This requires a process in which experts – whose competence and honesty are trusted – inform decision-makers of the available options for meeting voters’ stated preferences.	这需要能力和诚信度都值得信赖的专家把满足选民明确偏好的备选方案告知决策者。


Citizens are unlikely to be satisfied if they believe that experts are imposing their own agenda, or are captured by special interests.	如果认定专家另有目的或服务于特殊利益集团则不太可能获得民众满意的结果。


Distrust of experts fuels distrust of democratically elected governments, if not of democracy itself.	对专家的不信任加剧了对民选政府、甚至民主本身的不信任。


Why is there such a divide between experts and society?	专家和社会之间为何存在如此巨大的鸿沟？


Every country has had its own series of high-profile public health or safety scandals.	所有国家都存在著名的公共健康或安全丑闻。


Experts have been guilty of sloppiness and conflicts of interest.	专家们往往态度草率，并可能存在利益冲突。


Hard-won reputations have been quickly lost.	来之不易的信誉就这样迅速丧失了。


But critics often fail to recognize that science involves more – and more stringent – scrutiny than, say, business or government.	但批评者却往往未能意识到科学涉及比企业或政府更繁琐——也��严格的审查。


It is actually the standard-bearer of good practices concerning the validation of analyses and the discussion of policy proposals.	在涉及到分析验证和政策建议探讨等领域，科学在现实中才堪称优秀惯例的旗手。


Errors regularly occur in academia, but they are more swiftly and systematically corrected than in other fields.	学术界经常会犯错误，但其纠正错误的能力却远比其他领域更迅速、也更系统。


The collective nature of scientific validation also provides guarantees against capture by special interests.	科学验证的集体性质同样保证了科学研究不受特殊利益群体的左右。


The problem may, in fact, be deeper than the common grievances against experts suggest.	事实上，问题可能比对专家意见的普遍不满更为复杂。


A few decades ago, it was widely assumed that progress in mass education would gradually bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and popular belief, thereby contributing to a more serene and more rational democracy.	数十年前，人们普遍认为全民教育的进步将逐步弥合科学知识和民众信仰之间的鸿沟，进程促成一种更平静、也更理性的民主。


The evidence is that it has not.	但事实证明科学并没有促进民主。


As Gerald Bronner, a French sociologist, has convincingly shown, education neither increases trust in science nor diminishes the attraction of beliefs or theories that scientists regard as utter nonsense.	法国社会学家杰拉德·布朗纳令人信服地表明教育既未提升对科学的信任度、也未导致被科学家视为纯粹胡言乱语的信仰和理论的魅力有任何削弱。


On the contrary, more educated citizens often resent being told by experts what science regards as truth.	相反，教育程度更高的民众往往厌恶专家告诉他们真理是什么。


Having had access to knowledge, they feel empowered enough to criticize the cognoscenti and develop views of their own.	因为自己掌握知识，他们自视有能力批评专家并得出自己的见解。


Climate change – which the scientific community overwhelmingly regards it as a major threat – is a case in point.	被科学界普遍视为重大威胁的气候变化就是个很好的例子。


According to a 2015 Pew Research survey, the three countries where concern is the weakest are the US, Australia, and Canada, whereas the three in which it is the strongest are Brazil, Peru, and Burkina Faso.	2015年一份皮尤研究中心调查显示最不关心气候变化的三个国家是美国、澳大利亚和加拿大，而最关心的三个国家则是巴西、秘鲁和布基纳法索。


Yet average years of schooling are 12.5 for the first group and six for the second.	但前面一组平均受教育年限为12. 5年，而后面一组则仅有6年。


Evidently, education alone is not the reason for this difference in perception.	显而易见，教育本身并不是形成这种认知差异的理由。


If the problem is here to stay, we had better do more to address it.	如果这个问题长期存在，我们最好能尽力解决它。


First, we need more discipline on the part of the community of experts.	首先，我们需要专家团体加强自律。


The intellectual discipline that characterizes research is often lacking in policy discussions.	标志着研究活动的学术自律往往在政策讨论中非常缺乏。


Humility, rigorous procedures, the prevention of conflicts of interest, an ability to acknowledge mistakes and, yes, punishment of fraudulent behavior are needed to regain citizens’ trust.	谦虚谨慎、程序严密、防止利益冲突、善于认错以及处罚欺诈行为才能重塑民众的信任。


Second, there is a case for revising curricula to equip future citizens with the intellectual tools they will need to distinguish between fact and fiction.	其次，我们应当修改课程为未来的民众提供辨别虚构和现实所需的智力工具。


Society has everything to gain from citizens whose minds are both less suspicious and more critical.	能够减少怀疑、加强批判性的民众可以让社会受益。


Finally, we need better venues for dialogue and informed debate.	最后，我们需要开展对话和知情辩论的更好的场所。


Serious magazines, general-interest journals, and newspapers traditionally filled the space between the ether of peer-reviewed journals and the deep sea of hoaxes; yet they all struggle to survive the digital revolution.	严肃杂志、题材广泛的期刊和报纸在传统上填补了同行评审期刊和各式骗局间的空间； 但它们都力求在数字革命当中存活。


Other venues, perhaps new institutions, are needed to fill that space.	还需要其他场所，也许还有新的体制才能填满上述空间。


What is clear is that democracy cannot thrive if it is left empty.	有一点非常明确，那就是空洞的民主无法获得繁荣发展。


Emerging-Market Resilience	新兴市场的复苏能力


NEW YORK – With most of the world focused on economic instability and anemic growth in the advanced countries, developing countries, with the possible exception of China, have received relatively little attention.	发自纽约——全球大多数人都把注意力放在了发达国家的经济不稳和增长匮乏之上，而发展中国家（或许除了中国之外）所得到的关注则相对较少。


But, as a group, emerging-market economies have been negatively affected by the recent downturn in developed countries.	但作为一个群体，新兴市场经济体遭受了最近发达国家经济下滑的负面影响。


Can they rebound on their own?	那么，这些国家又是否可以依靠自身的力量恢复过来呢？


The major emerging economies were the world’s main growth engines following the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008, and, to some extent, they still are.	几个大的新兴经济体在2008年金融危机爆发后成为了全球增长的主要引擎，而且至今在某种程度上依然如是。


But their resilience has always been a function of their ability to generate enough incremental aggregate demand to support their growth, without having to make up for a large loss of demand in developed countries.	但它们的复苏能力一直都体现在其创造足够新增总需求以支撑自身增长的能力上，并不需要去补足发达国家大量流失的需求。


A combination of negligible (or even negative) growth in Europe and a significant growth slowdown in the United States has now created that loss, undermining emerging economies’ exports.	这种流失是在欧洲的微小（或甚至负）增长以及美国增长大幅下滑的联合作用下形成的，也使新兴经济体的出口遭到了打击。


Europe is a major export destination for many developing countries, and is China’s largest foreign market.	欧洲既是许多发展中国家的主要出口目的地，更是中国的最大国外市场。


China, in turn, is a major market for final products, intermediate goods (including those used to produce finished exports), and commodities.	相应地，中国则是成品，（包括那些用来制成成品的）半成品和大宗商品的主要市场。


The ripple effect from Europe’s stalling economy has thus spread rapidly to the rest of Asia and beyond.	欧洲经济停滞的连锁反应也因此迅速扩散到了亚洲其他地区甚至更广大的区域。


Moreover, not only is the tradable sector of Japan’s economy highly vulnerable to a slowdown in China, but the recent conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands raises the prospect of economic decoupling.	此外，不仅日本经济中的贸易部门极易受到中国经济放缓的影响，最近在尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛问题上的冲突也提升了经济减速的预期。


Apart from that, Japanese economic performance is set to remain weak, because the non-tradable side is not a strong growth engine.	除此之外，日本的经济表现必然疲软，因为其国内的非贸易部门并不是一个强劲的增长引擎。


The key questions for the world economy today, then, are how significant the growth slowdown will be, and how long it will last.	因此对于当前的世界经济来说，关键问题就是增长放缓的程度究竟有多大，并将持续多长时间。


With wise policy responses, the impact is likely to be relatively mild and short-lived.	通过明智的政策应对，这种影响是能够变得相对温和且短暂的。


One key issue clouding the future is trade finance.	笼罩着未来的一个关键事务就是贸易融资。


European banks, traditionally a major source of trade finance, have pulled back dramatically, owing to capital-adequacy problems caused by sovereign-debt capital losses and, in some cases, losses from real-estate lending.	传统上欧洲各大银行都是贸易融资的主要来源，但由于主权债务资本损失以及（在某些情况中）房产信贷上的损失所导致的资本充足率问题，而今却极度萎缩。


This vacuum could reduce trade flows even if demand were present.	即便需求已然存在，但这一真空状况也将减少贸易流。


In Asia, especially, filling the vacuum with alternative financing mechanisms has become a high priority.	尤其是在亚洲，用其他金融机制填补该真空已经成为了优先要考虑的问题。


In particular, although China’s tradable sector is highly exposed to developed economies, the government is likely to accept some short-run slowdown, rather than adopting potentially distorting stimulus measures.	特别是虽然中国的贸易部门受到了发达国家的极大影响，但政府也愿意接受一些短期的减速，而非采取一些可能引发混乱的刺激措施。


Given the risk of re-inflating asset bubbles, no one should expect a dramatic easing of credit of the type that followed the 2008 meltdown.	考虑到资产泡沫再度膨胀的风险，没有人会期望一个类似2008年经济重挫后的大幅度信贷宽松。


An accelerated public-investment program that avoids low-return projects is not out of the question.	一个排除了低回报项目的加速公共投资计划是在考虑范围之内。


But the best and most likely responses are those that accelerate domestic consumption growth by increasing household income, effectively deploy income from state-owned assets, and strengthen China’s social-security systems in order to reduce precautionary saving.	但最佳也是最可能的应对则是通过家庭收入增长，国有资产收入的有效分配，以及强化社会保障体系以减少预防性储蓄等方式来加速国内消费的增长。


Indeed, these are all key components of China’s recently adopted 12th Five-Year Plan.	事实上，这些都是中国最近“十二五”计划的关键组成部分。


Admittedly, China’s major systemic reforms await the country’s leadership transition, now expected in November.	众所周知，中国的重大系统性改革需要等到领导班子交接完毕之后才能启动，这意味着要在11月才能有所作为。


By most accounts, the pace of reform directed at expanding the market side of the economy needs to pick up quickly to achieve the ambitious economic and social goals of the next five years.	但在绝大多数情况下，旨在扩大经济中市场部分的改革路径需要迅速启动以满足未来五年极富雄心的经济和社会目标。


Some countries have bucked the global trend.	此外也一些国家逆市上扬。


Indonesia, for example, has experienced accelerating growth, with rising business and consumer confidence boosting investment to almost 33% of GDP.	例如印尼的增长就不断加速，不断增长的企业和消费者信心将投资推高到了占GDP近33%的水平。


Likewise, Brazil’s growth has been dented, but now looks set to recover.	同样，巴西的增长一度受挫，但如今似乎已经开始复苏。


Moreover, overall economic performance in Brazil masks an important fact: growth rates have been substantially higher among the country’s poorer citizens, and unemployment is declining.	此外，该国的总体经济表现掩盖了一个重要的事实：与贫穷市民有关的经济增长率较高，而失业率也正在下降。


The aggregate growth rate does not capture this inclusiveness, and thus understates the pace of economic and social progress.	总增长率并未反映出这类包容性，并因此低估了经济和社会进步的步伐。


The main challenge for Brazil is to increase its investment rate from 18% of GDP currently to closer to 25%, thereby sustaining rapid growth and economic diversification.	巴西所面对的主要挑战就是如何将其当前占GDP18%的投资比率提高到25%，并以此支撑迅速增长以及经济的多样化。


Commodity dependence, even with the creation of considerable domestic value added, remains high.	该国目前对大宗商品的依赖——即便已经创造了相当数额的国内增值——依然较高。


Economic-growth rates in other systemically large countries, including Turkey and Mexico, have risen as well, despite European and US headwinds.	尽管欧美表现不佳，但其他系统性大国，比如土耳其和墨西哥的经济增长率都有所上升。


Many African countries, too, are showing a broad pattern of sound macroeconomic fundamentals, durable growth acceleration, economic diversification, and investor confidence.	许多非洲国家也表现出一个广泛的模式，包括良好的宏观经济规则，持久的加速增长，经济多样化以及高昂的投资者信心。


The outlook for India’s economy remains more uncertain.	印度经济远景的不确定更大。


While growth slowed recently from very high rates – owing to a combination of exposure to developed-country weakness, internal loss of reform momentum, and declining investor confidence – that trend appears to be reversing after recent decisive corrective moves by the government.	虽然经济增长最近从高位下滑——这是发达国家危机的冲击，内部改革动力的流失以及投资者信心减弱的综合结果——但这个趋势似乎在最近政府一连串果断纠正措施中得到了逆转。


The main question is whether India’s parliament will pass crucial legislation or remain paralyzed by hyper-partisan, scandal-fueled infighting.	主要的问题就是印度议会究竟能否通过关键的立法，还是依然在极端派系化且丑闻频出的内斗中继续僵持。


Combining this general picture with more general developing-country trends – rising incomes, rapid growth in middle classes, expanding trade and investment flows, bilateral and regional free-trade agreements, and a growing share of global GDP (roughly 50%) – these economies’ growth momentum should return relatively rapidly, over the next 1-2 years.	将这个大图景和更多发展中国家的总体趋势结合起来——收入的提升，中产阶级的迅速增长，双边和多变自由贸易协定，以及经济总量占全球GDP份额的不断增长（大概50%）——这些经济体的增长动力应该会在未来一两年内实现相对较快的回归。


Most of the downside risk to this scenario lies in the systemically important economies of Europe, the US, and China.	这一情境中的大部分下滑风险都存在于欧洲，美国和中国等系统性重要的经济体内部。


To derail emerging economies’ growth momentum at this stage probably would require either an additional major demand shock from the advanced economies, or some kind of failure in China’s leadership transition that impedes systemic reform and affects the country’s growth.	如果在这个阶段挫伤新兴经济的增长动力的话，要么是发达经济体的需求又出现了一次额外的重挫，要么就是中国的政权交接出现了某种问题，阻碍了系统性改革并影响了国家经济的增长。


Notwithstanding low growth forecasts for the entire developed world, these systemic risks, taken individually and in combination, appear to be declining (though certainly not to the point that they can be dismissed).	尽管发达国家整体的增长预期较低，但这些系统性风险——无论是单独出现还是同时爆发——出现的可能性似乎都在降低（当然也没到可以被消除的地步）。


On balance, then, the multispeed growth patterns of the past decade are likely to continue.	因此总的来说，过去十年的高速增长模式很可能将持续下去。


Even as the developed economies experience an extended period of below-trend growth, the emerging economies will remain an important growth engine.	即便发达经济体面临着一段低于平均增速的长时期，新兴经济体依然会是一个重要的增长引擎。


Why Did Economists Not Foresee the Crisis?	经济学家为何无法预测危机？


CHICAGO – At the height of the financial crisis, the Queen of England asked my friends at the London School of Economics a simple question, but one for which there is no easy answer: Why did academic economists fail to foresee the crisis?	发自芝加哥——在经济危机最高峰之时，英女王伊丽莎白二世向我那些伦敦经济学院的友人们提出了一个简单却又无法轻易回答的问题：专业经济学家为何没能预测这场危机？


Several responses to that query exist.	对此其实有几种答案。


One is that economists lacked models that could account for the behavior that led to the crisis.	一是说经济学家缺少相关模型，因此也无法对导致本次危机的行为作出解释。


Another is that economists were blinkered by an ideology according to which a free and unfettered market could do no wrong.	另一种认为经济学家都被无限制自由市场的教条思想蒙住了眼睛，觉得这样的市场是不会出错的。


Finally, an answer that is gaining ground is that the system bribed economists to stay silent.	而最后一种逐渐流行的说法则是经济学家都收受了金融系统的好处，于是集体保持沉默。


In my view, the truth lies elsewhere.	在我看来，真相另有所在。


It is not true that we academics did not have useful models to explain what happened.	实际上，我们这些专业经济学家并不缺乏有用的模型去解释这些状况。


If you believe that the crisis was caused by a shortage of liquidity, we had plenty of models analyzing liquidity shortages and their effects on financial institutions.	如果你认为危机的成因是缺乏流动性，我们有一大堆模型可以分析流动性短缺及其对金融机构的影响。


If you believe that the blame lies with greedy bankers and unthinking investors, lulled by the promise of a government bailout, or with a market driven crazy by irrational exuberance, we had studied all this too, in great detail.	如果你觉得始作俑者是贪婪的银行家和盲从的投资者，是这些人在政府援助方案的包庇或是市场非理性繁荣的疯狂驱动下胡作非为，我们对此也有极为细致深入研究。


Economists even analyzed the political economy of regulation and deregulation, so we could have understood why some US politicians pushed the private sector into financing affordable housing, while others deregulated private finance.	经济学家们甚至分析了监管和去监管两者之间的政治经济效应，因此也深知为何某些美国政客极力推动私人部门发放住房贷款，另一些却着手去除对私人金融活动的监管。


Yet, somehow, we did not bring all this understanding to bear and collectively shout our warnings.	但让人困惑的是经济学家们竟没有将这些认识转化为结论，并集体发出警告。


Perhaps the reason was ideology: we were too wedded to the idea that markets are efficient, market participants are rational, and high prices are justified by economic fundamentals.	或许这样做的理由是与理念有关的：我们都过分固执地认为市场是有效的，市场参与者是理性的，而高价格是可以用经济法则来解释的。


But some of this criticism of “market fundamentalism” reflects a misunderstanding.	而某些对这种“市场原教旨主义”的批评则反映了一种错误的理解。


The dominant “efficient markets theory” says only that markets reflect what is publicly known, and that it is hard to make money off markets consistently – something verified by the hit that most investor portfolios took in the crisis.	当前主流的“有效市场管理论”只是说市场反映了公众所知的信息，也难以持续地从市场中赚钱——我们从某些投资者在危机中遭重创的投资组合中可以发现这点。


The theory does not say that markets cannot plummet if the news is bad, or if investors become risk-averse.	但该理论可没有说市场在碰到坏消息或是投资者变得厌恶风险时不会大幅下挫。


Critics argue that the fundamentals were deteriorating in plain sight, and that the market (and economists) ignored it.	有批评认为经济法则的失效显而易见，但市场（以及经济学家）却对此视而不见。


But hindsight distorts analysis.	但这都是马后炮。


We cannot point to a lonely Cassandra like Robert Shiller of Yale University, who regularly argued that house prices were unsustainable, as proof that the truth was ignored.	我们不能单凭一个像耶鲁大学的罗伯特·席勒（此君一直认为高房价是无法维持的）那样的孤独预言家就认为真相被忽视了。


There are always naysayers, and they are often wrong.	凡事都有唱反调的人，而且这些人经常是错的。


There were many more economists who believed that house prices, though high, were unlikely to fall across the board.	相比之下，有更多的经济学家认为房价虽然很高，但却不可能全盘下跌。


Of course, these expectations could have been distorted by ideology – it is hard to get into the past minds of economists.	当然，这些预期都会被理念所扭曲——但我们也无从追查经济学家们过去是如何思考的。


But there is a better reason to be skeptical of explanations relying on ideology.	而那些将原因单纯归咎于某种理念的解释也是站不住脚的，须知作为一个群体，无论是那些将市场效率视为笑话的行为经济学家；


As a group, neither behavioral economists, who think that market efficiency is a joke, nor progressive economists, who distrust free markets, predicted the crisis.	还是不相信自由市场的发展经济学家，都没能预测到这场危机。


Could it be corruption?	那么这其中是否还存在腐败呢？


Some academic economists consult for banks or rating agencies, give speeches to investor conferences, serve as expert witnesses, and carry out sponsored research.	有些专业经济学家在银行或评级机构担任顾问，在投资者讲座上发言，扮演专家证人的角色，还拿着别人的钱做研究。


It would be natural to suspect us of bias.	这令公众很自然地怀疑我们是否有偏袒之处。


The bias could be implicit: our worldview is shaped by what our friends in industry believe.	同时这种偏向性可以是隐性的：我们的世界观就是由那些金融界友人的信仰塑造出来的；


Or it may be an explicit bias: an economist might write a report that is influenced by what a sponsor wants to hear, or give testimony that is purely mercenary.	也可以是显性的：一个经济学家可能会撰写一份符合资助者心意的报告，或者纯粹为挣钱而发表证言。


There are enough instances of possible bias that the issue cannot be ignored.	有足够的事例可以证实这种潜在的偏向性，因此也无法忽视这一问题。


One remedy would be to ban all interaction between economists and the corporate world.	其中一个解决方案就是断绝经济学家与金融企业之间的所有联系。


But if economists were confined to the ivory tower, we might be unbiased, but we would also be ignorant of practicalities – and thus even less capable of predicting problems. One way to restore trust may be disclosure – for economists to declare a monetary interest in a particular analysis and, more generally, to explain who pays us.	但如果经济学家都被关在了象牙塔里，我们可能会变得客观，但却更加与实际情况脱节——并因此更加无法预测危机，另一种恢复信心的方式则是信息披露制度——比如说经济学家必须声明在某项特定分析中所获取的货币利益，或者更简单地说，告诉大家是谁给了我们钱。


A number of universities are moving in this direction.	事实上有一些大学已经开始推进这方面事务了。


But I believe that corruption is not the main reason that the profession missed the crisis.	但我相信腐败并非经济学家无法识别危机的主因。


Most economists have very little interaction with the corporate world, and these “unbiased” economists were no better at forecasting the crisis.	大多数经济学家都与企业交往甚少，而那些“不偏心的”经济学家也无法预测这场危机。


I would argue that three factors largely explain our collective failure: specialization, the difficulty of forecasting, and the disengagement of much of the profession from the real world.	在此我认为有三个因素能大概解释经济学家集体出错的原因：高度专业化，预测的难度，以及大部分经济学科与现实的脱节。


Like medicine, economics has become highly compartmentalized – macroeconomists typically do not pay attention to what financial economists or real-estate economists study, and vice versa.	跟医学一样，经济学也被划分成许多不同的门类——宏观经济学家一般不会关注金融经济学家或地产经济学家究竟在干什么，反之亦然。


Yet, to see the crisis coming would have required someone who knew about each of these areas – just as it takes a good general practitioner to recognize an exotic disease.	但预测危机却需要对各个经济学领域都有所涉猎的人——正如我们需要一个优秀的全科医师去辨认某种外来病一样。


Because the profession rewards only careful, well-supported, but necessarily narrow analysis, few economists try to span sub-fields.	由于该学科只崇尚细致，证据充分但也必然有些狭窄的研究，因此也只有少数的经济学家愿意在各细分领域之间进行跨界研究。


Even if they did, they would shy away from forecasting.	但即便他们这样做了，他们也会羞于预测。


The main advantage that academic economists have over professional forecasters may be their greater awareness of established relationships between factors.	专业经济学家相对于专业市场预测者的主要优势可能在于前者更容易意识到各因素之间已经建立的关联。


What is hardest to forecast, though, are turning points – when the old relationships break down.	而预测的最困难之处恰恰是转折点——就是当旧有的关联破裂之时。


While there may be some factors that signal turning points – a run-up in short-term leverage and asset prices, for example, often presages a bust – they are not infallible predictors of trouble to come.	虽然有些因素会反映转折点的到来——比如说短期金融杠杆和资产价格的上升通常预示着泡沫破裂——但这不意味着危机就一定会爆发。


The meager professional rewards for breadth, coupled with the inaccuracy and reputational risk associated with forecasting, leads to disengagement for most academics. And it may well be that academic economists have little to say about short-term economic movements, so that forecasting, with all its errors, is best left to professional forecasters.	专业上对跨领域研究的轻视，再加上预测的低准确性以及可能给名誉带来的损失，都让大多数专业经济学家对预测敬而远之，也导致专业经济学家甚少对短期经济活动发表意见，因此预测这件动辄得咎的事情只好留给专业预测者去做了。


The danger is that disengagement from short-term developments leads academic economists to ignore medium-term trends that they can address.	但这也暴露了其中的危机：对短期经济发展状况的怠慢导致专业经济学家忽略了他们有资格发表意见的中期趋势。


If so, the true reason why academics missed the crisis could be far more mundane than inadequate models, ideological blindness, or corruption, and thus far more worrisome; many simply were not paying attention!	如果是这样的话，引发这些经济学家们误判危机的真正原因就不是不恰当模型，理念误区或者腐败这类高深的理由，而是一个更平淡无奇但也更令人忧心不已的事实：许多经济学家根本就没有关注与危机有关的一切！


Malala’s Revolution	马拉拉的革命


ISLAMABAD – The men who attempted to kill 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai on October 9 knew what she represented.	伊斯兰堡—在10月9日试图杀害14岁的马拉拉·尤萨夫扎伊（Malala Yousafzai）的人们知道她代表着什么。


Her active involvement since the age of eleven in campaigning for the rights of girls in her region to be educated was well known.	她从11岁就积极地参与了所在地区助长女生受教育权的活动，相当有名。


Malala’s efforts, while applauded by the West and some segments of Pakistani society, were deeply resented by the obscurantist forces that go by the name of the Taliban, which in Pakistan calls itself Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.	马拉拉的努力受到了西方和巴基斯坦一部分人的赞扬，但被称为塔利班的反启蒙势力对她深恶痛绝。


Their choice of name is an ironic one, for Taliban, an Arabic word, means those seeking to be educated, whereas the Taliban’s principal aim is to keep Muslim societies backward so that they can be persuaded to adopt a seventh-century version of Islam.	他们巴基斯坦自称巴基斯坦塔利班（Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan），这是个奇怪的名字，因为“塔利班”这个阿拉伯词语的意思是寻求受教育，而塔利班的主旨是保持穆斯林社会的落后状况，以便说服他们接受17世纪的伊斯兰教义。


Education, particularly of women, stands in the way of achieving this goal.	教育特别是女性教育，是达到这一目的的障碍。


But the attack on Malala will, most likely, have an effect that is opposite to that intended by those who carried it out.	但对马拉拉的攻击的效果更可能与攻击者的本意背道而驰。


Several religious leaders joined the chorus of condemnation that followed the attack on Malala.	不少宗教领袖也齐声指责对马拉拉的供给。


In a sign of unity, a council of Sunni Muslim scholars in the eastern city of Lahore issued a fatwa, signed by 50 clerics, saying that the justifications cited by the girl’s attackers were “deviant” and had no basis in Islamic law.	东部城市拉合尔（Lahore）的一个逊尼派穆斯林学者委员会集体签名发布了一份教义裁决（共有50名牧师参与），认为马拉拉攻击者的理由是“离经叛道的”，毫无伊斯兰法律依据。


The Taliban seem to have been taken aback by the public and media reaction to the attack.	塔利班似乎对公众和媒体对攻击事件的反应大吃一惊。


Dawn, Pakistan’s largest-circulation English-language newspaper, reported that Hakimullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban’s leader, had ordered his foot soldiers to target media organizations in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad in response.	巴基斯坦发行量最大的英语报纸《黎明》（Dawn）报道，巴基斯坦塔利班领袖马哈苏德（Hakimullah Mehsud）已要求其步兵将目标对准卡拉奇、拉合尔、拉瓦尔品第（Rawalpindi）和伊斯兰堡的媒体组织作为应对措施。


Several TV channels had been extremely critical of the Taliban’s assaults on Pakistani society.	不少电视台严厉地抨击塔里本对巴基斯坦社会造成的伤害。


The extremists wanted to silence the majority that was waking up to the existential threat that radical Islam poses to their country.	极端主义者想要堵住逐渐明白极端伊斯兰教对国家造成的威胁的大多数人的口。


There is a widespread belief that Pakistani women are doing poorly when it comes to obtaining education.	一个广为流传的观念是巴基斯坦女性在教育方面表现不佳。


That impression is correct to some extent.	这一印象在某种程度上是正确的。


The overall literacy rate for women is undoubtedly low – much lower than that for men.	毫无疑问，女性识字率很低，比男性低得多。


But male education and literacy in Pakistan is not very high, either.	但巴基斯坦男性受教育率和识字率也并不是很高。


Although Pakistan is a signatory to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which include attainment of universal literacy for both boys and girls by 2015, the country is far from achieving the target, with literacy rates of 70% for boys and only 45% for girls in 2010.	尽管巴基斯坦是联合国千年发展目标的签署国（其中包括在2015年前让所有男孩和女孩识字的目标），但该国距离达成目标还差得很远，2010年男孩识字率为70%，女孩更是只有45%。


That said, over the 17-year period from 1993 to 2010, the number of girls enrolled in primary education increased from 3.7 million to 8.3 million.	在1993—2010年的17年中，入读小学的女孩数量从370万人增加至830万人。 这意味着每年7.


This implies a rate of growth of 6.7% a year, about 2.5 times the rate of increase in the number of girls entering the primary-school age cohort.	6%的增幅，大约是进入小学就读年龄段女孩人数增长率的2. 5倍。


But, even with this growth rate, girls still accounted for just 44.3% of the total number of enrolled students in 2010.	但是，尽管入学率增加迅速，但在2010年，女孩仍只占入学学生总数的44. 3%。


It is in higher education that Pakistani women have made extraordinary progress in recent years.	近几年来，巴基斯坦女性教育所取得的最大进步在高等教育。


Their share of total college enrollment has increased from 36% to 57% over the last couple of decades, rising from less than 15,000 in 1993 to 436,000 in 2010.	在过去十几年中，女生在大学生中的比例从36%增至57%，从1993年的不到15000人增加到2010年的436000人。


The proportion of women receiving higher education is approaching the 60% mark, owing to an impressive 28% annual rate of growth in their enrollment numbers in 2010, up from a 20% increase in 1993.	接受高等教育的女性比例正在接近60%大关，2010年女大学生入学率增加28%，1993年增长率为20%。


Although a very large number of girls drop out after primary school, the number completing higher education is now large.	尽管大量女生在小学毕业后就会辍学，但完成高等教育的女生数量如今已经颇为庞大。


This year, roughly 750,000 women will graduate from Pakistan’s institutions of higher learning.	今年大约会有75万女大学生从巴基斯坦高等教育机构毕业。


If the current rate of growth is maintained, by 2015 the number of women completing higher education could exceed 1.5 million a year.	如果当前增长率可以维持下去，那么到2015年，完成高等教育的女生数量将超过每年150万。


Had Malala died, she eventually would have been forgotten – another victim of the war that the extremists are waging in Pakistan. Her death would have added just one more individual to the tens of thousands who have already been killed in terrorist attacks across the country.	如果马拉拉被杀，那么她将最终被遗忘，无非是极端组织在巴基斯坦所挑起的战争的又一个受害者，无非是巴基斯坦恐怖主义者所犯下的又一庄血案。


Malala’s survival – and possibly even full recovery – provides a vibrant symbol for a troubled country.	但马拉拉活了下来，甚至可能完全康复，这让她成了困境重重的巴基斯坦令人振奋的象征。


She will begin to be identified with the change that is already underway.	她将与已经点燃星星之火的变革历程一起被人铭记。


It is not often recognized that women in Pakistan – at least those of a certain class – are receiving the kind of education that enables them to enter the modern sectors of the economy or to become entrepreneurs.	在巴基斯坦，女性（至少某个阶级的女性）很难获得能够让她们进入现代经济部门或成为企业家所需要的教育。


In education, numbers make a revolution.	在教育��域，数量就是革命。


The extremists understand that all too well.	极端主义者对此一清二楚。


A Talking Cure for Syria	叙利亚的谈判解决方案


LONDON – The proposal by the United States and Russia to hold a diplomatic conference to end the carnage in Syria deserves a less skeptical reaction than it has received.	伦敦—美国和俄罗斯提出的举行外交会议结束叙利亚大屠杀的方案受到了颇多质疑。 其实不应如此。


While it will be difficult to get all of the relevant parties to the table in Geneva any time soon, much less to ensure an outcome that will stick, diplomacy is the only game left.	尽管很难在很短的时间里让各方都来到日内瓦的谈判桌前，保证会议出结果的可能性也很低，但外交已经是唯一的解决之道。


As much as one might wish otherwise, every other policy option canvassed so far is wrong in principle, nonviable in practice, unlikely to be effective, or bound to increase rather than diminish suffering.	你可能还寄希望于其他方案，但目前的其他政策建议要么在原则上有问题，要么在实际中不可行，要么不可能有效果，要么必然会增加而不是减少痛苦。


After two years of civil war, with no decisive military victory by either side in sight, the situation could not be more desperate.	内战爆发已经两年，但没有任何一方能在看得见的未来取得决定性胜利，没有比这更令人绝望的局面了。


According to current United Nations estimates, more than 80,000 Syrians are dead, and 6.8 million – one-third of the country’s population – need urgent humanitarian assistance.	据联合国的估计，超过80 000叙利亚人丧生，680万人——相当于该国人口的三分之一——需要紧急人道主义援助。


Some 4.25 million are displaced internally, and more than 1.5 million have fled the country, sheltering as refugees mainly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.	约425万人在国内流离失所，超过150万人流往国外，逃亡目的地主要是黎巴嫩、约旦和土耳其。


The strain on Syria’s neighbors is immense, and the conflict is inexorably seeping into the wider region.	叙利亚邻国受到了巨大的压力，而冲突正在无情地在更广的地区蔓延。


Both government and rebel forces have committed atrocity crimes.	政府军和叛军都犯下了残暴罪行。


Many more are feared as violence among the main sectarian groups escalates.	随着主要宗派团体之间暴力的升级，许多人惊恐不已。


Continued international paralysis is indefensible.	国际社会对此持续无动于衷是不行的。


Inaction would ignite fires throughout the Middle East, and would violate the international community’s now-accepted responsibility to protect, through timely and decisive collective action, populations at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other major crimes against humanity and war crimes.	不作为会导致燎原之火席卷中东，也将违反如今被国际社会所接受的保护责任——通过及时果断的集体行动保护人民免受种族灭绝、种族清洗和其他反人类罪和战争罪伤害。


That principle, unanimously agreed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, has been successfully invoked elsewhere, including in support of diplomatic intervention in Kenya in 2008.	这一在2005年联合国大会一致通过的原则在其他地区都能良好地贯彻，包括支持2008年对肯尼亚的外交干预。


It also underpinned Security Council-mandated military interventions in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire in 2011 and, more recently, in Mali.	它支持了联合国安理会授权的对利比亚和科特迪瓦（2011年）一级马里（最近）的军事干预。


But how can it be applied to the mess now in Syria?	但如何把它应用于当前的叙利亚乱象？


The most immediate need, about which there should be little controversy, is massive humanitarian assistance.	应该没有争议的最紧迫的需要是大规模人道主义援助。


Delivery problems abound in the war zones, but not everywhere.	运送问题在战区存在，但并非处处存在。


Yet international donors are dragging their feet both in meeting existing commitments and in making new ones.	但国际援助者既没有兑现已经许下的承诺，也不再做出新的承诺。


And all the aid in the world won’t stop the killing.	而援助是不足以结束杀戮的。


It is too late now for non-military tools of coercion to have much effect, although Security Council threats of International Criminal Court prosecution for atrocity crimes – including any use of chemical weapons – must remain on the table .	如今，采取非军事强制手段已经无法再取得很好的效果，尽管安理会威胁要将暴行——包括任何使用化学武器的行为——送上国际刑事法庭不能取消。


But what of the military-response options still strongly favored by many policymakers and pundits?	但许多决策者和专家仍大力支持的军事干预选择又如何？


The trouble is that every tray in this toolkit, too, is empty.	麻烦在于这个工具箱里德所有工具包也都是空空如也。


Direct military intervention to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would never win Security Council approval, and has no volunteers anyway among capable military powers – albeit in most cases because of the political and military risks involved, rather than the legal indefensibility of acting outside the UN Charter.	直接军事干预推翻叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政权不可能赢得安理会批准，有能力进行军事干预的大国也不会站出来充当志愿军——尽管原因大多是政治性和军事风险性的，而不是因为在联合国宪章之外采取行动的非法性。


A less partisan intervention – pouring in troops and airpower to separate the warring parties forcibly – also has no takers, no likely UN authority, and only marginal hope of causing less harm than it would be intended to avoid.	偏向性更小的干预——派遣军队和控制制空权从而强制分离战争双方——也没有实施者，无法获得联合国授权，其效果也只能是减少伤害，而不可能是计划中的避免伤害。


There are many more enthusiasts for a more calibrated military intervention, designed to establish one or more no-fly zones, and maybe safe havens and humanitarian corridors on the ground.	精确军事干预的热情要大得多——如建立一个或多个禁飞区以及地面安全港和人道主义通道。


In the early days of the crisis, it was argued that, given the strength of the regime’s air defenses and ground forces, even these limited objectives could not be achieved without fighting an all-out war – and thus causing a net increase in human suffering.	在冲突之初，有人指出，拜巴沙尔政权的空中和地面优势所赐，即使是这样的优先目标也无法在不进行全面战争的情况下实现，因而这会大大增加人道伤害。


With most of the country now ablaze, this argument is less convincing.	目前，战火已经蔓延了叙利亚的大部分国土，这一观点的说服力更低了。


But it remains the case that there are no obvious takers for a military role, partly because of the scale, difficulty, and risk of the commitment required, and partly because of the likely political and legal costs, given the minimal prospect of Security Council endorsement.	但有一点仍然正确：没有显而易见的军事角色承担者，这部分是因为这一角色的规模、困难和风险所致，部分是因为潜在成本和法律成本，因为安理会很难支持这样的行动。


The United Kingdom and France are pressing hard for indirect military intervention: supplying arms to the rebel side, in their view, would be a low-cost, low-risk, potentially high-return option.	英国和法国在大力宣传间接军事干预：向叛军供应武器。 在它们看来，这是低成本、低风险、高潜在回报的选择。


And the European Union has now lifted its ban.	欧盟已经取消了禁令。


But the US is rightly cautious.	但美国正确地对此颇为谨慎。


A troubling proportion of the opposition forces are Islamic extremists, and there is no guarantee that weapons deliveries will stay out of their hands.	叛军中不乏伊斯兰极端主义反对武装，没人能保证武器不会输送到他们手中。


More broadly, increases in the supply of weapons funneled to rebel forces by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others have correlated with surges in the civilian death toll, suggesting that they cost more lives than they save – and with no evident strategic gains.	更广地说，通过卡塔尔、沙特和其他渠道流向叛军的武器供应的增加与平民死亡人数暴增有关，这表明武器供应夺命比救命更厉害，而且没有带来任何明显的战略利益。


The Assad regime, with its own external supporters, seems likely to have no difficulty matching any new hardware thrown at it.	巴沙尔政权及其本身的外部支持者似乎可以毫无困难地赶超对手获得的硬件设施。


If the rationale for arming the opposition is not so much to win the war as to weaken the government’s resistance to negotiation, it is arguable that the elements of a “hurting stalemate” are already in place, with more weapons likely to produce nothing but more fighting and more casualties.	如果武装反对派的理由与其说是为了赢得战争，不如说是减少政府对谈判的抵制，那么可以说，“有害僵局”的要素已经具备，更多的武器除了制造更多的战争和更多的伤亡之外别无用处。


The pressure that has always mattered most for the Assad regime is that capable of being applied by Russia.	对巴沙尔政权最有效的压力是俄罗斯可以做什么。


What is new, and encouraging, about the events of the last month is that Russia has found enough common ground with the US – in their mutual anxiety about the rising influence of radical Islam in an increasingly fragmented and volatile region – to be prepared at last to do some squeezing.	上个月事件的新的令人鼓舞之处是俄罗斯与美国找到了足够多的共同点——对极端伊斯兰教在日渐脆弱和动荡地区影响力日渐上升的共同担忧——终于可以携手压制了。


Painful concessions will be required from both sides if the Geneva conference is even to convene, let alone reach agreement on a cease-fire and transitional administration.	如果日内瓦会议想要成功召开——更不用说达成停火和过渡性政府协议了——双方都必须做出痛苦的让步。


It is encouraging that the US, following talks between Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, seems prepared to accept a role for senior Assad regime members in any settlement, and that constructive proposals are starting to emerge from at least some opposition quarters.	令人鼓舞的是，在国务卿科里和俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫举行会谈后，美国似乎准备好接受巴沙尔政府成员在解决方案中扮演重要角色； 此外，至少一些反对派开始提出建设性的方案。


Compromise can be anathema for purists, but it has always been the stuff of which peace is made.	妥协是纯粹主义者最讨厌的东西，但它往往是催生和平的关键。


It has never been more necessary than it is now in Syria.	叙利亚正是如此。


The Limits of Twitter Diplomacy	Twitter外交的限度


DENVER – Twentieth-century American statecraft produced Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, Richard Holbrooke, and many others who balanced the power of the United States with its responsibilities to develop key relationships, solve problems, and build international structures.	丹佛——二十世纪美国的治国方略催生出艾奇逊、基辛格和霍尔布鲁克和其他众多政治家，成功平衡了美国发展重要关系、解决问题、建设国际体系的义务和美国的国力。


“Twenty-first-century statecraft,” we have been told repeatedly, promises to go further and deliver more, for now US diplomats – and those of other countries – can use Twitter, Facebook, and other social media.	我们反复听人提及“二十一世纪治国方略” 有望更进一步、取得更多成果，因为现在美国和其他国家的外交官可以利用Twitter，Facebook和其他社交媒体。


With so many international problems today, diplomacy does need to combine the old-fashioned statecraft of the twentieth century with the new tools that budding technologies have provided.	面对今天这么多国际问题，外交官们确实要综合利用二十世纪经典治国方略和新兴技术提供的工具。


But tools alone cannot solve or build anything.	但单靠工具解决不了任何问题。


And yet the new tools are everywhere.	但新的工具触手可及。


It is hard to find a US ambassador in any part of the world who has not embraced the challenge of mastering these communication technologies.	世界各地的美国大使均已欣然接受了掌握这些通信技术所带来的难题。


Most have a Twitter or Facebook account, or post frequently on YouTube, in order to keep the public in the countries where they serve (and at home) informed of their daily activities, or occasionally their thinking about an issue or even their mood.	他们多数已经开通了Twitter或Facebook账户，或者频繁地在YouTube上发帖，目的是让所在国（以及美国本土）民众了解他们的日常活动，偶尔表达对某个问题的看法，甚至表露他们的心情。


The State Department estimates that its employees are in direct communication with more than 15 million people worldwide.	国务院估计其工作人员在世界各地与超过1500万人直接沟通。


Incredibly enough, more than 330,000 people “like” the personality-challenged department’s Facebook page.	令人难以置信的是，超过330,000人“喜欢”正面临个性化挑战的国务院的Facebook网页。


This generation of American diplomats is fast overcoming a reputation for being remote, emotionally distant figures.	这一代美国外交官正在迅速扭转过去疏远和冷漠的名声。


To be fair, in the past, an ambassador had few opportunities to connect with the host country’s population, apart from the occasional newspaper or television interview, or a photo of a meeting with a host country official or waiting on an airport’s tarmac for a visitor from Washington, DC.	公平地讲，除偶尔接受报纸或电视采访、与所在国官员合影或在机场停机坪迎接来自华盛顿的访问者外，过去的大使很少有机会与所在国民众直接沟通。


Now, as America’s tweeting diplomats have shown, there is no shortage of such opportunities.	但现在，美国发表推文的外交官表明根本不缺乏机会沟通。


Time constraints are not an issue.	时间限制不是问题。


Most US embassies ensure a constant stream of tweets by relying on public-diplomacy officers to get the word out about what the ambassador is doing day by day, even hour by hour.	多数美国使馆通过公共外交官发布大使每天、甚至每小时的活动来确保频繁地发布推文。


Many ambassadors have built mass followings in electronic terms, and generate numerous “likes” as they go about their daily routines of meetings and ribbon cuttings.	很多大使都积累了大量的电子追随者，并在完成会见剪彩等日常活动之余让不少人“喜欢”他们的推文。


All fun stuff.	这的确很有意思。


But have social media really made for better diplomats or helped solve difficult problems?	但社交媒体是否真的提升了外交质量或有助于解决疑难问题？


If so, why are there so many unmitigated and unmediated crises around the world – Syria’s civil war, the carnage in Egypt, and deteriorating US-Russian relations, to name just a few.	如若果真如此，那叙利亚内战、埃及大屠杀及美俄关系恶化等全世界那么多未经调停的严重危机又怎么解释？


The much-ballyhooed twenty-first-century statecraft, it seems, is really not up to the job.	很多人大肆宣扬的二十一世纪治国方略似乎并没有那么神奇。


Advocates accurately point out that social media are a tool that is ignored at one’s peril.	支持者们说得非常准确，谁敢忽视社交媒体风险自担。


But what is urgently needed today is an understanding that diplomacy is not only about shouting from the rooftops and communicating with the general public.	但今天人们迫切需要理解外交并不是高高在上地与公众交流。


It is about working on relationships one at a time.	外交的实质是建立关系。


Above all, it is about keeping the door open to deal with unsavory governments.	归根结底，外交是要与令人厌恶的政府保持沟通。


Governments, even terrible ones, comprise the people who lead a country.	哪怕再糟糕的政府也是由国家领导人组成。


Maybe they shouldn’t be in power; maybe the people demonstrating in the streets should be.	也许他们根本不应该掌权； 也许掌权的应该是街头的示威群众。


But, in the here and now, these relationships need to be maintained in order to help polarized societies make progress toward overcoming their divisions.	但此时此地，仍然需要与之保持关系，帮助两极分化的社会在克服分歧方面取得进展。


The US ambassador to Egypt, Anne W. Patterson, was excoriated in the media – especially in social media, which have no international boundaries (and often no manners) – for her courageous efforts to keep the door open for dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood government.	美国驻埃及大使安妮·帕特森遭到媒体、尤其是社交媒体（往往既没有国界也没有礼貌）的严厉批评，他们对她与穆兄会政府保持接触的勇敢努力进行抨击。


She did what any good – and, in her case, superb – diplomat should do: maintain relations with both sides and try to find a way forward.	她完成了任何称职——就她而言甚至是卓越的——外交官应当完成的任务：与双方保持关系，力求找到现实的解决方案。


Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood government and the secular opposition both complained about America’s relationship with the other.	事实上，穆兄会政府和世俗反对派都对美国与对方的关系颇多怨言。


That is the hot seat where American diplomacy belongs.	这就是美国外交官的尴尬境遇。


With all due respect to “eDiplomacy,” this type of private, traditional communication remains the heart and soul of the business.	尽管承认“电子外交”的作用，这种传统的私下交流仍然是现代外交的核心和灵魂。


Similarly, Secretary of State John Kerry has launched a courageous effort to revive the Israel-Palestine peace process.	同样，国务卿约翰·克里大胆努力恢复以巴和平进程。


Given the dearth of public information about his strategy, it is clear that he is not an avid practitioner of twenty-first-century statecraft – that is, he does not think out loud.	鉴于有关其战略的公众信息匮乏，很显然他不是二十一世纪治国方略的狂热倡导者——换句话说，他极少高调宣传。


And yet he got the parties together by developing trust, which is the coin of the realm for an effective diplomat.	但他通过建立互信让各方走到一起，这是他身为高效外交官的最好象征。


It is perhaps a little unfair to contrast these efforts to what the US did in Syria.	用上述努力与美国在叙利亚的所作所为相比或许有些不公平。


In an effort to stay ahead of intense media expectations (and reflecting a misunderstanding according to which Syria would be just another Tunisia), President Barack Obama’s administration essentially severed America’s relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime by publicly embracing the disparate opposition and calling for Assad’s immediate removal.	仅仅为满足媒体的强烈期待（并且反思叙利亚将步突尼斯后尘的误解），奥巴马总统政府基本上切断了美国与阿萨德政权的关系，公开承认一盘散沙的反对派，并呼吁阿萨德立即下台。


The US did not offer any clear indication of what it thought should follow such an outcome, apart from some kind of election process, which in a largely sectarian conflict like Syria’s would amount to nothing more than an elaborate census.	除某种形式的选举外，美国并没有明确说出今后的行动步骤，而选举进程在像叙利亚这样宗派冲突中不过是一次煞费苦心的人口普查。


Lo and behold, political leaders, especially tough and terrible ones like Assad, tend not to embrace a process whose stated purpose is to eliminate them.	特别是像阿萨德这样强硬可怕的政治领袖，往往不会接受从一开始就以推翻他们为目的的政治进程。


US diplomats – indeed, all countries’ diplomats – might want to consider that, rather than chasing record numbers of social media “followers,” they should be building trust on all sides in conflict-prone societies and looking for more leaders willing to take chances for peace.	美国外交官——事实上是所有国家的外交官或许应当思考这个问题，而不是以社交媒体“追随者”创纪录为目标。 他们应当在冲突各方间建立信任，寻找更多愿意为和平而冒险的领袖。


When the shooting has stopped and the sides are talking, diplomats can tweet to their hearts’ content.	当枪声停止且各方开始谈判，外交官或许可以随心所欲地发表推文。


Why Do Economies Stop Growing?	经济为何不再增长？


MILAN – Over the years, advanced and developing countries have experimented, sometimes deliberately and frequently inadvertently, with a variety of approaches to growth.	米兰—多年来，发达和发展中国家试验了一系列增长办法——有时是有意为之，大部分是无心插柳。


Unfortunately, many of these strategies have turned out to have built-in limitations or decelerators – what one might call elements of unsustainability.	不幸的是，这些战略多具有内生性极限或减速效应——也可以称之为不可持续性。


And avoiding serious damage and difficult recoveries requires us to get a lot better at recognizing these self-limiting growth patterns early on.	要想避免严重伤害和复苏不力，就必须及早认清这些自我局限的增长模式。


Here are some of the items in a growing library of decelerating growth models.	我们来讨论一些有减速效应的增长模型，这方面的例子正在日渐增多。


In developing countries, import substitution as a way to jump-start economic diversification can work for a while; but, over time, as productivity growth lags and comparative advantage is over-ridden, growth grinds to a halt.	在发展中国家，以进口替代作为经济多样化的启动手段可以在短期内见效，但假以时日，随着生产率增长的落后和比较优势弱化，增长会陷入停滞。


Small, open economies are naturally somewhat specialized, which leaves them vulnerable to shocks and volatility.	小型开放经济天生具有专门性，这意味着它们极易受冲击和波动的干扰。


But, in terms of growth and living standards, the cost of economic diversification, when implemented by protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, eventually outweighs the benefits.	但是，从增长和生活水平角度讲，经济多元化的成本（如果多元化是以保护本国工业免受外国竞争的办法实现的）最终将会压倒收益。


It is better to allow specialization, and build effective social safety nets and support systems to protect people and families during economic transitions.	更好的做法是走专门化道路，同时建设高效的社会安全网和支持系统从而在经济转型期保护人民和家庭。


Such “structural flexibility” is better adapted to enabling the broad changes that rapidly evolving technological and global economic forces require.	这一“结构性灵活度”能更好地适应剧变，这也是日新月异的技术和全球经济力量演化所要求的。


Mismanagement of natural-resource wealth underpins an especially potent self-limiting pattern of growth and development.	自然资源财富的管理不善便是典型的自我局限型增长和发展模式。


If invested in infrastructure, education, and external financial assets, natural-resource revenues can accelerate growth. But, too often, such revenues distort economic incentives, which come to favor rent-seeking and interfere with the diversification that is essential for growth.	如果将自然资源收入投资于基础设施、教育和外部金融资产等方面，则能加速增长，但是，跟多情况下，自然资源收入会扭曲经济激励，朝着有利于寻租的方向发展，而不利于增长所要求的多元化。


More recently, many advanced countries have discovered a “new” set of growth models with built-in structural limitations: excessive private or public consumption, or both, usually accompanied and enabled by rising debt and inflated asset prices, and a corresponding decline in investment.	更晚近一些，许多发达国家发现了一种具有内生结构性局限的“新”发展模型：私人或公共消费过度，或兼而有之，并通常伴随或由债务增长和资产价格膨胀以及相应的投资下降所致。


This approach appears to work until domestic aggregate demand can no longer sustain growth and employment, at which point it ends in either gradual stagnation or a violent financial and economic crisis.	这一模式会一直有效，直到国内总需求不再能够维持增长和就业，要么逐渐陷入停滞，要么发生严重金融和经济危机。


(In fact, many developing countries have learned this the hard way, but the lessons seem not to have crossed over to advanced countries.)	（事实上，许多发展中国家对此都有深刻教训，但发达国家并没有什么体验。 ）


But the opposite of the excessive-consumption model – excessive reliance on investment to generate aggregate demand – is also a self-limiting growth pattern.	但消费过度模型的反面——过度依赖投资形成总需求——同样是一种自我局限型增长模式。


When the private and social returns of investment diminish too much, growth cannot be sustained indefinitely, even though rising investment rates can sustain aggregate demand for a while.	随着投资的私人和社会回报一降再降，增长将不可能永久维持下去，尽管不断增加的投资率能够在短期维持总需求。


Altering this growth pattern is a significant part of the challenge that China now faces.	摆脱这一增长模式是中国当前所面临的重大挑战之一。


Rising inequality in either opportunity or outcomes (and often both) also poses threats to the sustainability of growth patterns.	机会和结果方面的不平等性的愈演愈烈（通常这两方面同时发生）也会对增长模式的可持续性构成威胁。


While people in a wide range of countries accept some degree of market-determined income variation, based on differential talents and personal preferences, there are limits.	在一个多层次国家中，人民能够接受一定程度的由市场决定的收入差异，但这种差异必须建立在天分和个人偏好不同的基础上，而且必须有个限度。


When they are breached, the typical result is a sense of unfairness, followed by resistance and, ultimately, political choices that address the inequality, though sometimes in counter-productive, growth-impeding ways.	如果不平等性越了界，最典型的结果就是产生不公平感，从而引发反抗情绪，最终将会形成修正不平等问题的政治选择，有时这种选择是反生产、不利于增长的。


Perhaps the largest long-run sustainability issue concerns the adequacy of the global economy’s natural-resource base: output will more than triple over the coming two or three decades, as high-growth developing economies’ four billion people converge toward advanced-country income levels and consumption patterns.	也许最大的长期可持续性隐忧在于全球经济自然资源基础是否充分：随着高增长发展中国家的40亿人口的收入水平和消费模式向发达国家看齐，产出将在未来二三十年内增长两倍以上。


Existing economic-development strategies will require significant adaption to accommodate this kind of growth.	现有经济发展战略要求实施重大调整以适应这种类型的增长。


Some adaptation will occur naturally, as rising energy and other commodity prices generate incentives to economize or seek alternatives.	一些调整会自动发生，因为上涨的能源及其他商品价格将产生节约和寻找替代品的激励。


But the un-priced environmental externalities – global warming and water depletion, for example – will require serious attention, not myopic, reactive mindsets and approaches. 	但无价可循的环境外部性——比如全球变暖和缺水——必须引起严重关注，采取具有远见卓识的应对措施。


All of these self-limiting growth patterns tend to have three things in common.	所有这些自我局限型增长模式具有三个共同点。


First, in one or several dimensions, some part of the economy’s base of tangible, intangible, and natural-resource assets is being run down.	首先，在一个或几个方面，经济的有形、无形和自然资源资产基础正在耗尽。


I would include social cohesion as part of the asset base: it is the one that is depreciated by excessive inequality.	我把社会凝聚力也纳入资产基础的概念中，它是一种因过度不平等而折旧的资产。


Measurement issues play an important role here.	在这方面，度量问题很重要。


It is easier to run down something that is partly invisible because it is not regularly or effectively measured.	具有一定程度不可见性的东西更容易耗尽，因为没有定期、有效的度量方法。


Expanded measurement of the dimensions of economic, social, and environmental performance is necessary to broaden awareness of sustainability issues.  	扩大对经济、社会和环境表现诸方面的度量手段是增进对可持续性问题理解的必要条件。


Second, unidentified self-limiting growth patterns produce very bad results.	其次，未被识别的自我局限型增长模式会造成极坏的结果。


Expectations come to exceed reality, and resetting the system to a sustainable growth pattern is difficult.	预期总会超越现实，将增长模式予以重置以恢复可持续性是很困难的。


After all, past investment shortfalls have to be made up and future-oriented investments undertaken simultaneously – a double burden that must be borne by the current generation.	毕竟，过去造成的投资短缺必须得到弥补，与此同时，还要进行面向未来的投资，因此当下的一代就不得不背负起双重负担。


An inability to resolve the distributional and fairness problem can produce gridlock, paralysis, and prolonged stagnation.	无法解决分配和公平问题将导致长期停滞僵局，造成经济瘫痪。


Finally, many of these flawed growth patterns involve fiscal distress.	最后，这些有缺陷的增长模式往往造成财政困局。


Contrary to the prevailing wisdom nowadays, some degree of Keynesian demand management in the transition to a more sustainable growth pattern is not in conflict with restoring fiscal balance over a sensible time period.	与当下流行的智慧相反，在向更具可持续性的增长模式转型过程中实行一定程度的凯恩斯主义需求管理与在一个合理时期内重建财政平衡并不矛盾。


On the contrary, applied both individually and together, fiscal stimulus and consolidation are necessary parts of the adjustment process.	相反，财政刺激和整合（不管是单独使用还是综合使用）乃是调整过程的必需组成部分。


But they are not sufficient.	但这还不够。


The crucial missing pieces are a shift in the structure of accessible aggregate demand and restoration of those parts of the economy’s asset base that have been run down, implying the need for structural change and investment.	我们忽略了几个关键点——可实现总需求结构的变化和经济资产基础中已耗尽部分的恢复，它们意味着需要实施结构性变革和投资。


Why Does Angela Merkel Hesitate?	默克尔为何迟疑不决？


MUNICH – “Where is Angela?” is the question The Economist asked when Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, and José Manuel Barroso met to prepare a European economic stimulus plan without Chancellor Merkel being present.	慕尼黑--当萨尔科奇、布朗和巴罗索在没有德国总理默克尔在场的情况下会面准备欧洲经济刺激计划的时候，英国经济学人杂志提出了“默克尔在哪里”的问题。


Indeed, Germany is currently the spoiler in the competition to provide billions to prevent a breakdown of the world economy.	确实，目前各国竞相提供数十亿计的资金来防止世界经济崩盘，德国就成了阻碍。


Why is Germany so hesitant when it comes to economic stimulus programs?	在经济刺激上，德国为何如此迟疑呢？


One popular theory is that, given the supply-side orientation of German economists, there is little sympathy for Keynesian, demand-oriented prescriptions.	其中一个普通的解释是，德国经济学家信奉供应派学说，对凯恩斯学派需求导向的药方并不热衷。


But no German economist has come out against an economic stimulus program, and many favor one.	但是德国经济学家中没有一个站出来反对经济刺激计划，而且很多人还赞同经济刺激。


Whereas Keynesian theory has largely disappeared from economic textbooks in the United States, it continues to be taught everywhere in Germany.	凯恩斯理论已经基本上从美国的经济学教科书中消失，但是德国各地还在继续教授这一理论。


German economists, in contrast to their American colleagues, never abandoned Keynesian policies as a means to combat demand deficits.	与美国同行相比，德国经济学家们从来没有放弃过凯恩斯主义政策来作为解决需求赤字问题的一种途经。


Moreover, German politicians rarely heed the advice of German economists.	而且，德国政坛人物很少听取德国经济学家们的意见。


A second hypothesis is closer to the truth: the decline of economic activity in Germany thus far has not been as strong as in other countries.	第二个假设更为接近事实，那也就是德国经济下滑目前为止还并不像其他国家那样强烈。


Germany did not have a real-estate bubble that threatened to burst, as did Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, and France.	德国并非像英国、爱尔兰、西班牙以及法国那样形成房地产泡沫并且即将破裂。


Germany has only been indirectly affected – by the decline in worldwide demand for German products – which explains an important timing difference in the business cycle.	德国只是由于全球对德国产品需求下降而间接受到影响。 这也就是为何商业周期中存在重要的时间差。


Whereas unemployment in the US has been rising for one and a half years, Germany currently is enjoying its lowest unemployment rate in 16 years.	美国的失业率在过去一年半时间里一直在上升，而德国目前的失业率却是16年以来最低的。


The German construction industry and retailing are still stable, as the latest survey of the Ifo Institute shows, and the whole world is profiting from this stability, as Germany is the second largest importer of goods and services after the US.	Ifo研究所最新的调查显示，德国的建筑和零售行业依旧稳定。 全世界也从这一稳定局面中收益，因为德国是仅次于美国之后的世界第二大商品和服务进口国。


While US imports are declining sharply, German imports are holding up –without any economic stimulus plan.	美国进口大幅度下降，而德国进口却在没有经济刺激计划的情况下维持原状。


This is why many Germans wonder whether the foreign criticism is fair.	这就是为何德国人疑惑外国人的批评是否公平。


To be sure, the world recession will hit Germany with full force.	的确，世界经济衰退将会全面打击德国。


The Ifo Institute has forecast that GDP will contract by 2.2% in 2009.	Ifo研究所预计，德国GDP将会在2009年萎缩2. 2%。


But the contraction will be primarily because of declining exports, a large portion of which consists of investment goods, as well as the drop in domestic equipment investment.	但是这一萎缩主要将会由于出口和国内设备投资下降而造成，而德国出口的一大部分包括投资设备。


These are areas where there is not much that the state can do to help.	还有一些领域国家是无能为力的。


It can cut taxes to stimulate consumption and it can invest in construction, but these sectors currently need little help, except perhaps for the automobile industry.	政府可以降低税收来刺激消费，还可以投资建筑行业。 但是目前这些行业可能除了汽车制造业之外基本上不需要帮助。


This could, of course, quickly change.	当然这一局面可能马上改变。


When the second-round effects hit the domestic sector in the course of 2009, a stimulus program will be needed.	当2009年第二轮影响波及到国内部门的时候就需要经济刺激了。


From the German perspective, the best timing for such a program would be the autumn of next year.	从德国的观点来看，经济刺激最好的时机就是明年秋天。


If the money is spent now, the economy in some sectors could overheat, helping no one.	如果现在就花钱，那么某些经济部门就会过热，对谁都没有帮助。


Paul Krugman, who has aimed massive criticism at Germany’s government, should keep this in mind.	克鲁格曼对德国政府大加指责，他应当知道这一点。


Krugman is an excellent economist.	克鲁格曼是一名出色的经济学家。


He is right in principle in demanding a major economic stimulus package from the German government that goes beyond the €35 billion already planned.	德国政府已经计划好350亿欧元的经济刺激计划，而他则要求进一步，这在原则上是对的。


But he should not ignore the time lags between the American and the German economic cycles.	但是，他不应该忽略美德两国经济周期的时间差。


Germany should prepare its economic stimulus program now and implement it when the time comes.	德国应该现在着手准备经济刺激计划并且在适当的时候予以落实。


A third hypothesis to explain Germany’s hesitancy is suspicion of the European Union’s redistribution machinery.	有关德国行动迟缓的第三个假设是怀疑欧盟的重新分配机制。


When Sarkozy and other EU leaders demand Germany’s participation in an economic stimulus and rescue package, one reason is that they expect Germany to again bear the lion’s share of the costs.	当萨尔科奇和其他欧盟领导人要求德国参与经济刺激和援救项目的时候，其中一个原因是他们想要让德国再一次承担大部分费用。


For example, of the €5 billion extension of the Cohesion Funds approved by the European Parliament in December 2007, Germany received nothing, but it bears 20% of the costs.	例如，欧洲议会在2007年12月批准延长价值五十亿的团结基金，德国分文未得，但是确支付了20%的费用。


Germans have always been enthusiastic proponents of the EU, not least because they hoped that a European identity would help compensate for their damaged national identity.	德国人一直热切支持欧盟，这并不仅仅是因为他们希望欧洲身份可以帮助补偿受损的民族身份。


So, whenever it came to restructuring the EU, they always accepted a level of influence that was small relative to their country’s size.	因此，只要涉及欧盟重建，他们总是愿意接受相对小于其国家规模的影响力。


Although Germany’s share of the EU population is 17%, it receives 13% of the voting rights in the EU Parliament.	尽管德国人口占欧盟的17%，但是它在欧盟议会中只有13%的投票权。


Its share in the more important Council of Ministers is only 8%, the same as that of the French, whose population share is 13%.	在更为重要的部长理事会中德国只有8%的投票权。 法国人口只占13%，但是有一样的投票权。


Former French President Jacques Chirac did not hesitate to justify this imbalance with a reference to World War II, which the Germans accepted.	法国前总统希拉克总是用第二次世界大战来给这一不平衡提供理由，德国也接受这一说法。


But their enthusiasm has limits.	但是德国的热情也有限度。


After all, aside from political under-representation, Germany’s annual contribution to the EU budget (most recently €7.4 billion) makes the country by far the largest net contributor.	毕竟，除了在政治上没有得到充分代表外，德国每年向欧盟预算提供资金(最近是74亿欧元)，遥遥领先成为最大的净贡献国。


Germany finances 20% of the EU budget but receives only 12% of EU spending.	德国提供欧盟资金的20%，而只得到12%的欧盟开支。


Willingness could be exhausted if the EU budget is further expanded without reducing Germany’s net contribution and narrowing the gap between its financing and voting rights.	如果欧盟预算进一步扩大而并不减少德国的净贡献以及缩小资金和投票权之间的差异的话，那么，德国的意愿就会到头了。


For these reasons, German reservations also extend to the European economic government that Sarkozy advocates, and that, again, would be financed more than proportionately with German money.	出于这些原因，德国对萨尔科奇主张的欧洲经济政府的主张也持有保留意见，而这一欧洲经济政府也将会主要是由德国不成比例地资助。


Sarkozy regards an EU economic government as a way to preserve his leadership in the EU beyond France’s Council presidency, which is now ending.	萨尔科奇把欧盟经济政府视为在法国的欧盟轮值主席结束之后保留其欧盟领导地位的手段。


Although the Czech Republic will assume the EU presidency in January, this has not prevented the French President from convening a new EU summit under Sarkozy’s leadership in the first half of 2009.	尽管捷克将会在一月担任欧盟轮值主席，但是这并没有阻止法国总统在2009年上半年主持召开一次新的欧盟首脑会议。


This affront will put not only Czech tolerance to the test, but also that of Merkel.	这一冒犯不仅会考验捷克的容忍程度，而且也会考验默克尔。


In the end, she will probably give in to Sarkozy’s wishes in order to avoid endangering her chances of re-election in September because of a conflict with the French.	最终，她会有可能屈从于萨尔科奇的意愿以避免由于同法国冲突而危及其九月再次当选。


But she will surely do so with clenched fists.	但是她这样做肯定是心怀不满。


Why Do Smart People Live Longer?	智者何以长寿


EDINBURGH – People with higher intelligence test scores in childhood and early adulthood tend to live longer.	爱丁堡--儿童时期以及早期成年智力测验成绩较高的人一般更加长寿。


This result has been found among people from Australia, Denmark, England and Wales, Scotland, Sweden, and the United States.	澳大利亚、丹麦、英格兰、威尔士、苏格兰、瑞典以及美国等国家的人群中验证了这一结果。


In fact, it has been found within every population that has been studied.	实际上，几乎所有接受研究的人群都验证了这一结果。


Indeed, the impact of intelligence on mortality rivals well-known risk factors for illness and death, such as high blood pressure, being overweight, high blood glucose, and high cholesterol.	确实，智力水平对死亡率的影响与众所周知的疾病和死亡风险因素相匹配。


Its effect is almost as important as that of smoking.	这些风险因素包括高血压、体重超重、高血葡萄糖以及高卡路里，其影响几乎与吸烟一样重要。


Differences in human intelligence have environmental and genetic causes.	人类智力水平的差异有环境和基因的原因。


An intelligence test score in early life is partly a record of what the environment has wrought on the brain and the rest of the body up to that time.	早年智力测验成绩在一定程度上记录了截至当时环境对大脑和身体其他部位的影响。


Babies who have lower birth weights, for example, are more prone to chronic illnesses later in life.	例如，出生体重较轻的婴儿在以后更容易得慢性疾病。


They also have, on average, slightly lower intelligence.	平均而言，他们智力水平较低。


But tests of whether birth weight might explain some of the link between intelligence and mortality have found no connection.	但是出生时的体重是否可以解释智力水平和死亡率之间的某些联系并没有找到联系。


Parents’ occupations are also related to their child’s intelligence and later risk of illness: children from more privileged backgrounds tend to have higher intelligence and better health, and to live longer.	父母的职业也与儿童的智力水平以及后期疾病风险有关。 家庭背景更好的孩子一般具有更高的智力水平，身体较好，而且长寿。


However, there is no convincing evidence that parental background explains the link between higher intelligence and longer life.	但是，人们还没有确凿的证据表明父母背景可以解释高智力水平和长寿之间的联系。


Other researchers have viewed intelligence test scores as possibly more than just an indicator of an efficient brain.	其他研究人员认为，智力水平测验说明的东西不仅仅是大脑运转良好的表现。


After all, the brain is just one organ of the body, so people whose brains work well in early life may also have other organs and systems that are more efficient than others’.	毕竟，大脑只是人体的一个器官。 因此，早年大脑运转灵活的人也可能具有比其他人更为有效的其他器官和身体系统。


But this “system integrity” idea is somewhat vague and difficult to test.	但是这一“系统完整”的观点有点模糊而且难以测试。


The best we have done to date has been to examine whether people’s reaction speeds are related to intelligence and to mortality.	我们目前为止做得最好的情况就是检查人的反应速度是否与智力水平和死亡率有关。


They are.	它们确实有关。


Reaction-time tests involve little thinking, and merely ask people to respond as fast as they can to simple stimuli.	反应时间测试几乎不用思考，仅仅是让人们对简单的刺激做出尽可能快的反应。


People who react faster have, on average, higher intelligence scores and live longer.	平均而言，反应快的人智力水平较高而且长寿。


But we need to think of better measures of the body’s integrity to test this idea more fully.	但是我们需要考虑有关身体完整的更好的标准来更加完整地测试这一观点。


A third potential explanation is that intelligence is about good decision-making.	第三个可能的解释是，所谓智力就是良好的决策。


Every day, as we live our lives, we make decisions about our health: what, when, and how much to eat; how much exercise to take; how to look after ourselves if we have an illness; and so forth.	我们每天生活中都要对我们的身体健康做出决定。 这些决定包括我们吃什么、什么时候吃以及吃多少，进行多少锻炼，有了疾病如何照料自己以及等等其他问题。


Therefore, the reason that intelligence and death are linked might be that people with higher intelligence in childhood make better decisions about health, and have healthier behaviors.	因此，智力和死亡相关的原因可能是，儿童时期智力水平更高的人对身体健康问题做出更好的决定，而且行为也更加健康。


As adults, they tend to have better diets, exercise more, gain less weight, have fewer hangovers, and so on.	作为成年人，他们一般饮食搭配较好，锻炼更多，体重增加较少，不大喝醉酒等等。


So far, so good.	目前还都不错。


But we do not yet have the full story.	但是我们还没有掌握全部情况。


There have not been any studies with data on childhood intelligence, lots of subsequent data on adult health behaviors, and then a long-term follow-up for deaths.	有关儿童智力、成年健康行为的大量数据以及对死亡的长期跟踪还没有任何研究。


And only such a study could tell us whether it is these healthy behaviors that explain the link between intelligence and death.	而只有这一研究才能够告诉我们是否是这些健康行为可以解释智力和死亡之间的联系。


A fourth type of explanation is that people with higher intelligence in childhood tend to attain better educational qualifications, work in more professional jobs, have higher incomes, and live in more affluent areas.	第四种解释是，儿童时期智力较高的人通常会获得较好的教育，从事更多的专业工作，具有更高的收入，而且居住在更富有的区域。


These variables are related to living longer, too.	这些可变因素也与长寿相关。


So, perhaps that’s it: higher intelligence buys people into safer and more health-friendly environments.	所以可能是这样，也就是智力水平较高可以让人进入更为安全和对健康更为有利的环境。


Certainly, in some studies, social class in adulthood seems to explain a lot of the link between intelligence and death.	当然，在某些研究中，成年时期的社会阶层似乎可以解释智力水平和死亡之间的关联。


The problem is that this “explanation” is statistical.	问题是，这一“解释”是统计意义上的。


We are still not sure whether, say, education and occupation “explain” the effect of intelligence on health, or whether they are, in effect, merely surrogate measures of intelligence.	我们还是不确定教育和职业是否“解释”智力对健康的影响，或者它们是否实际上仅仅是智力替代衡量标准。


Researchers have also searched for clues about the intelligence-mortality link in specific types of death.	研究人员还在具体死亡种类中寻求智力和死亡之间的联系。


This has been revealing.	这些研究颇有发现。


Lower intelligence in early life is associated with a greater likelihood of dying from, for example, cardiovascular disease, accidents, suicide, and homicide.	早年智力较低就更有可能死于心血管疾病、自杀以及杀人。


The evidence for cancer is less certain.	有关癌症的证据并不明朗。


As we have come across these specific findings, we have realized that each link might need a different explanation.	当我们发现这些具体情况时，我们已经意识到每个联系都可能需要不同的解释。


Finally, we know that how intelligent we are and how long we shall live are caused by both environmental and genetic influences.	最后，我们知道我们的智力水平和寿命长短是由环境和基因影响共同造成的。


There are experimental designs, using twins, that can find out the extent to which intelligence and mortality are linked because they share environmental and genetic influences.	有一些试验性的研究设计，它们使用双胞胎可以发现由于他们具有共同的环境和基因影响，其智力水平和死亡率在多达程度上是联系在一起的。


Among the most informative exercises we can undertake in cognitive epidemiology is to obtain a large group of twins on whom there is data on early-life intelligence and who were tracked for a long time to find out who had died.	我们在认知传染病学中可以进行的最为具有说明意义的研究就是掌握一大组双胞胎。 我们拥有这些双胞胎的早年智力数据并且长时间进行跟踪发现谁死亡。


We haven’t yet come across a large enough group of twins with such data.	我们目前还没有找到具有这些数据的足够数量的双胞胎组。


Finding one is a priority.	找到这一群组是��务之急。


The ultimate aim of this research is to find out what intelligent people have and do that enables them to live longer.	这一研究的最终目的就是发现高智力具有哪些东西及行为让他们更为长寿。


Once we know that, we will be able to share and apply that knowledge with the aim of achieving optimal health for all.	我们一旦知道，就可以分享和应用这一知识，目的在于为大众实现最佳健康。


Growth Out of Time	超越时间的增长


CAMBRIDGE – Robert Gordon of Northwestern University is a distinguished economist whose work in macroeconomics and studies of long-term economic growth have properly earned him high regard.	发自剑桥——美国西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）是位杰出的经济学家，他在宏观经济学方面的成就以及对长期经济增长的研究为其赢得了高度评价。


So his recent exercise in speculative future history, which asks whether economic growth in the United States has come to an end, has attracted much favorable attention.	因此近期戈登在推测未来历史上的研究——关于美国的经济增长期是否已经结束了——引发了众多关注。


But a basic flaw in Gordon’s argument is immediately apparent – and becomes glaringly so on closer examination.	但其论据的一个基本缺陷却是显而易见的——而且越是仔细观察这个缺陷就越明显。


Gordon distinguishes three Industrial Revolutions that have driven economic growth and improved living standards since the eighteenth century: IR #1 (“steam, railroads”), whose defining inventions date from 1750 to 1830; IR #2 (“electricity, internal combustion engine, running water, indoor toilets, communications, entertainment, chemicals, petroleum”), whose defining inventions date from 1870 to 1900; and IR #3 (“computers, the web, mobile phones”), dating from 1960.	戈登区分了自18世纪以来推动经济增长并提高生活水平的三次工业革命：第一次工业革命（“蒸汽、铁路”），其决定性的发明都在1750年到1830年之间产生； 第二次工业革命（“电力、内燃机、自来水、室内厕所、通讯、娱乐、化工、石油”），其决定性发明在1870年到1900年间出现；


The core of his article contrasts the transformational impact of IR #1 and, especially, IR #2 on per capita GDP and the quality of life with the relatively trivial consequences of IR #3.	第三次工业革命（“计算机、网络、手机”），发明的起始日期定为1960年。 他的文章主要对比了第一次工业革命及第二次工业革命（尤其是后者对人均GDP和生活质量的影响）的变革性影响以及第三次工业革命相比之下较为细微的影响。


The vulnerability of Gordon’s argument is his shortened time horizon for IR #3.	戈登论证的薄弱之处在于他缩短了第三次工业革命的时间范围。


Consider the following four sentences in his paper:	细想一下出现在其文章中的四句话：


·         “Both the first two revolutions required about 100 years for their full effects to percolate through the economy.”	·         “前两次工业革命都需要100年的时间来让其全面影响渗透到经济层面。 ”


·         “At a minimum, it took 150 years for IR #1 to have its full range of effects.”	·         “第一次工业革命至少需要150年的时间来实现其全面影响。 ”


·         “The inventions of IR #2 were so important…that they took a full 100 years to have their main effect.”	·         “第二次工业革命的发明是如此重要，以至于要整整100年来展现其影响。 ”


·         “…[T]he productivity impact of IR #3 evaporated after only eight years, compared to the 81 years (1891-1972) required for the benefits of IR #2 to have their full impact…”	·         “第三次工业革命的生产力影响作用在8年后就消失了，相比之下，第二次工业革命等待了81年（1891-1972）的时间才全面铺开……”


The last sentence is crucial: Gordon cuts off IR #3 circa 2005 – that is, 45 years from its onset, but less than half the time allowed for IR #1 and IR #2 to run their respective courses.	最后一句至关重要：戈登把3号工业革命于2005年切断了——也就是说自其发明始才存在45年，比第一和第二次工业革命得以运行的时间的一半还要短。


To take a salient example from the prior industrial revolutions, this is as if the impact of the railroads on the US economy were to be measured as of 1873, 45 years after construction began on America’s first line, the Baltimore & Ohio.	从之前的工业革命找一个显著的例子，这就好比在1873年衡量铁路对美国经济的影响——也就是美国开始在巴尔的摩和俄亥俄州建设第一条铁路的45年之后就衡量其对经济的影响。


In 1873, the retailer Montgomery Ward was just a year old, and the first Sears Roebuck catalogue was still 20 years away.	1873年，零售商蒙哥马利·沃德才仅仅创建1年，而西尔斯·罗巴克的第一份商品目录还要等20年后才出现。


Together, these companies invented mail order as the “killer app” of the railroad age, creating a continental market for consumer goods, with all of the economies of scale that followed.	而正是这些公司一起发明了邮购——它成为了铁路时代的“杀手级应用”，为日常消费品创造了一个横跨整个大陆的市场，其他所有的规模范畴也随之兴起。


Or, to take another example, what if we stopped measuring the economic impact of electrification only 45 years after the first generating plant, Thomas Edison’s Pearl Street Station, became operational in 1882?	或者，用���外一个例子，如果我们在第一个发电厂出现的45年之后就停下来衡量电气化的影响会怎样呢？ 托马斯·爱迪生（Thomas Edison）的珍珠街发电站在1882年开始运行。


At that point, America’s manufacturing industries were just discovering the benefits of flexible (re)configuration, which enabled distribution of generated electric power, while America’s home-appliance industry was in its infancy.	那时美国的制造业才开始发现灵活配置电力的好处，这使得分配产生的电力成为可能，而当时的美国家电产业尚处于起步阶段。


Gordon asserts that “the era of computers replacing human labor was largely over” during the past decade.	戈登断言过去十年“计算机替代人类劳动的时代在很大程度上已经结束了”。


Innovation in information and communications technology (ICT) focused first on electronic commerce, “itself largely completed by 2005.”	在信息和通讯技术上的创新首先集中在电子商务上，“其本身的创新到2005为止已经在很大程度上完成了。


After that, “labor-saving innovation” took a back seat to “a succession of entertainment and communication devices that do the same things as we could do before, but now in smaller and more convenient packages.”	”在那之后，“节省劳力的创新”让位于“一系列的娱乐和通讯设备——这些设备做的事情与我们过去能做的是一样的，只不过现在的封装得更小更便捷。 ”


In thus truncating and trivializing the ongoing ICT revolution, Gordon misses two fundamental processes.	就这样截断并贬低正在前进的信息通讯技术革命，戈登漏掉了两个最基本的过程。


First, and most evident, the rise of e-commerce is far from over.	首先，也是最明显的，电子商务的兴起还远未结束。


In the US, the most advanced country in this respect, e-commerce has just reached 10% of total retail spending, and is continuing to grow at double-digit rates through the slow recovery from the Great Recession.	在美国——这方面最先进的国家，电子商务达到了零售支出总额的10%，并在从大萧条的缓慢恢复过程中继续以2位数的速度增长。


At the same time, something much more significant is happening beneath the economic surface.	同时，更重要的是在经济表面下发生的事情。


From the early days of the computer revolution, researchers and popularizers envisioned “artificial intelligence” as the ultimate killer app (literally, in the case of the computer HAL in the film 2001: A Space Odyssey).	在计算机革命初期，研究人员与推广者把人工智能设想为终极杀手锏（从字面上来看，就是电影《2001太空漫游》中的电脑HAL）。


Decades of frustration are now yielding to success: the application of sophisticated statistical techniques to the accelerating accumulation of unprecedented quantities of so-called Big Data that the Internet simultaneously generates and captures.	而过去数十年的挫败如今正转化为成功：复杂的统计技术被应用于由互联网同时产生并截获的所谓“大数据”中加速积累的，前所未有的海量信息。


For proof of artificial intelligent “life,” consider the “virtual assistants” populating smart phones, beginning – but just beginning – with Apple’s Siri.	要证明人工智能拥有“生命”，试想一下流行于智能手机的“虚拟助理”——它始于——而且仅仅是开始——苹果的智能语音组件Siri。


The next wave of IR #3’s consequences can be discerned in systems that capture the intention behind a search request and couple it to a completed transaction, and in the application of predictive analytics to industrial supply chains and service provisioning.	第三次工业革命所引发的影响可以在那些捕捉每个搜索请求背后的动机并将其与一个已完成的交易相匹配的系统中识别出来，也可以在预测分析产业供应链和服务配置的应用上找到踪影。


If these innovations’ prospective impact on productivity and GDP growth cannot be quantified, well, that is the way it is with future history.	即便这些创新对生产率和GDP增长的潜在影响暂时无法被量化，但这必将在未来的历史得到实现。


Flawed as Gordon’s reading of IR #3 is, his concluding concern for the future of innovation in the US is well founded.	即使戈登对第三次工业革命的解读有误，他对美国创新未来走向的结论也是有充分理由的。


Of the assorted “headwinds” that he cites, the enormous increase in inequality and the plateau reached in educational attainment represent threats that differentiate America’s position from that of other advanced countries.	在他所引用的各种“逆风”因素中，不平等状况的大幅恶化以及教育成就的停滞代表了那些将美国的地位与其他发达国家区分开来的威胁。


But Gordon ignores the greatest threat to continued US global leadership in innovation: the delegitimation over the past generation of the state’s role as an economic actor.	但是戈登忽略了保持美国创新全球领导地位的最大威胁：在过去一代人的岁月中国家丧失了作为经济行动者的合法性。


As I illustrate and analyze at length in my new book, Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy: Markets, Speculation and the State, the state has become central to the Innovation Economy’s dynamics.	正如我在新书《在创新经济中施行资本主义：市场、投机和国家》说明与分析的一样，国家已经成为创新经济动力的关键。 它资助能产生发现和发明的上游研究；


It funds the upstream research that generates discovery and invention; supports the creation of new networks, from canals to the Internet; and serves as a creative customer for innovative products, as it did during the computer revolution’s nascence.	支持新网络的建立——无论是从前的运河还是如今的互联网； 同时也作为创新产品的消费者，正如其在计算机革命发生时所做的一样。


The state must also preserve continuity in the market economy when the speculative bubble that has funded its transformation bursts.	国家还必须在引发市场转型的投机泡沫爆破时保持市场经济的持续性。


And here, too, Gordon disappoints.	在这方面，戈登的论述也不尽如人意。


The only reference to government in his paper is not even to this stabilizing role. Rather, it is to the asserted headwind represented by the very debt incurred to prevent the global financial crisis of 2008 from triggering a second Great Depression.	其论文中唯一涉及政府的参考文献甚至还不是关于政府稳定作用有关的，而是为了说明防止2008年全球金融危机引发第二次大萧条而产生的债务是“逆风”。


But it also requires that they harmonize their domestic rules and regulations – such as product-safety standards and bank regulations – with those of other member states in order to ensure they do not act as indirect trade barriers.	但这同样要求各国政府协调各自的国内法规和监管——如产品安全标准和银行监管——已确保这些因素不会构成间接贸易壁垒。


Simply put, the European integration project has hinged on restrictions on national sovereignty.	简单说，欧洲一体���工程的瓶颈就在于国家主权的限制。


As the American example illustrates, it is possible to give up on sovereignty – as Florida, Texas, California, and the other US states have done – without giving up on democracy.	正如美国的例子所标明的，放弃主权——佛罗里达、德克萨斯、加利福尼亚，美国各州都是如此——并不一定意味着放弃民主。


Economic Policy’s Narrative Imperative	经济政策的故事动力


WASHINGTON, DC – The best advice I received when taking up policymaking responsibilities in Turkey more than a decade ago was to take “a lot of time and care to develop and communicate the ‘narrative’ to support the policy program that you want to succeed.”	华盛顿—十多年前我负责土耳其的政策制定，我所听到的最佳建议是“把大量时间和精力花在发展和传达一种‘故事’来支持你所想让其成功的政策计划上。


The more that economic policy is subject to public debate – that is, the more democracy there is – the more important such policy narratives are.	”经济政策越是容易引起公共争论——即民主成分越多——政策故事的重要性就越大。


The crisis faced by the European Union and the eurozone is a telling example of the need for a narrative that explains public policy and generates political support for it.	欧盟和欧元区所面临的危机就是很好的例子，说明了能解释公共政策并激发对政策的政治支持的故事的重要性。


A successful narrative can be neither too complicated nor simplistic.	成功的故事既不能太复杂，也不能太简单。


It must capture the imagination, address the public’s anxieties, and generate realistic hope.	它必须抓住眼球、解决公众的焦虑并激发现实希望。


Voters often sense cheap populism.	选民通常会感冒于廉价的民粹主义。


European Central Bank President Mario Draghi provided such a narrative to the financial markets last July.	去年7月，欧洲中央银行行长德拉吉就为金融市场提供了这样一种故事。


He said that the ECB would do everything necessary to prevent the disintegration of the euro, adding simply: “Believe me, it will be enough.”	他说欧洲央行将做任何该做之事防止欧元解体，并且言简意赅地加了一句：“相信我，这就够了。 ”


With that sentence, Draghi eliminated the perceived re-denomination tail risk that was highest in the case of Greece, but that was driving up borrowing costs in Spain, Italy, and Portugal as well.	德拉吉用这句话消除了人们所感到的重新计价尾部风险——这一风险在希��最高，但也推高了西班牙、意大利和葡萄牙的借贷成本。


It was not a populist message, because the ECB does indeed have the firepower to buy enough sovereign bonds on the secondary market to put a ceiling on interest rates, at least for many months.	这不是民粹主义说辞，因为欧洲央行真有在二级市场购买足够多主权证券从而将利率限制在某个水平之下的实力，至少在若干个月内是如此。


Central bankers, more generally, are typically able to provide short- or medium-term narratives to financial markets.	更一般地说，央行行长通常都有能力向市场提供短期和中期故事。


US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke provided his own by pledging that US short-term interest rates would remain very low, and the Bank of Japan’s new chairman, Haruhiko Kuroda, has just provided another by saying that he will double the money supply so that inflation reaches 2%.	美联储主席伯南克也这么做了——他承诺美国短期利率将维持极低水平； 日本银行新行长黑田东彦最近也如法炮制了一次——他宣布会将货币供应量扩大一倍，让通胀达到2%。


While central bankers can provide such narratives to financial markets, it is political leaders who must provide the overall socioeconomic messages that encourage long-term real investment, electoral support for reform, and hope for the future.	尽管央行行长可以向金融市场提供这类故事，但要鼓励长期真实投资、激发选民支持改革、点燃未来希望，还是要靠政治领袖给出总体社会经济承诺。


Central bank alchemy, to borrow a term from the US journalist Neil Irwin’s new book, has its limits.	央行炼金术——借用美国记者尼尔·埃尔文（Neil Irwin）新著的用词——总归有限。


Europe, in particular, needs a narrative of long-term hope that will trigger a real recovery.	特别是欧洲，它需要带来长期希望的故事，触发真正的复苏。


France is coming closer to the danger zone, and even Germany’s annual GDP growth is falling well below 1% per year.	法国正在接近危险区，甚至德国的年GDP增长也会大大低于每年1%。


In the meantime, the easing of sovereign interest-rate spreads provides little comfort to the growing army of unemployed in southern Europe, where youth unemployment has reached dramatic heights – close to 60% in Greece and Spain, and almost 40% in Italy.	与此同时，主权利差的放松并没有让南欧日渐庞大的失业大军更好过——年轻人失业纷纷达到了极高的数字，希腊和西班牙接近60%，意大利接近40%。


The narrative should address three essential questions.	故事要解决三大关键问题。


How can the European model of strong social solidarity and security be reformed, but endure?	欧洲强大的社会团结和安全模式如何改革并维系？


How can economic growth be revived and sustained throughout the EU?	如何重振经济增长并在整个欧盟维持？


And how can Europe’s institutions function with enhanced legitimacy to accommodate countries that share the euro and others that retain their national currencies?	如何增加欧洲机构的合法性以协调共用欧元和保有本国货币的国家？


For starters, a revolution is required in the organization of work, learning, and leisure.	首先，工作、学习和休闲的组织必须改变。


Social solidarity, essential to European identity, can and must include longer work lives, but also more work-sharing, adult learning, and shorter average work weeks (particularly close to retirement).	社会团结是欧洲身份认同的关键，它可以并必须包括更长的工作寿命，也可以并必须包括更大的工作共担、成人教育和更短的工作周（特别是在接近退休时）。


Such flexibility requires the consent of all: employees must adjust to changing requirements; employers must re-organize their enterprises to allow more work-sharing, work from home, and learning intervals; and governments must overhaul taxes, income support, and regulation to promote a “flex-solidarity revolution” that encourages personal choice and responsibility, while remaining committed to social cohesion.	如此灵活度要求所有人的一致意见：雇员必须调整适应变化的要求； 雇主必须重新组织企业允许更多的工作分担、在家办公和脱产学习；


This can lead to a better future for all, with citizens gaining better access to adult education, having more free time to pursue personal interests, and remaining productive and occupationally engaged far longer into their healthy lives.	政府必须修正税收、收入支持和监管以促进鼓励个人选择和责任的“灵活团结革命”，同时继续致力于增进社会凝聚。 这能给所有人带来更加美好的未来，公民有更多的机会获得成人教育，拥有更多的自由时间追求个人兴趣，并大大延长健康岁月的生产率和就业时间。


Europe does not need Asia’s rates of economic growth.	欧洲不需要亚洲那样的经济增长率。


It can secure decent jobs and prosperity, with a sustained annual growth rate of around 2%.	2%左右的持续年增长率就可以让它保持体面的就业和繁荣。


To achieve that, German voters should be told not that their country’s resources will forever flow to Spain, but that their wages can rise at twice the rate of the recent past without risking inflation or a current-account deficit, because Germany has the world’s largest external surplus.	要达到这一点，德国选民应该明白该国的资源将永远流向西班牙，但他们的工资可以以两倍于当前的速度增长而不导致通货膨胀和经常项目赤字，因为德国拥有世界最大的外部盈余。


Service-sector industries throughout the EU must be opened up.	整个欧盟的服务行业必须开放。


The countries with stronger fiscal positions should take the lead in a major pan-European skill-upgrading program.	财政状况更好的国家应该率先推出大规模泛欧洲技能升级计划。


The number of pan-European scholarships should be doubled.	泛欧洲奖学金数量应该翻番。


School programs everywhere should aim to educate trilingual citizens.	各地学校项目应该定位于培养能说三种语言的公民。


Moreover, a full European banking union with shared resources for resolution should be created without further delay.	此外，应该成立清算资源共享的完全的欧洲银行联盟，这一点已不容再拖。


The European Investment Bank, which received a significant capital increase in 2012, should add a large investment-support program for medium-size enterprises to its current operations, with a subsidy financed from the European budget to encourage first-time job takers for a limited period.	2012年，欧洲投资银行的资本金获得了极大提升，它应该在现有业务的基础上增加一个面向中等企业的投资支持计划，由欧洲预算出资为初次就业者提供临时性津贴以示鼓励。


Jobs and training for young people must be the centerpiece for the new growth pact, and projects must move ahead in “crisis mode,” rather than according to business as usual.	新增长契约必须以年轻人就业和培训为核心，各项目必须对“危机模式”未雨绸缪，而不是根据正常情况的业务模式制定。


Finally, while monetary union obviously requires greater sharing of sovereignty, there should also be a “greater Europe” that includes the United Kingdom and others.	最后，货币联盟明确要求更大程度的主权共享，与此同时，也应该有一个包括英国和其他国家在内的“大欧洲”。


This implies two-tier institutions that can accommodate both types of countries: the “euro-ins” and those that prefer to preserve their monetary sovereignty in a larger Europe built around a vibrant single market and common democratic values.	这意味着两套机构共存，以协调两种国家：“欧元国”（euro-in）和更愿意在以强健的单一市场和共同民主价值为基础的大欧洲中保留货币主权的国家。


These interconnected visions can and must be realized if Europe is to thrive again.	这些相互交融的愿景可以也必须实现，如果欧洲意在重振雄风的话。


Together, they form a compelling narrative that European leaders must begin to articulate.	它们合在一起就形成了欧洲领导人必须现在就开始宣扬的故事。


Why Eurobonds are Un-American	为什么说欧元债券不是美国式的


BRUSSELS – The emerging consensus in Europe nowadays is that only “debt mutualization” in the form of Eurobonds can resolve the euro crisis, with advocates frequently citing the early United States, when Alexander Hamilton, President George Washington’s treasury secretary, successfully pressed the new federal government to assume the Revolutionary War debts of America’s states.	布鲁塞尔—目前，欧洲的新共识是只有通过欧元债券将“债务共同化”才能拯救欧元危机，该方案的鼓吹者频繁引用美国早期的历史，当时华盛顿政府的财政部长汉密尔顿成功地迫使新联邦政府揽下美国各州的独立战争债。


But a closer look reveals that this early US experience provides neither a useful analogy nor an encouraging precedent for Eurobonds.	但若更仔细地考察就能发现，美国建国之初的经验既算不上是有用的类比，也绝不是欧洲债券令人鼓舞的先例。


First, taking over a stock of existing state debt at the federal level is very different from allowing individual member states to issue bonds with “joint and several” liability underwritten by all member states collectively.	首先，揽下现存州债务转换为联邦债务与允许个别成员国发行所有成员国共同兜底的“连带”责任债券是截然不同的。


Hamilton did not have to worry about moral hazard, because the federal government did not guarantee any new debt incurred by the states.	汉密尔顿并不需要担心道德风险，因为联邦政府并不对任何州级新债提供担保。


Second, it is seldom mentioned that US federal debt at the time (around $40 million) was much larger than that of the states (about $18 million).	其次，很少被提及的是，当时美国联邦债务（约4000万美元）比各州债务（约1800万美元）多得多。


Thus, assuming state debt was not central to the success of post-war financial stabilization in the new country; rather, it was a natural corollary of the fact that most of the debt had been incurred fighting for a common cause.	因此，将州债务揽下并不是美国独立战争后实现金融稳定性的中心原因，相反，这只是大部分债务起源于为统统目标而战这一事实的自然结果。


Moreover, the most efficient sources of government revenues at the time were tariffs and taxes collected at the external border.	此外，当时，最高效的的政府收入之源是关税和取自外部边界的税收。


Even from an efficiency point of view, it made sense to have the federal government service public debt.	即使从有效性的角度看，让联邦政府来为公债买单也是有道理可循的。


Federal assumption of the states’ war debts also yielded an advantage in terms of economic development: once states no longer had any debt, they had no need to raise any revenues through direct taxation, which might have impeded the growth of America’s internal market.	联邦将各州战争债揽下还产生了经济发展的优势：各州卸下了战无负担，因此不必通过可能阻碍美国内部市场发展的直接税开源。


Indeed, after the federal government assumed the states’ debt (already a small part of the total), state revenues fell by 80-90%.	事实上，在联邦政府揽下各州债务（只是总债务的小头）后，各州岁入下降了80—90%。


The states then became for some time fiscally irrelevant.	各州也因此在一段时间内不必担心财政状况。


Finally, the key to the success of financial stabilization was a profound restructuring.	最后，金融稳定成功的关键是深化重组。


Hamilton estimated that the federal government could raise enough revenues to pay approximately 4% interest on the total amount of debt to be serviced – significantly less than the 6% yield on the existing obligations.	汉密尔顿估算，联邦政府能够征收足够的岁入承担的总债务4%的利率——比当时债务存量6%的收益率低多了。


Holders of both state and federal bonds were thus offered a basket of long-dated bonds, some with an interest rate of 3%, and others with 6 % (with a ten-year grace period).	州债券和联邦债券持有者将获得一篮子长期债券，其中一些利率为3%，另一些为6%（但有10年宽限期）。


The basket was designed in such a way as to result in an average debt-service cost of 4%.	这个债务篮子的平均债务利息成本的4%。


In modern terms, the “net present value” of the total debt (federal and state) was reduced by about one-half if one were to apply the usual exit yield of 9%.	从现代观点看，这样一来，与以当时常见的到期收益率9%相比，总债务（包括联邦债务和州债务）的“净现值”被削减了一半。


Moreover, the new federal bonds’ very long maturities meant that there was no rollover risk.	此外，新的联邦债券极长的到期期限意味着不存在展期风险。


It would have been very dangerous to expose the federal government to this danger, given that the operation was rightly perceived at the outset as extremely risky.	联邦政府暴露于这一风险之下是十分危险的，如果这一操作从一开始就被正确地意识到风险极高的话。


For the country’s first few years, debt service swallowed more than 80% of all federal revenues.	在美国建国的最初几年中，债务利息吞噬了80%的联邦总岁入。


The slightest negative shock could have bankrupted the new federal government.	只要发生一丝负面冲击，就能让新成立的联邦政府破产。


Fortunately, the opposite happened: federal revenues tripled under the impact of a rapid post-war reconstruction boom, and continued to grow rapidly, aided by the country’s ability to remain neutral while wars ravaged the European continent.	幸运的是，情况正好相反：受战后重建繁荣刺激，联邦岁入增长了三倍，并因为美国在斩获蹂躏欧洲大陆时保持中立而持续快速增长。


By contrast, growth prospects in Europe today are rather dim, and interest payments, even for Greece or Italy, account for less than 20% of total revenues.	与美国相反，如今欧洲的增长前景十分黯淡，而即使是意大利和希腊，利息支付也只占总岁入的20%。


The real problem is the rollover of existing debt in a stagnating economy.	真正的问题是在经济停滞的情况下展期现有债务。


For example, Italy will soon have a balanced budget in structural terms, but must still face the problem of refinancing old debt as it matures each year.	比如，从结构上说，意大利很快就会实现平衡预算，但它仍必须面对为每年到期的旧债再融资的问题。


Assuaging doubt about the sustainability of public debt in the eurozone would thus probably require a deep restructuring as well.	因此，要缓和关于欧元区公债可持续性的质疑，可能也需要深刻的结构重组。


The eurozone crisis could certainly be resolved if all existing public debt were transformed into 20-year Eurobonds with a yield of 3%, and a five-year grace period on debt service.	如果现有债务转换为20年期、收益率3%的欧元债券，并得到5年利息宽限期，那么欧元区危机肯定能够解决。


One can easily anticipate the impact that this would have on financial markets.	你一眼就能看出这个方案对金融市场会造成什么影响。


More interesting in view of the current situation in the eurozone is what followed roughly a half-century after Hamilton acted.	对于如何看待欧元区现状这个问题，更有意思的办法是看看汉密尔顿方案出台后五十年发生了什么。


In the 1830’s and 1840’s, a number of states had over-invested in the leading transport technology of the time – canals.	在19世纪20年代和30年代，很多州在当时领先的运输技术——运河上投资过度。


When the canal-building boom ended, eight states and the Territory of Florida (accounting for about 10% of the entire US population at the time) were unable to service their debt and defaulted on their, mostly British, loans.	运河挖掘繁荣结束时，佛罗里达领地的八个州（当时占美国全国人口的10%）无法支付债务利息，不得不违约（其中大部分是对英国的债务）。


British bankers threatened that they would never again invest in these untrustworthy Americans.	英国银行家威胁说，他们绝不会再向这群没有信誉的美国佬投钱。


They could point to the precedent set by Hamilton, and had probably invested on the implicit understanding that, if necessary, the federal government would bail out the states again.	他们大概是受了汉密尔顿先例的误导，他们之所以投资，是因为他们认为联邦政府（如果必要的话）会再次出手拯救各州。


But, despite foreign creditors’ threats, the federal government did not come to the rescue.	但是，尽管有外国债权人的威胁，联邦政府仍拒绝出手援助。


The bailout request did not succeed because it could not muster a simple majority of the states (represented by the Senate) and the population (represented by the House of Representatives) under the normal decision-making procedure (the “Community method,” in European Union jargon).	援助要求没有成功，因为根据常规决策程序（用欧盟的话说，叫“共同体方法”），这需要州（由参议院代表）和人口（由众议院代表）简单多数的批准，而援助要求没有获得简单多数。


The defaults proved to be costly.	违约的代价是沉重的。


The 1840’s were a period of slow growth, and continued pressure from foreign creditors forced most of the official debtors to resume payments after a while.	19世纪40年代，美国增长缓慢，来自外国债权人源源不断的压力迫使大部分官方债务人在一段时间后重新履行偿还义务。


Default was not an easy way out, and all US states (with the exception of Vermont) have since embraced balanced-budget amendments to their constitutions as a way to shore up their fiscal credibility.	违约不是简单的解决之道，此后，所有美国州（只有佛蒙特州是例外）都在州宪法中加入了平衡预算修正案，以此捍卫财政信誉。


Are EU members prepared to take a similar step?	欧盟成员国准备好采取类似动作了吗？


Europe’s Asian Pivot	欧洲的亚洲重心


CAMBRIDGE/OXFORD – The Obama administration’s so-called “pivot to Asia” is the most important strategic shift that the United States has undertaken since the end of the Cold War – and it has profound implications for Europe.	剑桥/牛津—奥巴马政府的“亚洲重心”是美国自冷战结束以来最重要的战略变化——它对欧洲有着深远的影响。


But Europe’s leaders have largely ignored or misunderstood its significance, and thus have failed to seize the opportunity that it represents.	但欧洲领导人大多忽视或误解了它的重要性，因而没能抓住它所带来的机会。


For example, some in Europe believe that America’s interest in Asia is a recent development.	比如，一些欧洲人认为美国对亚洲的兴趣是最近才发展起来的。


But, as President Barack Obama put it in 2011, “The US has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.”	但是，正如奥巴马在2011年所指出的，“美国已经是、未来也将一直是太平洋国家。


The shift is aimed at ensuring that the US plays “a larger and long-term role in shaping this region,” where it has long helped to maintain stability and contributed to unprecedented economic growth.	”这一转变的目的是确保美国“在决定太平洋地区局势方面扮演更大、更长期的角色”，长期以来，美国帮助该地区实现了稳定和前所未有的经济增长。


Given this, America’s pivot should be viewed more as a consolidation of established policies than as an abrupt, short-term change.	基于此，美国的重心应该被视为对已有政策的整合，而不是突然的短期政策变化。


The policy’s scope is also widely misunderstood.	该政策的范围也往往被误解。


While the policy does include a rebalancing of America’s military posture in Asia – by 2020, the US Navy will deploy more of its forces, including six of its 11 carrier groups, to the Pacific Ocean – it covers the entire spectrum of diplomacy, economics, development, culture, and inter-societal relations.	它确实包括了美国亚洲军事部署的再平衡——到2020年，美国海军将把主力部队（包括11个航母战斗群中的六个）部署在太平洋——但也涵盖了外交、经济、发展、文化和跨社会关系的全方位内容。


This comprehensive approach is evident in Obama’s choice of destination for the first overseas trip of his second term.	这一套全面方案也体现在奥巴马第二任期的第一个出访对象的选择上。


By visiting Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia, Obama reinforced earlier efforts to strengthen diplomatic and economic engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.	他访问了缅甸、泰国和柬埔寨，进一步强化了早先加强亚太地区外交和经济参与的做法。


Furthermore, America officially joined the East Asia Summit in 2011, easing concerns in the region about China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea.	此外，2011年美国正式加入了东亚峰会，缓解了东亚关于中国在南海越来越强硬的担忧。


Likewise, America’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership and offers of economic engagement to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries are the latest initiatives underscoring its determination to strengthen its economic ties in the region.	类似地，美国提出的跨太平洋合作伙伴关系以及向东盟国家提供经济合作机会都是它强化与该地区经济合作决心的最新动作。


Such efforts to safeguard regional stability will ultimately benefit Europe, for which Asia has become an increasingly important trading partner.	这些捍卫地区稳定的动作最终将有利于欧洲。 对欧洲来说，亚洲已成为越来越重要的贸易伙伴。


Given the rising risk of conflict in Asia – owing to a toxic combination of rapid GDP growth, an arms race, historical resentments, rampant chauvinism, territorial disputes, and a lack of effective institutional arrangements for conflict resolution – Europe should welcome a stronger US presence in the region.	目前亚洲呈现出快速GDP增长、军备竞赛、历史仇恨、普遍的沙文主义、领土纠纷的危险组合，又缺少有效的制度性安排来解决冲突，因此发生冲突的风险很大，在这样的环境下，欧洲应该欢迎美国在该地区起到更大作用。


At the same time, Europe’s leaders must recognize that, by increasing its engagement in Asia, the US is not turning away from its European partners.	与此同时，欧洲领导人必须认识到，通过更多地参与亚洲，美国并没有与其欧洲伙伴国渐行渐远。


On the contrary, as US Vice President Joe Biden said in February, Europe remains “the cornerstone of [US] engagement with the rest of the world.”	相反，正如美国副总理拜登在2月所指出的，欧洲仍是“美国参与世界其他地区的基石。 ”


US leaders are well aware of the geopolitical factors that make Europe their most important and reliable ally.	美国领导人非常明白让欧洲成为美国最重要、最可靠盟友的地缘政治因素。


Its proximity to the Middle East and Africa – where the European Union and its member countries are the most important aid donors, trading partners, and security actors – will ensure the partnership’s continued relevance, as will the common values and deep economic integration that underpin transatlantic relations.	欧洲靠近中东和非洲——欧盟及其成员国是最重要的援助国、贸易伙伴和安全行动方——这样的地理位置决定了美欧伙伴关系的重要性，除此之外，跨大西洋关系更有共同价值和深度经济一体化为基础。


But the rebalancing does have strategic implications for Europe.	但再平衡确实对欧洲形成了战略影响。


America’s military presence in Europe will be gradually reduced, as will its willingness to take the lead in international crises – even those affecting Europe’s interests.	美国在欧洲的军事部署将逐渐减弱，其领导国际危机干预的意愿亦然——即使是对于影响欧洲利益的危机也是如此。


As a result, while the US will continue to provide intelligence, air support, and ammunition on a case-by-case basis, as it did recently in Libya and Mali, Europe will increasingly have to act first and alone.	因此，尽管美国将继续在危机发生时提供情报、空中支援和武器装备（如最近的利比亚和马里事件），但欧洲将逐渐独立行动。


If Europe is to overcome its current financial constraints and acquire the military capacity and level of coordination needed to fulfill its new role, it must pool and share its resources more effectively.	如果欧洲要克服当前的金融约束、获得满足其新角色要求的军事能力和协作水平，就必须更有效地集中和共享它的资源。


Furthermore, whether on a bilateral basis, through NATO, or through the EU, France’s insistence on military sovereignty must be reconciled with Germany’s culture of excessive military restraint.	此外，不管是在双边基础上还是通过北约或欧盟，法国对军事主权的坚持必须与德国过度的军事克制协调���来。


Failure to share resources and coordinate policy would seriously undermine Europe’s security interests.	不能共享资源和协调政策将严重危害欧洲的安全利益。


The US rebalancing will also create an opportunity for Europe to play a greater role in an increasingly important region.	美国再平衡还为欧洲创造了在日渐重要地区扮演更大作用的机会。


By joining the US in the rebalancing process and supporting relations with China that are built on cooperation rather than containment, the EU would contribute to global stability, while spreading European values.	欧洲可以加入美国的再平衡过程，支持建立在合作而不是遏制基础上的对中国关系，以此有助于全球稳定，同时传播欧洲价值。


To this end, the EU can leverage its position as a leading trading partner, investor, and aid donor; it can also contribute at leaders’ summits, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting and the ASEAN Regional Forum.	在这方面，欧盟可以利用其领先贸易伙伴、投资者和援助出资者的地位； 也可以通过领导人峰会起作用，比如亚欧峰会和东盟地区论坛。


The Obama administration seems to understand the potential benefits of such a “joint rebalancing,” with the EU-US statement on the Asia-Pacific region issued last July suggesting a move toward policy coordination.	奥巴马政府明白这一“联合再平衡”的潜在好处，去年7月欧盟-美国关于亚太地区的声明提出要迈向政策协作。


But, in pursuing such harmonization, Europeans should recognize that their Asia strategy – which has so far focused on commerce and, to a lesser degree, on the rule of law and human rights – will have to take on a security dimension.	但是，在追求融合的过程中，欧洲人应该认识到，他们的亚洲战略——目前集中于商业，而对法治精神和人权的关注较少——必须增加一个安全维度。


Indeed, if conflicts in Asia become more virulent, Europe cannot expect the US to shoulder the burden of maintaining regional stability alone.	事实上，如果亚洲冲突升级，欧洲不能期待美国独力承担维护地区稳定的责任。


While this does not necessarily imply a military role for Europe in Asia (although participation in peacekeeping missions should not be excluded), it does mean a more forceful diplomatic posture in support of mediation and multilateralism.	这并不一定意味着欧洲要在亚洲扮演军事角色（尽管参与维和任务的可能性不应该被排除），但确实意味着欧洲应该采取更强硬的外交姿态支持调停和多边主义。


A joint rebalancing would help to fortify all facets of the EU-US relationship, possibly catalyzing progress on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.	联合再平衡将有利于增强欧盟-美国关系的各方面，并有望推进跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴关系的前进。


It would also strengthen the largest economies’ rule-making capacity vis-à-vis the emerging economies, most notably China, in maintaining a liberal economic order.	这还可以加强两个最大经济体相对新兴经济体（特别是中国）在维持自由经济秩序方面的规则决定力。


In short, a common approach toward Asia would reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship at just the right time, and would guarantee that, despite having suffered from internal disagreements in the last decade, the EU-US partnership remains the cornerstone of a peaceful and prosperous world order.	简言之，一起偏向亚洲能够在正确的时间重振跨大西洋关系，并能够保证尽管过去十年内部分歧众多，但欧盟-美国伙伴关系仍是和平而繁荣的世界秩序的基石。


Why Fair Trade?	为何要有公平贸易？


LONDON – Historically, the term “fair trade” has meant many things.	发自伦敦——在历史上，“公平贸易”这个词有着许许多多的含义。


The Fair Trade League was founded in Britain in 1881 to restrict imports from foreign countries.	公平贸易联盟于1881年在英国成立以限制来自外国进口商品。


In the United States, businesses and labor unions use “fair trade” laws to construct what economist Joseph Stiglitz calls “barbed-wire barriers to imports.”	在美国，商界以及工会都利用“公平贸易”法来构建经济学家约瑟夫•斯提格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）所谓的“进口商品铁网屏障”。


These so called “anti-dumping” laws allow a company that suspects a foreign rival of selling a product below cost to request that the government impose special tariffs to protect it from “unfair” competition.	一系列“反倾销”法允许那些怀疑国外对手以低于成本的价格销售商品的企业要求政府征收特别关税来保护其免遭“不公平”竞争的威胁。


Such dark protectionist thoughts are far from the minds of the benevolent organizers of the United Kingdom’s annual “Fairtrade Fortnight,” during which I just bought two bars of fair-trade chocolate and a jar of fair-trade chunky peanut butter.	当然，那些好心的英国年度“公平贸易双周”组织者们可没有这些阴暗的保护主义思想。 笔者也在活动中购买了两条公平贸易巧克力以及一罐公平贸易花生酱。


Their worthy aim is to raise the price paid to developing-country farmers for their produce by excluding the inflated profits of the middlemen on whom they depend for getting their goods to distant markets.	他们可敬的目标就是希望绕过那些将农产品销往远方赚取额外利润的中间人，向发展中国家农民支付更高的产品价格。


Fair-trade products like cocoa, coffee, tea, and bananas do not compete with domestic European production, and therefore do not have a protectionist motive.	类似可可、咖啡，茶叶和香蕉这样的公平贸易产品与欧洲本地产品并无竞争，因此也并不存在任何贸易保护主义动机。


This is how it works: In exchange for being paid a guaranteed price and meeting “agreed labor and environmental standards” (minimum wages, no pesticides), poor-country farming cooperatives receive a FAIRTRADE mark for their products, issued by the FAIRTRADE Labeling Organization.	整个规则是这样的：通过满足“约定的劳工以及环境标准（比如最低工资和不施农药）”并以保底价出售农产品，穷国的农业合作社可以从公平贸易标签发放机构获得一个公平贸易标签。


This certification enables supermarkets and other retailers to sell the products at a premium.	这一认证确保超级市场和其他零售商以额外溢价出售这些商品。


Third-world farmers get a boost to their income, while first-world consumers get to feel virtuous: a marriage made in heaven.	于是第三世界国家的农民获得了高收入，而第一世界的消费者们则自我感觉良好：简直是天作之合啊！


The fair-trade movement, launched in the 1980’s, has been growing rapidly.	发端于1980年代的公平贸易运动正在迅速发展。


In a notable breakthrough in 1997, the British House of Commons decided to serve only fair-trade coffee.	其中1997年的一次突破性进展则是英国下议院决定只提供公平贸易咖啡。


By the end of 2007, more than 600 producers’ organizations, representing 1.4 million farmers in 58 countries, were selling fair-trade products.	到2007年底为止已经有超过600个生产组织——代表58个国家的140万农民——在销售公平贸易产品。


Today, a quarter of all bananas in UK supermarkets are sold under a FAIRTRADE mark.	时至今日，全英超市中1/4的香蕉都拥有公平贸易标签。