Yet the global negotiations on climate change are focusing on a different set of questions.	然而应对全球气候变化问题的国际谈判却在关注一组截然不同的问题。


The negotiations are mainly about which groups of countries should cut their emissions, by how much, how fast, and relative to which baseline year.	谈判主要集中于哪些国家应该减排，减排多少，减排速度以及从哪一年开始。


Countries are being pressed to cut emissions by 2020 by certain percentage targets, without much serious discussion about how the cuts can be achieved.	以致许多国家在还没有认真讨论该如何减排的情况下就已经承受着在2020���达到特定指标的重压。


The answers depend, of course, on which low-emission technologies will be available, and on how fast they can be deployed.	而很显然能这些问题的答案其实要取决于使用哪些低排放技术以及什么时候投入使用。


Consider the United States. To cut emissions sharply, the US will need to switch over this decade to a new fleet of automobiles, powered increasingly by electricity.	以美国为例，要想迅速减少碳排放量，美国需要在十年内将所有汽车逐渐替换为新的电力驱动车型。


The US will also have to decide on the renewal and expansion of its nuclear power plants, and on the use of public lands to build new renewable energy plants, especially using solar power.	美国还要下决心改造并扩大其核电厂，并在公共用地上建造更多可再生能源发电厂，特别是太阳能发电厂。


And the US will need a new power grid to carry renewable energy from low-density population sites – such as the southwestern deserts for solar power and the northern plains for wind power – to the high-density populations of the coasts.	同时，美国还需要一个新电网将可再生能源从低人口密度地区——比如太阳能资源丰富的西南部沙漠和风能充沛的北部平原——传输到高人口密度的沿海地区。


Yet all of this requires a national plan, not simply a numerical target for emissions reduction.	然而，这一切的实现都需要全盘的国家计划，而不仅仅是一个减排的数字目标。


Similarly, China, like the US, can reduce CO2 emissions through increased energy efficiency and a new fleet of electric vehicles. But China must consider the question from the vantage point of a coal-dependent economy.	而中国跟美国一样，可以通过提高能源利用率和电动汽车来减少二氧化碳排放，但也要考虑到自身经济是煤依赖型经济这一具体情况。


China’s future choices depend on whether “clean coal” can really work effectively and on a large scale. Thus, China’s emissions path depends crucially on early testing of the CCS technologies.	因此中国的未来技术选择将取决于“清洁煤”技术是否有效应用并大规模推广，而整个国家的二氧化碳减排策略在很大程度上将取决于“碳捕捉和封存”技术的早期测试成果。


A true global brainstorming approach would first discuss the best technological and economic options available, and how to improve these options through targeted research and development and better economic incentives.	由此可见，一个真正全球集思广益的办法就是首先讨论可资利用的最佳技术和经济选项，以及如何通过有针对性的研发和更好的经济激励措施来改进这些选项。


The negotiations would discuss the range of options open to each country and region – from CCS to solar, wind, and nuclear power – and would sketch a timetable for a new generation of low-emission automobiles, recognizing that market competition as well as public financing will set the actual pace.	而谈判协商将讨论每一个国家和地区的技术选择范围——从“清洁煤”到太阳能，风能，以及核能——并拟定推广新一代低排放汽车的时间表，同时也认识到市场竞争和政府资助这两项因素将决定上述技术推广的真实进度。


Based on these building blocks, the world could agree on allocating the costs for speeding the development and spread of new low-emission technologies.	基于这些讨论模块，世界各国将讨论决定具体哪些国家将分担某种低排放技术的研发推广成本。


This global framework would underpin national and global targets for emissions control and for monitoring the progress of the technological overhaul.	而这一全球性框架将成为实现各国/全球减排目标以及监测技术革新进展的基础。


As new technologies are proven, the targets would become more stringent.	随着新技术的不断研究成功，那些减排目标也将变得更有说服力。


Of course, part of the strategy would be to create market incentives for new low-emission technologies, so that inventors could develop their own ideas with the prospect of large profits if those ideas are right.	当然，这个策略的其中一部分将是为低排放技术引入市场激励体制，以便让那些私人研究者在有利可图的情况下发展自己的新技术。


My plea to discuss plans and strategies alongside specific emissions targets might seem to risk impeding the negotiations. But if we don’t have a strategy to accompany our targets, the world’s governments might not accept such targets in the first place, or might accept them cynically, without any intention of actually meeting them.	虽然笔者提出要在具体减排目标之外制定计划和战略的请求似乎有阻碍谈判进行之嫌，但如果没有跟目标相配套的具体策略的话，各国政府首先都不会接受这一目标，即便接受了，或许也没打算真正去实现它。


We need to think hard, and collaboratively, about the world’s real technological options, and then pursue a common global framework that allows us to move into a new era, one based on feasible and sustainable technologies for energy, transport, industry, and buildings.	因此各国需要同心协力认真思考世界上真正可供选择的技术，然后以各种能源，运输，工业和建筑方面的可行和可持续技术为基础，最终构建一个能带领世界踏入新时代的全球性框架。


Where Are the Syrian Peacemakers?	叙利亚和平的缔造者尚在何处？


DENVER – Much has been said about the similarities between the chaos in Syria and the Balkan wars of the 1990’s.	发自丹佛——人们对于叙利亚与巴尔干战争之间的相似性已经多有论述。


But, while the prolonged killing may indeed be reminiscent, the political and diplomatic effort that finally ended the war in Bosnia is hardly in evidence today.	但当旷日持久的杀戮确实令人回想起过去的惨剧时，当年在终结波斯尼亚战事方面所付出的政治和外交努力如今却不那么引人注目了。


To date, there has been nothing similar to the Contact Group plan that was hammered out in the summer of 1994 by representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States, and implemented the following year in Dayton, Ohio, after months of on-the-scene diplomacy.	迄今为止，虽然在叙利亚进行了数月的现场外交行动，我们依然未能看到任何跟1994年由英国、法国、德国，俄罗斯和美国分别派代表发起，随后那年在美国俄亥俄州代顿市开始执行的联络小组计划（Contact Group plan）类似的东西。


In Syria, the only diplomatic process is in the hands of the courageous, if beleaguered, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who has understood – better than many analysts of this latest international outrage – that any lasting political settlement must not be a triumph of one side or the other.	目前该国唯一的外交进程由勇气可嘉——同时也身陷重围的——前联合国秘书长科菲·安南操持着，而他比许多关注这场最新国际暴行的分析者们更清楚的一点，就是任何有持续效力的政治和解都不会是一方压倒另一方的胜利。


No one can watch the ongoing violence in Syria without a sense of horror at the armed attacks on largely unarmed civilians, overwhelmingly by groups that support President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.	没人可以毫无恐惧感地坐视那些目前持续发生在叙利亚国内的，对手无寸铁平民的武装袭击——且主要是由总统阿萨德的支持者发动的。


But those who say that Syria is on the brink of civil war miss what has become more obvious with each passing day: Syria alreadyis in a state of civil war, one whose battle lines were drawn months ago.	但那些认为叙利亚正处于内战边缘的人也忽视了一个每过一天都变得越发明显的事实：叙利亚已经处于内战状态，而且战线早在数月之前就已划定了。


On one side is Assad’s minority Alawite tribe, which over the years has attracted secular Sunnis to share in the spoils of a one-party, authoritarian state.	一方是总统阿萨德所属的少数伊斯兰什叶派阿拉维派部族，多年来他们一直与世俗逊尼派共同分享一个一党独裁国家所带来的甜头。


But Assad’s coalition is broader than that, which helps to explain how he has been able to hold on to power while other regimes in the region have not.	但阿萨德的联盟构成可比这更广泛，也足以解释他为什么能在本地区其他政权先后崩溃的情况下屹立不倒。


Syria’s Christians, many of its 1.5 million Kurds, and even Damascus-based, secular classes have been disinclined to join what is widely perceived in the country – though not by the rest of the world – as a sectarian Sunni opposition that might not be supportive of cultural pluralism were it to assume power.	叙利亚的基督教徒——其中绝大部分是150万库尔德人——甚至还有主要分布在首都大马士革的世俗阶层，都被迫加入一个可能在执政后不会支持文化多元主义的宗派主义逊尼派反对派——这点在叙利亚国内司空见惯，但在国际上却鲜为人知。


In the past, characterizing as a civil war a conflict in a complex region was a tacit warning that others should stay out. But the civil war in Syria has much broader ramifications, which could lead to a wider regional conflict.	在过去，在一个复杂区域发生的具备内战特征的冲突其实就是某种沉默的警告：外人不要插手。 但叙利亚的内战却有着更加严重的后果，并可能导致一场波及面更广的区域性冲突。


Given this looming threat, it is becoming increasingly clear that staying out of the Syrian mess may not be an acceptable choice for countries that have an interest in a calmer and more democratic Middle East.	考虑到这个不断增大的威胁，我们也应该逐渐明白袖手旁观对于那些对一个更平静也更民主的中东感兴趣的国家来说不是一个可接受的选项。


Ominously, the conflict looks increasingly like a proxy war between Iran and the Sunni Arab states, which regard their own minority Shia populations as a potential Iranian fifth column.	更不祥的是，这场冲突越来越像一场伊朗和逊尼派阿拉伯国家之间的代理人战争，而后者将本国的少数什叶派教徒视为伊朗的第五纵队。


Iran has sought to maintain its influence in the Levant (including in Lebanon and among some Palestinian groups) by providing material support to Assad.	伊朗试图通过对阿萨德提供物质支持的方式来保持自身对地中海东部地区（包括在黎巴嫩以及一些巴勒斯坦团体中）的影响力。


By contrast, many Sunni Arab states have provided varying degrees of support to the largely Sunni opposition, a hodgepodge of groups that include the Muslim Brotherhood and other sectarian forces similar to Egypt’s ultra-conservative Salafis. 	相反，许多逊尼派阿拉伯国家则对主要由逊尼派组成的反对派提供不同程度的支持，而这股反对力量其实是一个包含了穆斯林兄弟会和其他宗派主义力量——类似极端保守的埃及萨拉非党（Salafi）——的大杂烩。


Russia and China, bruised by their loss of face in the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, have sought to keep the international community out of Syria.	而俄罗斯和中国则因为在2011年北约主导的利比亚干涉行动上丢了面子，于是希望把国际社会隔绝在叙利亚国门之外。


Both countries fear that intervention – whether militarily or through economic sanctions – could harm their interests in Syria, where they – especially the Russians – have been the dominant external players.	两国都害怕干涉行动——不管是通过军事还是经济制裁的方式——会损害他们在叙利亚的利益，而它们——尤其是——本来就是该国最主要的外部参与者。


In the absence of concerted international action, the US and Europe have largely weighed in with vocal condemnation of the party committing the overwhelming number of human-rights violations: Assad and his henchmen. They have also highlighted the loss of life in an effort to shame Russia into adopting a more amenable position.	在缺乏协同一致的国际行动的情况下，美国和欧洲在很大程度上都是通过对那些犯下大量人权暴行的组织——阿萨德及其党羽——进行口头谴责的方式来施加影响,同时还不断对人员伤亡情况进行渲染以迫使俄罗斯采取一个更负责任的立场。


But denouncing Assad or Russia is unlikely to produce any effect except to assure domestic audiences that the West is on the side of the angels in the conflict.	但除了能使当地听众确信西方是站在好人一方之外，谴责阿萨德或者俄罗斯起不到任何作用。 同样，对那些杂七杂八鲜为人知的反抗团体表示支持；


Likewise, proclaimed support for disparate, barely-known rebel groups; demands for dead-on-arrival sanctions resolutions; feckless calls for Assad’s departure (as if he plans to take the advice); and half-baked ideas about enforced “safe areas” (an utter failure in Bosnia) are unlikely to spare many lives, much less bring about the endgame that is so desperately needed.	胡乱要求阿萨德离境（好像他愿意接受这个建议的样子）； 以及那些不成熟的关于建立“安全区”的想法（在波斯尼亚就遭遇了彻底的失败），都不足以拯救许多生命，也更无法带来人们迫切需要的冲突终结。


What is really needed are serious and sustained negotiations among interested international powers (let’s call them a “contact group”) on a viable political outcome.	真正需要的是关注此事的各国际力量之间进行认真且持续的谈判协商（让我们将其称之为���个“联络小组”）并因此产生一个切实可行的政治结论。


A “Contact Group Plan” should be carefully worked out with Annan and his team (the only entity at this point that seems to have access to all sides).	一个“联络小组计划”应该由安南及其团队（也是目前唯一能联络各方的实体）认真制定出来。


Most importantly, all of the plan’s stakeholders then need to support Annan, publicly and privately.	最重要的是，所有该计划的利益相关方都必须在计划出台后支持安南，不管是公开还是私下的。


Publicly declaring support for Annan’s ceasefire plan, and then whispering to journalists that it is “in tatters,” as has occurred repeatedly in recent weeks, will not get the job done.	一边公开宣称支持安南的停火计划，一边却私下告诉记者说该计划“彻底破产”，这种最近不断重演的做法是无法取得成果的。


Clearly, a new way forward is needed, and a good start would be a political/diplomatic plan that Annan could sell to the parties.	很显然，我们需要一个新的前进方式，而一个好的开始则是一个可以由安南向各方推销的政治/外交方案。


In the Balkans, it was a US team that finally sold the Contact Group Plan to the parties directly involved.	在巴尔干地区是一个美国团队最终向涉事各方推销了联络小组计划。


We didn’t succeed because we were geniuses. We succeeded because we had tremendous support from every country that wanted to see the horrific conflict in Bosnia brought to an end.	而我们成功推销的原因并不是因为自己是什么天才人物，是因为我们从所有希望看到波斯尼亚惨剧终结的国家处获得了极大的支持。


The same unqualified support is what Annan – the best diplomat we have out there – needs and deserves.	同样的无条件支持也是安南——目前叙利亚地区最优秀的外交家——所需要和应得的。


Where Did Market Volatility Go?	市场波动到哪里去了?


Television and newspapers continue to trumpet every twist and turn of global financial markets.	电视和报纸依然在鼓吹着全球金融市场的每一次波动。


In truth, however, the big story is the uneerie calm that has engulfed virtually every major asset class, from stocks to bonds.	然而，从大的层面上讲真正的情况却是令人不安的平静几乎已经席卷了从股票和债券所有大的资产品种。


Is the whole investment world on Prozac?	难道整个投资界都服了缓解焦虑的百忧解了吗？


Conspiracy theories abound, particularly among the ranks of financial traders, for whom volatility is like wind to a sailor.	合谋理论大量存在，尤其是在金融投资者的阶层中，对他们来说波动就像是水手眼里的风。


These traders confidently figure that as long as markets gyrate, no matter what the direction, they can always make money.	这些投资者声称只要市场在转动，不管它是转向哪个方向，他们总能够赚到钱。


And, thanks to the rest of us who don’t have the time, information, and skill to match wits with them, they are mostly right.	并且，我们其他的人并不拥有足够的时间、信息和技能去与他们斗智斗勇，所以他们总是对的。


But, with today’s dormant markets, the pickings are slim.	可是面对今天平静的市场，他们的利润就少得可怜了。


The favored bogeymen of the day are giant government investors, particularly Asian central banks, with their trillions of dollars in assets.	今天受益的精灵是巨大的政府投资者，尤其是拥有数以万亿计美元资产的亚洲中央银行。


These superfunds, whose managers do not necessarily share the same passion for profit as private investors, are said to be squeezing the life out of interest rates and exchange rates.	这些超级基金，它们的经理人并不需要像私人投资者那样一心一意地追求利润，被认为挤压了利率和汇率的活力。


“The big Asian central banks are oppressing us,” one young trader recently complained to me.	一位年轻的投资者最近向我抱怨说：“巨大的亚洲中央银行在压制着我们。 ”


What a difference a decade makes.	仅仅十年间就发生了怎样巨大的变化啊。


During the 1990’s, private investors looked at big, lumbering central banks as cash cows, long on money and short on financial acumen.	在二十世纪九十年代，私人投资者把行动迟缓的中央银行看作现金金牛，它们有的是钱但是却缺乏敏锐的金融洞察力。


George Soros once made a billion dollars off the Bank of England in just an hour.	乔治·索罗斯曾在一个小时内从英格兰银行身上赚了十亿美元。


His basic strategy was a standard one: bet against any central bank that tries to defend an inconsistent macroeconomic policy.	他的基本策略很普通：攻击任何试图捍卫一个不连贯的宏观经济政策的中央银行。


Traders did not win every battle, of course.	当然，投资者并不是每一次都会赢。


It was the speculators whose blood flowed in the streets when they attacked Hong Kong’s dollar peg in 1998.	当他们1998年攻击香港的联系汇率时投机者们遭到了惨败。


But overall, betting against big government financial institutions proved to be a richly rewarding business.	但是总的来说，攻击巨大的政府金融机构被证明可以获得巨大的回报。


That was the 1990’s.	那是二十世纪九十年代的事情。


Today, many traders see formerly inept state giants as financial geniuses, capable of taming complex financial formulas and exploiting their superior size and trading information to squeeze the life out of currency and interest rate markets.	今天，许多投资者把他们以前心目中无能的政府庞然大物看作金融天才，它们可以驾驭复杂的金融公式并且利用它们的超大规模和贸易信息来挤压利率和汇率市场的活力。


These behemoths’ innate conservatism, having calmed bond and currency markets, is now having a similar effect on stocks.	这些庞然大物天生的保守思想使债券和汇率市场变得平静，并且现在对股票市场也正在发挥同样的作用。


Although few accuse Asian central banks of explicitly conspiring to calm global markets, some say that their common cautious approach to trading is a form of implicit collusion.	尽管很少有人指责亚洲中央银行有显而易见的合谋活动来平息全球市场，但是有些人说它们在贸易上共同的谨慎措施是一种隐含的合谋方式。


As much as we may sympathize with young would-be millionaire traders, does their story of oppression make any sense?	在我们对那些梦想成为百万富翁的年轻投资者表示同情的同时，他们所谓受到压制的说法真的如此吗？


Could it be true that huge government investors from Asia (not to mention Russia, Latin America, and the Middle East) have quietly taken control of world markets?	亚洲（更不用提俄罗斯、拉丁美洲和中东）巨大的政府投资者真的悄悄地控制了世界市场了吗？


Perhaps, but the bogeyman theory seems a bit overblown.	也许是的，但是所谓受益的精灵的说法有点夸大其词了。


Yes, the big Asian central banks do sit on almost $3 trillion in assets; China’s central bank alone has around a trillion dollars.	是的，巨大的亚洲中央银行确实坐拥将近3万亿美元的资产； 中国的中央银行一家就拥有将近1万亿美元。


This gives them a capital base similar to the combined assets of all the world’s major hedge funds.	它们的资金相当于世界上所有大的对冲基金的资产总和。


But this metric is very deceptive.	但是这个衡量标准是极具欺骗性的。


Hedge funds constitute only a small percentage of overall world financial markets, which, according to a recent study by the McKinnsey Global Institute, now exceed $120 trillion.	对冲基金只在整个世界金融市场中占有很小的百分比。 而根据麦肯锡全球机构最近的一项研究显示，世界金融市场的总资产超过120万亿美元。


And hedge funds, unlike banks, can leverage their bets, borrowing to take on assets many times the size of their capital base.	而跟银行不同，对冲基金可以通过贷款来下注，借到数倍于它们资金规模的资金。


Otherwise, George Soros and his wealthy fellow investors could not have dreamed of taking on the Bank of England.	否则的话，乔治·索罗斯和他富有的投资者伙伴也不会梦想去挑战英格兰银行。


In fact, the explanation for market calm probably lies elsewhere.	事实上，市场平静的原因也许出在其他方面。


So, if a conspiracy of Asian central banks is not to blame for the volatility drought that is parching traders’ earnings, what is?	如果亚洲中央银行没有合谋造成市场波动的严重不足从而使投资者无从收益，那么原因在哪儿呢？


Surely, today’s low volatility is partly cyclical.	当然，今天的低波动���分是周期性的。


Stock market volatility was also very low during the early 1990’s, before reaching new peaks later in the decade.	在二十世纪九十年代早期股票市场在该年代后期达到新的顶点前其波动也非常小。


Moreover, financial innovation and globalization allow markets to spread risk more effectively than ever before, placing it in the hands of those who can best manage it.	另外，金融革新和全球化使市场比以前能更有效地传播风险，而把它放在那些能最好地控制它的人手中。


Improved central bank policy is another huge factor.	中央银行政策的改进也是另外一个巨大的因素。


In the early 1990’s, the average level of world inflation exceeded 30%; now it is less than 4%.	在二十世纪九十年代早期，世界通货膨胀的平均水平超过30%； 而现在它只有不到4%。


All of these changes have in turn contributed to lower economy-wide output and consumption volatility in both rich and developing countries.	所有这些变化反过来使富有国家和发展中的国家经济方面的产量和消费波动都降低了。


They have also contributed mightily to the high general level of asset prices, helping create the vast riches of which today’s hungry young traders are so jealous.	它们还大大地帮助使资产价值总体上处于一个很高的水准，并且创造了令当今的饥渴的年轻投资者们如此羡慕的巨大的财富。


So will today’s relative market calm continue?	那么今天市场相对的平静会一直延续下去吗？


Unfortunately, no.	不幸的是，答案是否定的。


Today’s brave new world of financial globalization will almost surely face severe new stress tests, reminding us that recessions still happen.	今天金融全球化美妙的新世界几乎肯定会面临严峻的新的压力的挑战，提醒我们衰退依然在发生着。


Frankly, although I do not see the five-year-old global expansion coming to an end yet, there is no question that risks are on the rise, with output in the United States having slowed sharply in the third quarter, and central banks’ hands tied by inflation risks. Further ahead, it is not hard to imagine geopolitical instability – possibly emanating from Iran, Iraq, or North Korea – unsettling markets.	坦率地说，尽管我并不认为长达五年的全球增长已经走到了尽头，但是毫无疑问风险正在加大，美国第三季度的产量就大大放缓了，而中央银行正在极力消除通货膨胀的危险。


Whatever the scenario that ends the calm, today’s age of low volatility will seem like a distant dream to most of us – and a forgotten nightmare for ambitious financial traders.	不管用什么方案来结束现在市场的平静，今天的低波动对于我们大多数人来说将会成为一个遥远的梦——并且成为雄心勃勃的金融交易者们的一个遗忘的恶梦。


Which New Middle East?	什么样的新中东？


BERLIN – Regardless of whether democratization in the “new Middle East” succeeds or authoritarian forms of government prevail once again, one fundamental change has already become clear: no one will be able to govern without taking into account domestic public opinion.	发自柏林——不管“新中东”的民主化能否成功或是独裁政府卷入土重来，一个根本性的变化已经明白无误地发生了：再没有人能在无视本国民意的情况下推行自身统治。


This change will shift the foreign-policy parameters of the Middle East conflict (understood as both an Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as a conflict between Israelis and Arabs more generally).	这一变化将改变应对中东地区冲突——以巴之间，或者宏观上的以色列人和阿拉伯人之间——的外交政策考虑因素。


Despite wars in Lebanon and Gaza, and the intifadas in the occupied West Bank, these parameters have proven surprisingly stable for decades, anchored by the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the Oslo accords with the Palestinians.	在以色列与埃及和约旦两国签署的和平协议，以及与巴勒斯坦人签订的《奥斯陆协议》的基础上，不管经历了黎巴嫩和加沙地区的战争还是西岸占领区的巴勒斯坦人起义，数十年里来这些因素都出人意料地保持了稳定


All this is about to change.	但这一切都将被改变。


And, while the tectonic shift in the region was triggered by the “Arab Awakening,” its players are not limited to the Arab world or to the confines of the Middle East conflict.	虽然该地区的政治架构变动是由所谓的“阿拉伯觉醒”所触发的，但其参与者并不仅限于阿拉伯世界或是中东冲突的范围。


The United States, Europe, Turkey, and, in a certain sense, Iran all play a role – some more directly than others.	美国、欧洲，土耳其以及（在某种情况下）伊朗都粉墨登场——只是干涉的程度有不同而已。


Let’s begin with the US.	让我们先看看美国。


President Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo two years ago created great expectations, but few or none have been fulfilled.	奥巴马总统两年前发表的开罗讲话构思了一个宏大的远景，但事实上却毫无建树（或仅仅实现了极少部分）。


Instead, the US allowed a political vacuum to form in the absence of any movement on the part of Israel’s government. This vacuum has now been filled by the Arab Awakening.	相反，美国容许在以色列政府缺乏任何行动的情况下出现一个政治真空，而如今这个真空就被“阿拉伯觉醒”所填补了。


Europe, meanwhile, is preoccupied with its own crisis.	与此同时，欧洲正深陷于内部危机当中。


But, in the last few years, the Europeans, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, have de facto slammed the door to European Union accession in Turkey’s face.	但在过去几年中，由德国总理默克尔和法国总统萨科齐带领下的欧洲人事实上当着土耳其人的面关上了加入欧盟的大门。


As a result, Turkey has embraced a “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy, in which the Arab world – even more than the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans – plays the central role.	于是土耳其转而采取了一项“准土耳其帝国”外交政策，把重心放在了阿拉伯世界——甚至包括高加索，中亚和巴尔干地区。


Of course, Turkey, in accordance with its political, security, and economic interests, has no choice but to pay close attention to its southern neighborhood, and must try to prevent chaotic developments there.	当然基于其政治，安全和经济利益，土耳其都必须密切关注其南面各邻邦并尝试阻止那些地区陷入任何形式的混乱当中。


Turkey would be facing the same risks even if it were integrated into a European context, but its priorities would then be completely different.	虽然应对的重点会完全不同，但即使是纳入了欧洲架构中的土耳其都将面对同样的风险。


Because of Europe’s short-sightedness, Turkey has in effect abandoned its ambitions for EU membership and opted for the neo-Ottoman project of becoming a Middle Eastern power – a policy shift that reflects both interests and ideology.	由于欧洲的短视，土耳其实际上放弃了自己的入盟梦想并转而走上了一条寻求成为中东重要势力的准土耳其帝国之路——而这也是一条反映出其利益和意识形态的政策。


On the one hand, Turkey views regional dominance as a stepping-stone to a greater global role; on the other hand, it views itself as a role model for successful modernization of the Middle East on an Islamic-democratic basis.	一方面，土耳其将区域称霸视为晋身全球势力的垫脚石； 另一方面，该国也将自身视为中东地区成功实现伊斯兰民主现代化的楷模。


This bid for regional preeminence will sooner or later bring Turkey into serious conflict with neighboring Iran.	这种争当区域老大的做法迟早将使土耳其和伊朗两国爆发严重冲突。


If Turkey prevails, Iran and the radicals in the region will be caught on the losing side of history – and they know it.	如果土方得胜，伊朗以及区域内的极端势力将遭遇历史性的惨败——而后者也深知这一点。


While Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government is trying to maintain good relations with Iran, its ambition to become the leading Sunni power means that Turkey must sooner or later contest Iran’s influence in Iraq, as well as in Syria and Palestine. And that means conflict.	而当土耳其总理埃尔多安的政府试图与伊朗维持友好关系之时，前者成为逊尼派穆斯林国家领头羊的野心意味着土耳其迟早会在伊拉克，叙利亚和巴勒斯坦挑战伊朗的影响力——这当然也意味着冲突。


The drastic deterioration in Turkey’s relations with Israel is related to this emerging Iranian-Turkish rivalry.	此外土耳其与以色列关系的迅速降温也与伊朗-土耳其敌对状态的出现有关。


To be sure, this rivalry also has a positive side from the Israeli point of view – the weakening of Iran and other regional radicals.	可以确定的是，这种敌对状态对以色列来说是有利的——伊朗和极端分子将遭到削弱。


But, for Turkey as an aspiring regional leader, the interests of the Palestinians are naturally more important than its relations with Israel.	但对土耳其这个野心勃勃的区域领袖来说，巴勒斯坦所代表的利益自然要比以色列要大。


This has become all the more true in light of the revolutionary changes in the Arab world, and is at the root of Erdoğan’s foreign-policy reorientation.	而根据目前阿拉伯世界所发生的革命性变化来看这个判断显然更加正确，也是埃尔多安外交政策转向的根源。


As a result, Israel is in an increasingly difficult situation.	结果以色列就陷入了一个日渐艰难的境地。


Without a strategic re-orientation of its own – to remain passive is a risky endeavor in a rapidly changing world order – Israel would further delegitimize and isolate itself internationally.	由于其本身并未实施任何战略转向——在一个急速变化的世界秩序中持有消极态度实在是个危险之举——以色列将进一步失去其存在合法性并在国际上孤立自己。


A viable Israeli answer to the dramatic changes in the region – and to their already foreseeable consequences – can only take the form of a serious offer of negotiations to Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian government, with the objective of signing a comprehensive peace treaty.	��以色列针对该区域激烈变革——以及他们已经预料到的后果——的积极回应只能是与阿巴斯领导下的巴勒斯坦权力机构展开认真谈判，并以此签署一个全面的和平条约。


Security questions must be taken seriously, but they carry less and less weight, because a sufficiently long period can be left between the treaty’s conclusion and its full implementation to resolve them by mutual agreement.	虽然安全问题必须认真考虑，但由于双方在上述和平条约的签署和全面实施之间会有足够时间对此进行协商，它们所占的分量已经日渐减轻了。


But Israel’s current passivity – with all of its negative long-term consequences for the country – is likely to continue as long as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu considers his coalition’s survival more important than a decisive peace initiative.	但只要总理内塔尼亚胡继续认为自己执政联盟的生存比一个决定性和平方案更重要的话，以色列目前的消极——以及所有将对这个国家造成的长期后果——都将依然存在下去。


At the same time, the pressure of the Arab revolutions is transforming the Palestinians into a dynamic political factor.	与此同时，阿拉伯革命的压力将把巴勒斯坦转变成为一个活性政治因素。


For example, in view of the looming fall of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, the pressure of the Egyptian revolution, and the new role of Islamism in the region, Hamas’s alliance with Iran is becoming increasingly problematic.	比如说鉴于叙利亚总统阿萨德下台，埃及革命的压力以及伊斯兰教在该区域所扮演的新角色，哈马斯与伊朗的结盟正变得越来越充满变数。


It remains to be seen whether, in the end, the “Turkish course” will prevail against the radicals in Gaza or not.	我们也可以拭目以待，看“土耳其进程”是否将在最后压倒加沙地区的极端势力。


In any case, Hamas faces some risky and consequential decisions of its own – all the more so should its main rival, Abbas’s Palestinian Authority, succeed in its current diplomatic campaign at the United Nations.	而无论在何种情况下哈马斯都将面对一系列将给自身带来风险和负面结果的决定——如果阿巴斯领导下的巴勒斯坦民族权力机构最近在联合国展开的外交行动取得成功的话，情况就将更加严重。


Obama had promised a Palestinian state within one year, and Abbas is now building upon that promise.	奥巴马已经承诺在一年之内实现巴勒斯坦建国，而阿巴斯则在进一步落实这一承诺。


But what happens next is crucial.	但下一步将发生的事则极端重要。


Will Abbas be able to keep the Palestinians on a diplomatic path, or will the situation degenerate again into violence and another disaster?	阿巴斯是否能巴勒斯坦人团结在一条外交道路上，或者再次堕落为暴力和另一场灾难。


And what will the Palestinian road towards peace look like after the UN decision to recognize some form of statehood for Palestine?	而当联合国认可了某种形式的建国之后巴勒斯坦的和平之路又将是何种走向？


Given the current pace of change in the Middle East, we might not have to wait long for answers – or for more questions.	依照中东地区目前的变革轨迹，我们可能不需要等待太久就能看到答案——或者是更多的麻烦。


Which Turkey in What Europe?	何种土耳其加入何种欧洲？


“A tempest in a teapot” is perhaps the best description of the recent squabbles about opening the European Union’s accession negotiations with Turkey.	最近欧盟开启与土耳其的入盟谈判所引起的争论可谓小题大做。


The election in Germany was in part fought on the issue, as Chancellor Angela Merkel ran on a platform of offering Turkey a “privileged partnership,” rather than full admission.	德国大选有一部分也是有关这一问题，德国总理安格拉·默克尔的竞选纲领为土耳其提供一个“特殊伙伴关系”，而非完整成员资格。


The Austrian government’s posturing – motivated as much by its upcoming elections as genuine foreign policy concerns – seemed to threaten the opening of the accession talks themselves.	奥地利政府受即将到来的选举和切实的外交担忧的双重推动而做出的姿态似乎威胁到开启入盟谈判。


But German foreign policy has always been marked by continuity, and the new foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the chief of staff under former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, has repeatedly advocated full membership for Turkey.	但是，德国的外交政策素来以连续性著称，前总理施罗德办公厅主任、新任外长弗兰克·沃尔特·施泰因迈尔多次重申土耳其应当具有完整的成员资格。


It is thus unlikely that the Grand Coalition will adopt a different political approach towards Turkey than the previous Red-Green government.	因此，德国的大联合政府不大可能在对待土耳其的问题上采取与前红绿政府不同的政治策略。


After a bit of drama, Austria also gave up its opposition to the accession talks, in exchange for a promise of admission for Croatia, and the intra-European squabbles have been patched up.	一阵激变之后，奥地利也不再反对入盟谈判。 作为交换，它得到了克罗地亚入盟的保证。


So the British, under Tony Blair’s current presidency of the EU Council of Ministers, have gotten their way for now, and the Americans – keen backers of Turkey’s EU aspirations – have once again succeeded in acting as a “European power.”	于是，英国作为欧盟轮值主席国暂时如愿以偿。 美国积极支持土耳其入盟的愿望，也再一次成功地扮演了“欧洲列强”的角色。


Accession negotiations with Turkey are now a fact.	土耳其的入盟谈判现在成为了既成事实。


But much of the debate about Turkey’s possible accession has been focused on the wrong issues: whether Turkey is culturally “in line” with Europe or whether Europe is in some sense “Christian” and could assimilate 100 million Muslims.	但是，有关土耳其的可能的入盟争论却集中于错误的问题上。 也就是，土耳其在文化上是否与欧洲“一致”，或者，欧洲在某种含义上是否归属“基督教”、能否吸纳一亿穆斯林。


The real issue – not disputed even by most Turks – is that Turkey is neither economically ready nor, above all, a mature enough democracy for full EU membership.	真正的问题是，土耳其既非在经济上准备就绪，而且最为重要的是，并不是一个符合欧盟成员资格的完全民主国家。 这一问题连大多数土耳其人都不质疑。


and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister, can place his trust in the near automatic mechanisms that characterize the EU’s instDespite substantial progress, democratization is only a torso.	尽管土耳其取得了实质性进步，但是民主化仍然残缺不全。


Human and civil rights still do not meet Western European standards, religious and ethnic minorities are recognized only on paper, acknowledgment of the historic genocide of the Armenians is given mere lip service, and civilian control over the military remains weak.	人权以及民权仍然无法满足西欧标准，宗教和少数族裔只是在纸面上得到承认，承认史上对亚美尼亚人的种族屠杀还仅仅是口惠而实不至，而军队的平民控制依然微弱。


Raising this long list of shortcomings puts Western critics in an uncomfortable position with their pro-European Turkish interlocutors.	列举这一长长的不足清单足以把西方批评家同他们的亲欧洲的土耳其对话者处于一个不利的地位。


Turkey’s pro-Western forces find just as much fault with their country’s political system as the European critics, but they expect the prospect of EU membership to accelerate the progress of reforms.	土耳其的亲西方势力所看到的他们国家政治体制中的毛病和欧洲批评家所看到的一样多，但是，他们期望欧盟成员的前景可以加快改革进程。


Nationalist Turks, on the other hand, regard joining the EU mainly as a confirmation of national power and view all criticism of the country as a violation of Turks’ collective honor.	另一方面，土耳其的民族主义者主要把加入欧盟视为对其国力的确认，而且将对其国家的所有批评都看作是对土耳其人集体荣誉的破坏。


Had the start of accession negotiations been postponed or canceled, Turkey’s pro-Europeans would have suffered from a nationalist backlash.	如果入盟谈判推迟或取消，那么，土耳其的亲欧洲人士将受到民族主义者回击。


Even now, Turkey’s unrequited love for Europe can still fade into aversion, with Islamic fundamentalism and Greater Turkey nationalism continuing to represent other, eastward-leaning options.	即使是现在，土耳其对欧洲的一厢情愿仍旧可能转变为厌恶，到时，伊斯兰原教旨主义和大土耳其民族主义将继续代表其他向东方倾斜的选择。


Advocates of a conditioned accession are thus under extraordinary pressure to be nice, even as Turkish officials stage provocations, like the recent suit against the noted author Orhan Pamuk for “public denigration of Turkish identity” because he dared to question the official position on the Armenian genocide.	有条件入盟的支持者因此面临巨大的压力要做到无懈可击，即使是土耳其官员挑起事端也是如此。 著名作家奥冉·巴穆最近因“公开诋毁土耳其特色”而遭到起诉，因为他敢于质疑官方有关亚美尼亚种族屠杀的立场。


As a result, a general lack of clarity about what kind of Turkey should be accepted characterizes the accession debate, which focuses – much as in the recent referenda on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands – on rather meaningless generalities.	所以，对于究竟应当接受哪种土耳其的问题莫衷一是成为入盟争论的特征。 这一争论就像最近法国和荷兰的欧盟宪法全民公投一样集中于没有意义的一般原则。


But, more importantly, the lack of clarity on the Turkish accession question reflects Europe’s ambivalence regarding its image of itself.	但是，更为重要的是，在土耳其入盟问题上莫衷一是反映了欧洲在其本身形象上的矛盾态度。


To be sure, Turkey shows substantial political and cultural differences, especially when it comes to the importance of civil society, sexual equality, and the role of religion in public life.	的确，土耳其展现了实质上的政治和文化区别，特别是在公众社会的重要性、性别平等以及公共生活中宗教的作用等等问题上。


But the real question is this: what kind of Europe do Europeans themselves want?	然而，实际问题是：欧洲人自己想要一个什么样子的欧洲？


“Deepening” and “widening” European integration are the superficial opposites here.	在此，“加深”和“扩大”欧洲联合只是表面对立。


Austria does not want any more members – with the inconsistent exception of Croatia – but wants to deepen the EU’s political and cultural unity.	除了克罗地亚这一并不连贯的例外之外，奥地利不想要任何更多的成员，但是想要加深欧盟的政治和文化团结。


Many “old” Europeans, including Germany after Schröder’s resignation and France under a weakened Jacques Chirac, share that stance.	许多“老”欧洲人，包括施罗德辞职后的德国和雅克·希拉克权力削弱后的法国，都持有那一立场。


Britain, the leading nation of “new” Europe, has no desire for an EU constitution, more executive and parliamentary power in Brussels, a stronger European Parliament, or the euro.	作为“新”欧洲的主要国家，英国无意通过欧盟宪法，增强布鲁塞尔的行政和议会权力和欧洲议会或者实行欧元。


Like many new members, Britain prefers a loosely connected Europe of different nations – essentially a free-trade zone, but with open borders at its periphery – with sufficient strategic coordination to constitute a quasi-empire in geopolitical terms, on a par with the United States.	像许多新成员一样，英国更喜欢一个由不同国家组成的、松散联合的欧洲，也就是基本上是一个自由贸易区，外围开放边界，战略协调充分，以便同美国平起平坐，成为一个地缘政治意义上的准帝国。


The fundamental difference is that a loosely tied Union is attractive to all sorts of aspirants, including Georgia, Ukraine, and other Soviet successor states – and perhaps even North African countries like Morocco – while a “deepened” Europe, with a clear political identity, high social-welfare entitlements, and growing cultural homogeneity, would naturally set itself apart and not be particularly attractive to these countries.	根本区别是，一个松散的联盟对各类有意入盟的国家而言都有吸引力，包括格鲁吉亚、乌克兰以及其他苏联继承国，甚至像摩洛哥那样的北非国家； 而“深化的”欧洲，由于明显的政治特征、高昂的社会福利以及不断增长的文化同性，自然会与众不同，对于这些国家而言并无特别吸引力。


Paradoxically, then, what the British, with their opposition to “deepening” European integration, are really offering the Turks is precisely the sort of “privileged partnership” that Austria, together with Angela Merkel, has been backing.	因此，自相矛盾的是，英国尽管反对“深化”欧洲联合，恰恰给土耳其提供奥地利以及安格拉·默克尔所支持的“特殊伙伴关系”。


Both positions reject the idea of making Turkey really “European.”	两种立场都拒绝将土耳其完全“欧洲化”的主张。


The structure that Britain seems to have in mind is, according to some, reminiscent of the loose alliance binding the British Commonwealth.	据某些人的看法，英国看起来所设想的结构令人联想起联合英联邦的松散联盟。


But “History’s ruse” could be that even as the British succeed in improving Turkey’s prospects for admission, the renegotiation of the Nice treaty, which will become necessary if Croatia is admitted, is likely to lead to stronger European integration.	然而，“历史诡计”可能是，即使英国成功地改善土耳其入盟的前景，但是，一旦接纳克罗地亚就必须对尼斯条约重新谈判，这样就有可能导致更为强大的欧洲联合。


Thus, what we may get is both deepening and widening of the EU – something that today seems like squaring the circle.	这样，我们可能既深化欧盟又扩大欧盟。 这样的结果今天看起来好似水中捞月。


Which Way is West for Turkey?	哪里才是土耳其的西方？


When Turkey's parliament voted in March 2003 against allowing American troops to open a northern front against Iraq, Turkey's traditional strategic partnership with the United States ended.	随着2003年3月土耳其议会对美国军队开辟伊战北线的计划投下反对票，土耳其与美国之间传统的战略伙伴关系终于走到了尽头。


The two countries still recognize many mutual interests, but now they manage these interests on a far different basis.	尽管土美之间还有不少共同利益，可如今他们管理这些利益的基础却已经大不相同了。


The vote shocked "old Europe" and the Arab world as much as the Bush administration.	投票结果震惊了"老欧洲"和阿拉伯世界，也震惊了布什政府。


Europeans who considered Turkey a potential Trojan horse for America within the European Union were forced to reconsider.	这个结果让那些曾把土耳其当成美国可能安插到欧盟内部的一匹特洛伊木马的欧洲人也不得不对土耳其刮目相看。


For many Arabs, the vote showed that Turkey was not an American lackey and would not cooperate with American imperial designs, despite close Turkish-Israeli relations.	而对阿拉伯人来讲，这一结果表明尽管土以关系十分密切，但土耳其毕竟不是美国的马屁精，也不会配合美国的霸权企图。


Long-simmering disagreements between Turkey and the US came to a boil with the emergence of the Kurds of northern Iraq as the Pentagon's main allies in the Iraq War.	随着居住在伊拉克北部的库尔德人成为五角大楼对伊战争的主要盟友，潜藏已久的土美分歧终于爆发了。


The American administration made it clear that military intervention by Turkey in Northern Iraq would not be tolerated.	美国政府明确表示：美国绝不容许土耳其对伊北部实行军事干预。


That message was confirmed on July 4, 2003, when American forces arrested several Turkish Special Forces troops in the town of Sulaimaniya, humiliating them by putting sacks over their head as they took them into custody.	2003年7月4日，美军在苏莱曼尼亚逮捕了几名土耳其特种部队成员，并在押送过程中把布袋套在他们头上以示羞辱，这再次表明了美国不许土耳其军事干预的强硬态度。


Only intervention by US Vice President Dick Cheney two and a half days later secured the release of the soldiers, who were alleged to have been planning clandestine operations within the Kurdish zone.	两天半后，只是因为美国副总统迪克·切尼出面干预，这几名土耳其士兵才得以获释。 他们的罪名是：企图在库尔德地区策划秘密行动。


Despite ongoing tensions, the Turkish government has been eager to mend relations with America, as it is anxious to have some influence over developments in Iraq.	尽管近来摩擦不断，土耳其政府还是尽量想和美国修复关系，因为它非常希望能对伊拉克的事态发展施加影响。


So the authorities responded quickly to the Bush administration's request for Turkish troops to join the coalition, although the idea was stillborn - rejected by both the Kurds and the American-appointed Governing Council in Iraq.	因此，土耳其政府对布什政府发出的加入联军的邀请做出了快速的响应，尽管这次行动从一开始就注定不可能成功－库尔德人和美国任命的伊拉克管理委员会都明确表示反对。


America has its own reasons to patch up the relationship.	美国也同样有着修复关系的愿望。


Turkey's secular, capitalistic, democratic order has become especially valuable to the Bush administration as it seeks to integrate the wider Middle East into the world system by liberalizing its economy and democratizing its polity.	在布什政府试图把中东广大地区纳入其全球体系，在那里实现经济自由化和政治民主化的过程中，土耳其的世俗、资本和民主秩序在美国政府看来都显得弥足珍贵。


Thus, America trumpeted its continuing support for Turkish membership in the EU, notably in President Bush's speech in June at Istanbul's Galatasaray University - at a bridge that joins Asia and Europe.	于是，布什总统6月在伊斯坦布尔加拉塔萨雷大学的讲话中再次重申了支持土耳其加入欧盟的立场，布什这次讲话的地点被安排在一座连接亚欧大陆的桥上。


But serious bilateral problems remain.	但土美双边关系还是存在着严重问题。


The government is irritated by US occupation forces' neglect of the northern Iraqi bases of the PKK, the Kurdish separatist insurgents who have fought a 15-year war against Turkey.	代表库尔德分离主义势力的库尔德工人党已经和土耳其交战了15年，而美国占领军却对其在伊北部的大本营视而不见。


More broadly, the government regards the US as too complacent vis-à-vis Kurdish political developments and unmoved by Turkey's concerns about Kurdish independence.	从更广义的角度讲，土耳其政府认为美国在对待库尔德局势发展的问题上太自以为是，根本不顾及土耳其在库尔德独立问题上的重重顾虑。


The US, for its part, is unhappy with the government's objections to unrestricted American use of the Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey, as well as by recent tensions with Israel.	而美国方面也对土政府拒绝其无限制使用土北部因斯里克空军基地的决定感到十分不快，此外引起美国不满的还有近来土以之间的紧张关系。


In the meantime, Turkey is moving closer to the EU, with the government overcoming nationalistic objections in the Parliament to push through comprehensive reforms.	与此同时，土耳其与欧盟的关系正日益密切，政府战胜了议会中的民族主义势力，开始推行全面的改革。


Turkey also showed its good will over Cyprus, removing a nagging political obstacle to EU membership.	此外，土政府在塞浦路斯问题上也表达了诚意，去掉了加入欧盟过程中一个令人心烦的政治障碍。


These steps led to the European Commission's recent recommendation to begin accession negotiations with Turkey.	上述举措使欧盟委员会在不久前发出倡议，建议开始与土耳其进行入盟谈判。


The EU accession process has also underpinned a shift in Turkish policy on Iraq.	欧盟的入盟进程也改变了土耳其的对伊政策。


Previously, Turkey viewed Iraq solely in the context of its domestic Kurdish problem.	从前，土耳其是单纯从国内库尔德问题出发来看待伊拉克的。


But widespread European opposition to the war removed the possibility of Turkish military intervention, forcing the government to develop another vision of Turkey's interests.	但欧洲国家的普遍反对消除了土耳其军事干预的任何可能性，迫使政府从另外的角度去看待土耳其的利益。


At the same time, the Iraqi Kurds also appear to appreciate how much they need a friendly Turkey.	与此同时，伊拉克库尔德人似乎也极为看重一个态度友好的土耳其。


The northern border with Turkey is their lifeline to the outside world.	与土耳其的北部边界是他们与外界沟通的生命线。


As a result, Turkey no longer considers a federalized Iraq a threat to its security, as long as each federal unit maintains a measure of ethnic diversity.	其结果是只要伊拉克联盟停留在保持种族多样性的范围之内，土耳其就不再把伊拉克联盟看成是对本国安全的威胁。


Of course, Turkey remains opposed to an independent Kurdistan. But now its concern is more closely tied to regional politics than to the Kurdish issue.	当然，土耳其仍然反对库尔德斯坦独立，但现在它所担心的问题更多地集中在地区政治，而不是库尔德问题的领域。


Turkey has no desire to serve as a strategic counterweight to Iran and believes that only a territorially intact Iraq can continue to play that role.	土耳其并不希望成为平衡伊朗的战略砝码，而且它认为，只有领土完整的伊拉克才能继续担此重任。


Furthermore, Turkey is concerned about the possibility of civil war in Kurdistan between the two largest Kurdish factions.	不仅如此，库尔德斯坦两大集团间爆发内战的可能性令土耳其政府倍感忧虑。


But, unlike either Iran or Syria, Turkey genuinely wishes to see a strong and representative government in Baghdad.	但与伊朗和叙利亚不同，土耳其是真心希望看到巴格达建立起有代表性的强大政府。


Thanks to EU pressures, Turkey's domestic Kurdish problem is well on the way to being resolved democratically, with most Kurdish leaders in Turkey expressing their commitment to Turkish unity.	多亏来自欧盟的压力，土耳其国内的库尔德问题正在走入民主解决的轨道，土耳其国内的绝大多数库尔德领袖都表达了他们支持土耳其统一的立场。


For Turkey to consider military intervention in Kurdistan, EU member states would first have to renege on their commitment to negotiate Turkish accession.	如果要让土耳其重新考虑对库尔德斯坦的军事介入，首先要欧盟成员国撕毁他们开始土耳其入盟谈判的承诺。


Equally dramatic would be any attempt by the Kurds to forcibly change the demographic balance of the multiethnic city of Kirkuk.	此外，库尔德人采取任何措施，强行改变多种族城市基尔库克的人口构成，其可能性也将同样微乎其微。


Turkey would prefer that Kirkuk, with its large Turkmen population, be given special status in the forthcoming draft Iraqi constitution.	土耳其希望有着众多土库曼人口的基尔库��，能在即将出台的伊拉克宪法草案中获得特殊的地位。


The US also shows signs of understanding the importance of maintaining a multiethnic Kirkuk and is putting pressure on its Kurdish allies.	有迹象表明美国也了解保持基尔库克多种族环境的重要性，而且正在对自己的库尔德盟友施加压力。


Turkish diplomacy has thus become a well-calibrated balancing act, moving closer to European positions in the Middle East, but eager to maintain close relations with the US.	正因如此，土耳其外交就成了需要准确调校的平衡行动，不断在中东问题上接近欧洲立场的同时也希望与美国保持密切的关系。


If this approach succeeds, Europe's bridge to Asia may also become its bridge to America.	如果能取得成功，那么这座连接欧亚的桥梁也可能会同时沟通欧美。


White House Sex Crimes	白宫性犯罪


NEW YORK – Sex crime has a telltale signature, even when those directing the outrages are some of the most powerful men and women in the United States.	纽约－性犯罪具有露出蛛丝马迹的特征，即使指挥这些暴行的是美国最有权力的男人或女人，也是如此。


How extraordinary, then, to learn that one of the perpetrators of these crimes, Condoleezza Rice, has just led the debate in a special session of the United Nations Security Council on the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.	那么，得知康多莉扎·赖斯－犯下这些罪行的罪犯之一，刚刚在联合国安理会领导了一个关于把性暴力作为战争武器的辩论，是多么的令人意外。


I had a sense of déjà vu when I saw the photos that emerged in 2004 from Abu Ghraib prison.	当我在2004年看到从阿布格莱布监狱流出的照片时，我有一种似曾相识的感觉。


Even as the Bush administration was spinning the notion that the torture of prisoners was the work of “a few bad apples” low in the military hierarchy, I knew that we were seeing evidence of a systemic policy set at the top.	即使布什政府编造出是一些军队下层的“坏蛋”在折磨囚犯这样的说辞，我也知道我们看见了在美国上层的系统性政策作恶的证据。


It’s not that I am a genius. It’s simply that, having worked at a rape crisis center and been trained in the basics of sex crime, I have learned that all sex predators go about things in certain recognizable ways.	这并不是因为我是个天才，而仅仅是因为我曾在一个强奸危机中心工作过，并接受过关于性犯罪的基本知识的训练，我知道所有的性罪犯都是用一定的可识别的方式进行犯罪。


We now know that the torture of prisoners was the result of a policy set in the White House by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Rice – who actually chaired the torture meetings.	现在我们知道对罪犯的折磨是白宫的前国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德，副总统迪克·切尼以及赖斯－她实际上主持折磨会议－在白宫制定的政策的结果。


The Pentagon has also acknowledged that it had authorized sexualized abuse of detainees as part of interrogation practices to be performed by female operatives.	五角大楼也承认它授权女性特工可以用对被关押人员进行性虐待作为审问活动的一部分。


And documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union have Rumsfeld, in his own words, “checking in” on the sexualized humiliation of prisoners.	并且，美国民权同盟取得的材料显示，拉姆斯菲尔德，用他自己的话说，要对囚犯的性羞辱进行“登记”。


The sexualization of torture from the top basically turned Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay into an organized sex-crime ring in which the trafficked sex slaves were US-held prisoners.	从美国上层来的折磨性趋势化将阿布格莱布和关塔那摩基地变成了一个有组织的性犯罪集团，其中被交易的性奴隶是美国控制的囚犯。


Looking at the classic S and M nature of some of this torture, it is hard not to speculate that someone setting policy was aroused by all of this.	看看有些是S和M级别的折磨，很难不去推测制定这个政策的人不被这些行为引起性冲动。


The nonsexual torture that was committed ranged from beatings and suffocation, electrodes attached to genitals, and forced sleep deprivation, to prisoners being hung by the wrists from the ceiling and placed in solitary confinement until psychosis was induced.	非性折磨包括了从毒打和窒息，电击生殖器以及强迫性睡眠剥夺，到将囚犯拴住手腕吊在天花板上并单独囚禁直到其精神失常。


These abuses violate both US and international law.	这些虐待既违反了美国法又违反了国际法。


Three former military attorneys, recognizing this blunt truth, refused to participate in the “military tribunals” – rather, “show trials” – aimed at condemning men whose confessions were elicited through torture.	三位承认了这个残酷现实的前军事律师，拒绝参加目的为判处其供述是通过折磨取得的囚犯刑罚的“军事法庭”－它还不如说是“审判表演”。


Though we can now debate what the penalty for water-boarding should be, America as a nation, maintaining an odd silence, still cannot seem to discuss the sexual crimes involved.	虽然我们现在辩论对用模拟溺水虐待囚犯的惩罚是什么，但是美国作为一个国家，对这类行为保持了令人奇怪的沉默，似乎仍然不可能讨论这类行为中涉及的性犯罪。


It’s not as if the sex crimes that US leaders either authorized or tolerated are not staring Americans in the face: the images of male prisoners with their heads hooded with women’s underwear; the documented reports of female US soldiers deployed to smear menstrual blood on the faces of male prisoners, and of military interrogators or contractors forcing prisoners to simulate sex with each other, to penetrate themselves with objects, or to submit to being penetrated by objects.	并不是美国领导人要么授权要么容忍的性犯罪没有注视着美国人：用女性内衣罩住头部的男性囚犯的图像； 有证明文件的安排美国女兵用月经血涂抹在男性囚犯脸上，以及军事审讯人员或者军事承包人强迫囚犯相互模拟性行为，将物品插入他们的私处，或者被强迫用物品插入私处的报道。


Indeed, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was written deliberately with loopholes that gave immunity to perpetrators of many kinds of sexual humiliation and abuse.	确实， 2006年的《特别军事法庭法案》故意为许多性羞辱和性虐待的罪犯免于惩罚留下了漏洞。


There is also the testimony by female soldiers such as Lynndie England about compelling male prisoners to masturbate, as well as an FBI memo objecting to a policy of “highly aggressive interrogation techniques.”	也有诸如林迪·英格兰这样的女兵的关于强迫男性囚犯手淫的证词，以及反对“高度激烈的审讯方法”的FBI备忘录。


The memo cites a female interrogator rubbing lotion on a shackled detainee and whispering in his ear – during Ramadan when sexual contact with a strange woman would be most offensive – then suddenly bending back his thumbs until he grimaced in pain, and violently grabbing his genitals.	该备忘录引用了一个女性审讯人员在一个戴着脚镣手铐的被押人员身上涂抹乳液并在他耳边低语的例子－在斋月，与一个陌生女人的性接触是非常犯忌的－然后突然将他的拇指往后掰直到他因疼痛而面部表情扭曲，并猛烈地抓他的生殖器。


Sexual abuse in US-operated prisons got worse and worse over time, ultimately including, according to doctors who examined detainees, anal sodomy.	随着时间的推移，在美国掌管的监狱里性虐待情况越来越严重，根据检查被押人员的医生的反映，最极端的情况还包括肛门鸡奸。


All this may sound bizarre if you are a normal person, but it is standard operating procedure for sex offenders.	如果你是一个正常人，所有这些都听起来很变态，但是这对性侵害者来说是标准的操作程序。


Those who work in the field know that once sex abusers control a powerless victim, they will invariably push the boundaries with ever more extreme behavior.	那些在这个领域工作的人都知道，一旦性虐待者控制了无力反抗的受害者，他们总是会用更极端的行为突破界限。


Abusers start by undressing their victims, but once that line has been breached, you are likely to hear from the victim about oral and anal penetration, greater and greater pain and fear being inflicted, and more and more carelessness about exposing the crimes as the perpetrator’s inhibitions fall away.	开始的时候，虐待者脱掉受害人的衣服，但是一旦突破了这个界限，你就有可能听到有关在其嘴巴插入物体和在其肛门插入物体的叙述，并且当罪犯的禁忌消失的时候，他会给受害者造成更大的痛苦和恐惧，而且对其罪行的暴露越来越不关心。


The perpetrator is also likely to engage in ever-escalating rationalizations, often arguing that the offenses serve a greater good.	罪犯也有可能将他们的行为无限合理化，并经常辩称这样做是为了达到一个的良好目的。


Finally, the victim is blamed for the abuse: in the case of the detainees, if they would only “behave,” and confess, they wouldn’t bring all this on themselves.	最后，受害者被归咎为要对受到虐待承担责任：在被押的情况下，如果他们仅仅能“表现不出格”并坦白其罪行，他们是不会招致这些东西的。


Silence, and even collusion, is also typical of sex crimes within a family.	沉默，甚至是共谋，是家庭性犯罪的特征。


Americans are behaving like a dysfunctional family by shielding sex criminals in their midst through silence.	美国人现在的表现就像是在一个机能不良的家庭内，用他们的沉默来袒护性罪犯。


Just as sex criminals – and the leaders who directed the use of rape and sexual abuse as a military strategy – were tried and sentenced after the wars in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, so Americans must hold accountable those who committed, or authorized, sex crimes in US-operated prisons.	像性罪犯一样－那些指挥使用强奸和性虐待作为军事策略的领导人－在波斯尼亚和塞拉利昂的战争过后都受到了审判并被判刑，所以美国人必须使那些从事性犯罪，或授权在美国掌管的监狱进行性犯罪的人承担责任。


Throughout the world, this perverse and graphic criminality has added fuel to anxiety about US cultural and military power.	在世界范围内，这种不正常的生动的犯罪行为加剧了人们对美国文化和军事实力的担忧。


These acts need to be called by their true names – war crimes and sex crimes – and people in America need to demand justice for the perpetrators and their victims.	这些行为应被叫它们真正的名字－战争犯罪和性犯罪－在美国的人们应该使罪犯受到审判，为受害者主持正义。


As in a family, only when people start to speak out and tell the truth about rape and sexual assault can the healing begin.	这就像是在一个家庭一那样，只有在人们开始大胆地说出强奸和性侵犯的真相时，创伤才能开始愈合。


Whither Africa’s “Frontier Markets”?	非洲“前沿市场”的凋谢


NEW YORK – Zimbabwe’s election appears, once again, to confirm a truism: Africa only seems to make international headlines when disasters strike – a drought, a coup, a war, a genocide, or, as in the case of Robert Mugabe, grossly incompetent government.	津巴布韦的选举好像再一次验证了这一真理，也就是非洲好像只有在干旱、政变、战争或者种族屠杀等灾害来临的时候才会成为国际头条新闻。


But, over the past several years, a number of sub-Saharan countries have attracted unprecedented inflows of foreign capital.	但是在过去几年时间里，几个萨哈拉沙漠以南国家吸引了前所未有的外国资本。


Recent global financial turmoil has only added to Africa’s allure, because its frontier markets are less vulnerable to international volatility than are most of the world’s more familiar emerging economies.	最近的全球金融风暴也只是增加了非洲的吸引力，因为与人们更为熟悉的大多数新兴市场相比，非洲前沿市场并不如此受国际市场的风吹草动影响。


There are three main reasons why many sub-Saharan countries are performing well.	萨哈拉以南国家表现优异有三个主要原因。


First, high commodity prices yield windfall profits for the region’s leading producers of raw materials.	首先，高昂的原材料价格给这一地区原材料生产国带来巨大利润。


Growing demand for energy, metals, and minerals – particularly in China – has driven unprecedented levels of foreign investment.	特别是来自中国的对能源、金属以及矿产品不断增长的需求推动了外国投资达到前所未有的水平。


Even large pension funds are beginning to take notice.	即使是大型养老基金也开始注意到了这一点。


Moreover, a large number of Africa’s poorest countries have benefited from exponential growth in (primarily United States-based) philanthropy.	而且，非洲的大量穷国也从主要来自美国的慈善事业巨大增长中获得了利益。


But, while both of these positive trends are likely to continue, a third positive factor may not prove as durable. Every year, Africans living outside the continent send roughly $30 billion to family and friends back home.	但是，尽管这两个积极的趋势有可能会继续，但是，第三个积极因素却未必持久。


These remittances are vitally important for economic stability in several African countries.	每年，在非洲大陆以外的非洲人给在非洲的亲朋好友寄大约300亿美元。


An economic slowdown in the US and Europe could substantially slow this infusion of cash, because immigrants are often the first to lose their jobs when recession fears take hold.	美国和欧洲经济放缓可能会减缓这一现金流入，因为在衰退担忧立足的时候，移民往往是首先丢掉工作。


At the same time, though Africa’s frontier economies are less vulnerable than other emerging markets to global financial turbulence, they are highly vulnerable to political turmoil closer to home.	与此同时，尽管与其他新兴市场相比，非洲的前沿经济体并不如此受到全球金融动荡的影响，它们还是容易受到临近的政治动荡的影响。


The three countries that served as pillars of regional stability for the past several years – Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa – are now too pre-occupied with political troubles of their own to provide the peacekeepers, reconstruction funds, and political pressure that often limit the damage from conflicts elsewhere in the region.	尼日利亚、肯尼亚和南非这三个在过去几年中成为地区稳定支柱的国家现在忙于应付自己的政治困难，无法提供限制该地区其他地方冲突而带来的破坏的维和士兵、重建基金以及政治压力。


Most of Nigeria’s problems are well known.	尼日利亚的大部分问题为人们所熟知。


Militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region have at times shut down as much as 30% of the country’s oil exports, a vital source of state revenue.	盛产石油的尼日尔三角洲地区的武装人员有时候关闭该国30%的石油出口，而石油是国家财政收入的关键来源。


President Umaru Yar’Adua has taken concrete steps to tackle elite-level corruption in Nigeria, and appears to have made progress toward a comprehensive peace agreement with the Delta rebels.	亚拉杜瓦总统已经采取确实的步骤来处理尼日利亚上层腐败问题，而且好像也在与三角洲地区反叛组织达成全面和平协议的道路上取得了进展。


But Yar’Adua might soon confront a big short-term problem.	但是亚拉杜瓦可能马上会遇到一个巨大的近期麻烦。


The country’s National Election Tribunal, having overturned the outcomes of several provincial elections, may well annul the results of last year’s presidential race, forcing him to run for president all over again.	全国选举委员会推翻了几个省的选举结果，也许会宣布去年总统选举的结果无效，从而迫使他再度竞选总统。


While Yar’Adua could use the goodwill that he has built up over the past year to win by an even larger margin, the 90-day election campaign would almost certainly trigger civil unrest, and Nigeria’s leadership would be too busy navigating domestic political rivalries to help stabilize conflicts elsewhere in Africa.	尽管亚拉杜瓦可以利用在过去一年时间里建立起来的亲善来赢得更大的胜利，但是为期90天的竞选活动几乎可能会引发民间动乱，而且尼日利亚领导人将会忙于在国内政治斗争中辗转而无瑕帮助稳定非洲其他地区的冲突。


Kenya’s troubles run deeper.	肯尼亚的麻烦还要深重。


Solid economic expansion and one of the world’s fastest-growing stock markets have not helped the country avert a deepening political crisis and mounting ethnic violence since disputed presidential election results in December.	该国经济成长稳健并且拥有世界上增长最快的股票市场。 但是自从去年十二月总统选举结果受到质疑以来，这些并没有帮助这个国家避免一场日益加剧的政治危机以及种族暴力事件。


President Mwai Kibaki, whom international observers accuse of rigging the vote, has hinted at a plan to share power in a unity government, but opposition leader Raila Odinga has heard these promises before.	齐贝吉总统被国际观察员指责为操纵选举投票。 他已经暗示在团结政府中分享权力，但是反对派领导人奥廷加以前也听到多这些保证。


Odinga worked hard to help elect Kibaki in 2002, only to see Kibaki renege on a similar pledge.	奥廷加在2002年尽力帮助齐贝吉当选，而齐氏则随后食言。


Despite the alarming escalation in violence, fears of civil war in Kenya are probably exaggerated.	尽管肯尼亚暴力升级令人担忧，但是内战的担心确是有点过分。


The country’s Orange opposition movement has recently won key posts in parliament and, for the moment, is heeding calls for calm from former United nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and representatives of the African Union.	该国橙色反对派运动最近在议会中赢得了关键职位，而且目前而言，它也在听取前联合国秘书长安南以及非洲联盟代表保持冷静的呼吁。


But no one should expect Kenya to play a stabilizing regional role again anytime soon.	但是人们不应当指望肯尼亚马上再次发挥地区性稳定作用。


The continent’s third pillar, South Africa, will spend 2008 mired in an escalating political feud between Thabo Mbeki, the lame-duck president, and Jacob Zuma, a former deputy who is the newly elected leader of the ruling African National Congress and the leading candidate to succeed Mbeki, his bitter rival, next year.	非洲大陆的第三根支柱南非将会在即将卸任的总统姆贝基和前任副总统祖玛之间日益升级的政治争斗下度过2008年。 而后者刚刚当选为非洲国民大会领导人并且是明年接替其死对手姆贝基的主要侯选人。


South Africa’s courts have become a political battleground, as Mbeki and his allies use corruption charges to try to cripple Zuma’s candidacy.	当姆贝基及其同盟者利用腐败指控来摧毁祖玛的候选资格的时候，南非的法院也已经成为政治战场。


The resulting political firestorm may well force Zuma to rely on core support from key allies within the country’s trade union movement and Communist Party, challenging the political elite’s pro-market consensus and provoking debate over the future of South Africa’s economic policy.	接下来的政治风暴或许会迫使祖玛依赖于南非工会运动和共产党的主要盟友的支持来挑战政治精英亲市场的共识并且促发有关未来南非经济政策的辩论。


No countries in sub-Saharan Africa will have the economic heft and political self-confidence to replace Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa as pillars of stability anytime soon.	萨哈拉沙漠以南国家中没有一个会马上具有足够的经济实力和政治自信来取代尼日利亚、肯尼亚和南非成为稳定的支柱。


Regional blocs like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the East African Community (EAC) will eventually assume larger roles in helping resolve the continent’s most intractable diplomatic and economic problems.	类似西非国家经济共同体、南部非洲关税联盟以及东非共同体那样的地区性组织最终将会在帮助解决非洲最为棘手的外交和经济问题上发挥更大的作用。


But that won’t happen this year.	但是这种情况今年不会出现。


There remain many good reasons for investors to take a chance on Africa’s frontier markets.	投资者有许多理由在非洲前沿市场上进行冒险。


But it will not necessarily take a drought, a coup, a war, or a genocide to make them think twice.	但是，这并不一定要用干旱、战争或者种族屠杀才能够让他们三思。


Whither Europe?	欧洲将向何处去？


BEIJING – With the likelihood of a contagious sovereign-debt implosion and European bank failures greatly reduced by the Greek debt deal and the European Central Bank’s lending program, it is time to look ahead.	北京—希腊债务协议的达成和欧洲央行贷款计划的实施大幅减少了传染性主权债去大爆发和欧洲央行大批倒闭的可能性，现在，我们应该把目光朝前看。


Where do the European Union, the eurozone, and the EU’s highly indebted countries go from here?	欧盟、欧元区以及债务沉重的欧元区成员国将何去何从？


Will Europe be able to roll back its welfare states’ biggest excesses without economic distress and social unrest toppling governments and, in the peripheral countries, undermining already-tenuous agreements with creditors?	欧洲能够成功地减少其福利国家最大的国度支出项，同时又不引起经济灾难、颠覆政府的社会动荡并且（在外围国家）不影响弱不禁风的债权人协议。


Some good news globally will have an impact on how these questions are resolved.	全球范围内的一些好消息将对这些问题的解决产生影响。


The United States’ economy is gradually reviving, albeit slowly by the standards of recovery from a deep recession.	美国经济正在逐步恢复活力，尽管从深度衰退复苏的角度看显得相当缓慢。


China, Brazil, and India have not decoupled from their customers in Europe and North America, and so are slowing, though a relatively soft landing is likely if Europe’s recession is as short and mild as predicted.	中国、巴西和印度并没有与欧洲和北美的消费者脱钩，因此，尽管它们正在减速，但若欧洲的衰退如预计那样缓慢而温和，它们可以实现相对较“软”的着陆。


The EU’s economic output and population are larger than that of the US, so the fate of the 27 EU countries is everyone’s business, from New York to New Delhi, São Paulo to Shanghai.	欧盟的经济产出和人口数量都要高于美国，因此其17个成员国的命运与我们所有人息息相关，不管你身处纽约还是新德里，圣保罗还是上海。


Formed originally as a free-trade area, the eurozone comprises 17 of the countries.	由自由贸易区演变而成的欧元区拥有17个成员国。


Knitting together 17 disparate economies, cultures, and institutions was a monumental undertaking, fraught with risk.	将17个经济、文化和制度都大相径庭的国家捆绑在一起是一项伟业，需要面临重重危险。


The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes unanimity in decision-making.	里斯本条约强调决策的一致同意。


With some members inside of the eurozone, and others remaining outside of it, and with disparate economic interests and monetary and fiscal traditions even within the eurozone, agreement is difficult.	里斯本条约缔约国既有欧元区成员国，也有非欧元区成员国，每个国家都有不同的经济利益和货币和财政传统（即使同处于欧元区的国家也不例外），因此达成一致是很困难的。


That sets the stage for three broad scenarios, each with implications for the European and global economy, the financial and banking system, and relations between the member states and EU institutions.	这就次年改成了三个大方向，每一个都对欧洲和全球经济、金融和财政体系以及欧盟成员国和欧盟机构之间的关系具有影响。


In the first scenario, a more united and homogeneous Europe emerges from the crisis, enforcing greater restrictions on member states’ budgets to reduce apparent risk.	第一个方向是一个更统一、更相近的欧洲从危机中站立起来，给成员国的预算施加更严格的限制，以减少显而易见的风险。


Accompanied by a strong, broad eurozone, risk of a future currency crisis remains.	强大而广大的欧元区的出现并不能完全消除未来货币危机风险。


In the second scenario, a two- or three-tiered Europe includes a two-tiered euro, with the weaker countries using a separate “euro-B” currency that can float against the stronger economies’ “euro-A.”	第二个方向是出现一个两到三个层次的欧洲，使用两层次的欧元设计，疲软国家使用单独的“B欧元”货币，其对坚挺国所使用的“A欧元”汇率可以浮动。


This arrangement would hold out the promise to fiscally stressed economies that, if they get their act together, they could rejoin euro-A – and do so more readily than they could from their own currency.	这一安排可以让财政不堪重负的国家维持承诺，如果它们采取一致行动，可以重新回到A欧元集团——比它们使用自己的货币要容易得多。


In the final scenario, what emerges is a more decentralized Europe, with less top-down agreement in areas beyond trade and a smaller, more homogeneous eurozone composed of the EU’s core economies.	最后一个方向是出现一个分散化的欧洲，不会有多少超越贸易层次的自上而下的协定，欧元区也会缩小，仅由品质均较好的核心欧盟国家组成。


Such a construct would be far more popular with citizens who are unhappy with the accretion of EU power in Brussels and the loss of traditional sovereignty.	反对扩大欧盟权力、减少传统主权的人士将会较为欢迎这种结构。


Some current euro members – Greece (and perhaps others) – would revert to national currencies.	一些现有欧元区成员国（希腊，可能还有其他国家）将恢复国家货币。


None of these options is easy; each entails serious difficulties and great risks.	这三种选择都是艰难的选择，每一种都伴随着严重的困难和极高的风险。


Episodic muddling through may be the best that can be hoped for.	阶段性的得过且过或许是人们最希望的选择。


For example, how would Greece (or any country) exit the euro in order to cushion the extreme downward wage adjustment required to regain competitiveness, and to avoid the severe social unrest that could result from reining in debt too rapidly?	比如，如果希腊（或任何国家）为了缓冲重获竞争力所需要的极端工资下调压力以及避免过快减债所造成的严重社会动荡而退出欧元区将会怎样？


As soon as word got out that Greece was seriously considering such a move – well before it could even generate a new drachma currency – euro bank deposits would flee Greece.	只要希腊认真考虑这一选择的消息一出——就算它还来不及铸造新的德拉克马货币——欧元银行存款就会争相逃离希腊。


As a result, Greece would be forced to impose capital controls.	结果，希腊将被迫采取资本管制。


Some contracts denominated in euros would be subject to Greek law, some to European law, and others – for example, derivatives contracts – to British or US law.	一些用欧元计价的合同将由希腊法律来裁定，一些将由欧洲法律来裁定，而其他，比如衍生品合约，将由英国或美国法律来裁定。


Legal chaos would result.	这将会产生法律混乱。


Yet sticking to the euro and forcing all of the adjustments in wages risks greater unrest; indeed, it might merely postpone the inevitable.	但死抱欧元不放、强行采取工资调整有可能导致严重动乱； 事实上，这只能延缓不可避免之事的发生。


Governments and the bond market will test the seriousness of the newly agreed fiscal guidelines (if they are ratified).	政府和债券市场将考验新达成的财政指导协议（如果被批准的话）。


While talk is tough now, the history of such agreements does not inspire optimism.	现在，谈判仍在艰难进行中，而历史表明，此类协议并不会激发乐观情绪。


Before the financial crisis, even Germany violated the EU Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) deficit limits.	在金融危机爆发前，即使是德国也违反了欧洲增长和稳定公约（GSP）的债务上限规定。


In the US, the 1980’s deficit limits set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law were not met, and, like the SGP, were revised and extended.	在美国，1980年的格拉姆-罗德曼-霍林斯（Gramn-Rudman-Hollings）法所规定的赤字上限从未被执行过，与GSP一样，该上限也被修订和扩大了。


Agreements with, and access to, the International Monetary Fund and Europe’s new bailout fund provide (soft) constraints.	关于如何才能获得IMF和欧洲新成立的援助基金的协议倒是能产生一定的（软）约束。


Regardless of how these governance and fiscal issues are resolved, or muddled through, Europe’s banks remain a thorny issue.	不论这些治理和财政问题如何被解决，或只是得过且过，欧洲银行的日子都不会好过。


With the time afforded by the ECB’s three-year cheap loans, they have some breathing room to rebuild their capital and clean up their balance sheets.	欧洲央行的三年期廉价贷款计划为欧洲银行赢得了时间，使它们能够重建资本基础、清理资���负债表。


But, while doing so, they are not likely to be expanding private-sector lending to support economic growth.	但是，在此期间，它们很可能不会扩张私人部门贷款以支持经济增长。


European banks are far more thinly capitalized, and account for a much larger share of credit extended, than banks in the US, where much more lending originates in capital markets.	与美国银行相比，欧洲银行的资本严重不足，而且信用扩张主要通过银行来进行。


Most large US banks – Citi is an exception – passed US Federal Reserve stress tests recently, with enough capital to withstand a hypothetical deep recession (13% unemployment, a 21% further fall in home prices, and a 50% stock-market decline).	大部分美国大银行（花旗是个例外）都通过了最近的美联储压力测试，有足够的资本抵御假设的深度衰退（失业率13%、房价继续下跌21%、股票继续下跌50%）。


Europe’s stress tests have been much weaker.	欧洲的压力测试要宽松得多。


Some sort of Brady bond to reduce and extend excessive sovereign debt will be necessary.	某种形式的布雷迪债券——以减少和延期过重的主权债务——看来是必不可少的。


We can expect further European turmoil – from banks, sovereign debt, and social unrest in response to even modest welfare-state rollbacks – and clashing visions, within and among countries, concerning the desirability of deeper European integration.	我们可以预期，欧洲（各国内部和国与国之间）将出现更多的动荡——银行、主权债务、即使是略有削减的福利国家政策也会引起社会动荡——面临更糟糕的前景，这使得欧洲一体化的客观需要进一步加大了。


Europe has come a long way from the days when its leaders prophesied that the euro would quickly rival the dollar as a global reserve currency.	欧洲距离其领导人所宣称的欧元将很快崛起为可与美元分庭抗礼的全球储备货币还有很长一段距离。


Yet no one should write off Europe.	但没人可以小觑欧洲。


It still has great strengths, and, with sensible reforms, the EU can survive and eventually return to greater prosperity and stability.	欧洲仍然坚挺，只要实施合理的改革，欧盟就能生存下来并最终实现更大的繁荣和稳定。


But Europe remains closer to the beginning of that process of renewal than to the end.	欧洲距离开启涅槃改革要比距离走向衰亡更近。


Whither North Korea?	北朝鲜何去何从？


SEOUL – According to North Korean state television, the heart attack that killed Kim Jong-il on December 17 was “due to severe mental and physical stress from overwork.”	首尔——据朝鲜电视台报道，12月17日致金正日死亡的心脏病发作是因“过度劳累引发的严重的精神和身体压力导致的。


That report instantly raised a question in my mind: if we accept the regime’s diagnosis, why did Kim need to work so hard, despite his frail health?	”读了这份报告，我脑海中立即闪现出一个疑问：如果接受朝鲜政权的结论，那么金正日为什么要在身体虚弱时这么努力工作？


In some sense, his sudden death seems to symbolize the helplessness of a desperate leader confronting overwhelming challenges.	从某种意义上讲，他的猝死似乎表明了一位陷入绝望的领导人在面对巨大挑战时的无奈。


Seen in this light, the more important question is whether or not Kim’s inexperienced son, the twenty-something “Great Successor” Kim Jong-un, will be able to consolidate power and somehow steer the country out of its deep malaise.	由此看来，更重要的问题是金正日缺乏经验的儿子、年仅二十多岁的“伟大接班人”金正恩能否成功地巩固政权，并以某种方式引导这个国家走出极度困境。


So far, the succession in Pyongyang seems to be proceeding in an orderly fashion.	从目前情况看，平壤的权力交接似乎正在有序进行中。


But, despite appearances, few totalitarian regimes, save those of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, have ever maintained a monolithic inner circle of power.	但尽管表面平稳，但除希特勒、斯大林和毛泽东外，没有几个独裁政权的权力核心能始终保持铁板一块。


North Korea is unlikely to be an exception to this rule.	朝鲜也不太可能例外。


The legitimacy of Kim Jong-un’s claim to power is weak, despite his blood tie to his father and grandfather, the dynasty that has ruled North Korea since its inception.	金氏家族自建国伊始就一直统治朝鲜，虽然与父亲及祖父有血缘关系，但金正恩接权的合法性依然相对薄弱。


The “Great Successor” has had barely two years of on-the-job training, compared to the 14 years his father spent studying directly under Kim Il-sung.	“伟大的接班人”仅仅接受过两年的在职培训，而他的父亲在金日成手下直接学习长达14年之久。


Of course, Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyung-hee, and his sister-in-law, Jang Seong-taek, will assume something of a regency role, acting both as patron to the Great Successor and as a force to mobilize the military to close ranks behind the Kim dynasty.	当然，金正日的妹妹金敬姬和他的妹夫张成泽将在一定程度上起到摄政作用，既扮演“伟大接班人”的支持者，又动员军队紧密团结在金氏家族周围。


But it is not clear how faithfully, and for how long, Kim Kyung-hee and Jang will remain supportive of Kim Jong-un.	但金敬姬和张成泽对于金正恩的忠诚度还无法确定，也不知道他们能够支持他多久。


They might even try to supplant Kim by claiming power for themselves.	这两人甚至可能试图取代金正恩把权力控制在自己手中。


Another challenge may come from the country’s senior leaders, especially among the military.  Will they remain faithful to Kim, who is 40-50 years their junior?	另一个挑战可能来自国家的高级领导人，特别是军队。 比他们小四五十岁的金正恩能否获得他们的效忠？


It is known that some senior military officers were quietly critical of Kim Jong-il’s failure in managing the country’s relationship with the United States and Japan.	众所周知某些高级军官私下对金正日未能管理好美日关系有诸多批评。


Their expectation might have been that North Korea could improve relations with the US while retaining its nuclear weapons, in exchange for not developing long-range missiles.	他们本来希望朝鲜以放弃发展远程导弹为代价，在保留核武器的同时改善朝美关系。


After all, if Pakistan did it, why not North Korea?	毕竟，如果巴基斯坦能这么做，朝鲜为什么不能？


Had that happened, economic assistance from the US and Japan would have flowed into North Korea, enabling the regime to manage the country’s moribund economy much better without initiating reforms, which the military appears to regard as dangerous.	如果实现这一计划，来自美日的经济援助就会流入朝鲜，使朝鲜政府在无需启动改革的情况下挽救奄奄一息的国内经济，这种举措被军队视为危险的。


Instead, with the economy, particularly food production, continuing to falter, perhaps one-third of the country is living at or below starvation levels.	相反，随着经济、特别是粮食生产持续衰退，或许有三分之一的朝鲜人挣扎在饥荒线上下。


Will Kim Jong-un leader be able to do better?	金正恩能做得更好吗？


In the early stages of this precarious succession, China has behaved as expected, trying to prop up the regime in order to ensure stability in its nuclear-armed neighbor.	在此次不稳定继承的早期阶段，中国的表现不出所料，北京试图支持朝鲜政府，以稳定这个拥有核武器的邻国的局势。


China’s foreign ministry sent a strong message of support for Kim Jong-un, and encouraged North Koreans to unite under the new leader.	中国外交部强烈表示支持金正恩，并鼓励朝鲜人民团结在新领袖的周围。


But the key external factor in ensuring a peaceful succession will be the policies of South Korea and the US, which must decide whether they can work with the North in the post-Kim Jong-il era.	但韩美政策才是确保和平继承顺利实现的关键外部因素，这两国必须确定能否在后金正日时代与朝鲜合作。


Will they wait to see what happens to the new leader, and thus continue their policy of “strategic patience,” which focuses mainly on denuclearization, and not move on to other areas until the North moves first?	他们是否会继续奉行以无核化为主的“战略耐心”政策，让朝鲜率先在其他领域采取行动，静候新领袖出现结果？


In that case, North Korea will gradually become more unstable, despite China’s support, as economic collapse undermines its quasi-legitimate leadership.	如若真是如此，即便拥有中国的支持，朝鲜仍将因为经济萎缩会影响其准合法领导地位而逐渐丧失稳定局面。


Or will South Korea and the US try to take advantage of Kim Jong-il’s passing with new policy initiatives?	韩美两国是否会借金正日去世之机推行新的政策？


If they can develop a two-track policy framework aimed at facilitating economic reform inside North Korea while continuing international pressure for denuclearization, constructive engagement may be possible.	如果他们能成功制定双轨制的政策框架，在推动朝鲜经济改革的同时继续保持国际无核化压力，就有可能实现建设性的接触。


Alas, next year is an election year in South Korea and the US.	可叹的是明年韩美两国即将举行大选。


In the feverish atmosphere of political high season, it will not be easy for incumbent administrations to pursue bold but risky policies.	在政治旺季的狂热氛围中，现任政府大胆采取冒险政策面临着很大的难度。


This is the agony of democracy, and it is why the next year may prove to be the most unstable, and even dangerous, period in decades for the Korean peninsula and the region.	这是民主之痛，同时也解释了明年为什么可能成为朝鲜半岛及地区数十年来最不稳定、甚至是最危险的阶段。


What happens if things go the wrong way?	如果局势朝着错误的方向发展后果将是什么？


What if, for example, Kim Jong-un fails to consolidate power, perceives the domestic political situation as worsening, owing to elite power struggles or popular discontent, and deems the external environment, especially South Korea and the US ever more hostile?	比方说，如果金正恩未能巩固权力，因为精英权力斗争抑或民众不满而认定国内政局恶化，同时认定外部环境，特别是韩美两国更加充满敌意将带来什么后果？


In that case, Kim III may grasp at provocation in one form or another, as his father did with intermittent attacks on South Korea in recent years.	如果真是如此，金氏家族第三代统治者将以这样或者那样的方式进行挑衅，就像其父近年来断断续续对韩国发动袭击那样。


If things do worsen even more, the world, like it or not, must be prepared to manage – and even confront – a scenario in which the Kim dynasty, and with it the North Korean state, collapses.	如果局势进一步恶化，无论世界各国是否愿意，都必须准备应对——甚至解决金氏王朝，甚至连带朝鲜政府陷入崩溃的状况。


Unfortunately, considering the current state of ill-preparedness in terms of international coordination, there will be confusion, misunderstanding, and overreaction among South Korea, the US, and China to other actors’ behavior.	遗憾的是，鉴于目前国际合作准备不足的窘境，韩、美、中之间肯定会出现混乱、误解和过度反应的状况。


So it is past time for all three powers, together with Japan and Russia, to start talking and planning ahead, jointly.	因此韩美中三国，以及日本和俄罗斯早就应当开启联合会谈和提前计划了。


A chaotic, imploding North Korea is in no one’s interest.	混乱、一触即发的朝��局势是不符合各方利益的。


Whither Pakistan?	逐渐枯萎的巴基斯坦？


LAHORE – Pakistan remains the world’s never-ending question.	拉合尔——巴基斯坦仍然是全世界一个没完没了的问题。


As 2010 concludes, several outstanding issues continue to bedevil the country.	2010年末，几个悬而未决的问题仍然困扰着巴基斯坦。


How they are managed in the year ahead will determine not only Pakistan’s immediate future and long-term prospects, but also the security of its region and, indeed, much of the world.	这几个问题不仅将决定巴基斯坦的短期和长远命运，而且将影响到该地区和世界绝大多数地区的安全局势。


It has been said – without exaggeration – that Pakistan faces an existential threat.	有人说巴基斯坦正面临着现实威胁，此言一点不虚。


The country has not defined a coherent approach towards those who are resorting to terrorism to advance their agendas, both within Pakistan and abroad.	巴基斯坦对国内和国外借助恐怖手段实现目标的极端份子缺乏一以贯之的态度。


It remains uncommitted to the idea of denying sanctuaries on its territory to Taliban fighters battling American and NATO troops in Afghanistan.	它仍然对拆毁阿富汗反美反北约塔利班分子在其领土上修建的避难所表现得并不积极。


Relations with India have soured in recent months, because Pakistan’s government is once again lending diplomatic support to the insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir.	与印度关系也在近几个月急转直下，因为巴基斯坦政府再次给印控克什米尔叛乱人员提供外交方面的支持。


Domestic terrorism in Pakistan has taken a heavy human and economic toll.	巴基斯坦的国内恐怖主义已经造成了惨重的人员伤亡和经济损失。


It is no longer aimed at official support of United States-led anti-terrorism activities.	恐怖主义所针对的已经不再是美国领导下官方支持的反恐行动。


Sunni Islamic extremists now target minority groups as well as other Muslim sects.	逊尼派伊斯兰极端分子现在既攻击其他穆斯林教派也攻击少数族裔。


Some 800 liberal and Sufi Islamic scholars have died in targeted killings by extremist groups who receive financial assistance from like-minded people in the Middle East, and some well-known and much-visited Sufi shrines have been bombed.	约800名自由和苏非派伊斯兰学者在由中东同道提供财务支持的极端组织针对性杀戮中丧生，某些人流量大的知名苏非派寺庙也遭遇炸弹袭击。


The economy is in shambles, and unable to meet the International Monetary Fund demands for its continued support.	国内经济一片混乱，无法达到国际货币基金组织继续援助的要求。


If the IMF terminates its current program, Pakistan will be unable to service its foreign debt.	如果国际货币基金组织终止援助计划，巴基斯坦的外债将陷入无法偿还的境地。


Indeed, a senior cabinet minister suggested recently that the international community should write off Pakistan’s debts – an amount estimated at $40 billion.	实际上，一名高级内阁部长不久前提出国际社会应取消巴基斯坦总额约400亿美元的外债。


The minister of finance forcefully repudiated the suggestion the following day, indicating that the government has not developed a consistent approach towards the faltering economy.	财政部长第二天就出面驳斥了这种说法，表示政府尚未制定统一措施来挽救低迷的经济。


The economy was also badly hurt by the massive floods of 2010, which caused damage estimated at $10 billion.	2010年的大洪水也对经济造成了影响，造成约100亿美元的巨额损失。


This damage could lower annual GDP growth by 1-1.5% for several years to come.	这可能使巴基斯坦未来几年的年均GDP增长降低1－1. 5个百分点。


In the 2010-2011 fiscal year, the IMF estimates that economic output will increase by less than 3% – one-third the rate expected in neighboring India and less than half that of Bangladesh.	2010－2011财年，国际货币基金组织估计经济增长将低于3%——这样的速度只有邻国印度的三分之一左右，还不到孟加拉共和国的一半。


Slower economic growth will cause a shortfall of jobs for new entrants to the workforce, thereby increasing the incidence of poverty.	经济增长放缓将加大新增劳动力的就业缺口，从而提高贫困的几率。


Indeed, the number of people living in absolute poverty is likely to increase by 10 million, bringing the total to more than 70 million, or 40% of the population.	事实上，绝对贫困人口可能增加1000万以上，总数达到7000多万，或占总人口的40%。


Pakistan thus ends 2010 as the sick man of South Asia.	巴基斯坦就这样以南亚病夫的形象结束了2010之旅。


The political system also remains unsettled.	政治体系同样充满动荡。


Despite passage in July of the 18th amendment to the Pakistani constitution, which restored it to the form in which it was promulgated in 1973, political and executive authority remains in the hands of President Asif Ali Zardari.	尽管7月18日巴基斯坦宪法修正案获得通过，从而使宪法恢复到1973年颁布时的形式，但掌握政治和行政大权的仍然是巴基斯坦总统阿西夫·阿里·扎尔达里。


The changes are supposed to make the executive branch accountable to the elected parliament, expand the prime minister’s authority, devolve more power to the provinces, and ensure independence to the judiciary.	修宪旨在让行政部门对当选议会负责，扩大总理权力，下放权力给地方各省，并确保司法独立。


In late 2009, the president also approved the seventh National Finance Commission, which will allocate to the provinces a larger share of the revenues collected by the central government.	2009年末，总统还批准召开第七次全国金融委员会，批准将中央政府收入的更大份额向地方财政拨付。


But a significant transfer of power from the presidency to parliament, or from the central to provincial governments, has yet to be brought about.	但从总统到议会、从中央到地方的大规模权力转移还远未完成。


Worse yet, the military remains outside civilian control.	更糟糕的是，军队仍然不接受文人控制。


General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani’s term in office, which was set to expire in November, was extended by three years.	原定于11月结束的卡亚尼将军的任期更是延长了三年。


Thus empowered, the general has been able to exert his influence over foreign policy, in particular in defining the country’s relations with the US, India, and Afghanistan.	得到授权后，将军就有权干预外交政策，特别是影响巴基斯坦与美国、印度和阿富汗的关系。


Even though the US offered $2 billion of assistance to the military to be disbursed over a period of 3-5 years, Kayani has resisted American pressure to move against the Taliban’s sanctuary in North Waziristan, used to stage operations against US and NATO troops in southern and eastern Afghanistan.	尽管美国已经在3－5年内提供了20亿美元的军事援助，卡亚尼将军依然抵制了美国攻击塔利班北瓦济里斯坦庇护所的压力，恐怖分子利用当地庇护所在阿富汗东南部对美国和北约部队发起攻击。


So, is a further increase in violence by various extremist groups likely?	那么各极端组织是否可能扩大使用暴力？


Will the economy collapse if the IMF withdraws its support?	国际货币基金组织撤销援助是否会导致经济崩溃？


Will the US increase its pressure by intervening militarily if Pakistan continues to harbor Taliban fighters operating from the tribal areas?	如果巴基斯坦继续庇护隐藏在部族区域的塔利班武装分子，美国是否会加大军事干预的压力？


Will the military subvert the constitutional changes aimed at reforming the political system?	改革政治体系的修宪活动是否会遭到军队的暗中破坏？


Despite all the grim news and auguries, there is some hope, owing to the increased political mobilization of Pakistan’s middle classes, whose members have finally begun to question those espousing extremism.	尽管存在所有这些不详的信息和预兆，但巴基斯坦中产阶级政治力量的增强仍然为问题的解决保留着一线生机，新兴的中产阶级终于开始质疑支持极端主义。


The judiciary is also more active, and is attempting to force the executive to remain within the bounds of the constitution.	司法系统也更加活跃，并试图迫使行政部门在宪法的范围内行事。


Moreover, a trade agreement with Afghanistan that allows Afghan goods to cross Pakistan en route to India may be one step towards an improvement of economic relations with that large and rapidly growing neighbor.	此外，与阿富汗签订允许阿富汗货物过境运往印度的贸易协议可能是与这个高速发展的邻国改善经济关系的第一步。


Indeed, an able economic team that has been installed in the government seems – at long last – to be addressing some of the economy’s deep structural flaws.	事实上，政府组建的有能力的经济团体似乎终于开始解决某些深层次的经济结构性问题。


As India in the 1990’s and Brazil in the early 2000’s showed, economies in deep distress can recover quickly once the right policies are implemented.	正如20世纪90年代的印度和21世纪的巴西所表明的那样，实行正确的经济政策可以令经济从危机中迅速复苏。


It could also happen in Pakistan, which would help to solve other, seemingly intractable problems.	这一点在巴基斯坦也不例外，而且经济的发展有可能解决似乎非常棘手的其他问题。


So all hope is not lost in Pakistan.	因此巴基斯坦并未失去所有的希望。


On the contrary, 2011 may well prove to be a better year for a battered economy and a political system under stress.	恰恰相反，历史可能证明2011年对其陷于困境的经济和承受压力的政治体系来讲是一次机遇。


Whither the Egyptian Revolution?	埃及革命何去何从？


WASHINGTON, DC – Egypt’s revolution toppled a dictator in February, but the country’s future as a stable, functioning democracy remains uncertain.	华盛顿——2月，埃及革命推翻了独裁者，但埃及是否能够成为一个正常运转的稳定民主国家还远未尘埃落定。


The West is, of course, limited in its ability to shape the transition process.	当然，西方在决定埃及转型过程方面只能起到有限作用。


Nonetheless, the potential for constructive influence remains considerable, and it should be responsive to those in Egypt who favor liberal ideas, democratic institutions, and broad distribution of the benefits of economic development.	尽管如此，西方仍具有相当可观的潜在建设性影响力，对于支持自由思想、民主制度以及让经济发展惠及全埃及的埃及人，西方应该有所反应。


The upcoming parliamentary elections are but an early stage in a long (perhaps decades-long) struggle to define the new Egypt.	即将到来的议会选举只是迈向新埃及的漫长斗争的第一步，整个过程可能会持续数十年。


Will Egypt gravitate toward Islamic theocracy or adopt a secular government that respects minority rights?	埃及将滑向伊斯兰神权政体，还是会产生一个尊重少数派权利的世俗政府？


Which economic policies – statist, liberal, or some combination of the two – will best ensure social justice and broad distribution of prosperity?	哪些经济政策能最好地确保社会公平和惠及广大埃及人民的繁荣？ 是中央计划体制，还是自由经济，还是两者的结合？


Can civilian control of the military be established?	是否会建立由人民掌控的军队？


Will the regional security structure formed around the United States, Egypt, and Israel survive?	围绕美国、埃及以及以色列的地区安全结构是否能保留下来？


The November elections will not resolve these fundamental questions, and whether a workable constitutional framework will develop is uncertain.	11月的选举解决不了基本问题，且是否能产生一个有效的宪法框架还不确定。


A parliamentary system of government will likely emerge, including a prime minister and a cabinet, with the strong possibility that the presidency will be politically overshadowed, particularly if the presidential election is delayed.	到时可能会产生一个政府议会体系，包括一位总理和一个内阁，总统的政治影响力很有可能会受到压制，特别是若总统选举被推迟的话。


The central unknown is the composition of the ruling coalition.	最大的未知数是执政联盟的组成。


It appears unlikely that a single party will emerge from the election with enough parliamentary seats to govern on its own.	看起来不太可能有哪个单一政党能从选举中胜出，获得足够席位单独执政。


So a coalition government will be necessary.	因此联合政府将是无可避免之事。


The political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (the Freedom and Justice Party) currently is the best-organized party, and may be in the strongest position to form a majority coalition, including Salafist elements.	目前，穆斯林兄弟会（Muslim Brotherhood）的政治部门（即自由和公平党（Freedom and Justice Party））拥有最好的组织形态，最可能组成一个包括沙拉菲派（Salafist）在内的多数联盟。


By contrast, secular liberal parties have yet to develop effective organizations or project compelling visions for the future.	相反，世俗的自由派政党尚没有建立起高效组织，也没有提出吸引眼球的未来愿景。


Although sentiment favoring a secular state is considerable, a coalition that can serve as an alternative or counterweight to the Muslim Brotherhood will be difficult to assemble.	尽管埃及社会支持建立世俗国家的情绪相当高涨，但很难建立起一个足以与穆斯林兄弟会相抗衡甚至取而代之的联盟。


In the near term, the most likely counterweight could be a liberal coalition with a heavy component of former members of deposed President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) – that is, those who have not been discredited by their association with Mubarak.	从短期看，最可能的抗衡者将是一个以下台总统穆巴拉克的国家民主党（NDP）为重要组成部分自由派的联盟——也就是说，这将是一群因与穆巴拉克有过合作而失去了信誉的人。


Election rules favor those who were organized before the revolution.	选举规则对在革命前就组织起来的政党有利。


Approximately one-third of the new parliament will comprise “non-party list” candidates.	新议会将有大约三分之一席位被“无党派”候选人占据。


Established networks based on family, local loyalties, and tribal affiliations will be key determinants in voting. These circumstances may favor “non-party list” candidates associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the former NDP, particularly in rural Egypt.	基于家庭、地方忠诚和部落势力的现有网络将成为选票的决定性因素。 这样的环境可能有利于与穆斯林兄弟会和前NDP有关联的“无党派”候选人，特别是在埃及农村地区。


Post-election shifts in the composition of coalitions could complicate the situation, making governance even more difficult.	各联盟在选举之后的成分变迁将使情况复杂化，让治国难上加难。


Power-sharing among coalition partners will be an intricate affair, including behind-the-scenes deals with the military, which will insist on measures to safeguard its interests.	联盟伙伴之间的权力分割错综复杂，包括与军方的幕后交易——后者肯定会坚持采取捍卫其自身利益的措施。


The political atmosphere in Egypt remains volatile.	埃及的政治氛围仍然极不稳定。


Expectations of economic improvement are extremely high.	人们对于经济改善的期望极高。


The initial elected government may pay an early political price for failure.	如果最初选出的政府不能满足人们的期望，将为此付出政治代价。


The starting point for the West in trying to assist Egypt’s transition must be recognition that patient, long-term engagement will be required.	西方援助埃及转型的起点应该是认识到这是一项需要耐心和长期参与的事情。


The effectiveness of this engagement will depend primarily on the persuasiveness of the West’s policy prescriptions, rather than on the volume of financial assistance.	西方的介入能否见效，主要取决于西方政治药方是否具有说服力，而不是财政援助手笔有多大。


G-8 countries have already pledged support to post-Mubarak Egypt, including economic aid, debt relief, and loan guarantees.	G8国家已经承诺支持后穆巴拉克时代的埃及，包括经济援助、债务纾困和贷款担保。


These steps are important, though delivery will be prolonged and the likely impact modest, at least in the near-term.	这些举措都是十分重要的，但实现过程将会十分漫长，效果至少在短期是有限的。


Egypt has already declined support from the International Monetary Fund.	埃及已然回绝了IMF的支持。


But, apart from an IMF-backed reform program, if the Egyptian government’s policy framework is right, resources will flow from the private sector, including foreign investment supportive of job creation and economic development.	但是，除了IMF的改革计划之外，如果政府的政策框架对头，那么埃及还可以从私人部门获得资源，包括有利于就业创造和经济发展的外国投资。


This is the message that Egypt needs to grasp and embrace.	这一点是埃及需要抓住并牢牢把握的。


G-8 governments should urgently and repeatedly undertake quiet, structured, and consistent communications with Egyptian counterparts about the economic reforms needed to bring about prosperity.	G8政府迫切需要反复与埃及政府就实现繁荣的所需的经济改革进行静悄悄、结构性、持续性的对话。


It is far too early to judge the strength of internal forces promoting liberal economic policies.	断言有利于自由经济政策的内部推动力有多强还为时尚早。


The need for economic growth could intrinsically push policymakers toward market-oriented economic policies (sensitive to considerations of “social justice”) and an open investment environment.	经济增长的需要将成为推动政客采取市场导向的经济政策（这对“社会公正”十分重要）和开放的投资环境的内因。


Powerful forces within the Egyptian business community are silent at the moment, but in time will reassert themselves.	眼下，埃及商界内部的强大力量还没有发声，但迟早会表明自己的立场。


Many business interests with job-creating capacity want the continuation of market-oriented reforms begun a decade ago (which produced impressive growth rates), but support broadening prosperity and rooting out corruption.	许多与就业创造能力息息相关的商业利益希望十年前开始的市场导向改革（创造了令人印象深刻的增长率）能够继续下去，同时也支持扩大繁荣、根除腐败。


Moreover, an independent media might tend to reinforce pro-market and democratic sentiment.	此外��独立媒体也能强化支持市场和民主的情绪。


Indeed, Western governments should continue to use their channels to the Egyptian military and future civil leadership to encourage them to uphold the rule of law, to act with restraint, and to respect free expression.	事实上，西方政府应该继续利用与埃及军方和未来民事领导人的渠道来促使他们赞成法治精神、保持行动克制、尊重言论自由。


Regional security arrangements will also require careful maintenance.	地区安全安排也需要小心维持。


Finally, countries supportive of a democratic Egypt should focus on encouraging the institutional and social underpinnings of democratic process and market reform.	最后，支持民主埃及的国家应该专注于鼓励国际和社会支持埃及的民主进程和市场改革。


This depends on the development of a robust civil society, tolerant of open debate, and healthy liberal political parties, as well as active participation by women and an independent media.	这取决于稳健公民社会的发展、对公开争论的包容、健康的自由派政党，以及女性和独立媒体的积极参与。


Winning broad public support will take time.	赢得广泛的公众支持需要时间。


Private non-profit organizations and private enterprise, rather than governments directly, are best equipped to provide this type of training and expertise for leadership development and capacity building.	私人非营利组织和私人企业，而不是各国政府的直接干预，最适于提供此类关于领导力开发和能力建设的培训和专业意见。


The job of democratic governments is to provide the resources that can make delivery of this aid possible.	而个民主国家的政府的职责则是提供让这种援助成为可能的资源。


Who Are Tomorrow’s Consumers?	谁是明天的消费者?


SINGAPORE – Luxury-brand companies’ stock prices plunged in July, after their financial results disappointed investors, owing largely to slower sales in emerging markets, especially in China.	发自新加坡——由于在新兴市场（尤其是中国）的销售额走低，财务数据令投资者感到忧虑，奢侈品牌公司的股价在7月大幅下挫。


Meanwhile, news reports indicate that high-end shopping malls in India and China are increasingly empty.	与此同时又有新闻报道指出印度以及中国高端购物中心的人流正不断减少。


What is going on?	究竟发生了什么事？


Many analysts had expected emerging markets to generate exponential growth over the next decade.	许多分析家都预计说新兴市场在未来十年内都将实现指数式的增长。


But now there is talk of how the global crisis is slowing down these economies and killing off discretionary spending.	而今人们谈论的却是全球危机是如何减缓这些经济体发展并扼杀自由支出的。


But a slowdown in China’s economic growth cannot really be blamed for slower sales of luxury goods or empty malls.	然而奢侈品牌或是购物中心门可罗雀可不能归咎于中国经济增长的放缓。 这个7.


The annual growth rate of China’s $7.5 trillion economy decelerated to 7.6% in the second quarter, from 8.1% in January-March – hardly a cause for panic.	5万亿经济体的增速从今年第一季度的8. 1%下降到第二季度7.


Moreover, two-thirds of the decline is attributable to slower investment rather than slower consumption.	6%的表现根本无法引起任何恐慌。 此外，2/3的减速是源自于投资降低而不是消费疲软。


For all of China’s long-term structural problems, it is not exactly slipping into recession.	就中国所有的长期结构性问题看来，它还未滑入衰退。


The real problem is that many analysts had exaggerated the size of the luxury-goods segment in emerging markets.	真正的问题在于许多分析家都夸大了奢侈品牌在新兴市场的销售份额。


China is by far the largest emerging-market economy, with 1.6 million households that can be called “rich” (defined as having annual disposable income of more than $150,000).	目前中国这个最庞大的新兴市场经济体有160万可以被称为“富有”的家庭（界定标准是拥有超过15万美元的年均可支配收入）。


But this is still smaller than Japan’s 4.6 million and a fraction of the 19.2 million rich households in the United States.	但相对于日本的460万来说还是偏低，跟美国的1920万相比更是相形见拙。


The number of rich households amounts to barely 0.7 million in India and one million in Brazil.	而印度和巴西的富裕家庭数量也分别只有80万和100万。


The point is that developed countries still dominate the income bracket that can afford luxury goods.	由此可见，可支付奢侈商品的收入层次中还是以发达国家的人占绝大多数。


The explosive growth recorded by this segment in emerging markets in recent years reflected entry into previously untapped markets, with the subsequent slowdown resulting from saturation.	而近年来新兴市场这部分分额所取得的爆炸式增长则反映了一种进入原本未开发市场的现象，而销售下跌也是由于市场饱和。


The number of high-income households is still growing, but not enough to justify the 30-40% compounded growth rates expected by some.	高收入家庭的数量依然在增长，但不足以支撑某些人所期望的30-40%复合增长率。


This does not mean that growth opportunities in emerging markets have disappeared, but expectations do need to be recalibrated.	这并不意味着新兴市场的增长机会已经消失，而是预期水平必须被重新调整。 尽管在过去10年内实现了蓬勃增长，但中国国内依然有1.


Despite the economic boom of the last decade, China still has 164 million households that can be called “poor” (with annual disposable income of less than $5,000) and another 172 million that are “aspirant” (between $5,000-$15,000).	64亿“贫困”家庭（年均可支配收入低于5000美元）以及1. 72亿“积极消费”家庭（年均可支配收入介乎5000到1.


Similarly, India has 104 million poor households and 107 million aspirant households.	5万美元之间），而印度的对应数字则分别是1. 04亿和1.


The real story for the next two decades will be these countries’ shift to middle-class status.	而未来20年的真实情况将是这些国家将进入中产状态。


Although other emerging regions will undergo a similar shift, Asia will dominate this transformation.	虽然其他新兴地区都将出现类似的转换，但转型的中心将会是亚洲。


A study by the economist Homi Kharas of the Brookings Institution gives us a sense of the scale of this change.	布鲁金斯学会经济学家荷米·卡拉斯（Homi Kharas）的一项研究向我们展示了这一变革的规模。


He estimates that 18% of the world’s middle class lived in North America in 2009, while another 36% lived in Europe. Asia’s share was 28% (after including Japan).	他首先判断2009年时全球有18%的中产阶级住在北美，另有36%在欧洲，亚洲（计入日本）为28%。


But Kharas’s projections suggest that Asia will account for two-thirds of the world’s middle class by 2030.	卡拉斯预计到2030年将全球有2/3的中产阶级住在亚洲。 换句话说。


In other words, Asia will displace not just the West, but even other emerging regions.	亚洲不仅将取代西方，甚至连��他新兴区域也无法望其项背。


This is the real business opportunity.	这才是真正的商业机会。


Of course, the rise of Asia’s middle class is not the only change we should expect.	当然，亚洲中产阶级的崛起并不是我们唯一预期的变革。


We are in the middle of a social and demographic shift that will both destroy and create consumer markets.	我们正处于一个同时会破坏和创造消费者市场的社会和人口结构变革。


The aging of developed markets is well known, but the latest data show that emerging markets are aging at an even faster pace.	发达国家市场的老龄化已经众所周知。 但最新数据显示新兴市场正在更加迅速地经历老龄化。


China’s median age is today 34.5 years, compared to 36.9 years for the US.	中国目前的中间年龄为34. 5岁，而美国的数字则是36.


However, the average Chinese will be 42.5 years old by 2030, compared to 39.1 for the average American.	然而中国人的平均年龄到2030年将达到42. 5岁，美国只有39.


The median Russian will be even older, at 43.3 years.	1岁，俄罗斯则更甚，43. 3岁。


The impact of aging is already being felt in these countries’ education systems.	这些国家的教育系统已经遭到了老龄化的冲击。


The number of students enrolled in primary schools in China has fallen by 18% since 1990, and by an astonishing 33% in South Korea.	中国的小学生入学数量自1990年以来已经下降了18%，韩国更是严重下跌了33%。


At the other end of the demographic scale, the share of the aged is growing explosively.	在人口结构量表的高龄一端，老年人的份额正出现爆炸性的增长。


Meanwhile, the nature of the basic consuming unit – the household – is also changing rapidly.	与此同时，基本消费单位——家庭——的特性也在迅速改变。


In most developed countries, the traditional nuclear family is in severe decline and is being replaced by single-individual households.	在发达国家，传统的核心家庭（只包括父母和儿女的家庭）数量不断减少，取而代之是单人家庭。


In Germany, for example, 39% of households consist of just one person.	例如在德国，39%的家庭只有一名成员。


Couples with children now account for barely 19% and 22% of households in the United Kingdom and the US, respectively.	有孩家庭仅仅分别占到了英国和美国家庭总量的19%和22%。


Nevertheless, it is not all about consumer atomization.	但情况不仅仅是消费者的分散原子化。


We are simultaneously witnessing the re-emergence of the multigenerational extended family, with as many as 22% of American adults in the 25-35 age group living with parents or relatives.	我们同时也见证了几代同堂家庭的重新兴起：在25-35年龄段的美国人中有22%都与父母或者亲戚住在一起。


By contrast, the extended family is giving way in India to nuclear families, which now account for 64% of households.	相比之下，印度的大家庭正在为核心家庭让路，前者目前占全部家庭总数的64%。


All of these changes will profoundly affect the future of consumer markets.	所有这些变革将深刻影响消费市场的未来走向。


For example, we need to revise our mental image of the nuclear family from American suburbia to fit the rapidly expanding cities of India.	比如我们需要重新修改原本来自美国郊区的核心家庭形象以使其适应印度迅速发展的各大城市。


By the same token, our mental image of the multigenerational extended family needs to include those in the West.	出于同样原因，我们对大家庭的形象认识也必须包含来自西方的大家庭。


An aging but increasingly middle-class Asia will be at the core of this new consumer landscape.	而一个年龄不断增长且中产阶级不断增长的亚洲将会是新消费者市场的核心。


Who Beats Corruption?	谁来打击腐败？


Corruption undermines the quality of life for people around the world, not only in poor countries.	腐败危害全世界人民的生活质量，而不仅仅是穷国。


The US currently is witnessing several corruption scandals.	美国正在经历几个腐败丑闻。


Even America’s Federal Emergency Management Agency, responsible for providing relief after natural disasters and man-made catastrophes, was in the hands of inept political cronies rather than professionals.	甚至是在自然灾害和人为灾难后负责提供援助的美国联邦紧急情况管理局也落于不称职的政治密友之手而非专业人士。


When hurricane Katrina struck America’s Gulf Coast, that incompetence proved fatal.	当卡特琳纳飓风袭击美国海湾沿岸时，这一不称职是致命的。


All societies require an effective government that can provide vital and irreplaceable public services and infrastructure.	所有的社会都要求有效力的政府来向它为之服务的人民提供关键和不可替代的公共服务。


Thus, governments are invested with unique powers, especially the powers of policing and judicial control.	因此，政府被授予独特的权力，特别是维持治安和司法控制的权力。


But these powers are also readily abused.	但是，这些权力同时也经常遭到滥用。


How, then, to ensure that governments are law-abiding as well as strong?	那么，如何来保证政府在强大的同时也守法呢？


The best answer, both in theory and practice, is to find ways to hold governments accountable to the people that they serve.	理论上和实践上最好的办法是寻求使得政府向其服务的人民负责的方法。


Elections are obviously one method, though campaign financing can be a source of corruption.	尽管竞选资助可能成为腐败的源泉，但是，选举明显地是方法之一。


Politicians around the world trade favors for cash needed to win elections, and they often use that cash to buy the votes of desperately poor people.	全世界的政客们都用特殊照顾来换取赢得选举所需要的资金，而且，他们经常用这些资金来买取赤贫人口的选票。


Clear electoral rules and procedures can help ensure transparency, but accountability also comes from the broad society in between elections.	清晰的选举规则和程序可以帮助确保透明，但是，在两次选举当中，广泛的社会阶层也可以产生向选民负责的效果。


Privately owned newspapers, independent radio and television networks, trade unions, churches, professional societies, and other groups within civil society provide a bulwark against despotism.	私人拥有的报纸、独立电台和电视网络、工会、教会、专业团体以及其他公民社会的团体为防止专制主义提供保障。


In the poorest countries, where illiteracy is high, desperate people are subject to government manipulation, and there is a lack of independent control through the media and professional organizations, governments face only weak control by society.	在最贫穷国家，文盲比例很高，绝望的民众受到政府操纵，缺乏通过媒体以及专业组织的独立监督，政府只面对来自社会的微弱的控制。


They tend to be the most despotic and corrupt, not because poor people care less about good governance – on the contrary, their very lives depend on it – but because they lack the means to keep their government disciplined and law abiding.	它们有可能最为专制和腐败，这并不是由于贫苦民众对良好的管制漠不关心（相反，他们的生计取决于此），而是由于他们缺乏控制政府并使其守法的手段。


The result is a trap in which poverty causes bad governance and bad governance causes poverty – a two-way spiral downward that can lead to such extreme deprivation that the government, lacking computers, telephones, information systems, and trained civil servants, couldn’t function honestly even if it wanted to.	其结果是这样一个困境：那就是，贫困造成管制混乱，而管制混乱又造成贫困。 这种恶性循环造成极端的窘境，即，由于政府缺乏电脑、电话、信息系统以及训练有素的公务员，即使想要廉洁运作也不可能。


The end result can be collapse into a kind of anarchy, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.	最终结果就是社会崩溃到无政府状态形式，就像利比里亚、塞拉利昂以及索马里那样。


One measure of the quality of governance in over 150 countries is provided by Transparency International, an organization dedicated to strengthening civil society in the fight against government corruption.	透明国际在超过150个国家中提供政府管制质量的衡量标准。 该组织在反对政府腐败的斗争中致力于强化公民社会。


Transparency International produces an annual ranking of “corruption perceptions,” measuring the public’s view of the extent of corruption in a country.	它制作“腐败洞察”的年度排名来衡量公众对某国腐败程度的观点。


In the 2005 rankings, Iceland scored as the least corrupt country, with the Scandinavian countries, New Zealand, and Singapore close behind.	在2005年的排名中，冰岛在最廉洁的国家中名列第一，斯堪的那维亚国家、新西兰以及新加坡紧随其后。


The US ranked seventeenth from the top, a not-so-glorious position for the world’s leading power.	美国排名第七，这对于一个全球统领强国而言并不十分光彩耀人。


In general, the poorer the country, the lower the ranking: tied for last place are Chad and Bangladesh.	总体而言，国家越穷，排名越低。 乍得和孟加拉国并列最末。


A bit of statistical analysis reveals further important patterns.	稍加进一步统计分析就可以揭示更为重要的模式。


First, Sub-Saharan African countries are less corrupt on average than countries at the same income level in other parts of the world.	首先，平均而言，萨哈拉沙漠以南国家与收入水平相同的其他国家相比腐败程度较低。


For example, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Rwanda rank much higher than Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Yet the Asian countries’ economies have tended to grow much faster over the past generation.	例如，布基那法索、加纳、马里以及卢旺达要比孟加拉国、印尼、巴基斯坦和越南排名远远靠前。


Corruption therefore cannot be the unique factor that holds Africa back.	但是，在过去一代人中，亚洲国家的经济发展要远远更快。


Africa’s problems have more to do with droughts, malaria, AIDS, and lack of infrastructure.	非洲的问题更多地与干旱、霍乱、艾滋病以及基础设施缺乏有关。


Poor countries achieve lower levels of corruption when civil rights are protected.	当穷国的民权得到保护时，它们的腐败程度就较低。


When people have the freedom to assemble, to speak, and to publish their views, society benefits not only by increasing the range of ideas that are debated, but also by keeping corruption in check.	当民众有集会、言论以及发表观点的自由时，辩论的观点范围加宽，而且腐败得到抑制，社会因此而受益。


It is no surprise that corrupt regimes routinely clamp down on the press, trade unions, and on professional associations.	因此，腐败定时压制报纸、工会以及专业团体也就不足为奇了。


In Africa, less corrupt countries like Ghana also have much better protection of civil liberties than more corruption-prone countries like Chad and Ethiopia, which are also even poorer.	在非洲，类似加纳 一样的腐败程度较低的国家对公民自由的保护要远远超过像乍得和埃塞俄比亚等更为贫困、更为倾向腐败的国家。


Finally, the data show that corruption is highest in oil and gas-producing countries.	最后，数据显示，石油和天然气生产国家的腐败最为严重。


In general, natural resources like oil, gas, diamonds, and other precious minerals breed corruption, because governments can live off of their export earnings without having to “compromise” with their own societies.	总体而言，由于政府可以依靠出口收入而无需同其社会“妥协”，因此，类似石油、天然气、钻石以及其他稀有金属的天然资源会促生腐败。


The natural resources are therefore not only a target of corruption but also an instrument of holding power.	所以，自然资源不仅是腐败目标，而且是维护权力的手段。


Many foreign companies, intent on cashing in, fuel the pathology of corrupt regimes by peddling in bribes and political protection.	许多外国公司意在获取利益而通过贿赂和政治保护而加剧腐败当局的病状。


The implications for action are clear.	采取行动的含义是明白无误的。