As it happened, some of the largest imbalances that fueled the current crisis arose in the private sector – and the euro’s introduction was indirectly responsible.	事实表明，助长当前危机的最主要失衡产生于私人部门，欧元的引入便是间接罪魁。


In particular, sovereign debt in the eurozone was deemed riskless: banks had only to hold minimal reserves against member countries’ bonds, which the European Central Bank accepted on equal terms at its discount window.	尤其是欧元区主权债务被视为无风险的假设：银行对于所持有的欧元区成员国债券只要留存最低储备就行了，欧洲央行的贴现窗口对所有欧元区成员国一视同仁。


Member countries could borrow at practically the same interest rate as Germany, and banks were happy to earn a few extra pennies by loading up their balance sheets with the government debt of the eurozone’s weaker economies.	成员国可以以事实上与德国相同的利率借钱，银行业很乐意持有大量欧元区疲软经济体国债，赚取零星的利差。


For example, European banks hold more than a €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) of Spanish debt, with German and French banks holding more than half of that sum.	比如，欧洲银行持有了超过1万亿欧元的西班牙债，其中一半是德国和法国银行持有的。


Instead of the convergence prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty, the radical narrowing of interest-rate differentials generated divergences in economic performance.	与马斯特里赫特所预示的趋同相反，利差的显著下降拉大了欧元区内的经济表现差异了西班牙、希腊和爱尔兰等国家出现了房地产泡沫，经济增长更快，产生了对其他欧元区国家的贸易赤字。


Countries like Spain, Greece, and Ireland developed real-estate bubbles, grew faster, and developed trade deficits with the rest of the eurozone, while Germany – weighed down by the costs of reunification – reined in its labor costs, became more competitive and developed a chronic trade surplus.	与此同时，德国尽管承受了重新统一的代价，但由于劳动力成本下降，竞争力获得了提高，产生了长期的贸易盈余。


The convergence of interest rates was broken when a newly elected government in Greece revealed that the deficit incurred by the previous government was much larger than had been reported.	希腊新当选政府上台后披露，前任政府任内的赤字要远远高于报告的数字，这使得利率趋同成为了历史。


European authorities were slow to react, because member countries held radically different views.	欧元当局对此反应迟缓，因为各成员国的态度大相径庭。


Germany, traumatized by runaway inflation in the 1920’s, and its dreadful political consequences, adamantly opposed any bailout.	对20世纪20年代恶性通胀及其可怕整治后果记忆犹新的德国坚决反对援助。


Moreover, it was heading into an election cycle, which increased the rigidity of its position.	此外，德国自身也正好处于选举周期，这进一步强化了它的立场。


With German leaders insisting on charging penalty rates for providing assistance, the crisis festered – and the rescue costs continued to grow.	德国领导人坚持，要想让德国提供帮助，就必须施加惩罚性利率，这进一步深化了危机，而救援成本水涨船高。


Indeed, as eurozone members’ inability to print their own money effectively relegated them to the status of less-developed countries that must borrow in a foreign currency, risk premiums widened accordingly.	事实上，欧元区成员国没有权利印刷本国钞票，这相当于把它们打到了与必须借入外币债务的欠发达国家相同的地位，风险溢价也因此加剧。


The authorities, seeing no solution, kicked the can down the road – an approach that usually works, because problems become easier to solve when markets calm down.	当局似乎对此束手无策，只能拖一天是一天——这一方法通常会管用，因为随着市场的冷静，问题会变得容易解决。


But, in this case, the crisis kept growing bigger, and the authorities ran out of road when Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled out additional guarantees beyond the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) without the consent of the Bundestag.	但这一回，危机持续发酵，而当德国宪法法院判决除非获得德国议会同意，否则不能为欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）提供更多担保时，当局终于走投无路了。


At the European Union’s December 9 summit in Brussels, the eurozone countries agreed to establish a closer fiscal union.	在12月9日的欧盟布鲁塞尔峰会中，欧元区国家同意建设一个更紧密的财政联盟。


But, by the time this decision was taken, it was no longer sufficient to bring the financial crisis under control.	但是，现在才做出这个决定已经不足以控制金融危机了。


The measures introduced by the ECB went a long way toward relieving banks’ liquidity problems, but nothing was done to reduce the large risk premiums on government bonds.	欧���央行在纾缓银行流动性问题方面实施了大量措施，但对于降低各国国债的高风险溢价方面却无动于衷。


Because the premiums are intimately interconnected with the banks’ capital deficiencies, half a solution is not good enough.	由于风险溢价基与银行资本不足问题密切相关，顾此失彼的政策是不足以解决问题的。


Unless the sovereign debt of the rest of the eurozone is successively ring-fenced, a Greek default could cause a meltdown of the global financial system.	除非其他欧元区成员国可以成功地隔离，否则希腊违约将造成全球金融体系大崩溃。


Even barring such a nightmare scenario in 2012, the summit sowed the seeds of future conflicts – over the emergence of a “two-speed” Europe and the false economic doctrine guiding the eurozone’s proposed fiscal pact.	即使能够阻止这一2012年噩梦情景，12月9日的峰会也种下了未来冲突的种子，即“两速”欧洲的出现和错误的欧元区财政计划指导思想。


That doctrine, by imposing austerity in a period of rising unemployment, threatens to push the eurozone into a vicious deflationary debt spiral from which it will be difficult to escape.	峰会提出的思想是在失业率上升的时期采取财政紧缩，这可能会导致欧元区陷入难以摆脱的恶性通缩债务循环。


Europe on the Sidelines	冷眼旁观的欧洲


MUNICH – The liberal international order that has helped stabilize the world since the end of the Cold War is under strain.	慕尼黑——冷战结束后稳定世界的自由国际秩序正在承压。


A revanchist Russia, chaos in the Middle East, and simmering tensions in the South China Sea are all symptoms of a system that is beginning to fray.	俄国的复仇、中东的混乱和南海的紧张局势都是系统开始出现问题的症状。


The drivers of instability are many.	不稳定的驱动因素有很多。


They include a shift in economic power from the West to the East, the weakening of formal institutions, and widespread disaffection in Western democracies.	包括经济实力从西方向东方转移、正规机构的削弱以及西方民主国家不满情绪越来越严重。


But, above all, two key developments that have been eroding the liberal international order: the United States’ withdrawal from global leadership and Europe’s prolonged crisis.	但最重要的首推侵蚀自由国际秩序的两大关键进展：即美国放弃全球领导责任和欧洲危机长期化。


Recently, there have been signs that the US is beginning to reassert itself.	但近来有迹象显示美国开始重新表现高调。


After six years of “leading from behind” and drawing meaningless red lines, US President Barack Obama has started to seek out innovative, flexible arrangements – diplomatic and military – to respond to global threats.	经过六年的“幕后领导”和划定毫无意义的红线，美国总统奥巴马已经开始寻求创新、灵活的外交军事安排——以便在应对全球威胁的斗争中发挥作用。


In 2015, the Obama administration was instrumental in bringing about the Paris climate agreement and a deal to rein in Iran’s nuclear program.	2015年，奥巴马政府在促成巴黎气候协议和遏制伊朗核计划协议中发挥了巨大作用。


And, last week, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter unveiled a proposed military budget for 2017 that signaled plans for a muscular global stance.	而上周，美国国防部长阿什顿·卡特公布了2017年拟定军事预算，显示出坚定有力的国际事务立场。


The request included funding for naval operations in Asia, a restocking of the military arsenal depleted in the fight against the Islamic State, and a commitment to technological innovation.	该预算包括资助亚洲海军活动、补充打击伊斯兰国战斗所消耗的军火，以及技术创新承诺。


The proposal’s centerpiece, however, was the quadrupling of US spending in Europe to “support our NATO allies in the face of Russia’s aggression.”	但该议案的核心是美国在欧经费翻两番，以“支持北约盟国抵抗俄国的侵略”。


Many in Europe might regard Carter’s announcement as cause for relief.	欧洲很多人可能将卡特公告当作松一口气的理由。


After years of handwringing over Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia, even as Russia was stirring up trouble in Ukraine, Europe is once again a strategic focus for the US.	在对奥巴马战略“重心”转向亚洲多年不知所措后（就连俄国在乌克兰兴风作浪期间也依然如此），欧洲再次成为美国首要的战略关注。


But the deeper message is far less encouraging.	但其中传递的深层次信息却远不如此令人鼓舞。


The US is acting because its European partners have not.	美国正在采取行动，而欧洲盟国却没有。


This divergence is troubling.	这样的背离是令人不安的。


American engagement is necessary to provide momentum, but it is Europe’s weight that has served as the critical mass required to move the world’s liberal order in a positive direction.	美国的参与是必须的，但欧洲的影响在促成世界自由秩序积极走向中同样必不可少。


From the perspective of the European Union, the latest US security bailout raises the possibility that after more than two decades of growing prominence, Europe will lose its agenda-setting power.	站在欧盟的角度，美国最新的安全救援凸显出这样的可能性，即在二十多年的声誉累积后，欧洲将无力继续决定世界事务。


In 2011, after NATO’s operation in Libya, which fully revealed the limits of Europe’s military capacity, then-US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Brussels.	在2011年完全暴露欧洲军力有限性的北约利比亚行动后，时任美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨对布鲁塞尔进行了访问。


His message was stark: “If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”	他的观点非常明确：“如果目前欧洲防御力量的下降趋势得不到遏制和逆转，那么未来那些成长中并未亲身体验过冷战的美国政治领袖可能不再将美国对北约的投资视为值得。 ”


In the years since, Russia has annexed Crimea and destabilized eastern Ukraine.	从那以后，俄国吞并克里米亚造成东乌克兰局势动荡。


Instability in the Middle East has sparked a large-scale migration crisis.	中东地区动荡局势引发了大规模移民潮。


Terrorism has reemerged as an important threat.	恐怖主义重新成为重要威胁。


And yet, for all the talk of streamlining and strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities, little of significance has been accomplished.	而虽然大家都在谈论精简强化欧洲的防御能力，但并未真正实现几个有意义的目标。


America’s change in calculus is not the result of Europe getting its act together; it reflects the recognition that the threat posed by Russia cannot be left unchecked.	美国战略考量的变化并非欧洲合作的结果； 它反映了人们所达成的共识，即不能听任俄罗斯威胁持续扩大。


This point was driven home by a recent report by the Rand Corporation showing how vulnerable NATO’s Baltic partners – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – would be to a Russian assault.	兰德公司最新一份报告很好地说明了这一点，显示了爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛等北约波罗的海伙伴在面对俄国进攻时将是多么脆弱。


As persistently low energy prices put the Kremlin under increasing pressure, there is a growing risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin could fan the flames of nationalism by lashing out once again.	随着能源价格持续低迷导致克里姆林承压越来越重，俄国总统普京再次煽动民族主义怒火的危险性也越来越高。


On its surface, America’s decision to confront Russia recalls previous occasions when Europe proved unable to respond to challenges in its neighborhood – most memorably in Bosnia in the 1990s.	表面上看，美国直面俄国威胁的决策提醒人们欧洲此前曾怎样无力应对其临近地区发生的威胁——其中尤以20世纪90年代的波斯尼亚最令人难忘。


But the current situation is more dangerous still; it is reminiscent of the Cold War, when Europe was an object and not an actor in geopolitics.	但当前局势依然更加危险； 令人回想起冷战时期，欧洲只是大国的争夺对象而非地缘政治参与国。


The continent risks once again becoming the chessboard on which the US and the Kremlin play for advantage.	欧洲大陆有可能再度沦为美国和克里姆林争夺优势的演绎场。


In 2001, the US accounted for one-fifth of the world’s economic output.	2001年，美国占世界经济总量的五分之一。


Today, it accounts for less than one sixth of the global total.	而今天，它仅占全球经济总量的六分之一不到。


No matter how committed and innovative American leadership remains, the US by itself can no longer guarantee the liberal international order.	无论美国领导人如何意志坚定、勇于创新，单靠美国自身力量已无法再为自由国际秩序提供保障。


It needs allies in the effort, and the EU, still the world’s largest economy despite years of stagnation, would make a perfect candidate – if only it would pull itself together.	美国需要盟友的支持，而欧盟多年停滞后依然是全球最大经济体，如果能够齐心协��将成为美国理想的合作者。


During the twentieth century, Europe was America’s partner of first resort.	二十世纪，欧洲曾经是美国首选的伙伴国。


Now, when it is needed once again, the EU is slipping toward the sidelines.	现在，当美国再次需要它时，欧盟却不再扮演重要角色。


Unless its leaders change course, the painful unraveling of the liberal world order will continue.	除非欧盟领袖改变策略，否则自由世界秩序还将承受解体带来的阵痛。


The Government the Eurozone Deserves	欧元区应有的政府


ATHENS – Will Greece’s troubles destroy Europe’s currency union, or reveal how it should be saved?	雅典—希腊问题会摧毁欧洲货币联盟吗？ 还是揭示了应该如何拯救欧元区？


The recent controversial bailout deal – likened by some to the 1919 Versailles Treaty, with Greece in the role of Germany – offers the latest twist in the eurozone’s existential saga.	争议重重的最新协议——有些类似于1919年的《凡尔赛和约》，今天的希腊相当于当时的德国——可谓欧元区存在神话的新转折。


The deal has caused a split in Syriza, Greece’s leftist governing party; opened a rift between Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and her uncompromisingly tough finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble; and spurred an effort by France to reassert itself within the Franco-German axis that has always been the “motor” of European integration.	该协议导致了希腊左翼执政党左翼联盟（Syriza）的分裂，也让德国总理默克尔和她的坚决不妥协的财政部长朔伊布勒之间的分歧，还促使法国重新评估其在一直充当着欧洲一体化“引擎”的法德轴心中的作用。


Meanwhile, many of North America’s Keynesian economists, such as Nobel laureates Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, sympathize with Greece’s anti-austerity stance.	与此同时，许多美国凯恩斯主义经济学家，如诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz），表示同情希腊的反紧缩立场。


Other economists, mainly in Europe, argue that Germany must assume a political role befitting its economic preeminence and must accept sovereignty-sharing (and burden-sharing) arrangements to ensure the monetary union’s cohesion and sustainability.	其他经济学家（主要是欧洲经济学家）认为希腊必须扮演与其经济重要性相当的政治角色，必须接受主权分享（和债务共担）安排以确保货币联盟的凝聚力和可持续性。


Humiliating a small country and rendering it a virtual protectorate does not serve Europe’s long-term interest.	羞辱一个小国、使其沦为被保护国不符合欧洲的长期利益。


Yet this is what is at stake.	但这一局面近在眼前。


Greece signed the deal after facing an explicit invitation from Schäuble to leave the eurozone – supposedly temporarily – and adopt a new currency.	在朔伊布勒明确要求希腊退出欧元区——据说是临时退出——采用新货币后，希腊在协议上签了字。


Germany’s stance marked the first open challenge by a leading European power to the notion that the monetary union is irrevocable.	德国的立场标志着欧洲领导力量首次公开挑战货币联盟不可动摇的概念。


As the French, instinctively sympathetic to the anti-austerity argument and conscious of their increasingly junior role in the Franco-German partnership, were quick to notice, the German stance also signaled a potential shift from a “European Germany” to a “German Europe.”	本质上同情反紧缩立场、意识到自己在法德合作中日益沦为配角的法国很快注意到，德国的立场也标志着从“欧洲德国”向“德国欧洲”的潜在变化。


It hardly helped that the negotiations between Greece and its creditors produced a growing mistrust in the competence and intentions of Syriza.	希腊及其债权人的谈判让人们日益怀疑左翼联盟的能力和动机，这无助于解决问题。


Devious and erratic negotiating tactics, coupled with secret schemes to prepare – as part of a “Plan B” – for an exit from the euro, undermined the government’s trustworthiness, leading even Paul Krugman to admit: “I may have overestimated the competence of the Greek government.”	诡异多变的谈判策略，加上秘密准备退出欧元区的计划——“B计划”的一部分——损害了左翼联盟政府的信誉，就连保罗·克鲁格曼也承认：“我也许高估了希腊政府的胜任能力。 ”


Yet, however complicated the blame game, some lessons can be drawn to guide future policy.	但是，不管指责游戏多么复杂，仍有一些教训可以汲取并作为未来政策的指引。


When fiscal misbehavior by Greece, a country representing no more than 2% of the eurozone’s GDP, poses serious dangers for the survival of the currency union, something is clearly amiss.	当只占欧元区GDP的2%的希腊政府的不当行为对货币联盟的生存造成严重威胁时，很显然一定是哪里出了问题。


But does the remedy lie in tougher measures – such as heavier penalties or even eviction – to enforce the eurozone’s rules, or do the rules need to be adjusted to accommodate members’ varying circumstances?	但解决办法是采取更严厉的措施——如加大惩罚甚至逐出联盟——以执行欧元区规则，还是需要更改规则以协调成员国之间不同的环境？


So far, enforcement has failed, owing to flaws in the eurozone’s foundations.	目前，执行规则的方针已经失败，原因在于欧元区基础的漏洞。


First, fiscal and external-account balances are to be kept in check in order to ensure financial stability and sustain the common currency.	首先，财政和外部账户平衡必须受到检查以保证金融稳定和维持共同货币。


Second, removing imbalances is the responsibility of national governments within the context of a rescue regime arranged by supranational authorities – the European Commission and the European Central Bank – in cooperation with the European Council, which in turn represents national governments.	其次，消除失衡是国家政府的责任，而国家政府之上又有一个超国家当局——欧盟委��会和欧洲央行——与欧洲理事会（反过来又代表国家政府）合作安排的救援机制。


The Greek saga shows that this system cannot control destabilizing imbalances quickly enough to ward off major crises.	希腊神话表明，这一体系无法迅速地控制破坏性失衡从而避免大危机。


Imbalances are not solely the result of irresponsible policies.	失衡不仅仅是不负责任的政策的结果。


They may reflect deeper weaknesses in economic structures, such as a lack of competitiveness or institutional shortcomings.	它们反映了经济结构更深层次的弱点，如缺乏竞争力或制度缺陷。


If Germany insists on national responsibility, it may find that enforcing the rules will have to be ever harsher, eventually leading to such social and political upheaval that the entire euro-edifice collapses.	如果德国坚持国家责任，也许将发现执行规则必须无比严厉，最终导致巨大的社会和政治剧变让整个欧元大厦崩塌。


The alternative is to embrace a “transfer union” that ensures a better balance between solidarity and responsibility.	替代方案是采取“转移支付联盟”，以更好地平衡团结和责任。


The United States embodies such a solution, ensuring an integrated pattern of development throughout the country.	美国就采取了这一方案，确保了整个国家可以以统一的发展路径前进。


The eurozone must strengthen its fiscal structures enough to respond to overall economic conditions while taking into account the differing circumstances of each member country.	欧元区必须强化其财政结构，使之能够对总体经济情况做出反应，同时又能考虑到各成员国不同的环境。


These stronger structures should permit limited resource transfers among eurozone countries, either to carry out countercyclical policy or to supplement investment spending, particularly in economic and social infrastructure.	这一更强大的结构应该允许欧元区国家之间进行有限的资源转移，可以是反周期政策，也可以是补充性投资支出，特别是经济和社会基础设施方面的投资。


But this must inevitably involve the creation of a separate eurozone budget, transferring competences from national to supranational authorities.	但这必然需要建立单独的欧元区预算，将能力从国家机构转移给超国家机构。


Common taxation and Eurobonds should form part of the new fiscal structure, and the European Stability Mechanism should include a debt redemption fund large enough to resolve sovereign-debt crises.	共同税收和欧元债券应该成为这一新财政结构的一部分，而欧洲稳定性机制（European Stability Mechanism）应该包括一个足够大的债务赎回基金以解决主权债务危机。


At the same time, the banking union, established by the EU in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, should be strengthened by enlarging the capital base of the Single Resolution Fund and establishing a common deposit guarantee scheme.	与此同时，银行联盟——已由欧盟在2007—2008年全球金融危机爆发后建立——应该得到强化，扩大单一清算基金（Single Resolution Fund）的资本基础并建立一个共同存款担保机制。


All of this presupposes that the powers of the EU’s supranational institutions, the European Parliament and the European Commission, will be significantly augmented.	所有这些设想都有一个前提，即欧盟的超国家机构——欧洲议会和欧盟委员会的权力应该大幅扩大。


The Commission should become a proper government, with a popularly elected president.	欧盟委员会应该成为一个恰当的政府，并有民选总统。


A European finance ministry should be created, and its head should preside over the Eurogroup (which convenes the finance ministers of eurozone member states).	必须成立一个欧洲财政部，部长应该由欧元集团（由欧元区成员国财政部长组成）成员担任。


A special Assembly of the European Parliament, comprising the eurozone members, should have powers – on the model of a national parliament – to legislate and control the executive.	应该建立一个由欧元区成员国组成的欧洲议会特别大会，仿照国家议会模式，赋予其立法和控制执法的权力。


These proposals will provoke plenty of criticism – and not just from Euroskeptics.	这些方案将引起诸多批评——不仅仅是欧元怀疑派。


But a move toward fiscal and political integration is the price that Europe – beginning with the eurozone – must pay to maintain its unity and global relevance.	但迈向财政和政治一体化是欧洲——从欧元区开始——维持统一和全球重要性所必须付出的代价。


The alternative is inconsistent (if not arbitrary) enforcement of the current rules, inducing divisiveness among member states and eventual fragmentation.	否则将是现有规则执行的前后矛盾（甚至独断专行），导致成员国之间的分歧，最后导致分裂。


Europe’s Brush with Debt	欧洲的债务冲突


MUNICH – French Prime Minister Manuel Valls and his Italian counterpart, Matteo Renzi, have declared – or at least insinuated – that they will not comply with the fiscal compact to which all of the eurozone’s member countries agreed in 2012; instead, they intend to run up fresh debts.	慕尼黑—法国总理瓦尔斯和他的意大利同侪伦齐宣布——或者说，至少是暗示——她们不会遵守2012年全部欧元区成员国一致同意的财政契约； 相反，他们还想借点新债。


Their stance highlights a fundamental flaw in the structure of the European Monetary Union – one that Europe’s leaders must recognize and address before it is too late.	他们的立场凸显出欧洲货币联盟结构的缺陷——欧洲领导人必须在为时已晚之前认识并纠正这一漏洞。


The fiscal compact – formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union – was the quid pro quo for Germany to approve the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was essentially a collective bailout package.	这个财政契约——正式名称是《欧洲货币联盟稳定、合作和治理条约》（Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union）是作为德国批准欧洲稳定机制（European Stability Mechanism，ESM，实质上是集体援助计划）的交换物签订的。


The compact sets a strict ceiling for a country’s structural budget deficit and stipulates that public-debt ratios in excess of 60% of GDP must be reduced yearly by one-twentieth of the difference between the current ratio and the target.	该契约设置了严格的国家结构性预算赤字上限，并规定对于占GDP的60%以上部分的公共债务，每年必须削减当前比率和目标比率差额的十二分之一。


Yet France’s debt/GDP ratio will rise to 96% by the end of this year, from 91% in 2012, while Italy’s will reach 135%, up from 127% in 2012.	但法国的债务/GDP之比将在今年年底上升到96%，2012年为91%。 而意大利将达到135%，2012年为127%。


The effective renunciation of the fiscal compact by Valls and Renzi suggests that these ratios will rise even further in the coming years.	瓦尔斯和伦齐对财政契约的事实违反表明，在未来几年中，这一比率还会继续上升。


In this context, eurozone leaders must ask themselves tough questions about the sustainability of the current system for managing debt in the EMU.	在这样的背景下，欧元区领导人必须扪心自问一个严肃的问题，即目前欧洲货币联盟债务管理制度的可持续性。


They should begin by considering the two possible models for ensuring stability and debt sustainability in a monetary union: the mutualization model and the liability model.	他们应该从考虑两种可能的在货币联盟中确保稳定和债务可持续性的模式开始：共同化模式和责任模式。


Europe has so far stuck to the mutualization model, in which individual states’ debts are underwritten by a common central bank or fiscal bailout system, ensuring security for investors and largely eliminating interest-rate spreads among countries, regardless of their level of indebtedness.	到目前为止，欧洲一直采取的是共同化模式，在该模式中，个体国家的债务由共同中央银行或财政援助体系兜底，确保投资者的安全，并基本抹平国家间的利差（不论它们的负债水平）。


In order to prevent the artificial reduction of interest rates from encouraging countries to borrow excessively, political debt brakes are instituted.	为了防止人为降低利率、鼓励国家过度借贷，实行了政治债务刹车。


In the eurozone, mutualization was realized through generous ESM bailouts and some €1 trillion ($1.27 trillion) worth of TARGET2 credit from national printing presses for the crisis-stricken countries.	在欧元区，共同化通过慷慨的ESM援助和大约1万亿欧元的TARGET2信用（危机冲击国的货币供应）实现。


Moreover, the European Central Bank pledged to protect these countries from default free of charge through its “outright monetary transactions” (OMT) scheme – that is, by promising to purchase their sovereign debt on secondary markets – which functions roughly as Eurobonds would.	此外，欧洲央行承诺通过其“直接货币交易”（OMT）机制免费保护这些国家不违约——即承诺在二级市场买入它们的主权债务——这和欧元债券的效果差不多。


The supposed hardening of the debt ceiling in 2012 adhered to this model.	2012年所设想的债务上限收紧就基于该模式。


The alternative – the liability model – requires that each state take responsibility for its own debts, with its creditors bearing the costs of a default.	替代方案——责任模式——要求各国为其自身债务负责，由其债权人承担违约成本。


Faced with that risk, creditors demand higher interest rates from the outset or refuse to grant additional credit, thereby imposing a measure of discipline on debtors.	面临这一风险的债权人将从一开始就要求更高的利率或者拒绝���供追加信用，以此作为约束债务人的纪律手段。


The best example of the liability model is the United States.	责任模式的最佳范例是美国。


When US states like California, Illinois, or Minnesota get into fiscal trouble, no one expects the other states or the federal government to bail them out, let alone that the Federal Reserve will guarantee or purchase their bonds.	当加利福尼亚、伊利诺伊或明尼苏达等州陷入财政困境时，没人会指望其他州或联邦政府会援助它们，更不用说美联储担保或购买它们的债券了。


Indeed, the Fed, unlike the ECB, does not buy any bonds from individual states; investors must bear the costs of any state insolvency.	事实上，与欧洲央行不同，美联储不购买任何来自个体州的债券； 投资者必须承担任何一州无力偿债的成本。


In 1975, New York had to pledge its future tax revenues to its creditors in order to remain solvent.	1975年，纽约州不得不将未来税收收入抵押给债权人以维持偿债能力。


Of course, the US was not always so strict.	当然，美国也不是永远如此严格。


Shortly after its founding, it tried debt mutualization, with Alexander Hamilton, America’s first Treasury secretary, describing the scheme in 1791 as the “cement” for a new American federation.	建国后不久美国曾尝试过债务共同化，首任财政部长汉密尔顿（Alexander Hamilton）在1791年将这一机制描述为新美利坚联邦的“混凝土”。


But, as it turned out, the mutualization model – used again in 1813 during the second war against the British – fueled a credit bubble, which collapsed in 1837 and thrust nine of the 29 US states and territories into bankruptcy.	但是，事实是共同化模式——在1813年第二次独立战争期间再次使用——助长了信用泡沫，该泡沫在1837年破裂，导致美国29个州和领地中的九个陷入破产。


The unresolved debt problem exacerbated tensions over the slavery issue, which triggered the Civil War in 1861.	未解决的债务问题恶化了导致1861年南北战争的奴隶冲突。


In this sense, as the historian Harold James has noted, mutualization turned out to be dynamite, not cement, for the new US federation.	从这个角度讲，正如历史学家詹姆斯（Harold James）所指出的，共同化是新美国联邦的炸药而不是混凝土。


Only after the Civil War did the US decide to operate the federation according to the liability model – an approach that has underpinned stability and limited individual states’ debt levels ever since.	直到南北战争后，美国才决定依照责任模式操作联邦——此后，该方针巩固了稳定，也限制了个体州的债务水平。


For Europe’s leaders, the withdrawal by France and Italy from the fiscal compact should serve as a clear sign that the mutualization model is not working for the eurozone, either.	对欧洲领导人来说，法国和意大利从财政契约中退出应该是一个明确的信号，共同化模式已不再适用于欧元区。


Following the Fed’s example, the ECB should abolish its OMT program – which, according to Germany’s Constitutional Court, does not comply with EU treaty law anyway.	欧洲央行应该效仿美联储，放弃其OMT计划——根据德国宪法法院的裁决，OMT无论如何都不符合欧盟条约法。


Furthermore, the ECB should reintroduce the requirement that TARGET2 debts be repaid with gold, as occurred in the US before 1975 to settle balances among the districts of the Federal Reserve System.	此外，欧洲央行应该重新引入TARGET2债务必须用黄金偿付的要求，美国在1975年前结算联邦储备体系各区之间余额时即如此操作。


Perhaps even the fiscal compact itself should be reconsidered.	也许财政契约本身也应该重新考虑。


Such measures would serve notice to investors that they cannot hope to be saved by the printing press in times of crisis, and would thus compel them to demand higher interest rates or deter them from granting credit in the first place.	这些措施将受到投资者关注——他们无法再指望危机时有印钞机拯救他们，因此将迫使他们要求更高的利率，或在一开始就不提供信用。


This would lead to greater discipline among the eurozone’s indebted countries and save Europe from a debt avalanche that could ultimately drive currently solvent states into bankruptcy and destroy the European integration project.	这将给欧元区负债国带来更大的纪律约束，让欧洲免于债务雪崩——债务雪崩可能最终导致目前仍有偿债能力的国家陷入破产并摧毁欧洲一体化工程。


Emerging Europe’s Deleveraging Dilemma	新兴欧洲的去杠杆困境


LONDON – Serbia’s Tigar Corporation, a privatized automobile tire and tube maker, was a poster child for corporate makeovers in transition economies.	伦敦—私有化的塞尔维亚汽车轮胎和管道制造商Tigar公司曾经是转型经济体企业整顿的正面典型。


Then eurozone deleveraging kicked in, and now the child in the poster is in serious trouble.	然后，欧元区去杠杆化过程来了，如今，这个正面典型陷入了大麻烦。


When Tigar sold its tire division to France’s Michelin, it invested the entire proceeds in new businesses.	Tigar将其轮胎部门出售给法国的米其林公司，将所获得的资金全部投入到了新业务中。


Perhaps capital expenditures were overly ambitious, but they triggered rapid export growth, and more than 2,000 jobs were created in the small town of Pirot to manufacture boots for European fishermen and New York City firemen, as well as technical rubber products.	或许资本支出过于雄心勃勃了，但这笔支出确实让出口有了快速增加，小城派洛特（Pirot）也增加了2 000多个为欧洲渔民和纽约市消防员制造靴子和其他高技术橡胶产品的工作岗位。


Expansion was, for lack of other options, financed largely through short-term loans.	由于缺乏其他选择，扩张大部分是通过短期贷款融资的。


Many banks in Serbia and other transition countries in Europe rely heavily on funding from their eurozone parent institutions.	在塞尔维亚和其他欧洲转型国家，许多银行严重依赖来自欧元区母机购的资金。


But, since the onset of the global financial crisis, eurozone-based banks’ subsidiaries in emerging Europe have been reducing their exposure to the region.	但是，自全球金融危机爆发以来，欧元区银行的新兴欧洲分支一直在削减其对该地区的风险敞口。


In 2009-2010, the European Bank Coordination Initiative – known informally as the “Vienna Initiative” – helped to avert a systemic crisis in developing Europe by stopping foreign-owned parent banks from staging a catastrophic stampede to the exits.	2009—2010年，欧洲银行合作计划（European Bank Coordination Initiative），即俗称的“维也纳计划”（Vienna Initiative）通过阻止国有母银行的恐慌性争相退出，避免了一场系统性危机。


But, in the second half of 2011, the eurozone-based parent banks that dominate emerging Europe’s banking sector came under renewed pressure to deleverage.	但是，在2011年下半年，主宰新兴欧洲银行部门的欧元区母银行感到了去杠杆化的新压力。


Many are now radically changing their business models to reduce risk.	很多银行如今正在彻底改变业务模式以降低风险。


Over the last year, funding corresponding to 4% of the region’s GDP – and, in some countries, as much as 15% of GDP – has been withdrawn.	去年，相当于该地区GDP的4%的资金被撤出，一些国家的撤资规模更是高达GDP的15%。


Bank subsidiaries will increasingly have to finance local lending with local deposits and other local funding.	分行越来越依靠本地存款和其他本地资金来源为本地贷款融资。


Without disputing the need for some deleveraging, a new incarnation of the Vienna Initiative – Vienna 2.0 – seeks to make the process orderly.	新的维也纳计划——维也纳2. 0避免了打扰去杠杆化需要的做法，而是寻求让去杠杆化过程更加有序。


After all, excessive and chaotic deleveraging by lenders to emerging Europe – and the ensuing credit crunch – would destabilize this economically and institutionally fragile region.	毕竟，新兴欧洲贷款人的过度、混乱的去杠杆化——及其所能造成的信贷动荡——会动摇这一经济和制度颇为脆弱的地区。


For Tigar, deleveraging has meant that banks that had pursued its business only a couple of years ago have suddenly cut lending – even though the company never missed a debt payment.	对Tigar公司来说，去杠杆化意味着支持其业务没几年的银行突然间砍掉了贷款，尽管该公司从未拖延过债务偿付。


Previous loans came due, while cash-flow needs grew.	此前的贷款逐渐到期，而现金流需求又在增加。


Despite its good operating margins, growing markets, and prime international clients, the company experienced a drop in liquidity, requiring serious balance-sheet restructuring.	尽管营业利润相当出色，市场在增长，主要国际客户也在增加，但该公司仍经历了流动性的枯竭，需要进行严重的资产负债表重组。


Tigar will make it; but many promising companies that lack its solid financial footing will not.	Tigar公司还能应付过去，但许多前途无量但缺少牢固财务根基的公司却难以为继了。


Of course, after several years of unfettered credit expansion, some retrenchment was necessary and desirable, and Tigar probably overextended itself.	当然，在经历了数年的自由信贷扩张后，出现一些紧缩是必要的，也是值得的，Tigar公司也可能扩张得太快了。


But several factors – most of them unrelated to the region – are pressuring banks to pursue faster-than-optimal deleveraging.	但一些因素——其中大多与该地区无关——正在迫使银行追求比最优速度更快的去杠杆化。


For starters, the Basel III package of global banking reforms and the European Union’s corresponding Capital Requirements Directive IV rule create disincentives for cross-border financing.	首先，巴塞尔III全球银行改革方案和相应的欧盟资本要求指引第四版（Capital Requirements Directive IV）规则给跨境融资造成了反向激励。


To be sure, they will help to prevent banks from using instruments resembling collateralized debt obligations (which banks use to repackage individual loans for placement on secondary markets) to reduce their exposure.	诚然，它们有助于防止银行使用类似于抵押债务证券（银行使用该工具对个别贷款进行再包装，然后把它们推向二级市场）的工具降低风险敞口。


But the new regulation also seriously penalizes subsidiary financing in new EU member and accession countries.	但新监管规则也对在新欧盟成员国和候选国从事融资活动的分行予以严厉惩罚。


Indeed, in many countries, bank guarantees can be issued only on the basis of local subsidiary equity, without support from the parent’s balance sheet.	事实上，在很多国家，银行担保只能以地方分行股本为基础进行，得不到母行资产负债表的支持。


Furthermore, collateral – especially real-estate assets – will continue to be downgraded.	此外，抵押品——特别是房地产资产——将继续降级。


Poor 2012 corporate financial results will further undermine credit ratings.	糟糕的2012年公司财务结果将进一步拖累信用评级。


Fewer and fewer companies will meet basic risk criteria.	能满足基本风险标准的公司越来越少。


While governments might offer attractive liquidity facilities, banks will be unable to on-lend the funds.	尽管政府可能会提供具有吸引力的流动性便利，但银行将无法贷出其所获得的资金。


And spillover effects from Greece will continue to affect Balkan and other emerging European banking markets.	而希腊的溢出效应将继续影响巴尔干和其他新兴欧洲银行市场。


Indeed, several Western financial groups are considering partial or complete exits from the region – without any clear strategic replacement in sight.	事实上，不少西方金融集团正在考虑部分或完全退出该地区，而且并没有提出明确的战略代替品。


The potential systemic crisis threatens to accelerate deleveraging further, with serious consequences for emerging Europe.	潜在系统性危机可能迫使去杠杆化进一步加速，给新兴欧洲带来严重后果。


That is why the Vienna Initiative must become an effective “voice” for the host countries in the Europe-wide debate on debt resolution and banking union.	这就是为什么维也纳计划必须成为东道国在泛欧洲债务解决方案和银行联盟争论中更有力的“声音”。


Every effort must be made to prevent the creation of new barriers within Europe’s financial system.	必须竭尽全力防止欧洲金融体系内部出现新壁垒。


Some progress has been made toward safeguarding emerging Europe’s banking system.	在捍卫新兴欧洲银行系统方面，我们已经取得了一些进步。


The European Investment Bank, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have agreed on a new Joint Action Plan, including investment totaling €30 billion ($39 billion) over the next two years, as well as policy advice, to support economic recovery and sustained growth in the region.	欧洲投资银行、世界银行和欧洲复兴开发银行已同意了新的联合行动计划，包括在未来两年中投资300亿欧元并提供政策建议以支持该地区的经济复苏和可持续发展。


They must now deliver.	这一计划必须现在就实施。


The European Commission and multilateral lenders should help to facilitate ongoing structural change in the banking sector, including bank acquisitions and balance-sheet restructuring for viable export-driven companies.	欧盟委员会和多边贷款人应该为正在进行的银行部门结构性变革提供便利，包括银行并购和健康的出口导向公司的资产负债表重组。


In exchange, private banks must live up to their collective responsibility to smooth the deleveraging process and limit the systemic impact of their actions.	作为交换，私有银行必须承担起集体责任，平滑去杠杆化过程，限制其行为的系统性影响。


Under these conditions, deleveraging could put emerging Europe on a more sustainable growth path.	在这样的条件下，去杠杆化能够把新兴欧洲带上更加可持续的增长模式。


Democratizing the Eurozone	让欧元区民主化


ATHENS – Like Macbeth, policymakers tend to commit new sins to cover up their old misdemeanors.	雅典—就像麦克白（Macbeth），决策者总是用新的重罪掩盖旧的轻罪。


And political systems prove their worth by how quickly they put an end to their officials’ serial, mutually reinforcing, policy mistakes.	而政治制度的价值就在于能很快地结束官员系列化的、互相强化的政策错误。


Judged by this standard, the eurozone, comprising 19 established democracies, lags behind the largest non-democratic economy in the world.	从这个标准判断，由19个老牌民主国家组成的欧元区比世界上最大的非民主经济体还要落后。


Following the onset of the recession that followed the 2008 global financial crisis, China’s policymakers spent seven years replacing waning demand for their country’s net exports with a homegrown investment bubble, inflated by local governments’ aggressive land sales.	2008年全球金融危机导致发生衰退后，中国决策者花了七年时间用地方政府激进的卖地行为煽动国内投资泡沫取代不断下降的中国净出口需求。


And when the moment of reckoning came this summer, China’s leaders spent $200 billion of hard-earned foreign reserves to play King Canute trying to hold back the tide of a stock-market rout.	而当今年夏天清算时刻终于到来时，中国领导人拿出2,000亿美元辛苦积攒的外汇储备扮演了一回卡努特王（King Canute），试图力挽股市暴跌之狂澜。


Compared to the European Union, however, the Chinese government’s effort to correct its errors – by eventually allowing interest rates and stock values to slide – seems like a paragon of speed and efficiency.	但是，与欧元区相比，中国政府纠正错误的努力——最终让利率和股票价值下跌——堪称速度和效率的典范。


Indeed, the failed Greek “fiscal consolidation and reform program,” and the way the EU’s leaders have clung to it despite five years of evidence that the program cannot possibly succeed, is symptomatic of a broader European governance failure, one with deep historical roots.	事实上，失败的希腊“财政整合和改革计划”，以及欧盟领导人不顾五年来该计划根本无法成功的铁证顽固死守此法，是更广泛的欧洲治理失败的症候，而这一失败有其深刻的历史根源。


In the early 1990s, the traumatic breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism only strengthened the resolve of EU leaders to prop it up.	20世纪90年代初，欧洲汇率机制的轰然崩溃加强了欧元区领导人支持它的决心。


The more the scheme was exposed as unsustainable, the more doggedly officials clung to it – and the more optimistic their narratives.	这一机制越是表现出不可持续，欧盟官员就越顽固地要坚守它——他们的辞令也越乐观。


The Greek “program” is just another incarnation of Europe’s rose-tinted policy inertia.	希腊“计划”只是欧洲的乐观政策惯性的又一个典型案例。


The last five years of economic policymaking in the eurozone have been a remarkable comedy of errors.	过去五年，欧元区经济决策堪称一场壮观的错中错闹剧。 政策错误不胜枚举：欧洲央行在2008年7月和2011年4月两次升息；


The list of policy mistakes is almost endless: interest-rate hikes by the European Central Bank in July 2008 and again in April 2011; imposing the harshest austerity on the economies facing the worst slump; authoritative treatises advocating beggar-thy-neighbor competitive internal devaluations; and a banking union that lacks an appropriate deposit-insurance scheme.	要求面临最糟糕衰退的经济体实施最严厉的紧缩； 支持以邻为壑式的竞争性内部贬值的极权条约；


How can European policymakers get away with it?	为何欧洲决策者犯了如此大错而不受惩罚？


After all, their political impunity stands in sharp contrast not only to the United States, where officials are at least accountable to Congress, but also to China, where one might be excused for thinking that officials are less accountable than their European counterparts.	毕竟，他们的政治豁免权不但与美国截然相悖（美国官员至少需要受国会问责），与中国也格格不入（对中国你也许没那么不忿，因为中国官员被认为比欧洲官员还要难问责）。


The answer lies in the fragmented and deliberately informal nature of Europe’s monetary union.	答案就在于欧洲货币联盟的碎片性和刻意为之的非正式性。


Chinese officials may not be answerable to a democratically elected parliament or congress; but government officials do have a unitary body – the seven-member standing committee of the Politburo – to which they must account for their failures.	中国官员也许不必向民主选举的议会或国会负责，但政府官员仍然有一个机构——七人组成的政治局常务委员会——可以问责失败。


The eurozone, on the other hand, is governed by the officially unofficial Eurogroup, which comprises the member states’ finance ministers plus representatives of the ECB and, when discussing “economic programs in which it is involved,” the International Monetary Fund.	另一方面，欧元区由官方地非官方（officially unofficial）的欧元集团治理。 欧元集团由成员国财政部长再加上欧洲央行的代表（在讨论“与其有关的经济计划”时还要再加上IMF的代表）组成。


Only very recently, as a result of the Greek government’s intense negotiations with its creditors, did Europe’s citizens realize that the world’s largest economy, the eurozone, is run by a body that lacks written rules of procedure, debates crucial matters “confidentially” (and without minutes being taken), and is not obliged to answer to any elected body, not even the European Parliament.	直到最近，作为希腊政府与其债权人紧张谈判的结果之一，欧洲公民才认识到，身为世界最大经济体的欧元区是由一个没有成文程序规则、“秘密”讨论关键问题（而且不进行记录）、并且没有应答任何民选机构（甚至欧洲议会也不行）义务的集团运行的。


It would be a mistake to think of the standoff between the Greek government and the Eurogroup as a clash between Greece’s left and Europe’s conservative mainstream.	认为希腊政府与欧元集团之间的僵局时希腊左翼与欧洲保守派主流的对峙是一个错误。


Our “Athens Spring” was about something more profound: the right of a small European country to challenge a failed policy that was wrecking the prospects of a generation (or two), not only in Greece, but elsewhere in Europe as well.	我们的“雅典之春”根源更加深刻：它事关一个欧洲小国挑战影响一代人（甚至两代人）前途的失败政策的权利——不仅是希腊，也包括欧洲其他国家。


The Athens Spring was crushed for reasons that had nothing to do with the Greek government’s left-wing politics.	雅典之春因为与希腊政府的左翼政治无关的原因而被镇压。


Time after time, the EU rejected and denigrated common-sense policies.	一次又一次，欧盟拒绝并诋毁常识性政策。


Exhibit A is the two sides’ positions on tax policy.	首要证据是双方在税收政策上的立场。


As Greece’s finance minister, I proposed a rate reduction for sales tax, income tax, and corporation tax, in order to broaden the tax base, increase revenues, and give Greece’s broken economy a boost.	作为希腊财政部长，我提出降低销售税、所得税和公司税税率，以扩大税基、增加收入、提振破产的希腊经济。


No follower of Ronald Reagan would quarrel with my plan.	罗纳德·里根的追随者绝不会反对我的计划啊。


The EU, on the other hand, demanded – and imposed – increases in all three tax rates.	另一方面，欧盟要求增加所有这三项税的税率——并且实施了。


So, if Greece’s tussle with its European creditors was not a left-right standoff, what was it?	那么，如果希腊与其欧洲债权人的角逐不是左右之争，又是什么？


The American economist Clarence Ayres once wrote, as if describing EU officials: “They pay reality the compliment of imputing it to ceremonial status, but they do so for the purpose of validating status, not that of achieving technological efficiency.”	美国经济学家克莱伦斯·亚里斯（Clarence Ayres）曾经写道——仿佛是在描述欧盟官员——“他们用给予崇高礼遇恭维现实，但他们这么做的目的确立地位，而不是实现技术效率。


And they get away with it because the eurozone’s decision-makers are not obliged to answer to any sovereign body.	”而他们犯了错而不受惩罚，是因为欧元区决策者没有应答仍和主权机构的义务。


It is incumbent upon those of us who wish to improve Europe’s efficiency, and lessen its gross injustices, to work toward re-politicizing the eurozone as a first step toward democratizing it.	责任在于我们这些一厢情愿想要改善欧洲的效率、降低它的总体不公正性、致力于欧元区的再政治化并以此作为迈向民主化的第一步的人。


After all, doesn’t Europe deserve a government that is at least more accountable than that of communist China?	毕竟，欧洲难道不应该有一个至少比共产主义中国更加可问责的政府吗？


The Perilous Politics of the Euro	危险的欧元政治


SANTIAGO – The jury is still out on whether Greece will manage to avoid default, remain in the eurozone, and reverse the brutal contraction of its economy.	圣地亚哥—对于希腊能否成功避免违约、继续留在欧元区中，并扭转经济颓势这桩公案，陪审团还没有就位。


But any fair panel already would have issued a verdict on the political consequences of the common currency: utter failure.	但只要法官持公平态度，就会裁定其给共同货币造成的政治后果：彻底失败。


Of course, the case for the euro was always political and came in two varieties: earthy and lofty.	当然，欧元案永远是政治问题，并且有两个角度：俗和雅。


The earthy case, seldom made clearly in polite company, was that the countries in southern Europe spent too much, taxed too little, and thus borrowed in excess.	从俗案角度讲——很少以礼貌的方式争论——问题在于南欧国家支出太多、征税太少，因此借贷过度。


So long as they could finance deficits by printing a local currency and devaluing it from time to time, they would stick to their free-spending ways.	只要它们能够随时印制本币和贬值为债务融资，它们就会继续维持自由支出模式。


Only the straightjacket of the euro and a monetary policy governed from Frankfurt could discipline them.	只有欧元和法兰克福货币政策当局能够在纪律上约束它们。


That was the theory.	理论上是如此。


The practical result was precisely the opposite.	实际结果正好相反。


With the risk of devaluation gone, interest-rate spreads dropped precipitously, and so did borrowing costs.	贬值风险不再让利差大幅缩小，借贷成本也随之下降。


Cheap money from abroad flooded into Europe's lower-income countries.	来自国外的廉价资金涌入了欧洲的较低收入国家。


In some places – Greece, Italy, and Portugal – the money financed an unsustainable public-spending binge.	在一些地区——希腊、意大利和葡萄牙——这笔资金支撑了不可持续的公共支出狂欢。


In others – Spain and Ireland – it financed the delusions of private real-estate developers.	在其他地区——西班牙和爱尔兰——这笔资金支撑了私人房地产开发商的错觉。


Debts ballooned everywhere.	债务到处泛滥。


The lofty political case for the euro was uttered most pleasingly in French.	欧元的政治雅案在法国表现得最淋漓尽致。


It promised peace, prosperity, and growing mutual respect, with political union as the ultimate goal.	它带来了和平、繁荣和日益增加的互相尊重，其最终目标是政治联盟。


It did not matter that no one seemed to know how to get there.	没人知道怎样实现这一最终目标，不过没有关系。


As I heard at countless conferences over the years, European will and determination would do the trick.	多年来，我在各种会议上听说欧洲能实现这一目标，只要有决心就可以。


As a non-European, I was told (sometimes politely, sometimes less so) that I could not possible understand that.	作为非欧洲人，有人告诉我（有时很礼貌，有时则不太礼貌）我无法理解这一点。


Well, the results are now visible, and even non-Europeans can grasp what has happened.	好吧，如今结果已经昭然，即使是非欧洲人也能看清发生了什么。


European institutions' legitimacy is down, and neo-fascist movements are up.	欧洲机构合法性在节节下降，新法西斯运动风生水起。


Anti-immigrant prejudices and clichés about tight-fisted northerners and lazy southerners proliferate.	反移民偏见和北欧吝啬、南欧懒惰的陈词滥调日渐兴旺。


Even proper newspapers are not above depicting German politicians in lederhosen and Hitlerian moustaches.	甚至严肃的报纸也免不了俗，把德国政客描绘成身穿德式皮裤、留希特勒小胡子的形象。


There may well be a worse outcome for the project of building an integrated and tolerant Europe, but I have trouble imagining it.	对于构建团结而宽容的欧洲这一工程，也许还有更糟糕的结果，但我不敢想象。


It did not have to be this way.	并非必须如此。


Monetary union was always a risky bet, but it did not necessarily have to produce mass unemployment (more than half of all young people in Greece and Spain do not have a job).	货币联盟永远是高风险赌博，但并不一定会造成大量失业（希腊和西班牙一大半年轻人没有工作）。


A significant part of the problem reflects the eurozone's flawed design, and that failure, too, is political.	问题有很大一部分反映的是欧元的设计缺陷，而这也是政治失败。


Yes, many of Greece's troubles were of its own making.	是的，希腊的许多麻烦纯属自作孽。


Pension benefits have been widely abused, tax collection is a mess, and (aside from beautiful beaches) the country offers few goods and services that the rest of the world wants to buy.	养老金滥发、征税工作一团糟、国家提供的商品和服务业不如世界其他地区法眼（美丽的海滨除外）。


But the depression – now a half-decade old – also has external causes.	但萧条——目前已经维持了五年多——也有外部因素。


Other European countries are not just buying too little from Greece; they are buying too little everywhere.	其他欧洲国家不仅很少买希腊的东西，其他国家的东西也一样。


As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times never tires of pointing out, there is a massive imbalance in Europe, and it is not the one you might think.	《金融时报》的马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）从未指出的是欧洲存在巨大的失衡，并且这个失衡与你想的也许并不一样。


Since the current crisis erupted, the eurozone's current account has gone from a small deficit to a surplus of nearly 2.5% of GDP.	当前危机爆发以来，欧元区经常项目已从略有赤字变为近GDP的2. 5%的盈余。


As countries like Greece have cut their expenditures, others, like Germany, have not expanded theirs.	在希腊等国家削减支出的同时，其他国家（如德国）并没有扩张它们的支出。


Northern Europeans are proud of living within their means – never mind that in doing so they are helping to sustain a regional crisis.	北欧人以量入为出为豪，至于这样做无异于帮助维持地区危机他们并不关心。


This kind of problem already worried John Maynard Keynes at the time of the post-World War II Bretton Woods negotiations.	在二战后的布雷顿森林谈判期间，凯恩斯便已开始担忧这类问题。


Outsiders can force a country to spend less by refusing to lend to it.	外部力量可能通过拒绝提供贷款强迫一国减少支出。


But how do you force a country or group of countries to spend more?	但你如何强迫一国或数国增加支出？


The eurozone does not have an answer for this inherently political conundrum, and therein lies one of its fundamental flaws.	欧元区对于这一内在政治难题束手无策，而这就是根本缺陷之一。


Nor does the eurozone have the automatic fiscal shock absorbers that – as is widely understood by now – are essential to stabilize incomes across the union.	欧元区也没有自动财政冲击吸收器。 如今我们都知道，这一吸收器是稳定整个联盟的收入的关键。


When the price of oil drops and Texas and Oklahoma fall into recession, money flows their way on a moment's notice and without any political vitriol.	当石油价格下跌、德克萨斯州和俄克拉荷马州陷入衰退时，不消多久资金就会流向两州而不会有任何政治说三道四。


But such a transfer union will not happen as long as a single northern European citizen is left standing.	但只要北欧反对，就无法形成这样的转移支付联盟。


So the eurozone will be forever plagued by economic imbalances and the political tensions that inevitably accompany them.	因此，欧元区将永远承受经济失衡及其摆脱不了的政治紧张后果的影响。


And, speaking of political tensions, Greece's negotiations with the EU broke new ground.	说道政治紧张，希腊与欧盟的谈判倒是赢得了新突破。


The new Syriza government caved after barely two weeks, when confronted with the ultimate nuclear threat: misbehave and the European Central Bank will stop funding your banks.	左翼联盟（Syriza）新政府仅仅坚持了两周就缴械投降，因为它们遇到了终极核威胁：行为不端，因此欧洲央行将停止给你的银行贷款。


Not even finance ministers in leather jackets are willing to countenance a bank run and the financial chaos that follows.	甚至身穿皮夹克的财政部长也不愿阻止银行挤兑及随后的金融混乱。


Independent central banks are a great thing, and ECB President Mario Draghi is a great central banker.	独立央行是一件了不起的事，欧洲央行行长德拉吉也是了不起的央行行长。


But that independence is meant to apply to monetary policy (jacking up interest rates if necessary, however unpopular it may be) and not to fiscal policy (forcing a country to cut expenditures and raise taxes to pay outstanding debt).	但这一独立性是为了适用于货币政策（在必要时提高利率，不管民众多么反对）而不是为了适用财政政策（强迫一国削减支出、提高税收以偿���存量债务）。


Did anyone say democratic deficit?	有人说过民主赤字吗？


Of course, none of this means that Greece's exit from the eurozone would be desirable.	当然，所有这些都不意味着希腊退出欧元区是一个好结果。


As the old joke goes, if you want to go there, I wouldn't start here.	老笑话说，你想去那里，我就不这里开始。


But here – in the monetary union – is where Greece finds itself, and leaving in a lurch without a plan B would be disastrous.	但“这里”——货币联盟——是希腊自己走进来的，在没有B计划的情况下突然走出去将是一场灾难。


Bad economics easily turns into bad politics.	糟糕的经济算盘很容易变为糟糕的政治决定。


Owing to its flawed design, the common currency now threatens to abort the very project of political union that it was meant to advance.	由于设计缺陷，欧元正在威胁到它应该起到推进作用的目标——政治联盟。


Now that would be a Greek tragedy.	这将是一场希腊悲剧。


Put Up or Shut Up	兑现承诺或闭嘴


NEW YORK – In public policy, peace talks, election campaigns, or corporate strategy, laying out intentions, promises, and commitments is never enough.	纽约——在公共政策、和平谈判、竞选活动或公司战略中，仅仅说明目标、约定和承诺还远远不够。


It is merely a first step toward a desired end – and entirely meaningless unless the second, third, and all subsequent necessary steps are taken.	这只是朝期望目标迈出的第一步——除非采取第二步、第三步和所有必要的后续措施这一步是没有任何意义的。


Moreover, taking the first step starts the clock on others' trust and confidence that the next steps will in fact be taken, or else risks creating the false impression that the failure to achieve a particular goal reflects mistaken (or irrelevant) intentions, not inadequate execution.	此外，第一步迈出后外界认为很快会采取后续步骤，否则就有可能造成误解，即特定目标未能实现是因为目标有误（或无关紧要），而不是因为执行力度没有达到。


We can see examples of this virtually everywhere we look.	这样的例子几乎随处可见。


Consider the European Central Bank's announcement in January that it would implement quantitative easing.	比方说欧洲央行1月宣布采取的量化宽松政策。


At the time, many leaders seemed to think that the ECB's move would be enough: Announcement made, money printed, economies back on track.	当时，很多领导人似乎认为欧洲央行此举已经足够：发公告、印货币、让经济重回轨道。


Unfortunately, that is not how monetary policy works: QE will not be enough, and no one should be naive about that.	不幸的是，这并不符合货币政策的运行规律：人们千万不能天真地以为仅仅实行量化宽松就够了。


In order to get economies back on track, QE is a useful step, but only as part of a larger package of measures.	为了让经济重回正轨，量化宽松是一个有益步骤，但其作用能否发挥有赖于落实涉及面更广的一揽子举措。


In the absence of other economic reforms, QE on its own cannot effect the changes needed to kick-start growth.	如果不进行其他经济改革，单纯依靠量化宽松并不能启动增长所需要的改革。


And if the reforms are not implemented and growth fails to materialize, politicians are likely to blame QE, not their own failure to take all the other steps that must follow it on the path of economic recovery.	而且如果改革未能落实、增长未能实现，政治家们可能会责怪量化宽松，而不是他们自己未能采取必要的后续措施来实现经济复苏。


Now consider free speech.	现在来看看言论自由。


Following the massacre at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris last month, world leaders dashed to the scene, locked arms, and marched in support of freedom of expression as a bedrock principle of civilized societies.	继巴黎上个月发生讽刺杂志《查理周刊》屠杀事件后，各国领导人冲到现场，挽起手臂，以游行的方式支持言论自由作为文明社会的基本原则。


The natural next step for many of them should have been to return home and immediately implement that principle. Instead, they returned home.	对其中不少人而言，回国立即奉行这项原则本该是再自然不过的举措，但事实却恰恰相反，他们回国后却没有采取进一步动作。


True, Egypt's military regime – whose foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, raised eyebrows when he appeared near the head of the march in Paris – released the Al Jazeera journalist Peter Greste from prison, and has since freed two other journalists, Mohamed Fahmy and Baher Mohamed, on bail.	埃及军政府外长萨迈赫•舒克丽出现在巴黎游行队伍的最前面的确引人侧目。 埃及政府从狱中释放了半岛电视台记者彼得•葛瑞兹，之后又保释了另外两名记者穆罕默德•法赫米和巴赫尔•穆罕默德。


But where is the regime's renunciation of the authority to have imprisoned them in the first place?	但埃及政权宣布与关押他们的权力机构脱钩的声明又在何处？


In another arena, peace negotiations, the recent ceasefire agreement in Ukraine is but the latest attempt to end the war between the country's government and Russian-backed separatists that has been raging for much of the past year in the eastern Donbas region.	在另一块战场，和平谈判和乌克兰最近的停火协议不过是结束乌克兰政府与俄分离主义武装战争的最新一次尝试。 过去大半年分离主义战火一直在顿巴斯东部地区熊熊燃烧。


Throughout the fighting, attempts to stop the killing have come and gone, and the war's innocent victims – not to mention much of the international community – have grown weary and cynical.	贯穿战争始终试图阻止杀戮的努力都未能取得持久的效果，战争的无辜受害者——更不要说国际社会大部分国家——都已经开始厌倦和愤世嫉俗。


The most effective peace agreements are part and parcel of a peace process.	最有效的和平协定是和平进程的重要组成部分。


The first step – signing the agreement – represents the parties' commitment to take the necessary subsequent steps.	签订协议的第一步代表了各方采取必要后续措施的承诺。


Everyone walks away knowing exactly what they are supposed to do, what to expect others to do, and what the consequences will be if they do not.	每个人离开谈判桌时都明确知道自己该怎么做、别人该怎么做、以及不这么做可能带来的后果。


When agreements fail, it is usually not because of what they contain, but because of what is missing, or because of what the signatories do despite what they have agreed.	协议失败往往不是因为写进协议的内容，而是因为没有写入的部分，或者因为签字方明明签字同意却违反自己的承诺。


A roadmap to peace is useful only if everyone follows it.	只有当每个人都严格遵守时和平路线图才能发挥作用。


Otherwise, the goal is lost.	否则就不能实现目标。


Election campaigns are the example par excellence of the phenomenon, and the world is now entering another “Season of the First Step."	竞选活动是这一现象最好的例子，世界现在又再次面临一系列的“第一步"。


At least seven general elections will be held in European Union member countries this year (and France will hold regional elections in March).	今年欧盟成员国将举行至少七次大选（法国地区选举将于三月举行）。


Greece has already voted (electing a government that so far seems unable to move beyond intentions and commitments), and the coming months will bring elections in Estonia, Finland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal, Poland, and Spain.	希腊已经进行过投票（当选政府到目前为止除目标和承诺外还没有采取任何举措），爱沙尼亚、芬兰、英国、丹麦、葡萄牙、波兰和西班牙则将在未���数月举行选举。


Add to this the US presidential election next year – preceded by a campaign that has already started – and we can expect a lot of promises floating around.	加之明年的美国总统大选——相关竞选活动今年就已经开始——我们无疑可以得到一大堆的承诺。


As voters in these countries are inundated with good intentions, ringing assurances, and solemn commitments, they will expect parties and candidates to follow through if they are elected.	因为上述国家的选民被宏伟的目标、响亮的保证和郑重的承诺所环绕，他们当然期望当选的党派和候选人能够兑现自己的承诺。


Certainly, parties and candidates attempt to persuade voters on the basis of their track records (and by impugning their opponents' track records).	当然，政党和候选人兑现承诺的记录（和责难对手兑现承诺的记录）是说服选民的基础。


If they do not follow through on their intentions, promises, and commitments, access to information and instant communication is such that empty promises simply will no longer persuade most people.	如果实现不了承诺的目标和约定，资料查阅和即时沟通能够确保空头支票无法让多数民众信服。


Companies campaign, too.	企业同样也在进行竞选活动。


They send their leaders before law-making bodies to express contrition for grave malfeasance and promise future good behavior.	他们派领导人前往立法机构忏悔严重渎职行为并承诺未来遵纪守法。


And yet the headlines are as filled as ever with stories of unethical, if not outright criminal, corporate behavior.	但报纸头条却一如既往充斥着不道德、甚至是犯罪的企业行动。


Unfortunately, too many corporate leaders persist in viewing the world as “us" versus “them," rather than attempting to understand why, in the absence of vigorous action, no one trusts them.	不幸的是，太多企业领导人坚持用“我们"与“他们"的视角来看待世界，而不是试图理解为什么如果不采取有力行动，没有人愿意相信他们的承诺。


Beginnings are vital; but they are just that.	开始至关重要； 但它们也仅仅就是开始。


There is no easy solution for the eurozone economy, for Greece, for Ukraine, or for any of the other major challenges we face today.	欧元区经济没有简单的解决方案，希腊、乌克兰或我们面临的其他重大挑战也是一样。


But unless protagonists are sure that announcements, campaign promises, and peace agreements will give rise to clear, purposeful action, they should think twice before opening their mouths.	但除非领导人能够肯定公告、竞选承诺及和平协议将带来明确、有目的的行动，他们应该先认真考虑再做出承诺。


Sustaining the Unsustainable Eurozone	维持无以为继的欧元区


ATHENS – When the eurozone was established, its creators envisioned gradual progress toward an “optimal currency area,” characterized by fiscal integration, the free movement of labor, and political union.	发自雅典——当欧元区建立之时，它的缔造者们希望它能逐渐朝着以财政统一，人员自由流动以及政治联盟为特点的“优化货币区”。


But this process has not occurred, and, as the interminable Greek crisis has shown, the eurozone remains rife with structural weaknesses and extremely vulnerable to internal shocks.	而这一进程却并未发生，与此同时，正如旷日持久的希腊危机所展现的那样，欧元区依然充斥着结构性缺陷并在内部冲击面前极端脆弱。


This is clearly not sustainable.	这个情况很显然是无法维持下去的。


Despite efforts to promote fiscal-policy coordination, eurozone members’ budgets still fall under the purview of separate national authorities, and northern Europeans continue to oppose transfers from more to less prosperous countries beyond the very limited allowance of the European Union’s regional funds.	尽管努力去推动财政政策协调一致，欧盟成员国的预算依然无法超越各国政府的狭隘眼界，而北欧各国也继续反对在欧盟区域基金规模本已很小的情况下像穷邻居们更多进行转移支付。


Moreover, labor mobility is severely constrained by linguistic and cultural barriers, as well as administrative bottlenecks.	此外，劳动者的流动也受到了语言和文化壁垒以及行政瓶颈的严重限制。


And “ever-closer” political union has ceased to attract public support – if it ever did – and is thus not feasible today.	而“前所未有地紧密”的政治联盟也不再努力吸引公众支持——如果曾经得到过的话——因此也变得不再可行。


A growing number of commentators – and no longer only in the Anglo-Saxon world – question the monetary union’s viability.	越来越多的评论员——而且不仅仅是说英语的那帮——开始质疑这一货币联盟的生存能力。


Some encourage Greece to exit the eurozone, believing that a more restricted and homogeneous currency union would be stronger and easier to unite.	有些人鼓动希腊退出欧元区，这么一个覆盖面更小且各国国情类似的货币联盟可以更强大，也更容易联合。


Others consider a Greek exit to be just the start of the inevitable unraveling of a scheme that does not serve the purpose for which it was created.	其他人则认为希腊的退出仅仅是一个开端，意味着一个与其初始设计意图背道而驰的进程正在不可避免地徐徐展开。


The eurozone has so far managed to prove the doomsayers wrong.	迄今为止，欧元区依然能证明这些预言家是错的。


By sheer force of political will, compromise after compromise has been reached, thereby sustaining a historic project that is not, in its current state, sustainable.	人们在纯粹依靠政治意愿的力量下达成了一个又一个的妥协，并以此支撑着一个——就其当前状态来说——无法持续的历史规划。


The need to maintain this commitment to European unity, and overcome the economic difficulties that arise, is reinforced by new geopolitical challenges.	那个维持欧洲联合的承诺，以及克服经济困境的需要在新的地缘政治挑战之下得到了强化。


Most notably, Russia’s perceived ambition of recapturing its Soviet-era influence is challenging the rules-based order that was established after World War II, and a surge in religious and political extremism is threatening democratic and liberal values.	其中最引人注目的，莫过于俄罗斯重夺苏联时代影响力的野心正在挑战二战之后建立的，以规则为基础的秩序，而宗教和政治极端主义的卷土重来则威胁着民主和自由价值观。


But the economic difficulties are bound to continue, fostering doubts about the currency union’s future – doubts that could become self-fulfilling by undermining the euro’s ability to function properly.	但经济困境将继续持续，引发对货币联盟未来前景的存疑——而这些疑问也可以在削弱欧元合理运作能力的情况下不断自我强化。


Already, economic pressures have fueled anti-European sentiment in Spain, Italy, and even France; if allowed to continue, such sentiment could culminate in secession, with devastating consequences for the eurozone and Europe as a whole.	经济压力本来就已经在不断撩动着西班牙，意大利甚至法国的反欧洲情绪； 如果任由其发展，这种情绪将将最终导致独立行为，为欧元区以及欧洲整体带来灾难性的后果。


The first step in such a process would probably be the eurozone’s division into sub-areas, comprising countries of relatively equal resilience.	这一进程的第一步很可能是欧元区分裂成为多个小区，各自由国情相近的国家构成。


As it becomes increasingly difficult to pursue coherent fiscal and monetary policies, the risk of the eurozone’s complete dissolution would grow.	随着越来越难以推动一致的财政和货币政策，欧元区完全解体的风险也逐渐增大。


Greece’s exit could shorten this timeline considerably.	而希腊的退出这将大大缩短这一进程。


Though such a scenario was inconceivable five years ago, when the Greek crisis first erupted, the term “Grexit” entered the European lexicon soon after, when the crisis reached a new peak.	虽然这一情景在五年前希腊危机首次爆发之时是无法想象的，但“希落(读là)（Grexit）”这个词在危机达到了一个新高度之后迅速进入了欧洲的字典之中。


But European leaders seemed to recognize the implications of allowing a country – even small, crisis-stricken Greece – to exit the eurozone.	但欧洲领导人们似乎意识到了容许这样一个国家——即便是危机深重的小国希腊——退出意味着什么。


That is why, this year, a series of Eurogroup meetings were held with the avowed purpose of averting such an outcome.	这也是为什么近一年时间召开了一连串欧洲集团会议，力阻这一后果的发生。


The problem is that Europeans have become so accustomed to muddling through that long-term solutions seem all but impossible.	但问题在于，欧洲人早已习惯在面对危机之时虚与委蛇，胡乱应付过去，使得任何长期解决方案都似乎无法实现。


Indeed, in recent years, eurozone authorities have introduced several policies for fighting financial crises – including government-backed rescue funds, a partial banking union, tougher fiscal controls, and a role for the European Central Bank as lender of last resort.	事实上近年以来，欧元区当局已经实施了多项政策来应对金融危机——推动以政府为后盾的救助基金，一个局部的银行联盟，更严格的财政管制，以及将欧洲央行确定为最后���急借款者。


But most of these policies – with the possible exception of the banking union – are aimed at managing default risk, not eliminating this risk’s root causes.	但大多数这类政策——可能银行联盟除外——都旨在应对违约风险，而非铲除导致这一风险的根源。


It is time to recover the capacity, displayed by the EU’s founders, to look ahead and pursue a dream of a better future.	如今也是时候重拾当年欧盟缔造者们所展现出来的那种目光长远并梦想更美好未来的能力。


Specifically, eurozone leaders must introduce a mechanism for fiscal transfers from stronger to weaker economies.	特别是欧元区领导人们必须引入一个在强弱经济体之间进行转移支付的机制。


In a currency union, individual economies cannot alter their exchange rates to account for changes in relative competitiveness.	在一个货币联盟中，单一经济体无法通过调整自身汇率来应对相对竞争力的改变。


The resulting price stickiness tends to delay macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, leading to rising debt and unemployment in weaker economies.	因此产生的价格粘性也会拖延宏观经济稳定和结构性调整，使得弱小经济体负债和失业率双双提升。


Without free labor mobility, fiscal transfers are the eurozone’s only option to ease debt repayment and, by stimulating economic activity, boost employment.	如果如果劳动者无法自由流动的话，财政转移支付就是欧元区缓解债务偿付压力，以及通过刺激经济活动来促进就业的唯一选项。


Establishing such a mechanism will not be easy, as it requires a resource that is in short supply in Europe today: trust.	建立这一机制绝不容易，因为它需要一种欧洲当前紧缺的资源：信任。


Indeed, the north and south have struggled to overcome cultural differences and unequal economic conditions, preventing them from viewing the situation from each other’s perspective.	事实上北欧和南欧一直都无法弥合双方的文化差异以及经济不平等状况，使得他们无法通过彼此的角度来判断形势。


Binding the union closer together could prove critical to building such trust.	让联盟联接得更加紧密的努力对于构建这种来说至关重要。


One strategy that combines rationality with the gradualism needed to overcome political resistance would be to increase the EU budget steadily, so that it can ultimately play a macroeconomic role, promoting stability and reinforcing cohesion within the eurozone.	一个既合理又与克服政治阻力所需的渐进主义相结合的策略就是稳步扩大欧盟的预算，使其最终得以扮演一个宏观经济的角色，提升欧元区内部的稳定和凝聚力。


It is a tough sell, but also a vital one.	这是一个艰难的任务，但也是生死攸关的一步。


Moving on From the Euro	摆脱欧元，继续前进


SAINT-PIERRE-D’ENTREMONT, FRANCE – European Monetary Union was never a good idea.	SAINT-PIERRE-D’ENTREMONT，法国—欧洲货币联盟从来不是个好主意。


I remember my surprise when, as a young assistant professor, I realized that I was opposed to the Maastricht Treaty.	我还记得，当时身为年轻助理教授的我意识到自己反对马斯特里赫特条约时是多么震惊。


I believed then – and still do – that European integration is a very good thing.	当时的我相信欧洲一体化是一件非常美妙的事情——现在仍然如此。


But the textbook economics I was teaching showed how damaging EMU could be in the absence of European fiscal and political union.	但我所教授的教科书经济学表明，如果没有欧洲财政和政治联盟，欧洲货币联盟将带来巨大的危害。


Nothing that has happened since has convinced me that the textbook was excessively pessimistic.	此后发生的所有事情让我觉得，教科书绝没有过度悲观。


On the contrary: it was far too optimistic.	相反，教科书是过度乐观了。


Life is strewn with banana skins, and when you step on one you need to be able to adjust.	生活的道路上到处是香蕉皮，如果踩到，你需要有调整能力。


But the monetary union itself turned out to be a gigantic banana skin, inducing capital flows that pushed up costs around the European periphery.	但货币联盟本身就是一块巨大的香蕉皮，它所带来的资本流动推高了欧洲外围的成本。


And adjustment – that is, currency devaluation – was not an option.	而调整——也就是货币贬值——已不再是一个选项。


Furthermore, most textbooks of the time ignored the financial sector; thus, they ignored the fact that capital flows to the periphery would be channeled via banks, and that when the capital stopped flowing, bank crises would strain peripheral members’ public finances.	此外，大部分当代教科书都忽视金融部门； 因此也就忽视了一个事实：流向外围的资本流将通过银行引导，而当资本停止流动时，银行危机将掣肘外围成员国的公共财政。


This, in turn, would further erode banks’ balance sheets and constrain credit creation – the sovereign-bank doom loop that we have heard so much about in recent years.	这反过来进一步削弱了银行资产负债表、制约了信用创造，形成了一个近几年来我们耳熟能详的主权-银行恶性循环。


And no textbooks predicted that European cooperation would impose pro-cyclical austerity on crisis-struck countries, creating depressions that in some cases have rivaled those of the 1930s.	而没有一本教科书预见到欧洲合作会向危机国施加亲周期紧缩，制造出一场在一定程度上堪与20世纪30年代相提并论的萧条。


It has been obvious for some years that the “actually existing EMU” has been a costly failure, both economically and politically.	多年来，很明显“实际存在的欧洲货币联盟”是一个代价昂贵的失败，不管在经济上还是在政治上都是如此。


Trust in European institutions has collapsed, and political parties skeptical not just of the euro, but of the entire European project, are on the rise.	对欧洲机构的信任崩溃了，质疑欧元乃至整个欧洲工程的政党开始兴起。


And yet most economists, even those who were never keen on EMU in the first place, have been reluctant to make the argument that the time has come to abandon a failed experiment.	但是，大部分经济学家，哪怕是那些一开始对欧洲货币联盟并不热情的经济学家，都不愿意挑明是时候放弃这个失败实验了。


A famous article by Barry Eichengreen pointed out that an anticipated EMU breakup would lead to the “mother of all financial crises.”	巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）的一篇著名文章 指出，预期中的欧洲货币联盟解体将导致“所有金融危机之母”。


It is hard to disagree with him.	很难不同意他的论点。


That is why economists of all stripes, whether or not they supported the introduction of the common currency, have spent the last five years developing and promoting a package of institutional reforms and policy changes that would make the eurozone less dysfunctional.	因此，各派别经济学家，不管是否支持共同货币，在过去五年中纷纷设计和推出降低欧元区功能失调情况的机构改革和政治变革方案。


In the short run, the eurozone needs much looser monetary and fiscal policy.	在短期，欧元区必须大幅放松货币和财政政策。


It also needs a higher inflation target (to reduce the need for nominal wage and price reductions); debt relief, where appropriate; a proper banking union with an adequate, centralized fiscal backstop; and a “safe” eurozone asset that national banks could hold, thereby breaking the sovereign-bank doom loop.	它还需要提高通胀目标（以降低名义工资和物价下降的需要）、恰当的债务纾困、有充足的中央财政支持的合理银行联盟，以及一种各国银行可以持有的“安全”的欧元区资产，从而打破主权-银行恶性循环。


Unfortunately, economists have not argued strongly for a proper fiscal union.	不幸的是，经济学家并未强烈要求合理的财政联盟。


Even those who consider it economically necessary censor themselves, because they believe it to be politically impossible.	即使有些经济学家认为在经济上有必要也会仔细审视自己的观点，因为他们认为在政治上不可行。


The problem is that silence has narrowed the frontier of political possibility even further, so that more modest proposals have fallen by the wayside as well.	问题在于沉默让政治可能性前沿变得更窄了，因此即使是较为温和的方案也无人问津。


Five years on, the eurozone still lacks a proper banking union, or even, as Greece demonstrated, a proper lender of last resort.	五年过去了，欧元区仍然没有合理的银行联盟，甚至如希腊所标明的，连合理的最后贷款人都没有。


Moreover, a higher inflation target remains unthinkable, and the German government argues that defaults on sovereign debt are illegal within the eurozone.	此外，提高通胀目标仍然无法想象，而德国政府指出，主权债务违约在欧元区是不合法的。


Pro-cyclical fiscal adjustment is still the order of the day.	亲周期财政调整至今仍主宰者政策界。


The European Central Bank’s belated embrace of quantitative easing was a welcome step forward, but policymakers’ enormously destructive decision to shut down a member state’s banking system – for what appears to be political reasons – is a far larger step backward.	欧洲央行姗姗来迟的量化宽松是一个值得欢迎的进步，但决策者关闭成员国银行系统——并且是出于政治上的原因——具��极大的破坏性，是退后的一大步。


And no one is talking about real fiscal and political union, even though no one can imagine European Monetary Union surviving under the status quo.	并且没人在谈论真正的财政和政治联盟，哪怕没人能够想象欧洲货币联盟可以在现状下生存下去。


Meanwhile, the political damage is ongoing: not all protest parties are as pro-European as Greece’s ruling Syriza.	与此同时，政治伤害仍在继续发生：并非所有的反对党都像希腊执政党左翼联盟（Syriza）那样亲欧洲。


And domestic politics is being distorted by the inability of centrist politicians to address voters’ concerns about the eurozone’s economic policies and its democratic deficit.	国内政治正在因为中间派政客无法解决选民担心欧元区经济政策以及民主赤字的问题而被扭曲。


To do so, it is feared, would give implicit support to the skeptics, which is taboo.	人们担心，这样做相当于间接支持怀疑派，而这是一个禁区。


Thus, in France, Socialist President François Hollande channels Jean-Baptiste Say, arguing that supply creates its own demand, while the far-right National Front’s Marine Le Pen gets to quote Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz approvingly.	因此，在法国，社会党总统奥朗德援引萨伊（Jean-Baptiste Say）的话指出供给自会创造需求，而极右翼的国民阵线（National Front）的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）则援引保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）论证自己的观点。


No wonder that working-class voters are turning to her party.	毫不奇怪工作阶级选民会倒向勒庞。


A victory for the National Front in 2017 or 2022, which is no longer unthinkable, would destroy the European project.	国民阵线在2017年或2022年的大选中获胜已不再是不可想象的事情，果真如此的话，将摧毁欧洲工程。


Citizens of smaller eurozone member states will have noted the brutal way the ECB was politicized to achieve Germany’s goals in Greece, and the conclusion that the eurozone is a dangerous “union” for small countries will seem inescapable.	欧元区小国的公民将会注意到欧洲央行被赤裸裸地政治化服务于德国在希腊的目标，而欧元区也无可避免地将被认为是对小国十分“危险”的联盟。


If centrist parties remain on the sidelines, rather than protesting what has happened, the political extremists will gain further valuable territory.	如果中间派政党继续袖手旁观而不是反对现状，那么政治极端分子将进一步攻陷更加重要的国家。


As for economists like me, who have balked at advocating an end to the failed euro experiment and favored reform, perhaps it is time to admit defeat and move on.	对于我这样的经济学家，一直在呼吁结束失败的欧元实验、支持改革，也许现在是时候承认失败、继续前行了。


If only anti-Europeans oppose EMU, the EU baby could end up being thrown out with the euro bathwater.	只要反欧洲派反对欧洲货币联盟，欧盟就可能与欧元一道寿终正寝。


An end to the euro would indeed provoke an immense crisis.	欧元的末日确实会引来严重危机。


But ask yourself this: Do you really think the euro will be around in its present form a century from now?	但扪心自问：你真的认为欧元真的会以现在的形式存在一百年？


If not it will end, and the timing of that end will never be “right.”	如果不是，则它会有结束的一天，而这一天永远不会是“正确”的日子。


Better, then, to get on with it before more damage is done.	因此，还不如趁着没有造成更大伤害让它结束。


The Eurozone’s False Recovery	欧元区的虚假复苏


LONDON – At first glance, the eurozone economy seems like it might finally be on the mend.	发自伦敦——乍眼看来，欧元区经济似乎终于走上了复苏的轨道。


Stock markets are rallying. Consumer confidence has picked up.	股市不断高涨，消费者重拾信心。


Lower oil prices, a cheaper euro, and quantitative easing by the European Central Bank are all expected to boost growth.	更低的油价，更便宜的欧元汇率，加上欧洲央行所实施的量化宽松手段都有望刺激增长。


ECB President Mario Draghi claims that “a sustained recovery is taking hold,” while policymakers in Berlin and Brussels latch onto signs of life in Spain and Ireland as proof that their bitter prescription of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms worked as advertised.	欧洲央行主席马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）宣称“一场持续的复苏已经确立。 ”而柏林和布鲁塞尔的政策制定者们纷纷拉来西班牙和爱尔兰的生命复苏迹象作样板，好证明自己那些严苛的财政巩固和结构改革方案都如早先宣称的那样奏效了。


On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the improvement is modest, probably temporary, and not the result of the policies promoted by Germany.	但如果抵近认真观察的话，就会明显发现这类改善的程度其实相当一般，甚至可能是临时性的，也非德国鼓吹的政策所产生的结果。


True, according to some estimates, the eurozone economy may now be growing at an annual rate of 1.6%, up from 0.9% in the year to the fourth quarter of 2014.	没错，按照某些估算数据，欧元区经济可能正以1. 6%的年均增长率增长，高于2014年第四季度的0.


But that is far slower than in the United States and Britain.	9%，但这一增长率依然远低于美国和英国。


With the eurozone economy 2% smaller than it was seven years ago, “recovery” does not feel like the right word – especially as the relief is unlikely to last.	再加上欧元区经济规模比七年前萎缩了2%的现状，“复苏”这个词似乎不太恰当——尤其是在这一状况很可能无法持续的情况下。


For starters, the one-off boost from lower oil prices is already being unwound.	首先，由低油价产生的一次性增长已经开始走向末路。


After dropping by more than half between mid-June and mid-January, oil prices in euros have since bounced back by a third, partly owing to the euro’s sharp depreciation, which is making imports generally more expensive.	在去年六月至今年一月期间下跌了超过50%之后，欧元计算的原油价格已经反弹了近1/3，这在某种程度上是由于欧元迅速贬值，以至于要花更多的钱来进口。


The effect of that on households’ budgets and companies’ costs is hardly cause for celebration.	而这对家庭支出和企业成本所造成的影响当然是不值得庆祝的。


Policymakers are counting on a more competitive currency to stimulate growth. But they are likely to be disappointed.	政策制定者们寄望于用一个更具竞争力的货币来刺激增长，但他们很可能会感到失望。


With eurozone exports increasingly reliant on global supply chains, a cheaper currency provides less of a boost than before.	随着欧元区的出口对国际供应链的依赖逐渐加深，廉价货币对经济的刺激要比以往更弱。


Exporters may also choose to pocket any gains, rather than seek to expand market share.	出口商可能也会选择把利润放进口袋，而非试图扩大市场份额。


In 2014, exports from the eurozone amounted to nearly €2 trillion ($2.6 trillion at the time) – more than those from China.	2014年，欧元区的出口总额达到了近2万亿欧元（当时相当于2. 6万亿美元）——这个数字比中国要高。


Given patchy global demand, rapid export growth will be difficult to achieve.	但考虑到全球需求的不景气状况，很难实现出口的快速增长。


In any case, with exports accounting for only one-fifth of the eurozone’s €10 trillion economy, they are unlikely to spur a strong recovery while domestic demand remains weak.	无论如何，出口只占到了整个欧盟区十万亿欧元总规模的1/5，因此也不大可能在国内需求依旧疲软的情况下带动强劲增长。


According to the ECB’s model, the euro’s 10% depreciation over the past year (in real, trade-weighted terms) may lift growth this year by a mere 0.2%.	根据欧洲央行的模型测算，欧元去年10%的贬值（以贸易加权的实际值计算）仅仅贡献了今年0. 2%的增长。


The benefits of quantitative easing are also likely to prove ephemeral.	量化宽松所带来的好处也很可能会被证明是暂时的。


The decline in governments’ borrowing costs is unlikely to boost growth much, as European Union rules preclude fiscal expansion.	政府借贷成本的降低也不太可能大幅刺激增长，因为欧盟的相关法规不允许财政扩张。


Overall, the eurozone’s fiscal stance is set to be broadly neutral this year, according to the European Commission, albeit with further squeezes in Ireland, France, and Italy.	根据欧盟委员会的声明，虽然爱尔兰，法国和意大利进一步紧缩开支，但总体来说，欧元区今年的财政态势将在很大程度上维持中性。


Quantitative easing does improve funding conditions for the few eurozone companies large enough to tap capital markets.	对于少数能触及资本市场的欧元区大企业来说，量化宽松确实改善了它们的融资状况。


But, even in the US and Britain, where capital markets play a much larger role in corporate finance, asset-price inflation did little to encourage consumers to spend or companies to invest.	但即便是资本市场在企业融资中扮演着更重要角色的英美两国，资产价格的膨胀也无力去鼓励消费者消费或企业投资。


On the contrary, investment in a weak real economy has been far less attractive than the prospect of earning easy money from financial engineering.	要知道在开发金融产品上赚快钱的前景远比向一个弱势实体经济投资更具吸引力。


Most businesses in the eurozone rely on bank finance, and while credit conditions have improved somewhat, lending is flat (and continues to fall in southern Europe).	大多数欧元区企业依赖银行融资，而虽然信贷状况得到了某种改善，贷款量依然波澜不惊（在南欧甚至持续下跌）。


As long as zombie banks are weighed down with bad loans, that is unlikely to change much.	只要那些僵尸银行依然背负着重重坏账，这种状况就难以有大的改善。


Nor can the small uptick in the eurozone’s growth, much less the relatively rapid expansion in Spain and Ireland, be attributed to the German recipe of fiscal consolidation and measures to increase export competitiveness.	而虽然德国开出了财政巩固药方以及旨在增强出口竞争力的相关措施，欧元区——远低于西班牙和爱尔兰的相对快速扩张——的小幅增长回升也没法证明其正确性。


Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth.	毕竟一切都必将回归真相。


Spain is hardly an example of a successful fiscal adjustment.	西班牙也算不上是成功财政调整的好榜样。


On the contrary, its recovery coincided with the easing of the extreme austerity imposed in 2011-13, which has encouraged households to spend more, despite stagnant wages. Even so, its economy remains 5.7% smaller than it was seven years ago.	相反，该国的复苏是与2011~2103年间极端紧缩政策的放宽相辅相成的，虽然是工资增长依旧停滞，但却鼓励家庭进行更多的消费来实现这一局面。


A whopping 23.7% of Spaniards – and one in two young people – are unemployed, while many more have dropped out of the labor force altogether.	高达23. 7%的西班牙人——包括50%的年轻人——都处于失业状态，而更多的人干脆直接就退出了劳动力市场。


Meanwhile, Spain’s budget deficit was 5.7% of GDP last year, the highest in the EU.	与此同时，西班牙去年的预算赤字相当于GDP的5. 7%，也是欧盟第一高。


Its rapidly rising public debt is set to top 100% of GDP this year.	该国快速增长的公共债务额今年也将超过GDP总量的100%。


As the country heads toward an election later this year, the European Commission has sanctioned the widening of its structural deficit.	为了应对该国的年末大选，欧盟委员会只得批准进一步扩大其结构性赤字。


Rather than flourishing as a result of austerity, Spain is in many ways getting a free pass.	因此与其说西班牙是因为执行紧缩而变得欣欣向荣，倒不如说是在很大程度上拿到了一张免费通行证而已。


Nor does Ireland – the fastest-growing EU economy last year – confirm the appropriateness of Germany’s policy prescriptions.	爱尔兰这个欧盟去年增长最快的经济体也无法坐实德国政策方案的适当性。


Ireland, after all, is a tiny, highly open economy whose booming export sector is benefiting from existing strengths – including low business taxes, a skilled workforce, and a flexible economy – and favorable external conditions, especially the strong recovery in its main markets, the US and Britain.	毕竟这个国家是一个规模较小且高度开放的经济体，其出口部门的蓬勃增长源自于其中一些已有的优点——包括较低的商业税赋，拥有较强技能的劳动力大军，以及灵活的经济结构——再加上有利的外部条件，尤其是英美等主要出口目的地的复苏。


Even so, the economy is smaller than it was before the crisis, the unemployment rate is in double digits, domestic demand remains depressed, and the €64 billion bank-bailout bill unjustly imposed on 2.2 million Irish taxpayers still looms large.	即便如此，该国的经济总量依然小于危机之前，失业率维持在双位数，国内需求依然一蹶不振，而不公正地强加于220万爱尔兰纳税人身上的640亿欧元银行援助账单依然在不断膨胀。


The eurozone economy is set to do a bit better in 2015, but not because of the policies demanded by Germany.	欧元区经济会在2015年表现的更好，但这并非出自于德国要求执行的政策。


And it is likely to be a temporary bounce, not the start of a sustained recovery.	这很可能是一个临时性的反弹，而非可持续复苏的开端。


To overcome its balance-sheet recession, the eurozone needs to clean up its banks, reduce the crushing overhang of mostly private debt, redress the huge shortfall in investment, eliminate barriers to enterprise, and tackle the deflationary drag of German mercantilism.	为了克服自身资产负债表的衰退状况，欧元区需要清理自身的银行，减少大多数沉重的私人债务，纠正在投资方面的巨额差额，消除对企业设立的壁垒，并应对德国重商主义所带来的通缩阻力。


And that is why the eurozone will not escape its problems anytime soon.	而这也是为何欧元区无法在短时间内摆脱自身问题的原因。


Signs of Life in the Eurozone	欧元区的生命迹象


NEW YORK – The latest economic data from the eurozone suggest that recovery may be at hand.	纽约—欧元区最新经济数据表明复苏也许近在眼前。


What is driving the upturn?	是什么推动了形势向好？


What obstacles does it face?	前方面临什么障碍？


And what can be done to sustain it?	应该如何维持有利形势？


The immediate causes of recovery are not difficult to discern.	复苏的近因不难识别。


Last year, the eurozone was on the verge of a double-dip recession.	去年，欧元区还在二次触底边缘徘徊。


When it recently fell into technical deflation, the European Central Bank finally pulled the trigger on aggressive easing and launched a combination of quantitative easing (including sovereign-bond purchases) and negative policy rates.	当欧元区陷入技术性通缩时，欧洲央行终于扳动了激进宽松的扳机，采取了量化宽松（包括购买主权债券）和负政策利率双管齐下的措施。


The financial impact was immediate: in anticipation of monetary easing, and after it began, the euro fell sharply, bond yields in the eurozone’s core and periphery fell to very low levels, and stock markets started to rally robustly.	金融效果立竿见影：预期货币宽松的欧元立刻贬值，并且在宽松实施之后维持跌势，欧元区核心和外围的债券收益率下降到极低水平，股市也开始强劲反弹。


This, together with the sharp fall in oil prices, boosted economic growth.	再加上油价暴跌，共同刺激了经济增长。


Other factors are helping, too.	其他因素也起到了帮助作用。


The ECB’s easing of credit is effectively subsidizing bank lending.	欧洲央行的信用宽松事实上不贴了银行贷款。


The fiscal drag from austerity will be smaller this year, as the European Commission becomes more lenient.	随着欧盟委员会标准的放宽，因紧缩而导致的财政拖累今年也有所减小。


And the start of a banking union also helps; following the latest stress tests and asset quality review, banks have greater liquidity and more capital to lend to the private sector.	银行联盟的启动也有所助益； 在最近的压力测试和资产质量检查后，银行拥有了更大的流动性和更多的资本用于私人部门贷款。


As a result of these factors, eurozone growth has resumed, and eurozone equities have recently outperformed US equities.	拜这些因素所赐，欧元区增长有所恢复，欧元区股票表现也胜过了美国。


The weakening of the euro and the ECB’s aggressive measures may even stop the deflationary pressure later this year.	欧元贬值和欧洲央行的激进措施甚至有可能在今年玩那些时候结束通缩压力。


But a more robust and sustained recovery still faces many challenges.	但要想获得更强劲、更持续的复苏，还面临着诸多挑战。


For starters, political risks could derail progress.	首先，政治风险可能破坏进展。


Greece, one hopes, will remain in the eurozone.	我们希望希腊能够留在欧元区。


But the difficult negotiations between the Syriza-led government and the “troika” (the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund) could cause an unintended accident – call it a “Grexident” – if an agreement on funding the country is not reached in the next few weeks.	但左翼联盟（Syriza）政府与“三驾马车”（欧洲央行、欧盟委员会和国际货币基金组织）之间的艰苦谈判可能导致意料外的结果——姑且称之为“希腊退出”——如果未来几周内无法形成融资协议的话。


Moreover, Podemos, a leftist party in the Syriza mold, could come to power in Spain.	此外，西班牙的左翼联盟——社会民主党（Podemos）可能赢得西班牙选举。


Populist anti-euro parties of the right and the left are challenging Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi.	左翼和右翼民粹主义反欧元政党正在挑战意大利总理伦齐。


And Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front is polling well ahead of the 2017 French presidential election.	极右翼的国民阵线（National Front）的马琳·勒庞（Marine Le Pen）在2017年法国总统选举民调中领先。


Slow job creation and income growth may continue to fuel the populist backlash against austerity and reform.	缓慢的就业创造和收入增长可能继续助长针对紧缩和改革的民粹主义反击。


Even the ECB estimates that the eurozone unemployment rate will still be 9.9% in 2017 – well above the 7.2% average prior to the global financial crisis seven years ago.	就连欧洲央行也估计，2017年欧元区失业率仍将高达9. 9%——远高于七年前全球金融危机爆发前的平均水平。


And austerity and reform fatigue in the eurozone periphery has been matched by bailout fatigue in the core, boosting support for a range of anti-euro parties in Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland.	欧元区外围过存在紧缩和改革疲劳，而核心国则存在援助疲劳，并让德国、荷兰和芬兰的反欧元政党大受欢迎。


A second obstacle to sustained recovery is the eurozone’s bad neighborhood.	持续复苏的第二个障碍是欧元区不利的周边环境。


Russia is becoming more assertive and aggressive in Ukraine, the Baltics, and even the Balkans (while sanctions against Russia have hurt many European economies).	俄罗斯日益变得咄咄逼人，大举染指乌克兰、波罗的海乃至巴尔干（而对俄制裁也伤害了许多欧洲经济体）。


And the Middle East is burning just next door: the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, and against foreign tourists in Tunisia, remind Europe that hundreds of homegrown jihadists could return from fighting in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere and launch further attacks.	中东则可谓家门口的大火：最近的巴黎和哥本哈根恐怖袭击，以及突尼斯针对外国游客的袭击提醒欧洲，数百土生土长的圣战者可能从叙利亚、伊拉克或其他地区的战场中回国发动更多袭击。


Third, while ECB policies keep borrowing costs lower, private and public debt in the periphery countries, as a share of GDP, is high and still rising, because the denominator of the debt ratio – nominal GDP – is barely increasing.	第三，尽管欧洲央行政策压低了借贷成本，外围国家的但私人和公共债务（占GDP之比）仍然很高并在继续升高，因为债务比率的分母——名义GDP几无增长。


Thus, debt sustainability will remain an issue for these economies over the medium term.	因此，债务可持续性在中期仍将是这些经济提的一大问题。


Fourth, fiscal policy remains contractionary, because Germany continues to reject a growing chorus of advice that it should undertake a short-term stimulus.	第四，财政政策仍然矛盾，因为德国继续拒绝关于其应该采取短期刺激措施的日益异口同声的建议。


Thus, higher German spending will not offset the impact of additional austerity in the periphery or the significant shortfall expected for the three-year, €300 billion ($325 billion) investment plan unveiled by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker.	因此，不可能指望德国增加支出来抵消外围国增加紧缩的影响，也不可能指望德国增加支出填补欧盟委员会主席容克所提出的投资计划中的三年3,000亿预计欧元资金缺口。


Fifth, structural reforms are still occurring at a snail’s pace, holding back potential growth.	第五，结构改革进展依然缓慢，拖累了潜在增长。


And, while structural reforms are necessary, some measures – for example, labor-market liberalization and pension overhauls – may boost the eurozone’s savings rate and thus weaken aggregate demand further (as occurred in Germany following its structural reforms a decade ago).	而尽管结构改革必不可少，但一些措施——比如劳动力市场自由化和退休金改革——可能增加欧元区储蓄率，从而进一步降低需求（十年前德国采取结构改革后就是如此）。


Finally, Europe’s monetary union remains incomplete.	最后，欧洲货币联盟依然不完整。


Its long-term viability requires the development over time of a full banking union, fiscal union, economic union, and eventually political union.	其长期可行性需要逐渐发展出完整的银行联盟、财政联盟、经济联盟以及最终的政治联盟才能保证。


But the process of further European integration has stalled.	但欧洲进一步一体化的过程陷入了停滞。


If the eurozone unemployment rate is still too high by the end of 2016, annual inflation remains well below the ECB’s 2% target, and fiscal policies and structural reforms exert a short-term drag on economic growth, the only game in town may be continued quantitative easing.	如果欧元区失业率在2016年底仍处于过高水平，年通胀仍低于欧洲央行2%的目标，而财政政策和结构改革又造成短期的经济增长拖累，那么唯一的办法只能是继续量化宽松。


But the ongoing weakness of the euro – fed by such policies – is fueling growth in the eurozone’s current-account surplus.	但欧元的持续贬值——拜这些政策所赐——刺激了欧元区经常项目盈余增长。


Indeed, as the euro weakens, the periphery countries’ external accounts have swung from deficit to balance and, increasingly, to surplus.	事实上，随着欧元贬值，外围国的外部账户已经从赤字转为平衡并且日益向盈余迈进。


Germany and the eurozone core were already running large surpluses; in the absence of policies to boost domestic demand, those surpluses have simply risen further.	德国和欧元区核心国已经存在大量盈余； 如果没有政策提振国内需求，这些盈余还将进一步增加。


Thus, the ECB’s monetary policy will take on an increasingly beggar-thy-neighbor cast, leading to trade and currency tensions with the United States and other trade partners.	因此，欧元区货币政策将日益呈现出以邻为壑效应，导致与美国和其他贸易伙伴之间的贸易和货币紧张局面。


To avoid this outcome, Germany needs to adopt policies – fiscal stimulus, higher spending on infrastructure and public investment, and more rapid wage growth – that would boost domestic spending and reduce the country’s external surplus.	要避免这一结果，德国需要采取能提振国内支出、降低其外部盈余的政策——财政刺激、提高基础设施和公共投资支出，以及工资加快上涨。


Unless, and until, Germany moves in this direction, no one should bet the farm on a more robust and sustained eurozone recovery.	除非德国向这一方向转变，否则欧元区复苏难以达到强劲而持续的程度。


Europe’s Misguided Investment Mania	被误导的欧洲投资狂热


BRUSSELS – The mantra in Brussels and throughout Europe nowadays is that investment holds the key to economic recovery.	布鲁塞尔—如今，在布鲁塞尔和整个欧洲广为流传的说法是经济复苏的关键在投资。


The lynchpin of the new European Commission’s economic strategy is its recently unveiled plan to increase investment by €315 billion ($390 billion) over the next three years.	新欧盟委员会的经济战略核心是其正在开展的计划——在未来三年增加3,150亿欧元投资。


But the Commission’s proposal is misguided, both in terms of its emphasis on investment and its proposed financing structure.	但欧盟委员会的方案是错误的，不管是其对投资的强调还是其所建议的融资结构。


The Commission’s plan, the signature initiative of President Jean-Claude Juncker at the start of his term, comes as no surprise.	作为主席容克的新官上任三把火之一，欧盟委员会的计划在意料之中。


With the eurozone stuck in a seemingly never-ending recession, the idea that growth-enhancing investment is crucial for a sustainable recovery has become deeply entrenched in public discourse.	欧元区陷入了看不见尽头的衰退，强化增长的投资是可持续复苏的关键这一思想已经深深地植根于公共讨论。


The underlying assumption is that more investment is always better, because it increases the capital stock and thus output.	基本假设是增加投资永远是件好事，因为它增加了资本存量，进而提振产出。


This is not necessarily the case in Europe at the moment.	此刻，在欧洲，未必如此。


European Union authorities (and many others) argue that Europe – particularly the eurozone – suffers from an “investment gap.”	欧盟当局（和许多其他人）认为欧洲——特别是欧元区——受困于“投资缺口”。


The smoking gun is supposedly the €400 billion annual shortfall relative to 2007.	铁证就是相对于2007年，每年据信出现了4,000亿欧元投资。


But the comparison is misleading, because 2007 was the peak of a credit bubble that led to a lot of wasteful investment.	但这一比较具有误导作用，因为2007年时信用泡沫顶峰之年，这一信用泡沫导致了大量浪费投资。


The Commission recognizes this in its supporting documentation for the Juncker package, in which it argues that the pre-credit-boom years should be used as the benchmark for desirable investment levels today.	欧盟委员会在其支持容克的辅助文件中承认了这一点，并认为应该用信用繁荣前的年份作为当今合意投资水平的基准。


According to that measure, the investment gap is only half as large.	根据这一标准，投资缺口只有原来的一半。


Unfortunately, even the pre-boom years are not a good guide for today’s European economy, because something fundamental has changed more quickly than is typically recognized: Europe’s demographic trends.	不幸的是，即使是繁荣前年份也不是今天欧洲经济的好指引，因为一个基本要素比通常认为的变化得更快：欧洲的人口趋势。


The eurozone’s working-age population had been growing until 2005, but it will fall from 2015 onward.	欧元区工作年龄人口一直保持增长至2005年，但从2015年将开始下降。


Given that productivity has not been picking up, fewer workers mean significantly lower potential growth rates.	由于生产率一直没有上升，工人的减少意味着显著降低的潜在增长率。


And a lower growth rate implies that less investment is needed to maintain the capital/output ratio.	而更低的增长率意味着维持资本/产出比所需要的投资更少。


If the eurozone maintained its investment rate at the level of the pre-boom years, there would soon be much more capital relative to the size of the economy.	如果欧元区保持繁荣前年份的投资率水平，其资本相对于经济的规模很快就会大大增加。


One might be tempted to say: So what?	你也许会问，那又怎样？


More capital is always good.	更多的资本永远是好事。


An ever-increasing capital stock relative to output, however, means ever-lower returns to capital and thus ever more non-performing loans in the banking sector over time.	但是，资本存量相对于产出不断增加意味着不断降低的资本回报，假以时日，这将给银行部门带来更多的不良贷款。


Given the weak state of Europe’s banking system, accumulating too much capital is not a luxury that the EU can afford.	考虑到欧洲银行体系的脆弱性，积累过多资本可不是欧盟经受得起的奢侈品。


Even setting aside the question of whether more is always better, what can the Juncker plan do to have a positive short-run impact on aggregate investment?	姑且将更多是否永远更好的问题放在一边，容克的计划可以做些什么才能产生对总投资的短期积极影响？


Academic research on the determinants of investment has generally concluded that the key variable is growth (or expectations of growth), and that interest rates play at most a secondary role.	投资决定要素的学术研究的总体结论是，关键变量是增长（或增长的预期），其次则是利率。


One immediate implication of this, of course, is that monetary policy is unlikely to have a strong impact on investment.	当然，一个马上可以得到的推论是货币政策不可能对投资带来重大影响。


Indeed, the market signal is clear: At present, there is no shortage of funding available in most of the EU.	事实上，市场信号十分明确：眼下欧盟大部并不存在你融资短缺。


The countries on the eurozone periphery, where credit might still be scarce, account for less than one-quarter of Europe’s economy.	欧元区外围国也许仍处于信用稀缺状态，但它们只占欧洲经济的四分之一弱。


So a lack of funding is not the reason that investment remains weak.	因此融资不足不是投资低迷的原因。


The Juncker plan is supposed to unlock, with €21 billion in EU funding, projects worth 15 times as much (€315 billion).	据称容克的计划要用210亿欧元的欧盟资金撬动价值15倍于此（3,150亿欧元）的工程。


That sounds far-fetched.	听起来很是飘渺。


Europe’s banking system already has more than €1 trillion in capital.	欧洲银行体系资本已经超过1万亿欧元。


The addition of €21 billion, in the form of guarantees from the EU budget, is unlikely to have a significant impact on banks’ willingness to finance investment.	以欧盟预算担保的形式增加210亿欧元不可能大幅刺激银行为投资提供融资的意愿。


The Juncker plan targets, in particular, infrastructure projects, which are often riskier than other investments.	特别是，容克的计划目标是基础设施工程，这类投资通常比其他投资风险更高。


But these risks usually are not financial; they reflect potential political and regulatory barriers at the national level.	但这些��险往往不是金融上的； 它们反映的是国家层面的潜在政治和监管壁垒。


These problems cannot be solved by a guarantee from the EU budget (which in any case could not be larger than 1/15th of the value of the project).	这些问题不可能通过欧盟预算担保解决（欧盟预算担保无论如何不可超过工程价值的1/15）。


The reason why there still is no good interconnection between the Spanish and French power grids is not a lack of financing, but the unwillingness of monopolies on both sides of the border to open their markets.	西班牙和法国电网之所以仍然不能很好地互通，原因不在缺少融资，而在于两边的垄断商不愿意开放市场。


Many rail and road projects are also proceeding slowly, owing to local opposition, not a lack of financing.	许多铁路和公路工程也是进展缓慢，原因在于地方反对而不是缺少融资。


These are the real barriers to infrastructure investment in Europe.	欧洲的基础设施投资面临实实在在的壁垒。


Large European companies can easily obtain financing at near-zero interest rates.	欧洲大公司可以轻松地以近零利率获得融资。


Calling for more investment is superficially always attractive.	号召增加投资永远具有吸引力。


But there are fundamental reasons to believe that the eurozone’s investment rate will remain permanently depressed.	但有根本性理由认为欧元区的投资率将持久保持低水平。


The often-invoked investment gap is mostly a result of wishful thinking, and the remaining barriers to investment have little to do with a lack of financing.	时常被人提及的投资缺口主要来自想当然，依然存在的投资壁垒与缺少融资没有什么关系。


Economic performance in the United States and the United Kingdom holds an important lesson for the eurozone.	美国和英国的经济表现给欧元区提供了重要教训。


Both economies’ recoveries have been driven largely by a pickup in consumption on the back of stronger household balance sheets, especially in the US.	美国和英国的经济复苏主要都是由消费推动的，而消费又是依靠家庭负债表改善推动的。


The revival of investment has followed the resumption of consumption growth.	美国尤其如此。 投资复苏随着消费增长恢复而到来。


If European policymakers are serious about economic recovery, they should focus on consumption, not investment.	如果欧洲决策者真的想要经济复苏，就应该专注于消费而不是投资。


Optimizing the Eurozone	优化欧元区


TOKYO – The eurozone is facing a bleak economic outlook, with growth remaining stagnant and the threat of deflation looming large.	东京—欧元区正面临暗淡的经济前景，增长依然停滞不前，通缩风险挥之不去。


The economist Martin Feldstein, who was skeptical of the initiative from the start, now calls it a “failure.”	从一开始就对此保持怀疑的经济学家马丁·费尔德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）称之为“失败”。


Is Feldstein right, or could the eurozone become the “optimal currency area” that its creators believed it to be?	费尔德斯坦说对了吗？ 欧元能够成为创立者相信其能够成为的“最优货币区”吗？


Answering this question requires, first and foremost, an understanding of the costs and benefits of various exchange-rate systems.	要回答这一问题，最重要的是理解不同汇率制度的利弊。


The International Monetary Fund was established 70 years ago to manage an “adjustable peg” system – a hybrid system in which exchange rates were usually fixed to the US dollar, but could be adjusted occasionally to improve the country’s competitive position in export markets.	七十年前，国际货币基金组织（IMF）之所成立，是为了管理“可调整的盯住”制度。 这是一个混合制度，汇率通常情况下与美元保持固定汇率，但偶尔也可以调整以改善一国在出口市场中的竞争力。


For the first few decades, this system leaned heavily toward “peg,” owing to the US dollar’s direct convertibility to gold.	在最初几十年里，这一制度严重倾向于“盯住”，这是因为美元与黄金直接可兑换。


This brought significant stability to the global monetary order, following the competitive devaluations of the 1930s that some economists considered damaging.	这给全球货币秩序带来了巨大的稳定性，许多经济学家认为有害的20世纪30年代式的竞争性贬值一去不返。


But the fixed exchange-rate system also undermined the United States’ capacity to manage its balance of payments.	但固定汇率制度也不利于美国管理收支平衡。


That is why, in 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally abandoned the dollar’s convertibility to gold, leaving major currencies’ exchange rates to float against one another.	正因如此，1971年美国总统尼克松单方面放弃了美元与黄金的兑换性，主要货币汇率开始浮动。


Such a system provides important advantages – most notably, it enables the US Federal Reserve to pump money into the economy to prevent or halt a recession.	这套制度拥有重要优点——最值得注意的是它使美联储能够向经济中注入货币以防止或停止衰退。


But it also carries serious risks, exemplified in the trade imbalances that emerged in the 1980s.	但这也带来了巨大的风险，20世纪80年代所出现的贸易失衡就是明证。


From 1980 to 1985, the US dollar appreciated by 50% against the currencies of Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; America’s current-account deficit was approaching 3% of GDP; and its top four competitors had massive surpluses and negative GDP growth.	1980至1985年，美元相对日本、西德、法国和英国货币升值了50%； 美国经常项目赤字接近GDP的3%；


In order to correct these imbalances, the five countries signed the Plaza Accord, in which they agreed to intervene in currency markets to devalue the dollar.	而其最主要的四大竞争者出现了巨大的盈余和GDP负增长。 为了纠正这些失衡，五国签署了广场协定，同意干预货币市场以使美元贬值。


It is against this background that the euro was born, with the goal of boosting European economies by expanding their “local” market, lowering transaction costs, and facilitating the flow of information.	欧元就是在这一背景下诞生的，其目标是通过扩大“本地”市场提振欧洲经济体、降低交易成本、促进信息流动。


In 1991, the loss of monetary-policy independence seemed like a worthwhile trade-off for Europe’s economies; today, it seems that it may have been a mistake.	1991年，对欧洲经济体来说，让出货币政策独立性似乎是划算的买卖，但如今看来这也许是一个错误。


In fact, America’s experience in the 1960s should have warned the eurozone’s creators that tying national monetary authorities’ hands might not be such a good idea.	事实上，美国在20世纪60年代的经验应该成为欧元区创立者的警告：束缚国家货币当局的双手也许并不是出色的主意。


That would not be the case if the eurozone operated according to Robert Mundell’s vision of an optimal currency area, with labor and capital adjustments replacing exchange-rate adjustment, and shocks being homogeneous (rather than asymmetric).	若根据罗伯特·蒙代尔（Robert Mundell）的最优货币区概念操作（用劳动力和资本调整代替汇率调整，冲击将是同步的而非不对称的），就不会如此。


Moreover, Germany’s experience with reunification suggests that political union is integral to such a union’s success.	此外，德国重新统一的经验表明政治联盟才是货币联盟成功的关键。


The eurozone’s performance has not met any of these criteria.	欧元区的表现没有达到这些标准中的任何一个。


Most notably, eurozone countries have faced powerful asymmetric shocks, to which their lack of independent monetary-policy instruments made it virtually impossible to respond.	最令人注目的是，欧元区国家经受了巨大的不对称冲击，而缺乏独立货币政策机构意味着几乎无从应对。


As a result, they have struggled with recurring economic crisis.	结果，欧元区国家陷入了反复发作的经济危机。


To understand the corrective power of monetary policy, one need only consider Japan’s recent progress in escaping from decades of stagflation.	要理解货币政策的正确力量，你只需要考察日本最近在摆脱几十年停滞方面所取得的进展。


Monetary expansion was one of the three key features of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic strategy – an approach that could have been implemented years ago to halt the yen’s sharp appreciation.	货币扩张是日本首相安倍晋三经济战略的三大关键部分之一——该战略应该在多年前就采用以阻止日元急剧升值。


The problem was that Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s predecessors behaved as if they were bound by a fixed exchange-rate regime.	问题在于日本银行行长黑田东彦的前任似乎陷入了固定汇率制度的桎梏。


Unlike in Japan, eurozone countries’ failure to implement bold monetary-policy measures is not a choice.	和日本不同，欧元区国家没有实施果断的货币政策措施并非它们的可选项。


The only available monetary-policy tool is to change collectively the euro’s value relative to outside currencies.	它们唯一可用的货币政策工具只有集体改变欧元相对外部国家的价值。


But use of this tool is constrained by the wide discrepancies among individual countries’ appetite for inflationary or deflationary price levels.	但这一工具的使用有一个制约因素：个体国家对价格通胀或通缩水平的忍受力大相径庭。


To be sure, European economic integration – a process that, one might say, culminated with the eurozone’s establishment – also brought clear political benefits.	平心而论，欧洲经济一体化——有人会说，这一过程在欧元成立时达到了高峰——也带来了显而易见的政治裨益。


As Robert Schuman promised when he conceived the idea of a European Community, integration has prevented the recurrence of war between Germany and France.	罗伯特·舒曼（Robert Schuman）在构思欧共体时承诺，一体化阻止了德国和法国之间再次爆发战争。


But whether monetary union on such a large scale was necessary to achieve this goal is dubious.	但是否必要通过如此大规模的货币联盟实现这一目标仍可商榷。


In any case, the eurozone exists – and, at this point, it would be exceedingly difficult to dismantle it fully.	无论如何，欧元区诞生了——而时至今日，要想完全拆散它也是极其困难的。


Given this, the goal today should be to move toward an optimal currency area.	考虑到这一点，今天的目标应该是向最优货币区靠拢。


For starters, Europe’s leaders must recognize that the eurozone, as it is currently constituted, is larger than Europe’s optimal currency area.	首先，欧元区领导人必须认识到，欧元区目前的构成规模已经超过了欧洲最佳货币区。


Some of its member countries – certainly Greece, and probably Italy and Spain – need an independent monetary policy.	一些成员国——希腊显然是，意大利和西班牙也许是——需要独立的货币政策。


Otherwise, they will continue to go from one crisis to the next, with countries that do fall within the optimal currency area – for example, Germany and France – facing the consequences.	否则它们将继续从一场危机走向领一场危机，而确实符合最优货币条件的国家——比如德国和法国——则需要收拾烂摊子。


Once membership in the eurozone is optimized, the next step will be to ensure continued progress toward political consolidation.	在对欧元区成员资格做出优化后，下一阶段应该是确保朝向政治整合持续迈进。


The result will be a stronger, more efficient eurozone – one in which the benefits really do outweigh the costs.	结果将是更强大、更有效的欧元区——这个欧元区将利远大于弊。


Can the Euro Be Repaired?	欧元可以修复吗？


PARIS – When Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, recently tabled the option of a Greek exit from the euro, he wanted to signal that no member could abstain from the monetary union’s strict disciplines.	巴黎—德国财政部长朔伊布勒最近将希腊退出欧元的选项摆上了台面，他希望释放一个信号，即，任何一个成员国都不能免于货币联盟严格纪律的约束。


In fact, his initiative triggered a much broader discussion of the principles underpinning the euro, its governance, and the very rationale for its existence.	事实上，他的方案激发了关于作为欧元、欧元治理模式以及欧元存在理由基础的原则的大讨论。


Only a fortnight before Schäuble’s proposal, Europe’s leaders had barely paid attention to a report on the euro’s future prepared by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and his colleagues from the other European Union institutions.	在朔伊布勒方案提出前两周，欧洲领导人便已经注意到欧盟委员会主席容克及其来自其他欧盟机构的同事所撰写的关于欧元未来的报告。 但关于希腊的新争论让很多决策者认为有必要回归原始出发点。


But the new dispute over Greece has convinced many policymakers of the necessity to return to the drawing board.	与此同时，公民们则在质疑为什么他们要共用一种货币？


Meanwhile, citizens wonder why they share this currency, whether it makes sense, and if agreement can be reached on its future.	这样有意义吗？ 关于希腊的未来是否能形成一致？


For currencies, as for countries, founding myths matter.	货币就像是国家，建立它需要神话。


The conventional wisdom is that the euro was the political price Germany paid for French acquiescence to its reunification.	传统智慧认为，欧元时德国为了重新统一而向法国支付的政治代价。