I would say that this is worse than a crime.	我敢说这比犯罪都更加恶劣。


It’s a mistake.	这是一种错误。


As someone with some background in politics, I understand the strategy of today’s government: create an extreme threat, first and foremost through shadowy associations with fascist organizations, and then say to citizens, “You can’t deal with this threat on your own, so you should trust us to figure out what to do with it.”	作为一个有政治阅历的人，我理解当今政府的策略：首先主要通过与法西斯主义组织的暧昧关系来制造一种极端威胁，然后告诉民众，“你们无法靠自己来处理这种威胁，因此你们应该相信我们，我们会告诉你们如何应对这种威胁”。


The message is then constantly reinforced by the view of the world formed by the media.	媒体宣传形成的世界观则推波助澜，不断的强化着这种信息。


I understand the reality of the fascist threat, but I also understand what the government wants us to take from it.	我明白法西斯主义威胁的真相，但是我也更明白政府想要我们如何看待这种威胁。


I firmly believe that we should not allow ourselves to participate in these games, nor that we should believe that Russia’s fascist organizations don’t have anything to do with the government.	我坚决相信我们不应该允许自己参与这种游戏，我们也不应该相信俄罗斯的法西斯组织与政府毫无瓜葛。


I think that when the authorities conceive such strategies, they assume that the outcome will be manageable.	我认为当局设计这种策略时，他们认为后果可以控制。


In reality, this is not always the case.	实际上，情况并不总是这样。


When you open a Pandora’s box, nobody can predict what will happen.	打开潘朵拉之盒后，没有人能够预计到会发生什么事情。


It is very risky to create a dangerous situation for political ends, because, more often than not, it is likely that the situation will become uncontrollable.	出于政治目的制造危险局势的风险极大，因为，更多情况下局势将会不可收拾。


Indeed, the threat of fascism is real.	实际上，法西斯主义威胁确实存在。


But the more people who don’t accept the fascist alternative are mobilized politically, the smaller the threat will be.	但是如果政治动员拒绝法西斯主义的人越多，威胁将会越小。


The most important question of the day is not the government’s perspective, that is, its desire to instill fear and eliminate checks and balances on its power.	现在最重要的问题不是政府的想法，即其希望向民众慢慢灌输恐惧心理，消除对其权力的制衡。


What matters are the actions of those who don’t want fascism in Russia and instead simply want Russia to be free.	重要的是那些不希望俄罗斯出现法西斯主义而希望俄罗斯自由的人们会采取什么行动。


There are many such people, tens of millions, but they are not always politically engaged and united.	这样的人数量众多，有几千万之多，但是他们并不总是积极参与政治并团结一致。


The good news, then, is that there are far fewer people who seriously want to see a fascist regime in Russia than the government claims.	令人欣慰的是，极其希望俄罗斯实行法西斯政体的人数要比政府宣称的少的多。


We should not lose heart, but we do need to be politically active and united.	我们不应该丧失勇气，但是我们确实需要积极参与政治并团结一致。


After all, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state that could rely on a powerful and ubiquitous secret police.	毕竟，苏联就依靠势力强大无处不在的秘密警察来维持极权。


And look how it ended up.	想想它是怎样分崩离析的吧！


Russia’s Fragile Power	俄罗斯脆弱的势力


Russia sent an impressive delegation to the World Economic Forum at Davos this year.	俄罗斯派了一个庞大的代表团出席了今年在达沃斯召开的世界经济年会。


After strong representation under Boris Yeltsin, the level of Russia’s participants had slipped since Vladimir Putin became president.	在叶利钦时期高级别的与会后，俄罗斯与会代表的级别在普京就任总统后被降低了很多。


This year, however, the Russians sent their “A” team, and a well-attended session focused on “Russia’s More Muscular Foreign Policy.”	但是今年俄罗斯派出了一个最高级、并且代表成员众多的代表团以显示“俄罗斯更加强悍的外交政策”。


With higher energy prices, many Russian officials are enjoying their renewed power.	随着能源价格变得越来越高，许多俄罗斯官员正享受着他们重新获取的势力。


I was asked to comment on United States-Russian relations at a dinner with top officials from the government and Gazprom, the giant energy company.	在一次与来自政府和大型的能源公司俄罗斯天然气公司的高级官员的晚宴上，我被问及如何看待俄美关系。


I said that America and Europe had too many illusions about democracy in Russia in the 1990’s, and were now going through a stage of disillusionment.	我说，在二十世纪九十年代的时候美国和欧洲对俄罗斯的民主抱有太多幻想，而现在它们正处于一个幻想破灭的时期。


There is concern about Russia’s future, how it will use its newfound power, and how the West should respond.	人们对俄罗斯的未来表示担忧，关心它将如何运用其新发现的势力，而西方国家又将作何回应。


One view is that Russian politics is like a pendulum.	一种观点认为俄罗斯政治就像一个钟摆。


It had swung too far in the direction of chaos under Yeltsin, and has now swung too far in the direction of order and state control under Putin.	在叶利钦时期它朝混乱的方向摆得太远了，而在普京统治下它又向秩序和国家控制的方向摆得太远了。


It has not swung back to Stalinism; Czarism might be a better historical metaphor.	它并没有摆回到斯大林主义； 就历史上看也许更像是沙皇的统治。


Observers debate whether it will eventually reach a new equilibrium.	观察家们争论着它是否会最终达到一个新的平衡。


The optimistic view is that property rights are becoming more deeply anchored than they were in the past, and that Russia’s future will depend on how fast a middle class with a stake in law-based government can be created.	乐观的观点认为财产权比过去更深入人心了，而俄罗斯的未来取决于与依法办事的政府休戚相关的中产阶级在多快的时间内能产生。


But others are not so sure.	但是其他人则没有如此的确信。


Sometimes pendulums continue to oscillate wildly unless there is some friction to slow them down, and sometimes they get stuck.	有时侯钟摆会继续剧烈地摇摆不定，除非有某种摩擦使其能慢下来，而有时它们会被卡住。


Pessimistic observers foresee a continual decline of freedom rather than a liberal equilibrium.	持悲观论调的观察家认为未来更可能出现自由的减少，而不是达到自由的平衡。


Faced with this uncertainty about the future of liberal democracy in Russia, how should western countries respond?	面对俄罗斯自由民主的未来的不确定性，西方国家该如何回应呢？


This question is particularly difficult for the Bush administration, which is torn between the president’s early endorsement of Putin and his pro-democracy agenda.	这个问题对于在早先支持普京以及促进民主的日程表之间挣扎的布什政府来说显得尤其困难。


Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared in 2005 that “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power,” and Senator John McCain, a US presidential candidate, has urged removing Russia from the Group of Eight advanced countries.	国务卿赖斯2005年宣称“今天政权的基本特征比国际权力分配更重要”，而准备参选总统的参议员麦凯恩要求把俄罗斯从八国集团中剔除出去。


Yet, in addition to its democracy agenda, the West has a realist agenda based on very tangible interests.	然而，除了这份民主日程表，西方还有一份基于切实利益的现实的日程表。


The West needs Russian cooperation in dealing with issues like nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the control of nuclear materials and weapons, combating the current wave of radical Islamist terrorism, and energy production and security.	西方需要俄罗斯在处理像伊朗和朝鲜的核扩散、核材料和核武器的控制、与目前的激进伊斯兰恐怖主义浪潮的斗争、能源生产以及安全的问题进行合作。


Moreover, Russia possesses talented people, technology, and resources that can help to meet new challenges like climate change or the spread of pandemic diseases.	此外，俄罗斯掌握着能帮助面对像气候变化或流行病的传播等挑战的专家、技术和资源。


There may not be as much conflict between these two agendas as first appears.	初看起来这两份日程表之间似乎并没有什么冲突。


If the West were to turn its back on Russia, such isolation would reinforce the xenophobic and statist tendencies present in Russian political culture and make the liberal cause more difficult.	如果西方抛弃俄罗斯，这种孤立只会强化目前俄罗斯政治文化中的排外以及中央集权论调，从而使自由事业变得愈加困难。


A better approach would be to look to the long run, use the soft power of attraction, expand exchanges and contacts with Russia’s new generation, support its participation in the World Trade Organization and other market-oriented institutions, and address deficiencies with specific criticisms rather than general harangues or isolation.	更好的办法应该是从长远着眼，运用柔性力量的吸引力，扩大与俄罗斯新一代的交流和接触，支持其加入世界贸易组织以及其他以市场为导向的组织，以特定的批评态度而不是通常的大声训斥或孤立来指出它的缺点。


In any case, the sources of political change in Russia will remain largely rooted in Russia, and Western influence will inevitably be limited.	不管怎样，俄罗斯政治变革的根源将一直深深地扎根于俄罗斯，而西方的影响无可避免是有限的。


But advocating engagement over isolation should not prevent friendly criticism, and in Davos I offered four reasons why Russia will not remain a major power in 2020 unless it changes its current behavior and policies.	但是提倡接触、反对孤立的做法并不是说反对友好的批评，而在达沃斯我提出了如果不改变其目前的做法和政策俄罗斯在2020年失去其大国地位的四点理由。


First, Russia is failing to diversify its economy rapidly enough.	第一，俄罗斯未能足够快地推动其经济的多元化。


Oil is a mixed blessing.	石油祸福相依。


Riding on record-high energy prices and raw material exports, in January 2007 Russia became the world’s tenth-largest economy.	凭借达到历史新高的能源价格和原油出口，俄罗斯在2007年1月成为了世界第十大经济体。


But energy exports finance about 30% of a government budget that is based on forecasts that oil remains at $61 per barrel.	但是能源出口占到了政府预算的大约30%，而其是以预计油价将继续维持每桶61美元的水平为基础的。


Russian industrial exports primarily consist of armaments, with advanced aircraft accounting for more than half of sales.	俄罗斯的工业产品主要是武器，而其中先进的战斗机占到了一半还多。


That leaves Russia vulnerable.	这使俄罗斯变得很脆弱。


A related problem is that Russia lacks a rule of law that protects and encourages entrepreneurs.	一个与之相关的问题是俄罗斯缺少保护和鼓励企业家的法治。


These are precisely the people needed to help foster a vibrant middle class – the bedrock of a stable democratic market economy.	而正是这些人需要得到帮助来促使形成一个充满活力的中产阶级，也就是一个稳定的民主市场经济的基础。


Instead, corruption is rampant.	而实际的情况却是腐败的蔓延。


Moreover, Russia’s demographic crisis continues, sustained by poor public health and inadequate investment in a social safety net.	此外，俄罗斯的人��危机一直在延续着，而糟糕的公众健康和社会保障系统投资的不足使这一问题一直难以解决。


Most demographers expect Russia’s population to shrink significantly over the coming decades.	大多数人口学家预言俄罗斯的人口在未来几十年里将会显著减少。


Adult male mortality is much higher than in the rest of Europe, and it has not been improving.	成年男子的死亡率比欧洲其他国家要高得多，并且一直没有得到改善。


Finally, while one can understand a former superpower’s temptation to seize its opportunity to return to a muscular foreign policy, Russia’s bullying in the energy area is destroying trust and undercutting Russia’s soft power in other countries.	最后，人们可以理解一个以前的超级大国想要抓住其恢复强悍外交政策的机会的欲望，但是俄罗斯在能源问题上的粗暴政策正在破坏其他国家对俄罗斯的信任以及削弱它的软实力。


Both Russia’s neighbors and Western Europe have become more wary of depending upon Russia.	俄罗斯的邻国和西欧对于依赖俄罗斯都变得更加谨慎了。


Most Russian participants at the Davos dinner seemed to ignore these criticisms, but it was interesting to hear one important official admit that reform might progress faster if oil prices dropped somewhat, and another accept the point that criticism should be welcomed as long as it is offered in a friendly spirit.	在达沃斯晚宴上的绝大多数俄罗斯代表似乎都没把这种批评当回事，但是听到一位重要官员承认，如果油价有所下跌那么改革的进程可能会加快，以及另一个重要官员认同应该欢迎以友好的态度提出的批评意见倒是非常有趣。


The mere fact that high-level Russians reappeared in Davos to defend themselves may be a small but healthy sign.	俄罗斯高级官员重新出现在达沃斯为他们的行为进行辩解本身就是一个细小但却健康的信号。


Russia’s Future and the West	俄国的未来和西方


Russia is again seeking a role as a global power and is therefore flexing its muscles.	俄国再一次寻求发挥全球性的作用，因此正在展示实力。


Signs of change in Russian foreign policy have been mounting ever since President Vladimir Putin delivered a confrontational speech in Munich last February.	自从普京总统今年二月在慕尼黑发表了一次对抗性的讲话以来，俄国外交政策改变的迹象就日益显现。


Since then Russia planted its flag on the seabed below the North Pole to demonstrate its claims to the Arctic and its natural resources; announced its intention to build its own missile defense system and issued repeated threats against Europe because of the planned deployment of a small American defense system; exploded a “stray” missile or bomb in Georgia as a warning signal to the government in Tbilisi and its Western friends; buzzed America’s military base on the Pacific island of Guam with surveillance aircraft; blocked a decision on the final status of Kosovo in the UN Security Council; and launched a hacker attack against computer systems in Estonia.	从那时以来，俄国在北极以下的海床上树立了国旗来显示其对北极及其自然资源的主权。 它宣布打算建立自己的导弹防御系统并且由于欧洲计划部署小型的美国防御系统而对其不断发出警告。


In addition, each winter there is a repeated threat of “problems” with oil and gas deliveries to Europe.	它在格鲁吉亚爆炸了一枚“偏离方向”的导弹，警告第比利斯政府及其西方盟友。 它用侦察飞机监视美国在太平洋岛屿关岛上的军事基地。


High oil and gas prices, America’s self-inflicted global weakening due to its misadventure in Iraq, and the rise of China and India obviously have prompted Moscow to change its foreign policy.	居高不下的石油和天然气价格、美国由于在伊拉克困难重重而自己造成在全球势力的削弱以及中国和印度的崛起等因素明显地促使莫斯科改变其外交政策。


Yet none of this amounts to a fundamental change in Russia’s strategy, because Russia continues to adhere to its fundamental decision, made in the early 1990’s, to open itself to the West.	但是，由于俄国继续坚持其在九十年代早期做出的国策，也就是向西方开放，因此所有这些都并不构成俄国战略上的根本性变化。


Still, the style of Russian politics has changed from cooperation to confrontation.	然而，俄国政治的风格已经从合作转化为对抗。


And, as history has shown, a change of style in foreign policy may quickly lead to a change in strategy.	而且，正如历史所揭示的那样，外交政策风格上的改变可能会迅速地导致战略上的改变。


Currently, Russia is undergoing a restoration.	目前，俄国正在经历复兴。


Such periods always follow revolutions and times of far-reaching change.	这样的时期总是跟随着革命和意义深远的变革时代。


The power of the center is being restored, following its partial disintegration after the end of the Soviet Union.	苏联解体后中央权威也随之分解了一部分，现在正在恢复。


But, ever since the sixteenth century, the center has played the main role in shaping Russian history, and now looks to be no different.	但是，自从十六世纪以来，中央权威一直在形成俄国历史上发挥主要作用，现在看起来也没有什么区别。


The restoration of central authority has been going on for some time.	中央权威的恢复已经进行一段时间了。


Indeed, today the center almost completely dictates Russian internal politics and economics, though not within a totalitarian or autocratic framework, but in a democratic and market-based fashion.	确实，如今中央几乎完全操控俄国的国内经济和政治，尽管这不是在一个专制或者集权的框架下，而是在民主和基于市场的形式进行。


Democracy has, of course, degenerated into what is sometimes called “managed democracy.”	当然，民主已经退化为有时被人成为“受管理的民主”。


Theoretically, there remain different parties, elections, a pluralistic society, an independent judiciary, and a market economy.	从理论上而言还有不同的政党、选举、多元社会、独立司法以及市场经济。


But in practice, the entire system is subject to control by the president.	但是在实际上，整个体系都受到总统的控制。


The people will still be allowed to vote for the president, but the real decision about who he will be will have been made beforehand.	人民还是被允许选举总统，总统是谁的实际决定已经事先做出了。


Even if its annual GDP approximates that of Italy, Russia still is a global power and too important to isolate, or even forget about.	即使俄国的年度GDP与意大利旗鼓相当，俄国依然是一个全球性的大国，其重要程度不容忽视甚至遗忘。


It retains enormous strategic weight.	它还拥有巨大的战略实力。


Russia’s future will be determined by whether it is successful in comprehensively modernizing its economy, which today is largely based on exports of oil, gas, and other natural resources.	俄国是否成功地将其经济全面实现现代化将会决定其未来。 其当今的经济很大程度上建立在出口石油、天然气以及其他自然资源的基础之上。


If Russia remains dependent on a natural-resource economy, it will again become a colossus with feet of clay.	如果俄国继续依赖于自然资源经济，它将再一次成为泥足巨人。


Indeed, it will not be nearly as powerful as the old Soviet Union.	实际上，它将连苏联的一半都不如。


Only if Russia succeeds in productively reinvesting the gains from its petro-economy will it achieve sustainable modernization.	俄国只有成功地将其石油经济的收益有成效地进行再投资才会实现可持续现代化。


But this also will require successful political modernization, which means nothing less than constraining the power of the center.	但是这将要求进行痛苦的政治现代化，也就意味着限制中央集权。


The most important aspect of this will be to secure real judicial independence.	最为重要的方面是确保实际的司法独立。


Moreover, Russia needs a system of checks and balances compatible with its own culture and tradition, because this, together with the rule of law, is an indispensable precondition of a functioning democracy.	而且，俄国需要与其文化和传统相适应的制衡制度，因为，这与法治一样是运转正常的民主制度不可或缺的前提条件。


Finally, Russia will need to build a functioning party system, capable of sustaining Russian democracy.	最后，俄国还需要建立正常运作的政党制度，这一制度能够维持俄国的民主。


Considering the country’s vast size, a two-party system seems to be the most appropriate.	鉴于俄国幅员辽阔，两党制度好像是最为适合的。


All these transformations will take time, and they will not come easily or be free of conflict.	所有这些转变都需要时间，而且也不会唾手可得。


So, for the foreseeable future, the West will have to deal with a Russia that yearns for its lost imperial power and shapes its foreign policy to this end.	所以，在可以遇见的将来，西方将会与一个渴望其失去的帝国势力并且以此来制定外交政策的俄国打交道。


In international politics, one side’s strength often reflects the other side’s weakness.	在国际政治中，某方的实力经常反映出对方的弱点。


The weakness of the US and Europe today is an open invitation for Russia to return to its old imperial politics.	美国和欧洲如今的弱点正好引诱俄国回到其旧的帝国政治之中。


This development is anything but safe, particularly for Europe.	这一发展势头决不是安全的，特别是对欧洲而言。


Europe thus has a strategic interest in Russia’s successful modernization and in good bilateral relations.	因此，在俄国成功进行现代化和其全球双边关系上，欧洲有着战略利益。


Above all, the European Union and its member states cannot allow Russia to recapture its imperial spheres of influence without severely damaging its own central interests.	首先，欧盟及其成员国不能允许俄国重新夺回其帝国势力范围而不严重破坏其自身的中心利益。


It is for this reason that securing the independence of Ukraine is so important, as is assuring Turkey’s European orientation.	正是这一原因，确保乌克兰的独立是非常重要的，正如确保土耳其的欧洲导向一样重要。


So, while Russia’s modernization and democratization are in Europe’s interest, its return to an imperial foreign policy and barely veiled authoritarianism at home is not.	所以，俄国的现代化和民主化符合欧洲的利益，其回到帝国式的外交政策以及明火执仗的国内专制主义并不符合欧洲的利益。


Most Russians look westward.	大多数俄国人向往西方。


In the next few years, Russia will offer Europe a great opportunity for closer cooperation, but it will also pose a risk of increased intrusion in European affairs.	在未来几年中，俄国将提供给欧洲很大的机会进行更为紧密的合作，但是，它也会在干涉欧洲事务上构成更多的风险。


The right responses to these opportunities and risks require a united, strong Europe.	对于这些机会和风险正确的回应要求联合和强大的欧洲。


Indeed, a strong and united Europe will also make an important contribution to Russia’s sustainable modernization.	确实，强大和联合的欧洲也将会对俄国可持续的现代化做出重要的贡献。


A weak and divided Europe will tempt Russia to pursue dangerous paths into the future.	一个弱小和分裂的欧洲将会引诱俄国追寻危险的通往未来的道路。


Russia’s Illiberal “Liberal Empire”	俄罗斯并不自由的“自由帝国”


Across the West, many people are questioning whether Russia will continue using natural gas as a means of putting economic and political pressure on Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries in what the Kremlin regards as its “near abroad.”	在整个西方，许多人在揣测俄罗斯是否会继续使用天然气作为向乌克兰、格鲁吉亚和其他被克里姆林宫看作是其“近邻”的国家施加经济和政治压力的一种手段。


Using the “energy weapon,” however, is not just a tactic: it is at the heart of the prevailing doctrine guiding Russian foreign policy.	然而，使用“能源武器”并不仅仅是一种策略，而是当前指导俄罗斯外交政策的信条的核心所在。


Russia’s policy toward the post-Soviet countries is based on the doctrine of a “liberal empire,” according to which Russia’s major government-owned and private companies should assume control of key economic entities across the territories of the former Soviet republics by acquiring their assets.	俄罗斯对于前苏联国家的政策是基于一个“自由帝国”的信条。 据此，俄罗斯的大型国有和私营公司通过获取前苏联共和国的资产来控制它们疆域内的重要经济实体。


In this context, the word “liberal” should be understood to suggest that the empire of the “new Russian dream” should be built by purely economic means, excluding all forcible action against other nations.	从这种层面上讲，“自由”这个词应该被理解为“新俄罗斯梦想”的帝国应该通过纯粹的经济手段来建立，而不会对其他国家采取任何强制手段。


Naturally, the key role in this model is given to the supply of energy to the post-Soviet countries.	自然，这种模式主要是通过向前苏联国家提供能源来实现的。


In particular, the Russian utility giant Gazprom uses increases in gas prices as a means to punish “disobedient” neighbors.	尤其是俄罗斯的公用事业巨头俄罗斯天然气工业公司通过提高天然气的价格来作为惩罚“不听话”的邻国的手段。


Ukraine was punished in this way for its eagerness to integrate with the West following the Orange Revolution.	乌克兰因为在橙色革命后急于融入西方而受到了这样的惩罚。


However, after the return of the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovych to the position of Ukrainian prime minister, the country’s pro-Western orientation has been significantly weakened.	然而，在亲俄罗斯的亚努科维奇重新成为乌克兰的总理后，这个国家亲西方的定位已经被大大弱化了。


So it should be no surprise that Ukraine under Yanukovych has faced no further problems with the supply of Russian gas.	所以，亚努科维奇执政下的乌克兰不会再遭遇俄罗斯天然气供应的问题也就不足为奇了。


But Georgia remains a major Kremlin-Gazprom target.	但是格鲁吉亚依然是克里姆林宫及俄罗斯天然气工业公司的一个主要打击目标。


Russia’s attempt to drag Georgia into its imperial net started in the summer of 2003, when the Russian power monopoly United Energy System took control of 75% of Georgia’s electricity network.	俄罗斯试图把格鲁吉亚拉进它的宗主国网络的努力始于2003年的夏天，当时俄罗斯的电力寡头联合能源系统控制了格鲁吉亚电网的75%。


After the Rose Revolution of November 2003, Russian companies turned out to be the most avid purchasers of Georgian enterprises and their assets.	在2003年11月的玫瑰革命后，俄罗斯的公司成为了格鲁吉亚的企业及其资产最热情的购买者。


The first significant obstacle in the way of Russia’s designs on Georgia was intervention by the US, which demanded that the Georgian government drop negotiations with Gazprom and banned Georgia from selling the gas pipeline that connects Russia and Armenia through Georgian territory.	俄罗斯对于格鲁吉亚的企图所遭遇的最大障碍在于美国的介入，后者要求格鲁吉亚停止与俄罗斯天然气工业公司的谈判，并且禁止格鲁吉亚通过穿越格鲁吉亚国境的连接俄罗斯与亚美尼亚的天然气管道出售天然气。


Russia punished Georgia almost immediately, banning the import of Georgian wines and mineral waters – both of which are key export goods.	俄罗斯几乎立即就对格鲁吉亚实行了惩罚，它禁止从格鲁吉亚进口葡萄酒和矿泉水这两个格鲁吉亚主要的出口产品。


As Georgia’s prospects of joining NATO seemed to increase, Russian actions became more illiberal.	随着格鲁吉亚加入北约的前景变得越来越明朗，俄罗斯的行动也变得愈加粗鲁。


Ethnic Georgians living in Russia, including those who are Russian citizens, became targets of persecution.	居住在俄罗斯的格鲁吉亚少数民族，其中一些是俄罗斯公民，成为了迫害的对象。


Russia’s actions are aimed at fomenting an anti-government backlash in Georgia, thereby paving the way for pro-Russian political forces to come to power.	俄罗斯行动的目标在于挑起格鲁吉亚境内的反政府浪潮，从而为亲俄罗斯的势力掌权铺平道路。


But the illiberalism inherent in Russian imperialism is not limited to recent behavior, and, more disturbingly, it extends to the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity, as Russian troops continue to prop up secessionist regions.	但是俄罗斯帝国主义内在的反自由主义并不局限于其最近的行为，更令人担忧的是，它延伸到了格鲁吉亚领土完整的问题上，因为俄罗斯的军队不断地支持想要脱离联邦的那些地区。


By provoking ethnic conflicts in the territories of former Soviet republics, Moscow hopes to keep them under its control and influence.	通过煽动前苏联共和国境内的少数民族冲突，莫斯科希望借此使它们处于其控制和影响之下。


Ironically, the Russian troops deployed in the renegade Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been accorded the status of “peacekeepers.”	具有讽刺意味的是，驻扎在背叛的格鲁吉亚地区，即阿布哈兹和南奥塞蒂的俄罗斯军队打的是“维和部队”的旗号。


But they are really illegal occupiers, as Russia’s decision to give Russian passports to these regions’ residents attests.	但是实际上他们却是非法的占领者，正如俄罗斯决定给这些地区的居民发放俄罗斯护照所表明的。


Now Russia is threatening to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if the West recognizes the Serbian province of Kosovo as an independent nation.	现在俄罗斯正在威胁，如果西方国家承认塞尔维亚的科索沃省为独立国家的话，那么它也要宣布承认阿布哈兹和南奥塞蒂的独立。


To the extent that most of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have already been given Russian citizenship, the recognition of those two regions’ sovereignty would be entirely fictitious and, in fact, an interim measure on the way to their full annexation by Russia.	鉴于阿布哈兹和南奥塞蒂的的绝大部分居民已经获得了俄罗斯国籍，承认这两个地区的独立主权就完全是虚假的，并且事实上只是它们最终被俄罗斯完全兼并过程中的一种临时措施而已。


To strengthen Russia’s political influence over Georgia’s separatist regions, Gazprom, without taking the trouble to ask for permission from Georgia’s democratically elected leaders, has begun constructing a gas pipeline connecting Russia and South Ossetia directly.	为了增强对于格鲁吉亚国内闹分裂地区的政治影响，俄罗斯天然气工业公司在甚至没有征得格鲁吉亚民主选举的领导人许可的情况下就开始建造一条直接连接俄罗斯与南奥塞蒂的天然气管道。


Although there was no interruption of gas supply from Tbilisi to South Ossetia, this step is necessary for the Kremlin to ensure even greater integration of this Georgian region into Russia’s economic system.	尽管第比利斯与南奥塞蒂的天然气供应从未中断，这是克里姆林宫为确保这个格鲁吉亚地区进一步融入俄罗斯经济体系而采取的一个必要步骤。


With Gazprom having already doubled gas tariffs for Georgia, the energy noose is tightening.	随着俄罗斯天然气工业公司已经把提供给格鲁吉亚的天然气价格翻了一倍，这种能源套索被收得越来越紧了。


But, thanks to gas supplies from neighboring Azerbaijan, Georgia has not yet been strangled.	但是，凭借邻国阿塞拜疆的天然气供应，格鲁吉亚还没有被勒死。


A revived Russian empire, whether it is constructed by force or through economic coercion, is not in anyone’s interests.	一个重新崛起的俄罗斯帝国，不管它是通过武力还是通过经济的压制建立起来的，都是违背大家的利益的。


Reigning in Russia’s illiberal “liberal empire” is the central question of European security today.	如何应对俄罗斯粗暴的“自由帝国”是当今欧洲安全所要面对的中心问题。


Russia\u0027s Incompetent War on Terror	俄国对恐怖主义无能为力


In response to the recent wave of terrorist attacks, Vladimir Putin has demanded that even more power be vested in him.	为了回应不久前的恐怖袭击的热潮，弗拉基米尔·普京呼吁赋予他更多的权力。


As leading Russian military expert Alexander Golts argues, the problem in Russia is not a lack of central power, but of power exercised incompetently and without individual initiative.	而在俄国最主要的军事专家Alexander Golts看来，俄国的问题不是缺乏中央集权，而是权力运用失当，缺乏个人的创造力。


The slaughter by terrorists of hundreds of Russian children in Beslan was final proof - if more was needed - of the utter incompetence of Russia's military and security services.	如果还有必要，那么恐怖分子杀害别斯兰数百名俄国儿童就是铁证，向世人昭示着俄国军队和安全部队的无能。


In Beslan, camouflaged men representing four ministries fussed uselessly, with no clear leader or goals, losing precious minutes when the violence erupted.	来自4个部委的武装便衣毫无意义地乱作一团，既没有明确的领导，也没有清晰的目标。


Meanwhile, Nikolai Patrushev, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB, the former KGB) and Rashid Nurgaliev, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), both sent to Beslan by President Vladimir Putin, were invisible as the tragedy unfolded.	他们浪费了宝贵的分分秒秒，直到暴行无可避免的发生。 与此同时，国家安全局（FSB，以前叫KGB）局长帕鲁谢耶夫和内政部（MVD）部长努尔加里耶夫受命于弗拉基米尔·普京总统双双来到现场，却在悲剧发生时踪影全无。


So once again Russians must face how ineffective their military is.	因此俄国人必须再次正视自己的军队是多么无能。


Indeed, none of Russia's power structures, including the military, the FSB, and the MVD, are capable of performing effective anti-terrorist operations.	实际上，俄国所有的权力机构，包括军队、国家安全局和内政部在内，都无法开展有效的反恐活动。


Most Russians reached this conclusion long before the Beslan attack.	早在别斯兰袭击之前，多数俄国人对此就了然于胸。


In 2002, after terrorists took 800 theatergoers hostage, Putin ordered that an anti-terrorist component be added to Russia's military strategic plan.	2002年恐怖分子劫持剧院800名人质后，普京就宣布在俄国的军事战略计划中加入反恐的内容。


Some military analysts saw this as the beginning, at long last, of serious reforms, as the army was capable only of executing military operations in Russia's traditional way, i.e., using overwhelming force, as in WWII.	有些军事分析家把这作为重大改革的开始，这场改革旷日持久，因为俄国军队只能执行传统意义上的军事任务，像二战时那样依靠人数的绝对优势取胜。


Russia's traditional army cannot fight terrorists effectively because it disdains the ability of soldiers to work in small groups, and does not encourage individual initiative on the part of officers.	传统的俄国军队无法有效对抗恐怖主义，因为他们不仅轻视士兵的小组作战能力，也不鼓励指挥员发挥个人能动性。


All are simply expected to execute orders scrupulously.	所有人都只能小心翼翼地执行命令。


But it is individual training and the ability to make split-second decisions in a fluid situation that are required in anti-terrorist operations.	但反恐活动需要单兵训练和在变化中当机立断的能力。


Incidentally, when one such anti-terrorist operation was suggested in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, Putin decided against it, understanding that instead of eliminating terrorists it would likely turn into a full blown traditional war.	顺便提一句，有人提议在格鲁吉亚的潘吉西峡谷执行这样的反恐任务时，被普京断然拒绝，理由是这不仅不能消灭恐怖，还有可能导致全面战争的爆发。


From the outset, the Defense Ministry was skeptical of Putin's order to include anti-terrorism on the military agenda.	从一开始，国防部就对普京让军队完成反恐任务的命令表示怀疑。


It suggested, instead, that the army should play a secondary role in anti-terrorist operations.	他们建议，军队应该在反恐行动中起辅助作用。


The Army's hostility to reform is deeply ingrained.	反对改革的情绪在军队里根深蒂固。


Today, Russia's army has no professional institution for training non-commissioned officers. The Defense Ministry simply names sergeants from senior conscripts, which means that sergeants are not very different from their subordinates in either age or training.	今天，俄国已经没有培训非雇佣军官的专业机构，军官仅仅由国防部从老兵中选出，也就是说军官在年龄和所受训练上都和下属差别不大。


The internal conditions of the "power" ministries - the FSB and the MVD, which bear the main responsibility for antiterrorist operations - are equally grim.	在反恐行动中负主要责任的权力机构是国家安全局和内政部，这些机构内部也问题重重。


Now the Kremlin wants to merge the FSB and MVD into one Ministry of State Security, thereby creating a single anti-terrorist center.	目前，克里姆林宫希望把国家安全局和内政部合并为统一的国家安全部，从而确立统一的反恐中心。


Putin has already decided to create an operational center of 13 groups in the Northern Caucasus region to coordinate the actions of the Defense and Emergencies Ministries.	普京已经决定在北高加索地区设立由13个机构组成的行动中心，负责协调国防和紧急情况部的行动。


But there is little reason to believe that this proposed bureaucratic monster will provide better security than the existing FSB and MVD forces.	但没多少理由能使人相信，这个即将诞生的官僚怪物会比国家安全局和内政部提供更多的安全。


The only positive result that may emerge from such a structural change could be that the number of anti-terrorist formations will grow.	上述结构改革可能产生的唯一积极结果是：增加反恐机构的数量。


Yet even that is uncertain: before Beslan, the response to terrorist attacks in Ingushetia and Chechnya consisted of efforts to form additional traditional military divisions.	但这仅有的一点好处也仍然飘忽不定：别斯兰惨案发生前，车臣和印古什恐怖袭击的应对措施中就包含了增加传统军事单位的数量。


It is now obvious that overwhelming numbers don't provide an advantage in fighting terrorism, because it is the terrorists who have the initiative.	现在我们能明显地看到：数量上的绝对优势并不能让我们在反恐斗争中占据主动，因为主动权始终握在恐怖分子手中。


They plan when and where to strike.	袭击的时间和地点由他们说了算。


Confronting them effectively will require root-and-branch change in order to inspire Russian security officials to take the initiative.	要想有效地对抗恐怖主义，就需要进行彻底的改革，鼓励安全官员们发挥主观能动性。


For example, Russian security structures have no information about the underground work of the terrorist organizations, which are spread across the entire Russian Federation.	举例来讲，俄国安全机构没有掌握有关地下恐怖组织的信息，而这些组织在整个俄联邦境内星罗棋布。


There is no credible intelligence penetration of these organizations.	他们在恐怖组织中没有可靠的情报来源。


This must change if Russia is to prevent future Beslans.	如果想避免别斯兰事件的再次发生，必须改变这种被动的局面。


But fighting terrorists requires an entirely different kind of spying from "uncovering" traditional "spies," or neutralizing unpopular oligarchs such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky.	但对抗恐怖分子需要与传统反谍手法完全不同的谍报手段，或者说削弱米卡耶·克多可夫斯基这样倍受争议的寡头影响。


To meet today's threats, troops must be able to take individual responsibility and initiative, and need to be trained to react resourcefully and at a moment's notice.	为了应对今天的挑战，我们必须充分发挥普通士兵的主观能动性，鼓励他们承担责任，还要训练他们接到通知后迅速有效的反应能力。


These qualities simply don't exist in Russia's Sovietized military organizations, with their rigid hierarchies and culture of blind conformity.	但俄国苏维埃化的军事组织根本不具备这样的素质，有的只是严格的等级制度和盲从的死板文化。


The entire military philosophy in Russia must be changed.	俄国的整体军事理念必须改变。


But neither Russia's president nor its power ministries seem ready for this.	但无论是俄国总统还是权力部门都还没有做好准备。


Instead of confronting today's new and very real enemy, they would rather confront the old, traditional one - the West.	比起与今天新的、实实在在的敌人作战，他们更愿意对抗过去的传统敌人－西方。


After the Beslan tragedy, Putin offered an exotic explanation of terrorism: the terrorists, he claimed, are instruments in the hands of those who still fear Russia as a nuclear power.	别斯兰惨剧发生后，普京对恐怖主义做出了奇怪的解释，他说，恐怖分子不过是害怕俄国核力量的人手中的工具。


This is nonsense on stilts, though it obviously sounds pleasing to generals in the power ministries, because the only war they know how to wage is with "world imperialism."	尽管这种论调在权力机构的将军们听来十分入耳，但这简直就是一派胡言，因为他们唯一会打的战争就是面对"全球帝国主义"的敌人。


They are useless at fighting today's new terrorist enemy.	他们对今天新出现的恐怖仇敌完全无能为力。


Without major reform of all security and military forces - reforms that provide incentives for individual officers to show initiative and take responsibility - Russia's war on terror will remain one-sided: the terrorists will be doing all the attacking.	如果不对所有的安全和军事力量进行重大改革，鼓励士兵和军官们发挥主观能动性并承担责任，俄国的反恐战争就会变成一场一边倒的闹剧：恐怖分子将会发动所有的袭击。


Russia’s Lawless Legality	俄罗斯法律权威的非法性


MOSCOW – Colonel Yuri Budanov is a convicted rapist and murderer.	莫斯科-尤里·布达诺夫上校是个被定了罪的强奸犯和杀人犯。


After serving half his prison sentence for the rape and murder of an 18-year-old Chechen, Elsa Kungayeva, he was released last December.	他强奸和谋杀了一名18岁的车臣人艾尔莎·库加耶娃，而在他服完了一半的刑期之后，于去年12月被释放。


Svetlana Bakhmina was a lawyer at Yukos, the oil company formerly run by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.	斯韦特兰娜·巴克米娜曾是过去由米哈伊·霍多尔科夫斯基掌控的尤科斯石油公司的律师。


In 2004, she was arrested and, in 2006, sentenced to six and a half years on embezzlement and tax fraud charges.	她于2004年被捕，并在2006年以贪污和偷税漏税罪被判6年半监禁。


Like Budanov, she applied for early release from prison in 2008.	2008年，如同布达诺夫一样，她申请了提前释放。


Her request was refused, as was her earlier plea in 2006 to suspend her sentence until her two small sons reached the age of 14 – a request she was entitled to make under Russian law.	和她早在2006年的申请一样，她又一次被拒绝了。 在2006年时，她曾申请缓刑，因为她的两个幼年的儿子还不满14岁-而根据俄罗斯相关法律她有权这样要求。


Vasily Aleksanyan was Executive Vice President of Yukos, and, as a lawyer, defended Khodorkovsky and his partner, Platon Lebedev, after their arrest in 2003.	瓦西里·阿历克斯恩雅曾是尤科斯公司的执行副总裁，作为一名律师，他在霍多尔科夫斯基和他的合作伙伴列别杰夫于2003年被捕后，为他们作了辩护。


He was subsequently disbarred and was himself arrested in April 2006.	他随后被取消了律师资格，而本人也于2006年4月被捕。


By that time, Aleksanyan was critically ill with AIDS, for which treatment was withheld.	当时，阿历克斯恩雅已身患严重的艾滋病，而对他的治疗却被停止。


In December 2008, the Moscow City Court approved his release on bail of 50 million rubles (around $1,775,000 at the time).	2008年12月，莫斯科市法院允许他以50万卢布（当时约合一百七十七点五万美元）被保释。


Finally, consider Khodorkovsky and Lebedev themselves.	最后，让我们来看看霍多尔科夫斯基和列别杰夫他们自己的遭遇。


Arrested in 2003, they were sentenced in 2005 to eight years in prison on charges of tax fraud.	在2003年被捕后，他们在2005年被判8年徒刑，罪名是偷税漏税。


They are serving their sentence in Chita on the Chinese border, although Russian law prescribes that, for the crimes with which they were charged, they were entitled to be imprisoned near their place of domicile, i.e., in Moscow.	他们被关押在俄中边界的赤塔，但俄罗斯法律规定，按他们被起诉的罪行，他们是可以被监禁在他们的居住地即莫斯科的附近。


When Dmitry Medvedev was elected as Russia’s president a little more than a year ago, he promised to do away with the “legal nihilism” in Russia.	当梅德韦杰夫于一年多前当选为俄罗斯总统时，他许诺要废除俄罗斯的“法律虚无主义”。


Although he was a close confidante of Vladimir Putin and probably was able to assume presidential office exclusively for that reason, many dared to hope that he would stop the vendetta against Khodorkovsky and all those who had been close to him.	虽然他是与普京关系密切的知己，这也许是他能当上总统的唯一原因，但那时许多人还敢寄希望于他会停止对霍多尔科夫斯基和所有曾和他关系密切的人们的仇杀。


Disillusion fully set in only one year after Medvedev’s election, when a new case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev was brought, this time for embezzlement of billions and money laundering.	仅仅在梅德韦杰夫当选一年后，这种幻想就完全破灭了。 霍多尔科夫斯基和列别捷夫再一次被指控，这一次的罪名是数十亿的贪污数额和洗钱。


A cynical observer remarked at the preliminary hearing that by the looks of it the Russian authorities couldn’t make up their mind: either the former Yukos bosses didn’t pay taxes or they embezzled money.	一位观察家在预审时嘲弄道，俄罗斯当局看来还没法决定尤科斯前老板们到底是逃了税还是贪污了公款。


But since when does one pay taxes on embezzled funds?	然而，从何时起人们开始对贪污的钱纳税了？


The courtroom where the new trial against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is taking place is slightly larger than a spacious classroom. And it is full of heavily armed guards.	对霍多尔科夫斯基和列别杰夫进行新审判的法庭只比一间大教室略为宽敞一点，而且满场是全副武装的卫兵。


Despite this, the two defendants are forced to sit inside a narrow cage whose glass front has only two small holes through which their lawyers can communicate with them.	尽管这样，两名被告还被迫坐在一个狭窄的笼子内，其玻璃做的正面只有两个小孔可供律师与他们沟通。


Every day, they are brought into the courtroom handcuffed like dangerous felons.	他们每天像危险的罪犯一样戴着手铐被带进法庭。


One cannot help but contrast this with Budanov, the rapist and murderer who is now free to move about Russia at will.	人们不禁要把这个案件与布达诺夫相比，这个强奸犯和杀人犯现在可以在俄罗斯随意走动。


The judge refused without comment requests by the defense to remove the cage and to replace one of the prosecutors, who had already been a prosecuting counsel during the first trial.	法官在没有发表任何评论的情况下，拒绝了撤去笼子和替换其中一位在第一次审判中曾担当过起诉律师的检察官的请求。


So the authorities’ aim seems clear: put Khodorkovsky and Lebedev away for a much longer time – more than 20 years if they are convicted.	因此，当局的目的看来很明白：让霍多尔科夫斯基和列别杰夫消失得更久一些-如果他们被定罪，他们会被监禁20年以上。


Few doubt that they will be.	对于他们这样的结局，很少有人表示怀疑。


Still, this new trial of course is also a test case for Medvedev’s presidency.	不过，这一新的审判当然是对梅德韦杰夫总统的一次考验。


So far, he has done nothing to counteract the legal nihilism against which he himself has spoken.	迄今为止，他仍没有任何行动来对抗他本人也反对的法律虚无主义。


But maybe he will in the course of this trial, which resembles a personal vendetta even more than the first one did.	但是，在这比第一次更像私人仇杀的审判过程中，他也许会有所作为。


To be sure, Khodorkovsky is no saint.	当然，霍多尔科夫斯基不是圣人。


Like many others in Russia who are allowed to enjoy their wealth in peace today (or maybe are lamenting its loss due to the financial crisis), he made his money in thoroughly obscure ways during the early post-Soviet years.	同俄罗斯其他许多可以安心享受他们的财富（或是因金融危机而感叹财富的损失）的人一样，在苏联解体后的最初岁月里，他以令人完全捉摸不透的方式积累了财富。


But, instead of buying villas, yachts, or soccer clubs abroad, he invested his fortune in Russia.	但是，他其后不是购买别墅、游艇或国外足球俱乐部，而是把财富投资在俄罗斯国内。


Of course, he did mainly fill his own pockets – and his social and political activities certainly were not entirely altruistic, either.	当然，他确实主要是填满了自���的口袋-他的社会和政治活动当然并非完全是无私的。


But what made him public enemy number one for Putin was his desire to move Russia in a political direction that he viewed as positive and desirable.	使他成为普京的头号公敌的原因是他要将俄罗斯转向他认为是积极和可取的政治方向。


It was his ambition to subject the country to truly far-reaching social and political reforms that sealed his downfall and also brought about this new trial, which appears intended to silence him for good.	正是他的这种让国家进行真正影响深远的社会和政治改革的雄心，带来了他跨掉的命运和这次新的审判，而这次审判的目的似乎是让他永远闭口。


Medvedev’s presidency will inevitably be measured by this case.	梅德韦杰夫总统的威信将不可避免地由此案件被衡量。


Will he tolerate and endorse his prime minister’s personal aversions, or is he willing to put an end to the infamous spectacle of a judicial process that has been manipulated and abused from beginning to end?	他会容忍和赞同他的总理的个人仇恨吗？ 还是他愿意结束这种整个司法程序从开始到结束被操纵和滥用的臭名昭著的局面？


Little speaks for the latter scenario, but Russia has always been a country where hope dies last.	出现后一种情况的迹象目前基本还没有，但俄罗斯历来是一个希望到最后才破灭的国家。


Russia’s Moving Presidential Target	俄国移动的总统目标


Recently, a small event caused a major stir in Russian politics.	最近，一起小事件在俄国政坛激起千层波浪。


An aide to President Vladimir Putin, Igor Shuvalov, said that it was realistic to expect the appearance of a new person whom Putin would consider his potential successor.	普京总统的顾问舒瓦洛夫说，预计出现某个人物，普京总统会考虑他作为可能的继任者，这是现实的。


The statement hit like a bombshell, producing an explosion of comments.	这一说法引起轩然大波，引发大量的评论。


There is nothing strange in this.	这里没有什么奇怪的。


Russia’s somewhat archaic political culture overly personifies power.	俄国有些古老的政治文化过多地将权力拟人化。


Perceptions and assessments of the country’s future often depend heavily on the personality of its leader, his resoluteness, and his intellectual and moral qualities.	有关国家未来的感觉和评估经常是大大依赖于其领导人的个性、果敢以及其智力和道德素质。


Furthermore, Putin himself is interested in preserving uncertainty with regard to his successor for as long as possible.	而且，普京本人也有兴趣在其继任人的问题上尽量长时间地保持不确定性。


By doing so, he avoids the damage to his authority that would be caused by becoming a “lame duck,” particularly given Russia’s servile bureaucracy and its lack of reliable institutions and respected traditions to carry out a smooth transfer of power.	这样做，他就避免由于成为“蹩脚鸭”总统而对其权威造成的损害，特别是鉴于俄国奴性的官僚体制及其缺乏可靠的机制和受到尊重的传统来实施平稳的权力转移。


Finally, different clans around the president have long been trying to promote their own candidates for succession.	最后，总统身边不同的部落长久以来一直试图举荐各自的继任候选人。


Statements similar to Shuvalov’s have already been made, and more can be expected.	像舒瓦洛夫那样的言论早就有了，而且还会有。


This ongoing discussion of the various candidates’ merits and drawbacks recalls how airplanes protect themselves from missile attacks by launching a false target.	这场有关不同候选人优缺点的持续进行的讨论让人们想起飞机为了躲避导弹攻击而发射虚假目标。


Public interest is the missile, and the target is the “ruling power,” which protects itself by providing a decoy in the form of aimless talk.	各种兴趣就是导弹，而目标就是“统治权力”。 统治权力通过以毫无边际的谈论的形式提供假目标来保护自己。


But a more fundamental question is why Russia’s politicians, journalists, and analysts (and even some in the West) happily engage in this ruse.	但是一个更为根本的问题是为什么俄国的政坛人物、记者以及分析家们(而且甚至连西方的某些人)对这一策略乐此不疲。


At the moment, who will succeed Putin is not important; what counts is the process that will result in the choice of Russia’s third president.	目前，何人继任普京已经不是重要的了； 重要的是产生俄国第三位总统的过程。


The real historical significance of the choice that Russia will face in 2008 will be determined not by the next president’s personal qualities, but by his loyalties – that is, to whom he owes his job.	俄国将在2008年面临的这一选择的历史性意义并非由下一位总统的个人素质决定，而是由他的忠诚决定，也就是，是谁给了他这一职位。


Putin’s successor (whoever that will be) will come to power as a result of a deal within a narrow elite circle.	普京的继任者(无论是谁)将会在一个狭小的精英圈子内部交易中上台。


This means that he will be accountable to and dependent on those who raised him to power, not in a symbolic sense, but in the quite real sense of fulfilling promises and facing sanctions if he does not.	这就意味着他将会向把他扶上权力的人负责并且依赖于他们。 这并非在某个象征的意义上，而是在履行诺言并且如果不这样做就面临制裁的实际意义上。


This narrow circle comprises not only very rich and resourceful people, but also members of informal but very effective organizations (which are often, perhaps not entirely correctly, called “mafia”).	这一狭小的圈子不仅仅有非常富有而且呼风唤雨的人物，而且还有非正式、但是非常有效的组织(不一定完全正确，但是经常被成为“黑手党”)。


Thus, the implementation of Operation Successor (which may include the extension of the current president’s term) has imitated the way Putin himself came to power, and leaves Russia on the same path that Yeltsin set in the last years of his presidency – a path that will either ruin the country or bring it to a dead end.	如此，所谓“继任行动”的执行(可能会包括延长现任总统的任期)类似于普京本人上台的方式，并且让俄国留在了叶利钦在其总统任期最后几年所设置的道路上。 这一道路要么摧毁国家，要么让国家走入死胡同。


Politicians who come to power by winning a free and fair election are accountable primarily to voters.	通过赢得自由公平选举上台的政坛人物们主要对选民负责。


This does not necessarily lead them to work solely for the public good.	这并不一定让他们仅仅为了公众利益而工作。


Even winners of competitive elections have commitments to their campaign teams and sponsors.	即使竞争性选举的胜利者也要对其竞选团队和赞助人抱有承诺。


However, the existence of real political opposition creates a different atmosphere, which spreads beyond elections.	但是，真正的政治反对派存在创造了一种不同的氛围，这一氛围扩散到选举之外。


Free elections do not determine politicians’ behavior, and do not necessarily ensure that moral, energetic, and intelligent people fill high offices.	自由选举并不决定政坛人物的行为，而且也并不一定确保道德高尚、精力充沛以及聪明的人占据高位。


But freedom and democracy do restrict arbitrariness and theft, and encourage politicians, regardless of their moral qualities, to take public interests into account.	但是自由和民主的确限制独断和盗窃，并且鼓励政坛人物要考虑公众利益，而无论其道德素质如何。


If the next president comes to power by means of a free and fair election, Russia will have a real chance at a decent future.	如果下一位总统是通过自由和公平的选举上台，那么，俄国就确实会有机会有一个良好的未来。


However, if Putin’s successor ��� or Putin himself – is imposed on the country in an uncompetitive way, Russia will remain on its current path to nowhere.	但是，如果普京的继任者或者普京本人是以一种没有竞争的方式强加给俄国的话，那么，俄国将会依旧停留在没有前途的路上。


This is a critical moment for Russia.	这是俄国的关键时刻。


Unfortunately, what is most important to comprehend in this moment is barely recognized, much less discussed.	不幸的是，这一时刻所需要理解的最为重要的事情却几乎没有为人所知，更不要说讨论了。


Russia\u0027s Naked Public Space	俄罗斯赤裸的公众空间


Those who lived in Moscow in the late 1990's frequently encountered odd - and mostly incomprehensible - billboards.	在上世纪90年代末生活在莫斯科的人常会碰到一些奇怪的-通常是不可理解的-公告牌。


The first such billboard showed a young woman's face, but no bar of soap or bottle of perfume.	其始作俑者展示了一张年轻女性的脸，但却没有香皂或香水一类的商品。


No brand name, either.	连商标都没有。


A short line said simply "I love you."	只有简单的一行字"我爱你。


Who loved this woman and why did he want everyone to know of his passion?	"是谁爱着这个女人，他为什么要让所有人都知道他的激情呢？


Rumors had it that one of Russia's richest men wanted to impress his sweetheart.	有谣传说这是俄罗斯最富有的人之一想要给他的甜心一个惊喜。


Next came a billboard showing a man's face, with foreign coins flowing down upon it.	第二块这样的广告牌则展示了一张男人的面孔，并且有外国的硬币飞落在他的脸上。


The line read, "Roma takes care of the Family, the Family takes care of Roma.	广告词是，"罗马照顾'家庭'，'家庭'关照罗马。


Congratulations!	恭喜！


Roma found a classy place for himself."	罗马为自己找到了一个上等的归宿。 "


There was never any public explanation for this message, either, just rumors - that "Roma" was Roman Abramovich (this was long before the tycoon bought the Chelsea football team, becoming a world celebrity), and that he had close ties with then President Boris Yeltsin's inner circle, known as "the Family."	对这条讯息也从来没有过公开的说明，只有谣传-"罗马"就是罗曼•阿布拉莫维奇（早在这位巨贾买下切尔西足球队，名扬世界之前），他与当时的叶利钦总统的内部圈子关系密切。 这个小圈子通常被称为"家庭"。


Even the few who claimed knowledge about Roma were unsure about who commissioned the billboard.	即便是几个声称认识罗马的人也不清楚究竟是谁委托制作了这块公告牌。


It was simply taken for granted that what is supposed to be public space - the streets of Moscow - was appropriated for a vaguely menacing private message.	大家都只是自然地认为本应作为公共空间的莫斯科街道被用来传递了一条暧昧而险恶的私人讯息。


Such "private" billboards kept appearing for about a year with varying themes.	这样不同主题的"私人"公告牌连续出现了大约一年。


The implications of this game, however, run deeper than the actual messages sent and received.	但这种游戏的意蕴远比其实际收发的讯息要深刻。


The billboards with their private messages were able to occupy public space so easily because in Russia public space is virtually empty: there's very little, if any, communication between state and society, and barely any public debate.	传递私人讯息的公告牌能够如此容易的占领公共空间是因为俄罗斯的公共空间几乎是闲置的：国家和社会之间的交流即便是有也少得可怜，而公共辩论则几乎没有。


Under Communism, public debate was confined to private kitchens.	在共产主义体制下，公共辩论被限制在私家的厨房里。


Everything beyond private space was state territory.	私人空间以外的一切都是国家领域。


Those who encroached upon it were punished.	侵占这一领域的人会受到处罚。


Perestroika turned the country into one big public space.	佩雷斯托伊卡（Perestroika）将整个国家变成了一个巨大的公共空间。


Streets and squares, newspapers and literary journals became the ground for free public expression.	街道和广场，报纸和文艺期刊成为自由表达公众言论的地方。


Newspapers published in gigantic numbers.	报纸的印数巨大。


Russia's people wanted to make a difference and amazingly they did: their energy and cohesion put an end to Communist rule.	俄罗斯人民想要改变，他们也令人惊讶地做到了这一点：他们的精神和凝聚力终结了共产党的统治。


Of course, what Russia had in the late 1980's and early 1990's wasn't institutionalized democracy, but revolutionary excitement.	当然，俄罗斯在上世纪80年代末及90年代初所拥有的并不是制度化的民主而是革命的骚动。


It was expected that out of this sea of democratic emotion new political institutions would emerge.	人们期望新的民主政治制度能够从民主情感的汪洋大海中浮现。


Instead, political life here has been reduced to mere formality.	然而，政治生活却沦为一种形式。


Although there's nothing like Soviet oppression, the alienation between state and society resembles that of Soviet days.	虽然没有了苏维埃的压迫，国家与社会之间的疏远却与苏维埃的年代如出一辙。


Unlike the Communist regime, the new Russian state doesn't treat its citizens like a flock of sheep.	与共产主义体制不同，新的俄罗斯国家并不把它的公民当作羊群对待。


On the contrary, the state generally ignores its citizens - it is in no way accountable to the public, nor does it bother to explain what actually goes on inside the Kremlin.	相反，国家通常忽视其公民-它不以任何形式对公众负责，也不刻意向公众解释克里姆林宫内的风云变幻。


With political parties driven into irrelevance, parliament turned into a rubber stamp agency, and national television networks taken under government control, public discourse has all but disappeared.	随着政党变得无足轻重，议会也变成了橡皮图章的代理，国家电视网被政府控制，公众讨论完全消失了。


Ideas may be voiced, but there's barely any audience, and these utterances don't resonate; they die away with no implications or consequences.	人们可以发表意见，但却几乎没有听众，这些言论也得不到共鸣； 它们自生自灭，留不下任何涵义或影响。


Russian society is atomized, with no sense of cohesion, solidarity, or collective drive in any interest group, professional or social, big or small.	俄罗斯社会被原子化了，在任何一个利益集团，不论专业的还是社会的，也不论大小，都感受不到凝聚力、团结和集体的驱动力。


Big business won't stand up for the oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, singled out by the Kremlin as a political enemy and imprisoned since last year.	石油大亨米凯伊•克多科夫斯基作为克里姆林宫的敌人在去年被投进监狱，而没有一家大公司出面为他说话。


Instead, each businessman makes his own deals with the Kremlin to gain relative security.	相反，每一个商人都各自与克里姆林宫达成交易以求相对平安。


The same lack of cohesion is found among journalists.	凝聚力的缺乏也同样存在于新闻工作者之中。


No professional solidarity was shown back in 2001, when Russia's private national television network NTV was taken over by the government.	当俄罗斯的私有国家电视网NTV在2001年被政府接管时，他们也没有表现出应有的职业团结。


A considerable degree of freedom remains, but a submissive society freely gives ground to the state.	自由在很大程度上依然存在，但一个顺从的社会却欣然让位给了国家。


Seven or eight liberal dailies publish critical opinion or even incriminating evidence against government officials.	七八家自由主义的日报发表着关于政府官员的批评意见甚至是罪证。


But their print runs range between 20 and 100 thousand copies, and their circulation is mostly limited to Moscow.	但这些报纸的印数仅在2-10万份之间，且发行范围大多局限于莫斯科。


With such small audiences, they are all but irrelevant.	如此之小的读者群使它们变得无关痛痒。


Worse, the broad public isn't anxious to get a better idea of how important government decisions are made.	更糟糕的是，广大的公众并不渴望更好地了解政府决策有多重要。


The old Soviet mindset persists: they up there will take their own decisions regardless of us down below.	陈旧的苏维埃式的思维方式仍十分顽固：反正他们 上面的人在 决策时不会考虑 我们下面的人 。


In this atmosphere of public silence, the virtually vacant public space is filled with odd voices that are not intended for public consumption.	在这种公众沉默的氛围之中，事实上被闲置的公共空间充斥着不想让公众理解的怪异声音。


The billboards were "them" communicating in our common space, exchanging messages, as it were, over our heads .	这些公告牌是"他们"在我们的共有空间的交流方式，这仿佛是在越过我们的头脑交换信息。


In March, a high-quality Moscow business daily, Vedomosti, published a letter from Mikhail Khodorkovsky.	今年三月，一份高质量的莫斯科商业报纸 Vedomosti 发表了一封来自米凯伊•克多科夫斯基的信。


It was a mystery how the letter was smuggled out of jail.	这封信是如何从监狱偷带出来的仍是个谜。


Did Khodorkovsky write the letter, or had he merely signed it?	是克多科夫斯基亲笔写了这封信，还是他仅仅签了个名而已？


If he was the author, was it his political manifesto or an act of repentance?	如果真是他写的，那么这究竟是他的政治宣言还是悔改的表现？


In the murky atmosphere surrounding Khodorkovsky's case, it is impossible to discover which theory is true.	在克多科夫斯基一案的黑暗氛围之中，不可能判定哪种推测更符合事实。


But the more relevant question is whom Khodorkovsky's letter aimed to address. Vedomosti readers may sympathize with Khodorkovsky's plight, but they account for only 60 thousand people.	然而，更重要的问题是克多科夫斯基的这封信究竟是写给谁看的。 Vedomosti 的读者们可能会同情克多科夫斯基的困境，但他们也仅有6万之众。


The public at large was basically unaware of Khodorkovsky's letter, because the state television networks did not report it.	大多数的民众都不知道克多科夫斯基的信件一事，因为国家电视网没有播报。


His missive was more likely an element in behind-the-scenes negotiations between Khodorkovsky and various Kremlin factions.	他的信更像是克多科夫斯基本人与克里姆林宫不同派系之间的幕后谈判中的一环。


Khodorkovsky's letter may have appeared in the public space, but it was not intended for public consumption.	克多科夫斯基的信虽然在公共空间出现，但却不是真正想让公众了解其含义。


Rather, it was like the "I love you" billboard.	它更像是那块"我爱你"的公告牌。


For the time being, Khodorkovsky's love remains unrequited.	而克多科夫斯基的爱暂时还没有得到回应。


Russia\u0027s Neurotic Invasion	俄国神经质般的入侵


PARIS – At the very moment China was getting a “gold medal” in diplomacy for the success of the opening ceremony in Beijing, Russia earned a “red card” for the extreme and disproportionate violence of its military intervention in Georgia.	巴黎-正当中国在北京奥运会开幕式上大获成功、赢得外交“金牌”之时，俄国却因为武力干涉格鲁吉亚施暴极端和没有尺度而得了“红牌”。


Whereas China intends to seduce and impress the world by the number of its Olympic medals, Russia wants to impress the world by demonstrating its military superiority.	正当中国打算通过其奥运会奖牌数目来诱惑世界并给它留下印象的时候，俄国却想要通过展示其军事优势来这样做。


China’s soft power versus Russia’s hard power: the two countries’ choices reflect their very different levels of self-confidence.	中国的软实力和俄国的硬实力构成对比。 两国的选择反应出各自不同水平的自信。


China may play the victim versus the West, but its leaders know that their country is back on the world scene at a level that they deem appropriate and legitimate.	中国对西方或许摆出受害者的地位，但是其领导人知道他们的国家回到了世界舞台，其程度他们认为是合理合法的。


Of course, domestically, China’s leaders lack confidence and behave accordingly towards their citizens.	当然，中国领导人在国内缺乏自信，也因此用这一态度对付其人民。


Yet, as China takes minuscule steps forward, Russia takes giant steps backward.	但是，正当中国大步伐前进之时，俄国却大幅度倒退。


For many years now, Georgia and Russia have been playing with fire, and war in the Caucasus looked preordained.	多年来，格鲁吉亚和俄国一直在玩火，高加索爆发战争看来在所难免。


Each side was waiting for a false move by the other to play its hand.	各方都在等候对方失误来挑起事端。


It is more than likely that the young and impulsive Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili fell into the trap that he had helped to create.	更有可能的情形是，格鲁吉亚年轻冲动的总统萨卡什维利跳进自己设下的圈套。


He wanted to demonstrate to his Western partners that Georgia needed NATO protection from Russia, and that accession was therefore urgent.	他想要向他的西方伙伴表明，格鲁吉亚需要北约的保护免受俄国侵略，因此加入北约是当务之急。


Regardless of whether some in the United States encouraged Saakashvili, he did not expect – but he should have – the “hyper-charged” reaction from Russia.	无论是否美国有人怂恿萨卡什维利，他本应该但是并没有预料到俄国会如此反应强烈。


For it is clearer than ever that Vladimir Putin is still in charge.	现在越发清楚，普京依旧大权在握。


The opportunity that Saakashvili presented to him to signal to the world Russia could no longer be humiliated was simply too tempting.	萨卡什维利给了他一次机会向世人表明俄国不得再次遭到羞辱。 这样的机会实在太诱人。


Well aware of Russia’s emergence as a growing energy super-power, of the relative weakening of US clout and determination, of Europe’s deep divisions between pro-Russians, such as Germany and even more so Italy, and anti-Russians (mostly from the EU’s newest members in eastern Europe), and of the United Nations’ paralysis owing to Russia’s veto power, the Kremlin is sending a strong message to the world: “the time for concessions is over.”	克里姆林宫完全清楚，俄国正在作为能源超级大国崛起，美国的影响力和决心相对削弱，欧洲如德国和更胜一筹的意大利等亲俄国家和反俄国家(主要是来自东欧的欧盟新成员国)分歧严重以及联合国由于俄国的否决权而寸步难行。 因此它向世界发出强烈信号，也就是“退让的时代结束了”。


For the Kremlin, it is likely that South Ossetia and Abkhazia would remain under formal Georgian sovereignty only if the country did not join NATO.	对于克里姆林宫而言，只有格鲁吉亚不加入北约，南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹才有可能留在格鲁吉亚。


Yet Russia, like Saakashvili, is playing with fire: its strategy of encouraging separatist forces in the two Georgian provinces may inflame separatist tendencies in other parts of the Russian Federation (remember Chechnya?).	但是俄国如同萨卡什维利一样也在玩火。 它鼓励格鲁吉亚两个省分裂主义势力的战略有可能点燃俄国其他部分的分裂主义倾向(还记得车臣吗？


Moreover, Russia is unnecessarily isolating itself from the world.	) 。 而且，俄国正在没有必要地自我隔离于世界。


Above all, this crisis confirms the new hierarchy of powers that now exists in the world.	最重要的是，这一危机确认了当今世界的权力座次。


In this new world, China and Russia are back and America, though still on top, is declining.	在这一新世界里，中国和俄国重返世界，而美国尽管还高居首位，但是在削弱。


As for Europe, while the European Union mediates, in doing so it is also demonstrating the limits of its influence.	对于欧洲而言，尽管欧盟正在调停，但是这样做它也表明其影响力有限。


The EU is truly “convincing” only when it can use the seductive power of a membership card.	欧盟只有运用其成员国资格这一张有诱惑力牌的时候才真正“有说服力”。


But Russia is not interested in joining, at least not on Europe’s terms.	但是俄国并没有兴趣加入，至少不是按照欧洲的条件。


Russians are well aware that Americans want their help in the Middle East; on other issues, they listen to Europe and America with a stance oscillating between indifference and brutality.	俄国人十分清楚美国人想要他们在中东问题上帮忙； 在其他问题上，他们听取欧美的声音，其立场则在无动于衷和残忍之间摇摆。


In the Caucasus, everyone is losing, though some more than others – foremost the civilians who have lost their lives or homes.	在高加索地区，所有人都有所损失，尽管程度不同。 损失最大的是流离失所或者丧生的平民。


Then comes the Georgian government, which has demonstrated its immaturity, if not irresponsibility.	接下来是显得不成熟、如果不是不负责的格鲁吉亚政府。


A lamb, after all, does not provoke a bear.	毕竟，绵羊不会激怒狗熊。


But Russia, too, has unnecessarily damaged its international image.	但是俄国也没有必要地损害了自己的国际形象。


The Kremlin did not need such a display of unrestrained force and brutality to prove its case.	克里姆林宫并不需要如此肆无忌惮地展示武力和残忍来表明自己的立场。


China, in comparison, now looks like a respectable partner.	相对而言，中国则看起来像是一个令人尊敬的伙伴国家。


As for the West, it is confronted with a dilemma.	对于西方国家而言，它们面临一个两难处境。


Can it reward Georgians for the leaders’ irresponsibility by rushing the country into NATO?	它们能否把格鲁吉亚推进北约来奖赏格鲁吉亚领导人的不负责吗？


On the other hand, can it afford to grant Russia the de facto right to control, directly or indirectly, countries like Georgia today and Ukraine tomorrow?	在另一方面，它们能够赋予俄国事实上的权利直接或者间接控制今天的格鲁吉亚、明天的乌克兰吗？


The current crisis in the Caucasus does not mark the return of the Cold War, nor is it likely to mark the start of open warfare between Russia and the West; it is, more simply, the return of the traditional imperialism practiced by the Russian Empire more than a century ago.	高加索当前的危机并不表明冷战的回归，也不大可能表明俄国和西方之间开始公开的战争。 更为可能的是，它表明的是俄帝国在一个多世纪以前所实行的传统帝国主义回归。


China is, with the exception of Tibet, a satisfied and confident status-quo empire.	除了西藏以外，中国则是一个心满意足而又自信的现实帝国。


Russia by contrast is a revisionist imperialist power, whose lack of self-confidence is returning to haunt the world.	相反俄国则是一个修正主义的帝国主义大国，其缺乏自信正又回来游荡世界。


Russia’s “Oil-for-Knowledge” Scheme	俄国的“石油换知识”规划


Whenever you fill up your European compact car’s gas tank, or that of your American SUV, you pay as much as a Russian schoolteacher earns in a month.	当你在你的欧洲中级汽车或者美国SUV的油箱里加满汽油时，你所支付的钱相当于一个俄国学校教师一个月的工资收入。


And every time you pay, you subsidize a regime that relies on energy, not information, as its main product.	而且，你每次付钱的时候，你都是在为一个依赖于能源而非信息作为其主要产品的政权提供补贴。


You finance the pre-modern and the inefficient, and perhaps worse: every time you pay, you may be collaborating with political evil.	你为前现代和没有效率的当局提供资金，甚至更为糟糕的是，你可能在与政治邪恶势力合作。


Russia began 2006, the year of its chairmanship of the G-8, by launching a gas war with Ukraine.	2006年俄国担任西方八国集团主席。 新年伊始，俄国就同乌克兰展开天然气之战。


Having a virtual monopoly on supply, Russia decided that it could dictate prices.	俄国几近垄断供应，因此就认为可以随意定价。


But Ukraine has a virtual monopoly on delivery, so Russia blinked in this standoff as soon as gas supplies to Western Europe dropped.	但是，乌克兰几乎垄断天然气运送，所以，当向西欧的天然气供应下降之时，俄国立即在这场对峙中退让了。


Modern economies rely not on monopolies, but on competition.	现代经济所依赖的并非是垄断，而是竞争。


Contemporary Russians consume competitive products: Nestle cereals, Mercedes cars, Hollywood movies.	当代俄国人消费的是竞争性产品：雀巢燕麦片、奔驰汽车以及好莱坞电影。


The problem is that they do not make them.	问题是俄国并不制造这些产品。


Russians pay for this consumption from the profits of gas and oil.	俄国人从天然气和石油的利润中付钱消费。


State-owned and private multinational companies drill fuel in Russia and sell it to Europe and North America.	国营和私营跨国公司在俄国钻探燃料并销往欧洲和美国。


The government partially redistributes profits by collecting taxes and paying salaries.	政府通过征税和支付工资来部分地重新分配利润。


Gas prices are growing, and so are Russian salaries.	天然气价格和俄国人的工资都在上涨。


This causes inflation, because, other than fuel, Russians do not produce much else.	这就造成通货膨胀，因为俄国除了燃料外并不生产什么其他东西。


To avoid inflation, the government deposits a large part of its profits into a Stabilization Fund.	为了避免通货膨胀，俄国政府将其利润的一大部分储存在一个稳定基金里。


But, because the Kremlin does not trust its own stocks and bonds, the Stabilization Fund invests in Western securities.	但是，由于克里姆林宫并不信任俄国自己的股票和债券，因此稳定基金投资于西方证券之中。


Thus, the government loses its chance to modernize Russian cities, roads, hospitals, and universities.	所以，政府就失去了将俄国的城市、道路、医院以及大学进行现代化改造的机会。


But inflation still grows, as do real estate prices.	然而，通货膨胀和房地产价格依旧上涨。


Mortgages are available at outrageously high interest rates.	房屋贷款利率其高无比。


No civil servant, military officer, or professor is able to buy even a modest apartment, unless they have an additional – often illegal – source of income.	公务员、军官或者教授除非有通常是非法的额外收入来源，否则就无力购买哪怕是中等面积的公寓。


Most don’t.	他们中的大多数人并没有这种收入。


Russia exposes an ugly truth of our era: illiberal societies can grow just as fast – even faster – than open ones.	俄国暴露了我们这个时代的一个丑陋的真相，那就是，非开明的社会可以像公开化社会一样快地增长，甚至还要更快。


Oil-rich states need global networks to sell their oil, to export their capital, and to import technologies and technologists.	石油储量丰富的国家需要全球性网络来销售它们的石油、出口其资本并且进口技术和技术人才。


Among current United Nations members, countries with large natural resource endowments are also more likely to have a non-democratic regime.	在目前的联合国成员国中，拥有大量自然资源的国家也更为可能是非民主政体。


In the 1980’s, Mikhail Gorbachev warned that Soviet oil resources were exhausted.	戈尔巴乔夫在二十世纪八十年代警告说，苏联的输油资源已经耗尽。


Of course, due to the Western engineering and management that became available after Gorbachev launched his perestroika reforms, the country was soon producing more oil than ever – indeed, more than was ever believed possible – and oil men like Mikhail Khodorkovsky arose out of the blue.	当然，由于戈尔巴乔夫发动改革后提供了西方的工程技术和管理，苏联马上就生产出了前所未有的石油。 实际上，产量惊人，令人难以置信。


But, while machines work everywhere, managers must abide by local traditions and belong to indigenous social networks.	但是，尽管机器可以在任何地方运转，经理人员却必须遵守地方传统并且隶属于本地社会网络。


If the cultural component is important, why share the profits with Western-minded people like Khodorkovsky?	如果文化要素是重要的话，那么，又何必同像科多尔科夫斯基那样具有西方头脑的人分享利润呢？


So no surprise that other managers, with better relations with those in power, now run Khodorkovsky’s Yukos Oil, as well as another major firm, Sibneft.	因此，其他同当权者保持更好关系的经理人员现在经营着科多尔科夫斯基的尤科斯石油公司以及另外一家大公司，即西伯利亚石油公司。


Foreign managers don’t seem to mind.	外国经理们看起来并不介意。


On the contrary, some of these managers, such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who now chairs a Gazprom subsidiary building a pipeline under the Baltic sea, are helping to expand Russia’s oil-based imperial designs over Europe.	相反，其中的某些人物正在帮助扩展俄国建立在石油基础上的对欧洲的霸权意图。 例如，德国前总理施罗德目前担任俄罗斯天然气公司子公司的董事长，这家公司正在波罗的海下修建管道。


In the strange new world of today, the modern and the pre-modern depend on each other.	在如今这个奇怪的新世界里，现代和前现代相互依存。


Thus, Russians trade oil for the products of knowledge.	这样，俄罗斯就用石油换取知识产品。


Imported technologies are cheap if you convert their prices into barrels of oil, so the country produces a shortage of its own geologists and chemists, not to mention economists and lawyers.	如果把价格转化为一桶桶石油的话，那么，进口技术是便宜的。 所以，该国缺少自己的地质学家和化学家，更不用说经济学家和律师了。


It needs only one gang of politicians.	它只需要一撮政客就足矣了。


In fact, for such a country, local experts are not just redundant, but dangerous.	实际上，对于这样一个国家而言，地方专家不仅多余，而且危险。


In their moments of sincerity, Russian policymakers admit that Russia is, from their point of view, overeducated.	俄罗斯的决策者诚心诚意地承认说，按照他们的观点，俄罗斯的受教育水平超过了需要。


They recently discovered what their Arab colleagues have known for a long time: that for an oil-rich regime, it is cheaper and safer to buy knowledge than to produce it.	他们最近发现了他们的阿拉伯同事们长久以来所知道的事情，那就是，购买知识要比生产知识要便宜而且更加安全。


So hidebound conservatives run Russian universities.	所以，迂腐守旧的保守派分子经营着俄国的大学。


Scientists go on trial for technical espionage, while ex-KGB spies sign multi-billion dollar contracts.	科学家由于技术间谍案受审，而前克格勃间谍们则签署价值数十亿��元的合同。


Non-governmental organizations are met with suspicion and harassment, with new legislation seemingly designed to vanquish them.	非政府组织受到怀疑和骚扰，而新的立法则看似要让它们俯首称臣。


Political parties are created or banned by anonymous Kremlin clerks.	克里姆林宫里匿名的官僚们随意建立或者取缔政治党派。


Elections are either canceled or faked.	选举要么被取消，要么舞弊。


Oil-poor neighbors like Ukraine are blackmailed.	像乌克兰那样的石油贫乏国家则受到敲诈。


An illiberal society can produce growth, but it cannot enjoy it.	一个不开明的社会可以产生增长，但是却无法享受增长。


Redistribution schemes benefit the population if, and only if, they are controlled by democratic feedback.	财富重新分配的规划只有在民主反馈的控制下才能够让民众受益。


The Russian Stabilization Fund embodies an unstable combination of anxiety and greed that is typical for an undemocratic regime.	俄罗斯稳定基金体现的是一种不稳定的结合，即忧虑和非民主政权所独有的贪婪。


Dependent on gas, oil, and multinationals, the G-8 countries accept quite a lot of guff from their current chair, Vladimir Putin.	由于依赖于天然气、石油以及跨国公司，八国集团接受了现任主席普京的许多胡言乱语。


Still, the arrogance of Russia’s rulers may have breached the West’s tolerance.	然而，俄国统治者的傲慢超越了西方的容忍。


Alternative sources to Russian energy are not the only means to decrease prices.	俄国能源的替代性资源并不是降低价格的唯一手段。


Global civil society has developed instruments to halt consumption that produces harm.	全球性自由社会已经开发了制止产生危害的消费。


Elegant ladies, for example, no longer buy fur coats.	例如，高雅的女士们不再购买皮毛大衣。


Many Westerners eagerly pay more for “Fair Trade” coffee.	许多西方人急切地为“公平贸易”咖啡付出更高的价钱。


Would a similar approach work for the gas in your oven?	对于你的炉子里的天然气而言是否有一个类似的方法可以奏效？


A century ago, the idea of decolonization sounded just as absurd.	一个世纪以前，非殖民化听起来很荒谬。


Public awareness is as crucial now as it was decisive then.	目前，公众意识至关重要，正如当初坚定不移一般。


Russia’s Pipeline to Empire	俄罗斯通往帝国的管道


Gerhard Schroeder, who less than a month ago was Germany’s Chancellor, has agreed to become chairman of the company that is building a gas pipeline from Russia, across the Baltic Sea to Germany, and on through Western Europe.	一个月前还是德国总理的施罗德已经同意就任一家公司的董事长。 这是一家正在修建从俄罗斯跨越波罗地海到德国，然后穿越西欧的天然气管道公司。


In many countries, Schroeder would now be charged with the crime of conflict of interest.	如果在其他许多国家，施罗德将会被指责为犯有利益冲突的罪刑。


His apparent ethical lapse is magnified by the fact that, at this very moment, Russia is threatening to cut off Ukraine’s gas supplies if that country does not give in to the pricing demands of Kremlin’s state-owned gas behemoth, Gazprom.	目前，俄罗斯威胁，如果乌克兰不屈从于俄罗斯的国有天然气公司GAZPROM的要价，它就会切断乌克兰的天然气供应。 因此，施罗德明显的道德错误就更为严重了。


Russia’s strategic task is obvious: cutting off Ukraine’s gas currently means cutting off much of Europe’s gas as well, because some of its biggest gas pipelines pass through Ukraine.	俄罗斯的战略目标是显而易见的。 目前，由于俄罗斯某些最大的天然气管道经过乌克兰，所以，切断乌克兰的天然气意味着同时也切断欧洲大部分的天然气供应。


By circumventing Ukraine, Poland, and of course, the Baltic countries, the new pipeline promises greater leverage to the Kremlin as it seeks to reassert itself regionally.	这一新管道包围乌克兰、波兰当然还有波罗地海三国，将会为俄罗斯在寻求地区影响力的过程中提供更大的手段。


President Vladimir Putin and his administration of ex-KGB clones will no longer have to worry about Western Europe when deciding how hard to squeeze Russia’s postcommunist neighbors.	当普京总统以及他的前克格勃刻板的同僚们决定在多大程度上挤压俄罗斯的后共产时代的邻国时，将不必再担心西欧了。


Should Europe really be providing Putin with this new imperial weapon?	欧洲果真应当向普京提供这种新的帝国主义武器吗？


Worse, might Russia turn this weapon on an energy-addicted EU?	更为严重的是，俄罗斯会不会将这一武器转向瞄准受能源问题困扰的欧盟呢？


That a German ex-chancellor is going to lead the company that could provide Russia with a means to manipulate the EU economy is testimony to Europe’s dangerous complacency in the face of Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions.	一位德国前总理将领衔一家可以为俄罗斯提供手段操纵欧盟经济的公司本身就表明，在普京的新帝国主义野心面前，欧洲危险地自满。


Certainly Russia’s media are aware of Europe’s growing dependence on Russian energy.	当然，俄罗斯媒体知道欧洲正日益依赖于俄罗斯的能源。


Indeed, they revel in it: after we integrate and increase our common gas business, Russian editorialists write, Europe will keep silent about human rights.	实际上，它们陶醉于此。 俄罗斯的社论说，在我们联合并增加了我们的共同天然气生意后，欧洲将会对人权问题保持沉默。


Putin expresses this stance in a more oblique way with his commitment to pursuing what he calls an “independent policy.”	普京通过致力于执行他所称的“独立政策”来更为婉转地表达这一立场。


What he means by that is that Russia is to be “independent” of the moral and human rights concerns of the Western democracies.	他此言的意思是，俄罗斯“独立于”西方民主国家的道德和人权关切。


Perhaps some European leaders really do believe that maintaining the Union’s cozy prosperity justifies silencing ourselves on human rights and other issues that annoy the Kremlin.	某些欧洲领导人可能果真相信，维持欧盟安逸的繁荣就可以成为在人权和其他让俄罗斯烦恼的问题上保持缄默的正当理由。


Of course, we may speak up, briefly, about “commercial” matters like the expropriation of Yukos, but if the Kremlin puts a price on our values or criticism of Russian wrongdoing – as in, say, bloodstained Chechnya – Europeans seem willing to shut up rather than face the possibility of higher energy prices, or even a blockade like that now facing Ukraine.	当然，我们可以短促地就类似没收尤科斯公司等“商业”事务上公开发表意见。 但是，如果克里姆林宫在我们的价值观或批评俄罗斯的错误行径，例如车臣流血冲突等作出报复，那么，欧洲看似就会情愿封口，而不愿面临可能更高的能源价格，甚至是类似乌克兰所正在面对的封锁。


As Putin shuffles his court, subordinating the Duma to his will, the EU’s hopes for a growing “Europeanization” of Russia should be abandoned.	普京重组他的法院，令议会杜马唯其马首是瞻。 欧盟应当放弃将俄罗斯日益“欧洲化”的希望。


The Russia that Putin is building has mutated from the post-Soviet hopes of freedom into an oil and gas bulwark for his new model ex-KGB elite.	普京正在建造的俄罗斯已经从后苏维埃的对自由的希望改变成为其新的前克格勃精英模范服务的石油和天然气堡垒。


Indeed, Matthias Warnig, the chief executive of the pipeline consortium that Schroeder will chair, is a longtime Putin friend.	实际上，施罗德将担任董事长的管道联合公司首席执行官Matthias Warnig是普京多年的朋友。


The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this year that Warnig, who heads Dresdner Bank’s Russian arm, was an officer in the Stasi, the East German secret police, and met Putin in the late 1980’s when the Russian president was based in East Germany as a KGB spy.	华尔街日报年初报道，Warnig是德瑞斯顿银行的俄罗斯分行主管，曾经是前东德秘密警察首领，在二十世纪八十年代末与普京相识。 当时，这位俄罗斯总统是常驻东德的克格勃间谍。


That Russians tolerate a government of ex-KGB men, for whom lack of compassion and intolerance of dissent are the norm, reflects their exhaustion from the tumult of the last 20 years.	由前克格勃人马组成的政府缺乏同情心，对异议毫不宽容。 俄罗斯人能够容忍这样的一个政府，反映出他们对于过去20年的风风雨雨已经疲倦。


Now the Kremlin seems to think that what is good for ordinary Russians is good for independent nations as well: small and weak countries will be shown no mercy once Russia is given the tools to intimidate, isolate, and threaten them with the prospect of an energy blockade.	现在，克里姆林宫好像认为，对于普通俄国人有益的东西对于独立国家也应当是有益的。 一旦给了俄罗斯工具使用能源封锁来恐吓、孤立以及威胁弱小国家，那么，俄罗斯对于它们就将毫不留情。


As a former Head of State of newly independent Lithuania, I frequently endured such threats.	作为新近独立的立陶宛前国家元首，我经常忍受这样的威胁。


The EU has signed numerous agreements with Russia including one for a “common space” for freedom and justice.	欧盟同俄罗斯签署了众多协议，包括有关建立自由和司法的“共同领域”。


The Kremlin is very good at feigning such idealism.	克里姆林宫非常善于伪装这样的理想主义。


Its control of Eastern Europe was always enforced on the basis of “friendship treaties,” and the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were “fraternal” missions.	其对东欧的控制总是建立在“友好条约”的基础上，而苏联1956年和1968年分别入侵匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克则是所谓“兄弟般”的使命。


But look how Putin abuses that “common” space: barbaric treatment of Chechens, the businessmen Mikhail Khodorkovsky imprisoned, foreign NGO’s hounded, a co-leader of last year’s Orange Revolution, Yuliya Tymoshenko, indicted by Russian military prosecutors on trumped-up charges.	但是，看看普京如何滥用这一“共同”领域的吧。 野蛮对待车臣人，将科多尔科夫斯基投入监牢，外国非政府组织遭到围剿，去年乌克兰“橙色革命”的副领导人季莫申科则被俄罗斯军队检察官以捏造的罪名起诉。


If Europeans are serious about their common space for human rights and freedoms, they must recognize that those values are not shared by the calculating placemen of Putin’s Kremlin.	如果欧洲人对他们的人权和自由的共同领域郑重其事，那么他们就必须承认，普京的克里姆林宫里狡猾的禄虫们并不认同这些价值观。


The same is true of viewing Russia as an ally in the fight against terrorism.	将俄罗斯视为反恐斗争的盟友也是同理。


Is it really conceivable that the homeland of the “Red Terror” with countless unpunished crimes from the Soviet era, and which bears traces of blood from Lithuania to the Caucasus, will provide reliable help in stopping Iran and North Korea from threatening the world?	“红色恐怖”从苏维埃时代起积累的无以计数的尚未惩处的犯罪，以及从立陶宛到高加索沾满血迹的策源地果真可以在制止伊朗和朝鲜威胁世界上提供可以信赖的帮助吗？


It seems more likely that the Kremlin’s cold minds will merely exploit each crisis as an opportunity to increase their destructive power and influence.	更有可能的是，克里姆林宫冷酷的头脑将会仅仅是利用这些危机，作为其提高破坏性力量和影响的机会。


For decades, my region of Europe was left to the mercy of evil.	几十年来，我所处的欧洲地区一直听任邪恶的摆布。


So I cannot sit back in silence as Europe stumbles blindly into a new appeasement.	所以，对于欧洲盲目地陷入新的绥靖主义，我无法袖手旁观。


We, the new democracies of Eastern Europe, have been taught by our legacy that behind Russia’s every diplomatic act lurks imperial ambition.	作为东欧的新兴民主国家，我们深受历史的教训，那就是，俄罗斯的每一个外交行动后都潜伏着帝国主义野心。


Western Europeans, who have been spared this legacy, should heed our warnings.	西欧国家免于这一遗产，应当听取我们的告诫。


Dependence on Russia – even if its face is now that of the allegedly “charismatic” Gerhard Schroeder – will only lead to an abyss.	依赖于俄罗斯，其脸面即使是据称很有“个人魅力”的施罗德，也只会带入不可预测的深渊。


Russia’s Population Implosion	俄罗斯的人口内爆


Years ago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn coined the phrase “preservation of the people,” by which he meant Russia’s cultural survival.	多年前，亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴（Alexander Solzhenitsyn）借用短语“保护人民”来形容俄罗斯的文化复兴。


Today, it applies to Russia in a far more literal way.	今天，这个短语以一种更为文学的方式运用于俄罗斯。


Although I am a physicist, I began to study demography about15 years ago, in the belief that the key global problem was not so much the threat of nuclear annihilation as the dynamics of population growth.	尽管我是一名物理学家，但是由于相信核毁灭的威胁还不如人口增长的生机勃勃给全球主要问题所带来的威胁严重，15年前我开始研究人口学。


It was a grim recognition that Russia faces the opposite problem: a rapid decline in population that threatens every aspect of Russian life.	但是，我却认识到一个残酷的事实，即俄罗斯正面对着截然相反的问题：人口的剧减已经威胁到俄罗斯人生活的每一个层面。


Indeed, just in the last ten years, Russia’s population has dropped by 9.5 million, despite the many thousands of Russians returning from former Soviet republics.	其实，仅在过去十年中，虽然有成千上万的俄罗斯人从前苏联共和国归来，俄罗斯的人口还是下降了950万。


The birthrate has increased somewhat beginning since 2000, and now stands near 1.5 million a year, but this is 700,000-800,000 below the replacement rate.	某些地方自2000年开始出生率有所上升，现在约保持在每年150万，但是这比人口替代率还低了70,0000到80,0000人。


Many observers argue that Russians are not having enough children because life is so harsh.	许多观察家认为，俄罗斯没有足够数量的儿童是因为生活太艰苦了。


But the problem is not so simple.	但是问题并非如此简单。


The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada have all seen declining birth rates as well.	美国、欧洲、日本、澳大利亚和加拿大也同样面临着持续下降的出生率。


In Spain, the birthrate of 1.07 per woman is even lower than in Russia.	在西班牙，每1. 07名妇女的出生率甚至比俄罗斯还要低。


Russia’s uniqueness stems instead from the high rate of early death among males, which is directly attributable to poor diet and high consumption of alcohol and tobacco, and, indirectly, to the stresses caused by the wrenching economic and political changes that began with Gorbachev’s	苏联人口学家Boris Urlanis所写的一篇名为《照顾好男人》的著名文章在25前出版时候曾引起很大轰动。 Urlanis的观点是——比起女人，男人才是更为敏感的生物——这个观点在当今家庭生活质量恶化、一半婚姻以离婚收场、没有父亲的孩子数量不断上升至历史最高纪录的情况下，甚至更为贴切。


Here is where the revised meaning of Solzhenitsyn’s “preservation of the people” comes in.	这正是索尔仁尼琴的“保护人类” 经过改良后意义恰到好处的地方。


Solzhenitsyn himself recently suggested that Russia’s national idea should be based on Ivan Petrovich Shuvalov’s proposal to Empress Elizabeth 250 years ago.	最近索尔仁尼琴本人也建议俄罗斯的国家思想应该以250年前Petrovich Shuvalov向伊丽莎白女王的提议为基础。


“Every move, every law should be assessed in terms of whether it helps to preserve the people,” according to Solzhenitsyn.	“每一个行动，每一项法律应当根据它是否有助于保护人类来进行评估，”根据索尔仁尼琴的观点，“如果没有帮助的话，就用法律停止。


“If not, down with the law.”	”


Solzhenitsyn’s suggestion is crude, but right in a fundamental sense.	索尔仁尼琴的建议是直接的，但是从本质来说却是对的。


Our public thought is fragmented, and the country’s intelligentsia, who are partly responsible for tending to society’s values and goals, are behaving in often-destructive ways.	大众的思想四分五裂，这个国家中对社会价值和目标取向负有部分责任的知识分子们却常常扮演着破坏性的角色。


The live-for-the-moment mentality of hedonism and greed that they have encouraged is embodied in Moscow’s casinos, of which there are more than in the rest of Europe – or, for that matter, Las Vegas.	他们所鼓励的今朝有酒今朝醉的享乐主义和贪婪心理在莫斯科的赌场中得以体现，这比欧洲其余地方表现的都要多——从这点而言，或许还可与拉斯维加斯媲美。


These values – reflected in the way people dress, how they behave in public, and the language they speak – are not the values of human life.	这些反映在人们的穿着风格上，反映在他们在公众场合的表现以及他们所运用的语言上的价值观已经不是人类生活的价值观。


A crime subculture is spreading in Russia, and it is attaining the status of official culture.	某种犯罪亚文化正在俄罗斯蔓延，并且它正在取代官方文化的地位。


Where the intelligentsia is not directly complicit, its members have, simply by remaining silent, refused to accept the responsibility that accompanies freedom.	在知识分子阶层没有直接密谋的地方，它的成员们已经简单地通过保持沉默拒绝接受伴随自由的责任。


By contrast, Solzhenitsyn, Tolstoy, and other writers in Russia’s great literary tradition fully understood this responsibility.	相反，Solzhenitsyn, Tolstoy和其他俄罗斯伟大文学传统中的作家却对这个责任有着充分了解。


The current Russian interpretation of freedom is instead characterized by a narrow, individualistic permissiveness that is incompatible with collective tasks.	而今，俄罗斯对自由的理解相反却带着一种狭隘的、个人主义的、与集体任务背道而驰的允许赞同。


In other words, Russia’s population crisis is one manifestation of a crisis of ideas.	换而言之，俄罗斯的人口危机是思想危机的一种表现。


This, of course, raises the broader question of whether declining birthrates, in Russia and elsewhere, imply a crisis of the liberal idea of freedom, with its focus on individual rights?	这当然引发了更广泛的问题，即在俄罗斯和其他地方出现的有关持续下降的出生率是否预示着有关自由的、关注人权的自由主义思想的危机？


Clearly, liberalism may be a contributing factor, if and where it is primitively understood to entail for the individual no countervailing obligations before society.	很明显，自由主义因素也许起了一定作用，如果它一开始被理解为是为个人而设且没有任何补偿性义务。


Clearly, the belief that liberalism is at fault for declining birth rates and dysfunctional families has gained currency in the West, which now produces popular books like Pat Buchanan’s The Death of the West .	很明显，由于持续降低的出生率和矛盾重重的家庭而陷入困境的自由主义已经在西方蔓延，这产生了诸如Pat Buchanan的畅销书《西方的消亡》。


But I think the crisis is deeper, reflecting a lack of awareness of the paths and goals of human development – an ignorance that cannot be reduced to Western-style democracy or liberal ideas.	但是我认为反映着对人类发展目标和轨道——某种不能被减少到只剩西式民主或自由思想的忽略——缺乏认识的危机越来越深。


For Russia, the issue is simple because the crisis – which has led to more homeless children than after either the Civil War or World War II – is so stark.	对俄罗斯而言，这个问题很简单因为这个危机是明摆着的，它已经导致了比内战和二战之后都多的无家可归的儿童。


“Preservation of the people” requires nothing less than that our men take care of themselves so that they can take proper care of our children.	“保护人民”要求的正是我们男人照顾好他们自己，这样他们才能很好地照顾好我们的孩子。


Russia’s Renegade Puppet	叛变的俄罗斯傀儡


MOSCOW – Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of Chechnya, recently proposed to Ahmed Zakaev, a leader of the nationalistic and comparatively moderate Chechen opposition, that he return to Chechnya. Kadyrov promised Zakaev amnesty and various positions ranging from director of the local theater to Minister of Culture.	发自莫斯科——最近，车臣共和国总统拉姆赞·卡德罗夫出面邀请车臣相对温和的民族主义反对派头目艾哈迈德•扎卡耶夫回国，还承诺要给予其特赦和官职，无论是当地剧院的主管还是文化部部长，随便扎卡耶夫挑选。


Zakaev looked ready to accept the proposal. His position in the nationalist opposition was weak.	而扎卡耶夫看来也已经准备好接受这个邀请。


There seem to be few, if any, fighters in Chechnya who recognize him as commander; his recent attempt to send an emissary to create a fighting unit directly under his command was not successful.	事实上，此人在民族主义反对派阵营中根本没什么地位，车臣叛军中也没几个人会把他当指挥官看待； 而他最近派遣密使，试图组建一支由自己指挥的武装力量的举动也最终宣告失败。


At the same time, Zakaev maintained rather friendly relations with Kadyrov, whose achievements – making Chechnya practically independent – he implicitly acknowledged.	但与此同时，扎卡耶夫却一直与卡德罗夫保持着相当良好的关系，并公开称赞了卡德罗夫所取得的成就——使车臣获得实质独立。


The Kremlin supposedly would not have opposed the deal.	而克里姆林宫方面也应该不会反对这场政治交易。


But, although Zakaev was one of the most moderate members of the Chechen resistance, an amnesty for him needed the Kremlin’s approval, and he does not seem to have received it, which is probably why he refused Kadyrov’s offer.	不过，尽管扎卡耶夫是车臣抵抗力量中的最为温和的一员，但如果要特赦，克里姆林宫的批准是少不了的，但扎卡耶夫似乎却尚未收到这样的批准，这可能也正是他最终回绝了卡德罗夫邀请的原因。


But the reason the Kremlin balked at offering Zakaev an amnesty is unlikely to be related him personally, but rather to Kadyrov.	而克里姆林宫不愿给予扎卡耶夫特赦的决定似乎不是针对他本人，而是把矛头指向了卡德罗夫。


The return to Chechnya of an amnestied Zakaev would greatly increase Kadyrov’s prestige. But the Kremlin wants to avoid this, owing to Kadyrov’s growing power and its general unease with a Russian Muslim elite that, while formally acknowledging Russian suzerainty, increasingly demands a redistribution of power within the Russian Federation.	如果扎卡耶夫以特赦之身重回车臣，无疑将大大地增加卡德罗夫的威望，这正是克里姆林宫最不想看到的，一方面是忌惮此人不断壮大的力量，另一方面也是对卡德罗夫这个俄罗斯穆斯林精英感到不满，因为此人虽然宣称接受俄罗斯的领导，但却不断要求在俄罗斯联邦内部进行权力的重新分配。


For most of the past two decades, jihadists in the Caucasus and Central Asia were a major source of concern for the Kremlin.	在过去20年的大部分时间里，高加索和中亚地区的伊斯兰圣战分子是克里姆林宫的主要忧虑之一。


Fear of “Talibanization” of the Caucasus prompted the Kremlin’s recent announcement that Russian Muslims should be protected from extremist propaganda from abroad, and that Russian Muslim education and spiritual life should be controlled in order to direct them away from extremism.	对高加索地区的“塔利班化”的恐惧促使克里姆林宫最近宣布：为保护俄罗斯境内的穆斯林免受境外极端主义的煽动，对其教育和精神生活都要予以控制，以引导他们远离极端主义。


It was fear of extremism, as well as a more general increase violence, that led to the rise of the Kadyrov clan in 2004, when the Kremlin decided to engage in  a “Chechenization” of the conflict.	而正是对极端主义的恐惧和普遍升级的冲突使得卡德罗夫一派在2004年得以崛起，当时克里姆林宫决定在冲突中推动“车臣化”进程。


The plan implied that the Kremlin would provide the Kadyrovs – first Akhmad Kadyrov, and then, after his death, his son, Ramzan – broad autonomy (independence in all but name) and huge sums of money.	这一计划意味着克里姆林宫将为卡德罗夫——开始是艾哈迈德·卡德罗夫，在他死后，便是他的儿子，拉姆赞·卡德罗夫——提供广泛的自治权力（但不能名义独立）和巨额资金。


The Kremlin closed its eyes to Kadryov’s amnesty of former guerrillas and their inclusion in his paramilitary units.	为实现其计划，克里姆林宫放任卡德罗夫给予前游击队员特赦，并把这些人收编入他靡下的准军事部队。


In exchange, Kadyrov was to wage war against the remaining Islamist resistance and thus relieve Moscow of the burden of shedding Russian blood, or at least minimize the cost in Russian casualties.	作为交换，卡德罗夫必须打击残余的伊斯兰抵抗力量，从而缓解莫斯科当局在清缴中因为流血牺牲而承受的政治压力，或者至少是要最大限度地降低俄罗斯人的伤亡。


The plan initially worked.	一开始，这个计划奏效了。


Kadyrov was able to create a strong force that could fight the guerrillas, basically on its own.	卡德罗夫以自己之力成功建立了一支可以和游击队抗衡的强大部队。


Kadyrov’s efforts can also be credited with ending major terrorist attacks in Russia’s heartland, such as those that occurred in Moscow in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004.	同时，在遏制俄罗斯核心区域内的主要恐怖袭击（比如2002年莫斯科恐怖袭击以及2004年别斯兰人质事件）方面，也应该给卡德罗夫记上一功。


Kadyrov seemed an effective antidote to the jihadists.	而尽管卡德罗夫似乎是对抗伊斯兰圣战分子的有效手段。


Still, the logical conclusion of the Kremlin’s Kadyrov policy appears to be precisely what it sought to prevent – Chechen independence – when it engaged in the first Chechen war almost a generation ago.	但克里姆林宫所制定的卡德罗夫政策在逻辑上却导向了俄罗斯本应极力避免的后果——车臣独立——这也正是俄罗斯人介入第一次车臣战争的原因。


Receiving from the Kremlin virtual carte blanche to do what he wants in Chechnya, Kadyrov made genuine efforts to transform himself into a popular leader.	在得到了克里姆林宫全权支持其在车臣的行动后，卡德罗夫成功将自身转型成为一个群众领袖。


It is clear that he has not brought down the unemployment rate and has no intention of ending corruption.	虽然他没有降低失业率，也没有意图去消灭腐败。


Still, he can be credited for some tangible results in bringing Chechnya a modicum of normality.	但无论如何，他在推动车臣局势正常化方面确实也是有所作为的。


The restoration of the capital, Grozny, was one of his clear achievements.	他的其中一个明显的政绩就是重建了车臣首都格罗兹尼。


Grozny was totally destroyed during the first Chechen war; both Russian and foreign observers compared it with WWII Stalingrad and assumed that it would be impossible to restore the city.	这个城市在第一次车臣战争中被炸成了废墟，以致俄罗斯和其他外国观察家都将其喻为二战中的斯大林格勒，认定这个城市已经无法重建并建议车臣另立新都。


It was suggested that a new Chechen capital be built. Yet, having enjoyed a huge subsidy from Moscow, Kadyrov has rebuilt Grozny and provided it with some security.	然而在获得了莫斯科的一大笔赞助后，卡德罗夫便着手重建了格罗兹尼，还为这个城市恢复了一些治安。


Kadyrov also catered to the spiritual aspirations of the Chechen majority.	此外，卡德罗夫还主动迎合了车臣主流民众的精神诉求。


He rejected Wahhabism – the ideological framework of the jihadists. But he maintained that Islam is an essential part of the Chechen tradition and presented himself as a leader who fully understood this.	他拒绝了圣战的意识形态框架——瓦哈比教派主义，但坚持认为伊斯兰教是车臣传统的必要组成部分，并将自己表现成一个对次传统有深刻理解的领袖。


So he encouraged an Islamic dress code and built a huge mosque – one of the biggest, if not the biggest, in Europe.	因此他不但鼓励伊斯兰教的衣着方式，还建造了一间宏伟的清真寺——其规模即使不算欧洲最大，也是其中之一。


All of this brought Kadyrov wide support among the Chechen population.	这一切都使得卡德罗夫在车臣民众中赢得了广泛的支持。


Even those who dislike him sometimes conclude that he is the best all the possible options, and he has improved his position by persistently weeding out Chechen military forces that are not directly under his command.	即使是那些不太喜欢他的人有时也会承认此人是所有的人选中的佼佼者，而他也通过不懈清除车臣境内不接受其领导的军事力量来巩固自己的地位。


His most recent effort was the liquidation of the “Vostok” battalion, despite its being an integral part of the Russian army.	卡德罗夫最近的一次行动就是解散了部署在车臣的“东方”特种营，而这支部队可是在隶属于俄国防部的。


It was probably inevitable that Kadyrov’s increasing power would worry the Kremlin, especially after the Kremlin itself created a precedent for secession by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the war with Georgia of 2008.	卡德罗夫力量的不断壮大将不可避免地引起克里姆林宫的忧虑，尤其是在克里姆林宫自己为加盟共和国独立运动开创了先例之后——俄罗斯在2008年格（鲁吉亚）俄（罗斯）战争之后公开承认阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯两个共和国从格鲁吉亚独立就是前车之鉴。


Allowing Zakaev’s return would have worsened matters by increasing Kadyrov’s prestige at home, as well as his international visibility and legitimacy.	在这个情况下，放扎卡耶夫回国将增加卡德罗夫的国内声望，国际曝光率及其统治合法性，这明显将令事态更为恶化。


That would have pushed Kadyrov even further away from Russian control at a time when the Kremlin has become increasingly unable, and possibly reluctant, to purchase his loyalty.	而在克里姆林宫越来越不可能，大概也不愿意再用贿赂来换取卡德罗夫效忠之时，这一切都将推着卡德罗夫渐行渐远。


Russia’s Self-Defeating “But”	弄巧反拙的“但是”


MOSCOW – Prime Minister Vladimir Putin insists that “Without normal democratic development Russia will have no future.”	发自莫斯科——俄罗斯总理普京坚称“没有了正常的民主发展，就没有俄罗斯的未来。


We Russians are pleased to hear these enlightened words, yet Putin adds a “but” to his argument, which weakens it considerably. In fact, Putin’s “but” renders his points senseless.	”正当我们这些俄罗斯人都在为这句开明言论而欢欣鼓舞之时，普京却在这句话后面补上了一句“但是……”，不仅削弱了原先那句话的力量，事实上，这句“但是……”令他的整个发言沦为了一堆空话。


We have hated this “but,” this coordinating conjunction, ever since the dawn of the Soviet era.	自苏联时代末期以来，我们就对“但是”这个连词深恶痛绝。


Then we were told that freedom is good, but that one can’t live in an individualist society without common concern for the communist state.	我们被告知说自由是好的，“但是”一个人是不能在一个缺乏共产主义国家意识的个人主义社会中生存的；


Democracy is great, but only in the interests of the working class.	我们被告知说民主是伟大的，“但是”只能服务于工人阶级的利益。


Now Russia’s prime minister tells us that democracy is indeed great, but that public protests cannot take place in public places, say, around hospitals and the like.	如今普京告诉我们说民主制度确实是优秀的制度，“但是”公众示威游行活动不能在医院这类公共区域附近举行。


Never mind that the Russian constitution does not list hospitals among places forbidden for public assembly, or that sick people need democracy, too.	不过俄罗斯宪法可没规定医院属于禁止公众聚集的区域，更别说病人也是需要民主的。


Russian President Dmitri Medvedev does understand – with no “buts” – that “freedom is better than not freedom,” that “legal nihilism” is bad and democracy is good.	而作为总统的梅德韦杰夫分明知道——这里可没有“但是”——“有自由比没自由好”，“法律无政府主义”是坏的而民主制度是好的。


He understands that Stalin was a criminal, that his order to murder Polish officers in Katyn was an act of depravity that has no excuse or explanation.	他也知道斯大林是一个罪人，此人下令在卡廷地区残杀波兰军政人员的行为是一桩事实确凿，无从辩护的恶行。


The president understands this; unfortunately, we don’t understand the role our president plays in our society.	总统知道这些； 但不幸的是，我们不知道这位总统究竟在社会中扮演一个什么样的角色。


He says all the right things, yet they don’t seem to be reflected in reality.	他所说的话都是对的，却似乎一句都没能付诸现实。


The Dissenters Marches, which take place on the 31st of every month (article 31 of the Russian constitution guarantees freedom of assembly), could be (and are) easily dismissed as a marginal protest of a few hundred people with no common goals or ideas.	逢每月31号都举行的持不同政见者大游行（选择这个日子是因为宪法31条保障公民自由集会的权利）通常会被轻易驱散，因为这只不过是一个人数稀少而且缺乏共同目标或理念的小型示威活动而已。


Putin’s and Medvedev’s poll numbers are so high, many argue, that they don’t need to care about a few dissenters.	有些人认为，普京和梅德韦杰夫的民意支持率如此之高，他们根本不须理会这么几个持不同政见者。


Besides, most Russians support the government with no dissent at all, they say.	此外这些人还声称，大多数俄罗斯人支持一个完全不存在其他声音的政府。


This doesn't say much, however, because the Russian majority always supports the government, regardless of the policies it implements.	但这完全是胡说八道，实际情况是俄罗斯大多数民众一贯支持政府，却不管政府推行的政策究竟是好是坏。


Today’s dissenters are indeed a minority and of course can be disregarded, but only up to a point.	没错，现在这些持不同政见者确实只是少数，也无疑会被漠视，但这只是数量意义上的。


After all, this minority is one of thinkers – musicians, artists, and writers, and those who move forward Russian science, technology, and economic innovation.	毕竟，这少数人都是一些有思想的人——音乐家、艺术家，作家，以及那些推动俄罗斯科学技术和经济创新的人。


Such people cannot be dismissed as useless, since we need the innovation that they deliver, even if we think Russia doesn’t need democracy.	即便我们认为俄罗斯不需要民主，但考虑到这些人为我国创新所作的贡献，他们也不应该被视为无用的人而遭到驱散。


True, not all members of the thinking minority attend the dissenters’ marches, yet many more of them silently oppose the regime.	虽然不是所有有思想的少数派人士都会参加持不同政见者大游行，但其中许多人正在默默地反抗现行的统治。


Our leaders talk obsessively of Russia’s industrial modernization, of their support for innovations such as nanotechnology, so that Russia can catch up with the developed counties.	我们的领导人大谈俄罗斯的工业现代化，大谈他们对纳米技术这类创新产业的支持，以便让俄罗斯能赶上发达国家的水平。


In line with Soviet traditions, a nanotechnology project was given a piece of land, with plans to set up various scientific facilities. The best brains in Russia –engineers, scientists, and inventors – will gather in one place, and from there begin moving the country forward.	沿袭前苏联的做法，一个纳米技术项目成立之后就会专门划拨一块土地，并兴建一系列科学设施，然后那些俄罗斯最聪明的人——工程师，科学家和发明家们——将聚集在这里，开始推动这个国家前进。


The hope is that not only those living in Russia but also emigrants will be overcome with patriotic feelings.	项目不但想要让本土俄罗斯人倍感自豪，也期望能激发起那些旅居海外的俄罗斯人的爱国感情。


They will come back to Russia (also drawn by high salaries) to make themselves famous and their motherland proud.	他们将回到祖国（也在高工资的吸引下），打响自己的名声，也为祖国增添荣誉。


A wonderful plan. But I fear that it won’t work.	这是个绝妙的计划，但恐怕不会有什么成果。


For example, imagine a genius who left Russia years back. He has achieved prominence in a foreign country, inventing something outstanding.	试想一个旅居海外多年的俄罗斯人才，在国外名声卓著，成就斐然。


Now he is asked to come home: your motherland is waiting for you, it values your contribution, it forgives your betrayal, and it will pay you more than what you are getting elsewhere.	现在有人召唤他说：祖国母亲正在呼唤你，她会会重视你的贡献，同时也忘记您的背叛，而且她给你的回报将比别处更多。


But this brilliant scientist is still a human being.	这个聪明的科学家毕竟是个普通人。


He is of course nostalgic for the birch trees, his old friends, ex-wife, and children from the first marriage.	他当然怀念故乡的白桦林，儿时的玩伴，前妻以及第一次婚姻生下的孩子们。


He wants to come back, to revisit all that he has left behind, in the meantime helping his nation to become economically strong, technically advanced, and prosperous.	他想回国，去重温一切被忘却的往事，同时也帮助自己的国家变得更加富强，先进和繁荣。


Yet, before making the final decision, he turns on the radio, watches a bit of TV, browses the Internet, and finds out what Russia is like.	但在最后下定决心之前，他打开收音机，电视和网页，希望看看俄罗斯的现状。


Journalists are killed, scientists are accused of espionage, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky remains unjustly imprisoned.	他看到记者被杀，科学家被控间谍罪，米哈伊尔·科多尔科夫斯基依然遭到非法的囚禁。


Various blogs tell him that Russia’s parliament is just a place for rubber-stamping decisions already taken at the top.	许多博客都告诉他说俄罗斯议会只不过是一个通过上层决定的橡皮图章。


He reads the confused and confusing speeches our leaders: freedom is good, but…	他还会读到我们领导人所发表的那些令人摸不着头脑的迷惑性讲话：“自由是好的，但是……”


This brilliant scientist learns that Vasily Aleksanyan, the terminally ill Yukos lawyer, was held in prison in inhuman conditions.	这位聪明的科学家还了解到瓦西里·阿列克参亚，那个病入膏肓的尤科斯公司代表律师，正在监狱里承受着以不人道的待遇。


Another lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, died in prison after being refused medical treatment.	另外一位律师谢尔盖·马格尼特斯基则因为得不到救治而死在狱中。


And yet another one, Stanislav Markelov, was gunned down on a Moscow street.	还有一位律师斯坦尼斯拉夫·马尔克罗夫则在莫斯科大街上惨遭枪杀。


Then this scientist will be surprised (or not) to discover that the Russian majority views Joseph Stalin as the third most popular person in a contest to be known as the “Face of Russia.”	然后这位科学家会惊讶地（或者不会）发现俄罗斯大众竟然在一场名为“俄罗斯面孔”的投票活动中把斯大林选为第三号��欢迎人物。


In the meantime, his junior colleague in Russia, who still has his whole future in front of him, does not attend the Dissenters’ March, but simply emigrates, which is also a form of protest.	而与此同时，他那些尚在国内的年轻同事们，置大好前途于不顾，也没有参加持不同政见者大游行，而是直接移居海外——这也是某种形式的抗议。


In Soviet times, communist leaders tried to lure people into the kolkhozes (collective farms) with promises of great crops and spectacular meat production.	在苏联时期，共产党领导人试图引诱人们搬进集体农场，并许诺说农场一定会获得大丰收。


Nothing worked, because the kolkhoz system was incompatible with high achievement in the long run.	这没有用，因为集体农场这个体制本身就无法确保其能长期获得高产。


Similarly, in a country where the concepts of democracy and freedom are balanced by “but,” achievements in science, technology, and economy are not possible.	同样，在一个民主和自由的概念都被“但是”所扭曲的国度，想取得科学技术和经济上的成就基本是不可能的。


The thinking minority needs a system of laws and institutions, real presidential elections, a working parliament, and justice that is independent, rather than merely following orders from above.	这些有思想的少数派需要一个有效的法律和政府系统，真实的总统选举，有所作为的议会，还有独立的司法体系，而不是仅仅遵从上面的意思。


Russia’s Skeptical G8 Partners	俄国疑虑重重的G8伙伴


Poor oil-rich Russia.	俄国，一贫如洗却盛产石油。


It is trying so hard to have its turn as chair of the elite Group of Eight countries taken seriously.	为使自己作为8国精英集团主席的地位受到世人的重视，俄国可谓使出了浑身解数。


President Vladimir Putin, perhaps hoping to elevate the presidential summit talks in St. Petersburg in July, has laid out an ambitious agenda.	也许是抱着提升7月圣彼得堡总统高峰会谈地位的目的，普京总统制定了一套雄心勃勃的计划。


He plans to lead his colleagues in erudite conversations about education, infectious diseases, and – to make sure that no one dozes off – “energy security.”	他将带领同僚们展开对话，其内容涵盖教育、传染病等诸多议题，而且为了确保没人打瞌睡¾¾对话中还将就“能源安全”问题展开讨论。


And what has Putin gotten for his efforts?	普京的努力效果如何呢？


Not much.	答案怕是不容乐观。


The Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney (but with his boss’s explicit approval), recently accused Russia of backsliding into its old “evil empire” ways.	由副总统切尼领导的布什政府（切尼获得了老板布什的明确授意）不久前指责俄国退回到了旧式的“邪恶帝国”时代。


Putin shot back, portraying the United States as “Comrade Wolf,” ready to pounce on any nation that leaves itself vulnerable.	普京不甘示弱，把美国描绘成“豺狼同志”，随时会扑到弱小的国家身上，把猎物撕成碎片。


Suspense seems to be building around how Bush and Putin will greet each other when they meet in St. Petersburg.	布什和普京在圣彼得堡的见面会是怎样一种场景似乎越来越成了难以破解的悬念。


Europeans, for their part, are still hysterical about getting caught up in the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute that left their pipelines dry for a few days at the beginning of this year.	而欧洲国家还在为年初的时候卷入俄罗斯和乌克兰的天然气争端，导致天然气输送一度中断而心有余悸。


They see discussing “energy security” with Russia as akin to chatting about water safety with Comrade Crocodile.	在他们看来，与俄国讨论“能源安全”就跟与鳄鱼同志探讨用水安全的问题一样荒唐可笑。


Of course, people who really want to be unkind will point out the absurdity of Russia’s membership in a club that includes the giant economies of US, Germany, Japan, England, France, Italy, and (less so) Canada.	当然，真正不怀好意的人会直截了当地指出：俄国加入一个由美、德、日、英、法、意、加等世界经济巨头组成的俱乐部，这一事实本身就非常可笑。


Why wasn’t Chinese president Hu Jintao, whose country’s economy is the world’s second largest (when measured at world prices), given a seat at the table instead of Putin?	为什么不让中国主席胡锦涛来代替普京的席位，因为（按世界价格计算），中国经济已经牢牢占据了世界第二的位置。


After all, even with all its energy resources, and even with today’s sky-high oil and gas prices, Russia’s national income is only about the size of Greater Los Angeles.	归根结底，即便有着丰富的能源储备，再加上今天的石油和天然气价格日趋高涨，俄国全部的国民收入仍然只能与区区一个大洛杉矶地区相提并论。


Perhaps what Putin needs to do is stop suffering all the criticisms and go on the offensive.	也许普京应该放弃守势，主动出击。


He could start by pointing out to his smugly democratic counterparts that he is probably more popular in Russia today than any of them are in their own countries.	他可以首先告诉自己那些自命不凡的民主对手，俄国人对他普京的支持率远比他们在各自国家的支持率高出许多。


He might actually win a fair election tomorrow (not that he would ever risk finding out).	明天他完全可能真正赢得一场公正的选举（虽然他不想冒险真那么做）。


Few of the others could make the same claim with a straight face.	那些国家的领导人没有几个敢不动声色地说出这番话。


Of course, Putin’s success over the past few years in killing off any semblance of a free press – and when an ex-KGB man “kills off” a free press, it is not just a figure of speech – has helped mute open opposition.	当然，在过去几年中，普京成功地扼杀了言论自由的一切萌芽¾¾而且当前克格勃成员压制言论自由时，这绝不仅仅局限于一种比喻¾¾普京的压制大大削弱了公开的反抗。


Even so, Putin does seem genuinely popular among a public longing for a leader who can anchor their country without sinking it.	即便如此，在那些企盼国家局势稳定、期待国家不要陷入动荡的平民百姓心目中，普京也确实享有极高的威望。


Putin might also argue that Russia’s fiscal position is far stronger that of the other G8 members.	普京还可以提出，俄国的财政状况令其他的G8成员国望尘莫及。


Yes, it helps that Siberia turned out to be a giant oil well, with the government sucking up much of the money.	没错，西伯利亚巨大的石油储量让政府获益匪浅，因为这笔财富绝大部分都装进了政府的腰包。


Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is balancing his country’s books, too, for now.	委内瑞拉总统雨果·查维斯（Hugo Chavez）也暂时让国家实现了收支平衡。


But, to be fair, oil is not the whole story.	但公平的讲，石油并不是全部原因。


Most economists advocate rich countries’ replacing their complex and antiquated tax codes with a simple low flat tax, and they bemoan the fact that so few countries have tried it.	多数经济学家都倡议富国废除复杂、过时的税法，代之以简便易行的统一低税收制度，他们哀叹如此有效的税收制度，却没有几个国家真正愿意尝试。


Putin, however, implemented such a policy a few years ago, and the results have been nothing short of miraculous.	而普京在几年前就执行了这样的政策，并且取得了非常神奇的效果。


Of course, the other G8 leaders might be less enamored of some of Russia’s other approaches to addressing budget problems.	当然，同样是解决财政问题，俄国所实行的其他政策就没有那么让八国集团领导人羡慕了。


Most G8 countries seem incapable of achieving the political consensus required to take necessary steps such as raising the retirement age or significantly cutting the indexation of benefits to inflation.	8国集团的多数国家似乎很难在政治上达成一致，提高退休年龄或大大削减与通货膨胀指数相关的补贴。


Russia, by contrast, has essentially abandoned its pensioners by inflating away the value of their incomes.	而俄国却恰恰相反，它任由通货膨胀把退休职工的收入侵蚀得一干二净，实际等于将依靠退休金维持生计的老年人抛到了一边。


Indeed, many of the elderly in rural Russia are forced to sustain themselves by growing potatoes on the tiny plots of land that the government allows them to till.	的���，在俄国农村，很多老年人被迫依靠在政府分给的小块土地上种植马铃薯来维持生计。


That is, assuming they survive at all: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russian male life expectancy has plummeted from 65 years to around 60 years.	而这样辛苦劳作的前提是假定老人们能够活到退休：自从柏林墙倒塌以来，俄国男性的平均寿命已经从65岁骤降至60岁。


There is growing evidence that the stress of transition is the leading cause of death, even above big killers in postcommunist Russia such as alcohol, murder, and AIDS.	有证据表明转型时期的压力是导致死亡的罪魁祸首，甚至超过了后共产主义时代俄国最为可怕的杀手：酒精、凶杀和艾滋病。


Should Putin tell his colleagues that they, too, could balance their countries’ intergenerational accounts by starving the elderly?	普京是否应该告诉8国集团的同僚们，他们也可以通过饿死老年人来平衡国内不同年龄群体的利益？


So perhaps Putin had better not try to push his country’s accomplishments too far.	因此，不要过分夸大俄国所谓的成就不失为明智之举。


Maybe the best plan is simply to let the vodka flow and hope for a round of smiles in the photo ops.	也许最好的计划莫过于举杯相敬，让媒体的闪光灯记录下拍照时的欢声笑语。


In any case, when Putin tells his guests how they can pay Russia more to improve their own “energy security,” he may finally get the respect that he craves.	无论如何，如果普京告诉客人们他们应该向俄罗斯交多少钱才能改善自己的“能源安全”状况，他可能会最终得到他渴望已久的尊重。


Russia’s Ukrainian Path to the Future	俄罗斯的乌克兰式未来之路


MOSCOW – Russia and the West are losing each other yet again.	莫斯科－俄罗斯和西方都再次相互失去对方。


The magnetic attraction and repulsion between the two has been going on for centuries.	在这两者之间的吸引和排斥持续了几个世纪。


Indeed, historians have counted as many as 25 such cycles since the reign of Tsar Ivan III.	确实，历史学家计算出，从沙皇伊凡三世统治以来，这样的循环多达25次。


In the past, however, Russia’s sharp anti-Western turns were reversed – usually out of simple necessity – after relations reached rock bottom. Not this time.	但是，在过去，俄罗斯激烈的反西方态度在双方关系到达最低点以后，都会发生逆转——这通常是处于简单的需要。


On the contrary, the deterioration of the relationship nowadays has developed a momentum of its own.	但是，这次不是这样，相反，现在关系的恶化已经具有了其自身的动量。


There are four reasons for this.	造成这一局面有四个原因。


First, the “loss” of the Cold War, and with it imperial and superpower status, has created a deep and so far unresolved crisis in the collective mentality of Russia’s political class.	首先，“输掉”冷战以及与之相随的帝王般的超级大国地位，在俄罗斯的政治阶层的集体思想意识里产生了一个很深并且到现在还没有得到解决的危机。


Russian leaders continue to perceive the West as a phantom enemy in opposition to which all the traditional mythologies of Russian foreign policy are being resurrected.	俄罗斯的领导人持续将西方作为假想敌，为了反对这个假想敌，俄罗斯外交政策所有传统的神话都复活了。


Second, by the end of Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term, Russia’s modernizing dreams had been shattered.	第二，在弗拉基米尔·普京的第二任总统末期，俄罗斯的现代化梦想被粉碎了。


Modernization, indeed, simply turned out to be yet another redistribution of property to those on top, particularly those who came out of the St. Petersburg mayoral office and the Federal Security Bureau (FSB).	事实上，现代化仅仅被证明是另一个将财产分配给上层社会——特别是那些来自圣彼得堡市长办公室以及联邦安全局(FSB)的人的再分配。