Banks had reassured themselves with the belief that countries could not become insolvent.	放贷给它的银行自我安慰地想：反正国家是不会破产的。


But then a wide range of inherently different countries seemed to line up like a row of dominos.	但殊不知当时的情形很严峻，一大批性质各异的国家纷纷进入高负债行列，就像一副码好的多米诺骨牌。


While Mexico had a petroleum-based boom in the wake of the second oil-price shock of the 1970’s, Argentina suffered from economic mismanagement under a military dictatorship that then staged its disastrous invasion of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.	趁着20世纪70年代的第二次石油价格冲击，墨西哥渡过了一段石油经济繁荣期； 在军事独裁下饱受经济弊政之苦的阿根廷，正在为发动马岛战争作准备；


Brazil had experienced an earlier version of its current economic miracle, with stunning growth rates financed by capital imports.	巴西则在预演它今日的经济奇迹，凭借资本输入支撑惊人的高速增长。


But in the end, these very different circumstances produced a common and inherently simple problem: over-indebtedness.	到头来，它们殊途同归，陷入了同一个泥潭：过度负债。


A Latin American default would have brought down the banking systems of all the major industrial countries, causing something like a replay of the Great Depression.	当时，如果拉美国家普遍违约，将把各大工业国的银行体系全都拖垮，引爆又一次大萧条。


Exposure to Mexican debt alone represented some 90% of the capitalization of major US banks.	美国各大银行近九成的资本都押在了墨西哥国债上。


The solution that was eventually adopted was considered brilliant at the time, because it avoided formal default by any of the big Latin American borrowers (though Brazil briefly defaulted five years later, in 1987).	最后所采取的办法，当时被认为是卓有成效的，因为拉美各大债务国没有一个出现正式违约的情况（只是巴西于5年后，也就是1987年，曾短暂出现过违约）。


It involved a combination of three elements: immediate international assistance, through the International Monetary Fund; severe domestic retrenchment, enforced by the highly unpopular conditionality of IMF programs; and additional financing provided by the banks.	这一套办法由三部分构成：国际货币基金组织（IMF）迅速提供国际援助； 根据IMF的贷款条件，顶住民意压力，对内厉行节约，削减开支；


There was no institutionalized write-down of Latin American debt until five years after the crisis, when a haircut no longer threatened banks’ stability.	直到五年之后，各金融机构才开始就拉美债进行资产减记，此时对银行自身的稳定性已不再构成威胁。


It was only at this moment that real lending for new projects could really begin.	也是从此时开始，新的放贷项目才得以真正启动。


In the meantime, Latin America remained mired in what became widely known as “the lost decade.”	而在这若干年里，拉美各国一直苦苦挣扎，乃至有了后来广受议论的“失去的十年”。


The contemporary European solution seems to be repeating the same time-buying tactics of the lost decade of the 1980’s in the developing world.	欧洲眼下所采取的办法，同20世纪80年代所谓“失去的十年”中，那些发展中国家所采取的拖延战术，似乎如出一辙。


There is the same combination of international support, highly unpopular domestic austerity measures (which are bound to set off major protests), and the apparent absolution of banks from financial responsibility for problems that they produced.	也是同样的组合：对外寻求国际支援，对内强推削减措施（必然引发抗议示威），并公然免除银行业的责任，尽管它们制造了危机。


Major European banks – in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – have, like their 1980’s predecessors, built up a gigantic exposure to what they erroneously thought was safe debt.	欧洲各大银行，不论是英国的、德国的还是法国的，就像20世纪80年代它们的前辈一样，错把国债当成安全债权，累积了巨大的头寸。


A substantial immediate haircut on the sovereign debt of the vulnerable eurozone countries would be so destructive that it would set off a new round of bank panics.	如果立即对脆弱的欧元区国家的主权债进行大规模减记，可能引发新一轮银行业大恐慌，其后果不堪设想。


Recognizing this problem, banks can hold their host governments to ransom.	恰恰是看准了这一点，那些银行便可以向它们的政府勒索赎金。


That is why the crisis has become a challenge for the UK, Germany, and France.	这才是此次危机给英国、德国和法国提出来的棘手问题。


The Franco-German initiative unveiled at Deauville in early November, which would require some possible measure of restructuring for debt issued after 2013, tried to avoid the immediate shock of a haircut.	法德首脑11月中旬在法国多维尔提出倡议修订《里斯本条约》，把出台强制债务重组机制的时间定在2013年以后，也是为了避免短期内爆发减记潮所可能造成的冲击。


But the pre-announcement of possible write-downs still led to a major wave of uncertainty about banks.	尽管如此，对可能减记的预披露仍会引发市场对欧洲银行业的担忧。


A long-term alternative requires some capacity to write down debt where it has reached excessive levels.	从长期来看，还有一种办法，就是当银行所持有的国债过多时，允许做一定数额的减记。


But it is also necessary to establish an iron-clad guarantee of some part of the outstanding debt, in order to remove fear of a complete write-down.	但是也必须对未到期债务中的一部分作出百分之一百的保证，预防全额减记引发恐慌。


A mechanism for dealing in an orderly way with sovereign bankruptcy would be a major contribution to global governance, and to solving a longstanding problem of sovereign-debt markets.	如能建立一套有序处理国家破产的机制，将是对全球治理领域的一大贡献，同是也可以解决主权债市场的一大顽疾。


Such proposals were widely discussed in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and IMF Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger pushed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism that would have offered a legal path to imposing general haircuts on creditors, thereby ending the collective-action problems that impede the efficient resolution of sovereign bankruptcy.	在20世纪90年代和21世纪头十年里，此类方案引发过广泛讨论，而且IMF的常务董事安妮·克吕格尔（Anne Krueger）还推动过一个主权债务重组机制（Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism），试图为债权人实施大规模减记提供一条法律通道，从而消除集体行动的困境，为有效解决国家破产扫除障碍。


If Europe could show – in the worst possible scenario of sovereign default – how such a process might operate, uncertainty would be reduced and markets would be reassured.	欧洲正面临着史上最严峻的主权违约危机，如果它能证明，它的一套办法行之有效且具有可操作性，就能减轻疑虑，重振市场信心。


And, in the longer term, we would have a viable international model of how to tackle severe sovereign-debt problems.	从长期来讲，也能为处理棘手的主权债务问题树立一个可靠的榜样。


Europe’s Triple Threat	欧洲的三重威胁


PALO ALTO – Europe is suffering from simultaneous sovereign-debt, banking, and currency crises.	发自帕罗奥图——欧洲正同时遭受着主权债务，银行以及货币危机的侵袭。


Severe economic distress and political pressure are buffeting relationships among citizens, sovereign states, and supranational institutions such as the European Central Bank.	严重的经济困局和政治压力正考验着公民，主权国家和类似欧洲央行这类超国家机构之间的关系。


Calls are rampant for surrendering fiscal sovereignty; for dramatic recapitalization of the financially vulnerable banking system; and/or for Greece and possibly other distressed eurozone members to quit the euro (or for establishing an interim two-tier monetary union).	更有各种声音甚嚣尘上，既有要求放弃国家财政主权的，又有号召大幅重组在财务上极端脆弱的银行系统，同时/或许还有人要求希腊或者其他可能陷入困境的欧元区国家退出欧元（或者临时建立一个双重货币联盟）。


In this combustible environment, policymakers are desperately using various vehicles – including the ECB, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Financial Stability Facility – in an attempt to stem the financial panic, contagion, and risk of recession.	在这个岌岌可危的境地，政策制定者们正不顾一切地运用各类手段——包括欧洲央行，国际货币基金组织以及欧洲金融稳定基金——来试图遏制金融恐慌，扩散以及陷入衰退的风险。


But are officials going about it in the right way?	但这些官员们选择的道路又是否正确呢？


The sovereign debt, banking, and euro crises are closely connected.	主权债务，银行以及欧元危机这三者其实是紧密相连的。


Given their large, battered holdings of peripheral eurozone countries’ sovereign debt, many of Europe’s thinly capitalized banks would be insolvent if their assets were marked to market.	由于欧洲许多资本薄弱的银行都忍痛持有大量欧元区边缘国家的主权债务，一旦其资产被推向市场的话就将面临破产。


Their deleveraging inhibits economic recovery.	同时这些银行的去杠杆化过程还阻碍了经济复苏。


And the large fiscal adjustment necessary for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, if not Italy and Spain, will be economically and socially disruptive.	而希腊，爱尔兰和葡萄牙等国（如果意大利和西班牙不包括在内的话）的大规模财政重整在经济和政治上都同样具有杀伤力。


Default likely would be accompanied by severe economic contraction – Argentina’s GDP fell 15% after it defaulted in 2002.	可能出现的违约将伴随着严重的经济规模收缩——2002年阿根廷发生违约时其GDP规模就随之下降了15%。


Despite stress tests, bailout funds, and continual meetings, a permanent workable fix has so far eluded European policymakers.	尽管进行了压力测试，设立援助基金同时连续开会商讨，欧洲的政策制定者们依旧未能找到一个长期可行的解决方案。


Failure will erect a huge obstacle to European economic growth for years to come, and could threaten the survival of the euro itself.	如果遭到失败的话欧洲未来的经济发展必将面临重大障碍，同时可能威胁到欧元的生存。


Disagreement among and between heads of state and the ECB over the Bank’s purchases of distressed sovereign debt have only added to the uncertainty.	而各国首脑内部及其与欧洲央行之间在购买危机受灾国主权债券方面的意见不一致只是增加了整个事件的不确定性而已。


A decent pan-European economic recovery, and successful gradual fiscal consolidation, would allow the distressed sovereign bonds to rise in value over time.	一个体面的泛欧洲经济复苏以及成功的财政逐步巩固将使危机受灾国主权债券的价值随时间不断升高。


Until then, the jockeying will continue over who will bear the losses, when, and how. Will it be Greek citizens?	到那时候，这些进程的执行者们将继续决定应该由谁在什么时候以何种方式承担损失：是希腊的公民们，还是法德两国的纳税人？


German, French, and Dutch taxpayers? Bondholders?	是债券持有者，金融机构，还是股东？


Financial institutions’ shareholders? And the fundamental problem is that how the battle is resolved will affect the amount of the losses.	而基本的问题则是缓解危机的方式将如何影响到损失的数量。


Prices of bank shares and the Euribor-OIS spread (a measure of financial stress) signal a profound lack of confidence in the sovereign debt of distressed countries, with yields on ten-year Greek bonds recently hitting 25%.	银行股的价格以及欧洲银行同业拆放款利率和隔夜指数掉期的利差（Euribor-OIS spread）都显示市场对受灾国主权债券的高度不信任，如今希腊十年期国债的收益率已经高达25%。


The crisis affects non-Europeans too; for example, concern over the exposure of American banks and money-market funds to troubled European banks is harming US financial markets.	而这场危机同时也危及到非欧洲国家，人们对美国银行和货币市场基金与受灾欧洲银行之间的牵涉情况感到忧虑，进而危害到了美国金融市场。


There are three basic approaches to resolving the banking crisis (which means resolving the fiscal adjustment, sovereign debt, and euro issues simultaneously).	在此总共有三种基本方式去解决银行危机（而这意味着同时解决财政调整，主权债物和欧元问题）。


The first approach relies on time, profitability, and eventual workout.	第一种方式依靠时间，收益率和最终的银行健康状况。


One estimate suggests that a 50% reduction in the value of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt (reasonable for Greece, but high for the others) would cause about $3 trillion in losses, overwhelming the capital of European banks.	有一项数据估计如果欧洲边缘国家的主权债券价值下跌50%的话（这对希腊来说很合理，对其他国家则较过分）就将带来3万亿美元的损失，比全欧洲银行资本的总和还高。


But the banks are profitable ongoing enterprises in the current low-interest-rate environment, because they typically engage in short-term borrowing and longer-term lending at higher rates, with leverage.	但在目前的低利率环境下银行其实是盈利部门，因为它们一般利用杠杆进行短期借款，再以更高的利率放出长期贷款。


Playing for time thus might enable them gradually to recapitalize themselves by retaining profits or attracting outside capital.	因此只要时间足够，银行就能逐渐通过保持盈利或者吸引外���资本的方式实现自我资产重组。


A strong, durable economic recovery would make such an approach workable.	一个强劲且持续的经济复苏将使这一方式变得可行。


Most European officials hope that, when combined with substantial public money to support troubled sovereign debt, it will.	大多数欧洲官员也希望能在与足量公共资金相结合支持危机国主权债券的情况下实现这一点。


The Obama administration adopted this option, following the unpopular Troubled Asset Relief Program, which injected hundreds of billions of public dollars into the banking system (most of which has been repaid).	奥巴马政府在实施了不受欢迎的问题资产救助计划（就是将数千亿美元公共资金注入银行系统，其中许多资金都得到了偿还）之后也采用了这一选项。


But some US banks, including Bank of America and Citi, are still vulnerable, with considerable toxic assets (mainly related to home mortgages) on their balance sheets.	但包括美洲银行和花旗银行在内的某些美国银行依然脆弱不堪，其资产负债表上依然存在大量有毒资产（主要涉及到房屋抵押债券）。


The second approach is rapid resolution.	第二种方式则是迅速解决。


But letting questionable banks gradually recapitalize themselves and resolving the bad debt later – perhaps with European Brady Bonds (zero-coupon bonds which in the 1990’s enabled US banks and Latin American countries to agree to partial write-downs) – won’t work if the losses are too large or the recovery is too fragile.	因为如果损失规模过大或者复苏太过脆弱的话，任由有问题的银行逐渐自我资产重组并随后解决问题债券——或许是通过欧洲版的布雷迪债券（于1990年代创设，使美国各大银行能部分减免拉美各国债务的零息债券，以时任美国财政部长布雷迪得名）——的方式将无法生效。


More rapid resolution may be necessary to prevent zombie banks from infecting the financial system.	因此有必要采取更加迅速的解决方案以防止有毒银行进一步感染整个财政系统。


The US Resolution Trust Corporation rapidly shut down 1,000 insolvent banks and Savings and Loans from 1989 to 1995 so that they would not damage healthy institutions.	美国清债信托公司曾在1989至1995年间迅速关闭了1000家破产银行和储蓄贷款公司，以防止其损害其他健康金融机构。


Scaled to today’s economy, assets worth $1.25 trillion were sold off, with 80% of the value recovered.	如果换算成当今经济规模的话，就有总值1. 25万亿美元的资产被出售并追回了80%的总价值。


The financial system rapidly returned to health.	金融系统也得以迅速恢复健康。


This approach requires judgment and resolve in separating insolvent institutions from solvent ones.	而这个方法需要具备判断和分析能力，以便将无还债能力和有还债能力的机构区分开来。


Finally, there is the path of public capital.	最后还有一条公共资本的路径。


If market-driven recapitalization is too slow, and closing failing institutions is impossible, a more extreme alternative is to inject public capital directly into the banks (rather than indirectly, as now, by propping up the value of the sovereign debt that they hold).	如果由市场推动的资本重组进程过于缓慢，同时又无法关闭无还债能力的金融机构，一个更加极端的备选方案就是将公共资本直接注入银行（而不是像现在这样通过力挺银行所持主权债券的间接方式）。


This approach prevents bank runs, because banks with more capital are safer.	这种手段能防止银行遭遇挤兑，因为拥有更多资本的银行显然会变得更加安全。


But how much public capital should be used, and on what terms?	但究竟该动用多少公共资本，在什么条件下动用？


Private capital, of course, is preferable, but, given the risk that it will be wiped out by future public intervention, investors will be wary.	而私人资本虽然更加适用，但考虑到这些金融机构可能在未来的公共干涉中遭到撤销，投资者自然会有所保留。


In the meantime, regulators are increasing banks’ capital ratios.	与此同时，监管者也在增加银行的资本充足率。


Europeans, both debtors and creditors, must address the banking problem forthrightly, and simultaneously with the euro, sovereign-debt, and fiscal-adjustment issues.	同时拥有借贷者和放贷者双重身份的欧洲人必须干脆利落地解决银行问题，并同时应对欧元，主权债务和财政重整事务。


Pretending that banks that passed modest stress tests can be kept open indefinitely with little collateral damage is wishful – and dangerous – thinking.	而假装认为那些已经通过温和压力测试的银行能在造成少量间接破坏的情况下无限期地经营下去的想法显然是一厢情愿——而且危险的。


Europe’s Troublesome Neighbors	欧洲的麻烦邻居


PARIS – Geography has dealt Europe a mixed hand.	发自巴黎 —— 对于欧洲来说，自己所处的地理位置堪称是一把双刃剑。


Europeans can congratulate themselves on being a relatively safe distance away from whatever tensions may accompany the rise of powers like India, Brazil, and, especially, China.	欧洲人庆幸自己离那些正在崛起的世界强权 —— 比如印度，巴西，尤其是中国 —— 足够远，因此也免予遭受这些大国崛起过程中所伴生的种种冲突。


But Europe is bordered to its south and east by two great regions that give cause for significant concern.	但与此同时，欧洲也与两个备受世界瞩目的区域为邻。


Neither Russia nor the Islamic world is, thus far, adapting well to globalization.	时至今日，无论是俄罗斯还是伊斯兰世界，都依然还是那副与全球化格格不入的样子。


The economies of both remain over-dependent on oil and gas exports.	两者的经济都严重依赖石油和天然气出口。


In the Middle East, this exacerbates the problem of creating jobs for ballooning populations of young adults.	在中东地区，这催生了为庞大的年轻人口创造工作的难题。


Russia, too, faces real demographic difficulties, though in the other direction as Russia’s population is projected to shrink by as much as 10% over the next 15 or 20 years.	而对于俄罗斯来说，人口也是个令人头痛的问题，只不过恰巧与中东相反罢了，因为预计在未来 15 到 20 年内，俄罗斯人口总量将下降整整 10% 。


Despite the understandable concerns of Finns, Poles, and others in Central and Eastern Europe, the relationship with Russia should be the easier of the two to manage.	尽管芬兰，波兰以及其他中东欧国家的担心不无道理，但欧洲与俄罗斯的关系相对于欧洲 - 穆斯林关系还算是比较好处理的。


The West’s relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War have resembled the meeting of two tectonic plates, with one progressively forced beneath the other.	自从冷战结束以后，欧俄之间的关系就像地球上两块挨在一起的大陆板块，不时你挤压一下我我挤压一下你。


The Georgia conflict of 2008 was the tremor that signaled substantial resistance to the western plate’s eastward movement.	比如 2008 年的格鲁吉亚冲突就凸显出“俄罗斯板块”对“欧洲板块”东进运动的巨大反作用力。


But the shifts that have taken place left Russia much diminished in terms of its sphere of influence and military might.	但所发生的一系列转变使得俄罗斯无论在国际影响范围还是军事力量方面都被大大削弱。


To be sure, Vladimir Putin’s Russia is nationalistic, awkward, and disposed to dangerous trouble-making.	无可否认，普京治下的俄罗斯满脑子民族主义，笨拙不堪而且经常惹一些大麻烦。


But it also faces acute social and public-health problems and has 1.3 billion Chinese on its eastern border, and it has important common interests with Europe, including trade in gas and oil and a shared preoccupation with Islamic extremism.	但这个国家其实也正面对着一些严峻的社会和公众健康问题，还有 13 亿中国人在东边虎视眈眈，此外俄罗斯人其实也和欧洲有着共同的利益，比如天然气和石油贸易，还有迫在眉睫的伊斯兰极端主义威胁。


Handled with forbearance and firmness, relations with Russia should remain difficult but manageable.	只要用克制而坚定的手腕来处理，欧洲的对俄关系即使如何复杂，也不至于无法管理。


With NATO backing off, the European Union stepping in with its Eastern Partnership initiative to shift continuing competition in the post-Soviet space onto a less antagonistic footing, and President Barack Obama demonstrating his willingness to assuage Russia’s damaged pride, major confrontation should be avoidable.	有北约作后盾，欧盟携自己的“东部伙伴关系计划”（ Eastern Partnership initiative ）逐渐将在前苏联区域的持续敌我斗争关系转变成一些敌意没那么浓厚的进入行动，而美国总统奥巴马也表现出安抚俄罗斯被剥夺的尊严的迹象，因此在这个区域，大型的冲突将得以避免。


Europe ’s relations with the Islamic world are a lot trickier.	而欧洲与伊斯兰世界的关系则更为棘手。


First, although Russia’s resentments may be fresher, those of the Muslim world run deeper, and are born of more profound interactions, past and present.	首先，虽然俄罗斯对欧洲的怨恨可能还只是近一个时期的事，但穆斯林世界的怨恨则更深，并且因更加深远的互动而催生，既有旧恨，又有新仇。


Second, whether one thinks of Al Qaeda’s terrorism or the presence of Western armies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe and the Islamic world have demonstrated a continuing willingness to deal violently with each other.	其二，不管你对基地组织的恐怖或者西方军队在伊拉克和阿富汗的行动作何感想，欧洲和伊斯兰世界似乎都更愿意用暴力的手段跟对方打交道。


Third, even if Europeans are a disparate group, the Islamic world is infinitely more so.	第三，即便欧洲人可以被区分为数个彼此不同的群体，而伊斯兰世界的情况只能更为复杂。


Islam is its identifying glue – but how much else do Indonesia and Yemen, for example, have in common?	伊斯兰教是贴在这个群体身上一个共同的标签 —— 但其中的国家，比如印尼和也门，究竟有什么相似之处？


The Islamic world is riven by disputes between Arab and non-Arab, Sunni and Shia, and Salafi extremists and theological moderates.	伊斯兰世界内部同样存在着阿拉伯人和非阿拉伯人，逊尼派和什叶派，原教旨主义分子和神学温和派人士之间的冲突。


Al Qaeda’s agenda is as much about the creation of a new Islamic caliphate as it is about waging jihad against the West.	即便是基地组织，也不忘在向西方发动圣战的同时将建立一个新伊斯兰教法统的目标写入自己的议程当中。


Fourth, Europeans find it hard to stomach traditional Islamic attitudes towards, say, women or homosexuals.	第四，欧洲人发现很难将传统伊斯兰教理念应用到妇女或者同性恋者身上。


Muslims find it hard to understand how we can believe our society is civilized when pornography and drunkenness are openly displayed.	反过来穆斯林也不明白一个满大街充斥着色情和酗酒的西方社会究竟有何文明可言。


To the extent that Europeans are Christian at all, we see religion as a matter of an individual’s relationship with his or her God; Muslims see it as an organizing social principle.	在某种程度上欧洲人都是基督教徒，因为人们将宗教看作么每个人自身与心目中的“神”的关系； 而穆斯林则将其视为某种组织性的社会准则。


Ours is a guilt culture; theirs a shame culture.	欧洲文化是罪感文化，而穆斯林文明却是耻感文化。


Israel is, of course, the single issue on which the Islamic sense of resentment focuses.	而以色列这个国家则理所当然地成为伊斯兰世界愤怒的发泄目标。


It exemplifies Western hypocrisy – whether over nuclear non-proliferation, the refusal to deal with the elected Hamas, or readiness to criticize Russia for “disproportionate” use of force in Georgia while remaining quiet over 1,300 deaths in Gaza.	因为它是西方人伪善的证明 —— 无论是在核不扩散，拒绝与民选的哈马斯政府合作，或者是在指责俄罗斯在格鲁吉亚“不当”使用武力的同时却对加沙地区冲突的 1300 条亡魂���持沉默的行为。


Unlike his two predecessors, Obama has had the courage to target the Israel-Palestine problem, the intractable seat of the infection, from the beginning of his presidency.	此外，与其两位前任不同，奥巴马有勇气在自己就任初期就着手处理以巴这个异常棘手的问题。


And he went to Cairo to address the Arab world with humility and respect, without shirking issues of human rights and individual freedom.	他亲赴开罗对阿拉伯世界发表演讲，满口谦虚和恭敬，一点也没提到人权和个人自由这些东西。


The risk in this American activism is that it will provide the excuse for Europeans to sit back and cheer while someone else does the heavy lifting.	对于欧洲人来说，美国如此活跃的坏处就是给了欧洲袖手旁观的理由。


But passivity would be a historic mistake.	但这种消极的行为将会犯下一场历史性的错误。


America’s Middle East interests are not identical with those of Europe.	须知美国在中东的利益跟欧洲可是截然不同的。


Protected behind its oceans, and applying its vast technological capacity to the goal of energy self-sufficiency, the United States is ultimately able to distance itself from the travails of the Middle East.	既有大洋的阻隔，再加上足以实现能源自给的强大技术实力，美国将最终得以远离中东地区的种种混乱。


Once out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US may find itself increasingly tempted to do just that.	一旦撤出了伊拉克和阿富汗，美国人就会发现自己将越来越乐于和中东划清界限。


For Europe, such distancing is impossible.	但对欧洲来说，这种隔离根本不可能实现。


European security is inextricably bound up with the need to find and maintain a modus vivendi with the Muslim world.	欧洲的安全毫无疑问将和穆斯林世界寻求并维持一种妥协的做法捆绑在一起。


Europe is not without leverage.	当然，欧洲也并不是没有力量。


It has currently put on hold a deepened economic relationship with Israel: if Israel’s government continues to refuse to stop its colonization of the West Bank, Europeans should make clear that, as Israel’s most important export market, they have tougher options at hand.	目前欧洲正与以色列发展更深入的经贸关系：这样一旦以色列政府拒绝停止其在西岸地区的殖民行为，欧洲就应该清楚地意识到，作为以色列最重要的出口市场，欧洲是有权使用一点强硬手腕的。


And, given the determination of both the Israeli and Iranian governments to use each other’s intransigence as an excuse for their own, Europe must also be prepared to use its economic muscle on Iran if and when the mullahs reject Obama’s extended hand.	再考虑到伊朗和以色列双方都决心利用对方的强硬态度作为自己行事的理由，欧洲也必须准备好将自己的经济力量施加到伊朗身上，特别是当那群宗教统治者们拒绝了奥巴马伸出的双手的时候。


European military forces will also be required to play a crucial role in policing and guaranteeing a two-state settlement.	最后，欧洲的军事力量也必须在制订和保证一个以巴两国方案方面扮演一个重要的角色。


This makes it all the more important for Europe to wake up to where its real security interests lie, and to take responsibility for asserting them.	这很重要，因为这将令欧洲真正醒悟到自己的安全利益究竟在哪里，并且承担起维护它的重任。


Europe’s Trust Deficit	欧洲的信任赤字


BERKELEY – There is no shortage of talk nowadays about Europe’s deficits and the need to correct them.	伯克利—如今，关于欧洲的赤字问题以及纠正这一问题的需要已是老生常谈了。


Critics point to governments’ gaping budget deficits.	批评家们纷纷将矛头指向巨大的政府预算赤字。


They cite the southern European countries’ chronic external deficits.	他们指责南欧国家长期背负着外部赤字。


They highlight the eurozone’s institutional deficits – a single currency and a central bank but none of the other elements of a well-functioning monetary union.	他们强调欧元区的制度性赤字——使用单一货币和单一央行，却没有其他货币联盟正常运转所必须的元素。


Of course, in all of these areas, the critics have a point.	当然，所有这些批评都有自己的道理。


But none of these is the deficit that really matters.	但这些赤字都不是真正的问题所在。


The deficit that prevents Europe from drawing a line under its crisis is a deficit of trust.	导致欧洲迟迟不能给这场危机画上休止符的是信任赤字。


First, there is deficient trust between national leaders and their publics.	首先，欧洲存在各国领导人与各国公众之间的信任不足。


We saw this most visibly in the person of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who fortunately has been kicked to the sidelines of the political scene.	这方面最显而易见的便是前意大利总理贝卢斯科尼，幸运的是，他早已被踢出了政界。


But even the most stalwart European leaders have lost their followers’ trust by baldly saying one thing today and the opposite tomorrow.	但即使是最坚强的欧洲领导人，也无不因为朝令夕改而丧失了追随者的信任。


At the end of February, for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a spectacle insisting that no bigger financial firewall was needed to protect other eurozone countries from a disorderly Greek default.	比如，2月底，德国总理默克尔做出了令人惊讶的坚持：欧洲不需要加固其金融防火墙来保护其他欧元区国家免受希腊的无序违约。


Not one more euro of German taxpayer money, she vowed, would be contributed for this purpose.	她坚定地宣称，德国纳税人不会再为此多花一个子儿。


Yet everyone knew that once the Bundestag voted for the latest Greek rescue and enough time passed to acknowledge reality gracefully, Merkel would reverse course and argue that the eurozone needed a bigger firewall after all.	但所有人都知道，一旦德国众议院投票赞成最近的希腊援助计划并经过足够长的时间来让她体面地承认现实，那么默克尔将会自食其言，指出欧元区毕竟还是需要更大的防火墙的。


In fact, there is nothing at all graceful about this.	事实上，对政客来说，体面是渴望不可及的。


For politicians to say one thing now when everyone knows they will soon say the opposite is guaranteed to erode trust in Europe’s leaders.	他们今天说要如此如此，但公众们知道，过不了几天，他们便会提出完全相反的观点。 这已足以让欧洲领导人的信任度受到极大伤害。


Second, there is a lack of trust among European Union member states.	其次，欧盟成员国之间也缺少互信。


The real reason why the northern Europeans have been unwilling to provide a “big bazooka” – that is, extend more financial assistance to Southern Europe – is that they don’t trust the beneficiaries to use it wisely.	北欧之所以不愿意提供“大炮”——即为南欧国家提供更多的金融支援——原因在于它们不相信受助国能明智地使用援助资金。


They fear, for example, that additional securities purchases by the European Central Bank, aimed at bringing down Spain’s borrowing costs, would only lead the Spanish government to relax its reform effort.	比如，它们担心，欧洲央行增加证券购买量——初衷是为了压低西班牙的借贷成本——的唯一效果是让西班牙政府放松其改革措施。


As a result, Germany and its allies are prepared to provide just enough assistance to keep the ship from capsizing, but not enough to set it on an even keel.	结果，德国及其盟国只准备提供使船不至于下沉的援助，而不会保证它能够平稳航行。


Third, there is lack of trust among the social groups called on to make sacrifices.	第三，被要求做出牺牲的社会团体之间也缺乏互信。


Italian taxi drivers would be prepared to allow more competition if they were sure that Italian pharmacy owners were willing to do likewise.	意大利出租车司机原因增加竞争，只要他们能确信意大利药店也这样做。


But if issuing more taxi medallions reduces cab drivers’ earnings, while pharmacists succeed in vetoing pro-competition measures to lower the cost of their services, the taxi drivers will end up worse off and the pharmacists will be enriched, which hardly seems fair.	但如果颁发更多的出租车执照减少了司机的收入，而药店成功地抵制了意在降低其服务成本的鼓励竞争措施，那么出租车司机就会遭受损失，而药店将会获益，这显然是不公平的。


In other words, lack of social trust blocks structural reform.	换句话说，社会信任的缺乏阻挡了结构性改革。


The Greek version of this dilemma, in which no one pays taxes because no one else pays taxes, is particularly stark.	在希腊，这一矛盾——其他人不缴更多的税，那么我也不愿因缴更多的税——尤其突出。


Survey research has revealed that societies vary greatly in their levels of trust.	调查研究表明，不同社会的信任水平大相径庭。


Economists, for their part, have shown that these different attitudes have deep historical roots.	经济学家已经证明，这种观念上的差异具有深刻的历史根源。


In European regions where minority groups were persecuted 500 years ago, ethnic and religious conflicts have been more pervasive in recent times.	在欧洲，迫害少数民族的历史至少长达500年，但民族和宗教冲突在最近一段时间更加普遍了。


In parts of the Balkans long ruled by the Ottoman Empire, trust in government is lower than in nearby regions that just happened to have been ruled by the more efficient Habsburgs.	在长期受到奥斯曼帝国统治的巴尔干地区，对政府的信任度要低于碰巧由效率更高的哈布斯堡王朝统治的邻近地区。


In regions where earlier inhabitants engaged in farming rather than herding, forcing them to cooperate more extensively, their descendants are more likely to form bonds of trust today.	在早期居民从事农耕而不是放牧的地区，先民被迫进行了更广泛的合作，其后代在今天也更易建立起互信。


Evidently, attitudes are passed down through the generations.	有证据表明，观念会随代际的推移而减弱。


They are embedded in societies in the form of culture.	观念会以文化的形式深入社会的血液。


Simply put, when it comes to trust, history casts a long shadow.	简言之，对于信任这个问题，历史起到了极大的作用。


Historians have long emphasized the importance of such “path dependence” – that events in the distant past continue to shape outcomes in the present.	历史学家很早就开始强调这种“路径依赖”的重要性，即很久以前发生的事件会影响现在的结果。


Yet they also point to exceptional windows in time when it is possible for societies to shift away from their established paths.	但他们也指出，时间具有神奇之窗，能让社会偏离已有路径。


A crisis, when the viability of established arrangements is called into question, is just such a window.	危机，即已有安排的活力出现问题之时，便是一种时间窗口。


The euro crisis thus offers Europe an opportunity to reestablish trust.	因此，欧元区��机便为欧洲提供了建立信任的机会。


Its national leaders need to reestablish the trust of their constituents by offering them straight talk.	欧洲各国领导人需要与选民直接对话，已建立信任。


EU member states need to rebuild their trust in one another.	欧盟成员国需要重建彼此的互信。


And European countries facing the need for wrenching structural reforms need to restore social trust at home.	而面临痛苦的结构性改革的欧洲国家需要重建国内的社会信任。


If this opportunity to rebuild trust is squandered, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for Europe to address its fiscal, economic, and institutional deficits.	如果这一重塑信任的良机被浪费了，那么欧洲修正其财政、经济和制度赤字的可能性即使存在，也将非常渺茫。


Europe’s Ukrainian Linchpin	乌克兰：欧洲的战略枢纽


BERLIN – Revolutions, it is said, almost always devour their children.	柏林 —— 有人说，革命到头来总会吞噬自己的儿女。 就“颜色革命”而言，这显然不假。


Obviously, this is also true for the “color revolutions” – first in Georgia, and now in Ukraine, where President Viktor Yushchenko, the hero of the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, was voted out in the first round of presidential elections a few weeks ago, having received less than 6% of the vote.	先是格鲁吉亚，如今轮到了乌克兰。 2004 年“橙色革命”的英雄，乌克兰总统尤先科，在几周以前的首轮总统选举中落败，只拿到了 6% 的选票。


By that point, Ukraine’s springtime of freedom had already deteriorated into a very visible development standstill, owing to a mixture of incompetence and corruption that cried out for change.	此前的形势是，乌克兰的自由之春已经退化成一种明显的发展停滞，政府的无能和腐败引发了变革的呼声。


Regardless of which of the remaining candidates will be elected in the upcoming runoff – the incumbent Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovych – the Orange Revolution will have come to an end.	无论其余的候选人谁最终当选，是现任总理季莫申科抑或亚努科维奇，橙色革命的历史一页肯定会就此翻过。


So it is worth looking back to the hopes that were linked to those wonderfully expectant days and nights on Maidan Square in the center of Kiev, and to Yushchenko’s electoral victory.	所以，现在值得回顾一下，想当年，基辅市中心的独立广场那些激动人心的日日夜夜、尤先科的最终当选，牵出了多少 憧憬 和希望。


It was a victory of democracy and independence over electoral fraud and naked power.	那是民主和独立对舞弊和强权的胜利。


But what happened in the winter of 2004/2005 was not only about the Ukrainian people’s democratic right to self-determination and their national independence, but also about the future of the European order as it had emerged from the Cold War’s end.	然而，发生在 2004~2005 年那个冬天的故事，不仅仅是乌克兰人民行使民主权利争取自治和独立的故事，也牵涉到冷战后欧洲秩序的未来。


At the time, Europe immediately understood the challenge and reacted effectively.	当时，欧洲马上理解了这一挑战，并作出了有效的回应。


The elections had to be repeated, and democracy won.	竞选必须重来，民主最终获胜。


Was this, in hindsight, all in vain?	这一切，如今全是徒劳吗？


By no means!	绝不！


Although Ukraine is in big economic and social trouble, it should not be forgotten that it has, until today, been saved from the fate of becoming a “guided” democracy in the Russian mold.	虽然乌克兰的经济社会问题重重，人们仍然不应忘记，那场革命拯救了乌克兰，使它摆脱了俄罗斯式的“听指挥”的民主，直到今天。


Independent media and freedom of speech have not been restricted in Ukraine, and elections since 2004 have been judged free and fair by both international observers and the parties themselves.	乌克兰不再限制独立的媒体和言论自由，国际观察家和各党派也公认 2004 年以来的历次选举是自由和公平的。


All this cannot be taken for granted in Eastern Europe.	这一切成就，在东欧的历史背景下看来，都是来之不易的。


Moreover, regardless of who wins the presidential runoff, fears about Ukraine’s independence will not, in contrast to 2004/2005, be an issue.	此外，不论谁赢得总统大选，乌克兰都不会有丧失独立性之虞，这跟 2004~2005 年那时很不一样。


This too, is a step forward that should not be underestimated.	那也是不容低估的成就。


Frustrated by Ukraine’s immobilism and corruption, Europe has turned away from the country – a stance that could turn out to be a significant strategic mistake.	乌克兰的顽固不化和贪污腐败令欧洲灰心，欧洲遗弃了这个国家 —— 这将被证明是一个重大的战略错误。


Ukraine is one of the cornerstones on which the European order rests after the Cold War.	乌克兰是后冷战欧洲秩序的一块基石。


Europe and Russia meet in Ukraine, and its fate will not only be a crucial factor in defining European security, but will also play a substantial role in future European-Russian relations.	欧洲和俄罗斯在乌克兰遭遇，乌克兰的命运不仅是欧洲安全形势的关键，也是未来欧 — 俄关系的关键。


With an independent, democratic Ukraine, European-Russian relations will have a completely different, and much more positive, character than if its role were to fundamentally change and history be reversed.	乌克兰是否能保持独立和民主，对整个欧 — 俄关系影响重大。 如果它保不住，历史就会倒退；


So the future of this big country is of great importance to Europe; in view of its own interests, therefore, Europe cannot afford an emotionally frustrated reaction.	如果能保住，情况就大不一样，对欧洲大为有利。 所以，这个大国的未来对欧洲十分重要，哪怕只考虑自身利益，欧洲也不能放任自己的情绪，眼看着它沉沦下去。


Rather, the opposite is needed: massive economic and political investment, and closer cooperation.	不仅如此，欧洲还应该积极行动起来，增大对乌克兰的经济政治投入力度，加强同它的合作。


Dealing with Ukraine will take patience and perseverance, but there is too much at stake to choose any other path.	同乌克兰打交道，需要耐心和恒心，但它实在是太重要，没有别的路可选。


This means that, when considering a “new eastern policy,” the European Union must focus first and foremost on Ukraine.	这就意味着，欧盟在考虑一种“新东方政策”之时，必须首先考虑乌克兰。


The EU’s eastern member states, in particular, must not lose their interest in Ukraine's future, otherwise the Union as a whole may soon do the same.	尤其是，来自东欧的欧盟成员国一定不能对乌克兰的未来失去信心，否则的话，欧盟迟早也会对它失去信心的。


Here, Germany and Poland will play a central role, for both belong to the EU’s six big member states and have the necessary strategic awareness of Ukraine’s importance for Europe.	在这一点上，德国和波兰的角色十分关键，这两个国家都属于欧盟六大国，并且对乌克兰的战略意义有清楚的认识。


By contrast, the interests of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain don’t point in this direction.	法国、英国、意大利和西班牙的利益未必能使它们认识到这一点。


This was another lesson learned in 2004.	2004 年的教训还有一条值得总结。


Only if Germany and Poland, together with the smaller eastern member states, jointly advocate such an “eastern” and neighborhood policy towards Ukraine, will EU policy as a whole receive the necessary power and perseverance.	只有当德国和波兰，会同其他较小的东欧成员国一起，主张对乌克兰实行“东方”睦邻政策，欧盟的整体策略才能表现出必要的力度和耐心。


Thus, whether Europe effectively pursues its own interests in Eastern Europe will depend on coordination between the governments in Berlin and Warsaw, and between them and the EU in Brussels and the other member states.	因此，欧洲是不是会在东欧坚决地贯彻自己的利益诉求，关键看柏林和华沙的政府是否能精诚合作，看它们同布鲁塞尔的欧盟政府和其他成员国是否能存异求同。


Germany and Poland should also jointly make sure that Europe’s interest in an independent and democratic Ukraine is not directed against anyone — not just in Kiev, but also in Moscow.	德国和波兰还应该共同努力，确保欧洲的利益诉求 —— 一个独立和民主的乌克兰 —— 不会引起任何方面的不满，不仅是基辅方面，也包括莫斯科方面。


Germany ’s new foreign minister has spoken of trying to recreate the old “Weimar Triangle” of France, Germany, and Poland.	德国的新外长曾说，要致力于重建当年的“魏玛三角” —— 法国、德国和波兰。


That will not work, primarily because France shows little interest, and it is an idea whose time is past.	那条路行不通。 首先是因为，法国对此不感兴趣。


But cooperation on Ukraine might eventually lead to the creation of a far more meaningful Germany-Poland-Russia triangle that could give a new stimulus to Europe’s eastern policy.	但是另一条路却是可以走走的，就是德国加强同乌克兰的合作，最终建立一个德国、波兰、俄罗斯大三角，这个三角的意义更深远，可以给欧洲的东方政策带来新的动力。


Europe’s Uneven Growth Challenge	欧洲不均衡发展的挑战


A year ago, the euro zone’s most important challenge was anemic economic growth.	一年前，经济发展疲软是欧元区所面临的最重要的挑战。


But 2006 turned out to be a good year for growth in Europe, as surprising strength in exports sparked unexpected increases in domestic demand.	但2006年是欧洲发展较快的一年，出口的迅猛增长出人意料地拉动了国内的需求。


Germany, the euro zone’s biggest economy, had a particularly dramatic turnaround, with annual GDP up by 2.7% in 2006, the highest rate since 2000.	欧元区最发达的国家德国经历了戏剧性的转折，2006年的国内生产总值增长了2. 7%，为2000年以后增长率之冠。


Not only has German resurgence raised overall growth in Europe, but it has also made growth less evenly balanced throughout the euro zone.	德国的复苏不仅促进了整个欧洲的经济增长，还打破了欧元区的增长均衡。


This is because Germany is growing faster than the other large economies, France and Italy.	这是因为德国比法国和意大利等其他经济大国增长更为迅速。


Germany accomplished this feat by dramatically re-structuring its corporate sector.	通过大规模改组企业部门，德国创造了这个奇迹。


From 2001 to 2005, there was a “silent revolution” in Germany.	从2001到2005年，德国悄然发生着革命。


While observers and commentators focused on the economy’s slow overall growth, behind the scenes, largely unnoticed, important changes were taking place.	就在观察家和评论家们喋喋不休地讨论经济发展迟缓的时候，重要但却不为人所知的变革正在幕后发生。


Without fanfare, German workers accepted longer hours without increases in pay.	德国工人默默接受了在不增加工资的条件下延长劳动时间。


This allowed Germany to improve its competitive position in world markets vis-à-vis the other large euro-zone economies, where there were no productivity revolutions, silent or otherwise.	这使德国与其他欧元区大国相比在国际市场上的竞争力有所提高，后者一直默不作声，既没有改革生产率，也没有采取其他相应措施。


It took some time for the silent revolution to show concrete results.	一段时间以后，默默无闻的改革取得了具体成果。


But by 2006, both German exports and GDP were growing faster than in France and Italy.	但截止到2006年，德国的出口和国内生产总值都比法国和意大利增长迅速。


Before the introduction of the euro, the reform gap between Germany and its larger neighbors would have been no problem for Europe.	引入欧元之前，德国和邻国之间的改革差距并不是什么了不起的问题。


The currencies of the reform laggards would have depreciated against that of Germany, and there might have been a supportive cut in interest rates as well.	如果哪个国家改革落后，那么其货币相对于德国马克的比价将会下跌，有可能还会引发辅助性的利率下降。


This is no longer possible.	但这样的时代一去不复返了。


Superior German economic performance has bid up the euro and European interest rates to levels that, while comfortable for the Germans, put pressure on the euro zone’s laggards.	德国经济的高速发展推动了欧元的升值，提升后的欧洲利率使德国游刃有余，却使欧元区的改革落后国感受到了压力。


The appropriate level of the euro for the Germans is too high for the French and Italians.	如果德国感到比价合适，法国和意大利就会感到难以承受。


The right interest rate for the French and Italians is too low for the Germans.	而如果法国和意大利感觉合适，德国就会感到利率太低。


For reform laggards like France, Italy, and Portugal, currency union with an increasingly competitive Germany is forcing an unwelcome choice between revving up their own reforms and permanent stagnation.	对于法国、意大利和葡萄牙这样的改革落后国来说，与竞争力日益增强的德国结成货币联盟迫使他们做出这样的艰难选择：要么加速国内的改革不乏，要么坐视经济永远停滞下去。


This is no easy choice.	这样的选择非常艰难。


Even with political will, revving up the reform process is a difficult task and takes time.	即便在政治上下定决心，加速改革进程也是一项艰苦卓绝的任务，需要足够的时间。


Indeed, it took a motivated Germany four to five years to do it.	实际上，即便以德国这样意志坚定，改革也耗费了4到5年才初见结果。


But the prospect of permanent stagnation for countries like France, Italy, and Portugal is unacceptable.	但法、意、葡等国永久停滞的前景是难以接受的。


Chronic stagnation is too high a price to pay for adopting the euro.	长期经济停滞是接纳欧元所付出的太过惨重的代价。


Naturally, politicians are reluctant to face up to choices between the unacceptable (permanent stagnation), the unthinkable (leaving the euro), and the hard-to-do (reform).	自然，政治家们不愿在不可接受（永久性停滞）、不可想象（退出欧元计划）和难以实施（改革）间做出选择。


So they are taking refuge in fantasy.	因此他们用空想来自我安慰。


In France, for example, all current presidential candidates hold out the unrealistic prospect of staying in the currency union but watering down the independence of the European Central Bank and its price stability mandate, increasing “consultation” between governments and the ECB, and manipulating the euro to France’s advantage.	比如在法国，所有总统候选人都提出了一个不太现实的方案，那就是留在货币联盟之内，但是要降低欧洲央行的独立性及其稳定价格的权限，并加强政府和欧洲央行之间的磋商，操纵欧元走势向对法国有利的方向发展。


This is pure escapism.	这纯粹是在逃避现实。


Approval of fundamental changes in the currency union must be agreed by all members, and so will not be forthcoming.	货币联盟内的根本性变化必须得到所有成员国的批准，因此是远水解不了近渴。


Nor will ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet be intimidated by French pressure to pursue a softer monetary policy.	欧洲央行行长简·克劳德·特里谢（Jean-Claude Trichet）也不会屈服于法国的压力，实行更为柔和的货币政策。


Trichet is a tough guy with a long history of standing up to the French politicians.	特里谢一直以强硬著称，面对法国领袖毫不示弱。


They couldn’t make him bend when, as Governor, he successfully defended the independence of the Bank of France, and they won’t make him bend now.	在当法国央行行长时，他没有屈服于法国政府的压力，捍卫了银行的独立地位，同样，现在的法国领导人不能使他屈服。


At the January meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, for example, Trichet virtually pre-announced that European interest rates would be increased in March just before the April French elections.	比如在欧洲央行管理委员会的1月会议上，实际就在四月举行的法国大选前，特里谢提前宣布将于三月提高欧洲利率。


The ECB President made it clear he will do his duty whatever the political pressure.	欧洲央行行长明确表示：无论面临什么样的政治压力，他都决心完成自己的任务。


The defining factor in Trichet’s sense of duty is the Maastricht Treaty, which clearly states the prime objective of Europe’s central bank to be the promotion of price stability.	决定特里谢责任感的因素是《马斯特里赫特条约》，条约明确规定：欧洲央行的主要目标是维护价格稳定。


Some in France – and not just the left – want to change this.	法国有些势力¾不仅限于左派¾希望加以改变。


One idea making the rounds is for the European Parliament to define the ECB’s objectives, on the basis that it is democratically elected – as if the Maastricht Treaty did not result from a democratic process.	其中一种提法是由欧洲议会来决定欧洲央行的目标，理由是欧洲议会由民主选举¾就像签订《马斯特里赫特条约》不是一项民主进程。


This high-handed attempt to highjack the ECB and make it a servant of the European Parliament would mean chronically low European interest rates and a depreciated euro.	这种劫持欧洲央行，将其变成欧洲议会附庸的蛮横企图会使欧洲利率持续低迷，还会造成欧元贬值。


France would be off the reform hook, of course, but at the expense of Germany, which would face unwanted inflationary pressures.	法国当然可以逃脱改革的枷锁，但代价是牺牲德国的利益，使德国不得不面对通货膨胀的压力。


This proposal illustrates how the reform gap, and the unbalanced growth that results from it, can debilitate the European fabric by setting one partner against the other.	这项提案说明改革差距和随之而来的发展不均衡能够如何削弱欧洲的团结，造成欧洲国家的内部争斗。


To protect European cohesion as well as improve their own economic situation, France and Italy must reform at a faster pace than Germany rather than just waiting for Germany to slow down.	为保护欧洲凝聚力 、改善各国的经济发展局面，法国和意大利必须以比德国更快的步伐推进改革，而不是等待德国慢下来。


The hard-to-do is preferable to the unacceptable and the unthinkable.	困难重重总好过无法接受或无法想象。


Still, there is little indication so far that the two reform laggards are up to the challenge.	但现在却没有迹象表明这两个改革落后国家正在接受挑战。


Europe\u0027s Unity in European Values	欧洲价值观中的欧洲统一


Alongside the debate about the European Union constitution, a debate about European values has also developed.	伴随着关于欧盟宪法的争论而来的是一场关于欧洲价值观的论战。


This debate is important not only for implanting meaning in the constitution, but will also determine the vitality and energy of the EU itself.	这场辩论的重要之处在于它不仅能够赋予欧盟宪法以实质的意义，还会决定欧盟本身的活力和精神。


The EU, being the product of several great religious and philosophical traditions, is a community of values.	欧盟作为诸多伟大的宗教和哲学传统的产物，是一个价值观的共同体。


The ideas of the Greeks and Romans, Christianity, Judaism, humanism, and the Enlightenment have made us who we are.	古希腊人和罗马人的理念、基督教、犹太教、人道主义和启蒙运动造就了今天的欧洲。


Dialogue with Islamic and Arabic cultures also helped form our identity.	与伊斯兰和阿拉伯文化的对话也在我们 同一性 的塑造中发挥了作用。


The pattern of our values has been woven over hundreds of years.	我们价值观的模式在几百年来一直演进着。


Europe is the continent of Michelangelo and Montesquieu, but also of the guillotine and the gas chamber.	欧洲是米开朗基罗和孟德斯鸠的大陆，但同时也是断头台和毒气室的大陆。


Indeed, the bitter experience WWII taught Europeans how fundamental is the importance of shared values.	的确，第二次世界大战的痛苦经历让欧洲人认识到共同价值观的根本重要性。


In an impoverished, war-ravaged Europe, people yearned for peace, freedom, stability, and a new chance to prosper.	在饱受战争蹂躏，百废待兴的欧洲，人们渴望和平、自由、稳定和实现繁荣的新机会。


The architects of European integration - Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi, and others - understood that these ideals could be achieved only by combining and interweaving the practical interests of Europe's countries.	欧洲统一的建筑师们-莫内、舒曼、阿登纳、德加斯佩利及其他人-深知只有将欧洲各国的实际利益紧密结合才能实现这些理想。


They built their fragile house of peace on a foundation of coal and steel.	他们将脆弱的和平之屋建造在煤炭和钢铁之上。


The founders passed the torch on to the generation of Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, Václav Havel, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and others. They broadened and deepened European cooperation.	缔造者们将火炬传到了Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, Václav Havel, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing等一代人手中。


Their leadership made it possible for Europe to make great strides towards its post-war ideals - peace, stability, and prosperity.	在他们的领导下欧洲才可能大踏步地实现其战后的理想-和平、稳定和繁荣。


We now stand at the threshold of a new phase of European cooperation.	现在我们正站在新一阶段欧洲合作的门槛上。


In late October, the EU's Constitutional Treaty will be signed.	在10月的晚些时候，欧盟的《宪法条约》将会得以签署。


A new generation of politicians is ready to carry the torch onwards.	新一代的政治家们已准备好接过火炬继续前行。


But is the torch still burning bright?	但这火焰还燃烧得那么明亮吗？


In the early 1950s, Jean Monnet wrote: "We are not forming a coalition of states.	让·莫内在20世纪五十年代早期曾写道："我们并不是要组建一个国家联盟。


We are uniting people."	我们是在把人民团结起来。


Apparently not.	"而现实显然并非如此。


As the Union races ahead, it seems that it has lost Europe's citizens along the way.	在欧盟大踏步前进的过程中，它似乎已将欧洲的公民们抛在了身后。


Many are turning their backs on the whole project.	有许多人正在抛弃这项事业。


They have trouble seeing what is common to Europe.	他们看不出欧洲有什么共同之处。


They do not feel part of the great whole.	他们不觉得自己是一个巨大整体的一部分。


Even in the new member states, enthusiasm for the European family of democracies is cooling.	甚至在新的成员国，对欧洲民主国家大家庭的热度也正在降温。


We have achieved a united Europe without uniting Europeans.	我们是在没有将欧洲人团结起来的情况下建立了一个统一的欧洲。


Today's post-war generations, lacking direct memory of WWII, view Europe's great achievements - liberty, peace, and prosperity - as a given.	当今战后的几代人由于缺少对第二次世界大战的直接记忆，便将欧洲的伟大成就-自由、和平和繁荣-看作是理所当然的。


The idea of Europe as a heritage and a mission does not mean much.	将欧洲作为遗产和使命的理念（对他们来说）并没有多大的意义。


But, without ideals, Europe's foundations will erode.	但，如果没有理想，欧洲的基础就会被侵蚀。


The emphasis on pure self-interest increases this threat.	强调纯粹的自我利益会增加这种威胁。


My generation grew up with the image of Europe as an economic form of cooperation.	在我们这代人成长的印象中，欧洲是一种经济合作的形式。


Political motives behind European integration were overshadowed by the economic project.	这一经济事业掩盖了欧洲一体化背后的政治动因。


The result is an impression of Europe as a marketplace.	其结果是使欧洲给人以一个市场的印象。


A Europe of markets and money, not of man and morals, dominated the project.	市场和货币的欧洲而不是人和道德的欧洲主导着这项事业。


But without a moral foundation, there can be no free-market economy.	但如果没有坚实的道德基础也就不会有自由市场经济。


Today, we are paying the price for not attending to Europe's shared values and common mission. Until Europeans know precisely what Europe stands for, what inspires and motivates us, the Union will not be able to take joint action in the world.	今天，我们正在为忽略欧洲共有的价值观和共同的使命而付出代价。 直到欧洲人准确地了解了欧洲所代表的含义及启迪和激励我们的动力，欧盟才能在世界上采取协调一致的行动。


The EU Constitution will make Europe more democratic and more transparent.	《欧盟宪法》将会使欧洲变得更加民主和透明。


It provides further guarantees that decisions will be taken by those closest to citizens, and it acknowledges the significance the values on which the Union rests: respect for human rights and dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, and the rule of law.	它进一步确保决策者将会是与公民们最接近的人。 它承认欧盟所赖以生存的一系列价值观的重要意义：尊重人的权利和尊严、自由、民主、平等和法制。


These shared values are the glue that binds governments together in the recognition that clinging to pure self-interest is no longer reasonable when common concerns call for a common strategy.	这些共有的价值观是将各国政府团结起来的粘合剂。 在此情况下，各国政府都承认当共同的关注需要我们采取共同战略时，敝帚自珍就不合时宜了。


For what is the point of doing away with Europe's physical borders if borders between its citizens remain?	如果欧洲各国的公民之间仍有隔阂，那么取消欧洲（各国间）的物理界限又有什么意义呢？


How can Europeans be happy that the Iron Curtain is gone if individuals and groups across the Union barricade themselves behind private iron curtains?	如果在铁幕消失之后欧盟的公民个人和集团仍将自己关在自设的铁幕后面，那么欧洲人又怎能快乐呢？


Indeed, fear, insecurity, and nationalism are again raising their heads.	事实上恐惧、不安全感和民族主义又在抬头。


It is important for Europeans to reflect on that as they prepare for further rounds of enlargement and consider starting accession negotiations with Turkey.	在欧洲人准备欧盟的进一步扩大和考虑开始与土耳其进行入盟谈判时，他们在一点上的反思尤为重要。


The preamble of the Constitution states that Europe is "united in its diversity."	《宪法》的导言声明欧洲是"在多元中统一。


This may be the most concise statement of what makes Europe Europe.	"这可能是对欧洲之所以成其为欧洲的最精辟的陈述。


But the words "united in diversity" raise the question of where this unity lies.	但"在多元中统一"所引出的问题是这种统一体现在何处。


The answer lies in the values on which the Union is based.	问题的答案是作为欧盟立盟之基的一系列价值观。


They are contained in three concepts: freedom, solidarity, and mutual respect.	它们包含在三个概念之中：自由、团结和相互尊重。


These three together make it possible for Europe to open its doors to a great diversity of peoples and at the same time to speak as a community of peoples prepared to take responsibility for one another.	在这三个概念的共同作用下，欧洲才可能在为高度多元化的不同民族敞开大门的同时作为肝胆相照的不同民族的共同体而发言。


Making such a community a reality will not come about by believing that Europe's culture is better than others.	认为欧洲的文化比其它文化优越的观点不能够使我们将这一共同体变成现实。


We will make it a reality through dialogue and deep reflection about Europe's common values.	我们要通过对话和对欧洲共同价值观的深刻反思来实现它。


Values must be the road that leads to what cannot be reached by markets and institutions alone - the accession of Europe's citizens to the European Union.	这些价值观必须成为一种途径引领我们通向仅依靠市场和制度无法达成的目标-让欧洲的公民拥护欧盟。


Only by embracing their shared values can Europeans prevent their Union from becoming a spiritless machine.	只有接受共有的价值观，欧洲人才能防止他们的联盟沦为一部没有灵魂的机器。


Together, Europeans must find what connects them, and derive new enthusiasm, new spirit from what they find - a spirit sorely needed to tackle the great issues of today.	欧洲人必须同心协力寻找相互间的纽带，并从发现中获得新的热忱和精神-一种为解决当今的问题所急需的精神。


No country can address these issues along.	没有哪个国家能独自解决这些问题。


After more than fifty years, Europe as a community of values remains as necessary as ever.	在50多年以后，欧洲作为一个价值观共同体的必要性仍然一如既往。


Europe’s Renminbi Romance	欧洲的人民币罗曼史


ROME/MADRID – The Chinese are losing confidence in their currency.	罗马/马德里—中国人正在失去对他们的货币的信心。


Faced with faltering economic growth, the People’s Bank of China has stepped up efforts to restore stability to the renminbi, using its vast foreign reserves to prop up its exchange rate and stem the flow of funds fleeing the country.	面临经济增长放缓的局面，中国人民银行采取了恢复人民币稳定的措施，动用其巨额外汇储备支持人民币汇率、阻止资金流出中国。


The PBOC’s governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, has repeatedly stated that there is no basis for continued depreciation, but few in the country seem to be listening.	中国人民银行行长周小川反复强调，人民币没有持续贬值的基础，但似乎很少有中国人听他的话。


In the last quarter of 2015 alone, the net capital outflow amounted to $367 billion.	光是2015年四季度，净资本流出就高达3,670亿美元。


And yet crumbling confidence within China has not prevented the West – and Europe in particular – from doubling down on the currency.	但中国国内的信心崩跌并没有阻止西方——特别是欧洲——对人民币另眼相看。


When the International Monetary Fund announced in December that the renminbi would join the US dollar, the British pound, the euro, and the Japanese yen in the currency basket underlying its unit of account, the Special Drawing Rights basket, the decision was clearly political.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）在12月宣布人民币将加入美元、英镑、欧元和日元，成为决定其账户单位特别提款权（SDR）价值的货币篮子，这一决定显然是政治性的。


Few would argue that the renminbi meets the IMF’s criteria for inclusion in the SDR currency basket.	没人认为人民币满足IMF特别提款权货币入篮标准。


It is not freely convertible, and access to it is limited both inside and outside China.	人民币不能自由兑换，在中国国内和国外都不能随心所欲获得人民币。


Some foreign branches of Chinese banks offer renminbi-denominated deposit accounts, and qualified investors can purchase debt instruments pegged to the currency in mainland China.	一些中资银行外国分支提供人民币计价存款账户，合格投资者可以购买盯住大陆人民币的债务工具。


But the volume is capped.	但购买量受到限制。


To be sure, the renminbi performs well in trade-related statistics.	平心而论，从交易相关数据看，人民币表现不错。


According to the financial network SWIFT, it is the second most used currency in trade finance, having overtaken the euro, and ranks fifth in terms of international payments.	据金融网络SWIFT，人民币是贸易融资中使用量第二大的货币，已经超过欧元； 在国际收支方面人民币名列第五。


These figures are inflated, however, by transactions with Hong Kong, which accounts for roughly 70% of international trade payments settled in renminbi.	但是，这些数字被与香港的交易所夸大，香港占了人民币国际贸易收支结算量的70%左右。


Vanishingly few contracts are issued in renminbi; the dollar remains king in invoicing, with the euro a distant second.	用人民币签署的合同少之又少； 美元仍是第一结算货币，欧元名列第二，但差距巨大。


Even the shares of the Japanese yen and the British pound, though very small, are still higher than that of the renminbi.	就连结算规模很小的日元和英镑也仍然高于人民币。


The IMF’s decision to add the Chinese currency to the SDR basket owes much to the decision by the United States to defer to Europe.	IMF决定将人民币加入SDR货币篮在很大程度上要归因于美国对欧洲的首肯。


The US had argued for years that the renminbi should be included in the SDR only if China opened its capital account, let its currency float freely, and had a more independent central bank.	多年来，美国一直要求只有中国开放资本账户、允许其货币自由浮动，并具备独立中央银行时才能将人民币纳入SDR。


None of this has happened.	这三个标准没有一个符合。


But after China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the support of Europe, the US agreed to drop its objections.	但中国在欧洲的支持下成立亚洲基础设施投资银行后，美国同意取消反对。


After all, the SDR basket plays a minor role in global finance, and admitting the renminbi was seen as a small price to pay to keep China embedded in the Bretton Woods institutions.	毕竟，SDR篮子在全球金融中只是个配角，而允许人民币加入其中被视为是为了让中国留在布雷顿森林体系所付出的微小代价。


Europe’s investment in the renminbi, however, goes far beyond political symbolism.	但是，欧洲的人民币投资远远超过了政治象征意义。


The continent’s leaders have been strong supporters of the internationalization of the renminbi and the efforts of reform-minded officials such as Zhou.	欧洲领导人是人民币国际化以及周小川等改革派官员的坚定支持者。


The currency’s inclusion in the SDR, it is hoped, will encourage China to liberalize its capital account further.	欧洲希望人民币被纳入SDR能鼓励中国进一步自由化其资本账户。


European governments and central banks are also actively working to make the renminbi a viable reserve currency, to increase trade with China.	欧洲政府和央行也在积极致力于让人民币成为可行的储备货币，以提高对华贸易。


British Chancellor George Osborne has made it clear that he would like the City of London to be the most important offshore market for renminbi trading and services.	英国财政大臣奥斯本（George Osborne）明确表示，他十分愿意看到伦敦金融城成为人民币交易和服务的最重要的离岸市场。


It was no coincidence that during President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United Kingdom in October 2015, China chose London to issue its first overseas renminbi sovereign debt.	在2015年10月习近平主席对英国进行国事访问期间，中国选择伦敦发行其第一宗海外人民币主权债务，这不是巧合。


The rest of Europe is equally enthusiastic.	欧洲其他国家也同样热衷于人民币。


Today, the continent is home to the largest number of renminbi bank clearings.	如今，欧洲是人民币银行清算量最大的地区。


Offshore renminbi hubs have emerged in Frankfurt, Paris, Milan, Luxemburg, Prague, and Zurich, and most of Europe’s central banks have added – or are considering adding – China’s currency to their portfolios.	离岸人民币枢纽在法兰克福、巴黎、米兰、卢森堡、布拉格和苏黎世纷纷涌现，大部分欧洲央行都将人民币加入（或考虑加入）其货币组合。


In October 2013, the PBOC and the European Central Bank signed a bilateral currency swap agreement for €45 billion ($50 billion), the largest ever for China outside of Asia.	2013年10月，中国人民银行和欧洲中央银行签署了450亿欧元规模的双边货币互换协议，这是中国在亚洲之外签署的最大一宗货币互换协议。


By propping up the renminbi as a reserve currency, Europe is hoping to support the liberalizers inside China and welcome the country to the core group of world powers that decide global monetary affairs.	通过支持人民币成为储备货币，欧洲希望支持中国国内的自由主义者（liberalizers），并欢迎中国加入决定全球货币事务的世界强国核心团体。


Unfortunately, however, it is doing so at a time when the renminbi is under speculative attack and the Chinese themselves are losing confidence.	但不幸的是，与此同时，人民币正处在投机袭击中，而中国人本身也在失去信心。


Europe’s efforts could succeed; but unless China makes its currency even more widely accessible and opens its market further, they are almost sure to fail.	欧洲的努力可能成功； 但除非中国让人民币变得更加可以广泛获得并且进一步开放市场，否则几乎肯定要失败。


Europe’s Vicious Spirals	欧洲的恶性循环


BERKELEY – The euro crisis shows no signs of letting up.	伯克利——欧元危机还没有显示出停止迹象。


While 2011 was supposed to be the year when European leaders finally got a grip on events, the eurozone’s problems went from bad to worse.	2011年本应是欧洲领导人最终掌控大局之年，但欧元区的问题反而更加恶化了。


What had been a Greek crisis became a southern European crisis and then a pan-European crisis.	希腊危机演变成南欧危机，继而又发展成泛欧洲危机。


Indeed, by the end of the year, banks and governments had begun making contingency plans for the collapse of the monetary union.	事实上，到年底的时候，银行和政府一开始为货币联盟的崩溃做准备了。


None of this was inevitable.	所有这些都不是不可避免的。


Rather, it reflected European leaders’ failure to stop a pair of vicious spirals.	相反，这反映出欧洲领导人在中止一对恶性循环方面的无能。


The first spiral ran from public debt to the banks and back to public debt.	恶性循环之一是公债-银行-公债。


Doubts about whether governments would be able to service their debts caused borrowing costs to soar and bond prices to plummet.	对政府是否有能力偿还债务的担忧导致借贷成本飙升、债券价格暴跌。


But, critically, these debt crises undermined confidence in Europe’s banks, which held many of the bonds in question.	但是，最关键的是，债务危机破坏了人们对手握大量可以债券的欧洲银行的信心。


Unable to borrow, the banks became unable to lend.	无法借到钱，银行自然也无法发放贷款。


As economies then weakened, the prospects for fiscal consolidation grew dimmer.	经济随之疲软，因此财政整合前景也变得更加虚弱。


Bond prices then fell further, damaging European banks even more.	这造成债券价格进一步下跌，给欧洲银行造成更多的伤害。


The European Central Bank has now halted this vicious spiral by providing the banks with guaranteed liquidity for three years against a wide range of collateral.	如今，欧洲央行通过向银行提供有保障的三年流动性（以范围很广的资产作为抵押）停止了这一恶性循环。


Reassured that they will have access to funding, the banks again have the confidence to lend.	银行获得了能够得到融资的保证，因此重新获得了发放贷款的信心。


Cynical observers suggest that the ECB’s real agenda is to encourage the banks to buy the crisis countries’ bonds.	怀疑派观察者指出，欧洲央行的真实意图是鼓励银行购买危机国债券。


But that would only further weaken the banks’ credit portfolios at a time when European regulators are desperate to strengthen them.	但这只能进一步恶化银行的信用组合，而与此同时，监管者正在现金办法改善它们。


The ECB’s decision to provide the banks with unlimited liquidity does not solve governments’ debt problems, nor is that its intent.	欧洲央行向银行提供不限量流动性的决定并不能解决政府债务问题，这也不是它的目的。


But it at least prevents the debt problem from creating banking problems, which, in turn, worsen the debt problem without end.	但这至少能够防止债务问题造成银行问题，再进一步恶化债务问题，如此没完没了地循环下去。


Europe’s second vicious spiral runs from fiscal consolidation to slow growth and back to fiscal consolidation.	欧洲的第二大恶性循环是财政整合-增长疲软-财政整合。


Tax increases and cuts in public spending are still needed; there is no avoiding this reality.	加税削减了仍属必须的公共支出； 这是不可避免的现实。


But these demand-reducing measures also reduce economic growth, causing deficit-reduction targets to be missed.	但这些需求削减措施也削弱了经济增长，造成预算削减目标无法达到。


Getting fiscal consolidation back on track then requires more spending cuts, which depress growth still further, causing budget performance to worsen even more.	于是，为了完成财政整合目标，就不得不削减更多的支出，而这又进一步抑制了经济增长，导致预算表现进一步恶化。


At some point, recession and unemployment will provoke a political reaction.	问题到达某种程度时，衰退和失业将导致政治反应。


Angry electorates will boot out austerity-minded governments.	愤怒的选民将驱逐持紧缩态度的政府。


And uncertainty about what kind of governments come next will not reassure investors or positively influence growth.	而继任者类型又存在不确定性，因此你无法肯定投资者会感到有保障或增长能得到积极影响。


Interrupting this second vicious spiral will require jump-starting growth, which, under current circumstances, is easier said than done.	中断第二大恶性循环需要提振增长，而在当前环境下，提振增长说起来容易做起来难。


The external environment is not favorable.	外部环境相当不利。


Economic growth in the United States is still weak, and growth in emerging markets seems poised to slow.	美国经济增长形势依然严峻，而新兴市场似乎也面临着减速。


So what are Europe’s policymakers to do?	那么，欧洲决策者将怎么做呢？


Restarting growth requires a two-handed approach that addresses both supply and demand.	重启增长要求两手抓两手都要硬，既要解决供给问题，也要解决需求问题。


Consider first the supply side.	先看供给问题。


Research on the European economy has shown that small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) are engines of employment creation.	关于欧洲经济的研究表明，中小企业是就业创造的引擎。


But SMEs need credit in order to grow and hire, which underscores the importance of the ECB’s recent steps to restore liquidity to the banking system.	但中小企业需要信贷支持才能获得增长、雇用工人。 这凸显了欧洲央行当前为银行体系重建流动性的举措的重要性。


The other supply-side measures will have to be taken by governments.	另一个供给端措施必须由政府实施。


The Italian parliament, for example, has agreed to remove limits on store-opening hours as a first step toward liberalizing the retail sector.	比如，意大利议会已经同意取消商店开张时间限制，作为零售部门自由化措施的第一步。


But taxi drivers and pharmacists have successfully resisted efforts to open their professions and make provision of their services more flexible and efficient.	但出租车司机和药店成功地抵制住了开放时间限制以使服务更灵活更有效的要求。


The need to placate such interest groups is a serious obstacle to jump-starting economic growth, because comprehensive reform is more effective than piecemeal reform.	如何安抚这些利益集团是重启经济增长的重大障碍，因为全面改革要比外围改革更加有效。


Getting all of the stakeholders to go along will require compensating losers.	协调这些相关利益者需要补偿损失者。


And here Europe’s social model can be an asset rather than a liability.	在这方面，欧洲的社会模式将是财富，而不是负担。


The losers from reform can be provided generous but temporary unemployment benefits.	改革的损失者可以获得慷慨但只是暂时的失业救济。


They can enroll in government-funded, industry-organized training schemes.	他们可以去政府出资、产业组织的培训计划学习。


European governments that promise to aid the losers are more likely to retain political support. They will be better able to stay the reformist course.	承诺帮助损失者的欧洲国家政府也可以因此保住政治支持度，可以继续沿着改革的方向走下去。


Likewise, taxi drivers will be more agreeable to the award of additional medallions if demand for their services is buoyant.	类似地，只要对出租车服务的需求旺盛，出租车司机也会支持改革，因为这样能使他们的收入升高。


Hence the continuing need for demand-side measures, which puts the ball back in the ECB’s court.	因此，需求端措施仍然需要，而这也需要欧洲央行出手。


Cutting interest rates will not be enough.	光削减利率是不够的。


Pushing up asset prices and pushing down the euro’s exchange rate will require the ECB to buy bonds on the secondary market – not the crisis countries’ bonds per se, but those of all eurozone members.	推高资产价格、压制欧元汇率要求欧洲央行从二级市场中购买债券——不光是危机国债券，而是所有欧元区成员国债券。


In other words, it will require quantitative easing.	换句话说，这需要欧洲央行采取量化宽松。


Nothing is guaranteed.	没有什么是万无一失的。


But Europe can still escape its vicious spirals if everyone does their part.	但欧洲如果每个人都能做好自己的三分三的话，欧洲仍然可以摆脱恶性循环。


Europe’s Vision Deficit	欧洲的宏观理念缺乏症


PARIS – In the Western part of Europe – the part that former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld maliciously labeled “Old Europe” – almost every government is in deep political trouble. The United Kingdom’s new coalition government may be the exception – for now.	发自巴黎——如今在欧洲的西部，就是那个被美国前国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德不怀好意地定义为“旧欧洲”的地方，几乎所有的国家政府都正深陷于政治困境当中——当然，英国的新联合政府可能暂时来说是个例外。


In the European Union’s big member states, the popularity ratings of leaders – Nicolas Sarkozy in France, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Angela Merkel in Germany, and José Luís Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain – hover around 25% or worse.	在那些欧盟大国内部，领导人——包括法国的萨科齐、意大利的贝卢斯科尼，德国的默克尔以及西班牙的扎帕特罗——的民众支持率都惨不忍睹，在25%甚至更低处苦苦挣扎。


Whether it is conservatives like Sarkozy, Christian Democrats like Merkel, right-wing populists like Berlusconi, or socialists like Zapatero, political affiliation appears to make no difference. If you hold office in Europe nowadays, you are in trouble.	无论你追随萨科齐这样的保守派，还是默克尔这样基督教民主党人，或是奉行贝鲁斯科尼式的右翼民粹路线，又或是扎帕特罗这样的社会主义者，只要你在欧洲当政，那就无一例外会陷入麻烦当中——政治立场似乎都无关紧要了。


What has gone so wrong?	这究竟是怎么回事？


The economic crisis seems to be the most obvious explanation, but perhaps too obvious.	经济危机似乎是最明显的解释，但或许也明显得有点让人信不过了。


Two years ago, when shockwaves from the collapse of the US housing bubble crashed onto European shores, these political leaders reacted with apparent vigor, making themselves rather popular for a while.	就在两年前，当美国地产泡沫爆破的冲击波及欧洲之时，上述几位领导人都做出了积极反应，博得了民众一片叫好之声。


Paradoxically, the early stages of the financial crisis appeared to favor conservative and pro-market leaders – who seemed to be in a better position to save the economy – more than socialists.	但奇怪的是，金融危机的早期影响似乎对保守派和力挺市场的领导人有利——因为他们看上去似乎更能挽救经济——而对社会主义者没什么好处。


Today, this is no longer the case.	时至今日，情况又调转了过来。


Socialism is on the rise again across Europe, at least in opinion polls. And right-wing populism has become an electoral force to be reckoned with in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.	社会主义正在整个欧洲兴起（至少民测试结果是这么显示的），而右翼民粹主义已经在法国，比利时和荷兰形成以了一股足以影响选举的力量。


Economic stagnation has come to appear endless.	经济停滞的状况似乎无穷无尽。


Jobs are scarce, and the future looks bleak everywhere.	就业机会稀少，人们的未来一片黯淡。


The Greek crisis has cast a pall over the entire eurozone.	希腊危机为整个欧元区蒙上了一层黑纱。


The common currency is now looked at with suspicion.	人们对欧元这个共同货币的质疑声此起彼伏。


On the fringes of public opinion, some people are even muttering suggestions that their countries should revert to their ancient national currencies – which of course would only bring disaster in the form of an even more confusing state of affairs, as EU countries are indebted in euros. To quit the eurozone would only increase their level of indebtedness.	甚至有人暗中建议说各国应该用回本国原有的货币——这无疑只会令情况变得更加一塌糊涂，因为欧盟各国其实都背负着欧元债务，退出欧元区只能增加他们的负债程度。


What makes this desolate economic landscape even gloomier is the striking inability of European leaders to explain what has happened and is happening to their citizens.	而令这种凄苦无比的经济状况更加黯淡的则是领导人的无能，他们无法向选民说明白：究竟已经发生了什么，又正在发生着什么。


Indeed, I believe that it is here that the seminal reason for their plunging poll ratings lies.	事实上，我认为这就是导致他们支持率下滑的重大原因。


Europe’s leaders seem to lead nowhere, because they have no vision on which to draw.	欧洲的领导人似乎搞不清自己究竟该往何处“领导”，因为他们根本就看不清未来，不知该往何处去。


Consider the euro: no head of state or government has so far been able to present a coherent defense of the eurozone to counter the pervasive unease that now exists towards the common currency.	让我们看看欧元的现状：面对无处不在的质疑，迄今为止都没有任何一位政府首脑能拿出一套条理分明的理论来为欧元区辩护。


Or public spending: all European leaders adamantly want to reduce government spending. But these same leaders, including that supposedly stern mistress of the budget Angela Merkel, were arguing less than two years ago that public spending would provide a “Keynesian” way out of the crisis.	再看看公共支出方面：所有欧洲领导人肯定都希望减少政府支出，但同样也是这帮领导人，包括据说一向是对预算卡得很紧的默克尔，都曾在一年多前声称扩大公共支出是一条“凯恩斯式”的摆脱危机之路。


Why such a turnaround?	这种180度的转向从何而来？


The European public has discovered that the 2008-2009 fiscal stimulus programs, which were aimed at forestalling an even greater crisis, generated more debts than jobs.	欧洲公众发现：在2008~2009年间为了预防更大危机而推行的财政刺激计划非但没有制造更多就业，反而加重了债务。


Politicians, however, hate to confess past errors.	而政治家们最讨厌为过去的失误认错了。


Thus, they appear unable to explain their new rationale for the spending cuts that they are now announcing.	因此很显然，他们也无法为当下宣布的开支缩减找到新的理由。


Europe’s leaders make things worse when they prove unable to connect isolated “reforms” – say, a lower public deficit – with any comprehensive vision of the economy.	当欧洲领导人们无法将孤立的“改革”——比如更低的公共赤字——和任何综合性的经济宏观理念联系起来之时，情况就更加无法收拾了。


A good example is Sarkozy’s effort to raise France’s retirement age from 60 to 62.	其中一个绝佳的例子就是萨科齐将法国退休年龄从60岁提高到62岁的举措。


Trade unions are up in arms, which, after all, is their duty.	工会组织对此激烈反对，毕竟这是他们的责任。


The population at large just does not understand what links raising the retirement age with the crisis.	而大部分民众只是不明白：提高退休年龄究竟和危机有什么关系啊？


The truth that politicians (David Cameron’s UK government excluded, at least for now) are reluctant to admit is that Western Europe’s current morass is distinct from the global US-made downturn.	而事实上，政治家们（卡梅隆的英国联合政府暂时除外）都不愿意坦白承认：西欧当前的困境其实是跟美国引发的全球衰退截然不同的。


Old Europe has entered into a severe and intractable crisis of the welfare state as ordinary Europeans have come to know it.	普通欧洲人正逐渐意识到“老欧洲”正陷入一场福利国家所独有的，难以解决的严重危机。


The generous retirement pensions, unemployment compensation, health coverage, and all kinds of social programs that make Western Europe a comfortable place to live were established when Europe’s economy and population were growing fast.	那些��慨的退休金，失业补偿，健康保障以及所有令西欧变成人间乐园的社会政策，其实都是在西欧经济和人口迅猛增长时建立的。 到如今，在持续整整一代人的经济和人口停滞之后，只能靠发行公共债务来支撑这些福利国家了。


Now, after one generation of economic and demographic stagnation, the welfare state can be financed only by issuing more public debt. Financial markets, awakened by the global crisis, will no longer support today’s Potemkin-like situation, in which welfare benefits have become a façade propped up by deficits.	全球危机动荡下的金融市场已经无法再支撑这种“波将金”式——当年俄国女皇的情夫波将金为了向女皇展示自己的富足，特地建起了一批富丽堂皇的假村庄，因此得名——的景象，而那些福利待遇也变成了赤字支撑下的假象而已。


Political leadership at such a moment demands a Churchillian accent.	而在这种情况下，政治领导人需要有一种丘吉尔式的作风。 这需要清楚地解释为什么欧元依然是防止通货膨胀这种最危险的社会危机的最佳工具；


It needs to be explained why the euro remains the best protection there is against inflation, the most dangerous social ill of all; why government stimulus will not work and never actually has delivered sustained growth; and why a new equilibrium between welfare and economic dynamism – based on less public debt and more private investment – must be established.	为什么政府刺激计划起不了作用且未能提供可持续增长； 还有就是为什么必须在福利和经济增长动力之间——就是更少的公共债务和更多的私人投资之间——建立一个新的平衡。


Such a discourse, if clearly articulated, would be understood and could be endorsed by many, if not by all.	这样一套论述如果能解释明白的话，将被民众所理解，即便不能说服所有人，也将得到大多数人的支持。


At the very least, it would bring a sense of coherence to the actions of politicians, and those opposed to this search for a new European equilibrium – mostly Marxists and populists – would need to compete with a new vision of their own.	至少它将为政治家们的行动带来条理性，而那些反对这种欧洲新平衡的探索的人——大部分都是马克思主义者和民粹主义者——将必须找到理由去说服他们自己。


Would such an articulate vision make Europe’s leaders more popular?	那么，这么一个条理分明的宏观理念是否会为欧洲领导人赢得更多的支持？


Maybe, and maybe not, but they would almost certainly appear more legitimate, even in the eye of their adversaries.	可能会，也可能不会，但这注定将为他们带来赢得更多的政治合法性，即便是他们的对手，也不得不对此表示赞同。


Europe’s Vision Free Leadership	缺乏远见的欧洲领导人


LONDON – The selection of Herman van Rompuy as President of the European Union’s Council of Ministers, and of Lady Catherine Ashton as the EU’s foreign policy chief, surely underlines the extent to which member states are in the driver’s seat in the EU.	发自伦敦——随着赫尔曼·范龙佩当选为欧洲理事会常任主席，以及凯瑟琳·阿什顿女士当选为欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表，这两个人选都明确说明了欧盟各成员国究竟在何种程度上掌控着整个联盟。


They manage its institutions in their own interest. The EU is no super-state striding bravely into a bright new dawn.	他们都遵照本国利益来操纵着各个欧盟机构，而欧盟也没能成为那个毫无畏惧大步迈向光明前途的超级国家。


French President Nicolas Sarkozy will not have to compete for the global limelight with any Brussels supremos.	自此，法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐无须再与布鲁塞尔的领导人争风吃醋了。


Germany will not be challenged to break out of its increasing introversion, no longer obliged to demonstrate its democratic post-war credentials by embracing the European cause at every turn.	德国也不再被要求去摆脱其日渐增强的内向性，也没必要再为证明自己的战后民主国家资格而对欧盟的所有进程照单全收。


Britain can rest easy that its world role will remain the aspiring Jeeves of the White House.	英国也松了一口气，因为其世界地位将依然保持着美国白宫的忠实跟班角色。


The best that could come from the appointment of Europe’s two new low-profile leaders is that it leads to better and more coherent management of the EU’s business.	而这两位低调欧洲领导人当选的最大好处，就是使得欧盟事务能得到更好也更有条理的管理。


Van Rompuy will be able to offer a longer view than that of a six-month national presidency. Lady Ashton should be able to tie together the political and resource arms of Europe’s external policies.	范龙佩的眼光显然会比一个任期六个月的国家总统更为长远，而阿什顿女士则能够把欧盟对外政策的政治与资源整合起来。


But it is not yet clear, whatever the Lisbon Treaty says, that Ashton has full control of either the EU external budget or of appointments to the new diplomatic service.	但不管《里斯本条约》上写得如何清楚，有一点还是不能确定，那就是阿什顿女士是否能完全控制欧盟的外交预算和新外交部门的人事任命。


She has a difficult hand to play, and can expect her elbow to be nudged regularly by EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso, who was the big winner in the carve-up of jobs.	她的处境比较艰难，可以预料她将经常受到欧盟委员会主席若泽·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐的排挤，因为后者是这次职位分蛋糕的最大赢家。


But foreign ministers will be deeply suspicious if they think that the Commission is taking over foreign policy.	而一旦欧盟成员国的外长们认为巴罗佐的欧盟委员会正在接管外交政策，这些人就将表示出极度的不信任。


Past experience suggests that there are five guidelines to follow if we want a more effective European presence on the world stage whenever foreign and security policy are at the top of the agenda.	过去的经验显示，如果我们希望欧盟能够以一个更有效率的形象出现在以外交和安全政策为最优先议程的世界舞台上，那就得遵循以下这五条方针。


First, we should dare to believe that what most suits Europe’s interests might also be best for our relationship with our closest ally, the United States.	首先，我们要敢于相信，最符合欧洲利益的政策，也是对欧洲与其最亲密盟友美国的双边关系最有利的政策。


We should, for example, want to prevent the militarization of nuclear energy in Iran precisely because of our concern as Europeans, not because we are allies of the US.	比如说，我们之所以坚决抵制伊朗的核能军事化，正是因为我们站在欧洲人的立场来考虑问题，而不是因为我们作为美国盟友的身份。


Second, our rhetoric about our role as America’s international partners for peace should not stray too far from reality.	其二，关于我们担当美国国际和平盟友角色的言论不能过度偏离现实。


True, we tend to align ourselves these days more with Venus than Mars, something for which the rest of the world should be deeply grateful. But we take this a little too far.	没错，在最近一段时间里我们更多地追随着爱神维纳斯，而不是战神，这应该得到世界其他国家的深深感激，但我们在这个方面走得有点过了头。


It is not just that Europe does not spend enough on hard power, but that what it does spend – about €200 billion – is spent badly.	这不仅是说欧洲在硬实力上的支出不够，而且是说我们的支出——大约2千亿欧元——都没有花在刀刃上。


The EU needs common defense procurement and harmonization to acquire the helicopters, transport aircraft, battlefield communications equipment, and surveillance drones that are necessary for twenty-first-century operations.	当前欧盟亟需执行共同的防务采购和协调，以获得在21世纪军事行动中所必须的直升机，运输机，战场通信设备以及无人驾驶侦察机。


For reasons of history, morality, and security, Africa should be regarded as a particular European responsibility.	出于历史，伦理和安全的原因，欧洲应该对非洲负起特殊的责任。


We should deploy our aid, diplomacy, and peace-keeping capacity to support sustainable development, good governance, and regional collaboration on the continent.	我们应该部署我们的援助，外交和维和力量来支持非洲的可持续发展，优质政府治理和区域合作。


Third, where Europe has a serious internal policy, it is easier to establish a more serious external policy.	第三，当欧盟能够建立起严格的内部政策时，我们将能更容易制定更为严格的对外政策。


The best example of this is energy policy and Russia, which wants a sphere of influence around its borders.	这方面最好的例子就是能源政策，以及如何应对希望在其边界扩大影响范围的俄罗斯。


Dealing with Russia has probably been the biggest failure in the attempt to make European foreign policy.	跟俄罗斯打交道的政策可能是尝试制定统一欧洲对外政策的最大败笔。


To formulate such a policy requires us to frame a single energy policy.	要制定这样的政策要求我们去制定一个单一的能源政策。


Lady Ashton will need to be firm in dealing with Russia and with member states who subordinate Europe to the commercial interests of their national energy companies.	这要求阿什顿女士在和俄罗斯以及那些将其国有能源公司的商业利益凌驾于欧盟利益的成员国打交道时，立场要坚定。


Fourth, European external policy is most effective the nearer it is to home.	第四，对外政策所针对的范围越靠近欧盟，其有效性就越大。


We are at our best in our own neighborhood – and at our worst, too.	我们最擅长于制定针对邻近地区的政策——但也是最有时也会显得极为愚蠢。


The greatest success of Europe’s external policy has been EU enlargement.	欧盟最成功的对外政策就是欧盟扩张。


This promoted and consolidated regime change without the use of weapons, thereby stabilizing the European continent.	在没有使用武力的情况下，它促进和巩固了这个地区的发展变化，因此也使得欧洲大陆更趋稳定。


The job is not complete.	但事情并没有完。


The prospect of EU membership is at the heart of EU policy in the western Balkans, where we are starting to show (for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina) a dangerous disinclination to apply tough conditionality.	欧盟成员资格的前景正是欧盟在西巴尔干地区政策的核心所在。 在那个地区，欧洲开始表现出一种对使用强硬制约政策的厌恶，但这种做法对我们来说是危险的（比如在波黑）。


We are committed to Ukraine’s “European vocation,” but not to its EU membership.	我们只是承诺给予乌克兰“欧洲资格”而不是欧盟成员国资格。


Spot the difference!	请千万注意这其中的区别。


We undertook more than four decades ago to negotiate Turkish membership once that country became fully democratic with an open economy and respect for human rights and the rule of law.	40多年前，我们承诺，在土耳其成为一个经济完全开放，尊重人权和法治的民主国家之后，就可以商讨让其加入欧盟。


For Europe to turn down Turkey would be tantamount to writing ourselves out of any serious script in global affairs.	对欧洲来说，拒绝土耳其无异于将自己排除到在世界事务之外。


We would be rejecting a country that is an important regional power, a significant NATO member, and a crucial energy hub.	我们正在拒绝一个重要的区域力量，一位重要的北约成员，一个关键的能源中心。


We would stand accused of burning, rather than building, bridges to the Islamic world.	我们宁愿忍受破坏与伊斯兰世界关系的指责，也不愿构建通向它们的桥梁。


Unfortunately, van Rompuy, an author and poet, has spoken out against Turkish membership in far cruder terms than one would expect from a gentle haiku writer.	更为不幸的是，范龙佩，这位作家兼诗人，已经以超出作为一位俳句作家所应有的极为严酷的口吻表达了对土耳其的拒绝。


My final guideline for policy is that Europe is not and will not become a superpower or super-state.	我给予制定外交政策的最后方针是欧洲不是也不会成为一个超级强权或超级国家。


Unlike the US, we do not matter everywhere.	与美国不同，我们并不四处耀武扬威。


We do not require a policy on every problem and every place.	我们不需要一个针对各种问题和世界各个地方的政策。


But where the problem affects much else, and where the region is close to home, we should have a policy that consists of more than waiting to agree with whatever America decides that its policy should be, as, for example, in the Middle East.	但是在问题影响范围较小的地方，在靠近欧盟的区域，我们要有自己的政策，而不是干等着去赞同美国的决定，比如中东政策。


The present “no war-no peace” lull in the Middle East is not sustainable; nor is a one-state solution either possible or desirable.	当前，中东“不战不和”的局面是不可持续的； 实行以色列一国制不但不可能，也不是可取的


So what can we do to nudge things forward in a region where America is again engaged but not respected, and where Europe is neither?	因此，在一个美国一再干预但也不被当地人所尊重的地方，我们该如何谨慎推动该地区的事态发展呢？


At the very least, we could set out our own policy, beginning with an effort to end the fragmentation of Palestine and Palestinians between the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.	同样，在一个欧盟也不受尊敬的地方，我们又该如何做呢？ 至少，我们要制定我们的自己的政策，以努力结束西岸，加沙和约旦东部之间的巴勒斯坦和巴勒斯坦人民的分裂为起点。


Does it matter if Europe is not on the same page as the US?	欧盟和美国不在统一阵线上就不行吗？


Frankly, no.	当然不是。


Two weeks ago, when Obama had to choose between a meeting of ASEAN or the celebrations in Berlin marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Wall, he chose to go to Asia.	两个星期前，奥巴马面临着是去参加东盟的会议还是出席柏林墙倒塌20周年纪念的选择，但他最终选择去了亚洲。


Will Europe do enough to change his mind the next time there is such a choice?	如果下次再出现这样的选择，欧洲是否能够改变他的选择呢？


As things stand, we are in danger of making Europe politically irrelevant, a successful customs union with a Swissified foreign policy and a group of fractious, vision-free leaders.	事情是明摆着的，我们正在处于使欧盟政治孤立，成为一个成功但却外交中立的关税联盟，以及成为一群难以驾驭，没有远见的领导人的危险中。


Europe’s Vital French Connection	欧洲的关键性法国路线


PARIS – In the debates raging over the future of the European Union and the eurozone, Germany always takes center stage.	巴黎—在关于欧盟和欧元区未来问题的争论中，德国始终占据着舞台的中心。


It has the largest economy, accounting for 28% of eurozone GDP and 25% of the eurozone’s population.	德国拥有规模最大的经济，占欧元区GDP的28%和人口的25%。


It is running a current-account surplus that is now larger than China’s – indeed, the largest in the world in absolute value.	它的经常项目盈余目前比中国还要高——从绝对值看，已是世界冠军。


And, while weighted majorities can overrule it on some issues, everyone acknowledges that little can be done in the eurozone unless Germany agrees.	此外，尽管加权多数可以在某些问题上否决德国，但谁都知道，没有德国点头，欧元区什么都做不了。


But the emphasis on Germany, though justified, should not lead to an underestimation of France’s critical role.	但强调德国尽管不无道理，却不能因此低估法国的关键作用。


France not only accounts for roughly 22% of eurozone GDP and 20% of its population – behind only Germany – but also has the healthiest demography in the eurozone, whereas the German population is projected to decline over the next decade.	法国不但占有欧元区GDP的22%和人口的20%——仅次于德国——还拥有欧元区最健康的人口结构，而德国人口数量预计将在下一个十年中有所下降。


At the same time, France’s critical role reflects more than its size.	与此同时，法国的关键作用要比其规模所体现的更大。


Indeed, in terms of influencing outcomes in Europe, France is as important as Germany, for three reasons.	事实上，就影响欧洲结果而言，法国和德国是同等重要的，原因有三。


First, France is an indispensable link between southern and northern Europe at a time of growing economic and financial division between creditors and debtors (a fissure that has begun to assume a cultural dimension).	首先，在债权国和债务国经济和金融差异越拉越大之时（目前已有人开始论及文化差异），法国是联系南欧和北欧不可或缺的节点。


An active France can play a bridging role, leveraging its strong relationship with Germany (a friendship that is a pillar of the EU) and its proximity and cultural affinities to the Mediterranean.	活跃的法国可以充分利用其与德国的良好关系（两国友好关系是欧盟的一大基石）以及与地中海地区在地理和文化方面的紧密关系，起到桥梁的作用，


France is “southern” in its current-account deficit, but “northern” in its borrowing costs (slightly above Germany’s), owing partly to inflows of capital fleeing the south, as well as to modest but positive economic growth.	法国的经常项目赤字属于“南欧”标准，而其借贷成本又属于“北欧”范围（只比德国略高），这部分是因为逃离南欧的资本流入了法国，部分是因为法国经济增长虽然缓慢，但好歹在正增长。


Moreover, there is no perceived “re-denomination” risk affecting French assets, given markets’ confidence that France will retain the euro.	此外，市场对法国留在欧元区内充满了信心，没有人认为法国资产有“重新计价”（re-denomination）风险。


So, while France faces huge economic challenges, its northern and southern features permit it to play a proactive role in the European project’s survival.	因此，尽管法国面临着巨大的经济挑战，但南北欧特征兼备让它可以在拯救欧洲工程的行动中处于主动地位。


French President François Hollande has already given a rather successful preview of this role, meeting German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on his first day in office, and, a month later, participating in a high-profile meeting with the Italian and Spanish prime ministers in Rome.	法国总统奥朗德已经成功地给出了这一角色的预览，一上任，他就在柏林会见了德国总理默克尔； 一个月以后，他又赴罗马参加了与意大利总理和西班牙首相的高规格会面。


Indeed, he took the lead in adding a “growth pact” to the “stability pact” that had been negotiated under Merkel’s leadership.	事实上，是他牵头要求在以默克尔主导的“稳定契约”谈判中加入“增长契约”内容。


Second, France, under its new center-left government, must demonstrate that the “European model” of a market economy coupled with strong social solidarity can be reformed and strengthened, rather than abandoned – not just in Europe’s more pragmatic north, but also in its more ideological south.	其次，在其中左翼政府领导下，法国必须证明，具有强大社会凝聚力的“欧洲模式”市场经济是可以改革和强化的，而不应该抛弃它——不仅更具现实主义的北欧是如此，更具理想主义的南欧也是如此。


French Socialists will not renounce their traditional commitments; nor should they.	法国社会党不会也不应该放弃其传统承诺。


But they now have the opportunity to contribute to the European model’s renewal.	但现在他们已经拥有了为改变欧洲模式做出贡献的机会。


Under Hollande, France’s Socialists favor achieving that renewal through a process of social dialogue that convinces rather than imposes, that focuses both on revenue measures and on boosting government efficiency, and that may adopt some of northern Europe’s more successful “flexicurity” policies, which combine greater labor-market flexibility with strong social protection.	在奥朗德的领导下，法国社会党赞成通过社会对话的模式来实现——讲道理而不是强加； 收入手段和提高政府效率两手抓；


The reforms should also introduce much greater individual choice, permitting solutions to retirement, education, health, and lifestyle issues that can be more easily tailored to citizens’ specific circumstances and needs.	可能采取某些北欧国家更成功的“弹性安全”政策（flexicurity，更大的劳动力市场弹性和更强的社会保障相结合）。 改革还应该大幅增加个人选择的范围，让退休、教育、卫生和生活方式问题的解决方案具有更大的弹性，更容易契合人民所处的具体环境和需求。


The government of Hollande and Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault has strong majorities at all executive and legislative levels, giving it a rare opportunity to act.	奥朗德和总理埃罗的政府在所有行政和立法层面都拥有绝对多数，因此掌握着千载难逢的行动时机。


If it can renew the European model at home, it will be able to project that success much more widely, particularly in southern Europe, in turn reinforcing confidence and belief in the EU, particularly among the young generation.	如果法国能够在国内改变欧洲模式，则将有能力将成功经验推而广之，特别是推广到南欧，从而反过来增强欧盟的信心和信念，特别是年轻一代的信心和信念。


The French center-left must lead in conceiving a vision for Europe in which solidarity and equity reinforce long-term economic strength.	法国中左翼必须领导世人接受团结和公平能增强长期经济实力的欧洲前景。


Finally, along with the United Kingdom among European countries, France retains more of a global role than Germany has yet acquired.	最后，与英国和欧洲国家一样，法国的全球作用比目前的德国更重要。


While the United Nations Security Council is outdated in its structure, it still plays a crucial legitimizing role; and France, not Germany, is a member.	联合国安理会的结构早已过时，但在合法化方面仍起着关键作用； 法国是其成员国，而德国不是。


In many other international organizations as well, France punches above its weight.	在许多其他国际组织中，法国的地位也要重于德国。


Similarly, while France exports much less than Germany outside the EU, many large French enterprises rival Germany’s in global reach and technical know-how.	类似地，尽管在欧盟之外法国的出口不如德国，但许多法国大企业在全球扩张和技术工艺方面与德国不相上下。


And French is still a global language.	法语仍是全球语言。


In other words, France not only is a link between Europe’s north and south, but also contributes substantially to linking Europe to the rest of the world.	换句话说，法国不仅是联系北欧和南欧的纽带，在联系欧洲和世界方面也起着重大作用。


Europe needs a renewed vision and effective policies to realize that vision.	欧洲需要新愿景和实现这一愿景的有效政策。


France’s Socialist-Green government can play a critical unifying role as Europeans confront their biggest challenge in decades.	在欧洲面临数十年来最大的挑战时，法国社会党-绿党政府可以起到关键的粘合剂作用。


Its success will be highly consequential – not least for the political debate that will inform the outcome of Germany’s elections in 2013.	法国的成功将具有重大意义——不仅对于可能暗示德国2013年大选结果的政治争论是如此。


Europe’s Winners and Losers	欧洲的赢家和输家


BERLIN – Rarely is a high-flying country brought back down to earth in a single night, but that is precisely what happened to Germany recently.	柏林— 已经腾飞的国家不会一夜回到解放前，但这正是德国最近所发生的事情。


In both football (soccer) and politics, the country had come to embody an unseemly mixture of arrogance and denial.	不管在足球方面还是政治方面，德国都陷入了不恰当的自大和否认的怪圈。


It thought itself the measure of all things European, in terms of both the European championship and the European Union. In both cases, it was deceiving itself.	德国自视为欧洲一切事务的准绳——从欧锦赛到欧盟，这纯属自欺欺人。


The same night that Germany was thrashed by the Italians in the championship’s semi-finals, German Chancellor Angela Merkel ran up against the limits of her own powers at the eurozone leaders’ summit in Brussels.	就在德国被意大利阻挡在欧锦赛决赛大门的同一晚，总理默克尔也在布鲁塞尔欧元区领导人峰会上撞到了她个人权力的南墙。


Germany’s political course since the beginning of the euro crisis two years ago had left it isolated, and she was no match for an alliance of Italy, Spain, and France.	自两年前欧元危机爆发以来，德国的政治路线让它成了孤家寡人，默克尔在意大利、西班牙和法国找不到一位盟友。


Indeed, she had no choice but to concede and agree to far-reaching changes to the EU’s new fiscal compact that will ease refinancing of the crisis countries and their banks.	事实上，默克尔别无选择，只能让步并同意欧盟新财政契约的深刻变化——放松对危机国家及其银行的再融资。


The German dogma of “no payments without counter-performance and control” was thus off the table, and the bargain struck in the early hours of the morning was exactly the opposite of what she had wanted.	德国的“没有对等表现和控制，就不给钱”立场已经破产，当天早晨所进行的激烈讨价还价正好与默克尔的如意算盘背道而驰。


The fiscal compact had been reduced to a shambles even before Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag, approved it later that day.	德国联邦议会尚未在当天晚些时候点头批准，财政契约便已经被阉割得不成模样了。


In terms of addressing the eurozone financial crisis, however, the agreement reached in Brussels was anything but a breakthrough, because it never transcended the logic of narrow crisis management.	不过，就修正欧元区金融危机这一点而言，布鲁塞尔所达成的协议绝对称不上是一次突破，因为它并未改变狭隘的危机管理逻辑。


It offers no strategy for overcoming the crisis in the south of Europe, which means that the threat to the eurozone has not been removed.	它没有给出任何克服南欧危机的战略，这意味着欧元区威胁警报并未消除。


Politically, however, the agreement amounts to a small revolution, because it has shifted the balance of power within the eurozone: Germany is strong, but not strong enough to get away with isolating itself completely from Europe’s other major players.	不过，从政治上讲，该协议称得上一场小型革命，因为它改变了欧元区内部的权力平衡：德国很强大，但并未强大到可以完全抛下欧洲其他主要大国独断专行的程度。


Decisions that go against Germany are possible.	与德国意见针锋相对的决定并不是没有可能。


There was patent gloating about the German defeat everywhere, only thinly disguised behind strained expressions of solidarity.	显然，人们对德国人吃瘪无不幸灾乐祸，只是在板着脸孔大谈团结时还略作伪装。


The full extent of the political damage that Germany’s bailout policy for the eurozone, with its austerity, mass unemployment, and economic depression, has caused in southern Europe remains to be seen.	德国给欧元区开出的援助政策——以及随之而来的紧缩、大规模失业和经济萧条——给南欧带来的政治伤害还为完全展现。


If Merkel had wanted the agreement reached in Brussels, the outcome would have marked the beginning of a fundamental revision of the eurozone’s crisis policy – and thus an expression of successful statesmanship.	如果默克尔本就希望在布鲁塞尔达成协议，那么结果将标志着欧元区危机政策的基本转变，其本人也将展现成功政治家的风采。


Instead, it is a full-blown defeat for Germany, linked to its firm denial that German policy has sharply reduced the country’s influence in the EU.	但最终结果是布鲁塞尔峰会成了一次对德国的大胜，坚决否决德国政策极大地削弱了后者在欧盟的影响力。 显然如此：德国在欧洲央行的影响力已然极大地减弱了；


Yet it clearly has: German influence within the European Central Bank has declined significantly; the German finance minister will not become head of the Eurogroup; and now we have the Brussels disaster!	德国财政部长不再是欧元集团首脑； 而现在，我们有迎来了布鲁塞尔灾难！


But Germany’s defeat, however widely celebrated, holds much cause for concern.	但不管德国的惨败是多么大快人心，人们仍不能对它掉以轻心。


First, not everything that Germany is arguing is wrong: the urgent need for medium-term fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to increase the crisis countries’ competitiveness will not go away.	首先，德国所要求的东西并非一无是处：中期财政整合的迫切需要和旨在增加危机国家竞争力的结构性改革的需要不会就此消失。


Equally important, however, is the reduction of economic imbalances and European policy coordination to enable growth.	不过，同样重要的还有减轻经济失衡以及提振增长的欧洲政策合作。


Second, political paranoia is rising on the German right: everybody supposedly just wants Germany’s money; our Anglo-Saxon partners' real aim is to weaken us; and the financial markets will not rest until Germany has invested all of its wealth and has thus endangered its economic success.	其次，德国右派的政治偏执正在与日俱增：恐怕人人都在渴望德国的钱； 我们的盎格鲁-撒克逊合作伙伴的真正目标是激活我们；


Germany is being “betrayed to foreigners” by the opposition, and “good” productive capital is once again being opposed to “bad” speculative capital.	金融市场在德国将其所有财富都用于投资、因而其经济成功陷入危险之前是不会善罢甘休的。


In the opinion pages of some German newspapers, anti-capitalism is returning in a new form, which entails nothing less than a renunciation of Europe and even of the West.	德国被反对者“出卖给了敌人”，“优质”生产资本被再一次出卖给了“劣质”的投机资本。 在一些德国报纸的评论版上，反资本主义带着新面目卷土重来，其内容不过是脱离欧洲甚至西方。


Of course, while the German right threatens to become more nationalistic, history will not repeat itself, because today’s Germany has changed, and so has its political environment.	当然，尽管德国右派可能变得更加民族主义，但历史不会简单重复，因为当今德国已不同以往，其政治环境也有了变化。


Still, an increasingly Euro-skeptic Germany in the heart of the EU could, given its great economic clout, seriously endanger the European integration process.	军官如此，处于欧盟中心地位又具有强大经济实力的日渐狐疑的德国可能严重威胁到欧洲一体化进程。


And, while that would jeopardize Germany’s own interests, practical political action is not always rational, particularly in times of serious crisis.	而这样做尽管会牺牲德国自身的利益，但实际政治行动并非总是理性的，特别是在危机当头的时候。


The same, incidentally, applies to France, except that the French, unlike the Germans, find it difficult to transfer political sovereignty, whereas for us Germans, it is all about the money.	顺便说一句，法国也面临着同样的局面，只不过与德国不同的是，法国很难转让政治主权，而我们德国人一切向钱看。


Both of these mental/political blocks are threatening the European project in equal measure.	威胁欧洲工程的思想/政治阻力同样巨大。


Indeed, if the result of the recent summit means that France and Germany will henceforth each forge alliances against the other, while hiding behind verbal expressions of solidarity, we might just as well forget about Europe.	事实上，如果最新峰会的后果是法国与德国各自建立针锋相对的阵营（尽管表面上仍然大谈团结），那我们还是忘记欧洲吧。


Without a functioning Franco-German axis, the European project cannot succeed.	没有运转良好的法德轴心，欧洲工程断无可能成功。


Both sides will have to decide whether or not they want Europe – that is, full economic and political integration.	法德双方都必须决定要不要欧洲——我说的是完全的经济和政治一体化。


Economically, they must choose either joint liability and a transfer union or monetary re-nationalization.	经济方面，它们必须选择要共同责任和转移联盟还是要货币的再国家化。


Politically, the choice is whether to empower a common government and parliament or return to full sovereignty.	政治方面，它们必须选择赋权给共同政府和议会还是回归完全主权。


What we know for certain is that, just as one cannot be a little pregnant, the existing hybrid is not sustainable.	我们所能确定的是，正如一个人怀不上孩子，现有的乱局是无法维持下去的。


Last November, Volker Kauder, the majority leader in the Bundestag, bragged that “suddenly Europe is speaking German.”	去年11月，德国联邦议院多数派领导人沃克尔·考德（Volker Kauder）大言不惭地说“欧洲突然开始说德语了。


He was wrong.	”他错了。


Just as Spain (not Germany) remains the benchmark in European football, so Europe speaks broken English at best.	正如西班牙（而不是德国）仍是欧洲足球的基准，说欧洲人讲蹩脚英语还差不多。


From the standpoint of safeguarding the European project, that is all for the better.	从捍卫欧洲工程的角度来说，这样要好得多。


Europe’s New Year’s Irresolution	欧洲的无解之年


BERLIN – Will the eurozone crisis end in 2013, or will it drag on throughout the year, and perhaps even deteriorate anew?	柏林—欧元区危机会在2013年结束吗？ 还是会在新的一年里继续拖后腿，甚至恶化到新阶段？


This is likely to be not only the crucial question for the European Union’s further development, but also a key issue affecting the performance of the global economy.	也许这不仅是事关欧盟未来发展的关键问题，也是影响全球经济表现的关键问题。


While the EU clearly needs internal reforms, two external political factors are central to its prospects this year.	毫无疑问，欧盟需要内部改革，但在今年，两大外部政治因素对其前景也很关键。


The first is America’s self-imposed fiscal cliff, which, if not avoided, could throw the United States into recession, with massive repercussions for the world economy, and thus for Europe.	首先是美国自动触发的财政悬崖，如果不能避免，可能将美国再次拖入衰退，世界经济也将广受抑制，欧洲亦然。


Second, a hot war in the Persian Gulf, in which Israel and/or the US confronts Iran over its nuclear program, would result in a sharp rise in global energy prices.	其次，波斯湾的热战——以色列和/或美国与伊朗因后者的核计划而产生冲突——可能导致全球能源价格飙升。


Either scenario would greatly aggravate Europe’s crisis: soaring oil costs or another US recession would harm even the strong northern European economies, to say nothing of the already-depressed countries in Europe’s south.	不管发生那个情景，欧洲危机都会被放大：石油成本高企或新的美国衰退将伤害到哪怕是最坚挺的北欧经济体，更不用说已经陷入泥淖的南欧国家了。


But, even then, the humanitarian consequences – especially in the case of another Middle East war – would most likely overshadow these scenarios’ impact on the European crisis.	但是，即便如此，人道主义后果——特别是在爆发新的中东战争的情况下——仍极有可能压倒这两大前景对欧洲危机的影响。


Indeed, Europe’s crisis only seems to be economic or financial in nature; in reality, it is political to the core, for it has revealed that Europe lacks two things: a political framework – that is, more statehood – for its monetary union, and the vision and leadership to create it.	诚然，欧洲危机看起来只是经济和金融性质的； 但实际上有其政治核心，因为危机反映出欧洲缺少两样东西：货币联盟的政治框架——也就是说，更多的国家属性；


Since the eruption of the European crisis in 2009, the EU and the eurozone have experienced massive, unprecedented changes.	2009年欧洲危机爆发以来，欧盟和欧元区经历了前所未有的大规模变化。


Today, the eurozone is on its way toward implementing a banking union, probably followed by a fiscal union, which in turn will lead to a genuine political union that centralizes sovereignty over essential economic policymaking.	如今，欧元区正在走向银行联盟，或许喉头还会有财政联盟，而这反过来会产生真正的政治联盟，将重要经济决策的主权集中化。


But these developments have not come about as part of a strategy.	但这些发展态势并不会作为战略的一部分而发生。


Had there been no crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other national leaders in the EU would never have been prepared to take these steps.	如果没有危机，德国总理默克尔和其他欧盟国家领导人根本不准备采取这些措施。


And this is not likely to change in 2013.	这一状况2013年也不会改变。


Even today, with the eurozone’s essential players apparently convinced that they are out of the woods, national narrow-mindedness is experiencing a revival in the EU, and the desire for change seems to be slackening.	即使在今天，欧元区关键成员仍显然认为自己在隔岸观火，狭隘的国家观念正在欧盟死灰复燃，变革的渴望似乎正在熄灭。


In particular, Merkel wants to be re-elected in 2013, and appears content to leave Europe for later.	特别是，默克尔希望在2013年获得连任，似乎不认为此后退出欧洲是多大的问题。


Unfortunately, with the election set for September, that means that three-quarters of the year will be wasted.	不幸的是，对9月的大选来说，这意味着今年将有三个季度被浪费。


And, because another Merkel-led coalition seems to be more likely (at least from today’s vantage point) than a real change in government, post-election Germany, absent renewed pressure from the crisis, will remain wedded to the politics of small or tiny steps, leaving Europe treading water.	此外，由于默克尔更有可能领导新的联盟（至少从现今的优势看是如此），而不是真正改组政府，因此大选后的德国在摆脱危机新压力的情况下将继续逡巡，看着欧洲在泥淖中苦苦挣扎。


As a result, developments in southern European will remain a key factor determining Europe’s course in 2013.	因此，南欧的发展局势将仍是决定2013年欧洲状态的关键因素。


The depression will continue, dimming prospects for economic growth throughout the EU and the eurozone.	萧条将会继续，整个欧盟和欧元区经济增长前景黯淡。


The gap between the rich north and the crisis-ridden south will widen, highlighting their contradictory interests and thus exacerbating Europe’s tendency toward separation, primarily between the north and the south, but also between the eurozone and the rest of the EU.	富有的北欧和深受危机困扰的南欧之间的差距会拉大，凸显出它们相互冲突的利益，从而加剧欧洲的分裂趋势——南北欧的分裂之势特别明显，但欧元区和欧盟其他国家之间也存在分裂趋势。


The European Central Bank will serve as the eurozone’s center of power even more than it does today, because it is the monetary union’s only institution that can actually act.	欧洲央行将成为欧元区的权力中心（甚至超过现今），因为它是这一货币联盟唯一可以采取实际行动的机构。


Though the ECB has absolutely nothing in common with the old Deutsche Bundesbank, the German public has not recognized this.	尽管欧洲央行与昔日的德国央行绝无共同之处，但德国公众并不明白这一点。


But the fact that the ECB’s power is only a technocratic substitute for the eurozone’s missing democratic political institutions will remain a growing problem in 2013.	但欧洲央行的权力是欧元区所缺失的民主政治制度的技术替代物这一事实将是2013年的一个继续发酵的问题。


This is also true, more generally, of German dominance of the EU.	更一般地说，德国对欧盟的主导力也是如此。


Should it continue without new institutional regulations that mutualize its role within the eurozone, 2013 will be a year of further disintegration.	如���没有新的制度性规则将德国在欧元区的角色共同化，那么2013年将是进一步分裂之年。


It will also be a year of destiny for France, whose government is keenly aware that, without painful reforms, the country might be doomed; the only question that remains is whether it can implement them.	2013年还将是决定法国命运的一年。 法国政府已经强烈地认识到，不进行痛苦的改革，法国就有可能失败；


The answer will determine not only President François Hollande’s political future, but also the future of the EU, because, without a strong German-French tandem, Europe’s crisis cannot be overcome.	剩下的问题只是是否能够实施改革。 这个问题的答案不仅将决定总统奥朗德的政治前途，也将决定欧盟的未来，因为没有强大的德法联盟，欧洲危机将是不可克服的。


Meanwhile, Europe’s negative political trends are reinforced by uncertainty in Britain about whether to remain in the EU, Italy’s upcoming general election, and aggressive nationalism in many member states.	与此同时，欧洲的消极政治趋势被英国的是否留在欧元区、意大利即将到来的大选以及众多成员国激进的民族主义所包含的不确定性而增强了。


Given this, Europe’s condition is quite obviously far from being stabilized, despite some leading Europeans’ recent statements suggesting otherwise.	这样看来，欧洲所面临的环境显然远远算不上稳定，尽管一些欧洲领导人的最新表态并非如此。


Europe in 2013 will continue to need the pressure from the crisis in order to find a way to overcome it once and for all.	2013年的欧洲将继续需要来自危机的压力以寻找一劳永逸克服危机的办法。


Regardless of electoral outcomes in important EU member states, Europeans will remain unable to expect much from their political leaders, because opposition forces generally have little more to offer than the incumbents do.	不管欧盟重要成员国的大选结果如何，欧洲人都不用期待政治领导人能给他们带来什么，因为反对派的能量总比在任者强一些。


We should wish Europe a successful year, but it would be foolish to bet on it.	我们还是祈祷欧洲能迎来成功的一年吧，但这个愿望看来相当蠢。


Europe’s Year of Indecision	欧洲的犹豫之年


NEW YORK – The dire economic situation in which most of the rich world found itself in 2011 was not merely the result of impersonal economic forces, but was largely created by the policies pursued, or not pursued, by world leaders.	纽约——2011年，大部分发达国家的经济状况可谓悲惨，造成这一状况的原因并不只有客观经济动力，大部分要归咎于全球领导人有意或无意追求的政策。


Indeed, the remarkable unanimity that prevailed in the first phase of the financial crisis that began in 2008, and which culminated in the $1 trillion rescue package put together for the London G-20 meeting in April 2009, dissipated long ago. Now, bureaucratic infighting and misconceptions are rampant.	事实上，在2008年危机爆发的第一阶段，人们已经达成了令人瞩目的一致，并在2009年4月的伦敦G20峰会共同推出了1万亿美元的救助计划，但这样一致早已烟消云散了。


Worse still, policy disagreements are playing out more or less along national lines.	更糟糕的是，政策不一致更多地出现在国家层面。


The center of fiscal conservatism is Germany, while Anglo-Saxon countries are still drawn to John Maynard Keynes.	德国是财政保守主义的核心，而盎格鲁-撒克逊国家则抱定了凯恩斯的大腿。


This division is complicating matters enormously, because close international cooperation is needed to correct the global imbalances that remain at the root of the crisis.	这一分歧让事态大大地恶化了，因为紧密的国际合作是纠正全球失衡这一仍未解决的危机根源所不必可少的。


Doubts about sovereign debt in Europe have revolved around the euro to such an extent that some now question whether the single currency can survive.	关于欧洲主权债务的疑虑丛生，以至于人们开始怀疑单一货币能否继续维持下去。


But the euro was an incomplete currency from the outset.	但欧元从诞生之日起便是一种不完备的货币。


The Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union without a political union – a common central bank, but no common treasury.	马斯特里赫特条约建立了一个没有政治联盟基础的货币联盟——有共同中央银行而没有共同财政部。


Its architects were aware of this deficiency, but other flaws in their design became apparent only after the crash of 2008.	欧元的缔造者对这一缺陷心知肚明，但在他们的设计中还有其他缺陷，这些缺陷直到2008年危机爆发后才显现出来。


The euro was built on the assumption that markets correct their own excesses, and that imbalances arise only in the public sector.	欧元的建立基于一个假设：市场能纠正自身的过度调整，失衡只会在公共部门产生。