This wall kept Chile and Latin America from joining the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution, which is why we remain underdeveloped to this day.	这堵墙阻碍智利和拉美国家参与十九世纪工业革命，也正因为如此，我们到今天仍然是欠发达国家。


But we need this wall to tumble if we do not want to miss today’s revolution, which is delivering societies based on knowledge, technology, and information.	但如果我们不愿错过今天这场以知识、技术和信息为基础的革命，就需要将面前的这堵高墙拆毁。


This revolution will be tremendously generous to those countries that embrace it – and utterly indifferent, even cruel, to those that ignore it or let it pass by.	这次革命对积极参与的国家将会极端慷慨，而对视而不见或错过机会的国家将会极为冷漠甚至残酷。


How will Chile breach this wall?	智利将要怎样获得突破？


First, by strengthening the three basic pillars without which development cannot germinate or opportunities flourish: a stable, vital, and participatory political democracy; a social market economy that is free, competitive, and open to the world; and a strong state that is effective in the fight against poverty and in promoting greater equality of opportunities.	首先要加强三大支柱建设，没有这些支柱，发展就无法萌芽，机会也无从谈起： 它们是生机勃勃、稳固、民众参与型的民主政体； 自由、竞争力强、对世界各国开放的社会市场经济；


Yet not even this will suffice if we are to build on rock and not on sand.	但要想使发展基础更为坚实仅有这三大支柱依然不够。


In this twenty-first century, emerging countries like Chile must invest in the pillars of modern society.	21世纪，像智利这样的新兴国家必须在现代社会支柱上投资。


I mean developing our human capital, which is our greatest resource; encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship, which are the only truly eternal resources we have on hand; investing in science and technology, which will open up unsuspected opportunities in the future; and promoting more dynamic and flexible markets and societies that will put us ahead, and at the helm, of change, rather than always lagging behind and trying to comprehend and adapt to change.	这里我指的是发展最宝贵的人力资本，鼓励发展我们掌握的真正永久性资源（即创新和企业家精神），投资将在未来带来未知机遇的科学技术，推动将会帮我们占据领先地位的更加健康灵活的市场社会，以积极主动的姿态掌控变革，而不是总被甩在后面，对各种变化只是疲于理解和应对。


Those are the pillars that our administration is emphasizing.	这些是本届政府重点建设的发展支柱。


As Chile deepens its integration with the world, we are also moving forward with structural reforms through which we will be able to improve substantially the quality of education received by millions of our children and youths; retrain three-quarters of Chilean workers over the next four years; grant universal access to broadband Internet service; double our investment in science and technology; promote innovation and entrepreneurship in the public and private sectors; and reduce the time needed to start up a company to one day – and the cost to zero.	随着智利越来越深地融入世界经济体系，我们也在不断推进结构改革，力求大幅改善成百上千万儿童和青年所接受的教育； 在今后四年对四分之三的智利工人开展再培训；


These are some of the many measures that form the goals – and foundation – of my administration.	以上就是构成本届内阁目标和基础的某些举措。


They are grand, noble, and ambitious goals, but fully attainable for today’s Chile, the Bicentennial Chile, a Chile now viewing the twenty-first century with more optimism and enthusiasm than ever before.	这些目标伟大、高尚、雄心勃勃，但同时完全符合今天二百年智利的现实状况，今天的智利正以前所未有的乐观和热情准备迎接21世纪。


Chile’s Uncertain Future	智利的不确定未来


CAMBRIDGE – When I was in Chile earlier this month, I was impressed by the contrast between the palpable success of its long-standing free-market policies and the current agenda of its leftist president, Michelle Bachelet.	发自剑桥 ——当我在本月初访问智利时，印象最深的莫过于长期自由市场政策为这个国家所带来的切实提升与其左派总统米切尔·巴切莱特（Michelle Bachelet）当前议程之间的反差。


How this contrast is resolved will be important not only to the country’s more than 17 million people, but also to everyone who regards Chile as a model of what sound economic policies have been able to achieve.	而如何消除这种反差将极为重要，不仅关乎该国1700万国民的福祉，还将影响到那些将智利视为合理经济政策成功典范的人们。


Chile’s economic performance has been the strongest in South America.	智利是南美洲经济表现最强的国家。


Its per capita GDP exceeds $22,000 in purchasing-power-parity terms, making its income higher than that of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.	按购买力平价计算人均GDP超过2. 2万美元，高于阿根廷，巴西和墨西哥。


It’s no surprise that Chile is considered a developed country – the only South American member of the OECD.	因此智利不出意料地被视为发达国家——也是经合组织在南美的唯一成员国。


Copper is Chile’s major product and accounts for half of its exports.	铜是智利的主要产品，占其出口的半壁江山。


Although the government owns Codelco, the world’s largest copper producer, it is Chile’s only publicly owned company.	政府下属的Codelco公司是全球最大的铜生产商，也是智利唯一的公营企业。


The company’s revenue varies with the global price of copper, yielding higher government revenues in some years and declines – for example, this year – when the global price is down.	该公司的营收会随全球铜价波动而变化，因此政府收入也会在某些年份走高或者下跌——比如今年这种下跌市。


The government follows a wise fiscal strategy that involves budget surpluses in years when copper revenue is high, with the additional funds channeled to a national stabilization fund.	政府遵循一个明智的财政策略，当预算因高铜价而出现盈余时就将多余的钱存入国家稳定基金。


But even with the currently depressed copper price, Chile’s budget deficit is only 2% of GDP.	但即便当前铜价如此低迷，智利的预算赤字也仅为GDP的2％。


As a result of Chile’s cautious fiscal strategy, the country has a national debt that amounts to only 16% of GDP – and a sovereign debt rating that is the highest in South America.	在谨慎财政策略之下，该国国家负债额只相当于GDP的16％——主权债务评级也是南美是最高的。


Taxes and other government revenues are less than 20% of GDP.	政府税收和其他收入相当于GDP的不到20％。


Half of tax revenue is collected with a value-added tax, which is essentially a tax on consumption.	税收收入的一半都是通过一项增值税来获得，而该税项实质上是一种消费税。


Although there is a tax on corporate income, it is integrated with personal taxes in a way that reduces its adverse effect on investment and production.	虽然也设立企业所得税，却是以一种和个人所得税打包的方式存在，从而降低了对投资和生产的负面影响。


Chile is well known for an investment-based pension system.	另外一项比较突出的是智利以投资为基础的养老保险制度。


Employees are required to contribute 10% of their wages to a private pension company of their choice and can then select one of the investment strategies offered by that company.	员工必须拿出自身工资的10％，任选一家私人养老金公司并投入该公司提供的其中一种投资策略中。


The government mandates the range of investment strategies, which vary in terms of the share of equities and fixed income that companies may offer.	政府对投资策略的范围做了强制规定，养老金公司只能改变持有股票的份额以及固定收入的数额。


For those who have worked and contributed during their entire adult life, this produces benefits that are more than 50% of pre-retirement income.	对于那些工作了一辈子也缴纳了养老金的人来说，由此带来的分红将超过其退休前收入的50％。


Meanwhile, sound monetary policy, guided by a series of talented central bankers (whose independence is enshrined in Chile’s constitution), has prevented inflation and kept long-term rates relatively low.	与此同时，在历任央行行长（智利宪法保障其独立性）英明指导下的稳健财政政策遏制了通货膨胀，维持长期利率处于相对较低的水平。


Chile’s inflation target is 3% with an acceptable range of plus or minus 1%.	智利的通胀目标是3％，可接受范围为±1％。


Inflation this year is expected to be 3.9%, and the ten-year bond rate is just 4.4%.	今年的通胀率预计为3. 9％，而十年期债券利率仅为4.


And, by protecting the floating exchange-rate regime, the central bank ensures that Chile does not confront the kind of foreign-debt crisis that has hit other Latin American countries.	4％。 同时通过维护浮动汇率制度，央行将确保智利不会出现其他拉美国家所面对的外债危机。


Chile is also a devoted free trader. It has free-trade agreements with more than 20 countries and is a member of the nascent Trans-Pacific Partnership.	智利也是一个忠实的自由贸易国，与20多个国家签订了自由贸易协定，也是新生的跨太平洋伙伴关系中的一员。


The economy has also benefited from its openness to foreign investment, with the stock of foreign direct investment in Chile topping 80% of GDP.	得益于其对外国投资开放政策，智利GDP有超过80％来自外国直接投资形成的存量。


There is also universal literacy, with 98% of the adult population able to read and write.	该国识字率也极高，有98％的成年人能够读写。


On average, young people spend an average of 15 years in school from primary through tertiary education.	平均而言，年轻人从小学到大专院校的平均就学时间为15年。


Chile’s excellent economic performance has been the result of the free-market policies introduced during the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet but confirmed and strengthened by democratically elected governments over the 25 years since he left office.	智利的优异经济表现是在奥古斯托·皮诺切特将军（Augusto Pinochet）的军事独裁期间推出，随后由民选政府在前者离任后的25年间确立并强化的自由市场政策的结果。


So, given the success and popularity of these policies, it is surprising that Chile’s voters have elected a president and a parliament that many Chileans now fear could put this approach at risk.	但令人吃惊的是，即便这些政策获得了如此高的成就和支持度，选民们却选出了令许多智利人至今担心会动摇这一政策的总统和议会。


Bachelet’s policy agenda emphasizes three major changes.	巴切莱特的施政纲领强调了三大变化。


A key element would be universal free university education, modeled on European systems.	一个关键点是效仿欧洲体制的全民免费大学教育。


Paying for this educational reform would require higher tax rates.	实现该教育改革需要更高的税率来支撑。


And labor laws would be revised to strengthen the role of unions.	同时将修改劳动法以加强工会的作用。


Critics of Bachelet claim that this agenda is already depressing business investment and is responsible for relatively slow economic growth.	巴切莱特的批评者声称这一议程已经开始遏制商业投资，并导致了相对缓慢的经济增长。


And they worry that foreign and domestic investors will be discouraged by the new labor rules.	他们担心国内外投资者将被新的劳动法吓跑。


Fortunately, the Chilean public shows no inclination to follow the mistakes of several other South American countries, especially Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina.	然而幸运的是，智利公众无意重蹈其他几个南美国家，尤其是委内瑞拉，厄瓜多尔，巴西和阿根廷的覆辙。


Even Bachelet’s critics agree that Chile’s basic macroeconomic policies will not change: an independent central bank committed to price stability, a free-trade regime with a floating currency, and a fiscal policy that will keep deficits and public debt low.	即使是巴切莱特的批评者也同意智利的基本宏观经济政策将不会改变：一个致力于价格稳定的独立央行，一个汇率浮动的自由贸易体制，一项将让赤字和公共债务控制在低水平的财政政策。


Bachelet’s term in office will end in 2017.	巴切莱特的任期将于2017年结束。


Under Chile’s constitution, she cannot serve another consecutive term.	按照智利宪法规定她无法再次连任。


The election that year will therefore be an important one to watch.	因此那一年的选举将有待重点观察。


The Democratic Merits of Selective Schools	精英学校的民主优势


SANTIAGO – Where do Latin American elites come from?	圣地亚哥——拉美精英们究竟从何而来？


If the magical realist fiction once so popular in the United States and Europe is any guide, they belong to one of the 14 families (yes, that is always the number) that since colonial times have owned all arable land – along with everything else.	如果从一度在美国和欧洲颇受欢迎的神奇现实主义小说中寻找答案，那么他们来自从殖民时代就拥有全部耕地——和一切财产的14个家族中的一个（没错，精英家族一直就是14个）。


But reality is more complicated than fiction.	但现实的复杂程度总是胜过小说。


In most Latin American countries, the traditional ruling families learned long ago to share their place at the table with a different kind of elite: the urban, professional, and educated graduates of the region’s top public schools and universities.	在多数拉美国家，传统执政家族早就学会与各式各样的精英分享自己的地位：这些精英包括在拉美最好的公立学校和大学接受教育的专业人士和城市毕业生。


In Chile, however, that may be about to change.	但智利或许会改变这一切。


Chile’s Instituto Nacional, a fiercely competitive secondary school for boys, is as old as the Republic itself.	智利国家学院是一所竞争激烈的男性中学，它的历史和共和国本身一样古老。


With no fees and an entrance system based entirely on merit, students from middle- and working-class families comprise the vast majority of the student body.	因为不收学费并实行以分数为唯一标准的招生制度，该校的绝大部分学生都来自中产及工薪阶层家庭。


In last year’s college entrance examinations, 22 Institute students were nationally ranked – far more than the nine who studied at the second most successful institution, an expensive private Catholic school run by the Church’s conservative Opus Dei organization.	去年高考中，有22名该校学生在全国名列前茅——排名第二的昂贵的私立天主教学校却仅有9名（该教会学校由教会保守的主业会机构负责经营）。


The Instituto and its counterpart for young women, Liceo 1, have educated 18 Chilean Presidents and four of the last seven, including the incumbent, Michelle Bachelet.	18名智利总统和近七任中的四任毕业于国家学院及与其地位对等的女校Liceo 1，现任总统巴切莱特也包括其中。


Chile is far from unique in this respect.	智利在这方面远非独一无二。


From Colegio Nacional in Buenos Aires to Stuyvesant High School in New York City, institutions that are public, meritocratic, and free have long and distinguished records of achievement across the Americas.	从布宜诺斯艾利斯的国立大学到纽约市史帝文森高中，拉美各国任人唯才的免费公立学校所取得的成绩最为突出。


One might expect that such schools would make a progressive leader like Bachelet proud – not least because she herself attended one.	有人可能认为此类学校或许会令巴切莱特这样的进步领袖感到自豪——原因之一是她本人也曾毕业于类似的学校。


Yet she has proposed a plan, recently approved by the Chilean Congress, that will upend the system, allowing the Instituto Nacional and two dozen other highly competitive public schools across Chile to select only 30% of their students through entrance exams, with the rest chosen by lottery.	但她最近却提出了一项彻底颠覆这一体制的计划，并在不久前通过了智利国会的审核。 该计划允许国家学院和智利其他二十余家竞争激烈的公立学校通过入学考试选拔30%的生源，其余部分则由抽签决定。


The affected schools’ students, teachers, and alumni are predictably upset.	受此影响，学生、老师和毕业生质量下降几乎毫无疑问。


Why would anyone wish to weaken public schools in the name of equality?	为什么有人想以“平等”为名削弱公立学校的地位？


Backers of the reform make two arguments – neither of which is convincing.	改革的支持者给出了两种说法——但没有一种能令人信服。


The first argument is that these schools’ achievements seem greater than they are.	第一种说法是这些学校的成绩并不像看上去那样突出。


By selecting only the strongest students, critics claim, they ensure strong results, without having to add a lot of value.	批评者称招收实力最强的学生确保公立学校成绩最好，但这并没有改变产生的附加值。


This is a textbook “endogeneity” problem: Do the students excel because of the quality of the school, or does the school gain strong results because of the quality of the students?	这是教科书式的经典“内生性”问题：是学校质量好让学生出类拔萃，还是学生实力强让学校成绩出色？


To answer this question, a recent paper compared standardized-test performance by students who barely missed gaining admission to the Instituto to that of enrolled Instituto students.	为了回答这个问题，不久前有份论文对比了差点未能考入国家学院的学生和成功考入该学院学生的标准化考试成绩。


It turned out that the performance gap between the two groups grew, and the difference was statistically significant.	结果是两者间的成绩差距越拉越大，而且这种差距具有统计学意义。


In short, there is reason to believe that elite public schools like Instituto Nacional do make a difference for their students.	简言之，有理由认为像国家学院这样的精英公立学校能够改变学生的成绩。


In fact, the critics  who helped to craft the reform recognize this.	事实上，主导改革的批评者们都了解这个问题。


They argue that the performance advantage is precisely why the doors of such schools should be open to all, without entrance exams.	他们认为成绩优势恰恰说明此类学校的大门应该向所有人敞开，也就是说要取消入学考试。


The proposal has a nice egalitarian ring to it; but it is far from clear that these schools and their teachers, however skillful, can have such a significant impact on a randomly selected group of students.	上述提案貌似弘扬了平等主义； 但目前尚不清楚无论这些学校和老师多么出色，是否能提高随机选择的学生成绩。


The challenge is particularly great for schools with a special focus, such as sports, music, science, or the visual arts.	体育、音乐、科学或视觉艺术等专业学校所面临的挑战尤其艰巨。


After all, not just any pair of legs will allow you to play soccer like Lionel Messi, and not just any set of vocal cords will allow you to sing like Maria Callas.	毕竟，不是只要有腿就能像梅西那样踢足球，也不是任何声音条件都能成为玛丽亚·卡拉斯。


The Bronx High School of Science in New York City takes children of immigrants and molds them into some of the world’s leading scientists.	纽约布朗克斯理科中学招收移民子女，并将其培养成世界最出色的科学家。


Not even the school’s most enthusiastic boosters – of which there are many – could argue with any certainty that it could produce such impressive results if it could not select its own students.	但就连该校最狂热的支持者（该校的支持者不乏其人）也无法确定如果被禁止自主招生，该校是否还能取得同样的优异成绩。


Latin America tried this experiment once already, with many public colleges attempting to deflect accusations of elitism by eliminating entrance examinations and tuition fees in the 1960s.	类似的试验在拉美已经进行过一次。 20世纪60年代众多公立大学曾试图通过取消入学考试和学费来摘掉所谓的精英主义帽子。


In a region where a university degree had, until then, represented a ticket to the good life, enrollment predictably swelled.	在大学学位几乎等同于美好生活的拉美地区，入学人数不出所料的迅速膨胀。


But, in many places, the experiment was short-lived.	但这个试验在很多地方都没有进行下去。


Institutions like the University of Chile and Brazil’s University of São Paulo resumed their highly competitive admissions processes.	像智利大学和圣保罗巴西大学这样的��校没过多久就恢复了竞争激烈的招生程序。


Those that did not, such as the University of Buenos Aires, saw their role in shaping their countries’ academic, business, and political elites diminish.	那些没有恢复选拔程序的大学，如布宜诺斯艾利斯大学，发现他们打造学术、商业和政治精英的能力被严重侵蚀。


In that last sentence, underline the word “political.”	最后一句话的重点其实是“政治”。


Indeed, the strongest argument for maintaining elite public schools, with their merit-based admissions policies, is political.	事实上，维持精英公立学校及其择优录取政策最有力的证据来自政治领域。


In countries where traditional wealthy elites have long wielded power, an alternative elite drawn from the middle classes and educated under republican values is politically invaluable.	在传统富人精英早已掌握权力的国家，从中产阶级吸收秉承共和党价值观的传统富裕阶层以外的精英具有宝贵的政治价值。


It is no coincidence that many of Chile’s democratic reformers of the last two centuries were once students at the Instituto Nacional.	过去两百年智利民主改革者有不少都毕业于国家学院并不稀奇。


In last year’s Chilean college entrance exam, the second-place school was not the only expensive Catholic institution with a largely upper-class student body to perform well; the rest of the top-ten schools also fit this description.	去年在智利大学招生考试中，名列第二的并不是唯一一所学费不菲的以上层阶级为主的天主教会学校； 前十名之内的其余学校也同样如此。


Opus Dei runs most – though not all – of them.	主业会管理着其中绝大部分——但并不是所有学校都被教会控制。


The dominance of such conservative, elitist institutions is why schools like the Instituto Nacional are so important.	保守、精英院校占主导地位说明了像国家学院这样的院校为什么如此重要。


Yet once the effects of Bachelet’s recent reform kick in, their graduates may no longer be at the top of the ranks.	然而，一旦巴切莱特最近的改革开始产生影响，他们的毕业生就可能不再名列前茅。


As the elite public schools suffer, so will Chilean democracy.	精英公立学校倒退最终会使智利民主蒙受损失。


Chile’s Pension Crunch	智利的养老金紧缩


SANTIAGO – Defined-benefit pension plans are under pressure.	圣地亚哥——养老金固定收益计划正在面临压力。


Changing demographics spell trouble for so-called pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, in which contributions from current workers finance pensions.	人口构成的变化为所谓随收随付（PAYG）系统带来困难，这套系统的特点是由现有劳动者缴费来资助养老金的发放。


And record-low interest rates are putting pressure on funded systems, in which the return from earlier investments pays for retirement benefits.	同时创记录的低利率正在对融资体系构成压力，上述系统依靠之前的投资来支付退休福利。


The Financial Times recently called this pensions crunch a “creeping social and political crisis.”	金融时报最近称上述养老金紧缩为一场“潜移默化的社会和政治危机。 ”


Defined-contribution, fully-funded systems are often lauded as the feasible alternative.	固定缴款、完全出资系统往往被赞赏为可行的替代选择。


Chile, which since 1981 has required citizens to save for retirement in individual accounts, managed by private administrators, is supposed to be the poster child in this regard.	智利被公认为这方面的代表性国度，该国从1981年起就要求民众向由私营管理人管理的个人退休账户内储蓄款项。


Yet hundreds of thousands of Chileans have taken to the streets to protest against low pensions.	但数十万智利人纷纷走上街头抗议养老金过低的现状。


(The average monthly benefit paid by Chile’s private system is around $300, less than Chile’s minimum wage.)	（智利私营体系平均月缴款额度约为三百美元，利于智利法定的最低工资。 ）


Chile’s government, feeling the heat, has vowed to change the system that countries like Peru, Colombia, and Mexico have imitated, and that George W. Bush once described as a “great example” for Social Security reform in the United States.	智利政府在压力之下承诺要改变曾被秘鲁、哥伦比亚和墨西哥等国模仿的养老金系统，乔治·W·布什也曾将这套系统形容为美国社会保障改革的“出色榜样”。


What is going on?	问题究竟出在什么地方？


The blame lies partially with the labor market.	责任可以部分归咎于劳动力市场。


Chile’s is more formal than that of its neighbors, but many people – especially women and the young – either have no job or work without a contract.	智利与邻国相比经济比较正规——但很多民众——尤其是妇女和年轻人——要么没有工作，要么没有合同。


High job rotation makes it difficult to contribute regularly.	经常更换工作加大了定期缴费的难度。


And it has proven difficult to enforce regulations requiring self-employed workers to put money aside in their own accounts.	而且事实证明要求自由职业者向个人账户存款的法规执行难度很大。


Moreover, the legally mandated savings rate is only 10% of the monthly wage, and men and women can retire at 65 and 60, respectively – figures that are much lower than the OECD average.	此外，法律规定的储蓄率仅为月工资的10%，而男性和女性的退休年龄分别为65岁和60岁——远低于经合组织国家的平均数。


The result is that Chileans save too little for retirement.	结果导致智利人退休存款过低。


No wonder pensions are low.	退休金额度低也就不足为怪了。


But that is not the end of the story.	但这还不是问题的全部。


Some of the same problems plaguing defined-benefit systems are also troubling defined-contribution, private-account systems like Chile’s.	困扰固定收益体系的某些问题同样困扰着以智利为代表的固定支付、私人账户系统。


Take changes in life expectancy.	以预期寿命的变化为例。


A woman retiring at age 60 today can expect to reach 90.	今天60岁退休的女性其预期寿命可以达到90岁。


So a fund accumulated over 15 years of contributions (the average for Chilean women) must finance pensions for an expected 30 years.	于是缴款期为十五年（智利女性缴款的平均年限）的养老基金却必须资助预期高达三十年的养老金支付。


That combination could yield decent pensions only if the returns on savings were astronomical.	只有储蓄回报率达到天文数字这样的组合才能带来满意的养老金数额。


They are not.	储蓄回报率当然没有那么高。


On the contrary, since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, interest rates have been collapsing worldwide.	相反，从2008到2009年全球金融危机后，世界各国利率就一直急速下行。


Chile is no exception.	智利也不例外。


This affects all funded pension systems, regardless of whether they are defined-benefit or defined-contribution schemes.	这种情况影响到所有出资养老金系统，无论是固定收益还是固定缴款计划。


Lower returns mean lower pensions – or larger deficits.	低收益意味着低退休金——或者赤字扩大。


The shock and its effect are large.	由此造成的冲击及其影响都很大。


In the case of a worker who at retirement uses his fund to buy an annuity, a drop in the long interest rate from 4% to 2% cuts his pension by nearly 20%.	如果劳动者在退休时用退休基金购买年金，那么长期利率从4%降到2%将使其养老金出现近20%的下降。


The rate-of-return problem is compounded in Chile by the high fees charged by fund managers, which are set as a percentage of the saver’s monthly wage.	智利基金经理高收费进一步加剧了回报率问题，储蓄者月薪的一定百分比被设定为基金经理的费用。


Until the government forced fund managers to participate in auctions, there was little market competition (surveys reveal that most people are not aware of the fees they pay).	在政府强制基金经理参与拍卖之前，市场竞争几乎非常微弱（调查结果显示大多数人并不清楚支付了多少费用）。


A government-appointed commission recently concluded that managers have generated high gross real returns on investments: from 1981 to 2013, the annual average was 8.6%; but high fees cut net returns to savers to around 3% per year over that period.	一家政府指定委员会最近得出结论 ，基金经理所得毛利相对于实际投资收益非常高：从1981到2013年，毛利相对于实际投资收益的占比为8. 6%；


Those high fees have also meant hefty profits for fund managers.	这样的高收费意味着基金经理利润丰厚。


And it is precisely the disparity between scrawny pension checks and managers’ fat profits that fuels protest.	正是少得可怜的养老金支票和基金经理丰厚利润之间的巨大反差激起了抗议活动。


So, more challenging than any technical problem with Chile’s pension system is its legitimacy deficit.	因此，合法性赤字比智利养老金系统的任何技术性问题都更有难度。


To address that problem, it helps to think of any pension system as a way of managing risks – of unemployment, illness, volatile interest rates, sudden death, or a very long life span.	将养老金系统视为管理——失业、疾病、利率波动、猝死或长寿——风险的一种方式对解决问题会有所帮助。


Different principles for organizing a pension system – defined-benefit versus defined-contribution, fully funded versus PAYG, plus all the points in between – allocate those risks differently across workers, taxpayers, retirees, and the government.	构建养老金体系的不同原则——固定收益与固定缴款、完全出资与现收现付，再加上这两者之间的一切形式——将上述风险以不同方式分配到劳动者、纳税人、退休人员和政府当中。


The key lesson from Chile is that a defined-contribution, funded system with individual accounts has some advantages: it can stimulate savings, provide a large and growing stock of investible funds (over $170 billion in Chile), and spur economic growth.	智利的主要经验是基于个人账户的固定缴款出资系统的确存在某些优势：它可以刺激储蓄、积累庞大且不断增长的可投资资金（智利可投资资金总额超过1700亿美元）并同时刺激经济增长。


But it also leaves individual citizens too exposed to too many risks.	但民众个人也因此被迫面对太多的风险因素。


A successful reform must improve the labor market and devise better risk-sharing mechanisms, while preserving incentives to save.	成功的改革必须在保持储蓄积极性的同时改善劳动力市场并制定更加合理的风险分担机制。


It is a tall order.	这是一项异常艰巨的任务。


Chile’s system already shares risks between low-income workers and taxpayers, via a minimum non-contributory pension and a set of pension top-ups introduced in 2008 (as Minister of Finance, I helped design that reform).	智利系统已经实现了低收入劳动者和纳税人之间的风险分担，设立了最低非缴费型养老金并在2008年实行了一系列养老金追加举措（作为时任财政部长，我协助设计了这项改革）。


Subsequent experience suggests that those benefits should be enlarged and made available to more retirees.	其后的经验表明上述福利应当扩大并提供给更多退休者。


But the Chilean government has little money left, having committed the revenues from a sizeable tax increase two years ago to the ill-conceived policy of free university education, even for high-income students.	但智利政府却受制于剩余资金不足，因为政府将两年前增税带来的可观资金投资于（甚至为高收入学生）提供免费大学教育等考虑不周的政策。


In response to the recent protests, the government has proposed an additional risk-sharing scheme: some (thus far undecided) part of a five-percentage-point increase in the mandatory retirement savings rate, to be paid by employers, will go to a “solidarity fund” that can finance transfers to people receiving low pensions.	为应对最近的抗议活动，政府又额外提出了一项风险分担计划：要求将由雇主支付的提高强制退休储蓄率5%所带来的部分资金划入“团结基金”，并用于低退休金领取者的转移支付。


The goal is correct, but, as usual, the devil is in the details.	这一目标方向正确，但魔鬼往往隐藏在细节当中。


In the medium to long run, it seems likely that wages will adjust, so that the effective burden of the additional savings will be borne by employees, not employers.	从中长期看，工资很有可能将进行调整，导致雇员、而非雇主将成为增量储蓄的实际承担者。


One study estimates that workers treat half of the compulsory savings as a tax on labor income, so too-large an increase (especially in the funds that do not go to the worker’s individual account) could cause a drop in labor-force participation, a shift from formal to informal employment, or both.	一项研究估计劳动者将强制储蓄的半数视为劳动收入税，因此（尤其是不进入劳动者个人账户的基金）增收数额过大可能造成劳动力参与度下降、或从正规行业转向非正规行业等后果。


Chile’s economy does not need that.	而这绝不是智利经济所需要的。


There are no easy answers to the pensions conundrum, whether in Chile or elsewhere.	退休金难题不存在简单的答案，无论是在智利还是在其他国家。


Chilean legislators will have to make difficult choices with hard-to-quantify tradeoffs.	智利立法机构必须依靠难以量化的利弊权衡做出困难的决策。


Whatever they decide, irate pensioners and pensioners-to-be will be watching closely.	无论他们如何决定，愤怒的退休人员和即将退休人员都将保持密切的关注。


Chile’s Presidential Minuet	智利的总统小步舞


BUENOS AIRES – Chile has been Latin America’s success story since the 1980’s, boasting rapid economic growth, successful integration into the world economy, solid democratic institutions, an effective state bureaucracy, and low levels of corruption.	布宜诺斯艾利斯——智利从20世纪80年代起就一直是拉美的成功典范，实现了快速的经济发展、与世界经济的成功融合、建立了可靠的民主制度、高效的国家官僚体系并且拥有低水平的腐败。


By most standards, the country is far better off than the rest of the region.	按照多数衡量标准，智利的情况都远胜于其他拉美国家。


Not surprisingly, Chileans have kept the ruling Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition (the Concertación ) in power for four consecutive terms since 1990, when democracy was restored after 17 years of General Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military rule.	所以，智利人在奥古斯托·皮诺切特将军17年的残暴军事统治后，从20世纪90年代起允许执政的基督教民主社会联盟 （ Concertación） 连任四届并不值得大惊小怪。


On December 13, however, voters in Chile’s presidential election are likely to make the Concertación candidate sweat.	但在12月13日这天，参加智利总统大选投票的选民可能会让基督教民主社会联盟紧张得汗流浃背。


The Concertación is running Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, the son of a former president who was president himself from 1994 until 2000.	基督教民主社会联盟的参选人爱德华多·弗雷是基督教民主党成员，也是前总统之子，其父曾在1994到2000年间担任总统一职。


His opponent is Sebastián Piñera, a tycoon, former senator, and presidential runner-up in 2006 who represents the main opposition forces – Piñera’s moderately conservative Renovación Nacional (RN) and the more rightist Union Democrata Independiente (UDI).	他的竞争对手是前参议员兼企业巨头塞瓦斯蒂安·皮涅拉，皮涅拉代表偏于保守的 民主革新党 （RN）和更为右翼的 独立民主联盟 （UDI）等主要反对力量，他曾在2006年总统选举中获得第二高票。


So far, nothing new: the RN and the UDI – which differ mainly in their attitude towards the military government from which they emerged (the RN being the more self-critical) – have been the main challengers in all the previous elections.	到目前为止一切照旧：此次大选的主要挑战者和以往一样，仍然是民主革新党和独立民主联盟，这两党的主要区别在于对待同为其母党的军政府的态度不同（民主革新党更注重自我批评）。


But change is coming, in the form of a 36-year-old maverick with no traditional-party backing.	但是变化正在发生，这次大选出现了一名没有传统政党支持的36岁标新立异的候选人。


Marco Enríquez-Ominami, with about 20% support in recent polls, is remarkably close to Frei (around 26%), and not terribly far from Piñera (roughly 38%).	Marco Enríquez-Ominami在最新民调中获得了20%的选民支持，这与弗雷非常接近（弗雷的支持率约为26%），离皮涅拉约38%的支持率差距也不算太大。


The young candidate’s unexpected popular support is rooted within the ruling coalition: his adoptive father is a prominent Socialist senator (his biological father, a leader of the revolutionary left in the 1970’s, was killed by Pinochet’s political police).	这位年轻候选人出人意料的公众支持仍然植根于执政联盟：他的养父是知名的社会党参议员（而他的生父则是20世纪70年代被皮诺切特政治警察杀害的一名革命左翼领袖）。


Marco himself was elected deputy on the Socialist ticket, but he defected when the party denied him the chance to contest Frei’s nomination in a primary.	Marco本人曾被推选为社会党候选代表，但在一次社会党不批准他与弗雷竞争之后他脱离了社会党。


With this unique mix of insider knowledge and outsider status, and a freshness that both main candidates lack, Enríquez-Ominami has gone farther than most observers predicted.	Enríquez-Ominami同时具备了圈内人的知识和圈外人的身份，还有两大主要候选人所缺少的新鲜与活力，因此他比多数观察家预测的走得更远。


Piñera’s lead and the emergence of Enríquez-Ominami are probably expressions of the same phenomenon: fatigue with – and within – the Concertación .	皮涅拉的领先和Enríquez-Ominami的崛起或许是同一现象的不同表现：那就是来自基督教民主社会联盟内部，以及民众对于基督教民主社会联盟的厌倦。


Despite its many successes since 1990, and the high popularity of the current president (Socialist Michelle Bachelet, Chile’s first female chief executive), time is taking a toll.	尽管20世纪90年代以来胜果累累，而且现任总统（社会党员米歇尔·巴切莱特，智利的首位女性行政长官）的支持率很高，但时间正在给社会联盟带来麻烦。


In recent years, several groups have split from the incumbent parties.	近年来，已经从执政党分裂出了几大集团。


Many voters are following suit, drawn mainly to Enríquez-Ominami.	许多选民也如法炮制，主要支持Enríquez-Ominami。


Frei’s lackluster numbers reflect his own weaknesses (he is notoriously uncharismatic and was the least popular of the four Concertación presidents), as well as the inevitable stress that two decades of uninterrupted rule has placed on the ruling coalition.	弗雷暗淡的支持数字反映了他自身的弱点（众所周知他毫无个人魅力，是连续四任基督教民主社会联盟总统中受欢迎程度最差的一个），以及连续二十年的不间断执政给执政联盟所造成的压力。


As things stand now, the right is likely to win the first round, but with less than 50%.	从目前的情况看，右翼可能赢得首轮选举，但得票率不到一半。


Even a comfortable Piñera victory could be reversed on the January 17th run-off, as Frei and Enríquez-Ominami are essentially splitting the center-left vote.	甚至连皮涅拉的轻松获胜都可能在1月17日的决选中遭到逆转，因为弗雷和Enríquez-Ominami实际上致使中左翼力量的得票趋于分散。


Enríquez-Ominami has the popularity and momentum to displace Frei from the run-off, but he may have a harder time defeating Piñera.	Enríquez-Ominami有能力也有意愿在决选中取代弗雷，但他击败皮涅拉可能比较困难。


The two most likely scenarios, then, are government continuity or predictable change (the right has been expected to capture the presidency for years).	因此，最有可能出现的局面是政府得以延续或者出现可以预期的改变（人们预期右翼势力将在未来若干年内把持总统一职）。


But a third scenario – less predictable change following a victory by Enríquez-Ominami – should not be ruled out, as campaign advertisements will appear in the media only starting November 13.	但第三种局面——即Enríquez-Ominami获胜后可预测程度较低的改变——也不能完全排除，因为11月13日起才开始刊登媒体竞选广告。


In terms of Chile’s major policies, however, continuity is almost certain to prevail, even if Enríquez-Ominami wins.	但从智利主要政策的角度，即便Enríquez-Ominami最终获胜，持续性几乎仍将肯定成为主旋律。


The center-left coalition that defeated Pinochet (in a 1988 plebiscite and his presidential candidate in the 1989 election) has been wise enough to keep, and in some cases deepen, the sound free-market policies inherited from the military government.	（在1988年公民投票中）击败皮诺切特（并在1989年大选中击败其总统候选人）的中左翼联盟十分明智，他们坚持并在某些情况下深化了从军政府那里承袭下来的有效的自由市场政策。


Chile boasts orthodox fiscal and monetary management, a very open economy, and a dynamic private sector.	智利实行规范的财政和货币管理、拥有非常开放的经济和充满活力的私有部门。


It was also the first country in the world to adopt a fully private pension system, a policy experiment carried out by one of Pinochet’s technocrats (who happened to be Piñera’s brother, José) and largely kept in place since then.	它也是世界第一个实现养老体系完全私有化的国家，这项政策探索的实行者是皮诺切特下属的一位技术专家（此人碰巧是皮涅拉的兄弟乔昔），并且从那以后一直延续至今。


These policies are popular with voters, and they are protected by powerful actors (for example, the strong export-oriented business sector) and by trade agreements with almost all the world’s major economies and regional blocs.	上述政策受到选民的欢迎，并且拥有实力派人物（例如出口导向的强大商务部门）和与世界几乎所有主要经济体和区域集团贸易协议的保障。


Unlike many Latin American countries, in which populist backlashes have followed the liberalizing reforms of the 1990’s, the main challenger in Chile is an even more pro-market coalition.	和20世纪90年代自由化改革后发生民粹主义回潮的许多拉美国家不同，智利的主要挑战者甚至是更加坚定的市场联盟。


Beyond the economy, there are, of course, many areas of disagreement.	除经济领域外，当然还有其他许多存在分歧的领域。


The Concertación has dealt prudently with the political legacies of the dictatorship, gradually rescinding the self-serving rules that Pinochet created to protect himself, the military, and the right, and making some progress in prosecuting human rights violators.	基督教民主社会联盟一直审慎地对待独裁政权的政治遗产，逐步的废除皮诺切特赖以保护自身、军队和右翼的自利条款，并且在起诉侵犯人权方面取得了某些进展。


But many are not happy: the far left – not very strong these days but with an important political tradition – wants more and faster progress on prosecutions, while the recalcitrant right insists on treating Pinochet (who died in 2006) as a national hero.	可许多人仍然不满：极端左翼势力——虽然今天不甚强大但却有着重要的政治传统——要求在诉讼领域取得更多更快的进步，同时倔强的右翼反对派坚持要求皮诺切特应当受到民族英雄般的对待。


Moral, ethnic, and environmental issues follow similar ideological lines.	道德、种族和环境事务同样遵循类似的意识形态准则。


And yet the range of the policy debate is much narrower, and the tone more amiable, than is the case in Chile’s more polarized neighbors, such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela.	但与智利更为两级分明的邻国如阿根廷、玻利维亚和委内瑞拉相比，政策辩论的范围相对狭窄，态度也更加温和。


In either of the most probable scenarios, continuity or prudent change, or even if the “outsider” candidate wins, Chile will in all likelihood remain a beacon of democratic stability, economic dynamism, and international engagement in a region too often characterized by political and economic turbulence.	无论发生哪一种可能的情况：政策延续或者审慎变化，甚至于“外部”候选人在大选中获胜，智利十有八九都会在这个经常发生政治和经济动荡的地区内，继续充当民主稳定、经济活力和国际友谊的灯塔。


Chile Stays the Course	智利决定路线方针


BUENOS AIRES – When Sebastián Piñera – the moderately conservative tycoon who was recently elected president – takes office on March 11, Chile will experience what some political scientists consider a watershed in every successful transition to democracy: the rotation of power among political parties.	布宜诺斯艾利斯 —— 随着预定于 3 月 11 日 继任的偏保守派巨头 塞巴斯蒂安·皮涅拉在不久前当选总统，智利注定会经历不同政党间的权力轮换，这一过程被某些政治学家视为向民主政体成功转折的必要步骤。


After General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship gave way to democracy in 1990, the center-left coalition known as the Concertación won four consecutive free and fair presidential contests.	在 奥古斯托·皮诺切特将军的独裁政权 1990 年被民主政权取代后，中左翼执政联盟连续四次在自由公正的总统竞选中获胜。


After 20 years in office, it will now cede power to Piñera´s Coalición por el Cambio , composed of his center-right Renovación Nacional and the more conservative Union Demócrata Independiente .	长达 20 年的执政生涯结束后，它现在会把权力交给皮涅拉的 争取变革联盟 , 该联盟由中右翼的 民主革新党 和更加保守的 独立民主联盟 联合组成。


The long rule of the Concertación reflected its success.	执政联盟 的长期执政反映出它作为政党的成功。


In almost all areas, from political stability to economic development to poverty alleviation, Chile has done very well over the past two decades, certainly much better than its Latin American neighbors.	在从政治稳定到经济发展再到扶贫的所有领域，智利在过去 20 年中的成绩都十分卓著，无疑远好于它的拉美邻国。


The rightist opposition had to solve the puzzle of defeating a coalition that had maintained Pinochet’s most successful policies (mainly the free-market, export-oriented economic model) without being tainted (as many Coalición leaders are) by links to his bloody regime.	右翼反对派不得不解决在不被与皮诺切特血腥政权关系所沾染的前提下，击败一直坚持实行皮诺切特最成功政策（主要包括自由市场、出口导向型经济模式）的联盟的难题。


Piñera benefited from his own critical stance towards the military government, and from an electoral campaign that emphasized the liberal much more than the conservative aspects of his coalition.	皮涅拉得益于他本人对于军政府的批评立场，同样得益于宣传其联盟自由面远多于保守面的竞选活动。


Instead of vindicating Pinochet and appealing to traditional Catholic values, Piñera offered a centrist vision of change that included more rights for homosexuals and an emphasis on social issues (in a country that, even after 25 years of strong growth, remains very unequal).	皮涅拉并没有依靠替皮诺切特辩白来迎合传统的天主教价值观，而是提出了中庸的改革路线，包括赋予同性恋者更多权利和加强对社会问题的关注（智利甚至在长达 25 年的强劲增长之后，不平等现象依然非常严重）。


Piñera’s victory was aided by the sclerosis of the Concertación, which ran as its candidate the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, the least popular of its four presidents of the last two decades.	执政联盟自身的问题也辅助了皮涅拉的成功。 代表执政联盟参选的基督教民主党候选人爱德华多·弗雷是过去 20 年间智利四任总统中受欢迎程度最低的一个。


(The current and popular Socialist president, Michelle Bachelet, could not legally run for reelection.)	（颇受欢迎的现任社会党总统 米歇尔·巴切莱特不能再合法地谋求连任。


Even worse, after the Socialist Party denied a young deputy, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, the possibility to compete in a primary against Frei, Enríquez launched a quite successful independent candidacy, which split the Concertación vote in the first round.	）更糟糕的是，在社会党否决了年轻代表马克·恩里克斯－大南与弗雷在初选中的竞争资格后，恩里克斯以独立候选人身份启动了相当成功的竞选活动，从第一轮开始就分流了执政联盟的票数。


With more internal democracy and some renewal in its leadership, the ruling alliance might have secured a fifth term.	如果在内部实行更多民主并对领导人实行优胜劣汰，那么执政联盟可能已经第五次连任成功。


How much change does Piñera represent for Chile?	皮涅拉会为智利带来多大变化？


First, a look at the numbers: the president-elect won the second-round vote with only a slight popular majority (51.6%), and will have fewer seats than the Concertación in the Senate.	首先让我们来关注一组数据：当选总统仅以极其微弱的优势（ 51. 6% ）赢得了第二轮投票，而且在参议院的席位数仍低于执政联盟。


The rough balance of power that has characterized Chilean politics over the past 20 years will continue during Piñera’s four-year term: only incremental, negotiated change will be possible.	过去 20 年来一直统治智利政治的大致权力平衡将在皮涅拉的四年任期中得以延续：只有双方协商的修修补补才会成为可能。


Moreover, at a substantive level there is not really that much difference between the two alliances (and even less between the centrist Piñera and Frei).	此外，从实质性的观点来看，两大联盟间并没有那么大的不同（中间派别的皮涅拉和弗雷之间区别更不显著）。


Yes, traditional constituencies of the right, such as the business sector, the military, and the Church, will find a somewhat more welcoming government, but a sharp rightward turn is unlikely.	是的，商业部门、军队和教堂等传统上受右派把持的选区会发现新政府更对胃口，但几乎不可能出现朝着右翼方向的剧烈转折。


The most controversial change that Piñera is likely to seek is the partial privatization of CODELCO, the huge and highly profitable state-owned copper company.	皮涅拉可能的最具争议性的改革是寻求利润丰厚的大型国有铜业企业智利铜业公司的部分私有化。


But, even if this politically risky move succeeded, he would just be deepening the economic model started by Pinochet and followed by the Concertación .	但即使这一政治冒险举动取得成功，他也不过是深化了由皮诺切特开创、并在执政联盟手中得以延续的经济模式。


In foreign policy, Chile is expected to adopt a harsher stance towards the Cuban dictatorship and Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, while retaining the policy of integration with Argentina and Brazil, and of negotiation with Bolivia (over an old territorial dispute).	外交政策方面，预计智利会对古巴独裁政权和委内瑞拉总统 乌戈·查韦斯采取更严厉的态度，并同时继续奉行与阿根廷和巴西友好往来及与玻利维亚就原有地区争端继续谈判的政策。


The real action may actually take place within the two political coalitions.	真正的变化可能实际发生在两大政治联盟的内部。


Previous signs of exhaustion in the Concertación have worsened after the electoral defeat.	执政联盟早已存在的衰竭迹象在选举失败后进一步恶化。


Several key party leaders have resigned.	几名重要的执政党领导人已经辞职。


The smallest of the alliance’s parties (the Radicals ) quickly negotiated a deal with the right in Congress (though it was canceled after the ensuing political scandal).	规模最小的联盟党派（激进党）迅速与国会右翼势力达成了一致（尽管这项协议在紧随其后的政治丑闻爆出后又被迫取消）。


And Enríquez-Ominami may continue to build his new force at the expense of the Concertación .	而 恩里克斯－大南很可能在损害执政联盟利益的基础上继续巩固他的新生势力。


Other tensions may erupt without the unifying incentives of power.	没有权力将不同派别融合在一起，随时可能触发其他各种紧张局势。


As the cleavages inherited from the military years fade and the ideological ocean that once separated left and right becomes a navigable river, there is potential for coalition reshuffling.	随着军政府时期裂痕的修复和分裂左右翼势力的意识形态海洋变成可以通航的河流，各派别现在有可能进行联盟内部重组。


Piñera needs more votes in Congress, and the experience of other multi-party presidential democracies such as Argentina and Brazil shows that it is not difficult for incumbents to attract coalition partners in exchange for government posts.	皮涅拉需要争取更多的国会票数，而阿根廷和巴西等其他多党派总统制民主政体的经验表明在任者很容易以政府职位为交换来吸引联盟合伙人。


Tensions in the new ruling coalition are also possible.	新的执政联盟内部也有可能出现紧张状况。


Piñera has said that he will emphasize technical competence in his cabinet appointments, with a bias towards the young.	皮涅拉已经表态要在任命内阁官员时强调技术能力，将更多机会留给年轻人。


This may bode ill for traditional politicians of the right who have been waiting two decades for a chance in office.	对于传统的右翼政治人士来讲这可能不是个好消息，为了拥有执政机会他们已经苦苦等待了二十年之久。


One factor, however, may hold everything together: Bachelet can and may run again for president in 2013-2014.	但有一种因素可能将所有因素联系在一起：巴切莱特有权而且可能在 2013 － 2014 年再次竞选总统。


Her popularity, plus the toll that holding office might take on the Coalición , could turn the Concertación’s recent narrow defeat into a future victory.	她在民众中的威望，再加上联盟执政可能产生的后果，可能会使执政联盟不久前的惜败转化成为未来的胜利。


This prospect gives incentives for both alliances to stay together.	这种希望为联盟党派提供了继续合作的动力。


Silver Linings for a Golden Age	黄金时代曙光微现


SINGAPORE – Are prospects for global stability and prosperity improving or deteriorating?	新加坡—全球稳定与繁荣的前景在改善还是在恶化？


With enlightenment and progress in some parts of the world accompanied by atavism and stagnation elsewhere, this is not an easy question.	很难说，世界上有的部分在启蒙和进步，有的部分在倒退和停滞。


But we can gain greater purchase on it by considering three other questions.	但为了回答这个问题，考虑其他三个问题是大有裨益的。


The first is whether the United States will regain its standing as a source of moral leadership.	第一个问题是美国能否重新赢得道德领袖地位。


Despite its flaws, America did provide such leadership, beginning at the end of World War II.	尽管错误百出，自二战结束以来美国确实在道德方面起到了领导作用。


But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed everything.	但2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击改变了一切。


Americans’ anger following the attacks drove them to support policies that they once would have considered inconceivable.	受到袭击的美国人怒不可遏，以至于开始支持曾经认为不可想象的政策。


In the name of the “global war on terror,” they have tolerated torture; accepted – and even endorsed – the illegal invasion of Iraq; and allowed innocent civilians to become collateral damage of mechanical drone strikes.	在“全球反恐战争”的名义下，他们容忍了虐待，接受——甚至支持——对伊拉克的非法入侵； 并放任平民成为无人机空袭的附带受害者。


In order to restore America’s moral leadership, President Barack Obama must make good on his early rhetoric – exemplified in his speeches in Istanbul and Cairo early in his presidency – which demonstrated genuine regard for the oppressed.	为了重塑美国的道德领导力，总统奥巴马必须兑现他曾经说过的话，真正给受压迫的人民带去曙光——如他在就任总统早期在伊斯坦布尔和开罗说的那样。


In 2007, during his first presidential campaign, he wrote that America “can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission.	2007年，在第一次竞选总统期间，他写道，美国“不能从世界中抽身，也不能让世界屈膝于己。


We must lead the world, by deed and by example.”	我们必须领导世界，用作为和榜样领导世界。 ”


But Obama cannot do it alone – and, so far, neither the American public nor the US Congress seems committed to reconnecting with its moral compass.	但奥巴马无法独自完成这一点——而如今，美国公众和美国国会似乎都没有依照道德指南针所知的方向前进。


It should be unacceptable, for example, for Congress to block the release of 86 Guantánamo Bay detainees cleared by a committee of national-security officials.	有些事情本应是不可接受的，比如，国会否决了国家安全官员委员会的释放86位关塔那摩囚犯的决定。


Not even the revelations by former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden that no one is exempt from the possibility of US surveillance have stirred Americans to demand a new approach.	就连前情报承包商斯诺登曝光没人能摆脱美国的监控也没有让美国人站出来要求变换方式。


The answer to the second major question shaping the world’s future – whether China will regain its economic momentum – also appears to be “no,” at least in the short term, with most experts agreeing that China’s export- and investment-led growth model has all but exhausted its potential.	第二个决定世界未来的问题是中国是否能够重新获得经济动力。 对这个问题的回答似乎也是“否”，至少在短期是如此，因为大部分专家都同意，中国出口和投资导向的增长模式已经耗尽了潜力。


Indeed, China cannot continue to rely on manufacturing exports when its major sources of demand – the US and Europe – are struggling and its labor costs are rising.	事实上，在其主要需求源——美国和欧洲——萎靡不振、其自身劳动力成本开始上升的情况下，中国无法继续依赖制造业出口。


Likewise, China’s government cannot continue to waste resources on economic-stimulus packages that have led to industrial overcapacity and skyrocketing local-government debt.	类似地，中国政府不能再将资源浪费在导致工业产能过剩和地方政府债务高企的经济刺激计划上。


And China cannot move toward a more market-oriented, efficient, and innovative economy with bloated state-owned enterprises blocking the way.	中国也不能让臃肿的国有企业成为迈向更市场化、更高效、更创新的经济的拦路虎。


Whether China can develop and implement a viable new economic-growth model in post-crisis conditions depends on whether President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang can revive the legacy of their predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji.	中国是否能在后危机时代背景下发展并实施可行的新经济增长模式取决于习近平主席和李克强总理能否接过邓小平和朱镕基的枪。


In other words, China’s future – and that of the global economy – depends on how committed its leaders are to overcoming vested interests and pursuing comprehensive structural and policy reform.	换句话说，中国的未来——以及全球经济的未来——取决于中国领导人有多大决心克服既得利益、追求全面的结构性和政策改革。


While many in the West contend (and perhaps hope) that China will not succeed in transforming its economy, Xi and Li are acutely aware of the previous growth model’s unsustainability – and the challenges that changing it will entail.	许多西方人认为（甚至希望）中国在经济转型方面无法获得成功。 习近平和李克强敏锐地认识到了此前增长模式的不可持续性——以及改变这一模式所隐含的挑战。


For example, in March, Li said that implementing the needed market reforms “will be very painful, and even feel like cutting one’s wrist.”	比如，李克强在3月份说，实施必须的市场改革将是痛苦的，甚至有断腕之痛。


And both Xi and Li have indicated the government’s willingness to tolerate slower GDP growth in the short term for the sake of building a stronger, more sustainable economy.	习近平和李克强均表示政府准备好了接受更缓慢的短期GDP增长，以换取更坚挺、更可持续的经济。


The final question is whether Europe and Japan will recover their “animal spirits.”	最后一个问题是欧洲和日本能否恢复它们的“动物精神”。


Given Europe’s current malaise and the waning impact of so-called “Abenomics” in Japan, it is difficult to believe that their economies, which fueled global output growth for several decades, will regain their former stature.	当前欧洲萎靡不振，而日本所谓的“安倍经济学”的影响也将逐渐消失，很难认为几十年来对全球产出增长推波助澜的欧洲和日本经济能够重获从前的活力。


Indeed, Europeans and Japanese have largely given up hope of doing so.	事实上，很多欧洲人和日本人早已放弃了这一幻想。


Although European Union leaders have managed to keep the eurozone intact, they lack a long-term strategy to lift their economies out of the doldrums.	尽管欧盟领导人设法维持了欧元区，但他们缺少将经济带出泥淖的长期战略。


The seriousness of Europe’s situation is reflected in growing acceptance of the high unemployment – and youth-unemployment rates of over 50% – that some EU countries, including Spain and Greece, now face.	欧洲局面的严重性表现在越来越多的人开始接受西班牙和希腊等某些欧盟国家目前所面临的的高失业——以及超过50%的年轻人失业率。


Meanwhile, the first two “arrows” of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic program – radical monetary-policy easing and increased government spending – seem to have given the country’s long-stagnant economy a lift.	与此同时，日本首相安倍晋三的经济计划的前两支“箭”——大规模货币政策宽松和增加政府支出——似乎给该国长期停滞的经济带来了一点动力。


But the third and most important arrow – structural reform – has so far had little impact.	但第三支也是最重要的一支箭——结构性改革——目前为止效果极为有限。


And, after more than two decades of political turmoil and economic decline, the Japanese public has become skeptical of official promises of economic revival.	而在经历了二十多年的政治混乱和经济停滞后，日本公众对官员关于经济复兴的承诺已经不太信任。


Fortunately, the US and Chinese economies are underpinned by societies that remain dynamic, vibrant, and hopeful.	幸运的是，美国和中国的经济仍有充满活力、能量和希望的社会的支撑。


Young people in other parts of Asia, especially India and the ten ASEAN countries, are similarly optimistic – as well they should be.	其他亚洲国家的年轻人，特别是印度和东盟十国，也相当乐观——理应如此。


Asia’s middle-class population is expected to experience explosive growth in the coming years, rising from 500 million people in 2010 to 1.75 billion in 2020.	据估计，在未来数年，亚洲中产阶级人数将迎来爆发性增长，从2010年的5亿增加到2020年的17. 5亿。


Africa, with its population of one billion, is also gaining economic momentum, contributing further to the rapid expansion of the global middle class, which is expected to surge from 1.8 billion in 2010 to 3.2 billion in 2020 and to 4.9 billion people – more than half of the world’s population – in 2030.	拥有十亿人口的非洲也在赢得经济动力，为全球中产阶级的扩张贡献着力量。 据估计，全球中产阶级人数将从2010年的18亿增加到2020年的32亿和2030年的49亿（超过总人口的一半）。


Despite the massive challenges that countries like Syria, Somalia, Egypt, and Afghanistan currently face, and global challenges like food security and climate change, the world has reason to be hopeful about the future.	尽管叙利亚、索马里、埃及、阿富汗等国家目前面临着诸多重大挑战，全球也面临着食品安全和气候变化等挑战，世界仍有理由对未来充满希望。


Notwithstanding today’s tragic and terrifying headlines, we may be entering a new golden age of human history.	尽管今天的情况悲惨可怕，但我们仍有可能正在步入人类历史的新的黄金时代。


China’s Visionary Stimulus	富有远见的中国经济刺激政策


SHANGHAI – In March of last year, the first session of China’s 12th National People’s Congress began with then-Premier Wen Jiabao delivering his tenth and final “report on the work of the government.”	发自上海——在去年3月召开的第12届全国人大会议第一次会议上，时任国务院总理温家宝发表了他第十份也是最后一份《政府工作报告》。


When he had finished, the 3,000 representatives in attendance gave him a resounding ovation that was surely a response to more than the report; it was a display of praise and respect for his achievements as the head of China’s government.	当他宣读完报告全文时，与会的三千名代表向他报以热烈掌声； 这不仅仅是出于例行礼节，更对温家宝作为中国国家政府领导人所取得成就的赞誉与致敬


Since then, however, assessments of Wen’s leadership – particularly his stewardship of the economy – have varied widely.	然而自那以后，对温家宝领导能力——尤其对其国家经济管理能力——的评价就出现了极大分化。


Whereas Wen’s supporters remain adamant that he fundamentally supported a shift toward democracy and a market economy for China, his critics lambast him for failing to fulfill his promises of political and economic reform.	支持者们坚持认为是他从根本上推动了中国向民主制度和市场经济的转型，而反对者们则指责他未能兑现实现政治和经济改革的承诺。


As Wen’s successor, Li Keqiang, attempts to engineer deep systemic reforms, understanding Wen’s policy decisions could not be more relevant.	如今随着温家宝的继任者李克强开始尝试推动深层次体制改革，对前者政策决策的理解就显得尤为重要了。


Wen’s most contentious economic policy was the CN¥4 trillion ($586 billion) stimulus package that his government launched in response to the 2008 financial crisis.	温家宝最具争议的经济政策就是其政府为应对2008年金融危机所实施的4万亿人民币（约合5860亿美元）刺激计划。


Though the policy succeeded in buttressing China’s economic growth, it was widely criticized as an overreaction – one that led to excessive monetary expansion.	虽然该政策成功维持了中国的经济增长，但也因此受到了广泛指责，认为这是最终导致了货币过度扩张的一次过激反应。


Indeed, the surge in bank loans caused China’s M2 (a broad measure of the money supply) to soar, from 150% of GDP in 2008 to some 200%, or more than CN¥100 trillion, today.	事实上，当时出现的银行贷款高速增长令中国的M2（衡量货币供应的广义数值）大幅飙升，从2008年相当于GDP的150%上升到如今的约200%（超过100万亿人民币）。


The massive injection of liquidity into China’s economy has contributed to rising debt, especially among local governments and firms, while fueling massive real-estate bubbles, and resulting in significant excess capacity.	对中国经济大规模注入流动性不但催生了大量地产泡沫和过剩产能，也导致负债增加，地方政府和企业负债状况尤为严峻。


Over the last 18 months, Li’s government has been attempting to address these challenges, by overhauling China’s industrial structure, reducing excess production capacity, restricting lending, containing the shadow banking sector, and curbing real-estate investment.	在过去一年半以来，李克强领导下的中国政府都在着手通过深度调整中国行业结构，压低过剩产能，限制贷款数量，严控影子银行部门以及遏制房地产投资来应对上述挑战。


And he has had some success – at the expense of economic growth.	虽然这些措施取得了一定成功，但也付出了牺牲经济增长的代价。


Though the current rate of 7% is comfortable, it is far lower than the double-digit rates that prevailed prior to 2008.	即便目前7%的经济增长令人满意，却也远低于2008年前所取得的双位数增长。


Given the need for further economic restructuring – and in view of long-term demographic trends, which will reduce the labor supply – pre-2008 growth rates are unlikely to be restored.	考虑到进一步调整经济结构的需要——以及长期的人口构成变化趋势所导致的劳动力供应下降——2008年前的增长率必将无法重现。


This is fine with Li, who recognizes that structural transformation and industrial upgrading – not an unsustainable credit-led growth model – is the key to achieving high-income status.	但对于李克强来说，结构转型和产业升级——而非不可持续的信贷驱动型增长模式——才是国家实现高收入阶段的关键，因此降速也是可以接受的。


But there is more to assessing Wen’s stimulus than the growth/reform trade-off.	然而对温家宝刺激政策的评估不应仅局限于增长与改革之间的权衡。


The policy also helped to expand China’s foreign trade and boost its external financial strength (with a robust balance-of-payments position, large international reserves, and a stable currency), thereby creating space for Li to carry out his ambitious reform agenda.	因为该政策同时也帮助扩大了中国的对外贸易并借助稳健的国际收支状况，巨额外汇储备和稳定的货币增强了自身外部金融实力，最终为李克强雄心勃勃的改革方案创造了空间。


At the same time, the global financial crisis triggered a shift in the relative price of assets worldwide.	与此同时，世界金融危机引发了全球资产相对价格的转换。


As developed countries were plunged into debt crises, with shrinking asset values and declining exchange rates, China’s international purchasing power grew.	随着发达国家陷入债务危机，导致资产价格下跌和汇率下行，中国的国际购买力反而有所增强。


This, together with Wen’s stimulus, bolstered China’s investment and financing capabilities considerably.	这些再与温家宝的刺激政策相结合，就大大强化了中国的投资和金融实力。


Countries like New Zealand and Peru, unable to depend on developed countries for export demand, signed bilateral free-trade agreements with China.	像新西兰或者秘鲁这些无法依赖发达国家实施出口的国家都与中国签订了双边自由贸易协定。


Likewise, when developed countries cut back on their foreign investment, China stepped in to inject much-needed capital into the global economy.	同时当发达国家削减自身对外投资规模之时，中国开始逐步向全球经济注入急需的资本。


In fact, many countries began to pursue improved bilateral relations with China, in order to gain access to its capital.	事实上许多国家都已经开始寻求改善对华双边关系以获取中国资本。


For example, in 2009, Jamaica was faced with a plummeting currency, surging unemployment, and considerable banking-sector risks stemming from exposure to government debt. When its traditional allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, rejected its pleas for help, it turned to China, which provided $138 million in loans to prop up the economy.	举个例子，当牙买加在1999年遭遇货币汇率急跌，失业率飙升以及由政府负债问题引发的严重银行风险时，其传统贸易伙伴美国和英国都拒绝出手相助，于是牙买加政府转而向中国求援，后者则提供了1.


By next year, China’s outward investment is likely to reach over $100 billion annually – bringing it close to parity with inflows.	预计到明年，中国的年对外投资额将达到1000亿美元，与其投资流入额逐渐靠拢。


It will not be long before China undergoes an historic shift from net merchandise exporter to net capital exporter.	相信不用多久，中国就能实现从商品净出口国向资本净出口国的历史性转型。


And China’s external financing activities do not end there.	但中国的对外金融举措并不会止步于此。


In 2009-2010, China also invested heavily in the International Monetary Fund, with the People’s Bank of China announcing in 2009 that it would buy up to 32 billion special drawing rights (the IMF’s quasi-currency) – the equivalent of about $50 billion.	在2009至2010年间中国也对国际货币基金组织进行了巨额投资——中国人民银行在2009年宣布将购买高达320亿美元的特别提款权（国际货币基金组织的一种准货币），相当于约500亿美元货币。


Over the same period, China signed multiple bilateral currency-swap agreements, offered policy loans and special assistance, and contributed to regional investment funds.	在同一时期，中国签署了多项双边货币互换协议，提供了多笔政策性贷款和特别资助，并对区域性投资基金进行了注资。


In the coming years, China’s engagement with the developing world will continue to deepen.	在未来几年，中国与发展中国家的联系将进一步加深。


The National People’s Congress has discussed using a portion of China’s foreign-exchange reserves to finance infrastructure projects in developing countries.	全国人大已经讨论拿出一部分外汇储备去资助发展中国家的基础设施建设。


Such a Chinese “Marshall Plan” could seek to strengthen developing countries’ capacity to absorb Chinese goods, or it could advance a broader development agenda.	这样一个中国版的“马歇尔计划”将致力于增强发展中国家采购中国商品的能力，也能推动一个更广泛的发展议程。


Some central-bank officials have even advocated the establishment of a supra-sovereign wealth fund for developing-country investment.	一些中国央行官员甚至提出要建立一个超主权财富基金来执行发展中国家投资。


China’s continued development demands that it continues to enlarge its capacity and influence in foreign assistance.	中国的持续发展需要其不断扩大对外援助的能力和影响力。


The global economic crisis accelerated the timetable for this process considerably, forcing China’s leaders to pursue it simultaneously with the economy’s structural transformation.	全球金融危机极大加速了这一进程，迫使中国领导人自发地通过经济结构转型去寻求实现该进程。


In this respect, Wen gave Li an invaluable head start.	在这个意义上，温家宝其实是为李克强创造了一个宝贵的开端。


How Fast Will China Grow?	中国将增长得多快？


BEIJING – In the 35 years since China’s transition to a market economy began, the country has grown at an average rate of 9.8% – an explosive and unprecedented rise.	北京—在市场经济改革以来的35年中，中国的平均增长率高达9. 8%——这是前所未有的爆炸式增长。


But there are signs that the Chinese miracle is coming to an end – or at least that the country’s economic growth is slowing.	但有迹象表明中国奇迹正在走向终点——或者至少经济增长正在放缓。


China’s growth rate has been falling since the first quarter of 2010.	自2010年一季度以来，中国的增长率一直在下降。


In 2014, it was a relatively anemic 7.4%.	2014年三季度，经济增长率降到了相对较低的7. 3%。


China’s economic growth is likely to continue to face stiff headwinds this year as well, at least when compared to previous decades.	随着2014年临近尾声，中国的经济增长可能将继续面临强劲的逆风，至少与前几十年相比是如此。


As policymakers draw up the country’s 13th five-year plan, they will grapple with a fundamental question: How fast can China expect to grow?	2015年，决策者将制定中国的十三五规划，他们将面临一个基本问题：可以预期中国增长得多快？


In setting a country’s GDP target, the first thing to understand is the economy’s potential growth rate: the maximum pace of expansion that can be attained, assuming favorable conditions, internally and externally, without endangering the stability and sustainability of future growth.	在制定一国GDP目标时，首先要明白经济的潜在增长率，即假设内部和外部条件有利、未来增长稳定性与可持续性不会受到威胁的情况下的最快扩张速度。


As Adam Smith discussed in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, economic growth depends on improvements in labor productivity, which today result from either technological innovation or industrial upgrading (the reallocation of productive capacity into new sectors with higher added value).	亚当·斯密在《国富论》中论证了经济增长取决于劳动生产率的改善，而今天劳动生产率的改善要么来自技术创新，要么来自产业升级（将产能重新配置给更高附加值的新部门）。


But developed countries at the innovation frontier are at a disadvantage.	但位于创新前沿的发达国家处于劣势。


To benefit from new technology, they must create it.	要想从新技术中获益，它们就必须创造新技术。


Developing countries, by contrast, possess a “latecomer advantage,” because they can achieve technological advances through imitation, importation, integration, and licensing.	相反，发展中国家拥有“后发优势”，因为它们可以通过模仿、进口、综合和许可实现技术进步。


As a result, their costs and risks are lower.	结果，它们的成本和风险更低。


Over the last 150 years, developed economies have grown at an average rate of 3% per year, whereas some developing countries have achieved annual growth rates of 7% or higher for periods of 20 years or longer.	过去150年中，发达经济体平均每年增长3%，而一些发展中国家在20年甚至更长的时间里保持7%甚至更高的年增长率。


To calculate how much of a latecomer advantage China has after 35 years of unprecedented growth, one needs to look at the gap between its levels of technological and industrial development and those of high-income countries.	要计算中国在经历了35年前所未有的经济增长之后还剩下多少后发优势，我们需要考察期技术和产业发展水平与高收入国家的差距。


The best way to see this is by comparing its per capita income, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), with those of developed countries.	考察这一差距的最佳办法是比较经购买力平价（PPP）调整的人均收入。


The larger the gap in per capita income, the larger the latecomer advantage and the greater the potential for growth.	人均收入差距越大，后发优势和增长潜力也就越大。


In 2008, China’s per capita income was just over one-fifth that of the United States.	2008年，中国人均收入只有美国的五分之一略多。


This gap is roughly equal to the gap between the US and Japan in 1951, after which Japan grew at an average annual rate of 9.2% for the next 20 years, or between the US and South Korea in 1977, after which South Korea grew at 7.6% per year for two decades.	这一差距大致相当于1951年美国和日本之间的差距，在此之后的20年里，日本平均年增长率为9. 2%。


Singapore in 1967 and Taiwan in 1975 had similar gaps – followed by similar growth rates.	这一差距也大致等于1977年美国和韩国之间的差距，在此之后的20年里，韩国年增长率为7. 6%。


By extension, in the 20 years after 2008, China should have a potential growth rate of roughly 8%.	1967年的新加坡和1975年的中国台湾也有类似差距——此后也出现了类似的增长率。 由此外推，在2008年后的20年里，中国的潜在增长率应在8%左右。


But potential growth is just one part of the story.	但潜在增长率只是故事的一部分。


Whether it can be achieved depends on domestic conditions and the international environment.	它是否可以实现取决于国内条件和国际环境。


In order to exploit its latecomer advantage, China must deepen its reforms and eliminate its economy’s residual distortions.	为了利用后发优势，中国必须深化改革，消除经济中残留的扭曲。


Meanwhile, the government should play a proactive role in overcoming the market failures – such as externalities and coordination problems – that are certain to accompany technological innovation and industrial upgrading.	与此同时，政府应该更主动地克服市场失灵——如外部性和协调问题——这些失灵是伴随技术创新和产业升级而生的不可避免的现象。


China has the potential to maintain robust growth by relying on domestic demand – and not only household consumption.	中国有潜力通过内需——不仅是家庭消费——保持鲁棒增长。


The country suffers no lack of investment opportunities, with significant scope for industrial upgrading and plenty of potential for improvement in urban infrastructure, public housing, and environmental management.	中国不缺少投资机会，有充分的产业升级空间和足够的潜力改善城市基础设施、公共住房和环境管理。


Moreover, China’s investment resources are abundant.	此外，中国的投资资源十分丰富。


Combined central- and local-government debt amounts to less than 50% of GDP – low by international standards.	中央和地方政府债务总和还不到GDP的50%——以国际标准衡量属于低水平。


Meanwhile, private savings in China amount to nearly 50% of GDP, and the country’s foreign-exchange reserves have reached $4 trillion.	与此同时，中国的私人储蓄相当于GDP的近50%，外汇储备高达4万亿美元。


Even under comparatively unfavorable external conditions, China can rely on investment to create jobs in the short term; as the number of jobs grows, so will consumption.	即使面临相对不利的外部条件，中国也可以在短期内依靠投资创造就业； 而随着就业岗位数量的增加，消费也会水涨船高。


The external scenario, however, is gloomier.	但是，外部情景会更加令人沮丧。


Though developed countries’ authorities intervened strongly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, launching significant fiscal- and monetary-stimulus measures, many of their structural shortcomings remain unresolved.	尽管发达国家当局在2008年全球金融危机后进行了强力干预，启动了大规模财政和货币刺激手段，但很多发达国家的结构缺陷仍没有解决。


“Abenomics” in Japan has yet to yield results, and the European Central Bank is following in the footsteps of America and Japan, pursuing quantitative easing in an effort to shore up demand.	日本的“安倍经济学”收效甚微，欧洲央行正在步美国和日本的后尘试图用量化宽松提振需求。


Employment in the US is growing, but the rate of workforce participation remains subdued and the economy has yet to attain the 6-7% growth rates usually recorded in a post-recession rebound.	美国的就业正在增加，但劳动力参与率仍然不高，经济也没有达到衰退后反弹通常可以达到的6—7%。


The US, Europe, and Japan are likely to experience continued sluggish performance, inhibiting China’s export growth.	美国、欧洲和日本可能将精力持续的低迷表现，抑制中国的出口增长。


As a result, Chinese growth is likely to fall below its potential of 8% a year.	结果，中国的增长可能会低于每年8%的潜在增长率。


As policymakers plan for the next five years, they should set China’s growth targets at 7-7.5%, adjusting them within that range as changes in the international climate dictate.	决策者在为下一个五年制定计划时应该增长目标定在7—7. 5%，在此范围内根据国际气候变化调整。


Such a growth target can help to stabilize employment, lower financial risk, and achieve the country’s goal of doubling income by 2020.	这一增长目标有助于稳定就业、降低金融风险、实现2020年收入翻番的目标。


China Adjusts	中国的调整


BAHRAIN – China watchers are waiting to see whether the country has engineered a soft landing, cooling down an overheating economy and achieving a more sustainable rate of growth, or whether Asia’s dragon will crash to earth, as others in the neighborhood have before it.	巴林—中国观察家们正在拭目以待，看中国到底是成功软着陆、给过热经济降温并达到可持续性更强的增长率，还是会重蹈邻邦覆辙重重坠落。


But some, particularly American politicians in this presidential election year, focus on only one thing: China’s trade balance.	但对有些人来说——特别是大选年的美国政客——唯一感兴趣的是中国的贸易平衡。


True, not long ago the renminbi was substantially undervalued, and China’s trade surpluses were very large.	诚然，人民币不久前还处于严重低估的状态，中国的贸易盈余也相当巨大。


That situation is changing.	但这一状态正在改变。


Forces of adjustment are at work in the Chinese economy, so foreign perceptions need to adjust as well.	调整的力量正在中国经济中见效，因此对中国的外部观点也应该作出调整。


China’s trade surplus peaked at $300 billion in 2008, and has been declining ever since.	中国的贸易盈余在2008年达到了3 000亿美元的高峰，此后一直在下降。


(Indeed, official data showed a $31 billion deficit in February, the largest since 1998.)	（事实上，官方数据显示，2月份出现了310亿美元的赤字，为1998年以来最大。


It is clear what has happened.	）到底发生了什么事一目了然。


Ever since China rejoined the global economy three decades ago, its trading partners have been snapping up its manufacturing exports, because low Chinese wages made them super-competitive.	自30年前重新加入全球经济以来，贸易伙伴便一直在抢购中国的出口制造品，这是因为中国的低工资使得这些产品极具竞争力。


But, in recent years, relative prices have adjusted.	但是，近几年来，相对价格已开始改变。


The change can be measured by real exchange-rate appreciation, which consists partly in nominal renminbi appreciation against the dollar, and partly in Chinese inflation.	这一改变可以用实际汇率升值来衡量。 实际汇率升值部分由名义人民币对美元升值决定，部分由中国通货膨胀决定。


China’s government should have let more of the real appreciation take the form of nominal appreciation (dollars per renminbi). But, because it did not, it has shown up as inflation instead.	中国政府本应让名义升值（按每人民币可兑换的美元数量衡量）占实际汇率升值的大头，但事实上并非如此，结果，通货膨胀起了主要作用。


The natural price-adjustment process was delayed.	自然发生的价格调整过程被推迟了。


First, the authorities intervened in 1995-2005, and again in 2008-2010, to keep the dollar exchange rate virtually fixed.	首先，当局在1995—2005年和2008—1010年两次出手干预，使得美元汇率稳固在一个不变水平上。


Second, workers in China’s increasingly productive coastal factories were not paid their full value (the economy has not completed its transition from Mao to market, after all).	其次，在生产率不断提升的中国沿海地区，工人并没有获得完全代表劳动价值的工资（毕竟，中国经济尚未全部完成毛泽东主义向市场的过渡）。


As a result, China continued to undersell the world.	因此，中国一直以超低价格在向全世界销售商品。


But then the renminbi was finally allowed to appreciate against the dollar – by about 25% cumulatively during 2005-2008 and 2010-2011.	但人民币最终还是开始了对美元的升值之路，2005—2008和2010—2011年间累积升值了25%。


Moreover labor shortages began to appear, and Chinese workers began to win rapid wage increases.	此外，劳动短缺也开始出现，中国工人开始迎来工资的快速上升。


Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai raised their minimum wages sharply in the last three years – by 22% on average in 2010 and 2011.	北京、深圳和上海均在过去三年中大幅提高了最低工资标准，2010和2011年平均提高了22%。


Meanwhile another cost of business, land prices, rose even more rapidly.	与此同时，另一大商业成本——地价也开始加速上涨。


As costs rise in China’s coastal provinces, several types of adjustment are taking place.	随着中国沿海省份成本的上升，多种调整也将随之出现。


Some manufacturing is migrating inland, where wages and land prices are still relatively low, and some export operations are shifting to countries like Vietnam, where they are lower still.	一些制造业正在迁往工资和地价仍相对较低的内地，一些出口业务正在迁往成本较低的越南更国家。


Moreover, Chinese companies are beginning to automate, substituting capital for labor, and are producing more sophisticated goods, following the path blazed by Japan, Korea, and other Asian countries in the “flying geese” formation.	此外，中国公司正在开始自动化进程，以资本代替劳动，生产更加成熟的产品——沿着日本、韩国和其他亚洲国家的“雁行”模式发展。


Finally, multinational companies that had moved some operations to China from the United States or other high-wage countries are now moving back.	最后，美国和其他高工资国家的跨国公司正在将业务从中国收回国内。


Productivity is still higher in the US, after all.	毕竟中国的生产率还不能与美国相媲美。


None of this is news to most international observers of China.	这些对大部分中国国际观察者来说都不是新闻。


But many Western politicians (and, to be fair, their constituents) are unable to let go of the syllogism that seemed so unassailable just a decade ago: (1) The Chinese have joined the world economy; (2) their wages are $0.50 an hour; (3) there are a billion of them; and (4) Chinese wages will never be bid up in line with the usual textbook laws of economics, so their exports will rise without limit.	但许多西方政客（平心而论，还包括他们的选民）还没有从十年前的陈腐观念中摆脱：（1）中国已经加入了世界经济； （2）那里的工资只有每小时0.


But it turns out that the basic laws of economics eventually apply after all – even in China.	（4）中国的工资永远不会达到教科书中的经济学定律所推论的水平，因此其出口将无限制增长下去。 但事实是，经济学基本定律还是见效了，即使那是在中国。


Like certain other aspects of the US-China economic relationship, China’s adjustment is reminiscent of Japan with a 30-year lag.	与中美经济关系的其他方面相同，中国的调整与30年前的日本如出一辙。


Japan’s trade balance fell into deficit in 2011, for the first time since 1980.	日本的贸易平衡在2011年由盈余变为赤字，这是1980年来的第一遭。


Special factors have played a role in the last year, including high oil prices and the effects of the March 2011 tsunami.	去年的情形有些特殊，比如油价高企和3月份所发生的海啸。


But the downward trend in the trade balance is clear.	但日本贸易平衡的下降趋势是显而易见的。


Even the current account showed a deficit in January.	即使是今年，1月份的经常项目也是赤字。


This development has received relatively little attention in the US and other trading partners, which is curious, given that, two decades ago, Japan’s big trade surplus was the subject of intense focus and worry – just like China’s now.	相对而言，日本的这一趋势并未引起美国和其他贸易伙伴关注，这着实令人新奇，因为二十年前日本的巨额贸易盈余让西方如临大敌，一如现在的中国。


At the time, some influential commentators warned that the Japanese had discovered a superior economic model, featuring strategic trade policy (among other attractions), and that the rest of us had better emulate them.	当时是，一些有影响的观察者警告说，日本人已经找到了超级经济模式，该模式（除了其他具有吸引力的方面外）以战略性贸易为特征，其他国家最好以日本为师。


Either that, or the Japanese were “cheating,” in which case we needed to stop them.	不管真是如此，还是日本人在“作弊”，我们都必须阻止他们。


Most economists rejected these “revisionist” views, and argued that Japan’s current-account surplus was large because its national saving rate was high, which reflected demographics, not cultural differences or government policies.	大部分经济学家否定了这些“修正主义”观点，指出日本的经常项目盈余很大程度上是由高国民储蓄率造成的，而高国民储蓄率体现了人口结构，而不是文化差异或政府政策。


The Japanese population was relatively young, compared to other advanced economies, but was rapidly aging, owing to a declining birth rate since the 1940’s and rising longevity.	与其他发达国家相比，日本人口相对较年轻，但由于20世纪40年代以来的出生率下降以及寿命的增长，日本人口正在快速老龄化。


That view has been vindicated.	这一观点最后被证明是正确的。


In 1980, 9% of Japan’s population was 65 or older; now the ratio is more than 23%, one of the highest in the world.	1980年，9%的日本人为65岁及以上人口； 如今，这一比例达到了23%以上，为世界最高之一。


As a consequence, Japanese citizens who 30 years ago were saving for their retirement are now dissaving, precisely as economic theory predicted.	结果，30年前努力储蓄的日本公民现在正在动用储蓄，与经济学理论的预测完全相同。


As the national saving rate has come down, so has the current-account surplus.	随着国民储蓄率的下降，经常项目盈余也越来越少。


China faces a similar demographic trend, and also a push to unleash household consumption in order to sustain GDP growth.	中国面临着与日本相同的人口结构趋势，并且也在推行解放家庭消费以维持GDP增长的方针。


As in Japan, the downward trend in China’s saving rate will show up in its current account.	与日本一样，中国储蓄率下降的趋势也将体现在经常项目中。


The laws of international economics still apply.	国际经济学定律最终将起作用。


Will China’s Infrastructure Bank Work?	中国的基础设施银行能行吗？


CAMBRIDGE – With China set to lead a new $50 billion international financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), most of the debate has centered on the United States’ futile efforts to discourage other advanced economies from joining.	美国剑桥—中国即将领导一个500亿美元规模的新国际金融机构——亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），而大部分争论集中在美国徒劳地鼓动其他发达经济体不要参加。


Far too little attention has been devoted to understanding why multilateral development lending has so often failed, and what might be done to make it work better.	几乎没人试图去理解为何多边发展贷款常常以失败告终，以及能够做些什么让它更管用。


Multilateral development institutions have probably had their most consistent success when they serve as “knowledge” banks, helping to share experience, best practices, and technical knowledge across regions.	多边发展机构最持久的成功也许是作为“知识”银行、帮助共享地区间经验、最佳实践和技术知识的时候。


By contrast, their greatest failures have come from funding grandiose projects that benefit the current elite, but do not properly balance environmental, social, and development priorities.	反之，它们最大的失败来自为宏伟工程融资，这些工程让当前精英集团获益，而没有实现环境、社会和发展重点的合理平衡。


Dam construction is a leading historical example.	水坝建设是最显著的历史例子之一。


In general, there is a tendency to overestimate the economic benefits of big infrastructure projects in countries riddled by poor governance and corruption, and to underestimate the long-run social costs of having to repay loans whether or not promised revenues materialize. Obviously, the AIIB runs this risk.	总体而言，对于治理不善和腐败横行的国家，其大型基础设施工程的经济收益会是多少有一种高估的倾向，而对于不论预期收入是否实现，偿还贷款的长期社会成本会是多少则有一种低估趋势。


That said, there are huge infrastructure needs across developing Asia, and it is high time for China to play a greater role in international lending institutions.	尽管如此，发展中亚洲存在巨大的基础设施需求，中国在国际贷款机构中扮演更大角色也正逢其时。


Moreover, the official US argument – that China should invest its money in existing institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, because a Chinese-led bank would likely have governance problems – smacks of hypocrisy.	此外，美国的官方观点——中国应该将钱投资于世界银行和亚洲开发银行等现有机构，因为中国领导的银行可能出现治理问题——有一种伪善的味道。


Good governance?	良好的治理？


Is the US prepared to relinquish its historical prerogative to choose the World Bank president?	美国准备放弃其选择世界银行行长人选的历史特权吗？


Likewise, the US worries that China may use the AIIB to advance China’s economic and political interests.	类似地，美国担心中国可能利用亚投行推进中国的经济和政治利益。


But anyone who is even vaguely familiar with the US approach to multilateral lending knows that no other country has been as adept at exploiting its power and leverage for strategic gain.	但只要你略微了解一下美国队多边贷款的方针就可以知道，在用实力和杠杆赢得战略利益方面，没有国家比美国更加擅长。


With China’s growing importance in the world order, it needs to be given space to forge its own approach to global economic leadership.	随着中国在世界秩序中日益重要，它需要获得空间构建其自身的全球经济领导方针。


Frankly, a relatively small infrastructure bank seems as good a place as any to start.	坦白说，一家相对较小的基础设施银行看起来正合适。


Besides, China is already pouring money into the developing world, often through highly opaque channels.	此外，中国已经开始向发展中世界提供资金，常常是通过高度不透明的渠道。


To the extent that the AIIB normalizes a portion of Chinese development assistance, and subjects it to scrutiny from the new bank’s advanced-country members, the new bank’s existence should be all for the better.	亚投行让中国的发展援助比重正式化，并且让其接受该银行发达国家成员国的监督，因此，亚投行的存在是一件好事。


With its penchant for constant experimentation and improvement, one might even hope that China will draw lessons and apply them to all of its developing-country lending.	中国以擅长不断实验和改进，因此你甚至可以期待中国将汲取教训并把这些教训应用到其所有发展中国家贷款中。


Who knows, maybe the existing development banks will learn something.	谁知道呢，也许现有开发银行还能从中学习。


While the world should generally welcome China’s initiative, the real question is what kind of aid developing Asia needs.	总体而言，世界应该欢��中国的亚投行，但真正的问题是发展中的亚洲需要怎样的援助。


Anyone who has worked in developing countries understands that weak institutions and poor governance are often far bigger obstacles to growth than a lack of funds.	在发展中国家工作的人都明白，弱制度和差治理常常是比资金缺乏更大的增长障碍。


And, however great a project looks on paper, practical implementation is often a sobering experience.	此外，一项工程不管在纸面上是如何宏大，其实际操作常常需要小心严谨。


Costs invariably far exceed initial estimates, and planners often woefully underestimate the skills and funding needed to ensure maintenance and repairs.	成本总是远远超过最初的估计，规划者常常大大低谷确保工程维持和修整所需要的技能和资金。


My interpretation of the World Bank’s record is that its role has been most consistently positive when it helps countries with “soft” development infrastructure: technical assistance and serving as a global knowledge bank.	我对世界银行记录的解读是，在用“软”发展基础设施帮助各国，即提供技术援助和作为全球知识银行时，其积极效果最大也最持续。


When its main role has been to provide financial muscle, the results have been less impressive.	当它的主要作用是提供金融援助时，结果就会差一些。


In China itself, for example, World Bank money has not been so important quantitatively, yet the Chinese generally credit the Bank for having helpful blueprints and information.	比如，以中国本身为例，世界银行的资金在数量上并不那么重要，但总的来说中国人认为世界银行为他们提供了大有裨益的蓝图和信息。


Indeed, a strong case can be made that development aid would be more effective if it took the form of outright grants, rather than loans that ultimately need to be repaid.	事实上，有强大的理由相信，发展援助如果以赠款而非最终需要偿还的贷款形式给予，效果会更好。


Headline aid numbers might seem less impressive, but long-run results would be better.	新闻标题上的援助数字也许不那么引人关注，但长期结果会更好。


Moreover, the world is awash in liquidity right now, and even where a government’s own money is inadequate, it is often possible to establish public-private partnerships to build genuinely high-return projects.	此外，如今世界流动性充裕，即使政府本身资金不足，也往往可以通过公私合作建设真正的高回报工程。


Competent government is a far scarcer commodity than cash.	胜任的政府是远比现金更加稀缺的商品。


Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the Chinese model of infrastructure development can be exported universally.	不幸的是，中国基础设施开发模式是否能够输出到全世界还远未可知。


China’s strong central government overwhelms opposition from people displaced by new roads, bridges, and dams, and for many years ran roughshod over environmental concerns and workers’ rights.	中国强大的中央政府可以镇压因新公路、桥梁和大坝而被迫移民的人民的反对，多年来还全然不顾环境问题和工人权利。


The parallels to the old Soviet Union are striking.	与前苏联有着惊人的相似之处。


Some developing countries in Asia work differently.	一些亚洲发展中国家运作方式有所不同。


In democratic India, for example, it took eight years to rebuild Mumbai’s airport, because courts forced the government to respect the rights of squatters on its outskirts.	比如，在民主的印度，重建孟买机场用了八年时间，因为法院迫使政府尊重郊区寮屋居民的权利。


Given the legacy of problematic loans and projects funded by Western-led infrastructure banks, it is reasonable to ask whether another one is needed, as opposed to reforming existing institutions.	西方领导的基础设施银行留下了大量有问题的贷款和工程，质疑改革现有机构、认为需要新的基础设施银行是合理的。


Still, if the AIIB views itself mainly as a knowledge bank, rather than a funding vehicle, it could provide real added value.	但是，如果亚投行将自身主要视为知识银行而不是融资机构，可以提供真正的附加值。


We should evaluate the AIIB by how it chooses and fosters projects, not just by how much financing it provides.	我们需要通过亚投行如何选择和推进工程，而不是仅仅通过它提供了多少融资，来评估亚投行。


Asia’s Multilateralism	亚洲的多边主义


NEW YORK – The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are poised to hold their annual meetings, but the big news in global economic governance will not be made in Washington DC in the coming days.	发自纽约——国际货币基金组织和世界银行即将分别召开其年度会议，但有关全球经济治理的大新闻并非来自几天后的华盛顿特区。


Indeed, that news was made last month, when the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy joined more than 30 other countries as founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).	因为真正的大新闻是上月英国、德国，法国和意大利与其他30多个国家一同成为亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行）的创始国。


The $50 billion AIIB, launched by China, will help meet Asia’s enormous infrastructure needs, which are well beyond the capacity of today’s institutional arrangements to finance.	这个由中国发起，筹资规模达500亿美元的亚投行将有助于满足亚洲极为庞大，但当今没有任何一个机制性协议有能力提供资金支持的基础设施建设需求。


One would have thought that the AIIB’s launch, and the decision of so many governments to support it, would be a cause for universal celebration.	人们会认为亚投行的启动，以及如此多的政府支持该行的决定，将成为全球共同庆祝这一盛事的原因。


And for the IMF, the World Bank, and many others, it was.	而对于世界货币基金组织，世界银行以及许多其他机构来说原本也是如此。


But, puzzlingly, wealthy European countries’ decision to join provoked the ire of American officials.	但令人莫名其妙的是，那些欧洲发达国家加入该行的决定竟然激怒了美国官员。


Indeed, one unnamed American source accused the UK of “constant accommodation” of China.	事实上，一位不愿透露姓名的美国官员指责英国“不断纵容”中国。


Covertly, the United States put pressure on countries around the world to stay away.	美国方面还暗中向全球各参与国施压，要求它们退出。


In fact, America’s opposition to the AIIB is inconsistent with its stated economic priorities in Asia.	事实上，美国对亚洲行的反对与其在亚洲所声称的经济优先政策并不一致。


Sadly, it seems to be another case of America’s insecurity about its global influence trumping its idealistic rhetoric – this time possibly undermining an important opportunity to strengthen Asia’s developing economies.	令人遗憾的是，这似乎是美国对其自身全球影响力的不安全感压倒其理念阐述的又一例证——而这次很可能会阻碍了一个让亚洲发展中经济体得以做大做强的重要契机。


China itself is a testament to the extent to which infrastructure investment can contribute to development.	中国本身就是一个基础设施投资可以在何种程度上推动发展的极佳范例。


Last month, I visited formerly remote areas of the country that are now prosperous as a result of the connectivity – and thus the freer flow of people, goods, and ideas – that such investments have delivered.	就在上个月，我赴中国考察了那些原本偏远但如今因为基础设施投资而与外界连通——并因此带来人员，商品和理念的更自由流动——并因此实现繁荣的地区。


The AIIB would bring similar benefits to other parts of Asia, which deepens the irony of US opposition.	亚投行也可以为其他亚洲国家带来类似的好处，同时也更深刻地体现了美方反对的荒谬性。


President Barack Obama’s administration is championing the virtues of trade; but, in developing countries, lack of infrastructure is a far more serious barrier to trade than tariffs.	奥巴马政府一直在鼓吹自由贸易的优越性； 但在发展中国家，基础设施的缺乏却是一个比关税更严重的贸易壁垒。


There is a further major global advantage to a fund like the AIIB: right now, the world suffers from insufficient aggregate demand.	像亚投行这样的一个资金实体还将为全球带来更大的益处：目前全世界都面临着总需求不足的问题。


Financial markets have proven unequal to the task of recycling savings from places where incomes exceed consumption to places where investment is needed.	而事实也证明，金融市场无力完成从那些收入高于消费地区回收储蓄，再投向急需投资地区的任务。


When he was Chair of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke mistakenly described the problem as a “global saving glut.”	当还担任美联储主席的时候，本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）错误地将这一问题定义为“全球储蓄过剩”。


But in a world with such huge infrastructure needs, the problem is not a surplus of savings or a deficiency of good investment opportunities. The problem is a financial system that has excelled at enabling market manipulation, speculation, and insider trading, but has failed at its core task: intermediating savings and investment on a global scale.	但在一个拥有如此巨大基础设施建设需求的世界上，真正的问题不在于储蓄过剩或是缺乏良好的投资机会，而是我们的金融体系极为擅长操纵市场，投机和内幕交易，却无法完成自身的核心任务：在全球层面上撮合储蓄和投资。


That is why the AIIB could bring a small but badly needed boost to global aggregate demand.	这也是为什么亚投行可以为全球总需求产生一点微小但急需的推动。


So we should welcome China’s initiative to multilateralize the flow of funds.	所以我们应当欢迎中国将资金流实现多边化的倡议。


Indeed, it replicates American policy in the period following World War II, when the World Bank was founded to multilaterize development funds that were overwhelmingly coming from the US (a move that also helped to create a cadre of first-class international civil servants and development professionals).	事实上，这一举动复制了美国在二战之后的政策，当年世界银行正是成立用来将主要来自美国的发展资金多边化（而这也帮助催生了一批第一流的国际官员和发展专家）。


The World Bank’s assistance was sometimes overburdened by prevailing ideology; for example, the free-market Washington Consensus policies foisted on recipients actually led to deindustrialization and declining income in Sub-Saharan Africa.	世界银行的援助在某些时候充斥着一些流行理念； 比如说，被推销给受援助国的华盛顿共识自由市场政策实际上导致了撒哈拉以南非洲的去工业化和收入下降。


Nonetheless, US assistance was, overall, far more effective than it would have been had it not been multilateralized.	但即便如此，如果没有实现多边化，美国的援助在总体上会更加低效。


Had these resources been channeled through America’s own aid agency, policymaking would have been subject to the vagaries of development thinking (or the absence of reflection) from one administration to another.	因为如果这些资源都是通过美国自身援助机构拨付的话，相关政策制定就将随着历任政府更替所导致的发展思维变化（或者不作为）而摇摆不定。


New attempts to multilateralize flows of assistance (including the BRICS countries’ launch of the New Development Bank last July) are similarly likely to contribute significantly to global development.	那些将援助多边化的新尝试（包括金砖五国在去年七月启动的新发展银行）也同样会对全球发展产生极大的促进作用。


Some years ago, the Asian Development Bank defended the virtues of competitive pluralism.	数年以前，亚洲发展银行证实了竞争性多元主义的优点。


The AIIB offers a chance to test that idea in development finance itself.	而亚投行则提供了一个测试发展援助自身理念的机会。


Perhaps America’s opposition to the AIIB is an example of an economic phenomenon that I have often observed: firms want greater competition everywhere except in their own industry.	或许美国对亚投行的反对是我经常观察到的一个经济现象的范例：企业都希望各领域有更多竞争，只要不在自己所在领域就好。


This position has already exacted a heavy price: had there been a more competitive marketplace of ideas, the flawed Washington Consensus might never have become a consensus at all.	这一立场已经付出了一个沉重的代价：如能有一个更具竞争性的理念市场，那个有缺陷的华盛顿共识可能永远都不会成为一个共识。


America’s opposition to the AIIB is not unprecedented; in fact, it is akin to the successful US opposition to Japan’s generous New Miyazawa Initiative of the late 1990s, which offered $80 billion to help countries in the East Asian crisis.	美国对亚投行的反对并不是没有先例的； 事实上，美国在1990年代末就成功压制了日本计划向东亚金融危机国家慷慨提供800亿美元援助的新宫泽动议。


Then, as now, it was not as if the US were offering an alternative source of funding. It simply wanted hegemony.	随后就跟今天这样，美国并不是想提供另一个援助来源，而只是想一家独大。


In an increasingly multipolar world, it wanted to remain the G-1.	在一个日渐多极化的世界上，它只想维护自己的一国霸权。


The lack of money, combined with America’s insistence on flawed ideas about how to respond to the crisis, caused the downturn to be far deeper and longer than it should have been.	如今资金的匮乏，再加上美国在如何应对危机方面层出不穷的错误理念，导致了该国影响力比原本更深远的衰退。


That said, US opposition to the AIIB is harder to fathom, given that infrastructure policy is much less subject to the influence of ideology and special interests than other policymaking areas, such as those dominated by the US at the World Bank.	即便如此，由于基础设施政策相对于其他政策领域（正如美国在世界银行所主导的那些）更难受制于意识形态和特殊利益的影响，美国对亚投行的反对就显得更加难人寻味。


Moreover, the need for environmental and social safeguards in infrastructure investment is more likely to be addressed effectively within a multilateral framework.	此外，对基础设施投资的环境和社会影响所急需的保障问题也将在多边框架下得到有效应对。


The UK, France, Italy, Germany, and the others who have decided to join the AIIB should be congratulated.	英国、法国，意大利，德国以及其他决定加入亚投行的国家都应该得到赞赏。


One hopes that other countries, both in Europe and Asia, will join as well, helping to fulfill the ambition that infrastructure improvements can raise living standards in other parts of the region, as they have already done in China.	我们也希望其他国家，无论在欧洲还是亚洲，都应该加入，一同协助实现通过改善基础设施来提高其他地区生活水平的宏图壮志，正如中国所展现的那样。


China and a New Balance of Power	中国和新的权力平衡


SHANGHAI – The last rival superpower to the United States, the Soviet Union, collapsed in 1991.	上海--最后一个与美国抗衡的超级大国苏联在1991年瓦解了。


But, apart from its military strength, the USSR was never really powerful enough to counterbalance US influence.	但是，除了其军事实力以外，苏联从来没有足够的实力来制约美国的影响。


In the late 1980’s, Japan seemed capable of challenging America’s industrial leadership, but by the 1990’s it lost its competitive edge.	在八十年代末，日本看似可以挑战美国在工业上的领先地位，但是到了九十年代日本失去了它的竞争实力。


China might itself wish to be a major force in a multi-polar world, but has been plagued by its lack of overall strength.	中国自身也许想要在多极化的世界中成为一个大国，但是其整体实力不足令其难以长袖善舞。


Given these realities, China sees the expanding European Union as a likely counterweight to unchecked US power.	鉴于这些现实因素，中国认为扩大中的欧盟有可能制衡美国实力。


In terms of economic output, today’s EU is on par with the US.	在经济产值上，如今的欧盟与美国并驾齐驱。


But it has yet to build a strong defense system that can respond effectively either to regional contingencies or to global needs.	但是欧盟尚未建立强大的防卫系统以有效地应付地区性紧急局势或者全球性需要。


What would be the strength of such a system if and when it is developed, and how will it compare with that of the US?	当这一系统建立之时，应该具有何种实力、以及如何与美国相比呢？


In assessing America’s strength, China follows US debates on the merits of a uni-polar or a multi-polar world with keen interest.	中国在评估美国实力的时候密切关注美国有关单极世界或者多极世界是非曲直的辩论。


Some Americans favor a uni-polar system in which the US dominates.	有些美国人赞成由美国统领的单极世界。


Such a Pax Americana would cost the country less to sustain, but the world would worry if America adopts a wrong policy, as has been the case in Iraq.	这样一个美式和平可以让美国以较少的代价予以维持，但是如果美国像在伊拉克问题上采取错误的政策，那么整个世界都会担忧。


The US certainly has a right to curb terrorists like those who staged the attack on September 11, 2001.	美国当然有权限制那些进行9/11袭击的恐怖分子。


But the “war on terror” did not warrant the decision to attack a sovereign state and topple its government on the flawed presumption that it housed weapons of mass destruction and was linked to the 2001 attacks.	但是“反恐战争”并不能够开脱美国攻击一个主权国家并且推翻其政府的决定。 美国的推测是错误的，也就是伊拉克藏有大规模杀伤性武器并且与2001年的恐怖攻击事件有牵连。


The US went to war despite strong opposition from France, Germany, Russia, China, and other United Nations Security Council members.	美国不顾法国、德国、俄国、中国以及其他联合国安理会成员国的强烈反对发动战争。


France and Germany have since sought to restore good relations with the US, but continue to disapprove of the war.	法国和德国从那时以来寻求恢复与美国的关系，但是继续反对这一战争。


The Middle East, always a region of concern for Europe, has become even less stable as a result of the war.	欧洲一直关注中东问题，而中东也由于这一战争而变得更为不稳定。


American leadership has been one of the war’s casualties.	美国的领导地位成为了这一场战争的牺牲品。


In China, the concept of an independent European defense – embodied in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and various police missions – is thus generally seen as necessary and effective in a multi-polar world system.	在中国，欧洲独立防务通常被视为是多极世界中所必需并且有效的。 欧洲独立防务的概念体现为欧洲安全和防务政策、欧盟快速反应力量以及各种不同的政策使命。


China observes that on most security matters, the ESDP will (for now) mimic American security interests, because the EU and US share fundamental values of human rights and democracy.	中国认为，在大多数安全问题上，欧洲独立安全和防务政策目前模仿美国的安全利益，因为欧盟和美国具有共同的人权和民主价值观。


Moreover, many EU members have simultaneously pledged their defense capabilities to NATO, which has been led by the US since its creation.	而且，许多欧盟成员国同时向北约保证投入其防务实力，而北约从成立以来一直由美国领导。


But the ESDP, once fully developed, will not necessarily follow America’s lead unconditionally, especially if American policy continues to deviate from the norm of international law, as in Iraq.	但是欧洲独立安全和防务政策得以全面落实后就不一定无条件地追随美国，特别是如果美国的政策继续像在伊拉克问题上那样偏离国际法准则。


As a result of acquiring a pan-European defense capacity, the Europeans are likely to play a more independent role than at present in managing intra-European security relations and carrying out global missions.	欧洲在获得了泛欧防务能力之后就有可能发挥比当前更为独立的作用，管理欧洲内部的安全关系并且履行全球使命。


China welcomes this expanded security role for the EU.	中国欢迎欧盟扩大安全作用。


Although it remains wary of international intervention by the EU, the substance and pattern of ESDP operations are likely to win China’s respect for several reasons.	尽管中国对欧盟实施国际干预存有戒心，但是，出于几个原因，欧洲独立安全和防务政策的实质和模式则有可能赢得中国尊重。


First, China’s leaders note that the ESDP gives priority to the legitimacy of its missions.	首先，中国领导人注意到，使命的合法性在该政策中居于首位。


So far, all ESDP missions have respected international law and governmental arrangements among disputing parties.	目前为止，该政策所有的使命都尊重国际法和争议各方的政府安排。


Most of its military or police missions have been based on UN Security Council resolutions, and ESDP missions outside Europe have been at the invitation of local authorities.	其大多数军事或者警察使命都建立在联合国安理会决议的基础之上，而且欧洲以外的使命也是受到当地政府当局邀请所为。


Of course, ESDP security missions, even those in accordance with Security Council resolutions, may not operate within the UN system – the EU prefers its own independent leadership.	当然，该政策的安全使命即使遵照联合国安理会决议也未必在联合国系统内运行，这是因为欧盟偏向于其独立的领导作用。


The ESDP does not necessarily require Security Council authorization as a condition for its missions, and it retains an independent role in executing them.	该政策并不一定要求安理会授权作为其使命的先决条件。 而且，它也在执行使命上保持独立作用。


However, when compared with the US, the ESDP (in Chinese eyes) cares far more about international legitimacy, backed by the authority of the UN.	但是，与美国相比，该政策在中国眼里更为关注得到联合国授权的国际合法性。


Second, the ESDP is concerned with good governance and institution building.	第二，该政策关注良好管治以及机制建设。


The EU is keen to restore or establish human rights, stability, and prosperity.	欧盟力求恢复或者建立人权、稳定和繁荣。


Outside Europe, the ESDP acts to enhance governance rather than promote regime change, and the EU has often assisted governments’ efforts to improve security conditions.	在欧洲以外，该政策努力改进管治而非政权更替。 而且欧盟还经常援助各国政府改善安全条件。


Third, the ESDP is open to international cooperation.	第三，该政策向国际合作开放。


The EU works with either non-EU states, such as NATO members like Canada, Norway, and Turkey, or applicants for EU membership.	欧盟既与非欧盟国家，例如加拿大、挪威和土耳其等北约成员国合作，也与申请加入欧盟的国家合作。


The ESDP cooperates with the UN and other regional organizations, such as the African Union and ASEAN.	该政策与联合国和非洲联盟、东盟等其他地区性组织合作。


When the EU reaches out, it tends to play a leading role in these collaborations.	当欧盟主动的时候往往会在这些合作中发挥主要作用。


There are good reasons to expect that China will continue to accept an independent European security mechanism.	人们有理由预计中国将会继续接受独立欧洲安全机制。


There is little concern, if any, about the ESDP intervening in internal Chinese affairs, such as Taiwan.	人们几乎不比担心该政策会干涉台湾问题等中国内部事务。


Indeed, China wants a strong and independent Europe, and from that vantage point it is not too early for China to envisage a truly multi-polar global system.	实际上，中国需要一个强大独立的欧洲。 而且从这一点上来看，中国现在直面一个真正多极化的全球体系为时并不太早。


China and India Exposed	中国与印度的痛处


BERKELEY – Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s forthcoming trip to India, following hard on the heels of President Barack Obama’s recent visit, will provide another opportunity for the media to gush about the growing global economic clout of China and India.	发自伯克利——美国总统奥巴马前脚刚走，中国总理温家宝随后展开印度之行，而此举也再度为媒体炒作中印两国在全球经济中日渐增长的影响力提供了良机。


We can be sure that the soft underbellies of both economies will be kept hidden from view.	而这两大经济体的缺陷也必将再次被掩盖在光环之下。


After a couple of centuries of relative stagnation, these two countries, containing nearly two-fifths of the world’s population, have experienced remarkably rapid income growth in the last three decades.	在经历了两个世纪的相对停滞后，这两个合共拥有全球2/5人口的国家在过去30年里经历了快速的收入增长。


In manufacturing and services (particularly software, business processing, etc.), respectively, China and India have made huge strides internationally, and their acquisition of global companies has attracted considerable attention.	中国的制造业和印度的服务业（特别是软件制造和业务流程外包等）给国际社会带来了巨大的冲击，而他们对全球企业的收购行为也引发了外界的广泛关注。


But some dubious assertions have, through constant repetition in recent, often breathless, accounts about the two economies, become part of conventional wisdom. Much of what really goes on inside these two large countries is often left out.	不过，近来关于这两大经济体铺天盖地的反复报道似乎已经令一些站不住脚的表象变成了人们的常识，结果两国内部的真实情况反倒被忽视了。


For example, in terms of value added (the value of output after deducting the cost of materials and components), China, contrary to popular impression, is not yet the manufacturing center of the world.	比如说，从产品附加值（即扣除了原料和组分成本之后的产品价值）的角度来看，与普遍印象相反，中国并不是全球制造业的中心。


The Chinese produce about 15% of value added in world manufacturing, while the United States contributes about 24% and the European Union about 20%.	中国对全球制造业产品附加值的贡献只有15%，而美国却有24%，欧盟也有20%。


Similarly, while India’s information technology-enabled services have gained an international reputation, the total number of people employed in this sector is less than 0.5% of India’s workforce.	与此类似，尽管印度的信息技术服务业闻名世界，但该行业的就业人数仅占印度总劳动力的0. 5%。


As such, it cannot, by itself, transform the Indian economy.	因此，仅靠这一部门还不能令印度的经济成功转型。


Chinese growth is widely regarded as furiously export-driven, but domestic investment has in fact been the major component.	此外，中国的经济增长普遍被认为是出口拉动的，但殊不知国内投资也是主要动力之一。


Even at the height of global trade expansion in 2002-2007, exports (in value-added terms) accounted for only a little more than one-quarter of GDP growth, whereas domestic investment contributed a substantially larger share.	即便是在2002-2007年那段国际贸易大肆扩张的鼎盛时期，出口（从附加值角度看）对GDP增长的贡献仅为1/4多一点，反倒是国内投资的贡献更大。


Moreover, contrary to popular belief, much of the dramatic poverty reduction in China over the last three decades was due not to integration into the global economy, but to domestic factors like growth in the agricultural sector (where mass poverty was concentrated).	而且，与普遍的看法相反，在过去30年里，中国国内贫困人口数量的急速下降并不是由于融入了全球经济，而是由诸如农业部门（大量的贫困人口都处在这一领域）的发展等国内因素所导致的。


This is attributable largely to public investment in rural infrastructure, and, in the initial period, to institutional changes in agrarian production organization and an egalitarian distribution of land-cultivation rights.	而这些因素的出现则主要归结于对农村基础设施的投资以及早期对农业生产组织形式和耕地平均分配的改革。


Expansion of exports of labor-intensive manufactures has nonetheless lifted many Chinese out of poverty.	劳动密集型产业的出口扩张无疑让许多中国人摆脱了贫困。


That is not true of India, where exports are still mainly skill- and capital-intensive.	不过以技术密集型和资本密集型出口为主的印度却没有那么幸运了。


Economic reform clearly has made the Indian corporate sector more vibrant and competitive, but most of the Indian economy is not in the corporate sector (public or private).	毫无疑问，经济改革使印度的企业部门生机勃勃，更具竞争力，但（无论是公共的或私人的）企业部门仅仅是印度经济的一小部分。


Indeed, 92% of the labor force is employed in the informal sector.	事实上，92%的劳动力都在非正式部门就业。


Indian poverty reduction has been significant, but not substantial.	印度的贫困状况的确有了明显下降，但还没达到大规模下降的程度。


However, in terms of non-income indicators of poverty – for example, child mortality, malnutrition, and school dropouts – India’s performance has been dismal (in some respects worse even than in sub-Saharan Africa).	从贫困的非收入指标来看——比如说，儿童死亡率，营养不良以及辍学等等——印度的表现就非常差（在某些方面甚至比撒哈拉以南非洲还要糟糕）。


In the financial media, China and India have become poster children for market reform and globalization, even though in matters of privatization, property rights, deregulation, and lingering bureaucratic rigidities, both countries have in many ways departed from economic orthodoxy.	在财经媒体眼中，即便中印两国在私有化，财产权，放松管制以及萦绕不去的官僚僵化等问题上都偏离了正统的经济理论，但这些都未能妨碍它们成为市场化改革和全球化的典范。


According to the US-based Heritage Foundation’s widely cited Index of Economic Freedom, China and India are relegated to the group described as “mostly unfree.”	根据美国传统基金会权威发布的经济自由度指数，中国和印度都应被归为“较不自由”的一类。


Out of a total of 157 countries in 2008, China ranked 126th and India 115th.	2008年，在157个国家中，中国和印度分别排在126和115位。


Although socialist economic policies in both countries inhibited initiative and enterprise, a positive legacy of that period cannot be denied.	虽然这两个国家早期的社会主义经济政策抑制了它们的创新能力和企业发展，但我们也不应抹杀了那段时期的积极一面。


It is arguable, for example, that Chinese socialism provided a strong launching pad for growth, particularly in terms of a solid base of education and health, rural electrification, a safety net enabled by equitable distribution of land rights, regional economic decentralization, and high female participation in the labor force.	比如说，中国的社会主义经济政策给教育和医疗卫生打下了坚实的基础，实现了农村电气化，构建了由平均地权支撑的社会安全网络，下放给地方发展经济的权力，以及鼓励妇女积极参加工作，因此也为后来的高速增长提供了强大的基础。


Moreover, a major part of the socialist legacy in both countries is the cumulative effect of the state’s active role in technological development.	而政府在科技发展中担任主要角色的累积效应则是这两国的另一个主要社会主义遗产。


Unlike in India, where the private corporate sector is the most dynamic sector, in China state-controlled companies are some of the globally more successful.	不过，在印度国，私企是最具活力的经济部门，反过来，在中国，国企较私企更为成功。


Even in famous private Chinese companies like Lenovo and Huawei Technologies, the ownership structure is highly convoluted, and the boundaries of state and private control rights blurred.	即便如联想和华为这样闻名海外的中国私有企业，其产权结构也是错综复杂，而国家控制权与私人控制权之间的界限则模糊不清。


The recent purchase of Volvo by the private Chinese automaker Geely generated much publicity, but most of the money was put up by municipal governments.	最近，中国私人汽车制造商吉利收购沃尔沃汽车的事街知巷闻，但这笔收购的款项绝��部分由地方市政府筹集的事实却鲜为人知。


Powerful political families run many Chinese state-owned enterprises.	在中国，许多国企都由有政治势力的家族把持着。


Indeed, there is some evidence that the overwhelming majority of multi-millionaires in China are relatives of high-ranking Communist Party officials.	事实上，有证据证明中国绝大多数百万富翁都是中共高官的亲戚。


And, thanks to the large pool of savings generated by Chinese households and state-owned companies, the Chinese economy can for the time being bear the waste and misallocation implied by such crony capitalism.	所幸中国的家庭和国企创造了庞大的储蓄，才使中国经济得以承受权贵资本主义造成的资源巨大浪费和扭曲配置。


Without political reform, the long-run viability of such a system is in doubt.	如果不进行政治改革，这种制度的存续是不可想象的。


Premier Wen himself indicated as much in a speech in August that was widely noted abroad, but largely blacked out in Chinese media.	温总理早在他8月份那次备受海外关注却被中国国内媒体封杀的讲话中充分阐述了这一点。


The global media should now go further, and begin to examine the many features of the rise of China and India that depart from the simplistic narrative of the triumph of market reform.	如今，全球媒体也是时候对中国和印度崛起中的特征进行研究，而不仅仅是简单地将其归因于市场改革的成功。


China and Russia in the New World Disorder	新的世界乱局中的中国和俄罗斯


Can Kosovo achieve independence without the tacit consent of Russia, and can there be a humanitarian and political solution to the tragedy in Darfur without the active goodwill of China?	科索沃在没有俄国默认的情况下能否实现独立，而在没有中国积极善意的情况下能否给达尔富尔危机带来人道主义的和政治解决方案？