Meanwhile, technological and market forces have contributed to job polarization, with the middle-income bracket gradually deteriorating.	与此同时，科技和市场力量使的就业呈现两极分化，中等收入群体每况愈下。


Automation, for example, seems to have spurred an unexpectedly rapid decline in routine white- and blue-collar jobs.	比如，自动化刺激了常规白领和蓝领岗位出人意料的迅速减少。


This has resulted in stagnating median incomes and rising income inequality, both of which constrain the private-consumption component of aggregate demand.	这导致了中位收入停滞不前和收入不平等性的加剧，而这两者都制约了总需求中的私人消费因素。


Even the one factor that has effectively increased disposable incomes and augmented demand – sharply declining commodity prices, particularly for fossil fuels – is ultimately problematic.	即使有效增加了可支配收入、支持了需求的因素——大宗商品（特别是化石燃料）价格暴跌——说到底也是大有问题。


Indeed, for commodity-exporting countries, the fall in prices is generating fiscal and economic headwinds of varying intensity.	事实上，对大宗商品出口国来说，价格下跌正在造成各种财政和经济困境。


Inflation – or the lack of it – presents further challenges.	通货膨胀——或通货不膨胀——带来了进一步挑战。


Price growth is well below targets and declining in many countries.	许多国家的物价增长远远低于目标水平，并且还在下降。


If this turns to full-blown deflation, accompanied by uncontrolled rising real interest rates, the risk to growth would be serious.	如果演变为全面通缩，加之以不受控制的真实利率升高，那么增长风险将非常严重。


Even very low inflation hampers countries’ ability to address over-indebtedness.	即使是极低的通胀也不利于于各国解决过度负债问题。


And there is little sign of inflationary pressure, even in the US, which is near “full” employment.	而几乎没有迹象表明会出现通胀压力，即使是在接近“充分”就业的美国。


Given such large demand shortfalls and output gaps, it should surprise no one that even exceptionally generous monetary conditions have proved insufficient to bolster inflation.	在需求短缺和产出缺口如此巨大的情况下，毫不奇怪，即使是无与伦比地宽松的货币条件也不足以提振通胀。


With few options for fighting deflation, countries have resorted to competitive devaluations.	各国对于如何解决通缩问题几乎没有选择，只能求助于竞争性贬值。


But this is not an effective strategy for capturing a larger share of tradable global demand if everyone is doing it.	但如果每个人都这样做，那么争取可贸易全球需求的更大份额也没有什么意义。


And targeting exchange-rate competitiveness doesn’t address the aggregate demand problem.	而以汇率竞争力为目标无法解决总需求问题。


If the global economy remains on its current trajectory, a period of intense volatility could destabilize a number of emerging economies, while undermining development efforts worldwide.	如果全球经济继续沿着当前轨迹运行下去，那么一段时间的剧烈波动可能动摇许多新兴经济体，也破坏全球发展努力。


That’s why policymakers must act now.	因此，决策者必须立刻行动起来。


For starters, governments must recognize that central banks, however well they have served their economies, cannot go it alone.	首先，政府必须认识到，决不能让央行独力支持经济，不管它们在这方面做得多么出色。


Complementary reforms are needed to maintain and improve the transmission channels of monetary policy and avoid adverse side effects.	需要实施补充性改革以维持和改善货币政策的传递渠道并避免不利的副作用。


In several countries – such as France, Italy, and Spain – reforms designed to increase structural flexibility are also crucial.	在一些国家——如法国、意大利和西班牙——旨在增加结构灵活性的改革也至关重要。


Furthermore, impediments to higher and more efficient public- and private-sector investment must be removed.	此外，阻碍增加和提高公共和私人部门投资的因素必须消除。


And governments must implement measures to redistribute income, improve the provision of basic services, and equip the labor force to take advantage of ongoing shifts in the economic structure.	政府必须实施措施重新分配收入、改善基本服务的供给，并训练劳动力大军抓住经济结构变化的良机。


Generating the political will to get even some of this done will be no easy feat.	争取政治意愿，让这些要点（哪怕是其中一些）得以实现绝非易事。


But an honest look at the sorry state – and unpromising trajectory – of the global economy will, one hopes, help policymakers do what’s needed.	但诚实地看待全球经济的不利局面——以及不乐观的轨迹——兴许有助于让决策者做需要的事。


Exhausted Italy	疲惫不堪的意大利


Italy is facing perhaps its most important elections since 1948, when voters confirmed the emergence of Italy’s new republic from the wreckage of Mussolini’s fascist regime.	意大利面临着或许是自1948年以来最为重要的选举。 当时，人们通过选举在墨索里尼法西斯政权的废墟上成立了新的意大利共和国。


On April 9-10, Italians must choose between Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right government and the center-left bloc headed by Romano Prodi.	4月9日到10日，意大利人必须在现任总理贝鲁斯卡尼领导的中间偏右政府和以普罗迪为首的中间偏左政党中做出选择。


But neither man seems the sort of decisive figure that overcoming Italy’s bleak economic predicament demands.	但是这两个人好像都不是那种能够带领意大利走出令人沮丧的经济困境的决定性人物。


Italy’s economic malaise is obvious.	意大利的经济萎靡不振显而易见。


Cumulative economic growth over the past five years was the slowest in the euro zone – 3.2%, compared to an average of 7.8% – with two years of stagnation.	过去的五年中，经济累积增长速度是欧元区中最缓慢的，只有3. 2%，而欧元区平均增长速度达到了7.


Per capita GDP, too, has fallen below the euro-zone average.	8%，其中两年处于停滞状态。 人均国民生产总值也下降到欧元区平均水平之下。


Employment has increased, but labor productivity has remained flat and total factor productivity has declined.	虽然就业率有所提高，但劳动生产率仍然毫无起色，生产要素总生产率不升反降。


Combined with strong real exchange-rate appreciation, this has led to a dramatic loss of competitiveness and weakening exports.	雪上加霜的是实际汇率提升，导致竞争力大幅下降，出口受到重创。


Indeed, the only growth sector seems to be books about Italy’s decline.	实际上，唯一增长的部分好像只剩下有关意大利经济衰退的书籍了。


Berlusconi claims that statistics are unreliable, for they conceal a much rosier reality for today’s well-off Italians.	贝鲁斯科尼宣称这些数字并不可靠，因为它们掩盖了当今富裕的意大利人的实际情况。


Other members of the government admit more soberly that Italy faces serious problems, but they lay the blame on factors beyond their control: a series of global economic shocks, a slow-down in continental Europe, the admission of China to the World Trade Organization, and the role of the euro.	现政府的其他成员则审慎地承认意大利确实面临严重的问题，但他们将之归结于那些超出他们控制范围的因素，也就使一系列的全球经济动荡、欧洲大陆经济不景气、中国加入世贸组织以及欧元的作用。


But such explanations are unconvincing.	但是这种解释难以令人信服。


The global shocks affected all European countries alike, as did the entry of China (and other Asian countries) into the WTO, but French exports, for example, suffered much less, while German exports actually increased.	全球动荡对所有欧洲国家都有影响，中国（以及其它亚洲国家）加入世贸组织同样如此，但是例如法国的出口损失甚微，德国的出口竟然有所增长。


True, European growth was dragged down by meager growth in Germany, but Italy grew marginally less than Germany.	确切地说，德国经济增长乏力拖了欧洲经济增长的后腿，但是意大利的经济增长更是微乎其微，甚至不如德国。


Finally, while the euro has put a stop to competitive devaluations, it also provided Italy with a sizeable benefit: a reduction by 6% of GDP in interest payments on the huge public debt accumulated in the 1990’s.	最后，虽然欧元的出现终结了竞争性货币贬值，但也给意大利带来了相当大的好处，那就是将国民生产总值中自上世纪90年代累积的大量公债的利息支付减少了6%。


It would be unfair, however, to blame the Berlusconi government alone for this dismal performance.	然而，将经济的低迷表现都归罪于贝鲁斯科尼政府并不公平。


Italy’s growth has been slower than Europe’s, with weakening exports, for the past decade, because the country was ill prepared to adjust to the global revolution in information technology and the changing pattern of world trade.	在过去十几年中，意大利经济增长低于欧洲平均水平，出口疲软，原因是该国对全球信息技术革命和世界贸易方式的变化准备不足，应对乏力。


Its infrastructure, both material and intellectual, was poorer, and its economic structure was unfit for the new challenges, owing both to firm size and their specialization in traditional sectors, as well as low levels of education and R&D.	其基础设施，无论是物资还是智力，都更为匮乏，并且其经济结构不能适应新的挑战，主要原因是公司的规模、专注于传统行业以及教育和研发水平低下。


Yet the Berlusconi government did next to nothing to address these deficiencies, despite being the first government in Italy’s history to survive a full five-year electoral term.	尽管贝鲁斯科尼政府是意大利历史上第一个渡过了完整五年任期的政府，但是在应对这些困境方面却基本上无所作为。


With an unassailable parliamentary majority, it could have undertaken coherent supply-side reforms, even at the risk of some initial unpopularity.	本来凭借其在议会中无法撼动的绝对多数，它可以进行连贯的供应学派的改革，即使在开始阶段存在面临抵制的风险。


A couple of reforms were belatedly enacted: timid intervention on pensions and a further increase in labor-market flexibility.	出台的一些改革措施则姗姗来迟。 例如，轻度干预退休金和进一步加大劳动市场的灵活性。


But nothing was done to deregulate product markets or to give proper incentives to restructuring, while privatization came to a halt.	但是在解除产品市场管制或适度刺激结构重组方面则没有采取任何措施，私有化进程也停滞不前。


Instead, the government chose old-style Keynesian policy: moderate tax cuts to increase disposable income and an increase in current expenditure.	相反，现任政府选择的是老套的凯恩斯主义政策，也就是温和减税以增加可支配收入和经常性支出。


Between 2001 and 2005, current non-interest expenditure rose by 2% of GDP, revenues fell by 0.5% of GDP, and the general government deficit rose by 1% of GDP.	2001年到2005年间，国民生产总值中经常性无息支出增长了2%，税收下降了0. 5%，政府赤字增加了1%。


Worse, the surplus fell from 3.2% to 0.5% of GDP, and fell even allowing for the business cycle.	更糟糕的是，盈余额从3. 2%下降到0.


As a result, the debt-to-GDP ratio declined only modestly until 2004 and rose again – to more than 106% – in 2005.	5%，即使考虑到商业周期的因素也是如此。 后果就是国民生产总值的负债率直至2004年才有所下降，但在2005年再次上升到超过106%


The weak fiscal position will severely constrain whatever government comes to power.	无论哪一方上台，恶劣的财政状况都将严重束缚未来政府的手脚。


The center-left’s ponderous electoral program proposes a cut of five percentage points in payroll taxes, but it is not clear where the required €10 billion will come from to pay for this.	中间偏左政党在其冗长乏味的竞选计划中提议将收入税减少5个百分点，但没有说明从哪里支付执行这一政策所需的100亿欧元。


The idea of increasing the low (12.5%) withholding tax on capital gains met with accusations that Prodi intends to expropriate wealth.	提高针对资本收入的低预扣赋税率（12. 5%）的提议则遭到指责，指责普罗迪打算劫富济贫。


But the right’s slim manifesto includes its own unaffordable promises, such as cuts in property taxes and increases in low-level pensions.	但是中间偏右政党在其空洞无物的宣言中做出的承诺，如削减财产税和提高低水平退休金，更是空中楼阁，镜花水月。


Italian voters are perplexed.	意大利的选民也茫然不知所措。


In 2001, Berlusconi signed a “contract with the Italians” containing promises that have gone unfulfilled.	2001年，贝鲁斯科尼签订《与意大利公民契约》，包括种种无法兑现的承诺。


He has always fancied himself as a savior, convinced that he alone can fix the country.	他一直以来都把自己想象成救世主，确信单凭其一己之力就可以解决国家的问题。


So he finds it unconceivable that anybody can feel otherwise or even that rules should stand in his way.	因此如果任何人有其它想法，他都觉得不可思议，甚至法规都不应对他构成限制和阻挡。


Hence his government’s efforts to pass laws changing judicial procedures, or to consolidate the duopoly of public (government-controlled) television stations and his own, or to concoct a bizarre new electoral law favorable to his coalition.	因此他领导的政府尽力通过修改司法程序的法律，设法巩固公共电视台（政府控制）和他所有的电视台的双头垄断地位，费尽心思去制定一部对其政党有利的离奇的新选举法。


But voters’ frustration with Berlusconi is not necessarily good news for Prodi and the left.	但是选民对贝鲁斯科尼丧气对普罗迪及左派政党来说不一定是好消息。


Opinion polls reveal that trust in all politicians and political parties has reached the lowest level ever.	民调显示民众对所有的政客和政党的信任度已经降到有史以来最低水平。


Italy has endured a sad and degrading electoral campaign, one that has generated a lot of heat, but little light.	意大利已经忍受了一场可悲可耻的选举，一场产生了大量的热量却没有产生多少光的选举。


One hopes that whoever wins buckles down to the serious work that Italy so desperately needs.	民众希望无论是谁获胜上台，都应顺应意大利的急需，全力以赴地开展工作。


Exiting from Democracy?	撤离民主？


Both President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair urgently need a plausible exit strategy from Iraq.	乔治·W·布什总统和托尼·布莱尔首相都需要从伊拉克撤军的看似可行的计划。


That they want to get out, now that their reasons for the war have so dramatically collapsed and domestic support is fading, is beyond doubt.	毫无疑问，他们都想撤离，因为他们发动战争的理由已经戏剧性地化为乌有，国内的支持也早已不复存在。


But neither wants to leave in ignominy, with their last man dramatically lifted of an embassy rooftop by helicopter.	但他们又都不想带着耻辱离开，由直升飞机戏剧性地接走使馆屋顶上的最后一名官员。


Both Bush and Blair want to leave Iraq, if not with a victory, then at least with some sense of "mission accomplished."	布什和布莱尔都想离开伊拉克，即使无法戴着胜利的花环，至少也让人感到"完成了使命"。


Judging from their recent statements, the scenario that they are concocting is simple. In January, there will be elections in Iraq.	从两人最近的讲话看，他们着手导演的一幕再简单不过，一月份将在伊拉克举行大选。


The resulting government will then ask the occupation troops to leave, say, within a year. Withdrawal will begin next spring.	选举产生的政府跟着会要求占领军离开，比如以一年为限，然后第二年春天，撤军就会开始。


While that scenario is simple, reality is not.	尽管设想再简单不过，但现实却极为复杂。


The first nagging question is this: will there actually be elections next January?	令人心烦意乱的问题首先是：大选能否在明年一月如期举行？


Prime Minister Iyad Allawi assures the world that there will be, and President Bush echoes his words.	阿拉维总理信誓旦旦向全世界保证这不是问题，布什总统也一再附和。


More neutral observers - and indeed, the daily news bulletins about bombings and hostage taking and "insurgents" - cast doubt on that prospect.	可立场更为中立的观察家－还有日复一日的爆炸、绑架以及"起义"，都足以使人们对描绘中的前景提出置疑。


The probability of Iraqi elections being held this coming January must be lower than 50%, and we can be certain that these will not be free and fair elections throughout the entire country.	明年1月伊拉克大选的可能性肯定到不了50%，而且我们可以认定，这绝不会是自由、公正的全国性大选。


Indeed, Iraq no longer deserves to be described as a united country.	实际上，伊拉克已经算不上是个统一的国家。


It has now joined the growing list of the world's failed states and can at best be described as a potential federation of three states plus the unruly city of Baghdad.	如今世界上失控的国家越来越多，现在又加上个伊拉克，即便人们拿出最乐观的估计，也只能是由三个州组成的潜在的联邦，再加上个谁都管不了的城市巴格达。


Without elections, the Coalition is in trouble. What other exit strategy can it devise?	大选不能举行，盟军就少不了麻烦，还能有什么样的撤军战略？


Above all, however, Iraq is in trouble. What other way forward is there for that unhappy former country?	可最重要的是，伊拉克会有麻烦，这个曾几何时的不幸国家还能有什么出路？


The answer need not be all despair. It may be that rethinking strategy in the light of new facts will open a way forward.	答案也不见得是死路一条，也许在新形势下重新思考真的会另辟蹊径。


After all, it might be the case that national elections in a place groping for a democratic future are not the best first step on the road to a liberal order. This is notably the case where entrenched groups - Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis - compete for central power.	归根结底，全国大选在一个摸索着走向民主的国家也许不是自由秩序的最好开端，尤其在库尔德人、什叶派和逊尼派几个民族为中央政权争得头破血流的情况下更是如此。


Elections, in such a case, may not even be wise at all - indeed, they may prove to be counterproductive.	这种时候举行大选也许根本就不明智，甚至还有可能带来负面的效果。


History suggests that elections do not create democracies. They confirm that the conditions for a democratic order are present.	历史经验表明选举不一定能创造民主，而只能说明这里具备建设民主的条件。


Thus, they are not the first step in the process of democratisation, but the last step in a preparatory phase in which at least two conditions have been created.	因此，选举不是民主进程中的第一步，而是在至少具备两个前提的条件下整个准备阶段的最后一步。


The first condition is a settled territorial arrangement. In "tribal" societies, this is not easy to bring about.	第一个条件是做好地区安排，这在"民族"社会中并非易事。


Bosnia's experience reveals why this is so.	波斯尼亚发生的一切说明了个中原委。


However much one may favor multiethnic nation-states, once such a construction has failed, it is imperative to listen to popular sentiment.	可不管人们多想建立多民族国家，一旦这种建设失败，就不得不服从大众情绪的指引。


Viable units will emerge that are less than ideal but at least capable of creating legitimate government - meaning a government that is both effective and acceptable.	能被多数人接受的组织会应运而生，虽然它们并不完美，却至少能产生合法的政府－这样的政府不仅有效，也能被大多数人所接受。


It would be disastrous to destroy the emergent Iraqi-Kurdish entity in the name of an abstract and no-longer existent greater Iraq.	如果以有悖原则为由摧毁刚刚涌现的伊拉克－库尔德联盟，而执意重建不复存在的大伊拉克，其结果将是灾难性的。


Anyone who experienced occupied Germany after World War II, as I did, remembers that the first postwar elections held there were local and regional.	像我本人一样，二次大战后经历过德国占领的人都会记得，最初的战后选举仅仅局限在地区的内部。


In fact, they established what are now the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany.	实际上，他们当时建立了如今德意志联邦共和国的雏形。


The second condition that must be satisfied before elections can be credible is security.	选举之前必须满足的条件之二是安全。


Initially, this may be an issue for the military. But peace and quiet based on tanks and the threat of air strikes cannot be enough.	起初，这可能要由军队负责，但建立在坦克和空袭威胁基础上的和平与安宁是远远不够的。


Security requires not just troops, but laws and their enforcement.	安全不仅需要强大的军队，还要有法律和严格的执行过程。


What one might call "the liberal order" requires at least two institutional ingredients.	人们口中的"自由秩序"至少有两个制度要素。


One is democracy, including elections and governments held to account by parliaments and ultimately the people. The other is the rule of law.	其一是民主，包括对议会及人民负责的选举和政府，其二则是法治。


Lord Ashdown, the High Representative of a coalition of countries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has set a good example of how the rule of law can be established.	在建立法治方面，波斯尼亚－黑塞哥维纳国家联盟高级代表阿什顿勋爵为我们创立了很好的典范。


It requires persons of great courage to become judges, and strong authorities to enforce their judgments.	这需要极有勇气的人担任法官，以及强劲有力的权威部门来执行判决。


But it can be done.	但这一切都是可以实现的。


In a Muslim country, such a strategy would, moreover, provide protection against hijacking of the law by religious fanatics.	在穆斯林国家里，这样的策略还能够防止宗教狂徒们劫持法律。 这可能会遵循所谓的"土耳其方案。


It would establish what might be called the "Turkish solution."	"近100年前，土耳其的开国前辈凯莫尔．


Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken up this very challenge, first set by his great predecessor Kemal Atatürk nearly a century ago.	阿塔土耳克首先提出了这个问题，继他之后，总理雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安成功地解决了这一挑战。


Perhaps what Iraq needs most is not a ballot box, but an Atatürk.	也许伊拉克最需要的不是简单的投票箱，而是像阿塔土耳克这样有远见卓识的伟人。


Such a strategy would be less simple than merely holding highly imperfect elections. It would make the exit of occupation forces more complex and perhaps more drawn-out.	这样的策略远不像强行大选这么简单，可能会使占领军的撤退情势更为复杂，时间也更漫长。


It would, however, have a more lasting impact on democratic development than a dubious process by which a limited number of people go to the polls to elect an ineffectual central government.	但与少数人选出的疲弱无力的中央政府相比，它会对民主发展产生更为深远的影响。


Such a strategy might even lead to an outcome about which those who want Iraq to join a free world can genuinely say: mission accomplished.	这样的策略甚至可能引导伊拉克踏上自由之路，那时候人们就可以发自内心地说：任务完成了。


Exiting International Justice	脱离国际公正


I recently took part in a conference in Belgrade entitled “Dealing with the Past in ex-Yugoslavia.”	不久前，我出席了贝尔格莱德举行的会议，题目是“面对前南斯拉夫的过去。


Although the rest of postcommunist Europe confronted such questions a decade ago, the Balkan wars of the 1990’s left both perpetrators and victims stuck in a time warp of justice delayed.	”尽管欧洲其它后共产主义国家早在10年前就不得不面对这个问题，但20世纪90年代的巴尔干战争却让犯罪者和牺牲者都陷在正义迟迟得不到伸张的时空怪圈之中。


As the conference’s participants made their way into Belgrade’s Hyatt Hotel, an angry band of mostly older protesters bearing posters that read, “Free Milosevic” greeted them.	随着与会者走进贝尔格莱德的Hyatt酒店，一群抗议者高举写着“释放米洛舍维奇”的标语正等待着他们，抗议者中绝大多数都是中老年人。


In a flurry of media and security, they confronted Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.	在媒体记者和保安人员的一阵混乱中，他们拦住了海牙国际刑事法庭负责前南问题的首席检察官迪旁蒂（Carla Del Ponte）。


Del Ponte is pressing Serbia’s government to cooperate in the still unresolved cases of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who ordered, implemented, and oversaw the massacre of 7,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995.	迪旁蒂曾向塞尔维亚政府施加压力，迫使他们在拉多万•卡拉季奇和拉特科·姆拉迪奇的审判中合作，正是这两个人下令执行并监督了1995年发生在斯雷布雷尼察的屠杀7000名穆斯林成年男子和男孩的暴行。


The protesters are not unrepresentative of Serb opinion.	抗议者还是代表了一些塞族人的观点。


Almost a decade after the start of the ICTY’s work, debate still rages over responsibility for war crimes, with little agreement on even the most basic facts of the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.	尽管前南国际刑庭成立已达10年之久，但有关战争罪行的争论还是非常激烈，就连波斯尼亚、克罗地亚和科索沃究竟发生了哪些基本事实都未能达成一致。


Serbian Prime Minister (then President) Vojislav Kostunica’s attempt in 2001 to set up a truth commission was doomed from the outset by allegations of bias, and was disbanded within a year.	塞尔维亚总理（当时任总统）伊斯拉夫·科什图尼察2001年成立真相委员会的企图从一开始就被指控为缺乏公正，成立起来的真相委员会也不到一年就遭到解散的厄运。


The ICTY is also in trouble.	前南国际刑事法庭也同样困难重重。


To be sure, Milosevic is on trial in The Hague for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.	的确，米洛舍维奇以战争罪、反人道主义罪和种族灭绝罪在海牙接受审判。


But comparisons to the post-WWII Nuremberg tribunal have worn thin: as the proceedings drag on, observers wonder why it has taken so long to establish criminal liability.	但海牙法庭和二次大战后纽伦堡法庭之间的对比正在日渐消失：由于审判迁延日久，观察家们怀疑为什么用了那么长时间来确立战争责任。


After all, at Nuremberg, the top rung of the Third Reich was tried and convicted within months.	毕竟在纽伦堡，第三帝国最高统帅们的审判和定罪只用了短短几个月的时间。


By contrast, Milosevic has taken advantage of the ICTY’s procedures to delay his trial, while challenging its jurisdiction and legitimacy.	与此相反，米洛舍维奇抓住前南国际刑事法庭的程序漏洞来拖延对他的审判，同时对法庭的权限及合法性提出质疑。


This plays well back home, where indicted war criminals are still touted as war heroes.	这一招在国内收到了很好的效果，那些受到指控的战争罪犯都像英雄似的被人崇拜。


Indeed, Serbia’s last presidential election became something of a referendum on Milosevic – and hence on Serbia’s relations with the West and the wider world.	实际上，塞尔维亚最近的总统大选几乎成了米氏问题的全民投票－同时参与表决的还有塞尔维亚与西方乃至世界的关系。


The pro-Milosevic candidate, Tomislav Nikolic, lost, but he received 46% of the vote.	拥护米洛舍维奇的候选人托米斯拉夫·尼科利奇没能赢得选举，但却获得了高达46%的选票。


Despite his campaign promises, Serbia’s President Boris Tadic has so far failed to cooperate with the ICTY by assisting in turning over Mladic (Karadzic is probably not in Serbia), who would surely testify against Milosevic.	尽管曾在竞选时做出承诺，塞尔维亚总统鲍里斯·塔迪奇还是没能把姆拉迪奇交给前南国际法庭（卡拉季奇也许根本不在塞尔维亚），而姆拉迪奇的证言肯定对米洛舍维奇不利。


One understands his trepidation: the first post-Milosevic prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, cooperated with the tribunal, and paid for it with his life.	我们能对塔迪奇的恐惧表示理解：第一位后米洛舍维奇时代的总理佐兰·金吉奇与法庭进行了合作，但却为此付出了生命的代价。


Such foot-dragging exposes the ICTY’s fundamental weakness: unlike the Nuremberg tribunal, the international community convened it	如此掣肘恰恰暴露了前南国际法庭的根本弱点：与纽伦堡法庭不同，国际社会是在战争中，而不是在战后，召集了前南国际法庭。 没有对证据或被审判者的绝对控制，前南国际法庭从一开始就缺乏行使“胜利者的公正”所必须的权威与合法性。


This continues to impede the case against Milosevic, raising questions about whether there is sufficient proof directly linking him to the policy of genocidal ethnic cleansing, although this is likely to be less problematic since the charges against him turn not on “command responsibility,” but instead on the ICTY’s charter principles of individual responsibility.	这继续阻碍着对米洛舍维奇的审判，使人们对是否有足够的证据证明他与种族灭绝政策有直接的关系产生了怀疑。


These implicitly authorize prosecution of those responsible for a “joint criminal enterprise,” thus linking liability for criminal behavior such as deportations and removals to other foreseeable atrocities.	但由于对他的指控不是仰仗“指挥责任”，而是采用了前南国际法庭个人责任的宪章原则，其中隐含着对“联合犯罪企业”责任者的起诉授权，把驱逐、免职等犯罪行为所应承担的责任与今后其它的暴力行为结合起来。


But time is running out.	可时间却越来越紧迫。


The ICTY must wrap up new indictments this year, and disband by 2008.	前南国际法庭必须在年内了结新的诉讼，并于2008年前彻底解散。


It enters this end game facing diminished resources and waning political will within the international community.	这场审判在进入尾声的时候，却面临着国际社会日益缩减的资源分配和日益削弱的政治意愿。


What will be the Tribunal’s legacy?	前南法庭会留下什么呢？


From the start, the ICTY’s aims were ambitious, having been launched under the UN Security Council’s peacemaking powers.	从一开始，由联合国安理会维和力量控制的前南国际法庭就抱着雄心壮志。


If this meant that the Tribunal was intended to deter further violence, then it failed, at least in the short run.	如果这意味着法庭想阻止进一步的暴力行动，那么它失败了，至少在短期内一败涂地。


After all, atrocities – including the Srebrenica massacre – continued after the ICTY began operating.	毕竟，暴行－包括斯雷布雷尼察大屠杀－在前南国际法庭开始运行后仍在继续。


What about ethnic reconciliation?	种族和解又会怎样？


The ICTY’s first chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, called for condemnation of ethnic persecution in order to enable all sides to transcend identity politics and move towards a more liberal political order.	前南国际法庭的第一位首席检察官理查德·戈德斯通（Richard Goldstone）呼吁谴责种族迫害，目的是使所有各方超越身份政治，建立起更为自由的政治秩序。


Individual accountability would somehow break the chain of ethnic identity and communal vengeance.	个人责任制会在一定程度上斩断种族身份和公共复仇的锁链。


But fostering ethnic reconciliation is a tall order for any court, and the ICTY hasn’t yet delivered.	但鼓励种族和解对任何法庭来讲都是脱离现实的要求，前南国际法庭也无法实现这样的目标。


A liberal political order implies a rule of law that recognizes precedents and analogical thinking. But many Serbs hold on to their sense of historical exceptionalism and unique suffering.	自由的政治秩序包含着承认已有先例和进行类似推理的法律原则，但很多塞族人都不肯放弃自己的历史例外论，认为自己��着独特的遭遇。


Indeed, the coincidence of the NATO bombing in 1999 with the indictment of Milosevic helped convert both events into “attacks on the Serbian people.”	实际上，1999年的北约轰炸与对米洛舍维奇的指控都被看成是“对塞尔维亚人民发起的攻击。 ”


Historical denial is no less evident in Croatia, where the polarities of blame and suffering have simply been reversed.	否定历史在克罗地亚也同样明显，那里的指责与苦难颠倒了位置。


There, too, the ICTY will not be missed.	前南国际法庭同样不会受到当地民众的怀念。


So the talk nowadays is of the right “exit strategy” from international justice.	因此今天要讨论如何脱离国际公正的问题。


When the ICTY closes its doors, where should its unfinished cases go?	当前南国际法庭的大门轰然关闭，那些尚未了结的诉讼该往何处去？


Del Ponte has called for “new partnerships for justice.”	迪旁蒂呼吁建立“新型公正伙伴关系。


That sounds fine, but what, realistically, are the choices?	”这个主意听起来不错，但现实的选择又在哪里呢？


Can the ICTY’s investigations and indictments really be turned over to national courts?	前南国际法庭的调查和诉讼是否真能移交给国家法庭？


So far, the picture is not promising: the few domestic trials in the region continue to reflect the fractious politics and pervasive ethnic bias that surround them.	迄今为止，前景并不乐观：该地区有数的几起国内审判仍然反映着周围难以驾驭的政治环境和无处不在的民族偏见。


As in many parts of the world, it may be several generations before the region’s crimes can be worked through.	和世界许多地方一样，可能需要经过几代人的不懈努力，才能完成该地区的犯罪调查。


The ICTY’s responsibility should be to forge and disseminate a record that limits the possibility of historical denial.	前南国际法庭的任务应当是完成并传播一份记录，从而使否定历史的可能性大大降低。


Exiting the Middle East Labyrinth	走出中东迷宫


BERLIN – Two years have passed since Barack Obama was elected President of the United States.	柏林——巴拉克·奥巴马当选美国总统已经两年了。


Much to his credit – and in contrast to his immediate predecessor – Obama tried, from his first day in office, to work towards a resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.	这两年里有一点值得赞扬，那就是与刚刚离职的前任相比，奥巴马从上任伊始就努力寻找以色列和巴勒斯坦冲突的解决办法。


Two years on, are good intentions the best that Obama’s new policy has to offer?	但两年过去了，奥巴马新政是否除了善意之外没有带来别的什么？


After all, nothing of value has in fact resulted from them.	毕竟，新政没有带来任何有价值的结果。


Even worse, given that Obama’s effort to enforce a permanent moratorium on new settlement construction in the West Bank has failed, is that direct negotiations between the conflicting parties have run aground.	不仅奥巴马永久冻结西岸定居点兴建的努力已经失败，冲突各方的直接谈判也已经走进了死胡同。


Good intentions count for little in life – and for less in politics.	善意在实际生活中没有多少价值——在政治领域更是这样。


What matters, first and foremost, are results.	生活中真正起作用的只有结果。


President George W. Bush believed that he needed to take account of only one half of America’s dual role in the Middle East, namely the alliance with Israel.	乔治·W·布什总统认为他所要做的只是顾及到美国在中东扮演双重角色之中的一个，说具体点就是以色列的盟友。


He had no time for the second US role, that of pivotal peace mediator between Israelis and Palestinians, during his entire eight-year presidency.	在长达八年的总统任期内，他始终没有时间顾及美国的另一个角色，那就是在以巴之间发挥关键的和平调解作用。


All his initiatives were intended only to pacify the international public.	他提出的所有计划都是为了安抚国际公众。


We all know where that led.	我们都知道他所取得的结果。


From the start, Obama wanted to do things differently, pursuing an active Middle East policy.	而奥巴马从上任伊始就力求改变，采取更为积极的中东政策。


But the results so far are not very different from those under Bush.	可是从目前来看，结果并不比布什好多少。


In both cases, standstill triumphed over progress.	在布什和奥巴马任内，停滞都压倒进展成为中东问题的主旋律。


Given this, and both sides’ intransigence, many would withdraw and try to forget the conflict altogether.	有鉴于此，再加上双方的强硬立场，很多人都选择远离是非，彻底忘掉这场中东冲突。


But it isn’t as simple as that, because a continuation of the conflict (which is what “forgetting about it” would boil down to) would not only prolong what is a tragedy for both Palestinians and Israelis, but would also be too dangerous for the region.	但事情却没有那么简单，因为冲突的持续（也是“视而不见”的必然结果）不仅会延长巴以双方的悲剧，也会给整个地区带来危险的结果。


Most ominously, the window of opportunity for a two-state solution could close for good, because realities on the ground will no longer allow it.	最可怕的是实现两国方案的机遇之门会永远关闭，因为现实情况已经不再允许做出这种选择。


For Israelis, this would mean permanent occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and thus reckoning with an Arab majority, which would erode the foundations of their state – democracy and the rule of law – and thus its legitimacy.	对以色列而言这意味着永久性的占领西岸和东耶路撒冷，从而不得不面对在数量上远胜于己的阿拉伯人，而这将削弱他们建国的基础——民主和法治——进而影响其地位的合法性。


Such a development is the greatest threat that Israel faces in the medium term, which makes a two-state solution vital to its own interests.	这样的事态发展是以色列中期面临的最大威胁，而两国方案也因此对捍卫其自身利益至关重要。


Of course, from Israeli leaders’ perspective, the status quo, with its absence of terror and missile strikes, is anything but negative.	当然，从以色列领导人的角度看，除恐怖活动和导弹袭击以外的现实情况一点都不差。


But it won’t last.	但情况不会永远这样。


Moreover, the country’s strategic situation is deteriorating with each passing year, because the global redistribution of power and influence from the West to the East can only weaken Israel’s position.	此外，以色列所面临的战略环境正在逐年恶化，因为全球权力和影响力在东西方之间的重新分配只能削弱以色列的力量。


For the Palestinians, the situation is oppressive, and for Gaza it is an outright humanitarian disaster.	而巴勒斯坦人所面对的现状令人窒息，说加沙面对一场彻头彻尾的人道主义灾难一点都不为过。


They are internally divided between Fatah and Hamas, under Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, isolated from the outside world in Gaza, hopeless in the region’s refugee camps, and rebuffed by their Arab neighbors.	他们在以色列占领的东耶路撒冷和西岸地区分裂为法塔赫和哈马斯两派势力，加沙地区的居民完全与世隔绝，在难民营里过着绝望的生活，同时受到阿拉伯邻国的抵制和冷落。


In these circumstances, the loss of a two-state perspective would be a recipe for further indignities and deepening misery.	在这样的情况下，分别建国的希望日益渺茫只能让巴勒斯坦民众进一步丧失尊严，并进一步加深他们的痛苦。


But, if Israelis and Palestinians share a vital interest in a two-state solution, they have very different interests, and therefore mean very different things when referring to the same issues.	虽说以色列和巴勒斯坦人在两国制方案中拥有共同的利益，但由于双方利益差别太大，因此在同一问题上常常提出截然相反的诉求。


For Israel, security is the top priority; for Palestinians, what matters most is an end to Israeli occupation.	安全对以色列而言是头等大事，而结束以色列占领则是巴勒斯坦人梦寐以求的愿望。


Israel cannot afford a second Gaza in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; for the Palestinians, a state with an ongoing Israeli military presence would be worthless.	把西岸和东耶路撒冷变成另一个加沙是以色列不能承受之重，而对巴勒斯坦人而言，如果允许以色列长期驻军，建国就是没有任何意义的空头支票。


Perhaps Obama’s central error was that an important but minor matter – stopping new settlements – was given central significance.	或许奥巴马的核心失误在于之前他给予停止新建定居点这一重要但不起决定作用的问题太过的关注。


An indefinite building freeze would lead to the immediate end of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s coalition government in Jerusalem, without giving Israel or Netanyahu anything tangible in return.	无限期冻结新建定居点会立即终结以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡��耶路撒冷的联合政府，而以色列或内塔尼亚胡却无法从中获得任何好处。


It should have been clear that Netanyahu would not extend the freeze.	内塔尼亚胡不会延长冻结时间的事实应该再明显不过。


The crucial question that the US must ask both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is whether they would be willing – here and now – to negotiate in earnest about the final status.	美国必须询问内塔尼亚胡和巴勒斯坦总统马哈茂德·阿巴斯的关键问题是，他们是否愿意在此时此地就最终解决方案展开严肃的讨论。


If so, a way out of the seemingly irresolvable conflict between Israeli security and Palestinian statehood would open.	如果美国能这么做，就会开启化解以色列安全和巴勒斯坦独立国家地位这对似乎无解矛盾的光明大道。


The formula could run as follows: a comprehensive agreement about the final status now (taking into account all open questions, including East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine); implementation of the agreement in pre-defined steps over a longer period of time; and monitoring of the process via a mechanism based on the presence on the ground of a third party (led by the US).This would give Palestinians a guarantee of their state’s borders, its capital, and the Israeli occupation’s pre-defined endpoint.	具体解决方法如下： 立即达成有关最终解决方案的全面协议（要综合考虑所有悬而未决的问题，包括以东耶路撒冷作为巴勒斯坦国的首都）； 在相当长的一段时期内按预定步骤落实全面协议内容；


They could use the time, with international help, to build up effective state institutions, address economic development, and heal the rift between West Bank and Gaza.	他们可以在国际社会的帮助下利用这段时间建立起行之有效的国家机构，解决经济发展问题，并消除西岸和加沙地带之间长期存在的不和。


On this new and permanent basis, they may find a solution for the Palestinian refugees and advance the cause of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.	在这个永久性解决方案的基础上，他们可以找到巴勒斯坦难民问题的解决办法，为法塔赫和哈马斯之间的和解事业而奋斗。


Israel would have a guarantee that its security would not be endangered by a final-status agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and that its withdrawal from the Palestinian territories would be gradual, over several years, and monitored on the ground by a third party.	以色列将会得到保证，最终地位协议和巴勒斯坦建国不会威胁到它的安全，而且它可以在几年内逐步从巴勒斯坦领土上撤军，同时接受第三方的实地监督。


The country would then have clear, internationally recognized borders, enabling it to end permanently the conflict with its Arab neighbors.	以色列自此将拥有国际社会承认的明确边界，确保它能永远结束与阿拉伯邻国的冲突。


While the situation in the Middle East currently looks hopeless, a new attempt that focuses on the essential points, not on minor ones, deserves support.	尽管目前的中东局势似乎无望，但注重关键而非次要问题的新的努力理应得到国际社会的支持。


The alternative is the loss of the two-state solution and the perpetuation of a terrible – and terribly perilous – conflict.	否则我们就要面临失去两国方案的危险，这场可怕而极度危险的冲突将可能常态化。


Exorcising Musharraf\u0027s Ghost	驱除穆沙拉夫的幽灵


CAMBRIDGE – Following its recent free elections, Pakistan is rebounding politically.	剑桥－在最近的自由选举之后，巴基斯坦正处于政治上的恢复过程之中。


But the euphoria that came with the end of the Musharraf era is wearing off, as the new government faces stark choices.	但是穆沙拉夫时代结束带来的喜悦，因为新政府面对的严峻选择，正在消失。


Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, democracy is not new to this 60-year-old state, but ethnic cleavages, weak institutions, and religious extremism in the North are perennially destabilizing.	不像伊拉克和阿富汗，民主对这个有60年历史的国家来说并不新鲜，但是民族分裂，松散的公共机构和在北部的宗教极端主义正在不断的破坏国家的稳定。


And, while the new government settles in and establishes its priorities, the West, especially the United States, must reassess the impact of its past dealings with Pakistan.	并且，在新政府入主并确定其优先解决的问题的同时，西方世界，特别是美国，必须对其过去和巴基斯坦交往的效果进行重新评估。


Pakistan’s new prime minister, Yousaf Gilani, is a seasoned politician and, more importantly, has Sufi family roots, which is a good omen because of the Sufi tradition of tolerance.	巴基斯坦的新总理，优素福·吉拉尼是一位经验丰富的政治家，更重要的是，他具有苏非派背景，因为该派提倡宽容的传统，这是一个很好的预兆。


Gilani unequivocally declared in his inaugural address that fighting terrorism is a top priority, and his first decision was to release from house arrest judges deposed by Musharraf.	吉拉尼在他的就职演说中明白地宣布打击恐怖主义是国家的首要任务，他的第一个决定就是释放被穆沙拉夫软禁的法官。


The respite from the horrendous spate of suicide bombings since the new government assumed power is similarly heartening.	新政府上任以来，大量恐怖的自杀炸弹袭击减少了，这同样令人振奋。


But the honeymoon period is coming to an end.	但是蜜月期即将结束。


Already, in Gilani’s hometown of Multan, rioters attacked government offices and banks to protest electricity disruptions.	在吉拉尼的家乡木尔坦，已经有聚众闹事者袭击政府机关和银行以抗议电力中断。


A couple of well-known opposition politicians, a chief minister and a federal cabinet minister of the previous pro-Musharraf government, were publicly thrashed, raising doubts about government control over law and order in the country.	一些出名的反对派政治家，在前一届支持穆沙拉夫政府里任职的一位重要部长和一个联邦内阁议员，被公开暴打，这引起人们对政府控制国家法律和秩序能力的怀疑。


So far, Musharraf has accepted his diminishing stature quietly – though he has few other options.	到目前为止，穆沙拉夫已经平静地接受了其影响力减弱的事实－虽然他几乎没有其它的选择。


The new political leadership, both inside and outside the parliament, has been carefully avoiding a head-on collision with the president.	新政治领导层，不管是在议会里还是在议会外，都小心地避免和总统发生正面冲突。


Interestingly, in the midst of the political transition, Musharraf embarked on a week-long visit to China to lobby for construction of an oil and gas pipeline between China and the Persian Gulf that would be routed through Pakistan.	有趣的是，在政治过渡的过程中，穆沙拉夫对中国进行了为期一周的访问，游说中国在中国和波斯湾之间建造一条通过巴基斯坦的石油和天然气管道。


The deeper question raised by this proposal is whether Musharraf meant to convey a message to the US that Pakistan’s priorities were shifting.	这个提议引发的深层次问题是，这是否显示穆沙拉夫有意向美国传达巴基斯坦的优先解决问题正在发生转变。


The revival of democratic politics in Pakistan will undoubtedly effect Pakistan-US relations.	巴基斯坦民主政治的复兴毫无疑问会影响它和美国的关系。


Pakistan’s military links with America appear to remain on a sound footing, so the strategic alliance with the US is likely to continue, perhaps with some nuanced differences over how to fight the “war on terror.”	巴基斯坦和美国的军事联系似乎仍然很牢固，所以它和美国的战略联盟可能依然会继续，虽然或许在怎样进行“反恐战争”上有细微的差别。


But Pakistani politicians are bound to be influenced by domestic public opinion, which is generally critical of US policies.	但是巴基斯坦政治家一定会受到国内公众意见的影响，而这些意见基本上都对美国政策不满。


Nevertheless, long-term US interests in the region will be better served if Pakistan’s democratic forces successfully establish themselves.	然而，如果巴基斯坦的民主力量能够成功确立其地位的话，美国在该地区的长期利益会得到更好地实现。


A proposal in the US Senate to increase development and education aid to Pakistan could help in winning the hearts and minds.	美国参议院要求增加对巴基斯坦发展和教育援助的提议可以帮助美国在巴基斯坦赢得民心。


Meanwhile, President George W. Bush has said that “if another September 11-style attack is being planned, it probably is being plotted in Pakistan and not Afghanistan.”	同时，乔治·沃克·布什总统说过“如果有人正在密谋另一个911式的袭击，它可能是在巴基斯坦而不是在阿富汗策划的。


Whether this American intelligence assessment is based on credible information is unknown.	”美国的这个情报评估是否建立在可靠的消息上还不知道。


American election-year politics may also be behind this assertion.	美国选举年的政治也可能在这个断言背后起着作用。


But it is significant that Bush decided to voice this view during Pakistan’s political transition.	但是布什决定在巴基斯坦政治过渡过程中说出这个观点意义重大。


Pakistan must take this view seriously, regardless of Bush’s motivations.	不管布什的动机是什么，巴基斯坦都必须认真对待这个观点。


The new government should quickly devise a policy to deal with terrorism.	新政府应尽快设计出对付恐怖主义的政策。


Recent months have seen dozens of suicide bombings and other terrorist activities – the price of Pakistan’s own past blunders, as well as those of the West.	最近几个月内发生了许多自杀炸弹袭击事件和其他恐怖活动－巴基斯坦自己和西方国家过去错误的代价。


Afghanistan is a prime example, as is the failure to settle the Kashmir imbroglio with India. Both failures have strengthened domestic terrorist groups.	阿富汗是一个重要的例子，巴基斯坦没能和印度解决克什米尔纠纷也是一个，这两个失败都加强了国内恐怖团体的力量。


Pakistan’s government appears to be preparing to talk to some of the extremists in the tribal areas, introduce political reforms, and redouble development efforts.	巴基斯坦政府似乎准备和部族地区的极端分子展开对话，引进政治改革以及加强在发展方面的努力。


But reference to “talks” makes the West uncomfortable.	但是，提及“会谈”让西方国家感觉不舒服。


American officials have likened this strategy to negotiating with terrorists, and point to a previous round of negotiations that did nothing to stop violence in the tribal areas.	美国官员已经把这个策略比作和恐怖分子谈判，并且指出前一轮的谈判对停止部族地区的暴力活动没有起到任何作用。


But the new leadership wants to distinguish between al-Qaeda terrorists and religious conservatives and disillusioned Pashtun youth within Pakistan.	但是新的领导层想将在巴基斯坦内的基地组织恐怖分子和宗教保守派以及醒悟的普什图青年区别开来。


After all, the victory of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province is a strong indication that people there have rejected religious political forces and violence.	毕竟，世俗的人民民族党(ANP)在巴基斯坦西北边境省份选举的胜利有力地的说明那里的人民已经拒绝了宗教政治和暴力。


This window of opportunity can be expanded through dialogue and reconciliation with those who are ready to disavow extremism and militancy. The new Pakistani government needs to explain this to the West in order to keep its support.	巴基斯坦新政府可以通过与那些准备放弃极端主义和武力的人的对话和和解来扩大机会窗口，它也需要将这一点解释给西方国家以保持它们的支持。


The US, meanwhile, should end direct military strikes in the area, even if these are conducted with the knowledge and cooperation of Pakistan’s military.	同时，美国应停止在该地区的直接军事打击，即使这些军事打击是在巴基斯坦军队知晓并配合的情况下进行的。


Force has never worked with the Pashtun tribes, and there is no evidence that this has changed.	武力从来对普什图族不起作用，现在也没有证据证明这一点已经发生了改变。


There are real signs that the new government is considered a credible partner in the tribal areas.	有确实的迹象表明在该部族地区，新政府被认为是一个可信的合作伙伴。


It needs to be given time to find a way out of the endless cycle of violence.	而且，找出解决无休止的暴力循环的方法需要时间。


Exorcising the Last Balkan Ghosts	驱走巴尔干半岛最后的恶魔


The next few weeks will see the resolution, one way or another, of the last territorial issues remaining in the Balkans, where the wars of the 1990’s ended with NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).	接下来几周将会最终解决巴尔干半岛留下的最后的领土问题，不管是以哪种方式。 二十世纪九十年代在那里发生的战争最终导致了北约1995年在波斯尼亚、1999年在科索沃的介入。


Even with peace, major problems were left unresolved.	即便维持了和平，但是一些关键的问题依然悬而未决。


Bosnia was divided between a Muslim-Croat federation and a Serb republic, with little authority vested in the central government and a large international military – and eventually civilian – presence needed to hold it together.	波斯尼亚被分裂成了一个穆斯林-克罗地亚联邦和一个塞族共和国，中央政府的权威小得可怜，只是依靠一支庞大的国际部队、最终是平民的存在才把这个国家联结在了一起。


Kosovo was left as a United Nations protectorate whose “final status” was uncertain.	科索沃需要联合国的保护，它的“最终地位”还没有确定。


These unresolved issues are now returning: prompted by Serbia’s government, Bosnia’s Serb leadership is contemplating secession, even as its Muslim leadership tries to increase central control.	这些悬而未决的问题现在又开始浮现出来：在塞尔维亚政府的唆使下，波斯尼亚的塞族领导人正在考虑脱离波斯尼亚，即便它的穆斯林领导人试图加强中央政府的控制。


And Kosovo’s Albanian population is clamoring for independence, while Serbia tries to postpone a decision by blocking action in the Security Council.	科索沃的阿尔巴尼亚族叫嚷着要独立，而塞尔维亚试图通过阻止安理会的行动来推迟作出决定。


There is a real risk of renewed violence, though perhaps not on the scale of the 1990’s.	现在真的存在再次发生暴力的危险，尽管也许不会达到二十世纪九十年代那样的规模。


If the current negotiations on Kosovo’s status fail, Albanian extremists will seek to expel the more than 100,000 Serbs who live there.	如果目前对科索沃地位的谈判失败的话，阿尔巴尼亚族的极端分子将会试图把生活在那儿的10万多塞族人驱逐出去。


Similarly, any move by Bosnia’s Serb Republic to secede could incite instability there.	同样地，波斯尼亚的塞族共和国任何寻求脱离国家的行动都会引发那里的不稳定。


Serbia, which traded violent nationalism for nonviolent nationalism when Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown eight years ago, has done all it can to impede resolution of these issues, with strong support from Vladimir Putin’s Russia.	当米洛舍维奇八年前被推翻时将暴力民族主义变为非暴力的民族主义塞尔维亚依靠普京在背后的撑腰，一直在尽力阻止在这些问题上作出决议。


Serbia wants as much independence as possible for the Serb Republic, while asserting its own sovereignty over Kosovo.	塞尔维亚希望塞族共和国能取得尽可能大的独立权，同时维持它自己对科索沃的主权。


Serbs governed only by Serbs on their own territory is still Serbia’s goal.	所有塞族人只在他们自己的领土上由塞族人来管治依然是塞尔维亚的目标。


The United States and the European Union are committed to a different vision: democratic transition and integration of all of the Balkans into NATO and eventually the EU.	美国和欧盟却有着不同的想法，他们希望看到民主的转变和把巴尔干半岛的所有国家都融入北约以及最终融入欧盟。


But they have been reluctant to impose conditions on Serbia, for fear of bringing even more radical nationalists to power.	但是他们却不太想强行让塞尔维亚接受条件，因为他们担心这样做会导致更多的激进民族主义分子走上权力的舞台。


The US allowed Serbia into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, despite Serbia’s refusal to extradite General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serbs’ military leader in the 1990’s, to The Hague to face war crimes charges.	美国允许塞尔维亚加入北约的和平伙伴计划，尽管塞尔维亚拒绝将二十世纪九十年代波斯尼亚塞族的军事领导人姆拉迪奇将军引渡到海牙接受战争罪的指控。


The EU has negotiated and initialed (but not yet signed) a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia, despite its recalcitrance in the Kosovo negotiations and meddling in Bosnia.	欧盟已经和塞尔维亚谈判并启动了稳定与联系协议（协议还没有签），尽管后者在科索沃问题的谈判上拒不退让并且还干涉波斯尼亚的事务。


But appeasement has failed.	但是这种安抚却遭到了失败。


The US and the EU must use the strong hand that they still hold to ensure that their vision prevails, bringing lasting peace to a region that has repeatedly dragged great powers into conflict.	美国和欧盟必须运用它们手上依然掌握的强大手段确保它们预想的局面占据上风，从而给这个一再把大国拖进冲突的地区带去最终的和平。


This requires, above all, a stiff warning to Serbia that it can no longer prevent Bosnia and Kosovo from moving towards Europe.	这首先要求严肃警告塞尔维亚不得再阻止波斯尼亚和科索沃向欧洲靠拢。


If for now a democratic Serbia prefers radical nationalism and alignment with Russia to membership in the EU and NATO, so be it.	如果现在一个民主的塞尔维亚宁愿走上激进民族主义的道路，并且在成为欧盟和北约成员国的问题上听从俄罗斯的指使，那么就随它去。


No vital US interests are at stake, and Serbia will soon recognize its mistake.	美国的任何重大利益都不会受到损害，并且塞尔维亚很快将认识到它的错误。


The EU should be relieved not to admit such a Serbia.	欧盟应该为没有接收这样的一个塞尔维亚而感到松了一口气。


At the same time, the US and the EU, acting together, must get serious in Bosnia and Kosovo.	与此同时，美国和欧盟应该携起手来严肃地对待波斯尼亚和科索沃的问题。


In Bosnia, any further moves to undermine the essential compromise reached in the 1995 Dayton agreement should be met with the full powers of Bosnia’s “high representative,” who has recently negotiated an agreement that will strengthen the country’s fragile governing structure.	在波斯尼亚，任何进一步削弱1995年戴顿协议所达成的重要妥协的举动都应该被波斯尼亚“高级代表”全权制止，后者最近通过协商达成了一项协议以加强这个国家脆弱的管治结构。


Bosnia’s leading Serb and Muslim politicians are playing with fire because they know the fire department is standing by.	波斯尼亚的塞族和穆斯林政治家正在玩火，因为他们知道有消防队员站在他们身边。


It is time to take away their matches.	现在是把他们手上的火柴拿走的时候了。


In Kosovo, now that a last-ditch round of negotiations has concluded with a report to the UN Secretary General, the US and the EU should agree to recognize Kosovo’s independence, provided the Kosovars agree to implement the plan submitted by Finnish mediator Marti Ahtisaari.	在科索沃，最后一轮孤注一掷的谈判后形成了一份呈交联合国秘书长的报告。 美国和欧盟应该同意承认科索沃的独立，只要科索沃人同意执行由芬兰调解人马尔蒂·阿赫蒂萨里提交的计划。


The Ahtisaari plan provides ample protection for Serbs and an international presence in Kosovo – which the US and the EU will need to deploy even without a new Security Council resolution – to ensure implementation.	阿赫蒂萨里计划为塞族人提供了充分的保护，并且让国际社会派代表驻扎在科索沃。 在这一方面，即便安理会没有达成新的决议，美国和欧盟也需要派人驻扎在那儿以确保计划的实施。


Ironically, Serbia’s resistance to the Ahtisaari plan undermines protection for Kosovo’s Serbs and increases the risk that they will be mistreated.	具有讽刺意味的是，塞尔维亚对阿赫蒂萨里计划的拒绝削弱了对生活在科索沃的塞族人的保护，并且增加了他们遭到虐待的危险。


American officials are fond of pointing out that the US has repeatedly intervened to protect Muslims from war and dictatorship.	美国官员总喜欢说美国曾经一再出面干涉以保护穆斯林免受战争和独裁统治。


But this claim will be devalued if the so far successful international interventions in Bosnia or Kosovo end in tragedy.	但是如果迄今为止在波斯尼亚或科索沃成功的国际干涉最终以悲剧告终的话，这样的说法就不会有那么大的说服力。


A satisfactory outcome in both places is within reach.	我们已经接近于在两个地方都取得令人满意的结果。


To achieve it, the US and the EU must ensure that Serbia is blocked from making trouble, Kosovo becomes independent, and Bosnia stays united.	为了实现这样的结果，美国和欧盟必须确保塞尔维亚不会再制造麻烦，科索沃获得独立，而波斯尼亚能够保持完整。


Expanding Crime and Punishment in Tibet	西藏，不断膨胀的罪与罚


NEW YORK – China has been widely criticized for its harsh treatment of almost any form of political dissent in Tibet.	发自纽约——中国一向对其西藏地区的任何政治异见分子都予以严厉镇压，并因此遭到了外界的广泛批评。


In 2008, for example, a Tibetan named Wangdu, an AIDS educator in Lhasa, received a life sentence for sending news about Tibetan protests to Tibetans abroad.	比如在2008年，一个名叫旺度，原本在拉萨进行艾滋病防治教育工作的西藏人就被判处了终身监禁，因为他向海外的西藏人传播西藏暴动的消息。


The logic was clear: preserve what China’s leaders call “stability” and “harmony” in order to maintain state power.	而政府这样做的逻辑也非常简单：维持领导人所说的“稳定”和“和谐”，从而维护手中的政权。


But two recent events in Tibet, involving the trials of two leading Tibetans who had not attacked or criticized the state at all, do not follow this logic.	但最近在西藏地区发生的事件却与上述逻辑毫不相关，因为案件牵涉到的两个西藏当地著名人士根本就没有攻击或是批评过政府。


In the first trial, on June 24, Karma Samdrup, 42, one of the wealthiest Tibetan businessmen in China, received a 15-year sentence from a court in Xinjiang for stealing antiques.	在6月24日的第一起案件中，42岁的嘎玛桑珠（中国大陆地区最富有的西藏商人之一）被新疆地区一所法院以盗窃文物罪判刑15年。


Human rights groups suggested the charge was invented, because the police had dropped the case for lack of evidence when it was first investigated 12 years ago, and neither witnesses nor new evidence were produced in court.	人权团体认为该罪名是捏造的，因为在该案件于12年前开审时警方就以缺乏证据为由放弃了调查，而最近这次审判则既未传召证人，也没有提出新的证据。


Despite a detailed critique of the prosecution’s case by two Chinese defense lawyers, the sentence, which had been known privately among officials for several days, was confirmed.	尽管有两位中国辩护律师对公诉人的指控进行了详细辩护，但判决依然如是，并且消息只是在政府官员中私下流传。


On July 3, Karma’s elder brother, Rinchen Samdrup, 46, was tried on charges of “endangering state security.”	接着在7月3日，嘎玛的哥哥，46岁的仁青桑珠以“威胁国家安全”罪被起诉。


His crime was failing to register a small environmental group run by him and his younger brother in their remote home village of Gonjo, in eastern Tibet.	原因是他与其弟其美朗加在两人的家乡，西藏东部的贡觉县建立了一个小型环保组织，却没有在有关部门注册备案。


Having been found guilty -- the conviction rate in China is around 98%, and is even higher in Tibet, so the verdict was never in doubt – he was sentenced to five years in prison.	在中国，审判定罪率大概在98%左右，在西藏地区则更高，因此裁决也是毫无疑问的——他被判处5年有期徒刑。


The younger brother, Chime Namgyal, 38, who is disabled, has been hospitalized since June 11 for serious injuries received whilst in custody.	而38岁的其美朗加则由于在拘留期间受重伤，自6月11日开始就在医院关押留医。


He did not even receive a trial, but was given a 21-month sentence by local officials for the same offense as Rinchen – endangering state security by unofficially organizing litter-collection, tree-planting, and nature patrols to stop the hunting of endangered species.	甚至在未经审判的情况下，他就被当地官员判处21月的劳改，罪名跟仁青桑珠一样——“威胁国家安全”，未经批准组织垃圾收集和植树活动，组织巡逻队阻止对珍稀野生动物的偷猎行为。


Even in China, such activities are not usually considered threats to the state.	而即便是在中国，这些行为一般也都算不上对国家的威胁。


These three cases are doubly inexplicable, because none of the three brothers has been accused of actually criticizing China, opposing the Communist Party, or even talking about politics.	这三起案件都疑点重重，因为这三兄弟都从未被指控有批评国家，反对共产党甚至谈论政治的行为。


On the contrary, they have been hailed as ideal Tibetan citizens.	相反，他们被人们视为西藏人的楷模。


Karma had founded and financed a leading Tibetan environmental organization in 2001, and was named China’s philanthropist of the year in 2006 by China Central Television (for “creating harmony between men and nature”).	嘎玛于2001年创立并资助了西藏最大的一个环保组织，并被中央电视台选为2006年度中国慈善家（当选原因是“创造了人与自然之间的和谐”）。


And, last year, the One Foundation, a humanitarian fund run by the film star Jet Li, awarded him one million renminbi by for his “model project.”	而就在去年，由华人电影明星李连杰创立的人道组织“壹基金”还向嘎玛颁发了“2009壹基金典范工程”奖，奖金100万元人民币。


Rinchen was well regarded, too.	而仁青桑珠同样也是名声在外。


His group was awarded a major environmental prize from Ford Motor Company in 2006, and in 2008 the Chinese government described him and his organization as “an extremely beneficial supplement to the government’s environmental protection work.”	他的组织在2006年度获“福特汽车环保奖”自然环境保护类一等奖，在2008年中国政府还称赞他及其组织“对政府的环保项目工作给予了极为有力的支持”。


This February, China’s most important paper, the People’s Daily, published a large photograph of him receiving the award, together with praise of his work. (The paper was apparently unaware that by then he had been in custody for five months.)	今年2月，中国最重要的报纸《人民日报》登载了一张仁青桑珠领奖的大幅照片，并撰文描述他的贡献（该报似乎不知道他自此之后就开始了长达5个月的拘留）。


Indeed, a book praising the brothers for their work, Tianzhu (“Heavenly Beads”), was published in China late last year, to wide acclaim.	事实上，一本名为《天珠》的书在去年末出版，书中对这几兄弟的贡献予以盛赞，并得到了广泛好评。


In June, for no apparent reason, the book was banned throughout the country, despite its lack of political content.	谁知到了6月，虽然书中并未包含任何政治内容，但该书却莫名其妙地遭到全国范围的查禁。


So, why is China targeting Tibetans who have no connection with politics and are regarded as model citizens?	那么，中国政府为什么要把目标指向这些与政治毫无关联，且被视为模范公民的西藏人呢？


Part of the answer may lie with corrupt local officials. Rinchen and Chime had criticized a local police chief for hunting endangered animals.	这其中一部分原因可能是跟腐败有关，因为仁青桑珠和其美朗加曾经批评一名当地公安部门领导猎杀珍稀动物。


One of his superiors at the nearby prefectural headquarters in Chamdo is suspected of having decided to punish them, as well as two of their cousins, Sonam Choephel and Rinchen Dorje, who are also in custody in Tibet for vague or unspecified offenses.	而有怀疑说正是该领导在昌都地区的上级决定惩罚他们及其两个兄弟，索朗曲培和仁青多杰，这两人目前也因为某些模糊的罪名而被关押在西藏。


But local officials could not have arranged for Karma to be tried in far-away Xinjiang, let alone persuade the central government to ban the brothers’ innocuous book about their love of nature.	但当地官员显然是无法安排嘎玛桑珠到遥远的新疆受审的，更别说去说服中央政府查禁那本没有政治问题，描述几兄弟对自然之爱的书。


Higher-level leaders may have taken up the case against Karma – persuading their counterparts in Xinjiang to resurrect the old antiques case – because he had used his connections in Beijing to complain about the treatment of his brothers by officials in Tibet.	这意味着可能有更高级的官员在针对嘎玛桑珠——这些官员要求他们在新疆的同僚把盗窃文物的旧案翻出来——因为桑珠利用自己和北京的关系来反映兄弟们在西藏当地官员处所受到的不良待遇。


This theory has gained credence because the Communist Party’s current leader in the Tibet Autonomous Region formerly held a powerful position in Xinjiang Province.	这个推理比较有说服力，因为西藏自治区当前的领导人曾经在新疆地区担任要职。


If it is true, the case against Karma suggests that officials stationed in Tibetan areas may be gaining more power, able to reach out beyond their jurisdictions to pursue what appear to be little more than personal grievances.	如果这是真的话，这个针对嘎玛桑珠的事件就意味着西藏当地官员的权力正不断膨胀，甚至能超出自己的管辖范围去处理一些显然属于私人恩怨的问题。


Nor are these the only cases.	而上述事件也不仅仅是孤立的个案。


Dorje Tashi, the wealthy owner of the Yak, a leading tourist hotel in Lhasa, is also said to be languishing in prison on vague political charges.	据说拉萨著名旅游酒店“牦牛（Yak）宾馆”的老板多杰扎西也因为某种政治指控而入狱。


In Tibet, where for the last 30 years major Tibetan businessmen had been seen as natural allies of the state, such developments are unprecedented.	在过去30年间，这些西藏大商人都被视为政府的天然同盟，而如今，这些事态的变化也是始料未及的。


China’s central government has the power to rein in its local chieftains, so its failure to do so in Tibet is puzzling.	中国的中央政府拥有节制地方首脑的权力，而其对西藏当地官员的放纵也是令人费解的。


If it continues to allow such cases to go forward, it risks losing even more credibility among those Tibetans who, like the three environmentalists, have tried to stay within the law and avoid politics.	如果任由事态继续发展下去，中央政府就可能失去那些遵纪守法，避谈政治的西藏人——正如上述三个环保主义者——的信任。


Other Tibetans may conclude that China’s government has relegated governance of their region to local satraps who have their own interests to pursue.	其他西藏人可能会因此认为：中国政府已经把该地的管治权下放到了那些心术不正的地方首脑手里。


In an area full of suspicion and antagonism towards the state, expanding the targets of its political prosecutions from Tibetan protestors to environmentalists and from dissident monks to businessmen risks further undermining China’s own objectives in its most troubled region.	在这么一个对中央政府充满猜疑和敌意的地区，将政治指控的目标从政治抗议者扩展到环保主义者，从持不同政见的僧侣延伸到商人，势必威胁到中国希望在该地区所达成的目标。


Expansion is Solidarity	扩大就是团结


Nowadays it is often alleged that the European Union’s sense of solidarity was put in jeopardy, if not shattered outright, by its enlargement to take in the countries of central and eastern Europe.	如今常听人说欧盟吸收中东欧国家加入的做法如果还没有彻底毁坏欧盟的团结，至少也产生了很大的威胁。


As Bulgaria and Romania come closer to membership, and with accession talks with Turkey and Croatia set to begin, it has become increasingly important to challenge that view.	随着保加利亚和罗马尼亚入盟日期的临近，与土耳其和克罗地亚的谈判也即将开始，挑战这种说法就显得尤为重要。


The values and interests of the EU’s newest member states coincide in most ways with those of the 15 earlier members.	多数领域里，欧盟最新成员国的价值观和利益与最早的15个成员国完全相同。


It is, of course, true that enlargement has fundamentally changed the Union and given rise to new problems and policy concerns. But the new member states in central and eastern Europe are deeply embedded in the economic, social, and cultural development of our Continent.	当然，东扩的确给欧盟带来了质的变化，也产生了全新的问题和政策顾虑，但中东欧的新成员与这块大陆的经济、社会和文化发展有着割舍不断的联系。


The ties that bind us together were frayed by forty years of Soviet domination, but this did not fundamentally change these states’ European character.	40年的苏联统治损坏了我们赖以联系的纽带，但并没有彻底抹杀这些国家的欧洲个性。


My country, Poland, has always had deep cultural ties to other European countries, especially France.	我的祖国波兰自始至终就与欧洲国家，特别是法国，有着深厚的文化联系。


We participated in all the major developments in European music, literature, and film (think of Andrzej Wajda’s films from the Solidarity era, such as “Danton,” which were French co-productions).	欧洲音乐、文学和电影的所有重大发展都离不开我们的参与（这一点只要想想安杰伊·瓦依达在统一时代与法国联合摄制的《丹东》等电影就知道了）。


Even in sport, East Europeans have long been integrated with the rest of Europe.	即便在体育领域，东欧国家也与其它欧洲国家也有着密不可分的联系。


Indeed, before World War I the German national football team consisted entirely of players with Polish names. But, above all, there is a deep sense among Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, and others, that they are Europeans.	实际在一次大战前，德国国家足球队就完全由波兰裔球员组成，但最重要的是，波兰人、匈牙利人、捷克人和其它东欧人一直坚定地认为自己是欧洲人。


This is the very meaning of the word “solidarity,” as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary: “unity resulting from feelings and sympathies.”	这就是“团结”一词在牛津英语辞典中的全部含义：“以感情和认同为基础的一致性。 ”


Solidarity, in the sense of unity resulting from common interests, also clearly exists within both the original EU-15 and the enlarged Union.	欧盟原15国与东扩后的新成员间显然存在着以共同利益为基础的团结。


The exceptions prove the rule.	这条法则在一些特例中得到了证实。


The EU’s disunity over the war in Iraq should not overshadow its member states’ agreement on almost all other great questions of international affairs. In economic matters, disagreements on, say, a single EU regulation should not be allowed to mask the fact that no member state, new or old, has ever contested the internal market.	我们不该因为欧盟在对伊战争问题上的分歧而忽略各成员国在所有其它重要国际问题上的一致看法，而在经济领域，对单一欧盟规则的不同看法也不该掩盖这样一个事实：那就是无论新老成员，我们对欧盟内部市场的看法是完全一致的。


Finally, the enlargement process itself is also manifestly a symbol of European social, civic, and cultural unity.	最后，东扩进程本身就明明白白地显示了欧洲在社会、人文和文化领域的团结。


The fact that it provoked debate and dispute does not detract from the conviction shared by old and new member states that they had an obligation to rebuild the Continent after 40 years of division.	由此引发的争论并不能动摇新老成员国共同的信仰，那就是它们有责任在长达40年的分裂后重新建设这块大陆。


But there are concerns that, if not fundamentally divisive, are worrying.	但有些问题如果没有直接造成分裂，至少也很令人担忧。


Should we fear the fact that Europe is no longer a purely Jewish/Christian and white continent?	欧洲不再是只信奉犹太/基督教的纯粹的白人大陆，这样的事实是否令人恐惧？


Will EU citizens whose origins are in other continents and whose religion is Hindu or Islam, Sikh or Buddhist, be able to identify with “European” values and culture?	很多来自其它大陆、信奉印度教、伊斯兰教、锡克教或佛教的欧盟居民是否能够接受“欧洲”的价值观和文化？


Will they be able to feel European, like the Poles or the Czechs have always felt?	他们是否会像波兰和捷克人一直以来那样，认可自己的欧洲身份？


These questions apply most pointedly – indeed, they cannot be avoided – in the case of Turkey’s possible accession to the EU.	这些问题不可避免地集中出现在土耳其可能的入盟问题上。


Is European integration animated by respect for another’s values?	尊重其它信仰是否会为欧盟增添新的活力？


Is it about sharing them or about contributing to them?	我们是应该接受这些信仰还是应该对其加以改造？


These are obviously knotty questions. They are particularly difficult if we see culture as the cement of Europe’s future.	这些问题显然十分棘手，特别是把文化看作欧洲未来的黏合剂时就更是如此。


All European countries probably believed at the outset that non-European newcomers could be assimilated in the same way that Polish immigrants were assimilated into Germany’s Ruhr region in the nineteenth century.	开始时，所有欧洲国家可能都认为：那些非欧洲的外来者应该完全融入欧洲的文化，就像19世纪的波兰移民融入到德国鲁尔地区的文化当中一样。


That this has not happened, at least on a large scale, is not to say that it cannot happen at all.	人们所期待的融合没有大规模发生，但这并不是说永远不会发生。


Look at the growing number of prominent citizens of Turkish origin in Germany. Consider the many second generation Indian and Pakistani Britons who are now seen in business suits carrying laptop computers and flying around the world.	只要看看越来越多在德国取得骄人成绩的土耳其人后裔，再想想那些身着西服、手提笔记本电脑飞遍全球的英国第二代印度和巴基斯坦人后裔就明白了。


But Europeans must admit that these individuals represent a small minority.	但欧洲人也必须承认这些人只能代表移民中很少的一部分。


Many immigrant groups in Europe find themselves flung back on their own communities by the impossibility of social and economic integration.	由于在社会和经济领域根本无法融合，欧洲很多移民团体都只能回头附着于自己的社团。


The constant threat of terrorism has made this isolation even more dramatic for the Europe’s Islamic populations.	经常性的恐怖威胁使欧洲伊斯兰人的孤立更为严重。


The EU cannot simply proclaim “solidarity” as a core value and then do nothing to foster it among those who feel marginalized.	欧盟不能仅仅空谈“团结”作为核心价值观的重要，却不采取行动团结那些身处社会边缘的移民。


They, too, must be allowed to feel those ties of “unity resulting from feelings and sympathy.”	他们也必须能够感受到“基于感情和认同的团结。


European solidarity cannot and will not survive their neglect.	”欧洲的团结根本经受不起他们的忽略。


Experimental China	中国改革的新实践


HONG KONG – Five years ago, few would have expected that China would produce four of the top ten global Internet companies (by number of visitors) – Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, and Sohu – as well as innovative multinationals like Huawei and Xiaomi.	香港—五年前，极少有人会料到中国能占据全球互联网公司前十名中的四席（以访问数衡量）——阿里巴巴、百度、腾讯和搜狐，并且能产生华为和小米这样的创新性跨国公司。


Nor would most have anticipated China’s increasing provision of global public goods, including its “one belt, one road” strategy, which aims to provide the infrastructure needed to knit Eurasia into a single vast market.	大多数人也不会预料到中国对全球公共品贡献的日益增加，包括其旨在提供将欧亚地区（Eurasia）打造成一个单一巨大市场所需要的基础设施的“一带一路”战略。


More remarkable news has just emerged: despite slowing economic-growth rates, China, together with Hong Kong, has recorded $29 billion in initial public offerings so far this year – almost twice the funds raised in US markets.	还有更加引人注目的最新消息：尽管经济增长率正在放缓，但今年中国与香港资本市场首次公开发行量已达290亿美元，是美国市场筹资规模的近两倍。


By any measure, the pace and scope of innovation in China has begun to increase.	不论从什么指标看，中国创新的节奏和范围都开始增加。


How has this happened, and why is it happening now?	这是如何发生的？ 为何会在现在发生？


The answer lies in the unprecedented challenges that China faces, including corruption, pollution, unsustainable local debts, ghost towns, shadow banks, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and excessive government control over the economy.	答案在于中国所遇到的前所未有的挑战，包括腐败、污染、不可持续的地方债务、“鬼城”、影子银行、效率低下的国有企业、政府对经济的过度控制等。


Certainly, no one would argue that these are positive developments for China; nonetheless, they have arguably been a blessing in disguise.	显然，没有人认为这些因素对中国有利。 但是，它们实际上起到了意料外的刺激作用。


They have imbued reform efforts with a degree of urgency that has had a far-reaching impact; indeed, conventional GDP data do not reflect the scale of the transformation that they are driving.	这使得改革任务变得紧迫，并形成深远的影响。 事实上，传统GDP数据无法反映中国目前所推动的转型的规模。


Of course, China has long been committed to market-driven structural reforms, at the national and municipal levels.	当然，在国家和地方层面，中国长期致力于推动市场发展的结构改革。


It could not have attained its position as the world’s second-largest economy otherwise.	否则中国也无法成为世界第二大经济体。


But the key to China’s success has been constant experimentation, and the pursuit of that credo appears to have intensified.	但中国成功的关键是持续改革实验，并且这方面的执着似乎还在增强。


For example, the networking of telecommunications, roads, rail, air, and maritime transport enabled China to become a global hub for the production of consumer durables, and improve their distribution.	比如，通讯、公路、铁路、航空和航海的网络化让中国成为全球耐用消费品生产枢纽，也改善了这些产品的分销。


More recently, China began to apply the same approach to building a more innovative, knowledge-based economy – one in which the services sectors, together with domestic consumption, drive growth.	最近，中国开始以同样的改革实践模式来构建更加创新、更加强调知识基础的经济，即由服务业和国内消费驱动的增长。


As a result, the country has increasingly been focusing on the so-called “killer apps” that, according to the historian Niall Ferguson, drove the West’s rise to economic dominance: competition, science, property, modern medicine, consumerism, and an ethic of hard work.	结果，中国日益重视所谓的“经济发展杀手软件包”——用历史学家尼尔·弗格森（Niall Ferguson）的话说，这类软件包推动了西方崛起成为经济主导力量——他们包括竞争、科学、产权、现代医学、消费主义和努力工作的伦理。


In particular, China has worked to boost market competition and foster science and innovation, with progress in these areas underpinned by efforts to improve governance, strengthen mechanisms of accountability, and boost investment in public goods.	特别是，中国致力于刺激市场竞争和推进科学与创新。 中国在这些领域获得进步的三个基础指标是：改善治理、强化问责机制、有效的公共品投资。


Crucially, even as China’s specific goals have shifted, its policymakers have adhered to the experimental approach that has served the country so well thus far.	至关重要的是，即使中国的具体目标发生了改变，其决策者也一直坚持了到目前为止让中国取得巨大成功的实验主义方针。


Indeed, it was the combination of broad-based education, openness to science and innovation, investment in advanced telecommunications infrastructure, and knowhow in manufacturing smart-phones that fueled China’s rapid advancement in the e-tail and Internet industries.	事实上，宽基础教育、向科学和创新开放、投资先进通讯基础设施、以及智能手机制造技术所组成的合力，让中国在电子和互联网行业迅速崛起。


This openness to innovation – along with what some say is lax regulation – also allowed platforms like Alibaba to integrate payments and logistics before many Western players did.	向创新的开放——以及一些人所谓的宽松监管——也让阿里巴巴等平台得以抢在西方竞争对手之前整合支付和物流服务。


China’s “learning by doing” approach is likely to continue to yield innovative solutions to emerging problems.	中国的“干中学（摸着石头过河）”的政策有望继续产生对新问题的创新性解决办法。


For example, faced with a shrinking labor force, the government has ramped up investment in robotic automation and other productivity-enhancing technologies.	比如，面临劳动力减少的局面，中国政府与企业加大了对机器人自动化和其它提高生产率的技术的投资。


The impact on China’s competitiveness of rising real wages – which have been increasing by more than 15% annually since 2008 – will, the country’s leaders expect, ultimately be offset by the benefits of productivity-led growth, not to mention the much-needed increase in domestic consumption.	中国领导人期望，由于实际工资的迅速增长（2008年以来每年增加了15%）对中国竞争力的影响，最终可以由生产率增长所带来的收益以及急需的国内消费增长来抵消。


Of course, China’s approach has brought significant stresses, setbacks, and failures.	当然，中国的“干中学”改革实践也带来了巨大的压力，包括一些领域的倒退及失败。


China’s real-estate, credit, and stock-market bubbles – which produced ghost towns, bad local debts, and stock-price volatility – attest to that.	中国的房地产、信贷和股市泡沫——它们造成了鬼城、地方坏账和股价波动——就是明证。


But the policy decisions that gave rise to these problems – decentralizing control over land and permitting markets to direct the flow of talents, trade, investment, and capital – have also been critical to progress.	但导致这些问题产生的前期改革决定，如下放土地控制权、允许市场决定人才、贸易、投资和资本的流动方向——却是中国进步的关键。


China’s leaders understand this well.	中国领导人十分明白这一点。


Rather than avoiding risk, they remain prepared to reverse failing policies; and, if necessary, they are willing to pay for mistakes.	他们没有回避风险，而是时刻准备扭转失败政策； 必要时他们愿意为错误付出代价。


Given the savings the country has built up, reflected in bulging foreign-exchange reserves, the central government has the fiscal room to afford it.	中国拥有巨大的储蓄——反映在其巨额外汇储备中——中央政府有足够的财政空间应对改革实践中的一些不可避免的失败。


Today’s anti-corruption campaign should be viewed as an effort by China’s leaders to correct another negative consequence of past policies.	今天的反腐运动应该被视为中国领导人试图纠正过往在国有企业过度下放行政权利政策的另一大举措。


The approach is two-pronged: the government is privatizing some SOEs, so that market competition can check the behavior of corporate managers, while treating the managers of other (typically larger) SOEs as public servants, subject to the increasingly severe rules of public accountability, including party discipline.	中国的国有企业改革是一个双管齐下的过程：政府将一些国有企业私有化，从而让市场竞争来约束公司管理者的行为，同时将其他（通常规模更大的）国有企业管理者视为公务员，受日益严格的公共问责法规（包括党纪）约束。


Earlier this month, President Xi Jinping announced a new wave of measures.	本月早些时候，习近平主席宣布了新一轮国企改革的措施，旨在加强对后一类国企管理者的问责。


China’s government is running real risks as it pushes through structural reforms that are unprecedented in speed, scale, and complexity.	中国政府正以前所未有的速度、规模和复杂性来推进结构改革。 在这个过程中会面临一些失败的风险。


Fortunately, China has both the experience and the wherewithal to experiment with the next stage of structural transformation.	幸运的是，中国拥有足够的经验和资金实施下一阶段结构转型所需要的改革新实验。


The Trouble with North Korea	朝鲜的麻烦


NEW YORK – Nobody would care much about North Korea – a small and isolated country of 24 million people, ruled by a grotesque dynasty that calls itself communist – if it were not for its nuclear weapons.	纽约—没人会很在意朝鲜——这是一个孤立的小国，有2400万人口，被一个自称共产主义的怪异王朝所统治——如果不是它有核武器的话。


Its current ruler, Kim Jong-un, the 30-year-old grandson of North Korea’s founder and “Great Leader,” is now threatening to turn Seoul, the rich and bustling capital of South Korea, into “a sea of fire.”	朝鲜的现领导人、“伟大领袖”30岁的孙子金正恩正在威胁把韩国富裕繁荣的首都首尔变成“一片火海”。


American military bases in Asia and the Pacific are also on his list of targets.	美军亚洲和太平洋基地也在他的目标清单上。


Kim knows very well that a war against the United States would probably mean the destruction of his own country, which is one of the world’s poorest.	金正恩十分明白，对美国的战争可能意味着亡掉自己的国家——全世界最穷的国家。


His government cannot even feed its own people, who are regularly devastated by famine.	他的政府甚至养不活国民——饥荒时不时就会袭击朝鲜。


In the showcase capital, Pyongyang, there is not even enough electricity to keep the lights on in the largest hotels.	样板间式的首都平壤甚至提供不了充足的电力保证最大饭店的灯都亮着。


So threatening to attack the world’s most powerful country would seem like an act of madness.	因此威胁袭击世界最强大国家的举动看起来与发疯无异。


But it is neither useful nor very plausible to assume that Kim Jong-un and his military advisers are mad.	但认为金正恩及其军事幕僚发疯既无用处，也不合理。


To be sure, there is something deranged about North Korea’s political system.	平心而论，朝鲜政治制度确实不乏疯狂之处。


The Kim family’s tyranny is based on a mixture of ideological fanaticism, vicious realpolitik, and paranoia.	金氏家族暴政的基础是意识形态狂热、残酷现实政治和偏执狂的混合物。


But this lethal brew has a history, which needs to be explained.	但这颗致命的种子有其历史来源值得细究。


The short history of North Korea is fairly simple.	短暂的朝鲜史十分简单。


After the collapse in 1945 of the Japanese empire, which had ruled quite brutally over the whole of Korea since 1910, the Soviet Red Army occupied the north, and the US occupied the south.	1945年日本帝国覆灭后——1910年以来，日本帝国一直对整个朝鲜半岛实施着残暴统治——苏联红军占领了北部，美国占领了南部。


The Soviets plucked a relatively obscure Korean communist, Kim Il-sung, from an army camp in Vladivostok, and installed him in Pyongyang as the leader of North Korea.	苏联人从符拉迪沃斯托克军营中物色了一个相对无名的朝鲜共产党金日成，在平壤立他为朝鲜领袖。


Myths about his wartime heroism and divine status soon followed, and a cult of personality was established.	随后，关于他在战争时期的英勇事迹和神化地位蜂拥而出，个人崇拜随之建立。


Worshipping Kim, and his son and grandson, as Korean gods became part of a state religion.	将金日成、金日成之子和金日成之孙当作朝鲜之神崇拜成为国家宗教的一部分。


North Korea is essentially a theocracy.	从本质上说，朝鲜是一个神权体制。


Some elements are borrowed from Stalinism and Maoism, but much of the Kim cult owes more to indigenous forms of shamanism: human gods who promise salvation (it is no accident that the Reverend Sun Myung Moon and his Unification Church came from Korea, too).	其中一些元素借鉴了斯大林主义和毛泽东思想，但金氏崇拜的大部分源自朝鲜本土的萨满神教：承诺救世的人神（文鲜明及其统一教出自韩国，这并不是偶然）。


But the power of the Kim cult, as well as the paranoia that pervades the North Korean regime, has a political history that goes back much further than 1945.	但金氏崇拜的权力，以及弥漫于朝鲜政权中的偏执狂，其政治历史根源可以远远追溯到1945年之前。


Wedged awkwardly between China, Russia, and Japan, the Korean Peninsula has long been a bloody battleground for greater powers.	朝鲜半岛就像是钉在中国、俄国和日本之间的一枚楔子，长期以来一直是大国的流血战场。


Korean rulers only managed to survive by playing one foreign power off against the other, and by offering subservience, mainly to Chinese emperors, in exchange for protection.	朝鲜统治者需要游走在各个外国势力之间小心生存，还需寻找宗祖国（主要是中国历朝）以寻求保护。


This legacy has nurtured a passionate fear and loathing of dependency on stronger countries.	这一历史根源导致朝鲜狂热地害怕和厌恶依靠强国。


The Kim dynasty’s main claim to legitimacy is Juche, the regime’s official ideology, which stresses national self-reliance to the point of autarky.	金氏王朝的正统性主要来自其正式意识形态——主题思想，主题思想的核心是国家的自力更生甚至自给自足。


In fact, Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il, were typical Korean rulers.	事实上，金日成及其子金正日都是典型的朝鲜统治者。


They played China against the Soviet Union, while securing the protection of both.	他们在中国和苏联的夹缝中游刃有余，从两国得到保护。


Of course, this did not stop North Korean propagandists from accusing the South Koreans of being cowardly lackeys of US imperialism.	当然，这并不妨碍朝鲜宣传机构指责韩国沦为美帝国主义的无耻走狗。


Indeed, paranoia about US imperialism is part of the cult of independence.	事实上，对美帝国主义的偏执态度正是独立崇拜的一部分。


For the Kim dynasty to survive, the threat of external enemies is essential.	对金氏王朝的生存来说，外敌的威胁是必不可少的。


The fall of the Soviet Union was a disaster for North Korea, as it was for Cuba; not only did Soviet economic support evaporate, but the Kims could no longer play off one power against another.	和古巴一样，苏联解体对朝鲜来说是一场灾难； 不但苏联的经济支持就此消失，金家甚至无法再游走于强国之间。


Only China was left, and North Korea’s dependence on its northern neighbor is now almost total.	对朝鲜来说，所剩只有北方邻国中国，而如今朝鲜中国的依赖可谓无以复加。


China could crush North Korea in a day just by cutting off food and fuel supplies.	只要中国切断食品和燃料供应，朝鲜指日之间就可能崩溃。


There is only one way to divert attention from this humiliating predicament: propaganda about self-reliance and the imminent threat from US imperialists and their South Korean lackeys must be turned up to a hysterical pitch.	只有一种方法让人们的视线从这一羞辱性的窘境中移开：宣传自力更生和美帝国主义及其韩国走狗迫在眉睫的威胁，必须这样做，而且要提高到歇斯底里的程度。


Without this orchestrated paranoia, the Kims have no legitimacy.	没有这一精心炮制的偏执，金氏王朝就没有正统性。


And no tyranny can survive for long by relying on brute force alone.	没有哪个暴政单靠蛮力长期维持。


Some people argue that the US could enhance security in northeast Asia by compromising with the North Koreans – specifically, by promising not to attack or attempt to topple the Kim regime.	一些人指出，美国可以通过向朝鲜妥协增强其在东北亚的安全——具体而言，就是能诺不袭击或颠覆金氏政权。


The Americans are unlikely to agree to this, and South Korea would not want them to.	美国人不可能同意这一点，韩国也不希望看到这一幕。


Apart from anything else, there is an important domestic political reason for US reticence: a Democratic US president cannot afford to look “soft.”	除去其他因素，美国的缄默还有重要的国内政治原因：民主党美国总统不能忍受被视为“软”。


More important, even if the US were to provide such guarantees to North Korea, the regime’s paranoid propaganda would probably continue, given the centrality to Juche of fear of the outside world.	更重要的是，即使美国向朝鲜提供这一保证，朝鲜的偏执宣传也会继续，因为来自外部世界的恐惧乃是主题思想的核心。


The tragedy of Korea is that no one really wishes to change the status quo: China wants to keep North Korea as a buffer state, and fears millions of refugees in the event of a North Korean collapse; the South Koreans could never afford to absorb North Korea in the way that West Germany absorbed the broken German Democratic Republic; and neither Japan nor the US would relish paying to clean up after a North Korean implosion, either.	朝鲜的悲剧在于，没人真的希望改变现状：中国希望朝鲜继续充当缓冲国，也担心朝鲜一旦崩溃会有数百万难民涌入； 韩国绝不可能像西德吸收崩溃的民主德国那样吸收朝鲜，它负担不起；


And so an explosive situation will remain explosive, North Korea’s population will continue to suffer famines and tyranny, and words of war will continue to fly back and forth across the 38th parallel.	因此，朝鲜崩溃的情形让人崩溃，朝鲜人民将继续承受饥荒和暴政，战争用词将继续在三八线上下飞来飞去。


So far, they are just words.	到目前为止，战争只停留在口头上。


But small things – a shot in Sarajevo, as it were – can trigger a catastrophe.	但一着不慎——就像萨拉热窝的枪声——就可能导致全盘崩塌。


And North Korea still has those nuclear bombs.	而朝鲜还掌握着核武器。


A Tale of Two Theories	双理记


PARIS – Global growth disappoints again.	巴黎—全球增长再一次令人失望。


A year ago, the International Monetary Fund expected world output to rise 4% in 2015.	一年前，国际货币基金组织（IMF）预计2015年世界产出增长率为4%。


Now the Fund is forecasting 3.3% for the year – about the same as in 2013 and 2014, and more than a full percentage point below the 2000-2007 average.	如今，IMF对今年的预测为3. 3%——与2013年和2014年大致相当，比2000—2007年平均水平低了整整一个百分点。


In the eurozone, growth in the latest quarter was underwhelming.	在欧元区，最近一个季度的增长令人失望。


Japan has returned to negative territory.	日本又回到了负增长。


Brazil and Russia are in recession.	巴西和俄罗斯陷入衰退。


World trade has stalled.	世界贸易停滞不前。


And China’s economic slowdown and market turmoil this summer have created further uncertainty.	而今年夏天中国经济的减速和股市动荡又进一步增加了不确定性。


True, there are bright spots: India, Spain, and the United Kingdom are beating expectations.	诚然，闪光点还是有的：印度、西班牙和英国都好于预期。


The United States’ recovery is solid.	美国的复苏也很扎实。


Africa is doing well.	非洲表现出色。


But, overall, it is hard to deny that the global economy lacks momentum.	但是，总体而言，无法否认全球经济增长乏力。


This is partly because trees cannot grow forever: China’s economy could not continue to get 10% bigger every year.	这部分是因为树木不可能永远向上长：中国经济无法继续以每年10%的速度扩大。


And in part, it is because growth is not unconditionally desirable: Citizens may be better off with a little less of it, and more clean air.	另一部分原因是增长并不是无条件值得追求的东西：增长略低但空气更清新，公民的生活会变得更加美好。


But many countries are still poor enough to be endowed with strong growth potential, and many others, though rich, have not yet recovered from the global financial crisis.	但许多国家仍然很穷，没有强劲增长的潜力，其他许多国家尽管较富裕，但尚未从全球金融危机中恢复。


So there must be something else holding growth back.	因此，必须做点其他什么让增长回归。


There are essentially two competing explanations.	从本质上说，有两个互相竞争的解释。


The first, the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis, has been proposed by Larry Summers.	第一个解释是拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）提出的长期停滞假说。


Its key premise is that the equilibrium interest rate at which demand would balance supply is currently below the actual interest rate.	该假说的关键前提是目前让供求平衡的均衡利率低于实际（actual）利率。


This seems paradoxical, because interest rates are close to zero in most advanced economies.	这似乎存在矛盾，因为大部分发达经济体的利率接近于零。


But what matters is the real rate of interest, that is, the difference between the market rate and inflation.	但真正重要的是真实（real）利率，基市场利率与通货膨胀率之差。


Aggregate economic balance may require a negative real interest rate; but with inflation at an all-time low – the IMF expects it to be negative this year and next in the advanced economies, and zero in the emerging economies – this is not feasible.	总体经济平衡可能需要真实利率为负； 但通胀正处于历史最低水平——IMF预计发达经济体今年和明年通胀率均为负，新兴经济体则接近于零——因此真实利率不可能为负。


There are several reasons why the equilibrium interest rate could have reached negative territory.	有多个原因能够解释为何均衡利率可能已经进入负区间。


Some are structural: saving is high globally, especially in Asia but also in Europe, where aging countries like Germany put money aside for retirement.	其中一些是机构性原因：全球而言，储蓄率非常高，亚洲尤其如此，欧洲也比较高（德国的个老龄化国家存钱以备退休）。


At the same time, the new digital economy is less capital-intensive than the old brick-and-mortar economy.	与此同时，新数字经济的资本密集程度不如旧的砖块水泥经济。


This may be accentuated in the future by the advent of the so-called sharing economy.	而所谓的分享经济的崛起可能让这一趋势在未来更加明确。


Other factors are temporary.	其他因素是暂时性的。


In several countries, debt-financed housing booms have left households and companies over-leveraged; and governments have reduced deficits to contain their own debt.	在一些国家，债务融资的住房繁荣让家庭和公司过度使用杠杆 ； 政府则削减预算以遏制自身债务。


As a result, there are likely to be too few investors and too many savers.	结果是投资者过少而储蓄者过多。


The Secular Stagnation Hypothesis is worrying, because it gives few reasons to believe that things will improve by themselves.	长期停滞假说令人担忧，因为根据这一假说，没有理由认为事情会自己变好。


True, debt deleveraging is not without limits.	诚然，债务去杠杆不是没有限度的。


But it is impeded by slow growth and, thanks to high unemployment and weak global demand, persistently low inflation.	但这一过程受到增长低迷和持续低通胀（拜高失业和萎靡的全球需求所赐）的制约。


Worse, over the longer term, low investment undermines productivity, while protracted unemployment destroys skills.	更糟糕的是，在长期，低投资会破坏生产率，而长期失业会破坏技能。


Both reduce future potential growth.	两者都降低了未来潜在增长。


A vicious circle, it seems, is at work.	看起来似乎形成了一个恶性循环。


The way to break it, according to Summers, is to sustain monetary stimulus and boost demand aggressively through fiscal policy.	在萨默斯看来，打破这一恶性循环的办法是保持货币刺激和通过财政政策大幅提振需求。


The alternative explanation for the persistence of weak global growth has been best formulated by the Bank for International Settlements, an organization of central banks.	关于全球增长持续萎靡的另一个解释的最佳阐述来自央行的央行——国际清算银行（BIS）。


The BIS maintains that excessively low interest rates are a big reason why growth is disappointing.	BIS认为，过低的利率是增长令人失望的重要原因。


This explanation may seem even more paradoxical than the first, but the logic is straightforward: Governments often try to escape the hard task of improving economic efficiency through supply-side reforms and rely on demand-side fixes instead.	这一解释看上去比第一个解释还要矛盾，但逻辑很清楚：政府常常试图摆脱通过供给端改革改善经济效率的艰巨任务，而依靠供给端措施。


So, when confronted with a growth slowdown caused by structural factors, many countries responded by lowering interest rates and stimulating credit.	因此，当面临因结构性因素引起的增长减速时，许多国家的应对措施时降低利率和刺激信用。


But cheap credit promotes bad investment and excessive debt, which borrowers often are unable to repay.	但廉价信用刺激了坏投资和过度债务，借款人常常无法偿还。


More fundamentally, investment is a bet that cannot pay off if growth is structurally depressed.	更为根本的是，投资是一项赌博，如果增长被结构性抑制，就无法产生收益。


Artificial growth promotion only ends in tears.	伪刺激增长必然以悲剧收场。


Furthermore, the BIS claims that credit may well aggravate structural deficiencies.	此外，BIS还认为信用可能大大激化了结构性弱点。


Housing bubbles and investments in dubious projects result in a waste of resources and a misallocation of capital that ultimately dampens potential growth.	住房泡沫和对可疑项目的投资导致资源浪费和资本错配，最终恶化潜在增长。


The best example is perhaps Spain in the 2000s, where students left university before graduating to take part in the real-estate frenzy.	最好的例子也许要数21世纪初的西班牙，大学生们纷纷辍学投身房地产疯狂。


Amassing useless concrete and losing human capital, the country lost twice.	西班牙建造了大量无用的水泥建筑而失去了人力资本，结果是双重损失。


So here, too, the logic points to a vicious circle: Slower growth leads to artificial remedies and further erosion of long-term growth potential.	这一解释的逻辑也指向一个恶性循环：增长减速导致伪方案，从而进一步破坏长期增长潜力。


The BIS argues in favor of fiscal restraint, debt restructuring if needed, and swift normalization of monetary policies – quite explicitly criticizing the US Federal Reserve’s caution and the European Central Bank’s aggressive stance.	BIS支持财政约束、必要的债务重组以及货币政策的迅速正常化——相当直白地批评了美联储的谨慎和欧洲央行的激进立场。


Both theories are internally consistent.	这两个理论都具有自洽性。


Both also fit only some of the facts.	但都只符合部分事实。


The Secular Stagnation Hypothesis accounts well for the mistakes made in the eurozone in the aftermath of the global recession, when sovereigns attempted to deleverage while companies and households were unwilling to spend, and the ECB was keeping monetary policy relatively tight.	长期停滞假说很好地考察了欧元区在全球衰退后所犯的错误——主权实体试图去杠杆，公司和家庭不愿支出，欧洲央行则保持相对较紧的货币政策。


The BIS’s explanation reads like a summary of the woes of China, where growth has slowed from 10% to 7% or less, but the authorities still push investment amounting to almost half of GDP and promote all sorts of low-return projects.	BIS的解释就像是对中国问题的总结——中国增长从10%放缓到7%，但当局仍保持投资占GDP的近半壁江山并推进各种低回报项目。


So which theory fits the facts better globally?	那么，那套理论更符合全球事实？


So far, it is odd to claim that advanced countries have stimulated demand excessively.	到目前为止，很难宣称发达国家过度刺激了需求。


Persistently low employment and near-zero aggregate inflation do not suggest that they have erred on the side of profligacy.	持续低就业和接近于零的总通胀并不意味着它们犯了不知节制的错误。


True, financial recklessness remains a risk, but this is why regulatory instruments have been added to the policy toolbox.	诚然，金融鲁莽仍是一个风险，但正因如此，必须在政策工具箱中添加监管工具。


So the BIS’s call for across-the-board monetary normalization is premature (though this does not mean that reforms should wait).	因此BIS号召全面货币正常化为时过早（尽管这并不意味着应该让改革等一等）。


In the emerging world, however, the mismatch between growth expectations and actual potential has often become a serious issue that demand-side stimulus and endless debt accumulation cannot cure.	但是，在新兴世界，增长预期和实际潜力之间的不匹配常常演变为一个严重问题，需求端刺激和无尽的债务累积无法解决这个问题。


Rather, governments should stop basing their legitimacy on inflated growth prospects.	反之，政府应该不要再将合法性建立在膨胀的增长前景上。


A New Chance for European Politics	欧洲政治的新机会


MADRID – Most political leaders in Europe want the European Union to emerge from its current crisis stronger and more united.	马德里—大部分欧洲政治领袖都希望欧盟能走出当前危机，变得更强壮、更统一。


But the economic policies that have been implemented in most EU countries since the crisis began have given rise to an unprecedented threat to deeper integration – and, indeed, to what already has been achieved.	但危机开始以来，大部分欧盟国家所实施的经济政策让深入一体化遇到了前所未有的挑战——目前已经取得的成就也陷入了危机之中。


After five years of financial and economic crisis, anti-European politics has come resoundingly to the fore in many EU countries – France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Holland, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and even Germany.	金融和经济危机爆发五年已经五年了，反欧洲政治在许多欧盟国家逐渐成为时尚——法国、英国、意大利、奥地利、荷兰、芬兰、希腊、葡萄牙甚至德国都是如此。


Growing institutional disaffection has become a corrosive reality almost everywhere in Europe.	日渐增加的制度性不满成为欧洲随处可见的后果严重的现实。


The only way to overcome Europe’s existential crisis, and to respond to citizens’ demands for change, is to confront Europe’s domestic opponents head-on: politics without palliatives.	克服欧洲生存危机、响应人民的变革需求的唯一可行之道是直面欧洲的国内反对者：决不妥协的政治。


Europe needs, first and foremost, to break the vicious circle of recession, unemployment, and austerity that now has it in its grip.	欧洲首先需要打破目前所处的衰退、失业和紧缩的恶性循环。


That means, first of all, refocusing economic policy on growth, employment, and institutional innovation.	这首先意味着把经济政策的注意力重新集中到增长、就业和制度创新上来。


It is impossible to advance toward political union while seeming to abandon Europe’s citizens along the way, which is the impression that unremitting austerity has created.	通过一路抛弃欧洲人民推进政治统一是不可能的，而这正是一根筋的紧缩给人带来的印象。


Sacrifice, too many Europeans believe, is not laying the groundwork for a better, more prosperous Europe, but is dragging them into a fatal tailspin.	太多欧洲人相信，牺牲并不能给更好更繁荣的欧洲创造基础，只能把他们拖入致命的混乱。


European leaders cannot remain passive in the face of the dangerous populist tsunami now crossing the continent, and they know it.	面对如今席卷整个大陆的危险的民粹主义海啸，欧洲领导人不能再消极以待了，他们也明白这一点。


There is still time to react – by demonstrating strong leadership and prioritizing growth over short-sighted policies – but that time is limited and the clock is ticking.	他们还有时间做出反应——通过向世人表明强大的领导力和把增长置于短视政策之前——但时间已经不多，而倒计时的钟在滴答作响。


Next year will be crucial, for it will mark the end of the current political cycle and the beginning of a new one.	明年是关键的一年，因为它标志着当前政治周期的结束和新政治周期的开始。


There will be a new German government, European Parliament elections, and, at the end of the year, a new European Commission.	明年将迎来新的德国政府、欧洲议会选举，年底还会有新的欧盟委员会。


It is here that political leaders should devote their efforts.	政治领袖应该将努力花在此处。


No one wants the EU to fail because of its citizens’ disaffection.	没人希望欧盟因为人民的不满而崩溃。


To take advantage of the political opportunity offered in 2014 requires launching an open, pedagogical effort now.	利用2014年提供的政治机会需要从现在开始展开开放、教育性的努力。


European citizens have already shown a sense of responsibility and capacity for sacrifice, but they should know why hope – in the form of higher employment and living standards – is not futile.	欧洲人民已经显示了责任心和牺牲精神，但他们应该知道为什么希望——即更高的就业和生活水平——没有满足。


If that does not happen, next year’s European elections may give rise to an unfortunate paradox.	若非如此，明年的欧洲选举可能会带来不幸的悖论。


Just when, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament gains more power than it has ever had, the risk of it being condemned to irrelevance is greatest.	由于里斯本条约的结果，随着彼时欧洲议会获得了前所未有的权力，它被细枝末节窒息的风险也达到了最大。


If, reflecting the mood in the member states, the elections result in a fragmented Parliament – possibly rendered less representative by low voter turnout – paralysis, disaffection, and ineffectiveness are guaranteed.	如果反映成员国情绪的选举产生出一个分裂的议会——可能因低投票率而产生较少的代表——僵局、不满和效率低下将难以避免。


That is why Europe’s leaders should take advantage of the coming political cycle to correct Europe’s institutional design and strengthen its democratic legitimacy, thereby enabling them to respond to Euro-skepticism and ad hoc bilateral deals with more integration.	这就是欧洲领导人应该利用即将带来的政治周期纠正欧洲制度设计、强化其国内合法性的原因，从而让它们能够应对欧元怀疑派临时的双边深化一体化交易。


If Europeans are to overcome their fear of giving up sovereignty in order to achieve political union, a civic sense of attachment to Europe and its institutions must be regained and nurtured.	如果欧洲人想要克服对放弃主权以实现政治联盟的恐惧，一种归依欧洲和欧洲机构的公民意识必须重新树立并成长起来。


Achieving this requires, among other things, the recovery of the Franco-German axis as Europe’s driving force.	达到这一目标的要求之一是作为欧洲驱动力的法-德轴心的复苏。


It also presupposes a European budget that is sufficient to meet expectations and equal to the challenges that await.	另一个前提是欧洲预算足以满足预算，能够面对前方的挑战。


Resolving these issues is as important as resolving individual countries’ economic problems.	解决这些问题与解决个别国家的经济问题一样重要。


Indeed, they are in large part the same problem.	事实上，它们在很大程度上是同一个问题。


Institutions are legitimized in part by their effectiveness, and the EU must recover its authority to defend common interests and harmonize them with national concerns.	制度的合法性部分来自于其效率，欧盟必须恢复其捍卫共同利益的权力，并将之与国家利益相协调。


The European Parliament can exercise its power only if citizens feel represented there.	欧洲议会可以行使其权力，只要人民认为有代表在议会中。


As Kemal Derviş, a vice president of the Brookings Institution, recently put it: “If independent technocrats are allowed to determine long-term policy and set objectives that cannot be influenced by democratic majorities, democracy itself is in serious jeopardy.”	正如布鲁金斯研究所副主席德尔维什（Kemal Derviş）最近所指出的：“如果独立技术官僚能够决定长期政策并设置不受民主多数派影响的目标，那么民主本身便已陷入了严重的问题之中。 ”


Next year will also mark the centenary of the outbreak of World War I. From that moment until the present, Europe has both endured the worst and enjoyed the best of its history.	明年还是第一次世界大战爆发100周年纪念。 从那时到现在，欧洲经历了历史上最坏的时代和最好的时代。


We should bear in mind the enormous symbolism of this date in order to understand how much Europe has changed – and, at the same time, to recognize the need to defend those changes.	我们应该时刻铭记这个日子的诸多象征意义，从而明白欧洲到底改变了多少——与此同时也认识到捍卫这些改变的需要。


The EU is one of the great political milestones of mankind.	欧盟是人类最重要的政治里程碑之一。


For this reason, and in order to emerge stronger from the difficult situation in which Europeans now find themselves, Europe’s leaders must work with the conviction that the future is inexorably linked to a more integrated and more capable Union.	因此，也为了从欧洲人目前的困难局面中走出并变得更加强大，欧洲领导人必须自信地认定更加一体化、更加无所不能的欧盟是不可阻挡的未来趋势。


Extreme Weather and Global Growth	极端天气和全球增长


CAMBRIDGE – Until recently, the usual thinking among macroeconomists has been that short-term weather fluctuations don’t matter much for economic activity.	坎布里奇—直到最近，宏观经济学家的惯常思维一直是短期天气波动对经济活动影响不大。


Construction hiring may be stronger than usual in a March when the weather is unseasonably mild, but there will be payback in April and May.	如果3月份的天气反常地温和，那么建筑业也许会雇用更多工人，但到了4月和5月就会出现相反的情况。


If heavy rains discourage people from shopping in August, they will just spend more in September.	如果8月份的大雨让人们打消了上街购物的冲动，那么他们会在9月份买更多东西。


But recent economic research, bolstered by an exceptionally strong El Niño – a complex global climactic event marked by exceptionally warm Pacific Ocean water off the coast of Ecuador and Peru – has prompted a rethink of this view.	但最近，超强厄尔尼诺让最新经济学研究纷纷开始反思这一观点。 厄尔尼诺是一种复杂的全球气候事件，其标志是厄瓜多尔和秘鲁太平洋沿岸海水特别温暖。


Extreme weather certainly throws a ringer into key short-term macroeconomic statistics.	极端天气显然会对重要的短期宏观经济数据造成影响。


It can add or subtract 100,000 jobs to monthly US employment, the single most-watched economic statistic in the world, and generally thought to be one of the most accurate.	它可以让全世界最受关注、也被广泛认为是最准确的经济指标之一的美国月度就业增加或减少100,000人。


The impact of El Niño-related weather events like the one this year (known more precisely as “El Niño Southern Oscillation” events) can be especially large because of their global reach.	像今年这样的厄尔尼诺相关天气事件（更准确地说应该是“厄尔尼诺南部震荡”）的影响因为其全球效应而显得尤其巨大。


Recent research from the International Monetary Fund suggests that countries such as Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa suffer adversely in El Niño years (often due to droughts), whereas some regions, including the United States, Canada, and Europe, can benefit.	国际货币基金组织的最新研究表明，澳大利亚、印度、印度尼西亚、日本和南非等国家在厄尔尼诺年份中受害严重（常常是因为旱灾），而美国、加拿大和欧洲等地区则从厄尔尼诺中获益。


California, for example, which has been experiencing years of severe drought, is finally getting rain.	比如，加利福尼亚州近多年来旱灾严重，现在终于喜逢甘霖。


Generally, but not always, El Niño events tend to be inflationary, in part because low crop yields lead to higher prices.	总体而言（但非总是如此），厄尔尼诺事件倾向于带来通胀效应，这部分是因为庄稼收成下降导致价格升高。


After two crazy winters in Boston, where I live, it would be hard to convince people that weather doesn’t matter.	我生活在波士顿，在经历了两个严冬之后，你很难再相信天气不重要的观点。


Last year, the city experienced the largest snow accumulation on record.	去年，波士顿市积雪创出了历史记录。


Eventually, there was no longer any place to put it: four-lane highways narrowed to two lanes, and two-lane roads to one.	最后你会感到无从下脚：四车道高速公路变成两车道，两车道道路变成一车道。


Roofs collapsed and “ice dams” building up from gutters caused severe flooding.	屋顶被压塌，贫民窟“冰坝”带来严重内涝。


Public transport closed, and many people couldn’t get to their jobs.	公共交通系统关闭，许多人没法上班。


It was a slow-motion natural catastrophe that lasted for months.	这是一场维持了几个月的慢动作自然灾害。


The US as a whole did not have a winter as extreme as New England’s in the first part of 2015, and the effects of the weather on the country’s overall economy were subdued.	总体而言，2015年初美国的冬天并不像新英格兰地区那样极端，天气对美国总体经济的影响也要小一些。


True, New York City had some significant snowfalls; but no one would have paid much attention had the mayor been more competent in getting the streets plowed.	诚然，纽约市遭遇了几场大雪； 但如果市长在扫雪工作上做得更加“给力”一些，你对此不会做太多关注。


Eastern Canada suffered much more, with severe winter weather playing a role (along with lower commodity prices) in the country’s mini-recession in the first half of the year.	东加拿大情况严重得多，严寒天气（以及大宗商品价格下跌）导致加拿大在去年上半年遭遇小型衰退。


This year’s winter is the polar opposite of last year’s.	今年的冬天和去年相比是另一个极端。


It was 68º Fahrenheit (20º Celsius) at Boston’s Logan Airport the day before Christmas, and the first speck of snow didn’t come until just before New Year’s Day.	圣诞节前一天，波士顿洛根机场温度为20℃，第一场雪直到元旦前夕才姗姗来迟。 树木也植被仿佛觉得现在是春天，开始开花；


Trees and plants, sensing spring, started to blossom; birds were just as confused.	鸟类也对天气感到困惑不已。


Last winter Boston was something of an anomaly.	去年冬天的波士顿属于反常情况。


This year, thanks in part to El Niño, weird weather is the new normal.	而在今年，部分拜厄尔尼诺所赐，怪异的天气已经成为新常态。


From Russia to Switzerland, temperatures have been elevated by 4-5º Celsius, and the weather patterns look set to remain highly unusual in 2016.	从俄罗斯到瑞士，气温比往年高4—5℃，2016年的天气模式看上去也会高度反常。


The effect on developing countries is of particular concern, because many are already reeling from the negative impact of China’s slowdown on commodity prices, and because drought conditions could lead to severe crop shortfalls.	这对于发展中国家的影响尤其令人关注，因为许多发展中国家已经承受着中国减速对大宗商品价格的消极影响和干旱条件所导致的庄稼收成大降。


The last severe El Niño, in 1997-1998, which some called the “El Niño of the Century,” represented a huge setback for many developing countries.	在上一次严重厄尔尼诺期间（1997—1998年，有人称之为“世纪厄尔尼诺”），许多发展中国家遭遇重挫。


The economic effects of El Niño events are almost as complex as the underlying weather phenomenon itself and therefore are difficult to predict.	厄尔尼诺事件的经济效应几乎与其背后的天气现象本身一样复杂，因此难以预测。


When we look back on 2016, however, it is quite possible that El Niño will be regarded as one of the major drivers of economic performance in many key countries, with Zimbabwe and South Africa facing drought and food crises, and Indonesia struggling with forest fires.	但是，当我们回首2016年时，很有可能会将厄尔尼诺视为许多重要国家经济表现背后的重要推动力，津巴布韦和南非面临旱灾和粮食危机，而印尼疲于扑灭森林火灾。


In the American Midwest, there has lately been massive flooding.	美国中西部最近则是大洪水泛滥。


There is a long history of weather having a profound impact on civil strife as well.	天气深刻影响国内冲突的历史也很悠久。


Economist Emily Oster has argued that the biggest spikes in witch burnings in the Middle Ages, in which hundreds of thousands (mostly women) were killed, came during periods of economic deprivation and apparently weather-related food shortages.	经济学家艾米丽·奥斯特（Emily Oster）指出，中世纪烧死巫师风潮最盛的时候正是经济剥削和显而易见与气候相关的粮食短缺时期，这段时间有数十万巫师（大部分是女巫）被杀死。


Some have traced the roots of the civil war in Syria to droughts that led to severe crop failure and forced a mass inflow of farmers to the cities.	有人将叙利亚内战的根源追溯到导致严重庄稼欠收、迫使大量农民流入城市的旱灾。


On a more mundane level (but highly consequential economically), the warm weather in the US may very well cloud the job numbers the Federal Reserve uses in deciding when to raise interest rates.	从更平淡（但经济后果巨大）的层面看，美国的温暖天气让美联储用来决定何时升息的就业数字变得十分微妙。


It is true that employment data are already seasonally adjusted to allow for normal weather differences in temperate zones; construction is always higher during spring than winter.	诚然，就业数据已经经过季节调整以考虑不同温度带的正常天气差异； 但建筑业在春天总是比冬天兴旺。


But standard seasonal adjustments do not account for major weather deviations.	但标准的季节调整不考虑重大天气偏差。


Overall, the evidence from past El Niños suggests that the current massive one is likely to leave a significant footprint on global growth, helping support economic recovery in the US and Europe, while putting even more pressure on already weak emerging markets.	总体而言，从前的厄尔尼诺证据表明，此次大规模厄尔尼诺可能给全球增长造成重大影响，有助于支持美国和欧洲的经济复苏，但也让已经十分疲软的新兴市场雪上加霜。


It is not yet global warming, but it is already a very significant event economically – and perhaps just a taste of what is to come.	这还不是全球变暖，但已经是一项重大经济事件——并且可能只是一个开端。


Exuberant Brazil	活力四射的巴西


Brazil’s stock market, as measured by the inflation-corrected Bovespa index, has more than quadrupled in value since President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s first election victory in October 2002, and is now at almost twice the peak achieved in 2000.	自从路易斯•伊纳西奥•卢拉•达席尔瓦（Luis Inácio Lula da Silva）总统2002年10月首度当选以来，巴西的圣保罗证交所指数（Bovespa index）在扣除通胀因素后的价值增长已经超过四倍，而且目前所处的点位是2000年高点的两倍。


In comparison, the inflation-corrected Shanghai Composite only doubled during this period, while the American stock market, as measured by the inflation-corrected Standard and Poor’s 500, increased only 50%.	相比之下，扣除通胀因素后的上证综指仅仅上涨了两倍，而美国股市如果用扣除通胀因素的标准普尔500来衡量，增长率只有50%。


Indeed, the United States has never experienced a fourfold increase in stock prices in less than five years, even during the late 1990’s bubble.	事实上，美国股价还从未在不到五年的时间内经历过四倍的增长，即便在20世纪90年代后期的股市泡沫中也不例外。


Given that Lula is an avowed leftist who counts Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro among his friends, Brazil’s performance is all the more surprising.	考虑到卢拉是人所共知的左翼分子，坚定地把雨果·查维兹（Hugo Chávez）和菲德尔·卡斯特罗（Fidel Castro）列为自己的伙伴，巴西的经济发展就更令人感到震惊。


How could he manage to preside over such a spectacular stock-market boom?	他是怎样导演了这样一场蔚为壮观的股市大发展？


Are Brazilians too exuberant?	巴西股市是不是太过繁荣了？


Might it be time for foreign investors to pull their money out?	国外投资者是不是应该撤出资金？


Stock-market movements are certainly hard to explain, but there are reasons to believe that Brazilians might be rationally exuberant.	股市的运行肯定很难解释，但我们有理由认为巴西仍然属于 理性的 繁荣。


Corporate earnings in Brazil have gone up roughly as fast as stock prices.	巴西企业盈利的增速几乎可以同股价的增速相媲美。


With the price/earnings ratio remaining stable and moderate, the stock-market boom does not appear to reflect merely investor psychology.	由于市盈率保持稳定并相对合理，目前的股市繁荣似乎不只是投资者心理的反映。


On the contrary, the real question is why the increase in stock prices has not outpaced growth in corporate earnings.	恰恰相反，真正的问题是股价的增长为什么没能超过企业收入的增幅。


After all, in the 1990’s, the US stock-market surge (as in many countries) was fueled by record-high price/earnings ratios.	归根结底，20世纪90年代，美国的股价飙升（与很多国家的情况类似）是由创纪录的市盈率所推动的。


In 1998, the price-earnings ratio in the US was 24, compared to a historical average of around 15.	1998年，美股市盈率为24倍，而该指标的历史平均值只有约15倍。


By contrast, the run-up in stock prices in Brazil started from a very different point, with the price-earnings ration as low as six in 1998.	与此形成鲜明的对照，巴西股价的急剧飙升开始于完全不同的点位――1998年的市盈率最低只有6倍。


When a stock-market boom reaches historic proportions, a story always develops to rationalize it.	股市繁荣创下历史记录的时刻，总会有报道称这一切都是理所当然。


The news media typically present reasons to justify the view that the economy has entered a “new era.”	新闻媒体通常会搜罗原因，来证明经济发展已经步入了“新的阶段”。


Sometimes the stories are mere fabrications to validate market optimism, as with the 1990’s boom.	有时这种报道纯属为市场乐观情绪提供依据的胡编乱造，20世纪90年代的股市繁荣就是如此。


But, at other times, the stories seem more solid.	但还有些时候，这样的报道似乎颇有根据。


Lula has called this a “magic moment” for the Brazilian economy.	卢拉称之为巴西经济的“魔幻”时刻。


While such words merit caution, economy fundamentals bear them out.	尽管使用这样的字眼需慎之又慎，但经济基本面却证实了卢拉的预言。


The currency, the real, has been strengthening steadily, to nearly twice its value against the US dollar in October 2002, when Lula was first elected.	货币、不动产一直在稳步攀升，较之2002年10月卢拉首次当选总统时对美元的比价增长了将近两倍。


Inflation and interest rates are falling, the country is running a trade surplus, foreign investment is flowing in at a high rate, and the government has more than paid off its debts to foreigners, becoming a net creditor to the rest of the world.	而通货膨胀和利率却一直在下降，国家的对外贸易一直处于顺差，外资也在快速涌入，政府不仅全部还清了所欠外债，而且还以纯债权国的形象出现在世界各国面前。


So stock investors seem to be recognizing Brazil’s economic vitality, carefully watching corporate earnings rise, and running with them.	因此股票投资人似乎认可巴西的经济活力，关注企业盈利的增长，并且在股市中顺势而为。


After being lone believers through 2002, Brazilian stock market participants are now finding that investors from all over the world want to join the party.	在经历了2002年的孤军奋战以后，巴西股市参与者们如今发现，来自世界各国的投资者都愿意加入到这场盛宴。