By contrast, the industrial sector’s share of GDP has remain unchanged, at around 26%, for the last three decades (the manufacturing segment is even smaller, at 14.9% of GDP).	相反，工业部门占 GDP比重几乎没有变化，在过去至少三十年的时间里一直徘徊在26%左右（制造业规模更小，只占GDP的14. 9%）。


When Modi’s emphasis on export-led manufacturing is viewed in the context of his government’s focus on heavy infrastructure projects – ranging from power generation to railways – it becomes clear that his growth model, with its mass deployment of labor and capital in industry, looks similar to East Asian countries’ strategy. It is also consistent with his frequent references to the need to create new cities, because urbanization is the spatial manifestation of industrialization.	莫迪强调出口拉动型制造业，这是因为旗政府强调重基础设施工程——如发电和铁路——很显然，他的增长模式及其将大量劳动力和资本配置于工业的做法与东亚经济���的战略十分相似，也与他经常提及的建设新城市的需要一致——城市化是工业化的空间标志。


The shift to an “East Asian” growth model should not be surprising, given India’s demographic pipeline.	从印度的人口因素看，转向“东亚”增长模式并不令人惊奇。


India needs to create jobs for the ten million people per year who join the working-age population.	印度每年都需要为进入工作年龄的公民创造一千万个工作岗位。


It also needs to accommodate the millions who wish to shift away from agriculture, which still employs half of the workforce.	印度还需要面对数百万想走出农地的国民——农业吸收了工作人口的一半。


Although the service sector was able to generate growth in the past, it has proved to be a poor job creator and only employs 27% of workers, far lower than its share of the economy.	尽管服务业在过去能够带来增长，但作为就业岗位创造器，服务业并不出色，只雇用了27%的劳动力，远远低于其占经济规模的比重。


By contrast, construction and manufacturing are rightly seen to be more promising outlets for the mass deployment of semi-skilled workers.	相反，建筑业和制造业被正确地视为大规模吸收技能平庸工人的理想方案。


There are, of course, many obstacles in Modi’s path.	当然，莫迪的道路存在诸多障碍。


India’s tax and regulatory regime is widely regarded as unfriendly to business; but Modi’s track record in government suggests that he is sensitive to this problem and will be able to make significant improvements.	众所周知，印度税收和监管制度对商业部门十分不友好； 但莫迪的执政记录表明他对这一问题十分敏感，能够带来重大改进。


The greater challenge for Modi will be financing his growth model.	莫迪所面临的更大的挑战是为其增长模式筹资。


The success of the East Asian model was predicated on a sharp increase in the investment rate.	东亚模式的成功是建立在投资率激增的基础上的。


Beginning with Japan, every rapidly growing East Asian economy sustained investment rates in the range of 38-40% of GDP over its rapid-growth phase.	从日本开始，所有高速增长的东亚经济体都在其高速增长阶段将投资率维持在GDP的38—40%。


China is currently investing almost half of its GDP.	中国目前将GDP的将近一半用于投资。


India’s fixed-investment ratio, by contrast, has declined in recent years to around 30% of GDP.	相反，印度固定投资比率在近几年里已下降到GDP的30%左右。


Foreign capital can play a role in supporting rapid growth, but international experience shows that domestic savings is key to sustaining high investment rates.	外国资本可以在支持高速增长方面起到作用，但国际经验表明，国内储蓄才是维持高投资率的关键。


Mobilizing these savings will require careful thinking about how the domestic financial system can be expanded by an order of magnitude without risking a future crisis.	动员储蓄需要谨慎思考如何尽快扩大国内金融体系而不引起未来危机的风险。


Another major problem will be the migration of tens of millions of people as they are sucked into the expanding industrial economy.	另一个主要问题是工业经济扩张所带来的数千万移民。


India does not have China’s sociopolitical controls, such as the hukou residential-permit system, to manage such a large-scale movement of people.	印度不具备中国这样的社会政治控制（如户口制度）管理如此规模的人口流动。


Japan and South Korea are perhaps too small to serve as useful precedents.	日本和韩国规模太小，也不足以成为有用的先例。


Modi may be hoping to preempt the problem through his project to create 100 “smart cities,” though how the program will be implemented remains unknown.	莫迪或可以寄希望于通过其打造100个“智慧城市”的计划取得先机，尽管这一计划如何实施尚不清楚。


Despite all of the obstacles and risks, Modi has articulated an explicit economic vision for the first time since Nehru.	尽管存在这些障碍和风险，莫迪仍然勾勒了自尼赫鲁时代以来的首个明确的经济愿景。


Unlike the apologetic reforms of the past two decades, Indians have been promised a confident new beginning.	与过去二十年以来的亡羊补牢式改革不同，印度获得了一个充满自信的新起点承诺。


It is now a matter of implementation.	现在就要看如何实施了。


Who Will Run the World’s Deficits?	世界赤字将来自哪里？


SINGAPORE – These days everyone seems to want to run a current-account surplus.	新加坡—当前，似乎所有人都想要经常项目盈余。


China has long run large surpluses.	中国长期存在巨额盈余。


The eurozone is now running even larger ones, with swings in southern Europe augmenting Germany’s longstanding surpluses.	欧元区目前的盈余甚至还要大，南欧的波动增加了德国长期存在的盈余。


Indeed, countries from Singapore to Russia are running large surpluses.	事实上，从新加坡到俄罗斯的各个国家也存在巨额盈余。


Meanwhile, America’s external deficit – which for decades has helped to sustain surpluses elsewhere – is now smaller than it was before 2008, with many economists arguing that it should never revert to its previous levels (they argue that the shale-gas boom makes this unlikely, anyway).	与此同时，美国的外部赤字——几十年来这笔赤字支撑着其他国家的盈余——比2008年有所减少，许多经济学家认为永远不会回到此前的峰值了（他们指出，页岩气景气使这成为不可能的事情）。


Financial markets have also made clear that the ability of other major deficit countries, like Brazil and India, to absorb capital flows is reaching its limit.	金融市场也明确无误地显示出其他主要赤字国家，如巴西和印度吸收资本流的能力到达了极限。


Since the world is a closed system, this raises the question: Who will run the world’s deficits?	世界是一个封闭系统，因此这就造成了一个问题：谁来负责世界赤字？


Mainstream economists believe that the global economy should function as a balanced mechanical arrangement in which external surpluses and deficits are smoothed out over time.	主流经济学家认为全球经济应该是一个平衡的机械安排，外部盈余和赤字应该随时间的推移而平滑。


But periods of global economic expansion have virtually always been characterized by symbiotic imbalances.	但全球经济扩张期几乎总是伴随着失衡。


One part of the world runs large deficits for a prolonged period, creating demand; another part of the world runs surpluses, financing its counterparts’ deficits.	世界一部分国家长期存在巨额赤字，创造需求； 另一部分存在盈余，为前一部分的赤字提供融资。


This was true of Roman-Indian trade in the first and second centuries, and of the age of European exploration in the sixteenth century.	在公元一二世纪，罗马-印度贸易即是如此，十六世纪的欧洲探索时代也是如此。


It was also true of the two Bretton Woods arrangements, in which the US ran the necessary deficits.	两次布雷顿森林体系安排亦是如此，美国保持着必要的赤字。


Admittedly, imbalanced systems create distortions.	诚然，失衡的系统会创造扭曲。


The Romans had to debase their coins, owing to the continuous loss of gold to India.	由于黄金不断向印度流失，罗马人不得不贬值其铸币。


The Spanish empire flooded the world with silver coins as it paid for its many wars.	支付战争费用的西班牙帝国让白银泛滥全球。


Bretton Woods I collapsed in 1971, when the dollar’s peg to gold became untenable, and Bretton Woods II ended in 2008, owing to the misallocation of capital.	布雷顿森林体系I崩溃于1971年，原因是美元不再能够盯住黄金； 布雷顿森林体系II崩溃于2008年，原因是资本的错配。


But these distortions did not prevent unbalanced systems from enduring for long periods.	但这些扭曲并未阻止失衡的系统的长期持续。


The only significant period of “balanced” economic expansion was in the early nineteenth century.	唯一一个相当长的“平衡”经济扩张时期是十九世纪初。


The British East India Company deliberately imposed a triangular trade arrangement whereby Britain sold manufactured goods to India in order to buy opium, which it subsequently sold in China to finance the purchase of tea and other products.	英国东印度公司有意引入了三角贸易安排，英国向印度出售制造品以买入鸦片，然后将鸦片卖给中国为购买茶叶和其他产品融资。


In other words, balanced global economic growth required war, colonization, and large-scale drug trafficking.	换句话说，平衡的全球经济增长需要战争、殖民和大规模贩毒。


So, what symbiotic imbalance will underpin the next round of global economic growth?	那么，怎样的共生性失衡会破坏下一轮全球经济增长？


Given that the current account is the difference between a country’s saving and investment rates, both of which are heavily influenced by demographics, we need to consider rapid changes in population dynamics.	经常项目即是一国储蓄率和投资率之差，而储蓄率和投资率受到人口结构的严重影响，因此我们需要考虑人口动态的变化。


China currently saves and invests half of its GDP, but, as its workforce shrinks in the coming years, its investment rate is likely to fall sharply.	目前，中国储蓄并投资了GDP的一半，但是，随着今后几年其劳动力数量的下���，其投资率可能大幅下降。


However, aging will keep the saving rate from falling at the same pace.	但是，老龄化会以相同的程度阻止储蓄率的下降。


This differential will generate large external surpluses that will transform China from the “world’s factory” into the “world’s investor.”	这一差异会带来巨大的外部盈余，让中国从“世界工厂”转变为“世界投资者”。


It would be convenient if global demographics were distributed in such a way that aging countries could run surpluses just when younger countries needed the capital.	要是全球人口结构的扩散结构是年轻国家需要资本，同时恰好老龄化国家保持盈余，那么问题就迎刃而解了。


In reality, many major economies will be trying to save for retirement at the same time.	在现实中，许多主要经济体会同时为退休而储蓄。


Moreover, the younger countries are typically emerging markets, which have neither the scale nor the capacity to absorb the world’s excess savings efficiently.	此外，年轻国家通常是新兴市场国家，既无规模，也无能力有效吸收世界过剩储蓄。


The US is the main exception: it has both the required scale and the youngest population of any major developed country.	美国是主要的例外：它拥有必须的规模和主要发达国家中最年轻的人口。


Given this, it will once again fall to the US to run the world’s largest external deficit, in what could be dubbed Bretton Woods III.	因此，成为世界最大外部赤字国的重任会再一次降临到美国头上，不妨称之为布雷顿森林体系III。


It may seem appalling to expect such a highly indebted country to continue to run deficits; but the world is willing to finance the US at negative real interest rates.	指望已然高度负债的国家继续产生赤字，这乍听起来骇人听闻； 但世界愿意以实际负利率为美国提供融资。


Indeed, the main international concern has been US policymakers’ reluctance to raise the government’s debt ceiling!	事实上，主要的国际担心是美国决策者不愿意提高美国政府的债务上限！


If the US is unable or unwilling to run the required deficits, the global economy will flounder in a savings glut of low demand and cheap capital until another alternative emerges.	如果美国不能或不愿产生需要的赤字，全球经济将陷入储蓄过剩、需求低迷、资本廉价的局面，直到美国的替代者出现。


Or perhaps the low cost of international capital will entice the US to absorb some of the world’s excess savings, triggering a new period of global expansion.	或者，低成本的国际资本或将诱使美国吸收一些过剩储蓄，带来新的全球扩张期。


While a Bretton Woods III arrangement would inevitably generate its own distortions, it could last for years if the capital is invested sensibly.	布雷顿森林体系III难免会产生其自身的扭曲，但如果能够明智地投资资本，它可以持续多年。


The prospect of its eventual demise is not a good reason to wait for some theoretical ideal of global balance to materialize.	其最终崩溃的前景并不能作为坐等全球平衡的理论理想实现的理由。


If history is any indication, we will be waiting for a long time.	如果历史可以作为指引的话，我们将等待很长时间。


Santa Claus Speaks German	圣诞老人说德语


Santa Claus was a Turkish Dervish who in the middle ages traveled through Central and Northern Europe, giving gifts to children and claiming to be the re-incarnation of Greek St. Nicholas, who preached in the fourth century.	圣诞老人原本是一位土耳其苦修士，在中世纪的时候，他穿越欧洲的中部和北部，为孩子们送去礼物，声称自己是4世纪传道的希腊圣·尼古拉的化身。


Together with the Christmas tree, Sankt Niklaus, as the Germans called the benefactor, became a central figure in German Christmas habits.	和圣诞树一起，Sankt Niklaus，德国人对乐善好施的圣诞老人的称呼，成为了德国圣诞节的中心。


In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, German immigrants, the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch, carried them to the United States, from where they later spread to the rest of the world, if only as marketing icons for Coca Cola.	在17世纪和18世纪里，德国移民，即所谓的德裔宾州人，将这一传统带到了美国，并从那里传扬到全世界，就好像为可口可乐打造市场品牌一样。


In 2006, Santa Claus again came from Germany with a sack full of good news about the business cycle.	2006年，圣诞老人又从德国而来，带着满满一口袋经济周期的好消息。


The Ifo business climate indicator, which had been rising since the second half of 2005, reached its highest level since Germany’s unification boom.	IFO经济景气指数从2005年后开始攀升，达到了德国统一后的最高水平。


After years of stagnant growth, the German economy has been growing at an annual rate of about 2.5% in 2006.	经过几年的缓慢增长，德国经济在2006年达到年增长率2. 5%。


While the value-added tax will rise by three percentage points in 2007, economic growth will remain healthy, at nearly 2%.	尽管增值税将在2007年提高三个百分点，德国的经济增长仍会维持一个健康的状态，保持在2％左右。


The Ifo business climate indicator is generated every month by asking 7,000 firms, primarily from German manufacturing industry, about their current business situation and their expectations for the next six months.	IFO经济景气指数每月会向7000家公司（主要是德国制造业的公司）问询目前的经济状况以及对未来6个月的展望。


It has been produced for half a century, and, according to a poll conducted by Reuters, it is Europe’s most prominent business indicator, outperforming even official EU indicators.	IFO经济景气指数已经存在了半个世纪，据路透社的一项民意调查，它是欧洲最著名的经济指标，甚至超过了欧盟官方的指标。


In early 2006, when the Ifo indicator foresaw an economic upturn while the German Federal Statistical Office reported meager quarterly GDP growth figures, some commentators scoffed.	2006年初，尽管当德国联邦统计局公布了GDP季度的微弱增长，IFO经济景气指数却预见到未来会出现经济复苏，而一些评论家对此嗤之以鼻。


But when the Office later revised its data upward, it became clear that the Ifo indicator was right.	但当德国联邦统计局后来将数据上调后，很明显，IFO是正确的。


This is good news not only for Germany, but also for Europe as a whole, as the business climate for German manufacturers reflects that in the rest of Europe – their main export market.	这不仅是对德国的一个好消息，同时也是对全欧洲。 德国制造业的经济气候也反映着欧洲的其他地方――德国主要出口市场的情况。


In 2006, the euro-zone economies may have grown by 2.7% on average, and should grow by 2.2% in 2007.	2006年，欧元区经济的增长率在平均2. 7％的水平，2007年将会是2.


However, there are substantial differences among these economies.	但是，这些国家的经济很不平衡。 有些确实情况良好。


Some are doing very well, indeed.	2006年，爱尔兰的GDP增长率达到5. 2％，芬兰是5.


In 2006, Ireland’s GDP may grow by 5.2%, Finland’s by 5.8% and Spain’s by 3.7%.	8%，而西班牙则为3. 7％。


By contrast, Portugal and Italy are currently Europe’s laggards, with growth rates of just 1.5% and 1.7%, respectively, in 2006.	但葡萄牙、意大利是目前拖欧洲后腿的国家，2006年的增长率仅为1. 5%和1.


Somewhat surprisingly, France also seems to be having a hard time keeping up, with a below-average growth rate of 2.1%.	7％。 令人吃惊的是，法国很费力地才能赶上欧洲的其他国家，其增长率为低于平均值的2.


More importantly, despite the promising news coming from Germany these days, it would be an overstatement to call the German economy a growth engine for Europe, given that it, too, is growing more slowly than the euro zone as a whole.	尤为重要的是，尽管最近从德国传出了好消息，如果称德国是欧洲经济增长的发动机，还是言过其实，因为德国的增长速度低于整个欧元区的增长。


Nevertheless, given that, aside from Italy, Germany recorded the EU’s lowest growth rate from 1995 to 2005, the improving performance of Europe’s largest economy is a source of relief.	但是，除了意大利，德国是1995－2005年欧盟增长率最低的国家，欧洲经济实力最强的国家有了改善，仍然让人松了一口气。


While the US economy begins to stagnate, across the Atlantic the business cycle seems to have turned upward at last.	虽然美国的经济开始出现疲软，大洋彼岸的经济总算有了好转。


As the world’s second largest exporter, the German boom was initially driven by foreign sales.	作为世界第二大出口国，德国的经济增长首先是由对外贸易带动的。


Indeed, German exports grew by 6.9% in 2005 and 11.2% in 2006.	德国的出口于2005年增长6. 9％，2006年增长11.


But, given increasing capacity utilization in the export industries, as well as higher investment requirements owing to the normal capital replacement cycle, domestic investment demand is now also rising.	2%。 但是，鉴于出口行业产能利用率的提高，以及由于正常的资本置换周期而出现更高的投资要求，国内投资需求也在上升。


Annual investment in equipment increased by 7.7% in 2006, while overall investment, including construction, was up by 5%.	2006年对机器产业的年度投资增长了7. 7％，而包括建筑业在内的总投资上升了5%。


Although Germany’s net investment as a share of GNP remains one of the lowest in the developed world, the additional investment implies more jobs in the construction and machine tool industries, followed by rising employment wherever the investment is placed.	尽管德国作为GNP一部分的净投资依旧是发达国家中最低的一个，增加的投资意味着建筑和机器产业出现了更多的就业机会，投资继而会带动就业率的提高。


Unfortunately, however, the upturn in the business cycle cannot be taken as a sign of structural improvement in the German economy.	遗憾的是，经济好转并不能作为德国经济结构性改善的标志。


Since 1970, Germany’s business cycles have been surprisingly regular: a downswing in the first half of each decade, followed by an upswing in the second half.	从1970年起，德国经济就保持着令人吃惊的规律性：每十年的前五年呈下滑走势，而在后五年上升。


Unemployment has always reached its lowest point at the end of the decade or a year later, driven by cyclical movements in equipment investment that followed the textbook multiplier-accelerator model.	依据书本上的乘数—加速数模型，在机器产业投资周期运动的推动下，失业率总是在每十年中的最后一年或者接下来的第二年达到最低点。


However, unemployment has increased from one boom to the next, with the lowest rate in each business cycle following a linear upward trend.	但是，失业率从一次经济繁荣到另一次经济繁荣，在每个经济周期中的最低点也呈直线上升的态势。


It is too early to speculate whether Germany will be able to break this pattern and reverse that trend.	如果预计德国将打破这一模式或者逆转这一趋势，还为时过早。


Despite the boom, and despite various programs that stimulated part-time employment, unemployment in absolute terms was about 4.5 million in 2006 and will be 4.1 million in 2007, compared to the last low point of 3.9 million in 2000.	尽管出现了经济增长，尽管推出了刺激兼职的各种就业计划，德国的失业率依旧在2006达到450万人,2007年将为410万人，而上一个最低点是2000年的390万人。


Germany’s economic development will have to be observed well into the next full decade in order to judge the potential for a structural trend reversal.	德国经济还需要在下一个十年中密切观察，才能判断是否有出现结构性逆转的潜力。


Nevertheless, there is every reason to expect the German economy’s upswing to continue for the time being.	但是，我们仍然有充分理由期待德国经济在目前持续上升。


With some luck, good times for Germany, and for Europe as a whole, could last until the end of the decade.	凭借一点运气，德国以及全欧洲的经济好时光能够持续到这个十年的结束。


Sarko v Sego At Last	最终萨尔科奇和罗雅尔对垒


The surprise in the first round of the French presidential election was that there was no surprise, except for the huge level of voter turnout.	法国总统大选首轮投票的唯一惊奇之处就是，除了选民踊跃投票外没有惊奇之处。


The two leaders of the Right and of the Left, the favorites in all the polls for a long time, came first and second.	左右两翼的领导人长期以来一直是民意调查的宠儿，现在以第一和第二名的位置胜出。


Four winners and one clear loser emerged from the first round.	第一轮出现了四名胜利者和一名明显的失败者。


The first winner is democracy.	第一个胜利者是民主。


For the first time in my lifetime, as I went to vote on Sunday with my children - in a peaceful celebration of that secular religion that is democracy when it works well - I had to wait in line patiently for a relatively long time.	选举是民主在运转良好时候的世俗宗教仪式。 当我和我的孩子们在星期天前往投票的时候，我有生以来第一次不得不耐心地排队等候较长的时间。


For 85% of the electorate went to vote in what has been the highest level of participation in presidential elections in France since Charles de Gaulle last ran for president in1965.	因为，85%的选民前往投票，这是自1965年戴高乐将军最后一次竞选总统以来法国总统选举中最高的参与程度。


The lesson of the first ballot of 2002, which saw a high level of abstention and the surprise elimination of the Socialist Lionel Jospin, partly explains that mobilization.	2002年选举首轮投票出现大量的弃权，并且出人意料地将社会党的若斯潘淘汰出局。 这一教训在一定程度上解释了为何出现如此之高的投票率。


Also, with the emergence of a new generation of political leaders, the French -- who were thought cynical towards politics -- seem to have regained their unique passion for it.	同时，新的一代政治领导人的涌现，让被认为是对政治玩世不恭的法国人看起来重新获得了对政治独特的热情。


The second winner is undeniably and by far Nicolas Sarkozy.	第二个胜利者无疑是萨尔科奇。


With 31% of the vote he will come to the second ballot in a very favorable position.	他获得31%的选票，将由此在第二轮投票中占据先机。


His strategy to attract the electorates of Jean Marie Le Pen’s extreme right, proved to be a winning one.	他的吸引勒庞极右翼选民的战略证明是获胜的法宝。


A majority of French who voted for him, did it, according to reliable exit poll studies, above all because of his personality.	根据投票后可靠的民意调查，大多数把票投给他的法国人之所以这样投票首先是因为他的个性。


They wanted a strong charismatic man to reawaken France economically and to reassure them in security terms.	他们想要一个强有力的、具有魅力的人来在经济上重新唤醒法国，并且在安全问题上为他们提供保证。


The third winner, though she is mathematically in a much less favorable position, is Segolène Royal.	第三个胜利者是罗雅尔，尽管她在数字上处于下峰。


Her making it to the second round is a huge relief for the Socialist party after the Jospin debacle of 2002 - and with more than 25% of the votes, she did nearly as well as François Mitterrand in 1981.	她能够进入第二轮对于2002年若斯潘惨败之后的社会党而言是巨大的安慰。 而且，她获得25%的选票，几乎和1981年密特朗的战绩一样。


In order to have a serious chance to win, she has to transform the second ballot into a referendum against Nicolas Sarkozy.	罗雅尔如果要有切实获胜的机会，就要将第二轮投票转变成为反对萨尔科奇的全民公决。


In a classical Left-Right contest she can only lose.	在一场传统的左右对峙竞赛中，她只会败北。


The working class is disappearing in modern France and what’s left of it tends to go more to the extreme-right than to the extreme-left.	工人阶级正在现代法国消亡，残留的部分更多地趋向于极右翼而非极左翼。


Segolène. Royal has done well, but probably not well enough, unless in a face to face debate with Nicolas Sarkozy she can rally a majority of viewers to the radical modernity of electing a woman to the highest French position.	罗雅尔表现不错，但还是不够，除非在与萨尔科奇的面对面的辩论中她能够将观众的大多数团结到将一名妇女推举到法国最高职位这一极端现代主义之上。


It is not what she says but what she is, or even more so the fear of her opponent that constitute her best chance.	她的最佳机会并非是她所说的话，而是她本人，甚至是对于她的对手的害怕。


The fourth winner, though his absence from the second ballot is a disappointment for him, is François Bayrou.	第四名胜利者是贝胡，尽管他无缘进入第二轮对他而言是极大的失望。


With more than18% of the votes he tripled his score of 2002.	他获得18%的选票，是他2002年所获选票的三倍。


He has turned the Center into a force.	他已经将中间派转变成为一支力量。


In the second ballot of France’s presidential elections, he will prove to be a Queen or more like a King maker.	在法国总统选举第二轮投票中，他有可能成为皇后甚至是拥立国王者。


His votes are needed by both remaining candidates and it is likely they will tend to split equally between Left and Right, for he cannot commit himself to clearly support one candidate over the other.	剩下的两名候选人都需要他的选票，而其选民有可能在左右两翼之间平均分散，因为他无法承诺明确支持其中一人。


The clear loser in the first round is the leader of the extreme-right Jean-Marie Le Pen.	第一轮投票中明显的失败者就是极右翼领导人勒庞。


With less than 11% of the votes in what will be the last campaign of his career, he turned into an “ageing detail of History”.	在这一其事业中最后一次竞选中，他获得不到11%的选票，成为“历史中年老的细节”。


In a campaign centered on the emergence of a new generation of political leaders, he lost his appeal.	这一场竞选集中在新的一代领导人的涌现上，他失去了他的感召力。


He did not mellow, but was swallowed by history’s zeitgeist.	他并没有变得香醇，但是却被时代思潮所吞没。


Now a second campaign begins.	现在第二轮竞选开始了。


The key strategic move for the two remaining candidates will be to attract the votes of the Center without losing their core Leftist or Rightist constituencies.	剩下的两名候选人的关键性战略行动就是在不丧失其核心左翼或者右翼选民的条件下吸引中间选民的选票。


That means emphasizing in a reassuring way, economic credibility for Segolene Royal, and social compassion for Nicolas Sarkozy.	这对于罗雅尔而言意味着以令人放心的方式强调经济问题上的可信度； 对于萨尔科奇而言，则是社会同情心。


The world and Europe in particular will be watching even more intensely this second round.	全世界，特别是欧洲将会更为密切地关注第二轮投票。


One can nearly detect a kind of “North-South divide,” with south Europe (pre dominantly Spain and Italy standing behind Segolène Royal, and northern Europe, predominantly Germany and Britain (the US as well) aligning themselves behind Nicolas Sarkozy.	人们几乎可以发觉某种“南北分裂”，即南欧(主要是西班牙和意大利)支持罗雅尔，而北欧，(主要是德国和英国以及美国)支持萨尔科奇。


For the European Union, new man or woman in the Elysee Palace may be a necessary condition for reinvigorating the European project, but it is not a sufficient condition.	对于欧盟而言，爱丽舍宫的新主人无论男女都可能是重振欧洲建设的必要条件。 但这并非是一个充分条件。


The French “No” to the referendum on Europe’s constitutional treaty in May 2005 revealed the depth of Europe’s crisis, it did not create it.	2005年法国全民公决否决了欧盟宪法揭示了欧洲危机的深度，但并没有制造这一危机。


Watching the celebration of patriotism behind the raising of the French flag and the singing of the national anthem during the first round of the campaign, one can easily believe that the British vision of a Europe of independent nation states has won already, if only by default.	当人们看到在第一轮竞选中法国国旗升起、高唱国歌之际所表现出的爱国主义，就会轻易相信英国的由独立民族国家组成的欧洲愿景已经不战而胜。


On May 6, the date of the second ballot, French citizens will choose between two risks.	5月6日是第二轮投票的日子。 法国公民将选择两种风险。


The first one, which is potential, given Sarkozy’s domineering personality is to have Sarkozy as president.	考虑到萨尔科奇专横的个性，让他成为总统，这第一种风险是潜在的。


The second risk may prove to be even a bigger one, and can be described as follows.	而第二种风险甚至可能更大，可以这样描述。


At this particular juncture in time and given the condition of their economy can the French reject the candidate that incarnates by far the best hope for change and “Renaissance.”	在这一时代的特殊关口以及鉴于其经济状况，法国人拒绝最为体现变革和“复兴”的最佳希望的候选人。


To succeed, Nicolas Sarkozy will have to turn his campaign slogan “Together everything becomes possible” into reality.	要想获得成功，萨尔科奇就要把他的竞选口号“团结一致，人定胜天”变为现实。


That implies successfully integrating French immigrants into the wider community with a combination of economic growth, restoration of the authority of the State, but also and above all a far greater sense of solidarity and fraternity.	这就意味着将法国移民成功地融入到更为广大的社区之中，结合经济增长和恢复国家权威，最为重要的是更大的团结和博爱的感觉。


Sarkozy Agonistes	斗士萨科齐


“Why do they hate us?” asked the Americans of the Islamic fundamentalists after 9/11.	“他们为什么恨我们？ ”美国人在911后对伊斯兰原教旨主义者发出这样的疑问。


“Why do they not like me?” could be the question asked by Nicolas Sarkozy to the French after more than one year in power.	“他们为什么不喜欢我？ ”这可能是尼古拉斯·萨科齐在掌权一年多后问的疑问。


Sarkozy is omnipresent both domestically and internationally.	萨科齐在国内和国际上无处不在。


On July 13, the leaders of more than 40 countries attended the first gathering of the “Union for the Mediterranean” in Paris.	7月13日， 40多个国家的领导人在巴黎参加了第一届“地中海联盟”聚会。


France is back in the world and in Europe.	法国来到了世界和欧洲的中心。


Domestically, an ambitious and difficult program of long-awaited reforms, which a majority of French citizens recognize are inevitable, has begun, with some early results in the field of labor law and education.	在法国国内，一个雄心勃勃、期盼已久而且困难重重的改革计划——大多数法国人认为这个改革计划不可避免——已经开始，并已经在劳动法律和教育方面初有成效。


Sarkozy’s energy, willpower, and activism are nothing short of spectacular.	萨科齐的精力、毅力和行动主义都令人瞩目。


And yet he is the least popular of the Fifth Republic’s presidents, the one whose “fall from grace” with the French has been the most spectacular, rapid, and durable, to the point where political experts, and his friends and foes alike, wonder whether he can rebound.	. 然而他也是第五共和国的总统中最不受欢迎的，他“失宠”于法国人也是是最引人注目、迅速以及持久的，以至于政治专家、他的朋友和敌人都怀疑他是否能够咸鱼翻身。


What went wrong?	出了什么问题呢?


“I don’t want a good General, I want a lucky one” the French Emperor Napoleon I used to quip.	法国皇帝拿破仑一世曾经这样说道，“我不想要一个好将军，我想要一个幸运的将军。


By that standard, he would not have wanted Sarkozy.	”根据这个标准，他不会要萨科齐。


Having campaigned on a promise to restore and improve the French people’s purchasing power, Sarkozy came to power, in May 2007, just a few weeks before the sub-prime mortgage crisis erupted, and a few months before commodity prices exploded.	依靠恢复和提高法国人的购买力这样一个承诺当选的萨科齐在2007年5月份上台，这离随后爆发的次级抵押贷款危机只有几个星期的时间，离随后商品价格的飙升只有几个月的时间。


He then assumed the European Union presidency just days after the resounding Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty reduced his role to an exercise in damage control at best.	然后，在爱尔兰人彻底对里斯本条约说“不”的几天后——这个事件使欧盟主席变成了一个最多是控制损害的角色——萨科齐担任了欧盟主席。


And, to make matters worse, the French soccer team, whose World Cup victory in 1998 gave his predecessor Jacques Chirac a short respite and a passing popularity boom, was humiliated in June’s Euro championship.	而且，火上浇油的是，法国足球队在在6月份的欧锦赛中失利，而该球队在1998年取得世界杯胜利曾使其前任雅克·希拉克获得了一个短暂的缓冲时间并使其支持率提高。


Yet the international context, with its unforeseen events, does not suffice to explain Sarkozy’s unpopularity with the French.	然而，发生了不可预知的事件的国际背景不能充分地说明为什么法国人不欢迎萨科齐。


His problem stems from the combination of his essence and style, which adds up to a brutal lack of coherence.	萨科齐的问题源自其本质和风格的结合，而这种结合造成了严重的不一致。


As economic crisis engulfs France and most of the world, the French are not reassured by their young and energetic president.	当经济危机席卷了法国和世界上大多数国家的时候，法国年轻而精力充沛的总统萨科齐没有打消法国人的疑虑。


Of course, there is an element of deeply unfair subjectivity in this perception.	当然，在这个观点中有很深且不公平的主管因素。


But this is what politics is all about.	但是，这就是政治。


The president’s physical appearance and his body language – if he was a Shakespeare character, he would probably be the traitor Iago in Othello – are part of the problem.	萨科齐总统的外貌及其身体语言——如果他是莎士比亚笔下的一个角色的话，他可能是《奥赛罗》中的反面人物伊阿古——也是问题的一部分。


His nervousness, his impulsiveness verging on vulgarity, is disconcerting even for the majority of French who voted for him.	他的焦躁，近乎粗俗的冲动，甚至使绝大多数选举他的法国人感到不安。


At home for example, the badly needed reform of the army has been accompanied by unnecessary malignity, as if a former interior minister imbued with a “police culture” was utterly incapable of understanding the “army culture” and its sense of honor.	例如，在法国国内，急需的军队改革伴随着不必要的狠毒，似乎一个浸透了“警察文化”的前任内政部长绝对不能理解“军队文化”及其荣誉感。


And his undeniable success in implementing his labor laws, exemplified by sparse street demonstrations, has been undermined by his irrepressible will to provocation, reflected in his gratuitous remark that “today when there is a strike in France, no one notices it!”	萨科齐在执行其劳动法律上不可否认地取得了成功，这一点被稀少的街头示威所证明，然而这种成功被其抑制不住的挑衅所削弱，其挑衅反映在他“如果现在在法国有一个罢工，没有人会注意它”这样无缘无故的言论中。


In his foreign policy, too, Sarkozy seems to combine the right intuitions with the wrong tactics – that is, when his entire strategy is not marred by the pursuit of contradictory objectives.	在其外交政策中，萨科齐也似乎将正确的直觉和错误的策略——也就是说，当他的整体策略没有被追求相反的目标损害的时候——混合起来了。


France’s policy toward China and the issue of the French and EU president’s attendance at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics has represented a spectacular illustration of this lack of consistency.	法国对中国的政策和关于法国总统兼欧盟主席参加北京奥运会开幕式的问题生动地描述了这种一致性的缺乏。


Sarkozy misjudged the balance of power between France and China, and France came out of that diplomatic episode badly bruised, with its president swallowing his human rights claims and bending to the diktat of realpolitik.	萨科齐误判了法国和中国之间的力量均衡，法国从这个外交插曲中浑身是伤的走了出来，其总统咽下了其对中国的人权指责并屈服于现实政治的命令。


In the same vein, there is a mismatch in Sarkozy’s approach to Europe between the message and the messenger, between careful diplomacy needed to create a new consensus within the European Commission and with countries like Ireland, and president’s rather authoritarian style.	同样的，萨科齐在对待欧洲的方式上，在信息和信使之间，在欧盟委员会内部以及和像爱尔兰这样的国家达成新的共识所需的谨慎外交以及其相当独裁的风格之间，都有错配。


While Sarkozy’s popularity remains low, a majority of the French want him to succeed, for he has four more years to go, and there is no alternative around the corner.	虽然萨科齐的支持率仍然很低，但是大多数法国人都希望他能成功，因为他还有四年任期，并且法国人也没有其它便利的选择。


The left remains in disarray, caught between its internal feuds and the rise of anti-capitalist extremism at its margins.	法国的左翼仍然处于混乱中，受困于其内部争斗和处于其边缘的上升的反资本主义极端主义之间。


For a president bent on implementing reforms, “less can be more” – less aggressiveness and less ego.	对一个决心要进行改革的总统来说，“少可以成多”——少是指少一些好斗和自负。


But can a man act against his deepest nature?	但是，一个人可以违反他最深层次的本性吗？


The answer is probably no.	答案可能是否定的。


Sarkozy and the Euro’s Perfect Storm	萨尔科奇和欧元的完美风暴


The more French president Nicolas Sarkozy attacks the European Central Bank and the strong euro, the more he is criticized in the European media, by European finance ministers, European Union officials and the ECB itself.	法国总统越是攻击欧洲央行和强势欧元，欧洲媒体、财长、欧盟官员以及欧洲央行本身就越是批评他。


The critics are right.	这些批评是对的。


The fundamental reason behind France’s current economic weakness is its lack of competitiveness even in other euro-zone economies where the euro is not a factor.	法国目前经济疲软背后的根本原因是其缺乏竞争力，即使是在其他欧元区国家也是如此，而在这些国家欧元并不是一个因素。


But Sarkozy has a point.	但是萨尔科奇还是有点道理。


A perfect storm is forming in the foreign exchange markets that threatens to catapult the euro to levels that will make even the euro-zone’s most efficient exporter—Germany—unable to compete in world markets.	一场完美风暴正在外汇市场上形成。 这一风暴威胁到把欧元升值到令即使欧元区最为具有效率的国家德国无法在世界市场竞争的水平。


If German exporters can’t compete at 1.50 euros to the dollar, what chances do French exporters have?	如果德国的出口商尚且无法在欧元对美元1. 5的情况下竞争，那么，法国的出口商有会有多少机会呢？


The euro is gaining ground for several reasons.	欧元升值有多重原因。


A precipitating factor is that the Federal Reserve has had a dramatic change of heart about the strength of the US economy.	其中一个促发因素是美联储对于美国经济实力的看法发生巨变。


Fed chairman Ben Bernanke is now extremely concerned that the economy’s housing market and mortgage problems will cause a recession unless interest rates are aggressively cut even if this means taking some risks with inflation.	美联储主席伯南克现在极为担忧，除非大幅度降息，否则，美国经济中的房地产市场以及房屋贷款中的问题将会导致经济衰退，即使降息意味着某些通货膨胀的风险。


This new “no recession” Fed policy has started the US dollar down the path to new lows.	美联储这一新的“不得衰退”的政策让美元跌到了历史新低。


The decline will likely be sustained by the substantial US current account deficit, which found in Bernanke’s cuts the spark it needed to make its impact fully felt in foreign exchange markets.	美国庞大的经常项目赤字有可能维持这一贬值。 伯南克降息让它在外汇市场影响巨大。


Of course, if interest rates also were being cut in the euro-zone, the fall in the dollar against the euro would be moderated.	当然，如果欧元区也降息，美元相对欧元贬值就会缓解。


This is Sarkozy’s major point.	这就是萨尔科奇的要点。


But the ECB has made it clear not only that interest rate cuts are not on the table—it is merely postponing, not abandoning, the interest rate increase originally planned for September.	但是欧洲央行表明，不仅不会降息，它只不过是在推迟，而不是放弃原计划在九月进行的加息。


The perfect storm is forming because both Europe and America, for different reasons, are following monetary policies that encourage the euro to rocket to dangerous levels.	由于欧洲和美国由于不同的原因正在采取鼓励欧元大幅升值到危险水平的货币政策，因此，一场完美风暴正在形成。


The anti-inflation hawks in Frankfurt are not at all happy with Bernanke’s aggressive 50 basis point cut and the promise of more to come.	欧洲央行内的反通胀强硬人士对于伯南克大幅降息50个基点以及再度降息的保证一点也不高兴。


It gives comfort to ECB critics like Sarkozy, and otherwise puts pressure on them to drop the central bank’s inflationary bias because of its effect on the euro.	这让像萨尔科奇那样的欧洲央行的批评者安慰，并且给他们压力，由于欧洲央行通胀的偏向对欧元的影响而放弃之。


Some are recalcitrant and are more than willing to see the euro rise because, with rate hikes off the table, the strong euro may be the only way left for fighting the incipient inflation they fear.	还有些人顽强抵抗，而且更加愿意让欧元升值。 这是因为，随着加息不再进行，强势欧元可能是对付他们所担心的通货膨胀的唯一途径。


But this policy is unsustainable.	但是这一政策是难以为继的。


The ECB should drop its inflationary bias because the European economy is weakening, and the weaker economy will contain whatever inflationary pressures now exist.	欧洲央行应当放弃其通胀偏见，因为欧洲经济正在变弱，而相对疲软的经济将会限制现在的无论何种通胀压力。


The anti-inflationary bias, which made sense until recently, now is seriously out of whack with current economic realities.	反通胀偏见直到最近还是蛮有道理，现在已经与当前的经济现实脱节了。


But European officials—and not only the ECB-- seem very reluctant to admit that their economy is faltering, fearing that it will further weaken confidence and add to the slowdown pressures.	但是不仅仅是欧洲央行，欧洲官员们看起来非常不情愿承认他们的经济正在下滑，他们担心这将会进一步削弱信心并且增添减缓的压力。


Every soft number — and there have plenty lately — is given a positive spin (“euro-zone economic fundamentals remain strong” or “the economy remains robust”) -- and the media goes along with the deception.	每一个软数字都被赋予积极的基调(“欧元区经济的基本面维持强力”或者“经济保持强劲”等等)，最近这些数目很多。 而媒体则附和这些欺骗。


The Ifo business confidence indicator in Germany has been down four months in a row but, according to Ifo, “the ECB does not have to change policy.”	德国的Ifo商业信心指数已经连续四个月下降，但是，根据Ifo的观点，“欧洲央行不必改变政策。


The European Commission’s economic index is plummeting, purchasing managers indices are down and so are German retail sales.	”欧盟委员会的经济指数在下降，采购经理指数也在下降，而德国零售也是如此。


Ordinary Europeans will pay a high price for their leaders self -deception and mistaken policies.	普通欧洲人对于其领导人的自欺欺人和错误政策将会付出高昂的代价。


The longer the ECB maintains its inflationary bias, the steeper the consequent economic decline as the economy crumbles under the weight of the skyrocketing euro and interest rates that are too high for current economic realities (though lower than where the ECB hawks had planned to go before the current financial crisis hit).	当前，欧元猛升，利率相对于当前经济现实过高(尽管利率低于欧洲央行鹰派在目前金融危机打击之前计划调高的水平)，经济正在衰弱。 欧洲央行越是长久地维持其通胀偏见，经济衰弱的后果就越发严重。


Ironically, the ECB will have to cut interest rates sooner, and by greater amounts, because its inflationary bias is sending the euro to dangerous levels for the current state of its economy.	具有讽刺意味的是，欧洲央行不得不提前更大幅度地降息，因为其通胀偏见正在让欧元升值到对于当前欧洲经济状况危险的水平。


It will not do ECB credibility any good if takes an economic collapse to convince it that the coast is clear on the inflation front.	如果需要一场经济崩溃才可以让欧洲央行确信不会发生通胀，这对于欧洲央行的信誉度不会有任何好处。


The ECB is not the old Bundesbank, which had such public support and trust in Germany that it could get away with almost anything.	欧洲央行不是原来的深受公众支持和信任的德国中央银行。 原来的德国中央银行可以毛发无损。


The ECB’s margin for error is much narrower—the support of its constituents less deep.	欧洲央行的错误空间大为缩小，而成员国对它的支持也并不深厚。


A major policy mistake and the same public officials now criticizing Sarkozy for attacking the ECB will be joining him.	一旦出现重大的政策错误，那些批评萨尔科奇指责欧洲央行的官员们就会加入到他的行列。


Maastricht treaty or no Maastricht treaty, loss of public support for the ECB will diminish its independence.	无论是否有马斯特里赫特条约，丧失公众对欧洲央行的支持将会削弱其独立性。


Sarkozy at Dusk	萨科齐的黄昏


PARIS – And the next French President will be…the Socialist Party’s candidate François Hollande.	发自巴黎——下一任法国总统是……社会党候选人弗朗索瓦·奥朗德（François Hollande）。


A month ago, any prediction uttered with such certainty would have sounded imprudent, if not foolish. Uncertainty prevailed.	倘若是在一个月前，任何如此言之凿凿的预测如果不被视为愚蠢的话，至少也是欠缺明智的。


Four candidates dominated the competition, and no one would have dared to predict which two will make it to the second-round run-off.	当时不确定性占了上风，四位候选人共同统治了整场竞选，没人敢预测究竟哪俩位将会进入到下一轮。


Indeed, the race looked more open than ever in recent memory.	事实上，这本该是一场比以往任何时候都更加充满可能性的竞争。


Suddenly, something happened – not an event in itself (though it started with Hollande’s first great public rally in mid-January), but rather something that may resemble an irresistible process that can be summarized as follows: a majority of the French want to punish a president who has fallen from their graces.	但突然之间，发生了某些事件——不仅仅是事件本身（虽然在欧朗德在一月中旬发起的第一次大游行之时就已初露端倪），而是某些看似不可抗拒的进程，一言以蔽之：大多数法国人想要惩罚那个辜负了他们一番苦心的总统。


They might not have dared to do so had they not found a reasonably credible alternative.	但直到找到了一个合理且可靠的取代者之前，选民们是不会这样做的。


Hollande, by appearing more sound and determined than most French voters thought he was, has given a voice (and a face) to a widespread desire to reject the incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy.	而奥朗德，这个比大多数法国人想象中更加睿智也更充满决心的人，为这种广泛存在于人民心中的渴求提供了一种声音（以及一个面孔）——让如今的当政者，尼古拉·萨科齐，下台走人。


That is not to say that Hollande is charismatic.	这并不是说奥朗德是个特别有魅力的人。


On the contrary, there remain lingering doubts about his gravitas, not to mention serious concerns about the realism or the wisdom of his program.	恰恰相反，坊间依然存在着许多对此人品行的质疑，更别提其政纲的可实现性或者合理性了。


But, unlike his former companion, Ségolène Royal, who challenged Sarkozy for the presidency in 2007, he looks and sounds “real.”	但跟其在2007年时与萨科齐争夺总统之位的前搭档赛格琳·罗雅尔（Ségolène Royal）不同的是，奥朗德无论是看上去还是听上去都特别“真实”。


From now on, the campaign appears set to be transformed into a classic left-right struggle, but with a major difference between the two main candidates’ strategies.	从今以后，整场竞选似乎注定要转变成为一场经典的左右之争，但两大候选人的战略却存在着一个重要区别。


Hollande wants to turn the presidential election into a referendum on Sarkozy, who, given his unpopularity, is seeking to frame the battle in terms of values and experience.	奥朗德试图将大选变为一场针对萨科齐的全民公决，而失去了民望的后者却想将这场缠斗限定为一场价值观与经验之争。


Indeed, the essence of Sarkozy’s campaign message has become: “You might not like me personally (you would be wrong, by the way, because I am not as you see me, and my experience in power has transformed me deeply), but you support my conservative values, because they represent what you really think.	事实上，萨科齐的竞选活动正是想传达这么一条核心信息：“你可能不太喜欢我这个人（其实你错了，因为我并不仅仅是你眼中的我，多年的执政经验已经使我发生了深刻的转变），但你会支持我的保守主义价值观，因为这才是你内心的诉求。


In a world that is changing so rapidly and brutally, you need stability and reassurance.	在这个急剧变化的世界上你需要稳定和信心，而这也是我所能给予的。


I can give you that.”	”


By emphasizing the ideological divide between him and Hollande, Sarkozy is also being led to court, more openly than ever, the extreme-right electorate of Marine Le Pen’s National Front, as if he sensed that she might not find enough signatures to qualify for a place on the ballot.	通过强调自己与欧朗德之间的意识形态差异，萨科齐甚至走的更远，打起了玛琳·勒庞的国民阵线党那批极右翼选民的主意，因为他估计勒庞无法得到足够的支持去在选举中占一席之地。


This strategy may make sense in the first round, but, by attracting extreme-right voters in the first round, Sarkozy could lose the support of centrist voters in the run-off.	这一策略或许能在第一轮凑效，但在吸引了那批极右翼选民之后，萨科齐很可能会在下一轮选举中失去中间派选民的支持。


They might be willing to vote for “experience,” but not for a “Christian conservative” who strays from humanistic values.	他们或许愿意为“经验”投下一票，却不会买一个抛弃了人本主义价值观的“基督教保守主义者”的帐。


In any case, one could argue that the French are being unfair toward their president.	无论如何，都有人会争辩说法国人对自己的总统有点不公平。


Sarkozy has had to confront exceptionally difficult circumstances, and his record is far from poor.	萨科齐在执政期间遭遇了极端困难的情况，而他的表现也可圈可点。


At the beginning of his term, France was at the helm of the European Union, and he proved to be a skillful leader.	在其任期之初恰逢法国担任欧盟轮值主席国，而萨科齐也证明了自己是个有政治手腕的领导人物。


Understanding the gravity of the economic crisis that erupted in 2008, he reacted swiftly and with considerable energy.	在意识到2008年经济危机的严重性之后，他迅速做出反应并做出了相当多的努力。


He has also launched a major and long-overdue reform of the pension system and higher education. He made the right choices in intervening in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.	他启动了对养老金和高等教育方面一直久拖不决的重大改革，在介入科特迪瓦和利比亚事务也做出了正确的选择。


One could easily add more such examples.	你可以轻易地找出类似的例子。


In brief, Sarkozy has sincerely tried to reform a deeply paralyzed country. And he cannot be held responsible for high unemployment, given the depth of the world crisis.	一言以蔽之，萨科齐确实真心想要改革法国这个陷入深度瘫痪的国家，而鉴于全球危机的严峻性，也不应该为当前的高失业率全归到他一个人身上。


Yet, barring a last-minute miracle – a major mistake by Hollande that wrecks his credibility, or a fresh bout of crisis that stokes voters’ desire for reassuring continuity at the top – Sarkozy appears condemned to be the second one-term president in the history of the Fifth Republic, following Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.	但除非在最后一刻出现了奇迹——比如奥朗德犯下了自毁信誉的大错，或者新一轮危机的侵袭使得选民将保持连续性重新放到了第一位，否则萨科齐将很可能步吉斯卡尔·德斯坦（Valéry Giscard d’Estaing）的后尘，成为法兰西第五共和国历史上第二位只干了一届就下台的总统。


In 1981, Giscard was defeated largely as a result of the “betrayal” of his former prime minister, Jacques Chirac, who ran against him.	然而吉斯卡尔1981年的连任失利在很大程度上要归因于其前总理雅克·希拉克的“背叛”，最终被后者取而代之。


In 2012, no one in Sarkozy’s camp is betraying the president (those who are trying, such as former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, have received no support). It is Sarkozy himself who has betrayed the hopes of his supporters and consolidated the hostility of his opponents.	但今年萨科齐阵营并未出现叛徒（虽然也有前总理德维尔潘这样的人试图倒戈，但都未能得到民众支持），而真正背叛其支持者并使其反对者团结一致的，正是萨科齐自己。


Sarkozy did so mostly at the very beginning of his presidency, and he is likely to be punished for it in 2012.	这些怨恨大多是在萨科齐任期刚开始时结下的，而他也将在2012年为此付出代价。


He has changed for the better, but only up to a point, and clearly not enough for a majority of the French, who, according to recent public-opinion polls, simply cannot stand the idea of having him on their television screens for another five years.	他的变革改善了整体状况，但显然尚未达到令大多数法国人满意的程度。 据最近一项民调显示，这些民众已经无法忍受这么一个人在他们家的电视屏幕上再呆五年了。


Of course, as former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson used to say, “a week is a long time in politics,” and Sarkozy will officially become a candidate only this week.	当然，正如英国前首相哈罗德·威尔逊（Harold Wilson）所言，“在政治上，一周里的变数太多了，”而萨科齐也将在这一周内正式成为一名候选人。


Yet it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to prevent the upcoming election from becoming an emotional and negative referendum on his persona.	但对他来说，如果想要阻止随后的选举演变成为一场对他个人形象的情绪化和负面性公投，即便并非不可能，至少也将极端困难。


Sarkozy, Carpe Diem!	萨科奇，抓住机会！


Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential election triumph in May, and now the victory of his party, the UMP, in the parliamentary election, has created the most favorable opportunity in decades for deep structural reform in France.	尼古拉·萨科奇在五月总统大选中告捷，如今他领导的政党人民运动联盟又在国会选举中获胜，这是法国数十年来最有利于进行深入的结构改革的机会。


Not only did Sarkozy win the presidency with 53% of the vote, but his approval rating has since soared, to 62%, after he formed an inclusive government with high-ranking recruits from the opposition.	萨科奇不仅以53%的选票赢得总统宝座，而且之后他的支持率一直攀升，在他招收反对党的高层组成包容性的政府之后，支持率甚至达到了62%。


In the first round of the parliamentary election, the UMP won a record-high 40% of the vote.	在首轮国会选举中，人民运动联盟破纪录地赢得了40%的选票。


While voters denied the UMP a landslide victory in the second round, its overall win meant that the governing party retained its legislative majority for the first time in 29 years.	虽然在第二轮选举中未能获得压倒性的胜利，但其总票数的胜利意味着29年来执政党第一次获得立法多数席位。


In the days following his election, Sarkozy brought France “back to Europe,” reinvigorating the Franco-German partnership and giving decisive support to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s campaign to revive the European Union’s draft constitutional treaty.	在大选后的日子里，萨科奇带着法国“重返欧洲”，巩固了法德之间的伙伴关系，在德国总理安格拉·默克尔重新展开欧盟宪法草案谈判的运动中给与了决定性的支持。


He demonstrated pragmatism by not vetoing ongoing EU accession negotiations with Turkey, thus avoiding unnecessary confrontation with Great Britain and Spain, despite maintaining his long-term opposition to full membership for Turkey.	尽管他没有放弃长久以来反对土耳其取得欧盟完全成员国地位的态度，但他也没有否决正在进行的让土耳其加入欧盟的谈判，从而避免了与英国和西班牙发生不必要的冲突，显示出务实的态度。


Likewise, his government’s discreet silence in the wake of the European Central Bank’s latest interest rate increase constitutes eloquent recognition of the ECB’s independence.	同样，他率领的政府在最近欧洲央行提高利率后谨慎地保持沉默，充分表明了他对欧洲央行独立性的认可。


But how will Sarkozy and his government respond to France’s internal challenges?	但是萨科奇和他的政府将如何应对法国内部的挑战？


With anemic growth, unemployment stuck between 9% and 10% for more than 20 years, and immigrant ghettos that vacillate between lawlessness and despair, France is indeed one of the sick men of Europe.	缓慢的发展、20多年来陷于9%至10%之间的失业率、徘徊在目无法纪与绝望之间的移民贫民区，法国的确是欧洲的病人之一。


Where adaptation to ruthless international competition and rapid technological change calls for flexibility and individual responsibility, the dominant culture in France continues to be one of assistance and entitlement.	尽管为了适应无情的国际竞争和飞快的技术发展需要变通和个人责任感，但法国的主流文化仍然讲究援助与权利。


It is now clear that the French government will follow Sarkozy’s presidential program to the letter. The program’s flagship measure is the wholesale exemption of overtime hours from social security and income taxes.	现在很清楚，法国政府将不折不扣地执行萨科奇的总统大选纲领，其中标志性的措施是大规模地免除加班收入的社会保障税和所得税。


Many economists and some foreign observers are puzzled by the emphasis Sarkozy has placed on this expensive provision.	许多经济学家和部分外国观察家对萨科奇强调这项代价高昂的规定感到迷惑。


Indeed, it might appear disproportionate to give higher priority to encouraging overtime than to stimulating employment.	的确，将鼓励加班的优先顺序置于刺激就业之上似乎有点本末倒置。


But France is not a normal country.	但是法国并不是一个正常的国家。


For ten years, it has struggled with the costs of a mandatory 35-hour week – a ceiling that is now so embedded in the legislation regulating working hours that simple abrogation would lead to chaos.	十年来，她一直在每周35小时的法定工作制的代价中挣扎——而这个工作时间上限现在已经深深地融入法律中，直接废除会引起混乱。


The alternative, a targeted tax holiday, constitutes a welcome break with the culture of “time off,” and an encouragement to those who, as Sarkozy’s campaign slogan put it, want to “work more in order to earn more.”	而另一个办法，即针对性的免税期，不但可以顺应民心，打破“下班”文化，还可以鼓励萨科奇的竞选口号所指的那些希望“通过增加工作来增加收入”的人。


The program’s other measures are a series of tax cuts for the middle class, entrepreneurs, and the wealthy, which, though expensive, constitute a similarly welcome break with France’s tradition of punitive taxation.	纲领中的其他措施是针对中产阶级、企业家和富人的一系列减税计划，这些计划虽然代价高昂，但同样顺应民心，打破了法国惩罚性税收的传统。


However, none of these measures goes to the heart of France’s structural problems.	然而，这些措施都没有触及法国的结构性问题。


The Gordian knot paralyzing initiative and blocking employment consists in the maze of regulations that stifle the labor market.	破坏进取心、妨碍就业的症结存在于抑制劳动力市场的错综复杂的规章制度之中。


French companies live under the constant threat of a surprise visit from the labor inspector to determine compliance with a thick book of arcane measures.	法国的公司经常接到劳工检查员的意外造访，检查他们是否遵守众多晦涩难懂的规定。


Worse yet, the knowledge that some law or regulation covers every aspect of employment poisons the workplace and discourages attempts to resolve problems pragmatically.	更糟糕的是，大家知道就业的每一个方面都有这样那样的法律或规定，这种想法对工作岗位有害无益，使人无意尝试通过务实的方式解决问题。


When both parties to a dispute know that they are likely to end in a labor court, neither has an incentive to compromise.	当纠纷的双方都知道最终还是得闹上劳工法庭时，双方都不会妥协。


The law’s most onerous provisions are those regulating the terms of employment contracts, for they condemn employers who decide to close a plant to a marathon of legal proceedings of uncertain duration and unpredictable outcome.	法律中最苛刻的规定是对就业合同期限的规定，因为雇主如果决定关闭工厂，就不得不面对马拉松似的法律诉讼，而且不知道会持续多久，结果也难以预料。


This not only hampers restructuring, but also makes firms hesitant to hire and inhibits innovation.	这不但抑制了结构调整，而且也使公司不愿招人，阻碍了创新。


A stop-gap measure that permits firms to hire workers for temporary assignments, on condition that they not be renewed, condemns the least skilled to a demoralizing cycle of short-term jobs and repeated spells of unemployment.	一项允许公司在不续约的条件下招聘临时工人的权宜措施则使技能水平最低的一群人不得不在短期的工作和反复的失业之间徘徊，很容易变得意志消沉。


These marginal workers are predominantly immigrants and the children and grandchildren of former immigrants, whose social and economic integration is thus blocked, trapping them in increasingly violent suburban ghettoes.	这些边缘化的工人绝大多数都是移民和移民的后代。 他们在社会和经济上融入的通道因此而受阻，陷于暴力现象越来越严重的市郊贫民区内不得脱身。


There is a simple, if radical, solution: abrogate the legal provisions that regulate the duration of employment contracts, and return the treatment of tenure and seniority to collective bargaining, as is the case elsewhere.	有一个简单（或许称得上激进）的解决办法：废除就业合同期限的法律规定，将终身职位和资历的处理退还给集体谈判，就像别的地方一样。


The logical complement of such freedom would be to make employers pay for the social costs of plant closings, by levying a tax on layoffs, which would increase with seniority.	这种权利有一个符合逻辑的补充，就是通过按下岗人员征税，并且随资历的增加而提高税率，让雇主承担关闭工厂的社会成本。


The proceeds of the tax could be used in part to fund the much needed expansion of France’s underdeveloped public job placement services.	这笔税收的部分收益可以用来资助法国落后的、急待发展的公共就业安置服务。


Unfortunately, Sarkozy’s program in this critical area is vague.	不幸的是，萨科奇的纲领在这个关键领域语焉不详。


Job protection benefits the employed at the expense of the unemployed, and some unions, notably the most militant, are strongly opposed to greater flexibility, and have already threatened to block liberalizing measures in the streets.	就业保护对已就业人员有益，但却以失业者为代价。 某些工会，特别是那些最好战的工会，强烈反对提高灵活性，并已威胁要走上街头阻挠自由化措施的实施。


The pragmatic course, therefore, was to set general objectives during the campaign, and, after the elections, to encourage the unions to make the first proposals.	因此，务实的办法是在竞选中制定大致的目标，然后在大选后鼓励工会提出第一批建议。


Prime Minister François Fillon has called for tripartite negotiations on tenure and seniority this summer and fall.	弗朗索瓦·菲永总理呼吁在今年夏秋两季展开有关终身职位和资历的三方会谈。


Will the government settle for marginal changes to the existing labor code, or will it seize its unique opportunity to break with a generation of stifling regulations?	政府是否会满足于对现有的劳动法进行无关痛痒的修改，还是会抓住唯一的机会破除一个世代的压制性规定？


The future of the French economy, the stability of French society, and the influence of France in the world hangs on the outcome.	法国经济的未来、法国社会的稳定以及法国对世界的影响力都取决于这个结果。


Sarkozy Chooses Dishonor	萨科齐选择了耻辱


PARIS – “Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonor.	发自巴黎——“英国和法国必须在战争与耻辱之间做出选择。


They chose dishonor. They will have war.”	他们选择了耻辱，因此战争必将降临。


Winston Churchill’s famous denunciation of the delaying tactics of the British and French on the eve of World War II should be a warning to French President Nicolas Sarkozy.	”丘吉尔曾用这句名言来谴责英法两国在二战前夕的绥靖政策，到如今，这句话也会在法国总统萨科齐身上应验。


In fanning vicious anti-immigrant passions for short-term political gain, he will have dishonor first and then defeat.	为了短期的政治利益，他大肆推动残酷的反移民政策，这将首先令其蒙羞，并将最终遭到挫败。


For, although a majority of French today may be inclined to sympathize with Sarkozy’s immigrant-bashing rhetoric, there is no guarantee that they will re-elect him in 2012.	虽然如今大多数法国人可能会倾向支持萨科齐的反移民论调，但这并不保证他就能在2012年继续获得人民的支持。


It is not so much Sarkozy’s performance as president that most Frenchmen reject; it is his essence.	萨科齐任总统期间的大多数表演都不会被法国大众所排斥，这就是他的本质。


At a time of rising unemployment, with France dominated by fears about the future, the French need a reassuring father or mother figure, not a jittery and manipulative leaderready to compromise ethics and France’s proud tradition that every citizen is entitled to equal treatment under the law.	在这个失业率上升，整个法国都被恐惧笼罩着的时期，法国人需要的是一个能像父母般带来安慰的角色，而不是一个神经质且富有统治欲的领袖，连放弃道德以及法国人引以为荣的传统——法律面前，公民平等——都在所不惜。


Former Prime Minister Michel Rocard did not mince words about Sarkozy’s recent proposals to strip foreign-born French nationals of their citizenship if convicted of threatening the life of a police officer, practicing polygamy, or female “circumcision.” “One has not seen such measures since the Vichy regime or since the Nazis,” Rocard declared.	对于萨科齐最近的提议——如果一个外国出生的法国公民威胁警察的生命，实行一夫多妻制，或者施行妇女“割礼”，那么就将被剥夺公民身份——前总理米歇尔·罗卡尔毫不掩饰自己的厌恶：“自从维希政府或纳粹统治以来都没见过这样的手段”。


Equating Sarkozy with Marshal Pétain’s collaborationist Vichy regime is, of course, an exaggeration, but Rocard’s concerns are shared by many French – and not only intellectuals and pundits.	虽然将萨科齐比做通敌卖国的马绍尔·贝当维希政权显然是有点夸张，但罗卡尔的忧虑也是许多法国人的感受——而且不仅限于知识分子和权威专家。


Even among traditional conservatives, there is a whiff of ethical disgust at Sarkozy.	即便是那些传统的保守派也在道德上对萨科齐感到厌恶。


Can the French really violate their values to such an extent?	法国人真能如此辱没自己的价值观吗？


Will re-introduction of the death penalty be the next step on this populist downward spiral?	重新执行死刑是否又是萨科齐这个日渐没落的民粹主义者的下一个伎俩？


Two years, of course, is a long time in politics, and any predictions today about the presidential vote in 2012 would be imprudent.	对政治来说，两年无疑是一段相当长的时间，任何试图在当下预测20102大选结果的做法都是不明智的。


Yet few analysts today would bet on Sarkozy’s re-election.	但现在许多分析家都不看好萨科齐。


He proved to be a great candidate in 2007, but he was also running against a particularly weak Socialist contender, Ségolène Royal.	在2007年的时候，他证明了自己是一个优秀的候选人，但他当时的对手是塞戈莱纳•罗亚尔这个极端弱势的社会党人。


In 2012 it is unlikely that a Socialist Party “starved for power” will commit electoral suicide once again by nominating an unelectable figure.	到了2012年，“渴望权力”的社会党将不会重蹈覆辙，将这么一个无法当选的人推上前台。


Could France today be like the France of 1980 on the eve of the Left’s first victory since the establishment of the Fifth Republic?	那么当今的法国是否会像1980年那样，处在自法兰西第五共和国成立以来第一次左派执政的前夕？


Will Dominique de Villepin, the flamboyant former prime minister under Jacques Chirac, be to Sarkozy what Chirac was to Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1981?	多米尼克·德维尔潘，这位雅克·希拉克当政期间光芒四射的前总理，会像希拉克1981年取代瓦莱里·吉斯卡尔·德斯坦那样击败萨科齐吗？


Chirac, it should be recalled, guaranteed the defeat of Giscard d’Estaing by dividing the Right so bitterly that it proved impossible to reunite behind Giscard in his final-round confrontation with François Mitterrand.	当年希拉克极大地分化了右派阵营，以至于在德斯坦在与密特朗捉对厮杀的最后关头右派们都还是一盘散沙。


Behind such speculation are important questions about the state of French society and governmental institutions.	在这些猜测的背后，最要紧的是一些有关法国社会现今状态和政府架构的问题。


France, perhaps more than most European countries, is faced with serious internal security problems and violence linked to the failures of previous immigration policies, which have turned the dreams of the 1960’s into the nightmares of the present.	相对于很多欧洲国家，法国正面对着非常严重的，由过往移民政策的失败所导致的内部治安和暴力问题，将一个1960年代的梦想之国变成了如今这幅噩梦般的景象。


The undeniable escalation of violence in too many big-city suburbs, and the emergence of local “Scarfaces” who live totally without rules in a fantasy-like world of brutality, reflect a state that has gone astray.	在许多大城市的郊区，暴力正在不断升级，还涌现出一批本地“黑帮老大”，他们无法无天，横行无忌，印证着这个国家正在迷失的道路上越走越远。


But a pure “law and order” response to these problems will not magically repair the damage inflicted by years of bad policy and neglect.	但单纯一个“法律和秩序”的解决方案是无法奇迹般地消灭这些由数年错误政策和忽视所结下的恶果。


Too much state is not the answer to a locally failed state.	而加大政府管制也并不是拯救一个失败本地政府的方法。


Successful education and integration policies take time to work and thus will not bring clear-cut results in time for the next election.	成功的教育和融合政策需要时间执行，因此也不会在下次大选之前就取得立竿见影的效果。


To stigmatize immigrants, Muslims in particular, or to destroy the camps in which Roma live, is a much easier task, even if it reveals the truly opportunistic and amoral nature of both Sarkozy and those who surround him.	因此侮辱移民（尤其是穆斯林）或者捣毁吉卜赛人聚居地就成为了最得心应手的做法，即便这暴露出了萨科齐及其党羽的机会主义和道德沦丧。


For nearly 60 years, universal suffrage has made successive French presidents the modern equivalents of elected monarchs, men who have concentrated in their hands more power than their counterparts in any other democratic country.	近60年以来，普选权都赋予了历届法国总统帝王般的权威，他们手中握有的权力比其他各国领袖都要多。


Chirac’s shortening of the presidential term from seven to five years has, paradoxically, resulted in an even greater concentration of presidential power.	讽刺的是，希拉克将总统任期从7年缩短到5年的做法反而令权力更加集中到总统手中。


The problem with this omnipotent presidency is that the qualities needed in order to be elected are not necessarily those required to master the art of government, with its mixture of distance, patience, serenity, and modesty, in addition to energy and activism.	这种权倾一时的总统制的问题就在于拿到了大多数选票并不意味着当选人就掌握了治理的艺术——这是一种矜持，耐心，宁静以及温和的混合体，再加上政治能量以及行动主义。


The French presidency combines both the symbols and the realities of power – the equivalent of both the Queen of England and the British prime minister.	法国总统同时拥有了权力的表象及其实质——形同于英国女皇和内阁首相的联合体。


But an office designed bespoke for a giant like Charles de Gaulle may simply be too much for any single man or woman.	但一个为夏尔·戴高乐这样的伟人度身订做的政府无法适用于任何凡人。


Indeed, it could very well be that the failures of recent French presidents point to a structural problem at the heart of the French constitution, and not just to the shortcomings of its various incumbents.	事实上，现今法国总统的所谓失败，��不仅仅是由于那些当选者的不称职，而都应归因于一个涉及法国宪法核心的架构问题。


Sarkozy Goes to War	萨科奇发起战争


PARIS – In 2003, France, under President Jacques Chirac, took the lead in opposing America’s planned invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.	巴黎——2003年，在雅克·希拉克总统执政期间，法国领导了反对美国入侵萨达姆·侯赛因治下伊拉克的运动。


French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s flamboyant speech at the United Nations encapsulated the “spirit of resistance” against what proved to be a dangerous adventure.	法国外长多米尼克·德维尔潘在联合国言辞华丽的讲话蕴含着对这次冒险行动的“反抗精神”。


In 2011, under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France has again taken a highly visible stand on a question of war and peace, except that now the French, together with the British, are leading the fight to protect Libya’s people from their erratic, brutal leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.	2011年，在尼古拉·萨科奇总统的领导下，法国又一次明确了自己在战和问题上的态度，唯一的不同之处在于，这次法国与英国一起在保护利比亚民众不受残酷而反复无常的领导人穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲压迫的斗争中发挥领导作用。


Why does France seem to crave such prominence?	为什么法国总渴望出名？


In the eyes of the French, France’s international status remains a key ingredient in forming their own national identity.	在法国人眼中，法国的国际地位一直是其民族特性构成的关键要素。


The way we French are perceived by others affects how we perceive ourselves, and nothing is more troubling for us than to be perceived with indifference or, worse, not to be noticed at all.	别人看待法国人的方式影响着法国人对自己的判断，对于我们来讲，没有比被视为冷漠或干脆默默无闻更令人苦恼的问题了。


Suddenly, with the Libya issue, we can tell ourselves that we are catching up with Germany, whose pusillanimity is striking; we are showing the way to the United States; and the French (and British) flags are deployed in the streets of “liberated” Libya, together with that country’s own new flag.	突然间在利比亚问题上，我们赶上了以优柔寡断著称的德国，我们为美国指引方向，法国（和英国）的旗帜与利比亚的新国旗一起，插满了“解放”利比亚的大街小巷。


And, just as suddenly, the French, according to early polls, are proud again to be French.	同样突然的是，稍早的民意调查显示，法国人再次为自己感到骄傲。


France’s seemingly natural propensity to intervene is reinforced in this case by three key factors: Sarkozy, Qaddafi, and the context of a wider Arab revolution.	此次有三种关键因素巩固了法国似乎与生俱来的干涉倾向： 萨科奇、卡扎菲和阿拉伯革命大环境。


The Sarkozy factor is fundamental.	萨科奇的因素至关重要。


The French president loves crises, with their concomitant surge of adrenaline.	这位法国总统热爱危机，以及随之而来的激增的肾上腺素。


For him, this is what power is about: taking hard decisions under unfavorable circumstances.	对他而言，这就是权力的意义所在： 在不利的条件下做出艰难的决策。


Of course, domestic considerations are not absent from Sarkozy’s thinking.	当然，萨科奇的思考不乏国内因素。


In 2007, when he played a key role in the liberation of Bulgarian nurses imprisoned by Qaddafi, Libya’s leader was rewarded with what looked like a legitimacy prize: an official visit to Paris.	2007年，当萨科奇促成卡扎菲释放被关押的保加利亚护士时，利比亚领导人被授予了看似是承认其合法地位的奖赏： 正式访问巴黎。


He was no longer a pariah, but an eccentric partner.	此时的卡扎菲不再受到排挤，而是成了古怪的合作伙伴。


Today, by contrast, it all looks as if intervention may re-legitimate Sarkozy in the eyes of French citizens, whose votes he will need in next year’s presidential election.	而今天则恰恰相反，一切军事干涉似乎都为重塑法国民众眼中萨科奇的合法地位，萨科奇在明年的总统选举中急需这些民众的投票。


An energetic and daring gambler, Sarkozy is taking a high but legitimate risk that he can retake the moral (and political) high ground.	萨科奇活像一名充满活力的大胆赌徒，冒着极大但合理的危险竭力将道德（和政治）制高点夺回到自己手中。


Beyond Sarkozy is Qaddafi, the ideal villain.	除萨科奇以外还有卡扎菲，由他来扮演罪犯再理想不过。


A caricature of a despot, he personifies the type of odious adversary whom all democrats want to see defeated.	他活像一幅暴君的漫画像，所有民主人士希望打败的可恶对手集中体现在他一人身上。


His behavior has been abominable for decades – and not only towards his people.	几十年来他的所作所为一直令人憎恶，但这种憎恶不光来自于国内。


The terrorist attacks on Western targets that he ordered include not only the Pan Am tragedy in Lockerbie, Scotland, but also a French UTA plane blown up over Africa.	由他下令针对西方目标的恐怖袭击不仅包括苏格兰洛克比的泛美悲剧，也包括法国阿灵顿飞机在非洲上空的爆炸。


And not only is Qaddafi truly bad, but Libya is comparatively small, and his forces appear relatively weak (this remains to be proven on the ground).	不仅卡扎菲是邪恶的化身，而且利比亚相对较小，他的力量似乎也比较薄弱（这一点尚有待于在地面行动中得到证实）。


Aside from these personality factors, there is the regional context.	除个性方面的因素外，还有地区环境因素在起作用。


Preventing Qaddafi from rebuilding the wall of fear that fell in Tunisia and Egypt is essential if the “Arab spring” is not to be succeeded by a new winter of discontent.	防止卡扎菲重建在突尼斯和埃及已经倒塌的恐惧之墙是防止已经到来的“阿拉伯春天”继之以不满的严冬的关键因素。


What is now done in the sky over Libya – sanctioned by international law and, unlike in Iraq in 2003, with the ambivalent political support of the Arab League – is fundamental if the Arab revolutionaries are to take a positive view of the West.	目前的利比亚空袭对阿拉伯革命者积极看待西方至关重要，利比亚不仅受到国际法律的制裁，而且和2003年伊拉克不同的是，阿拉伯联盟对它的政治支持也充满了矛盾。


The West is not trying, as it did during the Crusades or the Imperialist conquests of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to impose its religion or values on the Arabs.	西方并没有像十九及二十世纪早期十字军东征或帝国主义占领时那样试图将宗教或价值观强加给阿拉伯民众。


Instead, the West is defending common values, such as freedom, respect for human life, and the rule of law.	相反，西方维护的是共同价值观，比如自由、法治和对生命的尊重。


We have a duty to protect Arab lives and values, as Arabs themselves have requested.	我们有责任保护阿拉伯民众的生命和价值观，阿拉伯人自己也有这样的要求。


France has a common history and geography with the countries on the southern Mediterranean shore.	法国与南地中海沿岸国家拥有共同的历史和地理环境。


The duty to intervene – and the cost of indifference – is probably higher for France than for any other Western country.	因此法国进行干预的责任和继续漠视的代价可能比其他西方国家都高。


Indeed, France has a very large immigrant population that originated in the Maghreb, and for which the “Arab spring” is vitally important and a source of fascination and pride.	事实上，法国有大量来自马格里布的移民，而在他们看来，“阿拉伯春天”不仅至关重要，而且能带来魔力和骄傲。


And today, with France taking the lead in an international effort to protect the Libyan people from their leader, they can feel simultaneously proud of being French and of their Arab roots.	今天，因为法国领导了保护利比亚民众免受其领袖侵害的国际斗争，他们可以同时为自己的法国和阿拉伯身份感到骄傲。


These positive identities constitute the best protection against the sirens of fundamentalist Islam.	上述积极身份是抵御伊斯兰原教旨主义警报的最佳保护。


Of course, an ideal scenario implies that the intervention “goes well,” and that it does not incite confusion or chaos in Libya or the wider region.	当然，理想情况是指干涉行动“顺利进行”，而且没有在利比亚或非洲地区引起困惑和混乱。


France, together with Great Britain, and with the more distant support of the US, is undeniably risking much, for it is easier to start a war than it is to end one.	毫无疑问，在美国的远程支持下，法国正和英国一起冒着很大的风险，因为结束战争总比挑起战争更加困难。


But it is a worthwhile risk.	但这种冒险是值得的。


The cost of non-intervention, of allowing Qaddafi to crush his own people, and of thus signaling to the world’s despots that a campaign of domestic terror is acceptable, is far more menacing.	坐视不管、默许卡扎菲压迫本国民众、并以此向全世界暴君发出国内恐怖活动可以接受的信号，这样做其实蕴含着更大的风险。


Sarkozy has chosen the right course.	萨科奇做出了正确的选择。


In fact, he has chosen the only possible way forward.	事实上，他选择的是唯一一条前进之路。


Sarkozy’s Moment	萨科齐时刻


LONDON – A little more than three years ago, just as the financial crisis was getting into full swing, I published a guide to the international system of financial regulation, Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide.	发自伦敦——就在金融危机集中爆发的三年前，我写了一本关于国际金融管制制度的指南《全球金融管制：必读指南》。


It described an elaborate spider’s web of committees, councils, and agencies with overlapping responsibilities, unrepresentative memberships, and inadequate enforcement powers – a system built up incrementally over decades, with no guiding architectural hand or central authority to promote coherent global regulatory standards.	书中呈现了一个由众多委员会，理事会以及其他部门组成的全球监管架构，虽看似天网恢恢，但却被责任重叠，代表性缺乏和执行能力不足等问题弄得千疮百孔——这是一个耗费人们数十年的心血积累而成，无奈却始终缺乏一个指导性架构或者核心机构去推动全球统一监管标准的系统。 。


After all that has happened in the intervening years to demonstrate the dangers inherent in these flaws, and a plethora of summits and conferences, a 2008 guide to financial regulation ought now to be hopelessly out of date.	随后那几年所发生的一切已经彻底暴露了上述缺陷的内在危险性，又经过一大堆峰会论坛大肆讨论之后，这本2008年出版的金融管制指南似乎已经过时。


Unfortunately, it is not.	但不幸的是，情况恰恰相反。


True, some things have changed for the better.	毫无疑问，有些方面已经得到改善。


At the apex of the pyramid, the G-7 was obliged to give way to the broader G-20, bringing countries like China and India into the decision-making nexus as full partners.	在世界政经金字塔的顶端，7国集团（G7）不得不让位给代表性更强的20国集团（G20），将中国和印度当作全权合作伙伴纳入决策圈内。


G-20 summits are more cumbersome as a result, but that simply reflects the reality of the ongoing shift in economic power from West to East.	虽然这也令G20峰会更加臃肿，但却也清晰地反映了经济实力从西方向东方转移的事实


There is no point in pretending that this shift is not happening, or that standards set in New York and London will be slavishly followed in Mumbai and Beijing if China and India are not involved in the process.	有人试图假装这一转移从未发生，有人认为孟买或北京会在不参与决策过程的情况下无条件采用纽约和伦敦的标准，但这类想法都是毫无道理的。


So the increased importance of the G-20 should be welcomed.	因此我们也应该对G20日益增加的重要性表示欢迎。


There has been one other important change, too.	此外还有一个重要的变化。


The Financial Stability Forum, created after the Asian financial crisis as an informal coordinating body – the United States resisted anything stronger – was renamed the Financial Stability Board.	金融稳定论坛这个在亚洲金融风暴后创立的非正式协作机构——当时美国坚决反对建立更强大的机构——被重新命名为金融稳定委员会。


A “board” sounds more impressive, authoritative, and permanent than a mere “forum.”	“委员会”这个字眼比“论坛”听上去更令人印象更深刻，更具权威性也更加长期稳定。


In the arcane world of international financial diplomacy, these subtle shifts in terminology matter.	在诡秘的国际金融外交中，这些专业术语的细微切换确实能说明一些问题。


But the change in name should not blind us to the fact that the FSB has no more power than the FSF had.	但更名事件也不应让我们无视一个事实：金融稳定委员会的权力实际上跟从前那个论坛一般大小。


Successive G-20 summits have asked its chairman, Mario Draghi (now a favorite to succeed Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the European Central Bank), for updates on progress in reforming regulation, but the FSB has no authority over the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, or any of the other standard setters.	在此前多届G20峰会上与会各国都要求金融稳定委员会主席马里奥·德拉吉（如今也是顶替让-克劳德·特里谢出任欧洲央行行长的热门人选）汇报监管改革的进程，但该委员会的权力无法凌驾于巴塞尔银行监管委员会或其他标准制定者之上。


It cannot instruct them to change their rules. Nor can it achieve consistency between different standard setters’ approaches, or, indeed, consistency of implementation by different national regulators.	它无法命令这些机构去更改法则，也无法在各机构的不同标准之间达成一致，或者在不同国家的监管者之间获得同样的执行效果。


Yet consistent implementation is crucial to avoiding another regulatory “race to the bottom.”	但一致的执行效果也是避免各国争相降低管制标准的关键。


There are already dangerous signs that global firms are moving activities into more congenial jurisdictions in order to avoid tighter regulation in the major financial centers.	许多全球企业已开始向那些管制更宽松的地区迁移以躲避那些主要金融中心的严厉管制，这是个非常危险的迹象。


The G-20 should fill that gap urgently.	G20应当加紧弥合这一差距。


President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, which chairs the G-20 this year, has asked for a review of the governance of the financial system.	担任本年度G20峰会轮值主席的法国总统萨科齐已经要求检讨对金融系统的治理成效。


In response, the existing bodies are vigorously defending their autonomy, resisting any attempts to impose on them a modicum of coordination and discipline.	但反过来，那些业已存在的机构也在拼命维护自己的自主权，反抗任何试图迫使他们采纳哪怕极为微小的协调和规管的举动。


The International Monetary Fund, for example, has always resented the FSB, arguing that the Fund itself should be the monitor of systemic risk – and thus serve as the de facto global financial regulator.	比如世界货币基金组织就经常对金融管制委员会发火，认为自己本身就应该是系统性风险的监控者——并因此成为事实上的全球金融监管者。


But the IMF’s arguments have been weakened by a recently published report by its own evaluation office, highlighting the Fund’s failure to identify emerging risks in the run-up to the crisis.	但该组织下属评估部门最近发布的一份报告中却显示其根本没能在危机逐渐累积的过程中定义出那些不断膨胀的风险，因此也令该组织有点底气不足。


The IMF is too political a body to act as the systemic-risk watchdog.	事实上在扮演系统性风险监管这的角色上，世界货币基金组织还是过于政治化了。


The next G-20 summit should implement a fundamental reform of the FSB.	为此下一届G20峰会应当对金融监管委员会进行更彻底的改革。


It should give the FSB a legal personality, enshrined in an international treaty.	峰会应当给予该委员会一个法律地位，并将其写入到条约之中。


Currently, the Board has no formal status and only a small, though high-quality, permanent staff, hosted by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel.	目前该委员会尚未有一个正式地位，而只是一个由位于瑞士巴塞尔的国际结算银行支持下的小机构（虽然其级别很高，且人员长期稳定）。


Draghi’s successor as chairman should be a full-time appointee, and the FSB should be given powers to direct the other standard setters, review the implementation of standards by individual countries, and publish the results.	德拉吉的接任者应该全职负责该委员会，而委员会本身也应被授予指导其他标准制定机构，检查各国的标准执行情况并公布监管结果的权力。


It would be unrealistic to think that the FSB could direct countries to strengthen their regulation, but it should have some form of arbitration power analogous to that held by the World Trade Organization.	要求金融监管委员会直接指导各国去加强监管的想法是不现实的，但它也应当拥有某些类似世界贸易组织那样的裁判权。


So, if a country is thought to be operating a lax regime to attract mobile international business, the FSB could expose that behavior and publish its conclusions.	这样当一个国家被认为试图放宽监管以吸引国际企业的话，委员会就能曝光这些行为并公布自己的结论。


The anomaly that countries have decided to endow an international body with powers to regulate disputes in trading goods, but not in financial transactions, should be corrected.	那些国家向某些有权裁决商品贸易争端（而非金融制裁）的国际组织捐钱的行为也应当得到纠正。


There is a strong argument for going further, and subsuming the standard setters – the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, etc. – in a single body. They could be co-located in a regulatory Tower of Babel in Basel.	有某些强烈的呼声要求将改革推动到更深的层次，将所有标准制定者——包括巴塞尔委员会，国际证券事务监察委员会组织和国际保险监督官协会等组织——整合为一，并在巴塞尔的专门兴建一座监管机构总部，将所有机构都集中在那里。


That might happen one day, as the borderlines between different sub-sectors of the financial system become more blurred.	随着金融系统旗下的某些分支领域之间的界限逐渐模糊，这点或许能最终实现。


But, for now, however logical such an objective may be, it is probably too much to hope for.	但不管这个目标有多么合理，目前距离实现还有相当一段距离。


Even so, as the saying goes, it is important not to waste a good crisis.	但即便如此，正如人们所说，最要紧的是不要浪费了这次危机所带来的大好机会。


Sarkozy has a golden opportunity to put his mark on the global financial system. Surely a French president, eager for global success with a domestic election looming, will not pass up his chance?	萨科齐得到了一个在全球金融系统上烙下自身烙印的良机，而这位渴望用全球性成就来拉拢国内选票的法国总统难道会让其白白溜走？


Indeed, Sarkozy has an additional incentive, given that he would be scoring a point against the IMF, led by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, his likely Socialist opponent in the next presidential election.	事实上萨科齐还有一个额外的动机，他在下届大选中的潜在社会党对手多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩恰好也是世界货币基金组织总裁，为此他必须要在这场斗争中占得上风。


So, for once, logic and personal political motivation are pushing in the same direction.	因此在这一时刻，理性和个人政治动机都促使萨科齐在同一方向上发力。


That ought to be a winning combination.	而这也应当是一个迈向胜利的组合。


Sarkozy’s Société Générale Myopia	萨尔科奇在兴业银行问题上的短视


SAN FRANCISCO -- The French government should be honoring Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer for saving Société Générale from certain bankruptcy in the current rogue trader scandal, not criticizing him, as some high government officials have done.	旧金山--法国兴业银行胆大包天的交易员爆出丑闻后，法国中央银行行长努瓦耶挽救了该银行免于破产。 法国政府应该向他致敬，而不应当像某些政府高官那样批评他。


“Loose lips sink ships” is received wisdom in central banking circles.	在各国中央银行的圈子里，“言多必失”是至理箴言。


But if President Nicolas Sarkozy’s team in the Élysée Palace had had its way, Noyer would have immediately informed the government of Société Générale’s troubles.	但是如果萨尔科奇总统的爱丽舍宫班子如愿以偿的话，努瓦耶就将会立即告知政府有关兴业银行的困境。


Had that happened, there would have been an unacceptable risk that the news would leak to speculators before Société Générale had a chance to liquidate the extraordinary large stock positions that Jérôme Kerviel had amassed, presumably without the bank’s knowledge.	如果此事发生，那么，就会有无法令人接受的风险，也就是这一消息或许在银行不知情的情况下在兴业银行有机会清算科维尔囤积的庞大股票头存之前透露给投机者们。


The loss for Société Générale could have been far higher than the €5 billion it is reported to have incurred.	这给兴业银行带来的损失就将会远远大于据报导导致的50亿欧元了。


Speculators could have “front run” the bank in the markets, selling short, driving equity prices down, and forcing the French financial institution to sell into a bottomless pit.	投机者们就会在市场上先下手为强，进行卖空，把资产价格压低，并且迫使法国金融机构挥泪抛售。


Is a forced bankruptcy in extremely fragile global financial markets what the French government wanted for Société Générale?	对于兴业银行而言，法国政府果真想要在极为动荡不安的全球金融市场上被迫破产吗？


How can President Sarkozy, who has repeatedly attacked financial speculators, question the judgment of the very man who, by knowing how to keep his mouth shut in a crisis, thwarted them?	萨尔科奇总统多次抨击金融投机者，他如何能够质疑那个在危机时刻守口如瓶而挫败那些投资者的人的判断呢？


Of course, independent central bankers are not Sarkozy’s favorite people.	当然，独立的中央银行行长并非为萨尔科奇所宠爱。


According to Laurent Dubois, a political science professor at the Sorbonne in Paris, Noyer may pay for Sarkozy’s battles with the European Central Bank.	巴黎索邦大学政治学教授杜伯瓦说，努瓦耶或许会在萨尔科奇与欧洲央行的争斗中付出代价。


Sarkozy has “a problem with central banks’ independence,” and Noyer may become a “scapegoat.”	萨尔科奇“与中央银行的独立性存有芥蒂”，并且努瓦耶可能成为“替罪羊”。


Not likely – at least in the current political environment.	这至少在目前的政治环境下不大可能。


Sarkozy’s recent poll numbers have been dropping like a stone.	萨尔科奇最近的民意支持率已经直线下跌。


According to the TNS Sofres poll for Le Figaro Magazine, Sarkozy’s popularity tumbled a whopping eight percentage points in January, to just 41%, the lowest level since he took office last May and down from a high of 65% in July.	根据法国费加罗杂志所做的一项民意调查，萨尔科奇一月份的民众支持率猛跌八个点，仅仅达到41%，这是他上台以来最低的，而七月份最高曾经达到65%。


Sarkozy, who during his electoral campaign vowed to be the “president who delivers on purchasing power,” now faces an angry French public whose primary complaint is that purchasing power is being eroded by inflation.	萨尔科奇在其总统竞选中曾经发誓要成为“实现购买力的总统”。 但是他现在面临愤怒的法国公众，他们主要抱怨通货膨胀正在侵蚀他们的购买力。


In this changed political environment, Sarkozy is not likely to go after someone like Noyer who, as Bank of France Governor and a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, is widely viewed as a stalwart against inflation and a defender of French purchasing power.	在这一发生变化的政治环境中，萨尔科奇不大可能追究努瓦耶。 作为法国中央银行行长和欧洲中央银行管理委员会的成员，努瓦耶被广泛认为是通货膨胀的屏障以及法国人购买力的维护者。


Why risk a “soft on inflation” label?	为何要冒着戴上“对通货膨胀软弱”标签的风险呢？


Sarkozy might even tone down his attacks on the ECB, whose single-minded, inflation-fighting policies have made it one of his favorite targets.	萨尔科奇甚至可能缓和其对欧洲央行的攻击。 该行一心一意反对通货膨胀的政策已经让它成为萨尔科奇喜欢攻击的目标。


That would be a good thing.	这将会是一件好事。


With Sarkozy off his back, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet might feel freer to cut interest rates to counter the impending economic slowdown in Europe.	没有了萨尔科奇的压力，欧洲央行行长特里谢或许就会感到更为自由地下调利率来对抗马上来临的欧洲的经济减缓。


Meanwhile, though Société Générale has been saved by Noyer’s professionalism and political courage, it has been badly wounded and will most likely be taken over by another bank.	与此同时，尽管努瓦耶以其专业精神和政治勇气挽救了兴业银行，但是该银行还是元气大伤，而且很有可能被另一家银行收购。


A foreign takeover would raise French protectionist hackles.	外国收购将会及其法国人的保护主义愤怒。


“Société Générale will remain a great French bank,” Prime Minister Francois Fillon has said.	法国总理菲永已经发话：“兴业银行将会保留成为一家法国大银行。


“The government will not allow it to be the target of hostile raids by other banks.”	政府不会允许它成为其他银行恶意攻击的目标。 ”


The problem is that the French government is barred from doing this under an EU directive that it signed last year, which was specifically introduced to improve transparency in banking mergers.	问题是，根据其自己在去年签署的一项欧盟指令，法国政府不得这样做。 欧盟专门制定这一指令来增强银行兼并的透明度。


After Italy’s former central bank governor, Antonio Fazio, flagrantly abused his position to block a takeover of an Italian bank by ABN Amro, member countries agreed that future mergers would be assessed on five objective criteria, the idea being to prevent governments from blocking foreign bids purely for protectionist reasons.	意大利前央行行长法其奥悍然滥用其职位阻止一家意大利银行被荷兰银行收购。 欧盟成员国一致认为，未来的收购应该根据五项客观指标来进行评估。


Noyer’s diplomatic skill certainly will be put to the test if he has to navigate the treacherous waters between the Scylla of French protectionism and the Charybdis of the EU’s five criteria for bank mergers.	努瓦耶如果要在法国保护主义和欧盟有关银行兼并的五项标准之间的凶险地带辗转腾挪，那么，他的外交技巧就将会受到考验。


Foreign bank mergers have proved poisonous for euro-zone central bankers.	外国银行兼并对于欧元区央行行长们而言已经成为毒药。


So far, the only serious candidates to emerge for a Société Générale takeover are two French banks, Credit Agricole and BNP Paribas.	目前为止，只有两家法国银行成为收购兴业银行的认真的候选银行，它们是法国农业信贷银行和国民巴黎巴银行。


But should a credible foreign offer for Société Générale appear in the coming weeks – and it well might – another disruptive conflict between the Bank of France and the government may be in the offing.	但是，如果在未来几个星期内出现了兴业银行的有信誉度的外购收购要约，而且有可能出现，法国中央银行与政府之间的另一场破坏性冲突就在所难免。


The Société Générale rogue trader scandal has caused more problems than any of the main players possibly could have imagined.	兴业银行胆大包天的交易员丑闻所造成的麻烦要远远多于关键人物们所可能想像的。


Sarkozy’s Three-Way NATO Bet	萨科奇的北约三重赌注


PARIS – France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure after a 43-year absence last year brought to an end one of the exceptions françaises. It also helped frame the growing debate over whether to develop European defense more effectively or to seriously reform the Atlantic alliance.	发自巴黎 —— 去年法国在时隔 43 年后重返北约一体化军事架构，从而为又一个事务所谓“法国例外” （ exceptions françaises ，意指将法国排除在外的国际事务）的历史画上了句点。 而这也有助于设立一个框架，来容纳越来越多关于是应当发展更高效的欧洲防务，还是对美欧大西洋联盟进行重大改革的辩论。


At first glance, it may seem that France chose NATO at the expense of the ten-year-old European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).	咋一看，法国似乎是抛弃了刚实施了 10 年的欧洲防务与安全政策 （ European Security and Defense Policy ， ESPD ） 而转投北约的怀抱。


But that interpretation takes too pessimistic a view of ESDP’s achievements over the past decade, and is based on a flawed understanding of the relationships between NATO and the European Union.	但对于 该政策 在过去 10 年中所取得的成就来说，这种判断不但过于悲观，而且也是构筑在一种错误理解北约与欧盟之间关系的基础之上的。


Indeed, France’s return to NATO is far from a U-turn that reflects disenchantment with ESDP.	事实上，这次回归并不是一次意味着法国从欧洲防务与安全政策的迷梦中苏醒过来而进行的彻底反转。


Rather, it is the product of a 15-year process of rapprochement with NATO – and of the real progress being achieved in European defense.	恰恰相反，这是法国耗时 15 年最终实现与北约和解 —— 以及欧洲防务所取得的实质性进展 —— 的产物。


France ’s re-integration into NATO is, in fact, the final stage in a process that has seen the French military play an increasingly important role in the alliance’s operations.	而对于法国军事力量在大西洋联盟中角色逐渐增强这个历史进程来说，法国重新整合进北约只是其中的最后一个阶段。


France has been aligning itself with the military structures of a NATO that has progressively abandoned the practices that were at the root of General Charles de Gaulle’s decision to quit, most notably the placement of all NATO forces under a single command, even in times of peace.	更何况如今的北约相对于当年戴高乐所退出的那个组织在运作上已经有了极大的进步，早已不是那个以所有军事力量都归于单一指挥（即便在和平时期）为最大特点的机构了。


Sarkozy’s NATO policy is thus more of a follow-up on decisions and developments in the 1990’s than a radical U-turn from the policies of his predecessors.	因此，萨科奇的北约政策更多是对 1990 年代政策的延续和发展，而不是对其前任政策的彻底颠覆。


Where Sarkozy does distinguish himself is in adopting a more openly pro-Atlantic stance.	而萨科奇政策的与众不同之处则在于，他采取了一个更加公开地支持大西洋联盟的立场。


Beyond the often partisan and quintessentially French polemics about Sarkozy’s NATO decision, it is possible to discern what might best be termed a three-way wager by the French president.	对于萨科奇的重返北约的决定，除了那些经常存在的左右派系思维和那套经典的法式论调（民族主义，种族主义和大西洋主义）之外，我们或许还能看到某种可以被恰当地形容为这位总统的“三重赌注”的东西。


The first concerns building European defense in harmony with NATO, rather than in opposition to it.	而其中的第一重，则是建立与北约和谐共处的而不是对立的欧洲防务。


Ending the exception française in NATO has removed the suspicion that French support for developing European defense was really aimed at competing with the alliance or weakening it.	因为结束北约事务“法国例外”的历史将有助于消除这么一种怀疑，即法国支持和发展欧洲防务的目的是为了与北约分庭抗礼，或者是试图削弱北约。


Whether this suspicion had any truth or not, the message for many allies is clear: the developments the French want for ESDP are compatible with its full and complete membership of NATO.	不管这种怀疑有没有根据，传达给众多盟友的信息是明确的：法国所期望的欧洲防务和安全政策的发展是与其全面地，彻底的北约成员国身份相一致的。


American support for the European Union’s efforts to play a greater role in defense and security – a stance apparent since 2007 and confirmed by the arrival of the Obama administration – consolidates this approach.	美国支持欧盟在防务和安全上努力承担更重要的角色的立场 —— 该立场自 2007 年后就变得越发明确，并通过奥巴马政府的上台得到最后确认 —— 则巩固了这一进程。


The second part of Sarkozy’s wager concerns reforming and renewing the alliance.	萨科奇的第二重赌注则与联盟的改革有关。


France’s full engagement will increase the pace of reform in NATO and make the alliance a tool better adapted to twenty-first-century crises by paring down its cumbersome bureaucracy. France could not become an active player in this debate without being part of the alliance.	法国的全身心参与将加快北约改革的步伐，并通过削减其臃肿低效的官僚机构，使之成为能够更好地应对 21 世纪危机的工具。


Following the appointment of French officers to a number of key NATO posts, France can, along with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and a few other NATO allies, begin to implement much-needed reforms.	在法国官员被授予一系列北约要职之后，法国随之与英国，荷兰以及其他一些北约盟友一起，开始推行这场迫在眉睫的改革。


The last and perhaps most difficult part of the wager is “Europeanizing” the alliance.	而最后一条，也可能是最困难的赌注则是是盟友的 “ 欧洲化 ” 。


France can help to give NATO more balance by spreading political and military responsibilities more evenly among Europeans and Americans.	通过在欧洲和美洲各国之间更平均地分配政治和军事责任，法国可以使北约变得更为平衡。


Now that the right political conditions exist in the United States, it is up to Europeans to make the political decisions on budgets and resources that will enable them to strengthen their role in NATO.	既然在美国国内已经产生了合适的政治氛围，那么就该轮到欧洲人来制定关于预算和资源的政治决定，使他们能够增强自身在北约中的地位。


There is no guarantee, of course, that the three parts of this wager will pay off.	当然，没有任何承诺能保证这三条赌注都能兑现。


The forces of inertia are always strong, and when it comes to resources the current economic crisis favors neither ambitious reforms of the alliance nor serious intensification of ESDP.	惯性的力量总是那么强大，而谈到资源方面，当前的经济危机既不利于对联盟开展雄心勃勃的改革，也不利于强化欧洲防务和安全政策。


It will be a few years yet before we can determine whether these ambitions have borne fruit.	我们还需要好些年的时间才能判定这些雄心勃勃的目标是否能结出硕果。


The most serious criticism of France’s return to the alliance has been that it places the European defense project at risk, or at least endangers the ambitious vision of the EU as a leading strategic player.	而对法国重归联盟的最严肃的批判就是这一举动会令欧洲的防务计划岌岌可危，或者至少是损害了欧盟立志成为领导性战略角色的远大目标。


If that were the case, Sarkozy’s decision, regardless of the advantages to NATO or France, would clearly be open to question.	如果真是这样的话，姑且不论回归为北约或法国带来了多少好处，萨科奇的决定都无疑要面对广泛的质疑。


If France had returned fully to NATO’s military structures 10 or 15 years ago, before ESDP existed, this would indeed be a serious and well-founded objection.	但问题是，如果法国的回归是发生在 10 或 15 年前，在欧洲防务和安全政策尚未出现之时，���么上面的批判将会是一个严肃而且理由充分的反对声音。


But the fact that the EU has become a politico-military player since 1998 has radically changed the stakes.	然而欧盟自 1998 年以来就已经转变成为一个政治 - 军事运作体的事实彻底改变了整个状况。


In just a few years, the Union built a framework for managing civilian and military crises, however imperfect or incomplete these tools may still be.	在仅仅的几年时间内，欧盟就建立一个处理民事和军事危机的框架，尽管这个框架尚未完善，也难言完整。


The EU has since 2003 begun to assert itself operationally as well, carrying out 23 ESDP missions, six of which have been significant military operations.	自 2003 年始，欧盟就开始声称自己也可以独立行动，并执行了 23 次欧洲防务和安全任务，其中还有 6 次是重大的军事行动。


It has engaged in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, as well as South-East Asia with its Aceh peacekeeping mission, and more recently in the Caucasus and in the Indian Ocean.	其足迹涉及巴尔干地区，非洲，中东和阿富汗，东南亚地区印尼亚齐省的维和任务，以及最近在高加索和印度洋的行动。


These operations have varied widely in scale, ranging from a few dozen observers, police officers, or civilian advisors to several thousand soldiers.	这些行动范围十分广泛，包括了从少量观察员，警官或非官方顾问到数量达到几千人的士兵。


Although they have mostly been on land, operation “Atlanta” off the coast of Somalia saw the EU’s first naval operation.	尽管这些行动大部分都是在地面进行，但是在索马里海岸执行代号为 “ 亚特兰大 ” 的行动也见证了欧盟的首次海上行动。


All were launched autonomously, relying either on national command arrangements or on making the most of command arrangements with NATO known as Berlin-plus.	所有这些行动都是独立展开的，要么是依靠各国各自指挥，要么就是尽量借助 “ 柏林延伸妥协协议 ” 这样的北约内部协议进行指挥。


In these circumstances, France’s full involvement in NATO, far from burying the European project, looks like a vital tool for furthering it.	在这些情况下，法国对北约事务的全面参与不但没有埋葬欧洲项目，反而看起来更像推进这一项目的重要手段。


Sarkozy's decision has put France in a position to gain influence in the alliance and increase the pace of NATO’s reform, while at the same time strengthening the ESDP.	萨科奇的决定使法国在联盟中担当起了影响重大的角色，并且加快了北约改革的进程，而与此同时，也强化了欧洲防务和安全政策。


Building Bridges over the Persian Gulf	建立波斯湾的关系之桥


MADRID ‒ Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia spiked earlier this month, with protesters storming the Saudi embassy in Tehran after the execution of a Shia cleric in the Kingdom.	马德里—本月早些时候，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的紧张局势猛然恶化，沙特处决了一位什叶派牧师，导致沙特驻德黑兰大使馆前示威者云集。


This is just the latest manifestation of the deep-rooted rivalry between the two Middle Eastern powers.	这只是中东两大势力间根深蒂固的对立的最新写照。


But while their mutual enmity is longstanding, it is far from age-old, as it is sometimes portrayed.	但尽管它们的敌意由来已久，却并不像有时所描绘的那样古老。


Given their common interests, a return to cooperation, though highly challenging, is not impossible.	考虑到共同利益，恢复合作尽管挑战重重，但也并非不可能。


Although it has been essential in establishing their national identities, these countries’ sectarian divide – Saudi Arabia is the Arab world’s leading Sunni power, while Iran is majority Shia – has not always been an element of confrontation in the region.	树立民族身份对于这些国家来说至关重要，但它们的宗派分歧——沙特阿拉伯是阿拉伯世界逊尼派力量领头羊，伊朗则主要由什叶派组成——并非总是地区冲突因素。


It was not until 1501 that the Safavid dynasty established Shi’ism as the official religion of Persia, thereby distinguishing itself from its Sunni Ottoman neighbors, which were occupying part of their territory.	直到1501年，萨非王朝才将什叶派立为波斯国教，从而将自己与占领部分土地的逊尼派奥斯曼诸邻邦区分开来。


During the subsequent two centuries, Persia confronted the Ottoman Empire – the heart of the Sunni caliphate – for regional supremacy.	在随后的两个世纪中，波斯与奥斯曼帝国——逊尼派哈里发的核心——争夺地区霸权。


In 1932, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established, it adopted Wahhabism – a school of Sunni Islam – as its official creed.	1932年，沙特阿拉伯王国建立时将逊尼派伊斯兰教的一个派别——阿拉维派立为国教。


Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia and Iran established diplomatic relations.	尽管如此，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗仍建立了外交关系。


In the 1960s and early 1970s, their security and political cooperation deepened, owing to a shared interest in confronting radical movements that threatened their monarchies.	20世纪60年代和70年代初，由于在对抗威胁到君主制度的激进运动方面存在共同利益，双方安全和政治合作有所加深。


As they worked to limit Soviet-style communism’s advancement in the Arab world, they emerged as key Cold War allies of the West, especially the United States.	它们遏制苏联式共产主义对阿拉伯世界的蚕食，成为西方特别是美国的关键冷战盟友。


In the late 1970s, however, a sectarian battle of identities flared up.	但是，20世纪70年代末，一场身份的宗派战争开始兴起。


Saudi Arabia, supported by the financial gains brought by rising oil prices, started expanding its security efforts by exporting Wahhabism.	沙特阿拉伯有上涨的油价所带来的金融收益的支持，开始通过输出瓦哈比派扩大安全动作。


And it perceived a direct threat after 1979, when Iran’s Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah and the new regime declared itself to be the leader of Shia worldwide.	而当1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命颠覆了巴列维王朝、新政权宣布自己为世界什叶派领袖时，沙特感受到来自伊朗的直接威胁。


In response to Iran’s call for the liberation of all Shia, Saudi Arabia redoubled its efforts to spread Wahhabism, intensifying the struggle between the two powers.	作为对伊朗号召解放所有什叶派的回应，沙特阿拉伯加强宣传瓦哈比派，这让两大力量之间的斗争更加激烈了。


Though conflict has not erupted into direct confrontation, there has been no shortage of proxy battles, beginning with the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.	尽管冲突并未转变为直接对峙，但从20世纪80年代的两伊战争开始，代理战争层出不穷。


More recently, it has shaped the course of Syria’s civil war, in which Iran backs President Bashar al-Assad, who represents the Alawite sect of Shia Islam, while the Saudis are supporting anti-Assad Sunni forces.	最近，这场冲突决定着叙利亚内战的进程，伊朗支持代表什叶派伊斯兰教中的阿拉维派的总统巴沙尔·阿萨德，而沙特支持反阿萨德的逊尼派力量。


In Yemen, a Saudi-led coalition has used airstrikes to beat back the Houthis, Iran-backed Zaidi Shia rebels fighting the Sunni-led government – a conflict that has already claimed some 6,000 lives.	在也门，沙特领导的联军使用空袭回击胡塞武装——伊朗支持的、与逊尼派领导的政府对抗的扎伊迪派（Zaidi）什叶派叛军。 这场冲突已经造成约6,000人死亡。


But, as in the past, the latest confrontation between the two powers is related to domestic developments.	但是，和过去一样，沙伊之间的最新冲突与国内形势有关。


Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are currently undergoing important political and economic transitions that could leave their regimes vulnerable.	伊朗和沙特阿拉伯目前都在经历重要的政治和经济转型，可能导致政权不稳。


Iran, gearing up to elect a new parliament and Assembly of Experts (which chooses the country’s Supreme Leader) in February, remains in dire straits economically.	伊朗即将在2月举行议会选举和专家大会（Assembly of Experts，将决定最高领袖人选），但其经济状况依然令人担忧。


The unemployment rate reached 11.4% in 2014, and is considerably higher among young people.	2014年失业率高达11. 4%，年轻人失业率比这个数字还要高得多。


The international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has now led to the lifting of sanctions; but the economic benefits are yet to be widely felt.	伊朗核计划国际协议目前已经取消了制裁； 但其经济收益并未被广大伊朗人民所感受到。


Of course, if President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to open Iran to the outside world continue, those benefits ultimately will be widely felt, fueling the growth of the middle class.	当然，如果伊朗总统鲁哈尼继续其向外部世界开放伊朗的努力，那么这些收益终将被广泛感受到，刺激中产阶级的成长。


But for precisely that reason, more conservative elements within Iran’s government are deeply suspicious of Rouhani’s reformist agenda, viewing the potential emergence of a more worldly, pluralistic society as a serious threat to the regime’s survival.	但正是因此，伊朗政府中的保守元素对鲁哈尼的改革派日程抱有深刻的怀疑，认为更具世界性、更加多元的社会的出现是对政权生存的严重威胁。


Indeed, although Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ratified the nuclear deal last year, he has repeatedly declared that he still mistrusts the US.	事实上，尽管最高领袖哈梅内伊在去年批准了核协议，但他反复宣称仍不信任美国。


In addition, the conservative-controlled Guardian Council – which comprises six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by the parliament – has rejected 99% of reformist candidates for the upcoming election.	此外，保守派控制的监护委员会（Guardian Council，包括六名由最高领袖任命的成员和六名由司法界提名、经议会批准的法律人士）拒绝了即将到来的选举的99%的改革派候选人。


It thus appears that parliamentary opposition to Rouhani’s reforms is set to intensify.	因此，看来议会对鲁哈尼改革的反对还会加剧。


Saudi Arabia, too, is at a turning point.	沙特阿拉伯也站在转折点上。


Last year, following the death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who ruled for a decade, his half-brother, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, ascended to the throne.	去年，在位十年的沙特国王阿卜杜拉·本·阿卜杜勒阿齐兹逝世，其同父异母弟萨勒曼·本·阿卜杜勒阿齐兹即位。


Salman has since been shifting governmental responsibility to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud.	萨勒曼随后将治国重任交给了王储穆罕默德·本·纳耶夫（Muhammad bin Nayef）和副王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud）。


These changes at the top are occurring in a context of severe economic decline brought on by the collapse of world oil prices; budget revenue has been depleted to the point that the fiscal deficit reached 15% of GDP last year.	这些高层变化的发生恰逢世界石油价格崩盘导致沙特经济���重衰退之时； 预算收入告急，去年财政赤字达到了GDP的15%。


In this unstable context, leaders in both Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to believe that continued confrontation will help sustain them in power, not least by reinforcing the notion that more change, especially in the form of increased economic or political openness, would be dangerous.	在如此不稳定的环境下，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯领导人似乎都认为继续冲突能够强化“增加变化是危险的”（特别是增加经济和政治开放）这一概念，从而有利于保持他们的权力。


Friendly (or at least constructive) relations between both powers would thus appear to be a remote possibility, at least for the foreseeable future.	因此，两大力量间建立友好（或至少是建设性）关系似乎希望渺茫，至少在可以预见的未来是如此。


But steps can be taken that might at least prevent tensions from escalating further.	但可以采取一些措施，从而至少有望防止紧张进一步升级。


Khamenei’s condemnation of the attack on the Saudi embassy, which he called harmful for the country and Islam, was noteworthy in this sense.	从这个角度讲，哈梅内伊谴责对伊朗大使馆的袭击——称之为对伊朗和伊斯兰教的伤害——值得肯定。


Even with such steps, Iran and Saudi Arabia are highly unlikely to reach an agreement on Syria in the next round of international talks.	即使采取了这些措施，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯在下一轮国际谈判中就叙利亚问题达成协议的可能性极低。


But progress toward ending the war in Yemen – which is at an earlier stage than the Syrian war, and entails fewer international and regional interests – is possible, especially given Saudi Arabia’s economic travails.	但在结束也门战争——相较叙利亚战争，也门战争处于较早阶段，并且牵涉到的国际和地区利益也较少——方面是有可能取得进展的，特别是如果考虑到沙特阿拉伯经济困难的话。


The key will be agreement on a cease-fire, as a precursor to a long-term resolution of the conflict.	关键在于同意停火，以此作为长期冲突解决方案的先决条件。


While the gulf between Iran and Saudi Arabia runs deep, instances of pragmatic cooperation on specific issues like Yemen can help to build bridges.	伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的海湾很深，但在也门等具体问题上进行务实合作有利于搭建桥梁。


Doing so would benefit the entire region.	这样做将让整个地区获益。


The Kingdom Beyond Oil	超越石油的王国


RIYADH – Over the past few weeks, the government of Saudi Arabia has been engaged in an unprecedented strategic policy review that could have ramifications for every aspect of the country’s social and economic life.	利雅得——过去几周里，沙特政府一直在进行可能影响到国家社会和经济生活方方面面的前所未有的战略政策审核。


The full details are expected to be announced in January, but it is already clear that the kingdom – the world’s nineteenth-largest economy – is in desperate need of far-reaching reform.	完整的规定细节预计将于明年1月公布，但显而易见身为世界第十九大经济体的沙特王国迫切需要一次意义深远的改革。


There are two reasons why change has become urgent.	改革需求迫切主要有两个理由。


The first is the dramatic drop in global oil prices, from above $100 per barrel in the middle of 2014 to below $40 today.	首先是全球石油价格急剧下降，从2014年中的100多美元一桶一路降至今天的40美元以下。


With oil exports accounting for nearly 90% of government revenue, the pressure on Saudi finances has been intense; the fiscal balance has swung from a small surplus in 2013 to a deficit of more than 21% of GDP in 2015, according to projections by the International Monetary Fund.	因为石油出口占政府收入的将近90%，沙特政府承受的财政压力十分巨大； 据国际货币基金组织预测，财政平衡已经从2013年的小幅盈余下降到2015年赤字占GDP的21%以上。


The second reason is demographic.	第二个原因是人口结构。


In the next 15 years, some six million young Saudis will reach working age, putting enormous pressure on the labor market and potentially doubling its size.	今后15年，约六百万沙特青年将达到就业年龄，这将对劳动力市场造成巨大压力并可能扩大一倍现有的就业规模。


It is easy to be pessimistic about this confluence of circumstances, and many international commentators are.	这些情况加在一起很容易引发悲观，而很多国际评论家就是这样。


But there are also good reasons for optimism, most notably the new Saudi leadership’s recognition of the challenge and the possibilities that addressing them could create.	但也有充分的理由保持乐观，最重要的是新任沙特领导层已经认识到这一挑战，同时也对应对挑战所能带来的机遇了然于胸。


According to research by the McKinsey Global Institute, Saudi Arabia has the potential to double its GDP and create six million additional jobs by 2030, enough to absorb the influx of young men – and, increasingly, young women – entering the labor market.	按照麦肯锡全球研究院的研究成果，沙特有可能到2030年在实现GDP翻番的同时额外创造六百万个就业机会，足以吸纳涌入就业市场的青年男女。


To accomplish this however, the kingdom will have to dramatically reduce its unhealthy dependence on oil – a strategic goal that has been long discussed, but never implemented.	但要想实现这一目标，沙特王国必须大幅降低对石油的不健康依赖——这是一个早已讨论、但从未实施的战略目标。


Saudi Arabia has many sectors with strong potential for expansion.	沙特有诸多行业具备极强的扩张潜力。


The country has substantial untapped deposits of metals and non-metallic minerals, including phosphate, gold, zinc, bauxite, and high-quality silica.	该国拥有大量未经开发的金属和非金属矿物，包括磷酸盐、黄金、锌、铝土矿以及高品质的硅土。


Its retail sector is already growing quickly, but it lags behind in areas like e-merchandizing and supply-chain efficiencies.	其零售部门已经在迅速增长，但在电子商务和供应链效率方面仍相对落后。


The country’s tourism sector could be developed and upgraded, not only for the millions of Muslim pilgrims who visit the holy sites of Mecca and Medina every year, but also for leisure tourists.	该国的旅游业也可以开发和升级，不仅面对每年前往麦加和麦地那朝拜的数百万穆斯林朝圣者，同时也面对休闲游客。


Saudi Arabia has a long coastline on the Red Sea, as well as other unspoiled areas of natural beauty that could attract visitors.	沙特拥有漫长的红海海岸线，以及未经破坏的自然美景来吸引旅游者。


The manufacturing sector, too, could be built up; at the moment, the kingdom has only small-scale domestic manufacturing, despite being one of the largest markets in the region for cars, machinery, and other capital goods.	制造业也正在蓬勃发展； 目前还仅有小规模的国内制造，但却拥有该地区规模最大的汽车、机械和其他生产资料市场。


Exploiting these opportunities will require trillions of dollars in investment, radical improvements in productivity, and the government’s firm, sustained commitment.	发掘这些机会需要数万亿美元的投资，从根本上改善生产力以及政府的长期坚定承诺。


Doubling GDP over the next 15 years will necessitate about $4 trillion in investment, two-and-a-half times the amount of money that flowed into the kingdom’s economy during the 2003-2013 oil boom.	今后15年GDP翻一番需要约4万亿美元的投资，相当于2003-2013年石油繁荣期间流入王国经济投资金额的两倍半左右。


Attaining this level of investment will require radical policy reforms.	达到这一投资水平需要进行根本的政策改革。


During the oil boom, the state increased public-sector wages and social-welfare transfers – and thus was a major contributor to households’ growing prosperity.	石油价格高涨期，政府增加了公共部门工资和社会福利转移支付——并因此成为家庭繁荣的主要贡献者。


The public sector continues to dominate most aspects of the economy, especially employment; about 70% of Saudi nationals work for the state.	公共部门继续主导绝大多数经济领域，尤其是就业； 约70%的沙特国民在为政府工作。


But transforming the economy will require the participation of investors and businesses; indeed, we calculate that by 2025, at least 70% of the investment should come from the private sector.	但经济转型需要投资者和企业的加入； 事实上，我们计算到2025年，至少70%的投资应来源于私有行业。


Achieving this will require overhauling the country’s regulatory and legal framework.	实现这一目标需要对国家制度和法律框架进行彻底的改革。


It will also require large improvements in productivity.	此外还需要生产率的大幅提高。


Saudi Arabia’s productivity growth has lagged behind that of most other G-20 countries, rising by just 0.8% in the past decade.	沙特阿拉伯的生产率增长一直落后于其他多数G-20国家，过去十年仅仅增长了0.


Jump-starting productivity growth will require reworking the kingdom’s restrictions on business and labor practices.	8%。 启动该国生产率增长需要修订王国的企业和劳动力规则。


For now, the Saudi economy relies heavily on low-wage and low-productivity foreign workers on limited contracts; indeed, such workers hold more than half the jobs in the country.	目前，沙特经济在很大程度上依赖于签订限制性合同的低工资、低效率的外国工人； 事实上，这些工人占据了该国半数以上的工作岗位。


That will have to change if the economy is to raise productivity and modernize its non-oil sectors.	只有改变这一现状，才有可能提高生产率并实现非石油部门现代化。


The kingdom’s new leadership has some difficult but important choices to make as it formulates a detailed economic strategy.	该国新一届领导班子在制定详细的经济战略前需要做出一些艰难但却重要的选择。