Of course, Turkey is less destabilized than its Arab rivals and partners by a revolutionary process that does not directly challenge it.	当然，土耳其不像阿拉伯对手和伙伴那样受到革命进程的直接威胁。


After all, Turkey is already a functioning democracy.	归根结底，土耳其已经是运行顺畅的民主政体。


Turkey is also much less worried about its future than Israel is.	土耳其不像以色列那样对未来充满担忧。


Compared with the small Jewish state, Turkey has an expanding population and a deep awareness of its historical, religious, and cultural affinities with its neighbors.	和犹太小国相比，土耳其人口增长、对与邻国的历史、宗教和文化共鸣有着深入的认识。


These important assets make Turkey an “indispensable nation” in the region.	这些重要的优势让土耳其成为地区内“不可或缺”的一份子。


So, what threatens Turkey today is Turkey itself.	因此，今天威胁土耳其的正是土耳其自己。


Turkey is not “Asian” only in terms of economic energy and rapid growth: it is also Asian in a more political sense, with the rising temptation of a form of “Oriental despotism.”	土耳其不仅在经济活力和快速增长等意义上越来越靠近“亚洲”，它的亚洲化还具有更多的政治意义，实行某种形式的“东方专制主义”越来越有诱惑力。


Indeed, for many years, domestic critics of Erdoğan’s government have been denouncing what they describe as the “Putinization” of the regime.	实际上很多年来，埃尔多安政府的国内批评者一直在对政府所谓的“普京化”加以谴责。


Turkey, not the European Union, is currently making its presence felt in the world.	世界影响力日趋扩大的并非欧盟，而是土耳其。


But the course of history may change rapidly.	但历史的进程可能突然改变。


In reality, Turkey needs Europe as much as Europe needs Turkey.	实际上，土耳其需要欧洲不亚于欧洲需要土耳其。


Europe is for Turkey “a principle of moderation” and an enticement to remain democratic.	欧洲是土耳其“自我约束的准绳”和坚持民主的吸引力。


Turkey is for Europe, beyond its demography, “a principle of energy” and a cure for pessimism – even if, as Erdoğan is showing, self-confidence can easily turn into hubris.	而土耳其则除了庞大的人口外，是欧洲的“能量源泉”和治疗悲观主义的良药——即使像埃尔多安所表现的那样，自信可以很轻易地转变为自大。


The Neuroeconomics Revolution	神经经济学革命


NEW HAVEN – Economics is at the start of a revolution that is traceable to an unexpected source: medical schools and their research facilities.	纽黑文——经济学正处于一场革命的开端。 这场革命的源头出人意料：医学院和医学研究。


Neuroscience – the science of how the brain, that physical organ inside one’s head, really works – is beginning to change the way we think about how people make decisions.	神经科学——关于大脑，即那个人类脑袋内部的器官，如何工作的科学——正在改变我们关于人类如何决策的看法。


These findings will inevitably change the way we think about how economies function.	这些发现将不可避免地改变我们关于经济如何运转的看法。


In short, we are at the dawn of “neuroeconomics.”	简言之，我们正迎来“神经经济学”的发轫。


Efforts to link neuroscience to economics have occurred mostly in just the last few years, and the growth of neuroeconomics is still in its early stages.	将神经科学与经济学联系起来是近几年才兴起的事情，神经经济学也尚处于雏形阶段。


But its nascence follows a pattern: revolutions in science tend to come from completely unexpected places.	但其发端遵循了这样一条路径：科学革命总是起源于完全不曾料掉的地方。


A field of science can turn barren if no fundamentally new approaches to research are on the horizon.	如果不能提出新的基本方法，任何科学都会走入死胡同。


Scholars can become so trapped in their methods – in the language and assumptions of the accepted approach to their discipline – that their research becomes repetitive or trivial.	学者们将陷于现有方法——即该学科中已被接受的语言和假设——无法自拔，他们的研究也将陷入循环和琐碎的无用功。


Then something exciting comes along from someone who was never involved with these methods – some new idea that attracts young scholars and a few iconoclastic old scholars, who are willing to learn a different science and its different research methods.	接着，从未涉足旧方法的人会带来令人激动的新元素——吸引年轻学者和少数思想开放的老学者的新思想，这两类人愿意学习新科学和新研究方法。


At a certain moment in this process, a scientific revolution is born.	在此过程中，科学革命诞生了。


The neuroeconomic revolution has passed some key milestones quite recently, notably the publication last year of neuroscientist Paul Glimcher’s book Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis – a pointed variation on the title of Paul Samuelson’s 1947 classic work, Foundations of Economic Analysis, which helped to launch an earlier revolution in economic theory.	最近，神经经济学革命接连跨越了几座里程碑，令人注目的成果包括神经经济学家格里姆切（Paul Glimcher）去年的新书《神经经济分析基础》（Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis），该书的标题显然来自萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson）1947年的经典著作、上一次经济理论革命的起点《经济分析》（Foundations of Economic Analysis）。


And Glimcher himself now holds an appointment at New York University’s economics department (he also works at NYU’s Center for Neural Science).	格里姆切本人现在纽约大学经济学系工作（同时也在纽约大学神经科学中心兼职）。


To most economists, however, Glimcher might as well have come from outer space.	不过，对大部分经济学家而言，格里姆切简直就是天外来客。


After all, his doctorate is from the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine’s neuroscience department.	毕竟，其博士学位是在宾夕法尼亚大学医学院神经科学系取得的。


Moreover, neuroeconomists like him conduct research that is well beyond their conventional colleagues’ intellectual comfort zone, for they seek to advance some of the core concepts of economics by linking them to specific brain structures.	此外，像他这样的神经经济学家，他们所采取的研究方法与他们的正统同行的知识舒适域格格不入。 他们试图将经济学的核心概念与大脑的具体结构联系起来，以此推动经济学的进步。


Much of modern economic and financial theory is based on the assumption that people are rational, and thus that they systematically maximize their own happiness, or as economists call it, their “utility.”	现代经济学和金融学理论大体上基于人类理性的假设——人类总是系统性地最大化自身的快乐程度，即经济学家所谓的“效用”。


When Samuelson took on the subject in his 1947 book, he did not look into the brain, but relied instead on “revealed preference.”	萨缪尔森在1947年提出这一主题时，他并没有将研究目光投向大脑，而是提出了“显示偏好”。


People’s objectives are revealed only by observing their economic activities.	人的目标只能通过观察其经济行为而被显示。


Under Samuelson’s guidance, generations of economists have based their research not on any physical structure underlying thought and behavior, but only on the assumption of rationality.	在萨缪尔森的指引下，一代又一代经济学家将自己的研究建立在理性假设的基础上，而不是决定思考和行为的生理结构上。


As a result, Glimcher is skeptical of prevailing economic theory, and is seeking a physical basis for it in the brain.	因此，格里姆切对流行的经济学理论充满了怀疑，并一直在寻找经济理论的生理基础。


He wants to transform “soft” utility theory into “hard” utility theory by discovering the brain mechanisms that underlie it.	他试图通过找出背后的大脑机制将“软”效用理论转变为“硬”效用理论。


In particular, Glimcher wants to identify brain structures that process key elements of utility theory when people face uncertainty: “(1) subjective value, (2) probability, (3) the product of subjective value and probability (expected subjective value), and (4) a neuro-computational mechanism that selects the element from the choice set that has the highest ‘expected subjective value’…”	（3）主管价值和概率的乘积（期望直观价值）； 以及（4）选取选择集中具有最大‘期望主观价值’元素的神经计算机制……”。


While Glimcher and his colleagues have uncovered tantalizing evidence, they have yet to find most of the fundamental brain structures.	格里姆切和他的同事已经发现了不少诱人的证据，但离大体上揭示基础大脑结构还有一段距离。


Maybe that is because such structures simply do not exist, and the whole utility-maximization theory is wrong, or at least in need of fundamental revision.	也许这是因为这类结构根本不存在，整个效用最大化理论都是错误的，或至少需要进行重大修正。


If so, that finding alone would shake economics to its foundations.	果真如此的话，光是这一结论就将从根本上动摇经济学。


Another direction that excites neuroscientists is how the brain deals with ambiguous situations, when probabilities are not known, and when other highly relevant information is not available.	另一个令���经科学家激动不已的方向是大脑如何处理模糊情形，即概率未知或其他高度相关信息无法获得的情况。


It has already been discovered that the brain regions used to deal with problems when probabilities are clear are different from those used when probabilities are unknown.	根据已经发现的结果，大脑用来处理概率情况一目了然的区域与处理概率未知的区域是不同的。


This research might help us to understand how people handle uncertainty and risk in, say, financial markets at a time of crisis.	这一成果或许可以帮助我们理解人们如何处理像金融市场和危机来袭等情形的不确定性和风险。


John Maynard Keynes thought that most economic decision-making occurs in ambiguous situations in which probabilities are not known.	凯恩斯认为，大部分经济决策都是在概率未知的模糊情况下做出的。


He concluded that much of our business cycle is driven by fluctuations in “animal spirits,” something in the mind – and not understood by economists.	他推论说，我们商业周期的大部分是受“动物精神”波动的推动所致，所谓“动物精神”是指不为经济学家所理解的精神力量。


Of course, the problem with economics is that there are often as many interpretations of any crisis as there are economists.	当然，经济学有一个问题，当危机来临时，有多少经济学家，就有多少种干预办法。


An economy is a remarkably complex structure, and fathoming it depends on understanding its laws, regulations, business practices and customs, and balance sheets, among many other details.	经济是一种非常复杂的结构，洞察经济依赖于理解经济的法律、规则、商业活动和习俗、资产负债表等诸多细节。


Yet it is likely that one day we will know much more about how economies work – or fail to work – by understanding better the physical structures that underlie brain functioning.	但是，终有一天，我们将通过更好地理解大脑功能的生理结构基础来更好地了解经济如何起作用（或如何未起作用）。


Those structures – networks of neurons that communicate with each other via axons and dendrites – underlie the familiar analogy of the brain to a computer – networks of transistors that communicate with each other via electric wires.	这些大脑结构是将大脑比作计算机的基础——前者是通过轴突和树突相互交流的神经元网络，后者是通过电路相互联系的晶体管网络。


The economy is the next analogy: a network of people who communicate with each other via electronic and other connections.	经济将成为新的类比——通过电子和其他通信手段相互联系的人际网络。


The brain, the computer, and the economy: all three are devices whose purpose is to solve fundamental information problems in coordinating the activities of individual units – the neurons, the transistors, or individual people.	大脑、计算机和经济，这三者均是以通过个体单元——神经元、晶体管或个人——的合作和行为解决基本信息问题的机制。


As we improve our understanding of the problems that any one of these devices solves – and how it overcomes obstacles in doing so – we learn something valuable about all three.	只要我们对这三者之中的任何一者如何解决问题——以及如何克服解决问题中出现的障碍——的理解有了突破，都能将其推广到其他两者。


Bubbles Forever	永远的泡沫


NEW HAVEN – You might think that we have been living in a post-bubble world since the collapse in 2006 of the biggest-ever worldwide real-estate bubble and the end of a major worldwide stock-market bubble the following year.	纽黑文—在2006年史上最大全球房地产泡沫破灭、2007年世界股市大泡沫结束之后，你大概以为我们已经进入了后泡沫时代。 但关于泡沫的讨论仍没有淡出视野——许多国家的房地产市场仍有泡沫或出现了新的泡沫；


But talk of bubbles keeps reappearing – new or continuing housing bubbles in many countries, a new global stock-market bubble, a long-term bond-market bubble in the United States and other countries, an oil-price bubble, a gold bubble, and so on.	新的全球股市泡沫； 美国和其他国家长期债券市场泡沫；


Nevertheless, I was not expecting a bubble story when I visited Colombia last month.	尽管如此，当我上个月访问哥伦比亚时，并没有预期会看到泡沫。


But, once again, people there told me about an ongoing real-estate bubble, and my driver showed me around the seaside resort town of Cartagena, pointing out, with a tone of amazement, several homes that had recently sold for millions of dollars.	但是，人们再一次和我谈到了进行中的房地产泡沫，我的司机指向海滨度假小镇卡塔赫纳（Cartagena），带着惊愕的口气说，有的房子最近卖到了数百万美元。


The Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, maintains a home price index for three main cities – Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.	哥伦比亚央行有一个追踪三大城市——波哥大、麦德林和卡利的住房价格指数。


The index has risen 69% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms since 2004, with most of the increase coming after 2007.	自2004年以来，该指数实际值（经通胀调整）上涨了69%，其中大部分涨幅发生在2007年之后。


That rate of price growth recalls the US experience, with the S&P/Case-Shiller Ten-City Home Price Index for the US rising 131% in real terms from its bottom in 1997 to its peak in 2006.	房价上升之快令人想起了美国，标普/凯斯-希勒（S&P/Case-Shiller）十城市住房价格指数从1997年的底部到2006年的顶部总共上涨了131%。


This raises the question: just what is a speculative bubble?	问题由此而生：什么才是壮观的泡沫？


The Oxford English Dictionary defines a bubble as “anything fragile, unsubstantial, empty, or worthless; a deceptive show.	《牛津英语词典》对泡沫的定义是“任何易碎、虚幻、空洞、无价值的东西；


From 17th c. onwards often applied to delusive commercial or financial schemes.”	骗人的把戏。 自17世纪以来常用于欺骗性的商业或金融计划。


The problem is that words like “show” and “scheme” suggest a deliberate creation, rather than a widespread social phenomenon that is not directed by any impresario.	”问题在于，“把戏”和“项目”之类的词表明泡沫是有意为之之物，而不是不听从任何人指挥的普遍的社会现象。


Maybe the word bubble is used too carelessly.	也许“泡沫”一词有滥用之嫌。


Eugene Fama certainly thinks so.	尤金·法马（Eugene Fama）显然这样认为。


Fama, the most important proponent of the “efficient markets hypothesis,” denies that bubbles exist.	作为“有效市场假说”最重要的支持者，法马否认泡沫的存在。


As he put it in a 2010 interview with John Cassidy for The New Yorker, “I don’t even know what a bubble means.	在2010年接受《纽约客》采访时，法马对约翰·卡西迪（John Cassidy）说：“我甚至不知道泡沫是什么意思。


These words have become popular.	这些词倒是很流行。


I don’t think they have any meaning.”	我不认为它们有什么意义。 ”


In the second edition of my book Irrational Exuberance, I tried to give a better definition of a bubble.	在我的书《非理性繁荣》（Irrational Exuberance）第二版中，我尝试给泡沫下一个更好的定义。


A “speculative bubble,” I wrote then, is “a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increase.”	“投机泡沫”我写道，是“这样一种情况：关于价格上涨的新闻刺激了投资者热情，投资者热情通过心理感染传播，并在此过程中放大可以证明价格上涨合理性的���事。


This attracts “a larger and larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of the investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others’ successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement.”	”这吸引了“越来越庞大的投资者群体，他们尽管怀疑投资的真实价值，但也被吸引入局，部分是因为他们嫉妒他人的成功，部分是因为赌徒的兴奋。 ”


That seems to be the core of the meaning of the word as it is most consistently used.	这似乎是泡沫这个词最核心的意思，也是最常用的用法。


Implicit in this definition is a suggestion about why it is so difficult for “smart money” to profit by betting against bubbles: the psychological contagion promotes a mindset that justifies the price increases, so that participation in the bubble might be called almost rational.	这个定义隐含的含义是“聪明钱”为何极难通过赌反向下注从泡沫中赚钱：心理传染催生了论证价格上涨合理性的观念，因此参与泡沫可谓“几乎”（almost）理性。


But it is not rational.	但其实是不理性的。


The story in every country is different, reflecting its own news, which does not always jibe with news in other countries.	每个国家的故事各不相同，因为各国各有各的新闻，与其他国家并不总是相同。


For example, the current story in Colombia appears to be that the country’s government, now under the well-regarded management of President Juan Manuel Santos, has brought down inflation and interest rates to developed-country levels, while all but eliminating the threat posed by the FARC rebels, thereby injecting new vitality into the Colombian economy.	比如，目前哥伦比亚的故事是，在总统桑托斯广受好评的治理下，哥伦比亚政府将通胀和利率压到了发达国家水平，此外，消除FARC叛军的威胁不啻向哥伦比亚经济注入了新活力。


That is a good enough story to drive a housing bubble.	这个好故事足以推动住房泡沫。


Because bubbles are essentially social-psychological phenomena, they are, by their very nature, difficult to control.	因为泡沫从本质上说是一种社会心理学现象，因此天生难以控制。


Regulatory action since the financial crisis might diminish bubbles in the future.	自金融危机以来的监管行动或许能抑制未来泡沫。


But public fear of bubbles may also enhance psychological contagion, fueling even more self-fulfilling prophecies.	但公众对泡沫的恐慌也可能加强心理传染，助长更加自我实现的预言。


One problem with the word bubble is that it creates a mental picture of an expanding soap bubble, which is destined to pop suddenly and irrevocably.	泡沫一词的一个问题是它创造了一幅扩张的肥皂泡心理情景，这个肥皂泡注定会突然地、不可逆转地破灭。


But speculative bubbles are not so easily ended; indeed, they may deflate somewhat, as the story changes, and then reflate.	但投机泡沫并没有那么容易结束； 事实上，它们可能先因为故事的改变而收缩一定幅度，然后再度膨胀。


It would seem more accurate to refer to these episodes as speculative epidemics.	更准确的做法是将这些发作称为投机传染病。


We know from influenza that a new epidemic can suddenly appear just as an older one is fading, if a new form of the virus appears, or if some environmental factor increases the contagion rate.	从流感中我们知道，新的传染病可以在旧传染病正在消失时突然爆发，如果新的病毒种类出现的话，或者如果某些环境因素提高了传染率的话。


Similarly, a new speculative bubble can appear anywhere if a new story about the economy appears, and if it has enough narrative strength to spark a new contagion of investor thinking.	类似地，一个新的投机泡沫可以随时出现，如果关于经济的新故事出现，且故事性足够强以至于投资者被新思维传染的话。


This is what happened in the bull market of the 1920’s in the US, with the peak in 1929.	20世纪20年代美国牛市便是如此。 这次牛市在1929年见顶。


We have distorted that history by thinking of bubbles as a period of dramatic price growth, followed by a sudden turning point and a major and definitive crash.	我们认为泡沫是一段价格狂飙突进的时期，接着是突如其来的转折点和决定性的大跌，这扭曲了历史。


In fact, a major boom in real stock prices in the US after “Black Tuesday” brought them halfway back to 1929 levels by 1930.	事实上，“黑色星期二”后，美国股市实际价格出现过一次大涨，1930年，股市收复了1929年跌幅的一半。


This was followed by a second crash, another boom from 1932 to 1937, and a third crash.	接着到来的是第二次崩溃、1932—1937年的再次繁荣，以及第三次崩溃。


Speculative bubbles do not end like a short story, novel, or play.	投机泡沫不会像短篇故事、小说或戏剧那样结束。


There is no final denouement that brings all the strands of a narrative into an impressive final conclusion.	不存在将所有线索同时推向令人难忘的结局的剧终场景。


In the real world, we never know when the story is over.	在真实世界中，我们永远不知道故事什么时候结束。


The New Age Divide	新时代的分野


LONDON – So what does 2009 hold in store for us?	伦敦-2009年将会发生什么呢？


As ever, the unpredictable – a terrorist atrocity or a rash decision by a national leader – will take its toll.	和以往一样，这一年将会是无法预料的。 或许会发生恐怖主义暴行或者某个国家领导人做出草率的举动，这些都将会给我们带来影响。


But much of what happens tomorrow will be a result of history.	但是，明天发生的大部分事情都将会是历史的结果。


In the last century, the world’s population increased four-fold, and the number of people living in cities thirteen-fold.	在上个世纪，世界人口增长四倍，生活在城市中的人口增长了十三倍。


The world’s output grew by a factor of forty, water use by nine, energy use by thirteen, and the emission of carbon dioxide by seventeen.	全球产量增长了四十倍，用水增长九倍，能源消耗增长十三倍，而二氧化碳排放增长十七倍。


The twenty-first century has to live with the consequences of all that, good and bad.	人们在二十一世纪中不得不应对所有这些后果，无论好坏都是一样。


Some of the factors that will shape our lives appear to tug in different directions.	确定我们生活的某些因素似乎朝不同的方向拉动。


The age profiles of our societies are changing dramatically.	人类社会的年龄结构正在急剧改变。


Asia and Europe have experienced sharp falls in fertility rates.	亚洲和欧洲的人口出生率已经大幅下降。


The figures in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea are even more remarkable than those in Catholic European countries like Spain, Italy, and Poland.	香港、新加坡和韩国的数字要比西班牙、意大利和波兰这些欧洲天主教国家还要显著。


At the same time, people are living longer, so that in a generation the number of elderly dependents in some countries will outgrow that of the young.	与此同时，人们的寿命更长了。 因此，在一代人的时间里，某些国家需要供养的老年人数量将会超过年轻人。


We have been accustomed to societies with a demographic structure that resembles a pyramid – a broad youth base tapering to an elderly tip.	我们已经习惯了金字塔型的社会人口结构，也就是广大的年轻人基础逐渐变小成为顶尖上的老年人。


But now the structure is more like the profile of a skyscraper, more or less the same from top to bottom.	但是现在这一结构更像是一座摩天大楼，从上到下基本一样大小。


Our older populations have to cope with ever younger technology.	老年人口还要应对越发年轻的技术。


This expands educational and employment opportunities.	这就扩大了教育和就业机会。


Many students today are being prepared for jobs that do not yet exist.	如今，我们培育众多的学生迎接以前并不存在的职业工作。


Moreover, some sorts of knowledge can rapidly become redundant.	而且，某些种类的知识会马上变得多余。


Indeed, half of what a student learns in the first year of a four-year technical course will be out of date by the third year. Change itself accelerates.	确实，学生在四年制技术课程中第一年学习的东西有一半在第三年的时候就过时了。


Its results are magnified. Its benefits and its disadvantages penetrate more deeply.	变化本身会提速，其结果大大扩大，其益处和坏处渗透得更加深远。


Every month there are 31 billion searches on Google.	每个月谷歌的搜索数量达到三百一十亿次。


It took radio 38 years to reach an audience of 50 million. Facebook did that in two years.	广播用了38年时间才达到五千万受众，而Facebook仅仅用了两年。


We usually reckon that it is easier for young, unformed minds to handle changes like these.	我们通常认为年轻而又没有定型的头脑更为容易应付类似这样的变化。


How does someone like me, at university in the early 1960’s, adapt and cope?	像我这样六十年代早期上大学的人应该如何适应和应付呢？


How will older societies manage new technology and remain dynamic?	老年化社会如何管理新技术并且保持活力呢？


The biggest challenge for all of us, young and old, next year and for the indefinite future, will result from a different sort of change that is unlikely to respond simply to technological determinism.	对于我们所有年轻人和老年人来说，明年和无限远的未来的最大挑战将会来自于不同形式的变化，而这种变化不大可能仅仅应付技术决定论。


It results from the way we have been living for two centuries.	它取决于我们过去两百年的生活方式。


If older leaders do not produce the right answers soon, younger generations will reap the whirlwind – sometimes literally.	如果老一代领导人无法马上提出正确的答案，那么年轻一代就会自食其果。 有时果真如此。


2009 is supposed to see the conclusion of an agreement on global warming and climate change to succeed and build on the Kyoto Protocol.	各国应当在2009年签署全球气候变暖以及气候变化协议以取代和扩充京都议定书。


Copenhagen is the venue for the meeting.	会议将在哥本哈根举行。


Optimists cheer the departure of the Bush administration and assume that the arrival of the Obama presidency, which unlike its predecessor is not in denial about the science of global warming, will unlock the prospect of a deal.	乐观主义者为布什政府的下台而庆贺，并且认为奥巴马总统上台将会大大扩大达成协议的可能。 奥巴马政府与前任不同的是，他们并不否认全球变暖的科学依据。


Pessimists note that our mounting economic woes around the world are being used as an excuse for inaction on cuts in carbon emissions.	悲观主义者说，当今全世界经济危机严重，有人利用这一情况来为在减少二氧化碳排放上无所作为开脱。


But continuing to use energy inefficiently will not mitigate the painful effects of the global economic crisis.	但是继续没有效率地使用能源不会降低全球经济危机的痛苦影响。


If we make today’s problems the excuse for failure to save the environment, we will simply pile up much bigger – and potentially catastrophic – problems tomorrow.	如果我们用今天的问题来为拯救环境上无所作为开脱，那么，我们只不过是把问题越积越大，明天或许会产生灾难性的后果。


China, the biggest of the emerging economies, clearly understands this.	中国是最大的新兴经济国家，它很清楚这一点。


Whether India does as well seems to me rather more doubtful.	对于我来说，印度是否理解似乎更为令人怀疑。


China faces its own environmental dangers, for example, water stress.	中国面临自身的环境危险，例如说资源紧张。


It does not want to see its industries outdated and uncompetitive.	中国并不想要看到它的工业过时以及没有竞争力。


China will work for a global consensus on climate change.	中国将会为气候变化的全球共识做出贡献。


The big question is whether it will be able to impose tougher environmental standards throughout the whole country.	现在的大问题是它是否能够在全国都实行更为严格的环境标准。


For America, the problem is also mainly one of domestic politics.	对于美国来说，其问题也还主要是国内政治。


There will be no worthwhile American offer on the environment until there is a deal in Congress.	在国会达成协议以前，美国不会在环境问题上提出有价值的提议。


This year’s task may be to reach a global understanding in Copenhagen that is not too prescriptive, but which is more than aspirational and into which an American domestic political agreement can be incorporated once Obama achieves it.	这一年的任务就是在哥本哈根达成并不十分具有约束力的全球性谅解，但是这一谅解应该更为令人鼓舞，而且一旦奥巴马做到，就可以被纳入美国的国内政治协议之中。


But all of this sensitive diplomacy could be wrecked if, in response to rising unemployment, there is an outbreak of trade protectionism involving America, Europe, and China.	但是，如果美国、欧洲和中国之间由于失业率上升而爆发贸易保护主义，那么这一敏感的外交努力就会失败。


That is when the economic and environmental agendas could fatally collide.	这时候，经济和环境议题就会剧烈相撞。


So young and old alike should hold onto their hats in the exciting but dangerous years ahead.	所以，无论年轻人还是老年人都应该在这一令人激动而又危险的年份中站稳脚跟。


All of us must hope that the first Internet-generation American President can lead his own country and the rest of humanity into a safer and more sustainably prosperous future.	我们都希望美国的第一个互联网一代总统能够领导美国以及其他国家进入更为安全以及可持续繁荣的未来。


The New Bogeymen of Financial Capitalism	金融资本主义的新魔怪


The sub-prime crisis has diverted attention from rising fears about Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF’s) as the new bogeyman of global finance.	次级房贷危机把人们的注意力从日益担忧的、对被称为国际金融魔怪的国家财富基金上转移开来。


But the minute the sub-prime crisis subsides, anxieties about SWF’s will return.	但是，一旦次级房贷危机消退，对于国家财富基金的忧虑就会卷土重来。


For the emergence of this vast and growing pool of state-controlled funds may have implications more far-reaching, and certainly more politically sensitive, than the hopefully temporary distress caused by the subprime crisis.	这是因为，与人们所希望的由次级房贷危机所产生的短暂不安相比，国家控制基金大量涌现所产生的影响可能更为深远，而且在政治上更为敏感。


Indeed, if SWF’s continue to grow their investments are bound to permanently alter the relative weight of state and privately controlled assets in advanced economies.	确实，如果国家财富基金继续增加其投资，就必将永久性地改变发达经济体中国家和私人控制资产的相对份量。


According to Morgan Stanley, SWF’s are expected to manage $12 trillion by 2015, up from about $2.5 trillion today.	根据摩根斯坦利公司的估计，预计到2015年，国家财富基金管理的资产将会从现在的大约2. 5兆美元上升到12兆美元。


Both sums dwarf the sums controlled by hedge funds and private equity groups.	这使得对冲基金和私人直接投资公司控制的金钱相形见绌。


Thus some of the biggest investors – both passive and strategic – in financial markets in the coming years will be government institutions.	因此，未来几年中金融市场的某些最大的投资者，无论是被动还是战略投资者都将会是政府机构。


That the biggest of these institutions are in China, Vladimir Putin’s Russia and some unstable petro-states adds another worry to the mix.	这些最大的机构将来自中国、普京统治的俄国以及某些不稳定的石油生产国，这就会给这一组合增添担忧因素。


The growth of SWF’s is a direct consequence of the accumulation of more than $5 trillion in foreign reserves by emerging-market economies in Asia and among oil and commodity exporting countries.	亚洲的新兴市场经济体以及石油和原料出口国的超过5兆美元的外汇储备的直接后果就是国家财富基金的增长。


These economies’ current-account surpluses, together with massive inflows of capital, have led their monetary authorities to try to prevent their national currencies from appreciating in order to maintain the competitiveness of their industries.	这些经济体经常项目盈余以及大量的资本流入让它们的货币财政机关试图防止其货币升值，以便维持其产业的竞争力。


Initially, these countries invested their foreign reserves in liquid assets – short-term United States Treasury bills and government securities issued by other reserve currency countries.	最初，这些国家将其外汇储备投资于流动资产之上，也就是短期美国国债以及由其他储备货币国家发行的政府债券。


Then they realized that their holdings in liquid and low-return assets far exceed what is needed to avoid the type of speculative runs that East Asia experienced in 1997, and Russia in 1998.	随后，它们发现它们所持有的流动性和低收益资产远远超过避免东亚在1997年和俄国在1998年所经历的那种投机性挤兑所需要的数量。


After all, why hold US T-bills with a meager 5% return, German Bunds with a 4% return, or Japanese government bonds with a 0.5% return when you can acquire foreign firms, invest in real assets, stock markets, or higher-yielding corporate bonds?	毕竟，如果当你可以投资于房地产、股票市场或者高收益的企业债券时，何必持有5%回报可怜的美国国债、4%回报的德国债券或者0. 5%的日本政府债券呢？


The answer seemed a no-brainer.	答案看起来是显而易见的。


So central banks are transferring their excess reserves to existing or newly created SWF’s, which in turn invest in high-return equities.	所以各国中央银行正在将其多余的储备转移到现有或者新近成立的国家财富基金之中，而这些基金转而投资于高回报的股本之中。


But the emergence of SWF’s is creating a political backlash in the form of “financial protectionism.”	但是，国家财富基金的出现却也带来了以“金融保护主义”形式出现的政治反弹。


Examples include the China National Overseas Oil Company’s failed effort to buy the US energy firm UNOCAL, and Dubai Ports’ failed bid to buy a firm managing major US ports.	这些例子包括中国海洋石油总公司未能收购美国的能源企业加州联合石油公司，以及迪拜港口未能购买美国的一家大型港口管理公司。


There is now legislation pending in the US Congress aimed at tightening the approval process for foreign acquisition of US firms, and a similar reaction is occurring in Asia and Europe.	美国国会现在正在考虑立法，意图是收紧外国收购美国公司的审批手续，而亚洲和欧洲也在发生类似的反应。


Of course, not all SWF’s favor strategic investments, i.e. taking controlling stakes in the acquired firms.	当然，并非所有的国家财富基金都倾向于战略投资，也就是在被收购的公司中拥有决定性股份。


Some, like Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation, prefer passive and diversified investments with no controlling stake in companies.	某些公司，例如新加坡政府投资公司偏向于被动投资和多元化投资，并不在公司中拥有决定行股份。


And China, when it took a 10% stake in the US private equity group Blackstone, eschewed any voting rights in the company’s management, perhaps as a way of keeping US financial regulators happy.	而中国在投资美国黑石私人直接投资集团10%的股份之时，回避了在公司管理层的投票权，或许是为了让美国金融管理机构满意。


A third type of SWF takes the form of oil investment funds among oil/energy exporting countries, which are saving their windfalls into foreign assets.	国家财富基金的第三种类型采取在石油能源出口国家中的石油投资基金形式，这些基金将它们的大量石油收益储存到外国资产之中。


Norway, indeed, has been doing this – very quietly – for many years	实际上，挪威多年来就一直在默默地这样做。


Views about how to respond to the SWF’s vary.	有关如何应对国家财富基金的方式各不相同。


The United Kingdom has adopted a laissez faire approach, while political concerns dominate in the US, France and Germany.	英国采取放任自流的手段，而政治忧虑则左右了美国、德国和法国。 有人担心能否投桃报李。


Some worry about reciprocity: if Chinese firms are allowed to invest in US and EU firms, shouldn’t US and EU firms be allowed to invest freely in any Chinese firm?	也就是说，如果允许中国公司投资于美国和欧盟公司，美国和欧盟企业难道就不应该自由地投资于任何中国公司吗？


Others worry about national security: what would happen if “our” ports and security industries or other “strategic” firms were taken over by China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia?	还有人担心国家安全。 如果“我们的”港口和安全产业或者其他“战略性”公司被中国、俄国或者沙特接管，那将会发生什么事情？


Still others worry about the fact that SWF’s are state-owned: what would happen to corporate governance when investors may have objectives other than maximizing risk-adjusted returns?	还有人会担心国家财富基金是国家拥有的这一事实。 如果投资者的目标并非是将风险调整后的回报最大化，对公司管理将会发生什么影响？


Similarly, there are concerns about transparency: many SWF’s do not reveal their investment strategies and how they operate.	同样，还有对透明度的担心。 许多国家财富基金并不公布它们的投资战略和运作方式。


What would happen if a small group of huge state-owned SWF’s made very large investments in a variety of assets?	如果少数大型国有国家财富基金大量投资于不同的资产将会怎样？


How might equity prices or bond yields be distorted by $200 billion gorillas that need to invest $4 billion per week?	两千亿美元每周需要投资40亿美元，将会如何扭曲股本价格或者债券收益？


Dire predictions that the rise of the SWF’s means that the global financial system is becoming a form of state capitalism may be exaggerated.	国家财富基金意味着全球金融体系正在成为国家资本主义的一种形式，这一悲观的预言可能有失偏颇。


But a small group of government players managing a vast amount of foreign assets does create complications.	但是，一小股政府机构管理大量的外国资产的确产生影响和后果。


Of course, so long as the US runs annual current-account deficits of almost a trillion dollars, it will need to borrow from strategic rivals such as China, Russia, and unstable Middle East petro-states, which increasingly will lend in the form of high-yield equity investments rather than low-yield T-bills.	当然，只要美国每年的经常项目赤字达到一兆美元，它就需要向类似中国、俄国以及政局不稳的中东石油生产国借款，而更多地将会是以高收益的股本投资而非低收益的政府债券形式进行。


So unless the US starts to save more, it will find it hard to complain about the form – equity rather than debt – that the financing of its external deficit takes.	所以，除非美国开始更多地储蓄，否则，它将很难对为外部赤字提供资金的形式，也就是股本而非债务提出抱怨。


It is also true that the massive accumulation of foreign reserves that is now feeding the SWFs’ growth is excessive and driven by misguided exchange-rate policies, with vastly undervalued currencies resulting in current-account surpluses.	同样正确的是，现在助长国家财富基金增长的大量外国储备积累过度，而且是由错误导向的汇率政策驱使的。 巨额被低估的货币造成经常项目盈余。


These countries need to allow greater exchange-rate flexibility and currency appreciation to reduce their external surpluses – and thus the need to accumulate huge foreign reserves in the first place.	这些国家需要允许更大的外汇灵活性以及货币升值来减少其外部盈余，以及减少积累巨额外国储备的需要。


Indeed, emerging-market economies should reduce their accumulation of foreign assets rather than hope to weather the political backlash against SWF’s in the US and EU.	确实，新兴市场经济体应当减少其外国资产囤积，而非希望渡过美国和欧盟反对国家财富基金的政治反弹。


SWF’s are, it seems, here to stay and grow, and they do offer significant benefits.	看起来，国家财富基金将会存在下去而且会发展壮大，而且它们的确有重大的效益。


But if they grow too large while their activities remain opaque, widespread “financial protectionism” will become all but inevitable.	但是如果它们发育过大而其活动又不透明的话，大范围的“金融保护主义”将会是不可避免的。


The New Bush Doctrine	新布什学说


President George W. Bush’s second inaugural address set forth an ambitious vision of the role of the United States in advancing the cause of freedom worldwide, fueling worldwide speculation over the course of American foreign policy during the next four years.	乔治·W·布什总统的第二次就职演讲描绘了美国推动全球和平事业的雄心壮志，令世界纷纷揣测今后四年美国外交政策可能的走向。


The ideas expressed in Bush’s speech thus deserve serious consideration.	正因如此，布什演讲中所包含的思想很值得我们认真研究。


“It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,” Bush declared, “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”	“在不同国家、不同文化中寻找和支持民主运动和组织的发展是美国的既定国策，”布什宣称，“最终目标是在全球范围内消灭专政。 ”


There is a bow to diplomacy in the assurance that fulfilling this mission “is not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend our friends and ourselves by force of arms when necessary.”	布什在讲话中认可了和平的外交策略，做出了完成使命“不能主要依靠武力，虽然我们会在必要时用武力保卫朋友和自身的安全”的保证。


Similarly, Bush recognizes that outsiders cannot force liberty on people.	与此相似，布什还承认外人不能强迫国民接受自由。


Instead, “Freedom by its nature must be chosen and defended by citizens and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities.”	恰恰相反，“自由从本质上来讲必须由人民自己去选择和捍卫，并得到法治和少数民族共同的维护。 ”


Finally, there is acceptance of diversity, for “when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own.	最后，布什在讲话中认可了多样性，因为“当民族的灵魂被最终唤醒，建立的制度所反应的习惯和传统也许与我们自身的大不相同。


America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling.	美国不会把自身的执政模式强加给不愿接受的人。


Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom and make their own way.”	相反，我们的目标是帮助人们说出自己的心声、得到自己的自由和选择自己的道路。 ”


I agree with this goal, and have devoted the last fifteen years of my life and several billion dollars of my fortune to attaining it.	我赞同这样的目标，把生命中15年的光阴和几十亿美元的财富都献给了这项事业。


Yet I find myself in sharp disagreement with the Bush administration. It is not only that there is a large gap between official words and deeds; I find that the words sometimes directly contradict the deeds in a kind of Orwellian doublespeak.	但我绝不赞成布什政府的政策，这不仅是因为官员们的语言和行动之间多有差距，还因为他们的语言有时与所作所为恰恰相反，简直是一派奥威尔式的欺人之谈。


When Bush declared war on terror, he used that war to invade Iraq.	当布什宣布开始反恐战争的时候，他利用了这场战争来侵略伊拉克。


When no connection with Al Qaeda could be established and no weapons of mass destruction could be found, he declared that we invaded Iraq to introduce democracy.	当找不到任何与基地组织的联系、也找不到任何大规模杀伤性武器的时候，他宣称我们入侵伊拉克是为了给那里带去民主。


Now the elections in Iraq are about to be converted into a civil war between a Shi’a-Kurd dominated government and a Sunni insurrection.	时至今日，伊拉克大选就快要演变成什叶派库尔德政府与逊尼派起义者之间的一场内战了。


In Iraq and beyond, when Bush says that “freedom will prevail,” many interpret him to mean that America will prevail.	在伊拉克和其它地方，当布什宣称“自由终将获胜”，人们都理解为美国终将获胜。


This impugned America’s motives and deprived the US of whatever moral authority the country once had to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs.	这质疑了美国的动机，剥夺了它以前拥有的干涉别国内政的权力。


If, for example, America offers support to Iranian students who are genuinely striving for greater freedom, they are now more likely to be endangered by US support, as the regime’s hardliners are strengthened.	举例来讲，如果美国给真心争取自由的伊朗学生提供支持，可能反而会给他们带来麻烦，因为美国的支持会增强政府内部强硬派的势力。


To explain what is wrong with the new Bush doctrine, I have to invoke the concept of open society. That is the concept that guides me in my efforts to foster freedom around the world.	为了说明新布什学说究竟错在哪里，我不得不借用开放社会的理念，正是这个理念引导我在世界各地争取自由。


The work has been carried out through foundations operating on the ground and led by citizens who understand the limits of the possible in their countries.	具体的执行者是那些脚踏实地的基金组织，领导者则对本国可能的界线了然于胸。


Occasionally, when a repressive regime expels our foundation – as happened in Belarus and Uzbekistan – we operate from the outside.	偶尔当我们的基金组织被专制政府驱逐出境时¾就像白俄罗斯和乌兹别克斯坦曾经发生的那样¾我们就在境外继续开展行动。


Paradoxically, the most successful open society in the world, the US, does not properly understand the first principles of an open society; indeed, its current leadership actively disavows them.	荒谬的是，世界上最成功的开放社会美国却并不真正了解开放社会的首要原则。 实际上，美国目前的领袖迫不及待地否定上述原则。


The concept of open society is based on the recognition that nobody possesses the ultimate truth.	开放社会理念的基础是任何人都不掌握绝对的真理。


To claim otherwise leads to repression.	不承认这一点就会产生压迫。


In short, we may be wrong.	简言之，我们可能是错的。


That is precisely the possibility that Bush refuses to acknowledge, and his denial appeals to a significant segment of the American public. An equally significant segment is appalled.	这正是布什竭力否认的可能性，而他的否认迎合了很大一部分美国公众，同时也使另外一部分人感到震惊。


This has left the US not only deeply divided, but also at loggerheads with much of the rest of the world, which considers our policies high-handed and arbitrary.	这不仅使美国内部分裂加重，而且造成了美国与世界各国矛盾不断，人们都认为我们的政策高压横暴、独断专行。


President Bush regards his reelection as an endorsement of his policies, and feels reinforced in his distorted view of the world.	布什总统把重新当选看成是对其政策的认可，从而更加坚定了对错误世界观抱有的信心。


The “accountability moment” has passed, he claims, and he is ready to confront tyranny throughout the world according to his own lights.	他声称“解释时刻”最终已经过去，他又已做好准备，按照自己的方式来反抗专制统治。


But the critical process that is at the core of an open society – which the US abandoned for eighteen months after September 11, 2001 – cannot be forsaken.	但开放社会核心的重要程序¾2001年9月11日以来被美国放弃已有18个月了¾绝不能被彻底地抛弃。


That absence of self-criticism is what led America into the Iraq quagmire.	正是这种自我批评的缺失使美国陷进了伊拉克问题的泥沼。


A better understanding of the concept of open society requires that promoting freedom and democracy and promoting American values and interests be distinguished.	更好地理解开放社会的理念需要把推动自由民主和推动美国的价值观与利益区别开来。


If it is freedom and democracy that are wanted, they can be fostered only by strengthening international law and international institutions.	如果想要推动自由和民主，那么只能通过加强国际法和国际制度来加以实现。


Bush is right to assert that repressive regimes can no longer hide behind a cloak of sovereignty: what goes on inside tyrannies and failed states is of vital interest to the rest of the world.	布什说专制政权��能再藏在主权遮羞布的下面是对的：在专制和失败的国家里发生的一切都关系到世界其它国家的切身利益。


But intervention in other states’ internal affairs must be legitimate, which requires clearly established rules.	但干涉别国的内部事务必须合法，需要为此制定明确的规则。


As the dominant power in the world, America has a unique responsibility to provide leadership in international cooperation.	作为世界第一强国，美国在领导国际合作方面有着独一无二的责任。


America cannot do whatever it wants, as the Iraqi debacle has demonstrated; but, at the same time, nothing much can be achieved in the way of international cooperation without US leadership, or at least active participation.	美国既不能像伊拉克灾难中那样为所欲为， 但与此同时，如果没有美国的领导，或至少是积极的参与，那么国际合作恐怕也很难取得什么成果。


Only by taking these lessons to heart can progress be made towards the lofty goals that Bush announced.	只有吸取了这些教训，才有可能实现布什提出的那些崇高的目标。


China’s New Path	中国的新路径


CAMBRIDGE – The opaque nature of China’s government makes it difficult to see where Chinese economic policy is heading, and thus how the Chinese economy will develop in the years ahead.	发自剑桥——中国政府的不透明本质使外界难以摸清中国经济政策的走向，从而也很难揣摩中国经济在未来几年将如何发展。


But the scale of China’s economy and its role in global trade and financial markets compel us to try to understand the intentions of China’s new leadership.	但中国经济的巨大规模及其在全球贸易和金融市场中所扮演的角色迫使我们设法去理解中国新领导班子的意图。


A useful starting point is to examine the key appointments that have been made since President Xi Jinping assumed office.	我们可以通过分析自习近平就职后做出的一系列重要任命来推测。


One surprise was the decision to retain Zhou Xiaochuan as Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).	其中出人意表的一个决定是让周小川继续留任中国人民银行行长。


Zhou had come to the end of his term – and had reached an age at which officials are supposed to retire.	周的上一任任期已经结束——同时也到了官员应该退休的年龄。


So the decision to keep him on for at least the next two years represents a significant endorsement by the new Chinese leadership.	因此让他至少再留任两年的决定代表着中国新领导人对其的高度认可。


Zhou is an intelligent and internationally respected expert on monetary policy and finance.	周是一位睿智且国际知名的货币政策和金融专家。


As the head of the PBOC, he has favored more market-based monetary policies and increased internationalization of China’s currency, the renminbi.	作为中国人民银行行长，他一直比较青睐基于市场的货币政策和并使本国货币——人民币——越来越国际化。


He has also worked successfully to contain inflationary pressures.	他同时还成功遏制了通胀压力。


We can expect more of the same in the coming years.	而在未来几年我们即将看到更多类似的举措。


The new finance minister, Lou Jiwei, comes to the ministry from the China Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign wealth fund, where he dealt with global capital markets on a daily basis.	而新任财政部部长楼继伟是从中国投资有限责任公司——中国的主权财富基金——调任到财政部的，在中投时他负责处理与全球资本市场有关的日常事务。


Lou, a trained economist who previously served in the Ministry of Finance as a deputy minister, where he was a voice for pro-market reforms, indicated his current approach to tax and budget policy at a recent meeting in Beijing.	楼是一个训练有素的经济学家，曾任财政部副部长，也属于市场化改革派——他近期在北京的一次会议上在税收和预算政策上也表现出类似立场。


He rejected what he described as the European style of very large government and high tax rates and the American style of lower tax rates but large fiscal deficits, in favor of low budget deficits and a tax system that would promote “opportunities” for individuals and private enterprises.	他反对欧洲的大政府高税率以及美国式的低税率高财政赤字，比较偏爱低预算赤字和能使个人和公司获得更多“机会”的税收体系。


Xi and Premier Li Keqiang obviously knew what they were getting when they appointed Lou.	习近平主席和李克强总理显然在任命楼继伟时就知道会有什么结果。


And, despite his age, they promised that he would have a full five years as Finance Minister, which would push his tenure past the normal retirement age.	而且，尽管楼继伟年事已高，他们仍然承诺让他在财政部长的位置上做满五年，这就会让后者的任期超过一般的退休年龄。


Liu He is perhaps the least visible of the key economic thinkers.	刘鹤恐怕是众多重要经济智囊团中最不引人注目的一个了。


Liu played an important role in shaping the recently adopted 12th Five-Year Plan, with its emphasis on urbanization and service-sector development as a means to increase personal incomes and the share of consumer spending in GDP.	他在制定新的五年计划（十二五）中起到了重要作用，该计划强调城市化以及服务业的发展以提高个人收入和消费支出在GDP中所占的比例。


He has recently been promoted to the post of Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission, the principal body that advises the State Council on economic-development strategy and macroeconomic policy.	刘鹤最近被提拔为国家发展和改革委员会副主任，该机构专责为国务院提供关于经济发展策略和宏观经济政策方面的建议。


Taken together, these appointments demonstrate the new Chinese leadership’s emphasis on pro-market reforms and a shift from heavy industry to greater reliance on consumption and services.	总而言之，这些任命显示了中国新领导人将重点放在市场化改革以及经济重心从重工业向消费和服务转型方面。


That shift is likely to mean a slower rate of GDP growth than the annual rate of nearly 10% that China achieved during the last three decades.	这种变化很有可能意味着比过去三十年间近10%的GDP年增长率更缓慢的增长。


But a slowdown to 7% annual growth would still double China’s GDP over the next decade.	但即便年增长率下降到7%，仍足以令中国的GDP在未来十年翻���一番。


More consumption and less heavy industry will also reduce China’s demand for raw materials, dampening global commodity prices.	更多的消费及更少的重工业也会减少中国对原材料的需求，这会抑制全球商品价格。


Even more significant, shifting income from state-owned enterprises to middle-class workers and increasing consumer spending will reduce China’s enormous saving rate.	更重要地是，把财富从国有企业转移到中产阶级手中以及提高消费支出会降低中国极高的储蓄率。


Since a country’s current-account surplus is the difference between its national saving and its national investment, China’s current-account surplus is likely to continue to shrink in the coming years.	由于一国的经常账户盈余是其国民储蓄与国家投资之间的差额，中国的经常账户盈余很可能在未来几年中不断缩小。


That is consistent with the Five-Year Plan’s goal of basing GDP growth more on domestic demand and less on exports.	这与五年计划中使GDP增长基于国内需求并减少出口依赖的目标是一致的。


Since China’s external surplus is already down to less than 2% of GDP, a decline in domestic saving could result in China beginning to run a current-account deficit.	由于中国外部盈余已经降到了GDP的2%以内，国民储蓄的下降有可能会导致中国开始出现经常账户赤字。


In that case, China would no longer be a net buyer of foreign bonds and other assets.	在这种情况下，中国将不再是一个外国债券以及其它资产的净买家。


If China wanted to continue to invest in foreign businesses and natural resources, it would have to become a net seller of bonds from its portfolio.	如果中国想要继续投资外国企业及自然资源，它就要不断净卖出其投资组合中的债券。


The new leadership will, of course, face serious obstacles as it tries to shift policy in these market-friendly directions.	当然，中国的新领导人在尝试让政策利有于市场时会面临严重的障碍。


China’s state-owned enterprises are powerful forces in the economy, with substantial political influence; they will resist the shift from heavy industry to services.	中国的国有企业在经济中具有强大的力量，并有实质性的政治影响； 它们必将抵制政策中心从重工业转移到服务业。


Likewise, the widespread and official recognition of corruption introduces a new source of uncertainty into national and local politics.	同样，腐败的广泛蔓延以及官方对这种行为的默许为国家政治和地方政治带来了一种新的不确定因素。


But China’s new leaders have signaled where they want the economy to go and have emphasized their determination to reduce corruption.	但中国新的领导人已经表明了他们想要的经济走向，也强调了打击腐败的决心。


Most important, they have put talented people in charge of the process.	最重要的是，他们已经让有才干的人来负责相关工作。


The rest of the world should hope that they succeed.	世界其它各国都应该希望他们能成功。


The New Cosmopolitans	新国际阶层


As globalization proceeds, with the help of ever-faster communications, faster travel, and more powerful multinational corporations, a new, cosmopolitan social class seems to be emerging.	随着全球化的发展，通信变得更加快速，旅行变得更加便捷，跨国公司变得愈发强大，一个新的、国际性的社会阶层开始涌现。


These citizens of the world are developing loyalties to each other that cross national boundaries.	这些全球公民们跨越国界发展着彼此间的忠诚。


I was at a dinner the other night with Yale World Fellows, a carefully selected group of professionals, representing every major country of the world, who spend a semester here.	有一天晚上，我与耶鲁国际研究员们共进晚餐，那是一群仔细选拔出来的职业人士，他们代表着世界上的各个大国， 在这里从事一个学期的研究。


It was an unusual experience, because I began to feel that none of these people were really foreign to me.	那是一种特殊的经历，因为我没有觉得这其中哪个人真的很陌生。


It seemed they were probably easier to talk to than the local Americans who were waiting on us as and serving food.	比起等候我们进餐以及服侍我们的当地美国人，他们好像更加容易交流。


Of course, a cosmopolitan class is hardly new.	当然，国际性阶层并不是什么新鲜事。


In fact, 50 years ago, in his classic book Social Theory and Social Structure, the late sociologist Robert K. Merton described the results of a case study of influential people in a typical American town, Rovere, New Jersey.	事实上，50年前，已故社会学家罗伯特·莫顿（Robert K. Merton）在他的代表作《 社会理论和社会结构 》中便描述了他在一个典型的美国小镇——新泽西的Rovere——对一群有影响力的人士所做的个案研究。


As a sociologist, he chose this tiny town to study how people relate to each other and influence each other, just as biologists study tiny worms with only a few hundred cells so that they can study how each cell relates to an organism as a whole.	作为社会学家，他选择这个小镇来研究人与人之间的联系和影响，如同生物学家研究小虫子时用几百个巢室来研究每个巢室与整体的联系。


Merton discovered a strong pattern.	莫顿发现了一个很强的结构。


Rovere’s influential people seemed to be sharply divided into “cosmopolitan influentials,” who habitually orient themselves with respect to the world at large, and “local influentials,” who orient themselves with respect to their own town.	Rovere有影响的人士分为熟悉世界大局的“国际影响人士”以及熟悉自己小镇的“当地影响人士”。


As he and his assistants interviewed people, the division between the two groups became more intriguing, and significant, in his mind.	莫顿和助手们对这些人进行了采访，他认为这两类人的区别非常有趣，也非常重要。


Merton did not say that the cosmopolitan influentials were influential outside Rovere – apparently none of them was.	莫顿并没有提到国际影响人士在Rovere以外还有影响力——很显然，他们当中没有人是这样的。


What stood out instead was their habitual frame of reference, which was tied to their personal identities.	令他们突出的是他们提到事情的习惯框架，这与他们的个人身份有着紧密的联系。


When Merton engaged people in conversation, any topic would remind the cosmopolitan influentials of the world at large, while local influentials were reminded of things in their own town.	当莫顿安排人们谈话时，任何话题都能够让这些国际影响人士想起全世界，而当地影响人士则会想起自己小镇里的东西。


Cosmopolitan influentials, Merton said, tended to hang their success on their general knowledge, whereas locals relied on their friendships and connections.	莫顿说，国际影响人士取得成功依靠的是他们的一般知识，而当地影响人士则依靠他们的友谊和各种关系。


The cosmopolitan influentials were often uninterested in meeting new people in town; the locals wanted to know everyone.	国际影响人士通常并不乐于同小镇新来的人交往； 而当地影响人士则希望认识每个人。


The cosmopolitan influentials tended to take positions in local government that reflected their broad expertise: board of health, housing committee, or board of education.	国际影响人士倾向于牟取当地政府里可以表现他们宽阔职业才能的职位：健康董事会、房屋委员会或者教育董事会。


The local influentials tend to be in positions that they got through their local popularity: street commissioner, mayor, or township board member.	当地影响人士则倾向于那些能够用得上他们当地人气的职位：街道委员会委员，市长或者镇委员会成员。


The cosmopolitan influential in the town is like the medical specialist; the local influential is like the family doctor.	国际影响人士在小镇里好像媒体人士； 而当地影响人士则像家庭医生。


Merton concluded: “It appears that the cosmopolitan influential has a following because he knows , the local influential because he understands .”	莫顿总结说：“国际影响人士有簇拥是因为他知道，当地影响人士则是因为他理解。 ”


The local influentials, Merton discovered, spoke affectionately of their town, as if it were a unique and special place, and often said they would never leave.	莫顿发现，当地影响人士说起他们的小镇非常亲切，仿佛那是一个独特又特别的地方，他们通常会说自己再也不想离开。


The cosmopolitans spoke as if they might leave any day.	而国际影响人士则说他们有一天可能会离开这里。


What was true in Merton’s day is becoming even more starkly true in today’s globalized economy.	莫顿时代的真实，在我们今天国际化经济中则更加真实。


What I find particularly striking is the sense of loyalty developing among cosmopolitans.	我特别发现在这些国际人士中有一种正在发展的忠诚感。


After the World Fellows Dinner, the Fellow from Namibia was extolling to me, in impeccable and relaxed English, the beautiful vacation homes I might find (and even buy) there.	那次国际研究员晚餐之后，来自纳米比亚的研究员用完美、轻松的英语恭维我，说我在那里可以找到（甚至买下）漂亮的度假别墅。


I felt as if I could perhaps fall into a relationship with him that might work against the interests of the locals in Namibia.	我觉得兴许我和他可以建立一种关系，与纳米比亚当地人对着干。


I could picture doing that, and he and I would be natural allies, if I let it happen.	我可以想象到，他和我可以成为自然的盟友，如果我想的话。


I was left wondering why this is happening on such a scale now.	我在想为什么现在能够发展到这种程度。


Obviously, improved communications technology plays a role.	很显然，日益发达的通信技术起到了重要作用。


But how much does that explain the impression that the division between cosmopolitans and locals is so much wider now?	但如何解释现在的国际人士和当地人士会有越来越大的区别？


One must realize that individuals choose whether to play the role of cosmopolitan or local, and how much to invest in that role.	我们必须意识到，人们是自己选择来做国际人士还是当地人士，并且选择为这个角色投入多少。


People make a conscious choice to become either cosmopolitans or locals, depending on their own personal talents and the perceived returns from making the choice.	人们有意识地选择成为国际或当地人士，这要看他们自己的才能以及他们认为这样的选择所带来的回报。


In the twenty-first century, the new information age creates opportunities not just to be cosmopolitan in spirit and orientation, but to forge strong connections with other cosmopolitans.	21世纪这个新的信息时代不只为国际人士在精神上和定位上提供了机会，而且还为他们同其他国际人士创造了紧密的联系。


The cosmopolitans have shared experiences: they are directly communicating with each other across the globe.	国际人士都有着共同的经历：他们跨越国界彼此直接联系着。


Many cosmopolitans around the world now also share the English language, the new lingua franca.	全世界的很多国际人士现在都使用英语来交流，英语是新的国际通用语。


The term “global village” was first popularized in the late 1960’s by Canadian communications maven Marshall McLuhan in response to the already powerful communications media of that day.	“地球村”这一词汇是20世纪60年代末加拿大通信大王麦克·卢汉（Marshall McLuhan）最先倡导的，他是针对当时已经很强大的通信媒体而言的。


But McLuhan could not have anticipated the cosmopolitan class, because he could not have anticipated the immense development of direct interpersonal communications media that allow cosmopolitans around the world to form friendships.	但卢汉没有预想到有国际阶层，因为他无法预见到私人直接通信传媒的蓬勃发展帮助全世界的国际人士建立起友谊。


The cosmopolitans tend to be increasingly wealthy, and their wealth helps mark them as cosmopolitan.	国际人士一般都很富裕，而他们的财富也成为国际人士的标志。


Thus, economic inequality is felt differently in today’s world.	因此，经济上的不平等在现代社会也有着不同的感受。


Perhaps it is accepted resignedly, as the cosmopolitan class is too amorphous and ill-defined to be the target of any social movement.	也许，这是可以被无可奈何地接受，由于国际阶层太含糊而且定义不明，因此很难成为某个社会运动的目标。


There is no spokesperson for the cosmopolitan class, no organization that could be blamed for what is happening.	国际阶层也没有自己的发言人，也没有组织因此要受到责备。


I fear for the future.	我为未来担心。


How will the cosmopolitan class behave as their role in the world economy continues to strengthen?	当他们的角色在世界经济中逐渐加强的时候，国际人士该如何作为？


How unfeeling will they come to be about the people who share their neighborhoods?	他们对于生活在自己周围的人又是怎样的不关心？


Most importantly, if resentment by the locals emerges, what political consequences will result?	最重要的是，如果当地人对他们产生了厌恶，将会导致怎样的政治影响？


The New Face of the United Nations	联合国的新面孔


On January 1, 2007, Ban Ki-Moon, South Korea’s former foreign minister, will become United Nations Secretary-General, following Kofi Annan’s ten-year tenure.	2007年1月1日，南朝鲜前外长潘基文（Ban Ki-Moon）将在科菲·安南（Kofi Annan）10年任期届满后成为新任联合国秘书长。


Annan inspired the world with his diplomacy and leadership on poverty reduction and human rights, but the war in Iraq divided the world and drew attention and financial resources away from crisis regions and critical long-term problems like climate change, disease control, sustainable energy, and access to water.	安南在削减贫困和人权领域所展露出来的外交艺术和领导能力曾令世界耳目一新，但随之而来的伊拉克战争却使世界陷入分裂，并把财政资源和人们的注意力从危机地区和像气候变化、疾病控制、可持续能源利用和清洁用水等重大的长期课题上转移开去。


With the recent elections in the United States and the rise of Asia’s global influence, there is an opportunity to turn the world’s attention to the most critical challenges facing our planet.	不久前的美国选举和亚洲全球影响力的提高再次创造出机遇，可以让世界各国的注意力重新回到我们这个星球所面临的最为关键的挑战。


In addition to the long-term challenges of poverty, the environment, nuclear proliferation, and UN reform, the new Secretary-General will inherit a long list of hotspots: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia, Myanmar, Sudan, North Korea, and others.	新任秘书长不仅要面对贫穷、环境、核不扩散及联合国改革等一系列挑战，而且要解决伊拉克、伊朗、阿富汗、巴勒斯坦、黎巴嫩、索马里、缅甸、苏丹、北朝鲜等一系列热点问题。


Recent attempts to influence developments in these countries through threats and sanctions, and sometimes war, have failed. Most are less stable today than they were five years ago.	就在不久前，通过威胁和制裁、甚至是战争来影响这些国家局势发展的企图都遭到了失败，多数国家的境遇比5年之前更加糟糕。


Clearly, a new approach is needed.	显而易见，我们需要采取新的对策。


The leading Asian countries, including Ban’s South Korea, have long favored a balance of diplomatic approaches and economic incentives as the way to solve complex challenges.	很久以来，包括潘基文的祖国南朝鲜在内的亚洲主要国家更愿意用外交手段和经济措施相结合的方式来迎接复杂的挑战。


Rather than relying on sanctions and threats of force, the idea is to underpin long-term prosperity in today’s unstable regions.	他们认为目前的当务之急是巩固动荡地区的长期繁荣，而不能依靠单纯的经济制裁和武力威胁。


This balanced approach is important because most of the world’s hotspots are in trouble not only, or even mainly, because of politics, but because of the underlying challenges of hunger, disease, and environmental crisis.	这种平衡的对策至关重要，因为造成世界上多数热点麻烦不断的不只是政治因素，还有被政治因素所掩盖的饥饿、疾病和环境危机等挑战。


Consider Darfur, a crisis that has been debated in the UN Security Council as a confrontation between the Sudanese Government and the people of Darfur.	比如因苏丹政府和达尔富尔民众对立而被拿到联合国安理会讨论的达尔富尔危机。


But the deeper truth is that Darfur is unstable because it is home to an impoverished and fast-growing population without adequate supplies of water, food, health clinics, schools, and other basic services.	其中更深层次的原因是：由于达尔富尔贫困人口快速增长，缺乏足够的水、食物、医院、学校和其他基本服务，才造成了达尔富尔的动荡局面。


Rather than focusing on sanctions, the major powers would do much better to work with Sudan’s government to propose and help to finance long-term development strategies.	如果世界大国不是一味地强调制裁的作用，而是能与苏丹政府合作，制定并资助长期的发展计划，效果肯定会比现在好很多。


Defusing the crises in Darfur and elsewhere will be among the greatest challenges facing the new Secretary-General.	缓和达尔富尔和其他地区的紧张局势是新任联合国秘书长最为艰巨的任务之一。


Yet it is vital that the UN not simply lurch from one hotspot to the next.	但是，联合国的工作不仅限于处理一个又一个的热点，而明确这一点有着至关重要的意义。


The UN also has the unique role and opportunity to offer leadership in building a global consensus around vital long-term environmental and economic challenges facing the planet.	联合国还拥有独一无二的责任和机遇，那就是领导各国在重要的长期环境和经济挑战问题上达成全球性的共识。


Climate change, deforestation, growing populations, and other ecological strains will challenge the very survival of hundreds of millions of people around the world in the coming decades.	气候变化、森林采伐、人口增长和其他生态压力将在今后数十年内威胁到全世界数亿人口基本的生存。


UN leadership will be instrumental to proposing and forging solutions to such daunting long-term global challenges.	在联合国的领导下，人们将为迎接如此可怕的长期性全球挑战制定出切实可行的方案。


In fact, from 1992 to 2002, the UN’s member governments signed a number of treaties and agreements that can and should provide the foundation for long-term global solutions.	实际上，从1992到2002年，联合国所属各成员政府签订了几项能够而且理应作为全球性长期方案基础的协议和协定。


Three treaties emerged in 1992 out of the so-called Rio Conference on the Environment – on climate change, biodiversity conservation, and desertification.	1992年的里约会议签署了气候变化、生物多样性保护和荒漠化等三项环境协定。


In 2000, the member governments agreed on the Millennium Development Goals.	2000年，各成员国政府签署了千年发展目标。


And in 2002, they agreed on the Monterrey Consensus, pledging concrete efforts to triple aid flows to the poorest in order to reach the international goal for foreign assistance of 0.7% of rich-world GNP.	2002年又订立了《蒙特利尔共识》，承诺采取具体措施使最贫困国家得到的援助增加3倍，以便实现对外援助占发达国家国民生产总值0. 7%的国际目标。


The key for today’s UN, therefore, is not to create more goals, but to implement those that have been set.	因此，今天联合国的当务之急不是设立更多的目标，而是具体落实已经确立的任务。


This, too, fits strongly with the spirit in which Ban has approached his new position.	这与潘基文对自己新职务的态度不谋而合。


He has made clear his intention that the UN should implement the commitments that the world community has made.	他明确表示联合国应该执行世界组织所做出的承诺。


Without implementation, all of the treaties in the world would lead us nowhere.	缺少了有效的执行步骤，世界上所有的协定都将是一纸空文。


During his mandate, the Secretary-General will face the pressing challenge of forging a global agreement on climate change for the years beyond 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol ends.	在其任内，潘秘书长将面临在2012年《京都议定书》截止后达成全球气候变化协议的紧迫挑战。


The Millennium Development Goals remain far off track in the poorest countries, with just nine years to go.	千年发展目标所规定的期限只剩下9年，但该目标在最贫困国家的实施效果还远远不能令人满意。


Despite a global pledge to reduce significantly the loss of biological diversity by 2010, huge areas of rainforest and oceans continue to be destroyed.	尽管达成了2010年前大幅降低生物多样性损失的全球协议，但仍然有大面积的雨林和海洋继续遭受破坏。


If the United States works more closely within the UN framework, it will find willing partners in the rising Asian powers, which are intent on using their influence and resources to solve today’s challenges.	如果美国在联合国框架内密切合作，它将很容易在崛起的亚洲强国中找到合作伙伴，因为新崛起的亚洲国家都致力于运用自己的影响和资源迎接当今世界的挑战。


After all, Asian countries are interested in global stability to underpin their own long-term development.	归根结底，亚洲国家愿意维护全球的稳定，从而支持本国国内的长期发展。


They are acutely aware of their increasing influence around the world, as investors, trading partners, and as contributors to and victims of environmental change.	亚洲国家无不清楚地意识到自身作为投资者和贸易伙伴日益扩大的全球影响，他们清楚地意识到自己既是环境变化的始作俑者，也无时无刻不在受到环境变化的影响。


Behind the scenes, the Asian powers can help to defuse the crises in Darfur, North Korea, Myanmar, and elsewhere. And they will be crucial to forging new cooperative approaches to climate change, water scarcity, and the like.	亚洲强国可以在幕后协助缓和达尔富尔、北朝鲜、缅甸和其他地区的危机，他们在制定气候变化、水资源短缺和类似问题的全新合作对策方面也起着至关重要的作用。


The new Secretary-General comes to office with the world yearning to solve festering problems.	世界各国无不希望持续恶化的问题能够得到解决，从这个意义上讲，新任的联合国秘书长可谓受命于危难之间。


Importantly, there is already broad agreement on a set of shared goals.	世界各国在一系列共同目标上已经达成了广泛的协议，这一点非常重要。


Those goals are achievable.	这些目标是可以实现的。


The challenge is implementation.	如何实现这些目标就是我们必须面对的挑战。


The New Global Economy’s (Relative) Winners	新全球经济的（相对）赢家


CAMBRIDGE – The world economy faces considerable uncertainty in the short term.	剑桥讯——短期内，世界经济将面临极大的不确定性。


Will the eurozone manage to sort out its problems and avert a breakup?	欧元区是否能够理清自己的问题，避免出现分裂的结局？


Will the United States engineer a path to renewed growth?	美国能否走上一条增长恢复之路？


Will China find a way to reverse its economic slowdown?	中国能不能找到扭转经济增长放缓的方法？


The answers to these questions will determine how the global economy evolves over the next few years.	这些问题的答案将影响全球经济在未来几年内的发展。


But, regardless of how these immediate challenges are resolved, it is clear that the world economy is entering a difficult new longer-term phase as well – one that will be substantially less hospitable to economic growth than possibly any other period since the end of World War II.	但是无论眼前的这些挑战如何解决，可以肯定，世界经济正在进入新一轮的长期困难阶段——这可能是二战结束以来最不利于经济增长的一段时期。


Regardless of how they handle their current difficulties, Europe and America will emerge with high debt, low growth rates, and contentious domestic politics.	无论欧洲和美国如何解决它们当前的困境，它们注定会陷入高负债、低增长率和国内政治争议不休的境地。


Even in the best-case scenario, in which the euro remains intact, Europe will be bogged down with the demanding task of rebuilding its frayed union.	即使是在欧元保持无损的最好的情况下，欧洲也会因重建受损联盟这一艰巨的任务而停滞不前。


And, in the US, ideological polarization between Democrats and Republicans will continue to paralyze economic policy.	而在美国，民主党和共和党之间的意识形态分化也将继续阻碍经济政策的制订。


Indeed, in virtually all advanced economies, high levels of inequality, strains on the middle class, and aging populations will fuel political strife in a context of unemployment and scarce fiscal resources.	在几乎所有的发达经济体中，高度的不平等、中产阶段的压力和人口老龄化等问题，再加上失业和财政资源短缺，将激化政治冲突。


As these old democracies increasingly turn inward, they will become less helpful partners internationally – less willing to sustain the multilateral trading system and more ready to respond unilaterally to economic policies elsewhere that they perceive as damaging to their interests.	随着这些老牌民主国家逐渐将重心转向国内，它们在国际上发挥的作用将更小——它们维护多边贸易体系的意愿会减弱，而更倾向于单边应对它们认为会损害自己利益的别国的经济政策。


Meanwhile, large emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil are unlikely to fill the void, as they will remain keen to protect their national sovereignty and room to maneuver.	与此同时，中国、印度和巴西等大型新兴市场也不太可能出来填补这个空缺，因为它们仍极力要捍卫自己的国家主权和留有回旋的余地。


As a result, the possibilities for global cooperation on economic and other matters will recede further.	因此，未来在经济和其他问题上实现全球合作的可能性将更低。


This is the kind of global environment that diminishes every country’s potential growth.	这就是当前的全球环境，它会削弱各国的潜在增长。


The safe bet is that we will not see a return to the kind of growth that the world – especially the developing world – experienced in the two decades before the financial crisis.	可以肯定的是，我们将不会见到像金融危机发生前20年那样的全球增长——尤其是发展中国家的增长。


It is an environment that will produce deep disparities in economic performance around the world.	在这种环境下，世界各国的经济表现将出现巨大差异。


Some countries will be much more adversely affected than others.	有些国家受的不利影响会比其他国家更严重。


Those that do relatively better will share three characteristics.	而表现相对较好的国家一般具有三个共同的特点。


First, they will not be weighed down by high levels of public debt.	首先，它们不会被高额公共债务压垮。


Second, they will not be overly reliant on the world economy, and their engine of economic growth will be internal rather than external.	其���，它们不会过分依赖于世界经济，它们经济增长的动力来源于国内而非国外。


Finally, they will be robust democracies.	最后，它们会成为健全的民主国家。


Having low to moderate levels of public debt is important, because debt levels that reach 80-90% of GDP become a serious drag on economic growth.	将公债保持在中低水平是很重要的，因为债务水平一旦达到GDP的80-90%，将会严重拖累经济的增长。


They immobilize fiscal policy, lead to serious distortions in the financial system, trigger political fights over taxation, and incite costly distributional conflicts.	它会钳制财政政策，导致金融体系的严重扭曲，引发有关税收的政治斗争和挑起代价高昂的分配冲突。


Governments preoccupied with reducing debt are unlikely to undertake the investments needed for long-term structural change.	专注于减少负债的政府不太可能会分身去处理长期结构性改变所需的投资。


With few exceptions (such as Australia and New Zealand), the vast majority of the world’s advanced economies are or will soon be in this category.	除了极少数的例外（比如澳大利亚和新西兰），世界绝大多数的发达经济体都属于或即将属于这类高债务水平的国家。


Many emerging-market economies, such as Brazil and Turkey, have managed to rein in the growth of public debt this time around.	这次许多新兴市场经济体，比如巴西和土耳其，已经成功地控制了公共债务的增长。


But they have not prevented a borrowing binge in their private sectors.	但它们还未能阻止本国私营经济出现的借贷热潮。


Since private debts have a way of turning into public liabilities, a low government-debt burden might not, in fact, provide these countries with the cushion that they think they have.	由于私人债务可以转变为公共债务，因此事实上，政府债务的低负担也许并不能如这些国家所愿地为它们提供缓冲。


Countries that rely excessively on world markets and global finance to fuel their economic growth will also be at a disadvantage.	经济增长过度依赖世界市场和全球金融的国家也将处于不利境地。


A fragile world economy will not be hospitable to large net foreign borrowers (or large net foreign lenders).	脆弱的世界经济并不眷顾外国巨额净借方（或外国巨额净贷方）。


Countries with large current-account deficits (such as Turkey) will remain hostage to skittish market sentiment.	有庞大经常账户赤字的国家（比如土耳其）将受制于忧虑的市场情绪。


Those with large surpluses (such as China) will be under increasing pressure – including the threat of retaliation – to rein in their “mercantilist” policies.	而那些有大额盈余的国家（比如中国）在控制其“重商主义”政策方面将面临越来越多的压力——包括面临受到报复的威胁。


Domestic demand-led growth will be a more reliable strategy than export-led growth.	以依靠出口相比，依靠内需带动增长将会是更可靠的战略。


That means that countries with a large domestic market and a prosperous middle class will have an important advantage.	这意味着，国内市场规模较大、中产阶级较富裕的国家将具有重要优势。


Finally, democracies will do better because they have the institutionalized mechanisms of conflict management that authoritarian regimes lack.	最后，民主国家会有更好的表现，因为它们具有独裁政体所没有的制度化的冲突管理机制。


Democracies such as India may seem at times to move too slowly and be prone to paralysis.	像印度这样的民主国家可能有时看起来运转得较为缓慢，而且容易陷入瘫痪境地。


But they provide the arenas of consultation, cooperation, and give-and-take among opposing social groups that are crucial in times of turbulence and shocks.	但它们为各个社会反对团体提供了协商、合作和互谅互让的舞台，这些反对团体在动荡不安的时期往往发挥着重要作用。


In the absence of such institutions, distributive conflict can easily spill over into protests, riots, and civil disorder.	若没有这些制度，分配冲突很容易便演化成抗议、暴动和内乱。


This is where democratic India and South Africa have the upper hand over China or Russia.	这就是为什么印度和南非要比中国和俄国更具优势。


Countries that have fallen into the grip of autocratic leaders – for example, Argentina and Turkey – are also increasingly at a disadvantage.	受专制式领导者掌控的国家——比如阿根廷和土耳其——也正逐步趋于劣势。


An important indicator of the magnitude of the new global economy’s challenges is that so few countries satisfy all three requirements.	反映新全球经济挑战的严峻程度的一种重要指标就是，极少国家能同时满足这三个要求。


Indeed, some of the most spectacular economic success stories of our time – China in particular – fail to meet more than one.	的确，本时代在经济上取得最亮眼成绩的国家——尤其是中国——最多也只满足了其中一个要求。


It will be a difficult time for all.	未来对所有国家来说都会是个困难的时期。


But some – think Brazil, India, and South Korea – will be in a better position than the rest.	但是相对其他，有些经济体——比如巴西、印度和韩国——将占据更有利的地位。


The New Grammar of Power	新权力法则


MADRID – Humanity’s main concerns today are not so much concrete evils as indeterminate threats.	马德里——当今人类的主要忧虑与其说是具体某种罪恶，还不如说是不确定的威胁。


We are not worried by visible dangers, but by vague ones that could strike when least expected – and against which we are insufficiently protected.	我们并不担心显而易见的危险，而是担心说不清道不明的危险在难以预料的时候会突然袭击——而我们又没有准备好充分的防御措施。


There are, of course, specific, identifiable dangers, but what worries us most about terrorism, for example, is its unpredictable nature.	当然，当今世界存在具体可辨的危险，但举例来讲，恐怖主义最让我们担心的是其不可预知的性质。


What is most disturbing about the economy these days is its volatility – in other words, the inability of our institutions to protect us from extreme financial uncertainty.	现代经济最令人不安的是其波动性——换言之，我们的制度无法保护我们免受极端财务动荡的威胁。


Generally, much of our uneasiness reflects our exposure to threats that we can only partly control.	总体而言，我们感受到的不安大多来自我们只能部分控制自己所面临的威胁。


Our ancestors lived in a more dangerous but less risky environment.	我们祖先的生存环境更加危险，但却不像现在这样危机四伏。


They endured a degree of poverty that would be intolerable to those in advanced countries today, while we are exposed to risks whose nature, though hard for us to understand, would be literally inconceivable to them.	他们需要忍受当今发达国家居民无法忍受的贫困，而我们所面临的风险虽然自己也难以完全理解，但在他们看来根本就是匪夷所思。


Because interdependence exposes everyone around the world in an unprecedented way, governing global risks is humanity’s great challenge.	因为相互依赖以前所未有的方式影响每个人，所以控制全球风险是人类最严峻的挑战。 比方说气候变化；


Think of climate change; the risks of nuclear energy and proliferation; terrorist threats (qualitatively different from the dangers of conventional war); the collateral effects of political instability; the economic repercussions of financial crises; epidemics (whose risks increase with greater mobility and free trade); and sudden, media-fueled panics, such as Europe’s recent cucumber crisis.	传染病（其危险性随着人口流动和自由贸易而不断增加）； 以及由媒体造成的突如其来的恐慌，比方说欧洲近来的黄瓜危机。


All of these phenomena form a part of the dark side of the globalized world: contamination, contagion, instability, interconnection, turbulence, shared fragility, universal effects, and overexposure.	所有现象组成了全球化世界阴暗的一面：污染、传染病、动荡、互联、混乱、共同弱点和普遍影响，以及过于频繁的接触。


In this respect, one might speak of the “epidemic character” of our contemporary world.	从这个意义上讲，可以说现代世界具有“传染的性质”。


Interdependency is, in fact, mutual dependency – a shared exposure to hazards.	相互影响实际上是相互依存——也就是面对共同的风险。


Nothing is completely isolated, and “foreign affairs” no longer exists: everything has become national, even personal.	没有哪件事是完全孤立的，“外交”概念已经荡然无存：所有问题都与民族、甚至个人息息相关。


Other people’s problems are now our problems, and we can no longer look on them with indifference, or hope to reap some personal gain from them.	别人的问题现在同样是我们的问题，我们再也不能怀揣冷漠之心坐视不管，或希望抓住机会从中渔利。


This is the context of our current peculiar vulnerability.	这就是我们当前特有的脆弱的总体环境。


What used to protect us (distance, government intervention, foresight, classic defense methods) has been weakened, and now offers little or no protection.	曾经的保护因素（距离、政府干预、先见之明、传统的防御模式）已经遭到削弱，现在作用已经微乎其微，甚至完全失去了作用。


Maybe we haven’t taken into account all of the geopolitical consequences deriving from this new logic of mutual dependence.	也许我们还没有将这种新的相互依赖逻辑的所有地缘政治后果纳入考虑。


In such a complex world, not even the strongest is sufficiently protected.	在这样一个复杂的世界，即使最强的强者也得不到充分的保护。


Indeed, the logic of hegemony clashes with the current phenomena of fragmentation and autonomization – think of Pakistan, for example, or Italy – which create imbalances and asymmetries that are not always favorable to the powerful.	事实上，霸权逻辑与当前分裂化和自主化的潮流互相矛盾——比方说巴基斯坦或意大利——由此造成的不平衡和不对等并不总是对强者有利。


The weak, when certain that they cannot win, can hurt the strongest – and even make them lose.	如果弱者确定自己无法获胜，他们可以让强者蒙受损失——甚至让他们彻底失利。


In contrast to the centuries-old Westphalian order of nation-states, in which each state’s specific weight was the determining factor, in a world of interdependency, the security, economic stability, health, and environment of the strongest is continually a hostage of the weakest.	与几个世纪来民族国家的威斯特伐利亚秩序形成鲜明的对照（威斯特伐利亚秩序中国家的各自权重成为决定性的因素），在相互依存的世界中，强者的安全、经济稳定、健康和环境持续受到弱者的威胁。


All are exposed to the effects of disorder and turbulence on the periphery.	周边的混乱和动荡同样影响着强国和弱国。


These conditions of overexposure are for the most part unprecedented, raising numerous questions for which we don’t yet have the right answers.	这种过度影响的情况多数前所未有，进而凸显出我们还不知道答案的若干问题。


What kind of protection would be appropriate in such a world?	在这样的世界中什么样的保护才较为适宜？


Not surprisingly, a contagious globalization that increases vulnerability inevitably triggers preventive and defensive strategies that are not always proportionate or reasonable.	导致软弱性与日俱增的迅速传播的全球化不可避免地引发了预防及防御战略，上述战略并不总能做到恰当或合理本来也不足为奇。


The xenophobia and chauvinism that some of the defensive strategies can awaken may end up doing more harm than the threats from which they were intended to protect us.	某些防御战略可能激起的仇外及沙文主义甚至可能比它们本来意在防止的威胁造成更大的损失。


So, in this era of global warming, smart bombs, cyber warfare, and worldwide epidemics, our societies must be protected with more complex and subtle strategies.	因此，在这样一个全球变暖、智能炸弹、网络战争和全球传染病的时代，我们必须借助更加复杂和微妙的策略来保护我们的社会。


We cannot continue to pursue strategies that ignore our common exposure to global risks, and the resulting environment of mutual dependence.	我们不能继续坚持已经过时的策略，无视全球共同威胁以及应运而生的相互依存的总体环境。


We must learn a new grammar of power in a world that is made up more of the common good – or the common bad – than of self-interest or national interest.	我们必须学习新的权力法则，因为相比于个人或国家利益，在当今世界中发挥更大作用的是共同利益或共同损失。


These haven’t disappeared, of course, but they are proving to be indefensible outside of a framework capable of addressing common threats and opportunities.	个人利益和国家利益当然并没有消失，但事实证明它们如果脱离了能够解决共同机遇和威胁的总体框架，个人和国家利益根本就无从谈起。


While the old power game sought the protection of one’s own interests with no concern for those of others, overexposure forces reciprocity of risks, the development of cooperative methods, and the sharing of information and strategies.	传统的权力游戏追求在完全不顾他人利益的前提下保护自己的利益，而频繁接触则导致互通风险、制定合作策略、以及共享策略和信息。


Truly effective global governance is the strategic horizon that humanity must pursue today with all its energy.	真正有效的全球管理是人类当今必须全力追求的战略境界。


It sounds hard, and so it will be.	这听上去非常困难，事实也的确如此。


But it has nothing to do with pessimism.	但这与悲观主义没有任何联系。


The challenge of governing global risks is nothing less than the challenge of preventing the “end of history” – not as the placid apotheosis of liberal democracy’s global victory, but as the worst collective failure we can imagine.	管理全球风险挑战的重要性并不亚于避免“历史结束”——这种结束不是自由民主全球胜利的卓越巅峰，而是我们能够想象得到的最可怕的集体失利。


The New IMF	全新的IMF


WASHINGTON, DC – When Ministers meet for the IMF’s Spring Meeting this month they will find an institution with regained self-confidence.	华盛顿——当世界各国的部长们在本月的春季再次聚会的时候，他们将发现IMF将重获信心。


The London G20 summit gave a strengthened mandate to the IMF, while tripling its resources.	伦敦的20国峰会给了IMF更多的权力，将其可支配资金增加了3倍。


More concessional finance will be available for low-income countries, and international liquidity will be increased by a hand-out of $ 250 billion in special drawing rights (SDRs).	低收入的国家将会获得更多有条件的贷款。


This is a boost for the IMF, and it gives hope to emerging and developing countries that have been severely hit by a crisis that originated elsewhere.	IMF还将获得2500亿美元的特别提款权，对于那些备受金融危机之害的新兴国家和发展中国家而言，这将是个振奋人心的消息。


The IMF is well-positioned to help its members overcome the financing gaps resulting from the crisis.	IMF在帮助它的成员国对抗金融危机方面有着更为有利的条件。


In the run-up to the G20 summit access to the Fund’s credit facilities was increased and policy conditions were streamlined.	20国峰会给了IMF更多的资金和政策。


In a watershed with former practice, a new non-conditional credit line was introduced for well-performing countries.	对于那些经济表现良好的国家而言，最新引进了一种无条件贷款。


Mexico and Poland will be its first users and more countries will line up.	墨西哥和波兰将是第一批的受益者，还有更多的国家正在等待批准。


These more flexible lending policies reflect a new image of the IMF.	这种灵活的借贷方式的出现预示着一个全新的IMF。


The negative stigma attached to IMF financing is a thing of the past.	过去那种附加条件重重的贷款方式一去不再复返。


Its financing role in this crisis secured, the IMF now needs to strengthen its position as guardian of an open international financial system.	作为金融危机的防范者，IMF的作用尤其重要。 IMF应该是对国际金融系统的稳定起着重要的作用。


The IMF was created to prevent crises like the current one and in this it has failed.	IMF就是为了防范这类风险而建立的，但对于此次金融危机的发生，它显然没有发挥应有的作用。


Admittedly, there were warnings, but policy makers, particularly in advanced countries, did not follow suit.	虽然IMF事先已经提出警告，但各国的决策者，特别是发达国家的决策者并没有加以重视。


The ‘new’ IMF should be an institution that communicates better with its members, balances the interests of its advanced, emerging and developing members in an evenhanded manner, and aligns its policies better to the needs of the moment.	新的IMF应该与它的成员国进行更加有效的沟通，更加有效地平衡发达国家，新兴国家和发展中国家之间的利益，从而制定更加有效的政策。


Now that the IMF has been given a second lifetime, it needs to regain its central position in the international financial system.	如果说IMF被给予了第二次生命，它更应该在国际金融系统中扮演中心的角色。


For this, it needs to focus on three issues: improved surveillance of financial stability, strengthened international coordination, and an updated decision-making process.	为此，它应该做到以下三点：对金融的稳定加强监管，加强国际间的合作，建立更加有效的决策机制。


The new IMF needs to become more vocal on global financial stability issues.	新的IMF应该在全球金融系统稳定的问题上有更大的发言权。


The IMF should see to it that there are no gaps in the surveillance of financial institutions.	不管是什么样的金融机构，IMF都应该一视同仁地进行监管。


It can help shape a more robust global supervisory system which needs to be built in order to preserve the benefits of global financial markets.	一个更加灵活有效的全球监管系统有助于维护全球金融市场的稳定。


And it should help develop a vision on what the future financial landscape should look like.	也会给未来的全球金融市场描绘出一个大致的蓝图。


To this end IMF surveillance should include regular updates on supervisory regimes in systemically important countries.	为了达到这个目标，IMF的监管应该包括定期对一些重要国家进行监管。


Early warnings, commissioned by the G20, should be specific and the IMF should monitor whether policymakers give follow-up to the Fund’s advice.	更早的预警提示，正如20国峰会所要求的，IMF应该监督各国的政策制订者，让他们对IMF的建议有所重视。


The new IMF needs to take a fresh look at international policy coordination.	在国际政策的协调方面，新的IMF也需要有一个新的面孔。


The demand for a different monetary order, as advocated by China, sets the stage for a renewed effort to avoid the international imbalances which were at the root of this crisis.	由中国提出来的，关于建立不同金融秩序的想法应该得到重视，因为正是全球经济的不平衡性，导致本次金融危机产生。


First, the US saving deficit will need to be addressed in a sustainable manner.	首先，美国对国内的赤字应该有所重视。


Second, China will have to make its currency convertible.	第二，中国应该将它的货币可以自由兑换。


Third, the position of the euro will strengthen over time as more countries will join the euro zone.	第三，随着更多的国家加入欧元区，欧元的作用也将日益突显。


With more key currencies in place, the perspective of a truly multipolar currency system comes in sight, with an increased role for the SDR.	随着更多的货币登上历史舞台，一个多币种世界金融结构将出现。


This will lessen the need felt by emerging economies for self-insurance against financial instability, by building up large reserves.	如果国际特别提款权的作用越来越明显，新兴国家就不会为了防范风险而储备大量的外汇。


Finally, the new IMF needs governance structures that better reflect today’s new global realities.	最后，新的IMF的监管结构应该更加反映出如今的全球现实。


The perception that advanced countries are running business in the Fund, but do not adhere to Fund advice, has undermined the IMF’s authority.	如果认为发达国家应该在IMF有着更多的发言权，但同时又不遵循IMF的建议的话，IMF的权威性就无法得到保证。


The G20 summit marked the return of the United States to multilateralism.	20国的峰会标志着美国重新回到多边主义的时代。


This acceptance of collective responsibility should come with abandoning US veto power in the IMF by lowering required voting majorities, as well as abandoning Europe’s prerogative of appointing the Managing Director.	随着美国对集体责任的接受，也就是意味着放弃美国在IMF的一票否决权，对其他大多数的国家来说是一件好事。 同样欧洲也应该放弃在IMF任命执行总裁的权力。


One of the strengths of the IMF’s present governance structure, the constituency system, should be duplicated at the G20 as well, so as to ensure inclusiveness.	加强IMF现在监管结构的方法之一就是制度建设，同样也应该运用在20国峰会上，以便于保持系统的稳定性。


The rapid growth of China, India, and other emerging countries should come with increased influence, to be implemented through the planned quota increase in 2011.	随着中国，印度和其他新兴国家的快速崛起，他们在IMF的作用也应该得到加强，应该在2011年的计划中应该得以体现。


Advanced countries, including European countries, will see a relative decrease in voting power.	包括欧洲各国的发达国家的作用应该有所降低。


An increased say for emerging economies will imply taking more international responsibility as well, also in financial terms.	新兴国家在享受更多权力的同时，也应该在金融领域中担负起更多的责任。


Now European countries finance 42% of IMF lending and 62% of concessional World Bank lending.	现在欧洲国家提供着IMF42%的资金来源和世界银行62%的有条件贷款。


This task will have to be shared by emerging countries with large reserves.	新兴国家应该利用自己的外汇储备来承担更大的责任。


These reserves are put to better use by assisting the IMF in maintaining an open and stable financial system and prevent crises like these from recurring	如果将这些外汇储备用在IMF上，世界金融秩序将会更加的开放和稳定，另一次大规模的金融危机也可以有效地避免。


The New International Economic Disorder	新国际经济失序


NEWPORT BEACH – A new economic order is taking shape before our eyes, and it is one that includes accelerated convergence between the old Western powers and the emerging world’s major new players.	纽波特海滩——新的经济秩序正在我们眼皮底下形成，这个新秩序包括了西方旧势力和新兴世界新势力越来越快的趋同。


But the forces driving this convergence have little to do with what generations of economists envisaged when they pointed out the inadequacy of the old order; and these forces’ implications may be equally unsettling.	但这一趋同的推动力与一代又一代经济学家指出旧秩序不再适用时所设想的不同，它们有着令人不安的潜在影响。


For decades, many people lamented the extent to which the West dominated the global economic system.	几十年来，许多人对西方主导全球经济体系程度之深大为失望。


From the governance of multilateral organizations to the design of financial services, the global infrastructure was seen as favoring Western interests.	从多边组织的治理到金融服务的设计，全球基础设施都按照西方的利益在建设。


While there was much talk of reform, Western countries repeatedly countered serious efforts that would result in meaningful erosion of their entitlements.	尽管改革的呼声很高，但西方国家一再拒绝认真实施会造成其好处实质性受损的措施。


On the few occasions that such resistance was seemingly overcome, the outcome was gradual and timid change.	在极少数情况下，西方国家的抵制没有达到效果，但即便如此，变化也是缓慢而轻微的。


Consequently, many emerging-market economies lost confidence in the “pooled insurance” that the global system supposedly put at their disposal, especially at times of great need.	结果，许多新兴市场经济体对全球体系中本因由它们任意使用的“集体保险”（pool insurance，特别是在急需的情况下）失去了信心。


This change in sentiment was catalyzed by the financial crises in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, and by what many in these regions regarded as the West’s inadequate and poorly designed responses.	新兴市场心态的这一变化被20世纪90年代末及21世纪初爆发于亚洲、东欧和拉美的金融危机强化了，这些地区中的很多国家对西方设计缺陷明显的不给力的反应机制十分失望。


With their trust in bilateral assistance and multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund shaken, emerging-market economies – led by those in Asia – embarked on a sustained drive toward greater financial self-reliance.	新兴市场经济体所信任的双边援助和IMF等多边机构摇摆不定，这使得它们——在亚洲的带领下——开始持续地推动金融自力更生。


Once they succeeded in overcoming a painful crisis-management phase, many of these countries accumulated previously unthinkable levels of international reserves as precautionary cushions.	在成功地克服了痛苦的危机管理阶段后，许多新兴市场经济体积累起了以前不可想象的国际储备，一次作为预防性缓冲。


They extinguished billions in external indebtedness by generating and sustaining large current-account surpluses.	它们通过创造和持续巨额经常项目盈余还清了数十亿美元的外债。


And they increased the scale and scope of domestic financial intermediation in order to reduce their vulnerability to external storms.	它们还扩大了国内金融中介的规模与范围，以增强抵御外部冲击的能力。


These developments stood in stark contrast to what was happening in the West.	新兴世界的这一发展趋势与西方国家形成了鲜明对比。


There, unprecedented leverage, massive debt creation, and a seemingly infinite sense of credit entitlement prevailed.	在西方，蜂拥出现的是全所未有的高杠杆、大规模债务创造以及似乎是无穷无尽的信用福利。


Financial excesses become the rule rather than the exception, facilitated by financial innovation and the erosion of lending standards and prudential regulation.	在金融创新、贷款标准下降和审慎监管取消的推动下，金融过剩在西方成了常态，而不是例外。


Suddenly, the world turned upside down: “rich” countries were running large deficits and, in some cases, tipping from net creditor status to net indebtedness, while “poor” countries were running surpluses and accumulating large stocks of external assets, including financial claims on Western economies.	突然间，世界来了个天翻地覆：“发达”国家出现了巨额赤字，有的还从净债权人变成了净债务人，而“贫穷”国家出现了盈余并积累起了巨额外部资产存量，包括对西方经济体的金融权利。


Little did these countries know that their divergent paths would end up fueling large global imbalances, and eventually trigger a financial crisis that has shaken the prevailing international economic order to its foundations.	这些国家似乎都不清楚，它们的分道扬镳最终助长了全球失衡，引发了动摇现有国际经济秩序根基的金融危机。


There is no restoring fully that order.	不存在完全重建旧秩序的可能。


Rather than recovering strongly, sluggish Western growth is periodically flirting with recession at a time of high unemployment and multiplying debt concerns, particularly in Europe.	西方国家复苏疲软，经济前进一步后退两步，失业高企，债务忧虑陡增，特别是在欧洲。


In an amazing turn of events, virtually every Western country must now worry about its credit ratings, while quite a few emerging economies continue to climb the ratings ladder.	事情发生戏剧性转变后，事实上现在所有西方国家都得担心自己的信用评级了，而与此同时，不少新兴经济体的评级在持续上升。


We can now consider the image of Western delegations heading to emerging countries to plead, cap in hand, for financial support, both direct and through the IMF.	再想想现在，西方代表团前往新兴国家毕恭毕敬地恳求金融支持（不管是直接支持还是通过IMF支持）的情景吧。


At first blush, this unusual convergence between Western and emerging countries seems to reflect what advocates of a new international economic order had in mind.	乍一看，西方和新兴国家之间的反常趋同似乎反映了新国际经济秩序鼓吹者的观点。


But appearances can be misleading, and, in this case, they are misleading in a significant way.	但表面可能会误导人们认识本质，在这个问题上尤是如此。


Advocates envisaged an orderly process in which economic convergence accompanied and facilitated global economic growth.	新秩序鼓吹者设想会出现有序过程，经济趋同伴随并刺激全球经济增长。


They foresaw a collaborative process guided by enlightened policymaking.	他们预计，会出现依开明政策指导的合作过程。


But what is occurring is far different and more unpredictable.	但事实与他们所预计的大相径庭，且显示出更多的不可预测性。


Rather than exhibiting enlightened leadership, Western policymakers have consistently lagged realities on the ground, with a bewildering mixture of denial, misdiagnosis, and bickering undermining their responses.	西方决策者并没有表现出开明的领导力，反而一直不能直面事实，他们的反应混合了否认、错误诊断和有害无利的扯皮，使人难以摸着头脑。


Rather than proceeding in an orderly manner, today's global changes are being driven by the disorderly forces of de-leveraging emanating from a Europe in deep financial crisis and an America seemingly unable to restore sustained high rates of GDP growth and job creation.	眼下，全球变化远远称不上有序，而是受着一批无序推动力的推进，比如由欧洲的深度金融危机引发的去杠杆化和无法重塑持续GDP高增长率和就业创造的美国。


Multilateral institutions, particularly the IMF, have responded by pumping an unfathomable amount of financing into Europe.	多边机构（特别是IMF）的反应是为欧洲注入无限量的资金。


But, instead of reversing the disorderly deleveraging and encouraging new private investments, this official financing has merely shifted liabilities from the private sector to the public sector.	但是，这批官方融资并没有扭转无序去杠杆化状况并鼓励新的私人投资，只是将债务从私人部门移到了公共部门。


Moreover, many emerging-market countries have noted that the policy conditionality attached to the tens of billions of dollars that have been shipped to Europe pales in comparison with what was imposed on them in the 1990’s and early 2000’s.	此外，许多新兴市场国家已经注意到，和20世纪90年代及21世纪初它们所得到的资金相比，如今注入欧洲的数千亿美元所附带的条件可要宽松多了。


Fortunately, despite having lagged rather than led this process of consequential (and increasingly disorderly) global change, it is not too late for policymakers to catch up.	幸运的是，尽管在这一系列（越来越无序的）全球变化中，决策者始终落后于时代，没能承担起领导者的责任，但现在迎头赶上还为时未晚。


But doing so requires more than just better national policymaking in Europe and America; it is also time for urgent and deep reform of the multilateral system and its main institutions.	但这样做不但要求欧洲和美国的国家层面决策有所改善，还要求对多边体系及其主要机构进行刻不容缓的深度改革。


That process requires joint leadership by the emerging world as a true equal and partner of Western powers.	这一过程要求联合领导——新兴世界应该获得与其西方和作者真正平等的权力。


The “New” Iraq Insurgency	“新”伊拉克叛乱


Sun Tzu, the great Chinese philosopher of war, once wrote, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”	中国伟大的战略家孙子曾写道：“知己知彼，百战不殆。


The absence of such knowledge invites trouble, often disaster.	”不具备这样的头脑就会遇到麻烦，而且通常是灾难性的麻烦。


This certainly applies to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, where understanding the insurgents is both crucial and difficult.	这一点当然适用于正发生在伊拉克的武装冲突，而了解这些叛乱的性质是至关重要同时也是极为困难的。


To some degree, the Iraq insurgency reflects its historic predecessors.	在一定程度上，伊拉克的叛乱反映了其历史上的先例。


The conflict is “armed theater,” in which the antagonists are simultaneously locked in struggle with each other and sending messages to wider audiences, particularly the Iraqi people.	这样的冲突是“武装的戏剧”，敌手们同时陷入彼此胶着的对抗状态，向更为广泛的观众，特别是伊拉克人民传递讯息。


Like all insurgencies, public support – or the lack of it – will determine the outcome.	如同所有的叛乱一样，公众支持（的获得）—或是缺失—将会决定其成败。


Moreover, it is likely to be a protracted performance.	另外，这很可能是一种拖延式的表演。


History suggests that once an insurgency reaches “critical mass,” it takes a decade or more to eradicate it.	历史表明一旦某次叛乱达到“临界状态”，就需要十年或更长的时间来根除。


And, like past insurgencies, the Iraq conflict is one in which the insurgents use horrific acts to intimidate the public, expose the shortcomings of the government, and goad the regime into overreactions that might turn the public against it.	和过去的叛乱一样，在伊拉克的冲突中，叛乱分子使用恐怖活动来胁迫公众，暴露政府的软肋，迫使该政权采取非常手段来应对，而这样一来就可能会让公众倒戈。


But the Iraq insurgency deviates from its forebears in vital ways.	但伊拉克叛乱在本质上背离了其先例。


Its cultural context differs from twentieth-century insurgencies, particularly the use of a radical ideology derived from religion.	它的文化背景和20世纪的叛乱不同，特别是在使用源自宗教的激进意识形态这一点上。


By contrast, twentieth-century insurgencies were usually secular, based on economic class, sectarian differences, or other deep political cleavages.	相形之下，20世纪的叛乱通常是世俗的，基于经济阶层、宗派分歧或其他深刻的政治分裂的。


The intermingling of religious passion and political radicalism makes the Iraqi insurgency particularly dangerous and difficult to quell.	宗教激情和政治激进主义的交织使得伊拉克叛乱特别危险并很难平息。


The strategic context of the Iraq insurgency is also new.	伊拉克叛乱的战略背景也是全新的。


In the twentieth century, the superpowers supported insurgency and counterinsurgency as a type of proxy conflict.	在20世纪，超级大国们支持叛乱或反叛乱以作为一种替代冲突。


The Iraq conflict, by contrast, is part of the world’s first global insurgency – the web of individual conflicts spawned by Islamist extremism, most of them related in some way to al Qaeda, and the global war on terrorism.	相比之下，伊拉克冲突是世界上第一次全球性叛乱的一部分—脱胎于伊斯兰极端主义的冲突个体的集合，这些冲突大都和“基地”组织及全球性的反恐怖行动有或多或少的关联。


For the first time in history, terrorism gives insurgents the ability to strike directly at their enemies’ external allies.	恐怖主义使叛乱分子有史以来第一次有能力对敌方的外部同盟实施直接的打击。


Moreover, the organization and methods of the Iraq insurgency, while not unique, differ from those seen in the late twentieth century.	再者，伊拉克叛乱的组织和行动方式虽不是独一无二，但却也和20世纪末的叛乱有所不同。


Multiple insurgencies co-exist in time and space, each with differing objectives and tactics.	在同样的时间和地点存在着多个叛乱，而每一桩都有各自不同的目的和手段。


One component is the jihadists, some of them foreign and some local, with direct ties to al Qaeda or, at least, sympathy with its worldview.	其中的一部分就是圣战主义者，他们中有外国人也有本国人，都与“基地”组织有直接联系，或至少同情其世界观。


The jihadists appear to want a Taliban-style Iraq that could serve as a bastion for the wider global Islamist insurgency.	圣战主义者们似乎是想建立一个塔利班式的伊拉克来作为更广泛的全球伊斯兰叛乱的堡垒。


A second component consists of former Ba’athist officials seeking a return to power.	另一个组成部分就是企图重新掌权的前社会党官员。


With access to extensive funds, this group appears to sub-contract many of its operations to organized crime or “casual” insurgents motivated more by pay than by ideology.	在来源充裕的资金支持下，这个集团似乎通过操纵一些有组织犯罪或“临时”叛乱来进行活动。 而这其中的驱动力更多来自金钱而不是意识形态。


The third component is sometimes called “Sunni nationalist,” but that phrase is a misnomer, because this group’s members are less concerned with Iraq as a nation than with Sunni domination of post-Hussein Iraq and responding to what they see as personal injustices or abuses.	第三个组成部分有时被称为“逊尼派民族主义者”，但这一称谓实属用词不当。 因为这一集团的成员更在乎的是逊尼派对后侯赛因时代的伊拉克的掌控及应对在他们看来是对个人的不公正和虐待，而不是作为一个国家的伊拉克本身。


This group appears to rely heavily on tribal structures, kinship, and other local affiliations.	这一集团似乎非常依赖部族结构、血族关系和其他的本地从属关系。


While successful twentieth-century insurgencies developed some degree of hierarchy and a political wing, the Iraq insurgency remains a loose, amorphous network.	虽然20世纪成功的叛乱建立起了一定程度的等级和一支政治派别，但伊拉克现今的叛乱仍然是松散而缺乏组织性的。


The various components, and the subdivisions within them, do not appear to be centrally commanded.	其内部的不同组织和派别似乎并没有集中的指挥。


Some may cooperate; others do not.	有些会相互合作，而有些则不然。


Finally, the insurgency as a whole remains nihilistic, focused on destroying the new Iraqi government and the emerging economic and political system rather than articulating a coherent alternative.	最后，这场叛乱总体上还是处于无政府的恐怖状态，着力于破坏伊拉克新政府和新兴的经济和政治体系而不是明确提出一种具有一致性的另外选择。


In many ways, the Iraq insurgency is analogous to urban street gangs: each component shares behavioral and organizational similarities but pursues its own aggrandizement and undertakes autonomous operations within its “turf” rather than pursuing a master plan or strategy.	在很多方面，伊拉克的叛乱都类似于城市里的街头帮派：每个帮派都有着相似的行为方式和组织结构但却都追求其各自的壮大并采取在其“势力范围”内的自治运作，而不是追求一种总体规划或战略。


The good news for those who desire stability and democracy in Iraq is that an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency cannot “win” in the traditional sense of replacing the government and forming a new regime.	对于那些渴望稳定和民主的伊拉克人而言，好消息是一种涣散的、无组织和无政府状态的叛乱不可能取得传统意义上取代现政府并建立新政权的“胜利”。


The bad news is that an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency can eventually evolve into a coherent, efficient, and purposeful one.	但坏消息是，一种涣散的、无组织和无政府状态的叛乱也可能最终演变成一种协同一致、切实有效和目的明确的事业。


This would obviously pose a much more serious threat, but even an amorphous, disorganized, and nihilistic insurgency can survive and block stability, democratization, and prosperity for many years.	这显然会是一种更为严重的威胁。 但即便是一种涣散的、无组织和无政府状态的叛乱也能苟延残喘并在相当一段时期内阻碍稳定、民主和繁荣。


To return to the analogy, urban street gangs cannot seize political power, but they can certainly keep their neighborhoods dangerous, backward, and grim.	再回到我们先前的类比，街头的帮派不能攫取政治权力，但他们肯定能将使所在的街区置于危险、落后和可怕的状态。


There are, then, three paths for Iraq: evolution of a more serious insurgency, persistent violence at current levels, or resolution of the insurgency.	由此看来，伊拉克有三条道路可走：叛乱演变得更为严重，现有水平的持续不断的暴力或平息叛乱。


At least three factors will determine which path that injured nation takes.	至少有三个因素会决定这个千疮百孔的国家的走向。


One factor is the will of the new government.	一个因素是新政府的决心。


Insurgent movements that succeed do so because the government’s will collapses.	叛乱分子之所以能够得逞是因为政府决心的动摇。


It is not clear at this point how much determination Iraq’s emerging democratic leaders will have.	伊拉克新兴民主派领导人的决心究竟有多坚定现在还不清楚。


A second factor is restraint on the part of the Shi’ite community.	第二个因素则是什叶派集团的克制程度。


There are ominous indications that the relative forbearance of this group may end.	不容乐观的迹象表明这一集团的相对忍耐可能已到了尽头。


If that happens, the insurgency will be superseded by a much more dangerous sectarian civil war.	如果真是这样，那么这一场叛乱会被一场更为危险的宗派内战取代。


The third factor is the willingness of outside groups – both states and non-state groups – to prolong Iraq’s misery by supporting the insurgency, whether overtly or by inaction.	第三个因素是外部集团—既有国家集团也有非国家集团—通过明目张胆或隔岸观火的方式支持叛乱延长伊拉克痛苦的意愿。


Until states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others vigorously dry up the inflows of people and money that sustain the insurgency, Iraq will never become stable, democratic, and prosperous.	除非沙特阿拉伯、叙利亚和其他国家积极主动地切断使叛乱得以持续的人流和资金流，否则伊拉克就永不得稳定、民主和繁荣。


The New Middle East Order	中东新秩序


Sometime this month, President George W. Bush will – reluctantly – announce a new policy for the United States in Iraq.	本月某些时候，美国总统布什将不情愿地宣布美国在伊拉克的新政策。


A new policy is needed not only in order to halt America’s drift into impotence as it tries to prevent Iraq from spiraling into full-scale civil war, but also because the map of power in the Middle East has changed dramatically.	人们需要一个新政策，不仅是为了在美国防止伊拉克陷于全面内战的时候阻止美国滑入无能为力的境地，而且是因为中东的势力地图已经面目全非。


That map has been in constant flux for the last 60 years, during which the main players – Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, and Iran – have formed and broken alliances.	这一地图在过去60年中一直在不停变化。 这段期间，埃及、伊拉克、沙特、叙利亚、以色列以及伊朗等主要国家忽而结盟，忽而反目。


Now, something like a dividing line is emerging, and if Bush finally begins to understand the region’s dynamics, he may be able to craft a policy with a chance of success.	现在，一条类似分界线的东西正在出现，而如果布什最终开始理解该地区的动态形势，他就有可能制定一项可能成功的政策。


This regional realignment is typified by the emergence of a de facto alliance that dare not speak its name.	该地区各国纵横捭阖的典型就是一个事实上心照不宣的结盟正在形成。


Israel and Saudi Arabia, seemingly the most unlikely of allies, have come together to contain their common enemy: Iran, with its mushrooming influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.	以色列和沙特这两个看起来是最不可能的盟友已经共同遏制伊朗它们共同的敌人。 伊朗在伊拉克、黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦的影响力与日俱增。


Iran not only threatens Israel (and the region) with its desire for a nuclear capability and its Shi’a proxy militants; it is also seeking to usurp the traditional role of moderate Sunni Arab regimes as the Palestinians’ defenders.	伊朗觊觎核武器能力并且指使其什叶派代理人好战份子，不仅威胁以色列以及该地区，而且还在寻求僭取温和的逊尼派阿拉伯政权传统的巴勒斯坦人保护人的角色。


After decades of using concern for the Palestinian cause to shore up popular support for their own ineffective and undemocratic regimes, these moderate Arab leaders have now been put on the defensive by Iran’s quest for hegemony. If Iran succeeds in being seen as the genuine patron of Palestinian national aspirations, it will also succeed in legitimizing its claim for dominance in the Middle East.	这些温和的阿拉伯领导人几十年来一直利用对巴勒斯坦人事业的关注增强对其自身软弱无力及不民主的政权的民众支持，现在由于伊朗谋求霸权他们处于守势。 如果伊朗果真被视为巴勒斯坦人民族事业追求的真诚支持者，其在中东称霸的要求就会合法化。


Israel, a country in shock following its failure to destroy Hezbollah last summer, and humiliated by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejhad’s vow to “wipe Israel off the map” – a threat backed up by Iran’s support of Hamas and Hezbollah – now talks about a “quartet of moderates” as the region’s only hope.	以色列去年夏天未能摧毁真主党而惊愕不已，又因伊朗总统内贾德发誓将以色列“从地图上抹去”并且辅以对哈马斯和真主党的支持而蒙受羞辱。 现在它开始谈论起“温和派四方”是该地区的唯一希望。


Indeed, Israel now sees its security as relying not so much on a US guarantee, but on Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (which is seeking regional influence in fear of rejection by the European Union) restraining Iran and its paid proxies.	实际上，以色列现在认为，其安全并不如此依赖于美国的保证，而是埃及、约旦、沙特以及土耳其(该国因害怕被欧盟拒绝入盟而正在寻求地区影响力)限制伊朗及其受雇的代理人。


According to Israeli Vice Premier Shimon Peres, Israel hopes to isolate and contain the Shi’a/Farsi spheres of power by forging open cooperation with the Sunni/Arab domain.	以色列副总理佩雷斯说，以色列希望通过与逊尼派阿拉伯势力范围公开的合作来孤立并且遏制什叶派和波斯势力范围。


Saudi Arabia is just as eager to contain the Iranian threat and the growing “Shi’a crescent” that, with the empowerment of the Shi’a in Iraq, has moved westward to begin to include the Shi’a regions of the Kingdom.	沙特同样也渴望遏制伊朗的威胁以及不断增长的“什叶派新月”。 这一“什叶派新月”由于什叶派在伊拉克坐大已经向西转移，包括沙特王国的什叶派地区。


So it should be no surprise that the Saudi regime was the first to condemn Shi’a Hezbollah at the start of the war with Israel, and that it announced in December that it would support Iraq’s Sunnis militarily should a precipitate US withdrawal incite a Sunni/Shi’a civil war there.	因此，沙特政权在什叶派真主党与以色列交战伊始就第一个予以谴责、并在十二月份宣布，如果美国匆忙撤军导致伊拉克什叶派和逊尼派的内战，它将在军事上支持逊尼派也就不足为奇了。


The Shi’a threat to the Saudi government is ideological.	什叶派对沙特政府的威胁是意识形态上的。


Indeed, it goes to the heart of the Saudi state’s authority, owing to the Al Saud royal family’s reliance on Wahhabi Islam to legitimate its rule.	确实，由于沙特王室依靠瓦哈比伊斯兰来使其统治合法化，这就切中了沙特国家政权的要害。


Since the Wahhabis consider the Shi’a apostates, the challenge from the Shi’a – both within and without Saudi Arabia – represents a mortal threat.	由于瓦哈比认为什叶派是变节者，因此，来自沙特内部和外部的什叶派威胁构成心腹之患。


So Saudi Arabia is ready to cooperate with Israel not only against Iran, but also against other “radicals,” such as Hamas.	所以，沙特阿拉伯准备与以色列合作，不仅针对伊朗，而且针对其他“极端份子”，例如哈马斯。


Remarkably, Palestine’s Hamas prime minister, Ismael Haniyeh, was not received in Saudi Arabia in December, when he was traveling through the region pleading for support for his beleaguered government.	引人注目的是，巴勒斯坦哈马斯总理哈尼亚去年十二月份在沙特阿拉伯吃了闭门羹，当时他在中东巡游，争取对其面临四面楚歌的政府的支持。


Conservative Saudi Arabia prefers dealing with traditional and predictable leaders, such as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Lebanon’s premier, Fouad Siniora, rather than firebrand populist leaders like Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas’ Khalid Meshal, and Iran’s Ahmadinejhad.	保守的沙特阿拉伯更愿意同传统而又可以令人琢磨的领导人来往，例如巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯以及黎巴嫩总理西尼乌拉，而不是像真主党的纳斯鲁拉、哈马斯的马沙勒以及伊朗的内贾德那样狂热的民粹主义领导人。


Last year, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, worried by Shi’a expansionism, was persuaded by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the head of his National Security Council, to coordinate policy with Israel to counter Iran’s growing influence.	去年，沙特国王阿卜杜拉由于担心什叶派的扩张而在其国家安全委员会首领班达尔本亲王的劝说下与以色列协调政策，来钳制伊朗日益增加的影响力。


Israel, after all, is a “reliable enemy” for Saudi Arabia, having destroyed Nasser’s Egyptian army in 1967 – a time when the Saudis were fighting Egypt by proxy in Yemen.	对于沙特而言，以色列毕竟是一个“可靠的敌人”，它在1967年摧毁了纳塞尔的军队，当时，沙特正在也门通过代理人与埃及交战。