HONG KONG – Too often, debate about the relationship between the state and the market casts them as opposing forces locked in a zero-sum struggle.	香港—关于政府和市场关系的争论往往像两股方向相反的作用力，陷入零和博弈。


But this simplistic approach quickly turns constructive discussion into a casualty of the ideological battle between advocates of state and market capitalism.	这一过于简化的观点常导致建设性的讨论迅速成为国家资本主义和市场资本主义支持者之间的意识形态之争。


A more useful framework would view the state and the market as two sides of the same coin, bound together by the property-rights infrastructure (PRI).	更有效的分析框架应该是将政府和市场视为一枚硬币的两面，并通过产权基础设施（property-rights infrastructure，PRI）联系在一起。


The state interacts with the market – the realm of private, voluntary exchange of property rights – in three main ways.	政府通过三种主要途径与市场（自由交换私有产权的场所）互动。


First, the state transacts with the private sector through taxation and expenditure.	首先，政府通过税收和公共支出与私人部门交易。


Second, it establishes and maintains the PRI, which includes all of the institutions needed to delineate, exchange, fine-tune, and protect (through enforcement of law and contracts) property rights.	其次，政府建设并维护产权基础设施，包括产权界定、交换、调整和保护（即通过法律和契约的强制实施）所需要的一切制度。


Among these institutions are the judiciary and arbitration panels, which function not only to adjudicate property-rights disputes, but also to address administrative abuses and disputes between the private and public sectors.	这些制度包括司法和仲裁，其职能不仅是裁决产权纠纷，还包括纠正行政权力滥用并解决公私部门之间的纠纷。


Finally, the state competes with the private sector via state-owned enterprises and utilities.	最后，政府通过国有企业和公用事业与私人企业竞争。


Given that an effective PRI safeguards market order and stability, the market needs a strong state to manage it.	有效的产权基础设施能捍卫市场秩序和稳定，因此市场需要强大的政府来管理维护这一基础设施。


This means that whether a government is “big” or “small” is less important than how well it manages the PRI – that is, whether the state is able to ensure high-quality market order.	这意味着政府是“大”是“小”并不重要，重要的是其能否管理好产权基础设施，即政府是否能够维护良好的市场秩序。


Current policy debates have largely neglected this aspect of the state’s role, because Western thinkers take their countries’ PRI for granted, especially their regulatory and judicial systems, which have benefited from hundreds of years of development.	当前的政策争论大多忽视了政府角色这一方面，因为西方思想家总把本国的产权基础设施尤其是监管和司法体系视为理所当然的。 然而这一制度并不是一开始就存在并完善的，��是得益于数百年的发展与演进。


But these countries’ experience is entirely different from that of developing economies, which are under intense pressure to build a sound PRI quickly.	而这些西方国家的经验与发展中国家大不相同，发展中国家正面临巨大压力，需要迅速建立稳固完善的产权基础设施。


For a large economy like China – which has overlapping bureaucracies in different state agencies, and many layers of government extending from the central administration to local units – creating a transparent, fair, and effective PRI is particularly complex.	对于中国这样的大型经济体——不同政府机构的官僚政治盘根错节、职能重复交叉、 而且从中央到地方政府层层机构臃肿——建立透明、公平、有效的产权基础设施尤其复杂。


As a state-led economy moves toward a market-based system, policymakers are faced with a difficult choice: pursue policies associated with immediate and rapid GDP growth, or seek the longer-term, less visible benefits of PRI development.	当政府主导型经济向市场经济体系转变时，决策者面临着艰难抉择：追求能立刻带来快速GDP增长的政策，抑或寻求需要时期较长、效益不那么明显的产权基础设施发展。


When China began this transition, its central and local governments focused on building physical infrastructure, such as roads and electricity grids, which delivered tangible gains.	当中国开始转型时，中央和地方政府专注于建设公路和电网等实体基础设施，带来了看得见摸得着的收益。


But it was the state’s less visible investment in the country’s institutional infrastructure that had the biggest impact on China’s GDP growth.	但对中国GDP增长影响最大的其实是并非能立竿见影的对国家产权基础设施的投资。


Over the last three decades, the government has created a transitory but effective PRI to remove barriers to market entry, define new property rights, and mimic international rules, thereby facilitating external trade and enabling foreign multinationals to operate effectively in China.	在过去三十年中，中国政府建立了临时过渡但有效的产权基础设施，以消除市场进入壁垒、界定新产权、模仿国际规则，从而促进了对外贸易，也使外国跨国公司得以在中国高效运营。


China’s government-services supply chain plays an important role in orchestrating and supporting the market economy’s development.	中国的政府服务供应链在组织安排和支持市场经济的发展中起到了重要作用。


But it is not enough.	但这还不够。


With private and foreign-owned entities now accounting for more than two-thirds of China’s output, and with China becoming a leading actor in global markets, the need to upgrade its PRI is becoming increasingly urgent.	考虑到民营企业和外资企业贡献了中国三分之二以上的产出，中国也正在成为全球市场主角，因此产权基础设施的升级正变得日渐紧迫。


In order to create value consistently within domestic and international markets, China must ensure that competition is fair, transparent, and subject to the rule of law.	为了在国内外市场中持续创造价值，中国必须确保公平透明的竞争与法治。


China’s leaders know that private small and medium-size enterprises with fair market access would be a far more reliable source of innovation and jobs than are large state-owned monopolies.	中国领导人知道，只要能获得公平市场准入待遇，民营中小企业将是远比大型国有垄断巨头更为可靠的创新和就业源泉。


Given this, China’s continued economic success depends on reducing state ownership of productive capital, facilitating market innovation and growth, and investing in human capital, such as through education, health care, and social welfare.	因此，中国持续的经济增长取决于减少政府对生产资本的占有，促进市场创新和增长，以及投资人力资本（如通过教育、卫生和社会福利）。


Concretely, this means introducing land reform and privatization, regulating food and drugs, protecting human capital and intellectual property, safeguarding the value of household savings, ensuring market access, and executing fair and transparent taxation.	具体地说，这意味着引入土地改革和民营化，监管食品和药品，保护人力资本和知识产权，保护家庭储蓄价值，确保市场准入以及执行公平透明的税收。


Such reforms would not weaken the state; they would simply alter the distribution of power in order to create a more stable system.	这些改革不会削弱政府，只是改变权力分布，从而建立更稳定的体系。


For example, the primary objective of privatization would not be to reduce the size of the state sector, but to eliminate state-owned enterprises’ unfair and hidden privileges, such as subsidized credit and monopolistic market positions.	比如民营化的首要目的并不是削减国有部门规模，而是取消国有企业所拥有的不公平的隐形特权，如信贷补贴和垄断性市场地位。


This would help to eliminate corruption, by making bureaucratic functions more transparent and preventing officials from rewarding themselves at the public’s expense.	这有助于使政府机构功能更透明、防止官员慷国家之慨而中饱私囊，从而消灭腐败。


Strengthening the rule of law and creating a level playing field essentially involve building a stable, effective PRI, composed of institutions that can motivate public officials to deliver services as effectively as possible.	从根本上说，强化法治和建立平等竞技场要求建立稳定、有效的产权基础设施，这一制度体系应能激励政府官员尽量提高服务效率。


Such a PRI would ensure that the state fulfills its responsibility to safeguard justice, enforce the law firmly and transparently, and enable the strongest competitors to reap their just rewards.	而且，这一制度体系应能确保政府履行其职责：捍卫公平、坚定透明地执行法律、让最强大竞争者获取应得收益。


The good news is that many of China’s local governments, which are responsible for overseeing the country’s courts, are beginning to compete with each other to deliver better PRI.	令人欣慰的是，中国的许多地方政府（它们也负责监督法庭）已开始相互竞争并提供更好的产权基础设施。


They recognize that stable, equitable markets are better than physical infrastructure at creating jobs and driving long-term growth.	地方政府已经认识到，稳定公平的市场在创造就业、驱动长期增长方面比实体基础设施更有效。


The bad news is that those who benefit from the current system are resisting progress.	令人担忧的是，当前体系的既得利益者仍在阻挠进展。


In order to navigate the complex market-state relationship and achieve a beneficial outcome, Chinese policymakers must have a clear idea of where the state’s limited capacity and political capital are needed most. And that presupposes a discourse on the state-market relationship that is very different from the one to which Westerners are accustomed.	为了理顺复杂的市场-政府关系并从中受益，中国决策者必须清楚哪里最需要政府有限的能力和政治资本，而这就要求采取与西方政府-市场关系论截然不同的思维。


The West’s Second Chance in Syria	西方在叙利亚的第二次机会


NEW YORK – The last-minute agreement between Russia and the United States to put Syria’s chemical weapons under international control gives the West, which had run out of good options, a second chance to reach what always should have been its strategic goal: peace in Syria and an end to its people’s suffering.	纽约——俄美最后一刻达成的对叙利亚化学武器实施国际监督的协议给了已经别无选择的西方国家实现其长期战略目标（争取叙利亚和平和结束叙利亚人民苦难）的第二次机会。


Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took advantage of Western leaders’ failure to formulate a clear central objective.	俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫利用西方领导人未能制定明确核心目标的漏洞抢得了先机。


Did they hope to end Syria’s civil war by forcing a military stalemate, or to bring about the demise of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime?	俄国人是想制造军事僵局结束叙利亚内战，还是想推翻巴沙尔·阿萨德政府的统治？


Did they want to strengthen international law barring the use of chemical weapons, or to send Iran a signal about their determination to enforce “red lines”?	他们是想巩固禁用化学武器的国际法，还是想让伊朗明白他们捍卫“红线”的坚定策略？


The Russian proposal forced the West to choose prohibition of chemical weapons as its immediate goal.	俄国的建议迫使西方将禁止化学武器作为其直接目的。


Given that this is one of the few areas of possible agreement in the United Nations Security Council, it is a good starting point to repair badly damaged relations among the Council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US).	考虑到这是联合国安理会有可能达成一致的少数领域之一，这是中、法、俄、英、美等安理会五大常任理事国修复严重受损关系的一个不错的开始。


Of course, the deal may prove to be little more than a diversion, breaking the momentum toward military action but failing to achieve its goal.	当然，事态的发展也可能证明协议的作用只是暂时的，只能短时间阻止军事行动，但却无法实现其最终目的。


Its implementation will be a test of Russia’s good faith.	协议的执行将考验俄国是否诚信。


For their part, Western countries must avoid the traps of the difficult negotiation process that the deal demands, without losing sight of their strategic goal of ending the conflict.	西方国家必须避开协议所必须的艰苦谈判过程的陷阱，同时牢记自己终止冲突的战略目的。


The complex process of securing and destroying Syria’s chemical arsenal promises to be next to impossible in the midst of a civil war.	要想在内战期间实现集中并销毁叙利亚化学武器的复杂任务几乎是不可能的。


To succeed, Western leaders must reframe their approach to the Syrian endgame, rejecting the assumptions that have shaped their policies since the beginning of the crisis.	要想取得成功，西方领导人必须放弃自危机伊始就一直左右其政策的假设重新思考收拾叙利亚残局的策略。


The West’s fundamental mistake has been consistently to underestimate the Assad regime’s resilience.	西方的根本错误在于一直低估了阿萨德政权的弹性。


Despite its brutality, the Assad government retains a substantial base of supporters who are willing to fight to the death to prevent the regime’s collapse.	阿萨德政府虽然残暴，但却一直不乏愿意誓死战斗阻止政府垮台的拥护群体。


Indeed, many Syrians believe that they have no future if Assad’s government collapses – a belief that has been reinforced as the civil war’s dividing lines have become increasingly sectarian.	事实上，很多叙利亚人都相信如果阿萨德政府垮台他们就不会有前途——内战分界线越来越宗派化进一步巩固了这样的信念。


With regime supporters’ physical survival seemingly at stake, the expectation of a quick collapse was illusory.	因为政府支持者自身的生存受到威胁，指望阿萨德政权迅速垮台根本就不现实。


More problematic, the West’s loud calls for Assad’s exit from power, though now muted, have given false hope to the opposition, while Russia has been hiding behind the rhetoric of a “Syrian-led process” to avoid confronting its international responsibilities.	更大的问题是，虽然西方呼吁阿萨德政权退出的声浪已经平息，但反对派却因此被赋予了虚假的希望，而俄国则一直躲在“叙利亚主导进程”的花言巧语背后避免承担其国际责任。


But a diplomatic solution guided by the Security Council’s permanent members is the only credible path to peace.	但是由安理会常任理事国主导的外交方案才是实现和平的唯一可靠途径。


The alternative – an attempt at negotiation between Syria’s government and an increasingly fragmented opposition – would serve only to prolong the war and raise the death toll.	企图在叙政府和日益分散的反对派之间展开谈判只会延长战争时间并增加死亡人数。


Likewise, the West must recognize that reconciliation in Syria will be impossible without reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia regimes in the wider region.	同样，西方国家必须意识到没有区域逊尼及什叶政权的和解，在叙利亚实现和解是不可能的。


Several of the Sunni-ruled Gulf monarchies view Syria’s crisis and the prospect of Assad’s demise as an opportunity to compensate for Iraq’s rapprochement with Iran following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime and the emergence of a Shia-led government.	某些逊��派统治的海湾君主国甚至将叙利亚危机和阿萨德的倒台看作他们在萨达姆·侯赛因的逊尼派政权倒台及什叶派政府接管后与伊朗修复关系的机会。


A year ago, the US, the UK, and France appeared to side with Saudi Arabia when they rejected former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request that Iran be invited to the first attempt in Geneva to negotiate a settlement of Syria’s civil war.	一年前，美、英、法似乎支持沙特的立场，拒绝了前联合国秘书长科菲·安南邀请伊朗参加日内瓦首次结束叙利亚内战谈判的要求。


They probably feared that Iran’s participation in the talks would enable Iranian leaders to link efforts to end the Syrian crisis to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, enhancing their ability to resist international demands that the program be terminated.	他们似乎担心伊朗领导人会把结束叙利亚危机和伊朗核计划谈判扯在一起，并因此增强伊朗拒不执行中止核计划的国际要求的能力。


But, while Iran’s direct involvement in Syria – where its own Revolutionary Guards, along with its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, are fighting in support of Assad – is part of the problem, a long-term solution is virtually impossible without Iranian participation.	但尽管伊朗通过其自身武装革命卫队及黎巴嫩代理真主党直接介入叙利亚危机支持阿萨德的确是部分问题的始作俑者，但没有伊朗的参与要想达成长期解决方案几乎是不可能的。


Indeed, the Middle East cannot achieve long-term stability while Iran is excluded from negotiations and the Shia-Sunni schism is allowed to deepen.	事实上，如果不允许伊朗参与谈判并任由什叶派和逊尼派之间的分歧加深，就不可能实现中东的长期稳定局势。


Although it is too soon to tell what, if anything, will come of the current diplomatic charm offensive by Iran’s more moderate new president, Hassan Rouhani, it might herald an important shift in Iranian policy that could ultimately enable regional reconciliation.	虽然现在断言伊朗相对温和的新总统哈桑·鲁哈尼目前发动的外交魅力攻势能否起作用和能起多大作用都还为时尚早，但无法排除它预示伊朗政策的重大转变、以及最终实现地区和解的可能性。


With the entire Middle East undergoing a generational transformation, regional challenges cannot be addressed separately.	在整个中东地区普遍转型的情况下，地区挑战无法单独解决。


Only a unified, comprehensive approach can manage the forces driving momentous change in the Middle East, prevent outside powers’ rivalries from complicating the situation further, and ensure a peaceful outcome.	只有统一、全面的策略才能管理推动中东变革的各项驱动因素、防止外来势力进一步复杂化地区趋势、并确保实现和平结局。


With emerging regional powers increasingly challenging the capacity of the Security Council’s permanent members to shape events in the Middle East, there is no time to waste.	随着新兴地区大国进一步挑战安理会常任理事国控制中东局势的能力，我们已经没有时间可以浪费。


The West’s lofty and self-serving rhetoric has not helped to end Syria’s conflict; it may even have made the situation more dangerous.	西方傲慢利己的花言巧语对结束叙利亚冲突没有任何帮助； 甚至可能加剧局势的危险性。


Although the Russian initiative is not without pitfalls, it could be a crucial launchpad for more serious and constructive engagement with Syria – and with the rest of the Middle East.	尽管俄罗斯的倡议并非没有缺陷，但它可以成为与叙利亚（和中东其他地区）严肃、建设性接触的关键启动。


Emergency Education Now	从现在开始支持紧急情况教育


DAVOS – In an ideal world, whenever children needed help, they would get it.	达沃斯—在理想世界中，只要儿童需要帮助，就能得到帮助。


When girls and boys were forced from their homes or classrooms because of war, natural disaster, or other crises, the international community would, within days, formulate a plan to ensure their immediate wellbeing.	当女孩和男孩因为战争、自然灾难或其他危机而被迫离开家园或教室，全球社会就能在几天之内制定能保证他们临时福祉的计划。


And such plans would include not only life-saving interventions, but also havens of psychological support and learning that protect opportunity and hope. Such places exist.	这些计划不但将包括救命干预，也将心理支持和学习的避风港，以保护机会和希望。


Unfortunately, ours is far from an ideal world.	不幸的是，我们的世界远非理想世界。


When children need help, days turn into weeks and months.	当儿童需要帮助时，我们几天、几周甚至几个月都没有采取行动。


Hundreds of desperate children become thousands and eventually millions.	绝望儿童一开始是几百人，后来变成几千人，最后演变为几百万人。


Hope gives way to prolonged misery – not for a few months or even a year, but on average for more than a decade.	希望让位给了无尽的痛苦——不是几个月乃至一年，而是平均长达十年有余。


They are shut out of schools, locked out of opportunity, and condemned to live in unbearable conditions – subject to child labor or forced begging, sold into marriage, trafficked, conscripted into gangs, or recruited by extremists.	他们被排斥在学校门外，被机会所抛弃，被迫生活在无法忍受的条件下——可能沦为劳工或被迫乞讨，卖走当新娘、遭遇人贩、被黑帮吸收，或被恐怖分子招募。


What has happened in recent years in South Sudan, northern Nigeria, and Iraq – and in Jordan, and Lebanon, where hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugee children are being denied the chance to return to school – makes an overwhelming case for a new humanitarian fund for education in emergencies.	近几年来在南苏丹、尼日利亚北部和伊拉克所发生过的事情表明，我们急需成立一个新的人道主义基金用于紧急情况下的教育。 约旦和黎巴嫩的情况也是如此，这两个国家接收了数十万叙利亚难民儿童，他们返回学校的希望渺茫。


What has happened during the Ebola crisis in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone – where schools serving five million children remain closed or have not reopened quickly enough – makes this case, too.	利比里亚、几内亚和塞拉利昂的埃博拉危机期间，五百万孩子就读的学校被关门或无法以足够快的速度重新开门，同样表明建立这一人道主义基金的紧迫性。


Yemen and Chad are likely to be next.	也门和乍得可能成为下一批例子。


In all of these countries and situations, children’s future depends on whether we, the international community, act.	在所有这些国家和局面中，儿童的未来取决于我们——国际社会是否行动起来。


The Millennium Development Goals commit the international community to achieve the target of universal primary education by the end of 2015.	联合国千年发展目标 承诺国际社会在2015年实现小学完全普及的目标。


But the official out-of-school figure currently stands at 58 million.	但官方辍学数字目前仍高达5,800万。


And, once out of school for a year or more, children are unlikely to return.	此外，一旦儿童辍学时间超过一年，就不再可能回去上学。


There is a huge gap in our array of solutions.	我们的解决办法存在巨大不足。


In 2014, education received just 1% of humanitarian funds – leaving millions of children and young people on the streets or idle in camps.	2014年，教育只获得人道主义资金的1%——让数百万儿童和年轻人在街头游荡或在难民营虚度光阴。


And there is no mechanism to pay for the education of refugee children or those affected by disaster.	也没有为难民儿童或遭受自然灾害的儿童支付教育费用的机制。


To be sure, there are organizations – the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, and many other groups – that, working together, perform heroically.	平心而论，一些组织——联合国难民事务高级专署（United Nations High Commission for Refugees）、联合国儿童基金会和其他许多组织——齐心协力做着超凡的努力。


And organizations like the Global Partnership for Education, Sheikha Mozah’s Educate a Child foundation, and the Global Business Coalition for Education also contribute in times of emergency.	而全球教育合作组织（Global Partnership for Education）、莫扎王妃（Sheikha Mozah）的教育儿童基金会（Educate a Child）以及全球教育商业联盟（Global Business Coalition for Education）等组织也在紧急状态期间提供了帮助。


But that woefully small 1% figure means that the world simply does not have enough to ensure that more than a fraction of affected children get help.	但这区区1%的数字意味着世界根本无法确保多少受影响儿童得到帮助。


The solution must be based on a simple humane principle: No child should be denied opportunity simply because adults are unable to work together.	解决方案必须以一个简单的人道原则为基础：所有儿童都不应该仅仅因为成年人无法齐心协力而被机会拒绝。


That means establishing an emergency education system that enables adequate funding to be released to UN agencies and operational NGOs at the onset of a crisis – not years later.	这意味着需要成立一个紧急教育制度（emergency education system），让联合国机构和参与其中的非政府组织在危机伊始——而不是几年后——获得充足的资金。


What has been happening in Lebanon over the past two years is a case in point.	过去两年在黎巴嫩发生的事情就是如此。


Today, there are 465,000 Syrian child refugees.	如今，叙利亚儿童难民大约有465,000人。


The Lebanese government has volunteered to accept refugee children into the country’s schools by introducing a second afternoon session and enlisting teachers and school directors to take on the extra workload.	黎巴嫩政府自愿接受难民儿童进入本国学校，开设第二下午课堂，招募教师和学校管理者承担额外的工作量。


Complicating the situation, officials have had to persuade a divided country, already worried about the influx of refugees (which has added 20% to the country’s population). But few refugee children have enrolled.	让局面更加复杂的是，官员必须说服这个已经对难民的涌入（让全国人口增加了20%）十分担心的国家。


UNICEF and the UNHCR have devised a plan with the Lebanese government to implement this program, but the international community has failed to help.	联合国儿童基金会和联合国难民事务高级专署与黎巴嫩政府一起制定了一项实施该计划的方案，但国际社会没有提供帮助。


Only $100 million has been pledged, but $163 million is still needed.	目前的承诺资金只有1亿美元，尚需1. 63亿美元。


Though the Global Partnership for Education and other organizations want to do more, their mandate does not permit them to provide assistance to middle-income countries like Lebanon.	尽管全球教育合作组织和其他组织希望贡献更多力量，但它们的权限不允许它们为黎巴嫩这样的中等收入国家提供援助。


Something is very wrong with this picture.	其中有些地方出了严重的问题。


Lebanon’s government has a plan that requires no new schools or infrastructure, making it one of the most cost-effective solutions to a refugee crisis imaginable.	黎巴嫩政府有一个不需要新学校或基础设施的计划，这是你可以想到的最具性价比的难民危机解决方案。


But, still, the money is lacking.	但资金仍然短缺。


The same thing is happening in South Sudan.	南苏丹也是如此。


And in northern Nigeria, countless attacks by the terrorist group Boko Haram have underscored the need for a full safe-schools program; but the money to deliver it simply is not there.	而在尼日利亚北部恐怖组织博科圣地（Boko Haram）没完没了的袭击彰显出实施完整的安全校园计划的必要性； 但这方面的资金根本无从着落。


Similarly, in Pakistan, the Peshawar massacre last month has revealed how much more must be done to protect schools and children’s future.	类似地，在巴基斯坦，上个月的白沙瓦大屠杀揭露出在保护学校和孩子的未来方面任重道远。


Given such crises, the world can no longer afford to do without a humanitarian fund for education during emergencies.	考虑到这些危机，世界必须马上为紧急状态期间的教育建立人道主义激进。


In April, at the World Bank’s annual meeting, I will call for action by the assembled government ministers, and I hope to announce the establishment of such a fund at the Oslo Summit on Education for Development on July 6-7.	在4月的世界银行年会上，我将呼吁与会的政府部长们采取行动，我希望能在6月6—7日的奥斯陆发展教育峰会上宣布成立这样一个基金。


Education, it is said, cannot wait.	人们说，教育不等人。


Passing the hat when a crisis erupts is not the solution.	等危机爆发在募集捐款不是办法。


In 2015, we must do more.	2015年，我们必须做得更多。


A Better Year for Migrants?	移民境况改善的一年？


DUBLIN – The Mediterranean migration crisis has delivered two critical lessons.	都柏林—地中海难民危机告诉我们两个关键教训。


First, Europe and the international community have grossly inadequate systems for protecting vulnerable migrants.	首先，欧洲和国际社会保护脆弱移民群体的制度总体上存在不足。


Second, in the absence of such systems, populist leaders will prey on fear to gain political support, undermining the liberal, tolerant societies that have taken 70 years of hard work to build.	其次，在制度不足的情况下，民粹主义领导者通过煽动恐慌获得政治支持，破坏用了70年时间苦心经营才建成的自由宽容社会。


That is why vigorous action at the European and global levels is essential this year.	因此，今年从欧洲和全球层面采取强力措施至关重要。


In September, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will convene an extraordinary summit dedicated to building a fair global system for protecting refugees and vulnerable migrants.	9月，联合国秘书长潘基文将召开特别峰会，讨论构建一套保护难民和脆弱移民的公平的全球制度。


One hopes that countries will come prepared to make tangible, enduring commitments.	我们希望各国做好准备采取切实持久的承诺。


Such commitments were sorely lacking in 2015.	2015年，这样的承诺极度匮乏。


Indeed, the international community could have blunted last year’s crisis by providing even modest support for the three frontline countries – Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan – which together host some four million Syrian refugees.	事实上，国际社会本可以通过向三个前沿国家（土耳其、黎巴嫩、约旦，它们加起来接收了大约四百万叙利亚难民）提供哪怕最小的支持来遏制去年的危机。


With only around €10 billion ($10.8 billion), these countries could have provided better housing, food, and education for refugees, thereby reducing the incentive to flee to Europe.	只需要花费大约100亿欧元，这些国家就可以为难民提供更好的住宿、食物和教育，从而降低他们涌向欧洲的渴望。


That failure could end up costing Germany alone upwards of €21 billion annually for years to come.	这方面的失败可能在未来多年造成巨大的成本，光是德国就可能高达每年210亿欧元。


But the financial implications of the crisis pale in comparison to the human and political costs.	但这场危机的财政成本与人道和政治成本相比根本不值一提。


More than a million people risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean last year, and then endured grueling journeys through the Balkans.	去年，超过一百万人冒着生命危险穿越地中海，再历尽千辛万苦穿越巴尔干半岛。


Almost 4,000 people died on the way, and many European countries turned their backs on those who survived, refusing them safe haven.	近4,000人在途中丧生，而许多欧洲国家对幸存者视而不见，拒绝向他们提供安全港。


Cynical political leaders ruthlessly capitalized on popular anxiety by promoting an odious nationalist vision that either ignores or distorts real-life experiences with immigration.	犬儒主义政治领导人通过鼓吹可恶的民族主义愿景冷血地利用群众焦虑，他们忽视或者扭曲移民的真实情况。


In the United States, for example, not one of the 780,000 refugees resettled since September 11, 2001, has executed a terrorist attack.	比如，在美国，2001年9月11日以来共接收了780,000难民，没有一人参与了恐怖袭击。


Meanwhile, immigrants typically pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits.	与此同时，移民所支付的税收常常要高于他们所获得的福利。


Nonetheless, extremist forces are dangerously close to taking political power in some European states, and are gaining traction even in formerly liberal bastions.	尽管如此，极端主义力量仍然在一些欧洲国家危险地步步接近获得政治权力，即使在昔日的自由堡垒国家，它们也在日益得势。


Anti-migrant parties already are in power in Hungary and Poland.	反移民政党已经在匈牙利和波兰掌权。


Their success is compelling mainstream parties to adopt anti-migrant policies as well.	它们的成功正在迫使主流政党也采取反移民政策。


All of this has seriously undermined European cooperation.	所有这些都严重地破坏了欧洲的合作。


The EU’s program to process the million refugees who arrived on its shores has succeeded in “relocating” a mere 190 of them.	欧盟处置抵达欧洲沿岸的数百万难民的方案成功地“安置”了区区190人。


Checks at the borders of six countries within the Schengen Area have been reinstituted, at least temporarily.	申根区的六个国家重启边境检查（至少暂时如此）。


To the rest of the world, the EU appears chauvinistic and inept.	对世界其他地区来说，欧盟变得沙文主义又笨拙无能。


Of course, the crisis is not solely for Europe to solve; responsibility is not defined by proximity.	当然，危机的解决不能全靠欧洲； 不是谁离得近就由谁来负责。


But the EU might now face an existential threat, which it can overcome only with a strong show of solidarity and global leadership.	但欧盟也许已经面临生存危机，只有通过表现出强大的团结和全球领导力才能克服这场危机。


That is why its member states must take the lead in proposing solutions.	因此，其成员国必须带头制定解决方案。


The most urgent priority is to create safe and legal paths for refugees to reach Europe.	最紧迫的重点是为难民构建前往欧洲的安全合法途径。


This does not imply that every vulnerable migrant must be accepted.	这并不意味着必须接受每一位脆弱的移民。


But the EU should be more systematically generous in determining how many to admit, and it should implement organized ways to facilitate their entry.	但欧盟在决定收容多少人方面在整体上应该更加慷慨一些，并且应该有组织地为他们的进入提供便利。


Such a system would protect migrants and safeguard Europe (by enabling it to vet applicants fully).	这样一套制度能够保护移民、捍卫欧洲（通过充分审查申请）。


Beyond reducing the incentive for asylum-seekers to risk their lives and life savings to cross the Mediterranean, such an approach would show solidarity with the frontline countries, which will continue to host most of the refugees.	除了减弱寻求庇护者冒着生命危险、倾尽一生积蓄穿越地中海的动力，这一方针还能表现与前沿国家的团结一致。 前沿国家将继续接收大部分难民。


Equally important, it would put pressure on the rest of the international community to contribute.	同样重要的是，这将给国际社会其他成员造成压力，促使它们做出贡献。


That brings us to the second priority for 2016: building a robust global system to protect refugees and other vulnerable migrants.	这就引出了2016年的第二个重点：构建一套强大的全球制度保护难民和其他脆弱移民。


This requires, first and foremost, agreement by more countries to accept refugees.	这首先需要更多国家同意接受难民。


In recent years, the UN Refugee Agency has been able to resettle fewer than 75,000 of more than 20 million refugees annually.	近几年来，每年难民数量达2,000万以上，但联合国难民署只能安置不到75,000人。


Millions end up in protracted displacement, spending an estimated 25 years, on average, stuck in limbo, unsure when they might return home.	数百万人最终陷入了长期流离失所状态，平均需要25年才能结束颠沛和不安定，回到自己的家园。


In 2016, developed countries should agree to accept a combined total approaching a million refugees annually, either through resettlement or by issuing humanitarian, student, labor, and other visas.	2016年，发达国家应该同意接受每年总数接近100万的难民，方式可以是安置，也可以是提供人道、学生、劳工和其他签证。


With Canada alone saying that it will resettle 50,000 Syrian refugees this year, it is clear that this target is achievable.	仅加拿大一国便已表态今年将安置50,000叙利亚难民，显然这一目标是可以实现的。


At the same time, the international community must support the integration of refugees in major host countries like Turkey, Kenya, Lebanon, and Jordan.	与此同时，国际社会必须支持难民融入土耳其、肯尼亚、黎巴嫩和约旦等主要接收国。


As it stands, such countries receive just a fraction of the $3,000-5,000 per refugee required annually to provide adequate housing, food, health care, schooling, and job training during the first few years of displacement.	为难民在失去家园的前几年中提供充足的住宿、食物、医疗、教育和就业培训的成本为每人每年3,000-5,000 美元，而目前主要接收国只能获得其中一小部分资金。


And that does not account for the costs of building or upgrading infrastructure.	此外，这一数字尚未算入建设或升级基础设施的成本。


Lebanon’s water-supply system, for example, is faltering under the strain of the massive influx of refugees.	比如，黎巴嫩供水系统就不堪大量难民涌入的重负。


In exchange for funding, host countries should agree to integrate refugees fully into their schools, labor markets, and civic institutions.	接收国应该同意让难民充分融入本国学校、劳动力市场和民用机构，以此换取资金。


But integrating migrants effectively will be impossible unless European and other countries change how they perceive migrants.	但除非欧洲和其他国家改变对移民的看法，否则移民就不可能有效融入。


If migrants are viewed as a burden or, worse, a security threat, reactionary political forces will continue to gain ground, cutting off opportunities for newcomers and turning such fears into a self-fulfilling prophesy.	如果移民被视为一种负担，或者更糟糕地，被视为安全威胁，反动政治力量就会继续得势，减少新来者的机会，将这些恐慌转变为自我实现的预言。


If, however, host countries enthusiastically integrate migrants, everyone will benefit – including home countries (for example, through remittances).	但是，如果接收国热情地融入难民，那么所有人都能获益）包括难民祖国（比如通过侨汇）。


Last month in Paris, the international community proved that it could subordinate national self-interest to a greater global goal: confronting climate change.	上个月，国际社会在巴黎证明了它能够为了更大的全球目标——气候变化战胜国家自利。


In 2016, the same thing must happen to forge a better system for protecting migrants.	2016年，国际社会必须拿出同样的举动构建一个更好的保护难民的制度。


It is a matter of life and death for 20 million refugees and millions of other vulnerable migrants – and a profound test of the civic health of democratic societies worldwide.	对2,000万难民和数百万其他脆弱移民来说，这是生死攸关的大事——对于全世界民主社会的公民健全（civic health）来说，这也是影响深远的考验。


The Case for Surge Funding	波浪融资的契机


MUNICH – Important progress was made at the donors’ conference for Syrian refugees convened in London on February 4. But much more remains to be done.	发自慕尼黑——2月4日在伦敦召开的叙利亚难民援助会议取得了一大重要进展，但还有许多事物亟待完成。


The international community is still vastly underestimating what is needed to support refugees, both inside and outside the borders of the European Union.	国际社会仍然大大低估了支援难民所需的资源——无论是在欧盟的边界之内还是之外。


To deal with the refugee crisis, while putting the EU’s largely unused AAA borrowing capacity to better use, requires a paradigm shift.	为了应对难民危机，在更好地动用欧盟尚未使用的AAA级借款信用等级的同时，也需要实现一个范式上的转变。


Rather than scraping together insufficient funds year after year, it is time to engage in “surge funding.”	而相比于一年又一年地拼凑数量不足的经费，是时候该实施“波浪融资”策略了。


Spending a large amount of money up front would be far more effective than spending the same amount over several years.	提前动用大量资金将比把同样金额分成几年支付有效得多。


Frontloading the spending would allow us to address the most dangerous consequences of the crisis – including anti-immigrant sentiment in receiving countries and despondency and marginalization among refugees – more effectively.	前置开支将使我们得以解决危机的最危险后果——接受国的反移民情绪以及难民群体中的沮丧和边缘化——更有效。


Making large initial investments would help tip the economic, political, and social dynamics away from xenophobia and disaffection, and toward constructive outcomes that benefit refugees and the recipient countries alike.	动用大笔初始投资将有助于约束经济，政治和社会动力远离仇外心理和不满情绪，并取得对难民和受援国都有利的建设性成果。


Surge funding has been used often to finance immunization campaigns.	波浪融资策略常常被用来资助疾病免疫项目。


The International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), which borrows against future government contributions to immunization programs, has raised billions of dollars over the past several years to ensure that vaccination campaigns are successful as soon as possible.	国际免疫融资机制通过提前收取各国政府未来向免疫项目的捐款，在过去数年间筹集了数十亿美元以确保疫苗接种活动能够尽快成功执行。


In the long run, this is more effective than spending the same amount of money in yearly installments. IFFIm provides a convincing precedent for the current crisis.	从长远来看，这比将同样的数额分开几年划拨更为有效，也为当前的危机提供了具有说服力的先例。


A sudden large influx of refugees can cause panic that affects the general population, the authorities, and, most destructively, the refugees themselves.	难民突然大量涌入可能引起恐慌，并影响普通人群，政府当局以及——最破坏性的——难民自身。


The panic breeds a false sense that refugees are a burden and a danger, resulting in expensive and counter-productive measures, like erecting fences and walls and concentrating refugees into camps, which in turn breeds frustration and desperation among the refugees.	恐慌会产生一种错觉，认为难民是负担和危险，并催生耗资巨大而适得其反的措施，比如架设栅栏和围墙，把难民集中关在难民营，这反过来又滋生了难民的沮丧和绝望情绪。


If the global community could fund large-scale, concentrated programs to address the problem, the general public and the refugees would be reassured.	如果国际社会能够资助大规模且集中落实的一系列项目来解决这一问题，广大市民和难民才能安下心来。


A surge in spending is needed both in Europe and in frontline states like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.	无论是欧洲还是像约旦，黎巴嫩和土耳其这类冲突前沿国家，波浪融资是必要的。


The necessary investments include an overhaul of the EU’s asylum policy and improvement of its border controls.	必要的投资包括对欧盟庇护政策的重新检讨以及对边境管制的改进。


In frontline states, money is needed to provide refugees with formal employment opportunities, health care, and education.	在前沿国家，需要资金来为难民提供正规的就业机会，医疗保健和教育。


If life for refugees is made tolerable in frontline countries, and they believe that an orderly process is in place for gaining entry to Europe, they are more likely to wait their turn, rather than rushing to Europe and overwhelming the system.	如果难民在前沿国家的生活变得可以忍受，同时他们认为已经进入了一个前往欧洲的有序流程，那就更可能耐心等待，而非千方百计涌入欧洲并挤爆整个系统。


Similarly, if the refugee crisis can be brought under control, the panic will subside and the European public will be less prone to support anti-migrant policies.	同样，如果难民危机可以得到控制，恐慌就会逐渐消退，欧洲公众也不会那么轻易地去支持反移民政策。


Jordan could provide a test case.	对此约旦可以作为一个测试案例。


A country of 9.5 million people, it is providing refuge to 2.9 million non-citizens, including 1.265 million Syrians, and facing the influx of additional Syrians uprooted by Russian bombing.	这个950万人口的国家为290万非本国公民提供了庇护，其中包括126.


A combination of massive upfront direct financial assistance, enhanced trade preferences, and temporary debt relief is needed.	5万名叙利亚人，还可能有更多叙利亚人因俄罗斯轰炸而涌入，急需大量前期直接财政援助，加强贸易优惠待遇和临时债务减免等综合性政策来进行援助。


A successful program for Jordan could demonstrate the international community’s ability to bring the refugee crisis under control, opening the way to similar programs for other frontline states, adjusted on a case-by-case basis, depending on local conditions.	约旦项目的成功可以证明国际社会控制难民危机的能力，并为在其他国家的类似项目开辟道路——这些项目都将依据当地的条件进行具体调整。


The approach suggested here would cost more than EU member states can afford out of current budgets.	这一建议方案将比欧盟成员国目前能拿出来的预算要多。


A minimum of €40 billion ($45 billion) needs to be spent annually in the next 3-5 years; but even larger amounts would be justified to bring the migration crisis under control.	在未来3~5年内大概每年最少要支出400亿欧元（折和450亿美元），但其实需要更大的金额才能完全控制整个难民危机。


In fact, so far, lack of adequate financing is the main obstacle to implementation of successful programs in any of the frontline countries, particularly in Turkey.	事实上到目前为止，资金缺乏才是在任何前线国家（尤其是土耳其）实施成功方案的主要障碍。


While Germany has an unallocated budget surplus of €6 billion ($6.8 billion), other EU countries are running deficits.	虽然德国拥有60亿欧元（折合68亿美元）的未分配预算盈余，其他欧盟国家政府却面临着预算赤字。


German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has proposed a pan-European fuel tax, but that would demand either unanimous agreement or a coalition of the willing.	德国财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble）提出征收一项全欧范围的燃油税，但这需要实现一致同意或是建立一个拥有该意愿的联盟。


This enhances the merits of having recourse to the EU’s largely unused AAA credit.	这就增强了欧盟动用在很大程度上未使用的AAA借贷信用等级的可能性。


The migration crisis poses an existential threat to the EU.	难民危机对欧盟的生存造成了威胁。


Indeed, with the north pitted against the south, and the east confronting the west, the EU is coming apart at the seams.	事实上，在南北对立，东西相争的形势下，欧盟很可能四分五裂。


When should the EU’s AAA credit be mobilized if not at a moment when the EU is in mortal danger?	试问欧盟的AAA信用等级如果不在联盟生死关头动用，又该在什么时候动用呢？


It is not as if there is no precedent for this approach; throughout history, governments have issued bonds in response to national emergencies.	这种做法也不是没有先例； 在历史上，各国政府都曾在国家危急之时发行过债券。


Tapping the AAA credit of the EU, rather than taxing consumption, has the additional advantage of providing much-needed economic stimulus for Europe.	动用欧盟的AAA信用等级，而非对消费征税，对提供欧盟迫切需要的经济刺激政策有着额外的优势。


The amounts involved are large enough to be of macroeconomic significance, especially as they would be spent almost immediately and produce a multiplier effect.	涉及的金额将大到足以影响宏观经济，尤其是这笔钱会被立刻花掉并产生乘数效应。


A growing economy would make it much easier to absorb immigrants, whether refugees or economic migrants.	蓬勃发展的经济将使其更容易吸收移民，无论是难民或经济移民。


In short, surge funding is a win-win initiative, and it must be undertaken urgently.	总而言之，波浪融资是双赢的举措，而且必须尽快进行。


Turning Crisis into Success in Germany	将危机转化为德国的成功


BERLIN – According to an early May opinion poll by ARD DeutschlandTREND, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party’s popular support now stands at 15%, up from around 5% a year ago.	柏林—据5月初ARD德国趋势（DeutschlandTREND）的民意调查，极右翼的德国另类道路党（Alternative for Germany，AfD）的民众支持率为15%，而一年前只有5%。


Can this dangerous trend be reversed?	这一危险趋势能被扭转吗？


The AfD’s rise since last summer has been the direct result of the surge in the number of refugees – close to one million in 2015 – entering Germany.	AfD自去年夏天以来的崛起是难民融入数字激增的直接后果。 2015年有近一百万难民进入德国。


After all, the party has made opposition to admitting refugees the centerpiece of its platform, which also includes antagonism toward the European Union and a very conservative social program, to which an openly sectarian religious component was added at a May 3 party convention in Stuttgart.	毕竟，AfD的核心观点就是反对接受难民，其所持的其他立场包括反对欧盟和极为保守的社会计划，在5月3日斯图加特党代会上，又加上了公开的宗派宗教元素。


Yet Germany’s broad political center continues to hold.	但德国泛政治中间派依然坚挺。


The center-right Christian Democrats and their allies still have the support of about 33% of the electorate; the center-left Social Democrats have 20% support; and the Green Party is backed by some 13%.	中右翼的基督教民主党（Christian Democrats）及其盟友仍在选举中赢得33%的支持率； 中左翼的社会民主党（Social Democrats）拥有20%支持率；


Even the Free Democrats have clawed their way back from hard times, and now have about 6% support.	绿党则受到13%的支持。 就连自由民主党（Free Democrats）也从颓势中有所恢复，目前有6%的人支持。


In short, moderate political forces still enjoy the support of more than 70% of Germans – in contrast with, say, Austria, where the far right was able to gain 36% in the first round of presidential elections.	简言之，温和政治力量仍然受到70%以上的德国人的支持——这与（比如）奥地利形成了鲜明对比，后者的极右翼在第一轮总统选举中获得了36%的支持。


Even Germany’s Left Party, which has 8% support and is not traditionally defined as moderate, has a more moderate “eastern” wing and a more radical “western” wing.	就连德国的左翼党（Left Party，拥有8%支持率，并且在传统上不属于温和派）内部也存在一个较温和的“东”翼和一较激进的“西”翼。


The enduring strength of Germany’s political center probably reflects the country’s remarkable economic success, which it has sustained for more than a decade, even as most of the rest of Europe has faced serious challenges.	德国政治中间派的持续强势也许反映了德国经济的巨大成功，这一成功已经维持了十多年，即使在欧洲其他国家面临严重挑战时也没有受到多大影响。


It owes this outcome partly to the euro, which has benefited German exports and growth far more than most of its citizens realize.	这部分要归功于欧元，欧元给德国出口和增长所带来的好处要远大于大部分德国公民的认识。


If Germany still had – or had reverted to – the Deutschmark, employment and growth would have been hampered by a much stronger currency, on a trade-weighted basis, in the wake of the global economic crisis.	如果德国仍使用——或回归——德国马克，那么在全球经济危机爆发后，德国的就业和增长就会因为贸易加权汇率更高的货币而受到冲击。


More fundamentally, Germany has benefited from the extraordinary culture of consensus that it developed in the post-World War II period, with social partners and political parties showing a remarkable ability to compromise.	更基本的是，德国因为二战后时代所形成的杰出的共识文化而获益，社会伙伴和政治党派表现出令人瞩目的妥协力。


A fairly wide territorial distribution of economic activity, together with strong local governments and civil-society organizations, has contributed further to a general sense of contentment – a sense that is absent in much of the world nowadays.	经济活动的相当广泛的地域分布，加上强势地方政府和公民社会组织，进一步总体满意度——而在当今世界大部分地区都缺乏这种感觉。


Now, however, as the refugee crisis fuels populism and political polarization, the foundations of Germany’s success appear to be under threat.	但是，如今，随着难民危机点燃了民粹主义和政治极化，德国成功的基础似乎受到了威胁。


Indeed, Germany’s future could play out in two ways.	事实上，德国的未来可能有两条路。


The world has a large stake in which scenario prevails.	哪条道路成为现实对世界都有很大影响。


The first scenario is bleak: Germany fails to integrate the refugees socially and economically, political discontent surges, and the newcomers become increasingly frustrated with their plight.	第一个情景是悲观的：德国无法从社会和经济上融合难民，政治不满情绪飙升，新来者因为所受到的困境日益沮丧。


Any steps they take to vent that frustration embolden right-wing populists and could lead to violence from both sides.	他们表达沮丧的任何动作都会煽动极右翼民粹派，可能导致双方的暴力。


If, in the worst case, a terrorist attack were to occur – especially one that could, in some way, be linked to refugees – the nationalist-populist reaction would be powerful, potentially weakening the very fabric of German society.	在最糟糕的情况下，如果发生恐怖袭击——特别是以某种方式与难民联系起来的恐怖袭击——那么民族主义-民粹主义反应将十分强大，可能削弱德国社会的基础。


Anti-Muslim elements of that reaction would become fodder for religious extremists in the Middle East, by seeming to confirm their narrative of inevitable religious and civilizational conflict.	这一反应的反穆斯林要素将成为中东宗教极端分子的“燃料”，因为这似乎确认了他们关于宗教和文明冲突不可避免的叙事。


The second scenario turns the refugee challenge into another success.	第二个倾向是难民挑战转化为新的成功。


Integration of the refugees proceeds reasonably quickly, and Germany resumes its path of moderate politics, social solidarity, and economic growth.	难民的融合进行的相当迅速，德国回到温和政治、社会团结和经济增长的老路。


In the long term, the refugees could actually make a strong contribution to German prosperity.	在长期，难民其实可以为德国的繁荣带来重要贡献。


Despite the AfD’s rise, there is plenty of reason to remain optimistic.	尽管AfD崛起，但仍有充足的理由保持乐观。


Late last year, thousands of Germans gathered at train stations and on the streets to welcome the first groups of refugees as they arrived.	去年年底，成千上万德国人聚集在火车站和街头欢迎首批难民的到来。


Throughout much of the country, local communities have mobilized to provide housing, language training, and social guidance for refugees, who have never experienced anything like a wealthy democratic society.	在德国大部分地区，地方社区动员起来为从未体验过富裕民主社会的难民提供住宿、语言培训和社会指导。


Tens of thousands of teenage students are acting as “facilitating partners” to their refugee classmates who don’t speak German, many of whom arrived in the country without their parents.	数万十来岁的学生充当不说德语的难民同学（其中有许多离开父母只身来到德国）的“促进伙伴”。


Whether this approach will endure, and bring about successful integration, will depend on both the Germans and the refugees.	这一方针能否持续下去并实现成功的融合取决于德国人，也取决于难民。


The refugees will have to accept the rule of German law, even if in some cases it does not make sense to them.	难民必须接受德国的法治规则，即使在某些情况下他们并不认同。


Both the new arrivals and German residents will need to balance respect for diversity in lifestyles with the understanding that, in a secular democracy, the same laws apply to everyone.	新来者和德国居民都需要在尊重生活方式的多样性和理解世俗民主社会法律面前人人平等之间取得平衡。


Those laws must protect private religious and cultural space for all, without allowing that space to be used as an excuse for infringing on the basic human and democratic rights of every individual.	这些法律必须保护所有人的个人宗教和文化空间，决不允许这一空间被利用为破坏任何人的基本人权和民主权利的借口。


The large existing community of former immigrants could be helpful in articulating and implementing that delicate balance, imperfect as it may have been at times.	现有前移民组成的大型社区可以有助于阐明和实现这一脆弱的平衡，尽管有时候这一平衡并不完美。


The successful integration of the refugees will also depend on economic growth.	难民的成功融合也将取决于经济增长。


Indeed, this amounts to one more argument for Germany to use its fiscal space to increase investment and implement growth-enhancing policies.	事实上，这构成了德国动用其财政空间增加投资、实施促增长政策的又一个理由。


While the demographic inflow could become a large net benefit for Germany in the long run, it remains a burden in the short term.	尽管从长期看，人口流入可以为德国带来净利益，但在短期仍是一个负担。


That is why there is also a need for some burden-sharing by European countries, as well as efforts to achieve a marked slowdown in the refugee flow, while upholding the human rights of those fleeing conflict and death.	因此，还需要欧洲诸国共同承担一些责任，并采取措施大幅延缓难民流，同时保护这些逃离冲突和死亡的人的人权。


If Germany can integrate the refugees, it will send a powerful message to nihilists and extremists everywhere.	如果德国能够融合难民，将给世界各地的虚无主义者和极端分子带来一个强烈的信号。


It would show that, with a strong economy, active civil society, and the rule of secular law, religious differences, cultural tensions, and labor-market challenges can be overcome.	这将证明，在强大的经济、活跃的公民社会和法治精神下，宗教差异、文化对立和劳动力市场挑战是可以克服的。


This is a message that the world needs now more than ever.	眼下，世界无比需要这样一个信号。


Refugees and Reform in Europe	欧洲的难民和改革


LAGUNA BEACH – There is a simple truth beneath the growing human tragedy of Europe’s refugee crisis, and the European Union cannot address the massive influx of exhausted, desperate people in a manner compatible with its values unless governments and citizens acknowledge it.	拉古娜海滩—在欧洲难民危机这场日益严重的人道悲剧背后有一个简单的事实，而除非欧盟政府和公民承认这个事实，否则欧盟就无法以合乎其价值观的方法解决疲惫绝望的难民人群的涌入问题。


Simply put, the historic challenge confronting Europe also offers historic opportunities.	简单说，欧洲所面临的历史性挑战同样也是历史性机会。


The question is whether Europe’s politicians – who have failed to deliver on far less complicated issues over which they had a lot more control – can seize the moment.	问题在于欧洲的政客们能否抓住这一时机。 曾经有一些远比难民危机简单的问题，欧洲政客们对这些问题的控制力也要强得多，但他们并没有解决好这些问题。


The scale of the challenge is immense, with the flow of refugees extremely difficult to monitor and channel, let alone limit.	挑战的规模是巨大的，难民流极难监控和引导，更不用说限制了。


Fleeing war and oppression, tens of thousands of people are risking life and limb to find refuge in Europe – a phenomenon that will continue as long as chaos persists in countries of origin, such as Syria, and countries facilitating transit, such as Iraq and Libya.	数以万计的人们为了逃脱战争和压迫，冒着生命危险来到欧洲寻求避难——只要难民来源国（如叙利亚）和中转国（如伊拉克和利比亚）的乱局持续，这一现象也将持续下去。


In the meantime, Europe’s transport networks are under stress, as are shelters, border crossings, and registration centers.	与此同时，欧洲的交通网络正在承压，收容所、边防站和注册中心亦然。


Common asylum policies – including, for example, the basic rule that asylum-seekers should be registered at their point of entry into the EU – are not functioning or are being bypassed.	共同避难政策——包括（比如）寻求避难者应在进入欧盟的地点注册等基本规则——无从实施或被规避。


And the cherished concept of effortless travel within the border-free Schengen Area is under threat.	而欧盟引以为豪的申根地区无障碍跨境旅行的概念也遭到了威胁。


These problems are aggravated by coordination failures.	这些问题因为协调失灵而雪上加霜。


Attitudes toward refugees vary widely across countries, with Germany taking a particularly enlightened approach that contrasts sharply with Hungary’s notably heartless one.	各国对待难民的态度大相径庭，德国采取了特别开明的态度，与匈牙利高高挂起的态度形成了鲜明对比。


Some countries, such as the Czech Republic, have blocked deals to share the burden fairly among European Union members, including through mandatory quotas.	捷克等国家拒绝接受在欧盟成员国之间公平分担难民负担（包括通过强制配额实现）的协议。


Add to that the preferences of the refugees – who, after risking everything to get to Europe, have strong feelings about where they would like to settle – and the policy challenges are enormous, particularly in the short run.	除此之外还有难民的偏好问题——他们在历尽千辛万苦到达欧洲后，有各自强烈认定的目的地——而政策挑战也十分艰巨，短期尤其如此。


European politicians have yet to catch up with the reality on the ground, let alone get ahead of it.	欧洲政客尚未充分抓住现实，更不用说未雨绸缪了。


And their failure is exacerbating the risks to the EU’s political cohesion that emerged over the Greek crisis.	他们的失策进一步加深了因希腊危机而显现的欧洲政治凝聚力风险。


Politicians have a powerful incentive to get Europe’s response to the refugee crisis right.	政客们有强烈的激励让欧洲正确应对难民危机。


Beyond the need to alleviate the human misery that fills television screens and front pages of newspapers lies the imperative not to miss the significant medium-term opportunities that migration provides.	除了需要缓和充斥着荧屏和报纸头条的人道灾难，更重要的任务是不能错失这一大移民带来的巨大的中期机会。


Although there are pockets of high unemployment in Europe today, the ratio of workers to elderly people will decline considerably in the longer term.	尽管如今欧洲失业现象严重，但在长期，工人与老龄人口之比将大幅下降。


And, already, labor-market flexibility has been undermined by structural inertia, including difficulties in retooling and retraining workers, particularly the long-term unemployed.	劳动力市场灵活性已经因为结构惯性（包括重新组织和培训员工尤其是长期失业员工方面的困难）而大受影响。


As the German government and some corporate leaders, including the CEO of Daimler-Benz, have already recognized, an open-minded approach to refugee absorption and integration can help to mitigate some of Europe’s protracted structural problems.	德国政府和一些企业高管（包括戴姆勒-奔驰公司CEO）已经认识到，采取开放态度吸收和融合难民能够有助于减轻一些欧洲的结构性顽疾。


After all, a significant proportion of the incoming refugee population is said to be educated, motivated, and committed to building a better future in their new homes.	毕竟，据说即将到来的难民人口中有很大一部分受过教育，态度积极，有志于在新家园创造更好的未来。


Capitalizing on this, European decision-makers can turn a severe short-term challenge into a powerful long-term advantage.	利用这一点，欧洲决策者可以将严峻的短期挑战转化为巨大的长期优势。


An enlightened policy response to the refugee crisis could help Europe in other ways as well.	对难民危机采取开明政策应对措施还可能在其他方面助欧洲一臂之力。


Already, it is unlocking additional fiscal outlays in countries like Germany – which, despite having the means, did not previously have the will to spend – thereby helping to alleviate an aggregate-demand imbalance that, together with structural impediments to growth and excessive indebtedness in some countries, has held back the region’s recovery.	难民刺激了德国等国家的财政支出——此前这些国家尽管可以刺激支出，但不愿这样做——从而有助于缓和总需求失衡，而总需求失衡与增长的结构性障碍以及一些国家的过度负债阻碍了欧洲的复苏。


The current situation could also provide the catalyst needed to make decisive progress on the EU’s incomplete political, institutional, and financial architecture.	现状还能够提供必要的催化剂，促使欧洲不完整的政治、机构和金融结构取得决定性进展。


And it could compel Europe to overcome the political obstacles blocking solutions to longstanding problems, such as providing the cover needed for certain European creditors to grant deeper debt relief for Greece, whose already-massive fiscal and employment problems are being exacerbated by the influx of refugees.	现状可以迫使欧洲克服阻碍解决长期问题的政治障碍，如为某些欧洲债权人提供必要的保证从而为希腊争取更多的债务纾困。 希腊本已��分严重的财政和就业问题因为难民潮而进一步加剧。


It can even drive Europe to modernize its governance framework, which allows a few small countries to derail decisions supported by the vast majority of EU members.	现状甚至可能推动欧洲实现治理框架现代化，现有治理结构让一些小国能够破坏巨大多数欧盟成员国所支持的决定。


Pessimists would immediately point out that Europe has struggled to come together even on far less complex and more controllable issues, such as the protracted economic and financial crisis in Greece.	悲观派马上会说，欧洲在复杂程度更低、可控性更高的问题上都难以形成一致，如持续的希腊经济和金融危机问题。


Yet history also suggests that shocks of the scale and scope of the current refugee crisis have the potential to spur remarkable policy responses.	但历史也表明，当前难民危机的规模与范围有可能刺激重大政策应对措施。


Europe has the opportunity to turn today’s refugee crisis into a catalyst for renewal and progress.	欧洲有机会将今天的难民危机转变为复兴和进步的催化剂。


Let us hope that its politicians stop bickering and start working together to take advantage of this opening.	希望欧洲政客停止争吵，开始共同致力于利用这个机会。


If they fail, the momentum behind regional integration – which has brought peace, prosperity, and hope to hundreds of millions of people – will weaken considerably, to the detriment of all.	如果他们失败，地区一体化背后的动力——它曾经为数亿人带来和平、繁荣与希望——将大大受挫，损害的将是所有人的利益。


The Agony and the Exodus	痛苦与逃离


BRUSSELS – The tragic exodus of people from war-torn Syria and surrounding countries challenges the world’s reason and sympathy.	布鲁塞尔—大量人群从饱受战争摧残的叙利亚及其周边国家出逃，这出悲剧的正在挑战全世界的理性和同情。


Since 2011, some four million people have fled Syria, with millions more internally displaced.	2011年以来，大约四百万人逃离叙利亚，更有数百万人在叙利亚国内流离失所。


Syria’s neighbors – Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey – currently house the vast majority of the externally displaced.	叙利亚的邻国——约旦、黎巴嫩和土耳其——目前收留了绝大多数出逃的叙利亚人。


But, as the crisis has progressed, hundreds of thousands of refugees have headed toward Europe, with most taking the extremely dangerous marine route.	但是，随着危机的推进，数十万难民已经涌向欧洲，其中大部分采取的是极度危险的海路。


The nature and scale of this exodus have rendered all previous legal and political assumptions about migration obsolete.	出逃的性质和规模让此前一切关于移民的法律和政治假设显得苍白无力。


In the past, the chief motive for migration was economic.	在过去，移民的主要动机是经济。


The debate to which economic migration gave rise was between liberals, who upheld the principle of the free movement of labor, and those who wanted restrictions on movement among countries in order to protect jobs, culture, and/or political cohesion.	关于经济移民带来什么的争论分成两派，一边是坚持劳动力自由移动原则的自由派，另一边则希望限制跨国流动以保护就业、文化以及/或者政治凝聚力。


As the world filled up with nation-states, and empty spaces filled up with people, restriction triumphed over free movement.	世界由民族国家组成，空白空间由人填满，因此限制战胜了自由流动。


Controls on immigration became widespread after World War I. All countries developed population policies.	对移民的控制在一战后变得日益普遍。 所有国家都制定了人口政策。


But there has always been another, much smaller, group of asylum-seekers – those individuals forced to flee their home countries by persecution, often on religious or ethnic grounds.	但永远有作为人数小得多的他者的寻求避难人群——这些个体因为迫害（通常是宗教和宗族迫害）而被迫逃离祖国。


The 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees recognized a right of asylum for those unable to return to their country of origin owing to a “well founded” fear of persecution.	1951年《联合国难民公约》承认由于“理由充分”地担心迫害而无法回归祖国的人拥有避难权。


In practice, however, it has never been simple to distinguish between economic and political migrants, because political persecution usually includes economic restrictions.	但是，在实践中，你无法简单地分别经济和政治移民，因为政治迫害常常包含经济限制。


The Jews fleeing pogroms in Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, or Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, were both economic and political migrants.	犹太人在十九世纪末大量逃离东欧和20世纪30年代逃离希特勒的德国，他们既是经济移民，也是政治移民。


So were the East African Asians forced out of Uganda in the 1960s.	20世纪60年代东非亚洲人被迫离开乌干达也是如此。


But the number of those identified as political refugees with a right of asylum was much smaller than those whose chief motive was to improve their economic lot.	但被承认为政治难民，从而拥有避难权的人数远少于那些主要动机是为了改善经济状况的人。


This reflected the relatively settled political conditions of the world of the 1950s.	这反映出20世纪50年代相对固定的世界政治环境。


Back then, the countries from which refugees are now escaping were under colonial or quasi-colonial rule, while homegrown dictatorships then emerged to preserve order in the old empires’ successor states.	当时，如今难民正在纷纷逃离的国家还处于殖民地或半殖民地状态，后来，土生土长的独裁者出现了，以保证作为旧帝国走后的新国家的秩序。


It was the collapse of these brutal systems in the wake of the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring of 2011 that created the current refugee crisis.	2003年美国领导的入侵伊拉克战争和2011年阿拉伯之春让这些暴政政权纷纷崩溃，造成了目前的难民危机。


The refugees’ flight from Syria and other war-ravaged countries comes up against legal regimes that are poorly adapted to cope with it.	逃离叙利亚和其他战乱国的难民遇到了难以应对这一局面的法律制度。


The European Union severely restricts labor from non-member countries, but allows free movement of labor within its single market.	欧盟严格限制来自非成员国的劳动力，但允许其单一市场内部的劳动力自由流动。


This is justified by the fiction that the citizens of EU countries are members of a single polity.	其背后的理由是欧洲国家的公民都是同一个政体的成员。


The right of Greeks to work in Germany is no different from that of Parisians to work in Marseilles.	希腊人在德国的工作权利与巴黎人在马赛的工作权利没有区别。


But the EU is an incomplete state – one that may never be completed.	但欧盟是一个不完整的“国家”——也许永远无法完整。


An obvious indicator of this is that it lacks a fiscal-transfer mechanism to reduce the pressure of emigration from poor to rich areas.	关于这一点，一个显而易见的现象是欧盟缺少一个财政转移支付机制以减小从贫穷地区向富裕地区的移民。


In the absence of this, it is assumed that free economic migration within the EU will produce little net movement of populations.	在没有这个转移机制的情况下，欧盟假设其内部的自由经济移民不会带来多少人口的净流动。


The implicit model is that of the “guest worker” who comes and goes; in practice, a sizeable share of economic migrants from poorer parts of Europe stay in their country of destination, fueling an increase in support for anti-immigrant parties.	其隐含的模型是来来往往的“外来务工人员”模型； 实际上，来自欧洲较贫困地区的经济移民中有很大一部分留在了移民目的地，这助长了反移民政党的支持度。


The asylum system is totally unprepared to deal with the new generation of refugees, who are ineligible under the existing framework, because they are fleeing not from specific acts of persecution, but from the disintegration of their states.	避难制度完全没有做好准备以应对新一代难民。 根据当前框架，新一代移民没有资格避难，因为他们不是为了逃脱具体的压迫型为，而是因为祖国分崩离析而成为难民。


They can be provided “humanitarian protection” or be granted “discretionary leave to remain” for a short period; but then they can be deported as illegal immigrants.	他们可以获得“人道主义保护”或授予短期“自由裁量去留权”； 但不能作为非法移民被驱逐。


So what is to be done?	那么应该怎么做？


Temporary residence status, in Europe or outside, would be reasonable if a rapid return to normalcy in the refugees’ countries of origin was a realistic prospect.	给予暂时定居权，不管是在欧洲内还是外，是合理的，如果很快难民来源国回归常态的前景现实的话。


In Syria, for example, it is not: Although politicians and commentators talk about stemming the flood at the source, no peace plan is in sight.	比如，叙利亚就不是这样：尽管政客和评论家大谈要釜底抽薪，但却找不到任何和平计划。


The US and Russia back different sides.	美国和俄罗斯支持不同的派别。


The West cannot accept the possibility that the Assad dictatorship, however brutal, may be the least bad option on offer.	西方无法接受巴沙尔·阿萨德的独裁是最不坏的选择（无论其多么残酷）。


So the civil war will continue, the number of refugees in transit camps will increase, and more of them will risk their lives to enter leaky Fortress Europe.	因此内战还将继续，临时难民营的数量还会上升，有更多的人会冒着生命危险进入漏洞百出的欧洲堡垒。


Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, has proposed distributing 160,000 of the refugees currently in Europe across the EU’s 28 member states.	欧盟委员会主席容克提出将目前身在欧洲的160,000难民分配给28个欧盟成员国。


Germany is prepared to take far more.	德国准备接收更多的难民。


Indeed, Chancellor Angela Merkel has bravely asserted “the fundamental right to asylum for the politically persecuted with no upper limit; and that goes for refugees who come to us from the hell of civil war.”	事实上，德国总理默克尔勇敢地提出“受政治迫害者的避难的基本权利没有上限； 从内战地狱中来到我们中间的难民亦然。


But other European leaders, faced with the rise of extremist, anti-immigrant parties, have not endorsed Merkel’s view; and the refugees still have to get to Germany through countries like Hungary, which are erecting walls and other border defenses to keep them out.	”但其他欧洲领导人在反移民极端政党崛起的背景下并没有响应默克尔的观点； 难民人需要途经匈牙利等国家才能到达德国，而这些国家正在建设高墙和其他边境防卫装置阻止他们进入。


The truth is that the West cannot or will not absorb refugees in the numbers needed; and it has no solution to the problem of failed states.	真相是西方无法或不愿接收需要其接收的数量的难民； 失败之国的问题也找不到解决方案。


This means that, apart from doling out humanitarian aid to those in refugee camps, it has no policy.	这意味着，除了给难民营发放人道主义援助之外再无其他政策。


Unless and until that changes, the tragedy can only deepen.	除非改变这一局面，否则悲剧还会进一步深化。


The Limits of the German Promised Land	德国乐土的极限


MUNICH – Migrants seeking to escape poverty and war are flowing into Europe by the hundreds of thousands.	慕尼黑—寻求摆脱贫困和战乱的移民正在以数十万计涌入欧洲。


They are still mostly being welcomed, but the capacity of the reception centers is fast reaching its limits.	他们大部分仍受到了欢迎，但接待中心的能力正在迅速到达极限。


To staunch the flow of migrants over the Balkan route, Hungary has imposed controls on its borders – and was promptly followed by Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Poland.	为了阻止巴尔干通道上的移民流，匈牙利开始在边界进行管制——德国、奥地利、斯洛伐克、克罗地亚、斯洛文尼亚、捷克、荷兰和波兰也迅速跟进。


Germany is the migrants’ most favored destination.	德国是移民最爱的目的地。


So far this year, half of all asylum applications in the European Union have been filed there, although the country accounts for only 16% of the EU’s population.	今年截至目前，欧盟所有闭户申请中有一半是在德国填写的，尽管德国人口只占欧洲人口的16%。


By September, Germany had probably received some 400,000 applications or more, with the dramatic increase in migration flows since summer and before the reinstatement of border controls expected to push the number of asylum-seekers to 800,000 this year.	截至9月，德国可能已经接受了400,000或以上申请，而夏季以来、边境管制恢复以前移民数量的剧增预计将让今年寻求庇护人数提高到800,000。


Moreover, regular immigration to Germany could again reach the 400,000 mark, as in 2014.	此外，以德国为目标的正常移民也可能再次达到400,000，与2014年齐平。


The total would represent net immigration of 1.5% of the resident population – an extremely high proportion by historical and international standards.	两项合计，净移民总人数可能达到定居人口的1. 5%——从历史和国际标准看，这是个极高的比例。


The reason for the migrants’ strong preference for Germany is that the country, together with Sweden, has Europe’s most liberal asylum system and allocates particularly high levels of funding to accommodate the newcomers.	移民强烈偏好德国的原因是德国与瑞典的庇护制度为欧洲最自由的，分配给安置新来者的资金数量也非常大。


Between €1,000 ($1,120) and €1,200 per person per month is being transferred to the municipalities to cover the costs of accommodating them.	目前，各市正在获得每人每月1,000到1,200欧元的安置移民补贴。


The value of the benefits that the immigrants receive in Germany is a multiple of the wages they can earn in their home countries (if they manage to find a job there at all).	移民从德国获得的福利价值是他们在祖国所挣工资的数倍之多（如果他们找得到工作的话）。


The Dublin Regulation, according to which the first EU country that a migrant reaches is obliged to register and process the migrant’s application, has long been disregarded.	根据《都柏林公约》（Dublin Regulation），移民所抵达的第一个欧盟国家有义务注册并处理移民的申请。 这一规定早已名存实亡。


Greece and Italy are simply waving the refugees on.	希腊和意大利对移民无动于衷。


Germany accepted, with much fanfare, a large number of unregistered refugees from Hungary and offered them a warm welcome.	德国接受了大量来自匈牙利的未注册难民，并给予热忱的欢迎。


This decision arguably tempted so many more refugees from the Arab countries that soon thereafter Germany was forced to impose border controls.	大概是这一决定诱使更多来自阿拉伯国家的难民涌入而德国，很快就导致德国被迫开始边境管制。


What the German government had not reckoned with is that every refugee who manages to make it to Germany immediately texts the good news back to the home country, fueling a fresh wave of migrants.	德国政府未料到的是每一个成功抵达德国的难民都迫不及待地将好消息回报给祖国，促使新一波移民的到来。


The UN refugee camps in the countries surrounding Syria are thus being gradually relocated to Germany.	叙利亚周边国家的联合国难民营也因此逐渐“迁移”到了德国。


Only a fraction of asylum-seekers’ applications are ultimately approved, because most applicants are not politically persecuted but simply economic migrants.	只有一小部分寻求庇护者的申请最终会被批准，因为大部分申请者并未受到政治迫害，他们纯粹是经济移民。


In the first half of 2015, for instance, only about one-quarter of applicants came from Syria and Iraq, a significant proportion of whom had already found shelter in the UN camps in or around those countries.	比如，2015年上半年，只有四分之一的申请者来自叙利亚和伊拉克，很大一部分人已经在这些国家内部或周边找到了收容所。


But the proportion of Syrian refugees subsequently ballooned quickly, in part because the news spread that Germany approves most Syrian applications.	但叙利亚难民占比随后快速膨胀，部分是因为有传播开来的消息称德国批准了大部分叙利亚申请。


If an application is successful, a refugee has the right to bring along his or her family members as well.	如果申请成功，难民有权携带家人。


Frequently, Arab families send their minors to Germany in the not-unjustified hope that they will obtain the right for other family members to follow later.	阿拉伯家庭将未成年家庭成员送往德国，不无道理地希望他们能为其他家庭成员赢得随后跟进的权利。


Germany will have to deal with the consequences of this refugee wave for years to come.	在未来数年中，德国都必须应对这一难民潮的后果。


In order to distribute the burden more equitably, Germany tried to have a European quota system instituted to allocate applicants among the EU’s member countries.	为了更平等地分担负担，德国尝试建立一个欧洲配额制度，在欧盟成员国之间分配避难申请。


But Germany’s EU partners rejected this as “moral imperialism.”	但德国的欧洲伙伴国拒绝了，称之为“道德帝国主义”。


Germany thus failed to have a system adopted that would have provided it with some relief.	因此，德国无法采取能让它有所喘息的制度。


Instead, a quickly convened summit has now agreed on a limited quota system that will cover barely 120,000 people, aimed at providing relief to Hungary, Italy, and Greece; it will bring a further 31,000 refugees to Germany.	相反，如今一个匆匆召开的峰会同意了一个只能覆盖120,000人的配额制度，目的是为了给匈牙利、意大利和希腊提供喘息机会； 这个制度将给德国增加31,000难民。


In order to avert chaos, Germany has no choice but to impose restrictions.	为了防止混乱，德国别无选择，只能加以限制。


Among the most urgently needed steps is to develop the capacity to distinguish quickly – and ideally at the border – between refugees (who face political persecution) and economic migrants.	最紧迫需要的措施包括建设迅速区分——最好在边境就实现——难民（面临政治迫害）和经济移民的能力。


Germany’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees could set up border outposts to clear baseless asylum claims and send the rejected applicants, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, back to the first safe country they reached.	德国联邦移民和难民办公室（Federal Office for Migration and Refugees）可以设置边防站清理无依据的庇护主张，根据都柏林公约遣返被拒申请者至他们所抵达的首个安全国家。


This would allow Germany to concentrate on the task at hand: providing those granted refugee status the schooling and language lessons they will need to allow them to find employment as quickly as possible.	这能让德国集中精力于当前的任务：为获得难民身份者提供所需的教育和语言课程，以使他们尽快找到工作。


Connectivity and the Modern Refugee	连通性和现代难民


GENEVA – They were fresh off the boat, the group of refugees I met this time last year.	日内瓦—他们刚从船上下来——他们是我在去年遇到的一群难民。


They had fled their homes in Syria, traveled halfway across Turkey, and placed their lives in the hands of a gang of people smugglers promising to get them to Europe.	他们离开叙利亚的家园，途经土耳其，将身家性命托付给承诺将他们带到欧洲的黑帮人贩子。


Despite all that they had endured, one of them told me, upon landing on the Greek island of Lesbos, that they had panicked only once during that perilous voyage: when their mobile phone signal disappeared.	其中一位难民告诉我，尽管在登陆希腊莱兹伯斯岛（Lesbos）的过程中经历了千辛万苦，但在整个艰难的旅程中，他们只有一次感到恐慌：当他们的手机没有信号的时候。


That signal, however weak, had been the refugees’ only link to the outside world.	手机信号，不管它多么微弱，是难民与外部世界的唯一联系。


When it vanished – when they truly had no way to contact family, friends, or anyone who could help them – they were gripped by a sense of isolation and fear more intense than they had ever experienced.	当信号消失时——当他们真的没有任何办法与家人、朋友和任何能够帮助他们的人取得联系时——他们就陷入了一种从未体验过的剧烈的孤立和恐惧感。


It is a feeling no one should have to endure ever again.	这种感觉任何人都不想经历第二次。


For most people in the industrialized world – and everyone at this year’s World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos – connectivity is a fact of life.	对工业化世界的大部分人来说——以及出席今年世界经济论坛达沃斯年会的各位要人来说——连通性是生活中的既成事实。


We have mobile phones, tablets, and computers, all linked to superfast – and accelerating – broadband networks.	我们有手机、平板电脑和计算机，都能脸上超快——并且还在不断提速——的宽带网络。


Add to that an ever-increasing number of social-media platforms, and we are always in contact with one another.	此外还有数量不断增加的社交媒体平台，我们总能彼此取得联系。


Information flows so freely and relentlessly, in fact, that we tend to worry more about overload than scarcity.	事实上，信息流是如此自由和无孔不入，我们更担心过载而不是稀缺。


For refugees, life is very different.	对难民来说，生活与此天差地别。


Globally, refugees are 50% less likely than the general population to have an Internet-enabled phone, and 29% of refugee households have no phone at all.	全球而言，难民获得能上网的手机的机会比总体人口低50%，29%的难民家庭一部手机都没有。


Though 90% of refugees located in urban environments live in places with 2G or 3G coverage, about a fifth of those living in rural areas have no connectivity at all.	尽管90%的落脚于城市的难民生活在2G和3G信号覆盖地区，但五分之一生活在农村地区的难民无法接入任何网络。


This is a big deal.	这是一件大事。


For refugees, connectivity is not a luxury, but a lifeline – one that has become all the more important at a time when sentiment in many host countries is turning against them (even as plenty of grassroots movements and communities remain eager to help).	对难民来说，连通性不是奢侈品，而是生命线——在许多东道国民情对他们不利的时候（尽管很多草根组织和社区仍然渴望提供帮助），连通性更是无比重要。


In some cases, technology can do what hostile politicians and reluctant governments will not: give refugees a chance to rebuild their lives.	在一些案例中，技术可以完成敌意政客和不愿采取行动的政府所无法做到的事情：给予难民重塑生活的机会。


Connectivity means, at the most fundamental level, being able to remain in contact with family members left behind, some of whom may still be at risk of violence or persecution.	在最根本的层面，连通性意味着能够与留在后方的家庭成员保持联系，其中一些可能仍然暴露在暴力和迫害的风险下。


Connectivity also provides access to important and up-to-date information about new threats, such as disease outbreaks or the spread of conflict, or the availability of necessities like food and water, clothing, shelter, and health care.	连通性还能让难民获得关于新威胁（如疾病爆发或冲突蔓延）或必需品（如食品和水、衣物、居所和医疗服务）的重要的最新信息。


In the longer term, connectivity can support online education and training that equips refugees for the workforce.	从长期看，连通性能支持在线教育和培训，从而让难民具备工作技能。


It can help them find employment, and link them with legal or other crucial services.	连通性帮助他们找工作，帮助他们获得法律和其他重要服务。


And it can enable them to communicate more easily with organizations like the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), telling us what they need most, what we’re getting right, and where we need to make changes.	连通性让他们能够更加容易地与联合国难民署等组织取得联系，告诉我们他们最需要什么，我们哪些地方做得对，哪些地方需要做出改变。


In a world of unlimited data, there is little stopping us from providing refugees with this lifesaving connectivity.	在数据无极限的时代，没有什么能阻止我们为难民提供有救命作用的连通性。


If we are smart about how we design digital aid systems, we will have the opportunity to broaden our partnerships to hundreds, if not thousands, of organizations worldwide that are willing to help refugees.	如果我们明智地设计数字援助系统，就能有机会将合作范围扩大到全球数百乃至数千个愿意帮助难民的组织。


Realizing this potential requires overcoming two key challenges.	实现这一潜力需要克服两个关键挑战。


First, we must figure out how to improve connectivity for refugees today.	首先，我们必须找出如何改善今天的难民的连通性。


Second, we must position ourselves to use technology more effectively tomorrow.	其次，我们必须给自己定位，以便在未来更有效地使用技术。


Overcoming these challenges will require, first and foremost, that governments improve access, including by investing in the necessary digital infrastructure.	克服这些挑战首先需要政府改善可接入性，包括通过投资于必要的数字基础设施。


It will also require contributions from the private sector, particularly telecommunications providers, which can lend their technological expertise, global reach, and spending power to help ensure access to affordable phones and computers, inexpensive data plans, and training in digital literacy.	这也需要来自私人部门的力量，特别是通信服务供应商，它们能凭借技术专业知识、全球覆盖和财力帮助确保平价手机和计算机、廉价数据计划和数字知识培训的普及。


Success on these fronts will require using microwave links, satellite dishes, unused television spectrum, drones, and balloons to improve wireless Internet access and capabilities in locations containing many refugees.	在这些方面取得成功需要使用微波链、卫星接收器、全新电视频段、无人机和气球来改善无线互联网接入和接收大量难民的地区的接入能力。


Because the vast majority of today’s refugees are in developing countries, improved connectivity would carry far-reaching benefits for the host communities.	如今，绝大部分难民身处发展中国家，因此改善连通性将给东道国社区带来巨大的好处。


In 2014, my colleagues encountered a young Syrian man called Hany, who had fled the city of Homs with his family and found refuge in a camp in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley.	2014年，我的同事们偶遇一位名叫哈尼（Hany）的叙利亚年轻人，他与家人一起逃离霍姆斯，在黎巴嫩贝卡谷（Beka’a Valley）的一个难民营落脚。


A poet, rapper, and photographer, Hany was such a force of nature that it took my colleagues a while to realize he had a serious eye condition and could see only a few inches in front of his face.	哈尼是一位诗人、说唱歌手兼摄影师，他可谓天赋异禀，我的同事过了很长时间才意识到他有严重的眼疾，只能看见眼前几英寸的地方。


His mobile phone was utterly essential.	他的手机功能非常基本。


It enabled him to learn English, take his first photographs, and call for help when he needed it.	它使他能够学英语、拍出他的第一批照片、在需要的时候呼救。


That same phone rang one day with the news that the city of Regina, Canada, was to be his new home.	有一天，这部手机带来一则消息，加拿大雷吉纳（Regina）将是他的新家园。


As he put it, “my phone is my little world.”	他说，“我的手机就是我的小世界。 ”


For refugees like Hany, staying connected is not only a matter of survival; it also provides a route to self-reliance and independence, boosting their own wellbeing and enabling them to contribute to the communities that host them.	对哈尼这样的难民而言，保持连通不但事关生存； 也提供了通往自我恢复和独立之路，提高了他们自身的福利，也让他们能够为接收他们的社会贡献力量。


Last year, the World Economic Forum launched a program called Internet For All.	去年，世界经济论坛发起了一个称为“有网无类”（Internet For All）的计划。


We must ensure that “All” includes refugees.	我们必须确保“无类”中也包括难民。


Regime Change in the Arab World	阿拉伯世界的政权改变


Four years into a disastrous military adventure in Iraq and with the global war on terror against ill-defined forces of darkness still inconclusive, the collapse of America’s grand strategy has exposed how ill-conceived was its simplistic recipe for democratic change in the Arab world.	在伊拉克的军事冒险已经历时四年，针对概念模糊的黑暗势力的全球反恐战争依旧没有了结。 美国宏伟战略的崩溃表明，其在阿拉伯世界进行民主变革的简单化手段是如何地准备不良。


The paradox is that America might be winning the war for Arab democracy, even if by default, but cannot reap the benefits, simply because the emerging pattern of Islamic pluralistic politics does not coincide with the West’s brand of secular liberal democracy.	自相矛盾的是，即使兵不刃血，美国也可能正在赢得阿拉伯民主战争的胜利，但是它却无法获得益处，只是因为伊斯兰多元政治正在涌现的模式并不与西方世俗自由民主的模式向吻合。


The shift of the Arab world’s mainstream fundamentalist movements to democratic politics is tantamount to a repudiation of the jihadist project and of al-Qaeda’s apocalyptic strategies.	阿拉伯世界主流原教旨主义运动转向民主政治意味着拒绝圣战以及基地组织世界末日的战略。


The failure of jihadism is paving the way for a potentially promising restructuring of Islamic politics, but the West either doesn’t recognize the changes or is hostile to them.	圣战主义的失败正为伊斯兰政治中具有潜力的重组铺平道路，但是西方要么不承认变化，要么对此表现出敌意。


The rise of Islamists throughout the region as the sole power capable of exploiting the opportunities of free elections – Hamas’ victory in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood’s spectacular gains in the 2005 Egyptian elections are but the most noteworthy – the ascendancy to regional hegemony of Shiite Iran, and the sense among Arab rulers that the embattled Bush administration is running out of steam have all combined to stall the promising drive to political reform in the region.	最为显著的例子是哈马斯在巴勒斯坦大选中获胜，穆斯林兄弟会在2005年埃及的大选中出尽风头。 什叶派掌控的伊朗上升成为地区霸权，阿拉伯统治者们感觉到四面楚歌的布什政府正在山穷水尽。


The US retreated from its democratic designs once it realized that Arab democracy is not being identified with the liberal secular opposition, a political force that practically does not exist in the Arab world, but with Islamic radicals that are seek to repudiate America’s policies and the cause of reconciliation with Israel.	自由世俗反对派在中东实际上并不存在，而伊斯兰极端主义者却寻求反对美国的政策和与以色列和解的事业。


That this should be so has of course much to do with America’s traditional policy of sustaining the Arab world’s pro-Western dictators.	美国一旦发现阿拉伯民主并不与前者联系，而是与后者联系就从其民主规划中后退了。


But the notion that the genii of democratization can now be squeezed back into the bottle is a self-serving fantasy.	但是，民主化的魔鬼现在可以被压回到瓶子之中的想法是一个自我的幻觉而已。


The move of mainstream Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Hamas in Palestine, the Renaissance Party in Tunisia, or the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, away from jihadism to political participation started well before America’s democracy promotion campaign, and is not an attempt to please the West.	像埃及的穆斯林兄弟会、约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线、巴勒斯坦的哈马斯、突尼斯的复兴党或者摩洛哥的正义和发展党等主流伊斯兰主义者从圣战转向政治参与早在美国的民主促进运动之前就开始了，而且也不是为了取悦西方。


It is a genuine response to the needs and demands of their supporters.	它们是对支持者们的需求和要求的真切回应。


Extinguishing Arab democracy, as President Mubarak of Egypt is now trying to do through his recent ban on political parties that are based on religion, will bring neither stability nor peace to the Middle East.	埃及总统穆巴拉克最近取缔了宗教政党。 像这样消灭阿拉伯民主的做法不会给中东带来稳定或和平。


It will only exacerbate the rage of the masses at the West’s hypocrisy, now expressed in a form of democratic charlatanry.	这只会加剧群众对于西方伪善的仇恨，这种伪善现在用一种民主欺骗的形式表现出来。


The stability of those Arab regimes that are not sustained by a democratic consensus is bound to be fragile and misleading.	这些阿拉伯政权并不是靠民主共识来维系的，而其稳定必定是脆弱和误导的。


Just as Islamic democracy is the natural reaction to Arab secular autocracy and to the West’s collaboration with it, so will the destruction of political Islam usher in even more extreme options with movements like Hamas going back to social work and terror, and with al-Qaeda making inroads into Islamic societies.	正如伊斯兰民主是对阿拉伯世俗专制以及西方同谋的自然反应一样，政治伊斯兰的毁灭带来的是更为极端的选项，类似哈马斯那样的运动回到社会工作和恐怖之中，而基地组织则在伊斯兰社会中取得进展。


Both the West and the Arab rulers need to realize that the tense equation between the incumbent regimes and political Islam is not necessarily a zero-sum game.	西方和阿拉伯的统治者们都需要认识到，当权的政权和政治伊斯兰之间的紧张关系并非一定是零和游戏。 阿尔吉利亚总统布特弗利卡对此有深切的体会。


This has been learned the hard way by Algerian President Bouteflika who, through his Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation of February 2006, brought an end to a long and bloody civil war, the origins of which lay in the violent cancellation by the military of the Islamist Front’s (FIS) electoral victory in 1991.	他在2006年2月提出和平和民族和解宪章，结束了旷日持久的血腥内战。 这一内战由于1991年军队以暴力方式宣布伊斯兰阵线大选胜利无效而爆发。


It is in this context that the historic compromise between the religious (Hamas) and the secular (Fatah) to form a national unity government for Palestine might have established a new paradigm for the future of regime change in the Arab world.	正是在这一背景下，宗教的哈马斯和世俗的法塔赫之间历史性的妥协建立巴勒斯坦民族团结政府可能为阿拉伯世界政权更迭的未来建立了一个新的模式。


The concept of national unity governments might, indeed, be the formula that makes it possible to hold together the political families in the Arab world.	民族团结政府的概念可能确实是有可能让阿拉伯世界的政治家族团结在一起的方式。


King Muhammad VI of Morocco has already indicated that the Crown would consider a “historic compromise” with the Islamists should they, as predicted, win the elections in June 2007.	摩洛哥国王穆罕默德六世已经表明，如果伊斯兰主义者在2007年6月底大选中不出所料获得胜利，皇家将会考虑与其“历史性的妥协”。


Such compromises may be the only way to stem the slide to civil war, and possibly also co-opt the Islamists into a settlement with Israel and a rapprochement to the West.	这样的妥协可能是阻止滑向内战的唯一途径，也可能指派伊斯兰主义者与伊斯兰达成和解并且和西方建立友好关系。


Engaging political Islam will need to be the central part of any successful strategy for the Middle East.	与政治伊斯兰接触应当成为任何成功的中东战略的中心部分。


Instead of sticking to doomsday prophecies or to categorical perspectives that prevent an understanding of the complex fabric of Islamic movements, the West needs to keep the pressure on the incumbent regimes to stop circumventing political reform.	西方不应当坚持阻止理解伊斯兰运动复杂成分的世界末日的预言或者绝对性观点，而是需要继续对当前的政权施加压力来停止为了规避的目的而进行的政治改革。


As Algeria in the 1990’s showed, exclusion of the Islamists is a recipe for disaster, while inclusion can breed moderation.	正如阿尔吉利亚在1990年所展示的那样，排除伊斯兰主义者会导致灾难，而接纳则会培养温和。


The practical necessities of politics are bound to dilute ideological purity.	政治上的实际必要必定会稀释意识形态的纯洁性。


The Mecca agreement that brought forth the unity government in Palestine will inevitably temper Hamas’ radicalism, just as the regime’s avoidance in Jordan of an “Egyptian solution” to the Islamist challenge allowed the Islamic Action Front to contain within the movement many who would have been otherwise drawn into the jihadist orbit.	带来巴勒斯坦团结政府的麦迦协议将必然缓和哈马斯的激进主义。 该政权在约旦避免了对伊斯兰挑战采取“埃及解决方案”让伊斯兰行动阵线将许多本来可能被带入圣战主义圈子的人限制在了这一运动之中。


The challenge is not how to destroy Islamic movements, but how to turn them away from revolutionary to reformist politics by granting them legitimate political space.	挑战并非是如何摧毁伊斯兰运动，而是如何通过给予他们合法的政治空间而将他们从革命政治转向改革政治。


Global Zero at Ground Zero	全球零核的零基础


MADRID – Since its launch in December 2008, Global Zero, the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, has run up against some formidable challenges.	马德里—自2008年12月发布以来，《全球零核》（Global Zero）——没有核武器的世界愿景——便面临着一些可怕的挑战。


One is related to the readiness of the two major nuclear powers, Russia and the United States, to move from the stockpile reductions to which they agreed in the New START treaty to complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals.	其一与两个主要核大国——俄罗斯和美国——是否准备好了从旅行它们所签署的新战略核武器削减条约（New START）削减库存承诺迈向完全消除它们的核武库。


Others concern smaller nuclear powers’ willingness to go along, and whether reliable inspection, verification, and enforcement systems can be put in place.	也有人担心较小的有核国家是否愿意仿效美俄，是否能实施可靠的检查、核实和强制制度。


But these issues are not the real problem.	但这些问题都不是真正的问题。


Although Russia and the US possess roughly 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads, their nuclear capabilities are less of a threat than is the danger of proliferation.	尽管俄罗斯和美国拥有世界核弹头总量的90%，但它们的核能力与核扩散相比算不上大威胁。


It is this fear of a fast-growing number of nuclear-armed states, not the fine balancing of the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, that the case for Global Zero must address.	《全球零核》必须解决的问题并不是制衡美国和俄罗斯的核武库，而是快速增加的有核国家数量。


Indeed, addressing the underlying security concerns that fuel nuclear competition in regional trouble spots is more important to the credibility of Global Zero’s goal of “a world without nuclear weapons” than is encouraging exemplary behavior by the two major nuclear powers.	事实上，对于《全球零核》的“无核武的世界”目标的信誉来说，解决刺激敏感地区核竞赛背后的基本安全问题要比鼓励两大主要核大国做出榜样更加重要。


After all, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel might not be particularly impressed by a reduction in the US and Russian nuclear-weapons stockpiles from gross overkill to merely mild overkill.	毕竟，朝鲜、印度、巴基斯坦和以色列对美国和俄罗斯将核武器库存从杀伤力严重过剩削减至杀伤力略有过剩不会留下太深刻的印象。


There is a stark lack of synchrony between the (admittedly qualified) improvement in the two major nuclear powers’ bilateral relations and conditions in volatile regions around the world.	两个核大国的（公认）双边关系改善和世界动荡地区环境之间严重缺少同步性。


This gap is bound to affect negatively the processes of nuclear disarmament that are now being envisaged, for these states’ flirtation with nuclear weapons is not just a quest for prestige or status; it is an attempt to counter the conventional superiority of hostile neighbors – or, as with Iran and North Korea, of the US itself.	其中的差距注定会对当前的核武器削减愿景造成负面影响，因为这些国家的核挑衅不仅仅是出于对特权和地位的要求； 而是在试图挑战敌对邻邦的传统优势，而对于伊朗和朝鲜来说，挑战对象更是美国本身。


Consider Pakistan, for which repeated defeat at the hands of its sworn enemy, India, in conventional wars has been the catalyst for its readiness “to eat grass,” as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously put it, in order to counter India’s conventional superiority and nuclear capabilities.	以巴基斯坦为例，在常规战争中屡次被其死对头印度打败使得它决心即使“不长草”（佐勒菲卡尔·阿里·布托语），也要挑战印度的传统优势和核实力。


Today, Pakistan possesses more nuclear warheads than India does.	如今，巴基斯坦拥有比印度更多数量的核弹头。


To get to zero in this region, the conflict over Kashmir must be resolved, and India must cease being perceived by Pakistan as a threat.	要让该地区实现零核，就必须解决克什米尔冲突，巴基斯坦人还必须停止将印度视作威胁。


Ironically, the Russian case is no different from that of Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea.	讽刺的是，俄罗斯的情形与巴基斯坦、伊朗和朝鲜并无区别。


Notwithstanding the undeniable progress so far in Russia-US nuclear talks, the task of minimization, let alone elimination, of nuclear weapons by the Russians will depend on a willingness to address the Kremlin’s key security concern: its conventional military inferiority vis-à-vis the West.	尽管俄美核谈判已经取得了不可否认的进步，但俄罗斯是否最小化（更不用说废除了）核武器规模取决于克里姆林宫是否愿意解决关键性安全问题：对西方的传统军事劣势。


Meanwhile, Israel’s genuine, if arguably exaggerated, existential anxiety helps to explain its strategy of nuclear opacity.	与此同时，以色列现实的（虽有夸大之嫌）生存焦虑可以解释其不透明的核战略。


The prevailing perception in Israel is that of being surrounded by formidable non-nuclear threats, and dangerously weakened by the poor capacity of the state’s domestic front to sustain a long conventional war.	以色列的主流感觉是它位于可怕的非核威胁包围之中，而该国国土狭小，无法维持长时间的常规战争，因此显得尤为孱弱。


A country that in the summer of 2006 had to send a million of its citizens to underground shelters to escape massive ballistic warfare conducted by a non-state agent, Hezbollah, now faces an “Islamic Awakening” that it cannot fully fathom, and, with it, an ominous worsening of its strategic environment.	这个在2006年夏天不得不将100万公民送入地下掩体以躲避非国家代理人真主党大规模弹道武器袭击的国家如今面临着��根本无从彻底理解的“伊斯兰的觉醒”以及随之而来的其战略环境不断恶化的预兆。


Nor can Israel ignore the Middle East’s infamy as the only region in the world where chemical and biological weapons have been used since World War II.	以色列也无法忽视中东的另一大恶名——这里是世界上绝无仅有的在二战后使用过化学武器和生物武器的地区。


Iraq used them against Iran in the 1980’s, Egypt in Yemen in the 1960’s, and Iraq against its own Kurds.	伊拉克在20世纪80年代对伊朗使用过生化武器，埃及60年代在也门使用过，伊拉克对其国内的库尔德人也使用过。


But the cause of nuclear disarmament could advance in December, when the conference for the establishment of a “Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of mass Destruction” will be held in Helsinki (with, one hopes, all states in the region, including Israel and Iran, in attendance).	但核武器削减条约有望在12月取得进展，彼时赫尔辛基将召开“中东地区无核及大规模杀伤性武器”成立大会（人们希望包括以色列和伊朗在内的所有中东国家都将出席）。


But the initiative must avoid unworkable shortcuts.	但该计划必须避免不切实际的缺陷。


For example, the Arab position, which addresses Israel’s nuclear status outside the region’s broader security context, is the best recipe for failure.	比如，阿拉伯的立场——决定了以色列在地区广义安全环境之外的核地位——便是失败的最佳先声。


Instead, the conference needs to begin a dialogue among all stakeholders about their underlying security concerns.	相反，这次会议需要开启一次对话，让所有相关利益方谈论各自的基本安全问题。


The lesson for the Middle East in the mutual reduction of nuclear stockpiles by the US and Russia is that genuine disarmament is impossible unless preceded by an improvement in inter-state relations.	美俄共同削减核武器计划给中东带来的教益是，除非有跨国关系改善在先，否则是不可能发生真正的核武器削减的。


This is also the lesson of the other five world regions – Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa – that have adopted treaties establishing zones free of nuclear weapons.	这也是其他已经签署了建立无核武器条约的五个地区——拉美、南太平洋、东南亚、中亚和非洲——所要汲取的教训。


Israel needs to understand that its nuclear strategy cannot be sustained forever, and that Iran’s challenge to its supposed nuclear monopoly is not an obsession exclusive to the Iranian leadership.	以色列需要明白其核战略不可能永远维持下去，伊朗对其合拢段企图的挑战并不是伊朗领导人独有的夙愿。


A Middle East free of nuclear weapons certainly is preferable to a region with two or more nuclear-weapons states.	毫无疑问，无核武器的中东比存在两个或更多核武器国家的中东更令人欣喜。


But the Arab countries should assume that, unless and until they normalize their relations with Israel, effective engagement with it on such vital issues will remain impossible.	但阿拉伯国家应该知道，除非它们可以实现对以色列关系正常化，否则在这些关键性问题上它们是不可能真正说上话的。


Peace and regional de-nuclearization must go hand in hand.	和平和地区去核化必须齐头并进。


Israel’s then-prime minister, Shimon Peres, was not exactly opaque when he declared in December 1995 that, if given peace, Israel “would give up the atom.”	以色列前总理佩雷斯在1995年12月宣布只要获得和平，以色列就“会放弃原子”时就显得比较直白。


But the current incumbent, Binyamin Netanyahu, cannot have it both ways, conditioning nuclear disarmament on peace while doing everything he can to stall the peace process.	但现任总理内塔尼亚胡不能双管齐下，在将和平作为削减核武器的条件的同时竭尽所能阻挠和平进程。


The Muddled Case for Trade Agreements	贸易协定的迷思


PRINCETON – With global trade negotiations deadlocked for years, regional agreements – long a dormant route to trade liberalization – are back with a vengeance.	发自普林斯顿——随着全球贸易谈判陷入多年停滞，区域性贸易协定——这条长期以来蛰伏沉睡的贸易自由化路径——又迎来了春天。


The United States is at the center of two mega-deals that could shape the future path of world trade.	而美国正处于两场足以决定世界贸易未来道路的大型谈判的核心。


The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is further along, and involves 11 countries, besides the US, that collectively produce as much as 40% of global output; but China, crucially, is not among them.	泛太平洋伙伴关系协定(Trans-Pacific Partnership)推进相对较快，其中包含除美国之外的11个国家，合共占全球GDP份额的40%，但重点是并未将中国包括在内。


The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union has an even more ambitious reach, promising to join two giant regions that together account for half of world trade.	而与欧盟合作构建的泛大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership）则更具野心，试图将占全球贸易总量1/2的两大板块连成一片。


Trade agreements have long stopped being the province of experts and technocrats. So it is not surprising that both initiatives have generated significant and heated public discussion.	贸易协定早就不是专家和技术官僚的专属领地了，因此不出意外两大动议都随机引发了广泛而热烈的公众讨论。


The perspectives of proponents and opponents are so polarized that it is hard not to be utterly confused about the likely consequences.	支持者和反对者各自的观点是如此两极分化，以至于很难不被可能产生的后果所完全迷惑。


To appreciate what is at stake, we have to understand that these deals are motivated by a mix of objectives – some benign, others less so from a global perspective.	为了认清问题的症结，我们必须认识到这些协定都是被一系列混杂在一起的目标所推动的——如果站在全球的角度来看，有些是良性的，有些则没那么善意。


On the economic front, the trade agreements’ defenders tend to talk with both sides of their mouth.	在经济方面，贸易协定的维护者们堪称两面三刀:减少贸易壁垒能提高经济效率和专业化；


Reducing trade barriers is said to promote economic efficiency and specialization; but it is also supposed to increase exports and create jobs by increasing access to trade partners’ markets.	但同时也会通过来不断进占贸易伙伴的市场来增加出口和创造就业。


The first of these is the conventional comparative-advantage argument for trade liberalization; the second is a mercantilist argument.	前者是常规的贸易自由化比较优势观点； 而后者则是重商主义的说法。


The goals advanced by these arguments are mutually contradictory.	这些观点所推动的目标是相互对立的。


From the standpoint of comparative advantage, gains from trade arise from imports; exports are what a country has to give up in order to afford them.	从比较优势的立场上看，贸易的收益来自进口； 出口则是一个国家为获得这些收益所必须放弃的代价而已。


These gains accrue to all countries, as long as trade expands in a balanced fashion.	只要贸易持续以平衡的状态扩大，那所有国家都会因此得益。


Trade agreements do not create jobs; they simply reallocate them across industries.	贸易协定并不会创造就业； 只是把职位在不同行业之间重新分配罢了。


In the mercantilist worldview, by contrast, exports are good and imports are bad.	而在重商主义者眼中则恰恰相反，出口是良友而进口是恶人。


Countries that expand their net exports gain; all others lose.	那些扩大自身净出口的国家是胜者； 而其他国家则败下阵来。


Trade agreements can create jobs, but only to the extent that they destroy jobs in other countries.	贸易协定能创造就业，但其数量取决于其他国家所损失的就业数量。


Either argument for trade agreements is thus inconsistent with their advocates’ key claim that such deals will simultaneously create jobs and be mutually beneficial.	因此上述这两个观点都与它们的鼓吹者的核心观点不一致，因为这些人宣称协定能同时增加就业并让各方得益。


Strangely, supporters of the TPP and TTIP simultaneously rely on both arguments.	吊诡的是，泛太平洋伙伴关系协定和泛大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定的支持者们同时都仰仗这两套观点。


On the political front, proponents argue that TPP and TTIP will enshrine good, liberal rules for world trade.	在政治方面，支持者们认为两大协定都会把良好，自由的管制融入世界贸易。


Lower barriers and greater transparency in regulation are generally good things. But here, too, the reality is much more complex.	更少的贸易壁垒和更高的监管透明度总体来说是好东西，但在这里也不例外，因为现实要比理论更为复杂。


For the US, a great attraction of the TPP is that it will enforce tighter intellectual-property rules on other countries.	对美国来说，泛太平洋伙伴关系协定的吸引人之处在于可以对其他国家实施更严格的知识产权管制。


Such rules tend to have an uncertain impact on innovation while generating substantial rents for US patent and copyright holders.	但这些管制在为美国专利和版权持有人不断创造收入之外很可能对其他创新行为带来不确定的影响。


In the TTIP, the reduction of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade between the US and Europe will almost certainly restrict the space for domestic regulatory action.	在泛大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定方面，对美欧双边贸易中所谓非关税壁垒的削减几乎肯定会限制国内监管行为的运作空间。


Even if regulatory harmonization does not create a race to the bottom, the interests of investors and exporters will cast a longer shadow than before over social and environmental goals.	即便监管协调不会导致双方贸易竞争拼杀到最后一滴血，但投资者和出口商的不同利益会在社会和环境目标上笼罩一个比以往更深的阴影。


Perhaps most worrisome are the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions of the two agreements.	或许最令人感到忧心的是两项协定的投资者-国家争议解决条款。


These provisions establish a separate judicial track, outside a country’s own legal system, that allows firms to sue governments for apparent violations under trade treaties.	这些条款在一个国家自由的司法体系之外确立了一条单独的司法路径，让企业可以基于明确违反贸易条约的行为而起诉国家。


Proponents defend ISDS by saying that it will not have much consequence for countries, such as the US, where there is good rule of law, and that it will promote investment in countries, such as Vietnam, where there is not.	该项条款的支持者们辩护说这不会对像美国这样拥有良好法治的国家产生什么不利后果，并将促进对越南这类法治不完善国家的投资。


In that case, it is unclear why ISDS provisions are needed for the TTIP, which covers the advanced economies of North America and Europe.	在这种情况下，既然泛大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定的缔约方都是北美和欧洲的发达经济体，又为何需要附加上述条款呢？


In all of these areas, the TPP and TTIP seem to be about corporate capture, not liberalism.	在所有这些领域，两项协定似乎都与自由化无关，而是更与企业俘获策略有关（指大企业利用操纵公共政策获取利益）。


One of the most important, and equally ambiguous, objectives of these agreements relates to a subject that will not make any appearance in the texts: China.	其中一个最重要也同样含糊不清的地方是，这些协定的目标都与一个不会在任何条文中出现的事物相关：中国。


Both the US and Europe would like China to play the trade game by their rules.	美欧都想中国按照他们的玩法来进行贸易。


Negotiating these rules without China’s participation can be viewed as part of a strategy aimed at eventually coaxing China into a liberal global system.	而在没有中国参与的情况下商讨这些规章可被视为是旨在最终诱使中国进入一个自由化全球体系的某一部分策略。


But this approach can also be considered a way to isolate China and erect discriminating barriers against it in lucrative markets.	但这种做法同时也可以被看作是一种孤立中国并建立歧视性壁垒阻止其进入高回报市场的手段。


Finally, what especially grates on the agreements’ critics is the secrecy of the negotiations.	最后，尤其让这些协定招致批评的是谈判的隐秘性。


The draft texts are not open to public scrutiny, and the few outsiders who are allowed access to them are prohibited from divulging the contents.	相关协定的草案都并未公开给公众审查，仅有的几个被允许参与谈判的局外人都被禁止透露相关内容。


The stated goal of this policy is to facilitate negotiations.	对外宣称这一做法是为了加速谈判的进程。


But, as US Senator Elizabeth Warren has put it, this gets it exactly backwards: If transparency would make it harder to sell the final product to the public, it raises serious questions about the desirability of what is being negotiated.	但正如美国参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）所指出的那样，这也为其带来了明确的副作用：如果公开透明会导致公众更难以接纳最终出台的产物，那就得好好质问一下这些谈判究竟怀着何种目的。


It does make sense to subject the final text to an up-or-down legislative vote without allowing amendments.	应该将最终文本提交给一个一锤定音的立法投票，而且不允许修改。


But this can be done while making draft texts public.	但这可以通过向公众公开草案的方式实现。


The time for secrecy is past, if it ever existed.	不管是否曾经有过，但密谋的时代已经过去了。


In the end, there is much uncertainty about these trade agreements’ economic and political consequences, and considerable room for concern.	最后，这些贸易协定所产生的经济和贸易后果还存在着许多不确定性，还有相当大的关注空间。


Proponents only discredit themselves by deriding the skeptics as protectionists.	如果那些支持者们只是一味将怀疑的声音诬为保护主义者的话，最终受害的还会是他们自己。


Open, informed debate about specific provisions is exactly what is called for.	针对特定条款的公开且信息充分的讨论正是人们所需要的。


And that is possible only if the negotiating texts are opened to public scrutiny.	而这也只有在谈判文本接受公众公开质询时才能成为现实。


Europe’s Irrelevant Austerity Debate	跑题的欧洲紧缩之争


BRUSSELS – The most visible symptom of the crisis in the eurozone has been the high and variable risk premiums that its peripheral countries now must pay on their public debt.	发自布鲁塞尔——欧元区危机最明显的症状就是其极高且不断变动的风险溢价，而一众欧元区外围国家则必须为其公共债务支付这种风险溢价。


Moreover, an influential paper by the American economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff suggests that economic growth falls sharply when a country’s public debt rises above 90% of GDP.	此外，美国经济学家卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff ）在一篇颇有影响的论文指出当一国的公共债务上升到GDP的90%以上时，其经济增长会急剧下降。


So the policy prescription for solving the crisis seems simple: austerity.	所以解决该危机的政策方案似乎也很简单：紧缩。


Fiscal deficits must be cut to reduce debt levels.	必须削减财政赤字以降低负债务水平。


But the debate about austerity and the cost of high public-debt levels misses a key point: Public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.	但关于紧缩和高水平公共债务成本的讨论忽略了一个重点：欠外国人的公共债务不同于欠本国公民的债务。


Foreigners cannot vote for the higher taxes or lower expenditure needed to service the debt.	外国人无法投票支持提高税收或降低支出以减轻债务。


Moreover, in the case of domestic debt, a higher interest rate or risk premium merely leads to more redistribution within the country (from taxpayers to bondholders).	此外，就国内债务而言，高利率或高风险溢价只不过是导致更多的国内再分配（从纳税人到债券持有者）。


By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.	相比之下，对外债而言，高利率会导致国家整体的财富流失，因为在这种情况下政府必须把资源转移到国外，而这通常需要结合汇率贬值与国内支出削减。


This distinction between foreign and domestic debt is particularly important in the context of the euro crisis, because eurozone countries cannot devalue to increase exports if this is required to service foreign debt.	外债和内债的区别在欧元危机期间显得尤其重要，因为欧元区成员国无法像其它国家一样通过贬值货币来提高出口，从而减轻外债。


And the evidence confirms that the euro crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but about foreign debt.	而事实证明欧元危机其实并不是主权危机，而是外债危机。


Indeed, only those countries that were running large current-account deficits before the crisis were affected by it.	确实，只有那些在危机爆发前经常帐户赤字巨大的国家才会受到当前危机的影响。


The case of Belgium is particularly instructive, because the risk premium on Belgian sovereign debt has remained modest throughout most of the euro crisis, although the country’s debt/GDP ratio is above the eurozone average, at around 100%, and it went without a government for more than a year.	比利时的情况就很有启发性，尽管该国的债务对GDP比率高于欧元区国家的平均水平——大概为100%，而且一年多以来都缺乏政府管理，但比利时主权债务的风险溢价在整个欧元危机期间都保持在适度的水平。


An even starker example of the crucial difference between foreign and domestic debt is provided by Japan, which has by far the highest debt/GDP ratio among OECD countries.	能表明内债与外债之间关键差异的更恰当例子是日本，目前日本是经合组织成员国中债务对GDP比率最高的国家。


So far, the country has not experienced a debt crisis, and interest rates remain exceptionally low, at around 1%.	但迄今为止日本还未有过任何债务危机，其利率也保持在异常低的水平——大概为1%。


The reason is obvious: Japan has run sizeable current-account surpluses for decades, giving it more than sufficient domestic savings to absorb all of its public debt at home.	原因很明显：日本过去几十年的经常帐户都有大量盈余，这就让其有足够的国内储蓄来应对国内公共债务。


What does this imply for Europe’s austerity debate?	这对欧洲的紧缩讨论来说意味着什么呢？


If foreign debt matters more than public debt, the key variable requiring adjustment is the external deficit, not the fiscal deficit.	如果外债比国内公共债务更重要， 那么需要调整的主要变量就是对外赤字，而不是财政赤字。


A country that has a balanced current account does not need any additional foreign capital.	一个经常帐户收支平衡的国家不需要任何额外的外国资本。


That is why risk premiums are continuing to fall in the eurozone, despite high political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large fiscal deficits elsewhere.	这也是尽管意大利处于高度政治不稳定且其它地区仍然有巨大的财政赤字，但欧元区的风险溢价水平一直在持续下降的原因。


The peripheral countries’ external deficits are falling rapidly, thus diminishing the need for foreign financing.	外围国家的对外赤字正在急速下降，从而减少了对境外融资的需求。


The debate about austerity and the high cost of public debt is thus misleading on two accounts.	对紧缩和公共债务高成本的讨论因此在两方面都具有误导性。


First, it has often been pointed out that austerity can be self-defeating, because a reduction in the fiscal deficit can lead in the short run to an increase in the debt/GDP ratio if both the debt level and the multiplier are large.	首先，人们经常指出紧缩可能会弄巧成拙，因为如果债务水平和乘数都很大，减少财政赤字会导致短期内债务对GDP比率上升。


But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment.	但紧缩对外部调整来说却绝不会事与愿违。


On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.	相反，出于对政府支出减少的反应，国内需求减少得越厉害，进口量也将会下降得越多，经常帐户的收支平衡水平也会提高越多，从而最终减少风险溢价——将来会这样。


Italy’s experience is enlightening: the large tax increases implemented by former Prime Minister Mario Monti’s technocratic government in 2012 had a higher-than-expected impact on demand.	意大利的经验是具有启迪性的：2012年前总理马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）技术官僚政府实施的大幅度税收增加对需求的影响超过了预期水平。


The economy is contracting so much that the debt/GDP ratio is actually increasing, and the actual deficit is improving only marginally, because government revenues are falling along with GDP.	经济水平收缩得很厉害，以致债务对GDP比率仍然在上升——而实际赤字只是略微提高，因为政府收入跟GDP一起不断下降。


But a side effect of the fall in GDP is a strong decline in imports – and thus a strong improvement in the current account, which is why the risk premium continues to fall, despite the political turmoil unleashed by the country’s inconclusive recent election.	但GDP下降的副作用是进口大幅度下降——从而使得经常帐户收支平衡水平得到改善，所以尽管该国近期的无成果选举引发了政治动荡，其溢价水平却仍在继续下降。


Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis.	第二，如果外债成为严重的问题，对莱恩哈特和罗格夫结论的讨论升级与欧元危机就没有任何关联。