Instead, Taylor seems to have settled on another theory – his rent-control analogy – for why the government is doing everything wrong.	相反，泰勒有选择另一套理论——他的房租管制比方——来说明为何政府做的每件事都是错的。


The only possible response is to point to logic and evidence.	唯一可能的应对措施是依靠逻辑和证据。


Given real economic conditions, European and American monetary policy is not too loose; if anything, it is too restrictive.	给定真实经济条件，欧洲和美国货币政策并不过于宽松； 如果真有“过于”的话，那也是过于限制性。


The “natural” interest – what would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations – is actually lower than what current monetary policy is producing.	“自然”利息——可以用瓦尔拉一般均衡方程组求得——实际上要低于当前货币政策所产生的利息。


Yes, the inertial expectations of the economy have combined with monetary policy to distort interest and inflation rates, but not in the direction that Taylor is proposing.	诚然，经济的惯性预期（inertial expectations）与货币政策一起扭曲了利率和通胀率，但扭曲方向与泰勒的主张并不相同。


On the contrary, compared to what is needed (given the current state of the economy) or to what a free-market, flexible-price economy in proper equilibrium would deliver, interest rates are too high and inflation is too low.	相反，与（在当前经济状态下）需要什么或合理均衡状态所能产生的自由市场、弹性价格经济相比，利率太高而通胀太低。


There is indeed something wrong with today’s interest rates.	今天的利率确实有问题。


Why such low rates are appropriate for the economy and for how long they will continue to be appropriate are deep and unsettled questions; they call attention to what MIT’s Olivier Blanchard calls the “dark corners” of economics, where research has so far shed too little light.	为何如此低的利率对经济是合理的，以及如此低的利率在多长时间内��合理的，这些都是未解决的深刻问题； 它们需要人们关注麻省理工学院的奥利佛·布兰查德（Olivier Blanchard）所谓的经济学的“黑暗角落”，对这些角落的研究还太少。


What Taylor and his ilk fail to understand is that the reason interest rates are wrong has little to do with the policies put in place by central bankers and everything to do with the situation that policymakers confront.	泰勒及其同道没能理解的是，利率出错的原因与央行实施的政策没有什么关系，而与决策者面临的环境有极大的关系。


The Trouble with Japanese Nationalism	日本的民族主义问题


Barely half a year into his premiership, Japan’s Shinzo Abe is provoking anger across Asia and mixed feelings in his country’s key ally, the United States.	就任日本首相仅仅半年时间的安倍晋三已经在亚洲挑起了愤怒，并且让他的国家的重要盟友美国也感到很不快。


But will the Bush administration use its influence to nudge Abe away from inflammatory behavior?	但是布什政府是否会动用其影响力劝说安倍不要再有这种刺激人感情的行为呢？


Abe’s predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, was a mold-breaking leader, reviving Japan’s economy, reforming the postal savings system, and smashing the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s faction system.	安倍的前任小泉纯一郎是一个打破传统框架束缚的领导人。 他振兴了日本的经济，改革了邮政储蓄系统，并且打破了长期执政的自民党的派系体系。


But Koizumi also legitimized a new Japanese nationalism, antagonizing China and South Korea by his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.	但是小泉也使一种新的日本民族主义合法化，他因为每年都要去参拜靖国神社而激怒中国和韩国。


If anything, Abe is even more committed to building an assertive and unapologetic Japan.	如果说他们之间有什么不同的话，那么安倍只会更决心要建立一个固执己见并且绝不道歉的日本。


Anyone who believes that the Yasukuni controversy is an obscure historical matter that Chinese and Koreans use to badger Japan for political advantage has probably never spent much time there.	任何认为关于靖国神社的争辩只是中国人和韩国人为在政治上取得优势而纠缠日本的一个不为人所知的历史问题的人，也许对于这个问题的了解都相当肤浅。


The problem is not the 12 Class-A war criminals interred at the shrine; the real problem is the Yushukan military museum next door.	问题并不在于埋葬在神社里的十二个甲级战犯，真正的问题在于与它们相邻的游就馆。


Walking past the Mitsubishi Zero, tanks, and machine guns on display in the museum, one finds a history of the Pacific War that restores “the Truth of Modern Japanese History.”	走过陈列在博物馆里的三菱零式舰上战斗机、坦克和机枪，参观者会看到一段恢复了“现代日本历史真相”的太平洋战争的历史。 它使用的是民族主义的论调。


It follows the nationalist narrative: Japan, a victim of the European colonial powers, sought only to protect the rest of Asia from them.	那就是，日本作为一个饱受欧洲殖民统治强国欺凌的牺牲品，只是为了保护其他的亚洲人民不受它们的欺凌。


Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea, for example, is described as a “partnership”; one looks in vain for any account of the victims of Japanese militarism in Nanjing or Manila.	比如说，日本把朝鲜占用为殖民地被描述为是一种“伙伴关系”； 并且你在这里不会看到关于日本军国主义在南京或马尼拉滥杀无辜的任何描述。


One might be able to defend the museum as one viewpoint among many in a pluralist democracy.	人们也许会争辩说这个博物馆只是多元化民主社会中某些人的一种立场而已。


But there is no other museum in Japan that gives an alternative view of Japan’s twentieth-century history.	但是在日本没有对于日本在二十世纪的历史有另一种描述的博物馆。


Successive Japanese governments have hidden behind the Yushukan museum’s operation by a private religious organization to deny responsibility for the views expressed there.	每一届的日本政府都通过一个私人的宗教组织在背后来运作游就馆，从而逃脱对那里所表述的观点的责任。


That is an unconvincing stance.	这是一种无法令人信服的立场。


In fact, unlike Germany, Japan has never come to terms with its own responsibility for the Pacific War.	事实上，与德国不同，日本从未反省其在太平洋战争中的责任。


Although socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama officially apologized to China in 1995 for the war, Japan has never had a genuine internal debate over its degree of responsibility, and has never made a determined effort to propagate an alternative account to that of Yushukan.	尽管在社会党人村山富士担任首相时他曾在1995年正式代表官方就战争问题向中国表示道歉，但是日本国内从未对其应该承担多大的责任进行过认真的讨论，也从未真心进行过驳斥游就馆说法的宣传行动。


My exposure to the Japanese right came in the early 1990’s, when I was on a couple of panels in Japan with Watanabe Soichi, who was selected by my Japanese publisher (unbeknownst to me) to translate my book The End of History and the Last Man into Japanese.	我在二十世纪九十年代早期同日本右翼打过交道，当时我和渡边素一在日本参加了两次电视讨论节目。 渡边当时被我的日本发行商在我不知情的情况下挑选来担任我的著作《历史的终结和最后一个人》日文版的翻译。


Watanabe, a professor at Sophia University, was a collaborator of Shintaro Ishihara, the nationalist politician who wrote The Japan That Can Say No and is now the governor of Tokyo.	他是日本上智大学的教授，是石原慎太郎（民族主义政治家，《日本可以说不》的作者，现在是东京都知事）的合作者。


In the course of a couple of encounters, I heard him explain in front of large public audiences how the people of Manchuria had tears in their eyes when the occupying Kwantung Army left China, so grateful were they to Japan.	在两次会面中，我听到他在大量的观众面前解释说当关东军离开中国时，满洲国的人民是怎样满含泪水，他们对于日本是如何地感激。 在渡边看来，太平洋战争可归结为是一种竞争，因为美国决意压迫非白人的人种。


According to Watanabe, the Pacific War boiled down to race, as the US was determined to keep a non-white people down.	渡边与那些否认二战期间纳粹对犹太人大屠杀的人没什么不同。


Watanabe is thus the equivalent of a Holocaust denier, but, unlike his German counterparts, he easily draws large and sympathetic audiences.	但是，与他的德国持相似论点者不同，他在这里可以轻易地博得大量的观众，并且得到他们的认同。


(I am regularly sent books by Japanese writers that “explain” how the Nanjing Massacre was a big fraud.)	（我经常收到日本作者寄来的书，“解释”南京大屠杀是怎样一个巨大的骗局。 ）


Moreover, there have been several disturbing recent incidents in which physical intimidation has been used by nationalists against critics of Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, such as the firebombing of former prime ministerial candidate Kato Koichi’s home.	除此以外，最近还发生好几起令人担忧的事件。 例如，批评小泉参拜靖国神社的人受到了民族主义分子的暴力威胁，比如前首相候选人加藤弘一的家里就受到了燃烧弹的袭击。


(On the other hand, the publisher of the normally conservative Yomiuri Shimbun attacked Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits and published a fascinating series of articles on responsibility for the war.)	（在另一方面，一贯保守的《读卖新闻》的社长批评了小泉对靖国神社的参拜行为，并且发表了一系列令人印象深刻的讨论战争责任的文章。 ）


This leaves the US in a difficult position.	这让美国很为难。


A number of American strategists are eager to ring China with a NATO-like defensive barrier, building outward from the US-Japan Security Treaty.	一些美国战略家渴望在日美防卫协定之外建立一个类似北约的防御屏障来包围中国。


Since the final days of the Cold War, the US has been pushing Japan to rearm, and has officially supported a proposed revision of Article 9 of the postwar constitution, which bans Japan from having a military or waging war.	自冷战结束后，美国一直在推动日本重新建立军队，并且公开支持对禁止日本拥有军队或发动战争的战后宪法第九条进行修订。


But America should be careful about what it wishes for.	但是美国应该对其到底想要什么保持谨慎。


The legitimacy of the entire American military position in the Far East is built around the US exercising Japan’s sovereign function of self-defense.	美国军事基地在远东地区的合法地位是建立在美国代替日本行使自卫的主权的基础上���。


Japan’s unilateral revision of Article 9, viewed against the backdrop of its new nationalism, would isolate Japan from virtually the whole of Asia.	考虑到其新的民族主义的背景，日本单方面对于第九条的修订将会使日本被几乎整个亚洲孤立。


Revising Article 9 has long been part of Abe’s agenda, but whether he pushes ahead with it will depend in large part on the kind of advice he gets from close friends in the US.	修订宪法第九条一直是安倍想要做的事情，但是他是否真的会付诸实施很大程度上依赖于他从他的美国亲密朋友那里得到怎样的建议。


President Bush was unwilling to say anything about Japan’s new nationalism to his “good friend Junichiro” out of gratitude for Japanese support in Iraq.	布什总统出于对日本在伊拉克问题上的支持而不愿对他的“好朋友小泉”就日本的民族主义发表什么看法。


Now that Japan has withdrawn its small contingent of troops, perhaps Bush will speak plainly to Abe.	现在日本已经撤回了少量军队，也许布什现在可以坦率地对安倍发表看法了。


The Trouble with Libertarian Paternalism	自由家长式作风的问题


CHICAGO – There are many arguments against government paternalism: apart from limiting individual choice (for example, the choice to remain uninsured in the current health-care debate in the United States) and preventing individuals from learning, history suggests time and again that the conventional wisdom prevalent in society is wrong.	芝加哥—反对家长式政府的理由很多：除了这样会限制个人选择（比如，在当前美国医保争论为尘埃落定时选择不参加医保）和让人怠于学习之外，历史一再表明，社会所流行的传统智慧是错的。


And, since governments typically try to enforce the conventional wisdom, the consequences could be disastrous, because they are magnified by the state’s coordinating – and coercive – power.	此外，政府通常会强化传统智慧，因此可能造成灾难性后果，因为国家的协调力和强制力会放大负面效应。


A clear example is financial regulation, which in many ways is a form of paternalism.	一个显而易见的例子便是金融监管，从很多角度看，这是典型的家长式作风。


In the US, the low risk assigned to senior tranches of mortgage-backed securities made them attractive instruments for banks to hold, given the relatively high return they offered.	在美国，高等级按揭支持证券份额的低风险让它们颇具吸引力，因其高回报率而成为银行的最爱。


But they proved far from safe, despite the prior conventional wisdom.	但它们根本就不安全，尽管传统智慧认为它们安全。


And, because the regulator had pronounced them safe, far too many banks overloaded on them, rendering them even more risky when the banks tried to sell them at the same time.	而由于监管者曾宣称它们是安全的，因此太多的银行过多地持有了这些工具，当所有银行同时开始抛售时，更增加了它们的风险。


Other examples of the danger of the coordinating power of government paternalism abound.	其他政府家长式作风协调力所导致风险的例子不胜枚举。


As I drive to downtown Chicago, I pass a series of high-rise housing projects, meant in their time to be the miracle cure for homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and crime.	如果我开车去芝加哥市中心，那么我将经过一系列高层住宅项目，当初开发它们时，说这是治愈无家可归、贫困、失业和犯罪问题的良药。


Today, they are seen as the best way to concentrate and perpetuate many of those ills.	而如今，它们成了这些社会疾病集中而持久的写照。


Not only were the housing projects kept a safe distance from areas that had good jobs, but, with few residents experiencing stable families and livelihoods, there were not enough local examples of success to guide young people.	这些住宅项目与好工作所在地区相去甚远，住户中也鲜有家庭和睦、生活安康者，因此缺乏能指引年轻人的成功榜样。


As a result, many went astray.	结果，很多年轻人堕落了。


The fashion today is to integrate poor households into flourishing communities.	眼下流行的做法是将贫困家庭混杂于高尚社区中。


No doubt we will discover some unintended consequences in the future, and the power of government coordination will ensure that those consequences are widespread.	毫无疑问，在未来，我们将看到不少意料之外的后果，而政府的协调力意味着这些后果将随处可见。


But some amount of paternalism is necessary in civilized societies.	但在文明社会中，一定程度的家长作风是必不可少的。


Social security is a paternalistic form of forced savings for old age, preventing individuals from consuming and saving as they please.	社会保险就是一种家长式作风，它强迫人们为衰老储蓄，防止个人随心所欲地消费和储蓄。


It exists, in part, because individuals know that civilized societies will never stand by and watch the elderly starve.	这一制度的存在部分是因为人们知道文明社会不会坐视老年人饥寒交迫。


So individuals are forced to save in order to prevent them from gaming the system – not saving when young, knowing that they will be assured a minimum level of support by a humane society when old.	因此人们被强制储蓄，以防止作弊——在年轻时不储蓄，因为他知道老来无论如何都可以获得最低限度的社会福利。


Similarly, the mandated purchase of insurance in the Obama administration’s health-care bill is an attempt to prevent the young and the healthy from remaining uninsured and turning to the government for support only when they discover that they need it.	类似地，强制性购买奥巴马政府的医保也是在试图防止年轻人和健康人有朝一日发现自己需要医保时再向政府伸手索要。


So, if paternalism has benefits as well as costs, how do we get the former without the latter?	因此，家长式作风有利有弊，既然如此，就不能一厢情愿地认为有百利而无一害。


My colleague, Richard Thaler, along with Cass Sunstein, who currently serves in the Obama administration, wrote a best-selling book, Nudge, in which they suggest a way to reduce our uneasiness with paternalism.	我的同事泰勒（Richard Thaler）和桑斯坦（Cass Sunstein，现在奥巴马政府中就职）写过一本畅销书《助推》（Nudge），在书中他们指出，有一种办法可以减轻我们对家长式作风的不安。


Essentially, by exploiting behavioral quirks, they would nudge people into making decisions that are good for them, even while individuals have complete freedom to change their mind.	从根本上说，利用行为习惯，家长式作风可以助推人们做出有利决策，即便个人拥有改变主意的完全自由。


So libertarian paternalism, in their view, eliminates one of the main objections to paternalism – that it constrains individual choice.	因此，他们认为，自由的家长式作风消除了对家长式作风的一个主要反对点——限制个人选择。


For example, in deciding how their pension savings will be allocated, most people simply choose the default option in their employer-offered plan.	比如，在决定退休金储蓄应该如何配置时，大部分人都会选择雇主所提供计划的默认选项。


Often, the default option is unsuitable for most individuals – for instance, it typically allocates all savings to low-return money-market funds.	通常，默认现象对绝大多数人来说是可持续的——比如，它通常会将所有储蓄都配置给低回报货币市场基金。


Sunstein and Thaler would have the employer choose a default option that works for most people, such as 60% in equities, 30% in bonds, and 10% in money-market funds.	桑斯坦和泰勒让雇主选择适用大部分人的默认选项，比如60%配置于股票、30%配置于债券、另10%配置于货币基金。


That is the paternalistic part.	这就是家长式作风部分。


The libertarian part is that the employee has the right to opt out of the default option.	自由部分是雇员有权不选默认选项。


Because people rarely move away from the default option, the employer’s paternalistic choice prevails, and we get libertarian paternalism.	由于人们很少不选默认选项，因此雇主的家长式选择会胜出，而我们得到的是自由家长式作风。


What is not to like?	这有什么不好的？


The problem is that the semblance of choice in libertarian paternalism is an illusion.	问题在于，在自由家长式作风中，选择自由只是假象。


Choice remains unexercised, because individuals do not consciously think through their decision.	选择并未被执行，因为个人并未有意识地思考决策。


If their choices can be directed, is this not paternalism plain and simple, rendered more sinister because individuals are unaware that they are being nudged, and cannot raise their guard?	如果他们的选择可以被引导，那不是赤裸裸的家长式作风是什么？ 这样做更不道德，因为个人并不知道他们被助推了，从而根本无从捍卫自己的权利。


One response is to point out that most plans already have a default option that determines savings allocations.	对此，一种回应是大部分退休金计划已含有决定储蓄配置的默认选项。


Sunstein and Thaler merely say that the default option should be set in a way that is good for people, and clearly they have an idea of what is good.	桑斯坦和泰勒仅仅是说，默认选项应该以对人们有利的方式设置，且他们显然知道什么是“有利”。


This, then, is the nub of the problem.	那么，这就是问题的根结。


In choosing the default option, the government or the employer nudges all employees into prevailing fads such as “buy equity for the long run.”	通过选择默认选项，政府或雇主助推了所有雇员选择流行的时尚，比如“以长期视角买入股票”之类。


This, they believe, is better than the current typical default option of putting individuals’ money into money-market funds.	他们认为，这要比当前的典型默认选项——把钱投向货币基金要好。


But it may be worse: coordinating everyone into risky asset investments may be more dangerous than coordinating them into boring investments like money-market funds.	但事实可能正好相反：把所有人都协调进风险资产投资可能比将他们协调进货币基金之类的呆板投资更危险。


Could there be a better alternative?	有更好的替代方案吗？


What if there were no default option, and individuals were sent repeated, and increasingly urgent, reminders to choose an allocation if they did not choose one already.	不设默认选项如何？ 如果不做出选择，个人将收到一次比一次紧的敦促。


The conventional wisdom could be offered as a recommendation, along with explanations of why it makes sense, but it would not be the default.	传统智慧可以作为一种建议，并附上为何有效的说明，但不作为默认选项。


This would force people to exercise choice.	这将迫使人们执行选择。


Some people would differ from the conventional wisdom, benefiting the system by introducing some variety and resilience.	一些人会反传统智慧之道而行之，给系统带来一些多样性和活力，这是一件好事。


More generally, the flaw in some forms of libertarian paternalism is that the free choice that it appears to offer leaves the paternalism largely unconstrained.	更一般地说，一些自由家长式作风的缺陷在于其貌似提供了自由选择，但实际上导致了家长式作风的无约束。


Would it not be far better to force conscious choice in order to limit the consequences of paternalistic mistakes?	迫使人们做出自主选择从而限制家长式作风失误导致的后果，不亦宜乎？


The True Costs of the Iraq War	伊拉克战争的真实费用


The most important things in life  like life itself  are priceless.	生命中最重要的东西，比如说生命本身都是无价的。


But that doesn’t mean that issues involving the preservation of life (or a way of life), like defense, should not be subjected to cool, hard economic analysis.	但是，这并不是说涉及到保存生命（或者生活方式）的问题，例如说防务，就不应该接受冷静、细致的经济分析。


Shortly before the current Iraq war, when Bush administration economist Larry Lindsey suggested that the costs might range between $100 and $200 billion, other officials quickly demurred.	在当前的伊拉克战争前不久，当布什政府的经济学家林德赛提出战争花费可能介于1000亿到2000亿美元之间时，其他官员立即反对。


For example, Office of Management and Budget Director Mitch Daniels put the number at $60 billion.	例如，管理与预算局局长丹尼尔斯估计为600亿美元。


It now appears that Lindsey’s numbers were a gross underestimate.	林德赛的数字现在看起来是大大低估了。


Concerned that the Bush administration might be misleading everyone about the Iraq war’s costs, just as it had about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaida, I teamed up with Linda Bilmes, a budget expert at Harvard, to examine the issue.	我担忧正如在伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器以及与基地组织的联系上一样，布什政府可能在伊拉克战争的费用上欺骗了所有的人。 我与哈佛大学的预算专家贝尔姆斯合作来研究这一问题。


Even we, as opponents of the war, were staggered by what we found, with conservative to moderate estimates ranging from slightly less than a trillion dollars to more than $2 trillion.	即使是作为反战人士，我们也被我们的发现所震惊。 伊拉克战争保守以及温和的费用估计介于稍微低于1兆亿美元到多于2兆亿美元之间。


Our analysis starts with the $500 billion that the Congressional Budget Office openly talks about, which is still ten times higher than what the administration said the war would cost.	国会预算局公开谈论的费用是5000亿美元，仍然是布什当局所说的战争费用十倍。 我们的分析以此为起点。


Its estimate falls so far short because the reported numbers do not even include the full budgetary costs to the government. And the budgetary costs are but a fraction of the costs to the economy as a whole.	由于报告的数字甚至并不包含政府的全部预算费用，因此国会的估计仍然大为偏低，而预算费用仅仅是整体经济成本的一小部分。


For example, the Bush administration has been doing everything it can to hide the huge number of returning veterans who are severely wounded – 16,000 so far, including roughly 20% with serious brain and head injuries.	例如，布什政府竭尽全力来掩盖身负重伤回国的老兵数目。 目前为止，已经达到1万6千人，包括大约20％脑部以及头部受重伤的人。


So it is no surprise that its figure of $500 billion ignores the lifetime disability and healthcare costs that the government will have to pay for years to come.	所以，5000亿美元的数字忽略了政府不得不在未来岁月中支付的余生残疾抚恤金以及医疗费用，也就不足为奇了。


Nor does the administration want to face up to the military’s recruiting and retention problems.	而且，政府也不想面对军队的招募以及保留问题。


The result is large re-enlistment bonuses, improved benefits, and higher recruiting costs – up 20% just from 2003 to 2005.	结果就是大笔的重新入伍奖金、提高福利以及更高的招募成本。 仅仅从2003年到2005年这一费用就提高了20％。


Moreover, the war is extremely wearing on equipment, some of which will have to be replaced.	而且，这场战争对设备的损耗极大，某些设备不得不予以更换。


These budgetary costs (exclusive of interest) amount to $652 billion in our conservative estimate and $799 billion in our moderate estimate.	这些预算费用（不包含利息）保守估计是6520亿美元，温和估计是7990亿美元。


Arguably, since the government has not reined in other expenditures or increased taxes, the expenditures have been debt financed, and the interest costs on this debt add another $98 billion (conservative) to $385 billion (moderate) to the budgetary costs.	还可以论证，由于政府并没有节制其他开支或者增加的税收，战争费用是负债提供的，而且这一负债的利息成本另外给预算费用增加980亿美元（保守估计）到3850亿美元（温和估计）。


Of course, the brunt of the costs of injury and death is borne by soldiers and their families.	当然，受伤以及阵亡的最大部分由士兵以及家属们承担。


But the military pays disability benefits that are markedly lower than the value of lost earnings.	但是，军队所支付的残疾抚恤金大大低于损失的收入价值。


Similarly, payments for those who are killed amount to only $500,000, which is far less than standard estimates of the lifetime economic cost of a death, sometimes referred to as the statistical value of a life ($6.1 to $6.5 million).	同样，阵亡抚恤金仅仅是50万美元，大大低于死亡的一生全部经济成本的标准估计。 有时也把它称作生命的统计学价值（在610万美元到650万美元之间）。


But the costs don’t stop there.	然而，成本还不止这些。


The Bush administration once claimed that the Iraq war would be good for the economy, with one spokesperson even suggesting that it was the best way to ensure low oil prices.	布什政府曾经宣称伊拉克战争对于经济有益。 一名发言人甚至提出战争是确保低油价的最佳途径。


As in so many other ways, things have turned out differently: the oil companies are the big winners, while the American and global economies are losers.	正如在其他许多方面一样，实际情况大为不同。 石油公司们是大赢家，而美国经济和全球经济则是大输家。


Being extremely conservative, we estimate the overall effect on the economy if only $5 or $10 of the increase is attributed to the war.	按照极为保守的标准，如果由于战争只增加5美元或10美元，我们估计对经济的总体影响。


At the same time, money spent on the war could have been spent elsewhere.	同时，花在战争上的钱可以用在别处。


We estimate that if a proportion of that money had been allocated to domestic investment in roads, schools, and research, the American economy would have been stimulated more in the short run, and its growth would have been enhanced in the long run.	我们估计，如果把这些钱的一部分分配到道路、学校以及研究的国内投资上来，在短期内就会更大地刺激美国经济，而且其长远性的增长也会得���改善。


There are a number of other costs, some potentially quite large, although quantifying them is problematic.	还有一些其他花费，尽管确定它们的数量是困难的，但是其中某些花费潜在性地非常巨大。


For instance, Americans pay some $300 billion annually for the “option value” of military preparedness – being able to fight wherever needed.	例如，美国人每年为军事准备的“期权价值”支付3000亿美元。 所谓军事准备，也就是有能力在需要的时候随时作战。


That Americans are willing to pay this suggests that the option value exceeds the costs.	美国人愿意付这笔钱表明期权价值超过成本。


But there is little doubt that the option value has been greatly impaired and will likely remain so for several years.	但是毫无疑问，这一期权价值被大为损害了，而且在几年内还将是如此。


In short, even our “moderate” estimate may significantly underestimate the cost of America’s involvement in Iraq.	简而言之，即使是我们“温和”估计也可能大大低估美国介入伊拉克的成本。


And our estimate does not include any of the costs implied by the enormous loss of life and property in Iraq itself.	而且，我们的估计并不包含在伊拉克境内巨大的生命和财产损失的任何费用。


We do not attempt to explain whether the American people were deliberately misled regarding the war’s costs, or whether the Bush administration’s gross underestimate should be attributed to incompetence, as it vehemently argues is true in the case of weapons of mass destruction.	我们并不试图解释为什么美国人民有意在战争费用问题上受到欺骗，或者布什政府大大低估费用是否是由于不称职。 布什政府激烈争辩，而在大规模杀伤性武器问题上它的确不称职。


Nor do we attempt to assess whether there were more cost-effective ways of waging the war.	我们也并不试图评估是否有更为节省成本的办法来打这场战争。


Recent evidence that deaths and injuries would have been greatly reduced had better body armor been provided to troops suggests how short-run frugality can lead to long-run costs.	最近有证据表明，如果向士兵提供了防护服，阵亡和负伤将会大为降低。 这表明短期的节省如何会导致长期的费用。


Certainly, when a war’s timing is a matter of choice, as in this case, inadequate preparation is even less justifiable.	当然，如果像这场战争一样，战争时机是可以选择的话，准备不足就更加难以解释了。


But such considerations appear to be beyond the Bush administration’s reckoning.	但是，布什政府似乎无法考虑这些因素。


Elaborate cost-benefit analyses of major projects have been standard practice in the defense department and elsewhere in government for almost a half-century.	将近半个世纪以来，对大项目进行细致的成本效益分析已经成为国防部以及政府其他部门的例行做法。


The Iraq war was an immense “project,” yet it now appears that the analysis of its benefits was greatly flawed and that of its costs virtually absent.	伊拉克战争是一个巨大的“项目工程”，但是，现在看起来对其效益的分析存在巨大的缺陷，而对其成本则基本上没有分析。


One cannot help but wonder: were there alternative ways of spending a fraction of the war’s $1-$2 trillion in costs that would have better strengthened security, boosted prosperity, and promoted democracy?	我们不禁要问：这场战争花费了1兆亿美元到2兆亿美元之间，有没有其他替代的方式花这笔钱的一小部分，从而更为加强安全、刺激繁荣并且促进民主呢？


The Global Trust Deficit	全球信任赤字


NEW YORK – In their preoccupation with fiscal deficits, developed-country policymakers continue to neglect a different, yet equally critical, shortfall: the trust deficit between advanced and emerging economies when it comes to global governance.	纽约—发达国家决策者全神贯注于财政赤字，一直忽略了一个不同但同样关键的问题：发达国家和新兴经济体之间在全球治理上的信任赤字。


For decades, developed-country shareholders at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank used loan conditionality to spur economic reforms – often including contentious fiscal-austerity measures – in the so-called Third World.	几十年来，发达国家IMF和世界银行股东用贷款条件刺激所谓第三世界的经济改革——通常包括有异议的财政紧缩措施。


Through pragmatic, sustained reform efforts, countries like Brazil, China, and India turned their economies around to achieve stunning increases in GDP growth – from an average annual rate of 3.5% in 1980-1994 to 5.5% since then.	通过务实的持续改革，巴西、中国和印度等国家扭转了经济局面，获得了令人惊异的GDP增长——从1980—1994年间的年均3. 5%增至1994年后的年均5.


But, although developing countries now account for more than half of global GDP growth, advanced countries have yet to admit them to leadership roles that reflect their growing influence in the world economy.	但是，尽管发展中国家如今占了全球GDP增长的一大半江山，发达国家仍不承认反映它们对世界经济日渐增加的影响力的领导作用。


The failure so far of the US Congress to ratify the IMF reform package agreed to by G-20 finance ministers and central-bank governors in 2010 is the latest breach of trust – one that makes the promise of adequate representation for emerging economies seem like a shell game.	美国国会没有批准2010年G20财政部长和央行行长达成一致的IMF改革方案是信任缺失的最新写照，这让使新经济体获得充分代表的承诺成了一场骗局。


America’s unwillingness or inability to ratify the package – which includes doubling the IMF’s funding quota and shifting 6% of the new total, together with two directorships, to developing countries – undoubtedly contributed to the decision by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to establish their own development bank.	毫无疑问，美国不愿或不能批准IMF改革方案——包括IMF融资配额扩大一倍，并将新总量的6%和两个董事职位分配给发展中国家——刺激了金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）决定成立自己的开发银行。


In fact, a backlash against Western hegemony in global governance has been brewing for years, with developing countries increasingly turning away from the IMF in favor of creating alternative, regional sources of funding.	事实上，反对西方在全球治理上的霸权由来已久，越来越多的发展中国家绕开IMF，转而支持成立别的地区性融资源。


The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), together with China, Japan, and South Korea, established the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, and Latin American countries launched negotiations on the Banco del Sur in 2006.	2000年，东盟和中日韩推出了清迈协议（Chiang Mai Initiative），拉美国家也在2006年开始了关于南方银行（Banco del Sur）的谈判。


The accelerating erosion of emerging economies’ trust in the Bretton Woods institutions is particularly problematic now, given slow growth and continued economic weakness in advanced countries.	新兴经济体对布雷顿森林制度的信任正在加快流失，这一问题在发达国家陷入低增长和持续经济疲软的当下特别严重。 尽管世界经济今年预计可增长3.


While the world economy is expected to grow by 3.3% this year, average annual growth in the advanced countries is projected to be just 1.2%.	3%，但发达国家平均年增长率预计只有1. 2%。


Developed and developing countries alike would benefit from greater economic-policy coordination.	发达和发展中国家能从进一步经济政策协作中获益。


While regional groups may obtain some short-run benefits by pursuing narrower interests outside of multilateral channels, neither emerging nor advanced economies can fulfill their long-run potential in an environment characterized by isolationism and a zero-sum mentality in areas like trade and exchange-rate policy.	地区集团或许可以从追求多边渠道外的狭隘利益中获得短期好处，但不论是新兴还是发达经济体，都无法在孤立主义以及贸易和汇率政策等领域的零和思想环境下实现长期潜力。


Policy coordination, however, depends on trust, and building trust requires advanced-country leaders to keep their promises and offer their developing-country counterparts opportunities for leadership.	然而，政策协调依赖于信任，而建立信任要求发达国家领导人兑现承诺，为发展中国家同僚提供领导机会。


Instead, developed countries have been taking actions that compromise their legitimacy.	与之相反，发达国家的所作所为却在危害它们的正统性。


For example, after spending decades encouraging developing countries to integrate their economies into the global market, advanced countries now balk at trade openness.	比如，发达国家花了几十年鼓动发展中国家让经济融入全球市场，但现在却开始对贸易开放有所畏缩。


Indeed, despite pledges not to erect trade barriers after the global economic crisis, more than 800 new protectionist measures were introduced from late 2008 through 2010.	事实上，尽管全球经济危机以来做出了不少不搞贸易壁垒的承诺，但2008年末到2010年出现了800多项新的保护主义措施。


G-8 countries, the supposed champions of the global free-trade agenda that dominates the World Trade Organization, accounted for the lion’s share of these measures.	其中大部分来自G8国家——它们理应是全球自由贸易日程的拥护者，也主宰着世界贸易组织。


Some question the leadership ability of the BRICS.	有人质疑金砖国家的领导能力。


But many emerging markets are already leading by example on important issues like the need to shift global financial flows from debt toward equity.	但许多新兴市场已经通过全球金融流从债务流向股本的需要等重大问题证明了领导能力。


Mexico, for example, recently adopted – ahead of schedule – the changes in capital requirements for banks recommended by the Third Basel Accord (Basel III), in order to reduce leverage and increase stability.	比如，墨西哥最近超前采取了巴塞尔协议III所建议的银行资本要求修订，以降低杠杆、增加稳定性。


For too long, developed countries have clung to their outsize influence in the international financial institutions, even as their fiscal fitness has dwindled.	发达国家在过长的时间里过度地抓紧膨胀的国际金融机构影响力，即使在财政合理性已大大减弱时也不肯放手。


By ignoring the advice that they so vehemently dispensed to the developing world, they brought the world economy to its knees.	它们坚决抵制放权给发展中世界的建议，这导致世界经济萎靡不振。


Now, they refuse to fulfill their promises of global cooperation.	如今，它们又拒绝兑现全球合作承诺。


Leaders in developed and developing countries alike must deepen their commitment to economic reform and integration.	发达国家和发展中国家领导人必须深化对经济改革和一体化的承诺。


But only by giving emerging economies a real voice in global governance – thereby reducing the trust deficit and restoring legitimacy to multilateral institutions – can the global economy reach its potential.	但只有给新兴经济体在全球治理上的真正的话语权——从而减少信任赤字、重塑多边机构正统性——才能让全球经济实现潜能。


The Truth About Climate Change	气候变化的真相


EXETER – Many people ask how sure we are about the science of climate change.	埃克塞特-许多人问我们对气候变化这门科学有多大的把握。


The most definitive examination of the scientific evidence is to be found in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its last major report published in 2007.	对科学证据的最权威的审核可以在政府间气候变化专门委员会（ IPCC ）所做的工作中找到，此委员会最近的一项重要报告出版于2007年。


I had the privilege of being chairman or co-chairman of the Panel’s scientific assessments from 1988 to 2002.	我曾有幸在1988至2002年间任此委员会的科学评估小组的主席，或称为共同主席。


Many hundreds of scientists from different countries were involved as contributors and reviewers for these reports, which are probably the most comprehensive and thorough international assessments on any scientific subject ever carried out.	不同的国家的数百名科学家以撰稿者或评论者的身份参与了这些报告的撰写，这或许是历史上对科学问题进行国际评估的最全面和最彻底的一次。


In June 1995, just before the G-8 summit in Scotland, the Academies of Science of the world’s 11 largest economies (the G-8 plus India, China, and Brazil) issued a statement endorsing the IPCC’s conclusions and urging world governments to take urgent action to address climate change.	1995年6月，就在苏格兰八国峰会召开前夕，世界上11个最大的经济体的科学院（八国集团加上印度、中国和巴西）发表了一项声明，认同了IPCC的结论，并敦促世界各国政府采取紧急行动，以解决气候变化问题。


The world’s top scientists could not have spoken more strongly.	这是世界顶尖的科学家们发表声明所能达到的最强烈的程度。


Unfortunately, strong vested interests have spent millions of dollars on spreading misinformation about climate change.	不幸的是，强大的既得利益集团已花费了数百万美元来传播关于气候变化影响的错误信息。


First, they tried to deny the existence of any scientific evidence for global warming.	他们首先曾试图否认存在任何证实全球变暖的科学证据。


More recently, they have largely accepted the fact of anthropogenic (man-made) climate change but argue that its impacts will not be great, that we can “wait and see,” and that in any case we can always fix the problem if it turns out to be substantial.	而最近，他们基本上接受了这样的事实，即人为造成的气候变化的现象的存在，但认为其影响将不会很大，我们可以再“等等看” ，而且他们认为，在任何情况下，如果气候变暖发展到很严重的地步，我们总是能够解决这一问题的。


The scientific evidence does not support such arguments.	科学证据并不支持这种观点。


Urgent action is needed both to adapt to the climate change that is inevitable and to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, especially CO2, to prevent further damage as far as possible.	我们需要采取紧急行动以适应不可避免的气候变化，并减少温室气体特别是二氧化碳的排放，以尽可能防止更多的损害。


At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the world’s nations signed up to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the objective of which is “to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that does not cause dangerous interference with the climate system…, that allows ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, that ensures food production is not threatened, and that enables economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”	1992年在里约热内卢召开的地球问题首脑会议上，世界各国签署了气候变化框架公约（FCCC） ，其目标是“把大气中的温室气体浓度稳定在一定的水平，以避免造成对气候系统的危险的干扰. .


Such stabilization would also eventually stop further climate change.	，以使生态系统自然地适应气候变化，确保粮食生产不受到威胁，而且使经济以可持续的方式发展”。 这样的稳定策略最终也将阻止进一步的气候变化。


It is now recognized that widespread damage due, for instance, to sea level rise and more frequent and intense heat waves, floods and droughts, will occur even for small increases of global average temperature.	现在人们认识到，即使是全球平均气温的微幅升高也会带来诸如海平面上升和更频繁和更严重的热浪、洪水和干旱，并由此造成广泛的损害。


Therefore it is necessary that very strong efforts be made to hold the average global temperature rise below 2º Celsius relative to its preindustrial level.	因此，有必要作非常大的努力，让全球平均气温的上升控制在相对于前工业化时期气温的摄氏2 º范围内。


If we are to have a good chance of achieving that target, the concentration of CO2 must not be allowed to exceed 450 parts per million (it is now nearly 390 ppm).	如果我们想比较有把握地实现这一目标， 那么CO2浓度决不允许超过百万分之450（现在是将近百万分之390） 。


This implies that before 2050 global emissions of CO2 must be reduced to below 50% of the 1990 level (they are currently 15% above that level), and that average emissions in developed countries must be reduced by at least 80% of the 1990 level.	这意味着， 2050年前全球的二氧化碳排放量必须比1990年的水平减少50 ％以上（目前是超过了该水平的15 ％以上） ，而且发达国家的平均排放量必须至少比1990年的水平减少80 ％。


The United Kingdom has already committed itself to a binding target to reduce emissions by that amount, and President Barack Obama has expressed intention that the United States should also set that target.	英国已经承诺了一项具有约束力的目标，以减少排放量，而奥巴马总统也已表示，美国也打算建立这样的目标。


One clear requirement is that tropical deforestation, which is responsible for 20% of greenhouse gas emissions, be halted within the next decade or two.	20 ％的温室气体排放，是由于对热带森林的砍伐造成的，而要解决这一问题，明确要求我们在未来十年或二十年中停止砍伐。


Regarding emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its “Energy Technology Perspectives” has set out in detail the technologies and actions that are needed in different countries and sectors to meet these targets.	关于燃烧地下开发的燃料所产生的排放，国际能源机构（ IEA ）在其“能源技术展望”中已制订出详细的规划，列出了在不同的国家和行业中，要实现这些目标所需要的技术和采取的行动。


For the short term, the IEA points out that very strong and determined action will be necessary to ensure that global CO2 emissions stop rising (the current increase is more than 3% per year), reach a peak by about 2015, and then decline steadily toward the 2050 target.	短期而言，国际能源机构指出，必须采取非常重大和坚定的行动，以确保全球二氧化碳排放量停止增长（目前正以每年3 ％以上的速度增长） ，其高峰期约在2015年，然后稳步��降以实现2050年的目标。


The IEA also points out that the targets can be achieved without unacceptable economic damage.	国际能源机构还指出，这个目标可以在不带来无不可接受的经济损失的前提下实现。


In fact, the IEA lists many benefits that will be realized if its recommendations are followed.	事实上，国际能源机构说，如果其建议得到采纳，会带来许多好处。


What is required now is recognition that anthropogenic climate change will severely affect our children, grandchildren, the world’s ecosystems, and the world’s poorer communities, and that the severity of the impact can be substantially alleviated by taking action now.	现在需要的是，人们必须认识到人为造成的气候变化将严重影响到我们的子子孙孙的生活、世界生态系统以及世界上较贫穷的地区，而且如果现在采取行动，这种严重性可以大大缓解。


The Truth about NATO Burden-Sharing	北约责任分担的真相


BRUSSELS – When discussing Afghanistan, many newspapers continue to suggest that some of Europe’s NATO allies are under-performing in Afghanistan, and are either unable or unwilling to make a greater effort.	布鲁塞尔－在讨论阿富汗问题时，许多报纸持续暗示一些欧洲的北约同盟国家在阿富汗表现不佳，这些国家要么不能要么不愿意作出更大的努力。


Naturally, these allies feel that their efforts are under-valued.	自然，这些国家感觉他们的努力被低估了。


What is a fair and equitable burden?	什么是公平和公正的责任呢？


First of all, the debate about burden-sharing should not be reduced solely to today’s force levels in Afghanistan, because, however important these force levels are, they tell only part of the story.	首先，关于责任分担的辩论不应该仅仅局限于现在在阿富汗的军队级别，因为，不管这些军队级别如何重要，它们只是说明了部分的事实。


So let me broaden the debate and offer a more holistic perspective by covering three interconnected elements: defense transformation, operations, and the wider context of the international community’s efforts.	因此，请允许我扩大辩论的范围并通过覆盖三个相互关联的因素来提供一个更全局性的视点：防卫改革，军事行动和国际社会努力的更广阔的背景。


Defense transformation is a key aspect of burden-sharing.	防卫改革是责任分担的一个重要方面。


It is a golden rule within the alliance that the bulk of NATO’s forces and capabilities are owned by individual nations – the alliance’s fleet of Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) aircraft is a rare exception.	在同盟内，大部分的北约军队和军力都为单个国家所有是一个黄金法则－同盟的空中预警指挥系统的机队(AWACS)是一个罕见的例外。


As I don’t expect nations to abandon this principle, NATO will continue to depend on individual allies and their willingness to commit resources.	我不期望同盟国家抛弃这个法则，所以北约将继续依赖单个同盟国家和它们自愿提供的资源。


Contrary to popular opinion, the type of forces and capabilities needed by NATO are not as widely available in national inventories as one might think.	和流行的观点相反，北约需要的军队种类和军力并不像人们认为的那样在同盟国家内广泛存在。


Large proportions of NATO allies’ armed forces are still better suited for static territorial defense than for the expeditionary type of operation needed in Afghanistan.	北约同盟国的大部分武装部队更适合静态的领土防卫而不是在阿富汗需要的远征型的军事行动。


And, when the right type of forces and capabilities do exist, operations led by the United Nations, the European Union, or ad hoc coalitions, as well as national requirements, place additional demands on these assets.	并且，当恰当的军队类型和军力确实存在时，由联合国，欧盟，或者临时的国家联盟领导的军事行动以及各个国家的需要，都给这些军队及其军力提出了更多的要求。


Developing the necessary expeditionary capabilities is a major feature of NATO’s transformation process.	发展必要的远征能力是北约改革进程的一个重要特色。


But it is not possible to convert territorial forces into expeditionary forces overnight, and the costs of transformation often must compete with the costs of deploying forces for operations.	但是要将适应一个国家的军队在一夜之间改变成为远征部队是不可能的，而且改革的开支还经常与为军事行动部署军队所需的开支竞争。


Many allies face the dilemma of either spending money on operations or investing in new acquisition programs.	许多同盟国家面对要么在军事行动上进行投入要么在获得新程序上进行投入的两难抉择。


Moreover, many allies’ failure to respect the 2%-of-GDP target for their defense budgets exacerbates this dilemma, and also widens the capability gap with those allies that are investing in usable and deployable forces.	而且，许多同盟国家没能完成将GDP的2%作为防卫预算的目标，这加剧了这个难题，并且扩大了与那些在可用和可部署军队上投入的同盟国家的军力差距。


But, while there is no substitute for appropriate defense budgets, we could get more from current spending levels, especially through a smarter approach to defense acquisition.	但是，虽然没有适当的防卫预算的替代品，我们可以以目前的开支水平取得更多的物资，特别是通过一个更聪明的军事采办方法来达到这一点。


Unfortunately, despite the efforts of NATO and the EU, Europe’s defense sector remains fragmented, which leads to duplication, unhelpful competition from too many rival systems, and, significant capability gaps or incompatibilities.	不幸的是，尽管有北约和欧盟的努力，欧洲的防卫部门仍然是一盘散沙，这导致许多对立系统之间的重复无益的竞争以及重大的军力差距 或不相容。


In Afghanistan, for example, national systems for friendly-force tracking, which are vital to preventing accidental attacks on one’s own forces or allies, are not compatible.	例如，在阿富汗，对防止意外攻击自己或同盟的军队极其重要的国家友好军队跟踪系统都不兼容。


Extra time and money has therefore had to be invested in the acquisition of these capabilities.	因此，为了取得这些军力，就要投入额外的时间和金钱。


In Europe, many national defense budgets can no longer sustain both fully-fledged national forces and a national defense industry.	在欧洲，许多国防预算不再能既支持国家军队的全面发展又支持国防工业。


Only smarter multinational and transatlantic cooperation will give us forces that are capable of dealing with today’s security challenges.	只有更明智的跨国和跨大西洋的合作才能为我们提供能处理现今的安全挑战的军队。


In an alliance founded on the principle of “all for one, and one for all,” it is vital that all nations are seen to contribute fairly to operations.	在一个建立在“人人为我，我为人人”基础上的联盟内，每个国家都公平的对军事行动作出贡献非常重要。


Thus, NATO, developed a burden-sharing mechanism to assess members’ manning commitments for critical operational activities relative to their gross national income.	因此，北约发展了一个责任分担机制，按照其国民总收入来评估成员对重大军事行动的人员配备承诺。


This sort of arithmetic has the merit of giving some indications about burden-sharing, but it has also been shown that burden-sharing cannot be fully captured in graphs and spreadsheets.	这种算法的一个优点是可以给责任分担一些指标，但是它也显示责任分担不能用图表和数据表来完全反映。


How does one decide what is a fair contribution from a country of 50 million people compared to a country with only four million?	人们怎么确定一个有5千万人口的国家与一个只有4百万人口的国家相比，其贡献是公平的呢？


How can you evaluate a contribution of light infantry against the provision of critical enablers such as helicopters or air-to-air refueling tankers?	又怎样评估提供轻型步兵部队与供应诸如直升机或空对空加油机这样的增强军力的设施的贡献的大小呢？


Over what time period do you make your calculations?	进行这样的计算时计算的期限是多长呢？


Common funding, with all members paying a share according to their GDP, is one instrument that can be used to achieve more equitable burden-sharing.	所有成员按照它们的GDP支付一定份额的共同出资是一个可以用来取得更公正的责任分担的手段。


Traditionally, NATO applied a policy of “costs lie where they fall”: each member picked up all the costs for the operational contribution that it made to an Alliance operation.	传统上，北约使用“费用自负”政策：每个成员承担其在同盟行动中自己行动的成本。


During the past couple of years, NATO’s funding policy has been updated to allow common funding to be used as an incentive for the provision of certain theater-level enabling capabilities, like medical facilities, airports handling troops and supplies, or intelligence.	在过去的几年里，北约的出资政策已经被更新，以使共同出资可以被用来作为刺激提供诸如医疗设、机场处置部队和军事供给或者情报这样的提高战区军力设施的手段。


Burden-sharing is a sensitive issue, for both NATO and the international community, and passions sometimes run high.	责任分担对北约和国际社会都是一个敏感问题，有时候人们对其热情很高。


By stepping back and looking at the broader picture, it is clear that it is not just a matter of having the right capabilities, but also of having the money and political will to deploy them.	通过退一步并观察更广泛的图景，很明显，这不仅仅是一个去拥有恰当的军力的问题，而且还是一个金钱和愿意部署它们的政治意愿问题。


No single measure can resolve the burden-sharing problem.	没有一个单一的方法可以解决责任分担问题。 但是现在在北约内的一系列倡议可以对解决该问题作用：努力增加可用和可部署军队的改革；


But the range of initiatives now underway within NATO should help: transformation efforts to increase the pool of usable and deployable forces; wider use of multinational initiatives; greater reliance on common funding to assist force generation; and a comprehensive approach for sharing burdens more equitably across the entire international community.	对共同出资以支持军队更新换代的更大的倚重； 以及在整个国际社会更公正地分担责任的详尽的方法。


An alliance like NATO, in contrast to many “coalitions of the willing,” has the political consultation structures, proven planning mechanisms, effective command and control, and legitimacy that encourages nations to contribute to an operation. Alliance solidarity is not just a slogan.	与许多“志愿联盟”相比，像北约这样的联盟具有政治磋商机构，经过检验的计划机制，有效的指挥和控制机构，以及鼓励国家参与军事行动的正当性，联盟团结不仅仅是一句口号。


The sense of keeping one’s obligations and commitments to other allies, upon whom one’s own security ultimately depends, is a powerful motive for equitable burden-sharing.	履行一个国家的义务以及对其他同盟国家的承诺，是这个国家自己的安全赖以存在的基石，也是公正的责任分担的强大动机。


Totally fair burden-sharing may not be possible, but a security organization like NATO undoubtedly allows us to come closer to it than any other approach.	完全公平的责任分担可能不可能，但是像北约这样的安全组织毫无疑问会使我们比其他的任何途经更能接近这一点。


The Truth about Negotiations	谈判的真谛


ATHENS – When people and countries negotiate, they often talk about their interests as though they were the only matters that could elicit agreement.	雅典——当人们和国家谈判时，他们常常谈论其利益，似乎只有靠利益才能达成协议。


In casting his veto at the European Union’s December summit in Brussels, British Prime Minister David Cameron said, “What is on offer isn’t in Britain’s interests, so I didn’t agree to it,” as if agreement solely depended upon whether or not interests were satisfied.	去年12月份，英国首相戴维•卡梅伦在布鲁塞尔召开的欧盟峰会上投了否决票，他说“谈判的内容不符合英国的利益，所以我不同意，”似乎协议是否能达成只取决于各方利益是否得到了满足。


Then again, reaching an agreement might never have been Cameron’s goal.	再说，达成协议可能根本不是卡梅伦的目标。


While so-called “win-win” outcomes are increasingly considered to be the ultimate purpose of every negotiation, what if the negotiating parties contemplate a win-win outcome that actually harms non-participants to the talks, or is against the law?	尽管所谓的“双赢”结果日益成为每次谈判的最终目的，但是如果谈判各方商定的双赢结果实际上损害未参与谈判者的利益，该怎么办？


What if the outcome is beneficial but contrary to the principles of the negotiating parties?	如果谈判的结果对各方都有利，但是违背谈判各方的原则，该怎么办？


Imagine that you are at a negotiating table and want the other party to agree with you.	想象一下，你坐在谈判桌旁希望其他各方同意你的观点。


A strategy that could work would be to stress how the outcome is beneficial to everyone involved.	强调谈判结果对谈判各方如何如何有利是一种行之有效的战略。


But the outcome you propose might not be fair, or realistic, or you might be consciously lying.	但是你提出的谈判内容可能并不公平，或者不现实，亦或根本就是你有意撒谎。


So, although based on interests, such a proposal will not be easily accepted.	因此，即使基于利益，这样一份提议也将难以接受。


Indeed, when one ponders how many issues there are to consider, it becomes obvious that negotiation is a type of communication that involves far more than interests.	实际上，当一个人深思多少问题需要考虑时，显然谈判是一种交流，关注的远远不只是利益。


Principles, morality, and simple respect for the truth guide agreement as much as interests do.	原则、道德和对真理的尊重与利益一样能促成协议。


Some would argue that successful negotiators require only tact – the ability to use principles to conceal one’s true interests.	有人会说，成功的谈判者只需要机智的手段——利用原则隐藏其真正利益的能力。


If this were correct, the United States was right to wage war on Iraq on the basis of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.	如果这是正确的话，基于萨达姆•侯赛因构成的威胁，美国对伊拉克发动战争就是正确的了。


But it is now widely accepted that the way in which the US negotiated its way into war was a mistake – one that has cost it enormous credibility as a negotiating partner.	但是现在人们普遍认为，美国发动战争的谈判方式是一个错误——这一错误使美国作为谈判一方失去了大量的信誉。


In fact, the US often stands for high principles, such as freedom and democracy, and incorporates them successfully into its foreign policy.	实际上，美国常常象征着自由和民主等高原则并将它们成功地融入了其外交政策中。


Defending economic aid to Europe after World War II, General George C. Marshall, then US Secretary of State, gave an inspirational speech that argued that US policy is not directed against “any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.”	为了为二战后的欧洲提供经济援助辩护，时任美国国务卿乔治•C•马歇尔将军发表了鼓舞人心的演讲，称美国的政策不针对“任何国家或主义，而是针对饥饿、贫穷、绝望和混乱。


The Marshall Plan was as much about principles as it was about protecting US interests.	”马歇尔计划既保护了美国的利益，也捍卫了原则。


Even if the Cameron government’s rhetoric seems to be focused on “interests,” its negotiating positions also reflect higher principles, just as other countries’ do.	尽管卡梅伦政府的措辞似乎专注的是“利益”，其谈判立场还是反映了较高的原则，这一点与其他国家是一样的。


The United Nations and other organizations bear witness to countries’ commitment to principles of justice and solidarity, and to their willingness to set aside their narrow agendas to serve higher causes.	美国和其他组织见证了各国致力于公平和团结的原则，见证了各国愿意将自身的狭隘议程搁置一边，追求更高的事业。


Negotiation should address these causes no less than it speaks to interests.	谈判在解决利益问题的同时，还应该处理这些事业问题。


None of this is to deny that interests do, after all, play a role in negotiations, or that interests can affect morality.	这并不是否定利益终究会在谈判中发挥作用或者利益会影响道德。


Immanuel Kant famously argued otherwise – that morality should be free of non-universal interests.	伊曼努尔•康德有一句很著名的话，意思刚好与之相反，称道德不应该受非普世利益的影响。


But the contemporary philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues that moral norms are valid as long as people accept them freely after having considered the consequences of their implementation for the satisfaction of interests.	但是当代哲学家尤尔根•哈贝马斯表示，只要考虑了为满足利益而实行道德准则的后果后，人们接受了道德准则，道德准则就是有效的。


Of course, consideration of interests means just that: they must be taken into account; they do not have to be entirely satisfied.	当然，考虑利益只是意味着：必须考虑利益，但是并不一定要完全满足利益。


In some cases, the defense of interests alone might seem appropriate – for example, in certain business transactions.	在一些情况下，维护利益本身似乎就是合适的——比如在一些商业交易中。


The more complicated a negotiation, though, the more difficult it is to disregard complex issues such as values and norms or the importance of being sincere.	不过谈判越复杂就越难忽视复杂的问题，比如价值观和准则或者真诚的重要性。


As Aristotle said: “that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade.”	正如亚里士多德所说：“真理和更美好的东西往往更容易证明，也可能更具说服力。


Failure to provide proper arguments and reasons for a negotiating position could lead to a breakdown of communication among the parties.	”在谈判中，无法提供合适的论据可能会导致各方交流失败。


If negotiations truly need proper argumentation of this sort, it surely makes sense that many differences are resolved outside the context of negotiations.	如果谈判确实需要这类合适的论据，那么在谈判场外解决众多分歧必定是富有意义的。


Likewise, certain “negotiations” are not negotiations at all, but are better understood as processes of extortion and blackmail.	同样，这样的“谈判”根本不是谈判，理解为敲诈勒索的过程反而更好一些。


In today’s globalized world, true negotiation is necessary.	在当今全球化的世界里，真正的谈判必不可少。


Countries and peoples form an interconnected web of interests that cannot be easily disentangled and satisfied in an isolated manner.	各国和各民族形成了一个相互连接的利益网，拆开���个网络并满足某一方的利益并非易事。


Resolving disputes requires mutually accepted principles that guide how individuals and countries interact.	解决分歧需要共同接受的原则，这些原则能够引导个人和各国互动。


Negotiation is the path toward successful conflict resolution, but it should be conducted according to basic rules of true and open communication.	谈判是成功解决冲突之路，但是必须根据真诚开放交流的基本规则进行。


Countries and peoples should stop debating the interests that often divide them and start discussing the principles that unite them.	各国和各民族应该停止争辩常常会导致分歧的利益，开始讨论团结他们的原则。


As long as communication is conducted truthfully and with respect to values, norms, and objective facts, negotiations will be able to achieve consensus and agreement. 	只要真诚地交流，尊重价值观、准则和客观事实，谈判就能达成共识和协议。


The Tsunami Effect	海啸的影响


The extraordinary international response to the tsunamis that devastated South Asia is a remarkable political phenomenon.	国际社会对于给南亚带来毁灭性灾害的海啸做出的非常反应是一个值得注意的政治现象。


Though it is too soon to predict all the effects, some good consequences are already evident, as are some that are troublesome and others whose impact will play out over time.	尽管现在就预计所有结果为时过早，部分良性结果已经显现出来，部分则显得有些棘手，另外一些的影响则会随时间自然消逝。


One useful consequence is that wealthy countries’ low levels of assistance to those less fortunate has gained wider attention.	其中一个说明问题的结果就是：富裕国家对于那些遇难国家支援的微弱数量已经受到更广泛的注意。


Plainly, the comment by Jan Egeland, the United Nations official in charge of humanitarian assistance, calling the West “stingy,” hit home, especially in the United States.	联合国负责人道主义救援的官员珍·艾格兰德不加修饰的称西方国家尤其是美国 “吝啬”，可谓一语中的。


At that point, the Bush administration had committed a measly $35 million in aid.	当时，布什政府仅仅承诺提供可怜的3500万美元的援助。


While condemning Egeland’s comment, Bush quickly multiplied America’s commitment ten-fold.	在谴责艾格兰德所作评论的同时，布什把美国原来的援助承诺增至十倍。


In addition, he enlisted former Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton to lead a private fundraising effort.	而且，他还请求前总统乔治·布什和比尔·克林顿加盟，开展民间募捐活动。


This neatly fit a standard response to criticism of the level of American assistance: that private philanthropy exceeds government aid.	这恰恰和批评美国援助数量的普遍反应相吻合，即：民间募捐超出了政府援助。


Depending on what monies are included, this is true, although the British, Dutch, Germans, French, and other Europeans are also generous donors, despite lacking the tax benefits that encourage private philanthropy in the US.	虽然英国、荷兰、德国、法国和其它一些欧洲国家的国民也都慷慨解囊，但如果就捐助的现金数量来看，美国国民的个人募捐确实超出了其政府的援助金额――尽管美国的税收政策并没有起到鼓励个人募捐的作用。


Moreover, like official US assistance, a relatively small share of American private philanthropy ordinarily goes to the poorest countries.	此外，和美国的官方援助一样，美国国民慈善募捐中也只有相对较小的一部分送至最贫穷的国家。


In contrast, the countries that are most generous – Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and tiny Luxemburg – give proportionately far more than American governmental and private assistance combined, and the lion’s share of their aid goes to the world’s most impoverished countries.	与此形成鲜明对比，那些非常慷慨的国家――挪威、瑞典、丹麦、荷兰和小国卢森堡――在比例上远远超出了美国政府及个人的援助总和，拿出援助资金的最大份额来帮助世界上最贫穷的国家。


In the wake of the tsunamis, it seems possible that the US and other wealthy countries will rethink their assistance programs and, possibly, step up their aid to those most in need.	海啸发生之后，美国和其它一些富裕国家似乎完全来得及重新考虑他们的援助计划，并有可能对那些最需要救济的国家追加援助资金。


Perhaps even some oil-rich governments will be embarrassed by attention to their miserliness in doling out assistance.	也许一些石油大国会因为自己的吝啬受到注意而感到尴尬。


But there is also a risk that assistance for tsunami victims is diverting aid from disasters that are of a more chronic character or that are less amenable to sensational media coverage.	但对海啸灾民的救助，也可能使得对于具有长期性特点并且不会受到媒体大肆报导的灾难所进行的援助发生转移。


In announcing that it would stop accepting donations for the victims of the tsunami after collecting €40 million for that purpose, Médecins Sans Frontières noted its urgent need for funds for such man-made catastrophes as Darfur in Sudan and for the Democratic Republic of Congo.	“医生无国界”组织在收到对海啸灾民捐助的4000万英镑后，宣布停止接受针对与此的捐助，而明确指出急需资金针对类似苏丹达尔福尔地区和民主刚果共和国发生的人为灾难实施救助。


In recent years, many more people have died in the conflicts in Sudan and Congo than were killed by the tsunamis.	近年来，在苏丹和刚果，死于冲突的人远远多于此次死于海啸的人。


Some were direct victims of the fighting in those countries, while a much larger number died from war-related hunger and disease.	其中一部分人是暴力冲突的直接受害者，而更多的人则死于与战争相关的饥饿和疾病。


Similarly, the number of those forcibly displaced is a multiple of those who lost their homes and livelihoods due to the tsunamis.	同样，因此被迫流离失所的人数也是在海啸中失去房屋和生计的人数的若干倍。


Yet MSF was able to collect only €650,000 in two months of soliciting funds for Darfur, while it received €40 million for the tsunami victims in just eight days.	然而，“医生无国界”组织在为达尔福尔求助的两个月里仅筹到65万英镑的救济金，在短短的8天时间里收到救助海啸灾民的资金却高达4000万英镑。


Given the limited number of skilled personnel available to humanitarian agencies, human resources could follow the money.	单单计算人道主义机构中有经验的成员数量，投入人力的数目就快接近这一资金的数目了。


Another question likely to loom large in coming months is whether assistance is politicized and free of corruption.	未来几个月有可能出现的另外一个问题就是援助是否被政治化，并且没有腐败掺杂。


Politicization is important because the two countries that were hardest hit, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, both suffer armed conflicts in tsunami-hit regions.	政治化这一点很重要，因为两个受到重创的国家――印度尼西亚和斯里兰卡在受海啸袭击地区都经历着武装冲突。


Aceh province in Indonesia was previously largely closed to outsiders.	印尼的亚齐省在此之前就在印尼军方控制下，大规模对外来者关闭了。


It was ruled by the Indonesian army, which fought a brutal civil war against the separatist Free Aceh Movement.	印尼军方当时在与旨在搞分离的亚齐独立运动进行激烈内战。


Similarly, northern Sri Lanka is the main battleground for the long-running conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.	与之类似，斯里兰卡北部是政府军和泰米尔独立猛虎解放组织长期冲突的主要战场。


Despite headway towards settling that struggle, violence continues and could erupt again in full fury.	尽管解决纷争取得一定进展，暴力依然继续并且可能会再次全面爆发。


Germany, where combined public and private aid for tsunami victims has reached $1.1 billion (making it the largest international donor), says that it would like its aid to be used to foster peace settlements.	对海啸灾民的公共和私人捐助总和已达11亿美元的德国（成为国际上捐资最多的国家）表示希望捐助能够解决和平问题。


A worthy goal, but successful models do not come readily to mind.	为此目标值得一试，但到目前为止尚无此类成功范例。


More common is a situation like that of ex-Yugoslavia.	类似前南斯拉夫的情况则更为普遍。


During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia the UN was responsible for humanitarian assistance and also dedicated to peacemaking.	在克罗地亚与波斯尼亚的交火中，联合国负责当时的人道主义援助并致力于和平调解。


Yet it was never able to use the former to advance the latter.	但是人道主义援助并没有进一步实现和平调解。


It would not be the first time that a government misused aid intended for disaster victims.	政府滥用针对灾民的援助已经不是第一次了。


A notorious example is Nicaragua after the earthquake that leveled the capital, Managua, in December 1972.	一个臭名昭著的例子就是尼加拉瓜，1972年12月发生地震后，首都马那瓜被夷为平地。


Nicaragua’s dictator, Anastasio Somoza, diverted much of the international assistance meant for the survivors into his own pockets and those of his cronies.	当时的独裁执政者阿纳斯塔西奥·索莫扎（Anastasio Somoza）把大量用于救助地震生还者的国际救援资金揣进了自己及其亲信的腰包。


In the process, he incited popular support for the left-wing Sandinista guerrillas who toppled his government later in the decade.	因此激起了民众对左翼桑地尼斯塔（Sandinista）游击队组织的多数支持，该组织十年后推翻了他的政府。


The tsunamis provide an opportunity for the UN to reclaim the high ground that it lost recently.	海啸还为联合国提供了一次机会，使其得以收回刚刚失去的要地。 关于伊拉克“石油换食品”的丑闻至少说明联合国内部管理不善；


Battered by the Iraqi “oil for food” scandal, which, at the least, demonstrated mismanagement, and misdeeds by officials ranging from former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (now High Commissioner for Refugees), who faces allegations of sexual harassment, to rapes committed by UN peacekeeping troops in Congo, the UN has a chance to rehabilitate its reputation by managing the relief effort effectively.	其官员们的违法行为――从荷兰前总理鲁德·兰博斯（Ruud Lubbers）（现任难民署高级专员）因性骚扰受到指控到联合国维和部队在刚果的强奸行为――也破坏了联合国的形象。 而海啸让联合国有机会通过有效地实施救济援助得以恢复自身名誉。


Doing so requires putting the right person in charge — someone like Paul Hoffman, the American industrialist who managed the Marshall Plan more than half a century ago and, subsequently, headed the UN Development Program.	这就要求挑选合适人选负责相关事务，挑��像半个世纪多以前参与实施马歇尔计划，后来又负责联合国开发项目的美国实业家保罗·霍夫曼那样的人。


It also requires making sure that the person in charge gets the staff assistance and the political backing required to do the job well.	同时这还需要保证在位的人得到其成员的协助以及确保工作得以顺利进行的政治支持。


Taksim and the Left	塔克西姆和左翼


ISTANBUL – The small park in Taksim Square in the sprawling metropolis of Istanbul is one of the few green spaces left in the city center.	伊斯坦布尔—在不断向外扩张的大都市伊斯坦布尔有一个塔克西姆广场（Taksim Square），塔克西姆广场有一个小公园，它是市中心硕果仅存的几处绿色空间之一。


On May 28, a handful of Turkish environmentalists started a peaceful protest against a redevelopment plan for the park that would replace the greenery with a replica of an Ottoman-era army barracks, a shopping mall, and apartments.	5月28日，一批土耳其环保主义者开始了反对公园重新开发的和平示威。 重新开发将用仿建的奥斯曼帝国时代军营、购物城和公寓楼取代绿地。


But heavy-handed police repression launched a massive civic movement that has spread to the entire country.	但警察的持械镇压爆发了大规模公民运动并蔓延至全国。


The redevelopment plan for the park triggered a huge protest against what a large segment of the Turkish public, particularly young people, considers paternalistic and authoritarian political leadership.	对塔克西姆广场公园的重新开发计划触发了针对一大批土耳其公众（特别是年轻人）所认为的家长式和独裁式政治领导的大规模示威。


The movement’s rapid growth was fueled by widespread opposition to what many regard as official efforts to regiment lifestyles, as well as by frustration over perceived economic inequities.	对许多人所认为的生活集体化的官方尝试的普遍反对，以及对经济不平等感的沮丧使这场运动快速发酵。


Indeed, though environmentalists and secular youth spearheaded the protest movement, it became remarkably diverse and inclusive almost overnight.	事实上，尽管环保主义者和世俗年轻人才是这场示威运动的先锋，但它几乎在一夜之间变为令人注目的多样化和包容性运动。


Pious Muslims – particularly those who believe that Turkey’s urban development has created too much rent-seeking and too many easy fortunes – joined the demonstrations as well, as did some far-left groups.	虔诚的穆斯林——特别是那些认为土耳其的城市开发产生了太多的寻租和太多的暴富的人——也也加入了示威活动，一些极左组织亦然。


Some of the protests became violent.	一些示威出现了暴力。


Overall, however, the movement has remained peaceful and even joyous.	但是，总的来说，这场运动仍是和平甚至喜庆的。


Moreover, important figures in or close to the ruling Justice and Development Party expressed their willingness to hold a dialogue with the protesters.	此外，身为执政党正义与发展党（Justice and Development Party）党员或与该党关系密切的重要人物表示愿意与示威者展开对话。


President Abdullah Gül, in particular, played a calming, statesmanlike role.	特别是总统居尔发挥了沉着冷静的政治家风采。


A striking feature of the protests has been the distance that the demonstrators have put between themselves and existing political parties, including the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the largest force in the center-left secular opposition.	示威的一个显著特征是示威者刻意与现有政党保持距离，包括最大的中左翼世俗反对力量共和人民党（Republican People’s Party，CHP）。


In this sense, the Taksim “sit-in” resembles protests elsewhere, particularly in the advanced democracies, from the “Occupy Wall Street” movement to the protests in Spain and Italy.	从这个角度讲，塔克西姆“静坐”与其他国家的示威并无二致，特别是发达民主国家的示威，比如“占领华尔街”运动和西班牙和意大利的示威。


To be sure, there are country-specific features to such protests – including, in Turkey’s case, the reaction against lifestyle paternalism.	诚然，这些示威各有各的国家特征，包括（在土耳其的例子中）生活方式家长作风所引起的反应。


But social democrats must understand why the protests developed quite independently of existing, organized, center-left politics.	但社会民主派必须理解为何示威的发展会独立于现有的有组织中左翼政治。


Without such realism, the center left in Europe and the emerging world cannot regain political momentum.	缺少这样的现实主义，欧洲和新型世界的中左翼就无法重获政治动能。


Modern production systems, in which information technology plays an increasingly crucial role, are totally different from the large factory floors that characterized the birth of trade unionism and social democracy.	现代生产体系——信息技术在其中的作用越来越关键——与作为工联主义和社会民主诞生的特征的大工厂大相径庭。


The way much of GDP is now produced has made it significantly harder for the left to organize in traditional ways.	如今，大量GDP的产出方式让左翼以传统方式组织起来的难度大大增加了。


That has weakened center-left parties.	这削弱了中左翼政党。


Yet information technology and global social media have empowered people to overcome social fragmentation along occupational, residential, and national lines.	但信息技术和全球社交媒体把人民武装起来克服因职业、定居和民族而产生社会分裂。


On some recent days, posts about Taksim Square have reportedly occupied a huge part of the entire world’s “Tweet space.”	最近，在不少日子关于塔克西姆广场的帖子据说占据了全世界“Tweet空间”的大部分。


In this corner of cyberspace, there is, of course, everything under the sun, including calls for the worst sort of sectarianism.	当然，在网络世界的这个角落，一切都在阳光之下，包括对最糟糕的宗派主义的呼唤。


Nonetheless, what dominates is a desire for individual freedom, an acceptance of diversity, great concern for the environment, and a refusal to be “organized” from above.	尽管如此，占主导地位的是对个人自由的渴望、对多样化的接受、对环境的深忧，以及对从上而下“被组织”的拒绝。


Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the CHP’s reformist leader, quickly recognized these dynamics: “The demonstrators don’t want us on the front lines,” he said, “and we have much to learn from these events.”	CHP的改革派领导人吉利克哒罗格鲁（Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu）很快就认识到了这些动态：“示威者不希望我们站在前沿，”他说，“我们可以从这些事件中学到很多东西。 ”


And yet, while civil society can be a trigger, sooner or later democratic politics has to drive the process of change.	而尽管公民社会可能已被触发，但迟早民主政治必须推动改变过程。


Whether in New York, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Istanbul, or New Delhi, a feeling of unease and a desire for change has emerged in societies that are becoming increasingly unequal, and in which politics and business mix in non-transparent ways.	不管在纽约、巴黎、马德里、罗马、伊斯坦布尔还是新德里，紧张感和变化渴望在日渐不平等、政治和商业以不为人知的方式同流合污的社会中开始涌现。


Rising youth unemployment and cuts in pensions and social expenditures come at a time when many large multinational corporations legally avoid taxes by shifting their profits to favorable jurisdictions.	年轻人失业率上升，养老金和社会支出的削减，与此同时，跨国大公司通过将利润转移到有利法律管辖区实现合法避税。


In the eurozone, stock prices are soaring, while joblessness is at a record-high 12.2%.	在欧元区，股票价格暴涨，而失业率则达到了创纪录的12. 2%。


The democratic opposition can address the flaws of the existing order only if it recognizes the need for very different forms of mobilization from those of the past.	民主反对可以纠正现有秩序的缺陷，但这只有在从历史中学到截然不同的动员形式的必要性的情况下才能实现。


It must recognize a strong popular desire for individual autonomy, more leadership positions for women and the young, and greater support for individual enterprise (along with reforms of social insurance that make it cost-effective and truly inclusive).	民主反对必须认识到公众极其渴望个人自治，让女性和年轻人担起更多的领导责任，以及加大对个体企业的支持（并辅之以社会保险改革，使其成本低廉且真正具有包容性）。


Finally, the environment, climate change, and global solidarity will be defining themes of the twenty-first century.	最后，环境、气候变化和全球团结将是21世纪的显著特征。


Acting on their own, nation-states can successfully address neither tax avoidance nor carbon emissions.	各自为政的民族国家无法解决避税和碳排放问题。


The renewed patriotism seen in many places  – a response to the unfairness and dislocation that globalization can generate – must be reconciled with human solidarity, respect for diversity, and the ability to work across national borders.	许多地区重新涌现的爱国主义——对全球化所产生的不公平和错位的反应——必须与人类团结、尊重多样化以及跨境工作能力相协调。


The success of Germany’s Green Party reflects the focus that it has placed on many of these issues.	德国绿党的成功正是它关注大量此类问题的反映。


The events that started in Taksim Square are specific to Turkey, but they mirror aspirations that are universal.	塔克西姆广场所催生的事件是土耳其的个例，但它们也是全人类共同愿望的镜像。


The same can be said for the challenge facing the democratic left.	民族左翼所面临的挑战也是如此。


The Twilight of Pervez Musharraf	日薄西山的穆沙拉夫


It is said that political power in Pakistan flows from the three A’s: Allah, the Army, and support from America.	人们都说巴基斯坦的政治权力来自三个“A”：安拉(Allah)、军队(Army)和美国(America)的支持。


Of the three, it is the army leadership that has the clearest means of ridding the country of Pakistan’s president in uniform, Pervez Musharraf.	但是只有军队的领导层拥有最明显的手段能帮这个国家除掉穆沙拉夫——穿军装的巴基斯坦总统。


And that’s the main reason any power-sharing deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is unlikely to end Pakistan’s political turmoil.	而这也是任何与前总理贝布托的权力分享协议不太可能终结巴基斯坦的政治动乱的原因所在。


Musharraf hoped to extend his presidency this fall without caving in to opposition demands that he renounce his military position and restore a civilian rival to the post of prime minister.	穆沙拉夫希望能在今年秋天后延长他的总统任期，同时不必屈服于反对派的要求辞去他在军方的职务以及让一位文职的竞争对手来担任总理职务。


But few international leaders face such a wide range of sworn domestic enemies.	但是世界上很少有其他领导人像他这样面对如此广泛、立场坚定的国内敌人。


Since seizing power following a 1999 coup, Musharraf has survived at least three serious assassination attempts.	自从在1999年通过一场政变获得权力后，穆沙拉夫至少已经躲过了三次严重的暗伤图谋。


His anti-terrorist partnership with the United States fatally undermined his political alliance with Pakistan’s religious conservatives even before his government stormed Islamabad’s Red Mosque in July, killing more than 100 people.	甚至在他的政府七月份冲进伊斯兰堡的红色清真寺，杀死超过100人之前，他与美国的反恐合作就已经致命地削弱了他与巴基斯坦宗教保守势力的政治联盟。


The threat of terrorist attacks inside the country will continue to rise.	国内恐怖袭击的威胁将持续高涨。


Musharraf also has plenty of secular enemies.	穆沙拉夫同时还有许多来自世俗派的敌人。


Their anger, inflamed in March when he tried unsuccessfully to sack the Supreme Court’s independent-minded chief justice, rages on.	他们的愤怒在他三月份罢免最高法院具有独立思想的大法官乔杜里的企图未能成功时，迅速升温了。


The court recently ruled that Nawaz Sharif, who Musharraf unseated eight years ago, must be allowed to return from exile.	法院最近裁定八年前被穆沙拉夫赶下台的谢里夫必须被允许结束流亡回到国内。


Sharif is planning a grand entrance.	谢里夫正筹划一次盛大的入境。


His “decisive struggle against dictatorship” – and determined opposition to any deal with Bhutto that excludes him – will intensify.	他的“与独裁者决定性的斗争”以及坚决反对任何把他排斥在外的与贝布托的协议的势头会越来越猛。


Musharraf is warning him to remain in London.	穆沙拉夫警告他要他继续呆在伦敦。


America isn’t happy with Musharraf, either.	美国也对穆沙拉夫感到不满。


Some in Washington charge that he has done too little to roust al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from safe havens along the country’s border with Afghanistan.	华盛顿有些人指责他在把基地组织以及塔利班武装驱逐出他们位于巴基斯坦与阿富汗接壤地带的安全避难所这方面做得太少。


His recent flirtation with a plan to bypass Bhutto and declare emergency rule provoked pointed Bush administration criticism.	他最近表示要绕开贝布托实行紧急状况管制的计划也遭到了布什政府的批评。


But it’s the army that is most likely to eventually decide the fate of his presidency.	但是军方最有可能最终决定他能否继续在总统位置上干下去。


Musharraf’s rule has given the military leadership a strong role in policymaking, but his eight years in office have badly damaged domestic support for the army’s influence within the government.	穆沙拉夫的执政使军方的领导层在决策上担当了重要的角色，但是他的八年当政也严重损害了国民对于军队在政府内部影响力的支持。


His unpopularity has become their unpopularity.	他的不得人心变成了军队的不得人心。


Aware of a potential threat from within their ranks, Musharraf has populated his inner circle with relatively junior (and reliably loyal) officers.	认识到来自军队的潜在威胁，穆沙拉夫把他身边的核心成员换成了相对低级别（同时也是更忠心）的军官。


But a deal that makes Bhutto prime minister would undermine the military’s influence – and eventually its support for Musharraf’s presidency. As prime minister, she could eventually revisit her deal with Musharraf from a position of strength.	但是与贝布托达成的让她担任总理的协议会削弱军队的影响力，从而也会最终削弱它对穆沙拉夫担任总统的支持。


Military leaders know this, and the threat that they will eventually push him aside will plague his presidency well into next year.	在担任总理取得实权后，她最终可能会重新审视她与穆沙拉夫的协议。


The army is unlikely to move on Musharraf directly unless subtler methods fail.	但是，除非更为隐蔽的方法遭到了失败，军方不太可能直接把穆沙拉夫赶下台。


The generals know that another coup would further weaken the military’s popular standing – as well as Pakistan’s relations with the US – at a moment when Bhutto and Sharif have raised expectations at home and abroad for a permanent return to civilian rule.	将军们知道在贝布托和谢里夫燃起了国内外对于永久回归文官统治的期望时，策划另一次政变会进一步削弱军队在群众中的地位以及巴基斯坦与美国的关系。


But if Musharraf were to refuse to go quietly, the generals could promise him a long list of public corruption charges that he must survive without their protection.	但是如果穆沙拉夫拒绝悄悄地下台，将军们会确保让他遭受一长串公共腐败的指控而得不到他们的保护。


Musharraf’s presidency won’t survive long without military backing.	缺乏军方的支持，穆沙拉夫不可能在总统位置上呆太久。


To preserve the appearance that their meddling is benign, senior military officers probably know that they cannot afford to install another general as president.	为了保持它的介入是良性的表象，军队的高级官员也许清楚他们不可能再安排另一位将军来担任总统。


Instead, they will most likely support cosmetic political reforms, including a new law that formally separates the roles of army commander and head of state.	取而代之，它很可能支持表面的政治改革，包括制订一部新的法律正式地把军队领导人的角色与国家元首的角色分离开。


That is the strategy the military adopted in 1988, following the mysterious plane crash that killed former President (and General) Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. The army leadership ordered elections, permitted the formation of a civilian government, and then stage-managed the political process from the wings.	这正是军队在1988年导致前总统（将军）齐亚哈克丧身的神秘的撞机事件发生后采取的策略：军队下令进行大选，允许组成一个文官政府，然后从幕后操纵政治进程。


Bhutto, the leader of a secular party that now enjoys substantial support in Washington, would dominate policy planning in the next government at Musharraf’s expense.	贝布托，一个现在正受到华盛顿实质性支持的世俗党派的领导人，会在下一届政府中独享政策制定的权力，而由穆沙拉夫去付出代价。


She must build on her domestic support, but she can rely on economic and security cooperation with America to safeguard the country’s stability.	她必须获得国内的支持，但是她可以依靠与美国的经济和安全合作来保护国家的安定。


In addition, the military’s role as guarantor of stability, and its tight control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the army’s crown jewels, will continue.	除此之外，军队作为国家安定的守卫者的角色以及��对巴基斯坦核武库——军队的御宝——的严密控制将会延续下去。


The Bush administration can therefore enthusiastically back a return to civilian rule and claim a much-needed victory for democracy in a Muslim country.	布什政府因而可以热心地支持回归文官统治，并且可以宣称其迫切需要的在一个穆斯林国家民主的胜利。


But Bhutto would inherit Musharraf’s domestic enemies.	但是贝布托也会继承穆沙拉夫在国内的敌人。


Sharif would fulminate against her every misstep, threats of attack from religious radicals would continue, and the military would safeguard its interests from just off stage.	谢里夫会猛烈攻击她的每一次失策，宗教极端分子发动袭击的威胁将会继续存在，而军队会紧靠在幕后保护它的利益。


Adding to the pressure, America would expect the kind of cooperation in pacifying Pakistan’s tribal areas that Musharraf has proven unable to provide.	除开这些压力，美国会希望与她进行穆沙拉夫被证明无法提供的在平定巴基斯坦部族领域上的合作。


The military will, under any scenario, continue to quell fears of complete political chaos.	军队在任何情况下都会努力平息对于政治完全陷入混乱的担忧。


But it would also likely ensure that a Musharraf-Bhutto deal does not fully close a tumultuous chapter in Pakistan’s history.	但是它同样也会确保穆沙拉夫与贝布托的协议不会完全合上巴基斯坦历史上混乱的这一节。


The Two Faces of Vladimir Putin	弗拉基米尔·普京的两面派性


Russia’s split personality – symbolized by its Tsarist coat of arms, a two-headed eagle – has been on open display recently.	沙皇时代的武器族徽双头鹰所象征的俄罗斯的分裂个性最近公开表现出来。


One minute, President Vladimir Putin’s regime is on a charm offensive, desiring a settlement to its six-decade-old territorial dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands and reassuring investors following the conviction of oil billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky.	很快，普京政府就进行了有效反击，寻求方法以解决其与日本在千岛群岛领土归属问题上长达六年之久的争执，并在对石油亿万富翁米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基作出判决后力图恢复投资者的信心。


The next moment Putin balks at removing Russia’s military garrison from Moldova’s secessionist Transdniester region while prosecutors talk ominously of putting more oligarchs in the dock.	接下来，当检察官说起欲将更多的寡头政治者带上被告席时，普京却故意阻止将俄罗斯驻军从摩尔多瓦分立主义者的Transdniester地区撤军。


Perhaps the greatest display of this political schizophrenia took place last month in Red Square, where a witch’s brew of Red “Victory” flags, tri-color “Imperial” flags, Stalin portraits, and Orthodox icons marched side by side during the 60th anniversary celebration marking WWII’s end.	也许表现这种政治精神分裂症最伟大的一幕发生在上个月的红场，在纪念二战结束六十周年的庆典上，红色“胜利”旗帜、 三色“帝国”旗，斯大林头像，以及东正教的圣像一个挨一个，形成了可怕的组合。


Putin took that occasion to repeat his political mantra – “Russia is developing it’s own brand of democracy” – while spurning requests from the Baltic countries that Russia come clean about its deal with Hitler to devour them on WWII’s eve.	普京借此时机重复他的论调——“俄罗斯正在发展自己的民主”——与此同时他却拒绝了波罗的海国家的要求，他们要俄罗斯交待它在二战末期与希特勒达成入侵这些国家的交易的内幕。


This bizarre brew appears to have been concocted in an effort to reconcile the irreconcilable: the current yearning for democracy with Russia’s despotic past.	这种奇怪组合的出现看来是为了调解不可化解的矛盾：带着俄罗斯专制统治的历史，在今日呼吁民主。


But, like any muddle, it is succeeding only in confusing Russians about themselves and their country.	但是，正如任何混乱一样，只有使所有的俄罗斯人对他们自己以及他们的国家感到无比困惑时，这种调解矛盾之道方能成功。


Strangely, Putin seems as trapped by this muddle as everybody else.	奇怪的是，普京看来和其他人一样，都被这种混乱迷惑不解。


At times, Putin truly sees himself as a “modernizer” seeking to root Russia in the West.	有时候，普京确实将自己看作一个寻求将俄罗斯扎根在西方世界的“现代化主义者”。


At other times, like Stalin, he believes that Russia’s power requires a strong hand – what he calls his “dictatorship of law.”	而有时候，他却和斯大林一样，相信俄罗斯政权需要的是一种铁腕手段——也就是他所称的“法律的独裁”。


The problem, as Khodorkovsky’s conviction demonstrated, is that dictatorship usually seems to be trumping law.	正如霍多尔科夫斯基被判有罪这一事件所表现出的那样，问题在于独裁主义通常胜过了法律。


Historically, attempts at modernization in Russia, even when they look real, as with Stalin’s industrialization or Yeltsin’s market reforms, ultimately result in a Potemkin village-like state of affairs, because Russian society cannot change fast enough or with the patience necessary to see the changes through.	纵观历史，即使是在试图使俄罗斯现代化的尝试看来十分真实的时候，诸如斯大林的工业化或叶利钦的市场改革，其最终所导致的就是波特金村庄式的情势，因为俄罗斯社会无法改变得足够快，也没有足够必需的耐心来看透改革。


So, when Yeltsin’s American-style democratization of the 1990’s failed to bring “orderly” capitalism instantly, Putin on his accession imposed a restoration of state “order,” as if a stable political or economic system demanded a fusing of the Soviet past with the Orthodox Church and Mother Russia imagery.	因此，当上世纪90年代叶利钦的美国式民主化无法即刻带来“有序的”的资本主义时，上任的普京强行恢复了国家“秩序”，仿佛一个稳定的政治或经济体系所需要的就是结合着东正教教派和母亲俄罗斯形象的苏联历史。


Indeed, Putin’s signature characteristic is to be all men for all Russia’s people.	事实上，普京的签名风格融合了俄罗斯所有民族的特点。


By blending the Soviet past with the Tsarist past and a few shards of Yeltsin-era democracy, Putin seems to think that he can neutralize the extremes of Russian history.	通过将苏联的沙皇历史和一部分叶利钦时代的民主残片糅合在一起，普京认为他能够消除俄罗斯历史中的极端倾向。


Instead, the extremes seem to be squeezing out the desire for modernization.	然而，这种极端却反而促使人们对现代化更为向往。


High oil prices now seem to be the only factor allowing Putin to keep the reform charade going.	高额的石油价格现在看来是唯一一个使普京继续改革游戏的因素。


The nineteenth-century czar Alexander III once said: “Russia has only two true allies – its army and its navy.”	十九世纪的沙皇亚历山大三世曾说：“俄罗斯只有两个真正的同盟——它的军队和它的海军。


Oil is Putin’s army and navy, allowing him to build and maintain the image of a strong, but also an internationalist, state.	”石油就是普京的军队和海军，使他得以树立并维持一个强大的、但同时也是国际性的国家形象。


Alexander's formula is also popular today with Putin’s nationalists in Moscow and St. Petersburg.	亚历山大的话在莫斯科和圣彼得堡的民族主义者那里颇受欢迎。


In his pro-imperial Russia film “The Barber of Siberia,” the Oscar-winning director Nikita Mikhalkov – whose father composed the Stalin-era national anthem that Putin recently revived – used the coronation of Alexander III as the symbolic centerpiece of Russia’s greatness, inviting Russian leaders to walk in his footsteps.	在亲帝国主义俄罗斯电影《西伯利亚的理发师》中，奥斯卡获奖导演尼基塔·米哈尔科夫（Nikita Mikhalkov）用亚历山大三世的加冕典礼作为象征俄罗斯鼎盛时期的场景，吸引俄罗斯领导人追随着亚历山大三世的足迹。 基塔·米哈尔科夫的父亲正是创作了最近被普京恢复的斯大林时代的国歌的作曲家。


This strong-willed monarch, while ruling the Russian empire autocratically, managed to bring stability and prosperity, allowing capitalism to take root.	在独裁统治俄罗斯帝国期间，亚历山大三世这位意志坚定的君主成功地带来了稳定和繁荣，使资本主义得以在俄罗斯生根发芽。


He worked to strengthen and modernize Russia’s armed forces while avoiding armed conflict.	他努力加强并现代化俄罗斯的军队力量，同时也避免武力冲突。


He became known as “The Peasants’ Tsar,” though he didn’t tolerate any opposition thinking contrary to his own.	他被认为是“农民的”沙皇，尽管他无法容忍任何反对他的意见。


Putin sees his own crusade to save Russia from disintegration and separatism as similar to Alexander’s.	普京将他自己的改革视作类似于亚历山大那挽救俄罗斯于土崩瓦解和分裂主义之前的改革。


But how forward-looking is it to model a twenty-first-century country on the absolutist example of the past?	让一个二十一世纪的国家模仿过去的专制主义先例，这样的做法究竟目光有多长远呢？


Stalin is yet another cherished role model.	斯大林是另外一个值得珍惜的角色范例。


Here, too, Putin tries to walk on both sides of the street, calling Koba a tyrant to sooth the wounded feelings the Baltic leaders, yet instantly qualifying his remarks by saying that Stalin was no Hitler.	在这里，普京也同样试图两面都不得罪，称Koba为暴君以安抚波罗的海领导人受伤的情感，然而又马上修饰他所说的话，称斯大林决不是希特勒。


Can we really compare the degree of evil of these two men?	我们真的能够将这两个人的罪行做比较吗？


Despite his insistence on rubbing shoulders with world leaders and portraying himself as a modernizer, Putin, like his predecessors, is in fact a ruler who believes that only authoritarian rule can protect his country from anarchy and disintegration.	尽管他坚持与世界领导人并肩作战，并坚持将自己刻画成一位现代化主义者，普京，和他的前辈们一样，是一个坚信只有独裁主义统治才能保护他的国家免受无政府主义和土崩瓦解威胁的统治者。


But the old ideas, the mimicry and symbols Putin employs to achieve his goals, no longer correspond to today’s realities or Russia’s present capabilities.	但是，普京为了达到他的目标而采取模仿和使用象征性的符号——这些陈旧的观念再也无法对俄罗斯目前的能力现状作出反应。


Previously, it was Russia’s Western mission that was pure Potemkin village.	先前，俄罗斯的西方使命就是纯粹的波特金村庄。


Now Russianness itself seems to lack a secure foundation, for it is but a hollow shell of discarded state symbols.	现在俄罗斯属性本身看来缺乏一种安全的基础，因为它只是一个被抛弃了的国家符号组成的空壳。


Like a bad driver, a nation that looks left and right but never ahead is bound to crash.	正如一个技术蹩脚的司机一样，一个左右观望却永远不前进的国家定会垮台。


The Tyranny of King Cotton	棉花国王的专制统治


Americans like to think that if poor countries simply open up their markets, greater prosperity will follow.	美国人喜欢认为只要贫困国家开放本国市场，经济繁荣就会接踵而至。


Unfortunately, where agriculture is concerned, this is mere rhetoric.	令人遗憾的是，只要涉及到农业问题，这只能是一种夸夸其谈。


The United States pays only lip service to free market principles, favoring Washington lobbyists and campaign contributors who demand just the opposite.	美国对自由市场原则的支持仅限于说说而已，而一事当前还是站在要求恰好相反的华盛顿说客和竞选赞助者们一边。


Indeed, it is America’s own agricultural subsidies that helped kill, at least for now, the so-called Doha Development Round of trade negotiations that were supposed to give poor countries new opportunities to enhance their growth.	实际上，至少到目前为止，恰恰是美国自己的农业补贴在扼杀所谓的多哈发展回合贸易谈判中起到了重要作用，而多哈谈判原本的目的是为贫困国家发展经济创造全新的机会。


Subsidies hurt developing country farmers because they lead to higher output – and lower global prices.	补助会增加农产品的产量，压低全球价格，从而对发展中国家的农民造成伤害。


The Bush administration – supposedly committed to free markets around the world – has actually almost doubled the level of agricultural subsidies in the US.	摆出一副致力于全球自由市场姿态的布什政府却在实际上把美国的农业补贴数额几乎翻了一番。


Cotton illustrates the problem.	棉花就很能说明问题。


Without subsidies, it would not pay for Americans to produce much cotton; with them, the US is the world’s largest cotton exporter.	如果没有补贴，美国人种棉花根本得不偿失。 而有了补贴，美国就成了全世界最大的棉花出口国。


Some 25,000 rich American cotton farmers divide $3 to $4 billion in subsidies among themselves – with most of the money going to a small fraction of the recipients.	25，000名富得流油的美国棉农把高达30到40亿美元的补贴瓜分殆尽，这笔财富的绝大部分流入了一小部分人的腰包。


The increased supply depresses cotton prices, hurting some 10 million farmers in sub-Saharan Africa alone.	增加的产量压低了棉花的价格，仅在非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区就有1000万棉农受到影响。


Seldom have so few done so much damage to so many.	这么少人对这么多人利益造成损害的情况实属罕见。


That damage is all the greater when we consider how America’s trade subsidies contributed to the demise of the Doha Round.	如果考虑到美国的贸易补贴对多哈谈判的最终失败起了重要作用，这种伤害就更让人触目惊心。


Rather than offering to do away with its cotton subsidies, America offered to open up American markets to cotton imports – an essentially meaningless public-relations move that quickly backfired.	美国没有提出取消棉花补贴，反而提出开放国内的棉花进口市场¾这一公关意味甚浓的举措没有任何实际意义，而且很快就引发了其他国家的反抗。


Owing to its huge subsidies, America exports cotton, and it would import little even if formal barriers are removed.	由于巨额补贴的存在，美国的棉花大量出口，即使取消官方壁垒，美国也根本不需要进口棉花。


Thus, recent trade negotiations have a surreal air about them, because, whatever their outcome, ultimately cotton subsidies will have to go.	于是，不久前的贸易谈判就具有了超现实主义的色彩，无论结果如何，棉花补贴最终都要取消。


Brazil, frustrated with America’s intransigence, brought a case against US cotton subsidies before the WTO, which ruled as almost any economist would: the subsidies distort world trade and are therefore prohibited.	美国在谈判中的强硬态度使巴西大为光火，于是向世贸组织提起了针对美国棉花补贴的诉讼，世贸组织的裁决在所有经济学家的意料之中：棉花补贴扭曲了世界贸易，因此必须予以取缔。


Faced with the WTO order, the US will try to comply with the letter of the law and avoid its spirit, making changes in the subsidy program to ensure “technical” compliance.	面对世贸组织的裁决，美国必须绞尽脑汁在违背裁决精神的同时遵守其条文，修改自己的补贴计划，以确保“在技术层面上”遵守规则。


But these attempts will almost surely fail; in the end – though it may take years – cotton subsidies will be eliminated.	但这样的企图几乎注定会失败，最后¾尽管这其间可能需要几年时间¾棉花补贴将被彻底取缔。


Of course, the European Union’s subsidies are far larger, but, in contrast to the US, Europe has made some effort to reduce them, especially export subsidies.	勿庸置疑，欧盟的补贴规模更大，但与美国不同的是，欧洲已经为降低补贴、特别是出口补贴做出了一些努力。


While export subsidies appear more obviously “trade distorting,” America’s cotton and other subsidies are in fact almost as bad.	尽管出口补贴显然更能“扭曲贸易”，美国的棉花和其他补贴从实际情况看也好不到哪里去。


When subsidies lead to increased production with little increase in consumption, as is typical with agricultural commodities, higher output translates directly into higher exports, which translate directly into lower prices for producers, lower incomes for farmers, and more poverty in the Third world, including millions of cotton farmers eking out subsistence incomes in semi-arid conditions.	在补贴导致产量增加而需求基本不变的情况下，更多的生产就会直接演变成更多的出口，而更多的出口又会直接导致生产者低价格、农民低收入和第三世界国家更贫穷，这其中也包括成百上千万在半干旱地区从事种植的棉农竭尽全力维持仅仅能够糊口的收入。


America and other advanced countries are the real losers from the demise of the Doha Round.	美国和其他发达国家是多哈回合谈判失败真正的输家。


Had the Bush administration fulfilled its commitments, Americans taxpayers would have benefited from the elimination of huge agricultural subsidies – a real boon in this era of yawning budget deficits.	如果布什政府兑现了自己的承诺，那么巨额农业补贴的取消会使美国的纳税人从中受益¾这在今天财政赤字问题成堆的年代真正可以说是雪中送炭。


Americans would have been better off as consumers, too, with increased access to a variety of low-cost goods from poor countries.	美国消费者也会得到好处，享受到各种各样产自贫困国家的低成本商品。


Likewise, migration pressure would have been reduced, because it is the huge disparity in incomes more than anything else that leads people to leave their homes and families to immigrate to the US.	与此同时，移民压力也会得到缓解，因为收入的巨大差异比任何其他因素更能导致人们离乡背井移民到美国。


A fair trade regime would have helped reduce that disparity.	建立公平的贸易体系本来可以有助于减小这样的差异。


Indeed, citizens throughout the rich developed world all stand to benefit from a more prosperous globe – especially a world in which there is less poverty, with fewer people facing despair. For we all suffer from the political instability to which such despair gives rise.	的确，富裕发达国家的所有公民都能从更加繁荣的全球经济中获益¾如果这个世界不滋生那么多的贫困和绝望就更加如此，因为这种绝望所带来的政局动荡会给所有人造成损害。


But it is America that perhaps now stands to gain the most by reviving the Doha talks with a more credible and generous offer.	但如果更可信、更慷慨的提案能够使多哈回合谈判复苏，获益最大的恐怕也正是美国。


America’s influence in the world has suffered greatly in the last few years; the Bush administration’s hypocritical use of free-market rhetoric while pursuing protectionist policies has made matters worse.	过去几年来，美国的国际声誉大打折扣，布什政府假惺惺地借自由市场理论之名行保护主义政策之实的做法使美国的声誉进一步遭到重创。


America’s national interests thus dictate a change of policy. But there is also another powerful rationale for doing so: treating fairly those who are poorer and less powerful is the morally right thing to do.	改变政策符合美国的国家利益，但除此以外还有一个重要的原因：那就是公平地对待贫困和弱势群体符合道德原则的要求。


Europe’s National Wild Cards	欧洲的国家万灵丹


DUBLIN – Europe’s needs and Europeans’ desires are at odds.	都柏林—欧洲的需要和欧洲人的渴望之间是矛盾的。


At a time when strong, coordinated action is needed to stave off financial collapse in the European Union, the popular support that drove European integration over the last six decades is waning.	现在需要的是强大的、合作的动作来解决欧盟的金融崩溃，但在过去六十年中推动欧洲一体化的群众支持正在消逝。


After almost 70 years of peace, Europeans seem to have forgotten why unity was so important, indulging nationalist sentiment without regard for its potential consequences.	在经历了近70年的和平后，欧洲人似乎忘了为何统一如此重要，他们沉迷于民族主义，丝毫不顾其潜在后果。


At the same time, they fail to grasp that their economies are too closely interconnected for independent economic policy to work.	与此同时，他们没有抓住一个要领——他们的经济彼此联系太紧，无法存在独立经济政策。


This failure is rooted in electoral politics’ confinement to individual countries, which forces politicians to pretend that they can address economic issues with national policies alone.	这一失败的根源是选举政治对个别国家的羁绊。 选举政治强迫政客装作能够单靠国家政策解决经济问题。


Indeed, politicians face no electoral pressure to pursue broader action, even if it would bring domestic benefits.	事实上，政客身上没有追求广泛行动的压力，即使这能够带来国内好处。


Now the euro crisis is forcing EU leaders to address institutional changes – namely the creation of banking, fiscal, and political union – that they have long deferred.	如今，欧元危机正在迫使欧盟领导人作出他们一拖再拖的制度改变——即建立银行、财政和政治联盟。


But, while member states must agree unanimously on all key decisions, their mandates oblige them to view EU issues through the prism of national interest.	但是，尽管成员国必须一致同意所有关键决策，但它们的使命迫使它们透过国家利益的棱镜看待欧盟问题。


The brinkmanship and bargaining that this approach encourages make it impossible to develop and present pan-European visions to the public.	这一方针鼓励边缘政策和讨价还价，使形成泛欧洲愿景并将其展现在公众面前成为不可能的任务。


This problem is perhaps most evident in the United Kingdom.	这一问题最明显的要数英国。


Although the UK is not a eurozone member, its cooperation is crucial if EU institutions are to be used to solve the euro crisis.	尽管英国不是欧元区成员国，但如果要用欧盟制度来解决欧元危机，没有英国的合作是不可能的。


But, rather than offer the support that its European partners need, Britain is pursuing its own agenda.	但是，英国并没有提供其欧洲伙伴需要的帮助，而是在自顾自。


For example, by refusing to sign the fiscal compact, which imposes stricter controls on national spending in the eurozone, the UK has forced the arrangement to operate outside EU mechanisms.	比如，英国拒绝签署向欧元区国家施加更严格国民支持控制的财政契约，迫使这一安排在欧盟机制之外实行。


The UK’s rationale for its refusal – that no protocol was included in the treaty exempting the financial sector from certain regulations – suggests that similar outcomes can be expected in future negotiations.	英国的拒绝理由——条约没有包括让金融部门免于某些监管的协议——表明，后续谈判也可能出现类似结果。


In fact, as Prime Minister David Cameron recently explained, his government seeks to renegotiate the terms of its EU membership, and to hold a referendum on the outcome, which potentially would decide whether the UK remains an EU member.	事实上，正如首相卡梅伦最近所解释的，英国政府寻求谈判其欧盟成员资格条件，并就结果举行公投，公投结果将决定英国是否继续充当欧盟成员国。


While the UK is entirely free to leave the EU, given that it is a treaty-based union, the move carries serious risks.	英国完全有自由离开欧盟，但由于这是一个基于条约的联盟，这一动作会带来严重风险。


In preparation for the renegotiation, UK leaders are conducting a comprehensive audit of EU laws in order to identify powers that could be reclaimed.	准备谈判的英国领导人正在对欧盟法律进行详细审查，寻找可以利用的权力。


This could have a positive outcome, highlighting powers that other member states agree should be returned to national governments.	这可能会产生积极结果，强调其他成员国同意的权力应该归还国家政府。


The problem is that the UK has a strong interest in retaining full access to the EU market – the eurozone accounts for half of its exports of goods and services – but seems unwilling to submit to any obligation.	问题在于，完全进入欧盟市场对英国来说利益重大——欧元区占据其商品和服务出口的一半——但英国不愿意承担任何义务。


As a result, British officials appear more likely to develop proposals that suit only the UK, and that could give it an unfair advantage.	因此，英国官员更有可能给出只适合英国、让英国获得不公平优势的方案。


This would hinder negotiations, and could ultimately damage public support for EU membership.	这会阻碍谈判，并最终破坏欧盟成员资格的公众支持。


Like all markets, the EU’s Single Market is a political construct that relies on common rules, regulations, and conventions for stability and reliability.	和所有市场一样，欧盟单一市场是基于共同规则、监管和稳定性和可靠性惯例的政治产物。


Returning to national governments rule-making powers that could be used to impose criteria aimed at excluding others would endanger the entire market.	回归国家政府规则制定会造成排他的标准，破坏整个市场。


Likewise, some regulation – for example, environmental rules, product-safety standards, and anti-trust enforcement – is needed to ensure that competition is fair.	类似地，需要一些监管——比如环境规则、产品安全标准和反垄断规则——确保公平竞争。


Before the referendum is held, the UK public must understand that such matters simply cannot be returned to national authorities.	在举行公投之前，英国公众必须明白这些事物决不能回归国家当局。


Beyond damaging relations with the EU, the UK’s actions could undermine efforts to address Europe’s economic, social, and identity crises.	除了破坏与欧盟的关系，英国的行为还有可能破坏补救欧洲经济、社会和身份危机的努力。


If the UK presents a unilateral list of proposals for new EU rules, the other 26 EU member states could be encouraged to engage in brinkmanship of their own.	如果英国抛出新欧盟规则的单方面方案清单，其他26个欧盟成员国也有可能采取各自的边缘政策。


The likely result – 27 disparate sets of demands – could lead to the serial re-opening of old compromises on issues that have little relevance to the urgent threats that the EU now faces.	其结果——27组不相干的要求——可能导致与欧盟当前面临的迫切问题毫无关系的问题的旧妥协卷土重来。


Member states simply do not have the time to conduct a case-by-case analysis of requests from the UK – or the concomitant deliberations.	各成员国根本没有时间逐个分析英国的要求以及相应的讨论。


And the European Court of Justice would have difficulty reconciling a special set of exceptions for one country with the shared rights and freedoms on which the EU is based.	欧盟法院难以牺牲作为欧盟基石的共同权利和自由，为一个国家协调一系列特殊例外。


Cameron’s supporters cite the precedent set by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who in 1975 renegotiated the terms of Britain’s  membership in the European Economic Community – terms that his conservative predecessor, Edward Heath, had accepted a few years earlier – and then held a referendum on continued EEC membership.	卡梅伦的支持者援引工党首相威尔逊的先例——他在1975年重谈了其前任希斯几年前接受的英国欧洲经济共同体成员资格条件，随后举行了关于是否保留欧洲经济共同体成员资格的公投。


This tactic worked once, they argue, and it will work again.	他们认为，这一策略曾经奏效并将再次奏效。


But Wilson had to negotiate with eight fairly similar countries.	但威尔逊必须与八个相当相似的国家谈判。


By contrast, Cameron will face 27 distinct countries (including Croatia, which will join later this year), many of which are facing serious domestic challenges.	相反，卡梅伦面临27个大相径庭的国家（包括将于今年晚些时候加入的克罗地亚），其中不乏面临严重国内挑战者。


As a result, the negotiations have far more serious political implications – and far more room for error.	因此，谈判的政治影响将会大得多，犯错的可能也大得多。


Despite these risks, many British politicians believe that they can satisfy voters at the expense of “Europe,” perpetuating the idea that ties with the EU – a supposedly homogeneous foreign entity – amount to little more than a disposable convenience.	尽管存在这些风险，许多英国政客仍然相信他们可以牺牲“欧洲”满足选民，让欧盟——它应该是一个同质的外国实体——只能提供可有可无的方便性的思想永久化。


Now, it is up to the British public to think deeply about the benefits and sacrifices implicit in EU membership.	如今，英国公众必须深入思考欧盟成员国所包含的好处和牺牲。


The Unbearable Lightness of Change	改革不可承受之轻


MADRID – Barack Obama’s first year in office has been a sobering exercise in the limits of presidential power.	马德里 —— 巴拉克·奥巴马执政的第一年发人深省地告诉我们总统权力也是有限度的。


It also carries lessons about how the resilient and impersonal forces of history can constrain any leader’s drive for change.	这一年还让我们看到，客观而适应性极强的历史的力量是怎样限制领袖对于改革的追求。


Obama’s current “winter of discontent” genuinely reflects the mixed record of his first year.	现在摆在奥巴马面前的“不满的冬天”真实地反映了他在执政第一年的是非功过。


The Massachusetts electoral debacle only highlighted the growing rift between the president’s agenda and popular sensibilities.	马萨诸塞州的选举惨败只不过真实地反映了总统议程和公众感受之间矛盾的日益深化。


Admittedly, Obama inherited a collapsing financial system, a declining world order, and the ever-present threat of global terrorism.	没有人否认，奥巴马继承的是濒于崩溃的金融系统、日趋衰落的世界秩序和无所不在的全球恐怖主义威胁。


In his titanic efforts to stem decline and reform America, Obama has shown vision and talent, but he also learned the hard way that, as Henry Kissinger put it in his memoirs, the pledges of new administrations are almost invariably like “leaves on a turbulent sea.”	在遏制下滑及改革美国现有体制的巨大努力中，奥巴马表现出了远见和才干，但同时也通过失败的教训艰难地体会到亨利·基辛格在回忆录中的那句名言 —— 新政府的承诺几乎无一例外如同“漂浮在波涛汹涌的海面上的落叶”。


The impossible deadlines, the always ambiguous information the president is fed, and the complex choices that he must make are too frequently bound to clash with political constraints and the resistance to change of both allies and foes.	不可能完成的最后期限、向总统呈报的永远含糊不清的信息、以及他必须完成的复杂决策几乎注定会与政治束缚和敌我双方对于改革的抵制发生冲突。


The president’s domestic agenda is bold and revolutionary, but it clashes frontally with the most fundamental tenets of America’s liberal and individualistic ethos.	总统的国内议程大胆而富于革命色彩，但与支撑美国自由而个性化社会道德的最根本的原则发生了正面冲突。


His health-care reform plan, as the Massachusetts vote demonstrated, is perceived as a personal obsession and an entirely unnecessary distraction from much more urgent and vital concerns, such as the financial crisis and unemployment.	正如马萨诸塞州投票所表明的那样，他的医疗改革计划被普遍看成是一种个人化的迷恋，将人们的注意力从金融危机和失业等急迫而重要得多的问题上毫无必要地转移开去。


Obama’s priorities in foreign policy are definitely sound.	奥巴马在外交政策上的安排无疑是有道理的。


But creating a structure of international relations that will make a more stable and enduring world order is not a task to be completed within one year.	但建立有利于世界秩序持久稳定的国际关系架构的任务不是短短一年就能完成的。


Nor is it at all certain that the sacrifices required of a country already stretched beyond the limits of its financial capabilities, together with the resistance of world powers, will allow this to be accomplished even in a single presidential term.	我们甚至根本无法肯定，这项事业要求这个财力已经透支的国家所要做出的牺牲，再加上世界大国的抵制，奥巴马能在一届总统任期内完成上述目标。


Iraq is showing some positive signs of political and institutional recovery, but the omens for the future remain, in Obama’s own words, “messy.”	伊拉克出现了政治和体制恢复的积极迹象，但借用奥巴马自己的话说，未来的前景仍然“毫无头绪”。


The disintegration of an already fragmented country, the return of civil war, and the shadow of Iran’s power being cast over the Iraqi state are all plausible scenarios.	已经四分五裂的伊拉克继续分裂下去、内战战端重启、以及伊拉克被伊朗势力的阴影所笼罩都是可能出现的情况。


A man of peace, Obama has become no less a war president than his predecessor.	虽然热爱和平，但奥巴马发动的战争并不比他的前任们少。


Having seen the harsh realities of the world as it really is , he has become the champion of the “just war.”	目睹了当前世界的严酷现实，他已经成为“正义战争”的始作俑者。


In Afghanistan, he opted for a substantial military surge, but the notion of victory that would allow for a withdrawal of troops remains as foggy and uncertain as it was in the case of Iraq.	在阿富汗，他选择了大规模增兵，但撤军的胜利迹象却像在伊拉克一样含混不清而又茫无头绪。


The solution is ultimately political, not military.	我们最终需要政治、而非军事解决方案。


Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was right to recognize that the Taliban are “part of the political fabric” of Afghanistan and thus “need to participate in the country’s government.”	国务卿罗伯特·盖茨说得对，塔利班是阿富汗政治结构的一个组成部分，因此“有必要参与国家政府。 ”


But this might not be achieved without involving the major regional stakeholders, including Pakistan, China, and possibly Iran.	但如果没有巴基斯坦、中国、或许还有伊朗等地区主要利益相关方的参与，这一目标根本不可能实现。


The Obama administration’s failure in re-launching the India-Pakistan peace talks over Kashmir is one of the gravest weaknesses of its “AfPak” strategy.	奥巴马政府无法重启印巴就克什米尔问题的和平谈判暴露了其“阿富巴”（ AfPak ）战略最严重的弱点。


If these two countries’ mutual hostility is not reined in, and a fundamentalist Afghanistan continues to provide the strategic depth through which Pakistan threatens its sworn Indian enemies, the current disaster might still breed defeat.	如果这两个国家的相互敌视得不到遏制，原教旨主义的阿富汗继续为巴基斯坦提供威胁其不共戴天仇敌印度所需要的战略纵深，那么目前这场灾难可能仍然会造成失败的结局。


Obama is right to boast of his success in enlisting China to join serious sanctions on North Korea, but he might be wrong to draw conclusions from this about Iran, a vital strategic partner for the Chinese.	奥巴马夸耀争取到中国参与对北朝鲜的制裁行动再正常不过，但他由此认为在伊朗问题上也能争取到中国的支持却很可能犯了错误。


Likewise, America’s “reset button” policy with Russia has certainly improved relations with the Kremlin, but it remains highly improbable that the Russians would endanger their privileged relations with Iran by joining an economic siege.	伊朗是中国重要的战略伙伴。 同样，美国与俄国“重塑关系”的政策无疑改善了与克林姆林的关系，但争取到俄国加入经济封锁行动，威胁俄伊之间的特殊关系仍然是基本不可能的。


Israel ’s fear that the failure of sanctions might bring the United States to accept coexistence with a nuclear-armed Iran in the way it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War is not entirely unfounded.	以色列害怕制裁行动失败可能导致美国接受与装备了核武器的伊朗共存的现实，就像冷战时期接受与苏联共存一样，这种担心并不是完全没有依据的。


Obama’s administration will not start a war with a third Muslim country while the two others continue to burn.	奥巴马政府不会在其他两个穆斯林国家战火未息的情况下与第三个穆斯林国家开战。


Iran might eventually turn into the graveyard of Obama’s dream of a world without nuclear weapons.	伊朗可能最终成为埋葬奥巴马无核世界梦想的坟墓。


George Bernard Shaw once observed that “in the arts of peace Man is a bungler.”	萧伯纳曾根据自己的观察得出结论“在和平这项艺术中人类的行为都是笨手笨脚的。


Obama has just admitted that in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a president can also be one.	”奥巴马刚刚在以巴和平进程中承认，总统也可能是笨手笨脚的。


“This is as intractable a problem as you get,” he admitted after a wasted year of more error than trial.	“这是你所能遇到的最棘手的问题，”他在浪费了一年时间，犯了无数错误后承认。


He naively ignored the harsh lessons of 20 years of abortive peacemaking, and insisted on sticking to the worn-out paradigm of direct negotiations between parties that, when left to their own devices, are bound to come to a deadlock.	他天真地无视 20 年来和平流产的严酷教训，坚持走各方直接谈判的过时道路，当被容许自行其是时，冲突各方注定会陷入僵局而无法自拔。


He was commendably humble to admit that he was wrong “to have raised expectations so high.”	他虚心地承认“把期望值定得太高”是自己的错误，这种谦虚的态度是值得表扬的。


With no breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Obama is left with the epicenter of the Middle East’s maladies seriously undermining his entire strategy in the region.	因为在阿以冲突方面没有取得突破，奥巴马被困在中东痼疾的核心地带，严重破坏了他在中东地区的整体计划。


Yet he continues to be the greatest promise for a better world that this political generation can offer.	但他仍然是这代人能够做出的建设更美好世界的最现实的承诺。


And he still has time to vindicate Woodrow Wilson’s belief that a “president can be just as big a man as he chooses to be.”	而他也仍然有时间证明伍德罗·威尔逊的思想 —— “一位总统想多伟大就能有多伟大。 ”


The Japanese Experiment	日本的经济试验


NEWPORT BEACH – After years of tweaks, Japan has now initiated a major shift in its policy paradigm, with reactions ranging from great optimism that the country may finally be lifted out of a quarter-century of economic stagnation, to concerns that the authorities’ dramatic change of course may in fact end up making things worse.	发自纽波特滩——经过数年的迟疑和纠结之后，如今日本开始启动一场重大政策范式转变，而外界对此反应不一：乐观主义者相信该国最终会摆脱长达四分之一个世纪的经济停滞； 也有人担忧当局的巨大变革进程实际上可能会让事情变得更糟。


But, while debate naturally focuses on Japan’s economic, financial, and political maneuvers, the tipping point could well lie abroad.	但虽然争论自发地聚焦在日本国内的经济、金融和政治策略，其转折点却很有可能取决于国外。