Although it still isn’t clear how much Trump actually wants to be president, we know that he hates to lose.	尽管特朗普实际有多想成为总统尚不明确，但我们知道他不喜欢输。


And yet he doesn’t seem to understand the basics of presidential politics, nor the difference between the primary season and the main event.	但他似乎并不了解总统政治的基础知识，也不了解初选阶段和决选阶段之间的区别。


He still boasts that he defeated all of his Republican opponents, though, given how the primary process works, it’s easier to beat 16 rivals than one or two.	他仍在吹嘘他击败了所有共和党对手，但鉴于初选程序的运作方式，击败16名对手并不比一名或两名更难。


Trump also confuses the enthusiastic supporters who attend his rallies with the presidential electorate.	特朗普还令参加其总统选民集会的狂热支持者感到困惑。


He seems not to comprehend that what he says to his ardent fans is heard by a much larger, and less sympathetic, public.	他似乎并不了解他对忠实粉丝的言论会被规模更大、同情心更少的公众听见。


This is a key reason why his poll ratings were plummeting by mid-August.	而这恰恰是截止8月中旬其民调支持率暴跌的原因。


And so he did what flailing candidates often do: he shook up the staff.	于是他做了垂死挣扎的候选人往往会做的事：改组工作人员。


Bannon replaced Paul Manafort, who was close to the elites Bannon despises, and who had tried to strengthen Trump’s ties to them.	班农更换了保罗·马纳福特，后者与班农鄙视的精英关系密切，并试图强化特朗普和他们之间的关系。


Manafort made the major misstep of trying to compel Trump to change, and of telling mainstream Republicans that he could manage the candidate.	马纳福特的主要失误是试图迫使特朗普改变，以及告诉主流共和党人他能够管理候选人。


Even politicians without Trump’s outsize ego would bridle at such talk.	这样的说法肯定会激怒即使不具备特朗普这样超级自我的政治候选人。


By the time Manafort was replaced, Trump was ignoring his advice, and Manafort had essentially given up.	到马纳福特被替换时，特朗普已经无视他的建议，而马纳福特也基本处于放弃状态。


In the meantime, Manafort’s past as an adviser to and lobbyist for unsavory dictators around the world was catching up with him.	与此同时，马纳福特过去曾为世界各地令人生厌的独裁者担任顾问和说客的经历也开始影响他的现在。


In one instance, he had worked for former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, a proxy for Russian President Vladimir Putin who fled to Russia after being driven from power in 2014.	有一次他曾为前乌克兰总统亚努科维奇工作，亚努科维奇是俄国总统弗拉基米尔·普京的代理，并在2014年被赶下台后逃往俄国。


The US Justice Department has now started to scrutinize Manafort’s lobbying activities in the US on behalf of Yanukovych, which posed yet another threat to the campaign.	美国司法部现在开始调查马纳福特代表亚努科维奇在美国进行的游说活动，而这又对特朗普的竞选构成了新的威胁。


While Trump’s influential children had initially favored Manafort, that changed when he started to attract the wrong kind of media attention, including questions about Trump’s so-far inexplicable affinity for Putin.	虽然特朗普颇具影响力的子女开始时偏爱马纳福特，但当他开始吸引负面媒体关注（包括特朗普迄今为止与普京莫名其妙的亲密关系）时这一切都发生了改变。


Manafort may be gone from the Trump campaign, but his Ukrainian ties will be a matter of press interest for some time to come.	马纳福特或许已经离开了特朗普的竞选队伍，但在未来一段时间内他与乌克兰方面的关系将会成为媒体的兴趣点。


The 2016 presidential election isn’t over, so it’s still possible that Trump could end up in the White House.	2016年总统大选尚未结束，因此特朗普仍然可能最终入主白宫。


His poor judgment in people, glaringly apparent in recent weeks, is yet another reason why that is a dangerous possibility for American democracy.	他对人严重缺乏判断力，这在最近几个星期表现得再明显不过，是可能威胁美国民主的另一个理由。


How Trump Happened	为何要选特朗普?


NEW YORK – As I have traveled around the world in recent weeks, I am repeatedly asked two questions: Is it conceivable that Donald Trump could win the US presidency?	发自纽约——在最近几个星期的环球访问行程中，人们总会问我两个问题：唐纳德·特朗普会有可能赢得美国总统大选吗？


And how did his candidacy get this far in the first place?	他的竞选之路为何能走到今天？


As for the first question, though political forecasting is even more difficult than economic forecasting, the odds are strongly in favor of Hillary Clinton.	至于第一个问题，虽然预测政治比预测经济更困难，但希拉里·克林顿的胜算原本是极高的。


Still, the closeness of the race (at least until very recently) has been a mystery: Clinton is one of the most qualified and well prepared presidential candidates that the United States has had, while Trump is one of the least qualified and worst prepared.	然而两人的支持率竟能如此接近（至少直到最近）则令人费解：希拉里是美国最具资格且准备最充分的总统候选人之一，而特朗普却是最不够格且参选最仓促的人之一。


Moreover, Trump’s campaign has survived behavior by him that would have ended a candidate’s chances in the past.	此外，尽管特朗普表现出众多出格言行，但其选举之路却依然延续，要是在过去他早就走不下去了。


So why would Americans be playing Russian roulette (for that is what even a one-in-six chance of a Trump victory means)?	那么为什么美国人愿意去玩这么一场特朗普可能拥有1/6胜选机会的俄罗斯轮盘死亡游戏？


Those outside the US want to know the answer, because the outcome affects them, too, though they have no influence over it.	美国以外的人都想知道答案，因为虽然他们无从左右大选，但这一结果却会影响他们。


And that brings us to the second question: why did the US Republican Party nominate a candidate that even its leaders rejected?	这就为我们带来了第二个问题：美国共和党为什么提名一位连党内领袖都表示反对的候选人？


Obviously, many factors helped Trump beat 16 Republican primary challengers to get this far.	很明显，有众多因素帮助特朗普击败了另外16位共和党主要挑战者。


Personalities matter, and some people do seem to warm to Trump’s reality-TV persona.	比如个性就很重要，有些人似乎对特朗普在电视真人秀中展现的个人形象非常受用。


But several underlying factors also appear to have contributed to the closeness of the race.	但几个基本因素似乎也促成了两位侯选人势均力敌的状况。


For starters, many Americans are economically worse off than they were a quarter-century ago.	首先，许多美国人在经济上确实比他们在1/4个世纪前更为窘迫。


The median income of full-time male employees is lower than it was 42 years ago, and it is increasingly difficult for those with limited education to get a full-time job that pays decent wages.	全职男性雇员的收入中位数低于42年前的水平，而对于那些教育程度不高的人来说，找到一份能拿到足额工资的全职工作也越来越难了。


Indeed, real (inflation-adjusted) wages at the bottom of the income distribution are roughly where they were 60 years ago.	事实上，那些位处收入分配底部群体的实际（扣除通胀因素后）工资依然停留在约60年前的水平。


So it is no surprise that Trump finds a large, receptive audience when he says the state of the economy is rotten.	因此当特朗普指出经济状况不断恶化的时候，他立刻就能找到了一个庞大的听众群体。


But Trump is wrong both about the diagnosis and the prescription.	但问题在于特朗普对于这一症结的诊断和开出的处方都是错误的。


The US economy as a whole has done well for the last six decades: GDP has increased nearly six-fold.	美国经济作为一个整体在过去六十年中表现良好：GDP增长了近六倍。


But the fruits of that growth have gone to a relatively few at the top – people like Trump, owing partly to massive tax cuts that he would extend and deepen.	只是在大规模减税政策之下这些增长成果落到了位于收入金字塔顶端的一批人手里——比如特朗普，而他还会将此继续延伸和深化下去。


At the same time, reforms that political leaders promised would ensure prosperity for all – such as trade and financial liberalization – have not delivered. Far from it.	与此同时，政治领导人承诺的将惠及所有人的改革——例如贸易和金融自由化——却未能兑现，甚至遥遥无期。


And those whose standard of living has stagnated or declined have reached a simple conclusion: America’s political leaders either didn’t know what they were talking about or were lying (or both).	于是那些生活水平陷入停滞或衰退的人就会得出一个简单的结论：美国的政治领导人要么不知道自己在说什么，要么就是在说谎（或者两者兼有）。 Trump


Trump wants to blame all of America’s problems on trade and immigration. He’s wrong.	特朗普想把美国所有的问题都归罪于贸易和移民，但这是不对的。


The US would have faced deindustrialization even without freer trade: global employment in manufacturing has been declining, with productivity gains exceeding demand growth.	即使贸易不走向自由化，美国也依然会面临去工业化：由于生产力的增长超过了需求的增长，全球制造业的就业人数一直都是在下降的。


Where the trade agreements failed, it was not because the US was outsmarted by its trading partners; it was because the US trade agenda was shaped by corporate interests.	在那些贸易协议失效的领域，并不是美国遭到了贸易伙伴的抛弃； 而是因为美国的贸易议程被大企业利益所左右。


America’s companies have done well, and it is the Republicans who have blocked efforts to ensure that Americans made worse off by trade agreements would share the benefits.	美国企业的表现一直以来都很好，人们也致力于确保那些因受贸易协定影响而陷入困境的美国人可以分享发展收益，但这些努力却遭到了共和党人的长期阻挠。


Thus, many Americans feel buffeted by forces outside their control, leading to outcomes that are distinctly unfair.	因此，许多美国人感觉自己受到了超出他们控制之外的力量的冲击并导致了明显不公平的结果。


Long-standing assumptions – that America is a land of opportunity and that each generation will be better off than the last – have been called into question.	一直存在于人们心中的那种“美国是个充满机会的热土，每一代人都比上一代人活得更好”的图景也因此遭到了质疑 。


The global financial crisis may have represented a turning point for many voters: their government saved the rich bankers who had brought the US to the brink of ruin, while seemingly doing almost nothing for the millions of ordinary Americans who lost their jobs and homes.	对许多选民来说全球金融危机可能是一个转折点：他们的政府营救了那些使美国陷入破产边缘的富有银行家，而似乎对失去工作和家园的数百万普通美国人不管不顾。


The system not only produced unfair results, but seemed rigged to do so.	该体系不仅产生了不公平的结果，而且似乎是故意被操纵去这样做的。


Support for Trump is based, at least partly, on the widespread anger stemming from that loss of trust in government.	对特朗普的支持至少在部分程度上是基于对政府失去信任而产生的广泛愤怒。


But Trump’s proposed policies would make a bad situation much worse.	然而特朗普提出的政策会使情况变得更为糟糕。


Surely, another dose of trickle-down economics of the kind he promises, with tax cuts aimed almost entirely at rich Americans and corporations, would produce results no better than the last time they were tried.	当然，他承诺施行的另一个版本的滴流经济学（trickle-down economics，认为对富人减税能增加富人消费支出，从而向下惠及其他阶级的经济理论）——几乎对所有美国富裕阶层和大企业都进一步削减税负——将产生的结果肯定不会比上一次实施该政策时更好。


In fact, launching a trade war with China, Mexico, and other US trading partners, as Trump promises, would make all Americans poorer and create new impediments to the global cooperation needed to address critical global problems like the Islamic State, global terrorism, and climate change.	事实上，正如特朗普承诺的那样发动针对中国，墨西哥和其他美国贸易伙伴的贸易战将令所有美国人更贫穷，并为解决如伊斯兰国，全球恐怖主义及气候变化等问题的全球合作制造新的障碍。


Using money that could be invested in technology, education, or infrastructure to build a wall between the US and Mexico is a twofer in terms of wasting resources.	使用本可投资于技术，教育或基础设施的资金在美国和墨西哥之间建一堵墙就是一种两败俱伤的浪费资源方式。


There are two messages US political elites should be hearing.	美国政治精英们应该从此领会到两个讯息。


The simplistic neo-liberal market-fundamentalist theories that have shaped so much economic policy during the last four decades are badly misleading, with GDP growth coming at the price of soaring inequality.	首先，在过去四十年中塑造了多项经济政策的简单化新自由市场原教旨主义理论是存在严重误导性的，而GDP的增长正是以不平等状况的恶化为代价。


Trickle-down economics hasn’t and won’t work.	滴流经济学理论无论在过去还是将来都不会发生作用。


Markets don’t exist in a vacuum.	市场不存在于真空中。


The Thatcher-Reagan “revolution,” which rewrote the rules and restructured markets for the benefit of those at the top, succeeded all too well in increasing inequality, but utterly failed in its mission to increase growth.	通过重写规则和重组市场来为社会顶端阶层造福的撒切尔-里根“革命”极大地增加了不平等，但却完全辜负了其促进增长的使命。


This leads to the second message: we need to rewrite the rules of the economy once again, this time to ensure that ordinary citizens benefit.	这就引出了第二个讯息：我们需要重写经济的规则以确保普通公民能够受益。


Politicians in the US and elsewhere who ignore this lesson will be held accountable.	任何无视这一教训的美国和他国政治家将为此付出代价。


Change entails risk. But the Trump phenomenon – and more than a few similar political developments in Europe – has revealed the far greater risks entailed by failing to heed this message: societies divided, democracies undermined, and economies weakened.	变革意味着风险，但特朗普现象——以及欧洲出现的几个类似的政治走向——揭示出如果不注意这一讯息将带来的更大的风险：社会分裂，民主败坏，经济走弱。


Donald Trump’s North Korean Family Values	唐纳德·特朗普的朝鲜家庭价值观


ATLANTA – With every new US president arriving in Washington, DC, come a handful of counselors and aides whose personal ties, built over years and forged in election campaigns, give them pride of place in the administration.	亚特兰大——随着每一届新任美国总统抵达华盛顿，都会有几位与总统多年私交甚厚和在竞选活动中建立私人关系的顾问和助手籍此荣耀地在新政府中任职。


From the “Irish Brotherhood” that brought John F. Kennedy to office to the “Berlin Wall” that guarded Richard Nixon’s door, close friends and confidantes have often outdone the administration’s biggest names.	从将肯尼迪送进白宫的“爱尔兰兄弟会”到为理查德·尼克松守门的“柏林墙”，亲密的朋友和知己的风头往往压过政府中最著名的人物。


But no American president has ever brought to the White House an inner circle dominated by his family – until Donald Trump.	但在唐纳德·特朗普就职以前，还没有一位美国总统将以亲属为主的内部圈子带进白宫。


Judging by Trump’s business history and presidential campaign – which featured few, if any, intimates outside his family – his adult children will have a major hand in his administration’s decisions, despite their lack of experience in international and domestic affairs.	从特朗普的从商经历和总统竞选判断——他在任何一个时期都很少雇用除亲属以外的亲密人士——因此，他的成年子女会成为其政府决策的重要力量，尽管他们的国际和国内事务经验极为缺乏。


After hiring and firing personnel and shaping strategy during the election campaign, Trump’s children have remained front and center in his transition team.	在雇用及解雇工作人员和在竞选活动期间制定策略后，特朗普的子女一直处在其过渡团队的核心位置。


His daughter, Ivanka, joined the president-elect’s tête-à-tête with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.	他的女儿伊万卡参与了这位当选总统与日本首相安倍晋三的私下会面。


His son, Donald, Jr., played a role in picking Congressman Ryan Zinke to be Secretary of the Interior in the new administration.	他的儿子小唐纳德在挑选国会议员莱恩·辛克任新政府内政部长的过程中发挥了重要作用。


Now, Trump is taking his dynasty to the White House.	现在，特朗普正在把他的王朝带入白宫。


Ivanka is set to take over the First Lady’s office there.	伊万卡注定要接管那里的第一夫人办公室。


Her husband, the real-estate investor Jared Kushner, just might be suited, if only in the eyes of his father-in-law, to serve as a special envoy to broker peace in the Middle East.	她的丈夫，地产投资商贾瑞德·库什纳只有在其岳父眼中，或许适合担任中东和平谈判特使的职务。


Yes, Donald, Jr. and his brother, Eric, will remain in New York to run the Trump Organization, which oversees their father’s diverse businesses; but Trump’s claim that his sons will remain at arm’s length strains credulity.	没错，小唐纳德及其兄弟埃里克将留在纽约管理特朗普的组织，该组织负责监管其父名下各式各样的企业； 但特朗普声称他将与儿子们保持距离本身就会削弱民众对他的信任度。


All of this has spurred questions about the Trump children’s capacity to leverage their father’s presidency to benefit the family business, with many fixating on whether Trump is violating conflict-of-interest or anti-nepotism rules.	所有这些都引出了特朗普的子女利用其父的总统地位为家族企业谋利的疑问，很多人都指出特朗普是否正在违反利益冲突或限制裙带关系的原则。


But Trump regards such questions as essentially moot.	但特朗普认为这些问题根本没有意义。


That is not surprising.	这并不令人感到惊讶。


Trump’s management model has long been underpinned by a hereditary inner circle.	特朗普的管理模式长期以来一直由基于血缘的内部圈子支撑。


His adult children have spent their lives being groomed and promoted, and have operated at the pinnacle of the Trump Organization for years.	他的成年子女一直在接受提拔和培养，多年以来一直处在特朗普组织的最高层。


They now occupy three of the company’s board seats, with Trump occupying a fourth.	他们现在占据了公司三个董事席位，而第四个则由特朗普占据着。


Given their standing in the company, and their relationship with their father, their influence in his administration should not be in doubt.	鉴于他们在公司中所处的地位以及他们与父亲的关系，他们对新政府的影响力是毋庸置疑的。


The remaining top-level positions are filled by long-time family retainers who, on average, have 17 years on the job.	其余的高层职位被家族企业的长期雇佣者所掌握，这些人平均拥有长达十七年的就职经历。


Several have spent three decades at Trump’s elbow.	其中有几位三十年来一直是特朗普的左膀右臂。


Compared to public companies of comparable size, the Trump Organization’s dynastic C-Suite and the longevity of its consiglieri are striking.	与同等规模的上市公司相比，特朗普组织的王朝最高管理层及其参谋顾问的长期留任非常引人注目。


The lesson for any administration appointee should be clear: only loyalty comes close to heredity in winning and holding an executive role.	任何被政府任命者的教训都非常明确：在夺取和保住管理职位的道路上，只有忠诚能与血缘相提并论。


The record of the modern US presidency sheds little light on whether Trump’s family-driven leadership style will work.	现代美国总统史无法告诉人们特朗普这种家族主导型的执政模式能否取得成功。


Yet Trump is unlikely to weigh the pros and cons of stacking his inner circle with family members, not least because of his own experience: ever since his father brought him into the family business, he has never worked anywhere else.	但特朗普不太可能权衡将家庭成员塞进内部圈子的利弊，尤其因为其自身经历使然：自从他的父亲带他进入家族企业，他就从来没有在其他地方做过任何工作。


Moreover, Trump is far from the only corporate boss who prefers to keep leadership “all in the family.”	此外，喜欢把“领导权完全掌控在家人手里”的企业老板也并非只有特朗普一个。


A 2016 study by the Boston Consulting Group found that one-third of American companies with annual revenue of $1 billion or more are family-owned.	2016年波士顿咨询公司一项研究表明1/3年收入在10亿美元以上的美国企业所有权都掌握在家族手中。


Of those, 40% are family-run.	当然，其中40%由家族经营。


There is also plenty of precedent for family-based leadership in government, though not in developed democracies.	以家族为基础的领导权力在政府中也曾有过不少先例，尽管不在发达民主国家。


From Kazakhstan to Congo, blood binds together ruling elites who share the spoils, guard against usurpers, and ensure that their children succeed them in power.	从哈萨克斯坦到刚果，血缘将分享赃物、对抗篡位者和确保由其子女继承权利的执政精英联系在一起进行合作。


While it may seem far-fetched to compare the Trumps to, say, the Kims of North Korea – the world’s longest-running family dictatorship – plenty of similarities are likely to emerge.	尽管将特朗普与朝鲜的金氏家族（也是世界延续时间最长的家族独裁制度）相提并论或许似乎有些牵强——但仍有可能找到大量相似之处。


Some already have.	某些相���之处已经非常明显了。


The first rule of family dictatorships is that loyalty matters above all else.	家族独裁的首要原则是忠诚高于一切。


Like the histrionic pledges of support required from North Korean commissars and generals for their leader Kim Jong-un, the Trump White House is likely to demand unswerving fealty to the clan.	就像金氏家族要求朝鲜委员和将领承诺绝对忠于领袖金正恩家族一样，特朗普的白宫很可能要求任职官员绝对忠于特朗普家族。


That message has already been received loud and clear by incoming White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and Chief Strategist Steve Bannon.	即将上任的白宫幕僚长普利巴斯和首席策略家史蒂夫·班农已经彻底领会了这一信息。


Both have repeatedly affirmed their admiration for Kushner and vowed that he will be deeply involved in decisions, despite his utter lack of experience.	两者都一再强调他们对库什纳的钦佩，并承诺他将深度参与决策，尽管他完全没有参与决策所需的经验。


Second, tasks beat titles.	其次，任务比职务更重要。


Like Kim, who has ignored the pecking order of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea to give his sister and brother high-ranking positions, Trump is likely to entrust his offspring with key assignments.	以金正恩为例，他不顾执政的朝鲜工人党既定的尊卑秩序，任命他的姐妹和兄弟担任高级职务，特朗普很可能将关键任务委托给他的后代。


While nepotism laws will probably rule out official presidential appointments for Trump’s children and their spouses, that won’t matter much in practice; their de facto clout, as well as Trump’s own priorities, will quickly become apparent.	尽管限制裙带关系的法律很有可能阻止特朗普给予其子女及其配偶正式的总统任命，但这在实际执政时并不重要； 他们的实际影响力，以及特朗普自身的执政重点，可能很快变得明了。


Indeed, their influence in advancing Trump’s major goals could easily overwhelm that of cabinet-level appointees, who would be wise to accommodate them.	事实上，他们对推进主要目标的影响力很可能轻松压过内阁层面的接受任命者，而正式任命的内阁成员识趣地接纳他们才是明智的选择。


Third, there will be unexpected promotions and abrupt purges.	第三，或将出现意想不到的晋升和突如其来的清洗。


In North Korea, all of this dictated from the top.	在朝鲜，所有这些都由顶层权力掌控。


In his reality television persona, Trump’s enthusiastic firings and occasional Cinderella-like promotions of low-level employees provide an obvious parallel.	在他的现实电视真人秀中，特郎普极端的官员解雇和偶尔灰姑娘般地提拔底层雇员显然是美国版的独裁执政。


Under Trump, as under Kim, sputtering or failed policies are likely to have personnel consequences, though only those outside the family will face them.	像朝鲜金氏政权一样，在特朗普治下失败和糟糕的政策很有可能会产生人事后果，但只有家族以外的人才有可能承担这种后果。


Two weeks before the election, one of the Trump campaign’s top employees, Brad Parscale, suggested how a Trump White House would function.	选举前两周，特郎普竞选活动的顶级雇员之一布拉德·帕斯凯勒暗示了特朗普的白宫将如何运作。


“My loyalty is to the family,” Parscale said.	“我的忠诚属于这个家族，”帕斯凯勒说。


No one in Kim’s family could put it more succinctly.	即使金氏家族的任何人都不能再说得更加明确了。


There is nothing inevitable about this trap, and its effects are often exaggerated.	落入这一陷阱并非不可避免，而且由此带来的后果往往被外���夸大。


Trump could also do damage by inflaming Chinese government and military hardliners, if he confirms their belief that the US wants to undermine their country’s “core interests��� – namely, sustaining the appearance, if not the reality, that there is only one China.	特朗普的另一个破坏来自激怒中国政府和军界强硬派，如果他让他们认定美国想要破坏中国的“核心利益”——即保持表面上（尽管未必是实质上）的一个中国——的话。


Trump’s Choice on Climate Change	特朗普的气候变化选择


WASHINGTON, DC – Planning. It is the key to successful military action – and, in many ways, to success in general – and United States Marines like me pride ourselves on it.	华盛顿——计划既是成功军事行动的关键——而且在很多情况下，也是取得一般成功的关键——而我这样的美国海军陆战队恰恰以此为骄傲的资本。


But if you’ve spent 30 years in the military, as I have, you know that an effective plan cannot be static; operating environments change, often in surprising or unexpected ways.	但如果你像我一样拥有30年的从军经验，就会知道有效的计划一定不会是静止不变的； 计划的执行环境往往出现出人意料或令人惊讶的变化。


Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election earlier this month constitutes just such a change.	唐纳德·特朗普月初在总统竞选中获胜就是这样一种变化。


It may be a long time before we fully understand the new operating environment.	我们可能需要很长时间去理解新环境。


But we must begin adjusting – and continue adjusting as new facts come to light.	但我们必须开始调整——而且随着对事实了解的不断深入而不断延续这一调整过程。


Otherwise, we risk becoming vulnerable to serious strategic threats – the gravest of which is likely to be climate change.	否则，我们就有可能面临严重的战略威胁——其中最严重的威胁可能是气候变化。


The increase in the Earth’s surface temperature represents a fundamental shift in the global operating environment, both economically and militarily.	地球表面温度升高代表了全球经济和军事环境的根本转变。


It is not just that some so-called “elites” think that the weather is going to warm up a bit.	这绝不仅仅是某些所谓“精英”认为天气会变得暖和一点。


Climate change is not trivial; nor are its security implications.	气候变化绝非微不足道； 气候变化的安全影响也不容忽视。


Climate change is what we in the military call a “threat multiplier.”	我们军中称气候变化有“放大威胁”的作用。


Its connection to conflict is not linear.	它与冲突之间的关系绝非线性这样简单。


Rather, it intensifies and complicates existing security risks, increasing the frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions.	相反，它导致现有的安全风险复杂及恶化，加大未来任务的频率、规模和复杂性。


The urgency of the climate threat is growing quickly.	气候威胁的紧迫性正迅速加剧。


Climate change is already expanding the scope of military operations, with the US Navy and Coast Guard assessing new missions in the Arctic.	气候变化已经扩大了军事行动的范围，美国海军和海岸警卫队评估了北极的新行动。


More intense hurricanes, typhoons, and droughts are increasing the demand for military-assisted humanitarian responses, most notably in the Pacific.	强度更强的飓风、台风和干旱加大了对军事协助的人道主义对策的需求，其中尤以太平洋地区最为明显。


As increasingly extreme weather reshapes migration patterns, the number of displaced people (already at record highs worldwide) will rise, and competition for essential resources (such as water, food, and energy) will increase.	随着越来越频繁的极端天气改变迁移模式，流离失所者（已经达到有史以来创纪录的高位）的数量和对基本资源（如水、粮食和能源）的争夺将持续增加。


These effects will be particularly destabilizing in already-volatile situations, exacerbating challenges like weak governance, economic inequality, and social tensions – and producing truly toxic conflicts.	这些影响在本已不稳定的情况下将尤其不稳定，导致诸如治理薄弱、经济不平等和社会紧张等挑战恶化——并引发真正的高毒性冲突。


That is why we call climate change “an accelerant of instability.”	这就是为什么我们将气候变化称为“动荡催化剂”的理由。


Don’t take my word for it.	对我的话不必盲从。


America’s entire national security establishment is clear on this.	美国整个国家安全体系对此都心知肚明。


In fact, the US military has recognized climate change as a major security risk for more than a decade, making it a world leader on this front.	事实上，美国军方已经认识到气候变化是十多年来最主要的安全风险，也因此在这一领域发挥世界领导作用。


Last year’s National Security Strategy reiterated this view, identifying climate change as a top-level strategic risk to US interests, alongside factors like terrorism, economic crisis, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.	去年的国家安全战略重申了这一观点，明确气候变化和恐怖主义、经济危机及大规模毁灭性武器扩散等因素一起，构成了对美国利益的最高战略威胁。


These are not empty words.	这些都不是空话。


The US military has long been integrating climate change into our planning.	美国军方一直将气候变化纳入我们的计划之中。


After all, the worst security failures – for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which dragged the US into World War II, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks – tend to arise from inadequate preparation.	归根结底，爆发最严重的安全失败——如日本偷袭珍珠港将美国拖入第二次世界大战，以及2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击——往往都是由于准备不足。


Reflecting this lesson, during President George W. Bush’s administration, legislation was enacted to require all US defense agencies to consider the effects of climate change in future strategic policy development.	为体现这一教训，乔治·W·布什总统执政期间颁布法律，要求所有美国国防机构考虑气候变化对未来战略政策发展的影响。


In the last four years, the Department of Defense has released a series of directives that put climate-change preparedness at the center of how we do business.	过去四年国防部颁布一系列指令，将气候变化备灾工作作为我们执行任务的核心。


It is too early to say what the Trump administration will do when it comes to climate change.	猜测特朗普政府将在气候变化问题上采取哪些措施还为时尚早。


On the campaign trail, he promised to undo some key climate policies, even threatening to back out of the Paris climate agreement.	在竞选期间，他曾承诺撤销某些关键气候政策，甚至威胁要退出巴黎气候协定。


It is critically important that he and his cabinet recognize that to follow through on his promise would be extremely shortsighted.	最重要的是，特朗普及其内阁必须认识到兑现他的承诺将是极其短视的行为。


The truth is that it is in America’s best interest, in terms of both security and the economy, to remain on the path toward a cleaner future.	现实是在安全和经济领域，继续为更清洁的未来而努力与���国的最大利益相符。


Already, the clean-energy revolution has brought jobs, money, and industry to rural America.	清洁能源革命已经为美国农村带来了就业、资金和工业化。


It is a source of untold opportunities.	它带来了难以想象的机会。


And isn’t identifying opportunity one of America’s great strengths?	难道寻找机会不一直是美国的一项优势？


The shifting economic operating environment bolsters these opportunities.	不断变化的经济运行环境支撑了这些机遇。


China, India, and other emerging economies are racing to be the global clean-energy superpower; it would not be in America’s interest to be left behind.	中国、印度和其他新兴经济体正迅速成为全球清洁能源超级大国； 落后不符合美国的利益。


If America is to be great, as Trump has promised, it needs to build more future-oriented industries that can compete globally – and that can provide jobs to American workers.	如果美国想要像特朗普承诺的那样变得伟大，就需要建立更多面向未来的工业，可以在全球范围内展开竞争——并为美国工人提供就业机会。


Moreover, Trump’s administration will need to continue the US military’s work and create a more resilient national security strategy.	此外，特朗普政府要继续推进美国军方的工作，制定出更为灵活的国家安全战略。


The American Security Project, of which I am CEO, looks forward to providing the Trump administration with relevant advice and solutions.	我本人任首席执行官的美国安全计划期待为特朗普政府提供相关的建议和方案。


We will also call the administration to account if it fails to protect US interests adequately.	如果特朗普政府未能充分保护美国的利益，我们同样会追究它的责任。


Ignoring threats might work in politics, but it does not work in security.	对威胁视而不见可能在政治上有效，但在安全上却行不通。


Denying the reality of climate change will not make it go away; rather, it will erode the economy and expose the US to serious risks.	否认气候变化的现实不会让问题消失，反而会削弱经济，使美国面临严重的安全风险。


That would amount to a failure by Trump to fulfill one of his most important responsibilities as president: ensuring the security of the American people.	这相当于特朗普未能兑现作为总统最重要的一项承诺：即确保美国人民的安全。


Serious strategic risks cannot be a political plaything.	严重的战略威胁绝非政治把戏。


The threat of climate change does not sit neatly on either side of the left-right divide; it is – and must remain – part of US strategic planning.	气候变化威胁绝非左右翼分歧的产物——而且必须继续成为美国战略计划的一部分。


Anyone who has been involved in such planning knows that we cannot prepare only for the wars we want to fight; we must prepare for the wars that will come, whether we like it or not.	任何规划参与者都知道我们不能只为我们希望参与的战斗做好准备； 我们必须为未来的战争做好准备，无论我们是否喜欢。


A Wave Election in America?	美国的选举波？


WASHINGTON, DC – With the world mesmerized by the United States’ presidential race this year, the race for control of the US House of Representatives and the Senate has been largely overlooked.	华盛顿——随着世人瞩目今年的美国总统竞选，控制美国众议院和参议院的争夺很大程度上被人们忽视了。


But the outcome of the congressional elections could make or break the next president’s agenda.	但国会选举的结果可能成就或毁灭下一任总统的政策。


For all the power a president has, the 100-member Senate determines the fate of international treaties as well as the president’s nominations and legislative proposals.	虽然总统掌握的权力令人艳羡，但100名参议院议员决定着国际条约的命运以及总统提名和立法建议。


The 435-member House does not have as much power as the Senate, but control of the White House, the Senate, and the House by the same party could overcome much of the gridlock that has debilitated US governance in recent years.	435位众议院议员权力虽没有参议员那么大，但由同一党派控制白宫、参议院和众议院却可以打破近年来削弱美国执政力量的大部分僵局。


The US does not have party-line elections, so voters can either punish a party (usually the one that has been in charge) by voting against all of its candidates; fully support a particular party; or split their tickets by voting for one party’s presidential candidate and another party’s congressional candidates.	美国的选举不强制区分党派路线，因此选民们惩罚某政党（往往是执政党）往往可以通过投票反对其所有候选人； 完全支持某一政党；


Events have moved quickly since the Washington Post came upon an 11-year-old tape showing Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump bragging about his sexual aggressiveness.	《华盛顿邮报》公布11年前的共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普吹嘘自己性攻击行为的录像后，竞选局势迅速发生了变化。


Not only have the Democrats’ chances to retake the Senate improved; so, too, have their prospects for retaking the House.	不仅民主党重新入主参议院的机会有所提升； 而且重新入主众议院的机会也有所增加。


Previously, almost no one considered the House to be in play.	此前，几乎没人认为众议院选情会发生任何变化。


Trump’s drop in the polls since the tape’s release has changed that, and the candidate has made matters worse for his party by denying that he has groped or assaulted women – a claim that impelled numerous women to come forward and say otherwise.	录像公布后特朗普的民调支持率大幅下降，而候选人否认自己曾抚摸或袭击女性对本党选情造成了雪上加霜的后果——他的表态迫使数名女性站出来否定他。


Still, winning the House won’t be easy for the Democrats, because congressional districts have been heavily gerrymandered, and Republicans control more of the governorships and state legislatures that oversee that process.	但赢得众议院选举对民主党来说绝非易事，因为国会选区已被严重改划，而共和党则把持着更多州长席位和州立法机构来保障这一进程。


The Democrats must net at least 30 House seats and four Senate seats to retake control of each chamber, respectively.	民主党要想重新控制众参两院，必须分别净获取至少30个众议院席位和4个参议院席位。


A net Democratic gain of four Senate seats would produce a 50-50 split, in which case, if Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton wins, her vice president, Tim Kaine, would be on hand to break tie votes.	民主党净获4个参议院席位将形成五五开的局面，在这样的情况下，如果民主党总统候选人希拉里·克林顿获胜，她的副总统蒂姆·凯恩就有机会打破投票僵局。


Senate candidates who have stood apart from Trump have been faring better than those who have not.	与特朗普保持距离的参议院候选人比没保持距离的日子好过。


For example, Trump was ahead in Ohio before the tape’s release; recent polling indicates that now he is trailing Clinton there.	比如说在录像发布前，特朗普在俄亥俄州占据领先态势； 最近的投票表明他现在在那里落后于克林顿。


When the tape came out, Ohio Senator Rob Portman (along with nine other senators) rescinded his endorsement of Trump, and he still seems to have a solid hold on his seat.	录像公布时，俄亥俄参议员罗伯特·波特曼（以及其他九名参议员）取消了对特朗普的支持，并且波特曼似乎仍牢牢控制着自己的参议院席位。


Nonetheless, when Trump supporters attacked Republicans who had broken with him, a few re-endorsed him.	尽管如此，当特朗普的支持者攻击与他切断关系的共和党人时，有几位又重新对其表示支持。


It is widely agreed that the top of a ballot influences races further down.	人们普遍认为高级别选情会对低级别选情产生影响。


Though the extent to which this happens isn��t clear, when it happens overwhelmingly, it is known as a “wave election,” as occurred in 1980 when Ronald Reagan trounced Jimmy Carter and helped the Republicans reclaim the Senate and 34 House seats.	尽管并不明确这种情况会在多大程度上出现，但如果能占据压倒性优势，就会被人们称之为“选举波”，比如1980年罗纳德·里根击败了吉米·卡特并协助共和党重新夺回对参议院的控制权和34个众议院席位。


The Republicans didn’t have formal control of the House, but Reagan effectively had a working majority, because numerous Democrats from the South voted with them.	共和党人并未掌握对众议院的正式控制，但里根却实际掌握了有效多数，因为来自南方的几位民主党人为他投赞成票。


While a lot may happen in the campaign’s remaining three weeks, the US could be heading toward another wave election.	尽管在余下三周的竞选活动中可能出现很多变数，但美国可能正面临着又一次选举波。


Certain Senate races have long been considered in the bag for the Democrats.	长期以来，某些参议院席位一直被认为是民主党的囊中之物。


In Wisconsin, former Senator Russ Feingold is decisively ahead of incumbent Senator Ron Johnson, after having narrowly lost to him six years ago; and in Illinois, the GOP has effectively written off gaffe-prone Republican Senator Mark Kirk.	在威斯康星，前参议员拉斯·费恩戈尔德决定性地领先现任参议员罗恩·约翰逊，费恩戈尔德曾在六年前以微弱劣势负于后者； 而在伊利诺伊，大老党频繁犯错的共和党参议员马克·柯克在事实上已经出局了。


Senate seats in New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere that were considered toss-ups before the tape’s release have come closer to being within the Democrats’ reach.	录像公布前双方机会均等的新罕布什尔州、内华达州、北卡罗来纳州、宾夕法尼亚州和其他州的参议院席位已接近成为民主党的囊中之物。


Florida Senator Marco Rubio, who ran against Trump in the Republican primaries, was considered likely to win reelection; now, he’s seen as vulnerable.	共和党初选时特朗普的对手佛罗里达州参议员马可·鲁比奥曾被认为很有可能竞选连任； 但现在，他却被视为前景不妙。


If the US has a wave election, even Republican Senators whose seats are still considered safe, such as Arizona Senator John McCain, could be toppled.	如果选举波席卷全美，就连亚利桑那州参议员约翰·麦凯恩等席位依然安全的共和党参议员也有可能难逃���推翻的厄运。


But the Republicans could run interference against Clinton, even if they do lose in a wave.	但即使真的在选举波中失败，共和党人仍然可以对克林顿形成干扰。


A Republican minority in the Senate can still effectively limit her agenda by using the filibuster, which requires 60 votes to end a floor debate and bring a bill to a vote.	参议院的共和党少数派仍可利用阻挠提案来有效限制她的议程，因为规定必须凑齐60票才能结束辩论，并将法案付诸表决。


If Republicans keep control of the House, Speaker Paul Ryan, who may be eyeing the 2020 Republican presidential nomination, might try to cooperate with the president on some issues to show that he can get things done; but highly conservative House Republicans would likely rebel.	如果共和党人继续控制众议院，或许着眼于2020年共和党总统提名的议长保罗·瑞安为证明自己的办事能力，可能试图在某些事务上与总统合作； 但高度保守的众议院共和党人可能会试图反抗。


Meanwhile, the Supreme Court still has only eight members, instead of the usual nine, creating the possibility of split votes on key decisions.	此外，最高法院仍只有八名法官，而不是通常的九位，从而在进行关键决策时无法排除投票平局的可能。


Republicans are anxious to keep the Court’s ideological complexion intact after the death of the reliably conservative Antonin Scalia in February.	共和党人急于在2月可靠保守派安东尼·斯卡利亚去世后保持法院意识形态局势的完整。


That is why they have been blocking Obama’s more liberal nominee, Merrick Garland, since March.	这也解释了他们为什么从3月起阻止奥巴马提名的自由候选人梅里克·加兰进入最高法院任职。


So, even if the Democrats control the Senate starting in January, Republicans could still block a President Clinton’s Supreme Court nominations and policy program.	因此，即使民主党1月开始控制参议院，共和党人仍可以阻止克林顿总统的最高法院提名和政策计划。


And, because the Democrats are unlikely to win the House, the prospect for paralysis in Washington remains.	而且，因为民主党不大可能赢得众议院，华盛顿瘫痪的前景仍然无法排除。


Trump’s Defective Industrial Policy	特朗普的拙劣产业政策


CAMBRIDGE – US President-elect Donald Trump has yet to take office, but his brand of flawed industrial policy has been on full display since his surprise win in November.	坎布里奇—美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普尚未履新，但自11月出人意料地赢得大选以来，其漏洞百出的产业政策已经充分展现在人们眼前。


Within weeks of the election, Trump had already claimed a victory.	当选后不出几周，特朗普已经宣布了一场胜利。


Through a mix of inducements and intimidation, he prevailed on the heating and cooling firm Carrier to keep some of its operations in Indiana, “saving” around 1,000 American jobs.	通过威逼利诱，他成功说服空调暖通企业开利公司（Carrier）将一些业务保留在印第安纳州，从而“拯救”了大约1,000个美国工作岗位。


Touring the Carrier plant subsequently, he warned other US firms that he would impose stiff tariffs on them if they moved plants overseas and shipped products back home.	随后他以开利工厂为榜样，警告其他美国企业，如果它们把工厂迁往海外而产品返销国内，他将对它们征收高昂关税。


His Twitter account has produced a stream of commentary in the same vein.	他的Twitter账号也不断地发布同样风格的评论。


He has taken credit for Ford’s decision keep a Lincoln plant in Kentucky, rather than move it to Mexico.	他将福特公司把林肯汽车工厂留在肯塔基州而不是迁往墨西哥的决定揽为己功。


He has threatened General Motors with import tariffs if it continues to import Chevrolet Cruzes from Mexico instead of making them in the United States.	他威胁通用汽车公司，如果继续从墨西哥进口雪佛莱科鲁兹而不是将该车型放在美国生产，他将对其征收关税。


Trump has also hounded defense contractors for cost overruns, berating the aerospace giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin on separate occasions for producing planes that are too expensive.	特朗普还借口成本过高打击防务承包商，在不同场合分别严厉指责航空巨头波音和洛希德马丁生产的飞机太贵。


Trump’s policy style represents a sharp break from that of his predecessors.	特朗普的政策风格与其诸位前任大相径庭。


It is highly personalized and temperamental.	他的政策非常有个性和情绪化。


It relies on threats and bullying.	他的政策依靠威胁和恫吓。


It is prone to boasting, exaggeration, and lies about actual successes.	他的政策总是对成功夸大其词甚至生编硬造。


It is a type of public spectacle, staged on Twitter.	他的政策堪称一场在Twitter上演的公共闹剧。


And it is deeply corrosive of democratic norms.	他的政策严重破坏了民主范式。


Economists tend to advocate an arm’s-length relationship between government and business.	经济学家总是强调政府和企业之间要保持一定距离。


Public officials are supposed to insulate themselves from private firms, lest they be corrupted and engage in favoritism.	公职官员应该自觉与私营企业隔离，以防腐败和徇私。


This is a prized principle in the US – but one that is more often breached than observed.	这是美国的宝贵原则——但这一原则被打破的时候比遵守的时候更多。


An obvious example is the undeniable influence over US government policy exercised by finance moguls during the last three decades.	一个显著的例子是过去三十年中金融大佬对美国政府政策的影响力。


Yet close business-government interactions also lie behind many of America’s successes.	但政商之间的紧密互动也是美国许多成功背后的关键。


The history of US economic development is one of pragmatic partnerships and collaboration between the public and private sector, rather than arm’s-length relationships and rigid rules.	美国经济发展史便是一部公私部门务实协调与合作的历史，而不是一部刻意保持距离和僵硬的规则的历史。


As historically minded economists and policy analysts such as Michael Lind, Stephen Cohen, and Brad DeLong have reminded us, the US is heir to a Hamiltonian tradition in which the federal government provides the investment, infrastructure, finance, and other support that private enterprise needs.	具有历史思维的经济学家和政策分析家——如迈克尔·林德（Michael Lind）、史蒂芬·科���（Stephen Cohen）和布拉德·德隆（Brad DeLong）——提醒我们，美国是汉密尔顿传统的继承者。 汉密尔顿认为，联邦政府提供投资、基础设施、融资和其他私人企业所需要的支持。


US technological innovation owes as much to specific government programs, such as loan assistance or government purchases as it does to American entrepreneurs’ and inventors’ ingenuity.	具体的政府项目，如贷款补助和政府采购，对美国技术创新的意义不下于美国企业家和投资者的创造力。


As Harvard Business School professor Josh Lerner notes, some of the most dynamic technology companies in the US, including Apple and Intel, received financial support from the government before going public.	哈佛商学院教授约什·勒纳（Josh Lerner）指出，一些最有活力的美国技术公司，包括苹果公司和英特尔公司，在上市前都获得过政府融资支持。


The electric carmaker Tesla was a beneficiary of the same public loan guarantee program as Solyndra, the solar cell company that went bust in 2011 in a spectacular public collapse.	电动汽车制造商特斯拉公司是公共贷款担保的受益者。 太阳能电池制造商Solyndra公司也参加了同一个项目，但它在2011年上市后轰然倒闭。


As the Solyndra example illustrates, many public initiatives fail.	Solyndra公司的例子表明，许多上市操作以失败告终。


But the ultimate test is whether the social return on the portfolio as a whole is positive, taking successes together with the flops.	但最终的考验是整体投资组合的社会回报在盈亏相抵后是否为正。


Such broad evaluations tend to be rare.	范围如此广泛的评估十分罕见。


But one analysis found that US programs to boost energy efficiency had produced positive net benefits.	但一项分析发现美国提振能源效率的各种项目产生了正净收益。


Interestingly, the bulk of the benefits were attributable to three relatively modest projects.	有趣的是，大部分收益来自三项相对不起眼的项目。


Sociologists Fred Block and Matthew Keller have provided perhaps the best analysis of the US “developmental state” – a reality that they say the reigning market-fundamentalist ideology has obscured.	社会学家弗雷德·布洛克（Fred Block）和马修·凯勒（Matthew Keller）提供了也许是关于美国“发展状态”的最佳分析。 他们认为所谓“发展状态”是指被主流市场原教旨主义遮蔽的现实。


Block and Keller describe how a “decentralized network of publicly funded laboratories” and an “alphabet soup” of financing initiatives, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, work with private firms and help them commercialize their products.	布洛克和凯勒描述了“分散的公共资金支持的实验室网络”和“字母汤”融资项目——如小企业创新研究（SBIR）项目——是如何与私营企业合作并帮助它们实现产品商业化的。


They and their colleagues have documented the extensive role of both federal and state governments in supporting the collaborative networks on which innovation rests – whether in biotech, green technologies, or nanotech.	他们和他们的同事们证明 ，联邦和州政府在支持作为创新基础的合作网络方面起着重要作用——不管是生物技术、绿色技术还是纳米技术。


Such industrial policies, based on close collaboration and coordination between the public and private sectors, have of course been the hallmark of East Asian economic policymaking.	这些产业政策以公共和私人部门的紧密协调与合作为基础，它们显然是东亚经济决策的标志。


It is difficult to imagine China’s transformation into a manufacturing powerhouse – and the attendant success of its export-oriented model – without the Chinese government’s helping and guiding hand.	难以想象，如果没有中国政府的帮助和指导，中国如何变成今天的制造业超级大国，也无法想象其出口导向型模式的成功。


It is ironic that the same people who extol Chinese gains from globalization are often alarmed that a US administration may copy the Chinese approach and explicitly endorse industrial policies.	讽刺的是，称颂中国从全球化中得益的人常常发出警告，说美国政府要复制中国的方法，公然支持产业政策。


Unlike China, of course, the US purports to be a democracy.	当然，与中国不同，美国是所谓的民主国家。


And industrial policy in a democracy requires transparency, accountability, and institutionalization.	而民主国家的产业政策必须透明、可问责、制度化。


The relationship between the government and private firms has to be calibrated carefully.	政府与私营企业之间的关系必须谨慎处理。


Government agencies need to be close enough to private enterprises to elicit the requisite information about the technological and market realities on the ground.	政府机构要与私营企业走得足够近，从而获得关于当前技术和市场现实的信息。


For example, what are the fundamental reasons for the loss of manufacturing jobs in, say, automobile production, and how can the government help, if at all?	比如，（比如）汽车生产的制造业岗位流失的根本原因是什么，政府如何出手相助？


But they cannot get so close to private firms that they end up in companies’ pocket, or, at the other extreme, simply order them around.	但政府机构又不能与私营企业走得太近，沦为公司的傀儡，或者走向另一个极端，对公司发号施令？


And that is where industrial policy à la Trump fails to pass the test.	而这正是特朗普式产业政策的失败之处。


On one hand, his appointments to key economic positions indicate he has little intention of severing government ties to Wall Street and big finance.	一方面，他的重要经济职位人选表明他无意切断政府与华尔街和大金融企业的干系。


On the other hand, his policymaking-by-tweet suggests he doesn’t have much interest in building the institutionalized dialogue, with all the required safeguards, that sound industrial policy requires.	另一方面，他的“tweet治国”意味着他没什么兴趣构建制度化对话，而这——再加上其他必要的保护——是可靠的产业政策的必要条件。


This means that we can expect the Trump administration’s industrial policy to vacillate between cronyism and bullying.	这意味着我们可以看到，特朗普政府的产业政策将在裙带和恫吓之间摇摆。


That may benefit some; but it will do little good for the overwhelming majority of American workers or the economy as a whole.	这或许会给某些人带来好处； 但对绝大部分美国工人和整体经济，这有百弊而无一利。


Trumping the International Monetary System	国际货币体系面临特朗普冲击


HONG KONG – It is difficult to know exactly what US President-elect Donald Trump will do when he takes office in January.	香港 - 美国当选总统特朗普明年一月开始执政，届时他到底会怎么做，我们无法知晓 。


But he is all but guaranteed to pursue tax cuts and increased infrastructure spending.	但可以肯定的是他会实施减税及增加基础设施支出。


As a result, financial markets are anticipating faster growth in the United States – a perception that is boosting the dollar’s exchange rate against most currencies, including the renminbi, and triggering capital flight from emerging economies.	因此，金融市场预测美国增长会加速。 这一认识促使美元兑大部分货币（包括人民币）汇率强劲升值，并导致资本逃离新兴经济体。


Notwithstanding Trump’s vow to impose tariffs on China, a resurgent dollar will hurt America’s trade competitiveness.	抛开特朗普竞选时提出的要对中国征收高关税之口号，美元升值必定有损于美国的贸易竞争力。


After all, according to the International Monetary Fund, the dollar was already about 10-20% overvalued in June.	毕竟，据国际货币基金组织（IMF）今年六月的评估，美元已有10-20% 的高估。


But that is not all.	但美元升值的冲击超出了对贸易的影响。


While trade is supposed to be the primary driver of exchange rates, which should rise or fall to correct countries’ external imbalances, capital flows have grown to the point that their role in guiding exchange rates is now much larger.	尽管传统上贸易被认为是决定汇率的主要因素，汇率涨跌通常被认为可以纠正一国的对外贸易失衡，但当今资本跨境流动规模已经非常庞大，它们对汇率的冲击比以前大很多 。


In this context, market optimism about US growth could lead to ever-larger imbalances and possibly disrupt the international monetary system.	在这样的背景下，市场对美国增长保持乐观可能会导致比以往更严重的贸易及资本流动失衡，冲击并动摇国际货币体系。


In 2010, former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King famously used the game of Sudoku to depict global savings imbalances, highlighting that the numbers in the table cannot be chosen independently.	2010年，英格兰银行前行长金（Mervyn King）用数独填表游戏来描述全球储蓄失衡，他强调指出，表格中的数字无法独立选择。


If, for example, all countries want to achieve full employment, and high-saving countries target a trade surplus, the low-saving countries cannot target a lower trade deficit.	比如，如果所有国家都想实现充分就业，而高储蓄国还想获得贸易盈余，那么低储蓄国就无法减少贸易赤字。


So when former US Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke blamed the loss of monetary control in the US on the “surplus saving” countries, he had a point – at least with regard to trade flows.	因此，当美联储前主席伯南克（Ben Bernanke）指责“储蓄盈余”国导致美国货币失控时，他是有一定的道理——至少在贸易流方面与统计数字相符。


What is missing from this assessment are investment flows.	但这些解释没有考虑到跨境投资流。


In fact, we can also fill in a Sudoku table showing the stock of net foreign investment claims by non-reserve-currency countries on reserve-currency countries, mainly the US and the United Kingdom.	事实上，还有另一个数独填表游戏，这个游戏中的表格代表非储备货币国对储备货币国（主要是美国和英国）的净外国投资权益存量。


Some of the relevant investment flows have been funded through surplus credit in international markets.	其中一些相关的跨境投资流是通过国际市场的盈余信用融资获得的。


From 1997 to 2007, the US net investment deficit widened by only $0.3 trillion, while the net investment surpluses of China, Japan, and Germany rose by $1.2 trillion, $1.1 trillion, and $0.8 trillion, respectively.	从1997年到2007年，美国净跨境投资赤字只增加了0. 3万亿美元，而中国、日本和德国的净跨境投资盈余分别增加了1.


The major investment-deficit players were the eurozone minus Germany, with a deficit of $2.4 trillion during that decade, and the UK, with a deficit of $0.5 trillion.	显然，主要跨境投资赤字国不是美国，而是除德国以外的欧元区国家，它们在此十年间赤字高达2. 4万亿美元；


Over the next seven years, until 2014, America’s net investment position deteriorated by $5.7 trillion, producing a liability of 40.2% of GDP.	在接下来的七年（2008-2014）中，美国净跨境投资头寸恶化了5. 7万亿美元，造成相当于GDP的40.


The net investment position of the eurozone minus Germany hardly changed during this period, due to fiscal retrenchment.	2%的累积净负债。 拜财政紧缩所赐，除德国外的欧元区的净跨境投资头寸在此期间基本保持不变。


Meanwhile, Germany’s net investment surplus increased by $0.8 trillion, Japan’s rose by $1.2 trillion, and China’s was up by $0.7 trillion.	与此同时，德国净跨境投资盈余增加0. 8万亿美元，日本增加1.


The rest of the world’s net investment position strengthened by $3 trillion during this period, owing mainly to the commodity boom, which faded as China slowed.	7万亿美元。 同一时期世界其余国家净跨境投资头寸增加3万亿美元，主要原因是大宗商品繁荣，而随着中国经济减速，大宗商品已经回落。


The rapid growth in America’s gross liabilities to the rest of the world is apparent in US Treasury data on foreign holdings of US securities, which rose from $9.8 trillion in 2007 to $17.1 trillion by June 2015, of which $10.5 trillion was debt and $6.6 trillion equity.	美国对世界其他国家的总负债的迅速增长突出地显示在 美国财政部的美国证券海外持有情况数据中，其规模从2007年的9. 8���亿美元增加到2015年6月的17.


Foreign holdings of US securities were equivalent to 95% of US GDP in June 2015.	6万亿美元是股票。 2015年6月，美国证券的海外持有量相当于美国GDP的95%。


Against this background, policies that will strengthen the dollar considerably could prove highly problematic.	在这样的背景下，让美元升值的政策会带来显著而严重的问题。


While there are good arguments for higher investment in infrastructure – from employment creation to productivity gains – one cannot ignore the fact that it will likely attract more global savings, pushing the dollar even higher.	尽管美国提高基础设施投资的理由很充分，包括创造就业、提高生产率等，但一个无法忽视的事实是：这样可能吸引更多的全球投资进入美国，并推动美元进一步升值。


The Fed’s projected interest-rate hikes to deal with coming inflation would exacerbate this trend.	而预期中的美联储升息（主要为应对即将到来的通胀）将进一步强化美元升值趋势。


As the dollar strengthens, the value of US holdings of foreign assets will decline in dollar terms, while the country’s liabilities will continue to grow, owing to sustained fiscal and current-account deficits (now running at around 3-4% of GDP annually).	随着美元升值，美国所持有的海外资产的美元价值将下跌，而由于美国的财政和经常项目赤字（目前相当于其 GDP的3-4%）将继续，美国的对外负债也将继续增加。


The result will be further deterioration of America’s net investment position, which the IMF has projected will reach -63% of GDP by 2021.	结果是美国净跨境投资头寸将进一步恶化，IMF预计到2021年将达到GDP的-63%。


Recent experience suggests that countries with net investment liabilities totaling more than 50% of GDP are at high risk of some form of crisis.	历史经验表明，净跨境投资负债超过GDP的50%的国家，爆发某种形式的危机的风险很高。


While this pattern may not necessarily hold in the country with the dominant global reserve currency, there is a very real risk of capital-flow reversal.	尽管作为主要全球储备货币国的美国未必会重蹈覆辙，但资本跨境流动逆转的风险是实实在在的。


The truth is that it is unlikely that the dollar-induced imbalances will be sustainable.	真相是美元导致的贸易及资本流动失衡不太可能持续。


The other reserve-currency countries will probably continue to allow their currencies to depreciate, in order to reflate their economies, and emerging economies will probably continue to use exchange rates to cope with capital-flow volatility.	其他国际储备货币国可能继续允许货币贬值，以实现其经济体的再通胀，而新兴经济体可能继续用汇率变化来应对资本跨境流动的波动。


If this continues, the strain on the international monetary system will only intensify.	如果这些情况保持下去，国际货币体系的压力将日益严重。


There is something that can be done to ease the pressure.	有一些方法可以缓解这一压力。


During the global economic crisis, the Fed eased global liquidity shocks by undertaking currency swaps with other major central banks.	在全球经济危机期间，美联储通过与其他主要央行进行货币互换来减轻全球资本跨境流动的冲击。


Today, it could undertake similar swaps, but with countries facing large capital outflows, thereby slowing the dollar’s appreciation.	如今，美联储也可以动用类似的机制，与面临资本大量外流的国家进行货币互换，从而减缓美元的升值。


The question is whether the US under Trump would be willing to develop currency-swap arrangements and other coordination mechanisms for emerging economies such as Russia and China.	问题在于特朗普治下的美国是否愿意与俄罗斯和中国等新兴市场国家制定货币互换安排和其它货币协作机制。


Another route Trump could take would be to use the IMF as a proxy instrument to enforce discipline on countries with undervalued exchange rates.	特朗普可以采取的另一个方法是利用IMF作为代理工具，对汇率低估的国家执行纪律。


He does, after all, seem to view international institutions as little more than mechanisms to extract trade and investment advantages for the US.	他看上去似乎很乐意将国际机构视为可以用来促进美国贸易和投资优势的一个平台 。


This approach could put both the dollar and global financial stability at risk.	但这一方针可能让美元和国际金融稳定陷入危险。


At a time of far-reaching economic and geopolitical risks, investors view the US dollar as a safe haven.	在经济和地缘政治风险高企的时期，投资者往往将美元视为安全港。


But, in time, they may find that a new Plaza Accord – the 1985 agreement to devalue the dollar and push the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark sharply upward – will become necessary. Trump bought the Plaza Hotel three years later, but sold it in 1995.	但是，很快，他们可能会看到必须制定新的广场协议（1985年的广场协议让美元贬值，并让日元和德国马克急剧升值），而这一次货币协议或许可以称为“特朗普广场协议”。


Will the Dollar Be Trumped?	美元会式微吗？


SANTA BARBARA – Since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, capital inflows have pushed up the dollar’s value to levels not seen in more than a decade.	圣芭芭拉—自特朗普当选美国总统以来，资本流入将美元推高到十多年来所未见的水平。


At first blush, it might seem that markets are registering a massive vote of confidence in the president-elect, believing that his policies will be good for the US economy and, by extension, for the dollar.	乍一看，市场似乎对新当选总统信心十足，特朗普对美国经济来说是利好，推而广之，对美元来说也是利好。


But appearances can be deceiving.	但外表可能欺骗你。


Short-term exchange-rate movements are no way to judge a currency’s underlying strength.	短期汇率波动并不是判断货币基本形势的好方法。


Longer-term trends in how money is used internationally – particularly as a store of value for foreign investors or central banks – are far more telling.	货币国际用途的长期趋势——特别是作为外国投资者或央行的价值储藏手段——意义要重大得多。


In the context of the coming years, rather than just the next few weeks, Trump’s election will almost certainly be bad for the greenback.	在未来几年——而不是几周——特朗普的当选对美元来说几乎肯定是利空。


For starters, the dollar has shot up since the election only because Trump has promised to enact deep tax cuts and ramp up spending on decaying infrastructure and America’s supposedly “depleted” military.	首先，美元之所以在选举后升值，唯一原因是特朗普承诺实施深度减税并增加支出解决美国基础设施陈旧的问题和提升美国据说“耗尽”的军力。


This will boost near-term economic growth and inevitably push interest rates up.	这将提振短期经济增长，并难免会推升利率。


In a world hungry for attractive investment returns, a prospective Trump boom has drawn funds to Wall Street, in turn increasing demand for the dollar.	世界对有吸引力的投资回报十分饥渴，因此看到特朗普繁荣的希望吸引资金流向华尔街，反过来又增加了美元需求。


To be sure, a country that issues an internationally favored currency can generally exert influence over others, and has a distinct economic advantage.	平心而论，发行在国际上最受欢迎的货币的国家总能对其他国家施加影响，并拥有无与伦比的经济优势。


The dollar’s status as the dominant international reserve currency amounts to what former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously described as America’s “exorbitant privilege.”	美元作为主要国际储备货币的地位让法国前总统德斯坦把它称作美国的“过度特权”。


So long as foreigners are hungry for dollars, the US can spend whatever it needs to project power around the globe, simply by cranking up the printing press.	主要投资者渴望美元，美国就能肆无忌惮地花钱在全球部署力量； 反正只需要开动印钞机就能买单。


But the dollar’s future will now depend on whether Trump really does “make America great again.”	但如今美元的未来取决于特朗普是否真的想“让美国重新伟大”。


If he does, the dollar’s international appeal would be reinforced over time.	如果答案是肯定的，那么美元的国际吸引力将随时间增加。


But if he pursues his protectionist promise to put “America first,” which smacks of xenophobic nationalism, investors and central banks could gradually be impelled to find alternative reserves for their spare billions.	但如果他追求“美国第一”的保护主义承诺——这带有一些仇外民族主义的味道——投资者和央行可能逐渐被迫寻找其他储备货币来存放它们的巨量闲置资金。


Unfortunately, the latter scenario seems more likely, and there is ample reason to doubt that America’s “exorbitant privilege” will last.	不幸的是，后一种情景似乎可能性更大，有足够的理由怀疑美国的“过度特权”还能不能继续维持。


From an accounting perspective, dollars held outside the US are liabilities, and observers have long worried that the US may not be able to service its ever-mounting foreign-debt “overhang” indefinitely.	从会计角度讲，海外持有的美元是美国的负债，并且观察者早就开始担忧美国可能无法无限期地维持其不断增加的外债“积压”。


America’s dollar liabilities could reach a tipping point at any time, if skittish investors, seeking an alternative store of value, precipitate an irreversible downward spiral.	美国的美元负债随时都有可能达到临界点，如果担惊受怕的投资者因为寻找其他价值储藏手段而引起不可逆转的下降螺旋的话。


An untutored president pursuing populist policies could trigger such a spiral.	一位追求民粹主义政策的菜鸟总统可能触发这一向下螺旋。


Indeed, Trump already set off alarm bells during the campaign with careless remarks about trying to renegotiate US debt by buying it back from creditors at a discount.	事实上，特朗普在选战过程中已经敲响了警钟——他漫不经心地评论说要以折价从债权人手中收购美国债务的方式重新谈判债务问题。


This is exactly what Trump often does when one of his businesses runs into trouble, and it would effectively amount to a partial default on the national debt.	这正是特朗普在他旗下企业陷入困境时的惯用伎俩，将导致国民债务实际局部违约。


No statement could be better crafted to provoke a retreat from the greenback.	再好的政治家也想不出更好的毁灭美元的方法了。


Likewise, let us suppose that Trump will carry through on his budget promises.	类似地，让我们假设特朗普将贯彻其预算承诺。


Tax cuts and spending increases may spur economic growth in the near term, but they will increase the government’s debt, raising further doubts about America’s long-term willingness or ability to meet its commitments.	减税和增支在短期内也许能刺激经济增长，但也会增加政府债务，进一步增加关于美国兑现长期义务的意愿和能力的质疑。


Nor should we forget Trump’s pledge to bring millions of high-paying manufacturing jobs back to the US by imposing import tariffs and canceling trade agreements.	我们也不要忘了，特朗普承诺要通过实施进口关税和废除贸易协定让数百万高薪制造业工作流回美国。


If protectionism really is on his agenda, then we must assume that capital controls are, too.	如果保护主义真的进入他的日程，那么我们还必须假设会出现资本管制。


For America’s foreign creditors, Trump-style mercantilism could well be the final straw.	对美国的外部债权人来说，特朗普风格的重商主义很有可能是最后一根稻草。


But none of this means that a doomsday scenario – an immediate run on the dollar, or foreign creditors abruptly stampeding to the exits – is likely.	但所有这些都不意味着有可能发生末日情景——立刻发生美元挤兑，或外部债权人争相卖出美元。


The dollar has survived previous administrations’ egregious policy errors, and has defied repeated predictions of its demise.	美元曾经在此前多届政府的愚蠢政策错误中生存下来，人们一再预言美元的衰落，但它们从未成为现实。


We can rule out a swift, large-scale flight from the dollar, owing to its unique, long-standing status as an international store of value.	我们可以排除出现迅速大规模逃离美元的情形，因为长期以来美元一直是独一无二的国际价值储藏手段。


No other currency can yet challenge the dollar as an investment medium or reserve asset, nor can other countries match America’s extraordinarily efficient financial markets, which provide unparalleled liquidity.	其他货币都不能挑战美元作为国际中介或储备资产的地位，也没有国家拥有能与美国媲美的高效资本市场，而只有高效的资本市场才能提供无与伦比的流动性。


So, the greenback will remain the world’s ultimate safe haven for now, and it likely will not suffer a sudden, fatal blow, even if Trump’s policies turn out to be disastrous.	因此，美元现在仍将是世界终极安全港，不可能遭遇突发致命打击，即使特朗普的政策是一场灾难。


On the other hand, the dollar could succumb to a long, slow bleeding out, as America’s financial rivals try to make their own currencies more attractive and accessible.	另一方面，随着美国的金融对手让本国货币更具吸引力和更容易获得，美元可能陷入漫长缓慢的失血期。


China, for its part, has made no secret of its intention to establish the renminbi as a credible alternative to the dollar.	中国已不再掩饰将人民币打造成值得信赖的美元替代品的企图。


As more currencies become competitive, the dollar’s unique advantages will erode, as will America’s privileged position.	假以时日，随着更多货币竞争力的增强，美元的独特优势将受到侵蚀，美国的特权地位亦然。


Over time, Trump’s presidency will not benefit the dollar, because it won’t benefit the US economy.	随着时间的推移，特朗普总统任期将不利于美元，因为他不利于美国经济。


On the contrary, if Trump follows through on his campaign promises, the greenback could eventually be toppled from the peak of the global monetary hierarchy, as a widening range of alternatives emerge to pull it down.	相反，如果特朗普遵循其竞选承诺，那么随着大量替代品的兴起，美元可能被拉下全球货币层级的顶峰。


The American Public Against Trump	反对特朗普的美国公众


PRINCETON – The United States, supposedly the world’s beacon of democracy, is practicing a strange form of it nowadays.	普林斯顿—身为所谓世界民主灯塔的美国，眼下行为诡异。


One presidential candidate won nearly three million more votes than her opponent, who, with a big assist from a hostile foreign power, was nonetheless declared the winner.	一位总统候选人比她的对手多赢的近三百万张选票，而她的对手在敌对外国势力的鼎力相助下仍然成为获胜者。


Anywhere else on earth, such an event would be called a coup d’état.	在世界其他地方，这样的事件可以称之为政变。


Here in the US, we call it the Electoral College.	而在美国，我们叫它选举人团。


It gets stranger.	这就是诡异之处。


A Pew Research opinion poll conducted between November 30 and December 5, after the election had cast the usual victor’s glow on Donald Trump, indicated that only 37% of Americans thought Trump was well-qualified for the presidency, just 31% deemed him moral, and a mere 26% viewed him as a good role model.	皮尤研究公司（Pew Research）11月30日—12月5日的选举后民调表明，特朗普身上也出现了常见的赢家效应，只有37%的美国人认为特朗普是合格的总统人选，31%认为他品行端正，26%认为他是正面榜样。


On the other hand, 62% thought he had poor judgment and 65% considered him reckless.	另一方面，62%的美国人认为他判断拙劣，65%认为他鲁莽。


And this man won?	这样的人也能赢？


Perhaps, despite his appalling personal attributes, Trump’s positions on key issues resonated with the electorate.	也许，尽管私德糟糕，特朗普在关键问题上的立场与选民存在共鸣。


As an economist, I’ll leave aside Trump’s positively frightening foreign-policy views and concentrate on the economic issues that many pundits claim put him in the White House.	作为一名经济学家，我先撇开特朗普骇人的外交政策观，集中讨论许多专家认为让他成功问鼎白宫的经济问题。


In fact, judging by Trump’s own statements and his cabinet picks, he’s on the wrong side of almost every one.	事实上，从特朗普本人的言辞和他的内阁人选看，他几乎在所有问题上都犯下了错误。


It’s a sobering inventory.	这是个发人深省的局面。


Climate change: Only one economic issue poses an existential threat to life on earth.	气候变化：只有一个经济问题构成了对地球生命的生存威胁。


Yet Trump branded it a “hoax” during the campaign, and has picked a climate-change denier, Scott Pruitt, to head the US Environmental Protection Agency, which Pruitt, the attorney general of oil- and gas-producing Oklahoma, has frequently sued.	但特朗普在选战期间称之为“骗局”，并选择否认气候变化的斯科特·普鲁伊特（Scott Pruitt）领导美国环境保护署，而普鲁伊特在担任油气生产州俄克拉荷马州州长时经常与美国环境保护署打官司。


This is not the policy the American public wants.	这可不是美国公众想要的政策。


On the contrary, polling data show that Americans’ concern with global warming is now at or near all-time highs.	相反，民调数据表明美国人对全球变暖问题的关注度接近历史新高。


Americans really don’t want Miami Beach or lower Manhattan to be underwater.	美国人真的不希望迈阿密海滩或曼哈顿低地被海水淹掉。


Labor standards: Trump’s choice for Secretary of Labor, Andrew Puzder, is a CEO in the fast-food industry.	劳动标准：特朗普的劳工部长人选安德鲁·普兹德（Andrew Puzder）是快餐业的一位首席执行官。


Never mind that he uses crass sexual imagery to sell hamburgers.	他用低俗荤段子推销汉堡包，这不重要。


What’s more germane is that he prefers robots to human workers, doesn’t want to raise the minimum wage, and opposes the Department of Labor’s attempt to raise the salary level below which companies must pay extra for overtime.	重要的是他喜欢机器人，而不是人力，他不希望提高最低工资，也反对劳工部提高公司必须支付额外加班费的薪酬水平。


The public could not disagree with him more.	公众是坚决反对他的。


Raising the minimum wage has been winning in polls consistently for decades, and by wide margins – generally even among Republicans.	几十年来，提高最低工资一直受到民调的支持，并且优势巨大——即便是共和党也基本如此。


And when the labor department proposed its overtime rule in May, respondents told pollsters that the overtime threshold should be set even higher.	而5月劳工部提出其加班规则提案时，民调受访者表示加班门槛应该设置得更高一些。


Health care: “Repeal Obamacare” became the Republican Party’s mantra as soon as Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010.	医疗：自平价医疗法（ACA）2010年生效以来，“废除奥巴马医保”立刻成为共和党信条。


So, naturally, that was the position Trump adopted while vying for the Republican nomination.	因此，特朗普在宣誓成为共和党提名人选后也自然采取了这一立场。


Now, as president-elect, he has picked Representative Tom Price of Georgia, an avowed enemy of Obamacare – and you might say of Medicaid and Medicare (which provide coverage to the poor and elderly, respectively) – to run the Department of Health and Human Services.	如今，身为当选总统的他选择了乔治亚州众议员汤姆·普莱斯（Tom Price）领导卫生和公共服务部。 普莱斯是奥巴马医保的铁杆反对者，对分别覆盖穷人和老人的医疗补助（Medicaid）和医疗保险（Medicare）也是如此。


Unfortunately for Republicans, they haven’t figured out how to replace Obamacare, so their current policy is “repeal and delay.”	对共和党来说，不幸的是他们还没有找到如何取代奥巴马医保的办法，因此他们目前的政策是“撤销并拖延”。


In other words: “Call us back in two or three years.”	换句话说，就是“过两三年再来找我。 ”


Public opinion on the ACA is difficult to discern.	公众对ACA的态度很难观察。


Polling the name often gets slightly negative reviews.	民调常常表现出轻微的消极态度。


But that’s misleading.	但这具有误导性。


For example, a Kaiser Family Foundation poll conducted after the election found that 26% Americans favor outright repeal, while only 19% favor keeping the law as is.	比如，选举后进行的（凯撒家庭基金会Kaiser Family Foundation）民调表明26%的美国人支持完全撤销ACA，只有19%的人支持保持ACA原貌。


So does the public reject Obamacare?	那么，公众真的想拒绝奥巴马医保吗？


Well, no.	完全不是。


Among the remaining 47% who expressed an opinion, far more wanted to see the scope of the law expanded than scaled back.	在表达了观点的剩余47%中，绝大多数希望看到ACA扩大而不是缩小范围。


Even the Republicans know that many of the ACA’s key provisions, such as ensuring that people with pre-existing conditions can buy health insurance, are extremely popular.	即使是共和党也明白，ACA的许多关键条款，如确保具备条件的人购买医疗保险，是极其受欢迎的。


I suspect that many critics of Obamacare are really RINOs: repealers in name only.	我怀疑许多奥巴马医保的批评者其实是“标题党”。


Tax cuts: One of the most consistent findings in American public opinion polling for decades is that people want higher taxes, not lower, on the rich and corporations.	减税：几十年来，美国民调中观点最为一致的其中之一是人民希望对富人和公司课以更高而不是更低的税收。


The Republican catechism, however, has long enshrined lower taxes on both, and this became one of the few concrete policies that candidate Trump ran on.	共和党的教义一直是为这两者减税，而这也成为特朗普候选人全盘照收的少数具体政策这一。


In fact, Trump’s position is more popular than its polar opposite on only one economic issue: globalization.	事实上，特朗普只有一个经济问题的立场比他的对立面更受欢迎：全球化。


And on that one issue, Trump’s embrace of trade protection, hostility toward immigration, and prevention of outsourcing to foreign countries is bad news for the entire world.	而在这个问题上，特朗普提出的贸易保护、反对移民和防止向外国外包业务对全世界来说是坏消息。


Nowadays, a narrow majority of Americans seems to side with Trump, rather than with traditional Republican internationalism, on these issues.	如今，在这些问题上支持特朗普而不是传统的共和党国际主义的美国人只占微弱多数。


Forty-nine percent of respondents in an April 2016 Pew poll said that US involvement in the global economy is bad, because it lowers wages and costs jobs, while 44% said that globalization is good, because it opens new markets and creates opportunities for growth.	2016年4月的皮尤民调表明49%的受访者认为美国不应该参与全球经济，因为这拉低了工资、减少了工作岗位，而44%的受访者认为全球化是好事，因为它开放了新市场并为增长创造了条件。


Close, but here Trump is on the “right” side of the electorate.	比例很接近，但特朗普站在了选民中的“正确”一方。


That’s the public opinion scoreboard on the big economic issues.	这是重大经济问题的民调记分牌情况。


Unless you put almost all the weight on hostility to globalization, Trump seems to be on the wrong side of every one.	除非你认为全球化压倒一切，否则特朗普似乎站在了所有人的对立面。


So how did the candidate who is personally disrespected by most Americans, and who takes the unpopular side on most issues, win the election?	那么，这位人品为大部分美国人所不齿、并且在大部分问题上都站在少数一边的候选人，是如何赢得选举的？


One plausible answer, offered by Clinton and many others, focuses on the role of Russian cyber operations and FBI Director James Comey’s unconscionable “announcement” (of what amounted to nothing) just days before the vote.	克林顿和起许多人所认可的一个解释是选举前几天的俄罗斯网络行动和联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科米（James Comey）不“配合”的“宣布”（后来又不了了之）。


Putin got what he wanted.	普京得到了他想要的。


Comey?	科米呢？


I don’t know.	我不知道。


Bad News for America’s Workers	美国工人的坏消息


NEW YORK – As US President-elect Donald Trump fills his cabinet, what have we learned about the likely direction and impact of his administration’s economic policy?	纽约—随着美国当选总统陆续任命内阁，我们可以从中窥探出特朗普政府经济政策具有怎样可能的方向和影响？


To be sure, enormous uncertainties remain.	平心而论，仍然存在巨大的不确定性。


As in many other areas, Trump’s promises and statements on economic policy have been inconsistent.	和诸多其他领域一样，特朗普的经济政策承诺和陈述前后不一。


While he routinely accuses others of lying, many of his economic assertions and promises – indeed, his entire view of governance – seem worthy of Nazi Germany’s “big lie” propagandists.	他总是指责别人撒谎，但他的经济主张和承诺——事实上，是他的一整套治国理念——可以与纳粹德国的“大谎言”宣传家相媲美。


Trump will take charge of an economy on a strongly upward trend, with third-quarter GDP growing at an impressive annual rate of 3.2% and unemployment at 4.6% in November.	特朗普将掌舵一个处于强劲上升趋势的经济，三季度GDP增长年率达到了令人印象深刻的3. 2%，11月失业率为4.


By contrast, when President Barack Obama took over in 2009, he inherited from George W. Bush an economy sinking into a deep recession.	6%。 相反，2009年奥巴马总统开始执政时，小布什留给他的是一个滑向深度衰退的经济。


And, like Bush, Trump is yet another Republican president who will assume office despite losing the popular vote, only to pretend that he has a mandate to undertake extremist policies.	与布什一样，特朗普是又一位输掉普选仍然当选的总统，只能装作有权采取极端政策的样子。


The only way Trump will square his promises of higher infrastructure and defense spending with large tax cuts and deficit reduction is a heavy dose of what used to be called voodoo economics.	特朗普要想兑现他的承诺——提高基础设施和国防支出，同时大规模减税和降低赤字，只能大量使用所谓的巫毒经济学。


Decades of “cutting the fat” in government has left little to cut: federal government employment as a percentage of the population is lower today than it was in the era of small government under President Ronald Reagan some 30 years ago.	政府已经“减肥”了几十年，如今减无可减：联邦政府就业占总人口的百分比比30年前里根总统的小政府时代还要低。


With so many former military officers serving in Trump’s cabinet or as advisers, even as Trump cozies up to Russian President Vladimir Putin and anchors an informal alliance of dictators and authoritarians around the world, it is likely that the US will spend more money on weapons that don’t work to use against enemies that don’t exist.	众多前军官进入特朗普内阁或出任顾问，这样看来，尽管特朗普与俄罗斯总统普京关系密切，并与全球独裁者和极权者结成非正式联盟，但美国仍有可能在不可能用于不存在的敌人身上的武器花掉更多钱。


If Trump’s health secretary succeeds in undoing the careful balancing act that underlies Obamacare, either costs will rise or services will deteriorate – most likely both.	如果特朗普的卫生部长成功地撤销作为奥巴马医保的基础的平衡法案，那么要么医疗成本上升，要么医疗服务质量下降——并且很有可能兼而有之。


During the campaign, Trump promised to get tough on executives who outsource American jobs.	竞选期间，特朗普承诺要对将美国就业外包的企业高管采取强硬态度。


He is now holding up the news that the home heating and air conditioning manufacturer Carrier will keep some 800 jobs in my home state of Indiana as proof that his approach works.	如今，他将开利公司（Carrier）将保留我的家乡印第安纳州的800个工作岗位哪来当作他的方针见效的证据。


Yet the deal will cost taxpayers $7 million, and still allow Carrier to outsource 1,300 jobs to Mexico.	但这一协议将让纳税人花费700万美元，并且家庭采暖和空IT奥设备制造商开利公司仍会将1,300个岗位外包给墨西哥。


This is not a sound industrial or economic policy, and it will do nothing to help raise wages or create good jobs across the country.	这绝非可靠的产业或经济政策，并且无助于在全国范围提高工资或创造优质岗位。


It is an open invitation for a shakedown of the government by corporate executives seeking handouts.	这是开政府之门揖要求补贴的公司高管之盗。


Similarly, the increase in infrastructure spending is likely to be accomplished through tax credits, which will help hedge funds, but not America’s balance sheet: such programs’ long track record shows that they deliver little value for money.	类似地，基础设施支出增加通过税收优惠实现，这有助于对冲基金，而无助于美国资产负债表：这些项目的长期历史记录表明，它们基本上不具有资金价值。


The cost to the public will be especially high in an era when the government can borrow at near-zero interest rates.	在政府可以以近零利率借贷的情况下，公众的成本特别高昂。


If these private-public partnerships are like those elsewhere, the government will assume the risks, and the hedge funds will assume the profits.	如果这些公私合作项目和其他地区别无二致，那么政府将承担风险，而对冲基金将获得利润。


The debate just eight years ago about “shovel-ready” infrastructure seems to be a distant memory.	关于“万事俱备”（shovel-ready）的基础设施的争论发生在八年前，但好像已经是遥远的回忆了。


If Trump chooses shovel-ready projects, the long-term impact on productivity will be minimal; if he chooses real infrastructure, the short-term impact on economic growth will be minimal.	如果特朗普选择万事俱备项目，对生产率的长期影响将微乎其微； 如果他选择真正的基础设施项目，对经济增长的短期影响将微乎其微。


And back-loaded stimulus has its own problems, unless it is managed extremely carefully.	而后置（back-loaded）刺激有其自身的问题，除非能够非常谨慎地进行管理。


If Trump’s pick for US Treasury Secretary, the Goldman Sachs and hedge-fund veteran Steven Mnuchin, is like others from his industry, the expertise he will bring to the job will be in tax avoidance, not constructing a well-designed tax system.	如果特朗普的美国财政部长提名人选、前高盛公司成员、资深对冲基金人士史蒂文·姆努钦（Steven Mnuchin）与他的同行一模一样，那么随他上位的专长将是避税，而不是设计合理的税收制度。


The “good” news is that tax reform was inevitable, and was likely to be undertaken by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and his staff – giving the rich the less progressive, more capital-friendly tax system that Republicans have long sought.	“好”好是税收改革势在必行，并且很可能由众议长保罗·莱恩（Paul Ryan）和他的团队执行——为富人制定累进性较低、对资本较友好的税制，这是共和党长期追求的目标。


With the abolition of the estate tax, the Republicans would finally realize their long-held ambition of creating a dynastic plutocracy – a far cry from the “equality of opportunity” maxim the party once trumpeted.	共和党将通过废除房产税最终实现他们由来已久的企图——建立一个富人统治的王朝，这与该党曾经广为宣传的“机会平等”口号完全是南辕北辙。


Large tax cuts and large expenditure increases inevitably lead to large deficits.	大规模减水和大规模增支势必导致大规模赤字。


Reconciling this with Trump’s promise to reduce the deficit will probably entail a return to Reagan-era magical thinking: despite decades of proof to the contrary, this time the stimulus to the economy brought by tax cuts for the rich will be so large that tax revenues will actually increase.	要将这一逻辑与特朗普降低赤字的承诺相洽，有可能需要回归里根时代的魔法思维：尽管几十年来的事实都指向反面，但这一回富人减税给经济带来的刺激将足以大到让税收收入能够有所上升。


This story doesn’t end well for Trump’s angry, displaced Rust Belt voters.	这个故事对于支持特朗普的愤怒的锈带失业选民可不是什么美好回忆。


Unhinged budgetary policies will induce the US Federal Reserve to normalize interest rates faster.	错乱的预算政策将让美联储更快地实施利率正常化。 一些人着眼于通胀抬头（考虑到低失业率）；


Some see incipient inflation (given the low unemployment rate); some believe the long period of ultra-low interest rates has distorted capital markets; and some want to “replenish their ammunition,” so that the Fed can lower interest rates should the economy slow down again.	一些人认为长时间极低利率已经扭曲了资本市场； 一些人想“补充弹药”，从而当经济再次下滑时，美联储可以降低利率。


Trump has argued that the Fed should raise interest rates.	特朗普指出，美联储应该提高利率。


The Fed, which took the first step toward normalization in early December, will almost certainly deliver – and Trump will soon regret what he wished for.	从去年12月迈出正常化第一步的美联储几乎肯定会照办——而特朗普将很快为他所想要的东西后悔。


There’s a good chance that the monetary contraction will outweigh the fiscal stimulus, curbing the Obama growth spurt currently underway.	很有可能，货币收缩的影响将压倒财政刺激，让目前已经上路的奥巴马增长熄火。


Higher interest rates will undercut construction jobs and increase the value of the dollar, leading to larger trade deficits and fewer manufacturing jobs – just the opposite of what Trump promised.	提高利率将影响就业岗位的创造、令美元升值，导致更大的贸易赤字和更少的制造业岗位——这与特朗普的承诺正好相反。


Meanwhile, his tax policies will be of limited benefit to middle-class and working families – and will be more than offset by cutbacks in health care, education, and social programs.	与此同时，他的税收政策给中产阶级和工作家庭的收益有限——并且不如医疗、教育和社会计划被削减所造成的损失大。


If Trump starts a trade war – by, say, following through on his vow to impose a 45% tariff on imports from China and to build a wall on the US border with Mexico – the economic impact will be even more severe.	如果特朗普发动贸易战——比如，通过兑现其向中国进口品征收45%的关税以及在美墨边境筑墙的承诺——那么对经济的影响将更加严重。


Trump’s cabinet of billionaires could continue to buy their Gucci handbags and $10,000 Ivanka bracelets, but ordinary Americans’ cost of living would increase substantially; and without components from Mexico and elsewhere, manufacturing jobs would become even scarcer.	特朗普的亿万富翁内阁可以继续买古驰手包和10,000美元的伊万卡珠宝，但普通美国人的生活成本将大幅上升； 而失去了来自墨西哥和其他地方的零部件，制造业岗位将变得更加稀缺。


To be sure, a few new jobs will be created, mainly in the lobbying shops along K Street in Washington, DC, as Trump refills the swamp that he promised to drain.	诚然，随着特朗普重新填补被他清理过的门户，仍然会有一些就业岗位创造出来——主要是坐落华盛顿K街沿线的游说集团的岗位。


Indeed, America’s bog of legal corruption is likely to reach a depth not seen since President Warren G. Harding’s administration in the 1920s.	事实上，美国的司法腐败可能已经严重到了自20世纪20年代哈丁总统时代以来从未见过的程度。


And there really is no silver lining to the cloud that now hangs over the US and the world.	而美国和世界目前真的看不到任何希望之光。


As bad as his administration will be for America’s economy and workers, its policies on climate change, human rights, the media, and ensuring peace and security are likely to be no less damaging for everyone else.	特朗普上台对美国经济和工人固然是个坏消息，其气候变化、人权、媒体和确保和平与稳定的政策对所有人的伤害也一样深远。


Unchecked Trump?	不受制衡的特朗普？


NEW YORK – How has the 2016 election in the United States – which gave the Republican Party control of the presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives – affected the much-touted system of checks and balances as set out in the country’s constitution?	纽约—2016年美国总统大选让共和党同时控制了总统、参议院和众议院，它将如何影响引起纷纷议论的美国宪法所规定的制衡制度？


In my view, it has virtually eliminated them.	在我看来，它基本上已经取消了制衡。


The checks and balances generated by the judicial branch are certainly in danger.	司法部门的制衡显然岌岌可危。


Anything less than constant Democratic filibusters will allow Republicans to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court that they have blocked Democratic President Barack Obama from filling.	除非民主党不间断地进行冗长演讲，否则共和党将填补最高法院的出缺，而他们曾经阻止了民主党总统奥巴马填补空缺。


And the aging Supreme Court may soon have more slots open – slots currently held by liberal and centrist justices.	而年事越来越高的最高法院很快还会有更多的席位出缺——这些席位目前都控制在自由派和中间派法官手中。


Republicans therefore have a good chance of creating a conservative majority on the nine-member Supreme Court that may last for decades, especially if they win the presidency again in 2020.	因此，共和党很有机会在九人组成的最高法院形成保守派多数，并且保持这一多数数十年，特别是如果他们在2020年再次赢得总统选举的话。


That majority may erode democratic checks, such as the campaign-finance limits that were dealt a devastating blow by the 2010 Citizens United decision.	这一多数可能损害民主制衡，比如竞选融资限制。 2010年公民联合会案（Citizens United）裁决给了竞选融资限制沉重一击。


In a 5-4 majority, the Court ruled that corporations are “associations of individuals,” and thus that any limits on the amount of money corporations could spend on political campaigns violated their First Amendment right to freedom of expression.	最高法院以5比4多数裁定公司是“个体组成的联合体”，因此对公司为政治竞选花多少钱施加任何限制都违反了宪法第一修正案的言论自由权。


Republican obstructionism in the Senate has also put other levels of the federal judiciary at risk.	共和党在参议院的蓄意阻挠作风也让其他层次上的联邦司法岌岌可危。


During President Barack Obama’s second term in office, the rate at which vacancies in the US District and Circuit Courts were filled fell to its lowest point in 50 years.	在奥巴马的第二个任期中，美国地区和巡回法院出缺补足率下降至50年来的最低点。


Trump can now fill rapidly these vacancies with conservative judges who may well erode checks and balances further.	现在，特朗普可以用保守派法官迅速填补这些出缺，从而进一步破坏制衡。


State-generated checks and balances will not escape unscathed, either.	来自州的制衡也无法独善其身。


Indeed, given new partisan alignments at the state level – Republicans now control an all-time high of 68 of the 99 state legislative chambers and 33 of the 50 governorships – the possibility that states will challenge the federal government is substantially reduced.	事实上，考虑到最新的州与联邦看齐的情况——目前共和党创纪录地控制着99个州立法机构中的68个和50个州长职位中的33个——州挑战联邦政府的可能性大大降低了。


This has long-term implications.	这将带来长远的影响。


Since 2013, when another close Supreme Court decision gutted the Voting Rights Act, many, if not most, states with Republican majorities in both chambers have enacted laws and regulations that suppress voting.	2013年，最高法院同样以接近多数裁定否决了选举权利法（Voting Rights Act）至此以后，许多甚至大多数共和党在立法两院占多数的州都实施了抑制选举的法律和规则。 这些规则包括减少少数派占优势的地区的投票站数量；


Such rules include reducing the number of polling stations in minority-dominated areas; requiring photo IDs, such as driver’s licenses, which many minority members do not have; and eliminating both same-day registration and Sunday voting, historically popular among minorities.	要求带照片的身份证件比如驾照（许多少数派没有驾照）； 取消当天注册和星期天投票（历史上少数派喜欢这种形式）等。


A federal appeals court justice struck down a North Carolina law of this sort, because it suppressed African-American turnout with “almost surgical precision.”	一位联邦上诉法院法官否决了北卡罗莱纳州的一项此类法律，因为该法律以“外科手术般的精确度”打压非洲裔美国人的投票率。


But if Republicans appoint more judges, such checks will grow rarer.	但如果共和党任命更多的法官，这一制衡就会越来越少。


And if voter suppression helps Republicans to win control of more and more state legislatures, more such laws could be enacted.	而如果抑制选民有助于共和党赢得更多的州立法机关，那么会有更多的类似法律推出。


There is some reason for hope: the ultimate source of checks and balances is the US constitution, which is the hardest of all democratic constitutions to change.	也有感到希望的理由：制衡的终极来源是美国宪法，而美国宪法是民主宪法中最难以更改的。


To amend it by the normal route requires, among other things, a supermajority of two-thirds in the House of Representatives and the Senate, where the Republicans have nowhere near that kind of dominance.	以常规手段修订宪法的条件之一是众议院和参议院三分之二多数通过，而共和党还远没有达到如此大的优势。


The other route to constitutional amendment is a vote by two-thirds of state legislatures (34 out of 50 states) to call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, which then must put forward an amendment that is subsequently ratified by three-quarters of the state legislatures or state conventions.	另一个修订宪法的方法是三分之二州立法机关（50个州中的34个）投票要求国会举行修宪大会，在修宪大会上呈交的修订案需要四分之三的州立法机关或州会议批准。


No amendment in US history has ever been approved by this route.	美国历史上从未有过通过这种方式实现的宪法修订案。


But, while the Republicans would need to gain control over at least three or four more legislatures to make a credible attempt, the possibility that they could pursue such a strategy should worry people more than it does.	但是，尽管共和党至少需要在赢得三到四个立法机关才能做出可信的尝试，他们可能追求这一战略本身就足以引起人们的担忧。


Barring an amendment, the US is protected from some of Trump’s most egregious campaign promises.	成功阻挠宪法修正案让美国不必面对特朗普最危险的竞选承诺。


Proposals like restricting immigration on the basis of religion are unconstitutional.	根据宗教限制移民等方案是违宪的。


Other damaging proposals can be filibustered by Democrats in the Senate, where Republicans do not have the 60 votes needed to stop them.	其他高危方案民主党可以通过冗长演讲在参议院进行阻击，共和党没有获得阻止民主党所需要的60票。


To be sure, filibusters could be abolished at the start of the 2017-2018 Senate session.	诚然，冗长演讲可能在2017—2018届参议院被取消。


But Republican leaders must worry about a future in which they are in opposition and want to use the filibuster themselves.	但共和党领导人得担心未来当他们成为反对派的时候可能还会想用冗长演讲。


If they did make such a move, however, they would greatly reduce the Democrats’ oppositional power over the next few years.	但是，如果他们真的取消了冗长演讲，将大大削弱未来几年中民主党的反对力量。


In foreign policy, the US has always had few checks on the president, though some external limitations may apply.	在外交政策方面，美国对总统向来制衡很少，尽管一些外部限制可能会起作用。


For example, Trump cannot fulfill his campaign promise immediately to trash the Paris climate agreement – an international deal that all signatories are legally bound to respect for at least four years.	比如，特朗普无法立刻兑现其撕毁巴黎气候协定的竞选承诺——这是一项国际协议，所有签署国都有法律义务至少在四年时间里尊重其内容。


He could, however, undermine it, such as by indicating to countries like India that the US will not fulfill its commitments.	但他可以破坏巴黎协定，比如向印度等国家表示美国不会兑现承诺。


In domestic policy, however, Trump will have great scope to act.	但在国内政策方面，特朗普有巨大的行动空间。


Most vulnerable is the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), which has given health-care coverage to 20 million previously uninsured citizens.	最岌岌可危的是平价医疗法（奥巴马医保），给法律让2,000万此前没有医保的公民获得了医保覆盖。


The 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reforms, aimed at controlling banks and other financial institutions that are “too big to fail,” is also at risk of being undone.	旨在控制“太大而不能倒”的银行和其他金融机构的2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）金融改革也有可能被废除。


For concerned citizens who want to reestablish checks and balances in America, there are three urgent tasks.	对想要重建美国制衡制度的忧心忡忡的公民而言，有三个紧要任务。


First, they should start laying the groundwork to win at least three more Senate seats in 2018.	首先，他们应该开始着手准备在2018年至少再赢得三个参议院席位。


Second, they should act to prevent Republicans from gaining control of three-quarters of state legislatures, thereby opening the way for constitutional amendments.	其次，他们应该应该行动起来阻止共和党控制四分之三州立法机关，从而开启修宪之路。


And, third, they must mobilize more of their fellow citizens to reject authoritarian-style tactics and policies and support more inclusive democratic alternatives.	第三，他们必须动员更多的同志拒绝极权主义策略和政策，支持更具包容性的民主方案。


The existence of compelling alternatives is the most important check on populist politicians with authoritarian tendencies who win power through the vote.	对于通过选票赢得权力的有极权倾向的民粹主义政客来说，存在有说服力的替代方案是最重要的制衡。


By the next presidential election, US voters, like their British counterparts who voted in favor of Brexit, may be experiencing “buyer’s remorse.”	到下一次总统选举时，美国选民将和投票支持英国退欧的英国选民一样，将感受到“买家的后悔”。


But this is not enough; attractive and credible alternatives must be forged.	但这还不够，必须打造有吸引力的可信的替代方案。


Trump’s Emotional Intelligence Deficit	特朗普的情商缺陷


CAMBRIDGE – Last month, 50 former national security officials who had served at high levels in Republican administrations from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush published a letter saying they would not vote for their party’s presidential nominee, Donald Trump.	发自剑桥——上个月，50名曾在从理查德·尼克松到小布什麾下历届共和党政府中任职的前国家安全官员发表了一封联名信，说他们不会投票给本党的总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普。


In their words, “a President must be disciplined, control emotions, and act only after reflection and careful deliberation.”	用他们的话说，“一位总统必须懂得自律和控制情绪，在言行之前必定深思熟虑。


Simply put, “Trump lacks the temperament to be President.”	”简而言之，“特朗普缺乏总统气质”。


In the terminology of modern leadership theory, Trump is deficient in emotional intelligence – the self-mastery, discipline, and empathic capacity that allows leaders to channel their personal passions and attract others.	套用现代领导理论的术语，特朗普是情商不足——也就是缺乏使领导者传递其个人激情和吸引众人的自我控制，纪律和移情能力。


Contrary to the view that feelings interfere with thinking, emotional intelligence – which includes two major components, mastery of the self and outreach to others – suggests that the ability to understand and regulate emotions can make overall thinking more effective.	与那种认定情绪会干扰思考的观点相反，情商——由自我控制和与他人的沟通联结两大部分组成——表明，理解和调节情绪的能力可使总体思路更加清晰有效。


While the concept is modern, the idea is not new.	虽然这个概念相当现代，但这个想法其实并不新鲜。


Practical people have long understood its importance in leadership.	务实的人们早已理解了这一点对领导的重要性。


In the 1930s, former Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a crusty old veteran of the American Civil War, was taken to meet Franklin D. Roosevelt, a fellow Harvard graduate but one who had not been a distinguished student.	在1930年代，经历过美国内战的硬派老将，前最高法院法官奥利弗·温德尔·霍姆斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes），前往拜会富兰克林·D·罗斯福这位当学生时不太起眼的哈佛校友。


Asked later about his impressions of the new president, Holmes famously quipped: “second-class intellect; first-class temperament.”	后来有人问及他对新总统的印象时，霍姆斯精妙地调侃道：“二等的智力； 一流的气质。


Most historians would agree that Roosevelt’s success as a leader rested more on his emotional than his analytical IQ.	”大多数历史学家也都赞同，罗斯福作为一位领导者的成功更多地来自于其情商而非智商。


Psychologists have tried to measure intelligence for more than a century.	一个多世纪以来心理学家们都在研究如何测量智力。


General IQ tests measure such dimensions of intelligence as verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning, but IQ scores predict only about 10-20% of variation in life success. The 80% that remains unexplained is the product of hundreds of factors playing out over time.	常规的智商测试则用言语理解和知觉推理这类智力维度来进行测量，但一个人的成功中智商变量只占10~20％，剩下80％的不明变量则是数百项随时间流逝不断涌现的因素的产物。


Emotional intelligence is one of them.	情商就是其中之一。


Some experts argue that emotional intelligence is twice as important as technical or cognitive skills.	一些专家认为情商的重要性比技术或认知技能要多上一倍。


Others suggest it plays a more modest role.	其他人则认为它扮演着较为温和的角色。


Moreover, psychologists differ about how the two dimensions of emotional intelligence – self-control and empathy – relate to each other.	此外心理学家对情商的两个维度——自我控制和共情——之间相互关系的认识存在分歧。


Bill Clinton, for example, scored low on the first but high on the second.	例如比尔·克林顿在第一个维度上得分较低，但在第二个分数则较高。


Nonetheless, they agree that emotional intelligence is an important component of leadership.	但学者们一致认为情商是领导力的重要组成部分。


Richard Nixon probably had a higher IQ than Roosevelt, but much lower emotional intelligence.	理查德·尼克松的智商可能比罗斯福要高，而情商则要低得多。


Leaders use emotional intelligence to manage their “charisma” or personal magnetism across changing contexts.	领导者用情商来在不断变化的情境中管理他们的“魅力”或个人吸引力。


We all present ourselves to others in a variety of ways in order to manage the impressions we make: for example, we “dress for success.” Politicians, too, “dress” differently for different audiences.	我们都通过不同的方式将自己呈现给他人以塑造给人留下的印象：比如我们说“人靠衣装”，政治家也会针对不同的受众选择衣着。


Ronald Reagan’s staff was famous for its effectiveness in managing impressions.	罗纳德·里根的工作团队在印象塑造方面尤为出名。


Even a tough general like George Patton used to practice his scowl in front of a mirror.	即使是像乔治·巴顿这样不苟言笑的老将也会在镜子前练习眉眼表情。


Successful management of personal impressions requires some of the same emotional discipline and skill possessed by good actors.	个人印象的成功管理需要一些优秀演员同样具备的情感控制和表达技能。


Acting and leadership have a great deal in common. Both combine self-control with the ability to project.	表演和领导之间存在着大量共通之处，都需要将自我控制与情感投射的能力相结合。


Reagan’s prior experience as a Hollywood actor served him well in this regard, and Roosevelt was a consummate actor as well.	里根曾作为一名好莱坞演员的经验让他在这方面受益匪浅，罗斯福也曾是个技艺精湛的演员。


Despite his pain and difficulty in moving on his polio-crippled legs, FDR maintained a smiling exterior, and was careful to avoid being photographed in the wheelchair he used.	尽管罹患小儿麻痹症的双腿令他在移动时无比痛苦艰难，罗斯福始终保持着微笑的外表，并处处小心避免被人拍到自己坐在轮椅上。


Humans, like other primate groups, focus their attention on the leader.	人类跟其他灵长类动物群体一样会把注意力集中在领导者身上。


Whether CEOs and presidents realize it or not, the signals they convey are always closely watched.	无论CEO和总裁们是否意识到了这一点，他们传达的信号一直都会受到人们的密切关注。


Emotional intelligence involves awareness and control of such signals, and the self-discipline that prevents personal psychological needs from distorting policy.	而情商就包括认识和控制这些信号，并自律以防止因个人的心理需求而导致政策被扭曲。


Nixon, for example, could strategize effectively on foreign policy; but he was less able to manage the personal insecurities that caused him to create an “enemies list” and eventually led to his downfall.	例如尼克松可以泰然自若地制定外交政策战略； 但他不太善于管理自己内心的不安全感并因此创建了一个“敌人名单”，最终导致了他的倒台。


Trump has some of the skills of emotional intelligence.	而特朗普也确实拥有一些情商的技能。


He is an actor whose experience hosting a reality-television show enabled him to dominate the crowded Republican primary field and attract considerable media attention.	主持真人秀电视节目的经验使他得以称霸拥挤的共和党初选现场，吸引相当多的媒体关注。


Dressing for the occasion in his signature red baseball cap with the slogan “Make America Great Again,” he appeared to have gamed the system with a winning strategy of using “politically incorrect” statements to focus attention on himself and gain enormous free publicity.	在适当的场合戴着他那标志性的，书有“让美国再度伟大起来”口号的红色棒球帽。 他显然采用了一套成功策略把整个体系玩弄于股掌之中，用“政治不正确”的言论把各界的关注汇集在自己身上，并赚得巨大的免费宣传。


But Trump has proven deficient in terms of self-control, leaving him unable to move toward the center for the general election.	但特朗普在自控能力上的不足也是显而易见的，这也导致他无法将重点转移到总统大选的运作上。


Likewise, he has failed to display the discipline needed to master the details of foreign policy, with the result that, unlike Nixon, he comes across as naive about world affairs.	他也没有展示出掌控外交政策细节所需要的自律性，结果跟尼克松相反，特朗普给人留下了对世界事务极为无知的印象。


Trump has a reputation as a bully in interactions with peers, but that is not bad per se.	特朗普在和同僚共事时一贯盛气凌人，但一点本身并不是坏事。


As the Stanford psychologist Roderick Kramer has pointed out, President Lyndon Johnson was a bully, and many Silicon Valley entrepreneurs have a bullying style.	作为斯坦福大学的心理学家罗德里克·克莱默（Roderick Kramer）就指出，林登·约翰逊总统是个横行霸道的人，许多硅谷创业者也是一副颐指气使的做派。


But Kramer calls such figures bullies with a vision that inspires others to want to follow them.	但克莱默称这些霸气气质能激发出让其他人去追随他们的愿景。


And Trump’s narcissism has led him to overreact, often counter-productively, to criticism and affronts.	而特朗普的自恋往往导致他对批评和指责反应过度，最终取得适得其反的效果。


For example, he became embroiled in a dispute with an American Muslim couple whose son, a US soldier, was killed in Iraq, and in a petty feud with Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, after Trump felt slighted.	例如，他与一名在伊拉克战死的美军士兵的穆斯林父母爆发冲突，又在自觉被冷落时与众议院议长保罗·瑞安（Paul Ryan）斗气。


In such cases, Trump stepped on his own message.	在这种情形下特朗普令自己所能传达的讯息大打折扣。


It is this deficiency in his emotional intelligence that has cost Trump the support of some of the most distinguished foreign policy experts in his party and in the country.	正是这种情商缺陷导致特朗普失去了一些本党本国最杰出的外交政策专家的支持。


In their words, “he is unable or unwilling to separate truth from falsehood. He does not encourage conflicting views.	用他们的话说，“他无法或不愿意从虚像中找寻事实，也并不鼓励不同的观点交锋。


He lacks self-control and acts impetuously. He cannot tolerate criticism.”	他缺乏自控且行事浮躁，也无法忍受批评。


Or, as Holmes might say, Trump has been disqualified by his second-class temperament.	”或者也许霍姆斯会说，特朗普就败在了他二流的气质上。


The Next World Order	下一个世界秩序


MADRID – The annus horribilis of 2016 is behind us now.	马德里—流年不利的2016已经成为前尘往事。


But its low points – the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union, the election of Donald Trump as US president, the ongoing atrocities in Syria – were merely symptoms of a process of dissolution of the liberal rules-based global system that began long before.	但这一年的低谷时刻——英国投票脱离欧盟、唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统、叙利亚暴行继续横行——只是建立已久的基于规则的自由全球体系分崩离析过程的症候。


Unfortunately, those symptoms are now accelerating the system’s decline.	不幸的是，这些症候正在加速体系的衰落。


For years, the liberal order has been under strain.	多年来，自有秩序一直饱受压力。


Perhaps most obvious, there has been a lack of progress in the development of institutions and legal instruments.	也许最明显的是机构发展和法律工具进步乏力。


In short, we have been trying to fit the round pegs of twenty-first-century global power into the square holes of post-World War II institutions.	简言之，我们一直在试图用二十一世纪全球力量的圆钉钉入二战后机构的方孔。


Skewed representation reflecting a bygone era, whether on the United Nations Security Council or the International Monetary Fund’s Board, undermines global institutions’ legitimacy and ability to respond to new challenges.	反映旧时代的扭曲的代表——不管是联合国安理会还是国际货币基金组织（IMF）理事会——削弱了全球机构的合法性及其应对新挑战的能力。


This has spurred a shift toward informal mechanisms like the G-20 and new, untested institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.	这促使体系向G-20以及最新成立、尚未经过考验的亚洲基础设施投资银行等机构的非正式机构转变。


A better approach would aim to boost the representation of emerging economies in existing institutions.	更好的方针是着眼于提高新兴经济体在现有机构中的代表权。


It would also seek to incorporate more non-state actors, both civil-society organizations and business representatives, into international decision-making processes.	新方针还将寻求与更多的非国家行动方合作，包括公民社会组织和企业代表，将它们纳入国际决策程序。


But the challenge extends beyond the institutional mechanics that have preoccupied most commentators, including me.	但挑战并不局限于包括我在内的大部分评论家集中关注的机构机制。


The liberal international order’s philosophical core has been hollowed out, with fundamental ideas that were once considered staples of the modern world – free trade, democracy, human rights – either in retreat or under threat.	自由国际社会的理论核心已经空洞化，曾经被视为现代世界的标志的基本思想——自由贸易、民主、人权——要么正在倒退，要么饱受威胁。


Unless and until we recognize and address this reality, the liberal world order that has brought unprecedented peace and prosperity to the world over the past seven decades will continue to erode.	除非我们承认并解决这一现实，否则过去七十年来为世界带来了前所未有的和平与繁荣自由世界秩序将继续土崩瓦解。


Liberalism and the international order that it has sustained are a product of the Enlightenment.	自由主义及其所维持的国际秩序是启蒙运动的产物。


They are rooted in a belief in inexorable human progress, in the notion of a universally shared vision and direction – focused on mastering nature – which rational self-interest dictates should be pursued.	它们植根于人类进步不可动摇的信念，植根于坚信普世愿景和方向——其重点是征服自然——理性自利的意志都应该追求这一点。


In this view, the rule of law, human-rights protections, and trade are mechanisms for propelling humanity forward, even when the road gets bumpy.	根据这一看法，法治、人权保护和贸易是推动人类前进的机制，即使道路有时坎坷。


Today, our fates are more intertwined than ever, yet the underlying sense that we have a common purpose has been lost, because our ideas about what that purpose should be have been challenged – and even negated.	如今，我们的命运比以往任何时候都更加纠结，但基本的感觉——我们有着共同的目标——已经不复存在，因为我们关于这一目标应该是什么的观念受到了挑战，甚至遭遇否定。


We now know that the resources that support our progress are not unlimited, and that our planet cannot support an ever-growing number of people with the lifestyles that have historically accompanied prosperity.	现在我们知道，支持我们的进步的资源不是取之不尽的，我们的地球无法支持不断增加的人口按照已经实现历史性繁荣的生活方式生活。


Universalist mechanisms cannot function properly without a foundation of universal ethics, objectives, and expectations.	普世机制无法在没有普世道德、目标和期望的基础的情况下合理运转。


What they can do is fuel discontent and conflict and, as we have learned in 2016, drive people to reject rationality and deny reality.	我们可以做的是助长不满和冲突，而在2016年我们看到，我们还可以鼓动人们拒绝理性、否认现实。


That is deeply troubling, and it must be addressed.	这令人非常不安，必须解决这个问题。


The first step is a reckoning.	第一步是清算。


Instead of clinging to Enlightenment rhetoric and dogmas, we must recognize the limits of our world, and shift our attention from conquering it toward preserving it.	我们不能再执着于启蒙运动的修辞和教条，而必须承认我们的世界的极限，将我们的注意力从征服世界转向保护世界。


That is the shared vision and direction needed to buttress a new, modern global order.	我们需要这样的共同愿景和方向来支持新的现代全球秩序。


The next step is an assessment of what, exactly, we should expect from this new reality – and the development of new parameters for measuring success.	下一步是评估我们应该期望这一新现实带来哪些东西，以及形成哪些衡量成功的新指标。


We cannot suppose that future generations will have more, but we can work for them to have better.	我们不能认为子孙后代会拥有更多的东西，但我们可以努力让他们拥有更好的东西。


To that end, policy should be based not on blunt indicators of aggregate change, such as GDP and net trade data, but on more nuanced metrics that provide a clearer picture of wealth distribution, education, and quality of life.	在这方面，政策不应该基于粗暴的总需求指标，GDP和净贸易数据，而应该用更细致的指标提供关于财富分配、教育和生活品质的更清晰的图景。


The third step is to get everyone on the same page.	第三步是让所有人都参与进来。


In today’s world, common approaches are essential to address challenges and create new opportunities.	当今世界，共同方针是解决挑战、创造新机会的关键。


No amount of nationalist rhetoric or anti-trade sentiment can change this.	民族主义修辞和反贸易情绪无法改变局面。


Of course, even without effective international systems underpinned by a universal ethic and purpose, the international community will have to cooperate to tackle challenges as they arise.	当然，即使没有基于普世道德和目标的国际体系，国际社会也必须合作面对它们所带来的挑战。


But, chances are, such cooperation will come only after a problem has had a sufficiently powerful impact on the perceived interests of individual actors.	但是，极有可能这样的合作只有在问题给个体行动方的可感知利益造成充分巨大的影响时才会出现。


The danger here is twofold.	这里的风险是双重的。


First, the absence of universal norms condemns the world to be perpetually reactive.	首先，普世规范的缺失决定了世界永远只能应变。


The result is an inefficient and destabilizing crisis-response model – and no constructive vision for the future.	结果是危机响应模式效率低下、无法起到稳定效果，也没有关于未来的建设性愿景。


Second, and more insidious, the absence of an overarching purpose reinforces a narrow view of self-interest, with decisions made discretely, based on a transactional, rather than a systemic, outlook.	其次也是更隐蔽的是，压倒一切的目标的缺失强化了狭隘的自利观，决策将基于事务性而非系统性的展望分散做出。


Trump, for one, seems convinced that such an approach is exactly what the world needs.	特朗普似乎认定这一方针才是世界所需要的。


But we know what such self-interested deal-making really produces.	但我们知道这种自利的交易模式会带来什么。


Indeed, the consequences of a myopic policy unmoored from values can already be seen, most outrageously in Syria.	事实上，脱离价值观的近视政策的后果就在眼前，最令人发指的便是叙利亚。


The brutal siege of Aleppo culminated six years of empty rhetoric and half-measures by Western leaders who seemed to believe that the atrocities of Syria’s civil war did not merit real action.	残忍的阿勒颇围城战是六年来西方领导人的空洞说辞和权宜之计的后果的“大成”，西方领导人似乎认为叙利亚内战的惨状不值得采取认真的行动。


Syria is an augury of a global dystopia.	叙利亚是全球反乌托邦的先兆。


But our fate need not be so dark.	但我们的命运未必如此黑暗。


Instead of mourning the liberal world order, as so many seem eager to do, we should be seeking to advance a new, shared purpose that can anchor a truly global system – and guarantee a better future for all.	我们不必如许多人急不可耐的那样宣判自由世界秩序死亡，而应该寻求推进新的共同目标，使之成为真正的全球体系之锚——并保证所有人都能拥有更美好的未来。


Protecting Europe in the Age of Trump	在特朗普的时代保护欧洲


BRUSSELS – Just like the polls prior to the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum, the polls in the run-up to the United States’ presidential election were wrong.	布鲁塞尔——就像英国退欧公投前的民意调查一样，美国总统大选前的民意调查同样犯了错误。


And just like Brexit, the unthinkable has happened: Donald Trump is now President-elect of the US, signaling the triumph of nativism over internationalism.	像英国退欧一样，不可思议的事情已经发生：唐纳德·特朗普现在是当选美国总统，表明本土主义已经对国际主义大获全胜。


In the contest between open and closed societies, the latter are clearly winning, and liberal democracy is quickly becoming a resistance movement.	在开放和封闭社会的竞争中获胜的显然是后者，而自由民主正在迅速成为一场抵抗运动。


With Trump in the White House, the US will become obsessed with itself.	随着特朗普入主白宫，美国将陷入自我迷恋之中。


It is safe to say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the US and the European Union is now a nonstarter.	现在可以说美国和欧盟间的跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系已经不可能成功。


But a Trump presidency will adversely affect Europe in more ways than that.	但特朗普当选总统对欧洲的负面影响还远不止于此。


The EU’s territorial integrity itself is now at stake.	欧洲的领土完整本身现在正处在危险之中。


Trump has made it abundantly clear that his foreign-policy priorities do not include European security.	特朗普已经非常明确地表示欧洲安全不包含在其外交政策优先事项当中。


He doesn’t recognize NATO’s strategic necessity, and he has shown an interest in transatlantic relations only when he has alluded to unpaid bills.	他不承认北约的战略必要性，而且他对跨大西洋关系的兴趣只局限在未付账单中。


A Trump presidency will lead to an epic geopolitical shift: for the first time since 1941, Europe cannot rely on the US defense umbrella; it now stands alone.	特朗普当选总统将导致史诗般的地缘政治变化：1941年来，欧洲首次无法依赖美国的防务保护伞； 欧洲现在要依靠自身。


Europe has been only too happy to make life easy for itself.	一直以来，欧洲乐得生活的轻轻松松。


For the past century, transatlantic relations have adhered to a perverse, unspoken dynamic, whereby the more active the US has been, the more Europe has dozed off.	过去一个世纪，跨大西洋关系一直呈现无法言喻的反常状态，即美国越活跃，欧洲就越被动。


When the Americans have intervened abroad – as they did in Iraq – Europe has responded with grandstanding lectures about “imperial overstretch.”	当美国在国外采取干预行动时——就像他们在伊拉克所做的那样——欧洲却报以“帝国主义过度扩张”的哗众取宠的演说。


And when the Americans have failed to intervene, or intervened late or ineffectively – as in Syria and Libya – Europeans have demanded more American leadership.	而当美国人未能干预，或干预过迟或无效时——就像在叙利亚和利比亚所发生的那样——欧洲人又要求美国更多地发挥领导作用。


That era is now over.	现在那个时代已经结束。


Trump knows that the EU has the money, technology, and know-how to be a global power equal to the US, and it is not his problem that Europe lacks the political will to harness its full potential.	特朗普知道欧洲在资金、技术和专门技能领域有能力成为与美国对等的全球大国，而欧洲缺乏充分发挥潜能的意愿不该由他来负责。


We Europeans have assumed for too long that it is cheaper and safer to let the US solve our problems, even in our own backyard.	我们欧洲人已经在太长时间里假设让美国解决我们的问题更加安全和廉价，即使问题发生在我们自己的后院当中。