial shock in emerging economies, regulation should be the major macro-prudential instrument used to counter it.	考虑到资本账户的不稳定性是新兴经济体最主要的顺周期性金融冲击，监管应该是对抗这一冲击的主要宏观计划工具。


These regulations should complement, not substitute for, other countercyclical macroeconomic policies.	同时这些监管也应当是其他反周期宏观经济政策的补充而非取代物。


The IMF recommends giving higher priority to those other policies, whereas we have previously recommended using them and capital-account regulations simultaneously.	该组织同时建议给于这类政策比那些其他政策更高的优先度，而我们则建议将这些政策和资本账户监管并列实施。


It is not just emerging markets that have had to pay heed to the dangers of rapid liberalization.	需要留意快速自由化风险的可不仅仅是新兴市场国家。


Japan’s experiences also offer valuable lessons about the importance of prudence in capital-account liberalization for a currency in increasingly high demand internationally.	对于一种国际需求持续增高的货币来说。 日本的经验也为谨慎实施资本账户自由化的重要性提供了宝贵一课。


For an extended period, Japan allowed only strongly regulated financial intermediaries to manage capital flows, effectively discouraging the international use of its currency.	在相当长的一段时期。 日本只允许受到严格监管的金融中介机构去管理资金流，也因此有效遏制了其货币的国际应用。


And when a tsunami of capital looked set to flood the economy, policymakers did not shy away from trying to contain the inflows.	而当一场资本海啸似乎要淹没整个经济体之时。 政策制定者们也毫不犹豫地尝试遏制这些现金流入。


In a sense, Western Europe was once in the same boat.	在某种意义上，西欧地区也曾出现过同样的情况。


Its capital-account liberalization was also a long-term process, beginning with current-account convertibility in 1958 and ending with capital-account convertibility in 1990.	其资本账户自由化同样也是一个长期进程，始于1958年的经常账户可兑换性，最终完成于1990年的经常账户可兑换性。


And it faced a crisis of its payments system two years later that led to significant depreciation for some countries’ currencies.	而就在大功告成两年后，其支付系统就遭遇了一场危机并导致某些国家的货币大幅贬值。


None of this is intended to suggest that the internationalization of the renminbi should not take place in the foreseeable future.	上述例子并不是建议人民币的国际化不应在可见的将来实施。


Given the importance of China in the global economy, the denomination of an increasing share of trade and investment in renminbi seems inevitable.	考虑到中国在全球经济中的重要性，人民币交易和投资份额的不断扩大似乎是不可避免的。


But China’s authorities should manage that process gradually, choosing the specific channels through which it should take place.	但中国当局应当按部就班地管理这一进程，选好执行这一进程的各种特定渠道。


Indeed, China is perhaps the most successful example in history of gradual and pragmatic economic transformation.	事实上，中国或许是有史以来在渐进及实用主义经济转型方面的最成功范例。


It should not allow itself to be tempted from its tried and tested course by calls for a policy that has led too many emerging economies onto the rocks.	因此它也不应当让自身被一种已经导致无数新兴经济体摇摇欲坠的政策所蛊惑，最终偏离已经经过历练和考验的进程。


The Chinese Economy’s Great Wall	中国经济的长城


WASHINGTON, DC – The recent decline in China’s currency, the renminbi, which has fueled turmoil in Chinese stock markets and drove the government to suspend trading twice last week, highlights a major challenge facing the country: how to balance its domestic and international economic obligations.	华盛顿—最近，人民币贬值给中国股市动荡推波助澜，让政府在上周两次中止交易，这彰显出中国所面临的一个重大挑战：如何平衡国内和国际经济责任。


The approach the authorities take will have a major impact on the wellbeing of the global economy.	当局采取何种方针将对全球经济的利益造成重大影响。


The 2008 global financial crisis, coupled with the disappointing recovery in the advanced economies that followed, injected a new urgency into China’s efforts to shift its growth model from one based on investment and external demand to one underpinned by domestic consumption.	2008年全球金融危机，以及随后发达国家复苏令人失望让中国的转型政策面临了新的紧迫性。 中国欲将其增长模式从基于投资和外需转为基于国内消费。


Navigating such a structural transition without causing a sharp decline in economic growth would be difficult for any country.	做好这一结构转型并且不让经济增长严重下降对任何国家来说都是难事。


The challenge is even greater for a country as large and complex as China, especially given today’s environment of sluggish global growth.	而对于中国这样的复杂大国，挑战尤其巨大，特别是在当今全球增长萎靡的环境下。


For years, China’s government sought to broaden equity ownership, thereby providing more Chinese citizens with a stake in a successful transition to a market economy.	多年来，中国政府试图扩大权益所有权，从而让更多的中国公民在成功的市场经济转型中分得一杯羹。


But, like the United States’ effort to expand home ownership in the years preceding the 2008 crisis, Chinese policies went too far, creating a financially unsustainable situation that implied the possibility of major price declines and dislocations.	但是，与美国在2008年危机前扩大房屋所有权的措施一样，中国的政策过犹不及，造成了一个金融上不可持续的局面，并极有可能出现剧烈的价格下跌和混乱。


As a result, the adjustment challenge has grown dramatically.	因此，调整挑战变得十分艰巨。


With Chinese companies no longer able to sell a rapidly increasing volume of products abroad and support further expansion of productive capacity, the economy has lost some important growth, employment, and wage engines.	中国公司不再能够向国外出售迅速扩大的产量并进一步支持产能扩张，中国经济失去了一些重要的增长。 就业和工资引擎。


The resulting economic slowdown has undermined the government’s capacity to maintain inflated asset prices and avoid pockets of credit distress.	由此带来的经济减速制约了政府保持资产价格膨胀、避免信用枯竭的能力。


In an effort to limit the detrimental impact of all this on citizens’ wellbeing, Chinese officials have been guiding the currency lower.	为了减轻所有这些给中国公民福利带来的不利影响，中国官员指引人民币贬值。


A surprise devaluation last August has been followed by a number of lower daily fixes in the onshore exchange rate, all intended to make Chinese goods more attractive abroad, while accelerating import substitution at home.	去年8月的突然贬值后，人民币在岸汇率一跌再跌，所有这些都是为了增加中国商品的海外吸引力，同时加快国内的进口替代。


The renminbi has depreciated even more in the offshore market.	人民币在离岸市场的贬值幅度比在岸市场还要大。


China’s currency devaluations are consistent with a broader trend among both emerging and advanced economies in recent years.	人民币贬值与近几年来囊括新兴市场和发达经济体的更广大的趋势相符。


Soon after the global financial crisis, the US relied heavily on expansionary monetary policy, characterized by near-zero interest rates and large-scale asset purchases, which weakened the dollar, thereby boosting exports.	全球金融危机后，美国很快开始严重依赖扩张性货币政策，其特征是近零利率和大规模资产购买，美元于是贬值，从而刺激出口。


More recently, the European Central Bank has adopted a similar approach, guiding the euro downward in an effort to boost domestic activity.	最近，欧洲央行也采取了类似的方针，指引欧元贬值以刺激国内经济活动。


But in pursuing its domestic objectives, China risks inadvertently amplifying global financial instability.	但在追求国内目标的同时，中国也在不经意间放大了全球金融动荡风险。


Specifically, markets worry that renminbi devaluation could “steal” growth from other countries, including those that have far more foreign debt and far less robust financial cushions than China, which maintains ample international reserves.	具体而言，市场担心人民币贬值可能“偷走”其他国家的增长，包括那些外债比中国高得多、金融缓冲远不及中国（中国有着巨量国际储备）充分的国家。


This concern speaks to the even more challenging balancing act that China must perform as it seeks to play the role in global economic governance that its economic weight warrants.	这一担忧给中国带来了更加艰巨的平衡挑战：在中国寻求在全球经济治理中获得与其经济实力相称的作用的过程中，它必须平衡好各方利益。


After all, China is now the world’s second-largest economy (and, by some non-market measures, the largest).	毕竟，现在中国是世界第二大经济体（以一些非市场标准衡量已经是世界第一大经济体）。


And, indeed, China has lately been showing greater interest in gradually internationalizing its financial system.	诚然，中国最近表现出逐渐实现其金融体系国际化的兴趣。


Notably, it recently succeeded in persuading the International Monetary Fund to add the renminbi to the basket of currencies that determines the value of the Special Drawing Right, the unit the IMF uses in dealing with its 188 member countries.	最近，中国令人瞩目地成功说服国际货币基金组织（IMF）将人民币加入决定其特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子。 SDR是IMF用来与其188个成员国做交易的价值单位。


That step – which places the renminbi on par with the major global currencies (the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen) – will enhance public- and private-sector acceptance of China’s currency in the international monetary system.	这一举措——授予人民币与主要全球性货币（美元、欧元、英镑和日元）同等地位——将让更多公共和私人部门在国际货币体系中接受人民币。


At the same time, it created the expectation – though not the obligation – that China will refrain from aggravating global financial instability.	与此同时，这也形成了一个预期——乃至义务——即中国不会去加剧全球金融动荡。


There will come a time when China’s domestic and international responsibilities will again be relatively well aligned.	总有一天，中国的国内和国际责任将再次相对更加一致。 但这一天不是现在；


But that time is not now; and, given the country’s tricky ongoing structural transition, it probably will not come anytime soon.	考虑到中国未竟的结构转型困难重重，这一天在近期也不可能到来。


In the meantime, it seems likely that China will continue to feel compelled to place its domestic obligations first, but in a nuanced way aimed at avoiding large disruptive tipping points for the global economy.	与此同时，中国可能继续被迫首先顾及其国内责任，但方式将更加细致，以避免引发全球经济的大动荡。


Whether that will be enough to avoid disorderly outcomes, however, is not totally assured.	但是，这是否足以避免无需结果绝非板上钉钉。


China’s Political Interventions	中国的政治干预


TOKYO – In the last week or so, stock markets around the world have been hit by an upsurge in volatility, with large price swings confronting traders in New York, Tokyo, London, and beyond.	东京—在上周前后，全球股市波动陡增，纽约、东京、伦敦和其他地区的交易员纷纷面临巨大的价格震荡。


And the entire global financial spasm has been largely blamed on a single culprit: China.	而全球金融痉挛的原因大多指向了同一个罪魁：中国。


In a free economy, market mechanisms can produce stability or instability.	在自由经济中，市场机制可以制造稳定或不稳定。


An increase in the price of a tangible good would typically cause demand to fall, leading the market toward a new equilibrium.	有形商品价格的上涨通常导致需求下降，促使市场形成新均衡。


By contrast, an increase in the price of an asset like a stock raises expectations of a further increase, causing demand to rise, potentially to excessively high levels.	相反，股市等资产的价格上涨制造出进一步上证的预期，导致需求增加，有可能达到过高水平。


In a planned economy like China’s, where policymakers use various tools to influence asset prices, such instability could, in theory, be avoided; indeed, the Marxist view is that government intervention to stop crises is precisely why controlled economies are superior to their free-market counterparts.	在像中国这样的计划经济中，决策者用各种工具影响资产价格，理论上，这一不稳定可以避免； 事实上，马克思主义观点认为，阻止危机的政府干预正是管制经济优于自由市场经济的要害。


But, in practice, that does not seem to be the case.	但在实践中似乎并非如此。


So-called price-keeping operations by China’s monetary authorities (an approach tried in Japan in the early 1990s) are presumably the reason why the domestic stock market rose sharply over the last year, far beyond the levels warranted by the country’s economic fundamentals.	中国货币当局所谓的维持价格操作（日本在20世纪90年代曾经尝试过）想必正是过去一年中国股市暴涨的原因，其涨幅远远超过了经济基本面所隐含的水平。


The recent stock-market plunge suggests that investors have concluded that equity prices have become unsustainable.	最近的股市暴跌表明投资者认定股价已不可持续。


Yet the Chinese government has remained committed to intervention, responding to the correction with heavy-handed, politically motivated measures, including the complete suspension of trade of many companies’ stocks.	但中国政府仍决定干预，用出于政治动机的大手笔政策应对市场修正，包括完全停牌许多公司的股票。


The move seemed to have halted the further deterioration of the Shanghai stock market.	这一措施似乎阻止了上证指数的进一步下跌。 但效果只是暂时的；


But the effect was only temporary; on August 24, the market fell by 8.5%, the largest drop since 2007.	8月24日，市场下跌8. 5%，创出2007年以来的最大跌幅。


The long-term systemic impact of China’s interventionist approach may be even more serious than the stock market’s current decline.	中国的干预主义方针的长期系统性影响也许比股市的当前下跌更加严重。


Few want to invest in a market where the government can change the rules of the game at any time, especially if they have had first-hand experience of being blocked from trading at a crucial moment.	没人愿意在政府可以随时更改游戏规则的市场上投资，特别是他们获得了在关键时刻被禁止交易的第一手经验。


To make matters worse, Chinese investors do not have the same access to information that investors in other markets do.	更糟糕的是，中国投资者不像其他市场上的投资者那样可以获得那么多信息。


Can a highly organized financial market like the one that is emerging in Shanghai ever be compatible with an authoritarian regime?	像上海这样的高度组织的金融市场有可能与极权体制相容吗？


Another recent intervention by the Chinese authorities – gradual appreciation, followed by the unexpected devaluation of the renminbi – raises similar questions.	中国当局的另一项最新干预——逐渐升值，然后出人意料地让人民币贬值——也造成了类似的问题。


To be sure, the first part of the move was probably motivated largely by the desire to strengthen markets’ role in setting the exchange rate, which promises to boost long-term stability and improve the renminbi’s chances of becoming a global reserve currency.	平心而论，这一做法的第一阶段也许主要是因为渴望加强市场在决定汇率方面的作用，这有助于增加长期稳定、增加人民币成为全球储备货币的机会。


But, as the recent devaluation showed, the shift, coming after years of efforts to strengthen the renminbi, could fuel a sharp increase in volatility in world currency markets.	但是，最近的贬值表明，这一在强化人民币多年后所发生的变化可能给世界货币市场带来波动剧增。


Of course, the renminbi’s recent depreciation was much smaller than the de facto currency devaluations engineered by the United States and the United Kingdom after the financial crisis of 2008. It was also nowhere near as significant as the devaluation that the Bank of Japan has pursued since 2012.	当然，最近的人民币贬值比2008年金融危机后美国和英国所发动的实际贬值要小得多，也远远比不上2012年以来日本银行所发动的贬值。


But the fact that the renminbi has been so highly managed, together with its history of steady appreciation, meant that the sudden devaluation had a more significant effect on the market than the US, British, and Japanese moves, all of which were communicated better in advance.	但人民币受严格管制这一事实以及多年来的稳步升值的历史意味着其突然贬值要比美国、英国和日本的动作产生更大的市场影响。 后三者的贬值人们是提前得到暗示的。


Still, warnings that renminbi devaluation will spark a “currency war” are unwarranted.	尽管如此，关于人民币贬值将引发“货币战争”的警告是站不住脚的。


Under the flexible exchange-rate system that now prevails around the world, if each country focuses its monetary policy on achieving ideal inflation and employment conditions at home, the result will be reasonably stable – or even so-called Pareto-optimal – macroeconomic conditions.	当今世界，弹性汇率制度是主流，如果每个国家的货币政策都专注于实现理想的国内通胀和就业条件，结果将是相当稳定——甚至所谓的帕累托最优——的宏观经济环境。


To be sure, the US may respond to China’s devaluation by postponing interest-rate hikes or moderating the pace of its withdrawal from quantitative easing, and Japan may intensify its own QE to cope with negative spillovers.	当然，美国也许会通过暂停升息或调整退出量化宽松的节奏来应对人民币贬值，而日本可能加码其自身的量化宽松以应对消极溢出效应。


But competitive cumulative devaluations will not arise.	但竞争性累计贬值不会发生。


Nonetheless, recent events should compel China’s leaders to reconsider the extent to which they control the country’s economy.	尽管如此，最近的事件应该迫使中国领导人重新思考控制中国经济的程度。


If they maintain their secretive decision-making and continue to manipulate the price system for political ends, their chances of building a stable, resilient, and market-oriented economy, underpinned by a major international reserve currency, will be seriously compromised.	如果他们继续秘密决策、用政治操纵价格系统，那么他们构建一个以主要国际储备货币为基础的、稳定而恢复力强的市场经济的机会将受到严重制约。


North Korea’s Step Too Far?	朝鲜越界了吗？


BEIJING – After nearly a month of belligerent bluster from North Korea, China appears to have had enough, ending its silence about North Korea’s brinkmanship and suddenly roaring its disapproval of its ally’s reckless threats.	北京—朝鲜放出战争狂言近一个月后，中国好像是受够了，不再对朝鲜的边缘行为保持沉默，突然表示了对这一盟国鲁莽威胁的失望。


China’s exceptional tough talk does not necessarily mean that it intends to abandon Kim Jong-un’s regime; but, at the very least, it does suggest that a radical shift in China’s policy toward North Korea might no longer be unthinkable.	中国反常的强硬态度并不一定意味着它想抛弃金正恩政权，但至少表明了中国对朝政策的急剧变化不再向以往那样是不可想象的。


When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi exchanged phone calls with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on April 6, he expressed China’s rejection of rhetoric and action aimed at destabilizing the Northeast Asian region.	中国外交部长王毅与联合国秘书长潘基文4月6日通电话时表达了中国拒绝动摇东北亚地区稳定的口头和实际行动。


Moreover, Wang made clear that China would not allow “troublemaking on China’s doorstep.”	此外，王毅还澄清，中国不会允许有人“在中国家门口制造麻烦”。


The next day, Chinese President Xi Jinping, speaking to an assembly of primarily Asian political and business leaders at the annual government-sponsored Boao Forum for Asia, declared that no country “should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.”	第二天，习近平主席在亚洲政治和商业领袖年度会议——博鳌亚洲论坛上说，“不能为一己之私把一个地区乃至世界搞乱。


Xi did not mention any country by name, but his implicit condemnation of North Korea was clear to all.	”习近平没有提到具体的国家名字，但其实暗指朝鲜再清楚不过了。


Before these official rebukes, there had been much speculation about whether China would risk a fundamental change in its relations with North Korea, the socialist “little brother” that it continues to subsidize heavily.	在这些正式诘难之前，已有很多人猜测中国是否会冒险彻底改变与其仍在大量援助的社会主义“小兄弟”朝鲜的关系。


Following the rare display of open indignation by Xi and Wang, such speculation has now become stronger than ever.	在习近平和王毅罕见地公开发怒之后，这类猜测变得更加强烈了。


Some ask what “value” Kim’s hermit kingdom provides that prevents China from acting decisively; others wonder to what extent Chinese leaders’ domestic concerns continue to inhibit their willingness to switch course on North Korea.	有人问，金氏隐士王国有什么价值，能让中国做不出果断决策； 还有人不知道中国领导人会在多大程度上由于担心国内问题而继续抑制其教训朝鲜的意图。


In fact, China’s leaders have agonized over North Korea’s recent provocations.	事实上，中国领导人对朝鲜的最新挑衅行为感到十分恼怒。


They have been struggling to persuade the Kim regime to temper its volatility and accept a “grand bargain”: official recognition and normalization of relations with all of its neighbors, and with the United States, in exchange for denuclearization.	他们一直在忙于说服金氏政权收敛气焰，接受“大谈判”：正式承认和正常化其与所有邻国以及美国的关系，以此作为其去核化的交换条件。


Indeed, this has led to considerable squabbling between the two countries in recent years.	事实上，最近几年，这已经导致两国数度交恶。


China understands that North Korea’s intractability is rooted in its deep isolation from the world, mass deception of its people, and Kim’s fear of losing control of a country that only his family has ruled.	中国知道，朝鲜的难以驾驭植根于它与世界的深度隔绝、其人民的长期受骗，以及金氏害怕失去对朝鲜的独家统治权。


So the country’s rulers have come to believe that they can gain attention and resources only through provocation.	因此，朝鲜统治者相信，挑衅是他们获得注意和资源的唯一方法。


For China, the Kim regime’s survival can be assured only if it follows China’s lead in reforming and opening up.	对中国来说，只有它跟随中国的领导，实行改革开放才能保证其生存。


But, faced with South Korea’s shining democracy and booming economy, the Chinese model is irrelevant to the North: following it would mean acknowledging the South’s supremacy on the Korean Peninsula, and thus an instant loss of legitimacy.	但是，面对韩国朝气蓬勃的民主和繁荣的经济，中国模式与朝鲜并不相契：跟随中国意味着承认韩国在朝鲜半岛的领导地位，这对金氏政权的合法性来说是沉重打击。


During the past two decades, North Korea’s leaders have experimented lightly with minimal “reform,” only to retreat from it quickly.	过去20年来，朝鲜领导人略做了一些“改革”的微小实验，但无不迅速不了了之。


China patiently bore this pattern of intermittent brinkmanship and timid reform, largely owing to its belief that the risks posed by the Kim dynasty could be controlled as long as China did not cut off the regime’s lifeline of oil, food, and other necessities.	中国耐心忍受着朝鲜间歇性的边缘政策和抑制改革，很大程度上是因为它相信金氏王朝所带来的风险是可控的，只要中国不切断金氏政权的石油、食品和其他必需品生命线。


More important, China’s leaders believed that by shielding the North from US pressure, it was acting in the interest of its own national security.	更重要的是，中国领导人认为用朝鲜来抵挡美国的压力符合其自身国家安全利益。


But here China’s analysis has been completely wrong, for it underestimates the Kim regime’s unmanageable desperation whenever it believes that its survival in doubt.	但在这里，中国的算盘大错特错了，因为它低估了金氏政权在认为生存受到威胁时所迸发的不可遏制的绝望。


Moreover, North Korea does not want to be beholden to any power, including China.	此外，朝鲜不希望被某个大国玩弄于股掌之间，包括中国。


So it exploits China’s goodwill and national-security concerns, and even regards Chinese patronage as its due.	因此它利用着中国的良好意图和国家安全需要，甚至把中国的赞助当成理所当然。


A further complication concerns North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.	让局面更加复杂的是朝鲜的核野心。


The North appears to be convinced that, with nuclear weapons, it can maintain complete diplomatic independence, and that China, fearing nuclear blackmail, will never abandon it.	朝鲜似乎坚信，有了核武器就有了完全的外交独立，而害怕核要挟的中国永远不会抛弃它。


Now, however, it is North Korea’s turn to make a mistake.	但是，如今轮到朝鲜犯了错。


Kim Jong-un’s childish tantrums have genuinely enraged China.	金正恩孩子气的怒火真正惹恼了中国。


Yes, the country’s leaders have sometimes complained about the heavy burden of subsidizing North Korea; but, until now, they had never shown such open disgust with the North’s performance.	是的，中国领导人有时抱怨援助朝鲜负担太重； 但是此前从未有中国领导人如此公开地表示对朝鲜表现的不满。


China’s warning that it will not allow North Korean “troublemaking on China’s doorstep” can be considered the equivalent of a “yellow card” in soccer.	中国警告它不会允许朝鲜“在中国家门口制造麻烦”，这等同于在足球比赛中“亮黄牌”。


China has not decided to abandon North Korea.	中国还没有决定抛弃朝鲜。


But the warning is a stern one for Kim Jong-un: China may send him to the sidelines if he does not change his behavior.	但对金正恩来说，警告是严厉的：如果他不改变行为，中国要把他罚出场了。


US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to visit Beijing in the coming days.	美国国务卿克里即将访问北京。


It is now time for American and Chinese leaders to negotiate a real and viable exit from the current crisis, while productively exploring ways to restart the denuclearization process on the Korean peninsula.	现在，是中美领导人协商当前危机的真正可行的解决之道并有成果地探索朝鲜半岛无核化进程的时候了。


If Kim’s bombast and nuclear threats lead to China-US bonding over a joint North Korea settlement, the entire world will be the safer for it.	如果金正恩夸大的核威胁导致中美联手推出朝鲜解决方案，那么整个世界都将因此变得更加安全。


Chinese Shadows	中国的阴暗面


NEW YORK – These are interesting times in China.	发自纽约——这段时间以来中国发生了一些有趣的事件。


A senior Communist Party official, Bo Xilai, is brought down – accused of offenses that include wire-tapping other party bosses, including President Hu Jintao – while his wife is investigated for her alleged role in the possible murder of a British businessman.	一名共产党高官——薄熙来——被撤职，罪名包括对（国家主席胡锦涛在内的）其它党内大佬进行窃听——而其妻子则因为牵涉到一名英国商人的怀疑谋杀案而受到调查。


Meanwhile, a blind human-rights activist escapes from illegal house arrest, finds refuge in the United States’ embassy in Beijing, and leaves the compound only after claims that Chinese authorities in his hometown had threatened his family.	与此同时，一名盲人人权分子从非法软禁他的家中逃了出来，跑到了美国驻北京大使馆寻求避难，随后在声明自己家人遭到所在地当局威胁后才离开了使馆。


Despite exhaustive press coverage of these events, it is remarkable how little we actually know.	虽然媒体对两件事的报道铺天盖地，但我们真正知道的东西却异常稀少。


The British businessman’s body was allegedly cremated before any autopsy was conducted.	那名英国商人的尸体据说未经解剖验尸就被送去了火化。


None of the lurid tales about Bo’s wife have been proven.	那些关于薄熙来妻子的离奇故事全都未经证实。


And the reasons for her husband’s political disgrace remain murky, to say the least.	至少在目前来说，她丈夫究竟因何在政治上倒台，还是一件说不清楚的事情。


Things always tend to get interesting in China before a National People’s Congress, where the Party’s next leaders are anointed.	中共下任领导人通常都由全国人民代表大会开会选定，而在会议召开之前情况往往会变得诡异无比。


Leadership change in most democracies is a relatively transparent process; it follows national elections.	大多数民主国家的领导人更替都是一个相对透明的过程； 只待全国大选后尘埃落定。


To be sure, even open democracies have their share of opaque jockeying and deal-making in what used to be called smoke-filled rooms.	当然，即便是公开的民主制度也会有暗中的人选交易，或是所谓“吸烟室”里的讨价还价。


This is particularly true in East Asian countries, such as Japan.	特别是在日本这样的东亚国家，这类情况尤为常见。


But, in China, everything takes place out of sight.	但在中国，一切都是暗中进行的。


Because leaders cannot be ousted through elections, other means must be found to resolve political conflicts.	由于无法用选举来罢免领导人，于是必须用其他方式来解决政治争端。


Sometimes, that entails deliberate public spectacles.	有时这就意味着刻意导演一场公开的闹剧。


The disgrace of Bo, Chongqing’s former Party leader, certainly falls into this category.	重庆前市委书记薄熙来的陨落显然属于这个范畴。


A handsome, charismatic populist born into the Party elite, Bo was known as a tough official, whose methods in fighting organized crime – and others who got in his way – were often unrestrained by law.	他是一个长相英俊，富有魅力的民粹派，从小就在中国政治精英阶层中浸淫成长。 他也是一个铁腕领导，在打击有组织犯罪（黑社会）——以及任何敢跟他对着干的人——方面经常使用一些逾越法律的手段。


Bo’s ex-police chief, who is said to have done the dirty work, embarrassed the Party by fleeing to the US consulate in Chengdu in February, after he fell out with his boss.	薄熙来手下的前公安局长，也就是传说中为他干这些脏活的人，在与他关系彻底破裂后于今年1月潜逃到了美国驻成都领事馆，让中共丢尽了脸。


Despite Bo’s nostalgia for Maoist rhetoric, he is conspicuously wealthy.	虽然薄熙来看上去无比怀念过去那套毛泽东理论，但他自己显然富得流油。


His son’s expensive lifestyle as a student at Oxford and Harvard has been described in lavish detail in the press.	其子在牛津和哈佛上学期间的奢侈生活方式也都被媒体不厌其烦地逐条披露了出来。


In other words, Bo bore all the hallmarks of a gangster boss: corrupt, ruthless towards his enemies, contemptuous of the law, and yet moralistic in his self-presentation.	换句话说，薄熙来身上拥有一个黑帮老大的所有特质：腐败，对对手毫不留情，蔑视法律，但一张嘴满口都是道德说教。


But the same could be said of most Party bosses in China.	这一点对大多数中共领导人来说都是如此。


They all have more money than can be explained by their official pay.	他们都拥有无法用自身工资收入来解释的财富。


Most have children studying at expensive British or American universities.	许多人的子女都在英美那些学费昂贵的大学就读。


All behave as though they are above the laws that constrain normal citizens.	所有人的行为似乎都凌驾于法律之上，仿佛法律只是制订来管制普通公民的。


What was unusual about Bo was his open ambition.	但薄熙来的不寻常之处在于他那种公开表露的权力欲。


Chinese party bosses, like Japanese politicians – or, indeed, Mafia dons – are supposed to be discreet in their appetite for power.	中共大佬们，跟日本政客——或者，事实上还有黑手党教父——那样，本应尽力隐藏自己的权力欲。


Bo behaved more like an American politician.	而在这一点上薄熙来则表现得像一个美国政治家。


He liked to throw his weight around in public.	他喜欢公开叫板。


That was enough to annoy other party bosses.	而这也足以激怒其他党内大佬了。


Since factional rivalry inside the Party cannot be handled discreetly, some of Bo’s colleagues felt that he had to go.	由于党内的派系争端无法暗中调和，因此薄熙来的某些同僚觉得是时候让他走人了。


The way that party bosses, in China no less than in Japan, get rid of irksome rivals is to bring them down through public scandals, leaked to an obedient press, which then fans the flames.	无论是中国还是日本，党派大佬消灭恼人对手的方式就是通过公众丑闻让他们倒台，先把消息透露给手下俯首帖耳的媒体，然后再煽风点火。


The appearance of a wicked wife in Chinese public scandals is a common phenomenon.	而在中国的公众丑闻中恶妻的登场堪称一个常见的情境。


When Mao Zedong purged his most senior Party boss, Liu Shaoqi, during the Cultural Revolution, Liu’s wife was paraded through the streets wearing ping-pong balls around her neck as a symbol of wicked decadence and extravagance.	当年毛泽东在文化大革命中整倒身边级别最高的党内大佬刘少奇时，后者的妻子就被戴上乒乓球做成的项链游街，以示其生活奢靡堕落。


After Mao himself died, his wife Jiang Qing was arrested and presented as a Chinese Lady Macbeth.	在毛泽东死后，其妻江青旋即被捕并被描绘成中国的麦克白夫人（莎士比亚悲剧人物，怂恿其夫弑君篡位）。


It is possible that the murder accusations against Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, are part of such political theater.	而对薄熙来妻子谷开来的谋杀指控很可能就是这出政治戏剧的其中一幕。


In fact, Bo’s fall from grace involves not only his wife, but his entire family.	事实上，薄熙来的倒台不仅牵涉到他的妻子，还包括其整个家庭。


This, too, is a Chinese tradition.	这也是一项中国传统。


The family must take responsibility for the crimes of one of its members.	家族必须为其中一位成员的罪行负责。


When that individual falls, so must they.	一个人倒台了，所有人都无法幸免。


On the other hand, when he is riding high, they benefit, as was the case with many of Bo’s relatives and his wife, whose businesses thrived while he was in power.	另一方面，当一个人扶摇直上，其他人也随之鸡犬升天，正如薄熙来大权在握的时候其妻子以及许多亲戚都生意兴隆那样。


There has been a great deal of speculation about the consequences of Bo’s fall, and of the daring escape of the human-rights activist, Chen Guangcheng, after 18 months of house arrest.	外界对薄熙来倒台以及盲人人权分子陈光诚在遭受18个月软禁后大胆脱逃所产生的后果有诸多猜测。


Will his flight to the US embassy harden the attitudes of China’s leaders?	后者飞赴美国大使馆的举动是否会��中国领导人的态度转趋强硬？


Will it force the US to get tougher on human rights in China?	这一事件是否会迫使美国在中国人权问题上板起面孔？


If so, what will follow from that?	如果答案是肯定的话，接着又会发生些什么？


Since Bo presented himself as a populist critic of modern Chinese capitalism and an authoritarian promoter of Maoist ethics, his natural enemies inside the Party leadership would seem to be the more “liberal” bosses, who favor free-market capitalism and perhaps even some political reforms.	由于薄熙来一方面把自己打扮成为对当代中国资本主义的民粹派批判者，另一方面又刚愎自用地鼓吹毛泽东式道德，因此他在党内的天然敌人似乎就是那些更倾向“自由化”的大佬们，后者偏爱自由市场资本主义，或许甚至会欢迎某些政治改革。


The current premier, Wen Jiabao, would seem to be this faction’s leader. He has made speeches about the need for democratic reform, and has been openly critical of Bo.	现任国家总理温家宝似乎就是该派系的领军人物，也曾多次发表有关民主改革紧迫性的演说并公开批评薄熙来。


Chen asked him to investigate abuses against him and his family.	而陈光诚也请求温家宝下令调查自己和家人所遭受的迫害。


So, could the fall of Bo lead to a more open society, less hostile to dissident voices?	因此，薄熙来的倒台是否会催生一个更开放，对异见声音更少敌意的社会？


It is possible that Chinese Communists who favor more economic liberalism would also be more receptive to a more open society.	是否那些偏爱经济自由主义的共产党人也更倾向于接受一个更加开放的社会？


But the opposite could also be true: the wider the disparities in wealth, and the more people protest against economic inequality, the more the regime will crack down on dissidents.	但事情的反面也可能出现：随着财富分配不均现象逐渐恶化，越来越多人起来抗议经济分配不均，该政权对异见分子的镇压也会更严厉。


Such repression is not meant to protect communism, let alone what little is left of Maoism.	这样的镇压并不是为了维护共产主义，更别提什么毛泽东主义了。


On the contrary, it is meant to protect the Chinese Communist Party’s brand of capitalism.	相反，这是为了维护中国共产党的资本主义招牌。


That may be why Bo had to be toppled, and certainly why dissidents like Chen, as well as his family, have to suffer so much that refuge in a foreign embassy is their final, desperate option.	这可能是薄熙来为何会被罢免的原因，也是陈光诚及其家人为何要遭受如此多的苦难，以致最后只能绝望地将逃往一个外国使馆作为自身最后选择的原因。


China’s India Land Grab	中国掠夺印度领土


NEW DELHI – Stoking tensions with Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines over islands in the South and East China Seas has not prevented an increasingly assertive China from opening yet another front by staging a military incursion across the disputed, forbidding Himalayan frontier.	新德里—与日本、越南和菲律宾在东海和南海岛屿整个不休并没有让越来越专断的中国停下脚步，它又新开辟了一条前沿，出兵越界侵入争议中的喜马拉雅边境禁区。


On the night of April 15, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) platoon stealthily intruded near the China-India-Pakistan tri-junction, established a camp 19 kilometers (12 miles) inside Indian-controlled territory, and presented India’s government with the potential loss of a strategically vital 750-square-kilometer high-altitude plateau.	4月15日夜，解放军的一个排暗中进入中印巴三方交界附近，深入在印控区19公里扎营，并向印度政府主张具有战略关键意义的750平方公里高海拔高原地区。


A stunned India, already reeling under a crippling domestic political crisis, has groped for an effective response to China’s land-grab – the largest and most strategic real estate China has seized since it began pursuing a more muscular policy toward its neighbors.	因国内政治危机焦头烂额的印度大吃一惊，匆忙寻求积极响应中国的领土掠夺——这是中国开始对邻国采取更强硬政策以来最大、最具战略性的不动产掠夺。


Whether China intends to stay put by building permanent structures for its troops on the plateau’s icy heights, or plans to withdraw after having extracted humiliating military concessions from India, remains an open – and in some ways a moot – question.	中国将继续侵占，建设雪线高原的永久军营，还是准备在获得印度羞辱性的军事妥协后撤离仍不明朗，而且从某种程度上说，这个问题并没有什么意义。


The fact is that, with its “peaceful rise” giving way to an increasingly sharp-elbowed approach to its neighbors, China has broadened its “core interests” – which brook no compromise – and territorial claims, while showing a growing readiness to take risks to achieve its goals.	事实是，中国的“和平崛起”已经让位于日渐对四邻的日渐专横，它扩大了自己的“核心利益”——即不容妥协的利益——和领土主张，同时表现出准备不惜冒险实现这一目标。


For example, China has not only escalated its challenge to Japan’s decades-old control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, but is also facing off against the Philippines since taking effective control of Scarborough Shoal last year.	比如，不但升级了其对日本对尖阁列岛（钓鱼岛）几十年控制权的挑战，还从去年控制黄岩岛开始于菲律宾针锋相对。


What makes the Himalayan incursion a powerful symbol of China’s aggressive new stance in Asia is that its intruding troops have set up camp in an area that extends beyond the “line of actual control” (LAC) that China itself unilaterally drew when it defeated India in the 1962 Chinese-initiated border war.	让喜马拉雅山入侵事件成为中国专横亚洲新立场的有力标志的是其闯入不对在“实际控制线”之外的地区扎营，这条实际控制线是中国在1962年由其发动的边境战争后单方面划定的。


While China’s navy and a part of its air force focus on supporting revanchist territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas, its army has been active in the mountainous borderlands with India, trying to alter the LAC bit by bit.	中国的海军和部分空军专注于支持其在南海和东海的报复性领土和领海主张，其陆军则活跃于中印边境的山区，试图一点一点改变实际控制线。


One of the novel methods that the PLA has employed is to bring ethnic Han pastoralists to the valleys along the LAC and give them cover to range across it, in the process driving Indian herdsmen from their traditional pasturelands.	解放军所采用惯用伎俩是让汉族牧民来到实际控制线沿线的山谷，提供保护让他们跨越实际控制线，从而将印度牧民驱逐出他们的传统牧场。


But the latest crisis was sparked by China’s use of direct military means in a strategic border area close to the Karakoram Pass linking China to India.	但最近的危机的引发方式是中国直接在毗邻连接中银的喀喇昆仑山口的战略边境地区直接使用军队。


Because the LAC has not been mutually clarified – China reneged on a 2001 promise to exchange maps with India – China claims that PLA troops are merely camping on “Chinese land.”	实际控制线并不是双方公认的——中国违反了2001年于印度交换地图的承诺——因此中国宣布解放军只是在“中国领土”上扎营。


Yet, in a replay of its old strategy of furtively encroaching on disputed land and then presenting itself as the conciliator, China now counsels “patience” and “negotiations” to help resolve the latest “issue.”	但是，中国在重演其暗中渗透争议领土然后以调停者面目出现的故技，提出要以“耐心”和“谈判”帮助解决最新的“问题”。


China is clearly seeking to exploit India’s political disarray to alter the reality on the ground.	中国显然实在试图利用印度的政治乱局改变领土现实。


A paralyzed and rudderless Indian government initially blacked out reporting on the incursion, lest it come under public pressure to mount a robust response.	群龙无首、陷入瘫痪的印度政府获知解放军侵入的消息大惊失色，唯恐受到要求采取强硬措施的公众压力。


Its first public statement came only after China issued a bland denial of the intrusion in response to Indian media reports quoting army sources.	印度媒体引用军方消息源报道了解放军的入侵，中国随后发布了不痛不痒的否认，直到此时，印度政府才第一次发布公开声明。


To add to India’s woes, Salman Khurshid, the country’s bungling foreign minister, initially made light of the deepest Chinese incursion in more than a quarter-century.	让印度更加被动的是，拙劣的外交部长库什德（Salman Khurshid）一开始对二十五年多来最深入的中国人入侵事件满不在乎。


The garrulous minister called the intrusion just “one little spot” of acne on the otherwise “beautiful face” of the bilateral relationship – a mere blemish that could be treated with “an ointment.”	这位多嘴部长称入侵只是双边关系“漂亮脸蛋”上的“小粉刺”，只消“略施药膏”就能轻易除去。


Those inept comments fatally undercut the government’s summoning of the Chinese ambassador to demand a return to the status quo ante.	如此不当评论不啻给予印度政府召见中国大使要求恢复现状的要求致命一击。


With Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s corruption-tainted government tottering on the brink of collapse, there has been no official explanation of how India was caught napping in a militarily critical area where, in the recent past, China had made repeated attempts to encroach on Indian land.	总理辛格的政府因深陷腐败而摇摇欲坠，没有任何正式理由解释印度如何陷入了关键军事地区的困局，最近一段时间，中国再三试图侵占该地区的印度国土。


In fact, the government inexplicably replaced regular army troops with border police in 2010 to patrol the mountain-ringed plateau into which the PLA has now intruded.	事实上，政府不知因何在2010年用边境巡警代替了正规军���逻目前被解放军侵入的高原山区。


Known as Depsang, the plateau lies astride an ancient silk route connecting Yarkand in Xinjiang to India’s Ladakh region through the Karakoram Pass.	这片被称为达普桑（Depsang）的高原地区横跨穿越喀喇昆仑山口、连接新疆莎车和印度拉达克（Ladakh）地区的古老的丝绸之路


India, with a military staging post and airstrip just south of the Karakoram Pass, has the capacity to cut off the highway linking China with its “all-weather ally,” Pakistan.	印度在喀喇昆仑山口南端拥有一个军事补给站和飞机跑道，有能力切断连接中国和其“全天候盟友”巴基斯坦的高速公路。


The PLA intrusion, by threatening that Indian base, may have been intended to foreclose India’s ability to choke off supplies to Chinese troops and workers in Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan region, where China has expanded its military footprint and strategic projects.	解放军的入侵威胁了印度的军事基地，其目的大概是遏制印度切断中国驻巴基斯坦吉尔吉特-巴尔蒂斯坦地区（Gilgit-Baltistan，中国在此扩大了驻军和战略工程规模）军队和工人的补给的能力。


To guard those projects, several thousand Chinese troops reportedly have been deployed in the rebellious, predominantly Shia region, which is closed to the outside world.	为了保卫这些工程，据报道几千中国军队已部署在这一什叶派占多数的对与外部世界隔绝的叛乱区。


For India, the Chinese incursion also threatens its access to the 6,300-meter-high Siachen Glacier, to the west of Depsang.	对印度来说，中国的入侵还威胁了它对达普桑以西的海拔6300米锡亚琴冰川（Siachen Glacier）的接近。


Pakistan claims the Indian-controlled glacier, which, strategically wedged between the Pakistani- and Chinese-held parts of Kashmir, served as the world’s highest and coldest battleground (and one of the bloodiest) from the mid-1980’s until a cease-fire took effect in 2003.	巴基斯坦对这一战略性地楔入巴基斯坦和中国控制克什米尔地区的印控冰川有着主权主张，自20世纪80年代以来，这里是全世界最高、最冷（也最血腥）的战场，直到2003年停火协议生效。


India’s nonmilitary options to force a Chinese withdrawal from Depsang range from diplomatic (suspension of all official visits or reconsideration of its recognition of Tibet as part of China) to economic (an informal boycott of Chinese goods, just as China has hurt Japan through a nonofficial boycott of Japanese-made products).	印度迫使中国从达普桑撤军的非军事选择包括外交手段（中止所有正式访问或重新考虑承认西藏为中国一部分）和经济手段（非正式抵制中国货，正如中国通过非官方抵制日货那样给日本造成损失）。


A possible military response could involve the Indian army establishing a camp of its own on Chinese territory elsewhere that China’s leaders regard as highly strategic.	可能的军事应对手段包括派遣印军在中国领导人视为高度战略重要性的其他地区中国领土建立军营。


But, before it can exercise any option credibly, India needs a stable government.	但是，在可信地执行任何选择之前，印度需要一个稳定的政府。


Until then, China will continue to press its claims by whatever means – fair or foul – it deems advantageous.	在此之前，中国将继续无所不用其极地利用形势声张自己的主张。


Chinese Values?	中国价值观？


BERLIN – There can be little reasonable doubt today that the People’s Republic of China will dominate the world of the twenty-first century.	发自柏林——如今我们已经没有什么理由去怀疑中华人民共和国会在21世纪主导整个世界。


The country’s rapid economic growth, strategic potential, huge internal market, and enormous investment in infrastructure, education, and research and development, as well as its massive military buildup, will see to that.	该国高速的经济增长，战略潜力，庞大的国内市场以及对基础设施，教育和科研的巨额投资，还有大规模军备建设都证明了这一判断。


This means that, in political and economic terms, we are entering an East and Southeast Asian century.	这意味着，在政治和经济意义上，我们正在进入一个东亚和东南亚的世纪。


Lest we forget, the outcome for the world would have been far worse if China’s ascent had failed.	必须认识到的是，如果没有中国的成功崛起，这个世界肯定是一番更糟糕的景象。


But what will this world look like?	但如今这个世界又将是何种状况？


We can foresee the power that will shape its geopolitics, but what values will underlie the exercise of that power?	可以预期这股势力将塑造自己的地缘政治格局，但在这些行为背后又会是一种什么样的价值观在支撑着一切？


The official policy of “Four Modernizations” (industrial, agricultural, military, and scientific-technological) that has underpinned China’s rise since the late 1970’s has failed to provide an answer to that question, because the “fifth modernization” – the emergence of democracy and the rule of law – is still missing.	自1970年代以来一直为中国崛起打下基础的“四个现代化”（工业、农业，军事和科学技术）政策并不能为此提供答案，因为“第五个现代化”——民主的崛起以及法治——依然处于缺失状态。


Indeed, political modernization faces massive opposition from the Chinese Communist Party, which has no interest in surrendering its monopoly of power.	事实上，政治现代化进程遭到了中国共产党的极力反对，因为他们根本没兴趣放弃自身对权力的独家垄断。


Moreover, the transition to a pluralist system that channels, rather than suppresses, political conflict would indeed be risky, though the risk will grow the longer one-party rule (and the endemic corruption that accompanies it) persists.	此外，向一个疏导（而非压制）政治冲突的多党制体系的转型也充满风险，即便该风险必将随着一党制统治（以及相伴而生的地方性腐败）的继续延续而不断增大。


Ideologically, Chinese leadership’s rejection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is based on the contention that these supposedly universal values are a mere stalking horse for Western interests, and that repudiating them should thus be viewed as a matter of self-respect.	在意识形态上，中国领导层对人权，民主和法治这类事物的抵制是基于一个观点，那就是这些一般被认为是普世价值的东西其实只是实现西方利益的掩护伞而已，因此对这些事物的否定也应该被视为一种自尊之举。


China will never again submit to the West militarily, so it should not submit to the West normatively either.	既然中国已经永远不会再屈从于西方军事力量之下，因此也不能再度臣服于西方的规范。


And here we return to the concept of “Asian values,” originally developed in Singapore and Malaysia.	现在让我们回到这个起源于新加坡和马来西亚的“亚洲价值观”概念。


But until this day, three decades later, its meaning remains unclear.	但时至今日，也是该概念提出整整30年后，其意义却依然模糊不清。


Essentially, the concept has served to justify collectivist-authoritarian rule by aligning it with local tradition and culture, with autonomy defined in terms of otherness – that is, differentiation from the West and its values.	从本质上，这一概念就是为了证明某种集体主义专制统治是源于当地传统和文化的正当产物，而自治则被定义为是一种外来物——换句话说，这就是一种与西方及其价值观完全不相同的事物。


Thus, “Asian values” are not universal norms, but rather a self-preservation strategy harnessed to identity politics.	因此，“亚洲价值”并不是普世规范，而是一种服务于身份认同政治的自我保护策略。


Given the history of Western colonialism in Asia, the desire to maintain a distinct identity is both legitimate and understandable, as is the belief in many Asian countries – first and foremost China – that the time has come to settle old scores.	考虑到西方对亚洲的殖民历史，这种保持独特身份定义的意愿既具有其合法性，在情感上也是可以理解的，对许多亚洲国家——旗手当然是中国——来说，现在是时候清算一下旧账了。


But the effort to preserve one’s power, the need for a distinct “Asian” identity, and the desire to settle historical scores will not solve the normative question raised by China’s emergence as the century’s dominant power.	但维护自身实力，那些营造特殊“亚洲”身份定义的需要以及清算历史旧账的意愿都不能解决由中国崛起成为本世纪支配力量所带来的规范问题。


How that question is answered is crucially important, because it will determine the character of a global power, and thus how it deals with other, weaker countries.	而这个问题将如何得到解答是极端重要的，因为它将决定一个全球势力的特性，并以此决定它将如何与那些比它弱小的国家相处。


A state becomes a world power when its strategic significance and potential give it global reach.	当战略重要性和潜力令一个国家可以将自己的势力延伸到全球的时候，它就变成了一个全球势力。


And, as a rule, such states then try to safeguard their interests by imposing their predominance (hegemony), which is a recipe for dangerous conflict if based on coercion rather than cooperation.	而一般来说，这样的国家随后将尝试通过强加其支配地位（霸权主义）的方式来维护自身利益，而如果此举是基于强迫而非合作的话，就将成为滋生危险冲突的温床。


The world’s acclimation to a global hegemonic structure – in which world powers guarantee an international order – survived the Cold War.	世界对一个全球霸权架构的顺从——也就是由全球势力维护一个世界秩序的状况——在冷战后幸存了下来。


The Soviet Union wasn’t ideologically anti-Western, because Communism and Socialism were Western inventions, but it was anti-Western in political terms.	苏联并非在意识形态上反对西方，因为共产主义和社会主义其实都是西方的发明，但它在政治层面上反对西方。


And it failed not only for economic reasons, but also because its internal and external behavior was based on compulsion, not consent.	而其崩溃并不仅仅是出于经济原因，而是因为它的国内外行为都是基于被迫的服从而非人们的真心赞成。


By contrast, the United States’ economic and political model, and that of the West, with its individual rights and open society, proved to be its sharpest weapon in the Cold War.	相比之下，美国（以及西方）的经济和政治模式，及其对个人权利和公开社会的倡导，成为了冷战中最有力的武器。


The US prevailed not because of its military superiority, but because of its soft power, and because its hegemony was based not on coercion (though there was some of that, too), but largely on consent.	美国的获胜并不仅仅来自其军事优势，而是出自其软实力，出自其支配地位并不是来自于威胁强迫（虽然某些时候也有类似情况出现）而在很大程度上基于人们的赞同。


Which path will China choose?	那么中国会选择哪条道路？


While China will not change its ancient and admirable civilization, it owes its re-emergence to its embrace of the contemporary Western model of modernization – the huge achievement of Deng Xiaoping, who put the country on its current path more than three decades ago.	中国一方面没有抛弃其令人敬仰的古老文明，另一方面也因为采取了当代的西方现代化模式才实现了重新崛起——这是邓小平的伟大功绩，正是他在30多年前让中国走上了这条道路。


But the decisive question of political modernization remains unanswered.	但有关政治现代化的决定性问题依然未能得到解答。


Clearly, national interests, and sometimes pure power, play a part in how the US and other Western countries apply values like human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and pluralism.	很显然，国家利益以及其他某些纯粹的权力行为，是美国和其他西方国家推行人权、法治，民主和多党制过程中的一部分考虑。


But these values are not mere ideological window dressing for Western interests; in fact, they are not that to any significant extent.	但这些价值观可不仅仅是西方利益的遮羞布； 事实上，它们并没有达到那么夸张的程度。


They are indeed universal, and all the more so in an era of comprehensive globalization.	它们就是一种普世的东西； 而且这一点在这个广泛全球化的时代显得更加明显。


The contribution of Asia – and of China, in particular – to the development of this universal set of values is not yet foreseeable, but it will surely come if the “fifth modernization” leads to China’s political transformation.	我们无法预计亚洲——尤其是中国——将对这一整套价值观做出什么样的贡献，如果“第五个现代化”为中国带来政治转型的话必将贡献良多。


China’s course as a world power will be determined to a significant extent by the way it confronts this question.	中国晋身成为一个全球势力的进程将在很大程度上通过它如何面对这个问题来决定。


Choosing Mr. Europe	挑选欧洲先生


BRUSSELS – America’s riveting presidential election campaign may be garnering all the headlines, but a leadership struggle is also underway in Europe.	布鲁塞尔--美国引人入胜的总统大选或许吸引了所有的头条新闻，但是欧洲也在进行一场领导权的斗争。


Right now, all eyes are on the undeclared frontrunners to become the first appointed president of the European Council.	目前，所有的目光都集中在成为第一个经过任命的欧洲理事会主席的没有公开宣布的侯选人身上。


Nobody – not even people closely involved in the process – really knows how the European Union’s leaders are chosen.	即使完全参与这一过程的人士也不确切知道欧盟领导人是如何挑选的。


There are no formal rules, much less elections; somehow, names just surface in the media to become part of the EU’s mysterious internal bargaining system.	这里没有什么正式的规则，更不要说选举； 不知如何，人名浮现于媒体之中，成为欧盟神秘的内部交易体制中的一部分。


In fact, there are five jobs up for grabs, so a complex but secretive discussion is being conducted between Europe’s chancelleries over who might do what without disturbing the delicate balances between political families or between large and small states.	实际上，总共有五个最高职位供人抢夺，因此欧洲各国政府间正在进行一场复杂而秘密的讨论，以便在不破坏政治家族或者大小国家之间微妙平衡的情况下决定谁担任什么职务。


At the heart of this process is the even touchier issue of whether the people who will take charge of the EU’s main institutions should be strong leaders.	这一过程的核心是一个更为敏感的问题，也就是负责欧盟主要机构的人士是否应该是强势领导人。


In principle, everyone wants heavy-hitters; in practice, many national leaders resist the idea of a more independent and assertive team in Brussels.	在原则上，每个人都想要大人物； 而实际上，许多国家领导人却拒绝接受布鲁塞尔有一个更为独立和张扬的团队。


The dilemma is neatly summed-up by the two clear candidates for the top job as “Mr. Europe.”	最高职务“欧洲先生”现在有两个明显的侯选人，这就清楚地体现了这一矛盾。


On the one hand, there’s the safe pair of hands personified by Jean-Claude Juncker, the veteran prime minister of tiny Luxembourg, who knows the ins and outs of the EU’s political machinery and chairs the euro zone’s ministerial set-up.	在一方面，小国卢森堡老牌首相容克尔是一个稳妥的侯选人。 他对欧盟的政治机器了如指掌，而且主持欧元区的部长会议。


He won’t make waves, but he won’t make headlines either.	他不会引发巨变，但也不会造成新闻。


Then there’s Tony Blair.	下一个就是布莱尔。


World famous but controversial, Blair is capable of rallying public opinion and giving the European project the high profile that the EU craves.	他闻名世界但是引发争议，能够团结各种舆论并且可以赋予欧洲建设以欧盟所盼望的人望。


But he’s also liable to turn a 30-month ceremonial post as the EU’s figurehead into one with much more political clout than its 27 national leaders might like.	但是他也有可能把欧盟为期30个月的礼仪性职务转变成为更为政治性的角色，超过欧盟27个国家领导人所希望的程度。


The other four posts will probably be decided as part of a package deal, owing to the need to achieve some sort of balance.	另外四个职务有可能由于某种平衡而作为一揽子交易而决定。


First, there’s the question of whether the European Commission’s current president, former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Barroso, should get another five-year term.	首先是欧盟委员会的现任主席、葡萄牙前总理巴罗索是否应该连任五年。


His early promise to be the EU executive body’s new broom has turned into a steady-as-she-goes captaincy, and there’s the added question of whether his re-appointment might turn the job into a standard 10-year post for his successors, regardless of their abilities.	他原先要新官上任三把火，结果却四平八稳。 而且还有一个问题，那就是再度任命他是否会把这一职务变成标准的10年任期，而无论其继任者的能力如何。


The choice for No. 3 job – the foreign policy supremo who will have extra resources and powers to build on the position created by Javier Solana – looks more straightforward.	第三位职务的侯选人看起来更为明显。 索拉纳创立了这一外交政策的超级职务，具有更多的资源和权力。


Solana, the soft- spoken Spaniard who was previously NATO’s secretary-general, looks like the odds-on favorite to take the new job for a few months before handing it over to Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister and ex-premier who gained international stature in the Balkans in the 1990’s.	言辞温和的索拉纳是西班牙人，曾经担任北约秘书长。 他看起来会担任这一职务几个月时间，然后交给瑞典外相和前首相比尔特，他在九十年代处理巴尔干问题上赢得了国际地位。


But nothing is certain.	但是没有什么事情是确定无疑的。


If Denmark’s prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen were to succeed as a compromise candidate between Juncker and Blair, as is widely suggested, the presence of two center-right Scandinavians would present a problem.	如果丹麦首相拉斯穆森正如许多人所建议的那样成为容克尔和布莱尔之间的妥协人选，那么，两个中间偏右的斯堪的那维亚人就会成为麻烦。


The remaining two posts, president of the European Parliament and the “Mr. Euro” job currently held by Juncker, will also have to contribute to overall balance and reflect the outcome of the European Parliament elections in mid-2009.	剩下的两个职位，也就是欧洲议会主席以及容克尔目前担任的“欧洲先生”职务也将会促进总体平衡并且反映2009年年中欧洲议会选举的结果。


The parliament is a further wild card in this wholly undemocratic and unpredictable process.	议会也是这一完全不民主和无法预料的过程的另一个未知因素。


Under the Reform Treaty – the look-alike successor to the controversial European constitution that creates the post of EU president – the parliament’s 785 members will also have their say.	改革条约有可能成为饱受争议的欧盟宪法的替代物并且创立欧盟主席的职位。 根据这一条约，欧洲议会的785个议员们也将会发表意见。


In years past, only governments could torpedo candidates for Europe’s top jobs, but now the parliament also will be able to reject them.	在过去的年份里，这一各国政府才有能力否决欧盟最高职位的侯选人，但是现在议会也可以拒绝他们。


It’s not at all clear which will have the greater power to decide the outcome.	现在根本就不清楚谁会有更大的权力来决定结果。


This uncertainty is beginning to focus attention on the fundamental question of whether the EU can continue to choose its leaders in such a strange and furtive manner.	这一不确定局面开始让人们注意到欧盟是否可以继续以这种奇怪而又暗箱操作方式来挑选领导人。


When the Union was smaller and more modest, inter-governmental horse-trading seemed acceptable, not least because national politicians could downplay the importance of “Europe.”	在欧盟规模更小低调的时候，政府间的交易看起来是可行的，这并不是因为各国政治人物可以低调处理“欧洲”的重要性。


Today, with the EU eager to play a forceful role on the world stage, a move towards a more open system appears to be inevitable. The EU’s interlocutors in Washington, Beijing, and elsewhere already make it plain that national leaders claiming to speak for Europe lack credibility, as do EU leaders who so evidently have no convincing political mandate.	如今，欧盟急于在世界舞台扮演更为重要的角色，因此，转向更为开放的制度也就看起来不可避免了。 欧盟在华盛顿、北京以及其他地方的对华们已经表明，声称代表欧洲说话的欧洲国家领导人缺乏可信度，而欧盟领导人明显没有令人信服的政治授权也是如此。


Two clearly defined schools of thought are emerging.	现在有两个明确的主张。


There are those who argue that these are sensitive and complicated issues beyond most voters’ understanding, and that more democracy would result in either populism or embarrassingly widespread abstentions.	有人认为这些是敏感和复���的问题，超出了大多数选民的理解，而且更多的民主将会要么造成民粹主义，要么是让人尴尬的大范围弃权。


Others believe the EU cannot continue being run along the same lines as in Beijing or even Pyongyang. It’s an issue that will confront any new team chosen by the old methods.	还有人相信欧盟无法再继续像北京或者平壤那样运作。 这将会是任何通过老方法挑选出来的新团队所要面临的问题。


Choosing the IMF’s Next Leader	IMF总裁人选之争


For more than a decade, I have criticized the Fund’s governance, symbolized by the way its leader is chosen. By gentlemen’s agreement among the majority shareholders – the G-8 – the managing director is to be a European, with Americans in the number two post and at the head of the World Bank.	发自纽约——国际货币基金组织（IMF）新总裁的甄选进程比预期中快，而笔者十几年来不断抨击的恰恰是该组织以其首脑选举制度为代表的管制方式：根据各大利益攸关方（G8）之间的君子协定——总裁必须是欧洲人，而二把手以及世界银行总裁则由美国人担任。


The Europeans typically picked their nominee behind the scenes, as did the Americans, after only cursory consultation with developing countries.	欧洲人通常会私下商定继任人选，美国人也一样，双方都不太理会发展中国家的意见，只是草草咨询一下了事。


The outcome, however, was often not good for the IMF, the World Bank, or the world.	而这种做法所产生的结果对IMF本身，世界银行以及全世界都是没有好处的。


Most notorious was the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, one of the main architects of the Iraq War, to lead the World Bank.	其中一个最臭名昭著的任命就是指派保罗·沃尔福威茨这个伊拉克战争的主要策划者担任世界银行总裁。


His judgments there were no better than those that got the United States involved in that disastrous adventure.	他在任时所作出的决策跟导致美国卷入那场灾难性冒险的决定一样糟糕。


Having placed fighting corruption at the top of the Bank’s agenda, he left in the middle of his term, accused of favoritism.	此人将反腐败设为世界银行首要议程，最终却因为自身的徇私行为而被迫中途离职。


Finally, as a new order seemed to emerge in the aftermath of the US-made Great Recession, the G-20 agreed (or so it was thought) that the next IMF head would be chosen in an open and transparent manner.	最终在对美国引发的大萧条的反思中，一个新秩序似乎正逐渐浮现，20国集团（G20）同意（或者设想）下一任IMF领导人将通过公开透明的方式选出。


The presumption was that the outcome of such a process almost surely would be a managing director from an emerging-market country.	有人推测说这一程序将催生一位来自新兴市场国家的总裁。


After all, the IMF’s main responsibility is to fight crises, most of which have been in developing countries – more than a hundred since the disastrous policies of financial deregulation and liberalization began some 30 years ago. There were many heroes of these battles in the emerging markets.	毕竟IMF的主要任务就是应对危机，而大部分危机都发生在发展中国家——自从在30多年前启动取消金融管制和经济自由化的乱政后已经有超过100个国家遇险，并因此涌现出许多风云人物。


Crises need to be carefully managed.	应对危机需要异常谨慎。


In 1997, the mismanagement of the East Asia crisis by the IMF and the US Treasury transformed downturns into recessions, and recessions into depressions. The world cannot afford to repeat that performance.	回想起来正是IMF和美联储对1997年东亚金融危机的错误处置直接导致该地区的经济下滑演变成衰退，再又由衰退恶化成萧条，而当今世界已经无力再次承受这样的过失。


Today, the imminent crisis is in Europe, where the European Central Bank seems to be putting its own balance sheet and those of European banks – loaded with debt from Ireland, Greece, and Portugal – above the well-being of these countries’ citizens.	如今危机也正不断逼近欧洲：欧洲央行似乎要将自身以及其他欧洲国家央行的资产负债表盈亏——上面满是爱尔兰，希腊和葡萄牙的债务——凌驾于这些国家民众的福祉之上。


This debt almost surely needs to be restructured, but, having allowed the banks to leverage themselves beyond any level of prudence and load up on toxic derivatives, the ECB is now warning against any sort of restructuring or write-down.	这些债务几乎肯定要被重组，但在放任这些银行盲目使用高杠杆并积累大量有毒金融衍生品之后，欧中央行现在对任何形式的债务重组和减记都开始持反对态度。


But it is a bit late for the ECB to describe debt restructuring as “unthinkable.”	但欧洲央行现在才将债务重组认定为“不可考虑”已经有点太迟了。


The ECB should have done some thinking before it let this state of affairs arise.	欧洲央行本该在纵容这一情况产生之前深思熟虑。


Indeed, more than thinking, it should have done some regulating to prevent Europe’s banks from becoming so vulnerable.	而事实上不仅要考虑，更应该采取一些管制措施以防欧洲各国银行变得过于不堪一击。


Now the ECB needs to think about how to help everyone, not just the bankers who bought the bonds.	如今欧洲央行需要考虑如何拯救所有人，而不仅仅是那几个购买了债券的银行。


The new thinking should put people first, and banks’ shareholders and bondholders second.	这个新思维必须以民众福祉为先，随后才是银行的股东和债券持有人。


Even if the shareholders and bondholders lose everything, with the right restructuring, we can still save the banks and protect taxpayers and workers.	即使后面两者失去了一切，只要合理地进行重组，我们依然可以拯救这些银行并保护纳税人和劳动者的利益。


Where the IMF’s next managing director will come down on this issue – and on whether fiscal salvation is to be achieved through austerity, with costs borne by ordinary citizens, even as bankers get only a mild slap on the wrist – is critically important, but hard to predict.	IMF下任总裁将何时着手处理这个问题——而这一财政拯救行动是否是通过财政紧缩（由普通市民来承担成本，而银行家只是略伤了点皮毛）——则极端重要，却也是难以预测的。


Despite the failure of the IMF’s strategy in East Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, it still has adherents, even within the emerging markets.	尽管IMF的策略在东亚，拉美和其他地区都不奏效，但依然有人拥护这个组织，甚至包括一些新兴市场国家。


The leadership contest has turned out differently from what many had expected.	总裁之位争夺战的走向跟许多人想象的不同。


Some of the most qualified candidates (in both developed and developing countries) have not received the support of their own governments that the political process seems to require.	某些最够资格的候选人（无论是来自发达国家还是发展中国家）都未能从本国政府处得到整个政治程序所需的支持。


Other qualified people from emerging markets have been reluctant to put their hats into the ring – it is a brutal job, with a travel schedule that requires physical stamina to match wisdom and experience.	其他来自新兴市场国家的候选人则对是否参选犹豫不决——这是一份相当残酷的工作，整天东奔西走，不但要求智慧和经验，还得有一幅好身板。


Much as I would like to see someone from the emerging markets and the developing world head the IMF, the first priority is to choose a leader with the requisite skills, commitments, and understandings in an open and transparent process, someone who will continue along the reform path on which the Fund has embarked.	而包括笔者在内的许多人都希望看到来自新兴市场和发展中国家的人选来领导IMF，首要原则是通过一个公开透明的程序选择一个具备相关能力，承担和认识水平的领导人，一个能在IMF业已启动的改革道路上坚持走下去的人。


Realpolitik might mean that there will be senior people from both China and the US in the top management team, but the presumption that the number two position should be filled by an American also has to go.	权力政治可能意味着在最高管理层将同时有中美两国的高层人物跻身其中，而二把手位置将依然由美国人来担任的推测也必须被抛弃。


Whatever the outcome, the IMF, the World Bank, and the international community need to reaffirm their commitment to an open and transparent process – and ask how that process can be improved.	但不管最后人选是谁，IMF，世界银行和国际社会都必须重申他们对公开透明程序的承诺——并思考如何改善这一程序。


For example, rather than nominations from governments, which often are reluctant to support excellent candidates from opposition parties, an international nominating committee could put forward names.	与其由各国政府提名候选人（它们往往不愿提名来自反对派的绝佳人选），不如由一个国际提名委员会来进行提名。


Similarly, changes in voting procedures (public voting by countries, rather than through constituencies, or a requirement that candidates win the support of a majority of developing and emerging countries) could persuade more emerging-market officials to put their names forward.	同样，对投票过程的修改（由各国公开投票而不是通过选区，或者要求当选人必须赢得大多数发展中和新兴市场国家的支赞成票）将促使更多的新兴市场国家官员竞逐总裁之位。


What we are seeing now – open campaigning, as opposed to selection behind closed doors – seems to be a move in the right direction.	我们现在所看见的——公开竞选，而不是闭门商议——似乎是向正确的方向迈出了一步。


But one hopes that campaign promises won’t tie the new leader’s hands, as so often happens in electoral politics.	但我们也希望当选者不要像在选举政治中经常发生的情况那样被竞选承诺束缚了手脚。


Simplistic ideologies got the world into the mess in which it now finds itself, and simplistic prescriptions (even of the “tough-love austerity” form) will only compound the problems.	过分简单化的意识形态将世界拖入了现在这场混乱当中，而同样过分简单化的拯救方案（即便是以“辣手仁心的紧缩”形式）也只会令问题更加复杂化。


One of the leading candidates to be the IMF’s next managing director has turned out to be a Frenchwoman, Christine Lagarde, who, as France’s finance minister, helped lead her country through the Great Recession. She has been an outspoken advocate of financial-sector reforms, and has won the respect of all of those with whom she has worked.	其中一个呼声最高的下届IMF总裁候选人是一位法国女性，克里斯蒂娜·拉加德，作为法国财政部长她成功带领国家渡过了衰退，而她本人也是位金融部门改革的大力鼓吹者，在同僚中也久负盛名。


The world should be thankful that there is at least one. Where she was born should not be an impediment to her prospects.	虽然政治总是不青睐那些优秀的候选人，但世界应该庆幸至少还有拉加德这么一位，而国籍也不应该成为她当选的障碍。


Choosing to Learn	选择学习


STOCKHOLM – The Nordic countries’ economies are performing well, and a part of the reason is that they are gradually reforming their “social model,” adapting it to new realities in ways that respond to people’s demands.	斯德哥尔摩—北欧国家的经济表现不错，其中很重要的原因之一就是它们在逐步改革自己的“社会模式”，响应人民的需求来应对新的现实情况。


But there is nothing uniquely “Nordic” about this change.	但这种变革并不是独一无二“北欧式”的。


On the contrary, it is one that others can emulate.	相反，它是其他国家可以效仿的。


Obviously, such a policy requires significant investment in research and development.	显然，这样的政策需要在研发方面大量投资。


Sweden, for example, invests more than any other European country in this area – well above the EU target of 3% of GDP.	例如，瑞典在这方面的投资超过了其他任何一个欧洲国家—远超过了欧盟占GDP 3%的目标。


Many countries invest less, and even Sweden’s 4% of GDP might not be enough, given higher spending on R&D in China, India, and the United States.	许多国家投资少于瑞典，鉴于中国、印度和美国在研发方面的更高投入，即便是瑞典占GDP 4%的投入可能也是不足的。


Moreover, large investments in R&D may be of limited use if knowledge can’t be transformed into successful businesses.	另外，如果知识不能被转化为成功的业务，那么对研发大量投资的作用也可能是有限的。


That requires adopting policies that cover everything from kindergarten training to collaboration between universities and companies, as well as an overall business climate in which success is rewarded and failure is not treated as a human catastrophe.	需要采取的政策将会涵盖从幼稚园培训到公司与高校的合作，以及一种健康的商业大环境的营造。 在这样的环境下，成功会得到奖赏，而失败也不会被视作人为的灾难。


America’s success is to a great extent based on this kind of thinking.	美国的成功在很大程度上就是基于这样的一种思维。


Unfortunately, most European educational systems are based on outdated practices and theories.	 不幸的是，大多数的欧洲教育体系都建立在过时的惯例和理论之上。


Although educational possibilities and structures have gradually been diversified, the major shortcoming of most European educational systems remains: students have too few choices, and teachers, if they want to remain in their profession, must adhere to a severely compartmentalized pedagogy.	虽然教育的可能性和结构已经被逐渐多元化，但大多数欧洲教育体系的重大缺陷仍然存在：学生的选择太少，而老师们如果想保住饭碗就必须严格遵循高度模块化的教学法。


As with corporate monopolies, the consumers (students) are often seen as a homogeneous mass, where all students can be educated according to the same pedagogical approach.	就像公司垄断一样，顾客（学生）通常被看作是同质化的群体，因而所有的学生都可以用同样的教学方式来教育。


But schools must be able to meet the needs and abilities of individual children in a way that makes learning a stimulating adventure.	但学校必须通过将学习变成一种具有启发性的历险活动从而能够适应不同学生个体的需求和能力。


Other countries might find Sweden’s system worth studying.	其他国家可能会发现瑞典的体系值得研究。


Its schools are financed by local communities and work within the framework of a national curriculum designed by the parliament and government.	它的学校通过各地的社区获得资助，并在议会和政府制定的课程框架内开展教学活动。


But, while everyone must follow these rules, individual schools are run in a competitive manner.	但是，尽管所有学校都必须遵守这些规定，而每一个学校都是以一种竞争的方式运作。


Anyone – parents, teachers, or even companies – can apply for a license to operate a school.	任何人—父母、老师甚至公司—都可以申请办学校的许可。


The National School Board is, in principle, instructed to approve an application if the proposed school is likely to fulfill the national goals and has a solid financial base.	从原则上讲，如果提出申请的学校有达到国家目标的实力和稳定的财政基础，那么国家教育委员会都会批准其申请。


Moreover, private schools are not seen as mere supplements to public schools, but as fully-fledged alternatives, so they need not offer something different.	另外，私立学校不止被看作是对公立学校的补充，而是另一种完备的选择，所以它们也不需要别出心裁。


A community where a private school offers its services must support it with the same amount of money, or vouchers, per student that it provides to public schools.	私立学校所在的社区必须在资金支持和给予每个学生的教育凭证上给它和公立学校同等的待遇。


The amount of financing per student is the same, and schools that receive vouchers cannot charge additional fees.	每个学生获得的资金是相同的，得到教育凭证的学校不得再收取额外的费用。


After this system was adopted in the 1990’s, many non-public schools were established.	当这一体系在1990年代实施之后，许多非公立学校应运而生。


The pioneers were often parents’ or teachers’ cooperatives, usually with a special pedagogical philosophy.	其先行者往往是持有某种独特教学观的父母或教师的合作体。


Companies operating chains of schools later came to play an important role as well.	经营连锁办学的公司随后也扮演了重要角色。


As a result, the variety of schools has increased throughout Sweden.	其结果是不同种类的学校在瑞典快速增长。


The voucher system means that all students, irrespective of family income, can attend the school of their choice.	凭证制度意味着所有的学生，不论家庭收入，都能自主择校。


Even in rural areas, there is now a wide choice of schools, and it seems that competition has improved the overall quality of Swedish schools, as non-public schools’ very existence has created a demand for reform of public schools.	即便是在农村地区，学生也有众多的学校可以选择。


If there is any difference, it seems that non-public schools often are better than public schools in dealing with children with learning problems.	由于非公立学校的存在造成了对公立学校进行改革的需求，所以竞争似乎使瑞典学校的整体素质得到了提升。


There are, of course many alternatives to what Sweden has done to revitalize education.	当然，在振兴教育方面除了瑞典的做法还有其他的选择。


But three features of Sweden’s reform seem particularly important: it was based on a combination of public and market systems; it was general in form, without demanding that non-public schools be special in order to be licensed; and it covered all students.	但瑞典的改革有三个特点似乎特别重要：它是建立在公共和市场体系结合的基础之上； 它在形式上具有普遍性，没有规定非公立学校必须与众不同才能获得办学许可；


Sweden’s voucher educational system is probably the most ambitions of its kind in the world.	瑞典的凭证教育制度很可能是世界上的同类制度中最为雄心勃勃的。


This is all the more remarkable insofar as the principle of competition on which it relies has taken root in a country where competition within the area of public services has not generally been accepted.	在一个公共服务领域内的竞争还没有被完全接受的国家，其教育制度所依赖的竞争原则能够如此深入人心，也更凸显其卓尔不凡。


Reuniting the United Kingdom	重新统一英国


LONDON – In the end, democracy came to the rescue.	伦敦—最终，民主得到了救赎。


The people of Scotland voted by a comfortable margin of about 10% to remain part of the United Kingdom – not least because of the campaigning of three Labour politicians, Alastair Darling, Gordon Brown, and Jim Murphy.	苏格兰人民以令人舒心的10%优势继续成为英国的一部分——这是三位工党政治家阿拉斯代尔·达令（Alastair Darling）、戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）和吉姆·墨菲（Jim Murphy）活动的功劳。


At times, it seemed that the result would be much closer, or even that we British might engineer the dismemberment of our country, which for centuries has brought together four national communities: England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.	有好几次，结局已经无比接近，甚至于我们英国人有可能促成我们的祖国的分解。 几个世纪以来，英国由四个民族社会（national community）组成：英格兰、威尔士、北爱尔兰和苏格兰。


The Scots have been part of the British state for more than 300 years, at the heart of the Protestant, imperial, adventuring, outward-looking culture that forged Britain’s identity.	苏格兰人成为英国的一部分已逾三百年，他们是铸就英国身份的新教、帝国、冒险和向外看文化的中流砥柱。


Still, that identity has been fractured; I hope not beyond repair.	尽管如此，这一身份一直是断裂的； 我希望这不会无法修复。


In any case, things will never be quite the same again.	无论如何，破镜即使重圆，也不再是原来的镜子。


Now, the people of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland – not rejected, after all – must behave as well as possible to salvage something workable from the sometimes bitter and divisive arguments.	如今，英格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰人民——毕竟它们没有被拒绝——必须竭尽所能从有时相当令人不快的分裂言论中挽回一些行得通的东西。


We have to display magnanimity – a difficult enough virtue to practice at the best of times.	我们必须表现出宽宏大量——这即使在最好的时代也相当难能可贵。


Before trying to rise to this challenge, what can we learn from this walk along the cliff edge?	在试图奋起应对这一挑战前，我们可以从这次几乎走到悬崖边的经历中学到什么？


Despite the huge turnout on polling day in Scotland, referendums are a lamentable way of trying to settle big political issues.	尽管苏格兰投票日群情雀跃，但用公投作为解决重大政治问题的办法实属悲哀。


Those who established and developed parliamentary democracy in Britain knew this very well.	建立和发展了英国议会民主的人十分清楚这一点。


Referendums are the favorite device of populists and would-be dictators.	公投是民粹主义者和潜在独裁者的最爱。


One vote on one day subsumes complex matters with one ballot question, which in any event is frequently not the question that many people actually answer.	在某一天投一票将复杂问题归结为公民投票问题，而这往往不是许多人实际所回答的问题。


Parliamentary democracies should have nothing to do with them.	议会民主应该和公投绝缘。


In the event, we did not dispose of 300 years of shared experience and common prosperity on one Thursday in September 2014.	最终，300年的共同经验和共同繁荣没有葬送在2014年9月的某个星期四。


But there are three reasons why we seemed at times to come so close to that outcome, none of which reflect well on the British political process or, in my view, justify the claim that our future will, and must, be different.	但有三个理由可以说明我们距离这一结果相当接近，其中没有一个原因能很好地反应英国政治程序或者（在我看来）证明我们的未来将会也必须不同。


First, while Scottish nationalism has many honorable roots and aspirations, the campaign and its incubation showed a nasty tinge of chauvinism and an occasionally brutish hostility toward pluralism, reflected, for example, in the intimidation of some journalists.	首先，尽管苏格兰民族主义拥有可歌可泣的传统和壮志，但该运动及其酝酿表现出令人厌恶的沙文主义色彩，并且时不时对多元主义表现出粗野的敌意——比如，不少记者的恫吓就是明证。


Overall, the English took on the role of what philosophers and social scientists call the “other,” an alien threatening force, in the pro-independence campaign.	总体而言，在亲独立运动中，英国扮演了哲学家和社会学家所谓的“他者”，一种外部威胁势力。


The English were every day’s villains.	英格兰人是天天与苏格兰人相伴的恶棍。


Now we have to try to forget all of that.	现在我们必须把这些全部忘掉。


Second, Britain, like other countries in Europe, is suffering from the rise of angry, populist, anti-enlightenment political forces, fueled by conspiracy theories.	其次，与欧洲其他国家一样，英国正在经历愤怒的民粹主义反启蒙政治势力的崛起，其背后的推动力是阴谋论。


In England, the electoral success of the UK Independence Party is one such example.	在英格兰，英国独立党（UK Independence Party）在选举中的成功就是这样的例子。


Demagogues stack prejudices atop half-truths, and any attempt to connect discussion with reality is shot through with contemptuous accusations of dishonesty and self-interest.	蛊惑民心的政客堆砌半真不假的信息，以此产生偏见，而一切试图让讨论与现实联系起来的努力都通过侮辱性的撒谎和自私指责打压下去。


Responsible political leaders will have to be more aggressive, bold, and vigorous in confronting such interlocutors.	在面对这样的对话者时，负责任的政治领导人必须更加积极、果断和强势。


Finally, as far as policy is concerned, we Britons have deluded ourselves to think that our system of government – increasingly shown to be unrepresentative, inefficient, and over-centralized – could survive with a little tinkering here and there.	最后，就政策而言，我们英国人自欺欺人地相信我们的政府体系可以通过零敲碎打的修补生存下去。 而事实上，这一体系的代表性越来越低，越来越低效，越来越过度集中。


This belief has suited the two main political parties.	这一信念适用于两大主要党派。


Labour has sought to avoid a constitutional debate, because any move in the direction of federal institutions requires addressing the party’s over-representation in the UK parliament.	工党寻求避免宪政争论，因为任何联邦制度方向的变化都要求该党在英国议会获得多数代表权。


It is unfair to give ever more power to a Scottish parliament while continuing to give Labour, which controls 41 Scottish constituencies in the House of Commons, disproportionate say over what happens in England.	在给予苏格兰议会更大权力的同时继续让控制着下议院41个苏格兰选区的工党拥有英格兰事务的优势发言权是不公平的。


As for the Conservatives, the party has allowed its belief in the union of the country’s constituent parts to foreclose any discussion of how that union can be modernized.	至于保守党，其关于英国各部分联盟的信念杜绝了任何关于如何让联盟现代化的讨论。


If we are to prevent the UK from rattling to pieces, we have to change the way we govern ourselves.	如果我们想防止英国分崩离析，就必须改变我们管理我们自己的方式。


The pace that Prime Minister David Cameron has now proposed for this process is breathtaking.	首相卡梅伦目前对该过程的节奏把握令人捏一把冷汗。


Conservatives held a majority of the seats in Scotland less than 60 years ago.	不到60年前，保守党在苏格兰拥有多数席位。


Today, there is one Scottish Conservative MP out of 59 in the UK Parliament, a mark of how the Tories have allowed themselves to be frozen out of some parts of the country.	如今，，苏格兰保守党议员只占英国议会的59分之一，这充分说明了保守党是如何让自己被驱逐出英国的某些部分之外的。


In some respects, this is the biggest challenge of all to the UK’s political culture.	从某些角度看，这是所有人都必须面对的英国政治文化的最大挑战。


Conservatives are losing touch with parts of the country where once they were strong – not just Scotland, but also cities and the north of England – and there is a growing disconnect between the party and Britain’s increasingly important minority ethnic groups.	保守党正在脱离英国某些他们曾经很强的部分——不仅有苏格兰，还包括北英格兰的一些城市——并且与英国日益重要的少数族裔群体也在日益失去联系。


Some of the same problems affect Labour.	工党也受到一些同样的问题的困扰。


Both big parties will have to address these issues as we start on the long and difficult task of reforming a UK that has lost some of the glue of affinity and solidarity that has held it together for so long.	两大党都必须解决这些问题，这样，我们才能够开始改革英国这一漫长而艰巨的任务——这个国家已经失去了部分亲和力和让其团结了如此之久的凝聚力。


For some British citizens south of the Scottish border, it will be difficult to act with the goodwill now required to recover from the referendum episode.	对苏格兰边界以南的一些英国公民来说，要他们带着从公投事件中恢复所必须的良好意愿行动将十分困难。


I do not know how much Alex Salmond, the now-resigned Scottish Nationalist Party leader who pressed for the referendum, is responsible for the surge in his own party’s support; but I suspect that he may, alas, have galvanized all too much nationalist sentiment in England.	我不知道敦促举行公投、现已辞职的苏格兰民为族党（Scottish Nationalist Party）领导人阿莱克斯·萨尔蒙德（Alex Salmond）在其政党支持率上升中居功几何； 但我怀疑，唉，他给英格兰带来了太多的民族主义情绪。


I heard one commentator claiming that the referendum campaign was “beautiful.”	我听一位评论家声称，公投运动是“美丽的”。


Perhaps in the end, we really could “trust the people,” and that is an invigorating thought.	也许最终我们真的可以“相信人民”，这是一个令人振奋的想法。


Let others, who oppose democracy in their own countries, take note.	让其他在本国反对民主的人注意吧。


But the campaign did come perilously close at times to being a triumph for un-reason.	但这场运动确实有好几次接近于非理性者获得胜利，令人捏一把冷汗。


The challenge now is to figure out how to banish half-truths and big lies from our politics and restore reason and moderation to our divided land.	现在的挑战是指出如何将半真不假和大谎言驱逐出我们的政治，并为我们的分裂之地重塑理性和节制。


What I Learned From Vladimir Putin	我了解的普京


LONDON – Is Russian President Vladimir Putin, like most political leaders, predisposed to spinning the truth for his own benefit?	伦敦——俄罗斯总统普京是否像多数政治领袖一样愿意为自身利益而扭曲真相？


Or does he go far beyond that, governing Russia and dealing with his neighbors and the rest of the world with reckless mendacity, abetted by a supine national media?	或者他还远不止于此，在懒散成性的国内媒体教唆下，依赖不计后果的谎言来治理俄罗斯、与邻国和世界各国打交道。


Sometimes, in answering questions like this, we can draw not only on what we have heard and seen, but also on personal experience.	有时要想回答这样的问题，我们不仅需要借鉴自己的耳闻目睹，个人经验也非常必要。


I first met Putin in October 1999 in Helsinki, when I was attending a European Union-Russia summit as the EU’s external affairs commissioner.	1999年10月我作为欧盟对外事务专员出席欧盟-俄罗斯首脑会议时第一次见到普京。


President Boris Yeltsin canceled his attendance at the last moment; he was “indisposed.”	叶利钦总统最后一刻以“身体不适”为由取消了参会计划；


In his place, Yeltsin sent the new acting prime minister, Vladimir Putin, whose behavior confirmed the wisdom of the observation that you can take the man out of the KGB, but you can’t take the KGB out of the man.	而是派新任代总理普京替他出席，普京的所作所为证实了这句话的正确性：你可以把人调离克格勃，但克格勃的印记会伴随这个人一生。


Preparing for the meeting in the early morning, the EU team heard that there had been an explosion in Grozny, Chechnya’s capital, killing several people.	清早起来筹备会议时，欧盟代表团听说车臣首府格罗兹尼发生爆炸并致数人死亡。


When Putin arrived, we asked him about it.	普京抵达时，我们向他了解情况。


He claimed to know nothing, but promised to find out by lunch what had happened.	他说他并不清楚，但承诺会在午饭时通报情况。


At our lunchtime discussion, he reported that the explosion had been caused by Chechen terrorists who were running their own arms bazaar.	午餐讨论期间他汇报说爆炸是由经营武器市场的车臣恐怖分子造成的。


By this time, we knew that the deaths had been caused by a Russian military assault; it subsequently came to light that a wave of Russian ballistic missiles (probably Scuds) had killed more than a hundred people.	而此时我们已经知道是俄军进攻导致了这些人死亡； 之后又传出俄罗斯发射的一波弹道导弹（很可能是飞毛腿导弹）已经导致超过百人死亡。


Putin had looked us in the eye and lied, almost certainly aware that we knew he was lying.	普京直视着我们的眼睛说了谎，他几乎肯定知道我们明白他说的不是真话。


The communiqué that day made no mention of Chechnya, but enunciated the usual “blah blah” about shared values, belief in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and the need for strategic cooperation.	当天的公报并未提及车臣，而是大谈特谈以往那套“共同价值观”、民主、人权、法治信念和战略合作等空话。


I can recall countless instances of – how can I best put it? – Putin and his colleagues economizing with the truth on a spectacular scale.	我可以举出——我该怎么形容才好——不计其数的实例，证明普京及其同事大肆利用真相。


On Chechnya, they regularly reported either that they had received no complaints from the EU about humanitarian relief, or that they were complying with the United Nations code on relief efforts; they were duplicitous on both counts.	在车臣问题上，他们一直报告说没有接到欧盟的任何投诉，或称一直严格遵守联合国救援活动相关守则； 其实他们在两个问题上一直是两面三刀。


Similar dissembling characterized negotiations on trade, partnership agreements, the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe, and access to Kaliningrad.	此外他们在贸易、伙伴关系协定、欧盟东扩和进入加里宁格勒等问题上一直在耍花招。


Against this background, I find it difficult to believe any of Putin’s account of what has been happening in Ukraine – a view shared by many seasoned observers in Poland and the Baltic states.	在这样的背景下，我觉得很难相信普京口中乌克兰发生了什么——波兰和波罗的海国家的许多资深观察家也秉承同样的看法。


Putin does not want to preside over a country with a declining population and a footprint that is largely Asian.	普京不甘心担任一个人口缩减、势力范围仅限于亚洲的国家的总统。


He wishes, like a modern czar, to re-create the historic Slav state of Russia, incorporating Ukraine, and to rebuild, albeit in a different form, the Kremlin’s lost empire.	他像现代沙皇般希望重新打造曾在历史上一度辉煌的俄罗斯斯拉夫国，吞并乌克兰，并重建（尽管以另一种形式）克里姆林宫的失落帝国。


The Eurasian Union – Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – is to be its heartland.	帝国的核心领土是由俄罗斯、白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦组成的欧亚联盟。


To this end, Putin has always resisted Ukraine’s historic turn to the West, about which the EU itself has been standoffish in the past.	为此普京一直反对乌克兰历史性地像西方靠拢，而欧盟过去在这个问题上同样热情不高。


The EU was prepared to recognize Ukraine’s “European vocation,” but it did as little as it could to encourage this outcome.	欧盟曾准备承认乌克兰的“欧洲使命”，但它真正为此所做的工作却少之又少。


When Ukrainians earlier this year ousted their corrupt president, Viktor Yanukovych, after he backed out of an association agreement with the EU, Russia set out to destabilize the country.	乌克兰腐败总统维克托·亚努科维奇今年初因退出欧盟联合协议而被民众驱逐时，俄罗斯开始对乌克兰稳定起破坏作用。


Crimea was annexed on the spurious grounds that it had once been part of Russia – a justification that, if applied elsewhere, could underwrite the violent redrawing of boundaries in much of Europe.	克里米亚曾是俄国一部分的吞并理由根本站不住脚，因为如果同样的理由在其他地方适用，相当于认可欧洲大部分地区可以凭武力重新绘制边境版图。


Then came Russia’s fomenting of, and participation in, armed separatists’ effort to take over parts of eastern Ukraine, which led directly to the downing last month of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and the death of all 298 people on board.	而后是俄罗斯煽动并参与武装分裂份子接管东乌克兰行动，该行动直接导致上个月马航17航班被击落和机上全部298人罹难。


Though likely an accident, it was an accident that happened only because of Russia’s duplicitous and lethal meddling.	尽管很可能是一次意外，但恰恰是俄国的背信弃义和致命干涉导致了此次意外的发生。


So, though I am saddened by the Putin regime’s behavior, I am not surprised by it.	因此虽然我对普京政权的所作所为感到难过，但我并不吃惊。


I do hope to be surprised by the EU’s recognition that what has happened in Ukraine requires Europe to stand up for international decency and the rule of law.	我的确希望欧盟能出人意料地承认乌克兰局势需要欧洲站出来捍卫国际尊严和法治原则。


There should be no more happy talk about shared values.	我们不该再兴高采烈地谈论共同价值观。


This is a time for steely principle.	现在的当务之急是必须坚持原则。


That will not be welcomed by Europe’s far right, from Hungary’s Jobbik to France’s National Front.	匈牙利Jobbik运动和法国国民阵线等欧洲极右翼政党肯定不以为然。


They love Putin.	普京是他们眼中的宠儿。


But Ukraine has proved a step too far for some of his erstwhile admirers, like Nigel Farage, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party.	但事实证明即便对英国独立党领袖法拉奇等昔日的崇拜者而言乌克兰也已似乎走得太过。


If Farage had had some first-hand experience dealing with Putin, he might have reached an accurate assessment much sooner.	如果法拉奇有过接触普京的第一手经验，他准确认清形势可能会快得多。


From Beethoven to Beijing	从贝多芬到北京


LONDON – On July 1, 17 years ago, I was sailing on Britain’s Royal Yacht away from Hong Kong where, at midnight the previous day, China assumed sovereignty under the terms of an international agreement with the United Kingdom (tabled at the United Nations) known as the Joint Declaration.	伦敦—17年前的7月1日，我登上了英国皇家游艇离开香港。 前一天午夜，中国根据被称为中英联合声明（Joint Declaration）的国际协定（在联合国制定）收回香港主权。


That agreement guaranteed Hong Kong’s way of life for 50 years under Deng Xiaoping’s slogan “One country, two systems.”	该协定保证香港将在邓小平的“一国两制”方针下保持50年不变。


The rule of law and the freedoms associated with pluralism – due process and the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship – were to remain the bedrock of Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.	法治精神以及多元主义自由精神——程序正义以及言论、集会和信仰自由——将继续充当香港繁荣与稳定的基础。


Fast forward to this year.	光阴荏苒，很快就过去了17年。


On a date that meant so much to me personally as the colony’s last governor, and much more to the citizens of Hong Kong, I attended a magnificent production of Beethoven’s “Fidelio” on the grounds of a country house near Oxford.	作为末代港督，这个日子对我个人来说意义重大，对香港人民来说更是如此。 7月1日，我出席了在牛津附近的一间乡间别墅举行的盛大的贝多芬《费德里奥》（Fidelio）演出。


Beethoven’s only opera, written in 1805 (the year of Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz) and rewritten in 1814 (when Napoleon abdicated), is one of the supreme cultural expressions of fundamental human values – freedom and opposition to tyranny – that resonate in every society.	《费德里奥》是贝多芬唯一的歌剧，初写于1805年（即拿破仑在奥斯特里茨（Austerlitz）获胜的那一年），重写于1814年（拿破仑退位的那一年），是对能在各个社会都引起共鸣的基本人类价值——自由和反暴政——的伟大的文化表达。


“Fidelio’s” most dramatic moment comes when political prisoners are briefly released from their dungeons.	《费德里奥》的高潮出现在政治犯从地牢中暂时释放出来时。


“Oh Heaven!	“哦，天堂！


Salvation!	救赎！


Happiness,” they sing. “Oh Freedom!	幸福，” 他们说道，“哦，自由！


Will you be given us?”	我们会达到你们吗？


As they sang of liberty, the setting sun’s rays dazzled the prisoners and the Oxfordshire audience.	”在他们歌颂自由的同时，落日余晖让犯人和牛津郡的观众们感到炫目。


Nature underlined the importance of the message.	大自然也在彰显这一信念的重要性。


Much of the history of the two centuries since Beethoven composed his opera has centered on that quest for freedom: the fight against colonial powers, the campaigns for basic human rights, the resistance to modern totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.	自贝多芬完成他的歌剧以来的两个世纪中，历史主要围绕追求自由这一主题展开：反殖民地斗争、基本人权运动、抵抗现代集权主义和独裁政权。


On the whole, liberty has triumphed.	总体而言，自由获得了胜利。


But the struggle is not yet over; it continues on every continent and takes many forms.	但斗争并未结束； 而是在各个大洲以多种形式继续开展着。


Consider the victims of torture from Central America to Côte d’Ivoire to Pakistan; the legal harassment – not least of journalists – in Egypt; the persecution of gays in Russia and Uganda; human trafficking, prevalent even in developed countries; and the abduction of young Christian women in northern Nigeria.	从中非到科特迪瓦到巴基斯坦，酷刑肆虐； 在埃及，合法骚扰公行（不仅仅是针对记者）；


In many countries, political dissidents (like the captives in “Fidelio”) are locked up – or worse – in defiance of the clear and open procedures that should ensure the rule of law.	在尼日利亚北部，年轻的女基督徒惨遭绑架。 在许多国家，政治异见者（就像《费德里奥》中的囚犯）遭到关押——甚至更糟——本应确保法治精神的清晰公开程序荡然无存。


The extent to which concern for human rights should be a consideration in setting foreign policy is a contentious issue in most democracies, which often believe that their own record entitles them to lecture others.	在大部分民主国家，应该在外交政策中考虑多少人权因素是一个有争议的问题。 民主国家常常认为，凭借其自身的记录，它有权对别国说三道四。


Sometimes it does; often it does not.	有时候是如此，有时候则不是。


For example, the United States’ own record, at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere, has undermined American politicians’ credibility on this subject.	比如，美国自身在关塔那摩湾和其他地方的记录就削弱了美国政客在这一主题上的信誉。


There is also the question of consistency.	另一个问题是一致性。


One cannot credibly thump the table about human rights in one country, but keep one’s opinions to oneself in another – an all-too-common occurrence when, say, a trade deal might suffer.	你不能对不同的国家两面三刀——但在贸易协定等事务上，这一情形稀松平常。


A lack of consistency has been one of the European Union’s sins in attempting to establish a value-based foreign policy.	缺少一致性是欧盟在尝试建立基于价值的外交政策上的一宗罪。


The EU sought to build a partnership of economic and political cooperation in the Mediterranean region, for example, in which financial assistance and trade liberalization would be contractually linked to progress in advancing human rights and developing democratic institutions.	比如，欧盟试图建立地中海地区经济和政治合作伙伴关系，其中的金融援助和贸易自由化将通过契约联系起来，以促进人权和发展民主机构。


This sensible objective was sabotaged by the tendency to overlook what was actually happening in some countries.	这一明智的目标因为总是忽视有的国家的实际发生情况而遭到妨碍。


Many suspect that some EU member states, while insisting on robust human-rights clauses in bilateral agreements with countries known to torture prisoners, secretly aided in the rendition of suspected terrorists to these same countries.	许多人怀疑一些欧盟成员国一方面在与有虐待囚犯记录的国家谈判双边协定时要求加入强健的人权条款，一方面又秘密帮助恐怖主义嫌犯引渡回这些国家。


I have no doubt that it is in the national interest of democracies to promote freedom and human rights.	我毫不怀疑推广自由和人权有利于民主国家的国家利益。


Though these values cannot be imposed by force or manufactured like instant coffee, the world is likely to be more peaceful, stable, and prosperous the more that countries treat their own citizens decently.	尽管这些价值不可能通过武力强加或如同速溶咖啡那样制造出来，如果各国能够更体面地对待自己的公民，世界将变得更和平、更稳定、更繁荣。


This is not a prescription for a soggy policy that denies the demands of the real world.	这并非否认真实需求的空洞政策的药方。


But reliance on realpolitik as the guiding light of foreign policy has a pretty shabby track record.	但依靠现实政治作为外交政策的指南针的历史记录相当不堪。


Realpolitik brought us the bombing of Cambodia and the mass killings under Pol Pot.	现实政治给我们带来了柬埔寨轰炸和布尔波特大屠杀。


Moreover, “realist” assumptions often turn out to be remarkably implausible.	此外，“现实主义”假设常常非常不靠谱。


Trade deals often are not secured or sustained by political kowtows.	贸易协定常常得不到保障，或必须靠政治屈服维持。


Countries buy what they need and sell what they can at the best price they can get, regardless of whether another country has or has not written a ministerial communiqué.	各国以最优价格购买需要的东西，出售可以出售的东西，不管别国有没有写部长级公告。


Rather, all relevant policies – from aid to political and security cooperation – should be related to strengthening the institutions and values to which one adheres.	但是，所有相关政策——从援助到政治和安全合作——都应该有利于强化其所坚持的制度和价值。


All of this brings me back to July 1 of this year.	所有这些把我带回了今年7月1日。


While I was listening to “Fidelio,”tens of thousands of Hong Kongers (organizers say hundreds of thousands) were demonstrating for liberty.	当我欣赏《费德里奥》时，数万香港人（据组织者称有数十万）正在为了自由而游行。


They want a fair and open system for electing their government, and to defend the freedom and rule of law that make Hong Kong so special and successful, a genuinely liberal – in the classical sense – society.	他们想要公正开放的体系选举政府，希望捍卫让香港变得如此特殊和成功、成为真正的（古典含义的）自由社会的自由和法治精神。


Eventually, Hong Kong’s people will get what they want, despite China’s objections; freedom invariably wins in the end.	最终，香港人民会得到他们所想要的，即使有中国的反对； 最后的胜利永远属于自由。


But China’s rulers would take a giant step forward by recognizing that such aspirations are not a threat to the country’s wellbeing.	但中国统治者如能认识到这一诉求并非对其国家福祉的威胁，将是一个大进步。


For now, however, China, a great country and a growing power, is handling its economic affairs with more sophistication and a surer touch than it is addressing its political challenges.	但是，目前，作为一个大国和日渐崛起的强国，中国处理经济事务的手法比其应对政治挑战更加成熟和可靠。


The High Cost of Cheap Meat	廉价肉类的高成本


BERLIN – Factory-style livestock production is a critical driver of agricultural industrialization.	柏林—工厂化畜牧业生产是农业工业化的关键推动力。


Its remorseless expansion is contributing to climate change, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and human-rights violations – all to satisfy Western societies’ unhealthy appetite for cheap meat.	其不断的扩张导致了气候变化、森林采伐、生物多样性损失和人权侵犯——而这都是为了满足西方对廉价肉食的不健康胃口。


Europe and the United States were the largest meat consumers in the twentieth century, with the average person eating 60-90 kilograms (132-198 pounds) annually – far more than is required to meet humans’ nutritional needs.	欧洲和美国是二十世纪最大的肉类消费国，平均每人每年要吃60—69公斤肉——远远高于满足人类硬要需要的水平。


Though Western consumption rates are now stagnating and even declining in some regions, they remain far higher than in most other regions in the world.	如今尽管西方消费率已不再走高，甚至在某些地区出现了下降，但仍远高于其他大部分地���。


Meanwhile, in emerging economies – especially the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) – members of the burgeoning middle class are changing their diets to resemble those of their rich-country counterparts.	与此同时，在新兴经济体——特别是所谓的金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）——新兴中产阶级正在改变饮食结构，模仿发达国家中产阶级。


In the coming decades, as incomes continue to rise, so will demand for meat and dairy products.	在未来几十年中，随着收入继续上升，肉类和奶制品需求也将水涨船高。


To meet this demand, the world’s agribusiness firms will attempt to boost their annual meat output from 300 million tons today to 480 million tons by 2050, generating serious social challenges and ecological pressures at virtually every stage of the value chain (feed supply, production, processing, and retail).	为了满足这一需求，世界农业企业将把肉类产量从今天的3亿吨提高到2050年的4. 8亿吨，整个价值链（饲料供给、生产、加工和零售）的几乎每一阶段都会造成严重的社会挑战和生态压力。


One major problem with factory-style livestock production is that it leads to considerable greenhouse-gas emissions – and not just because the digestive processes of ruminant animals produce methane.	工厂化畜牧业生产的一个主要问题是造成巨量温室气体排放——因为反刍动物的消化过程会产生甲烷。


The waste from the animals, together with the fertilizers and pesticides used to produce feed, generate large quantities of nitrogen oxides.	来自动物的废气，以及生产饲料所使用的化肥和杀虫剂会造成大量氮氧化物。


Indeed, the factory model implies significant land-use change and deforestation, beginning with the production of feed.	事实上，从饲料生产开始，工厂化模式意味着土地用途的巨大改变和森林采伐。


As it stands, about one-third of existing agricultural land is used for feed production, with the total share used for livestock production, including grazing, amounting to about 70%.	目前，大约三分之一的现有农地用于饲料生产，其中用于畜牧生产（包括牧草）的比重为70%左右。


With expanded meat consumption, soybean production alone would nearly double, implying a proportional increase in the use of inputs like land, fertilizer, pesticides, and water.	随着肉类消费的增加，光是大豆产量就将接近翻番，这意味着土地、化肥、杀虫剂和水等投入品用量的相应增加。


Increased crop diversion to feed livestock will put upward pressure on food and land prices, making it increasingly difficult for the world’s poor to meet their basic nutritional needs.	越来越多的作物用于喂养牲口将导致粮食和土地价格出现上涨压力，使世界贫困人口更加难以满足基本营养需要。


Making matters worse, the shift from mixed-use or indigenous systems of raising livestock to large-scale operations jeopardizes rural livelihoods, particularly in developing countries.	更糟糕的是，畜牧业从混养或地方饲养向大规模经营转变，这将危害到农村牲口，特别是在发展中国家。


Pastoralists, small producers, and independent farmers simply cannot compete with low retail prices that fail to account for the industry’s true environmental and health costs.	牧民、小生产商和独立农民根本无法与低廉的零售价格竞争——这样的价格无法覆盖该行业真正的环境和健康成本。


And the industrial livestock system, with its low wages and poor health and safety standards, does not provide a good alternative for employment. 	而工业化畜牧业系统工资低、健康和安全标准低，因而也不是理想的就业替代方案。


Finally, there is the public-health impact of industrial livestock production.	最后，工业化畜牧业生产还有公共健康影响。


For starters, excessively high levels of meat and dairy consumption are contributing to nutrition-related health problems like obesity and cardiovascular disease.	首先，过高的肉类和奶类消费导致了肥胖、心血管病等于营养有关的健康问题。


Moreover, keeping large concentrations of animals in confined spaces facilitates the proliferation of infectious diseases that can spread to humans, such as avian flu.	此外，将动物大量集中在受限制的空间有利于传染病的传播，包括禽流感等可以传播给人的疾病。


And measures used to mitigate that risk, such as the administration of low doses of antibiotics to prevent disease (and promote growth), are creating a public-health crisis by strengthening resistance to antimicrobial drugs.	而遏制这一风险的措施，如使用低剂量抗生素以预防疾病（和刺激生长）会引发抗药性，造成公共健康危机。


Add to this the horrific conditions suffered by the animals themselves, owing to the industry’s resistance to applying reasonable animal-welfare standards, and one might wonder how the industry could have been allowed to grow so large.	除了动物本身所遭遇的可怕环境，由于畜牧业不愿采取合理的动物福利标准，你可能会质疑为何让这个行业变得如此巨大。


The answer lies in its oligopolistic power, which enables industrial livestock producers to externalize their true social and environmental costs, which must then be covered by workers and taxpayers.	答案在于寡头政治权力，它使工业化畜牧业生产商能够将真正的社会和环境成本外部化，而随后必须由工人和纳税人来承担代价。


The reality is that there are other ways to meet the world’s need for meat and dairy.	现实是，我们有其他满足世界肉类和奶类需要的办法。


In the European Union, only two key elements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would have to be changed to reduce drastically the distortions in the production system.	在欧盟，只要改变共同农业政策（Common Agricultural Policy）的两个关键要素，就可以显著减少生产体系的扭曲。


Implementing these changes would send a clear signal that European policymakers take consumers’ wishes seriously.	实施这些改变将释放一个明确的信号——欧洲决策者认真对待消费者的愿望。


The first change would be to prohibit imports of genetically modified feed, and require that farmers produce at least half of their animal feed on their own farms.	第一个变化是禁止进口转基因饲料，并要求农民自己生产至少一半农场动物所需饲料。


A clear set of rules on feed procurement would eliminate international imbalances in nutrients, and diminish the power of multinational agricultural biotechnology corporations like Monsanto.	为饲料采购制定明确规则将让国际营养失衡问题不复存在，并削弱孟山都等跨国农业生物技术公司的实力。


Moreover, slurry and manure would no longer be transported long distances, and could be used to fertilize farmers’ own land to produce feed.	此外，泥浆和粪肥也不会被长途运输，可以用于增肥农民自身的生产饲料用地。


Second, the unnecessary administration of antibiotics in feed and watering systems should be prohibited.	其次，应禁止对饲料和灌溉系统添加不必要的抗生素。


This would force farmers to treat animals individually for illnesses, based on veterinary diagnosis.	这将迫使农民根据兽医诊断逐一治疗动物疾病。


In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration could ban the non-therapeutic use of antibiotics.	在美国，食品和药品监督局（Food and Drug Administration）可以禁止非治疗用途的抗生素。


And the US Department of Agriculture’s farm bill programs could provide increased support for free-range livestock operations, in order to encourage more sustainable approaches to meat production.	而美国农业部农场补贴计划可以为放养畜牧增加支持，以鼓励更为可持续的肉类生产方法。


Of course, these actions would be only important first steps.	当然，这些措施只是重要的第一步。


As emerging-economy middle classes grow, it is vital to recognize that existing Western models of meat production and consumption do not provide a sound blueprint for the future.	随着新兴经济体中产阶级的成长，一个关键是认识到现有西方肉类生产和消费模式绝不是可靠的未来蓝图。


It is time to create a system that adheres to our ecological, social, and ethical boundaries.	应该建立一个符合我们的生态和社会现状以及伦理规范的系统。


Getting to Yes on Transatlantic Financial Regulation	对跨大西洋金融监管说“是”


WASHINGTON, DC – As 2014 gets underway, signs of a fraying regulatory relationship between the European Union and the United States seem to be everywhere.	华盛顿—随着2014年的到来，欧盟和美国的监管关系冲突信号尽显。


The US Federal Reserve’s tough new regulations on foreign banks have spurred the European Commission to threaten retaliation.	美联储对外国银行的严厉新规引起了欧盟委员会的反弹，扬言要报复。


Progress toward reconciling US and EU rules on derivatives – one of the main causes of the financial crisis – has fallen apart.	美国和欧洲的衍生品规则的协调工作进展落后。 衍生品是金融危机的主要原因之一。


And plans by the EU and the United Kingdom to “ring-fence” bank deposits are poised to depart in form and substance from one another and from the newly unveiled Volcker rule in the US.	欧盟和英国“隔离”银行存款的计划从形式到实质都不同，与美国新采取的沃克尔规则（Volcker rule）也不相同。


But the lesson that most observers draw from these increasingly high-profile disputes – that, even in financial regulation, power politics trumps the common good – is incomplete.	但大部分观察者从日益加剧的分歧中得出的教训——即，即使在金融监管领域，权力政治也压倒了共同好处——是不完全的。


After all, regulatory disparities are not just a product of divergent national interests; how effectively diplomacy is practiced and coordinated can play a role as well.	毕竟，监管分歧并不仅仅是国家利益差异的产物； 外交实践和协作效率的高低也起着作用。


For example, a recent study highlighted the failure of G-20 leaders to define a consistent and achievable roadmap for implementing the financial-reform agenda announced after the 2008 crisis.	比如，一项最新研究强调G-20领导人没能在2008年危机后给出一致的、可实现的金融监管日程实施路线图。


For roughly the past decade, heads of state have been calling on regulators to tackle big issues, such as capital standards, along with other matters like over-the-counter derivatives and credit-ratings reforms.	在过去的十年中，各国首脑一直在不但要求监管者处理资本要求这样的大问题，也要求他们处理场外市场衍生品和信用评级改革等其他问题。


But, during this period, officials have acted more or less at their discretion, leaving problems to be addressed according to different economic and political cycles.	但是，在此期间，官员或多或少地拥有自由裁量权，这导致问题得根据不同的经济和政治周期予以解决。


Radical disparities between the rule-making cultures of the US and the EU are exacerbating the problem.	美国和欧盟的决策文化之间的巨大差别加剧了这一问题。


Unlike the US, where independent agencies lead the rule-making process according to Congressional dictates, legislative actors in Brussels and Strasbourg – the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament – set regulatory agendas and write the rules.	在美国，独立机构根据国会授权领导规则制定过程，与此不同的是，在布鲁塞尔和斯特拉斯堡——欧盟委员会、欧洲理事会和欧洲议会——是立法者制定监管日程和起草规则。


And, though EU agencies like the European Central Bank are assuming an increasing share of regulatory responsibility, divergences in decision-making procedures continue to affect the rate and nature of transatlantic coordination.	此外，尽管欧洲央行等欧盟机构承担的监管责任比重越来越大，但决策程序的分歧仍然影响了跨大西洋协作的节奏和性质。


Making matters worse, market and monetary reforms have occasionally merged, with rule-making becoming partly dependent on the decisions of disparate agencies and institutions.	更糟糕的是，市场和货币改革偶尔会合而为一，规则制定部分取决于不同机构和部门的决定。


Meeting enhanced Basel III capital standards, for example, is about more than just rules; it requires the recapitalization of banks – a process that is taking longer in Europe than in the US, partly because the eurozone has had to negotiate funding mechanisms for banks and cash-strapped governments.	比如，符合加强后的巴塞尔III资本标准便不仅仅事关规则； 还需要重组银行——这一过程在欧洲花费的时间比��美国更长，部分是因为欧元区必须为银行和现金不足的政府谈判融资机制。


Now these delays are raising doubts in the US about the EU’s commitment to reform.	如今，这些拖延因素已经让美国开始怀疑欧盟的改革承诺。


All of these problems reflect the simple fact that policymakers lack suitable tools for conducting regulatory diplomacy in a world of dynamic market reform.	所有这些问题都反映了一个简单事实，即决策者缺少动态市场改革环境下的合适的监管外交工具。


The conventional means for doing so – mutual recognition and substituted compliance – were developed in an environment in which countries would spur each other to raise standards by offering foreigners easier access to domestic markets once regulations in their home countries mirrored their own.	监管外交的传统方式——互相承认和合规替代——需要一种环境，即各国通过让外国人更容易进入本国市场（只要其母国监管与本国相同）互相鞭策提高标准。


Neither mechanism foresees a situation whereby all countries simultaneously seek to upgrade their financial systems across a variety of sectors.	这两种机制都没有遇见到所有国家同时寻求横跨多部门升级金融系统的局面。