Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman developed transformational objectives only in response to external events after they entered office.	威尔逊、富兰克林·罗斯福和杜鲁门均在入主白宫后、在应对外部事件时才发展出了变革型目标。


Crisis conditions can liberate a gifted leader from the accumulated constraints of vested interests and bureaucratic inertia that normally inhibit action in the American system.	危机环境可以将天赋异禀的领袖从美国制度的顽疾——既得利益和官僚惰性的重重约束中解放出来。


Bill Clinton, caught up in the complacent 1990’s, is said to have envied Franklin Roosevelt’s crisis conditions of the 1930’s.	20世纪90年代踌躇满志的克林顿据说相当嫉妒富兰克林·罗斯福可以遇到20世纪30年代的危机环境。


In such situations, action becomes more fluid.	在这样的局面中，行动的弹性更大。


A leader with transformational objectives faces better odds, and an inspirational style is more likely to find responsive followers and to make their role more relevant.	有着变革型目标的领袖的机会更大，鼓动型风格更可能找到积极响应的追随者并让他们扮演更重要的角色。


For example, George W. Bush used the crisis conditions after September 11, 2001, in the service of an assertion of executive power, as well as to invade Iraq.	比如，小布什就利用了2001年9月11日之后的危机环境要求表现实力并出兵伊拉克。


But, while turbulent times may set the stage for transformational leaders, it does not follow that bold and risk-loving leaders are always best suited to address the crises that define such periods.	但是，尽管动荡时期能为变革型领袖创造舞台，并不能因此得出果断而乐于冒险的领袖总是适合解决决定“动荡”性质的危机的结论。


President George H. W. Bush, unlike his son, was transactional, but implemented a very successful foreign policy.	老布什就与他的儿子不同，他是位事务型领袖，但实施了颇为成功的外交政策。


Whether they are transformational or incremental in their objectives, leaders need certain soft- and hard-power skills to be effective.	不管领袖的目标是变革性的还是渐进性的，他们都需要一定的软实力和硬实力技能来增加效率。


Among the soft-power skills are emotional intelligence (self-control and the ability to use emotional cues to attract others); vision (an attractive portrait of the future that balances ideals, objectives, and capabilities); and communication (the ability to use words and symbols to persuade both an inner circle and a broader audience).	软实力技能包括情商（自我控制和利用心理暗示吸引他人的能力）、愿景（平衡理想、目标和能力的有吸引力的未来描述）以及沟通（用词语和符号说服内部圈子和外部听众的能力）。


For the use of hard-power resources, two skills are particularly important: organizational capacity and a Machiavellian proficiency in bullying, buying, and bargaining to form winning coalitions.	在使用硬实力资源方面，两种技能特别重要：组织力以及在通过欺压、收买和讨价还价中形成获胜联盟方面的无所不用其极。


Above all, effective leadership requires contextual intelligence and an intuitive diagnostic ability that helps a leader understand change, set objectives, and align strategies and tactics accordingly.	说到底，高效领导要求有肆应商（contextual intelligence）和本能判断力，这两种能力有助于领袖理解变化、设定目标并据此协调战略和战术。


As Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of modern Singapore, once told me, a leader must be a quick learner, test reality, be prepared to change his mind as conditions change, and act calmly in a crisis.	现代新加坡国父李光耀曾经对我说，领袖必须能够快速学习、检验现实、随时准备随环境改变思维并且在危机中保持镇定。


Contextual intelligence implies both a capability to discern trends in the face of complexity and adaptability while trying to shape events.	肆应商既包括面对复杂局面识别趋势的能力，也包括一边改变事件一边适应的能力。


Bismarck once referred to this skill as the ability to intuit God’s movements in history, and seize the hem of His garment as He sweeps past.	俾斯麦曾把这种技能称为历史中的本能神迹，一种在清扫过去是抓住要领的能力。


More prosaically, leaders with contextual intelligence, like surfers, have the ability to judge and adjust to new waves and ride them successfully.	更平白点说，有肆应商的领袖与冲浪者一样，具有判断和驾驭新潮流的能力。


Leaders of this type not only adapt their style to the situation and to their followers’ needs; they also create flows of information that “educate their hunches.”	这种类型的领袖不但能让自己的风格适应环境和追随者的需要，还能创造“教育他们的直觉”的信息流。


This involves the ability to size up group politics and understand the positions and strengths of various stakeholders in order to decide when and how to use transactional and inspirational skills.	这包括揣摩集团政治并理解不同相关利益者的立场和优势，以便确定何时以及如何使用事务性和鼓动性技能的能力。


It is the self-made part of luck.	这是可以自我制造的幸运。


This skill is crucial in unstructured situations, when it is often more difficult to ask the right questions than it is to get the right answers.	这一技能在无序局面中至关重要，在这种局面下，通常问对问题比得到正确的答案更难。


Leaders with contextual intelligence are good at providing meaning or a road map by defining the problem that a group confronts.	有肆应商的领袖善于通过定义集团所面临的的问题提供意义或给出路线图。


They understand the tension between the different values involved in an issue, and how to balance the desirable with the feasible.	他们明白一个问题中不同价值之间的冲突，也知道如何平衡所欲和所能。


In particular, contextual intelligence requires an understanding of groups’ cultures; the distribution of power resources; followers’ needs and demands; information flows; and timing.	特别地，肆应商要求领袖理解集团文化、实力资源的分布、追随者的需要和需求、信息流以及时机。


Contextual intelligence is particularly important in foreign policy, because an effective leader must understand the culture and power structure of other societies, and how they interact as an international system.	肆应商在外交政策中特别重要，因为高效的领袖必须理解其他社会的文化和实力结构，以及它们如何互相影响形成国际体系。


With years of experience in foreign affairs, George H. W. Bush had excellent contextual intelligence.	在多年的外交实践经验中，老布什练就了卓越的肆应商。


With almost no experience in foreign affairs, “W” did not.	而几乎没有外交实践经验的小布什则否。


That gap proved the difference between the success of the father and the failure of the son.	其中的差距就是父亲的成功和儿子的失败的差别的来源。


Controlling Chinese Television	中国的电视管制


The 2003 World Press Freedom report put out by the group Reporters without Borders ranks China 161st among 166 nations, somewhere between Iran and North Korea.	由"无边界记者组织"发布的2003年度《世界新闻自由报告》将中国排在全部166个国家的中的第161位，大致位于伊朗和北朝鲜之间。


But Chinese television fare, at least, no longer consists of the prudish melodramas and clumsy indoctrination programs of the Maoist past.	但至少中国现在的电视银屏上已不再有毛泽东时代那些一本正经的情节剧和笨拙的说教式节目了。


Casual observers of today's freewheeling offerings of sex, crime, drugs, violence, and banal game shows on Chinese TV might come away with the impression that most of the shackles have been removed from televised content.	不经意的观察者会发现在如今中国的电视节目中，性、犯罪、毒品、暴力和老套的游戏节目已是稀松平常，并可能由此得到中国的电视节目内容已经摆脱桎梏的印象。


To be sure, this impression disappears if one focuses on explicit political content.	然而，如果我们将注意力集中在直白的政治性内容上，这种印象就不复存在了。


Viewpoints that deviate in the slightest from Party doctrine are still absent from Chinese TV.	与党的原则稍有背离的观点也仍然不会出现在电视上。


Despite the surface diversity of programming, the monolithic control of political discourse has changed little since the 1950's.	尽管电视节目在表面上已呈多元化，但对政治话语的控制从上世纪50年代以来就几乎没有改观。


But the sheer volume of China's TV programming makes maintaining such control difficult.	但中国电视节目的巨大播出量使这种控制变得困难。


China Central Television (CCTV) alone has 12 channels (many broadcasting 24 hours a day), and employs about 3,000 people.	仅中国中央电视台（CCTV）一家就拥有12个频道（许多频道全天24小时播放节目）和近3000名雇员。


CCTV falls under the control of the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television.	CCTV受中央宣传部和广播电影电视部管辖。


Numerous provincial and municipal TV stations are also required to carry some CCTV programming.	众多的省、市级电视台也按规定转播CCTV的某些节目。


This combination represents a vast administrative undertaking.	这种联播方式代表着一项艰巨的行政任务。


Given the staggering amount of programming needed to fill the time slots, content monitoring must be implemented with maximum efficiency.	由于电视节目的需求量如此巨大，使得对电视节目内容的监控必须有最高的效率。


Censorship has been made easier, not more difficult, by the government's decision in the 1990's to shift to a free-market strategy for entertainment products.	由于政府对娱乐节目的战略在20世纪90年代向市场化转变，检查制度有所放宽。


Big subsidies to TV stations were mostly discontinued, and the new "sink or swim" approach forced TV outlets to compete for advertising revenues, resulting in programming with greater mass appeal.	政府不再对电视台进行巨额的补贴。 新的"优胜劣汰"的市场机制迫使众多的电视台为了争夺广告收入而制作更受大众欢迎的节目。


Thus, in a strategy mirrored elsewhere in the cultural sphere, the government simply relinquished much control over the moral component of TV content.	因此，正如在文化领域的其它方面实行的策略那样，中国政府在很大程度上放弃了对电视内容在道德方面的控制。


The anti-pornography saohuang campaigns carried out in the 1980's and early 1990's are a thing of the past.	在上世纪80年代和90年代初所实施的反色情的"扫黄"运动已成为历史。


Perhaps realizing that an entertained and distracted populace is less likely to complain about public policy, the Party has allowed entertainment programming to follow the Western model, lessening the need for micro-managed censorship.	也许是意识到获得充分娱乐和心不在焉的老百姓不太会对公共政策发牢骚，共产党已经允许娱乐节目沿袭西方的模式从而放宽了在微观上的审查。


The result is a de facto separation between news and everything else.	这种政策的结果就是新闻节目和其它节目事实上的分离。


This conveniently allows the authorities to control news programming with an iron hand while relegating the bulk of programming to a looser and less labor-intensive monitoring system.	这样一来就便于有关部门严格控制新闻节目同时将大量的节目转入较宽松和较低劳动强度的监控体系。


Of course, given China's highly politicized atmosphere, politics can leak into even the most innocuous areas of discourse, and the many talk shows and audience participation formats necessitate a less intrusive but nonetheless effective system of content regulation.	当然，在中国高度政治化的大环境下，政治会渗透到即便是最无伤大雅的话语之中，许多谈话节目和观众参与的形式也需要一种较为含蓄但却仍然有效的内容管制体系。


The first surprise I encountered while working for CCTV as a program planner was how minimal this system is.	我作为节目策划人为CCTV工作所遇到的第一个意外就是这种最低限度的管制体系。


Top-down directives and outright censorship are rare.	来自高层的指示和直接的审查极少发生。


Few written guidelines outlining forbidden or sensitive topics exist.	也几乎没有成文的方针列出禁忌或敏感的话题。


No constant memoranda dictate content.	更没有规定内容的备忘录。


Party officials don't hover over each step of the process, and virtually no cutting of completed products is carried out on Party orders.	共产党的官员不会对节目流程的每一步都进行干预，也完全没有执行共产党的指令对已完成的节目进行删节的情况。


On the surface, writers, directors, and performers seem free to plan and produce their shows with little or no supervision or monitoring.	在表面上看，文案、导演和演员似乎可以自由地策划和制作他们的节目，而几乎不会受到监控。


So how does such a system block offending content?	那么这种管制体系究竟是如何将不合适的内容拒之门外的呢？


First and foremost, the system is largely reactive.	首要的一点是这种体系主要是反应性的。


The department heads and oversight committees that meet to evaluate programming seldom dictate content, but merely pass their complaints and recommendations down to programming heads.	定期碰头对节目进行评估的部门领导和审片委员会很少指定节目的内容。 他们仅仅是将发现的问题和建议下达给节目编导。


The top-down hierarchy is autocratic and arbitrary; lower levels have little collaborative input and no right of appeal.	这种自上而下的层级是专断性的； 较低层的员工极少有机会发表意见也无权上诉。


Serious breaches can result in reprimands or dismissals.	严重违背上级意见的行为会导致处分或解雇。


In effect, the system has become largely self-regulating.	事实上，这种体系在很大程度上已经成为一种自律。


In my experience, 99% of all censorship occurs with the writers and producers themselves.	就我的经验来讲，99%的审查都是由文案和制片人自己执行的。


Sporadic complaints and warnings from above enable them to develop an intuitive sense for the boundaries of acceptable content, so they create shows that are free from offending material from the outset.	来自上级的零星投诉和警告使他们建立起一种对可接受内容的界限的直觉，这种直觉使他们的节目从开始制作时就不会有不合适的内容。


The lack of explicit guidelines also keeps content more conservative than it need be, because producers tend to err on the safe side.	在缺少明确的内容指南的情况下，制片人往往会因为安全起见而使节目更保守。


Vague but pervasive intimidation is the main factor keeping TV personnel in line.	含糊但却普遍存在的恐吓是使电视台的职员循规蹈矩的主要因素。


But another force serves the Party's interests as well: the deep-seated Chinese cultural inertia that stresses collectivist, group-oriented behavior.	但还有一种力量也在为共产党的利益服务：中国根深蒂固的强调集体主义和团体导向行为的文化惯性。


In such an atmosphere, inclusion of politically incorrect content is not merely a risky move, but constitutes a breach of social decorum.	在这样的氛围中，含有政治导向错误的内容不但是种冒险，还是违反社会规范的。


Indeed, working daily with Chinese TV creators, I noticed a subtle, almost instinctive tendency to avoid any content or format that is unusual, novel, or unorthodox, never mind subversive.	的确，在与中国电视人共事的过程中，我发现了一种微妙的，近乎本能的避免任何特别、新颖、非正统，更别说是颠覆性的内容的倾向。


The exceptions to this state of affairs are when the Party initiates a propaganda campaign, such as the one associated with the turnover of Hong Kong in 1997, or the more recent anti-Falun Gong blitzkrieg.	这种情况的例外是当共产党发动如有关1997香港回归和最近的反法轮功的闪电战一类的宣传攻势时。 在这种时候，共产党就会下达指令制作含有某种特殊意识形态内容的节目。


At such times, directives are issued to produce programming with specific ideological content, and such shows - dubbed renwu (duties) - are perfunctorily overseen by TV producers, after which the more bottom-up mode returns.	这些节目-称为"任务"-被制片人马马虎虎地对付过去，任务完成之后，节目流程又回到那种更为自下而上的模式。


Many TV producers have internalized these controls so well that they are an unconscious fact of life, and audiences now entertained by endless costume dramas and soap operas are not clamoring for freer political content.	许多��视制片人已经将这种控制内化成为一种潜意识的日常行为。 在大量的古装剧和肥皂剧中获得充分娱悦的观众也没有要求更为自由的政治内容。


Barring some catastrophic change, this method of information control can be expected to continue well into the 21st century.	如果没有什么巨大的变故，这种信息管制的方式会在21世纪的中国延续下去。


The Return of Yellow Fever	黄热病归来


SEATTLE – Before the horrors of the latest Ebola outbreak in West Africa could even begin to fade from our minds, the Zika virus emerged as a major global health risk, and is now occupying researchers and doctors in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.	西雅图—最近的西非的埃博拉疫情爆发的恐怖尚未在人们脑海中散尽，寨卡病毒便崛起成为全球主要健康威胁之一，目前令南美、中美和加勒比地区研究者和医生们焦头烂额。


Yet the death toll from another virus is rising fast: yellow fever.	但另一种病毒——黄热病的致死人数正在迅速上升。


In southwestern Africa, Angola is facing a serious yellow fever epidemic – its first in 30 years.	在非洲西南部，安哥拉正面临严峻的黄热病传染疫情——这是30年来首次在这里爆发黄热病疫情。


Since the virus emerged in Luanda, Angola’s capital and most populous city, last December, it has killed 293 people and infected a suspected 2,267.	自去年12月黄热病病毒在安哥拉首都兼最大城市罗安达现身以来，已经夺走293人的生命，疑似传染病例2,267人。


The virus has now spread to six of the country’s 18 provinces.	目前该病毒已经蔓延到安哥拉十八省的六个。


Travelers have taken cases to China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya.	旅行者已经将黄热病带到了中国、民主刚果和肯尼亚。


Namibia and Zambia are on high alert.	纳米比亚和赞比亚也处于高危预警中。


Yellow fever virus is transmitted by Aedes aegypti – the same mosquito that spreads the Zika virus.	黄热病病毒由埃及伊蚊传播——和寨卡病毒一样。


Symptoms include fever, muscle pain, headache, nausea, vomiting, and fatigue.	其症状包括发热、肌肉疼痛、头痛、反胃、呕吐和疲劳。


At least half of untreated patients with severe cases of yellow fever die within 10-14 days.	至少一半的重症病例如果得不到治疗将在10—14天内死去。


The good news is that, unlike Zika or Ebola, yellow fever can be controlled with an effective vaccine, which confers lifelong immunity within a month of administration.	好消息是，和寨卡和埃博拉不同，黄热病可以用有效疫苗控制，这种疫苗只需要一个月就可以形成终身免疫。


And, indeed, vaccination forms the core of Angola’s National Response Plan, initiated early this year with the goal of administering the yellow fever vaccine to more than 6.4 million people in Luanda Province.	此外，事实上接种也是安哥拉本月早些时候启动的国家响应计划的核心形式，该相应计划的目标是为罗安达省的640万多人接种黄热病疫苗。


So far, nearly 90% of that target population has been vaccinated, thanks largely to the World Health Organization, the International Coordinating Group for Vaccine Provision, and other countries, including South Sudan and Brazil, which together made some 7.35 million doses of the vaccine available.	目前，在世界卫生组织、国际疫苗供应协调小组（International Coordinating Group for Vaccine Provision）和南非和巴西等其他国家的大力帮助下（它们供提供了735万剂疫苗），90%的目标人群已经接种。


The mass vaccination effort has stemmed the spread of yellow fever.	大规模接种方案阻止了黄热病的传播。


But to end the outbreak, vaccination has to continue not only in Luanda, where an additional 1.5 million are at risk of infection, but also encompass other affected provinces.	但要战胜疫情，接种不但要在罗安达继续进行（该省还有150万人暴露在传染风险下），还必须扩展到其他受影响省份。


This will be a major challenge.	这将是一个重大挑战。


One key problem is cost.	一个关键问题是成本。


In 2013, the yellow fever vaccine cost $0.82 per dose in Africa – a price that most developing countries cannot afford.	2013年，非洲黄热病疫苗每剂成本为0. 82美元——这是大部分发展中国家无法承受的价格。


A 2015 report by Médecins Sans Frontières showed that the vaccine is now almost 70 times more expensive than it was in 2001.	一份2015年无国界医生组织的报告表明，目前黄热病疫苗几乎比2001年贵了70倍。


Making matters worse, even if countries have the money, there are serious supply constraints.	更糟糕的是，即使各国不缺钱，也面临着严重的供给约束。


Senegal’s Pasteur Institute of Dakar, one of only four facilities in the world producing yellow fever vaccines, manufactures about ten million doses per year, and the manufacturing process is extremely difficult to scale up.	塞内加尔的达喀尔巴斯德研究所是全球仅有四家生产黄热病疫苗的机构之一，每年可以生产一千万剂，并且产能极难扩张。


Moreover, the Pasteur Institute is about to close down for a five-month renovation, during which it will be unable to produce more vaccine.	此外，巴斯德研究所即将进行为期五个月的停产翻修，在此期间将无法生产更多疫苗。


Fortunately, the situation is set to improve.	幸运的是，情况很快就会改善。


The Pasteur Institute is constructing a new facility about 30 kilometers from Dakar, in Diamniadio, that is expected to triple production by 2019.	巴斯德研究所正在距离达喀尔30公里的迪亚姆尼亚迪奥（Diamniadio）建造新产能，预计可以在2019年将产量增加两倍。


Another yellow fever vaccine manufacturer, Sanofi Pasteur in France, is also expanding its manufacturing capacity.	另一家黄热病疫苗生产商法国赛诺菲巴斯德公司（Sanofi Pasteur）也正在扩大产能。


(The other two manufacturers are based in Brazil and Russia.)	（另两家生产商位于巴西和俄罗斯）。


For now, however, supplies are tight.	但是，目前供应十分紧张。


One way to stretch existing stores could be by administering a fractional dose (one-fifth of the usual dose), which has also been shown to protect against yellow fever.	一种扩大现有储量的方法是减小剂量（减小到常规剂量的五分之一），实验表明这样仍然能够抵抗黄热病。


But even that may not be enough if the virus spreads further.	但如果病毒进一步蔓延，即使这样也不足够。


And, unfortunately, the high density of Aedes aegyptii mosquitoes in the affected areas means that the risk of transmission remains high.	而不幸的是，埃及伊蚊在受影响地区分布密度很高，这意味着传播风险也很高。


An outbreak in a region like Asia, which lacks experience with a yellow fever epidemic and has no capacity to manufacture the vaccine, would be particularly difficult to control.	如果缺乏应对黄热病传染经验、也没有疫苗生产能力的亚洲等地区出现疫情爆发，情况将特别难以控制。


According to John P. Woodall, the founder of the disease-alert service ProMED, if yellow fever spreads to parts of Asia with the right climate and mosquito species, hundreds of thousands could be infected (and possibly die) before vaccine stocks are delivered.	据疾病预警服务商ProMED创始人约翰·伍达尔（John P. Woodall）的称，如果黄热病在合适的气候条件下由适合的蚊子种类传播到亚洲的一些部分，那么在疫苗库存建立起来之前将会有数十万人被传染（并可能死去）。


The virus also has the potential to spread to the Americas, which are home to Aedes mosquito vectors that transmit not only yellow fever, but also dengue, Zika, and chikungunya.	黄热病病毒也有可能传播到美洲，美洲的伊蚊不但可以传播黄热病，也可以传播登革热、寨卡和奇昆古尼亚热。


Already, the Pan American Health Organization has declared an epidemiological alert for yellow fever in Latin America.	目前，泛美卫生组织已经发布拉丁美洲黄热病预警。


To help limit yellow fever’s spread, international health regulations require that all travelers to the 34 countries where yellow fever is endemic present a vaccination certificate.	为了帮助遏制黄热病传播，国际卫生监管当局要求前往34个出现黄热病传染疫情的国家的旅客提供接种证明。


But the implementation of those regulations depends on each country’s capacity, and is thus far from perfect.	但这一监管措施的实施取决于各国的能力，因此不可能十全十美。


Already, a total of nine laboratory-confirmed cases of yellow fever imported from Angola have been reported by the National IHR Focal Point of China.	目前，中国《国际卫生条例》国家归口单位报告了总共九例经实验室确认的来自安哥拉的输入性病例。


Reports of yellow fever infection in non-immunized travelers returning from a country where vaccination against the disease is mandatory highlights the need to reinforce the implementation of vaccination requirements.	报告有从强制性接种黄热病疫苗的国家归来的未免疫旅行者黄热病传染病例突显出强制实施接种要求的必要性。


The WHO is working closely with several partners and the Angolan government to combat the current outbreak.	世卫组织正在同多家合作伙伴和安哥拉政府密切合作遏制黄热病疫情爆发。


But, as some health experts have pointed out, even more needs to be done.	但是，一些卫生专家指出，还需要做更多事。


The WHO now must convene an emergency committee to coordinate a broader international response, mobilize funds, and spearhead the rapid scale-up of vaccine production, as well as a “standing emergency committee” capable of addressing future public-health crises quickly and effectively.	目前，世卫组织必须成立一个紧急委员会协调更广泛的国际响应，动员资金，并牵头促进迅速扩大疫苗产能，同时还要成立一个能够迅速有效地应对未来公共卫生危机的“常设紧急委员会”。


Converting Syria	转变叙利亚


An Arab-Israeli peace requires a comprehensive approach, because the problems at stake are intertwined.	阿拉伯和以色列之间的和平需要一种综合的方式来达成，因为许多重大问题都是相互交织的。


Not only are key issues such as Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees insoluble without an all-Arab consensus, but any country that is left out of the peace process is bound to persist in its role as a revolutionary power bent on regional destabilization.	没有一种整个阿拉伯世界的共识，不但诸如耶路撒冷和巴勒斯坦难民这样的关键性问题解决不了，而且任何一个被排除在和平进程之外的国家都肯定会坚持扮演革命力量的角色，继续制造地区性的不稳定。


Admittedly, Israeli governments have never liked the idea of negotiating peace with all enemies simultaneously, if only because the political costs of the required concessions would be unbearable.	众所周知，以色列政府从来不喜欢同时与所有敌人进行和平谈判的想法，因为难以承受所需妥协的政治成本。


The Israeli strategy of peacemaking therefore oscillates between two visions: while the Israeli left gives priority to the Palestinian problem, the Israeli right prefers pursuing a settlement with the big Arab powers.	因此以色列实现和平的战略总是在两种愿景之间振荡：左派将巴勒斯坦为题视为当务之急，而右翼则倾向于寻求与阿拉伯大国之间的协议。


The current Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and the American veto on negotiations with Syria indicate that we have returned to the “Palestine first” concept.	目前的以巴和谈及美国拒绝与叙利亚进行谈判表明我们又重新回到了“巴勒斯坦为先”的理念上。


But the prospects of success are desperately dim.	但成功的机会却是微乎其微。


With the Americans still refraining from engaging in a Clinton-like level of committed mediation, the parties look to be incapable of meeting each other’s minimal requirements for a settlement.	由于美国人仍然不愿进行克林顿式的倾力斡旋，所以各方看起来都不能满足彼此达成协议的最低要求。


Their failure would have dire consequences for the entire region.	他们的失败会给整个地区造成严重的后果。


The Syria-Iran-Hamas-Hezbollah axis would be emboldened in its challenge to American leadership in the region, and, with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas humbled and defeated, a third Intifada would be a likely scenario.	叙利亚—伊朗—哈马斯－真主党轴心会更大胆地挑战美国在该地区的领导权。 并且随着巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯被挫败，第三次抗暴运动很可能会出现。


It is therefore vitally important to take Syria, an ally of Iran and the patron of spoilers such as Hamas and Hezbollah, out of the war equation.	因此，将叙利亚这个伊朗的盟友和哈马斯、真主党等的资助国从战争等式中删除就变得尤为重要。


But this requires that both Israel and the United States change course.	但这需要以色列和美国作出重大改变。


Syria has a keen interest in being invited into an US-led settlement with Israel.	叙利亚对应邀加入美国主导的与以色列的和解进程表现出浓厚的兴趣。


The muted response of the Arab states to Israel’s recent mysterious air raid on its territory reflects its isolation within the Arab world – an isolation with which the Syrians are extremely uncomfortable.	阿拉伯各国对以色列最近对叙利亚领土实施的神秘空袭保持缄默反映了该国在阿拉伯世界被孤立的状态―这种孤立让叙利亚人极不舒服。


The Ba’athist regime in Damascus is marked by two major formative experiences: Hafez al-Assad’s loss of the Golan Heights to Israel, and his son Bashar’s loss of Lebanon.	大马士革的社会党政权有着两项重大的发展经历：Hafez al-Assad将戈兰高地输给了以色列，和他的儿子Bashar失去了黎巴嫩。


Recovering the Golan, gaining recognition of Syria’s special interests in Lebanon, and reconciling with America are thus vital objectives for the regime and the best way that Bashar al-Assad can boost his legitimacy at home.	收复戈兰高地、确立叙利亚在黎巴嫩的特殊利益并与美国达成和解是该政权至关重要的目标也是Bashar在国内巩固其合法性的最佳方式。


Syria’s readmission into the Arab consensus and financial support from the Gulf monarchies for abandoning the Shi’a alliance with Iran and Hezbollah would also be significant gains.	被重新纳入到阿拉伯共识中及海湾各君主政体在它放弃与伊朗和真主党的什叶派联盟后对其的财政支持，对叙利亚而言是巨大的收获。


Bashar may lack his father’s acumen, but he, too, knows a simple truth: peace with Israel is the price to pay.	Bashar也许缺乏他父亲那样的敏锐，但他也明白一个简单的道理：与以色列和解是它必须付出的代价。


The question remains whether Bashar understands that peace is not only about regaining the Golan, but also about normalization of relations with Israel, which his father was reluctant to allow.	现在的问题仍然是Bashar是否明白和平不仅仅关乎收复戈兰高地，也有赖于和以色列关系的正常化，而这一点正是他的父亲所抗拒的。


The old Assad feared that open borders and the end of the politics of conflict might erode his one-party system.	老阿萨德担心开放的边界和冲突政治的终结可能削弱他的一党专制。


Peace thus requires a degree of political and socioeconomic change to diminish the appetite for military adventurism.	因此和平需要一定程度上的政治和社会经济变革从而减少军事冒险主义的野心。


A Damascene conversion is not only possible, but is also vital for regional peace.	大马士革的转变不仅仅是可能的，也是与地区和平休戚相关的。


The most realistic scenario is now a three-front war pitting Israel against Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.	现在最现实的情景就是一场叙利亚、哈马斯和真主党三方对以色列的战争。


But a Syrian-Israeli peace would drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, thereby cutting off Hezbollah’s lines of arms supply while allowing the vital task of stabilizing Lebanon to succeed.	但叙－以和平将会如同在叙利亚和伊朗之间插入一只楔子，切断真主党的武器供应线并使稳定黎巴嫩的重要任务能够成功。


The only way to extricate Syria from the fatal Iranian embrace is to draw it into a regional scheme for peace.	使叙利亚摆脱伊朗人的死亡拥抱的唯一办法就是将其引进一项区域性的和平计划。


Alas, precisely because of their isolation and the Ba’athist regime’s paranoiac nature, the Syrians are unlikely to meet the US condition for peace talks: abandoning their current rogue alliances and their marriage with terror.	可恰恰是因为它的孤立状态和社会党政权偏执的特点，叙利亚人很可能满足不了美国的和谈条件：放弃它们目前的流氓联盟和对恐怖主义的支持。


But a Damascene conversion can only be the outcome of negotiations, not a prerequisite for them.	但大马士革人的转变只能是谈判的结果，而非对他们的先决条件。


The idea that the Arab-Israeli peace process requires choosing between a Syrian or a Palestinian track has proved to be a dangerous fallacy.	那种认为阿－以和平进程需要在叙利亚道路和巴勒斯坦途径之间选择的观点是一种危险的谬论。


Neither the Palestinians nor the Syrians will acquiesce to their exclusion.	巴勒斯坦人和叙利亚人都不会甘愿被排除在外。


A revolutionary force in international relations is one whose level of dissatisfaction with the status quo is such that it works to undermine it at any price.	国际关系中的革命力量往往对现状极为不满以至于要不惜一切代价破坏它。


In addition to reviewing the state of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the November Middle East conference that President George W. Bush has called should begin to build a platform for an Israeli-Syrian negotiating track and a region-wide forum where clear rules of conduct and engagement are agreed by all.	除了评估巴以谈判的进展，布什总统召集的十一月中东会议还应该开始为以色列和叙利亚的谈判搭建平台。 同时还应该设立一个泛地区的论坛，该论坛对于行动和接触都应该有经各方同意的明确规则。


Of course, this conference will not bring an end to the Damascus-Tehran axis.	当然，这次会议不会终止大马士革－德黑兰轴心。


But if the US exercises a brand of statesmanship different from the one that has so far put it on the defensive on almost every front, it could start to eat away at the foundations of that axis.	但如果��国能够表现出一种与使其目前在各条战线上都疲于应付的作为全然不同的大国风范，它就可以削弱这个轴心的基础。


The 2009 “World Prison Population List” compiled by the International Center for Prison Studies at King’s College, London, put the total number of inmates in Chinese jails at 1.57 million – larger than the population of Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Swaziland, Trinidad & Tobago, Fiji, or Qatar.	2009年由伦敦英皇学院国际监狱研究中心编纂的《世界监狱人口列表》将中国监狱的总收容人数确定为157万——比爱沙尼亚、几内亚比绍、毛里求斯、斯威士兰、特立尼达和多巴哥、斐济货卡塔尔的人口还要多。


Taking the BRICS Seriously	认真对待金砖国家


BEIJING – Sailing down the Moscow River on a cool evening earlier this month, I found myself in intense conversation with the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC).	北京—本月早些时候的一个凉爽的夜晚，我沿着莫斯科河泛舟而下，与中国人民代表大会外事委员会主任委员窃窃私语。


Meanwhile, South African and Brazilian parliamentarians were swaying to Russian music and a guide pointed out the sights.	与此同时，南非和巴西议员们正在欣赏俄罗斯音乐，在导游的指引下观赏景色。


The first parliamentary forum of the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – had come to a convivial conclusion.	金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）第一次议会论坛在欢乐的气氛中落下了帷幕。


Before the meeting opened, many wondered whether the five parliaments could possibly find common ground.	会议开始前，许多人质疑五国议会能否找到共同立场。


What on earth could India’s fractious and rumbustious Lok Sabha, with its impassioned debates and disruptions, have in common with China’s decorous NPC, a rigorously controlled echo chamber for Communist Party decisions?	暴躁又吵闹的印度人民院（Lok Sabha）总是充斥着争论和破坏，它与端庄高雅、跟随中共决策亦步亦趋的中国人大能有什么共同点？


Membership in the new BRICS grouping, many believed, did not provide a strong enough basis for cooperation.	许多人认为，同为新金砖国家集团成员并未提供足够的合作基础。


Such skepticism has been leveled at the BRICS grouping itself from its inception, with some dismissing it as the only international organization invented by an investment bank.	组团伊始时，这类质疑在金砖国家内部也存在，有人对金砖国家嗤之以鼻，认为它只是某家投资银行发明出来的国际组织。


Specifically, the term BRIC was coined more than a decade ago by then-Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill, who did not initially count South Africa among the ranks of the major emerging economies.	具体而言，“金砖四国”一词是十多年前由时任高盛公司分析师吉姆·奥尼尔（Jim O’Neill）所提出，最初，南非并没有被算进这一主要发展中经济体行列。


But Russian President Vladimir Putin liked the idea from the start, and suggested in 2006 that the four countries should meet regularly.	但俄罗斯总统从一开始就喜欢这个观点，在2006年建议四国应该定期会晤。


The grouping was soon formalized, with annual summits planned.	很快，金砖四国就正式组团，并计划每年召开一次峰会。


South Africa joined in 2011, solidifying the BRICS’ presence across the global South, with only Russia in the North.	2011年南非也加入其中，巩固了金砖国家对全球南方国家的代表，只有俄罗斯是北方国家。


In fact, this is why Russia’s centrality to the enterprise is so intriguing.	事实上，正因如此，俄罗斯在这一集团中拥有有趣的核心地位。


Given that Russia was, until recently, a member of the G-8 – the northern hemisphere’s most important economic grouping – it would seem to have little affinity with the other four BRICS members, which have traditionally been viewed as the leading developing-country voices in global forums.	俄罗斯直到最近都是G-8成员国——北半球最重要的经济集团——这使得它与传统上一直被视为发展中国家在全球论坛上的领导者的其他四个金砖成员国若即若离。


But, by seizing on the idea of the BRICS, Putin revealed his desire to build an alternative global platform – and advance an alternative worldview.	但是，普京紧紧抓住金砖国家的概念，表明了他渴望构建另一个全球平台、宣扬另一种世界观。


The continual deepening of the BRICS enterprise has caught many international observers by surprise.	金砖国家组织的不断深化让许多国际观察家感到震惊。


In addition to their annual summits – which have produced joint declarations covering every major global issue, from questions of peace and security to United Nations reform – the BRICS have conducted foreign ministers’ meetings and engaged in think-tank consultations.	除了每年一次的峰会——这一峰会所产生的联合声明涵盖了所有重大全球问题，如和平与安全、联合国改革等——金砖国家还召开了外交部长会议、涉足了智库咨询。


Moreover, the BRICS have created the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai and headed by one of India’s most respected private-sector bankers.	此外，金砖国家还成立了总部设在上海、由印度最著名私人银行家为首脑的新开发银行。


Seen against this background, the recent parliamentary forum is just the newest in an expanding array of institutions and mechanisms that are establishing the BRICS as an international grouping that cannot be ignored.	从这一背景看，最近召开的议会论坛只是金砖国家不断扩大的机构和机制建设的最新动作。 这一系列动作正在让金砖国家成为不容忽视的国际集团。


The BRICS are emerging at a time when the future of the international system that arose in the immediate aftermath of World War II is increasingly being called into question.	金砖国家的出现恰逢二战后建立的国际体系未来日益受到质疑时。


After two world wars, numerous civil wars, colonial oppression, and the horrors of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, the far-sighted statesmen of the time decided that liberal internationalism, based on the UN charter and allied institutions, was the only way to prevent more carnage.	在经历了两次世界大战、各种内战、殖民镇压、大屠杀和广岛核爆后，当时的远见卓识的政治家认定，基于联合国宪章和联合机构的自由国际主义（liberal internationalism）是防止大屠杀重现的唯一办法。


And, indeed, for seven decades, that system has largely achieved its goals.	而事实上，其实年来你这一体系基本上达到了它的目标。


It has broadly ensured global peace, although at the cost of shifting many conflicts to the periphery.	它从整体上确保了全球和平，尽管也将许多冲突转移到了外围。


And it did not benefit only the developed world; it also ensured decolonization, promoted development, and found ways to accommodate the voices of newly emerging countries.	它不但让发展中世界获益良多，也确保了去殖民地化、增进了发展，并为协调新兴国家的声音找到了出路。


But it seems that existing arrangements are no longer adequate.	但看起来现有安排已有所欠缺。


China and India are seeking global influence commensurate with their economic weight; Brazil and South Africa are emerging as continental powerhouses, and hydrocarbon-fueled Russia is chafing at its status on the margins of the Western system.	中国和印度追求与它们的经济实力相称的全球影响力； 巴西和南非正在崛起为洲级大国，而以碳氢化合物为底气的俄罗斯也不满于它在西方体系中的边缘地位。


Not surprisingly, many think that the current system is ready for a makeover.	毫不奇怪，许多人认为当前体系马上就要发生天翻地覆的变化了。


The existing world powers, however, will not cede their influence so easily.	但是，现有世界列强不会轻易放弃影响力。


It is absurd that China’s voting power in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is the same as Belgium’s.	中国在世界银行和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的投票权与比利时等量齐观，这实在是荒谬可笑。


But the G-20’s effort to create parity in these institutions between the advanced economies and the emerging and transition countries has ground to a halt.	但G-20意欲在这些机构中建立发达经济体与新兴和转型国家实现权力平等的努力遇到了瓶颈。


Indeed, although US leaders technically agreed to IMF voting reforms, the US Congress has so far refused to ratify them.	事实上，尽管美国领导人在技术上已经同意了IMF的投票改革，但美国国会仍拒绝批准。


It is important to note that countries like India and Brazil – unlike, say, Germany and Japan a century ago – are not seeking to overturn the world order.	值得注意的是，印度和巴西等国家与（比如）一个世纪前的德国和日本不同，它们并不追求颠覆世界秩序。


All they want is a place at the high table.	它们想要的只是高等级舞台的一席之地。


Barring that, they have little choice but to build their own – though India, Brazil, and South Africa have reason to wonder if a Chinese-led world order would be an improvement on the current one.	如果把这条路封死，它们就别无选择，只能自起炉灶——尽管印度、巴西和南非有理由质疑中国领导的世界秩序是否能比当前秩序有所改进。


The BRICS’ response is both understandable and disquieting.	金砖国家的反应不难理解，也令人不安。


As countries acquire economic and military power, they start exercising their geopolitical muscle, too.	随着国家获得经济和军事实力，就会开始大秀地缘政治“肌肉”。


The challenge for advocates of world order is to accommodate emerging powers within a framework of universal, predictable rules and global structures that ensure everyone a fair deal, appropriate for their size, capabilities, and contributions to the international system.	世界秩序的提倡者的挑战在于在一个框架内容纳新兴力量，这个框架包括可预测的普世规则以及确保所有人都能获得与其规模、能力和对全球体系的贡献相适应的公平交易的全球结构。


Today’s world leaders appear to lack the statesmanship, the breadth of vision, and the generosity of spirit of those who created the post-1945 world order.	与创立1945年后世界秩序的老一辈相比，今天的世界领导人似乎缺少政治家风度、宽广的襟怀和慷慨精神。


By clinging stubbornly to the system they dominate and barring the door to new entrants, they have left those outside little choice.	他们顽固地执着于他们所主导的体系、不向新来者敞开大门，这让外部力量别无选择。


What the BRICS countries have in common is their exclusion from the places they believe they deserve in the current world order.	金砖国家有一个共同点：它们都被排斥在它们认为自己所应该拥有的当前世界秩序中的地位之外。


That may not look like enough of a basis for a credible new international system.	这也许并不足以成为建立可信的新国际体系的基础。


But, with their economies on course to overtake those of the G-7 before 2050, looks can be deceiving.	但是，金砖国家的经济有望在2050年超越G-7，目前的外表也许具有欺骗性。


The fact is that, if the BRICS are not allowed to help lead within the existing global system, they will inevitably create their own.	事实是，如果金砖国家无法在现有国际体系中取得领导地位，它们必然会构建自己的国际体系。


What that might mean for the world order established in 1945 is anybody’s guess.	这对1945年建立的世界秩序意味着什么？ 诸君大可开动脑筋自己想象。


The Human City	人类城市


SINGAPORE – The tangled web of international organizations that constitutes global governance has become so remote and ineffective that few count on it to deliver results anymore.	新加坡——构成全球治理网络的错综复杂的国际组织已经疏远低效到没有人期待取得成果。


Now, after decades of turf wars and self-marginalization, international organizations must rally around an increasingly pressing global priority: sustainable urbanization.	如今经过几十年的地盘之争和自我边缘化，这些国际组织必须团结起来完成可持续城市化这项日益紧迫的全球任务。


The world is undergoing an unprecedented and irreversible wave of urbanization, with the share of the global population living in cities set to reach 60% by 2030.	世界正在经历史无前例、不可逆转的城市化浪潮，到2030年全球城市人口比例将达60% 。


But rapid urbanization is driving up industrial fossil-fuel consumption and household water consumption, and is increasing demand for food in areas where arable land is scarce.	但飞速城市化推升了工业化石燃料消耗和家庭用水量，同时增加了耕地稀缺地区人们的食品需求。


In short, the current urbanization trajectory is not sustainable.	总之，当前的城市化轨迹是不可持续的。


But existing efforts to alter the situation remain woefully inadequate.	但改变现状的努力仍然严重不足。


While the United Nations General Assembly has tasked its agency for human settlements, UN-HABITAT, with promoting sustainable urbanization, the agency lacks the influence to ensure that this vital issue makes it onto the global agenda.	尽管联合国大会责成其人居机构联合国人居署推进可持续城市化，但该机构影响力无法确保这一关键问题进入全球议程。


Moreover, international development players – including UN agencies, NGOs, corporate citizenship programs, and other charitable organizations – rarely coordinate their activities, even though their interventions are increasingly concentrated in densely populated cities.	此外，尽管联合国机构、非政府组织、企业公民计划和其他慈善组织等国际发展机构的干预行为日益集中在人口稠密的城市，但各机构却很少相互协调形成合力。


Given that promoting sustainable urbanization and improving coordination would bolster progress in other priority areas (including women’s rights, climate change, youth unemployment, and literacy), sustainable urbanization must become a bureaucratic priority.	鉴于促进可持续城市化及增进协调可以推动妇女权利、气候变化、青年失业及扫除文盲等众多其他领域的合作，因此官方必须重点推进可持续城市化运动。


And it must be complemented by a technological disruption, with investments channeled toward developing and distributing innovations that would make cities more livable, efficient, and sustainable.	同时可持续城市化必须辅之以技术创新，引导资金流向使城市更宜居、高效、可持续发展的创新成果的研究及分配领域。


In fact, many useful innovations, such as energy-generating building materials and zero-emissions transportation, already exist; they simply need to be made accessible to those who need them most.	其实，产能建材及零排放交通等众多有用的创新成果已经存在； 要做的仅仅是向最���要的人推广它们。


Devices like small-scale water-filtration systems, portable heart monitors, and low-cost tablet computers are already dramatically improving the lives of the world’s poorest citizens and helping to level the economic playing field.	小型水过滤系统、便携式心脏监视器和低成本平板电脑等设备已经显著改善了世界最贫困民众的生活，并在一定程度上改善了经济竞争环境。


The future impact of global governance rests on forging new alignments that facilitate the flow of vital knowledge and technologies from an increasingly diverse array of sources to urban populations worldwide.	能否建立从多样化源头向全球城市人口传播重要知识技术的新联盟将会决定今后全球执政的影响力。


The tools needed to make urban life more sustainable are no longer flowing only from North to South and West to East.	强化可持续城市生活的工具不再单纯地由北向南、由西向东。


China has taken the lead in exporting solar photovoltaic cells, while clean-tech parks are arising even in the Arab world.	中国现已成为太阳能光伏电池最大的出口国，而环保技术产业园正在阿拉伯世界如雨后春笋般崛起。


Governments, companies, supply-chain managers, corporate-citizenship strategists, NGOs, and others should commit to reducing their carbon footprints and to leveraging their resources to contribute to sustainable urbanization.	政府、企业、供应链管理者、企业公民战略师、非政府组织和其他各种力量应全力降低碳排放，同时利用各项资源为实现可持续城市化助力。


Opportunities to make such contributions are appearing constantly – and across all sectors.	所有经济领域不断出现诸如此类的贡献机会。


In construction, for example, contractors are forming partnerships with labs to test materials that better reflect heat while absorbing energy to power cooling systems, and utility companies are leveraging new software tools to deploy smart meters in homes and offices.	比方说在建筑领域，承包商与实验室结成伙伴，对隔热性能更强并吸收热能驱动制冷系统的材料展开测试。 公用事业企业运用全新软件工具在家庭和办公室安装智能电表。


Two US cities – New York and Seattle – have raised efficiency standards for new construction to record levels.	纽约和西雅图两座美国城市对新建筑物能效标准做出了史无前例的提升。


Similarly, automobile manufacturers, mobility-services companies, and local governments are working together to advance sustainable transportation by providing incentives for efficient non-ownership of vehicles.	同样，汽车制造企业、移动服务企业和地方政府正联手推动机动车的高效非占有制，希望借此让交通运输持续性更高。


As a result, carpooling is gaining prevalence in cities like Berlin.	拼车也因此日渐成为柏林等城市的流行趋势。


Furthermore, MIT has developed the foldable electric CityCar, four of which can fit into a conventional parking space.	此外，麻省理工学院研发出折叠电动车CityCar，4辆电动车仅仅占据一个传统的停车位。


At last year’s Rio+20 conference, the eight largest multilateral development banks pledged $175 billion to develop sustainable transportation.	在去年召开的里约+20峰会上，8家最大的多边开发银行承诺投入1750亿美元用于可持续交通建设。


Information technology can also reduce stress on the transportation system.	信息技术也可以缓解交通系统的压力。


For example, Singapore is harnessing its near-complete fiber-optic network to reduce urban congestion by introducing a spate of measures encouraging workers to telecommute.	比方说，新加坡充分利用目前已接近完工的光纤网络系统，通过引入一系列劳动者远程办公激励举措来缓解城市的交通拥堵。


As these measures take effect, self-sufficient satellite towns will likely develop, reducing transportation-related energy consumption further, while fostering a more active civil society.	相关措施收效后将可能出现大批自给自足的卫星城，在进一步节约交通能耗的同时培育更积极主动的公民社会。


Singapore is leading the way in another area as well: production and distribution of potable recycled water.	在另外一个领域新加坡也一马当先：那就是再生饮用水的生产和销售。


Many cities worldwide are following its example, expanding their water catchment and treatment programs.	全世界众多城市都积极仿效，大力发展水收集和处理计划。


Meanwhile, vertical farm experiments – which aim to augment urban food supplies by cultivating crops in skyscraper greenhouses – are proliferating from the American Midwest to Osaka, Japan.	此外，旨在利用摩天大楼大棚栽培作物增加城市粮食供应的垂直农场试验正在从美国中西部向日本大阪蔓延。


And India has become a leader in converting biomass and food waste into energy.	印度也在生物及食品废物产能领域取得领先地位。


Of course, the billions of farmers and villagers worldwide should not be forgotten.	当然，我们绝不能忘记全球数十亿农村居民。


Interventions like rural electrification, the provision of drought-resistant seeds and agricultural technology, and the expansion of micro-insurance are vital not only to rural populations’ welfare, but also to catalyze a new “Green Revolution,” without which city dwellers will face severe food shortages.	实现农村电气化、提供抗旱种子、农业技术及扩大小额保险等举措不仅对农村人口福利至关重要，还可以促成新一轮“绿色革命”，让城市居民免受粮食短缺的困扰。


With new, innovative solutions appearing every day, the real challenge lies in bringing them to scale – and that requires international cooperation.	虽然新的创新方案天天出现，但真正的挑战在于借助国际合作实现创新成果规模化应用。


But the “smartest” cities are not necessarily the most technologically advanced. Rather, they are the places where technology and public policy support citizens’ welfare and aspirations.	虽然“最智能”城市并不一定在技术上最为先进，但它们的技术和公共政策必须注重民众的福利和愿望。


This crucial fact will guide discussion at the New Cities Foundation’s second annual summit in June – the theme of which is “The Human City” – and should be at the heart of sustainable urbanization initiatives.	这一关键事实将指引以“人类城市”为主题的6月举行的新城市基金会第二届年度峰会的讨论，并理应成为可持续城市化举措的核心议题。


Making sustainable urbanization a strategic priority might be the only way to overcome the interrelated crises of jobless growth, youth unemployment, and income inequality.	将可持续城市化作为战略重点或许是克服盘根错节的无就业增长危机、青年失业及收入不平等的唯一方法。


While some factory jobs can be outsourced or automated, robots cannot yet retrofit buildings, install solar PV cells on rooftops, or construct vertical farms.	虽然某些工厂岗位可以实现外包或自动化，但机器人还不能改造建筑、在屋顶安装光伏太阳能电池或者建造垂直农场。


Even the movement in some cities, such as Singapore and Tokyo, toward driverless subways or cars will demand substantial labor to build and manage the relevant systems.	就连新加坡和东京等某些城市的无人驾驶地铁或汽车项目也需要大量人力建设和管理相关系统。


In the future, as in the past, the most labor-intensive jobs will involve building homes, production facilities, and, in turn, communities.	无论过去还是将来，最需要密集劳动的岗位往往包括住宅、生产设施以及社区建设。


Instead, small policy-rate increases must be incorporated into a broader fiscal and distributional strategy, implemented alongside more public spending on infrastructure and skills upgrading, as well as some gentle forms of income policies, employing, for example, “moral suasion.”	相反，必须将小幅的政策利率升高纳入到更广泛的���政和分配政策，扩大基础设施和技术升级领域的公共支出，并同时执行某些形式更加温和的收入政策，比方说开展“道义劝说”。


Coping with Catastrophic Risks	应付灾难性风险


One year after the Indian Ocean tsunami, what are the lessons?	印度洋大海啸发生一年来，我们得到了哪些教训呢？


The biggest one is that it was the type of disaster to which policymakers pay too little attention – one that has a very low or unknown probability of occurring, but that creates enormous losses if it does occur.	最大的教训是，这是一种决策者极少予以关注的灾害，它的发生可能性非常低或者无以知晓。 但是，如果确实发生就将产生巨大损失。


Great as the death toll, physical and emotional suffering of survivors, and property damage caused by the tsunami were, even greater losses could be inflicted by other disasters of low (but not negligible), or unknown, probability.	死亡人数极高，幸存者的身体和情感苦难以及由大海啸所带来的财产损失也十分巨大。 甚至，其他可能性低（但并非可以忽略）的或者不得而知的的灾难可能会造成更大的损失。


For example, the asteroid that exploded above Siberia in 1908 with the force of a hydrogen bomb might have killed millions of people had it exploded above a major city.	例如，1908年在西伯利亚上空爆炸的小行星具有一颗氢弹的威力，如果在一座大城市上空爆炸，就有可能杀死数以百万计的人口。


Yet that asteroid was only about 200 feet in diameter.	但是，那个小行星的直径只不过是200英尺。


A much larger one (among the thousands of dangerously large asteroids in orbits that intersect the earth’s) could strike the earth and cause the total extinction of the human race through a combination of shock waves, fire, tsunamis, and blockage of sunlight, wherever it struck.	一个体积更为巨大的小行星（数以千计的尺寸大得危险的小行星的轨道与地球交叉）可能撞击地球，并且无论在哪里撞击都能够通过冲击波、大火、大海啸以及阻挡阳光造成人类灭亡。


Other catastrophic risks include natural epidemics (the 1918-1919 Spanish influenza killed between 20 million and 40 million people), nuclear or biological attacks by terrorists, certain types of lab accidents, and abrupt global warming.	其他灾难性风险包括天然流行病（1918年到1919年的西班牙流感夺去大约2000万到4000万人的生命），恐怖分子发动核子或者生物攻击，某些种类的实验室事故以及突发的全球温室效应。


The probability of catastrophes, whether intentional or not, resulting from human activity appears to be increasing because of the rapidity and direction of technological advances.	由于技术进步的迅猛和方向，由人类有意或者无意活动引起的灾难可能性看起来在增加。


The fact that a catastrophe is unlikely to occur is not a rational justification for ignoring the risk of its occurrence.	灾难不大可能发生的事实并不是忽略其发生风险的具有理性的理由。


Suppose that a tsunami as destructive as the one in the Indian Ocean last year occurs on average once a century and kills 250,000 people.	设想一下，像去年发生在印度洋的那样具有破坏力的大海啸平均每个世纪发生一次，令25万人死亡。


That is an average of 2,500 deaths per year.	这也就是每年平均2500人死亡。


If such a toll could be substantially reduced at moderate cost, the investment would be worthwhile.	如果适量的成本就可以实质性地降低此类死亡率，那么，这一投资就会是有价值的。


Educating residents of low-lying coastal areas about the warning signs of a tsunami (tremors and a sudden recession in the ocean), establishing a warning system involving emergency broadcasts, telephoned warnings, and air-raid-type sirens, and improving emergency response systems would have saved many who were killed by the Indian Ocean tsunami.	教育低海平面居民有关大海啸的警告迹象（震颤以及海洋突然退潮）、建立包括紧急广播、电话警告以及空袭警报那样的警报等警报系统，并且改善紧急应对体系将有可能挽救许多被印度洋大海啸夺去生命的人。


At the same time, the cost would have been well below any reasonable estimate of the average losses that can be expected from tsunamis.	与此同时，其成本也会远远低于大海啸引起的平均损失的合理估计。


There are several reasons why such measures weren’t taken in anticipation of a tsunami on the scale that occurred.	对那种规模的大海啸并没有采取措施的原因有好几个。


First, although a once-in-a-century event is as likely to occur at the beginning of the century as at any other time, it is much less likely to occur in the first decade of the century than later.	首先，尽管一个世纪一次的事件有可能在本世纪的任何时间发生，在本世纪头十年发生的可能性要远远低于以后发生的可能性。


Politicians with limited terms of office and thus foreshortened political horizons are likely to discount low-risk disaster possibilities, since the risk of damage to their careers from failing to take precautionary measures is truncated.	政客们任期有限因而政治抱负受到局限，有可能不重视低风险灾害的可能性，这是因为不采取预防性措施而对其生涯造成的损害有限。


Second, to the extent that effective precautions require governmental action, the fact that government is a centralized system of control makes it difficult for officials to respond to the full spectrum of possible risks against which cost-justified measures might be taken.	第二，由于有效的预防措施要求采取政府行动，政府作为一个集权的控制体系使得官员难以应付全部可能的风险。 否则，就有可能采取措施，其成本受到控制从而变得合理。


Given the variety of matters to which they must attend, officials are likely to have a high threshold of attention below which risks are ignored.	鉴于官员们应付的事情繁杂，他们对于关注就有一个比较高的门槛标准，低于标准以下的风险就被忽略不计了。


Third, where risks are regional or global rather than local, many national governments, especially in poorer and smaller countries, may drag their heels in the hope that larger and richer countries will bear the costs of addressing them.	第三，如果风险是地区性或者全球性的，而非地方性的，许多国家的政府、特别是小国和穷国可能会希望大国和富国将会支付解决问题的费用而拖延采取行动。


Knowing this, larger and richer countries may be reluctant to take precautionary measures, as this would reward and thus encourage “free riding.”	大国和富国知道了这一点就会不愿意采取预防性措施，因为这样就会提供奖赏并鼓励“免费搭车”。


Fourth, countries are poor often because of weak, inefficient, or corrupt government, characteristics that may disable them from taking cost-justified precautions.	第四，穷国之所以贫穷，大多是因为其政府软弱、低效率或者腐败。 这些特征使得他们无力采取成本合算的预防措施。


And the difficulty people everywhere have in thinking in terms of probabilities – especially low probabilities, which they tend to write off – weakens political support for incurring the costs of taking precautionary measures.	并且加上世界各地的人们在考虑可能性时存在困难，因此就削弱了为采取预防性措施进行开销的政治支持。 特别是那些较低的可能性，人们倾向于将它们一笔勾销。


An even more dramatic example of neglect of low-probability/high-cost risks is the danger of an asteroid strike, which is analytically similar to the menace of tsunamis.	忽视较低可能性以及高成本风险的更为极端的例子是小行星撞击地球的危险。 这从分析角度而言与大海啸的危险相似。


Indeed, in part because tsunamis are one of the risks of an asteroid collision, the Indian Ocean disaster has stimulated new interest in asteroid defense.	实际上，部分由于大海啸是小行星碰撞的风险之一，因此，印度洋大海啸激发了对防止小行星碰撞地球的新的兴趣。


Deflecting an asteroid from its orbit when it is still hundreds of millions of miles from Earth is a feasible undertaking.	在一颗小行星距离地球还有数亿英里远的时候将其从轨道上偏离是可行的。


Nevertheless, in the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) spends only $4 million of its annual budget of more than $10 billion on mapping dangerously close large asteroids.	但是，在美国，美国国家航空航天局在其超过100亿美元的年度预算中只花费4百万美元用于测绘大的构成危险的近距离小行星。


At the current rate, NASA may not complete the task for another decade, even though such mapping is the key to an asteroid defense because it may give us years of warning.	按照目前水平，国家航空航天局可能无法完成下一个十年的任务，即使这样的测绘对于防止小行星撞击地球而言是关键因素，因为测绘可以给我们好几年的预警时间。


The fact that a disaster of a particular type has not occurred recently or even within human memory (or even ever) is a bad reason to ignore it.	某种特定的灾难最近、或者在人类记忆中（或者从来）没有发生的事实是忽略它的糟糕的理由。


The risk may be slight, but if the consequences should it materialize are great enough, the expected cost of disaster may be sufficient to warrant defensive measures.	风险可能是轻微的，但是可能造成的后果是巨大的，可以预期的灾难成本应当足以建立防护性措施。


The Dead-End of Corbynismo	科尔宾主义是一条死路


SANTIAGO – Latin America has a new export: populist backlash.	圣地亚哥—拉丁美洲输出了新东西：民粹主义反弹。


It first landed on the warm and receptive shores of the Mediterranean, nurturing support for Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos.	它首先抵达了温暖而包容的地中海沿岸，壮大了对希腊左翼联盟党（Syriza）和西班牙社会民主党（Podemos）的支持。


Now it has reached the United Kingdom.	如今它又来到了英国。


Corbynismo, the ideology of the long-marginalized British MP Jeremy Corbyn – who admired Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chávez, thinks Vladimir Putin was justified in invading Ukraine, and now heads Britain’s venerable Labour Party – sounds familiar to anyone acquainted with Latin America.	科尔宾主义——长期被边缘化的英国国会议员杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）的思想——对于任何一位熟悉拉丁美洲的人来说听上去都似曾相识。 科尔宾仰慕已故的委内瑞拉总统查韦斯（Hugo Chávez），认为普京入侵乌克兰是合理的。


It calls for monetary financing of fiscal deficits (now called “people’s quantitative easing”), nationalization of industry (beginning with the railroads), and an end to competition and the private provision of public services.	目前他是受人尊敬的工党的领导人。 科尔宾主义号召用货币融资解决财政赤字（现在称为“人民的量化宽松”）、产业国有化（从铁路开始）以及结束竞争和私人提供公共服务。


This is the stuff that former Prime Minister Tony Blair and his supporters thought – wrongly, it seems – they had consigned to the dustbin of history.	前首相布莱尔（Tony Blair）及其支持者认为——他们好像弄错了——这些东西早已经被丢进了历史垃圾箱。


Of course, this new populism (Hillary Clinton’s Democratic rival Bernie Sanders is also a card-carrying member) has much fodder.	当然，这一新民粹主义（希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）的民主党竞争对手伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）也是民粹主义者）有的是“料”。


As Martin Wolf has emphasized, the 2008-2009 financial crisis made voters understandably angry at “greedy plutocrats and their lackeys in politics and media.”	马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf）强调，2008—2009年金融危机让选民对“贪婪的财阀及其政界和媒体界走狗”愤怒不已，这不难理解。


Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman (who sometimes sounds like a Corbynista, but isn’t one) and Wolfgang Munchau stress that Europe’s moderate left lost popular support by being too ready to embrace the extreme version of fiscal austerity demanded by Germany and its orthodox allies.	诺贝尔奖获得者保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman，他有时候也像是个科尔宾主义者，但实际上并非如此）和沃尔夫冈·穆乔（Wolfgang Munchau）强调，欧洲的温和左派因为时刻准备着接受德国及其正统派盟友所要求的极度紧缩而失去了民众支持。


But being mad is not the same as being right.	但疯不代表正确。


The new European populists are parlaying legitimate frustration into a misguided set of policies that can only produce more of the same.	新欧洲民粹主义者正在将合情合理的沮丧情绪演变为误导性政策组合，这一组合只能导致更多的沮丧。


Latin Americans learned this the hard way in decades past.	这是拉丁美洲在过去几十年中学到的痛苦教训。


Europeans (and perhaps Americans) may be about to as well.	欧洲人（也许还有美国人）可能马上就要重蹈覆辙了。


Three conceptual confusions cause Corbynismo to get crucial matters completely wrong.	三个概念上的混淆让科尔宾主义完全弄错了关键点。


The market for potatoes is not like the market for loans.	土豆市场和贷款市场是不同的。


Yes, bankers are greedy.	是的，银行家是贪婪的。


And, yes, financial markets require close supervision and regulation.	是的，金融市场需要严格监督和监管。


But what is true of financial markets need not be true of other markets.	但对金融市场成立的东西对其他市场未必成立。


A transaction involving potatoes happens at one point in time only: the buyer parts with her money, the seller parts with his tubers, and that is it.	土豆交易只在某一个时点发生：买家交钱，卖家交货，交易完毕。


A financial transaction, by contrast, happens over time: the borrower gets the money today and promises to repay in a month, year, or decade.	相反，金融交易需要一段时间：借款人今天拿钱，承诺一个月、一年或十年后偿还。


This makes finance especially susceptible to crooks and con men.	这让金融十分容易受到流氓和骗子的青睐。


And because expectations and confidence about future events are crucial, governments must, like European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, stand ready to do “whatever it takes” to stabilize financial markets.	而由于对未来事件的预期和信心具有关键重要性，因此政府必须向欧洲央行行长德拉吉那样时刻准备着“不惜一切代价”稳定金融市场。


As the great Cuban-Argentine-American economist Carlos Díaz-Alejandro pointed out long ago, financial markets are not disciplined by the threat of bankruptcy.	伟大的古巴-阿根廷-美国经济学家卡洛斯·迪亚兹-亚历杭德罗（Carlos Díaz-Alejandro）早就指出，金融市场的纪律不是来自破产威胁。


When banks get into trouble, governments always save them or wish they had (think Lehman Brothers).	当银行陷入麻烦时，政府总是会拯救它们或渴望拯救它们（想想雷曼兄弟公司）。


Regulation needs to provide the discipline that markets cannot.	监管需要提供市场所不能提供的纪律。


But followers of Corbynismo are wrong to infer that the ills of financial markets infect all other markets, all the time.	但科尔宾主义者推论说金融市场的病症无时无刻不在传染给其他所有市场，这是错误的。


Countries, whether rich or poor, do not need a Potato Supervisory Board with new and enhanced regulatory powers.	无论是穷国还是富国，都不需要拥有加强的新监管权力的土豆监督局。


It is great to be Keynesian – but during both halves of the cycle.	凯恩斯主义者了不起——但得在周期的上半段和下半段。


Yes, orthodox economists of (mostly) Teutonic origin peddle a lethal fiscal-policy prescription.	是的，（大部分）日耳曼裔正统经济学家都支持致命的财政政策药方。


When the economy is booming, they claim, expenditure must be cut (or, if all else fails, taxes raised) in order to reduce demand.	当经济繁荣时，他们主张，必须削减支出（或者，当其他手段都没用时，增加税收），以此降低需求。


When the economy is tanking, expenditure also has to be cut in order to restore confidence and revive investment.	当经济萎靡不振时，也必须削减支出以重塑信心、重振投资。


For some European economies, this prescription has caused a needlessly long recession.	对一些欧洲经济体来说，这一药方导致了毫无必要的长时间衰退。


But it does not follow that, as Corbynistas believe, large budget deficits and debts are harmless.	但这并不意味着，如科尔宾主义者认为的那样，大额预算赤字和债务是无害的。


On the contrary, when debts become unsustainable and governments have no option but to close hospitals and slash pensions, it is the poor and vulnerable who suffer most.	相反，当债务变得不可持续、政府别无他��，职能关闭医院、削减退休金时，受打击最大的穷人和弱势群体。


The way to render an aggressively counter-cyclical fiscal policy feasible is by relying on modern budget rules.	让积极的反周期财政政策可行的办法是依靠现代预算规则。


A modern Keynesian government does not hesitate to increase spending in the face of a recession.	现代凯恩斯主义政府会毫不犹豫地在面临衰退时增加支出。


But, in order to do that, it needs the high credibility and low debt that follow from having saved and repaid debt during the upswing.	但是，为了做到这一点，政府需要很高的信誉和低债务水平，而低债务水平来自经济繁荣期的储蓄和偿债。


We did this in Chile during the copper price boom of 2006-2008, running budget surpluses of up to eight percentage points of GDP.	在智利，我们在2006—2008年铜价繁荣时期做到了这一点，预算盈余最高达到了GDP的八个百分点。


When Wall Street melted down, we had the fiscal room to apply one of the most aggressive anti-crisis plans anywhere.	当华尔街崩溃时，我们还有财政空间实施全球最积极的反危机计划。


A rigorous fiscal rule, designed and applied by center-left governments, made it all possible.	有中左翼政府设计并实施的严格财政规则让这一切得以实现。


Progressive ends are not the same as statist means.	进步的目的不同于集权的手段。


There is nothing inevitable or God-given about suffering, injustice, and inequality.	苦难、不公和不平等绝不是不可避免的，也不是注定的。


That is why modern social democrats and progressive liberals are eager to right social wrongs.	因此，现代民主党和进步自由派急切地要纠正社会的错误。


But effectiveness requires agnosticism about the policies required to achieve lofty ends.	但要取得效果，就需要对实现崇高目标的政策抱以怀疑态度。


Consider health care.	以医疗为例。


Different things work differently in different places.	不同的东西在不同的地方起不同的作用。


Britain has a single payer and a single service provider: the National Health Service.	英国有一个单一支付人和一个单一服务提供人：国民医保制度（National Health Service）。


Canada has a single public payer but mostly private providers.	加拿大有一个单一公共支付人，但提供人大多为私人所有。


Obamacare establishes a public mandate to buy private insurance (with public subsidies for the poor) to finance services provided by (mostly) private hospitals and clinics.	奥巴马医保规定了一个公共使命：购买私人保险（穷人可以获得公共补贴）为（占大部分数量的）私人医院和诊所的服务提供资金。


The same is true in education, pensions, or housing for the poor.	教育、退休金或穷人的住房也是如此。


States are right to spend generously on education; but, of the world’s top ten universities listed by the Shanghai ranking, seven are private.	国家在教育上慷慨投入是正确的； 但是，在上海大学排行榜上，前十名中有七家是私立大学。


Successful pension systems often have a solidarity pillar (public) and a contributory pillar (private).	成功的退休金制度需要团结（公共）和出资（私人）双管齐下。


And so on.	如此等等。


This is old hat to students of modern public policy.	对现代公共政策的学生来说，这些都是老生常谈。


Yet the Corbynistas seem to have assimilated none of it.	但科尔宾主义者似乎完全不得要领。


That is the bad news.	这是坏消息。


The good news is that the ideas already exist to provide a progressive alternative to 1960s-vintage Corbynismo.	好消息是20世纪60年代就已过时的科尔宾主义的进步性替代思想已经存在。


Some were developed in the rich world; others in emerging countries.	一些来自发达世界，一些来自发展中国家。


Political leadership – Italy’s prime minister, Matteo Renzi, is one example – is now required to push those ideas forward.	现在，需要政治领导力——比如意大利总理伦齐——推动这些思想。


Back to Socialism	回到社会主义


LONDON – The remarkable thing about Jeremy Corbyn, the hard-left outsider who stunned the British establishment by capturing the leadership of the Labour Party, is not his alleged lack of patriotism.	伦敦—对杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）来说，值得注意的不是人们指责他缺少爱国主义。 这位强硬左派外部人士成为工党领袖，堪称对英国传统的一次颠覆。


Whether he wishes to sing God Save the Queen at public events seems a rather trivial matter.	他是否愿意在公众场合高唱《天佑女王》并不重要。


The remarkable thing about his brand of leftism is how reactionary it is.	就他的左派标签而言，值得注意的是修正主义程度有多大。


Corbyn is an old-fashioned socialist who would like to soak the rich and put transport and utilities back under state control.	科尔宾是个老派社会主义者，支持对富人课以重税、把交通和公用设施重新收归国有。


His rhetoric of class war suggests a complete break with mainstream social democracy.	他的阶级斗争论表明他与主流社会民主派完全决裂。


Postwar European social democracy was always a compromise with capitalism.	战后欧洲的社会民主派一直是与资本主义妥协的产物。


Left-wing ideology, especially in Britain, owed more to certain Christian moral traditions (“more Methodist than Marx”) than to any political dogma.	左翼意识形态（特别是在英国）更多地来源于某些基督教道德传统（“比马克思更加卫理公会”）而非任何政治教条。


Labour leaders like Clement Attlee, the first prime minister after World War II, were not opposed to a market economy; they just wanted to regulate markets in such a way that might best serve working-class interests.	工党领袖，如二战后首位首相克莱蒙特·艾德礼，并不反对市场经济； 他们只是希望管制市场，使其尽可能符合工作阶级的利益。


During the Cold War, social democracy was Western Europe’s egalitarian alternative to communism.	冷战期间，社会民主派是西欧用于取代共产主义的平等主义。


Attlee, for one, was ferociously anti-communist.	艾德礼本人就是死硬反共产主义者。


Lip service was paid at Labour Party conferences to the old symbols of socialism.	在工党的会议上，社会主义的旧象征说得十分漂亮。


Party leaders sang the Internationale with teary-eyed nostalgia.	工党热泪盈眶地领袖高唱《国际歌》。


And, until Tony Blair struck it out in 1995, Clause 4 of the party’s constitution still promised “common ownership of the means of production” and “popular control” of industry.	党章第四条一直承诺“生产资料公有”和产业的“公共控制”，直到1995年才由托尼·布莱尔废除了这条党章。


(Corbyn might well try to restore it.)	（科尔宾很可能会试图重新将这一条写入党章。


But when it came to national government, ideological socialists were swiftly shunted aside to make way for more pragmatic operators.	）但只要进入国家政府，理想主义社会主义者很快就会摇身一变，成为更加务实的操作者。


By the time Blair, following the example of his friend US President Bill Clinton, became Prime Minister by promoting the “third way,” socialism seemed to be dead and buried.	当布莱尔效仿他的朋友、美国总统比尔·克林顿，通过承诺“第三条路”成为英国首相时，社会主义似乎已经死透了。


Clinton and Blair – who came to power after that other odd Anglo-American couple, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, had started to tear at the fabric of social democracy – made compromises of which Attlee would not have dreamed.	克林顿和布莱尔——继奇怪的盎格鲁-美利坚组合里根和撒切尔夫人之后，这一对组合开始撕扯社会民主派的纹理——达成了艾德礼想都不敢想的妥协。


The genius of Clinton and Blair was to combine genuine concern for the underprivileged with an unseemly devotion to the fat cats of Wall Street, the City of London, and some murkier places, too.	克林顿和布莱尔的天才之处是将关于社会地位低下群体的真正担忧与不得体地卑躬屈膝于华尔街、伦敦金融城和其他更加见不得人之处的权势人物相结合。


Blair vacationed with Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s plutocrat prime minister.	布莱尔与意大利富豪总理贝卢斯科尼一起度假。


Clinton used his presidential pardon to allow wealthy cronies to elude justice.	克林顿用总统特赦权让富豪友人逍遥法外。


And after leaving office, both men swiftly put their reputations in the service of their bank accounts.	而在卸任后，两人又都利用声誉为自己的银行账户服务。


One might say that by compromising with capitalism too much, the third-way leaders compromised themselves.	你也许会说，第三条路领导人向资本主义妥协得太多，以至于把自己也妥协掉了。


This is one reason why, under Corbyn, the hard left struck back and finally managed to wrest power from the compromisers.	这也是在科尔宾领导下的强硬左派要逆袭并最终从妥协派手中夺回权力的原因之一。


Especially to many young people, Corbyn is the longed-for man of conviction, the “authentic” voice of the people.	特别是对许多年轻人来说，科尔宾是他们企盼已久的深孚众望之人，“真正的”人民的声音。


Never having had much of an ideology in the first place, the soft-left social democrats, faced with a real socialist, ended up having nothing much to say.	温和左倾的社会民主派从一开始就从未用过多少意识形态，面临真正的社会主义者，他们最终讲不出什么东西来。


Could Hillary Clinton be similarly punished in her quest to be the Democratic Party’s nominee in next year’s US presidential election?	希拉里·克林顿在她谋求民主党明年美国总统大选提名人选时也会受到类似的惩罚吗？


Could the center left, which she represents, lose control of the party?	她所代表的中左翼可能失去对民主党的控制吗？


In recent opinion polls, her main opponent, Bernie Sanders, who proudly calls himself a socialist, is edging ever closer to Clinton – and is actually leading her in some states.	最新民调显示，她的主要反对者、骄傲地自称为社会主义者的伯尔尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）与她的差距越来越小——在一些州甚至已经领先于她。


Like Corbyn, he has the air of authenticity – a politician who says what he thinks, unlike the scripted professionals of mainstream Washington.	与科尔宾一样，桑德斯拥有真实的氛围——作为一位政客，他想什么就说什么，这与照本宣科的主流华盛顿职业政客不一样。


And yet there is no Democratic left, including Sanders, that is remotely as hard as the Corbynites.	但包括桑德斯在内的民主党左派都无法与科尔宾阵营比强硬。


Compared to Corbyn, Sanders is a moderate.	与科尔宾相比，桑德斯十分温和。


More important, what a militant faction did to the Labour Party is being done now not to the Democrats, but to the Republicans.	更重要的是，军方派系对工党的影响没有在民主党身上上演，倒是在共和党身上上演。


Indeed, the Republican rebels look far more extreme than Corbyn, let alone Sanders.	事实上，共和党叛逆者比科尔宾还要极端得多，更不用说桑德斯了。


The Republican Party is in danger of being taken over by fanatics who see compromise in government as a form of villainous treachery.	共和党有被狂热分子掌控的危险，他们把政府内的妥协看成邪恶的背叛。


Forcing the archconservative John Boehner to quit as Speaker of the House for being too soft was an act of war by Republicans against their own party.	迫使极端保守派约翰·博纳（John Boehner）因过于软弱而辞去众议院议长的便是共和党人针对本党所发动的战争。


Most aspiring Republican presidential candidates are not only extreme, but also more reactionary than Corbyn.	野心最大的共和党总统候选人不但极端，也比科尔宾更加修正主义。


Their favored slogans – “Take back our country” or “Make America great again” – invoke a past when neither the New Deal nor the expansion of civil rights disturbed the peace of upstanding white Christians.	他们最爱的口号——“找回我们的国家”或“让美国再次伟大”——号召回到罗斯福新政和民权的扩张都不能影响正直的白人基督徒的和平的时代。


These hard-right Republicans, too, prize “authenticity” – indeed, they prize it above anything else (hence the appeal of Donald Trump).	这些强硬右派共和党也赞赏“真实性”——事实上，这是他们最看重的品质（唐纳德·特朗普的吸引力亦然）。


And they, too, are in angry revolt against party leaders, who are believed to have compromised themselves simply by trying to govern.	他们也愤怒地与党领袖决裂，认为后者仅仅为了执政而妥协自己。


It is too soon to predict who will win the Republican nomination.	预测谁会赢得共和党提名还为时尚早。


It is unlikely, but possible, that a hardliner like Ted Cruz, or a rank amateur with deep religious convictions, such as the neurosurgeon Ben Carson, will capture the party.	有可能（但可能性不大）泰德·科鲁兹（Ted Cruz）等强硬派或神经外科医生本·卡尔森（Ben Carson）等有着深刻宗教信念的十足的“打酱油”角色会成为共和党领袖。


But capturing the leadership of a political party is still easier than being elected US President.	但获得一个政党的领导权仍比当选美国总统容易。


Few people expect Corbyn to win a national election in Britain, either; that is why his parliamentary party is in such despair.	也很少有人预期科尔宾能赢得英国国家大选； 因此，他的议会政党相当地绝望。


So Clinton, despite her so far lackluster campaign, and despite a popular perception of inauthenticity, even outright shiftiness, will probably hang on to her party and scrape through in the end.	因此，尽管克林顿目前选战不利，也被公众认为不真实甚至非常狡诈，但她仍有可能赢得她的政党并最终险胜。


She will prevail not because her views look any more convincing than those of the center-left professional pols of the Labour Party, but because her opponents look so much worse.	她胜出不是因为她的观点比工党中左翼职业政客更加令人信服，而是因为她的反对者比她还要糟糕得多。


Coronary Capitalism	冠状动脉资本主义


FRANKFURT – A systematic and broad failure of regulation is the elephant in the room when it comes to reforming today’s Western capitalism.	法兰克福——说到改革今天的西方资本主义制度，人们一直对监管体系全面性及系统性的失灵故意视而不见。


Yes, much has been said about the unhealthy political-regulatory-financial dynamic that led to the global economy’s heart attack in 2008 (initiating what Carmen Reinhart and I call “The Second Great Contraction”).	的确，导致2008年全球经济心脏病发作的病态政治－监管－金融体制已经引发了众多讨论，上述机制正是引发卡门·莱因哈特和我所谓的“第二次大收缩”的首要因素。


But is the problem unique to the financial industry, or does it exemplify a deeper flaw in Western capitalism?	需要讨论的是，这个问题仅限于金融行业，还是代表了西方资本主义制度更深层次的缺陷？


Consider the food industry, particularly its sometimes-malign influence on nutrition and health.	以食品业为例，该行业有时会给营养和健康目标带来严重的后果。


Obesity rates are soaring around the entire world, though, among large countries, the problem is perhaps most severe in the United States.	肥胖率激增现在已经成为世界性问题，但在大国里以美国最为严重。


According the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, roughly one-third of US adults are obese (indicated by a body mass index above 30).	据美国疾病控制和预防中心统计，约三分之一的美国成年人体型肥胖（即身体质量指数大于30）。


Even more shockingly, more than one in six children and adolescents are obese, a rate that has tripled since 1980.	更令人震惊的是，儿童和青少年的肥胖比例超过六分之一，1980年后青少年的肥胖比例比原来增加了两倍。


(Full disclosure: my spouse produces a television and Web show, called kickinkitchen.tv, aimed at combating childhood obesity.)	（信息披露：我妻子制作了一档名叫kickinkitchen. tv的电视网络节目，目的就是引导儿童战胜肥胖。


Of course, the problems of the food industry have been vigorously highlighted by experts on nutrition and health, including Michael Pollan and David Katz, and certainly by many economists as well.	当然，迈克尔·波林 and 大卫·卡兹等营养健康专家已经极力强调了食品业存在的问题，同样的问题无疑也引起了很多经济学家的关注。


And there are numerous other examples, across a wide variety of goods and services, where one could find similar issues.	各种商品和服务领域其他的类似问题还有很多。


Here, though, I want to focus on the food industry’s link to broader problems with contemporary capitalism (which has certainly facilitated the worldwide obesity explosion), and on why the US political system has devoted remarkably little attention to the issue (though First Lady Michelle Obama has made important efforts to raise awareness).	但这里我只想讨论食品业与现代资本主义制度普遍问题之间的联系，上述联系无疑推动了全球肥胖人数的激增。 我还想讨论美国政治制度为什么对这个问题视而不见（尽管第一夫人米歇尔·奥巴马已经为唤醒人们的认识付出了重要的努力）。


Obesity affects life expectancy in numerous ways, ranging from cardiovascular disease to some types of cancer.	肥胖会在诸多方面影响寿命，其中既包括心血管疾病，也包括某些种类的癌症。


Moreover, obesity – certainly in its morbid manifestations – can affect quality of life.	此外，病态的肥胖可以影响生活质量。


The costs are borne not only by the individual, but also by society – directly, through the health-care system, and indirectly, through lost productivity, for example, and higher transport costs (more jet fuel, larger seats, etc.).	承受肥胖损失的不只是个人，同样也包括社会——承受肥胖损失可以直接通过卫生保健系统，也可以间接通过运输成本增加等生产率损失（如消耗更多航空燃料，座椅加大等）。


But the obesity epidemic hardly looks like a growth killer.	但肥胖的蔓延对经济增长却鲜有坏处。


Highly processed corn-based food products, with lots of chemical additives, are well known to be a major driver of weight gain, but, from a conventional growth-accounting perspective, they are great stuff.	众所周知，精加工的玉米食品及大量添加剂是体重上升的主要推手，但从传统增长核算的角度，它们却是非常好的东西。


Big agriculture gets paid for growing the corn (often subsidized by the government), and the food processors get paid for adding tons of chemicals to create a habit-forming – and thus irresistible – product.	大农业种植玉米并从中获利（通常还能拿到政府补贴），食品加工企业则添加数以吨计的化学品，最终生产的产品让人成瘾，因而也就无法抗拒。 整个链条中，科学家负责找到精确的盐、糖和化学添加剂配比使新发明的速食食品最让人上瘾；


Along the way, scientists get paid for finding just the right mix of salt, sugar, and chemicals to make the latest instant food maximally addictive; advertisers get paid for peddling it; and, in the end, the health-care industry makes a fortune treating the disease that inevitably results.	广告商负责推销； 最后，医疗保健业从治疗不可避免的疾病中赚取大量财富。


Coronary capitalism is fantastic for the stock market, which includes companies in all of these industries.	冠状动脉资本主义是股市的强心剂，股市是上述所有行业企业的云集之所。


Highly processed food is also good for jobs, including high-end employment in research, advertising, and health care.	精加工食品同样有利于创造就业，其中也包括研发、广告和医疗保健等领域的高端就业机会。


So, who could complain?	因此，还有谁会抱怨？


Certainly not politicians, who get re-elected when jobs are plentiful and stock prices are up – and get donations from all of the industries that participate in the production of processed food.	政治家肯定不会，他们因为就业充足、股票上涨而再次当选，而且从参与加工食品生产的所有行业获得捐赠。


Indeed, in the US, politicians who dared to talk about the health, environmental, or sustainability implications of processed food would in many cases find themselves starved of campaign funds.	事实上，胆敢谈论加工食品对健康、环境或可持续发展影响的美国政治家常常会发现自己的竞选捐赠几近枯竭。


True, market forces have spurred innovation, which has continually driven down the price of processed food, even as the price of plain old fruits and vegetables has gone up.	诚然，市场力量推动创新，而创新则不断压低加工食品价格，即使普通水果和蔬菜的价格不断上涨。


That is a fair point, but it overlooks the huge market failure here.	这种说法有一定道理，但却忽略了市场的极度失败。


Consumers are provided with precious little information through schools, libraries, or health campaigns; instead, they are swamped with disinformation through advertising.	学校、图书馆或健康运动为消费者提供了寥寥可数的宝贵信息，但他们却被广告中大量的虚假信息所淹没。


Conditions for children are particularly alarming.	儿童的状况尤其令人担忧。


With few resources for high-quality public television in most countries, children are co-opted by channels paid for by advertisements, including by food industry.	由于多数国家缺乏高质量的公共电视资源，由广告商、包括食品行业赞助的电视频道不约而同地把目标瞄准了儿童。


Beyond disinformation, producers have few incentives to internalize the costs of the environmental damage that they cause.	除去散播虚假信息，生产企业鲜有动力对自己造成的环境损失成本进行内化。


Likewise, consumers have little incentive to internalize the health-care costs of their food choices.	同样，消费者也鲜有动力对自身食品选择所带来的健康成本进行内化。


If our only problems were the food industry causing physical heart attacks and the financial industry facilitating their economic equivalent, that would be bad enough.	即使食品业导致生理心脏病、金融业导致经济心脏病是我们所面临的唯一问题，情况也已经够糟糕了。


But the pathological regulatory-political-economic dynamic that characterizes these industries is far broader.	但已成为上述行业标志的病态监管－政治－经济体制所造成的影响却远比这更加广泛。


We need to develop new and much better institutions to protect society’s long-run interests.	为保护社会的长远利益，我们需要建立新的、更好的制度。


Of course, the balance between consumer sovereignty and paternalism is always delicate.	当然，消费者主权和家长作风间的平衡总是非常微秒。


But we could certainly begin to strike a healthier balance than the one we have by giving the public far better information across a range of platforms, so that people could begin to make more informed consumption choices and political decisions.	但我们可以在一系列领域为公众提供更准确的信息，使人们能开始做出更加明智的消费选择和政治决策，从而增进上述平衡的健康度。


As the full extent of the cover-up was revealed, foreign investors, like GIC Private Limited (Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund), rebelled.	7亿日元亏损。 丑闻的盖子被揭开后，新加坡政府投资公司（GIC Private Limited，新加坡的主权财富基金）等外国投资者反应强���。


Redefining Business Competence	重新定义商业胜任力


DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA – One of the most interesting parts of my job as a business school dean is engaging in candid conversations with leaders across industries.	达拉姆，北卡罗来纳—作为商学院院长，我工作中最有意思的部分之一是与各行业领袖进行直率的对话。


A few years ago, I started hearing a troubling refrain: business leaders are feeling the type of public disdain once reserved for politicians.	几年前，我开始听到令人不安的保留：商业领袖正在感受到此前专属于政客的公众鄙夷。


The problem is one of trust – or lack thereof.	这是个信任问题，或者说信任缺失问题。


The 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer reveals that less than one-fifth of the global public believes that business and government officials will tell the truth when confronted with a difficult issue.	2014年埃德尔曼信任指数（2014 Edelman Trust Barometer）表明只有不到五分之一的全球公众认为商界和政府官员会在面临困难问题时说出真相。


That public sentiment is affecting business worldwide.	这一公众情绪正在影响全球商业。


The Duke University CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey found that nearly 60% of chief financial officers in the United States believe that a lack of public trust has harmed the business environment.	杜克大学《首席财务官》杂志全球商业展望调查（Duke University CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey）发现，近60%的美国首席财务官认为公共信任缺失已经危害到商业环境。


Those percentages are even higher in other parts of the world.	这一百分比在世界其他地区甚至还要高。


Given the constant stream of security and data breaches and allegations of financial manipulation involving some of the world’s most respected banks, who can blame the public for feeling this way?	安全和数据不断泄漏，一些世界最著名银行被指金融操纵，在这样的背景下，不能怪公众有这样的感觉。


Now, more than ever, we need leaders who can regain the public’s trust.	如今，我们比任何时候都需要能重获公共信任的领袖。


To do that, we must redefine what it means to be a competent business leader.	为了实现这一目标，我们必须重新定义什么才是胜任的商业领袖。


Traditionally, society has measured business competence by a person’s intellectual ability to examine problems broadly and deeply.	传统上，社会通过一个人的在考察问题广度和深度方面的知识力（intellectual ability）衡量他的商业胜任力。


But, in order to seize global opportunities today, we need to emphasize a new dimension: the ability to create a shared set of values and foster a culture that embraces those beliefs.	但是，为了在当今世界抓住全球机会，我们需要强调一个新维度：创造共享价值集、打造接受这些信念的文化的能力。


Doing so requires taking three, sometimes uncomfortable, steps.	这样做需要三个有时会让人相当难受的步骤。


First, business leaders must overcome their fear of learning from others.	首先，商业领袖必须克服向他人学习的恐惧。


That sounds simple, but how many executives can admit that they don’t know everything or that they aren’t the smartest person in the room?	这听起来很简单，但有多少高管能够承认他们并非万事通，或者并非房间里最聪明的人？


Many business leaders talk a good game about diversity, but surround themselves with people who are just like them.	许多商业领袖大谈多样化，但只和与自己类似的人混在一起。


Working closely with others who think differently can be scary and frustrating.	与思维不同的人紧密合作是可怕而令人沮丧的。


But the best leaders have the courage to encourage authenticity in both themselves and others.	但最优秀的领袖有勇气鼓励自己和他人变得真实。


Second, embrace the ambition of others.	其次，坦然接受他人的野心。


The downfall of many business leaders in recent years has been greed and selfish ambition.	近几年来，许多商业领袖的坠落都是拜贪婪和自私野心所赐。


Great leaders are other-directed instead of self-focused.	伟大领袖是他人导向（other-directed）的，不会只关注自己。


They adopt a “your success is my success” mentality.	他们采取“你成功就是我成功”思维。


This attitude goes a long way toward developing trust among team members and helps foster strong commitment to a common vision.	这一态度非常有利于团队成员之间形成信任，也有助于为共同目标营造坚强承诺。


It also requires leaders to trust others that they will not abuse the faith placed in them.	它也要求领袖相信他人不会滥用他们获得的信任。


Finally, business leaders must value collaboration – and mean it.	最后，商业领袖必须珍视合作——真心实意地珍视。


Leaders who overcome fear and frustration, embrace the ambition of others, and possess a strong character and sense of purpose are likely to build diverse teams whose members share an identity and common goals but still represent themselves authentically.	克服了恐惧和沮丧、坦然接受他人的野心并且具有强烈的目标感的领袖更有可能构建多样化团队，团队成员共享一个身份，具有共同目标但仍能真实地展现自我。


Research has shown that such teams outperform others, which means that this approach can lead to a tremendous competitive advantage.	研究表明这样的团队表现胜过其他团队，这意味着该方法可以带来巨大的竞争优势，简言之，合作不但重要；


In short, collaboration not only matters; it wins.	还能致胜。


Imagine the immense potential we would have to solve some of the world’s toughest challenges if business leaders adopted this strategy.	想象一下，如果商业领袖采取这一战略，我们就可以在解决当今世界最棘手挑战等方面获得巨大潜力。


Consider the global threat posed by Ebola.	以埃博拉所造成的全球威胁为例。


Efforts are underway to research, manufacture, and distribute experimental drugs that could treat the disease.	人们增在努��研究、制造和分配可能治愈这一疾病的实验药物。


But until now drug companies had largely ignored Ebola, because there appeared to be little profit in developing a drug for populations that could not afford to pay for it.	但到目前为止，制药公司基本没有人关注埃博拉，因为为无力承担药价的人口开发药物无利可图。


The New York Times reported last month that United States officials are planning to scale up the production of one experimental drug, but it is still not likely to meet demand.	《纽约时报》上个月报道说，美国官员正在计划扩大一种实验药物的生产，当仍可能无法满足需求。


If some of the brightest minds in business and health care had found a way to encourage the production of an Ebola drug before the outbreak, thousands of lives might have been saved.	如果商业和医疗界最聪明的脑袋能找到办法在埃博拉爆发前就鼓励生产药物，现在就可以挽救成千上万生命。


The type of leadership that I am advocating poses no threat to a company’s bottom line.	我所宣扬的领导风格不会影响公司利润。


On the contrary, it is the starting point for scaling a business to its full potential.	相反，让企业充分实现潜力只是起点。


As former Procter & Gamble CEO and current US Secretary of Veterans Affairs Bob McDonald is fond of saying, leaders have a responsibility to make sure that their organization can “do well and do good.”	前宝洁公司CEO、现任美国退伍军人事务部长鲍勃·麦克唐纳（Bob McDonald）喜欢说，领袖有责任确保他们的组织“做好事、把事做好。 ”


Business can be the common thread that weaves positive change throughout the world.	商业可以成为给全世界带来积极变化的共同主线。


In order to reach that goal, we need business leaders with the vision, skills, and commitment to make a profit and a difference.	为了达到这一目标，我们需要具备愿景、技能和决心的商业领袖获得盈利、创造不同。


A new standard for business competence that incorporates more than the bottom line will go a long way toward winning back the public’s trust.	不只关注利润的新商业胜任力标准非常有利于赢回公众信任。


Corporate Short-Termism in the Fiscal Cliff’s Shadow	财政悬崖阴影下的企业短期行为


CAMBRIDGE – Economic trends are sometimes more closely related to one another than news reports make them seem.	发自剑桥——经济趋势有时比新闻报道的还要密切相关。


For example, one regularly encounters reports of governments’ financial troubles, like the “fiscal cliff” in the United States and the debt crisis in Europe.	比如，人们经常会看到关于政府财政困难的报道，例如美国的“财政悬崖”以及欧洲债务危机。


And much attention has been devoted, often in nearby opinion pieces, to the view that hyperactive equities markets, particularly in the US and the United Kingdom, push large corporations to focus disproportionately on short-term financial results at the expense of long-term investments in their countries’ economies.	而最近的一些评论文章则聚焦到极度活跃的股票市场之上——尤其是在美国和英国——认为这会促使大型企业过分关注短期财务业绩，并是以牺牲本国经济的长期投资为代价的。


The two are not unconnected.	这两者并不是不相关联的。


And examining that connection provides a good opportunity to assess the weaknesses and ambiguities of the longstanding argument that furiously high-volume stock-market trading shortens corporate time horizons.	一直以来都有观点认为疯狂而巨额的股市交易缩短了企业运营视野，而对上述关联的研究也提供了一个极佳的机会来评估这一观点的弱点和含糊不清之处。


The conventional thinking is that as traders buy and sell corporate stocks more often, they induce corporate managers to plan for shorter and shorter horizons.	传统思维认为随着交易员越来越频繁地买卖股票，他们会诱导企业管理者制定越来越短的运营周期。


If institutional investors refuse to hold stocks for more than a few months, the thinking goes, CEOs’ time horizons for corporate planning must shrink to roughly the same timeframe.	按照这种思路，如果机构投资者拒绝持有股票超过几个月，首席执行官为公司制定的运营时间周期也会缩短到大概同样的范围。


Policymakers in Europe and the US are urged to act on this conventional thinking: Something must be done to insulate CEOs, boards, and managers from the financial markets’ ever-shortening time horizons.	欧洲和美国的政策制定者们都被敦促按照这种常规思维行事：要把首席执行官、董事会和经理人与金融市场越来越短的投资周期隔绝开来。


The UK’s official Kay Review from last July and the European Union’s Green Paper on corporate governance, adopted by the European Parliament earlier this year, diagnose corporate short-termism as a serious problem and point policymakers toward solutions.	今年年初欧洲议会所采纳了去年七月的英国官方约翰·凯评估报告以及欧盟企业治理绿皮书的观点，将企业短期逐利的行为视为严重问题并指出政策制定者应当对此制定解决方案。


American commentators – and, increasingly, US judges – want to insulate CEOs and boards further from their firms’ trading shareholders.	而美国评论员——以及越来越多的法官——都想把企业的首席执行官和董事会与其公司的交易股东进一步隔离开来。


But highlighting short-term trading in stock markets obscures other powerful sources of short-termism in corporate time horizons, such as uncertainty about long-term government fiscal policies on both sides of the Atlantic.	但对股市短期交易的聚焦掩盖了导致企业短期运营行为的其他重大原因，比如对大西洋两岸政府财政政策的不确定。


More important, some corporate short-termism may not be as strong as it is thought to be.	更重要的是，一些企业的短期行为并没有人们想象中那么严重。


Consider, first, the lofty market capitalization of Apple and other tech companies, which belies the depiction of US financial markets as hopelessly short-term-oriented.	首先请考虑，苹果以及其他科技公司的高市值都表明把美国金融市场描述成无可救药的短期导向市场是错误的。


The ability to appreciate the long-term earnings potential of Silicon Valley and firms like Apple, Amazon, and Facebook suggests that more is going on in the US stock market than a relentless focus on short-term financial performance.	对硅谷以及像苹果、亚马逊和Facebook这些公司长期收益潜力的鉴别能力表明美国股市并不只是不顾一切地关注短期财政业绩。


Indeed, the intermittent over-valuation of entire economic sectors – recall the dot-com bubble from a decade ago – indicates that financial markets are often excessively focused on the long term.	确实，对整个经济领域的间歇性高估——回想一下十年前的互联网泡沫——表明金融市场经常会过分关注长期利益。


Many firms during the bubble had no hope of making enough money in the short run to justify their sky-high stock prices.	很多泡沫时代的公司根本不可能在短期内赚足够的钱来证明其高高在上的股票价格。


Moreover, there are ambiguities in the trend lines for stock-holding periods.	此外，股票持有期的趋势线也存在许多不明确之处。


While the overall average length of time for holding a stock has declined, the impact on senior managers is unclear, because the holding period for core institutional investors, like Vanguard and Fidelity, has not changed in the past decade or two from its two- or three-year baseline.	当整体平均持股时间缩短的时候，这对企业高管的影响却是不确定的，因为核心机构投资者——比如美国先锋集团（Vanguard Group）和富达（Fidelity）——的持有时间在过去的十几二十年并没有什么变化，还是保持其2到3年的基线。


Fast program trading pulls the overall holding period average down.	快速交易程序把股票平均持有时间缩短了。


But it’s not as clear as many believe that the holding period for traditional shareholders has shortened greatly – or at all.	但这无法——或者完全不能——证明传统股东持有股票时间就像许多人相信的那样大幅缩短了。


The declining average is partly due to a furiously trading fringe.	平均持有时间的下降在某种程度上源自于疯狂的交易边际。


Excessive short-termism can come from the executive suite as much as from financial markets, especially from CEOs, who in the US have an average tenure of 6-7 years.	过多的短期行为来自金融市场的可能性和来自行政系统的可能性一样大，尤其是公司首席执行官级别，美国企业的这类职位通常有6~7年的任期。


It is fully understandable – and largely supported by empirical evidence – that these CEOs would want good results to occur on their watch, rather than after their successor takes over.	我们完全能理解——而且实验证据也证实了这一点——这些CEO只想公司在自己掌管的时期有良好的表现，而不愿在他们的继任者接管后才有表现良好。


Insulating CEOs and boards further from financial markets may perversely free them to focus even more narrowly on short-term results.	把高管和董事从金融市场进一步隔离开来反而会促使他们更加关注狭隘的短期结果。


In any case, while concern with corporate short-termism has arrived on the US judicial agenda, judges in America (or elsewhere, for that matter) are not well positioned to weigh economic evidence that is far from clear regarding the sources, extent, and even the direction of short-term thinking in large corporations.	无论如何，对企业短期行为的关注已经提到了美国的司法议程，美国的法官(对于这个问题，也许别的地方也是如此）并不能很好的衡量经济证据——这些证据在大公司短期思维的来源，程度，甚至指令方面都不甚清晰。


Other political and administrative institutions are better positioned to determine whether corporate short-termism is a serious problem and what the best solution would be.	而���他政治和行政机构则能更好的判断公司短期行为是否是个严重问题及最好的解决方案是什么。


For example, a so-called Tobin tax on financial transactions is a frequently proposed solution, but it is not a policy solution that could be implemented by corporate-law judges.	比如，一个对金融交易征收的所谓托宾税（Tobin tax）是一个被经常提出的方案，但这并不是一个可以由公司法法官实施的方案。


Finally, firms that become more oriented toward short-term performance may be reacting to their real environment, not to their financial environment.	最后，那些更加倾向于短期业绩表现的公司有可能对它们的真实环境而不是金融环境做出反应。


They may well be adapting to new economic, political, and technological realities, not hiding from the future.	它们也许能很好地适应新的经济、政治和科技现实，而不是逃避未来。


Critics of short-term thinking, like the authors of the Kay Review and the EU Green Paper, ought to consider that economic life has, in fact, become more short term.	短期思维的批评者们，比如约翰·凯评估报告和欧盟绿皮书的作者，都应该考虑到经济周期实际上已经变得更短了。


That brings us to the link between corporate short-termism and weak public finances.	这让我们把企业短期投资和脆弱的公共财政联系起来。


Companies on both sides of the Atlantic could be thrown off course by the US fiscal cliff and the EU sovereign-debt crisis.	大西洋两岸的公司都有可能被美国财政悬崖和欧洲主权债务危机拖离其原来轨道。


If economy-defining government and regulatory policies have become unstable in the short and long term, companies must adjust to that reality.	如果对经济起决定作用的政府和管制政策在短期和长期上都变得不稳定，那企业就必须适应那样的现实。


Similarly, if technological innovation can now transform major industries in a matter of a few years, or even months, long-term investment makes less sense than it did before.	同样地，如果科技创新现在能在短短的几年或者几个月内改变主要的产业，长期投资就不会像过去那样有意义。


Amazon’s lofty price/earnings multiple indicates that investors are not shy about financing its long-term future.	亚马逊超高的市盈率表明投资者并不惮于投资其长期未来。


But does Amazon’s success mean that traditional brick-and-mortar retailers are slackers for not upgrading their stores, or for not building new stores in better locations?	但亚马逊的成功是否就意味着传统实体零售商是一帮不升级其商店或不在更好地段建新店的懒虫？


If investors understand that online distribution is revolutionizing the retail sector, isolating the sector’s CEOs from financial markets would just push more resources into a deteriorating, shrinking business model.	如果投资者能理解在线分销正在彻底改革零售业，那么把零售业的总裁与金融市场隔离开来只会把更多的资源推到一个恶化萎缩的经济模型。


In this sense (and only this sense), short-term thinking that induces change and movement away from obsolete technology – here and throughout the economy – may well facilitate long-term prosperity.	从这种意义上说（也仅仅在这个意义上），引起变化和运动远离过时技术的短期投资——在零售业以及整个经济中——可能会很好地促进长期繁荣。


Corrupting the Fight Against Corruption	破坏反腐斗争


At its recent annual meeting, World Bank officials spoke extensively about corruption.	世界银行的官员在最近的年会上大为谈论腐败问题。


It is an understandable concern: money that the Bank lends to developing countries that ends up in secret bank accounts or finances some contractors’ luxurious lifestyle leaves a country more indebted, not more prosperous.	这一关切可以理解，因为世界银行借给发展中国家的钱最后落在某些秘密帐户上，或者资助了某些承包商奢侈的生活方式，从而令国家更为负债累累，而非更为繁荣。


James Wolfensohn, the Bank’s previous president, and I are widely credited with putting corruption on the Bank’s agenda, against opponents who regarded corruption as a political issue, not an economic one, and thus outside the Bank’s mandate.	世界银行的前任行长沃尔福森和我不顾反对把腐败问题列入该行的议题而广受赞誉。 那些反对者把腐败视为一个政治问题，而非经济问题，因而超出了世界银行的职权范围。


Our research showed systematic relationships between corruption and economic growth, which allowed us to pursue this critical issue.	我们的研究表明，腐败和经济增长之间存在体系上的关系，这一关系使得我们可以探究这一关键问题。


But the World Bank would do well to keep four things in mind as it takes up the fight.	但是，世界银行开始治理腐败之时，应当注意以下四个问题。


First, corruption takes many forms, so a war on corruption has to be fought on many fronts.	首先，腐败形式多样，所以，反腐战争应当在众多的战线开展。


You can’t fight the diversion of small amounts of money by weak and poor countries while ignoring the massive diversion of public resources into private hands of the sort that marked, say, Russia under Boris Yeltsin.	我们无法打击弱小国家转移少量资金而同时忽视将公共资源大规模地转移到私人手中。 叶利钦统治下的俄罗斯就是一个例子。


In some countries, overt corruption occurs primarily through campaign contributions that oblige politicians to repay major donors with favors.	在某些国家，公开的腐败主要通过竞选资助进行。 这些资助让政客们用好处回报主要的捐助者。


Smaller-scale corruption is bad, but systemic corruption of political processes can have even greater costs.	小规模的腐败是坏的，但是政治进程中体制性腐败则会造成更大代价。


Campaign contributions and lobbying that lead to rapid privatizations of utilities – before appropriate regulatory frameworks are in place, and in a manner that produces only a few bidders – can impede development, even without direct kickbacks to government officials.	竞选资助以及院外游说导致共用事业在适当的监管框架到位之前快速私有化，其方式产生仅有的几个竞标者。 因而它们会在甚至没有给政府官员直接回扣的情况下阻碍发展。


Life is never black and white.	生活从来不是泾渭分明。


Just as there is no “one size fits all” policy for economic development, there is no such policy for fighting corruption.	正如没有放之四海而皆准的经济发展政策一样，反腐也没有什么灵丹妙药。


The response to corruption needs to be as complex and variegated as corruption itself.	对付腐败之道应当像腐败本身一样复杂而又形形色色。


Second, it’s fine for the World Bank to deliver anti-corruption sermons.	第二，世界银行布道反腐并无不可。


But policies, procedures, and institutions are what matter.	但是，重要的还是政策、程序以及体制。


In fact, the Bank’s procurement procedures are generally viewed around the world as a model to be admired.	实际上，全世界基本上把世界银行的采购程序视为值得崇拜的典范。


Indeed, some countries with large dollar reserves – hardly in need of World Bank credit – borrowed from the Bank at far higher interest rates than they were getting from the United States, believing that these procedures would help ensure high-quality projects free of corruption and become standard in other areas.	确实，一些拥有大量美元储备的国家根本不需要世界银行的贷款，但也从世行那里用比从美国那里高得多的利息借钱，因为它们相信这些程序会帮助确保高质量的工程不受腐败侵蚀并成为其他领域的标准。


But success in fighting corruption entails more than just good procurement procedures (avoiding, for instance, single-source non-competitive bidding).	但是，反腐的成功需要比良好的采购程序更多的东西(例如，避免单个来源的非竞争性竞标)。


Many other policies and procedures can be enacted that reduce incentives for corruption.	可以颁布许多其他政策和程序来降低腐败的激励。


For example, some tax systems are more corruption-resistant than others, because they curtail the discretionary authority of tax officials.	例如，某些税收制度要比其他的税制更为抗拒腐败，因为它们可以抑制征税人员的自由裁量权。


Third, the World Bank’s primary responsibility is to fight poverty, which means that when it confronts a poor country plagued with corruption, its challenge is to figure out how to ensure that its own money is not tainted and gets to projects and people that need it.	第三，世界银行的主要责任是与贫困作战，这就意味着当它面对一个深受腐败侵蚀的穷国时，它的挑战是找到途径来确保款项不被污染并能够用于需要的工程和人们的上面。


In some cases, this may entail delivering assistance through non-governmental organizations.	在某些情况下，这就会要求通过非政府组织提供援助。


But seldom will it be the case that the best response is simply to walk away.	但是，视而不见很少就是最佳的对应之策。


Finally, while developing countries must take responsibility for rooting out corruption, there is much that the West can do to help.	最后，尽管发展中国家必须承担铲除腐败的责任，西方国家也需要做很多事情。


At a minimum, Western governments and corporations should not be complicit.	至少，西方国家政府和企业不应当串通一气。


Every bribe that is taken has a payer, and too often the bribe payer is a corporation from an advanced industrial country or someone acting on its behalf.	每个行贿总有行贿者，而在很多情况下，行贿者是来自发达工业化国家的企业或其代理人。


Indeed, one reason for the so called “natural resource curse” – the fact that resource-rich countries do not, on average, do as well as resource-poor countries – is the prevalence of corruption, too often aided and abetted by companies that would like to get the resources they sell at discount prices.	确实，所谓的“自然资源诅咒”的其中一个原因就是腐败盛行，而那些希望将其自然资源折价出售的公司则经常助长腐败。 “自然资源诅咒”是指资源丰富的国家一般而言落后于资源贫乏的国家。


The US under President Jimmy Carter made an important contribution in passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which made bribery by American companies anywhere in the world illegal.	美国卡特政府通过反海外腐败法规定美国公司在全球任何地方行贿均为违法，从而做出了重要的贡献。


The OECD’s Convention on Bribery was another step in the right direction.	经合组织反贿赂公约是在正确方向上的另一个步骤。


Making all payments to governments transparent would bring further progress, and Western governments could encourage this simply by tying this requirement to tax deductibility.	让所有给政府的支付透明化将会带来更大的进步，而西方国家政府只要通过把这一要求与税收抵扣捆绑在一起就可以鼓励做到这一点。


It is equally important to address bank secrecy, which facilitates corruption by providing corrupt dictators with a safe haven for their funds.	处理银行保密也同样重要��银行保密通过给腐败的独裁者提供其资金的安全庇护而便利了腐败。


In August 2001, just before the terrorist attacks on America, the US government vetoed an OECD effort to limit secret bank accounts.	2001年8月，美国的恐怖主义攻击前夕，美国政府否决了经合组织限制秘密银行帐户的决议。


While the government has since reversed its stance on bank secrecy for terrorists, it has not done so for corrupt officials.	尽管美国政府从此以后改变了对恐怖份子银行秘密的立场，但是，对于腐败官员还没有这样做。


A strong stand by the World Bank would enhance its credibility in the war on corruption.	世界银行的强硬立场将会提升其在反腐战争中的信誉度。


Those who criticize the Bank’s stance on corruption do not do so because they favor corruption.	那些批评世界银行在腐败问题上的立场的人们并非因为他们赞成腐败才这样做。


Some critics worry about corruption in the corruption agenda itself: that the fight will be used as a “cover” for cutting aid to countries that displease the US administration.	某些批评人士担心反腐议程本身的破坏，那就是，这一斗争将会被用来作为削减令美国政府不悦的国家援助的“借口”。


Such concerns have found resonance in the seeming incongruity of the Bank’s tough talk on corruption and simultaneous plans to expand lending to Iraq.	世行大谈反腐，与此同时计划扩大对伊拉克的贷款看似互不合宜。 这些关切在此找到了共鸣。


No one is likely to certify that Iraq is corruption-free – or even ranks low on corruption internationally.	无人能够证明伊拉克没有腐败，甚至位于国际腐败程度后排。


The most strident criticism, however, comes from those who worry that the World Bank is straying from its mandate.	但是，最为刺耳的批评来自于那些担心世界银行正在偏离其职权范围的人们。


Of course, the Bank must do everything that it can to ensure that its money is well spent, which means fighting both corruption and incompetence.	当然，世行必须竭力确保它的钱用在了实处，也就是既要反腐，也要同不称职做斗争。


But money itself will not solve all problems, and a single-minded focus on fighting corruption will not bring development.	但是，金钱本身并不会解决所有问题，而且，一心一意关注反腐也不会带来发展。


On the contrary, it might merely divert attention from other issues of no less moment for those struggling to lift themselves out of poverty.	相反，这只会把那些奋力摆脱贫困的人们的注意力从其他同样重要的问题上转移开来。


The Impunity Trap	免罚陷阱


NEW YORK – Ours is a world of impunity.	纽约——我们的世界是个不受惩罚的世界。


Allegations of corruption swarmed around FIFA for decades, culminating in indictments of current and former officials last week.	腐败指控围绕国际足联几十年，上周终于以大规模起诉国际足联官员达到高潮。


Yet FIFA President Sepp Blatter was re-elected four times, including after the indictments were filed.	但国际足联主席布拉特却四次当选，最后一次还是在提起诉讼之后。


Yes, Blatter has finally resigned, but only after he and dozens of Federation members once again showed their scorn for honesty and the law.	是的，布拉特最终辞职了，但却是在他和数十名足联官员再次表达了对诚信和法律的蔑视之后。


We see this kind of behavior all over the world.	类似这样的行为遍及全世界。


Consider Wall Street.	比如华尔街。


In 2013 and 2014, JPMorgan Chase paid more than $20 billion in fines for financial malfeasance; yet the CEO took home $20 million in compensation in both 2014 and 2015.	2013年和2014年，摩根大通为金融渎职支付罚金超过200亿美元； 但该公司首席执行官在2014和2015两年依然拿到了2，000万美元的酬劳。


Or consider corruption scandals in Brazil, Spain, and many other countries, where governments remain in power even after high-level corruption within the ruling party has been exposed.	再比如巴西、西班牙和其他许多国家爆出的腐败丑闻，即使在执政党高层腐败丑闻公之于众后政府仍然留在台上。


The ability of those who wield great public and private power to flout the law and ethical norms for personal gain is one of the more glaring manifestations of inequality.	有人能利用巨大的公私权力蔑视法律及伦理规范来谋取私利是不平等最明目张胆的表现。


The poor get life sentences for petty crimes, while bankers who fleece the public of billions get invitations to White House state dinners.	穷人因为轻微的犯罪就被判处无期，而欺诈公众数十亿美元的银行家却应邀出席白宫的国宴。


A famous ditty from medieval England shows that this is not a new phenomenon:	中世纪英国一首著名的小曲表明这种现象自古就有：


The law locks up the man or womanWho steals the goose off the commonBut leaves the greater villain looseWho steals the common from the goose.	法律惩戒从平民那里偷鹅的男女但却让偷盗公众财物坏人逍遥法外


Today’s greatest thieves are those who are stealing the modern commons – raiding government budgets, defiling the natural environment, and preying on the public trust.	今天偷盗现代平民——抢劫政府预算、玷污自然环境、掠夺公众信任者才是最大的窃贼。


When the indictments against the 14 FIFA officials were filed, the cast of characters included not only miscreants from the sports world, but also some familiar players: secret Swiss bank accounts, Cayman Islands tax havens, shell corporations – all of the financial appurtenances that are literally designed to shield the rich from scrutiny and the law.	14名国际足联官员的起诉书所牵扯的不仅是体育界的罪犯，还有某些非常熟悉的机构：瑞士银行秘密账户、开曼群岛避税天堂、空壳公司——以上一切金融附属产业都旨在保护富人免受法律的监督和惩罚。


In this case, the FBI and US Justice Department have done their jobs.	这种情况下，联邦调查局和美国司法部的工作做得非常出色。


But they did so, in part, by penetrating the murky worlds of financial secrecy created and protected by the US Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the US Congress (ever-protective of Caribbean tax havens).	但他们是穿透了由美国财政部、国税局和国会（加勒比海避税天堂的坚定保护者）建设并保护的金融秘密的黑暗世界才达到了这一目标。


In some societies and economic sectors, impunity is now so pervasive that it is viewed as inevitable.	在某些社会和经济部门，有罪不罚现象现在已经泛滥到被认为是不可避免的。


When unethical behavior by political and business leaders becomes widely viewed as “normal,” it then goes unpunished by public opinion, and is reinforced as normal – creating an “impunity trap.”	当政界和商界领袖的不道德行为被普遍视为“正常”，就能避开公众舆论的谴责，并让人们更加见怪不怪、习以为常——“免罚陷阱”也因此形成。


For example, with politicians in the United States now so flagrantly and relentlessly on the take from wealthy donors, much of the public accepts new revelations of financial impropriety (such as the Clinton Foundation’s morally dubious financial dealings) with a cynical yawn.	比方说，因为美国政客现在如此明目张胆、毫无顾忌地接受富人捐款，不少公众在面对新揭露的财务不当行为（比方说克林顿基金会在道德上可疑的金融交易）时仅仅是玩世不恭地打个哈哈。


The situation in the global banking sector is especially alarming.	全球银行业的状况尤其令人担忧。


A recent careful study of ethical attitudes in the financial-services industry in the US and the United Kingdom showed that unethical and illegal behavior is indeed now viewed as pervasive.	最近对美英金融服务业道德态度的一次严肃的调查显示，不道德和非法活动现在的确被视为普遍现象。


Some 47% of respondents said that it is “likely that their competitors have engaged in unethical and illegal activity,” and 23% believed that their fellow employees have engaged in such activities.	大约47％的受访者说“其对手可能从事不道德的非法活动，”还有23%的人认为自己的同事也在这样做。