At Doha in November 2001, they pledged to give something more valuable than money: the opportunity for poor countries to sell their goods and earn their way out of poverty.	2001年11月在多哈，它们保证给予比钱更为有价值的东西，也就是给穷国出售其产品并且获得收入摆脱贫困的机会。


With great fanfare, developed countries seemed for a while to be making good on their promise, as Europe extended the “Everything but Arms” initiative (EBA), under which it was unilaterally to open its markets to the poorest countries of the world.	在一阵大肆喧闹中，当欧盟延伸“除了武器外的所有产品”项目（EBA），也就是向世界最贫困国家单方面开放其市场之际，发达国家们看似某些时候确实在实现其诺言。


The opening was less than it seemed.	这一开放比看起来的要小。


The devil is in the details, as many less developed countries discovered that EBA’s complicated rules of origin, together with supply-side constraints, meant that there was little chance for poor countries to export their newly liberalized products.	问题出在了细节之中。 许多不发达国家发现，这一项目复杂的原产地规则以及供应方限制意味着贫穷国家几乎没有机会出口它们刚刚获得贸易自由的产品。


But the coup de grace was delivered by the world’s richest country, the United States, which once again decided to demonstrate its hypocrisy.	但是，美国这一世界上最富有的国家再次决定展现其伪善，从而给了致命的一击。


The US ostensibly agreed to a 97% opening of its markets to the poorest countries.	美国表面上同意向最贫困国家开放其市场的97％。


The developing countries were disappointed with the results of Europe’s EBA initiative, and Europe has responded by committing itself to dealing with at least part of the problem that arises from the rules of origin tests.	发展中国家对于欧盟的开放市场项目的结果感到失望，作为回应，欧盟承诺解决至少一部分由原产地规则检验引起的问题。


America’s intention was, to the contrary, to seem to be opening up its markets, while doing nothing of the sort, for it appears to allow the US to select a different 3% for each country.	相反，美国的意图却是看似开放其市场实则无所作为，因为，美国针对每个国家挑选不同的3％。


The result is what is mockingly coming to be called the EBP initiative: developing countries will be allowed freely to export everything but what they produce .	其结果就是被嘲弄为EBP的项目，也就是，发展中国家被允许自由出口所有它们所不生产的产品。


They can export jet engines, supercomputers, airplanes, computer chips of all kinds—just not textiles, agricultural products, or processed foods, the goods they can and do produce.	它们可以出口喷气机发动机，超级计算机，飞机以及所有种类的计算机芯片，唯独没有它们做得来而且实际生产产品，如纺织品、农产品或者加工食品。


Consider Bangladesh.	以孟加拉为例。


If we go by the most widely used six-digit tariff lines, Bangladesh exported 409 tariff lines to the US in 2004, from which it earned about $2.3 billion.	如果我们采用最为常用的六位数稅则编码，孟加拉国在2004年向美国出口了409个税则编码产品，收入为23亿美元。


But its top 12 tariff lines – 3% of all tariff lines – accounted for 59.7% of the total value of its exports to the US.	但是，其价值最大的12项税则产品，也就是所有税则编码的3％占向美国出口的总价值的59. 7％。


This means that the US could erect barriers to almost three-fifths of Bangladeshi exports.	这就意味着美国可以给孟加拉出口产品的几乎五分之三设立贸易壁垒。


For Cambodia, the figure would be about 62%.	对于柬埔寨而言，这一数字将近62％。


The situation is no better if the 3% rule applies to the tariff lines that the US imports from the rest of the world (rather than to the lines individual poor countries export to the US), for then the US can exclude roughly 300 tariff lines from duty-free and quota-free treatment.	即使美国把3％规则适用于从世界其他地方进口的产品税则编码也无济于事，因为那样美国就可以将大约300种税则产品从免税和免配额待遇中排除。


For Bangladesh, this implies that 75% of the tariff lines, accounting for more than 90% of the value of its exports to the US, could be excluded from duty-free treatment.	对于孟加拉而言，这就意味着占向美国出口商品价值90％的税则编码的75％将可能被从免税待遇中排除。


Exclusion from duty-free treatment could reach 100% for Cambodia, which exported only 277 tariff lines to the US in 2004.	排除在免税待遇之外可能波及柬埔寨出口产品的100％，而该国2004年仅仅向美国出口了277项税则编码产品。


The official argument for the 3% exclusion is that it affects “sensitive products.”	对于3％排除的正式理由是，这影响到“敏感产品”。


In other words, while the US lectures developing countries on the need to face the pain of rapid adjustment to liberalization, it refuses to do the same.	换句话说，美国向发展中国家宣扬面对快速调节适应贸易自由化的痛苦的需��，它自己却拒绝这样做。 （实际上，美国已经有11年的时间来适应纺织品贸易自由化。


(Indeed, it has already had more than 11 years to adjust to liberalization of textiles.)	）但是真正的问题更为严重，因为3％排除法是可憎的分而治之政策的幽灵。


But the real problem is far worse because the 3% exclusion raises the specter of an odious policy of divide and conquer, as developing countries are invited to vie with each other to make sure that America does not exclude	各发展中国家被邀请相互竞争来确保美国并不把它们的关键产品根据3％规则排除在外。 整个排除规则恰恰破坏了多边贸易体系。


Indeed, there may be a further hidden agenda behind the 97% proposal.	确实，97％建议后面可能还有更大的不可告人的目的。


At the World Trade Organization’s meeting Cancun in 2003, the developing countries stood together and blocked efforts to forge a trade agreement that was almost as unfair as the previous Uruguay round, under which the poorest countries actually became worse off.	在世界贸易组织2003年坎昆会议上，发展中国家立场一致，阻止了制定几乎和前一轮乌拉圭回合一样不公正的贸易协议。 乌拉圭回合协议让最贫穷国家雪上加霜。


It was imperative that such unity be destroyed.	摧毁这样的联合是非常必要的。


America’s strategy of bilateral trade agreements was aimed at precisely that, but it enlisted only a few countries, representing a fraction of global trade.	美国的双边贸易协议的战略恰恰以此为目标，但是它只是得到了代表全球贸易一丁点儿的几个国家的支持。


The 97% formula holds open the possibility of extending that fragmentation	97％规则可能会把这一分裂延伸到世界贸易组织本身。


The US has already had some success in pitting the poor against each other.	美国在让穷国内斗方面成功过。


Preferential access for African countries, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and more recent initiatives, seems to be largely a matter of trade diversion – taking trade from some poor countries and giving it to others.	根据非洲发胀和机遇法案（AGOA）和最近的倡议给予非洲国家们的优惠市场准入更为可能是一种贸易分离，也就是从某些穷国中分离贸易交给其他国家。 例如，孟加拉国在美国的服装市场份额从2001年的4.


For example, Bangladesh’s share in US clothing markets declined from 4.6% in 2001 to 3.9% in 2004.	9％。 在同一时期，AGOA国家在美国服装市场份额从1.


During the same period, AGOA countries’ market share in the US clothing sector increased from 1.6% to 2.6%, and it is likely to increase further when AGOA countries start to take full advantage of duty-free access.	6％上升到2. 6％，而且，当AGOA国家开始充分利用免税市场准入时，这一份额可能还会提高。


AGOA had a sunset clause, but if the duty-free access becomes permanent for less developed countries in Africa – as stipulated in Hong Kong – then poor countries in Asia will continue to lose US market share.	AGOA包含一个日落条款，但是，如果正如在香港世贸会议规定的那样将针对非洲欠发达国家而言免税准入永久化，那么亚洲穷国将继续失去美国的市场份额。


The WTO is supposed to prevent these trade-diversionary agreements, but so far no case has been successfully brought.	世界贸易组织理应防止这些分离贸易的协议，但是目前为止还没有成功地做到这一点。


Even if America succeeds in dividing the developing countries, however, it may inspire a degree of unity elsewhere.	即使美国成功地分离了发展中国家，也会在其他地方激发团结。


Both those committed to trade liberalization within a multilateral system and those committed to helping developing countries will look at America’s new strategy with abhorrence.	那些致力于多边体系下的贸易自由化和帮助发展中国家的人们将以憎恶的目光看待美国的新战略。


Game Changers for Growth	增长的局面改变因素


BERKELEY – The recent G-20 meeting of finance ministers in Saint Petersburg confirmed that the debate between growth and austerity is over – at least for now.	伯克利—最近在圣彼得堡举行的G20财政会议确认了增长和紧缩之争已经结束——至少在当下是如此。


With protracted recession in Europe and slowdowns in emerging markets, concern about budget deficits has given way to apprehension about growth.	随着欧洲的长期衰退和新兴市场的减速，对预算赤字的担忧已经让位给对增长的担忧。


In July, the International Monetary Fund revised its global growth forecast downward for the second time this year.	7月，IMF今年第二次下调全球增长预测。


Both Japan and the United States stand out as bright spots in the subdued global outlook, but for different reasons.	日本和美国成为暗淡全球前景的亮点，但各有各的原因。


In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has unleashed a combination of aggressive monetary and fiscal expansion along with promised reforms of the labor market, corporate governance, regulation, and trade.	在日本，首相安倍晋三同时抛出了激进的货币和财政扩张，并承诺改革劳动力市场、公司治理、监管和贸易。


In response to rapid and bold stimulus measures, Japan’s economy is expected to grow at a rate of around 3% this year – one of the highest rates among advanced economies – and the Nikkei index rose 80% in the six-month period ending in May of this year.	在快速而大胆的刺激措施作用下，日本经济预计今年增长率为3%左右——为发达经济体中最高值之一——而日经指数在截至今年5月的半年中上涨了80%。


Now Abe has signaled his intention to move forward with tough structural reforms.	如今，安倍放出信号将跟进一步采取严厉的结构性改革。


If he delivers, his policies will be game changers for Japan.	若得偿所愿，那么他的政策将让日本焕然一新。


In the US, the story is one of continued recovery as the headwinds slowing growth dissipate.	美国的情况则是随着增长逆风的逐渐减弱，复苏在持续发生。


State- and local-government budgets are improving, the housing market is strengthening, and households are deleveraging and repairing their balance sheets.	州和地方政府赤字在改善，房地产市场在走强，家庭在去杠杆并修复资产负债表。


Counterproductive and excessive fiscal austerity at the federal level has dampened growth this year, but the private sector has proved more resilient than expected.	联邦层面的适得其反的过度财政紧缩拖累了今年的增长，但私人部门比预期中恢复力更强。


Under current law, fiscal contraction is slated to ease next year and monetary policy is likely to remain supportive, so most forecasters predict an acceleration of growth.	在现行法律下，财政收缩将在明年放松，货币政策仍将保持支持性，因此大部分预测家预计增长会加速。


But growth prospects could be undermined by another bruising political battle over the federal budget, resulting in deep spending cuts.	但增长前景可能因深度减支引发的新一场围绕联邦预算的政治斗争而受挫。


The current Republican rhetoric in the House of Representatives portends additional fiscal austerity.	从众议院共和党的语气看，会有新一轮财政紧缩。


Earlier this year, the Congressional Budget Office warned that the potential US growth rate has declined as a result of years of subpar investment rates, the aging of the population, and smaller productivity gains.	今年早些时候，国会预算办公室警告说，美国潜在增长率因为多年的投资率不足、人口老化和生产率增速下降而有所下降。


Every year of below-capacity growth means lower growth capacity in the future, owing to lost investment, erosion of worker skills and experience, and diminished risk-taking.	每一个低于产能的增长年份都意味着未来增长能力的下降，这是因为投资有所下降，工人技能和经验有所损失，风险承担行为有所减少。


Still, there are often-overlooked reasons for optimism about America’s future potential growth.	但是，一些常被忽视的理由表明，美国未来潜在增长前景乐观。


A recent McKinsey Global Institute study identifies five mutually reinforcing “game changers” that could have a significant effect on GDP growth, productivity, and employment in the US by 2020: shale energy, big-data analytics, exports in knowledge-intensive industries, infrastructure investment, and talent development.	最新的麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）研究提出了五大相互强化的“局面改变因素”，能极大地影响2020年的GDP增长、生产率和美国就业。 它们是页岩能源、大数据分析学、知识密集型产业出口、基础设施投资和人才开发。


Two of these – shale energy and big-data analytics – build on ongoing technological breakthroughs in which the US has a strong lead and depend primarily on private-sector action, not macroeconomic or structural policies.	其中的两者——页岩能源和大数据分析学——建立在不断的技术突破上，而技术突破主要取决于私人部门行为，而不是宏观经济和结构性政策，美国在这方面领先优势明显。


US production of shale gas and oil has been growing by more than 50% annually over the last five years.	在过去五年中，美国页岩油气产量年增长率超过50%。


As a result of increasing supplies, US natural-gas prices have declined by two-thirds since 2008 and are likely to remain significantly lower than prices in the rest of the world at least through 2020.	由于供给的增加，美国天然气价格自2008年以来下跌了三分之二，并且将维持显著低于世界其他地区的水平直到（至少）2020年。


This price advantage will enhance America’s competitiveness as a manufacturing location, particularly for energy-intensive activities.	这一价格优势能增强美国作为制造业落脚点的竞争力，特别是能源密集型活动。


The US has the largest recoverable shale-gas reserves and the second-largest recoverable shale-oil reserves in the world.	美国拥有世界第一大可恢复页岩气储量和第二大可恢复页岩油储量。


It also enjoys a technological lead in shale-energy technologies, and it already has a vast network of pipelines, refineries, and ports in the energy sector that can be repurposed for shale gas and oil (though much more investment will be needed).	美国和拥有页岩能源技术方面的领先优势，并建成了巨大的输油管道、炼油厂和能源部门港口网络，可以直接用于页岩气和页岩油（尽管也需要大量新投资）。


Growth in shale energy will mean more investment, production, and jobs in the energy sector itself.	页岩能源的增长意味着能源部门本身的更多的投资、产量和就业岗位。


Lower gas prices will boost manufacturing production, particularly in downstream industries like petrochemicals and primary metals that use natural gas as fuel and feedstock.	气价下降将提振制造业产量，特别是石化产品和以天然气为燃料和投入品的初级金属等下游行业。


Growth in energy and energy-intensive industries will fuel additional demand, output, and employment across a wide swath of supporting activities, including transportation, construction, and professional services.	能源和能源密集型产业的增长将助力大范围支持性活动的需求、产出和就业增长，包括运输业、建筑业和专业服务。


Overall, McKinsey estimates that growth in shale energy could add 2-4% to annual GDP and create up to 1.7 million jobs by 2020.	总体而言，麦肯锡估算页岩能源增长将在2020年将美国年GDP提高2—4%，并创造最多170万个工作岗位。


But extracting shale energy involves environmental risks and uncertainties, among them groundwater contamination, higher methane emissions, and potential seismic effects.	但提炼页岩能源会产生环境风险和不确定性，包括地下水污染、甲烷排量和潜在的地震效应。


And shale gas emits CO2 when burned, even though it has half the carbon content of coal and has played a significant role in cutting US carbon emissions to mid-1990’s levels.  	页岩气燃烧时还会释放二氧化碳，尽管页岩气比煤炭的含碳量低一半，并且对美国将碳排放量减至20世纪90年代中期水平居功至伟。


Not surprisingly, the President of the Natural Resources Defense Council, an admired environmental group, recently remarked that “fracking is about the most complicated thing I have encountered.”	毫不奇怪，广受尊敬的环境团体——自然资源保护委员会（Natural Resources Defense Council）主席最近评论说，“致裂法是我所见过的最复杂的东西。


More research on the environmental risks and benefits of shale energy, and the development of new standards and regulations to control these risks are required.	”我们需要更进一步地研究页岩能源的环境风险和收益，并开发新标准和监管以控制这些风险。


Big data and advanced analytics are another technology-driven game changer for US growth.	大数据和先进分析法是美国增长的有一个技术推动型局面改变因素。


As more data are generated, stored, and transmitted in digital form, new data sets relevant to personal and business decisions are growing exponentially.	随着更多数据的产生、存储和以数字形式传输，与个人和企业决策有关的新数据集正在呈现指数增长之势。


As a result of advances in computing power, the advent of cloud computing, and new software tools, more of these data sets can be quickly analyzed and used by businesses to reduce costs, boost productivity, and create new products and services.	随着计算能力的增加、云计算的出现和新软件工具的���发，更多的这些数据集可以得到快速分析，并被企业用于缩减成本、提高生产率和创造新的产品和服务。


Big data and advanced analytics can also reduce costs and enhance efficiency in health care and government, and can create value for consumers through greater product variety and quality, as well as enhanced convenience – benefits that are not captured in GDP statistics.	大数据和先进分析法还能降低医疗和政府的成本、提高它们的效率，并通过更大的产品多样性和更高的产品质量、更好的产品便利性为消费者创造价值——这些都是GDP统计数字之外的好处。


McKinsey estimates that big-data analytics could add about $325 billion, or 1.7% to annual GDP in the retail and manufacturing sectors, while generating up to $285 billion in productivity gains and cost savings in health care and government by 2020.	麦肯锡估算，到2020年，大数据分析学可以为零售和制造部门增加3250亿美元或相当于年GDP的1%的产值，同时为医疗部门和政府带来2850亿美元的生产率提高和成本节约好处。


The potential savings in health-care costs would ease pressures on government budgets and release resources to boost growth in the rest of the economy.	医疗成本的潜在节省将减轻政府预算压力，释放资源用於提振经济的其他部分的增长。


New information and communications technologies were game changers that boosted the potential growth rate of the US economy in the 1990’s.	20世纪90年代改变美国经济潜在增长率局面的因素是新信息和通信技术。


McKinsey’s research suggests that shale energy and big-data technologies will be game changers with similar benefits for the economy’s potential growth over the next several years.	麦肯锡的研究表明，页岩能源和大数据技术将在未来数年内给美国经济的潜在增长带来等量齐观的好处，它们是新的局面改变因素。


America’s Opposing Futures	美国针锋相对的未来


I recently learned something interesting: American international finance economists and American domestically oriented macroeconomists have very different – indeed, opposing – views of the likely consequences of America’s huge current-account deficit.	最近我听说了一件趣事：美国的国际金融经济学家和国内宏观经济学家对美国经常帐目巨额赤字可能造成的后果持有迥然不同，甚至是截然相反的观点。


International finance economists see a financial crisis as likely, followed by a painful and perhaps prolonged recession in the United States.	国际金融经济学者认为巨额赤字可能带来金融危机，紧随其后的也许就是漫长而痛苦的国内衰退。


Domestically oriented macroeconomists, by contrast, see a forthcoming fall in the value of the dollar not as a crisis, but as an opportunity to accelerate growth.	而国内宏观经济学家的看法却恰恰相反，他们认为美元即将贬值非但不是一次危机，还是一次加速成长的难得机会。


Domestically oriented macroeconomists look at the situation roughly like this: at some point in the future, foreign central banks will become less willing to continue buying massive amounts of dollar-denominated securities in order to prop up the greenback.	国内宏观经济学家的观点大致如下：未来的某个时刻，国外央行会不愿继续为了保持美元价值而购进大量以美元计价的证券。


When they cease their large-scale dollar-purchase programs, the value of the dollar will fall – and it will fall hard.	如果他们停止大规模的美元购买计划，美元的价值就会下跌¾而且是狂跌不止。


But, according to this view, as the dollar’s value declines, US exports will become more attractive to foreigners and American employment will rise, with labor re-allocated to the newly-vibrant export sector.	可是按照上述观点，随着美元价值的下滑，美国出口对国外的吸引力就会增加，美国的就业也将增长，劳动力会被重新分配到重新赢得活力的出口部门。


It will be like what happened in Britain after it abandoned its exchange-rate peg and allowed the pound to depreciate relative to the Deutschmark , or what happened in the US in the late 1980’s, when the dollar depreciated against the pound, the Deutschmark , and – most importantly – the Japanese yen.	这种情况将与放弃固定汇率并允许英镑对德国马克贬值后英国的状况非常相似，或者可以类比20世纪80年代的美国，当时的美元对英镑、德国马克特别是日元都出现了大幅度的贬值。


International finance economists see a far bleaker future.	国际金融经济学家对前景的预测却远没有那么乐观。


They see the end of large-scale dollar-purchase programs by central banks leading not only to a decline in the dollar, but also to a spike in US long-term interest rates, which will curb consumption spending immediately and throttle investment spending after only a short lag.	他们认为，外国央行停止大规模的美元购买计划不仅会带来美元的下跌，还会造成美国长期利率的升高，而长期利率的飙升会使消费开支立即停止，并进而遏止投资支出。


To be sure, international finance economists also see US exports benefiting as the value of the dollar declines, but the lags in demand are such that the export boost will come a year or two after the decline in consumption and investment spending.	可以肯定的是，国际金融经济学家也认为美元贬值后出口会从中受益，但需求的滞后会使出口增长比消费和投资的下降延迟一到两年。


Eight to ten million people will have to shift employment from services and construction into exports and import-competing goods, implying that structural unemployment will rise.	800到1000万人将不得不从服务和建筑行业转向出口和进口竞争性商品，也就是说结构性的失业不可避免地将会发生。


Moreover, there may be a financial panic: large financial institutions with short-term liabilities and long-term assets will have a difficult time weathering a large rise in long-term dollar-denominated interest rates.	不仅如此，美元贬值还可能带来金融恐慌：美元计价的长期利率大幅提高会使持有大量短期负债和长期资产的大型金融机构陷入困境。


This mismatch can cause financial stress and bankruptcy just as easily as banks’ local-currency assets and dollar liabilities caused stress and bankruptcy in the Mexican and East Asian crises of the 1990’s and in the Argentinean crisis of this decade.	上述失调会造成金融危机和破产，就像银行的本国货币资产和美元负债在20世纪90年代的墨西哥和东亚危机、以及最近10年的阿根廷危机中所造成的压力和破产那样轻而易举。


When international finance economists sketch this scenario, domestically oriented macroeconomists respond that it sounds like a case of incompetent monetary policy.	国际金融经济学家描述的这幅图景，国内宏观经济学家却认为更像是货币政策的失误。


Why should the Federal Reserve allow long-term interest rates to spike just because other central banks have ceased their dollar-purchase programs?	美联储为什么仅仅由于外国央行停止了美元购买计划就允许长期利率大幅增长？


Should not the Fed step in and replace them with its own purchases of long-term US Treasury bonds, thereby keeping long-term interest rates at a level conducive to full employment?	美联储就不能介入其中，自己购买美国发行的长期债券，从而把长期利率控制在有利于扩大就业的水平？


To this, international finance economists respond that the Fed does not have the power to do so.	对于这种说法，国际金融经济学家认为美联储根本不具备这样的能力。


When forced to choose between full employment and price stability, the international finance economists say that the Fed will choose price stability, because its institutional memory of the 1970’s, when inflation ran rampant, remains very strong.	一旦被迫在扩大就业和稳定价格之间做出选择，国际金融经济学家认为美联储肯定会选择后者，因为它对20世纪70年代猛烈的通货膨胀至今记忆犹新。


Therefore, since a fall in the value of the dollar raises import prices, and thus functions as a negative shock to the supply side of the economy, the Fed will have to raise, not lower, interest rates, and sell, not buy, bonds.	因此，由于美元贬值会提高进口价格，进而对经济的供应领域产生负面的影响，美联储将选择提高而非降低利率，也就是出售而非购买债券。


Serious economists whom I respect enormously find themselves taking strong positions on opposite sides of this debate.	我非常尊敬的严肃的经济学家在这场辩论中的观点尖锐对立、南辕北辙。


I’m not wise enough to say which side is right, but I certainly know which side I hope is wrong.	我没有能力指出谁对谁错，但我肯定知道我希望其中一方的观点是错误的。


America’s Other 30%	美国的其余30%


NEW HAVEN – The American consumer is but a shadow of its former almighty self.	纽黑文——美国消费者现在只剩下以前无所不能的影子。


Personal consumption in the United States expanded at only a 1.5% annual rate in real (inflation-adjusted) terms in the second quarter of 2012 – and that was no aberration.	2012年第二季度美国个人消费经通胀调整后的实际年增长率仅为1. 5%——而且这还算不上什么失常表现。


Unfortunately, it continues a pattern of weakness that has been evident since early 2008.	不幸的是，这不过是2008年初以来日趋明显的疲软格局的延续。


Over the last 18 quarters, annualized growth in real consumer demand has averaged a mere 0.7%, compared to a 3.6% growth trend in the decade before the crisis erupted.	与危机爆发前10年3. 6%的增长趋势相比，过去18个季度实际消费需求的年均增长率仅有可怜的0.


Never before has the American consumer been this weak for this long.	7%。 美国消费者还从未有过如此长时间的弱势记录。


The cause is no secret.	其中的原因并不是什么秘密。


Consumers made huge bets on two bubbles – housing and credit.	消费者在住房和信贷这两个泡沫上下了大注。


Reckless monetary and regulatory policies turned the humble abode into an ATM, allowing families to extract dollars from bubbles and live beyond their means.	不计后果的货币和监管政策把原本简陋的居所变成了自动提款机，让有房一族从泡沫当中提取美元，享受着超出自身经济能力的生活。


Both bubbles have long since burst, and US households are now dealing with post-bubble financial devastation – namely, underwater assets, record-high debt, and profound shortages of savings.	这两大泡沫其实早已破裂，美国家庭正被迫面对泡沫破灭所带来的金融后果。 相关问题包括水下资产、创记录的负债和深度储蓄短缺。


At the same time, sharply elevated unemployment and subpar income growth have combined to tighten the noose on over-extended consumers.	与此同时，失业率飙升和收入增长欠佳也收紧了本已过度举债的消费者脖子上的绞索。


As a result, American households have hunkered down as never before.	于是乎，美国家庭前所未有地放低了姿态。


Consumers are diverting what little income they earn away from spending toward paying down debt and rebuilding savings.	消费者把赚取的微薄收入用来还债和重建储蓄，而不是用来支出。


That is both logical and rational – and thus not something that the US Federal Reserve can offset with unconventional monetary easing.	此举确为逻辑理性之举——因此绝非美联储靠超乎常规的宽松货币政策可以抵消的。


American consumers’ unprecedented retrenchment has turned the US economy’s growth calculus inside out.	美国消费者前所未有的紧缩态度已经将美国经济增长预测翻了个底朝天。


Consumption typically accounts for 70% of GDP (71% in the second quarter, to be precise).	消费通常占国内生产总值的70%（准确的讲二季度为71%）。


But the 70% is barely growing, and is unlikely to expand strongly at any point in the foreseeable future.	但这70%几乎没有任何增长，而且在可以预见的未来强劲增长的可能性也微乎其微。


That puts an enormous burden on the other 30% of the US economy to generate any sort of recovery.	这就导致推动经济复苏的巨大压力落到其余30%的美国经济身上。


In fact, the other 30% has not done a bad job, especially considering the severe headwinds coming from consumers’ 70%.	其实，这其余30%的表现可圈可点，尤其考虑到70%消费所产生的严重阻力。


The 30% mainly consists of four components – capital spending by firms, net exports (exports less imports), residential construction, and government purchases.	其余这30%主要包括四个部分：即公司资本支出、净出口（出口减去进口）、住宅建设和政府采购。


(Technically, the pace of inventory investment should be included, but this is a cyclical buffer between production and sales rather than a source of final demand.)	（技术上还应该包括库存投资的速度，但该指标仅为生产和销售之间的周期性缓冲，而并非最终需求的来源。 ）


Given the 0.7% trend in real consumption growth over the past four and a half years, the US economy’s anemic 2.2% annualized recovery in the aftermath of the Great Recession is almost miraculous.	鉴于过去四年半中实际消费区区0. 7%的增长率，大萧条后美国经济能以2.


Credit that mainly to the other 30%, especially to strong exports and a rebound in business capital spending.	2%的速度缓慢复苏不失为一个奇迹。 这主要归功于除消费以外的其余30%，特别需要感谢强劲的出口和企业资本支出的反弹。


By contrast, the government sector has been moving in the opposite direction, as state and local governments retrench and federal purchases top out after post-crisis deficit explosions.	反之，政府部门却朝着相反的方向发展，因为国家和地方政府执行紧缩，联邦采购也随着后危机时代的赤字爆炸达到了极限。


The housing sector has started to recover over the past five quarters, but from such a severely depressed level that its growth has had little impact on the overall economy.	房地产部门过去五个季度已经开始复苏，但因为之前的状况过于严重，其目前增长对整体经济的影响微乎其微。


Given the strong likelihood that consumers will remain weak for years to come, America’s growth agenda needs to focus on getting more out of the other 30%.	鉴于消费今后几年持续疲软的可能性极大，美国经济增长议程需要重点挖掘其余30%的潜力。


Of the four growth components that fall into this category, two have the greatest potential to make a difference – capital spending and exports.	在构成这其余30%的四大门类中，资本支出和出口这两类最有可能有所作为。


Prospects for these two sources of growth will not only influence the vigor, or lack thereof, of any recovery; they could well be decisive in bringing about an important shift in the US growth model.	这两大增长源头的前景不仅会影响到复苏的前景，还很可能成为美国经济增长模式重大转变的决定因素。


The 70/30 split underscores the challenge: the US must face up to a fundamental rebalancing – weaning itself from excessive reliance on internal demand and drawing greater support from external demand.	70/30的分割进一步凸显了挑战：美国必须直面一次根本性的调整——逐渐摆脱对国内需求的过度依赖，并向外部需求争取更多的支持。


Capital spending and exports, which together account for about 24% of GDP, hold the key to this shift.	共同占国内生产总值约24%的资本支出和出口构成了此次转型的关键因素。


At just over 10% of GDP, the share of capital spending is well below the peak of nearly 13% in 2000.	资本支出的比例将将超过GDP的10%，远低于2000年近13%的峰值。


But capital spending must exceed that peak if US businesses are to be equipped with state-of-the-art capacity, technology, and private infrastructure that will enable them to recapture market share at home and abroad.	可如果美国企业要配备先进的产能、技术和私有基础设施，夺回国内外市场份额，资本支出就必须超过2000年的峰值。


Only then could export growth, impressive since mid-2009, sustain further increases.	只有这样从2009年中以来令人印象深刻的出口增长才能更进一步。


And only then could the US stem the rising tide of import penetration by foreign producers.	也只有这样美国才能遏制外国生产企业进口渗透的增长势头。


The other 30% is also emblematic of a deeper strategic issue that America faces – a profound competitive challenge.	其余这30%也象征美国所面临的更深层次的战略问题——同时也是深刻的竞争挑战。


A shift to external demand is not there for the asking. It must be earned by hard work, sheer determination, and a long overdue competitive revival.	向外部需求转型也并非招之即来，必须依靠勤奋、毅力和迟到的竞争力复苏来努力争取。


On that front, too, America has been falling behind.	美国在这方面也已经落后。


According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, the US slipped to fifth place in 2011-2012, from fourth place the previous year, continuing a general downward trend evident since 2005.	世界经济论坛发布的全球竞争力指数显示，美国从前一年的第四位下滑至2011-2012间的第五位，延续2005年来明显的持续下滑势头。


The erosion is traceable to several factors, including deficiencies in primary and secondary education as well as poor macroeconomic management.	持续下滑可以归结为若干因素，其中包括中小学教育缺陷和宏观经济管理的低效。


But the US also has disturbingly low rankings in the quality of its infrastructure (#24), technology availability and absorption (#18), and the sophistication and breadth of its supply-chain production processes (#14).	同样令人不安的还有美国的基础设施质量排名（第24位）、技术有效性和吸收度排名（第18位）、此外还有供应链生产工艺的广度和深度（第14位）。


Improvement on all counts is vital for America’s competitive revival.	全方位的改善对美国竞争力的复苏至关重要。


But meeting the challenge will require vigorous growth from America’s other 30% – especially private capital spending.	但迎接上述挑战需要美国其余的30%——尤其是私人资本开支保持强劲的增长势头。


With the American consumer likely to remain on ice, the same 30% must also continue to shoulder the burden of a sluggish economic recovery.	由于美国消费可能会持续低迷，同样这30%还必须继续担负起疲弱的经济复苏重担。


None of this can occur in a vacuum.	所有这些都不可能在真空当中实现。


The investment required for competitive revival and sustained recovery cannot be funded without a long-overdue improvement in US saving.	没有美国储蓄迟到已久的复苏，恢复竞争力和持续复苏所需的资金根本不可能实现。


In an era of outsize government deficits and subpar household saving, that may be America’s toughest challenge of all.	在政府赤字超大和家庭储蓄欠佳的年代，这或许是美国所面临的最严峻的挑战。


America\u0027s Other 87 Deficits	美国的其他87处赤字


NEW HAVEN – The United States has a classic multilateral trade imbalance.	纽黑文——美国存在经典的多边贸易失衡。


While it runs a large trade deficit with China, it also runs deficits with 87 other countries.	除了对中国的巨大贸易赤字意外，对其他87个国家，美国也存在赤字。


A multilateral deficit cannot be fixed by putting pressure on one of its bilateral components.	多边赤字是无法通过向双边伙伴中的一边施加压力解决的。


But try telling that to America’s growing chorus of China bashers.	但美国日渐壮大的对华强硬派可不这么想。


America’s massive trade deficit is a direct consequence of an unprecedented shortfall of domestic saving.	美国的大规模贸易赤字是前所未有的国内储蓄短缺的直接结果。


The broadest and most meaningful measure of a country’s saving capacity is what economists call the “net national saving rate” – the combined saving of individuals, businesses, and the government.	对一国储蓄能力的最广泛也最有意义的测量指标是经济学家所谓的“净国民储蓄率”——个人、企业和政府储蓄之和。


It is measured in “net” terms to strip out the depreciation associated with aging or obsolescent capacity.	该指标测量“净”值，以剔除与老龄化或报废产能有关的折旧。


It provides a measure of the saving that is available to fund expansion of a country’s capital stock, and thus to sustain its economic growth.	该指标可用来测量可为一国资本存量增长融资从而保持经济增长的储蓄量。


In the US, there simply is no net saving any more.	在美国，净储蓄早已不复存在。


Since the fourth quarter of 2008, America’s net national saving rate has been negative – in sharp contrast to the 6.4%-of-GDP averaged over the last three decades of the twentieth century.	自2008年第四季度以来，美国净国民储蓄率一直是负数，与20世纪最后30年的平均水平——占GDP的6. 4%相去甚远。


Never before in modern history has the world’s leading economic power experienced a saving shortfall of such epic proportions.	在现代历史中，还从未有哪个世界经济大国经历过如此规模的储蓄短缺。


Yet the US found a way to finesse this problem.	但美国找到了一条解决这一问题的妙招。


Exploiting what Valéry Giscard d’Estaing called the “exorbitant privilege” of the world’s reserve currency, the US borrowed surplus savings from abroad on very attractive terms, running massive balance-of-payments, or current-account, deficits to attract foreign capital.	利用季斯卡（Valéry Giscard d’Estaing）所谓的世界储备货币的“过度特权”，美国可以廉价借入国外的盈余储蓄，维持巨额国际收支（或经常项目）赤字以吸引外国资本。


The US current account, which was last in balance in 1991, hit a record deficit of $801 billion (6% of GDP) in 2006.	美国经常项目上一次出现余额是在1991年，2006年，经常项目创出了8010亿美元（相当于GDP的6%）赤字的历史记录。


This gap has narrowed in the past couple of years, but much of the improvement probably reflects little more than the temporary impact of an unusually tough business cycle.	过去几年来，赤字有所减少，但大部分改善可能只是受异常艰难的商业周期的暂时影响所致。


This is where America’s multilateral trade deficit enters the equation, for it has long accounted for the bulk of America’s balance-of-payments gap.	美国多边贸易赤字长期以来都要占美国国际收支缺口的大头。


Since 2000, it has made up fully 96% of the cumulative current-account shortfall.	自2000年以来更是占到了累计经常项目赤字的96%。


And that is what ultimately makes the China-centric blame game so absurd.	这也是中国罪魁论的可笑之处。


Without addressing the root of the problem – America’s chronic saving shortfall – it is ludicrous to believe that there can be a bilateral solution for a multilateral problem.	除非能从根源上解决问题——即慢性储蓄短缺——否则，认为能用双边办法解决多边问题就是荒唐可笑的。


Yet that is exactly what US officials, together with many prominent economists, believe America needs.	但这正是美国官员以及众多出名经济学家认为美国所需要做的。


Since the trade deficit is widely thought to put pressure on US jobs and real wages, the US-China trade imbalance has come under special scrutiny in these days of great angst.	贸易赤字被广泛认为给美国就业和真实工资造成了严重压力，因此，近期以来，人们心急火燎地对美中贸易失衡给予了特别关注。


Yes, China does account for the largest component of America’s multilateral trade deficit – making up 42% of the total trade gap in 2010.	是的，中国是美国多边贸易赤字最主要的组成部分，占2010年贸易总缺口的42%。


Conscious outsourcing and supply-chain management decisions by US multinationals play an important role in exaggerating China’s share.	美国跨国公司的主动外包和供应链管理决策是中国份额大增的重要原因之一。


But that does little to let China off the hook in the eyes of Washington.	但这并没有让华盛顿的官员们停止对中国指手画脚。


Long-standing charges of currency manipulation provide the proverbial smoking gun that US politicians – of both parties – believe justifies the imposition of steep tariffs on China’s exports to the US (which totaled $365 billion in 2010).	长期存在的货币操控指控为美国政客——不管是共和党还是民主党——提供了约定俗成的确凿证据，使他们认定应该对中国向美国出口的商品加以高额关税。


That was precisely the argument behind the US Senate’s recent overwhelming approval of a “currency bill” that took dead aim on China.	这就是美国参议院最近以压倒性多数通过的矛头直指中国的“货币法案”背后的观点。


While it may be convenient to hold others accountable for America’s problems, this is bad economics driving bad politics.	给美国的问题找个替罪羊也许只是权宜之计，但仍不可不谓是坏算盘驱使的坏政策。


In an era of open-ended US government budget deficits and chronic shortfalls in personal saving, America is doomed to suffer subpar savings and massive multilateral trade deficits for as far as the eye can see.	在一个美国政府预算赤字和慢性个人储蓄短缺早已是众人皆知的时代，美国注定要在可见的未来经历储蓄不足、多边贸易赤字巨大的时期。


In that vein, closing down trade with China, while failing to address the saving shortfall, is like putting pressure on one end of a water balloon.	切断与中国的贸易不但不能解决储蓄短缺问题，还可能弄巧成拙。


The Chinese component of America’s multilateral trade deficit will simply migrate somewhere else – most likely to a higher-cost producer.	美国多边贸易赤字中的中国成分只可能转移给另一个国家，该国的生产成本十有八九会远高于中国。


That would be the functional equivalent of a tax hike on beleaguered American families – hardly the solution that US politicians are promising.	此举无异于向困境重重的美国家庭加税，绝不是美国政客所承诺的解决方案。


This is not to ignore important US-China trade issues that need to be addressed.	这并不是要忽视必须修正的美中贸易问题。


Market access should be high on the agenda – especially for a sluggish US economy that needs new sources of growth, like exports.	市场准入应该成为最优先项——特别是对疲软的、急需出口等新增长源的美国经济来说。


With China now America’s third largest – and by far its most rapidly growing – export market, the US should push hard to expand business opportunities in China, especially as the Chinese economy tilts increasingly toward internal demand.	中国目前是美国第三大、也是增长最快的出口市场，因此美国应该致力于拓展中国机会，特别是在中国经济越来越倾向于内需的当口。


China should be viewed as an opportunity, not a threat.	中国应该被视为机会，而不是威胁。


At the same time, the US government should come clean with the American public about charges of Chinese currency manipulation and unfair trade practices.	与此同时，美国政府应该向美国公众澄清，指责中国操纵汇率是不公平的贸易伎俩。


The renminbi has, in fact, appreciated by 30% relative to the US dollar since mid-2005.	事实上，自2005年以来，人民币已对美元升值了30%。


In broad multilateral terms – a far more meaningful gauge because it measures a currency’s value against a broad cross-section of a country’s trading partners – the “real effective” renminbi currently stands about 8% above its most recent 12-year average (1998-2010).	从多边数字来看——该指标更有意义，因为它测量一国货币相对于该国所有贸易伙伴的价值——“真实有效”的人民币汇率大约要比过去12年（1998—2010）的平均值高了8%。


Yes, China continues to accumulate a vast fund of foreign-exchange reserves.	是的，中国仍在继续囤积巨量外汇储备。


But this is as much the result of speculators’ “hot money” plays as it is a conscious and perfectly reasonable effort by Chinese policymakers to remain focused on financial stability and manage currency appreciation in a gradual, disciplined, and orderly fashion.	但对于这个问题，投机者的“热钱”所起的作用不亚于中国决策者有意识、极合理地专注于金融稳定大局、坚持渐近可控的升值之路。


China-bashing in the US speaks to a corrosive shift in the American psyche.	指责中国体现出美国人心态的恶化。


It deflects attention away from those truly responsible for perpetuating the greatest saving shortfall in history.	这使得美国人的注意力从真正应该对导致史上最大储蓄短缺问题永久化的人身上移开。


Washington has been seduced by the political economy of false prosperity.	美国已经被虚假繁荣的政治经济学惯坏了。


That seduction has encouraged America to squander its savings and live beyond its means for nearly two decades.	它使美国人在近20年的时间里一直过着过度奢侈的生活。


Now the game is up.	现在，游戏结束了。


The ultimate test of any nation’s character is to look inside itself at moments of great challenge. Swept up in the blame game, the US is doing the opposite.	不管是什么国家，其国民性格的终极考验都是能否在面临重大挑战是躬身自省。


And that could well be the greatest tragedy of all.	美国正在倒行逆施，大玩抹黑他人的游戏。


After all, America’s 88 deficits did not arise of thin air.	说到底，美国的88个赤字不是一日炼成的。


The American Consumer is Not Okay	美国消费者有恙


NEW HAVEN – The spin-doctors are hard at work talking up America’s subpar economic recovery.	纽黑文—诡辩老手努力地为美国欠佳的经济复苏开脱。


All eyes are on households.	所有目光都集中在家庭身上。


Thanks to falling unemployment, rising home values, and record stock prices, an emerging consensus of forecasters, market participants, and policymakers has now concluded that the American consumer is finally back.	由于失业率的下降、家庭价值的增加和创新高的股市，预测家、市场参与者和决策者目前形成了新的共识，美国消费者终于回来了。


Don’t believe it.	别信他们。


First, consider the facts: Over the 21 quarters since the beginning of 2008, real (inflation-adjusted) personal consumption has risen at an average annual rate of just 0.9%.	首先来看事实：自2008年初以来的21个季度中，真实（经通胀调整的）个人消费平均增长年率只有0. 9%。


That is by far the most protracted period of weakness in real US consumer demand since the end of World War II – and a massive slowdown from the pre-crisis pace of 3.6% annual real consumption growth from 1996 to 2007.	这是美国真实消费需求自二战结束以来最长的疲软期，大大低于1996—2007年危机前真实消费增长年率3. 6%


With household consumption accounting for about 70% of the US economy, that 2.7-percentage-point gap between pre-crisis and post-crisis trends has been enough to knock 1.9 percentage points off the post-crisis trend in real GDP growth.	家庭消费占美国经济的约70%，因此危机前后趋势之间2. 7个百分点的差距足以让危机后真实GDP增长率趋势下降1.


Look no further for the cause of unacceptably high US unemployment.	9个百分点。 无怪乎美国失业率会高到不可忍受的程度了。


To appreciate fully the unique character of this consumer-demand shortfall, trends over the past 21 quarters need to be broken down into two distinct sub-periods.	为了充分理解这一消费需求短缺的独特特征，过去21个季度的趋势可以被分为两个不同的次级阶段。


First, there was a 2.2% annualized decline from the first quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009.	首先是2008年一季度到2009年二季度，此阶段出现了2. 2%的年化下降。


This was crisis-driven carnage, highlighted by a 4.5% annualized collapse in the final two quarters of 2008.	这是拜危机所赐，高峰是2008年后两个季度，年化下降达4. 5%。


Second, this six-quarter plunge was followed, from mid-2009 through early 2013, by 15 quarters of annualized consumption growth averaging just 2% – an upturn that pales in comparison with what would have been expected based on past consumer-spending cycles.	接着，在这六个季度的下降后是2009年年中至2013年年初的15个季度，年化消费增长平均率只有2%——若基于过去消费支出周期预测，则这一增长显得极为无力。


That key point appears all but lost on the consumer-recovery crowd.	这个关键点人人都看得到，唯有消费复苏派对此视而不见。


In recent speeches and discussions with current and former central bankers, I have been criticized for focusing too much on the 0.9% trend of the past 21 quarters and paying too little attention to the 2% recovery phase of the post-crisis period.	在最近的演讲与现任和前任央行行长的讨论中，我被批太关注过去21个季度0. 9%的增长趋势，而没有关注到危机后时期2%的复苏节奏。


At least it’s a recovery, they claim, and a sign of healing that can be attributed mainly to the heroic, unconventional efforts of the US Federal Reserve.	他们指出，这至少是复苏，也是走向健康的信号，其功劳主要来自美联储果断的非常规手段。


This brings us to the second part of the argument against optimism: analytics.	这就把我们带到了反对乐观的第二个理由：分析。


One of the first concepts to which an economics student is exposed in a basic macro course is “pent-up” consumer demand.	经济学学生在基础宏观课程中接触的第一批概念之一是“被抑制的”消费者需求。


Discretionary consumption is typically deferred during recessions, especially for long-lasting durable goods such as motor vehicles, furniture, and appliances.	自由裁量消费通常会在衰退中被推迟，特别是汽车、家居和电器等长期耐久品。


Once the recession ends and recovery begins, a “stock-adjustment” response takes hold, as households compensate for foregone replacement and update their aging durable goods.	当衰退结束、复苏开始时，“存货调整”反应就会出现，家庭开始补偿此前的替代，升级老旧的耐久品。


Over most of the postwar period, this post-recession release of pent-up consumer demand has been a powerful source of support for economic recovery.	在战后的大部分时间里，这一危机后释放的被抑制的消费者需求是经济复苏的强大支撑力。


In the eight recoveries since the early 1950’s (excluding the brief pop following the credit-controls-induced slump in the 1980’s), the stock-adjustment response lifted real consumption growth by 6.1%, on average, for five quarters following business-cycle downturns; spurts of 7-8% growth were not uncommon for a quarter or two.	在20世纪50年代初的八次复苏中（不包括20世纪80年代信用管制导致的衰退之后的短暂繁荣），存货调整反应平均将真实消费增长提高了6. 1%（商业周期衰退后5个季度），一两个季度出现7—8%的增长井喷也不足为奇。


By contrast, the release of pent-up demand in the current cycle amounted to just 3% annualized growth in the five quarters from early 2010 to early 2011.	相反，当前周期的释放的被抑制需求只带来了3%的年化增长（在2010年初至2011年初的五个季度中）。


Moreover, the strongest quarterly gain was a 4.1% increase in the fourth quarter of 2010.	此外，最强季度增长出现在2010年四季度，增长率为4. 1%。


This is a stunning result.	这是个令人沮丧的结果。


The worst consumer recession in modern history, featuring a record collapse in durable-goods expenditures in 2008-2009, should have triggered an outsize surge of pent-up demand.	现代史以来最严重的消费衰退——2008—2009年耐久品支出下降创出历史记录——应该触发被抑制需求的全面爆发。


Yet it did anything but that.	但什么都发生了，唯独这一幕没有发生。


Instead, the release of pent-up consumer demand was literally half that of previous business cycles.	相反，被抑制消费者需求的释放大概只有此前商业周期水平的一半。


The third point is more diagnostic: The shockingly anemic pattern of post-crisis US consumer demand has resulted from a deep Japan-like balance-sheet recession.	第三点是关于诊断的：美国消费者需求在危机后增长如此无力是因为类似于日本的深度资产负债表衰退导致的。


With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the 12-year pre-crisis US consumer-spending binge was built on a precarious foundation of asset and credit bubbles.	从后见之明中我们知道，危机之前美国所经历的12年的消费者支出繁荣建立在脆弱的资产和信用泡沫的基础之上。


When those bubbles burst, consumers were left with a massive overhang of excess debt and subpar saving.	当这些泡沫破裂时，留给消费者的是大量积压的过多债务和过少储蓄。


The post-bubble aversion to spending, and the related focus on balance-sheet repair, reflects what Nomura Research Institute economist Richard Koo has called a powerful “debt rejection” syndrome.	泡沫期后的支出厌恶，以及与此相关的对修复资产负债表的关注，反映了野村研究所经济学家辜朝明所谓的强大的“债务拒绝”综合症。


While Koo applied this framework to Japanese firms in Japan’s first lost decade of the 1990’s, it rings true for America’s crisis-battered consumers, who are still struggling with the lingering pressures of excessive debt loads, underwater mortgages, and woefully inadequate personal saving.	辜朝明用这一框架���析日本第一个失去的十年（20世纪90年代）中的日本企业，但这一框架也适用于饱受危机打击的美国消费者，他们至今仍在挥之不去的过度债务负担、按揭资不抵债和个人储蓄严重不足的局面中苦苦挣扎。


Through its unconventional monetary easing, the Fed is attempting to create a shortcut around the imperative of household sector balance-sheet repair.	美联储实施了非常规的货币宽松，试图创造一条修复家庭部门资产负债表的捷径。


This is where the wealth effects of now-rebounding housing prices and a surging stock market come into play.	在这里，目前已步入反弹的房价和暴涨的股市的财富效应体现出来了。


But are these newfound wealth effects really all that they are made out to be?	但这些新出现的财富效应真的就是我们想要的吗？


Yes, the stock market is now at an all-time high – but only in current dollars.	是的，股市目前已经创出历史新高——但这是以当前美元衡量的。


In real terms, the S&P 500 is still 20% below its January 2000 peak.	若以真实值衡量，标准普尔500指数仍比2000年1月峰值低了20%。


Similarly, while the Case-Shiller index of US home prices is now up 10.2% over the year ending March 2013, it remains 28% below its 2006 peak.	类似地，尽管Case-Shiller美国房价指数在2013年3月累计同比增长10. 2%，但仍比2006年峰值低了28%。


Wealth creation matters, but not until it recoups the wealth destruction that preceded it.	财富创造能起到效果，但得等到它消弭了此前的财富毁灭之后。


Sadly, most American households are still far from recovery on the asset side of their balance sheets.	不幸的是，大部分美国家庭的资产负债表的资产端还远远没有复苏。


Moreover, though the US unemployment rate has fallen, this largely reflects an alarming decline in labor-force participation, with more than 6.5 million Americans since 2006 having given up looking for work.	此外，尽管美国失业率有所下降，但这大部分反映了值得警惕的劳动力参与率的下降，自2006年以来超过650万美国人放弃寻找工作。


At the same time, while consumer confidence is on the mend, it remains well below pre-crisis readings.	与此同时，尽管消费者信心在反弹，但仍比危机前水平低得多。


In short, the American consumer’s nightmare is far from over.	简言之，美国消费者的噩梦远远没有醒来。


Spin and frothy markets aside, the healing has only just begun.	抛开市场欢腾，康复才刚刚开始。


America’s Political Recession	美国的政治衰退


BERKELEY – The odds are now about 36% that the United States will be in a recession next year.	伯克利—目前，美国在明年陷入衰退的可能性大约在36%。


The reason is entirely political: partisan polarization has reached levels never before seen, threatening to send the US economy tumbling over the “fiscal cliff” – the automatic tax increases and spending cuts that will take effect at the beginning of 2013 unless Democrats and Republicans agree otherwise.	原因完全是政治上的：党派两极分化达到了前所未有的程度，眼看就把美国经济逼下“财政悬崖”——2013年开始自动增税减支，除非民主党和共和党达成其他一致方案。


More than a century ago, during the first Gilded Age, American politics was sharply polarized as well.	一百年前，在第一次镀金时代期间，美国政坛也出现了迅速两极分化。


In 1896, future President Theodore Roosevelt was a Republican attack dog.	1896年，日后成为美国总统的西奥多·罗斯福是一位共和党打手。


He denounced Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan as a mere puppet of the sinister governor of Illinois, John Peter Altgeld.	他抨击民主党总统候选人布莱恩（William Jennings Bryan）只不过是伊利诺伊州黑老大奥特戈尔德（John Peter Altgeld）的傀儡。


Bryan, Roosevelt said, “would be as clay in the hands of the potter under the astute control of the ambitious and unscrupulous Illinois communist.”	罗斯福说，布莱恩“就像是制陶家手上的粘土，被野心勃勃、肆无忌惮的伊利诺伊州共产主义者玩弄在股掌之间。


The “free coinage of silver” would be “but a step towards the general socialism which is the fundamental doctrine of his political belief.”	”“自由铸币制”将“是迈向完全社会主义的一个步骤，社会主义就是他的基本政治理念。


He and Altgeld “seek to overturn the...essential policies which have controlled the government since its foundation.”	”他和奥特戈尔德“想颠覆……自建国以来便控制着政府的基本政策。 ”


Such language is as extreme as any we hear today – and from a man who was shortly to become Vice President (and later President, following the assassination of William McKinley).	这番话与如今我们所听到的那些一样极端，而说这番话的是即将成为副总统（并在麦金利遇刺后成为总统）之人。


We have heard Texas Governor Rick Perry call obliquely for the lynching of his fellow Republican, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, should he come to the Lone Star State.	我们听到得克萨斯州州长佩里（Rick Perry）拐弯抹角地表示，要是其共和党同僚、美联储主席伯南克胆敢到得州来的话，就会处死他。


And we have seen Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach explore the possibility of removing President Barack Obama from the ballot in Kansas, because, Kobach suggested, Obama is “not a natural-born citizen.”	我们也听到堪萨斯州州务卿科巴赫（Kris Kobach）寻求在堪萨斯州选票上抹掉总统奥巴马的名字，因为他认为奥巴马并非“生而美国公民”。


But neither Perry nor Kobach is likely ever to be a US president, whereas Theodore Roosevelt was more than a partisan.	但不论是佩里还是科巴赫，都不可能成为美国总统，而西奥多·罗斯福已经超越了党派色彩。


He was happy to make deals with Democrats – to put himself at the head not just of the Republican Party but of the bipartisan Progressive coalition, trying either to yoke the two forces together or to tack back and forth between them to achieve legislative and policy goals.	他乐于与民主党做交易——让自己不仅成为共和党的党首，也��上跨党派的进步联盟的首脑，他通过促使两党齐头并进和周旋于两党之间左右逢源达到立法和政策目标。


Obama broadly follows Ronald Reagan’s (second-term) security policy, George H.W. Bush’s spending policy, Bill Clinton’s tax policy, the bipartisan Squam Lake Group’s financial-regulatory policy, Perry’s immigration policy, John McCain’s climate-change policy, and Mitt Romney’s health-care policy (at least when Romney was governor of Massachusetts).	奥巴马全面仿照了里根（第二任期）的安全政策、老布什的支出政策、克林顿的税收政策、跨党派斯夸姆湖集团（Squam Lake Group）的金融监管政策、佩里的移民政策、麦凯恩（John McCain）的气候变化政策以及罗姆尼（至少在其担任马萨诸塞州州长期间）的医疗政策。


And yet he has gotten next to no Republicans to support their own policies.	但他并不向共和党靠拢，支持共和党的政策。


Indeed, like Clinton before him, Obama has been unable to get Republican senators like Susan Collins to vote for her own campaign-finance policies, McCain to vote for his own climate-change policy, and – most laughably – Romney to support his own health-care plan.	事实上，像前任克林顿一样，奥巴马无法说服柯林斯（Susan Collins）等共和党参议员支持其本人的竞选金融政策，麦凯恩支持其本人的气候变化政策，以及——最可笑的——罗姆尼支持其本人的医疗计划。


Likewise, he has been unable to get Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Paul Ryan to endorse his own Medicare cost-control proposals.	类似地，他也无法让共和党副总统候选人莱恩支持其本人的联邦医保计划成本控制方案。


There are obvious reasons for this.	之所以如此，有诸多显而易见的原因。


A large chunk of the Republican base, including many of the party’s largest donors, believes that any Democratic president is an illegitimate enemy of America, so that whatever such an incumbent proposes must be wrong and thus should be thwarted.	共和党党基——包括很多该党的最大赞助人——中有很大一部分认为，只要是民主党总统，便是美国的非法敌人，因此，只要是民主党内阁提出的方案，便一定是错误的，应该抵制。


And the Republican cadres believe this of Obama even more than they believed it of Clinton.	共和党干部还认为奥巴马比克林顿更符合这一观点。


This view clearly influences Republican office-holders, who fear the partisan beast that mans their campaigns’ phone banks and holds the purse strings.	这一观点显然影响了共和党领导人，他们担心党派之争扼住了其竞选阵营的电话银行和钱袋子。


Moreover, ever since Clinton’s election in 1992, those at the head of the Republican Party have believed that creating gridlock whenever a Democrat is in the White House, and thus demonstrating the government’s incapacity to act, is their best path to electoral success.	此外，自从克林顿1992年当选以来，共和党领导人就认定，不论民主党谁当总统，都要在白宫制造僵局，以证明政府的无法作为，这是竞选成功的最佳之道。


That was the Republicans’ calculation in 2011-2012.	这就是2011—2012年期间共和党的算盘。


And November’s election did not change the balance of power anywhere in the American government: Obama remains President, the Republicans remain in control of the House of Representatives, and the Democrats control the Senate.	11月的大选并未改变美国政府权力平衡：奥巴马仍然是总统，共和党仍然控制着众议院，民主党仍然控制着参议院。


Now, it is possible that Republican legislators may rebel against their leaders, arguing that they ran for office to govern, not to paralyze the government in the hope that doing so will give the party power to reign as it wishes after the next election.	如今，共和党立法者可能已经背叛了其领导人，认为他们在其位应谋其政，而不是以共和党在下一次选举中夺取权力为目的制造政府瘫痪。


It is possible that Republican leaders like Representatives John Boehner and Eric Cantor and Senator Mitch McConnell will conclude that their policy of obstruction has been a failure.	博纳尔（John Boehner）众议员、康托（Eric Cantor）众议员、麦考奈尔（Mitch McConnell）参议员等共和党领导人可能会认为他们的阻挠政策已经失败了。


They might note that, although the economy remains deeply troubled and depressed in the aftermath of a financial crisis for which they set the stage, Obama’s policies have been by far the most successful of those in any major advanced country, and conclude that he has been a relatively good president, and one worth supporting.	他们也许会注意到，尽管经济仍麻烦重重，金融危机一波未了（正是他们为金融危机制造了温床），但迄今为止，奥巴马的政策是诸发达国家中最成功的，他们也许会认为相对来说，奥巴马是一位好总统，值得支持。


But don’t count on it.	但别当真了。


Right now, every senior politician in America is telling their favorites in the press that they are confident that compromise on the “fiscal cliff” will be reached before the end of December.	目前，所有美国高级政客都在媒体面前向支持者表示，自己对在12月底之前就“财政悬崖”问题达成一致有信心。


But they are telling their favorites this because they think that pessimism now will lead to their being blamed for gridlock later.	但他们之所以向支持者如此表示，是因为当前的悲观气氛会导致人们把随后的僵局的责任推到他们头上。


It seems to me that the odds are around 60% that real negotiation will not begin until tax rates go up on January 1.	对我来说，有60%的可能，真正的谈判在明年1月1日税率提高之前是不会发生的。


And it seems to me that, if gridlock continues into 2013, the odds are 60% that it will tip the US back into recession.	对我来说，如果政治僵局持续到2013年，美国有60%的可能因此重陷衰退。


Let us hope that it will be short and shallow.	但愿是我目光短浅。


Bye-Bye, Middle East?	拜拜，中东？


PARIS – For some time now, a certain strategic vision has been gaining traction: the United States is becoming energy-independent, paving the way for its political retreat from the Middle East and justifying its strategic “pivot” toward Asia.	巴黎—不久前，一种战略观点开始流行：美国这在变得能源独立，为其从中东的战略和撤退扫清道路，也为其战略“支点”移向亚洲造势。 乍一看，这一观点无比正确。


This view seems intuitively correct, but is it?	但真的如此吗？


Energy-hungry America has long depended on the global market to meet domestic demand.	渴望能源的美国长期以来一直依靠全球市场满足国内需求。


In 2005, the US imported 60% of the energy that it consumed.	2005年，美国所消费的能源中60%来自进口。


Since then, however, the share of imports has decreased, and it should continue to do so.	不过，至此以后，进口比重便有所降低，未来仍将维持这一趋势。


The US is expected to become energy self-sufficient in 2020, and to become an oil exporter by 2030.	据估计，到2020年，美国将实现能源自给，并在2030年成为石油出口国。


This scenario would grant the US three enormous advantages.	这一形势将给美国带来三大优势。


It would enhance US economic competitiveness, especially relative to Europe, given the lower costs involved in the extraction of shale gas.	这将赋予美国经济竞争力，特别是相对欧洲的竞争力，因为美国提取页岩气的成本更低。


It would also reduce America’s exposure to growing unrest in the Arab world.	这还将减少美国对日益动荡的阿拉伯世界的风险暴露。


Finally, it would increase the relative vulnerability of America’s main strategic rival, China, which is becoming increasingly dependent on Middle East energy supplies.	最后，这还将增加美国主要战略竞争对手中国的相对弱势，后者正日益依赖中东的能源供给。


These facts obviously need to be taken seriously, but their implications for US foreign policy in the Middle East should not be too hastily drawn.	这些因素显然都值得严肃考虑，但它们对美国的中东外交政策的影响不应该过早下结论。


Above all, though energy dependence is a key element of US policy in the region, it is far from being the only factor.	无论如何，尽管能源依赖是美国在该地区政策的主要决定要素，但绝不是唯一要素。


Israel’s security and the desire to contain Iran are equally important.	以色列的安全和对遏制伊朗的渴望也同样重要。


Moreover, the Middle East’s role in the global geopolitics of energy will grow in the coming decades, making it difficult to see how a superpower like the US could simply walk away from the region.	此外，中东在全球能源地缘政治中的作用将在未来几十年中与日俱增，因此，对于美国这样的超级大国，很难想象它会对该地区一弃了之。


Within the next 15 years, OPEC countries will account for 50% of global oil production, compared to only 42% today.	在未来15年中，欧佩克国家将占据全球石油产量的一半，而今天为42%。


Furthermore, the country on which this increase will most likely hinge is Iraq.	此外，份额的增长之源极有可能来自伊拉克。


Could the US ignore a country that in roughly ten years will become the world’s second-largest oil exporter, generating more than $200 billion annually in revenue, while increasingly being dominated by an authoritarian Shia regime that is close to Iran?	在未来十年中，伊拉克可能将成为世界第二大石油出口国，每年产生2000多亿美元收入，同时又在日益被亲伊朗的什叶派独裁政权主导。 这样一个国家容得美国忽视吗？


Would it withdraw in the face of the consequent strategic threat to its three allies – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel – in the region?	美国会放任其三大地区盟友——沙特、土耳其和以色列面临战略威胁从该地区撤退吗？


Such a possibility seems even more far-fetched as long as the Iranian nuclear crisis remains unresolved and the Syrian crisis continues to widen the region’s Shia-Sunni divide (reflected in increased tension between Turkey and Iran).	只要伊朗核危机得不到解决，叙利亚危机继续扩大中东什叶派-逊尼派分歧（反映在土耳其和伊朗日益紧张的对峙上），这样的可能性就愈加渺茫了。


Even as US President Barack Obama was visiting Asia in November – a trip meant to underscore America’s “pivot” – he was forced to devote considerable time and attention to mediating a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.	尽管美国总统奥巴马在11月访问了亚洲——旨在强调美国的“支点”地位——他仍不得不投入大量时间和精力调停加沙的以色列和哈马斯冲突。


Indeed, if oil were truly America’s only or paramount interest in the Middle East, its special relationship with Israel would be mystifying, given the harm that it implies for US interests among Arab oil exporters.	事实上，如果石油真是美国在中东的唯一重要利益，则其与以色列的特殊关系就无法解释了，因为这有害于美��与阿拉伯石油出口国的关系。


Even when its energy dependence on the Middle East was at its peak, the US rarely altered its policy of support for Israel.	即使其对中东能源的依赖已经过了顶峰期，美国也不会改变支持以色列的政策。


It is also important to bear in mind that in 1973, the US suffered less from the OPEC oil embargo than Europe did, even though America, which had resupplied Israel in its war with Egypt and Syria in October of that year, was the primary target.	记住以下这一点也很重要。 1973年，美国所遭受的欧佩克石油禁运要远轻于欧洲，尽管美国才是禁运的主要目标——因为美国在当年10月以色列对埃及和叙利亚的战争中支持以色列。


In the end, America’s position in the region strengthened after Egypt became a US ally and made peace with Israel.	最终，在埃及成为美国盟友并与以色列和解后，美国在该地区的地位提高了。


China’s growing interest in the Middle East also decreases the likelihood of an American withdrawal.	中国在中东利益的提升也降低了美国撤退的可能性。


The US will remain concerned about ensuring the security of energy supplies for its Asian allies, which, like China, are increasingly dependent on the region’s oil exporters.	美国仍将考虑确保亚洲盟国能源供应的安全问题，它们与中国一样，越来越依赖中东的石油出口。


Nevertheless, while an American withdrawal from the Middle East seems highly unlikely, US exposure to the region will indeed decline; as that happens, America’s role there will probably become more subdued – and perhaps more cynical.	尽管如此，虽然美国不太可能撤出中东，但美国在该地区的暴露毫无疑问将有所降低； 随着这一趋势，美国在中东的作用可能也会与日具减，日益受制。


Its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will likely be limited to maintaining the status quo rather than seeking a comprehensive settlement.	其对以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突的干涉可能将局限于维持现状，而不再寻求全面解决。


This stance – suggested by America’s opposition to granting Palestine observer-state status at the United Nations – would amount to an admission by the US that it has given up on the creation of two states in the Middle East.	这一立场——可从美国在联合国大会上反对授予巴勒斯坦观察员国地位中一窥端倪——无异于承认放弃在中东建立两个国家的努力。


That would certainly satisfy Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and the Palestinian fringe seeking to weaken the Palestinian Authority.	这显然满足了以色列总理内塔尼亚胡以及寻求削弱巴勒斯坦权力机构的巴边缘组织。


But it would fully vindicate those who believe that Obama is more a man of good will than a visionary.	但也充分证明认为奥巴马是善人多过空想家是正确的。


America’s Perpetual Christmas	美国永不结束的圣诞


Has the United States transcended the laws of economics?	美国能否超越经济规律？


As the New Year begins, the US continues to race ahead of its rich-country counterparts.	新年伊始，美国经济仍然领先于其它富裕国家。


The gargantuan US trade deficit?	庞大的贸易赤字？


No problem.	没问题。


In 2005, it widened further, and the dollar only strengthened.	2005年赤字额继续增加，而美元却依然坚挺。


Low investment and a deteriorating primary education system?	投资规模小、初等教育体系恶化吗？


Not to worry.	别担心。


The super-flexible US economy keeps managing to produce more with less.	超级灵活的美国经济只用很少的投入就能获得更多的效益。


Nor are there any signs of America’s economic hegemony starting to fold under the weight of maintaining its unilateral military dominance.	此外美国经济霸权也没有在保持单边军事统治的重压下显露出彻底失败的迹象。


Instead of feeling the pinch of wartime privations, like in any ordinary country, American consumers are binging as if it were Christmas all year round.	美国消费者没有象普通国家的消费者那样感到战争时期物质匮乏的压力，他们继续狂欢，好像1年365天天天都是圣诞节。


There are those who truly believe in the idea that America is exceptional.	有人虔诚地相信美国经济与众不同。


Those true believers argue that America’s consumers can long pursue their spendthrift ways because their country’s economy is better than everyone else’s.	这些人认为由于美国经济比其它国家都好，美国消费者就能够继续他们挥金如土的生活。


The US labor market is more flexible than Europe’s, enabling it to react more nimbly to the ever shifting sands of globalization.	美国的劳务市场比欧洲灵活，能够迅速调整适应全球化不断变化的需要。


And, unlike most countries, especially in Latin America and Asia, the US system ruthlessly prunes weak corporate leadership.	此外，与拉丁美洲和亚洲的多数国家不同，美国的经济体系无情地剪除一切软弱的企业领导。


Moreover, the true believers cite America’s better-funded and hyper-competitive university system, which sucks in a disproportionate share of the world’s top students and researchers.	不仅如此，这些虔诚的崇拜者还用美国资金充足、竞争激烈的大学体系来证明自己的正确，这些大学吸纳世界顶尖学生和研究人员的数量之多令人惊讶。


Many ultimately choose to immigrate to America permanently, and it is relatively easy for them to do so, thanks to a society that still welcomes outsiders with open arms (even if things have become more difficult since 2001).	这些人中的很大一部分最终永久定居美国，他们定居的难度相对较小，这也要归功于仍旧张开双臂欢迎外来移民的美国社会（尽管2001年以后难度已有所增大）。


On top of all this, the US military, rather than being a burden, feeds the country’s technological superiority by subsidizing basic research.	除此之外，美国军队不但不是社会的负担，还通过资助基础研究为美国保持技术领先做出了贡献。


By contrast, skeptics hold that the US economy already contains the seeds of its own socio-economic decline.	与此形成鲜明对照的是，怀疑论者认为社会经济衰退的种子早已蕴藏在了美国的经济之中。


They point to worsening income inequality, as images beamed worldwide from post-hurricane New Orleans illustrated all too clearly.	他们指的是日益拉大的收入差距，这一点在新奥尔良遭受飓风袭击后传送到世界各地的电视画面中已经有了清楚地证明。


Poor children do not have reasonable access to health care.	贫困儿童得不到合理的医疗救治。


Nor are the non-poor faring particularly well, as wage growth has remained virtually flat for a very long time, even as corporate profits are booming.	非贫困人口的生活状况也并不理想，因为很久以来虽然企业利润大幅度飙升，但员工薪水却一直没有太大增长。


Indeed, this disconnect may explain why polls do not give President Bush the credit for economic management that his strong record would seem to merit. Nor does it help Americans’ mood that they spend far more of their lives working than do citizens in Europe or, these days, even Japan.	实际上，这解释了布什总统出色的经济管理为什么没有为他赢得相应的民意，美国人的工作时间比欧洲人、甚至日本人长得多对公众的情绪也没有帮助。


All of these factors place deep stresses on the social fabric which, so the skeptics argue, will ultimately play out in the political arena.	怀疑论者认为所有这些因素都转化成了社会压力，而社会压力最终会对政治局势造成影响。


Interestingly, both sides cite America’s gaping trade deficit – believe it or not, the US is soaking up two-thirds of global excess saving – to support their arguments.	有趣的是，正反两方都把美国的贸易赤字做为支持本方观点的依据，无论你是否相信，美国都吸纳了全球多余存款的三分之二以上。


The true believers view the deficits as evidence that the world recognizes how special the US is and wants to buy in. Skeptics see an empire living on borrowed money and borrowed time.	狂热的崇拜者把赤字作为全世界认可美国特殊性，愿意大宗买进的证据，而怀疑论者看到的却是一个依靠借钱、借时间度日的没落帝国。


So which is it?	到底哪种看法是对的？


In my view, those who think that America is about to collapse are likely to be disappointed.	在我看来，认为美国行将崩溃的一方可能会感到失望，但与此同时，我怀疑美国例外论也即将终结。


Nevertheless, I suspect that the age of American exceptionalism is near an end, and soon per capita income in Europe and Japan will approach that of the US, rather than falling farther behind.	欧洲和日本的人均收入与美国之间的差距不会进一步拉大，相反会迅速地接近美国的水平。


Though the next few years are likely to underscore some of the weaknesses that the skeptics highlight, the end will come mainly because other countries will find creative ways to mimic the most effective US institutions, albeit within their own legal, political, and social frameworks.	尽管怀疑论者强调的弱点将会在今后几年内渐渐凸显，但最终结果是其它国家会创造性地模仿效率最高的美国制度，尽管这种模仿将发生在其自身的法律、政治和社会构架之中。


We would do well to recall how, at the beginning of the 1990’s, book after book was still being written urging US and European corporations to imitate Japan or face certain doom.	我们还能够清晰地记起20世纪90年代初期如何出现了一本接一本的著作，敦促美国和欧洲公司模仿日本的做法，预言惟其如此才能逃脱失败的命运。


The last 15 years have of course revealed deep flaws in Japan’s financial system.	当然过去15年中日本金融体系暴露了很多深层次问题。


But another major factor contributing to Japan’s decline was that firms elsewhere began adopting Japanese methods, such as just-in-time supply chains.	但导致日本衰退的另一个重要因素是其它地方的公司也开始采用日本的管理方法，比如及时生产管理。


Surely, imitation will someday impinge on superior US growth performance as well.	当然，有一天这种模仿也会威胁到美国经济的发展前景。


Perhaps the biggest weakness in the true believers’ argument is the trade deficit.	狂热崇拜者所举论据中最经不起推敲的也许就是贸易赤字问题。


For the moment, America’s ability to borrow vast sums at low interest rates acts like a huge dose of steroids on the economy. It artificially props up consumption growth and allows the government to defer hard choices between taxes and military expenditures.	美国以低利率大量举债的能力就像给经济注入了一针强心剂，人为地支持了消费的增长，使政府得以延迟在税收和军事开支之间做出艰难的抉择。


At some point, the party is going to end.	但美国的经���狂欢终有一天将会曲终人散。


The unwinding of the US economy might even begin in 2006, particularly if Japan continues to grow out of its doldrums, the US housing market softens dramatically, and Europe’s economic recovery accelerates.	美国经济可能在2006年开始衰退，特别是在日本经济继续复苏、美国住房市场明显疲软、欧洲经济复苏逐渐加快的情况下，美国的经济衰退更有可能发生。


Individually, these are each highly plausible scenarios, and collectively they would hit the US trade deficit like a perfect storm.	单独去看，每种状况的可能性都无法排除，而这些合在一起，就构成了冲击美国贸易赤字的完美风暴。


Perhaps the end will come in a different way, but it is difficult to imagine the age of US exceptionalism lasting indefinitely.	也许终结的到来会采取另外一种方式，但很难想象美国例外论时代将会无限期地延长。


Can the end come abruptly in 2006?	美国经济盛宴是否会在2006年突然结束？


This is not the most likely scenario, but it is not unthinkable.	这种情况的可能性虽然不大，但也不是完全不可想象。


America’s Strategy Vacuum	美国的战略真空


NEW HAVEN – Apparently, policymakers at the Federal Reserve are having second thoughts about the wisdom of open-ended quantitative easing (QE).	纽黑文——显然，美联储决策者对开放式量化宽松政策（QE）明智与否开始有些犹豫。


They should.	这种犹豫合情合理。


Not only has this untested policy experiment failed to deliver an acceptable economic recovery; it has also heightened the risk of another crisis.	这项效果不明的政策试验不仅未能实现合格的经济复苏，甚至可能引发另外一场危机。


The minutes of the January 29-30 meeting of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) speak to a simmering discontent: “[M]any participants…expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases.”	不满情绪在1月29－30日举行的美联储联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）会议上暗潮汹涌：“众多与会者…表达了对进一步采购资产所引发的潜在成本和风险的忧虑情绪。


The concerns range from worries about the destabilizing ramifications of an exit strategy from QE to apprehension about capital losses on the Fed’s rapidly ballooning portfolio of securities (currently $3 trillion, and on its way to $4 trillion by the end of this year).	”与会者既忧心量化宽松退出策略可能带来动荡，也担心美联储证券组合迅速膨胀引发资本损失（目前美联储证券组合价值3万亿，并将在年底达到4万亿的规模）。


As serious as these concerns may be, they overlook what could well be the greatest flaw in the Fed’s unprecedented gambit: an emphasis on short-term tactics over longer-term strategy.	无论担忧情绪多么严重，它们都忽略了美联储这项史无前例策略中最大的弱点：那就是强调短期战术甚于长期战略。


Blindsided by the crisis of 2007-2008, the Fed has compounded its original misdiagnosis of the problem by repeatedly doubling down on tactical responses, with two rounds of QE preceding the current, open-ended iteration.	在2007-2008年危机面前目瞪口呆的美联储一而再、再而三地压注于战略对策，先是推出两轮量化宽松又继之以目前开放式的重复操作，并因此不断加深对问题的误判。


The FOMC, drawing a false sense of comfort from the success of QE1 – a massive liquidity injection in the depths of a horrific crisis – mistakenly came to believe that it had found the right template for subsequent policy actions.	联邦公开市场委员会从第一轮量化宽松（在危机恐怖情绪达到顶峰时大规模注入流动性）的成功中感受到虚假的安全感，从而错误地相信已经找到了后续政策行动的正确模式。


That approach might have worked had the US economy been afflicted by a cyclical disease – a temporary shortfall of aggregate demand.	假如是总需求暂时不足的周期性顽疾困扰美国经济这种办法有可能奏效。


In that case, countercyclical policies – both fiscal and monetary – could eventually be expected to plug the demand hole and get the economy going again, just as Keynesians argue.	在上述情况下，按照凯恩斯理论，财政及货币等反周期政策最终可以弥补需求不足，从而让经济再度启动。


But the US is not suffering from a temporary, cyclical malady. It is afflicted by a very different disease: a protracted balance-sheet recession that continues to hobble American households, whose consumption accounts for roughly 70% of GDP.	但与其说困扰美国的是暂时的周期性痼疾，还不如说是另一种顽疾的并发症：一场旷日持久的资产负债表衰退持续绑架美国家庭，而家庭消费占到美国国内生产总值约70%的份额。


Two bubbles – property and credit – against which American families borrowed freely, have long since burst.	美国家庭曾信手拈来的房地产和信贷两大泡沫早已破灭。


But the aftershocks linger: Household-debt loads were still at 113% of disposable personal income in 2012 (versus 75% in the final three decades of the twentieth century), and the personal-saving rate averaged just 3.9% last year (compared to 7.9% from 1970 to 1999).	但由此造成的影响并未消除：2012年家庭债务负担仍然占个人可支配收入的113%（二十世纪后三十年这一比例曾经仅为75%），而去年的个人储蓄率平均仅为3. 9%（1970至1999年曾为7.


Understandably fixated on balance-sheet repair, US consumers have not taken the bait from their monetary and fiscal authorities.	不难想见专注于资产负债表修复的美国消费者并未吞下货币财政当局抛出的香饵。


Instead, they have cut back on spending.	相反，他们已经削减开支。


Gains in inflation-adjusted personal-consumption expenditure have averaged a mere 0.8% over the past five years – the most severe and protracted slowdown in consumer demand growth in the post-World War II era.	五年来通胀调整后的个人消费开支平均仅增长0. 8%，这是二战结束后最严重也最持久的消费需求增长放缓。


The brute force of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus rings hollow as a cyclical remedy to this problem.	在大规模货币财政刺激领域使用蛮力无助于对上述问题��周期性补救。


Another approach is needed.	采用其他方法非常必要。


The focus, instead, should be on accelerating the process of balance-sheet repair, while at the same time returning monetary and fiscal policy levers to more normal settings.	相反，在复原货币财政政策杠杆的同时加速修复资产负债表应当引起足够的重视。


Forgiveness of “underwater” mortgages (where the outstanding loan exceeds the home’s current market value), as well as reducing the foreclosure overhang of some 1.5 million homes, must be part of that solution.	具体措施应包括减免“水下”按揭贷款（即未偿款超过家庭当前市值的贷款），并逐步解除悬在150万户家庭头顶的抵押品赎回权取消。


How else can the crisis-battered housing market finally clear for the remainder of US homeowners?	还有什么其他办法能让剩余的美国房主摆脱房地产市场的影响？


The same can be said for enhanced saving incentives, which would contribute to longer-term financial security for American households, most of which suffered massive wealth losses in the Great Recession.	其他措施还包括强化储蓄激励机制，提升大萧条时期遭受巨大财产损失的多数美国家庭的财务安全。


Expanded individual retirement accounts and 401K pension schemes, special incentives for low-income households (most of which have no retirement plans), and an end to the financial repression that the Fed’s zero-interest-rate policy imposes on savers must also be part of the solution.	相关措施还应包括扩大个人退休账户和401K养老金计划、建立低收入家庭（其中大部分没有退休计划）特别激励机制，并结束美联储零利率政策强加在储户身上的财务压制。


Yes, these are controversial policies.	诚然，上述政策充满争议。


Debt forgiveness raises thorny ethical concerns about condoning reckless and irresponsible behavior.	债务减免将纵容鲁莽和不负责行为的棘手伦理问题摆在了我们面前。


But converting underwater “non-recourse” mortgage loans, where only the house is at risk, into so-called “recourse liabilities,” for which nonpayment would have consequences for all of a borrower’s assets, could address this concern, while simultaneously tempering America’s culture of leverage with a much greater sense of responsibility.	但解决问题可以将水下的“无追索权”抵押贷款转化为所谓的“可追索债务”，把不还债仅仅丢掉房屋转变为威胁到借款者的所有资产，并借此为美国的杠杆文化注入新的责任感。


Timing is also an issue, especially with respect to saving incentives.	在鼓励储蓄的问题上，时机的把握也同样重要。


To avoid the shortfall in aggregate demand that might arise from an abrupt surge in saving, these measures should be phased in over a period of 3-5 years.	为避免存款激增可能导致总需求不足，应当在3－5年内分阶段实施上述举措。


The main benefit of these proposals is that they are more strategic than tactical – better aligned with the balance-sheet problems that are actually afflicting the economy.	相关提案的主要优势是关注战略胜过战术层面，因此在解决实际困扰当前经济的资产负债表问题时更能对症下药。


As the quintessential laissez-faire system, the US has outsourced strategy to the invisible hand of the market for far too long.	由于崇尚典型的自由放任主义，美国一直将战略问题交给市场这只看不见的手。


That has left the government locked into a reactive and often misguided approach to unexpected problems.	长此以往导致政府在处理突发问题时被动且时常受到误导。


Thus, the Fed is focused on cleaning up after a crisis rather than on how to avoid another one.	因此，美联储似乎更关注危机善后，而不是避免新一轮危机爆发。


The same is true of US fiscal policy, with an event-driven debate that now has ever-shorter time horizons: the fiscal cliff on January 1, sequestration of expenditures on March 1, expiration of the continuing budget resolution on March 27, and the new May 18 debt-ceiling limit.	美国财政政策也是如此，事件驱动争议的最后期限越来越紧迫：1月1日的财政支出悬崖、3月1日的支出封存、3月27日的持续预算决议到期、还有5月18日的新一轮债务上限。


A compliant bond market, which may well be the next bubble, is mistakenly viewed as the ultimate validation of this myopic approach.	被误当成这种短视做法终极检验的顺从的债券市场很可能酝酿着下一轮泡沫。


The dangers of America’s strategy vacuum and the related penchant for short-termism have been mounting for some time.	美国战略真空和短期主义危险已经存在了很长时间。


Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter famously raised this concern in a 1996 article in the Harvard Business Review.	1996年哈佛商学院教授迈克尔·波特在《哈佛商业评论》刊载的一篇文章中尽人皆知地提出了这个问题。


His focus was on corporate decision-making and misaligned incentives leading to a worrisome dichotomy between the short-term tactics of “operational effectiveness” (cost cutting, outsourcing, and reengineering) and the long-term visionary bets that frame successful strategies.	他在文章中重点探讨了企业决策和错误激励所导致的短期“运营效率”（削减成本、外包和重组）和构成成功战略的长期远见目标之间令人担忧的二分法。


While Porter’s critique was directed at business managers, it bears critically on the current US policy debate.	尽管针对的是企业管理者，但波特的评论会对当前美国政策争论造成关键的影响。


A successful long-term strategy cannot be seen as a succession of short-term fixes.	一系列短期的修修补补绝不能同成功的长期战略划等号。


The internal debate in the FOMC represents a healthy and long-overdue recognition that the central bank may be digging itself into an ever-deeper hole by committing to misguided policies aimed at the wrong problem.	联邦公开市场委员会的内部争议意味着在太久之后，央行终于开始意识到针对错误问题的政策误导引发的后果越来越严重。


A comparable debate is raging over fiscal policy.	财政政策领域同样存在类似的争议。


Can America finally face up to the perils of its strategy vacuum?	美国最终能否正视自己的战略真空？


America’s Political Class Struggle	美国的政治阶级对立


NEW YORK – America is on a collision course with itself.	发自纽约——美国当前正在陷入一场自身与自身的斗争之中。


This month’s deal between President Barack Obama and the Republicans in Congress to extend the tax cuts initiated a decade ago by President George W. Bush is being hailed as the start of a new bipartisan consensus. I believe, instead, that it is a false truce in what will become a pitched battle for the soul of American politics.	就在本月，奥巴马总统与众议院共和党团之间就进一步实施减税（该提议由前总统小布什发起）达成了协议，并被认为是新两党共识的发端，但在我心目中这只是一条荒谬的停火协定，并将最终演化为围绕美国政治核心价值的一场缠斗。


As in many countries, conflicts over public morality and national strategy come down to questions of money. In the United States, this is truer than ever.	在许多国家内部，所有关于公共道德和国家战略的冲突最终都会归结到钱的问题上，而这一点在美国尤其正确。


The US is running an annual budget deficit of around $1 trillion, which may widen further as a result of the new tax agreement.	美国的年度预算赤字高达1万亿美元，而这一状况将随着新税务协议的实施而进一步恶化。


This level of annual borrowing is far too high for comfort. It must be cut, but how?	毫无疑问，这种年度借贷居高不下的状况必须被遏制，但我们又该如何去遏制呢？


The problem is America’s corrupted politics and loss of civic morality.	但问题则在于美国的腐败政治和公民道德的缺失。


One political party, the Republicans, stands for little except tax cuts, which they place above any other goal.	其一个政党——共和党——将减税凌驾于其他一切目标之上。


The Democrats have a bit wider set of interests, including support for health care, education, training, and infrastructure.	民主党人的政治目的则相对较多，包括医疗保障，教育，职业培训和基础设施建设。


But, like the Republicans, the Democrats, too, are keen to shower tax cuts on their major campaign contributors, predominantly rich Americans.	但跟共和党人一样，民主党人也热衷于给自己的竞选赞助者——那些富裕的美国人——提供减税优惠


The result is a dangerous paradox.	而此举引发的结果则是一个极度危险的矛盾综合体。


The US budget deficit is enormous and unsustainable.	美国的预算赤字极为巨大而且无法持续。


The poor are squeezed by cuts in social programs and a weak job market.	穷人们则被社会福利项目的削减和低迷的就业市场折磨得奄奄一息。


One in eight Americans depends on Food Stamps to eat.	每8个美国人就有1个要靠政府发放的食品券维生。


Yet, despite these circumstances, one political party wants to gut tax revenues altogether, and the other is easily dragged along, against its better instincts, out of concern for keeping its rich contributors happy.	但尽管情况如此糟糕，当一个政党想要削减整体税收收入之时，另一个政党却罔顾自己的更崇高本职而选择轻易附和之，目的只是为了取悦自己那些富有的赞助者。


This tax-cutting frenzy comes, incredibly, after three decades of elite fiscal rule in the US that has favored the rich and powerful.	更令人难以置信的是，这场减税狂热竟然在持续30年的偏袒有权有势者的精英财政管理后出现了。


Since Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, America’s budget system has been geared to supporting the accumulation of vast wealth at the top of the income distribution.	自从罗纳德·里根于1981年当选总统以来，美国的预算系统就被用作帮助那些位于利益分配链条高端的人聚集巨额财富服务。


Amazingly, the richest 1% of American households now has a higher net worth than the bottom 90%.	令人吃惊地是，最富有的那1%美国家庭所拥有的资本比位于底层的90%家庭还要多。


The annual income of the richest 12,000 households is greater than that of the poorest 24 million households.	最富有的那1. 2万个家庭的年收入比最贫穷的2400万家庭还要高。


The Republican Party’s real game is to try to lock that income and wealth advantage into place.	民主党的真正意图就是确保上述收入和财富优势能长期维持下去。


They fear, rightly, that sooner or later everyone else will begin demanding that the budget deficit be closed in part by raising taxes on the rich.	因此他们当然也害怕某一时刻其他所有人都会要求通过提高富人缴税额的方式来结束这种预算赤字状况。


After all, the rich are living better than ever, while the rest of American society is suffering.	毕竟当美国其他阶层正在受苦受难之时，富人们的生活却日益奢靡。


It makes sense to tax them more.	因此向他们征收更多的税是公平合理的。


The Republicans are out to prevent that by any means.	共和党人自然会想尽一切办法阻止这一切发生。


This month, they succeeded, at least for now.	而他们在本月取得了胜利，至少是现在。


But they want to follow up their tactical victory – which postpones the restoration of pre-Bush tax rates for a couple of years – with a longer-term victory next spring.	但他们还想乘胜追击——将恢复小布什上任前税率的提案再推迟几年——再在明年春天取得一个长期胜利。


Their leaders in Congress are already declaring that they will slash public spending in order to begin reducing the deficit.	他们在众议院的领袖已经明确表示将大幅削减公共开支以减少赤字。


Ironically, there is one area in which large budget cuts are certainly warranted: the military.	讽刺的是，有一个领域的开支是必须进行大规模削减的——军事。


But that is the one item most Republicans won’t touch.	但这一领域却是大部分共和党人不愿意触及的。


They want to slash the budget not by ending the useless war in Afghanistan, and by eliminating unnecessary weapons systems, but by cutting education, health, and other benefits for the poor and working class.	他们削减开支的方式不是结束在阿富汗的长期战争，撤销不必要的武器系统，而是削减教育，卫生以及其他造福于穷人和工薪阶层的部门。


In the end, I don’t think they will succeed.	但我不认为他们会最终成功。


For the moment, most Americans seem to be going along with Republican arguments that it is better to close the budget deficit through spending cuts rather than tax increases.	虽然现在大多数美国人都会同意共和党的说辞，认为应该用减少公共开支的方式来削减预算赤字而不是增税。


Yet when the actual budget proposals are made, there will be a growing backlash.	但当预算草案最终出台时，就将遇到越来越大的反对阻力。


With their backs against the wall, I predict, poor and working-class Americans will begin to agitate for social justice.	我预测，那些走投无路的穷人和工薪阶层开始奋起为社会公平而抗争。


This may take time.	这可能需要一些时间。


The level of political corruption in America is staggering.	美国政治的腐败程度令人震惊。


Everything now is about money to run electoral campaigns, which have become incredibly expensive.	一切都围绕着如何搞钱来运作选举活动，而这些活动也变得极端昂贵。


The mid-term elections cost an estimated $4.5 billion, with most of the contributions coming from big corporations and rich contributors.	刚刚结束的中期选举耗资45亿美元，而大部分的捐助者都是那些大企业和富裕阶层。


These powerful forces, many of which operate anonymously under US law, are working relentlessly to defend those at the top of the income distribution.	这些巨大的力量——许多都在美国法律下暗中运作着——正不懈地维护那些分配金字塔高层的利益。


But make no mistake: both parties are implicated.	但可以确定的是：两党都牵涉其中。


There is already talk that Obama will raise $1 billion or more for his re-election campaign.	已经有传言说奥巴马将为自己的连任竞选筹资超过10亿美元。


That sum will not come from the poor.	这笔钱显然也不会来自于穷人。


The problem for the rich is that, other than military spending, there is no place to cut the budget other than in areas of core support for the poor and working class.	而富裕阶层的问题则在于，除了军事领域之外，最可供开支削减的领域莫过于那些主要为穷人和工薪阶级的领域。


Is America really going to cut health benefits and retirement income?  Will it really balance the budget by slashing education spending at a time when US students already are being out-performed by their Asian counterparts?	美国是否真的要削减卫生保障和退休收入？ 在美国学生已经落后于亚洲国家的孩子们的时候，削减教育开支是否合理？


Will America really let its public infrastructure continue to deteriorate?	美国能否继续坐视本国的基础设施逐渐衰败？


The rich will try to push such an agenda, but ultimately they will fail.	富人们将尝试去实现这几点，但他们最终会失败。


Obama swept to power on the promise of change.	奥巴马用改变的承诺夺得了总统宝座。


So far there has been none.	但这些承诺至今还未实现。


His administration is filled with Wall Street bankers.	他的政府里充斥着华尔街银行家。


His top officials leave to join the banks, as his budget director Peter Orszag recently did.	他的高级下属纷纷弃他而去，加入银行，正如他的预算办公室主任彼得·奥斯泽格最近所做的那样。


He is always ready to serve the interests of the rich and powerful, with no line in the sand, no limit to “compromise.”	他自己也常常准备好为权势阶级的利益服务，根本没有自己的底线，任何东西都可以“妥协”。


If this continues, a third party will emerge, committed to cleaning up American politics and restoring a measure of decency and fairness.	如果这一状况持续下去的话，一个承诺扫除美国政治恶习并重新实现社会正义和公平的第三党派就会崛起。


This, too, will take time.	这也需要一些时间。


The political system is deeply skewed against challenges to the two incumbent parties.	整个政治系统虽然遭到了现有这两大党派的扭曲。


Yet the time for change will come.	但真正的改变依然会降临。


The Republicans believe that they have the upper hand and can pervert the system further in favor of the rich. I believe that they will be proved wrong.	共和党人相信自己胜券在握并在富人的授意下进一步将这个政治系统引向邪路的时候，我却相信现实最终将证明他们是错的。


America\u0027s Problems Run Deeper than Wall Street	美国的问题不止于华尔街


CAMBRIDGE – With less than two months remaining before America’s presidential election, much attention is focused on the state of the American economy and the challenges that it will present to the next president.	剑桥—在离美国总统大选还有不到两个月的时候，人们的注意力也大都集中在了美国经济的现状及下届总统在这方面所要面临的挑战上。


We are in the midst of a financial crisis caused by the serious mispricing of all kinds of risks and by the collapse of the housing bubble that developed in the first half of this decade.	我们正处在一场金融危机之中。 这场危机是由对所有风险的严重错误定价和和美国在这十年的前五年中所产生的房地产泡沫的崩溃造成的。


What started as a problem with sub-prime mortgages has now spread to houses more generally, as well as to other asset classes.	最初的次贷问题现在已经蔓延到整个的房地产以及其他的资产种类。


The housing problem is contributing to the financial crisis, which in turn is reducing the supply of credit needed to sustain economic activity.	住房问题正使金融危机愈演愈烈，而后者又正减少着维持经济活动所需的信贷供应。


Indeed, the financial crisis has worsened in recent weeks, reflected in the US Federal Reserve’s takeover of quasi-government mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – which may cost American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars – as well as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the sale of Merrill Lynch.	的确，这场金融危机在最近几周已经恶化了。 这表现在美联储接管半官方的房屋贷款公司房利美和房地美—这可能会让美国的纳税人们付出数百亿美金的代价—和雷曼兄弟公司的破产及美林证券的出售。


Ultimately, these financial failures reflect the downward spiral of house prices and the increasing number of homes with negative equity, i.e., with substantial mortgage debt in excess of market values.	最终，这些金融失败所反映的是房价的螺旋式下降和拥有负资产（即所背负的房贷债务超过房产的市值）的家庭越来越多。


Negative equity is significant because mortgages in the United States are generally “no recourse” loans.	负资产事关重大是因为美国的房贷通常是“无追索权”贷款。


If a homeowner defaults, creditors can take the house, but they cannot take other property or income to make up any unpaid balance.	如果房屋业主断供，债权人可以收走房产，但他们却不能用其他的资产或收入来弥补欠款。


Even in those states where mortgages are not “no recourse” loans, creditors generally do not pursue the assets or income of individuals who default.	即便在那些房贷不是“无追索权”贷款的州，债权人通常也不会追索断供人的资产或收入。


We cannot be sure about how much further house prices will fall.	我们不能确定房价还会跌多少。


Experts say another 15% decline is required just to return to the pre-bubble price path.	专家们说必须再跌15%才刚能回到泡沫产生前的价格路径上。


But there is nothing to stop the decline from continuing once it reaches that point.	可即使房价跌到了那个点也没有任何力量能阻止它继续下滑。


The growing gap between mortgage debts and house prices will continue to increase the rate of defaults.	房贷债务和房价之间不断扩大的差距会使断供率继续上升。


Many homeowners who can afford to make their mortgage payments will choose to default, move to rental housing, and wait to purchase until house prices have declined further.	许多有能力偿还房贷的业主也会选择断供，并租房而居，等到房价继续下跌再伺机购房。


As homeowners with large negative equity default, the foreclosed homes contribute to the excess supply that drives prices down further.	随着拥有负资产的业主断供，取消赎回权的抵押房产又会加剧市场供过于求的情况从而使房价进一步下跌。


And the lower prices lead to more negative equity and therefore to more defaults and foreclosures.	更低的房价导致更多的负资产从而造成更多的断供和取消房产赎回权的情况发生。


It is not clear what will stop this self-reinforcing process.	我们还不清楚什么样的力量会阻止这种自我强化的进程。


Declining house prices are key to the financial crisis and the outlook for the economy, because mortgage-backed securities, and the derivatives based on them, are the primary assets that are weakening financial institutions.	不断下跌的房价对金融危机和经济前景至关重要，因为以房贷为依托的证券和其它以其为基础的衍生产品是正在弱化各金融机构的首要资产。


Until house prices stabilize, these securities cannot be valued with any confidence.	在房价稳定之前，市场不会对这些证券的价值有任何信心。


And that means that the financial institutions that own them cannot have confidence in the liquidity or solvency of potential counterparties – or even in the value of their own capital.	而这就意味着持有这些资产的金融机构不能对潜在交易对手的资产变现能力和偿付能力抱有信心—甚至对自身的资本价值也是如此。


Without this confidence, credit will not flow and economic activity will be constrained.	没有这种信心，信贷就不会流动，经济活动也会被抑制。


Moreover, because financial institutions’ assets were bought mainly with borrowed money, the shortage of credit is exacerbated by their need to deleverage.	再者，因为金融机构的资产主要使用贷款购得，信贷短缺又加剧了它们减债的需求。


Since raising capital is difficult and costly, they deleverage by lending less.	由于融资困难重重且代价不菲，他们就通过减少放贷来减债。


But the macroeconomic weakness in the US now goes beyond the decreased supply of credit.  Falling house prices reduce household wealth and therefore consumer spending.	但美国宏观经济的疲软远远不止于信贷供应的萎缩。 不断下跌的房价使家庭财富缩水从而减少��消费支出。


Falling employment lowers wage and salary incomes.	就业率的下降降低了薪资收入。


The higher prices of food and energy depress real incomes further.	高企的食品和能源价格进一步遏制了实际收入。


And declining economic activity in the rest of the world is lowering demand for US exports.	世界其他国家和地区经济活力的下降也正在降低对美国出口产品的需求。


The US Federal Reserve has, in my judgment, responded appropriately by reducing the federal funds interest rate sharply and creating a variety of new credit facilities.	我个人认为美联储的应对是得当的。 它大幅降低了联邦基金的利率并创立了一系列新的信贷举措。


The low interest rate helped by making the dollar more competitive, but otherwise monetary policy appears to have lost traction because of the condition of the housing sector and the dysfunctional state of the credit markets.	低利率使美元更具竞争力，但因为房地产的现状和信贷市场的功能失灵，除此之外的货币政策似乎失去了牵引力。


The US Congress and the Bush administration enacted a $100 billion tax rebate in an attempt to stimulate consumer spending.	美国国会和布什政府实施了一项1000亿美元的减税计划，试图刺激消费支出。


Those of us who supported this policy generally knew that history and economic theory implied that such one-time fiscal transfers have little effect, but we thought that this time might be different.	我们当中那些支持这项政策的人大都明白历史和经济理论证明这种一次性的财政转移支付收效不佳。 但我们认为这次可能会有所不同。


Our support was, in the words of Samuel Johnson, a triumph of hope over experience.	支持我们观点的论据用Samuel Johnson的话来讲就是“一次希望对于经验的胜利。 ”


In the end, our hopes were frustrated.	最终，我们的希望受挫了。


The official national income accounting data for the second quarter are now available, and they show that the rebates did very little to stimulate spending.	第二季度的官方国民收入财务数据已经公布，其显示退税政策对刺激消费几乎没有作用。


More than 80% of the rebate dollars were saved or used to pay down debt.	80%的退税款都被存入银行或用于还债。


Very little was added to current spending.	只有很少的一部分被加入到现有支出之上。


So that is where the US is now: in the middle of a financial crisis, with the economy sliding into recession, monetary policy already at maximum easing, and fiscal transfers impotent.	所以这就是美国的现状：深陷一场金融危机之中，经济正走向衰退，货币政策已经宽松到最大限度，财政转移支付不力。


That is an unenviable situation, to say the least, for any incoming president.	至少这对于任何一位继任总统都不是什么大好形势。


Obama’s Burmese Gamble	奥巴马的缅甸之赌


ARLINGTON – The rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar (Burma) has proceeded at a blistering pace.	阿林顿—美国和缅甸以极快的速度恢复了邦交。


A year ago, the two countries did not even have ambassadors in each other’s capitals.	一年前，两国还没有互派大使。


In May, President Thein Sein became the first leader from Myanmar to visit the White House in nearly a half-century.	5月，总统吴登盛成为近半个世纪以来第一个访问白宫的缅甸领导人。


But has Barack Obama’s administration been too quick to embrace what was, until recently, one of the world’s most repressive regimes?	但奥巴马政府接受这个不久前还是世界最残酷政权的国家是不是太快了点？


Or, on the contrary, is decisive US support essential to Myanmar’s fledgling reform process?	或者反过来，美国的果断支持是否对缅甸摸石头过河的改革过程至关重要？


Until the recent opening, Myanmar, which gained independence in 1948, had been ruled by a secretive military junta since 1962.	1948年，缅甸独立。 自1962年到不久前，缅甸一直由神秘的军事集团统治。


As recently as 2010, the regime held elections so blatantly rigged that the main opposition party refused to participate.	迟至2010年，缅甸军政府还举行了一场赤裸裸操纵的选举，以至于反对党拒绝参与。


But in 2011, shortly before assuming the presidency, Sein, a general who served as Prime Minister under the junta, began to take steps that impressed even the most skeptical observers.	但在2011年，军政府时期以将军身份担任总理的吴登盛在就任总统前开始采取令最狐疑的观察者也觉得了不起的步骤。


Unlike the token gestures of reform offered by previous rulers, Sein’s actions appeared substantive and meaningful.	与此前的统治者装模作样的改革姿态不同，吴登盛的动作是具体且意义深远的。


One important change was the release of hundreds of political prisoners, including the regime’s most prominent opponent, Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been under house arrest for nearly 15 years.	一个重要的变化是释放了数百名政治犯，包括最著名的体制反对者昂山素季，她被软禁将近15年。


Moreover, Sein initiated a dialogue with Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), about a transition to civilian rule.	此外，吴登盛还与身为诺贝尔和平奖获得者兼全国民主联盟（NLD）领袖的昂山素季举行了会谈，商讨向文治的转型。


The subsequent elections bolstered hope for Myanmar’s democratic future.	随后的选举增强了人们关于缅甸民主未来的希望。


In 1990, when the NLD won 81% of the seats in Parliament, the junta promptly voided the results and arrested Suu Kyi.	1990年，NLD在议会赢得80%议席，但军政府马上宣布结果无效并逮捕了昂山素季。


In 2012, the NLD won 43 of the 44 seats that it contested, and the military accepted Suu Kyi as the reform movement’s legitimate leader.	2012年，NLD在其所争取的44个议席中赢下43席，而军政府接受昂山素季作为改革运动的合法领袖。


Furthermore, Sein has reached out to the Karen, Kachin, and other ethnic minorities – groups whose members have suffered decades of official persecution and mistreatment.	此外，吴登盛还与克伦、克钦和其他少数民族进行了接触——这些群体遭受了长达数十年的官方迫害和虐待。


And efforts to open Myanmar’s economy to international trade have transformed the country’s commercial capital, Yangon (Rangoon), with businesspeople now arriving on direct flights from at least a half-dozen foreign capitals and once-empty streets now congested with imported cars.	将缅甸经济向国际贸易开放改变了缅甸的经济首都仰光，目前，商人至少可以从六个国家的首都直飞仰光，曾经空空荡荡的街道如今跑满了进口汽车。


But, in some areas, reform has been painfully slow.	但是，在某些领域，改革进展极为缓慢。


In fact, when it comes to human rights and minority protections, Myanmar may even be regressing.	事实上，在人权和少数民族保护方面，缅甸甚至可能在退步。


The liberalization process has exposed the country’s long-standing religious divisions, leading to a wave of sectarian violence aimed primarily at the minority Muslim community.	解放过程暴露了缅甸长期存在的宗教分歧，导致了一系列主要针对穆斯林少数派的宗派暴力。


From coastal Rakhine to inland towns like Meiktila and Tatkon, Buddhist monks have incited violence against Muslims (and sometimes vice versa), with local officials often tacitly permitting religious bloodletting.	从沿海的若开到内陆的密铁拉和达贡，佛教徒无不煽动着针对穆斯林的暴力（有时则反过来），而地方官员往往对宗教流血束手旁观。


At his meeting with Sein in Washington, DC, Obama condemned the violence against Myanmar’s Muslims, which has displaced many of them.	奥巴马在华盛顿与吴登盛会晤时谴责了针对缅甸穆斯林、让其中很多人流离失所的暴力。


On the same day, the US State Department released its annual report on religious freedom, in which Myanmar was included among the world’s eight worst offenders.	同一天，美国国务院发布了其宗教自由年度报告，缅甸名列全世界对宗教干涉最粗暴的八个国家之一。


This has not always been the case.	并非总是如此。


Although Myanmar is an overwhelmingly Buddhist country, dozens of religious and ethnic communities have long lived there side by side.	尽管缅甸是个佛教占压倒性优势的国家，但长期以来，数十种宗教和民族一直共处着。


In the heart of Yangon, the golden dome of the Sule Pagoda stands just across the street from the minarets of the Bengali Mosque.	在仰光市中心，苏雷宝塔（Sule Pagoda）的金顶与孟加拉清真寺（Bengali Mosque）尖塔隔街相望。


In order to achieve the peace and stability needed to consolidate Myanmar’s democratic transition, both Sein and Suu Kyi should do more to establish themselves as representatives of all of Myanmar’s citizens.	为了实现巩固缅甸民主转型所需要的和平和稳定，吴登盛和昂山素季都需要更上层楼，把自己打造成全体缅甸人民的代表。


Muslims need to be assured of their personal security and guaranteed full civil rights.	穆斯林需要得到人生安全和充分公民权利保证。


The Obama administration has staked significant political capital on the wager that Myanmar’s promise may finally bear fruit.	奥巴马政府下了极大地政治资本赌注，押注缅甸的承诺最终能产生结果。


And, indeed, the rate of change in Myanmar over the last two years has been nothing short of remarkable.	而事实上，缅甸在过去两年变化的速度绝对称得上令人瞩目。


But, as Sein acknowledged at the White House, Myanmar’s government “has been encountering obstacles and challenges along [its] democratization process.”	但是，正如吴登盛在白宫所承认的，缅甸政府“已经在（其）民主化道路上遇到了障碍和挑战。


How it copes with these problems – and those that have yet to arise – will determine whether America has given its blessing prematurely.	”它如何处理这些（以及尚未出现的）问题将决定美国支持缅甸的决定是否操之过急。


America\u0027s Renminbi Fixation	人民币现实主义


NEW YORK – For seven years, the United States has allowed its fixation on the renminbi’s exchange rate to deflect attention from far more important issues in its economic relationship with China.	纽约—七年来，美国一直紧紧抓住人民币汇率不放，从而将人们的注意力从中美关系的其他重要得多的问题上移开。


The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the US and China is an excellent opportunity to examine – and rethink – America’s priorities.	即将到来的中美战略和经济对话将是一次检验（和反思）美国策略重点的良机。


Since 2005, the US Congress has repeatedly flirted with legislation aimed at defending hard-pressed American workers from the presumed threat of a cheap Chinese currency.	2005年以来，美国国会一再与立法者演双簧，试图将压力重重的美国工人从假定的廉价人民币的威胁中解救出来。


Bipartisan support for such a measure surfaced when Senators Charles Schumer (a liberal Democrat from New York) and Lindsey Graham (a conservative Republican from South Carolina) introduced the first Chinese currency bill.	对此手段的跨党派支持始于参议员舒默（Charles Schumer，纽约州自由派民主党）和格雷厄姆（Lindsey Graham，南加州共和党）所提出的首个人民币法案。


The argument for legislative action is tantalizingly simple: the US merchandise trade deficit has averaged a record 4.4% of GDP since 2005, with China accounting for fully 35% of the shortfall, supposedly owing to its currency manipulation.	立法行为的理由惊人地简单：自2005年以来，美国平均商品贸易赤字达GDP的4. 4%，创下了历史之最，中国贡献了其中35%，据信这是它操纵人民币汇率的结果。


The Chinese, insists a broad coalition of politicians, business leaders, and academic economists, must revalue or face sanctions.	大批政客、商人和经济学家众口一词，坚持人民币必须升值，否则就应该对中国采取制裁。


This reasoning resonates with the US public.	美国公众对此颇有共鸣。


Opinion polls conducted in 2011 found that fully 61% of Americans believes that China represents a serious economic threat.	2011年民意调查现实，61%美国人相信中国是严重的经济威胁。


As such, the currency debate looms as a major issue in the upcoming US presidential campaign.	于是，货币争论便成了即将到来的总统大选的主要话题。


“Enough is enough,” President Barack Obama replied, when queried on the renminbi in the aftermath of his last meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.	“‘够了’已经够了。 ”总统奥巴马在他与胡锦涛主席会面后被问及人民币问题时回答说。


Obama’s presumptive Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, has promised to declare China guilty of currency manipulation the day he takes office.	十有八九将成为奥巴马对手的共和党候选人罗姆尼（Mitt Romney）承诺说，只要他入主白宫，马上就将中国对人民币的操纵宣布为非法。


But, however appealing this logic may be, it is wrong.	但是，如此逻辑虽然非常吸引人，但却是错的。


First, America’s trade deficit is multilateral: the US ran deficits with 88 nations in 2010.	首先，美国贸易赤字是多边的：2010年，美国对88个国家存在赤字。


A multilateral imbalance – especially one that it is traceable to a saving shortfall – cannot be fixed by putting pressure on a bilateral exchange rate.	多边失衡——特别是可以追溯到储蓄不足的多边失衡——是无法通过施压双边汇率解决的。


Indeed, America’s major threat is from within.	事实上，美国的主要威胁在于国内。


Blaming China merely impedes the heavy lifting that must be done at home – namely, boosting saving by cutting budget deficits and encouraging households to save income rather than rely on asset bubbles.	指责中国只会耽误解决国内重担的时间——即通过削减预算赤字提振储蓄以及鼓励家庭储蓄收入而不是依靠资产泡沫。


Second, the renminbi has now appreciated 31.4% against the dollar since mid-2005, well in excess of the 27.5% increase called for by the original Schumer-Graham bill.	其次，自2005年年中以来，人民币已经对美元升值了31. 4%，比当初的舒默-格雷厄姆法案所要求的27.


Mindful of the lessons of Japan – especially its disastrous concession on sharp yen appreciation in the Plaza Accord of 1985 – the Chinese have opted, instead, for a gradual revaluation.	5%幅度大多了。 中国人吸取了日本的教训——特别是日本屈服于1985年广场协议让日元剧烈升值所带来的灾难性影响——选择了逐步升值之路。


Recent moves toward renminbi internationalization, a more open capital account, and wider currency trading bands leave little doubt that the endgame is a market-based, fully convertible renminbi.	最近中国出台了人民币国际化、加大资本账户开放、增加货币交易上下限等措施，毫无疑问地表明了其最终目标是基于市场的、完全可兑换的人民币。


Third, there has been significant improvement in China’s external imbalance.	第三，中国外部失衡问题已经得到了很大的改善。


The International Monetary Fund estimates that China’s current-account surplus will narrow to just 2.3% of GDP in 2012, after peaking at 10.1% in 2007.	IMF估计，中国经常项目盈余占GDP的比重将在2012年收缩至2. 3%，该数字的高峰出现在2007年，为10.


American officials have long bemoaned China’s saving glut as a major source of global instability.	1%。 长期以来，美国官员一直认为中国储蓄过剩是全球不稳定性的重要原因。


But they should look in the mirror: America’s current-account deficit this year, at an estimated $510 billion, is likely to be 2.8 times higher than China’s surplus.	但他们需要好好照照镜子：美国的经常项目赤字今年预计将达5100亿美元，比中国的盈余高出2. 8倍。


Finally, China has evolved from the world’s factory to its assembly line.	最后，中国已经从世界工厂转变为流水线。


Research shows that no more than 20% to 30% of Chinese exports to the US reflect value added inside China.	研究表明，中国出口到美国的货物中，只有不超过20—30%体现了在中国获得的增加值。


Roughly 60% of Chinese exports represent shipments of “foreign invested enterprises” – in effect, Chinese subsidiaries of global multinationals.	大约60%的中国出口仅仅是“外商投资企业”的出货，从本质上说是中国对全球跨国公司的补贴。


Think Apple.	苹果就是明证。


Globalized production platforms distort bilateral trade data between the US and China, and have little to do with the exchange rate.	全球化生产平台扭曲了中美双边贸易数据，这与汇率一点关系也没有。


Rather than vilifying China as the principal economic threat to America, the relationship should be recast as an opportunity.	中国不应该被戴上美国首要经济威胁的帽子，中美贸易关系应该被当做是一个机会。


The largest component of US aggregate demand – the consumer – is on ice.	美国总需求的最大组成部分——消费者——目前很不给力。


With households focused on repairing severely damaged balance sheets, inflation-adjusted private consumption has expanded at an anemic 0.5% average annual rate over the past four years.	家庭正在忙于修复严重受损的资产负债表，过去四年来，经通胀调整的私人消费年平均增长率只有区区0. 5%。


Consumer deleveraging is likely to persist for years to come, leaving the US increasingly desperate for new sources of growth.	消费者去杠杆化可能还会持续几年，这使得美国需要竭尽全力寻找新的增长源。


Exports top the list of possibilities.	出口便是新增长源最有力的候选者之一。


China is now America’s third largest and most rapidly growing export market.	如今，中国是美国第三大也是增长最快的出口市场。


There can be no mistaking its potential to fill some of the void left by US consumers.	毫无疑问，中国具有填补美国消费者留下的空白的潜力。


The key to realizing that opportunity lies in access to Chinese markets – all the more significant in light of China’s upcoming pro-consumption rebalancing.	抓住这一机会的关键在于进入中国市场——特别是借中国即将支持消费以实现再平衡的东风。


Historically, China has had an open development model, with imports running at 28% of GDP since 2002 – nearly three times Japan’s 10% import ratio during its high-growth era (1960-1989).	从历史上看，中国已经形成了开放发展模式，自2002年以来进口相当于GDP的28%，是日本高增长时期（1960—1989年）10%的近三倍。


As a result, for a given increment of domestic demand, China is far more predisposed toward foreign sourcing.	因此，在国内需求增量给定的情况下，中国偏向外部资源的倾向要强得多。


As the Chinese consumer emerges, demand for a wide variety of US-made goods – ranging from new-generation information technology and biotech to automotive components and aircraft – could surge.	随着中国消费者的崛起，对各种美国制造商品——从新一代信息技术和生物技术到汽车零部件和飞机——将得到保障。


The same is true of services.	服务亦然。


At just 43% of GDP, China’s services sector is relatively tiny.	中国服务部门贡献的GDP只占总量的43%，相对来说相当弱小。


There is enormous scope for America’s global services companies to expand in China, especially in transactions-intensive distribution sectors – wholesale and retail trade, domestic transportation, and supply-chain logistics – as well as in the processing segments of finance, health care, and data warehousing.	美国的全球服务公司在中国的扩张前景无限，特别是交易密集型物流部门——批发和零售贸易、国内运输、供应链物流等——以及金融、医疗和数据仓储方面的处理细分市场。


The US needs to refocus the US-China trade agenda toward expanded market access in these and other areas – pushing back against Chinese policies and government procurement practices that favor domestic production and indigenous innovation.	中国需要调整中美贸易日程的重点，将之放在扩大诸领域的市场进入上——反对中国政策和政府采购优先考虑国产商品和自主创新。