Politics can offer all kinds of goods that voters find very attractive: tax breaks, subsidies, and social benefits.	政治能够提供对选民具有吸引力的所有东西：退税、津贴以及社会福利。


But small states are less likely to think that they can create the rules of the game, and accordingly they are more willing and able to make adjustments.	但是小国认为建立游戏规则不太可能是它们，因此它们更愿意拥有能够做出调整的权力。


They are more keenly aware that if they try to redistribute too much, they will simply drive away the factors of production: capital will flow elsewhere, and labor will likewise migrate.	它们更为敏锐地意识到，如果他们试图重新分配得太多，它们就很容易驱散走生产的必备因素：资金会流向他处，劳力也会一样发生迁徙。


The same sort of logic applies to the large states: France and Germany are losing skilled labor at the same time as they are drawing in cheaper labor from Eastern Europe.	同样的逻辑也适用于大国：当来自东欧的廉价劳力进入法国和德国之时，法、德也正在失去技术劳力。


The result is that they are feeling less French or German, creating greater political room, on both the left and the right, for nationalist ressentiment.	结果，它们感到它们不再是原来的法国或德国，这为民族主义愤恨之情在左、右翼都创造了更大的政治空间。


In the earlier rounds of European integration, from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, the big states received very obvious gains, which their politicians could easily present as such to voters.	从1950年代到1980年代所进行的早期欧洲一体化使大国获得了显著得可以让政治家们轻易展现给选民看的利益。


But since 1989 – or since the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1992 – the political dynamic has changed.	但是自从1989年开始——或者说自从1992年《马斯特里赫特条约》生效以来——政治气候就已经改变了。


It is now the EU’s smaller states that gain the most from wider and deeper European integration.	如今从更广泛更深远的欧洲一体化进程中获利最丰的是欧盟各个小国。


If the large states are to obtain similar gains, and their politicians are to recover voters’ respect, their governments will have to accept the small-state logic and abandon the Great Power posturing of the past.	如果大国也要获得相似的利益，如果他们的政治家要恢复选民对他们的尊重，它们就必须接受小国的逻辑，抛弃过去的大权力姿态。


Europe’s Smart Asian Pivot	欧洲的聪明亚洲支点


MADRID – For the first time in centuries, the focus of the global economy is shifting to the East.	马德里—几百年来，世界经济的焦点第一次出现了东移。


The United States has commenced its “pivot” to Asia, and its relations with China, in particular, seem constantly to be flirting with Thucydides’s trap, the historical pattern that suggests that a rising power will inevitably collide with a reigning power.	美国开始将“支点”设在亚洲，特别是中美关系，似乎一直修昔底德陷阱周围起舞——作为历史范式，崛起大国难免与现有大国发生碰撞。


But, with the US and China regarding each another warily in the foreground of world affairs, where does Europe fit in?	但是，考虑到中美两国在国际事务前沿彼此均相当谨慎，欧洲应该如何游刃有余于其中？


The European Union is at a critical historical juncture, one that demands its own pivot eastward – a coherent and decisive Asian strategy that builds on Europe’s strengths.	欧盟正站在关键性的历史分隔点上，我们需要有自己的东向支点——建立在欧洲的优势上的明确果断的亚洲战略。


Although the EU’s population is only one-fifth the size of that of China and India combined, and its military presence in Asia is minimal, its €12.6 trillion ($16.8 trillion) economy is the world’s largest.	尽管欧盟人口只有中印之和的五分之一，在亚洲的军事部署也可忽略不计，但其12. 6万亿美元的经济规模是世界之最。


This has not gone unnoticed by Asia’s governments, which are heavily dependent on economic growth to meet their young and growing populations’ demand for jobs and prosperity.	亚洲国家政府对此也有所注意，亚洲国家严重依赖经济增长解决年轻且不断增长的人口的就业和繁荣需求。


Currently, Asia is the EU’s main trading partner, surpassing North America and constituting one-third of its total trade.	目前亚洲已超过北美成为欧盟主要贸易伙伴，占其总贸易规模的三分之一。


Trade with China alone is worth more than €1 billion per day, second only to trade with the US.	光是与中国的贸易每天就超过10亿欧元，仅次于美国。


Moreover, the EU has a somewhat paradoxical asset at its disposal: it is not a Pacific power and does not carry the burden of great-power status in Asia.	此外，欧盟手上还握着颇有些矛盾意味的资产：它不是太平洋势力，没有身为亚洲超级大国的负担。


Far from being a weakness, this is precisely the source of the EU’s potential strength in Asia, for it provides a degree of diplomatic agility that the American heavyweight cannot muster.	这绝非劣势，而恰恰是欧盟在亚洲的潜在优势，因为这提供了美国这样的重量级选手无法具备的外交灵活性。


In attempting to execute its strategic pivot, the US is haunted at virtually every turn by its status as a historical hegemon, a military power, and the guarantor of its Asian allies’ security.	为了落实其战略支点，美国几乎在每个转折点都受到其地位的困扰——历史超级大国、军事霸权、亚洲盟友的安全守护者。


Even when rebranded as a “rebalancing,” America’s eastward shift is inevitably met with suspicion by some Asian countries, particularly China.	即使美国的东移战略冠上了“再平衡”的名义，也难免会引起一些亚洲国家的狐疑，特别是中国。


Europe, by contrast, can use its agility to perform a “smart pivot.”	相反，欧洲可以利用其灵活性成为“聪明支点”。


The EU must engage with Asia on at least three mutually beneficial fronts, with trade being the most important.	欧盟必须在三个方面与亚洲展开互利互动，其中最重要的是贸易。


The trade-liberalization agreements that the EU has in the pipeline with Asia’s vibrant economies (including South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Japan, and Thailand) are more ambitious in scope than previous bilateral deals.	欧盟正在与不少生机勃勃的亚洲经济体进行贸易自由化协定谈判（包括韩国、新加坡、马来西亚、印度、越南、日本和泰国），此次谈判的雄心和规模都超过了此前的双边谈判。


As large-scale regional free-trade arrangements take shape, the EU continues to signal unequivocal commitment to free trade through sophisticated bilateral agreements.	大规模地区性自由贸易协定正在成型，与此同时，欧盟也在继续释放明确的承诺信号，通过成熟的双边协定实现自由贸易。


But trade flows are vulnerable.	但贸易流相当脆弱。


Of course, economic relations between states foster interdependence, decreasing the risk of conflict.	当然，国与国的经济关系带来了互赖关系，减少了冲突的风险。


But if conflict does erupt, the cost is far higher.	但如果冲突爆发，代价也会大得多。


When the territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands flared anew last year, Japanese auto exports to China plummeted 80% in just three months.	去年，日本和中国就钓鱼岛问题重燃领土争端，结果日本对华汽车出口在三个月内暴跌80%。


Herein lies Asia’s specific paradox: a high level of economic integration has not given rise to regional institutions that can support the stability required for sustained prosperity.	在这里隐藏着亚洲的特殊矛盾：高度经济融合并没有带来能支持持续繁荣所需要的稳定的制度融合。


Instead, Asia remains deeply scarred by unsettled disputes, periodic fits of nationalism, and contested borders, all of which tend to be amplified by apprehension stemming from the asymmetric rise of some of its powers.	相反，亚洲仍深深地被未解决纠纷、周期性民族主义和边界纠纷困扰着，所有这些都因为一些强国的不对称崛起所引起的担忧而愈演愈烈。


Regional integration is a recipe for long-term stability in Asia, and a second line of engagement for the EU.	地区融合是亚洲长期稳定的关键，也是欧盟介入亚洲的第二个角度。


In Europe, once torn apart by war, armed conflict among EU member states is now almost unthinkable.	欧洲也曾经因为战争四分五裂，但如今，你很难想象欧盟国家之间会爆发武装冲突。


The EU’s institutional architecture facilitated the pivot from devastating and recurrent wars to peace and prosperity.	欧盟的制度框架有利于让亚洲支点从频发的灾难性战争走向和平与繁荣。


But creating that architecture is a daunting task, which has taken Europe decades and is still ongoing.	但营造这样的制度框架是艰巨的任务，欧洲花了几十年，并且仍在前进。


Successive quandaries and crises have revealed the flaws in the EU’s institutional design, and each (painstaking) upgrade has made the European project that much stronger.	一个接一个的困难和危机暴露了欧盟制度设计存在缺陷，而每一次（艰难）的新生让欧洲工程变得越来越强大。


With no hint of paternalism, and recognizing its status as a work-in-progress, the EU should increase its engagement with Asia’s existing structures and lend its know-how where possible – for example, in ASEAN’s shift toward a three-pillared design (political-military, economic, and socio-cultural) by 2015.	在不采取家长作风、认识到自身也在不断改进中的基础上，欧盟应该更多地参与亚洲的现有结构，在可行支出提供自己的经验——比如在2015年将东盟建设成有三大支柱（政治-军事、经济和社会-文化）支撑的设计。


On the global front, the EU and China may find themselves to be natural partners on key issues.	在全球问题前沿，欧盟和中国或许会发现它们是重要问题上的天然伙伴。


China is facing increasing pressure (particularly from the US) to assume a global political role that corresponds to its economic weight.	中国正在受到越来越大的压力（特别��来自美国的压力）要求其承担与其经济分量相称的全球政治作用。


Here, China could find an excellent partner in Europe, either in a G-3 format with the US or in focused bilateral cooperation.	在这方面，中国可能会发现欧洲是个出色的伙伴，不管是与美国一起构成G3还是与欧盟的双边合作。


Consider the Middle East.	就拿中东来说吧。


China and Europe might find common cause in the vacuum left as America’s domestic energy revolution weakens its commitment to the region.	中国和欧洲可以在美国国内能源革命削弱了其在该地区的关注度后所造成的真空中找到共同利益。


As China’s reliance on Middle East energy resources grows – 90% of the region’s oil exports will go to Asia by 2035 – the need to deepen engagement with oil-producing states will become more acute.	随着中国日益依赖中东的能源——到2035年，中东90%的石油出口将流向亚洲——深化与石油生产国的互动的需要日益紧迫。


Europe, the Middle East’s experienced neighbor, could be China’s strategic partner in this endeavor.	作为中东经验丰富的近邻，欧洲可以在这方面成为中国的战略伙伴。


Japan is another Asian giant regaining confidence, following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s energetic stimulus program.	在首相安倍晋三的大手笔刺激计划驱动下，日本正成为另一个重拾信心的亚洲巨人。


As Japan takes unprecedented trade-liberalization steps in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations with the US and other economies in Asia and the Americas, and boosts its regional engagement, Europe must maintain its strong ties with the world’s third-largest national economy.	日本通过与美国和其他亚洲和美洲国家的跨太平洋合作伙伴谈判迈出了前所未有的贸易自由化脚步，也提振了其地区参与，在这样的环境下，欧洲必须增强其与世界第三大国家经济体的联系。


The ambitious bilateral trade agreement now under construction is expected to boost exports in both directions by up to one-third.	目前正在进行中的雄心勃勃的双边贸易谈判预计可以双向提振出口三分之一。


In any comprehensive strategy for engagement with Asia, the EU is only as strong as its parts.	不管在何种与亚洲的全面合作战略，欧盟都不具有优势。


Though country-to-country engagement with Asia’s rising powers may be tempting, and while China often prefers bilateral dealings, renationalization of EU members’ foreign policies would be counterproductive.	尽管与亚洲崛起大国之间的国与国的联系颇具吸引力，而中国通常也更偏好双边协定，但欧盟成员国外交政策的重新国家化将形成掣肘。


A thickly woven cord is needed to keep Europe reliably anchored as it points eastward, whereas separate strands would withstand only a limited degree of strain in the turbulent years ahead.	欧洲需要拧成一股绳，这样才能在东进过程中稳稳地把自身锚定，而各自为政无法让欧洲在未来几年的动荡中屹立不倒。


The EU vs. Democracy	欧盟与民主的较量


ROME – One of the ways in which the European Union effectively asserts the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law is through its External Cooperation Programs, whereby, on the invitation of local authorities, it provides support in the form of electoral assistance projects and election observation missions.	发自罗马 —— 如果想让欧盟有效维护民主和法治的基本价值的话，其中一个方法就是通过实施外部合作计划（ External Cooperation Programs ），在地方当局的邀请之下，该计划能够以选举协助项目以及选举观察团的形式提供支持。


So, during the course of 2009, the EU sent election observation missions to various countries, including Mozambique, Afghanistan, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Malawi, and Bolivia.	据此在 2009 年的工作进程中，欧盟向好几个国家派遣了选举观察团，包括莫桑比克、阿富汗、几内亚比绍、黎巴嫩，马拉维和玻利维亚。


Just this month the European Parliament sent observers to Ukraine’s presidential election.	就在本月欧洲议会还派员观察了乌克兰总统大选。


At the end of each mission, a couple of days after the election, the Head of Mission, who is normally a member of the European Parliament, first issues a preliminary report on the election and on the handling of the electoral process, followed by a final report a few months later.	而在每次任务结束之时，选举结束几天之后，观察团团长（通常都是欧洲议会议员）首先会就整场选举以及选举的全部操作过程撰写一份初步报告，然后在几个月之后提交一份最终报告。


On December 6 last year, Evo Morales was re-elected President of Bolivia with more than 60% of the popular vote.	在去年的 12 月 6 日，伊沃·莫拉莱斯再次以超过 60% 的得票率当选玻利维亚总统。


In her preliminary statement, the EU Head of Mission, MEP Renate Weber, stated that the electoral process had, in general terms, adhered to international standards with respect to democratic elections, and that the Bolivian Electoral Commission had acted in a transparent, neutral, and efficient way.	而在欧盟观察团团长，欧洲议会议员雷娜特·韦伯的初步报告中，则认为整个选举过程总体上是符合民主选举的国际标准的，此外玻利维亚选举委员会的运作也是透明，中立和有效的。


But the preliminary report also included some criticism that irked the Bolivian administration.	但初步报告中也涵盖了一些令玻利维亚当局恼火的批评。


In particular, the report stated that the country’s sharp political polarization was highly visible in the media, in particular on Bolivian television stations.	尤其是报告中指出该国尖锐的政治对立在媒体层面上显露无遗，在玻利维亚的电视上尤其突出。


In fact, while opposition candidates were given fair exposure on private TV and radio, the EU Head of Mission observed various cases in which their state-controlled counterparts privileged the government’s parliamentary candidates.	事实上，当反对派候选人在私营电视台和电台上得到了公平合理的曝光之时，欧盟观察团团长观察到了几个国营媒体偏袒执政党议会候选人的案例。


For example, Bolivia TV devoted 62.7% of its news bulletins to the government party’s candidates, whereas the seven opposition parties combined mustered only a 37.2% share.  This, according to Weber, amounted to an “abuse of institutional propaganda.”	比如，玻利维亚电视台将其 62. 5% 的新闻焦点都放在执政党的候选人身上，而七个反对党合共加起来只分得了 37.


I believe that it is important that the EU carries out such monitoring in non-EU states. But what about elections in EU member states?	我相信欧盟在非欧盟国家执行这类监察活动是有其重要意义的。 但问题是这是否也应该应用到欧盟内部成员国的选举之上？


Shouldn’t what is good for the goose also be good for the gander?	俗话说得好：对一只鹅有好处的东西也该对鹅群有利啊。


I have in mind the two countries of which I am a citizen (Italy and Malta), where the media situation is an absolute disaster.	此时浮现在脑际的是两个我拥有公民身份的国家（意大利和马耳他），这两国的媒体状况简直就是一场灾难。


More or less everybody is acquainted with the situation in Italy, where Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi not only owns the three major private TV stations, but, as the head of government, also “manages” indirectly at least two of the three state-owned TV channels.	在意大利每个人都或多或少地知道：总理贝卢斯科尼不但拥有 3 家私营电视台，同时还作为政府首脑间接“管理”着其他三家国营电视台的其中两家。


Media manipulation has become the order of the day in Italy, but, unfortunately, the EU, behaving on the premise that it will not interfere in internal matters, refuses to say a word about any of this.	媒体操纵在意大利简直就是家常便饭，但不幸的是，打着不干涉成员国内政旗号的欧盟，哪怕是说一句话都不愿意。


The situation is even worse in the smallest EU member country, Malta. There, the only two political parties represented in parliament since independence in 1964 have ganged up to ensure for themselves an oligarchic duopoly on anything that goes on in the country.	而在最小的欧盟成员国马耳他，情况更糟。 马耳他自 1964 年独立以来议会里就只有两个政党，如今这两党还沆瀣一气搞寡头政治，垄断了该国一切事务。


The political leaders of the Nationalist (Christian Democratic) Party and the Labor Party have enacted a law whereby, since 1994, they alone share more than €200,000 state financing.	马耳他国民（基督教民主）党和工党的头头们制定了一条法律，规定自 1994 年开始只有他们才能分享 20 万欧元的国家资助。


Not content with this, the two parties passed a law in 1992 that gave each of them – and no other parties – a national TV station.	而就连这样都没能满足这帮人的胃口，两党在 1992 年又通过一条法律，规定给两家 —— 可不包括其他党派 —— 各分配一个国家电视台。


Getting greedier by the day, they then decided to share on a 50-50 basis both the National Electoral Commission and the National Broadcasting Authority.	随着贪欲的日渐膨胀，两党接着决定按 50 ： 50 的比例对半分割国家选举委员会和国家广播机构的席位。


Nor have they shrunk from constitutional tinkering in order to lock in their power. Indeed, they have changed the constitution three times since 1987 to ensure that every vote for the Nationalist Party and the Labor Party is given a higher weighting than votes received by any of the country’s other political parties when it comes to translating votes into parliamentary seats.	为了牢牢把持住权力，这两党不但回避去修订完善宪法，事实上，自 1987 年开始两党已经把宪法修改了三次，好确保在选票转化为议会席位时，马耳他国民党和工党所获的每一张选票都能比其它党派的得票获得更大的权重。


All of this is happening not in some remote country, far removed from civilization.	所有这一切都不是什么人类文明之外的异域奇闻，而是一个欧盟成员国内的现状。


It is happening in an EU member state. When will the EU intervene to stop this internal rot?	那么欧盟究竟要到什么时候，才愿意插手这种来自内部的腐败呢？


The Exchange-Rate Delusion	汇率幻觉


MILAN – If one looks at the trade patterns of the global economy’s two biggest players, two facts leap out.	米兰——看看世界全球两大经济体的贸易模式，你可以发现两个事实。


One is that, while the United States runs a trade deficit with almost everyone, including Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, not to mention the oil-exporting countries, the largest deficit is with China.	首先，美国对几乎所有国家都存在贸易赤字，包括加拿大、墨西哥、中国、德国、法国、如本、韩国和中国台湾，更不用说石油出口国了，其中最大的赤字来自中国哦。


If trade data were re-calculated to reflect the country of origin of various components of value-added, the general picture would not change, but the relative magnitudes would: higher US deficits with Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and a dramatically lower deficit with China.	但如果贸易数据根据增加值成分原产地进行重新计算，那么，基本图景没有发生变化，但美国赤字主要来自德国、韩国、中国台湾和日本，而对中国的赤字显著降低了。


The second fact is that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – all relatively high-income economies – have a large trade surplus with China.	其次，日本、韩国和中国台湾——均为相对高收入经济体——对中国均有很大的贸易盈余。


Germany has relatively balanced trade with China, even recording a modest bilateral surplus in the post-crisis period.	德国对中国的贸易相对平衡，但在危机到来之前也有一定的双边盈余。


The US has a persistent overall trade deficit that fluctuates in the range of 3-6% of GDP.	美国的贸易赤字总量一直维持在GDP的3—6%之间。


But, while the total reflects bilateral deficits with just about everyone, the US Congress is obsessed with China, and appears convinced that the primary cause of the problem lies in Chinese manipulation of the renminbi’s exchange rate.	但是，总量反映的是对每个国家的双边赤字，而美国国会总是针对中国，认定问题主要出在中国对人民汇率的操纵上。


One problem with this view is that it cannot account for the stark differences between the US and Japan, Germany, and South Korea.	这一观点的一大问题是，它不能解释美国和日本、德国以及韩国之间的巨大贸易赤字。


Moreover, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the renminbi is now rising quickly, owing to inflation differentials and Chinese wage growth, particularly in the country’s export sectors.	此外，人民币真实价值（经通胀调整）正在快速上升，这主要是由中国通胀差异和中国工资增长（特别是其出口部门）引起的。


That will shift the Chinese economy’s structure and trade patterns quite dramatically over time.	假以时日，这将显著改变中国经济的结构和贸易模式。


The final-assembly links of global-value added chains will leave China for countries at earlier stages of economic development, such as Bangladesh, where incomes are lower (though without producing much change in the balance with the US).	中国处于全球价值增加链的总装端，将使中国让位给经济发展阶段更低的国家，比如孟加拉国，因为那里的收入水平更低（但与美国之间的贸易余额不会有太大改变）。


A somewhat more sensible concern might be that the dollar’s reserve-currency status causes it to be “over-valued” with respect to every currency, not just the renminbi.	更加合理的判断是，美元的储备货币地位使得它对所有货币（不光是人民币）都“高估”了。


That could create additional pressure on the tradable part of the US economy, and thus might help to explain why the US tradable sector has not generated net employment for two decades.	这给美国经济的可贸易部分带来了更大的压力，也有助于解释为何美国可贸易部门在过去20年里根本没有净创造出就业岗位。


But, in order to explain performance relative to Japan and Germany, one would have to argue that the euro and the yen have been undervalued, which makes no sense.	但是，如果要解释日本和德国的相对表现，也有人会说欧元 和日元被低估了，这是毫无道理的。


In fact, the employment generated by the tradable sector has been in services at the upper end of the distributions of value-added per person, education, and income.	事实上，可贸易部门的就业创造集中在服务业，且处于人均价值增加分配、教育和收入的高端。


As a result, growth and employment in the tradable sector have gone separate ways, with healthy growth and stagnant employment.	结果，经济增长和可贸易部门的就业之间出现了背离，前者强劲，后者停滞不前。


In Germany, by contrast, the tradable sector is an employment engine.	德国的情况正好相反，可贸易部门是就业引擎。


The same is true of Japan.	日本也是如此。


The US economy’s distinctive features for at least a decade prior to the crisis that began in 2008 were an unsustainably high level of consumption, owing to an illusory wealth effect, under-investment (including in the public sector), and savings that fell short of the investment deficiency.	在2008年危机爆发的前十年中，美国经济有一个显著特征，那就是消费水平达到了不可持续的高度，原因是财富效应幻觉、投资不足（包括公共部门投资）以及比投资不足还要严重的储蓄不足。


That excess household and government consumption fueled the domestic economy – and much of the global economy as well.	家庭和政府的过度消费助长了国内经济，从很大程度上说，也提振了全球经济。


In several European countries that now confront fiscal and growth challenges, the pattern was somewhat different: most of the excess consumption and employment was on the government side.	在一些如今面临财政和增长挑战的欧洲国家，经济模式有所不同：大部分过度消费和就业来自政府。


But the effect was similar: an unsustainable pattern of income and employment generation, and lower productivity and competitiveness in these economies’ tradable sectors, leading to trade deficits, stunted GDP, and weak job creation.	但最终效果是一样的：不可持续的收入和就业创造模式以及可贸易部门生产率和竞争力低下，这导致了贸易赤字、GDP增长受阻以及就业创造不力。


One could argue that the euro has been and still is overvalued, and that this has hindered many eurozone economies’ productivity relative to non-eurozone countries.	你可能会说，欧元过去是、现在仍是被高估的，这导致了很多欧元区经济体的生产率赶不上非欧元区国家。


But the relative productivity deficiencies within the eurozone are more important for growth, and have nothing to do with the exchange rate.	但欧元区内部的生产率相对低下对增长的消极作用更大，且这与汇率问题无关。


The focus on currencies as a cause of the West’s economic woes, while not entirely misplaced, has been excessive.	将货币视为西方经济困境的原因尽管不能说全无道理，也是有失偏颇。


Developing countries have learned over time that real income growth and employment expansion are driven by productivity gains, not exchange-rate movements.	多年来，发展中国家已经懂得，真实收入增长和就业扩张的动力是生产率提升，而不是汇率波动。


This, in turn, requires public and private investment in tangible assets, physical and telecommunications infrastructure, human capital and skills, and the knowledge and technology base of the economy.	这反过来要求有形资本的公共和私人投资、实物和通信基础设施建设、人力资本和技能以及为经济打下知识和技术基础。


Of course, it is possible for a country’s terms of trade to get out of line with income and productivity levels, requiring a rebalancing.	当然，一国的贸易条件可能与其收入和生产率水平不相匹配，这就要求再平衡。


But resetting the terms of trade is no substitute for tackling the structural underpinnings of productivity.	但重置贸易条件不能代替改善生产率的结构性基础。


None of this is peculiar to developing countries.	这些都不是发展中国家才有的问题。


Underinvestment has long-term costs and consequences everywhere.	投资不足在世界各地都会造成长期成本和后果。


Excess consumption merely hides these costs temporarily.	过度消费只能暂时掩盖这些成本。


In the US, productivity deficiencies have led to a pattern of disconnection from global supply chains.	在美国，生产率低下已经导致了与全球供给链脱钩的模式。


So the challenge for America is not only to restore productivity, but also to restore its links to the main currents of world trade.	因此，美国的挑战不仅在于重振生产率，也在于重塑其与世界贸易主流的联系。


China’s growth – and, more generally, that of the major emerging economies – provides a substantial potential tailwind.	中国的增长——从更大的角度讲，是主要新兴经济体的增长——可助美国一臂之力。


That is certainly true nowadays for Germany, Japan, and South Korea.	今天的德国、日本和韩国就是明证。


The US and others can take advantage of it as well, but only if productivity relative to income levels in specific areas of potential competitiveness begin to rise. 	美国和其他国家也可以利用这一点，但这是有前提条件的——其某些具有潜在竞争力的特定领域生产率相对于收入水平开始上升。


As long as America economic policy remains focused primarily on deficits, domestic demand, exchange rates, and backsliding on trade openness, its investment deficiencies will remain unaddressed.	只要美国经济政策注意力集中在赤字、国内需求和汇率上，而在增进贸易开放度方面开倒车，其投资效率低下的问题就不可能得到解决。


That means that its employment and income-distribution problems will remain unaddressed as well.	而这意味着其就业和收入分配问题也不可能得到解决。


The good news is that, at a deep level, incentives across advanced and developing countries are aligned.	好消息是，发达国家和发展中国家的激励已经深层次地获得了一致。


The emerging economies would like nothing more than the restoration of sustainable patterns of growth in the advanced economies, and are prepared to be cooperative players in that process.	新兴市场非常欢迎发达经济体重振可持续增长模式，也做好了在此过程中与发达经济体合作的准备。


But focusing on these countries’ exchange rates is not the right way to go about it.	但纠结于新兴经济体的汇率问题绝非正确方向。


Europe’s Crisis of Values	欧洲的价值观危机


NEW YORK – Xenophobia and extremism are symptoms of societies in profound crisis.	纽约——仇外心理和极端主义是深刻社会危机所表现出来的症状。


In 2012, the far-right Golden Dawn won 21 seats in Greece’s parliamentary election, the right-wing Jobbik gained ground in my native Hungary, and the National Front’s Marine Le Pen received strong backing in France’s presidential election.	2012年，极右翼的金色黎明党在希腊议会选举中赢得21个席位，右翼的尤比克党在我的祖国匈牙利站稳脚跟，而国民阵线的马林·勒庞在法国总统选举中得到支持。


Growing support for similar forces across Europe points to an inescapable conclusion: the continent’s prolonged financial crisis is creating a crisis of values that is now threatening the European Union itself.	右翼力量得到的支持越来越强无可避免地得出一个结论：欧洲大陆长期的财政危机正在威胁到欧盟本身的价值。


When it was only an aspiration, the European Union was an immensely attractive idea that fired many people’s imagination, including mine.	当还停留在美好愿望的时候，欧盟这个有诱惑力的想法激发了包括我在内很多人的想象力。


I regarded it as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of sovereign states that were willing to give up part of their sovereignty for the common good.	我将其视为开放社会的化身——主权国家联盟为追求共同利益自愿放弃部分主权组合在一起。


They shared a common history, in which the French Revolution, with its slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity, left a lasting legacy.	它们拥有共同的历史，法国大革命自由、平等、博爱的口号留下了不可磨灭的传统。


Building on that tradition, member states formed a union based on equality and not dominated by any state or nationality.	以大革命传统为基础，各会员国不受任何国家或民族的控制，在平等的基础上缔结联盟。


The euro crisis has now turned the EU into something radically different.	欧元危机已经彻底改变了欧盟的性质。 欧元区不再是自愿组成联盟，仅仅靠严厉的规则才得以勉强维持。


Far from being a voluntary association, the eurozone is now held together by harsh discipline; far from being an association of equals it has become a hierarchical arrangement in which the center dictates policy while the periphery is increasingly subordinated; instead of fraternity and solidarity, hostile stereotypes proliferate.	欧盟各国已经不再平等，相反却等级森严，核心国家任意决定政策，而外围国家只能俯首听命。 联盟各国已不再团结友爱，而是相互间充满了敌意。


The integration process was spearheaded by a small group of farsighted statesmen who subscribed to open-society principles and practiced what Karl Popper called “piecemeal social engineering.”	一体化进程的倡导者是一小群有远见的政治家，他们信奉开放社会原则，践行卡尔·波普尔所谓的“渐进式社会工程”。


They recognized that perfection is unattainable; so they set limited objectives and firm timelines – and then mobilized the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent, requiring further steps.	他们清楚不可能尽善尽美，因此制定了有限度的目标和确定的时间表——籍此来调动进一步采取行动的政治意愿。 他们清楚地知道目标实现后其不足之处必定会很快暴露，进而敦促采取进一步的措施。


That is how the European Coal and Steel Community was gradually transformed into the EU.	欧洲煤钢共同体正是通过这种方式逐步转化为欧盟。


France and Germany used to be in the forefront of the effort.	法德曾是相关行动的领导者。


As the Soviet empire disintegrated, Germany’s leaders recognized that German reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe, and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it.	随着苏维埃帝国的解体，德国领导人意识到只有在加强欧洲团结的背景下，才有可能实现德国的统一。 他们也准备付出巨大的牺牲去实现这一目标。


When it came to bargaining, the Germans were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than others, thereby facilitating agreement.	谈判过程中德国人愿意比别人多些付出少些收获，以此来推动协议的达成。


At the time, German statesmen would assert that Germany had no independent foreign policy, only a European one.	当时，德国政治家宣称德国不存在独立外交政策，只服从统一的欧洲目标。


This stance led to a dramatic acceleration in European integration, culminating in the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the introduction of the euro in 1999.	这一姿���戏剧化加速了欧洲一体化进程，1992年签订《马斯特里赫特条约》以及1999年引入欧元令欧洲一体化达到了高潮。


A period of consolidation (which included the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in 2002) followed.	之后是一段时间的整合（包括2002年欧元纸币和硬币开始流通）。


Then came the crash of 2008, which originated in the United States but caused greater problems in Europe than anywhere else.	而后2008年起源于美国的崩溃导致欧洲比其他地方蒙受了更大的损失。


Policymakers responded to the collapse of Lehman Brothers by announcing that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail, which required substituting state credit for frozen markets.	决策者在雷曼兄弟倒台后宣布绝不允许其他有系统重要性的金融机构崩溃，而这需要以国家信用代替已陷入冰冻的市场。


Shortly thereafter, however, German Chancellor Angela Merkel asserted that such guarantees had to be provided by each state individually, not by Europe collectively.	但此后不久，德国总理安格拉·默克尔称欧洲无法统一提供上述担保，而必须由联盟各国独立提供。


That marked the beginning of the euro crisis, because it exposed a flaw in the single currency of which neither the authorities nor financial markets were aware – and which is still not fully recognized today.	这项决策标志着欧元危机的开始，因为监管当局和金融市场此前均未意识到的单一货币缺陷就此暴露——直到今天我们还未彻底认清上述缺陷的严重性。


By creating the European Central Bank, the member states exposed their own government bonds to the risk of default.	欧洲央行成立后，各成员国政府债券有可能出现违约。


Developed countries that issue bonds in their own currency never default, because they can always print money.	以本国货币发行债券的发达国家不会有违约风险，因为印钞权总掌握在他们手中。


Their currency may depreciate, but the risk of default is absent.	他们的货币可能贬值，但根本不可能出现违约。


By contrast, less developed countries that borrow in foreign currencies may run out of currency reserves.	相比之下，以外币借款的欠发达国家可能耗尽全部的外汇储备。


When a fiscal crisis hit Greece, the financial world suddenly discovered that eurozone members had put themselves in the position of developing countries.	财政危机重创希腊时，金融界突然发现欧元区成员国的位置已经等同于发展中国家。


There is a close parallel between the euro crisis and the Latin American debt crisis of 1982, when the International Monetary Fund saved the international financial system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default.	欧元危机和1982年的拉美债务危机有着很强的相似性，当时国际货币基金组织为挽救国际金融体系借贷给负债国的资金刚够让他们避免违约。


But the IMF imposed strict austerity on these countries, pushing them into a prolonged depression.	但国际货币基金组织勒令这些国家实行严格的紧缩政策，并因此将他们推入长期的经济萧条之中。


Latin America suffered a lost decade.	拉丁美洲失去了十年的宝贵时光。


Today, Germany is playing the same role as the IMF did then.	今天德国所扮演的角色与当时的国际货币基金组织如出一辙。


The setting differs, but the effect is the same.	虽然时过境迁，但效果却完全相同。


The euro crisis pushed the financial system to the verge of bankruptcy, which has been avoided by imposing strict austerity and lending countries like Greece just enough money to avoid default.	欧元危机将金融体系推向了破产的边缘，而解决方法是向希腊等国提供刚够避免违约的借款并强制其采取严格的紧缩政策。


As a result, the eurozone has become divided into creditors and debtors, with the creditors in charge of economic policy.	结果导致整个欧元区被割裂为债权国和债务国，并由债权国掌控经济政策。


There is a center, led by Germany, and a periphery, consisting of the heavily indebted countries.	具体而言包括以德国为首的核心国家和负债累累的周边各国。


The creditors’ imposition of strict austerity on the periphery is perpetuating the eurozone’s division between center and periphery.	债权国对周边国家执行的严格紧缩政策固化了欧元区核心和外围国家之间的区隔。


Economic conditions are continuing to deteriorate, causing immense human suffering.	经济情况持续恶化，致使民众遭受到巨大的痛苦。


The innocent, frustrated, and angry victims of austerity provide fertile ground for hate speech, xenophobia, and all forms of extremism.	无辜、沮丧、愤怒的紧缩政策受害者为仇恨言论、仇外心理和各种形式的极端主义提供了肥沃的土壤。


Thus, policies designed to preserve the financial system and the euro are transforming the EU into the opposite of an open society.	因此原本旨在保护金融体系和欧元的政策正致使欧盟转向开放社会的对立面。


There is an apparent contradiction between the euro’s financial requirements and the EU’s political objectives.	欧元融资需求和欧盟政治目标间存在着显而易见的冲突。


The financial requirements could be met by replicating the arrangements that prevailed in the global economy in the 1980’s and dividing the eurozone into a center and periphery; but that could not be reconciled with the principles of an open society.	资金需求可以藉由复制1980年代全球经济所践行的规则以及将欧元区割裂为核心及外围国家来加以实现，但这与开放社会的矛盾根本无法调和。


There are ways in which the policies pursued to preserve the euro could be modified to meet the EU’s political objectives.	我们有办法修改欧元保护政策来满足欧盟的政治目标。


For example, individual countries’ government bonds could be replaced by Eurobonds.	比如可以用欧元债券来替换各国政府债券。


But, insofar as the contradiction remains, the political objectives ought to take precedence.	但只要矛盾依然存在，就应该优先满足政治目标。


Unfortunately, that is not the case.	遗憾的是情况并不是这样。


The financial problems are pressing – and monopolizing politicians’ attention.	财政问题异常紧迫——吸引了政治家们的关注。


Europe’s leaders are so preoccupied with the crisis of the day that they have no time to ponder the long-term consequences of their actions.	欧洲领导人如此专注于眼前的危机，已经来不及思考自己行动的长远后果。


As a result, they continue on a course that perpetuates the division between center and periphery.	结果是他们继续走一条固化核心及周边分歧的道路。


This is such a dismal prospect that it must not be allowed to happen.	绝不能允许这样的暗淡前景变成现实。


Originally, the EU was conceived as an instrument of solidarity and cooperation.	过去的欧盟被视为团结合作的工具。


Today, it is held together by grim necessity.	但今天，仅仅出于迫不得已的需要各国才勉强维持结盟。


That is not the Europe we want or need.	这不是我们需要或者希望的欧洲。


We must reverse this intolerable transformation.	我们必须扭转这种无法容忍的转变。


We must find a way to recapture the spirit of solidarity and shared values that once inspired the European imagination.	我们必须想方设法重新找到激发欧洲想象力的团结精神和共同价值观。


The Endangered Arab Christian	危急中的阿拉伯基督徒


BRUSSELS – The recent abductions of Syriac Orthodox Archbishop Yohanna Ibrahim and his Greek Orthodox counterpart, Paul Yazigi, reflect not only the increasing brutality of Syria’s civil war, but also the escalating crisis for Christians across the Arab world – one that could end up driving them away altogether.	布鲁塞尔—最近，叙利亚东正教大主教伊布拉西姆（Yohanna Ibrahim）和希腊东正教大主教雅兹吉（Paul Yazigi）遭遇绑架，这不仅反映出叙利亚内战残酷程度的日益上升，也表明阿拉伯世界的基督徒危机正在升级，最终可能将他们完全驱逐出该地区。


According to the International Society for Human Rights, 80% of all acts of religious persecution worldwide in 2012 were directed at Christians.	根据国际人权协会（International Society for Human Rights）的数据，2012年全世界80%的宗教审判行为针对基督徒。


This surge in discrimination against Christian communities in countries where they have lived for many centuries can be explained largely by increasing Islamist militancy and the rise of political Islam in the wake of the Arab Spring.	在基督徒群体定居好几百年的国家发生对基督徒歧视激增的现象大体上可以用伊斯兰好斗性的上升和阿拉伯之春所唤醒的政治伊斯兰的崛起来解释。


As Islamist parties have taken power in the region, a wave of intimidation and discrimination has been unleashed on Christian minority populations.	随着伊斯兰政党正在中东地区掌权，威胁和歧视的潮流侵袭了基督徒少数派。


For example, on February 26, at a garment market in Benghazi, Libya, members of a powerful Islamist militia rounded up dozens of Egyptian Coptic Christians – identified by crosses tattooed on their right wrists – whom they then detained, tortured, and threatened with execution.	比如，2月26日，在班加西的一个服装市场，一群某实力派伊斯兰武装集团成员包围了几十名来自埃及的科普特族基督徒——证据是他们右手腕上的十字架纹身——并对这些人进行了拘禁、虐待和处决威胁。


Among the victims was a Coptic priest, whom the captors beat severely before shaving his head and moustache.	受害者中有一名科普特牧师，施暴者先是对他拳打脚踢，然后把他的头发和胡须全部剃净。


Priests have also been assaulted in Tripoli, and churches have been torched.	的黎波里也出现了攻击牧师和焚毁教堂的事件。


All of this sends a clear message: non-Muslims are not safe in Libya.	所有这些传递了一个清晰的信号：非穆斯林在利比亚很不安全。


While Libya has no significant religious minority, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians live and work in the country, where Christian proselytizing is illegal – and where one can be accused of proselytizing simply for possessing a Bible.	利比亚没有象征性的宗教少数派，数十万埃及人在利比亚生活和工作，在这里，宣传基督教是非法的——只要拥有圣经，就可能因传教而被告上法庭。


But Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-controlled government does not seem particularly eager to protect its Christian citizens in Libya; it offered only a half-hearted call for the release of its detained citizens.	但穆斯林兄弟会控制的埃及政府似乎并不热衷于保护利比亚的基督徒埃及公民； 只是心不在焉地呼吁释放遭羁押公民。


This reflects the similarly deteriorating situation for Christians in Egypt, where they account for roughly 15% of the population.	这反映出与埃及基督徒相似的境况恶化，在埃及，基督徒占据着约15%的人口。 4月初，圣马可大教堂（St.


In early April, a funeral at St. Mark’s Cathedral (the seat of the Coptic Church in Cairo) for four Christians killed in sectarian riots days earlier descended into chaos, with thousands of mourners attacked as they tried to leave after the service.	Mark’s Cathedral，开罗科普特教会所在地）为四名基督徒举行了葬礼。 这四人在几天前发生的宗派骚乱中丧生。


Police fired tear gas into the compound, standing by as those outside the cathedral launched petrol bombs, hurled rocks, and shot at those inside.	葬礼最后演化成了暴乱，数千名送行者在葬礼结束离开途中被袭。 警方向人群发射了催泪弹，严阵以待教堂外人群投掷汽油瓶、石块袭击教堂内人员。


At least two died and 80 were injured in the five-hour clash.	暴乱持续了五小时，至少两人丧生、80人受伤。


Christians blame the Muslim Brotherhood not only for allowing Muslim Egyptians to attack them with impunity, but also for permitting – and delivering – incendiary anti-Christian rhetoric.	基督徒指责穆斯林兄弟会不但放任埃及穆斯林袭击他们而不予惩罚，还允许——甚至组织——教唆反基督教言论。


For example, at an open rally for President Mohamed Morsi last year, the cleric Safwat Hegazy warned that Egyptian Muslims would “splash blood” on Christians who “splash water” on Morsi’s legitimacy.	比如，在去年针对总统穆尔西的公开抗议中，牧师赫加奇（Safwat Hegazy）警告说，埃及穆斯林会让向穆尔西合法性“泼水”的基督徒“溅血”。


In February, Egypt’s Coptic patriarch, Pope Tawadros II, sharply criticized the country’s leadership in a televised interview, calling the new constitution discriminatory and dismissing Morsi’s “national dialogues” as an empty gesture.	2月，埃及科普特族长塔瓦德洛斯二世主教（Pope Tawadros II）现身电视尖锐地批评埃及领导人，声称新宪法是歧视性的，指责穆尔西的“民族对话”只是空把式。


This unusually assertive stance reflects rising frustration among Christians, as well as the secular and liberal opposition, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s power monopoly.	这一不同寻常的断然立场体现了在穆斯林兄弟会的权力垄断下的基督徒的日益沮丧以及世俗和自由派的不满。


Syria, which once welcomed thousands of Christians fleeing war-torn Iraq, is experiencing an analogous change, as the country’s increasingly sectarian civil war generates fear and mistrust throughout the population.	曾经张开怀抱欢迎数钱逃离伊拉克的基督徒难民的叙利亚也在经历类似的变局，该国宗派色彩越来越明显的内战在整个人口中间制造了恐慌和不信任。


Although Christians have largely sought to remain neutral in the conflict, they have become involved gradually, some by taking up arms and others as victims of kidnapping and violence.	尽管基督徒大体上寻求在冲突中保持中立，但也渐渐地被拖入其中，一些人拿起了武器，另一些人则成为绑架和暴力的受害者。


Melkite Greek Catholic Patriarch Gregorios III recently stated that, since 2011, over 1,000 Christians have been killed and more than 40 churches and other Christian institutions (schools, orphanages, and care homes) have been damaged or destroyed.	天主教希腊麦勒卡教派领袖格雷戈里奥斯三世（Gregorios III）最近称，自2011年以来，有1000多基督徒被杀，40多座教堂和其他基督教机构（学校、孤儿院和老人院）被破坏或摧毁。


Some estimate that 300,000 Christians have fled Syria.	有人估计，30万基督徒逃离了叙利亚。


Furthermore, fallout from relentless regional conflict is destabilizing Lebanon, a country that offers Christians a constitutional guarantee of political representation.	此外，残酷地区冲突的余波正在动摇黎巴嫩。 黎巴嫩给予基督徒政治代表的宪法保障。


Some 400,000 refugees – many of them Sunni Muslims, including fugitive rebels – have poured over the border from Syria, exacerbating sectarian tensions and threatening to disrupt Lebanon’s delicate social and political balance.	40万难民——许多是逊尼派穆斯林，包括流亡叛军——从叙利亚边境涌来���恶化了宗派紧张，也引发了黎巴嫩脆弱的社会和政治平衡崩溃的危险。


Given that, as Göttingen University’s Martin Tamcke points out, there is no remaining alternative for Christian refugees in the Middle East, they are increasingly heading to Europe and North America.	有鉴于此，哥廷根大学的坦穆克（Martin Tamcke）指出，中东基督徒难民已别无选择，只能前往欧洲和北美。


If this trend is allowed to continue, the Middle East will gradually lose its Christian congregations.	如果放任这一趋势发展，中东将逐渐失去基督徒。


In order to prevent such a tragic outcome, Western leaders must take a more active role in advocating the protection of Christian minorities throughout the Arab world.	为了防止如此悲剧的结果，西方领导人必须扮演更加积极地角色支持保护整个阿拉伯地区的基督徒少数派。


Ultimately, Christians and Muslims in the Arab world have the same desires: freedom, dignity, and equal rights.	说到底，阿拉伯地区的基督徒和穆斯林有着相同的愿望：自由、尊严和平权。


Those who are persecuting Christians should recognize that the Arab Spring should benefit all Arabs.	指责基督徒的人应该明白，阿拉伯之春理应让所有阿拉伯人受益。


The Extremists Unbound	不受约束的极端主义者


JERUSALEM – The pattern of policymaking in the Middle East, as it was defined since President Bush’s “axis if evil” speech of January 2002, is undergoing a momentous change of direction.	耶路撒冷－布什总统在2002年1月发表“邪恶轴心”演讲后确定了中东政策的制定模式，现在该模式正在经历一个重大的方向性变化。


Bush’s foreign-policy paradigm of an alliance of “moderates” to defeat the “extremists” – a model too enthusiastically seconded by an unimaginative Israeli leadership and by those Arabs (led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia) who dread the forces of radical change – has collapsed.	布什用与“温和派”结盟来打败“极端主义者”的外交政策范例——一个极其需要缺乏想象力的以色列领导层和害怕激进变革力量的阿拉伯国家（这些阿拉伯国家由埃及和沙特阿拉伯领导）支持的模式——已经失败了。


The “extremists,” whom Bush expected to be defeated through economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military action, have prevailed.	布什期望通过经济制裁、外交孤立和军事行动打败的“极端主义者”已经取得了胜利。


It is the “moderates” who must now adapt their policies.	现在，“温和派”必须调整他们的政策了。


Israel and the United States failed resoundingly in their attempt to dislodge Hamas from Gaza, or in forcing it to accept conditions for an end to the international boycott.	以色列和美国将哈马斯从加沙驱逐出去的努力以及迫使哈马斯接受条件以换取结束对其的国际封锁都彻底失败了。


Fearing the costs of an invasion of Gaza’s urban alleys, Israel handed a strategic victory to Hamas.	因为担心侵入加沙进行街头巷战的代价，以色列由此使哈马斯取得了一个策略性的胜利。


It accepted a truce, brokered by an Egyptian government fearful of Iran’s influence in neighboring Gaza, that not only gave Hamas political legitimacy and undermined the international community’s policy of not negotiating with this fundamentalist group, but that also allowed it to continue rearming.	以色列接受了由埃及政府——它担心伊朗对与之接壤的加沙的影响力——作为中间人促成的停战协定，该协定不仅给予了哈马斯政治合法性，破坏了国际社会不与哈马斯这样的原教旨团体谈判的政策，而且允许哈马斯继续重整军备。


Indeed, Hamas now poses a strategic threat to Israel’s urban centers and military facilities.	事实上，哈马斯现在对以色列的城市中心区域和军事设施构成了战略性的威胁。


Israel’s war in 2006 in Lebanon against Hezbollah, supported by the US and the entire Arab “moderate” camp, was no more successful.	以色列于2006年在黎巴嫩袭击真主党的战争——该战争得到了美国以及整个阿拉伯“温和派”阵营的支持——不再是一个成功。


In fact, Hezbollah is now not only militarily stronger than ever – Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for its disarmament, has proven to be an utter failure – but also more politically robust than before the war.	事实上，真主党不仅在军事实力上变得前所未有的强大——要求真主党裁军的安理会1701号决议已经成为完全失败——而且，在政治上比战争前更有活力。


Admirably adept at weaving together all of Lebanon’s political, religious, and nationalists threads, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nazrallah, is today the undisputed master of Lebanon.	真主党的领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉（Hassan Nazrallah）善于将黎巴嫩的政治、宗教和民族主义编织起来加以利用，他现在是黎巴嫩毋庸置疑的首领。


The Syrian patron of Hezbollah, President Bashar al-Assad, another member of the “axis of evil,” is also doing well, thank you.	“邪恶轴心”的另一成员、支持真主党的叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德也干得不错，谢谢。


Not only Israel and the US, but also Egypt and Saudi Arabia have hoped for the political demise of this friend of every radical regional cause – from Hamas and Iran to the anti-Western forces in Lebanon – that they oppose.	不单单是以色列和美国，还有埃及和沙特阿拉伯，都曾希望他们反对的这个许多区域激进运动——从哈马斯、伊朗，到黎巴嫩的反西方势力——的伙伴的政治死亡。


But Assad managed to emerge from Syria’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 to become the broker without whom a Lebanese government could not be created and a president could not be elected.	但是，阿萨德已经从2005年叙利亚被迫从黎巴嫩撤离的挫折中成功走了出来，并且成为一个没有他就无法建立黎巴嫩政府、无法选举黎巴嫩总统的中间人。


This, and the indirect negotiations with Israel that are now underway in Turkey – which Assad knows cannot produce major results, given Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s political weakness and Bush’s lame-duck status – have helped to open for Syria the gates of Europe, where he had also once been a pariah.	这，以及正在土耳其进行的与以色列的间接谈判——鉴于以色列总理埃胡德·奥尔默特的政治软弱和布什的跛脚鸭处境，阿萨德知道这次谈判不会取得重大成果——已经帮助叙利亚打开了欧洲的大门，而阿萨德也曾在欧洲是一个被排斥的人物。


Moreover, desperate to recover its relevance in Middle East politics, the US has now radically changed its attitude and agreed to a meeting between US Undersecretary of State for Near East Affairs David Welch and Riad Daoudi, Syria’s chief negotiator with Israel.	此外，因为美国急于恢复在中东政治中的影响力，它现在已经极大地改变了它的态度，并且同意主管近东事务的副国务卿大卫·韦尔奇（David Welch）和叙利亚对以色列的首席谈判代表里亚德·达乌迪(Riad Daoudi)进行会谈。


America’s drive to force Iran to stop its nuclear program through an ineffective sanctions regime has been no more successful than any of its other schemes to isolate the region’s extremists.	美国通过一个无效的制裁机制迫使伊朗停止其核计划的企图，和试图孤立该地区的极端主义者的其它计划一样，都不成功。


Indeed, the US has now completely reversed its position of not negotiating with Iran until it stops uranium enrichment.	事实上，美国现在完全改变了在伊朗停止其铀浓缩活动之前不与它谈判的立场。


The participation of Under Secretary of State William Burns in the European dialogue with Iran, together with plans to station American diplomats in Teheran for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, represents a momentous shift in America’s policy, and also an indication to Israel to refrain from a military strike.	美国副国务卿威廉·伯恩斯(William Burns)参与欧洲和伊朗的对话，以及美国计划自1979年伊斯兰革命以来首次向德黑兰派驻外交官，代表了美国政策的重大变化，并暗示以色列不要对伊朗进行军事打击。


Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, America is in no mood to open a third front against the Islamic world.	由于深陷伊拉克和阿富汗，美国已经没有心情开辟反对伊斯兰世界的第三个前线。


The consequences of an Israeli attack on Iran “would be extremely stressful for us,” warned Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Michael Mullen.	美国参谋长联席会议主席麦克·马伦（Michael Mullen）将军警告说，以色列袭击伊朗的后果“将会对我们产生极大的压力”。


With the defeat of his ideologically inspired foreign policy, Bush has finally decided not to remain blind to the benefits of engaging Syria and Iran.	随着其受意识形态驱使的外交政策的失败，布什最终决定不对与叙利亚和伊朗交往的好处视而不见了。


However isolated within the Arab family the Syrians may be, and however embattled their Iranian allies are, the two countries hold the keys to Middle East stability.	不管叙利亚可能在阿拉伯世界中是多么地孤立，不管其同盟伊朗遭受着多么严重地围困，这两个国家都在维护中东稳定中起重要的作用。


They are crucial players in Lebanon, they have a role to play in pacifying Iraq, they can influence a change of attitude of powerful and extremely destabilizing non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah, and their leverage on Hamas is vital for the stability of the Palestinian front.	它们在黎巴嫩是有重要影响力的国家，它们在安抚伊拉克中可以起作用，它们能影响势力强大并且是重大不稳定因素的非国家组织——例如哈马斯和真主党——的态度，并且，它们对哈马斯的影响力对维护稳定的巴勒斯坦前线至关重要。


Engaging Iran is also the only way to stave off a nuclear apocalypse in the region.	而且，与伊朗交往也是避免该地区的核灾难的唯一途径。


Of course, the overall cooling of political tensions reflects the collapse of another misconception of the Bush administration – that the “axis of evil” is an irrational coalition interested only in spreading evil.	��然，政治紧张状况的全面缓和反映了布什政府另一个错误想法——即“邪恶轴心”是一个只对散播邪恶感兴趣的失去理性的联盟——的消散。


Pursuing radical goals does not necessarily mean that a country will act irrationally.	追求激进的目标不一定意味着一个国家的行为也是非理性的。


Neither Syria nor Iran – in fact, not even North Korea – has an interest in being the pariahs of the world community, and they fully understand the economic consequences of isolation.	叙利亚和伊朗都不会——事实上，甚至北朝鲜都不会——从国际社会的排斥中受益，并且，它们都完全明白孤立的经济后果。


Their policies are about more than spreading terror and revolution; they are about promoting negotiable interests.	它们的政策不仅仅是关于传播恐怖主义和革命，而是关于推进通过谈判可以获得的利益。


They are both mindful of the limits of the politics of destabilization, and they are clearly looking forward to a more dialogue-oriented American administration willing to address their political and strategic concerns.	它们都没有忘记不稳定的政治的界限，并且，很明显，它们在期待着一个愿意关注它们的政治和战略担忧的更加对话导向型的美国政府。


The Failure of China Bashing	攻击中国的失败


With China's rapid growth increasingly affecting a wide range of issues worldwide, it has become expedient for US presidential candidates to blame China for some of America's domestic problems.	随着中国的快速增长越来越多地影响着全球范围内的多种事务，美国总统候选人也越来越喜欢把美国国内的某些问题归咎于中国。


But in this year's US presidential election campaign, China bashing has been virtually non-existent.	但在本年度的美国总统竞选活动中，攻击中国的言论几乎已经不复存在。


There are good reasons for this welcome change.	有很多原因共同造就了这个可喜的变化。


Recent US elections rarely spared China, which found itself a frequent target of populist demagoguery.	近些年来，中国在美国大选中常常难逃厄运，成了总统候选人们煽动民众情绪的牺牲品。


Its exchange-rate regime, which pegs the Renminbi to the US dollar, was blamed for the mounting US trade deficit.	中国实行的将人民币与美元挂钩的汇率政策，被说成是美国贸易赤字的罪魁祸首。


Never mind that America's bilateral trade deficit with China, even including Hong Kong, accounts for less than one-fifth of the total US deficit: growing imports from China and more direct investment by US companies supposedly fueled US unemployment.	更不用说美国与中国的双边贸易赤字，甚至连香港的份额也被算了进来，据说这占到了美国赤字总额的近五分之一：日益增长的中国商品进口和美国公司的直接投资被看作是失业率居高不下的元凶。


Similarly, the unfinished reforms in China's banking sector and state-owned enterprises have been used as evidence of state subsidies for dumping activities.	与此相似，中国银行业和国有企业尚未完成的改革成了国家补贴倾销行为的罪证。


Although the majority of China's exports now come from private companies that receive virtually no loans from state banks , American candidates in previous elections routinely sought to curry favor with working class voters by vowing to protect US jobs against China's supposedly unfair business practices.	尽管眼下私有公司已经成了中国出口贸易的主力，而这些公司几乎从未得到过国家银行的贷款支持。 以前的总统候选人总是信誓旦旦，要保护美国公众的就业机会不受中国所谓不公正贸易行为的侵害，以此来赢得劳动阶级的欢心。


The jobs issue could be exploited further by citing poor working conditions, low wages, child labor, and other problems commonly found in developing countries.	就业问题甚至可能被进一步利用，发展中国家常见的工作环境差、工资水平低、童工和其它问题也无一例外成了博取支持的武器。


Attacking a communist country has always seemed to offer American politicians a convenient way to appeal to the average voter.	攻击共产主义一直就是美国政客讨好普通选民的有力武器。


After all, most US voters can be trusted not to learn how other countries, let alone countries in the Far East, really work.	毕竟大多数美国选民根本就不了解其它国家，更不用说远东国家的运作情况。


But this time, George W. Bush and John Kerry both know that it would be unwise to bash China too hard.	可这次，乔治·W·布什和约翰·凯利都清楚：拼命攻击中国是不明智的。


American companies and the entire US economy have a huge stake in China now, so both candidates have no interest in rocking the boat.	如今，美国企业和整个美国经济在中国都有着巨大的利益，因此两位候选人都对给中国捣乱没多大兴趣。


A candidate may promise more anti-dumping actions against Chinese goods, vow to press harder on China to change its exchange rate regime, or sharpen criticism of China's weak enforcement of intellectual property rights; but over-protectionism may make a candidate look irresponsible in 2004.	候选人可以许诺对中国商品采取更多的反倾销措施、迫使中国改变现行的汇率制度、或者加大对中国保护知识产权不力的批判力度，但历史已经发展到2004年，过度的保护主义也可能会使候选人显得不负责任。


Indeed, protectionism can do nothing to reduce America's trade deficit and stanch domestic unemployment.	实际上，保护主义根本无助于减少美国的贸易赤字，也不可能解决国内的失业问题。


No matter how much politicians blame others, growing US imports mean greater reliance on international markets, and some China factor in America's investment portfolio is needed to compete against European and Japanese firms.	不管政治家们对别国的抨击多么激烈，美国进口的日益增长还是意味着对国际市场越来越多的依赖，而美国也需要中国的某些证券投资，才能与欧洲和日本的公司相抗衡。


There is no hiding these facts from American voters anymore.	候选人不再向选民们隐瞒这些事实。


George W. Bush failed to honor his anti-Chinese protectionist campaign promises of 2000, as did Bill Clinton throughout his presidency.	乔治·W·布什没能兑现2000年竞选中做出的反华保护政策承诺，同样的承诺在比尔·克林顿的整个任期内也无法兑现。


Any China-bashing and protectionist pleas this time around will most likely ring just as hollow.	而这次的任何攻击中国和保护主义的承诺也很可能成为一纸空文。


Moreover, China's geopolitical importance to the US has grown immensely since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. of September 11, 2001.	不仅如此，在2001年9月11日美国和华盛顿恐怖袭击发生后，中国地缘政治对美国的重要性有了很大的提升。


At least for now, engaging China in the global fight against terrorism is in America's interest.	至少从目前来看，在全球反恐斗争中团结中国符合美国的利益。


China does have some common interests in fighting Islamic extremist terrorism, and it did not try to block America's path to the Iraqi war in the UN Security Council.	中国和美国的确在反对伊斯兰极端恐怖主义的斗争中拥有共同的利益，中国也并未在联合国安理会阻止美国发动伊拉克战争。


China has also been cooperating constructively with the US and its allies in dealing with North Korea's nuclear capabilities.	中国一直在与美国进行建设性合作，并与美国合作处理了北朝鲜核问题。


Of course, America still wants to contain China and prevent it from becoming a major regional and world power.	当然，美国仍然希望遏制中国，阻止其成长为地区和世界的主要力量。


But that remains a long-term strategic goal, not the stuff of presidential campaigns, especially when China seems too weak to pose any immediate threat to the US on any front in the foreseeable future.	但这不过是个长期战略目标，而不是总统选举应该关注的对象，特别是中国还远未强大到在任何领域对美国构成实质性威胁的时候更是如此。


China has never been a positive factor in American politics; so, from its perspective, the less it is mentioned in this US election season, the better.	在美国政治中，中国从来就不是一个积极的因素，因此在中国看来，自己在美国总统大选中越少被提到越好。


The relative silence about China in the US these days may be due merely to the news dominance of the Iraq War.	这些日子以来中国问题在美国大选中的相对静默也许只是出于对伊战争的需要。


Yet it may also indicate that America's political elites are in the process of facing up to new realities and adjusting their view of China accordingly.	但这也可能预示着美国的政界精英们正开始面对新的现实，并相应地调整自己的对华看法。


The Failure of Inflation Targeting	设定通货膨胀目标的失效


New York – The World’s central bankers are a close-knit club, given to fads and fashions.	纽约--各国的中央银行行长们组成了一个联系紧密的俱乐部，他们习惯于赶风潮。


In the early 1980’s, they fell under the spell of monetarism, a simplistic economic theory promoted by Milton Friedman.	在八十年代早期，他们深受弗里德曼鼓吹的货币主义简单化经济理论的影响。


After monetarism was discredited – at great cost to those countries that succumbed to it – the quest began for a new mantra.	货币主义名声丧失，那些推崇这一理论的国家付出了高昂的代价。 从那以后，人们开始寻找新的理论。


The answer came in the form of “inflation targeting,” which says that whenever price growth exceeds a target level, interest rates should be raised.	这一理论主张，只要价格增长超过设定的水平，利率就应该提高。 这一粗糙的药方不是建立在经济理论或者经验主义证据的基础之上。


This crude recipe is based on little economic theory or empirical evidence; there is no reason to expect that regardless of the source of inflation , the best response is to increase interest rates.	人们没有理由预期，无论通胀的源泉为何，最佳的应对措施就是提高利率。 人们希望大多数国家有足够的理智不去设定通货膨胀目标。


One hopes that most countries will have the good sense not to implement inflation targeting; my sympathies go to the unfortunate citizens of those that do.  (Among the list of those who have officially adopted inflation targeting in one form or another are: Israel, the Czech Republic, Poland, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, South Africa, Thailand, Korea, Mexico, Hungary, Peru, the Philippines, Slovakia, Indonesia, Romania, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, Iceland, and Norway.)	对于那些实行通胀目标国家的不幸公民我表示同情。 (那些以这种或者那种形式设定通胀目标的国家有：以色列、捷克共和国、波兰、巴西、智力、哥伦比亚、南非、泰国、韩国、墨西哥、匈牙利、秘鲁、菲律宾、斯洛伐克、印尼、罗马尼亚、新西兰、加拿大、英国、瑞典、澳大利亚、冰岛以及挪威。


Today, inflation targeting is being put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail.	如今，设定通胀目标受到了考验，而且它几乎可能通不过考验。


Developing countries currently face higher rates of inflation not because of poorer macro-management, but because oil and food prices are soaring, and these items represent a much larger share of the average household budget than in rich countries.	发展中国家目前面临更高的通胀率并非是因为宏观管理不善，而是由于石油和食品价格在窜升。 与富国相比，这些项目在平均家庭预算中占据更大的比例。


In China, for example, inflation is approaching 8% or more.	例如在中国，通胀正在迫近8%或者更高。


In Vietnam, it is even higher and is expected to approach 18.2% this year, and in India it is 5.8% .	在越南，通胀甚至更高而且预计将会在今年达到18. 2%。


By contrast, US inflation stands at 3%.	印度的通胀是5. 8%。


Does that mean that these developing countries should raise their interest rates far more than the US?	与此相比，美国的通胀是3%。 这是否意味着这些发展中国家应该提高利率大大超过美国呢？


Inflation in these countries is, for the most part, imported .	早些国家的通货膨胀在绝大部分而言是输入的。


Raising interest rates won’t have much impact on the international price of grains or fuel.	提高利率对农作物或者燃料的国际市场价格并不产生什么影响。


Indeed, given the size of the US economy, a slowdown there might conceivably have a far bigger effect on global prices than a slowdown in any developing country, which suggests that, from a global perspective, US interest rates, not those in developing countries, should be raised.	确实，鉴于美国经济的规模，其经济放缓对于全球价格的影响肯定会大于任一发展中国家。 这就表明，从全球角度而言，美国的利率而非发展中国家的利率应当提高。


So long as developing countries remain integrated into the global economy – and do not take measures to restrain the impact of international prices on domestic prices – domestic prices of rice and other grains are bound to rise markedly when international prices do.	只要发展中国家保留在全球经济之中并且不采取措施限制国际价格对国内价格的影响，当国际大米和其他农作物价格显著上升的时候，其国内价格肯定也会显著上升。


For many developing countries, high oil and food prices represent a triple threat: not only do importing countries have to pay more for grain, they have to pay more to bring it to their countries and still more to deliver it to consumers who may live a long distance from ports.	对于许多发展中国家而言，高昂的油价和食品价格构成了三重威胁，也就是不仅进口国家不得不为农作物付出更高的价钱，而且要支付更高的运费并且在交付给那些远离港口的消费者的时候还要付出更多。


Raising interest rates can reduce aggregate demand, which can slow the economy and tame increases in prices of some goods and services, especially non-traded goods and services.	提高利率可以降低总体需求，这样可以减缓经济并且限制某些商品与服务价格���上升，特别是并不交易的商品和服务。


But, unless taken to an intolerable level, these measures by themselves cannot bring inflation down to the targeted levels.	但是，除非这些措施运用到不可容忍的水平，它们本身并不能够把通货膨胀降低到设定的水平。


For example, even if global energy and food prices increase at a more moderate rate than now – for example, 20% per year – and get reflected in domestic prices, bringing the overall inflation rate to, say, 3% would require markedly falling prices elsewhere.  That would almost surely entail a marked economic slowdown and high unemployment.	例如，即使全球能源和食品价格以更为温和的速度提高(比如说每年20%)并且在国内价格上体现出来，把整体通货膨胀率降低到例如3%将会要求其他地方的价格大幅度下降。 这几乎肯定会造成显著的经济放缓以及高失业率。


The cure would be worse than the disease.	治疗还不如疾病好。


So, what should be done?	那么人们应当做什么呢？


First, politicians, or central bankers, should not be blamed for imported inflation, just as we should not give them credit for low inflation when the global environment is benign.	首先，政坛人物或者央行行长们不应当因输入通货膨胀而遭受职责，正如我们不应当在全球环境良好的时候赞许他们为低通胀做出成绩一样。


Former US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, it is now recognized, deserves much blame for America’s current economic mess.	现在人们认识到，美联储前主席格林斯潘对于美国当前的经济糟糕形势要承担很大的责任。


He is also sometimes given credit for America’s low inflation during his tenure.	他有时候还因为其任期内美国的低通胀而受到赞扬。


But the truth is that America in the Greenspan years benefited from a period of declining commodity prices, and from deflation in China, which helped keep prices of manufactured goods in check.	但是事实是，在格林斯潘年代，基本商品价格下滑而且中国的通货紧缩帮助限制了制造业商品的价格，美国从中受益。


Second, we must recognize that high prices can cause enormous stress, especially for lower-income individuals.	第二，我们必须认识到高物价会造成经济紧张，特别是对于那些低收入人士而言。


Riots and protests in some developing countries are just the worst manifestation of this.	某些发展中国家的骚乱和抗议正式这一局面最差的表现。


Advocates of trade liberalization touted its advantages; but they were never fully honest about its risks, against which markets typically fail to provide adequate insurance.	贸易自由化的鼓吹者们强调它的优势； 但是他们对于其风险从来都不是开诚布公。


Over a quarter-century ago, I showed that, under plausible conditions, trade liberalization could make everyone worse off.	市场对于这些风险通常并不提供足够的保险。 我在25年以前证明，在可能的条件下，贸易自由化有可能让所有人都日子更加难过。


I was not arguing for protectionism, but rather sounding a cautionary note that we must be aware of the downside risks and be prepared to deal with them.	我并不是主张保护主义，而是提出忠告，也就是我们必须清楚负面风险并且准备好应付它们。


When it comes to agriculture, developed countries, such as the US and European Union members, insulate both consumers and farmers from these risks.	在农业问题上，美国和欧盟等发达国家让消费者和农民免于这些风险。


But most developing countries do not have the institutional structures, or the resources, to do likewise.	但是大多数发展中国家并没有机制性结构或者资源也这样做。


Many are imposing emergency measures like export taxes or bans, which help their own citizens, but at the expense of those elsewhere.	许多国家正在实施出口税或者禁止出口等紧急措施。 这些措施帮助了本国的公民，但是其他国家的人要付出代价。


If we are to avoid an even stronger backlash against globalization, the West must respond quickly and strongly.	如果我们想要避免反对全球化的更大浪潮，西方国家就必须立即采取强有力的行动。


Bio-fuel subsidies, which have encouraged the shift of land from producing food into energy, must be repealed.	生物燃料补贴鼓励了把农田从生产粮食转移到生产能源。 这一补贴必须予以取消。


In addition, some of the billions spent to subsidize Western farmers should now be spent to help poorer developing countries meet their basic food and energy needs.	此外，花在补贴西方国家农民身上的数以亿计的钱现在应该用来帮助更为贫困的发展中国家来满足其基本的食品和能源需要。


Most importantly, both developing and developed countries need to abandon inflation targeting.	最为重要的是，发展中国家和发达国家都需要放弃设定通货膨胀目标。


The struggle to meet rising food and energy prices is hard enough.	迎接不断上升的食品和能源价格的斗争已经够艰巨的了。


The weaker economy and higher unemployment that inflation targeting brings won’t have much impact on inflation; it will only make the task of surviving in these conditions more difficult.	通胀目标带来的经济疲软和失业上升对于通货膨胀不会有什么影响； 这只是让在这些条件下生存的任务更为困难。


The Fairness of Financial Rescue	金融救助的公平性


BERKELEY – Perhaps the best way to view a financial crisis is to look at it as a collapse in the risk tolerance of investors in private financial markets. Maybe the collapse stems from lousy internal controls in financial firms that, swaddled by implicit government guarantees, lavish their employees with enormous rewards for risky behavior.	伯克利 ——


Whatever the cause, when the risk tolerance of the market crashes, so do prices of risky financial assets.	恐怕，最好地来看待金融危机的方法就是把它看做是投资者在私人金融市场中风险承受力的一种崩盘。


Everybody knows that there are immense unrealized losses in financial assets, but no one is sure that they know where those losses are.	这种崩盘的原因或许是金融公司内部混乱的监控，在政府潜在的担保下，过于慷慨给与冒险者的巨大经济回报；


To buy – or even to hold – risky assets in such a situation is a recipe for financial disaster.	或许是经过长期的幸运之后，大家都变得过于乐观；


So is buying or holding equity in firms that may be holding risky assets, regardless of how “safe” a firm’s stock was previously thought to be.	或许简单地归结于大家一种非理性的恐慌行为。


This crash in prices of risky financial assets would not overly concern the rest of us were it not for the havoc that it has wrought on the price system, which is sending a peculiar message to the real economy.	不管原因如何，市场对风险的承受力一旦崩塌，金融资产的价格也会随之一落千丈。 每个人都会因此而损失巨大，但都不知道损失是如何产生的。


The price system is saying: shut down risky production activities and don’t undertake any new activities that might be risky.	在此环境下，购买 —— 甚至是持有具有风险的资产无疑是金融灾难的所在。 同样的，不论这个公司在市场上的股价过去是多么的“安全”，现在购买或是持有公司的股权都难以幸免于难。


But there aren’t enough safe, secure, and sound enterprises to absorb all the workers laid off from risky enterprises. And if the decline in nominal wages signals that there is an excess supply of labor, matters only get worse.	价格的崩盘对我们每个人的影响程度或许不同，但价格体系的变化却对实体经济产生一定影响。


General deflation eliminates the capital of yet more financial intermediaries, and makes risky an even larger share of assets that had previously been regarded as safe.	价格体系变化告诉我们：停止有风险的产品，不要再参与新的有风险性行为。


Ever since 1825, central banks’ standard response in such situations – except during the Great Depression of the 1930’s – has been the same: raise and support the prices of risky financial assets, and prevent financial markets from sending a signal to the real economy to shut down risky enterprises and eschew risky investments.	一旦工资水平降低，这就意味着劳动力供过于求，局面更加恶化。 一般性的通缩会导致过多的金融中介机构关门，使得过去一些安全的资产也变得具有风险。


This response is understandably controversial, because it rewards those who bet on risky assets, many of whom accepted risk with open eyes and bear some responsibility for causing the crisis. But an effective rescue cannot be done any other way.	自从 1825 年起，除了 1930 年代的大萧条之外，央行对此一般的做法都是如此：将风险性的金融资产保值，防止金融市场的风险波及到实体经济上，关掉风险性的企业，避免冒险性投资。


The political problem can be finessed: as Don Kohn, a vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve, recently observed, teaching a few thousand feckless financiers not to over-speculate is much less important than securing the jobs of millions of Americans and tens of millions around the globe.	这种做法一直有所争议，因为它奖赏了那些制造风险资产的人，许多对风险保持警惕的人反而因为危机而承担了后果。 但要想有效的救助，只能这样做。


Financial rescue operations that benefit even the unworthy can be accepted if they are seen as benefiting all – even if the unworthy gain more than their share of the benefits.	在让那些风险资产的业主破产的同时，也就是对实体经济的活力关上 了大门。


What cannot be accepted are financial rescue operations that benefit the unworthy and cause losses to other important groups – like taxpayers and wage earners.	政治问题可以如此平衡：正如美联储副主席唐 • 科恩说的那样，要想给几千个金融冒险家一个教训，那就会导致美国数百万个工作岗位，甚至全球数千万个工作的丧失。


And that, unfortunately, is the perception held by many nowadays, particularly in the United States.	金融救助即便是那些不值得救助的人，但如果大家都可以受益的话，还是可以接受的 —— 尽管那些金融冒险家是最大的受益者。


It is easy to see why.	但有一种情况不能接受，那就是救助了那些冒险家，却给其他重要团体带来损失 —— 例如纳税人和工薪一族。 这样的情形如今非常普遍，特别是在美国。


When Vice Presidential candidate Jack Kemp attacked Vice President Al Gore in 1996 for the Clinton administration’s decision to bail out Mexico’s feckless government during the 1994-1995 financial crisis, Gore responded that America made $1.5 billion on the deal.	我们很容易知道为什么会这样。


Similarly, Clinton’s treasury secretary, Robert Rubin, and IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus were attacked for committing public money to bail out New York banks that had loaned to feckless East Asians in 1997-1998.	当 1994-1995 年的墨西哥金融危机之时，当时的共和党副总统候选人杰克 .


They responded that they had not rescued the truly bad speculative actor, Russia; that they had “bailed in,” not bailed out, the New York banks, by requiring them to cough up additional money to support South Korea’s economy; and that everyone had benefited massively, because a global recession was avoided.	坎普攻击克林顿政府的戈尔副总统对墨西哥政府伸出援助之手时，戈尔答道，美国在此交易中赚到 15 亿美元。


Now, however, the US government can say none of these things. Officials cannot say that a global recession has been avoided; that they “bailed in” the banks; that – with the exception of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – they forced the bad speculative actors into bankruptcy; or that the government made money on the deal.	同样的， 1997 年亚洲金融风暴中，当克林顿的财政部长鲁宾和 IMF 总裁康德苏对纽��银行实施救助时，也饱受责难，他们回应道，我们没有救助当时真正的投机祸首俄罗斯，我们是救助自己人，没有救外人，同时，纽约银行必须给北朝鲜额外的资助，此次救助化解了全球性危机，于是每个人都获利颇丰。


It is still true that the banking-sector policies that were undertaken were good – or at least better than doing nothing.	然而如今，美国政府却不能以此作为借口：政府官员不能说一场全球性的危机得以化解；


But the certainty that matters would have been much worse under a hands-off approach to the financial sector, à la Republican Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in 1930-1931, is not concrete enough to alter public perceptions.	也不能说他们拯救自己的银行 —— 贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟除外 —— 他们迫使冒险者破产；


What is concrete enough are soaring bankers’ bonuses and a real economy that continues to shed jobs.	更不能说政府在交易中赚到了钱。


The Fallen Heroes of the Financial Crisis	经济危机的殉难者


PARIS – Oscar Wilde said that experience is the name we give to our mistakes.	发自巴黎——王尔德曾说过：所谓经验，只不过是我们给错误所取的名字而已。


Last year, we tried to analyze the errors that led the world into economic crisis. Now it is time to analyze the mistakes we made when trying to get out of it.	去年我们尝试去分析那些导致整个世界陷入金融危机的失误，而如今也是时候分析一下我们在找出前者的过程中另外犯下的失误了。


When the scale of the crisis became clear last year, many were certain that it would be managed badly. But perhaps we should be grateful that it was managed at all.	当危机的严峻程度在去年充分暴露出来之时，许多人都认定政府应对危机的手段将极为拙劣，但至少我们该庆幸至少还有人出手去应对危机。


Unlike in the 1930’s, decision-makers acted quickly, ignoring dogmas that warned against rapid intervention.	与1930年代不同的是，决策者们反应相当迅速，把那些反对政府过早干涉市场的教条抛在了脑后。


Moreover, they knew that, in contrast to the inter-war period, close international coordination would be needed.	此外政治家们也意识到，与两次世界大战中间的那段时期相比，他们需要更紧密的国际合作。


In 2008-2009, the influence of the G-20 grew, at the expense of the G-8.	于是在2008~2009年间G20的影响力不断增大而G8的号召力则逐渐萎缩。


People became aware of the need for truly global governance. And, at long last, a number of proposals emerged aimed at making such governance a reality.	人们都意识到必须实现真正的全球治理，最终也制定出一系列方案将这种治理变为现实。


Experience, it turns out, is not just the name we give to our mistakes.	这表明经验并不仅仅是我们为错误所取的名字。


As the financial crisis has shown, it is also the process that enables us to increase our understanding and ultimately to envisage a new world.	随着金融危机的出现，经验也同时成为确保我们增进自身理解并最终实现新世界的一个进程。


Unfortunately, however, this process has not gone far enough, enabling many banks, governments, and international institutions to return to “business as usual.”	但不幸的是这一进程却未能推进得足够深入，以致让许多银行，政府和国际机构都退回到了那种“原始状态”。


Indeed, today the global economy’s arsonists have become prosecutors, and accuse the fire fighters of having provoked flooding.	事实上，如今一手造成金融危机的纵火者已经摇身一变成为了检察官，还指控消防员激起了群众的愤怒。


At the peak of the crisis, governments had an opportunity to create a new global financial infrastructure. But they let it slip through their fingers.	在危机最严峻的时期，各国政府拥有一个创建国际金融新架构的好机会，但这却被白白浪费掉了。


The fact that many Western economies got out of recession last year should not fool us into thinking that the crisis was only a brief interlude, and that the post-crisis world can return to the pre-crisis status quo.	虽然许多西方经济体已经在去年成功摆脱了衰退，但这并不能阻止我们怀疑这场危机是否只是某出戏剧的中场休息环节，而接着的后危机时代是否会回复到前危机中的那种糟糕状况。


There is pressure to re-write the history of this crisis by depicting effects as if they were causes, and to blame the governments that managed the crisis for starting it.	已经有些人开始要求重写整个危机的历史，将各国所做的努力解释为成因，并指责那些应对危机的政府其实是危机的始作俑者。


A low point – perhaps one should say the height of ridiculousness – was reached last year when rating agencies intensified their surveillance of government debt, and markets that had been victimized by the agencies’ incompetence and bad faith became fixated on their evaluations.	一个低点——或者可以将其称为一处荒谬剧的高潮——就在去年发生，当时那些评级机构纷纷调低对各国政府债券的评级，而被这些机构的失职所害的市场则迟迟无法打消对它们的怀疑。


Lehman Brothers had been awarded a high rating on the very eve of its collapse, yet now the rating agencies criticize governments that pulled the global economy back from the abyss for violating accounting principles.	在崩溃逼近的前夕雷曼兄弟竟然还得到了一个很高的评级，谁知现在那些评级机构却反咬一口，指责政府用破坏会计准则的方式将世界经济从深渊中拉出来。


Are rating agencies and the markets really so ill-informed about public spending?	那些评级机构和市场真的对公共支出一无所知吗？


According to the International Monetary Fund, G-20 countries earmarked 17.6% of their GDP on average to supporting their banking systems, although they spent much less.	据世界货币基金组织的统计，G20成员国原定计划拨付占GDP总量17. 8%的资金来支持其银行系统，当然最后的花费比这个数字要少。


Likewise, spending to stimulate the real economy totaled only 0.5% of GDP in 2008, 1.5% in 2009, and probably 1% this year.	同样，2008年在刺激实体经济方面的支出只占了GDP的0. 5%，而2009年则上升到1.


In total, the recovery plans of European Union members came to only 1.6% of GDP compared with 5.6% in the US.	5%，2010年则大概为1%。 总计下来，欧盟成员国的经济复苏计划只占其GDP的1.


Governments took the right measures to save the banks, but ignored the political consequences.	各国政府都采取了正确的手段去拯救银行，但却忽视了其政治后果。


By doling out vast sums of money to rescue the financial system, without asking for genuine guarantees in return, they showed a lack of foresight.	政府斥巨资拯救金融系统，却没有要求银行做出相应的承诺，这点是缺乏远见的。


Acknowledging that rating agencies were incompetent without doing anything to regulate them was inexcusable.	单纯指出评级机构的无能，却不对他们进行任何监管，这也是不可饶恕的。


As a result, taxpayers may need to pay twice, once for the bailout and again for the low-quality debt they have incurred during the bailout, as the austerity programs unveiled in Europe attest.	结果纳税人就必须为此付两次钱，一次是给拯救计划，而第二次是给拯救计划中所担负下来的那些劣质债务，正如欧洲披露的紧缩计划所证明的那样。


Paradoxically, the growing sense that a catastrophe has been averted has given rise to a growing demand for governments to cut public and social spending, and to refrain from proposing investment programs.	矛盾的是,，那种大灾已过的思想令公众不断要求政府削减公共和社会支出，并停止出台投资项目。


People are racing back to the policies that caused the crisis in the first place.	人们又重新投身于原先导致危机的政策当中。


But governments are not guilty of deceiving the public; if anything, they acted naïvely and are now paying the price.	但政府并不应该负上蒙蔽公众的罪责； 更可能的是，他们正在为原先的幼稚行为付出代价。


Governments really have no choice: they must take responsibility and exercise power, even if it requires swimming against the tide of public opinion – and especially if it can help alleviate the social suffering brought on by the crisis.	各国政府都无从选择：他们必须承担起责任并行使权力，即便这意味着违背民意——特别是这些行为有助于缓解危机所导致的社会苦难时。


Indeed, we should remember that economic growth was sustainable only in countries with highly developed social welfare systems, like France.	事实上，我们应知道只有在那些社会福利系统高度完善的国家，经济增长才是可持续的，比如法国。


Yes, these countries will recover at a slower pace than elsewhere, but countries that have fallen into a deep hole must work harder than those that have fallen into a shallow one.	没错，这些国家的复苏将比其他国家要慢，但那些陷入了大麻烦的国家显然要比问题较少的国家付出更多努力。


Perhaps most importantly, the drive for greater competitiveness, regardless of the cost, will only aggravate the crisis.	或许最重要的是，无论其实施成本多大，那种增强竞争力的做法都只能令危机更加恶化。


After all, export-led growth policies can succeed only if other countries are willing to run deficits.	毕竟出口导向的政策只有在其他国家愿意实施赤字财政的时候才能成功。


Given that the global imbalances that led to the crisis remain unaddressed, increased competitiveness will be a Pyrrhic victory – and one that will exact a severe toll on domestic living standards and consumption.	考虑到导致危机的全球贸易失衡依然存在，增加竞争力只能获得一场惨胜——而且对各国国内生活水平和消费都会带来惨重打击。


The Fallen Pharaoh	垮台的法老


Egypt’s Kifaya Movement has raised the ante in its opposition to President Hosni Mubarak’s regime by issuing a massive report that dares to name names and detail corruption among the country’s leaders.	埃及因纳夫运动（Kifaya Movement）发表了一份长篇报告，大胆地披露了国内领导人贪污的具体细节和姓名，为反对胡斯尼·穆巴拉克（Hosni Mubarak）总统的独裁统治押上了更大的筹码。


Nothing in Egypt’s long history has ever equaled this airing of the country’s dirtiest laundry.	在埃及悠久的历史上，没有哪一事件能够与这次对国内最肮脏的洗钱运动的揭露相媲美。


Kifaya’s action is especially bold in the midst of a government crackdown to prepare the way for the succession of Mubarak’s son, Gamal.	在为穆巴拉克之子贾迈勒继位铺平道路的政府镇压运动中，因纳夫的这次行动显得尤其大胆。


For example, a recent law mandates punishment for anyone who spreads rumors that Gamal is to be the next president.	比如，不久前通过的一项法律规定：传播贾迈勒继位流言的任何人都必须受到惩罚。


Corruption in Egypt, as in other Arab states, is so extensive as to undermine the possibility of economic advancement, higher living standards, a free media, independent courts, and democracy.	埃及流传甚广的腐败甚至威胁到了经济发展、生活水平提高、言论自由、司法独立和民主赖以存在的基础，这一点和其他阿拉伯国家的情况并无二致。


Egypt’s political elite, fearful of critical media coverage, defeat in fair elections, and even imprisonment, prefer the existing regime and oppose any significant reform.	埃及的精英政治人物惧怕媒体的批评报导、惧怕自己会在公平选举中落败乃至锒铛入狱，所以他们更愿意维持独裁现状，反对进行任何重大的改革。


This is a key theme of the report, entitled Corruption in Egypt: A Black Cloud That Never Passes.	以上就是这份名为《埃及的腐败：挥之不去的阴云》的报告的主题。


As long as the system is corrupted from above, and as long as the only way common people can deal with the government is through bribery, says the report, inefficiency will reign and people will cheat each other.	这份报告中提到，只要国家的体制存在自上而下的腐败、只要平民百姓必须通过贿赂政府来达成自己的目的，效率低下就会永远存在，人们就会相互欺骗。


The only way to break this vicious circle is to replace the regime.	打破这个邪恶怪圈的唯一方法就是更换政府。


At the same time, as was seen in Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Authority, a corrupt regime encourages people to turn to radical Islamists, who work hard to present themselves as honest.	与此同时，正如人们在雅瑟·阿拉法特（Yasir Arafat）的巴勒斯坦政权中亲眼所见，一个腐败的政府促使人们变成极端伊斯兰主义分子，这些人为塑造诚实的形象耗费了巨大的努力。


If the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power in Egypt one day, Kifaya’s report will explain a lot about how it happened.	如果有一天穆斯林兄弟会(Muslim Brotherhood)能够在埃及掌权，这份因纳夫运动的报告将很好地解释其中隐藏的缘由。


The report begins by joking that Egypt’s name should be changed to “Fasadistan,” the land of corruption.	报告一开始就戏谑地提出埃及的名字应当改作腐败的国度（“Fasadistan”）。


It documents cases relating to housing, business, health, transportation, trade, banks, drugs, agriculture, politics, culture, and the media.	报告辑录了与住房、商业、医疗、运输、贸易、银行、药物、农业、政治、文化和媒体有关的案例。


One chapter covers how the security forces control appointments to all key jobs, including in schools and universities.	其中一章揭露了安全力量是如何操控所有关键位置的人事任免，甚至连学院和大学也不能幸免于难。


But the most dramatic part of the book concerns Mubarak himself.	但该书最富戏剧性的段落还是与穆巴拉克有关。


An anecdote in the report, which rings true, has Mubarak meeting with officers of the Third Army two years ago.	报告中收录了一则似乎确实的轶事报导，说穆巴拉克两年前曾经接见过第三军的军官。


Some of the younger officers complained about corruption.	有些青年军官向他抱怨国内的腐败状况。


Mubarak apparently surprised them by saying that he knew that many leading people in the country were thieves, but that he believed they had stolen enough to keep them happy.	穆巴拉克的回答显然让他们大吃一惊，这位总统说他知道国内很多领导人物都是窃贼，但他相信他们已经偷得心满意足了。


He was afraid, he explained, that if he appointed new people they would start over in their depredations, putting a much heavier burden on Egypt.	他解释说，他担心如果任命新的领导，他们会开始新一轮的掠夺，这样只会加重埃及的负担。


According to the report, however, Mubarak; his wife, Susan; and his two sons, Gamal and Alaa, are far from being mere bystanders.	但是按照报告中的说法，穆巴拉克、他的夫人苏珊、以及他的两个儿子贾迈勒和阿莱，远远没有袖手旁观那么简单。


When Mubarak became president in 1981, parliament granted him the right to control all military contracts without legislative oversight.	穆巴拉克在1981年成为总统后，就从议会得到了在没有任何立法监督情况下控制所有军事合同的生杀大权。


In effect, the report states, he has a monopoly on military spending and imports, apparently a rich source of kickbacks each time he approves a deal.	实际上，报告谈到他有权独自决定军事开支和军事进口，每批准一项交易显然都会给他带来极为丰厚的回扣酬劳。


Similarly, Susan Mubarak is the head of as many as 100 charities that often exist only on paper.	与此相似，苏珊·穆巴拉克在多达100家慈善团体担任首脑，而这些团体大多只存在于字里行间。


The report charges that as much as $5 million might go to one of these institutions in a year, but that a large portion is then siphoned off to her secret foreign bank accounts.	报告指控每年流往其中某家机构的款项可能高达500万美元，但其中的很大部分很快被她在国外开设的秘密银行帐号所吞没。


Ironically, Susan Mubarak, says the report, urged the passage of a 1992 law that permitted Egyptian non-governmental organizations to receive foreign funds – a provision used by some opposition groups – in order to provide channels for the NGO’s she runs.	具有讽刺意味的是，苏珊·穆巴拉克1992年敦促通过了一项法律，允许埃及非政府组织接受国外资金，以便为自己管理的非政府组织提供渠道，这项规定也为一些反对组织打开了方便之门。


The president’s son Gamal also has his own charities that provide him with money, claims Kifaya, including the famous al-Mustaqbal organization.	总统的儿子贾迈勒也掌握着为他生钱的慈善机构，其中包括闻名遐尔的al-Mustaqbal组织。


Mubarak’s two sons are said by the report to receive profit-making partnerships – without making any investment – in a large number of companies, including Phillip Morris, Skoda Auto, Movenpick, Vodafone, McDonalds, and many others.	报告称穆巴拉克的两个儿子在很多公司担任盈利合伙人¾却用不着任何投资¾其中包括菲利普·莫里斯、斯柯达汽车、莫文皮克（Movenpick）、沃达丰（Vodafone）、麦当劳和很多其他企业。


They can also, it adds, obtain unsecured bank loans for themselves and their friends.	报告还透露，总统公子可以为自己和朋友拿到不用任何担保的银行贷款。


The report maintains that these funds are often used to participate in illegal financial transactions, arms’ dealing, and money laundering.	报告透露，这些资金常被用作进行非法金融交易、买卖武器和洗钱之用。


The sons’ interests allegedly also include forays into drug smuggling and illegal exports of archaeological treasures – Egypt’s cultural heritage – in partnership with Culture Minister Faruq Husni, who is supposed to safeguard them.	总统公子的兴趣据称还包括与文化部长胡斯尼串通一气走私毒品和非法出口古埃及的文化遗产¾珍贵古董，而文化部长则在交易中充当他们的保护伞。


Anyone who stands in their way, according to the report, can be thrown into prison on false charges of drug dealing.	任何妨碍他们行动的人都会被安上子虚乌有的贩毒罪名投进监狱。


Other cabinet ministers are no better, Kifaya claims.	据因纳夫报告指称，其他内阁部长也好不到哪去。


Boutros Ghali, nephew of the former UN Secretary-General, Interior Minister Habib Aladli, and such powerful figures as Ibrahim Suleiman and Safwat Sharif are engaged in similar deals, sometimes in partnership with Mubarak’s sons.	前联合国秘书长的侄子布特罗斯·加利（Boutros Ghali）、内政部长哈比比·阿达里（Habib Aladli）以及像易卜拉欣·苏莱曼（Ibrahim Suleiman）和萨福瓦特•谢里夫（Safwat Sharif）这样的实权人物也都在干着类似的勾当，有时还会与穆巴拉克的儿子勾结在一起。


In short, the report says, officials can do what they like, unbound by law or transparency.	简而言之，报告说官员们可以随心所欲，而不受法律或透明度的任何约束。


By using the “emergency law,” which has restricted freedom since 1981, together with censorship and rigged elections, Egypt’s government treats its citizens like serfs.	通过在1981年以后实行限制自由的“紧急状态法”，建立严格的审查制度和操纵选举，埃及的政府像对待奴隶一样压制埃及的国民。


Meanwhile, massive corruption is devastating Egypt’s economy, with growth falling by half in the last two years, accompanied by rising unemployment, higher inflation, and currency depreciation.	与此同时，大规模的腐败彻底破坏了埃及的经济，近两年来的经济增长减少将近一半以上，随之而来的还有失业率上升、通货膨胀增大和货币贬值。


Foreign investment is also declining, and local production is paralyzed, necessitating expensive imports.	外国投资也在持续下降，当地生产陷入瘫痪，迫使埃及必须进口许多昂贵的物品。


The discontent fueled by these failures is a major potential cause of unrest.	上述问题引发的不满情绪是导致局势不稳的主要潜在原因。


By issuing such a detailed report and daring to name Mubarak and his family as the prime culprits, Kifaya is challenging the regime head-on.	通过发表这样一份长篇报告，大胆指称穆巴拉克及其家人为主要责任者，因纳夫运动正在向独裁政府发起正面的挑战。


The need for reform, it argues, is not based merely on a desire for better government or abstract rights, but is necessary to save a country that is being strangled.	因纳夫报告指出，改革的需要不仅来源于人们对完善政府或抽象权利的渴望，而且对于拯救这个正在被慢慢扼杀的国家有着绝对的必要。


The regime may respond by trying to tighten the noose.	独裁政权的反应可能是企图进一步加强对舆论的控制。


The Decline of Renewable Energy	绿色能源的衰落


PRAGUE – Many today believe that renewable energy will let us get off fossil fuels soon.	布拉格—如今，很多人相信可再生能源很快就能让我们摆脱化石燃料。


Unfortunately, the facts say otherwise.	不幸的是，事实正好相反。


According to International Energy Agency data, 13.12% of the world’s energy came from renewables in 1971, the first year that the IEA reported global statistics.	据国际能源署（IEA）的数据，1971年世界能源中有13. 12%来自可再生能源，这也是IEA第一次报告全球数字。


In 2011, renewables’ share was actually lower, at 12.99%.	2011年，可再生能源的比例实际上有所缩小，为12. 99%。


Yet a new survey shows that Americans believe that the share of renewables in 2035 will be 30.2%.	但新调查显示，美国人认为到2035年，可再生能源比例将是30. 5%。


In reality, it will likely be 14.5%.	现实可能性大概在14. 5%。


Solar and wind energy account for a trivial proportion of current renewables – about one-third of one percentage point.	太阳能和风能在现有可再生能源格局中几可忽略不计，大概只占三分之一个百分点。


The vast majority comes from biomass, or wood and plant material – humanity’s oldest energy source.	绝大部分可再生能源来自生物，即木头和植物材料——人类最古老的能量源。


While biomass is renewable, it is often neither good nor sustainable.	生物能固然是可再生的，但它既不好，也不可持续。


Burning wood in pre-industrial Western Europe caused massive deforestation, as is occurring in much of the developing world today. The indoor air pollution that biomass produces kills more than three million people annually.	前工业化时代，燃烧木料导致西欧森林大面积被毁，今天的大量发展中国家也在重蹈这一覆辙。 生物能产生的室内空气污染每年要夺走300多万人的生命。


Likewise, modern energy crops increase deforestation, displace agriculture, and push up food prices.	类似地，现代能源作物恶化了毁林状况、挤出了农业、推高了食品价格。


The most renewables-intensive places in the world are also the poorest.	世界上可再生能源最密集的地区正是最贫困的地区。


Africa gets almost 50% of its energy from renewables, compared to just 8% for the OECD.	非洲有近50%的能源来自可再生能源，而经合组织国家只有8%。


Even the European OECD countries, at 11.8%, are below the global average.	在欧洲经合组织国家，这一比例为11. 8%，也低于全球平均水平。


The reality is that humanity has spent recent centuries getting away from renewables.	事实是，几百年来人类越来越少地使用可再生能源。


In 1800, the world obtained 94% of its energy from renewable sources.	1880年，世界能源的94%来自可再生能源。


That figure has been declining ever since.	这一比例此后一直在下降。


The momentous move toward fossil fuels has done a lot of good.	转向化石燃料的有力趋势带来了诸多好处。


Compared to 250 years ago, the average person in the United Kingdom today has access to 50 times more power, travels 250 times farther, and has 37,500 times more light.	与250年前相比，今天平均每个英国人可以获得多50倍的电力、250倍的旅行距离、37500倍的光明。


Incomes have increased 20-fold.	收入则增加了20倍。


The switch to fossil fuels has also had tremendous environmental benefits.	转向化石燃料还带来了巨大的环境好处。


Kerosene saved the whales (which had been hunted almost to extinction to provide supposedly “renewable” whale oil for lighting).	煤油拯救了鲸鱼（从前，为了供应被认为“可再生”的鲸油用于照明，鲸鱼几乎被捕杀殆尽）。


Coal saved Europe’s forests.	煤炭拯救了欧洲的森林。


With electrification, indoor air pollution, which is much more dangerous than outdoor air pollution, disappeared in most of the developed world.	而电气化让比室外空气污染危险得多的室内污染在发达国家成为了历史。


And there is one environmental benefit that is often overlooked: in 1910, more than 30% of farmland in the United States was used to produce fodder for horses and mules.	还有一项常被忽视的环境好处：1910年，美国30%以上的农地被用于生产马匹和骡子所需要的饲料。


Tractors and cars eradicated this huge demand on farmland (while ridding cities of manure pollution).	拖拉机和汽车让农场不再有这项需求（也让城市免受肥料污染）。


Of course, fossil fuels brought their own environmental problems.	当然，化石燃料也有其自身的环境问题。


And, while technological innovations like scrubbers on smokestacks and catalytic converters on cars have reduced local air pollution substantially, the problem of CO₂ emissions remains.	此外，尽管烟囱洗涤装置和汽车催化转换器极大地减少了本地空气污染，但二氧化碳排放问题依然存在。


Indeed, it is the main reason for the world’s clamor for a return to renewables.	事实上，这正是���吁世界重回可再生能源的主要理由。


To be sure, wind and solar have increased dramatically.	平心而论，风能和太阳能增长迅猛。


Since 1990, wind-generated power has grown 26% per year and solar a phenomenal 48%.	自1990年以来，风能发电每年增长26%，太阳能更是达到了令人惊叹的48%。 但这只是从无到有。


But the growth has been from almost nothing to slightly more than almost nothing.	1990年，风能占全世界能源之比为0. 0038%；


In 1990, wind produced 0.0038% of the world’s energy; it is now producing 0.29%.	现在达到了0. 29%。


Solar-electric power has gone from essentially zero to 0.04%.	太阳能电力从几乎为零增长至0. 04%。


Yes, Denmark gets a record 34% of its electricity from wind.	是的，丹麦创出了34%的电力靠风能的记录。


But electricity accounts for only 18% of its final energy use.	但电力只占丹麦最终能源使用量的18%。


Europe now gets 1% of its energy from wind – less than before industrialization, when cozy windmills contributed about 2% (and ships’ sails provided another 1%).	目前欧洲有1%的能源来自风能——比工业化前的水平还要低，当时转动舒缓的风车贡献了2%的能源（船帆也贡献了1%）。


The UK set its record for wind power in 1804, when its share reached 2.5% – almost three times its level today.	英国风能占比记录出现在1804年，比重为2. 5%，是今天水平的近三倍。


Moreover, solar and wind will still contribute very little in the coming decades.	此外，在未来数十年中，太阳能和风能的贡献比例不会有太多变化。


In the IEA’s optimistic scenario, which assumes that the world’s governments will fulfill all of their green promises, wind will provide 1.34% of global energy by 2035, while solar will provide 0.42%.	根据IEA的乐观情景——假设世界各国政府将充分兑现其绿色承诺——到2035年，风能将提供全球能源的1. 34%，太阳能提供0.


Global renewables will most likely increase by roughly 1.5 percentage points, to 14.5% by 2035.	2035年全球可再生能源比例有望增加1. 5个百分点左右，达到14.


Under unrealistically optimistic assumptions, the share could increase five percentage points, to 17.9%.	5%。 在不现实的乐观假设下，这一比例将增加五个百分点，至17.


So we are nowhere near switching back to renewables anytime soon.	因此，我们远没有站在重归可再生能源的门槛上。


In the US, renewables accounted for 9.3% of energy production in 1949.	在美国，1949年可再生能源占能源产量的9. 3%。


President Barack Obama’s administration expects that number, almost a century later, to increase slightly, to 10.8% by 2040.	总统奥巴马的政府预计，到近一个世纪后的2040年，这一比例将略有上升，达到10. 8%。


In China, renewables’ share in energy production dropped from 40% in 1971 to 11% today; in 2035, it will likely be just 9%.	在中国，可再生能源占能源产量的比例从1971年的40%降至今天的11%； 到2035年，可能只有9%。


Yet we are paying through the nose for these renewables.	但我们为这些 可再生能源投入得太多。


In the last 12 years, the world has invested $1.6 trillion in clean energy.	在过去12年中，全世界清洁能源投资总量为1. 6万亿美元。


By 2020, the effort to increase reliance on renewables will cost the European Union alone $250 billion annually.	2020年，增加可再生能源依存度的措施光是在欧盟每年就将耗费2500亿美元。


Spain now pays almost 1% of its GDP in subsidies for renewables, which is more than it spends on higher education.	目前，西班牙将GDP的1%用于补贴可再生能源，比花在高等教育上的钱还要多。


At the end of the century, Spain’s massive investment will have postponed global warming by 62 hours.	到本世纪末，西班牙的巨大投资将可以让全球变暖停止62小时。


Current green energy policies are failing for a simple reason: renewables are far too expensive.	当前绿色能源政策失败的原因很简单：可再生能源太贵了。


Sometimes people claim that renewables are actually cheaper.	时不时有人站出来说，可再生能源其实更便宜。


But if renewables were cheaper, they wouldn’t need subsidies, and we wouldn’t need climate policies.	但如果可再生能源更便宜的话，它们就不需要补贴，我们也不需要气候政策了。


Former US Vice President Al Gore’s climate adviser, Jim Hansen, put it bluntly: “Suggesting that renewables will let us phase rapidly off fossil fuels in the United States, China, India, or the world as a whole is almost the equivalent of believing in the Easter Bunny and [the] Tooth Fairy.”	前美国副总统戈尔的气候顾问汉森（Jim Hansen）直率地指出：“说可再生能源可以让我们迅速抑制美国、中国、印度或全世界化石燃料用量和相信存在复活节兔子和牙仙是一样的。 ”


The solution is to innovate the price of renewables downward.	解决方案时用创新让可再生能源价格降下来。


We need a dramatic increase in funding for research and development to make the next generations of wind, solar, and biomass energy cheaper and more effective.	我们需要大量增加研发资金，让下一代风能、太阳能和生物能更便宜、更高效。


Consider China.	以中国为例。


Despite the country’s massive investment in solar and wind, it mostly sells solar panels to Western countries at subsidized prices.	尽管中国大手笔投资风能和太阳能，但主要是以补贴价向西方国家出售太阳能面板。 风能只占中国能源总量的0.


Wind makes up just 0.2% of China’s energy, and solar accounts for 0.01%.	2%，太阳能只占0. 01%。


Meanwhile, China has 68% of the world’s solar water heaters on rooftops, because it is a smart and cheap technology.	与此同时，中国拥有全世界68%的屋顶太阳能热水器，因为这是一项智能而廉价的技术。


It needs no subsidies, and it produces 50 times more energy than all of China’s solar panels.	它不需要补贴，并且产生的能源比中国太阳能面板加起来还要多50%。


When green renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels, they will take over the world.	当绿色可再生能源比化石燃料更便宜时，它们就能主宰世界。


Instead of believing in the Tooth Fairy, we should start investing in green R&D.	我们不应该相信牙仙，而应该开始投资绿色研发。


The Fall of the House of Murdoch	默多克阵营的覆灭


NEW YORK – During the four decades since the Watergate affair engulfed US President Richard Nixon, politicians have repeatedly ignored the scandal’s main lesson: the cover-up is worse than the crime.	发自纽约——在水门事件将美国总统理查德·尼克松拉下马后近40年来，政治家们一再忽视了事件所留下的最深刻教训：掩盖罪行的行为往往比罪行本身更加恶劣。


Like Nixon, they have paid a higher price for concealing their misdeeds than they would have for the misdeeds alone.	而尼克松这伙人为掩盖自身恶行所付出的代价也比恶行本身更为高昂。


Now, for once, comes a scandal that breaks that rule: the United Kingdom’s phone-hacking affair, which has shaken British politics to its foundations.	而如今曝光的一条丑闻却打破了这条惯例：那就是触动了英国政治底线的窃听事件。


Over the past decade, the tabloid newspaper The News of the World, owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, targeted 4,000 people’s voicemail.	在过去10年来，《世界新闻报》这个隶属于鲁伯特·默多克新闻集团旗下的小报把目标对准了近4000人的电话语音信箱。


The list includes not only royalty, celebrities, and other VIPs, but also the families of servicemen killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and those of victims of the July 2005 terrorist attack in London.	其中不但包括王室成员，社会名流和其他重要人物，还包括阿富汗和伊拉克阵亡英军的家属以及2005年7月伦敦恐怖袭击遇难者的亲人。


It all unraveled when The Guardian reported that the tabloid had hacked into the voicemail of missing 13-year-old Milly Dowler, apparently in the hope of obtaining some private expressions of family members’ grief or desperation that it could splash on its front page.	这个八卦小报窃听13岁失踪儿童Milly Dowler的语音信箱以便获取其家人的绝望言论作为头条，不料却被《卫报》发现并公诸于世。


When the girl’s murdered body was found six months later, the family and the police thought she might still be alive, because The News of the World’s operatives were deleting messages when her phone’s mailbox became full.	因为《世界新闻报》的操作人员在女孩语音信箱已满的时候删除了一些信息，以至于当这个小女孩的尸体在失踪6个月后被发现之时，家属和警方都以为她可能还活着。


(According to Scotland Yard, Murdoch hacks reportedly bribed mid-level police officers to supply information as well.)	（根据伦敦警务处总部的报告，默多克同时还窃听了那些据报受到了贿赂的中级警务人员以获取信息。 ）


In the extensive annals of eavesdropping, all of this is something new.	在窃听的漫长历史中，上述一切都是相当新奇的。


Not even Stalin wiretapped the dead.	要知道即便是斯大林也不会窃听死者的电话。


A cover-up ensued.	掩盖行为接着发生了。


James Murdoch, Rupert’s son and Chairman and Chief Executive of News Corporation’s European and Asian operations, authorized a secret payment of £1 million ($1.6 million) to buy the silence of hacking victims.	鲁伯特·默多克的儿子，新闻集团欧亚分部的主席和首席执行官詹姆斯·默多克批准秘密支付1亿英镑（约合1.


Millions of in-house emails reportedly have been destroyed.	6亿美元）的封口费给被窃听者。


Still, it seems safe to say that the peculiarly repellant inhumanity of the original deeds will remain more shocking than the details of this or any other cover-up.	据报有数百万封内部邮件被销毁。 但原来那种骇人听闻的无耻窃听行为似乎依然比掩盖行为更令人感到震惊。


Even so, the political consequences of the phone-hacking scandal will depend on far more than the outcome of the official investigations now underway in Britain. Above all, the scandal’s impact will depend on how governments and citizens assess what News Corporation really is.	但既便如此，这起电话窃听丑闻的政治后果将不仅取决于现在英国当前的调查行动，而最终取决于政府和市民们将如何看待新闻集团。


The Murdochs call News Corporation a journalistic enterprise.	默多克家族将新闻集团称之为一个记者型企业。


In fact, it is, first, an entertainment company, with the bulk of its revenue coming from its film and television holdings.	事实上它却首先是一个娱乐业企业，因为其收益的绝大部分都来源于下属的电影电视控股公司。


Second, and more importantly, it is a propaganda machine for right-wing causes and political figures.	而其次也是更重要的一点，则是它作为右翼势力和政治人物宣传机器的角色。


This is News Corporation’s main face in the US, in the form of Fox News, whose hallmark has been relentless propagation of right-wing ideology.	新闻集团在美国的主要面目就是以福克斯新闻网的形式展现出来，而该频道则充斥着对右翼意识形态的各式宣传。


Whereas political propaganda had once been the domain of governments and political parties, Fox News is formally independent of both – though itoverwhelmingly serves the interests of America’s Republican Party.	虽然政治宣传曾经是政府和政治党派的主要任务，而福克斯新闻则在形式上独立于这两股力量——但它却一面倒地在为美国共和党的利益服务。


In Britain, News Corporation has been creating a sort of state unto itself by corrupting the police, assuming police powers of surveillance, and intimidating politicians into looking the other way.	在英国，新闻集团通过贿赂警察，承担警察的监控权力，以及恐吓政客不要多管闲事，俨然成为了一个国中之国。


In the US, it has behaved similarly, using corporate media power to breathe life into a stand-alone political organization, the Tea Party.	该集团在美国也类似有类似的作为，就是利用其自身企业媒体力量来向一个长期孤立的政治组织——茶党——打强心针。


All of this is far removed from what a journalistic organization is supposed to do.	所有这一切都与一个记者型组织的行为相差甚远。


Journalism’s essential role in a democracy is to enable people to fulfill their roles as citizens by providing information about government, other powerful institutions, civil movements, international events, and so on.	在一个民主制度里，新闻业的重要角色就是通过提供关于政府，其他权力机构，公民运动，国际事务等信息，使人们能够履行其作为公民的责任。


But News Corporation replaces such journalism with titillation and gossip, as it did when it took over the 168-year-old News of the World and turned it into a tabloid in 1984, and with partisan campaigns, as it did when it created Fox News in 1996.	但新闻集团却用调侃和八卦代替了新闻，正如其接管了拥有168年历史的《世界新闻报》并将其转变为一个八卦小报，并在1996年创立福克斯新闻网用于党派斗争中那样。


Not surprisingly, at Fox News, as at many other News Corporation outlets, editorial independence is sacrificed to iron-fisted centralized control.	不出所料，在福克斯新闻网以及其他新闻集团旗下媒体，编辑独立性已经让位于铁腕中央集权。


News and commentary are mingled in an uninterrupted stream of political campaigning.	新闻和评论则被参杂到了一股从不间断的政治宣传流中。


Ideology trumps factuality.	意识形态凌驾于事实。


And major Republican figures, including possible contenders for the party’s presidential nomination, are hired as “commentators.”	而主要共和党领导人，包括该党总统提名人的潜在竞争者则被聘为“评论员”。


Indeed, its specific genius has been to turn propaganda into a popular and financial success.	事实上，该集团的特殊天赋就是将宣传转化为一种大众和经济层面上的成功。


Given The News of the World’s profitability, no one should be surprised if the Murdochs have been replicating their sunken British flagship’s reprehensible behavior elsewhere.	考虑到《世界新闻报》的盈利水平，没人怀疑默多克家族不会把这艘沉没的英国旗舰的模式使用在别处。


But, whatever else is revealed, the UK phone-hacking scandal is of a piece with the Murdochs’ transformation of news into propaganda: both reflect an assault on democracy’s essential walls of separation between media, the state, and political parties.	但无论还有什么丑闻被揭露出来，英国的电话窃听丑闻都是默多克家族将新闻转型为政治宣传的其中一个片段：它们都破坏了民主制度中媒体，政府和政党之间相互独立的原则。


The Murdochs are fusing these entities into a single unaccountable power that, as we see in Britain today, lacks any restraint or scruple.	而默多克家族正试图将这些独立实体整合成为一个单一且不负责任的权力实体，既有无人管制又恣意妄为，正如我们亲眼所见的那样。


That effort should compel us to confront an uncomfortable reality underlying both the British phone-hacking scandal, with its penumbra of appalling cruelty and wanton corruption, and Fox News, America’s most popular news channel: too many people want what the News Corporation has been offering.	这一动向将迫使我们面对一种令人厌恶的现实，这一现实同时隐藏于英国电话窃听丑闻和福克斯新闻网背后，前者有着骇人听闻的残忍和蛮横的腐败，而后者作为美国最受欢迎的新闻频道，有太多人喜欢新闻集团所提供的东西。


And what too many people want can be dangerous to a civilized, law-based society.	而太多人想要的东西却可能对一个文明法制社会构成危害。


To glimpse just how dangerous, consider Italy, where Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s MediaSet conglomerate has seduced broad swathes of the electorate since the 1980’s with a Murdoch-like combination of insipid variety shows and partisan political theater.	为了简单描述一下究竟有多大危害，试想一下意大利，当总理贝卢斯科尼的MediaSet企业联合体自1980年代以来就采取了与默多克类似的手段，利用乏味表演和党派政治剧场的结合体吸引了大多数选民。


When Italy’s postwar party system collapsed in the early 1990’s, Berlusconi was able to establish his own political party, win power, and, over the course of three governments, bend laws and government institutions to serve his business and personal interests.	结果当意大利的战后政党系统在1990年崩溃之后，贝卢斯科尼得以建立自己的政党，赢得权力，并在三届的政府任期中滥用法律和政府机关来为自己的企业和个人利益服务。


The News Corporation seems determined to take Britain and the US down a similar path.	新闻集团似乎决心要把英美两国拖向上述道路。


But now, at least in Britain, the political class is in revolt.	但如今至少在英国，政界正在奋起反击。


Prime Minister David Cameron – who previously cultivated close ties with News Corporation leaders, even employing as his press secretary The News of the World’s former editor, who was recently arrested for his role in the scandal – called the phone hacking “disgusting.”	首相戴维·卡梅伦这个原本与新闻集团首脑关系密切，甚至聘请《世界新闻报》前编辑作为其媒体秘书的人将电话窃听称为“恶心之举”。


Meanwhile, Labour leaders, who had also sought the Murdochs’ favor, have vowed to block News Corporation’s bid for full ownership of Britain’s largest pay-television broadcaster.	与此同时，原本不断向默多克靠拢的工党领袖也呼吁阻止新闻集团全资控股英国最大的付费电视网的行动。


Whether the rebellion will jump across the Atlantic remains to be seen.	而大西洋对岸的反抗者们何时能挺身而出，则依然是有待观察。


The Fall of the Hyper Power	超级强国的坠落


Listen carefully these days to Israelis and South Koreans.	现在，世人应当认真听取以色列和韩国所言。


What they are hinting at is no less than a tectonic shift in the international system: the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world.	它们所指的完全就是国际体系中结构性转移，那就是从单极世界向多极世界的转移。


Israelis are rediscovering Europe.	以色列人正在重新发现欧洲。


They intuitively sense that they can no longer rely only on the absolute security guarantee represented by the United States’ combination of active and passive support.	他们直觉地感到，他们无法再依赖于由美国的综合积极和消极支持所代表的绝对安全保证。


The war in Lebanon, so frustrating for Israel, accelerated that subtle change.	黎巴嫩战争对于以色列而言极为沮丧，加速了这一微妙的变化。


Now Europe and its various contingents are playing a leading role in picking up the pieces there.	目前，在该地区收拾残局中，欧洲及其不同的分遣机构正在扮演领导者的角色。


America, of course, remains Israel’s life insurance policy, but enlargement and diversification of diplomatic alliances is starting to be seen as crucial by Israeli diplomats, if not by Israeli society.	当然，美国还是以色列的人寿保险单，但是，即使不是以色列社会，以色列外交官也开始认为外交联盟的扩大和多样化是关键的。


The Quartet (the US, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations) used to be regarded as “One plus Three,” but that is no longer the case.	中东问题四方(美国、俄罗斯、欧盟以及联合国) 过去向来被视为“三加一”。 但是，现在已经不是这样了。


Europe and Russia no longer see themselves as secondary players, because the US, not to mention Israel, needs them.	欧洲和俄罗斯不再把它们自己视为二等国家，因为美国，不要说以色列需要它们。


As for the South Koreans, they are counting on China to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis.	至于韩国，他们指望中国处理朝核危机。


They, too, see the world through a prism that makes America continue to appear essential, but no longer preeminent.	他们也透过让美国显得关键但并非独霸的棱镜来观察世界。


Recently, a high South Korean official listed in hierarchical order the countries that mattered most in the North Korean nuclear crisis.	最近，一位韩国高官以在朝核问题上的重要性的顺序从高到低列举了各国。


China came first, followed by the US, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, whereas Europe was absent.	中国第一，接下来是美国、俄罗斯、日本以及韩国，而欧洲则榜上无名。


These are only a few signs among many others.	在其他许多国家中只有少数几个迹象。


One could also mention the recent Sino-African summit in Beijing, or the intensification of Venezuelan-Iranian relations.	人们还可以提及最近在北京召开的中非峰会，或者是委内瑞拉与伊朗之间加剧的紧张关系。


All these developments subtly indicate a deep trend that can be formalized in one sentence: America’s unipolar moment, which began in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, is over.	所有这些进展微妙地表明一种深刻的趋势，可以用一句话概括，那就是，从1991年苏联帝国崩溃以来的美国单极时代结束了。


Of course, one should not “bury” the US too soon.	当然，人们还不应当过早地“埋葬”美国。


America is much more resilient than its critics believe.	美国要比它的批评者们所相信的要更有韧性。


It has a unique capacity to rebound, and it controls unparalleled military, intellectual, economic, and even political resources.	它具有独特的反弹能力，而且它控制着无可比拟的军事、知识、经济甚至政治资源。


The Republicans’ defeat in this month’s mid-term Congressional elections is a sign that Americans want to sanction their leaders for their strategic and ethical shortcomings, and they did so with gusto.	本月共和党在国会中期选举中东失败表明，美国人想要惩罚其领导人的战略和道德缺失，而且他们让共和党一败涂地。