The government ensures that all children have a place in preschool, so that they are ready for formal schooling by the age of six.	政府保证所有孩子都能接受学前教育，让他们做好从6岁开始的学校教育的准备。


And health care is universal, so the child can grow up healthy.	医保也是普遍适用的，因此每个孩子都能健康成长。


A comparison of the US and Sweden is therefore revealing.	因此，比较一下美国和瑞典就很能说明问题。


Using comparable data and definitions provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the US has a poverty rate of 17.3%, roughly twice Sweden’s poverty rate of 8.4%.	看一下经合组织所提供的可比数据和定义，美国贫困率为17. 3%，是瑞典的数字（8.


And America’s incarceration rate is 10 times Sweden’s rate of 70 people per 100,000.	4%）的两倍有余。 美国人入狱率是瑞典（10万人中有70人）的十倍。


The US is richer on average than Sweden, but the income gap between America’s richest and poorest is vastly wider than it is in Sweden, and the US treats its poor punitively, rather than supportively.	平均而言，美国比瑞典更富，但美国最富和最穷之间的收入差远大于瑞典，且美国对待穷人的态度是惩罚，而不是支持。


One of the shocking realities in recent years is that America now has almost the lowest degree of social mobility of the high-income countries.	近几年来出现的一个令人震惊的现实是美国的社会流动率在高收入国家中几乎垫底。


Children born poor are likely to remain poor; children born into affluence are likely to be affluent adults.	生而平穷的孩子很可能死也贫穷，生而富足的孩子很可能死也富足。


This inter-generational tracking amounts to a profound waste of human talents.	这一代际演化导致了人力资源的大浪费。


America will pay the price in the long term unless it changes course.	从长期看，除非有所改变，否者美国将为此付出代价。


Investing in its children and young people provides the very highest return that any society can earn, in both economic and human terms.	投资于儿童和年轻人可以为社会带来最高的回报，不管从经济学上说还是从人类学上说。


Asia’s Invention Boom	亚洲发明繁荣


BELLEVUE, WASHINGTON – For more than a century, the United States has been the dominant global force for innovation.	贝尔维尤，华盛顿—一个多世纪以来，美国一直是全球创新的主导力量。


But China and other Asian countries are now testing that dominance, and the West should welcome the challenge.	但中国和其他亚洲国家正在挑战美国的主导地位，而西方应该欢迎这种挑战。


China’s move from imitation to innovation has been a matter of national policy in recent years.	中国从模仿向创新的转变是近几年来的一项国家政策。


In 2011, for example, the government established a set of ambitious targets for the production of patents.	比如，2011年，政府设立了一系列关于专利数量的宏伟目标。


Almost immediately, China became the world’s top patent filer.	而中国几乎马上就成为世界顶尖的专利申请国。


China soon surpassed the US in other important measures.	很快，中国在其他重要方面也超过了美国。


Each year, Chinese universities award more PhD’s in science and engineering than US institutions do – and more than twice as many undergraduate degrees in these fields.	每年，中国大学所授予的理科和工科博士数量比美国机构更多——而本科生数量更是超过美国一倍有余。


Moreover, China is set to outpace the US in investment in research and development.	此外，中国即将在研发投资方面超越美国。


Since 2001, China’s R&D expenditure has been growing by 18% annually and has more than doubled as a share of GDP.	自2001年以来，中国研发支出以每年18%以上的速度增加，占GDP的比重更是翻了一番多。


In the US, that ratio has remained relatively constant.	在美国，这一比例则相对稳定。


To be sure, such metrics can easily be manipulated – a fact that critics are quick to point out.	诚然，这些指标很容易被操纵——批评者往往很快就能指出这一点。


But statistics from the US National Science Foundation reveal a genuine drive to innovate across much of Asia, with East, South, and Southeast Asian countries together spending more on R&D than the US.	但来自美国国家科学基金会（US National Science Foundation）的数据表明了亚洲大部的真正创新动力。 东亚、南亚和东南亚国家的研发支出之和已经超过了美国。


And technology-intensive activity in the region is fast approaching that of North America and Western Europe.	而该地区技术密集型活动正在快速接近北美和西欧。


In fact, Asian countries are helping to fuel one another’s innovative success.	事实上，亚洲国家正在助推彼此的创新成功。


China’s invention initiative has produced such rapid results in part because the government actively cooperates with its Asian competitors.	中国的发明计划之所以能产生如此快速的结果，部分是因为政府积极地与亚洲竞争对手展开合作。


Indeed, despite territorial disputes and other divisive issues, the commissioners of the patent offices of Japan, South Korea, China, and, to a lesser extent, Singapore and Taiwan meet often to define and coordinate their intellectual-property (IP) policies.	事实上，尽管存在领土纠纷和其他不和，但日本、韩国、中国以及（在更小程度上）新加坡和中国台湾的专利官员经常开会定义和协调彼此的知识产权政策。


China’s leaders know that they can learn from countries like Japan and South Korea, which implemented policies to encourage innovation and protect IP rights long before China did.	中国领导人知道他们可以从日本和韩国身上学习经验，后两者实施鼓励创新和保护知识产权的政策远远早于中国。


The precise impact of Asia’s IP expansion is impossible to predict.	亚洲知识产权扩张的到底有多大影响难以预测。


But its transformative potential is obvious.	但其转型潜力是显而易见的。


Asian countries are essentially giving tens of thousands of top minds the opportunities and incentives to tackle today’s most pressing challenges, such as developing cost-effective sustainable-energy solutions, ensuring affordable health care for aging populations, and improving the quality of life in overcrowded cities.	可以说亚洲国家为数以万计的顶级专家提供了机会和激励去解决当今最紧迫挑战——如发展高性价比可持续能源解决方案、确保老龄化人口看得起病，以及改善过度拥挤的城市的生活质量等。


These complex problems demand a plurality of innovative talent and long-term international collaboration – not just to find solutions, but also to deploy them.	这些复杂问题需要大量创新型人才和长期国际合作——不仅仅是找到解决办法，也要实施这些办法。


In an increasingly knowledge-based global economy, partnerships and cooperation will be the natural order.	在日益依靠知识的全球经济中，伙伴关系与合作将是自然法则。


In this context, the West would be foolish to resist Asia’s IP emergence.	在这样的背景下，西方阻挠亚洲知识产权崛起是相当愚蠢的。


Instead, Western governments should support, learn from, and reap the rewards of the invention boom in the East.	相反，西方政府应该支持、学习并摘取东方发明繁荣的果实。


For example, the US, which leads the world in bringing innovative products to the market, should offer commercialization channels to innovative Chinese universities and small companies.	比如，在将创新产品引入市场方面领先全球的美国应该为中国创新性大学和小公司提供商业化渠道。


And Chinese and Western companies should be encouraged to invest in one another’s IP.	中国和西方公司应该被鼓励投资彼此的知识产权。


Such cooperation has already begun.	这样的合作已经开始了。


For example, in 2008 Intellectual Ventures (which I helped found) established a presence in China and other countries with emerging innovation cultures in order to focus their inventors’ talent and energy.	比如，2008年，告高智发明公司（Intellectual Ventures，我也参与了创立）在中国和其他创新文化方兴未艾的国家展开经营活动，以便关注这些国家发明者的才华和能量。


The resulting global network of more than 400 institutions and over 4,000 active inventors has produced more patent applications than many R&D-intensive companies do.	由此产生了包括400多家机构和4,000多个活跃发明者在内的全球网络，它所申请的专利比许多研发密集型公司还要多。


In this ecosystem, everyone wins.	在这一生态系统中，人人都是赢家。


The inventors gain access to the company’s expertise in IP development and to an international community of experienced problem-solvers.	发明者能获得公司在知识产权开发方面的专家经验，加入由经验丰富的问题解决者组成的国际社区。


Intellectual Ventures gets a stake in valuable solutions.	高智发明公司对有价值的方案做股权投资。


And the world benefits from those solutions.	世界都会因这些方案受益。


Imagine if more such initiatives were launched, not only by companies, but also by governments.	试想一下，如果有更多的类似项目会怎样——不仅由公司发起，也可以由政府发起。


A cooperative approach could help to improve the troubled trade dynamics between Asia and the West, characterized by disagreement over China’s lax enforcement of IP laws.	合作方法有助于改善陷入麻烦的亚洲和西方的交易动态——一个显著特征是西方对中国执行知识产权法律不力十分不满。


Instead of shaking its fist, the West could provide incentives that encourage China to become a responsible actor in the existing IP regime.	西方不应该棒杀，而是可以提供激励鼓励中国成为现有知识产权机制中的负责任的行为人。


These could include, for example, efforts to organize viable alternatives to piracy for the tens of thousands of Chinese companies that currently earn a living from it.	这些激励可以包括（比如）为数以万计靠盗版为生的中国公司组织可行的替代方案。


Some Western entrepreneurs already turn to these so-called Shan Zhai enterprises to manufacture their prototypes at scale, creating a kind of cross-border Kickstarter culture.	一些西方企业家已经将这些所谓的“山寨”企业转变为 为它们的原型产品提供量产服务的企业，创造了一种跨境Kickstarter文化。


Eventually, many Shan Zhai companies will evolve into legitimate businesses with their own IP.	最终，许多山寨公司将携自己的知识产权演化为合法企业。


Given that Asian countries naturally will uphold and defend IP rights more vigorously when they have more at stake, the West should look for ways to hasten this transition.	由于亚洲国家在更多自身利益牵涉其中时自然会更有力地支持和保护知识产权，因此西方应该找到加快这一转变的方法。


The West can also take some lessons from the various models Asian countries are experimenting with as they ramp up domestic innovation.	西方也可以借鉴亚洲国家正在做的各种模式的提升国内创新的实验。


In South Korea, LG recently launched a program to solicit invention ideas from the public, promising inventors a hefty 8% stake in the proceeds of any ideas the company commercializes.	在韩国，LG公司最近提出了一项计划，从公众那里征求创新思想，承诺如若公司将发明项目商业化，则发明人能获得此过程中高达8%的权益。


That is probably not an approach that many American companies have considered.	这或许是许多美国公司从未想象过的办法。


But maybe they should.	但它们应该想到。


Asia is also experimenting with creative ways to finance innovation, such as China’s IP exchanges and Malaysia’s IP loan programs.	亚洲也在试验创新性创新融资办法，比如中国的知识产权交易所和马来西亚的知识产权贷款计划。


The West should pay attention to these efforts, because they could offer alternatives to traditional avenues for sourcing and financing invention, such as venture capital, that are producing lackluster results.	西方应该关注这些举措，因为它们可以为发现创新和创新融资提供传统方式（往往结果平平，如风险资本）之外的替代方案。


Finally, Western companies should be willing to supply inputs to Chinese businesses selling innovative products.	最后，西方公司应该乐于为出售创新产品的中国企业提供投入品。


This recommendation may seem radical, but only because the view of a one-way flow of innovation from West to East has become so entrenched.	这一建议可能有些激进，但这只是因为从西方向东方的单向创新流动的观念过于根深蒂固。


In fact, there is no good reason for Western businesses to stand on the sidelines as Asia produces whiz-kid entrepreneurs and high-tech start-ups.	事实上，当亚洲频频出现神童企业家和高科技创业公司时，西方企业没有理由袖手旁观。


These pioneers are building ecosystems with points of entry at every level, and the West should enter at all of them.	这些先锋正在建立各个层面都有入口的生态系统，而西方不应该错过每一个入口。


As Asian innovation comes into its own, the US and other developed countries must find ways to participate – or risk missing the opportunity of the century in a vain bid to recapture bygone supremacy.	随着亚洲创新自主性的不断增强，美国和其他发达国家必须找到参与办法——否则就有可能在徒劳地试图掌握已成过去的主导权的过程中措施世纪良机。


The Ingenious General	天才将军


WASHINGTON, DC – Had Ariel Sharon never entered politics, he would still be known around the world as a military commander and tactician.	华盛顿——如果沙龙从未进入政坛，他依然会是世界闻名的军事指挥官和战术家。


In both roles, he was extraordinary, because his methods diverged from normal military practices, even in the unconventional Israeli army.	在这两方面他都具有非凡的才能，因为他的方法即使在超乎常规的以色列军队也迥异于常规的军事行动。


Consider the Yom Kippur War.	以赎罪日战争为例。


On October 16, 1973, ten days after Egypt’s army surprised the Israelis by crossing the Suez Canal, Sharon turned defeat into victory by leading his own troops across the canal through a narrow gap in the Egyptian front.	1973年10月16日，埃及军队跨越苏伊士运河、奇袭以色列十天后。 沙龙率部通过埃及前线一条狭窄的缝隙跨过运河，一举将失败变成了胜利。


The Israelis swiftly spread out behind the Egyptians, overrunning anti-aircraft batteries and blocking supply and reinforcement routes.	以色列人迅速在埃军后方散开，占领防空炮台并阻断给养和增援线路。


Within six days, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had to plead for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire: so many Egyptian units were cut off, wrecked by air strikes, under attack, or fully encircled that no major forces were left to stop the advancing Israelis – not even to guard the road to Cairo.	短短六天内，埃及总统萨达特被迫请求立即、无条件停火：太多的埃及部队被拦腰截断，无法躲避空袭和地面炮火，或者被完全包围，以致于没有大部队能阻止以色列人进攻——甚至无法保卫通往开罗的道路。


The Egyptian high command was convinced that Sharon’s crossing was only an overnight raid by light forces.	埃及最高统帅部相信沙龙的渡河不过是小股部队的连夜突袭行动。


Their reasoning was sound: The Israelis did not control even their own side of the canal, so they could not possibly reinforce the first wave of a few hundred men with a handful of tanks.	他们的理由似乎也合情合理：以色列不可能组织起超过几百人、数辆坦克的首波突袭，因为他们甚至控制不了运河的己方一侧。


Rather than pulling their units back across the canal to chase the raiding Israelis, the Egyptian commanders believed that their forces could capture all of them by converging toward one another, thus closing the two-mile gap that Sharon had exploited.	埃及统帅部认为与其撤回运河对岸追击偷袭的以色列人，还不如让埃军互相靠拢、填补被沙龙所用的两英里缺口就能全数俘获以军。


Sharon’s superiors agreed with their Egyptian counterparts.	沙龙的上司也赞同埃及对手的看法。


They ordered Sharon to stop sending forces across the canal, and instead to widen the gap on the Israeli side.	他们命令沙龙停止派军渡河，而是全力扩大运河以方一侧的缺口。


Sharon did not obey, pleading communications difficulties while sending as many of his forces as possible across the canal.	沙龙借口通讯困难没有服从，同时派尽可能多的部队渡河。


He calculated that attacking the Egyptians from their own rear – destroying the missile batteries that impeded the Israeli air force, ambushing reinforcements and supplies, and simply causing massive confusion across the entire front – would induce organizational collapse in the Egyptian army.	他料定从后方袭击埃及人——摧毁他们阻碍以空军进攻的导弹阵地、伏击援军和物资、在前线制造大规模混乱——可能导致埃及军队出现组织上的崩溃。


That is exactly what happened.	事实果然不出所料。


But Sharon’s fellow generals were furious at him, as was often the case.	但这让沙龙的同胞将军们大为光火，这种情况以前也屡次出现过。


In 1953, at the age of 25 and already a wounded veteran of the 1947-49 War of Independence, Sharon was recalled to active duty to establish Israel’s first commando unit.	1953年年方25岁的沙龙已经在1947-49年独立战争中因伤退伍，之后又被重新召回现役，组建以色列的首支突击队。


Arab raiders were crossing Israel’s unfenced borders to rob cattle and steal farm implements, sometimes attacking civilians.	阿拉伯入侵者穿过以色列疏于防御的边界抢掠牲畜窃取农具，有时甚至袭击以色列平民。


Guarding Israel’s elongated borders would have required 20 times more troops than Israel had.	守卫以色列漫长的边境线的任务需要20倍的军力才能完成。


So Israel chose to mount punitive raids against Egyptian and Jordanian military outposts and villages that harbored marauders.	因此以色列选择对埃及约旦军事哨所进行惩罚性袭击并扫荡窝藏掠夺者的村庄。


Sharon was given a free hand to raise and train his unit.	沙龙得到授权放手组织训练自己的部队。


Instead of insisting on discipline, his men wore whatever they liked, never saluted anybody, and never drilled.	沙龙并不强调纪律，他手下的战士爱穿什么就穿什么、不向任何人敬礼也从不出操。


But they launched devastating night raids while suffering few casualties, even when going up against Jordan’s Arab Legion, by far the best Arab military force.	但这支部队能对最精锐的阿拉伯军队约旦阿拉伯军团发动毁灭性夜袭而自己很少伤亡。


Sharon sought natural fighters rather than dutiful soldiers, and he carefully planned each raid, always sending some men well beyond the target of the attack to ambush any reinforcements.	沙龙要的是天生的战士而不是忠诚的士卒。 他为每次夜袭都制定了详尽计划，每次都会派人深入到远远超过袭击目标的敌后去伏击增援部队。


The main assault force advanced toward the target in the darkness until detected, then rushed forward, firing every weapon, while mortar and machine-gun emplacements remained in the rear, firing just ahead of the advancing troops.	主力部队在黑暗掩护下无声无息地���着目标迫近，直到被敌人发现再全力冲锋，所有武器一齐开火。 而迫击炮和机枪阵地会留在部队身后，其火力恰好覆盖冲锋部队的前方。


Within three years, Sharon commanded an entire brigade in the 1956 Sinai campaign, which he led in a swift advance across the desert to link up with a paratroop battalion that had been dropped deep into Egyptian territory at the entrance to the strongly defended Mitla Pass.	短短三年内沙龙就指挥一个旅参与了1956年的西奈战斗。 他率领全旅官兵快速穿越沙漠与空降到埃及腹地守卫森严的米特拉山口的伞兵营汇合。


There Sharon was to stop but did not, instead fighting a bloody battle to conquer the pass.	按照命令沙龙本该在那里止步，但他却没有，而是浴血奋战夺取了米特拉山口。


His immediate superiors wanted him out, but the top leadership instead promoted him to command a division.	他的顶头上司想将他赶出部队，但最高领导层却提拔他担任师指挥官。


That is how Sharon came to plan and fight the extraordinary battle of Umm Katef in the June 1967 war.	沙龙因此在1967年6月战争中策划并指挥了乌姆卡提夫那次非同寻常的战斗。


The battle lasted only one night, but it was unique in its complexity.	这次战斗只持续了一个晚上，但其复杂性却是独一无二的。


The Egyptian defenses blocked the central highway across the Sinai with a fortified box containing powerful artillery and more than a hundred tanks, fronted by three parallel trench-lines manned by thousands of infantrymen and anchored on sand dunes and high ground at each end.	埃及守军用配备火炮的防御工事和一百多辆坦克封锁了穿越西奈半岛的中央公路，并在正面设置了三条平行战壕，并由依托沙丘掩体及两侧制高点的数千名步兵把守。


Sharon had his troops climb over the sand dunes to enter the trench lines at their top end and attack down their length – a simple maneuver that the Egyptians could have defeated had they not been pinned down by an artillery barrage and Israeli tanks firing directly at them.	沙龙让部队翻越沙丘进入战壕内部，从天而降袭击对手——如果没有遭到密集的炮火牵制和以色列坦克的正面袭击，埃及人本来可以挫败这次简单的行动。


The Israeli infantrymen had taped flashlights to their helmets so that the tank gunners could direct their fire at the Egyptians just ahead of them.	以色列步兵将手电贴在自己的头盔上，这样坦克射手就能将炮火瞄准前面的埃及人。


Still, the Egyptian artillery was superior, and should have at least silenced the tanks firing at the trench line.	但埃及炮兵仍然颇具优势，而且至少应该可以压制向战壕开火的以色列坦克。


But paratroopers, flown in by helicopters, suddenly jumped the Egyptian gun crews, who never had a chance in hand-to-hand combat.	但从直升机上跳下的以军伞兵却出其不意地袭击埃及炮手，这些炮手在贴身肉搏中根本没有机会胜出。


The Egyptians’ tanks could still have counter-attacked, but they were engaged by an Israeli tank battalion that appeared from well behind the trench lines, having crossed supposedly impassable sand dunes.	埃及坦克本来仍可以发起反攻，但他们被战壕后面冒出来的一个以色列坦克营缠住，这个坦克营不知怎样越过了被认为不可逾越的沙丘。


Then the Israeli tanks that had been shooting up the trench lines crossed over them to enter the box, and finish off Egyptian resistance.	之后刚刚朝战壕开火的以军坦克从这几辆坦克的上面开进防御工事，彻底粉碎了埃军的抵抗行动。


The road through Umm Katef was opened.	通过乌姆卡提夫的道路因此被打开了。


Sharon had once again broken the basic rules of warfare, yet won total victory.	沙龙又一次打破了战争的基本法则，但依然大获全胜。


But, even for the unconventional Israeli army, Sharon was too unconventional.	但即使在超乎常规的以色列军队，沙龙也太标新立异了。


When he was passed over for promotion to Army Chief of Staff and retired from active duty (he fought his epic 1973 battle as a reservist), a wise Israeli general warned his colleagues that he would return as Defense Minister, and that if he lost that office – as he did after the 1982 Lebanon War – he would return as Prime Minister.	当他在争夺陆军参谋长的角逐中落败并退出现役时（参加1973年史诗战争时他的身份是预备役），一位明智的以色列将领就告诫同事他会回来担任国防部长，而如果他没能当上国防部长（就像1982年黎巴嫩战争中所出现的状况），他就会担任以色列总理职务。


Only now has Sharon met an enemy that he cannot outmaneuver.	直到现在沙龙才遭遇了他无法智取的敌人。


The Snowden Time Bomb	斯诺登定时炸弹


PRINCETON – In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, world leaders repeated a soothing mantra.	普林斯顿——全球金融危机发生后，各国领导人不断重复着宽慰民众的口头禅。


There could be no repeat of the Great Depression, not only because monetary policy was much better (it was), but also because international cooperation was better institutionalized.	货币政策的明显改善（事实的确如此）以及国际合作制度化的长足进步确保了大萧条不会再次上演。


And yet one man, the American former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, has shown how far removed from reality that claim remains.	但一位名叫爱德华·斯诺登的美国前情报部门承包商已经证实这种说法距离现实有多远。


Prolonged periods of strain tend to weaken the fabric of institutional cooperation.	长时间的紧张局势会削弱机构合作。


The two institutions that seemed most dynamic and effective in 2008-2009 were the International Monetary Fund and the G-20; the credibility of both has been steadily eroded over the long course of the crisis.	2008-2009年最具活力和成效的两家机构是国际货币基金组织（IMF）和G-20，但两者的信誉在漫长的危机进程中均有所削弱。


Because the major industrial economies seem to be on the path to recovery – albeit a feeble one – no one seems to care very much that the mechanisms of cooperation are worn out.	由于主要工业经济体似有复苏之势（尽管势头非常微弱），似乎没有人在意合作机制已经老化失效。


They should.	这当然不对。


There are likely to be many more financial fires in various locations, and the world needs a fire brigade to put them out.	世界各国可能发生更多金融火灾，因此需要消防队来完成灭火工作。


The IMF’s resources were extended in 2009, and the organization was supposed to be reformed in order to give emerging markets more voice.	2009年国际货币基金组织的资源得到了拓展，该组织本应持续改革强化新兴市场发言权。


But little progress has been made.	但这方面的改革却一直没有多大进展。


The Fund was the centerpiece of the post-1945 global economic system.	IMF是后1945年全球经济体系的核心机构。


It subsequently played a central role in the management of the 1980’s debt crisis and in the post-communist economic transition after 1989.	它在20世纪80年代的债务危机管理以及1989年开始的后共产主义经济转型中均发挥了核心作用。


But every major international crisis since then has chipped away at its authority.	但其后的每一次重要国际金融危机都削弱了基金组织的权威性。


The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis undermined its legitimacy in Asia, as many governments in the region believed that the crisis was being exploited by the United States and US financial institutions.	1997-1998年的亚洲金融危机动摇了其在亚洲的合法地位，因为很多亚洲政府认为危机受到了美国和美国金融机构的利用。


The post-2007 Great Recession discredited the IMF further for three reasons.	三个原因导致IMF的信誉在后2007年大萧条中进一步受损。


First, the initial phase of the crisis looked like an American phenomenon.	首先，危机的初始阶段看似只与美国相关。


Second, the IMF’s heavy involvement in the prolonged euro crisis looked like preferential treatment of Europe and Europeans.	其次，IMF频繁介入长期欧元危机似乎是对欧洲和欧洲人另眼相看。


In particular, the demand that, because the world was focused on Europe, another European (and another French national) should succeed the IMF’s then-managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was incomprehensible to the large emerging-market countries.	特别是有人提出要求，称因为整个世界都在关注欧洲，因此另一名欧洲人（而且是另一名法国人）应当接替时任总裁多米尼克·斯特劳斯－卡恩在IMF的领导地位在新兴市场大国看来简直不可理喻。


Eventually, as in the Asian crisis, European governments and the European Commission fell out with the Fund and began to blame its analysis for having confused and unsettled markets.	最终就像亚洲危机时一样，欧洲政府和欧盟委员会与IMF闹翻，开始责怪该组织的分析困扰并搅乱了市场。


On the big issues underlying the global financial crisis – the problem of current-account imbalances and deciding which countries should adjust, and reconciling financial reform with a pro-growth agenda – the IMF cannot say much more, or say it more effectively, than it could before the crisis.	在造成全球金融危机的经常账户失衡、决定哪些国家应该调整以及协调金融改革及增长议程等重大问题上，IMF的话语权与危机前相比并没有多少进步。


The G-20 was the great winner of the financial crisis.	G-20是金融危机的大赢家。


The older summits (the G-7 or, with the addition of Russia, the G-8), as well as the G-7 finance ministers’ meetings, were no longer legitimate.	原有的峰会（G-7或者加上俄罗斯的G-8），还有G-7财长会议，都已经失去了合法地位。 它们当中包含了实际造成问题的国家；


They consisted of countries that had actually caused the problems; they were dominated by the US; and they suffered from heavy over-representation of mid-sized European countries.	无法摆脱美国的控制； 中等欧洲国家得到过度代表的现象十分严重。


The G-20, by contrast, brought in the big emerging markets, and its initial promise was to provide a way to control and direct the IMF.	相反，G-20引入了新兴市场大国，并且在开始时承诺要控制和引导IMF。


The new mood of global economic regime change was captured in the official photograph that was widely used in coverage of the most successful of the G-20 summits, held in London in April 2009.	2009年4月在伦敦召开的最成功的G-20峰会媒体报导所广泛采用的官方照片准确捕捉到了全球经济体制变化的崭新氛围。


In the short term, the London summit mitigated financial contagion emanating from southern Europe; gave the World Bank additional resources to deal with the problem of trade finance for emerging-market exports; appeared to give the IMF more firepower and legitimacy; and seemed to catalyze coordinated fiscal stimulus to restore confidence.	短期来看，伦敦峰会成功控制了南欧金融危机的蔓延； 使世行拥有更多资源处理新兴市场出口贸易融资问题；


But only the more technical of these four achievements – the first two – stood the test of time.	但这四项成就中只有技术性较强的前两项经受住了时间的考验。


Everything else that was agreed at the London summit turned sour.	伦敦峰会的其他协议都出了问题。


The follow-up summits were lame.	后续的峰会根本不见成效。


The idea of coordinated fiscal stimulus became problematic when it became obvious that many European governments could not take on more debt without unsettling markets and pushing themselves into an unsustainable cycle of increasingly expensive borrowing.	当人们意识到许多欧洲国家政府无法在避免市场不安并将自身推向越来越贵因而难以为继的借贷周期的情况下承担更多的债务，统一财政刺激政策的理念就出现了问题。


And yet, however limited the London summit’s achievements proved to be, the summit process itself was not fully discredited until Snowden’s intelligence revelations.	但无论事实证明伦敦峰会所取得的成就多么有限，在斯诺登泄密事件之前峰会本身还没有彻底失信。


It may be that leaders and their staffs were naive in believing that their communications were really secure.	或许因为领导人及工作人员居然天真到相信他们的信息联络真正安全。


But Snowden’s revelations that the London summit’s British hosts allegedly monitored the participants’ communications make it difficult to imagine that the genuine intimacy of earlier summits can ever be recreated.	但斯诺登披露伦敦峰会英国主办方监控与会者的信息传递使人们相信早前峰会真正保密的状况很难再现。


And, with the espionage apparently directed mostly at representatives of emerging economies, the gulf between the advanced countries and those on the rise has widened further.	而且因为间谍活动显然更多地针对新兴经济体代表，发达国家和新兴国家之间的鸿沟也因此进一步加深。


World leaders appear partly ignorant and partly deceptive in responding to the allegations.	各国领导人在回应相关指控时显得既虚伪又无知。


They are probably right to emphasize how little they really know about surveillance.	他们强调对监控行为一无所知也许是对的。


It is in the nature of complex data-gathering programs that no one really has an overview.	复杂的数搜集计划本来就没有任何监控措施。


But the lack of transparency surrounding data surveillance and mining means that, when a whistleblower leaks information, everyone can subsequently use it to build their own version of how and why policy is made.	但数据监视和采集计划缺乏透明度意味着一旦举报人泄漏信息，人人都可以由此推导出政策制定原因和方法的不同版本。


The revelations thus encourage wild conspiracy theories.	泄密因此催生了离奇的阴谋理论。


The substantive aftermath of the London summit has already caused widespread disenchantment with the G-20 process.	伦敦峰会的实质性后果已经使人们普遍对G-20峰会丧失了信心。


The Snowden affair has blown up any illusion about trust between leaders – and also about leaders’ competence.	斯诺登事件摧毁了领导人相互信任的所有幻想，同样不复存在的还有对领导人能力的信心。


By granting Snowden asylum for one year, Russian President Vladimir Putin, will have the bomber in his midst when he hosts this year’s summit in Saint Petersburg.	因为承诺为斯诺登提供一年庇护，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京举办今年的圣彼得堡峰会时就好像把一枚定时炸弹埋在了身边。


The Snowden Effect	斯诺登效应


MADRID – The continued leaking of classified information by the former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden has provoked heated debate about privacy and international law, which, unfortunately, has overshadowed the geostrategic dimension of his actions.	马德里—前美国国家安全局合同工斯诺登不断地泄漏保密情报，这激起了关于隐私和国际法的激烈争论，不幸的是，这一争论盖过了斯诺登行为的地缘政治影响。


In fact, Snowden’s revelations about US surveillance programs, and his own ongoing struggle to avoid extradition, reveal much about President Barack Obama’s conception of US foreign relations.	事实上，斯诺登披露的美国监视计划及其本人为避免引渡而做的斗争反映了美国总统奥巴马对美国外交关系问题的首肯态度。


More than any other incoming American president in recent memory, Obama raised expectations worldwide.	与其他近期美国总统相比，奥巴马更高地提升了国际预期。


Yet he has proved to be mainly, if not solely, interested in domestic issues, resulting in a foreign policy of reaction.	但他的兴趣主要（如果不是全部的话）集中在国内事务上，这是由外交政策反应决定的。


The Snowden affair highlights three elements of this: US-Russia relations, US influence in South America, and US relations with Europe.	斯诺登事件反映了这一方针的三大要素：美俄关系、美国在南美的影响，以及美国与欧洲的关系。


The Kremlin’s handling of the affair is indicative of the tense state of US-Russia relations.	克里姆林宫处理斯诺登事件的手法彰显美俄关系的紧张状态。


In the aftermath of the bilateral relationship’s ill-fated “reset,” Russia has been eager to maintain its global position as a foil to the US, causing many people on both sides to revert to a Cold War mentality.	在美俄双边关系不幸的“重启”后，俄罗斯急切地欲维持其衬托美国的国际立场，这让美俄双方的众多人士重新回到了冷战思维。


By falling into this trap, the US has provided President Vladimir Putin with endless fodder to score political points and solidify his domestic position.	掉入这一陷阱的美国为俄罗斯总统普京提供了用不尽的素材赢得政治闪光点并巩固其国内地位。


Putin regards anti-Americanism as an effective tool for short-circuiting domestic discontent.	普京将反美作为遏制国内异见的有效工具。


Developments like the US Congress’s enactment of the Magnitsky Act, portrayed in Russia as an American provocation, have allowed the Kremlin to rally support at home with retaliatory measures such as a ban on foreign adoptions, while providing cover for a crackdown on domestic opponents.	美国国会批准的马格尼茨基法案（Magnitsky Act）被俄罗斯描述为美国的挑衅，克里姆林宫采取了禁止外国人领养俄罗斯孤儿等报复措施赢得国内支持，有效地打击了国内反对者。


Following the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, which the Kremlin regarded as another example of Western overreach, Russia has been more aggressive in asserting itself internationally, mainly in opposition to the US.	在2011年北约领导的干预利比亚行动后——克里姆林宫将此视为西方越界的又一例证——俄罗斯在追求国际影响力方面变得更加积极了，当然主要是反对美国。


This is most obvious in Russia’s dogged support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.	最显然的是俄罗斯顽固地支持叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德政权。


And Russia’s refusal to hand over Snowden, under the pretext of strict adherence to the law, has allowed Putin to poke Obama in the eye once again – this time while posing as a defender of legality and human rights.	俄罗斯以依法为由拒绝交出斯诺登让普京再次与奥巴马争锋相对——这一回，作为合法性和人权捍卫者的是俄罗斯。


This coup de théȃtre was magnified by Putin’s cynical claim that Russia would allow Snowden to stay only if he stopped leaking information “aimed at inflicting damage on our American partners.”	放大这条妙计的是普京愤怒的呼声——俄罗斯不会允许斯诺登滞留国内，除非他停滞泄漏“旨在伤害我们的美国伙伴”的情报。


Presumably, Putin would not object to the infliction of such damage behind closed doors, during a debriefing with the Russian security services.	我看在于俄罗斯安全部门的分析会上，普京不会反对幕后释放这些伤害。


Moreover, the Snowden affair reinforces the perception that the US is losing its sway in South America.	此外，斯诺登事件增强了一种感觉：美国正在失去对南美的统治力。


With few notable exceptions, such as US Ambassador to Brazil Tom Shannon, US diplomacy has lacked a strategic vision for Latin America.	除了极少数显著的例外——比如美国驻巴西大使香农（Tom Shannon）——美国外交缺少关于拉美的战略愿景。


Barack Obama’s 2008 election created high expectations in this region, too; but his administration’s approach has been reserved, at best, and often obtuse.	奥巴马在2008年的当选使人们对这一地区也期望颇高，但其政府对拉美的方针至多只能算有所保留，时不时出些昏招。


While China’s influence in Latin America has soared, the US has remained aloof.	中国对拉美的影响力大幅增加，但美国仍漠然视之。


Obama’s visit in May was presented as an effort to reinvigorate relations in the context of the rise of the Asia-Pacific region.	奥巴马5月的拉美之行表现出试图在亚太地区崛起的环境下振兴拉美关系的姿态。


Unfortunately, the chickens of Obama’s first term have already come home to roost.	不幸的是，奥巴马必须收拾好第一个任期留下的烂摊子。


For example, the US is far and away Ecuador’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than a third of its foreign trade.	比如，美国毫无疑问是厄瓜多尔最大的贸易伙伴，占其对外贸易的三分之一强。


Yet, facing the possibility that Ecuador might grant Snowden asylum, the US felt the need to scramble, with Vice President Joe Biden personally pleading America’s case to Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, even after Obama announced that he would not engage in “wheeling and dealing” over the extradition.	但是，在面临厄瓜多尔可能想斯诺登提供庇护的局面时，美国感到了马上采取行动的必要，副总统拜登以个人名义向厄瓜多尔总统科雷亚表达了美国的意思，尽��奥巴马宣布他不会“不择手段”地引渡斯诺登。


The threat by US officials to cut off aid to Ecuador, which would amount to a measly $12 million in 2014, further evinces a clumsy approach.	美国官员威胁削减对厄瓜多尔的援助——2014年将只有区区1200万美元——是更加拙劣的昏招。


America’s traditional sources of influence – its soft power, regional alliances, and financial leverage – appear to be running dry.	美国影响力的传统源泉——软实力、地区联盟和金融杠杆——都在枯竭。


The message to the world is clear: the US is not the regional power that it should be.	世界得到的信号是明确的：美国不再是它所应该是的地区大国。


Finally, turning to Europe, Obama’s flippant attitude concerning alleged US surveillance of the European Union and its member states shows that American exceptionalism is alive and well.	最后，回到欧洲，奥巴马关于美国被控监视欧盟及其成员国问题的轻率态度表明美国的例外主义（exceptionalism）风头正劲。


Instead of acknowledging the legitimacy of European concerns, he shrugged them off as a frivolity: “[I] guarantee you that in European capitals, there are people who are interested in, if not what I had for breakfast, at least what my talking points might be should I end up meeting with their leaders.”	奥巴马非但没有承认欧洲担忧的合理性，反而认为这是无关紧要的小事：“（我）向你们保证，在欧洲各国首都都有这样的人，他们即便不想知道我早餐吃了什么，至少也很有兴趣知道我在与他们的领导人会面后说了哪些要点。 ”


The US certainly has an interest in gaining deeper analytical insight into its European allies’ decision-making than can be gained by simply calling, say, German Chancellor Angela Merkel.	显然，获得关于欧洲盟友决策的更深层次的分析洞见，而不是光靠给（比如）德国总理默克尔带电话获得消息，这符合美国的利益。


Accepting that spying is realistically part of the US toolkit, we Europeans expect it to be conducted responsibly.	接受谍报是美国现实主义工具之一，我们欧洲人可以指望这一工具被合理使用。


By dismissing European concerns about how such surveillance is carried out, Obama has demonstrated one of America’s worst habits – that of patronizing Europe.	奥巴马对欧洲人关于监视如何进行的担忧不屑一顾，这表明了美国的一个最坏的习惯——对欧洲居高临下。


In fact, Europeans have raised serious questions about US intelligence practices. These range from the lack of professionalism implied by allowing contractors to conduct such sensitive work to America’s hands-off approach toward certain allies, like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, while relegating many of its other allies – including most of the European Union – to surveillance-worthy status.	事实上，欧洲就美国情报行为提出过严重质疑，包括让合同工从事如此敏感的工作所体现的不专业性、对某些盟友（如英国和新西兰）采取不干涉方针而将其他盟友（包括大部分欧盟国家）降格为有必要监视的国家，等等。


The bitter irony is that, at this suddenly inauspicious moment, Europe and the US are launching their most significant joint project since the creation of NATO – a transatlantic free-trade agreement.	更讽刺的是，在这个突发的不详时刻，欧洲和美国正在打造自创立北约以来最重要的联合项目——跨大西洋自由贸易协定。


For the sake of its success, is it really too much to ask of the US that it play its part internationally with a bit more skill and professionalism, and that it treat its partners with respect?	为了协定的成功，欧洲对美国要求——应该在处理国际事务中多点技巧和专业性、尊重它的伙伴——真的太过分了吗？


Reckoning With Inequality	对不平等现象的清算


CAMBRIDGE – When it comes to the rise in economic inequality since the 1970s in the United States and some other advanced economies, it doesn’t really matter which measure of income distribution we choose: They all show the increase.	发自剑桥——当涉及到自上世纪70年代在美国和其他一些发达经济体所出现的经济不平等扩大现象时，真正的问题并不在于我们选择哪种收入分配措施：因为这些措施都无法遏制不平等的扩大。


And, while many competing explanations have been proposed, we do not need to agree about causes to concur on sensible policies to address the problem.	与此同时，虽然人们对此提出了许多这样那样的解释，我们也不是非得要在对事件成因的看法上达成一致，大家照样可以搁置争议，携手推行合理的政策来应对这一问题。


There are many ways to measure inequality. Each can tell us something different.	有很多种方法去测量不平等状况，而每种方法都会告诉我们一些不同的东西。


Many Asian countries’ recent economic success has reduced inequality by some measures (for example, a big fall in the poverty rate), but not by others (the high-low range has increased).	许多亚洲国家近年取得的经济成就在某些测量方式（比如贫困率大幅下跌）上减少了不平等现象，但从其他方式上看则不然（高-低收入差距有所增加）。


In the US, however, all measures of inequality have pointed in the same direction since the turn of the century, reflecting the fact that the benefits of economic growth have gone almost exclusively to those at the top.	而在美国，一切测量不平等的方法自世纪之交以来都指向了同一方向，反映出经济增长所带来的好处了几乎全都归了位于社会顶层的那一小撮人。 前0.


The share of income received by the top 0.5% has reached 14%, where it was in the 1920s.	5％的人收入占全社会总收入的份额已达14％，上次出现这样的情况还是在1920年代。


Normally, one would think that diagnosing the cause of such a fundamental shift would be a necessary step in prescribing a cure.	通常人们会觉得找到这类根本性转变的成因才是开出药方的必要步骤。


In that case, one might be discouraged by the over-abundance of plausible explanations that have been offered and the difficulty in choosing among them.	但在这种情况下，你会被一大堆看似合理的解释淹没，陷入选择困难，最终消磨掉了所有决心。


Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century emphasizes what he sees as a very long-term trend arising from a high return to capital, which causes inherited wealth to accumulate at a faster rate than earned income grows.	托马斯•皮克提（Thomas Piketty）在《二十一世纪的资本》一书中重点强调了由高资本回报率所催生的一个超长期趋势，使得财富传承的积累速度高于工资收入的增长。


Piketty’s book, published in 2013, did much to put inequality back on the agenda of American economists.	这本出版于2013年的书影响巨大，令不平等状况重归美国经济学家的议程之中。


But most researchers believe that the sources of widening US inequality lie primarily within earned income, rather than arising from the difference between earned income (wages and salaries) and unearned income (return on capital).	但大多数研究人员认为，美国不断扩大的不平等状况主要来源于收入内部的不平等，而非来自劳动收入（工资和薪金）和非劳动收入（资本回报）之间的差异。


The first explanation for earned-income inequality is technological change, which raises the demand for skilled workers faster than the supply.	针对劳动收入不平等的第一个解释是技术变革，这令对高技术工人的需求增长比供给要快。


But, while this can explain a widening wage or income gap between skilled and “unskilled” workers (defined according to whether they are college-educated), this has little to do with the gap between the top 1% and the rest.	不过虽然这可以解释高技术和“非技术”工人（以其是否受过大学教育来界定）之间不断扩大的工资或收入差距，却无法解释最富有的那1％和其他人之间的差距。


The second explanation is what is called “assortative mating,” according to which highly accomplished professional men no longer marry their secretaries, but instead choose highly accomplished professional women.	第二种解释是所谓的“选型交配”：那些成就卓越的成功男士不会再娶他们的秘书为妻，而是选择同样成绩斐然的职业女性。


The third is the winner-take-all character of many professions, from dentists to university professors to movie stars.	第三种解释是许多行业（从牙医到大学教授再到电影明星）赢家通吃的特质。


Because modern media tell us who is the best dentist in town or the best movie actor in the world, relatively small differences in abilities win far bigger differences in income than they used to.	由于现代传媒会告诉我们谁是城里最好的牙医或是世上最好的演员，在能力上相对小的差异却能产生比过去大得多的收入差异。


According to the fourth explanation, the very high compensation of corporate executives, especially in the financial sector, is not a return to services that are in demand because they are socially valuable (like having gone to medical school or having been born with acting talent).	而第四种解释认为，企业高管获得的极高花红，尤其是在金融领域，并不是因其服务于有社会价值（比如毕业于医学院或拥有与生俱来的表演天赋）的需求所带来的回报。


Rather, managers essentially get to set the terms of their own pay, through compensation packages that reflect failures of corporate governance, tax law, and financial engineering.	相反，这些高管们基本上都是自己收入条款的设定者，这其实反映出在公司治理，税法和金融工程等方面的失灵。


Stock options, for example, have failed in their original goal of relating pay to performance.	例如股票期权原本是为了将薪酬与绩效联系起来，如今却变了味。


Finally, an especially popular explanation is that the rich have captured the levers of power, through campaign donations.	最后一个特别流行的解释认为富人已攫取权力的杠杆。


The politicians they finance are only too eager to enact favorable policies.	通过竞选捐款，他们资助的政客们都纷纷制定有利于富人的政策。


But many policy prescriptions to ameliorate inequality apply regardless of the cause.	而不管原因为何，许多改善不平等状况的政策药方其实都适用。


Most would make the tax system more progressive, by, for example, lowering the effective marginal tax rate for low-income workers – what US President Barack Obama has called “making work pay.”	大多数会采用更加先进的税收制度，例如为降低低收入劳动者的有效边际税率——就是美国总统奥巴马所提出的 “让工作真正挣钱”。


Enhancing the earned-income tax credit is a live option today, and Obama proposed in his January 2016 State of the Union address expanding wage insurance, which currently helps workers who lose their jobs because of trade but could be extended to those who lose their jobs due to technological change.	强化劳动所得税抵免也是当前的一个热点选择，奥巴马在他2016年1月发表的国情咨文中提出扩大工资保险，该保险目前只能帮助那些因为一般工作原因而失业的人，未来可能延伸到那些遭遇科技变革影响的失业者。


Similarly, the payroll tax for low-income workers could be eliminated.	同样，对于低收入工人的工资税也可能被取消。


In light of looming deficits for America’s Social Security and Medicare programs, such changes in the tax code should ideally be revenue-neutral.	鉴于美国的社会保障和医疗保险计划可能出现赤字，这类税收准则上的变化理论上应该对财政收入影响不大。


The Republican candidates for president this year, as usual, propose massive tax cuts, focused on the rich, without a plan for how to pay for them.	今年共和党总统候选人像往常一样提出针对富人大规模减税，却拿不出个如何支付社保和医保的方案来。


The US can raise additional revenue with which to address inequality in fiscally responsible ways.	美国可以用在财政上负责任的方式去增加额外收入以应对不平等状况。


The tax break for “carried interest,” by which hedge-fund managers’ income is taxed at low capital-gains rates, should be abolished (as Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton favors), and the exemption for the estate tax (originally expanded by George W. Bush) could be reduced.	对于“附带权益”的税务豁免——比如以较低的资本利得税率向对冲基金经理的收入征税——应该取消（民主党总统候选人希拉里•克林顿正是如此主张），同时对房地产税的豁免（最初由小布什提出）可以减少。


At the same time, the cap on payroll taxes for upper-income workers could be raised, and distorting tax deductions, like that for mortgage interest, could be tightened for upper-income households.	与此同时，对高收入劳动者的工资税上限可能被提高，而针对高收入家庭的扭曲性税收减免（例如相关抵押贷款利率）则会收紧。


A lot should be done on the spending side, too.	在支出侧也有许多事情可做。


Examples include universal high-quality preschool, health insurance for all, and infrastructure spending.	例子包括提供高品质普遍性学前教育，为所有人提供医疗保险，以及基础设施支出。


Many of those who are upset about inequality are attracted to the banner of Bernie Sanders (or that of Donald Trump).	许多对不平等状况感到沮丧的人被吸引到伯尼•桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）或唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）的旗帜下。


Many believe that one must break up banks in order to address the root cause of the problem, which is thought to be that the rich have “bought” politicians.	许多人认为必须拆分银行才能彻底铲除问题的根源，因为正是这些富人“收买”了政治家们。


Money in politics is indeed a big problem.	金钱确实是政治上的一大问题。


But what do politicians use all that money for?	但是政治家会怎么用这些钱呢？


It doesn’t go into their pockets (at least not in the US).	它不会进入他们的口袋（至少在美国不会）。


It goes to running for office: campaign advertisements and mobilizing supporters.	他们会花钱去竞选公职：发布竞选广告和动员支持者。


In my view, voting for candidates who will enact the right policies is a far more direct strategy for addressing inequality – and much else – than voting for those who want to break up the banks to reduce the amount of money available to dissuade voters from supporting the right candidates.	在我看来，投票支持的那些会推行正确政策去解决不平等状况——以及其他各项事务——的候选人才是更为直接的策略，而非把选票投给那些想分拆银行并最终减少可动用的资金数量，妄图以此阻碍选民选择合适人选的候选人。


A Perfectly Crazy Idea for the IMF	一个对IMF的彻底疯狂建议


GENEVA – In the movie Dangerous Minds, the actress Michelle Pfeiffer plays a former US Marine who becomes a teacher in an inner-city high school.	发自日内瓦——在电影《危险心灵》中，女演员米歇尔·普法伊费尔（Michelle Pfeiffer）饰演一位在内陆小城担任高中老师的前美国海军陆战队员。


In a difficult environment, where academic achievement is far from the top of the rebellious teens’ list of priorities, Pfeiffer’s character comes up with an unorthodox – and effective – new approach: each student will start the year with an “A” grade, which is theirs to lose.	在面对一帮无心向学的叛逆少年时，这位女教师想出了一个路子有点野但相当有效的新点子：每个学生都以“A”等成绩开始自己的学年，随课堂表现而扣减。


At a time when many emerging-market economies are as discouraged as Pfeiffer’s students, perhaps the International Monetary Fund should take a page out of her playbook.	而 当许多新兴市场经济体都像那些学生一样自暴自弃的时候，也许国际货币基金组织（IMF）也该和这位女教师一样将剧本翻到新的一页了。


Emerging economies inhabit a risky world characterized by volatile capital flows.	新兴经济体处于一个资本流动极不稳定的高风险世界中。


But, rather than rely on the IMF to fulfill its mandate of protecting them from liquidity crises, they self-insure by accumulating large stockpiles of international reserves.	对此它们通过积累大量国际储备来自我保障，而非等待IMF出手履行其保护各国免遭流动性危机的使命。


Emerging and developing economies now lend nearly $7.5 trillion to the US Treasury – resources that could be used to fund badly needed infrastructure projects.	迄今为止新兴和发展中经济体已经向美国财政部贷款达7. 5万亿美元——这些钱本可用来资助各国国内急需的基础设施建设项目。


What is curious about this approach is that the IMF’s record in handling financial crises, though far from perfect, is generally quite good.	这种做法的奇怪之处就在于：虽然IMF在处理金融危机方面的记录不尽完美，但一般还是相当不错的。


So why the reluctance to count on the Fund?	那么为何各国都不愿向该组织求助？


Perhaps the most obvious reason is timing.	其中最明显的理由或许是时机。


For historical reasons, most Fund facilities are better suited to managing crises than they are to preventing them.	由于各种历史原因，大多数基金设施更擅长管理而不是防止危机。


By the time countries turn to the IMF for support, they have already lost access to international capital markets.	在受灾国向IMF求助时，它们往往已经断绝了一切进入国际资本市场的渠道。


Yet they have to engage in protracted negotiations that allow the situation to deteriorate before it improves.	同时它们还必须经历漫长的谈判，导致使局势在出现转机之前进一步恶化。


Tapping a country’s own reserves may not be an ideal option, but at least it is fast.	调用一个国家自身储备可能不是一个理想的选择，但至少足够迅速。


But the IMF does offer a fast option.	但IMF确实提供了一个快速选项。


The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) facility grants immediate access to Fund resources, no questions asked.	灵活信用额度（Flexible Credit Line）机制允许各国在无需回答任何问题的情况下迅速获取基金资源。


It amounts to a pre-approved loan that eligible countries can obtain whenever they want, on the basis of the strength of their fundamentals and policy record. It is thus the perfect tool for preventing self-fulfilling liquidity crises.	这相当于符合资格的国家可以根据其基本面状况以及政策记录随时获取一笔预先批准好的贷款,因此也是防止自我强化型流动性危机的完美工具。


Yet IMF members do not seem to be interested in the FCL.	然而各IMF成员国似乎对上述机制不太感冒。


Seven years after the facility was developed, only three countries (Colombia, Mexico, and Poland) have access to it.	该机制建立七年来只有三个国家（哥伦比亚，墨西哥和波兰）使用过。


While not all of the Fund’s 189 members could qualify for it, the number that do is a lot higher than three.	虽然并非IMF的189个成员国都有使用资格，但实际数量远远不止3个。


The FCL-like Precautionary and Liquidity Line, which has an even lower bar for eligibility, has only two takers.	而与FCL类似的预防和流动性额度（Precautionary and Liquidity Line），虽然门槛更低，但也只得两个受援国。


The problem is stigma.	问题在于名声。


Countries fear that by applying for pre-approval – a process that they are not confident will remain confidential, as promised – they will signal potential economic problems.	虽然IMF声明预先批准的申请过程是保密的，但各国却对此将信将疑，害怕一旦走漏了风声就会被视为存在潜在经济问题。


Worse, they could be rejected, either the first time they apply or when their approval comes up for review (every 1-2 years); that would surely undermine confidence in their economies, if word of it were to get out.	更糟糕的是，申请——无论是首次申请还是1~2年一度的复审——都可能被拒绝； 如果这事传了出去，肯定也会削弱外界对本国经济体的信心。


This is where Pfeiffer’s strategy comes in.	这就是女教师的策略能奏效的地方。


Instead of forcing countries to work for approval, the IMF could create a new FCL-like facility for which all of its members are pre-approved, with the exception of countries that do not meet certain criteria in terms of policies and fundamentals.	与其迫使各国申请批准，IMF可以创建一个新的FCL类机制，除了那些因政策和基本面不符合某些标准的国家之外，所有成员国都能预先获得批准。


Exceptions could be identified as part of the IMF’s so-called Article IV consultations with members – an approach that would strengthen IMF country surveillance.	那些例外情况可以被定义为IMF与成员国之间所谓第四条（Article IV）磋商的一部分——某种强化IMF对该国监控程度的手段。


As for the rest, pre-approval would substantially diminish the temptation to self-insure by accumulating reserves.	至于其他方面，预先批准会大大减少引发囤积储备的自我保障动机。


As with any attempt to change the status quo, this approach would raise challenges.	正如任何改变现状的企图一样，这种方法也会迎来挑战。


For starters, IMF staff could face political pressure from countries that did not qualify, particularly if those countries were among the IMF’s more influential members.	首先，基金组织工作人员可能遭遇那些不合资格国家所施加政治压力，特别那些在IMF中比较有影响力的成员国。


But, as Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati suggested in 2006, this risk could be mitigated by specific, measurable, and transparent criteria.	但正如廷托·卡德拉（Tito Cordella）和爱德华多·勒维·叶雅迪（Eduardo Levy Yeyati）在2006年所建议的那样，可以通过具体，可衡量和透明的标准来舒缓这类风险。


The disadvantage of this approach is that it would preclude more nuanced country-specific analyses involving qualitative assessments.	而这种方法的缺点在于将涉及更详细的针对每个国家特殊情况的分析，其中涉及众多定性评估。


Moreover, if evaluations were made public, negative assessments could precipitate crises.	此外，如果评价过程被公之于众，某些负面评估或会引发危机。


Ensuring that the eligibility criteria are clear and specific could help to prevent such an outcome.	确保明确和具体的资格标准将有助于防止这种结果。


A more direct approach to preventing crises in weaker economies would be to create a continuous eligibility scale, akin to the sovereign rating scale (which does not have a large effect on country risk), with countries at different points on the scale having access to different types of precautionary facilities.	一个防止较疲弱经济体爆发危机的更直接方法是创建一个类似于（对国家风险没有很大影响的）主权评级量表的连续型资格标准，不同国家在量表中的位置不同，从而获得的预防机制也不同。


The final risk is that, if many countries fulfill the criteria, the Fund might not have enough resources to meet its commitments in a crisis.	最后的风险是，如果许多国家都能达到标准，IMF可能没有足够的资源来履行其在危机中的承诺。


This problem could be solved by boosting the Fund’s capacity to borrow, while reducing the amount of resources that the Fund needs to set aside for FCL-like facilities.	这个问题可以通过提高基金借款能力，同时减少其需要为类FCL机制预留的资源量来解决。


After all, a successful precautionary credit line is one that is never (or very rarely) used.	毕竟一个从来不会（或很少）被使用的预防信用额度才是一个成功的机制。


Financial globalization demands a stronger global financial safety net.	金融全球化需要一个更强有力的全球金融安全网来支撑。


Economists and policymakers have been tinkering with the international financial architecture since the mid-1990s, without much success.	自1990年代中期以来，经济学家和政策制定者一直在修改国际金融架构，但却并未取得多少成功。


While the idea of redefining the status quo may sound crazy, it may be, to paraphrase the physicist Niels Bohr, just crazy enough to be right.	虽然重新定义现状的想法可能听起来很疯狂，但或许可以改写一下物理学家尼尔斯·玻尔（Niels Bohr）的名言，是否疯狂到一定程度，才有实现正确的可能。


Egypt after Morsi	穆尔西身后的埃及


BERLIN – Egypt lies at the heart of the Arab revolution, even if the original spark occurred in Tunisia.	柏林—埃及是阿拉伯革命的核心，尽管最初的星星之火点燃在突尼斯。


But Egypt – with its strategic location, stable borders, large population, and ancient history – has been the principal power of the Arab world for centuries, defining the movement of history there like no other.	但埃及——及其战略位置、稳定的边境线、庞大的人口和古老的历史——几百年来一直是阿拉伯世界的主要力量，其决定阿拉伯历史走向的作用无人能及。


This implies that the overthrow of Egypt’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, will have much broader repercussions.	这意味着埃及民选总统穆尔西的下台将引起更广泛的反响。


Was Morsi’s ouster a classic counterrevolution in the guise of a military coup?	穆尔西的下台典型的披着军事政变的反革命吗？


Or did the coup prevent a total takeover of power by the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus avert Egypt’s economic collapse and chaotic descent into religious dictatorship?	还是政变防止了穆斯林兄弟会的全面掌权，从而避免了埃及经济的崩溃和混乱地走向宗教独裁？


No one should deny that what happened in Egypt was a military coup, or that forces from former President Hosni Mubarak’s regime have returned to power.	没人可以否认埃及所发生的事件属于军事政变，或者来自前总统穆巴拉克政权的势力重新掌握了权力。


But, unlike in 2011, when the few pro-Western liberals and huge numbers of urban, middle-class youth rallied against Mubarak, now the same groups support the coup, lending it a certain (democratic?) legitimacy.	但是，与2011年不同的是，当时极少数亲西方自由派和数量庞大的城市中产阶级年轻人群起反对穆巴拉克，而如今同一个群体支持政变，使政变具有了一定程度的（民主的？


Nonetheless, the overthrow of a democratically elected government by the military cannot be glossed over.	）合法性。 尽管如此，这无法为民选政府被军队推翻洗地。


So what options does Egypt now have?	那么，如今埃及的观点如何？


Will it repeat the Algerian tragedy, in which the military canceled an election to prevent Islamists from assuming power, leading to an eight-year civil war that claimed up to 200,000 lives?	它会重蹈阿尔及利亚悲剧的覆辙吗？ 阿尔及利亚军队曾取消了一次选举以防止伊斯兰教掌权，结果导致了八年内战，20万人因此丧命。


Will the country return to military dictatorship?	埃及会回到军事独裁吗？


Or will Egypt end up with something like a Kemalist “democracy” of the type that long prevailed in Turkey, with a civilian government but the military pulling the strings?	或者，埃及最终会迎来类似于长期存在于土耳其的基马尔主义（Kemalist）式“民主”，即由军队操纵的傀儡文职政府吗？


All three alternatives are possible, though it is impossible to predict which one will come to pass.	所有这三条道路都有可能发生，但具体是哪一条还不可能预测。


But one thing already can be said for certain: the basic distribution of power within Egyptian society has not changed.	但有一点可以说已经确定无疑，那就是埃及人内部的权力分配。


The military and the Muslim Brotherhood divide power between themselves. The Western-oriented liberals do not have any real power and stand, as we are seeing now, on the army���s shoulders.	西方导向的自由派没有任何真正的权力，正如我们所看到的，他们唯军队马首是瞻。


We should not forget that Morsi’s opponent in the presidential election in 2012 was Ahmed Shafik, a former general and the last Mubarak-era prime minister – certainly no liberal.	我们不应该忘记，穆尔西在2012年总统选举中的对手是沙菲克，而沙菲克是前将军、穆巴拉克时代末代总理，且显然不是自由派。


A victory by either the Brotherhood or the military would not be a victory for democracy.	不管是穆兄会还是军队获得胜利，都不是民主的胜利。


Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since 2006, may serve as an example of what the Brotherhood wants: undivided power, including over the military.	2006年以来统治着加沙地带的哈马斯可以作为穆兄会意图的一个例子：完全的权力，包括军队。


Likewise, the Egyptian army’s hold on power, beginning in the 1950’s, resulted in a decades-long military dictatorship.	类似地，自20世纪50年代开始把持权力的埃及军队也是数十年军事独裁史的结果。


But there is a third and new factor now in play, one that does not measure power in the same way as the military and the Brotherhood.	但现在有了第三个、也是新出现的因素的作用，它衡量权力的方式不同于军队和穆兄会。


Through their leadership of the protests for two years, urban middle-class youth have gained their own legitimacy, and, with their technological and linguistic capacities, are able to dominate global debate about Egypt.	通过两年来对示威游行的领导，城市中产阶级年轻人赢得了他们自身的合法性，且他们拥有技术和语言能力，能主导关于埃及的全球争论。


These young people want progress, not power; they want the future to resemble the life that they see on the Internet and in the West.	这些年轻人希望进步，而不是权力； 他们希望未来可以获得他们从互联网和西方所了解到的生活。


If this movement were channeled into institutional politics, it would significantly affect Egypt’s internal distribution of power.	如果这一运动被引导到制度政治，将极大地影响埃及国内权力分配。


Egypt’s unfolding drama will be framed by the triangle of contradictions and demands among these three groups.	埃及的闹剧将由这个三角矛盾以及这三个群体的要求决定。


And it should not be forgotten that, along with young people’s sense that they lacked a future under the nationalistic military dictatorships of the past, mass poverty was the second trigger of the 2011 revolution.	我们也不应该忘记，年轻人感到在过去的民族主义军事独裁下他们没有未来，除此之外，大规模贫困是爆发2011年革命的第二因素。


Underlying the contradiction between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood is not only the question of religion, but also all of the social problems, including inequality, that riddle Arab societies.	军队和穆斯林兄弟会冲突的原因不仅仅是宗教问题，而是充斥着整个阿拉伯社会的社会问题，其中就包括不平等性问题。


The Brotherhood has effectively assumed a role similar to that of left-wing European political parties in the nineteenth century.	穆兄会有效地扮演了类似于19世纪欧洲左翼政党的角色。


Whoever wants to weaken the Brotherhood has to address the urgent social issues that it raises and try to solve them.	如果你想削弱穆兄会，就必须决绝解决它所带来并试图解决的紧迫社会问题。


This means that whatever solution ultimately prevails will be measured according to whether it can solve the economic crisis (particularly the lack of job opportunities for the young) and deepening mass poverty.	这意味着最终什么解决方案会胜出将通过该方案是否能解决经济危机（特别是年轻人就业机会不足的问题）和不断深化的大规模贫困问题来衡量。


The chances of this are slim.	机会很小。


Throughout the Arab world, nationalism constricts societies and retards cooperation, the dismantling of tariffs, and the creation of an economic community.	放眼阿拉伯世界，民族主义束缚着社会，阻碍着合作、取消关税和建立经济社会。


And yet the economies of the Arab countries in crisis are too small to succeed on their own; even if everything goes well, they cannot offer their large and young populations hope of a positive future.	危机中的阿拉伯国家太小，不可能单枪匹马获得成功； 即使所有方面都进展良好，它们也无法给广大年轻人带来积极未来的希望。


They need enhanced cooperation, which, given a common language, would rest on a stronger foundation than it does in Europe.	它们需要加强合作，共同的语言意味着阿拉伯世界的合作基础比欧洲更好。


In Egypt, the West should work with all three leading political forces – the military, the Brotherhood, and the urban young – because no short-term solution will come in the form of one option.	在埃及，西方应该与所有三大领先政治实力合作，即军队、穆兄会和城市年轻人，因为从短期看不可能会出现单一观点的解决方案。


The worst approach would be to marginalize or even persecute the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam again.	最坏的情形是再一次边缘化甚至迫害穆斯林兄弟会甚至伊斯兰政治势力。


More broadly, with Syria’s civil war destabilizing Lebanon and threatening to do the same in Jordan, and with Iraq plagued by similar sectarian violence, the military coup in Egypt appears to herald the end of the Arab revolutions, at least for the time being.	更广地说，叙利亚内战动摇着黎巴嫩，也威胁约旦，与此同时，伊拉克也在饱受类似的宗派暴力的摧残，因此埃及军事政变似乎是阿拉伯革命结束的先声，至少从目前看是如此。


Everywhere, the signs are pointing backwards.	所有地方的信号都指向相反的方向。


But we should not be deceived.	但我们也别被欺骗了。


Even if the struggle for power seems decided, this does not mean a return to the former status quo.	即使权力之争已经确定，但这并不意味着回到从前的状况。


When the revolutions of 1848 in Europe were rolled back the following year, everything was nonetheless different, as we now know.	如今我们知道，当1848年欧洲革命在一年后卷土重来时，一切都已经不同。


The monarchies remained in power for decades, but the Industrial Revolution and the advent of democracy had become unstoppable.	君主制继续掌了几十年权力，但工业革命和民主的崛起已经势不可挡。


We also know, however, that this led Europe to a future that was anything but serene.	但是，我们也知道，这给欧洲带来的未来一点都不平静。


The Arab world might not be so deeply affected, but the near future there will certainly be neither peaceful nor stable.	阿拉伯世界或许受影响不会那么深，但近期未来显然也不会和平稳定。


The Arab Wars of Religion	阿拉伯宗教战争


MADRID – Throughout the Arab world, a struggle between two major historical forces, religion and secularism, is now unfolding.	马德里—纵观阿拉伯世界，两大历史势力之争——宗教和世俗——方兴未艾。


It is the type of battle between Caesar and God that took Europe centuries to resolve.	这场战争堪与折磨欧洲数百年之久的凯撒和上帝之战相媲。


The future of the Arab Middle East will be decided in the fight between Syria’s Sunni insurgents, supported throughout the region by the Saudi Wahhabis – the patrons of religious fundamentalism – and its secular Baath regime; between the fundamentalist Hamas and the secular PLO in Palestine; and between Egypt’s young secular opposition, forged in the protests of Tahrir Square, and the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Salafists.	阿拉伯中东的未来将取决于叙利亚的逊尼派叛军（他们有原教旨主义赞助人、沙特瓦哈比派在整个地区的支持）及其世俗的社会复兴党（Baath）政权之争、原教旨主义哈马斯和世俗的巴解组织之争、以及埃及形成于解放广场示威的青年世俗反对派与穆斯林兄弟会和极端沙拉菲派之争。


So far, the Arab revolts have vindicated the assumption that, given the structure of most Arab societies, toppling secular autocracies inevitably means opening the door to Islamic democracies.	目前，阿拉伯革命已经证明了一个假设——大多数阿拉伯社会的结构决定了推翻世俗独裁免不了意味着开启了伊斯兰民主的大门。 我们多次看到了这一动态。


We saw that dynamic play out in Algeria in the early 1990’s, with the Islamic Salvation Front’s first-round victory in a parliamentary election (which prompted the cancellation of the second round); with Hamas’s electoral victory in Palestine in 2006; and, most recently, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic rise to power in Egypt.	20世纪90年代初的阿尔及利亚是如此，伊斯兰救世阵线（Islamic Salvation Front）在议会选举第一轮中胜出（这导致第二轮选举被取消）； 2006年哈马斯在巴勒斯坦选举中获胜也是如此；


In both Algeria and Egypt, secular forces were incapable of stemming political Islam’s rise, which could be cut short only by a military takeover.	在阿尔及利亚和埃及，世俗力量无力阻止政治伊斯兰的崛起，只有通过军事接管才能遏制。


The Algerian military coup eventually ushered in a bloody civil war that is estimated to have taken more than 200,000 lives.	阿尔及利亚军事政变最终演变成血腥内战，据估计有超过20万人丧命。


The consequences of the Egyptian coup have still to unfold.	埃及政变的后果可能尚有待发酵。


The secular opposition’s accession to power on the back of a tank might feed the Islamists’ rage for years to come.	世俗反对派在坦克的支持下问鼎权力，这可能导致未来多年中伊斯兰教徒的怒火。


The Muslim Brotherhood’s loss of trust in the democratic process would be bad news for Egypt and a boost to Al Qaeda and other jihadists who believe that power can be obtained only through blood and terror.	穆斯林兄弟会在民主进程中丧失了信誉，这对埃及来说是一个坏消息，而对相信权力只能来自鲜血和恐怖的基地组织和其他圣战主义者来说这是一针强心剂。


The concept of separation of church and state is alien to Islam – former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini once famously declared that “Islam is politics or it is nothing” – and Islamists have still to prove that they are amenable to democratic governance.	让教堂和国家分离的思想与伊斯兰教不相容——前伊朗最高领袖霍梅尼有一句名言，“伊斯兰教要么是政治，要么什么也不是”——伊斯兰教徒仍然需要证明他们可以服从于民主治理。


Indeed, Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s deposed president, has only himself to blame for his political demise.	事实上，被推翻的埃及总统穆尔西丢掉政治前途只能怪罪自己。


His sectarian, authoritarian behavior polarized his country to such a degree that even the army’s chief, General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, known for his Islamist sympathies, withdrew his support from the man who had appointed him.	他的宗派主义独裁行为导致了埃及的极化，以至于以同情伊斯兰教著称的军队首脑西西（Abdul Fattah al-Sisi）将军也不再支持任命了他的穆尔西。


Likewise, the revival of the Shia-Sunni civil war in Iraq largely reflects the sectarian rule of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.	类似地，伊拉克什叶派-逊尼派战争的死灰复燃在很大程度上是拜总理马利基的宗派统治所赐。


Nor has Hamas’s rise to power in Gaza ushered in inclusive, democratic governance.	哈马斯在加沙地带的崛起和掌权也没有带来包容性的民主治理。


After having failed to reverse Hamas’s electoral victory by military means, the PLO agreed with its Islamist rivals on a plan for national reconciliation; but this pact remains a dead letter.	在试图以军事手段推翻哈马斯的选举胜利失败后，巴解组织与其伊斯兰教对手就国民和解问题达成了一致，但这份契约无异于废纸一张。


As for Syria, the revolt against one of the most secular autocracies in the Arab world has degenerated into a fight to the death between Sunnis and Shia that is spilling over to other countries in the region.	再看叙利亚，针对阿拉伯世界最世俗的独裁政权之一的革命退化为一场逊尼派和什叶派之间的殊死斗争，并且可能溢出到中东地区的其他国家。


A Sunni jihad has now been launched against the Baath regime and its Shia allies, Iran and Hezbollah.	如今，一场针对社会复兴党政权及其什叶派盟友伊朗和真主党的逊尼派圣战已经打响。


Neighboring Lebanon, with its fierce Sunni-Shia divide, is already being directly affected.	存在严重逊尼派-什叶派冲突的邻国黎巴嫩已经受到了直接影响。


The struggle between religion and state in the Maghreb is less violent, but potentially explosive nonetheless.	马格里布（Maghreb）的宗教和国家之争没有那么暴力，但也具有爆发性潜力。


Tunisia, where the Arab Spring began, is now caught between secularists and religious fundamentalists.	阿拉伯之春的起源地突尼斯如今也有世俗派和原教旨主义者纠缠不清。


The Islamist Ennahda party leads the government, but it faces a serious challenge from the ultra-conservative Salafists of Hizb Ut-Tahrir.	伊斯兰复兴运动党（Islamist Ennahda）领导着突尼斯政府，但它面临来自极端保守的沙拉菲派伊斯兰解放党（Hizb Ut-Tahrir）的严重挑战。


In Morocco, King Mohammed VI did not conceal his support for the Egyptian coup, but the Islamist Justice and Development Party, which leads his government, denounced it.	在摩洛哥，国王穆罕默德四世毫不隐瞒他对埃及政变的支持，但领导摩洛哥政府的伊斯兰正义和发展党（Islamist Justice and Development Party，JDP）意见相反。


Indeed, Istiqlal, a secular center-right party, left the government in the wake of the Egyptian coup, accusing the JDP, under Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, of trying to “Egyptianize” Morocco by monopolizing power, as Morsi did in Egypt.	事实上，世俗中右翼政党独立党（Istiqlal）在埃及政变前夕脱离了政府，并指责以首相本基兰（Abdelilah Benkirane）为首的JDP试图通过效仿穆尔西在埃及那样垄断权力使摩洛哥“埃及化”。


Even in Turkey, a non-Arab Muslim country with strong aspirations to reconcile Islam with democracy, the agreement between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist government and the urban middle class to limit official encroachment on secular lifestyles is unraveling.	甚至在让伊斯兰教和民主相协调的愿望十分强烈的非阿拉伯的穆斯林国家土耳其，总理埃尔多安的伊斯兰教政府和城市中产阶级之间就限制官方对世俗生活方式指手画脚问题所达成的一致也在动摇之中。


Erdoğan now promises to “reconstruct Turkey” in his own authoritarian and religious image.	如今埃尔多安誓要按他自己的独裁和宗教形象“重建土耳其”。


The Arabs’ march to freedom is bound to be a long and tortuous process – perhaps the main geopolitical test of the twenty-first century.	阿拉伯人迈向自由的长征之路注定是漫长而曲折的——或许将是21世纪的主要地缘政治考验。


Yet the battle between secularism and religion in the Arab world does not have to last centuries, as it did in Europe, if only because contemporary generations can benefit from the long process of social and scientific progress that enabled the West to pave the way to modern democracy.	但阿拉伯世界的世俗和宗教之争并不需要像欧洲那样持续几百年，原因很简单：当代人可以从让西方通往现代民主的社会和科学进步的长期过程中获益。


But adapting this Western legacy for the contemporary Arab world, while recovering Arabs’ own medieval heritage of tolerance and scientific excellence, will be difficult.	但让当代阿拉伯世界接受这一西方遗产、同时复兴阿拉伯自身的宽容和擅长科学的中世纪传统将是十分困难的。


One hopes that Egypt’s defeated Islamists will move from the politics of vengeance to a soul-searching process that leads to the recognition that democracy is not a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all.	但愿在埃及受到打击的伊斯兰教能告别复仇的政治，走向反省，认识到民主不是赢家通吃的零和博弈。


The Leninist “democratic centralism” to which Morsi seemed to have subscribed, if maintained, will be a standing provocation to the new generations and their allies in the old state apparatus to rise up, even at the price of civil war.	穆尔西所采纳的列宁主义的“民主集中制”如果持续下去，将是对旧国家组织中的新一代人及其盟友的崛起的挑衅，这甚至会导致内战的代价。


Egypt for Sale	出售中的埃及


CAIRO – Last week’s visit to Egypt by King Salman of Saudi Arabia resulted in 22 agreements, including a $22 billion oil deal to prop up Egypt’s moribund economy.	开罗——沙特阿拉伯国王萨尔曼上周访问埃及签署了22项协议，包括一项220亿美元的石油协议撑起埃及垂死的经济。


But the lavish aid came at a price: Egypt had to relinquish two Red Sea islands ceded to it by Saudi Arabia in 1950.	但这样大方的援助需要付出代价：埃及不得不放弃1950年沙特阿拉伯割让给它的两座红海岛屿。


The move exposed the Egyptian leadership’s narrative that the country remains a major regional power as a lie.	此举拆穿了埃及领导人关于该国依然是地区大国的谎言。


Indeed, Egypt cannot even handle domestic challenges posed by a rapidly growing population dependent on unaffordable subsidies – a situation that jihadists are exploiting with much success.	事实上，埃及甚至无法应对依赖超额补贴的迅速增长的人口所造成的国内难题——圣战分子非常成功的利用了这一局势。


How did the country reach this point?	埃及究竟怎样陷入到如此境地？


When Muhammad Ali defeated the British in 1807, Egypt became the first Arab country to gain de facto independence.	默罕默德·阿里1807年击败英国人使埃及成为第一个赢得事实上独立的阿拉伯国家。


But Ali’s grandson, Ismail, squandered that independence with profligate spending, establishing a dependency on external assistance that persists to this day.	但阿里之孙伊斯梅尔的挥霍无度浪费了这种独立，造成了一直延续至今的依赖外部援助。


First, Ismail was forced to sell Egypt’s shares in the Suez Canal in 1875 to cover his budget deficits.	首先，伊斯梅尔被迫于1875年出售埃及在苏伊士运河的股权用于支付其财政赤字。


When that proved insufficient to stop the fiscal hemorrhaging, European creditors established a committee to ensure payment.	当事实证明这并不足以止住财政大出血时，欧洲债权人成立了一家保障债务支付的委员会。


By 1877, more than 60% of Egypt’s revenue was servicing this debt.	到1877年，埃及超过60%的收入都用来还债。


In 1882, the British took control of the country to protect their investments.	1882年，英国为了保护在埃及的投资而控制埃及。


Egypt’s dependence on the British continued until Gamal Abdel-Nasser took power in 1952.	埃及对英国的依赖一直到贾迈尔·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔1952年掌权才结束。


He welcomed the Soviets, who provided sophisticated weapons in exchange for the same kinds of IOUs that doomed his predecessor.	纳赛尔张开双臂欢迎苏联，后者为其提供先进的武器以换取曾为其前任带来厄运的同样类型的借据。


By the time Nasser died in 1970, the Soviet Navy had transformed the port of Alexandria into a virtual Soviet republic, with Russian spoken as a second language.	到1970年纳赛尔去世时，苏联海军已经将亚历山大港变成了以俄语为第二语言的事实上的苏联加盟共和国。


Meanwhile, Nasser pursued costly populist economic policies.	此外，纳赛尔还奉行代价昂贵的民粹主义经济政策。


He expanded the bureaucracy by offering every college graduate a government sinecure; today, 24% of the workforce is employed by the state.	他拓展了官僚机构，为每一位大学毕业生提供了一份政府闲职； 今天，政府雇佣了该国24%的劳动力。


He introduced subsidies for commodities, from bread to oil, that amounted to 8.1% of GDP in 2013-2014.	他为从面包到石油的所有商品提供补贴，2013-2014年占比高达 GDP的8. 1%。


In 2014-2015, 81% of the budget went to debt service, subsidies, and wages, crowding out education and other investments essential to long-term growth.	2014-2015年，81%的预算都用来还债、支付补贴和工资，挤占了对长期增长至关重要的教育和其他投资。


All of this intensified Egypt’s need for foreign aid.	所有这些都加剧了埃及对国外援助的急需。


And, in fact, despite Nasser’s pro-Soviet bent, Egypt was the largest recipient of American foreign aid until its disastrous war with Israel in 1967 froze relations.	而且事实上，尽管纳赛尔具有亲苏倾向，直到1967年与以色列的灾难性战争冻结埃美关系之前，埃及一直是美国对外援助的最大接受国。


Unable to challenge Israel militarily, Soviet pilots engaged Israeli adversaries in dogfights over the Suez Canal.	因为无法在军事上挑战以色列，苏联飞行员在苏伊士运河上空与以色列对手展开了空中格斗。


Nasser, who railed against imperialism and economic subservience, had delivered his country into vassalage.	热衷于抨击帝国主义和经济从属性的纳赛尔亲手让自己的国家成为了附庸。


Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, attempted to revive Egypt by liberalizing the economy, making peace with Israel, and abandoning the alliance with the Soviets in favor of the US and Western Europe.	纳赛尔的继任者安瓦尔·萨达特试图通过自由化重振埃及经济、与以色列握手言和，并放弃与苏联结盟而转向西欧和美国。


He was rewarded with an aid package that averaged more than $2 billion per year.	他因此获得了每年超过20亿美元的援助奖励。


But, with Egypt’s population growing at an annual rate of 2.2%, even this was not enough.	但因为埃及人口年增长2. 2%，就连这笔巨款也不足以应付支出。


Today, Egypt also depends on aid from Europe and the Persian Gulf, delivered through, for example, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development.	今天，埃及同样依赖于欧洲和波斯湾国家所提供的援助，援助渠道包括阿拉伯经济和社会发展基金、阿布扎比发展基金和沙特发展基金。


The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has given Egypt $2.5 billion – more than 50% in the form of grants – making Egypt its largest aid recipient.	阿拉伯经济发展科威特基金会已经为埃及提供了25亿美元——其中超过50%是无偿援助——埃及也因此成为该机构最大的援助接收国。


Such aid props up Egypt’s economy by funding infrastructure projects and providing budgetary relief.	上述援助通过投资基础设施项目和提供预算救济对埃及经济起到了支撑���用。


The occasional debt write-off also helps.	偶尔发生的债务勾销也提供了帮助。


Egyptians rarely hear about their country’s dire financial straits.	埃及人很少听到自己国家的财政困境。


Instead, the government-controlled press boasts about new bridges and increased industrial production, while highlighting Egypt’s role in regional affairs, such as the dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the cobbling together of governments in Lebanon.	相反，政府控制的媒体吹嘘新桥梁落成和工业生产增加，同时强调埃及在地区事务中的作用，比方说陷入休眠状态的以巴和平进程以及拼凑在一起的黎巴嫩政府。


Such propaganda aims to sustain the myth that Egypt holds a unique and powerful position in the Middle East.	这样的宣传是为了继续维持埃及在中东具有强大和独特地位的神话。


To be sure, unlike in most other Arab countries, particularly Lebanon and Yemen, Egypt has a sense of national identity, rooted in the Pharaonic empires of antiquity.	可以肯定，和其他多数阿拉伯国家（尤其是黎巴嫩和也门）不同，埃及有着植根于古代法老帝国的民族认同感。


And its largely homogenous population – 90% Sunni Muslim – has allowed it to avoid the sectarian conflicts plaguing countries like Iraq and Syria, and to forge a strong central government.	而该国在很大程度上同质化的人口——逊尼派穆斯林占90%以上——也令其避免陷入困扰伊拉克和叙利亚等国家的宗派冲突并且成立了强大的中央政府。


But the narrative of regional dominance that Egypt’s leaders have fashioned increasingly rings hollow.	但埃及领导人编造的地区领导故事听上去越来越空洞。


The 750,000 Egyptians who graduate from college each year want jobs, not empty promises based on past glory.	每年大学毕业的750，000埃及人需要的不是基于过去辉煌的空洞承诺，他们需要工作。


The unskilled laborers in the decimated tourist industry pine for foreigners to return.	在大幅下降的旅游业从业的非熟练劳动力渴望外国游客重新流入。


And factory workers yearn for production levels that local unemployed consumers’ purchasing power cannot sustain.	而工厂工人所向往的生产水平也是当地无业消费者的购买力所无法维持的。


Instead of delivering on these imperatives, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been forced to relinquish territory to the Saudis to secure the aid the country needs to stay afloat, facing considerable mockery in the process.	埃及总统阿卜杜勒 - 法塔赫·塞西不但满足不了这些迫切的需求，反而被迫将领土交还给沙特以换取国家支撑下去所需要的援助。


In the zero-sum game that is Middle East politics, however, one party’s loss is another’s gain.	但在中东政治的零和游戏中，一方的损失就是另一方的收益。


And in the case of Egypt today, it is radical Islamists who are reaping the rewards of popular disillusionment with the government.	而在今天埃及的情况下，从大众对政府的希望幻灭中受益最大的是极端伊斯兰分子。


The Islamists are offering their own narrative: The modern nation-state has failed Arabs and Muslims.	伊斯兰分子有他们自己的解释：现代民主国家已经满足不了阿拉伯人和穆斯林的需求。


This resonates with a population that is experiencing the state’s failure every day.	这在每天都亲眼目睹国家失败的民众当中引发了强烈的共鸣。


Focusing on restoring past Islamic glory is becoming more appealing than resurrecting a regional power that could never even secure rights for Palestinians.	着眼于恢复过去伊斯兰教的辉煌正在变得比重建一个或许永远无法确保巴勒斯坦人权利的地区大国更具吸引力。


Egypt’s leaders retain the legitimacy and strength needed to curtail this dangerous narrative.	埃及领导人仍然掌握着遏制这个危险故事的合法性和能力。


But, if they are to succeed, they will have to acknowledge what Egypt is – and what it is not.	但如果想要取得成功，他们必须认清埃及的能力边界。


In a country where ancient artifacts are deeply cherished, the myth of regional greatness is one relic that should disappear soon.	在一个深深珍爱所有古文物的国家，地区大国神话应当是一个迅速消失的遗留物。


Showdown in Egypt	埃及大决战


LONDON – With massive anti-government protests across Egypt on June 30 – a year to the day after Egyptians elected their first-ever civilian president – a diverse and decentralized movement has challenged President Mohammad Morsi’s hold on power as never before.	伦敦——在选出首任平民总统一年后的6月30日，埃及国内爆发了大规模反政府抗议活动。 遍布各地的抗议活动多种多样，对穆罕默德·穆尔西总统继续执政构成了前所未有的挑战。


Hundreds of thousands were mobilized to take to the streets, with many storming and burning down the Cairo headquarters of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood.	成千上万人走上街头，很多人强行攻占并烧毁了执政党穆斯林兄弟会在开罗的总部。


At the end of the day, the president was given an ultimatum.	当天傍晚，总统接到最后通牒。


The first “revolutionary” statement of Egypt’s new grassroots Tamarod (rebel) movement demanded that Morsi leave within two days or face a march on the presidential palace.	埃及基层新的反抗（Tamarod）运动首次发表“革命”声明要求穆尔西在两天内离开，否则就要到总统府门前举行示威活动。


“In the name of 22 million citizens, we declare that Mohammad Morsi is no longer the legitimate President of Egypt.”	“我们代表2200万群众宣布穆罕默德·穆尔西不再是埃及的合法总统。


The protesters then appealed to “the institutions of the state, the army, the police, and the judiciary to side with the popular will.”	”抗议者接下来呼吁“政府、军警和司法部门顺应民意的要求。 ”


The army has spoken, issuing an ultimatum of its own to Morsi: Address the protesters’ demands or face a military solution to the crisis.	军方以向穆尔西发出最后通牒的方式做出了表态：答应抗议者的要求，否则将武力解决冲突。


As the day ended, Morsi’s office declared that it had not been consulted prior to the army’s statement, and tens of thousands of the president’s supporters demonstrated in several cities simultaneously at midnight.	当天傍晚，穆尔西办公室宣布军方发布声明前并未征询他们的意见，成千上万的总统支持者午夜在数个城市同时举行示威活动。


So what will happen next?	局势将会如何发展？


And what impact will the Tamarod movement and the army intervention have on Egypt’s precarious democratization process?	反抗（Tamarod）运动和军事干预将如何影响埃及脆弱的民主化进程？


The path to today’s crisis was predictable.	今天危机的爆发并不出人意料。


Morsi won the presidential election with only 51.7% of the vote, while the other 48.3% included very powerful forces, including figures from the Mubarak regime and their supporters.	穆尔西赢得总统大选的得票率仅有51. 7%，而其余48.


Opposition to Morsi hardened following the annulled November 2012 constitutional declaration, by which he had sought sweeping powers – allegedly to protect the country’s infant elected institutions against a politicized judiciary.	3%则包括穆巴拉克政权及其支持者在内的强大力量。 2012年11月为夺取绝对权力废除宪法宣言激化了政府与反对派的矛盾，穆尔西这么做据说是为了保护埃及新生的脆弱机构不受政治化司法体制的影响。


The lack of tangible material gains for ordinary Egyptians also fueled public anger.	埃及百姓物质收益的欠缺也助长了公众的愤怒。


All of the presidential candidates had made wild promises; but the absence of significant achievement, such as resolving the country’s chronic shortages of gas and electricity, helped to fuel the massive anti-Morsi mobilization.	所有总统候选人都做出了大胆的承诺。 但在承诺兑现方面（比方说解决该国长期以来的天然气及电力短缺）缺乏明显进展助长了大规模的反穆尔西运动。


Incompetence during a political transition has a high price.	政治转型期的无能往往需要付出高昂的代价。


But Morsi is not entirely without accomplishments or supporters.	但穆尔西也并非全无政绩或支持者。


Last August, he culled the leaders of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).	去年8月，他剔除了武装部队最高委员会（SCAF）领袖。


On the economic front, the Egyptian Central Bank’s report for the period of July 2012 to March 2013 indicates that the balance-of-payments deficit fell from $11.2 billion to $2.1 billion, owing to rising tourism revenues and debt forgiveness.	而在经济领域，由于旅游收入增加及债务减免，埃及央行2012年7月至2013年3月期间的报告显示该国国际收支逆差出现了从112亿美元到21亿美元的明显下降。


This improvement did not trickle down to ordinary citizens, and there was no effective media and communication strategy to capitalize on it.	上述经济改善并未惠及普通百姓，也没有通过有效的��体及沟通战略善加利用。


But Morsi’s core supporters remain committed.	但穆尔西的核心支持者却从未动摇过。


Whereas only a few hundred showed up to support the fraudulently elected Mubarak during the revolution, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians rallied for two consecutive weeks in Rab‘a al-‘Adawiyya square, near the presidential palace, to express their solidarity with Morsi.	尽管革命期间只有区区数百人现身支持靠欺诈当选的穆巴拉克，却有成千上万的埃及民众为声援穆尔西而在拉比雅·阿德维娅广场的总统府附近连续集会两周。


If Morsi survives in office, he will have to rely on the army to guarantee his government’s safety.	只有依靠军队保障政府安全穆尔西才能继续执政。


He will also need a massive show of strength from his supporters.	他的支持者也必须展示强大的力量。


But this would mean returning the army to the center of politics – and thus sacrificing the gains from Morsi’s imposition last August of greater civilian control.	但这意味着军队将回归到政治核心——进而牺牲掉强化民众控制这一穆尔西去年8月当选以来的最大进步。


And the army’s ultimatum indicates that the military is moving in the direction of a coup.	而且最后通牒显示军方正准备发动政变。


Mobilization of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist supporters is also risky.	穆尔西领导的穆斯林兄弟会及其他伊斯兰支持者的参与也颇具冒险性。


Indeed, the revolutionary step of steering once-armed Islamists toward electoral and constitutional politics could be reversed in ongoing power struggle.	事实上，正在进行的权力斗争有可能逆转引导曾经全副武装的伊斯兰教徒走向选举及宪法政治的革命性步骤。


If Morsi does not remain in power, much will depend on how he is removed.	如果穆尔西无法继续掌权，他将以何种方式下台将在很大程度上决定此后的形势。


Reliance on street mobilization and army intervention to bring down an elected leader who has support on the ground is unlikely to lead to a positive outcome.	依靠街头动员和军队干预迫使拥有基层支持的当选领袖下台不太可能带来好的结果。


On the contrary, that pattern – seen in Spain in 1936, Iran in 1953, Chile in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Sudan in 1989, and Algeria and Tajikistan in 1992 – usually leads to military dictatorships, civil wars, or both.	相反，曾在1936年西班牙、1953年伊朗、1973年智利、1980年土耳其、1989年苏丹和1992年阿尔及利亚和塔吉克斯坦上演的戏码却往往导致军事独裁、内战或两者兼而有之。


But there is also Charles de Gaulle’s precedent of a peaceful exit by an elected president.	但历史上也曾有过当选总统戴高乐和平退出的先例。


The massive protests in France in 1968 led to an early parliamentary election, which de Gaulle’s supporters won decisively.	1968年法国出现的大规模抗议活动导致提前举行议会选举，而戴高乐的支持者在议会选举中赢得了决定性的胜利。


But de Gaulle later resigned of his own volition, over an issue of minor importance.	但后来戴高乐却因为一个没那么重要的问题主动选择了辞职。


The problem with this precedent is that Morsi does not have de Gaulle’s background, and Egypt’s chaotic political transition of 2013 is far from France’s consolidated democracy of 1968.	问题是穆尔西并不具备戴高乐的背景，而且2013年埃及混乱的政治转型与1968年法国的综合民主根本无法相比。


French Gaullists did not face persecution; several Egyptian opposition figures have already vowed that Morsi and the Muslim Brothers will.	法国的戴高乐主义者并未受到迫害，而一些埃及反对派人物已经发誓决不让穆尔西和穆斯林兄弟会的日子好过。


That raises the stakes of political survival considerably, especially given the absence of any credible guarantor of constitutional norms and behavior.	宪法规范及行为缺乏可信的担保在很大程度上加大了政治生存的赌注。


Moreover, a possible replacement for Morsi is not very clear.	此外，谁有可能代替穆尔西执政目前还不清楚。


Parts of the opposition speak of a transitional “presidential council.”	部分反对派曾经提到渡性“总统委员会”。


But that idea failed once already, during the SCAF’s rule (February 2011-June 2012), owing partly to the lack of popular mobilization behind a uniting figure(s), but mostly because of the egos – indeed, megalomania – of the politicians involved.	但部分因为缺少由公认人物出面的民众动员，且更大程度上因为相关政客的妄自尊大，同样的方案已经在武装部队最高委员会执政期间（2011年年2月 - 2012年6月）失败过一次。


Morsi will almost certainly not be removed without the involvement of the army and the security establishment.	没有军方及安全机构的参与几乎可以肯定穆尔西不会下台。


And the winners will probably try their best to block the Islamist forces from a comeback, implying another cycle of no-holds-barred political – and perhaps physical – combat, in which democracy serves as a mask to legitimize the exclusion, and possibly the destruction, of one’s political opponents.	获胜者很可能会阻止伊斯兰势力卷土重来，这意味着新一轮无所不用其极的政治和武装斗争。 在此期间，各方势力会戴着民主的面具合法地排挤和迫害政治对手。


Egypt’s Dead Men Walking	埃及的活死人


CAIRO – Mass death sentences are usually associated with regimes like those of Adolf Hitler’s Nazis or Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge.	开罗—大面积死刑判决常常出现在希特勒的纳粹或波尔布特的红色高棉这样的政权统治下。


But Egypt’s military rulers have now joined the ranks of such regimes, staging circus-like trials in which the outcome is foreordained.	但埃及军事统治者如今也加入了这类政权的行列，进行着如同儿戏的结果早已预订的审判。


One such trial, in March 2014, produced 529 death sentences; another, in April, yielded 683 death sentences.	2014年3月进行的一次审判制造了529起死刑； 另一次4月份进行的审判产生了683起死刑。


And the trend shows no signs of slowing.	并且这一趋势毫无减缓迹象。


Last month, 107 people – including Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first freely elected president – were handed death sentences for their alleged role in a mass “prison break” during the January 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak.	上个月，107人——包括埃及首位自由选举总统穆尔西在内——因为被控在2011年1月反前总统穆巴拉克的暴动中集体“越狱”而判处死刑。


Morsi was also accused of “colluding with foreign militants” – that is, Hezbollah and Hamas – in order to free political prisoners in Egypt.	穆尔西还被控“里通外敌”——即真主党和哈马斯——以释放埃及政治犯。


Soon after, the six defendants in the so-called “Arab Sharkas” case – who were handed death sentences in October 2014 for allegedly attacking security posts – were executed, despite a local and international outcry against the flawed trial.	不久，六名所谓的“阿拉伯沙尔卡斯”（Arab Sharkas）案的被告——他们在2014年10月因被控袭击安全岗而被判处死刑——被执行死刑，尽管地方和国际人士都强烈反对这一漏洞百出的审判。


According to Ahmed Helmi, a lawyer for four of the six men, the government wanted to “send a message following Morsi’s verdict” that it would carry out such sentences.	赫尔米（Ahmed Helmi）是六人中的四人的律师之一，他表示政府希望“在穆尔西的裁决后释放一个信号”——他们会真的执行这些审判。


His clients and the others, he concluded, were just “scapegoats.”	他说，他的当事人和其他人只是“替罪羊”。


Overall, civilian courts have handed down more than 1,000 death sentences since Egypt’s military overthrew Morsi in July 2013.	埃及军方2013年7月推翻穆尔西以来，民事法庭总共宣判了1,000多起死刑判决。


The profiles of the “convicts” raise eyebrows: Emad Shahin, for example, is a world-renowned academic who has taught at Harvard and the American University in Cairo; Sondos Asem is a promising young scholar and political activist.	被“定罪”者名单令人侧目：比如，沙欣（Emad Shahin）是世界著名学者、哈佛大学和开罗美利坚大学（American University）教授； 阿塞姆（Sondos Asem）是前途无量的年轻学者和政治活动家。


Making matters worse, extra-judicial killings by the security services and elements in the military are rampant.	更糟糕的是，安全部门和军方所实施的法外处决现象猖獗。


The most dramatic of these episodes accompanied the coup in July 2013, when Egyptian police and army opened fire on crowds protesting Morsi’s ouster in Cairo’s Rab’a Square, killing more than 1,000 protesters in less than ten hours.	最显著的例子与2013年7月的政变有关，当时埃及警方和军方向开罗拉巴广场（Rab’a Square）反对推翻穆尔西的群众开火，在不到十小时时间内有超过1,000示威者被杀。


More recently, Islam Atito, an engineering student at Cairo’s Ain Shams University who supported the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, was found dead in the desert on the outskirts of Cairo.	更晚近一些，开罗夏姆斯大学（Ain Shams University）工科学生、支持被定性为非法的穆斯林兄弟会的阿提托（Islam Atito）被发现死于埃及郊外的沙漠中。


Egypt’s interior ministry claimed that Atito had been involved in the “assassination” of a police officer and was killed in a firefight with security forces during a raid on his “hideout.”	埃及内政部声称阿提托与“刺杀”某警官的案件有涉，死于安全部队在突袭其“藏身窝点”时的交火。


But according to the student union of the university’s engineering faculty – whose members collectively resigned in protest against the killing – Atito was arrested during a final exam on the university campus.	但根据夏姆斯大学工程学院学生会的说法——全体成员在因为反对杀戮而集体退学——阿提托是在学校参加期末考试时被捕的。


The government, it is claimed, had Atito abducted and murdered in response to his activism.	学生会表示，政府劫持并杀害阿提托是因为他是活跃分子。


As a human-rights lawyer monitoring the case notes, this is just one of several such cases – none of which is being seriously investigated.	一位关注此案的人权律师指出，这只是多起类似案件中的一起——所有这些案件都没有进行严肃调查。


These judicial and extra-judicial killings reflect the depth of Egypt’s current crisis.	这些司法和法外杀戮反映出埃及当前危机之深刻。


The “hawks” who control the security and military establishments seem intent on restoring a Mubarak-style regime, but with one key difference: they believe that Mubarak did too little to repress the opposition.	控制安全部门和军方的“鹰派”决心要重塑穆巴拉克式的统治，但他们与穆巴拉克有一个关键不同：他们认为穆巴拉克在镇压反对者方面做得远远不够。


For Egypt’s current leadership, the brutal tactics employed by the likes of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad are more likely to work in the Egyptian context than in those countries.	对于埃及的现任领导层来说，利比亚的卡扎菲和叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德所采用的残暴策略在埃及的环境中起作用的可能性比上述两国都要大。


After all, the probability of international intervention (as in Libya) is nil, and the likelihood of a full-fledged armed revolution (as in Syria) is extremely limited.	毕竟，国际干预（如利比亚）的概率几乎为零，而全面武装起义（如叙利亚）的可能性也极其有限。


But relying on force to subdue dissent in a country where 70% of the population is under the age of 30 will be a major challenge, if not resulting in a bloodbath.	但依赖武力在一个70%人口不到30岁的国家打击持异见者是一个重大挑战，极有可能血流成河。


The brutal policies of Egypt’s hawks have also transformed the opposition.	埃及鹰派的残暴政策也让反对派发生了改变。


At a 2013 sit-in protesting Morsi’s ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie, declared, in what became a rallying cry for the movement, “Our peacefulness is stronger than their bullets.”	在2013年反对穆尔西被推翻的静坐示威中，穆斯林兄弟会最高领袖巴迪（Mohamed Badie）宣布——这句话���来成为穆斯林兄弟会的战斗口号——“我们的平和比他们的子弹更强大。


But, with Badie having since been sentenced to death in multiple cases (including one related to attacks on police stations in the southern province of Minya), the phrase has become the subject of bitter mockery among young political activists, including Brotherhood members.	”但是，此后巴迪因多项指控（其中一项与南部明亚省袭击警署的案件有关）被判处死刑，这句话也成为对包括穆兄会成员在内的年轻政治活动家的苦涩嘲讽。


Rassd, a Brotherhood-affiliated news website, recently published a letter (link in Arabic) by the group’s former secretary-general, Mahmoud Ghozlan, asserting that the “revolution” will continue to be non-violent.	穆斯林兄弟会所属新闻网站Rassd最近公开了一封由该组织前总书记戈兹兰（Mahmoud Ghozlan）所写的信，信中主张“革命”继续以非暴力的形式进行。


But it also published harsh criticism of Ghozlan’s position by young Brotherhood activists – a notable development for an organization in which dissent is rarely publicized.	但该网站还公开了年轻的穆兄会活跃分子对戈兹兰的立场的批评——对于极少公开内部异见的组织来说，这是一个引人注目的情况。


In fact, anger among younger members has become so acute that the Brotherhood has allegedly changed some 65% of its leadership, according to Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, the head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Administrative Office Abroad (a new body that organizes the thousands of Brotherhood members now in exile).	事实上，年轻成员中的愤怒情绪已经十分尖锐，据埃及穆斯林兄弟会海外行政办公室（Administrative Office Abroad，组织数千名目前处于流亡状态的穆兄会成员的新机构）主管阿卜杜尔-拉曼（Ahmed Abdel-Rahman）透露，穆兄会因此换掉了65%的领导层。


The organization has also adopted a harsher line, having publicly stated that the “reformist” approach that its government took after winning parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 was “wrong”, and that excluding non-Islamist revolutionary youth groups was a “major mistake.”	穆兄会还采取了强硬路线，公开宣称其政府在2011年和2012年议会和总统选举后采取的“改革主义”方针是“错误的”，将非伊斯兰革命青年组织排除在外更是“严重错误”。


Given Egypt’s mass death sentences, extrajudicial violence, and the dominance of hawks in the security and the military establishments, together with the rhetorical, behavioral, and organizational changes within the Muslim Brotherhood, the chances of reconciliation are fading by the day.	考虑到埃及的大面积死刑判决、法外暴力和鹰派主导安全部门和军方，再加上穆斯林兄弟会的言辞、行为和组织变化，妥协的可能性一天比一天小。


In an environment in which “compromise” is regarded as a dirty word, Egypt’s future appears to be far from bright.	在“妥协”被视为脏话的环境中，埃及的未来恐怕不妙。


Egypt Needs a President, Not a Pharaoh	埃及要的是总统，不是法老


Egypt is undergoing a heated nationwide debate over political reform. The central issue is a demand by all opposition parties and civil society groups to amend the 1971 constitution and abolish the 23-year-old State of Emergency that was imposed following Anwar Sadat's assassination in 1981.	一场全国政治改革的热烈讨论正在埃及进行，核心事件是所有反对党和民间社团一致要求修改1971年宪法，取消1981年安瓦尔·萨达特遇刺后实行达23年之久的紧急状态。


Such demands are not new. But President Hosni Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party have been stonewalling since the mid-1980's.	这个要求早已不再新鲜，但从20世纪80年代中起就遭到胡斯尼·穆巴拉克总统和执政的民族民主党的重重阻挠。


What makes the demands for reform more pressing this time are ominous developments in Egypt, the region, and in the wider world.	使这次改革呼声更为迫切的是埃及目前的困难状态，以及在地区和国际事务中的险恶环境。


At home, concern about Mubarak's age (76) and deteriorating health has grown.	在国内，对穆巴拉克年龄（76岁）和健康状况恶化的忧虑日益增长。


Mubarak's ill health, widely rumored for years, was never officially acknowledged until November 2003, when it could no longer be covered up.	近年来虽然一直谣传穆巴拉克的身体状况十分糟糕，但直到2003年11月再也无法隐瞒的时候官方才予以证实。


While speaking to Parliament, Mubarak fainted before millions of TV viewers.	在议会讲话时，穆巴拉克在成百上千万电视观众面前昏了过去。


Although he returned an hour later and delivered the rest of his speech, Egyptians began to demand greater transparency regarding the president's health as well as other state affairs.	尽管他1小时后就恢复了知觉，并完成了那次讲话，埃及人还是开始要求对总统健康状况更多的知情权，其它国事领域也是如此。


Meanwhile, Egypt's sagging economy, high unemployment rate, and rampant corruption have driven many Egyptian youngsters to despair.	与此同时，埃及日益下滑的经济、居高不下的失业率和肆意蔓延的腐败使很多青年人陷入绝望。


More than one half of living Egyptians were born since Mubarak assumed office.	埃及半数以上的现有人口都是穆巴拉克执政后出生的。


According to a recent report by the UN Development Program, roughly half of those between 15 and 30 years old dream of emigrating to Europe, North America, or Australia.	援引联合国开发计划署不久前的一份报告，约半数15到30岁之间的埃及人梦想移民到欧洲、北美或澳大利亚。


There are weekly reports of would-be illegal Egyptian immigrants drowning in the Mediterranean.	每周都有所谓埃及非法移民命丧地中海的报道。


A few weeks ago, several youngsters suffocated to death while being deported back to Egypt across the Libyan desert in overloaded trucks.	几个星期前，几个年轻人被装在超载的卡车里遣返回埃及，途中路过利比亚沙漠时甚至窒息而死。


The incident caused an uproar that compelled the authorities to arrest, interrogate, and try the Egyptian police officers in charge.	这一事件激起了民众的愤慨，迫使埃及当局逮捕、讯问并审判了负责押送的几名埃及警官。


Regional and international events have also emboldened the Egyptian opposition, not only to press for reform, but to focus on amending the constitution's articles that pertain to the presidency.	地区和国际事务也推动了埃及的反对浪潮，人们不仅要求改革，而且提出修改有关总统任命的宪法条款。


Mubarak has been re-elected four times, and rumors have persisted that he will either seek a fifth six-year term or establish a "hereditary republic" and groom his 41-year old son, Gamal, to succeed him, like Syria's Hafez al-Assad and son, Bashar.	穆巴拉克已经连续四次当选，传言还表明他会谋求第五次六年任期，或者建立"世袭"共和国，培养41岁的儿子贾迈勒·穆巴拉克接班，就像叙利亚总统哈菲兹·阿萨德和儿子巴沙尔·阿萨德一样。


The opposition battle cry is "No" to Mubarak's re-election and "No" to passing the presidency to Gamal.	反对派的斗争口号是阻止穆巴拉克再次连任，并阻止他将大权传给贾迈勒。


Many Egyptians may not have major misgivings about Gamal Mubarak per se, but they find it mortifying that, after 24 years of the father, they might be stuck with another 24 or more years of the son.	很多埃及人也许对贾迈勒·穆巴拉克本人并无反感，但在父亲24年的漫长统治后，再由儿子继续统治24年甚至更长时间，却让他们感到苦不堪言。


The current constitution was adopted in October 1971, and has 211 articles, 30 of which concern the presidency.	现行宪法于1971年10月生效，共211条，其中30条与总统任命有关。


The president is nominated by two-thirds of the People's Assembly, and endorsed in a plebiscite that allows only for a simple "Yes" or "No."	总统系由埃及人民议会三分之二的议员提名任命，再由公民投票进行简单的"是""否"表决。


A simple majority of the ballots is required to win a six-year term, which is renewable indefinitely by the same process.	赢得六年任期只需符合简单多数，且任期可以通过同样程序无限延长。


These lax procedures contrast jarringly with the president's powers.	如此宽松的程序却与总统的权力形成了鲜明的对比。


The president is the head of state and commander-in-chief; officiates over the Supreme Judiciary Council, the Supreme Police Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers; and can appoint and recall one or more vice-presidents at his sole discretion.	总统身为国家首脑和军队司令，全权管辖最高司法委员会、最高警察委员会和部长内阁，可以全权决定一个或多个副总统的任命或罢免。


He also appoints the prime minister and senior ministers, and must approve all other ministers, ambassadors, and state representatives.	总统也负责任命总理和高级部长，且必须批准所有的部长、大使和政府代表的任命。


He can call general elections, declare war, impose a state of emergency, and issue decrees that have the force of law.	他可以召集大选、宣布战争、执行紧急状态和颁布有法律效力的政令。


There are no checks and balances on these powers.	根本没有权力的制衡。


A single article stipulates that, "Accusation of the President of committing grand treason or any other criminal act may be made upon a motion submitted by at least one-third of members of the People's Assembly and approved by two-thirds."	有条款规定，"控告总统犯叛国罪或其它罪行须由人民议会三分之一以上的议员提出动议，并得到三分之二以上议员的批准。


The president is then suspended from carrying out his duties, and the vice-president fills in until the accusation is resolved.	"满足上述条件则暂停行使总统权力，由副总统暂时接任直至审判完成。


But Mubarak has never enacted the law essential to implementing this article or appointed a vice-president, despite repeated popular demands to do so.	但穆巴拉克却从未颁布执行上述条款的必要法律，也从未任命过副总统，尽管人们要求的呼声此起彼伏。


The result has been a de facto "imperial presidency," with Mubarak likened to the god-king Pharaohs of ancient Egypt.	其结果导致了事实上的"帝王总统"，甚至有人把他比作古埃及神圣的法老王。


No other head of state in modern times enjoys as much power.	没有任何现代的国家领袖拥有这样的权力。


A more apt analogy popular in Egypt compares Mubarak to Leonid Brezhnev, who for two decades presided over the Soviet Union's stagnation and decline.	埃及流行将穆巴拉克比作勃列日涅夫，此君在苏联停滞和衰退时期统治长达20年以上。


Egypt's status as a regional power under Mubarak has similarly weakened steadily.	在穆巴拉克的统治下，埃及作为地区大国的地位日渐削弱。


On the economic front, annual foreign investment inflows have plummeted from $3 billion in the mid-1990's to a minuscule $300 million in 2003.	经济领域内，年外资流入额从20世纪90年代中期的30亿美元直线下降到2003年的区区3亿美元。


Demands for reform are now focused on introducing direct presidential elections with two or more contenders, and limiting presidents to two consecutive terms in office.	改革要求目前集中在由两个或更多的竞争者参与总统直选，并将总统任期限制在连任不超过两届。


It is no less important to reduce the presidency's sweeping powers and formulate viable mechanisms for enforcing the accountability of all public officials without exception.	除此之外，削弱总统的绝对权力和建立可行的公共官员责任机制也有着同样重要的意义。


Should Mubarak and his government fail to recommend constitutional amendments that satisfy these demands, ever more Egyptians will desert the regime and risk their lives in search of salvation in other lands.	如果穆巴拉克及其政府未能提出满足要求的宪法修正案，就会有更多的埃及人脱离现政权，为在其它国家寻求解脱而心甘情愿冒着生命的危险。


Egypt on Jordan’s Mind	约旦眼中的埃及


AMMAN – The behavior of Jordan’s Royal Court in the days following the official announcement of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi in Egypt’s presidential election tells an intriguing story.	安曼—约旦皇家法院（Royal Court）在穆斯林兄弟会的穆尔西宣布取得埃及总统大选胜利后这几天的行为颇有点意思。


At first, Jordan’s King Abdullah II hesitated to sign a long-sought-after election law.	一开始，约旦国王阿卜杜拉二世对于签署人们期待已久的选举法犹豫不决。


This was followed by approval of the law, a request for its revision, and a surprise official meeting with the leader of Hamas.	接着，选举法被批准，但又被要求进行修订，还出人意料地与哈马斯领导人进行了正式会晤。


During the past year, King Abdullah has been adamant that Jordanians should vote in free and fair elections no later than the end of 2012.	过去一年来，阿卜杜拉国王十分坚定地认为约旦人民应该在2012年之前获得自由公平选举的权利。


Constitutional changes were adopted.	约旦宪法进行了修订。


An independent election commission was created by law.	独立的选举委员会依法成立。


And a respected Jordanian jurist who had been a judge at the International Court of Justice was reprimanded for dragging his feet in getting the election law passed.	某广受尊敬的法学家、前联合国国际法院法官因阻挠选举法通过而受到了批评。 。


So why did the king wait four days after both houses of parliament passed the law to sign it, and why did he immediately ask for changes?	既然如此，为什么国王要等待四天才签署这项两院已经通过了的法律？ 为什么他要求立刻修改这项法律？


The law, which establishes a largely majoritarian system based on single-member districts, with only 17 of the parliament’s 140 seats to be elected according to national party lists, was approved by Jordan’s Senate just hours before Egypt’s independent election commission declared Morsi the winner.	该法建立了一项以单一成员选区为基础的绝对多数制度，在140个议员席位中，只有17个根据国家党派名单选出。 约旦参议院在埃及独立选举委员会宣布穆尔西胜出之前批准了这项法律。


People to whom I spoke in Jordan’s government and palace say that they were led to believe that the post would go to Mubarak’s last prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq.	据约旦政府和王室成员告诉我，他们原本认为穆巴拉克时期的末代总理莎菲克会赢得大选。


Morsi’s victory changed everything.	穆尔西的胜利改变了一切。


Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the country’s parliamentary election in 2010, arguing that the government “did not provide any guarantees of its integrity.”	2010年，约旦穆斯林兄弟会曾抵制约旦议会选举，声称政府“没有提供任何诚信保证”。


In the 2007 election, the Brotherhood accused the government of “fraud,” and opposed the majoritarian electoral system.	在2007年的选举中，穆斯林兄弟会指责政府“舞弊”，并反对多数获胜的选举规则。


Senior officials in Jordan have been slowly walking back from the comprehensive political reforms that were promised in the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring.	阿拉伯之春爆发伊始，约旦曾承诺进行全面的政治改革，此后，埃及高级官员一直在慢慢地开倒车。


Many, including former Prime Minister Awn Khasawneh, believe that this reflects a belief among senior Jordanian officials that the Arab Spring has run its course in Jordan and the region.	包括前首相哈苏奈（Awn Khasawneh）在内的许多人认为这反映了约旦高官的想法：阿拉伯之春在约旦和该地区已是明日黄花。 毕竟，群众示威运动并未形成气候；


After all, popular protests have failed to gather steam; Bashar al-Assad’s regime has held firm in Syria; and Egypt, with neither a constitution nor a parliament, has apparently veered from democracy, if not descended into chaos.	巴沙尔牢牢地控制着叙利亚； 而既无宪法又无议会的埃及即使不能说陷入了一片混乱，显然也在和民主渐行渐远。


But Khasawneh, who had encouraged Islamists to join the political process, and forged a rapprochement with the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, warns that it is a mistake to write off the Arab Spring.	哈苏奈曾鼓励伊斯兰主义者加入政治进程中，还促成了与巴勒斯坦伊斯兰运动组织哈马斯的和解。 但他也警告说，认为阿拉伯之春已经失败是错误的。


In May, shortly after his resignation, he warned Jordanian leaders of complacency in the reform process.	5月份次之后不久，他警告约旦领导人不要对改革进程感到自满。


His last word after being replaced by a conservative was to remind Jordan’s leaders that spring is a season that always returns.	在被保守派取代之后，哈苏奈最后说的话是提醒约旦领导人，阿拉伯之春随时随地会再次灿烂。


With the announcement of Morsi’s victory in Egypt, spring seems to have returned to Jordan more quickly than even Khasawneh had expected.	随着穆尔西在埃及宣布获胜，阿拉伯之春似乎以比哈苏奈所设想的速度更快地卷土重来了。


The Islamic Action Front, the Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, continued to reject the majoritarian electoral system, which favors tribes over political parties and other important social groups.	穆斯林兄弟会在约旦的政党伊斯兰行动阵线（Islamic Action Front）仍拒绝多数获胜的选举制度，因为该制度更有利于部落而不是政党和其他重要社会团体。


In particular, owing to the relative insignificance of national party lists, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who comprise nearly half the electorate, receive only a small percentage of elected officials.	特别是，由于全国党派名单影响力相对较小，占选民数量接近一半的巴勒斯坦裔约旦人只能选出很小一部分官员。


The King’s approval of the law will allow the newly established election commission to begin its work.	阿卜杜拉国王批准选举法意味着新成立的选举委员会工作的开始。


But now he wants the parliament to make the law more representative as well.	但现在他还希望议会能使选举法更具代表性。


Indeed, he welcomed Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in an official meeting that included a royal lunch, meetings with Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh, and, most important, talks with the head of Jordan’s intelligence service, which in 1999 had recommended the expulsion from Jordan of Mashal and four other senior Hamas officials.	事实上，阿卜杜拉国王在正式会晤中欢迎了哈马斯领导人马沙尔（Khaled Mashal），这次会晤包括了皇家午宴以及与首相塔拉瓦奈（Fayez Tarawneh）的会面，最重要的是，还包括了曾在1999年建议将马沙尔和其他四名哈马斯高级官员逐出约旦的约旦情报局首脑。


The decisions to improve the election law and receive Mashal are not aimed solely at persuading Jordan’s own Islamists to join the political process.	改善选举法、接纳马沙尔的目的并不止于说服约旦国内的伊斯兰主义者加入到政治进程中来。


Like other Arab countries, Jordan, with seven million people, looks up to Egypt, its most populous and powerful Arab neighbor.	与其他阿拉伯国家一样，拥有700万人口的约旦密切关注着它人口最多、实力最强的阿拉伯邻邦埃及。


And, economically, Jordan is still dependent on Egypt for natural gas, which is delivered at reduced rates.	从经济上讲，约旦仍需依赖埃及获得天然气（所需费用已得到了削减）。


Jordan seems to have read the political tea leaves and concluded that it makes more sense to improve relations with Egypt’s rising leaders than it does to fight them.	约旦似乎已经算定了政治算盘，认为改善与埃及新领导人的关系而不是与他们相抗才是上策。


And better relations with Egypt presuppose closer ties with Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.	而改善与埃及的关系需以与穆尔西和穆斯林兄弟会建立更加密切的关系为前提。


Egypt’s Broken Economy	埃及的破败经济


WASHINGTON, DC – Egyptians’ political aspirations have dominated the country’s public life since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak last year.	华盛顿—自从穆巴拉克去年倒台以来，政治渴望就主导着埃及人民的公共生活。


Unfortunately, as those aspirations are addressed, the economy has entered a steep decline, jeopardizing one of the revolution’s main goals, namely improvement in Egyptians’ living standards and welfare.	不幸的是，在政治渴望被满足的同时，埃及经济却步入了深度衰退，这也使得革命目标之一即改善埃及人民的生活水平和福利落了空。


Indeed, the populist rhetoric of Egyptian politicians threatens to undo the economic reforms undertaken by the Mubarak regime.	事实上，埃及政客的民粹主义论调已成为自穆巴拉克时代就开始的经济改革的威胁。


In 2004, a major reform program was launched under former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif.	2004年，前总理那齐夫（Ahmed Nazif）开始了一项重大改革计划。


It was aimed at removing bureaucratic constraints to growth by restructuring the financial sector, streamlining business regulations, liberalizing foreign trade, and reducing the government’s role in the economy.	该计划的目标通过金融部门改革、疏通商业法规、开放对外贸易以及减弱政府在经济中所扮演的作用来是消除增长中的官僚主义约束。