To be sure, street protests have already had a profound impact on Algeria’s authoritarian politics, with official fears of massive uprisings affecting public budgets and political appointments.	平心而论，街头抗议已经对阿尔及利亚集权政治造成了深远影响，官员担心大规模动乱影响公共预算和政治任命。


But the decision to prolong Bouteflika’s presidency will not provide the kind of strong, transformational leadership that Algeria needs to materialize the regime’s stability promises.	但延长波特弗利卡总统任期的决定并不能给阿尔及利亚带来实现政权的稳定承诺所需要的强大的转型性领导。


The Algerian authorities face a major challenge, because rejection of pluralist institutions makes it more difficult to find negotiating partners.	阿尔及利亚当局面临着巨大的挑战，因为拒绝接受多元制度让它难以找到谈判伙伴。


The more the regime tries to buy off the protesters, the more overweening it appears – and the angrier citizens become.	政权越是试图收买反对者，就会越显出它的自负——人民也就变得越愤怒。


And the enraged younger generation, in particular, is not especially fearful of losing the limited benefits offered by the status quo.	尤其是，愤怒的年轻一代并不特别害怕失去现状给他们带来的那点可怜的好处。


America After the Election	大选后的美国


NEW YORK – The ongoing presidential campaign in the United States stands out for its lack of civility and the vast differences between the candidates: the anti-establishment businessman Donald Trump on the Republican side and the polished politician Hillary Clinton representing the Democrats.	基辅—正在进行中的美国总统选战有两个特点，一是不文明，二是候选人差异巨大：共和党一边是反建制商人唐纳德·特朗普，代表民主党的则是道貌岸然的政客希拉里·克林顿。


The contest has exposed deep fault lines within American society and damaged the country’s global reputation.	这场选战暴露出美国社会内部深刻的断层线，也损害了美国的国际名誉。


No surprise, then, that one of the few things Americans seem to agree on is that the campaign has gone on for too long.	因此，毫不奇怪，一件能让美国人统一意见的极少数事情之一便是这场选战实在是又臭又长。


But soon it will be over.	但它马上就要结束了。


The question is: what comes next?	问题是，接下来会怎样？


Polls suggest that Clinton, a former senator and secretary of state, will defeat the controversial Trump.	民调显示，前参议员、国务卿克林顿将击败饱受争议的特朗普。


But polls are not to be confused with reality.	但不要把民调与现实弄混了。


After all, going into June’s Brexit referendum, most observers believed that a victory for “Remain” was a sure thing.	毕竟，6月份英国举行脱欧公投时，大部分观察家认为“留欧”阵营取得胜利是板上钉钉。


More recently, Colombian voters rejected a peace accord that was widely expected to receive popular approval.	最近则有哥伦比亚人民拒绝和平协议的事件，人们原本广泛预期这一协议会受到热烈欢迎。


All of this is to say that, while a Clinton victory may be likely, it is no certainty.	所有这些表明，尽管克林顿眼看就要取得胜利，但结果仍不确定。


The only poll that counts is the one on November 8.	唯一有意义的民调是11月8日。


Until then, all we can do is speculate.	在此之前，我们只能猜测。


Yet some predictions can be made with greater confidence.	但已经有人做出了信心满满的预测。


There is little doubt that the US will emerge from this election a divided country with a divided government, regardless of who is president or which party has a majority in either chamber of Congress.	几乎毫无疑问，经历了这次选举后，美国将是一个分裂的国家，出现一个分裂的政府，不管谁当总统、哪个党控制国会两院多数。


Neither Democrats nor Republicans will be able to realize their objectives without at least some support from the other.	不管是民主党还是共和党，都无法实现自己的目标，除非得到对方的一定的支持。


But no one should think that the only divide in American politics is between Republicans and Democrats.	但决不能认为美国政治唯一的分歧点就在共和党和民主党。


In fact, splits within the two major parties are just as deep, with large and highly motivated factions pulling each to their respective extremes – Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right.	事实上，两大党内部的分裂同样深刻，规模庞大、斗志昂扬的派系将两党推向各自的极端——民主党左倾，共和党右倾。


This makes compromise on centrist positions all the more difficult to achieve.	这导致在中间立场形成妥协的局面非常难以达成。


The rapid resumption of presidential politics will undermine compromise further.	总统政治的迅速卷土重来将进一步破坏妥协。


If Clinton wins, many Republicans will assume that it was only because of Trump’s flaws, and they will judge her likely to be a one-term president.	如果克林顿获胜，许多共和党人会将全部责任推给特朗普的缺陷，而认为克林顿只能担任一个任期。


A country favoring change, they will conclude, is unlikely to keep a Democrat in the Oval Office for a fourth term.	他们会这样认为：一个喜欢变化的国家不可能让民主党主宰椭圆办公室四个任期。


Many Republicans (especially those who deny the legitimacy of a Clinton victory) will thus seek to frustrate her administration, lest she be able to run again in 2020 as a successful incumbent.	许多共和党人（特别是那些否认克林顿胜利合法性的共和党）将因此寻求对克林顿政府从中作梗，唯恐她在2020年作为成功的在任总统再次竞选。


Similarly, if Trump manages to win, most Democrats (and even some Republicans) will – after recovering from their surprise and dismay – make it their highest priority to ensure that he does not have an opportunity for a second term.	类似地，如果特朗普成功获胜，大部分民主党人（甚至一些共和党人）在从震惊与沮丧中回过神之后将把确保特朗普无法参加第二次竞选作为最高任务。


Given how much of Trump’s agenda his fellow policymakers would likely find objectionable, governing would be very difficult during his administration.	特朗普��策团队所制定的日程必将遭遇重重阻力，在他的任期内，治理国家将非常困难。


In either scenario, it may still be possible to make progress in a few key areas.	不管发生哪个情景，仍有可能在一些关键领域取得进展。


The next US government might manage to enact legislation to fund the modernization of America’s aging infrastructure, a policy that both candidates and many in Congress favor.	下一届美国政府或可以实施立法筹资对美国陈旧的基础设施进行现代化，两位获选人和许多国会议员都支持这样做。


It might also be able to cobble together a majority to reform the US tax code – in particular, lowering the high rate for corporations and raising taxes on the wealthy.	或许也有望凑成多数改革美国税法——特别是降低高昂的公司税率并对富人增税。


There could even be some reform of health care, President Barack Obama’s signature achievement, owing to serious implementation problems with the current system.	甚至还可能会有一些医疗改革，作为奥巴马总统招牌式的成就，当前医疗制度仍存在严重的实施问题。


But other issues requiring cooperation between Congress and the president are unlikely to be addressed any time soon.	但其他要求国会与总统合作的问题绝无可能在短期得到解决。


One is immigration reform, which is as controversial in the US as it is in Europe.	其一是移民改革，这个问题在美国与在欧洲一样存在争议。


Another is trade: because the domestic political environment makes policymakers wary of supporting positions with dedicated opponents, both Trump and Clinton oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even though its ratification would benefit America’s economy and strategic standing.	另一个是贸易：国内政治环境导致决策者害怕支持存在专注的反对者的立场，因此特朗普和克林顿都反对跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP），即使批准该协定有利于美国经济和战略立场。


Meanwhile, America’s deficit and debt are certain to rise, as there seems to be little or no will to reduce entitlement spending.	与此同时，美国的赤字和债务也必将增加，因为根本看不出有削减福利支出的意愿。


The foreign-policy implications of the election are somewhat different, because, under the US Constitution, the president enjoys considerable latitude.	大选的外交政策影响略有不同，因为，根据美国宪法，总统享有相当大的自由度。


While only Congress can officially declare war or ratify treaties, presidents may use (or refuse to use) military force without explicit congressional approval.	只有国会可以正式宣战或批准条约，但总统可以在没有国会明确批准的情况下使用（或拒绝使用）武力。


They can also enter into international agreements other than treaties, appoint powerful White House staff, and change US foreign policy by executive action, as Obama recently did regarding Cuba.	总统还可以签署国际协定而非条约，任命强力白宫官员，以及通过行政动作改变美国外交政策（如奥巴马最近对古巴的动作）。


Under Clinton, this discretion could translate into establishing one or more safe areas in Syria, providing more defensive arms to Ukraine, and taking a tougher line toward North Korea as it continues its nuclear and missile buildup.	如果克林顿当选，这一自由裁量权将带来的是：在叙利亚建立一个或多个安全区； 为乌克兰提供更多防御武器；


It is more difficult to guess what Trump would do.	以及对继续核和导弹实验的朝鲜采取更加强硬的立场。


He is, after all, a political outsider, so no one knows how much of his campaign rhetoric would be translated into policy.	特朗普会怎么做更难猜测。 毕竟，他是政治局外人，因此没人知道他的竞选纲领中有多少会转化为政策。


Still, one could anticipate a Trump administration distancing itself from some traditional allies in Europe and Asia and standing mostly aloof from the Middle East.	但人们可能预测特朗普政府将与某些欧洲和亚洲的传统盟友保持距离，对中东更是敬而远之。


What exactly will happen to America after the presidential election remains an open question.	美国总统大选后究竟会发生什么仍是一个开放性问题。


Though some outcomes can reasonably be expected, the only genuine certainty is that the 96% of the world’s population that does not vote in US elections will feel the effects no less than Americans will.	尽管可以合理地预期到一些结果，但唯一真正确定的是不能在美国总统大选中投票的96%的世界人口都将与美国人一样真切地感受到大选结果的影响。


America and Europe	美国和欧洲


Deeply frustrated by the Bush administration’s policies, many people and governments in Europe hope for a fundamental change in American foreign policy after the upcoming presidential election.	在对布什政府的政策深感挫伤之后，欧洲的许多人和政府都希望在即将进行的总统大选之后，美国的外交政策能有根本性的变化。


But it would take a medium-sized political miracle for these hopes not to be disappointed, and such a miracle will not happen – whoever is elected.	但要这些希望别成为失望，就需要有一场中等规模的政治奇迹，而这样的奇迹将不会发生—不管谁当选。


The Bush administration made numerous foreign-policy blunders with far-reaching consequences.	布什政府在外交政策上屡犯大错，后果深远。


But Bush neither invented American unilateralism nor triggered the transatlantic rift between the United States and Europe.	但布什既没有发明美国的单边主义，也没有造成大西洋两岸欧美之间的裂隙。


To be sure, Bush reinforced both trends, but their real causes lie in objective historical factors, namely America’s being the sole world power since 1989 and Europe’s self-inflicted weakness.	确切地说，布什强化了这两种趋势，但究其原因还在于客观的历史因素，也就是自1989年以来美国在世界上的一家独大和欧洲自作自受的软弱。


As long as America remains the sole world power, the next US President will be neither able nor willing to change the basic framework of America’s foreign policy.	只要美国仍然还是世界唯一的超级大国，下一任美国总统就既不能也不愿改变美国外交政策的基本框架。


It will, of course, be important who wins the presidency: a candidate expected to continue Bush’s foreign policy or someone ready for a new beginning.	当然，谁赢得总统宝座也很重要：是一个会继续布什外交政策的候选人，还是一个准备重新开始的人。


In the former case, the transatlantic rift will deepen dramatically.	如果是前一种情况，欧美之间的裂隙会进一步加深。


Four, or even eight, more years of US policy à la Bush would inflict such damage on the substance of the transatlantic alliance as to threaten its very existence.	4年，甚至8年的“布什式”美国政策的继续会给跨大西洋联盟造成实质性的破坏，甚至危及其生存。


But if America’s next president is committed to a new direction, US foreign policy might again become more multilateral, more focused on international institutions and alliances, and willing to bring the relationship between military force and diplomacy back to within its historical proportions.	但如果美国的下一任总统有志于开拓新方向，那么美国外交政策可能再一次变得更多边化，更关注国际机构和联盟，并愿意将武力和外交的关系重新摆放到其历史的范畴中去。


That is the good news.	那将会是条好消息。


The bad news is that, even under such auspicious conditions, the US, as a world power, will not relinquish its “free-hand” policy or forget its strength and its claim to preeminence among nations.	而坏消息则是，即便在如此祥和的环境下，美国作为世界唯一的超级大国，也不会放弃其“随心所欲”的政策或忘记自身的实力，令其他国家唯其马首是瞻。


Another piece of bad (or good?) news is that a more multilateral American policy will increase the pressure on Europeans to take on more responsibility for international crisis management and conflict resolution – in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and Russia, and with respect to Turkey’s future.	另一个坏（抑或是好？ ）消息是，一种更多边化的美国政策会向欧洲人施加压力，让他们在国际危机管理和冲突解决方面担负起更多的责任—在阿富汗、伊朗、中东、高加索地区和俄罗斯以及与土耳其的未来相关的事务方面。


To this common agenda, the Europeans should add Africa, climate change, and reform of the United Nations and the world trading system.	欧洲人还应该把非洲、气候变化和联合国改革及世界贸易体系写入这一共同议程。


For a long time, Europe has underestimated its weight and importance.	长期以来，欧洲都低估了自己的份量和重要性。


Europe’s geopolitical, economic, and social weight is quite obvious.	它在地缘政治、经济和社会方面的影响力不言自明。


But Europe’s integration of sovereign states’ interests by means of common institutions could also be an example for much of the world.	但欧洲通过共同制度整合主权国家利益的方式也同样为世界其他许多地方做出了榜样。


In particular, the way Europe, in the process of its enlargement, has projected its power to achieve lasting peace across the whole continent, and fostered development by integrating entire economies, states, and societies within its institutional framework, could become a model for shaping a cooperative world order in the twenty-first century.	特别是欧洲在扩大的过程中运用其实力实现整个大陆的持久和平，通过所有经济体、国家和社会在其制度框架内的一体化来促进发展的做法，更可以成为二十一世纪建立合作的国际秩序的样板。


This modern, progressive, and peaceful model is unique and superior to all other currently available approaches to the fundamental questions of political order.	这种现代、进步且和平的模式是独特的，并且优于其它所有现行的、针对政治秩序的根本性问题的众多模式。


But could doesn’t mean will.	但“能够”并不意味着“将要”。


Europe’s global influence is feeble because of its internal quarrels and lack of unity, which render the European Union weak and limit its ability to act.	欧洲全球影响力的虚弱是由于内部纷争和缺乏统一。 这让欧盟也变得软弱，并限制了它的行动能力。


Objectively strong, subjectively infirm – that is how the EU’s present condition can be described.	外强中干—这就是对欧盟现状的最佳描述。


The current moment of American weakness coincides with a substantially changed international political environment, defined largely by the limits of US power, Europe’s ineffectiveness, and the emergence of new global giants like China and India.	美国现时的软弱是与经历了深刻变化的国际政治环境相关的，其特点是美国势力的局限，欧洲的无所作为和中国、印度等新的全球大国的出现。


In light of these developments, does it still make sense to speak of “the West”?	在这样的形势下，再提“西方”还有意义么？


I believe it does, more than ever, because the rift between Europe and America leaves both sides substantially weaker in global terms.	我认为比以往任何时候都有意义，因为欧美之间的裂隙使得双方的实力在全球层面上都大打折扣。


The unilateral overstretching of American power offers a chance for a new beginning in US-European relations.	美国实力的单边过渡延伸给欧美关系的新起点提供了机会。


America, more than in the past, will depend on strong partners and will seek such partnerships.	美国比以往更需要强大的伙伴，也会寻求这样的伙伴关系。


So what are the Europeans waiting for?	既然如此，欧洲人还在等待什么？


Why not start now to overcome the traditional tension between NATO and the EU – especially as French policy toward NATO under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been moving in the right direction?	为什么不从现在就开始改变北约与欧盟之间传统的紧张局面—特别是在萨科奇总统主持下的法国对北约的政策正向着正确方向发展的情况下？


A regular mutual presence of the Secretary General of NATO and of the head of EU foreign policy in the councils of both organizations doesn’t require much time and effort.	让北约的秘书长和欧盟外交政策的领导人定期相互出席对方组织相关委员会的会议并不需要花多少时间和精力。


Why not initiate EU-US consultations at a high political level (with the Secretary-General of NATO participating in security matters) – for instance, by inviting the US Secretary of State and other members of the administration, such as the Treasury Secretary or the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to sit several times a year on the appropriate EU Council meetings?	何不开启欧盟—美国的高政治级别（北约秘书��参与到安全事务中）协商—例如，邀请美国国务卿和其他政府官员，如财政部长或环保部门首长每年出席几次欧盟相关委员会的会议呢？


Why not have routine annual meetings between the European Council and the US President?	为什么不建立欧盟委员会和美国总统之间每年定期会晤的机制呢？


Periodic meetings between the appropriate committees of the US Congress and the European Parliament would also be of great importance, as ultimately both bodies will have to ratify any international treaties.	美国国会和欧洲议会的相关委员会之间的定期会晤也会十分重要，因为任何国际条约都要经过这两个机构的批准。


The fate of the Kyoto Protocol should be a lesson to all parties involved.	《京都议定书》的命运对相关各方都应该是个教训。


No such US-EU consultations would require any new agreements, so they could start without any further preliminaries.	如此的美国—欧盟协商机制不需要任何新的协议，因此完全可以马上付诸实施。


There is one certainty that Europeans can take home from the US election campaign even today: with a more multilaterally oriented US foreign policy, Europe won’t be riding comfortably in the US world-political slipstream much longer.	就算在今天，欧洲人也能从美国总统竞选中明确地看到一点：随着美国外交政策更加以多边化为导向，欧洲在美国的世界政治滑流中怡然而行的日子不会长久了。


And that is a good thing.	这是件好事。


The new transatlantic formula must be greater say in decision-making in exchange for a greater share of responsibility.	新的跨大西洋关系必须在决策方面拥有更大的发言权以换取更多的责任。


America at Stall Speed?	失速的美国？


NEWPORT BEACH – Judging from the skittishness of both markets and “consensus expectations,” the United States’ economic prospects are confusing.	纽波特海滩——从市场和“一致预期”的变幻莫测判断，人们对美国经济前景仍是一片茫然。


One day, the country is on the brink of a double-dip recession; the next, it is on the verge of a turbo-charged recovery, powered by resilient consumers and US multinationals starting to deploy, at long last, their massive cash reserves.	今天眼看着美国就要掉下二次探底的悬崖了； 过了一晚，受消费回弹刺激和美国跨国公司终于开始着手使用手里的大把现金储备，看上去高速复苏又近在眼前了。


In the process, markets take investors on a wild rollercoaster ride, with the European crisis (riddled with even more confusion and volatility) serving to aggravate their queasiness.	在市场的左右摇摆之间，投资者仿佛坐上了过山车，而欧洲危机（更令人困惑、更大起大落）进一步加剧了乘客的头晕反应。


This situation is both understandable and increasingly unsettling for America’s well-being and that of the global economy.	这一情形不难理解，却也加剧了美国和全球经济的不安。


It reflects the impact of fundamental (and historic) economic and financial re-alignments, insufficient policy responses, and system-wide rigidities that frustrate structural change.	这反映了基础性（和历史性）经济和财政再联盟、政策应对不力、以及让结构变革陷入停顿的系统性僵化所产生的后果。


As a result, there are now legitimate questions about the underlying functioning of the US economy and, therefore, its evolution in the months and years ahead.	结果，人们对美国经济的基础功能及其在未来数月和数年的发展动向提出了合理质疑。


One way to understand current conditions – and what is needed to improve them – is to consider two events that recently attracted considerable worldwide attention: the launch of Boeing’s Dreamliner passenger jet and the tragic death of Apple’s Steve Jobs.	一种理解当前形势——以及如何改进——的办法是思考两件引起世界范围大关注的事件：波音梦幻客机的发布以及苹果公司的乔布斯去世的噩耗。


Let us start with some simple aeronautic dynamics, using an analogy that my PIMCO colleague, Bill Gross, came up with to describe the economic risks facing the American economy.	让我们从一些简单的航空动力学开始，用我的太平洋投资公司（PIMCO）同事格罗斯（Bill Gross）所做的比方来描述美国经济所面临的经济风险。


For the Dreamliner to take off, ascend, and maintain a steady altitude, it must do more than move forward.	梦幻客机想要起飞、升空然后维持稳定高度，光是向前运动是不够的。


It has to move forward fast enough to exceed critical physical thresholds, which are significantly higher than those for most of Boeing’s other (smaller) planes.	它必须向前运动得足够快，超过某个物理临界阈值——远高于绝大部分波音其他型号（体型更小）的飞机。


Failure would mean succumbing to a mid-air stall, with tepid forward motion giving way to a sudden loss of altitude.	失败意味着空中停车、降速因而导致高度突降。


Unless we are convinced of the Dreamliner’s ability to avoid stall speed, it makes no sense to talk about all the ways in which it will enhance the travel experience for millions of people around the world.	除非我们确信梦幻客机有能力避免失速，否则大谈能如何改进全球数百万乘客的旅行体验纯属空中楼阁。


America’s economy today risks stall speed.	美国经济如今就面临着失速风险。


Specifically, the question is not whether it can grow, but whether it can grow fast enough to propel a large economy that, according to the US Federal Reserve, faces “balance-sheet deleveraging, credit constraints, and household and business uncertainty about the economic outlook.”	具体而言，问题不在于是否增长，而在于增长是否足够快，足以驱动一个面临着“资产负债表去杠杆化、信贷约束以及家庭和企业对经济前景充满狐疑”（美联储语）的大型经济。


And, remember, it is just over a year since certain US officials were proclaiming the economy’s “summer of recovery” – a view underpinned by the erroneous belief that America was reaching “escape velocity.”	还有，不要忘了，仅仅是一年前，一些美国官员信誓旦旦地宣称美国经济已经步入了“复苏之夏”，而这一观点还得到了美国正在达到“逃逸速度”的错误信念的支持。


Stall speed is a terrifying risk for an economy like that of the US, which desperately needs to grow robustly.	失速对于像美国这样的极度需要稳健增长的经济体来说具有很高风险。


Without rapid growth, there is no way to reverse persistently high and increasingly structural (and therefore protracted) unemployment; safely de-leverage over-indebted balance sheets; and prevent already-disturbing income and wealth inequalities from growing worse.	没有快速增长就无法逆转持续且越来越倒向结构性（从而会更加难以根除）的事业趋势，无法实现过度负债的资产负债表的安全去杠杆化，无法防止已然恶化的收入和财富不平等雪上加霜。


The private sector alone cannot and will not counter the risk of stall speed.	私人部门无法也不会单独抵挡失速风险。


What is desperately needed is better policymaking.	当前急需的是更好的决策。


Specifically, policymakers must be open and willing to understand the unusual challenges facing the US economy, react accordingly, and possess sufficiently potent policy instruments.	具体而言，决策者应该开诚布公，并愿意厘清美国经济所面临的非常规挑战，做出相应的反应，同时掌握充分的有效政策工具。


Unfortunately, this has been far from the case in America (and in Europe, where the situation is worse).	不幸的是，美国（以及欧洲，那里的情况比美国还遭）的现状离这一步还差得很远。


Moreover, US policymakers in the last few weeks have been more interested in pointing fingers at Europe and China than in recognizing and responding to the paradigm shifts that are at the root of the country’s economic problems and mounting social challenges.	此外，最近数周，美国决策者对向欧洲和中国指手画脚更感兴趣，而没有把精力放在识别和应对范式变化上，而范式变化才是美国经济问题和社会挑战日渐艰巨的根源。


This is where the insights of Steve Jobs, one of the world’s best innovators and entrepreneurs, come in.	这正是史蒂夫·乔布斯——全世界最好的创新者和企业家——的洞见的闪光之处。


Jobs did more than navigate paradigm shifts; he essentially created them.	乔布斯不但引导着范式的变化方向； 事实上，他创造着范式。


He was a master at converting the complicated into the simple; and, rather than being paralyzed by complexity, he found new ways to deconstruct and overcome it.	他是化繁为简的一代宗师； 他不但没有陷入复杂性的漩涡中无法走出，反而发现了重建和克服复杂性之路。


Teamwork was an obligation, not a choice.	团队合作是一种义务，而不是一种选择。


And he eschewed the search for the single “big bang” in favor of aiming for multiple breakthroughs.	他并没有寻求单一的“大爆炸”，而是以各个击破为目标。


Underlying it all was a willingness to evolve – a drive for perfection through experimentation.	归根到底，这来自于渐近——用实验为推动力一步步迈向完美——的意愿。


Moreover, he excelled at selling to audiences worldwide both his vision and his strategy for realizing it.	此外，他还擅长向全世界信徒兜售自己的新愿景及其实现战略。


So far, America’s economic policymakers have fallen short on all of these fronts.	到目前为止，美国经济决策者在这方面已经大大落后了。


Rather than committing to a comprehensive set of urgently-needed reinforcing measures, they seem obsessed with the futile search for the one “killer app” that will solve all of the country's economic problems.	他们并没有承诺给出一整套急需的强化措施，而是沉溺于徒劳地寻求“大杀器”来一次性解决美���的所有经济问题。


No surprise that they have yet to find it.	结果呢？ 当然是一无所获。


Teamwork has repeatedly fallen hostage to turf wars and political bickering.	团队合作经常会沦为山头林立和政治扯皮。


Little has been done to deconstruct structural complexity, let alone win sufficient public support for a medium-term vision, a credible implementation strategy, and a set of measures that is adequate to the task at hand.	目前，我们连解构复杂性的努力都没有拿出来，更不用说赢得公众对某个中期愿景、某个可信实施战略以及一揽子足以应付手头问题的措施的支持了。


The longer the policymaking impasse persists, the greater the stall-speed risk for an economy that already has an unemployment crisis, a large budget deficit, many underwater mortgages, and policy interest rates floored at zero.	决策僵局多持续一日，美国经济——已经陷入了失业危机、大规模财政赤字和大量资不抵债按揭贷款泥淖，同时政策利率已经下降到零水平——的失速风险就放大一分。


This is an atmosphere in which unhealthy balance sheets come under even greater pressure, and healthy investors refuse to engage.	着这样的环境下，不健康的资产负债表将进一步承受更大的压力，而健康的投资者则拒绝赶这趟浑水。


In the process, the risk of recession remains uncomfortably high, the unemployment crisis deepens, and inequities rise as already-stretched social safety nets prove even more porous.	随之而来的是，衰退风险将继续阴魂不散，失业危机将继续深化，而不平等性将随着已然千疮百孔的社会安全网的进一步损坏而继续提高。


America, China, and the Productivity Paradox	美国、中国和生产率悖论


NEW HAVEN – In the late 1980s, there was intense debate about the so-called productivity paradox – when massive investments in information technology (IT) were not delivering measureable productivity improvements.	纽黑文—20世纪80年代末，有一个所谓的生产率悖论的激烈争论——信息技术的大规模投资并没有带来可测的生产率改进。


That paradox is now back, posing a problem for both the United States and China – one that may well come up in their annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue.	如今，这一悖论卷土重来，给美国和中国造成了一个问题，一个将在一年一度的中美战略和经济对话中出现的问题。


Back in 1987, Nobel laureate Robert Solow famously quipped, “You can see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics.”	让我们回到1987年。 这一年，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛（Robert Solow）提出了他的著名讽刺：“计算机时代随处可见，就是无法在生产率数字中找到踪迹。


The productivity paradox seemed to be resolved in the 1990s, when America experienced a spectacular productivity renaissance.	”生产率悖论似乎在20世纪90年代得到了解决，当时，美国出现了蔚为壮观的生产率复兴。


Average annual productivity growth in the country’s nonfarm business sector accelerated to 2.5% from 1991 to 2007, from the 1.5% trend in the preceding 15 years.	1991—2007年美国非农商业部门生产率年增长率为2. 5%，而此前15年的趋势值为1.


The benefits of the Internet Age had finally materialized.	5%。 互联网时代的好处终于实现了。


Concern about the paradox all but vanished.	关于生产率悖论的关注也烟消云散。


But the celebration appears to have been premature.	但人们似乎高兴得太早了。


Despite another technological revolution, productivity growth is slumping again.	尽管经历了又一次技术革命，但生产率增长再次下降。


And this time the downturn is global in scope, affecting the world’s two largest economies, the US and China, most of all.	这一回，生产率下降是全球趋势，影响最大的正是世界最大的两个经济体——美国和中国。


Over the past five years, from 2010 to 2014, annual US productivity growth has fallen to an average of 0.9%.	在过去五年中（2010—2014年），美国生产率平均年增长率下降到0. 9%。


It actually fell at a 2.6% annual rate in the two most recent quarters (in late 2014 and early 2015).	实际上，在最近两个季度中（2014年底和2015年初），生产率以2.


Barring a major data revision, America’s productivity renaissance seems to have run into serious trouble.	6%的年率降低。 除非有重大数据修正，否则美国生产率复兴已经陷入了大麻烦。


China is witnessing a similar pattern.	中国也经历了类似的过程。


Although the government does not publish regular productivity statistics, there is no mistaking the problem: Overall urban employment growth has been steady, at around 13.2 million workers per year since 2013 – well in excess of the government’s targeted growth rate of ten million.	尽管政府并不定期公布生产率数字，但问题已经显而易见：城镇总体就业增长十分稳定，自2013年一直保持在每年1,320万人——远超政府目标增长率一千万人。


Moreover, hiring seems to be holding at that brisk pace in early 2015.	而在2015年初，雇用活动似乎继续维持着这一强势。


At the same time, output growth has slowed from the 10% trend of the 33 years ending in 2011 to around 7% today.	与此同时，产出增长从33年（截至2011年底）来的趋势率10%下降到如今的7%。


That downshift, in the face of sustained rapid job creation, implies an unmistakable deceleration of productivity.	这一降幅是在持续高速就业创造的背景下发生的，表明生产率必定在减速。


Therein lies the latest paradox.	最新的悖论就在这里。


With revolutionary technologies now driving the creation of new markets (digital media and computerized wearables), services (energy management and DNA sequencing), products (smartphones and robotics), and technology companies (Alibaba and Apple), surely productivity growth must be surging.	革命性技术正在创造新的市场（数字媒体和计算机化可穿戴设备）、服务（能源管理和DNA测序）、产品（智能手机和机器人）和高科技公司（阿里巴巴和苹果），毫无疑问生产率增长应该高歌猛进。


As a modern-day Solow might say, the ���Internet of Everything” is everywhere except in the productivity statistics.	当代索洛也许会说，“万物联网”随处可见，就是无法在生产率数字中找到踪迹。


But is there really a paradox?	但这真是一个悖论吗？


Northwestern University’s Robert Gordon has argued that IT- and Internet-led innovations like automated high-speed data processing and e-commerce pale in comparison to the breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution, including the steam engine, electricity, and indoor plumbing.	西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）指出，信息技术和互联网引领的创新，如自动化高速数据处理和电子商务等，与包括蒸汽机、电力和自来水的工业革命相比根本不值一提。


He maintains that, although these innovations led to dramatic transformations of the major advanced economies – such as higher female labor-force participation, increased transportation speed, urbanization, and normalized temperature control – these changes will be extremely hard to replicate.	他认为，尽管这些创新给主要发达经济体带来了巨大的变化——比如更高的女性劳动力参与率、交通速度的提高、城市化以及标准化温度控制——但这些变化极其难以复制。


Indeed, as taken with today’s revolutionary technologies as we are – I say this staring at my sleek new Apple Watch – I am sympathetic to Gordon’s argument.	事实上，今天的革命性技术令我沉迷——写下这句话的时候，我一边看着我崭新的苹果手表——但我对戈登的观点深有共鸣。


If US productivity figures are to be taken at anything close to face value – a persistently sluggish trend interrupted by a 16-year spurt that now appears to have faded – it is possible that all America has accomplished are transitional efficiency improvements associated with the IT-enabled shift from one technology platform to another.	如果美国生产率数据确实如其所表现的那样——一个长期萎靡的趋势被一个为期16年的涨势打破，而如今这一涨势已经消失——那么有可能美国所取得的所有成就只是信息技术所驱动的、发生在从一个技术平台转移到另一个技术平台期间的过渡性的效率改进。


Optimists maintain that the official statistics fail to capture marked quality-of-life improvements, which may be true, especially in the light of promising advances in biotechnology and online education.	乐观派认为官方数字没有体现生活质量的显著改善，也许确实如此，特别是考虑到生物技术和在线教育等重大突破时。


But this overlooks a much more important aspect of the productivity-measurement critique: the undercounting of work time associated with the widespread use of portable information appliances.	但这忽视了生产率衡量手段批评的另一个重要得多的角度：便携式信息设备的普及所带来的工作时间的低估。


In the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the length of the average workweek has held steady at about 34 hours since the advent of the Internet two decades ago.	在美国，据劳动统计局（Bureau of Labor Statistics）估算，平均工作周时长自二十年前互联网出现以来一直保持在34小时左右。


Yet nothing could be further from the truth: knowledge workers continually toil outside the traditional office, checking their email, updating spreadsheets, writing reports, and engaging in collective brainstorming.	但这与现实相去甚远：知识工人日益在传统办公室之外埋头苦干，检查邮件、更新报表、撰写报告、参与集体头脑风暴。


Indeed, white-collar knowledge workers – that is, most workers in advanced economies – are now tethered to their workplaces essentially 24 hours a day, seven days a week, a reality that is not reflected in the official statistics.	事实上，白领知识工人——即发达经济体的大部分工人——如今需要每天24小时、每周七天随时待命，这完全没有体现在官方数字中。


Productivity growth is not about working longer; it is about generating more output per unit of labor input.	生产率并不是工作时间更长； 而是关乎单位劳动投入产生更多产出。


Any undercounting of output pales in comparison with the IT-assisted undercounting of working hours.	产出的低估与信息技术所导致的工作时长低估相比不值一提。


China’s productivity slowdown is probably more benign.	中国生产率减速的情况也许不如美国严重。


It is an outgrowth of the Chinese economy’s nascent structural transformation from capital-intensive manufacturing to labor-intensive services.	它是中国经济从资本密集型制造业向劳动密集型服务业的方兴未艾的结构转型的副产品。


Indeed, it was only in 2013 that services supplanted manufacturing and construction as the economy’s largest sector.	事实上，直到2013年，服务业才超过之熬夜和建筑业，成为中国经济最大的部门。


Now the gap is widening, and that is likely to continue.	如今，差距正在扩大，并且这一趋势可能会继续下去。


With Chinese services requiring about 30% more workers per unit of output than manufacturing and construction, combined, the economy’s structural rebalancing is now shifting growth to China’s lower-productivity services sector.	中国服务业每单位产出所需要的工人数量比制造业和建筑业加起来还要多30%，因此中国经济的结构性再平衡正在让增长转移到生产率更低的服务业上。


China has time before this becomes a problem.	在这一转变成为问题之前，中国还有充足的时间。


As Gordon notes, there have been long-lasting productivity dividends associated with urbanization – a trend that could continue for at least another decade in China.	戈登指出，城市化会带来长期持续的生产率红利——在中国，这一红利至少还可以维持十年。


But there will come a time when this tailwind subsides and China begins to converge on the so-called frontier of the advanced economies.	但这股顺风终有停止的一天，而中国也将开始想所谓的发达经济前沿靠拢。


At that point, China will face the same productivity challenges that confront America and others.	到了那一步，中国将面临美国和其他国家所面临的相同的生产率挑战。


Chinese policymakers’ new focus on innovation-led growth seems to recognize this risk.	中国决策者将创新驱动型增长作为新的重点，这表明他们认识到了这一风险。


Without powerful innovations, sustaining productivity growth will be an uphill battle.	没有强大的创新，维持生产率增长将十分困难。


China’s recent shift to a slower-productivity trajectory is an early warning of what may well be one of its most daunting economic challenges.	中国最近的生产率下降趋势是一个早期信号，它将成为中国最艰巨的经济挑战之一。


There is no escaping the key role that productivity growth plays in any country’s economic performance.	生产率增长是一国经济表现的决定性因素，古今中外概莫能外。


Yet, for advanced economies, periods of sustained rapid productivity growth have been the exception, not the rule.	但是，对发达经济体而言，持续高速生产率增长已经成为例外而非常规。


Recent signs of slowing productivity growth in both the US and China underscore this reality.	最近出现的中美两国生产率增长齐降现象凸显出这一现实。


For a world flirting with secular stagnation, that is disturbing news, to say the least.	对于陷入长期停滞的世界来说，这是个令人心烦的消息。


A New Blueprint for US-China Relations	美中关系新蓝图


NEW YORK – In the coming decades, nothing will matter more for global peace, prosperity, and governance than how the United States and China handle the ongoing shift in their relative power.	纽约—在未来几十年中，美国和中国如何应对两国相对实力的不断变化将是影响全球和平、繁荣和治理的最重要的因素。


In the long term, today’s other pressing challenges – including Russia’s relationship with the West and events in the tumultuous Middle East – will amount almost to sideshows by comparison.	从长期看，目前的其他紧迫挑战——包括俄罗斯与西方的关系以及动荡的中东的各种事件——相比之下只能等而下之。


What makes the Sino-American relationship dangerous is that powerful forces in both countries seem intent on a collision course.	让中美关系变得危险的是两国的强大力量似乎决定要来一个碰撞。


On the Chinese side, under Xi Jinping’s assertive leadership, the government is no longer heeding Deng Xiaoping’s injunction that the country should “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” in international affairs.	中国在习近平的强势领导下，政府不再遵循邓小平在国际事务上“韬光养晦，等待时机，永远不要当头”的遗训。


It has pursued manifestly expansionist territorial claims, most notably in the South China Sea, and shown a clear determination to resist the indefinite continuation of American dominance in the region.	中国开始公然追求扩张主义领土主张，特别是在南海，并明确表现出反对美国在该地区无限期主导的决心。


The prevailing Chinese mindset is that the US is intent on isolating, containing, and undermining it.	中国人普遍认为，美国想要孤立、遏制和破坏中国。


Unhappily, there is plenty of evidence on the US side to feed that sentiment.	令人不快的是，美国方面的诸多证据催生了这一情绪。


Whatever many American policymakers may be saying in private, their public discourse almost invariably reflects an intention to remain the world’s dominant power – and specifically in Asia – in perpetuity.	不管美国决策者私下里怎么说，他们在公开场合几乎无一例外地表示要永远保持美国的世界主宰力——特别是在亚洲。


The most confrontational recent articulation of this position can be found in a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, by Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, arguing that the central objective of American grand strategy must be “preserving US primacy in the global system,” and urging a series of aggressive economic, political, and military measures to “balance” China.	这一立场最近的最具冲突性的表现莫过于罗伯特·布莱克维尔（Robert Blackwill）和阿什利·泰利斯（Ashley Tellis）撰写的外交关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）报告。 该报告认为，美国大战略的核心目标必须是“保持美国在全球体系中的超然地位，”并敦促美国政府采取一系列进攻性经济、政治和军事手段以“制衡”中国。


They say this is not a “containment” strategy, but it amounts to nothing less.	他们说，这不是“遏制”战略，但其程度绝不下于遏制。


Is there another way to manage the relationship that, while reflecting the reality of these forces and mindsets on both sides, would not risk turning legitimate competition into dangerous confrontation?	有没有另一种处理办法，既能反映双方的这些力量和思维的现实，又不会让合理竞争演变为危险的冲突？


In a new report for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kevin Rudd, former Australian Prime Minister and now head of the Asia Society Policy Institute, outlines just such a strategy, which he calls “constructive realism”.	在哈佛大学肯尼迪学院贝尔福尔科学和国际关系中心（Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs）的一份 新报告中，前澳大利亚总理、现任亚洲社会政策研究所（Asia Society Policy Institute）的陆克文（Kevin Rudd）提出了这样一个战略，他称之为“建设性现实主义”。


It’s a clunky label, but his analysis and policy prescriptions are compelling.	这是一个笨重的主题，但他的分析和政策建议极具说服力。


The “realist” dimension of Rudd’s argument recognizes that certain areas of disagreement – including Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, US alliances in Asia, Chinese military modernization, and the legitimacy of China’s political system – will remain intractable for the foreseeable future.	陆克文观点的“现实主义”维度承认，分歧的某些方面——包括台湾问题、南海和东海领土纠纷、美国的亚洲盟友、中国军事现代化和中国政治制度合法性等——在可预见的未来仍然非常棘手。


They will defy easy solutions – and thus will require very careful management.	这意味着不可能有容易的解决方案——因此需要非常谨慎的管理。


The “constructive” part of Rudd’s thesis argues for systematic collaboration – with the US treating China more as an equal – in tackling a series of other difficult issues at bilateral, regional, and global levels.	陆克文报告的“建设性”部分提出，在处理双边、地区和全球层面上的一系列其他难题是，可以进行系统协作——美国更应该将中国视为平等的对手。


Bilaterally, such cooperation might involve an investment treaty, a joint intelligence task force on terrorism, a cyber-security protocol, agreed measures for managing unplanned military incidents, and mutual ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.	就双边情形而论，这类合作可以包括投资条约、联合反恐情报特勤组、网络安全协议、一致的意料外军事事故管理办法、互相批准全面禁止核武器条约（Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty）等。


On a regional level, Rudd argues, the US and China could work on joint strategies to denuclearize and, ultimately, reunify the Korean Peninsula; tackle the lingering sore of Japan’s war history; harmonize regional trade agreements; and transform the East Asia Summit into a more complete Asia-Pacific Community.	在地区层面，陆克文指出，美国和中国可以致力于制定联合战略，以促进朝鲜半岛的去核化以及最终重新统一、处理长期悬而未决的日本战争史问题、协调地区贸易协议、将东亚峰会办成更全面的亚太共同体等。


Globally, Rudd believes that the joint agenda could focus on combating climate change, revitalizing the G-20, further internationalizing the renminbi; giving China a greater role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and reforming other key international institutions within the UN system.	就全球层面而论，陆克文认为中美联合日程应该着重于抵抗气候变化、提振G-20、人民币的进一步国际化、给予中国在国际货币基金组织和世界银行更重要的角色、在联合国体系内改革其他重要国际机构等。


Some in the West – including veteran China watcher David Shambaugh – remain convinced that this kind of collaborative accommodation will not be necessary, because failures of economic and political management will bring about China’s implosion.	一些西方人——包括老牌中国观察家沈大伟（David Shambaugh）——仍认为这类协作性适应（collaborative accommodation）并非必须，因为经济和政治管理的失败将让中国从内部崩溃。


Rudd argues that they are wrong, and that Xi will neither overplay his authoritarian hand nor under-deliver on growth.	陆克文认为这些人是错误的，习近平不会过度使用极权措施，也不会让增长大幅降低。


China’s rise will continue, and the world – including the US – will have to find principled ways of peacefully accommodating it.	中国将继续崛起，而世界——包括美国——必须找到和平适应这一变化的原则性方法。


Rudd’s recommendations are undoubtedly ambitious.	陆克文的建议毫无疑问是宏大的。


But, given his credentials – he is a formidable Chinese linguist and creative policy thinker, with long and close personal relationships with key figures in both the US and China – his argument must be taken seriously.	但是，凭他的资质——他精通汉语，又是建设性政策思想家，与美国和中国的重要人物有着长期紧密的个人关系——他的观点必须认真对待。


Indeed, though Rudd’s tenure as Australia’s prime minister was anything but smooth, his sheer force of intellect is unmatched by that of any public figure with whom I have interacted over the last 30 years.	事实上，尽管陆克文的澳大利亚总理生涯一点都不平坦，但他的过人智力是我在过去30年里打过交道的所有公共人物中首屈一指的。


(Not that this will much help his evident willingness to be drafted as the next UN Secretary-General: in that role the major powers have always preferred bland secretaries to creative generals.)	（这未必大大有助于他显而易见的争取成为下一任联合国秘书长的意愿：对于这个职位，主要大国永远更喜欢平庸温和的秘书，而不是有创造力的统帅。 ）


No American presidential candidate is likely to be comfortable talking about the US as anything other than Number One.	美国总统候选人绝不可能踌躇满志地大谈美国不再是第一名。


But we must hope that in the years ahead we hear less talk of “primacy” and “dominance” and much more about cooperation and collaboration.	但是，在未来几年中，但愿我们可以少听到一些“超然”、“主宰”，多听到一些合作和协作。


It is only with such US policies toward China that the world can begin to be confident that the twenty-first century will not, like the last, become a vale of tears.	只有这样的美国对华政策可以让世界有信心二十一世纪不会重蹈二十世纪泪流成河的覆辙。


America Confronts Old and New Europe	美国面对的新旧欧洲


US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's petulant remark of last year about "old and new Europe" was right for the wrong reasons.	美国国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲费尔德去年有关"新旧欧洲"的胡言乱语刚好歪打正着。


He meant it to refer to Europe's divisions, but in May, ten additional states joined the European Union.	他本来是指欧洲的分裂，但今年5月，又有10个国家纳入了欧洲联盟。


The expanded Europe truly forms a new Europe.	扩张后的欧洲真的成了新欧洲。


Should America be nervous?	这是否令美国感到不安？


Fifty-four years after the announcement of the Schuman Plan that began to knit together the economies of France and Germany, the EU now has 25 countries and a population larger than that of the United States.	联结法德两国经济的舒曼计划颁布54年后的今天，欧盟已有25个成员国，人口数甚至超过了美国。


Eight of the new members are former Communist countries that were locked behind the Iron Curtain for nearly half a century.	其中8个新成员为前共产党国家，近半个世纪来他们被铁幕重重封锁。


Their attraction to the Union is a sign of the appeal - the "soft power" - of the idea of European unification.	它们加入欧盟表明了欧洲统一理念"软性力量"所具有的强大生命力。


Of course, this new Europe faces many problems.	勿庸置疑，这个新欧洲面临着巨大的挑战。


The per capita income of the new countries is less than half of that of the fifteen members they are joining. Concerns have been raised about the influx of cheap labor.	新成员的人均生产总值还不到原有15个国家的一半，廉价劳动力的大量涌入也引起了人们不小的担忧。


But average GDP growth rates in the new members are twice as high as in the original members, and this can provide a welcome stimulus to stagnant labor markets and sluggish economies.	但新成员的平均国内产值增长率是原有成员国的两倍，这对停滞的劳动力市场和裹足不前的经济将产生良好的促进作用。


Political arrangements are somewhat more problematic.	政治局势似乎更加问题重重。


Negotiations are underway to revise a draft EU constitution.	各成员国正在谈判，修改欧盟宪法草案。


Some Europeans worry that the constitution will enable courts to carry the integration process further and faster than public opinion in member states will tolerate.	欧洲某些人担心宪法将赋予法院权力，以超出成员国公众所能容忍的最快速度推进欧洲的统一进程。


Lack of grassroots support might lead to rejection of the constitution in countries like Britain, where referenda have been promised before the new arrangements come into force.	缺少来自底层的支持可能导致英国等国否决这一宪法，因为上述当局许诺在新局势成形前举行全民公决。


Across the Atlantic, most Americans (to the extent they pay attention) regard these changes with general approval.	大西洋的另一端，关注此事的美国人多数持赞成态度。


But some express concern that the new Europe will be defined in opposition to the US.	但也有人表达了新欧洲也许会与美国作对的担忧。


Not only do the remarks of French leaders about recreating a multi-polar world arouse alarm, but recent public opinion polls show a decline in the popularity of the US among Europeans and a desire for more independent policies.	不仅法国领导人重建多极世界的讲话令人惊恐，最近的民意测验也表明美国在欧洲的受欢迎程度日益下降，以及欧洲人对独立自主政策越来越强烈的渴望。


The Iraq War proved costly to American soft power, with the US losing about 30 percentage points of attractiveness on average in Europe, including in countries like Britain, Spain, and Italy, whose governments supported the war.	对伊战争让美国的"软性力量"付出了昂贵的代价，美国在欧洲国家的平均吸引力下降了约30个百分点，其中包括在英国、西班牙和意大利等支持这场战争的国家。


The recent photographs of detainees being abused and sexually degraded in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison added fuel to the fire.	不久前战俘在巴格达阿布格莱布监狱遭受虐待和性侮辱的照片曝光更为这一事件火上浇油。


Now some American neo-conservatives argue that the US should drop its longstanding support for European integration.	如今，美国某些新保守主义者甚至主张撤销长久以来对欧洲统一进程的支持。


Such a policy change would be a serious mistake.	这样的政策变化将犯下严重的错误。


Not only would it add to anti-American attitudes and fail to accomplish its objectives, but it over-estimates the extent to which the new Europe is being formed in opposition to the US.	它不仅助长反美情绪，达不到既定目标，还过高估计了新欧洲形成给美国带来的威胁。


Whatever the rhetoric in France, for example, the policies and attitudes in countries such as Britain or Poland demonstrate that good trans-Atlantic relations can be maintained.	无论法国怎样慷慨陈辞，英国或波兰等国的态度依然表明：良好的泛大西洋关系能够维持下去。


If anything, the risks of a US-Europe split will be reduced rather than increased by the EU's recent enlargement.	如果一定要说影响，那么最近欧洲的东扩将削减而非助长美欧分裂的危险。


Moreover, there are several objective reasons why the current friction between Europe and the US is unlikely to lead to divorce.	此外，若干客观原因使目前的欧美摩擦不会导致分离。


For one thing, the divisive war in Iraq may turn out to be the last act of the twentieth century rather than a harbinger of the twenty-first.	首先，伊拉克的分裂战争也许标志着20世纪的终结，但绝非21世纪的起始。


American unilateralism is much less in evidence in the world's other hot spots, such as North Korea and Iran, both because of the costs of the war in Iraq and the realities of the situation in those other regions.	美国的单边主义在北朝鲜和伊朗等其它热点地区远没有如此明显，这既因为伊拉克战争代价惨重，也是其它地区的现实情况使然。


Moreover, while the common security threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared, both the US and Europe face a new common threat from radical	这种威胁在大西洋两岸同样存在，尽管奥萨马·本·拉登试图在欧美之间挑起矛盾。 只有通过情报共享、跨国警界合作和追踪金融汇兑等密切的民间合作，才有可能战胜跨越国界的恐怖活动。


Europe and America also share a common structure of economic interests and values.	欧洲和美国还拥有共同的经济利益和价值观结构。


While trade produces frictions in democracies, it also enhances wealth.	尽管贸易造成民主国家间的摩擦，但同时也带来巨大的财富。


If one looks at foreign direct investment, it is clear that the two sides of the Atlantic are closely integrated.	看看国外直接投资就知道，大西洋两岸是紧密联系在一起的。


In terms of values, while some differences exist between Europe and America, at the fundamental level of democracy and human rights, no other two parts of the globe share more.	价值观方面，尽管欧洲和美国间存在分歧，但在民主和人权的根本问题上，没有哪两个地区观点如此一致。


As the writer Robert Kagan concluded in the revision of his book in which he declared Europeans to be from Venus and Americans from Mars, it turns out that Americans seeking democratic legitimization of their policies and self-images cannot escape Europe.	正如作家Robert Kagan在其著作修订版中总结的那样，欧洲源于金星而美国源于火星，但最终寻求合法政策及自我形象的美国离不开欧洲的支持。


In short, it is good for Americans - and for the world - that old and new Europe are becoming one.	简而言之，新旧欧洲合而为一对美国和世界都是喜讯。


We can all benefit from the soft power of an enlarged Europe.	我们都将受益于经过扩张的欧洲所拥有的软性力量。


What Makes America Great	是什么让美国伟大


CAMBRIDGE – Presidential inaugurations and commencement ceremonies are usually very emotional events.	坎布里奇—总统就职典礼和毕业典礼通常都是非常情绪性的事件。


They are rites of passage that mark both an end and a new beginning in the life of a country or an individual.	这类仪式既标志着一个国家或一个个体的一个段落的结束，也标志着新的开始。


As a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, I attend our commencement ceremony every year.	作为哈佛肯尼迪政府学院教授，我每年都要参加毕业典礼。


Despite this regularity, I still become emotional as I see my students complete a phase of their lives and contemplate their future.	尽管毕业典礼对我来说如此平常，但当我看到学生完成了生命中的一个阶段、开始考虑他们的我来时，我都会感到十分激动。


One of the highlights of our ceremony is a video in which several professors and public personalities read, line by line, John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address.	在我们的典礼上，一个高光时刻是多名教授和公共人物逐字逐句朗读约翰·肯尼迪的就职演说。


It is a text written 56 years ago, in a different world, where the Cold War, the threat of nuclear Armageddon, and the challenges faced by so many newly independent poor states dominated policymakers’ concerns.	这是一份写于56年前的文件，它代表着一个不同的世界，一个冷战、核末日威胁以及大量新晋独立穷国所面临的挑战占据决策者关注焦点的世界。


And yet, running at under 14 minutes, it never fails to move and inspire everyone in the audience, including that half of the graduates and their families who hail from other countries, near and far.	但是，在不到14分钟的时间里，这份就职演说每一次都能打动和鼓励观众席上的每一个人，包括来自世界各地的那一半毕业生和他们的家庭。


To understand why, it is useful to recall a few of the most famous passages.	要想知道为什么会这样，不妨回忆一下这篇名著。


For starters, there was Kennedy’s vow to defend freedom for its friends and from its enemies: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”	一开始，肯尼迪宣誓要捍卫自由的朋友，抵御自由的敌人：“要让每个国家都知道，不管它想要我们好还是坏，我们都将不惜一切代价，承受一切负担，克服一切困难，去支持我们的朋友，对抗任何敌人，以确保自由的生存和成功。 ”


There was also his commitment to fight poverty: “To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required – not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.	他还承诺打击贫困：“住在乡村茅舍、渴望打破重重痛苦的一半地球人：我们承诺竭尽全力帮助他们自力更生，不管需要多长时间——这不是因为共产党也会这么做，不是因为我们需要他们的选票，而是因为这是正确的事。


If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”	如果自由社会不能帮助众多处于贫困的人，它也无法拯救那极少数富裕的人。 ”


And this commitment was part and parcel of hemispheric solidarity: “To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.”	而这一承诺是西半球团结的基石：“对于我们边境以南的兄弟共和国来说，我们做出一项特殊承诺——让我们的好话变成好事——在一个新的进步同盟中——帮助自由人和自由政府摆脱贫困的枷锁。 ”


Finally, there was Kennedy’s ethic of service on behalf of the commonwealth: “And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.	最后，公益服务伦理观：“还有，我的美国同胞：不要问国家能为你做些什么——问问你能为你的国家做些什么。


My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.”	我的世界公民同胞：不要问美国会为你做什么，问问我们携起手来能为人的自由做些什么。 ”


These words’ enduring emotional appeal is rooted in their embrace of a potentially difficult course of action, motivated by a pledge to uphold values shared by citizens of America and the world alike.	这些话之所以能够造成经久不衰的情绪号召力，是因为它们提到了也许很困难的行动方针，其背后的推动力是誓死捍卫美国和世界公民的共同价值观。


It was this approach – one founded on a value-based system of rules, not on individual deals – that enabled the US to create and sustain a coalition of countries that could maintain peace and international cooperation.	这一方针——它建立在基于价值观的规则体系之上，而不是建立在个人交易基础上——让美国得以创造和维持一个能够保证和平与和平合作的国家联盟。


Fast forward to today.	快进到现在。


President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign narrative was based on the assumption that the US has fallen from its former greatness.	当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的竞选纲领基于这样的认识：美国已经从昔日的伟大中衰落。


Jobs have moved to Mexico and China because weak leaders negotiated bad deals.	就业流向了墨西哥和中国，因为软弱的领导人谈判了糟糕的协议。


Immigrants, mostly illegal, have taken the few jobs that remain, killing and raping in their free time.	移民，主要是非法移民，则拿走了剩下的少数岗位，而在空余时间尽干些杀人强奸的勾当。


It follows that the US needs a president who will put America first and knows how to extract the best deals for it at every opportunity, using the country’s full might to advance its interests.	因此，美国需要一位把美国放在第一位、知道如何在每一次机会中如何获得最佳协议、用美国的全部力量推进它的利益的总统。


I doubt that an inaugural address based on these ideas will awe and inspire many audiences at commencement ceremonies, especially where many of those in attendance are citizens of other countries.	我怀疑基于这些思想的就职演说是否能够在毕业典礼上震撼和激发大量听众，特别是当许多听众是其他国家的公民的时候。


Such a speech will encourage no one to “bear any burden” for the sake of any universal principle or challenge, be it human rights or global warming.	这样一份演讲无法鼓励任何人为任何普世原则或挑战“承担一切负担”，不管是人权还是全球变暖。


It will not exhort us to focus on something bigger than ourselves.	它无法劝诫我们风物长宜放眼量。


Over the course of history, very few powerful states have developed a sense of themselves as being based not on ethnic heritage, but on a set of values that all citizens can live by.	在历史进程中，很少有强大的国家能发展出这样一种感受：认为自己不是基于民族文化遗产，而是基于一系列所有公民生存之所系的价值观。


For the US, it was “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”	对美国来说，这就是“生活、自由和追逐幸福”。


For the Soviet Union, it was international proletarian solidarity – “workers of the world, unite.”	对苏联来说，这是世界无产者大团结——“全世界工人联合起来”。


The European Union is based on universal values and principles that are so attractive that 28 countries have opted to join it; and, Brexit notwithstanding, some half-dozen more are trying to get in.	欧盟是基于能够吸引28个国家加入其中的普世价值观和原则； 尽管发生了英国退欧，仍有六个国家正在努力加入其中。


By contrast, a great and powerful Russia or China today – or the Third Reich in its time – may be able to garner the support of its citizens; but such states cannot constitute the basis of an international order that others find appealing, because they are based on a vision of themselves that does not encompass others.	相反，今天伟大且强大的俄罗斯或中国——或当年的第三帝国——也许能够赢得本国公民的支持； 但这些国家无法构成其他国家向往的国际秩序的基础，因为它们是基于并不包含他者的自身的愿景的。


The basis of America’s greatness and ability to lead the world stems from universal values that underpin a set of rules that uphold the others’ rights, not an America that tries to base its greatness on a set of deals aimed at getting the better of others.	美国的伟大和领导世界的能力的基础来自普世价值观，这些普世价值观又是保护他者权利的规则体系的基础，而不是试图将伟大建立在以从他者身上获得更多好处为目标的交易体系的基础上的美国。


Such an America will find its ability to lead the world compromised by a shortage of goodwill and an abundance of distrust.	这样一个美国将发现，它领导世界的能力受到缺乏商誉和充满不信任的制约。


Other countries will huddle together to protect themselves from the US bully.	其他国家将联合起来抵抗美国的仗势欺人。


If Trump really wants to make America great again, he should ponder how his inaugural address will sound to a global audience 56 years from now.	如果特朗普真的想让美国重新伟大，他应该仔细思考他的就职演说如何面对56年前的全球听众。


Will it inspire the Class of 2073 the way Kennedy’s address still inspires graduates today?	它能否激发2073届毕业生，就像肯尼迪的就职演说激发今天的毕业生那样?


America Goes from Teacher to Student	美国从教师爷变成学生


Cambridge -- As the United States’ epic financial crisis continues to unfold, one can only wish that US policymakers were half as good at listening to advice from developing countries as they are at giving it.	剑桥--当美国庞大的金融危机继续演进之时，人们只能希望美国的决策者们在从发展中国家听取建议时能够有一半像发表建议那样在行就好了。


Americans don’t seem to realize that their “sub-prime” mortgage meltdown has all too much in common with many previous post-1945 banking crises throughout the world.	美国好像并不认识到，他们的“次级”房屋贷款破灭与许多1945年后席卷全球的银行危机有太多的共同之处。


The silver lining is that there are many highly distinguished current and former policymakers out there, particularly from emerging market countries, who have seen this movie before.	令人欣慰的是，有许多特别是来自新兴市场国家的在任和前任杰出的决策者们已经看到了这一局面。


If US policymakers would only listen, they might get an idea or two about how to deal with financial crises from experts who have lived through them and come out safely on the other side.	如果美国的决策者们听取意见的话，他们就会从安然度过金融危机的专家那里知道如何应付它们。


Unfortunately, the parallel between today’s US crisis and previous financial crises is not mere hyperbole.	不幸的是，当今美国危机和以往金融危机的相同之处并不仅仅是夸张的。


The qualitative parallels are obvious: banks using off-balance loans to finance highly risky ventures, exotic new financial instruments, and excessive exuberance over the promise of new markets.	本质上的相同之处是明显的。 银行使用帐外贷款来为极为具有风险的项目融资，别出心裁的金融工具以及对新的市场前景的过度兴奋。


But there are strong quantitative parallels as well.	但是从数量上来说也有很强的共同之处。


Professor Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and I systematically compared the run-up to the US sub-prime crisis with the run-up to the 19 worst financial crises in the industrialized world over the past 60 years.	马里兰大学莱恩哈特教授和我系统地比较了美国次级房贷危机和过去60年整个工业化世界19个最为严重的金融危机之前的状况。


These include epic crises in the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and Japan, along with lesser events such as the US savings and loan crises of the 1980’s.	这些包括斯堪的那维亚国家、西班牙和日本发生的巨大的危机，以及二十世纪八十年代美国储蓄和贷款危机等较为轻微的事件。


Across virtually all the major indicators – including equity and housing price runs-ups, trade balance deficits, surges in government and household indebtedness, and pre-crisis growth trajectories – red lights are blinking for the US.	几乎所有主要标志，包括资产和住房价格攀升、贸易平衡赤字、政府和居民负债猛增以及危机以前的增长轨迹等等都给美国亮出了红灯。


Simply put, surging capital flows into the US artificially held down interest rates and inflated asset prices, leading to laxity in banking and regulatory standards and, ultimately, to a meltdown.	简而言之，汹涌流向美国的资本人为地压低了利率并抬高了资产价格，导致银行和监管标准松懈并且最终造成瓦解。


When Asia and Latin America had their financial meltdowns in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, they took advice not only from the IMF, but also from a number of small panels composed of eminent people representing diverse backgrounds and experiences.	九十年代和二十一世纪之初亚洲和拉美金融危机发生之际，它们不仅从国际货币基金组织、而且也从几个代表了多样背景和经验的著名人士组成的专家小组那里听取建议。


The US should do the same.	美国也应如此。


The head of the IMF, Frenchman Dominique Strauss-Kahn, could easily select a superb panel from any range of former crisis countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Sweden, not to mention Argentina, Russia, Chile, and many others.	国际货币基金组织主席、法国人思特劳斯·卡恩可以轻而易举地从任何范围的前危机国家、包括墨西哥、巴西、韩国、土耳其、日本以及瑞典，更不用说阿根廷、俄国、智利以及其他许多国家那里挑选一个超级专家小组。


Admittedly, the IMF’s panel would have to look past America’s current hypocrisy.	应当承认，国际货币基金组织的专家小组将会放过美国目前的伪善。


The US Treasury strongly encouraged Asia to tighten fiscal policy during its 1990’s crisis.	在九十年代的危机中，美国财政部强烈鼓励亚洲紧缩财政政策。


But today the US Congress and President are tripping over themselves to adopt an ill-advised giant fiscal stimulus package, whose main effects will be to tie the hands of the next president in simplifying the US tax code and closing the budget deficit.	但是今天，美国国会和总统却自我矛盾地要采纳一个巨大的、鲁莽的财政刺激一揽子方案，其主要效果就是限制下一任总统简化美国税法以及消除预算赤字的空间。


Americans firmly told Japan that the only way to clean up its economy was to purge insolvent banks and regenerate the financial system through Schumpeterian “creative destruction.”	美国人坚定地告诉日本说，收拾日本经济烂摊子的唯一途径就是清除负债的银行，并且通过熊彼特的“创造性破坏”来重造其金融体系。


Today, US authorities appear willing to contemplate any measure, no matter how inflationary, to insure that none of its major banks and investment houses fails.	如今，美国当局似乎愿意考虑任何措施来确保其主要银行和投资公司没有一家倒闭，而无论其手段具有多大的通胀风险。


For years, foreign governments complained about American hedge funds, arguing that their non-transparent behavior posed unacceptable risks to stability.	多年来，外国政府抱怨美国的对冲基金，说它们不透明的行为对稳定造成不可接受的风险。


Now, many US politicians are complaining about the transparency of sovereign wealth funds (big government investors mainly from Asia and the Middle East), which are taking shares in trophy American assets such as Citibank and Merrill Lynch.	现在，许多美国政界人物则在抱怨国家财富基金(也就是主要来自亚洲和中东的庞大的政府投资者)的透明度问题。 这些基金正在花旗银行和美林公司等让美国骄傲的资产上入股。


In fact, having countries like Russia and China more vested in the well-being of the US economy would not be a bad thing.	实际上，让像俄国和中国那样的国家在美国经济福祉上更多投资并非一件坏事。


Yes, the IMF ought to develop a voluntary code of conduct for SWF’s, but it should not be used as a weapon to enforce financial protectionism.	是的，国际货币基金组织应该给主权财富基金制定一个自愿遵守的行为准则，但是这并不应当用来实行金融保护主义的武器。


For years, I, along with many others, have complained that emerging markets need greater representation in global financial governance.	多年来，我和其他许多人抱怨说新兴市场国家需要在全球金融管理中占有更大的代表比例。


Today, the issue goes far beyond symbolism.	今天，这一问题远远超过了象征主义。


The US economy is in trouble, and the problems it spins off are unlikely to stop at the US border.	美国经济陷入麻烦，而它所带来的问题不大可能局限于美国境内。


Experts from emerging markets and elsewhere have much to say about dealing with financial crises.	来自新兴市场国家和其他地方的专家们对于应付金融危机有很多话要说。


America should start to listen before it is too late.	美国在为时已晚之前应该开始倾听。


America’s Second Chance with India	美国和印度的第二次机会


NEW YORK – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, DC, in June garnered little public attention outside of India.	纽约—印度总理莫迪6月份的访美之旅在印度之外基本没有引起什么关注。


Yet diplomats and military professionals in Asia and beyond were certainly watching closely.	但亚洲外交官和军事专业人士显然在密切关注。


For good reason: the rapprochement between the world’s two most populous democracies could shape the world’s future.	其来有自：世界上人口最多的两个民主国家之间的关系缓和可以决定世界的未来。


It is worth noting that in his address to the US Congress, Modi invoked the word “partner” or “partnership” no fewer than 15 times.	值得注意的是，在美国国会演讲中，莫迪至少15次提到了“伙伴”一词。


The official joint statement released by the two governments described India as a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States, eligible for advanced technologies with military applications.	两国政府发布的正式联合申明将印度描述为美国的“主要防务伙伴”，有资格获得军用先进技术。


The relationship between India and the US has evolved from one of cool distance to strategic proximity in a generation – lightning fast for geopolitics.	在一代人的时间里，印美关系从冷眼保持距离演变为战略性靠近——就地缘政治而言，发展不可不谓快。


The factors underlying this shift merit attention, for many of them are likely to bring the two countries even closer.	这一转变背后的推动因素值得关注，因为其中许多因素有望让两国更加紧密。


The Cold War’s end was a significant part of the bilateral rapprochement, because it eliminated the possibility of India’s continued association with the Soviet Union, as well as its rationale for embracing non-alignment.	冷战的结束是印美关系缓和的一个重要部分，因为印度不再需要与苏联打交道，不结盟的理由也不再成立。


A second factor is Pakistan.	第二个因素是巴基斯坦。


For a long time, the US pursued an even-handed policy toward South Asia’s two most strategically important countries.	长期以来，美国对这两个在战略上最重要的南亚国家采取的是一碗水端平的政策。


Nonetheless, during most of the Cold War, Pakistan was seen as a friendly country, whereas its great rival, India, was viewed as difficult.	尽管如此，在冷战的大部分时间里，巴基斯坦被视为友邦，而它的劲敌印度被视为一个难点。


This view was reinforced when Pakistan became the essential conduit of weapons to Afghans fighting the Soviet occupation of their country.	巴基斯坦成为向阿富汗输送武器助其抵抗苏联侵略的重要通道后，这一观点进一步得到了强化。


But the bond between the US and Pakistan weakened when Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.	但1989年苏军撤出阿富汗后，美巴关系有所削弱。


Relations suffered further from Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, its provision of sanctuary and support to the Taliban, and its willingness to extend hospitality to some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists, including Osama bin Laden.	巴基斯坦发展核武器、为塔利班提供庇护和支持并且愿意给包括本·拉登在内的全球最危险恐怖分子提供藏身之所，这进一步影响了美巴关系。


As a result, US ties to India were no longer constrained by fear of complications in Pakistan.	结果，美国建设对印关系不再受到顾虑巴基斯坦不满的约束。


China is also animating the improvement in India-US ties.	中国也在推动印美关系的改善。


The motivation is far more fundamental than the fact that India and China still have an unresolved border.	其背后的动机远比中印边境问题仍有待解决这一事实更具根本性。


China’s rise has created a strong incentive for countries with a stake in Asia to increase their cooperation with the US, as well as with one another, to ensure that they can stand up to China’s political, military, and economic might.	中国的崛起强烈地刺激了在亚洲有利益所在的国家加强与美国以及彼此之间的合作，以确保能够抵御中国的政治。 军事和经济力量。


Domestic politics also loom large in the relationship’s development – on both sides.	国内政治也严重影响着印美关系的发展——对两国都是如此。


The decline of India’s Congress party reduced the influence of the political force most associated with maintaining distance from the US.	印度国大党的衰落降低了最支持与美国保持距离的政治力量的影响力。


Meanwhile, there are now more than three million Indian-Americans, and, as with many other immigrant populations, they have become ever more prominent and powerful.	与此同时，如今美国有三百万印度裔公民，与许多其他移民群体一样，他们变得更加重要和强大。


Supporting closer ties with India has become a rare example of bipartisan US foreign policy, and it can be expected to continue regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress after this November’s elections.	支持加强对印关系已成为美国罕见的跨党派外交政策之���，并且可以期待这一状况将继续保持，不管今年11月哪个党入主白宫。


The breakthrough in bilateral ties came a decade ago, when the US lifted sanctions introduced in response to India’s nuclear weapons program and then signed an accord paving the way for US involvement in India’s civil nuclear energy program.	双边关系的突破始于十年前，当时，美国取消了因印度核武器计划而实施的制裁，随后签署了一份协议，为美国参与印度民用核能计划扫清了道路。


India, unlike both Pakistan and North Korea, is seen as a responsible nuclear power, a country the US now supports for membership in various groups designed to stem the further spread of nuclear materials and weapons.	和巴基斯坦和朝鲜不同，印度被视为负责任的核力量，目前美国支持印度加入各种为防止核材料和武器进一步扩散而设立的组织。


Economic ties are also growing, along with India’s economy.	随着印度经济的增长，印美经济关系也在加强。


Bilateral trade has increased to more than $100 billion a year.	双边贸易已增加到每年1,000亿美元以上。


High-level visits have become commonplace.	高层访问已经稀松平常。


Closer economic ties and large-scale collaboration on clean energy are a high priority.	更紧密的经济关系和清洁能源领域的大规模合作是重中之重。


One can also predict increased cooperation between the two countries’ military and intelligence establishments.	可以预期，两国军事和情报机构之间的合作也将增加。


Indeed, joint efforts to keep the Indian Ocean open and safe are already a reality.	事实上，保持印度洋开放和安全的联合行动已是既成事实。


The US and India need not be formal allies for their relationship to have the desired effect on Chinese strategic calculations.	美国和印度正式结盟就可以对中国的战略意图形成想要的影响。


Challenges remain, of course.	当然，挑战仍然存在。


Bureaucracy, corruption, and poor infrastructure continue to hold back India’s economy.	官僚主义、腐败和拙劣的基础设施仍然制约着印度经济。


Indian leaders must also be careful not to do or say things that could alienate the country’s large Muslim minority.	印度领导任还必须保持谨慎，不可做出或说出可能梳理该国为数巨大的穆斯林少数群体的内容。


And they must still ensure that close ties with the US are not simply the policy of one prime minister or party.	他们还必须确保与美国的紧密关系不仅仅是一届总理或一党的政策。


This means getting the Congress party fully on board and overcoming the resistance of career officials to new ways of thinking and acting.	这意味着要让国大党充分参与进来，并克服事务官对新思维和行为的抵触。


It is difficult to overlook the irony in much of this.	不难看出，其中不乏讽刺之处。


More than a half-century ago, in the early years of the Cold War, many in Washington saw India as a potential model of non-Communist political and economic development.	五十多年前，在冷战初期，华盛顿有许多人将印度视为非共产主义政治和经济发展的前在榜样。


For many reasons, things did not work out that way, as India became economically statist, for a time politically authoritarian, and geopolitically closer to the USSR than US officials liked.	出于众多原因，事情并未朝这个方向发展，印度在经济上演变为国家主义，政治上一度成为极权主义，地缘政治上比美国官员所期待的更加接近于苏联。


Now, however, India is emerging as a successful example of a market-oriented democracy with close ties to the US.	但是，如今，印度正在崛起成为与美国关系密切的市场经济民主的成功范例。


Second chances are rare in life, but both India and the US may be getting just that.	生活中很少能获得第二次机会，而印度和美国可能恰恰获得了这一机会。


America Keeping Haiti Down	美国在海地的伏都教人权政策


The IDB, the world's largest regional development bank, works in Latin America and the Caribbean purportedly to “contribute to the acceleration of economic and social development.”	作为世界上最大的区域开发银行，泛美开发银行在拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区的工作据称是“为加快经济和社会发展作贡献”。


Its actions in Haiti, however, have severely undermined those goals.	但是，它在海地的行为已经严重损害了这些宗旨。


Roughly $54 million in IDB loans for water infrastructure in Haiti, home to literally the world’s worst water, offered a proven path to preventing deadly water-borne diseases. Designed to assist in fulfilling the right to water in the most impoverished nation in the Western Hemisphere, these loans and the lives they could have saved instead have become pawns in a deliberate political power play.	泛美开发银行为了改善海地的饮用水基础设施——毫不夸张地说，海地的饮用水状况是世界上最糟糕的——提供的大约5400万美元贷款，为防止致命的水致疾病提供了可行的途径。 这些贷款原计划用于帮助世界西半球上最贫穷的国家实现其饮用水权利，它们及其可以挽救的生命不应该在一个深思熟虑的政治权力游戏中成为牺牲品。


In 2001, US officials threatened to use their influence to stop previously approved IDB funding unless Haiti’s majority political party submitted to political demands to accept a particular apportionment of seats in a Haitian electoral oversight body.	2001年，美国官员威胁道，除非海地的主要政党接受一家海地选举观察机构中席位分摊的特别的政治要求，否则他们就会使用他们的影响力来阻止事先已经获得批准的泛美开发银行对海地的资助。


Soon after, at the behest of the US, instead of disbursing the loans as planned, the IDB and its members took the unprecedented step of implicitly adding conditions to require political action by Haiti before the funds would be released.	不久之后，在美国的要求之下，泛美开发银行及其成员没有按原计划发放贷款，而是采取了从没采取过的措施，在发放这些资金之前暗示增加海地采取政治行动的条件。


These actions violated the IDB’s own charter, which strictly prohibits the Bank and its members from interfering in the internal political affairs of member states.	这些行为违反了泛美开发银行自己的章程，该章程严格禁止银行及其成员干涉成员国的内部政治事务。


Internal emails reveal that a US legal counselor inside the IDB proposed to the US Treasury Department that, though the loans faced no legitimate technical obstacles, the US could effectively block them by “slowing” the process.	一些内部电子邮件显示，一位泛美开发银行内的美国律师向美国财政部提出如下建议：虽然这些贷款不存在合法性技术障碍，但是美国可以通过“延缓”贷款进程来有效地阻止贷款的发放。


Indeed, by requesting further review of the loans, Haiti would have to make scheduled payments before the funds were even disbursed.	确实，通过要求对贷款进行进一步的审查，海地将不得不在贷款发放之前就进行定期还款。


“While this is not a ‘bullet-proof’ way to stop IDB disbursements,” the counsellor wrote, “it certainly will put a few more large rocks in the road.”	“虽然这不是阻止泛美开发银行贷款发放的‘完美无缺’的方法”，该律师写道，“但是，它肯定会给贷款的发放设置更多的障碍”。


In 2001, then-US Ambassador to Haiti Dean Curran publicly and explicitly linked the withholding of IDB loans to the demand that Haiti’s political parties reach a compromise that America wanted.	在2001年，时任美国驻海地大使的迪安·科兰（Dean Curran）曾公开明确地将泛美开发银行贷款的扣留和海地的政党达成美国希望的妥协的要求联系起来。


These tactics worked.	这些策略奏效了。


Deprived of funds that had already been committed and expected, Haiti fell into arrears on money owed for loan repayment, triggering IDB policies that prevented the Bank from releasing loans.	由于被剥夺了已经被承诺和期待的资金，海地没有支付偿还借款的资金，而这会使泛美开发银行启动阻止银行贷款发放的银行政策。


In subsequent years, the US employed additional delaying tactics, working with the IDB to move the goal posts whenever Haiti appeared to be meeting their demands.	在后来的几年里，美国又使用了其他的延迟策略，这些策略就是在海地似乎快要满足其要求的时候，和泛美开发银行一起改变目标标杆。


The results have been devastating.	这些策略的后果是毁灭性的。


The town of Port-de-Paix, slotted ten years ago by the IDB as the first project site due to its particularly deplorable water situation, has yet to see the implementation of any water projects.	和平港市因为其悲惨的饮用水状况，在十年前就被泛美开发银行跟踪作为第一个项目实施地点，但是，到目前为止还没有看到任何饮用水项目的实施。


A study conducted by Zanmi Lasante, Partners In Health, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, and New York University’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice found no functioning public water sources in the city.	由健康伙伴（Zanmi Lasante）、罗伯特·弗·肯尼迪人权纪念中心以及纽约大学人权和全球正义中心进行的研究发现，在和平港市没有可供饮用的公共水源。


Researchers found three-quarters of water sources in the city contained high levels of coliform bacteria, a key indicator of contamination with fecal matter.	研究人员发现，该市3/4的水源都含有很高水平的大肠杆细菌，这是水源被排泄物污染的一个重要指标。


A frightening 15% of households reported symptoms likely related to typhoid.	而且，还有令人震惊的高达15%的家庭报告了可能和伤寒症有关的症状。


If the US and other member states join the IDB and take on the responsibility to improve conditions in the Americas, they cannot then use their membership to undermine the basic rights of the people they claim to serve simply to advance their own political agenda.	如果美国和其他成员国加入泛美开发银行，承担起改善美洲各国状况的责任，那么，他们就不能仅仅为了推进自己的政治议程，而利用其成员资格去破坏他们声称要去服务的人们的基本权利，


The IDB and the US government must take responsibility for their actions and implement the necessary transparency mechanisms to ensure that such abuses do not recur.  Congressional inquiries and annual reviews of the Treasury Department by the Government Accountability Office could provide the oversight necessary to prevent future political misuse of the IDB and its funds.	泛美开发银行和美国政府必须为他们的行为承担责任，并实施必要的透明度机制来保证这样的权利滥用不再发生。 美国国会质询和政府责任办公室对财政部的年度审查可以为防止以后对泛美开发银行及其资金的政治滥用提供必要的监督。


The people of Haiti, as well as US taxpayers, deserve a system that makes public the status of IDB loans and projects in Haiti in order to ensure that the US and IDB member states uphold their commitments to development and human rights.	为了保证美国和泛美开发银行成员国实践他们对发展和人权的承诺，海地人民和美国的纳税人应该拥有一个将泛美开发银行贷款以及在海地的项目的状况向公众公开的制度。


Alliances for Peace	为了和平的联盟


WASHINGTON, DC – I grew up in the shadow of World War II, and at the dawn of the Cold War.	华盛顿—我成长于二战的阴影和冷战的黎明中。


My father’s work as a Foreign Service officer gave me an opportunity to see history up close in a searing way: I will never forget walking the beaches of Normandy with him and seeing the burned hulks of Higgins’ boats still on those shores, just a few years after so many young men went to their graves so the world could be free.	我的父亲是一位驻外事务处（Foreign Service）官员，这使我有机会以一双火眼金睛近距离观察历史：我永远不会忘记和他一起漫步在诺曼底海滩，看见烧毁的希金斯艇（Higgins’ boats）的庞大身躯仍矗立在岸上，就在几年前，大批年轻人为了世界的自由慷慨赴死。


Likewise, I will never forget the eerie feeling of riding my bike through the Brandenburg Gate from West Berlin into the East, and seeing the contrast between people who were free and those who were trapped behind the Iron Curtain.	类似地，我也永远不会忘记骑着自行车从西柏林通过布兰登堡门前往东柏林时的怪异感觉，目睹自由的人和被困在铁幕之后的人的反差。


What strikes me now, all these years later, is that a generation of leaders won not only a war, but also the peace.	多年以后，如今让我震惊的是一代领导人不但赢得了战争，还赢得了和平。


They did it together.	他们齐心协力做到了这一点。


The United States and our partners worked to create alliances that brought prosperity and stability to Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea.	美国和我们的伙伴努力建立了给西欧、日本和韩国带来繁荣与稳定的联盟。


Old enemies became new allies, and together pioneered a new global economic system that made the world more prosperous.	旧敌人成了新盟友，并一起引领了让全世界更繁荣的新全球经济制度。


And even as the Cold War raged, leaders found ways to cooperate on arms control and prevent a nuclear Armageddon.	哪怕是在冷战肆虐时，领导人们也找得到办法在武器控制和阻止核末日等方面进行合作。


In short, by building effective and indispensable international institutions and strategic partnerships, we did not just avoid another catastrophic world war; we ultimately ended the Cold War and lifted global living standards for hundreds of millions of people.	简言之，通过构建有效的、不可或缺的国际机构和战略合作关系，我们不但避免了又一场灾难性世界大战，我们最终还结束了冷战，提高了全球数亿人的生活水平。


That is the remarkable story of the twentieth century.	这是20世纪令人瞩目的故事。


The question now is what story will emerge from the twenty-first century.	现在的问题是21世纪的故事会怎样展开。


Today, the world order faces new challenges.	今天，世界秩序面临新挑战。


Russian aggression is rattling allies.	俄罗斯的入侵让盟国震惊。


Extremists who hijack religion threaten governments and people everywhere.	从事宗教圣战的极端主义者威胁着政府和各处的人民。


Technology is accelerating a shift in the balance of power between governments and governed that offers both opportunities for democratic accountability and obstacles to inclusive politics.	科技正在加速治国者和被治者之间的实力平衡，既提供了民主问责的机会，也形成了包容政治的障碍。


We have gone from a world where power resided in hierarchies to one where it inhabits networks.	我们已经从权力呈现层级分布的世界来到了权力呈现网络分布的世界。


Statecraft has yet to adapt.	但治国术还没有适应。


The international institutions and partnerships that emerged in the postwar years demand both maintenance and modernization.	战后时期出现的国际机构和合作关系既需要维持，也需要现代化。


In the face of all of this turbulence, some suggest that America should turn inward.	面临所有这些动荡，有人认为美国应该转向内向。


That is nothing new.	这不过是陈词滥调。


Some argued the same after WWII.	二战后就有人提出这样的观点。


They argued it again 25 years ago, after the fall of the Berlin Wall.	25年前柏林墙倒塌后又有人这样说。 那时，他们错了。


They were wrong then – and they are wrong now.	如今，他们也是错的。


The need for leadership has never been greater, and the US has never been more engaged with the world.	对领导力的需要从未如此巨大，美国也从未如此深地参与世界。


Our role in Afghanistan’s first-ever peaceful, democratic transition reminds us all that, having invested so much blood and treasure in helping to give Afghans a chance to succeed in battle, the world has just as much responsibility to help its leaders succeed in governance.	我们在阿富汗历史上首次和平的民主转型中所扮演的角色提醒我们所有人，世界付出如此大的鲜血和金钱代价帮助阿富汗人获得在战争中获胜的机会，也有同样大的责任帮助阿富汗领导人在治国方面取得成功。


We know that the destruction of 100% of Syria’s declared chemical weapons would not have happened without direct, hands-on diplomacy and perseverance, just as Syria’s immoral and horrifying civil war will not end without an equal commitment.	我们知道，如果没有亲力亲为地直接参与和坚持不屑，就不可能100%摧毁叙利亚宣称拥有的化学武器，正如没有这些努力，叙利亚令人骇人听闻的邪恶内战是不会结束的。


So, too, in Asia, where President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping just announced ambitious commitments to tackle climate change, we are reminded of what countries can accomplish together with real leadership – and of how much additional leadership is required to conclude a successful climate agreement in Paris next year.	亚洲也是如此，奥巴马总统和中国国家主席习近平刚刚作出宏达承诺解决气候变化问题，我们可以从中看到，有了真正的领导力，各国可以完成怎样的成就——也可以看到，要在明年的巴黎敲定成功的气候协定还需要多少领导力。


The world has changed, and we are changing with it.	世界已经发生了变化，我们也在随之改变。


Lines on the map no longer contain the gravest threats, and the players are no longer divided neatly into two camps.	地图上的线不再包含最严重的威胁，各行动方也不再泾渭分明地分成两个阵营。


In the twenty-first century, next door is everywhere.	在21世纪，后门无处不在。


That is why the world needs coalition diplomacy.	因此，世界需要联盟外交（coalition diplomacy）。


No country can defeat terrorism on its own.	没有哪个国家能够单枪匹马击败恐怖主义。


No country can solve the existential threat of climate change alone.	没有哪个国家能够单枪匹马解决生存危机。


No country can eradicate extreme poverty, combat potential pandemics, or improve nuclear security by itself.	没有哪个国家能够依靠自己消灭极端贫困、战胜潜在传染病或改善核安全。


None of us can live safer, richer lives by turning our back to the world.	如果我���不直面世界，我们所有人都无法获得更安全、更富裕的生活。


We must build on our history of working with allies by forming new coalitions – with governments, with civil society, and, yes, with everyday people.	我们必须与政府、与公民社会——是的，还要与普罗大众——结成新的联盟，与盟友们一起构建历史。


A good example is the international effort to confront the Islamic State’s malign brutality in Iraq and Syria.	一个很好的例子是针对伊斯兰国在伊拉克和叙利亚残忍暴行的国际努力。


Political, humanitarian, and intelligence tools from more than 60 countries are being used to support unified military action.	来自60多个国家政治、人道和情报工具被用于支持联合军事行动。


Success depends not on what one or even a handful of countries can do alone, but on what all of us are able to achieve by moving forward together against this common threat.	成功不取决于一国甚至少数几国可以独力完成什么，而是取决于我们所有人可以通过携手面对这一共同威胁实现什么。


On an equally important front, the US is working with the United Nations to galvanize a global response to the danger posed by the Ebola virus.	在另一个同样重要的阵线，美国正在与联合国一起努力激励全球应对埃博拉病毒的威胁。


I have personally talked with more than 50 foreign leaders, and we all agree that only by coordinating our actions can we stop the devastation in West Africa and halt Ebola’s spread.	我个人与50多位外国领导人讨论了这一问题，我们都同意，只有通过协调行动才能阻止西非的灾难和埃博拉的传播。


We are making progress on both issues, but much work remains.	我们在这两个问题上都在取得进展，但仍有许多工作要做。


Bringing together countries with competing interests and varying resources is hard work.	让利益相互竞争、资源大相径庭的国家走到一起是一个艰难的工作。


It demands intense diplomatic engagement and calls upon relationships that have been built and maintained over decades, as well as alliances with new partners.	这要求大量外交投入、动员几十年来所构建和维持的关系以及与新合作伙伴的联盟。


But by overcoming differences and coordinating efforts to defeat the Islamic State and conquer Ebola, we are reinforcing support for a world order grounded in collective solutions to common problems.	但通过克服差异、共同努力击败伊斯兰国、征服埃博拉，我们正在强化对基于针对共同问题的集体解决方案的世界秩序的支持。


Cooperation is equally vital in reinforcing the bedrock economic principles on which America and other countries built their postwar prosperity.	对于巩固作为美国和其他国家战后繁荣基础的经济原则，合作也同样重要。


Frustration cannot grow faster than opportunity in any country.	不论哪个国家，沮丧都不会比机会发展得更快。


For example, the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) reflect President Obama’s determination to strike an accord with countries that represent one-third of global trade and 40% of global GDP.	比如，跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP）表明了奥巴马与占全球贸易三分之一、全球GDP百分之四十的地区形成一致的决心。


The benefits – for both the US and our partners – are enormous.	不管是对美国还是对我们的合作伙伴，好处都是巨大的。


Estimates are that the TPP could provide $77 billion a year in real income and support 650,000 new jobs in the US alone.	据估计，光是在美国，TPP每年可以增加77美元真实收入、支持650,000个新就业岗位。


The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership being negotiated with the European Union offers another major step toward increasing trade.	正在与欧盟谈判的跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership）则提供了另一个促进贸易的一大步。


Whether for mutual security or shared prosperity, genuine partnerships are not built overnight.	不管是为了共同安全还是共同繁荣，真正的伙伴关系都不是一夜建成的。


Patient diplomacy and a collective will are needed to advance common goals. America’s objectives remain the same as they have been for decades – peace, prosperity, and stability for the US and for our partners around the world.	耐心的外交和集体意愿是推进共同目标的必要条件，美国的目标与数十年来别无二致——和平、繁荣以及美国和我们的全球伙伴的稳定。


Closing the Investment Gap	填补投资缺口


BERKELEY – The weakness of private investment in the United States and other advanced economies is a worrisome – and perplexing – feature of the recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis.	伯克利—美国和其他发达经济体私人投资疲软，2008年全球金融危机后的复苏的这一特征令人担忧，也令人困惑。


Indeed, according to the International Monetary Fund, through 2014, private investment declined by an average of 25% compared to pre-crisis trends.	事实上，据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，2014年较危机前趋势，私人投资平均下降25%。


The shortfall in investment has been deep and broad-based, affecting not only residential investment but also investment in equipment and structures.	投资不足的深度和广度都很大，不但影响住宅投资，也影响设备和结构投资。


Business investment remains significantly below pre-2008 expectations, and has been hit hard again in the US during the last year by the collapse of energy-sector investment in response to the steep drop in oil prices.	商业投资显著低于2008年前的预期，去年美国商业投资因为石油价格暴跌所导致的能源部门投资骤降而再遭重创。


Interestingly, the investment shortfall in the US coincides with a strong rebound in returns to capital.	有趣的是，美国的投资短缺和资本回报率的强力反弹同时发生。


By one measure, returns to private capital are now at a higher point than any time in recent decades.	从某种程度上讲，私人资本回报率目前比最近几十年中的任何时候都要高。


But extensive empirical research confirms that at the macro level, business investment depends primarily on expected future demand and output growth, not on current returns or retained earnings.	但大量实证研究证实，在宏观层面，商业投资主要取决于预期未来需求和产出增长，而不是当前回报率或留存利润。


According to the IMF, this “accelerator” theory of investment explains most of the weakness of business investment in the developed economies since the 2008 crisis.	据IMF，这一投资的“加速器”理论解释了2008年危机后发达经济体商业投资疲软的绝大部分。


In accordance with this explanation, investment growth in the US has been in line with its usual historical relationship with output growth.	根据这一解释，美国投资增长与其与产出增长的正常历史关系相符。


In short, private investment growth has been weak primarily because the pace of recovery has been anemic.	简言之，私人投资疲软主要是因为复苏疲软。


Businesses have marked down their pre-crisis investment plans to reflect a post-crisis “new normal” of slower and more uncertain growth in demand for their output.	企业削减危机前的投资计划，以适应速度更低、不确定性性更大的危机后产出需求增长“新常态”。


Under conditions of weak aggregate demand, stronger public investment encourages more private business investment.	在总需求疲软的背景下，加强公共投资鼓励更多的私人商业投资。


But public investment, too, has fallen below pre-crisis expectations, aggravating rather than ameliorating the slump in private investment.	但公共投资也不如危机前预期，加剧而不是缓解了私人投资的暴跌。


The accelerator explanation of the shortfall in business investment in the US is consistent with evidence that, where projected demand growth has been relatively strong – for example, in cable, telecommunications, digital platforms, social networking, and, until recently, energy – investment growth has also been relatively strong.	美国商业投资短缺的加速器解释与证据一致。 证据表明，预测的需求增长相对强势的部门——比如在电缆、通讯、数字平台、社交网络以及直到最近的能源等——投资增长也相对强势。


Indeed, telecom and cable companies accounted for the largest share of business capital expenditures during the last three years, with energy production and mining second on the list.	事实上，通讯和电缆公司占据了过去三年商业资本支出的最大份额，紧随其后的是能源生产和矿产。


Differences in innovation opportunities across industries are also consistent with the changing composition of business investment.	行业间创新机会的差异也与商业投资份额变化一致。


During the 2009-2015 period, while business investment in equipment slowed in the US, it accelerated in intellectual property products, including research and development, software, and so-called artistic originals (the output of artists, studios, and publishers).	2009—2015年期间，美国设备商业投资放缓，但知识产权产品，包括研发、软件和所谓的原创作品（艺术家、工作室和出版商的产出）等，呈现加速增长。


R&D investment usually expands faster than GDP during cyclical expansions, and the current period is in line with historical trends.	在周期性扩张中，研发投资通常快于GDP，最近一段时期与历史趋势相符。


Indeed, as a share of the economy, R&D investment is now at its highest level on record, which bodes well for future productivity growth.	事实上，以占经济比重论，研发支出目前处于历史最高水平，这十分有利于未来生产率增长。


As the accelerator theory of investment would predict, much R&D investment is occurring in technology-intensive sectors where current and future expected demand has been strong.	投资的加速器理论认为，大量研发投资发生在当前和未来预期需求强势的技术密集型部门。


There is also evidence that the distribution of returns to capital is becoming increasingly skewed toward these sectors.	也有证据表明，资本回报的分布越来越向这些部门倾斜。


According to a recent McKinsey Global Institute report, the most digitized sectors – ranked by 18 metrics on digital assets, digital usage, and digital workforce – enjoy significantly higher profit margins than traditional sectors.	据最新的麦肯锡全球研究所报告，最为数字化的部门——通过数字资产、数字用途和数字劳动力等十八个指标排序——所获得的利润率显著高于传统部门。


In a recent letter to the chief executives of the S&P 500 companies and large European corporations, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest investment management company, expressed concern that many global firms may be sacrificing value-creating investments by distributing dividends and buying back their own shares.	在致标普500成分股公司和呕吼大公司首席执行官的信中，全球最大投资管理公司贝莱德公司（Black Rock）首席执行官拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）表示担心许多全球企业可能正在用发放股利和回购本公司股票的方式浪费创造价值的机会。


Among US nonfinancial corporations, the proportion of investable funds used for dividends and share buybacks has been trending upward, albeit with cyclical ups and downs, since the 1980s.	在美国非金融公司中，20世纪80年代以来用于股利和股票回购的可投资资金比例呈现增加之势（尽管存在起伏）。


After a sharp downturn during the 2008-2009 recession, this proportion has now recovered to nearly 50%, a high point relative to historical averages.	2008—2009年衰退期间这一比例大幅下井，但如今又恢复到50%左右，从历史平均值看相当高。


The macro evidence indicates that the primary cause of disappointing business investment in the US and other developed countries in the years following the global financial crisis has been anemic demand, not a lack of investable funds resulting from excessive distributions to shareholders.	宏观证据表明，全球金融危机以来美国和其他发达国家商业投资令人失望的主要原因是需求萎靡，而不是过多地向股东分配而导致可投资资金不足。


Over the longer term, however, the upward trend in dividends and share buybacks as a percentage of corporate investable funds is a symptom of mounting shareholder pressure on corporations to focus on short-term returns at the expense of long-term investments.	但是，从长期看，股利和股票回购占公司可投资资金的百分比的上升趋势是股东日益向公司施加压力、要求其专注于短期回报而非长期投资的症候。


In a recent McKinsey survey of 1,000 top executives and corporate directors, 63% reported that shareholder pressure to realize short-term returns has increased over the last several years.	最近，麦肯锡调查了1,000名高管和公司董事，其中63%表示过去几年中股东对实现短期回报的压力有所增加。


Indeed, some 79% reported pressure to demonstrate strong financial returns in two years or less.	事实上，79%的受访者表示承受着在两年或以内实现大量财务回报的压力。


Shareholder pressure tends to be greater in older firms, and in the US over the last few decades, the proportion of older firms has been growing as the startup rate for new businesses has fallen.	股东压力对于老牌企业往往更大，在过去几十年中，美国老牌企业占比因为企业创业率的下降而有所上升。


In addition, as Fink and others have warned, compensation practices that link top executives’ pay to measures of short-term success like quarterly earnings per share or annual equity performance also encourage “short-termism” in corporate investment decisions.	此外，芬克和其他人警告说，将高管薪酬与短期成功指标（如季度每股收益或年度股票表现）挂钩的做法也鼓励了 公司投资决策的“短期化”。


A sliding capital gains tax, with rates that decline as the holding period for investments increases, would reduce incentives for short-termism among investors.	递减的资本利得税——即税率随投资持有期的增加而降低——能遏制投资者短期化的激励。


Among others, Larry Fink, the Center for American Progress, and Hillary Clinton propose this approach.	拉里·芬克、美国进步中心（Center for American Progress）和希拉里·克林顿都建议采取这一方针。


In his recent CEO letter, Fink also calls on companies to issue annual “strategic frameworks” for long-term value creation, supported by quantifiable financial metrics and linking long-term executive compensation to performance on them.	在其最新的首席执行官的信中，芬克还呼吁各大公司为长期价值创造制定年度“战略框架”，使用量化财务指标并将长期高管薪酬与这些指标的表现挂钩。


These frameworks, Fink notes, should cover environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors that are core determinants of long-term value.	芬克指出，这些框架应该覆盖环境、社会和治理（ESG）因素，它们是长期价值的核心决定因素。


Companies can use the new evidence-based standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board to disclose material information about their ESG performance to their investors.	公司可以使用可持续性会计准则委员会（Sustainability Accounting Standards Board）所开发的新的基于证据的标准向投资者披露关于ESG表现的实质信息。


Strategic frameworks, along with ESG disclosure, should encourage both companies and their shareholders to focus more on long-term value and less on short-term financial performance.	战略框架配合ESG披露能够鼓励公司及其股东更加关注长期价值而不是短期财务表现。


But at the macro level, expected growth in demand and associated innovation opportunities will remain the primary drivers of business investment.	但在宏观层面，需求及相应创新机会的预期增长将仍然是商业投资的主要推动力。


Inequality and the American Child	不平等性与美国儿童


NEW YORK – Children, it has long been recognized, are a special group.	纽约—我们早就知道，儿童是一个特殊群体。


They do not choose their parents, let alone the broader conditions into which they are born.	他们无法选择父母，更不用说更广义的出生环境了。


They do not have the same abilities as adults to protect or care for themselves.	他们没有如同成人那样的保护或照看自己的能力。


That is why the League of Nations approved the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1924, and why the international community adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989.	因此，国际联盟在1924年通过了日内瓦儿童权利宣言，国际社会也在1989年实施了儿童权利公约。


Sadly, the United States is not living up to its obligations.	悲哀的是，美国没有在履行义务。


In fact, it has not even ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.	事实上，它甚至没有批准儿童权利公约。


The US, with its cherished image as a land of opportunity, should be an inspiring example of just and enlightened treatment of children.	美国向来以机会之地的形象自豪，它本应该成为公正、开明地对待儿童的榜样。


Instead, it is a beacon of failure – one that contributes to global sluggishness on children’s rights in the international arena.	相反，它却成了失败的象征——为儿童权利在国际经济场上的全球颓势做出了“贡献”。


Though an average American childhood may not be the worst in the world, the disparity between the country’s wealth and the condition of its children is unparalleled.	普通美国儿童也许不是全世界境况最糟糕的，但美国财富和儿童条件之间的反差大到无与伦比。 大约14.


About 14.5% of the American population as a whole is poor, but 19.9% of children – some 15 million individuals – live in poverty.	5%的美国总人口属于穷人，但19. 9%的儿童——大概相当于1,500万人——生活在贫困中。


Among developed countries, only Romania has a higher rate of child poverty.	在发达国家中，只有罗马尼亚的儿童贫困率更高。


The US rate is two-thirds higher than that in the United Kingdom, and up to four times the rate in the Nordic countries.	美国的儿童贫困率比英国高三分之二，比北欧国家高三倍。


For some groups, the situation is much worse: more than 38% of black children, and 30% of Hispanic children, are poor.	某些群体的状况更是恶劣得多：38%的黑人儿童和30%的西班牙裔儿童是穷人。


None of this is because Americans do not care about their children.	所有这些都不是因为美国不在乎它的儿童。


It is because America has embraced a policy agenda in recent decades that has caused its economy to become wildly unequal, leaving the most vulnerable segments of society further and further behind.	而是因为美国在近几十年中采取的政策日程导致其经济变得普遍不平等，让最脆弱的社会细分群体越来越落后。


The growing concentration of wealth – and a significant reduction in taxes on it – has meant less money to spend on investments for the public good, like education and the protection of children.	��富的日益集中——以及财富税收的大幅减少——意味着花在教育和儿童保护等公共品投资上的支出越来越少了。


As a result, America’s children have become worse off.	结果，美国儿童的境况每况愈下。


Their fate is a painful example of how inequality not only undermines economic growth and stability – as economists and organizations like the International Monetary Fund are finally acknowledging – but also violates our most cherished notions of what a fair society should look like.	他们的命运是一个惨痛的教训，说明了不平等性不但破坏经济增长和稳定——经济学家和国际货币基金组织（IMF）等组织总算开始承认这一点了——也有悖于我们最珍视的公平社会的概念。


Income inequality is correlated with inequalities in health, access to education, and exposure to environmental hazards, all of which burden children more than other segments of the population.	收入不平等与健康不平等、教育不平等和环境危险不平等都具有相关性，而所有这些对儿童的影响比其他人群更大。


Indeed, nearly one in five poor American children are diagnosed with asthma, a rate 60% higher than non-poor children.	事实上，近五分之一的美国贫穷儿童被诊断出哮喘，比非贫穷儿童高出60%。


Learning disabilities occur almost twice as frequently among children in households earning less than $35,000 a year than they do in households earning more than $100,000.	年收入低于35,000美元家庭的儿童学习无能比例比年收入高于100,000美元家庭的儿童高出近一倍。


And some in the US Congress want to cut food stamps – on which some 23 million American households depend, threatening the poorest children with hunger.	一些美国国会议员还想削减食品券——大约2,300万美国家庭需要仰仗食品券——这将令去贫穷儿童面临挨饿的危险。


These inequalities in outcomes are closely tied to inequalities in opportunities.	这些结果上的不平等与机会不平等息息相关。


Inevitably, in countries where children have inadequate nutrition, insufficient access to health care and education, and higher exposure to environmental hazards, the children of the poor will have far different life prospects from those of the rich.	在儿童营养不足、无法获得足够医疗和教育的国家，环境风险也难免更高，穷孩子的生活前景远远比不上富孩子。


And, partly because an American child’s lifetime prospects are more dependent on his or her parents’ income and education than in other advanced countries, the US now has the least equality of opportunity of any advanced country.	此外，部分因为美国儿童一生前景比其他发达国家更多地取决于父母的收入和教育，目前美国的机会平等程度低于任何其他发达国家。


At America’s most elite universities, for example, only around 9% of students come from the bottom half of the population, while 74% come from the top quarter.	比如，在美国的精英大学，只有9%左右的学生来自底层二分之一人口，74%来自最高层四分之一人口。


Most societies recognize a moral obligation to help ensure that young people can live up to their potential.	大部分社会都认为帮助确保年轻人能实现潜力所允许的生活水平是一种道德义务。


Some countries even impose a constitutional mandate for equality of educational opportunities.	一些国家甚至从宪法上规定教育机会必须平等。


But in America, more is spent on the education of rich students than on the education of the poor.	但在美国，富学生的教育支出要高于穷学生。


As a result, the US is wasting some of its most valuable assets, with some young people – bereft of skills – turning to dysfunctional activities.	结果，美国正在浪费其最宝贵的资产之一。 一些年轻人无法获得技能，只能从事非正常活动。


American states like California spend about as much on prisons as on higher education – and sometimes more.	加利福尼亚等州的监狱支出与高等教育支出相当，有时还要更高。


Without compensatory measures – including pre-school education, ideally beginning at a very young age – unequal opportunities translate into unequal lifelong outcomes by the time children reach the age of five.	不采取补偿措施——包括最好从幼儿时期就开始的学前教育——机会不平等就会在儿童达到五岁时转化为一生结果的不平等。


That should be a spur to policy action.	这应该成为对政策行动的鞭策。


Indeed, while inequality’s harmful effects are wide-reaching, and impose huge costs on our economies and societies, they are largely avoidable.	事实上，尽管不平等性的伤害效应很广，并且给我们的经济与社会造成了巨大成本，但它们大多是可以避免的。


The extremes of inequality observed in some countries are not the inexorable result of economic forces and laws.	一些国家所观察到的极端不平等不是经济力量和定律的无情结果。


The right policies – stronger social safety nets, progressive taxation, and better regulation (especially of the financial sector), to name a few – can reverse these devastating trends.	正确的政策——强化社会安全网、累进税制和更好的监管（特别是对金融部门），等等——可以扭转这些消极趋势。


To generate the political will that such reforms require, we must confront policymakers’ inertia and inaction with the grim facts of inequality and its devastating effects on our children.	要形成这些改革所需要的政治意愿，我们必须将决策者的惰性和不作为与不平等性的严峻现实及其对儿童造成的消极影响对立起来。


We can reduce childhood deprivation and increase equality of opportunity, thereby laying the groundwork for a more just and prosperous future – one that reflects our own avowed values.	我们能够减轻儿童权利的剥夺、增加机会平等，从而为更公正、更繁荣的未来——反映我们所公开追求的价值的未来——打下基础。


So why don’t we?	为什么我们还不行动呢？


Of the harm that inequality inflicts on our economies, politics, and societies, the damage done to children demands special concern.	不平等性给我们的经济、政治与社会造成诸多伤害，其中对儿童的伤害需要特别关注。


Whatever responsibility poor adults may bear for their lot in life – they may not have worked hard enough, saved enough, or made good decisions – children’s circumstances are thrust upon them without any sort of choice.	成年人受穷，他自己得负责——也许是工作不够努力，储蓄不够充足、没有做出好决策等——但儿童的环境是上天强加给他们的，他们无从选择。


Children, perhaps more than anyone, need the protection that rights afford – and the US should be providing the world with a shining example of what that means.	也许儿童比其他任何人都更需要权利赋予的保护——而美国应该为前世界树立此中含义的榜样。


American Conservatism’s Crisis of Ideas	美国保守主义的思想危机


BERKELEY – On the back left corner of my desk right now are three recent books: Arthur Brooks’ The Battle, Charles Murray’s Coming Apart, and Nicholas Eberstadt’s A Nation of Takers.	伯克利—现在，在我书桌的左后角摆着三部新书：布鲁克斯（Arthur Brooks）的《战争》（The Battle）、穆雷（Charles Murray）的《崩溃》（Coming Apart）和埃伯斯塔特（Nicholas Eberstadt）的《匪之国》（A Nation of Takers）。


Together, they constitute an important intellectual movement, which also happens to be a large part of the reason that American conservatism today has little that is constructive to say about managing the economy – and little purchase on the center of the American electorate.	总的来说，它们代表了重要的思想动向，这也恰好是当今美国保守主义对治理经济鲜有建设性意见、在美国选举舞台上频频败北的重要原因。


But let’s back up historically, to the founding of what we might call modern conservatism in early nineteenth-century Britain and France.	但让我们回顾历史，看看我们所谓的现代保守主义是如何在19世纪初的英国和法国起源的。


There were some – Frédéric Bastiat and Jean-Baptiste Say come to mind – who believed that government should put the unemployed to work building infrastructure when markets or production were temporarily disrupted.	一些人——巴斯夏（Frédéric Bastiat）和萨伊（Jean-Baptiste Say）立刻出现在眼前——认为当市场或生产出现了暂时性的干扰时，政府应该安排失业者去建设基础设施。


But they were balanced by those like Nassau Senior, who spoke out against even famine relief: Although a million people would die in the Irish Potato Famine, “that would scarcely be enough.”	但他们的观点被西尼尔（Nassau Senior）反对，他认为就连食品救济都不应该有：尽管数百万人因爱尔兰土豆饥荒丧命，但“这远远不够。 ”


The main thrust of early conservatism was root-and-branch opposition to every form of social insurance: make the poor richer, and they would become more fertile.	早期保守主义的主要卖点是彻底反对任何形式的社会保险：让穷人变富，他们就会生更多孩子。


As a result, farm sizes would drop (as land was divided among ever more children), labor productivity would fall, and the poor would become even poorer.	结果，农场规模会下降（因为土地得分给越来越多的子女），劳动生产率会下降，而穷人会变得更穷。


Social insurance was not just pointless; it was counterproductive.	社会保险不但毫无意义； 简直就是大逆不道。


The proper economic policy was to teach people to venerate the throne (so that they would respect property), the paternal hearth (so that they would not marry imprudently young), and the religious altar (so that they would fear pre-marital sex).	合理的经济政策是让人们尊王（从而尊重产权）、尊父（从而不会轻率早婚）、尊宗教（从而畏惧婚前性行为）。


Then, perhaps, with women chaste for half or more of their childbearing years, the surplus population would diminish and conditions for the poor would be as good as they could be.	接着，只要女人在一半或以上的育龄时期严守贞洁，新增人口就会减少，穷人所处的环境就能尽可能地改善。


Fast-forward 150 years to post-World War II America, and to the original Chicago School critique of the New Deal version of social insurance – that it created “notches” that perverted economic incentives.	快速地浏览一下二战前150年中的美国，看看芝加哥学派对罗斯福新政这一社会保险新形式的最初批判——它形成了阻碍经济创新的“等级”（notch）。


The government, Milton Friedman and others argued, told the poor: make more money and we will take away your free housing, food stamps, and income support.	弗里德曼和其他人指出，政府告诉穷人：赚多点钱，我们将剥夺你的免费房子、食品券和收入支持。


People are rational, Friedman said, so they will not work for long if they get nothing or next to nothing for it.	人是理性的，弗里德曼说，因此如果没有好处或好处不多，他们是不会长时间工作的。


The big difference between the Malthusian conservative critics of social insurance in the early nineteenth century and the Chicago critics of the 1970’s is that the Chicago critics had a point: Providing public support to the “worthy” poor, and then removing it when they began to stand on their own feet, poisoned incentives and was unlikely to lead to good outcomes.	19世纪初马尔萨斯派保守主义对社会保险的批判和芝加哥学派20世纪70年代的批判之间的重大区别在于，芝加哥学派的批判有���样一个要点：为“相称的”穷人提供公共支持，在他们开始自立根生时撤掉支持，这样做会破坏激励，不可能形成好的结果。


And so, from 1970 to 2000, a broad coalition of conservatives (who wanted to see the government stop encouraging immorality), centrists (who wanted government money spent effectively), and leftists (who wanted poverty alleviated) removed the “notches” from the social-insurance system.	1970—2000年，保守派（他们想让政府停止鼓励伤风败俗行为）、中间派（他们想让政府把钱花在刀刃上）和左派（他们想减贫）组成了广泛同盟，把“等级”从社会保险体系中逐出。


Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and even George W. Bush and their supporters created the current system, in which tax rates and eligibility thresholds are not punitive disincentives to enterprise.	卡特、里根、老布什、克林顿甚至小布什诸位总统及其支持者创建了当前的体系，税率和起税点不再起到抑制企业的反激励效果。


So what is the problem that America’s new generation of conservative critics of social insurance sees?	那么，美国新一代社会保险的保守主义批判家看到了什么问题？


It is not that raising poor people’s standard of living above bare subsistence produces Malthusian catastrophe, or that taxes and withdrawal of welfare benefits make people work, at the margin, for nothing.	产生马尔萨斯式崩溃的不是穷人的生活水平较勉强维生有所提高，让人们几乎无酬工作的也不是税收和取消福利。


For Eberstadt, the problem is that dependence on government is emasculating, and that too many people are dependent on government.	在埃伯斯塔特看来，问题在于对政府的依赖在让人民变弱，太多的人仰仗政府过活。


For Brooks, it is that knowing that public programs make one’s life easier causes one to vote for non-Republican candidates.	在布鲁克斯看来，问题在于知道公共项目让生活变得更加容易导致民众把选票投给非共和党候选人。