Kemalism not only introduced a variant of the Latin alphabet, which totally cut off Turks from any link to their history and culture; it also banned traditional forms of attire (fez, baggy trousers for men, headscarves for women) and forced a European dress code on the entire population.	凯末尔主义不但引入了一种变形的拉丁字母，并借此切断了土耳其人与自身历史文化的任何联系； 而且还禁止传统的着装形式（毯帽、男士灯笼裤和女士头巾）并强制全体民众采用欧洲的着装标准。


All Arabic- or Muslim-sounding surnames had to be changed to Turkic ones.	所有阿拉伯或穆斯林姓氏都必须改成突厥姓氏。


No European society has experienced so wrenching a process of top-down cultural revolution.	如此痛苦的自上而下的文化革命所有欧洲社会都未曾经历过。


In the West, secularization went hand in hand with the Enlightenment project of democratization and liberalization.	在西方，世俗化进程与民主化和自由化的启蒙运动齐头并进。


In Turkey – and in a less radical form under the Shah in Iran and under military dictators in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Iraq – the population never had a choice.	但在土耳其——在伊朗国王和埃及、突尼斯、叙利亚和伊拉克等国军事独裁者相对不那么激进的统治下——民众从未有权选择。


The AKP’s electoral victories since 2002 (as well as comparable developments in other Muslim countries) were, in a way, the return of the repressed.	正义与发展党2002年后的选举胜利（以及其他穆斯林国家的类似进展）在某种程度上代表被压迫者的反抗。


Because the Kemalist system eventually liberalized politically (though not culturally), the emergence of a multiparty system eventually also empowered the traditional conservatives whose preferences had long been denied.	因为凯末尔体制最终实现了政治自由化（虽然并不是文化自由化），但多党制的兴起最终也完成了对传统保守主义者的授权，这些人的喜好曾长期不被社会接受。


At the same time, economic modernization brought social mobility to the conservatives, which led to the emergence of a new bourgeoisie that clung to its traditional religious values and viewed the Kemalist elite – ensconced in the army, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the universities – as oppressors.	与此同时，经济现代化为保守主义者带来社会流动性，从而导致固守传统宗教价值观并将隐藏在军队、官僚体系、司法体系和大学之中的凯末尔主义精英视为压迫势力的新兴中产阶级力量逐步壮大。


These voters formed the basis of the AKP’s electoral victories and democratic legitimacy.	这些选民构成了正义与发展党选举胜利和民主合法性的根基。


The recent effort by elements of the army – the shield of Kemalist secularism – to overturn the will of the people (as it has done three times in the last half-century) confirms the continuing clash between secularism and democracy in Turkey.	刚刚发生的军队分子（凯末尔世俗主义的盾牌）推翻人民意愿的政变（过去半个世纪以来曾3次发生这样的政变）再次凸显了土耳其世俗主义和民主之间的持续冲突。


At the same time, Erdoğan’s foreign policy in recent years has been anything but successful.	同时，埃尔多安近年实施的外交政策根本不成功。


His initial commitment to “zero conflicts with neighbors” has led, instead, to deteriorating relations with Armenia, Russia, Israel, and Egypt – not to mention significant domestic blowback, including a wave of terrorist attacks, from involvement in Syria’s civil war.	他起初实施的“与邻国零冲突”政策反而导致了与亚美尼亚、俄罗斯、以色列和埃及关系日趋恶化——更不要说对国内可观的反作用力，包括因卷入叙利亚内战而造成的一波恐怖袭击浪潮。


None of this has eroded Erdoğan’s support at home, while the United States and the European Union found themselves supporting him, albeit through clenched teeth, against the latest coup attempt.	所有这些都没有对埃尔多安的国内支持率造成影响，美国和欧盟虽然咬紧牙关，但仍然在最近爆发的政变企图中对埃尔多安表达了支持的态度。


This attests to Western powers’ fundamental interest in a stable Turkey, which the EU needs in order to stop further waves of immigrants, mainly from Syria, and which the US needs for its war, limited as it is, against the Islamic State.	这证明稳定土耳其符合西方列强的根本利益，欧盟需要土耳其来阻止主要来自叙利亚的进一步的移民浪潮，而美国也需要土耳其的帮助才能打赢针对伊斯兰国的有限战争。


It is doubtful that Erdoğan’s pursuit of internal enemies – real and imagined – will prevent either the US or the EU from courting Turkish cooperation.	埃尔多安追捕国内反对派（无论确实存在还是异想天开）都不太可能阻止美国或欧盟寻求土耳其的合作。


But Erdoğan’s brutal response to the coup attempt – which may include show trials, in addition to the “cleansing” of public institutions of both remnants of the secularist establishment and his former allies in the Gülen movement – will only deepen the chasms within Turkish society.	但埃尔多安对政变企图的残酷回应——其中可能包括公开审判以及对世俗主义制度及其前葛兰运动盟友残余公共机构的“清洗”行为——只会导致土耳其社会的分歧进一步深化。


Indeed, terrorist attacks have been launched not only by the Islamic State, but also by Kurdish militants, whose demands for autonomy challenge the concept of an indivisible Turkish nation – a cornerstone of the Kemalist state.	事实上，发动恐怖袭击的不仅包括伊斯兰国，还包括库尔德武装，后者要求自治挑战了土耳其民族不可分割的理念，而这也是凯末尔政府的一项基本原则。


Prior to the attempted putsch, Erdoğan made significant moves to reduce tension with Russia and Israel, and both efforts seem unlikely to be derailed by his post-coup crackdown.	在爆发此次叛乱前，埃尔多安采取重要措施缓解与俄罗斯和以色列的紧张局势，而相关工作似乎不太可能受到埃尔多安后政变期镇压活动的影响。


Yet Syria’s civil war does not appear to be winding down, and the de facto implosion of Syria as a coherent state will continue to challenge Turkish politics and social cohesion, with more and more refugees trying to cross into Turkey.	但叙利亚内战似乎没有平静下来的趋势，而叙利亚作为统一国家事实上的内爆将继续挑战土耳其政治及社会凝聚力，造成试图涌入土耳其的难民越来越多。


Ultimately, Kemalist military-based secularism proved to be unsustainable: its demolition under the AKP enjoys broad support.	最终，凯末尔式的军事世俗主义被证明是不可持续的：他在正义与发展党治下被消灭享有广泛的群众基础。


But the failed coup is likely to reinforce the illiberal aspects of the democracy emerging under Erdoğan, in which the will of the people and majoritarian rule runs counter to pluralism, human rights, and freedom of speech.	但这次未遂政变很可能会强化埃尔多安治下民主的非自由层面，导致民众意愿和多数统治压制多元主义、人权和言论自由。


The stability of such a system in Turkey – where, despite popular opposition to the coup, hostility to Erdoğan is strong – remains to be seen.	尽管绝大多数人反对政变，但民众对埃尔多安的敌意也依然很强，因此上述体系在土耳其的稳定性尚有待观察。


The Euro’s Narrow Path	欧元的独木桥


BERKELEY – With Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the French presidential election, and Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union enjoying a comfortable lead in opinion polls ahead of Germany’s general election on September 24, a window has opened for eurozone reform.	发自伯克利——随着法国总统选举以埃马纽埃尔·马克龙的胜利告终，以及默克尔所属的基督教民主联盟在9月24日德国大选前的民调中遥遥领先，一个欧元区改革的窗口随之开启。


The euro has always been a Franco-German project.	欧元一直是由法德主导的项目。


With a dynamic new leader in one country and a fresh popular mandate in the other, there is now an opportunity for France and Germany to correct their creation’s worst flaws.	如今法国拥有了一位充满活力的新领导人，对应的德国首脑又一次得到了民众的授权，也就为两国共同去纠正这个作品的最严重缺陷创造了机会。


But the two sides remain deeply divided.	但双方之间依然存在巨大分歧。


Macron, in long-standing French tradition, insists that the monetary union suffers from too little centralization.	马克龙秉承法国一直以来的传统，坚持认为货币联盟的问题在于中央集权程度太低。


The eurozone, he argues, needs its own finance minister and its own parliament. It needs a budget in the hundreds of billions of euros to underwrite investment projects and augment spending in countries with high unemployment.	在他看来欧元区需要设立自有的财政部长和议会，还需要获拨数千亿欧元的预算以承担投资项目以及增加在高失业率国家身上的支出。


Merkel, on the other hand, views the monetary union’s problem as one of too much centralization and too little national responsibility.	另一方面，默克尔却认为货币联盟的问题是集权过度而各国分担责任过少。


She worries that a large eurozone budget wouldn’t be spent responsibly.	她担心巨额的欧元区预算不会被负责任地使用。


While not opposed to a eurozone finance minister, she does not envision that official possessing expansive powers.	虽然不反对欧元区设立财政部长，但她并不寄望该官员能拥有广泛的权力。


But there is a narrow path forward that should be acceptable to both sides.	但其实存在一座双方都应该能接受的前进独木桥。


It starts with completing the banking union.	这将从完善银行联盟开始。


Europe now has a single supervisor in the European Central Bank, but it lacks a common deposit insurance scheme, which German officials oppose on the grounds that there has been inadequate risk reduction in the European banking system.	欧洲如今已经在欧洲中央银行任命有一位单一监管人，但它缺乏一个共同的存款保险方案，而德国官员反对该方案的理由是欧洲银行系统的风险还未降到合理水平。


In other words, they worry that the fees levied on German banks will be used to pay off depositors in other countries.	换言之，他们担心从德国银行处收取的费用将被用于偿付其他国家的储户。


The solution lies in bulletproofing the banks by strictly applying the demanding capital standards of Basel III and limiting concentrated holdings of government bonds.	解决办法是通过严格执行《巴塞尔协议 III》 的较高资本金标准并限制政府债券的集中持有来保障这些银行。


The paradox here is that European regulators, including German regulators, have in fact been arguing for looser application of those regulations in negotiations with the United States.	这里的自相矛盾之处在于，欧洲监管机构（包括德国监管机构）实际上一直在与美国的谈判中要求放宽这些监管规定的应用。


In doing so, they have been arguing against their own best interests.	而在这样做的时候，他们其实在和自己的最佳利益对着干。


Next, Europe needs to transform the European Stability Mechanism, its proto-rescue fund, into a true European Monetary Fund (EMF).	其次，欧洲需要将欧洲稳定机制这个救助基金雏形转变为真正的欧洲货币基金 (European Monetary Fund)。


Its resources could be augmented by increasing governments’ capital subscriptions and expanding its ability to borrow.	它的资源可以通过增加政府的资本认购和扩大其借贷能力来扩充。


Decision-making could be streamlined by moving from the current unanimity rule to qualified majority voting.	决策可以通过从将目前的全体一致规则转化为合格的多数票来进行简化。


The EMF could then take the place of the ECB and the European Commission in negotiating the terms of financing programs with governments.	然后，欧洲货币基金就可以取代欧洲央行和欧盟委员会去与各国政府商讨融资计划条款。


The final decision of whether to extend an emergency loan would no longer fall to heads of state in all-night talks.	是否延长紧急贷款的最终决定也因此无需由各国家元首在通宵会谈中达成；


Rather, it would be taken by a board made up of eurozone representatives, including from civil society, nominated by the European Council and confirmed by the European Parliament, giving the process a legitimacy it currently lacks.	相反它将由一个经欧洲理事会提名并由欧洲议会确认——这为这一进程补足了当前所缺乏的合法性——的欧元区代表（包括公民社会代表）组成的委员会来承担。


But Germany will agree only if it sees steps limiting the likelihood of expensive intervention.	但德国只有在看到那些有助于限制大手笔干预措施可能性的步骤时才会点头同意。


This brings us to the vexed question of fiscal policy.	这就给我们引来了财政政策的棘手问题。


It is past time to abandon the fiction that the ultimate source of fiscal discipline is a set of strictly enforced EU rules.	我们早该放弃那种认定财政纪律的最终来源是一套严格执行的欧盟规则的幻想。


Taxation and public spending remain sensitive national prerogatives, rendering outside oversight ineffectual.	税收和公共支出仍然是敏感的国家特权，令到外部监督束手无策。


Assigning oversight to the European Commission in Brussels promises, inevitably, not discipline but a dangerous populist backlash.	将监督权授予布鲁塞尔的欧盟委员会带来的——不可避免地——不是纪律，而是一场危险的民粹主义回潮。


The alternative is to return control of fiscal policy to national governments, abandoning the pretense that policy can be regimented by EU rules.	另一种选择是将财政政策的控制权交还给各国政府，撕掉欧盟规则可以约束该政策的幌子。


Governments could then make their own decisions; if they make bad decisions, they will have to restructure their debts.	然后政府可以作出自己的决定； 一旦它们决策错误，就必须进行债务重组。


Adopting a European debt-restructuring mechanism would help to avoid the worst fallout.	采用一套欧洲债务重组机制将有助于避免最坏的后果。


Any adverse consequences would no longer spread to other countries, because their banks would no longer hold concentrations of government bonds.	任何不利的后果将不再蔓延到其他国家，因为它们的银行将不再集中持有大量政府债券。


They would not bankrupt the EMF, which would be able to lend only in cases of illiquidity, not insolvency.	它们也不会令欧洲货币基金破产，因为后者只会在流动性受阻的情况下借贷，不会去救助破产国。


These ideas will horrify dedicated euro-federalists.	这些想法会令那些一心致力于实现欧元联邦化的人震惊不已。


One bone they can be thrown is a pilot unemployment insurance fund amounting to, say, 1% of eurozone GDP.	可以安抚他们一个方法是建立试点性失业保险基金，其规模相当于欧元区 GDP 的1%。


This would be analogous to US arrangements under which the federal government provides partial funding for state-administered unemployment insurance.	这类似于美国联邦政府为各州管理的失业保险提供部分资金的安排，也让欧元区财政部长有点事情好做。


And it would give the eurozone finance minister something to do. If the initial modest program was shown to work, it could be scaled up.	如果最初的适度计划能证明有效，那么就可以相应扩大规模。


But German politicians are aware that unemployment is 2.5 times higher in France than at home, raising the danger that transfers would all go one way.	但德国政界人士意识到法国的失业率要比本国高出2. 5 倍，也因此增加了转移支付只会单向流动的风险。


That’s why such proposals are contingent on structural reforms that reduce unemployment where it is high and increase the flexibility of labor and product markets.	这就是为何这样的提议都取决于以减少高失业率以及增加劳动力和产品市场灵活性的结构性改革。


This is essentially the bargain Macron has offered Merkel.	这基本上就是马克龙提供给默克尔的交换条件。


To paraphrase, “I’ll undertake deep structural reforms if you agree to modest steps in the direction of fiscal federalism, completing the banking union, and creating a European Monetary Fund.”	换句话说，“如果你（德国）同意在财政联邦制的方向上采取适度的步骤，完善银行联盟，建立一个欧洲货币基金组织，我（法国）将进行深层次的结构改革”。


No one on either side of the Rhine will regard this bargain as perfect.	莱茵河两岸的人都不会认为这是完美的交易。


But with the euro in the balance, the perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good.	但鉴于欧元的命运悬而未决，“完美”不应该被允许成为“好”的对立面。


Three Ways Ahead for the Eurozone	欧元区的三个前途


WASHINGTON, DC – After a tumultuous year, politics seem to be stabilizing across Europe.	华盛顿—在经历了动荡的一年后，欧洲政坛似乎开始稳定下来。


Though the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gained almost 13% of the vote in Germany’s recent federal election, it does not pose a serious threat to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership.	尽管极右翼的德国另类选择党（AfD）在最近的德国联邦选举中赢得近13%的选票，但并未给总理默克尔的领导权造成严重威胁。


In France – the other pillar of the European project – President Emmanuel Macron can count on a solid parliamentary majority.	在欧洲工程的另一个支柱法国，总统马克龙能够倚赖坚强的议会多数。


And, despite the uncertainty surrounding the details of Brexit, there is little doubt that, whatever plans the European Union makes, it will be doing so without the United Kingdom as a member.	而尽管围绕英国退欧的细节还存在很多不确定性，但几乎没有人怀疑，不论欧盟采取什么计划，英国都不再是其中一分子。


So now the question is how the EU and, in particular, the eurozone, will move forward.	因此，现在的问题是，欧盟，尤其是欧元区，会如何前进。


There are three possibilities.	有三种可能。


The first option is a “more united union,” as described by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his state of the union address last month.	第一个选择是欧盟委员会主席容克在上个月的盟情咨文中所描述的“更加统一的联盟”。


Juncker’s vision rejects a multi-speed Europe, in favor of uniform steps by all EU members.	容克的愿景拒绝了多速的欧洲，支持欧盟所有成员齐头并进。


This would mean, for starters, expanding the Schengen Area of border-free travel to include Bulgaria and Romania.	这首先意味着扩大跨境自由的申根区，将保加利亚和罗马尼亚也包括进来。


Juncker also called for progress toward a European Social Standards Union embodying a shared understanding of welfare entitlement in the single market.	容克还呼吁建立一个欧洲社会标准联盟（European Social Standards Union），就单一市场的福利权益形成统一的认识。


As for the euro, Juncker stressed that it is meant to be the currency of the entire EU, not just select countries.	对于欧元，容克强调它要成为整个欧盟的货币，而不仅仅是一部分国家的货币。


With that in mind, the EU should pursue the creation of a full banking union, in which banking rules and supervision are consistent across all member states.	据此，欧盟应该追求建立一个全面的银行联盟，其中，各成员国的银行规则和监督要统一起来。


The commissioner for economic and financial affairs should become a European finance minister, and the European Stabilization Mechanism should become the European Monetary Fund.	经济和金融事务委员应该成为欧洲财政部长，而欧洲稳定机制（European Stabilization Mechanism）应该成为欧洲货币基金（European Monetary Fund）。


A year ago, such “hardline” integrationism would have lacked credibility; after all, the UK would never stand for it.	一年前，如此“强硬”的一体化根本毫无可信度可言； 毕竟，英国绝不会支持它。


But, with Brexit apparently a sure thing, Juncker’s vision has gained some credibility.	但如今，英国退欧已是板上钉钉，容克的愿景也有了一些可信度。


Nonetheless, Juncker’s “one-speed” approach to integration remains highly controversial.	尽管如此，容克的“单速”一体化方针仍然饱受争议。


So Macron has set out his own ambitious vision for Europe, which echoes many of Juncker’s proposals, but seems to allow for more differentiation within the EU, at least in the medium term.	因此，马克龙也抛出了他自己的宏大愿景，其中不少与容克的方案遥相呼应，但马克龙的方案允许欧盟内部存在差异，至少在中期是如此。


For example, if Poland does not want to adopt the euro, it should not be forced to do so, and that decision should not prevent other eurozone countries from moving ahead with integration.	比如，如果波兰不想采用欧元，就不应该强迫它这样做，并且这一决定也不应该妨碍其他欧元区国家继续迈向一体化。


That is why Macron wants a separate eurozone parliament, which would decide on matters that do not pertain to all members of the European Parliament.	因此，马克龙希望建立一个单独的欧元区议会，由它来决定不适用于欧洲议会全体成员的事务。


Differences in the level of integration countries pursued today would not prevent anyone – or everyone – from eventually joining the EU’s deeply integrated “core.”	各国所追求的一体化程度的不同不应该妨碍任何国家——或每一个国家——最终加入欧盟深度一体化的“核心”。


The third – and, it seems, most likely – way forward for the eurozone is business as usual.	欧元区的第三种——似乎也是最有可能的一种——前途是一切照旧。


The economic crisis that long powered calls for more integration – and, in some cases, for more fragmentation – has subsided, with eurozone GDP growth now exceeding 2% and unemployment having declined significantly.	引起加强一体化——有时是更加分裂——的呼声的经济危机已经过去了，目前欧元区GDP增长率超过2%，失业也大幅减少。


Even Greece – the one country that remains, to some extent, in crisis mode – continues to muddle through.	甚至是希腊——从某种程度讲，它是唯一一个仍陷在危机模式中的国家——也一直能够勉强维持。


In this context, policymakers may well decide, as they have so many times before, to put ambitious eurozone reforms on the back burner, deciding that the reforms pursued during the crisis are sufficient.	在这样的环境下，决策者很可能会如同此前多次发生过的那样，将宏大的欧元区改革计划往后推，认为危机期间所采取的改革已经足够。


This would leave them more space to focus on other areas – such as energy, digital regulation, and migration – that in the current context may appear to require more urgent attention.	这让他们有更大的空间关注其他领域——如能源、数字监管和移民等——从当前的情况看，这些领域更加需要紧急关注。


If policymakers do go this route, there are serious risks.	如果决策者真的按照这条路走，将带来严重的风险。


Yes, the eurozone is now functioning, and key reforms in other areas are important.	承让，目前欧元区运转良好，而其他领域的关键性改革也确实很重要。


But the monetary union retains a fundamental flaw: the absence of mechanisms capable of forestalling cost divergences across countries that have lost the ability to engage in exchange-rate adjustment.	但货币联盟仍然有一个根本性缺陷：其成员国失去了用汇率进行调整的能力，同时又没有一个能够阻止国家间成本分化的机制。


One such mechanism would be more labor mobility in services.	一种机制是加强服务业劳动力流动性。


But even if eurozone countries agreed to further labor-market liberalization, workers would face high cultural and linguistic barriers.	但即使欧元区国家统一进一步实施劳动力市场自由化，工人们也将面临很高的文化和语言壁垒。


In any case, without any such mechanism, the trends that culminated in the last economic crisis could well lead to another.	无论如何，如果不存在任何这样的机制，最终导致上一次经济危机的趋势，很有可能还会导致新的危机。


After the experience of the crisis, if signs of growing cost divergences begin to emerge in the future, interest-rate differentials among eurozone countries will rise much faster than they did before the last crisis, providing an earlier warning signal.	在经历了危机之后，如果未来出现成本分化加剧的信号，欧元区国家间的利率差异将比上一次危机中更快地扩大，这将是一个早期警告信号。


Yet, given that much of the debt overhang remains and much of the rescue ammunition has been spent, another shock could be devastating.	尽管如此，由于仍然累积着大量债务并且大量救援资金已经消耗掉，新的冲击可能带来灾难性后果。


As Martin Wolf reports, the economist Adam Lerrick proposes a scheme whereby the beneficiaries of sudden changes in interest-rate differentials would transfer half their gains into a “financing cost stabilization account,” to be paid back when the interest-rate shock subsides.	据马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）报道，经济学家亚当·雷里克（Adam Lerrick）提出了一种机制，让利息差异突然变化的受益人将所得收益转入一个“融资成本稳定账户”，当利率冲击消退后返回。


But, like other eurozone reforms, such a scheme would have to be agreed among eurozone members.	但是，和其他欧元区改革一样，这一机制需要欧元区成员国之间达成一致。


With Merkel still forming her new coalition government, it is impossible to say for certain what approach to integration Europe will take in the coming years.	默克尔仍然在组建新的联合政府，因此，现在无法确认欧洲会在未来几年采取怎样的一体化方针。


But, given the likelihood that her coalition will include the Euroskeptic Free Democrats and the pro-integration Greens, with her own Christian Democrats in between, rapid pursuit of ambitious integration objectives for the entire EU seems unlikely.	但她的执政联盟将包括疑欧派的自由民主党和支持一体化的绿党，而她本人的基督教民主党介于两者之间，因此，大踏步追求宏大的全欧盟一体化的目标可能性很低。


A more realistic option is a multi-speed effort whereby the eurozone countries can move ahead, while others are allowed to wait.	一个更加现实的选择是多速方案，欧元区国家能够继续前进，其他国家可以等一等。


The outcome would not be perfect, but it would be better – much better – than the status quo.	结果不会完美，但要比现状更好——好得多。


Redefining Europe, and Europeans	重塑欧洲，和欧洲人


LEIPZIG – Traveling through Germany in the run-up to its federal election on September 24, one cannot help but be struck by the lingering signs of profound trauma from the 2015 refugee crisis.	莱比锡—在德国即将迎来9月24日的联邦选举之际周游这个国家，你一定会被2015年难民危机所造成的挥之不去的深切伤痕所震撼。


Suddenly and virtually without warning, nearly a million desperate people – mostly Syrians fleeing the carnage in their homeland – flocked to Germany.	突然间，在几乎没有任何预警的情况下，近一百万绝望的人群——大部分是逃离祖国大屠杀的叙利亚人——涌入了德国。


And while Germany may be Europe’s most bureaucratically well-managed country, even it was overwhelmed.	尽管德国也许是欧洲官僚管理最完善的国家，也没有能够抵挡得住。


German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response to the crisis two years ago was to throw out the rulebook and open her country’s borders.	德国总理默克尔对这场两年前的危机的反应是打破常规，打开国门。


She famously told the German people, “Wir schaffen das” (We can do it).	她告诉德国人民，“我们可以做到。 ”


But German public opinion today suggests that the country has become warier of such bold gestures.	但当下的德国公众态度表明，这个国家对如此激进的姿态变得更加谨慎了。


Yes, Germany did it, because there was no alternative; and many Germans are proud of their country for rising to the occasion.	是的，德国做到了，因为没有第二条路可以走； 许多德国人对自己的祖国能够面对这样的情况挺身而出感到自豪。


But most hope that such a crisis never happens again.	但大部分人希望这样的危机再也不要发生。


Although many Germans have come to terms with what happened two years ago, a small minority still feels betrayed.	尽管许多德国人接受了两年前所发生的事情，但仍有一小部分人觉得自己被背叛了。


They have responded with anger and xenophobic nationalism, and these sentiments will undoubtedly be reflected in how they vote.	他们因此产生了愤怒和仇外民族主义，这些情绪毫无疑问要反映在选票中。


But Germany’s trauma from the refugee crisis should be put in perspective.	但德国因为难民危机而蒙受的伤害应该全面地去看待。


Far more refugees have sought and found protection in countries such as Lebanon and Turkey than in Germany.	在黎巴嫩和土耳其等国家寻求并得到保护的难民数量远多于德国。


In relative terms, Germany would have had to take in 20 million refugees to match Lebanon in 2015.	相对而言，2015年德国需要接受2,000万难民，才能与黎巴嫩相提并论。


In Turkey, Istanbul alone is now hosting more refugees than all of Germany.	在土耳其，光是伊斯坦布尔现在所收容的难民就比整个德国都要多。


Of course, Germany is not the only European country that remains unsettled from the refugee crisis.	当然，德国不是唯一一个因为难民危机而变得不安的欧洲国家。


In my own country, Sweden, a political party that wants to shut us off from the rest of the world will most likely make strong gains in next year’s general election.	在我的祖国瑞典，一个希望让我们与世界其他部分隔离开来的政党，很有可能在明年的大选中收获颇丰。


And in many Central European countries that only recently regained their sense of sovereignty, refugees are widely viewed as posing a threat to national identity.	在许多知道最近才重新拥有了主权感的中欧国家，难民被广泛视为构成了对民族身份的威胁。


One way or another, these issues will dominate European politics in the years ahead.	这些问题将以各种各样的方式主导未来多年的欧洲政治。


Europe is slowly trying to build up resilience to the kind of trauma it experienced in 2015.	欧洲正在缓缓试图构建恢复力，弥合2015年所经历的创伤。


It is a continent that once exported war and turmoil, but that now wants to protect itself from its neighbors’ problems.	欧洲曾经输出了战争和动乱，但如今，它要保护自己不受周边邻居的问题的影响。


One of the lessons from 2015 is that the European Union will need to develop a far stronger common foreign and security policy.	2015年的一个教训是欧盟必须制定一套更加强大的共同外交和安全政策。


The EU must replace lofty rhetoric with concrete action, while also accepting its regional and global responsibilities.	欧盟必须用务实的行动取代豪言壮语，同时也要接受其地区和全球责任。


Barbed wire fencing between Hungary and Serbia will not shield Europe from the effects of war in Ukraine, putsches and terrorism in Anatolia, or violent conflagrations in the Levant and Mesopotamia.	在匈牙利和塞尔维亚之间修建铁丝网无法让欧洲隔绝乌克兰战争、安纳托利亚（Anatolia）叛乱和恐怖主义，以及黎凡特和美索不达米亚暴力冲突的影响。


And it will not help Europe manage the dramatic shift now underway in Africa, which will be home to 40% of the world’s working-age population in a few decades.	它也无助于欧洲管理非洲正在发生的剧变。 几十年后，世界40%的工作年龄人口都将来自非洲。


Another lesson from 2015 is that European countries must learn to redefine their national identities.	2015年的另一个教训是欧洲国家必须学会重塑民族身份。


The United States, Australia, and Canada have all been built on immigration, and most of us are the progeny of people from somewhere else.	美国、澳大利亚和加拿大都是移民建立的国家，而我们中的大部分人祖先也不是本地土著。


Indeed, there is not much left of the “first nations” in these countries.	事实上，在这些国家，已经没有多少“原住民”剩下了。


It is now entirely possible for there to be more people of Swedish descent in Chicago than in Stockholm.	芝加哥的瑞典人后裔比斯德哥尔摩多，这完全是可能的。


To be sure, Europe is different from its Western counterparts.	诚然，欧洲和其他西方国家不同。


Its tribes have been fighting one another for millennia.	它的部落战火燃烧了千年之久。


And for the past two centuries, Europeans have been building ever-stronger nation-states and national identities on the basis of long, complicated historical experiences.	但在过去两个世纪中，欧洲人一直在漫长复杂的历史经验的基础上，构建日益强大的民族国家和民族身份。


The EU itself was of course built by nation-states.	当然，欧盟本身就是民族国家建立的。


But their citizens wanted to overcome their long legacy of tribalism and war.	但这些国家的公民，希望克服部落主义（tribalism）和战争的遗产。


Judged by that objective, the EU’s first half-century has been a tremendous success.	从这个目标判断，欧盟的第一个五十年堪称巨大的成功。


And yet the strains are there for anyone to see.	但后继乏力也是显而易见的。


Whether justified or not, when people perceive a threat to their national identity, their tribal instincts kick in.	不管有没有充分的理由，当人们感到民族身份受到威胁时，他们的部落本能就会蜂拥而出。


And for a truly frightened few, Brussels and Mecca have both come to be seen as mortal threats.	而对于真正被吓到的一小撮人，布鲁塞尔和麦加都被视为致命威胁。


For Europe to find its place in a rapidly changing world, its citizens will have to learn to tap multiple identities.	欧洲要想在快速变化的世界中找到一席之地，其公民就需要学会利用多重身份。


One can be a proud Swede and a proud European at the same time; one can also be both German and Turkish, and derive strength from that duality.	你可以同时是一个骄傲的瑞典人，又是一个骄傲的欧洲人； 你可以既是德国人，也是土耳其人，并从这种双重性中获取优势。


It is not disloyal to see oneself as a citizen of the world.	自视为世界公民不是不忠。


On the contrary, it is honorable.	相反，这是一件光荣的事。


Such a shift in attitudes would make for a very different Europe.	这种态度的转变将带来一个截然不同的欧洲。


We would have finally moved on from ancient tribal conflicts and fears, and embraced a networked, digital future.	我们终将摆脱古老的部落冲突和恐惧，拥抱网络化的数字未来。


Merkel, who will likely be elected to another four-year term as chancellor on September 24, told Germans that they “can do it.”	有望在9月24日赢得又一个四年总理任期的默克尔告诉德国人，他们“可以做到。


But whether Germany and the rest of Europe will do it remains to be seen.	”但德国和欧洲其他国家会不会做仍有待观察。


We have our work cut out for us.	我们面临的任务十分艰巨。


The Federalist Threat to Europe	欧洲的联邦主义威胁


STOCKHOLM – The world is fundamentally different after the “Brexit” referendum in the United Kingdom.	发自斯德哥尔摩——这个世界是在英国“脱欧”公投之后发生了根本性的变化。


It will be decades before we know the full effect of British voters’ decision to leave the European Union.	而只有再等几十年，我们才能真正认识到英国选民脱欧决定的全面影响。


One thing we can know for sure, however, is that it is in the EU’s best interest to maintain strong ties with the UK, despite the fact that British voters made their decision unilaterally.	但有一件事是确定无疑的，就是虽然英国选民单方面作出了自己的决定，但保持与英国的紧密联系依然符合欧盟的最佳利益。


Too much is at stake to allow the process to be dominated by petty power games that overshadow or undermine common interests, as happens so often in European politics.	如果放任这一进程被可能掩盖或损害共同利益的细小权力博弈所左右，就必将影响到大局，正如欧洲政治中经常出现的那样。


Economically, growth in the EU will undoubtedly benefit from an open trading relationship with Britain.	在经济上，欧盟的增长无疑将从一个开放的对英贸易关系中受益。


A free-trade agreement that includes financial services will minimize the damage from Brexit for all parties involved, because European firms will still rely on London as the region’s only global financial center.	包括金融服务在内的自由贸易协议将最大限度地减少脱欧对各方的伤害，因为欧洲企业仍然得依赖伦敦作为该地区唯一的全球金融中心。


Even if banking services migrate elsewhere in the eurozone, companies like Volvo, Siemens, and Total will still need London if they are to compete with companies like Toyota, GE, and Exxon.	即使银行服务在欧元区其他地区迁移，沃尔沃，西门子和道达尔这样的企业如果还想与丰田，通用电气，埃克森公司竞争的话，就没法绕开伦敦。


Politically, the EU and the UK will benefit from maintaining close cooperation because neither side is spared from the problems afflicting the region today.	在政治上，欧盟和英国都将从紧密合作中受益，因为任何一方都无法摆脱困扰本地区的众多问题。


These include increasing aggression from Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin; the rise of ISIS and the threat of homegrown terrorism; and refugees fleeing to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa.	这些措施包括俄罗斯及其总统普京日益增加的侵略行径； ISIS兴起和本土恐怖主义威胁；


Moreover, the Brexit vote does not change the strategic importance of NATO, where continued cooperation is necessary and where the EU needs the UK as much as the UK needs the EU.	以及从中东和北非涌入欧洲的难民。 此外，脱欧公投不会改变北约的战略重要性，维持合作非常必要，而且欧盟需要英国的程度并不亚于英国需要欧盟。


So, what should the EU do?	那么欧盟究竟该如何行动呢？


European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has called for more federalism – for more power to be delegated to the EU’s governing institutions.	欧盟委员会主席让-克劳德·容克（Jean-Claude Juncker）呼吁建立更强化的联邦制——将更多的权力委托给欧盟管理机构。


I consider Juncker a close friend, but I strongly disagree with him about this idea.	虽然我和容克私交不错，但我坚决不同意他这个想法。


Moving toward deeper integration or centralized control would be a dangerous path to take, for it would increase the risk of other members choosing to leave the EU.	向更深层次的一体化和中央控制体制推进将是一个危险的路径，因为这会增加其他成员国选择脱离欧盟的风险。


And, beyond that hazard, there are other reasons to avoid federalist measures.	而在这一危机之外，还有其他原因要求不我们不要走上联邦制的道路。


Consider the main economic argument offered by federalists: the eurozone needs a common fiscal policy to harmonize policy decisions, such as taxation.	联邦主义者所提出的主要经济依据是欧元区需要一个共同的财政政策来协调税收等政策决策。


This is wrong for two reasons.	但这是错误的，原因有二：


First, the EU’s fundamental economic problems are structural.	首先，欧盟的根本经济问题是结构性的。


Europeans will continue to gravitate toward populism if they do not see improvements in their standard of living, which will happen only with higher productivity growth.	只要欧洲人一天没有看到自身生活水平的改善，他们就将继续倾向于民粹主义，而这生活水平改善只能靠更高生产率增长来实现。


A single fiscal policy would not bring this about – and could make the problem worse.	一个单一财政政策无法解决该问题——并且可能使问题变得更糟。


What Europe needs, instead, is a reform strategy that increases competitiveness and reduces barriers to competition.	相反欧洲需要的是一个改革战略以提高竞争力并减少竞争壁垒。


In particular, EU policymakers should pursue policies that make labor markets more flexible.	欧盟政策制定者尤其应当实施令劳动力市场更加灵活的政策。


These would include lower marginal tax rates, tighter criteria for determining benefits eligibility, stricter requirements for job searches, more resources for skills training, and less restrictive employment-protection regulation.	这将包括降低边际税率，确定更严格的福利分配标准，为找工作设立更严格的要求，投入更多资源进行技能培训，同时减少限制性的就业保护法规。


The second reason is political.	第二个原因是政治上的。


Put plainly, there is no political support for the higher taxes and spending cuts that would be necessary with a common fiscal policy.	说白了，统一财政政策所需的加税和削减开支举措是不存在政治基础的。


Brussels would be accused of wasting taxpayers’ money, and any effort to disregard public opinion and impose fiscal integration on EU members would only backfire and fuel the wave of populist rage that carried the Brexiteers to victory.	人们会指责布鲁塞尔浪费纳税人的金钱，而任何在无视民意的情况下强加给欧盟成员国的财政一体化只会适得其反，助长了令英国脱欧最终实现的民粹主义浪潮。


Today, supporters of the EU must face the facts: an ever-closer union is not the European people’s will, even in the member states that would never choose to leave it.	如今欧盟的支持者必须面对这样的事实：一个不断紧密联合的联盟并非欧洲人民的意志，即使是那些绝不会选择离开的成员国中也是如此。


If the European Commission forces the post-Brexit narrative in this direction, the result will be the opposite of what was intended.	如果欧洲委员会非得要在这个方向上描绘后脱欧时期的图景，其结果必将大相径庭。


In fact, federalism is probably the single greatest threat to the future of the EU.	事实上，联邦制可能是对欧盟未来的最大一个威胁。


Those who want the EU to survive should resist the temptation to assert more control.	谁想要欧盟的存续下去的人应当抵制夺取更多控制权的诱惑。


We need a Europe that stands united because it wants to, not because it is forced to by new political super-structures that lack any underpinning of popular support.	我们不需要一个在缺乏民意支持的新超级政治体制强压之下构筑的欧洲一体化，而是一个符合欧洲本身意愿的一体欧洲。


Europe’s Battle on Four Fronts	欧洲的四大战役


LONDON – With Germany’s election over, Europe has reached the end of a season of continuous political upsets.	伦敦——随着德国大选结束，欧洲已经走到了持续政治动荡期的尽头。


It is now time for actions that adequately respond to the upheavals created by all these votes.	现在已经到了采取行动应对所有这些投票所造成混乱的时候。


Frans Timmermans, the European Commission’s first vice president, last year described the state of Europe as “multi-crisis”: Brexit, refugees, “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and Poland, the still-unresolved euro crisis, and the geopolitical risks attributable to Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.	欧洲委员会第一副总裁弗兰克·蒂姆曼去年曾用 “多重危机”这个词来形容欧洲的状态：英国脱欧、难民问题、匈牙利和波兰的“非自由民主”、仍然悬而未决的欧元危机以及应当归咎于唐纳德·特朗普和弗拉基米尔·普京的地缘政治危险因素。


All are challenging the “European project” that began 60 years ago with the Treaty of Rome.	所有这些都对60年前始于《罗马条约》的“欧洲计划”构成了挑战。


But crises invariably create opportunities.	但危机总是伴随着机遇。


And last year’s multi-crisis has produced a convergence of opportunities.	而去年的多重危机已经为欧洲带来了不止一个机遇。


European leaders no longer have an excuse for inaction while they wait for voters’ next rebuff.	欧洲领导人不再有不作为的借口，因为他们继续等下去，只会等来选民下一次打击。


Economic reforms in France, German unease about refugees and the euro, new attitudes toward European integration in Brussels, and signs that Brexit will be delayed indefinitely or even completely averted: all have created new possibilities for taming the dangerous forces unleashed by last year’s populist revolts.	法国的经济改革、德国对难民问题和欧元问题的担忧、布鲁塞尔对欧洲一体化的新态度以及英国脱欧将被无限延期甚或完全颠覆的迹象：所有这一切都为驯服去年民粹主义暴动所释放的危险力量创造了新的机遇。


But realizing these opportunities will require four simultaneous political and economic breakthroughs across Europe.	但抓住这些机遇需要在欧洲各国同时实现四大政治和经济突破。


France must act on over-regulation and excessive public spending.	法国必须采取行动，纠正过度监管和过度公共开支。


Germany must rethink fiscal austerity and monetary dogma.	德国则必须重新思考财政紧缩和死板的货币政策。


Britain needs a turnabout on nationalism and immigration.	英国需要转变在民族主义和移民问题上的立场。


And European Union officials must abandon their obsession with driving all member countries toward an “ever-closer union” that many of their citizens do not want.	而欧盟官员则必须放弃他们对促使所有成员国实现许多民众并不接受的“越来越紧密联盟”的痴迷。


Without simultaneous breakthroughs on all four fronts, it is hard to imagine progress on any of the separate aspects of the multi-crisis.	如果没有这四方面的同时突破，很难想象任何进展能够在多重危机的某个领域单独取得。


For example, any easing of German-inspired austerity will require evidence of economic reform in France; but French reforms will succeed only if Germany agrees to more generous fiscal rules and supports monetary policies that benefit the eurozone’s weaker members.	例如，德国推动的任何紧缩政策的放松都需要证明法国正在采取经济改革； 而只有在德国同意更宽松的财政规则并支持惠及欧元区弱势成员的货币政策的前提下法国的改革才能取得成功。


Similarly, Brexit could be averted or indefinitely delayed if the EU offered an extension of the negotiating period beyond March 2019 and suggested some modest concessions on immigration and welfare payments.	同样，如果欧盟同意将谈判期限延长到2019年3月以后并在移民和福利支付问题上做出某些微小的让步，才有可能避免或无限期推迟英国的脱欧进程。


But European leaders would consider offering such concessions only if they saw clear evidence that British voters were changing their minds about leaving the EU.	但欧洲领导人只有看到明确的证据，证明英国选民正在改变其离开欧盟初衷的情况下才会考虑作出这样的让步。


Now consider the German voters who have turned against Chancellor Angela Merkel and her SPD coalition partners, mainly because they resent what they see as uncontrolled immigration and unjustified transfer payments to Greece.	现在来看看反对安格拉·默克尔总理及其领导的社会民主党伙伴联盟的那些德国选民，他们持反对态度主要因为他们痛恨所看到的不受控制的移民以及针对希腊的不合理的转移支付。


These voters will oppose the fiscal and monetary integration required to stabilize the eurozone if they think their money will be spent on subsidizing poor countries on Europe’s periphery that refuse to cooperate on refugees and fail to abide by EU laws.	如果这些选民认为政府用他们的钱来补贴那些拒绝在难民问题上合作并拒绝遵守欧盟法律的欧洲周边贫困国家，他们就会反对稳定欧元区所必须的财政和货币一体化政策。


The only way to convince German voters that their money will not be misdirected would be to create separate political institutions and a separate budget for the eurozone.	说服德国选民他们的钱并未被乱用的唯一方法是建立欧元区独立的政治机构和预算计划。


This is the proposal advanced by French President Emmanuel Macron and supported in principle by Merkel.	这项提案由法国总统伊曼纽尔·马克龙提出并原则上获得了默克尔的赞同。


But plans for such a two-track Europe can advance only if Merkel can overcome German nationalists who want to break up the single currency, and only if Macron can silence integrationist zealots in Brussels who want to force all EU countries to join the eurozone.	但这样一项欧洲双轨制计划实行的前提是默克尔能够压制想要打破单一货币的德国民族主义者，同时还要求马克龙能够压制布鲁塞尔的一体化狂热分子，这些人希望迫使所有欧盟国家加入欧元区。


At first sight, simultaneous progress on many fronts seems too much to hope for.	乍看上去，同时在诸多方面取得进展的可能性是微乎其微的。


After all, if the necessary breakthroughs in France, Germany, Britain, and Brussels were each a 50-50 coin-toss, the probability of all four coins landing “heads” would be only 6.25%.	毕竟，如果法国、德国、英国和布鲁塞尔取得必要突破的概率都是掷硬币式的50%对50%，那么所有四个硬币都正面朝上的概率应当仅有6. 25%。


Fortunately, there are at least two reasons for dismissing such apparently logical scepticism.	幸运的是，至少有两个理由可以推翻如此明显的逻辑怀疑。


First, the political and economic decisions that leaders across Europe now face are anything but independent.	首先，欧洲各国领导人现在所面临的政治和经济决策都具有相关性。


What happens in Paris, London, and Brussels will depend crucially on the government program that Merkel negotiates with her eventual coalition partners in Berlin.	巴黎、伦敦和布鲁塞尔所发生的一切将完全取决于默克尔与其柏林最终联盟伙伴就政府计划的谈判结果。


And Germany’s coalition agreement will, in turn, depend on Macron’s diplomatic skills in advocating a distinct politico-economic identity for the eurozone.	而德国的联盟协议又反过来取决于马克龙的外交技巧，取决于他如何宣传欧元区显著的政治经济特征。


Equally important, the EU bureaucracy will have to embrace – enthusiastically – the concept of a two-track Europe.	同样重要的是，欧盟官僚机构必须热情拥抱双轨制欧洲的概念。


This means abandoning the assumption that all EU members are heading for the same destination, and an end to treating non-euro countries as second-class laggards (described condescendingly as “pre-ins”).	这意味着放弃所有欧盟成员国都在向同一目标努力的假设及改变将非欧元区国家视为落后的二等公民的态度（欧盟官僚机构之前曾屈尊俯就地将这些国家称之为“预备加入国”）。


Now, suppose that EU leaders recognized that the only feasible way to maintain European stability and progress would be by adopting the two-track or “concentric circles” model, with a more politically integrated eurozone surrounded by a looser economic confederation of non-euro countries.	现在，假设欧盟领导人认识到保持欧洲稳定和进步的唯一可行方法是实行双轨制或采用“同心圆”模式，靠近核心部位的是政治更为一体化的欧元区，而外围则是由非欧元区国家构成的松散的经济联盟。


Under these circumstances, Britain would be likely to change its mind about Brexit.	在这样的条件下，英国将很可能改变其退出欧盟的初衷。


Failing that, Britain would spend several years in a transition limbo and would then almost certainly re-join Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the outer ring of EU countries that object to the pooling of sovereignty required by the euro.	若非如此，英国将会花费几年时间陷入 困难的过渡状态，之后几乎肯定会重新加入瑞典、丹麦、波兰、匈牙利和捷克共和国等欧盟外围国家，反对欧元所要求的主权集中。


This outer orbit would also attract Norway and Switzerland through the irresistible pull of economic gravity.	这条外层轨道还将借助几乎不可抗拒的经济吸引力吸引挪威和瑞士的加入。


This points to the second reason to believe that EU leaders could achieve simultaneous political and economic breakthroughs across Europe.	由此推导出相信欧盟领导人能够在欧洲各国同时取得政治和经济突破的第二个理由。


The necessary decisions in Paris, Berlin, London, and Brussels are not just a random coin toss.	巴黎、柏林、伦敦和布鲁塞尔的必要决策绝不仅仅是随机的抛掷硬币。


There are strong incentives for voters and political leaders in all democratic countries to take decisions that support economic prosperity and political stability, once it becomes obvious that all the alternatives are economically damaging or politically dangerous.	而是只要事实证明所有其他备选方案都将对经济造成损害或带来政治风险，那么所有民主国家的选民和政治领袖都将强烈希望作出支持经济繁荣和政治稳定的决策。


This is the point that French voters arguably reached in April when they elected Macron, and a similar turning point is rapidly approaching in Britain, as the risks and contradictions of Brexit become ever clearer.	法国选民4月选出马克龙的时候可能已经达成了这项共识，同时随着英国脱欧的风险和矛盾变得越来越明显，英国类似的转折点可能正在加速到来之中。


All that remains is for Germany to recognize that its prosperity and security depends on a more integrated eurozone inside a more flexible EU.	余下的就是德国必须认识到它的繁荣和安全取决于进一步欧元区一体化，以及处在欧元区外围的更加灵活的欧盟。


Europe Between Trump and Xi	夹在特朗普和习近平之间的欧洲


PARIS – The most recent World Trade Organization ministerial conference, held in December in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was a fiasco.	巴黎——今年12月在阿根廷布宜诺斯艾利斯召开的最新一届世贸组织部长级会议失败得非常之惨。


Despite a limited agenda, the participants were unable to produce a joint statement.	尽管议程有限，但与会者仍未能达成联合声明。


But not everyone was disappointed by that outcome: China maintained a diplomatic silence, while the United States seemed to celebrate the meeting’s failure.	但并非各方都对这一结果感到失望：中国在外交方面保持沉默，而美国似乎庆幸这次会议的失败。


This is bad news for Europe, which was virtually alone in expressing its discontent.	这对欧洲而言是个坏消息，事实上只有欧洲在表达不满。


It is often pointed out that, in the face of US President Donald Trump’s blinkered protectionism, the European Union has an opportunity to assume a larger international leadership role, while strengthening its own position in global trade.	外界常常指出，在美国总统唐纳德·特朗普推行狭隘保护主义的情况下，欧盟有机会发挥更大的国际领导作用，同时强化其自身在全球贸易领域的国际地位。


The free-trade agreement recently signed with Japan will give the EU a clear advantage over the US in agriculture, and strengthening trade ties with Mexico could have a similar impact, as the US renegotiates the North American Free Trade Agreement.	最近与日本签署的自贸协定将导致欧盟在农业领域对美国取得明显的优势，而随着美国重新谈判北美自由贸易协定，加强与墨西哥的贸易关系也有可能产生类似的影响。


Some suggest that, to strengthen its position further, Europe should team up with China, which, despite its reticence at the WTO conference, has lately attempted to position itself as a champion of multilateralism.	有人提出为进一步巩固自身地位，欧洲应当与中国合作，中国虽然在世贸组织会议上保持沉默，但最近却试图将自身定位为多边主义的领导者。


A Sino-European partnership could be a powerful force offsetting America’s negative impact on international trade and cooperation.	中欧伙伴关系完全有可能成为抵消美国对国际贸易及合作所造成负面影响的强大力量。


Yet such a partnership is far from certain.	但这样一种伙伴关系距离确定还相去甚远。


Yes, Europe and China converge on a positive overall view of globalization and multilateralism.	是的，欧洲和中国对全球化和多边主义同样抱有积极的总体看法。


But whereas Europe supports a kind of “offensive multilateralism” that seeks to beef up existing institutions’ rules and enforcement mechanisms, China resists changes to existing standards, especially if they strengthen enforcement of rules that might constrain its ability to maximize its own advantages.	虽然欧洲支持一种旨在加强现有机构规则和执法机制的“进攻性多边主义”，但中国却拒绝改变现有标准，尤其如果这种改变有可能强化执行限制发挥其自身能力优势的规则。


Europe’s desire to force China to adhere to common rules aligns its interests more closely with the US, with which it shares many of the same grievances, from China’s continued subsidization of private enterprises to the persistence of barriers to market access.	欧洲迫使中国遵守共同规则的愿望导致其利益与美国更紧密地联系在一起，欧美拥有诸多共同的不满，从中国持续实行私营企业补贴到市场准入屏障。


According to one recent study, market access barriers erected by China have taken a high toll on the growth of EU exports.	最近的一项研究显示，中国的市场准入壁垒已经对欧洲出口增长造成了很大的影响。


But the US and the EU do not have the same vision for how to address these grievances.	但美国和欧盟在如何解决这些不满方面看法并不一致。


In order to limit abuse of WTO rules by China, Europe’s leaders want to be able to negotiate new, clearer rules, either through the framework of a bilateral investment agreement or through a plurilateral agreement on public procurement.	为限制中国滥用世贸规则，欧洲领导人希望能够通过双边投资协议框架或多边公共采购协议来谈判新的、更明确的规则。


Trump does not want to reform the system; he wants to sink it.	特朗普并不想改革现有制度； 他想要废弃它。


In fact, with Trump seeking to use bilateral deals to secure reductions in America’s trade deficit, the possibility that the US will leave the WTO altogether – a nightmare scenario for the EU, which advocates shared norms over force – cannot be excluded.	事实上，因为特朗普试图利用双边协定来减少美国贸易赤字，美国未来彻底退出世贸组织的可能性将无法排除——这对欧盟而言不啻于一场噩梦，后者一直主张不使用武力而使用共同规则。


Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, had his own solution.	特朗普的前任奥巴马提出了自己的解决方案。


New multilateral frameworks – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU – would circumscribe China’s room for maneuver.	新一代多边框架协定——与亚洲的跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）和与欧盟的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）——将会限制中国的回旋空间。


As such frameworks brought about regulatory convergence, the US and the EU would be able to define the standards of the emerging new global economy, forcing China either to accept those standards or be left behind.	因为这样的框架协定会带来监管趋同效应，美国和欧盟将能借此定义新兴全球经济标准，从而迫使中国要么接受要么被甩开。


But this project has now been fatally undermined.	但该计划已经遭到了致命的破坏。


Obama’s effort to finalize both agreements before the end of his presidency, though understandable, bred serious concerns about hastiness.	奥巴马试图在任期结束前最终敲定这两份协定的努力虽然可以理解，但却引发了对匆忙决策的严重关切。


Europeans recognized that full regulatory convergence between the US and the EU would, in reality, take at least a decade.	欧洲人认识到美国和欧洲间实现全面监管趋同实际上至少需要十年时间。


So, under pressure from their citizens, European leaders began to express concern about what the TTIP was lacking in terms of, say, environmental and sanitary regulations and transparency.	因此在国内民众的压力下，欧洲领导人开始对环境和卫生法规及透明度的缺乏表达关注。


Given their shared interest in regulatory convergence, particularly to strengthen their position vis-à-vis China, the US, and the EU will eventually have to resume cooperation toward that end.	因为在监管趋同，尤其是强化对中国立场方面拥有共同的利益，美国和欧盟最终将不得不恢复合作。


But, as long as Trump is in power, advocating bilateral reciprocity over multilateralism, such an effort will probably be impossible.	但只要特朗普掌权，积极宣扬双边互惠并压制多边主义，这样的努力也许根本就不可能。


Instead, Trump’s America will most likely continue to take advantage of its far-reaching commercial influence to secure strategic or political gains.	相反，特朗普的美国极有可能继续利用其深远的商业影响力来获取战略或政治好处。


On this front, Europe is at a significant disadvantage.	在这方面，欧洲的劣势相当严重。


The EU is, after all, not a state, and it does not speak on international matters with one voice.	欧盟毕竟不是一个国家，因此无法用一个声音在国际事务中表达自己的诉求。


It is not out of the question that the Chinese, who speak the language of realpolitik fluently, would prefer to meet the ad hoc demands of the Americans over the multilateral conditions of the Europeans.	那些熟练运用现实政治语言的中国人不是不可能宁愿满足美国人也不愿满足欧洲人对多边条件的特别要求。


In this context, the EU’s top priority should be to unify the positions of its member states, with the goal of overcoming the barriers erected by the US and creating shared systems for constraining China.	在这样的大背景下，欧盟的首要任务应当是统一成员国立场，以克服美国所设的壁垒和建立共同制约中国的制度。


But that is easier said than done.	但说来容易做来难。


As it stands, many EU countries resist the introduction of any trade restrictions, whether owing to an excessive commitment to liberal economic ideals or fear of jeopardizing their own interests in China by, say, establishing an EU mechanism for managing foreign investment.	目前，许多欧盟国家反对引入任何贸易限制，无论出于对自由经济理想的过度痴迷亦或是害怕欧盟管理国外投资共同机制的建立会有损于它们自身在中国的利益。


The emergence of “illiberal” governments in Central and Eastern Europe complicates matters further for the EU.	中东欧地区“非自由”政府的兴起导致欧盟所面临的局面更加复杂。


These governments have no interest in any form of multilateralism, as they have embraced a narrow view of their interests.	上述政府对任何形式的多边主义都不感兴趣，因为他们只在乎自身的狭隘利益。


They often seem fascinated by the logic of realpolitik espoused by Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.	它们看似时常沉迷于特朗普、中国主席习近平和俄罗斯总统普京所推崇的现实政治逻辑。


Moreover, these countries’ pursuit of their commercial interests could come at the expense of EU procurement rules.	不仅如此，这些国家可能以损害欧盟采购规则为代价来追求其自身的商业利益。


And they are not alone within the EU.	而且这种做法在欧盟内部并不稀奇。


Greece, for example, has accepted large amounts of Chinese investment.	例如希腊已经接受了大笔的中国投资。


The EU then refused to mention China explicitly in a resolution on the conflict in the South China Sea.	欧盟而后又在涉及南海冲突的一项决议中明确拒绝提到中国的名字。


To be sure, European countries are not wrong to welcome Chinese investment.	可以肯定，欧洲国家欢迎中国投资并没有错。


But China should be reciprocating, offering European investment in China a warmer welcome.	但中国应当互惠互利，更积极地欢迎欧洲在中国的投资。


That is why the EU and China should work to complete the bilateral investment treaty that they have been negotiating for years, with limited progress.	欧盟和中国应当努力完成双方已经谈判数年但却进展有限的双边投资条约。


Such a treaty should rely on reciprocal rules, including the dismantling of barriers to China’s market.	这样的条约应当以互惠原则为基础，包括拆除中国市场存在的投资壁垒。


French President Emmanuel Macron is trying to advance offensive multilateralism.	法国总统伊曼纽尔·马克龙正竭力推进进攻型多边主义。


But unless the EU as a whole embraces the cause, Europe – caught between China, which has a very conservative but outdated interpretation of multilateralism, and Trump, who wants to get rid of it – risks becoming a casualty.	但除非欧盟作为一个整体拥护这项事业，否则夹在信奉非常保守但又过时的多边主义解读的中国和想要彻底废除多边主义的特朗普之间的欧盟就很有可能成为牺牲品。


Securing Post-Brexit Europe	捍卫英国退出后的欧洲


MADRID – It is said that good things come to those who wait.	马德里—据说好事总是降临到耐心等待的人头上。


If so, then the European Union’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, more than a decade overdue, must be a very good thing.	果真如此的话，那么姗姗来迟十年的欧盟新全球外交和安全政策战略（Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy）就是一件大好事。


Actually, it is exactly what Europe needs.	实际上，它正是欧洲所需要的。


But the timing of its release – in the immediate aftermath of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU – could relegate it to irrelevance.	但其发布时机——英国投票脱离欧盟之后立即发布——可能导致它变成鸡肋。


How the EU moves forward with the strategy will be a bellwether for the future of the European project.	欧盟如何推进该战略将是欧洲工程未来的决定性因素。


The strategy, developed by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, does precisely what it should: it provides a coherent guiding vision and a flexible framework for adopting concrete policies.	该战略由欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表费德里卡·墨赫里尼（Federica Mogherini）制定，可谓切中要害：它提供了一个一致的指导性愿景和一个采纳具体政策的灵活框架。


It strikes the ideal balance between realism and ambition, recognizing the EU’s limitations and pinpointing the improvements that are needed.	它实现了务实和进取的完美平衡，承认欧盟的局限性，并精确指明了需要的改进之处。


The strategy’s grounded perspective is apparent from the first sentence: “We need a stronger Europe.”	该战略“接地气”的视角可谓开宗明义：“我们需要一个更强大的欧洲。


This signals a major shift from the previous, outdated strategy, issued in 2003, whose much-maligned opening sentence declared, “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”	”这表明它与发布于2003年的上一版过时战略有了重大改变。 上一版的第一句话显得相当别有用心：“欧洲从未如此繁荣，如此安全，如此自由。


Specifically, the strategy emphasizes the importance of the EU’s enduring soft power, in which prospective enlargement plays an important role, while acknowledging that soft power alone is not enough to ensure security.	具体而言，该战略强调欧洲保持软实力的重要性，其中潜在的扩张在这方面起着重要作用； 同时也承认光有软实力不足以确保安全。


Moreover, it implicitly establishes the right sequence for the development of the EU’s approach to the world, by offering a far more specific vision for addressing regional challenges than it does for global challenges.	此外，它所给出的解决地区挑战的愿景要比解决全球挑战的愿景具体得多，这间接地给出了欧盟全球方针制定的正确顺序。


The message is clear: the EU needs to get its act together within its neighborhood before it can grasp a broader role.	个中含义是明确的：欧盟需要先在周边团结一致，然后才能争取更大的角色。


All of this is well and good, but it will amount to nothing if EU leaders do not “join up,” as Mogherini puts it, to ensure that the strategy fulfills its potential.	所有这些都很好，但如果欧盟领导人不像墨赫里尼所说的那样“联合”起来以确保该战略的潜力得到充分实现，一切都是空谈。


And, so far, the outlook does not look particularly promising.	而到目前为止，前景并不十分乐观。


“Brexit,” which has thrown global markets into turmoil and raised serious questions about the Union’s future, has eclipsed the release of the security strategy, which barely got a mention in the conclusions of the latest European Council summit.	“英国退出”已经让全球市场陷入混乱，也提出了关于欧盟未来的严肃问题，它让新安全战略的发布黯然失色，在最近的欧洲理事会峰会决议中对后者几乎没有提及。


Making matters worse, instead of inspiring much-needed soul-searching among EU leaders, the British referendum seems to have spurred many to allow national political interests, not to mention personal ambitions, to guide their thinking.	更糟糕的是，英国公投并没有启发欧盟领导人进行急需的扪心自问，反而似乎刺激了许多人让国家政治利益——更不用说个人野心了——来指导思维。


This self-serving impulse was on display in European Parliament President Martin Schulz’s fiery comments calling for the UK to invoke Article 50 (the withdrawal procedure) immediately – a move surely intended as a shot across the bow of his political rival, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had called for deliberation and time.	这一自利冲动可以从欧洲议会主席马丁·舒尔茨激烈的评论中一窥端倪。 舒尔茨要求英国立刻启动第50条（退欧程序）——这显然是为了警告他的政治对手、呼吁谨慎考虑和给英国时间的德国总理默克尔。


It can also be seen in French President François Hollande’s tough posturing, which seems motivated by the expectation of a battle with the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen in next year’s presidential election.	这一自利冲动也可以从法国总统奥朗德的强硬姿态中一窥端倪。 奥朗德如此反应似乎受到极右翼政党国民阵线的马琳·勒庞可能在明年的总统大选中与他进行一番恶斗的刺激。


And it is abundantly clear in the struggle between the European Council and the European Commission for control over the forthcoming Brexit negotiations, in which the Council is concerned primarily about upholding the autonomy of the member states.	另一个可以清楚地表明这一自利冲动的现象是欧洲理事会和欧盟委员会为了控制即将到来的英国退欧谈判而斗得不可开交，欧洲理事会担心的主要是鼓励成员国的自治权。


This is precisely the kind of short-sightedness that has long undermined the EU’s image in the world and, by reinforcing the impression of fecklessness and ineptitude, in the member states as well.	长期以来，正是这种短视损害了欧盟在世界和成员国（通过强化无能和愚蠢的印象）的形象。


If it continues, Brexit could, as the doomsayers warn, be the EU’s downfall.	如果这一局面继续下去，如末日论者所警告的，英国退出可能标志着欧盟解体。


If, instead, EU leaders rise to the challenge that Brexit poses and come together to realize the vision set out in the new global strategy, the EU could emerge from this tumultuous period stronger than ever.	相反，如果欧盟领导人站出来直面英国退出所带来的挑战，团结一致地实现新全球战略中所提出的愿景，那么欧盟能够从这一混乱时期中走出并变得比以往更加强大。


In uncertain times, Europe must decide how it will address the existential challenges it faces.	在不确定的时代，欧洲必须决定如何应对它所面临的生存挑战。


The sensible way forward is to minimize weaknesses by maximizing collective strengths.	明智的前进之道是通过尽量扩大集体优势来尽量缩小劣势。


The alternative – for each country to go its own way, as the British have chosen to do – would be reckless.	否则——像英国所选择的那样，各国各走各路——就将失之鲁莽。


But the most dangerous approach – the one that would bring the most strife and insecurity – would be to continue pretending to be united, while acting independently.	但最危险的方针——将带来最严重的冲突和不安全的方针——是继续假装统一，同时各自为政。


Already, EU leaders have missed an important opportunity.	欧盟领导人已经失去了一个重要机会。


They could have woven the process of defining Europe’s aspirations, and of drafting a security strategy that reflected them, into broader discussions of what the EU should be, including at the most recent European Council summit.	他们本可以主导制定欧洲的愿望和起草反映这些愿望的安全战略的过程，将它转换为关于欧盟应该怎样的大讨论，在包括最近的欧盟理事会等场合进行。


They should not also miss the opportunity presented by the strategy that has been produced.	他们不应该再次失去已经出台的新战略所带来的机会。


Such opportunities do not come along every day.	这些机会不会每天都有。


Whether the new EU strategy symbolizes the start of a new chapter for Europe or a dead letter about a defunct project will depend on whether European leaders can overcome their parochialism and commit to cooperation.	新欧盟战略标志着欧洲新篇章的开始，还是标志着欧洲工程的死亡，取决于欧洲领导人是否可以克服狭隘，致力于合作。


The early returns are not promising.	早期的转变不容乐观。


Tackling Migration at the Source	从源头解决移民问题


WASHINGTON, DC – For citizens of poor countries, migration often is a highly appealing option.	华盛顿——对贫困国家的公民来说，移民的选项往往非常具有吸引力。


The journey to a new country is often perilous, but it promises far greater economic opportunity: average per capita incomes in advanced economies can be more than 50 times higher (in terms of purchasing power parity) than those in the developing world.	前往新国家的旅程往往伴随着危险，但却很可能带来重大的经济机遇：发达经济体的人均收入均值（以购买力平价计算）可以比发展中世界高出50倍乃至更多。


In many cases, migrants’ physical security improves as well.	在许多情况下，也会显著改善移民的人身安全状况。


Yet, for recipient countries, immigration remains a contentious topic, with governments struggling to settle on policies that will enable their economies to reap the benefits and avoid incurring excessive costs.	但对接收国来说，移民仍然是一个颇具争议的话题，接收国政府竭尽全力制定政策从而使本国经济能在避免付出过高的成本的同时获得收益。


Immigration is a particularly salient topic of political debate in Europe and the United States.	移民是欧美国家特别突出的一项政治争议话题。


Even in Japan, which has largely closed its borders to migrants, the need to find ways to cope with rapid population aging has lately been stimulating discussion of the issue.	即使在基本对移民关闭边境的日本，寻找方法应对人口快速老龄化的必要性最近也引发了对这一问题的讨论。


In all of these countries, the debate tends to boil down to three basic positions.	在所有这些国家，讨论往往归结于三个基本立场。


The first – espoused by a small minority, and lacking significant political support – is that immigration is fundamentally beneficial to an advanced country, as newcomers can mitigate demographic challenges and contribute to the economy’s skills base.	第一种观点——其支持者往往是少数族裔，并且缺乏主要势力的政治支持——即移民主要为发达国家带来好处，因为新移民可以缓解人口压力并加固经济的技术根基。


The second position is precisely the opposite: immigration should be prevented by all available means.	第二种立场则恰恰相反：即发达经济体应当竭尽全力防止移民流入。


Proponents of this view often argue that migrants drive down wages, particularly at the lower end of the income distribution, undermining natives’ living standards.	这种观点的支持者往往认为移民压低工资，特别是在收入分配的低层阶段，从而导致当地人的生活水平下降。


They also argue that migrants dilute the recipient country’s culture and traditions – a claim with an emotional pull that economists often underestimate.	他们还认为移民会淡化接收国的文化和传统——经济学家往往会低估这种说法在情绪方面的吸引力。


The third position falls somewhere between these extremes.	第三种立场处于这两种极端之间。


It recognizes the potential benefits of some immigration, but calls for strict proficiency tests, to ensure that only migrants who can fill a skills gap in the recipient country are accepted.	它承认某些移民潜在的好处，但呼吁严格执行能力测试，以确保只有填补接收国某项技能空白的移民才会被接受。


That way, immigration will improve the quality of supply in the labor market and boost firms’ competitiveness, without generating cultural pressures.	这样，移民就能在不造成文化压力的情况下，提高劳动力市场的供给质量并提升企业竞争力。


Of course, this approach looks quite different from the perspective of migrants’ home countries, which lose not only valuable skilled labor, but also any resources invested in that labor, say, through the education system.	当然，从移民来源国的角度看，这种方法的效果是截然不同的，它们不仅损失了有价值的熟练劳动者，还损失了投资在这名劳动者身上的一切资源（比方说通过教育体系）。


While a country may benefit from its expatriates’ remittances, it is the migrants alone who secure the overall benefits of relocating.	虽然一个国家可以从海外人员的汇款中得到好处，但只有移民本人能享受国外生活的总体便利。


In any case, when advanced countries accept only a small number of skilled migrants, they do nothing to diminish the pressure that drives migration flows, which overwhelmingly comprise people who lack the new country’s required skills.	无论如何，当发达国家只接收少量技术移民时，他们其实未采取任何措施来减轻促使移民流动的压力，而多数流动的移民并不掌握新国家所需的技术。


And those pressures are powerful, as demonstrated by the tragic situation in the Mediterranean Sea, where more than a thousand refugees on the treacherous route from Africa to Europe died in the first four months of this year.	就像地中海悲惨局势所表明的那样，这样的压力非常强势，仅今年前四个月就有超过一千名难民在从非洲到欧洲的危险旅途中丧生。


If these pressures are allowed to persist, many migrants will ultimately make it to the developed world, one way or another.	如果坐视这样的压力继续下去，许多移民最终将以这样或那样的方式来到发达世界。


And while immigration liberals are right that migrants will help to ease demographic pressures in recipient countries, the prohibitionists are right that the newcomers will place considerable cultural stress on their new communities, particularly in Europe.	尽管移民自由主义者认为移民有助于缓解接收国的人口压力确有道理，但反对者认为新移民将对新社区（尤其是欧洲）造成巨大文化压力的论调也不无道理。


This is why any solution to the migration challenge must focus on spurring development in migrants’ home countries.	这也解释了为什么针对移民问题的任何解决方案都必须着眼于促进移民本国的发展。


For Europe, the focus should be on Africa, the main source of migration flows.	对欧洲来说，需要重点关注非洲问题，因为非洲是欧洲移民流动的主要来源地。


More rapid economic growth in Africa would, over time, greatly reduce the pressure that Europe faces.	促进非洲经济快速增长将随着时间的推移大大降低欧洲所面临的压力。


Africa’s long-term development will of course require greater political stability and peace; in the meantime, however, there are steps that Europe can take to help spur growth.	非洲的长期发展当然需要加强和平与政治稳定； 但与此同时，欧洲可以采取某些措施来协助刺激经济。


While Africa has plenty of natural resources, it lacks the capital and knowhow needed to support a significant growth acceleration.	尽管非洲拥有大量的自然资源，但却缺乏支持经济显著加速的资本和专业知识。


Public resources are simply inadequate to supply the bulk of that capital.	公共资源根本不足以提供所需开发资金的主体。


So, as has lately been recognized, investment must come from the private sector, as must critical skills and access to more developed markets.	因此，人们最近开始认可投资必须来源于私营部门，私营部门还必须提供关键技术和发达国家市场准入能力。


But tapping private investment requires the public sector to take some enabling steps, joined by the philanthropic sector, which also has significant resources to contribute.	但利用私人投资需要公共部门采取特定的扶持措施，吸引慈善行业加盟，上述行业手中掌握的大量资源也可以协助达到这样的目的。


This is not to say that public investment and philanthropy should subsidize inherently unprofitable projects.	这并不是说公共投资和慈善事业应当补贴从本质上无利可图的项目。


On the contrary, that would leave everyone worse off in the long run.	恰恰相反，从长远看，这不符合所有相关方的利益。


The goal should be to identify projects that, despite being economically profitable, are unattractive to private investors, owing to institutional and other barriers, and then work to remove those obstacles.	因此目标应当是找到尽管在经济上有利可图，但却因为制度和其他障碍而无法吸引私人投资者的项目，然后，竭尽全力保证这些障碍的消除。


One key barrier to private investment in Africa is risk.	对非洲私人投资的一个主要障碍是风险。


When the investment environment is considered uncertain, as is the case in most developing countries, investors demand a risk premium on virtually any project, even those with potentially high rates of return.	就像多数发展中国家那样，当投资环境被认为不确定时，投资者会对几乎任何项目要求风险溢价，就连潜在回报率很高的项目也无法幸免。


Individual project risk is, after all, very difficult to measure in such a context.	毕竟，在这样的环境下衡量单个项目的风险有着很大的难度。


The public sector can help with risk-pooling measures such as carrying certain tranches of risk or providing insurance.	公共部门可以通过采取承担一定风险或提供保险的风险汇总措施为私人资本提供帮助。


Such risk pooling, accompanied by institution-building across all sectors (not just health and education), could go a long way toward boosting economic growth and development in Africa and elsewhere.	这样的风险汇总辅之以横跨所有行业的制度建设（不仅限于医疗和教育），可能会对促进经济增长和非洲及其他地区的发展起到很强的推动作用。


The positive impact of this approach would be far-reaching – beginning with a reduction in migration pressure.	这种做法将产生深远的积极影响——首先就是减轻移民压力。


The impact would be even greater if new investment targeted areas with the largest number of displaced persons and migrants-in-waiting, as proposed by a new “Commission on Forced Displacement”.	如果像新成立的“被迫流离失所者委员会”所建议的那样，针对流离失所和潜在移民人数最多的目标区域新增投资，将会产生更大的影响。


Investment-driven growth is no substitute for conflict resolution and political stabilization; on the contrary, the former cannot be sustained without progress on the latter.	投资驱动的经济发展不能取代冲突化解和政治稳定； 恰恰相反，如果后者迟迟不能向前推进前者所取得的进展很可能也无法维系。


But an economic boost could serve as an important source of much-needed hope – and the start of a virtuous circle of peace and prosperity.	但经济增长可以作为迫切需要的希望的重要来源——也是建立和平与繁荣良性循环的开始。


A New Growth Model for Europe’s Neighborhood	欧洲近邻的新增长模式


LONDON – More than ten years after the global financial crisis, the world economy is finally enjoying a broad-based recovery.	伦敦—全球金融危机已经过去了十年多，世界经济终于迎来了广泛复苏。


Europe and its broader neighborhood are no exception: economic growth in almost every country in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, as well as in Russia and Turkey, has accelerated in the last year, and is projected to remain robust.	欧洲及其广大近邻也不例外：在中东欧、中亚、中东、北非以及俄罗斯和土耳其，几乎所有国家经济增长去年增长都有所提高，预计未来也将保持强劲增长。


Yet new challenges loom.	但新挑战呼之欲出。


If not addressed, these regions’ prospects will dim.	如果不加以解决，这些地区前途堪忧。


As the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s new Transition Report shows, before the Great Recession, the countries of Europe and its broader neighborhood were outperforming comparable emerging economies elsewhere.	欧洲复兴开发银行的新《转型报告》（Transition Report）显示，大衰退前欧洲及其广大近邻诸国表现要好于其他地区的可比新兴经济体。


In recent years, however, the tables have turned – and the gap is growing.	但在最近几年中，情况发生了逆转，并且差距不断扩大。


The explanation is straightforward.	原因很简单。


Previously, Europe and its broader neighborhood enjoyed high total factor productivity (TFP) growth.	此前，欧洲及其广大近邻享受了较高的全要素生产率增长。


By eliminating many of the inefficiencies inherited from their socialist or otherwise dirigiste pasts, these countries were putting their capital and labor to increasingly good use.	这些国家取摆脱了源自社会主义或其他国家干预主义历史所造成的低效率，将资本和劳动力用于更加合适的用途。


Yet, by 2009, the low-hanging fruit had been picked, and investment in fixed capital had fallen below the levels in emerging economies elsewhere.	但到了2009年，容易的果实已经摘尽，固定资本投资下降到其他新兴经济体水平之下。


Faced with the large amounts of non-performing loans inherited from the crisis, countries shifted their attention to deleveraging, leaving investment and TFP growth to stall.	面临大量危机所产生的不良贷款的这些国家的注意力转到了去杠杆化上，投资和全要素生产率增长陷入停滞。


Countries in Europe and its broader neighborhood – even those whose economies are less developed – cannot base long-term growth on a low-wage comparative advantage.	欧洲及其广大近邻诸国——即使是其中的较不发达经济体——无法依靠低工资比较优势实现长期增长。


Instead, they must lay the foundations of future-oriented growth models, underpinned by stronger human capital and innovation.	相反，它们必须为未来导向的增长模式打好基础，而其根本在于加强人力资本和创新。


This demands, first and foremost, deeper integration into the global economy.	这首先要求更加深入地融入全球经济。


Nowadays, access to larger markets is vital to generating incentives for innovation and productivity growth.	如今，能够进入更大的市场是产生创新红色生产率增长激励的关键。


European Union countries obviously benefit from the single market.	欧盟国家显然因为单一市场而获益良多。


For emerging Europe and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, taking advantage of economies of scale will require reduced trade barriers and better connectivity.	但对新兴欧洲和中东和北非（MENA）国家来说，利用规模经济需要降低贸易壁垒、加强联动性。


In concrete terms, this means that emerging Europe and the MENA region need to invest more in infrastructure.	具体而言，这意味着新兴欧洲和MENA地区需要加强基础设施投资。


And, in fact, according to the Transition Report’s estimates, these regions’ infrastructure investment requirements amount to about €2.2 trillion ($2.6 trillion).	而事实上，据《转型报告》的估算，这些地区的基础设施投资要求高达约2. 2万亿欧元。


To meet this need, fiscally constrained countries will have to mobilize private resources, via private-public partnerships.	要满足这一需求，财政吃紧的国家必须通过公私合作来动员私人资源。


Developed-country actors often worry that infrastructure investments in emerging economies may result in “roads to nowhere,” with money being channeled toward remote regions where nobody lives or from which existing residents are eager to leave, using those shiny new roads.	发达国家行动方常常担忧新兴经济体的基础设施投资会导致“断头路”，资金被用在了没什么人居住或现有居民急切地想要利用这些新造好的公路逃之大吉的偏远地区。


But this does not have to be the case.	但并不总是如此。


Turkey is a case in point.	土耳其是一个很好的例子。


In 2002, the country launched a major effort to turn 25% of its road network into dual carriageways over the course of about ten years.	2002年，土耳其实施了一项浩大工程，在十年时间里将25%的公路网络拓宽为双车道。


The EBRD’s Transition Report’s analysis shows that this investment has had a major impact on domestic trade and created jobs in the country’s previously underdeveloped eastern regions.	欧洲复兴开发银行的《转型报告》分析表明，这项投资对国内贸易和此前不发达的东部地区的就业创造都产生了重要影响。


As countries attempt to attract financing for their own infrastructure projects, they should learn from – and highlight for potential donors – such successes.	各国在为自身基础设施项目招商引资时，应该从这样的成功案例中汲取经验，并向潜在出资者进行宣传。


Designing effective strategies for long-term infrastructure investment requires attention to another key area: the environment.	制定有效的长期基础设施投资战略需要关注的另一项关键领域是环境。


Countries must anticipate the regulatory changes that will arise, as they attempt, say, to meet their commitments under the Paris climate agreement.	各国必须预备面对为了（比如）兑现巴黎气候协定承诺而必须做出的监管变化。


This approach is in line with the market consensus.	这一方针与市场共识一致。


Using the FTSE Russell Low Carbon Economy database, the ERBD found that while greener firms remain less profitable than their less sustainable counterparts – they are, after all, largely younger and smaller – they are growing faster.	欧洲复兴开发银行用据富时罗素低碳经济（FTSE Russell Low Carbon Economy）数据库的数据发现，尽管绿色企业的盈利能力较之可持续性较差的同行仍显不足——毕竟绿色企业大多比较年轻，规模也较小——但增长很快。


Perhaps more important, we found that firms with a higher share of green revenues have higher stock-market valuations (price-to-earnings ratios), even if their current return on equity is lower than that of their non-green peers.	也许更重要的是，我们发现绿色收入较高的企业，股市估值（市盈率）也较高，即使它们当前权益回报率要低于它们的非绿色同行。


This suggests that investors expect stronger growth in greener market segments, or at least attach more value to supporting greener firms.	这表明，投资者预期绿色市场细分能产生更强的增长，或至少愿意赋予更高估值来支持绿色企业。


In places where fossil fuels are adequately priced, firms themselves also recognize the benefits of greener, more energy-efficient technologies.	在化石燃料价格较高的地区，企业本身也认识到更加绿色、能源效率更高的技术的好处。


Unfortunately, many countries still have in place substantial energy subsidies, which must be phased out to propel the shift toward a green economy.	不幸的是，许多国家仍然实施巨额能源补贴，要想推动绿色经济转型，这一补贴必须取消。


To ensure that the neediest households do not suffer, the removal of subsidies can be offset by targeted assistance, as has been done recently in Belarus, Egypt, and Ukraine.	为了确保最有需要的家庭不会蒙受损失，取消补贴必须辅之以定向补助，最近的白俄罗斯、埃及和乌克兰都采取了这样的做法。


A new growth model for Europe’s neighborhood must also involve a rebalancing of the financial system.	欧洲近邻的新增长模式还必须包括金融系统的再平衡。


Given the Great Recession’s legacy of non-performing loans, financing for new investment is more likely to come from equity than from debt.	考虑到大萧条带来的不良贷款的遗留问题，新投资项目的融资更可能来自股本而非债务。


Fortunately, equity investors are also oriented toward the long term, and are increasingly willing to buy greener assets.	幸运的是，权益投资者也开始转向长期视角，越来越愿意购买绿色资产。


Yet greater reliance on equity finance will require better state and corporate governance, underpinned by the rule of law.	但更多依靠权益融资要求更好的国家和公司治理，而这又需要以法治为基础。


Achieving that will be no easy feat. But EBRD research implies that, at least in the European neighborhood, progress would benefit not just the economy – including by promoting investment and innovation – but also the environment and society as a whole.	实现这一点绝非易事，但欧洲复兴开发银行的研究表明，至少在欧洲近邻，这方面的进步不但能够令经济——包括通过促进投资和创新实现——受益，也将惠及整体环境和社会。


That is an investment worth making.	这样的投资是非常值得的。


A Dramatic Comeback for Europe	欧洲的戏剧性回归


LONDON – The Dutch are famous for building dykes that hold back the tides and storms sweeping across the Atlantic.	伦敦—荷兰人以建造大坝闻名于世，这些大坝阻挡了横扫大西洋的大潮和大风。


Have the Dutch now done it again, holding back the wave of populist politics that seemed to be threatening Europe after last year’s Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s victory in the United States?	现在，荷兰人再次建成了一座大坝——阻挡民粹主义浪潮政治的大坝吗？ 自去年英国脱欧公投和特朗普当选美国总统以来，这股民粹主义浪潮便威胁着欧洲。


The unexpectedly weak performance of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Dutch election on March 15 seems to suggest this.	吉尔特·维尔德斯（Geert Wilders）的自由党（PVV）在5月15日的荷兰选举中令人意外地表现低迷，这似乎印证了这一点。


Despite predictions running as high as 25% of the popular vote for Wilders, the PVV gained only 13%.	尽管预测结果显示维尔德斯的支持率高达25%，但PVV最后只赢得13%的选票。


If voters in France’s upcoming presidential election prove closer to the Dutch than to Americans and Britons in their susceptibility to xenophobia and protectionism, their decision will have global implications for politics, economics, and the ideology of global capitalism.	如果在即将举行的法国总统选举中，选民再次表现出更加接近于荷兰而不是美国和英国的对仇外主义和保护主义的敏感性，他们的决定将影响到全球政治、经济和资本主义意识形态。


A swing back to the center in continental Europe would strongly suggest that the unexpected victories for populist and anti-globalization movements in the US and Britain were not primarily a response to unemployment and disappointing economic performance since the financial crisis, mass migration, or the threat of Islamist terrorism.	欧洲大陆若能回归中间派，将强烈地表明，民粹主义和反全球化运动在美国和英国所取得的出人意料的胜利主要不是因为失业和金融危机以来令人失望的经济表现、大量移民，或伊斯兰恐怖主义威胁。


This conclusion follows from the fact that France has suffered from much higher unemployment and a longer post-crisis recession than either the US or Britain, as well as experiencing more problems with terrorism and Islamic militancy.	这一结论所依据的事实是，比起美国和英国，法国所承受的失业率要大得多，危机后衰退期要长得多，并且恐怖主义和伊斯兰斗争的问题也要严重得多。


If German voters in the autumn follow the French and Dutch in moving back toward the political center, immigration will also be discredited as the root cause of populism.	如果德国选民在秋天也步法国和荷兰的后尘，回归政治中间派，那么移民也将从民粹主义的原因清单中除名。


After all, Germany has experienced a much larger influx of foreigners than Britain or the US.	毕竟，德国所接受的外国人数量远远多于英国或美国。


Instead, populism will look more like an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, motivated less by immigration and economic policy than by conservative cultural attitudes among Trump and Brexit voters and the unusual demographic alliances pitting old against young, rural against urban, and university graduates against less educated voters in the US and Britain.	相反，民粹主义将更像是一个盎格鲁-萨克逊现象，其动机与其说是渔民和经济政策，不如说是特朗普和英国选民的保守的文化态度，以及导致两国老少对立、城乡对立、大学毕业生和文化层次较低选民对立的反常的人口分层结盟。


The economic implications will also be far-reaching if the center holds in Europe.	如果中间派在欧洲稳住阵脚，对经济的影响也将十分深远。


The European Union is a bigger trading partner than the US for most emerging economies.	对于大部分新兴经济体来说，欧盟是比美国更大的贸易伙伴。


And the euro is the only real alternative to the dollar as an international currency.	欧元也是唯一真正能够替代美元的国际货币。


So the EU’s continuing commitment to a philosophy of open trade, globalization, and carbon reduction could be sufficient to prevent a paradigm shift toward protectionism and climate-change denial that seemed almost inevitable with Trump’s election.	因此，欧盟继续坚守开放贸易、全球化和碳减排承诺或许足以阻止转向保护主义和否认气候变化的范式转变。 而随着特朗普的当选，这两个转变大有不可避免之势。


Such a change in global leadership would require a dramatic improvement in Europe’s economic performance.	全球领导层的如此变化需要欧洲经济表现发生很大起色。


Fortunately, that outcome can be expected if voters reject populist politics in France and Germany.	幸运的是，如果法国和德国的选民拒绝民粹主义政治，经济表现改善是可以期待的。


The EU has suffered a prolonged economic slump since the 2008 financial crisis, largely because the German government vetoed the kind of monetary and fiscal stimulus that helped to pull the US out of recession in 2010.	自2008年金融危机以来，欧盟经历了长时间的经济萧条，这主要是因为德国政府否决了帮助美国2010年就走出衰退的货币和财政刺激。


Germany’s veto on US-style quantitative easing was also the main reason for the near-collapse of the single currency in 2012.	德国否决美国式量化宽松也是2012年欧洲单一货币濒临崩溃的主要原因。


But a dramatic change to European policy and economic conditions occurred in March 2015, when the European Central Bank belatedly launched a bond-buying program similar to America’s, but on a far larger scale.	但在2015年，欧洲政策和经济条件发生了戏剧性变化。 欧洲央行终于启动了类似于美国的债券购买计划，但规模更大。


By purchasing almost three times the total net issuance of eurozone bonds, the ECB effectively circumvented eurozone rules and began to monetize Europe’s government deficits, as well as creating a mutual support system between strong economies such as Germany and weaker ones like Italy and Spain.	欧洲央行购买了几乎三倍于欧元区净发行量的债券，有效地规避了欧元区规则，开始将欧洲政府赤字货币化，还在德国等坚挺经济体和意大利和西班牙等疲软经济体之间建立了一套互相支持系统。


The ECB’s actions quickly reversed the fragmentation of the European banking system and eliminated fears of a euro breakup.	欧洲央行的行动很快就扭转了欧洲银行体系四分五裂的局面，也消除了对欧元解体的担忧。


The immediate result was an upsurge in confidence among both businesses and consumers.	这立刻就提升了企业和消费者的信心。


By last summer, most of Europe was already enjoying a decent recovery, when renewed fears of disintegration, this time caused by politics, not finance, suddenly overwhelmed the improvement in economic conditions.	到去年夏天，大部分欧洲国家复苏形势喜人，就在此时，新的分裂担忧接踵而至——这一回的原因是政治，而不是金融——一夜之间就压倒了经济条件的改善。


Brexit and Trump created an expectation that Europe would be the next domino to fall to populism in the looming Dutch, French, and German elections.	英国脱欧和特朗普当选形成了一个预期：随着荷兰、法国和德国大选的巨型，欧洲可能将是下一块倒向民粹主义的多米诺骨牌。


Of course, this possibility still cannot be dismissed, which is why international investors remain cautious about Europe.	当然，这一可能仍然不可忽视，因此，国际投资者仍然对欧洲保持谨慎。


But if the populist victories that worry investors do not in fact happen, a surge of business and consumer confidence will send waves of investment flowing into the eurozone.	但如果投资者所担心的民粹主义胜利实际上没有发生，那么商业和消费者信心的大反弹将给欧元区带来巨大的投资流。


The key event will be the final round of the French election on May 7.	关键事件将是5月7日举行的法国大选第二轮。


If this results in a victory for Emmanuel Macron, the centrist front-runner, France will embark on a path leading to at least a modicum of economic reforms.	如果领先的中间派安曼努尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）胜出，法国将走上至少进行销量经济改革的道路。


That, in turn, will create a much more cooperative relationship between France and Germany.	这反过来将在法国和德国之间营造出更加合作性的关系。


Both main candidates for German Chancellor are eager to rebuild post-Brexit Europe by strengthening the Franco-German axis – and the start of a French reform process would reassure German voters that their government, by easing EU austerity, would not merely be pouring money into a bottomless pit.	德国的两位主要总理候选人都渴望通过强化法德轴心重塑英国脱欧后的欧洲——而法国启动改革过程将让德国选民放心地相信德国政府放松欧盟紧缩不会是徒劳地填补无底洞。


This brings us to the ideological implications if centrist forces win and economic recovery accelerates in Europe this year.	这就引出了，如果中间派胜出，并且今年欧洲经济复苏能够加速，会引起怎样的意识形态影响。


In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, the European “social market” model of capitalism seemed like a logical alternative to the Thatcher-Reagan market fundamentalism that had broken down after 30 years of global dominance.	全球金融危机发生后，欧洲“社会市场”资本主义模式立刻成为撒切尔-里根市场原教旨主义在主宰了30年破产后的合乎逻辑的替代品。


Indeed, President Barack Obama moved the US toward greater government activism in macroeconomic management, financial regulation, environmental policy, and health care.	事实上，美国总统奥巴马推动美国在宏观经济管理、金融监管、环境政策和医疗卫生等方面走向更大的政府积极主义。


Paradoxically, however, Europe moved in the opposite direction.	但荒谬的是，欧洲却走向了相反的方向。


Under German pressure, the EU became the last bastion of monetarism, fiscal austerity, and the “disciplining” role of financial markets.	在德国的压力下，欧盟成为货币主义、财政紧缩和金融市场的“纪律约束者”角色的最后堡垒。


The result was the near-fatal euro crisis of 2010-2012.	结果是2010—2012年爆发了几乎致命的欧元危机。


If this year’s elections result in a centrist French president and a revival of Franco-German cooperation, the EU’s unexpected infatuation with market fundamentalism will probably end.	如果今年的选举最后产生了一位中间派法国总统和法德合作的复兴，那么欧盟令人意外的对市场原教旨主义的沉迷很有可能寿终正寝。


Europe will enjoy a better, more sustainable, and socially inclusive economic recovery than the US under Trump.	欧洲将出现比特朗普治下的美国更好、更加可持续的社会包容的经济复苏。


If this happens, the rest of the world may again start to see the EU as a source of inspiration and a model.	果真如此的话，世界其他国家将再次把欧盟视为灵感来源和榜样。


Europe’s Economic Dilemma	欧洲的经济困境


CAMBRIDGE – Europe faces a serious problem.	坎布里奇—欧洲面临严重的问题。


Although economic activity has recently increased, the eurozone has lost the ability to respond to the next downturn when it happens, as it inevitably will.	尽管经济活动最近有所活跃，但欧元区已经丧失了应对下一次衰退的能力。 这是一个必然结果。


The European Central Bank deserves credit for the economic improvements that have occurred in the past few years.	过去几年中所实现的经济改善应该归功于欧洲中央银行。


In a speech at the annual gathering of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 2014, Mario Draghi, the ECB’s president, explained that three things could improve economic performance in Europe:	在2014年怀俄明州的杰克森霍尔（Jackson Hole）央行行长年会的讲话中，欧洲央行行长德拉吉（Mario Draghi）说了三个能够改善欧洲经济表现的因素：


But Draghi went on to predict that Germany would not create a fiscal deficit and that Italy and France would not undertake the needed structural reforms.	但德拉吉跟着预测，德国不会出现财政赤字，意大利和法国也不会实施必要的结构性改革。


He concluded that the ECB would have to stimulate growth by reducing interest rates, which would increase net exports by creating a more competitive euro.	他下结论说，欧洲央行必须通过降息刺激增长。 降息能够让欧元更有竞争力，从而增加净出口。


The ECB has since taken the short-term interest rate into negative territory, cutting it from 0.2% in August 2014 to -0.3% now.	此后，欧洲央行将短期利率下降到了负区间，即从2014年8月的0. 2%下降到目前的-0.


The ECB also bought long-term bonds for its portfolio, increasing the volume of its holdings from €2.2 trillion ($2.6 trillion) in 2014 to more than double that amount now.	欧洲央行还用自己的组合购买长期债券，将其持有量从2014年的2. 2万亿欧元增加了一倍多。


The euro-dollar exchange rate fell from $1.39 in 2014 to a low of $1.04 in 2016, before recovering to the current level of $1.18.	39美元下探至2016年1. 04美元的低点，随后反弹到目前的1.


The ECB’s negative-interest-rate policy also stimulated business investment and other spending that is sensitive to borrowing costs.	18美元。 欧洲央行的负利率政策还刺激了商业投资和其他对借贷成本比较敏感的支出。


But the ECB’s policies also mean that it has no ammunition left to fight the next recession, which could be caused by a collapse of asset prices, starting with the price of long-term bonds.	但欧洲央行的政策也意味着它已经没有弹药可用来对付下一场衰退，这场衰退可能因为资产价格崩盘而引发，首当其冲的将是长期债券价格。


German ten-year bond prices are extremely high, reflecting a current yield of less than 0.5%.	德国十年期债券价格目前非常高，隐含收益率还不到0. 5%。


A fall in US stock and bond prices, which are also out of line with past experience, could cause European asset prices to decline in sympathy.	美国股票和债券价格的下跌——目前也已经偏离了历史经验水平——可能导致欧洲资产价格的同步下跌。


Alternatively, European exports could fall in response to geopolitical events in Asia or the Middle East, depressing overall economic activity in Europe.	或者，欧洲出口可能因为亚洲或中东的地缘政治事件而下降，抑制欧洲的总体经济活跃度。


An end to the US expansion, now in its ninth year, could pull down demand in Europe.	美国扩张的结束——目前这一扩张期已经持续到第九年——可能拖累欧洲的需求。


Although the US economy is now performing very well, the excessive level of asset prices – the result of a decade of near-zero interest rates – poses a threat to stability.	尽管美国经济目前表现出色，但资产价格水平过高——这是十年来利率接近于零的结果——严重威胁着稳定。


Whatever the cause of the next downturn, ECB policies that helped in the past would no longer be available.	不管下一场衰退原因为何，在过去起到帮助作用的欧洲央行政策都不再可用。


The conventional response – reducing interest rates – is impossible, because current short-term interest rates in the eurozone countries are already near zero or negative.	常规响应手段——削减利率不再可能，因为当前欧元区国家短期利率已经接近于零或为负数。


To be sure, the ECB could expand its purchases of long-term bonds.	诚然，欧洲央行可以扩大其长期债券购买量。


But doing so would not have the same effect that it did in the past.	但这样做无法产生和过去一样的效果。


One of the goals of large-scale bond purchases – so-called quantitative easing – was to drive down long-term interest rates in order to stimulate business investment and housing construction.	大规模购买债券，即所谓的量化宽松的目标之一是压低长期利率从而刺激商业投资和住房建设。


But with long-term interest rates now close to zero, bond purchases would not be able to lower them any further.	目前，长期利率已经接近于零，购买债券无法进一步降低它们。


Another goal of lowering the yield on long-term bonds was to stimulate demand for equities.	降低长期债券收益率的另一个目标是刺激股票需求。


Higher stock prices would lower the cost of equity-financed business investment and increase household wealth, thereby stimulating consumption.	股价上涨降低了股权融资的商业投资的成本，也增加了家庭财富，从而刺激了消费。


This was never as successful in Europe as it was in the United States, where share ownership is more widespread.	在这一点上，欧洲一直不如美国成功，后者的股票所有权分布得更加广泛。


But now, with long-term bond yields already close to zero, it could not even be tried.	但如今，长期债券收益率已经接近于零，无法如法炮制。


In short, the ECB would be unable to respond to an economic downturn by lowering interest rates and buying long-term bonds.	简言之，欧洲央行无法再通过降低利率和购买长期债券来应对经济衰退了。


And without the ability to reduce interest rates, the ECB also would be unable to stimulate net exports by reducing the value of the euro.	而如果失去了降低利率的能力，欧洲央行也将无法通过降低欧元价值来刺激净出口。


Whereas the US could respond to a new downturn with fiscal stimulus, it is difficult to see how this could be achieved in Europe.	美国可以用财政刺激应对新的衰退，但欧洲很难实现这一点。


The eurozone has no fiscal authority.	欧元区没有财政当局。


Each member country could of course reduce taxes and increase spending.	当然，各成员国可以减税增支。


But much of the stimulus would spill over to the country’s trading partners through increased imports.	但这些刺激的大部分都将通过增加进口溢出到贸易伙伴国。


The result would be an increase in the country’s national debt with relatively little increase in its domestic demand.	结果是国家国民债务增加，而国内需求相对来说几无变动。


An appropriate response to this dilemma may be a policy of coordinated fiscal expansion.	应对这一困境的一个合适的方案是协调性财政扩张政策。


Each country would have to agree to a combination of tax cuts and increases in government spending scaled to the size of the economic downturn.	各国必须达成一致，根据经济衰退的规模采取联合减税和增加政府支出。


Waiting until the downturn occurs to plan this coordinated response would be a mistake.	等到衰退发生再去规划这一协调响应措施将是一个错误。


All eurozone governments should place fiscal coordination with their European partners high on their agenda, before it is too late.	所有欧元区国家政府应该未雨绸缪地将与欧洲伙伴国的财政协调列为重点事项。


Europe’s Doom Loop in Reverse	逆转了的欧洲厄运循环


BRUSSELS – During the 2011-2012 euro crisis, the currency area became mired in a “doom loop,” in which weak banks in financially distressed countries rationed credit, causing a recession that intensified pressure on government finances, which were already burdened by the need to cover banks’ losses.	发自布鲁塞尔——在2011~2012年的欧元危机期间，欧元区曾经陷入过一场“厄运循环（doom loop）”——财政危机国的各个受灾银行都对信贷实施定量配给，导致经济衰退，进一步加剧了本已背负了救助银行损失责任的政府财政压力。


But such self-reinforcing spirals can also operate in the opposite direction.	但这类自我强化型螺旋也可以朝着相反方向运动。


Understanding these dynamics may be the key to determining the eurozone’s relative strength today.	而对这些动态的理解则可能是决定当今欧元区相对强弱势力的关键。


In a doom loop, the expectations of default drive up risk premia until the economy reaches the brink of collapse, even if the underlying problems could be managed over time.	在厄运循环中，即使潜在的问题能够随时间得到应对，对违约的预期也会不断推高风险溢价直到经济濒临崩溃。


At a certain point, when the gulf between financial-market pessimism and economic reality becomes too large, the market becomes ready for a reversal.	而在某一特定时点上，当金融市场悲观情绪与经济现实之间差距过大时，市场就可能会出现逆转。


This was the case for the eurozone during the summer of 2012.	2012年夏天的欧元区就是如此。


European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s pledge to do “whatever it takes” to prevent the euro from disintegrating reassured markets so effectively because investors’ fear was largely based, to paraphrase US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on “fear itself.”	欧洲央行行长马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）“尽一切可能”来防止欧元瓦解的承诺之所以能如此有效地安抚市场，是因为投资者的恐惧主要基于——用美国总统富兰克林·D·罗斯福的话说——“恐惧本身”。


Draghi’s intervention marked the start of a new cycle: the doom loop reversed, and became a benign credit cycle in which lower risk premia allowed both banks and governments to refinance at lower rates, making more credit available to the economy and thereby fueling a recovery that increased government revenue.	德拉吉的干预标志着一个新周期的开始：厄运循环逆转并形成一个良性的信贷周期，低风险溢价令银行和政府可以以较低的利率实施再融资，为经济提供更多的信贷，从而推动经济复苏增加政府收入。


Governments in most of the eurozone countries that had previously been stuck in the doom loop were able to stabilize public finances without further expenditure cuts.	以前陷入厄运循环的大多数欧元区国家政府都能够在无需进一步削减支出的情况下稳定公共财政。


But this positive credit cycle is less visible than the doom loop, because it takes a lot less time to cut the number of borrowers and push the economy into a recession than to foster a recovery when credit becomes available again.	但这一正面信贷周期并不像厄运循环那样明确可见，因为减少借贷者数量并推动经济陷入衰退的时间可比在信贷恢复供应时孕育经济复苏要短促得多。


Even if over-stretched borrowers can spend and invest, they most likely won’t do so right away.	即便原本周转困难的借贷者终于可以花钱和投资，他们也可能不会立马执行。


But, given time, easier credit conditions rarely fail to generate a recovery.	不过随着时间的推移，更宽松的信贷条件基本上都会产生一场复苏。


The ECB’s vast program of quantitative easing (QE), initiated in March 2015, reinforced the virtuous cycle.	欧洲央行于2015年3月启动的大规模量化宽松计划也强化了这一良性循环。


But the truth is that the doom loop had been reversed long before QE began.	但事实上在宽松开始之前厄运循环就已逆转。


In any case, the common definition of that program – the large-scale purchase of government bonds by the ECB – is inaccurate.	无论如何，大家对该计划的定义——由欧洲央行大规模购买各国政府债券——是不准确的。


The ECB General Council makes the key decisions, but its policy is executed mostly by national central banks (NCBs).	这一关键决策会由欧洲央行总理事会作出，但其政策主要由各国中央银行去执行。


Normally, all NCBs in the euro system undertake the same operations, and the results are pooled.	通常情况下，欧元体系内所有国家的央行都采取同样的行动，并将行动结果汇聚在一起。


But, when it comes to QE, each NCB buys only the bonds of its own government on its own account.	但就量化宽松而言，每个国家央行都只是动用自身财力去购买本国政府债券。


The Banca d’Italia has bought only Italian government bonds, and the Bundesbank only German Bunds.	意大利银行只购买了意大利国债，而德意志银行也只购买了德国国债。


NCBs are part of their respective countries’ larger public sectors, and eventually transfer all of the profits or losses from these transactions back to their own government.	这些央行只是各国更庞大公共部门的一部分，也会最终将这些交易产生的所有利润或损失转移回本国政府。


So when they purchase long-term government bonds, they are acting like a subsidiary of a large corporation buying the debt of its parent company (issuing short-term liabilities to itself).	所以当它们购买长期政府债券时就类似一家大型企业的子公司去购买母公司债务一样（等于母公司向自身发行了短期债）。


In short, the eurozone’s QE program amounts essentially to a massive asset-liability management exercise, in which (national) public debt is reshuffled from one part of the public sector (governments) to another part (the national central bank).	简而言之，欧元区的量化宽松计划实质上是一项大规模资产负债管理工作，其中（国家）公共债务由公共部门的一部分（政府）重新配置到另一部分（国家央行）。


While the sums involved are very large – a total of about €2 trillion ($2.44 trillion) so far – the real impact is minor.	虽然涉及金额极大——迄今为止共计达2万亿欧元（折合2. 44万亿美元）——但实际影响却是微不足道的。


Of course, the ECB claims that the QE program contributed decisively to the recovery.	虽然欧洲央行声称自己的量化宽松计划对复苏作出了决定性的贡献。


But the fact is that there has been little change in interest rates or risk spreads since the bond purchases started.	但事实上，自债券购买启动以来利率或风险利差几乎都没有发生变化。


This indicates that the end of QE – which is likely to come later this year – will not mean the end of the recovery.	这表明量化宽松的停止——可能在今年晚些时候——并不意味着复苏的终结。


And, given that financial markets know that QE will end, they have already priced in that expectation.	且由于金融市场已经知道量化宽松行将结束，它们也已经在对这一预期进行定价。


But can today’s benign credit cycle last much longer?	但当前这一良性信贷周期能持续更久吗？


There may be some reason for concern; after all, the eurozone experienced a similar self-reinforcing cycle of easy credit, growth, and little pressure on government finances before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.	在此可能存在一些值得关注的理由； 毕竟在2007~2008年全球金融危机之前欧元区也经历过一个类似的信贷宽松，增长，政府财政压力不大的自我强化周期。


But it seems unlikely that the current cycle will lead to similar excesses and end in a similar bust, because the growth pattern in the peripheral eurozone countries has changed considerably.	但当前周期似乎不可能导致类似的过度投机行为并以类似的爆破收场，因为欧元区外围国家的增长模式已经发生了很大变化。


During the pre-crisis credit boom, growth in countries like Spain and Portugal was based largely on domestic demand, financed by capital inflows.	在危机前的信贷繁荣期，西班牙和葡萄牙等国的经济增长很大程度上依赖于国内需求，靠资本流入来支持。


In Italy, domestic demand was less exuberant, but foreign capital was still needed at the margin to finance a large public debt.	意大利的国内需求不太旺盛，但依然需要低利率的外资来支撑庞大的公共债务。


So when capital inflows suddenly stopped, these economies were thrown into crisis.	所以当资本流入突然停止，这些经济体立刻就陷入了危机。


Today, however, growth in these countries is based mainly on exports, while domestic demand remains subdued.	而今这些国家的增长主要依靠出口，而国内需求依然疲软。


Moreover, these countries are maintaining current-account surpluses while their growth rates rise; in other words, far from relying on fickle capital inflows, they are repaying their external debt.	此外，这些国家在经济增长率上升的同时保持了经常账户盈余； 换句话说，它们远远不需要依靠反复无常的资本流入就可以偿还外债。


This new, more robust growth model could be sustained until the remaining unemployment is absorbed.	这个崭新也更强劲的增长模式可以持续到剩余的失业率被吸收掉。


No financial cycle lasts forever.	没有一个金融周期能永远持续。


But the one driving today’s recovery in the eurozone, including the peripheral countries that were hardest hit by the crisis, may be set to persist for a while yet.	但推动欧元区——包括遭受危机冲击最严重的欧元区外围国家——当前复苏的周期有可能会持续一段时间。


The Eurozone’s Hidden Strength	欧元区的隐藏优势


BRUSSELS – For years, the eurozone has been perceived as a disaster area, with discussions of the monetary union’s future often centered on a possible breakup.	布鲁塞尔—多年来，欧元区一直被视为灾难地区，对于货币联盟未来的讨论往往以其可能解体为中心。


When the British voted to leave the European Union last year, they were driven partly by the perception of the eurozone as a dysfunctional – and perhaps unsalvageable – project.	去年，当英国投票脱离欧盟时，部分原因就在于英国人认为欧元区是一个无法正常运转——并且可能已经无法挽回——的工程。


Yet, lately, the eurozone has become the darling of financial markets – and for good reason.	但最近，欧元区成了金融市场的“香饽饽”，其来有自。


The discovery of the eurozone’s latent strength was long overdue.	欧元区的隐藏优势其实早就应该被发现。


Indeed, the eurozone has been recovering from the crisis of 2011-2012 for several years.	事实上，欧元区从2011—2012年危机中复苏已经持续了几年。


On a per capita basis, its economic growth now outpaces that of the United States.	用人均值衡量，其经济增长已经超过美国。


The unemployment rate is also declining – more slowly than in the US, to be sure, but that partly reflects a divergence in labor-force participation trends.	失业率也在下降——诚然比美国更慢，但这部分是因为劳动力参与率的不同导致的。


Whereas labor-force participation in the eurozone is on the rise, it has been declining in the US since around 2000.	劳动力参与率在欧元区呈现上升之势，而在美国自从2000年左右以来一直在下降。


The departure of Americans from the job market reflects what economists call the “discouraged worker” phenomenon.	美国人民远离就业市场反映了经济学家所谓的“沮丧的工人”现象。


And, indeed, the trend has accelerated since the recession of 2009.	事实上，这一趋势在2009年衰退以来有所加速。


In principle, declining labor-force participation should be a problem in the eurozone, too, given the prolonged period of very high unemployment that many European workers have faced.	理论上，劳动力参与率下降也应该成为欧元区的问题，因为许多欧洲工人长期以来都面临着非常高的失业率。


But, in the last five years, 2.5 million people in the eurozone have actually joined the labor force, as five million jobs were created, reducing the overall decline in unemployment by half.	但是，在过去五年中，实际上有250万欧元区人加入了劳动力大军，而创造就业岗位数量达到了五百万，从而总体失业情况下降了一半。


Moreover, the eurozone recovery has been sustained, somewhat unexpectedly, even in the absence of continuous fiscal stimulus.	此外，有些出乎预料，即使在没有进行持续的财政刺激的情况下，欧元区的复苏也得到了维持。


The heated discussions about austerity of recent years have been misplaced, with both critics and official cheerleaders overestimating the amount of austerity applied.	近几年来日益激烈的关于紧缩的讨论没有切中要害，批评者和官方支持者都高估了紧缩的实际规模。


The average cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit has been roughly constant since 2014, at around 1% of GDP.	自2014年以来，经周期调整的平均财政赤字基本一直保持在GDP的1%上下。


Of course, large differences in the fiscal position of individual member states remain.	当然，个别成员国之间巨大的财政状况差异仍然存在。


But this is to be expected in such a diverse monetary union.	但在如此多样化的货币联盟中，这本是应有之义。


The truth is that even France, often considered a weak performer, has deficit and debt levels comparable to those of the US.	真相是，即便是常常被认为是“劣等生”的法国，其赤字和债务水平也只是和美国等量齐观。


A comparison with the US, as well as with Japan, also undercuts the common perception that the eurozone’s fiscal rules, including the (in)famous Stability and Growth Pact and the 2012 “fiscal compact,” have been irrelevant.	与美国还有日本的对比也可以反驳一个常见的感觉，即欧元区财政规则，包括大（臭）名鼎鼎的稳定与增长公约和2012年“财政契约”，是无关紧要的。


True, no country has been officially reprimanded for excessive deficits or debts.	诚然，没有国家因为赤字或债务过高而受到正是惩罚。


But the clamor over rule breaches at the margin has overshadowed the broad underlying trend toward sound public finances that the fiscal rules have fostered.	但对略微越界的大呼小叫蒙蔽了人们对更大的基本趋势的关注：财政规则塑造了趋向可靠公共财政的趋势。


All of this suggests that the “soft austerity” pursued in many eurozone countries may have been the right choice after all.	所有这些都表明，许多欧元区国家所采取的“软紧缩”是完全正确的选择。


To be sure, one should not overestimate the eurozone’s long-term economic strength.	当然，我们不应该高估欧元区的长期经济优势。


While the average growth rate might remain above 2% for the next few years, as the remaining unemployed are absorbed and the long-term trend of older workers rejoining the labor market continues, the pool of unused labor will eventually be exhausted.	未来几年，随着剩余失业人口得到吸收，以及年长劳动者重新加入劳动力市场的长期趋势维持下去，平均增长率有望继续维持在2%以上，但未利用劳动力最终会耗尽。


Once the eurozone has reached the so-called “Lewis turning point” – when surplus labor is depleted and wages start to rise – growth rates will fall to a level that better reflects demographic dynamics.	一旦欧元区达到所谓的“刘易斯拐点”，即剩余劳动力耗尽，工资开始上升时，增长率将下降到能更好地反映人口动态的水平。


And those dynamics aren’t particular desirable: the eurozone’s working-age population is set to decline by about half a percentage point per year over the next decade at least.	而这些动态并不十分动人：至少未来十年，欧元区工作年龄人口可能每年都会减少大约半个百分点。


Yet, even then, the eurozone’s per capita growth rate is unlikely to be much lower than that of the US, because the difference in their productivity growth rates is now minor.	但即使到那时，欧元区人均增长率也不可能大大低于美国，因为它们之间的生产率增长率现在已经非常微小。


In this sense, the eurozone’s future may look more like Japan’s present, characterized by headline annual growth of a little over 1% and stubbornly low inflation, but per capita income growth similar to that of the US or Europe.	从这个角度讲，欧元区的未来更像是日本的现在，其特征是标题年增长率略高于1%，通胀畸低，但人均收入增长与美国或欧洲相当。


Fortunately for the eurozone, it will enter this period of high employment and slow growth on sound footing – thanks, in part, to that controversial austerity.	对欧元区来说，幸运的是它进入这一高就业、慢增长的时期时步履很稳——这部分要归功于充满争议的紧缩。


By contrast, both the US and Japan are facing full employment with fiscal deficits higher than 3% of GDP – about 2-3 percentage points higher than those of the eurozone.	相反，美国和日本都面临着充分就业时财政赤字高于GDP的3%的情况——大约比欧元区的水平高2—3个百分点。


The US and Japan also have heavier debt burdens: the debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 107% in the US and more than 200% in Japan, compared to 90% in the eurozone.	美国和日本的债务负担也更加沉重：美国债务-GDP之比为107%，日本更是超过200%，而欧元区为90%。


There is evidence that in the wake of a financial crisis, when monetary policy becomes ineffective – for example, because nominal interest rates are at the zero bound – deficit spending can have an unusually strong stabilizing impact.	有证据表明，在发生金融危机的情况下，如果政策无效——比如因为名义利率已经位于零区间——赤字支出可以起到不同寻常的稳定效果。


But there remains a key unresolved issue: once financial markets have normalized, will maintaining a deficit for a long time provide continuous stimulus?	但仍然有一个关键的未解决问题：一旦金融市场实现了正常化，长时间保持赤字是否能提供持续的刺激？


The fact that the eurozone’s recovery is now catching up with that of the US, despite its lack of any continuing stimulus, suggests that the answer is no.	欧元区复苏目前正在赶上美国，尽管没有进行任何持续的刺激，这一事实表明答案是否定的。


Indeed, the experience of the eurozone suggests that while concerted fiscal stimulus can make a difference during an acute recession, withdrawing that stimulus when it is no longer vital is preferable to maintaining it indefinitely.	事实上，欧元区的经验表明，尽管一致的财政刺激能在剧烈衰退时制造不同，当刺激不再不可或缺时退出刺激要比无限期地保持刺激更好。


With austerity – that is, reducing the deficit, once the recession has ended – recovery might take longer to become consolidated; but once it is, economic performance is even more stable, because the government’s accounts are in a sustainable position.	在紧缩情况下——即等到衰退结束就降低赤字——复苏可能需要更长时间来巩固； 但一旦巩固了，经济表现就会更加稳定，因为政府账户此时处于可持续的状态。


John Maynard Keynes famously said, “In the long run, we are all dead.”	凯恩斯有一句名言：“长期看，我们都死了。


That may be true, on a long enough timeline.	”这也许是正确的，如果“长期”够长的话。


But it is no excuse to dismiss longer-term considerations.	但这绝不是放弃长期整合的借口。


In fact, for the eurozone, the long run seems to have arrived – and the economy is still alive and kicking.	事实上，对欧元区来说，长期似乎已经到达——而经济仍然生龙活虎。


The Eurozone Must Reform or Die	欧元区的改革生死关


OXFORD – With the election of a reform-minded centrist president in France and the re-election of German Chancellor Angela Merkel seeming ever more likely, is there hope for the stalled single-currency project in Europe?	发自牛津——随着法国的中间路线改革派新总统上台，同时德国总理默克尔的连任概率日渐增加，是否意味着陷入停滞的欧洲单一货币项目重燃希望？ 也许如此。


Perhaps, but another decade of slow growth, punctuated by periodic debt-related convulsions, still looks more likely.	但在隔三差五的债务动荡的袭扰之下，我们更有可能面临又一个十年的低速增长。


With a determined move toward fiscal and banking union, things could be much better.	如果能财政和银行业联盟方面迈出坚实的一步，情况可能会有所改善；


But, in the absence of policies to strengthen stability and sustainability, the chances of an eventual collapse are much greater.	但在缺乏政策以强化稳定和可持续性的情况下，最终崩溃的可能性却要大得多。


True, in the near term, there is much reason for optimism.	的确，在短期内有很多理由去保持乐观。