Although the original rationale was to buy the crop in years of excess supply and sell in years of excess demand, thereby stabilizing prices, in practice the price paid to cocoa and coffee farmers, who were politically weak, was always below the world price in the early decades of independence.	非洲国家普遍采取了咖啡和可可的商品委员会制度，其初衷是在丰收年份收购剩余供给，以便在需求过剩时出售，从而稳定价格； 但实际上，在独立的最初数十年里，在政治上处于弱势的可可和咖啡农民获得的收购价总是低于世界价格。


As a result, production fell.	由此带来的结果是产量下降。


Politicians often seek to shield consumers through price controls on staple foods and energy.	政客通常试图通过主食和能源价格管制来保护消费者。


But artificially suppressing prices usually requires rationing to domestic households.	但人为压低价格通常意味着需要对国内家庭实行配给。


(Shortages and long lines can fuel political rage just as surely as higher prices can.)	（短缺和没完没了的排队也能激发政治怨怒，一点都不比价格高涨温和。


Otherwise, the policy satisfies the excess demand via imports, and so raises the world price even more.	）要不然就是采取用进口满足过剩需求的办法，而这会给世界食品价格火上浇油。


If the country is a producer of the commodity in question, it may use export controls to insulate domestic consumers from increases in the world price.	如果一国正好是产生问题的商品的生产国，那么它也许会采取出口管制来保护本国消费者免受世界价格上涨影响。


In 2008, India capped rice exports, and Argentina did the same for wheat exports, as did Russia in 2010.	2008年，印度就限制了稻米出口，阿根廷则限制了小麦出口。 2010年，俄罗斯也曾限制过小麦出口。


Export restrictions in producing countries and price controls in importing countries both serve to exacerbate the magnitude of the world price upswing, owing to the artificially reduced quantity that is still internationally traded.	生产国的出口限制和进口国的价格管制都会进一步推高世界价格，这是因为进入��际贸易环节的商品数量被人为压低了。


If producing and consuming countries in grain markets could cooperatively agree to refrain from such government intervention – probably by working through the World Trade Organization – world price volatility might be lower.	如果谷物生产国和消费国精诚合作，阻止此类政府干预——可以通过世界贸易组织来实现——世界价格的波动性是可以降低的。


In the meantime, some obvious steps should be taken.	与此同时，有几个措施显然应该马上实施。


For starters, bio-fuel subsidies should be abolished.	首先，生物燃料补贴应该取消。


Ethanol subsidies, such as those paid to American corn farmers, do not accomplish policymakers’ avowed environmental goals, but do divert grain and thus help drive up world food prices.	美国向玉米农民发放乙醇补贴，但这么做并没有能够达到政客拍胸脯保证的环境目标，却平白消耗了大量谷物，助长了食品价格。


By now this should be clear to everybody.	如今这已是众人皆知的秘密了。


But one cannot really expect the G-20 agriculture ministers to be able to fix the problem.	但不用指望G20农业部长们能够解决这个问题。


After all, their constituents, the farmers, are the ones pocketing the money.	毕竟，手里握着选票的农民是受益者。


(The US, it must be said, is the biggest obstacle here.)	（不得不说，美国是其中最大的障碍。 ）


It is probably best to accept that commodity prices will be volatile, and to create ways to limit the adverse economic effects – for example, financial instruments that allow hedging of the terms of trade.	或许我们最好接受商品价格继续波动的事实，转而创造限制不良经济后果的方法，比如开发能够对冲贸易平衡恶化的金融工具。


What the G-20 agriculture ministers have agreed is to forge a system to improve transparency in agricultural markets, including information about production, stocks, and prices.	G20农业部长们已经同意打造能够增进农产品市场透明度的体系，包括对产量、存货和价格信息的发布。


More complete and timely information might indeed help.	更完全、更及时的信息或许能够起到效果。


But the broader sort of policy that Sarkozy evidently has in mind is to confront speculators, who are perceived as destabilizing agricultural commodity markets.	不过，萨科齐显然打定了主意要向投机客动刀。 他认为投机客是使农产品市场不稳定的因素。


True, in recent years, commodities have become more like assets and less like goods.	诚然，近年来，商品价格行为更像是资产，而不是实物商品。


Prices are not determined solely by the flow of current supply and demand and their current economic fundamentals (such as disruptions from weather or politics).	价格并不仅仅由当前供需流以及当前经济基本面（比如天气灾害和政治动荡）决定。


They are increasingly determined also by calculations regarding expected future fundamentals (such as economic growth in Asia) and alternative returns (such as interest rates) – in other words, by speculators.	对未来基本面的预期判断（比如亚洲经济增长）以及参考回报率（比如利率）在价格决定方面所起的作用越来越大，换句话说，就是投机客在价格决定方面所起的作用越来越大了。


But speculation is not necessarily destabilizing.	但投机并非生而具有破坏性。


Sarkozy is right that leverage is not necessarily good just because the free market allows it, and that speculators occasionally act in a destabilizing way.	萨科齐认为，并不能因为自由市场允许杠杆存在就认为它一定是好的，投机客的行为有时也会会造成不良后果，此言不差。


But speculators more often act as detectors of changes in economic fundamentals, or provide the signals that smooth transitory fluctuations.	但更多的时候，投机客通常是经济基本面的探测器，提供能熨平暂时性波动的信号。


In other words, they often are a stabilizing force.	换句话说，投机客通常是稳定因素。


The French have not yet been able to obtain agreement from the other G-20 members on measures aimed at regulating commodity speculators, such as limits on the size of their investment positions.	目前，法国尚不能与其他G20成员国就管制商品投资者的问题（比如限制它们的投资头寸）达成一致。


I hope it stays that way.	我希望永远不要达成一致。


Shooting the messenger is no way to respond to the message.	信使不能因为他所传递的信息而受害。


Can France Make Middle East Peace?	法国能否实现中东和平？


RAMALLAH – Since the beginning of the year, the French government has been building support for an international conference to restart the Israel-Palestine peace process.	拉马拉——今年年初以来，法国政府一直在争取召开国际会议重启以色列-巴勒斯坦和平进程。


France deserves applause for its brave effort to revive a process that has been going nowhere for the better part of a decade.	法国重启过去10年来未能取得任何成果的和平谈判勇气固然可嘉。


But success will require more than courage.	但仅凭勇气却无法取得成功。


Any international bid to resolve the problem of Palestine depends on six factors.	解决巴勒斯坦问题的任何国际努力都取决于6大因素能否发挥作用。


The first is seriousness.	首先是严肃性。


When France first made its plans known in January, many dismissed the idea as little more than a diplomatic stunt.	今年1月法国最初宣布计划时，很多人都把这一想法当作外交噱头加以驳斥。


Palestinian officials were at first suspicious of the initiative.	巴勒斯坦官员起先也对这一计划持怀疑态度。


They feared that it would merely give the Israelis another photo opportunity: After the handshakes, ordinary Palestinians would continue to suffer under the occupation.	他们担心重启谈判只会给以色列又一次拍照机会：在双方握手后，巴勒斯坦人将继续在以色列占领下受苦。


When it became clear that the French effort was in earnest, and a date was announced for preparatory talks on May 30, the clear timelines encouraged Palestinian officials to sign up to the process.	当事实证明法国态度是认真的，且5月30日的预备会谈宣布后，明确的时限鼓励巴勒斯坦官员加入到此次和平进程。


This good faith must continue no matter what obstacles arise.	无论遇到什么样的障碍，这种真诚的态度必须继续保持。


The second key ingredient is multilateralism.	第二大关键因素是多边主义。


Israel, the stronger party in the conflict, prefers bilateral talks, which put it in a better position to dictate terms.	作为巴以冲突强势一方的以色列更愿意举行双边会谈，因为这样能为它创造更好的条件来发号施令。


The weaker side in such talks does, of course, have a sort of power: the power to say no.	上述会谈中实力较弱的一方当然也有某种权力：那就是在谈判中说不。


But the exercise of that power usually comes at a high price.	但行使这项权力往往需要付出高昂的代价。


The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany were able to work together to forge the Iranian nuclear deal.	联合国五大常任理事国加德国共同努力促成了伊朗核协议的达成。


Similar success can be obtained in the Middle East only if all parties focus on finding a solution, and do not let the strong Israelis dictate to the weak Palestinians.	只有各方一心一意寻求解决办法、不允许强大的以色列命令弱小的巴勒斯坦才能在中东取得类似的成功。


The third essential factor is a clear timetable.	第三大核心因素是明确的时间表。


For Israelis and Palestinians, decades of open-ended negotiations have produced little.	对以色列人和巴勒斯坦人而言，长达数十年的开放式谈判几乎没有产生任何作用。


If the French want this process to succeed, they must set out clear timelines, and a date by which the talks must yield results.	如果法国人希望谈判进程取得成功，就必须制定明确的时间表，明确谈判必须产生结果的最后日期。


After all, the outlines of what is required for a settlement are fairly well understood.	归根结底，达成协议所需的轮廓性条款各方其实都心知肚明。


What is missing is the will for peace.	现在缺少的是和平意愿。


Once there is a deadline, procrastination can’t be part of the negotiating tactics.	一旦确定了最后日期，拖延就不能成为谈判策略的一部分。


And once a timeline is set, the price of failure must be made clear.	一旦制定时间表，失败的代价就必须说清。


This is a crucial fourth ingredient.	这是第四个关键成分。


Any negotiator knows that the parties to a conflict will be reluctant to make compromises unless there is a price to pay if the talks fail.	谈判者都知道除非谈判失败需要付出代价，否则冲突各方都不愿做出妥协。


When he first announced the French initiative, Laurent Fabius, France’s former foreign minister, said that if the talks break down, France will recognize Palestine (though his successor, Jean-Marc Ayrault, has backed away from this position, saying that recognition would not be automatic).	最初宣布计划时，法国前外长法比尤斯曾表示如果谈判破裂，法国将承认巴勒斯坦国（但其继任者让 - 马克·埃罗并未坚守这一立场，表示法国不会自动承认巴勒斯坦国）。


As a permanent UN Security Council member, France’s recognition of Palestine could be crucial.	作为联合国安理会常任理事国，法国承认巴勒斯坦可能至关重要。


The pressure on Israel might become even greater if, by November or December, it became clear that it was not negotiating in good faith.	如果到11、12月，事实证明以色列并未认真谈判，那么它所承受的压力可能更大。


US President Barack Obama’s administration, by that point in its final weeks, could then play a decisive role, by making the costs of intransigence clear to Israel.	美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马内阁届时已进入最后几周的执政阶段，但仍能让以色列知道不妥协的代价，从而发挥决定性作用。


The fifth condition for success is that justice must be seen to be done.	成功的第五个条件是必须公平公正。


Even if Israeli and Palestinian leaders can be persuaded to sign some kind of deal, it will not stand the test of time unless it is generally regarded as fair.	即使可以说服以色列和巴勒斯坦领袖签署某种协议，但除非外界普遍认为协议公正否则也经受不住时间的考验。


Deals do require compromises, but no deal will stick if the compromises by one side seem so overwhelming that the resulting agreement is perceived as unjust.	签署协议的确需要妥协，但如果一方的妥协过分到令所签协议失去公正，那么这项协议也无法真正执行。


There is considerable regional and international agreement on what would count as a just solution: an independent state of Palestine, roughly around the 1967 borders, a resolution of the refugee problem, and an arrangement to share Jerusalem.	关于协议的公正地区和国际社会有着广泛的共识：即大致以1967年边界为限成立独立的巴勒斯坦国、解决难民问题、并签署协议分享耶路撒冷。


Moreover, it is impossible for the negotiations to be seen as fair if Israel maintains its brutal occupation and continues to build settlements on Palestinian lands.	此外，如果以色列继续保持其野蛮占领并继续在巴勒斯坦土地上建设定居点，这样的谈判也不太可能被视作公正。


Finally, the success of the talks requires public support, which can be obtained only if the leaders genuinely give peace a chance.	最后，需要公众的支持谈判才能取得成功，而这样的公众支持只有当领导人真正给和平一个机会才能争取到。


The average Palestinian – and Israeli, too – needs to believe that peace is possible.	普普通通的巴勒斯坦人还有以色列人需要相信完全可能实现和平。


This means changes in Israeli military policy, travel restrictions, and political posturing, and an end to one-upmanship by both sides.	而这意味着修改以色列的军事政策、旅行限制和政治姿态，同时双方必须摒弃高人一等的作风。


Pierre Vimont, the French special envoy, has been charged by his government with an enormous task, one that he cannot possibly accomplish on his own.	法国谈判特使皮埃尔·维蒙肩负着政府赋予的艰巨任务，这项任务不可能凭借他的一己之力完成。


He will need an earnest multilateral effort, clear timelines, a commitment to justice on all sides – and perhaps a miracle.	他需要真正的多边努力、明确的时间表，以及所有各方承诺实现公平——除此之外，可能还需要奇迹的发生。


Can Green Trade Tariffs Combat Climate Change?	绿色关税能制止气候变化吗？


BERKELEY – In recent months, China has taken center stage in the international debate over global warming.	伯克利--最近几个月来，中国在有关全球气候变暖的国际辩论中占据中心位置。


It has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest source of greenhouse gases, and it became developing nations’ diplomatic champion at the recent United Nations climate negotiations in Bali.	中国已经超过美国成为全世界最大的温室气体排放国，而且成为最近联合国巴厘气候问题谈判中发展中国家外交的领头。


Now China may become the target of a full-fledged trade war that could destroy – or perhaps rescue – the chances of bringing rich and poor nations together to fight global warming.	现在中国也许会成为一场全面贸易战的目标，这一贸易战也许会摧毁或者挽救穷国和富国携手对付全球变暖的机会。


The focus on China intensified late last year, when new data from the International Energy Agency and other research organizations revealed that China had overtaken the US as the largest source of greenhouse gases – and, more ominously, that its emissions are growing at a rate that exceeds all wealthy nations’ capacity to decrease theirs.	当时，国际原子能机构和其他研究机构的新数据表明中国已经超越美国成为温室气体的最大排放国家。 而且更为不详的是，中国的排放增长远远超过所有富有国家降低排放的能力。


Even if China met its own targets for energy conservation, its emissions would increase by about 2.3 billion metric tons over the next five years – far larger than the 1.7 billion tons in cutbacks imposed by the Kyoto Protocol on the 37 developed “Annex 1” countries, including the US.	即使中国实现其自身节能的目标，其排放在未来五年中还是将会增长大约23亿吨。 这一数字要远远大于京都议定书规定包括美国在内的37个“附件一”发达国家的17亿吨的减排量。


After the inconclusive end of the UN led Bali talks on the global environment, worry has grown among US and European industries – especially iron, steel, cement, glass, chemicals, and pulp and paper – that any new climate treaty would put them at a big disadvantage against their fast-growing competitors in China.	联合国有关环境变化的巴厘谈判并没有达成实质性的协议。 在此之后，美国和欧洲的某些产业，特别是钢铁、水泥、玻璃、化工以及纸浆和造纸等行业忧心忡忡。


In response, the US Congress is moving to create a system of trade sanctions that would levy heavy taxes on imports from other major greenhouse gas emitters.	它们担心新的气候协议将会使得它们在快速增长的中国竞争对手面前处于非常不利的地位。 作为回应，美国国会正在采取行动建立一个贸易制裁体系，对其他主要温室气体排放国家实施苛刻的关税。


Ironically, the American plan is taking shape even before the US takes any action to reduce its own emissions, inviting charges of hypocrisy, violation of international law, and threatening a major trade war.	具有讽刺意味的是，美国在采取行动减少自身排放之前就酝酿这一规划，引发他人指控其伪善和违反国际法并且威胁到发一场大规模贸易战。


The tariff proposal – contained in the central piece of global warming legislation now before Congress – would impose emission controls on domestic industries starting in 2012.	这一关税提议是国会正在考虑的一项全球变暖法案的中心部分，它将从2012年开始对国内行业实施排放控制。


It would also levy punitive tariffs on greenhouse-gas-intensive products imported from countries that lack “comparable action” to that of the US, starting in 2020.	对于从缺乏类似美国的“类似行动”的国家进口的高温室气体密度的产品还将征收惩罚性关税。


Industrial lobbies and labor unions are pushing hard for these sanctions to take effect more quickly.	各行业的游说者以及工会正在加紧让这些制裁早日生效。


European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and industrial chambers of commerce strongly advocate a similar tariff system, leading many analysts to predict that the EU will also adopt some sort of green tariff system in the next few years.	欧盟委员会主席巴罗索和法国总统萨尔科奇以及各个产业商会也极力鼓吹类似的关税制度。 这使得许多分析家预计欧盟也将会在未来几年里采取某种形式的绿色关税制度。


Warning of an “all-out trade war” if the sanctions go forward, US Trade Representative Susan Schwab argues that green trade sanctions would violate World Trade Organization rules.	美国贸易代表施瓦布警告说，如果实行制裁将会引发“全面的贸易战”。 她认为，绿色贸易制裁将会违反世界贸易组织的规则。


In a recent letter to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, she wrote, “We believe this approach could be a blunt and imprecise instrument of fear, rather than one of persuasion, that will take us down a dangerous path and adversely impact US manufacturers, farmers, and consumers.”	她最近给众议院能源和商业委员会写信说道：“我们相信这一措施是明显和无的放矢的恐吓手法，而不是劝导手法。 这将会走向危险的道路并且给美国的制造业、农民以及消费者造成负面的影响。


Developing nations’ allies, meanwhile, are warning that the sanctions plan could destroy the chances of a post-Kyoto treaty.	与此同时，发展中国家的盟友们警告说，制裁计划可能破坏达成京都议定书失效后的协议的机会。


Chinese diplomats have not responded directly, but they have noticeably hardened their stand on climate talks.	中国外交官并没有直接做出反应，但是他们明显地在气候谈判中强化了立场。


In February, China’s top climate negotiator, Yu Qingtai, said at the UN that rich nations, which “caused the problem of climate change in the first place,” must be treated as “culprits,” and developing countries as “victims.”	在二月份，中国的气候变化特别代表于庆泰在联合国表示，富国“首先造成了气候变化问题”，因此是“罪魁祸首”，而发展中国家则是“受害者”。


Despite China’s official hard line, some Chinese environmental officials privately express alarm at run-away carbon emissions, and suggest that foreign green tariffs would actually strengthen their hand in domestic policy struggles over controlling greenhouse gases by helping to win political support for emissions cuts.	但是，尽管中国官方持强硬态度，中国的某些环保官员私下对二氧化碳排放失控表示惊讶并且表示，外国绿色关税通过帮助赢得在减排问题上的政治支持而将会在实际上在国内有关温室气体的政策斗争中加强他们的地位。


Pan Yue, vice-director of the State Environmental Protection Administration, recently argued in a China Daily article in favor of stronger emissions regulations and a more “green-oriented China,” warning that “China’s image among the international community” was in jeopardy.	国家环保局副局长潘岳最近在中国日报上撰文支持更为强有力的排放法规以及更为“绿色导向的中国”。 他警告说“中国在国际社会的形象”处于危险之中。


The growing dispute over trade sanctions brings to the fore not only the fundamental ethical question of whether wealthy nations should bear the burden of emissions reduction alone, but also the strategic question of whether sticks as well as carrots should be used to induce green behavior in developing countries.	对于贸易制裁不断增加的争议把一些问题带到了前台。 它们不仅包括富有国家是否应该单独承担减排负担这一伦理问题，而且还包括对发展中国家是否应该恩威并用来促进环保行为。


Although China may not like it, the international trading system may provide more leverage than any other post-Kyoto mechanism over developing countries’ environmental policies.	尽管中国可能并不喜欢，但是国际贸易体制可能会比任何京都议定书之后的其他机制更加对发展中国家的环境政策发挥作用。


Despite the threat of trade wars, trade sanctions could emerge as the most effective means of forcing international action on global warming.	尽管存在贸易战的威胁，贸易制裁或许将会成为在全球变暖问题上强制采取国际行动的最为有效的手段。


Can Hamas Stay in Power?	哈马斯当局能否维系？


With one-third of the Palestinians’ Hamas-led government now under arrest by Israel, the escalation in Israeli-Palestinian relations has moved beyond military confrontation.	目前，哈马斯领导的巴勒斯坦政府三分之一成员均遭以色列当局逮捕，巴以关系的升级已超越了军事冲突。


A far more fundamental question has come into view: can a Palestinian government that draws its authority from an agreement with Israel stay in power when it is led by an organization committed to the destruction of Israel?	一个更大的问题展现在人们面前，那就是，一个从与以色列的协议中获得权力、受到致力于消灭以色列的组织领导的巴勒斯坦政府能否继续执政？


The abduction of an Israeli soldier in the Gaza Strip, as well as the abduction and subsequent murder of an 18-year old Israeli civilian in the West Bank, have brought to the fore that question, which has haunted Israeli-Palestinian relations since Hamas won parliamentary elections in January.	哈马斯一月份赢得议会选举以来该问题就一直萦绕着巴以关系。 一名以色列士兵在加沙地带遭绑架，一位18岁以色列平民在约旦河西岸被绑架后遭杀害事件使得该问题变得更加突出。


The international community, led by the “Quartet” (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia), has put three conditions to the Hamas government if it wishes to achieve international legitimacy and continue to be supported financially.	“四方”（包括美国、欧盟、联合国及俄罗斯）领导的国际社会以向哈马斯政府提出三项作为其取得国际合法性和继续获得财政援助的先决条件。


Hamas must recognize Israel’s right to exist, stop all terrorist activities, and commit itself to carry out all previous international agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority.	哈马斯必须承认以色列的生存权、停止一切恐怖活动并切实执行巴勒斯坦当局已签署的一切国际协议。


These look like reasonable conditions to any outside observer.	这些条件对任何一位旁观者来说似乎都是合理的。


To Hamas, however, they appear to undermine its very raison d'etre.	但对哈马斯来说，它们似乎破坏了其存在目的。


After all, this is an organization committed to the destruction of Israel – its charter calls for a holy war against all Jews – and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historical Palestine.	毕竟，这是一个致力于消灭以色列的组织。 其章程呼吁进行抗击一切犹太人的圣战并成立巴勒斯坦历史上第一个伊斯兰国家。


Indeed, Article 22 of that charter reveals that Hamas views the Jews (together with the Freemasons and other nefarious organizations like Rotary International and the Lions Club), as responsible for the French and Bolshevik Revolutions, World War I, and World War II.	哈马斯认为犹太人（共济会以及其他臭名昭著组织如“扶轮国际”和“狮子俱乐部”）对法国大革命、十月革命、第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战的爆发均负责。


So it is no great surprise that Hamas rejected the Quartet’s conditions.	所以哈马斯拒绝了四方的条件也就不足为奇了。


At the same time, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who represents Fatah, which lost the January elections, has tried in vain to find common ground with Hamas through an ambiguous text known as “The Prisoners’ Document.”	巴勒斯坦总统哈阿巴斯（阿布·马赞）代表一月份大选失败的法塔赫组织。 他尽管与此同时试图通过那个摸棱两可的囚犯文件同哈马斯达成共识，但一切都是徒劳。


This document was intended to serve as an implicit acceptance of Israel’s right to exist.	该文件意在默认以色列的生存权。


But nothing of the sort appears in the truncated text approved by Hamas.	但在哈马斯批准的删剪版中却没有相关的内容。


On the contrary, the text legitimizes continuing attacks against Israeli civilians in the West Bank, making it unacceptable to Israel – and to the international community.	相反，文件将继续袭击约旦河西岸的以色列平民合法化，这使得以色列和国际社会均无法接受。


But the current crisis cannot be solved by words alone.	但是仅用言辞无法改变当前的危机。


One of the paradoxical results of America’s almost messianic belief in elections as a panacea for all the ills of the Middle East is that Hamas – the winner of democratic elections – has gained a degree of legitimacy that it never had before.	美国几乎救世主般地认为选举是消除中东一切弊病的灵丹妙药。 但结果荒谬的是，哈马斯这个民主选举制的赢家得到了一定程度的、前所未有的合法性。


On the other hand, Hamas’s history and current behavior clearly indicate that it regards elections as merely a political tool, and that it is devoid of any commitment to the norms and values underlying democracy.	另一方面，哈马斯过去和现在的行为已清楚地表明它只是将选举当作政治工具，而没有致力于任何民主规范和价值。


Fascist and communist regimes of the past, which followed a similar instrumentalist approach to democracy, come to mind here.	在此我们想起了过去的法西斯主义和共产主义。 它们都相似地将民主作为实现其目的的工具。


Yet, at the same time, the US supports Abu Mazen, trying to undermine the Hamas government, thus casting a shadow on the credibility of its own commitment to democracy.	但是，与此同时，美国支持阿布·马赞，试图削弱哈马斯政府，因此对其自身对民主的承诺的恶可信度投下阴影。


The current violence may escalate further, and could bring down the Hamas government.	当前的暴力也许会进一步升级并使哈马斯政府倒台。


On the other hand, diplomatic means may bring about the release of the Israeli soldier and put a stop to the firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into Israel – a daily occurrence that has challenged the credibility of the new Israeli government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.	另一方面，那名以色列士兵也许会通过外交途径获得自由并阻止从加沙向以色列发射卡萨姆型火箭。 每天发射火箭已经动摇了在总理奥尔默特领导下的以色列新政府的信誉。


But the fundamental problem is that, until now, at every historical juncture, the Palestinians refused to accept a compromise and consequently failed in nation-building.	但是根本问题在于，到目前为止，每逢关键历史时刻，巴勒斯坦人总是拒绝妥协，结果在国家建设上失败。


In 1947, they refused the UN partition plan, which called for the establishments of two states in British Palestine.	1947年，巴勒斯坦人拒绝了联合国的分隔计划。 该计划呼吁在英属巴勒斯坦成立两个国家。


In 1993, after the Oslo agreements, the Palestinian Authority established under Yasir Arafat became another militarized authoritarian regime, very much like Syria and Egypt, and did nothing to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian refugees.	1993年奥斯陆协议签署后，阿拉法特领导下的巴勒斯坦当局变成了又一个同叙利亚与埃及非常相似的军事化独裁政权，没有采取任何措施减轻巴勒斯坦难民的苦难。


It was this failure that brought Hamas to power.	哈马斯因此上台。


The current crisis is obviously the first serious test for Olmert and his plans for further withdrawal from Israeli-occupied territories.	显而易见，当前危机是对奥尔默特和其继续从以色列占领领土撤军计划的第一个严峻考验。


But it is an even greater test for the Palestinians: will they once again be led by a radical and fanatical leadership into another national catastrophe?	但危机对巴勒斯坦人考验更大。 他们会再一次被一帮激进而狂热的领导者带入另一场民族灾难吗？


Or will they finally realize that a future of independence, sovereignty, and dignity is open to them – but only if they grant the Israelis what they rightly claim for themselves?	他们会终将认识到只要给予以色列人他们自己所要求的东西，即独立、主权和尊严，那么这些东西也将在未来岁月向他们敞开怀抱吗？


The international community can urge the Palestinians toward a decision.	国际社会可以敦促巴勒斯坦人作出决定。


But that decision, and its moral costs, remains in the hands of the Palestinians alone.	但是决定权和为此所付出的道德代价只在巴勒斯坦人自己手中掌握。


Can Hezbollah Weather the Arab Spring?	真主党能经受住“阿拉伯之春”吗？


BEIRUT –Three years ago, regional opinion polls showed that the Middle East’s most popular leaders were Hezbollah leader Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.	贝鲁特—三年前，区域民意调查显示中东地区最受人们爱戴的领导是真主党领袖哈桑·纳斯鲁拉，叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德以及伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪－内贾德。


People at the time appreciated that they were standing up to Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, and pushing back against aggressive American policies in the region.	当时的人们都很欣赏他们的做法：在黎巴嫩和加沙勇于面对伊朗，奋起反攻美国在当地的侵略性政策。


With the Arab Spring, regional public opinion has shifted toward prioritizing civil rights and democratic reform over foreign policy.	随着阿拉伯之春的到来，当地的公众舆论开始转向优化民权以及外交政策的民主改革上来。


Today, Assad is reviled, Ahmadinejad’s government is accused of violently suppressing its own pro-democracy protestors, and both Hezbollah and Iran are condemned for continuing to back Assad as he slaughters his own population.	今天，阿萨德遭到人们的辱骂，内贾德政府被指责暴力镇压支持民主的抗议者，真主党和伊朗则由于继续支持阿萨德而被谴责，因为阿萨德屠杀害当地的居民。


As a result, Hezbollah is no longer the widely popular movement that it once was across the Arab and Muslim worlds, but it remains a highly effective and heavily armed force.	因此，在阿拉伯以及穆斯林世界，真主党并不像过去一样广泛受到人们的欢迎，但是它仍然是一支效率极高的武装势力。


And, in politics, as Machiavelli pointed out long ago, it is more important to be feared than loved.	在政治上，正如多年之前马基雅维利提出的那样，受到敬畏比受到爱戴更重要。


To be sure, Hezbollah is still grudgingly respected for its ability to stand up to Israel.	的确，由于真主党在应对伊朗方面的能力而勉强受到人们的尊重。


But it has lost its halo as a voice for the oppressed and downtrodden, and has exposed itself as a partisan and sectarian party that will side with Iran and its allies even at the expense of human rights and human lives in neighboring Syria.	但是他已经失去了光环，不再代表受到压迫以及被蹂躏的民众的心声。 他向人们展示的是一个党派，他甚至以牺牲邻国叙利亚民众的人权和性命为代价，和伊朗以及他的盟国站在一边。


But Hezbollah’s hard power has, up to now, not been affected by developments in the Arab Spring or Syria.	但是到目前为止，真主党的强硬势力并没有由于阿拉伯之春或者叙利亚的发展而受到影响。


Its deployment in Lebanon, its fighting capacity, and its thousands of missiles are all still intact.	他在黎巴嫩的部署，战斗力和数以千计的导弹仍旧原封不动。


Hezbollah was initially thrilled at the outbreak of popular revolts against rulers closely allied with the US and the West.	一开始，爆发反对与美国以及西方势力结盟统治者的民众叛乱，这使真主党感到害怕。


Even Libya’s Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi was considered a foe for having allegedly ordered the killing of Lebanese Shiite leader Imam Musa Sadr in 1978.	甚至连利比亚陆军上校卡扎菲都由于1978年颁布政令杀害黎巴嫩什叶派领袖萨德尔而被认为是敌人。


Hezbollah had been in a virtual cold war with Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt since January 2009, when Nasrallah had effectively accused Mubarak’s government of collusion in Israel’s intervention in Gaza, and had called for the “Egyptian people to take to the streets in their millions.”	从2009年一月开始，真主党穆巴拉克的埃及政府陷入了冷战之中，当时，在以色列干预加沙问题上，纳斯鲁拉谴责穆巴拉克政府与以色列勾结。


But, as the revolts proceeded, it emerged that people wanted good government and social justice, and were not enamored of Iran or interested in joining an axis of resistance.	然而随着叛乱继续进行，人们开始想要一个亲民的政府和公平的社会，他们并不倾向于伊朗也对加入抵抗轴心国不感兴趣。


Furthermore, as the Muslim Brotherhood rose in Egypt, Hezbollah’s erstwhile ally, Hamas, drifted away from it and its Syrian and Iranian backers, and found a new footing in Egypt and the Gulf.	此外，随着穆斯林兄弟会在埃及的兴起，真主党之前的联盟哈马斯开始远离他以及他的叙利亚和伊朗支持者，在埃及和海湾地区建立了新的关系。


But Hezbollah’s disappointment turned to intense concern when Syrians rebelled against Assad.	但是，叙利亚在反抗阿萨德的时候，真主党开始从失望转向密切的关注。


If his regime falls, Hezbollah is at risk of losing its arms-supply bridge to Iran.	如果阿萨德政府被推翻，真主党就可能会失去她想伊朗进行军事供给的通道。


It would be unable to compensate for that loss by relying on Lebanese seaports or Beirut’s airport, because both could easily be blockaded.	依靠黎巴嫩海港和贝鲁特机场是不能弥补这个损失的，因为它们都很容易被封锁。


It would still have its full first-strike and retaliatory capacity, but, like a bee, it would be able to sting only once.	他依旧拥有先下手为强以及报复势力，但是和蜜蜂一样，只能蛰一次。


Without the ability to resupply itself, Hezbollah would emerge from any future war a significantly weakened force.	真主党没有能力补充自己，在未来的战争中，它都会是一支弱势力。


Within Lebanon itself, Hezbollah is still strong, but its comfort level has declined.	在黎巴嫩内部，真主党是一股强实力，但是舒适度有所下降。


In May 2008, it demonstrated its domestic dominance by taking over the capital, Beirut.	2008年5月，他占领了首都贝鲁特，展示了它在国内的支配地位。


In January 2011, it brought down Saad Hariri’s government and installed one more to its liking.	2011年1月，它转入萨阿德·哈里里政府并且根据喜好建立了另一个。


But, in just the last few weeks, parts of the Sunni north have erupted in armed defiance of Hezbollah and the government that it dominates, and are openly supporting the Syrian rebels.	但是就在刚刚过去的几周之内，逊尼派北部的部分地区已经爆发反对真主党以及他所支配的政府武装叛乱，并且公开支持叙利亚叛乱势力。


In a sense, these Sunni groups are creating an armed enclave in northern Lebanon to counterbalance the armed Shia enclaves in Beirut, the south, and the Bekaa region.	从某种意义上说，这些逊尼派集团在黎巴嫩北部建立了一个武装飞地，抗击什叶武装势力在贝鲁特，南部以及贝特区域的飞地。


Hezbollah has also been shaken by the abduction and continued detention of a dozen Lebanese Shiites – some close to Nasrallah – by opposition forces in Syria.	真主党也由于12位黎巴嫩什叶派人持续被反对势力绑架和拘留而动摇，这些拘留的人有的倾向于纳斯鲁拉。


Hezbollah faces parliamentary elections in the spring of 2013.	2013年春天，真主党将要面临议会大选。


If its Christian ally, Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, does poorly, or if the ever-shifting Druze leader Walid Jumblatt returns his Progressive Socialist Party to the anti-Syrian alliance of which it was once a part, Hezbollah would lose its parliamentary majority, and hence its ability to form and topple governments.	如果他的基督盟友米歇尔·奥恩的自由爱国运动进展不顺的话，或者如果不断变化的德鲁士领导瓦利德·朱巴拉特把激进社会党归还反对叙利亚联盟（它曾经是该联盟的一部分），真主党就会失去在议会中的大部分席位，因此建立以及推翻政府的能力都会失去。


Perhaps anticipating these domestic vulnerabilities, Hezbollah encouraged and joined the resumption of National Dialogue discussions involving all of Lebanon’s main communities.	或许在预测到这些弱点之后，真主党会鼓励并且重新加入全国对话（涉及黎巴嫩主要的社区）。


Strategically, Hezbollah fears that if Assad falls, and if it loses the ability to resupply itself rapidly and effectively as a result, Israel will take advantage by unleashing another war against it.	在战略上，真主党担心如果阿萨德政府倒下，那么他就失去快速有效自我补充的能力，以色列就会发动另一场反对战争而占据优势。


With tensions between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, unresolved, this fear cannot be discounted.	如果真主党的保护人以色列和伊朗之间的紧张关系不解除的话，这种担心害怕是不能消除的。


Even if Hezbollah can adjust to the Arab Spring, it fears the winter with Israel that might follow.	即使真主党能够适应阿拉伯之春，他仍旧担心以色列之冬会紧随其来。


Can High Oil Prices Be Good?	高油价能变成好事吗？


World oil prices crossed $40 a barrel in mid-summer, and have since climbed to the mid-$50's.	仲夏时节，世界油价涨过了每桶40美元大关，此后又一路飚升至每桶50几美元。


Today's oil prices are still only two-thirds the real peak reached during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and future markets expect the oil price to fall back and settle at perhaps $45 a barrel.	比起1979年伊朗革命时的油价最高点，今天的油价还仅仅是那时的三分之二左右，而未来市场预计油价会开始回落，并在每桶45美元左右启稳。


But the current high level of oil prices has led forecasters to start reining in their expectations for economic growth.	但油价的居高不下却促使预言家们开始对经济增长充满了渴望。


"Higher oil prices are here to stay," says the American economic forecaster Allen Sinai.	"高油价还会继续下去，"美国经济预言家艾伦·西奈如是说。


"[T]hat has to subtract growth and could cause core inflation to pick up."	"油价上涨必须扣除增长因素，也可能会导致核心通货膨胀的抬升。


Indeed, according to Sinai, higher oil prices are "the biggest risk...since the bursting of the stock-market bubble in 2000-2001."	"实际西奈认为，高油价是"2000－2001年股市泡沫破裂后…最大的危险。 "


Sinai is hardly alone.	持这种观点的绝非西奈一人。


If the oil price stays at $40 a barrel, expect it to have next to no effect on short-term world GDP growth.	如果油价保持在每桶40美元的水平，那么短期内对各国国内生产总值的影响可以忽略不计。


But if the oil price remains at or near $60 a barrel, expect everyone's forecasts of GDP growth to be reduced by 1% per year.	可如果油价在60美元或附近居高不下，那么预计人均国内生产总值的增长每年将下降1%。


High oil prices also threaten to slow long-term productivity growth.	高油价还可能对长期生产率的增长构成威胁。


With high - and volatile - oil prices, businesses will focus their investments less on boosting productivity and more on maintaining flexible energy usage.	如果油价居高不下、动荡不稳，企业就会把资金投向的重点放在保持灵活的能源利用，而忽略对生产率的提高。


At $40 a barrel, expect oil prices to slow the long-run growth rate of the world's potential output by 0.1% per year.	40美元一桶的油价预计会使全球潜在产出的长期年增长率降低近01.


At $60 a barrel, expect the "measured" long-term rate of potential world output growth to slow by roughly 0.3% per year.	%，而60美元一桶的油价将会"可衡量的"全球潜在产出长期年增长率降低近0. 3%。


With most shocks to the world economy, we expect central banks to take steps to offset their effects.	我们预计：各国央行会采取措施抵消油价上涨对全球经济的多数影响。


When business investment committees become more cautious, we expect to see the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and others lower interest rates to make the numbers more attractive.	如果企业投资委员会变得更为谨慎，那么我们希望美联储、欧洲央行、英格兰银行和其它银行会降低利率，增大贷款的吸引力。


If consumers go on a spending binge, we expect the world's central banks to raise interest rates to cool off construction spending and free up the resources needed to prevent shortage-inducing inflation.	如果消费开支一路上涨，我们则希望各国央行提高利率，降低基建开支的热度，从而释放防止通货膨胀和短缺所需的资源。


But this economic logic does not apply in the case of increases in oil prices.	但这样的经济逻辑在油价上涨时并不适用。


Although high oil prices look like a tax on business activity that depresses aggregate demand, they also raise inflation, both directly and indirectly.	尽管高油价似乎是企业活动的额外赋税，同样抑制了总体需求，但同时也直接或间接地提高了通货膨胀。


Central banks respond to lowered demand by reducing interest rates and to higher expected inflation by raising interest rates.	各国央行为调节需求减少而降低利率，为防止通胀上涨而升高利率。


Because high oil prices both lower demand and raise inflation, central banks respond by doing little or nothing.	由于高油价既减少需求，也提高通胀，各国央行只好什么都不做。


The effects of high oil prices thus flow through to the economy without being moderated by the world's central banks leaning against the wind.	于是，高油价带来的后果在经济中得以完全的显现，而世界各国的央行都在调节措施方面无所作为。


Yet if we take a very long-term view, it is not so clear that high oil prices are bad for the world as a whole.	但如果从长期来看，高油价对世界的负面影响并不十分明显。


For example, if high oil prices were the result of taxes that were then redistributed to oil users, they would be unambiguously good.	例如，如果高油价是税收带来的结果，而这些税收又重新分配给了所有石油用户，那么它所带来的好处是勿庸置疑的。


To be sure, most taxes entail heavy "excess burdens": the cost is significantly greater than the value of the revenue raised because of potential taxpayers' myriad attempts at evasion and avoidance.	可以肯定，多数税收会带来沉重的"额外负担"。 税收成本远较收入价值为高，因为潜在的纳税者会想出种种办法来进行逃避。


A tax on oil, however, does not entail excess burdens.	而对石油征税却不会带来额外负担。


On the contrary, it implies excess benefits .	不仅不会带来负担，甚至还有额外的收益。


Shifts to more energy-efficient means of transportation ease congestion. Attempts to shave costs by economizing on energy use reduce pollution.	向更为节能的运输方式过渡缓解了拥堵，节约能源、降低成本还能够减少污染。


Higher prices for oil substitutes spur research into other energy technologies - research that is much needed today if we are to tackle the problems of global climate change tomorrow.	高油价替代了研究其它能源科技的激励政策－而如果我们想要避免今后的全球气候变化，这种研究正是目前的当务之急。


A well-designed tax on oil would also reduce demand, thereby lowering the potential for windfall profits for those who rule or own the ground over the oil deposits.	设计合理的燃油税还可以降低需求，从而减少油田土地的所有者敛取不义之财。


A little more than a decade ago, Lloyd Bentsen, President Bill Clinton's first Treasury Secretary, tried to ensure precisely that, proposing to use a "BTU tax" to close America's fiscal deficit.	10多年前，克林顿总统的首任财长劳埃德·本特森曾试图达到这个目标，提议设立"BTU税收"来解决美国的财政赤字。


The Republican Party and the American Petroleum Institute sank that proposal.	共和党和美国石油协会否决了这项提案。


A decade later, we have high oil prices, but they are not due to a well-designed tax, either in America or elsewhere.	10年以后，我们还是面临高油价，但无论在美国还是世界各地，油价飞涨都不是由于合理设计的税收。


As a result, the price boom is boosting windfall profits for the owners of oil deposits rather than improving countries' public finances.	其结果是，油价的飞涨让油田主们一夜暴富，而国家的公共财政却没有因此有任何改善。


Time to Test Iran	考验伊朗正逢其时


NEW YORK – Most of the debate about how to address Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear-weapons capacity focuses on two options.	纽约—大部分关于如何处理伊朗发展核武器生产力的问题集中于两个选择。


The first is to rely on deterrence and live with an Iran that has a small nuclear arsenal or the ability to assemble one with little advance notice.	第一是依靠威慑并接受拥有小型核武库或组装核武器能力的伊朗，然后多加关注。


The second is to launch a preventive military strike aimed at destroying critical parts of the Iranian program and setting back its progress by an estimated two or more years.	第二是发动预防性军事打击，摧毁伊朗核计划的关键部分，将其迈向核武器的进程打回两三年前。


But now a third option has emerged: negotiating a ceiling on the nuclear program that would not be too low for Iran’s government and not too high for the United States, Israel, and the rest of the world.	但如今，第三个选择也浮出了水面：谈判一个对伊朗政府来说太低，对美国、以色列和世界其他国家来说太高的核计划上限。


In fact, such an option has been around for years – and in several rounds of negotiations.	事实上，这一选择已经出现了好几年了，谈判也进行了好几轮。


What has changed, however, is the context.	但是，变化的是环境。


And changes in context can be critical; indeed, what happens away from the negotiating table almost always determines the outcome of face-to-face talks.	而环境的变化可能是关键性的； 事实上，谈判桌之外所发生的形势几乎总能决定面对面谈判的结果。


The single most important change in context is the rapidly deteriorating state of Iran’s economy.	环境的最重要变化便是伊朗经济的急剧恶化。


The many financial and oil-related sanctions that have been implemented in recent months and years are starting to bite.	最近几个月和几年来众多金融和石油相关制裁正在显现效力。


They were designed not to impede Iran’s nuclear program directly, but rather to increase the price that Iran’s leaders must pay for pursuing their nuclear ambitions.	这些制裁并不是为了直接阻碍伊朗核计划，而是为了提高伊朗领导层为追求核野心所必须付出的代价。


The thinking (or, more accurately, the hope) was that Iran’s leadership, if forced to choose between regime survival and nuclear weapons, would choose the former.	其中的算盘（更准确地说，是希望）是伊朗领导被迫在政权和核武器之间做出选择的时候，他们会选择前者。


This hypothesis may soon get a real-world test.	这一假设也许很快就会在现实世界中得到检验。


Iran’s currency, the rial, has fallen roughly 40% in recent weeks, sharply increasing Iran’s inflation rate and what Iranians must pay for imports and many staples.	近几周来，伊朗货币里亚尔贬值了约40%，极大地增加了伊朗的通货膨胀率和伊朗的进口品和原材料价格。


The result is the first signs of serious public discontent with the regime since the violent repression of the Green Movement in 2009.	结果，伊朗出现了自暴力镇压2009年绿色运动（Green Movement）以来首次严重的反对现有政权的公共不满。


Iran’s merchant class, one of the pillars of the clerical establishment that has ruled the country since the 1979 revolution, is grumbling as well.	伊朗商界——1979年革命以来主宰这个国家的支柱之一——也开始动摇。


Other factors also could give negotiations a real chance.	其他因素也可以给予谈判真正的机会。


Upheavals in the Arab world suggest that no regime in the Middle East is entrenched; Iran’s leaders would have to be blind not to have taken note.	阿拉伯世界的动乱表明，在中东，没有哪个政权是牢不可破的； 除非伊朗领导层是瞎子，否则不会看不到这一点。


In his speech at the United Nations in late September, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu signaled a willingness to give sanctions more time, until at least the summer of 2013.	以色列总理内塔尼亚胡在9月的联合国演讲中给出的信号时延长制裁时间，只扫到2013年夏。


And there are signs that, regardless of who wins November’s presidential election, the US might well undertake an armed strike, with potential destruction much greater than if Israel were to act alone.	其他迹象表明，不管谁赢得11月的大选，美国都会对伊朗发动武装袭击，造成比以色列单方面行动更大的破坏。


Again, the Iranians might see compromise as the lesser of the threats that it faces.	在这里，伊朗可能会将妥协视为比所面临的威胁更小的问题。


Until now, negotiations have been desultory at best.	到目前为止，谈判充其量只能说是断断续续。


The compromise that Iranian officials are suggesting is nowhere near what they would have to accept to avert military action and gain an easing of sanctions.	伊朗官员所做出的承诺距离大小军事打击威胁、放松制裁还差得很远。


But now is the time to present to Iran a comprehensive package – what it must do and what the reward would be if it agreed.	但如今，是时候把全面的选择机会摆在伊朗面前了——它应该怎样做？ 照办能获得怎样的好处？


It would also be essential to set a deadline for Iran to accept such an accord, lest it use further negotiations to buy time to improve its nuclear capabilities.	这对于设置一条伊朗接收条件的最后期限也是至关重要的，以免伊朗利用进一步谈判拖延时间、发展其核设施。


The precise terms would have to be determined, but Iran would have to give up all of the uranium that it has enriched to 20% and stop enriching to that level.	具体条件还有待决定，但伊朗必须放弃所有浓度在20%以上的浓缩铀并停止往这一水平靠的浓缩��动。


It would also have to accept a ceiling on how much uranium it could possess or enrich at lower levels.	伊朗还必须接受用于低水平浓缩活动的铀的最大用量限制。


Limits on the number of centrifuges and where they could be housed might also be necessary.	离心机数量限制和架设地点限制也是必要条件。


Inspections would need to be frequent and intrusive to reassure the outside world of what Iran is doing – or, perhaps more to the point, what it is not doing.	需要进行频繁、深入的检查以让外部世界确知伊朗到底在干什么——或者说，在现在这个节骨眼上，伊朗到底没有在干什么。


In return, Iran would receive substantial relief from the removal of those sanctions imposed in response to its nuclear program.	作为回报，伊朗将因针对其核计划的制裁措施的移除而大松一口气。


Moreover, the offer’s essential elements should be made public.	此外，该条件的主要内容应该公开披露。


That way, if the regime balked, it would have to explain to its own people why it was not prepared to abandon its nuclear-weapons program, despite a reasonable US proposal that was not designed to humiliate Iran, and that, if accepted, promised a major improvement in Iranian living standards.	如此一来，如果伊朗政权出尔反尔，就不得不向自己的人民解释，既然美国提出的计划并没有羞辱伊朗，且如果伊朗接受，美国还承诺极大地改善伊朗人民的生活水平，为什么伊朗还没有做好放弃核武器计划的准备？


It is possible that the new economic and political context will lead Iran’s rulers to accept what they have rebuffed until now.	也许新的经济和政治环境会让伊朗统治者接受他们一直以来断然拒绝的东西。


If, on the other hand, the regime remains determined to pursue its nuclear goals, regardless of cost, then we will know that there is no alternative to the first two options: attacking Iranian facilities or living with a nuclear-armed Iran.	另一方面，如果伊朗政权继续决意不顾成本地追求其核目标，那么我们就会知道，不存在可以替代前两种选择的方案，即要么袭击伊朗核设施，要么接受有核伊朗。


Both outcomes are potentially risky and costly, but the US public, in particular, should be made aware that it was Iran that rejected a reasonable alternative to war before one began.	这两个结果都是高风险、高成本的，但（特别是）美国公众应该了解，一开始是伊朗拒绝了战争的合理替代方案。


And, if push came to shove, it would be good for other governments to know that the US and/or Israel decided to attack only after offering Iran a face-saving way out.	此外，如果推动变成了强行推进，则有助于其他政府了解美国和/或以色列是在给了伊朗体面台阶之后才决定动武的。


That would make it less difficult to keep economic pressure on Iran in the aftermath of any strike.	这能让在袭击之后保持对伊经济压力的困难减小。


Going public makes sense for another reason: Iran’s people ought to know that any attack on the country was one that it had largely brought on itself.	公开披露能够有效还有另一个原因：伊朗人民应该知道，任何针对该国的袭击从很大程度上说都是该国自食其果。


This realization might mute any “rally around the flag” reaction and thus not rule out regime change down the road.	这一认识将平息所有“团结在红旗下反抗”的反应，一段时间后，政权的更迭也不是没有可能。


We tend to think of diplomacy as something carried out in secret; sometimes, however, it is better to hide in plain sight.	我们总是人为，外交手段必须秘密进行； 但是，有的时候，将外交手段曝于光天化日之下是更好的选择。


This is such a moment.	现在就是如此。


But time is of the essence; diplomacy needs to move faster if it is not to be overtaken by Iran’s march to a nuclear weapon – and, with it, the march to conflict.	但时间是最重要的因素； 外交手段需要加快进程，否则就会被伊朗核武器发展进度赶上，果真如此，西方真得面临冲突了。


Can Italy Be Saved?	意大利有的救吗？


MILAN – As the economist Mario Monti’s new government takes office in Italy, much is at stake – for the country, for Europe, and for the global economy.	米兰——经济学家马里奥·蒙蒂的新政府入主意大利。 不管对意大利、对欧洲还是对全球经济来说，这都是一个生死存亡之秋。


If reforms falter, public finances collapse, and anemic growth persists, Italy’s commitment to the euro will diminish as the perceived costs of membership come to outweigh the benefits.	如果改革不力、公共财政崩溃而增长萎靡持续，意大利人将会感到维持欧元区成员国资格成本大于收益，意大利可能退出欧元区。


And Italy’s defection from the common currency – unlike that of smaller countries, like Greece – would threaten the eurozone to the core.	而意大利叛离共同货币将动摇欧元区的核心，这与像希腊这样的小国绝然不同。


Italy is a large economy, with annual GDP of more than $2 trillion.	意大利是一个大国，年GDP超过2万亿美元。


Its public debt is 120% of GDP, or roughly $2.4 trillion, which does not include the liabilities of a pension system in need of significant adjustments to reflect an aging population and increased longevity.	意大利的公共债务相当于GDP的120%，即大约2. 4万亿美元，其中不包括养老体系负债，该负债需要作重大调整以反映人口老龄化和寿命的增加。


As a result, Italy has become the world’s third-largest sovereign-debt market.	意大利已成为世界第三大主权债务市场。


But rising interest rates are causing the debt-service burden to become onerous and politically unsustainable.	但利率的升高大大加重了意大利的债务维持负担，使其在政治上变得不可持续。


Furthermore, Italy must refinance €275 billion ($372 billion) of its debt in the next six months, while investors, seeking to reduce their financial exposure to the country, are driving the yield on Italian ten-year bonds to prohibitively high levels – currently above 7%.	此外，意大利必须在未来6个月内获得2 750亿欧元的债务再融资，而投资者正在试图减少对意大利的风险暴露，这使得意大利10年期国债收益率畸高，目前已经超过了7%。


The need to refinance outstanding debt is not the only challenge.	再融资现有债务的需要并非唯一的挑战。


Domestic and foreign bondholders, especially banks, have experienced capital losses, which have damaged balance sheets, capital adequacy, and confidence.	国内外债权人，特别是银行，已经出现了资本损失，资产负债表、资本充足率和信息都受到了损坏。


The trade and current-account deficits are large and rising, probably reflecting a loss of competitiveness and productivity relative to Germany and France, two of Italy’s largest trading partners.	意大利贸易和经常项目赤字巨大，且在不断攀升，这也许反映了意大利相对其两大贸易伙伴——德国和法国——竞争力下降的事实。


Moreover, economic growth has been slow for the past decade, and is not accelerating, which will make it difficult to lower the public-debt burden even with fiscal consolidation.	此外，过去十年来意大利的经济增长一直很慢，而且看不到加速的迹象，这使得意大利即使实施了财政整合也很难降低公共债务负担。


Italy’s low growth rates reflect several factors, including labor-market rigidities, public-sector under-investment in the science and technology base of the economy, limitations on competition in certain sectors, and an extended period of structural adjustment to the eurozone environment.	意大利的低增长是诸多因素的反映，包括劳动力市场僵化、经济的科学技术基础的公共部门投资不足、某些部门竞争力受限，以及加入欧元区以来的长期结构性调整。


But Italy has significant strengths as well.	但意大利也有不少重大优势。


Aggregate debt (government, household, non-financial corporations, and financial institutions) is slightly more than 315% of GDP, similar to Switzerland (313%), France (323%), the United States (296%), and even Germany (285%), all 2009 numbers.	总债务（政府、家庭、非金融企业和金融机构债务之和）略高于GDP的315%，与瑞士（313%）、法国（323%）、美国（296%）甚至德国（285%）差别不大（均为2009年数字）。


But household debt is very low, at less than 50% of GDP.	但家庭债务水平很低，还不到GDP的50%。


Moreover, a long-standing pattern of high household savings, in the range of 17%-30% of income, means that individual and household net worth is higher than in most advanced countries.	此外，长期存在的家庭高储蓄模式（大约相当于收入的17%—30%）意味着意大利个人和家庭净财富要高于大部分发达国家。


That is not all. The businesses and industries of central and northern Italy are efficient, innovative, and globally integrated.	还有，意大利中部和北部的商业和工业效率高、创新性好，且深度融入了全球经济。


And budget deficits were held in check during and after the crisis, unlike in many other advanced countries.	其预算赤字都是在危机期间及以后发生的，这与许多发达国家不同。


Of course, while this was necessary, given the high initial public-debt burden, it limited counter-cyclical stimulus and impeded growth.	当然，尽管这是难免的，但由于初始债务负担很高，仍然限制了意大利反周期刺激手段的规模，妨碍了经济增长。


Italy’s crisis comes at a time of heightened risk for key countries (for example, a hard landing in China, or persistently high unemployment in the US).	意大利危机爆发于关键国家风险高企的当口（比如中国出现硬着陆、美国失业率持久居高不下等）。


In assessing such risks, it is useful to focus on three variables: resources, competence, and will.	在评估这些风险时，关注三个变量是大有裨益的：资源、能力和意愿。


Does a country have the resources to address the problems that it faces?	一个国家是否有解决其所面临的问题的资源？


Do policymakers have the experience and expertise to implement effective reforms?	政客是否有经验和专业知识实施有效改革？


Do the authorities recognize the need to act decisively and aggressively?	当局是否认识到了采取果断有力的反应的需要？


Resources come first.	资源是最重要的。


If the resources are inadequate, the outcome will be bad, regardless of competence or will, unless there is some sort of external help.	如果资源不足，不论能力和意愿如何，结果都不会好，除非能够获得外援。


Likewise, political will is irrelevant without the competence to translate it into effective policies.	类似地，政治意愿如果没有能力转化为高效政策，也将是一无是处的。


It seems to me that in several important cases, including Italy, the US, and China, there is a relatively favorable scenario and a much less attractive one, distinguished largely by the effectiveness of the policy responses.	在我看来，在不少重要国家，包括意大利、美国和中国，都存在一个相对有利的情景和一个悲观得多的情景，其间的差别大体上就在于政策反应的有效性。


Unlike Greece, where resources are deficient (giving rise only to unattractive scenarios), these countries’ resources are adequate, but either competence or political will (or some combination of the two) is in doubt, though analysts’ assessments vary widely.	与缺乏资源的希腊不同（希腊只存在悲观情景），这些国家有着充足的组员，但要么能力有限，要么政治意愿不给力，要么两者兼而有之，尽管具体程度不同分析家有不同看法。


For Italy, that means that the health of its consolidated balance sheet can be used in conjunction with reforms and parameter shifts in the pension system to restore fiscal balance and boost growth over time.	对意大利来说，这意味着其整合之后的资产负债表可以与养老体系的改革和参数变化共同起作用，重建财政平衡，并在长期提振经济增长。


Three things are required: a comprehensive reform program that meets the adjustment challenges head-on, political backing for that program, and time to implement enough of it to establish the credibility needed to lower the high risk premium on Italian debt.	这需要满足三大要求：应对当前调整挑战的全面改革计划、实施这一改革计划的政治支持力，以及实施充分改革以建立降低意大利债务风险溢价所必须的信誉的时机。


With the first two requirements dependent on Italy’s turbulent domestic politics, investors are increasingly unwilling to bet on the relatively favorable scenario, which means that Italy does not have time.	前两大要求依赖于意大利一团糟的国内政治，因此越来越多的投资者不愿意下注于出现有利情景，而这意味着意大利来时无多。


Rising yields could undercut the fiscal-stabilization and economic-growth program before it can be fully implemented.	收益率的上升可能破坏财政稳定性和经济增长计划，使其尚未完全实施便告夭折。


And, as yields rise, the adequacy of the country’s resources becomes questionable or worse.	此外，随着收益���上升，意大利是否有足够的资源也将日益成疑。


What is needed is a financial circuit breaker, in the form of a transitional lender of last resort.	意大利需要一个金融断路开关，其形式可以是过渡性最后贷款人。


This would allow the reform programs to shift the balance of risk back toward the favorable scenario.	这可以让改革计划将风险平衡拉回有利情景。


There is, however, a final risk factor.	不过，还存在一个终极风险因素。


The type of determined intervention designed to prevent the run-up in bond yields may not be forthcoming, owing to a concern within the eurozone core, led by Germany, that unconditional, aggressive action by a lender of last resort would undercut the incentive – and hence the political will – to undertake the required reforms.	防止国债收益率升高的坚决干预可能无法实施，因为以德国为首的欧元区核心国家担心无条件的激进最后贷款人行为会削弱采取必须改革激励，从而影响政治意愿。


The sequencing problem is obvious: a commitment conditional on reform progress will not bring back private investors immediately, because it does not reduce the perceived risk of substantial political obstacles to implementing the necessary measures.	由此带来的问题是显然的：以改革为条件的承诺不会立刻将私人投资者吸引回来，因为这无法降低存在妨碍必须措施实施的重大政治障碍的风险感知。


Only bold and largely unconditional commitments by both the European Union and Italy can break this dangerous impasse.	唯有欧盟和意大利同时做出重大且无条件的承诺，才能打破这一危险的僵局。


Absent either one, the risk of a sequential unraveling of eurozone public finances and a global economic downturn will remain high.	缺少任何一者，欧元区公共财政分崩离析和全球经济衰退的风险都不会有所减少。


Can Science Save Europe?	科学能拯救欧洲吗？


VIENNA– Europe’s current financial squeeze defies easy solutions.	维也纳——欧洲目前的财政困难没有轻松的解决之道。


Self-inflicted austerity has met popular restlessness for more tangible measures to revive economic growth and create jobs.	自我强制性的紧缩政策换来的是公众采取更实在措施恢复经济增长和创造就业机会的呼声愈加高涨。


Protesters vividly express widespread frustration with deepening inequality, and condemnation of privileges of a global financial elite comes uncomfortably close to implicating government.	抗议人士淋漓尽致地表达了对不平等现象愈演愈烈的不满，他们对全球金融精英特权的谴责令人不安地近乎牵连到了政府。


In previous times, such a situation would have been described as pre-revolutionary.	如果是以前，这种情况可能被视为革命的前夜。


In today’s world, the consequences may seem more benign, but they are no less worrisome: a loss of solidarity, a return to nationalist insularity, and greater scope for political extremism.	但当今世界这样的后果或许更为温和，但却同样令人忧虑：我们面临着团结的丧失、民族狭隘情绪的回归和更大范围的政治极端主义。


Europe’s image has suffered accordingly, notably from the perspective of Asia’s booming economies.	欧洲的形象因此遭受了损失，特别当你比照亚洲蓬勃发展的经济时这一后果更难以回避。


Whereas China, India, and others have enjoyed continuing economic growth and investment in research and innovative capacity, Europe is perceived as being on the brink of decline, economically as well as politically.	在中国、印度和其他国家实现经济持续增长并投资创新研究的同时，欧洲却被公认近乎陷入经济和政治上的衰退。


Worse still, Europe also seems intent on ignoring its persistent strengths.	更糟的是，欧洲似乎已决意忽视它所拥有的持久的优势。


Those strengths lie in Europe’s science base, part of the cultural heritage that shapes European identity.	上述优势源于欧洲的科研基地，它在欧洲特色和文化遗产的形成方面不可或缺。


In terms of numbers – whether of scientific publications, researchers, or overall access to high-quality tertiary education – Europe compares favorably with its international partners (which are also competitors).	无论是科学出版物、研究人员或接受高质量高等教育人群的总体数量，欧洲与国际合作伙伴（同时也是竞争对手）相比都毫不逊色。


So why, critics ask, does Europe produce many novel scientific ideas and discoveries, but fail to transform them into marketable products?	于是，批评家们提出疑问，为什么欧洲出产的许多科学新思想和发现未能转化为适销对路的产品？


In fact, that question is wedded to an obsolete linear model of innovation.	其实，这个问题与过时的线性创新模型不无关系。


What is lacking in Europe is public and official awareness of where the real potential of European science lies.	欧洲真正缺乏的是官方及公众对欧洲科学真正潜力的清醒认识。


Scientific curiosity, given sufficient space and autonomy, remains the most powerful driving force behind the completely unforeseeable transformations in how our societies develop.	如果有足够的空间和自主权，科学好奇心仍然是社会发展不可预见的转变背后最强大的动力。


In order to understand what science can do for Europe, it is important to clarify what science – that is, curiosity-driven frontier research – cannot do for Europe: deliver results that can immediately be commercialized.	为了理解科学之于欧洲的作用，关键是要先明确科学——也就是由好奇心驱动的尖端研究——不能给欧洲带来什么：不能得到立即可以商业化的研究成果。


Frontier research, like innovation, is an inherently uncertain process.	尖端研究的过程和创新类似，具有与生俱来的不确定性。


One does not know what one will find when working at the cutting edge and attempting to push into unknown territory.	当从事尖端工作并尝试进入到未知领域时，没有人知道会发现些什么。


Any short-term economic benefits are welcome byproducts, not the main “deliverables” that can be planned.	任何短期经济效益都是受人欢迎的副产品，而不是可以计划的主要“成果”。


Nor will science create much-needed jobs, except for those who work in research organizations and universities.	除科研机构和大学的工作人员，科学也无法创造出人们所急需的就业机会。


Instead, cutting-edge research pioneers new ways of working (and models of future workplaces), which require novel skills and knowledge that will diffuse widely into society and transform production and services.	相反，尖端研究开创全新工作方式（及未来工作模式），这需要新型的知识和技能广泛散布到社会中并改变产品和服务。


For example, it could lead to more environmentally friendly and resource-efficient uses of natural resources, or to investment in services that are more responsive to human needs and better attuned to human interaction.	例如，它可能实现对自然资源更环保及更高效的利用，或者投资于更适应人类需要也能更好地与人类互动的各项服务。


Science is the only civic institution with a built-in long-term time horizon – a feature that builds confidence in a fragile future.	科学是唯一内在长时间跨度的民间体系，这样的特点让人们对脆弱未来的信心得以保持。


Modern science began in Europe 300 years ago with relatively few people – perhaps no more than a thousand when the putative scientific revolution was in full swing.	现代科学300年前在欧洲发端时人数相对较少——举世公认的科学革命如火如荼时也许还不足千人。


They began to engage in the systematic inquiry of how the natural world (and to a lesser extent, the social world) functioned.	他们开始系统性地调查自然界（和范围较小的人类社会）如何运作。


They obtained new knowledge of how to manipulate and intervene in natural processes.	他们获得了操纵和干预自然进程的全新知识。


The experimental practices that they invented spread beyond the laboratories.	他们所发明的实验性做法拓展到实验室以外的世界。


Later, they began to underpin and merge with progress in the crafts to drive forward the Industrial Revolution.	之后，它们开始巩固并与工艺进步相融合，进而推动了工业革命。


The idea that we can only know what we can make gained wide acceptance.	我们的理解范围与制作能力成正比的理念得到了广泛的认可。


New tools provide new means of investigation, enabling researchers to speed up computation, for example, and hence increase the production of new knowledge.	新工具提供了新的调查手段，例如让研究人员能够加快计算速度，从而增加新知识的产出。


Science and technology mutually reinforce each other, and both percolate through the social fabric.	科学和技术相辅相成，并同时通过社会结构逐步渗透。


This was the case in 1700, and it remains true today.	1700年代的情况即是如此，今天这条规律也同样适用。


Let us now look forward towards the future.	现在让我们展望未来。


According to health statistician Hans Rosling, our planet will probably be home to at least nine billion people by 2050.	按照卫生统计学家汉斯·罗斯林（Hans Rosling）的说法，我们的星球到2050年将至少可能拥有90亿人口。


Six billion will live in Asia, one billion in Africa, 1.5 billion in the Americas, and 500 million in Europe.	其中60亿生活在亚洲、10亿在非洲、15亿在美洲，5亿在欧洲。


By ensuring that the pursuit of new knowledge remains a high priority, Europe can safeguard the scientific revolution and retain a leading edge globally, despite having fewer people than other regions.	只有保证对新知识的探索仍是一项优先任务，欧洲才能在人口与其他地区相比不占优势的情况下捍卫科学革命并保持全球领先地位。


Europe’s scientific institutions are already evolving and adapting to new global challenges.	欧洲科研机构已经在不断发展并适应新全球挑战的需求。


People working within science and people working with science – ordinary citizens – will assure that the unending quest for human betterment continues to be an important part of European identity.	科研工作者和科技使用者（普通民众）将确保对人类进步永无止境的追求永远成为一项重要的欧洲特色。


Science alone will not save Europe.	光靠科学本身并不能拯救欧洲。


Rather, a Europe that knows how to put its science to work will not need to be saved.	相反，一个知道如何利用科学的欧洲不需要被拯救。


Can Science Save the World?	科学能否拯救世界？


CAMBRIDGE – For most people, there has never been a better time to be alive than now.	剑桥——对大多数人来说，历史上还从未有如今这般适宜生活的时代。


The innovations that drive economic advances – information technology, biotech, and nanotech – can boost living standards in both the developing and the developed world.	推动经济进步的发明——信息技术、生物科技和纳米技术——对发展中和发达国家的生活水平均有提升作用。


We are becoming embedded in a cyberspace that can link anyone, anywhere, to all the world’s information and culture – and to every other person on the planet.	我们越来越离不开可以将任何地方的任何人与世界上所有信息及文化联系起来、将这个星球上每一个人联系起来的网络。


Twenty-first century technologies will offer environmentally benign lifestyles and the resources to ease the plight and enhance the life chances of the world’s two billion poorest people.	21世纪的技术将带来环保的生活方式和资源，缓解困境，提高全世界20亿最贫困人口的生活际遇。


Moreover, the greatest threat of the 1960’s and 1970’s – nuclear annihilation – has diminished.	而且，上世纪60、70年代最大的威胁——核毁灭——已经减弱。


This threat could recur, however, if there is a renewed standoff between new superpowers.	不过，如果新的超级大国之间重新出现抵牾，这个威胁还会再次出现。


And there are other risks stemming from humanity’s greater collective impact on the planet, and from the growing empowerment of individuals.	此外，还有其他的危险，源自人类对这个星球集体影响的扩大，以及个人权利的增加。


Soon after World War II, physicists at the University of Chicago started a journal called the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to promote arms control.	二战之后不久，芝加哥大学的物理学家们开办了一份杂志，名为《原子科学家公报》，旨在促进军备控制。


The logo on the Bulletin’s cover is a clock, the proximity of whose hands to midnight indicates the editors’ judgment of the precariousness of the world situation.	《公报》封面上的标志是一个时钟，指针指在午夜附近，表明编辑们对当时全球形势动荡的判断。


Every few years, the minute hand shifted, either forwards or backwards.	每隔几年，时钟上的分针都会移动，有时向前，有时退后。


It came closest to midnight in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis.	1962年古巴导弹危机期间最接近午夜。


When the Cold War ended, the Bulletin’s clock was put back to 17 minutes to midnight.	冷战结束后，《公报》上的时钟退回到午夜前17分钟。


But the clock has been creeping forward again.	不过，这个时钟又在缓缓地向前走了。


We are confronted by proliferation of nuclear weapons (by, say, North Korea and Iran).	我们面临着核武器的扩散（如朝鲜和伊朗）。


Al-Qaeda-style terrorists might willingly detonate a nuclear weapon in a city center, killing tens of thousands.	基地组织的恐怖分子可能很乐意在某个市中心引爆一颗核武器，杀死上万民众。


Even if the nuclear threat is contained, the twenty-first century could confront us with grave new global perils.	即便核威胁被遏制住，21世纪还是可能出现严重的全球性新危机。


Climate change looms as this century’s primary long-term environmental challenge.	气候变化已隐隐成为本世纪主要的长期环境问题。


Human actions – burning fossil fuels – have already raised the carbon dioxide concentration higher than it has ever been in the last 500,000 years, and it is rising by about 0.5 % a year.	人类的行为——燃烧化石燃料——已经将二氧化碳浓度提高到50万年来最高的水平，而且还在以每年约0. 5%的速度上升。


More disturbingly, coal, oil, and gas are projected to supply most of the world’s growing energy needs for decades to come.	更让人不安的是，预计在未来的数十年里，煤、石油和天然气将供应全球大部分不断增长的能源需求。


If that continues, the concentration of CO2 will rise to twice the pre-industrial level by 2050, and three times that level later in the century.	如果这种情况继续下去，到2050年，二氧化碳浓度将上升到前工业时代的两倍，到本世纪末则将上升到前工业时代的三倍。


The world spends nearly $7 trillion a year on energy and its infrastructure; yet our current research and development efforts are not up to meeting the challenge of climate change.	全世界每年在能源和基础设施上花费近7万亿美元； 而我们当前的研究和开发工作还不足以解决气候变化的难题。


There is no single solution, but some measures, like better insulation of buildings, would save rather than cost money.	一劳永逸的解决办法是不存在的，但是有一些措施，例如提高建筑物的隔热性能，可以省钱，而不是花钱。


Efforts to economize on energy, storing it, and generating it by “clean” or low-carbon methods deserve priority and the sort of commitment from governments that were accorded to the Manhattan Project (which created the atomic bomb) or the Apollo moon landing.	节约能源、存储能源和通过“干净”或低碳的方法产生能源的努力应该列为优先事项，并且应该得到各国政府的重视，就像对待“曼哈顿计划”（制造了原子弹）或阿波罗登月一样。


The top priority should be a coordinated effort by Europe, the United States, and the other G-8+5 countries to build demonstration plants to develop carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.	首先要做的应该是欧洲、美国及其他G8+5国家合作修建示范工厂，开发碳捕获和存储（CCS）技术。


This is crucial, because whatever technical advances there may be in solar and other renewable energy sources, we will depend on coal and oil for the next 40 years.	这是关键性的一步，因为在接下来的40年里，不论太阳能和其他可再生能源方面出现什么样的技术进步，我们仍须依赖煤和石油。


Yet unless the rising curve of annual emissions can be reversed, the CO2 concentration will irrevocably reach a truly threatening level.	除非年排放量的上升曲线被逆转，否则二氧化碳浓度必然会真正达到危险的水平。


Mankind must also confront other global “threats without enemies” that are separate from (though linked with) climate change.	人类还必须面对不同于气候变化（但却有联系）的其他 “没有敌人的全球性威胁”。


Loss of biological diversity is one of the most severe such threats.	生物多样性的丧失是这些威胁中最为严重的。


The extinction rate is 1,000 times higher than normal, and is increasing.	生物灭绝速度比正常情况高了1000倍，而且还在加快。


Biodiversity is a crucial component of human well-being and economic growth.	生物多样性是人类康乐和经济增长的关键因素。


We are clearly harmed if fish stocks dwindle to extinction.	如果鱼类资源减少到灭绝边缘，对我们明显不利。


Less evidently, there are plants in the rain forest whose gene pool might be useful to us.	不那么明显的是，热带雨林中有一些植物的基因库可能对我们有用。


The pressures on our planet depend, of course, on our lifestyle.	当然，这颗星球受到的压力取决于我们的生活方式。


The world could not sustain its 6.5 billion people if they all lived like present-day Americans.	如果全世界65亿人都像今天的美国人这样生活，地球将不堪其重。


But it could if even prosperous people adopted a vegetarian diet, traveled little, and interacted virtually.	但如果即使富国的人们也养成素食的习惯、减少旅行、通过虚拟的方式交流，地球就可以负担。


New technology will determine our lifestyle, and the demands that we make on energy and environmental resources.	新的技术将决定我们的生活方式，以及我们对能源和环境资源的需求。


Nevertheless, our problems are aggravated by rapid growth in the human population, which is projected to reach eight or even nine billion by 2050.	然而，人类人口（预计到2050年将达到80亿，甚至90亿）的迅速增长加重了我们的问题。


If the increase continues beyond 2050, one cannot help but be gloomy about most people’s prospects.	如果人口在2050年之后继续增长，大多数人将前途堪忧。


There are now, however, more than 60 countries where the fertility rate is below replacement level.	不过，现在有60多个国家的生育率低于更替水平。


If this were true of all countries, the global population would start to decline after 2050 – a development that would surely be benign.	如果所有国家都这样，全球人口将在2050年之后开始减少——这样的情况绝对是有益的。


All of today’s developments – cyber, bio, or nano – will create new risks of abuse.	如今所有的技术发展——网络、生物或纳米——都有被滥用的风险。


The American National Academy of Sciences has warned that, “Just a few individuals with specialized skills…could inexpensively and easily produce a panoply of lethal biological weapons.…The deciphering of the human genome sequence and the complete elucidation of numerous pathogen genomes…allow science to be misused to create new agents of mass destruction.”	美国国家科学院警告说：“只需几个具备专门技能的人……就能以极少的代价轻易地制造出各种致命的生物武器……人类基因组序列的破译和无数病原体基因组的完全解密……使科学能够被用于制造具有大规模杀伤作用的新药剂。 ”


Not even an organized network would be required; just a fanatic with the mindset of those who now design computer viruses.	甚至都不需要一个有组织的网络； 只要有一个思维方式类似电脑病毒设计者的疯子就行。


The global village will have its village idiots.	地球村不会缺少白痴。


In our increasingly interconnected world, there are new risks whose consequences could be widespread – and perhaps global.	这个相互联系越来越多的世界上存在新的危险，其后果可能影响广泛——或许是全球性的。


Even a tiny probability of global catastrophe is unacceptable.	全球性的灾难，即便只有极小的可能性，也是不可接受的。


If we apply to catastrophic risks the same prudent analysis that leads us to buy insurance – multiplying probability by consequences – we would surely prioritize measures to reduce this kind of extreme risk.	对于灾难风险，如果我们像购买保险时一样进行谨慎的分析——用后果乘以可能性——我们肯定会把降低这种极端风险的措施排在第一位。


The decisions that we will make both individually and collectively in the foreseeable future will determine whether twenty-first century science yields benign or devastating outcomes.	我们在可预见的未来个人和集体所做的决定将决定21世纪的科学带来的后果是良性的还是破坏性的。


Can the Elephant Dance with the Dragon?	象和龙可以共舞吗？


TRIVANDRUM, INDIA – It is fashionable these days, particularly in the West, to speak of India and China in the same breath.	特里凡得琅，印度——最近，特别是在西方，同时谈论印度和中国非常时髦。


These are the two big countries said to be taking over the world, the new contenders for global eminence after centuries of Western domination, the Oriental answer to generations of Occidental economic success.	这两个大国被说成是要领导世界，在西方统治了几个世纪后世界地位新的竞争者，以及对西方多代经济成功的亚洲回答。


Indeed, two new books explicitly twin the two countries: Robyn Meredith’s The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and China and What It Means for All of Us and Harvard business professor Tarun Khanna’s Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India are Reshaping their Futures – and Yours .	确实，有两本新书明确地把两个国家类比在一起：罗宾·梅雷迪斯（Robyn Meredith）的《象和龙：印度和中国的崛起以及其对我们所有人的意义》以及哈佛商业教授塔润·汉纳（Tarun Khanna）的《几十亿企业家：中国和印度怎样改变他们的未来－以及你的》。


Both books view the recent rise of India and China as shifting the world’s economic and political tectonic plates.	这两本书都把最近中国和印度的崛起看作是改变了世界的经济和政治结构。


Some even speak of “Chindia,” as if the two were joined at the hip in the international imagination.	有些人甚至把两个国家合称“Chindia”，好像在国际想象中这两个国家是连体的一样。


Count me among the skeptics.	我对这样的观点表示怀疑。


It is not just that China and India have little in common, save for the fact that they occupy a rather vast landmass called “Asia.” It is also that they are already at very different stages of development.	这不仅是因为除了他们共同位于一个叫做“亚洲”的巨大大陆以外，中国和印度的共同点非常少，，而且因为他们处在非常不同的发展阶段。


China started its liberalization a decade and a half before India, hit double-digit growth when India was still hovering around 5%, and, with compound growth, has put itself in a totally different economic league from India, continuing to grow faster from a larger base.	中国比印度早十五年开始经济自由化，这使其经济增率长达到两位数，而这个时候印度的经济增长率仍然在 5%左右徘徊，而且随着中国经济的复合增长，已经使他和印度处于完全不同的经济发展梯队并且在一个更大的基数上持续更快增长。


Moreover, the two countries’ systems are totally dissimilar.	而且，两个国家的制度也完全不同。


If China wants to build a new six-lane expressway, it can bulldoze its way through any village in its path.	如果中国想要建设一条六道的高速公路，他可以铲除位于高速公路通过地点的任何乡村的障碍。


In India, if you want to widen a two-lane road, you could be tied up in court for a dozen years over compensation entitlements.	在印度，如果你想拓宽一条两道的道路，可能会因为赔偿问题把你困在法院几年。


When China built the Three Gorges dam, it created a 660-kilometer long reservoir that necessitated displacing two million people – all accomplished in 15 years without a fuss in the interest of generating electricity.	当中国建造他的三峡大坝的时候，他建造了一个660公里长的水库，这需要200万人转移－这所有的过程在15年内完成，并且因为发电有利没有人大惊小怪。


When India began the Narmada Dam project, aiming to bring irrigation, drinking water, and power to millions, it spent 34 years (so far) fighting environmental groups, human rights activists, and advocates for the displaced all the way to the Supreme Court, while still being thwarted in the streets by protesters.	当印度开始用于为成千上万的人提供灌溉、饮水和发电目的的纳吗达（Narmada）大坝工程的时候，他花了34年（到目前为止）和环境保护组织，人权激进分子以及移民的律师作斗争，一直进行到最高法院，期间还有街上不断的抗议阻挠项目进程。


That is how it should be: India is a fractious democracy, China is not.	实际情况是这样的：印度是一个脾气不好的民主体制而中国不是。


But, as an Indian, I do not wish to pretend that we can compete in the global growth stakes with China.	但是，作为一个印度人，我不希望假装我们可以在全球增长的擂台上和中国竞争。


But if we can’t compete, can we co-operate?	但是如果我们不能竞争，那么我们可以合作吗？


The two civilizations had centuries of contact in ancient times.	在古代这两个文明有几个世纪的接触。


Thanks mainly to the export of Buddhism from India to China, Chinese came to Indian universities, visited Indian courts, and wrote memorable accounts of their voyages.	主要由于佛教从印度向中国的传播，中国人开始到印度的大学学习，参观印度的法庭以及为他们的游记撰写回忆文章。


Nalanda received hundreds of Chinese students in its time, and a few Indians went the other way; a Buddhist monk from India built the famous Lingyin Si temple in Huangzhou in the fifth century.	纳兰达在那个时候接收了成千上万的中国学生，并且有些印度人也来到中国； 有一位印度僧人在五世纪的时候在杭州建立了著名的灵隐寺。


Southwest India’s Kerala coastline is dotted with Chinese-style fishing nets, and the favorite cooking pot of the Malayali housewife is the wok, locally called the cheen-chetti (Chinese vessel).	位于印度西南部的喀拉拉邦的海岸线分布着中国式的渔网，马来亚力（Malayali）主妇最喜欢的烹饪工具是在当地叫 cheen-chetti （意思是中国船）的锅。


But it has been a while since Indians and Chinese had much to do with each other.	但是中国和印度有很长一段时间互不来往。


The heady days of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (“Indians and Chinese are brothers”), the slogan coined by Nehru’s India to welcome Chou En-Lai in 1955, gave way to the humiliation of the 1962 border war, after which it was “Hindi-Chini bye-bye” for decades.	那些令人陶醉的印度人和中国人是兄弟的日子，以及在1955年尼赫鲁时代的印度铸造的欢迎周恩来的标语，都让位给1962年边境战争带来的耻辱，在此之后是几十年的“印度－中国拜拜”。


The border dispute remains unresolved, with periodic incursions by Chinese troops onto Indian soil and new irritants such as the anti-Chinese protests by Tibetan exiles who have been given asylum in India.	边境争端仍然没有得到解决，定期的有中国的军队侵入印度的领土，此外还有新的导致两国关系紧张的因素，例如在印度被给予庇护的西藏流亡者反对中国的抗议。


To speak of a bilateral “trust deficit” might be an understatement.	所以现在说两国“缺乏互信”都可能是对两国关系的一个掩饰。


And yet, there is some good news.	然而，也有好消息。


Trade has doubled in each of the last three years, to an estimated $40 billion this year; China has now overtaken the United States as India’s largest single trading partner.	在过去的三年里，两国的贸易量每年都已经翻番，今年达到约400亿美元； 中国现在已经取代美国成为印度最大的单一贸易伙伴。


Tourism, particularly by Indian pilgrims to the major Hindu holy sites in Tibet, Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar, is thriving.	旅游，特别是印度朝圣者对位于西藏的印度教圣地雪灵山和玛旁雍错湖的访问，蓬勃发展。


Indian information technology firms have opened offices in Shanghai and Hangzhou, and Infosys recruited nine Chinese this year for its headquarters in Bangalore.	印度的信息技术公司已经在上海和杭州设立了公司，Infosys今年为它位于班加罗尔的总部招聘了九名中国员工。


There are dozens of Chinese engineers working in (and learning from) Indian computer firms and engineering companies, while Indian software engineers support the Chinese telecoms equipment manufacturer Huawei.	有许多中国工程师在为印度的计算机公司和工程公司工作（并向它们学习），与此同时，印度的软件工程师也在为中国的电信设备制造商华为停供支持。


By and large, India is strong in areas in which China needs to improve, notably software, while China excels at hardware and manufacturing, which India sorely lacks.	大体上，印度在中国需要提高的领域里有很强的实力，特别是在软件方面，同时，中国在硬件和制造业上很占优势，而这些是印度非常缺乏的。


So India’s Mahindra and Mahindra company manufactures tractors in Nanchang for export to the US.	所以印度的Mahindra and Mahindra公司在南昌制造拖拉机出口到美国。


The key operating components of Apple’s iPod were invented by the Hyderabad company PortalPlayer, while the iPod itself are manufactured in China.	苹果iPod的主要操作芯片是由位于海德拉巴的PortalPlayer公司发明的，但是iPod本身是在中国制造的。


Philips employs nearly 3,000 Indians at its “Innovation Campus” in Bangalore to write more than 20% of the company’s global software, which Philips’ 50,000-strong workforce in China then turns into brand-name goods.	飞利浦在位于班加罗尔的“创新校园”雇用了大约3000个印度人来编写它全球20%以上的软件，然后再由在中国的由50000名员工组成的强大的工作团队把它们变成品牌产品。


In other words, the elephant is already dancing with the dragon.	换句话说，象已经在和龙跳舞。


The only question is whether political tensions could bring the music screeching to a halt.	唯一的问题是政治紧张是否会使音乐骤然停止。


There is no doubt that, whatever India’s legitimate differences with China’s Communist regime, cooperation is in the best interests of both peoples.	毫无疑问的是，不管印度的正统体制和中国的共产主义政权有什么不同，合作符合两国人民的最大利益。


After all, one plus one doesn’t only equal two; put together properly, it can add up to 11.	毕竟，一加一不只等于二，把它们合理加起来，可以达到11。


Can the G-8 Survive St. Petersburg?	八国集团能否挺过圣彼得堡峰会？


Russia’s gradual inclusion in the G-8 was supposed to nurture the growth of democracy, foster creation of a free-market economy, and encourage constructive behavior in international relations.	俄罗斯逐步接纳为八国集团理应培育民主发展、建立自由市场经济并鼓励国际关系中建设性行为。


Instead, Russia’s leaders have become more interested in consolidating state power at home and abroad than in promoting democracy, protecting human rights, and cooperating with the West.	与此相反，俄罗斯的领导人们却对在国内外加强国家权力要比促进民主、保护人权以及同西方合作更为感兴趣。


The collapse of the USSR, President Vladimir Putin has proclaimed, was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.	普京总统曾宣称，苏联的瓦解是二十世纪最大的地缘政治灾难。


Obviously, the USSR is not about to be resurrected.	很明显，苏联无法死而复生。


But Putin has moved to reassert state control over strategic sectors of the economy, including oil and gas, communications, pipelines, electricity and banking, as well as limiting political rights, harassing independent groups, and strengthening control over the media.	但是，普京却采取行动对经济中的战略部门，包括石油、交通、输油管道重新加强国家控制，并且强化对媒体的控制。


Moreover, Russia is coming to the fore, firmly and confidently, to regain its Great Power status.	更有甚者，俄罗斯正在走到前台，坚决而又自信地重新获得大国地位。


Putin continues to pursue a brutal military campaign in Chechnya while intervening politically in Soviet successor states like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus and rejecting Western tactics aimed at curbing Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.	普京继续在车臣推行残忍的军事战役的同时在政治上干预苏联继承国，例如乌克兰、格鲁吉亚、摩尔多瓦以及白俄罗斯，以及拒绝西方旨在限制伊朗和北韩的核武器野心的手段。


Putin’s position is reinforced by strong public support, as well as by the dramatically weakened position of major Western leaders.	强大的公众支持以及西方领导人地位大为削弱强化了普京的立场。


George W. Bush and Tony Blair have lost the popularity they enjoyed before the Iraq war, and Blair, together with French President Jacques Chirac, will soon leave the political scene.	布什和布莱尔已经失去了伊拉克战争前的支持率，而布莱尔和法国总统希拉克都将马上离开政治舞台。


Angela Merkel in Germany and Romano Prodi in Italy are ruling with weak coalition governments.	德国的莫克尔和意大利的普罗迪则都是以微弱的联合政府执政。


In these circumstances, given Russia’s continuing failure to meet the G-8’s political and economic standards, the upcoming summit in St. Petersburg could produce a backlash, eroding the legitimacy, credibility, and relevance of the world’s most developed countries.	在这种形势下，鉴于俄罗斯继续无法满足八国集团的政治和经济标准，即将到来的圣彼得堡峰会可能会产生强烈反应，从而侵蚀世界最发达国家的合法性、可信度以及重要程度。


Indeed, Russia and the world may well see in the summit the G-8’s silent approval of Putin’s domestic and foreign policies.	的确，俄罗斯和整个世界在峰会上可能会发现八国集团默认普京的内外政策。


Clearly, there are many who would endorse former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s recent call on Western countries to stop pressuring Putin over human rights.	很明显，许多人都会支持前苏联领导人戈尔巴乔夫最近对西方国家的呼吁，那就是停止在人权问题上对普京施加压力。


According to Gorbachev, Western pressure merely strengthens Putin, “because in essence his position is very close to the aspirations of the people.”	戈尔巴乔夫认为，西方的压力恰恰加强了普京的地位，“因为在本质上，普京的立场和俄罗斯人民的愿望非常接近”。


Bush has echoed that sentiment, telling CNN ahead of his trip to the summit that admonishing the Russian president in public on matters such as democracy and human rights would be counterproductive.	布什也重复这一观点。 在动身前往峰会前，他告诉有线新闻网说，在诸如民主和人权问题上公开地告诫俄罗斯总统将会产生反作用。


“No leader likes to be scolded publicly,” he said.	他说：“没有任何一个领导人喜欢被当众训斥”。


But can the West afford to remain aloof?	但是，西方能够保持超脱吗？


Russia started off its year as G-8 president with a crisis over gas supplies to Ukraine, and even threatened Europe with rerouting its gas exports to Asia.	俄罗斯作为今年的八国集团主席国新年伊始就制造了输送给乌克兰的天然气危机，而且甚至威胁欧洲说将其天然气出口转向亚洲。


Putin has placed energy security at the top of the summit’s agenda, but that does not mask Russia’s ambition to dominate European markets by controlling the pipelines that carry its oil and gas, the refineries that process it, and the retail outlets that sell it.	普京把能源安全问题列为本次峰会议程的首要问题，但是这并不掩盖俄罗斯通过控制运送其石油和天然气的管道、加工炼油厂以及出售它们的零售网点而操纵欧洲市场的野心。


The dilemma facing the West is that it needs Russia’s backing not only on policy toward Iran and North Korea, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East as a whole.	西方面临的困境是，它不仅在对伊朗和朝鲜的政策上，而且在阿富汗、伊拉克以及整个中东地区都需要俄罗斯的支持。


Unfortunately, Bush’s strategy of democracy promotion has mainly contributed to unease around the world and alienation from Western goals.	不幸的是，布什的促进民主的战略让世界不得安宁，而且也偏离了西方的目标。


Especially in view of the Iraq experience, Putin has won substantial public sympathy by arguing that opposition to Western democracy promotion is resistance not to democracy itself, but to Western intervention against Russian “sovereign democracy.”	特别是在伊拉克问题上，普京主张反对西方促进民主并非抵制民主本身，而是抵制西方在俄罗斯的“主权民主”上进行干预，因而赢得了坚实的公众同情。


Clearly, an ostracized Russia is a dangerous Russia.	很明显，受到孤立的俄罗斯是危险的。


But to hold a G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg in an atmosphere of “business as usual” may be even more dangerous.	但是，在一种“例行公事”的气氛中召开圣彼得堡八国集团峰会可能更为危险。


Bush and European leaders issued a statement after their recent meeting in Austria saying that Russia must honor “democratic freedoms, respect for human rights, civil society and transparency, and a responsible approach to energy security.”	布什和欧洲各国领导人在他们最近的奥地利会议后发表声明说，俄罗斯必须遵守“民主自由、对人权、公民社会、透明性的尊重以及负责任的能源安全政策”。


But words alone are not enough.	但是，仅仅有言语是不够的。


Nor should it be the end of the story.	而且也不能就此为止。


The G-8’s seven democratic countries should use the St. Petersburg summit as an opportunity to reaffirm their will to develop close and friendly relations with Russia.	八国集团中的七个民主国家应当把圣彼得堡峰会作为一个重申其愿意发展与俄罗斯紧密和友好关系的机会。


But if their inclusion of Russia is to serve a useful purpose, they must also reaffirm the values that unite them.	但是，如果它们吸纳俄罗斯还有更有用的目的，那么，它们就必须重申将它们团结在一起的价值观。


Can the Islamic State Unify Europe?	伊斯兰国能团结欧洲吗？


MUNICH – During the financial crisis, the eurozone’s northern members rescued their southern counterparts by offering huge bailouts and backing the European Central Bank’s promise to save the euro at all costs.	慕尼黑—金融危机期间，欧元区北方成员国提供巨额援助、支持欧洲央行不惜一切代价拯救欧元的承诺，挽救了它们的南方邻居。


When Germany recently requested a quota system to cope with the massive influx of refugees, however, its partners showed no such solidarity.	然而，最近当德国要求采取配额制度处理大规模难民涌入时，它的伙伴国家并未表现出同样的团结。


And now that France, reeling from the Paris attacks, has declared war on the Islamic State, other European countries are shrugging their shoulders, mumbling condolences, and silently hoping that the conflict will spare them.	而如今，遭遇巴黎袭击的法国已经向伊斯兰国选战，其他欧洲国家只是耸耸肩，略表哀悼，静静许愿冲突不要让自己牵扯其中。


The implication is clear: although Europe has made significant progress toward fiscal union, it remains far removed from political union.	影响显而易见：尽管欧洲朝着财政联盟的方向取得了重大进步，但距离政治联盟依然十分遥远。


A half-century after the foundation of a common market and 15 years after the launch of the common currency, Europe still lacks a united police force and a single foreign policy.	在共同市场建立半个世纪、公共货币启用15年后，欧洲仍缺乏统一的政治力量和单一回避政策。


Perhaps most problematic, the EU is still home to 28 armies, with 28 commanders-in-chief, bound together only loosely by NATO.	也许问题最大的是，欧盟仍有28支军队、28位总司令，通过北约松散地捆绑在一起。


Some European leaders – including French President François Hollande and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker – seem unbothered by this reality.	一些欧洲领导人——包括法国总统奥朗德和欧盟委员会主席容克——似乎并不焦虑于这一现实。


They argue that Europe should be accelerating progress toward fiscal union even further, by introducing a common insurance scheme for deposits, a single budget, Eurobonds, more financial risk-sharing, and a unified unemployment-benefits system as quickly as possible.	他们指出，欧洲应该加速朝财政联盟进一步靠拢，尽快引入共同存款保险机制、单一预算、欧元债券、更多的金融风险共担和统一的失业保险制度。


In fact, such measures would only exacerbate the flaws in the eurozone’s structure.	事实上，这些措施只能扩大欧元区结构的缺陷。


They would sustain false relative prices – the result of the inflationary credit bubble in the south that formed after the euro’s adoption – that are preventing the euro’s southern European countries from regaining competitiveness.	它们将维持错误的相对价格——这是采用欧元后形成的南方通胀性信用泡沫带来的——而这一错误的相对价格阻挠了欧元区南方国家重获竞争力。


As a result, structural unemployment in France and Southern Europe would persist.	结果，法国和南欧的结构性失业将永久化。


Moreover, the proposed measures would compound Europe’s public-debt problems by reducing interest-rate spreads among countries even further, sustaining asset-price bubbles, and destroying the capital market’s allocative role.	此外，他们提出的措施将进一步降低欧洲国家间的利息差，维持资产价格泡沫，破坏资本市场的配置作用，从而加剧欧洲公共债务问题。


This was the mistake the United States made after its founding, when various rounds of debt mutualization fueled an unsustainable credit bubble that drove nine of the 29 US states and territories into bankruptcy from 1835 to 1842 and paved the way for the American Civil War.	美国在建国后曾经犯过这一错误，多次债务共同化助长了不可持续的信用泡沫，导致1835—1842年间29个州和领地中有九个破产，也打下了内战的基础。


The disadvantages of strengthening Europe’s fiscal union further do not end there.	进一步加强欧洲财政联盟的不利之处不仅限于此。


Continued progress toward fiscal union would, paradoxically, make political union increasingly unlikely for one simple, but important reason: France.	继续想财政联盟迈进将矛盾地让政治联盟更加不可能实现，原因简单而重要：法国。


Europe’s strongest military power by far, France has thwarted all attempts to pool Europe’s armed forces.	目前法国是欧洲军事最强大的国家，它反对一切将欧洲武装力量集中起来的建议。


In 1954, France’s National Assembly rejected the treaty for the Western Union Defense Organization.	1954年，法国国民大会拒绝了西方联盟防御组织（Western Union Defense Organization）。


In 2005, France rejected the proposed European Union Constitution, which could have marked the beginning of the political unification process.	2005年，法国拒绝了欧盟宪法草案，该草案意味着政治统一过程的开端。


Successive French presidents have declared that France will not accept a United States of Europe as even a remote goal of European politics.	此后各位法国总统宣布法国不会接受欧罗巴合众国，哪怕将此作为欧洲政治的遥远目标也不行。


But France – whose banking system and industries are heavily exposed to southern Europe – is a major beneficiary of fiscal union.	但法国的银行系统和工业对南欧风险暴露甚深，它是财政联盟的主要受益者之一。


When the global financial crisis began, French banks’ exposure to Greece, at €58 billion ($61.7 billion), was twice as high as that of German banks.	全球金融危机爆发时，法国银行对希腊的风险暴露高达580亿欧元，是德国银行的两倍。


Given this, it is understandable that France prefers fiscal to political unification.	因此，不难理解法国更偏好财政联盟而非政治联盟。


But if other European countries accept this preference, and Europe continues along its unbalanced integration path, there will be no leverage to convince France to support political union.	但如果其他欧洲国家接受其偏好，并且欧洲继续其失衡一体化道路，就不会有任何力量能说服法国支持政治联盟。


Perhaps the tragic terrorist massacre in Paris will change the French aversion to political integration.	也许悲剧性的巴黎恐怖主义屠戮会改变法国对政治一体化的厌恶。


By highlighting that even a mighty military power sometimes needs support, the attack could prove to be a game changer in the effort to create a European political union.	巴黎恐怖袭击突显出，即使是军事强国有时候也需要支持，因此可能成为建立欧洲政治联盟的局面改变因素。


Of course, for this to happen, the countries of Europe must unite to help France in its fight against the Islamic State.	当然，要想实现政治联盟，欧洲各国必须团结起来帮助法国打击伊斯兰国。


Meanwhile, France and other EU countries should help Germany, Austria, Sweden, Hungary, and Slovenia to alleviate the refugee crisis by accepting a quota system.	与此同时，法国和其他欧盟国家也应该帮助德国��奥地利、瑞典、匈牙利和斯洛文尼亚通过配额制度解决难民危机。


As Europe attempts to build a sustainable, stable, and prosperous union, it should look to successful unions like the US and Switzerland for guidance.	在欧洲尝试建立一个可持续、稳定、繁荣的联盟时，它需要着眼于美国和瑞士等成功的联盟作为榜样。


Both of those unions began as military-defense organizations, and only later developed fiscal unions.	美国和瑞士都是从军事-防御联盟开始，随后才发展成财政联盟。


It took decades, if not centuries, for them to obtain sizeable public budgets and begin engaging in income redistribution.	它们花了数十年乃至上百年时间形成大规模公共预算并开始参与收入再分配。


And both prohibit the kind of fiscal or monetary bailout operations for single states or cantons that the EU pursued during the financial crisis.	它们都禁止为单个州实施欧盟在金融危机期间所追求的财政和货币援助。


It is time for the EU to change its approach to integration.	欧盟应该改变其一体化方针。


Instead of continuing to push for unbalanced fiscal integration, it must work to implement key elements of political union, including an integrated police force, common asylum laws, a single foreign policy, and, above all, a united army.	它不应该继续追求失衡的财政一体化，而必须致力于实施政治联盟的关键要素，包括一体化警察部队、共同避难法、单一外交政策，最重要的则是统一的军队。


If recent events have taught us anything, it is that threats to the EU stem not from inadequate fiscal risk-sharing, but from insufficient coordination on foreign-policy and security challenges.	如果说最近的事件教会了我们什么，那就是对欧盟的威胁不是来自财政风险共担不足，而是来自外交政策和安全挑战协作不够。


Can the Stability Pact Be Reformed?	能改革《稳定协议》吗？


The European Commission recently proposed important changes to how the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is to be implemented.	欧盟委员会不久前提议，对《稳定和增长协议》（SGP）的实施方式做出重要的调整。


Now the Commission and ECOFIN (the committee of euro area finance ministers) are reviewing the proposals, as well as others put forward by member states.	目前委员会和ECOFIN（欧元区财长委员会）正在对此项建议和成员国提出的其它议案进行审阅，并将于2005年上半年做出决定。


A decision is expected in the first half of 2005, but how the Pact will be revised remains uncertain.	但最终决定出台之前，《协议》将如何修改仍然很不确定。


The need for reform is self-evident: with structural factors accounting for 75-80% of aggregate budget deficits for the euro area in recent years, the Pact’s 3%-of-GDP ceiling for national budget deficits has been breached repeatedly since 2002.	改革的必要性显而易见：结构性因素在欧元区近年来的预算赤字总额中占到了75-80%，而且2002年以后《协议》规定的国家预算赤字不超过国内生产总值3%的上限也屡次被突破。


Smaller member states, notably Finland and Ireland (as well as Spain) and the two non-euro area countries Denmark and Sweden, have stuck to the principle of fiscal balance or small – though diminishing – surpluses. But the largest European Union members, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, have been unable or unwilling to play by the rules.	虽然芬兰和爱尔兰等面积较小的成员国（其中也包括西班牙）和丹麦、瑞典两个非欧元区国家一直坚持财政平衡或小有盈余（尽管盈余量日渐减少）的预算原则，但英、法、德等欧盟最大的成员都不愿或无力遵守这项规则。


Indeed, France and Germany barely escaped financial sanctions in November 2003 for their violations of the Pact.	实际上，法德两国由于违反《协议》，2003年11月刚刚勉强逃过一次金融制裁。


Although the European Court of Justice later declared that decision invalid, the impasse remains.	尽管欧洲法院稍后宣布这项决定无效，但事情却已经陷入了僵局。


So either fiscal behavior or the Pact’s rules must change.	因此，预算行为或《协议》规定两者当中，必须有一个要做出改变。


The European Commission’s recent proposals amount to a relaxation of its earlier hard-line stance, providing a catalogue of ways in which the fiscal rules can be made more flexible.	最近欧盟委员会提出的议案对以前强硬的立场做出了缓和，提出了可以适当放宽预算规则的几种情况。


But it is difficult to see how this hodge-podge will “strengthen economic governance” or clarify the Pact’s implementation.	但很难指望这些五花八门的新规定真能“加强经济管理”或明确《协议》的执行规则。


None of the proposals are mutually exclusive, but there are trade-offs.	这些提议并不互相排斥，但却有不少折中的方法。


If, for example, one extends the time period over which member states are required to conform to the rules, there is less need to modify the rules themselves.	举个例子，如果延长成员国的达标期限，修改标准本身就不那么必要了。


If deficits are redefined to exclude certain expenditures, the 3% ceiling can be observed.	如果重新界定赤字涵义时把某些开支排除在外，那么3%的最高限额就可能得以遵守。


But removing some public expenditures from the deficit runs counter to sound execution of fiscal policy.	但把某些公共开销从赤字中排除出去是与合理执行预算政策相违悖的。


For example, Germany recently proposed that expenditures undertaken to meet European commitments – such as Rampamp;D spending to support the Lisbon agenda of enhanced productivity – be exempted.	举例来讲，德国不久前提出把实现欧洲共同目标的开支－比如支持生产率提高的里斯本议程所需的研发经费从赤字中排除出去。


The problem is that allowing public investment to be financed by borrowing would lead to continuing disputes between the Commission and individual member states, because it relies excessively on that blurred distinction.	但问题在于允许以借贷的方式进行公共投资会导致委员会和各个成员国之间矛盾不断，因为这种做法过多地有赖于本已模糊的界线。


Others seek to broaden the definition of “exceptional circumstances” to permit the deficit ceiling to be breached in any year with prolonged unsatisfactory GDP growth, not just -2%.	还有人想纳入更多“特殊情况”，使国内生产总值长期发展欠佳的所有年份都可以打破赤字上限，而不受-2%增长率的限制。


In particular, countries that break the Pact’s deficit ceiling because they overestimated their growth – and hence government revenue – want to be treated more leniently than those who deliberately violate the rules.	特别是由于高估了增长状况和政府收入而突破《协议》赤字上限的国家希望能与明知故犯者区别对待。


This may sound principled, but basing deficit monitoring on targets rather than outcomes merely strengthens an already powerful incentive for governments to rig their forecasts.	这项原则听起来蛮有道理，但以目标而非结果为基础来控制赤字只能纵容政府哄抬增长预测的数值。


Yet an exception might be warranted where a violation of the deficit ceiling has led to fiscal tightening in line with advice from the Commission and endorsed by Ecofin.	如果有国家在已经按照委员会建议缩紧预算、并获得欧元区财长会议批准的情况下还是打破了赤字限制，那么它就有可能受到区别对待。


Having violated the ceiling in 2002, Germany looked set to do so again in 2003 despite tightening its budget along Commission lines.	2002年突破限额后，尽管按照委员会规定采取了措施，德国还是会在2003年再次突破限额。


When it turned out that Germany’s starting position had been more unfavorable than initially thought and that revenues were again failing, Germany’s government objected to additional consolidation.	当德国政府意识到起点比预想低很多，而且收入还是达不到要求的时候，他们拒绝采取进一步的压缩措施。


Where a country’s fiscal adjustments have been approved by its peers, there should be limits on how much more can be asked of it.	如果国家已经按照周围同伴的意愿进行了预算调整，那么别的国家就不应该无限制地要求它。


All of this may be beside the point, for it is the threat of financial sanctions under the Pact that inspired governments to seek to reform its rules.	所有这些可能都是不切实际的，正是因为害怕《协议》规定的金融制裁，各国政府才愿意实行改革措施。


But the Commission now proposes to put the emphasis entirely on peer pressure – naming and shaming offenders.	但现在委员会却提议把重点完全转向伙伴国的压力－找到违反规定的国家并对其进行羞辱。


This may encourage national policy-makers who defend the SGP’s deficit ceiling to continue to do so, but peer pressure will lose some of its effectiveness when the ultimate threat of sanctions disappears.	这可能会激励支持《协议》赤字限额的国家继续做下去，但如果失去了制裁的最终威胁，伙伴国的压力也可能丧失一部分作用。


In short, the Commission’s proposals and the follow-up suggestions put forward by some governments have forced open a Pandora’s Box.	简言之，委员会和接踵而来的政府建议已经打开了潘多拉之盒。


Both the Commission and the euro area countries seem to be hoping that more rapid growth will ease – and ideally resolve – the dilemma that reform of the Pact has put before them.	委员会和欧元区国家似乎希望：加速增长会缓解－甚至是解决－改革《协议》摆在他们面前的进退两难的困境。


TABLE 1	表 1


GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL BALANCES	一般政府财政余额


(% OF NOMINAL GDP)	（占名义国内生产总值的百分比）


2000-06	2000-06


2000	2000


2001	2001


2002	2002


2003	2003


2004p	2004p


2005p	2005p


2006p	2006p


Austria	奥地利


Belgium	比利时


Finland	芬兰


France	法国


Germany	德国


Greece	希腊


Ireland	爱尔兰


Italy	意大利


Luxembourg	卢森堡


Netherlands	荷兰


Portugal	葡萄牙


Spain	西班牙


-1.7	-1. 7


0.2	0. 2


7.1	7. 1


-1.4	-1. 4


1.3	1. 3


-4.2	-4. 2


4.4	4. 4


-0.7	-0. 7


6.0	6. 0


2.2	2. 2


-2.9	-2. 9


-0.9	-0. 9


0.1	0. 1


0.6	0. 6


5.2	5. 2


-1.5	-1. 5


-2.8	-2. 8


-3.7	-3. 7


1.0	1. 0


-2.7	-2. 7


6.4	6. 4


-0.1	-0. 1


-4.4	-4. 4


-0.4	-0. 4


4.3	4. 3


-3.3	-3. 3


-3.8	-3. 8


-0.2	-0. 2


-2.4	-2. 4


2.8	2. 8


-1.9	-1. 9


-1.3	-1. 3


0.3	0. 3


2.1	2. 1


-4.1	-4. 1


-4.6	-4. 6


0.2	0. 2


-2.5	-2. 5


0.8	0. 8


-3.2	-3. 2


-2.8	-2. 8


0.4	0. 4


-1.5	-1. 5


-0.1	-0. 1


1.1	1. 1


-3.7	-3. 7


-3.9	-3. 9


-5.3	-5. 3


0.0	0. 0


-2.9	-2. 9


-2.3	-2. 3


-0.9	-0. 9


1.5	1. 5


-3.4	-3. 4


-0.2	-0. 2


-3.1	-3. 1


-2.4	-2. 4


-3.0	-3. 0


-2.2	-2. 2


-1.1	-1. 1


1.8	1. 8


-2.6	-2. 6


-3.3	-3. 3


-0.5	-0. 5


-3.6	-3. 6


-1.7	-1. 7


-3.8	-3. 8


Euro area	欧元区


0.1	0. 1


-2.8	-2. 8


Denmark	丹麦


Sweden	瑞典


United Kingdom	英国


2.5	2. 5


5.1	5. 1


3.8	3. 8


2.8	2. 8


2.9	2. 9


0.7	0. 7


1.6	1. 6


-0.3	-0. 3


1.2	1. 2


-3.5	-3. 5


1.4	1. 4


0.8	0. 8


-3.3	-3. 3


1.5	1. 5


-3.2	-3. 2


p Projected	p 计划


Source: OECD  Economic Outlook  76 database.	摘自： 经合组织 《经济展望》 第76数据库。


TABLE 2	表 2


GENERAL GOVERNMENT CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED	一般政府周期调整


FINANCIAL BALANCES	财政余额


(% OF NOMINAL GDP)	（占名义国内生产总值的百分比）


2000	2000


2001	2001


2002	2002


2003	2003


2004p	2004p


2005p	2005p


2006p	2006p


Austria	奥地利


Belgium	比利时


Finland	芬兰


France	法国


Germany	德国


Greece	希腊


Ireland	爱尔兰


Italy	意大利


Netherlands	荷兰


Portugal	葡萄牙


Spain	西班牙


-2.7	-2. 7


-1.1	-1. 1


6.1	6. 1


-1.9	-1. 9


2.0	2. 0


-4.2	-4. 2


3.1	3. 1


-2.5	-2. 5


4.4	4. 4


-2.9	-2. 9


1.3	1. 3


-0.1	-0. 1


0.1	0. 1


5.4	5. 4


-2.0	-2. 0


-3.4	-3. 4


-4.5	-4. 5


-3.3	-3. 3


-5.0	-5. 0


-0.3	-0. 3


0.6	0. 6


4.7	4. 7


-3.2	-3. 2


-4.2	-4. 2


-1.2	-1. 2


-2.6	-2. 6


-2.2	-2. 2


-2.4	-2. 4


0.2	0. 2


-0.7	-0. 7


1.4	1. 4


2.8	2. 8


-3.4	-3. 4


-2.7	-2. 7


-5.2	-5. 2


-0.1	-0. 1


-1.4	-1. 4


0.8	0. 8


-0.8	-0. 8


1.3	1. 3


-3.2	-3. 2


-2.8	-2. 8


-5.8	-5. 8


-0.5	-0. 5


-2.6	-2. 6


0.7	0. 7


-1.7	-1. 7


1.0	1. 0


-2.5	-2. 5


-3.8	-3. 8


-0.9	-0. 9


-2.9	-2. 9


-0.1	-0. 1


-1.8	-1. 8


0.0	0. 0


-0.6	-0. 6


0.6	0. 6


-2.7	-2. 7


-2.1	-2. 1


-3.1	-3. 1


-1.0	-1. 0


-3.6	-3. 6


0.2	0. 2


-0.2	-0. 2


Euro area	欧元区


-2.3	-2. 3


2.0	2. 0


-2.2	-2. 2


-2.0	-2. 0


Denmark	丹麦


Sweden	瑞典


United Kingdom	英国


1.5	1. 5


3.6	3. 6


1.0	1. 0


1.8	1. 8


2.7	2. 7


0.3	0. 3


1.6	1. 6


-0.1	-0. 1


-1.7	-1. 7


2.4	2. 4


0.9	0. 9


-3.4	-3. 4


0.6	0. 6


-3.5	-3. 5


1.3	1. 3


0.2	0. 2


p Projected	p 计划


Source: OECD  Economic Outlook 76 database.	摘自： 经合组织 《经济展望》 第76数据库。


Can US-Iran Relations Be Revived?	美国伊朗关系还能复苏吗？


During World War II, Allied soldiers occupied Iran, using the country as a way station to transport supplies from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union.	二次大战期间，盟军的部队占领了伊朗，把它用作从波斯湾向苏联运送给养的中转站。


This was Iran’s first exposure to Americans.	这是美伊之间的首次接触。


“They arrived in our country with a certain innocence,” said the respected Iranian historian Kaveh Bayat, “and without any colonial pretenses.”	“可以说他们进入我国时是清白的，”倍受尊重的伊朗历史学家Kaveh Bayat说，“他们没有任何殖民企图。 ”


The Americans’ supply train would regularly pass through my father’s ancestral village, Arak, then a scenic oasis of green gardens and fruit orchards.	美国的给养火车会定时经过我父辈们祖居的村庄阿拉克，当时那里到处是风景如画的绿洲和果园。


“Whenever we heard the train coming,” my father once told me, “all the young boys in the village would run as fast as we could through the apple orchard to greet the passing Americans.	父亲曾告诉我，“只要听到火车经过，村里所有的男孩都会快速跑过苹果园，向路过的美国人问候。


They would smile and wave and throw us whatever gifts they happened to have – playing cards, chewing gum, lifesaver candies….For us they were like heroes from another world.”	而他们会面带微笑、招手致意，并把身上碰巧带着的小礼物扔给我们－纸牌啦、口香糖啦、救急的糖果啦…在我们眼里，他们简直就是来自另一个世界的英雄。 ”


So much has changed since then.	这以后的变化太大了。


Iran’s 1979 revolution did away with the pro-American, undemocratic regime of the Shah, bringing in its place the anti-American, undemocratic regime of the clerics.	1979年的伊朗革命废除了亲美主义、推翻了伊朗国王的不民主统治，并以反美主义和教士的不民主统治取而代之。


Relations between the United States and Iran have been officially non-existent since a group of radical students stormed the US embassy in Teheran – 25 years ago this week – taking sixty six Americans hostage for 444 days.	25年前，就在这个星期，一些激进的学生袭击了驻德黑兰的美国使馆，把66个美国人扣为人质，关押了444天后，美伊之间的正式关系就几乎不复存在了。


Sixty years ago, Arak was a humble village known to US troops for its grapes; today Pentagon officials hone in on it as an industrial city that is integral to Iran’s worrisome nuclear program.	60年前，美国士兵眼中的阿拉克不过是个盛产葡萄小村庄，而今天，它在五角大楼官员的眼里却是一座工业城市，与伊朗令人不安的核计划息息相关。


And yet few countries have a more paradoxical relationship than the US and Iran.	但没有几个国家之间的关系像美伊关系这么奇特。


While the Iranian regime continues to be belligerently anti-American, the Iranian people are overtly pro-American.	尽管伊朗当局坚持顽固的反美立场，但伊朗人民却公开地支持美国。


While the governments in Teheran and Washington appear to be strategic archrivals, in the words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “there are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran.”	尽管德黑兰和华盛顿政府是战略对手，但用前国务卿亨利·基辛格的话讲，“像伊朗这样没理由和美国冲突或利益如此一致的国家，全世界恐怕也找不到几个。 ”


Indeed, Iran has likely benefited more than any other country from US-led regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, as both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were the country’s sworn enemies.	实际上，从美国领导的阿富汗和伊拉克权力更迭之中，伊朗得到的好处比任何国家都多，因为塔利班和萨达姆·侯赛因都是他们誓不两立的敌人。


But neither side seized the opportunity to build on this common ground, and today US-Iran relations are as antagonistic as they have been in years.	但双方都没能抓住机会，扩大和对方的共同之处，于是今天的美伊关系就和几年前一样水火不容。


For the US, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, opposition to Israel, and support for extremist groups have become increasingly intolerable in the context of the war on terror.	在美国眼里，伊朗的核计划、反对以色列和支持极端组织在如今对恐怖主义宣战的背景下变得越来越无法容忍。


Iran’s long-standing opposition to relations with the US is a bit more complex.	伊朗长期坚持与美国敌对的原因有点复杂。


To be sure, many of Iran’s ruling elites came of age politically during the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist agitations of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and still cling to that worldview.	但可以肯定的是，伊朗很多领导人都出自二十世纪六七十年代，那时反帝国和殖民主义热情都很高涨，对他们的世界观产生了很大影响。


Although their revolutionary zeal may have waned over the years, they still tend to share the outlook of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who likened the relationship between Iran and the US to that “between a sheep and a wolf.”	虽然革命热情随着年龄的增长而有所消减，但他们还是愿意追随已故的阿亚图拉·霍梅尼的世界观，把伊朗和美国之间的关系比作“羊和狼”的关系。


Ideological rigidity alone, however, does not explain Iran’s often-gratuitous anti-Americanism.	不过，意识形态上的刻板并不能完全解释伊朗常常没来由的反美主义。


For Iran’s political and military elite, any increased liberalization that would likely result from an opening of ties with the US represents a threat to their interests.	在伊朗的政治军事当权派看来，开放伊美关系所带来的自由会威胁到他们的既得利益。


From their perspective, Iran is now a closed party – their party – and the less who join in, the merrier.	在他们眼里，伊朗现在是封闭的聚会－是他们自己的聚会－参加的人越少，才越能得到快乐。


With America bogged down in Iraq and oil prices hitting record highs, regime hardliners see little reason to compromise these days.	随着美国在伊拉克陷入困境、石油价格又创下了历史新高，强硬的统治者根本没有妥协的理由。


On the other hand, some influential Iranians – led by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani – recognize that relations with the US are inevitable, given Iran’s need to re-integrate into the international community and face its economic deficiencies.	另一方面，以前总统哈什米·拉夫桑贾尼为代表的一些有影响的伊朗人承认：如果要重新融入国际社会、正面处理国内的经济危机，那么伊美关系是必不可少的。


Moreover, the Iranian people are overwhelmingly in favor of rapprochement.	此外，绝大多数伊朗人也完全赞成建立和谐的伊美关系。


As author Afshin Molavi wrote in his incisive travelogue Persian Pilgrimages , Iranian youth today are not revolutionary idealists, like those of three decades ago.	就像Afshin Molavi在涵义深刻的旅行杂记《波斯朝圣》中写道的那样，今天伊朗的年轻人不再是30年前的革命理想主义者。


Instead, they have concrete demands, like jobs and political and social freedom.	相反，他们有着自己的具体要求，比如就业机会和政治社会自由。


They are desperate to enter the global community and rid themselves of a damaged international reputation.	他们不顾一切地要融入全球社会，永远洗刷掉身上狼藉的国际恶名。


Today’s Iranian intellectuals have undergone a similar maturation process, dismissing the “utopianist” and “nativist” political ideals of their predecessors.	今天伊朗的知识分子也经历了类似的成熟过程，彻底抛弃了前人“乌托邦”和“排外主义”的政治理想。


Referring to Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s 1962 book Gharbzadegi (“West-toxication”), which became one of the manifestos of the 1979 revolution, one secular intellectual in Teheran remarked to me that, “Nobody reads Al-e Ahmad anymore.	谈到成为1979年革命宣言的Jalal Al-e Ahmad1962年的著作Gharbzadegi（《西方中毒》）时，德黑兰的一位世俗学者对我说��“现在已经没人再读Al-e Ahmad的书了。