In his speech, Köhler reported that the Fund had taken the evidence on board and would incorporate it in its future advice.	科勒在讲话中说，IMF获得了第一手证据，并将会在未来的建议中予以考虑。


But in the current crisis, the academic evidence has overwhelmingly shown that fiscal austerity does what textbook economics says it will do: the more severe the austerity, the greater the drag on growth.	但在最近的危机中，学术证据一边倒地表明财政紧缩带来了经济学教科书上所说的效果：紧缩越严厉，增长受累越大。


A variety of studies confirming this proposition, including one by the IMF’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, have withstood considerable scrutiny and leave little room for ambiguity.	大量研究确认了这一说法，其中就包括IMF首席经济学布兰查德（Oliver Blanchard）。 这些研究经得起考验，结论明白无误。


The two public voices arguing for the magical properties of austerity are official agencies based in Europe: the OECD and the European Commission.	有两家公共机构支持紧缩的魔力，它们都是欧洲的官方机构：经合组织和欧盟委员会。


The Commission’s stance, in particular, is animated by an institutional commitment to a fiscal viewpoint that leaves no room for evidence.	尤其是欧盟委员会，它的立场非常坚定，支持根本没有证据证明的财政观点。


Among the G-7 economies, only Italy has done worse than the UK since the Great Recession began.	在七国集团中，只有意大利在大衰退爆发后的表现比英国更差。


Indeed, the UK’s GDP has only just regained its 2008 level, lagging behind even France.	事实上，英国GDP才刚刚恢复2008年的水平，表现连法国都比不上。


This is all the more remarkable given that the crisis in the UK was comparatively mild.	考虑到英国的危机相对较为温和，这一点就更加引人注目了。


The fall in property prices was modest relative to Ireland and Spain, and, because there was no construction boom, there was no construction bust.	英国房地产价格的下跌比起爱尔兰和西班牙相对温和，而由于英国不存在建筑业繁荣，因此也没有建筑业衰败。


Having missed the warning signs about the bank Northern Rock, which needed to be bailed out by the UK government after a run on its deposits in September 2007, the British authorities, unlike their eurozone counterparts, quickly dealt with the economy’s distressed banks.	英国当局没有注意到诺森洛克（Northern Rock）银行的警示信号——在2007年9月发生储户挤兑后，它需要英国政府的救助——但和欧元区机构相反，它们迅速行动起来处置了英国的受困银行。


For these reasons, the UK should have had a quick recovery; instead, the Cameron government’s gratuitous austerity stifled it.	从这些方面看，英国应该会有迅速的复苏； 相反，卡梅伦政府用毫无道理的紧缩扼杀了它。


The IMF’s apology was a mistake for two reasons.	IMF的致歉是错误的，原因有二。


Thumbing one’s nose at scholarly evidence is always a bad idea, but it is especially damaging to an institution that relies so heavily on the credibility of its technical competence and neutrality.	对学术证据嗤之以鼻永远不是好主意，但对于一个严重依赖技术能力和中立性信誉的机构来说尤其危险。


If the Fund embraces muddled economics, on what basis will it defend its policy advice?	如果IMF的经济学学得好一点，又怎么会为其政策建议辩护呢？


Moreover, in choosing to flatter the UK’s misguided policy, the Fund has confirmed its deference to its major shareholders.	此外，IMF选择奉承英国的错误政策，这确认了IMF为其大股东马首是瞻的本质。


For years, the view has been that the IMF is a foreign-policy instrument of the United States.	多年来，人们一直认为IMF是美国的外交政策工具。


The softness in its annual surveillance of UK economic policy has also been well known.	其对英国经济政策的年度评估态度之软弱也是众所周知的。


But in taking this latest step, the Fund has undermined – perhaps fatally – its ability to speak “truth to power.”	但在做出了最新致歉姿态后，IMF再无脸面宣扬“真理的力量”了。


If so, a fundamental question may well become unavoidable: Why does the IMF exist, and for whom?	既然如此，一个根本性问题就变得不可避免：IMF为什么还要存在下去？ 为谁存在下去？


The Global Economy’s Groundhog Day	全球经济的欧洲土拨鼠日


NEW DELHI – In the movie “Groundhog Day,” a television weatherman, played by Bill Murray, awakes every morning at 6:00 to relive the same day.	新德里—在电影《土拨鼠日》（Groundhog Day）中，比尔·穆雷（Bill Murray）扮演的电视天气预报员每天都会在早晨6点起来，过同一个日子。


A similar sense of déjà vu has pervaded economic forecasting since the global economic crisis began a half-decade ago.	自五年前全球经济危机爆发以来，经济预测界也是如此。


Yet policymakers remain convinced that the economic-growth model that prevailed during the pre-crisis years is still their best guide, at least in the near future.	但决策者仍然自信地认为在危机前大行其道的经济增长模式仍是他们的最佳指南，至少在近期是如此。


Consider the mid-year update of the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, which has told the same story every year since 2011: “Oops!	以国际货币进组织（IMF）《世界经济展望》（World Economic Outlook）的年中更新为例。 自2011年以来，该报告一直在讲同一个故事：“哦！


The world economy did not perform as well as we expected.”	世界经济没有像我们预期的那样表现。


The reports go on to blame unanticipated factors – such as the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, uncertainty about America’s exit from expansionary monetary policy, a “one-time” re-pricing of risk, and severe weather in the United States – for the inaccuracies.	”接着，报告将矛头指向了未预料到的因素——比如日本东北大地震和海啸、美国推出扩张性货币政策的不确定性、风险的“一次性”重新定价、美国天气恶劣，等等——以此为预测失准开脱。


Emphasizing the temporary nature of these factors, the reports insist that, though world GDP growth amounted to roughly 3% during the first half of the year, it will pick up in the second half.	《世界经济展望》强调这些因素的暂时性质，认定尽管世界GDP增长在上半年只有大约3%，但会在下半年加速。


Driven by this new momentum, growth will finally reach the long-elusive 4% rate next year.	受新动力推动，增长最终会在明年达到久违的4%水平。


When it does not, the IMF publishes another rendition of the same claims.	如果事实并非如此，IMF搬出其他理由重复相同的主张。


This serial misjudgment highlights the need to think differently.	一系列的误判彰显出有必要做不同的思考。


Perhaps the focus on the disruptions caused by the global financial crisis is obscuring a natural shift in developed economies to a lower gear following years of pumped-up growth.	也许强调全球金融危机的破坏阻碍了人们关于发达经济体在经历了多年的奔腾增长后出现减速的自然转变的认识。


Moreover, though emerging economies are also experiencing acute growth slowdowns, their share of the global economic pie will continue to grow.	此外，尽管新兴市场也在经历急剧的增长减速，但它们占全球经济的比重仍在继续上升。


In short, tougher economic competition, slower growth, and low inflation may be here to stay.	简言之，更激烈的经济竞争、更慢的增长和低通胀可能继续存在下去。


In the United States, conditions for an economic takeoff ostensibly have been present for the last year.	在美国，去年看上去出现了经济起飞的条件。 家庭债务和失业有所下降；


Household debt and unemployment have fallen; corporate profits and cash reserves are large; the stock market is valuing the future generously; banks are ready to lend; and fiscal consolidation is no longer hampering demand.	公司利润和现金储备规模巨大； 股市对未来相当乐观；


Yet, contrary to expectations, growth in household consumption has remained lackluster, and businesses have not ramped up investment.	但是，与预期相反，家庭消费数据仍然毫无亮点，企业也没有加大投资。


In the first two quarters of this year, America’s GDP barely exceeded the level it attained at the end of last year, and much of the increase was driven by goods that have been produced but not yet sold.	今年前两季度，美国GDP并未超过去年年底的水平，增长的大头是由生产出来但尚未销售出去的商品贡献的。


The prevailing explanation – a brutally cold winter – is wearing so thin that everyone should be able to see through it.	流行的解释——异常寒冷的冬季——实在过于单薄，所有人都可以一眼看穿破绽。


American consumers remain scarred by the crisis.	美国消费者仍在舔舐危机留下的伤疤。


But there is another problem: in their homes and workplaces, the sense of excitement about the future is missing, despite all the gee-whiz gadgetry that now surrounds them.	但还有另一个问题：在家里和单位里，对未来的兴奋感正在日益消失，尽管现在各种新奇小玩意唾手可得。


And while the US Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing has propped up businesses, it is no substitute for the enthusiasm and anticipation needed to propel investment.	而尽管美联储的量化宽松政策刺激了企业，也不能作为促进投资的热情和参与的替代品。


Even the reduced global forecast of 3.4% GDP growth for this year is likely to prove excessively optimistic.	即使是向下修正的GDP增长预测（3. 4%），也极有可能过于乐观了。


Before the crisis, world trade grew at 6-8% annually – well faster than GDP.	危机前，世界贸易以每年6—8%的速度增长，远快于GDP。


But, so far this year, trade growth remains stuck at about 3%.	但是，到今年目前为止，贸易增长只有3%左右。


Failure to recognize the fundamental slowdown that is occurring is reinforcing the expectation that old models can revive growth – an approach that will only create new fragilities.	没有认识到正在发生的根本性减速使人们预期旧模式能够重振增长，而这一观念只能制造新的弱势。


Atif Mian and Amir Sufi warn that US consumers’ purchases of cars and other durables have been bolstered by the same unsustainable “subprime” lending practices that were used to finance home purchases before the crisis.	阿提夫·米安（Atif Mian）和阿米尔·苏菲（Amir Sufi）警告说，美国消费者的汽车和其他耐用品消费受不可持续的“次级”借贷行为驱动，而这正是危机前刺激买房行为的因素。


Similarly, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, envisages a Britain with a Cyprus-sized financial sector amounting to 900% of GDP.	类似地，英格兰银行行长马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）认为英国的金融部门正在向塞浦路斯靠拢（规模相当于GDP的900%）。


And economist Michael Pettis cautions that China’s reliance on policy stimulus to kick-start the economy whenever it stalls will merely cause macroeconomic vulnerabilities to accumulate.	经济学家迈克尔·佩蒂斯（Michael Pettis）警告说，中国每次陷入停滞都依靠政策刺激促使经济重新启动，这将导致宏观经济脆弱性逐渐积累。


The two tectonic shifts in the global economy – slower GDP growth and increased emerging-market competition – have created a fault line that runs through Europe.	全球经济的两大构造变迁——GDP增长放缓和新兴市场竞争加剧——形成了一条贯穿欧洲的断层线。


The technical lead held by Europe’s traditional trading economies is being eroded, while wage competition is encouraging fears of deflation.	欧洲传统贸易经济所保持的技术优势正在消失，而工资竞争助长了通缩恐慌。


And, with the eurozone’s most debt-burdened economies bearing the brunt of these shifts, Italy is sitting directly atop the fault.	此外，欧元区债务最重的经济体承受了这些变迁的主要影响，意大利更是首当其冲。


The European Central Bank, however, is unable to revive eurozone growth on its own.	但是，欧洲央行无法凭一己之力重振欧元区增长。


Given the resulting drag on the global economy – and especially on world trade – it is in the world’s interest to engineer a coordinated depreciation of the euro.	在全球经济（尤其是世界贸易）因此受到拖累的情况下，欧元的协调贬值符合全世界利益。


At the same time, a globally coordinated investment stimulus is needed to create new opportunities for growth.	与此同时，需要全球协调的投资刺激创造新的增长机会。


Just as Bill Murray’s character could not escape Groundhog Day without radically changing his life, we cannot expect different economic outcomes without fundamentally different growth models.	就像比尔·穆雷扮演的角色只有彻底改变生活才能摆脱土拨鼠日，我们也无法在不从根本上改变增长模式的情况下指望出现不同的经济结果。


Asia After the Afghan War	阿富汗战争后的亚洲


TOKYO – July will mark two milestones in America’s sometimes-tortured relations with Asia.	发自东京——美国与亚洲之间偶尔纠结的关系将在今年7月迎来两个里程碑。


One is the beginning of the end of the nearly decade-long struggle in Afghanistan – the longest war in United States history – with President Barack Obama announcing the withdrawal of 30,000 US troops from the country by next summer.	首先，随着奥巴马总统宣布3万名驻阿富汗美军将在明年夏天以前陆续撤出，持续近十年之久的阿富汗战争——也是美国历史上历时最长的一场战争——终于迎来了落幕的时刻。


The other is the 40th anniversary of Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing, a turning point in the Cold War and the first step on China’s road to modernization – but at the time a huge shock to Asia, particularly Japan.	其次，亨利·基辛格秘密访华40周年纪念也即将到来，当年基辛格的访问成为了冷战的一个转折点，也是中国迈向现代化的第一步——同时也让整个亚洲，尤其是是日本，大为震惊。


The looming Afghan withdrawal recalls, at least for some Asians, a third, even more traumatic event: America’s chaotic exit from Saigon in April 1975.	至少对某些亚洲人来说，美国从阿富汗撤军的情形会令他们回想起另一件更为痛苦的往事：1975年4月，美国从西贡仓促逃离。


Back then, that debacle seemed to presage a broader US withdrawal from Asia, with a war-weary American public seeking the supposed comforts of isolationism.	当时美国国民已经厌倦了战事，渴望重投孤立主义以寻找一丝安慰，因此美国在越南的溃败似乎意味着其将大规模收缩部署在亚洲的军队规模。


Today’s Asian nervousness exists not only because isolationism appears to be gaining ground once more in America, but also because Afghanistan’s stability remains in doubt, while China’s power is rising in the absence of any pan-Asian consensus or institutional structure.	如今孤立主义在美国国内再次抬头，阿富汗的稳定仍然堪忧，而在缺乏发亚洲共识或制度框架的情况下，中国却正如日东升，这一切都让亚洲坐立不安。


America did, indeed, turn inward following the fall of Saigon, and its neglect of Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 led to chaos and Al Qaeda’s near-takeover of the country.	事实上败走西贡后美国确实转向保守，而在1989年苏联撤出阿富汗后，美国人对这个国家的漠视则导致阿国内部陷入混乱，几乎让基地组织夺取了整个政权。


So it is not surprising that many Asian leaders are asking themselves what commitments the US will maintain once its troops leave Afghanistan.	可见许多亚洲领导人对美国在撤军后继续对阿富汗承担什么样的责任表示怀疑就不足为奇了。


Perhaps equally important, many people in Asia are also debating whether the region would be able to rebalance itself should the US scale back its military presence.	而同样重要的是，许多亚洲人都在争论：在美国人收缩其军事存在后的亚洲是否还能重新实现战略均衡。


Fortunately, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has reassured America’s Asian friends and allies that regional disengagement is not being contemplated.	幸运的是，美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨已经向其亚洲友好国家和盟国做出保证：美国不会撤出该区域。


At the recent Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore – indeed, in the presence of Chinese Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie – Gates outlined his ideas for continuing US cooperation in and with Asia.	近日在新加坡举行的香格里拉对话会中——中国国防部长梁光烈上将也有出席——盖茨列出了他关于美国与亚洲的继续合作纲要。


Gates promised to increase the number of US warships deployed to Singapore as part of the US-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement; increase the number of US Navy calls in Asian ports; hold more joint naval exercises; and improve multilateral military cooperation.	盖茨承诺，按照美国与新加坡战略框架协议的要求增加在新加坡的军力部署； 增加美国海军在亚洲各港口的访问次数；


Even more reassuring were the principles that will, according to Gates, guide America’s future Asian strategy: free and open commerce; support for the rule of law and the rights, responsibilities, and sovereignty of Asia’s states; open access to Asian and global sea lanes, airspace, and cyberspace; and peaceful resolution of all conflicts.	此外，盖茨还强调了美国未来亚洲战略的主要原则：自由开放的贸易； 对法治以及亚洲各国权利，责任和主权的支持；


These principles matter, because Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and even Mongolia all regard America’s military presence in the region as essential to counterbalancing China’s increasing might.	各类冲突的和平解决。 这些原则十分重要，因为澳洲、日本、韩国、泰国、菲律宾、印度、印尼、新加坡、马来西亚、新西兰，越南甚至是蒙古都把美国在亚洲的驻军作为制衡中国崛起的必要因素。


Gates, however, is due to step down from his post shortly, which is unfortunate, because the Obama administration’s apparent lack of any explicit Asia strategy means that Gates’s reassurances might not reassure for very long.	但很不幸的是，盖茨很快就要离职了，鉴于奥巴马政府明显缺乏清晰的亚洲战略，因此盖茨的保证似乎也将命不久矣。


Nowadays, US policy on Asia needs the type of strategic vision and insight that guided Kissinger’s discussions with Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai four decades ago.	当今的美国亚洲政策需要有40年前指导基辛格与毛泽东和周恩来谈判的那种战略远景和洞察。


Without a clear and convincing doctrine, at least some Asian leaders are likely to remain dubious of America’s ability to remain Asia’s dominant military force, particularly given its economic woes, projected fiscal retrenchment, and other overseas commitments.	但考虑到美国当前的经济困境，财政紧缩以及其他一些海外承诺，如果美国人不能拿出一份清晰且具有说服力的指导原则，那么亚洲的领导人们仍然会对美国维持亚洲军事主导地位的能力半信半疑。


This lack of clarity may become particularly troublesome should China’s leaders underestimate the enduring quality of America’s Asian commitments.	同时如果中国领导人也因为这种战略清晰性的缺失而低估美国对亚洲承诺的长期效力，那么问题就更加严重了。


Securing a structure of peace in Asia, however, is not solely America’s responsibility.	当然，亚洲各国维持一个和平的结构不仅仅是美国的责任。


America’s friends and allies need to think hard about what sort of regional order they want, and they must begin to collaborate in order to breathe life into a structure of peace within which all of Asia can prosper and feel secure.	美国的友好国家和盟国需要认真反思自己究竟想要形成一种什么样的区域秩序，并且必须同心协力为一个实现亚洲繁荣和安全的和平架构注入生命力。


Japan’s government in particular needs to identify a coherent Asia strategy and stick to it, instead of leaning towards China one minute, and America the next.	日本尤其要制定一个具有连续性的亚洲战略并坚定贯彻执行，而不能在中美之间朝秦暮楚。


In constructing a viable strategy, deepening Japan’s partnerships with Asia’s great democracies – India, Indonesia, and South Korea – must be a priority.	此外在构建一个切实可行的战略时，日本必须优先考虑深化与诸如印度、印尼和韩国等亚洲民主国家的盟友关系。


But the biggest question concerns China’s place in a consensual Asian order, and its willingness to collaborate with its neighbors, as well as with the US, in creating it.	但最终重大的问题还是中国在亚洲统一秩序共识中的位置，以及中国是否愿意与其邻国和美国合作构建这样一种秩序。


The doubts that many Asians now hold about China’s intentions are well grounded, given the secretive nature of China’s military build-up, and its leaders’ increasingly aggressive tone in territorial disputes with India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.	考虑到中国秘密提升军事力量的行为，以及其领导人在与印度，日本，菲律宾和越南的领土争端中日趋强硬的态度，我们就可以理解亚洲许多国家心中对中国真正意图的担忧并不是空穴来风。


China’s unconditional support for North Korea’s wayward regime, despite its repeated crimes against peace, is also a cause for concern about whether China will treat its neighbors’ security concerns with respect.	此外，尽管朝鲜一再破坏区域和平，但中国对这个流氓政权却给于无条件支持，这也是导致其他国家对中国是否认真对待其邻国的国家安全有所保留的重要原因。


Today’s Asia-Pacific region has now become the focus of the global economy.	今日的亚太地区已经成为了全球经济的焦点。


According to the World Bank, three of the top five economic powers (China, Japan, and India) will be Asian powers within this decade.	据世界银行报告，在今后十年里，世界五大经济体中有三个将在自亚洲（中国，日本和印度）。


The boom that has brought this shift occurred because America’s military presence in the region provided stability and predictability.	而正是美国在该区域的军事存在为该区域带来了稳定和清晰的预期，为亚洲带来了经济繁荣，最终促成了上述格局。


America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan must not be allowed to call this stability into question.	因此美国的阿富汗撤军行动一定不能影响到这一稳定的存续。


What happens in Afghanistan as America begins to draw down its troops will test the willingness of all of Asia’s powers to work together to build a secure regional order.	随着美国开始撤军，阿富汗的后续发展将成为一块试金石，检验亚洲各国齐心协力构建区域安全秩序的意愿。


In Afghanistan, their long-term interests are essentially in harmony, as none – including China – wants to see Afghanistan become a haven for terrorism once again.	阿富汗国内稳定是亚洲各国共同的长远利益所在，毕竟没有任何一个国家——包括中国——希望看到该国再度沦为恐怖主义的避难所。


But only a strong regional consensus on Afghanistan’s future can avert the prospect of a renewed struggle for mastery there.	而只有关于阿富汗未来去向的坚定共识才能扭转该国新一轮政权抢夺的乱象。


If such a consensus can be forged, however, it will provide a foundation for further collaboration in building a pan-Asian order based on consent, not military might.	一旦亚洲各国达成了这样的共识，那么，共同构建基于共识而非军事实力的泛亚洲秩序就有了基础。


East Asia’s New Year Resolutions	东亚的新年决心


SEOUL – If World War III ever breaks out, its origins will not lie in the Middle East, South Asia, or Eastern Europe. It is in East Asia – where the strategic interests of China, the United States, and their respective partners intersect – that the geopolitical stakes, diplomatic tensions, and potential for a global explosion are highest.	首尔—如果第三次世界大战爆发，那么起源不会是中东、南亚和东欧，而会在东亚——中国、美国以及它们的盟友的利益交汇点，这里是地缘政治重要性、外交紧张程度和全球爆发潜力最高的地区。


Because it is so obviously in every player’s interest to avoid outright conflict, we have stony handshakes like that between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Beijing last month.	显然，避免彻底冲突符合所有行动方的利益，因此我们看到了中国国家主席习近平与日本首相安倍晋三上个月在北京貌合神离地握了手。


But if there is to be a genuinely durable peace, the region’s leaders need to work harder and more courageously to achieve it.	但如果真的要实现持久和平，该地区领导人就需要更努力、更大胆地实现这一目标。


Each of them could pursue game-changing initiatives if only they could summon the necessary statesmanship.	他们都可以追求局面改变措施，但这要求他们拥有必要的政治家风度。


So, here – in a spirit of supreme, but perhaps not totally naive, optimism – are the 2015 New Year’s resolutions that I would most like each of East Asia’s leaders to make.	因此，我带着最高的乐观情绪——这未必是完全天真的愿望——希望所有东亚领导人都能拿出2015年的新年决心。


Xi Jinping: “I will make it clear that any territorial claims we have in the South China Sea are based only on reasonable assertions of sovereignty over particular land features and the rights that accompany them under the Convention on the Law of the Sea.	习近平：“我将澄清，我们在南海的一切领土要求都只基于合理的特殊地貌主权主张及其根据《海洋法公约》所附带的权利。


I will stop talking about our ‘historical waters,’ and order the removal of the ‘nine-dashed’ line from the map in Chinese passports.	我将停止谈论我们的‘历史领海’，并将‘九段线’从中国护照地图上删除。


“Having made our authority in Hong Kong clear, I will find a way to let the people there have the local leader they want.	“我将澄清我们对香港的权力，寻找让香港人民拥有他们想要的地方领导人的办法。


A little flexibility here should also be a helpful message to those getting restless in Taiwan that China really can accommodate difference.	在这方面给予一些灵活度也将有利于让焦虑的台湾感到中国真的可以协调差异。


“Also in that spirit, I will welcome the Dalai Lama to Beijing and negotiate with his leadership team a package of cultural autonomy and limited self-government, satisfying once and for all the reasonable aspirations of the Tibetan people.”	“基于同样的精神，我还将欢迎达赖喇嘛来北京，与他的领导团队协商一揽子文化自治和有限的自治政府，一次性满足西藏人民的所有合理诉求。 ”


Shinzo Abe: “I will invite to Hiroshima or Nagasaki on the August A-bomb anniversary all six-party talks leaders to kick-start serious negotiations on a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which will embrace Japan and both Koreas and be guaranteed by the US, China, and Russia.	安倍晋三：“我将邀请六方会谈全体领导任参加8月份的广岛或长崎原子弹爆炸周年祭，以促进东北亚无核武器区谈判，东北亚无核武器区将包括日本和朝鲜半岛两国，并由美国、中国和俄罗斯提供保障。


“And I will make 2015 the year that the historical grievances between us and our neighbors are buried for good.	“2015年，我还将以积极方式结束我们与邻国的历史恩怨。


Remembering the impact of Willy Brandt’s Kniefall at the Jewish ghetto site in Warsaw in 1970, I will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II by visiting Nanjing and accepting Japanese responsibility for the terrible massacre of 1937-1938.	我还记得1970年勃兰特在华沙犹太纪念碑前的下跪，我将以访问南京、承认日本对1937—1938年骇人听闻的大屠杀的责任的方式纪念第二次世界大战结束70周年。


“I will also do everything I can to remove from the Yushukan Museum, on the grounds of the Yasukuni Shrine, all exhibits which deny, question, or are insensitive to Japan’s responsibility for waging aggressive war and committing atrocity crimes in the 1930s and 1940s.	“我还将竭尽全力将靖国神社游就馆中所有否认、质疑或对日本在20世纪三四十年代发动侵略战争、犯下残暴罪行无动于衷的陈列移除。


I will start by removing from its pedestal the steam locomotive that ran on the Thailand-Burma “Death Railway,” the display of which dishonors the more than 100,000 prisoners of war and forced laborers who perished from disease, malnutrition, or maltreatment in its construction.”	首先我将把泰国-缅甸‘死亡铁路’上的蒸汽机车从基座上拆除，这个展品羞辱着100,000多在建设泰缅铁路过程中死于疾病、营养不良和虐待的战俘和被迫劳工。 ”


South Korean President Park Geun-hye: “I will remove the ‘May 24’ sanctions we placed on North Korea after their military provocations in 2010, because they are making impossible nearly all of the measures to build trust and confidence that I keep saying are necessary.	韩国总统朴槿惠：“我将取消我们在2010年朝鲜进行军事挑衅后对他们实行的‘5·24’制裁，因为这些制裁让我一直强调的构建信任和信心的必要条件无法成立。


“Of course the North should continue to be named and shamed in the United Nations for its human-rights abuses and nuclear misbehavior.	“当然，朝鲜应该继续因为其虐待人权和不恰当的核行为在联合国接受千夫所指。


But pariah states never behave responsibly, and no state has a bigger role than we do in coaxing Kim Jong-un’s regime into normality.	但流氓国家从来不会负责任地行动，而没有一个国家像我国那样在诱导金正恩政权正常化中起着如此重要的作用。


Serious re-engagement will be politically hard for me to deliver.	对我来说，真正的重新融合在政治上十分艰难。


But if I do not, I will be on the wrong side of history.”	但如果我不尝试，我就站在了历史的对立面。 “


North Korea’s Kim Jong-un: “I will surprise everyone by freezing our efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles, and I will prove my seriousness by opening our uranium enrichment plants to inspection.	朝鲜的金正恩：“我将给所有人一个惊喜，冻结一切开发核武器和导弹的行动。 我还将证明我的诚意，开放我们的铀浓缩设施以供检查。


That will leave no one with any credible reason to delay resumption of the six-party talks.	如此，任何人都不再有站得住的理由推迟六方会谈的重启。


“We have known since the 1990s that a denuclearization settlement is the best guarantee of our regime’s security.	“自20世纪90年代你以来我便知道，去核化方案是我们的体制的最佳保障。 我也许会有些形象问题，但我没有疯。


I may have image problems, but I am not crazy.	中国对我们已经无爱；


China has fallen out of love with us; my people know too much about the wider world; and everyone knows that to use our handful of nuclear weapons would be suicidal.	我的人民对外部世界知道得太多； 并且所有人都知道，使用我们的那一点点核武器无异于自杀。


It is time to reach an agreement.”	是时候达成协议了。 ”


US President Barack Obama: “I will say publicly what Bill Clinton was saying privately a decade ago.	美国总统奥巴马：“我将公开说出克林顿十年前私下里说的话。


It may be painful for many Americans to hear, and it will not impress my opponents.	这话也许对许多美国人来说很不中听，并且不会给我的反对者留下深刻印象。


But if I can make it believable, it will do more to win the US friendship, respect, and ultimate security in East Asia and around the world than our trillion-dollar nuclear-weapons modernization program or all the unworkable and counter-productive missile-defense systems at which we keep hurling money.	但如果我可以以可信的方式说出这番话，就能为美国赢得更多的友善、尊重以及东亚和全世界的终极安全，这比我们耗资万亿美元的核武器现代化计划和一切不切实际、适得其反的导弹防御系统更有效。


“It is simply this: The US should not use its immense military and economic power to try to stay top dog on the global block in perpetuity.	“这番话很简单：美国不应该将其强大的军事和经济实力用于保持永恒的全球霸主地位。


Rather, we should be using that power to create a world in which we will be comfortable living when we are no longer top dog on the global block.”	相反，我们应该将这一实力用于创造一个即使我们不再是全球霸主仍能舒适地活在其中的世界。 “


Perhaps the idea that any of these resolutions will actually be made is fanciful.	或许这些决心中的所有内容在现实中都无异于童话。


And we all know that it is in the nature of New Year’s resolutions that, even when they are made, they are rarely kept.	我们也都明白新年决心的特点——就算许了决心，也很少能够兑现。


But should any one of the resolutions on my list come to pass, the result would be momentous.	但上述决心中实现任何一个，都能带来巨大的成果。


Cumulatively, they would be transformative.	累计起来，它们足以起到变革的效果。


The rest of us should hope that they are made, and kept, and we should continue nagging until they are.	我们其他人理应希望这些决心的许诺和恪守，并且应该一直提醒他们，直到这些决心实现。


Defusing Asia’s Arms Race	缓和亚洲军备竞赛


BANGKOK – The ruling against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague will be met with relief in the region’s capitals.	曼谷—海牙常设仲裁庭（PCA）就中国在南海的领土主张做出不利于中国的裁决，该地区各国将因此大舒一口气。


But it is unlikely to reverse one of Asia’s most worrying trends: an alarming regional arms build-up.	但这无法扭转亚洲最令人担忧的趋势之一：值得警惕的地区军备竞赛。


According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Asia now accounts for almost half of the world’s arms expenditure, which is more than twice the total expenditure of countries in the Middle East and four times greater than that of Europe.	据斯托克霍姆国际和平研究所（Stockholm International Peace Research Institute）目前亚洲的军备开支占世界的近一半，比中东国家总开支多一倍多，更比欧洲多出四倍。


Vietnam, which restored diplomatic relations with the United States only in 1995, is now considering allowing the US Navy to use its Cam Ranh Naval Base – which was built and used by the US Air Force during the Vietnam War (and then by the Soviet and Russian navies).	1995年才与美国恢复邦交的越南目前增在考虑允许美国海军使用其金兰海军基地。 该基地由美国空军在越南战争期间建设和使用（后来苏联和俄罗斯海军也使用过）。


It has also purchased a clutch of Russian-made submarines, and it spent eight times more in arms procurement between 2011 and 2015 than it did in the previous five years.	越南还采购了一批俄制潜艇，2011—2015年军备采购开支比此前五年增长八倍。


Thailand, too, wants submarines for its navy, despite having only shallow waters in the Gulf of Thailand and no territorial claims in the South China Sea.	泰国也希望为海军配备潜艇，尽管泰国湾深度很浅并且其在南海并无领土主张。


The Philippines, which brought the case against China in The Hague, is beefing up its military as well, with the procurement of fighter jets from South Korea and new investments in its navy, supported not only by the US, but also by Japan.	将仲裁案提交海牙的菲律宾也在加强军力，从韩国采购战斗机并向海军新投资，不仅有美国支持，也有日本支持。


The Philippines has also rehabilitated its defense alliance with the US, marking a U-turn from its decision to expel the US Navy from its base at Subic Bay in 1991.	菲律宾还恢复了与美国的防务联盟，其态度较1991年将美国海军赶出苏比克湾基地时来了个一百八十度大转弯。


In the same spirit, the American Seventh Fleet has stepped up its Freedom of Navigation Operational Patrols (FONOPs) in the South China Sea.	本着同样的精神，美国第七舰队打着航行自由（FONOP）的旗号开进南海。


Lastly, Japan is gaining influence in the region by inching away from its post-war “peace constitution.”	最近，日本通过修改战后“和平宪法”影响该地区。


So far, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government has reinterpreted Article 9, which renounces war, to allow for Japan to come to the defense of its allies.	目前，日本首相安倍晋三政府已经重新解释了放弃战争权利的宪法第九条，允许日本参与盟国防务。


The government has also revised security laws to allow exports of weapons technology to its partners in the region, thereby buttressing their defense capabilities.	安倍政府还修订了安全法，允许向地区合作伙伴出口武器技术，以增强它们的防御力量。


All of these countries are responding to China’s rapid emergence as the foremost threat to regional stability.	所有这些国家都在应对迅速崛起为地区稳定最大威胁的中国。


On the headwaters of the Mekong River, China has constructed upriver dams that deprive downstream countries like Cambodia and Vietnam of vital water resources.	在湄公河上游，中国建设了大坝，使下游的柬埔寨和越南无法获得重要的水资源。


In the South China Sea, China has built artificial islands and militarized them with airstrips and defense facilities; and it is flexing its naval muscles with a newly minted aircraft carrier group, with more on the way.	在南海，中国建设人工岛并修筑机场跑道和防务设施； 此外，中国还通过其新生产、即将大量列装的运输机大秀海军肌肉。


In the run-up to the PCA’s decision, China drummed up support in far-flung African countries, where it has investments, and among more easily influenced members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, such as Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos.	在PCA作出裁定的过程中，中国收买它进行投资的遥远的非洲国家以及东盟中比较容易影响的国家（如文莱、柬埔寨和老挝）支持它。


China’s goal is to prevent ASEAN members from uniting against it and to diminish the role of international law in a region where it seeks strategic dominance.	中国的目标是防止东盟成员国一致对中，并削弱国际法在其寻求战略主宰地位的地区的作用。


More ominously, China ramped up its South China Sea activities in spite of the tribunal’s proceedings, vowing long ago to ignore any ruling that invalidated its claims.	更加令人担忧的是，中国完全无视仲裁程序，继续其在南海的活动，早就宣布不接受任何人为其领土主张无效的裁定。


Asia’s arms race is the biggest since the Cold War, and it is accelerating against an increasingly unfavorable international backdrop.	亚洲军备竞赛是冷战以来规模最大的军备竞赛，在日益不利的国际背景下，这场竞赛还在不断加速。


The US is preoccupied with the Islamic State and other terrorist threats abroad, and now with the presidential campaign at home.	美国陷入了伊斯兰国和其他外部恐怖主义威胁，目前国内又处于总统选战期间。


And Europe is in disarray after the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union, which followed eight years of weak growth, austerity, and prolonged crises.	欧洲自英国投票脱离欧盟后陷入混乱，而在此前八年，欧洲经历了增长萎靡、紧缩和漫长的危机。


If anything, this should be Asia’s moment to assume a global leadership role.	眼下理应成为亚洲扮演全球领导角色的时刻。


Sadly, the region’s bitter geopolitical rivalries stand in the way, owing to the absence of an institutional framework to prevent, mitigate, and settle territorial disputes.	悲哀的是，该地区尖锐的地缘政治对峙横亘其中，而这一对峙产生的原因乃是缺乏预防、遏制和解决领土纠纷的机构框架。


Unless, and until, such arrangements are established, the risk of conflict will grow, jeopardizing the region’s economic transformation – which in recent decades has lifted a billion Asians out of poverty.	除非这一安排得以确立，否则冲突风险将不断上升，阻碍近几十年来让十亿亚洲人摆脱贫困的地区经济转型。


Creating a viable regional security framework will not be easy, given the seeming intractability of many of Asia’s geopolitical fault lines.	建立可行的地区安全框架绝非易事，因为亚洲存在大量难以弥合的地缘政治断层线。


These include the standoff between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; the confrontation between North and South Korea; the tumultuous relationship between China and Taiwan; and China’s claims on the sovereign territory of Japan and India, in addition to that of the Philippines and Vietnam.	其中包括印巴克什米尔僵局，南北朝鲜对峙，中国复杂的两岸关系，中国对日本和印度以及对菲律宾和越南主权领土的主张。


Resolving such conflicts requires, at a minimum, some baseline rules of the game, which can be developed and implemented only on a multilateral basis, not in the unilateral way that China demands.	解决这些冲突至少需要一些基本游戏规则，而这些规则只有在多边基础上才能制定和实施，而不是中国所要求的双边方式。


For example, ASEAN is drafting a Code of Conduct to govern the South China Sea; but the effort has made little headway, owing to Chinese intransigence.	比如，东盟正在起草一份治理南海的行动准则； 但由于中国的不让步而步履维艰。


If the Philippines does not overplay its victory at The Hague, and if other interested parties step back a little and give China space to recognize the dangers of its own aggression, Chinese leaders may yet become more willing to negotiate a regional agreement.	如果菲律宾不对海牙仲裁庭的胜利大做文章，并且其他利益相关方略作退步从而让中国有余地认识到其自身侵略的危险，中国领导人也许更有兴趣进行地区协定谈判。


The alternative – further escalation of the Asian arms race – is in no one’s interest.	否则——亚洲军备竞赛进一步升级——不符合所有人的利益。


Northeast Asia’s Home Fires Burning	东北亚内政之火在燃烧


TOKYO – Successful diplomatic summits are almost always pre-cooked affairs, with every aspect of the meeting, from the initial handshakes to the final communiqué, minutely choreographed.	东京—成功的外交峰会几乎总是周详备至的，会议的各个方面，从一开始的握手到最后的公报，都可以精确到分钟。


But next month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing looks like a high-risk enterprise.	但下个月的亚太经济合作会议（APEC）北京峰会却似乎是一起高风险事件。


It is not even clear whether Chinese President Xi Jinping will agree to meet with one of his most important guests, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.	甚至不清楚中国国家主席习近平是否会同意与其最重要的宾客之一日本首相安倍晋三会晤。


It is also unclear whether Abe will be able to meet with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.	安倍是否能与韩国总统朴槿惠会晤也是个疑问。


And yet there is considerable reason to hope not only for formal handshakes and bilateral meetings among Northeast Asia’s “Big Three” leaders, but also for substantive discussions aimed at lowering tensions in the region.	但也有很强的理由期待东北亚“三大”领导人之间不但会有正式的握手和双边会晤，还会有旨在缓和地区紧张局势的重要对话。


That hope is built on all three leaders’ need for a period of diplomatic quiet, owing to the difficult domestic challenges that each now faces.	如此期待是因为这三位领导人都需要外交平静期以处理各自目前所面临的困难的国内挑战。


Xi may be confronting the most difficult domestic agenda: an effort to engineer a relatively smooth transition from an economic structure based on manufacturing and exports to one in which domestic consumption and services fuel growth.	习近平也许面临着最艰难的国内日程：设计相对平滑的转型过程，让经济结构从基于制造业和出口转向依靠国内消费和服务助推增长。


Not only has structural transformation caused the economy to slow; it has also exposed deep flaws in China’s financial system.	这一结构转型不但导致了经济减速，还暴露了中国金融体系的深刻缺陷。


The shift in the country’s economic model would be difficult in the best of circumstances.	中国经济模式的转变即使在最佳环境下也是十分困难的。


But it is being undertaken simultaneously with the deepest political purge China has experienced since the days of Mao Zedong, with Xi targeting corrupt officials high and low.	但与此同时，中国还面临着自毛泽东时代以来最深刻的整风运动，习近平的目标直指各个级别的腐败官员。


At the moment, the focus seems to be on People’s Liberation Army officers and those tied to now-imprisoned former Chongqing Communist Party boss Bo Xilai and the former Politburo security chief Zhou Yongkang, who is awaiting sentencing.	眼下的焦点对准了解放军军官以及与已身陷囹圄的前重庆市委书记薄熙来和等待审判的前政治局常委周永康有关系的官员。


Indeed, the most perilous phase of Xi’s purge may now be underway, given the recent arrest of the deputy commander of the Sichuan Military District – a key post, given the district’s large and restive Tibetan population.	事实上，习近平的整风运动也许正在经历最危险的时刻，——最近，成都军区副司令员被拿下，他的职位至关重要，因为成都军区需要负责地域广袤、桀骜不驯的藏区。


Abe’s domestic troubles, stemming from two decades of economic stagnation, are well known.	众所周知，安倍的国内麻烦来自二十年的经济停滞。


Although his economic strategy, known as “Abenomics,” appears to have ended deflation, vibrant growth is nowhere in sight.	尽管他的经济战略——所谓的“安倍经济学”似乎已经终止了通缩，但强劲增长还远未到来。


Moreover, after a series of scandals cost Abe some newly appointed ministers, some fear that he may no longer be willing to follow through on the liberalizing structural reforms – the so-called “third arrow” of Abenomics – that sustained economic recovery requires.	此外，在一系列丑闻导致安倍新任命的内阁大臣纷纷下台后，有人担心他可能不再准备按部就班实施维持经济复苏所需要的自由化结构改革，即所谓的安倍经济学的“第三支箭”。


Park may appear to face the least vexing domestic conditions, with South Korea’s economy growing at a 3.2% annual pace in the second quarter of 2014, only marginally lower than market forecasts.	朴槿惠的国内情况也许是三人中最好的，2014年二季度，韩国经济增长年率为3. 2%，只比市场预期略低。


But Park undoubtedly views her domestic circumstances as anything but rosy; in many ways, this has been an annus horribilis for her and her country.	但毫无疑问，朴槿惠并不认为她的国内环境很乐观； 从很多角度看，这是她和她的国家多灾多难的一年。


Indeed, disaster has stalked South Korea this year, beginning in April with the sinking of the ferry Sewol, which claimed some 300 lives, most of them high school students.	事实上，今年韩国饱受灾难困扰，一开始是4月的岁月号（Sewol）客轮沉没，导致300人死亡，其中大部分是高中生。


The trial of the Sewol’s captain, the apparent suicide of its owner, and a series of scandals involving beatings and bullying leading to death and suicide among army conscripts have cost Park key ministerial resignations, and have created a pervasive sense of unease about how the country is governed.	岁月号船长的被捕、岁月号船东的死亡（显然是自杀）、以及一系列导致士兵死亡和自杀的虐待和殴打丑闻导致朴槿惠政府重要部长辞职，也造成了普遍的对其治国水平担忧。


Complicating matters further is the need for Park to devise a viable response to a new diplomatic charm offensive by North Korea’s usually charmless leader, Kim Jong-un.	让情况更加复杂的是朴槿惠需要找到可行的应对之道来对付常常毫无魅力可言的朝鲜领导人金正恩的外交魅力攻势。


Park remains, rightly, a skeptic concerning Kim’s motives; but the spectacle of the North’s second-highest-ranking official appearing suddenly at the Asian Games earlier this month created a frisson of excitement that perhaps Kim the Younger may actually want to improve relations.	朴槿惠正确地对金正恩的动机保持怀疑； 但朝鲜二号人物在本月早些时候出现在亚运会的场景给人们带来了一丝兴奋之情——也许小金真的希望改善朝韩关系。


Faced with these domestic concerns, all three leaders need a respite from the tensions that have bedeviled relations among their countries over the past three years.	面临这些国内问题的三位领导人需要暂时缓和在过去三年中让三国交恶的紧张局势。


But, because each has played on these tensions, particularly with Japan, in order to control their domestic opponents, achieving this necessary respite may prove difficult.	但是，由于三方都对目前的紧张局势负有责任——特别是与日本的紧张局势，中韩需要以此控制国内反对派——实现这一必要的缓和也许十分困难。


And yet there are signs that the three leaders understand that the APEC summit may be a make-or-break moment for their countries’ relations.	但有迹象表明三位领导人都明白APEC峰会也许是决定三国关系走向的时刻。


Much of the worst anti-Japanese bombast has disappeared from Chinese television in recent weeks, and former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda is due to meet with Xi in Beijing this week.	最近几周，中国电视屏幕上已不再有最糟糕的反日宣传，前日本首相福田康夫将在本周在北京与习近平举行会晤。


This does not yet add up to a thaw in the bilateral relationship, but it does suggest that Xi may be seeking a respite, at least until China’s economy is on a more stable footing and his anti-corruption campaign begins to wind down.	这并不意味着双边关系开始解冻，但确实表明习近平也许在寻求缓和，至少在中国经济立足更稳、其反腐运动进入收官阶段之前需要缓和。


Park, too, has sent signals that she may want to ease tensions.	朴槿惠也释放出希望缓和紧张局面的信号。


She recently met with former Japanese finance minister Fukushiro Nukaga, and Kim Kwan-jin, the chief of South Korea’s National Security Office, recently met with Abe’s national security adviser, Shotaro Yachi.	最近她与前日本财相额贺福志郎以及朝鲜国家安保室长金宽镇举行了会晤，最近与安倍国家安全顾问谷内正太郎举行了会晤。


With Abe, Park, and Xi each facing daunting domestic challenges, a rare convergence in each country of self-interest and national interest may be creating a chance for improved relations.	安倍、朴槿惠和习近平都面临着各自国内的艰巨挑战，三国自身利益和国家利益的罕见趋同可能正在形成改善三国关系的良机。


The question now is whether Northeast Asia’s Big Three leaders can overcome old positions, shake hands, and get serious about regional diplomacy.	现在的问题是东北亚三大领导人是否能够克服旧立场，把手言欢，认真对待地区外交。


Asian Growth in Turbulent Times	动荡时期的亚洲经济增长


NEW DELHI – A new reality is emerging in Asia.	新德里 — 新的现实正在出现。


In recent decades, many of Asia’s economies have boomed.	近几十年来，许多亚洲经济体都实现了繁荣。


The region today accounts for about 40% of the world’s GDP – up from 25% in 1990 – and contributes about two-thirds of global economic growth.	该地区占全球GDP的比重从1990年的25％提高到目前的约40％，对全球经济增长的贡献约为三分之二。


There’s more. Asia has made unprecedented strides in reducing poverty and improving broad development indicators.	不仅如此，亚洲在减贫和改善广义发展指标方面也取得了前所未有的进展。


The poverty rate fell from 55% in 1990 to 21% in 2010, while education and health outcomes have improved significantly.	贫困率从1990年的55％下降到2010年的21％，而教育和医疗卫生事业也显著改善。


Hundreds of millions of lives have been improved in the process.	在此过程中，数以亿计人口的生活水平得以提高。


And, looking ahead, Asia is expected to continue to grow at an average annual rate of 5%, leading global economic expansion.	展望未来，预计亚洲将继续保持年均5％的增速，引领全球经济扩张。


But today, the region is facing challenging new economic conditions.	但如今，在新的经济形势中，该地区正面临挑战。


With growth in advanced economies tepid, risk aversion increasing in global financial markets, and the commodity super-cycle coming to an end, the world economy is providing little impetus to Asian growth.	发达经济体增长乏力，全球金融市场避险情绪上升，大宗商品的超级周期即将结束，全球经济形势对亚洲增长几无推动作用。


At the same time, China is moving toward a more sustainable growth model that implies slower expansion.	与此同时，中国正向更可持续的增长模式转型，而这意味着增速将放缓。


Given the growing links between China and the rest of the world, particularly Asia, the spillover effects are significant.	鉴于中国与世界其他国家，特别是亚洲国家的联系日益密切，中国增速放缓将带来显著的溢出效应。


Indeed, China is now the top trading partner of most major regional economies, particularly in East Asia and ASEAN.	中国目前是大多数主要地区经济体，特别是东亚和东盟的第一大贸易伙伴。


New research by the International Monetary Fund, to be published in next month’s Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific, suggests that the median Asian country’s economic sensitivity to China’s GDP has doubled in the last couple of decades.	基金组织即将在2016年4月期《亚太地区经济展望》中发布一份新研究，其指出：典型亚洲国家经济对中国GDP的敏感度在过去几十年翻了一番。


So China’s slowdown means a slower pace of growth across Asia.	因而，中国经济放缓意味着整个亚洲的增速也将放缓。


Asia’s achievements in recent decades attest to the hard work of the region’s people, as well as to the soundness of the policies that many Asian governments have adopted since the late 1990s, including improved monetary-policy and exchange-rate frameworks, increased international reserve buffers, and stronger financial sector regulation and supervision.	近几十年来亚洲的成绩是该地区人民辛勤劳动的印证，也归功于该地区许多国家政府自上世纪90年代末以来采取的稳健政策措施，包括改善货币政策和汇率框架、增加国际储备缓冲以及加强金融部门监管。


Against this backdrop, the region attracted vast amounts of foreign direct investment.	在此背景下，该地区吸引了大量的外国直接投资。


As trade links expanded, a sophisticated network of integrated supply chains emerged, creating the conditions for Asia to become a manufacturing powerhouse and, increasingly, an exporter of services as well.	随着贸易联系日益紧密，一个更复杂的一体化供应链网络已经出现，为亚洲成为制造业巨擘以及出口更多服务创造了条件。


More recently, thanks to strong policies and ample reserves, the region quickly recovered from the global financial crisis.	最近，得益于有力的政策和充裕的储备，该地区迅速从全球金融危机中复苏。


Asia also benefited during these years from strong global tailwinds, including favorable external financing conditions and the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy.	这些年中，亚洲也受益于全球强劲的利好因素，包括有利的外部融资条件以及中国经济的快速增长。


Amid this new testing reality now dawning in Asia, we must not lose sight of the deep, and long term, structural challenges facing the region.	在亚洲面临新现实的考验时，我们不能忽视该地区面临的深刻而长期的结构性挑战。


Populations are rapidly aging and even declining in countries like Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand, dragging down potential growth and putting pressure on fiscal balances.	人口在迅速老龄化，在日本、韩国、新加坡和泰国等国家，人口甚至在下降，因此拖累了增长潜力，并给财政收支平衡造成压力。


Income inequality is a further challenge.	收入不平等是另一个挑战。


While inequality has remained stable or declined in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, it is rising in many parts of the region, most notably in India and China (as well as other parts of East Asia).	虽然马来西亚、泰国和菲律宾的收入不平等状况已经稳定或有所下降，但在该地区的许多地方，特别是在印度和中国（以及东亚其他国家），收入不平等正在上升。


In many emerging markets and developing countries, widespread infrastructure gaps persist, notably in power and transport.	许多新兴市场和发展中国家还持续存在广泛的基础设施缺口，电力和运输领域尤甚。


And, elsewhere in the region – the small Pacific islands in particular – vulnerability to the effects of climate change is increasing.	在该地区其他地方，特别是小型的太平洋岛屿国家，对气候变化效应的脆弱性正在增加。


This shifting landscape calls for bold action on several fronts.	鉴于格局的这些转变，需在几个方面采取大胆行动。


While the response will certainly need to be tailored to each country’s specific circumstances, some recommendations could be helpful for most countries:	具体应对措施无疑会因国而异，而一些建议可能会对大多数国家有所帮助：


· Because inflation remains low across most of the region, monetary policy should remain supportive of growth in case downside risks materialize.	•                     由于该地区大部分国家的通胀水平依然较低，货币政策应在下行风险出现时继续支持经济增长。


· Exchange-rate flexibility and targeted macroprudential policies should be part of the risk-management toolkit.	•                     汇率灵活性和有针对性的宏观审慎政策应是风险管理工具箱的一部分。


· Countries need to deepen their financial systems to channel the large pool of domestic and regional savings toward financing their development needs; closing the region’s infrastructure gaps, for example, remains critical.	•                     各国需深化金融体系，引导国内和该地区的大量储蓄为发展需求融资； 例如，消除该地区的基础设施缺口仍然至关重要。


· Structural reforms, aided by fiscal policy, should support the economic transitions and rebalancing, while boosting potential growth and alleviating poverty.	•                     在财政政策的支持下，结构性改革应支持经济转型和再平衡调整，同时提高潜在增长和减贫。


The good news is that Asia, as demonstrated by its strong performance in recent years, can meet these challenges and continue to build upon the significant achievements of the past two decades.	好的消息是，鉴于近年来经济表现强劲，亚洲能够应对上述挑战，在过去二十年所取得令人瞩目成就的基础上更上一层楼。


It has the resources and the people; it has the buffers and resilience; and it has ample opportunities for further trade and financial integration.	亚洲地区既拥有自然资源和人力资本，又具备缓冲和应变能力，更拥有进一步提高贸易和金融一体化的充足机会。


To discuss these challenges, the government of India and the IMF are organizing the Advancing Asia conference in New Delhi on March 11-13, bringing together regional policymakers and thinkers.	为讨论这些挑战，印度政府和基金组织将于3月11-13日在印度新德里举办一场题为 “推进亚洲发展”的会议，将邀请该地区的政策制定者和思想家参会。


India, a bright spot among emerging markets in these difficult times – indeed, the world’s fastest growing major economy – is an auspicious place to hold this gathering.	作为困难时期新兴市场的一个亮点，印度的确是世界上增长最快的主要经济体，因此它是举办此次会议的一个吉祥场所。


Our mutual aim in convening with Asian policymakers is clear and critical, for Asia and for the global economy: to ensure that growth in Asia continues to be robust, sustainable, and inclusive, so that the region remains a powerful locomotive for global growth.	与亚洲的政策制定者齐聚一堂，我们有着明确的共同目标，其对亚洲乃至全球经济都至关重要：确保亚洲的增长依然强劲、可持续和具有包容性，从而使该地区在全球增长中继续保持强大的火车头作用。


Asia Enters the Storm	风暴袭向亚洲


BERKELEY – As 2011 draws to a close, there are growing signs that Asia is becoming caught up in the global slowdown, dashing hopes that the region’s economies would “decouple” from the prolonged recession in Europe and America’s lackluster recovery.	伯克利——在2011年行将结束之际，有越来越多的迹象表明，亚洲正在陷入全球减速，该地区经济体可以与欧洲和美国复苏乏力的长时间衰退“脱钩”的希望越来越渺茫。


China’s export growth is slipping, owing to faltering demand in Europe, which has surpassed the United States as China’s largest foreign market.	中国出口增长正在下滑，主要原因是超越美国成为中国最大海外市场的欧洲的需求在消退。


Indeed, China’s manufacturing activity is contracting for the first time in almost three years.	事实上，中国制造业活动出现了近3年来的首次下滑。


Reverberations are already evident in other emerging Asian economies that depend on exports both to China-based manufacturers and to the US and Europe.	依赖中国生产者和欧美市场的其他新兴亚洲经济体的反应也相当强烈。


Decoupling did not occur in 2008, when exports accounted for about 45% of pan-Asian GDP (excluding Japan) and every emerging country in the region experienced a sharp contraction in growth as world trade plummeted.	2008年并没有发生脱钩，当时，在泛亚洲GDP（不含日本）中，出口要占大约45%，随着世界贸易量的剧烈萎缩，该地区的所有新兴经济体都经历了大幅衰退。


Nor is decoupling likely today, because exports still account for about the same share of the region’s GDP, and about 50% of these exports are still headed to developed countries.	如今，脱钩也不可能发生，因为出口占该地区GDP的比重并为下降，且其中50%的出口对象是发达国家。


So the idea of decoupling appears to be a chimera.	因此，脱钩的构想完全是镜花水月。


Even if the euro crisis is resolved, austerity in Europe, along with anemic growth or worse in the US, will mean a slowdown in export-dependent Asia.	即使欧元危机得到了解决，欧洲的紧缩和美国的疲软仍意味着依赖出口的亚洲会减速。


But Asia’s economies can still grow much faster than the developed West if they respond to prolonged stagnation by rebalancing their growth toward internal demand, especially household consumption.	但亚洲经济体仍能以比发达西方快得多的速度增长，如果它们通过转向内需（特别是家庭消费）实现增长再平衡以应对出口的长期停滞的话。


The good news is that these economies have substantial room for such rebalancing, as well as the policy flexibility to accomplish it.	好消息是，这些经济体有很大的再平衡空间，也有足够的政策灵活度来实现它。


The share of consumption in GDP in these economies fell from more than 60% in the early 1980’s to less than 50% today.	这些经济体消费占GDP的比重从20世纪80年代初的60%多下降到了如今的不到50%。


In China, it is less than 40% – far below the norm for the world’s major economies and for other Asian economies at a comparable stage of development – despite nearly 7% annual average growth in China’s per capita consumption in recent years.	中国更是只有不到40%，远低于世界主要经济体的平均水平，也低于处于可比发展阶段的亚洲经济体，虽然近年来其人均消费平均年增长率接近7%。


The Asian economies are home to 3.5 billion consumers, but their share in global consumption remains small – much smaller than their share in global GDP.	亚洲经济体拥有35亿消费者，但它们的全球消费比重却依然很低，远不如其全球GDP比重。


China alone accounts for 20% of the world’s population, nearly 11% of global GDP, but only 3% of global consumption.	中国一国就拥有20%的世界人口和11%的世界GDP，但其消费额只占全球的3%。


China and most of the other emerging Asian economies have strong government balance sheets – the GDP shares of their budget deficits and public debt are relatively small.	中国和其他大部分新兴亚洲经济体都有着相当健康的政府资产负债表，预算赤字和公共债务占GDP的比重相对较小。


As a result, they have the fiscal firepower to boost consumption in order to mitigate the effects of declining exports.	因此它们有的是财政实力通过提振消费减轻出口下降的影响。


True, many local governments in China are saddled with debt, some of which may need to be restructured.	诚然，不少中国地方政府深受债务困扰，其中一些可能需要重组。


But the central government enjoyed a 28% increase in revenues over the last year, and has more than $3 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves.	但中央政府去年财政收入增长高达28%，而且握有超过3万亿美元的外汇储备。


In addition, the moderation of inflationary pressure as a result of slower growth and cooling global commodity markets will allow Chinese and other Asian policymakers to shift their focus from containing economic overheating to rebalancing growth.	此外，全球经济放缓和商品市场冷却让通胀压力有所缓解，这将使中国和其他亚洲国家决策者能够将注意力从治理经济过热转向实现增长再平衡。


In China, where inflation is falling sharply, monetary policy has already begun to ease.	中国的通胀就出现了显著下降，货币政策也开始转向宽松。


Even with significant policy support, however, most of the smaller Asian economies – Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and even South Korea – will not be able to replace external demand with internal demand to the same extent that China can.	不过，尽管有政策的大力支持，大部分小型亚洲经济体——台湾、泰国、新加坡甚至包括韩国——也无法向中国那样以内需替代外需。


So, even with rebalancing, exports will remain a significant determinant of their growth, and China is already their major export market.	因此，即使实施了再平衡措施，出口仍将是这些国家的重要增长支柱，而中国已然成为了它们的主要出口市场。


That is why China’s rebalancing is so important not only for its own economy, but for all of China-centric Asia.	这就是为何中国的再平衡不仅事关其自身的经济，也事关以中国为中心的亚洲。


Intra-regional trade flows have surged during the last decade, but they have been concentrated in parts and components that go into finished products assembled in China for export to developed countries.	过去十年来，该地区内部贸易流出现了爆发式增长，但其主要模式是零件和半成品输入中国，再由中国组装后出口发达国家。


With depressed markets in the developed world, intra-regional trade in the future will depend more on exports to satisfy Chinese domestic demand.	随着发达世界市场的萎缩，未来的地区内贸易将更多地依赖满足中国内需的出口。


Again, there is cause for optimism: China’s imports from Asia have been growing faster than China’s exports to the US for the last several years.	而在这一方面也存在乐观因素：近几年来，中国从亚洲经济体的进口增速要快于中国对美国的出口增速。


China responded to the 2009 global slowdown with dramatic fiscal and monetary stimulus, which fueled a rapid investment-led recovery at home and throughout Asia.	为了应对2009年全球放缓，中国抛出了大规模财政和货币刺激，助长了国内和整个亚洲的投资拉动型快速复苏。


Investment, mainly by local governments and state-owned companies with easy access to bank financing, soared to more than 45% of GDP, and, consistent with China’s long-run urbanization strategy, was concentrated in infrastructure and property-development projects.	投资——主要由容易获得银行融资的地方政府和国有企业进行——占GDP的比重暴增到45%，且主要集中在基础设施和房地产开发项目，这和中国的长期城市化战略是一致的。


Over time, much of the expansion in capacity will be absorbed, as an estimated 15 million people move from rural to urban areas each year over the next decade.	假以时日，如此产能扩张总有一天能被吸收，因为据预计，未来十年每年会有1 500万人口从农村迁往城市。


But, for now, many investment projects are not yet generating enough income to service their debts (some of them never will), and there is significant spare capacity.	但是，眼下，许多投资项目并不能产生足够的收入偿付债务（有的甚至永远无法偿还），而且造成了大量的产能过剩。


Confronted with another global slowdown that could depress its export markets for years, China needs to boost consumption even as it cools investment. And it needs to so in ways that do not rely on excessive credit expansion.	在未来多年中，中国需要面对全球再次放缓、其出口市场进一步收缩的局面，因此必须不惜以冷却投资为代价提振消费，���不能依赖过度的信贷扩张来实现这一目标。


China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, which will take effect in 2012, recognizes these policy imperatives and calls for several measures to fulfill them, including wage increases for urban workers; income support for rural households; enhanced access to capital for small businesses, especially in the underbuilt services sector; and more generous social-welfare programs, which would reduce Chinese households’ high levels of precautionary saving.	将于2012年开始产生效果的中国十二五规划认识到了这些政策的必要性，也提出了一些手段应对，包括城市工人的工资增加计划、农村家庭收入支持计划、中小企业（特别是欠发达的服务业）资本渠道融通计划以及实惠的社会福利计划，这些手段将降低中国家庭极高的预防性储蓄水平。


All of these measures are already underway, and Chinese leaders appear committed to embracing a new growth strategy that will benefit both China’s population and Asia as a whole.	这些手段均已进入了实施阶段，且中国领导人似乎下定了决心要推行能让中国人民和整个亚洲都能从中获益的新的增长战略。


The Asian economies should not count on being able to decouple from the economic woes of Europe and the US in the short run.	从短期看，亚洲经济体无望能与欧美经济困境脱钩。


But there are promising signs that, over time, the advanced countries’ difficulties will trigger a healthy, if belated, shift in Asia’s development strategy, with China leading the way.	但假以时日，发达国家的困境很有可能会刺激亚洲转向更加健康的发展战略（尽管有些迟），而中国将是其中的领军国家。


Asia Exposed	陷于危局的亚洲


NEW HAVEN – Asian authorities were understandably smug in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009.	纽黑文—不难理解，亚洲各国政府在2008—2009年金融危机后颇有些自鸣得意。


Growth in the region slowed sharply, as might be expected of export-led economies confronted with the sharpest collapse in global trade since the 1930’s.	该地区的增长迅速放缓，这并不出人意料，因为这些出口导向的经济体面对的是自20世纪30年代以来最严重的全球贸易崩溃。


But, with the notable exception of Japan, which suffered its deepest recession of the modern era, Asia came through an extraordinarily tough period in excellent shape.	但是，除了日本这一显著的例外之外（它陷入了现代化以来最严重的衰退），亚洲在整个艰难时期的表现极为出色。


That was then.	但彼一时，此一时。


For the second time in less than four years, Asia is being hit with a major external demand shock.	不到四年后，亚洲再一次经受了严重的外部需求冲击。


This time it is from Europe, where a raging sovereign-debt crisis threatens to turn a mild recession into something far worse: a possible Greek exit from the euro, which could trigger contagion across the eurozone.	这一回冲击来自欧洲。 肆虐欧洲的主权债务危机似乎要把小规模衰退变成一场大危机：希腊可能退出欧元区，这将在整个欧元区引发动荡蔓延。


This is a big deal for Asia.	对亚洲来说，兹事体大。


Financial and trade linkages make Asia highly vulnerable to Europe’s malaise.	金融和贸易上的联系使得亚洲对欧洲的萎靡不振非常敏感。


Owing to the former, the risks to Asia from a European banking crisis cannot be taken lightly.	因此，对于亚洲来说，欧洲银行危机绝对不容小觑。


Lacking well-developed capital markets as an alternative source of credit, bank-funding channels are especially vital in Asia.	亚洲缺乏发达的资本市场作为信用的替代来源，因此银行融资渠道对亚洲来说尤为重要。


Indeed, the Asian Development Bank estimates that European banks fund about 9% of total domestic credit in developing Asia – three times the share of financing provided by banks based in the United States.	事实上，亚洲开发银行估计欧洲银行提供了亚洲发展中国家9%的国内信用总量，是美资银行的三倍。


The role of European banks is especially significant in Singapore and Hong Kong – the region’s two major financial centers.	欧洲银行在亚洲两大金融中心——新加坡和香港尤其重要。


That means that Asia is far more exposed to an offshore banking crisis today than it was in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, which led to a near-meltdown of the US banking system.	这意味着与2008年几乎让美国银行系统陷入万劫不复的雷曼兄弟倒闭事件相比，眼下的危机给亚洲带来的风险要大得多。


The transmission effects through trade linkages are just as worrying.	贸易联系的传递效应同样值得担忧。


Historically, the US was modern Asia’s largest source of external demand.	从历史上看，美国是现代亚洲最大的外部需求源。


But that appears to have changed over the past decade.	但过去十年来，情况有变。


Seduced by China’s spectacular growth, the region shifted from US- to China-centric export growth.	在中国强劲经济增长的诱惑下，亚洲出口增长不再以美国为中心，而开始以中国为中心。


That seemed like a good move.	看起来这似乎并不是一个坏变化。


Combined shipments to the US and Europe fell to 24% of developing Asia’s total exports in 2010 – down sharply from 34% in 1998-1999.  Meanwhile, over the same period, Asia’s dependence on intraregional exports – trade flows within the region – expanded sharply, from 36% of total exports in 1998 to 44% in 2010.	2010年，亚洲发展中国家流向美国和欧洲的出口量占总量的比重为24%，较1998—1999年的34%有了显著下降。 与此同时，亚洲的地区内出口依存度——即地区内贸易流——增长迅速，占总出口量比重从2998年的36%上升为2010年的44%。


These numbers seem to paint a comforting picture of an increasingly autonomous Asia that can better withstand the blows from the West’s recurring crises.	这些数字似乎表明，亚洲的独立性正在提高，能够更好地抵御西方世界一再发生的危机的冲击。


But research by the International Monetary Fund shows that, beneath the veneer, 60-65% of all trade flows in the region can be classified as “intermediate goods” – components that are made in countries like Korea and Taiwan, assembled in China, and ultimately shipped out as finished goods to the West.	但IMF的研究表明，深度挖掘可以看出，60—65%的地区内贸易流可以归为“中间产品”类别——由韩国和台湾生产组件，由中国进行拼装，最后的制成品出口到西方。


With Europe and the US still accounting for the largest shares of China’s end-market exports, there can be no escaping the tight linkages of Asia’s China-centric supply chain to the ups and downs of demand in the major developed economies.	欧洲和美国仍然占据着中国终端产品出口的最大比重，因此紧密相连的亚洲以中国为中心的供给链并不能与主要发达国家的起伏脱钩。


Moreover, there is an important and worrisome twist to those linkages: China itself has tilted increasingly toward Europe as its major source of external demand.	此外，在这些联系中还有一个令人担忧的重要扭曲：中国本身越来越依赖欧洲作为其外部需求的主要来源。


In 2007, the European Union surpassed the US as China’s largest export market.	2007年，欧盟超过美国成为中国最大的出口市场。


By 2010, the EU accounted for 20% of total Chinese exports, while the US share was just 18%.	2010年，欧盟已占中国出口总量的20%，美国只有18%。


In other words, a China-centric Asian supply chain has made a big bet on the grand European experiment – a bet that now appears to be backfiring.	换句话说，以中国为中心的亚洲供给链是一场押注欧洲的豪赌，现在看来形势不妙。


Indeed, in China, a now-familiar pattern is playing out yet again – another slowdown in domestic growth stemming from a crisis in the advanced economies of the West.	事实上，在中国，熟悉的桥段正在再次上演——国内增长因西方发达经济体的危机而减速。


And, as goes China, so will go the rest of an increasingly integrated Asia.	而中国一减速，其他日渐一体化的亚洲国家也得跟着减速。


The good news is that, so far, the downside has been much better contained than was the case in late 2008 and early 2009.	好消息是，到目前为止，与2008年末到2009年初相比，减速趋势获得了更好的控制。


Back then, Chinese exports went from boom to bust in just seven months – from 26% annual growth in July 2008 to a 27% decline in February 2009.	当是时，中国的出口在7个月内发生了枯荣转换，从2008年7月的同比增长26%变为2009年2月的同比下降27%。


This time, the annual export gain has slowed from 20% in 2011 to 5% in April 2012 – a significant deceleration, to be sure, but one that stops well short of the previous outright collapse.	这一回，同比出口增长从2011年的20%下降为2012年4月的5%——不可不谓是显著减速，单核前一次的大崩盘相比要好得多。


That could change in the event of a disorderly euro breakup, but, barring that outcome, there is reason to be more sanguine this time around.	如果欧元发生无序崩溃，那么情况可能会有变，但只要不发生这一事件，有理由相信此次的形势更加乐观。


The bad news is that Asia seems to be learning little from repeated external demand shocks.	坏消息是，一再发生的外部需求冲击似乎并没有让亚洲吸取教训。


In the end, internal demand is the only effective defense against external vulnerability.	说到底，只有内需才是最有效的抵抗外部脆弱性的手段。


Yet the region has failed to construct that firewall.	但亚洲地区没能建起这一防火墙。


On the contrary, private consumption fell to a record-low 45% of developing Asia’s GDP in 2010 – down ten percentage points from 2002.	相反，2010年，亚洲发展中国家的私人消费占GDP的比重创出了历史新低，只有45%，比2002年下降了10个百分点。


In these circumstances, immunity from external shocks – or “decoupling,” as it is often called – seems fanciful.	在这种情况下，想要对外部冲击免疫——即人们常说的“脱钩”——只能是痴人说梦。


As with most things in Asia nowadays, China holds the key to supplying Asia’s missing consumer demand.	如今，与亚洲大部分事务一样，供应亚洲急需的消费需求的关键在于中国。


The recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) has all the right ingredients to produce the ultimate buffer between the dynamism of the East and the perils of a crisis-battered West.	最新的十二五规划所提出的目标非常正确，有助于在东方的活力和饱受危机冲击的西方的风险之间建立起终极缓冲。


But, as the euro crisis causes China’s economy to slow for the second time in three and a half years, there can be little doubt that implementation of the Plan’s pro-consumption rebalancing is lagging.	但是，欧洲危机导致中国经济在三年半后再一次出现减速表明，毫无疑问，支持消费的十二五规划再平衡措施已经显得有些晚了。


There are no oases of prosperity in a crisis-prone globalized world.	在一个易受危机冲击的全球化世界中，不存在繁荣的绿洲。


That is equally true for Asia, the world’s fastest-growing region.	作为世界增长最快地区的亚洲也不能例外。


As Europe’s crisis deepens, the twin channels of financial and trade linkages have placed Asia’s economies in a vice.	随着欧洲危机的深化，金融和贸易的双生渠道意味着亚洲经济也无法独善其身。


Rebalancing is the only way out for China and its partners in the Asian supply chain.	再平衡是中国及其亚洲供给链伙伴的唯一生存之道。


Until that occurs, the vice now gripping Asia will only continue to tighten.	惟其如此，紧扼亚洲咽喉之手才会松开。


China’s Asia?	中国的亚洲？


CLAREMONT – Distinguishing diplomatic rhetoric from official policy is never easy.	克莱蒙特—区分外交辞令和官方政策向来不易。


But it is especially difficult in China, where the government’s actions so often fail to match its statements.	但在中国特别困难，中国政府的行往往与它的言不一致。


Given this, it is worth asking whether the latest slogan adopted by Chinese officials – “Asia for Asians” – is merely nationalist posturing for domestic consumption or a signal of a genuine policy shift.	考虑到这一点，有必要问一问，中国官员最近常说的口号——“亚洲人民的亚洲”只是为了国内消费而采取的民族主义姿态，还是真正的政策转变信号？


The most authoritative reference to an “Asia for Asians” occurred in May, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.	对“亚洲人民的亚洲”最权威的引述是5月中国国家主席习近平在亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议上的主旨演讲。


In a carefully crafted statement, Xi laid out China’s vision for a new regional security order – one in which, as the slogan suggests, Asians are in charge.	习近平以精心组织的辞令提出了中国的新地区安全秩序愿景——顾名思义，在这个愿景中，亚洲人起着主导作用。


According to Xi, at the fundamental level, “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”	习近平说，在根本层面，“亚洲的事情要靠亚洲人民来办，亚洲的问题要靠亚洲人民来处理，亚洲的安全要靠亚洲人民来维护。


Fortunately, he declared, they have the “capability and wisdom” to build peace and security in the region through cooperation.	”幸运的是，他宣布他们有“能力和智慧”通过合作构建地区和平与安全。


This vision, of course, entails an overhaul of the Asian security structure, with a drastically reduced role for the United States.	当然，这一愿景包括了对亚洲安全结构的修正，美国的作用将大幅削弱。


Indeed, Xi implicitly criticized the existing US-dominated security architecture in Asia as stuck in the Cold War, and characterized “military alliance targeted at a third party” as “not conducive to maintaining common security.”	事实上，习近平间接批评现有以美国为主导的亚洲安全格局仍处于冷战状态，称“针对第三方的军事联盟不利于维护地区共同安全”。


Since the speech, lower-level officials and the Chinese media have reiterated similar lines.	自此次演讲以来，底层官员和中国媒体一直以此为基调进行转述。


At first glance, this vision seems entirely reasonable; after all, most countries prefer to manage domestic and regional affairs without the meddling of outside powers.	乍一看，这一愿景十分合理； 毕竟，大部分国家都更愿意在没有外部势力指手画脚的情况下管理国内和地区事务。


But Xi’s statement marked a significant departure from China’s long-standing position on America’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region.	但习近平的辞令与中国长期以来对美国在亚太地区身影的立场背道而驰。


Since the US-China rapprochement four decades ago, China has maintained a studied ambiguity regarding America’s role as the guarantor of Asia’s security.	自四十年前中美恢复邦交以来，中国美国的亚洲安全保障者角色一直刻意的暧昧。


China’s pragmatic leaders knew that the US presence helped to contain the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia), prevented Japan from re-arming, and kept sea-lanes open.	中国的务实领导人知道，美国的存在有助于遏制苏联（以及随后的俄罗斯）、防止日本重新武装、保持海路开放。


They also recognized that they lacked the power to challenge the US-led security order or offer a feasible alternative.	他们也明白，他们缺少挑战美国领导的安全秩序或提供可行替代方案的实力。


This may be changing.	这也许正在改变。


Though some analysts remain convinced that Xi’s “Asia for Asians” line is an empty attempt to bolster his nationalist credentials, an equally strong case can be made that it signifies a genuine policy shift.	尽管一些分析家仍认为习近平的“亚洲人民的亚洲”路线只是防空炮，目的是巩固他的民族主义者形象，但同样有理由认为这表明了真正的政策变化。


While the argument is not overwhelming, it should not be dismissed out of hand.	尽管这一观点尚不足以令人信服，但也不能完全否认。


The most conclusive evidence of Xi’s readiness to challenge the established order lies in the economic sphere.	习近平准备挑战既成秩序，最有说服力的证据在于经济。


Most notably, China has established new development institutions, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the new Silk Road Fund, to which it will channel tens of billions of dollars – clear challenges to the established Western-dominated multilateral institutions.	最引人注目的是，中国建立了不少新发展机构，包括亚洲基础设施投资银行和新丝绸之路基金，将向其中注入数百亿美金——显然这是向西方主导的多边机构的挑战。


On the security front, however, China has made much less headway in turning its “Asia for Asians” vision into reality.	但是，在安全方面，中国在将其“亚洲人民的亚洲”愿景转变为现实方面的动作就要少得多。


To be sure, it has acquired some military capabilities to deter the US from intervening in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, and it has improved its security cooperation with Russia and Central Asian countries through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.	诚然，它已经拥有了一定的军事实力震慑美国队台湾海峡或南海的干预，并且通过上海合作组织强化了其与俄罗斯和中亚国家的安全合作。


But such modest gains are more than offset by the security setbacks that China has suffered as a result of its assertiveness in regional territorial disputes.	但这些轻微的进展往往被中国因为在地区领土争议中表现得咄咄逼人而带来的安全隐患所抵消。


Indeed, after many months of increasingly forceful military moves – most notably, the unilateral declaration of an air-defense identification zone covering a large swath of the South China Sea, including disputed territories – China’s ties with Japan reached an all-time low.	事实上，在多个月日渐升级的军事动作后——最引人关注的便是单方面宣布了覆盖包括争议领土在内的广大南海海域的防空识别区——中国与日本的关系降到了历史冰点。


And concerned Southeast Asian countries have been entreating the US to remain in the region as a counterweight to China.	忧心忡忡的东南亚国家也恳求美国留在该地区制衡中国。


Underlying the “Asia for Asians” trope may be China’s belief that the US, not its own behavior, is to blame for its neighbors’ defiance.	在“亚洲人民的亚洲”辞令的背后，中国也许认为美国——而不是中国自己——的行为要为邻国的反抗负责。


Some Chinese strategists believe that the US is using Asian states, particularly Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, as pawns to contain China.	一些中国战略家认为美国正在利用亚洲国家——特别是日本、越南和菲律宾充当挡箭牌遏制中国。


If this perspective has prevailed in the internal policy debate, Chinese leaders, including Xi, could have reached the fateful conclusion that, on balance, America’s security presence in Asia directly threatens Chinese interests and must be eliminated.	如果这一观点在国内政策争论中占得上风，包括习近平在内的中国领导人可能会形成一个重大结论，即，总而言之美国在亚洲安全事务上的身影直接威胁到中国的利益，必须将它除掉。


That would be a grave strategic error, based on a fundamental misreading of Asian security dynamics.	这将是一个可怕的战略错误，其根源是对亚洲安全动态存在根本性误解。


Most of China’s neighbors, even North Korea, fear an unconstrained Chinese hegemon – and, if the US security presence were eliminated, that is precisely what they would face.	大部分中国的邻国，哪怕是朝鲜，都害怕不受遏制的中国霸权——而如果美国的安全保障被去除，它们就将面临不受遏制的中国霸权。


“Asia for Asians” would be “Asia for the Chinese.”	“亚洲人民的亚洲”将变成“中国人民的亚洲”。


It is difficult to imagine that Chinese policymakers, known for their sophistication and realism, could be pursuing a strategy that is not only unlikely to gain support from fellow Asians, but also is guaranteed to spark conflict with the US.	很难想象以成熟和务实闻名的中国决策者回去追求不但不可能赢得亚洲邻国的支持、还必然会导致与美国的剧烈冲突的战略。


Given this, it is likely – indeed, desirable – that “Asia for Asians” will remain a mere slogan.	基于此，有可能——事实上，但愿如此——“亚洲人民的亚洲”将只是一个口号。


In fact, Xi has lately toned down his description of China’s aims, recently telling Communist Party leaders that, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world.”	事实上，习近平最近在中国的目标问题上的口风也有所缓和，最近他对中共领导人说，“要提升我国软实力,讲好中国故事,做好对外宣传。 ”


But, even as rhetoric, the phrase “Asia for Asians” is problematic for historical reasons.	但是，即使习近平这样说，但出于历史原因，“亚洲人民的亚洲”一词仍有问题。


In the 1930s, Japanese militarists used the idea of an “East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” as a cover for their imperial ambitions and conquests.	20世纪30年代，日本军国主义者以“大东亚共荣圈”作为帝国和征服野心的幌子。


The slogan was widely ridiculed, particularly in China, for its transparent absurdity.	这一口号受到了广泛的口诛笔伐，特别是在中国，因为它具有显而易见的荒谬性。


This may help to explain the lukewarm reception that the concept of “Asia for Asians” has received this time around.	这有助于解释如今“亚洲人民的亚洲”概念为何会遭受冷遇。


The smartest thing for Chinese leaders to do would be to drop it, once and for all.	对中国领导人来说，最聪明的做法是一劳永逸地抛弃这一概念。


Asia in the World	世界中的亚洲


NEW YORK – Before I became the UN’s Secretary-General, I was an Asian diplomat.	纽约--在成为联合国秘书长之前，我一直是一名亚洲外交官。


While I was foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, my Government and I strongly advocated détente with the North.	在我担任韩国外长的时候，我和我的政府极力主张与朝鲜缓和关系。


When some in the world called for sanctions and punitive action, South Korea pushed for dialogue.	当世界上的某些人要求制裁以及惩罚性行动的时候，韩国则推动对话。


That requires listening as well as speaking.	对话不仅要求发言，也要求倾听。


It means sticking to principles, but also attempting to understand the other side, however irrational or intransigent it may sometimes appear.	这意味着坚持原则，但是同时也努力理解另一方，而无论那一方有时看起来有多么的没有理性和不妥协。


This remains my style at the United Nations.	这还是我在联合国的风格。


I believe in the power of diplomacy and engagement.	我相信外交和接触的力量。


I prioritize dialogue over debate or declaration.	我把对话置于辩论或者宣言之上。


Above all, I seek results.	最主要的，我寻求有所结果。


We are doing that now in Myanmar.	我们正在缅甸做着这件事。


My Special Adviser, Ibrahim Gambari, has been back in Yangon.	我的特别顾问甘巴里已经回到了仰光。


His brief is to be the honest broker, the facilitator of a dialogue between government and opposition leaders, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi.	他的任务是诚实地居中，促使政府和反对派领导人、特别是昂山素季对话。


The goal is for Myanmar’s Government to release all detained students and demonstrators, engage with the opposition, move toward a more democratic society, and rejoin the international community.	目标就是让缅甸政府释放所有遭到逮捕的学生和示威者，与反对派接触，向民主社会转变并且重新加入国际社会。


This brand of diplomacy is not quick or easy.	这一外交行动既不快捷也不容易。


There is seldom applause, and often no outward evidence of movement.	很少得到赞扬，而且经常没有进展的迹象。


It is a quiet, painstaking slog behind the scenes.	这是幕后的、静悄悄以及充满艰辛的努力。


You have to work the phones, cajole world leaders to do this or that.	人们要打电话，哄着各国领导人做这做那。


It is a symphony – often not a very harmonious one – of small steps that you hope will lead to something greater.	这是一场经常不是很和谐的交响乐，由微小的步伐组成，你希望这些步伐可以导致某些更大的成就。


You expect nothing.	你不指望什么。


You can only keep trying, keep pushing.	你只能不断努力推动。


Maybe it works, maybe not.	也许奏效，也许不奏效。


Then you try some more, in a different way, aiming all the while for some small progress that makes the next step possible.	然后你再用另一种方式做努力，企图取得一些小的进展可以达到下一步。


We are at this point in Darfur.	在达尔富尔问题上我们就是这样。


I have spent hundreds of hours working behind closed doors with various parties to the conflict – Sudan’s Government, rebel leaders, neighbouring countries, and African Union partners.	我已经花费了数以百计小时来同冲突各方进行幕后工作。 它们是苏丹政府、叛乱领导人、邻国以及非洲联盟夥伴。


Meanwhile, we are pushing ahead with one of the most complex peacekeeping operations in our history, feeding and protecting hundreds of thousands of displaced people, and sponsoring difficult peace negotiations in Libya.	同时，我们正在推动我们历史上最为复杂的维和行动，给几十万流离失所的人提供食物和保护，并且在利比亚鼓励困难的和平谈判。


But even as I push my brand of “Asian” diplomacy, it can sometimes feel a bit lonely to be an Asian at the international community’s diplomatic roundtable.	但是即使我推行我的“亚洲”外交，有时候在国际社会外交舞台上还是不免感到有点孤单。


We Asians inhabit the world’s largest continent, with the world’s largest population and its fastest-growing economies.	我们亚洲人居住在世界上最大的大陆，拥有世界最多的人口以及增长最快的经济。


We have a rich history and ancient cultures.	我们历史悠久，文明古老。


Yet our role in international affairs is far less than it could, or should be.	但是我们在国际事务中的作用还是差强人意。


Asia’s contribution to the UN, though significant, could be greater.	亚洲对联合国的贡献尽管举足轻重，但是还可以更大。


Its humanitarian assistance, to put it politely, is less than generous.	礼貌地说，其人道主义援助还不够慷慨。


We are the only continent where regional integration and common markets have not taken hold.	亚洲是唯一还没有地区融合和共同市场的大陆。


Latin Americans and North Americans dream of creating a free-trade zone.	拉美以及北美构想建立自由贸易区。


Europeans speak of building a United States of Europe.	欧洲人谈论建立欧洲合众国。


The African Union aspires to become a United States of Africa.	非洲联盟希望成为非洲合众国。


Why no United States of Asia?	为何没有亚洲合众国呢？


There are many reasons why Asia is different: history, cultural diversity, unresolved territorial and political disputes, a lack of multilateral experience, and the predominance of one or two centers of power.	亚洲区别的理由很多：历史、文化多样性、尚未解决的领土和政治争议、缺乏多边经验以及一个或两个权力中心的控制。


But the main reason is that we have not tried.	但是主要原因是我们还没有试图这样做。


Asia does not do itself justice.	亚洲没有充分发挥自身的能力。


As an Asian Secretary-General, I hope to see this change.	作为来自亚洲的秘书长，我希望这一情况得到改变。


I hope to see an Asia that is both better integrated and more internationally engaged.	我希望看到亚洲更为融合，更为在国际上接触。


I expect particularly great things of my fellow Koreans, a remarkable people who have come into their own.	我特别期望我的韩国同胞们有所作为。 韩国人民是非凡的人们，已经独立自主。


I hope to see Korea assume more responsibility in the world, commensurate with its growing economic clout – especially in the area of development, one of the three pillars of the UN Charter.	我希望韩国在世界上承担与其不断增长的经济实力相称的更大的责任，特别是在发展领域。 发展是联合国宪章的三大支柱之一。


Koreans need to step up, speak out, and do more, and that should start with more generous official development assistance.	韩国人需要站出来发言，做更多的事情，而这需要从更为慷慨的官方发展援助开始。


Koreans have already shown their penchant for multi-lateral diplomacy and trouble shooting through the six-party talks.	韩国人已经通过六方会谈展现出其对多边外交和解决问题的倾向。


Now, they, and Asians at large, need to bring both their skills and their success to bear on the most pressing global issues of the day.	现在，他们以及整个亚洲需要把他们的技能和成功发挥出来，为当今急迫的全球性问题发挥作用。


This is not just my hope, it is also Asia’s obligation.	这不仅是我的希望，也是亚洲的义务。


Asia’s Almighty Middle Class	亚洲的全能中产阶级


SEOUL – Despite recent economic uncertainty, Asia’s middle class is growing fast.	首尔——尽管近期经济仍有不确定性，亚洲的中产阶级却在快速成长。


In the coming decades, this burgeoning demographic segment will serve as a keystone for economic and political development in the region, with significant implications for the rest of the world.	未来几十年，该新兴细分人口群体将成为地区经济政治发展的基石，对世界其他国家也将产生显著的影响。


The OECD estimates that the global middle class (defined as households with daily expenditures of $10-100 per person, in 2005 purchasing power parity terms) will swell to 4.9 billion people by 2030, from 1.8 billion in 2009.	据经合组织估计截止2030年全球中产阶级（定义为按2005年购买力平价计算，每人日均开支达10-100美元的家庭）将膨胀至49亿人，而2009年还仅有18亿的规模。


Two-thirds are expected to reside in Asia, up from 28% in 2009, with China home to the largest share.	其中的三分之二将居住在亚洲，2009年上述比率仅为28%，其中最大部分居住在中国。


Indeed, if China pursues the structural reforms and technological upgrading needed to maintain rapid economic growth, its middle class should exceed one billion people in 2030, up from 157 million in 2009.	事实上，如果中国推行保持经济快速增长所需的结构改革和技术升级，相比于2009年的仅1. 57亿，到2030年那里的中产阶级人口将达到10亿之多。


The rapid emergence of Asia’s middle class will bring far-reaching economic change, creating new market opportunities for domestic and international companies.	亚洲中产阶级的快速崛起将为国内国际企业创造新的市场机会，进而催生影响深远的经济变革。


Already, demand for consumer durables has increased in the region, with China becoming the world’s largest market for automobiles and mobile phones.	该地区对耐用消费品的需求已有所增加，中国已成为全世界最大的汽车和手机市场。


But there remains substantial room for more consumption in luxury goods and technological products, as the purchasing power of the developing world’s middle class catches up to that in the advanced countries.	但随着发展中国家中产阶级购买力赶上发达国家，奢侈品和技术产品的消费仍有很大余地。


This convergence will contribute to more sustainable economic growth, with Asia’s economies rebalancing toward domestic demand, especially household consumption, and thereby becoming less vulnerable to external shocks.	上述融合将助力持续性更强的经济增长，亚洲经济围绕国内需求、尤其是居民消费实现再平衡，从而不那么容易受到外部冲击。


Given the decline in export demand since the global economic crisis, this shift could not be timelier.	鉴于全球经济危机爆发后出口需求下降，上述转变真可谓恰逢其时。


And the benefits will not be confined to Asia; as imports to the region increase, global trade imbalances will decline, improving the sustainability of economic growth worldwide.	而且也不仅亚洲会从中受益； 随着地区进口增长，全球贸易失衡状况将有所缓和，从而提高全球经济增长的可持续性。


Indeed, Asia’s growing middle class will transform a region known as a global manufacturing hub into a consumption powerhouse.	事实上，亚洲不断壮大的中产阶级将把这座全球著名的制造业中心转变为消费重地。


As demand rises, more and better jobs will be created not only in Asia, but also globally, along supply chains and across production networks.	随着需求不断攀升，不仅亚洲会创造出更多更好的就业机会，全球范围内的供应链及整个生产网络也将会从中受益。


With rising prosperity comes improved education and health care, which promise to help drive long-term economic growth by improving productivity.	繁荣之后教育和医疗升级随之而来，有望通过提高生产力推升长期经济发展水平。


In China, this would represent a significant shift from prevailing conditions, in which the children of poor households, especially in rural areas, lag in terms of nutrition and school enrollment, despite significant progress in recent decades on lowering infant mortality and raising educational attainment.	中国的现有状况将发生显著改变，尽管数十年来已经在降低新生儿死亡率和提高受教育程度方面取得了长足的进步，但那里的贫困家庭儿童，特别是在农村地区，仍缺少营养和学校教育。


Equipped with high-quality education, Asia’s rising middle class will demand higher-quality public services.	有了高质量的教育，亚洲正在崛起的中产阶级会要求更高质量的公共服务。


Increased confidence in their country’s political systems and institutional structures, enhanced by improved perceptions of upward mobility, will help to strengthen the rule of law.	对国内政治制度和体制结构信心增强再加上更宽广的晋身空间将有助于加强法治。


And there will be more opportunities for women to learn and work, leading to greater gender equality.	妇女会得到更多的学习和工作机会，从而缩小性别差距。


Most important, the rise of the middle class is likely to be accompanied by growing demands for political freedom and civil liberties, thereby fostering democratization.	最重要的是，中产阶级崛起很可能伴随对政治自由和公民权利需求的不断增长，进而推动民主化进程。


Indeed, an examination of a large sample of countries, from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, reveals that a larger population of affluent, educated citizens – especially women – brings about more political participation and greater support for democracy, particularly in less-developed countries.	事实上，对十九到二十一世纪大量国家样本的考察显示受过良好教育的富裕民众——特别是女性——尤其是在那些欠发达国家，能够催生出对政治的更多参与和对民主的更强支持。


In the West, capitalism and democracy progressed in tandem, as the development of markets reduced the power of landlords and increased that of the working and middle classes.	在西方，随着市场发展在削弱地主权力的同时增强劳工和中产阶级权力，资本主义和民主携手取得了长足进步。


By participating actively in politics, basing their electoral choices on rational self-interest, and developing the sense of moderation needed to resist dictatorship, the middle class promotes democratic progress.	通过积极参政、在理性自利的基础上进行投票以及培养抵制独裁所需的节制感，中产阶级极大地推动了民主进程。


At the same time, the growth of private organizations associated with the rise of the middle class prevents state institutions from monopolizing political resources.	同时，与中产阶级崛起相关的民间组织成长防止国家机构垄断政治资源。


In Asia, South Korea experienced a similar progression, with rapid economic growth spurring the rise of a large middle class, which in turn drove democratization in the 1980s.	在亚洲，韩国也经历过类似的发展，经济的快速增长催生了庞大的中产阶级，进而在20世纪80年代推动了民主化的崛起。


That history may repeat in China before long.	中国或许过不多久就会重复这段历史。


Given the benefits of having a large middle class, Asian countries should be nurturing theirs by improving health care, upgrading infrastructure, investing in universities and technical training, and addressing income and educational disparities.	鉴于庞大中产阶级的可观价值，亚洲各国应通过改善医疗保健、升级基础设施、投资大学和技术培训以及缩小收入和教育差距来对其进行培育。


Moreover, social safety nets should be created or strengthened, in order to help safeguard the middle class from negative shocks and boost consumption growth (which continues to be hampered by precautionary saving).	此外，应建立或加强社会安全网，以此来促进消费增长（目前仍受制于预防性存款），协助保护中产阶级抵御负面冲击。


Finally, public policies – aimed at strengthening the rule of law, promoting trade, and achieving sound macroeconomic management – are essential to sustain growth, thereby ensuring the continuous upward mobility of lower-income families.	最后，以强化法治、促进贸易和实现健全宏观经济管理为目标的公共政策对保持经济发展至关重要，并以此确保低收入家庭能持续拥有晋身余地。


That upward mobility is the key to keeping in motion a virtuous circle of middle-class expansion and economic growth.	这是保持中产阶级不断扩张及经济增长良性循环的关键因素。


The Short Asian Century?	短暂的亚洲世纪？


TOKYO – The British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm once called the epoch stretching from the French Revolution of 1789 to World War I’s outbreak in 1914 as the “long nineteenth century.”	东京—英国马克思主义历史学家埃里克·霍布斯鲍姆（Eric Hobsbawm）曾经将1789年法国大革命至1914年第一次世界大战爆发期间的这一段时间称为“延长的十九世纪”。


A little over a decade ago, people began to speculate about an emerging “Asian century,” driven by an unstoppable China and enabled by America’s supposed inevitable decline.	十多年前，人们开始预测“亚洲世纪”即将出现，其背后的主要动力是不可阻挡的中国，而美国看似不可避免的衰退则提供了助力。


But with China’s economy in turmoil, key East Asian “tiger” economies like Malaysia and Thailand floundering, and even Singapore facing questions about the vitality of its economic model, is this “Asian century” coming to a premature end?	但中国经济陷入了动荡，重要的东亚“小龙”经济体（如马来西亚和泰国等）颓势尽显，甚至新加坡也面临着经济模式是否可行的问题，难道这个“亚洲世纪”即将夭折？


Political and economic troubles plague the region from east to west.	政治和经济麻烦从东向西困扰着整个地区。


In India and Indonesia, hopes that the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joko Widodo, respectively, would spark a new wave of economic reform now seem to be running into the sand.	在印度和印度尼西亚，莫迪和维多多分别当选总理和总统让人们寄希望于他们为如今看起来步履蹒跚经济改革带来新活力。


Similarly, in South Korea, two successive presidents have failed to follow through on their bold promises to rein in the chaebol, the country’s massive family-owned conglomerates, in order to unleash the animal spirits of entrepreneurship.	类似地，在韩国，连续两位总统都没能兑现遏制财阀（家族控制的企业集团）、从而释放企业家精神的动物精神的承诺。


And in Japan, although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has implemented far-reaching reforms, they have yet to reignite economic dynamism, and efforts to address the demographic threat posed by a rapidly aging population have not even begun.	而在日本，尽管首相安倍晋三实施了深刻的改革，但仍未能重振经济活力，而解决因人口快速老化而带来的人口问题的措施甚至尚未开始。


Then there are Asia’s serious political and security challenges, including the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, signs of resurgent nationalism across the region, and the fracturing of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” mode of government.	还有其他许多严重的政治和安全挑战，包括美国和中国之间日益严重的战略对峙、整个地区民族主义复兴的信号，以及香港“一国两制”政府模式的崩溃趋势。


More destabilizing, China is making vast territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, as well as to the Indian province of Arunchal Pradesh.	更令人不安的是，中国在东海和南海以及印度阿鲁纳恰尔邦大肆主张领土权。


And, perhaps most dangerous, the isolated and unpredictable North Korean regime is becoming more unstable than ever under the callow and violent leadership of Kim Jong-un.	而最危险的情况也许是与世隔绝又不可预测的朝鲜政权正在金正恩冒进的暴力领导下变得比以往任何时候都更加不稳定。


In the absence of coherent regional frameworks, it is no surprise that rival structures are being built, with the US championing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will link 12 Pacific Rim countries into a vast free-trade area, governed by an advanced set of agreed rules.	在缺少统一地区框架的情况下，毫不奇怪会产生互相敌对的结构。 美国领衔的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP）将环太平洋12国联系起来，形成一个巨大的自由贸易区，并根据一套一致同意的事先确定的规则治理。


For its part, China is working to establish, through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and its “Silk Road” initiative, a Sino-centric trade area that perpetuates not only its regional hegemony, but also its state-capitalist model.	而中国也在致力于通过亚洲基础设施投资银行和“丝绸之路”计划构建一个以中国为中心的贸易区，这个贸易区将服务于其地区霸权和国家资本主义模式。


All of this uncertainty reveals critical flaws in the Asian century’s foundations – flaws that, until recently, were masked by the region’s rapid economic growth.	所有这些不确定性彰显出亚洲安全基础存在关键缺陷——这些缺陷被该地区的高速经济增长所掩盖，知道最近才显露出来。


Indeed, vast production chains linking businesses across countries gave the impression of a uniquely Asian superstructure.	事实上，将各国企业联系在一起的巨大生产链营造出一个独一无二的亚洲上层建筑的印象。


As long as the region’s economies were thriving, there was little incentive to identify – much less address – the problems facing them.	只要该地区各经济体继续欣欣向荣，就不会有人有动力认识——更不用说纠正——它们所面临的问题。


The resulting policy inertia lay at the heart of many of the region’s emerging economic troubles.	由此带来的政策惯性构成了该地区诸多新见经济问题的核心。


And this torpor will be difficult to address, partly because it is built into some countries’ systems of government.	而这一顽疾难以治愈，部分是因为它已经深深嵌入了一些国家的政府系统。


India’s federal system, for example, has proved to be a much bigger roadblock to reform than Modi anticipated, with state governments balking at measures like a new unified sales tax and land reform – both crucial to enable India to build a unified internal market underpinned by world-class infrastructure.	比如，印度的联邦制度对改革的阻碍作用远远大于莫迪的预计，邦政府对新的统一销售税和土地改革怨声载道，而这两项措施都是让印度构建以世界级基础设施为基础的统一的内部市场的关键。


Vietnam faces a similar problem of policy paralysis, owing to divisions within its collective communist-party leadership.	越南面临着类似的政策无力问题，因为其共产党领导集体内部存在分歧。


China’s top-down state capitalism has enabled it to avoid this problem, with the ruling Chinese Communist Party relatively united on the economic agenda.	中国自上而下的国家资本主义使其避免了这一问题，执政的中国共产党在经济日程上相对统一。


But the economy’s virtually unchecked growth over the last few decades has created other huge challenges – namely, environmental degradation on a scale unseen anywhere else on the planet, a massive volume of local-government debt, and large-scale corruption.	但中国经济在过去几十年中几乎不可遏制的增长制造了其他一些艰巨挑战——即地球上其他任何地区都甘拜下风的环境破坏、巨大的地方政府债务以及大规模腐败。


All have now burst into the open.	所有这些问题现在都已公开爆发。


And the Party’s ability to address them cannot be taken for granted, as its muddled management of recent stock-market volatility made clear.	而中共处理这些问题的能力未必如人们所认为的那样坚挺，最近其处理股市波动的拙劣管理表现清楚地表明了这一点。


The actual depth of China’s economic woes is unclear, given that both decision-making and key statistics remain shrouded in secrecy.	中国经济混乱到底有多深尚不清楚，因为其决策过程和关键统计数字仍然讳莫如深。


What is clear is that the authorities sought-after shift to a more sustainable services- and consumption-driven economy will require far-reaching market-oriented reforms.	清楚的是当局大受欢迎的向更可持续的贸易和消费驱动经济的转型需要深远的市场改革。


This represents an existential choice for China’s rulers, as the ceding of government control that successful reform demands clashes directly with President Xi Jinping’s goal of strengthening the Party’s grip on the country.	这是中国执政者的生存选择，因为成功改革要求政府让出控制权，而这与国家主席习近平增强党对国家控制力的目标背道而驰。


Malaysia and Thailand also face a near-existential choice between continuing on their current paths – one-party ethnocracy in Malaysia and elite/military rule in Thailand – and beginning a process of political reconciliation, aimed at bringing large, marginalized portions of their populations into the fold.	马来西亚和泰国也面临着接近生死存亡的选择，一边是继续当前道路——马来西亚是一党家族统治，泰国则是精英/军方统治——另一边是开始政治妥协，让人口中为数巨大的边缘化人群也加入其中。


So far, however, it seems that both countries’ leaders are blind to the choice facing them.	但是，到目前为止，两国领导人似乎都对他们所面临的选择视而不见。


Perhaps the most hopeful story is that of Japan, which, after two decades, has finally begun to reverse its entrenched policy inertia.	也许最有希望的是日本，二十年后，日本终于开始扭转根深蒂固的政��惯性。


Old habits of coddling agriculture, electric power, and other economic sectors are being disregarded.	偏向农业、电力和其他经济部门的旧习惯正在成为众矢之的。


More needs to be done, of course, particularly ratification of the TPP, which will unshackle more areas of Japan’s economy.	当然，日本还有更多的事要做，特别是签署TPP，该协议将为日本经济打开更多领域。


With his bold approach, Abe has emerged as a model for Asia’s other leaders – in particular, the Chinese.	安倍进三的方针相当果断，他也堪称是其他亚洲领导人的榜样——特别是中国。


If the Asian century is to endure, such boldness will be vital.	如果亚洲世纪想要继续下去，这种果断是必不可少的。


Uniting for an Asian Century	为实现亚洲世纪而联合起来


SEOUL – There is no question that Asia’s standing in the global economy is stronger than ever.	发自首尔——毫无疑问，如今亚洲在全球经济中的地位要比以往任何时候都更重要。


The region now produces about 40% of the world’s GDP, measured according to purchasing power parity.	根据购买力平价计算，该地区目前生产了全球GDP中的约40%。


During the recent economic crisis, Asia accounted for more than half of global GDP growth.	而在最近一次经济危机中，亚洲又贡献了全球GDP增长的一半以上。


Add to that a massive population and growing political influence, and Asia finally appears ready to lead on a world stage long dominated by the West.	再加上庞大的人口以及不断扩大的政治影响力，亚洲似乎终于在长期由西方主导的世界舞台上显露出了领头羊的气象。


But it is too early to open the champagne.	但现在庆祝还为时过早。


The United States and Europe maintain an advantage, in terms of global strategic influence, while Asian countries are facing major political, economic, and security challenges.	美国和欧洲在全球战略影响力方面依然保持着优势，而亚洲各国则面临着重大的政治，经济和安全挑战。


In fact, Asia’s growth momentum is declining.	事实上，亚洲的增长势头正在放缓。


China is working overtime to achieve an economic soft landing, following decades of breakneck expansion.	经过几十年的突破性扩张之后，中国正在奋力实现经济软着陆。


Japan is preoccupied with escaping slow growth and coping with population aging.	日本急于脱离缓慢增长的泥潭并应对人口老龄化。


Asia’s other economic powerhouses – India, Indonesia, and South Korea – each face their own set of economic and political problems.	其他亚洲经济引擎——印度，印尼和韩国——都面临着各自的经济和政治问题。


Across the region, rising income inequality, financial instability, and environmental degradation are hampering development.	整个地区不断扩大的收入不平等，金融不稳定和环境退化都在阻碍着发展。


More problematic, despite being deeply interdependent, the region’s countries struggle to act collectively.	但问题在于，尽管该地区各国互相依存程度极深，但仍然难以实现集体行动。


The persistence of power rivalries, historical resentments, and territorial disputes, together with pronounced disparities in economic and military might, create substantial obstacles to unity.	势力对抗，历史不满和领土争端的持续存在，以及经济和军事力量上的显着差异都对区域一体化造成了实质性障碍。


A recent surge in coercive behavior by China, a nationalist revival in India, and a shift toward conservatism in Japan have exacerbated these challenges.	近期中国强硬行动的激增，印度民族主义复兴，以及日本向保守主义的转变都加剧了这些挑战。


But, at a time when Western countries are moving toward isolationism – exemplified by the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as US president – intra-regional trade and investment are more important than ever.	但在这个西方国家走向孤立主义的时代——以英国的脱欧公投和美国人选举特朗普为美国总统为标志——区域内的贸易和投资会比以往任何时候都更重要。


Beyond the economic benefits, integration would yield important political benefits, with an integrated Asia enjoying more influence on the international stage.	除了经济效益之外一体化将产生重要的政治效益，令亚洲在国际舞台上更具影响力。


To reap those benefits, Asia must mitigate regional military and political conflicts and develop a long-term vision for regional integration.	为了获得这些好处，亚洲必须减少区域内军事和政治冲突，并制定一套实现区域一体化的长期愿景。


Asia is home to some of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.	亚洲是世界上其中一些最危险的火药桶的所在地。


There is a risk of armed clashes in the East and South China Seas, and North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, despite tougher sanctions pushed by the United States and the United Nations.	在东中国海和南中国海存在着武装冲突的危险，而朝鲜不顾美国和联合国的更严厉制裁持续研发核武器和弹道导弹。


Stronger cooperation among Asian countries, together with the international community, could ease regional tensions and lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs.	亚洲国家与国际社会加强合作可以缓解区域紧张局势，并令朝鲜放弃核武计划。


Some regional institutions have already been established, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN+3 (the ten members of the ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).	一些区域性架构，包括东南亚国家联盟（东盟），东盟+3（东盟的十个成员加上中国，日本和韩国）和东亚峰会（EAS）都已经建立。


Such institutions will be critical to resolving conflicts and establishing a framework for peace that can support regional prosperity and global leadership.	这类架构将对解决冲突并建立一个能够支持区域繁荣和全球领导的和平框架至关重要。


But that is only the first step. And whether Asian leaders share a common vision for regional integration remains unclear.	但这只是第一步，因为尚不能明确亚洲领导人是否拥有共同的区域一体化愿景。


Judging by Europe’s experience – from the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to the establishment of the European Union in 1993 – there is no need to rush the integration process. But it will take a lot of time and effort.	根据欧洲的经验——从1951年欧洲煤钢共同体成立到1993年欧洲联盟建立——没有必要去匆忙推动整合，但这个过程确实要耗费极大的时间和精力。


Perhaps the best way to kick-start this process is to identify areas where the region can gain the most from integration, and take steps that will bring quick returns.	也许启动这一进程的最好方法是确定该地区可以在那些领域中率先通过整合获益，并采取一些能带来快速回报的措施。


For example, Asian countries can move toward a single market with common rules governing trade and free movement of workers, especially skilled ones.	例如，亚洲国家可以走向单一市场，制定有关贸易和劳动者（特别是技术工人）自由流动的共同规则。


Launching the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free-trade agreement currently being negotiated by ASEAN and six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand), would be an important step in this direction.	还有就是发起区域全面经济伙伴关系，目前由东盟及六个合作伙伴（澳大利亚，中国，印度，日本，韩国和新西兰）正在谈判的自由贸易协定将是朝这个方向迈出的重要一步。


Given the vulnerability of cross-border capital flows, Asia must also pursue joint action on financial supervision, surveillance, and regulatory issues to prevent and manage crises.	鉴于跨境资本流动的脆弱性，亚洲还必须在金融监查，监督和监管问题上采取联合行动以预防和管理危机。


One specific goal should be to improve the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, a $240 billion currency-swap arrangement, and its surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.	一个具体目标应该是提升《清迈多边化倡议》这个总金额达2400亿美元的货币互换安排以及其附属监查机构东盟+3宏观经济研究办公室的职能。


Another should be to establish a de facto Asian Monetary Fund with a broader membership.	另一个应该是建立一个实质上的亚洲货币基金并吸纳更广泛的成员。


It should be noted that none of these efforts would aim to supplant existing sub-regional, regional, and global institutions.	应当指出的是，这些努力都不是为了取代现有的次区域，区域和全球机构。


Rather, by making Asia a more effective and united actor, new regional trade and financial measures would complement and strengthen current arrangements.	相反，通过使亚洲成为更有效和统一的行动者，新的区域贸易和金融措施将能对当前的安排予以补充和加强。


For any of this to work, bureaucracies and the private sector, including business leaders and academics, must actively support high-level political commitments to integration.	为了实现这一目标，官僚机构和私营部门，包括商界领袖和学术界，都必须积极支持针对一体化的高级别政治承诺。


Such support should not be too difficult to muster.	把这种支持汇集起来不会太难。


After all, integration would facilitate the exchange of valuable knowledge, from effective economic and social policies to technological and scientific insight.	毕竟一体化将有助于交流从有效经济和社会政策到技术和科学见解的种种珍贵知识。


Forums and dialogues on regional public goods could also prove valuable by promoting cooperation on cross-border challenges, including epidemics, natural disasters, and environmental degradation.	关于区域公共物品的论坛和对话也可以证明是有价值的，因为它们可以促进对包括流行病，自然灾害和环境退化等跨边界挑战的合作。


Person-to-person connections would help to highlight for Asian societies their cultural commonalities and shared values, fostering progress in areas where particular countries might lag.	人与人之间的联系也有助于强调亚洲社会的文化共性和共同价值观，以推动在某些国家有所滞后的领域取得进展。


At a time when the global order is increasingly uncertain, Asia should take its fate into its own hands, by pursuing closer economic and political regional cooperation.	在全球秩序日趋充满不确定性的时候，亚洲应该通过进行更密切的经济和政治区域合作来掌握自己的命运。


If Asian countries can develop a shared vision for an economic community and a political association, this century could be theirs.	如果亚洲国家能够为经济共同体和政治联合体制定共同的愿景，那么这个世纪就将是它们的世纪。


Asian Footsteps in Africa	亚洲人在非洲留下的足迹


CAMBRIDGE – Don’t look now, but capitalism – maligned in these bailout-ridden recessionary days – is reshaping Africa inexorably.	剑桥——看看当今社会，资本主义——在那些“救助经济”横行的日子里——正在无情地改变着非洲。


What is different today is that it is emanating from China and India, rather than from the conventional bastions of capitalist prowess.	如今，来自中国和印度的救助和那些传统的老牌资本主义国家比较起来，究竟又有什么区别呢？


Devi Shetty, a celebrated cardiac surgeon in Bangalore, brings health relief to India’s masses through his Narayana group of hospitals.	黛非·舍蒂，这位来自班加罗的著名心脏外科手术专家，通过他医院的Narayana计划给印度大众带来医疗拯救计划。


Some years ago, I witnessed his early experiments with rural telemedicine, especially in the Indian states of Karnataka and West Bengal.	我目睹了他早期在印度农村通过远程医疗救助边远地区，特别是在印度的卡纳塔克邦和孟加拉邦。


In my visit last month, the wall was adorned by a large map of Karnataka festooned with colored pins, to indicate that he now served most district capitals in the remotest parts of the state.	去年我访问过他一次，在那里，我看到墙上挂着卡纳塔克邦的大幅地图。 上面用彩色图标插着彩旗，表明着他的医疗已经覆盖了遍及边远地区的卡纳塔克邦大部分的范围。


Moreover, a world map showed outreach to rural areas of East Africa and Southeast Asia, and the room has been upgraded to reflect a still-expanding global reach.	在另一张世界地图上，东非和南亚上的广大农村地区也标上了记号，说明了服务的范围已经向着全球化扩张。


All this comes from carefully acquired experience – technical and sociological – with delivering expert medical advice through teleconference facilities, aided by satellite links.	所有的一切来源于精湛的技术——技术上和社会学上的——通过卫星的联结，利用远程通讯技术将专业的医疗服务提供出来。


Shetty’s team has successfully participated in telemedicine consultations – multi-specialty, non-stop availability, and supplemented by continuing education – with hospitals in 14 African countries.	舍蒂团队已经在非洲14个国家的医院，通过远程医疗成功提供丰富多彩的长期的医疗教育。


This effort is part of then Indian President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam’s ambitious pan-African e-Network project to link all 53 African capitals to tertiary care facilities across India.	以上的计划是印度总统阿卜杜尔•卡拉姆博士雄心勃勃的与非洲e-Network计划中的一部分，目的是将印度的第三代医疗技术提供给非洲53个首都的医院。


Shetty is a healer, first and foremost.	舍蒂是一个医生和开拓者，同时他也是一个企业家。


But he is also an entrepreneur, and this is the latest in his many efforts to create successful, low-cost, but cutting-edge medical ecosystems in tough locations worldwide.	他的目标是给世界上贫瘠的土地带来低成本高效能，最尖端的科技医疗服务。


He aspires audaciously to what he calls the universal Walmartization of healthcare – a reshaping of medical care that the world’s indigent need, and in Africa more than most other locations.	他把他的计划大胆的称为全球范围的“沃尔玛式”的医疗——满足全球范围，特别是在非洲地区的极端匮乏医疗需求。 。


Cynics say that India’s e-Network is currying favor with Africa in exchange for natural resources. Perhaps.	务实主义者会认为印度在非洲的e-Network计划的目的——换取非洲的自然资源。


But in that effort, India must contend with its neighbor, China, which speaks with a louder voice and carries a larger stick.	如果是这样的话，印度必须和他的邻居中国展开竞争。 后者目前在非洲更有实力和更有发言权。


Chinese Communist Party President Hu Jintao’s peripatetic diplomacy across Africa has ensured that the Chinese are omnipresent there.	中国国家主席胡锦涛在非洲的“巡视”外交访问确保了中国人在非洲的主导地位。


China has traded much investment in physical infrastructure in places otherwise shunned – Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – for access to natural resources.	中国在非洲——除去安哥拉，苏丹和津巴布韦之外的国家——的基础设施投入了大量的投资，以换取非洲的自然资源。


Witness also an unprecedented convening of 48 African heads of state and senior officials in Beijing in 2006 to signal unequivocally that China would speak with the loudest voice.	2006年，来自48个非洲国家的首脑和高级官员参加的北京会谈，更加说明了中国不可撼动的在非洲的地位。


India tried to mimic the event, with an India-Africa summit in New Delhi in 2008.	印度也不甘示弱，在2008年的新德里也举办了一次印非峰会。


Fourteen countries attended to discuss food price inflation, energy needs, etc.	会议有14个非洲国家参加，议题是关于粮食价格上涨，能源的需求等。


Alas, India’s voice was drowned out, not by China’s attempts to provide medicine and education to Africa, but by the sheer magnitude of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investments in physical infrastructure.	唉，印度的声音显得有点微弱，原因倒不是中国对印度的医疗教育的服务。 而是来自中国国有企业在非洲的基础设施的投资。


But loud voices need not be the most effective.	但声音大并不表示就一定有效果。


Indian influence will no doubt exploit assets less available to others, particularly the Indian diaspora in countries like South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria.	印度的影响力在一些国家无可撼动，例如有大量印度侨民居住的南非，肯尼亚，坦桑尼亚和尼日利亚等。


India and Africa have been linked over the centuries by trade, religion, and post-imperial political consciousness.	经过几个世纪的贸易，宗教以及长期互动，还有殖民政治之后的共同价值观。


Gandhi and the Non-Aligned Movement remain important symbols.	甘地和不结盟运动也是一个重要的象征。