It is time for the international community to redouble its resolve, regain its sense of purpose, and reaffirm, in both word and deed, its commitment to human rights and a more just world.	国际社会应该痛下决心，重新燃起使命感，从口头到实践履行其对人权和正义世界的承诺。


Davos Man’s Depression	达沃斯人的沮丧


NEW YORK – For 15 years, I have attended the World Economic Forum in Davos.	纽约—15年来，我一直参加在达沃斯举行的世界经济论坛。


Typically, the leaders gathered there share their optimism about how globalization, technology, and markets are transforming the world for the better.	通常情况下，领导者们聚集一堂，分享他们对全球化，技术和市场正如何改良世界所持有的乐观主义。


Even during the recession of 2001, those assembled in Davos believed that the downturn would be short-lived.	即使是在2001年的衰退中，汇聚于达沃斯论坛的人们依然相信下降趋势将是短期的。


But this time, as business leaders shared their experiences, one could almost feel the clouds darkening.	但是这次当商业领袖们分享他们的经验之时，我们可以感觉到乌云密布。


The spirit was captured by one participant who suggested that we had gone from “boom and bust” to “boom and Armageddon.”	一位把握了会议精神的演讲者者提出，我们已经从“繁荣与衰退”阶段进入了“繁荣与大决战”阶段。


The emerging consensus was that the IMF forecast for 2009, issued as the meeting convened, of global stagnation – the lowest growth in the post-war period – was optimistic.	新近冒出的共识是：会议召开时国际货币基金组织就2009年全球停滞作出的预测持有乐观态度，而本轮全球停滞的经济增长率是战后以来最低的。


The only upbeat note was struck by someone who remarked that Davos consensus forecasts are almost always wrong, so perhaps this time it would prove excessively pessimistic.	唯一的乐观音符是有人评论达沃斯的一致预测几乎总是错误的，所以也许这次的预测可能会被证明是过于悲观了。


Equally striking was the loss of faith in markets.	同样引人注目的是缺发对市场的信心。


In a widely attended brainstorming session at which participants were asked what single failure accounted for the crisis, there was a resounding answer: the belief that markets were self-correcting.	在一个参与者甚众的献计群英会中，与会者被问及到底哪一项失误得为这次危机负责，结果有个答案回响不绝：相信市场能够自我校正。


The so-called “efficient markets” model, which holds that prices fully and efficiently reflect all available information, also came in for a trashing.	认为价格可以完全并且有效地反映一切可获的信息的所谓“有效市场”模型也遭到抛弃。


So did inflation targeting: the excessive focus on inflation had diverted attention from the more fundamental question of financial stability.	同样被丢弃的还有通货膨胀目标制：对通货膨胀的过度关注已经把注意力从更根本的问题（即金融稳定性）上转移开来。


Central bankers’ belief that controlling inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for growth and prosperity had never been based on sound economic theory; now, the crisis provided further skepticism.	中央银行相信：增长和繁荣要求必须控制通货膨胀，而且仅此一项几乎已经足够，但这种看法从来就不是以正确的经济理论为基础的。 现在的危机进一步滋生了怀疑态度。


While no one from either the Bush or Obama administrations attempted to defend American-style free-wheeling capitalism, European leaders argued for their “social market economy,” their gentler form of capitalism with its social protections, as the model for the future.	无论在布什政府还是奥巴马政府内部都没有人企图为美式的随心所欲的资本主义展开辩护，而欧洲的领导者们则论证他们的“社会市场经济”将是未来采用的模型。 “社会市场经济”是一种温和版、提供社会保护的资本主义。


And its automatic stabilizers, with spending automatically increasing as economic woes increased, held out the promise of moderating the downturn.	而且它的自动稳定者们还作出了缓和下降趋势的承诺。 在经济灾祸发生的时候，花费会自动上升。


Most American financial leaders seemed too embarrassed to make an appearance.	大部分的美国金融领袖似乎太过尴尬，以至于他们压根儿就没露面。


Perhaps their absence made it easier for those who did attend to vent their anger.	也许他们的缺席使得与会者可以更容易地发泄愤怒。


But business leaders from the “real” sector and the few labor leaders who work hard at Davos each year to advance a better understanding of the concerns of working men and women among the business community were particularly angry at the financial community’s lack of remorse.	有几位劳工领袖因为金融群体缺乏自责而尤感愤怒，他们年年在达沃斯辛勤工作，推动商业界更好地了解劳动者关心的问题。


A call for the repayment of past bonuses was received with applause.	有关偿还过去奖金的呼吁赢得了阵阵掌声。


Indeed, some American financiers were especially harshly criticized for seeming to take the position that they, too, were victims.	实际上，一些美国金融家们受到了极其猛烈的批判， 因为他们看上去持有的立场是：他们也是受害者。


The reality is that they were the perpetrators, not the victims, and it seemed particularly galling that they were continuing to hold a gun to the heads of governments, demanding massive bailouts and threatening economic collapse otherwise.	现实里他们是作恶的人而不是牺牲品。 尤其让人愤怒的是，他们继续用枪指着政府的头要求大规模的紧急援助，并且威胁否则就会经济崩溃。


Money was flowing to those who had caused the problem, rather than to the victims.	钱流向那些引发问题的人，而不是蒙受损失的人。


Worse still, much of the money flowing into the banks to recapitalize them so that they could resume lending has been flowing out in the form of bonus payments and dividends.	更糟糕的是，很多流进银行用以调整资本结构，以便他们可以恢复借贷的资金已经以红利支付和股息的形式流出。


The fact that businesses around the world were not getting the credit they need compounded the grievances expressed at Davos.	全世界的商业界并没有获得他们需要的信用，这一事实加剧了在达沃斯表达出来的不满情绪。


This crisis raises fundamental questions about globalization, which was supposed to help diffuse risk.	这轮危机引发了有关全球化的根本问题，而全球化被认为是有助于分化危机的。


Instead, it has enabled America’s failures to spread around the world, like a contagious disease.	但它反而使得美国的失利如同传染病一般在世界上传播。


Still, the worry at Davos was that there would be a retreat from even our flawed globalization, and that poor countries would suffer the most.	即便如此，出现在达沃斯的忧虑仍然是各国将退出我们有缺陷的全球化进程，而且贫穷国家将蒙受最大损失。


But the playing field has always been unlevel.	但是一直以来竞技场就是不平坦的。


How could developing countries compete with America’s subsidies and guarantees?	发展中国家如何能与美国的补贴和担保竞争？


So how could any developing country defend to its citizens the idea of opening itself even more to America’s highly subsidized banks?	因此有哪一个发展中国家能够在国民面前捍卫其进一步向获得政府高度补贴的美国银行开放市场的观点呢?


At least for the moment, financial market liberalization seems to be dead.	至少就目前而言，金融市场的解放看起来已经死亡。


The inequities are obvious.	不均衡是明显的。


Even if poor countries were willing to guarantee their deposits, the guarantee would mean less than that from the United States.	即使穷国愿意为他们的存款提供担保，这种担保也意味着比来自美国的担保少。


This partly explains the curious flow of funds from developing countries to the US – from whence the world’s problems originated.	这部分解释了资金不可思议地从发展中国家流向美国，从世界问题发端的地方。 而且，发展中国家缺乏资源来采取发达国家制定的大型刺激政策。


Moreover, developing countries lack the resources to engage in the massive stimulus policies of the advanced countries.  Making matters worse, the IMF still forces most countries that turn to it for help to raise interest rates and lower spending, worsening the downturns.	雪上加霜的是，国际货币基金组织迫使大多数向它求助的国家提高利率，降低消费，加重了下降趋势。


And, to add insult to injury, banks in advanced countries, especially those receiving aid from their governments, seem to be pulling back from lending in developing countries, including through branches and subsidiaries.	还有更糟糕的：发达国家的银行，尤其是那些接受政府援助的银行似乎退出了发展中国家的借贷业务，包括通过分支机构和子公司进行的借贷。


So the prospects for most developing countries – including those that had done everything “right” – are bleak.	所以大部分发展中国家都是前景黯淡，即使那些已经做“对”了每件事的发展中国家。


As if all this were not enough, as the Davos meeting opened, America’s House of Representatives passed a bill requiring American steel to be used in stimulus spending, despite the G-20’s call to avoid protectionism in response to the crisis.	就像这些都还不够糟一样，达沃斯论坛开幕时美国众议院通过了一项议案，要求经济刺激方案下进行的花费必须使用美国钢铁，虽然20国集团（G-20）呼吁避免采取保护主义来应对危机。


To this litany of concerns we can add the fear of borrowers that the massive American deficits would drain the supply of global savings, and worries of holders of US dollar reserves, that America may be tempted to inflate away its debt.  At Davos, those who trusted the US not to inflate away its debt intentionally worried that it might happen unintentionally. There was little confidence in the none-too-deft hand of the US Federal Reserve – its reputation marred by massive monetary-policy failures in recent years – to manage the massive buildup of debt and liquidity.	在达沃斯，那些信任美国不会用通货膨胀来消解债务的人 有意识地 担心这一幕可能会 在无意间 发生。 对于精妙无俦的美国联邦储备委员具有手段来处理大量增加的债务和资产折现力，人们几乎不抱信心：它的名声近几年来因为巨大的货币政策失误已经大打折扣。


President Barack Obama seems to be offering a needed boost to American leadership after the dark days of George W. Bush; but the mood in Davos suggests that optimism and confidence may be short-lived.	乔治·W·布什执政的黑暗岁月之后，巴拉克·奥巴马总统似乎必然会提升美国的领导能力。 但是达沃斯的气氛显示乐观主义和信心可能都是短期而已。


America led the world in globalization.	在全球化中，美国领导了世界。


With American-style capitalism and America’s financial markets in disrepute, will America now lead the world into a new era of protectionism, as it did once before, during the Great Depression?	当美式资本主义和美国的金融市场声名狼藉之时，美国还将领导世界进入一个保护主义的新时代，就像它在大萧条之中曾经做过的那样吗？


Deadlock in Durban	德班僵局


NEW YORK – The 17th conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, popularly known as COP-17, is taking place in Durban, South Africa, at a critical moment, as the historic 1997 Kyoto Protocol is set to expire next year.	纽约——第十七届联合国气候变化框架会议（简称COP17）正在南非举行，这次会议的时间可谓关键，因为1997年京都议定书将于明年失效。


But, like the climate-change conferences in Copenhagen in 2009 and in Cancún in 2010, COP-17 can be expected to spend much and produce little.	但是，与2009年哥本哈根和2010年坎昆的气候变化会议相似，COP17很可能以期望越大失望越大的结局收场。


Indeed, the extravagance of these conferences seems to grow, rather than shrink, as their dismal results become more apparent.	事实上，这些会议的铺张似乎并未收敛，反而有膨胀之势，因为它们的不给力已是众人皆知了。


COP-15 in Copenhagen lasted 12 days, and is estimated to have attracted 15,000 delegates and 5,000 journalists.	哥本哈根的COP15举行了12天，据估计共吸引了15000名与会代表和5000名记者。


The carbon emissions created by so many people flying to Denmark was real, while the emissions targets that the conference sought remained beyond reach.	这么多人飞到丹麦所产生的碳排放可是实实在在的，而会议所追求的排放目标到现在还没个影子。


That will be true in Durban as well – and on an even greater scale.	德班也逃不过这个结局——只是规模可能比哥本哈根还要大。


The real problem is that the expectations concerning meaningful action on climate change, as opposed to gimmicks such as US President Barack Obama’s last-minute arrival and minuscule gestures in Copenhagen, are now lower than ever.	真正的问题是，对气候变化采取有意义行动——而不是像奥巴马在在哥本哈根会议上那样姗姗来迟，而且如同蜻蜓点水一样来了就走——的期望越来越低。


There are two problems that cannot be wished away.	有两个问题根本不用指望解决。


First, the United States under Obama’s ineffective leadership has drifted yet further into a “What’s in it for me?” attitude on key issues requiring international action.	首先，由于奥巴马领导不力，在要求国际行动的关键问题上，美国正在“我有什么好处”的扯皮道路上越走越远。


In place of what the economist Charles Kindleberger once called an “altruistic hegemon,” the America that the world now faces is what I call a “selfish hegemon.”	改一下经济学家金德尔伯格（Charles Kindleberger）所谓的“无私霸权”，我将如今世界所面对的美国称为“自私霸权”。


Thus, the US has virtually pulled out of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, with Obama acquiescing to greedy business lobbies that will not settle unless more of their demands are met.	因此，美国已经实质性地退出了多边贸易谈判多哈回合，奥巴马默许了贪婪商人游说团，如果要求得不到满足，他们是不会在谈判协议上签字的。


But not only has Obama abandoned Doha; he has also seriously endangered the multilateral trading system by diverting US efforts and resources to discriminatory bilateral trade deals and, most recently, to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will principally aid countries that are worried about an aggressive China and seek political security rather than increased trade.	但奥巴马不但抛弃了多哈，他还严重地威胁了多面贸易体系，因为在他的领导下，美国正在将资源和精力用于区别对待的双边贸易协议和最近的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系协定上，后者主要是为了援助担心侵略性的中国的国家以及寻求政治安全（而不是增进贸易）。


The same is true of environmental action: after Australia’s belated ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007, the US remains the only country that has not ratified the agreement.	在环境问题上也是如此：澳大利亚2007年批准京都议定书之后，美国成了唯一一个仍未批准该协议的国家。


The second problem is that the sheer weight of the US in international affairs, though diminished nowadays, has nonetheless led to a corruption of the principles that should underpin a new climate-change treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol.	第二个问题是美国在国际事务上的分量虽然已有所下降，但仍足以破坏理应成为京都议定书之后的气候变化条约的基础的原则。


For example, unlike the World Trade Organization, whose dispute-settlement mechanism imposes penalties for abandoning negotiated reductions of trade barriers, the targets for emission reductions are not binding and enforceable commitments.	比如，与世界贸易组织不同——世贸组织的争端解决机制可以对拒不执行商定的减少贸易壁垒措施的行为施以惩罚——排放削减并不具有约束性，也没有强制性义务。


The US has not agreed to accept such sanctions for failing to meet emissions targets; but, without penalties, the exercise is largely futile and only encourages cynicism about the effort to combat climate change.	美国不同意和不接受因达不到排放目标而受到制裁； 但是，没有惩罚机制，排放削减要求就是无用功，只会激起人们对对抗气候变化努力的冷嘲热讽。


Moreover, abandoning the Kyoto Protocol’s exemption of developing countries from obligations for current emissions, the US has insisted on obligations from China and India that reflect a common form of “taxation” of emissions.	此外，美国要求废除京都议定书对发展中国家排放义务的豁免，坚持认为中国和印度也必须承担责任，以反映普适的排放“税”。


But there are persuasive reasons why these countries insist that the obligations must instead reflect per capita emissions, a criterion that would require far greater emission cuts by the US than its leaders now contemplate.	但这些国家则坚持认为减排责任必须反映人均排放——根据这一标准，美国应该减少比其领导人预期更多的排放量——它们能拿出有说服力的理由。


Besides, these countries correctly argue that the tradeoff between action on climate change and poverty reduction is more compelling for them at their level of per capita income, unless they can access newly emerging technologies at low cost.	此外，这些国家正确地指出，从它们的人均收入看，气候变化行为和消除贫困之间的权衡才是更重要的问题，除非它们能够以低成本获得新技术。


This demand suggests that the US should subsidize the flow of technology to India and China from US firms holding patents, which is highly impractical.	根据这一要求，美国应该补贴从握有专利权的美国公司流向印度和中国的技术，这是很不现实的。


That is where the $100 billion Global Climate Change Fund, promised at the Cancún COP-16 conference, comes in.	这正是坎昆的COP16决定成立1000亿美元全球气候变化基金的原因。


Unfortunately, even environmental icons like Al Gore in the US are so heavily invested in new green technology that their self-interest is tied up in this fund being spent on developing privately owned new technologies that are protected by patents.	不幸的是，尽管戈尔登美国环保人士花重金投资于新兴绿色技术，将自身利益与该基金绑在一起，但该基金的资金都花在了开发受专利保护的私有新技术上。


The new “Green Revolution” seeds that the Nobel laureate agronomist Norman Borlaug developed with public money were freely available to all users anywhere.	诺贝尔奖获得者、农学家布劳格（Norman Borlaug）用公共资金开发的新的“绿色革命”种子可以被世界各地的使用者免费获得。


The technology developed by the money spent from the Global Climate Change Fund also should be equally available to all, including India and China, which would then enable them to agree to more emissions cuts.	用全球气候变基金的资金开发的技术也应该对包括印度和中国在内的全世界开放，以促使各国同意更多地减排。


Indeed, even the contributions to the Fund should have reflected the past damage by the developed countries over the course of a century of carbon emissions – an obligation based on the well-established tort principle that the US has accepted for domestic pollution.	事实上，该基金的出资额应该反映发达国家过去一百年中的排放所造成的伤害——美国在治理国内污染时就采取了这一完善的谁侵权谁承担义务的原则。


But here, too, the US has rejected the idea outright.	但是，在全球气候变化基金这件事上，美国拒绝完全采用这一办法。


Several such sensible ways to design the Kyoto Protocol’s successor treaty have been undermined by efforts to accommodate inappropriate US-led demands and objections, resulting in the impasse that became evident at the COP conferences in Copenhagen and Cancún.	不少设计京都议定书后任条约的明智办法由于为了协调美国为首的要求和反对而遭到了破坏，��致哥本哈根和坎昆COP会议陷入了僵局。


Those who do not believe in magic know better than to hope that it will somehow disappear in Durban.	那些不相信奇迹的人心知肚明，这些障碍不会在德班会议上消失。


Dear World, Please Confront America	亲爱的世界，请对抗美国


Is it possible to fall out of love with your own country?	人可不可能不爱自己的祖国呢？


For two years, I, like many Americans, have been focused intently on documenting, exposing, and alerting the nation to the Bush administration’s criminality and its assault on the Constitution and the rule of law – a story often marginalized at home.	两年来，我像许多美国人那样，全心专注于证明、揭露以及提醒整个美国有关布什政府的犯罪行为及其违反《美国宪法》和法治的事实——这在国内通常被边缘化了。


I was certain that when Americans knew what was being done in their name, they would react with horror and outrage.	我敢肯定，一旦美国人知道布什政府以他们的名义做了什么，他们都会觉得恐惧和愤怒。


Three months ago, the Bush administration still clung to its devil’s sound bite, “We don’t torture.”	. 三个月前，布什政府仍然抓住其邪恶的演讲片断“我们不拷打囚犯”不放。


Now, Physicians for Human Rights has issued its report documenting American-held detainees’ traumas, and even lie detector tests confirm they have been tortured.	现在，医生促进人权协会已经发表报告，证明被美国控制的被押人员有外伤，而且，甚至测谎测试都确认了这些被押人员被拷打过。


The Red Cross report has leaked: torture and war crimes.	红十字组织的报告泄漏了这样的事实：拷打和战争犯罪。


Jane Mayer’s impeccably researched exposé The Dark Side just hit the stores: torture, crafted and directed from the top.	珍·迈尔（Jane Mayer）完美的调查作品《黑暗面》已经上市，该作品显示：拷打是由上层精心设计和指挥的。


The Washington Post gave readers actual video footage of the abusive interrogation of a Canadian minor, Omar Khadr, who was seen showing his still-bleeding abdominal wounds, weeping and pleading with his captors.	《华盛顿邮报》为读者提供了对一个名叫奥马尔·卡德尔（Omar Khadr）的未成年的加拿大人的刑讯审问录像报道，奥马尔·卡德尔展示了他仍然流着血的腹部伤口，哭泣着向抓捕他的人求饶。


So the truth is out and freely available.	所以，事实的真相是公开的并可以自由地获得的。


And America is still napping, worrying about its weight, and hanging out at the mall.	但是，美国人仍然在小憩，担心他们的体重，逛商场打发时间。


I had thought that after so much exposure, thousands of Americans would be holding vigils on Capitol Hill, that religious leaders would be asking God’s forgiveness, and that a popular groundswell of revulsion, similar to the nineteenth-century anti-slavery movement, would emerge.	我曾经认为在暴露了这么多真相后，有许多美国人会到国会山上守夜，宗教领袖会请求上帝的原谅，并出现类似于19世纪反对奴隶制度运动时的普遍的公众厌恶情绪。


To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, if torture is not wrong, nothing is wrong.	根据亚伯拉罕·林肯的观点，如果拷打没有错，那么，就没有什么是错的了。


And yet no such thing has occurred.	然而，这些事件还没有发生。


There is no crisis in America’s churches and synagogues, no Christian and Jewish leaders crying out for justice in the name of Jesus, a tortured political prisoner, or of Yahweh, who demands righteousness.	在美国的基督教派和犹太教派中没有爆发危机，基督教领导人和犹太教领导人都没有以遭受折磨的政治囚犯耶稣或要求正义的耶和华的名义大声呼吁正义。


I asked a contact in the interfaith world why. He replied, “The mainstream churches don’t care, because they are Republican.	我问一个在多信仰界的熟人这是为什么，他回答说，“主流的基督教会都不在乎这些事情，因为他们是共和党人。


And the synagogues don’t care, because the prisoners are Arabs.”	犹太教会也不在乎这些事情，因为囚犯都是阿拉伯人。 ”


It was then that I realized that I could not be in love with my country right now.	到这个时候，我才意识到我现在不能爱我的祖国了。


How can I care about the fate of people like that?	我怎么能这样对人的命运漠不关心呢？


If this is what Americans are feeling, if that is who we are, we don’t deserve our Constitution and Bill of Rights.	如果美国人真是这样认为的，如果这就是真实的我们，那么，我们不配我们拥有的《宪法》和《权利和自由法案》。


Even America’s vaunted judicial system has failed to constrain obvious abuses.	即使美国大肆吹嘘的司法系统也没能抑制这些明显的虐待。


A Federal court has ruled that the military tribunals system – Star Chambers where evidence derived from torture is used against the accused – can proceed.	一个联邦法庭裁决军事法院系统——源自拷打的证据被用来反对被告的星法院——可以继续下去。


Another recently ruled that the president may call anyone anywhere an “enemy combatant” and detain him or her indefinitely.	另一个联邦法庭裁决总统可以在任何地方称呼任何人为“敌方武装人员”并视情况拘留他或她。


So Americans are colluding with a criminal regime.	所以，美国人和一个犯罪政权串通在一起。


We have become an outlaw nation – a clear and present danger to international law and global stability – among civilized countries that have been our allies.	我们已经在我们的文明的盟国中变成了一个不遵守法律的国家——这是对国际法和世界稳定的一个明显的现存威胁。


We are – rightly – on Canada’s list of rogue nations that torture.	我们——恰如其分地——出现在加拿大列出的实行拷打的流氓国家的名单上。


Europe is still high from Barack Obama’s recent visit.	. 欧洲还处在最近巴拉克·奥巴马访问带来的兴奋之中。


Many Americans, too, hope that an Obama victory in November will roll back this nightmare.	许多美国人也希望奥巴马在11月的胜利会击退这个恶梦。


But this is no time to yield to delusions.	但是，现在不是沉迷于错觉的时候。


Even if Obama wins, he may well be a radically weakened president.	即使奥巴马获胜，他也极有可能是一个权力被极度削弱的总统。


The Bush administration has created a transnational apparatus of lawlessness that he alone, without global intervention, can neither roll back nor control.	布什政府已经建立了一个超越国界的违法机制，在这个机制中如果没有国际干预，靠自己奥巴马是既不能对抗也不能控制这一点的。


Private security firms – for example, Blackwater – will still be operating, accountable neither to him nor to Congress, and not bound, they have argued, by international treaties.	有人认为，根据国际条约，私人安全公司——例如黑水公司——将会继续经营，既不对总统负责，也不对国会负责，并且不受约束。


Weapons manufacturers and the telecommunications industry, with billions at stake in maintaining a hyped “war on terror” and their new global surveillance market, will deploy a lavishly financed army of lobbyists to defend their interests.	武器制造商和电讯业在维护大肆宣传的“反恐战争”上以及在新的全球监测市场中，拥有几十亿美元的利益，它们会部署一个财力庞大的游说队伍来维护它们的利益。


Moreover, if elected, Obama will be constrained by his own Democratic Party.	而且，如果当选，奥巴马也会受到自身的民主党的制约。


America’s political parties bear little resemblance to the disciplined organizations familiar in parliamentary democracies in Europe and elsewhere.	美国的政党与在欧洲及其它地方的议会民主中常见的有纪律的组织相比，相似的地方很少。


And Democrats in Congress will be even more divided after November if, as many expect, conservative members defeat Republican incumbents damaged by their association with Bush.	并且，如果像许多人预期的那样，保守的议员击败了因与布什联合而受害的在职的共和党议员，那么在今年11月份之后，国会中的民主党人会更分裂。


To be sure, some Democrats have recently launched Congressional hearings into the Bush administration’s abuses of power.	虽然，有些民主党人最近启动了对布什政府滥用权利的议会听证会。


Unfortunately, with virtually no media coverage, there is little pressure to broaden official investigations and ensure genuine accountability.	不幸的是，由于没有媒体的报道，它就没有扩大官方调查和确保真正地承担责任的压力。


But, while grassroots pressure has not worked, money still talks.	但是，虽然公众的压力没有起到作用，然而，金钱仍然是万能的。


We need targeted government-led sanctions against the US by civilized countries, including international divestment of capital.	我们需要由文明国家的政府领导的有目的对美国的制裁，包括国际资本剥夺。


Many studies have shown that tying investment to democracy and human rights reform is effective in the developing world.	许多研究显示，在发展中国家将投资和民主以及人权改革联系在一起是有效的。


There is no reason why it can’t be effective against the world’s superpower.	没有理由认为这在反对世界超级大国上是无效的。


We also need an internationally coordinated strategy for prosecuting war criminals at the top and further down the chain of command – individual countries pressing charges, as Italy and France have done.	我们也需要国际协调的从上倒下起诉指挥系统的战争罪犯的策略——像意大利和法国做过的那样，由单个的国家进行指控。


Although the United States is not a signatory to the statute that established the International Criminal Court, violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are war crimes for which anyone – potentially even the US president – may be tried in any of the other 193 countries that are parties to the conventions.	虽然美国不是建立国际刑事法院的条约的签字方，但是，违反日内瓦公约第三条的行为都是战争犯罪，对犯下这些罪行的任何人——甚至可能是美国总统——都可以在该公约缔约国的其它193个国家中的任何一个国家进行审判。


The whole world can hunt these criminals down.	全世界都可以追捕这些罪犯。


An outlaw America is a global problem that threatens the rest of the international community.	不守法的美国是一个威胁国际社会其它国家的全球性问题。


If this regime gets away with flouting international law, what is to prevent the next administration – or this administration, continuing under its secret succession plan in the event of an emergency – from going further and targeting its political opponents at home and abroad?	如果这个政权逃脱了藐视国际法应得的惩罚，那么，拿什么来阻止下一任政府——或者在紧急情况下，按照秘密继任计划继续执政的本届政府——从事更过分的行为并将目标对准其国内和国外的政治对手？


We Americans are either too incapable, or too dysfunctional, to help ourselves right now.	现在，对于帮助我们自己，我们美国人要么太无能为力，要么太机能不良。


Like drug addicts or the mentally ill who refuse treatment, we need our friends to intervene.	像拒绝接受治疗的吸毒成瘾者或者精神病人那样，我们需要我们的朋友的介入。


So remember us as we were in our better moments, and take action to save us – and the world – from ourselves.	所以，就像我们在状况较好的时候记住我们那样，采取措施——从我们自己手中——挽救我们以及世界。


Maybe then I can fall in love with my country again.	或许，到那时候我可以再次爱上我的祖国。


Death and Tobacco Taxes	死亡和烟草税


A global killer is ripping through the world’s poorer countries largely unchecked.	一个全球性致命物正在世界贫穷国家肆虐。


Within 25 years, it will cause 10 million deaths a year worldwide –more than malaria, maternal deaths, childhood infections, and diarrhea combined .	在未来25年中，它将在一年时间内造成全世界一千万人死亡，超过霍乱、母死、儿童感染以及疟疾的总和。


Over half of the dead will be aged 30 to 69, losing about 25 years of life expectancy.	超过一半的死者年龄在30岁至69岁之间，早死大约25年。


The culprit? Tobacco.	这一元凶就是烟草。


The same addiction that became the top preventable cause of death in Western countries has made big inroads in developing countries.	成为西方国家中首要可防治死因的耽溺在发展中国家大行其道。


Smoking killed 100 million people in the twentieth century, mostly in developed countries.	吸烟在二十世纪造成一亿人死亡，大多数在发达国家。


On current trends smoking will kill about one billion people in the twenty-first century, mostly in developing countries.	按照目前的趋势，吸烟将会在二十一世纪造成大约十亿人死亡，大多数在发展中国家。


In India, smoking triples the risk of death from tuberculosis in men and women and may even contribute to the spread of tuberculosis to others.	在印度，吸烟造成男女死亡的风险超过肺结核的三倍，甚至造成肺结核的传播。


About 1 million people per year will soon die from smoking in China and India.	在中国和印度每年大约一百万人死于吸烟。


Perhaps 150 million young adults will be killed by tobacco in these two countries alone, unless there is widespread cessation.	除非大规模戒烟，仅仅在这两个国家大约有一亿五千万年轻成年人死于吸烟。


But the death tolls of the past need not become the world’s future.	但是过去的吸烟死亡并非一定是世界的将来。


We know how to control tobacco use.	我们知道如何控制烟草使用。


Cessation by the 1.1 billion current smokers is needed to lower tobacco deaths over the next few decades.	为了在未来几十年中降低吸烟死亡人数，现在需要十一亿人戒烟。


Reduced uptake of smoking by children would save lives chiefly after 2050.	降低儿童吸烟将会主要在2050年后挽救性命。 戒烟是有成效的。


Quitting works: even those who stop smoking in their 40’s lower their risk of death remarkably, and those who quit in their 30’s have death risks close to lifelong non-smokers.	即使那些在四十多岁戒烟的人也可以极大地降低死亡风险，而那些在三十多岁戒烟的人的死亡风险和终生不吸烟的人接近。


Tobacco tax increases, dissemination of information about the health risks of smoking, smoking bans in public, complete bans on advertising and promotion, and cessation therapies are effective in helping smokers to quit.	增加烟草税、传播吸烟造成的健康风险的信息、禁止公共场合吸烟、完全禁止烟草广告和促销以及戒烟治疗在帮助烟民戒烟上卓有成效。


Tobacco taxes are probably the single most cost-effective intervention for adult health in the world.	烟草税大概是最为具有成本效益的成年健康干预手段。


A tripling of the excise tax would roughly double the price of cigarettes (as has happened in New York City), preventing about three million deaths per year by 2030.	将税收提高三倍将会把香烟价格提高大约两倍(纽约就是这样)，在2030年以前每年防止大约三百万人死亡。


Most OECD countries began to take tobacco control seriously in the last two decades, and have decreased male tobacco deaths since.	大多数经合组织成员国在过去二十年中开始认真对待烟草控制问题，并且从那时以来减少了男子吸烟死亡。


But effective tobacco control measures are not underway in developing countries.	但是发展中国家并没有采取有效的烟草控制措施。


Taxes are about 80% of the street price of cigarettes in Toronto, but less than 30% in Beijing or Delhi.	税收大约相当于多伦多街头香烟价格的80%，但是在北京或者德里只有30%。


In many countries, tobacco taxes have fallen in real terms.	在许多国家，烟草税收已经在实际价格上下降。


Knowledge of the health risks from smoking is low: 61% of Chinese smokers in 1996 thought tobacco did them “little or no harm.”	有关吸烟的健康风险的知识也很低。 1996年，61%的中国烟民认为吸烟对他们“无害或者基本无害”。


Opposition from the tobacco industry is an obvious obstacle to tobacco control.	来自烟草产业的反对力量是烟草控制的明显阻碍。


Spurious economic arguments against higher taxes have been debunked in the West, but are still commonly repeated in the finance ministries of developing countries.	在西方，反对多征税的虚假的经济论点已经遭到驳斥，但是却在发展中国家的财政部通常加以重复。


Money not spent on tobacco would be spent on other goods and services.	不花在香烟上的钱就会花在其他食品和服务上。


Indeed, even sharply reduced demand for tobacco would not mean unemployment in most countries.	确实，在大多数国家，即使是烟草需求大幅度降低也并不意味着失业。


Tax hikes lower consumption and raise revenue in the medium-term: a 10% higher tax means about 7% higher revenue over the medium term.	增加税收降低消费并且在中期提高财政收入。 增加税率10%就可以在中期内提高税收收入大约7%。


These funds are a precious resource in fighting poverty.	这些资金是治理贫困的宝贵资源。


In China, a 10% higher price would reduce consumption by 5% and raise enough excise revenue to pay for a basic health package for 33 million poor rural Chinese.	在中国，提高价格10%将会减少消费5%并且增加足够的国内税收来为三千三百万贫穷的农村人口提高基本医疗。


Even in the face of smuggling, higher taxes reduce consumption and raise revenue.	即使在走私的情况下，高税收也会降低消费和增加财政收入。


Smuggling is abetted by the tobacco industry in order to gain market share and scare finance ministers into lowering taxes.	烟草产业助长走私，为的是获得市场份额并吓唬财政部长们降低税收。


But governments can counter it in several ways: local language warnings with a prominent tax stamp on cigarette packs are one example.	但是各国政府可以用几个方法来对付。 其中一个例子就是在香烟盒子上用当地语言提出警告并且贴上醒目的税票。


Another common argument against tobacco control – that if people are not harming others, governments should not interfere with their individual decisions – is at odds with both common sense and the evidence.	另一个常见的反对烟草控制的论点是，如果人们并没有危害他人，各国政府就不应该干预他们的个人决定。 这一论点有悖常理并且与事实证据不符。


Most smokers become addicted as adolescents or young adults, when shortsightedness and lack of information make rational decisions difficult.	大多数吸烟者在少年时期或者刚刚成年的时候开始上瘾，那个时候他们目光短浅，缺乏信息，难以做出理性的决定。


In countries with good information about tobacco risks, by the time child smokers become adults, more than 80% wish they never started.	在那些有关烟草危害信息丰富的国家，当儿童吸烟者成年的时候，超过80%的人希望他们从来就没有开始。


Recently, no less than William F Buckley has argued that nicotine addiction cannot be dismissed as free choice.	最近，巴克利说，尼古丁上瘾并不能被认为是自由选择。


Moreover, recent economic research finds that higher taxes are justified on welfare grounds, because the costs to smokers are huge (even though the external costs to others might be small), and that higher cigarette taxes do not hurt the poor (since the self-control value of higher taxes helps the poor more).	而且最近的经济研究发现，出于福利的理由提高税收也是有道理的，因为烟民的代价太高(即使对其他人的外部代价可能较小)，而且增加香烟税收并不伤害穷人(因为更高税收的自我控制价值可以更多地帮助穷人)。


Nobel laureate Amartya Sen wisely reminds us that “it is important that the practical case for tobacco control is not dismissed on the basis of an incomplete libertarian argument.”	诺贝尔奖得主森睿智地提醒我们说，不要用不完整的自由派论点驳斥烟草控制的实际理由，这是非常重要的。


The agenda is clear.	行动议程是明确的。


Governments must take tobacco seriously as a leading killer of adults worldwide.	各国政府必须严肃对待烟草，把它作为全世界成年人的主要致死因素。


International poverty goals must include tobacco control.	国际扶贫目标必须包含烟草控制。


Developing countries must not be fooled by the empty economic arguments that paralyzed control efforts in the West for so long.	发展中国家不能被让西方的控制烟草努力如此长久地陷于瘫痪的经济论点所愚弄。


The Gates Foundation can fund action and research.	盖茨基金会可以资助行动以及研究。


There are hopeful signs: more than 160 countries have signed the World Health Organization’s global tobacco control treaty, and the Caribbean heads of state have recently declared they want to tackle tobacco together.	现在出现了希望的迹象。 超过160个国家已经签署世界卫生组织全球烟草控制条约，而加勒比各国领导人最近宣布他们将联合一致对付烟草问题。


About 150-180 million tobacco deaths would be avoided before 2050 if the proportion of adults in developing countries who quit smoking increases from below 5% today to 30-40% by 2020 (like current quit rates in Canada).	如果发展中国家戒烟人口的比例从当今的5%不到提高到2020年的40%(正如加拿大目前的戒烟率)，那么，在2050年以前就可以避免大约一亿五千万到一亿八千万人死于吸烟。


Because control policies deter children from starting, even greater benefits can be expected beyond 2050.	由于控制政策组织儿童开始吸烟，所以，人们可以预期在2050年以后将会有更大的收益。


Benjamin Franklin once said, “In this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”	富兰克林曾经说过，在这个世界上，除了税和死亡之外没有什么事情可以说是确定无疑的。


Yet we have a tax that could prevent hundreds of millions of premature deaths.	但是，我们却有一个可以防止数以亿计的人提早死亡的税收。


It is time to use it.	现在就应该使用这一税收。


Death-Defying Europe	不死的欧洲


As the European Union prepares to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome later this month, the EU is widely perceived to be on its knees.	当欧盟准备在这个月晚些时候庆祝《罗马公约》签订50周年时，在外界看来它已是脆弱不堪了。


European integration, is felt to have, somehow met its Waterloo in 2005, when Dutch and French referendums unexpectedly torpedoed the draft EU constitution.	在2005年，荷兰和法国的全民公决出人意料地使《欧盟宪法》草案遭遇决定性的破坏时，人们觉得这就是欧盟的滑铁卢。


Media stories have focused on the paralysis that is said to have gripped EU decision-making, but the reality is different.	媒体报道的焦点集中在据称是欧盟的决策瘫痪，但事实并非如此。


Far from suffering an irreversible decline in its fortunes, the EU has been has been conducting business as usual, quietly getting on with the job of constructing new policies and projects.	欧盟非凡没有陷入到不可逆转的厄运当中，而是一直在按部就班地平静运作，创建新的政策和项目。


Take a look at some recent headlines.	看看最近的新闻标题。


The EU is putting together an energy and environment strategy that aims to end the self-defeating competition within Europe for oil and gas, while also establishing Europe as global leader in the effort to halt climate change.	欧盟正在进行一项能源和环境的战略规划，其目的是要结束欧洲内部为获得石油和天然气而进行的恶性竞争，同时也使欧洲成为遏制气候变化努力方面的全球领袖。


The Union’s common foreign and security policy may not yet mean that Europe speaks to the world with one voice, but it is taking shape and has already healed some of the wounds inflicted by disagreements over the war in Iraq.	欧盟的共同外交和安全政策可能还不一定意味着欧洲对世界用同一种声音说话，但它已经初具雏形，并已经弥合了由于在伊拉克战争上出现分歧而产生的一些裂隙。


Of equal importance, Europe’s economic integration continues to move ahead, with the euro buoyant and a single marketplace for financial services now coming into sight.	同等重要的是欧洲经济一体化继续推进，欧元态势良好，一个单一的金融服务市场也正进入人们的视线。


The starting point for the EU’s unhappy bid to create a shared constitution had been fears that its decision-making mechanisms were being overloaded by the accession of so many new members, first in May 2004 and again at the beginning of this year.	欧盟创造共同宪法的不幸经历的出发点是担心决策机制正由于大量新成员国的加入（第一次是在2004年5月而再一次是今年年初）而超负荷运转。


The constitutional treaty was originally designed to streamline the system, and it was only later that it was over-enthusiastically expanded into the lengthy and pompous document that is now a dead letter.	宪法公约的初衷是要简化这一体系，只是后来它却过于狂热地扩展一份内容冗长、言词华丽的文件，而现在则成为故纸一堆。


Yet there are signs that the EU machine has so far been coping rather well without the constitution.	然而，有迹象表明即便在没有宪法的情况下，欧盟机器也一直都能运转良好。


The volume of EU rule-making last year was almost exactly the same as 10 years ago.	欧盟去年的立法量几乎和十年以前相同。


During 2005 and 2006, the flow of EU directives, regulations, and associated reports, green papers, and communications continued at the same rate as the 2,800 a year chalked up in 1996, when Jacques Delors was at the helm of the European Commission and the EU project was being widely hailed as unstoppable.	在2005年和2006年，一系列的欧盟指令、法规和相关报告、绿皮书和通讯继续保持在1996年2800件的总量水平上。 当年正值Jacques Delors掌舵欧盟，而欧盟工程被广泛称道为势不可挡。


Brussels is nowadays a government town akin to Washington, D.C, even if it is also a place where complex negotiations among the Union’s 27 members grind forward only slowly.	布鲁塞尔现今是一个与华盛顿类似的政府所在地，即便它也是一个欧盟27个成员国间错综复杂的谈判在磕绊中缓慢进展的地方。


On top of all this, the European economy is looking brighter.	更为重要的是，欧洲经济的前景更为光明。


In Germany, the EU’s economic locomotive, unemployment is down and business confidence is up.	在欧洲的经济发动机德国，失业率降低，商业的信心得到提升。


And throughout the EU, the positive effects of the enlargement strategy that has brought in 10 ex-communist countries over the past three years looks to be generating a new self-confidence.	在整个欧盟，在过去三年里纳入10个前共产主义国家的扩盟战略的积极成效似乎正在为欧盟增添新的自信。


None of this should be surprising.	以上所述，并非偶然。


It would take a good deal more than a hiccup in the EU’s delicate political process to bring integration to a standstill, let alone put it into reverse.	在欧盟细致的政治流程中需要有一个比打击更大得多的挫折才能使一体化进程完全陷入停顿，更别说使其逆转。


The global pressures pushing European nations closer together are as strong as ever, so the impasse over the EU’s constitutional treaty was never going to push Europe off course for very long.	让欧洲国家以前所未有的姿态紧密团结的全球性压力空前巨大，因此欧盟宪法公约的僵局绝不会使欧洲长时间偏离正轨。


The path ahead is far from clear, of course.	当然，前进的道路远未明朗。


But a consensus does seem to be emerging on how the EU’s future will pan out.	但一个关于欧盟的未来将如何展开的共识却似乎已然出现。


Diplomats and policy analysts are generally agreed that key elements of the failed constitution will be rescued from the wreckage and turned into something along the lines of the “mini-treaty” that Nicolas Sarkozy, the front-runner in the French presidential race, proposed last autumn at a Friends of Europe meeting in Brussels.	外交官和政策分析家们大都一致认为失败宪法（草案）的关键因素还可以从废墟中被挽救出来，并转化为“迷你公约”的形式。 这一建议是法国总统竞选中的领军人物Nicolas Sarkozy去年秋天在“欧洲之友”布鲁塞尔的一次会议上提出的。


The details are still anyone’s guess, but the consensus view is that the EU will have many of the constitution’s most important procedural mechanisms by sometime next year.	虽然具体内容还只是在人们的猜测中，但在这一共识中，欧盟在明年的某个时候会将许多宪法中最要的程序性机制部署到位。


The EU is far from being out of the woods.	欧盟还远未脱离困境。


Creating coherent policies is unremittingly difficult when there are so many nations, each with a different political culture.	在政治文化各不相同的成员国众多的情况下，创建具有连贯性的政策始终是困难的。


But the idea that the constitutional crisis is holding everything back is mistaken.	但那种认为宪法危机正拖累所有一切的想法也是错误的。


The much greater problem has been that EU governments have been concentrating so hard on the details of “building Europe” that they have neglected broader strategic questions.	更大的问题是欧盟各国的政府一直纠缠于“建造欧洲”的细节上而却忽略了更广泛的战略问题。


There is little or no discussion of where Europe is heading and what sort of Europe its people want.	在欧洲何去何从及欧洲人需要什么样的欧洲的问题上鲜有讨论。


It is strange but true that even American unilateralism under President George W. Bush has not provoked a genuine debate over Europe’s future role in the world.	奇怪但却真实的是即便美国在布什总统领导下实行的单边主义也未能引发关于欧洲在世界的未来角色的辩论。


The EU’s problem is not its so-called “constitutional crisis,” but rather its lack of a recognizable political identity.	欧盟的问题不是所谓的“宪法危机”，而是缺少一种可识别的政治身份。


Death in Lhasa	拉萨死亡事件


PRAGUE – On April 8, two Tibetans, Lobsang Gyaltsen and Loyak, were sentenced to death by the Municipal Intermediate People’s Court in Lhasa.	布拉格—4月8日，两名藏人洛桑嘉参和洛亚被拉萨中级人民法院宣判死刑。 罪名是纵火燃烧中国人的商铺，导致人员死亡。


Both men were convicted of committing arson that caused death against Chinese owned businesses.  Another two Tibetan activists, Tenzin Phuntsok and Kangtsuk, received a suspended death sentence, and a third, Dawa Sangpo was sentenced by the same court to life imprisonment.	另两个藏人 Tenzin Phuntsok 和Kangtsuk被判处死缓。 第三名藏人Dawa Sangpo被判处无期徒刑。


These latest verdicts are the first death sentences meted out by Chinese courts to those who took part in protests that swept Lhasa and other Tibetan cities in the spring of 2008.	这是自从2008年春天的那场席卷拉萨和西藏其他城市的骚乱以来，中国法庭首次对参与那场抗议的人士宣判死刑。


Since these trials took place in complete isolation from the rest of the world, with no impartial observers or foreign journalists present, it is to be doubted, strongly, that the defendants received anything remotely like a fair trial in accordance with international judicial standards.	由于法庭审判是完全封闭的，既没有独立观察员参加也没有外国记者的在场。 按照国际审判标准来看，被告很有可能没有受到公正的审判。


We therefore appeal to the authorities of the People’s Republic of China to rescind the decision to execute these protesters, and to provide them with an opportunity to be re-tried in a judicial process that is more in keeping with the international standards that China says that it adheres to.	所以我们请求中国政府撤销对他们的死刑判决，在一个国际认可的标准司法体系中对他们进行公正的审判，这也是中国政府一再承诺的。


And the first standard that must be met is that the trial, first of all, must be verifiable and open to international observation.	首先，审判必须是公开的，并且在国际观察员的监督之下举行。


But beyond the grim fates of the Tibetans that have now been sentenced by the Tibetan court to death or life imprisonment for the protests that took place a year ago, we are also concerned about the hundreds of other detained protesters who have yet to be tried by the Municipal Court in Lhasa.	除了关注这些已经被拉萨法院宣判死刑或无期徒刑的这些藏人之外，我们同样关心那些成百名仍然在押的抗议者。


Indeed, it is our belief that the recent death sentences could mark the onset of an avalanche of highly doubtful Court rulings in Tibet, which could lead to a worrying number of executions in that tense and troubled region.	有了此次死刑判决的先例，我们对法庭的公正性不得不提出质疑，我们担心，在这个充满着紧张局势的地区，后续的审判会有更多的死刑判决。


If China is to gain an international position of respect commensurate with its position in the world economy, as well as to benefit from its rise to pre-eminence among the world economic powers, it is vital that China’s representatives in Tibet acknowledge the need for due legal process for all of its citizens, including its ethnic minorities.	如果中国在世界经济的舞台上已经获得了尊敬，而且正在受益于崛起成为一个经济强国。 那么，中国更应该在西藏，对那些包括少数族群的所有公民都给予公正的司法程序。


Tied to that sense of due process of law is a call for the Chinese leadership to allow representatives of the international community to have access to Tibet and its adjoining provinces.	为了实现公正的审判程序，中国领导人应当允许国际社会的代表进入西藏及其周边省份。


For these provinces have now been, for the most part, cut off from international observation ever since the protests that wracked Tibet last spring.	自从去年春天那场抗议事件以来，国际观察员一直没被允许进入该区域。


Only by making its rule in Tibet more transparent for the rest of the world can the government of the People’s Republic of China dispel the dark shadows of suspicion that now hang over Tibet.  Only by allowing an international presence to report, dispassionately and truthfully, on what is happening in Tibet, will China’s government dispel the idea that its continued rule there means that even more severe human rights abuses will be inflicted on members of China’s ethnic minorities.	只有让西藏问题透明化，才能驱散国际社会对中国政府的疑虑。 只有国际社会能够客观公正地在西藏进行采访报道，才能让大家相信中国政府并没有对少数民族进行迫害。


The Death of World Heritage Sites	世界遗产之死


SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA – Climate change has claimed another victim.	旧金山，加利福尼亚—气候变化又多了一个牺牲品。


Almost one-quarter of the coral in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area – one of the world’s richest and most complex ecosystems – has died this year, in the worst mass coral bleaching in recorded history.	今年，世界上最丰富、最复杂的生态系统之一、澳大利亚大堡礁世界遗产区死去近四分之一的珊瑚，是有记录以来规模最严重的珊瑚漂白。


Even in the far northern reaches of the Reef, long at a sufficient distance from human pressures like coastal development to preserve, to a large extent, coral health, a staggering 50% of the coral has died.	即使在大堡礁的最北沿——那里与海岸开发等人类压力距离足够远，因而能够保证珊瑚的健康——珊瑚死亡比例更是高达惊人的50%。


The above-average sea temperatures that triggered this bleaching were made 175 times more likely by climate change.	引发这一漂白潮的是高于平均水平的海水温度，而海水温度高于平均水平的可能性因为气候变化而增加了175倍。


As the ocean continues to absorb heat from the atmosphere, large-scale coral bleaching like that which has decimated the Great Barrier Reef – not to mention other destructive phenomena spurred by rising temperatures – is likely to become even more frequent and devastating.	随着海洋继续从大气中吸收热量，重创大堡礁级别的大规模珊瑚漂白频率可能进步增加，后果也可能更加严重——更不用说其他因温度升高引起的毁灭现象了。


The future of priceless World Heritage sites – and, indeed, our planet – depends on the immediate reduction of climate-change-inducing greenhouse-gas emissions.	世界遗产是无价之宝，它们——事实上，还有我们的地球——的未来依赖迅速降低导致气候变化的温室气体排放。


Yet many of the governments responsible for protecting these sites within their borders are not only failing to take strong climate action; they are actively pursuing dirty energy projects like coal mines and coal-fired power plants.	但许多负责保护境内世界遗产的政府不但没有采取强有力的气候行动； 实际上还在积极运行煤矿和煤电等肮脏能源项目。


Even as the Great Barrier Reef dies before our eyes, Australia continues to increase its exploitation of dirty fossil fuels.	即使大堡礁在我们眼皮底下死去，澳大利亚仍在继续增加肮脏化石燃料的开采。


In the past year, the Australian government has approved both the massive Carmichael coalmine and the Abbot Point terminal, located near the Reef, to facilitate the global export of output from the Carmichael mine.	去年，澳大利亚政府批准了大型煤矿卡迈克尔（CarMichael）和阿伯特角（Abbot Point）站，后者位于大堡礁附近，为便利卡迈尔克出产的煤向全球出口而建。


The emissions attributable to the Carmichael mine will be some of the highest resulting from a single project anywhere in the world.	卡迈克尔煤矿所产生的排放量将是全世界所有单体煤矿中最大的。


And the problem isn’t limited to Australia.	而问题不仅仅局限于澳大利亚。


In low-lying Bangladesh, one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, the government supports a proposal to build two huge coal-fired power plants adjacent to the Sundarbans World Heritage site.	地势低洼的孟加拉国是最容易受到气候变化影响的国家之一，其政府支持在毗邻孙德尔本斯（Sundarbans）世界遗产地的地区兴建两座巨型煤电厂。


India, too, supports the proposal.	印度也支持这一计划。


Not only will these power plants emit large quantities of greenhouse gases; they will also devastate the Sundarbans, where the Ganges and other rivers meet the Bay of Bengal in a spectacular delta of mangrove islands that is home to endangered Bengal tigers and river dolphins.	这些电厂不但将产生大量温室气体，还会毁掉孙德尔本斯。 孙德尔本斯是恒河和其他多条河流注入孟加拉湾的地方，这里有壮观的红树林三角洲，是濒危的孟加拉虎和海豚的家园。


The power plants will pollute the waters with toxic coal ash, bring constant coal-barge traffic, and require the dredging of riverbeds.	发电厂排放的有毒煤尘会污染水质，开展永久性煤炭驳运交通，并且必须开挖河床。


Mercury from the smokestacks will accumulate in the marine life, permanently contaminating the food supply of hundreds of thousands of people and vulnerable wildlife.	烟囱中所排放的汞将在海洋生物体内堆积，永久性污染数百万人和脆弱的野生动物的食物供应。


It is true that Bangladesh is energy poor, a problem that must be addressed if it is to continue to develop economically.	诚然，孟加拉国能源匮乏，要想继续发展经济，这一问题就必须解决。


But there are alternatives.	但解决这一问题有其他办法。


The country has significant potential for renewable-energy production, and it is already a world leader in rooftop solar energy.	孟加拉国有着巨大的可再生能源生产潜力，并且已经是世界屋顶太阳能领先者。


Of course, the responsibility to avert dangerous anthropogenic climate change does not fall only on countries that are home to World Heritage sites.	当然，避免危险的人为气候变化的责任不能全部落在世界遗产所在国。


But, knowing what we know today, initiating such damaging dirty energy projects is indefensible.	但是，在知道我们现在知道什么的情况下，启动如此具有破坏性的肮脏能源项目是站不住脚的。


With governments failing to protect our natural heritage, the World Heritage Committee must step up, in order to help bring an end to the relentless exploitation of fossil fuels.	政府不能保护我们的自然遗产，世界遗产委员会（WHC）必须站出来，结束无休止地开发化石燃料。


Specifically, the WHC should make recommendations to governments for reducing fossil-fuel-related threats, identify sites that are in particular danger from such threats, and carry out monitoring missions.	具体而言，WHC应该向政府发出减少化石燃料相关威胁的建议，列出遭到此类威胁特别严重的世界遗产地，并进行监督。


The objective should be, first and foremost, to encourage governments with the capacity to reduce fossil-fuel-related threats to designated sites to take action.	目标首先是鼓励有能力减少指定遗产地的化石燃料相关威胁的政府采取行动。


Such action from the WHC would also help to educate and empower civil society, while placing pressure on financial institutions to withhold the funding required for massive development projects.	WHC的这一行动还有助于教育和赋权公民社会，同时向金融机构施压不要为大规模开发项目提供资金。


The WHC’s annual meetings, such as that which just ended in Istanbul, are the ideal forum for such an effort.	WHC年会——如最近在伊斯坦布尔结束的——是这类措施的理想论坛。


Already, dozens of organizations and more than 60,000 individuals have called on the committee to urge India and Bangladesh to cancel the proposed coal plants and invest in renewable energy instead.	目前，已有数十个组织和超过60,000个人在委员会敦促印度和孟加拉国取消计划中的煤电厂，转而投资可再生能源。


Similarly, dozens of renowned scientists, NGOs, and international and Australian lawyers have demanded that the WHC counsel Australia not to continue supporting developments that will exacerbate the impact of climate change on the Great Barrier Reef.	类似地，数十著名科学家、非政府组织和国际和澳大利亚律师要求WHC劝告澳大利亚不要继续将恶化气候变化对大堡礁的影响的开发项目。


As the threat of climate change grows increasingly menacing, influential institutions like the WHC must take a stand against the toxic and insidious legacy of dependence on coal and other fossil fuels.	随着气候变化威胁愈演愈烈，WHC等有影响的机构必须坚决反对依赖煤炭和其他化石燃料这一贻害无穷的遗留问题。


If the committee remains silent on this crucial issue, World Heritage sites around the world will suffer.	如果WHC在这一关键问题上继续沉默，全球世界遗产都要遭殃。


A Hanging in India	印度的一次绞刑


NEW DELHI – On July 30, Yakub Memon, a chartered accountant and the brother of a notorious gangster now living in self-imposed exile, was hanged for complicity in the planning and execution of serial bomb blasts that killed 257 people in Mumbai in 1993.	新德里——7月30日，既是臭名昭著的匪徒的兄弟、又是注册会计师的雅各布·梅蒙因1993年合谋在孟买策划及实施连环爆炸案，造成257人死亡而被执行绞刑。


The hanging, India’s first in three years, has prompted reactions ranging from dismay to scarcely concealed bloodlust.	这是三年来印度首次执行绞刑，引发了从惊慌到几乎毫不掩饰的嗜血等各种反应。


And it has intensified the domestic debate over the death penalty.	这加剧了印度国内对死刑的争论。


To be sure, no one suggests that India’s judicial system did not function properly in Memon’s case.	可以肯定，所有人都认可印度司法体系在梅蒙案中正常发挥了作用。


He was convicted according to due process of law, and his punishment was in accordance with valid statutes.	梅蒙按照正当的法律程序被宣判有罪，并依据现行法律来定罪量刑。


During his 21 years behind bars, Memon exhausted every possible appeal available to him, including one for presidential clemency.	监禁的21年间，梅蒙用尽了包括总统特赦在内的一切可能的上诉途径。


The Supreme Court even held an emergency hearing at 2:30 in the morning, just hours before the execution was set to occur, before deciding to allow it to proceed.	最高法院甚至在死刑执行前于凌晨2:30召开紧急听证会，最终决定死刑正常执行。


But the question remains: Should capital punishment be on the books at all?	但问题依然是：法律规定中是否应该包含死刑？


As an opposition legislator, I attracted considerable opprobrium for voicing my opinion, on the morning of Memon’s hanging, that it should not be.	身为一名反对党议员，我因在梅蒙行刑当天凌晨公开表达反对意见而备受指责。


I expressed my sadness that our government has killed a human being, whatever his crimes may have been.	我为政府杀人而深感难过，无论这个人犯有什么样的罪行。


State-sponsored killing diminishes us all, I added, by reducing us to murderers, just like those we are punishing.	我还说过以国家为主体的杀戮让所有人蒙羞，因为它让我们都沦为杀人犯，和被我们惩罚的人没有区别。


My view is not popular in India, and my own party disclaimed my statement.	我的观点在印度并不受欢迎，我所在政党都拒绝承认我的声明。


But my position is based on ample evidence that the death penalty does not actually deter the crimes it punishes.	但我有充分证据表明死刑实际并未对其惩戒的犯罪起到遏制作用。


Data collected by the Death Penalty Project at Delhi’s National Law University demonstrate conclusively that there is no statistical correlation between applying the death penalty and preventing murder.	德里国家法律大学死刑项目搜集的数据表明适用死刑和防止谋杀之间根本不存在统计数据上的相关性。


This evidence echoes similar findings in other countries.	该证据与其他国家研究都得出了相似的结论。


My statements were also motivated by problems with the way capital punishment is imposed in India.	印度死刑执行方式存在的问题也促使我发表了这份声明。


The Supreme Court has declared that the death penalty should be applied only in the “rarest of the rare” cases.	最高法院宣布适用死刑的案件应遵循“罕见中的罕见”的原则。


And, indeed, the last three executions in the country stemmed from terrorist offenses that threatened or took a large number of lives.	事实上，印度最近三起实际执行的死刑均源于威胁或夺走大量民众生命的恐怖袭击。


But the decision to impose capital punishment remains highly subjective.	但死刑判决依然充斥着主观因素。


Indeed, whether the death penalty is meted out depends on a number of variables, beginning with judicial and social biases.	事实上，是否适用死刑取决于包括司法和社会偏见在内的若干变量。


Public outrage – potentially fueled by inflammatory media coverage – can push for a harsher sentence, especially in cases relating to terrorism or crimes against women.	公众愤怒——可能因煽动性的媒体报导而火上浇油——尤其在与恐怖或女性犯罪相关的案例中很有可能导致严判。


Economic status also comes into play, with poor criminals being executed much more often than wealthy ones, not least because they cannot afford high-quality legal representation.	经济状况也同样发挥作用，犯罪的穷人由于请不起高质量律师等原因被判死刑的概率比富人大得多。


And the president’s decision to commute a sentence is subjective.	总统减刑决策也充满了主观因素。


A 1983 case held that one way to determine whether a crime meets the “rarest of the rare” requirement is whether the community’s “collective conscience” has been “so shocked” that it expects those wielding judicial power to inflict the death penalty, regardless of their personal opinions.	1983年的一个案例表明衡量犯罪行为是否符合“罕见中的罕见”的标准是看它能否“震撼”社会的“集体良知”，乃至普通民众期待那些司法权的执掌者无论个人同意与否均判处死刑。


This leaves much room for the arbitrary and disproportionate application of capital punishment.	由此可能导致武断和不成比例的适用死刑。


From 2010 to 2013, 436 death sentences were handed down by lower courts.	2010到2013年间地方法院共做出436起死刑判决。


Of those, 280 were commuted to life imprisonment, with many of the other cases likely to remain in limbo for decades.	其中280起被改判无期，余下不少案件还要在狱中拖上几十年。


As for the death sentences that have already been carried out – two in that four-year period – it is impossible to ascertain the objective criteria that made the crimes in question more heinous or “rarer” than those that did not merit execution.	至于已经实际执行的死刑——四年中总共执行了两起——按照客观标准确定相关犯罪比那些没有执行死刑的犯罪更加“罕见”或令人发指几乎没有可能。


Ambiguity and subjectivity have no place in matters of life and death.	在事关生死的问题上容不得模糊和主观性。


Yet, when it comes to the imposition of capital punishment, both are prominent.	但在适用死刑的问题上，这两个因素都十分突出。


That makes it all the more difficult to justify the practice.	因此死刑的正确性更加难以证明。


Just a couple of weeks before Memon’s execution, India’s Law Commission, a government body composed of retired judges and legal experts that works for legal reform, organized consultations to assess the effectiveness of the provisions governing the death penalty in India and the purpose of the penalty itself.	就在梅蒙行刑前几个星期，由负责司法改革的退休法官和法律专家组成的政府机构印度法律委员会组织了针对印度死刑条款及死刑本身目的的有效性评估。


Unsurprisingly, based on the evidence and the opinions presented at the Law Commission’s hearings, there was a general consensus that the courts are unable to adopt a fair and non-discriminatory approach to the death penalty, and support for its abolition was overwhelming.	不出所料，基于法律委员会听证会上提交的证据和意见，与会人士普遍认为法院无法以公平和非歧视性的态度来对待死刑，同时一边倒地支持废除死刑。


That will not happen any time soon.	但近期还不可能废除死刑。


The Indian public overwhelmingly supports the death penalty, especially for convicted terrorists.	印度民众一边倒地支持死刑，特别是对已经定罪的恐怖分子。


The debate over Memon’s hanging was often emotional, with media interviewing survivors of the Mumbai blasts.	就梅蒙绞刑的争论往往充斥着感情色彩，比如媒体采访孟买爆炸案的幸存者。


Moreover, it has been suggested that the alternative to the death penalty – life imprisonment – would make India vulnerable to hijackings and other assaults by terrorist groups attempting to free their jailed comrades.	此外，有人提出替代死刑的无期徒刑会导致企图营救其被囚同志的恐怖团体在印度组织劫机和其他袭击活动。


In the face of such security concerns, my argument that taking a human life is wrong, and that the state should not compound criminal wrongdoing with its own, found little resonance.	面对如此的安全问题，我所提出的不应剥夺人类生命和国家不应以暴制暴的观点几乎很少有人赞成。


Globally, India is part of a dwindling minority.	全球范围内，印度属于仍在不断缩减的少数派范畴。


More than 130 countries have abolished the death penalty.	130多个国家已经废除了死刑。


Twenty-five countries have it on the books, but have not executed anyone for decades.	25个国家仍有相关规定，但已经几十年没有执行过任何死刑。


That leaves roughly 30 countries that still apply it.	只剩下30多个国家仍旧适用死刑。


India’s membership in this group has international repercussions; for example, European Union countries will not extradite criminals to countries where they may face execution.	印度在死刑问题上的立场能够引发国际反应； 比方说，欧盟国家拒绝向仍旧执行死刑的国家引渡犯罪分子。


But the real problem is deeper: capital punishment is, at its core, about nothing more than retribution.	但真正的问题可能层次更深：死刑从本质上来讲不过是一种报复。


It may be tempting to declare that anyone who kills (or participates in killing) innocent people does not deserve to live.	宣传任何杀人（或参与杀人）的人都不配活下去可能非常诱人。


But is revenge a worthy motive for a state’s actions, especially toward its own citizens?	但复仇是不是国家行动的有效动机，特别当面对的是自己的公民？


India’s greatest son Mahatma Gandhi observed that “an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.”	印度最伟大的儿子甘地认识到“以眼还眼会使全世界都变成盲人。


For now, India remains blind to the case for abolishing the death penalty.	”现在，印度仍不愿关注废除死刑。


One day, I am sure, it will see the light.	但我相信有一天我们会看到光明。


Until then, the lonely battle for its abolition must continue.	在那一天到来之前，我还要继续孤独地争取废除死刑。


Debating Defense	事关防御的辩论


BRUSSELS – The Haitian earthquake has made two things horrifically clear: security challenges are not only man-made, and military forces are often a vital part of humanitarian aid. This is a timely reminder, because security and defense are now the focus of a major debate within both NATO and the European Union.	发自布鲁塞尔 —— 海地大地震向我们明明白白地揭示了两个事实：一，安全问题不光是人为的，二，军队通常是人道救援的一个必不可少的部分。 这是一个及时的提醒，因为安全和防御目前正是北约和欧盟内部讨论的一个主要问题。


Generals, it is said, always prepare to fight the last war – an old jibe, but one that contains an element of truth.	据说那些将军们经常都在为最后一仗作准备 —— 这句老谚语还是包含了一点深刻含义的。


Indeed, flexibility does not come naturally to armed forces, with the result that the two decades since the end of the Cold War have seen only slow adaptation to the military’s evolving roles.	事实上，军队天然地不具有灵活性，冷战已经过去了 20 年，军队也只是缓慢地在适应自己不断发展的角色而已。


But NATO’s priorities this year include a sweeping review of its own strategic purpose, something the alliance has not questioned since 1999, while the EU continues to struggle towards its goal of forging a European defense policy worthy of the name.	但今年北约优先要考虑的则是对自身战略目的的大刀阔斧的检讨，这是自 1999 年以来联盟从未质疑过的事情，而欧盟则在挣扎着实现自己构建一个名副其实的欧洲防御政策的目标。


In both cases, there are more questions than answers.	在这两方面，所遇到的问题都比解决方案要多。


To begin with, what is meant by security?	首先，所谓的安全究竟是什么？


Does it refer to the geopolitics of international relations, or to protecting society against terrorist attacks?	安全是否跟地缘政治或者是国际关系有关，还是保护社会不受恐怖袭击的伤害？


It is both, of course, but the sort of policies that will achieve these two very different objectives is far from clear.	当然这两者都有，但要制定出能实现这两样截然不同目标的政策的前景远远还没有明朗。


How America and Europe should engage with governments around the world will be crucially important in the coming years.	美国和欧洲将如何与全世界政府打交道将是未来几年中一个非常重要的问题。


In addition to issues like climate change, there is also a sense that other players are flexing their muscles.	此外还有比如气候变化一类的问题，必须意识到还有其他的一些国家正在摩拳擦掌。


Is the comparatively new Shanghai Cooperation Organization a flimsy grouping of China, Russia, and the Central Asian countries, or is it shaping up to be a new global defense and security player whose existence will have serious implications for the West?	一个相对更新的上海合作组织究竟只是中国，俄罗斯和中亚国家之间软弱无力的联盟，还是一个新的全球防御和安全参与者，而且这个参与者的存在将对西方有严重的影响？


Does the birth of the G-20 strengthen the Atlantic security relationship, or does it contain the seeds of NATO’s eventual demise?	而 G20 集团的催生是否强化了大西洋安全关系，还是将导致北约的最终消亡？


Indeed, does the West’s security thinking reflect the realities of a world which within two generations will number some nine billion people?	事实上，西方的安全思维是否反映了一个即将在 20 年内人口达到 90 亿的世界的现实状况？


Right now, the future of Western security is being shaped by tensions within the Atlantic relationship.	目前，西方安全的未来是由大西洋联盟内部的紧张关系所塑造的。


There is really no consensus on whether Afghanistan is a “winnable” war, and whether the Bush administration’s “war on terror” set the West on a long-term course that may prove comparable in scale to the Cold War.	对于阿富汗战争是否是“可以获胜的”，小布什的“反恐战争”是否将西方拖入了一个堪与冷战相比的长期进程中，联盟内部各方都缺乏一个共识，


Indeed, many Europeans wonder whether American leadership in Afghanistan and elsewhere is the solution or the problem.	而事实上，许多欧洲人都在寻思是否美国在阿富汗和其他地区的领导地位是否就是问题的解决方法。


There is probably even less agreement in both the United States and the EU on whether the security of citizens is genuinely at stake in Afghanistan, and whether the Iranian nuclear program really poses a threat to the West.	而在平民安全是否与阿富汗战争根本相关，或者伊朗核项目是否真的对西方构成威胁等方面，美国和欧盟的共识则可能更加少。


It is not that easy for Europeans to set the future security agenda when their credibility on defense matters leaves so much to be desired.	对于欧洲人来说，当自己在安全事务方面的可靠性在许多方面都未能得到满足的时候，自然很难去设定未来的安全议程。


Of the two million men and women in EU countries’ armed forces, only 2% are combat ready.	在欧盟国家 200 万的男女军人中，只有 2% 是做好了战斗准备的。


The jury is still out on whether the European Security and Defense Policy has significantly improved the EU’s military capabilities and outreach.	也依然难以判断欧洲安全和防御政策是否真的极大提高了欧盟的军事实力和力量延伸。


Some argue that Europe needs to follow the example of its agricultural policy and introduce a CAP-style defense budget so that free-rider EU countries start to pay their way.	有些人提出欧洲应当参照自己的农业政策，引入一个类似共同农业政策这样的防御预算，让那些搭便车的欧洲国家也负起责任来。


There is also criticism that Brussels still has not done enough to persuade or even force EU governments to open up their military procurement to one another.	也有批评说布鲁塞尔没有作出足够的努力去说服或者强迫欧盟国家去向其他国家开放军备采购。


European governments have resisted genuine opening of their national defense markets for a host of reasons, including an obsession with meeting national defense requirements, concerns over sovereignty, and a desire to protect jobs and local high-technology capabilities.	欧盟各国都有一连串理由来反对完全放开本国的军备防御市场，包括对自身国土防御需要的迷惘，对国家主权的考虑，以及保护本国就业和当地高科技生产能力的考虑。


So where do we go from here?	那么我们从此将走向何处？


A dozen international think tanks are organizing a worldwide on-line debate, to be held from February 4-9, in association with NATO, the European Commission, and several governments.	一批国际智库正连同北约，欧盟委员会和几个国家的政府一道，组织一场在线讨论，时间定在 2 月 4 日 ~9 日。


The debate will be open not just to defense experts, but also to non-governmental organizations, development specialists, and anyone with views on where global security thinking should be headed.	而这场一讨论将不仅对防御专家开放，也对非政府组织，发展问题专家���以及任何对全球安全思维走向有想法的人开放


The five-day Internet debate will include 10 topics, ranging from human rights to piracy, from crisis preparedness to climate change, and from development to conflict prevention.	这场持续 5 天的网上讨论将包含 10 个主题，从人权到海盗问题，危机准备，气候变化，发展以及冲突防止问题。


Discussion will be sparked by on-line appearances by top military, political, and civil-society leaders, who will debate with participants.	讨论将由高级军事领导人，政治家以及公民社会的领导人在线发起，而这些也将与参与者展开辩论。


Anyone interested in taking part can log on from anywhere in the world to pose questions or comment on what is being said, but they need first to sign up at www.securityjam.org .	任何有兴趣参加的人都可以在世界各地针对会上的言论发表自己的问题和评论，但必须首先在 www. securityjam.


It is encouraging to see that many thousands are indeed getting involved, because without popular engagement, security will remain undefined, and the important reforms that are needed will lack political legitimacy.	看到成千上万的人参与这场辩论是一个振奋人心的事情，因为如果没有大众的参与，安全就是难以界定的问题，而那些迫在眉睫的重要改革也会缺乏政治合法性。


Debt and America’s Decline	债务以及美国的衰落


MILAN – Italians and other Europeans have serious problems addressing their own national debts, public and private, so it may seem immodest for a European to discuss America’s growing and grave debt problem.	发自米兰——意大利以及其他欧洲国家都在处理本国公/私债务方面面临着严重问题，因此让身为一个欧洲人的我来谈论美国不断加剧的债务问题似乎有点不太厚道。


But the fiscal realities on both sides of the Atlantic nowadays are very similar, and only lingering trust in the promise of America keeps alive the expectation among some Europeans that some grand American coup de théâtrewill resolve the country’s dire debt situation.	但如今大西洋两岸的财政困境其实异常相似，摇摇欲坠，在许多欧洲人看来，只能寄望于美国能够做出某些惊世之举，戏剧性地解决自身的债务问题了。


Of course, many Americans recognize the scale of the country’s debt burden.	毫无疑问，许多美国人都意识到自己的国家已经债台高筑。


Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus America’s highest ranking military officer, recently said, “The greatest danger to American security comes from the national debt.”	美国参谋长联席会议主席（也就是美军官阶最高的人物）迈克尔·马伦上将最近就放言称：“美国最大的安全威胁就是国家负债。


Four Americans out of ten agree with him, whereas less than three in ten deem terrorism or Iran more dangerous.	”而10个美国人里大概有5个会同意他的说法，只有不到3个认为恐怖主义或伊朗才是头号敌人。


America’s Great Power status has always been tied to its level of debt.	美国的世界霸主地位其实一直都跟它的债务水平密切相关。


Indeed, it was the absence of debt that marked the United States’ emergence as a world power between 1914 and 1917.	事实上，正是1914~1917年间零负债的状况确立了美国的崛起。


The US went from owing $3 billion (mostly to Great Britain) to being a net creditor for about the same amount, thanks to $6 billion in war credits given to the Western Allies.	在向西方盟友发放了60亿美元战争贷款之后，当时的美国由欠债30亿美元（大部分欠英国）的穷亲戚摇身一变成为手握30亿美元净债权的大财主。


A further $3 billion in credits for European post-war reconstruction cemented America’s status as the world’s premier creditor nation, with its surplus equal to roughly 8% of GNP at the time.	随后支持欧洲重建的30亿美元贷款进一步巩固了美国世界第一大债权人的地位，而当时美国的债权额几乎相当于其国民生产总值的8%。


This shift meant that the US had essentially replaced Britain as the heart of the world’s financial and monetary system.	这一转变意味着美国已经取代英国成为世界金融和货币体系的核心。


Previously, thanks to the gold standard and Britain’s political stability, the City of London had been the world’s key source of capital and financial guarantees for more than a century.	在此之前，在金本位和国内稳定政治局面的双重支撑下，伦敦市已经在超过100年的时间内承担着世界资本和金融担保的核心角色。


The new era began suddenly in January 1915, when, after a few months of deep uncertainty, gold started to be shipped to New York in increasing quantities.	这个新时代是在1915年1月突然开启的，当时某种不确定的局面已经持续了数月，然后越来越多的黄金开始被运往纽约。


A few months earlier, the veteran Boston financier Henry Lee Higginson had sketched in a letter to President Woodrow Wilson what America’s new strategy should be.	而就在几个月之前，波士顿金融界大佬亨利·李·希金森就已经在一封给总统伍德罗·威尔逊的信中勾勒出了美国的新战略。


“This is our chance to take first place,” he wrote.	“我们抢占世界第一的机会来了，”他在信中这样写道。


America’s financial house had to be put in order, all debts repaid, and, as London had done for a long time, confidence had to be maintained, which meant guaranteeing the dollar’s convertibility into gold.	所有美国金融机构必须按规矩行事，还要还清所有债务，此外，正如伦敦长期以来一直在做的那样，必须维持市场的信心，这就意味着必须保证美元能和黄金自由兑换。


Alone among the world’s great nations, the US did manage to guarantee dollar convertibility throughout the Great War.	在一战期间，美国是列强中唯一一个能保证其货币和黄金之间自由兑换的国家。


With peace, the dollar and Wall Street became the dominant force on the world’s financial landscape.	而在和平到来之时，美元和华尔街也就一跃成为世界金融版图中的霸主。


The financial-market rules established after 1933 by President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal enabled the dollar to replace the British pound at the center of the international system.	在1993年后由美国总统富兰克林·罗斯福的“新政”所确立的金融市场管理规则，则令美元得以取代英镑成为国际金融系统的核心。


America’s role as the world’s banker went unchallenged for the next 40 years ago, until President Richard Nixon decoupled the dollar from gold.	在随后40年间，没有人能挑战美国作为世界银行家的地位，直到理查德·尼克松将美元与黄金脱钩之后。


Yet, even without the gold standard, America’s economic might, together with the recycling of petrodollars, kept the dollar on top.	但即便没有了金本位制度，美国的经济实力（加上对石油美元的再循环利用）依然将美元维持在世界之巅。


Indeed, the US remained the world’s premier creditor nation until 1986-1987, when it became a debtor nation again.	事实上，美国在1986~1987年财政年度之前依然是世界第一大债权国，但随后就变成了债务国。


In the two decades that followed, America’s debt usually was around $3 trillion, rising or falling with the exchange rate of the dollar.	在接着的20年间，美国的债务总额通常维持在3万亿美元左右，并随着美元汇率的升跌而增减变化。


Starting in 1990, the US began to import more and more capital, particularly from Asia.	然而从1990年开始，美国开始引入越来越多的资本，其中大多数来自亚洲。


In the 2000’s, China became the prime source of debt financing, and Americans were happy, because it enabled the US Federal Reserve to keep interest rates low.	21世纪到来之后中国成为美国债务融资的最大来源国，而美国人对此也乐此不疲，因为这令美联储得以维持一个较低的利率。


There were some who foresaw danger.	不过有些人却从中看到了危机。


The Swedish economist Axel Leijonhufvud foresaw asset-price inflation – houses in particular – and a worsening of credit quality.	瑞典经济学家阿克谢尔·莱永胡夫预见了资产价格膨胀——尤其是在房地产方面——以及信贷质量的进一步恶化。


Financial innovation soon made that prediction come true.	很快金融创新就让这些预言变成了现实。


It is enough to remember that in 2008 there were only 12 public companies in the world with AAA credit ratings, but more than 60,000 – mostly American – triple-A structured financial products.	2008年是值得铭记的一年，当年只有区区12家上市公司能获得AAA级信用评级，却有超过6000个（大多数来自美国）被评定为AAA级的金融产品。


The US, the world’s banker, had mutated into the world’s hedge fund.	而美国这个世界银行家也蜕变成为了一个世界级的对冲基金。


With that change, the banker’s traditional imperative to maintain fidelity and trust – to “keep faith,” as Higginson put it – was forgotten.	在这些转变的影响之下，银行家传统的忠诚和信誉——“守信”——被抛到了九霄云外。


And it is in America’s public debt that the debris of its financial system’s broken promises are collected, just as Italy’s massive public debt reflects its past national prodigality.	如今美国金融系统那些无法兑现的承诺通通都集中到了国家的公共债务之上，正如意大利的庞大政府债务体现了其过去的挥霍无度那样。


The figures for the US are staggering.	美国的债务总额令人震惊。


Public debt includes not only the federal government’s current $13.2 trillion, but another $3 trillion owed by America’s states, counties, and cities.	其公共债务不仅包含了联邦政府的13.


In addition, there is the $3.9 trillion in debt owed by America’s government-backed housing-finance agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others), which currently underwrite more than 90% of all US mortgages.	2万亿美元债务，还包含了由国内各州以及各县市所欠下的3万亿美元，此外还要加上那些有美国政府背景的房屋信贷机构（房地美，房利美等）的3. 9万亿美元欠款——这些机构目前承担了全美超过90%的抵押贷款。


As a result, America’s public debt has reached roughly 140% of GDP.	把上述数字都加在一起之后，美国的公共债务总额几乎等于其GDP的140%


The US Congress is well aware of what these numbers portend, but its members have chosen to avert their eyes.	虽然美国国会很清楚这些数字究竟在警告着什么，但那些议员们却选择睁一只眼闭一只眼。


Indeed, the president is no longer required to provide the usual five-year forecast of the country’s fiscal position. A one-year perspective is now deemed sufficient.	事实上，议会也不再要求总统提供对未来5年财政状况的常规预测，只需提交未来一年的展望就可以了。


So, where does that leave the world economy?	那么世界经济究竟该往何处去？


There is no newly emerging Great Power that can assume responsibility for global finance, as there was in 1914.	至今还没有一个新崛起的世界强权能像1914年的美国那样承担起全球财政的重任。


Back then, Wall Street was ready for the job.	当时的华尔街已经蓄势待发。


Someday, Shanghai and Hong Kong might be ready, but that possibility is of little help now.	而在未来的某些时候，上海和香港可能会成为接班人，但这种可能性对当今的状况来说，只能是杯水车薪。


Debt and Democracy	债务与民主


PRINCETON – The European Union’s sovereign-debt crisis constitutes a fundamental threat not only to the euro, but also to democracy and public accountability.	发自普林斯顿——欧盟的主权债务危机不但从根本上动摇了欧元，还损害了其民主制度以及政府公信力。


At the moment, Europe’s woes and dilemmas are confined to relatively small countries like Greece, Ireland, and Hungary.	虽然当前欧洲的苦难和踌躇还仅限于希腊，爱尔兰和匈牙利这样的小国。


But all of them look as if their governments have cheated on fundamental articles of the democratic contract.	但这几个国家的政府似乎都违背了民主契约中的一系列基本信条。


The rotating presidency of the EU is about to shed a spotlight on one of these countries.	而欧盟轮值主席制度则将人们的注意力引向了其中一个国度。


Hungary’s turn at the EU helm comes at a time of fierce debate over Prime Minister Victor Orbán’s alteration of constitutional law and suppression of press freedom, as well as a new round of worries about the country’s financial sustainability.	匈牙利即将执掌欧盟大权，而对该国总理维克托·奥尔班篡改宪法镇压媒体的讨论却日趋激烈，同时还夹杂着人们对该国金融稳定性的再度忧虑。


Hungary has many reasons to be sensitive to the issue of the political consequences of debt.	匈牙利有足够的理由为债务的政治后果感到担心。


After all, Hungary still holds the world record for hyperinflation, with the currency debased by 1027 in the 1940’s, paving the way for the imposition of Communist dictatorship.	须知这个国家依然保持着恶性通货膨胀的世界纪录——1940年代该国货币竟然贬值了1027倍，直接导致了共产主义独裁政权的上台。


The EU’s debt arithmetic is uncertain and precarious.	欧盟的债务计算方式既模糊不清又不可靠。


Fiscal consolidation in the Mediterranean countries might just do the trick, and allow – at great cost – a return to normal financing arrangements.	地中海沿岸国家的财政巩固政策可能会成功，并在付出巨大代价的情况下恢复到正常的财政状况。


But if market nervousness persists and interest rates remain high relative to rates for secure German debt, the debt burden will rapidly become unsustainable.	但如果市场依旧过度焦虑，而现行利率持续高于稳定安全的德国国债利率的话，各国的债务负担状况将迅速恶化。


So it might be a good idea for the EU to prepare a mechanism that spells out how debt can be trimmed.	因此欧盟应当对此有所准备并设立一个削减债务的机制。


Many economists have argued this case on the basis of arithmetic calculation.	许多经济体都在计算方式上对这一机制提出了自己的意见。


But the European Central Bank, notably by ECB board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, has elegantly spelled out the case against debt reduction – a case that is politically significant and deeply moral.	但欧洲中央银行，尤其是其董事会成员洛伦佐·比尼·斯马吉，则直截了当地否定了该机制——因为该机制在政治和道德上都存在极为重大的影响。


Indeed, the principle of not reneging on public debt is deeply intertwined with the development of legal security, representative government, and modern democracy.	事实上，在公共债务上不能赖账的原则早已和法律保障，代议制政府以及现代民主的发展深深地交织在了一起。


In the wake of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when Britain revolted against the spendthrift Stuart dynasty, the British government adopted a new approach to debt. Voting on budgets in Parliament – a representative institution – ensured that the people as a whole were liable for the obligations incurred by their government.	自从1688年英国人民发动光荣革命奋起反抗挥霍无度的斯图亚特王室之后，英国政府就采用了一套新的债务制度：在议会（代议制机构）投票通过预算，以确保人民作为一个整体对政府支出负责。


A constitutional approach limited the scope for wasteful spending on luxurious court life (and on military adventure), which had been the hallmark of early modern autocratic monarchy.	这是一种限制早期专制王朝奢侈宫廷消费（或者军事行动）的宪政手段。


The lesson of 1688 was reinforced by the next European revolutionary wave.	而光荣革命的经验在随后的欧洲革命浪潮中进一步得到推广。


In the aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleon, France was heavily in debt, and the revolutionary regimes had discredited themselves through paper-currency (assignat) inflation.	法国大革命和拿破仑统治使法国政府负债累累，而革命政权则在滥发纸币——指券（assignat），流通于法国大革命期间的一种以没收的土地为担保的证券，后当作货币使用——的过程中丧失了自己的信用。


After the Congress of Vienna returned King Louis XVIII to the French throne, his advisers debated whether or not to recognize the debt incurred by Napoleon. The decision not to default contributed to the legal security needed for the French economy to catch up with Britain’s industrial revolution.	在维也纳会议拥戴路易十八复辟之后，皇帝的幕僚们在是否承认拿破仑所欠下的债务方面进行了讨论，而最终承担债务的决定为法国经济提供了急需的法律保障，使其能赶上英国工业革命的脚步。


The experience of wartime inflations and de facto defaults in the twentieth century made the theme of responsible finance a crucial part of a new European consensus.	20世纪的战时通货膨胀以及实质性赖账的经验使负责任的财政成为新欧洲共识的一个重要主题。


A foundation of the European integration process was recognition of the importance of a stable currency to political legitimacy.	而欧洲一体化进程的其中一个基础就是承认一个拥有政治合法性的稳定货币的重要性。


Indeed, the EU’s critical French-German axis was held together by the conviction that political order in a democracy depended on the security of debt.	事实上，欧盟的法德轴心就是源自于这样一个信条：民主政体的政治秩序必须在确保政府债务安全性的情况下才能实现。


In Germany, the expropriation of two generations of middle-class bond holders was seen as the outcome of the Kaiser’s war, and then of Hitler’s war – in other words, a result of democratic failure.	在德国，对两代中产阶级债券持有人的剥夺被看作是德国皇帝战争以及随后希特勒战争所导致的恶果——换言之，这意味着民主制度的失败。


After inflation and unstable government, Charles de Gaulle rebuilt the French political system, but also the idea of the French nation, by championing currency stability.	在经历了通货膨胀和政府不稳定之后，夏尔·戴高乐重建了法国政治系统以及法国的国家理念，将货币稳定性奉为政府的首要责任。


He explicitly went back to the legacy of Napoleon, and argued that France could be stable only with a strong currency.	他完全继承了拿破仑的政治遗产，认为只有一个强势的货币才能确保国家稳定。


The financial revolution that swept the world over the last two decades seemed to sever the link between representative government and public finance.	但在过去20年间席卷了全世界的金融革命似乎切断了代议制政府和公共财政之间的联系。


Derivatives and other complex financial instruments seemed to offer a way to circumvent citizens’ responsibility for expenditure to which they had consented.	金融衍生物以及其他复杂金融工具则提供了一条路径，让政府得以绕过公民的批准来进行消费。


In other words, modern government finance had come to resemble sub-prime mortgages, which created the illusion of universal home ownership; rules and limits no longer applied.	换言之，现代政府财政已经变得类似于某种次级贷款，不但产生了一种全球共同分担债务的幻像； 规章限制也不再适用。


Countries could practice generosity on the never never.	各国政府可以肆意消费却无需偿还。


The apparently hard rules of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty and its Growth and Stability Pact, which impose a 3%-of-GDP ceiling on fiscal deficits and 60% on government debt, encouraged ingenious accounting to shift expenditure for purely cosmetic purposes.	欧盟《马斯特里赫特条约》及其《稳定与增长公约》严格规定政府财政赤字不能超过GDP的3%，政府负债不能超过GDP的60%，而各国为了达到这一标准，往往利用会计制度的漏洞来转移多余的支出。


The financial revolution went in parallel with the effective disenfranchisement of Europeans.	跟金融革命同时发生的还有对欧洲人选举权的有效剥夺。


For the past 20 years, it looked as if power was being shifted to a technocratic elite.	在过去20年以来，权力似乎已被转移到了技术精英手中。


Behind-the-scenes accounting tricks were accompanied by behind-the-scenes political tricks.	偷偷摸摸的会计伎俩与见不得光的政治阴谋相结合。


Citizens, unsurprisingly, complained about the declining legitimacy of EU institutions.	而公民们则不出意外地抱怨欧盟机构合法性的衰落。


Similarly, in guaranteeing the debt of Irish banks in September 2008, the Irish government did something that no responsible government should have contemplated.	同样，为了担保2008年9月爱尔兰银行所负的债务，爱尔兰政府做出了一些任何负责任政府都不可能考虑的举动。


It took responsibility for obligations that amounted to a multiple of Ireland’s national income, driving up government debt to more than 1,300% of GDP.	政府承担了超出爱尔兰国民收入许多倍的债务，以致政府负债上升到GDP总额的1300%。


Prime Minister Brian Cowen, who still defends this action, is likely to be massively punished in the next elections.	而至今仍在为这一举动辩护的总理布赖恩·考恩势必将在下一次选举中遭到严厉惩罚。


But Cowen’s actions were symptomatic of a broader failure: the fundamental link between the liability of citizens and taxpayers and the responsibilities of government had been broken.	但考恩的行为其实是一场更大失败的预兆：公民和纳税人的义务与政府责任之间的纽带已经彻底断裂了。


The idea of shifting some part of EU members’ existing government debt to a European bond may be technically appealing, but it will work only if there is a return to the British principles of 1688 (or the principles of the American Revolution).	将一部分欧盟成员国现有债务转化为欧盟债券的想法或许在技术上是可行的，但只有在回复到1688年的英国原则（或者美国革命的原则）之后才能真正发挥其效用。


Taxpayers across the EU must have the sense that they control what they owe – and that they will not be held responsible for the mistakes and frauds of the unholy alliance between irresponsible finance and irresponsible government.	欧盟的纳税人必须明白自己只能为自己控制之下的债务负责——而不应为那些不负责任的金融界和不负责任的政府之间的邪恶同盟所造下的罪孽负责。


Debt, Dictatorship, and Democratization	{0\u003eDebt, Dictatorship, and Democratization\u003c}0{\u003e债务、独裁和民主化\u003c0}


NEW YORK – After Saddam Hussein’s fall, the United States successfully pressed creditors to write off much of Iraq’s external debt.	{0>NEW YORK – After Saddam Hussein’s fall, the United States successfully pressed creditors to write off much of Iraq’s external debt. <}0{>纽约——萨达姆·侯赛因倒台后，美国成功迫使债主免除了伊拉克绝大部分外债。


Senior American officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, later President of the World Bank, argued that the Iraqi people should not be saddled with obligations that the dictator contracted in order to enrich himself and oppress his subjects.	<0} {0>Senior American officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, later President of the World Bank, argued that the Iraqi people should not be saddled with 背负obligations that the dictator contracted in order to enrich himself and oppress his subjects臣民. <}0{>后任世行行长的保罗·沃尔福威茨等美国高官提出伊拉克民众不应负担独裁者为塞满腰包和压迫臣民欠下的债务。


Citing a long-standing doctrine in international law, advocates of a write-off claimed that Iraq’s debt was “odious.”	<0} {0>Citing a long-standing doctrine in international law, advocates of a write-off claimed that Iraq’s debt was “odious. ”可憎的 As a result, the creditors were no longer protected under global legal rules.


As a result, the creditors were no longer protected under global legal rules.	<}0{>免债鼓吹者们援引长期形成的国际法理论，宣称伊拉克债务是“可憎”的。 因此，债主们不再受到国际法律规则的保护。


As political change again sweeps across the Middle East, the issue of odious debt is back.	{0>As political change again sweeps across the Middle East, the issue of odious debt is back. <}0{>随着政治变革的浪潮再次席卷中东，“可憎债务”问题又一次引发人们的关注。


But all debt that was contracted by a previous oppressive regime cannot, for that reason alone, be classified as “odious.”	<0} {0>But all debt that was contracted by a previous oppressive regime cannot, for that reason alone, be classified as “odious. ”<}0{>但仅仅出于以上原因，不能将之前的压迫政权所欠下的所有债务全部划归“可憎债务”范畴。


The question is this: how much of the money went to meritorious development projects, and how much went instead to prop up the regime and line its leaders’ pockets?	<0} {0>The question is this:<}0{>问题在于：<0} {0>how much of the money went to meritorious值得赞赏的 development projects, and how much went instead to prop up扶持 the regime and line its leaders’ pockets? <}0{>这笔资金有多少用于值得称道的开发项目，又有多少用于扶持独裁政权，流进了独裁领袖的腰包？


In the case of Egypt, for example, Minister of Economic Cooperation Faiza Abu al-Naga suggested in January that Mubarak himself was directing the country’s foreign-loan policy and “oversee[ing] the entire process.”	{0>In the case of Egypt, for example, Minister of Economic Cooperation 经济合作部长Faiza Abu al-Naga suggested in January that Mubarak himself was directing the country’s foreign-loan policy and “oversee[ing] the entire process. ”<}0{>比如以埃及为例，经济合作部长法伊扎·阿布·娜佳曾在1月表示，制定国内外国贷款政策并“监督整个过程”的工作由穆巴拉克亲自负责。


Even if true, there may be nothing legally wrong with such an arrangement.	<0} {0>Even if true, there may be nothing legally wrong with such an arrangement. <}0{>就算事实果真如此，这样的安排在法律上也无可指责。


After all, lending and aid to Egypt by the US and other Western powers have long been entangled with geopolitics, and using the tools of finance to back a loyal ally in an unstable region is not odious or illegitimate per se.	<0} {0>After all, lending and aid to Egypt by the US and other Western powers have long been entangled with geopolitics, and using the tools of finance to back a loyal ally in an unstable region is not odious 可恶or illegitimate per se本身. <}0{>归根结底，美国和其他西方大国对埃及的借款和援助一直就和地缘政治搅在一起，利用金融工具支持动荡地区的忠诚盟友本身不能算是可恶或者非法。


But, to the extent that the funds contributed to internal repression, or to the personal enrichment of the regime’s leaders, lenders may bear some responsibility, at least for relieving taxpayers of the burden of debt contracted against, or with indifference towards, their interests.	{0>But, to the extent that以…为限 the funds contributed to internal repression, or to the personal enrichment of the regime’s leaders, lenders may bear some responsibility, at least for relieving taxpayers of the burden of debt contracted against, or with indifference towards, their interests. <}0{>可是，如果这笔资金用于国内压迫或流入到独裁领袖个人的腰包，那么借款人就需要承担一定的责任，至少应保证纳税人免于偿还损害或无视其自身利益的债务。


This responsibility cannot be absolute or unlimited, however, and should be confined to situations where lenders were aware (or should have been aware) that the funds might be used for corrupt or oppressive ends.	<0} {0>This responsibility cannot be absolute or unlimited, however, and should be confined to situations where lenders were aware (or should have been aware) that the funds might be used for corrupt or oppressive ends. <}0{>这种责任不是绝对或无限的，只有当借款人了解（或应当了解）自己的资金可能用于腐败或压迫目的的情况下才应承担这种责任。


The bulk of Egypt’s estimated $35-$37 billion in external debt is owed to official (governmental) creditors and multilateral and regional development institutions.	{0>The bulk of Egypt’s estimated $35-$37 billion in external debt is owed to official (governmental) creditors and multilateral and regional development institutions. <}0{>埃及约合350－370亿美元的外债多数来源于官方（政府）债主和多边及地区发展机构。


At the same time that the World Bank publicly described Egypt as one of the region’s most corrupt countries, its own International Finance Corporation maintained Egypt as a leading customer.	<0} {0>At the same time that the World Bank publicly described Egypt as one of the region’s most corrupt countries, its own International Finance Corporation国际金融公司 maintained Egypt as a leading customer. <}0{>世界银行公开将埃及称为区域内最腐败的国家，但与此同时，世行下属的国际金融公司仍然把埃及当作最主要的客户。


Likewise, Tunisia’s foreign borrowing increased significantly in recent years, even as perceived corruption, as measured by Transparency International, worsened significantly.	{0>Likewise, Tunisia’s foreign borrowing increased significantly in recent years, even as perceived corruption腐败程度, as measured by Transparency International透明国际, worsened significantly. <}0{>无独有偶，突尼斯近来在对外借款大幅增长的同时，根据透明国际的测算，其腐败程度也大幅升高。


In both countries, a narrow elite managed and manipulated the economy for their own benefit, but found it easy to win praise from the international financial institutions whenever they made gestures toward liberalization.	<0} {0>In both countries, a narrow elite managed and manipulated the economy for their own benefit, but found it easy to win praise from the international financial institutions whenever they made gestures toward liberalization. <}0{>两国经济都由一小撮精英负责管理和操纵，他们在为自身牟利的同时，发现只要作出自由化的姿态就可以赢得国际金融机构的赞扬。


Debt relief will doubtless make it easier for new regimes to proceed with much-needed policies to create jobs, improve infrastructure, and develop human capital.	{0>Debt relief will doubtless make it easier for new regimes to proceed with much-needed policies to create jobs, improve infrastructure, and develop human capital人才资本. <}0{>债务减免无疑会降低新政府推行急需的创造就业、改善基础设施和开发人力资源政策的难度。


But the case for debt cancellation is fundamentally about transitional justice.	<0} {0>But the case事实 for debt cancellation is fundamentally about transitional justice转型正义. <}0{>但免除债务本质上属于过渡司法的内容。


The risk of a hasty bargain with creditors for debt forgiveness is that it could preclude a process of accountability for the past.	<0} {0>The risk of a hasty bargain with creditors for debt forgiveness is that it could preclude 妨碍a process of accountability for the past. <}100{>急急忙忙地和债主讨论债务豁免可能会妨碍对过去负责。


Instead, an independent commission should be established to examine the previous regime’s foreign-borrowing policy, its objectives and effects, and what lenders knew (or could reasonably be assumed to have known) about those objectives and effects.	{0>Instead, an independent commission should be established to examine the previous regime’s foreign-borrowing policy, its objectives and effects, and what lenders knew (or could reasonably be assumed to have known) about those objectives and effects. <}0{>相反，应当组建独立的委员会审视前政权的对外借贷政策，核实它们的目标和效果，以及借款人对上述目标和效果了解（或可以合理认定应该了解）些什么。


Such a commission should be composed largely of nationals who have broad public credibility, perhaps with a minority delegation of foreign experts.	{0>Such a commission should be composed largely of nationals who have broad public credibility广泛的公众信誉, perhaps with a minority delegation of foreign experts. <}0{>这样的审核委员会应当招募广受公众信任的国内知名人士，或许还要吸纳少量外国专家代表。


Its mandate should be not only to allocate responsibility for past decisions, but also to forge recommendations for transparent, accountable borrowing in the future.	<0} {0>Its mandate 权限should be not only to allocate responsibility for past decisions, but also to forge recommendations for transparent, accountable borrowing in the future. <}0{>它的权限不应仅局限在对已经作出的决策分清责任，还应对今后透明、负责任的借贷行为提出建议。


On the basis of such a commission’s findings, the new government should engage in discussions with its official creditors, including the international financial institutions.	<0}新政府应该{0>On the basis of such a commission’s findings, the new government should engage in discussions with its official creditors, including the international financial institutions. <}0{>根据上述委员会的审核结果与官方债主，包括国际金融机构进行谈判。


Critics of forgiving odious debt argue that it risks discouraging future lending to some developing countries, given the uncertainty of being repaid.	{0>Critics of forgiving odious debt argue that it risks discouraging future lending to some developing countries, given the uncertainty of being repaid. <}0{>批评者认为免除所谓的“可憎债务”可能导致将来债主因为债务偿还的不确定性而不愿向某些发展中国家放债。


But, where oppressive regimes are using foreign credit to postpone needed domestic political and economic reforms, that may be a good outcome.	<0} {0>But, where oppressive regimes are using foreign credit to postpone needed domestic political and economic reforms, that may be a good outcome. <}0{>但是，如果压迫政权利用外国贷款来延缓国内需要的政治和经济改革，不愿放债也许是一种好的结果。


At a minimum, creditors would have to examine more carefully those to whom they are lending, and where the money is really going.	{0>At a minimum, creditors would have to examine more carefully those to whom they are lending, and where the money is really going. <}0{>至少债主们不得不认真审核自己的借款对象，了解这笔资金真正的去处。


If creditors turn a blind eye to corruption and oppression, they should have to pay a price.	<0} {0>If creditors turn a blind eye to corruption and oppression, they should have to pay a price. <}0{>如果债主们对腐败和压迫视而不见，那么他们应该为此付出代价。


Managing Debt in an Overleveraged World	在一个过度杠杆的世界上管理负债


MILAN – What ever happened to deleveraging?	发自米兰——在去杠杆化的过程中都发生了些什么？


In the years since the 2008 global financial crisis, austerity and balance-sheet repair have been the watchwords of the global economy.	从2008年全球金融危机至今，紧缩和资产负债表修复一直是全球经济高喊的口号。


And yet today, more than ever, debt is fueling concern about growth prospects worldwide.	然而时至今日，债务却比以往任何时候都更加引发对全球增长前景的关注。


The McKinsey Global Institute, in a study of post-crisis debt trends, notes that gross debt has increased about $60 trillion – or 75% of global GDP – since 2008.	麦肯锡全球研究院一项针对危机后债务发展趋势的研究指出，自2008年以来全球债务总额增加了约60万亿美元——相当于全球GDP的75％。


China’s debt, for example, has increased fourfold since 2007, and its debt-to-GDP ratio is some 282% – higher than in many other major economies, including the United States.	比如中国的债务自2007年以来就增加了四倍，并且其债务/GDP比率高达282％——比包括美国在内的许多其他主要经济体都要高。


A global economy that is levering up, while unable to generate enough aggregate demand to achieve potential growth, is on a risky path.	一个杠杆率上升却无法产生足量总需求以实现潜在增长的全球经济相当危险的。


But to assess how risky, several factors must be considered.	但要评估风险有多大，就必须考虑下列几个因素。


First, one must consider the composition of the debt across sectors (household, government, non-financial corporate, and the financial sector).	首先，必须考虑各部门（家庭，政府，非金融企业，金融部门）的债务构成状况。


After all, distress in these sectors has very different effects on the broader economy.	毕竟，这些部门各自面临的债务压力对整体经济有着非常不同的影响。


As it turns out, economies with similar and relatively high levels of gross debt relative to GDP exhibit sharp differences when it comes to the composition of the debt.	事实证明，在债务构成的问题上那些总负债/GDP比率相近且相对较高的经济体会呈现出巨大差异。


Excessive household debt is particularly risky, because a shock in the price of assets (especially real estate) translates quickly into reduced consumption, as it weakens growth, employment, and investment. Recovery from such a shock is a long process.	过度家庭负债产生的风险尤其巨大，因为一旦资产价格收到冲击（尤其是房地产）就会迅速转化为消费减少，因为前者同时削弱了增长，就业和投资，而从这样的冲击中恢复过来又是个漫长的过程。


The second factor to consider is nominal growth – that is, real growth plus inflation.	要考虑的第二个因素是名义增长——也就是说，实际增长加上通货膨胀。


Today, real growth is subdued and may even be slowing, while inflation is below target in most places, with some economies even facing the risk of deflation.	当前实际增长低迷，甚至有可能放缓，而大多数国家的通胀则低于目标值，一些经济体甚至面临通货紧缩的风险。


Because debt is a liability for borrowers and an asset for creditors, these trends have divergent effects, increasing value for the asset holder, while increasing the liability of the debtor.	由于债务既是借款人的负债又是债权人的资产，这些趋势就会产生不同的效果，一方面令资产持有人的价值增加，另一方面也增加了债务人的负债。


The problem is that, in a low-growth environment, the probability of some form of default rises considerably.	问题是在这么一个低增长环境下，出现某种形式违约的概率大增。


In that case, nobody wins.	在这种情况下，双方都是输家。


The third key factor for assessing the risk of growing debt is monetary policy and interest rates.	评估债务增长风险的第三个关键因素是货币政策和利率。


Though no one knows exactly what a “normal” interest-rate environment might look like in the post-crisis world, it is reasonable to assume that it will not look like it does today, when many economies are keeping rates near zero and some have even moved into negative territory.	虽然没有人确切知道在危机后的世界中一个“正常”的利率环境应该是什么样子，但也可以推断它肯定不应该像今天这个样子——许多经济体都维持着近零利率，部分甚至进入了负值区。


Sovereigns with high and/or rising debt levels may find them sustainable now, given aggressively accommodative monetary policy.	那些负债水平较高并/或正在上升的主权国家现在可能绝大情况是可以维持的，因为实施了积极宽松的货币政策。


Unfortunately, though such accommodation cannot be sustained forever, today’s conditions are often viewed as semi-permanent, creating the illusion of stability and reducing the incentive to undertake difficult reforms that promote future growth.	但不幸的是，虽然显然无法永远维持这种和谐状态，但当前的情况却往往被视为半永久性的，制造出一种稳定的幻觉，也削弱了实施推动未来增长的艰难改革的决心。


The final, and arguably most important, factor shaping debt risk relates to investment.	最后（也可以说是最重要）的债务风险塑造因素则与投资有关。


Increasing debt to sustain current consumption, whether in the household or government sector, is rightly viewed as an unsustainable element of a growth pattern.	利用增加债务来维持眼下的消费量，无论是在家庭还是政府部门，都应该被视为一种不可持续的增长模式组成部分。


Here, China’s case is instructive.	这里中国的情况就是对我们有所教益的。


In a sense, the frequent refrain that China’s debt is on an unsustainable path is true.	从某种意义上说，外界频繁鼓吹中国债务不可持续的说法是正确的。


After all, high levels of debt increase vulnerability to negative shocks.	毕竟高水平的债务增长确实会令国家在面临负面冲击时显得较为脆弱。


But, in another sense, this misses the point.	但在另一种意义上，这其实是不得要领的。


Many governments nowadays are accumulating debt in order to buttress public or private consumption.	许多国家政府正在不断增加债务以巩固公共或私人消费。


This approach, if overused, can amount to borrowing future demand; in that case, it is clearly unsustainable.	如果过度使用这一手段的话，等于提前透支了未来的需求； 这种情况下显然是不可持续的。


But, if used as a transitional measure to help jump-start an economy or to provide a buffer from negative demand shocks, such efforts can be highly beneficial.	但如果作为过渡性措施，以快速重启经济或作为负需求冲击的缓冲垫，这种做法可以是非常有益的。


Moreover, in a relatively high-growth economy, ostensibly high debt levels are not necessarily a problem, as long as that debt is being used to fund investments that either yield high returns or create assets worth more than the debt.	此外，在一个相对高增长的经济体中，只要这些债务被用于资助投资，无论是产生高回报或创造了价值超过债务的资产，那么高债务水平显然并不一定是个问题。


In the case of sovereign debt, the return on investment can be viewed as the increment to future growth.	在主权债务方面，投资回报可以被视为未来增长的增量。


The good news is that, in China, much of the accumulated leverage has indeed been used to fund investment, which in principle creates assets that will augment future growth.	好消息是，在中国很多增加的杠杆确实被用于资助投资，这在原则上会创造出能提升未来增长的资产。


(Whether the results of the government’s recent decision to increase the fiscal deficit to stimulate the economy follow this long-term growth-enhancing pattern remains to be seen.)	（但政府最近决定增加财政赤字以刺激经济的政策是否会遵循这一长期促进增长模式，还有待观察。 ）


The bad news is that directed lending and the relaxation of credit standards in China, particularly after the crisis, have led to investment in assets in real estate and heavy industry with a value well below the cost of creating them.	坏消息是，指令性贷款和信贷标准的放宽，尤其是在危机过后，都导致对中国房地产和重工业资产的投资所创造的价值远低于它们的成本。


The return on them is negative.	这些投资得到的只能是负回报。


China’s so-called debt problem is thus not really a debt problem, but an investment problem.	因此中国所谓的债务问题其实并不是个债务问题，而是投资的问题。


To address it, China must reform its investment and financial systems, so that low- or negative-return investments are screened out more reliably.	为了解决这一问题，中国必须改革其投资和金融体系，以便尽可能其筛选掉那些低/负回报投资。


That means tackling the mispricing of risk that results from the government’s backing of the country’s state-owned banks (which surely could not be allowed to fail).	这意味着去除因政府对国有银行的兜底所导致的风险错误定价（因为国家肯定不会让这些银行破产）。


Many developed countries are also failing to invest in high-return assets, but for a different reason: Their tight budgets and rising debts are preventing them from investing much at all.	许多发达国家也没有投资于高回报的资产，但用意则有所不同：这些国家紧绷的预算和不断上升的债务不允许其大量支出。


As this weakens growth and reduces inflation, the speed at which their sovereign-debt ratios can be reduced declines considerably.	由于这会削弱增长并降低通胀，该其主权债务比减少的速率也大幅下降。


In order to spur growth and employment, these economies must start paying closer attention to the kind of debt they accumulate.	为了有效刺激经济增长和就业，这些经济体必须开始更加关注其积累的债务类型。


If the debt is financing growth-promoting investment, it may be a very good idea.	如果债务融资是促进增长的投资，它可能是一个很好的主意。


If, however, it is financing “current operations” and raising short-term aggregate demand, it is highly risky.	但如果这些融资用于“眼前操作”以刺激短期总需求，这就是非常危险的。


Of course, the situation is not cut and dried.	当然形势是不断变化发展的。


The return to public investment is affected by the presence or absence of complementary reforms, which vary from country to country. And there is some potential for abuse, with expenditures being misclassified as investments.	对公共投资的回归会受到是否存在与其相辅相成的改革的影响，每个国家的情况都会有所不同，同时还存在被滥用的可能，因为有些支出会被误判为投资。


Yet, in an environment of low long-term interest rates and deficient short-term aggregate demand (which means there is little risk of crowding out the private sector), it is a mistake not to relax fiscal constraints for investment.	然而在一个长期利率低下且短期总需求缺乏（这意味着有排挤私营部门的风险很小）的环境中，不放松对投资的财政限制是错误的。


In fact, the right kind of public investment would probably spur more private-sector investment. Identifying such investment is where today’s debt debate should be.	事实上，正确的公共投资可能会刺激更多私人部门投资，而当前债务辩论所应该做的，就是把这类投资定义出来。


As a result, Argentina was barred from making a current interest payment to holders of its restructured debt unless it simultaneously paid the holdouts the full amount of principal and interest contractually owed to them.	结果导致阿根廷被禁止向其同意重组的债权人支付现行利息款，除非它同时向所有抵制者支付合���规定拖欠的全部本金和利息。


What To Do About Debt	怎样对付债务


GENEVA – Over the last few months, a great deal of attention has been devoted to financial-market volatility.	日内瓦—在过去几个月中，大量注意力集中到了金融市场动荡上。


But as frightening as the ups and downs of stock prices can be, they are mere froth on the waves compared to the real threat to the global economy: the enormous tsunami of debt bearing down on households, businesses, banks, and governments.	但股价涨落固然可怕，与这同样可怕的是，与全球经济所面临的真正威胁相比，这些涨落只是浪尖上的涟漪。 巨大的债务海啸正在摧毁家庭、企业、银行和政府。


If the US Federal Reserve follows through on raising interest rates at the end of this year, as has been suggested, the global economy – and especially emerging markets – could be in serious trouble.	如果美联储在今年年底如期开始升息，全球经济——特别是新兴市场——可能陷入严重的麻烦。


Global debt has grown some $57 trillion since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, reaching a back-breaking $199 trillion in 2014, more than 2.5 times global GDP, according to the McKinsey Global Institute.	据麦肯锡全球研究所的数据，自2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭以来，全球债务增加了大约57万亿美元，在2014年底达到了令人咋舌的199万亿美元，比全球GDP大1.


Servicing these debts will most likely become increasingly difficult over the coming years, especially if growth continues to stagnate, interest rates begin to rise, export opportunities remain subdued, and the collapse in commodity prices persists.	5倍多。 在未来几年中，维持这些债务极有可能越来越困难，特别是如果增长继续停滞而利率开始提高、出口机会依然萎靡不振、大宗商品价格崩盘之势无法挽回的话。


Much of the concern about debt has been focused on the potential for defaults in the eurozone.	大量对债务的关注集中在了欧元区的违约可能上。


But heavily indebted companies in emerging markets may be an even greater danger.	但新兴市场的重债国可能更加危险。


Corporate debt in the developing world is estimated to have reached more than $18 trillion dollars, with as much as $2 trillion of it in foreign currencies.	发展中国的公司债务据估计已经高达18万亿美元以上，其中有2万亿美元为外币债务。


The risk is that – as in Latin America in the 1980s and Asia in the 1990s – private-sector defaults will infect public-sector balance sheets.	风险在于——如20世纪80年代的拉美和90年代的亚洲——私人部门违约将影响到公共部门资产负债表。


That possibility is, if anything, greater today than it has been in the past.	如今，这一概率比以往更大了。


Increasingly open financial markets allow foreign banks and asset managers to dump debts rapidly, often for reasons that have little to do with economic fundamentals.	日益开放的金融市场让外国银行和资产管理者能够迅速甩卖债务——通常是出于与经济基本面无关的理由。


When accompanied by currency depreciation, the results can be brutal – as Ukraine is learning the hard way.	当甩卖碰巧遇上货币贬值时，结果可能非常残酷——乌克兰正在领教这个惨痛的教训。


In such cases, private losses inevitably become a costly public concern, with market jitters rapidly spreading across borders as governments bail out creditors in order to prevent economic collapse.	在这样的情形中，私人损失难免成为代价高昂的公共问题，随着政府出手援助债权人以防止经济崩溃，市场波动很快就会跨国传播。


It is important to note that indebted governments are both more and less vulnerable than private debtors.	负债政府既比私人债务人强大，又比私人债务人脆弱，认识到这一点很重要。


Sovereign borrowers cannot seek the protection of bankruptcy laws to delay and restructure payments; at the same time, their creditors cannot seize non-commercial public assets in compensation for unpaid debts.	主权借款人无法寻求破产法的保护以推迟和重组偿付； 与此同时，它们的债权人无法获得非商业公共资产作为未偿还债务的补偿。


When a government is unable to pay, the only solution is direct negotiations.	当政府无法偿付时，唯一的办法是直接谈判。


But the existing system of debt restructuring is inefficient, fragmented, and unfair.	但现有债务重组制度效率低下、支离破碎并且不公平。


Sovereign borrowers’ inability to service their debt tends to be addressed too late and ineffectively.	主权借款人无力维持债务的问题总是发现得过晚，解决的效果也不好。


Governments are reluctant to acknowledge solvency problems for fear of triggering capital outflows, financial panics, and economic crises.	政府不愿承认有偿债能力问题，因为害怕这样会引发资本外流、金融恐慌和经济危机。


Meanwhile, private creditors, anxious to avoid a haircut, will often postpone resolution in the hope that the situation will turn around.	与此同时，私人债权人担心遭遇“剃头”（haircut），常常会中止清算，寄希望于情况峰回路转。