Podemos Secretary-General Pablo Iglesias, for instance, has drawn criticism from idealistic activists in the movement for his “hyper-leadership” and “online Leninism.”	我们可以运动总书记伊格莱西亚斯（Pablo Iglesias）就被本运动内的理想主义活跃分子批评他的“超然的领导地位”和“在线列宁主义”。


In response, Iglesias has declared that, “one cannot storm heaven by consensus.”	为此，伊格莱西亚斯回应说“你不能用舆论来攻讦天堂。 ”


Grillo holds no official position in M5S, which bills itself as a “non-association,” and yet he owns the blog that has been key to the movement’s success, as well as the copyright to its official symbol.	格里洛在M5S中没有正式职位，M5S也自我标榜“不结社”，但他有一个对M5S的成功至关重要的博客，以及M5S官方符号的版权。


He has revoked M5S members’ right to use that symbol for supposedly breaking the “rules” – or what is officially called the “non-statute” – of his “anti-party.”	他以M5S成员违反他的“反结党”（anti-party）“规则”——或官方所谓的“非条例”——为由，剥夺了他们使用这一符号的权利。


And those running for public office under the M5S banner must sign a contract promising to pay fines if they violate party principles.	以M5S成员身份担任公职的人必须签署协议承诺如果违反党的原则就要罚款。


Of course, political movements are not necessarily populist in nature.	当然，政治运动未必具有民粹性质。


As the Green and feminist movements have shown, a movement can contest traditional forms of politics without claiming to represent “the real people” or the “silent majority.”	绿党和女权运动表明，运动能够在不必宣称代表“真正的人民”或“沉默的大多数”的情况下，对传统政治形式构成挑战。


But today’s political movements also tend to be less pluralistic than the large parties that have dominated post-war European politics.	但今天的政治运动大多也比主导战后欧洲政治的大政党更不多元。


This makes sense, given that “movement” implies not just dynamism, but also a presumption that all members are in complete agreement about the path forward.	这有一定的意义，因为“运动”不仅仅意味着活力，也隐含一个假定：所有成员都完全认可前进道路。


The problem is that when everyone supposedly already agrees on where they are going, there seems to be no need for extensive democratic deliberation.	问题在于当所有人都被认为已经同意了方向时，便似乎不再有高度政治自由化的必要。


Thus, the movements that have emerged in Europe in recent years – on both the left and the right – have focused on strengthening their respective individual leaders, rather than empowering their rank-and-file members, even when they emphasize participatory democracy.	因此，近几年崛起于欧洲的运动——不管是左翼还是右翼——开始注重于巩固各自的个体领导人，而不是赋权普通成员，即使它们标榜参与型民主。


In the case of Macron and Kurz, each leader has tapped into the sense of dynamism and purpose that is usually a key feature of single-issue movement politics.	在马克龙和库尔兹的例子中，两位领导人各自利用了活力感和目的性——它们常常是单一问题运动政治的核心特征。


Kurz, for his part, has bent the entire ÖVP to his will.	库尔兹让整个ÖVP拜服于自己。


In addition to giving it a new name, he has reorganized its internal structures and changed its official color from black to turquoise.	除了赋予政党新的名字，他还重组了其内部结构，将象征颜色从黑色变成松绿色。


Still, the party’s conservative platform has hardly changed at all, suggesting that Kurz’s moves are about marketing and asserting his personal authority more than anything else.	尽管如此，该党的保守平台几乎没有发生改变，这表明库尔兹的举动纯粹是为了推销和彰显自己的权威。


In the end, Podemos, La République En Marche!, and Momentum, the youth movement that helped Jeremy Corbyn reshape the British Labour Party’s platform, are not important because they are movements per se.	最后，我们可以运动、共和国前进运动以及动力运动（Momentum，帮助科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）改组英国工党平台的青年运动）都不是因为它们是“运动”而重要。


Rather, they are important because they provide more political choices for citizens, especially those frustrated with prevailing duopolies – political systems dominated by two long-established parties offering nearly identical policy prescriptions.	相反，它们重要，是因为它们为公民提供了更多的政治选择，特别是为那些不满于双头垄断——由两个历史悠久、提供近乎相同的整治方案的老牌政党主导的政治制度——横行的人来说。


In Corbyn’s case, movement politics could reestablish Labour’s progressive credentials, and reverse what many saw as an embrace of neoliberal policies under former Prime Minister Tony Blair.	在科尔宾的例子中，运动政治能够重塑共党的进步性质，改变首相布莱尔给你人留下的西自由主义政策的印象。


But it would be naive to think that movements alone will make European politics more democratic.	但认为光靠运动就能让欧洲政治变得更加民主是幼稚的。


If anything, they could operate even less democratically than traditional parties, owing to their strong plebiscitary forms of leadership.	它们充其量只能以比传统政党更不民主的方式运行，这是它们强烈的平民表决型领导形式决定的。


Democracy Beyond the Nation-State	民族国家以外的民主


WASHINGTON, DC – According to the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, it is impossible to have full national sovereignty, democracy, and globalization simultaneously.	华盛顿——按照哈佛大学经济学家丹尼·罗德里克的说法，不可能同时拥有充分的国家主权、民主和全球化。


The concept of a “political trilemma of the world economy,” which Javier Solana also recently explored, is useful, but incomplete.	哈维尔·索拉纳 最近探讨过的“世界经济的三难政治困境”的概念尽管有效，但却仍然是不完整的。


Rodrik’s argument, elaborated in his new book, is that too much globalization erodes the sovereignty of democratic nation-states, by increasingly subjecting them to economic and financial forces that may not correspond with the wishes of the domestic majority.	罗德里克在新书中所阐述的观点是过度全球化侵蚀民族民主国家的主权，导致它们受到不符合国内绝大多数人意愿的经济和金融势力的影响越来越大。


By this logic, an authoritarian state may function better in a globalized world, because it is unconstrained by, say, electoral concerns.	按照这一逻辑，威权国家可能在全球化背景下能更好的发挥作用，因为它们较少受到选举关切的牵制。


With less globalization, democratic decision-making within the nation-state would be less constrained by external forces – particularly financial markets – meaning that its scope would be wider.	在全球化程度较低的情况下，民族国家内部的民主决策或许可以较少受到外力——特别是金融市场的影响，也就是说民主决策所涉及的范围相对较大。


Globalization and democracy, without the nation-state, is also possible, though Rodrik is skeptical about whether democratic institutions could function on a global scale.	在没有民族国家的前提下实现全球化和民主也有可能，尽管罗德里克对民主制度能否在全球范围内发挥作用持怀疑态度。


Of course, Rodrik does not portray this trilemma as a hard-and-fast rule.	当然，罗德里克并没有将上述三难局面确定为一条硬性规则。


Rather, his goal is to highlight the challenges associated with fostering or maintaining these three institutional arrangements, partly or fully.	相反，他的目标是强调与促进或维持这三种制度安排相关的挑战，上述挑战既有可能关系全局也有可能涉及某些局部。


But, to get the most out of Rodrik’s concept, it is necessary to account for another dimension: the many levels of governance that exist in today’s world.	但要想充分发掘罗德里克的概念，就有必要考虑另外一种维度：那就是当今世界存在的多层次治理结构。


The nation-state, managed by national government, remains the fundamental building block of the international order.	由国家政府管理的民族国家仍然在国际秩序中发挥根本的基石作用。


But below the nation-state are states (or provinces), cities, and regions, which may have their own governance structures.	但拥有各自治理结构的州（或省）、城市和地区可能构成民族国家。


Above, there are supranational blocs like the European Union and global institutions like the United Nations.	民族国家之上还有像欧盟和联合国这样的超越国家的全球机构。


Any discussion of the trilemma must take into account these various levels of governance.	任何有关这种三难困境的探讨都必须将上述不同的治理层次纳入考量的范畴。


It is true that today’s widespread disillusionment with government is partly a backlash against globalization, which has seemed to impose itself on nation-states.	的确，今天对政府希望的普遍幻灭部分来自于全球化所造成的反弹，而全球化似乎是强加在民族国家头上的。


But another reason for the disillusionment may be that citizens feel disconnected from their national governments.	但希望幻灭的另一个原因可能是民众感觉接触不到国家政府。


Yet subnational governments are not so far away, and citizens often feel that they can still exert significant influence over them.	但地方政府其实并不遥远，而民众往往感觉地方政府是能对他们造成较大影响力的。


As a result, the tension between democracy and globalization seems to be less acute at, say, the municipal level.	结果导致民主与全球化之间的紧张关系似乎在市级层次显得不那么突出。


It helps that subnational governments tend to be focused on more local-level concerns – such as infrastructure, education, and housing – that are not perceived as being strongly influenced by globalization.	地方政府往往更加关注基础设施、教育和住房等涉及地方层面的部分关切——而这些领域并没有受到全球化的大规模影响。


On the opposite end of the spectrum are supranational governance structures, such as the EU.	与地方政府相对应的是超国家的治理机构，比如欧盟。


Not only does the EU often deal with globalization-related issues like trade; Europe’s citizens feel that the distant and disconnected “Brussels,” over which they have little influence, is infringing on the sovereignty of nation-states.	欧盟不仅经常处理与贸易有关的全球化问题； 欧盟民众感觉遥远而难以企及的“布鲁塞尔”尽管几乎不受他们的影响，却正在侵入民族国家的主权事务。


This sentiment, exemplified in the Brexit vote, can be observed across Europe.	这种情绪在英国脱欧公投中得以展现，在欧洲许多国家都可以看到类似的现象。


The ways in which these dynamics can complicate Rodrik’s political trilemma have been on stark display in Catalonia, where the tension between local democracy and the nation-state is even more acute than that with globalization.	上面提到的因素进一步恶化了罗德里克提到的政治三难局面，这样的困境在加泰罗尼亚问题上得到了充分的展现，该地区地方民主和民族国家之间的矛盾甚至比全球化带来的冲突更剧烈。


Indeed, many Catalans are more frustrated with Spain’s national government than they are with either globalization or the EU.	事实上，许多加泰罗尼亚人面对西班牙国家政府的沮丧程度超过面对欧盟或全球化。


The same can be said of Scotland vis-à-vis the United Kingdom.	苏格兰和英国也属于同样的状况。


In this context, a retreat to the nation-state that rejects globalization, as is occurring in the United States under President Donald Trump, becomes even more problematic, because it threatens to resurrect all of the economic and political pathologies that nationalism incited in the past, and then some.	在这样的情况下，像唐纳德·特朗普总统所领导的美国那样退回抗拒全球化的民族国家将会变得更为棘手，因为这样做可能再次唤醒民族主义过去曾经唤起的所有经济和政治病态，之后某些问题又会重新萌芽。


But what if we adopted a new approach, in which local-level democracy and sovereignty were strengthened instead?	但如果我们采取强化地方民主和主权的新方法又将如何？


In many countries, if not most, cities are the centers of innovation and progress, as the promise of agglomeration, economies of scale, and positive spillovers attract high-performing firms.	在许多国家，甚至多数国家，创新和进步的核心都是城市，因为产业集聚、规模经济、吸引高效企业的正面溢出效应使得城市发展前景非常广阔。


Citizens feel close to their municipal governments and proud of their cities, but their pride in their identity does not have the damaging qualities of nationalism.	民众感到与市政府息息相关，并为自己的城市感到自豪，但他们对身份认同的这种自豪感却并没有产生民族主义那样的破坏性作用。


As the nation-state cedes some of its power to regional, state, or municipal governments, the trilemma weakens.	随着民族国家将某些权力让渡给地方、州或市级政府，这样的三难困境将会有所缓和。


Both democracy, with its concomitant sense of belonging, and globalization, driven by cosmopolitan cities open to the world, can thrive, without causing any country to lose sovereignty.	民主及其所伴生的归属感，以及向世界开放的大都市所驱动的全球化，都可以在不导致任何国家丧失主权的情况下兴旺发达。


The benefits of such an approach could be profound.	这样的方法可能带来深刻的好处。


But there are serious risks.	但同时也会伴随着严重的风险。


As successful metropolitan areas attract a growing share of a country’s capital, skilled labor, and innovative capacity, rural areas, in particular, are likely to face economic decline: fewer job opportunities, closure of hospitals and schools, and deteriorating infrastructure.	随着成功的大城市吸引越来越多国家资本、熟练劳动力和创新能力，广大农村地区尤其可能面临经济下滑：就业机会减少、学校和医院关张以及基础设施不断恶化。


That trend, as we have seen, creates fertile ground for populist politicians to offer simplistic solutions, rooted in extreme ideologies that sow division and undermine progress.	正如我们所看到的那样，这样的趋势为民粹主义政治家鼓吹简单化方案创造了肥沃的土壤，这些方案植根于极端意识形态，它们播下分化的种子并破坏进步。


That is why it is vital to find ways to help, from the start, those who may be left behind by such a system.	因此想方设法从一开始就帮助那些可能在这样一套体系中落后的民众的确至关重要。


Here, the nation-state would retain a major role, though an appropriate balance must be struck, in order to prevent the trilemma from reasserting itself.	在这个问题上，民族国家将继续发挥主要作用，但我们必须达到适当的平衡，以防止三难困境再次成为现实。


The Great Populists	大民粹主义者


WARSAW – The first challenge to the Western hegemony that followed the collapse of Communism in Europe was the emergence of the so-called BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – in the 2000s.	华沙—欧洲共产主义崩溃后，西方霸权面临的首要挑战是21世纪初所谓的金砖国家的崛起。 金砖国家是指巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非。


Rapidly growing and collectively accounting for nearly half of the world’s population, the rise of the BRICS seemed set to tip the balance of power away from the United States and Western Europe.	金砖国家高速增长，人口总和占世界的近一半，它们的崛起似乎必定会将实力平衡从美国和西欧手中夺走。


Today, the BRICS look like less of a geopolitical threat to the West.	如今，金砖国家对西方的地缘政治威胁已有所减小。


Russia, Brazil, and South Africa are in severe economic straits, and China is wobbling.	俄罗斯、巴西和南非陷入了严重的经济困难。 中国也是步履蹒跚。


Only India maintains its luster.	只有印度保持着强势。


And yet the West is coming under pressure again, including in its own backyard.	但西方也再次面临压力，包括“后院失火”。


This time, the challenge is political, not economic: the rise of politicians who relish conflict and disdain national and international law and democratic norms.	现在的挑战是政治而非经济：喜欢冲突、藐视国家和国际法以及民主范式的政客的崛起。


I call such leaders “PEKOs,” after the four most prominent examples of their kind: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyep Erdoğan, the Polish politician Jarosław Kaczyński, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.	我将这些领导人称为“皮克”（PEKO）。 这个名字来自四位这类政客的显著例子：俄罗斯总理普京（Putin）、土耳其总理埃尔多安（Erdoğan）、波兰政客卡钦斯基（Kaczyński）和匈牙利总理欧尔班（Orbán）。


PEKOs do not view politics as the management of collective emotions in order to achieve broad policy goals: faster economic growth, a more equitable distribution of income, or greater national security, power, and prestige.	皮克不把政治视为管理集体情绪以实现广泛政策目标——包括经济增长、更平等的收入分配以及更大的国家安全、实力和地位等。


Instead, they regard politics as an endless series of intrigues and purges aimed at preserving personal power and privilege.	相反，他们把政治视为一系列永无终点的阴谋和清洗，目标是保护个人权力和特权。


The PEKOs share the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin’s belief that “politics must take precedence over economics.”	皮克都同意俄国革命家列宁的信条：“政治必须优先于经济。


Indeed, they value it over every other kind of policy consideration.	”事实上，他们将这一信条置于其他一切政策考虑之前。


Politics is not a means to an end, but the air they breathe, and policies are merely instruments in their endless struggle to stay alive.	政治不是一锤定音的手段，而是他们呼吸的空气，而政策只是他们永不停歇的生存斗争的工具。


It would be a mistake, however, to think of the PEKOs as today’s equivalent of the “Great Dictators” of the 1930s.	但是，将今天的皮克视为20世纪30年代的“大独裁者”是一个错误。


The PEKOs may be nationalists, but their opinions would not have been out of place in the drawing rooms of Europe before World War I (the same cannot be said of the Nazis or the Spanish Falange).	皮克可能是民族主义者，但他们的观点在一战前的欧洲客厅中也是不可或缺的话题（纳粹和西班牙长枪党则并非如此）。


Nor is their economic approach necessarily statist.	他们的经济方针也未必是国家主义的。


Putin certainly has strong dirigiste leanings, but if Orbán and Kaczyński are deserving of the label, then so was French President Charles de Gaulle.	普京显然具有强烈的统制（dirigiste）倾向，但如果说欧尔班和卡钦斯基也符合这一标签的话，那么法国总统戴高乐也是如此了。


And Erdoğan has actually dismantled Kemalist statism in Turkey and introduced free-market policies.	而埃尔多安实际上打破了土耳其的基马尔国家主义，实施了自由市场政策。


The biggest difference between the Great Dictators and the PEKOs is that the latter regularly have to face their electorates.	大独裁者和皮克之间的最大区别是后者隔一段时间就必须面对选民。


Indeed, their confrontational politics is the central element of their survival strategy.	事实上，他们的对抗式政治是其生存战略的核心。


Each one of them has gained (or maintained) power by polarizing their societies and mobilizing their electoral base.	他们中每一个人都通过极端化社会和动员选民赢得（并保持）权力。


The PEKOs’ political style has been enabled by modern news media, which, scrambling for audience share, simplify and sensationalize issues.	皮克的政治风格之所以能成功，是拜现代新闻媒体所赐。 现代新闻媒体争夺听众份额，极尽简化和情绪化问题之能。


Starkly antagonistic statements and positions tend to gain the most exposure.	尖锐对立的陈述和立场总能获得最多的曝光。


This gives confrontational politicians a powerful advantage, and produces the electoral polarization on which the PEKOs have fed.	这让对抗式政客赢得强大的优势，并造成了皮克赖以兴起的选举极化。


This political strategy is undoubtedly effective.	这一政治战略毫无疑问是卓有成效的。


In Russia, for example, real wages fell by more than 9% in 2015, and the share of Russian families that cannot afford adequate food or clothing has increased from 22% to 39%.	比如，在俄罗斯，2015年真实工资下降了9%以上，买不起足够食品和衣物的俄罗斯家庭比例从22%增加到39%。


And yet Putin’s approval rating remains at 80%.	但普京的支持率仍高达80%。


Unlike the emergence of the BRICS, which ultimately was a boon to the world economy, the rise of the PEKOs poses a real threat – especially as they begin to apply their confrontational approach to foreign affairs and global economic governance.	金砖国家的崛起说到底是世界经济的幸事，但皮克的兴起带来了实实在在的威胁——特别是当他们开始将对抗式方针用于外交事务和全球经济治理中时。


International firms should be particularly concerned.	国际企业尤其应该担心。


Having spread their operations across the world during the quarter-century since the fall of Communism, they have become dependent on rules-based stability and economic integration.	在共产主义崩溃之后的二十五年中，它们的经营全球开花，但它们依赖基于规则的稳定和经济一体化。


Their fortunes will increasingly depend on developing strategies to avoid (or at least hedge) the new risks posed by PEKOs.	它们的财富越来越依赖发展战略来避免（或至少对冲）皮克带来的新威胁。


To make matters worse, the PEKO phenomenon seems to be capable of spreading even to the heart of the West.	更糟糕的是，皮克现象似乎大有向西方心脏地带蔓延的能力。


Examples include Scottish and Catalan nationalists and British politicians campaigning to pull the United Kingdom out of the European Union.	这方面的例子包括苏格兰和加泰罗尼亚民族主主义者以及要求英国脱离欧盟的英国政客。


Those who champion these causes have been shockingly dismissive of the massive economic damage their proposals would likely cause their own societies.	鼓吹这些运动的人令人震惊地无视他们的方案可能给本国社会所带来的严重经济伤害。


Similarly, in at least two major Western democracies, serious candidates for the highest office are acting like PEKOs: US Presidential candidate Donald Trump and the French National Front leader Marine Le Pen, who will seek her country’s presidency in 2017.	类似地，至少在两个主要西方民主国家，最高领导地位的领衔候选人也有像皮克一样的表现：美国总统候选人特朗普（Donald Trump）和法国国民阵线领导人勒庞（Marine Le Pen，将于2017年角逐法国总统竞选）。


If their bids for power succeed, the dangers posed to global stability will rise by an order of magnitude.	如果他们在权力斗争中获胜，那么全球稳定所面临的危险将放大几个数量级。


Growth Without Industrialization?	无需工业化的增长？


CAMBRIDGE – Despite low world prices for the commodities on which they tend to depend, many of the world’s poorest economies have been doing well.	发自剑桥——尽管全球各地的商品价格依然偏低，但世界上许多以此为生的最贫穷经济体却都表现良好。


Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic growth has slowed precipitously since 2015, but this reflects specific problems in three of its largest economies (Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa).	撒哈拉以南非洲的经济增长自2015年以来急剧减缓，但这只反映了当地三个最大型经济体（尼日利亚，安哥拉和南非）的具体问题。


Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Rwanda are all projected to achieve growth of 6% or higher this year.	埃塞俄比亚，科特迪瓦，坦桑尼亚，塞内加尔，布基纳法索和卢旺达预计今年将实现6％以上的增长。


In Asia, the same is true of India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam.	而在亚洲，印度，缅甸，孟加拉，老挝，柬埔寨和越南也是如此。


This is all good news, but it is also puzzling.	这是个好消息，但有时也令人费解。


Developing economies that manage to grow rapidly on a sustained basis without relying on natural-resource booms – as most of these countries have for a decade or more – typically do so through export-oriented industrialization.	那些无需依赖高价自然资源而持续实现快速增长的发展中经济体——跟它们十多年来的发展模式相反——通常都是通过出口导向的工业化。


But few of these countries are experiencing much industrialization.	但是这些国家并没有实现多少工业化。


The share of manufacturing in low-income Sub-Saharan countries is broadly stagnant – and in some cases declining.	撒哈拉以南低收入国家的制造业份额增长大体上停滞不前，甚至在某些情况下有所下降。


And despite much talk about “Make in India,” one of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s catchphrases, the country shows little indication of rapid industrialization.	尽管“印度制造”已经成了总理纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）的口头禅之一，但这个国家却没有展现出什么快速工业化的迹象。


Manufacturing became a powerful escalator of economic development for low-income countries for three reasons. First, it was relatively easy to absorb technology from abroad and generate high-productivity jobs.	制造业之所以能成为低收入国家经济发展的强大助推力，原因有三：首先从国外吸收技术并产生高效率的工作相对容易。


Second, manufacturing jobs did not require much skill: farmers could be turned into production workers in factories with little investment in additional training.	第二，制造业的工作并不需要太多的技能：农民可以在工厂里变成生产工人，也无需多少额外培训投资。


And, third, manufacturing demand was not constrained by low domestic incomes: production could expand virtually without limit, through exports.	第三，制造业需求并不受国内低收入水平的限制：通过出口，生产基本上可以无限增长。


But things have been changing.	但情况一直在变化。


It is now well documented that manufacturing has become increasingly skill-intensive in recent decades.	现在有足够的证据表明近几十年来制造业的技能密集程度日益提高。


Along with globalization, this has made it very difficult for newcomers to break into world markets for manufacturing in a big way and replicate the experience of Asia’s manufacturing superstars.	随着全球化的进程，这使得新来者非常难以打入世界制造业市场并复制以往那些亚洲制造业大国的经验。


Except for a handful of exporters, developing economies have been experiencing premature deindustrialization.	除少数出口国之外，发展中经济体已经出现了提前的去工业化状况。


It seems as if the escalator has been taken away from the lagging countries.	似乎这股助推力已经从落后的国家身边流走了。


What, then, are we to make of the recent boom in some of the world’s poorest countries?	那么我们究竟应该如何看待某些世界上最贫穷国家新近的繁荣状况？


Have these countries a discovered a new growth model?	这些国家是否又发现了一套新的增长模式？


In recent research, Xinshen Diao of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Margaret McMillan of Tufts University, and I have looked at the growth patterns among this new crop of high-performing countries.	在最近的研究中，美国国际食品政策研究所的刁新申，塔夫茨大学的玛格丽特·麦克米兰（Margaret McMillan）和笔者共同研究了这批新的高增长国家的增长模式。


Our focus is on the patterns of structural change these countries have experienced. We document a couple of paradoxical findings.	我们的重点是这些国家所经历的结构变化模式，并记录了一些存在矛盾性的发现。


First, growth-promoting structural change has been significant in the recent experience of low-income countries such as Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania, despite the absence of industrialization.	首先，尽管缺乏工业化，但埃塞俄比亚，马拉维，塞内加尔和坦桑尼亚等低收入国家近年的经验表明增长促进型的结构性改革作用显著。


Labor has been moving from low-productivity agricultural activities to higher-productivity activities, but the latter are mostly services rather than manufacturing.	劳动力从低生产率的农业活动转移到了其他高生产力活动，但后者主要是服务业而非制造业。


Second, rapid structural change in these countries has come at the expense of mostly negative labor productivity growth within non-agricultural sectors.	其次，这些国家的快速结构性变化大多都是以非农部门劳动生产率的负增长为代价的。


In other words, even though the services that absorbed new employment exhibited relatively high productivity early on, their edge diminished as they expanded.	换句话说，尽管吸收新工作的服务业在初期产生了较高的生产力，但其边际效应也随着行业扩张而递减。


This pattern contrasts sharply with the classic East Asian growth experience (such as in South Korea and China), in which structural change and gains in non-agricultural labor productivity both contributed strongly to overall growth.	这一模式与经典的东亚增长经验（如韩国和中国）形成了鲜明对比，后者的结构性变化和非农业劳动生产率的增长都对总体增长产生了巨大贡献。


The difference seems to be explained by the fact that the expansion of urban, modern sectors in recent high-growth episodes is driven by domestic demand rather than export-oriented industrialization.	两者之间区别似乎是因为近来这段高增长时期的城市化和现代部门的扩张是由国内需求驱动，而非以出口为导向的工业化。


In particular, the African model appears to be underpinned by positive aggregate demand shocks generated either by transfers from abroad or by productivity growth in agriculture.	尤其是非洲模式显然由国外侨汇或者农业生产率提升所产生的正面总需求冲击的支撑起来的。


In Ethiopia, for example, public investments in irrigation, transport, and power have produced a significant increase in agricultural productivity and incomes. This results in growth-promoting structural change, as increased demand spills over to non-agricultural sectors.	以埃塞俄比亚为例，灌溉，运输和电力方面的公共投资显着提高了农业生产力和收入，并因此催生了促进增长的结构性变化，因为需求会外溢到非农业部门。


But non-agricultural labor productivity is driven down as a by-product, as returns to capital diminish and less productive firms are drawn in.	而非农部门劳动生产率的下降则是作为上述情况的副产品而出现，因为资本回报率下降，生产效率较低的企业则收缩经营。


This is not to downplay the significance of rapid productivity growth in agriculture, the archetypal traditional sector.	说这些可不是要淡化农业这个典型传统部门实现快速生产率增长的重要意义。


Our research suggests that agriculture has played a key role in Africa not only on its own account, but also as a driver of growth-increasing structural change.	我们的研究表明农业在非洲所扮演的关键作用不仅在其本身，还在于其作为增长结构变化的推动力。


Diversification into non-traditional products and adoption of new production techniques can transform agriculture into a quasi-modern activity.	对非传统农产品的多样化尝试以及新生产技术的采用都可以将农业转变为一项准现代活动。


But there are limits to how far this process can carry the economy.	但这个过程对整个国家经济的推动程度有限。


In part because of low income elasticity of demand for agricultural products, outflows of labor from agriculture are an inevitable outcome during the process of development.	部分原因是农产品需求较低的收入弹性，同时劳动力从农业部门流出也是发展过程中不可避免的结果。


The labor that is released must be absorbed in modern activities.	这些被释放的劳动力必须被现代活动所吸收。


And if productivity is not growing in these modern sectors, economy-wide growth ultimately will stall.	如果这些现代部门的生产力不增长，经济增长就最终将陷入停滞。


The contribution that the structural-change component can make is necessarily self-limiting if the modern sector does not experience rapid productivity growth on its own.	如果现代部门自身没有经历过生产力的快速增长，那么目前这种结构变化部分可以做出的贡献就必然会出现自限性。


Low-income African countries can sustain moderate rates of productivity growth into the future, on the back of steady improvements in human capital and governance. Continued convergence with rich-country income levels seems achievable.	如果人力资本和治理水平能不断提升，低收入非洲国家就可以在未来维持温和的生产率增长率，与富裕国家收入水平的持续趋同似乎也可以实现。


But the evidence suggests that the growth rates brought about recently by rapid structural change are exceptional and may not last.	但有证据表明，最近这种由快速结构性变化所带来的增长率是一个例外，也可能无法长久持续。


Francis of the Forest	森林的弗朗西斯


WASHINGTON, DC – When Pope Francis visited Latin America in July, he made an impassioned plea for the protection of the Amazon rainforest and the people who live there.	华盛顿——教皇弗朗西斯7月访问拉丁美洲时，曾就保护亚马逊雨林向当地居民做了慷慨激昂的陈述。


“Our common home is being pillaged, laid waste and harmed with impunity,” he told activists gathered in Bolivia for the World Meeting of Popular Movements.	“我们共同的家园遭到肆无忌惮的洗劫和损毁，”他告诉在玻利维亚汇聚一堂的民众运动世界会议积极分子。


“Cowardice in defending it is a grave sin.”	“不敢挺身而出保护雨林是一种严重的罪过。 ”


Heeding Francis’s call for action is not only a moral issue; it is a practical one.	听从弗朗西斯的行动号召既是道德问题也是实际需要。


When world leaders meet at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris later this year to craft a response to the challenges of global warming, they should put in place policies to protect tropical forests and the people who make them their home.	当世界各国领导人今年晚些时候汇聚巴黎召开联合国气候变化大会制定全球变暖对策时，他们应该出台政策保护热带雨林和生活在雨林之中的民众。


Francis is hardly the first missionary to have visited the Amazon.	弗朗西斯并非访问亚马逊地区的首位传教士。


Franciscan, Jesuit, and Dominican priests have been spreading the gospel in the region for centuries.	几百年来方济会、耶稣会和多米尼加教士一直在这个地区布道。


What makes Francis’s appeal different is that his words were directed not so much at the local population, but at the residents of North America and Europe, where demand for timber, biofuels, and agricultural products drives the destruction of the rainforests and imperils the lives of indigenous populations.	弗朗西斯诉求的不同之处在于他的呼吁与其说针对当地民众还不如说面向北美和欧洲民众，是后者对木材、生物燃料和农产品的需求推动了热带雨林的破坏并危及到土著居民的生活。


Communities in the Amazon have suffered grievously from the economic incentives to cut down the rainforests.	砍伐雨林的经济诱惑令亚马逊各部落损失惨重。


Around the world, indigenous people are being threatened, murdered, and driven from their homelands.	世界各地的土著居民被迫背井离乡，并且遭到威胁和杀戮。


Of the 116 environmental activists killed in 2014, 40% were indigenous leaders.	在2014年被害的116位环保主义者中 40%是土著领袖。


In September 2014, for example, Edwin Chota and three other leaders of the Asháninka communities in Peru, were brutally murdered, most likely by illegal loggers.	以2014年9月为例，埃德温·乔塔和秘鲁阿沙宁卡部落的另外三名领袖遭到残酷杀害，作案可能性最大的当属非法伐木者。


Two months later, José Isidro Tendetza Antún, a leader of the Shuar people in Ecuador, was tortured and killed while headed to a protest against a mining project that threatened his people’s homeland.	两个月后，厄瓜多尔舒阿尔族领导人何塞·伊西德罗·安通在前往抗议威胁当地人家园的一个采矿项目时被折磨和杀害。


In addition to being an affront to human rights, deforestation and the accompanying assault on indigenous cultures is a serious threat to the fight against climate change.	除了是对人权的侮辱，森林砍伐和对土著文化随之而来的冲击是对气候变化斗争的严重威胁。


The links between the loss of forest cover and global warming has been well documented.	事实已经证明森林覆盖率下降和全球变暖是有联系的。


Carbon-dioxide emissions from forest clearing and burning account for nearly 10% of global emissions.	森林砍伐及焚毁所造成的二氧化碳排放占到全球排放量的接近10%。


Meanwhile, forest people have demonstrated that they are often the best guardians of the trees on which their livelihoods depend.	与此同时，森林居民已经证明他们往往是赖以生存树木的最好的监护者。


The forests where indigenous people live often hold more carbon than those managed by any other owners, public or private.	土著人居住的森林往往比其他公私所有者管理的碳吸收能力更强 。


Indeed, indigenous reserves in the Brazilian Amazon have played a critical role in lowering deforestation rates – at a considerable cost.	事实上，巴西亚马逊地区的土著保留地在降低森林采伐率方面发挥了关键的作用——并为此付出了相当大的代价。


In the past 12 years, more activists and indigenous leaders have been killed in Brazil than in any other country.	过去12年里，巴西被杀害的积极分子和土著领导人比其他任何国家都多。


During the proceedings in Paris later this year, countries will be expected to present national plans – known as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – outlining the specific steps they will take to reduce CO2 emissions.	预计今年晚些时候的巴黎会议上各国将提交国家计划——也叫国家决定计划（INDCs）——概述将为降低二氧化碳排放采取的具体步骤。


If Francis’s appeal is to be respected, these steps must include commitments to help indigenous people secure the right to their land and empower them to protect their forests against destruction.	如果弗朗西斯的吁能够得到重视，那么上述步骤必须包括承诺协助土著居民保护其土地权，授权他们保护自己的森林免遭破坏。


So far, only a little more than one-quarter of the world’s countries have submitted preliminary INDCs for review.	目前为止，全球仅有略超过四分之一的国家已将初步国家决定计划提交审核。


Unfortunately, few countries with tropical forests have submitted their plans, and not one of the Amazon countries has done so.	遗憾的是，拥有热带森林的国家没有多少已经提交了计划，亚马逊流域国家更是一个都没有。


Mexico, by contrast, is setting a good example.	相反，墨西哥正在树立好的榜样。


The government has used its INDC to set several ambitious goals, including commitments to zero deforestation by the year 2030 and to restoring forest ecosystems in the country’s watersheds.	政府已利用国家决定计划推出了几项雄心勃勃的目标，包括承诺到2030年实现零砍伐，并恢复该国流域的森林生态系统。


And yet, while Mexico has relatively strong formal land and property rights for indigenous peoples and local communities, those rights have yet to be integrated with other regulations – hindering any kind of economic development.	但尽管墨西哥土著居民和当地部落拥有较强的正式土地和财产所有权，这些权利仍未纳入其他法规制度——从而对任何形式的经济发展起到阻碍作用。


Industrialized countries, such as the United States and the members of the European Union, bear a special responsibility for providing solutions to the problem of deforestation.	美国和欧盟成员国等工业化国家对解决森林砍伐问题负有特殊的责任。


Forest communities must be provided with assistance in managing their resources and maintaining their livelihoods.	必须为森林部落提供资源管理和生计维持方面的援助。


The Green Climate Fund, established by the United Nations to help developing countries mitigate CO2 emissions and adapt to climate change, should include provisions specifically for indigenous people, along the lines of the Climate Investment Fund’s Dedicated Grant Mechanism.	联合国设立的绿色气候基金其目的是协助发展中国家减少二氧化碳排放及适应气候变化，应当在气候投资基金的专用拨款机制下，纳入专为土著民众制定的规则。


Francis’s upcoming trips will include visits to Washington, DC and Paris, where he is expected to continue his advocacy on behalf of the environment.	弗朗西斯即将开始的行程将包括访问巴黎和华盛顿，并将在那里继续宣传环境保护。


It is up to our leaders to answer his call and turn prayers into policy.	我们的领导人必须决定是否听取他的意见，并将祈祷转变为政策。


A British Test of Reason	理性的英国考验


PARIS – If voters in the United Kingdom decide in the country’s referendum on June 23 to leave the European Union, it will not be for economic reasons.	巴黎—如果英国选民在6月23日的全民公决中决定脱离欧盟，那肯定不是出于经济原因。


They may choose Brexit because they want full sovereignty, because they hate Brussels, or because they want migrants to return home, but not because they expect great economic benefits.	他们选择英国退出可能是因为渴望主权完整，因为讨厌布鲁塞尔，或者因为想把移民送回家，但不是因为期望获得巨大的经济利益。


The pro-Brexit camp initially appeared to be holding two strong economic cards.	支持英国退出阵营最初似乎手握两张经济好牌。


The first was UK citizens’ overwhelming rejection of their country’s net fiscal transfer to the rest of the EU, which currently amounts to 0.4% of GDP.	第一张牌是英国公民压倒性地拒绝英国向欧盟其他国家进行净财政转移。 目前净财政转移占GDP的0.


Since Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher first demanded to have “her money back” in 1979, the budgetary costs of EU membership have completely overshadowed its economic benefits in the public’s view.	4%。 在公众眼里，自1979年首相撒切尔夫人第一次要求“要回她的钱”以来，欧盟成员资格带来的预算成本大大超出了经济收益。


The second card was the sorry state of continental Europe’s economy.	第二张牌是欧洲大陆经济的糟糕状态。


In terms of GDP growth, employment, or innovation, other EU countries, on average, lag behind the UK (and, to an even greater extent, the United States).	用GDP增长、就业或创新等标准衡量，平均而言欧盟国家落后于英国（并且落后于美国更甚）。


Whereas EU membership was once regarded as a gateway to prosperity, it is increasingly viewed as a drag on progress.	欧盟成员资格曾经被视为繁荣之路，但如今正在日益被视为进步的拖累。


But lately, as John Van Reenen of the London School of Economics recently put it, the economic case for Brexit has been largely missing in action.	但最近，伦敦经济学院的约翰·范·里宁（John Van Reenen）指出，英国退出的经济理由在行动中难觅踪影。


Its advocates are at pains to explain what kind of trade and partnership agreements, if any, Britain could enter into with the EU, much less how those agreements would be superior to the current arrangement.	该理由的支持者难以解释英国可以与欧盟缔结何种贸易和合作伙伴协定，更不用说这些协定如何能够优于当前安排了。


As a result, it is tough to argue that the UK would receive a net economic boost – or even that it will not suffer considerably – by leaving the EU.	因此，很难认为退出欧盟的英国可以获得净经济提振——甚至可以不受到重大打击。


Of the eight economic evaluations recently surveyed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a respected independent research institution, only one claims that leaving the EU would lead to significant economic gains.	在声誉卓著的独立研究机构财政研究所（Institute for Fiscal Studies）最近调查的八项经济评估中，只有一项认为脱离欧盟能带来重大经济收益。


And that study – produced, unsurprisingly, by Economists for Brexit – has been sharply criticized by the rest of the economic profession for lacking an appropriate analytical basis.	而这项研究——毫不意外，来自支持英国退出的经济学家——受到了其他经济学界人士的尖锐批评，认为它缺乏合理的分析基础。


Most studies find that Britain would suffer significantly from leaving the EU.	大部分研究发现英国将因为脱离欧盟而遭受巨大损失。


UK exporters would end up participating less in the large EU market, and they would be shut out of EU-negotiated agreements ensuring access to major international markets.	英国出口商最终将减少在庞大的欧洲市场的参与，并且被排除在欧盟谈定的、确保进入主要国际市场的协定之外。


While the UK could negotiate new agreements with these partners, that would take time, and, acting alone, its negotiating power would presumably be weaker.	英国可以与这些合作伙伴谈判新的协定，但这需要时间，并且单独行动的话，其谈判力必将受到削弱。


This means that the UK would trade less with EU and non-EU partners alike.	这意味着英国与欧盟和非欧盟贸易伙伴的贸易额将减少。


It would pay higher prices for inputs and consumer goods, and British firms’ reduced integration into global value chains would undermine productivity.	英国将为投入品和消费品支付更高昂的价格，英国公司融入全球价值链程度降低也将破坏生产率。


The cost in terms of foregone GDP would be 5-20 times higher than the saving implied by not contributing to the EU budget.	从损失GDP的角度衡量，不为欧盟预算提供资金的成本将比隐含的节省高出5—20倍。


That is not an appealing deal, to say the least.	这显然不是划算的买卖。


All modern analysis of economic internationalization shows that foreign trade is a powerful selection mechanism.	所有现代经济国际化分析都表明，对外贸易是一个强大的遴选机制。


It provides major growth opportunities for the most productive and innovative firms, while enabling them to learn from their overseas competitors.	它为生产率最高、创新力最强的企业提供巨大的增长机会，也让它们能从海外竞争对手身上汲取经验。


It is no accident that the world’s best firms – which have the highest productivity, profits, and wages, and invest in strengthening human capital – are trade champions.	世界最佳企业——它们拥有最高的生产率、利润和工资，并投资于强化人力资本——都是贸易冠军，这绝非巧合。


Brexit’s adverse impact on UK firms’ scope for development would further increase the economic cost.	英国退出对英国企业发展规模的消极影响将进一步增加其经济成本。


These arguments have been forcefully advanced ahead of the referendum.	这些观点在全民公决前夕得到了大力宣传。


Yet they have not simplified the debate on the costs and benefits of Brexit.	但它们并没有简化英国退出的成本-收益争论。


This may be partly because that debate has not played out along party lines.	这也许部分是因为争论并不是在党派层面展开的。


Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservatives are deeply divided on the topic, while Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party is lukewarm about the EU.	首相卡梅伦所在的保守党在这个问题上陷入了深刻的分裂，而杰瑞米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）的工党对欧盟态度不冷不热。


Because the choice is not between left and right, independent views have gained greater weigtht.	这不是左与右的选择，独立观点影响更大。


The June 23 referendum is important in its own right, owing to its far-reaching implications for the UK’s relationship with Europe.	6月23日的全民公决本身十分重要，因为它将对英国与欧洲的关系产生深远影响。


But it will also deliver broader lessons.	但它也将带来含义更加广泛的教训。


If British voters decide to leave the EU, it will indicate that rational economic arguments carry less weight than emotional appeals.	如果英国选民选择脱离欧盟，那就表明理性经济观点分量不及情感诉求。


Such an outcome will bolster populist forces elsewhere – from Italy to France to the US – in their advocacy of isolationist policies that most experts regard as economic nonsense.	这样的结果将刺激其他国家的民粹主义鼓吹在大部分专家眼里毫无经济意义的孤立主义政策的力量——从意大利到法国到美国都是如此。


To oppose such forces and policies, mainstream political parties will have to address their failure, even with the facts on their side, to offer a narrative compelling enough to convince voters to choose economic openness.	为了对抗这些力量和政策，主流政党必须扭转失败（尽管事实站在它们这一边），提供足够有说服力的叙事让选民选择经济开放。


A vote by a majority of British citizens to remain in the EU would have the opposite impact, highlighting that, whatever negative feelings people may have about a policy or entity, reason and logic cannot be tossed aside.	如果大部分英国公民选择留在欧盟，那么会带来相反的效应，突出表明不管人们对于一项政策或一个实体抱有如何负面的感觉，都不会失去理性和逻辑。


Equally important, such an outcome could encourage greater scrutiny of the economic consequences of populist programs in the US and the rest of Europe.	同样重要的是，这一结果可能鼓励人们更加严厉地审视美国和欧洲其他国家民粹主义计划的经济后果。


What is at stake in the June 23 referendum is therefore not only the relationship between Britain and the EU – or even the future of the “European project.”	因此，6月23日的全民公决不仅事关英国与欧盟的关系——甚至“欧洲工程”的未来。


How voters decide will be an important test of whether democratic choices in advanced countries are governed by economic rationality or popular passions.	选民如何决定将是发达国家民主选择是受经济理性还是群众热情支配的重要考验。


Politics in the Way of Progress	进步路上的政治


BERKELEY – There are 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aim to tackle problems including poverty, hunger, disease, inequality, climate change, ecological degradation, and many others in between.	伯克利—联合国可持续发展目标（SDG）一共十七个，人们期望以此解决包括贫困、饥饿、疾病、不平等、气候变化、生态破坏以及其他许多相关问题。


Clearly, 17 is too many.	显然，十七个目标太多了。


As Frederick the Great supposedly said, “He who defends everything defends nothing.”	据说腓特烈大帝曾说过，“想要捍卫一切，结果什么都捍卫不了。


Similarly, those who emphasize everything emphasize nothing.	”类似地，强调一切等于什么都不强调。


This points to the problem of forging goals through consensus: they can end up being a wish list for everything short of heaven on Earth.	这就引出了通过共识制定目标的问题：到头来，这些目标就成了一份建设人间天堂的清单。


But, to be effective, goals should operate like turnpikes, which allow you to make progress toward a specific destination much faster than if you had taken the scenic route.	但要想有效，目标应该像是高速公路，让你抵达具体目的地的速度大大快于观光小径。


The purpose of consensus building, then, should be to get us to the on-ramp, after which it becomes harder to make a wrong turn or reverse course.	因此，构建共识的目的应该是将我们引到高速公路入口，一旦进入了高速公路，想转错或掉头都难。


Still, there could be obstacles on the road ahead.	尽管如此，路上仍然可能会有障碍。


For Tsinghua University’s Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng of the University of Hong Kong, these include “technological disruption, geopolitical rivalry, and widening social inequality,” but, above all, “populist calls for nationalist policies, including trade protectionism.”	清华大学的沈联涛（Andrew Sheng）和香港大学的肖耿认为，这些障碍包括“技术破坏、地缘政治对立和社会不平等性加剧”，但首先是“对包括贸易保护主义在内的民族主义政策的民粹主义吁求”。


Sheng and Geng see a world in which “the sovereign state still reigns supreme, with national interests overshadowing shared objectives.”	沈联涛和肖耿看到了一个“主权国家仍然拥有支配地位，国家利益始终影响共同目标”的世界。


They point out that, for advanced and developing economies alike, “paying for global public goods has become all the more unappealing,” given that “both democratic and authoritarian governance” have struggled to deliver “equitable development.”	他们指出，不管是发达经济体还是发展中经济体，“掏钱建设全球公共品越来越不具有号召力，”因为“不论是民主还是极权治理”，都难以实现“平等发展”。


Their conclusion is that “achieving the SDGs will probably be impossible” in a world beholden to “the antiquated Westphalian model of nation-states.”	他们的结论是，在一个受制于“过时的威斯特伐利亚民族国家模式”的世界中，“实现SDG也许是不可能的”。


After all, there is “no global tax mechanism to ensure the provision of global public goods,” and “no global monetary or welfare policies to maintain price stability and social peace.”	毕竟，“不存在一个全球税收机制确保全球公共品的供给”，也“不存在全球货币和福利政策来维持价格稳定和社会和平”。


Another obstacle, argues Mark Suzman of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, is that “without a more deliberate, data-driven focus on the needs of women and girls in particular, progress toward a wide range of [SDG] objectives will suffer.”	比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会的马克·苏兹曼（Mark Suzman）提出了另一个障碍，即“如果不更成熟地、数据推动地关注（特别是）妇女和女孩的需要，朝向广泛的SDG目标的进步就会遇到阻挠”。


Over the past two centuries, the world has made significant strides in reducing infant mortality, such that the typical woman no longer has to spend five years of her life pregnant and another ten years nursing.	在过去两个世纪中，世界在降低婴儿死亡率方面取得了重大进展，普通妇女不再需要将生命中的五年时间用来怀孕，再将十年时间用来哺乳。


Yet traditional patriarchal systems are still blocking women from contributing as much as they otherwise could, and without more data, we cannot see where those blockages are occurring.	但传统父权制度仍然在阻碍妇女做出她们力所能及的贡献，而如果没有更多的数据，我们就无法看到这些障碍发生在哪里。


Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence, for his part, warns that as long as there are “non-inclusive growth patterns” in both developing and advanced economies, there is little hope of “reducing poverty and fulfilling basic human aspirations for health, security, and the chance to contribute productively and creatively to society.”	诺贝尔经济学奖得主迈克尔·斯宾塞（Michael Spence）则警告说，只要发展中和发达经济体存在“非包容性增长模式”，我们就没有什么希望能够“减少贫困并充分实现健康、安全和为社会做出生产性和创造性贡献的基本人类愿望”。


And, complicating matters further, inequitable growth risks fueling “political or social turmoil, often marked by ideological or ethnic polarization, which then leads either to wide policy swings or to policy paralysis.”	让情况更加糟糕的是，不平等的增长有可能助长“政治或社会动荡，其特征通常为意识形态或种族极化，并导致剧烈的政策波动或者政策瘫痪”。


And Kaushik Basu of Cornell University laments that a “growth slowdown” in India, once “a poster child for political stability and economic growth among emerging economies,” has become a “source of serious concern not just domestically, but around the world.”	康奈尔大学的考希克·巴苏（Kaushik Basu）哀叹印度的“增长减速”，这个曾经的“新兴经济体的政治稳定和经济增长模范”，已经沦为“令人严重担心的原因，不仅国内如此，国际上也是如此”。


To right the Indian ship, Basu calls on the government to focus its development efforts on specific sectors such as health, education, and medical tourism, and to do more to attract capital investment.	为了纠正印度的航向，巴苏呼吁政府发展政策要注重卫生、教育和医疗旅游等具体部门，并加大力度吸引资本投资。


To me, a common underlying concern in all of these commentaries is not so much economics as politics and people – and a politics of people.	在我看来，所有这些评论背后有一个共同的根本性问题，它不是经济上的，而是政治和人民上的——或者说是民有政治（politics of people）。


We live in a world that is far richer than that of any previous generation.	我们所生活的世界，要比我们的祖先所生活的世界富有得多。


In theory, it should be easy to ensure that all people have the nutrition and health care they need to live full lives.	理论上，确保所有人都能获得圆满生活所需要的营养和医护。


Educating all people so that they can make the best use of modern technologies and the other resources at their disposal should be rather straightforward.	全实现民教育，让人们能够最好地随心所欲使用现代技术和其他资源，这应该是应有之义。


And it should be obvious to everyone – even the richest among us – that providing comfort in old age, and prosperity for the next generation, requires that the wealthiest pay enough in taxes to ensure that growth is truly and equitably shared.	要想让老年人能获得优渥的生活，下一代能实现繁荣，就必须要求最富有的人群支付足够多的税收以确保增长能够真正做到公平分享，这应该是人人都能理解的浅显道理——即使是我们当中最富有的人。


The problem is that while many people work toward the SDGs, political confidence men (and some women) are throwing up new barriers, by stoking the resentments of those who have benefited the most from inequitable growth, as well as those who have missed out.	问题在于，尽管有很多人致力于SDG，但政治心机客（和一些心机婊）在树立新的障碍，煽动那些从不平等的增长中获益最多的人和被遗忘的人的仇恨。


In the United States, one can see this every hour on Fox News, where Mexican auto-parts workers, Salvadoran refugees, Muslims, “ungrateful” non-white Americans, and “globalists” of all stripes are routinely vilified.	在美国，福克斯新闻台每小时都有这样的报道，墨西哥汽车零件工人、萨尔瓦多难民、穆斯林、不知感恩的非白人美国人以及各色各样的“全球主义者”都是日常抹黑对象。


And, of course, one can see the same thing in other countries around the world.	当然，你在世界其他国家也能看到这些东西。


But many of those sitting at home watching cable news (or reading commentaries about the SDGs) hail from the top 50% of the income distribution in the Global North, or from the top 20% in the Global South.	但很多坐在家里观看有线电视（或阅读关于SDG的评论）的人来自全球北方收入分布较高的50%，或全球南方收入分布最高的20%。 我们应该是真心实意感恩我们当前所处环境的人。


We are the ones who need to be sufficiently grateful for our circumstances.	我们当中有一些人比其他人拥有得更多；


Some of us have much more than others; but we all have far more than we deserve.	但我们所有人所拥有的都要远远多于我们应得的。


Then again, perhaps we should stop thinking in terms of what is “deserved” at all.	同样，也许我们根本就应该不再有“应得”思维。 “正因为我们所有人都应得一切，”乌尔苏拉·勒瑰恩（Ursula K.


“For we each of us deserve everything,” a character in Ursula K. Le Guin’s 1974 novel The Dispossessed reminds us, “and we each of us deserve nothing.”	Le Guin）1947年的小说《一无所有》（The Dispossessed）的一位角色提醒我们，“所以我们所有人都一切都不应得。 ”


In other words, achieving the SDGs may require a radically different approach.	换句话说，实现SDG也许需要截然不同的方法。


“Free your mind of the idea of deserving, the idea of earning,” Le Guin’s character continues, “and you will begin to be able to think.”	“解放思想，摆脱应得思维，摆脱赚取思维，”勒瑰恩的角色继续说道，“然后你就有了思考能力。 ”


The Crisis of Market Fundamentalism	市场原教旨主义危机


LONDON – The biggest political surprise of 2016 was that everyone was so surprised.	伦敦—2016年最大的政治惊奇是每个人都如此惊奇。


I certainly had no excuse to be caught unawares: soon after the 2008 crisis, I wrote a book suggesting that a collapse of confidence in political institutions would follow the economic collapse, with a lag of five years or so.	显然，我并非后知后觉：2008年危机后不久，我写了一本书指出，经济崩溃之后将是对政治制度的信心的崩溃，时差大概是五年左右。


We’ve seen this sequence before.	此前我们曾目睹过这样的事件序列。


The first breakdown of globalization, described by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their 1848 The Communist Manifesto, was followed by reform laws creating unprecedented rights for the working class.	马克思和恩格斯在1848年《共产党宣言》中所描述的全球化的第一次崩溃之后是为工人阶级带来前所未有的权利的改革法。


The breakdown of British imperialism after World War I was followed by the New Deal and the welfare state.	一战后英国帝国主义的崩溃之后是罗斯福新政和福利国家。


And the breakdown of Keynesian economics after 1968 was followed by the Thatcher-Reagan revolution.	1968年凯恩斯主义经济学的崩溃之后是撒切尔夫人-里根革命。 在我的书《资本主义4.


In my book Capitalism 4.0, I argued that comparable political upheavals would follow the fourth systemic breakdown of global capitalism heralded by the 2008 crisis.	0》（Capitalism 4. 0）中我指出，2008年危机所预兆的第四次全球资本主义系统性崩溃之后也将发生可比的政治剧变。


When a particular model of capitalism is working successfully, material progress relieves political pressures.	当某种资本主义模式取得成功时，物质进步缓解了政治压力。


But when the economy fails – and the failure is not just a transient phase but a symptom of deep contradictions – capitalism’s disruptive social side effects can turn politically toxic.	担当经济失灵时——并且失灵不是暂时性阶段，而是深刻矛盾的症候——资本主义的破坏性社会副作用就会成为政治毒药。


That is what happened after 2008.	2008年后的情况正是如此。


Once the failure of free trade, deregulation, and monetarism came to be seen as leading to a “new normal” of permanent austerity and diminished expectations, rather than just to a temporary banking crisis, the inequalities, job losses, and cultural dislocations of the pre-crisis period could no longer be legitimized – just as the extortionate taxes of the 1950s and 1960s lost their legitimacy in the stagflation of the 1970s.	当人们认为自由贸易、去监管化和货币主义的失败正在导致持久紧缩和预期下调的“新常态”，而不仅仅是一场暂时性银行危机时，不平等性、工作岗位损失以及前危机时代的文化断层便不再被视为合理——正如20世纪五六十年代的沉重税负在20世纪70年代的滞胀时期不再被视为合理。


If we are witnessing this kind of transformation, then piecemeal reformers who try to address specific grievances about immigration, trade, or income inequality will lose out to radical politicians who challenge the entire system.	如果我们正在经历这种转变，那么试图解决具体针对移民、贸易或收入不平等的怨恨的渐进派改革家将败给调整一整套制度的激进政客。


And, in some ways, the radicals will be right.	并且，从某种角度，激进派才是正确的。


The disappearance of “good” manufacturing jobs cannot be blamed on immigration, trade, or technology.	“优质”制造业岗位的消失不能归咎于移民、贸易或技术。


But whereas these vectors of economic competition increase total national income, they do not necessarily distribute income gains in a socially acceptable way.	但是，这些方面的经济竞争固然增加了总国民收入，却未必以社会可接受的方式分配收入收益。


To do that requires deliberate political intervention on at least two fronts.	这样需要在至少两个方面进行有意识的政治干预。


First, macroeconomic management must ensure that demand always grows as strongly as the supply potential created by technology and globalization.	首先，宏观经济管理必须确保需求增长始终能够与技术和全球化所创造的供给潜力齐头并进。 这就是最根本的凯恩斯主义洞见，在20世纪80年代初货币主义的鼎盛时期，它曾经被拒绝；


This is the fundamental Keynesian insight that was temporarily rejected in the heyday of monetarism during the early 1980s, successfully reinstated in the 1990s (at least in the US and Britain), but then forgotten again in the deficit panic after 2009.	在20世纪90年代，它成功“复辟”（至少在美国和英国是如此）； 但在2009年后的赤字恐慌中，它又被忘得一干二净。


A return to Keynesian demand management could be the main economic benefit of Donald Trump’s incoming US administration, as expansionary fiscal policies replace much less efficient efforts at monetary stimulus.	回归凯恩斯主义需求管理也许是即将履新的美国唐纳德·特朗普政府的主要经济红利，扩张性财政政策将取代效率低下的货币刺激。


The US may now be ready to abandon the monetarist dogmas of central-bank independence and inflation targeting, and to restore full employment as the top priority of demand management.	眼下，美国也许已经准备好抛弃央行独立性和通胀目标等货币主义信条，将恢复充分就业作为需求管理的最重要目标。


For Europe, however, this revolution in macroeconomic thinking is still years away.	但是，对欧洲来说，这场宏观经济思维革命还需要很多年才会到来。


At the same time, a second, more momentous, intellectual revolution will be needed regarding government intervention in social outcomes and economic structures.	与此同时，在政府干预社会结果和经济结构方面，需要另一场更加关键的思想革命。


Market fundamentalism conceals a profound contradiction.	市场原教旨主义掩盖了一个深刻的矛盾。


Free trade, technological progress, and other forces that promote economic “efficiency” are presented as beneficial to society, even if they harm individual workers or businesses, because growing national incomes allow winners to compensate losers, ensuring that nobody is left worse off.	自由贸易、技术进步和其他促进经济“效率”的力量被包装成同样有利于社会，即使它们伤害了个体工作者或企业，因为日益增长的国民收入让赢家能够补偿输家，从而确保没有人境况会变遭。


This principle of so-called Pareto optimality underlies all moral claims for free-market economics.	所谓的帕累托最优原理是一切自由市场经济学的道德主张的基础。


Liberalizing policies are justified in theory only by the assumption that political decisions will redistribute some of the gains from winners to losers in socially acceptable ways.	政策自由化只有在政治决定能够以社会可接受的方式将一些收益从赢家手中再分配给输家的假设下才能在理论上成立。


But what happens if politicians do the opposite in practice?	但如果政客在现实中反其道而行之，结果会怎样？


By deregulating finance and trade, intensifying competition, and weakening unions, governments created the theoretical conditions that demanded redistribution from winners to losers.	通过金融和贸易去监管、加强竞争、削弱工会，政府创造了要求“劫富济贫”的再分配的理论条件。


But advocates of market fundamentalism did not just forget redistribution; they forbade it.	但市场原教旨主义的鼓吹者不但忘记了再分配； 他们干脆禁止再分配。


The pretext was that taxes, welfare payments, and other government interventions impair incentives and distort competition, reducing economic growth for society as a whole.	他们的托辞是税收、福利支出和其他政府干预削弱了激励，扭曲了竞争，降低了社会整体的经济增长。


But, as Margaret Thatcher famously said, “[…] there’s no such thing as society.	但是，如撒切尔夫人的名言所言，“根本没有社会这回事。


There are individual men and women and there are families.”	只有男个体、女个体和家庭。


By focusing on the social benefits of competition while ignoring the costs to specific people, the market fundamentalists disregarded the principle of individualism at the heart of their own ideology.	”市场原教旨主义者关注竞争的社会收益，而忽视这给具体的人所造成的代价，因此否认了个人主义原则在我们的意识形态中的核心地位。


After this year’s political upheavals, the fatal contradiction between social benefits and individual losses can no longer be ignored.	今年的政治剧变后，社会收益与个人损失之间的致命矛盾不可继续忽视。


If trade, competition, and technological progress are to power the next phase of capitalism, they will have to be paired with government interventions to redistribute the gains from growth in ways that Thatcher and Reagan declared taboo.	如果贸易、竞争和技术进步要想成为资本主义下一阶段的推动力，就必须辅之以政府干预，以撒切尔夫人和里根奉为禁忌的方式再分配增长受益。


Breaking these taboos need not mean returning to the high tax rates, inflation, and dependency culture of the 1970s.	打破这些禁忌未必意味着回归20世纪70年代的高税率、通胀和依赖文化。


Just as fiscal and monetary policy can be calibrated to minimize both unemployment and inflation, redistribution can be designed not merely to recycle taxes into welfare, but to help more directly when workers and communities suffer from globalization and technological change.	正如财政和货币政策可以作出调整以同时实现失业和通胀的最小化，再分配也可以设计为不仅仅是将税收回收为福利，而是在工人和社区因为全球化和技术变化而受到冲击时给予更加直接的帮助。


Instead of providing cash handouts that push people from work into long-term unemployment or retirement, governments can redistribute the benefits of growth by supporting employment and incomes with regional and industrial subsidies and minimum-wage laws.	政府不应该提供现金救济，让人们从工作状态转为长期失业或退休，而应该通过用地区和行业补贴以及最低工资法等方式支持就业和收入，从而实现收益再分配。


Among the most effective interventions of this type, demonstrated in Germany and Scandinavia, is to spend money on high-quality vocational education and re-training for workers and students outside universities, creating non-academic routes to a middle-class standard of living.	这种类型最有效的干预是将钱用于高质量职业培训以及工人和毕业后学生的再培训上，打造一条通往中产阶级生活水平的非学术道路，德国和北欧国家即是明证。


These may all sound like obvious nostrums, but governments have mostly done the opposite.	这些政策看起来显而易见，但政府往往南辕北辙。


They have made tax systems less progressive and slashed spending on education, industrial policies and regional subsidies, pouring money instead into health care, pensions, and cash hand-outs that encourage early retirement and disability.	它们降低税制的累进性，削减教育、产业政策和地区补贴支出，而将钱用于医疗、退休金和现金救济，鼓励人们早早退休和失能。


The redistribution has been away from low-paid young workers, whose jobs and wages are genuinely threatened by trade and immigration, and toward the managerial and financial elites, who have gained the most from globalization, and elderly retirees, whose guaranteed pensions protect them from economic disruptions.	再分配与低收入年轻工人渐行渐远，而他们的岗位和工资真正受到贸易和移民的威胁； 反之，再分配又有利于管理和金融精英以及年长退休者，前者是从全球化中受益最多的人，后者能够安全地获得退休金保护他们不受经济动荡影响。


Yet this year’s political upheavals have been driven by elderly voters, while young voters mostly supported the status quo.	但今年的政治剧变是由年长选民推动的，倒是年轻选民大多支持现状。


This paradox shows the post-crisis confusion and disillusionment is not yet over.	这一悖论表明危机后的困惑和幻灭还没有完全结束。


But the search for new economic models that I called “Capitalism 4.1” has clearly started – for better or worse.	但寻找我称之为“资本主义4. 1”的新经济模式之旅显然已经开始——不管结果如何。


Only More Europe Can Beat Europe’s Nationalists	只有进一步欧洲融合才能击败欧洲民族主义者


BRUSSELS – British voters’ choice to leave the European Union is unfortunate, but unsurprising.	布鲁塞尔——英国选民选择离开欧盟非常不幸，但并不令人吃惊。


For decades, British politicians have avoided making the case for EU membership, or even explaining to the British people how the Union works and why it is necessary.	数十年来，英国政客都避免为欧盟成员资格说话，甚至不愿向英国民众解释欧盟的运作方式及其存在的原因。


Throughout his premiership, David Cameron failed to show any leadership or willingness to engage in a meaningful way with the EU.	终其首相任期，卡梅伦一直未能表现出任何领导能力，也不愿以有意义方式接触欧盟。


One foot was always out the door as he repeatedly railed against faceless bureaucrats in Brussels.	他总是一只脚跨在欧盟门外，并一再攻击布鲁塞尔那些不露脸的官僚。


Sadly, his last-minute attempt to defend EU membership during the Brexit campaign was not enough to undo the effects on British public opinion of decades of lies.	可悲的是，他在英国退欧最后一刻捍卫欧盟成员资格的努力不足以抵消英国数十年舆论传播的谎言。


Britain has chosen isolation in Europe, against the advice of its friends and allies.	英国没有听从朋友和盟国们的意见，已经选择了孤立于欧洲。


Now that its post-imperial decline is complete, the most important lesson to take away from the “Brexit” referendum that sealed its fate is that one cannot defeat nationalism by pandering to nationalists.	现在后帝国时代的下滑结束后，从决定其命运的“英国脱欧”公投中应当吸取的最重要的教训是不能靠取悦民族主义者来打败民族主义。


If the EU wants to tackle the strains of nationalism that are undermining its very raison d'être, it will have to listen to people’s concerns and offer a radical new vision for effective governance.	如果欧盟真想解决破坏其存在理由的各种民族主义，它就必须了解民众的忧虑，并提供有效执政的全新目标。


Otherwise, the nationalist cancer will spread.	否则，民族主义癌症将会继续传播。


To begin with, the remaining EU countries must now uphold European law and push for a quick and clean divorce.	首先，剩下的欧洲国家现在必须执行欧洲法律，推动英国干净、迅速的脱欧。


The United Kingdom’s citizens voted to leave, and its political leaders insist that they will respect the referendum’s outcome, so it is not “punishment” to insist that they do so as soon as possible.	英国民众投票脱欧，而且政治领袖坚称将尊重公投结果，因此要求他们尽快完成脱欧程序算不上是什么“惩罚”。


If British inaction causes Europe to continue to suffer economically from political uncertainty, a full separation should be carried out unilaterally.	如果英国拒不作为导致欧洲继续因政治不确定遭受经济损失，则欧盟应单方面实行彻底的分离。


Politically, the UK is already on its way to becoming an adversary, rather than a trusted partner, of the EU.	政治上，英国已经成为欧盟的竞争对手，而不是值得信赖的伙伴。


Before reversing herself under fire, Theresa May – the home secretary, who is now the leading candidate to succeed Cameron as Prime Minister – implicitly threatened the future status of EU nationals living in the UK by promising only that they would be “part of the negotiation” for Britain’s exit.	在遭到攻击并扭转口风前，最有可能接替卡梅伦出任首相的内政大臣特雷莎·梅含蓄地威胁了生活在英国欧盟民众，仅仅承诺他们将成为英国退欧“谈判的部分内容”。


May actually opposed Brexit.	梅实际反对英国脱欧。


Yet her anti-European hostility differs only in degree, not in kind, from that of pro-Brexit politicians, such as Daniel Hannan, a Conservative MEP, and Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party, who rejoice at the possibility of additional exit referenda across the EU.	但她对欧盟的敌意相比保守派议员丹尼尔·汉南和英国独立党领袖奈杰尔·法拉奇等赞成脱欧的政治家并无本质区别而仅仅是程度上的不同。 后者为其他欧盟国家脱欧公投的可能性而感到异常兴奋。


Fortunately, post-Brexit contagion has so far failed to materialize, most likely thanks to the embarrassing public spectacle that the UK has become since June 23, with its economic prospects dimming, its financial sector – a global powerhouse – scouting new locations, and its leaders stabbing one another in the back.	幸运的是，很可能因为6月23日以来英国尴尬的公众奇观，英国脱欧传染病迄今为止未能成功传播。 英国经济前景日趋暗淡、其全球强势金融业寻找新的所在地以及英国领导人互相在背后使绊。


In fact, the referendum may have even prompted EU countries – including those with noisy Euroskeptic parties, such as Denmark and Sweden – to close ranks in support of EU membership.	事实上，公决甚至可能已经促使欧盟国家——包括丹麦和瑞典等国吵吵闹闹的欧洲怀疑主义政党——为支持欧盟资格而相互团结。


A post-referendum poll in Sweden found 66% of respondents still in favor of EU membership.	瑞典后公投民调显示仍有66%的受访者赞成加入欧盟。


In Denmark, similar polling after the Brexit referendum showed a 9% jump in support of EU membership.	在丹麦，英国脱欧后类似的民调显示支持留欧者出现了9%的明显增加。


EU leaders must not sit on their hands.	欧盟领导人绝不能袖手旁观。


The Brexit crisis should be treated as an opportunity for the Union, given that concerns about globalization, terrorism, immigration, and inequality are now mainstream.	英国退欧危机应当被欧盟视为机会，因为全球化、恐怖主义、移民和不平等关切现在已经成为主流。


A divided Europe has failed to respond to these challenges; and, while the British will be missed, the EU will now be less divided.	分裂的欧洲未能应对上述挑战； 而且尽管我们会思念英国，但现在欧盟分裂的趋势将会得到遏制。


Still, today’s EU is not capable of decisive, large-scale action.	但今天的欧盟仍然无力采取大规模的果断行动。


To provide an alternative to the emotional appeal of populist nationalism, the Union must become more responsive to its citizens’ demands.	要想提供民粹民族主义情感诱惑之外的其他选择，欧盟必须更快地响应其民众要求。


This will require radical structural reforms to the eurozone and to the EU’s central political institutions.	这需要针对欧元区和欧盟中央政治体制开展彻底的结构性改革。


Economists generally agree that a single currency without a fiscal union or a common treasury is unsustainable.	经济学家普遍认为没有财政联盟或共同国库的单一货币缺少持续性。


If Europeans do not finish the job they started when they established the euro, they will continue to experience the economic pain of structural disunity.	如果欧洲人不完成设立欧元时已经开始的任务，就会继续经历结构不统一的经济阵痛。


Complete integration would deliver prosperity and better governance.	全面一体化将改善执政并带来繁荣。


Europe’s security arrangements suffer similar shortfalls.	欧洲安全机制也存在类似的不足。


It is absurd that Europe has the globally respected European Space Agency, but no credible organization to collect and share intelligence in the fight against terrorism.	欧洲拥有全球推崇的欧洲航天局，但却没有可靠的组织来搜集和共享打击恐怖主义的情报非常荒谬。


The attacks in Paris last November should have made it obvious that borderless terrorism demands borderless intelligence, yet EU member states continue to put individual sovereignty ahead of collective security.	去年的巴黎袭击应当已经表明无国界恐怖主义需要无国界的情报，但欧盟成员国却依然关注个体主权胜于集体安全。


More inter-governmental cooperation simply won’t do.	加强政府间合作根本没用。


Europe needs a central intelligence authority with teeth.	欧洲需要长着牙齿的中央情报机构。


Only by starting on such far-reaching reforms can Europe begin to stem the rise of populism that led to the success of the UK’s “Leave” campaign.	只有启动类似意义深远的改革欧洲才能遏制导致英国成功脱欧的民粹主义崛起。


Some would say that more sovereign powers should be returned to EU member states. I could not disagree more.	有人说要向欧盟成员国归还主权，而我却不敢苟同。


This would only further weaken the project of integration that has safeguarded peace and prosperity in Europe for decades.	这只会进一步削弱已经捍卫欧洲和平繁荣几十年的整合项目。


Populism and Euroskepticism are the enemies of that project. The only way to beat them is to build a Europe that works for its citizens.	民粹主义和欧洲怀疑论是欧洲整合项目的敌人，只有建设服务于民众的欧洲才能将其打败。


Anything less works only for the demagogues who would follow the UK into the wilderness.	不这样做恐怕正中追随英国走入未知险境的煽动者们的下怀。


The UK’s Multilateral Trade Future	英国的多边贸易未来


CAMBRIDGE – As the United Kingdom negotiates the terms of its divorce from the European Union, it would be wise for the country’s leaders to begin looking further into the future to determine what approach to international trade relations would serve it best.	剑桥—在英国与欧盟谈判分手协议时，英国领导人的明智做法是着眼于未来以决定采取怎样的国际贸易关系方针最为合适。


Does the UK really want to hang its future on bilateral agreements with a long list of individual trade partners?	英国真的需要把未来系于一长串个别贸易伙伴的双边协议吗？


Or would it be better off joining existing mega-regional free-trade agreements, while working to strengthen the global multilateral system under the World Trade Organization?	还是加入现成的大区域自贸协定，同时致力于强化世贸组织框架下的全球多边贸易体系更好？


The bilateral approach would demand a huge amount of time and resources, with UK negotiators engaging in a series of discussions with each and every country with which they wanted to do business.	双边方针需要巨大的时间和资源，英国谈判员要逐一与其想做生意的各个国家进行一系列讨论。


The end result would be a tangled network of deals that would only exacerbate the balkanization of the international trading system.	最终结果将是一个错综复杂的协议网，加剧国际贸易体系的支离破碎。


This approach limits gains from trade.	这一方针制约了贸易所带来的收益。


For example, the Inter-American Development Bank reports that the trade gains from Latin America’s 33 small regional trade agreements have been meager.	比如，据泛美开发银行报道，拉美33个小型地区贸易协议所产生的贸易收益微乎其微。


The key to boosting those gains, according to the IADB, is to adopt a new strategy that expands access across and within markets.	它指出，扩大这些收益的关键在于采取新战略，加强市场间和市场内部的准入。


This suggests that, for the UK, mega-regional trade agreements – which provide access to multiple markets, but entail lower levels of fiscal and regulatory integration than the EU – are the best way forward.	这表明，对英国来说，大型地区贸易协定——它们能够提供多市场准入，但又不会像欧盟那样要求财政和监管一体化——是最好的前途。


After all, it is this approach that would enable UK firms to position themselves in well-developed and integrated supply chains, serving much larger markets than those to which a bilateral agreement would grant them access.	毕竟，这一方针让英国企业能够打入发达的一体化供给链，面对比双边贸易所能允许的规模大的多的市场。


The argument can be made that a multilateral approach is not just the better option; it is the only one.	可以这样说，多边方针不仅仅是更好的选择； 它也是唯一的选择。


Consider the recent challenges faced by Bombardier, a Canadian multinational that produces 100-150-seat passenger jets using globally sourced parts, including wings made by Bombardier UK, the largest manufacturing employer in Northern Ireland.	以庞巴迪（Bombardier）为例。 这是一家加拿大跨国公司，用全球化外包的部件生产100—150座客用飞机，其中机翼为英国庞巴迪生产，它也是北爱尔兰最大的制造业厂商。


Bombardier negotiated the sale of up to 125 of its jets to Delta Air Lines.	庞巴迪与德尔塔航空公司（Delta Air Lines）议定了125架飞机的销售合同。


But the American aviation giant Boeing challenged the sale, alleging that, enabled by subsidies at home, Bombardier was selling the jets at below-market rates, giving the company an unfair advantage.	但美国航空业巨头波音公司对此发难，指控庞巴迪公司凭借国内补贴，用低于市场水平的价格销售这些飞机，从而获得不公平的优势。


Despite loud protests from Canada and the UK, the US Department of Commerce now seems set to impose an extremely high import tariff of about 300%.	尽管加拿大和英国强烈抗议，但美国商务部即将对庞巴迪征收高达300%左右的进口关税。


The effects of that duty will radiate throughout the supply chain, hitting the 4,200 employees of Bombardier UK.	这笔关税的影响将贯穿整个供给链，冲击到英国庞巴迪的4,200名员工。


This experience demonstrates the limitations of bilateral agreements, especially in a world where supply chains and markets extend far beyond the countries involved.	这一经验说明了双边协议的局限性，特别是在一个供给链范围远远不止于参与其中的国家的世界中。


The UK may negotiate a bilateral free-trade agreement with, say, Canada, but UK firms will secure few benefits, unless Canadian firms can sell products with UK components to their other trading partners.	英国或许可以与（比如）加拿大谈判双边贸易协议，但英国企业无法就此保证多少收益，除非加拿大企业可以将包含英国产零部件的产品卖给其他贸易伙伴。


The Bombardier episode also highlights the importance of engagement in – and reform of – the WTO, under whose rules the US-initiated proceedings against Bombardier are taking place.	庞巴迪的例子还突显出世贸组织的参与——以及改革——的重要性。 美国的针对庞巴迪的诉讼就是根据世贸组织发起的。


The impact of WTO rules and resolution mechanisms is far-reaching, as 164 countries worldwide subscribe to them.	世贸组织规则和解决机制的影响非常深远，被全世界164个国家所认可。


Yet WTO rules have their flaws.	但世贸组织规则也有缺陷。


For example, they allow exporting countries to provide financial support and subsidies to specific industries; but they also give importing countries the right to use tariffs to offset these subsidies.	比如，它们允许出口国为特定行业提供金融支持和补贴； 但同时也允许进口国用关税来抵消这些补贴。


The WTO has heard countless disputes over its subsidies and dumping rules, and it is now sure to hear one more, over the Bombardier case, because the US and Canada have different ideas about how to interpret these rules.	世贸组织已经处理过无数起关于其补贴和倾销规则的纠纷，现在又要再加上一个——庞巴迪案，因为美国和加拿大对于如何解释这些规则有着不同的理解。


Though no one is happy with the current WTO rules, efforts to reform them have so far ended in deadlock.	尽管所有人都对现行世贸组织规则不满，但改革这些规则的努力僵持不下。


But recent high-value cases involving high-tech products like airplanes, semiconductors, and green technologies, including solar panels and biodiesel, make clear that the problem cannot be ignored.	不过，最近所发生的包括飞机、半导体和绿色技术（如太阳能面板的生物柴油）等高科技产品在内的高案值案件清楚地表明，这个问题已经不容忽视。


And the fact is that concerns over state aid and competition policy can be addressed only in a multilateral forum like the WTO.	而事实上，关于国家援助和竞争政策的关注只有在世贸组织这样的多边场合才有可能解决。


Because the UK has historically shown far less appetite for industrial subsidies than its trading partners have, it stands to gain from clear international rules on industrial support and anti-subsidy tariffs.	从历史看，英国对产业补贴的热衷程度远远比不上其贸易伙伴，因此，如果关于产业支持和反补贴关税的国际规则得到明确，对英国大有裨益。


Given this, the UK has a strong incentive to engage with – and help to upgrade – the WTO.	考虑到这一点，英国有强烈的激励参与——并帮助改革——世贸组织。


Another multilateral forum that could prove invaluable to the UK is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a mega-regional trade agreement that provides for duty-free trade and includes modest commitments in areas like state aid and competition policy, without requiring EU-level integration.	另一个对英国极具价值的多边平台是跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），这是一个大区域贸易协议，它能带来无关税贸易，并包括了一些国家援助和竞争政策方面的初步承诺，同时也不要求欧盟水平的一体化。


Though the TPP suffered a setback last year, when Donald Trump withdrew the United States, last month the 11 Pacific Rim countries remaining in the deal committed to keeping it alive.	尽管TPP在去年遭受重挫——特朗普宣布美国退出了该协议——但上个月，11个仍参与协议的环太平洋国家表示要将TPP坚持到底。


The TPP does not have to limit its membership to the Pacific; the UK could engage with it.	TPP的成员资格不必限定在太平洋； 英国可以加入其中。


Given its free-trade credentials and international stature, the UK could help to breathe new life into these and other trade negotiations that have been thrown into disarray by the Trump administration’s protectionist impulses.	凭借其自由贸易方面的历史表现和国际地位，英国能够为这些和其他被特朗普政府和保护主义冲动废黜的贸易谈判注入新的生机


With Brexit looming, the UK has no choice but to redesign its future trading relationships.	随着退欧的临近，英国别无选择，只能重新制定其未来贸易关系。


As a major producer of sophisticated components, its long-term trade strategy should focus on gaining deep and unfettered access to integrated cross-border supply chains.	作为先进零部件的主要生产国，其长期贸易战略应该注重于能够深度、畅通地进入一体化的跨境供给链中。


That means pivoting away from bilateral deals, toward a multilateral approach that enables the country to rebalance and expand its trading arrangements around the world.	这意味着不可以双边协议为主，而要转向多边方针，让英国能够实现再平衡和扩大其在全球范围内的贸易协议。


Poverty Is Also a Psychosocial Problem	贫困也是社会心理问题


BRIGHTON – Being poor is a highly shameful experience, degrading one’s dignity and sense of self-worth.	布莱顿—贫穷是非常可耻的经历，它吞噬人的尊严和自我价值感。


While the manifestations and causes of poverty differ, the humiliation that accompanies it is universal.	贫穷的表现和根源各异，但其所带来的耻辱则放之四海而皆准。


Recent research conducted at the University of Oxford found that from China to the United Kingdom, people facing economic hardship – even children – experience a nearly identical assault on their pride and self-esteem.	牛津大学的最新研究发现，从中国到英国，面临经济困境的人，即使他只是儿童，也会经历几乎相同的对骄傲和自尊的打击。


Yet, despite the clear evidence linking poverty to psychological distress, policies tacking poverty do not typically take shame into account.	但是，尽管有清楚的证据表明贫困与心理压力有关，但扶贫政策通常并不会考虑到耻辱因素。


Rather, poverty reduction efforts tend to focus on tangible manifestations of deprivation such as lack of income or education.	相反，扶贫措施常常注重无形的形式，如缺少收入或教育。


As a result, solutions to poverty often implicitly assume that more material wealth or improved living conditions will automatically translate into non-tangible benefits, including improved mental wellbeing.	结果，减贫方案常常间接假定只要提高物质财富、改善生活条件，就能自动带来包括精神福利改善在内的无形收益。


This lack of focus on the “psychosocial” side of poverty – the interaction between social forces and individual attitude or behavior – is misguided.	对贫困的“社会心理”面——即社会力量和个体态度或行为之间的互动——关注不够起到了误导作用。


If we are to alleviate human suffering and achieve the UN’s premier Sustainable Development Goal of ending poverty “in all its forms” by 2030, addressing the intrinsic and instrumental roles that shame plays in poverty must be front and center in our efforts.	如果我们想要减少人道痛苦，实现联合国的最重要的可持续发展目标——到2030年消灭“一切形式”的贫困，就必须将解决羞耻在贫困问题上所扮演的内在和积极的角色作为核心。


The crippling sense of dishonor that accompanies poverty, and impedes people from taking positive action to improve their situation, has been seen around the world.	伴随贫困而生的羞辱感会造成严重后果，阻碍人们采取积极行动改善境况。 这种现象全世界随处可见。


In India, the shame associated with crop losses and financial stress has pushed farmers to substance abuse and, in extreme cases, suicide.	在印度，因庄稼歉收和财务压力而导致的羞耻感让农民陷入药物滥用，在极端情形甚至可能发生自杀。


In Tanzania, researchers studying bilingual education have found that a fear of being mocked can prevent students with weaker English skills from participating in class.	在坦桑尼亚，双语教育研究者发现，害怕被愚弄让英语较差的学生不愿在上课时全身心投入。


And in Uganda, poor high school students say the inability to pay fees, purchase uniforms, or obtain school supplies is a constant source of humiliation.	在乌干达，贫穷的高中学生表示，付不起学费、买不起校服或得不到学习用品会带来持久的羞辱感。


To address poverty-related shame, and adequately account for the role shame plays in perpetuating poverty, a number of steps must be taken.	要解决与贫困有关的羞耻，充分考虑羞耻在导致贫困长期化中所起的作用，需要采取一系列措施。


For starters, policymakers should recognize the problem.	首先，决策者应该承认问题。


Rather than seeing shame as an unfortunate byproduct of living in poverty, human development planners should consider how poverty undermines human dignity.	人类发展计划人员不可将羞耻视为生而贫困的不幸的副产品，而应该思考贫困是如何损害人的尊严的。


The Nobel economics laureate Amartya Sen, one of the most influential voices on poverty reduction, has long argued that shame is a driver of “absolute” poverty.	诺贝尔经济学奖得主、减贫领域最有影响力的人士之一亚马蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）早就指出，羞耻是“绝对”贫困的推动因素。


Taking shame seriously must be part of any poverty-reduction strategy.	认真对待羞耻必须成为扶贫战略的一部分。


Moreover, shame, a lack of self-confidence, and low self-esteem can negatively impact how people view their ability to affect change, sustaining a perception of inadequacy that can be debilitating and trap them in poverty.	此外，羞耻、缺乏自信和自尊心不够强会左右人们对自己影响变化的能力的看法，导致无能感难以克服，从而让人变得更弱，陷入贫困。


To help people escape, human development strategies must consider how to bolster personal agency, aspiration, and self-efficacy – the belief in one’s ability to influence events that affect one’s life.	要帮助人们摆脱贫困，人类发展战略必须考虑如何提高人的能动性、志向和自信——即相信自己拥有左右影响自己生活的事件的能力。


Finally, policymakers must be aware that programs aimed at reducing poverty, if not properly implemented, can actually increase feelings of shame.	最后，决策者必须认识到，以减贫为目标的计划，如果实施不合理，反而可能增加羞耻感。


For example, researchers working in India in 2005 found that Indian women stopped going to health clinics in order to avoid debasing treatment by health workers – to the detriment of their own wellbeing and that of their children.	比如，研究者在2005年发现，印度妇女为了逃避医护人员损害她们自身和她们的孩子的福祉的羞耻性治疗而拒绝去卫生所。


Women in South Africa applying for child support grants have reported similar experiences, as have food bank users in the UK.	申请儿童抚养补助的南非妇女也报告了类似的经历，英国的食品银行用户也是如此。


In fact, many respondents in Britain said the stigma of receiving free food was so severe that “fear” and “embarrassment” were common emotions.	事实上，许多英国调查对象说，接受免费食物的耻辱感非常巨大，让他们无不感到“恐惧”和“尴尬”。


The issue of shame, and the need to take it more seriously in poverty-reduction policies, is slowly gaining traction.	羞耻问题，以及在减贫政策中更严肃地对待这个问题的必要性，正在缓慢迎来转机。


Academics who research human suffering have recognized that “recipient dignity” is a crucial component of successful poverty alleviation.	研究人类痛苦的学者已经承认，“接受者的尊严”是成功的扶贫的关键要素。


For example, a 2016 review of cash transfer programs in Africa found that the absence of stress and shame enhanced confidence in recipients, leading to improved decision-making and productivity.	比如，关于非洲转移支付项目的一份2016年的评估发现，摆脱了压力和羞耻后，接受者信心有所增强，从而带来决策的改善和生产率的提高。


Building on such evidence, the University of Oxford is extending its research on the “shame-poverty nexus,” to study how the international development sector can “shame-proof” anti-poverty policies.	基于这一证据，牛津大学正在将其“羞耻-贫困的关系”的研究进行扩张，探讨国际发展部门如何制定“不羞耻”（shame-proof）的扶贫政策。


Programs aimed at reducing poverty are moving in the right direction, but much work remains to be done to integrate the psychosocial component of poverty into policy and planning.	旨在扶贫的计划在向正确的方向迈进，但在将贫困的社会心理要素纳入政策和规划方面仍有许多工作要做。


Only when policymakers truly grasp that dignity and self-respect are unavoidable prerequisites in the struggle against deprivation – rather than outcomes of its alleviation – will the world have a fighting chance of eradicating poverty in all its forms.	只有当决策者真正领会到尊严和自尊是减贫斗争不可或缺的先决条件——而不是扶贫的结果，世界才获得了消灭所有形式的贫困的战斗机会。


The Power of Monuments	纪念碑的力量


NEW YORK – The ghastly spectacle last month of neo-Nazis marching through Charlottesville, Virginia, carrying torches and barking slogans about the supremacy of the white race, was sparked by the city’s plans to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee, the leader of the Confederate army, which fought to retain slavery in the secessionist South during the American Civil War.	纽约—上个月，弗吉尼亚州夏洛特维尔（Charlottesville）出现了“壮观”的新纳粹游行，游行者手持火炬，高喊白人至上的口号。 这次游行的起因，是该市计划移除南北战争中领导邦联军队，为脱离联邦的南方蓄奴州而战的罗伯特·李的雕像。


The statue of General Lee on his horse has been there since 1924, a time when the lynching of black citizens was not a rarity.	这座李将军骑马的雕像树立于1924年，当时，对黑人公民动用私行的情况还不少见。


Inspired by the events taking place in Charlottesville, advocates have emerged in Britain seeking to pull Admiral Nelson off his famous column on Trafalgar Square in London, because the British naval hero supported the slave trade.	受夏洛特维尔事件的刺激，英国也出现了一批人想要将著名的伦敦特拉法加广场的纳尔逊将军雕像移除，因为这位英国海军英雄支持奴隶贸易。


And two years ago, protesters at the University of Oxford demanded the removal of a sculpture of Cecil Rhodes from Oriel College, where the old imperialist had once been a student, because his views on race and empire are now considered to be obnoxious.	而在两年前，牛津大学的示威者要求移除奥里尔学院（Oriel College）的塞西尔·罗兹（Cecil Rhodes）塑像，因为他对种族和帝国的见解现在看来令人憎恶。 这位昔日的帝国主义者曾在奥里尔学院就读。


There always was something magical about this kind of iconoclasm, which rests on the belief that smashing an image will somehow solve the problems associated with it.	这类打倒偶像的行为，总是带有一丝魔幻。 这种行为建立在一个信念的基础上：打破一个形象，便解决了与之相关的问题。


When English Protestants challenged the power of the Roman Catholic Church in the sixteenth century, mobs laid waste to stone-carved saints and other holy representations with pick-hammers and axes.	十六世纪英国新教徒挑战罗马天主教会的权力时，暴徒举起锤子和斧头，破坏圣徒石像和其他圣迹。


Eighteenth-century revolutionaries did the same to churches in France.	法国的十八世纪革命也做了同样的事情。


The most radical example occurred in China only a little more than 50 years ago, when Red Guards destroyed Buddhist temples and burned Confucian books – or indeed anything old and traditional – to herald the Cultural Revolution.	而最激进的例子发生在中国，时间仅仅50余年——红卫兵摧毁佛寺，焚烧儒家著作（事实上是一切旧的、传统的东西），拉开了文化大革命的帷幕。


It is easy to deplore this type of destruction.	公开谴责这种破坏是容易的。


Great buildings and works of art are lost.	伟大的建筑和艺术作品随之毁于一旦。


One is tempted to assume that only people who believe in the magical power of images would wish to erase them.	你也许会认为，只有相信形象的魔力的人，才会去抹杀它们。


The sensible way to deal with monuments of the past would be to see them simply as artifacts of history.	对待过去的纪念物，明智的方法是只将它们视为历史的工艺品。


And yet it is not so simple.	但事情并没有那么简单。


Who would argue that after 1945 streets and squares in German cities should continue to be named after Adolf Hitler?	谁会提出1945年后的德国城市街头和广场仍应该以阿道夫·希特勒命名？


It was surely not just a childish mistake to remove sculptures of the Führer – or of Soviet leaders in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.	移除元首的塑像——或者1989年后中欧和东欧的苏联领导人塑像——显然不仅仅是一个孩子气的错误。


One could argue that images of these leaders and their henchmen lacked the artistic value of great churches of medieval England, or Tang Dynasty Buddhist sculptures in China.	你可以说，这些领导人和他们的爪牙的形象没有中世纪英格兰大教堂或中国唐代佛教雕塑的艺术价值。


But then statues of General Lee are hardly worth preserving for artistic reasons either.	但要那么说的话，李将军的雕像也不存在值得保护的艺术原因。


The question is where we should draw the line.	问题在于我们应该在哪里划定界限。


Should a historical figure be judged by the amount of blood on his hands?	历史人物应该根据他手上沾了多少鲜血来评判吗？


Or should we establish a proper time frame?	还是我们应该设定一个合适的时间框架？


It might be argued that monuments celebrating villains who lived within living memory and would still cause grief to surviving victims must be removed, and that anything older should be left alone.	也许有人说，对于活在鲜活的记忆中，或者仍然令幸存的受害人切齿的反派人物，纪念他们的纪念碑必须移除，而年代更早的，就让它去把。


But that doesn’t quite work, either.	但这也未必合理。


The argument for preserving a sculpture of Hitler in a public place, assuming that such a thing still exists, does not get stronger as time goes on.	在公共场所保留希特勒雕像，好像这个东西仍然存在似的，这样的观点并不随着时间而强化。


Many people in the US South argue that Confederate monuments should be protected as mere reminders of the past, as part of a common “heritage.”	许多美国南方人认为，邦联纪念碑应该保护起来，它们仅仅是过去的记忆，是共同“遗产”的一部分。


The problem is that history is not always neutral.	问题在于历史并不总是中性的。


It can still be toxic.	历史有可能仍然是有毒的。


The way we tell stories of our past, and keep memories alive in cultural artifacts, is a large part of how we view ourselves collectively.	我们讲述我们的过去的方式，以及在文化作品中保持记忆的方式，是我们看待我们自身的集体观念的一个重要部分。


This demands a certain degree of consensus, which often does not exist, especially when there has been a civil war.	这需要一定程度的共识，而共识常常并不存在，特别是存在内战的时候。


The case of postwar Germany is quite straightforward.	战后的德国就是非常直观的例子。


Both East and West Germany set out to build their collective futures in direct contrast to the Nazi past.	东德和西德都要构建与过去的纳粹方向截然相反的集体未来。


Only a resentful fringe still wishes to cling to fond memories of the Third Reich.	只有心怀仇恨的边缘群体，还沉浸在第三帝国的美好回忆中。


Nonetheless, to this day, German authorities ban the display of Nazi imagery, fearing that it might still tempt people to repeat the darkest episodes of their country’s history.	尽管如此，时至今日，德国当局仍然禁止陈列纳粹形象，担心它仍有可能引诱人们重蹈国家的最黑暗历史。


This fear is understandable, and not wholly irrational.	这一担心不难理解，亦非完全不理性。


Such temptations could even become stronger as Nazism fades from living memory.	随着纳粹主义从活人的记忆中逐渐淡出，这样的诱惑甚至可能会越变越强。


Britain has a less traumatic recent history.	英国的现代史不像德国那样充满了创伤。


The views of Cecil Rhodes, or Admiral Nelson, though fairly conventional in their time, are certainly no longer fashionable today.	对塞西尔·罗兹和纳尔逊将军的看法，尽管在他们的时代颇为寻常，时至今日显然已经不再流行。


It is highly unlikely that many British people gazing up at Nelson on his column or passing Oriel College, Oxford, will be inspired to advocate slavery or build an empire in Africa.	绝不可能会有很多英国人因为仰望了纳尔逊的雕像，或途径了牛津奥里尔学院，就会收到启发进而支持奴隶制或在非洲构建一个帝国。


The American South, however, is still a problem.	但美国南方仍然是一个问题。


The losers in the Civil War were never quite reconciled to their defeat.	南北战争的输家从未对他们的失败完全释然。


For many southerners, though by no means all, the Confederate cause and its monuments are still felt to be part of their collective identity.	对许多南方人来说（尽管绝非所有南方人），邦联及其纪念碑仍然是他们的集体身份的一部分。


Although hardly anyone in his right mind would advocate the revival of slavery, nostalgia for the Old South is still tinged with racism.	尽管几乎任何心智正常的人，都不会鼓吹恢复奴隶制，但老南方（Old South）的乡愁仍然有几分种族主义色彩。


That is why statues of General Lee in front of court buildings and other public places are noxious, and why many people, including southern liberals, wish to see them removed.	因此，矗立在法院跟前和其他公共场所的李将军雕像就具有毒害性，而正因如此，许多人，包括许多南方自由派，希望它们倒掉。


There is no perfect solution to this problem, precisely because it is not just about images carved from stone.	这一问题没有完美的解决办法，之所以如此，原因正在于这不只是一个刻在石头上的形象的问题。


Resentment in the South is political.	南方的仇恨是一个政治问题。


The wounds of the Civil War remain unhealed.	南北战争的伤口仍然没有愈合。


Much of the rural south is poorer and less educated than other parts of the US.	许多南方农村地区都要比美国其他地区更贫穷、教育程度更低。


People feel ignored and looked down upon by urban coastal elites.	这里的人感到被城市沿海精英们忽略和轻视。


That is why so many of them voted for Donald Trump.	因此，他们中有很多人把票投给了特朗普。


Knocking down a few statues will not solve this problem. It might even make matters worse.	推倒几座雕像解决不了这个问题，反倒有可能让它们变得更加糟糕。


Publicizing the Plight of Journalists	宣传记者的困境


AMSTERDAM – Every five days, on average, somewhere in the world, a journalist is murdered for being a journalist.	阿姆斯特丹——平均每隔五天，在世界的某个角落，就会有一名记者因为记者的身份而被杀害。


Nine out of ten times, no one is prosecuted, creating an atmosphere of impunity that extends beyond death threats or violence.	十次里有九次，没有人被起诉，因此造就了死亡或暴力威胁以外的一种逍遥法外的氛围。


Imprisonment of journalists is at an all-time high, and members of the press routinely suffer harassment and intimidation while on assignment.	监禁记者的暴行创下历史记录，媒体人员在履行职务时往往遭到骚扰和威胁。


Today, journalism is one of the most dangerous professions anywhere.	今天，新闻工作是全世界最危险的职业之一。


One way to address this state of affairs is by talking about it.	公开谈论是改变这种状况的一种方法。


Three recent examples highlight the risks journalists take to report the news, and underscore why publicizing their plight is the only way to bring about change.	最近有三个例子突出了记者进行新闻报道的危险，并强调了为什么将这种困境公诸于世是改变现状的唯一方法。


Consider Maria Ressa, CEO of Rappler.com, an online news network based in the Philippines.	以菲律宾在线新闻网Rappler. com首席执行官玛利亚·路易萨为例。


Since founding Rappler in 2012, Ressa’s website has become an invaluable source of information about the extrajudicial killings linked to President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs.”	自2012年成立Rappler以来，路易萨的网站已经公开了与杜特尔特总统“禁毒战”法外处决信息有关的大量宝贵资料。


For her enterprising reporting, Ressa has received more than 80 death threats in the last month alone.	由于她的勤奋报道，路易萨仅上个月就收到死亡威胁80多条。


Many of these warnings have come from anonymous bloggers, with IP addresses traceable to the president’s associates.	其中不少警告来自匿名博客，其IP地址可以追踪到总统的同僚。


Then there is the case of William Ntege, a journalist who reported on recent protests against Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s decision to run in the next presidential election, despite constitutional prohibitions preventing him from doing so.	还有威廉·恩特的案例，这位记者报道了不久前反对乌干达总统穆塞韦尼参加下一任总统选举的抗议活动（尽管宪法规定穆塞维尼再次参选为非法）。


Ntege was severely beaten by police for his coverage, and held in jail for more than ten days.	恩特因为这篇报道而遭到警方的残酷殴打，并被投入监狱监禁了十多天。


Finally, there is the erosion of press freedoms in Myanmar.	最后是缅甸的新闻自由遭到侵蚀。


A new clause written into the country’s media law allows citizens to file a lawsuit if they have a complaint with an article or news item, even if the reporting does not directly mention them.	该国媒体法新条款允许公民对某篇文章或新闻报道提起诉讼，即使该报道并未直接提及他们的姓名。


This legal provision – in sharp contrast to international norms – has led to 61 cases filed against journalists since February 2016, when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy came to power.	这项法律规定与国际法形成鲜明的对照——已经导致2016年2月后昂山素季的全国民主联盟上台以来出现了61起针对记者的诉讼案例。


Infringements of press freedom like these have become common tactics for autocratic regimes, from Turkey to Russia and beyond.	从土耳其到俄罗斯再到其他国家，侵犯新闻自由已经成为独裁政权的普遍策略。


But it is not only despots and strongmen who have declared war on the press.	但不光是独裁者和强人正在对媒体宣战。


In Colombia and Mexico, hundreds of journalists have been placed under armed guard to protect them from criminal syndicates.	在哥伦比亚和墨西哥，数百名记者正在接受武装警卫的保护，以使他们免遭犯罪集团的侵害。


Yet this hasn’t stopped journalists across Latin America from leaving the profession in droves.	但这并没有阻止大批拉美记者离开记者队伍。


A favorite strategy of Mexican drug gangs seeking to stay out of the headlines is to threaten investigative journalists’ children.	墨西哥毒品团伙寻求避免曝光的最常用策略是威胁调查记者的子女。


No wonder the media’s ranks are shrinking.	难怪媒体队伍正在不断萎缩。


Part of the reason most consumers of news do not know these stories is that organizations like mine have long worked to ensure that journalists never become the story.	多数新闻消费者不了解这些报道的部分原因是像我所在机构这样的组织一直试图确保记者本身不成为新闻报道的主角。


Press freedom groups have typically operated under the assumption that the best way to protect fact-based, investigative journalism is to shield the storyteller from violence.	新闻自由团体运营的默认假设是保护以事实为基础的调查新闻最好的办法就是保障报道者免受暴力的威胁。


And, like most journalists, we have opted to do our jobs quietly, rather than burdening readers and viewers with how dangerous the profession has become.	而且像多数记者一样，我们选择静静地完成工作，而不是抱怨记者行业的危险性从而增加读者的负担。


But it is time to change our approach, and make a point of highlighting the hazards.	但现在是时候改变策略突出这背后的危险。


For example, Ntege was released only after considerable effort by a team of lawyers retained by Reporters Respond, the Free Press Unlimited emergency fund for journalist safety.	比方说，只有在记者回应聘请律师团队并付出大量努力后恩特才被释放，而记者回应是新闻自由无极限组织用来确保记者安全的应急基金。


Since the fund’s inception in 2011, it has helped dozens of journalists around the world, including, most recently, a group of reporters fleeing mob violence in Burundi.	自2011年该基金成立后，已经帮助世界各地数十位记者，包括最近协助一批布隆迪记者逃离民众暴力。


And a huge number of organizations aid journalists in distress in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.	而且有大量机构帮助在中东、东欧和其他地方遇难的记者。


These stories behind the news must be told.	这些新闻背后的故事必须被公开。


Of course, telling these tales is just the beginning.	当然，公开这些故事仅仅是一个开始。


Press freedom advocates must also deliver journalists a stronger, more coordinated framework for their protection and safety.	新闻自由主义者还必须为记者建立更加强大和统一的框架才能保证他们的安全。


To that end, my organization is engaging with other global entities to strengthen the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.	为实现这一目的，我所在机构正在与其他全球实体进行合作，强化记者安全和逍遥法外问题联合国行动计划。


We have also begun holding regular meetings with other media freedom groups to devise a path forward.	我们还开始定期与其他媒体自由机构召开会议探讨前进的方向。


And, we have started working to ensure that media protections are backed up by legislation and enforcement.	而且，我们开始努力保障立法和执法机构支持媒体保护行动。


Journalists will need brave prosecutors and judges to hold attackers accountable if impunity is to end.	如果不想让犯罪份子继续逍遥法外，记者需要勇敢的检察官和法官来对袭击者进行惩罚。


But the most important changes must come from within the media industry itself.	但最重要的变革必须来自媒体行业本身。


Because journalists’ safety directly affects news organizations’ employees, freelancers, and audiences, these organizations should report on the topic.	因为记者安全直接影响到新闻机构的员工、自由职业者和读者，这些机构应当报道这一主题。


With attacks on the press increasing, the old approach – prideful silence – no longer makes sense.	随着对新闻媒体的攻击不断增加，“骄傲地沉默”这样原有的方法已经不再有道理。


If the journalists use their platforms to inform the world of the dangers they and their colleagues face, the world will have to listen.	如果记者利用手中的平台通报世界他们及其同事所面临的危险，那么世界一定会倾听。


Violence against journalists has historically been an issue that has remained behind the headlines.	一直以来，针对记者的暴力活动从未登上过新闻的头版头条。


On November 2, as the world recognizes the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists, let’s commit to making these stories front-page news.	11月2日，随着世界正式承认结束对记者犯罪逍遥法外国际日，让我们共同努力使这些报道成为头条新闻。


Probing the Productivity Paradox	试探生产率悖论


WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last decade or so, productivity growth has slowed considerably in most major developed economies, even as impressive advances have been made in areas like computing, mobile telephony, and robotics.	华盛顿—过去十年中，大部分发达经济体的生产率增长显著放缓，虽然在计算、移动技术和机器人方面取得了令人印象深刻的进步。


All of these advances ostensibly should have boosted productivity; and yet, in the United States, a world leader in technological innovation, business-sector labor productivity growth in 2004-2014 averaged less than half the rate of the previous decade.	表面上看，所有这些进步都应该起到提振生产率的作用，但在作为世界技术创新领导者的美国，2010—2014年企业部门劳动生产率平均还不到过去一个十年的一半。


What is going on?	到底发生了什么？


One theory that has gained a lot of traction lately is that the so-called productivity paradox does not actually exist.	一个最近相当热门的理论是所谓的生产率悖论其实并不存在。


Productivity growth only seems to be dropping, the logic goes, because the statistics we use to measure it fail to capture fully recent gains, especially those from new and higher-quality information and communication technology (ICT).	生产率增长只是貌似在下降，因为我们用来衡量生产率的统计数据不能充分体现全部最新进展，特别是来自新的、质量更高的信息和通讯技术的进展。


If prices do not reflect quality improvements in the new products, price deflators are overestimated, and real output is underestimated.	如果价格并未体现新产品的质量改进，那么价格平减指数就会被高估，真实产出就会被低估。


Moreover, the skeptics point out, standard measures of productivity are based on GDP, which, by definition, includes only output produced.	此外，怀疑派指出，标准的生产率衡量方法基于GDP，而根据定义，GDP只包含生产出来的产出。


Consumer surplus – which is growing fast, as Internet-based services like Google search and Facebook generate substantial utility to consumers, at a market price of close to zero – is ignored.	消费者剩余被忽略了，而随着谷歌搜索和Facebook等基于互联网的服务为消费者带来巨大的效用，消费者剩余增长非常迅速。


There is some logic to this argument.	这一观点不无道理。


Indeed, a recent review of research on productivity by the Brookings Institution and the Chumir Foundation confirmed that gains from new technologies are underestimated, owing to measurement issues relating to both product quality and consumer surplus.	事实上，最新的布鲁金斯学会和楚梅尔基金会（Chumir Foundation）的生产率研究综述也确认，由于与产品质量和消费者剩余的衡量指标有关的问题，来自新技术的收益被低估。


But these two types of mismeasurement, the report continues, explain only a relatively small share of the slowdown in economic gains.	但报告继续指出，这两类衡量指标问题之能解释经济收益放缓的相对较小的部分。


Furthermore, these lapses have existed for a long time, and they do not seem to have increased substantially in recent years.	此外，这些问题存在由来已久，最近几年也没有出现显著放大的迹象。


The conclusion is clear: the productivity-growth slowdown is real.	结论很清楚：生产率增长放缓是实实在在的。


Perhaps, then, we must look at the other component of the paradox: technological innovation.	那么，也许我们必须将目光投向悖论的另一个组成部分：技术创新。


Many have argued that the real issue is that recent technological innovations have been less consequential than their predecessors.	许多人指出，最新技术创新的真正问题在于所带来的成果比从前的技术创新更少了。


New ICT technologies, the “techno-pessimists” claim, simply do not bring the kind of economy-wide benefits that were brought by, say, the internal combustion engine and electrification.	“技术悲观论者”声称，新信息和通讯技术根本没有带来可以与内燃机和电气化相提并论的惠及整个经济的收益。


“Techno-optimists,” for their part, believe that ICT advances do have the potential to drive rapid productivity growth; their benefits are merely subject to lags and come in waves.	而“技术乐观论者”相信信息和通讯技术的进步有望推动生产率的迅速提高； 只不过它们的收益有些滞后并且呈现波动特征。


What do the numbers say?	数字怎么说？


Firm-level data show that productivity growth has held up relatively well for firms that are at the technological frontier.	企业层面的数据表明，位于技术前沿的企业，生产率增长相对维持得较好。


It is the less technologically advanced firms, which are often smaller, that have experienced the major growth slowdowns.	技术不太先进的企业——通常规模也较小——是增长放缓的主要部门。


This suggests that the problem may not be the technology itself, but rather its slow diffusion.	这表明问题可能不在技术本身，而在于技术扩散缓慢。


There is also a macroeconomic element to the decline in productivity growth, rooted in deficient aggregate demand.	生产率增长放缓还有宏观层面的原因，其根源在于总需求不振。


According to former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, when the desired level of investment is below the desired level of savings despite a nominal interest rate of zero, chronically deficient demand constrains GDP and productivity growth, producing so-called “secular stagnation.”	据美国前财政部长拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）所言，如果渴望的投资水平低于渴望的储蓄水平——即使名义利率为零，长期需求不振就会制约GDP和生产率增长，形成所谓的“长期停滞”。


But, of course, demand- and supply-side arguments are inextricably linked.	但是，当然，需求侧和供给侧观点是相辅相成的。


And, indeed, techno-pessimist expectations, which can lower expected profits, may be discouraging investment.	事实上，技术悲观论者的预期可能会导致预期利润降低，从而阻碍投资。


Meanwhile, excessive income concentration at the top – a situation that inadequate technological diffusion may exacerbate – contributes to excess savings.	与此同时，收入向顶层的过度集中——技术扩散不充分可能加剧这一情况——导致了储蓄过剩。


Any strategy to address the problems underpinning low productivity growth – from inadequate technological diffusion to income inequality – must address skill constraints and mismatches affecting the labor market’s ability to adjust.	任何解决低生产率增长的根本问题——从技术扩散不充分到收入不平等——的战略都必须解决影响劳动力市场调节能力的技能约束和不匹配。


As it stands, workers, particularly from lower income groups, are slow to respond to demand for new higher-level skills, owing to lags in education and training, labor-market rigidities, and perhaps also geographical factors.	目前，工人，特别是收入水平较低的工人，对于新的高水平技能要求反应缓慢，其原因在于教育和培训的不足、劳动力市场僵化，可能还有地理因素。


These factors, together with rent capture and winner-take-all markets, can entrench inequality and blunt markets’ competitiveness.	这些因素加上租金捕获（rent capture）和赢家通吃的市场，可能进一步稳固了不平等性，破坏了市场竞争力。


Spurring investment is also important.	刺激投资也很重要。


In most advanced economies and many emerging economies, investment rates fell sharply in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, and have still not returned to pre-crisis levels.	在大部分发达经济体和许多新兴经济体，2008年全球金融危机后投资率出现暴跌，至今仍没有回到危机前水平。


But innovation is often embedded in capital and needs new investment to spread across economies.	但创新常常来自资本，并需要新投资在不同的经济间扩散。


Fortunately, world leaders seem to recognize some of the imperatives they face.	幸运的是，世界领导人似乎认识到了他们所面临的一些当务之急。


At the recent G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, world leaders emphasized the need to boost investment and accelerate structural reforms to enhance productivity and lift potential growth.	在最近的中国杭州G20峰会上，世界领导人强调必须提振投资、加速结构性改革以提高生产率和潜在增长。


One hopes that this is the first step toward an integrated approach that addresses the forces impeding technology diffusion, undermining competitiveness, and exacerbating inequality.	我们希望这是迈向解决制约技术扩散、破坏竞争力、加剧不平等性的因素的全面方针的第一步。


We cannot know how new technologies will affect the world economy in the long term.	我们无法知道新技术在长期如何影响世界经济。


But we know one thing: the productivity paradox is real, and it is contributing to rising inequality in many societies.	但我们知道一点：生产率悖论是实实在在的，并且它导致了许多社会不平等性的加剧。


It is time to address it.	必须解决这个问题。


Inequality in the Twenty-First Century	21世纪的不平等状况


MUMBAI – At the end of a low and dishonest year, reminiscent of the “low, dishonest decade” about which W.H. Auden wrote in his poem “September 1, 1939,” the world’s “clever hopes” are giving way to recognition that many severe problems must be tackled.	发自孟买——在这卑劣虚伪的一年行将结束时（语出英国诗人W·H·奥登《1939年9月1日》一诗中“卑劣虚伪的十年”），世界上那些“聪明的希望”正在让位于许多亟待解决的严峻问题。


And, among the severest, with the gravest long-term and even existential implications, is economic inequality.	而其中最为严酷，拥有最重大长期性影响甚至事关人类存续的，则是经济不平等。


The alarming level of economic inequality globally has been well documented by prominent economists, including Thomas Piketty, François Bourguignon, Branko Milanović, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, and well-known institutions, including OXFAM and the World Bank.	包括托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty），弗朗索瓦·布吉尼翁（François Bourguignon），布兰科·米兰诺维奇（Branko Milanović）和约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨（Joseph E. Stiglitz）在内的知名经济学家以及包括乐施会和世界银行在内的著名机构都记录了全球经济不平等的惊人程度。


And it is obvious even from a casual stroll through the streets of New York, New Delhi, Beijing, or Berlin.	而这种状况甚至当你在纽约，新德里，北京或柏林街头散步时也不时会碰到的。


Voices on the right often claim that this inequality is not only justifiable, but also appropriate: wealth is a just reward for hard work, while poverty is an earned punishment for laziness.	右派往往声称这种不平等不仅是正当且恰当的：财富是勤奋工作者的公正回报，而贫穷则是懒惰者自找的惩罚。


This is a myth.	但这只是个荒诞的说法。


The reality is that the poor, more often than not, must work extremely hard, often in difficult conditions, just to survive.	现实情况是穷人往往必须在困难条件下极其艰辛地工作才能求存。


Moreover, if a wealthy person does have a particularly strong work ethic, it is likely attributable not just to their genetic predisposition, but also to their upbringing, including whatever privileges, values, and opportunities their background may have afforded them.	此外如果一个富人具有特别强的职业道德，这不仅可以归因于他们的遗传素质，还可以归因于他们的教养，包括他们的背景可能为其带来的任何特权，价值和机会。


So there is no real moral argument for outsize wealth amid widespread poverty.	因此在普遍贫穷的情况下占据巨额财富在道德上是站不住脚的。


This is not to say that there is no justification for any amount of inequality.	这并不是说任何不平等状况都是不正当的。


After all, inequality can reflect differences in preferences: some people might consider the pursuit of material wealth more worthwhile than others.	毕竟不平等也会反映出偏好的差异：有些人可能认为追求物质财富比其他事务更有价值。


Moreover, differential rewards do indeed create incentives for people to learn, work, and innovate, activities that promote overall growth and advance poverty reduction.	同时差别性回报确实会激励人们学习，工作和创新，去实施推动总体发展和脱贫的活动。


But, at a certain point, inequality becomes so severe that it has the opposite effect.	但在一定程度上，不平等会变得如此严重以致产生了反效果。


And we are far beyond that point.	而我们眼下也远远超出了这一点。


Plenty of people – including many of the world’s wealthy – recognize how unacceptable severe inequality is, both morally and economically.	包括许多富人在内的全球各界人士都认识到严重的不平等在道德和经济上是多么令人无法接受。


But if the rich speak out against it, they are often shut down and labeled hypocrites.	可一旦富人提出反对，他们往往会遭到禁言并贴上伪善的标签。


Apparently, the desire to lessen inequality can be considered credible or genuine only by first sacrificing one’s own wealth.	显然减少不平等的愿望只有先牺牲自身财富的情况下才算是可信或真诚的。


The truth, of course, is that the decision not to renounce, unilaterally, one’s wealth does not discredit a preference for a more equitable society.	当然，事实上不单方面舍弃自身财富的决定并不能抹煞对更公平社会的偏好。


To label a wealthy critic of extreme inequality as a hypocrite amounts to an ad hominem attack and a logical fallacy, intended to silence those whose voices could make a difference.	把一个对极端不平等现象的富有批评者称为伪君子等同于人身攻击和逻辑上的谬误，旨在压制那些可能有所作为者的声音。


Fortunately, this tactic seems to be losing some of its potency.	幸运的是，这种策略似乎正在失效。