That is why a more expansionary fiscal stance is also vital, with Germany leading the way in deploying increased public investment to “crowd in” private investment and boost competitiveness.	因此，更具扩张性的财政立场也很重要，其中德国在增加公共投资以“挤入”私人投资、提高竞争力方面起着领导作用。


The IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook describes the success of this approach in recessionary environments.	IMF最新的《世界经济展望》（World Economic Outlook）描��了这一方针在衰退环境中的成功。


Given that Germany and even France can borrow at record-low interest rates, any reasonably well-designed investment program will strengthen the public sector’s balance sheet.	德国甚至法国能够以创纪录的低利率借到钱，因此任何设计合理的投资计划都能够增强公共部门的资产负债表。


And, with the eurozone running a current-account surplus of nearly $350 billion – which the euro’s recent decline will bolster further – there is no risk of a eurozone-wide balance-of-payments crisis.	此外，欧元区经常项目盈余接近3,500亿美元——最近欧元对美元贬值还会进一步提振经常项目盈余——因此不存在泛欧元区的收支平衡危机。


The key is confidence.	关键在于信心。


Germany must trust that its agreement to loosen the eurozone’s fiscal belt will not lead to a slowdown of structural reforms, and countries like France need to know that excessive austerity will not exacerbate the impact of politically difficult structural reforms in the short run.	德国必须相信它同意放松欧元区财政腰带不会导致结构性改革的减速，法国等国家也需要知道过度紧缩不会放大政治困难的结构性改革的短期影响。


In this sense, top-level political support, voiced in a way that elicits the approval of Europe’s citizens, will be crucial.	在这方面，用能引导欧洲公民首肯的方式进行顶层政治支持至关重要。


Gabriel and Macron must lead the charge, backed by Sapin and Schäuble.	加布里埃尔和马科伦必须起到领导作用，萨宾和朔伊布勒应该在背后予以支持。


Crucially, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French Prime Minister Manuel Valls – not to mention the new Commission – must also step in to offer genuine support for the project.	关键是德国总理默克尔和法国总理瓦尔斯——更不用说新欧盟委员会了——也必须站出来为该计划提供真正的支持。


Waning confidence is a eurozone-wide problem, but the Franco-German relationship lies at its core.	信心不振是一个泛欧元区问题，但其中的要害在于法德关系。


And, as experience has shown, Germany and France can have a major impact when they work together.	经验表明，德国和法国如能携手将产生重大影响。


The power of that relationship is what the Pisani-Ferry/Enderlein initiative represents – and what could, with sufficient political support, revitalize Europe.	法德关系的力量就是皮萨尼-费里/恩德莱恩的方案所代表的——并且可以在得到足够政治支持的情况下重新激活欧洲。


Lessons from Germany for Integrating Refugees	德国的难民融合经验


DAVOS – Governments around the world are facing a huge challenge.	达沃斯—全世界政府正面临一个巨大的挑战。


The number of international migrants has surged in recent years, reaching 244 million in 2015 – a 41% increase from 2000.	国际移民数量近几年来大幅增加，2015年达到了2. 44亿——较2000年增加了41%。


With that total including 20 million refugees, preventing a humanitarian nightmare demands swift and responsible integration into host societies.	总数中包括了2,000万难民，因此阻止人道主义噩梦需要迅速而负责任地让难民融入东道主社会。


The logistical challenge of doing so is placing mounting pressure on the countries facing the largest influxes.	实现融合的后勤挑战正在给面临最大难民流入的国家造成巨大压力。


Germany, which received about 1.1 million people in 2015, knows this pressure all too well.	德国在2015年接收了大约110万人，对这一压力有着清楚的认识。


Yet Germany has not buckled.	但德国没有屈服。


On the contrary, it has handled the pressure exceedingly well, proving that through sustained collaboration among governments, business, and civil society, countries can develop effective approaches to meeting the needs of refugees and the countries that receive them.	相反，它十分出色地处理了这一压力，证明通过政府、企业和公民社会之间的持续合作，各国能够制定出有效方针满足难民和接收国的需要。


To succeed, each country must ensure that it has the capabilities, resources, and structures in place to manage refugees’ needs efficiently.	要想成功，各国必须确保它有能力、资源和现成的安排有效管理难民的需要。


Sound management and coordination among transit and destination countries can enable governments, businesses, NGOs, and aid agencies to address more effectively the challenges that will inevitably arise along the way.	可靠的管理以及中转国和目的国之间的协调能够让政府、企业、非政府组织和援助机构更有效地应对在此期间难免会出现的挑战。


At the same time, to ensure that actors in transit and host countries actually provide what the refugees need, the challenges that arise must be viewed from the refugees’ perspective.	与此同时，要想确保中转国和东道国的行动方确实提供难民之所需，就必须从难民的角度来看待所产生的挑战。


Fortunately, the needed cooperation and commitment seems to be emerging.	幸运的是，所需的合作与承诺似乎正在出现。


From my own vantage point in Germany, I’ve seen growing numbers of businesses seize the opportunity to tackle logistical and humanitarian challenges, offering services that help refugees rebuild their lives, while sharing the costs of infrastructure, technology, health care, training, education, and more.	从我本人在德国的有利观察点出发，我看到越来越多的企业抓住机会处理后勤和人道主义挑战，提供服务帮助难民重建生活，同时共担基础设施、技术、医疗、培训、教育和其他成本。


In particular, about 100 German businesses, including some that are household names, have joined the Wir Zusammen (We Together) initiative, which aims to help integrate new arrivals.	特别是，大约100家德国企业，其中不乏一些家喻户晓的名字，加入了我们一起计划（Wir Zusammen），该计划的目标是帮助新来者融入东道主社会。


To date, the initiative has secured internships for some 1,800 refugees and apprenticeships for another 300.	目前，该计划已经让1,800名难民获得实习机会，让另外300名难民获得学徒资格。


My own firm, PwC Germany, offers a free ten-week language and vocational training course for refugees when they first arrive – the most critical period for them.	我所在的公司德国普华永道为第一次到达的难民提供为期十周（对他们来说这是最关键的一段时期）的免费语言和职业培训。


Many refugees are prohibited from working during their first three months in a new host country, and lack access to public integration programs until their asylum application is approved.	许多难民在到达新东道国的前三个月是被禁止工作的，并且在庇护申请得到批准钱也难以参加公共融合计划。


Thanks to our initiative and others like it, refugees can use this time to prepare to enter the job market, by gaining valuable skills, not to mention a certified assessment of their occupational aptitude.	拜我们和其他类似的项目所赐，难民能够 利用这段时间获得宝贵的技能乃至职业能力倾向的认证评估，为进入就业市场做好准备。


Such initiatives help not just the refugees, but also businesses – and, in turn, Germany’s economy.	这些项目不仅能帮到难民，也能帮到企业——反过来又能帮到德国经济。


Companies that are not afraid of language barriers and cultural differences early in the integration process are rewarded with the chance to train and hire people who are highly motivated and often highly skilled.	不惧融合过程早期的语言障碍和文化差异的公司所获得的回报是有机会培训和雇用干劲十足并且通常具备高技能的人手。


For companies facing skills shortages, this should be particularly tempting.	对面临技能短缺的公司来说，这应该是非常具有有诱惑力的。


Manufacturing, health care, and nursing are likely to benefit the most from the growth in the labor pool.	制造业、医疗和护理也许是受益于劳动力储备增长最多的部门。


Germany’s experience holds important lessons for other countries attempting to resettle refugees.	德国的经验为其他尝试安置难民的国家提供了重要经验。


One of the most useful and readily applicable is that the refugee journey is best managed in four distinct phases.	其中最有用并且现成可用的经验是通过四个不同阶段来对难民之旅进行最佳管理。


The transit phase.	中转阶段。


The refugee has escaped from a country where life has become unsustainable, whether because of conflict or a lack of economic opportunities, but has yet to arrive in the host country.	难民已经逃出生活不可持续的国家——或者是因为冲突，或者是因为找不到经济机会——但尚未到达东道国。


This is the most insecure phase, during which refugees have no safe haven.	这是最不安全的阶段，在此期间难民找不到安全港。


They are vulnerable not only to the elements, but also to smugglers, traffickers, and other criminals seeking to take advantage of their vulnerability.	他们不但受到自然环境的影响，也饱受走私者、人贩子和其他犯罪分子的威胁。


The arrival phase.	到达阶段。


Refugees find some semblance of safety, as they are given temporary shelter and support.	难民找到了一定程度的表面安全，获得了临时居所和支持。


During this phase, they can register with their current host country and apply for asylum in the protective country of their choice.	在该阶段，他们可以在当前东道国注册，并申请他们所选择的保护国的庇护资格。


Protection, settlement, and integration.	保护、安置和融合。


Once in their country of choice, refugees receive protection and support, while they await the assessment of their asylum applications.	一旦进入所选国家，难民就能获得保护和支持，同时等候庇护申请评估。


If accepted, they are provided with housing and integrated into communities through work and education programs.	如果被接受，他们将获得住房，并通过工作和教育项目融入社区。


It is during this stage that businesses can make the biggest contribution.	企业在该阶段起到最大的作用。


Indeed, I strongly believe that integration works best when linked to practical training and concrete professional opportunities.	事实上，我坚信融合与实践培训和具体的职业机会联系在一起时最为有效。


The repatriation phase.	遣返阶段。


If a refugee’s application for asylum is refused, he or she is returned to the country of origin.	如果难民的庇护申请被拒绝，他将被送回来源国。


In the longer term, repatriation can occur even with refugees who secure asylum, if the circumstances in their home country change and it becomes safe to return.	从长期看，遣返在难民拿到庇护身份之后也有可能发生，如果他们祖国的环境改变、已能安全返回的话。


In every phase, many parallel tasks require capabilities and resourcing.	在每个阶段都有许多并行的任务需要能力和资源去解决。


As we have seen in Germany, business can play a major role in supporting national and local governments, thereby helping the refugees, themselves, and the wider economy.	我们在德国看到，企业能够在支持国家和地方政府、从而帮助难民、企业自身和整体经济方面起到重要作用。


In that sense, the refugee crisis really is a valuable opportunity.	从这个角度讲，难民危机其实是宝贵的机会。


For refugees’ sake – and our own – we should not squander it.	为了难民——以及我们自己——我们不应该浪费这个机会。


Will Europe Let Germany Lead?	欧洲会不会接受德国领导？


BERLIN – The United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s referendum defeat and subsequent resignation, and Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States have created a power vacuum in the West, and in Europe.	柏林——权力真空已经随英国退欧公投、意大利总理马特奥·伦齐在全民公投中失败并随后辞职以及唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统在西方和欧洲各国形成。


At a time when Europe needs to make important collective economic and foreign-policy decisions, domestic issues are preoccupying larger European Union member states such as France, the UK, Spain, and Italy.	值此欧洲必须做出重大集体经济及外交政策决策之际，国内问题却吸引了法、英、西班牙和意大利等欧盟大国的注意力。


Consequently, there is growing pressure on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her government to step up and lead.	因此，德国总理默克尔及其政府面临着挺身而出、领导欧洲的越来越大的压力。


But while Germany wants to show leadership, it needs European partners who are willing to engage and compromise.	尽管德国希望展示其领导力，但仍然需要欧洲伙伴的妥协及参与。


Germany’s critics are right to say that it could be more open to other member states’ policy proposals, but many of the complaints leveled against Germany have been unfair – and often self-serving.	德国的批评者可以说德国本应对其他成员国的政策建议更加开放，但针对德国的很多抱怨其实并不公平——而且往往自私自利。


For example, the German government has been accused of shunning European solidarity in response to the 2008 financial crisis.	例如，有人指责德国政府为应对2008年金融危机而放弃欧洲团结。


But, while German measures have sometimes come too late, or been ill-conceived – such as its “temporary Grexit” proposal – Germany’s government has also agreed to numerous bailout programs, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, and an EU banking union.	但尽管德国的措施有时来得太晚，而且有时思虑不周——比如德国的“临时希腊脱欧”计划——但德国政府也通过了若干救助计划，同意建立欧洲稳定机制和一家欧盟银行联合体。


What’s more, Germany has borne the largest financial burden.	更重要的是，最沉重的财政负担由德国背负。


Germany has also been criticized for not agreeing to underwrite Eurobonds, and for opposing a transfer union.	有人指责德国不同意承保欧元债券，并反对成立转移支付联盟。


But these arguments have not always been made in good faith: member states such as France want to share risk without ceding sufficient sovereignty over economic policymaking.	但这些说法往往并不诚实：像法国这样的成员国希望共担风险，但却不愿交出足够的经济决策权力。


Germany’s government and citizens are more open than most to the deeper integration required to make the euro sustainable, including fiscal union.	德国政府和民众对维护欧元可持续发展、包括构建财政联盟所必需的深层次融合比多数国家都秉持更为开放的态度。


But, to achieve that, all partners need to move forward, in terms of sharing policy sovereignty and risk.	但为实现这一目标，所有伙伴国都需要在共享政策主权和共担风险方面取得进步。


A third complaint made against Germany is that it engages in beggar-thy-neighbor behavior, by pursuing restrictive fiscal policies that have created an excessive current-account surplus of close to 9% of GDP.	针对德国的第三种抱怨是其实行以邻为壑的政策，德国实行的限制性财政政策造成经常账户顺差过大，接近9%的国内生产总值。


This has indeed been a mistake.	这其实是一种误会。


But it is Germany’s problem, first and foremost.	但这首先来讲是德国的问题。


While Germany has a large investment gap that hurts domestic productivity and growth, it is not the main culprit behind tepid growth, high unemployment, low competitiveness, and other economic ills elsewhere in Europe.	虽然德国投资顺差过大有损国内生产率和经济增长，但它并非增长乏力、失业率高企、竞争力低下和欧洲其他国家各项经济问题的主要负责人。


Admittedly, many German policymakers have been misguided in their obsession with fiscal austerity, and with their criticism of the European Central Bank’s monetary-policy approach.	诚然，德国许多决策者都会被对财政紧缩的痴迷所误导，他们更愿意批评欧洲央行的货币政策措施。


But they are justifiably frustrated with the slow pace of economic reform across the EU.	但他们对欧盟各国经济改革步伐缓慢的不满很容易理解。


Overall, Germans are deeply pro-European, and the German government has done more for Europe than it is given credit for.	总体而言，德国人坚定支持欧洲，而德国政府远比外界所承认的为欧洲做了更多事。


Leadership mistakes are easy to identify and criticize in retrospect.	如果采用事后诸葛亮的方式很容易找到和批判领导者的错误。


A more constructive exercise is to judge decisions in the context of the information that was available at the time they were made, and to apply past lessons to future choices.	但根据决策当时所掌握的信息对决策进行评判无疑是更具建设性的做法，并且可以在未来选择时吸取过去的教训。


With the benefit of hindsight, the German government – indeed, any government – would have acted differently with respect to the Greek debt crisis, fiscal policy, the Brexit referendum, and so forth.	如果从事后来看，德国政府——其实包括任何政府——都会对希腊债务危机、财政政策、英国退欧公投以及诸如此类的事件采取不同的措施。


So, a fairer benchmark for German leadership is other large European governments’ own track records.	因此，评判德国领导能力更公平的标准是其他欧洲大国政府自身的政策记录。


Would Europe really be better off today if Germany’s government had followed the paths taken by its French, British, or Italian counterparts in recent years?	如果德国政府采纳了近年来法国、英国或意大利同僚的路线，会不会真能改变欧洲局势？


Even if Merkel was late in responding to the crises in Italy and Greece, she has also shown extraordinary tolerance, open-mindedness, and foresight.	即使默克尔迟迟未能应对意大利和希腊爆发的危机，但非凡的宽容、开明和远见仍在她身上展现得淋漓尽致。


In two key areas – addressing the refugee crisis and confronting Russian aggression – her government has shown more European solidarity than most other member states.	在解决难民危机和直面俄罗斯入侵等两大关键领域，默克尔政府比其他多数成员国政府表现得更加团结。


Moreover, Merkel demonstrated sound leadership in her response to Trump’s victory.	此外， 面对特朗普的当选默克尔展现出了卓越的领导力。


She congratulated him, and offered him a close working relationship, but only on the basis of “common values” such as “democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of each and every person.”	她向他表示祝贺，并承诺与其密切合作，但必须以“民主、自由、尊重法治和全体民众的尊严”等“共同价值观”为前提。


She is also the most important, and the most sympathetic, partner for the UK government in the upcoming Brexit negotiations.	面对即将到来的英国退欧谈判，她也是英国政府最重要、最富同情心的合作者。


Merkel’s approval rating remains the envy of other European leaders, and she could be the last well-grounded, non-populist head of government among the larger Western countries.	默克尔的支持率一直为其他欧洲领导人所艳羡，而且她很有可能成为欧洲大国中最后一位坚定的非民粹主义政府领导人。


Italy’s December 4 constitutional-reform referendum may have been the final wake-up call for Europe to get its act together in order to address social divisions, political extremism, and deepening economic and political crises.	意大利12月4日的宪法改革公投或许是唤醒欧洲最后的机会，欧洲必须共同行动，解决社会分裂、政治极端主义和不断深化的经济和政治危机。


The German government should learn from its past mistakes, while continuing to step up as a leader for Europe.	德国政府理应从过去的失败中吸取教训，并继续挺身而出领导欧洲前进。


But it can’t do it alone.	但要实现这一目标，单靠德国的力量还远远不够。


Other EU governments should stop bashing Germany as a way to deflect attention from their own failings.	其它欧盟政府应当停止用抨击德国的方式来分散对他们自身失误的注意力。


In recent years, their attacks have gone too far, and have been counterproductive.	近年来，他们的攻击极为过分，而且已经产生了相反的效果。


Germany needs its partners to come to the table, and to engage in a constructive dialogue about concrete solutions to Europe’s deepening crisis.	德国需要欧洲伙伴积极参与，就解决欧洲不断深化危机的具体方案展开建设性的对话。


Germany Must Defend the Euro	德国必须捍卫欧元


NEW YORK – Financial markets abhor uncertainty; that is why they are now in crisis mode.	纽约—金融市场讨厌不确定性； 这就是当前市场进入危机模式的原因。


The governments of the eurozone have taken some significant steps in the right direction to resolve the euro crisis but, obviously, they did not go far enough to reassure the markets.	欧元区各国政府已经朝着解决欧元危机的方向迈出了重大一步，但是，很显然，这还不足以让市场放心。


At their meeting on July 21, the European authorities enacted a set of half-measures.	在7月21日的会议上，欧洲各国当局制定了一套权宜之计。


They established the principle that their new fiscal agency, the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), should be responsible for solvency problems, but they failed to increase the EFSF’s size.	它们设置了一个原则：新的财政机构欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）应该担起避免国家破产的责任； 但它们没能扩大EFSF的规模。


This stopped short of establishing a credible fiscal authority for the eurozone.	这意味着它们并没有建立起一个可靠的欧元区财政当局。


And the new mechanism will not be operative until September at the earliest.	此外，新机制至少要到9月份才能生效。


In the meantime, liquidity provision by the European Central Bank is the only way to prevent a collapse in the price of bonds issued by several European countries.	在此期间，欧洲央行所提供的流动性是避免某些欧洲国家债券价格崩盘的唯一救命稻草。


Likewise, Eurozone leaders extended the EFSF’s competence to deal with banks’ solvency, but stopped short of transferring banking supervision from national agencies to a European body.	类似地，欧元区领导人将EFSF的职责扩展到处理银行的破产问题，但却没有将银行监管权从国家机构转移到欧洲机构手里。


And they offered an extended aid package to Greece without building a convincing case that the rescue can succeed: they arranged for the participation of bondholders in the Greek rescue package, but the arrangement benefited the banks more than Greece.	他们为希腊提供了扩展的救助计划，但并未使人们确信该计划定能成功：他们安排债权人参与到希腊救助计划中，但这一安排的最大受益人并不是希腊，而是银行。


Perhaps most worryingly, Europe finally recognized the principle – long followed by the IMF – that countries in bailout programs should not be penalized on interest rates, but the same principle was not extended to countries that are not yet in bailout programs.	也许最令人担心的是，欧洲最终意识到了（IMF早就意识到了）这一原则——救助计划对象国不应该在利率上受到惩罚——但并未将它推广到尚不在救助计划之列的国家。


As a result, Spain and Italy have had to pay much more on their own borrowing than they receive from Greece.	结果，西班牙和意大利在其自身贷款上所需要支出的金额远远超过了它们从希腊身上得到的金额。


This gives them the right to opt out of the Greek rescue, raising the prospect that the package may unravel.	这给了它们不参加希腊救助计划的权利，而这样一来，救助计划功败垂成的风险就会大大增加。


Financial markets, recognizing this possibility, raised the risk premium on Spanish and Italian bonds to unsustainable levels.	在金融市场意识到这一点之后，西班牙和意大利债券的风险溢价提高到了不可持续的水平。


ECB intervention helped, but it did not cure the problem.	欧洲央行介入了，收到了一定成效，但并未解决问题。


The situation is becoming intolerable.	情况正在变得难以为继。


The authorities are trying to buy time, but time is running out.	当局希望赢得行动时间，但时间不等人。


The crisis is rapidly reaching a climax.	危机正在快速走向井喷。


Germany and the other eurozone members with AAA ratings will have to decide whether they are willing to risk their own credit to permit Spain and Italy to refinance their bonds at reasonable interest rates.	德国和其他拥有AAA信用评级的欧元区成员国将不得不做出抉择，是否愿意将其自身信用置于险境以使西班牙和意大利能够以合适利率再融资其债券。


Alternatively, Spain and Italy will be driven inexorably into bailout programs.	否则的话，西班牙和意大利也将无情地被打入救助计划名单中。


In short, Germany and the other countries with AAA bond ratings must agree to a eurobond regime of one kind or another.	简言之，德国和其他AAA国家必须接受某种形式的欧元债券机制。


Otherwise, the euro will break down.	否则的话，欧元小命难保。


It should be recognized that a disorderly default or exit from the eurozone, even by a small country like Greece, would precipitate a banking crisis comparable to the one that caused the Great Depression. It is no longer a question whether it is worthwhile to have a common currency.	必须指出，无序违约或（即便是像希腊那样的小国）退出欧元区将导致可与引发大萧条的银行危机相提并论的危机。


The euro exists, and its collapse would cause incalculable losses to the banking system.	欧元的崩溃将给银行体系带来不可估量的损失。


So the choice that Germany faces is more apparent than real – and it is a choice whose cost will rise the longer Germany delays making it.	因此德国所面临的选择既真实又紧迫，德国晚一日做出抉择，代价就要增加三分。


The euro crisis had its origin in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision, taken in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008, that the guarantee against further defaults should come not from the European Union, but from each country separately.	欧元危机的根源是德国总理默克尔在2008年9月雷曼兄弟公司违约后的决策——对不会发生进一步违约的担保不应该来自欧盟，而应该由各国各自做出。


And it was German procrastination that aggravated the Greek crisis and caused the contagion that turned it into an existential crisis for Europe.	而正是德国的犹豫逡巡加重了希腊危机，导致了危机的蔓延，最终演变成危及欧洲生存的大危机。


Only Germany can reverse the dynamic of disintegration in Europe.	唯有德国能够扭转欧洲瓦解的趋势。


That will not come easily: Merkel, after all, read the German public’s mood correctly when she made her fateful decision, and the domestic political atmosphere has since become even more inhospitable to extending credit to the rest of Europe.	这并不容易：毕竟默克尔在做出重大抉择时是对德国公众情绪做出了正确解读的，而此后德国国内政治氛围越来越反对扩大欧洲其他国家的信用。


Merkel can overcome political resistance only in a crisis atmosphere, and only in small steps.	直到危机爆发，默克尔才得以克服政治阻碍势力，但也只是向前迈出了几小步。


The next step will likely be to enlarge the EFSF; but, by the time that step is taken, France’s AAA rating may be endangered.	下一步可能是扩大EFSF； 但是，当这一步终于迈出的时候，法国的AAA评级可能已经告急了。


Indeed, by the time Germany agrees to a eurobond regime, its own AAA standing may be at risk.	事实上，当德国最终同意欧元债券机制时，它自己的AAA评级是否还能安如泰山也是个问题。


The only way that Europe can escape from this trap is by acting in anticipation of financial markets’ reactions, rather than yielding to their pressure after the fact.	欧洲摆脱这一陷阱的唯一道路是引导金融市场的反应，而不是在事后屈服于金融市场压力。


This would require intense debate and soul-searching, particularly in Germany, which, as the EU’s largest and best-rated economy, has been thrust into the position of deciding the future of Europe.	这会导致激烈的争论和深思，特别是作为欧盟中规模最大、评级最高的经济体德国，它肩负着决定欧洲未来的重任。


That is a role that Germany has been eager to avoid and remains unwilling to accept.	这是德国一直在尽力避免且至今不愿接受的角色。


But Germany has no real choice.	但德国没有其他现实选择。


A breakdown of the euro would precipitate a banking crisis that would be beyond the global financial authorities’ ability to control.	欧元崩溃将掀起全球金融当局根本无力控制的银行危机。


The longer Germany takes to recognize this, the higher the price it will have to pay.	德国醒悟的时间越长，所需要付出的代价就越大。


Germany’s Strange Turn Against Trade	德国诡异转向反贸易


BERLIN – The window of opportunity to complete the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union is closing quickly.	柏林—完成美国与欧盟之间跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP）的机会窗口正在快速流失。


National elections will be held this year and next in the US, France, and Germany, and the campaigns will play out in an environment that is increasingly hostile to international agreements in any form.	今年和明年，美国、法国和德国均将举行全国大选，选战将形成一个对一切形式的国际协定日渐怀有敌意的环境。


The biggest risk might come from the least likely source: Germany, an export powerhouse.	最大的风险可能来自最难以置信的地方：出口强国德国。


As it stands, some 70% of Germans citizens oppose the TTIP, almost twice the average in other European countries.	目前，大约70%的德国人反对TTIP，几乎是其他欧盟国家平均水平的两倍。 他们一边倒地相信，德国不会获得经济利益；


They overwhelmingly believe that Germany will not benefit economically, that lower-skill workers’ wages will suffer, that large corporations will gain power at the expense of consumers, that data and environmental protection will be compromised, and that citizens’ rights will be undermined.	低技能工人的工资将受到影响； 大公司将以消费者为代价攫取权力；


But a slew of studies have proved all of these claims to be overblown or outright wrong.	但不少研究证明，所有这些观点要么过于夸张，要么大错特错。


In fact, Germany – whose economic progress since the end of World War II has been driven by its consistent openness to international trade and economic integration, and which remains one of Europe’s most open and trade-dependent economies – would be among the main beneficiaries of the TTIP.	事实上，自二战结束以来，德国的经济进步正是受其坚持向国际贸易和经济一体化打开国门的推动，德国也一直是欧洲最开放、最依赖贸易的经济体之一，也将是TTIP的主要受益者之一。


It is projected that the TTIP would raise annual per capita income in Germany by 1-3%, or €300-1,000 per year by 2035.	据预测，到2035年，TTIP可以让德国年人均收入提高1—3%或每年300—1,000欧元。


Moreover, with nearly 50% of German jobs linked, directly or indirectly, to the tradable sector, the deal would also help protect employment.	此外，近50%的德国工作岗位直接或间接与可贸易部门有联系，因此TTIP也有助于保护就业。


And, by boosting the ability of the US and Europe to set global business standards, German firms’ international competitiveness would rise.	此外，通过提高美国和欧洲制定全球商业标准的能力，德国企业的国际竞争力也将上升。


Not every individual or company stands to gain from the TTIP, but the net effect on Germany’s economy and citizens would be clearly positive.	并非所有个人或公司都能从TTIP中获益，但其对德国经济和公民的净影响显然是积极的。


Why, then, do so many in Germany oppose the deal?	那么，为什么有如此之多的德国人反对这一协议？


One reason is that Germany’s apparent economic success has increased aversion to change.	一个原因是德国明显的经济成功增加了对变革的厌恶情绪。


The country not only endured the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis; it has actually thrived in recent years, experiencing robust GDP growth and impressive wage gains.	德国不但忍受了2008—2009年全球金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机，实际上在近几年中相当繁荣，GDP增长强健，工资上升显著。


The unemployment rate has been halved since 2005, reaching a record low of 4.6% today, and its current-account surplus has soared to a staggering 8% of GDP.	自2005年以来，失业率下降了一半，目前达到了4. 6%的创纪录低位，经常项目盈余飙升至令人咋舌的GDP的8%。


The sense of being Europe’s economic superstar has generated policy inertia, bringing the country almost to a complete standstill on economic reforms.	身为欧洲经济超级明星的感觉形成了政策惯性，让德国几乎陷入了经济改革的全面停滞。


While most other Europeans are desperately looking for any opportunity to pull their country out of crisis, Germans see little reason to meddle with an ostensibly prosperous status quo.	大部分其他欧洲人都急切地寻找着让国家走出危机的机会，而德国人却找不到改变貌似繁荣额现状的理由。


Unfortunately for Germany, its current path is not as smooth and secure as people like to think.	对德国来说，不幸的是目前的道路并不像人们所想象的那样平稳和笃定。


In fact, since its lost decade as the “sick man of Europe” in the 2000s, Germany has caught up with other advanced economies in only some areas.	事实上，自21世纪初沦为“欧洲病夫”的失去的十年以来，德国只在几个领域实现了对其他发达经济体的赶超。


It still has one of the lowest rates of public and private investment among OECD countries, and will be hit harder than most by a dramatic demographic shift over the next decade.	其公共和私人投资仍然是经合组织国家中最低之一，并且未来十年所面临的人口变化冲击比大部分国家都要大。


Beyond providing an immediate economic boost, the TTIP would help Germany weather the longer-term challenges it faces.	除了带来即期经济提振，TTIP还有助于德国抵御其所面临的长期挑战。


Germany’s opposition to the TTIP also reflects the recent surge in populist and nationalist sentiment in much of the Western world.	德国反对TTIP也反映了最近民粹主义和民族主义情绪在西方世界大部的崛起。


The appeal of such forces is particularly pronounced in the EU, owing to the popular perception that European integration has weakened national sovereignty and left citizens subject to decision-making by unelected technocrats.	这些力量的号召力在欧盟尤其巨大，原因是人们普遍感到欧洲一体化削弱了国家主权，让公民需要面对非选举产生的技术官僚的决策。


The last thing many Europeans want is yet another set of supra-national rules, formulated behind closed doors, governing their economies.	许多欧洲人绝不愿意看到闭门讨论产生的新的超国家规则来管理他们的经济。


This sentiment is especially acute for Germans, who remain bitter at, as they perceive it, having been Europe’s paymaster during the crisis.	德国人的这一情绪尤其尖锐，如他们所感到的，他们仍对德国充当危机期间的发饷官而怨声载道。


Some now fear that the TTIP is just another trick, intended to take advantage of Germany’s economic strength and generosity.	眼下，一些人担心TTIP只不过是一场新把戏，目的是利用德国的经济强势和慷慨。


Overcoming this fear will be no easy feat.	克服这一恐惧绝非易事。


A third reason for Germany’s opposition to the TTIP is that the country is already engaged in a battle for wealth redistribution.	德国反对TTIP的第三个原因是德国已经身陷财富再分配战争。


Germany currently has the highest inequality in private wealth in the eurozone, and it has experienced a sharp increase in wage inequality over the last two decades.	目前，德国的私人财富不平等性为欧元区最大，并且在过去二十年中经历了工资不平等性的急剧升高。


In fact, many Germans anticipate a further increase in inequality.	事实上，许多德国人认为不平等性将进一步增加。


Not only is the minimum wage widely circumvented; some politicians have capitalized on fears of the current influx of refugees to win votes, claiming that openness to foreigners will only make inequality worse.	不但最低工资被广泛规避； 一些政客还利用对目前难民涌入的恐慌来赢得选票，声称向外国人开放只能导致不平等恶化。


Compounding Germans’ disillusionment is the sense – shared by many in Europe and elsewhere – that the system is “rigged.”	加剧德国人的幻灭感的是他们——如欧洲和其他地区的许多人一样——认为系统被“操纵”了。


Volkswagen managers received huge bonuses this year, despite the global scandal caused by the company’s years-long effort to evade emissions standards. And the release of the Panama Papers has revealed how the wealthiest avoid paying taxes.	今年大众公司管理层获得巨额奖金，尽管该公司多年来作弊以规避排放标准的全球丑闻被曝光。


Claims that the TTIP would benefit primarily the wealthy have thus struck a chord with labor unions and others.	声称TTIP 主要有利于富人的观点因此打动了工会和其他人的心。


A trade-dependent economy has much to gain from freer trade, especially with a market as large as the US.	一个依赖贸易的经济体能从更自由的贸易中获益良多，特别是面对像美国这样的大市场。


Germany should be using its political clout to push its European counterparts to seal the deal.	德国应该利用其政治力量促使其欧洲同侪在TTIP上签字画押。


Instead, with the popularity of the country’s two largest political parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats, falling fast, Germany’s leaders are unlikely to push an unpopular deal.	相反，德国最大的两个政党——基督教民主联盟和社会民主党正在快速坠落，在这样的情况下，德国领导人不可能推行不受欢迎的协议。


That is bad news for everyone – especially Germans.	这对于所有人来说都是坏消息——对德国人尤其如此。


Germany’s Drift from Europe	德国与欧洲渐行渐远


BERLIN – “What’s the matter with Germany?,” people on both sides of the Atlantic are asking with increasing frequency.	柏林—“德国究竟怎么了？ ”大西洋两岸的人们正越来越频繁地提出这一问题。


In Berlin, however, nobody seems to understand the question.	然而，在柏林似乎没人明白这个问题。


Doubts about Germany’s role have much to do with the current economic and financial crisis, and also with the weakness of the European Union and its institutions.	对德国作用的怀疑既与当下的经济与金融危机有关，也与欧盟及其机构的软弱有关。


Ever since the referendum failures of both the European constitution and the Lisbon treaty, the EU has been flying on autopilot, run by its bureaucrats.	自从针对欧洲宪法和《里斯本条约》的全民公决失败以来，欧盟就进入了“自动驾驶”状态，由官僚们打理。


With 27 members and no reform of its institutions and procedures, EU processes have become harrowingly inefficient.	在拥有27个成员国而却没有实施任何机构和程序改革的情况下，欧盟各项进程效率低下得令人痛心。


Crises are also always moments of truth, because they relentlessly expose both the strengths and weaknesses of all the players involved.	危机也通常是真相大白的时刻，因为它们会残酷无情地暴露出所有相关方的长处和弱点。


For that reason, Europe now requires leadership not from a weak EU Commission or from any other European institutions, but from the capitals of its major member countries.	正因如此，欧洲现在所必需的领导力不是来自软弱的欧盟委员会或其他欧盟机构，而是来自于其主要成员国的首都。


As always, when serious economic and financial matters are at stake, people look to Germany, the EU’s largest economy.	在严峻的经济和金融形势下，人们一如既往地将目光投向德国，这个欧盟最大的经济体。


But what they see confounds them, because Germany is openly refusing to lead.	但这次人们却倍感挫败，因为德国公然地拒绝领军。


True, Germany has been hit hard – very hard – by the economic crisis.	诚然，德国遭受了经济危机的沉重打击—可谓元气大伤。


But its economy is nonetheless stronger than ever after the challenges of reunification and the necessary reform of the country’s labor market and welfare systems.	但其经济仍处在经历了两德统一的挑战和必要的劳力市场及福利体系改革之后最为强健的时期。


What amazes our neighbors and partners – and increasingly causes distrust – is that ever since the beginning of the global meltdown last September, the German government has focused almost exclusively on national crisis management, rebuffing any and all attempts at a European approach.	令所有的邻国及伙伴诧异（也日益导致他们的不信任）的，是自从全球经济危机在去年12月发生以来，德国政府几乎仅仅专注于国内危机管理，并断然拒绝任何欧洲层面上的举措。


Add to this the palpable tensions in Franco-German relations, the blocking of a common EU gas market, close strategic cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, etc., and the worries about Germany multiply.	在法德关系明显紧张之外，又加上了德国对欧盟天然气共同市场的抵制和与普京领导下的俄罗斯建立紧密的战略合作关系……如此种种另外界对德国的担心与日俱增。


It’s not just that there is fear in Berlin that any European solution would be much more expensive for Germany and take a lot longer; this new form of German euroskepticism also shows a fundamental change of attitude amongst the overwhelming majority of Germany’s political and economic elite.	问题不仅仅是柏林担心任何一种欧洲层面的解决方案对德国而言成本都更为高昂，而且实施周期也更长； 德国这种新形式的欧洲怀疑论还反映出在其压倒多数的政治和经济精英阶层中的根本性态度转变。


The change is evident by asking a single question: would it still be possible today to give up the D-Mark and introduce the euro as a common currency?	只需提出一个问题就能证明这种转变：如果在目前的情况下，德国还可能放弃马克并引入欧元作为共同货币吗？


The answer is a resounding no.	答案是响亮的“不可能”。


Regardless of whether it’s Chancellor Angela Merkel or Foreign Minister Frank Steinmeier, this answer reverberates across the political spectrum, and it is held irrespective of which parties or people form the government.	不论总理默克尔和外交部长施泰因迈尔意下如何，这一回答将在整个德国政治界回响，不分党派和政要。


Following the changing of the guard after the end of Germany’s red/green coalition, a fundamental shift in attitude has gradually taken place.	在德国的红/绿联盟终结之后的政治换防以来，一种态度的根本性转变逐渐发生。


Europe today is no longer seen as the key project in German politics in which people are willing to invest an essential part of their political capital – and thus of their own future.	当今的欧洲已经不是德国政治生活中的核心议题—那种让人们甘愿投入关键性的政治资产，甚至用未来押宝的议题。


Rather, 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunited Germany is beginning to realize that it can also act alone.	相反，在柏林墙倒塌的20年之后，统一的德国正开始意识到它也可以自行其是。


The problem, of course, is that this is a huge misapprehension.	当然，问题在于这是个巨大的错误认识。


Germany’s relationship with Europe is seen as a functional one by nearly all the democratic parties.	几乎所有的民主政党都认为德国与欧洲关系是实用的。


But, while Europe no doubt remains important for asserting both common and national interests, it is no longer a project of the future.	尽管对于同时主张共同利益和国家利益而言欧洲无疑仍是重要的，但它已不再是一项关乎未来的计划。


The German perspective is thus shifting in the direction of that of France and the United Kingdom: the EU is increasingly seen as a framework and precondition for asserting national interests, rather than as an aim in itself.	因此，德国的立场正向着法国和英国的方向转变：欧盟越来越被当作是一个主张国家利益的框架和前提，而非目的本身。


The reasons for this profound change are obvious: the reunification and the historical resolution of the hitherto open “German question”; the failure of the EU constitution and thus of the European vision; the institutional weakness of an expanded 27-member EU; and the increasing inefficiency and slowness of EU institutions.	这种深刻转变的原因显而易见：两德统一和迄今无解的“德国问题”的相关历史决议； 因欧盟宪法失败而破灭的欧盟愿景；


So will Germany revert to nationalism?	那么德国会重归国家主义么？


All political players in Berlin reject this charge with great indignation.	柏林所有的政治势力都义正词严地驳斥这种指责。


Indeed, there is no strategy or master plan whatsoever for a return to nationalism.	的确，现在并没有任何形式的回归国家主义的战略或总体规划。


The fundamental change in Germany’s European policy is simply happening – the result of a process that could almost be termed “organic.”	德国对欧洲政策的根本性转变就��样发生着—这是一个几乎可以被称为“有机”的过程的自然结果。


As such, this does not makes the drift in German policy – which manifests itself, for example, in a refusal to lead in the present crisis – any better.	就此而言，它也没有让德国政策的渐行渐远—例如通过拒绝在当下的危机中承担领导责任表现出来—有更好的托词。


It is a strategic illusion of the large member states that they can defend their own status without this stolid entity called Europe.	就算没有欧洲这个有名无实的实体也能捍卫其自身的地位—这是大成员国们的一种战略幻觉。


After all, can Germany really afford to let the EU’s enlargement into Eastern Europe fail?	毕竟，德国真的能够承受欧盟东扩的失败么？


Can it afford a life-threatening crisis of the euro, a common market endangered by growing protectionism, or Russia pushing into the EU’s Eastern neighborhood?	它能面对一场事关欧元生死的危机，一个被日渐抬头的贸易保护主义威胁的共同市场，或俄罗斯的势力逼近欧盟的东欧邻国而无动于衷么？


Can it really conduct an independent national policy in the Middle East and Africa, or play an effective role in resolving global issues, from addressing climate change to building a new financial order?	它真的能够在中东和非洲实行独立的国家政策，或在从应对气候变化到建立金融新秩序的全球事务中发挥有效作用么？


To ask these questions – and many more – is to answer them: only a strong, substantially more integrated EU can manage all this.	提出这些—以及更多的—问题也就给出了答案：只有一个强大的、真正更为统一的欧盟才能应对这一切。


But this EU will have a future only if its member governments and peoples are willing to invest a substantial part of their political success and their national interests.	但只有当其各成员国政府及人民愿意将他们相当一部分的政治成功和国家利益投入其中时，这个欧盟才有未来。


And this applies above all, as it did in the past, to Germany, in the heart of the continent, with the EU’s largest population and economy, and, last but not least, with its difficult past.	和过去一样，这一点首先适用于德国—因为它位于欧洲大陆的中心，是欧盟的第一人口和经济大国，更因为它有一段曲折的历史。


Europe’s Economic Groupthink	欧洲的经济集体思维


FRANKFURT – During the recent hearing on the constitutionality of the European Central Bank’s measures to prevent the eurozone from falling apart, Andreas Vosskuhle, President of Germany’s Constitutional Court, raised an important question: Do non-German economists condemn the ECB’s outright monetary transactions (OMT) as unequivocally as all but one of the German experts testifying?	法兰克福—在最近的欧洲央行防止欧元区分裂措施合宪性听证会上，德国宪法法院主席安德里斯·沃思库勒（Andreas Vosskuhle）提出了一个重要问题：除了一名德国专家的证词，非德国经济学家一致明确谴责欧洲央行的直接货币交易（OMT）吗？


Of course, there are German economists (not to mention Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government) who support ECB President Mario Draghi’s policies.	当然，也有德国经济学家（更不用说总理默克尔的政府了）支持欧洲央行行长德拉吉的政策。


Still, an overwhelming majority of German (and possibly Dutch and Finnish) economists seem to favor keeping the ECB on the sidelines in the eurozone crisis.	但是，德国（也许还有荷兰和芬兰）经济学家中的压倒性多数支持欧洲央行置身欧元区危机事外。


It’s a fiscal issue, the typical German economist says, and monetary policy will not help; on the contrary, activating it will only make matters worse.	这是个财政问题，典型的德国经济学家会如此评论，货币政策不会有帮助； 相反，激活货币政策只能让事情变得更糟。


Of course, everyone would prefer it if the line between monetary and fiscal policy had not become blurred as a result of the crisis.	当然，要不是货币和财政政策之间的界线因为危机而变得模糊的话，所有人都会支持这一点。


But blindly sticking to principle would have been a highly risky option for the ECB.	但盲目坚持原则对于欧洲央行来说是危险的选择。


It would have meant accepting in 2012 what has been called “redenomination risk” – economic newspeak for a eurozone breakup.	在2012年时，这意味着接受所谓的“重新计价风险”——欧元区崩溃的经济学说法。


Nonetheless, by launching its OMT scheme, the ECB has committed German (and other northern European) taxpayers, without their parliaments’ approval, to a potential obligation to bail out – well, whom, exactly?	尽管如此，欧洲央行通过实行OMT制度在没有经过相关国家议会批准的情况下康了德国（和其他北欧国家）纳税人之慨，让他们来负担援助的潜在义务。


Indeed, it appears that the typical northern European taxpayer supports the typical stakeholder in northern European banks that are over-exposed to southern European debtors.	那么，到底援助了谁？ 事实上，典型的北欧纳税人似乎支持过度持有南欧债务的典型的北欧银行相关利益方。


Likewise, German legal scholars interpret the ECB’s activities as being incompatible with European treaty provisions that prohibit bailouts and monetary financing of the debt of eurozone members.	类似地，德国法律学者认为欧洲央行的行动与禁止援助和向欧元区成员国债务提供货币融资的欧洲条约内容不相容。


And one can easily understand civil servants’ strong reluctance to disregard legal obligations and risk criminal liability for breach of trust.	你也不难理解，公务人员很不情愿忽视法律义务，承担背信的刑事责任。


Germany’s Constitutional Court, of course, does not write the rules.	当然，规则不是由德国宪法法院制定的。


But its obligation is to render a dispassionate reading of legal agreements, and it is renowned for doing so, which is one reason why it is the country’s most trusted institution.	但德国宪法法院有以不带感情色彩地解读法律协定的义务 ，它在这方面也做得无可指摘，这也是它成为德国最受信任的机构的原因之一。


Nonetheless, the ECB is right that it is faced with very different monetary conditions in different member states; indeed, the eurozone is akin to a badly working fixed-exchange-rate system, with all of the attendant risks.	尽管如此，欧洲央行是正确的：它在不同成员国面临截然不同的货币条件； 事实上，欧元区就像是拙劣的固定汇率系统，存在固定汇率系统的所有风险。


Ultimately, limiting the ECB to its conventional tool kit amounts to accepting the risk of a eurozone collapse.	说到底，将欧洲央行限制在常规工具范围内不啻接受欧元区崩溃的风险。


Against this backdrop, institutional investors self-insured – quite rationally – against a eurozone breakup by withdrawing behind safer borders.	针对这一背景，机构投资者通过将资金撤到安全线以外实现自我保护，这相当理性。


With fiscal policy incapable of responding, the ECB was stuck with a second intermediation role: mitigating with its Target2 system the effects of European financial markets re-segmenting along national lines.	由于财政政策无法响应，欧洲央行无法摆脱第二个中介角色：用其Target2系统中和欧洲金融市场按国境线再次分裂的效应。


This is fiscal dominance in its purest form.	这是纯粹的财政支配。


It is here that Vosskuhle’s question matters the most.	沃思库勒问题的重要性正在此处。


Debates within eurozone member states typically converge on what legal scholars call herrschende Meinung (“dominant opinion”), which, in turn, appears to reflect their countries’ status as creditors or debtors.	欧元区内部成员国之间的争论通常会收敛于法律学者所谓的“占优观点”（dominant opinion），占优观点反过来反映了各自国家作为债权人和债务人的地位。


Reinforcing this, the typical career-conscious economist has little incentive to deviate.	典型的有职业意识的经济学家不会有偏离这一方向的激励，从而会强化这一过程。


The media are no remedy, as competition for ratings forces them to favor oversimplification over differentiation, complexity, and nuance.	媒体不是万灵丹，评级竞争迫使它们支持过分简单化，反对区别、复杂和微妙差别。


In terms of substance – which the German Constitutional Court explicitly and intentionally avoids – the case for OMT has always been about preventing a liquidity crisis from morphing into a solvency problem, especially on the eurozone’s periphery.	就实质而言——德国宪法法院有意地明确回避这一问题——OMT永远是防止流动性危机转变为偿债能力问题（特别是欧元区外围国）的措施。


From an investor’s perspective, the mechanics of this are simple: all are reluctant to hold private or public debt from a country that is vulnerable to redenomination.	从投资者的角度看，这一机制的机理很简单：所有人都不愿意持有可能遭遇重新计价事件的国家的私人和公共债务。


This by itself creates a rollover risk, which is why, for example, a small firm in Bozen (Bolzano, in Italy’s South Tyrol) is subject to higher financing costs than its competitor in Innsbruck (in Austria’s northern Tyrol).	这本身就造成了延期风险，也是（比如）波岑（Bozen，即位于意大利提洛尔山南麓的波尔扎诺）小企业面临比因斯布鲁克（位于奥地利提洛尔山北麓）的竞争对手更高的融资成本的原因。


The OMT scheme’s success depends on an unlimited capacity to intervene – to do “whatever it takes,” as Draghi famously put it.	OMT制度的成功依赖于无限的干预能力——用德拉吉的名言说，就是“竭尽全力”。


Legally constraining this capacity would be self-defeating.	从法律上约束这一能力将是自我毁灭行为。


So, if the OMT scheme is not feasible under current treaty provisions, these provisions – which, after all, are of human, not divine, origin – must be amended.	因此，如果OMT制度在当前条约框架下不可行，则条约必须修改——毕竟条约是人定的，而不是天定的。


But a treaty change would require engaging the European public – and, in several member states, submitting the proposed revisions to popular referenda.	但修改条约需要欧洲公众的参与——在一些成员国，还需要就���订方案进行全民公投。


Given how often such referenda have been defeated in recent years – for example, in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland – that is a scenario that everyone wants to avoid.	近几年来，公投往往不合决策者之意——法国、荷兰和爱尔兰皆是如此——因此没人希望走到这一步。


What is dispiriting is that we ponder these arguments so infrequently.	令人沮丧的是，极少考虑这些问题。


In fact, the minimal prerequisites for a working monetary union are not discussed upfront and transparently anywhere.	事实上，运转正常的货币联盟的最低要求从来没得到过坦诚而透明的讨论。


With politicians focused on the median voter, and a groupthink-generating media, the eurozone muddles through, just barely surviving.	政客眼里只有普通选民，媒体只会造就集体思维，欧元区在得过且过，勉强维持局面。


But, if the eurozone is to be a sensible long-term proposition, mere survival is not enough.	但是，如果欧元区要成为明智的长期之选，仅仅活下去是不够的。


The main justification for a monetary union cannot be the possibly disastrous consequences of its falling apart.	货币联盟的存在理由不能仅仅是崩溃所可能造成的灾难性后果。


Even less convincing is the neo-mercantilist point that the eurozone would allow for indefinite current-account surpluses (it does not).	更没有说服力的是新重商主义观点——欧元区将引来无穷的经常项目盈余（并非如此）。


Originally, Europe’s monetary union was supposed to provide a stable framework for its deeply integrated economies to enhance living standards sustainably.	一开始，欧洲货币联盟是为了向其深度一体化的各经济体提供稳定的框架持续地提高生活水平。


It still can.	现在，它仍能如此。


But this requires acknowledging what the crisis has revealed: the eurozone’s institutional flaws.	但这要求承认危机所揭露的事实：欧元区的制度性缺陷。


Remedying them calls for a minimum of federalism and commensurate democratic legitimacy – and thus for greater openness to institutional adaptation.	修正这些缺陷需要足底限度的联邦主义和相应的民主合法性——因此也需要对制度性调整持更开放的态度。


Germany’s Fiscal Follies	严肃财政纪律，德国恐徒劳无功


PRINCETON – All over the world, public-sector deficits are exploding.	普林斯顿——全世界的公共赤字都在激增。


Governments face massive costs rescuing banks and businesses hit by the financial and economic crisis.  There is a universal consensus that Keynesian stimulus is needed.	为了救助受金融和经济危机冲击的银行和企业，各国政府要负担高昂成本。 当前需要凯恩斯式的经济刺激，也已是普遍共识。


At the same time, policymakers are looking more and more nervously for an “exit strategy.”	与此同时，政策制定者也在日益急切地寻找“退出策略”。


They know that they cannot run deficits forever, but they do not want to say when the painful exit should begin.	他们知道赤字财政不能永远搞下去，但他们不想明说，这种痛苦的“退出”会从何时开始。


Germany is different, not because it is not spending now, but in how it talks about the future.	德国却是个例外，不是说它没有扩张政府开支，而是说它在谈到未来的时候开门见山，显得特立独行。


The German government has taken a peculiarly aggressive line in attacking deficits and in trying to lay down a firm exit strategy.	德国政府采取了一个特别坚决的方针来对付赤字，还试图敲定一套退出策略。


Chancellor Angela Merkel has criticized the United States Federal Reserve and the Bank of England for “quantitative easing,” which has in practice allowed the central bank to monetize many types of government and non-government debt.	德国总理默克尔（Angela Merkel）曾经批评美联储和英格兰银行的“量化宽松”政策，说它实质上允许央行把各种政府和非政府债务货币化。


The German government also successfully passed a constitutional law requiring the government deficit to be capped at 0.35% of GDP in 2016 and eliminated by 2020.	德国政府还通过了一个宪法修正案，规定到2016年，政府赤字不得超过GDP的0. 35%，到2020年则要彻底消除。


Both the attacks on excessively easy central banks and the effort to limit government debt are enormously popular in Germany.	不论是攻击央行过度宽松货币政策的论调，还是限制政府举债的政策，在德国都很得人心。


But they have been widely condemned by economists worldwide (including in Germany) as nonsense.	可是全世界的经济学家，包括德国的经济学家，则广泛认为那是无稽之谈。


Merkel is not the first German politician to adopt a hardline stance on monetary policy and debt – nor is she the first to face a torrent of international criticism.	默克尔并非第一位对货币政策和政府债务持强硬立场的德国政治家，她也不是招惹国际舆论批评的第一人。


In the late 1970’s, when the world was facing a mixture of stagnant growth and inflation, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt insistently told British, French, and American leaders that their deficits were wrong and dangerous.	早在20世纪70年代后期，全世界都面临滞涨风险的时候，德国总理施密特（Helmut Schmidt）固执地跟英、法、美国的领导人说，他们搞赤字财政是错误而危险的。


He believed that the solution to stagflation “was that those with deficits should get rid of them.”	他坚信滞涨的解药是“赤字国家摆脱赤字”。


His fellow leaders began to think Schmidt arrogant.	但他之后几任德国领导人觉得施密特当初有点自以为是。


The most obvious explanation for the German peculiarity is an obsession with the lessons of German history, particularly the two episodes of runaway inflation in the twentieth century, in which holders of monetary assets were expropriated.	德国如此特立独行，最明显的解释是，德国历史上的惨痛教训令它难以忘怀，尤其是20世纪的两次恶性通货膨胀，令货币资产持有者倾家荡产。


The Great Inflation of the early 1920’s, which culminated in a hyper-inflation in which prices changed several times daily, destroyed the middle classes and bred the political instability that eventually opened the way to Hitler’s rise.	20世纪20年代早期的大通胀期间，最严重的时候物价一天涨好几回，打垮了中产阶级，动摇了政治稳定，为希特勒的最终上台创造了机会。


Hitler repeatedly promised that he would use any means to fight inflation, but his militarism also led to the expropriation of savings.	希特勒屡次信誓旦旦，说要用一切手段打击通胀，但他的军国主义同样把国民财富消耗一空。


Even though only quite old people have personally experienced even the second of these episodes of monetary destruction, their political resonance is still acute.  Germany’s mass circulation Bild Zeitung warned in a headline in March 2009 of inflation at a time when all price signals pointed in the opposite direction.	虽然就连第二次恶性通胀都已过去好长时间了，只有一些老人还有亲身经历，但这两次恶性通胀的政治回声至今刺耳依然。 2009年3月，德国的大众报纸《图片报》（Bild Zeitung）的一条新闻还在发布通胀警告，即使当时所有价格指标都指向通缩风险的方向。


Merkel has acute political antennae, and her response struck a deep chord with popular sentiment.	默克尔的政治嗅觉很灵敏，她的反应同大众情绪若合符节。


A second rationale for Germany’s policy is demographic.	德国政策的第二个原因是人口结构。


Budget limitation appeals not just to the old, but is especially attractive to young people, who worry that they will be made to pay the costs of caring for an increasingly elderly and dependent population.	节制预算不仅受到老年公民的赞同，也深深地吸引着年轻人，德国的人口日益老龄化，越来越多的人到了领取养老金的年龄，年轻人生怕自己不得不为这些人埋单。


There is a third explanation for Germany’s particular stance.	德国的特立独行还有第三种解释。


With governments around the world (including Germany’s) accumulating unprecedented levels of peacetime debt, markets are worrying about sustainability.	由于世界各国政府（包括德国政府）的负债水平达到了和平时期的最高峰，市场对其稳定性深感忧虑。


Some crisis-prone countries such as Latvia are already unable to sell any more debt.	一些处于债务危机边缘的国家，如拉脱维亚，它们的债券已经卖不动了。


But even large and stable countries such as Britain and the US are finding auctions of government paper increasingly problematic.	甚至连英国和美国这些比较大而稳定的国家也感到政府债券拍卖变得越来越困难。


Big investors, particularly Asian countries’ reserve funds, are increasingly nervous.	大投资者，尤其是亚洲国家的储备基金，对资产安全性的忧虑与日俱增。


A cast-iron mechanism to ensure that the debt build-up does not continue forever is appealing as a way of withstanding increasingly fraught competition for funding.	吸引外国资金的竞争变得日益激烈，在这种情况下，制定一套强有力的措施来保证债务不会没完没了地增加，还真一个不错的信用姿态。


Germany will look like a better credit risk, thereby allowing it to fund its current budget deficits more easily and cheaply.	德国希望自己的信用风险看上去比较低，这样就能更容易、以更低成本为当前的预算赤字进行融资。


There is obviously some element of bluff in legislating balanced budgets.	通过立法来强制平衡预算的做法显然有点虚张声势的成分。


Extravagant promises to behave better at some future point are not completely credible, although they often have a short-term impact.	夸海口说未来怎么怎么做得更好，其实是不能全信的，不过这种承诺往往具有一定的短期效应。


In 1985, the US Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman Act, which provided for automatic spending cuts in the case of deficits.	1985年，美国国会通过了格拉姆—拉德曼法案（Gramm-Rudman Act），规定一旦出现赤字就自动削减政府开支。


It was ruled unconstitutional, but it began a process of budget consolidation.	该法案最终被宣布违宪，但它开启了一轮巩固预算的努力。


The European Union’s Maastricht criteria, which cap deficits at 3% of GDP, belong in the same category: a measure that could be relaxed as the political pressure changed, but which did help initially in reducing deficits and borrowing costs.	欧盟的马斯特里赫特标准规定，赤字不得超过GDP的3%，也属���类似情况：在政治压力转变以后，此类措施完全可能松懈下来，但最初在削减赤字和借贷成本方面，它们的确功不可没。


The real problem with the German measure is not so much our lack of knowledge about what the world will look like in 2016 or 2020 as it is that Germany is politically and economically bound to European integration, and thus tied to states with very different budgetary perspectives and priorities.	我们不知道，到了2016年或2020年，世界经济形势会是怎样，但德国那些措施的真正问题还不是这个，真正的问题是，德国在政治和经济上都受制于欧洲一体化进程，也就是说，它是同一些具有非常不同的预算环境和预算目标的国家绑在一起的。


As a result, it makes little sense for Germany to compete to have more solid budgets than its neighbors: all European countries have tied themselves together.	所以，德国努力争取在预算稳定性上胜过邻国其实没有多少意义：所有的欧盟国家都是拴在一条绳上的蚂蚱。


When Germans tie their hands with constitutional budget laws, they are in effect untying their neighbors’.	德国通过宪法预算修正案收紧了口子，实际上会迫使邻国松口子。


Europe’s monetary unification of the 1990’s was supposed to be accompanied by fiscal convergence and harmonization.	20世纪90年代启动的欧洲货币一体化进程，是以最终实现财政划一和协整为预设条件的。


When budgets move in different directions, pressures shift to regional policy (to redistribute income) and to monetary policy (to boost growth).	一旦预算上分道扬镳，压力就会传导到区域政策（以进行收入再分配）和货币政策（以促进增长）。


The prospects for friction between EU members escalate.	欧盟成员国之间的摩擦会加剧。


The best hope for Germany is that people – both German voters and Chinese fund managers – will take such promises seriously now, but forget about them in ten years.	德国现在得求神拜佛，希望人们——德国选民和中国基金管理者——现在把这些承诺当真，又在十年后把它们忘掉。


Germany’s Five Election Unknowns	德国选举的五个未知数


On September 18, Germany will hold an election that contains at least five unknowns.	9月18日，德国会进行一场至少有五个未知数的选举。


If it were an equation, it would be impossible to solve.	如果说这是一个方程式，那么它将不可能有解。


Fortunately, politics is not mathematics – though, unfortunately, this means that there are no clear solutions.	幸运的是，政治不是数学—虽然，不幸的是，这意味着没有明确的答案。


Indeed, even in the opaque terms of contemporary politics, the German case is particularly vexing.	的确，即便是在当代政治不透明的环境下，德国的情况也特别让人伤脑筋。


The first unknown is why the election is taking place at all.	第一个未知数就是为什么要进行选举。


Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had another fifteen months to go before the end of the electoral term, and it seemed that he had no difficulty mobilizing his admittedly slender majority in parliament.	施罗德总理的任期结束还有15个月，而他似乎在调动议会里无可否认的微弱多数方面也没有困难。


To be sure, the big issues that the Federal President listed when he dissolved the Bundestag are real.	确切地说，当联邦总统解散德国联邦议院时所列举的重大问题都是真实存在的。


The fiscal position is, by German standards, unacceptable, and public debt at current levels is contrary to the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact and a burden on future generations.	以德国的标准衡量，当前的财政状况令人不能接受； 目前的国债水平也与欧盟的《稳定与增长协定》大相径庭，并成为了未来世代的负担。


Demographic developments alone require major reforms of social policy.	仅仅人口统计学数据的变化发展就需要德国在社会政策方面进行重大改革。


Moreover, the institutions of the federal system do not permit decisions to be made either expeditiously or clearly.	另外，联邦体系下的机构设置也使得政府无法进行迅速而明确的决策。


None of this is new, nor will it be changed by an election.	上述问题都是老生常谈，也不会通过选举而改善。


So it is not obvious to many people why they are voting.	所以许多人都不明白为什么要进行选举。


The second unknown concerns what, exactly, separates the major parties in this contest.	第二个未知数是，究竟是什么造成了这场竞争中主要政党的分野。


The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU) are both committed to the “social market economy,” to the essentials of corporatist economic management, to maintaining the entitlements of the welfare state, and to the EU and NATO.	社会民主党(SPD)和基督教社会党(CDU)都坚定不移地坚持“社会市场经济”，坚持社团主义经济管理的原则，坚持维护福利国家的权利，也都坚持对欧盟和北约的承诺。


True, the campaign has brought out nuances that may turn out to be important.	确实，在竞选过程中显现出的细微差别可能最终被证明非常重要。


Schröder’s SPD uses the word “social” a little more emphatically than it did in the last seven years.	施罗德的社会民主党比过去七年更强调使用“社会”这一字眼。


The opposition CDU leader, Angela Merkel, has linked its program to the ambitious ideas of an outsider, former Constitutional Court judge Paul Kirchhof, seeking a dramatic simplification of the tax system.	反对派基督教民主党的领袖安格拉·默尔克（Angela Merkel）将其党的事业与一位党外人士，前宪法法院法官保罗·基尔希霍夫（Paul Kirchhof）的雄心壮志联系起来，以寻求大规模地简化税制。


In international affairs, Merkel is more skeptical about European enlargement, notably to include Turkey, than Schröder.	在国际事务方面，默尔克在欧盟扩容，特别是土耳其的加入方面，相较于施罗德有更多的疑虑。


Merkel, an East German by background, is also more cautious in her approach to Russia.	从背景上讲是东德人的默尔克，在与罗斯打交道的问题上也更为谨慎。


But these are nuances, not fundamental differences.	但这些都只是细微差别，并非根本性的分歧。


The third unknown is the performance of the Left Party, a new formation positioned to the left of the SPD and built on East Germany’s ex-communist PDS, with the addition of a significant number of dissident Social Democrats in the West who proclaim themselves to be defenders of the welfare state.	第三个未知数是定位于和社会民主党相左的新政党，左翼党的表现。 该党脱胎于东德前共产主义性质的，民主社会主义党（PDS），后又吸纳了为数众多的，自称为福利国家捍卫者的西德社会民主党中的持不同政见者。


The Left Party is led by two talk show politicians, Gregor Gysi, the former PDS leader, and Oskar Lafontaine, the ex-leader of the SPD, who do not have much more in common than a record of political failure and a talent for populist speeches.	左翼党由两位“脱口秀”政客领导：前民主社会主义党党魁格里格·基希（Gregor Gysi）和前社会民主党领袖奥斯卡·拉方丹（Oskar Lafontaine）。 两人除了一连串的政治失败和善于发表民粹主义论调的演讲之外，并无多少共同之处。


But this clearly appeals to those who feel that they have been neglected and forgotten.	但他们的言词对于那些感到被忽视和被遗忘的人还是有显著的吸引力。


The popular vote for this party – which could be 10% – may well determine what kind of coalition is formed after the election.	这个党在大选中可能获得的10%的投票，很可能会决定在大选之后组成什么样的联盟。


The fourth unknown is therefore what the next government will actually do.	所以第四个未知数就是下一届政府会怎么做。


It will clearly be a government without the new Left Party.	它明显会是一个没有左翼党参加的政府。


It will also be a government without the Greens, who continue to have a devoted, if limited, clientele, but are now regarded by many as a luxury that Germany can no longer afford.	它也不会给绿党一席之地。 虽然绿党拥有一支规模有限但却忠诚的追随者，但它现在已经被许多人看作是德国再也负担不起的奢侈。


This leaves two possibilities: a coalition between the CDU, its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, and the liberal Free Democrats, or a grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU.	如此一来，还有两种可能性：一个由基督教民主党、其巴伐利亚的姊妹党，基督教社会联盟和自由民主党组成的联盟，或是一个由社会民主党和基督教民主党组成的大联盟。


The latter is what most Germans want; the former is what they are most likely to get.	后者是大多数德国人想要的； 而前者则是他们最有可能得到的。


But most people doubt whether it even makes a difference, and they are probably right.	但大多数人都怀疑这两者究竟是否半斤八两，这种想法可能是对的。


There is a widespread desire for change, including a change of government, but there is an equally widespread belief that nothing momentous will happen.	对变革，包括改换政府的愿望人皆有之，然而人们也大都相信重大的变革不会发生。


This underscores the final, and deepest, unknown concerning the upcoming election: who will put a confused and directionless Germany back on a road to initiative and growth?	这一点更突出了与即将进行的选举相关的最后、也是最深刻的一个未知数：谁会将一个陷入迷茫、失去方向的德国带回到积极增长的路途上呢？


Who will make Germany an engine of Europe again rather than a gloomy passenger?	谁会使德国重新成为欧洲的引擎而不仅仅是一个阴郁的过客？


What Germany needs is, in fact, fairly clear.	其实，德国所需要的东西甚为明确。


It needs to accept that globalization is above all an opportunity, one that must be grasped by confident, innovative, and entrepreneurial people.	它必须接受全球化首先是一个机遇，一个必须由自信、富于创新精神和企业家精神的人来把握的机遇。


Germans need to understand again – as they did so well after 1945 – that their future lies in their own hands, as citizens, rather than in the power of some remote State.	德国人需要再一次明白—正如他们在1945年以后所明白的那样—未来掌握在作为公民的他们自己的，而不是在某个遥远的强国手中。


Above all, Germany must appreciate that the changes it needs are improvements that would guarantee its future security.	首先，德国必须感激地认识到它所需要的变革是能够确保其未来安全的社会进步。


Perhaps what it requires most is a touch of Margaret Thatcher’s policies of the 1980’s, combined with Tony Blair’s rhetoric of today.	或许它最需要的就是一点撒切尔在1980年代的政策，再加上一些布莱尔当今的能言善辩。


But it remains to be seen whether, or when, that might be on offer.	但这样的形势会否或何时出现，我们还要拭目以待。


Germany’s Five Shocks	德国受到的五次冲击


Over the last decade, Germany has been the slowest growing economy in the European Union, and Europe has been the slowest growing continent in the world.	过去10年来，德国一直是欧盟经济增长最为缓慢的国家，而欧洲则是世界经济增长最为缓慢的大陆。 从1995到2005年，德国的增长率只达到14.


From 1995 to 2005, Germany will have grown by only 14.6%, while the old EU on average will have grown by 24%, the US by 39.9%, and the world economy by 45.6%.	6%，而原有的欧盟国家平均增长率为24%，美国为39. 9%，整个世界为45.


Why has Germany performed so badly?	6%。 德国的表现为什么这么差？


One theory, endorsed by the head of Germany’s ruling Social Democratic Party, Franz Müntefering, is that Germany is already where the others still want to be.	德国执政的社会民主党主席弗兰茨·明特费林心中的理论是：德国已经实现了其它国家为之奋斗的理想。


Slow German growth, he maintains, is a sign of natural convergence.	他坚持认定德国的增长缓慢是一种自然现象。


But this theory is not convincing.	但这种理论根本站不住脚。


Germany has recently been overtaken in terms of per capita income by several EU countries, including Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, and France, and is still growing more slowly than all of them.	德国不久前在人均收入领域已经被几个欧盟国家赶超，它们是爱尔兰、英国、荷兰和法国，而增长速度仍然赶不上其中的任何一个。


Another, more plausible theory is that over the past fifteen years there have been various external challenges or shocks that have hit the country simultaneously.	另一个更切实际的理论是过去15年来，德国同时遭受了各种外部挑战或震荡的打击。


Rigid as it was, with an extensive welfare system and an over-regulated labor market, Germany was unable to react to these shocks and ran into trouble.	由于体制僵化，福利体系庞大和劳动力市场管理过死，德国未能从容应对这些挑战，因此惹上了麻烦。


This theory recalls that of the British historian Arnold Toynbee, according to which empires collapse because they are unable to react to external challenges.	这种理论让人想起了英国历史学家阿诺德·汤因比的说法，他认为未能正确地应对外部挑战是国家崩溃的主要原因。


The first shock was intensified globalization, which brought a lot of new low-wage competition.	第一轮冲击是日益紧密的全球化，大量新的低薪竞争也随之而来。


Although globalization is a gradual process, it gained momentum when China decided to play the game.	尽管全球化是一个渐进的过程，但中国决心加入赋予了它巨大的力量。


China is ten times the size of Japan, and Japan was not easy to deal with, either.	中国的领土面积是日本的10倍，而应付日本也已经殊为不易。


German precision instruments and optical equipment, for example, lost their competitive edge when Japan entered the game.	举例来讲，日本加入全球竞争以后，德国的精密仪器和光学设备就失去了竞争的优势。


The second shock was EU integration, including the northern and southern enlargements.	第二轮冲击波来自欧盟的整合，包括向南北两个方向的扩充。


The dismantling of the EU’s internal borders boosted each country’s market size and brought about the predicted economies of scale.	欧盟内部边界的土崩瓦解扩大了各国的市场，带来了人们所预期的规模经济。


But this helped Europe’s small countries more than the big ones, and it implied more competition for Germany, Europe’s biggest economy.	但这对小国的帮助比大国更大，对欧洲最大的国家¾德国来讲意味着更为激烈的竞争。


Think of Nokia, the mobile phone maker.	看看手机制造商诺基亚就清楚了。


Due to the economies of scale that the common market made possible, Nokia was able to exploit its inventions fully, while Germany’s Siemens recently decided to give up on the mobile phone market.	由于共同市场使规模经济成为可能，诺基亚得以充分地利用自身的发明创造，而德国的西门子最近决定放弃移动电话市场。


The third shock was the euro, which has induced a rapid convergence of long-term interest rates, which in some countries had been five to seven percentage points above the German level.	第三轮冲击波来自欧元，由此引发了长期利率的迅速趋同，而此前某些国家的长期利率要比德国高出7个百分点。


Freed from exchange-rate risk, international investors no longer demanded a risk premium from these countries and were willing to provide funds to all of them under the same favorable conditions that previously had been reserved for Germany.	摆脱了汇率风险的影响，国际投资者不再要求这些国家提供风险酬劳，并愿意以同样优惠的条件向所有国家供应资金，而这样的优惠条件以前只有德国才能得到。


This is good for Europe, because it helps improve the allocation of capital and stimulates growth by transporting German savings to the remote and previously disadvantaged regions of the euro zone.	这对欧洲来讲值得庆幸，因为它能够把德国的储蓄分散到欧元区相对偏远、曾经处于不利位置的地区，有助于改善资金的分配和刺激经济的增长。


But it is of doubtful benefit to German workers who also would have liked to cooperate with that capital.	但这对德国工人来讲似乎没什么好处，因为德国工人也希望能吸纳更多的资金。


The fourth shock was eastern EU enlargement, which has brought extraordinary chances for trade and investment in the east, but has also brought massive low-wage competition.	第四轮冲击波是欧盟的东扩，它为东部的贸易和投资带来了非同寻常的机会，但也带来了大规模的低薪竞争。


On average, wage costs in the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 are only 14% of the West German level.	平均来讲，2004年新加入欧盟的国家工资成本只有德国西部的14%。


Low-wage competition has led to substantial outsourcing and off-shoring activities that have kept German firms competitive by reducing their demand for domestic labor.	低薪竞争的结果是大规模外包和境外活动，这些活动降低了德国公司对国内劳动力的需求，保持了企业的竞争力。


As neither Germany’s unions nor its welfare state would accept falling wages, the result was higher unemployment and slower growth.	因为德国工会和福利国家都不会接受降低薪水，结果就导致了失业率居高不下和增长速度缓慢。


The fifth shock was German unification, which is a failure in economic terms.	第五轮冲击波来自德国的统一，从经济发展的角度来讲，两德的统一并不成功。


GDP per working-age person in East Germany had been 61% of the West German level in 1996, but it is now only 59%.	1996年，东德劳动人口的人均国内生产总值曾经占到了西德的61%，但现在却降到了59%。


The slow growth of the eastern part of the country has pulled down the Germany-wide average, while the enormous demand for public funds in the east has increased public debt.	德国东部的缓慢发展拖了整个国家的后腿，而东部对公共资金的巨额需求又大大加重了整个国家的债务负担。


The weak fiscal position has in turn undermined investors’ confidence, with obvious implications for economic growth.	财政疲软对投资者的信心产生了很大的影响，而信心因素对经济增长至关重要。


All five shocks constitute historical developments that are good for the world as a whole, but problematic for Germany.	上述五轮冲击波都有利于整个世界的历史发展，但对德国来讲却问题重重。


In order for the country to meet the challenges and to continue to grow, it would have to make its labor markets flexible.	为了能够迎接挑战、持续增长，德国应该使劳动力市场更加灵活。


Only if wages adjust downward to accommodate the new international environment can German workers become competitive again, so that the country returns to a higher employment level, exploiting its human capital up to the capacity constraint.	只有调低工资、适应全新国际环境的需要，德国工人才能重拾竞争力，国内的就业水平才能回升，人力资源也才能得到充分的利用。


The new government that voters will most likely elect in September will be confronted with the difficult task of confronting Germans with reality and pushing through the necessary reforms.	德国选民可能在9月份选出新一任政府，它的任务是使德国人面对现实并推行必要的改革。


Only then will we know whether Germany can meet the Toynbeean challenge it is facing.	只有到那时，我们才会知道德国能否成功地应对汤因比挑战。


Germany’s Gold Delusion	德国的黄金错觉


WASHINGTON, DC – Germany’s gold is on the move.	华盛顿—德国的黄金正在移动。


For the first time since official gold transactions became more transparent, the Bundesbank has given notice that a significant portion of its holdings will be transferred home from France and the United States.	自正式黄金交易变得较为透明以来，德国央行第一次表明将把很大一部分黄金持有量从法国和美国移回国内。


Ostensibly, this is just a matter of monetary housekeeping.	乍一看，这不过是货币内政。


But why now?	但为什么是现在？


One possibility is that German policymakers believe that we are approaching an every-country-for-itself scenario – and only gold guarded by one’s own police is worth anything.	一种可能是，德国决策者认为而我们正在迈向各自为政的情景——用自己的政策所捍卫黄金是唯一有意义的东西。


But this is more than far-fetched.	但这一解释实在太过牵强。


The world in which financial trust breaks down completely between Germany and France or Germany and the US is one in which we have much bigger problems than where a country’s gold is located.	如果德法之间或德美之间的金融信任崩溃，那么我们面临的问题将远大于把一国的黄金放在哪里。


International trade would collapse, and major global companies would struggle to sell their products.	国际贸易将崩溃，主要跨国公司将难以出售产品。


Having more gold at home, rather than in the vaults of the New York Fed, would be neither here nor there in such a situation.	把黄金藏在国内而不是纽约联邦美联储金库里对这一情况根本无济于事。


Does Germany think that its gold will be subject to sanctions or some form of confiscation – as sometimes happens to rogue nations?	德国是认为其黄金会被制裁或遭遇某种程度的没收，就像有时发生在流氓国家的情况那样？


Again, this is hardly plausible.	这也难以令人信服。


Countries like Iran and Venezuela work long and hard to become international pariahs.	伊朗和委内瑞拉被世界唾弃是因为它们长时间的作恶。


Germany, by contrast, is a mainstay of the democratic world. That is not going to change.	相反，德国是民主世界的中流砥柱之一，而且这一点并不会发生改变。


Perhaps German central bankers sense a longer-term shift in international preferences away from the dollar and want to be ready in some fashion.	或许德国央行预测长期国际偏好将远离美国，希望对此未雨绸缪。


This is plausible in terms of a future decline in the dollar’s importance as a reserve asset and safe haven.	这一看法有点道理：未来美元作为储备货币和安全港的重要性会下降。


Reserve holdings of dollar assets (primarily by central banks) were worth around 2% of US GDP in 1948 and about the same in 1968.	美元资产储备持有量（主要持有者是各国央行）在1948年时相当于美国GDP的2%左右，1968年也在相同水平。


Today, such holdings are at least 15% of US GDP – with some estimates as high as 30%.	如今，这一比重至少在15%，有人预测高达30%。


Much of this rise stems from growing prosperity and current-account surpluses in middle-income countries.	该比重的上升很大一部分来自中等收入国家的繁荣和经常项目盈余。


When you sell more to the world than you buy, you accumulate claims on the rest of the world – and you need to decide the form in which you want to hold those claims.	当你向世界卖出的东西小于买进的东西时，你就会累积对世界其他部分的债权，并且你需要决定以何种形式持有这一债权。


At present, the world holds a lot of US dollar assets, and greater diversification of portfolios in coming years would not be shocking.	目前，全世界持有了大量的美元资产，未来几年趋向多元化一点都不令人奇怪。


There is certainly much discussion of the renminbi’s rising international role – an issue on which Arvind Subramanian, my colleague at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, continues to do the most interesting work.	关于人民币国际地位崛起的讨论不绝于耳，我的彼得森国际经济研究所同事萨博拉曼尼安（Arvind Subramanian）在这方面做出了相当有意思的成果。


But moving Germany’s gold is hardly helpful in this regard.	但移动德国的黄金对这一点鲜有帮助。


What would help is to turn the euro around – in the sense of convincing investors that the common currency has a bright future, because it is underpinned by a stronger monetary, fiscal, financial, and political union.	真正有帮助的是让欧元坚挺起来——即让投资者确信，这一共同货币拥有光明的未来，因为它有强大的货币、财政、金融和政治联盟做后盾。


When seen in this light, the physical location of gold is purely a distraction.	当人们看到这一点时，黄金的地理位置完全不值一提。


It is as if German political elites think that they are back in the era of the gold standard.	德国政治精英似乎认为他们回到了金本位时代。


But, even back then, what mattered was the amount of gold you owned – not where it was actually stored.	但是，即使果真如此，有意义的也是你拥有多少黄金，而不是你把黄金放在哪里。


The broader and more worrying trend is the politicization of central banking.	更宏大、也更令人担忧的趋势是中央银行业务的政治化。


Leading German political figures are becoming increasingly suspicious of the European Central Bank, while also worrying aloud about the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy.	德国政治领导人越来越不信任欧洲央行，对美联储的货币政策也是颇有微词。


Their motivating fear is the prospect of inflation.	德国这一举动的背后是对通胀前景的担忧。


But the real fear is not inflation itself – that is, that prices might rise at a surprisingly fast clip this year or next. Rather, the fear is that central banks will not see inflation coming until it is too late, and that this will cause a major upward shift in inflation expectations.	但真正的担忧不是通胀本身，即价格可能在今年或明年出人意料的大幅攀升，而是各国央行发现通胀来临时已经太迟了，这将造成通胀预期的剧烈提高。


Again, moving gold does nothing to keep inflation under control or change the behavior of central banks.	然而移动黄金对保证通胀可控或改变央行行为方面也是无济于事的。


The link between currencies and gold was irrevocably broken in 1971, when US President Richard Nixon decided to suspend the convertibility of dollars into gold for central banks.	货币和黄金的联系在1971年美国总统尼克松决定中止各国央行美元和黄金的相互兑换时便已不可逆转地切断了。


We have lived in a purely fiat money system ever since – meaning that our money’s value is not backed by gold or any other physical item.	此后，我们便生活在纯粹法币的货币制度中，这意味着我们的钞票价值并不由黄金或其他任何实在物体作支撑。


Such monetary systems can succeed only as long as the central bank can credibly commit to keeping inflation under control.	这一货币制度只有在央行保持通胀可控承诺可信的情况下才能成功。


German politicians would thus seem to be suffering from some serious delusions about the importance of gold and the effects of shifting its location.	因此，德国政客大概是受到了严重的黄金及其所在地重要性错觉的毒害。


But they are right to worry about the ECB’s policies: Providing unconditional credit to eurozone governments is unlikely to make these governments more careful.	但他们对欧洲央行政策的担心是正确的：为欧元区政府提供无条件信用不可能让这些政府变得更加谨慎。


There is a real danger that so-called “fiscal dominance” will undermine monetary policy and make it much harder to control inflation.	所谓的“财政主宰”（fiscal dominance）是真正的威胁，它会破坏货币政策，并让通胀变得更加难以控制。


The German fascination with gold is a red herring.	德国的黄金疯魔症没有现实基础。


Its fear of wayward monetary policy is not.	其对任意妄为的货币政策的担心则有现实基础。


The End of German Hegemony	德国霸权的终结


BRUSSELS – Without anyone quite noticing, Europe’s internal balance of power has been shifting.	布鲁塞尔—不知不觉间，欧洲内部实力平衡一直在发生变化。


Germany’s dominant position, which has seemed absolute since the 2008 financial crisis, is gradually weakening – with far-reaching implications for the European Union.	2008年金融危机以来德国看似绝对的主导地位正在逐渐削弱——这对欧盟有着深远的影响。


Of course, from a soft-power perspective, the mere fact that people believe Germany is strong bolsters the country’s status and strategic position.	当然，从软实力角度讲，仅凭人们相信德国很强这一事实便足以支持德国的地位和战略位置。


But it will not be long before people begin to notice that the main driver of that perception – that Germany’s economy continued to grow, while most other eurozone economies experienced a prolonged recession – represents an exceptional circumstance, one that will soon disappear.	但用不了多久，人们就将开始注意到，德国强盛的感觉的主要动力——德国经济在其他大部分欧元区经济体长时间衰退时仍能持续增长——是一个例外，并且很快就会消失。


In 12 of the last 20 years, Germany’s growth rate been lower than the average of the other three large eurozone countries (France, Italy, and Spain).	在过去20年中，有12年德国增长率慢于其他三个欧元区大国（法国、意大利和西班牙）平均水平。


Although German growth surged ahead during the post-crisis period, as the graph shows, the International Monetary Fund predicts that it will fall back below that three-country average – and far below the eurozone average, which includes the smaller high-growth countries of Central and Eastern Europe – within five years.	尽管德国增长率在危机后时期中跃居首位（如图所示），但国际货币基金组织（IMF）预计，五年内德国增长率将降到三国平均水平以下——并大大低于包括中欧和东欧规模较小的高增长国家在内的欧元区平均水平。


To be sure, Germany still has some apparent advantages.	平心而论，德国仍拥有一些显而易见的优势。


But a closer examination shows that they are not quite as positive as they seem.	但仔细考察就能发现，这些优势并不像表面上那样乐观。


For starters, Germany is close to full employment – in sharp contrast to the double-digit unemployment rates that prevail in much of the eurozone.	首先，德国接近于充分就业状态——这与许多欧元区国家动辄两位数的失业率形成了鲜明对比。


But the combination of full employment and low growth rates actually points to an underlying problem: very slow productivity growth.	但充分就业和低增长率共存其实表现出一个根本性问题：生产率增长极为缓慢。


Add to that a shrinking pool of workers capable of meeting the needs of Germany’s labor market – the country’s population is aging, and the arriving refugees lack the needed skills – and the German economy seems set for a protracted period of sluggish performance.	除此之外，有能力满足德国劳动力市场需要的工人数量越来越少——德国人口正在老龄化，新来的难民则缺少必要的技能——德国经济似乎即将进入长时间停滞。


Another apparent advantage is Germany’s large financial reserves, which not only cushioned it from the crisis, but also conferred upon it considerable political sway.	另一个显而易见的优势是德国巨大的金融储备，这一储备不但为德国提供了危机缓冲，还给德国带来了巨大的政治影响力。


Indeed, because German funds were indispensable in bailing out the eurozone’s deeply stressed periphery, the country became central to all efforts to address the crisis.	事实上，由于德国资金是援助欧元区深度危机的外围国家不可或缺的资源，德国也因此成为解决危机的一切手段的核心。


Germany’s consent was needed to create Europe’s “banking union,” which entailed the transfer of supervisory powers to the European Central Bank and the creation of a common fund to resolve failing banks.	建立欧洲“银行联盟”需要德国的首肯。 银行联盟意味着向欧洲央行让渡监督权，并建立一个清算倒闭银行的共同基金。


And German resistance contributed to a delay in the ECB’s intervention in bond markets; when the ECB finally did launch its bond-buying program, it did so with Germany’s tacit approval.	德国的抵制导致欧洲央行迟迟不能干预债券市场； 最后欧洲央行终于启动了其债券购买计划，但也是在德国的默许下。


But now that interest rates are at zero, Germany’s large savings are no longer doing it much good.	但如今，利率接近于零，德国的大量储蓄不再能够带来巨大的好处。


And with the financial storm having largely abated, Germany lacks new opportunities to demonstrate its political clout, both within and outside the eurozone.	而随着金融风暴逐渐远离，德国也不再拥有证明其政治实力的新机会，不管是在欧元区内部还是之外。


Indeed, whereas Germany, owing to its deep involvement in Central and Eastern European economies, was a key player in the Minsk agreements that were meant to end the conflict in Ukraine, it has little influence in the Middle Eastern countries that are occupying the world’s attention today.	事实上，德国深深地介入了中欧和东欧经济体，因此成为旨在结束乌克兰冲突的明斯克协议的关键方，但它对吸引着当今世界主要目光的中东国家影响甚微。


While many have highlighted Germany’s political leadership in the refugee crisis, the reality is that being thrust into the front line of that crisis, without having much influence over the factors that are driving it, is placing considerable strain on the country.	许多人强调德国在难民危机中所表现的政治领导力，但现实是，在这场危机中挺身而出的德国对于造成危机的因素并无多少影响力，因此到处缚手缚脚。


Germany is now, for the first time, in the position of having to ask its EU partners for solidarity, as it cannot absorb all the newcomers alone.	如今，德国第一次需要号召其欧盟伙伴国团结起来，因为它无法单枪匹马吸收全部新来者。


As usual, however, perceptions are lagging behind reality, which means that Germany is still widely viewed as the eurozone’s most powerful force.	但是，和往常一样，感觉总是落后于现实，这意味着德国仍被广泛视为欧元区实力最强的力量。


But, as the global business cycle accelerates Germany’s return to the “old normal,” the power shift within Europe will become increasingly difficult to ignore.	但是，随着全球商业周期加速德国回归“旧常态”，欧洲内部的实力变化将越来越难以忽视。


Germany, which exports a large volume of investment goods, benefited more than other eurozone member countries from the investment boom in China and other emerging economies.	德国出口着巨量投资品，它从中国和其他新兴经济体的繁荣中所获得的收益远大于其他欧元区成员国。


But emerging-economy growth is now slowing considerably, including in China, where demand is shifting from investment toward consumption.	但新兴经济体增长如今显著放缓，中国也是如此，其需求正从投资转向消费。


This tends to undermine German growth and benefit southern European countries, which export more consumer goods.	这一趋势不利于德国增长，而有利于出口更多消费品的南欧国家。


The ongoing shift in Europe’s economic and political power dynamics is likely to have a major impact on the EU’s functioning – and especially that of the eurozone.	欧洲经济和政治实力动态的持续变化可能会对欧盟——特别是欧元区——的运转形成重大影响。


For example, without a strong Germany to enforce the eurozone’s fiscal strictures and urge the implementation of difficult but necessary structural reforms, countries may lose their motivation to do what is needed to ensure fairness and stability in the long term.	比如，没有强大的德国来执行欧��区财政苛责和督促实施困难但必要的结构改革，各国可能不再有动力实施确保长期公平与稳定所需要的举措。


If inflation remains low, the ECB might feel freer to pursue further rounds of monetary stimulus, undermining fiscal objectives further.	如果通胀保持低位，欧洲央行可能觉得可以腾出手来进行更多的货币刺激，从而进一步破坏财政目标。


In short, we may be headed toward a less “Germanic” economic policy in the eurozone.	简言之，我们可能进入了欧元区“德国化”经济政策逐渐式微的时期。


While that might enhance the EU’s popularity in the periphery, it could increase resistance to EU membership in Germany – a country that, despite its waning economic strength, remains an important piece of the integration puzzle.	这也许可以强化欧盟在外围的支持度，但可能导致德国日益反感欧盟成员国地位。 而尽管德国的经济优势正在丧失，但它仍是欧洲一体化拼图中重要的一片。


Germany’s Neighborhood Watch	四顾茫然的德国


FRANKFURT – On a recent trip to Germany, I was struck by two distinct narratives.	法兰克福—在最近的德国之旅中，我震惊于两种截然不同的说法。


One narrative features a robust German economy with low unemployment, strong finances, and the right competitive position to exploit the most dynamic segments of global demand.	其中之一说德国经济稳健，失业率低，财政坚挺，占据有利的竞争地位，能够掌握全球需求中最有活力的部分。


The other narrative describes an economy that is encumbered by never-ending European debt crises whose perpetrators seek to shift their responsibility – and their financing needs – onto Germany’s pristine balance sheet.	另一个说法称德国经济正受没完没了的欧债危机拖累，危机罪魁试图将责任和融资需要都抛给德国安然无恙的资产负债表。


Both narratives are understandable.	两种说法都不难理解。


But they cannot co-exist forever.	但它们不会永远共存。


After all, it is difficult to be a good house in a deteriorating neighborhood.	毕竟，覆巢之下，安有完卵？


Either the neighborhood improves, or the value of the house declines.	要么邻国境况改善，要么德国也被拖下水。


And it matters a great deal which narrative prevails – for Germany, for Europe, and for the global economy.	总有说法最后一语成谶——对德国、对欧洲、对全球经济皆然。


Germany today is reaping the benefits of many years of responsible domestic economic management.	如今，德国正从多年来负责任的国内经济治理中大获其益。


In addition to maintaining sound public finances, German leaders implemented difficult structural reforms aimed at improving international competitiveness, including painful labor-market reforms.	除了维持稳健的公共财政之外，德国领导人还实施了艰难的意在改善国际竞争力的结构性改革，包括带来阵痛的劳动力市场改革。


As a result, Germany is one of the few advanced economies today that has created many jobs and maintained financial stability.	结果，德国是如今稍有的能够创造大量工作岗位、维持财政稳定性的发达经济体之一。


In other words, it is the AAA of AAAs.	换句话说，德国是AAA中的AAA。


Yet Germany is also part of a highly challenged neighborhood, if not its anchor.	但德国也是四面楚歌社区中的一员，就算它起着定海神针的作用。


Its neighbors include countries – most notably on the eurozone’s periphery – that are struggling.	它的四周皆是苦苦挣扎的国家，特别是那些欧元区外围国。


They have high overall unemployment (and alarmingly high youth joblessness), and are unable to grow on their own power.	这些国家总体失业率极高（青年人失业率更是高到了足以拉响警报的程度），而且无法自力更生实现增长。


In some cases, they also face solvency questions, and are far from achieving the socio-political consensus needed to get their economic houses in order.	有的国家还面临偿债能力问题，也无法形成恢复经济秩序所需的社会政治共识。


To state the obvious, this contrast between Germany and its neighborhood is very awkward.	一个显而易见的现象是，德国及其邻国之间的对比颇有些令人尴尬。


It fuels endless internal and external tensions, encourages finger pointing, and promotes a loud and disruptive blame game.	这一对比催生了没完没了的内部和外部紧张，助长了相互指责，彼此之间大玩高声互骂的游戏。


And all of this distracts attention from the need to compete in a rapidly changing global economy.	而这一切又分散了人们的注意力——如何在快速变化的全球经济中获得竞争力才是当务之急。


The longer all of this persists, the more it tears at the fabric of European unity.	这个游戏玩得越久，就越容易破坏欧洲的统一基础。


Accordingly, European officials need to continue to make steadfast progress in three major areas:	因此，欧洲官员必须在三大领域坚定不移地向前看：


·         Improve individual countries’ domestic policy mix in a manner that targets debt sustainability through both growth promotion and deficit reduction, especially in the most vulnerable peripheral economies;	·         改善个体国家的国内政策组合，以通过刺激增长和赤字削减实现债务可持续性为目标，特别是那些最脆弱的外围经济体。


·         Enhance the eurozone’s internal financial circuit breakers to reduce the risk of disruptive financial feedback loops and destabilizing multiple equilibria; and	·         增强欧元区内部的财政断路保护机制，以降低发生破坏性财政反馈环和动摇性多重均衡的危险。


·         Strengthen the eurozone’s institutional underpinnings, as well as its mechanisms for policy coordination and peer review.	·         巩固欧元区的制度性基石以及政策合作和互评机制。


None of these steps is easy; and they are certainly not automatic.	在这三方面取得进步都不是件容易的事； 更不用说坐等它们自动实现了。


Moreover, to maximize their effectiveness, they must be implemented simultaneously; indeed, this is a situation in which one plus one plus one equals more than three.	此外，为了实现效果最大化，必须三管齐下； 事实上，这是一个一加一加一大于三的局面。


And this will not happen unless two other, even more controversial steps are taken.	而没有其他两个领域的进步，任何一个领域都无法取得进展，不管步子迈得多大。


First, Germany must play an even larger role in conducting and coordinating the eurozone’s policy responses.	首先，德国应该在指挥和协调欧元区政策反应方面其到更大的作用。


I know that many Germans are uncomfortable with this.	我知道，许多德国人不愿意如此。


But there is no workable alternative for Europe’s well-being – and, therefore, that of Germany.	但站在欧洲的角度看，除此之外别无可行之法，因此，德国亦然。


The European Union’s institutions still lack the authority and credibility needed to take on this role.	欧盟机构仍然缺乏必须的权威和威信发挥作用。


The European Central Bank does not possess the proper structural policy tools, and it has already been forced to bear burdens that, arguably, are beyond its strictly defined mandate.	欧洲央行缺少合理的结构性政策工具，而且被迫承担了远超其严格限定的权力的负担。


And there is no other economy that comes close to Germany in size, influence, and economic and financial health.	而欧洲也没有第二个国家可以在规模、影响力以及经济和财政健康度上与德国相媲美。


Second, the eurozone, led by a Germany that is working closely with France, needs to clarify decisively what it intends to look like in the medium term.	其次，由德国（以及与之密切合作的法国）所领导的欧洲需要果断行动，向人们清楚地展示其中期目标。 欧洲面临两种选择，两者均既脆弱又极具争议；


There are two alternatives, both sensitive and controversial, and the choice is for Europeans alone to make and sustain; but they must make it if they are decisively to put behind them the risk of eurozone fragmentation.	且选择哪个需要由欧洲人自己做出、自己维持； 但欧洲人必须做出选择，如果他们下决心要把欧元区分崩离析的风险抛在身后的话。


On one hand, they can decide to let politics dominate economics.	一方面，他们可以选择让政治主导经济。


This is not easy for politicians to sell, especially in the core countries (particularly Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands), as it would involve large multi-year subsidies to the periphery – or the analytical equivalent of the difficult decision made over 20 years ago to reunify Germany at a currency parity.	政客想兜售这个主意并不容易，特别是对核心国家（尤其是德国、芬兰和荷兰）而言，因为这意味着要在多年内向外围国提供补贴——从分析角度讲，这与20多年前德国重新统一后实行货币平价的决定一样困难。


Here, however, there is the added difficulty of a potential conflict between regional politics and national democratic processes.	但是，这一回有一个附加的难点——潜在的地区政治冲突以及国家层面的民主程序。


On the other hand, they can decide to allow economics to prevail. Here, eurozone members would collectively opt for a smaller and less imperfect union that includes countries with more similar initial conditions – economically, financially, politically, and socially.	另一方面，他们可以选择经济归经济��如此，欧元区成员国将集体选择更小更不完善的联盟，只包括经济、财政、政治和社会初始条件较为相似的国家。


And, again, there is no easy way to do this, especially given that the eurozone was intentionally designed with no exit in mind.	而这也不是容易完成的任务，特别是考虑到欧元区本身的设计方案并不包括退出机制这一情形。


Until these difficult and controversial decisions are made, periods of relative tranquility in Europe are likely to be interrupted by the recurrent eruption of financial instability and bouts of political bickering and dithering.	在这些困难而争议重重的选择做出之前，反复发作的财政失稳以及没完没了的政治争论和犹豫将打破欧洲的相对平静期。


And the longer this continues, the greater the risk that Germany’s neighborhood will erode the robustness of what the country has painstakingly built.	而这段时间拖得越长，邻国将德国历尽艰辛建立起来的稳健性侵蚀殆尽的风险就越大。


Ultimately, there can be no strong Germany without a stable eurozone; no stable eurozone without a strong Germany; and no global economic stability without both.	总之，没有坚挺德国，就没有稳定的欧元区； 没有稳定的欧元区，就没有坚挺的德国；


It is time for Europeans to make the difficult longer-term choices that are critical to sustaining and enhancing their historical regional project.	没有坚挺的德国和稳定的欧元区，就没有全球经济的稳定。 欧洲应该马上做出艰难的长期选择，此乃维持和巩固欧洲的历史性地区工程的关键。


Germany’s Pathological Export Boom	德国变异的出口激增


Germany is the world’s industrial bazaar.	德国是世界工业集市。


No other country can offer its international clients such a broad variety of industrial products.	没有其他国家给国际客户提供如此广泛的工业产品。


Germany has 450 hidden world champions for niche products, and is home to 15 of the 20 biggest trade fairs in the world.	德国拥有450个声誉卓著产品的隐蔽的世界冠军，是全世界15到20个最大的博览会所在地。


It is also the world’s top exporter of merchandise and the second-largest exporter of goods and services.	它还是世界最大的商品出口国和第二大产品和服务出口国。


But Germany is gradually becoming a bazaar economy in a different sense, because nowadays it specializes in packaging and selling its products, while outsourcing an ever-larger share of its high value-added manufacturing to low-wage countries.	但是，德国正逐渐成为另一个含义上的集市经济，因为现在它专门从事包装和销售产品，而将高附加值制造业中越来越多的份额外包给低工资国家。


In other words, Germany’s role in the world economy is shifting from that of a producer to that of a merchant.	换言之，德国在世界经济中的作用正逐步从生产者转向经商者。


As a result, its exports contain an ever-increasing share of imported goods and services and the share of domestic value-added in its exports per unit of output is rapidly declining.	因此，其出口包含了不断增加的进口商品和服务的份额，而国内每个出口单位的附加值正在迅速降低。


This does not mean that the German-made share of exports is falling in absolute terms.	这并不意味着出口中的德国制造份额的绝对值在降低。


It only means that the total volume of German exports has been rising faster than the total German value-added in those exports.	这只是意味着德国产品出口总量增长要快于这些出口产品中德国附加值总量的增长。


Is this good or bad?	这是好事还是坏事？


A favorable assessment cannot rest on the fact that the overall German value-added in exports has been growing because this is simply an effect of the German specialization in export-related production.	鉴于出口产品中的德国附加值总量增长仅仅是由于德国专门从事与出口有关的生产的效应，因此，不能因此而得出较佳的评估。


When a country specializes in a certain area, capital and labor move into that area at a rate faster than they move into other areas – indeed, the growth of export-related sectors may come at the cost of a decline in other areas.	当一个国家专门从事于某一个领域之时，资本和劳力就会比其他领域更快地流向这一领域。 事实上，出口相关部门的增长的副作用是其他领域的下降。


Simply put, there is such a thing as excessive specialization.	简而言之，德国存在着过度专业细分。


To assess whether excessive specialization has occurred in Germany, we must focus on the labor market, for it is here that the effect of specialization is most visible.	评估过度专业细分是否已在德国发生，必须把注意力改换集中到劳动力市场，因为专业细分进程就是在这里组织的。


Unfortunately, there is no reason to be optimistic.	不幸的是，没有理由乐观。


From 1995 to 2004, Germany lost a total of 1.09 million full-time equivalent jobs in manufacturing and trade.	从1995年到2004年，制造业损失了总共109万个同等全职工作。


At the same time, no new jobs were created in the rest of the economy.	与此同时，并没有新的就业机会在经济中的其他地方产生。


On the contrary, employment outside manufacturing and trade declined, so that the economy as a whole suffered a net loss of 1.26 million full-time equivalent jobs.	相反，制造业以外的就业下降，所以，就经济整体而言，损失了126万个同等全职工作。


In fact, since the fall of communism, the percentage decline in German industrial employment has been larger than in any other OECD country.	实际上，共产主义垮台以来，德国产业就业率降低的比率大于其他任何经合组织国家。


In part, this was due to the decline in the former East Germany.	这部分是由于前东德的衰落。


But even western Germany holds the second-lowest rank of all developed countries.	但是，即使是西德也位于所有发达国家的倒数第二位。


The automobile and electrical engineering industries have been at the forefront of the bazaar economy.	汽车和电器工程产业处于集市经济的前沿。


To remain price competitive, they have had to rely on imported components.	为维持价格竞争力，它们依赖于进口部件。


The manufacture of electrical products, such as chips and passive devices, has quite often been shifted completely to Asia, while even automobiles that are still assembled in Germany rely heavily on components produced in Eastern Europe.	像芯片和无源装置等电器产品制造大多已经完全转移到了亚洲，甚至连在德国境内组装的汽车也严重依赖于在东欧生产的零部件。


At bottom, the coincidence of unemployment and booming exports can be explained by the high and rigid wages from which Germany still suffers.	从根本上而言，失业和出口激增并存可以通过严格的高工资来解释。 德国目前还是深受其害。


As a consequence of its welfare state and aggressive unions, Germany has had the highest hourly labor costs in the world for most of the last twenty years; only recently has Denmark taken the lead due to a revaluation of the krona.	严格的高工资来源于过分的工会政策，特别是来源于作为整体经济中最低工资限制的福利国家安置收入。 在过去20年中的大多数时间里，德国的每小时劳动力成本居于世界首位, 只是由于最近丹麦货币克朗重新估价才使得丹麦名列第一。


Excessive wages destroy the labor-intensive upstream product stages too fast and also impairs other labor-intensive sectors like textiles, simple services, tourism, and construction.	过度的工资极快地摧毁劳动密集型上游产品阶段，还破坏像纺织品、简单服务业、旅游业和建筑业等其他劳动密集型部门。


As a result, these labor-intensive sectors must release a lot of labor and capital, which push into the capital-intensive export sectors that are better able to cope with high wages.	结果，这些劳动密集型部门必须释放大量的劳动力和资本，推入到资本密集型出口部门，而这些部门更为能够应付高工资。


But, while these sectors therefore grow especially fast, their high capital intensity means that they cannot fully employ the released labor, with the result that some of the unemployed workers have nowhere to turn but the welfare state.	这些部门因此而极为快速地增长，其资本高度集中意味着它们无法完全雇佣释放出来的劳动力，结果是某些失业工人除了伸手向福利国家索取福利外无路可走。


At the same time, since returns to capital are kept low by high wages, very little investment occurs.	同时，由于资本回报被高工资压得很低，投资匮乏。


The excess of savings over investment flows abroad as capital exports.	多于投资的过度储蓄作为资本输出流向外国。


Economic growth and job creation slow, while exports soar.	在出口激增的同时，经济增长和就业机会却在放缓。


Astonishingly, many interpret Germany’s export boom and current-account surplus, which measures these capital exports, as an indicator of the strength of Germany as an investment location.	令人惊讶的是，许多人将出口激增和经常项目盈余解释为德国是强劲的投资目的地。


But, according to the Bundesbank, net investment abroad (including financial investment) has already roughly matched domestic investment in recent years.	但是，根据德意志银行的统计，近年来，国外净投资（包括金融投资）业几乎和国内投资持平。


As the international division of labor proceeds further, the import content of German products will continue to increase, which means that rising exports will lead to fewer domestic jobs and less income growth.	随着国际分工的加深，德国产品的进口含量将继续增加。 这意味着增长的出口将伴随越来越少的国内就业机会和更低的收入增长。


Unless and until German workers accept the need for greater flexibility in the face of global competition, export profits will continue to be invested abroad, reducing overall production costs – and reinforcing the bazaar economy at home.	除非德国工人面临全球竞争而接受更大的灵活性的需要，否则，出口利润将会继续被投资到国外以便降低总体生产成本，并且增强国内的集市经济而并不创造更多的就业机会。


Germany’s Political Stagnation	德国的政治停滞期


A year ago, Angela Merkel, Germany’s charming new chancellor, was in the final phase of her election campaign.	一年以前，安吉拉•默克尔，德国魅力十足的现任新总理正处在其竞选战役的最后阶段。


The incumbent, Gerhard Schröder, lagged so far behind her Christian Democrats (CDU) in public opinion polls that she thought she would win a landslide victory and could therefore afford to expound the cruelties of the liberal austerity program delineated in her electoral campaign.	当时的在职首相施罗德在公众民意调查中是如此落后，以至于默克尔以为她会赢得一场压倒性的胜利并可以阐明自己在竞选过程中所描绘的自由化节俭计划的残酷性。


She even announced a value-added tax increase (which her new government has, indeed, decided to implement in 2007).	她甚至宣布了提高增值税—这项计划她的新政府已经决定在2007年实施。


But German voters did not appreciate her honesty.	但德国的选民并不欣赏她的诚实。


When she named the law professor Paul Kirchhof, who advocated a flat tax, as her candidate for finance minister, Merkel’s electoral cakewalk turned into a nightmare.	当默克尔提名在德国提倡统一税率的法律教授Paul Kirchhoff作为财政部长的候选人时，她的选举步态竞赛就变成了一场噩梦。


She lost nearly her entire lead, and in the end won by only a tiny margin – a margin too small to form her preferred coalition with the liberal Free Democrats.	她几乎失去了所有的领先优势，最终只是以极少的票数胜出。


Instead, she had to form a coalition with Schröder’s Social Democrats (SPD), though without Schröder himself.	这种优势微弱得使她不能组建与自由党的理想联盟，反倒不得不与施罗德的社会民主党联合，虽然施罗德本人已成为局外人。


Merkel’s first year of government will soon be over.	默克尔女士执政的第一年即将结束。


It has been successful in terms of international relations.	在国际关系方面，这是成功的一年。


She won the respect of her European Union partners and managed to salve Germany’s damaged relationship with the United States.	她赢得了欧盟伙伴的尊重并弥合了与美国之间的受损关系。


Her unpretentious manner and intellectual capacity (she holds a doctorate in physics) quickly won her the respect of many, even of Vladimir Putin, whose language she speaks fluently.	她的谦逊和智慧（她拥有物理学博士学位）很快为她赢得了人们的尊敬，其中包括弗拉季米尔•普京。 默克尔能够讲流利的俄语。


However, Merkel has disappointed everyone who hoped that she would continue and even expand Schröder’s domestic economic reform agenda.	然而，她却让所有那些希望她会继续甚至扩展施罗德的经济改革议程的人失望。


While her party program speaks of opening union contracts, relaxing job protection, and, in particular, overhauling the incentive structure of the welfare system, her government has been mostly silent about these issues.	尽管她的政党计划提到开放工会合同，放松就业保护，特别是改革福利体系中的激励机制，可她领导下的政府在这些问题上却几乎都保持缄默。


The cautious steps toward wage subsidies that her government has taken are mere window dressing and cannot be taken seriously.	其政府在实施工资补贴上的谨小慎微的做法也仅仅是装饰门面而已，不可当真。


Thus, Merkel has so far dampened any hope that the important and hard reforms that she announced during her campaign and that Germany urgently needs will be carried out under the CDU-SPD “grand coalition” government.	迄今为止，默克尔让所有希望她在选举期间所宣布的，德国迫切需要的至关重要而又大刀阔斧的改革会由她所谓的“大联盟”政府实施的人们感到沮丧。


To be sure, she has put healthcare reform and a reform of company taxation on the agenda, but the plans presented so far give no indication of a major breakthrough.	确切地说，她把医疗改革和公司税的改革列入议程，但到目前为止提出的实施计划却都没有任何的重大突破。


This stagnation in policymaking has been heavily criticized by the media and the influential Wirtschaftsrat (Economic Council), an association of entrepreneurs who sympathize with the CDU.	这种政治上的停滞受到了来自媒体和同情默克尔所领导的基督教民主党的，极具影响力的德国企业家协会“德国经济委员会”（Wirtschaftsrat）的强烈批评。


Even Germany’s Christian Democratic president, Horst Köhler, has continually reminded the government of the need to press ahead with economic reforms in order to pave the way for sustainable growth.	甚至作为基督教民主党人的德国总统霍斯特·克勒都不断地提醒政府继续进行那些经济改革以便为可持续发展铺路的必要性。 为什么默克尔不能再大胆一些，为什么她没有坚持竞选期间所宣布的改革议程呢？


So why does Merkel not dare more?	一个表面化的回答就是社会民主党，她的联盟伙伴不愿再继续改革。


Why is she not sticking to the announcements she made during her campaign?	但如果接受这样的解释，那么下一个问题就是为什么社会民主党不愿继续施罗德的改革事业。


The superficial answer is that her coalition partner, the SPD, is not willing to go further.	对德国政治停滞期的真正解释是没有一个支持自由化改革的多数派，因为首先这样的改革会造成太多的输家。 德国是一个拥有广泛福利体系的国家。


But if this is the explanation, the next question is why the SPD is unwilling to continue Schröder’s reform course.	该国31%的GDP都通过政府渠道用于社会目的的支出。 不少于41%的达到选举年龄的成年人口的主要生活来源靠政府的财政转移支付，如国家养老金、完全公共津贴、失业救济金、残障救济金和社会补助等。


Such questions lead to the real explanation of Germany’s political stagnation: there is simply no popular majority in favor of liberal reforms, because in the near term such reforms would create too many losers.	在真正投票的选民中，公共转移支付的受益人形成了明显的大多数。


Germany’s extensive welfare system spends 31% of the country’s GDP for entitlement programs operated by the government sector.	与这些数据相对应的是，收入最高的10%的人口支付了个税总额的一半，收入最高的20%的人口所付个税则占总额的约80%，而40%的有收入的人口根本不缴纳个人所得税。


No less than 41% of the voting-age adult population lives primarily on government transfers such as state pensions, full-scale public stipends, unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and social assistance. (In East Germany, the figure is a whopping 47%.)	如此一来也就难怪绝大多数人和甚至基督教民主党选民中的微弱多数都宁愿强化在这一问题上的国家社会主导而不是市场主导。


Among those adults who actually vote, recipients of public transfers form a clear majority. Indeed, the upper 10% of income recipients pay more than 50% of aggregate income tax revenue, and the upper 20% pays about 80%, while 40% of income recipients pay no income taxes whatsoever.	社会民主党为了解这些意向付出了高昂的代价：尽管施罗德的自由化改革慎之又慎，但还是引发了党内倒戈，并致使其前任党主席兼前临时���政部长奥斯卡•拉方丹摒弃社民党，另创新党。


Small wonder that a huge majority of the population – and even a slight majority of CDU voters – prefer a strengthening of the welfare state to a more market-oriented system.	拉方丹大打公共转移支付受惠人的意向这张牌，并牢牢地占据了左派阵地。 他梦想着一个在无限资源泽备下的永恒的福利国家。


The SPD learned about these preferences the hard way, when Schröder’s liberal reforms, as cautious as they were, prompted an internal revolt and induced his predecessor as party chairman and temporary former Minister of Finance, Oskar Lafontaine, to desert the SPD and found a new party.	在拉方丹的“左翼”政党与东部德国的前共产主义者合并后，它获得了牢固的选民基础，并改变着德国的政治平衡。


Lafontaine now plays directly on the preferences of public transfer recipients and firmly occupies the left margin of German politics, dreaming the dream of the everlasting welfare state that can draw on unlimited resources.	由于害怕失去选票和担心本党成员的离弃，社民党便不能继续施罗德的改革议程。


Indeed, after Lafontaine’s “The Left” party merged with eastern Germany’s ex-communists, it secured a firm base among voters, changing the political equilibrium in the country.	许多基督教民主党人可能梦想着在下届选举中与自由党和绿党建立新的联盟。 这个联盟将能够实施连绿党都愿意接受的福利国家和劳力市场的必要改革。


Faced with the prospect of losing members and voters to the new party, the SPD simply cannot afford to continue Schröder’s reform agenda.	然而，基督教民主党的领导层正准备以更社会化的姿态出现，从而在推迟必要改革的过程中争取更多的选民。 在这样一个政治诡计之中，德国正逐渐断送自己的未来。


Many Christian Democrats may be dreaming of the next election, and a new coalition with the Free Democrats – and perhaps the Greens – that would carry out the necessary welfare and labor market reforms. But the reality is that the CDU leadership is re-orienting the party toward more socialist attitudes in order to attract a larger share of the electorate, making postponement of the necessary reforms all but inevitable.	Hans-Werner Sinn 是慕尼黑 Ifo Institute for Economic Research的主任。


Hans-Werner Sinn is the Director of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich.	版权所有：Project Syndicate， 2006年。


Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006. www.project-syndicate.org	www. project-syndicate.


Germany’s Same Old Election	德国一成不变的传统选举


BERLIN – Germany’s current parliamentary election campaign looks like a front-running contender for the title of the most boring in the history of the Federal Republic.	柏林——德国正在举行的议会选举就像一场对联邦共和国历史上最乏味头衔的鲁莽争夺。


The predominant response among commentators to the sole television debate between Chancellor Angela Merkel and her challenger, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, held two weeks before the election, was a collective yawn – all the more remarkable considering the historical events that overshadow this election.	安格拉·默克尔总理及其挑战者弗兰克•瓦尔特•施泰因迈耶外长在选举前两周举行的唯一一次电视辩论让评论家们昏昏欲睡——这在这次选举特别的历史背景下显得更加异乎寻常。


Twenty years ago, the Berlin Wall came down, triggering a seismic shift that moved the borders of the old Federal Republic and of Western Europe as a whole, hundreds of miles to the east.	20年前柏林墙倒塌引起翻天覆地的变化，原有联邦德国和西欧的边界线整体向东推进了数百英里。


The vast Soviet empire exited the historical stage without a single shot being fired.	苏联帝国兵不血刃地退出了历史舞台。


This anniversary should have provided ample reason for a heated debate about the successes and failures of German reunification and for offering a vision for Germany and Europe for the next 20 years.	值此纪念日，我们有充分的理由热烈讨论德国重新统一的成败，并制定今后20年内德国和欧洲的目标。