In fact, despite the seemingly unending stream of new energy initiatives and projects, Europe has made little progress; its energy situation may even be worse.	事实上，尽管新的能源计划和工程似乎层出不穷，但欧洲其实并没有多少进步；


Repackaging the same old strategies – here one need look no further than European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker’s much-hyped €300 billion investment package – simply will not work.	其能源状况可能还有所恶化。 新瓶装旧酒是起不了作用的——欧盟委员会主席容克引起热捧的3,000亿欧元投资计划就属此类。


With attention focused on COP21 next December, the coming year will be an exceptional opportunity to build a sound global energy system.	明年的注意力都集中在12月的COP21上，明年将是一个建立可靠全球能源体系的无与伦比的良机。


Europe, which has prided itself on its energy leadership, should set an example by developing – and then implementing – a realistic long-term strategy that involves the private sector.	向来以身为能源事务领导者而自豪的欧洲应该在发展——以及实施——包括私人部门的现实长期战略方面树立一个榜样。


Global Finance and Global Warming	全球金融和全球变暖


NEW DELHI/LONDON – Since 2008, when the global financial crisis nearly brought down the world economy, financial reform has been among the top items on policymakers’ agendas.	新德里/伦敦—2008年，金融危机几乎将世界经济摧毁，此后，金融改革一直是决策者日程的重中之重。


But, as leaders move from fixing the problems of the past to positioning the financial system for the future, they must also grapple with new threats to its stability, particularly those stemming from climate change.	但是，当领导人们从解决过去的问题转向为未来金融体系定位时，他们必须认识到金融体系稳定的新威胁，特别是来自气候变化的威胁。


That is why a growing number of governments, regulators, standard-setters, and market actors are starting to incorporate rules concerning sustainability into the financial system.	正因如此，越来越多的政府、监管者、标准制定者和市场参与者开始将可持续性规则纳入金融体系。


In Brazil, the central bank views the integration of environmental and social factors into risk management as a way to strengthen resilience.	在巴西，中央银行将环境和社会因素纳入风险管理，以作为增强恢复力的办法之一。


And in countries like Singapore and South Africa, companies listed on the stock market are obligated to disclose their environmental and social performance, a requirement that investors and regulators increasingly view as essential to the efficient functioning of financial markets.	在新加坡和南非等国，股市上市公司必须披露它们的环境和社会表现，投资者和监管者日益将这一要求视为金融市场有效运转的必要条件。


Initiatives like these might once have been regarded as part of a peripheral “green” niche.	类似措施一度被视为外围“绿色”利基的一部分。


Today, they are considered central to the operation of the financial system.	如今，它们已是金融体系运行的核心。


In Bangladesh, the central bank’s efforts to support economic development include low-cost refinancing for banks lending to projects that meet goals for renewables, energy efficiency, or waste management.	在孟加拉国，中央银行支持经济发展的措施包括为满足可再生能源、能源效率或废物管理目标的工程的银行贷款提供再融资。


In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is currently evaluating the implications of climate change for the insurance sector as part of its core mandate to oversee the safety and soundness of financial institutions.	在英国，英格兰银行最近正在评估气候变化对保险业的影响，以此作为其监督金融部门安全性和可靠性的核心使命的一部分。


In China, annual investment in green industry could reach $320 billion in the next five years, with the government able to provide only 10-15% of the total.	在中国，五年后绿色产业年投资规模有望达到3,200亿美元，而政府只能提供10—15%。


In order to prevent a funding shortfall, the People’s Bank of China has recently produced a report with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) setting out a comprehensive set of recommendations for establishing China’s “green financial system.”	为了防止资金短缺，中国人民银行最近与联合国环境署（UNEP）发布了一份报告，提出了关于建立中国“绿色金融体系”的全套建议。


In India, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry has established a new “green bond” working group to explore how the country’s debt markets can respond to the challenge of financing smart infrastructure.	在印度，印度工商联合会（Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry）成立了新的“绿色债券”工作组，考察印度债务市场应该如何响应为智能基础设施融资的挑战。


And recent regulatory changes hold out considerable potential for listed investment trusts to deploy capital for clean energy.	而最新的监管变化释放出大量上市投资信托将资本配置于清洁能源的潜力。


So far, such measures affect only a small fraction of the $305 trillion in assets held by banks, investors, financial institutions, and individuals in the global financial system.	目前，这些措施只影响到全球体系中银行、投资者、金融机构和个人所持有的305万亿美元资产的一小部分。


But they are set to be applied more broadly as financiers and regulators alike recognize the full consequences of environmental dislocation.	但随着金融家和监管者充分认识到环境失序的后果，这些措施将得到更广泛的应用。


Those consequences already are severe.	这些后果已然十分严重。


In 116 of 140 countries assessed by UNEP, the stock of natural capital that underpins value creation is in decline.	在联合国环境署评估的140个国家中，有116个国家的作为价值创造基础的自然资本存量越来越少。


The human and economic costs of continued high-carbon growth include severe health impacts, growing disruption to infrastructure, and water and food security, as well as increasing market volatility, most notably in developing countries.	继续高碳增长的人道和经济成本包括严重的健康影响、日益加剧的基础设施和水和食品安全破坏，以及市场波动性的扩大，特别是发展中国家。


This damage will become worse, with risks becoming unmanageable if emissions of greenhouse gases are not reduced to net zero levels between 2055 and 2070.	这一伤害将变得更加严重，如果温室气体排放无法在2055—2070年间下降到净零水平，这一伤害可能将无法控制。


As the threat from climate change becomes more evident, financing the response to its impact will become increasingly important.	随着气候变化威胁的日益显现，为应对措施融资也将变得日益重要。


Developed countries have committed to mobilize $100 billion in annual financial flows to developing countries by 2020, but much more is needed.	发达国家已承诺到2020年每年动员1,000亿美元金融流援助发展中国家，但我们需要的远不止这些。


Above all, it is essential to place the financing challenge posed by climate change within the broader context of the green economy and sustainable development.	最重要的是，必须将气候变化所带来的金融挑战置于更广的绿色经济和可持续发展框架内。


The task for those charged with governing the financial system is to enable the orderly transition from high- to low-carbon investments and from vulnerable to resilient assets.	金融体系的管理者的任务是有序实现从高碳投资向低碳投资以及从脆弱资产向高恢复力资产的转型。


According to the New Climate Economy initiative, $89 trillion will be spent on global infrastructure investment by 2030 – with an additional $4.1 trillion needed to make it low-carbon and resilient.	根据新气候经济（New Climate Economy）计划的数据，到2030年全球基础设施投资将达到89万亿美元——而要让这些投资变得低碳而高恢复力，必须在增加4. 1万亿美元投资。


To mobilize the required capital, policymakers will need to harness the power of the financial system.	要动员所需要的资本，决策者需要借助金融体系的力量。


The scope of risk management will need to be expanded, so that long-term sustainability and risks from climate change are included in prudential rules for banking, insurance, and investment.	风险管理的范畴需要扩大，从而将长期可持续性和金融变化风险纳入银行、保险和投资的审慎规则中。


New “green banks” can help to bring in funding from debt and equity markets.	新“绿色银行”有助于带来债市和股市资金。


Transparency will have to be improved, through better corporate reporting and enhanced disclosure from financial institutions.	透明度必须改善，可以通过更好的公司报告制度和强化金融机构的披露实现。


And financial professionals’ skills and incentives will have to be retooled and revised to reflect these new priorities.	金融专业人士的技能和激励也需要重新梳理以反映这些新重点。


Promising avenues for international cooperation are now opening up.	如今，大有希望的国际合作之门正在敞开。


For example, the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors have just asked the Financial Stability Board to explore how the financial sector could address climate issues.	比如，G-20财政部长和央行行长刚刚要求金融稳定委员会（Financial Stability Board）研究金融业如何解决气候问题。


Actions such as these will not only strengthen climate security; they will also contribute to a more efficient, effective, and resilient financial system.	这类措施不但可以强化气候安全； 还有助于建立更高效、更有效、恢复力更强的金融体系。


Global Finance’s Supply-Chain Revolution	全球金融供应链革命


HONG KONG – In March 2011, the catastrophic earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster that hit Japan halted production of key components on which many global supply chains depend.	香港—2011年3月席卷日本的地震、海啸和核灾难中断了全球供应链所依赖的一大关键节点。


The sudden disruption of these essential materials from the production process forced a reassessment of how these supply chains function.	许多生产过程的关键原料突然中断了，这迫使我们重新评估供应链的功能。


But such vulnerabilities are not confined to the manufacturing sector.	但供应链的脆弱性并不只局限在制造部门。


The finance industry, too, has suffered its own near “supply chain” meltdown in recent times.	最近一段时间，金融业也经受了“供应链”的几乎坍塌。


The failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 not only roiled global financial markets, but also brought global trade practically to a standstill as wholesale banks refused to fund each other for fear of counterparty failure.	2008年的雷曼兄弟倒闭事件不仅动摇了全球金融市场，还让全球贸易陷入了事实上的停顿，因为对交易对手倒闭的担忧使得批发银行拒绝彼此提供融资。


The simple banking system of the past, one based on retail savings being concentrated in order to fund the credit needs of borrowers, had evolved into a highly complex – and global – supply chain with knock-on risks of disruption comparable to those seen in Japan last spring.	过去的简单银行体系——集中零售储蓄，以此为基础满足借款人的信用需求——已演变为高度复杂的全球供应链，这一供应链有一种一损俱损的风险，正如去年春天日本灾难的影响。


Financial supply chains and those in the manufacturing sector share three key features – architecture, feedback mechanisms, and processes – and their robustness and efficiency depend upon how these components interact.	金融供应链与制造业供应链有三大相似之处——结构、反馈机制和过程——其稳健性和高效性取决于这些组成成分的相互作用。


In today’s financial architecture, as with other supply chains, interdependent networks tend to concentrate in powerful hubs.	与其他供应链一样，在当今金融结构中，相互依存的网络集中汇聚于强大的中心。


For example, just two financial centers, London and New York, dominate international finance, and only 22 players conduct 90% of all global foreign-exchange trading.	比如，两大金融中心——伦敦和纽约主导着国际金融，而22家主要机构控制着90%的全球外汇交易。


Such concentration is very efficient, but it also contributes to greater systemic risks, because, if the leading hubs fail, the whole system can collapse.	如此集中具有相当高的效率，但也造成了更大的系统性风险，因为如果主要中心倒闭，整个体系都得崩溃。


Open feedback mechanisms ensure a supply chain’s ability to respond to a changing environment, but, in the case of financial supply chains, feedback mechanisms can amplify shocks until the whole system blows up.	开放的反馈机制确保了供应链能够对环境变化产生反应，但是，在金融供应链中，反馈机制可能会不断增强冲击，直到整个体系因此崩溃。


The Lehman Brothers collapse triggered just such an explosion, with the financial system saved only by government bailouts.	雷曼兄弟的倒闭便触发了这样一种大爆炸，最后依靠政府出手援助，金融体系才免于崩盘。


Finally, the processes within supply chains, and the feedback interactions between them, can make the system greater or smaller than the sum of its parts.	最后，供应链的内部过程以及供应链之间的反馈互动会造成整个体系大于或小于各部分之和。


Since a complex network comprises linkages between many sub-networks, individual inefficiencies or weaknesses can have an impact on the viability of the whole.	由于整个网络由相互联系的大量次级网络组成，因此个体的无效性或疲软性能够对整个整体的生存产生冲击。


Like manufacturing supply chains in the wake of the Japanese disruption, financial supply chains face formidable pressures to re-engineer and adapt as the global economic balance shifts towards emerging markets.	正如日本受灾前的制造业供应链，金融供应链也面临着全球经济均衡向新兴市场倾斜这一趋势所带来的调整和适应压力。


As that happens, billions of consumers will enter these countries’ middle classes, new social networks will evolve, and climate change will become a growing factor in global commerce.	数十亿消费者将步入各自国家的中产阶级行列，新的社会网络正在演化生成，气候变化也在日益成为全球商业的重要影响因素。


In addition, major regulatory reforms will impose new and higher costs on the financial sector.	此外，重大监管改革将给金融部门带来新的和更高的成本。


Banks and other institutions are also under pressure to devise new financial products that can help the real sector to manage more complex risks and enable investment in areas such as green technology and infrastructure for developing economies.	银行和其他机构在面临新的压力——设计新的金融产品以帮助实体部门管理更复杂的风险并为绿色技术和发展中国家基础设施等领域的投资提供便利。


Moreover, global financial stability now depends upon greater cooperation at the international level, with tighter enforcement of rules at the national level.	另外，如今全球金融稳定性取决于国际层面的更紧密合作以及国家层面的更严格的规则的实施。


It is also clear that emerging markets are searching for alternative growth models that are green and sustainable.	同样显而易见的是，新兴市场正在寻求绿色可持续的替代增长模式。


Their financial sectors will have to operate very differently from the current model, which is driven by consumption.	其金融部门将不得不采取与现有模式截然不同的消费驱动的经营模式。


In a world in which both consumption and finance must grow more slowly to cope with global resource and environmental constraints, what role can finance play in reducing addictive consumption, funded by unsustainable leverage?	当今世界，消费和金融都必须放缓增长速度，以应对全球资源和环境约束。 在这样的背景下，金融可以在减少用不可持续的杠杆融资的消费增加方面起到什么作用？


And, given that financial institutions will have to monitor and manage risk in a radically different manner, both for themselves and their customers, what is the role of distribution in a world where consumption, savings, and investment will accelerate in volatility?	此外，不论是为自己还是为客户着想，金融机构都必须用完全不同的方法监控和管理风险，这样的背景下，分配可以在消费、储蓄和投资都将更加波动的世界中起到什么作用？


Financial “production” is currently a top-down process.	当前，金融“生产”是一个自上而下的过程。


Instruments are designed in such a way that their sales generate more profits for financial engineers than for end users.	金融工具被设计用于为金融工程师，而不是最终用户，产生更多的利润。


But the rise of interactive social networking has made financial innovation more bottom-up.	但互动社交网络化的兴起已使得金融创新开始转变为自下而上了。


Millions of bank customers using mobile phones can provide immediate feedback on which products and services they like or dislike.	数以百万计的银行移动电话客户可以即时反馈他们喜欢或不喜欢什么产品和服务。


In the future, client-service and transaction-management systems will receive more input from customers more frequently, so that product design is shaped interactively.	在未来，客户服务和交易管理系统将更多更频繁地从客户那里获得输入变量，因此产品设计将变得更加具有互动性。


The current strategy in the financial sector drives excessive competition by increasing market share at rivals’ expense, often breaking trust with customers for the sake of short-term gains.	当前的金融部门战略是“以邻为壑”，经常出于短期利益不惜破坏客户信任度，这造成了过度竞争。


Yet the financial sector has, in previous eras, proven that it can operate as a public good by providing trustworthy, efficient services.	但是，金融部门的历史已经证明，它可以作为一种公共产品来运行——通过提供值得信赖的高效服务。


The winning financial supply chains of the future will instill confidence that they offer safe, stable, and efficient services to the most clients.	未来的金融供应链上策将是培养人们对它们能够向大多数客户提供安全、稳定、高效的服务的信心。


Innovation in the last century focused on processes, products, and services.	上个世纪的创新专注于过程、产品和服务。


Today, the financial sector needs innovation of a higher order, involving business models, strategy, and management approaches that restore trust in finance.	如今，金融部门需要更高层次的创新，包括业务模式、战略和管理方法的创新，以重建人们对金融的信任。


Just as Steve Jobs of Apple transformed the computer industry through lifestyle products and highly reliable, user-friendly, and “cool” services, financial institutions will have to introduce new value chains that create confidence by adapting to the growing needs of new markets.	正如乔布斯的苹果公司通过生活风格的产品和高度可信赖、用户友好的“酷”服务改变了计算机产业一样，金融机构也必须引入新的能通过适应日益增加的新市场需求创造客户信心的价值链。


Given such profound changes, financial leaders should think about how to orchestrate a new financial supply chain – the “killer app” for our still new century.	在深远变革的背景下，金融领袖应该想一想，如何打造新的金融供应链——新世纪的“杀手级应用”。


2008 Revisited?	重温2008？


NEW YORK – The question I am asked most often nowadays is this: Are we back to 2008 and another global financial crisis and recession?	纽约—最近我最常被问道的问题是：我们回到了2008年，将迎来又一场全球金融危机和衰退吗？


My answer is a straightforward no, but that the recent episode of global financial market turmoil is likely to be more serious than any period of volatility and risk-off behavior since 2009.	我的回答直截了当：不。 但最近的全球金融市场动荡可能比2009年以来的所有波动和避险时期都要大。


This is because there are now at least seven sources of global tail risk, as opposed to the single factors – the eurozone crisis, the Federal Reserve “taper tantrum,” a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, and a hard economic landing in China – that have fueled volatility in recent years.	这是因为，目前至少有七大全球尾部风险源——而不只像近几年那样只有一些单一因素——欧元区危机、美联储的“削减恐慌”（taper tantrum）、希腊可能退出欧元区以及中国经济硬着陆等——助长波动性。


First, worries about a hard landing in China and its likely impact on the stock market and the value of the renminbi have returned with a vengeance.	首先，对中国硬着陆及其对股市和人民币价值的可能影响卷土重来。


While China is more likely to have a bumpy landing than a hard one, investors’ concerns have yet to be laid to rest, owing to the ongoing growth slowdown and continued capital flight.	与硬着陆相比，中国更有可能发生“颠簸”着陆，但投资者的担忧并未就此平息，因为增长减速在持续，资本外逃也没有停止。


Second, emerging markets are in serious trouble.	其次，新兴市场麻烦重重。


They face global headwinds (China’s slowdown, the end of the commodity super cycle, the Fed’s exit from zero policy rates).	它们面临全球不利形势（中国减速、大宗商品价格超级周期的结束、美联储退出零政策利率）。


Many are running macro imbalances, such as twin current account and fiscal deficits, and confront rising inflation and slowing growth.	许多经济体存在宏观失衡，如经常项目和财政双赤字，并面临通胀抬头和增长减速。


Most have not implemented structural reforms to boost sagging potential growth.	大部分没有实施结构改革以提振停滞的潜在增长。


And currency weakness increases the real value of trillions of dollars of debt built up in the last decade.	而货币疲软增加了过去十年所累积的美元债务的实际值。


Third, the Fed probably erred in exiting its zero-interest-rate policy in December.	第三，美联储在12月份退出零利率政策可能是一个错误。


Weaker growth, lower inflation (owing to a further decline in oil prices), and tighter financial conditions (via a stronger dollar, a corrected stock market, and wider credit spreads) now threaten US growth and inflation expectations.	疲软的增长、降低的通胀（拜油价进一步下跌所赐）和收紧的金融条件（通过美元升值、股市修正走势和信息利差扩大）正在威胁美国的增长和通胀预期。


Fourth, many simmering geopolitical risks are coming to a boil.	第四，许多酝酿多时的地缘政治风险一触即发。


Perhaps the most immediate source of uncertainty is the prospect of a long-term cold war – punctuated by proxy conflicts – between the Middle East’s regional powers, particularly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.	也许最紧迫的不确定性源头是中东地区势力，特别是逊尼派的沙特阿拉伯和什叶派的伊朗之间可能爆发长期冷战——通过代理冲突进行。


Fifth, the decline in oil prices is triggering falls in US and global equities and spikes in credit spreads.	第五，石油价格下跌引发美国和全球股市下跌，扩大了信用利差。


This may now signal weak global demand – rather than rising supply – as growth in China, emerging markets, and the US slows.	考虑到中国、新兴市场和美国增长放缓，这也许意味着全球需求疲软——而不是供给增加。


Weak oil prices also damage US energy producers, which comprise a large share of the US stock market, and impose credit losses and potential defaults on net energy exporting economies, their sovereigns, state-owned enterprises, and energy firms.	疲软的油价还威胁到美国的能源生产商（它们是美国股市的主要组成部分），并带来净能源出口经济体、它们的主权财富基金、国有企业和能源企业的信用损失和潜在违约。


As regulations restrict market makers from providing liquidity and absorbing market volatility, every fundamental shock becomes more severe in terms of risk-asset price corrections.	监管者限制做市商提供流动性和吸收市场波动，因此每一次基本面冲击都会造成更加剧烈的风险资产价格修正。


Sixth, global banks are challenged by lower returns, owing to the new regulations put in place since 2008, the rise of financial technology that threatens to disrupt their already-challenged business models, the growing use of negative policy rates, rising credit losses on bad assets (energy, commodities, emerging markets, fragile European corporate borrowers), and the movement in Europe to “bail in” banks’ creditors, rather than bail them out with now-restricted state aid.	第六，拜2008年后实行的新监管措施、可能破坏已然广受挑战的业务模式的金融技术的崛起、负利率政策日益广泛的使用、不良资产（能源、大宗商品、新兴市场、脆弱的欧洲公司借款人）信用损失加剧以及欧洲“自救”（bail-in）银行债权人而不是用目前受到限制的国家援助救助它们所赐，全球银行饱受回报率低企的挑战。


Finally, the European Union and the eurozone could be ground zero of global financial turmoil this year.	最��，欧盟和欧元区可能成为今年全球金融动荡的风暴眼。


European banks are challenged.	欧洲银行正在接受挑战。


The migration crisis could lead to the end of the Schengen Agreement, and (together with other domestic troubles) to the end of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government.	移民危机可能导致申根协议解体，并（与其他国内麻烦一道）让德国总理默克尔政府下台。


Moreover, Britain’s exit from the EU is becoming more likely.	此外，英国退出欧盟的可能性日增。


With the Greek government and its creditors once again on a collision course, the risk of Greece’s exit may return.	希腊政府及其债权人再次形成对峙，希腊退出的风险可能卷土重来。


Populist parties of the right and the left are gaining strength throughout Europe.	右翼和左翼民粹主义政党正在整个欧洲得势。


Thus, Europe increasingly risks disintegration.	因此，欧洲分裂风险日增。


To top it all off, its neighborhood is unsafe, with wars raging not only in the Middle East, but also – despite repeated attempts by the EU to broker peace – in Ukraine, while Russia is becoming more aggressive on Europe’s borders, from the Baltics to the Balkans.	最糟糕的是，其周边也不安全，不但中东饱受战火蹂躏，乌克兰也是如此（尽管欧盟一再牵头媾和），俄罗斯在从波罗的海到巴尔干半岛的欧洲边境虎视眈眈。


In the past, tail risks were more occasional, growth scares turned out to be just that, and the policy response was strong and effective, thereby keeping risk-off episodes brief and restoring asset prices to their previous highs (if not taking them even higher).	在过去，尾部风险偶然性更大，增长恐慌仅仅是恐慌，政策应对强力有效，因此避险时期都比较短，资产价格很快就可以收复前高甚至再创新高。


Today, there are seven sources of potential global tail risk, and the global economy is moving from an anemic expansion (positive growth that accelerates) to a slowdown (positive growth that decelerates), which will lead to further reduction in the price of risky assets (equities, commodities, credit) worldwide.	如今，有七大潜在全球尾部风险，而全球经济正在从扩张不力（正增长并且加速）转为放缓（正增长但减速），这将进一步拉低全世界风险资产（股票、大宗商品、信用）的价格。


At the same time, the policies that stopped and reversed the doom loop between the real economy and risk assets are running out of steam.	与此同时，结束和扭转实体经济与风险资产之间的致命循环（doom loop）的政策日渐无力。


The policy mix is suboptimal, owing to excessive reliance on monetary rather than fiscal policy.	由于过度依赖货币而不是财政政策，政策组合处于次优状态。


Indeed, monetary policies are becoming increasingly unconventional, reflected in the move by several central banks to negative real policy rates; and such unconventional policies risk doing more harm than good as they hurt the profitability of banks and other financial firms.	事实上，货币政策正日益变得反常规，这体现在多家央行的负实际利率上； 而这些非常规政策可能弊大于利，因为它们影响了银行和其他金融企业的盈利能力。


Two dismal months for financial markets may give way in March to a relief rally for assets such as global equities, as some key central banks (the People’s Bank of China, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan) ease more, while others (the Fed and the Bank of England) will remain on hold for longer.	在经历了惨痛的两个月后，3月份的金融市场可能迎来全球股票等资产的喘息期，因为一些重要央行（中国人民银行、欧洲央行和日本银行）进一步宽松，其他央行（美联储和英格兰银行）也将继续保持宽松。


But repeated eruptions from some of the seven sources of global tail risk will make the rest of this year – unlike the previous seven – a bad one for risky assets and anemic for global growth.	但七大全球尾部风险源中的一些反复爆发可能让今年的余下部分——不同于过去七年——成为风险资产的凶年，让全球增长十分萎靡。


The Global Financial System’s Weakened Defenses	被削弱的全球金融防御体系


ZURICH – Eighty-five years ago this month, Credit-Anstalt, by far the largest bank in Austria, collapsed.	发自苏黎世——八十五年前的五月，Credi Anstalt这个当时奥地利最大的银行宣告破产。


By that July, banks in Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey had experienced runs.	随后两个月，埃及、德国、匈牙利、拉脱维亚、波兰，罗马尼亚和土耳其等国的银行都爆发了挤兑。


A banking panic hit the United States in August, though the sources of that panic may have been domestic.	八月时美国也爆发了银行业恐慌，尽管这场恐慌很可能源自其国内因素。


In September, banks in the United Kingdom experienced large withdrawals.	九月英国境内的银行相继遭遇大额取款。


The parallels to the 2008 collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers are strong – and crucial for understanding today’s financial risks.	这场历史事件与美国雷曼兄弟投资银行于2008年的破产拥有极大的相似性——对于理解今天的金融风险也是至关重要的。


For starters, neither the collapse of Credit-Anstalt nor that of Lehman Brothers caused all of the global financial tumult that ensued.	首先，一切随后爆发的全球金融动荡的始作俑者既不是Credi Anstalt也不是雷曼兄弟。


Those collapses and the subsequent problems were symptoms of the same disease: a weak banking system.	这些崩溃以及紧接着产生的麻烦都是同一个问题的表象：脆弱的银行体系。


In Austria in 1931, the problem was rooted in the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, hyperinflation in the early 1920s, and banks’ excessive exposure to the industrial sector.	在1931年的奥地利，问题的根源是第一次世界大战奥匈帝国的解体，1920年代初的恶性通货膨胀，以及银行业为工业部门承担了过度的风险。


By the time Credit-Anstalt collapsed, the world had been in deep recession for two years, banking systems in a number of countries had become fragile, and tensions were easily transmitted across national borders, with the gold standard exacerbating financial vulnerability by constraining central banks’ ability to act.	在Credi Anstalt崩溃的时候全世界实际已经陷入衰退整整两年了，一些国家的银行系统弱不禁风，紧张态势极易跨越国界传播，而金本位制度对中央银行行动能力的限制则加剧了金融体系的脆弱性。


Similarly, in 2008, the entire financial system was overextended, owing to a combination of weak internal risk management and inadequate government regulation and supervision.	同样，在2008年时由于内部风险管理薄弱且政府规管和监督不足，整个金融体系过度扩张。


Lehman Brothers was simply the weakest link in a long chain of brittle financial firms.	雷曼兄弟只不过是一长串脆弱金融公司中最薄弱的那一环而已。


Could a crisis like those triggered by the Credit-Anstalt and the Lehman Brothers collapse happen today?	那么今时今日是否会再次发生那些由Credi Anstalt和雷曼兄弟倒闭所引发的危机？ 对此人们一般都会持否定态度。


One is tempted to say no.	毕竟全球经济和金融体系似乎正在好转；


After all, the global economy and the financial system appear to be on the mend; risk-taking in the private sector has been reduced; and huge, though burdensome, regulatory improvements have been undertaken.	私营部门的冒险行为已经减少； 同时大规模（虽然繁琐缓慢）的监管升级正在展开。


Taken together, these developments surely make for a stable financial system.	总之，这些事态发展的无疑会造就一个稳定的金融体系。


The problem with this reasoning is that financial crises tend to reveal fault lines that were not visible before.	但这一推断的问题是金融危机往往会揭露出一些之前并不可见的断层。


Indeed, the financial sector manages the risks that it recognizes, not necessarily all the risks that it runs.	事实上，金融业没法发现所有隐患，只能管理自身已经认识到的风险。


And it is easy to overestimate the crisis-preventing power of the new regulatory environment, which is analogous to a new highway: It is technically safer than a country road, but it also attracts more cars that are traveling at much higher speeds, so traffic accidents continue.	同时人们往往会高估了新的监管环境下的危机预防能力，这类似于一条新的高速公：在技术上确实比一般道路安全，但也吸引了更多的汽车以更高的速度行驶，所以交通事故依旧无法避免。


Unable to rule out a new crisis, how well are we equipped to cope with one?	那么既然无法排除新的危机，那我们在应对方面是否做足了呢？


The short answer is: not very.	简要的回答是：不是很够。


In fact, if a financial crisis were to occur today, its consequences for the real economy might be even more severe than in the past.	事实上，如果今天要爆发金融危机的话，其对实体经济的影响可能会比以往更严重。


Of course, because central banks now recognize that their responsibilities extend beyond stabilizing prices to include the prevention and management of financial tensions, they would undoubtedly be quick to respond to any shock with a battery of market operations.	当然，由于各国央行已经意识到自己的职责已不仅是稳定物价，还得包含预防和应对财政紧张局势，自然将会迅速使出一连串市场运作来对任何冲击做出反应。


But, in the event of a crisis, the tools available to central banks to prevent deflation and a collapse of the real economy are severely constrained, especially today.	但在危机的情况下，各国央行可以用来防止通缩和实体经济崩溃的工具其实受到严重制约，尤其是在当下。


In the early twentieth century, central banks could all devalue their currencies against gold, thereby raising the price level and escaping debt deflation.	在二十世纪早期，各国央行都可以让本国货币相对黄金贬值，从而提高价格水平和逃避债务通缩。


And, indeed, nine countries, including the UK, did exactly that in 1931, with another eight countries, including the US, following suit over the next five years.	而且，事实上有包括英国在内的五个国家都在1931年用了这招，而美国与其他八个国家则在随后5年间纷纷效仿。


Today, however, currency depreciation is a zero-sum game.	然而时至今日，货币贬值已经变成了一个零和游戏。


Without the joint-depreciation option, central banks responded to the 2008 crisis with interest-rate cuts that were unprecedented in scope, size, and speed, as well as massive purchases of long-term securities (so-called quantitative easing, or QE).	在缺乏合伙贬值选项的情况下，各国央行只得用范围，规模和速度都史无前例的��息来应对2008年危机，或是大规模购买长期债券（即所谓的量化宽松政策）。


And those efforts were effective.	这些努力也产生了效果。


But interest rates remain extremely low, and are even negative in some countries, and QE has been taken close to its limits, with public support for the policy waning.	但利率仍然非常低，一些国家甚至出现了负利率，量化宽松的实施也已接近极限，公众对这一政策的支持度也不断减弱。


As a result, these tools’ ability to cushion an economy against further shocks is severely constrained.	其结果是，这些工具缓冲经济遭受进一步冲击的能力受到严重限制。


While forward guidance by central banks has also helped, it, too, is unlikely to be able to provide an effective buffer against a new shock.	虽然央行的前瞻指导也有帮助，但也不太可能有效缓冲新的冲击。


None of this is to say that another global financial crisis is necessarily imminent.	这一切并不是说另一次全球性的金融危机已经迫在眉睫。


On the contrary, economies worldwide are making progress in recovering from the 2008 disaster, and the US Federal Reserve’s tightening of policy last December signals that the global interest-rate cycle is moving into the next phase.	相反，全球经济在从2008年的灾难中恢复过来，美国联邦储备委员会在上年十二月的政策紧缩说明全球利率周期正进入下一个阶段。


This is good news.	这是一个好消息。


But the danger of another financial crisis should not be ruled out.	但遭遇另一场金融危机的危险不应被排除。


Indeed, given that the capacity of central banks to cope with a financial shock will remain woefully limited for years to come, it should be taken very seriously. The risks of complacency are simply too great.	事实上，由于各国央行在未来几年应对金融震荡的能力依然有限，这一危险应该引起高度重视，因为骄傲自负的可能产生的风险实在太大了。


What Role for Global Governance?	全球治理的角色


WASHINGTON, DC – Can global governance solve most of our economic problems?	华盛顿—全球治理能够解决大部分经济问题吗？


Or does it too often promise more than it can deliver, and divert attention from more practical reforms that national governments should implement?	或者，全球治理是否总是承诺得多、兑现得少，并且将人们的注意力从国家政府应该实施的更加务实的改革上转移？


In a recent commentary, Harvard University economist Dani Rodrik thoughtfully argues the latter.	在最近的评论中，哈佛大学经济学家丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）意味深长地支持后者。


Is he right?	他这么认为正确吗？


To be sure, national policy has a more direct effect – good or bad – on a country’s citizens.	平心而论，国家政策对于一国公民的影响更加直接——无论好坏。


But we cannot ignore the global effects of bad national policies, the most obvious examples noted by Rodrik being greenhouse-gas emissions and infectious diseases.	但我们不能忽视坏国家政策的全球效应，罗德里克所提出的最显著的例子是温室气体排放和传染病。


People in the “country of origin” may pay a price, but so will the rest of us.	“来源国”人民也许付出了代价，但我们其余所有人也要付出代价。


“Globalization” has been a catchword for decades, and the need for global governance has admittedly been exaggerated in recent years, especially by those on the center left.	“全球化”是几十年来的流行语，而全球治理的需要在近几年中诚然也有所夸大，特别是中左翼。


This has led to calls for new alternatives, such as “responsible nationalism” or “inter-governmental” – as opposed to supranational – decision-making in the European Union.	这导致人们呼唤新措施，如“负责任的民族主义”或欧盟“政府间”——而不是超国家——决策。


Such proposals make for a healthy debate.	这些方案带来了健康的争论。


For example, we should reevaluate the current system for deciding trade agreements, which have become more about regulatory and investment issues than about eliminating import tariffs or other import barriers.	比如，我们应该重估当前的贸易协定决定体系，它更关注监管和投资问题，更少关注取消进口关税或其他进口壁垒。


It is no surprise that even some free-trade supporters object to agreements that allow trade groups to insert language granting multinational corporations undue market power at the expense of consumer protection.	毫不奇怪，即使是一些自由贸易支持者也反对允许贸易集团干涉其中，授予多边合作过分的市场力量而不顾消费者保护。


Still, the push for stronger global governance in recent years has not happened in a vacuum.	但是，近几年来推动加强全球治理的力量也不是来自真空。


Countries have undoubtedly become more economically and socially interdependent, owing to trade, travel, and telecommunications, not to mention multinational corporate structures and international financial flows.	毫无疑问，由于贸易、旅行和通讯，更不用说多边合作结构和国际金融流，各国在经济和社会上的变得更加相互依存。


Global intercourse is broader, faster, and more ubiquitous than ever before.	全球互动比以往任何时候都要更加广泛、更加迅速、更加普遍。


Globalization may occasionally hit speed bumps, such as the current slowdown in world trade; but the underlying technological changes driving interconnectivity will only continue to bring people and countries closer together.	全球化也许偶尔碰壁，比如目前世界贸易的减速，但推动互联性的根本性技术变革必将继续让人和国家走得更近。


Ultimately, this is for the best, because the major challenges we face today are global in nature.	说到底，这是最好不过的，因为当今世界所面临的主要挑战都具有全球性。


Efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change will require consistent global coordination.	遏制气候变化影响的措施需要持之以恒的全球合作。


Even local initiatives, which are increasingly important for addressing the problem, must fit into a framework of converging global policies and obligations.	即使是地方措施——这些措施对于解决问题变得越来越重要——也必须适合让全球政策和义务趋同的框架。


Otherwise, people will not feel as though they are making a difference or contributing to a shared goal, and others will not feel pressure to do anything at all.	否则，人们将不会觉得他们正在让情况变化或贡献于共同目标，而其他人也不会感到压力做出任何贡献。


Another global challenge is taxation, which requires international coordination to stanch rampant avoidance and evasion.	另一个全球挑战是税收，它需要国际合作遏制无孔不入的避税和漏税。


The problem is not just individual “tax havens”; there is also a need to capture corporate profits that companies’ move internationally with complex devices such as “transfer pricing” and “tax-base shifting” to minimize their tax bill.	这个问题不仅仅只是个别“避税港”； 还需要防止公司运用复杂的“转移定价”和“税基改变”等技术进行利润的国际转移从而实现税收最小化。


Disparate tax rules among different countries have resulted in close to a zero-sum game for national governments, which are forced to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies to secure a bigger slice of a shrinking pie.	不同国家各自为政的税收规则导致国家政府间形成一个接近于零和的博弈，政府被迫采取以邻为壑政策确保从日益缩小的蛋糕中获得更大的份额。


Under the current system, countries have strong incentives to offer ever-greater tax advantages to companies operating within their borders, even though they stand just as strong a chance of being undercut by another country as companies shift their declared profits from one jurisdiction to another.	在当前体系下，国家有强烈的激励为在境内经营的公司提供更大的税收优惠，即使极有可能公司将报告利润从一个司法辖区转移到另一个，从而让另一个国家受益。


In most cases, companies are not doing anything illegal by taking advantage of this fragmented system.	在大部分情况下，公司利用这一各自为政的体系绝对合法。


But if countries are serious about reducing inequality and funding pensions and health care for their citizens, they will have to cooperate in global-governance efforts to prioritize fair taxation.	但如果各国认真对待降低不平等性和为公民养老金和医保筹集资金的问题，就必须合作采取全球治理，将公平税收作为重点。


Climate change and taxation are just two issues requiring global coordination, but the list goes on.	气候变化和税收只是需要全球合作的问题的其中两个，而绝不是全部。


The monetary policies of large reserve-currency central banks such as the United States Federal Reserve can have far-reaching spillover effects, as can self-destructive exchange-rate policies or regulations on cross-border financial flows.	大型储备货币央行，如美联储的货币政策可能产生巨大的溢出效应，自我毁灭式的汇率政策或跨境金融流管制亦然。


In most of these cases, the damage runs downstream from large countries to smaller countries; however, if enough small countries are affected, the aggregate damage can flow back to the larger economies themselves, as we’ve seen in the European debt crisis.	在大部分这样的例子中，伤害从大国转移到下游小国； 但是，如果足够多的小国受到影响，总的伤害可能回流到大经济���本身，欧洲债务危机就是明证。


Given the scale of these challenges, we have no choice but to cooperate internationally and strengthen global and regional institutions and frameworks such as the International Monetary Fund, the EU, and the G20, which will meet in Hangzhou, China, next month.	考虑到这些挑战的规模，我们别无选择，只能进行国际合作和加强国际货币基金组织、欧盟、G20等全球和地区机构和框架。 G20将在下个月在中国杭州举行峰会。


But global governance is not an either/or proposition.	但全球治理不是一个要么/要么方案。


When national or local policies are sufficient to address a problem, then they should be pursued.	当国家或地方政策足以解决问题时，也应该采取。


Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity – whereby decision-making should occur at the most local level possible – is crucial to flexible, functioning global governance.	事实上，辅助性原则——决策应该在尽可能地方的层面发生——对于能良好运转的灵活的全球治理至关重要。


The presence of global-governance frameworks should never become an excuse for national or local inaction.	全球治理框架的存在决不能作为国家或地方不作为的借口。


Public policy is a multi-level and multi-channel effort with local, national, regional, and global dimensions.	公共政策是兼具地方、国家、地区和全球维度的多层次和多渠道方案。


Ideally, policy debates should acknowledge this reality.	在理想情况下，政策争论应该承认这一现实。


We also must acknowledge the urgency of shoring up faith in global governance from another perspective.	我们还必须承认从另一个角度巩固全球治理信念的紧迫性。


Across the US, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, a resurgence of identity politics and xenophobic nationalism threatens to reprise the great tragedies of the twentieth century.	纵观美国、亚洲、欧洲和中东，身份政治的复兴和排外民族主义有可能让二十世纪的大悲剧重演。


Against this backdrop, stressing the existence and needs of a global community is necessary not only for economic reasons, but also to help ensure a peaceful world.	在这样的背景下，强调全球社会的存在和需要不但在经济上必要，也是确保和平世界的必要。


The False Economic Promise of Global Governance	全球治理的虚假经济承诺


CAMBRIDGE – Global governance is the mantra of our era’s elite.	坎布里奇——全球治理已经成为我们这个时代精英的口头语。


The surge in cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, and information produced by technological innovation and market liberalization has made the world’s countries too interconnected, their argument goes, for any country to be able to solve its economic problems on its own.	精英们提出，技术创新和市场自由化带来的跨境商品、服务、资金和信息流动激增大大提高了全球国家的关联程度，以至于任何国家都难以依靠自身的力量解决国内经济问题。


We need global rules, global agreements, global institutions.	我们需要设立全球机构，制定全球规则及全球协议。


This claim is so widely accepted today that challenging it may seem like arguing that the sun revolves around the earth.	这样的说法今天普遍为人们所接受，质疑它就像对地球围绕太阳旋转提出质疑。


Yet what may be true for truly global problems such as climate change or health pandemics is not true when it comes to most economic issues.	但适用于气候变化或流行疾病等真正全球问题的规律并不一定适用于多数经济问题。


Contrary to what we often hear, the world economy is not a global commons.	与我们经常听到的不同，世界经济并不属于全球公域。


Global governance can do only limited good – and it occasionally does some damage.	全球治理所能带来的好处有限——而且有时还会造成损失。


What makes, say, climate change a problem that requires global cooperation is that the planet has a single climate system.	气候变化需要全球合作是因为地球仅有单一的气候体系。


It makes no difference where greenhouse gases are emitted.	在哪里排放温室气体都没有任何差异。


So national restrictions on carbon emissions provide no or little benefit at home.	因此国家限制碳排放对国内的好处几乎可以忽略不计。


By contrast, good economic policies – including openness – benefit the domestic economy first and foremost, and the price of bad economic policies is primarily paid domestically as well.	恰恰相反，明智的经济政策——包括开放——首先是要有利于国内经济，承担经济政策不善所付出的代价也同样如此。


Individual countries’ economic fortunes are determined largely by what happens at home rather than abroad.	单个国家的经济命运主要取决于国内情况而非国际局势。


If economic openness is desirable, it is because such policies are in a country’s own self-interest – not because it helps others.	如果经济开放受民众欢迎，主要因为上述政策符合国家自身利益使然——而不是因为这样做能够帮助外界。


Openness and other good policies that contribute to economic stability worldwide rely on self-interest, not on global spirit.	能为全球经济稳定添砖加瓦的开放和其他明智政策并不取决于全球精神，而是取决于自身利益。


Sometimes domestic economic advantage comes at the expense of other countries.	有时，牺牲其他国家利益才能成就国内经济优势。


This is the case of so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policies.	这就是所谓以邻为壑政策的案例。


The purest illustration occurs when a dominant supplier of a natural resource, such as oil, restricts supply on world markets to drive up world prices.	石油等领域占主导地位的自然资源供应商为哄抬价格而限制国际市场资源供应就是最经典的案例。


The exporter’s gain is the rest of the world’s loss.	在这种情况下，出口国的收益就是世界其他国家的损失。


A similar mechanism underpins “optimum tariffs,” whereby a large country manipulates its terms of trade by placing restrictions on its imports.	“最佳关税”背后也存在类似的机制，即大国通过限制进口达到操纵贸易条件的目的。


In such instances, there is a clear argument for global rules that limit or prohibit the use of such policies.	在这样的情况下，实行限制或禁止运用上述政策的全球规则理由显然非常充分。


But the vast majority of the issues in world trade and finance that preoccupy policymakers are not of this kind.	但困扰决策者的绝大多数世界贸易和金融问题并不属于此类。


Consider, for example, Europe’s agricultural subsidies and ban on genetically modified organisms, the abuse of antidumping rules in the United States, or inadequate protection of investors’ rights in developing countries.	这方面的例子有欧洲农业补贴、对转基因生物禁令、美国滥用反倾销规则或发展中国家未能充分保护投资者权益。


These are essentially “beggar thyself” policies.	这些基本上都属于“风险自担”政策。


Their economic costs are borne primarily at home, even though they may produce adverse effects for others as well.	由此产生的经济代价主要由国内民众承担，即使此类政策可能同时对别国民众产生不利的影响。


For example, economists generally agree that agricultural subsidies are inefficient and that the benefits to European farmers come at large costs to everyone else in Europe, in the form of high prices, high taxes, or both.	举例来说，经济学家普遍认为农业补贴十分低效，高价格高税收或二者兼备导致欧洲农民受益的同时损害了其他所有人的利益。


Such policies are deployed not to extract advantages from other countries, but because other competing domestic objectives – distributional, administrative, or related to public health – dominate economy-wide motives.	这样的政策部署不是为了从其他国家那里占取好处，而是因为分配、管理或与公共健康相关的其他矛盾的国内目标主宰了整个经济动机。


The same is true of poor banking regulations or macroeconomic policies that aggravate the business cycle and generate financial instability.	加剧经济周期和造成金融动荡的糟糕的银行法规和宏观经济政策也同样如此。


As the 2008 global financial crisis showed, the implications beyond a country’s own borders can be momentous.	2008年全球金融危机表明超越一国边界的经济溢出效应可能无法忽视。


But if US regulators fell asleep on the job, it was not because their economy benefited while everyone else paid the price.	但如果美国监管机构未能尽职尽责地完成监管工作，原因并不是因为别国经济受损而美国经济受益。


The US economy was among those that suffered most.	美国本身就是受害最重的经济体之一。


Perhaps the biggest policy letdown of our day is the failure of governments in advanced democracies to address rising inequality.	我们这个时代最大的经济失策或许是发达民主国家政府未能解决不平等日益扩大的问题。


This, too, has its roots in domestic politics – financial and business elites’ grip on the policymaking process and the narratives they have spun about the limits of redistributive policies.	其根源同样来源于国内政治——具体而言，是金融和商业精英控制决策过程以及他们胡编乱造的有关再分配政策的限制。


To be sure, global tax havens are an example of beggar-thy-neighbor policies.	可以肯定，全球避税天堂就是以邻为壑政策的例子。


But powerful countries such as the US and European Union members could have done much on their own to limit tax evasion – and the race to the bottom in corporate taxation – if they so desired.	但只要他们愿意，美国和欧盟等大国原本有能力采取更多限制避税——和竞相减免企业税的措施。


So the problems of our day have little to do with a lack of global cooperation.	因此我们今天的问题与全球合作的缺失并没有什么关系。


They are domestic in nature and cannot be fixed by rule making through international institutions, which are easily overwhelmed by the same vested interests that undermine domestic policy.	今天的问题本质上是国内问题，因此不能通过国际机构制定规则来加以解决，更何况破坏国内政策的那些既得利益能够轻易影响所谓的国际体系。


Too often, global governance is another name for the pursuit of these interests’ global agenda, which is why it ends up mainly furthering globalization and harmonizing domestic economic policies.	全球治理往往只是保护既得利益全球计划的代名词，也正因如此，它所起到的主要作用是在推进全球化的同时协调国内经济政策。


An alternative agenda for global governance would focus on improving how democracies function at home, without prejudging what the policy outputs ought to be.	全球治理替代计划不预判会产生何种政策效果，而是专注改善民主制度的国内运作问题。


This would be a democracy-enhancing rather than globalization-enhancing model of global governance.	这是一种侧重于强化民主国家而非全球化的全球治理模式。


What I have in mind is the creation of global norms and procedural requirements designed to enhance the quality of domestic policymaking.	我认为应当制定旨在提高国内决策质量的全球规则和程序要求。


Global disciplines pertaining to transparency, broad representation, accountability, and use of scientific or economic evidence in domestic proceedings – without constraining the end result – are examples of such requirements.	与透明度、广泛代表性、问责制和在国内诉讼中使用科学或经济证据等相关的全球纪律——只要不限制最终结果——都是上述规定的实例。


Global institutions already use disciplines of this type to some extent.	全球机构已经在某种程度上采纳了这种类型的纪律。


For example, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) explicitly requires the use of scientific evidence when health concerns are at issue for imported goods.	比方说，世贸组织的卫生及植物检疫措施应用协议（SPS协议）明确要求在进口商品涉及健康问题时须出示科学的证据。


Procedural rules of this kind can be used much more extensively and to greater effect to improve domestic decision-making.	这种类型的程序性规则可以很大程度上更好地扩大应用，以改进国内的决策程序。


Anti-dumping rules can also be improved by requiring that consumer and producer interests that would be adversely affected by import duties take part in domestic proceedings.	此外我们还可以要求受进口关税不利影响的消费者和生产者参与国内诉讼来改进反倾销规则。


Subsidy rules can be improved by requiring economic cost-benefit analyses that incorporate potential consequences for both static and dynamic efficiency.	我们可以借助包含静态和动态效率潜在后果的经济成本效益分析来改进补贴规则。


Problems rooted in failures of domestic deliberation can be solved only through improved democratic decision-making.	只有通过改进民主决策进程才能解决国内审议所带来的问题。


Global governance can make only a very limited contribution here – and only if it focuses on enhancing domestic decision-making rather than constraining it.	全球治理在此只能起到非常有限的作用——而且起作用的前提是它促进国内决策而不是对其加以限制。


Otherwise, the goal of global governance embodies a yearning for technocratic solutions that override and undercut public deliberation.	否则，全球治理目标就包含一种对技术专家方案的渴望，这样的方案只会践踏并削弱公众审议。


The Global Growth Funk	全球增长恐慌


NEW YORK – The International Monetary Fund and others have recently revised downward their forecasts for global growth – yet again.	纽约—国际货币基金组织（IMF）和其他机构最近调低了全球增长预测——又一次这么干了。


Little wonder: The world economy has few bright spots – and many that are dimming rapidly.	毫不奇怪：世界经济几乎没有亮点——并且许多方面在迅速恶化。


Among advanced economies, the United States has just experienced two quarters of growth averaging 1%.	发达经济体中，美国前两季度增长率平均只有1%。


Further monetary easing has boosted a cyclical recovery in the eurozone, though potential growth in most countries remains well below 1%.	进一步货币宽松刺激了欧元区周期性复苏，但大部分国家潜在增长率仍显著低于1%。


In Japan, “Abenomics” is running out of steam, with the economy slowing since mid-2015 and now close to recession.	在日本，“安倍经济学”动力告急，2015年年中以来的经济减速眼看就要演变为衰退。


In the United Kingdom, uncertainty surrounding the June referendum on continued European Union membership is leading firms to keep hiring and capital spending on hold.	在英国，围绕6月是否继续保留欧盟成员资格的全民公决的不确定性导致企业冻结了招聘和资本支出。


And other advanced economies – such as Canada, Australia, Norway – face headwinds from low commodity prices.	而其他发达经济体——如加拿大、澳大利亚和挪威——面临大宗商品价格低迷的不利局面。


Things are not much better in most emerging economies.	新兴经济体的情况也好不到哪里去。


Among the five BRICS countries, two (Brazil and Russia) are in recession, one (South Africa) is barely growing, another (China) is experiencing a sharp structural slowdown, and India is doing well only because – in the words of its central bank governor, Raghuram Rajan – in the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.	在金砖五国中，两国（巴西和俄罗斯）进入了衰退，一国（南非）几乎没有增长，另一国（中国）正在经历急剧的结构性减速，而印度表现出色只是因为——用其央行行长拉古兰·拉詹（Raghuram Rajan）的话说——在瞎子王国，独眼龙就可以称王。


Many other emerging markets have slowed since 2013 as well, owing to weak external conditions, economic fragility (stemming from loose monetary, fiscal, and credit policies in the good years), and, often, a move away from market-oriented reforms and toward variants of state capitalism.	许多其他新兴市场自2013年以来也经历了衰退，原因是外部环境疲软、经济脆弱（拜好光景年份宽松的货币、财政和信用政策所赐），以及（常常）从市场改革转向各种国家资本主义。


Worse, potential growth has also fallen in both advanced and emerging economies.	更糟糕的是，发达和新兴经济体的潜在增长也有所下降。


For starters, high levels of private and public debt are constraining spending – especially growth-enhancing capital spending, which fell (as a share of GDP) after the global financial crisis and has not recovered to pre-crisis levels.	首先，高企的私人和公共债务水平约束着支出——特别是刺激增长的资本支出，其占GDP之比自全球金融危机后大幅下降，至今仍未收复失地。


That falloff in investment implies slower productivity growth, while aging populations in developed countries – and now in an increasing number of emerging markets (for example, China, Russia, and Korea) – reduce the labor input in production.	这一投资下降意味着更缓慢的生产率增长，而与此同时，发达国家的老龄化——现在越来越多的新兴市场（如中国、俄罗斯和韩国）也是如此——降低了投入生产的劳动力。


The rise in income and wealth inequality exacerbates the global saving glut (which is the counterpart of the global investment slump).	收入和财富不平等性的加剧了全球储蓄过剩（对应全球投资暴跌）。


As income is redistributed from labor to capital, it flows from those who have a higher marginal propensity to spend (low- and middle-income households) to those who have a higher marginal propensity to save (high-income households and corporations).	收入从劳动力手中通过再分配流入资本手中，也从边际支出倾向更高的群体（中低收入家庭）流入边际储蓄倾向更高的群体（高收入家庭和公司）。


Moreover, a protracted cyclical slump can lead to lower trend growth.	此外，漫长的周期性下跌可能导致更低的趋势增长率。


Economists call this “hysteresis”: Long-term unemployment erodes workers’ skills and human capital; and, because innovation is embedded in new capital goods, low investment leads to permanently lower productivity growth.	经济学家称之为“滞回”（hysteresis）：长期失业侵蚀工人技能和人力资本； 而由于创新总是伴随新资本商品，因此低投资导致生产率增长的持久性下降。


Finally, with so many factors dragging down potential growth, structural reforms are needed to boost potential growth.	最后，如此多的因素拖累着潜在增长，因此需要结构改革提振潜在增长。


But such reforms are occurring at suboptimal rates in both advanced and emerging economies, because all of the costs and dislocations are frontloaded, while the benefits occur over the medium and long term.	但发达国家和新兴经济体的结构改革都远低于最优水平，因为结构改革的成本和混乱是前置的，而收益要到中期和长期才能显现。


This gives opponents of reform a political advantage.	这就让反对改革者占了政治上风。


Meanwhile, actual growth remains below the diminished potential.	与此同时，实际增长仍低于受抑制的潜在增长。


A painful deleveraging process implies that private and public spending need to fall, and that savings must rise, to reduce high deficits and debts.	痛苦的去杠杆化过程意味着私人和公共支出需要下降，而储蓄必须上升，以降低高企的赤字和债务。


This process started in the US after the housing bust, then spread to Europe, and is now ongoing in emerging markets that spent the last decade on a borrowing binge.	这一过程始于房地产泡沫破裂后的美国，然后传播到欧洲，现在则正在过去十年依靠借贷狂欢大肆支出的新兴市场进行。


At the same time, the policy mix has not been ideal.	与此同时，政策组合也不理想。


With most advanced economies pivoting too quickly to fiscal retrenchment, the burden of reviving growth was placed almost entirely on unconventional monetary policies, which have diminishing returns (if not counter-productive effects).	大部分发达经济体过快地将重心转移到财政紧缩，重振经济增长的负担几乎一股脑儿全部压在了非常规货币政策身上，而这些政策的回报是递减的（甚至会产生不利于生产的副作用）。


Asymmetric adjustment between debtor and creditor economies has also undermined growth.	债务经济体和债权经济体之间的不对称调整也破坏了增长。


The former, having overspent and under-saved, had to spend less and save more when markets forced them to do so, whereas the latter were not forced to spend more and save less.	前者支出过度，储蓄不足，必须在市场迫使它们这么做时减少支出增加储蓄，而后者没有被迫增加支出减少储蓄。


This exacerbated the global savings glut and global investment slump.	这加剧了全球储蓄过剩和全球投资减少。


Finally, hysteresis further weakened actual growth.	最后，滞回进一步削弱了实际增长。


A cyclical slump reduced potential growth, and the reduction in potential growth prospects led to further cyclical weakness, as spending declines when expectations are revised downward.	周期性下降拉低了潜在增长，而潜在增长前景的下降导致进一步周期性疲软，因为当预期调低时，支出也下降了。


There are no politically easy solutions to the global economy’s current quandary.	对于当前全球经济的困境，没有政治上易行的方案。


Unsustainably high debt should be reduced in a rapid and orderly fashion, to avoid a long and protracted (often a decade or longer) deleveraging process.	不可持续的找债务必须迅速有序地降低，以避免长期而漫长（常常达到十年或更长）的去杠杆过程。


But orderly debt-reduction mechanisms are not available for sovereign countries and are politically difficult to implement within countries for households, firms, and financial institutions.	但有序减债机制对于主权国家来说难以获得，在政治上也难以为了国内家庭、企业和金融机构实施。


Likewise, structural and market-oriented reforms are necessary to boost potential growth.	类似地，结构和市场改革是提振潜在增长的必要条件。


But, given the timing of costs and benefits, such measures are especially unpopular if an economy is already in a slump.	但是，考虑到成本和收益的时间特征，当经济已经处于衰退时，这些措施特别不受支持。


It will be no less difficult to leave behind unconventional monetary policies, as the US Federal Reserve recently suggested by signaling that it will normalize policy interest rates more slowly than expected.	退出非常规货币政策的困难性也不遑多让，美联储最近放风将比预期更加缓慢地实现政策利率正常化证明了这一点。


Meanwhile, fiscal policy – especially productive public investment that boosts both the demand and supply sides – remains hostage to high debts and misguided austerity, even in countries with the financial capacity to undertake a slower consolidation.	与此同时，财政政策——特别是同时刺激需求端和供给端的生产性公共投资——仍被高债务和受误导的紧缩掣肘，即使是有融资能力放缓整固速度的国家也是如此。


Thus, for the time being, we are likely to remain in what the IMF calls the “new mediocre,” Larry Summers calls “secular stagnation,” and the Chinese call the “new normal.”	因此，如今我们可能仍处于IMF所谓的“新平庸”（new mediocre）、拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）所谓的“长期停滞”和中国人所谓的“新常态”中。


But make no mistake: There is nothing normal or healthy about economic performance that is increasing inequality and, in many countries, leading to a populist backlash – both on the right and the left – against trade, globalization, migration, technological innovation, and market-oriented policies.	但不要搞错了：增加不确定性并在许多国家导致民粹主义——不管是左翼还是右翼——攻讦贸易、全球化、移民、技术创新和市场经济政策的经济表现绝对不正常、不健康。


Global Imbalances without Tears	简单易懂的全球不平衡


CAMBRIDGE – Doctors have long known that it is not just how much you eat, but what you eat, that contributes to or diminishes your health.	发自剑桥——医生们早就意识到决定一个人健康状况的并不是你吃了多少，而是你吃了什么。


Likewise, economists have long noted that for countries gorging on capital inflows, there is a big difference between debt instruments and equity-like investments, including both stocks and foreign direct investment.	同理，经济学家也早就知道对那些充斥着大量资本流入的国家来说，债务工具和权益类投资（包括证券与外国直接投资在内）是大不相同的。


So, with policymakers and pundits railing against sustained oversized trade imbalances, we need to recognize that the real problems are rooted in excessive concentrations of debt.	因此，当政策制定者及学者们对持续过大的贸易不平衡状况口诛笔伐之时，我们需要意识到真正的问题其实是来自于比例过高的债务。


If G-20 governments stood back and asked themselves how to channel a much larger share of the imbalances into equity-like instruments, the global financial system that emerged just might be a lot more robust than the crisis-prone system that we have now.	如果20国集团（G20）政府能跳出迷局并自问如何才能将不平衡中的更大部分变成权益类工具，那么因此而产生的全球金融系统将比我们目前这个危机重重的系统更加健全可靠。


Unfortunately, we are very far from the idealized world in which financial markets efficiently share risk.	不幸的是，我们距离这个金融市场有效分担风险的理想世界还很远。


Of the roughly $200 trillion in global financial assets today, almost three-quarters are in some kind of debt instrument, including bank loans, corporate bonds, and government securities.	在当今大概200万亿的全球金融总资产之中，约有3/4都是各种形式的债务工具，包括银行贷款，企业债券以及政府债券。


The derivatives market certainly helps spread risk more widely than this superficial calculation implies, but the basic point stands.	与这个粗略的计算相比，金融衍生品市场当然会将风险变得更加分散，但基本情况还是不变的。


Certainly, there are some good economic reasons why lenders have such an insatiable appetite for debt.	当然也有一些合理的经济理由去证明领导人们为何如此热衷于债务。


Imperfect information and difficulties in monitoring firms pose significant obstacles to idealized risk-sharing instruments.	信息不充分以及监管企业方面的困难都为理想的风险分散手段制造了相当大的阻碍。


But policy-induced distortions also play an enormous role.	但政策所导致的扭曲也扮演了一个重大角色。


Many countries’ tax systems hugely favor debt over equity.	许多国家的税收系统极大地偏袒债务而非权益。


The housing boom in the United States might never have reached the proportions that it did if homeowners had been unable to treat interest payments on home loans as a tax deduction.	如果购房者无法将需要向房屋贷款支付的利息当作减税的话，美国的房市繁荣根本就无法达到曾经的那个高度。


Corporations are allowed to deduct interest payments on bonds, but stock dividends are effectively taxed at the both the corporate and the individual level.	企业也被允许减免为债券所支付的利息，但股票分红无论是在企业还是个人方面都要被征税。


Central banks and finance ministries are also complicit, since debt gets bailed out far more aggressively than equity does.	中央银行和财政部也是狼狈为奸，因为对债务的救助要比权益多得多。


But, contrary to populist rhetoric, it is not just rich, well-connected bondholders who get bailed out. Many small savers place their savings in so-called money-market funds that pay a premium over ordinary federally insured deposits.	但对此民粹主义者的说辞也有误，因为不仅那些富有且有政界人脉的债权人受到了救助，还有许多将其储蓄投资于那些提供比普通联邦担保存款回报更高的所谓货币市场基金的小储户也得到了救助。


Shouldn’t they expect to face risk?	难道这些人就不应该面对风险吗？


Yet a critical moment in the crisis came when, shortly after the mid-September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, a money-market fund “broke the buck” and couldn’t pay 100 cents on the dollar. Of course, it was bailed out along with all the other money-market funds.	但危机中的一个关键的时刻恰好就在雷曼兄弟在2008年9月中旬破产的不久之后到来，一个货币市场基金净资产价值跌到每股1美元以下，当然它也和其他货币市场基金那样得到了救助。


I am not advocating a return to the early Middle Ages, when Church usury laws forbade interest on loans.	我并非鼓吹要回到中世纪早期，当时教堂制定的一系列贷款法律都禁��收取贷款利息。


Back then, financial-market participants had to devise fantastic schemes and contortions to disguise interest payments.	在那时候，金融市场参与者们必须策划出精妙的计划和托辞来隐瞒利息的支付。


Yet today the pendulum has arguably swung too far in the opposite direction.	但今天钟摆又向另一个方向摆动了太远。


Perhaps scholars who argue that Islamic financial systems’ prohibition on interest generates massive inefficiencies ought to be looking at these systems for positive ideas that Western policymakers might adopt.	或许那些认为禁止收取利息的伊斯兰金融系统极大导致了低效率的学者们应该找出该系统的积极一面，以供西方政策制定者采纳。


Unfortunately, overcoming the deeply ingrained debt bias in rich-world financial systems will not be easy.	但不幸的是，改变发达国家金融系统对债务根深蒂固的偏好是非常不容易的。


In the US, for example, no politician is anxious to say that home-mortgage deductions should be eliminated, or that dividend payments should be tax-free.	比如说在美国，没有政治家乐意宣称房屋抵押贷款减税政策应该被取消，或是分红所得应该免税。


Likewise, developing countries should accelerate the pace of economic reform, and equity markets in too many emerging economies are like the Wild West, with unclear rules and lax enforcement.	同样，发展中国家应当加快金融改革进程，而许多新兴经济体的权益市场简直就像当年无法无天的美国西部，既缺乏明确规则，法规的执行也相当松懈。


Worse still, even as the G-20 talks about finding a “fix” for global imbalances, some of the policy changes that its members have adopted are arguably exacerbating them.	更糟糕的是，即便G20商讨如何去“修补”全球不平衡，其中一些成员国所采用的新政策实际上却使之更加恶化了。


For example, we now have a super-size International Monetary Fund, whose lending capacity has been tripled, to roughly $750 billion.	比如说我们如今拥有一个特大的国际货币基金组织，其借款能力已经增长了3倍，达到7500亿美元。


Europe has similarly expanded its regional bailout facility.	欧洲同样也扩大其区域性救助机制。


These funds may prove to be an effective short-term salve, but, over the long run, they will likely fuel moral-hazard problems, and potentially plant the seeds of deeper crises in the future.	这些基金在短期内可能会是良药，但长期来说它们将滋生某些道德危险方面的问题，并为更深刻的危机埋下伏笔。


A better approach would be to create a mechanism for orchestrating orderly sovereign default, both to minimize damage when crises do occur, and to discourage lenders from assuming that taxpayers’ money will solve all major problems.	一个更好的方法将则是建立一个精心设计的主权违约机制，一方面减少危机的破坏，另一方面也防止借款人觉得能靠纳税人的钱来解决所有大麻烦。


The IMF proposed exactly such a mechanism in 2001, and a similar idea has been discussed more recently for the eurozone.	世界货币基金组织早在2001年已经提出了这个机制，欧元区国家最近也讨论了类似的理念。


Unfortunately, however, ideas for debt-restructuring mechanisms remain just that: purely theoretical constructs.	但不幸的是，债务重建机制的理念依然还停留在纯理论层面。


In the meantime, the IMF and the G-20 can help by finding better ways to assess the vulnerability of each country’s financial structure – no easy task, given governments’ immense cleverness when it comes to cooking their books.	与此同时，世界货币基金组织和G20可以研究更有效的方式去评估各国金融架构的脆弱程度——考虑到政府在捏造数据方面的天赋，该任务堪称艰巨。


Policymakers can also help find ways to reduce barriers to the development of stock markets, and to advance ideas for new kinds of state-contingent bonds, such as the GDP-linked bonds that Yale’s Robert Shiller has proposed. (Shiller bonds, in theory, pay more when a country’s economy is growing and less when it is in recession.)	政治制定者们也可以想办法减少阻碍证券市场发展的障碍，并创设一些新的状态依存性债券，比如说耶鲁大学的罗伯特·希勒所提出的与GDP挂钩的债券（理论上，希勒的这种债券在一个国家经济繁荣时支付较多，不景气时则支付较少）。


Of course, even if the composition of international capital flows can be changed, there are still many good reasons to try to reduce global imbalances.	当然，即便国际资本流入的组成成分可以改变，但依然还是有很大的必要去减少全球不平衡。


An asset diet rich in equities and direct investment and low in debt cannot substitute for other elements of fiscal and financial health.	一个权益和直接投资占大部分，债务占小部分的资产组合依然无法取代其他有助于财政和金融稳健的因素。


But our current unwholesome asset diet is an important component of risk, one that has received far too little attention in the policy debate.	但我们目前这种不健康的资产组合则是风险的一个重要组成部分，也是一个常常被政策讨论所忽视的事实。


The State of Global Poverty	全球贫困状态


WASHINGTON, DC – The economic geography of the world is changing.	华盛顿—世界经济地理正在改变。 欧元区面临又一轮停滞；


The eurozone faces the specter of another round of stagnation; Japan has slipped into recession; and the United States, despite relatively strong performance in the latter part of 2014, has raised concerns worldwide with its exit from quantitative easing.	日本已经滑入衰退； 美国今年下半年经济表现相对较为强劲，但其推出量化宽松的决定让全世界担心不已。


Meanwhile, emerging economies have continued to perform well.	与此同时，新兴经济体继续表现出众。


India and Indonesia are growing at more than 5% per year; Malaysia at 6%; and China by more than 7%.	印度和印度尼西亚年增长率超过5%； 马来西亚达到6%，中国超过7%。


The scale of the global change can be seen when purchasing power parity (PPP) – a measure of the total amount of goods and services that a dollar can buy in each country – is taken into account.	若将购买力平价（PPP）考虑在内，全球变化的规模更加可见一斑。


According to the figures for 2011, released last year, India is now the world’s third largest economy in terms of PPP-adjusted GDP, ahead of Germany and Japan.	根据今年早些时候发布的2011年数据，按经PPP调整的GDP衡量，印度目前已是世界第三大经济集体，超过了德国和日本。


The data also revealed that China would overtake the US as the world’s largest economy in PPP terms sometime in 2014 – a shift that, according to our estimates, occurred on October 10th.	数据还表明中国将在今年某个时候超过美国成为PPP标准的世界第一大经济体——从我们的估计看，这个时候就在今年10月10日。


Despite this progress, a large proportion of people in developing countries remain desperately poor.	尽管取得了如此进步，但发展中国家的大量人口仍处于极端贫困。


Globally, the poverty line is defined as a daily income of $1.25, adjusted for PPP – a line that many criticize as shockingly low.	全球贫困线为日收入1. 25美元（经PPP调整），这一标准被许多人批为低到令人震惊。


But what is truly shocking is that nearly one billion people – including more than 80% of the populations of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Liberia, and Burundi – live below it.	但真正令人震惊的是有近十亿人——包括民主刚果、马达加斯加、利比里亚和布隆迪80%以上的人口——生活在这条线以下。


One reason global poverty has been so intractable is that it remains largely out of sight for those who are not living it, safely somebody else’s problem.	全球贫困问题之所以如此棘手，一个原因是它很少受到非生活在贫困中的人的关注，它只是别人的问题。


The fact that most participants in discussions about global poverty – the readers of this commentary included – know few, if any, people who live below the poverty line is an indication of the extent of the world’s economic segregation.	大部分全球贫困问题讨论的参与者——包括这篇评论的读者——很少或根本不认识生活在贫困线以下的人，这正是世界经济分裂程度的一个写照。


If poverty were communicable, its incidence would be far lower by now.	如果贫困问题能得到宣传，贫困率应该比现在低得多。


Fortunately, a chorus of voices, not just from civil-society groups, but also from international organizations, has given rise to a global movement to end poverty.	幸运的是，越来越多的异口同声——不仅来自公民社会团体，也来自国际组织——已经燃起了一场终结贫困的全球运动。


There is now a growing consensus that global poverty is not just a problem of the poor.	越来越多的人达成共识，全球贫困不仅仅是穷人的问题。


Though moral outrage is important, it is not enough when it comes to crafting policy.	尽管道德愤怒很重要，但并不足以左右政策。


Policymakers need data and, equally important, the ability to analyze it.	决策者需要数据以及——同样重要的——分析数据的能力。


The first task is to distinguish between what is feasible and what is not.	第一个任务是区分可行和不可行。


For example, some have proposed including the provision of employment for all adults in the Millennium Development Goals’ successor framework, which is to be unveiled this year.	比如，有人建议在千年发展目标的后继框架（将于2015年启动）中写入为所有成年人提供就业这一目标。


This is an impossible target.	这是不可能实现的目标。


All economies of any reasonable size will have some unemployment.	任何上规模的经济体都会存在一些失业情况。


In fact, a limited amount of unemployment can help to promote development.	事实上，有限的失业有助于促进发展。


To declare “employment” a right is to divest the word “right” of its meaning.	将“就业”作为一项权利违背了“权利”一词的含义。


Next, there must be recognition that economies are complex and interconnected.	其次，必须认识到经济体是复杂并且相互联系的。


Consider, for example, a government policy in which subsidies, funded with newly printed money, are handed out to residents of 1,000 villages.	比如，考虑一项政府政策，其中的补贴以印钞为资金来源，对象为1,000个村庄的村民。


This will not necessarily be a boon for the economy as a whole.	对整体经济来说，这未必是件好事。


Injecting money might improve the living standards in the villages receiving the funds, but doing so may well drive up the cost of food throughout the country, causing residents of non-subsidized villages to fall into poverty.	注入资金可能会改善获得补贴的村庄的生活水平，但也会大大推高整个国家的食品成本，导致无补贴村庄的村民陷入贫困。


The macroeconomic impact of micro-interventions is an important reason why poverty has persisted, despite well-meaning interventions to combat it.	微观干预的宏观经济影响是贫困之所以持续的一个重要原因，尽管干预的初衷是对抗贫困。


Another reason poverty endures is persistent – and, in many places, widening – inequality.	另一个贫困持续存在的原因是持久——在许多地方还在不断扩大——的不平等性。


The current level of global inequality is unconscionable.	当前全球不平等性水平已经令人难以接受。


In 2013, the World Bank, where I am Chief Economist, helped bring the term “shared prosperity” into everyday discourse by declaring, for the first time, that every society should make progress toward this goal its mission.	2013年，由我担任首席经济学家的世界银行首次宣布，所有社会都应该将迈向“共享繁荣”的目标作为使命，“共享繁荣”一词也成为热门词汇。


To be sure, there will always be a certain amount of inequality in the world; in fact, as with unemployment, a limited amount is desirable as a driver of competition and growth.	诚然，世界总会有一定程度的不平等性存在； 事实上，和失业一样，有限程度的不平等是值得追求的，它可以推动竞争和增长。


But the deep and pervasive inequality that exists today can only be condemned.	但是，今天所存在的深度、普遍的不平等必须谴责。


According to some back-of-the-envelope calculations, the wealth of the world’s 50 richest people totals $1.5 trillion, equivalent to 175% of Indonesia’s GDP, or a little more than Japan’s foreign-exchange reserves.	简单计算就可知道，世界最富有的50人总共拥有1. 5万亿美元，相当于印尼GDP的175%，略高于日本的外汇储备。


If one assumes that this wealth yields 8% per year, the annual income of the world’s 50 wealthiest people is close to the total income of the poorest one billion – in other words, those living below the poverty line.	如果假设这笔财富每年产生8%的收益率，那么世界最富有的50人的年收入就接近于最贫穷的十亿人（即生活在贫困线以下的人）的总和。


This is a collective failure.	这是全人类的失败。


As 2015 begins, we must consider policies and interventions to curb such extreme inequality.	随着2015年的临近，我们必须考虑采取政策和干预遏制这一极端不平等。


We must do this not only out of a sense of justice, but also because, in a world afflicted with such extreme disparities, its poorest residents lose their voice, even when they have the right to vote.	我们必须这样做，这不仅是出于正义精神，也是因为，在一个受极端不公折磨的世界中，最贫困居民根本无从发出声音，即使他们拥有投票权。


Extreme inequality is, ultimately, an assault on democracy.	说到底，极端贫困是对民主的攻击。


Who Should Lead International Institutions?	谁有资格领导国际机构？


OXFORD – The United Nations is seeking a new secretary-general. The World Bank presidency is up for grabs.	发自牛津——联合国正在甄选下一任秘书长，世界银行行长的职位正虚位以待，而世界卫生组织也在物色一位新带头人，其他一些国际组织也面临着类似的状况。


The same goes for several other international organizations. At a time when conflicts of interest among the United States and its allies, together with the rise of China and Russia, are undermining global cooperation, the question of who fills these vacancies could not be more important.	在这个美国及其盟国之间的利益冲突伴随着中国和俄罗斯的崛起一道破坏全球合作的时代，最重要的问题莫过于该有谁来填补这些空缺。


In the past, the process of selecting the right candidate has reflected rivalries among countries and popularity contests played out among governments, NGOs, and the media.	在过去，选择合适候选人的过程反映了各国之间的竞争以及哪些人在各国政府，非政府组织和媒体眼中最受欢迎的拉票角逐。


This was clearly never the best approach. But, with a hegemonic United States willing and able to hold international institutions together, cooperation remained viable.	虽然这显然不是最好的办法，幸而一家独大的美国愿意且能够把这些国际机构拧成一股绳，使得各方依然能实现合作。


Today, the unpredictable statements of US presidential candidate Donald Trump and the more isolationist vision that he is encouraging among his supporters has the rest of the world nervous about the changing nature of America’s role in the world.	如今，美国总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普捉摸不定的言论及其在支持者中鼓吹的进一步孤立主义立场令全球其他国家紧张不已，担心美国在世界上扮演的角色发生剧变。


And America’s allies in Europe are not exactly at their most stable, owing to a combination of deep-rooted economic challenges, the United Kingdom’s looming exit from the European Union, and surging support for populist political forces in many countries.	而深层次的经济挑战，英国脱欧日期的临近以及各国民粹主义政治力量的日益膨胀也让美国在欧洲盟国陷于风雨飘摇的状态，。


Moreover, the US and its allies are not only unwilling to underpin global cooperation, they lack the capacity even to try.	此外，美国及其盟国不仅缺乏巩固全球合作的意愿，甚至连去尝试的能力都没有。


The International Monetary Fund’s recent World Economic Outlook reports that the US and its allies will account for just 39% of global output in 2020, down sharply from 64% today, with the US share falling from 22% to 15%.	国际货币基金组织在最近发表的《世界经济展望》中指出，美国及其盟国占全球总产出的比值将从目前的64%大幅降至2020年的39％，而其中美国所占的份额也将从当前的22％降到15％。


For the international institutions, this means that communication, compromise, and consensus are more important than ever – and not just among countries.	对于各大国际机构来说，这意味着相互之间进行沟通，达成妥协和共识的意义要比以往任何时候都更加重要——过去人们总觉得这只是国家之间的事情。


Given strong anti-establishment and even nationalist sentiment in many countries, international institutions must also be more open with – and responsive to – the global public that they are supposed to serve.	鉴于许多国家中涌现出大量反建制甚至民族主义情绪，国际机构也必须对他们致力于服务的全球公众持有更加开放（和殷切）的态度。


All of this demands a more meritocratic and unbiased approach to filling the top positions at the international institutions.	所有这一切都需要一个更加任人唯才及公正的方式来填补在各大国际机构的最高职位空缺。


To assess the candidates fairly and effectively, five key criteria should be used.	而为了能公正有效地评估候选人，应推行下列五个关键标准。


First, candidates should have a proven ability not just to define a mission, but also to take on the more challenging task of mobilizing a broad coalition of stakeholders to achieve it.	首先，候选人应该有证明自己能力不仅限于界定一个任务，还要承担更具挑战性的部分——组织动员一个广泛的利益相关者联盟来实现它。


UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, for example, had little trouble identifying critical issues, from specific humanitarian crises in countries like Haiti, Myanmar, and Pakistan to broader challenges like climate change and global poverty. But his success in spurring countries to work together to address those issues is dubious.	例如联合国秘书长潘基文在界定关键问题方面的能力无可指摘——从海地、缅甸、巴基斯坦等国的人道主义危机到气候变化和全球贫困这类更广泛挑战等等，但他在促进各国共同努力解决这些问题方面的成效是让人生疑的。


Second, leaders must be able to persuade countries to fund their organizations.	其次，领导者必须能够说服各国去资助他们的组织。 前非洲开发银行行长唐纳德·P·卡贝鲁卡（Donald P.


Former African Development Bank President Donald P. Kaberuka convinced countries to double their contributions during his tenure; during the same cycle, the World Bank’s resources were increased by just one-third.	Kaberuka）就成功说服各国在他任职期间将资助数目增加了一倍； 而在同一时期，世界银行获得的资源仅增长了1/3。


But it is not just a matter of getting more money.	但这仅仅是搞到更多钱的问题。


Organizations need to focus on expanding their core resources, which are not tied to any specific task, rather than drawing more discretionary or earmarked resources.	组织需要把重点放在扩大其不依赖于任何特定任务的核心资源，而不是吸引更多的委托或预留项目资源。


Otherwise, they risk becoming hired hands for a few pet projects, rather than critical platforms for broad cooperation.	否则，他们就有可能沦为几个小型附属项目的雇工而无法成长成为实现广泛合作的重要平台。


Unfortunately, in recent years, discretionary funding has largely taken over, and now accounts for more than 90% of resources in several agencies.	不幸的是，近几年来全权委托资金已经在很大程度上接管了整个系统，已经占到了几大机构资金来源的90％以上。


The International Organization for Migration, the importance of which has been underscored by the ongoing refugee crisis, relies entirely on discretionary funding.	在当前难民危机中凸显出其重要性的国际移民组织就完全依赖全权委托资金运作。


To change this, international organizations need leaders who are convincing salespeople, which means that they must be widely perceived as genuine and trustworthy.	要改变这一状况，各国际组织就需要一个能扮演可信推销员角色的领导，这意味着他们必须被广泛认为是诚实且值得信赖的。


The third criterion for effective leadership of an international institution is strong, results-oriented management.	国际机构高效领导者的第三个标准是强势且以结果为导向的管理风格。


Successful candidates should already have experience leading an organization that performed well, achieving the results they set out to achieve.	合适的候选人应该具备领导某���构的经验且该机构运行良好，完全实现他们最初设定的目标。


There should be evidence that the candidate can translate a vision into a plan, with clear benchmarks against which progress can be measured.	应该有切实的证据表明候选人有能力将愿景转化为计划并订立衡量项目进展的明确基准点。


The current slates of candidates is wanting in this regard.	对最近这批国际机构候选人来说这方面的能力尤为重要。


This can have far-reaching consequences.	这将产生深远的影响。


World Bank President Jim Yong Kim has faced substantial criticism for his handling of his flagship initiative: an internal restructuring.	世界银行行长金勇（Jim Yong Kim）就因为在处理其核心举措——世行内部重组项目——方面表现不力而饱受批评。


That process has dragged on for four years, and many staff members claim that it is undermining the efficiency of lending operations.	这一过程已经拖了四年，而许多工作人员也声称该项目拖低了贷款运作的效率。


While it is difficult to assess these claims reliably, a leaked internal survey of the organization’s employees indicates, at the very least, that the management culture needs improvement.	虽然难以评估这些言论的真实性，但一份外泄的组织内部员工调查显示最起码这一管理文化是亟待改进的。


This is closely related to the fourth criterion: hiring (and retaining) the right staff.	这就与第四条标准密切相关：雇用（和留住）合适的员工。


No leader can do everything alone, so choosing a high-quality team is crucial.	没有一个领导人可以把所有事情都揽在自己身上，因此选择一个高素质的团队是至关重要的。


If those working at the organization are unhappy, recruiting the most talented and motivated people will be nearly impossible.	如果那些在组织中工作的人都心怀不满，就不可能招聘到最有才华和上进心的员工。


Beyond creating an open, challenging, and supportive culture – reflected in internal surveys that are shared publicly (not leaked) – the leaders of international organizations must resist pressure from member countries to hire particular senior officials, who are not necessarily the highest-performing candidates.	除了建立一个开放，具有挑战性和互助性的文化——反映在公开（而非泄露）的内部调查中——国际组织的领导人必须能顶住各成员国指定聘请特定高级官员的压力，因为那些人不一定会是表现最佳的候选人。


Moreover, they must be willing and able to identify and remove inherited senior managers who are not up to standard.	此外，他们必须愿意且能够识别并驱逐原组织中那些不够格的高级管理人员。


The key words must be meritocracy and morale.	在此的关键词必须是精英主义和士气。


The final criterion for effective leadership of an international organization concerns accountability.	国际组织高效领导者的最后一个标准则是问责制。


In the last couple of decades, heads of the IMF, the World Bank, and the UNHCR Refugee Agency have left office under a cloud of suspicion.	在过去几十年中，国际货币基金组织，世界银行和联合国难民署的负责人都是在一片质疑中离任。


Some leaders have lately established far stricter codes of conduct; it is up to the new ones to ensure that they are being enforced.	一些领导人随后树立了更为严格的行为准则； 而新领导人的责任是确保它们被执行。


Welcoming independent evaluation – and disclosing the results – is essential.	欢迎独立评估——并披露其结果——是至关重要的


And strong institutions need outstanding leaders who can build consensus among increasingly bad-tempered governments, while attracting sufficient resources and mobilizing talented people to get the job done. This is no time to compromise for short-term political expediency.	世界比以往任何时候都更需要强大的国际机构，而强大的机构需要那些可以在对抗气氛日渐浓厚的政府间建立共识，同时吸引足够的资源和动员优秀人才完成这项工作的领袖人物，切不可为了短期政治权宜妥协而所托非人。


Globalization After the Crisis	危机之后的全球化


WASHINGTON, DC – The world economy has just been through a severe recession marked by financial turmoil, large-scale destruction of wealth, and declines in industrial production and global trade. According to the International Labor Organization, continued labor-market deterioration in 2009 may lead to an estimated increase in global unemployment of 39-61 million workers relative to 2007.	华盛顿特区——


Meanwhile, global growth in real wages, which slowed dramatically in 2008, is expected to have dropped even further in 2009, despite signs of a possible economic recovery.	世界经济刚刚经历了一场严重衰退，金融市场动荡不安，大量财富灰飞烟灭，工业生产与全球贸易出现下降。


In a sample of 53 countries for which data are available, median growth in real average wages had declined from 4.3% in 2007 to 1.4% in 2008.	根据国际劳工组织的测算，由于不断恶化的就业形势，估计全球的失业人口要比2007年增加3900万到6100万人。


The World Bank warns that 89 million more people may be trapped in poverty in the wake of the crisis, adding to the 1.4 billion people estimated in 2005 to be living below the international poverty line of $1.25 a day.	到今年年底，全球失业人口将创新高，达到2. 19亿－2.


In this climate, globalization has come under heavy criticism, including from leaders of developing countries that could strongly benefit from it.	与此同时，尽管经济复苏的曙光隐约初现，但全球实际工资的增速在继2008年大幅放缓之后，预期将在2009年进一步下滑。 根据目前掌握的53个国家的数据，平均实际工资增幅的中值增速已从2007年的4.


President Yoweri Museveni, who is widely credited for integrating Uganda into world markets, has said that globalization is “the same old order with new means of control, new means of oppression, new means of marginalization” by rich countries seeking to secure access to developing country markets.	世界银行发出警告说，在原有生活于全球贫困线（每天1. 25美元）以下的14亿人（2005年估算值）这一基础之上，将另有8900万人于危机之后陷入同样的困境之中。


Yet the alternative to global integration holds little attraction.	在这种大环境下，全球化已成千夫所指，批评者甚至包括可从中受益良多的发展中国家的领导人。


Indeed, while closing an economy may insulate it from shocks, it can also result in stagnation and even severe homegrown crises. Current examples include Myanmar and North Korea; before their economic liberalization China, Vietnam, and India were in the same boat.	乌干达总统约韦里·穆塞韦尼曾因将本国融入世界市场而广受赞誉，现声称：全球化是那些试图进入发展中国家市场的富国所采取的一种策略， “与此前一样的旧秩序相比，只不过采取了一种新的控制，压迫和边缘化手段。


To ensure a durable exit from the crisis, and to build foundations for sustained and broad-based growth in a globalized world, developing countries in 2010 and beyond must draw the right lessons from history.	而实行经济自由化之前的中国、越南和印度同样如此。 对于发展中国家来说，为了彻底摆脱危机，为在全球化的世界中实现全面可持续性的增长打好基础，它们必须在2010年以及之后的岁月里，从历史中汲取正确的经验教训。


In the current crisis, China, India, and certain other emerging-market countries are coping fairly well.	在当前这轮危机之中，中国、印度和某些其他新兴市场国家的应对颇为出色。


These countries all had strong external balance sheets and ample room for fiscal maneuver before the crisis, which allowed them to apply countercyclical policies to combat external shocks.	原因是在危机发生之前，这些国家都拥有强健的对外资产负债表和充足的财政调整空间，因而得以运用反周期政策应对外部冲击。


They have also nurtured industries in line with their comparative advantage, which has helped them weather the storm.	这些国家还培育了符合自身比较优势的行业，这有助于它们安然度过风暴。


Indeed, comparative advantage – determined by the relative abundance of labor, natural resources, and capital endowments – is the foundation for competitiveness, which in turn underpins dynamic growth and strong fiscal and external positions.	事实上，由劳动力、自然资源和资本等要素禀赋的相对丰富程度所决定的比较优势正是竞争力的基础，而竞争力又支撑了强劲的经济增长和稳健的财政收支与国际收支。


By contrast, if a country attempts to defy its comparative advantage, such as by adopting an import-substitution strategy to pursue the development of capital-intensive or high-tech industries in a capital-scarce economy, the government may resort to distortional subsidies and protections that dampen economic performance.	相反的，若一国试图违反其比较优势，如采取进口替代战略，在一个资本稀缺的经济体中，发展资本密集型产业或高科技产业，该国政府可能要借助扭曲性补贴与保护措施，而这些措施将会抑制经济表现。


In turn, this risks weakening both the government’s fiscal position and the economy’s external account.	反过来，此举又将可能恶化该国政府的财政地状况及其外部帐户。


Without the ability to take timely countercyclical measures, such countries fare poorly when crises hit.	由于没有能力及时采取反周期措施，在危机到来之时，这类国家的表现将会很糟。


To pursue its comparative advantage and prosper in a globalized world, a country needs a price system that reflects the relative abundance of its factor endowments.	一个国家要发挥自身的比较优势、并在全球化的世界中实现繁荣，需要一个反映其要素禀赋相对丰富程度的价格体系。


Firms in such a context will have incentives to enter industries that can use their relatively abundant labor to replace relatively scarce capital, or vice versa, thereby reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness.	这种环境下的企业将获得激励，进入能用其相对丰富的劳动力替代相对稀缺的资本的行业，或是存在相反替代条件的行业，从而降低成本、增强竞争力。


Examples include the development of garments in Bangladesh, software outsourcing in India, and light manufacturing in China.	这方面的案例包括：孟加拉国服装产业、印度软件外包业以及中国轻工业的发展等。


But such a relative price system is feasible only in a market economy.	不过，只有在一个市场型的经济体中，这种相对价格体系才可行。


This is why China – which appears to be faring well in the crisis, meeting its 8% growth target in 2009 – became an economic powerhouse only after instituting market-oriented reforms in the 1980s.	这便解释了为何中国只有在上世纪八十年代进行以市场为导向的改革之后，方才成为了一大经济增长点（中国在本次危机中的表现很好，在2009年实现了8%的增长目标）。


Indeed, all 13 economies with an average annual growth rate of 7% or more for 25 years or longer, identified in the	的确，由诺贝尔奖得主迈克尔·斯宾塞领导完成的《增长委员会报告》指出，曾连续二十五年或更长时间内保持或超过7%的年均增长速度的十三个经济体，均是市场经济体。


Pursuing its comparative advantage strengthens a country’s resilience to crisis and allows for the rapid accumulation of human and physical capital.	顺应本国的比较优势，既可以增强一国抗击危机的能力，也可以进行人力资本与实物资本的快速积累。


Developing countries with such characteristics are able to turn factor endowments from relatively labor- or resource- abundant to relatively capital-abundant in the span of a generation.	具备此种特征的发展中国家可以在一代人的时间内，将要素禀赋由劳动力充足型或资源丰富型转变为资本充足型。


In today’s competitive global marketplace, countries need to upgrade and diversify their industries continuously according to their changing endowments.	在当今这个竞争激烈的全球市场之中，国家需要根据自身不断变化的情���，对其产业进行升级和多元化。


A pioneering firm’s success or failure in upgrading and/or diversifying will influence whether other firms follow or not.	先行进行产业升级和/或多元化的企业成败会影响到其他企业跟进与否。


Government compensation for such pioneering firms can speed the process.	而政府对于此类先行企业的补贴能够加快这一进程。


Industrial progress also requires coordination of related investments among firms.	产业提升也需要投资该领域的企业之间彼此协调。


In Ecuador, a country that is now a successful exporter of cut flowers, farmers would not grow flowers decades ago because there was no modern cooling facility near the airport, and private firms would not invest in such facilities without a supply of flowers for export.	如今，厄瓜多尔已是一个成功的切花出口国，但在几十年前，当地农民并不愿种植花卉，因为当时机场附近没有现代化的冷藏设施； 而私人公司鉴于没有出口花卉的货源供应，也不愿意投资兴建此类设施。


In such chicken-and-egg situations, in which the market alone fails to overcome externalities and essential investments go lacking, the government can play a vital facilitating role.	在这种先有鸡还是先有蛋的困境中，仅靠市场无力破除外部性的制约，政府就可以扮演起一个关键性的推动者角色。


This may be one of the reasons why the	这便解释了为何《增长委员会报告》 也发现：所有成功的经济体都具有坚定、可信而有力的政府。


The world is now so far down the path of integration that turning back is no longer a viable option.	如今，世界已在一体化之路上走出了很远，调头折返已不再可能。


We must internalize lessons from the past and focus on establishing well-functioning markets that enable developing countries fully to tap their economies’ comparative advantage.	我们必须将历史的经验教训铭记在心，专注于建立可使发展中国家充分开发其经济比较优势的、运作良好的市场。


As part of this process, a facilitating role for the state is desirable in developing and developed economies alike, although the appropriate role may be different depending on a country’s stage of development.	作为此进程的一部分，政府的辅助作用对发展中国家和发达国家同样有益； 尽管各国政府所适合出演的角色可能互有差别，这将取决于各国所处的特定发展阶段。


Ultimately, in today’s complex and interlinked world, even the most competitive economies need a helping hand as they climb the global ladder.	最终，在当今这个纷繁复杂，相互关联的世界中，即便是那些最具竞争力的经济体，当它们于世界舞台中力争上游之时，也需要获得一臂之力的帮助。


Globalization and Anti-Americanism	全球化和反美主义


Anti-American sentiments are rising around the world.	反美情绪正在世界范围内高涨。


American Democrats say that President Bush's policies have squandered America's attractiveness. Republicans reply that America is bound to be resented because of its size and its association with globalization.	美国民主党称布什总统的政策破坏了美国的吸引力，共和党则回应说美国之所以遭到怨恨是因为它国土广袤以及它与全球化的紧密联系。


Anti-Americanism, they say, will persist because some people see America as a cultural threat.	他们说，反美主义会持续下去，因为一些人把美国看成一个文化侵略国。


I believe that such views lack historical perspective.	我相信这种观点缺少历史依据。


Contrary to conventional wisdom, globalization is not homogenizing and Americanizing the cultures of the world.	与习惯思维相反，全球化并不是要把世界文化同一化和美国化。


Although the United States is at the forefront of the current information revolution, which is creating many similarities in social and cultural habits (such as television viewing or Internet use) that are attributed to Americanization, correlation is not causation.	虽然美国处在当前的信息革命的最前沿，而这场信息革命在社会和文化习惯方面创造了很多相似性（如收看电视或使用因特网），一定程度传播了美国化，但这种相关联关系不是因果关系。


To see why, imagine a country that introduced computers and communications at a rapid rate in a world in which America did not exist.	为什么这么说呢？ 想象有一个国家，在一个没有美国的世界，高速度地发展电脑和通讯。


You would still expect major social and cultural changes from such modernization.	你仍然会看到，这个国家的社会和文化会因此发生巨变。


Of course, because the US exists and is at the forefront of the information revolution, there is a degree of Americanization, but that is likely to diminish over the course of the twenty-first century as technology spreads and local cultures modernize in their own ways.	当然，因为美国存在并处于信息革命的最前沿，因此存在一定程度的美国化。 但这可能只会减少21世纪的课程，因为科技的传播和地方文化的现代化有着各自不同的方法或途径。


Historical proof that globalization does not necessarily mean homogenization can be seen in Japan, a country that deliberately isolated itself from earlier waves of globalization.	历史证明全球化并不一定意味着同一化。 例如日本。


In the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan became the first Asian country to embrace globalization, and to borrow successfully from the world without losing its uniqueness.	日本曾经有意使自己和全球化隔离开来，直到19世纪中叶，日本才成为第一个接受全球化的亚洲国家，并从世界其他国家成功借鉴了很多东西，与此同时也没有失去自己的独特性。


During the Meiji Restoration, Japan searched broadly for tools and innovations that would allow it to become a major power rather than a victim of Western imperialism.	在明治維新时期，日本广泛搜寻各种工具和革新方法，逐渐发展为一个主要的权力国，而不是西方帝国主义的牺牲品。


It sent young people to the West for education.	它还送年轻人到西方接受教育。


Its delegations scoured the world for ideas in science, technology, and industry.	其代表团在全世界搜寻科学、技术和工业的理念。


In the political realm, Meiji reformers were well aware of Anglo-American ideas and institutions, but deliberately turned to German models because they were deemed more suitable to a country with an emperor.	在政治领域，改革者们熟知英美的想法和机构，却有意走德国的路子，因为他们认为一个君主的政治体制更适合日本。


The lesson that Japan teaches the rest of the world is not simply that an Asian country can compete, but that after a century and a half of globalization, it is possible to adapt while preserving a unique culture.	日本给世界其他国家上了一课，不仅在于它告诉世界亚洲国家同样具有竞争力，还在于在一个半世纪的全球化之后，日本是可以适应世界，同时保有自己独一无二的文化的。


More fundamentally, the image of a homogenizing America reflects a mistakenly static view of culture.	更为重要的是，同化美国的想象反映了一个错误的静态文化观。


Efforts to portray local cultures as unchanging often reflect reactionary political strategies rather than descriptions of reality.	努力把本国文化描绘成一个不变的文化其实更多反映了反动的政治战略而不是事实本身。


As the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa has put it, those who argue in favor of cultural identity and against globalization, betray a stagnant attitude towards culture that is not borne out by historical fact.	就象秘鲁作家Mario Vargas Llosa指出的那样，那些以保持文化身份为由反对全球化的人，其实暴露了一种停滞的文化态度，不会被历史所接受。


Do we know of any cultures that have remained unchanged through time?	我们知道哪个文化在经历时间的洗涤后仍然保持不变呢？


To find any of them one has to travel to the small, primitive, magico-religious communities made up of people… who due to their primitive condition, become progressively more vulnerable to exploitation and extermination.	为了找到它，人们必须去那些小的、原始的、魔幻宗教部落，那里的人们因为原始的条件，面对开发和消亡，变得更加脆弱。


Vibrant cultures are constantly changing and borrowing from other cultures - and that borrowing is not always from the US.	活跃的文化不断地在改变，不断地借鉴其它文化--不仅仅是借鉴美国文化。


For example, many more countries turned to Canada than to America as an example for framing constitutions in the aftermath of the Cold War.	比如，冷战后有很多国家选择加拿大而不是美国作为制定本国宪法的范本。


Globalization is also a two-edged sword.	全球化也是一个双刃剑。


In some areas, there is not only a backlash against American cultural imports, but an effort to change American culture itself.	在一些地区，不仅仅是有人反对进口美国文化，还有人想努力改变美国文化。


Capital punishment may now be supported by a majority of Americans, but the death penalty is regarded as an egregious violation of human rights across Europe - indeed, across much of the world.	死刑现在可能被大多数美国人所接受，但在欧洲，事实上是在世界的大部分地区，死刑却被看作严重违背了人权。


American environmental attitudes toward climate change or genetic modification of food bring similar criticism.	美国对气候变化或对转基因食品的态度也遭到了同样的指责。


More subtly, America's openness to immigration both enriches and changes American culture.	更巧妙的是，美国开放的移民政策丰富并改变了美国文化。


Finally, globalization and the information revolution may reinforce rather than reduce cultural diversity.	最后，全球化和信息革命可能加强而不是减少文化的多样性。


Some French commentators express fear that in a world of Internet global marketing, there will no longer be room for a culture that cherishes hundreds of different types of cheese.	一些法国评论员表达了他们的担忧：在世界的因特网市场上，将不再会有怀有几百种不同奶酪的文化的位置。


But on the contrary, the Internet allows dispersed customers to come together in a way that encourages niche markets, including hundreds of Web sites dedicated only to cheese.	事实正相反，因特网用某种方式将分散的用户集中起来，形成特定市场，其中包括几百家只钟情于奶酪的网站。


The Internet also allows people to establish a more diverse set of political communities.	因特网还允许人们建立更多样的政治团体。


The use of the Welsh language in Britain and Gaelic in Ireland is greater today than fifty years ago.	在英国威尔士语言的应用和在爱尔兰格尔语的应用比起五十年前要多。


Britain, Belgium, and Spain, among others in Europe, have devolved more power to local regions.	英���、比利时和西班牙，以及欧洲其它国家，已经下放了更多的权力到地方区域。


The global information age may strengthen rather than weaken local cultures.	全球信息年代可能会强化而不是弱化地方文化。


Economic and social globalization does produce superficial similarities in T-shirt logos and soft drink brands, but an underlying cultural diversity will remain.	的确，经济和社会的全球化导致了T恤和软饮料商标的雷同，但是隐藏在下面的文化多样性会得以保留。


American culture is now prominent, and it contributes to America's attractiveness - its "soft power" - in many, but not all, areas.	美国文化现在很突出，它在很多地方，而不是所有地方传播了美国的魅力--它的"软实力"。


At the same time, immigrants, ideas, and events outside America's borders are changing American culture within the borders of the US.	与此同时，美国境外的移民、主意和事件也正改变着美国境内的美国文化。


As globalization spreads technical capabilities, and information technology allows broader participation in global communications, American economic and cultural preponderance may diminish.	当全球化传播了技能，信息技术使广泛参与到全球传播中成为可能，美国的经济和文化优势可能会减少。


A little less dominance may mean a little less anxiety about Americanization, fewer complaints about American arrogance, and less intensity in the anti-American backlash.	少一点优势可能意味着少一点对美国化的忧虑、对美国傲慢态度的抱怨、以及强烈的反美呼声。


The US may have less control in the future, but it may find itself living in a world somewhat more congenial to its basic values of democracy, free markets, individual liberties, and human rights.	美国在将来可能会少一点控制力，但可能会发现自己正处在一个更加协调的世界--在基本的民主价值观、自由市场、个人自由和人权方面。


The Cacophony of the World	世界的不和谐之声


PARIS – In his masterpiece Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger describes, probably too idyllically, the international balance-of-power system that, following the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, produced what came to be called the “Concert of Europe.”	巴黎—在雄篇巨著《大外交》一书中，亨利·基辛格有点天真烂漫地写道，1814—1815年维也纳会议之后的国际实力平衡体系产生了后来所谓的“欧洲协调”（Concert of Europe）。


As Kissinger describes it, after the Napoleonic Wars, “There was not only a physical equilibrium, but a moral one.	基辛格说，拿破仑战争后，“不但出现了现实平衡，还出现了道德平衡。


Power and justice were in substantial harmony.”	实力和公正处于显现出一片大和谐。


Of course, the concert ended in cacophony with the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914.	”当然，1914年夏天爆发的一战打破了这一协调。


Today, after the brutality of the first half of the twentieth century, the temporary bipolarity of the Cold War, and America’s brief post-1989 hyperpower status, the world is once again searching for a new international order.	如今，在经历了野蛮的20世纪上半叶、短暂的冷战双极格局和1989年后美国单一超级大国阶段后，世界正在再一次寻找新的国际秩序。


Can something like the Concert of Europe be globalized?	类似欧洲协调的安排会全球化吗？


Unfortunately, global cacophony seems more probable.	不幸的是，全球不和谐的可能性增加了。


One obvious reason is the absence of a recognized and accepted international referee.	一个显而易见的原因是缺少一个明确的、被广泛接受的国际仲裁者。


The United States, which best embodies ultimate power, is less willing – and less able – to exercise it.	美国的实力最强，但不太愿意——也缺少能力——执行这一功能。


And the United Nations, which best embodies the principles of international order, is as divided and impotent as ever.	联合国最能体现国际秩序原则，但一直都处于莫衷一是和无法胜任的状态。


But, beyond the absence of a referee, another issue looms: the wave of globalization that followed the end of the Cold War has, paradoxically, accelerated fragmentation, affecting democratic and non-democratic countries alike.	但是，除了缺少仲裁者，还有另一个问题：随冷战结束而发生的全球化浪潮有一个悖论，它加速了分裂，影响着民主和非民主国家。


From the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia’s violent self-destruction, and Czechoslovakia’s peaceful divorce to today’s centrifugal pressures in Europe, the West, and the major emerging countries, fragmentation has been fundamental to international relations in recent decades.	从苏联解体、南斯拉夫的暴力自我毁灭和捷克斯洛伐克的和平分手到如今欧洲、西方和主要新兴国家的离心之势，分裂一直是近几十年来国际关系的基本旋律。


The information revolution has created a more global, interdependent, and transparent world than ever.	信息革命造就了一个更全球化、更相互依赖、更透明的世界，这是前所未有的。


But this has led, in turn, to an anxious, balkanizing quest for identity.	但这反过来也导致了迫切的、引发分裂的身份认同要求。


This effort to recover uniqueness is largely the cause of the international system’s growing fragmentation.	努力恢复独特性，这就是国际体系日渐分裂的主要原因。


In the Concert of Europe, the number of actors was limited, and they were mostly states, whether national or imperial.	在欧洲协调中，行动者的数量是有限的，且大多是国家——既有民族国家，也有帝国。


Essential values were widely shared, and most actors favored protecting the existing order.	基本价值得到广泛认同，大部分行动者支持捍卫既有秩序。


In today’s world, by contrast, the nature of the actors involved is no longer so clear.	相反，在当今世界，行动者的性质不再明确。


Transnational forces, states, and non-state actors are all involved, and their goals are complex and sometimes contradictory, with no universal commitment to preserving the status quo.	跨国势力、国家和非国家行动者皆参与其中，它们的目标各异，有时甚至争锋相对，不存在维持现状的共同承诺。


The US may be intent on creating a transatlantic trade-and-investment pact with Europe, which would make a political statement to the world that the West writ large constitutes the universal normative reference point.	美国可能下定决心要与欧洲达成跨大西洋贸易和投资契约，这相当于一份政治宣言，向全世界表明西方存在着明确的共同规范参照点。


But does such a West exist?	但这样的西方存在吗？


In our era of fragmentation, there is a more powerful and dynamic American West, a globally more problematic European West (itself fragmented between a prosperous north and an economically lagging south), and even a British West and, in Japan, an Asian West.	在我们的分裂时代，存在一个更强大、更有活力的美国西方，一个全球性问题更严重些的欧洲西方（它本身又存在繁荣的北部和经济落后的南部之间的分裂），甚至还有一个英国西方和一个亚洲西方（在日本）。


The concept of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) may have been an astute branding tool.	金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）的概念也许已成为高明的品牌推广术。


But, aside from its members’ high growth rates, has it had any real significance?	但是，这四个国家除了增长率高些��外，还有别的真正影响力吗？


Indeed, China is clearly in a category of its own, as a source of perceived (or real) risk to its regional environment.	事实上，中国显然属于自己的分类，是其所属地区环境中的感知（或实在）风险因素。


If the BRICs’ growth slows (as has begun to happen), the concept’s artificiality will become widely apparent.	如果金砖国家的增长放缓（这已经开始发生），这一概念的人工雕琢痕迹就会显露无疑。


What unites emerging powers today is more their denial of international responsibilities than their joint diplomatic efforts.	如今，新兴强国之间的共同点是它们拒绝国际责任，而不是它们在外交事务上联手并进。


Fragmentation also affects societies internally.	分裂还影响社会内部。


Deep partisan divisions – whether over the role of government or social/cultural issues – are leading to near-paralysis in democratic societies like the US.	严重的党派分歧——不管是关于政府的角色和是关于社会/文化问题——正在导致美国等民主社会几近瘫痪。


In non-democratic societies, they can lead to revolution and violent power struggles.	在非民主社会，这些问题可能导致革命和暴力权力斗争。


This has been the case in much of the Arab world since late 2010.	2010年末以来的阿拉伯世界便是明证。


Even power itself is more fragmented than ever.	就连权力本身也陷入了前所未有的分裂。


Indeed, Moises Naim proclaims its demise in his latest book, The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used To Be.	奈伊姆（Moises Naim）在其近著《权力的终结：从董事会到战场，从教堂到国家，为什么当权的意义已与往日不同》（The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used To Be）中认为权力将会消亡。


While Naim’s conclusion may be premature, he is right about one thing: “Power no longer buys as much as it did in the past.”	或许奈伊姆的结论下得过早了，但他有一点事正确的：“权力不再像过去那样无所不能。


It is “easier to get, harder to use – and easier to lose.”	”它“更容易获得，更难以行使——也更容易失去。 ”


Some analysts maintain, reassuringly, that rapprochement between Asia and the West is possible, given symbiosis between Western democracy and authoritarian Confucianism.	一些分析家安慰说，亚洲和西方关系的缓和是可能的，因为西方民主和专制的儒家是共生关系。


This is Kishore Mahbubani’s argument in his book The Great Convergence.	马凯硕（Kishore Mahbubani）在其著作《大分歧》（The Great Convergence）中如是说。


But the harmony stemming from the encounter between different cultures and systems is nowhere near – and will not be as long as the rule of law has not taken hold in the emerging world and a culture of modesty has not made headway within the plural West.	但源自不同文化和体系碰撞的和谐离我们仍十分遥远——只要新兴国家不建立法治精神，西方国家不接受中庸之道，和谐就无法实现。


The cacophony of the world has replaced the concert of Europe.	世界的不和谐已经取代了欧洲协调。


And this may very well be the case for the foreseeable future.	在可预见的未来都将是如此。


Global Solutions for Globalization’s Problems	全球化问题的全球解决方案


OXFORD – The last few decades of globalization and innovation have resulted in the most rapid progress that the world has ever known.	牛津——近几十年的创新及全球化让世界取得了前所未有的快速进步。


Poverty has been reduced.	贫困已经有所缓解。


Life expectancy has increased.	平均寿命有所增加。


Wealth has been created at a scale that our ancestors could not have imagined.	人类以祖先无法想象的速度创造着财富。


But the news is not all good.	但问题也接踵而至。


In fact, the achievements brought about by globalization are now under threat.	事实上，全球化的成果现在正在受到威胁。


The world has simultaneously benefited from globalization and failed to manage the inherent complications resulting from the increased integration of our societies, our economies, and the infrastructure of modern life.	世界在受益于全球化的同时未能控制住社会、经济和现代生活基础设施一体化所带来的并发症。


As a result, we have become dangerously exposed to systemic risks that transcend borders.	结果令我们受到跨越国界的系统性风险威胁。


These threats spill across national boundaries and cross the traditional divides between industries and organizations.	上述风险可以跨越国界以及行业和组织间的传统隔阂。


An integrated financial system propagates economic crises.	一体化的金融系统可以传播经济危机。


International air travel spreads pandemics.	国际航班传播流行病。


Interconnected computers provide rich hunting grounds for cybercriminals.	联网计算机为网络罪犯提供了五光十色的狩猎场。


Middle Eastern jihadis use the Internet to recruit young Europeans.	中东圣战者利用互联网招募欧洲年轻人。


Living standards rise – and greenhouse-gas emissions follow, accelerating climate change.	生活水平提高增加了温室气体排放，进而加速了气候变化的步伐。


As a byproduct of globalization, crises that once burned locally and then quickly flamed out now risk sparking international conflagrations.	全球化的副产品是从前能被迅速扑灭的地区危机现在有可能在国际上点燃熊熊大火。


A pandemic, flood, or cyber attack in the City of London or Wall Street could send the entire world into a financial tailspin.	伦敦或华尔街爆发流行病、水灾或网络袭击可能使整个世界陷入金融混乱的局势。


If the progress that globalization has delivered is to be sustained, countries must accept shared responsibility for managing the risks that it has engendered.	如果要想维持全球化带来的进步，各国必须承担起风险管理的共同职责。


National governments – whether powerful, like the United States and China, or weak, like Iraq and Liberia – are unable to address these cascading and complex challenges on their own.	国家政府无论强（如美国和中国）弱（如伊拉克和利比亚），都无法凭一己之力解决摆在面前的诸多复杂难题。


Only a small fraction of the risks arising from globalization require a truly global response.	全球化带来的风险只有一小部分需要真正的全球性对策。


But, by definition, these risks transcend the nation-state; thus, coordinated action is required to address them effectively.	但从定义上看，这些风险超越了民族国家的界限； 因此，需要采取统一行动才能有效加以解决。


The nature of the response needs to be tailored to the threat.	对策的性质需要与问题相一致。


In the case of pandemics, the key is to support countries where outbreaks occur and help those most at risk of infection.	在流行病问题上，关键是要支持爆发疫情的国家，为受感染风险最大的民众提供帮助。


Widespread dangers, such as climate change or a new financial crisis, can require the cooperation of dozens of countries and a broad range of institutions.	那些具有普遍性的风险，比方说气候变化或新的金融危机，可能需要数十个国家和一系列机构展开通力合作。


In nearly every case, an international effort is needed.	几乎在所有情况下，国际努力都是不可或缺的。