In the years leading up to the crisis, two bubbles – property and credit – fueled a record-high personal-consumption binge.	在危机前的几年中，两种经济泡沫——房地产和信贷——加剧了创纪录的个人消费热潮。


When the bubbles burst, households understandably became fixated on balance-sheet repair – namely, paying down debt and rebuilding personal savings, rather than resuming excessive spending habits.	当泡沫爆发时，不难理解每个家庭都开始关注如何改善其负债——也就是偿还债务并重新开始储蓄，而不是恢复过度消费的习惯。


Indeed, notwithstanding an unprecedented post-crisis tripling of Fed assets to roughly $3 trillion – probably on their way to $4 trillion over the next year – US consumers have pulled back as never before.	确实，尽管前所未有的危机后美联储资产大概翻了三倍到3万亿美元——并可能在未来一年内达到4万亿美元，美国的消费还是前所未有的回落了。


In the 19 quarters since the start of 2008, annualized growth of inflation-adjusted consumer spending has averaged just 0.7% – almost three percentage points below the 3.6% trend increases recorded in the 11 years ending in 2006.	自2008年初以来的19个季度中，计入通胀因素后消费支出的年化增长率平均仅为0. 7%——几乎比截至2006年的前11年每年3.


Nor does the ECB have reason to be gratified with its strain of quantitative easing.	欧洲央行也没有理由为其量化宽松政策的作为而感到满意。


Despite a doubling of its balance sheet, to a little more than €3 trillion ($4 trillion), Europe has slipped back into recession for the second time in four years.	尽管它的资产翻了倍，达到3万多亿欧元（折合约4万亿美元），欧洲已经在四年中第二次回落到衰退状态。


Not only is QE’s ability to jumpstart crisis-torn, balance-sheet-constrained economies limited; it also runs the important risk of blurring the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy.	不仅量化宽松政策重启那些饱受危机折磨且资产负债表受制的经济体的能力有限； 它还冒着模糊货币政策和财政政策之间区别的重大风险。


Central banks that buy sovereign debt issued by fiscal authorities offset market-imposed discipline on borrowing costs, effectively subsidizing public-sector profligacy.	那些购买由财政当局发行的主权债务的央行逃脱了市场对借贷成本施加的约束，实际上资助了公共部门的挥霍行为。


Unfortunately, it appears that Japan has forgotten many of its own lessons – especially the BOJ’s disappointing experience with zero interest rates and QE in the early 2000’s.	不幸地是，日本似乎忘了自身所经历的许多教训——尤其是日本央行在2000年代实施零利率和量化宽松政策的沮丧经历。


But it has also lost sight of the 1990’s – the first of its so-called lost decades – when the authorities did all they could to prolong the life of insolvent banks and many nonfinancial corporations.	但它同时也也忘记了1990年代——也是第一个所谓“失落的10年”——再此期间当局尽其所能延长资不抵债的银行和许多非金融公司的寿命。


Zombie-like companies were kept on artificial life-support in the false hope that time alone would revive them.	这些行尸走肉般的公司靠着人为力量勉强继续运行，它们都抱着一种虚幻的希望——时间能够拯救一切。


It was not until late in the decade, when the banking sector was reorganized and corporate restructuring was encouraged, that Japan made progress on the long, arduous road of balance-sheet repair and structural transformation.	直到这个10年的末期，当银行开始重组而且企业也被鼓励重组时，日本才在修复资产负债表和结构改革的道路上取得了进步。


US authorities have succumbed to the same Japanese-like temptations.	美国当局已经屈服于与日本一样的诱惑。


From quantitative easing to record-high federal budget deficits to unprecedented bailouts, they have done everything in their power to mask the pain of balance-sheet repair and structural adjustment.	从量化宽松政策到破纪录的联邦预算赤字都被用于前所未有的救援行动，他们用尽一切力量来掩饰资产负债表修复与结构调整所带来的痛苦。


As a result, America has created its own generation of zombies – in this case, zombie consumers.	结果，美国已经创造出了它自己的僵尸——也就是僵尸消费者。


Like Japan, America’s post-bubble healing has been limited – even in the face of the Fed’s outsize liquidity injections.	跟日本一样，美国泡沫破裂后的恢复是有限的——即使是在美联储注入大规模流动资金的情况下。


Household debt stood at 112% of income in the third quarter of 2012 – down from record highs in 2006, but still nearly 40 percentage points above the 75% norm of the last three decades of the twentieth century.	2012年第三季度美国家庭负债相当于收入的112%——虽然较2006年的创纪录高位有所回落，但仍比20世纪最后30年75%的标准高了几乎40个百分点。 同样，2012年截止到11月的后四个月中个人储蓄率仅为3.


Similarly, the personal-saving rate, at just 3.5% in the four months ending in November 2012, was less than half the 7.9% average of 1970-99.	5%，这还不到1970~1999年7. 9%的平均储蓄率的一半。


The same is true of Europe. The ECB’s über-aggressive actions have achieved little in the way of bringing about long-awaited structural transformation in the region.	欧洲的情况也是如此，欧洲央行过于激进的行动并未在区内促成人们期待已久的结构性改革。


Crisis-torn peripheral European economies still suffer from unsustainable debt loads and serious productivity and competitiveness problems.	饱受危机折磨的欧洲外围经济体仍然面对着无法承受的债务负担和严重的生产力和竞争力问题。


And a fragmented European banking system remains one of the weakest links in the regional daisy chain.	而碎片化的欧洲银行体系仍然是区域链条中最脆弱的一环。


Is this the “cure” that Abe really wants for Japan?	这就是安倍想为日本寻求的“解决方案”吗？


The last thing that the Japanese economy needs at this point is backsliding on structural reforms.	此时日本经济最不需要的就是结构改革的倒退。


Yet, by forcing the BOJ to follow in the misdirected footsteps of the Fed and the ECB, that is precisely the risk that Abe and Japan are facing.	然而通过迫使日本央行追随美联储和欧洲央行的错误步伐，这正是安倍和日本所面临的风险。


Massive liquidity injections carried out by the world’s major central banks – the Fed, the ECB, and the BOJ – are neither achieving traction in their respective real economies, nor facilitating balance-sheet repair and structural change.	由世界主要的央行——即美联储、欧洲央行、日本央行——贯彻的大规模流动性注入既不能在各自的实体经济里促进交易，也不能促进资产负债表修复和结构性变革。


That leaves a huge sum of excess liquidity sloshing around in global asset markets.	这就让大量多余的流动资金在全球资本市场上流动。


Where it goes, the next crisis is inevitably doomed to follow.	不管这些资金流到何处，下一个危机也无可避免地注定随之而来。


Why Remember Pearl Harbor?	纪念珍珠港事件


NEW YORK – December 7 marks the 67th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.	纽约--今年12月7日是日本攻击珍珠港事件67周年纪念日。


Over the years, “the day of infamy” has become a classic reference point for galvanizing patriotic sentiment in America.	多年来，人们用这一“奇耻大辱之日”激发美国爱国情怀百试不爽。


In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, for example, analogies to Pearl Harbor were made frequently.	例如，在2001年9月11日恐怖主义攻击事件后，人们经常把它和珍珠港事件进行类比。


But despite its central place in America’s collective memory, Pearl Harbor remains little understood.	但是尽管珍珠港在美国人的集体记忆中占据中心地位，但是人们对它还是一知半解。


Why did Japan initiate such a seemingly self-destructive war in the first place?	日本为何进行这一看起来是自我毁灭的战争呢？


Aside from lessons that Japan must learn from its momentous decision, is there something to be learned by the United States as well?	除了日本要从这一重大决定中吸取教训之外，美国有没有经验教训要总结呢？


The decision to attack Pearl Harbor was reached after five months of deliberations that included numerous official conferences.	袭击珍珠港的决定是在经过五个月的审议后做出的，决策过程中举行了难以计数的会议。


It was a gradual process in which more sympathetic, albeit firm, US engagement might have helped sway Japan in a different direction.	这是一个渐进的过程。 在这一过程中，如果美国坚定而又富有同情地与日本接触，那么或许会把日本引向另一个方向。


In fact, Japanese government opinion was so divided that it is surprising that it was able to unite in the end.	实际上，日本政府内部观点充满分歧，最终能够团结一致实在令人惊讶。


Many in the Japanese Army initially regarded the Soviet Union as the main threat facing the country.	日本皇军有许多人把苏联视为国家面临的主要威胁。


Others saw the US as the primary enemy.	其他人则把美国视为主要敌人。


Some were concerned with more abstract, ideological enemies, such as Communism and “Americanism,” while there were also voices highlighting the menace of the “white race” (including Japan’s allies, Germany and Italy) against the “yellow race.”	有人担心更为抽象的意识形态上的敌人，例如共产主义和所谓“美国主义”。 还有人则强调“白种人”(包括日本的盟国德国和意大利)对“黄种人”的威胁。


Then there were those who preferred not to fight any enemy at all, particularly the US, whose long-term war-making power, the government knew, far surpassed Japan’s own.	进而，还有人希望根本不要打仗，特别是与美国打仗。 政府知道，美国的长久作战实力远远超过日本。


The tactical mastermind of the Pearl Harbor operation, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was one of them.	珍珠港行动的战术策划人海军上将山本五十六就是其中反对之人。


Over the course of the summer of 1941, events slowly tilted Japan towards the possibility of war with the West.	1941年夏天，各种事件逐步把日本推向与西方开战。


But Pearl Harbor was in no way inevitable.	但是袭击珍珠港决非不可避免。


Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union compelled Japan in July 1941 to prepare a plan of attack.	德国攻击苏联迫使日本在1941年准备进攻方案。


Although it made clear Japan’s desire to take advantage of the European conflict and gain a foothold in the European colonies in Southeast Asia, the plan was not clear about who constituted Japan’s true enemy.	尽管这一方案明确了日本利用欧战并且在欧洲各国在东南亚取得立足点的愿望，但是它并未明确说明谁是日本的真正敌人。


Japan’s military thrust into Southeast Asia led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration to impose sanctions.	日本军队攻入东南亚导致美国总统罗斯福当局实行制裁。


The US froze Japanese assets, an example followed by Britain and the Dutch East Indies.	美国冻结了日本的资产，英国和荷属东印度也随后效仿。


When Japan responded by taking over southern French Indochina, the US retaliated by imposing an embargo on oil exports to Japan.	日本通过占领法属印度支那南部还以颜色，美国则对日本实行石油禁运予以报复。


Rather than telling Japan that the US was determined to search for a diplomatic solution, America’s categorical reaction confirmed it to the Japanese as an arrogant and conceited enemy.	美国不仅没有告诉日本它决心寻求外交解决途经，其坚硬的反应措施使得日本确信美国是一个自负的敌人。


Moreover, by transferring its Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, the US encouraged the Japanese understanding that the US fully anticipated war with Japan.	而且，美国将太平洋舰队从圣地亚哥转移到珍珠港，促使日本认为美国完全打算与日本开战。


World War II in the Pacific finally came about for many different reasons.	第二次世界大战的太平洋战争最后打响有多种不同的原因。


But it was, above all, the sense of encirclement and humiliation that united the deeply divided Japanese government.	但是首先是因为被包围感和屈辱感使得原本意见分歧严重的日本政府团结起来。


Feeling defeated by a series of failed approaches to the US, including an overture to hold direct talks with Roosevelt, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe resigned on October 16, making hard-line Army Minister Hideki Tōjō his successor.	日本首相近卫文磨试图接近美国包括与美国总统罗斯福举行直接会谈，但是都无功而返。 他深感受挫而在10月16日辞职，把首相位子让给了强硬派陆军大臣东条英机。


The high-handed tone of the Hull Note of November 26, demanding Japan’s withdrawal of all its troops from China, was a final blow to the moderates in Japan’s government, who still hoped for diplomatic negotiations.	美国国务卿赫尔11月26日照会日本言辞高傲严厉，要求日本从中国完全撤军。 这是对依旧希望外交谈判的日本政府温和派的最后一击。


By this time, many policymakers were convinced that the US was not ready to hear them out.	到了此时，许多决策者都相信美国并不打算听取他们意见。


It was ultimately in the name of saving Asia for all Asians from what was regarded as Western arrogance that the government united to wage war.	日本政府最后以大东亚共荣、抵御洋人傲慢无理的名义联合一致开战。


On December 1, it was decided that the war would commence in six days.	12月1日，日本决定在六天内开战。


There were legitimate historical reasons for Japan to feel humiliated on the eve of war.	战前日本感觉受到屈辱是有合理历史原因的。


The gunboat diplomacy that resulted in the opening of Japan and unequal treaties in the mid-19th century was but a beginning.	炮舰外交迫使日本门户开放并且在十九世纪中叶签署不平等条约只是一个开始。


More immediately, the Great Depression and the subsequent compartmentalization of the world into economic blocs also worked to the advantage of the already powerful.	更为直接的是，经济大萧条以及随之而来各国经济组成集团同样有利于早先的列强。


Coupled with the economic hardship of the interwar years were instances of racial prejudice in the US that aimed at preventing Japanese immigration.	伴随两次世界大战之间经济困境的是美国种族偏见，意在防止日本移民。


United by this long-simmering and humiliating sense of exclusion, Japanese policymakers, whatever their differences, stumbled toward the December 1 decision to go to war.	日本决策者由于这一长期潜伏、令人羞辱的排斥之感而不顾彼此分歧，于12月1日决定开战。


With almost 70 years of hindsight, Pearl Harbor should offer some lessons for US foreign policy today.	珍珠港事件过去将近70年时间。 有了这一后见，这一事件应该给美国当今的外交政策提供某些经验教训。


Despite obvious differences between Pearl Harbor and recent Islamist terrorist tactics, they show the common desire of self-proclaimed Davids to topple their Goliaths in a clearly lop-sided battle.	尽管珍珠港事件和最近伊斯兰恐怖主义伎俩有明显的不同，但是它们都显现出在一场实力对比悬殊的战斗中鱼死网破的愿望。


These Davids depend on Western technologies to overcome imbalances of power, and are driven by a sense of real or imagined humiliation.	这些弱者依靠西方技术克服实力不平衡，而且他们都受到实际或者想像中受辱感的驱使。


But no matter how strong and historically justified such grievances may be those who resort to murderous tactics must be condemned.	但是，无论这些冤屈有多么强烈、具有多少历史合理性，那些采取谋杀伎俩的人都应该受到谴责。


However, high-handedness and tough talk alone are an inadequate response, for this approach further humiliates those who already feel humiliated, and alienates those who might otherwise proffer a more moderate voice.	但是，仅仅是态度强硬和严厉对话尚不足以回应，因为这一手段进一步羞辱那些已经感到受辱的人，并且让那些原本温和派离心离德。


Diplomacy no longer works with terrorism, but it can help to prevent it by dealing carefully with potentially hostile states.	对于恐怖主义外交已经无济于事，但是外交可以帮助认真应对潜在的敌对国家。


With global expectations mounting for a fresh start in US foreign policy, it is vital not just to remember, but to understand the attack on Pearl Harbor.	现在全世界日益期待美国���交改头换面，因此，不仅怀念、而且理解珍珠港事件也就越发重要。


America’s Global Election	关乎全球的美国选举


NEW YORK – Most people around the world will not be able to vote in the United States’s upcoming presidential election, even though they have a great deal at stake in the result.	发自纽约——世界上大部分人都无法在即将到来的美国总统大选上投票，尽管大选的结果与他们的利益息息相关。


Overwhelmingly, non-US citizens favor Barack Obama’s re-election over a victory for his challenger, Mitt Romney.	相比米特·罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）——美国以外的大多数人更希望巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）能连任。


There are good reasons for this.	他们有充分的理由支持奥巴马而非罗姆尼。


In terms of the economy, the effects of Romney’s policies in creating a more unequal and divided society would not be directly felt abroad.	就经济而言，美国之外的人们并不会直接感受到罗姆尼创造一个更不平等更分裂的社会政策所带来的影响。


But, in the past, for better and for worse, others have often followed America’s example.	然而一直以来，无论美国的做法是好是坏，其他国家通常都会争相效仿。


Many governments quickly subscribed to Ronald Reagan’s mantra of deregulated markets – policies that eventually brought about the worst global recession since the 1930’s.	之前许多政府曾迅速追随美国前总统罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）放松管制市场的口号——这种政策最终酿成了自1930年代以来最严重的全球经济衰退。


Other countries that followed America’s lead have experienced growing inequality – more money at the top, more poverty at the bottom, and a weaker middle class.	其它以美国为榜样的国家都经历了日渐恶化的不平等状态——富人越来越富有，穷人越来越穷困，而中产阶级的力量则日渐薄弱。


Romney’s proposed contractionary policies – the attempt to reduce deficits prematurely, while the US economy is still frail – will almost surely weaken America’s already anemic growth, and, if the euro crisis worsens, it could bring on another recession.	罗姆尼推荐主张经济紧缩的政策——当美国经济仍然很虚弱时贸然试图降低赤字——几乎必然会削弱美国本已乏力的增长，而且，如果欧元危机继续恶化，将会引发另一轮衰退。


At that point, with US demand shrinking, the rest of the world would indeed feel the economic effects of a Romney presidency quite directly.	到那时，随着美国需求萎缩，世界其他国家将真切而直接地感受到罗姆尼任总统所带来的经济效应。


That raises the question of globalization, which entails concerted action on many fronts by the international community.	这就引出了全球化的问题，全球化在许多方面都需要国际社会一致行动。


But what is required with regard to trade, finance, climate change, and a host other areas is not being done.	但在贸易、金融、气候变化以及许多其他领域上需要做的事情都没有实现。


Many people attribute these failures partly to an absence of American leadership.	很多人把这些失败在某种程度上归咎于缺乏美国的领导。


But, while Romney may summon bravado and strong rhetoric, other world leaders would be unlikely to follow him, owing to the belief (correct in my judgment) that he would take the US – and them – in the wrong direction.	然而，尽管罗姆尼或许会发表强硬的言论甚至虚张声势，世界上其他领导人也不大可能会追随他，因为他们认为（依我判断这是正确的）罗姆尼将会把美国以及他们带往一个错误的方向。


American “exceptionalism” may sell well at home, but it does poorly abroad.	美国“例外论”在其国内也许很得人心，但国外却不这么看。


President George W. Bush’s Iraq war – arguably a violation of international law – showed that though America spends almost as much on defense as the rest of the world combined, it could not pacify a country with less than 10% of its population and less than 1% of its GDP.	前美国总统乔治·沃克·布什（George W. Bush）所发动的伊拉克战争——可以说这违反了国际法——显示了尽管美国国防支出几乎等于世界其他国家的总和，它也无法使一���人口只有其10%， GDP仅相当于其1%的国家屈服。


Moreover, it turned out that US-style capitalism was neither efficient nor stable.	此外，事实证明美国式资本主义既没有效率也不稳定。


With most Americans’ incomes stagnating for a decade and a half, it was clear that the US economic model was not delivering for most citizens, whatever official GDP data said.	从大部分美国人的收入停滞了十五年的情况看来，不管官方的GDP数据怎么说，显然美国的经济模式并不能给大部分公民带来益处。


Indeed, the model blew up even before Bush left office.	确实，这种模式的弊端甚至在小布什离任之前就显露出来了。


Together with the abuses of human rights under his administration, the Great Recession – the predictable (and predicted) consequence of his economic policies – did as much to weaken America’s soft power as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan did to weaken the credibility of its military power.	加上小布什政府对人权的滥用，经济大萧条——这是布什经济政策可预见（确实被预测中了）的后果——确实像伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争削弱了美国军事实力的可信度一样削弱了美国的软实力。


In terms of values – namely, the values of Romney and his running mate, Paul Ryan – things are not much better.	在价值观方面——也就是罗姆尼和他的竞选伙伴保罗·瑞安（Paul Ryan）的价值观——情况也不甚理想。


For example, every other advanced country recognizes the right to accessible health care, and Obama’s Affordable Care Act represents a significant step toward that goal.	比如，所有其他的发达国家都承认其公民有获得价格合理医疗服务的权力，而奥巴马的可承担医疗法案（Affordable Care Act）则代表了朝该目标迈进的重要一步。


But Romney has criticized this effort, and has offered nothing in its place.	罗姆尼对此大加批判，但却未能提出任何可以替代这一法案的政策。


America now has the distinction of being among the advanced countries that afford the least equality of opportunity to their citizens.	美国现在是给本国公民提供机会最不均等的发达国家之一。


And Romney’s drastic budget cutbacks, targeted at the poor and middle class, would further impede social mobility.	而罗姆尼针对穷人和中产阶级的大幅预算削减政策会进一步阻碍社会流动性。


At the same time, he would expand the military, spending more money on weapons that do not work against enemies that do not exist, enriching defense contractors like Halliburton at the expense of desperately needed public investment in infrastructure and education.	同时他还会扩大军队，花更多的钱在武器上——这些武器并不会对不存在的敌人起到任何作用，只能使哈利伯顿（Halliburton）这类国防军工企业更加富有，而这是以牺牲急需政府投资的基础设施和教育为代价的。


While Bush is not on the ballot, Romney has not really distanced himself from the Bush administration’s policies.	虽然小布什没有参加竞选，罗姆尼却没有和小布什政府过去的政策划清界限。


On the contrary, his campaign has featured the same advisers, the same devotion to higher military spending, the same belief that tax cuts for the rich are the solution to every economic problem, and the same fuzzy budget math.	相反，他的竞选活动使用同样的顾问团，同样致力于更高的军事支出，也怀着同样的信念——即给富人减税是解决所有经济问题的办法，还有同样含糊不清的预算计算方法。


Consider, for example, the three issues that are at the center of the global agenda mentioned earlier: climate change, financial regulation, and trade.	细想一下，比如之前提到的全球议程最关注的三个议题：气候变化、金融监管和贸易。


Romney has been silent on the first, and many in his party are “climate deniers.”	罗姆尼对第一个问题一直保持沉默，而他所在的共和党人很多人都“否认气候问题的存在”。


The world cannot expect genuine leadership from Romney there.	在这个问题上，全世界都不用指望罗姆尼了。


As for financial regulation, while the recent crisis has highlighted the need for stricter rules, agreement on many issues has proven to be elusive, partly because the Obama administration is too close to the financial sector.	至于金融监管，最近的危机凸显出人们需要制定更为严格的监管规则，然而在许多问题上所达成的协议被证明是逃避问题的，这一部分是由于奥巴马政府与财政部门过于亲近。


With Romney, though, there would be no distance at all: metaphorically speaking, he is the financial sector.	但对罗姆尼来说根本不存在距离的问题：形象地说，他本人就是财政部门。


One financial issue on which there is global agreement is the need to close down offshore bank havens, which exist mainly for purposes of tax evasion and avoidance, money laundering, and corruption.	一个全球已达成协议的金融问题就是需要关闭离岸银行这个避风港——离岸银行的存在主要是为了避税漏税、洗钱和贪污。


Money does not go to the Cayman Islands because sunshine makes it grow faster; this money thrives on the absence of sunshine.	钱流入开曼群岛并不是因为那里的阳光让这些钱增长得更快，这些钱本来就是在黑暗中积累出来的。


But, with Romney unapologetic about his own use of Cayman banks, we are unlikely to see progress even in this area.	然而，罗姆尼自己就使用开曼银行，而且对此毫无悔意，我们也不大可能会看到他会在这方面有所作为。


On trade, Romney promises to launch a trade war with China, and to declare it a currency manipulator on Day One – a promise that gives him little wiggle room.	在贸易方面，罗姆尼许诺要跟中国打一场贸易战，并在上任第一天就宣布其为汇率操纵国——这把他逼到了墙角。


He refuses to note the renminbi’s large real appreciation in recent years, or to acknowledge that, while changes in China’s exchange rate may affect the bilateral trade deficit, what matters is America’s multilateral trade deficit.	他拒绝关注这几年来人民币汇率的大幅度实际升值，或者说拒绝承认虽然中国的汇率变化可能会影响双边贸易逆差，但更重要的其实是美国的多边贸易逆差。


A stronger renminbi would simply mean a switch in the US from China to lower-cost producers of textiles, apparel, and other goods.	人民币走强直接意味着纺织品，服装和其他商品的低成本制造国从中国变成了美国。


The irony – again lost on Romney – is that other countries are accusing the US of currency manipulation.	讽刺的是——这依然无法引起罗姆尼的注意——其他国家正谴责在美国操纵汇率。


After all, one of the main benefits of the Federal Reserve’s policy of “quantitative easing” – perhaps the only channel with a significant effect on the real economy – derives from the depreciation of the US dollar.	毕竟，美联储的量化宽松政策的其中一个主要好处——也许是唯一一个能对实体经济产生重大影响的渠道——就来自于美元的贬值。


The world has a lot riding on America’s election.	美国的总统大选对整个世界来说影响都很大。


Unfortunately, most people who will be affected by it – almost the entire world – will have no influence on the outcome.	不幸地是，大部分即将受到该选举影响的人——几乎是整个世界——对结果却没有任何的影响力。


The Battle Cry of the Non-Oppressed	未受压迫者的战争号角


TEL AVIV – Nobody should be surprised that Scotland’s recent referendum on independence left the United Kingdom intact.	特拉维夫—苏格兰最近的独立公投的最终结果是英国安然无恙，这本不令人奇怪。


In the past, regions or communities have achieved statehood almost exclusively after a struggle against colonial subjection and oppression, galvanized by an appeal to a distinctive religious, cultural, or ethnic identity.	在过去，地区或社会建国成功几乎清一色是依靠反殖民统治和压迫的斗争，推动力量往往是独特的宗教、文化或种族身份诉求。


Complaints about economic dynamics, social policies, or governance inefficiencies – the basis of Scotland’s “yes” campaign – are not the cris de coeur of a successful independence movement.	关于经济活力、社会政策或治理低效的怨气——苏格兰对独立说“是”的阵营的基础就在于此——从未唤起过成功的独立运动。


That is bad news for secessionists elsewhere in the West.	对西方的其他分裂主义者来说，这是个坏消息。


Of course, Scotland’s technocratic nationalism made sense.	当然，苏格兰的技术官僚民族主义有其意义。


As the movement’s leader, Alex Salmond, acknowledged in a 2012 consultation document, “Scotland is not oppressed and we have no need to be liberated.”	独立运动领导人亚历克斯·萨尔蒙德（Alex Salmond）在2012 的咨文中承认，“苏格兰没有受到压迫，我们不需要被解放。


The struggle for independence, he explained, was aimed at creating the kind of efficient administrative and economic structures that would enable Scotland to reach its potential.	”他解释说，独立斗争的目标是建立高效的行政和经济结构，以使苏格兰实现潜力。


The “yes” campaign hoped to win supporters with a utopian vision of an independent Scotland that included European Union and NATO membership; a currency union with England, but no fiscal union; improved public services and social benefits; and lower taxes.	“是”阵营希望凭借一个拥有欧盟和北约成员资格的独立的苏格兰、一个和英格兰一起构成的货币而非财政的联盟、改善的公共服务和社会福利以及更低的税收这一乌托邦前景赢得支持者。


In other words, Scotland would have everything it has now, only better, and on its own terms.	换句话说，独立后的苏格兰将拥有现在所拥有的一切，只会更好，不会更差。


This vision was undoubtedly appealing to many Scots.	这一前景毫无疑问吸引了大量苏格兰人。


But it proved significantly less compelling than the economic doomsday scenarios advanced by its unionist opponents, including former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, former World Bank President Robert Zoellick, and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne.	但显然它远远敌不过包括前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘、前世界银行行长罗伯特·佐利克和前财政大臣乔治·奥斯本在内的统一主义反对派所宣扬的经济末日情景。


In other words, many people’s votes were driven by risk aversion, fear, and intimidation, rather than hope, passion, or deep emotional attachment to a common identity.	换句话说，许多人的投票受风险厌恶、恐惧和威胁的驱动，而不是受希望、激情或对共同身份的深刻情感归属的驱动。


This contrasts sharply with the motivations espoused by Scotland’s nobles in the fourteenth century, when they succeeded in preserving their country’s independence from English rule.	这与十四世纪苏格兰贵族所发动的运动截然相反。 当时，他们成功地捍卫了国家脱离英格兰统治的独立性。


“It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honors that we are fighting,” they declared, “but for freedom alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself.”	“事实上，我们的斗争不是为了光荣、富有或荣耀，” 他们说，“而只是为了自由，没有哪个诚实的人会放弃自由。 ”


In fact, the “no” campaign’s victory might have been even more resounding if the Westminster establishment’s desperate, last-minute offer to grant Scotland more powers on taxation, spending, and welfare had been included as an option in the ballot.	事实上，如果英国当局最后时刻授予苏格兰更大的征税、支出和福利权力的争取姿态一开始就包括在投票选项中的话，“不”阵营的胜利还会更加辉煌。


National movements driven by a historical mission or an uncompromising quest to assert group identity against a dominant power normally do not succumb to economic considerations and last-minute economic bait.	受历史使命或面对主宰势力主张群体身份的不可妥协的要求驱动的国家运动通常不会屈从于经济考虑或最后时刻的经济诱惑。


It was none other than the founder of the Zionist fundamentalist right, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who warned in 1924 against “the naive assumption that the aspiration of the Palestinians…will be paralyzed by such means as subsidies, economic advantages, or bribery.”	原教旨锡安主义右派创始人杰伊夫·亚博金斯基（Ze’ev Jabotinsky）在1924年警告说，“巴勒斯坦人的雄心……可以通过补贴、经济进步或自由这样的办法消磨，这样的想法是幼稚的。


Recognizing that their “natural patriotism is pure and noble,” he knew that they could not be “bought off.”	”他意识到巴勒斯坦人“纯粹而高贵的天生的爱国主义”，明白他们不可能被“收买”。


Now, Salmond is probably re-thinking his avoidance of nativist identity politics.	如今，萨尔蒙德或许在反思他回避本土身份政治的做法。


What Edmund Burke defined as a group’s attachment to “the inns and resting places of the human spirit” – that is, ethnic, religious, and community ties – would have been a much more powerful mobilizing force for an independence movement.	埃德蒙·伯克（Edmund Burke）所定义的一个群体对“人类精神的栖身之所”——即种族、宗教和社会联系——的依恋将永远是更有力得多的独立运动动员力。


The “yes” campaigners would not have had to look far for inspiration.	“是”阵营本不需要辛苦寻找灵感。


James Joyce – himself not devoid of traces of Irish nationalism – wrote that “nationality, language, [and] religion” are “the nets” into which “a man is born.”	詹姆斯·乔伊斯（James Joyce）——他本人并未摆脱爱尔兰民族主义痕迹——写道，“国籍、语言、[和]宗教”是“人类诞生”于其中的“网”。


Similarly, George Orwell distinguished between Celtic nationalism and Anglophobia, stating that the former is belief “in the past and future greatness of the Celtic peoples.”	类似地，乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）区分凯尔特民族主义者和仇英心理，指出前者是对“凯尔特民族过去和未来的伟大”的信念。


True, Scotland’s great minds in the age of Enlightenment, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and even the national poet, Robert Burns, were all fervent advocates of “Britishness,” whatever that might mean today.	诚然，启蒙时代苏格兰的伟大思想家——如大卫·休谟、亚当·斯密乃至于国民诗人罗伯特·彭斯（Robert Burns）——无不是“英国性”的强烈支持者，不管今天这可能意味着什么。


Yet an identity-based campaign could have resorted to the heritage of the Scottish Renaissance of the mid-twentieth century or to the Celtic Revival and Celtic Twilight movements, which awakened a spirit of cultural nationalism among Scots in the late nineteenth century.	但基于身份的运动本可以诉诸于二十世纪中叶的苏格兰复兴（Scottish Renaissance）或在19世纪末唤醒了苏格兰人文化民族主义精神的凯尔特复兴和凯尔特曙光（Celtic Revival and Celtic Twilight）等运动。


In the run-up to the referendum, Scotland’s independence movement became an important point of reference for Catalans and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the Veneto and South Tyrol regions in Italy, Corsicans and Bretons in France, and the secessionists of Quebec.	在通往公投的过程中，苏格兰独立运动成为西班牙加泰罗尼亚人和巴斯克人、比利时弗朗芒人、意大利威尼托（Veneto）和南蒂罗尔（South Tyrol）地区、法国科西嘉人和布列塔尼人以及魁北克分裂分子的重要参照点。


All hoped that Scotland would pave the way for the peaceful breakup of their own states.	他们无不希望苏格兰能为他们自身的建国开辟一条和平分裂之路。


With the defeat of Scotland’s independence movement – not to mention Québécois voters’ stunning rejection of the province’s largest separatist party in last April’s election – that hope may be waning.	苏格兰独立运动失败了——更不用说去年4月魁北克省选举中选民一边倒地拒绝了最大的分裂主义政党——这一希望也随之落空。


And with good reason.	理应如此。


There is little historical precedent for the peaceful breakup of a state, with an exception like Czechoslovakia’s consensual split in 1993 occurring in unique circumstances.	国家和平分裂的先例极少，捷克斯洛伐克1993年的自愿分裂只是例外，需要相当独特的环境才能发生。


A state is far more likely to go to war to defend its unity.	更有可能的是国家发动战争捍卫统一。


The United States and Spain did it in their civil wars, and today’s Spain would go to the outer limits of its capacity to prevent a Catalan or Basque referendum, let alone independence.	美国和西班牙的内战都是如此，今天的西班牙也会竭尽全力阻止加泰罗尼亚或巴斯克公投，更不用说独立了。


Nationalist groups in Western democracies are not subjugated people.	西方民主国家的民族主义群体并非被征服者。


Theirs is the nationalism of free, liberated people, who can expect the most generous devolution deals possible to protect their singular legacies and address their grievances.	他们是自由的民族主义、被解放的人民，大可期待获得最慷慨的放权保护他们独特的遗产、消弭他们的仇恨。


And perhaps that is why federal arrangements like those in Australia and Canada – essentially what Westminster grudgingly offered Scotland – could be their best option.	也许正因如此，澳大利亚和加拿大等国家的联邦制度可以成为他们的最佳选择——英国不情愿地向苏格兰所做的让步亦然。


Long Live China’s Slowdown	中国经济放缓万岁


NEW HAVEN – At 7.7%, China’s annual GDP growth in the first quarter of this year was slower than many expected.	发自纽黑文——今年第一季度中国7. 7%的年GDP增长率比很多人预计的要缓慢得多。


While the data were hardly devastating relative to a consensus forecast of 8.2%, many (including me) expected a second consecutive quarterly rebound from the slowdown that appeared to have ended in the third quarter of 2012.	虽然这一数据相对普遍8. 2%的预测来说并不是灾难性的，但很多人（包括我）都预计这次放缓——这种放缓似乎在2012年第三季度就已经结束了——后出现连续性的二次反弹。


China doubters around the world were quick to pounce on the number, expressing fears of a stall, or even a dreaded double dip.	而世界各地的中国怀疑论者则迅速针对这一数据大做文章，担心经济停滞甚至出现可怕的二次衰退。


But slower GDP growth is actually good for China, provided that it reflects the long-awaited structural transformation of the world’s most dynamic economy.	但假如能反映出全世界最活跃的经济体已经出现期待已久的结构性改革的话，较为缓慢的GDP增长对中国来说就是件好事。


The broad outlines of this transformation are well known – a shift from export- and investment-led growth to an economic structure that draws greater support from domestic private consumption.	这个改革的大轮廓是众所周知的——即从出口及投资导向型经济增长向由更多国内个人消费支撑的经济结构过渡。


Less well known is that a rebalanced China should have a slower growth rate – the first hints of which may now be evident.	更不为人所知的是重新平衡后的中国增长率应该更低——其第一批暗示迹象如今已经成为了现实。


A rebalanced China can grow more slowly for one simple reason: By drawing increased support from services-led consumer demand, China’s new model will embrace a more labor-intensive growth recipe.	重新调整过的中国会因为一个简单的原因而增长得更慢：即通过不断拉动服务主导的消费者需求，中国的新模式将会迎来一个更加劳动密集型的增长模式。


The numbers seem to bear that out.	这些数据似乎证实了这一点。


China’s services sector requires about 35% more jobs per unit of GDP than do manufacturing and construction – the primary drivers of the old model.	中国的服务业每创造一个单位的GDP要比制造业和建筑业——这是旧模式中最主要的驱动力——所需的劳动要多35%。


That number has potentially huge implications, because it means that China could grow at an annual rate in the 7-8% range and still achieve its objectives with respect to employment and poverty reduction.	这个数据有着潜在的巨大影响，它意味着中国能以7-8%的年增长率增长，同时还能实现提升就业和降低贫困率的目标。


China has struggled to attain these goals with anything less than 10% growth, because the old model was not generating enough jobs per unit of output.	中国一直奋力在10%的增长率之上实现这些目标，因为旧模式每个单位的产出并不能产生足够的工作岗位。


As Chinese manufacturing moved up the value chain, firms increasingly replaced workers with machines embodying the latest technologies.	由于中国制造业不断向价值链的上端移动，公司也不断地用最先进的机器来取代工人。


As a result, its economic model spawned a labor-saving, capital-intensive growth dynamic.	因此其经济模式催生了一个节省劳力，资本密集型的增长模式。


On one level, that made sense.	从某个程度说，这是说得通的。


Capital-labor substitution is at the heart of modern productivity strategies for manufacturing-based economies.	对以制造业为主的经济体来说，资本替代劳力是现代生产力的核心策略。


But it left China in a deepening hole: increasingly deficient in jobs per unit of output, it needed more units of output to absorb its surplus labor.	但这让中国陷入了难以自拔的泥潭：每单位产出所提供的工作岗位越来越少，这就需要更多的产出来吸收多余的劳力。


Ultimately, that became more of a problem than a solution.	最终，这会成为一个问题而不是解决方案。


The old manufacturing model, which fueled an unprecedented 20-fold increase in per capita income relative to the early 1990’s, also sowed the seeds of excessive resource consumption and environmental degradation.	旧的生产模式在上世纪90年代初期推动了前所未有的人均收入20倍的增长，同时也埋下了过度消耗资源和环境退化的隐患。


Services-led growth is, in many ways, the antidote to the “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable” growth model that former Premier Wen Jiabao’s famously criticized in 2007.	服务导向型增长从很多方面来说都能解决“不稳定、不平衡、不协调并最终不可持续”的增长模式——众所周知前总理温家宝批评过这一模式。


Yet services offer more than just a labor-intensive growth path.	然而服务业提供的不仅是劳动密集的增长路径。


Compared to manufacturing, they have much smaller resource and carbon footprints.	相对制造业，它们使用的能源更少，碳排放量也低。


A services-led model provides China with an alternative, environmentally friendlier, and ultimately more sustainable economic structure.	服务导向的模式给中国提供了一种选择，对环境更有益，最终而言也是一种更可持续的经济结构。


It is premature, of course, to conclude that a services-led transformation to slower growth is now at hand.	当然，由此就断言很快服务业就会导致增长更缓慢还为时过早。


The latest data hint at such a possibility, with the tertiary sector (services) expanding at an 8.3% annual rate in the first quarter of this year – the third consecutive quarter of acceleration and a half-percentage point faster than the 7.8% first-quarter gain recorded by the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction).	最新的数据暗示了这种可能性，第三产业（即服务业）在今年第一季度以8. 3%的速度扩张——这是其连续第三个季度的加速并比第二产业第一季度（制造业和建筑业）7.


But it will take more than a few quarters of mildly encouraging data to validate such an important shift in the Chinese economy’s underlying structure.	8%的增长率高出半个百分点。 但是要证明中国经济发生了根本结构的改变还需要多几个季度的数据来支撑。


Not surprisingly, China skeptics are putting a different spin on the latest growth numbers.	然而不出所料，中国怀疑论者也对最新的增长数据赋予了完全不同的意义。


Fears of a shadow-bank-induced credit bubble now top the worry list, reinforcing longstanding concerns that China may succumb to the dreaded “middle-income trap” – a sustained growth slowdown that has ensnared most high-growth emerging economies at the juncture that China has now reached.	他们现在最担忧影子银行会引发信贷泡沫，这又让强化了他们一直以来的担忧：中国可能会掉入可怕的“中等收入陷阱”——这是一种很多高增长新兴经济体在发展到中国这个阶段都面对过的持续增长放缓。


China is hardly immune to such a possibility.	中国几乎不大可能避免这种可能性。


But it is unlikely to occur if China can carry out the services-led pro-consumption rebalancing that remains the core strategic initiative of its current (12th) Five-Year Plan.	但���果中国能进行服务主导消费导向的调整——这仍然是中国当前（第十二个）五年计划的核心战略，这种情况就不大可能会发生。


Invariably, the middle-income trap afflicts those emerging economies that cling to early-stage development models for too long.	不变地是，中等收入陷阱会折磨那些过分长期依赖初级阶段发展模式的新兴经济体。


For China, the risk will be highest if it sticks with the timeworn recipe of unbalanced manufacturing- and construction-led growth, which has created such serious sustainability problems.	对中国来说，如果它继续其过时且不平衡的制造业和建筑业主导增长模式——这已经导致了非常严重的可持续性问题，那么它就很有可能掉进这一陷阱。


If China fails to rebalance, weak external demand from a crisis-battered developed world will continue to hobble its export machine, forcing it to up the ante on a credit- and investment-led growth model – in effect, doubling down on resource-intensive and environmentally damaging growth.	如果中国无法成功调整，发达国家饱受危机冲击的疲软外部需求将会持续遏制其出口机器，迫使它在信贷和投资主导的增长模式上押更多的赌注——实际上就会加倍进行资源密集和伤害环境的增长。


But I remain hopeful that China’s new leadership team will move quickly to implement its new model.	但我依旧对中国新的领导班子很快实施新模式保持乐观。


There are no viable alternatives.	因为他们并没有什么切实可行的替代方案。


Financial markets, as well as growth-starved developed economies, are not thrilled with the natural rhythm of slower growth that a rebalanced Chinese economy is likely to experience.	金融市场，以及缺乏增长的发达国家，并不喜欢调整后的中国经济可能要经历的增长放缓。


Resource industries – indeed, resource-based economies like Australia, Canada, Brazil, and Russia – have become addicted to China’s old strain of unsustainable hyper-growth.	资源产业——事实上像澳大利亚、加拿大、巴西和俄罗斯这些资源型经济体——都已经过度依赖中国过去那种不可持续的高速增长张力。


Yet China knows that it is time to break that dangerous habit.	然而中国自知是时候要破除这一危险习惯了。


The United States is likely to have a different problem with consumer-led growth in China.	很有可能中国的消费者主导增长模式对美国来说会成为一个问题。


After all, higher private consumption implies an end to China’s surplus saving – and thus to the seemingly open-ended recycling of that surplus into dollar-based assets such as US Treasury bills.	毕竟更高的私人消费意味着中国的储蓄盈余时代走向终结——从而也不能再无限循环利用这种盈余转化为美元资产，比如美国国库券。


Who will then fund America’s budget deficit – and on what terms?	那么谁又能为美国的预算赤字提供资金——其条件又会是什么呢？


Just as China must embrace slower growth as a natural consequence of its rebalancing imperative, the rest of the world will need to figure out how to cope when it does.	正如中国必须接受较慢的增长作为其势在必行调整的结果，世界其他各国也需要找到应对这一状况的手段。


Why Small Booms Cause Big Busts	为何小泡沫会造成大萧条


BERKELEY – As bubbles go, it was not a very big one.	发自伯克利——当泡沫膨胀时，其规模还不算太大。


From 2002 to 2006, the share of the American economy devoted to residential construction rose by 1.2 percentage points of GDP above its previous trend value, before plunging as the United States entered the greatest economic crisis in nearly a century.	在随美国遭遇近一个世纪以来最严重经济危机而暴跌之前的2002~2006年间，经济中住宅建筑占GDP的份额仅比先前的趋势值高出了1. 2%。


According to my rough calculations, the excess investment in the housing sector during this period totaled some $500 billion – by any measure a tiny fraction of the world economy at the time of the crash.	据笔者的粗略计算，这一时期住房领域的过度投资总额约为5000亿美元——无论怎样计算，都不过崩溃时世界经济总规模的一小部分而已。


The resulting damage, however, has been enormous.	然而因此造成的损失却是巨大的。


The economies of Europe and North America are roughly 6% smaller than we would have expected them to be had there been no crisis.	欧洲及北美各经济体比预期无危机的情况萎缩了6%。


In other words, a relatively small amount of overinvestment is responsible for some $1.8 trillion in lost production every year.	换句话说，相对少量的过度投资竟然导致了每年约1. 8万亿美元的GDP损失。


Given that the gap shows no signs of closing, and accounting for expected growth rates and equity returns, I estimate that the total loss to production will eventually reach nearly $3 quadrillion.	鉴于跌幅尚未出现收窄的迹象，我估计包括预期增长率和股本回报率在内，GDP总损失最终将达到近3000万亿美元。


For each dollar of overinvestment in the housing market, the world economy will have suffered $6,000 in losses.	意味着每1美元的房地产市场过度投资会令世界经济遭受6000美元的损失。


How can this be?	这是怎么回事？


It is important to note that not all recessions cause so much pain.	需要特别注意的是，并非所有的经济衰退都会造成如此严重的痛苦。


Financial blows in 1987, 1991, 1997, 1998, and 2001 (when some $4 trillion of excess investment was lost when the dot-com bubble burst) had little impact on the broader real economy.	比如1987，1991，1997，1998和2001年（当时网络泡沫破灭，4万亿美元的过度投资也打了水漂）的金融冲击就对更广泛的实体经济影响不大。


The reason why things were different this time can be found in a recently published paper by Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor.	而为什么这次情况会不同则可在奥斯卡·乔达（Òscar Jordà）、莫利兹·舒拉里克（Moritz Schularick）、艾伦M·泰勒（Alan M.


Large credit booms, the authors show, can greatly worsen the damage caused by the collapse of an asset bubble.	Taylor）最近发表的论文里找到答案。 在这篇论文中作者指出，大规模的信贷繁荣会大大加重资产泡沫崩溃造成的破坏。


Historically, when a recession is caused by the collapse of an asset bubble that was not fueled by a credit boom, the economy is roughly 1-1.5% below what it otherwise would have been five years after the start of the downturn.	从历史上看，当经济衰退因并非由信贷繁荣推动的资产泡沫所引发时，在衰退开始的五年后经济要比无衰退情况下缩减1~1.


When a credit boom is involved, however, the damage is significantly greater.	5%。 一旦由信贷繁荣所推动则破坏会明显扩大。


When the bubble is in equity prices, the economy performs 4% below par, on average, after five years – and as much as 9% below par when the bubble is in the housing market.	当泡沫体现在股价上时，衰退五年后经济的表现平均低于标准值4%。 当泡沫体现在房产市场时，这个数值将会达到9%。


Given these findings, it is clear that the distress experienced since the beginning of the economic crisis is not far out of line with historical experience.	有见及此，很显然自经济危机开始以来的惨痛经历也与历史经验不相上下。


For many economists, recessions are an inevitable part of the business cycle – the bust that necessarily follows, like a hangover, from any boom. John Maynard Keynes, however, had little time for this view.	在许多经济学家看来，衰退是经济周期不可避免的一部分——无论任何繁荣，随后的爆破是必然的，就像痛饮之后的宿醉。


“It seems an extraordinary imbecility that this wonderful outburst of productive energy should be the prelude to impoverishment and depression,” Keynes wrote in 1931, after the boom years of the 1920s had given way to the Great Depression.	然而约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）并不认同这一观点，“将生产能力的巨大膨胀视为贫困和衰退的必然前奏是非常愚蠢的，”凯恩斯在1920年代经济繁荣转向大萧条后的1931年写到。


“I find the explanation of the current business losses, of the reduction in output, and of the unemployment which necessarily ensues on this not in the high level of investment which was proceeding up to the spring of 1929, but in the subsequent cessation of this investment.”	“我发现当前商业亏损，产量减少及高失业率并非源自于一直延续到1929年春天的高投资水平，而是因为随后出现的投资中断。 ”


A few years later, Keynes proposed a fix to the problem.	几年后，凯恩斯提出了问题的解决方法。


In The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes explained how booms are created when “investments which will in fact yield, say, 2% in conditions of full employment are made in the expectation of a yield of, say, 6% and are valued accordingly.” In a recession, the problem is flipped.	在《就业、利息和货币的一般理论》一书中，凯恩斯解释了繁荣是如何建立的，“在充分就业情况下实际只能有，比如说，2%的投资收益率，但却被赋予了6%的预期收益率，并以此来进行估值。


Investments that would yield 2% are “expected to yield less than nothing.”	”在经济衰退期则相反，那些收益2%的投资却被视为“预期收益率小于零。 ”


The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which widespread unemployment does indeed drive the returns of those investments below zero.	所产生的结果就是一个自我实现的预言，大规模的失业事实上导致那些投资的回报率低于零。


“We reach a condition where there is a shortage of houses,” Keynes wrote, “but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses that there are.”	“我们随后出现了住宅短缺的情况，”凯恩斯写到，“但即便如此就算有这些住宅也没人能承担得起”


His solution was simple: “The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.”	他的解决方案也很简单：“纠正贸易周期的正确方法并不是消灭繁荣而使我们长期处于半衰退状态； 而是消灭衰退而令我们长期处于准繁荣状态。


For Keynes, the underlying problem was a failure of the economy’s credit channels.	”对于凯恩斯来说，最基本的问题在于经济体的信贷渠道出现失��。


The financial reaction to the collapse of a bubble and the resulting wave of bankruptcies drives the natural rate of interest below zero, even though there are still many ways to put people productively to work.	即便还有很多方法可以令人们积极开展工作，但对泡沫爆破以及随后银行倒闭潮的金融应对手段导致自然利率低于零。


Today, we recognize that clogged credit channels can cause an economic downturn.	如今，我们认识到信贷渠道受阻可以导致经济下行。


There are three commonly proposed responses.	对此也有三个经常提出的应对方案。


The first is expansionary fiscal policies, with governments taking up the slack in the face of weak private investment.	一是扩张性的财政政策，在私人投资不振的情况下政府把相关责任承担起来。


The second is a higher inflation target, giving central banks more room to respond to financial shocks.	二是提高通胀目标，给与中央银行更多的空间去应对金融冲击。


And the third is tight restrictions on debt and leverage, especially in the housing market, in order to prevent a credit-fueled price bubble from forming.	三是对负债和杠杆严加管控，尤其是住宅市场，防止形成由信贷推动的价格泡沫。


To these solutions, Keynes would have added a fourth, one known to us today as the “Greenspan put” – using monetary policy to validate the asset prices reached at the height of the bubble.	在这三个之外，凯恩斯会加上第四条，我们如今称之为“格林斯潘对策”——利用货币政策去将泡沫最高峰时的资产价格合理化。


Unfortunately, in a world in which fiscal austerity appears to exert a mesmerizing hold over politicians, and in which a 2% inflation target seems set in stone, our policy options are rather limited.	不幸的是，在政客们似乎无法抗拒使用财政紧缩手段，而2%的通胀目标也无法突破的情况下，我们的政策选项也相当有限。


And that, ultimately, is how a relatively small boom can lead to such a large bust.	而这最终也是为何一个小泡沫会造成大萧条的原因。


Rebalancing the State’s Balance Sheet	重新平衡国家资产负债表


MILAN – Until recently, relatively little attention was paid to states’ balance sheets.	发自米兰——直到最近，人们对世界各国资产负债表的关注一直都较少。


Measurement and reporting were neglected.	对这些数据的测算和报告都被忽略了。


Even today, states’ liabilities receive considerable attention, while their asset sides receive significantly less.	而即使是在各国负债状况受到外界普遍关注的今天，其资产状况依旧鲜有人问津。


In an earlier era, states owned substantial industrial assets.	从前各国都拥有大量的工业资产。


This “commanding heights of the economy” model was rejected largely because it seriously under-performed, especially when state-owned sectors were protected from competition (as was the norm).	但这种“占据经济制高点”的模式由于其严重表现不佳而遭到了摈弃，尤其当国有企业在竞争中受到保护时（这已经成为常态）。


Efficiency declined.	效率因此降低。


But, more important, the absence of entry and exit by firms, a key ingredient of innovation, caused dynamism to suffer and losses to grow over time.	但更重要的是，缺少企业的进入或退出——这才是创新的关键组成部分——导致经济活力不足，其损失也随着时间的推移而不断增大。


The model’s shortcomings led to privatization in many developed and developing countries.	这种模式的缺点导致很多发达及发展中国家进行私有化。


In Europe, privatization was viewed as a key step in the integration process.	在欧洲，私有化被看作是一体化进程的关键步骤。


The theory, in Europe and elsewhere, was that states could not be impartial owners of industrial assets.	欧洲和其他地区的理念是国家不可能成为工业资产的无私持有者。


Through regulation, public procurement, and hidden subsidies, they would favor their own assets.	借助相关法律法规、政府采购以及隐性津贴，政府会偏帮它们自己名下的资产。


Of course, state ownership is not the only way to impede efficiency and dynamism.	当然，国有制并不是惟一阻碍效率与活力的因素。


Regulations in a range of countries, from Japan to Italy, create sectors that are sheltered from competition, with detrimental effects on productivity.	一些国家（从日本到意大利）的相关规定造就了一批无需参与竞争的部门，这对生产力来说是一种损害。


This pattern is particularly pronounced in the non-tradable sectors (which account for two-thirds of the economy), where the discipline of foreign competition is absent by definition.	这种模式在占整体经济规模2/3的非贸易部门显得尤其明显，国外竞争法则在这些领域是受到明令禁止的。


Even here, foreign-based domestic competitors could improve performance.	即使在笔者所在的意大利米兰，拥有国外背景的国内竞争者都有改善其表现的空间。


It is important that more attention is now paid to public liabilities – not only growing sovereign debt, but also larger, non-debt liabilities embedded in social-insurance programs.	更多地关注公共负债很重要——公共负债不仅包括不断积累的主权债务，也包括那些在社会保险项目上数目更为庞大的非债务负债。


A combination of defective growth models, rising longevity, and unanticipated increases in costs (such as health care in America) have caused these longer-term liabilities to explode.	有缺陷的增长模式、不断延长的寿命与超出预计的成本增加（比如美国的医疗）一起导致了长期债务的爆发式增长。


Reining in debt and other liabilities has substantially reduced governments’ scope for sustaining demand in the face of severe negative shocks, thus reducing their ability to buy time for structural adjustment in the private sector.	债务和其它应付款项的制肘之下，政府面对严重的负面冲击时维持需求的余地也大大缩小，并因此降低了它们为私人部门进行结构性调整争取时间的能力。


For now, investment in a shift to a sustainable growth and employment pattern has been crowded out.	就目前而言，投资转向可持续发展和就业的模式已经被排挤出局。


Shifting consumption to investment via tax increases is possible, but too problematic politically, with the burden-sharing issue usually leading to impasse and inaction.	通过增税使消费转向投资是有可能的，但在政治上很成问题，因为责任由谁分担的问题往往最终会导致僵局与不作为。


Meanwhile, the asset side of states’ balance sheets remains largely invisible. States own land, mineral rights, and infrastructure.	与此同时，国家资产负债平衡表的资产一面在很大程度上仍是隐性的，比如国有土地、矿权和基础设施。


Some have sovereign wealth funds.	有些国家有主权财富基金。


Many have public pension funds of substantial magnitude, consisting of diversified portfolios of assets.	很多国家都有规模庞大的公共养老基金，并由多元化投资组合构成。


These assets are, in a sense, spoken for – there are claims on them in the form of liabilities, which have grown as expected risk-adjusted returns on assets decline; but they do represent a partial funding of public liabilities and are an element of resilience.	这些资产，某种意义上说，都已经名花有主了——它们会以应付款项的形式支付给应得的人，而随着在预期中资产风险调整收益的下跌这些支付责任还有所增加； 但它们的确代表了一部分公共负债的资金来源并且也是实现经济复苏的一项要素。


By contrast, in China, the asset side of the state balance sheet is very large: land, foreign-currency reserves of $3.5 trillion, and around an 85% stake in state-owned enterprises that account for about 40% of output.	相比之下，中国国家资产负债表的资产方面非常巨大：土地、外汇储蓄高达3. 5万亿美元并且拥有国企85%的股份——这相当于全国总产出的40%。


This balance-sheet configuration has helped China to respond to shocks and sustain high levels of public-sector investment.	这种资产负债结构已经帮助中国顺利应对金融冲击并维持巨额公共投资。


The liability side will expand as social insurance grows – but slowly, owing to a fear of underestimating the liabilities being created.	而这些资产的负债一面将会随着社会保险覆盖的增长而扩张——但由于害怕低估即将产生的负债，这种扩张的步伐将会相对缓慢。


In the best case – without a sharp decline in financial assets accelerating an economic downturn, a sudden collapse of a defective growth model, or even rapid increases in liabilities associated with demographic shifts or health-care technology – it might make sense to focus only on controlling liabilities.	最好的情况是——金融资产不会急剧下挫而导致经济衰退加速，有缺陷的增长模型不会突然崩溃，或是与人口结构转换或医疗技术相关的负债不会急剧上升——这样仅仅集中精力控制负债就说得通。


But a best-case scenario provides a poor policy framework in our imperfect world.	然而这种美梦式的设想会给我们这个从不完美的世界带来差劲的政策。


In fact, states are routinely called upon to deal with a wide range of market failures or limitations: unsustainable growth patterns and regulatory myopia; distributional problems associated with the evolution of technology and globalization; accelerating concentration of national income; and major structural transitions associated with shocks and secular trends in technology and the global economy.	事实上，国家也通常被要求处理各种市场失灵或市场局限性：不可持续的增长模式和监管上的短视； 与技术进步及全球化相关的分配问题；


Here is the dilemma: Governments with substantial assets have flexibility and the capacity to act, but they can also mismanage their assets to the detriment of markets and economic dynamism.	而困境就在于：拥有大量资产的政府拥有灵活性和行动力，但它们同时也会因资产处置失当对市场和经济活力造成破坏。


In China, where the asset side of the balance sheet is large, the strategy of shrinking it via privatization has been largely rejected, at least for now.	中国资产负债表上的资产一面非常巨大，通过私有化来对其进行收缩的策略已经被摈弃了，至少目前来说是如此。


The loss of resilience would be too great.	而失去经济复原能力的代价可能会极为巨大。


That leads to the challenge of effective management of public assets – management that promotes rather than impedes market efficiency and innovation.	这就提出了对公共资产进行有效管理的挑战——这种管理应该促进而不是妨碍市场效率和创新。


Here, what might be called the pension/sovereign-wealth-fund model – in which a public entity holds and manages a diversified portfolio of assets as a financial investor with appropriately specified duties and governance – seems to be the right way to go.	在此那种可能会被称为养老金或主权财富基金的模式——拥有和管理一个多样化资产组合的某个公共实体成为了一个具备特定责任和管制能力的金融投资者，——似乎是一条明智的路。


The asset side of the balance sheet is maintained in the aggregate, but the management of the assets, particularly the diversification of holdings, can be thought of as prudent and de facto privatized.	资产负债表的资产一面总体维持不变，而对资产的管理——尤其是所持资产的多样化——可以被认为是谨慎以及事实上的私有化。


For developed countries, increasing resilience and flexibility over time by building public assets should be a long-term priority.	对发达国家来说，通过构建公共资产来提升复原能力和灵活性应该是长期的优先选择。


Periodic systemic risk affects entire economies and public finances, not only financial markets, and governments should be able to respond during periods of rapid structural change.	这回死因为周期性涌现的系统风险影响着整个经济和公共金融——不仅是金融市场，而政府应当有能力在快速结构性变革的时期做出应对。


In practice, this means two things.	实际上，这意味着两件事。


First, once a collective choice is made about the desired levels of social insurance, the implied liabilities should be fully funded over time.	首先，一但作出了与社会保险所需水平相关的集体选择，其暗含的支付责任就应当得到充分的资金支持。


The alternative is a poor intergenerational burden-sharing choice.	与此相对的拙劣选择则是由几代人来分担责任。


Second, governments, like individuals, households, and businesses, need to save for a rainy day.	其二，跟个人、家庭和公司一样，政府也需要未雨绸缪。


That is all the more important in periods – like the current one – of rapid change, high volatility, and only partly predictable systemic instability.	这在那些急速变化、波动大并且系统不稳定只能被部分预测的时期——正如眼前这段时间，这才是最重要的。


Why Support the TPP?	为何支持TPP？


CAMBRIDGE – Agreement among negotiators from 12 Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) represents a triumph over long odds.	美国剑桥—来自12个环太平洋国家的谈判员终于在跨太平洋洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）上达成一致，这是一次非常难能可贵的胜利。


Tremendous political obstacles, both domestic and international, had to be overcome to conclude the deal.	达成协议需要克服巨大的国内和国际政治障碍。


And now critics of the TPP’s ratification, particularly in the United States, should read the agreement with an open mind.	而如今，对批准TPP持批评态度者，特别是在美国，应该以开放的态度读一读这个协议。


Many of the issues surrounding the TPP have been framed, at least in US political terms, as left versus right.	围绕TPP的诸多问题被定性为左右之争，至少在美国政治界是如此。


The left’s unremitting hostility to the deal – often on the grounds that the US Congress was kept in the dark about its content during negotiations – carried two dangers.	左派对该协议抱有坚定不移的敌意——其理由常常是美国国会在谈判期间一直对内容一无所知——这带曾经来了两大危险。


A worthwhile effort could have been blocked, or President Barack Obama’s Democratic administration could have been compelled to be more generous to American corporations, in order to pick up needed votes from Republicans.	一项值得为此付出的努力可能被阻挠，或总统奥巴马的民主党政府可能被迫对美国公司采取更慷慨的态度，这样才能从共和党手中争夺必需的选票。


In fact, those concerned about labor rights and the environment risked hurting their own cause.	事实上，那些关心劳工权利和环境的人可能搬起石头砸自己的脚。


By seeming to say that they would not support the TPP under any conditions, Obama had little incentive to pursue their demands.	既然他们表现出在任何条件下都不会支持TPP，那么奥巴马也就没什么动力追求他们的所求。


Seen in this light, the TPP that has emerged is a pleasant surprise.	从这个角度看，TPP可谓是意外之喜。


The agreement gives pharmaceutical firms, tobacco companies, and other corporations substantially less than they had asked for – so much so that US Senator Orrin Hatch and some other Republicans now threaten to oppose ratification.	该协议给制药企业、烟草公司和其他公司所带来的东西远远少于它们所要求的，以致于美国参议员奥林·哈奇（Orrin Hatch）和其他一些共和党威胁要反对批准TPP。


Likewise, the deal gives environmentalists more than they had bothered to ask for.	类似地，该协议给环保主义者带来的东西要多于他们所要求的。


Perhaps some of these outcomes were the result of hard bargaining by other trading partners (such as Australia).	也许这些结果中有一些是拜其他贸易伙伴（如澳大利亚）的强硬讨价还价所赐。


Regardless, the TPP’s critics should now read the specifics that they have so long said they wanted to see and reconsider their opposition to the deal.	无论如何，TPP的批评者现在应该读一读那些长期以来他们一直说想一睹为快的具体条款，并重新思考对该协议的反对态度。


The most controversial issues in the US are those that are sometimes classified as “deep integration,” because they go beyond the traditional easing of trade tariffs and quotas.	在美国，最具争议性的问题那些有时被归类为“深度一体化”的问题，因为它们超过了传统的放松贸易关税和配额的范畴。


The left’s concerns about labor and the environment were accompanied by fears about excessive benefits for corporations: protection of the intellectual property of pharmaceutical and other companies, and the mechanisms used to settle disputes between investors and states.	左派对劳工和环境的关注伴随着对公司过度获益的担忧：对制药公司和其他公司知识产权的保护以及用于解决投资者和国家纠纷的机制。


So what, exactly, is in the finished TPP?	那么，已完成的TPP究竟包含了些什么？


Among the environmental features, two stand out.	在环境方面，有两点特别引人注目。


The agreement includes substantial steps to enforce the prohibitions contained in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).	TPP包括了执行写入国际濒危物种国际贸易公约（CITES）的禁令的重大措施。


It also takes substantial steps to limit subsidies for fishing fleets – which in many countries waste taxpayer money and accelerate the depletion of marine life.	它还规定了重大措施限制对捕鱼船队的补贴——在许多国家，这一补贴浪费了纳税人的钱，也加速了海洋生物的耗竭。


For the first time, apparently, these environmental measures will be backed up by trade sanctions.	显然，这些环境措施是第一次得到贸易制裁的支持。


I wish that certain environmental groups had devoted half as much time and energy ascertaining the potential for such good outcomes as they did to sweeping condemnations of the negotiating process.	我希望某些环保组织可以拿出它们用于大肆谴责谈判过程一半的时间和精力用于研究这些好结果的潜力。


The critics apparently were too busy to notice when the agreement on fishing subsidies was reached in Maui in July.	批评者显然太忙了，以致于他们没有注意到关于渔业补贴的协议7月在毛伊岛就已经达成。


But it is not too late for environmentalists to get on board.	但环保主义者现在开始努力也不晚。


Similarly, various provisions in the area of labor practices, particularly in Southeast Asia, are progressive.	类似地，劳工实践领域的诸多条款，特别是在东南亚，也具有进步性。


These include measures to promote union rights in Vietnam and steps to crack down on human trafficking in Malaysia.	这些条款包括促进越南工会权利的措施和打击马来西亚人口贩卖的措施。


Perhaps the greatest uncertainty concerned the extent to which big US corporations would get what they wanted in the areas of investor-government dispute settlement and intellectual property protection.	也许最大的不确定性在于美国大公司能在多大程度上在投资者-政府纠纷解决和知识产权保护等领域得偿所愿。


The TPP’s critics often neglected to acknowledge that international dispute-settlement mechanisms could ever serve a valid purpose, or that some degree of patent protection is needed if pharmaceutical companies are to have sufficient incentive to invest in research and development.	TPP批评者常常不承认国际纠纷解决机制能够有助于合理目的，或者，要让制药公司有足够的激励投资于研发就必须进行一定程度的专利保护。


There was, of course, a danger that such protections for corporations could go too far.	当然，一个危险是对公司的保护走得太远。


The dispute-settlement provisions might have interfered unreasonably with member countries’ anti-smoking campaigns, for example.	比如，纠纷解决条款也许会不合理地干扰成员国的禁烟运动。


But, in the end, the tobacco companies did not get what they had been demanding; Australia is now free to ban brand-name logos on cigarette packs.	但是，最终，烟草公司并没有得偿所愿； 如今，澳大利亚大可以禁止在香烟包装盒上出现商标名标志。


The TPP also sets other new safeguards against the misuse of the dispute-settlement mechanism.	TPP还规定了防止纠纷解决机制滥用的新条款。


Likewise, the intellectual property protections might have established a 12-year monopoly on the data that US pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies compile on new drugs (particularly biologics), thereby impeding competition from lower-cost generic versions.	类似地，知识产权保护已经为美国制药和生物科技公司建立了12年的新药（特别是生物制药）数据垄断，从而阻止来自成本更低的仿制药的竞争。


In the end, these companies did not get all they wanted; while the TPP in some ways gives their intellectual property more protection than they had before, it assures protection of their data for only 5-8 years.	最后，这些公司没有得到想要的一切； 尽管TPP以某种方式给了它们比以前更多的知识产权保护，但对于它们的新药数据，保护期只有5—8年。


The focus on new areas of deep integration should not obscure the old-fashioned free-trade benefits that are also part of the TPP: reducing thousands of existing tariff and non-tariff barriers.	关注深度一体化的新领域不应该忽视老牌 自由贸易益处，它们也是TPP的一部分：降低了数千种现有关税和非关税壁垒。


Liberalization will affect manufacturing sectors such as the automotive industry, as well as services, including the Internet.	自由化将影响到汽车业等制造业，也将影响��包括互联网在内的服务业。


Liberalization of agriculture – long a stubborn holdout in international trade negotiations – is noteworthy.	农业自由化——长期以来一直在顽固地拒绝在国际贸易谈判门外——也值得关注。


Countries like Japan have agreed to let in more dairy products, sugar, beef, and rice from more efficient producers in countries like New Zealand and Australia.	日本等国家同意来自新西兰和澳大利亚等国家的效率更高的生产商的奶制品、糖、牛肉和大米进入国内。


In all these areas and more, traditional textbook arguments about the gains from trade apply: new export opportunities lead to higher wages and a lower cost of living.	在所有这些和其他领域，关于贸易的益处的传统教科书观点都适用：新的进口机会带来更高的工资和更低的生活成本。


Many citizens and politicians made up their minds about TPP long ago, based on seemingly devastating critiques of what might emerge from the negotiations.	许多公民和政客对TPP的看法在很久以前便已形成，并且是基于对谈判可能结果的毁灭性批评。


They should now look at the outcome with an open mind.	现在，他们应该带着开放心态看一看谈判结果。


They just might find that their worst nighttime fears have vanished by the light of day.	他们会发现，他们最糟糕的噩梦情景已经消失在朗朗乾坤之下。


Europe’s Non-Deal of the Century	欧洲世纪性交易的失败


BRUSSELS – As Europe picks over the ruins of the mega-merger that would have created a world-beating new aerospace and defense giant, questions are being asked about the inglorious role that the European Union played in the fiasco.	布鲁塞尔——随着欧洲在本应缔造出令世人震惊的全新航空航天及国防巨头的巨型合并所遗留的废墟上挑挑拣拣，人们不禁要问欧盟在这场惨败中究竟扮演了哪些不光彩的角色。


The European Commission’s failure to champion the $50 billion merger of the Franco-German European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), owner of Airbus, and the United Kingdom’s BAE Systems is being seen as a crucial factor in the deal’s collapse.	欧盟委员会未能支持空客所有者法德欧洲航空防务及航天公司（EADS）及英国BAE系统公司案值500亿美元的合并，这被外界普遍视为此次交易失败的关键因素。


The integration of the two high-tech aviation and avionics leaders had looked like an EU-inspired blueprint for industrial success.	这两家航空和航空电子技术领导企业的合并曾视作为欧盟工业腾飞的创意蓝图。


For several years, EU leaders have been urging the consolidation of Europe’s defense industries, so the proposed deal – which originated in the corporate boardrooms of EADS and BAE Systems – looked like an answer to their calls.	若干年来，欧盟领导人一直敦促整合欧洲国防工业，于是此次由EADS和BAE系统公司董事会提出的合并议案就像在响应他们的号召。


Yet both the Commission and the European Parliament kept silent and withheld the political support that might have ensured that the deal went through.	但欧盟委员会和欧洲议会却不约而同地选择保持沉默，没有提供确保此次交易顺利达成所需的政治支持。


A timely reminder by EU leaders of the strategic importance of the aerospace sector would have helped allay many of the misgivings in Berlin, and to a lesser degree in London, that ultimately sank the deal.	由欧盟领导人出面及时提醒人们航空航天产业的战略重要性或许有助于打消柏林抱有的众多疑虑，但对最终否决交易的伦敦却起不到多少作用。


Aviation, like defense, is the sharpest of the R&D cutting edges available to advanced countries, and regularly produces key technological breakthroughs.	航空和国防一样位列先进国家尖端科技研发的最前沿，往往能够产生关键性的技术突破。


Nationalist squabbles over the details of the merger would surely have been attenuated by a statesmanlike intervention from the Commission in Brussels.	布鲁塞尔欧盟委员会的政治干预原本应当可以弱化由合并细节所引发的民族主义争吵。


It was therefore a bizarre coincidence that the merger’s collapse came on the day that the Commission unveiled its new industrial strategy for regaining Europe’s competitive edge in the face of Asian and North American competition.	于是成就了一个奇怪的巧合，即合并失败和欧盟委员会公布其在面对亚洲和北美竞争时重新夺回欧洲竞争优势的全新产业战略就发生在同一天。


One of the most powerful arguments for the EADS-BAE marriage had been the expectation of industry analysts that within 20 years China will challenge Airbus and Boeing in the global aviation market, while also creating a powerful new defense industry.	EADS与BAE联姻最有力的理由是行业分析家预测在20年内，中国将在成就强大的全新国防工业的同时，对空客和波音在全球航空市场的地位形成挑战。


That scenario now looks all the more likely.	目前来看这样的情况更有可能出现。


Why, then, did the European Commission remain silent?	既然如此，欧盟委员会为什么保持沉默？


The answer appears to be that it feared negative reactions from the three governments involved in the merger talks, and believed that its own authority would suffer from any public rebuff.	答案似乎是担心涉事的三国政府参与合并谈判可能带来的消极反应，并且深信任何公众抗拒情绪将会有损于委员会自身的权威。


The persistent rumor circulating among defense company executives is that soon after news of the proposed merger leaked, the weekly commissioners’ meeting chaired by Commission President José Manuel Barroso was enjoined to keep silent on the matter in order to avoid any potential dangers.	国防公司高管圈内一直流传着这样的谣言，即在合并提案消息泄露后，由委员会主席若泽·曼努埃尔·巴罗佐主持的委员会每周例会责成对此事件保持沉默，以避免陷入可能引发的麻烦。


Whether true or not, the important point is that the merger transcended national considerations, and the European Commission had a duty to involve itself.	无论传言是真是假，重要的是合并超越了国家的考量范畴，欧盟委员会有责任参与其中。


The EU’s executive body is meant to be the driving force behind Europe’s efforts to revive laggard industries and fight to reverse the long-term economic decline that the eurozone crisis appears to presage.	欧盟执行机构本就应该推动欧洲复苏其落后产业并力争扭转欧元区危机似乎预示的长期经济衰退的努力。


Nobody is arguing that the Commission is responsible for the deal’s unhappy end – only that it should have rallied support for it.	没有人认为欧洲委员会应当对交易不圆满的结果负责，只是说它本来应当给予相应的支持。


The significance of the merger’s collapse is now becoming clear to observers across Europe, especially in Germany, where the media have been extremely critical of how “negative politics” sealed the proposed merger’s fate.	欧洲各国（特别是德国）观察家现在已经意识到合并失败将会产生的重大后果。 德国媒体一直对“消极政治”如何决定合并提案的命运持有极端批评的态度。


With the EU in the throes of the seemingly endless eurozone sovereign-debt crisis and facing a looming debate over its future decision-making architecture, the collapse of the EADS-BAE merger will be no more than a footnote in the history books.	在欧盟正在承受看似无休无止的欧元区主权债务危机所���来的痛苦并且对未来决策架构的探讨已经迫在眉睫的情况下，EADS和BAE的合并失败恐怕仅仅是历史书上的一个脚注。


But it may be said to mark the point when the European Commission openly acknowledged that it has become little more than a secretariat to EU governments.	但可以说这次合并失败标志着欧盟委员会公开承认自己已沦为欧盟各国政府的秘书处。


That is a far cry from the political powerhouse that some Europeans fear – and for which others still hope.	这与某些欧洲人所担心的强力政治机构相去甚远——强力政治机构仍然是有些人所追求的目标。


Should Central Banks Target Employment?	中央银行应该把目标定在就业上吗？


WASHINGTON, DC – On December 12, US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke announced that the Fed will keep interest rates at close to zero until the unemployment rate falls to 6.5%, provided inflation expectations remain subdued.	华盛顿—12月12日，美联储主席伯南克宣布美联储将一直保持利率近零水平直至失业率降到6. 5%，只要通胀预期保持可控。


While the Fed’s governing statutes, unlike those of the European Central Bank, explicitly include a mandate to support employment, the announcement marked the first time that the Fed tied its interest-rate policy to a numerical employment target.	美联储的治理权限——与欧洲央行不同——明文规定包括支持就业的指令权，但伯南克的话是标志着美联储第一次将其利率政策与就业数字目标挂钩。


It is a welcome breakthrough, and one that should be emulated by others – not least the ECB.	这是一个值得欢迎的突破，应该被其他央行所效仿——不仅仅是欧洲央行。


Central banks’ statutes differ in terms of the objectives that they set for monetary policy.	中央银行的权限因它们为货币政策设定的目标的不同而不同。


All include price stability.	所有央行的目标都包括价格稳定。


Many add a reference to general economic conditions, including growth and employment or financial stability.	不少央行还加上了总体经济状况（包括增长和就业或是金融稳定）内容。


Some give the central bank the authority to set an inflation target unilaterally; others stipulate coordination with the government in setting the target.	一些国家给予央行单方面决定通胀目标的权力，一些国家则要求央行与政府合作设定这一目标。


There is no recent example, however, of a major central bank setting a numerical employment target.	但是，近年来从未有主要国家的央行设定就业数字目标。


This should change, as the size of the employment challenge facing the advanced economies becomes more apparent.	这应该发生改变，因为发达国家所面临的就业挑战规模日益显著。


Weak labor markets, low inflation, and debt overhang suggest that a fundamental re-ordering of priorities is in order.	疲软的劳动力市场、低通胀和债务积压意味着需要将对各项任务来一次根本性重新排序。


In Japan, Shinzo Abe, the incoming prime minister, is signaling the same set of concerns, although he seems to be proposing a “minimum” inflation target for the Bank of Japan, rather than a link to growth or employment.	在日本，即将出任首相的安倍晋三也释放出同样的信号，尽管他准备为日本银行设定一个“最低”通胀目标，而不是与通胀或就业挂钩。


The spread of global value-chains that integrate hundreds of millions of developing-country workers into the global economy, as well as new labor-saving technologies, imply little chance of cost-push wage inflation.	全球价值链的扩大将数亿发展中国家工人以及劳动力节约型技术与全球经济融为一体，这意味着成本推动型工资通胀几无可能发生。


Likewise, the market for long-term bonds indicates extremely low inflation expectations (of course, interest rates are higher in cases of perceived sovereign default or re-denomination risk, such as in Southern Europe, but that has nothing to do with inflation).	类似地，长期债券市场表明，通胀预期极低（当然，利率在人们感觉存在主权违约风险和重新计价风险时会有所增加，南欧便是明证，但这和通胀无���）。


Moreover, the deleveraging underway since the 2008 financial implosion could be easier if inflation were moderately higher for a few years, a debate the International Monetary Fund encouraged  a year ago.	此外，如果通胀在未来数年略有上升，2008年金融危机爆发以来的去杠杆化也会更加容易，IMF在一年前就鼓励讨论这样做。


Together with these considerations, policymakers should take into account the tremendous human and economic costs of high unemployment, ranging from the millions of shattered lives, skills erosion, and disappearance of opportunities for an entire generation, to the dead-weight loss of idle human resources.	除了这些考虑，决策者还应该考虑高失业带来的巨大人力和经济成本，包括数百万对生活失去信心的人、技能损失、一整代人丧失机会、闲置人力资源的平白浪费等。


Is the failure to ensure that millions of young people acquire the skills required to participate in the economy not as great a liability for a society as a large stock of public debt?	对于一个对社会来说是一笔大负债但更是一笔巨额公共债务存量的经济，其失败能否保证千百万年轻人能够获得参与其中的技能？


Nowhere is this reordering of priorities more needed than in the eurozone.	最需要对任务重要性重新排序非欧元区莫属。


Yet, strangely, it is the Fed, not the ECB, that has set an unemployment target.	但是，奇怪的是，美联储而不是欧洲央行设定了通胀目标。


The US unemployment rate has declined to around 7.7% and the current-account deficit is close to $500 billion, while eurozone unemployment is at a record high, near 12%, and the current account shows a surplus approaching $100 billion.	美国失业率已降至7. 7%，经常项目赤字接近5 000亿美元，而欧元区失业率达到了创纪录的近12%，经常项目盈余近1 000亿美元。


If the ECB’s inflation target were 3%, rather than close to but below 2%, and Germany, with the world’s largest current-account surplus, encouraged 6% wage growth and tolerated 4% inflation – implying modest real-wage growth in excess of expected productivity gains – the eurozone adjustment process would become less politically and economically costly.	如果欧洲央行的通胀目标是3%而不是接近但低于2%，且世界最大经常项目盈余国德国将工资提高6%并容忍4%的通胀——这意味着真实工资增长略高于预期生产率增长——则欧元区调整过程的政治和经济代价将会更小。


Indeed, the policy calculus in Northern Europe greatly underestimates the economic losses due to the disruptions imposed on the South by excessive austerity and wage deflation.	事实上，北欧的政策算盘大大地低估了过度紧缩和工资通缩给南欧造成的影响以及由此产生的经济损失。


The resulting high levels of youth unemployment, health problems, and idle production capacity also all have a substantial impact on demand for imports from the North.	随之而来的年轻人高失业率、医疗问题和产能闲置也对北欧出口商品需求带来了巨大冲击。


Contrary to conventional wisdom, the ECB’s legal mandate would allow such a re-ordering of priorities, as, with reference to the ECB, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that “The primary (emphasis added) objective of the European System of Central Banks…shall be to maintain price stability,” and there is another part of the Treaty dealing with general eurozone economic policies that emphasizes employment.	与传统智慧相反，欧洲央行的法定权力允许这样的任务优先顺序重排，因为对于欧洲央行，《欧盟运行条约》规定“欧洲中央银行体系的主要（特别强调）目标是……保持价格稳定”，而对于强调就业的欧元区总体经济政策，该条约另有条文规定。


This would seem not to preclude a temporary complementary employment objective for the ECB at a time of exceptional challenge.	这似乎并不妨碍欧洲央行在面临重大挑战时暂时补充以就业目标。


Moreover, the ECB has the authority to set the eurozone-wide inflation target, and could set it higher for two or three years, without any treaty violation.	此外，欧洲央行有设定泛欧元区通胀目标的权力，可以在两三年内将其设在较高水平而不违反条约。


The real problem is the current political attitude in Germany.	真正的问题在于德国的政治态度。


Somehow, the memory of hyperinflation in the early 1920’s seems scarier than that of massive unemployment in the early 1930’s, although it was the latter that fueled the rise of Nazism.	然而，20世纪20年代恶性通胀的记忆似乎比20世纪30年代初大规模失业的记忆更为惨痛，尽管后者才是导致纳粹上台的原因。


Maybe the upcoming German elections will allow progressive forces to clarify what is at stake for Germany and Europe – indeed, the entire world.	或许即将到来的德国选举将让进步力量澄清德国和欧洲——事实上是全世界——所面临的危机。


In a more global context, none of this is to dismiss the longer-term dangers of inflation.	从全球角度看，所有这些都没有消除长期通胀危险。


In most countries, at most times, inflation should be kept very low – and central banks should anchor inflation expectations with a stable long-term target, although the alternative of targeting nominal GDP deserves to be discussed.	在大部分时候的大部分国家，通胀都应该维持在极低水平，央行也应该通过稳定的长期目标锚定通胀预期，尽管如此，将目标改为名义GDP的替代方案也值得考虑。


For the coming 2-3 years, however, particularly in Europe, the need for deleveraging, the costs of widespread joblessness, and the risk of social collapse make the kind of temporary unemployment target announced by the Fed highly desirable.	此外，货币政策不可能长期代替结构性改革和可持续预算。 长期零真实利率会带来资产泡沫、资源配置不当和意料之外的收入不平等等风险，最近的历史（不仅仅是美国和日本）证明了这一点。


Read more from our "New Model Central Banking" Focal Point.	但是，在未来2—3年，特别是在欧洲，去杠杆化的需要、失业高企的成本以及社会崩溃的风险让美联储所宣布的临时性失业目标显得极为合理。


Mario Draghi’s Opiate of the Markets	市场的德拉吉鸦片


CHICAGO – From the standpoint of European stability, the Italian elections could not have delivered a worse outcome.	芝加哥—站在欧洲稳定的立场看，意大利选举结果可谓坏到了极点。


Italy’s parliament is divided among three mutually incompatible political forces, with none strong enough to rule alone.	意大利议会分裂为三个互不相容的政治阵营，没有一个强大到足以单独执政。


Worse, one of these forces, which won 25% of the vote, is an anti-euro populist party, while another, a Euro-skeptic group led by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, received close to 30% support, giving anti-euro parties a clear majority.	更糟糕的是，其中一个获得了25%选票的阵营是反欧元民粹主义政党，另外一个支持率近30%的阵营是前总理贝卢斯科尼领导的欧元怀疑派，这使得反欧元政党占据明显多数。


Despite these scary results, the interest-rate spread for Italian government bonds relative to German bunds has increased by only 40 basis points since the election.	尽管结果令人担忧，但选举以来意大利政府债券相对德国国债的利差只上升了40个基点。


In July 2012, when a pro-European, austerity-minded government was running the country, with the well-respected economist Mario Monti in charge, the spread reached 536 basis points.	2012年6月，执政意大利的是紧缩派政府，政府首脑是德高望重的经济学家蒙蒂，此时的利差为536个基点。


Today, with no government and little chance that a decent one will be formed soon, the spread sits at 314 points.	如今，陷入无政府状态、且没有任何迹象表明会在不久的将来形成得体政府的意大利，利差只有314个基点。


So, are markets bullish about Italy, or have they lost their ability to assess risk?	那么，是市场看好意大利，还是市场失去了评估风险的能力？


A recent survey of international investors conducted by Morgan Stanley suggests that they are not bullish.	摩根士丹利进行的最新国际投资者调查表明，投资者并不看好意大利。


Forty-six percent of the respondents said that the most likely outcome for Italy is an interim administration and new elections.	46%受访者声称意大利最有可能的结果是过渡政府+新选举。


And they regard this outcome as the worst-case scenario, one that implies a delay of any further economic measures, deep policy uncertainty, and the risk of an even less favorable electoral outcome.	他们认为这一结果堪称最坏情形，意味着进一步经济措施将被推迟、政策面临极大的不稳定性，并有可能形成更加不利的选举结果。


The survey also clearly indicated why the interest-rate spread for Italian government bonds is not much wider: the perceived backstop provided by the European Central Bank.	调查还明确显示了为何意大利政府债券利差没有显著加大：人们感到欧洲央行在支持意大利。


Although investors believe that the backstop is unlikely to be used, its mere presence dissuades them from betting against Italy.	尽管投资者认为这一支持不可能成为实际动作，但仅仅是有支持存在便足以促使他们不再看空意大利。


In other words, the “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) scheme announced by ECB President Mario Draghi last July has served as the proverbial “bazooka” – a gun so powerful that it does not need to be used.	换句话说，欧洲央行行长德拉吉去年7月宣布的“直接货币交易”（OMT）机制已经成了“火箭炮”的代名词——这个武器威力如此巨大，以致于根本不必真正拿出来使用。


Then-US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson sought a bazooka during the 2008 financial crisis.	时任美国财政部长保尔森在2008年金融危机期间就祭出过类似的火箭炮。


He failed, because he believed that even a fake gun would work if it looked scary enough.	他失败了，因为他认为只要气势汹汹，就算是假枪也能奏效。


Not falling for the trick, speculators repeatedly called his bluff.	投资者并不买账，一再戳穿了他的虚张声势。


Draghi, with his famous pledge to do “whatever it takes” to ensure the euro’s survival, succeeded where Paulson did not.	德拉吉的著名承诺——“不惜一切代价”确保欧元生存正是成功在保尔森的失败之处。


After all, he controls the monetary spigot.	毕竟，他控制着货币龙头。


But even Draghi’s bazooka is partly a bluff.	但即使是德拉吉的火箭炮，也有一半是虚张声势。


Draghi designed it to relieve the ECB of the huge political responsibility of deciding when to save a country from default.	德拉吉的火箭炮是用来纾解欧洲央行决定何时拯救一国走出违约困境的政治责任压力的。


For this reason, triggering the OMT mechanism requires the unanimous consent of eurozone governments.	出于这一理由，出发OMT机制要求欧元区各国政府的一致同意。


But, if the bazooka is needed, how likely is it to be fired before the German election in September?	但是，如果火箭炮真的需要开炮，有多少可能能够在9月德国选举之前实现？


The Morgan Stanley survey did not ask this question, probably because everybody knows the answer: not likely at all.	摩根士丹利的调查并没有问道这一问题，其原因也许在于所有人都知道答案：根本没有可能。


Thus, markets remain calm because they expect the bazooka not to be needed.	因此，市场之所以保持冷静，是因为市场预期德拉吉的火箭炮不会真的使用。


In that case, the fact that it cannot be triggered easily does not pose a significant problem.	果真如此的话，火箭炮不会轻易发射这一事实并不构成严重问题。


Its presence is enough to support a benign self-fulfilling prophecy.	它的存在已足以支持良性的自我实现预言。


In other words, Draghi’s bazooka has anesthetized markets, impairing their ability to assess risk.	换句话说，德拉吉的火箭炮麻醉了市场，是它丧失了评估风险的能力。


But as with all anesthetics, Draghi’s cannot and will not last forever.	但它的麻醉作用再大，也无法也不会永远持续。


Either the underlying problem is fixed before the patient wakes up, or the pain will be devastating.	要么根本问题在耐心耗尽前得到解决，要么发生灾难性的痛苦事件。


The investors surveyed by Morgan Stanley put the chance of a renewed crisis in Italy below 25%.	摩根士丹利所调查的投资者认为意大利危机重新爆发的几率不到25%。


I believe that it is higher than 50%.	我认为高于50%。


Even after Germany’s election, I am not sure that the government will be willing to support an Italian rescue program without asking for major guarantees concerning the objectives – and even the composition – of Italy’s ruling coalition.	即使在德国选举之后，我仍不确定德国政府愿意支持意大利援助计划而不要求获得关于意大利执政联盟目标——甚至其组成——的重大承诺。


Indeed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel will face a serious dilemma following her likely re-election.	事实上，德国总理默克尔将在可能的连任后面临一个严重的两难。


Without strict conditionality, she would risk shifting the domestic consensus in favor of Germany’s emerging Euro-skeptic mood.	如果不要求严苛的条件，她可能会让国内一致观点倒向新崛起的怀疑欧元派。


But, by insisting on such conditionality, she would trigger a huge political crisis in Europe. If the German government gets to decide who governs Italy, why should Italians bother voting?	如果德国政府能够决定谁来治理意大利，那���意大利人还要选举干什么？


The eurozone will look like a German protectorate, rather than a voluntary union of sovereign countries.	欧元区则像是德国的保护国，而不是主权国家组成的自愿联盟。


The political backlash would be enormous.	其政治反响将会极其激烈。


The only hope is that the eurozone makes strong progress toward establishing fiscal-redistribution mechanisms, such as European unemployment insurance, before Draghi’s anesthetic wears off.	唯一的希望是欧元区在德拉吉的麻药失去药效前朝着成立财政再分配机制的方向去的重大进步，比如形成欧洲失业保险制度。


Otherwise, Europe will face a very rude awakening indeed.	否则的话，欧洲将面临极其痛苦的未来。


Why the Fed Should Postpone Rate Hikes	为何美联储应该暂停升息


JACKSON HOLE, WYOMING – As central bankers from around the world gather this week in Jackson Hole for the Federal Reserve’s annual Economic Policy Symposium, one key topic of discussion will be the current global stock-market turmoil.	杰克森霍尔，怀俄明州—本周，全球央行行长将齐聚杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole），出席一年一度的美联储经济政策讨论会。 讨论会的一个重要议题是当前股市动荡。


There are many reasons for these gyrations, but the expectation that the Fed will start to raise interest rates – perhaps as early as September – is clearly one of them.	动荡的原因有很多，但预期美联储将开始升息——也许从9月份就会开始——显然是其中之一。


The arguments for a rate hike are valid.	支持升息的理由很充分。


The United States’ economy is gaining traction.	美国经济正在重获动力。


The International Monetary Fund forecasts 3% annual growth in 2015 and 2016, accompanied by inflation rates of 0.1% and 1.5%, respectively.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测2015和2016年增长率为3%，对应通胀率分别为0. 1%和1.


When an economy is normalizing, it is reasonable to reduce expansionary measures, such as those introduced after the crisis of 2008.	5%。 当经济开始正常化时，减少扩张政策（比如2008年危机后实施的那些）再合理不过了。


Because the Fed has clearly communicated that it will move gradually toward less expansionary policies, its credibility would be damaged if it did not follow through.	美联储早就明确表示它将逐渐减少扩张性政策，因此，如果它不那么做，信誉就会收到影响。


But there are strong reasons for the Fed to postpone interest-rate hikes and to keep monetary policy expansionary over the coming quarters.	但有很好的理由认为美联储应该暂停升息，并在未来几个季度保持货币政策扩张。


For starters, the US recovery remains weak.	首先，美国复苏仍然疲软。


Historically, 3% growth during a recovery is far from impressive.	从历史看，复苏期间3%的增长绝算不上漂亮。


In other recent recoveries, growth often hit 4% or even 5% when increased capacity utilization pushed up productivity and investment.	在其他几次最近的复苏中，随着产能利用率的提高助推生产率和投资，增长率常常达到4%甚至5%。


Over the past three decades, the US has been able to grow at an average annual rate of around 2.5%.	在过去三十年中，美国能够以平均每年2. 5%的速度增长。


Some attribute relatively slow growth to demographic factors, which have reduced the labor force, as well as to weak productivity levels, which have been low.	一些人将相对较慢的增长归因于人口因素，人口因素导致劳动力减少和已然低迷的生产率水平进一步恶化。


But America’s potential output may be underestimated, and its inflation propensity exaggerated.	但美国的潜在产出可能被低估，而通胀倾向被高估。


The US labor market works well.	美国劳动力市场运转良好。


Unemployment is down to 5%, with no signs of overheating.	失业率已下降至5%，没有过热迹象。


The employment cost index suggests that wage increases so far have been surprisingly low.	就业成本指数表明目前工资增长低得出人意料。


One reason for this is that labor-market flexibility increased during the recovery.	这一现象的一个原因是复苏期间劳动力市场弹性有所增加。


Self-employment, short-term contracts, or part-time arrangements account for many of the jobs that have been created over the past few years.	自由职业、短期合同工和兼职占了过去几年工作岗位创造的很大一部分。


Full-time jobs with comprehensive benefits are now much rarer.	如今，福利俱全的全职工作少见多了。


This ongoing “Uberization” of the US labor market means that the balance in the wage-setting process has shifted.	美国劳动力市场的这一持续的“优步化”（Uberization）意味着工资决定过程的平衡已经发生了改变。


As a result, it will take longer for demand to feed through to wages and inflation than in the past.	结果，需求反馈到工资和通胀所需要的时间比以前更长了。


Moreover, the economy is undergoing an ongoing technological shift stemming from digitization and globalization.	此外，美国经济正在经历数字化和全球化带来的持续的技术变迁。


Estimates from Citigroup indicate that almost half of all jobs will be disrupted in the coming decades.	花旗集团的估算表明，在未来几十年中，近一半的工作岗位将不复存在。


Jobs that require lower skills and less training are particularly vulnerable; but it is also clear that many other occupational categories – including administration, accounting, logistics, banking, and various service activities – are likely to be affected.	技能和训练要求低的岗位尤其脆弱； 但同样明确的是，许多其他岗位类别——包括管理、会计、物流、银行和各种服务活动——也可能受到影响。


Companies will be able to reduce their headcount and production costs while improving customer service, which, like Uberization, will affect the wage-setting process.	公司可以在减少人手、降低生产成本的同时改进客户服务，这与优步化一样，也将影响工资决定过程。


Central bankers, I believe, are underestimating the impact of this structural shift.	我认为，央行行长低估了这一结构变迁的影响。


In the more tech-oriented economies, like the US, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries, there is a risk that traditional macroeconomic models will overestimate the cost pressure from labor.	在更加技术导向的经济体，如美国、英国和北欧国家，一个风险是传统宏观经济模型将高估来自劳动力的成本压力。


Another reason why the Fed should postpone a rate hike is that financial turmoil in emerging markets, particularly China, could have a substantial impact on the global economy, with some clear implications for the US economy.	美联储应该暂停升息的另一个原因是新兴市场（特别是中国）的金融动荡可能给全球经济造成重大冲击，美国经济也将受到明显影响。


In particular, lower energy and commodity prices are likely to dampen inflationary pressure.	特别是，能源和大宗商品价格下跌可能消除通胀压力。


When inflation is low for a long period, inflation expectations also tend to be low.	当通胀长期保持低迷时，通胀预期也会趋于下降。


Add falling commodity and energy prices to the mix and there is a risk that inflation expectations will remain too low to sustain a balanced recovery.	再加上大宗商品和能源价格下跌，就产生了一个风险，即，通胀压力太低而无法维持平衡复苏。


The global implications of lower emerging-market currencies are also likely to be deflationary.	新兴市场货币贬值的全球影响也可能是通缩性的。


The direct impact is that a stronger dollar reduces the cost of imported goods.	直接影响是强势美元增加进口品的成本。


The indirect effect, which might be substantial, is that cost-competitive light manufacturing in emerging markets increases.	间接影响可能更大，即成本竞争力强的新兴市场制造业的增长。


That would reinforce the deflationary pressure from globalization for years to come.	这将强化今后多年内来自全球化的通缩压力。


There is also a risk of greater currency-market volatility if the Fed jumps the gun in raising rates.	如果美联储抢先升息，还会带来货币市场波动扩大的风险。


The Fed’s unconventional monetary policies have been necessary for the US.	美联储的非常规货币政策对美国来说是必要的。


But, because they flooded global markets with liquidity, large portfolio flows have moved into emerging-market countries, whose currencies often are not as liquid as the dollar.	但是，这些政策给全球市场注入了流动性，巨大的投资组合流流向了新兴市场国家，而它们的货币流动性常常不如美国。


When investment moves back into dollars, the currency fluctuations in these less liquid markets can become excessive.	当投资流回美元时，这些流动性较差的市场的货币就会过度波动。


The Fed clearly has a responsibility to consider how its policy decisions affect the global financial system.	美联储有责任考虑其政策决定如何影响全球金融体系。


Excessive currency volatility is not in America’s interest, not least because large exchange-rate depreciations in emerging markets would amplify the effects of globalization on US jobs, wages, and inflation, particularly as weaker foreign currencies make outsourcing a more economically viable solution.	过度货币波动不符合美国的利益，因为新兴市场的大规模汇率贬值将放大全球化对美国就业、工资和通胀的影响，特别是当外币贬值使外包在经济上更加划算时。


Another reason for the Fed to reconsider hiking rates is that the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions depends on a well-functioning global financial system.	美联储应该重新考虑是否升息的另一个理由是布雷顿森林机构的合法性依赖全球金融体系的正常运转。


The global economy’s center of gravity is moving to Asia, Latin America, and Africa, but the IMF and the World Bank still seem to mirror the reality of the 1950s.	全球经济的重心正在转向亚洲、拉丁美洲和非洲，但IMF和世界银行所体现的仍然是20实际50年代的现实。


If the Fed is seen as unleashing a major crisis in emerging markets, this will almost certainly do long-term damage to the global financial system.	如果美联储被认为是在制造一场新兴市场大危机，那么这几乎肯定会给全球金融体系造成长期伤害。


The Fed should regard lower commodity prices, reduced inflationary pressures, changes in the labor market, and further disruptive technological shifts as sufficiently convincing arguments to postpone a rate hike.	美联储应该将大宗商品价格的下跌、通胀压力的减小、劳动力市场的变化以及未来破坏性技术变迁视为暂停升息的压倒性证据。


Including the risk of excessive volatility in the global financial system tips the balance even further.	如果考虑到全球金融体系过度波动的风险，那么暂停升息的理由就更加充分了。


There is plenty of time for the Fed to signal that its policy stance has shifted, and the conclave in Jackson Hole is an excellent opportunity to start that communication.	美联储有充足的时间释放信号表明其政策立场的转变，而杰克森霍尔会议便是一次开始释放这一信号的良机。


If the facts have changed, the policy implications must also change.	如果事实发生了改变，政策也应该改变。


The greatest loss of credibility always comes when policymakers try to ignore changing realities.	信誉的最大损失永远来自决策者试图忽视变化的现实。


Why the Greek Bailout Failed	失败的希腊援助


CAMBRIDGE – As the Greek crisis evolves, it is important to understand that a successful structural-adjustment program requires strong country ownership.	美国剑桥—随着希腊危机的演进，一个很重要的要点是明白成功的结构调整方案需要强大的国家所有权（ownership）。


Even if negotiators overcome the most recent sticking points, it will be difficult to trust in their implementation if the Greek people remain unconvinced.	即使谈判者克服了最近的症结，如果说服不了希腊人民，也很难信任调整方案的实施。


That has certainly been the experience so far.	显然，目前的经验就是如此。


And without structural reform, there is little chance that the Greek economy will see sustained stability and growth – not least because official lenders are unwilling to continue extending an unreformed Greece significantly more money than it is asked to pay.	而如果没有结构改革，希腊经济就无从实现持续稳定和增长——官方贷款人不愿给予不实施改革的希腊远远多于要求它偿还的资金。


(This has been the case through most of the crisis, even if one would never know it from the world press coverage.)	（大部分危机都是如此，尽管也许无法从全球媒体报道中了解这一点。 ）


Greece’s membership in the European Union gives its creditors significant leverage, but evidently not enough to change the fundamental calculus.	希腊的欧盟成员资格给了其债权人很大的杠杆（leverage），但显然仍不足以改变基本面。


Greece remains very much a sovereign country, not a sub-sovereign state.	希腊仍然是主权国家（country）而不是次主权的邦国（state）。


The “troika” of creditors – the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission – simply do not enjoy the kind of leverage over Greece that, say, the Municipal Assistance Corporation wielded over New York City when it teetered on the edge of bankruptcy in the mid-1970s.	“三驾马车”债权人——IMF、欧洲央行和欧盟委员会——在希腊问题上并没有获得类似于20世纪70年代市政援助公司（Municipal Assistance Corporation）在纽约市濒临破产时所获得的杠杆。


The best structural-adjustment programs are those in which the debtor country’s government proposes the policy changes, and the IMF helps design a bespoke program and provides the political cover for its implementation.	最好的结构调整计划应该让债务国政府实施政策变化，并由IMF帮助设计定制方案和提供实施方案的政治掩护。


Imposing them from the outside is simply not an effective option.	从外部实施这些政策绝非有效方法。


So, for reforms to take hold, the Greek government and its electorate must believe in them.	因此，要想巩固改革，希腊政府及其选民必须相信改革政策。


That a country must take ownership of its reform program is not a new lesson.	一国必须拥有其改革方案的所有权（ownership），这并非新教训。


The IMF’s rocky relationship with Ukraine began long before the latest round of negotiations.	IMF与乌克兰关系不稳定在最近一轮谈判之前很久就开始了。


Back in 2013, IMF staff wrote a sobering report on the organization’s experience in the country.	2013年，IMF工作人员撰写了一份发人深省的报告，总结了IMF在乌克兰的经验。


Their conclusion, in essence, was that the government’s failure to embrace the reform process fully all but guaranteed that its program would not work.	从根本上说，他们的结论是政府不充分相信改革程序，改革方案就无从奏效。


If a government is incapable of or uninterested in making the needed adjustments, the report argued, the best option is to drip money out as reforms are implemented, as is now being done in Greece.	报告认为，如果政府无力执行需要的调整或对调整不感兴趣，那么最佳办法是不实施改革就不给钱，就像现在对希腊做得那样。


Unfortunately, that approach has not proved adequate to overcome the challenges there.	不幸的是，这一方针不足以克服希腊的问题。


Structural-reform conditions often tilt the balance between competing domestic factions, for better or for worse.	结构改革的条件常常会改变互相竞争的国内派系，结果有利有弊。


If there is no will inside the country to maintain the reforms, they will quickly be undermined.	如果国内没有意愿维持改革，那么改革很快就会遭到破坏。


Left-wing ideologues have long viewed structural-reform programs with deep suspicion, accusing international lenders like the IMF and the World Bank of being captured by neoliberal market fundamentalists.	左翼思想一直认为结构改革方案十分可疑，IMF和世界银行的国际贷款人被新自由派市场原教旨主义绑架了。


This critique has some truth in it, but is overblown.	这一批评不无道理，但用力过猛。


To be sure, structural reforms often favor policies like labor-market flexibility.	诚然，结构改革常常向弹性劳动力市场等等政策倾斜。


But one should not make the mistake of viewing these interventions in black-and-white terms.	但不应该非黑即白地看待这些干预。


Breaking down dual labor markets that are excluding young workers (as they do in much of southern Europe, including Italy and, to some extent, France) is very different from making it easier to fire all workers.	打破将年轻工人排除在外的二���劳动力市场（南欧有很多这样的情况，包括意大利和一定程度上的法国）与让解雇一切工人变得更容易是完全不同的两码事。


Making pension systems sustainable does not amount to making them stingier.	让退休金体系变得可持续并不意味着一定要减少退休金。


Making tax systems simpler and fairer is not the same as raising all taxes.	简化和公平化税收体系并不等同于提高一切税收。


Recently, opponents of structural reform have put forward more exotic objections – most notably the problem caused by deflation when policy interest rates are at zero.	最近，结构改革的反对者提出了更加奇怪的反对理由——最值得关注的是政策利率处于零水平时通缩所造成的问题。


If structural reforms simply lower all wages and prices, it may indeed be difficult in the short-term to counter the drop in aggregate demand.	如果结构改革降低了所有工资和物价，那么克服短期总需求下降的确十分困难。


But a similar critique could be made of any other change in policy: if it is poorly designed, it will be counter-productive.	但类似的批评也适用于其他任何政策变化：如果设计不合理，必然不利于生产。


The truth is that the way forward in Europe requires achieving greater productivity.	真相是欧洲要向前进就必须提高生产率。


The lessons from Greece and other unsuccessful bailout programs are sobering.	希腊和其他失败援助方案的教训发人深省。


If a debt bailout program requires a wholesale change in a country’s economic, social, and political model, the best course of action might be to write off the private losses, rather than pour in public money to cover them.	如果债务援助方案要求一国经济、社会和政治模式发生全面的变化，那么最好的行动方案可能是减记私人损失，而不是用公共资金覆盖私人损失。


In cases like Greece, the creditors’ passion for structural reforms might be better directed at home – particularly toward improving financial regulation.	在希腊的例子中，债权人的结构改革热情也许更应该引导向国内——特别是改善金融监管。


The vast majority of Greeks want to stay in the EU.	绝大多数希腊人都希望留在欧盟。


In an ideal world, offering financial aid in exchange for reforms might help those in the country who want to shape it into a modern European state.	在理想情形中，以改革为交换提供金融援助也许有助于那些希望转变为现代欧洲邦国的国家。


But given the difficulty Greece has had so far in making the necessary changes to reach that goal, it might be time to reconsider this approach to the crisis completely.	但考虑到希腊目前在做出必要改变从而实现这一目标方面所遇到的困难，也许应该彻底重新思考这一危机解决方案。


In place of a program providing the country with further loans, it might make more sense to provide outright humanitarian aid – regardless of whether Greece remains fully within the eurozone.	对于向一国提供更多贷款的方案，也许最好的办法是提供直接人道援助——不管希腊是否完全留在欧元区。


Why the Greek Deal Will Work	为何希腊协议会起作用


LONDON – Now that Greek banks have reopened and the government has made scheduled payments to the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, does Greece’s near-death experience mark the end of the euro crisis?	伦敦—希腊银行已经重新开门，希腊政府也按期偿付了欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）。 那么，希腊差点死去的经验是否标志着欧元危机的结束？


The conventional answer is a clear no.	传统答案是言简意赅的“不”。


According to most economists and political commentators, the latest Greek bailout was little more than an analgesic.	根据大部分经济学家和政治评论家的观点，最新一轮希腊援助充其量只是止痛剂。


It will dull the pain for a short period, but the euro’s deep-seated problems will metastasize, with a dismal prognosis for the single currency and perhaps even the European Union as a whole.	它能够暂时减少痛苦，但欧元的深层次问题将会转移，这个单一货币乃至整个欧盟的预后非常不乐观。


But the conventional wisdom is likely to be proved wrong.	但传统智慧可能是错误的。


The deal between Greece and the European authorities is actually a good one for both sides.	希腊和欧洲当局的协议实际上对于双方都是好事。


Rather than marking the beginning of a new phase of the euro crisis, the agreement may be remembered as the culmination of a long series of political compromises that, by correcting some of the euro’s worst design flaws, created the conditions for a European economic recovery.	该协议绝非欧元危机新阶段开始的标志，它有可能作为一系列漫长的政治妥协的起点被人铭记，这一系列妥协纠正了欧元最糟糕的设计缺陷，为欧洲经济复苏创造了条件。


To express guarded optimism about the Greek deal is not to condone the provocative arrogance of former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis or the pointless vindictiveness of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble.	表示对希腊协议谨慎乐观并不是要饶恕前希腊财政部长瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis）目中无人的傲慢或德国总理朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）毫无意义的恶意相逼。


Neither is it to deny the economic criticism of the bailout provisions presented by progressives like Joseph Stiglitz and conservatives like Hans-Werner Sinn.	这也不是要否认斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）等进步人士和辛恩（Hans-Werner Sinn）等保守人士对援助条款的经济学批评。


The arguments against creating a European single currency and then allowing Greece to cheat its way into membership were valid back in the 1990s – and, in theory, they still are.	反对创造欧洲单一货币然后允许希腊作弊获得欧元区成员资格的批评可以在20世纪90年代很有道理——理论上，它们至今仍然如此。


But this does not mean that breaking up the euro would be desirable, or even tolerable.	但这并不意味着应该让欧元区解体，甚至不意味着可以容忍欧元区解体。


Joining the euro was certainly ruinous for Greece, but there is always “a great deal of ruin in a nation,” as Adam Smith remarked 250 years ago, when losing the American colonies seemed to threaten Britain with financial devastation.	加入欧元区显然给希腊造成了破坏，但亚当·斯密在250年前失去美国殖民地眼看着要给英国带来金融灾难时就指出，“一个国家永远有各种破坏”。


The great virtue of capitalism is that it adapts to ruinous conditions and even finds ways of turning them to advantage.	资本主义的一大优点是它能适应破坏性条件甚至找到办法把它们转化为优势。


The United States in the mid-nineteenth century was badly suited for a single currency and a single economic structure, as evidenced by the Civil War, which was provoked as much by single-currency tensions as by moral abhorrence to slavery.	十九世纪中叶的美国十分不适合采取单一货币和单一经济结构，南北战争就是明证，单一货币紧张局势和对奴隶制到的痛恨都是战争爆发的原因。


Italy would probably be better off today if Garibaldi had never launched unification.	如果加里波第没能统一意大利，说不定意大利会比今天更好。


But once unification has happened, the pain of dismantling the political and economic settlement usually overwhelms the apparent gains from a break-up.	但一旦统一事件发生了，废除政治和经济制度安排的痛苦常常会比分裂的直接好处更大。


This seems to be the case in Europe, as clear majorities of voters are saying in all eurozone countries, including Germany and Greece.	欧洲似乎就是如此，所有欧元区国家，包括德国和希腊的绝对多数选民都这么认为。


Thus, the question was never whether the single currency would break up, but what political reversals, economic sacrifices, and legal subterfuges would occur to hold it together.	因此，问题从来不是单一货币是否将打破，而是何种政治逆转、经济牺牲和法律借口能让单一货币得以维持。


The good news is that Europe now has some persuasive answers.	好消息是欧洲现在已经有了一些有说服力的答案。


Indeed, Europe has overcome what could be described as the “original sin” of the single-currency project: the Maastricht Treaty’s prohibition of “monetary financing” of government deficits by the ECB and the related ban on mutual support by national governments of one another’s debt burdens.	事实上，欧洲已经克服了可称之为单一货币工程“原罪”的东西：马斯特里赫特条约禁止欧洲央行给政府赤字“货币融资”以及对国家政府共同支持彼此债务负担的禁令。


In January, ECB President Mario Draghi effectively sidestepped both obstacles by launching a program of quantitative easing so enormous that it will finance the entire deficits of all eurozone governments (now including Greece) and mutualize a significant proportion of their outstanding bonds.	1月，欧洲央行行长德拉吉事实上绕过了这两个障碍，实施了量化宽松方案，其规模之大足以为所有欧元区政府（现在也包括希腊）的全部赤字提供融资，并将它们未偿还债务的大部分共同化。


Moreover, European governments have belatedly understood the most basic principle of public finance.	此外，欧洲政府终于认识到公共财政的最基本原则。


Government debts never have to be repaid, provided they can be extended in a cooperative manner or bought up with newly created money, issued by a credible central bank.	政府债务永远不必偿还，只要可以以合作的方式展期或用由可信央行发行的新创造的货币买断。


But for this to be possible, interest payments must always be made on time, and the sanctity of debt contracts must always take precedence over electoral promises regarding pensions, wages, and public spending.	但要让这一幕发生，必须按时支付利息，并且债务契约的神圣性永远高于关于退休金、工资和公共支出的选举承诺。


Now that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government has been forced to acknowledge the unqualified priority of debt servicing, and can now benefit from unlimited monetary support from the ECB, Greece should have little problem supporting its debt burden, which is no heavier than Japan’s or Italy’s.	如今，希腊总理齐普拉斯政府被迫承认了支付债务利息才是至高无上的当务之急，因此可以获得来自欧洲央行的无限量货币支持，因此，希腊支持其并不比日本或意大利更沉重的债务负担应该没有什么问题。


Finally, Germany, Spain, Italy, and several northern European countries required, for domestic political reasons, a ritual humiliation of radical Greek politicians and voters who openly defied EU institutions and austerity demands.	最后，德国、西班牙、意大利和一些北欧国家出于国内政治原因要求对公开违抗欧盟机构和紧缩要求的希腊政客和选民给予形式羞辱（ritual humiliation）。


Having achieved this, EU leaders have no further reason to impose austerity on Greece or strictly enforce the terms of the latest bailout.	实现了这一目的，欧盟领导人就没有进一步的理由对希腊施加紧缩或严格执行最新援助的条件。


Instead, they have every incentive to demonstrate the success of their “tough love” policies by easing austerity to accelerate economic growth, not only in Greece but throughout the eurozone.	相反，他们有很大的激励通过放松紧缩以加速经济增长（不仅仅是希腊，而是整个欧元区）来证明“严���的爱”的成功。


This raises a key issue that the Tsipras government and many others misunderstood throughout the Greek crisis: the role of constructive hypocrisy in Europe’s political economy.	这就引出了一个齐普拉斯政府和其他人在整个希腊危机中误解的问题：假设性伪善在欧洲政治经济学中的作用。


Gaps between public statements and private intentions open up in all political systems, but these become huge in a complex multinational structure like the EU.	公开言论和私下意图之间的差异在所有政治制度中都存在，但像欧盟这样的复杂多边结构中特别巨大。


On paper, the Greek bailout will impose a fiscal tightening, thereby aggravating the country’s economic slump.	表面上，希腊援助将带来财政紧缩，从而加剧希腊经济衰退。


In practice, however, the budget targets will surely be allowed to slip, provided the government carries out its promises on privatization, labor markets, and pension reform.	但在实际中，预算目标必然有商量余地，只要政府兑现其在私有化、劳动力市场和退休金改革方面的承诺。


These structural reforms are much more important than fiscal targets, both in symbolic terms for the rest of Europe and for the Greek economy.	这些结构改革比财政目标重要得多，不管是对欧洲其他国家的象征意义还是对希腊经济而言。


Moreover, the extension of ECB monetary support to Greece will transform financial conditions: interest rates will plummet, banks will recapitalize, and private credit will gradually become available for the first time since 2010.	此外，延长欧洲央行对希腊的货币支持将转变金融环境：利率将下降，银行将资本重组，私人信用将逐渐可得（这是2010年以来没有发生过的事）。


If budget targets were strictly enforced by bailout monitors, which seems unlikely, this improvement in conditions for private borrowers could easily compensate for any modest tightening of fiscal policy.	如果援助监督者严格执行预算目标——这看起来不太可能——这一私人借款人条件的改善轻而易举就能补偿任何财政政策的略微收紧。


In short, the main conditions now seem to be in place for a sustainable recovery in Greece.	简言之，目前希腊可持续复苏的主要条件看起来已经具备。