Of course, Iran’s leaders may believe that economic isolation is the greatest danger to the regime.	当然，伊朗领导人也许认为经济孤立是政权的最大危险。


But what happened in Libya has made them fear that Qaddafi’s fate could be theirs, too, without an adequate deterrent.	但利比亚的下场让他们担心，如果没有足够的威慑，他们也难逃卡扎菲的命运。


Indeed, commenting on Qaddafi’s plight in 2011, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said, “[T]his gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’	事实上，2011年在评论卡扎菲的困境时，最高领袖哈梅内伊说：“卡扎菲先生把所有核设施一股脑儿打包装船运往西方人，对他们说：‘拿走吧！


Look where we are, and in what position they are now.”	’看看我们，在看看他们现在的状况。 ”


But today, two years later, Iran must look again at where it is.	但在两年后的今天，伊朗必须再一次看看自己。


As long as crippling economic sanctions remain in place, the government will be unable to have its yellowcake and eat it, too.	只要严厉的经济制裁保持下去，伊朗政府最终无法拥有核武器并享受核武器带来的好处。


Allowing Iran to retain some low-grade enrichment capacity would be a plausible concession – and one that would allow the country’s leaders to save face – but only if linked to Iran’s unfettered disclosure of all nuclear activities to the IAEA and confirmed cessation of any capability that contributes to weaponization.	允许伊朗保有一些低层次浓缩能力或许是可行的让步——也能让伊朗领导人保住颜面——但伊朗必须实打实地向IAEA披露所有核活动并确认停止所有有利于武器化的设施。


And, given the stakes, any international agreement with Iran must come with an assured response to cheating, including military action.	此外，考虑到兹事体大，与伊朗的国际协定必须有白纸黑字的作弊应对措施，包括采取军事行动。


With little leverage, Iran’s leaders would then have two options.	伊朗领导人没有多少回旋余地，只有两个选择。


They could follow North Korea by sacrificing economic prosperity for nuclear breakout, and hope that US and Israeli talk of “all options” being on the table to stop their efforts is a bluff; or they could pursue economic prosperity by forgoing a nuclear-weapons capacity, and hope that a Libya-style revolt does not envelope the country and doom the regime to a fate like that of Qaddafi.	他们可以效仿朝鲜，牺牲经济繁荣换取核突破，然后寄希望于美国和以色列要求把“所有选择”摆上台面以阻止他们的动作是纸老虎； 或者他们可以追求经济繁荣，放弃核武器能力，然后寄希望于利比亚式的叛乱不会席卷全国、让政权重蹈卡扎菲覆辙。


It is not an easy choice, but it is one that Iran’s leaders cannot postpone for much longer.	这不是一个容易的选择，但伊朗领导人无法将这一选择拖延多久。


Kenya’s Somali Contradiction	肯尼亚的索马里悖论


NAIROBI – The attack that killed more than 70 people at Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall last week was, according to al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist militant group that carried it out, retribution for Kenya’s intervention in Somalia.	内罗毕—上周，索马里青年军（al-Shabaab）袭击了内罗毕韦斯特盖特（Westgate）购物中心，导致70多人丧生，这是对肯尼亚干预索马里的惩罚。


That raises a simple question: What is Kenya doing in Somalia, and is it worth the price?	这带来了一个简单的问题：肯尼亚在索马里做了什么？ 值得为此付出如此代价吗？


Since Kenya’s army invaded its northeastern neighbor two years ago, the government has told Kenyans that they were going to war against al-Shabaab.	自两年前肯尼亚军队入侵其东北方邻国以来，政府告诉肯尼亚人民他们是在和索马里青年军打仗。


But, as with most official pronouncements in Kenya, that story was only partly true.	但是，正如大部分肯尼亚官方公告所说的，这只是部分事实。


On the night of October 15, 2011, I lay awake listening to the Kenyan military convoys passing through the border town of Dadaab on their way to Somalia to launch the first foreign military campaign in Kenya’s history.	2011年10月15日晚，我躺在床上，睡意全无，听到肯尼亚军车隆隆驶过边境小镇达达布（Dadaab）进入索马里，这是肯尼亚历史上第一次对外用兵。


The proximate cause was the abduction of two Spanish aid workers from the vast refugee camps that encircle Dadaab.	肯尼亚出兵的直接原因是达达布周边巨大的难民营中的两名西班牙医务人员遭到劫持。


For the Kenyan authorities, it was the final straw after a series of abductions of Westerners by al-Shabaab; to stop the incursions, they launched what military leaders believed would be a quick campaign.	对肯尼亚当局来说，此前已发生过一系列西方人被索马里青年军劫持事件，此次事件让他们忍无可忍； 为了停止索马里青年军的侵犯，他们发动了这次军方领袖相信很快就可以结束的行动，。


Over the last two years, some progress has ostensibly been made.	过去两年中，表面上取得了一些进展。


The two Spanish aid workers were released last July, and al-Shabaab has attempted only one abduction since.	两名西班牙医务人员于去年7月被释放，此后索马里青年军劫持事件也只发生了一起。


Moreover, the rebels have been dislodged from the southern Somali port of Kismayo, which was once their main base.	此外，叛军被逐出了其主要基地、索马里南部的基斯马约（Kismayo）港。


But al-Shabaab retains control of the majority of Somalia and remains capable of striking Mogadishu, the capital, as well as Nairobi.	但索马里青年军仍控制着索马里大部，仍有能力袭击首都摩加迪休和内罗毕。


Given this, if the Kenyan government’s aim was, as it claimed, to destroy al-Shabaab, the intervention has been a spectacular failure.	考虑到这一点，如果肯尼亚政府的目的如其所说是摧毁索马里青年军，那么这场军事干预就是彻头彻尾的失败。


But there is much more to the story.	但这并不是故事的全部。


In fact, retaliation against the militant group was little more than a convenient excuse to launch the so-called Jubaland Initiative, a plan to protect Kenya’s security and economic interests by carving out a semi-autonomous client state in southern Somalia.	事实上，报复该军事组织无非是发动所谓的朱巴兰计划（Jubaland Initiative）的蹩脚借口，其目的在索马里南部扶植一个半自治附庸国以保护肯尼亚的安全和经济利益。


While knowledge of the plan was initially confined largely to Kenyan government officials, it was not long before its contours began to be revealed.	尽管关于该计划的情报一开始仅限于肯尼亚政府官员知道，但其轮廓很快就浮出了水面。


Kenya has installed a client regime in Kismayo, and has supported the new government in its quest to make Jubaland a semi-autonomous region, along the lines of Puntland, Somaliland, and the many other self-declared proto-states that have emerged as Somalia has unraveled.	肯尼亚在基斯马约悄悄地复制了一个附庸政权，对新政府提供支持，为使朱巴兰成为半自治地区做准备。 随着索马里的分裂，出现了普特兰（Puntland）、索马里兰（Somaliland）和其他许多自称雏形国家的半自治省。


Beyond preventing Somalia’s violence from spilling over into Kenya and undermining its security and its tourist-driven economy, such a buffer state could be forced to absorb the half-million Somali refugees who now live in Dadaab’s refugee camps.	这样的缓冲国除了可以防止索马里暴力溢出到肯尼亚、破坏其安全和基于旅游业的经济，还可以强迫其接受目前住在达达布难民营的50万索马里难民。


In this sense, the Jubaland Initiative is a policy of stunning racial profiling – and a gift to al-Shabaab recruiters in Kenya.	从这个角度看，朱巴兰计划是再好不过的种族分离计划，索马里青年军可以借此良机在肯尼亚招兵买马。


Furthermore, contrary to claims that securing Kismayo put al-Shabaab at a disadvantage, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported in July that the Kenyan Defense Forces have actually gone into business with al-Shabaab.	此外，与保卫基斯马约让索马里青年军处于劣势的说法相反，联合国索马里和厄立特里亚监督小组在7月份报告说，肯尼亚国防军实际上在于索马里青年军做交易。


The group’s profits from illicit charcoal (and possibly ivory) exported from Kismayo have grown since Kenya took control.	肯尼亚控制基斯马约后，索马里青年军在基斯马约木炭（可能还有象牙）出口中获得的利润有所增加。


This highlights a fundamental problem: the Kenyan state’s endemic corruption constantly undermines its policymakers’ goals.	这凸显出一个根本性问题：肯尼亚的腐败顽疾一直在拖累决策者的目标。


Indeed, in Kismayo, Kenyan officials have reverted to their default occupation – the pursuit of private profit.	事实上，在基斯马约，肯尼亚官员早已故态重萌——追逐私利。


Instead of working to achieve the diplomatic objective of defeating al-Shabaab, Kenya’s military, politicians, and well-connected businessmen have been lining their own pockets.	肯尼亚军队、政客和关系深广的商人并没有致力于实现击败索马里青年军的外交目标，而是在为自己的腰包奋斗。


Moreover, Kenya’s desire to carve out a buffer state conflicts with the Somali government’s goal of uniting the country.	此外，肯尼亚渴望扶植一个缓冲国与索马里政府统一全国的目标冲突。


Indeed, the last thing the government in Mogadishu wants is another semi-autonomous region challenging its authority – or another country annexing southern Somalia for its own purposes.	事实上，摩加迪休政府最不愿意看到的便是又一个挑战其权威的半自治地区——或又一个别有用心蚕食其南部领土的国家。


The United States and the European Union – which are bankrolling the African Union’s intervention in Somalia to support the Mogadishu-based government – have attempted to paper over the disagreement with Kenya over the Jubaland Initiative, despite its potential to fuel further conflict.	美国和欧盟——它们为非盟干预索马里提供了资金并支持摩加迪休政府——企图掩盖与肯尼亚在朱巴兰计划上的分歧，尽管这有可能助长进一步冲突。


In fact, Kenya-backed Jubaland forces clashed with Somali government troops in Kismayo earlier this year.	事实上，今年早些时候，肯尼亚支持的朱巴兰军队与索马里政府军在基斯马约交过火。


The Westgate attack should spur Kenya’s leaders to re-think their approach toward Somalia.	韦斯特盖特袭击案应该会刺激肯尼亚领导人反思其索马里政策。


A more coherent strategy would involve cutting off al-Shabaab’s funding and addressing the grievances – such as human-rights abuses against Somalis, discrimination against Muslims, foreign meddling in Somalia, and corruption – that motivate its recruits.	更明确的战略应该包括切断索马里青年军的财源和遏制让索马里青年军壮大的怨气——比如针对索马里人的人权侵害、歧视穆斯林、对索马里的外部势力干预以及腐败。


In a bizarre twist, al-Shabaab even called on Kenyans to prosecute their leaders for post-election bloodletting in 2007-2008.	极度扭曲的索马里青年军甚至表示支持国际刑事法庭起诉肯尼亚领导人在2007—2008年选举后发生的流血事件中的罪行。


Given these intractable grievances – and, more important, the weakness and corruption of the Kenyan state – the cycle of violence will be very difficult to break.	在冲天怨气的作用下——更重要的是肯尼亚国家的孱弱和腐败——暴力循环难以打破。


That is why the attack on the Westgate mall is unlikely to be the last such tragedy.	这就是韦斯特盖特购物中心袭击案绝不可能是最后的悲剧的原因。


Terrorized Tunisia	恐怖威胁下的突尼斯


TUNIS – The recent terror attack on Berlin’s Christmas market – which killed 12 and injured more than 50 – cast a pall over this year’s holiday celebrations across Europe.	突尼斯——最近针对柏林圣诞市场的恐怖袭击——此次袭击造成十二人死亡、超过五十人受伤——为今年欧洲各地的假日庆祝活动蒙上了一层阴影。


Viewed from Tunis, where I happened to be during the fallout, the attack has also had a major, albeit different, impact.	恐怖袭击时我碰巧在突尼斯，在突尼斯人看来，这次袭击同样产生了重大、尽管截然不同的影响。


Tunisia, after all, is the home country of Anis Amri, the alleged perpetrator.	突尼斯毕竟是被控罪犯阿尼斯·阿米尔的祖国。


Like Europeans, Tunisians fear terrorism.	像欧洲人一样，突尼斯人害怕恐怖主义。


But they fear not just individual terrorist attacks, like those in the Bardo museum in Tunis and on the beach in Sousse in 2015, or even the numerous political assassinations it has faced since its regime change began in 2011.	但他们所害怕的不仅是像2015年发生在突尼斯巴尔多博物馆和苏斯海滩那样的个人恐怖袭击，甚至是从2011年政权更迭开始后屡次发生的政治暗杀。


Tunisians worry that social upheaval will destroy their remarkable but fragile young democracy.	突尼斯人担心社会动荡或将破坏他们令人赞叹但却依然脆弱的年轻的民主体制。


Neighboring Libya offers a stark illustration of what that could look like.	邻国利比亚提供了体制被破坏所产生的恐怖后果的鲜明例子。


The prospect of Tunisia’s government attempting to manage the situation alone is not an attractive one.	突尼斯政府试图单枪匹马控制局面的前景并不乐观。


Tunisians know that their state is weak and cannot really protect them.	突尼斯人知道他们的国家非常脆弱，无法真正保护他们。


They could end up like Egypt, which is becoming a police state, or move in the direction taken by Algeria, where a brief flirtation with political Islam 25 years ago gave way to an authoritarian clampdown and years of violent conflict.	他们最终可能像埃及一样，埃及正在成为一个警察国家，或者走上阿尔及利亚所走的道路，25年前在与政治伊斯兰主义有过一段短暂的调情后，阿尔及利亚局势最终陷入专制镇压和多年的暴力冲突。


Making matters worse, concerns about terrorism have all but killed off Tunisia’s large tourism industry, severely weakening the economy.	更糟的是，恐怖主义所引发的担忧几乎扼杀了突尼斯的大规模旅游业，严重削弱了其国内经济。


As a result, a country that already receives International Monetary Fund support is trying to buy social stability by increasing state employment.	结果导致这个已经在接受国际货币基金组织援助的国家还在试图通过增加国家就业来购买社会稳定。


To contain the bulging budget deficit, it has opted to increase taxes, further reducing growth.	为了抑制不断扩张的预算赤字，这个国家选择增加税收，从而进一步削弱了增长前景。


This downward spiral has become institutionalized, as the main unions have dug in their heels and civil society has become disillusioned.	因为主要工会组织固执己见且民间团体感到心灰意冷，导致这样的经济衰退螺旋开始制度化。


Young people, in particular, lack trust in institutions – a serious problem in a country where 38% of the population is under 25 years old.	尤其是年轻人对机构缺乏信任——这在一个38%的人口还不到25岁的国家造成了严重的问题。


The young people I met in Tunis, brought together by the British NGO Forward Thinking, which promotes understanding between between secular and religious worldviews, come from across the political spectrum.	我在突尼斯遇到的来自不同政治背景的年轻人因为英国非政府组织前瞻思考所做的工作而走到一起，这是一家促进世俗和宗教世界观之间相互理解的非政府组织。


But they have one thing in common: they view themselves as victims of globalization.	但他们都有一个共同点：就是把自己视为全球化的受害者。


The international community is, in their view, conspiring against them, undermining their chances to find employment and form families.	国际社会在他们眼中合谋反对他们，破坏他们找到工作和组建家庭的机会。


This perception has created fertile ground for terrorist recruiters; Tunisia has sent more jihadis than any other country to fight in Syria and Iraq.	这种看法为恐怖份子招募者创造了肥沃的土壤； 突尼斯派往叙利亚和伊拉克作战的圣战者比其他任何国家都多。


The threat of cross-border terrorism has attracted international attention to Tunisia.	突尼斯的跨境恐怖主义威胁已经吸引了国际关注。


But it is not the only reason we should care about the country’s fate.	但这并不是我们关心该国命运的唯一理由。


Tunisia remains a beacon of hope for democracy and political freedom in the region.	突尼斯仍然是一座希望的灯塔，不懈地追求地区民主和政治自由。


I visited Tunis with a former official from Ukraine, a country that, despite having a very different history and culture, has a lot in common with Tunisia.	我与一位前乌克兰官员一道访问突尼斯，乌克兰尽管有着不同的历史和文化，但却与突尼斯有许多共同之处。


Ukraine, too, experienced a revolution that drove its former leader into exile, only to see sought-after reforms stall.	乌克兰也经历了一场导致前任领袖流亡的革命，不料竟面对备受推崇的改革陷入停滞的结果。


And both have faced serious disruptions from war (in Tunisia’s case, in Libya), including an influx of displaced people (each country is home to around two million refugees).	突尼斯和乌克兰同样面临战争的严重破坏（突尼斯所受的战争破坏来自利比亚），包括大量流离失所人口的涌入（大约有200万难民涌入上述两国）。


The international community must help to ensure that both Tunisia and Ukraine can fulfill their revolutions’ potential.	国际社会必须确保突尼斯和乌克兰的革命潜力得到充分发挥。


This must include help in dealing with refugees, as well as – and more important – support for broad state-strengthening reforms.	这必须包括协助解决难民问题，以及——更重要的是——支持强化政府力量的广泛改革。


For all of its flaws, the political dialogue that has been initiated in Tunisia, thanks to the Islamist movement Ennahda and the non-religious parliamentary parties, has saved the country from the political abyss.	尽管存在种种问题，但多亏伊斯兰复兴党运动和非宗教议会政党，在突尼斯已经启动的政治对话成功地将这个国家从政治深渊的边缘拉了回来。


But unless the government can deliver on reforms, that dialogue will collapse – and so will the prospects of Tunisia’s young people.	但除非政府能够实现改革，否则对话——还有突尼斯年轻人的未来——迟早会崩溃。


Ukraine holds a lesson here as well.	乌克兰在这个问题上也应当吸取教训。


Its reform process has taken hold, thanks partly to significant outside support.	在外部势力的强势支持下，其国内改革进程已经取得了成功。


But entrenched interests are still resisting progress.	但既得利益仍然阻碍国家的进步。


While reforms must be owned domestically, outsiders – in particular, the European Union – can help to reinforce the local vision by providing a viable path of institutional change.	尽管改革必须得到国内支持，外部势力——尤其是欧盟——可以通过指明可行的体制改革道路来强化当地人的目标。


Extending a helping hand is in the EU’s self-interest.	伸出援手符合欧盟自身的利益。


It, too, is facing a refugee crisis, which it cannot address without effective partnerships.	欧盟也同样面临难民危机，如果没有有效的合作关系就很难解决好。


For example, European institutions and the Spanish government have succeeded in containing the flow of migrants across the Strait of Gibraltar.	例如，欧洲机构和西班牙政府成功地控制了直布罗陀海峡两岸的移民流动。


To get a handle on the wider migration crisis, while making migration less hazardous for the migrants themselves, more deals with credible partners must be made.	为控制移民危机进一步恶化，同时降低移民自身所面临的风险，必须与可信的伙伴国达成更多协议。


And here, Tunisia is a good candidate.	突尼斯在这方面可以发挥积极作用。


Europe already has been able to negotiate arrangements with Tunisia to restrict migrant flows and to return those who have been denied asylum.	欧洲已经成功地与突尼斯谈判限制移民流动，并遣返那些庇护申请被拒绝的民众。


Yet the Berlin attack highlights the limits of the country’s institutional capacity.	���柏林袭击凸显了该国体制能力的局限性。


Apparently, Amri’s expulsion from Germany was postponed, owing to the Tunisian bureaucracy’s slowness in confirming his citizenship.	显而易见，阿米尔从德国的驱逐出境被迫推迟，因为突尼斯官僚体制在确认其公民身份的过程中效率低下。


That is why the international community must also offer Tunisia resources to strengthen its state agencies and civil society alike, as well as a vision of closer integration with the EU to help direct the political process, much as it has done in Ukraine.	这也是国际社会为什么必须为突尼斯提供资源强化其国家机构和民间社会，以及与欧盟进一步融合，并像对乌克兰那样指导其国内政治改革的理由。


This is not about EU membership, but about opening up markets and relaxing visa restrictions (admittedly a hard sell after the Berlin massacre).	这无关欧盟成员资格，而是需要开放市场和放松签证限制（显然在柏林大屠杀发生后推行这样的政策很有难度）。


The fear, in both Tunisia and Ukraine, is that Europe will close its doors further.	突尼斯和乌克兰的恐惧在于欧洲会进一步采取封闭政策。


I saw the distress in the eyes of Ukrainian reformers after the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU, and I sensed a similar reaction in Tunisia when the Berlin attacker’s identity emerged.	在英国投票退出欧盟后我看到了乌克兰改革者眼中的痛苦，而在柏林，袭击者身份曝光后我感受到同样的痛苦也出现在突尼斯人眼中。


By attempting to insulate itself from the outside world, Europe would only end up depriving these countries’ citizens of any hope of better lives at home.	通过努力令自身与外界隔绝，欧洲最终只会剥夺这些国家民众在国内更好生活的希望。


America’s Berlusconi	美国的贝卢斯科尼


LONDON – For the past couple of weeks, the world has been guessing at how US President-elect Donald Trump will behave in office and what policies he will pursue, following a long campaign full of contradictory statements.	伦敦——过去几周来，在经历了一次矛盾声明层出不穷的漫长的竞选活动后，世界各国一直在猜测美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普在任职期间将作何表现以及他将实行什么样的政策。


America’s previous businessman-presidents – Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover – were around too long ago to provide much guidance.	美国上一任商界总统沃伦·哈丁和赫伯特·胡佛任职期间已经过于久远，很难提供太多的具体线索。


There is, however, a recent European precedent: Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi.	但近期欧洲却有一个先例：那就是意大利的西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼。


What Trump has achieved, Berlusconi pioneered.	特朗普的成绩，曾经是贝卢斯科尼的创造。


Like Trump, Berlusconi is a businessman who made his first fortune in real estate.	像特朗普一样，贝卢斯科尼是在房地产领域掘到第一桶金的商界巨子。


When he entered politics in 1994, he was an outsider, albeit one who, also like Trump, had long been close to plenty of insiders.	当1994年步入政坛时，他被视为局外人，虽然也像特朗普一样，一直与很多内部人士保持着密切的关系。


The similarities don’t end there.	相似之处还不止于此。


Both Trump and Berlusconi are intimately familiar with the insides of courtrooms; Trump has moved fast since the election to settle fraud lawsuits against Trump University, but has about 70 other suits outstanding against him and his businesses.	特朗普和贝卢斯科尼都非常熟悉法庭内部事务； 参选以来，特朗普迅速采取措施解决了针对特朗普大学的欺诈诉讼，但仍有针对他本人及其企业的其他七十宗诉讼处在审理过程之中。


And both have an array of conflicts of interest with their role as head of government, thanks to their large business empires.	而且由于拥有大型企业帝国，他们都与政府首脑角色有着一系列利益冲突。


Berlusconi, like Trump, managed to present himself as a rich man and a populist.	贝卢斯科尼像特朗普一样，成功地把自己塑造为富人和民粹主义者。


He preferred to communicate directly with the people, bypassing traditional media and party structures.	他乐于与民众直接沟通，绕过传统媒体和党派机构。


His propensity for glamorous women and glitzy homes somehow enhanced his popular appeal.	他喜欢追求豪宅和美女在某种程度上增强了他对民众的吸引力。


The comparison between Trump and Berlusconi is far from superficial.	特朗普和贝卢斯科尼之间的比较还远远不能停留在表象上。


In fact, Italy’s experience with Berlusconi – or Il Cavaliere (the Knight), as he is known in his country – provides six clear lessons for Americans and the world on what to expect from Trump.	事实上，贝卢斯科尼在意大利的表现——他在本国也被称之为骑士——为美国和世界对特朗普的期待提供了六大明确的线索。


First, no one should underestimate the next US president.	首先，任何人都不应低估下一任美国总统。


Already, Trump has defied expectations; few expected him even to win the Republican primary.	特朗普已经一再出人意料； 认为他能赢得共和党初选的人都少之又少。


Yet many observers continue to predict his imminent downfall, assuming that he will last only four years in the White House, if he is not impeached before that.	但许多观察家仍然预测他即将到来的倒台，推测他即使在四年任期届满之前未遭弹劾，在白宫任职也很难超过四年之久。


Berlusconi’s experience tells a different story.	但贝卢斯科尼的经历却与人们的想象截然不同。


Berlusconi, too, has been consistently underestimated by his opponents.	贝卢斯科尼也一直被他的竞争对手所低估。


Commentators deemed him too ignorant and inexperienced to last as prime minister, assuming that he would not survive the cut and thrust of politics or the pressures of government.	评论家认为他因过于无知和缺乏经验而难以胜任总理，推测他无法在政治的短兵相接和政府压力下持续存活。


Yet Berlusconi remains one of the kingpins of Italian politics.	但贝卢斯科尼却仍然是意大利政界的主要人物。


In the last 22 years, he has won three general elections and served as prime minister for nine years.	过去22年，他曾经赢得三次大选，并在九年时间里担任总理职务。


Every time journalists or intellectuals have tried to take him on in public debate, they have lost.	每次记者和知识分子试图在公开辩论中同贝卢斯科尼较量，他们都落于下风。


Trump’s critics – indeed, all US observers – should keep that in mind.	特朗普的批评者——其实包括所有美国观察家——都应该牢记这种情况。


The second lesson is that Trump will probably pursue what is essentially a permanent political campaign, injecting himself directly into conversations.	第二个教训是特朗普很可能实行本质上永无止境的政治竞选，让自己直接融入对话的主题当中。


Berlusconi has often used television, especially his own commercial channels, to that end.	贝卢斯科尼常常利用电视（尤其是他自己的商业频道）来实现这一目标。


Instead of giving interviews he cannot control, Berlusconi has often worked with favored acolytes, or simply talked directly to the camera.	贝卢斯科尼不去接受他无法控制的采访，而是经常与关系密切的追随者合作，或者直接面对摄像机。


When he was in office, many a political talk show was interrupted by a phone call from the prime minister demanding to have his say.	许多政治脱口秀都曾被总理要求发表意见的电话所打断过。


From Trump, we should expect not just a continued Twitter barrage, but also the use of TV, including talk shows, and other channels to speak directly to the people.	从特朗普身上，我们不仅会看到持续密集的推特攻势，还会看到他利用电视、包括脱口秀和其他渠道直接向民众发表谈话。


Trump’s decision to release a two-and-a-half-minute YouTube video laying out his priorities, in lieu of a press conference, reinforces this reading.	特朗普决定不召开新闻发布会，而是发布时长两分半的YouTube视频来阐述他的政策重点进一步强化了这种解读。


While the approach may not seem very presidential, it works, at least when carried out by a master marketer who plays fast and loose with the facts.	虽然这种做法似乎离总统有些距离，但至少在一个能迅速随意玩弄事实的营销大师操纵下，这种方法能够发挥不错的效果。


The third lesson from Berlusconi’s success is that even a very wealthy and powerful person can wield the victim narrative effectively.	贝卢斯科尼成功背后的第三个教训是即使非常富裕和有权有势的人也可以有效地借助受害者陈述。


Indeed, even while in office, Berlusconi consistently claimed that he was being attacked by the judiciary, by rival businessmen, by “communists,” by the political establishment.	事实上，即使在执政期间，贝卢斯科尼也一直声称自己是司法机构、商业竞争对手、“共产主义分子”和政治机构的攻击对象。


When the chips are down, expect Trump to do the same.	情况危急时，特朗普也会这样做。


Never mind that he is a billionaire, born to a wealthy family, or that, in the next election, he will be the incumbent.	不要以为他是亿万富翁、出生在富裕家庭、或者在下一次竞选中他的身份将是现任总统。


He will consistently portray himself as besieged by self-serving enemies.	他将自始至终把自己描绘成处在谋求自我利益敌人的包围之中。


The fourth lesson is that mudslinging is bound to happen.	第四个教训是污蔑必然发生。


Berlusconi’s used his TV stations and newspapers so liberally to smear his opponents that the writer Roberto Saviano called them his macchina del fango or “mud machine.”	贝卢斯科尼随意利用自己的电视台和新闻媒体来抹黑对手，以致作家罗伯特·萨维亚诺将其称之为他的“抹黑机器”。


Trump’s attacks on the media, often carried out via Twitter, are a precursor to this, as are his campaign vows to “open up” libel laws.	特朗普往往通过推特来攻击媒体、就像他“放开”诽谤法的竞选口号一样都是类似的前兆。


His chief mud-slinger is likely to be his newly appointed chief strategist, Stephen Bannon, the former chair of the ultra right-wing Breitbart News.	特朗普的首席抹黑专家可能是新任命的首席战略家斯蒂芬·班农，班农曾担任极右翼布莱巴特新闻的主席职务。


The fifth lesson is that Trump will probably continue to prize loyalty above all else in his administration, just as Berlusconi has.	第五个教训是像贝卢斯科尼一样，特朗普很可能继续在政府中遵循忠诚高于一切的原则。


Already, Trump has made his three oldest children – who are supposed to run his business during his presidency – key players in his campaign and transition.	特朗普已经安排他年龄最大的三个子女——他们本应在他竞选总统期间经营他的企业——成为他竞选和过渡时期的关键力量。


Federal law may prohibit Trump from appointing his children to government posts, but they will surely remain at the center of his decision-making.	联邦法律可能禁止特朗普任命其子女担任政府职务，但他们无疑将成为决策的核心力量。


Already, his daughter, Ivanka Trump, and her husband, Jared Kushner, attended Trump’s first meeting with a head of government, Japan’s Shinzo Abe.	他的女儿伊万卡·特朗普及其丈夫贾里德·库什纳已经与一位政府首脑——日本的安倍晋三——一道参与了特朗普的首次会议。


Even Trump’s non-family appointments – often controversial or radical figures who would not have a place in any administration except his – reflect an emphasis on personal loyalty.	就连特朗普家人以外的任命——往往是在特朗普内阁外不太可能有位置的争议或激进人物——反映出他对个人忠诚的强调。


The final lesson of Berlusconi is that expressions of admiration for strongmen like Russian President Vladimir Putin should be taken seriously.	贝卢斯科尼教训的最后一课是应当重视对像俄罗斯总统普京这样强人政府的崇敬表达。


Narcissistic lone rangers like Berlusconi and Trump are accustomed to making personal deals, and prefer other strongmen as their interlocutors.	像贝卢斯科尼和特朗普这样孤独而自恋的游侠习惯于进行个人交易，并喜爱与其他强人对话。


Berlusconi’s favorite overseas visits while in office were to Putin’s dacha and former Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s tent, not to boring European Council meetings or G20 summits.	特朗普任职期间最期待的海外出访是到普京的乡间别墅及利比亚独裁者卡扎菲上校的帐篷，而不是到无聊的欧洲理事会会议或G20峰会上。


In the end, however, there is one key difference between Silvio Berlusconi and Donald Trump.	但归根结底，西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼和唐纳德·特朗普之间只有一个关键不同。


Berlusconi had no real agenda while in office, except to further his business and personal interests and nurture his own power by providing resources and favors to his supporters.	贝卢斯科尼任职期间除通过向其支持者提供资源和好处来推动其商业和个人利益以及培养个人势力外并无真正的政策目标。


His greatest disservice to Italians was his inaction in the face of economic stagnation, but at least he didn’t make it worse.	他对意大利最大的伤害是在经济停滞时期不作为，但至少他没有让情况变得更加糟糕。


Trump, by contrast, does have an agenda, however hard to read.	相比之下，无论多么难以理解，特朗普的确存在政策目标。


Whether it will make things better or worse remains to be seen.	特朗普的议程会让局势好转抑或恶化仍有待观察。


Berlusconi on the Boil	热锅上的贝卢斯科尼


Silvio Berlusconi was elected as Italy's prime minister after campaigning on a platform of reinvigorating the economy through tax cuts and liberalization.	在宣扬通过减税和开放重振经济的竞选活动后，西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼当选为意大利总理。


After three years in office, he has not delivered on his economic agenda and his government is in shambles.	就任3年后，他没能实现自己的经济理想，以他为首的政府也开始风雨飘摇。


What went wrong?	问题究竟出在哪里？


Italy's economic ills are well known.	意大利的经济痼疾尽人皆知。


At the risk of over-simplifying, they can be grouped under three headings:	如果不惮简陋，大致可以归结为3个方面：


·  Weak public finances .	·  公共财政薄弱 。


When Italy joined the European Monetary Union, its primary budget surplus (tax receipts in excess of government spending, excluding interest payments) was about 5% of national income.	意大利加入欧洲货币联盟之时，其主要预算盈余（除利息支付外超过政府开支的纳税收入）只占国民收入的5%。


In 2004, the surplus will shrink to about 1.5% - before the tax cuts that Berlusconi promised for next year.	到贝卢斯科尼承诺减税的前一年，也就是2004年，上述盈余将进一步缩减至约1.


Excessive social welfare spending (mainly public pensions) and the cost of servicing the public debt drain resources from more productive government spending and impose a high tax burden.	5%。 过度的社会福利开支（主要是公共养老金）和偿付国债的费用将资源从高效的政府开支领域抽走，形成了高额的税收负担。


The government has failed to take any meaningful action, and the problem is getting worse.	政府未能采取任何有意义的行动，导致问题日益恶化。


Unsurprisingly, the rating agency Standard & Poor's recently downgraded Italian public debt.	因此，不久前标准普尔评级机构降低了意大利国债的信用等级，其实并不让人感到奇怪。


·  Declining competitiveness .	·  竞争力下降 。


Italy's most dynamic producers are small manufacturing firms in traditional sectors with relatively low technological content.	意大利最具活力的企业是传统行业的小型制造公司，技术含量相对较低。


With these firms now exposed to foreign competition from low-cost producers in Asia and Eastern Europe, Italy's share of world exports has been shrinking in recent years.	目前这些公司面临着来自亚洲和东欧低成本制造企业的国际竞争，意大利的国际出口份额近年来也有所下降。


Italy has a few large corporations, mainly in services, utilities, or sectors shielded from competition.	意大利有几家大公司，主要处于服务、公用事业或存在竞争保护的领域。


These monopolistic producers act like a distorting tax on the rest of the economy.	这些垄断企业成为其余经济部门变相的经济负担。


Smaller but more competitive manufacturing firms lack the resources to expand in more advanced technological sectors.	规模较小但更有竞争力的制造公司缺少在高科技领域扩张所需的资源。


The volume of private and public R&D spending is one of the lowest among industrial countries.	私有和公共的研发开支处在工业国家中最低的水平。


As a result, Italy is receiving immigrants with relatively low skills, while many of its most productive young graduates emigrate to the US, the UK, or other European countries.	因此，意大利接收的移民技能相对有限，而本国很多年轻毕业生又移民到美、英或其它欧洲国家。


The government has done little to remedy this.	政府在这方面没什么建树。


Liberalization attempts in energy and public utilities have faltered, perhaps also because the government pockets monopoly rents through dividends from public enterprises.	能源和公共事业部门的自由化改革进展缓慢，可能是因为政府也从公共企业获得垄断利润。


Privatization has stalled.	私有化改革也停步不前。


·  The Mezzogiorno .	· 意大利南部地区。


Labor productivity is traditionally much lower in Italy's south than in the rest of the country. But centralized wage negotiations impose the same salary everywhere.	传统上，意大利南部的劳动生产率大大低于其它地区，但集中谈判强制不同地区采取同样的薪酬政策。


So many in the South remain poor and out of work, particularly the young.	因此，南部有很多人贫困失业，年青人尤其如此。


Early on, the government proposed legislation to increase labor market flexibility and relax constraints on firing rules. But its strategy of dividing the trade unions failed and some of the proposed legislation was eventually withdrawn.	早些时候，政府提出过加大劳动力市场灵活性、放松解雇限制的议案，但分裂工会的策略没有奏效，导致有些提案被最终撤回。


Why has the government achieved so little, despite a large majority in Parliament, widespread backing among the population, and supportive media?	尽管拥有议会的多数支持、人民的广泛赞同和媒体的全力拥护，政府为什么还是鲜有成果？


The main reason is government infighting.	主要原因是政府的内部争斗。


In a well functioning democracy, electoral competition between government and opposition induces the government to pursue efficient policies. Not so in Italy, where the main site of electoral competition has always been  within the governing coalition.	在运转正常的民主社会，政府和反对派之间的选举竞争促使政府采取有效的政策，但在意大利却并非如此，因为这里的选举竞争主要发生在执政联盟的内部。


Each government party is afraid of losing votes to its coalition partners, and undermines or blocks whatever the government is trying to do.	每个政党都怕因联盟伙伴而丢失选票，这无形中破坏或阻止了政府采取行动。


The result is policy paralysis, until time has run out for everyone.	结果造成政策瘫痪，浪费了非常宝贵的时间。


The same problems led to the collapse of the previous government (a left-wing coalition led by current EU Commission President Romano Prodi), and they would certainly continue under a new government if a left-wing coalition was voted into office at the next election.	同样的问题导致了前任政府的失败（现任欧盟执委会主协普罗迪领导的左翼联盟），并且如果左翼联盟在下届大选中获胜，同样的问题肯定会再度出现。


Unstable coalition governments have been typical of Italy's postwar politics.	不稳定的联盟政府是战后意大利政治的典型产物。


In an attempt to solve the problem, a mixed electoral system was introduced in the early 1990's, with about three quarters of the seats assigned under plurality rule in single member districts and the rest allocated under proportional representation.	为解决这一问题，20世纪90年代早期曾引入混合选举制度，即同一选区内四分之三的席位仍由多数规则确定，而其余则按比例代表制产生。


But the hope that this would ensure greater stability has been unfulfilled.	但借此增加稳定性的愿望并没有实现。


The residual proportional component of the electoral system has kept many political parties alive.	选举制度的剩余比例规定使很多政党得以继续生存。


Because all of them compete for these proportional seats, government infighting remains acute.	由于所有人都拼命争夺比例席位，政府的内部争斗仍然异常激烈。


A logical solution would be to scrap the proportional component of the electoral system altogether, and move decisively toward a two-party political system under fully majoritarian elections. But that is unlikely.	合理的解决方法是将选举制度的剩余比例部分捏合在一起，果断地在严格多数选举中实行两党制，但这种可能性并不太大。


On the contrary, the smaller centrist parties that scored a victory in the recent European Parliament elections are now demanding a return to full proportionality.	恰恰相反，刚在欧洲议会选举中获胜的小规模温和派正在呼吁比例代表制的全面恢复。


If they get it, matters will most likely go from bad to worse.	如果成功，局面就会更加恶化。


Under the current system, Italian governments achieve little, but at least they last longer.	现有体制下的意大利政府虽然效率低下，但至少还算稳定。


A return to full proportionality would probably mean a return to rapid government turnover, which carries with it the risk that policy horizons will also become shorter.	恢复比例代表制可能意味着恢复政府的迅速更迭，而这意味着政策前景会愈加短暂。


As Italians know all too well, government instability inevitably breeds financial volatility.	意大利人再清楚不过，政府的不稳定必将带来严重的金融动荡。


Italy’s Taxing Election	意大利的征税选举


MILAN – A winter election is not to Italian tastes.	米兰——意大利人一向不喜欢冬季选举。


But, on February 24-25, up to 50 million voters will go to the polls to elect a new parliament, delivering Italy’s 62nd government in the last 65 years.	但今年的2月24－25日，多达5000万选民将投票选出新一届议会，并组成65年来意大利的第62届政府。


Since November 2011, Italy has been led not by a politician, but by an academic economist and a former European Union commissioner, Mario Monti.	2011年11月以来，领导意大利的不是政治家，而是经济学家兼前欧盟委员马里奥·蒙蒂。


His emergency technocratic government, supported by the left and right, was a masterstroke of outgoing President Giorgio Napolitano.	蒙蒂的应急技术派政府得到了左右两派的一致支持，是即将卸任的总统乔治·纳波利塔诺的建功立业之举。


Napolitano’s move was crucial, filling Italy’s need to replace the inefficient and scandal-ridden Silvio Berlusconi, in whom fellow leaders and global markets had lost all confidence, with an internationally respected figure.	纳波利塔诺此举非常关键，以一位在国际上备受尊敬的人物取代低效、丑闻缠身且已失去其他领导人及全球市场信任的贝卢斯科尼。


Under Monti’s leadership, reforms were finally initiated and markets were calmed.	在蒙蒂的领导下，改革进程终于开始并成功平复了市场情绪。


To enhance the credibility of public finances, Monti’s government substantially increased taxes, particularly on real estate, while preserving the already record-high income-tax rate.	为提升公共财政可信度，蒙蒂政府在维持创纪录所得税率的同时大幅增加税收，尤其是针对房地产领域。


The tax plan highlighted that Italy, like Japan, is a country of public debt and private wealth.	该税收计划强调意大利和日本一样以公债和私产为特色。


As the economist Marco Fortis points out, Italian family wealth is still, if not for long, second to none in Europe.	经济学家马可·福蒂斯指出，即使排名在不久后发生变化，但意大利的家庭财富依然在欧洲首屈一指。


Beyond growing international credibility, two major changes to the Italian political landscape have shaped the election campaign.	除国际信誉逐步恢复外，意大利政治格局的两大变化也决定了竞选活动的走势。


The first is Monti’s surprise resignation in December, after losing the backing of Berlusconi’s party.	其一是蒙蒂在失去贝卢斯科尼政党支持后于去年12月突然宣布辞职。


While he will not run as a candidate (he is already a senator for life), he formed a centrist coalition – affiliated with neither the left nor the right – to contest the election, and has declared his willingness to resume his leadership role if the coalition is victorious.	虽然不再以候选人身份参选（蒙蒂已被授予终身参议员职位），但他成立了（既不隶属于左派也不隶属于右派的）中间派别联盟，并宣称若联盟获胜他愿意继续担任领袖。


The second change is that, after almost two decades of striving for a workable political system dominated by the center-left and center-right parties, Italy is experiencing a remarkable dispersion of forces.	其二是在为建立中间偏左及中间偏右政党主导的可行政治制度奋斗近二十年后，意大利的党派力量正在逐步分散。


The ballot will include dozens of competing parties, most of which will not win parliamentary seats, owing to a 2005 electoral law requiring at least 4% of the national vote to enter the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and 8% on a regional basis to enter the Senate.	几十个竞争党派将参与选举，其中多数因2005年选举法规定至少要4%的全国选票才能进入众议院（下院）及8%的地区选票才能进入参议院而无缘赢得议会席位。


According to public-opinion polls, the center-left Democratic Party, led by Pier Luigi Bersani, along with some more left-leaning allies, has the support of roughly 33% of the electorate, down since late January, while backing for Berlusconi’s center-right coalition has risen to 28%.	民调结果显示，由贝尔萨尼领导的中间偏左民主党及某些更为左倾的合作伙伴共同赢得了约33%的选民支持，这一数据比一月下旬有所下降，而同一阶段对贝卢斯科尼中间偏右联盟的支持率已经上升至28%。


Meanwhile, Monti’s centrist grouping has only 16% support, while the populist Five Star Movement, founded by the comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009, has 17% backing – a figure that could go higher if those who previously stayed at home decide to cast a protest vote.	此外，蒙蒂的中间团体仅获16%的支持率，而喜剧演员毕普·格里罗于2009年成立的民粹主义五星运动的支持率则为17%，如果居家人士决定投票抗议这一数字还有可能增加。


The real battle, therefore, is between the Bersani and Berlusconi coalitions.	因此真正的角逐将在贝尔萨尼和贝卢斯科尼联盟之间展开。


Most observers believe that Bersani will carry the day, thanks to the much-criticized electoral law, which will give him control of the lower chamber if he wins a majority – regardless of how many people vote or how slim the margin.	多数观察家认为贝尔萨尼将最终获胜，因为无论多少人参与投票及优势多么微弱，只要贝尔萨尼能赢得多数，那么根据饱受诟病的选举法他就可以控制下院。


The law favored Berlusconi in 2008; it is likely to benefit Bersani now.	选举法曾在2008年帮助贝卢斯科尼赢得选举，而这次贝尔萨尼很可能成为受益者。


But, in order to govern, Bersani would need both chambers, and he is unlikely to muster 50.1% in the Senate.	不过贝尔萨尼必须控制参众两院才能掌控政局，但他不太可能得到50.


At the same time, with Monti’s coalition failing to gain traction, reflecting the historically limited appeal of classic bourgeois parties in Italy, many observers are wondering what his role in the next government will be.	1%的参议院席位。 同时蒙蒂联盟因经典资产阶级政党在意大利向来缺乏吸引力而功亏一篑，因此许多观察家都好奇他将在下届政府中扮演何种角色。


For Bersani, creating a coalition with Monti may well be the key to gaining control of the upper house and, in turn, of the government.	对贝尔萨尼而言，与蒙蒂结成联盟很可能是取得上议院控制权、并藉此控制政府的关键因素。


Amid these plans and predictions, a growing banking scandal has reminded Italians that, in politics, luck can sometimes make the difference.	虽然有众多的计划和预测，但一场不断发酵的银行丑闻提醒意大利人运气有时在政治领域会成为决定因素。


When Monte dei Paschi di Siena – Italy’s third-largest bank – revealed that it faced losses of up to €720 million ($970 million) from complex derivatives deals carried out in 2006-2009, support for Bersani’s coalition slipped, owing to the PD’s long-standing ties to the bank.	当意大利第三大银行锡耶纳银行披露因2006－2009年期间进行的复杂衍生品交易而面临高达7亿2千万（合9亿7千万美元）的亏损，民主党因为与该行有长期关系而影响了贝尔萨尼联盟的支持率。


Given that Italians tend to vote against, rather than for, issues, mistrust of the PD has translated into increased support for Berlusconi’s coalition.	由于意大利人倾向于因突发事件投出反对票而不是赞成票，对民主党的不信任已导致贝卢斯科尼联盟的支持率上升。


Another issue with the potential to undermine the PD’s standing is the party’s advocacy of a new wealth tax.	鼓吹新征财产税是可能影响民主党选举的另一个问题。


Italians already shoulder heavy taxes: an individual taxpayer with annual income of €50,000 pays €15,000 in income tax; with two children, that total drops by only €1,000.	意大利人的税收负担已经相当繁重：一名年收入50,000欧元的纳税人需缴纳15,000欧元的所得税； 有两个孩子的纳税人税额仅减少1,000欧元。


By contrast, a French taxpayer with the same income pays only €9,000; with two children, the tax bill plummets to €3,000, and a €1.5 million fortune would mean an additional wealth tax of only €4,230.	相比之下，法国一名同等收入的纳税人仅需缴纳9,000欧元所得税； 有两个孩子的纳税人税额则骤降至3,000欧元，也就是说在法国拥有150万欧元财产仅需额外缴纳4,230欧元的财产税。


In other words, with or without children, the French citizen’s annual tax payment would be smaller than that of the Italian taxpayer with no additional wealth.	换言之，无论有没有子女，法国公民的年纳税额均小于拥有同等财产的意大利纳税人。


In this context, a new wealth tax could be a dangerous proposition for the PD.	鉴于上述情况，新增财产税对民主党而言可能是一项危险的倡议。


One feature of Italy’s turbulent politics remains consistent: the control exercised by entrenched interests, and the dominance of a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy.	意大利动荡政局有一个特点一直保持不变：那就是由既得利益群体掌握控制权，并由臃肿低效的官僚机构占据统治地位。


With less than one-fifth of the population of the United States, Italy’s parliament has twice as many members as the US Congress, and they are among the world’s best-compensated and most privileged MPs.	意大利人口不及美国的五分之一，但议员数量却达到美国的两倍，而且议员所拥有的薪酬和特权在世界各国均处于领先地位。


Meanwhile, Italy’s top bureaucrats are the highest paid in history, according to OECD data, with several retired officials drawing larger pensions than former US presidents receive.	此外，经合组织数据显示，意大利高官享受有史以来的最高薪酬，某些退休官员的退休金甚至超过了美国前任总统。


The salaries of Italy’s military chiefs of staff and chief of police are almost triple those of their American counterparts.	意大利军队参谋长和警察局长的工资几乎达到美国同僚的三倍。


But prospects for political reform do not inspire optimism.	但人们很难乐观看待政治改革的前景。


While Grillo’s supporters may ignite fireworks in protest of these gilded giveaways for a few months, a consistent assault leading to genuine reform seems doubtful.	尽管格里罗的支持者可能放几个月焰火抗议上述镀金赠品，但真正推动改革的持续性努力却似乎希望渺茫。


More broadly, the outcome of Italy’s election will undoubtedly have a far-reaching impact on a still-fragile eurozone, though the nature of that impact remains impossible to predict – unless Berlusconi returns to power, in which case the consequences will be all too clear.	从广义上看，尽管影响的性质无法确定，但意大利选举结果无疑将对脆弱的欧元区产生深远的影响——除非贝卢斯科尼重新掌权，如果那样将出现昭然若揭的后果。


Bernanke Meets the Press	伯南克会见媒体


CAMBRIDGE – At the United States Federal Reserve’s recent and first-ever public press conference, Chairman Ben Bernanke gave a spirited defense of the Fed’s much-criticized policy of mass purchases of US government bonds, also known as “quantitative easing.”	发自剑桥——在美联储最近也是头一次的新闻发布会上，主席本·伯南克为本机构饱受诟病的大规模购买美国政府债券（也就是所谓的“量化宽松”）政策大力辩护。


But was his justification persuasive?	那么他的理由有说服力吗？


Most economists viewed his performance as masterful.	大多数经济学家认为伯南克干的不错。


But the fact that the dollar has continued to slide while gold prices have continued to rise suggests considerable skepticism from markets.	但美元持续下滑而黄金不断上升的事实也反映出市场对此的怀疑态度。


One of the hardest things in central banking is that investors often hear a very different message from that which the central bank intends to send.	对于中央银行来说，最困难的事莫过于投资者们听到的信息往往与央行想传达的截然不同。


The Fed, of course, has been forced to turn to “QE,” as traders call it, because its normal tool for fine-tuning inflation and growth, the overnight interest rate, is already zero. Yet US economic growth remains sluggish, and is accompanied by stubbornly high unemployment.	很显然，美联储是在交易者的呼吁下被迫采用“量化宽松”政策的，因为原本一直用来对通胀和增长进行微调的隔夜利率已经下降到近乎零了，但美国经济却依然停滞不前，又被挥之不去的高失业率所困扰。


QE has been blamed for everything from asset-price bubbles to food riots to impetigo.	人们把一切问题都归咎于量化宽松政策，从资产价格泡沫到食品暴乱甚至连脓包病都没有漏下。


Everyone from foreign finance ministers to cartoon satirists (check out the video “quantitative easing explained”) to Sarah Palin has ripped into the policy.	包括外国财政部长到政治漫画家（请参见网上一段名为“量化宽松答疑”的动画视频）以及前共和党总统候选人萨拉·佩林在内的所有人都争相对政策发表自己的高见。


Critics insist that QE is the beginning of the end of the global financial system, if not of civilization itself.	批评认为量化宽松政策拉开了全球金融系统灭亡的序幕，甚至关系到整个文明。


Their most telling complaint is that too little is known about how quantitative easing works, and that the Fed is therefore taking undue risks with the global financial system to achieve a modest juicing of the US economy.	他们最有说服力的抱怨就是人们对量化宽松究竟如何运作知之甚少，因此美联储冒着可能毁灭全球金融系统的巨大风险换来的只是对美国经济的一点推动作用。


Whether or not the critics are right, one thing is clear: with the Fed lagging other global central banks in the monetary-tightening cycle, and with rating agencies contemplating a downgrade of America’s credit score, the US dollar’s purchasing power has sunk to an all-time low against the currencies of America’s trading partners.	不论这一观点是对是错，有一点是相当明确的：随着美联储与其他各国央行的货币紧缩周期政策背道而驰，加上各大评级机构纷纷考虑调低美国的信用评级，美元的购买力相对于美国的贸易伙伴来说已经下降到了前所未有的低点。


Bernanke’s defense was robust and unequivocal.	伯南克的辩词其实是站得住脚的。


He argued that QE is not nearly as unconventional as its critics claim.	他指出量化宽松政策完全不是批评所说的“非常规行为”。


If one looks at how it has affected financial conditions, including long-term interest rates, volatility, and stock prices, QE looks an awful lot like conventional interest-rate policy, which we think we understand.	如果从该政策对包括长期利率，波动性和股价等金融状况的影响来看，它与我们自以为很熟悉的常规利率调整政策非常相似。


Thus, concerns about QE’s supposed ill effects are wildly overblown, and there is nothing especially challenging about eventually reversing course, either.	因此对量化宽松政策潜在负面影响效应的担忧其实是被过度放大了，况且如果最终想逆向回收这一政策的话也没有太大的难度。


Bernanke dismissed complaints about commodity prices and emerging-market inflation, arguing that these phenomena had far more to do with lax monetary policies and overly rigid exchange rates in fast-growing developing economies.	伯南克否定了那些关于商品价格和新兴市场通胀的抱怨，认为这些状况更多地来源于对货币政策的错误运用以及那些高速发展经济体过度僵化的汇率管制。


The Fed chairman’s comments come at a critical and sensitive moment.	主席的这番评论恰好是选在一个关键和敏感的时间点来发表的。


Over the next year or so, the Fed is likely to enter a tightening cycle, raising interest rates on a steady and sustained basis.	在未来几年间，美联储将可能进入一个货币紧缩周期，并稳步提高利率。


It does not want to rush, because the US economy is still weak, with first-quarter growth a lackluster 1.8%.	美���储无意高歌猛进，因为美国经济依旧虚弱，今年第一季度的增长率也只有可怜的1.


But it cannot wait too long, lest inflation expectations drift to a dangerously high level, forcing the Fed to move aggressively – and at the cost of considerable economic pain – to wring inflation out of the system.	8%。 但同时该机构也可能不能长期按兵不动，以免通胀预期上升到一个危险的程度，最终迫使其使出强硬手段，在付出极大经济代价的情况下去遏制通胀。


In unwinding QE, Bernanke must avoid another landmine, namely an unwelcome collapse in asset prices.	在逐步脱离量化宽送政策方面，伯南克必须小心另外一个陷阱，那就是资产价格的意外崩溃。


Many savvy Wall Street traders are convinced that QE is just the old “Greenspan put” on steroids.	许多华尔街交易老手都确信量化宽松政策只不过是旧有“格林斯潘对策”的放大版。


The cult of the “Greenspan put” stemmed from the previous Fed chairman’s avowed belief that the Fed should not try to resist a sharply rising stock market, except to the extent that such a market undermines the long-term stability of prices for ordinary goods.	这种对“格林斯潘对策”的迷信源自于这位前美联储主席一条众所周知的理念：美联储不应尝试压制一个快速上涨的股票市场，除非市场已经发展到了危及一般商品长期价格稳定性的程度。


But if the stock market collapses too quickly, the Fed should worry about a recession and react aggressively to cushion the fall.	但如果股票市场过快下跌的话，美联储应当小心衰退的可能性并使出强硬手段来缓冲下跌。


Are traders right?	那么这些交易员的观点又是对是错？


Is QE merely the sequel to the “Greenspan put”?	量化宽松政策是否就是“格林斯潘对策”的翻版？


It is certainly the case that today’s super-low interest rates encourage investors to pour funds into risky assets.	当前极低的利率促使投资者将资金投向一些高风险资产。


The Fed probably would argue that it is the job of regulators to make sure that asset bubbles do not induce too much borrowing and an eventual debt crisis, though of course monetary policy has to be in the mix.	虽然货币政策也必须考虑到这些因素，但美联储可能会认为监管者有责任去确保资产泡沫不会导致过度借贷并最终引发债务危机。


Given the sluggish recovery, Bernanke could have gone even further and argued that the Fed is the one who has it right.	考虑到当前不甚乐观的复苏态势，伯南克甚至可以进一步认为只有美联储走对了路子。


Other advanced-economy monetary authorities, such as the European Central Bank, might be over-reacting to short term inflation volatility.	包括欧洲央行在内的其他发达经济体货币管理机构可能是对短期的通胀波动性反应过度了。


However, perhaps not wanting to cause problems for his foreign counterparts, Bernanke took a more cautious approach, merely defending the Fed’s policy as the right choice for America.	但或许是不想冒犯自己的外国同行，伯南克采取了一个更为谨慎的对策，仅仅坚持美联储的政策是对美国有利的选择。


In defending the Fed’s policy, Bernanke had to be careful not to say anything that might overly alarm investors.	在为美联储政策辩护的过程中，伯南克必须小心不要发表一些可能引发投资者过度恐慌的言论。


Indeed, there is already reason enough for them to be nervous: after all, the Fed’s epic easing of financial conditions must eventually be followed by exceptionally painful tightening.	事实上，投资者已经有足够的理由去恐慌：毕竟美联储对金融的大幅放宽最终将以非常痛苦的紧缩作为结尾。


Will the economy be ready when the time comes?	那么美国经济是否已经准备好迎接这一时刻？


Explaining the inevitable shift to tightening could prove a far greater challenge than explaining the exceptional accommodation of quantitative easing.	跟解释量化宽松的特殊调节措施比起来，解释这场向紧缩政策的必然转化显然更有难度。


The Fed must always remember that no matter how calm and rational its analysis may be, it is dealing with markets that can be anything but calm and rational.	美联储应当牢记：无论它的分析有多冷静或者多合理，但自己却是与一个最缺乏冷静和理性的市场打交道。


Precisely because so much emotion has been invested in QE, the psychological effects of returning to normalcy are going to be perilous and unpredictable.	恰恰由于已经有如此多的情绪被投入到了量化宽松政策之上，因此回复常态所带来的心理冲击可能是极为危险且出乎意料的。


The Tragedy of Ben Bernanke	本·伯南克的悲剧


BERKELEY – It is difficult to read former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke’s new memoir, The Courage to Act, as anything other than a tragedy.	伯克利—阅读美联储前主席本·伯南克的新自传《行动的勇气》（The Courage to Act），除了悲剧之外再难有别的感觉。


It is the story of a man who may have been the best-prepared person in the world for the job he was given, but who soon found himself outmatched by its challenges, quickly falling behind the curve and never quite managing to catch up.	这是一个关于一个男人的故事，他是全世界最适合做给他的任务的人，但很快就发现力不从心，只能明知不可为而为之。


It is to Bernanke’s great credit that the shock of 2007-2008 did not trigger another Great Depression.	2007—2008年的冲击没有引发又一场大萧条，这笔功劳要记在伯南克身上。


But his response to its aftermath was unexpectedly disappointing.	但他在危机后的反应出人意料地令人失望。


In 2000, Bernanke had argued that a central bank with sufficient will could “always,” in the medium term at least, restore full prosperity via quantitative easing.	2000年，伯南克指出，有足够意愿的央行“永远”可以至少在中期通过量化宽松重塑充分繁荣。


If a central bank printed money and bought financial assets on a large-enough scale, people would begin to step up their spending.	如果央行印钱并大规模购买金融资产，人们就会开始增加支出。


Even if people believed that only a fraction of quantitative easing was permanent, and even if the incentive to spend was low, the central bank could restart the economy.	即使人们相信只有一小部分量化宽松是持久的，即使支出激励十分微小，央行也可以让经济重新起步。


In the end however, Bernanke did not deliver.	但是，最后伯南克并没有实现这一点。


Even though the Fed and many other central banks printed much more money than economists would have thought necessary to offset the impact of the financial crisis, full prosperity has yet to be restored.	尽管美联储和其他许多央行印钞数量之大远远超过了经济学家所认为的抵消金融危机影响所需要的量，但充分繁荣至今没能重建。


Bernanke increased the US monetary base five-fold, from $800 billion to $4 trillion.	伯南克将美国货币基础扩大了四倍，从8,000亿美元扩大到4,0000亿。


But it wasn’t enough.	但这还不够。


And then, his courage failing, he balked at taking the next leap: more than doubling the monetary base to $9 trillion.	接着，他失去了信心，采取了又一次“大跃进”：将货币基础再扩大一倍多，达到9万亿美元。


In his last years in office, Bernanke was reduced to begging in vain for Congress to institute fiscal expansion.	在担任美联储主席的最后一年，伯南克甚至开始徒劳地乞求国会采取财政扩张。


So what went wrong?	那么，哪里出了问题？


The answer, as is often the case, depends on which economist you ask.	一如往常，答案取决于你对哪个经济学家问这个问题。


If I understand Bernanke correctly, he would argue that nothing fundamental went wrong, and that a temporary savings glut has artificially lengthened the time it takes for aggressive monetary expansion to restore full prosperity.	如果我对伯南克的理解正确，那么他会说，基本面没有问题，暂时的储蓄过剩人为地拉长了激进货币扩张重建充分繁荣所需要的时间。


Loss-adverse sovereign wealth funds, emerging-market millionaires parking their money in the US and Europe, and governments seeking to ensure freedom of action have pushed full-prosperity interest rates down substantially and extended the time it takes for shocks to dissipate.	厌恶损失的主权财富基金、把钱存在美国和欧洲的新兴市场富豪以及寻求确保行动自由的政府持续性地拉低了充分繁荣利率，延长了冲击消散所需要的时间。


Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff holds a different view: Bernanke’s cardinal error was to focus too narrowly on the money supply.	哈佛大学的肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）持不同看法：伯南克的主要错误是过于狭隘地关注货币供给。


According to simple economic models, when the money market is in full-prosperity equilibrium, the debt market is too.	根据简单的经济学模型，当货币市场处于充分繁荣均衡时，债务市场也是如此。


But in the real world, it might have been more effective for governments to buy back risky debts and induce lenders to write off losses.	但在真实世界中，对政府来说也许回购高风险债务、促使贷款人减记损失更有效。


This, more than loose monetary policy, would have boosted private spending and rapidly restored full prosperity.	这将比放松货币政策更加能够提振私人支出和快速重建充分繁荣。


Still others would make the case that monetary action would have been enough, if only the Fed had committed to a target for annual inflation that was higher than 2% and vowed to do as much quantitative easing as necessary to reach that goal.	还有一些经济学家会说，如果美联储承诺将年通胀目标定在高于2%的水平，或承诺实现这一目标需要多少量化宽松就实施多少量化宽松就好了，这样货币动作就足够了。


This simple promise – were it to be made credible – would have been far more effective than much larger amounts of quantitative easing.	这一简单的承诺——如果取得信誉的话——将远比大大增加量化宽松量更有效。


Finally, there is a fourth view, championed most prominently by Larry Summers and Paul Krugman.	最后，是第四种观点，以拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）和保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）为首。


They argue that there is little evidence that monetary policy will ever restore full prosperity.	他们指出，没有证据表明货币政策能够重建充分繁荣。


In this view, Milton Friedman’s dream of using strategic monetary interventions to offset economic shocks remains just that: a dream.	根据这一观点，米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）的梦想——用战略性货币干预抵消经济冲击终究只是一个梦想。


It was only the unique circumstance in Europe and the US over the last half-century – most notably rapid demographic and productivity growth – that made his ideas seem plausible.	过去半个世纪中欧洲和美国的特殊环境——最引人注目的是快速的人口和生产率增长——让他的观点看似可行。


“If nobody believes that inflation will rise, it won’t,” is how Krugman put it. “The only way to be at all sure of raising inflation is to accompany a changed monetary regime with a burst of fiscal stimulus.”	“如果没人相信通胀会上升，它就不会上升，”克鲁格曼如是说，“最安全的提高通胀的唯一方法是用大规��财政刺激替换货币机制。


I do not claim to know which of these views is the correct one.	我不知道这四个观点哪个是正确的。


But I do think that this discussion is the most important debate in the field of macroeconomics since John Maynard Keynes wrestled with similar questions in the 1930s.	但我确实认为，自凯恩斯在20世纪30年代与类似的问题角力以来，这场讨论是宏观经济学领域最重要的争论。


For Keynes, the answer was clear, and it was something close to what is being argued by Summers and Krugman; indeed, his conclusions are what transformed him from a monetarist into a Keynesian.	对凯恩斯来说，答案是明确的，这个答案与萨默斯和克鲁格曼的观点比较接近； 事实上，正是这一结论让凯恩斯从货币主义者变成了凯恩斯主义者。


“It seems unlikely that the influence of [monetary] policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself,” Keynes wrote in 1936. “I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment.”	“关于利率的[货币]政策凭借其本身产生足够的影响力，这似乎是不可能的，”凯恩斯在1936年写道，“因此，我相信，某种程度的投资的全面社会化将是确保接近充分就业的唯一办法。


Those are words worth considering the next time we find ourselves needing the courage to act.	”下一次我们发现需要鼓起勇气采取行动时，仍值得考虑这些话。


A New Caliphate?	新哈里发帝国？


PRINCETON – The recent declaration of a caliphate by the militant group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is an unprecedented event in modern times.	普林斯顿—军事组织伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国（Islamic State in Iraq and Syria，ISIS）最近宣言要建立一个哈里发帝国，这是现代社会前所未有的事件。


Regardless of how it turns out, one thing is clear: violent jihadism is now an entrenched feature of the Arab political landscape.	不管此事如何发酵，有一点是明确的：暴力圣战主义如今已成为阿拉伯政治版图上根深蒂固的特征。


Not since the Turkish Republic abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 has any Muslim group in control of territory made such a bid.	自1924年土耳其共和国废除奥斯曼哈里发帝国以来，从未有控制领土的穆斯林集团提出如此宏伟的主张。


Even Al Qaeda and the Taliban have limited their demands to the creation of statelets (emirates), which they hope will eventually coalesce into a caliphate.	即使是基地组织和塔利班，在建立酋长国方面的要求也不多见，而他们的目标正是最终通过联合诸酋长国建立一个哈里发帝国。


This hesitation can be explained, at least partly, by the fact that neither Osama bin Laden nor Mullah Omar (the Taliban’s leader) can fulfill the conditions for being a caliph, one of which is proof of descent from the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh.	这一犹豫态度至少部分可以用一个事实来解释：不管是本·拉登还是奥马尔（塔利班领袖），都无法满足成为哈里发的条件，因为这必须追溯到先知穆罕默德所在的古莱什（Quraysh）部落。


The new caliphal claimant, the Islamic State’s emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, can.	而新的哈里发帝国主张者——ISIS埃米尔巴格达迪（Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi）可以。


As conceived in Islamic political thought, a caliphate, unlike a conventional nation-state, is not subject to fixed borders.	在伊斯兰政治思想中，哈里发帝国与常规民族国家不同，并不局限于固定国界。


Instead, it is focused on defending and expanding the dominion of the Muslim faith through jihad, or armed struggle.	相反，哈里发帝国专注于通过圣战或武装斗争捍卫和扩张穆斯林信仰的支配权。


The statement announcing the new caliphate, entitled “This is the Promise of Allah,” was issued on the first day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, and lays out a radical vision for reconfiguring the Arab world.	题为《这是真主的承诺》（“This is the Promise of Allah”）的新哈里发帝国建国宣言发布于伊斯兰神圣的斋月的第一天，并提出了重组阿拉伯世界的激进愿景。


First, it declares that ISIS will drop its titular reference to “Iraq and Syria” to become simply the Islamic State, implying that it has its sights set on other countries, especially Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Lebanon.	首先，宣言宣布ISIS将去除徒具虚名的“伊拉克和叙利亚”定语，只保留“伊斯兰国”，这意味着它的目光已经转向他国，特别是约旦和沙特阿拉伯，或许还有黎巴嫩。


The rest of the statement is replete with injunctions from the Koran, several of which refer to God deputizing the “true believers” as his regents on earth, empowering them to humiliate and defeat his “enemies,” who now include Shia Muslims, democrats, nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jews, and Christians.	宣言的其他部分则充斥着古兰经的神谕，其中不少说神指定其“真正信徒”摄政人间，授予他们羞辱和打败他的“敌人”的权力，目前这些敌人包括什叶派穆斯林、民主人士、民族主义者、穆斯林兄弟会、犹太人和基督徒。


These believers are now operating, the statement continues, under the banner of the Islamic State, which currently controls the territory between Aleppo in Syria and Diyala in Iraq, where it has already established the structures of a proto-state: courts, a tax system, and security and social services.	宣言继续说，这些信徒目前正在伊斯兰国的大旗下展开行动。 伊斯兰国��前控制着从叙利亚的阿勒颇到伊拉克的迪亚拉（Diyala）之间的领土，并且已经建立了雏形国家的结构：法院、税收体系、安全和社会服务俱全。


The Islamic State argues that all Muslims, including all jihadist factions, must acknowledge the caliph as their leader if they are not to live in sin.	伊斯兰国指出，所有穆斯林，包括所有圣战组织，如果不想生活在罪恶中，就必须承认哈里发是他们的领导者。


Though this notion of a collective religious obligation is largely consistent with traditional Islamic law, most Muslims consider such injunctions irrelevant in the modern age.	尽管这一集体宗教义务观大致上与传统伊斯兰法相符，但大部分穆斯林认为这些禁令已与现时代格格不入。


Nonetheless, with al-Baghdadi at its helm, the Islamic State is convinced that its new caliphate will – indeed, is supposed to – flourish.	尽管如此，以巴格达迪为首的伊斯兰国认为，其新哈里发意志将——事实上，是想必将——不断壮大。


Al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, is a 40-something Iraqi from Samarra, north of Baghdad.	巴格达迪真名Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai，来自伊拉克巴格达以北的萨马拉（Samarra），今年四十多岁。


A fairly enigmatic figure, he has a higher degree in Islamic studies, and is a gifted strategist and orator.	他是个神秘莫测的人物，拥有伊斯兰教研究的高等学位，也是天赋异禀的战略家和演讲家。


Al-Baghdadi has managed to strike numerous deals with the Sunni tribes of Iraq, without whom he could not have conquered so much territory so quickly.	巴格达迪成功地与伊拉克逊尼派部落达成了大量协议，没有他们的支持，他就无法如此迅速地征服如此广袤的领土。


And, in the few recorded statements that have been released, he displays a mastery of classical Arabic.	而在目前公布的为数极少的有记录文件中，他表现出对阿拉伯古语的精通。


All of this will help him to achieve his goal of succeeding Osama bin Laden as the leader of the global jihad against the forces of nonbelief.	这些都有助于他实现他的目标——继任本·拉登成为针对异教徒势力的全球圣战的领袖。


Whether the announcement of the new caliphate turns out to be politically significant, however, remains to be seen.	但是，宣布建立新哈里发帝国是否会掀起巨大的政治动荡还有待观察。


Its enduring influence will depend on two factors.	其影响力的持续取决于两个因素。


The first is the Islamic State’s continued military success, and its ability to maintain and consolidate its control of territory.	首先是伊斯兰国继续在军事上取得成功，以及有能力保持和巩固领土控制。


So far, jihadist success has depended largely on the divisions within Arab countries and the weakness of their governments, particularly the five – Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – that have lost control over significant portions of their territory.	目前，圣战的成功大部分依靠阿拉伯国家内部的分裂和政府的孱弱——特别是利比亚、埃及、叙利亚、伊拉克和也门五国——这导致政府失去了国家领土大部的控制权。


And these countries are showing no signs of stabilizing.	这些国家也没有任何稳定下来的信号。


While it is unlikely that national borders will be redrawn, the fact that large jihadi-controlled territories are becoming the norm will only make it easier for such forces to augment their financial resources and attract new recruits.	尽管重画国界仍不太可能，但圣战主义控制大片领土渐成常态的实施将让圣战势力扩大资金源、吸引新战士变得更加容易。


The second factor is the Islamic State’s ability to secure sufficient support.	第二个因素是伊斯兰国保证足够支持的能力。


Today, jihadism is more fundamentally divided than ever before.	如今，征战主义的根本分歧之严重前所未有。


Even Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s current leader, views al-Baghdadi as an extremist, and has taken steps to distance his group from the Islamic State.	甚至基地组织当前领袖扎瓦西里（Ayman al-Zawahiri）也罢巴格达迪视为极端主义者，并采取行动让基地组织与伊斯兰国保持距离。


But many jihadi groups and individuals, particularly young people, have signaled their support for the caliphate.	但许多圣战组织和个人，特别是年轻人，表现出对哈里发帝国的支持。


The Islamic State’s statement has already been viewed more than 187,000 times on YouTube, and has been posted innumerable times on Twitter and Facebook, attracting positive comments.	伊斯兰国的宣言在YouTube上已被观赏187,000多次，在Twitter和Facebook上也有数不清的转帖，吸引着积极评论。


A more ominous development is the emergence of a group called the Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem, which has claimed responsibility for murdering – as a gift to the new caliph – the three kidnapped Israeli teenagers whose bodies were recently found in the West Bank.	一个更加不妙的发展趋势是出现了一个叫做耶路撒冷伊斯兰国支持者（Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem）的组织，该组织宣布为杀害三名被绑架以色列少年负责，并说这是为新哈里发帝国的献礼。 三名以色列少年的遗体最近在约旦河西岸被发现。


Jihadism is clearly alive and well across the Arab world.	圣战主义显然十分活跃，并且遍布整个阿拉伯世界。


After decades of unjust and ineffective rule, not to mention tragic foreign interventions, there is no shortage of disenfranchised and frustrated citizens for organizations like the Islamic State to recruit.	在经历了几十年的不公和低效统治后（更不用说悲剧性的外国干预了），有大量被剥夺公民权、生活无望的人民可供伊斯兰国这样的组织招募利用。


Whether this new caliphate succeeds or not, religious violence in the Arab world will likely get worse before it gets better.	不管新哈里发帝国能否成功，阿拉伯世界的宗教暴力在好转之前还将进一步恶化。


The Best Ways to Fight Extreme Poverty	抗击极端贫困的最好方式


COPENHAGEN – In 1950, people in South Korea and Pakistan earned roughly the same amount of money annually.	哥本哈根——1950年，韩国和巴基斯坦民众每年所得相差无几。


Today, the two countries are scarcely comparable.	而今天，这两个国家几乎不具有可比性。


South Korean’s per capita income has grown 23-fold since then, while Pakistan has experienced only a three-fold increase.	韩国的人均收入从那以后增长了23倍，而巴基斯坦却只增长了三倍。


How we can help more of the world’s poorest countries emulate South Korea’s success is one of the most important questions facing the world today.	我们怎样才能帮助世界更多最贫困国家效仿韩国的成功是当今世界面临的最重要问题之一。


Better economic outcomes mean empowering entire populations with better health, more education, longer life, and less vulnerability to challenges like natural disasters.	改善经济成果意味着赋予所有人更强健的体魄、更优质的教育，更长的寿命和更强的战胜自然灾害能力。


Many of the United Nations’ proposed 169 development targets for the next 15 years are, at their heart, concerned with poverty reduction.	减贫是联合国提出未来15年169项发展目标中最常见的核心目标。


But not all targets are equally good.	但并不是所有目标都能带来同等效益。


The Copenhagen Consensus Center, of which I am director, recently asked 60 teams of economists to evaluate the benefits and costs of these proposed targets, which will come into force to replace the Millennium Development Goals in September.	我领导的哥本哈根共识中心最近委托60组经济学家评估上述目标的成本效益状况。 上述拟议中的目标将取代千年发展目标于9月生效。


One of the least desirable targets seems laudable at first: full employment for all.	其中一个最不理想的目标乍看似乎最值得称赞：那就是实现全民就业。


Unfortunately, this is a dream, not a target.	不幸的是，这只是梦想而非目标。


Economies need some unemployment to allow workers to change jobs, and most governments already focus on job creation.	经济发展需要让一些人失业以便实现岗位转换，而且多数政府已经在着力创造就业机会。


Research suggests that politicians and interest groups would use a full-employment target to support expensive, protectionist policies that generate great jobs for some but drive many into the informal economy.	研究表明政客和利益集团会利用全民就业支持代价昂贵的保护主义政策，在为部分人带来好工作的同时却让更多人进入非正式经济队伍。


So it would probably end up doing less good than it would cost, and it is certainly not the way to reduce extreme poverty.	因此这项目标带来的效益可能还不及成本，肯定不是削减极端贫困的最佳方式。


About 14.5% of the world’s population, or one billion people, live on less than $1.25 a day.	全世界约14. 5%的人口，也就是十亿人，每天仅靠不到1.


So why not end extreme poverty by simply transferring enough resources to this billion people to get them to at least $1.26 a day?	25美元生活。 那么为什么不干脆给这十亿人转款，让他们的生活费至少每天达到1.


The world’s poorest would be able to feed and educate their children better and become healthier.	26美元？ 这样全世界最贫困民众就能更好地抚养教育子女及改善健康。


But, in addition to the financial cost, there would be huge administrative challenges, along with corruption and institutional deficiencies.	但除去财务成本，还会带来腐败、体制缺陷和巨大的管理难题。


When these factors are weighed against the benefits in monetary terms, each dollar spent ending extreme poverty with cash transfers would achieve about $5 worth of social value.	权衡这些因素和在货币方面产生的效益，以现金支付形式每花一美元结束极端贫困都将产生5美元的社会价值。


That is not a bad return at all, but there are many better ways to help.	这样的回报一点不差，但还有更好的提供帮助方式。


One possibility is to triple mobile broadband penetration in developing countries.	一种可能性是将发展中国家移动宽带普及率提高3倍。


This would provide small-scale businesspeople such as farmers and fishermen with market information, enabling them to sell their goods at the highest price – and to boost productivity, increase efficiency, and generate more jobs.	农民和���民等小商人可以借此了解市场信息，以最高价格出售产品——从而改善生产力、提高效率、创造更多就业机会。


Our research shows that the benefits, added up, would be worth $17 for every dollar spent – making it a very good development target.	我们的研究表明上述效益加起来相当于每花1美元收益17美元——这使之成为非常诱人的发展目标。


An even better intervention addresses migration.	改进干预方式能够解决移民问题。


More than 200 million people today work outside their home countries.	今天有超过2亿人在国外工作。


As rich countries age, they need more workers.	随着富裕国家不断老龄化，他们需要更多劳动力。


At the same time, people from developing countries are more productive in a developed country.	与此同时，发展中国家民众在发达国家能提高工作效率。


Easing restrictions on migration would allow young people from developing countries to expand industrialized economies’ diminishing workforces – and generate the taxes needed to pay for care for the elderly.	放宽移民限制能使发展中国家年轻人补充工业化国家不断缩减的劳动力——同时产生支付养老费用所需的税赋。


Such migration would also be good for the developing countries, because migrant workers send home remittances.	这样的移民对发展中国家也非常有利，因为外来务工人员能将挣来的报酬汇回家去。


In total, every dollar spent on increased migration would produce more than $45 of social good – possibly more than $300.	总的来讲，每耗费一美元扩大移民就能产生超过45美元——甚至可能超过300美元的社会效益。


While in today’s political climate, increasing migration might be difficult to achieve, it is worth pointing out how effectively it could help the world’s poorest.	尽管扩大移民在当今政治气候下或许难以实现，但应该指出移民对帮助世界最贫困人口多么有价值。


The single development target that would have the biggest impact on global prosperity would be the completion of the Doha trade round.	完成多哈回合贸易谈判是对全球繁荣最具影响的单一发展目标。


Lowering trade barriers would mean that all countries could focus on doing what they do best, making everyone better off.	降低贸易壁垒意味着所有国家都能集中精力做最擅长的工作，让所有人过得更好。


Moreover, freer trade would accelerate economic growth, owing to increased innovation and knowledge exchange.	此外，因为创新增加和知识交流，自由贸易得以加速经济增长。


Heavy reliance on trading in a global market was one of the main reasons that South Korea has developed so rapidly and essentially eradicated its poverty in the last 65 years.	严重依赖全球市场贸易是韩国发展如此之快的主要原因之一，过去65年来该国基本实现了根除贫困的目标。


Economic models indicate that a successful Doha round would make the global economy $11 trillion richer each year by 2030, with most of the benefits going to developing countries.	经济模型表明成功的多哈回合谈判将使全球经济到2030年每年增加11万亿美元财富，其中多数收益将流向发展中国家。


Each person in the developing world would earn $1,000 more per year, on average.	发展中国家每人每年平均收入增加1，000美元。


The number of people living in extreme poverty would fall by 160 million.	极端贫困人数将下降1. 6亿。


For every dollar spent, mostly to pay off Western farmers blocking the current negotiations, the world would achieve more than $2,000 of benefits, making free trade a phenomenal investment.	这方面每投入1美元（主要用于支付阻碍谈判的西方农场主），世界能够实现超过2，000美元收益，使得对自由贸易的投资效率惊人。


Each of these proposals – full employment, cash transfers, broadband rollout, freer migration, and lower trade barriers – is covered by at least one of the UN’s 169 development targets.	所有计划——全民就业、现金转移支付、宽带推广、放宽移民和降低贸易壁垒——全部包含在联合国169项发展目标之中。


And herein lies the problem.	问题就在这里。


Trying to do 169 different things at once would be foolhardy.	试图同时完成169项任务是有勇无谋。


It would mean spending too much time and resources on lower-return priorities, instead of focusing on the targets that promise the biggest impact on the world’s poorest.	这意味着在低效目标上浪费过多时间和金钱，而不是全力实现对全球穷人产生最大影响的目标。


In fact, our research shows that there are 19 phenomenal targets that – like freer trade – should be prioritized above all of the others.	事实上，我们的研究显示像自由贸易一样，应该集中精力优先完成其中19项非同凡响的目标。


The final decision about which targets will become global policy will affect the flow of trillions of dollars over the next 15 years.	那些目标成为全球政策的最终决策将对今后15年价值数万亿美元的资金流动产生影响。


In September, when world leaders gather in New York, they need to focus on the smartest ways to boost global prosperity.	9月，当世界领导人齐聚纽约，他们要对推动全球繁荣的明智方式进行重点探讨。


Doing so would help more countries take South Korea’s path and lift their populations out of poverty.	这样做将帮助更多国家步韩国之后尘，实现民众脱贫致富的目标。


Better Learning Through Better Betting	从更好的赌局中更好地学习


PHILADELPHIA – The course of public debate has become depressingly familiar.	费城—公共争论的过程令人抑郁地熟悉。


It often begins with a surprise – for example, Donald Trump, the real-estate tycoon turned reality TV star, defies the odds to become the US Republican Party’s presumptive presidential nominee.	它常常从惊奇开始——比如，转型电视真人秀明星的房地产大亨唐纳德·特朗普令人大跌眼镜地成为美国共和党总统提名代表。


The pundits dive in.	然后，专家出场。


Why is it happening?	为什么会这样？


What does it mean?	这意味着什么？


What will come next?	接下去会怎样？


After a time, the future that was being debated is revealed.	一段时间后，作为争论对象的未来会水落石出。


In an ideal world, everyone would acknowledge which forecast proved correct. Lessons would be learned.	在理想的世界里，每个人都会看到哪个预测是正确的。


People would change their thinking accordingly.	人们将学习教训，据此改变思维。


Collectively, we would all be a little wiser.	集体而言，我们都会变得更聪明一点。


But this is a less-than-ideal world.	但这是不那么理想的世界。


All too often, instead of learning lessons, the pundits just continue arguing.	常常，专家并不学习教训，而只是继续争论。


They dispute what happened.	他们争论发生的事情。


They disagree about who predicted which outcome.	他们不承认谁预测了哪个结果。


No minds are changed.	没人改变思维。


Collectively, we become no wiser.	集体而言，我们没有变聪明。


For those who think we can do better, one solution is to make bets on our predictions.	对那些认为我们可以做得更好的人来说，一个解决方法是对我们的预测下注。


In early 2014, the economists Tyler Cowen and Bryan Caplan did just that.	2014年初，经济学家泰勒·科文（Tyler Cowen）和布莱恩·卡普兰（Bryan Caplan）就这么做了。


Cowen was pessimistic about unemployment in the United States, so he bet Caplan that the rate would not fall below 5% during the following 20 years.	科文对美国的失业擒故康感到失望，因此他和卡普兰打赌失业率在未来20年里不会低于5%。


Two years later, unemployment had dropped to 4.9%.	两年后，失业率降到了4. 9%。


Caplan had won a clear victory.	卡普兰获得无可非议的胜利。


It is exactly that sort of clarity that betting on predictions seeks to obtain.	这种无可非议性正是下注预言所要获得的。


Left unchallenged, pundits routinely use vague language, such as “unemployment will remain high for years” or “Trump’s support will slide.”	专家不用面对诘难，他们往往使用模糊的字眼，比如“失业将保持高企多年”或“特朗普的支持率将大跌”。


These sound good on television, but they do not produce an indisputable, testable result.	在电视上，这听起来很不错，但并没有形成无可争议的可检验的结果。


(How many years is “many”?	（多少年是“多年”？


How much decline qualifies as a “slide”?)	下降多少算得上“大跌”？


Bets force the two parties to agree to well-defined terms – making it obvious to everyone who was right and who was wrong.	）下注迫使双方就定义明确的条件形成一致——让人们能够显而易见的看出谁对谁错。


The purpose of betting, of course, is not to declare winners and losers; it is to replace endless, pointless arguments with a clear determination of whose understanding of reality is closer to the truth.	当然，下注的目的不在于宣布谁胜谁负； 而是为了通过明确定义谁对现实的理解更加接近真实来取代又臭又长、毫无意义的争论。


The ultimate goal is to make us all a little wiser.	其最终目的是为了让我们所有人变得更聪明。


And yet, unfortunately, when it comes to achieving that goal, betting has consistently failed.	但不幸的是，在实现这一目的方面，下注一贯是失败的。


Take Cowen’s response to losing his bet with Caplan.	以科文对他输掉与卡普兰的赌局的反应为例。


He quickly acknowledged that he had lost, according to the terms of the bet.	根据赌注的条件，他很快就承认他输了。


But he nonetheless insisted that this did not prove Caplan right.	但他仍坚持这并不证明卡普兰是对的。


Cowen noted that while the unemployment rate had fallen, the employment-to-population ratio had barely budged.	科文指出，尽管失业率有所下降，但就业-人口比并未发生多少变化。


In his evaluation of the outcome, Cowen concluded that, “I feel I’m the one who won the bet.”	在对结果的评述中，科文总结道：“我觉得我才是赢得赌局的人。


Their wager had settled absolutely nothing.	”他们的赌注根本毫无意义可言。


Unfortunately, that is what typically happens when people make simple bets on complex debates.	不幸的是，这是人们就复杂争论进行简单下注的常见结果。


In 1980, the biologist Paul Ehrlich and the economist Julian Simon made another famous wager – on the price of five metals ten years later.	1980年，生物学家保罗·欧利希（Paul Ehrlich）和经济学家朱利安·西蒙（Julian Simon）进行了另一场著名的赌局——十年后五种金属的价格。


Their bet ended with a clear win for Simon, but Ehrlich shrugged off the outcome as meaningless.	最后西蒙赢得无可非议的胜利，但欧利希对结果嗤之以鼻。


And he was not wrong.	他也没有错。


If the two scientists had chosen a different starting year, Ehrlich might well have been the winner.	如果两位科学家选择不同的起始年份，那么欧利希很有可能成为胜利者。


The problem with bets like these is that they are far too simple to settle the complex debates that underlie them.	类似赌局的问题在于它们过于简单，无法评判其背后的复杂争论。


A handful of metal prices cannot settle a sprawling Malthus vs. Cornucopia argument, just as a single data point for unemployment cannot be the final word in the dispute between Cowen and Caplan.	几种金属的价格无法评判枝节横生的马尔萨斯对丰饶（Malthus vs. Cornucopia）的争论，正如一个简单的失业数据无法权威判定科文和卡普兰之间的争议。


And yet it would be a shame to abandon bets altogether.	但彻底放弃赌局也不合理。


Doing so would leave only the squalid food fights into which so many important debates devolve.	这样做只能让重要争论所针对的问题变成一片狼藉。


The solution is to take bets far more seriously, to expand them, and to design them to be capable of settling debates to the satisfaction of most reasonable observers.	解决办法是大幅提高赌局的严重性��扩展它们，让它们具备能够以让大部分理性观察者满意的程度评判争论的能力。


Ideally, a bet would use a question as big as the debate it means to settle.	在理想情况下，赌局应使用和它所要评判的争论一样大的问题。


But that will not work, because big questions – “Will population growth outstrip resources and threaten civilization?” – do not produce easily measurable outcomes.	但这并不管用，因为大问题——“人口增长会超越资源，从而威胁到文明吗？ ”——无法产生可容易地衡量的结果。


The key, instead, is to ask many small, precise questions.	相反，关键在于提出许多精确的小问题。


Cowen and Caplan should not have relied on the unemployment rate alone; they should have included the employment-to-population ratio and other metrics they agreed would have diagnostic value.	科文和卡普兰不应该仅仅依靠失业率一个数字； 他们还应该纳入就业-人口比和其他他们一致认为具有诊断价值的指标。


Ehrlich and Simon should have made a wider array of predictions, on metal prices, food production, air quality, and other factors.	欧利希应该扩大预测的范围，使之包括金属价格、粮食产量、空气质量和其他因素。


This approach, using question clusters, could be applied to virtually any important debate.	使用问题组的方法可应用于几乎所有重要争论。


Right now, for example we are putting the hawks-versus-doves argument about the Iran nuclear deal to the forecasting test.	比如，最近我们正在把伊核协议的鹰派-鸽派争论作为预测检验的对象。


Naturally, using many questions could result in split decisions.	自然地，使用多重问题可能导致两可的决定。


But if our goal is to learn, that is a feature, not a bug.	但如果我们的目标是学习，那么这是利而不是弊。


A split decision would suggest that neither bettor’s understanding of reality is perfectly accurate and that the truth lies somewhere between.	两可的决定意味着所有下注者对现实的理解都不完全正确，事实介于两者之间。


That would be an enlightening result particularly when public debates are dominated by extreme positions – the clash between Ehrlich and Simon being a classic illustration.	这是一个富有启发性的结果，特别是在公共争论被极端立场所主导时——欧利希和西蒙的赌局就是经典的例子。


Of course, none of this is possible if those involved are not willing to think together about how to settle their disagreement.	当然，如果参与赌局者不愿共同思考如何评判他们的分歧，这一切都无从谈起。


This is not always easy, to say the least.	含蓄地讲，这并不总是很容易。


After their famous bet, Simon and Ehrlich considered a second bet involving a large basket of measures; but it never came about, partly because of personal antipathy between the two men.	在他们的著名赌局结束后，西蒙和欧利希曾考虑过进行第二次赌局，对象包括了范围甚广的一揽子指标； 但这场赌局从未成行，部分是因为两人互不买账。


What is needed is a neutral party and arbiter – a role that think tanks, for example, are well positioned to play.	我们需要一个中立方或仲裁者——（比如）智库就很适合这个角色。


But, whatever the difficulties, the quality of public debate stands to benefit enormously from well-structured wagers.	但是，无论有什么困难，公共争论的质量都能从设计合理的赌局中获益良多。


When it comes to learning about the world, betting on outcomes beats arguments that settle nothing.	在学习了解世界方面，下注于结果总比什么都解决不了的争论强。


Better Red than Dead?	赤字要比没命好吗？


Will the inexorable rise in medical costs around the world someday pose a major challenge to contemporary capitalism?	全世界医疗费用的猛升会不会在某一天对现代资本主义构成重大挑战呢？


I submit that in the not-so-distant future, moral, social, and political support for capitalism will be severely tested as would-be egalitarian health systems face ever-rising costs.	我预计在不远的将来，当原本平均主义的医疗体系面临不断上升的费用之时，资本主义的道德、社会以及政治支持将会受到严重挑战。


Rising incomes, population aging, and new technologies for extending and enhancing life, have caused health costs to rise 3.5% faster than overall income for many decades now in the United States.	在美国，收入增加、人口老化以及延续生命和提高生命质量的新技术在几十年中让医疗费用上升超过总体收入3. 5%。


Some leading economists project that health expenditures, which already constitute 16% of the US economy, will rise to 30% of GDP by 2030, and perhaps approach 50% later in the century.	医疗费用已经占到美国经济的16%。 某些主要的经济学家估计，到2030年，医疗费用将会占国民生产总值的30%，到本世纪末期有可能达到50%。


Other rich and middle-income countries, although typically spending only half what the US does today, won’t lag far behind.	其他富有和中等收入国家尽管现在一般只花费美国的一半，也不会相差太远。


Countries in Europe and elsewhere have shielded their citizens from a part of this rise by piggybacking on US technological advances.	欧洲以及其他地区国家通过借助美国的技术进步让它们的公民们免受部分上升之苦。


Ultimately, though, they face the same upward cost pressures.	但是，它们最终还是面临费用上升的压力。


Hasn’t the start of the twenty-first century marked the death of all other ideologies, with China’s raw capitalism putting pressure on gentler forms in Europe and elsewhere?	二十一世纪伊始，随着中国原始资本主义给欧洲和其他地方更为柔和的制度施加压力，是否标志着其他所有意识形态的死亡呢？


The problem is that attitudes towards healthcare are fundamentally different.	问题是对医疗的态度迥然不同。


Many societies view healthcare as a right, not a luxury.	许多社会把医疗视为一项权利，而非奢侈品。


When medical expenses constituted only a small percentage of income, as was typically the case 50 years ago, an egalitarian approach to healthcare was a small extravagance.	当50年前医疗费用通常只占收入的一小部分的时候，以平均主义对待医疗是一个小小的奢侈。


The direct and indirect costs were relatively minor and affordable.	直接和间接的费用相对较小而且可以承受。


But as health expenses start taking up a third of national income, healthcare socialism starts becoming just plain Marxism: to each according to his needs.	但是，随着医疗费用占据国民收入的三分之一的时候，医疗社会主义开始成为赤裸裸的各取所需的马克思主义了。


Even China’s authoritarian capitalism will someday feel the pressure, as its rural populations, who currently have little access to doctors or hospitals, eventually explode with discontent.	中国的农村人口缺医少药，最终将会揭竿而起。 其专制资本主义也会随之在某一天感到压力。


One often hears about rising healthcare costs in the context of future government budget projections, with old-age health costs expected to dominate growth in government expenditures in coming years.	人们经常听说政府预算预计中医疗费用上升，在未来几年中，老年人的医疗费用预计将会控制政府的开支。


But a careful look at the projections by, say, the US Congressional Budget Office, show that the aging of our societies is only a part of the problem, and not the larger part.	但是如果仔细看一看美国国会预算办公室的预计就会发现，我们的社会老龄化只不过是问题的一部分，而且还不是较大的部分。


The real issue is whether societies are willing to provide elderly people with equal access to ever newer and improved medical techniques.	真正的问题是各国社会是否愿意向老年人一视同仁地提供日新月异的医疗技术。


A change on the horizon that will exacerbate current frictions is the growing importance of individualized health care.	个人化医疗是一新近的变化。 这将会使得目前的摩擦加剧。


For most of modern history, relatively inexpensive public health precautions, such as providing clean drinking water and routine vaccinations, have been the main factor pushing up life expectancy.	对于大多数现代社会而言，相对便宜的公共医疗预防措施，例如提供清洁饮水和固定的疫苗是推进寿命预期的主要因素。


Public health measures have trumped the importance of individual care.	公共医疗手段已经超过了个人化护理的重要性。


But today, the balance is shifting.	但是如今，天平正在移动。


Heart operations are already a major factor in extending life in many rich countries.	在许多富有国家，心脏手术已经是延长生命的一个主要因素。


Sophisticated X-ray diagnostic techniques such as CT scans make it possible to detect many cancers at a treatable stage.	像CT扫描那样先进的X光诊断技术可以在可治疗阶段检查出许多癌症。


Some drug researchers predict that with continuing advances in understanding the human genome, doctors may eventually be able to predict illnesses 15-20 years in advance, and begin prophylactic treatment immediately.	某些药品研究人员预计，随着对人类基因组理解不断加深，医生最终可以提前15年到20年预测疾病，并且立即开始预防疾病治疗。


(With some experts predicting that individuals will routinely live beyond 110-115 years by mid-century, one might wonder what all this will do to other social conventions such as marriage, but I will leave this thought to another day.)	(某些专家预计，到本世纪中叶，人一般可以活到110岁到115岁。 也许有人会思考这对于像婚姻那样的其他社会习俗产生什么影响，但是我以后再讨论这一问题。


In addition to reducing mortality, new medical techniques can also have a huge effect on the quality of life.	除了减少死亡率，新的医疗技术还可以对生活质量产生巨大影响。


Roughly 250,000 hip replacements are performed in the US each year.	美国每年进行大约25万个髋部更换手术。


Under-60 patients are becoming more important as newer artificial joints prove their capacity to withstand more active lifestyles.	随着更加新颖的人工关节证明有能力承受更为积极的生活方式，60岁不到的病人正在变得越发重要。


At $6,000, the average cost of a hip replacement is only a thousandth the cost of what it supposedly took to implant a bionic arm, eye, and two legs on the fictional “The Six Million Dollar Man” in the popular mid-1970’s TV show.	髋部更换手术的平均费用是6千美元，这只是七十年代中期流行电视片“身价六百万”中植入仿生胳膊、眼睛以及两条腿费用的十分之一。


Of course, hip replacement patients don’t get super-human speed, strength, and vision – at least not yet.	当然，髋部更换病人并不会有超人的速度、力量和视力，至少目前还没有。


If Tour de France officials think they have big problems now with steroids, just wait ten years.	如果环法自行车赛官员认为他们现在的麻烦是类固醇，那就再等五年再看吧。


In principle, greater use of market mechanisms to allocate health care can slow or even temporarily reverse the rise in healthcare costs.	原则上，更多地使用市场机制来分配医疗会减慢甚至暂时逆转医疗费用的上升。


But improved efficiency has its limits.	但是改进的效率毕竟还有限度。


Ultimately, the evidence suggests that societies spend ever-larger fractions of their income on health over time, in contrast to food expenditures, for example, which fall as countries become wealthier.	最终，证据表明社会随着时间的推移在医疗上花费越来越多的收入部分。 随着各国变得富有，相对食品花费就会下降。


Spending pressures, in turn, lead to acceleration of innovation.	花销的压力反过来导致创新的加速。


This raises long-term well being all around, but exacerbates short-term inequalities and frictions.	这就提高了全世界的福祉，但是却加剧了短期不平等和摩擦。


I am not arguing against healthcare capitalism, but warning that support will become fragile, far more so than for, say, globalization nowadays.	我并不是在反对医疗资本主义，而是在警告说，对此的支持将会变得脆弱，要比当今对于全球化的支持还要脆弱。


Most countries rely far too much on command and control, and provide far too few incentives for patients and providers to make efficient choices.	大多数国家过多地依赖于命令和控制，并且没有提供什么激励手段让病人和医疗单位做出高效的选择。


Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether healthcare pressures will ultimately cause the current trend towards free (and freer) market capitalism to reverse, with a very large chunk of the economy reverting to a more socialist system.	但是，医疗压力最终是否会让目前的自由(以及更为自由)的市场资本主义潮流逆转，而经济中的很大部分转向更为社会主义的体制，这还有待观察。


Some societies might decide that it is better to be red than dead.	某些社会或许会认为赤字要比没命好。


Better than Basel	改善巴塞尔


ROME – The Basel Accords – meant to protect depositors and the public in general from bad banking practices – exacerbated the downward economic spiral triggered by the financial crisis of 2008.	罗马—巴塞尔协议本是为了保护储户和普罗大众免受银行不当行为的伤害，但也加重了2008年金融危机所触发的经济颓势。


Throughout the crisis, as business confidence evaporated, banks were forced to sell assets and cut lending in order to maintain capital requirements stipulated by the Accords.	在整个危机中，随着商业信心的蒸发，银行被迫出售资产、削减信贷，以维持巴塞尔协议规定的资本要求。


This lending squeeze resulted in a sharp drop in GDP and employment, while the sharp sell-off in assets ensured further declines.	信贷冻结导致了GDP和就业率的暴跌，而资产大甩卖则造成了进一步的衰退。


My recent study with Jacopo Carmassi, Time to Set Banking Regulation Right, shows that by permitting excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks – in some cases allowing banks to accumulate total liabilities up to 40, or even 50, times their equity capital – the Basel banking rules not only enabled, but, ironically, intensified the crisis.	我和卡马西（Jacopo Carmassi）的最新研究《设置银行监管权正逢其时》（Time to Set Banking Regulation Right）指出，巴塞尔银行规则允许大型国际银行使用过度杠杆、承担过多风险——在某些案例中，银行可以累积相当于权益资本四五十倍之多的总负债——这不但埋下了危机的种子，而且颇为讽刺地起到了火上加油之效。


After the crisis, world leaders and central bankers overhauled banking regulations, first and foremost by rectifying the Basel prudential rules.	危机过去后，世界领导人和央行行长改善了银行监管，最主要的措施就是修订巴塞尔审慎规则。


Unfortunately, the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive have failed to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules – namely, their reliance on banks’ risk-management models for the calculation of capital requirements, and the lack of supervisory accountability.	不幸的是，新的巴塞尔III协议及其后的欧盟资本要求指令（EU Capital Requirements Directive）并没能纠正国际审慎规则的两大主要缺陷——即对用银行风险管理模型计算资本要求的依赖以及对监督者缺乏可问责性。


The latest example highlighting this flaw is Dexia, the Belgian-French banking group that failed in 2011 – just after passing the European Banking Authority’s stress test with flying colors.	这一缺陷的最新写照是比利时-法国联营的德夏（Dexia）银行在2011年的倒闭——彼时它刚刚胜利通过欧洲银监局的压力测试。


The stunning opacity of solvency ratios encouraged regulators to turn a blind eye to banks’ excessive risk-taking.	银行的偿债能力比率透明度太低，这使得监管者干脆闭上双眼任由银行承担过度风险。


The problem is that the Basel capital rules – whether Basel I, II, or III – are of no help in separating the weak banks from the sound ones.	问题在于，巴塞尔资本规则——不论是巴塞尔I、II还是III——都对识别疲软银行和坚挺银行毫无帮助。


Indeed, more often than not, the banks that failed or had to be rescued in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis had solvency ratios higher than those of banks that remained standing without assistance.	事实上，在2008年金融危机中接受援助的银行中不乏偿债能力比率好于不需援助银行者。


Compounding the problem, the diversity in banks’ capital ratios also indicates a dramatic distortion of the international playing field, as increasingly competitive conditions in financial markets have led to national discretion in applying the rules.	让问题更加复杂的是，银行资本比率的多样性也表明了国际竞争平台的重大扭曲——金融市场的竞争条件越来越多地给予各国应用规则的自由裁量权。


Meanwhile, the opacity of capital indicators has made market discipline impossible to impose.	与此同时，资本指标的不透明导致市场纪律无法起作用。


Thus, large banks are likely to continue to hold too little capital and to take excessive risks, raising the prospect of renewed bouts of financial instability.	于是，大银行可以继续持有过少的资本、承担过度的风险，增加金融不稳定性再次爆发的可能性。


In order to overcome these shortcomings in international banking regulations, three remedies are needed.	为了克服这些国际银行监管方面的缺陷，我们需要采取三大补救措施。


First, capital requirements should be set as a straightforward ratio of common equity to total assets, thereby abandoning all reference to banks’ own risk-management models.	首先，资本要求应该被设置为普通股对总资产的直观比率，从而避免参考银行自己的风险模型。


The new capital ratio should be raised to 7-10% of total assets in order to dampen risk-taking by bankers and minimize the real economic impact of large-scale deleveraging following a loss of confidence in the banking system.	新资本比率要求应该被设为总资产的7—10%，以抑制银行家承担风险的冲动并将随银行系统信心缺失而来的大规模去杠杆化的实际经济冲击最小化。


Second, new capital ratios with multiple and decreasing capital thresholds, which trigger increasingly intrusive corrective action, should serve as the basis for a new system of mandated supervisory action.	其次，新资本比率要求应设置多个递减的资本阈值，各阈值触发递增的严厉纠正动作，以此作为新的指令性监督行动系统。


Supervisors should be bound by a presumption that they will act.	监督者应受到他们将采取行动的假设的制约。


They could argue that action is not necessary in a specific case, but they would have to do so publicly, thus becoming accountable for their inaction.	他们可以争辩说在某具体案例中必须要采取行动，但必须公开作如是论，从而为他们的不作为负责。


In order to eradicate moral hazard, the system must have a resolution procedure to close banks when their capital falls below a minimum threshold.	为了根除道德风险，新系统必须有一个在银行资本不能满足最低阈值时将其关闭的方案程序。


Finally, solvency rules should be complemented by an obligation that banks issue a substantial amount of non-collateralized debt – on the order of 100% of their capital – that is convertible into equity.	最后，偿债能力比率应该有所补充——通过让银行承担发行大量无抵押可转换债务（100%由其自有资本做支持）的义务来实现。


These debentures should be designed to create a strong incentive for bank managers and shareholders to issue equity rather than suffer conversion.	这笔信用债的设计应该为银行管理者和股东提供极大的发行股票而不是接受债转股的激励。


These three measures, if applied to all banks, would eliminate the need for special rules governing liquidity or funding (which would remain open to supervisory review, but not to binding constraints). There would also be no need for special restrictions on banking activities and operations.	这三项措施如能对所有银行适用，将能消除出台治理流动性和融资的特别规则的需要（将受监督者审查，但没有强制性约束），对银行活动和经营的特别限制也将失去必要性。


The most remarkable feature of the policy deliberations on prudential banking rules so far has been their delegation to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors and the banks themselves, both of which have a vested interest in preserving the existing system.	目前，审慎银行规则的政策考虑的最显著特征是委托巴塞尔银行监督委员会和银行本身来制定规则，这两者都是现行系统的既得利益者。


Governments and parliaments have an obligation to launch a thorough review of the Basel rules, and to demand revisions that align them with the public interest.	各国政府和议会有义务对巴塞尔规则予以彻底审视，要求他们做出与公共利益一致的修订。


Betting the House	下注房产


Homeowners around the world effectively gamble on home prices.	全世界的私房拥有者都乐此不疲地加入到房价的赌博当中。


Their risks today are often big due to real estate bubbles in such glamour cities as London, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Istanbul, Moscow, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Sydney, Melbourne, Vancouver, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., and Miami. Those bubbles may keep expanding, or may burst, leaving many homeowners mired in debt.	由于伦敦、巴黎、马德里、罗马、伊斯坦布尔、莫斯科、上海、杭州、悉尼、墨尔本、温哥华、洛杉矶、拉斯维加斯、波士顿、纽约、华盛顿特区和迈阿密等魅力都市都存在房地产泡沫，所以这场赌博的风险很大。


The risk to home prices in the aftermath of a bubble is real and substantial.	经历了泡沫之后的房价风险是实实在在的。


In the last cycle of real estate busts, real (inflation-corrected) home prices fell 46% in London in 1988-95, 41% in Los Angeles in 1989-1997, 43% in Paris in 1991-98, 67% in Moscow in 1993-97, and 38% in Shanghai in 1995-1999.	在上一轮的房地产泡沫破裂之后，伦敦的实际房价（折算通胀后的）在1988-95年间下跌了46%，洛杉矶在1989-97年间下跌了41%，巴黎在1991-98年间房价跌幅为43%，莫斯科在1993-97年间跌幅为67%，上海在1995-99年间的跌幅为38%。


All of these drops were eventually reversed, and all of these markets have boomed recently.	所有的下跌最终都有所反弹，而最近房地产市场在上述地区又进入了繁荣期。


But this does not guarantee that future drops will have a similar outcome.	但这并不能保证未来的房价下跌会带来同样的后果。


On the contrary, the future real value of our homes is fundamentally uncertain.	相反，从根本上讲，我们房产的未来真正价值还是未知数。


Most homeowners are not gambling for pleasure.	大多数的私房拥有者参与房价赌博并不是为了娱乐。


They are just buying real estate because they need it.	他们购置不动产时出于实际的需要。


But, because they do nothing to protect themselves against their real estate price risks, they are unwitting gamblers.	然而，由于他们没有采取任何防范不动产价格风险的措施来保护自己，因而他们又是不自知的赌博者。


In fact, home buyers in most countries do nothing to protect themselves – short of selling their homes – because there is nothing to be done.	实际上，大多数国家的购房者都没有采取任何的自我保护措施—除了出售他们的房产以外—因为他们无计可施。


A market for real estate derivatives that can help balance these risks is only just beginning to appear.	能够平衡这些风险的不动产衍生品市场也仅仅是雏形初现。


Well-developed markets for real estate derivatives would allow homeowners to kick the gambling habit.	高度发达的不动产衍生品市场能够让私房拥有者放弃赌博的习惯。


A liquid, cash-settled futures market that is based on an index of home prices in a city would enable a homeowner living there to sell in a futures market to protect himself.	一个基于城市房价指数的有流动性、以现金结算的期货市场可以让当地的私房所有者通过在期货市场上的售出而保护自己。


If home prices fall sharply in that city, the drop in the value of the home would be offset by an increase in the value of the futures contract.	如果该城市的房价大幅下跌，房产价值的跌损会由期货合同价值的上升来抵销。


That is how advanced risk management works, as financial professionals know.	这就是为金融专业人士们所熟知的高级风险管理。


But the tools needed to hedge such risks should be made available to everyone.	但用于规避这些风险的工具应该能被所有人利用。


Attempts to set up derivatives markets for real estate have -- so far -- all met with only limited success.	建立不动产衍生品市场的努力迄今为止也只取得了有限的成功。


In May 2003, Goldman, Sachs & Co. began offering cash-settled covered warrants on house prices in the United Kingdom, based on the Halifax House Price Index and traded on the London Stock Exchange.	高盛公司于2003年5月开始在英国推出针对房价的现金备兑认股权证（cash-settled covered warrants）。 这一产品是基于“Halifax房价指数”开发的，并在伦敦股票交易所进行交易。


In October 2004, Hedgestreet.com began offering “hedgelets” on real estate prices in US cities – contracts that pay out if the rate of increase in home prices based on the OFHEO Home Price Index falls within a pre-specified range.	在2004年10月，Hedgestreet. com开始提供针对美国城市不动产价格的“hedgelets”—一种当基于“OFHEO房价指数”的房价增长率达到某一既定幅度时就会赔付的合同。


My former student Allan Weiss and I have been campaigning since 1990 for better risk management institutions for real estate.	我从前的学生Allan Weiss和我自1999年以来就一直在为建立更好的不动产风险管理机构而奔波。


In 1999, we co-founded a firm, Macro Securities Research, LLC, to promote the development of such institutions, working with the American Stock Exchange to create securities that would allow people to manage real estate as well as other risks.	在1999年，我们共同创建了一家名为Macro Securities Research, LLC的公司旨在促进这些机构的发展。 我们与美国证券交易所（American Stock Exchange）合作开发能够让人们管理不动产和其他风险的有价证券品种。


These will be long-term securities that pay regular dividends, like stocks, whose value is tied – either positively or negatively – to a real estate price index.	这些长期证券和股票一样定期派发红利。 它们的价值与某种不动产价格指数成正负关联的关系。


Early this month, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced that it will also work with us to explore the development of futures markets in US metropolitan-area home prices.	本月早些时候，芝加哥商品交易所也宣布将与我们合作开发基于美国都市区房产价格的期货市场。


We hope to facilitate the creation of such markets in other countries as well.	我们也希望能够为其他国家创建这样的市场助一臂之力。


Because even many financially sophisticated homeowners will find direct participation in derivative markets too daunting, the next stage in the development of real estate risk management will be to create suitable retail products.	由于即使是许多具备金融知识的私房拥有者也会对直接参与衍生品市场望而生畏，所以开发不动产风险管理的下一步将会是创造合适的零售产品。


For example, the derivative markets should create an environment that encourages insurers to develop home equity insurance, which insures homeowners not just against a bust but also against drops in the market value of the home.	例如，衍生品市场应该营造一种环境，鼓励保险公司开发房产股票保险。 该险种不但对投保人进行破产保险，也针对房产市场价值的下跌提供保险。


Such insurance should be attractive to homeowners if it is offered as an add-on to their existing insurance policies.	如果将这样的险种作为已有险种的附加险，那么它们对于私房拥有者应该是颇具吸引力的。


Derivatives markets for real estate should also facilitate the creation of mortgage loans that help homeowners manage risks by, say, reducing the amount owed if a home’s value drops.	不动产衍生品市场也应该为创建旨在帮助私房所有者管理风险的按揭贷款方式提供便利。 这种贷款方式能在房产价值下跌时让按揭人减少欠款。


Such products should appeal to homebuyers when the mortgage is first issued.	这样的产品在按揭最初被核准时对购房者应该是有吸���力的。


Insurance companies and mortgage companies ought to be willing to offer such products if they can hedge the home-price risks in liquid derivative markets.	保险公司和按揭贷款公司如果能在具有流动性的衍生品市场上规避房价风险，那么它们应该愿意提供这样的产品。


Creating these retail products will require time, experimentation, and some real innovation.	开发这样的零售产品需要时间、尝试和一些真正的创新。


Over the next decade, we might expect that a broad spectrum of insurance, lending, and securities companies will become involved.	在未来十年，我们可能会期望有更广泛的保险、贷款和证券公司加入这一行列。


As these retail products start to take shape, they will spur increased activity in the derivative markets.	随着这些零售产品开始成形，它们会刺激衍生品市场的发展。


As the new risk-management industry develops, its components will gradually boost each other.	在新的风险管理业发展过程当中，其不同门类之间也会相辅相成。


These developments offer hope that current and future homeowners will be spared the agony of worrying about the vicissitudes of the real estate market.	这些新发展让现在和未来的私房拥有者们看到了从对不动产市场起起落落的担忧中解脱出来的希望。


They will be able to leave the game of real estate speculation to professionals and rest assured about the value that they have accumulated in their homes.	他们将能把买卖不动产的游戏交给专业人士打理而安享自己从房产中所聚敛的价值。


That is good news, because there is a pretty strong chance that we are going to see major price declines in a number of cities around the globe in the next few years, and these price declines will cause real pain to many homeowners.	这是个好消息，因为我们极有可能在未来几年见证全球一些城市房价的大幅下跌。 这样的跌幅会给许多私房拥有者造成真正的痛苦。


But if the momentum toward better risk management continues, it will be the last real estate cycle in which homeowners are unable to protect themselves.	但如果更好的风险管理以现有态势继续发展，这就会是房屋所有者无法保护自己的最后一个不动产市场循环。


Betting With the House’s Money	举债豪赌


Many people have been asking why the dollar hasn’t crashed yet.	许多人都在问为何美元还没有崩溃。


Will the United States ever face a bill for the string of massive trade deficits that it has been running for more than a decade?	美国会为十数年以来那一连串巨大的贸易逆差买单吗？


Including interest payments on past deficits, the tab for 2006 alone was over $800 billion dollars – roughly 6.5% of US gross national product.	加上过往的逆差所产生的利息，仅2006年的账单就超过8000亿美金—约为美国国民生产总值的6. 5%。


Even more staggeringly, US borrowing now soaks up more than two-thirds of the combined excess savings of all the surplus countries in the world, including China, Japan, Germany, and the OPEC states.	更令人吃惊的是，美国的负债相当于包括中国、日本、德国和欧佩克国家等在内的所有贸易顺差国家储蓄总余额的三分之二强。


Foreigners are hardly reaping great returns on investing in the US.	外国人在美国的投资罕有丰厚回报。


On the contrary, they typically get significantly lower returns than Americans get on their investments abroad.	正相反，他们所获得的回报通常比投资国外的美国人所得要低得多。


In an era in which stock and housing prices are soaring, the central banks of Japan and China are holding almost two trillion dollars worth of low-interest bonds.	在这个股价和房价疯长的时代，日本和中国的央行正掌握着价值两兆美金的低息债券。


A very large share of these are US treasury bonds and mortgages.	其中大部分是美国国库券和抵押贷款。


This enormous subsidy to American taxpayers is, in many ways, the world’s largest foreign aid program.	这项对美国纳税人的巨额补贴，在很多方面堪称世界上最大规模的外国援助项目。


If America’s competitive position is so weak, what magic is holding up the dollar?	如果美国的竞争优势如此虚弱，那么又是什么魔力在支持美元呢？


Most sober analysts have long been projecting a steady trend decline in the dollar against the currencies of America’s trading partners, especially in Asia and emerging markets.	大多数头脑清楚的分析家都一直预测着美元相对其贸易伙伴国货币的稳定贬值趋势，特别是相对于亚洲和新兴市场国家的货币。


So why hasn’t more adjustment taken place already?	那么，为什么还没有出现更多的调整呢？


The first answer, of course, is that the trade-weighted dollar has fallen – by more than 15% in real terms since its peak in early 2002.	当然，第一个答案就是贸易加权的美元已经贬值—自其高峰的2002年初以来已实际贬值15%。


Yet the US deficits have persisted, and even risen, since then.	然而，美国的赤字仍然居高不下，甚至自那时起还有所上升。


The real driving force has been two-fold.	真正的驱动因素有两层。


First and foremost, America’s government and consumers have been engaged in a never-ending consumption binge.	第一层，也是最重要的，是美国政府和消费者已经陷入了一场从不停歇的消费狂潮。


On the consumer side, this is quite understandable.	在消费者方面，这是不难理解的。


With over 80% home ownership, the epic boom in housing prices of the last ten years has spread deep into the American middle class.	随着置业率超过80%，房价在过去十年里的历史性成长的事实已经广泛深入美国中产阶级。


Equity holdings are somewhat more concentrated, but many middle class Americans have still benefited indirectly through their pension funds.	虽然股权更为集中化，但许多美国中产阶级仍然从他们的养老金中间接获益。


Overall, after almost 25 years of stunning prosperity, punctuated by only two mild recessions, most Americans feel pretty confident about their economic situation.	总体上看，经过了近25年令人难以置信的繁荣（其间只被两次轻微的经济衰退打断），大多数美国人对他们的经济情况充满信心。


Unemployment is at a cyclical low, and the economy appears to be less volatile than at any point in modern history.	失业率处在周期性的低点，经济情况也比现代历史上的任何时候都要稳定。


So it is not surprising that private consumption continues to hold up even as US economic growth has shifted into lower gear.	所以即便是在美国经济增长渐入低速期时，私人消费仍然旺盛的情况也就不足为奇了。


People have enjoyed such huge capital gains over the past decade that most feel like gamblers on a long winning streak.	人们在过去十几年来享受了如此丰厚的资本收益，以至于他们似乎感觉像只赢不陪的赌徒。


By now, they see themselves as playing with the house’s (or their houses’) money.	现在，他们认为自己是在用赌场（或“他们”赌场）的钱赌博。


It is less easy to rationalize why the US government is continuing to run budget deficits despite a cyclical boom.	要明白为什么美国政府在周期性经济繁荣的情况下依然继续保持预算赤字就不那么容易了。