For Murray, it is that social insurance means that behaving badly does not lead to catastrophe – and we need bad behavior to lead to catastrophe in order to keep people from behaving badly.	在穆雷看来，问题在于社会保险意味着做得不好不会导致崩溃——我们需要导致崩溃的坏行为，这样才能让人们不再做出坏行为。


The crucial point is that America’s conservative elites believe Brooks, Eberstadt, and Murray.	关键点在于，美国保守主义精英相信布鲁克斯、埃伯斯塔特和穆雷。


To this day, Mitt Romney is convinced that he lost the presidency in 2012 because Barack Obama unfairly gave Latino-Americans subsidized health insurance; gave women free reproductive health coverage (excluding abortion); and gave other groups similar “gifts.”	眼下，罗姆尼相信他之所以输掉2012年总统大选，是因为奥巴马不公平地给了拉丁裔美国人健康保险补贴，给了妇女免费的生殖健康保险（不含流产），还给了其他群体类似的“礼物”。


He could “never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives.”	他绝不会“让他们认为他们应该承担个人责任，看好自己的生活。 ”


In fact, it would be a tough sell for any candidate to convince Americans who receive government benefits that they are dependent rather than empowered; that it is bad for people to vote for politicians who make their lives better; and that good public policy seeks to create human catastrophe rather than to avert it.	事实上，不论哪位候选人，让拿政府福利的美国人相信他们与其说是受助者，不如说是依赖者、相信把票投给让他们生活更好的政客是不对的、让他们相信好的公共政策应该造成而不是避免人类灾难都不是易事。


The problem for American conservatives is not their choice of candidates or the tone of their rhetoric. It is that their ideas are not politically sustainable.	美国保守主义者的问题不在于候选人的选择或是说辞的语调，而在于他们的想法不具有政治可持续性。


Angry people swayed by the populist message are angrier at liberal professors, clever bankers, or skeptical journalists than they are at multi-billionaires.	被民粹主义信念激怒的人民对自由派教授、聪明的银行家或怀疑派记者的��怒要大于他们对亿万富翁的愤怒。


The Indispensable American Partner	不可或缺的美国伙伴


MADRID – The United States is gearing up for that most intoxicating (and exhausting) of political events: an open-seat race for the presidency.	马德里—美国正在为最令人兴奋（也最令人疲惫）的政治事件做准备：总统席位的开放竞争。


With US President Barack Obama's eight years in office coming to an end, and Vice President Joe Biden unlikely to run, the race will be without an incumbent.	副总统拜登看起来不会参与，因此这场角逐不会有现任官员。


As a result, the election could be less a referendum on the last eight years than a contest of ideas, with foreign policy emerging as a key topic.	因此，这场大选也许并不是对过去八年的全民公决，而是一场思想的竞争，而外交政策正在成为其中的关键。


The potential candidates have already sought to stake out their positions on key foreign-policy issues, with early Republican frontrunner Jeb Bush, for example, delivering a speech devoted entirely to the topic.	潜在候选人已开始在关键外交政策上表明立场，比如，早期共和党领跑者杰布·布什（Jeb Bush）专门就此话题做了一次演讲。


As for the Democrats, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's likely nomination (despite recent revelations that she used her personal email account to conduct government business) reinforces foreign policy's centrality to the election.	在民主党方面，前国务卿希拉里·克林顿可能获得提名（尽管最新曝光表明她使用个人电子邮件账户处理公事），这进一步加强了外交政策在大选中的关键性。


Recognizing this trend, the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council has brought together a group of experts and practitioners to help infuse substance into the foreign-policy discussions leading up to the US election, including by preparing a public discussion paper.	考虑到这一趋势，世界经济论坛全球日程委员会（World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council）召集了一组专家和实干家，提前就美国大选中的外交政策问题作了实质性讨论，还准备了一篇公开讨论文章。


From my perspective as the group's only European member, the overarching message should be that the US must conceive of itself not as “the indispensable power," as it now does, but as “the indispensable partner."	我是小组中唯一的欧洲成员，在我看来，最重要的信息应该是美国不可继续如现在那样将自己视为“不可或缺的力量”，而是将自己视为“不可或缺的伙伴”。


This is not merely a matter of semantics; such a change will require the US to re-conceive its role in the world.	这不仅仅是语义学问题； 如此挑战要求美国反思其在世界中的作用。


But the payoff, for both the US and the liberal world order that it created, would be substantial.	但不管对美国还是对其所创造的自由世界秩序来说，这样做的好处是无穷的。


The key to success will be America's ability to retain the best – and abandon the worst – of that most American of notions: exceptionalism.	成功的关键是美国能否对最“美国”的概念——例外论去芜存菁。


The sense in the US that the country is unique, with a special mission to promote prosperity, security, and freedom worldwide, has long shaped American foreign policy.	在美国，认为本国独一无二，负有促进全球繁荣、安全和自由的特殊任务，这一观念长期以来决定着美国的外交政策。


The idea extends as far back as 1630, when John Winthrop, the Massachusetts Bay Colony's first governor, declared that his community must act as a “city upon a hill," setting an example for the world.	这一观念可以追溯到1630年，那一年，马萨诸塞湾殖民地首任总督约翰·温斯罗普（John Winthrop）宣布他的社区将像一座“山巅之城”（city upon a hill），为全世界树立一个榜样。


In doing so, he planted the seed of the values-based approach that was adopted by the US as it spearheaded the development of the rules and structures that order today's world.	就这样，他种下了基于价值的方针的种子，美国根据这一方针领导制定了决定当今世界秩序的规则与结构。


Those rules and structures have delivered unprecedented economic growth, benefiting all (though the US has reaped the greatest rewards).	这些规则与结果带来了前所未有的经济增长，惠及所有人（尽管美国拿走了最大的果实）。


But, ironically, the notion of American exceptionalism often has led the US to undermine the international system that it nurtured.	但是，讽刺的是，美国例外论常常导致美国破坏它所培养的国际体系。


Indeed, US history reveals a persistent isolationist streak, in which the “city upon a hill" is not a beacon, but a fortress.	事实上，美国历史一直有一种孤立主义倾向，“山巅之城”好像不是一座灯塔，而是一座堡垒。


At times, including over the last six years, the belief that the US is better off going it alone has led to withdrawal from the world.	一次又一次（包括在过去六年中），美国最好还是只顾自己的观念导致其从世界舞台中退出。


This tendency was not a serious issue before World War II (though the people of Abyssinia and Manchuria may beg to differ).	这一趋势在二战前并不是什么严重的问题（尽管阿比西尼亚和满洲人会提出异议）。


But today, US withdrawal from the international system that it built has serious ramifications – namely, the kind of chaos and lawlessness exemplified by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.	但如今，美国从其所构建的国际体系中退出将造成严重后果——即各种混乱和无法，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰就是明证。


Yet isolationism is not America's most destructive impulse.	但孤立主义不是美国危害最大的举动。


Worse is its “exemptionalism": its penchant for opting out of the rules that it promotes – and often actively enforces – elsewhere.	更糟糕的是其“豁免论”（exemptionalism）：置身其在其他地区所推行——并且常常积极执行——的规则之外。


The lengthy – and growing – list of major international conventions left unratified by the US includes the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.	美国迟迟不肯批准的主要国际公约名单不可不为冗长——并且还在增长，包括《国际刑事法院罗马规约》（Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court）、《废除一切形式妇女歧视公约》（Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women）、《禁止地雷公约》（Mine Ban Convention）、《儿童权利公约》（Convention on the Rights of the Child）、《残疾人士权利公约》（Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities）等。


Beyond the resentment that such an attitude engenders, American exemptionalism directly undermines multilateral institutions' capacity to address challenges that the US is unwilling or unable to resolve on its own.	除了这一态度可能产生的不满之外，美国豁免论还直接影响了多边机构解决美国不愿或不能独力解决的挑战的能力。


How can the US expect China to follow rules on maritime delimitation in the East and South China Seas when it refuses to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?	当美国拒绝批准联合国哦《海洋法公约》（Convention on the Law of the Sea）时，它如何能够要求中国遵守东海和南海的领海界线？


US President Barack Obama's administration has tried to create the illusion of a change of course in this regard, pushing “soft" deals that allow the US to participate without submitting to binding rules.	美国总统奥巴马政府试图营造一种状况正在改变的幻觉，推出了一些“软”协议让美国可以在不必遵守约束性规则的情况下参与。


Such was the case with the much-lauded “handshake agreement" between Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping on carbon-dioxide emissions in November.	大受赞扬的奥巴马与中国国家主席习近平在11月所达成二氧化碳排放“握手协议”便是如此。


But, though such arrangements make for great headlines, they do not provide the stability and predictability necessary for long-term success.	但是，尽管这样的安排吸引了大量目光，但并没有提供长期成功所需要的稳定性和可预测性。


For that, hard rules and strong institutions are essential.	在这方面，硬规则和强势机构才是至关重要的。


If the US is to serve as the world's “indispensable partner," it must recommit to the rules-based order that has served it – and the world – so well for the last seven decades.	如果美国要成为世界“不可或缺的伙伴”，它就必须重新致力于在过去七十年给它——以及全世界——带来无穷好处的基于规则的秩序。


It should begin by strengthening the flagging institutions that have served as the backbone of the liberal international order.	首先，美国应该强化作为自由国际秩序基石的核心机构。


Specifically, the US should finally approve the International Monetary Fund reform package that was agreed in 2010; promote real progress at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May; and ensure that this December's UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference in Paris yields formal commitments.	具体而言，美国应该最终批准2010年就形成一致的国际货币基金组织改革方案、推进5月核不扩散条约审议大会（Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference）取得真正进展、确保12月的联合国巴黎气候变化会议框架公约形成正式承诺。


Indispensable partnership is about helping countries help themselves.	不可或缺的伙伴意味着帮助各国帮助自己。


It requires vision, commitment, and, most important, leadership.	这要求远见卓识、承诺以及（最重要的）领导力。


A frank discussion about America's foreign policy could prove vital to ensuring that this “city upon a hill" remains a beacon of hope – and a catalyst of progress.	开诚布公地讨论美国外交政策将是确保这个“山巅之城”仍是希望灯塔——以及进步催化剂的关键。


American Foreign Policy after Iraq	伊拉克之后的美国对外政策


What comes after Iraq?	伊拉克之后又会是什么？


If President George W. Bush’s current troop “surge” fails to produce an outcome that can be called “victory,” what lessons will the United States draw for its future foreign policy?	如果布什总统的部队“急流”不能交出一份可以称作“胜利”的答卷，那么美国可以从中为其未来的对外政策吸取什么样的教训呢？


Will it turn inward, as it did after its defeat in Vietnam three decades ago?	它会转为内向，正如30年前兵败越南之后那样么？


Will it turn from promoting democracy to a narrow realist view of its interests?	它会从推动民主转向为一种对自身利益的狭隘现实主义观吗？


Even while discussion in Washington is fixated on Iraq, a number of thoughtful foreign observers are asking these longer-term questions.	即便在华盛顿的讨论仍聚焦伊拉克的情况下，一些有思想的外交观察家已经开始提出这些长期性的问题了。


Analysts and pundits have often been mistaken about America’s position in the world.	分析家和专家们对美国在世界上的地位往往有错误的认识。


For example, two decades ago, the conventional wisdom was that the US was in decline.	例如，20年前，一般的公众观点认为美国正在衰落。


A decade later, with the Cold War’s end, the new conventional wisdom was that the world was a unipolar American hegemony.	10年后，随着冷战结束，新的公众观点又认为世界上只有美国一个超级霸权。


Some neo-conservative pundits drew the conclusion that the US was so powerful that it could decide what it thought was right, and others would have to follow.	一些新保守派专家认定美国是如此强大，以至于它可以按自己的意志决策，而其它国家不得不遵从。 Charles Krauthammer高调地将这种观点称为“新单边主义”。


Charles Krauthammer celebrated this view as “the new unilateralism,” and it heavily influenced the Bush administration even before the attacks on September 11, 2001.	它甚至在2001年“9. 11”袭击发生之前都一直对布什政府产生着重要的影响。


But the new unilateralism was based on a profound misunderstanding of the nature of power in world politics.	但新单边主义是基于对世界政治实力特点的深刻误解。


Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants.	实力是取得需要的结果的能力。


Whether the possession of resources will produce such outcomes depends upon the context.	通过所拥有的资源能否获得这样的结果还依赖于环境。


For example, a large, modern tank army is a powerful resource if a war is fought in a desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp – as America discovered in Vietnam.	例如，如果战争在沙漠中进行，那么一支庞大的现代化坦克部队就是一种强大的资源。 但如果战事在沼泽地区进行则不然—正如美国在越南所发现的那样。


In the past, it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly.	过去，人们一般认为军事实力主导着绝大多数问题，但在当今的世界，实力的大环境千差万别。


I have likened the distribution of power in politics today as analogous to a three-dimensional chess game.	我把当今政治实力的分配比作一盘三维国际象棋。


On the top board – military relations among states – the world is, indeed, unipolar, and likely to remain that way for decades.	在上盘—国家之间的军事关系中—世界确实是单极化的，而且这种情况很可能还要持续几十年。


But on the middle board of economic relations, the world is already multipolar, and the US cannot obtain the outcomes it wants without the cooperation of Europe, Japan, China, and others.	但在中盘的经济关系方面，世界已经是多极化了，而美国也不可能不通过与欧洲、日本、中国和其它国家合作就获得自己需要的结果。


And, on the bottom board of transnational issues outside the control of governments – including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism – power is chaotically distributed, and it makes no sense at all to claim American hegemony.	在下盘超越政府控制之外的跨国事务方面—包括从气候变化到流行疾病到跨国恐怖主义—实力的分配是混乱的，因而在这样的背景下提出美国的霸权也是毫无意义的。


Yet it is on this bottom board that we find most of the greatest challenges we face today.	然而正是在下盘让我们发现了当今面对的最大挑战。


The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires the “soft” power of attraction as well as the hard power of coercion. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want.	应对这些问题的唯一途径就是通过与他人合作，而这就需要吸引的“软”实力和高压的硬实力并用，而没有现成的能让我们如愿以偿的简单军事解决方案。


The new unilateralists who dominated Bush’s first administration made the mistake of thinking that the unipolar distribution of power in the military context was sufficient to guide foreign policy.	主导布什第一届政府的新单边主义者们错误地认为在军事环境中的实力单极化分配足以引导对外政策。


They were like a young boy with a hammer who thinks that every problem resembles a nail.	他们就像一个手拿锤子的小孩，认为所有的问题都像钉子一样。


The danger of their approach is now obvious.	他们这种思维方式的危险性在当下就显而易见了。


Whoever plays a three-dimensional game by focusing on only one board is bound to lose in the long run.	任何人在玩三维国际象棋游戏时，只注重某一个盘，那么从长期来看他是注定要失败的。


Fortunately, the pendulum has begun to swing back toward cooperation.	幸运的是，这个钟摆现在又开始滑向合作。


In Bush’s second term, some of the most extreme unilateralists have departed from the government, and the president has approached difficult problems like North Korea or Iran with a more multilateral approach than during his first term.	在布什的第二任期，一些最极端的单边主义者离开了政府，而总统本人在处理北朝鲜或伊朗等更复杂的问题时也采用了比在第一个任期更为多边的策略。


Likewise, for all the complaints about the United Nations, the US and others turned to UN peacekeepers to sort out the mess after the Lebanon War last summer.	同样，针对关于联合国的所有抱怨，美国和其它国家都通过联合国维和部队来收拾去年夏天黎巴嫩战争留下的烂摊子。


The Iraq War, in particular, increased public awareness of the mistakes in Bush’s first term, but other issues are changing as well.	伊拉克战争尤其加深了公众对布什在第一任期所犯错误的认识，但其它情况也在变化中。


Americans now view cooperative action on global climate change more favorably.	美国人现在开始以更赞许的态度来看待全球气候变化方面的合作行动。


Similarly, the threat of pandemics means that Americans may come to recognize the importance of a stronger World Health Organization, just as the problem of nuclear proliferation is increasing awareness of the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency.	同样，流行性疾病的威胁意味着美国人可能会最终承认一个更强有力的世界卫生组织的重要性，正如核扩散的问题使公众更加意识到国际原子能机构的重要性一样。


The nature of these problems means that the US does not have the luxury of turning inward no matter what the outcome in Iraq.	这些问题的特点意味着不论伊拉克问题的结果如何，美国都没有重新回归内向政策的奢侈了。


These are not problems you can leave overseas.	这不是些你能留在海外的问题。


They follow you home.	它们会如影随形般的跟你回到国内。


It also is unlikely that American foreign policy will return to a narrow realism and drop all emphasis on democracy and human rights.	美国的对外政策也不大可能回到狭隘的现实主义，而不再强调民主和人权。


While the Iraq War discredited the idea of coercive democratization, both Republicans and Democrats have a strong strand of idealism in their foreign policy orientations.	尽管伊拉克战争令强制民主化的理念声名狼藉，共和党和民主党人在他们的对外政策取向中仍保持着强烈的理想主义色彩。


The problem for whoever is elected president in 2008 will be to find appropriate realistic means to advance democratic values and adjust official rhetoric accordingly.	在2008年获选总统的任何人所面临的问题都将是寻求推进民主价值观的适当的现实主义途径并对官方论调做出相应调整。


When rhetoric greatly outstrips reality, others view it as hypocrisy.	当官方论调凌驾于现实之上时，别人就会认为这是种虚伪。


Americans will need to find ways to assert their narrative of democracy, freedom, and rights in a manner that respects diversity and the views of others.	美国人需要找到一种尊重多样性和他人观点的方式来宣扬他们对民主、自由和权利的坚持。


What Iraq has taught is the importance of developing civil society and the rule of law before trying to hold broad-based elections.	伊拉克给我们提供的教训是在试图举行广泛的选举之前先发展公民社会和健全法制的重要性。


Democracy is more than voting, for it requires large investments in education, institutions, and promotion of non-governmental organizations.	民主不仅仅是选举，因为它还需要在教育、制度和推动非政府组织发展方面进行大量的投入。


It must be rooted in the indigenous society and bear its characteristics, not be imposed from abroad.	它必须是植根于本地社会并承袭其特点，而不是被强加的舶来品。


It is highly unlikely that the US will react after Iraq as it did after Vietnam.	美国在伊拉克战争之后做出类似越战后的反应的可能性微乎其微。


The paradox of American power is that the world’s only military superpower cannot protect its citizens by acting alone.	美国实力的悖论在于：这个世界唯一的军事超级大国靠单打独斗无法保护其公民。


American Foreign Policy After the Mid-Term Elections	中期选举之后的美国外交政策


NEW YORK – Few Americans cast their ballot in the recent mid-term elections on the basis of foreign policy.	发自纽约——在本次中期选举中，只有为数不多的美国人是基于外交政策的原因而投票的。


While it may be difficult for people around the world to comprehend this, given the global reach of the United States, it is an undeniable fact.	鉴于美国的全球影响力，世界其他地方的人们可能难以理解这一点，但这却是一个合理的事实。


Most Americans are, after all, preoccupied with the US economy’s sluggish growth and persistent high unemployment.	毕竟绝大多数美国人都将精力放在了国内的增长停滞和长期高失业率之上。


The world’s challenges seem far removed from their day-to-day lives.	而那些全球危机似乎离他们的日常生活太遥远了。


The Cold War ended a generation ago; the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, are nearly a decade in the past.	冷战结束已经是上一代人的话题； 9·11恐怖袭击也已经过去将近十年。


Most Americans do not feel the sacrifices associated with the large troop presence and ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.	大多数美国人都对派驻阿富汗和伊拉克的庞大军队所付出的牺牲毫无知觉。


But the fact that foreign policy did not materially affect the November elections does not mean that the results will not affect US foreign policy.	虽然外交政策并未对本次中期选举产生重大影响，但这却不意味着选举结果不会影响美国的外交政策。


They will, but in ways that are inconsistent and even surprising.	影响是必然的，但会以一种反复无常甚至令人大吃一惊的方式。


One relationship sure to be influenced by Republican gains will be that between the US and Russia.	共和党占优的形势必将影响到美俄关系。


Quick or easy Senate approval of the New START arms-control treaty is highly unlikely, given stated concerns about verification and the protection of US missile-defense programs; instead, we can expect delays and, possibly, attempts to amend what the two governments already agreed upon.	参议院将无法迅速或轻易地批准新的《削减战略武器条约》，因为议员们对如何核实战略武器数量与美国导弹防御系统防御能力的都心里没底。 与于是乎，我们将会看到对条约的拖延，甚至对两国政府业已达成的协议的反对。


Congress may also prove less willing to remove hurdles to Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization, given what is widely judged to be its leaders’ anti-democratic behavior.	众议院估计也不太会移除对俄罗斯加入世贸的诸多障碍，因为大家都对俄罗斯领导人的反民主行为感到反感。


China, too, will feel the results of the new balance in Congress.	中国也会感觉到两党重新划分众议院势力的影响。


Pressure was already growing to introduce trade sanctions in response to China’s refusal to allow its currency to rise to a natural level against the dollar.	事实上，已经有越来越多的压力要求对中国拒绝令其货币兑美元升值到一个合理水平的做法实施贸易制裁。


Such pressure will likely grow, given concerns over Chinese behavior both at home and abroad.	这些压力将越来越大，因为大家对中国在其国内和国外的所做所为都有意见。


Moreover, Congress will resist rolling back any of the long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba.	此外，中国将抵制美国取消对古巴的任何长期制裁。


President Barack Obama has the authority to take some small steps on his own to normalize ties, but substantial change to US policy requires Congress to act – and Congress wants to see fundamental change in Cuba before it does so.	美国总统奥巴马有足够的权威区在美国-古巴关系正常化的道路上取得一些微小进展，但长期的改变则需要参议院批准——但参议院却希望在解除制裁之前能看到古巴发生一些根本性的变化。


There will be other consequences stemming from the election.	选举还将带来其他一些后果。


What little chance there was of the US backing any global plan to limit or tax carbon emissions has disappeared.	美国支持关于限制或者征收碳排放税的任何全球方案的微小可能性都已彻底破灭。


Improvement in US performance on climate change will have to come from innovation and increased energy efficiency.	美国在这方面的改善只能依靠科技创新和提高能源利用效率了。


One can anticipate the Republicans, now in control of the House of Representatives, exploiting their ability to convene hearings to question and review foreign policy.	人们可以预见到，目前控制了众议院���共和党人将利用手中的权力召开质疑或检讨当前外交政策的听证会。


Depending on how this power is used (or abused), it can be beneficial (exercising needed oversight and increasing the transparency of policy and policy-making) or destructive (if, for example, hearings degenerate into politically motivated attacks on administration officials and policies).	取决于他们如何使用（或者滥用）这些权力，结果可能是有益的（实施必要的监察或者提高外交政策制定的透明度）或是有害的（比如说听证会可能异化成对某些官员和政策的政治攻击）。


In many other areas, continuity can be expected to trump change.	而在其他许多领域，政策的持续性将不会有什么变化。


This comes as little surprise, as America’s Constitution and political system delegate most of the initiative on foreign policy and defense to the president.	这毫不奇怪，因为美国的宪法和政治系统将大多数外交和国防事务交由总统承担。


Yes, Congress must declare war, approve spending, agree to most senior appointments, and (in the case of the Senate) ratify treaties, but the president has enormous latitude when it comes to carrying out diplomacy and using military force in situations other than war, which tend to be most situations.	国会可以宣战，批准预算，通过大多数高级官员任命，以及（就参议院来说）提准条约，但在绝大多数情况下，总统在执行外交或者除了战争之外的军事行动方面都拥有极大的自由度。


One area of probable continuity is the Middle East, where Obama will continue to try to broker a deal between Israelis and Palestinians and press Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.	其中一个能保留政策持续性的领域可能是中东，因为奥巴马将继续尝试促成以巴双方的和平条约，并迫使伊朗放弃发展核武器（共和党人一直都要求不要向以色列施加过多压力，而对伊朗采取更强硬手段）。


(Republicans, however will argue for putting less pressure on Israel to compromise and more pressure on Iran.)  But he can expect considerable backing from Republicans if he wants to maintain a sizeable US military presence in Afghanistan beyond this July, or a modest military presence in Iraq beyond the end of 2011.	但如果奥巴马想要在今年7月后在阿富汗维持一直相当数量的部队，或是在2011年末以后在伊拉克维持适度的军事存在，他都是可以得到共和党相当程度上的支持的。


Questions abound when it comes to foreign economic policy, however.	但在经济外交政策方面则存在着许多问题。


Three completed trade agreements (with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia) have been languishing for years, mostly because of deep opposition to free trade from labor unions and the Democratic Party.	三项全面贸易条约（与韩国，巴拿马和哥伦比亚）已经在工会和民主党的阻挠下拖延了几年时间。


Republicans have historically been more supportive of such bilateral free-trade agreements.	而共和党一直以来对这类双边自由贸易条约都是表示支持的。


But will the new generation of Republicans continue this tradition?	但新一代共和党人是否会坚持这一传统？


There is a fair chance that one or more of these bilateral accords will be approved (in part because the Obama administration seems finally to have recognized that trade can generate good jobs), but it is far less certain that the president will gain the authority needed to negotiate a new global trade deal.	这是那几项双边条约获得通过的好机会（其中一部分原因是奥巴马政府似乎最终意识到贸易可以催生新的工作机会），但更不确定的则是总统是否有足够的权威去商讨一个新的全球贸易协定。


An even bigger question mark hovers over what might be the greatest national security concern of all: the federal budget deficit.	而一个更重要的问题则是所谓最大的国家安全问题：联邦债务赤字。


Failure to address the deficit (and the mounting debt) will create pressures to reduce what the US spends on foreign aid, intelligence, and defense – although Republicans are more likely than Democrats to protect such spending (except for foreign aid).	如果无法解决赤字（以及不断堆积的债务）的话，那么美国的对外援助，情报和国防事务都将面临巨大的压力——即便共和党人比民主党人更倾向于维持这部分经费（对外援助除外）。


Mounting debt also leaves the US vulnerable to the decisions of those who lend it money – or to the vagaries of the market.	不断增加的债务将迫使美国向那些国际债主们俯首称臣，或是无法承受市场的突然波动。


A dollar crisis could weaken the foundations of American power.	美元危机将影响到美国的全球权力基础。


But averting such a crisis requires that the White House and Congress, Democrats and Republicans, agree on a plan for moving the US budget toward balance.	但克服这一危机则需要白宫和国会，以及民主党和共和党双方都能在促使美国实现财政平衡方面达成共识。


Alas, the election makes such agreement more distant than ever.	无奈的是，中期选举却令这类共识离我们更加遥远了。


America’s Global Balancing Act	美国的全球平衡行动


With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the disintegration of Iraq’s and Syria’s borders, and increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, the post-Cold War era appears to have ended in 2014.	伊拉克和叙利亚分崩离析； 中国在南海和东海日益嚣张——考虑到这些发面，后冷战时代似乎已经在2014年结束了。


Is that true?	真的如此吗？


The post-Cold War era was not really an “era,” but rather a gradual transition from a bilateral Cold War to a more complex international order that still involves, in the final analysis, two world powers.	后冷战时代不是真正的“时代”，而是一个从双边对峙的冷战最终分析仍存在两个超级大国的更加复杂的国际秩序的逐渐转变时期。


In brief, the decisive axis of the new order increasingly involves the United States and the People’s Republic of China.	简单说，决定新秩序的轴心已经日益明确——美国和中华人民共和国。


The Sino-American competition involves two significant realities that distinguish it from the Cold War: neither party is excessively ideological in its orientation; and both parties recognize that they really need mutual accommodation.	中美竞争包含了两个重要事实，使其与冷战区分开来：双方对于方向问题都不过分意识形态化； 双方都认识到它们真的需要相互迁就。


America’s supposed “pivot to Asia” took a back seat in 2014 to the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East.	2014年，美国的“重返亚洲”政策因为乌克兰和中东危机而变得不再显眼。


To what extent has uncertainty about the US commitment in Asia stoked tension between China and America’s Asian allies?	美国的亚洲承诺的不确定性如何助长了中国和美国的亚洲盟国之间的紧张？


I disagree with the premises of the question.	我不同意这个问题的前提。


I do think America has made it quite clear that it is in the interest both of America and China to avoid situations in which they will be pushed toward a collision.	我确实认为美国非常清楚地表示，避免让中美双方陷入会把它们推向冲突的局面符合双方的利益。


The recent indications of some initial dialogue between China and India, and between China and Japan, suggest that China also realizes that escalating old grievances is not in its interest.	最近的一些中印、中日之间初步对话的迹象表明，中国也认识到煽动旧仇恨不符合它的利益。


The more serious problem with the “pivot to Asia” was its actual wording, which implied a military posture designed to “contain” or “isolate” China.	“重返亚洲”所包含的更加严重的问题是它的实际用词，其中暗含要“遏制”或“孤立”中国的军事姿态。


The Chinese have come to realize more clearly that we were not deliberately attempting to isolate them, but that we had a stake in the avoidance of collisions in the Far East that could produce a wider spillover.	中国人已经更清楚地认识到我们不是故意试图孤立他们，而是避免可能产生更广泛的溢出效应的远东冲突对我们来说意义重大。


Xi Jinping has used his war on corruption to concentrate more power in his hands than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, 30 years ago.	习近平用其反腐斗争巩固更多的权力，这是30年前邓小平以来从未有过的。


How do you see Xi’s presidency evolving?	你认为习近平的任期会如何发展？


Power in China is somewhat informally defined, and its limits are set more by political realities than by constitutional arrangements.	从某种程度上讲，中国的权力界定不那么正式，其权力的边界更多地由政治现实而不是宪法安排决定。


That makes it difficult to say whether Xi’s power is greater than any Chinese leader’s since Deng.	因此，很难说习近平的权力比邓小平以来的任何一位中国领导人更大。


He certainly has an authoritative personality and without doubt is more active on the international scene than some of his predecessors.	他显然是一个拥有权威的人，并且毫无疑问比他的几位前任在国际舞台上更加活跃。


He has also been very decisive in attacking the growing corruption that has become a major source of internal malaise, reaching even the highest levels of government.	在打击业已成为国内顽症、甚至已蔓延到政府最高成的日益猖獗的腐败方面，他也比几位前任更加果断。


In that respect, it may be argued that his power is more wide-ranging than that of his predecessors, but in fairness it must also be noted that the patterns of corruption that his predecessors faced were not as acute and widespread as they have become in recent years.	从这个角度讲，或许可以说他的权力范围比他的前任们更广，但在公正方面，你还必须注意到，他的前任所面临的腐败方式没有最近几年那样赤裸裸和普遍。


At the same time, the increasing emphasis in party journals on the proposition that China’s armed forces must be viewed as servants of the Communist Party, and not simply of the nation, seems to suggest concern that the military may be developing its own view of Chinese domestic affairs, in addition to proclaiming with increasing assertiveness its responsibility for national security.	与此同时，党报日益强调党指挥枪、反对军队国家化，这似乎表明存在一种担心，即军队除了在捍卫国家安全责任方面变得日益强硬之外，也正在产生他们自身对中国内政的看法。


The Party elite, quite understandably, does not find this reassuring.	不难理解，中共精英对此感到十分不安。


Can Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime withstand a prolonged period of low energy prices and Western sanctions?	俄罗斯总统普京的政权能够抵挡长时期的低油价和西方制裁吗？


What risks do you see emerging should Russia’s economy continue to decline, with Putin increasingly unable to reward his political base?	你认为如果俄罗斯经济继续衰退，普京在奖赏他的政治基础方面日益力不从心，会产生什么后果？


There is, of course, a danger that at some point Putin may choose to lash out and create a truly massive international crisis, and perhaps precipitate some new form of direct East-West warfare.	当然，在某个点上普京也许会选择孤注一掷，制造真正的大规模国际危机，也许还会引爆新形式的东西方直接战争，这种危险是存在的。


But to say that, one must also assume that to some extent he himself is unbalanced and has shifted from a kind of guerilla warfare against the West, always with some possibility of retreat, to all-out combat.	但果真如此的话，我们还必须假设，在某种程度上，他本人已经失衡，从对西方的某种游击战——永远存在撤退的可能——转变为孤注一掷的战争。


The outcome of that would be inherently unpredictable, but probably in any case very destructive for Russian wellbeing.	这一情况的结果具有内在不可预测性，但也许无论如何对俄罗斯人的福祉来说都是一场灾难。


If Russia’s economy continues to decline, and if the West succeeds in deterring Putin from further use of force, it is still conceivable that some acceptable resolution (a form of which I recommended publicly by talking about the Finland model) may be contrived.	如果俄罗斯经济继续衰退，并且西方继续威慑普京使之不敢扩大武力，我们仍然可以认为可以形成某种可接受的解决方案（我在谈及芬兰模式时曾公开建议过）。


But that depends in turn on the West’s firmness in supporting Ukraine’s efforts to stabilize itself.	但这反过来取决于西方在支持乌克兰稳定自身方面有多坚定。


Following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, much of the world now perceives the US as being in a period of “retreat,” similar to the post-Vietnam War era.	美军撤出阿富汗和伊拉克后，世界上有许多人现在认为美国已经入“撤退”期，就像越战后时代那样。


Is the US embracing a form of neo-isolationism?	美国正在采取某种形式的新孤立主义吗？


Or will America’s apparent inward turn be as brief as it was following Vietnam?	还是说，美国显而易见的向内转和越战之后一样只是短暂现象？


I do not believe that the US is in a “period of retreat.”	我不认为美国进入了“撤退期”。


The fact of the matter is that the redistribution of global power has produced a situation in which the US is no longer the sole hegemon.	重要的事实是全球实力的再分配产生了一个美国不再是唯一霸权的局面。


The US has to acknowledge the fact that the world is now much more complex.	美国必须承认一个事实，即现在的世界比以前复杂得多。


The spread of conflict throughout the Middle East is currently precipitated more by the rise of religious sectarianism than by American interventionism.	中东地区的冲突蔓延更多地是拜宗教门户之见崛起所赐，而不是因为美国的干涉。


In these volatile circumstances, greater attention must be given to the national interests of countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.	在这些暴力环境下，必须将更多注意力放在土耳其、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、埃及和以色列等国家的国家利益上。


By the same token, the interests of any one of them must not be allowed to become the total interest of the US.	同理，这些国家中的任何一国的利益决不能成为美国的总利益。


What may surprise the world most in 2015?	2015年什么事情能给世界带来最大的意外？


Perhaps the gradual reappearance in Russia of a more politically assertive liberal middle class.	也许是俄罗斯逐渐在再现政治上更积极的自由中产阶级。


That middle class was beginning to play a more significant role in shaping domestic and international Russian policy under Dmitri Medvedev.	在梅德韦杰夫时期，这一中产阶级开始在俄罗斯国内和国际政策中扮演更加重要的角色。


With Putin’s return to power and his recent adventurism, it has been pushed aside by deliberately awakened and intensely stimulated national chauvinism.	随着普京重回宝座并且采取了最近的冒险主义，自由中产阶级被刻意唤醒并且密集刺激的民族沙文主义所压制。


Waving a chauvinist banner, however, may not be the best solution for dealing with international problems, especially if the West is intelligent and united. The Russian middle class, quite naturally, wishes to live in a society like that of Western Europe.	但是，高举沙文主义的大旗也许并不是处理国际问题的最佳方案，特别是在面临明智而团结的西方的情况下。


A Russia that gradually begins to gravitate toward the West will also be a Russia that ceases to disrupt the international system.	逐渐开始被西方吸引的俄罗斯也将是一个停止干扰国际制度的俄罗斯。


America’s Enemy Within	美国国内的敌人


NEW YORK – Barring any unexpected new revelations, there is not much to be learned from the Tsarnaev brothers, better known as “the Boston bombers.”	纽约——除出人意料的事实真相外，从察尔纳耶夫兄弟（也叫“波士顿兄弟”）身上再也得不到什么新的东西。


We can dig into their family histories in strife-torn Dagestan, or examine, once again, the lethal appeal of Islamist radicalism.	我们可以挖掘俩兄弟在倍受纷争蹂躏的家乡达吉斯坦的家庭史，也可以再次审视伊斯兰激进主义的致命吸引力。


But I doubt that this would be enlightening.	但我怀疑这样做有没有意义。


The elder brother, Tamerlan, who died in a gun battle with the police, appears to fit perfectly the profile of what the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger calls “the radical loser.”	在与警方交火中丧生的哥哥塔梅兰似乎是德国作家汉斯·马格努斯·恩岑斯贝格口中“激进失败者”的典型。


And his younger brother, Dzhokhar, recovering from gunshot wounds in a Boston hospital while waiting to be put on trial for his life, seems to have been a pathetic follower who acted less out of deep conviction than out of fraternal love.	而正在波士顿医院接受枪伤治疗并等待接受死刑审判的弟弟焦哈尔与其说因为信仰参与恐怖活动，还不如说是因为兄弟情谊而被牵扯其中的可怜的追随者。


The radical loser is the kind of young man who feels victimized by an unfeeling, uncaring world.	激进失败者是指那些感觉被绝情、冷漠的世界抛弃的年轻人。


That sour sense of rejection, felt by many confused youths, turns for some into a fierce desire for vengeance.	很多困惑的年轻人那种酸楚的被抛弃感，在某些人身上化成了强烈的复仇欲。


Like Samson in the temple of Gaza, he wishes to destroy himself in a public act of violence, taking as many people as possible with him.	像加沙寺庙中的萨姆森一样，他追求公众暴力中的自我毁灭，让尽可能多的人给他陪葬。


Anything can trigger this final act: a lover’s rejection, a job application denied.	情侣分手、工作申请被拒，任何小事均可触发这场最后的疯狂。


In the case of Tamerlan, a talented boxer, he was denied the chance to become a champion because he was not yet a United States citizen.	具体到天才拳手塔梅兰，他因为不是美国公民而失去了登上冠军宝座的机会。


Radical Islamism offered him a ready-made cause to die for.	激进伊斯兰主义为他提供了为事业献身的现成的机会。


More interesting, and in a way far more disturbing, has been the reaction in the US to the Boston bombings, which killed three people and injured 264.	美国对致3人死亡、264人受伤的波士顿爆炸事件的反应非常有趣，在某种意义上也更耐人寻味。


Even after Tamerlan had died, and Dzhokhar, already wounded, was the only known fugitive, the Boston authorities decided to close down the entire city.	即使在塔梅兰已死，受伤的焦哈尔被证明是唯一已知逃犯的情况下，波士顿当局依然决定封锁整座城市。


Public transport was halted, trains to and from the city were stopped, shops and business closed, and citizens were told to stay home.	公共交通及城市列车停运、公司商店关闭、市民被告知要待在家里。


Until the surviving bomber was found, Boston was reduced to a ghost town.	在幸存的爆炸案嫌犯被发现之前，波士顿已经沦为一座鬼城。


If two troubled young men with homemade bombs cobbled together from fertilizer and pressure cookers can have this effect on a major American city, one can imagine how tempting their example must now be to other radical losers, not to mention radical groups.	如果两个用化肥和高压锅自制炸弹的迷惑的年轻人能对美国的主要城市产生这样的影响，那么不难想象他们的榜样对其他激进失败者、更不要说极端组织将构成多大的诱惑。


It shows how vulnerable a modern city can be when its leaders lose their nerve.	此次事件显示领导人丧失勇气时现代城市将变得多么脆弱。


The authorities’ overblown reaction – and that of much of the press – was all the odder for having occurred just as the US Senate was voting down a bill that would have made it harder for known killers and mentally disturbed people to buy guns, or for private individuals to acquire weapons normally used only in warfare.	因为发生在美国参议院刚刚否决一项加大已知杀手及精神错乱人员购买枪支及私人获取战争武器难度的法案之后，当局和多数媒体的夸张反应就显得更加怪异。


It seems as though Americans can tolerate a society in which schoolchildren and other innocents are regularly murdered by deranged men with weapons bought on the open market, but erupt in collective hysteria when the killings are committed by people labeled as “terrorists.”	看来美国人可以容忍中小学生和其他无辜民众被持有从公开市场所购武器的精神错乱者杀害，却在所谓“恐怖份子”策划的杀戮中集体爆发癔症。


This may reflect what people are accustomed to.	这也许是人们习惯成自然的反应。


The Spanish had grown so inured to acts of violence from Basque separatists that the murder of 191 people in Madrid by Islamist extremists in 2004 was met with remarkable sang-froid.	西班牙人对巴斯克分离主义份子的暴行麻木不仁，以致于2004年伊斯兰极端份子在马德里杀害191人的暴行并未引起多大反应；


When 52 people were killed in a suicide bombing on the London Underground the following year, the British, too, reacted with relative calm, having lived through years of Irish terrorist violence in the 1970’s.	而次年当自杀式炸弹袭击在伦敦地铁夺去52条生命的时候，英国人也因为经历过20世纪70年代爱尔兰恐怖主义的暴行而显得相对冷静。


Like the Spanish, they were used to it.	英国人和西班牙人一样已经见怪不怪。


Americans, despite the attacks of September 11, 2001, are not.	尽管经历过2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击，美国人却还没有对暴力司空见惯。


Worse than that, a number of Republican senators, including such luminaries as John McCain, called for stripping Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is a US citizen, of his legal rights and placing him before a military tribunal as an “enemy combatant,” as though the 19-year-old college student were a soldier in a war against America.	这还不算，就像年仅19岁的大学生兼美国公民焦哈尔·察尔纳耶夫是反美战争中的士兵一样，以约翰·麦凯恩等杰出人物为代表的几名共和党参议员呼吁剥夺他的合法权益，并将其作为“敌方战斗人员”移交军事法庭审理。


Exaggerated fear of outside enemies has always been part of the American political landscape.	美国政界一直存在对外敌夸大其词的恐惧。


The “nation of immigrants” was traditionally regarded as a refuge from danger.	美国作为“移民国家”传统上被视为避险之地。


The evil outside world should not be able to touch the Land of the Free.	邪恶的外部世界不应触及这片自由的土地。


When it does – Pearl Harbor, September 2001 – all hell breaks loose.	当珍珠港、911等外来袭击真实发生后，美国人好像掉进了活地狱。


Another factor may be the need for a common enemy in a country whose citizens come from so many different cultures and traditions.	另一个因素或许是民众来自多元文化和传统的国家需要同仇敌忾。


Besieged by Communists or Islamists, people feel a sense of belonging.	共产党或伊斯兰教徒的围攻给人带来归属感。


Defense of the nation against dangerous outsiders – and their domestic agents, whether real or imagined – provides a powerful bond.	保护国家免遭想象或真实的危险外来者及其国内代理人的荼毒可以产生强大的凝聚力。


Such bonds can be useful, even necessary, in times of war.	这样的凝聚力在战时不仅有效，而且必须。


But the politics of fear poses a danger to the US itself.	但恐惧政治也威胁美国自身的安全。


The aim of political terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, is to provoke retaliation and maximize publicity for their cause.	以“基地”为代表的政治恐怖组织的目的就是激起报复，最大限度地为他们的事业宣传。


As common criminals, such groups’ members would not achieve this goal.	如果被当作普通罪犯，恐怖组织成员的上述目标将无法实现。


But by claiming to be soldiers at war with the world’s biggest military power, they gain sympathy, as well as recruits, among the radical losers and the disaffected.	但自称与世界排名第一的军事强国作战能帮助他们博取同情，进而从激进失败者和不满群众当中征召人员。


Former President George W. Bush once explained terrorism as the expression of hatred for American freedom.	前总统乔治·W·布什曾经说过恐怖主义是表达对美国自由的仇恨。


But when terrorism results in torture of prisoners, ever more police surveillance, and official threats to US citizens’ legal rights – or, for that matter, when a crime committed by two young immigrants causes an entire city to be shut down – Americans’ government is harming their freedom more than any terrorist could ever hope to do.	但当恐怖主义导致对犯人施暴、警方加强监视和美国公民合法权益受到官方威胁——或者就本案而言，两名年轻移民所犯的罪行导致波士顿全城陷入瘫痪时——美国政府对于自由的伤害远远超乎任何恐怖份子的想象。


American Hegemony or American Primacy?	美国霸权还是美国主导？


CAMBRIDGE – No country in modern history has possessed as much global military power as the United States.	美国剑桥—在现代历史上，没有哪个国家拥有如同美国那样强大的全球军事实力。


Yet some analysts now argue that the US is following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom, the last global hegemon to decline.	但如今一些分析家认为美国正在步上一个衰落的全球霸权——英国的后尘。


This historical analogy, though increasingly popular, is misleading.	这一历史比较尽管越来越热门，却有误导之嫌。


Britain was never as dominant as the US is today.	英国从未获得可与今日美国相媲美的主宰力。


To be sure, it maintained a navy equal in size to the next two fleets combined, and its empire, on which the sun never set, ruled over a quarter of humankind.	诚然，它拥有一支规模等于第二名和第三名之和的海军，并且“日不落帝国”统治范围覆盖了四分之一的人类。


But there were major differences in the relative power resources of imperial Britain and contemporary America.	但大英帝国和当代美国的相对实力来源截然不同。


By the outbreak of World War I, Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in terms of military personnel, fourth in terms of GDP, and third in military spending.	一战爆发时，英国的军人数量只在列强中位居第四，GDP也位居第四，军事支出位居第三。


The British Empire was ruled in large part through reliance on local troops.	大英帝国在很大程度上利用当地武装实现统治。


Of the 8.6 million British forces in WWI, nearly a third came from the overseas empire.	在一战的860万英军中，近三分之一来自海外。


That made it increasingly difficult for the government in London to declare war on behalf of the empire when nationalist sentiments began to intensify.	这使得当民族主义情绪开始高涨时，伦敦政府日益难以代表整个帝国宣战。


By World War II, protecting the empire had become more of a burden than an asset.	到二战时，保护整个帝国成了一种负担而不是资产。


The fact that the UK was situated so close to powers like Germany and Russia made matters even more challenging.	英国与德国和俄国的实力已非常接近，这一事实让挑战更加紧迫。


For all the loose talk of an “American empire,” the fact is that the US does not have colonies that it must administer, and thus has more freedom to maneuver than the UK did.	在所有泛泛而谈的“美利坚帝国”论中，一个事实是美国并不拥有它必须管理的殖民地，因此拥有比英国更大的腾挪自由。


And, surrounded by unthreatening countries and two oceans, it finds it far easier to protect itself.	此外，美国周边是没有威胁的邻国和两个大洋，保护自己要容易得多。


That brings us to another problem with the global hegemon analogy: the confusion over what “hegemony” actually means.	这就引出了关于全球霸权比较的另一个问题：对“霸权”真实含义的混淆。


Some observers conflate the concept with imperialism; but the US is clear evidence that a hegemon does not have to have a formal empire.	一些观察家将霸权列为帝国主义的同义词； 但美国是一个明显的例子，说明了霸权并不一定要靠正式的帝国实现。


Others define hegemony as the ability to set the rules of the international system; but precisely how much influence over this process a hegemon must have, relative to other powers, remains unclear.	另一些观察家将霸权定义为有能力制定国际制度规则； 但霸权必须拥有相对其他列强多多少的影响力仍不明确。


Still others consider hegemony to be synonymous with control of the most power resources.	还有一些观察家认为霸权意味着控制最多的实力资源。


But, by this definition, nineteenth-century Britain – which at the height of its power in 1870 ranked third (behind the US and Russia) in GDP and third (behind Russia and France) in military expenditures – could not be considered hegemonic, despite its naval dominance.	但是，据此定义，十九世纪的英国——在1870实力顶峰时期，其GDP为世界第三（次于美国和俄国），军事支出亦为世界第三（次于俄国和法国）——就不能称之为霸权，尽管它拥有海洋主宰力。


Similarly, those who speak of American hegemony after 1945 fail to note that the Soviet Union balanced US military power for more than four decades.	类似地，说美国在1945年后拥有霸权的人没有注意到苏联在四十多年的时间里都在制衡美国的军事实力。


Though the US had disproportionate economic clout, its room for political and military maneuver was constrained by Soviet power.	尽管美国拥有无与伦比的经济实力，但其政治和军事腾挪空间因为苏联的力量而大受限制。


Some analysts describe the post-1945 period as a US-led hierarchical order with liberal characteristics, in which the US provided public goods while operating within a loose system of multilateral rules and institutions that gave weaker states a say.	一些分析家将1945年后的时期称为美国领导的、以自由为特征的层级秩序，其中美国提供公共品并在弱国也能赢得话语权的松散的多边规则和机构体系中施展。


They point out that it may be rational for many countries to preserve this institutional framework, even if American power resources decline.	他们指出，对许多国家来说，维护这一制度框架是理性的，即使美国实力源在衰落。


In this sense, the US-led international order could outlive America’s primacy in power resources, though many others argue that the emergence of new powers portends this order’s demise.	从这个角度讲，美国领导的国际秩序能够比美国的实力源主导地位存在更长时间，尽管其他许多人指出新力量的崛起预示着这一秩序的崩溃。


But, when it comes to the era of supposed US hegemony, there has always been a lot of fiction mixed in with the facts.	但是，在所谓的美国霸权时期，一直有许多混杂在一起的事实和矛盾。


It was less a global order than a group of like-minded countries, largely in the Americas and Western Europe, which comprised less than half of the world.	它与其说是一套全球秩序，不如说是一群观念相近的国家（主要来自美洲和西欧，不到世界的一半）。


And its effects on non-members – including significant powers like China, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet bloc – were not always benign.	其对非成员国的影响——包括中国、印度、印度尼西亚和苏联阵营等主要力量——并不总是积极的。


Given this, the US position in the world could more accurately be called a “half-hegemony.”	因此，美国在世界中的地位更应该称为“半霸权”（half-hegemony）。


Of course, America did maintain economic dominance after 1945: the devastation of WWII in so many countries meant that the US produced nearly half of global GDP.	当然，美国确实在1945年后维持了经济主宰力：二战让许多国家变成了焦土，这意味着美国贡献了全球GDP的近一半。


That position lasted until 1970, when the US share of global GDP fell to its pre-war level of one-quarter.	但是，从政治或军事角度看，世界是双极结构，苏联制衡着美国的实力。


But, from a political or military standpoint, the world was bipolar, with the Soviet Union balancing America’s power.	事实上，在此期间，美国常常无法捍卫它的利益：苏联拥有了核武器； 共产党在中国、古巴和半个越南建立了政权；


Indeed, during this period, the US often could not defend its interests: the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons; communist takeovers occurred in China, Cuba, and half of Vietnam; the Korean War ended in a stalemate; and revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were repressed.	朝鲜战争以僵局收场； 匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克起义被镇压。


Against this background, “primacy” seems like a more accurate description of a country’s disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft.	在此背景下，或许“主导”才更准确地描述了一国在三大实力源上的（可测量的）超凡比重：军事、经济和软实力。


The question now is whether the era of US primacy is coming to an end.	现在的问题是美国主导的时代是否正在走向结束。


Given the unpredictability of global developments, it is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively.	考虑到全球发展趋势的不可预测性，当然也就无法笃定地回答这个问题。


The rise of transnational forces and non-state actors, not to mention emerging powers like China, suggests that there are big changes on the horizon.	跨国力量和非国家行动方的崛起——更不用说中国等新兴力量了——意味着全球局势的重大变化。


But there is still reason to believe that, at least in the first half of this century, the US will retain its primacy in power resources and continue to play the central role in the global balance of power.	但仍有理由相信，至少在本世纪上半叶，美国将仍然拥有实力源的主导地位，并继续在全球实力平衡中扮演核心角色。


In short, while the era of US primacy is not over, it is set to change in important ways.	简言之，尽管美国主导的时代还没结束，但必定会发生重要改变。


Whether or not these changes will bolster global security and prosperity remains to be seen.	这些改变能否提升全球安全与繁荣还有待观察。


Renewing American Leadership	重建美国领导


MADRID – December always provides an opportunity to pause and reflect on what was and what will be.	马德里—12月永远是停下来思考过去怎样、未来又会怎样的机会。


This year, one of the conclusions that such reflection yields is that the United States remains firmly at the center of the liberal world order.	今年，这样的思考所产生的一个结论是美国仍然是自由世界秩序的核心，这一地位十分稳固。


Another is that the US needs to do more to lead in the way that its international standing demands.	另一个结论是美国需要做更多的事才能满足其国际地位所要求的领导责任。


Doubts about America’s continued global leadership have been proliferating for years.	多年来，关于美国是否能够保持全球领导力的质疑此起彼伏。


But, though the much-discussed multi-polar world order may well be in the cards, the reality is that, for now, efforts to address global challenges – from climate change to conflict in the Middle East – demand US engagement.	但是，尽管广受关注的多极世界秩序也许已经注定，但现实是就目前而言，解决全球挑战——从气候变化到中东冲突——的措施都需要美国的参与。


Unfortunately, the narrative of American decline has gained so much traction in recent years that even US officials seem to have started to believe it, pursuing weak and piecemeal policies (or, in some cases, doing nothing at all).	不幸的是，美国衰落的说法在近几年中获得了巨大的市场，就连美国官员也似乎已经开始相信它，推行弱势的零星政策（在有些问题上甚至无所作为）。


President Barack Obama’s restrained foreign-policy approach appears to be fueling, not reducing, global instability.	总统奥巴马的克制外交方针助长而不是遏制了全球动荡。


The reasons for this lack of strong action are disputed.	不再采取强势行动的原因饱受争议。


Some blame Obama’s own fears about repeating his predecessors’ mistakes; others blame a hostile Congress for tying his hands.	一些人指责奥巴马害怕重蹈前任覆辙； 也有人指责敌意国会的掣肘。


In fact, both factors may be at work.	事实上，也许两个因素都在起作用。


It may well be true that Obama would rather exercise caution – even when bold action is called for – than act impulsively and potentially cause more damage.	奥巴马宁愿谨慎行事——哪怕是在人们呼吁采取果断行动时——而不愿冲动以免造成更多伤害。


But the negative impact of an obstructionist, highly partisan US Congress should not be underestimated.	但以制造障碍为己任的高度党派对立的美国国会所起到的消极作用也不能小觑。


For example, by blocking reforms to International Monetary Fund governance that were agreed in 2010, Congress has damaged, perhaps irreparably, the legitimacy and relevance of the Bretton Woods institutions.	比如，国会阻挠在2010年就形成一致的国际货币基金组织（IMF）治理改革，这可能对布雷顿森林机构的合法性和重要性造成了不可挽回的伤害。


Likewise, by refusing to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the US Congress has undermined America’s credibility as it attempts to reaffirm international law in the South China Sea, where China is acting with increasing audacity.	类似地，美国国会拒绝批准联合国海洋法公约，这损害了美国的信誉，使其在中国日益蛮横的南海问题上难以主张国际法。


And, by opposing the inclusion of legally binding climate commitments, it weakened the global climate agreement that was reached this month in Paris, leaving compliance and implementation uncertain.	此外，美国国会还反对纳入有法律约束的气候承诺，从而削弱了本月在巴黎所达成的全球气候协定，留下了遵守和实施方面的不确定性。


Stalemate has become the name of the game in US politics in recent years.	近几年来，僵局已成为美国政治博弈的代名词。


That is why next year’s presidential election is so crucial.	正因如此，明年的总统选举至关重要。


It offers an opportunity for a fresh start, a new approach that produces the type of policy actions that the world needs.	这次选举提供了一个采取新方针，带来世界所需要的政策行动的全新开始的机会。


The key is engagement – among branches of the US government, between the US government and the public, and between the US and the rest of the world.	关键在于参与（engagement）——美国政府各部门的参与，美国政府和公众之间的参与，以及美国和世界其他国家之间的参与。


For starters, to avoid the kind of obstructionism that prevailed in the last eight years, the next president must engage Congress directly and actively.	首先，为了避免过去八年中所出现的阻挠一切的情况，下一位美国总统必须直接、积极地参与国会。


And, in fact, two of the Obama administration’s recent wins – the passage of so-called trade promotion authority (fast-track negotiating authority to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the reauthorization of the small but vital Export-Import Bank – were the result of dedicated outreach, education, and, yes, cajoling of lawmakers.	而事实上，奥巴马政府的两次最近的胜利——通过所谓的贸易促进授权（快车道谈判授权以完成跨太平洋合作伙伴关系）和对规模较小但至关重要的进出口银行的重新授权——便是不遗余力的广泛接触、教育以及，是的，诱导立法者的结果。


The Iran nuclear agreement, one of Obama’s hallmark achievements, involved similar efforts to engage Congress, from protracted trips to Capitol Hill by Obama administration officials to a creative approach that allowed legislators to display their displeasure for the deal, without blocking its progress.	伊朗核协议是奥巴马的标志性成就之一，其中也包括了类似的参与国会的努力，奥巴马政府官员坚持不懈地拜访国会山，并提出了一套创造性的方针，允许立法者表达他们对协议的不满而不会阻挠协议进展。


Even in America’s highly divisive political atmosphere, it seems, where there is a will, there is a way.	看起来，即使在高度分化的美国政治气候下，也是有志者事竟成。


America’s next president must also improve engagement with citizens, whose widespread disaffection constrains – or allows – US leaders to pursue a weak foreign policy.	下一任美国总统还必须改善与公民之间的参与，美国公民的普遍不满制约——或者让——美国领导人采取了弱势外交。


Like many Europeans today, most Americans do not seem to understand – or care to understand – that the crumbling of the liberal world order would have dire consequences for all of them.	和当今的许多欧洲人一样，大部分美国人似乎不理解——也不屑理解——自由世界秩序的崩溃会给他们所有人都带来可怕后果。


It was not always this way.	并不总是如此。


Immediately after World War II, the memory of war, together with the enduring threat posed by the Soviet Union, made plain the importance of building and maintaining a liberal world order.	第二次世界大战刚刚结束时，战争的记忆加上苏联所带来的持续威胁，使得人人都能理解构建和维持自由世界秩序的重要性。


Today, though the need for such an order is just as great, the argument is not nearly as comprehensible or emotionally powerful.	如今，尽管对这一秩序的需求与当时同样巨大，但这一论点已不再那么完整或者具有那么强大的情感力量。


Discussion of rules and institutions comes across as bloodless.	对规则和制度的讨论给人留下不会流血的引向。


It is up to political leaders – and especially the president – to figure out how to make a compelling case about what is at stake.	政治领导人——尤其是总统——的责任就是找到如何将让最重要的事情显得刻不容缓。


Only this approach can secure the mandate from the public that the next US president will need to engage effectively with other world leaders.	只有这一方针能够确保下一任美国总统能够获得与其他世界领导人有效参与的公众授权。


And make no mistake: Such engagement is indispensable.	不要搞错了：这一参与是不可或缺的。


While the US must play an integral role in addressing global challenges, from ending the Syrian civil war to following through on the promises of the Paris climate agreement, it cannot do it alone.	美国必须在解决全球挑战过程中起到核心作用，不管是结束叙利亚内战还是兑现巴黎气候协定承诺。


Real progress will demand real cooperation.	只有真合作才能带来真进步。


In the second half of the twentieth century, the US showed that committed leadership could help to ensure widespread stability and prosperity.	二十世纪下半叶，美国证明了全力以赴兑现领导力能有助于确保广泛的稳定与繁荣。


In the twenty-first century, it has showed how devastating a lack of such leadership can be.	在二十一世纪，美国又证明了缺乏这一领导力所能造成的灾难性后果。


Finger pointing will not fix anything.	指责游戏无助于解决问题。


Only by pursuing genuine, deep, and sustained engagement, both at home and abroad, can the next administration ensure that the coming years will be better than the last.	下一届美国政府只有追求真正的深度可持续合作——不管在国内还是国外——才能确保未来几年会比过去几年更好。


American Pie in the Sky	美国派在天上飞


NEW YORK – While the risk of a disorderly crisis in the eurozone is well recognized, a more sanguine view of the United States has prevailed.	纽约—欧元区发生无序危机的风险已为人们所认识到，但对于美国，人们的普遍看法仍是乐观。


For the last three years, the consensus has been that the US economy was on the verge of a robust and self-sustaining recovery that would restore above-potential growth.	在过去三年中，共识一直是美国经济快要实现稳健的自我维持复苏，将重回超过潜在增长率的增长阶段。


That turned out to be wrong, as a painful process of balance-sheet deleveraging – reflecting excessive private-sector debt, and then its carryover to the public sector – implies that the recovery will remain, at best, below-trend for many years to come.	这是错的，因为痛苦的资产负债表去杠杆化过程——反映了私人部门的过度负债及其后负债向公共部门转移——意味着即使在最好的情形下，复苏在未来多年内也打不到趋势水平。


Even this year, the consensus got it wrong, expecting a recovery to above-trend  annual GDP growth – faster than 3%.	即使在今年，共识也没有看准形势，期待超趋势的年GDP增长复苏——3%以上。


But the first-half growth rate looks set to come in closer to 1.5% at best, even below 2011’s dismal 1.7%.	但上半年的增长率能接近1. 5%便已谢天谢地了，甚至连2011令人失望的1.


And now, after getting the first half of 2012 wrong, many are repeating the fairy tale that a combination of lower oil prices, rising auto sales, recovering house prices, and a resurgence of US manufacturing will boost growth in the second half of the year and fuel above-potential growth by 2013.	7%都赶不上。 而如今，在错判了2012年上半年的形势后，很多人又在重复老童话了——油价下降、汽车销售增加、房价复苏、美国制造业重振雄风，所有这些的综合作用将在今年下半年提振经济增长，在2013年将增长拉到潜在水平之上。


The reality is the opposite: for several reasons, growth will slow further in the second half of 2012 and be even lower in 2013 – close to stall speed.	现实正好相反：多种理由表明增长会在2012年下半年有所放缓，在2013年进一步恶化，降至近乎停滞的程度。


First, growth in the second quarter has decelerated from a mediocre 1.8% in January-March, as job creation – averaging 70,000 a month – fell sharply.	首先，二季度增长率较一季度的差强人意的1. 8%有所减慢，这是因为就业创造——平均每个月创造70 000个岗位——迅速疲软所致。


Second, expectations of the “fiscal cliff” – automatic tax increases and spending cuts set for the end of this year – will keep spending and growth lower through the second half of 2012.	其次，“财政悬崖”预期——在今年年底自动实行增税减支——将在2012年下半年拖累支出和增长。


So will uncertainty about who will be President in 2013; about tax rates and spending levels; about the threat of another government shutdown over the debt ceiling; and about the risk of another sovereign rating downgrade should political gridlock continue to block a plan for medium-term fiscal consolidation.	此外，2013年谁能入主白宫、税率和支出水平会如何、债务上限是否会引发又一次政府关门、政治扯皮导致的中期财政整合计划无法实施是否会引发主权评级的再次下调，这些方面的不确定性也会对支出和增长形成冲击。


In such conditions, most firms and consumers will be cautious about spending – an option value of waiting – thus further weakening the economy.	在这样的环境下，大部分企业和消费者会对支出慎之又慎——等待的选择价值——从而进一步拖累经济。


Third, the fiscal cliff would amount to a 4.5%-of-GDP drag on growth in 2013 if all tax cuts and transfer payments were allowed to expire and draconian spending cuts were triggered.	第三，财政悬崖将对2013年GDP形成4. 5%的拖累作用，如果减税和转移支付到期停止且严厉的支出削减被触发的话。


Of course, the drag will be much smaller, as tax increases and spending cuts will be much milder.	当然，如果增税减支较为温和的话，拖累作用也会大大降低。 但是，即使财政悬崖最后只是增长的小趔趄——GDP只损失0.


But, even if the fiscal cliff turns out to be a mild growth bump – a mere 0.5% of GDP – and annual growth at the end of the year is just 1.5%, as seems likely, the fiscal drag will suffice to slow the economy to stall speed: a growth rate of barely 1%.	5%——且年末年增长率最后只有1. 5%（看起来很有可能），财政拖累仍将把经济增速压低到停滞水平——经济增长率低于1%。


Fourth, private consumption growth in the last few quarters does not reflect growth in real wages (which are actually falling).	第四，过去几个季度的私人消费增长并未反映真实工资增长（实际上，真实工资在下降）。


Rather, growth in disposable income (and thus in consumption) has been sustained since last year by another $1.4 trillion in tax cuts and extended transfer payments, implying another $1.4 trillion of public debt.	相反，可支配收入增长（以及它所带来的消费增长）在去年之所以能够持续，是因为增加了1. 4万亿美元的减税并延长了转移支付，而这意味着公共债务又增加了1.


Unlike the eurozone and the United Kingdom, where a double-dip recession is already under way, owing to front-loaded fiscal austerity, the US has prevented some household deleveraging through even more public-sector releveraging – that is, by stealing some growth from the future.	4万亿美元。 美国与欧元区和英国不同，后两者由于实行了前瞻性财政紧缩，二次探底已经发生了，而美国正在通过公共部门增加杠杆延缓家庭的去杠杆化，换句话说，美国在向未来偷取增长。


In 2013, as transfer payments are phased out, however gradually, and as some tax cuts are allowed to expire, disposable income growth and consumption growth will slow.	2013年，随着转移支付的逐渐停止（不管多么缓慢）以及一些减税项目的到期，可支配收入和消费增长将会下降。


The US will then face not only the direct effects of a fiscal drag, but also its indirect effect on private spending.	美国将不仅面临财政拖累的直接后果，还将面临其对私人支出的间接影响。


Fifth, four external forces will further impede US growth: a worsening eurozone crisis; an increasingly hard landing for China; a generalized slowdown of emerging-market economies, owing to cyclical factors (weak advanced-country growth) and structural causes (a state-capitalist model that reduces potential growth); and the risk of higher oil prices in 2013 as negotiations and sanctions fail to convince Iran to abandon its nuclear program.	第五，四大外部因素将进一步阻碍美国增长：欧元区危机的恶化、中国的硬着陆、因周期性因素（发达国家增长疲软）和结构性原因（国家资本主义模式抑制了潜在增长率）共同导致的新兴市场经济体整体放缓、以及2013年油价上涨（因谈判和制裁不能促使伊朗放弃核计划所致）。


Policy responses will have very limited effect in stemming the US economy’s deceleration toward stall speed: even with only a mild fiscal drag on growth, the US dollar is likely to strengthen as the eurozone crisis weakens the euro and as global risk aversion returns.	政策应对措施对于防止美国经济滑向停滞效果极其有限：即使财政拖累对增长的影响很小，美元也可能因欧元区危机拖累欧元以及全球避险行为回潮而升值。


The US Federal Reserve will carry out more quantitative easing this year, but it will be ineffective: long-term interest rates are already very low, and lowering them further would not boost spending.	美联储将在今年追加量化宽松，但这不会起效：长期利率已然很低，进一步压低它们不会提振支出。


Indeed, the credit channel is frozen and velocity has collapsed, with banks hoarding increases in base money in the form of excess reserves.	事实上，信用渠道已经冻结，货币流速极慢，银行纷纷以超额储备的形式囤积基础货币。


Moreover, the dollar is unlikely to weaken as other countries also carry out quantitative easing.	此外，在其他国家也推出量化宽松的情况下，美元也不可能贬值。


Similarly, the gravity of weaker growth will most likely overcome the levitational effect on equity prices from more quantitative easing, particularly given that equity valuations today are not as depressed as they were in 2009 or 2010.	类似地，增长不振的重力极有可能会压制通过进一步量化宽松对股价的浮力，特别是考虑到如今的股票估值早已不像2009和2010年那样处于低位了。


Indeed, growth in earnings and profits is now running out of steam, as the effect of weak demand on top-line revenues takes a toll on bottom-line margins and profitability.	事实上，收益和利润的增长正在失去动力，因为需求疲软对运营收入的影响让利润率和盈利性遭受重创。


A significant equity-price correction could, in fact, be the force that in 2013 tips the US economy into outright contraction.	事实上，股价的重大修正可能在2013年将美国经济拖入严重衰退。


And if the US (still the world’s largest economy) starts to sneeze again, the rest of the world – its immunity already weakened by Europe’s malaise and emerging countries’ slowdown – will catch pneumonia.	而如果美国（仍是世界第一大经济体）再一次感冒，那么世界其他国家——免疫力已经因为欧洲的疲软和新兴国家的减速大卫削弱——恐怕又要的肺炎了。


American Power in the Twenty-First Century	二十一世纪的美国实力


CAMBRIDGE – The United States government’s National Intelligence Council projects that American dominance will be “much diminished” by 2025, and that the one key area of continued American superiority – military power – will be less significant in the increasingly competitive world of the future.	坎布里奇——美国政府国家情报委员会预测到2025年美国的优势将“大幅度削弱”，而美国赖以保持其优势的关键领域——军事实力——其重要性也将在未来竞争日趋激烈的世界格局中有所降低。


Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called the 2008 financial crisis a sign that America’s global leadership is coming to an end.	俄罗斯总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫称2008年金融危机标志着美国全球领导地位的结束。


The leader of Canada’s opposition Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, suggests that US power has passed its mid-day.	加拿大反对派自由党领导人迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫则认为美国权力的鼎盛期已经过去。


How can we know if these predictions are correct?	我们怎样才能知道这些预测是否准确呢？


One should beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline.	人们应当警惕全方位衰退的误导性比喻。


Countries are not like humans with predictable life spans.	国家毕竟不同于寿命可以预测的人类个体。


For example, after Britain lost its American colonies at the end of the eighteenth century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain’s reduction to “as insignificant a country as Denmark or Sardinia.”	例如，当英国在十八世纪末失去美洲殖民地后，霍勒斯·沃波尔曾哀叹英国已沦落到“像丹麦或撒丁岛一样微不足道”。


He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even greater ascendency.	但他没有能够预测到工业革命将使英国在接下来的世纪中统治地位更加稳固。


Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power.	罗马帝国在登上权力顶峰后依然延续了三个多世纪的统治。


Even then, Rome did not succumb to another state, but suffered a death of a thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes.	即使到最后，罗马也没有向另外一个国家屈服，而是在被野蛮部落蹂躏得千疮百孔后最终走上了灭亡的道路。


Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the US in the coming decades, the classical transition of power among great states may be less of a problem than the rise of modern barbarians – non-state actors.	实际上，虽然未来十年内中国、印度或巴西将超越美国的预言盛极一时，但在大国间实现传统权力转换的问题或许比不上现代蛮族（非国家势力）的崛起。


In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power diffusion may be a greater threat than power transition.	在以信息为基础但缺乏网络安全的世界里，权力分散的威胁可能大于权力的转移。


So, what will it mean to wield power in the global information age of the twenty-first century?	那么，在全球信息时代的二十一世纪行使权力将意味着什么？


What resources will produce power?	哪些资源能够带来权力？


In the sixteenth century, control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on its industrial primacy and its navy.	十六世纪，对殖民地和金条的控制赋予西班牙竞争优势，十七世纪的荷兰从贸易和金融中获利，十八世纪的法国依托庞大的人口和军队，而十九世纪英国的力量则来自于它独一无二的工业地位和海军。


Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins.	传统智慧一直认为军队规模最大的国家将会胜出，但在信息时代获胜的也许是最会讲故事的国家（或非国家）。


Today, it is far from clear how the balance of power is measured, much less how to develop successful survival strategies.	今天，仍然没有明确的方法来衡量权力的平衡，更不必说如何制定成功的生存战略了。


In his inaugural address in 2009, President Barack Obama stated that “our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”	在2009年的就职演说中，巴拉克·奥巴马总统提出“我们的力量来自审慎地使用手中的权力； 我们的安全来自正义的事业、榜样的力量、以及谦卑和克制的调和作用。


Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America.	”其后不久，希拉里·克林顿国务卿也说，“美国仅凭一己之力无法解决最急迫的问题，而没有美国的参与世界也无法解决这些问题。


We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of tools at our disposal.”	我们必须充分利用所谓的‘明智的权力’，利用能够为我们所用的一切工具。


Smart power means the combination of the hard power of command and the soft power of attraction.	”明智的权力意味着将命令的硬实力和吸引的软实力结合在一起。


Power always depends on context.	实力总与所处的环境脱不了干系。


The child who dominates on the playground may become a laggard when the context changes to a disciplined classroom.	在操场上呼风唤雨的孩子在循规蹈矩的教室则可能成为一名落后份子。


In the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the Pope had, but four decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalin’s empire had collapsed.	二十世纪中期，约瑟夫·斯大林曾轻蔑地询问教皇管辖几个师，而四十年后，教皇制度依然完好无损，而斯大林的帝国却已经分崩离析。


In today’s world, the distribution of power varies with the context.	当今世界，随着环境的不同权力的分配也在发生变化。


It is distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game.	权力分配的模式酷似一场三维棋局。


On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the US is likely to remain the only superpower for some time.	在棋局的最上层，军事实力基本将维持单极格局，而美国在一段时间内很可能仍会是唯一的超级大国。


But on the middle chessboard, economic power has already been multi-polar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance.	但在棋局的中层，十多年来经济实力一直保持着多级化的态势，美、欧、日、中是四大强国，而其他国家的重要性也日趋增加。


The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions that occur outside of government control.	棋局的底层是政府无法控制的跨境交易领域。


It includes diverse non-state actors, such as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets, and, at the other extreme, terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cyber-security.	参与其中的有各式各样的非国家角色，如电子汇款数额高于多数国家预算的银行家，还有处在另一个极端的运送武器的恐怖分子或威胁网络安全的黑客。


It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change.	其中还包括传染病和气候变化等全新挑战。


On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other cliché.	在这底层棋局上，实力异常分散，谈论单极、多极、霸权或其他陈词滥调都毫无意义。


Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalization and transnational challenges.	即便在金融危机发生后，令人目眩的技术发展仍然可能继续驱动全球化和跨国挑战。


The problem for American power in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state.	即便是最强的国家也有越来越多的问题无法控制是二十一世纪美国权力所面临的问题。


Although the US does well on military measures, there is much going on that those measures fail to capture.	虽然美国在军事领域成绩斐然，但还有很多军事领域无法涵盖的问题。


Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that prevents America from achieving all its international goals acting alone.	在信息革命和全球化的影响下，世界政治变化的方式阻碍美国自行其是地实现所有国际目标。


For example, international financial stability is vital to Americans’ prosperity, but the US needs the cooperation of others to ensure it.	例如，国际金融稳定对美国的繁荣至关重要，但美国需要其他国家的配合才能确保国际金融稳定。


Global climate change, too, will affect Americans’ quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone.	全球气候变化也将影响美国人的生活质量，但美国同样无法依靠自身力量管理全球气候。


In a world where borders are more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must help build international coalitions and institutions to address shared threats and challenges.	在边境面对毒品、传染病和恐怖主义变得漏洞百出的世界里，美国必须协助成立国际联盟和机构，应对共同面临的挑战和威胁。


In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game.	从这个意义上讲，权力已经成为一场能产生积极效应的游戏。


It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals.	仅从相对于他人的实力角度考虑还远远不够，我们必须考虑到实现目标的实力。


On many transnational issues, empowering others can help to accomplish one’s own goals.	在许多跨境问题上，为他国授权能有助于实现本国的目标。


In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power.	在这个世界上，网络和联系成为相对实力的重要来源。


The problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of recognizing that even the most powerful country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.	二十一世纪美国实力所面临的问题不是逐渐衰落，而是必须承认即便最强大的国家也无法单枪匹马实现目标的现实。


Abusing Churchill	滥用丘吉尔


NEW YORK – A bronze bust of Winston Churchill, displayed in the White House since the 1960s, has been the object of a continuing right-wing canard in Washington.	纽约—从20世纪60年代开始，白宫里摆着一尊丘吉尔的铜像，它是华盛顿一直在流传的一个右翼谣言的目标。


The story goes that when President Barack Obama moved in, he returned the bust to the British Embassy, supposedly signifying his hatred of Britain.	这个谣言说，奥巴马总统入主白宫时把这尊铜像还给了英国大使馆，以示他对英国的讨厌。


In fact, Obama did no such thing.	事实上，奥巴马根本没有这么做过。


The bust still stands in the White House Residence, where it always did, except for a short time under President George W. Bush when it was being repaired.	丘吉尔铜像仍然矗立在在总统官邸，和往常一样，只不过在小布什期间因为修复需要而离开了一小段时间。


But Obama might have done well to remove the bust.	但奥巴马移除这尊铜像或许属于“干得漂亮”范畴。


The cult of Churchill has not been an altogether beneficial one for the United States.	丘吉尔崇拜对于美国来说有百害而无一利。


Too many US presidents fancy themselves Churchill’s true heirs.	太多美国总统幻想自己是丘吉尔的真正传人。


Bush had a copy of Churchill’s bust, lent to him by Tony Blair, in the Oval Office.	布什有一尊托尼·布莱尔送的丘吉尔铜像复制品，把它摆在椭圆办公室里。


He liked to portray himself as a “war president,” a “decider,” and a “great leader,” like Churchill.	他喜欢自称“战时总统”、“决策者”和“伟大领袖”，就像丘吉尔那样。


He had a taste for battle dress.	他也喜欢戎装。


And he got his country into a very foolish war.	他也让他的国家陷入了一场极其愚蠢的战争。


Donald Trump’s British crony, Nigel Farage, the former leader of the UK Independence Party, suggested that Trump should put the bronze bust back in the Oval Office.	唐纳德·特朗普的英国密友、前英国独立党领导人尼格尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）建议特朗普把这尊铜像迎回椭圆办公室。


Trump thought this was a splendid idea.	特朗普想这绝对是个好主意。


Trump is the least appropriate figure to cast himself in Churchill’s mold.	特朗普最没有资格自比丘吉尔。


Insofar as he has a coherent position on anything, he is hostile to most of the things that Churchill stood for.	要说他对什么东西存在一以贯之的立场，那就是他对于丘吉尔所主张的东西大多怀有敌意。


His “America first” posture, standing aloof from Western allies, is exactly the kind of attitude against which Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt struggled in order to successfully resist Hitler’s Third Reich.	他的“美国第一”姿态对于西方盟友冷眼相对，与丘吉尔和富兰克林·罗斯福为了抵御希特勒的第三帝国而努力的态度截然相反。


The summer before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 75 years ago this month, Churchill and Roosevelt met in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, to set out their ideals for a postwar world.	日本偷袭珍珠港（75年前的12月）的那年夏天，丘吉尔和罗斯福纽芬兰岛布雷莎湾（Placentia Bay）会晤，制定了战后理想世界。


The resulting Atlantic Charter included everything Trump seems to be against: lower trade barriers, economic cooperation, and the advancement of social welfare.	脱胎于此的大西洋宪章囊括了一切特朗普所反对的东西：降低贸易壁垒、经济合作、推进社会福利。


Once Hitler was defeated, Churchill was also a proponent of European unification, even if he remained ambivalent about Britain’s role in the future union.	打败希特勒后，丘吉尔又成为欧洲结盟的支持者，即使他对英国在未来的联盟中的角色态度矛盾。


Farage’s campaign for Brexit, often pilfering Churchill’s own wartime rhetoric about Britain’s finest hour in defending freedom against tyranny, was aimed at dismantling the very project Churchill favored.	法拉奇在宣传英国脱欧时常常片面地移用丘吉尔本人的战时修辞，说这是英国反抗暴政、捍卫自由的最佳时刻，而他的目标却是让丘吉尔所支持的工程轰然解体。


The “special relationship” between the US and Britain, established during WWII, was never as substantial as Churchill and others liked to believe.	二战期间建立的美国与英国之间的“特殊关系” 从未向丘吉尔和其他人愿意相信的那样重要。


The US, as the dominant postwar power, pursued its own interests, whether the British liked it or not.	作为战后主宰力量的美国追求自己的利益，不管英国喜不喜欢。


And British pride in standing alone against Nazi Germany, and the self-aggrandizing notion of being America’s special partner, has prevented the United Kingdom from playing to its full strength as a major power inside the EU.	英国独力对抗纳粹德国的骄傲，及其身为美国特殊伙伴的虚荣阻止了英国全力争取成为欧盟内部的主要力量。


American leaders sometimes pay lip service to the special relationship, to flatter visiting British prime ministers or get the UK onside in dubious military adventures.	美国领导人有时在嘴上强调这一特殊关系，以奉承到访的英国首相或让英国在可疑的军事行动中站边。


There is talk of giving the relationship a new lease of life in the age of Trump and Brexit.	有人说，要在特朗普和英国脱欧时代让这一关系获得新生。


Whereas Obama warned that Britain outside the EU would be at the back of the queue for special trade deals, House Speaker Paul D. Ryan recently stated that the US should quickly make a new deal with Britain to show “solidarity” with an “indispensable ally.”	奥巴马警告说，退出欧盟的英国应该在特殊贸易协议队列中排在最后一个，但众议院议长保罗·莱恩（Paul D. Ryan）最近表示美国应该迅速与英国签订新协议以彰显与“不可或缺的盟友”的“团结”。


A special US tenderness for Brexit Britain – Trump oddly referred to himself as “Mr. Brexit” – rather suggests the solidarity of two countries embarking on their own forms of economic nationalism.	美国对脱欧的英国的特殊关照——特朗普反常地自称为“英国脱欧先生”——确实表明了这两个采取各自经济民族主义的国家之间的团结。


Again, this is precisely the route that Churchill and Roosevelt sought to avoid; after all, economic nationalism was one of the reasons why Europeans almost succeeded in destroying their continent.	而这亦是丘吉尔和罗斯福肯定会避免的道路； 毕竟，经济民族主义正是欧洲人几乎毁掉欧洲大陆的原因之一。


Of course, Trump’s love of Brexit may be just a question of words, like so much else about the great showman.	当然，特朗普喜欢英���脱欧也许只是文字游戏，这位伟大“影帝”最擅长此道。


It is hard to imagine the US jeopardizing its economic interests by favoring Britain at the expense of far bigger stakes in the rest of Europe.	很难想象美国牺牲欧洲其他部分的更大的代价支持英国，甚至不惜有损于自己的经济利益。


But words do matter, as Churchill knew well.	但文字很重要，丘吉尔深知这一点。


Again, the rhetoric of Trump and his supporters, and of the Brexiteers, could not be further removed from the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.	特朗普及其支持者，以及英国脱欧派的修辞与大西洋宪章的精神完全南辕北辙。


Talk of sinister international bankers and other “citizens of nowhere” (British Prime Minister Theresa May’s phrase) undermining, in league with rootless liberal elites, “ordinary,” “real,” and “decent” people (Farage) smacks of the anti-Semitic propaganda that swirled around Europe in the 1930s.	关于与草根自由派精英、“普通的”、“真正的”和“体面的”人（法拉奇）合谋搞破坏的罪恶的国际银行家和其他“无来处的公民”（用英国首相梅的话说）的言论很有些20世纪30年代萦绕欧洲的反犹宣传的味道。


And Churchill’s response to the flirtations of Trump and the European far right with Vladimir Putin’s Russia can easily be imagined.	丘吉尔对于特朗普和欧洲极右翼与普京的俄罗斯眉来眼去会做出如何反应很容易想象。


None of this means that Churchill was always right, let alone a figure to emulate.	所有这些都不意味着丘吉尔永远是对的，更不是永远值得效仿的人物。


He was the right man in 1940 to raise British morale, when morale was about the only thing the British had going for them.	他是1940年提升英国人士气的正确人选，当是时，士气几乎是英国人唯一的伙伴。


But he is not a good model for politicians in less perilous times.	但在不那么危险的时代，他并不是一个很好的政治家榜样。


His views of colonial rule were already out of date before the war, and became a racist anachronism after it.	他对殖民统治的观点在战前就已经不合时宜，战后他更是堪称种族主义老古董。


His romantic ideas about the moral superiority of the English-speaking peoples were old-fashioned during his lifetime, and are an arrogant absurdity now.	他关于英语民族道德优越性的浪漫理想在他的时代就已属于迂腐，从今天看更是一种自大的荒谬。


But Churchill was neither petty nor provincial.	但丘吉尔既非小人，也不是乡巴佬。


His vision, at least as far as the Western world is concerned, may have been romantic, but it had a certain nobility.	他的愿景——至少从西方世界的观念看——也许是浪漫的，但也有一定的贵族气质。


The same cannot be said of the next occupant of the White House.	下一任白宫主人绝非如此。


The idea of Trump, advised by Farage, using Churchill’s bronze head as a totem would have filled the old man with horror.	特朗普根据法拉奇的建议用丘吉尔的铜头像当作图腾将让这位老人惊悚不已。


American Retreats	美国的撤退


Los Angeles – As Barack Obama’s incoming administration debates the pace and consequences of withdrawal from Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of other American exits in the final decades of the twentieth century.	洛杉矶—当即将上任的巴拉克·奥巴马政府激辩从伊拉克撤军的速度和后果时，检查美国20世纪最后几十年进行其他撤退所产生的战略影响颇有裨益。


Although American commitments to Lebanon, Somalia, Vietnam, and Cambodia differed mightily, history reveals that despite immediate costs to America’s reputation, disengagement ultimately redounded to America’s advantage.	尽管美国在黎巴嫩，索马里，越南和柬埔寨分别履行了千差万别的责任，历史显示撤出上述地区虽然会立刻影响美国的声誉，但是最终还是对美国有益。


In all of these cases, regional stability of sorts emerged after an American military withdrawal, albeit at the cost of a significant loss of life.	所有这些案例在美国撤军之后都出现了某种地区稳定，虽然是以损失大量生命为代价获得的。


America’s former adversaries either became preoccupied with consolidating or sharing power, suffered domestic defeat, or confronted neighboring states.	美国原来的敌人不是全力关注巩固或瓜分权力，遭受国内失败，就是对阵邻国。


Ultimately, America’s vital interests prevailed.	最后，美国的切身利益将会胜出。


The evidence today suggests that this pattern can be repeated when the United States departs Mesopotamia and leaves Iraqis to define their own fate.	今日的证据表明，当美国离开美索不达米亚，让伊拉克人决定他们自己命运的时候，将会再现同样的模式。


Of the four withdrawals, arguably the 1982-1984 American intervention in Lebanon marks the closest parallel to Iraq today.	在四次撤退中，1982年至1984年美国介入黎巴嫩被论证为和今天介入伊拉克最为相似。


A country torn by sectarian violence beginning in 1975, Lebanon pitted an even more complex array of contestants against each other than Iraq does today.	1975年开始的派别之争撕裂了黎巴嫩，这个国家陷入比今日的伊拉克更复杂的派别敌对之中。 ，


Into this fray stepped the US and its Western allies. Their objective was to create a military buffer between the PLO and Israeli forces that were then fighting in Beirut in order to promote the departure of both.	美国和它的西方盟友介入了这场冲突，目标是在激战的巴解组织和以色列军队之间建立军事缓冲区，从而促进双方撤军。


The massacres in Palestinian refugee camps prompted a new commitment to “restore a strong and central government” to Lebanon, to quote President Ronald Reagan.	发生在巴勒斯坦难民营里的屠杀又促成了一个新任务，用罗纳德·里根总统的话来说，就是“为黎巴嫩重建一个强大的中央政府”。


But the result of intervention was that US forces became just one more target, culminating in the 1983 bombing of a US Marine barracks that killed 241 American soldiers.	但介入的结果是美军也成了目标，以1983年一座海军营房被炸而告终，共有241名士兵在爆炸中丧生。


A similar suicide bombing two days later claimed the lives of 58 French soldiers.	两天后，同样的自杀式爆炸致使58名法军士兵丧命。


In February 1984, facing a quagmire, Reagan acceded to Vice President George H.W. Bush’s recommendation to get out of Lebanon.	1984年2月，面对困境的里根同意了副总统乔治·H·W·布什的建议从黎巴嫩撤军。


But the withdrawal of Western forces did not stop the fighting.	但西方军队的退出并没有让战争结束。


The civil war continued for another six years, followed by a bumpy political aftermath: Syrian intervention and expulsion (two decades later), as the Lebanese defined their own fate with the US exercising only background influence.	内战又持续了六年，然后是棘手的政治后果：叙利亚介入并(在20年后)撤出，黎巴嫩人决定自己的命运，美国则只施加幕后影响。


In 1992, the sirens of Somalia’s political collapse lured the US into another civil war to save a country from itself.	1992年，索马里政治崩盘的警报致使美国介入另一场内战来拯救一个国家。


The US humanitarian mission to that benighted country sought to salvage a failed United Nations enterprise to secure and feed Somalia’s ravaged population.	美国在那个黑暗国家中的人道主义使命致力于完成联合国已经破产的任务，对索马里被劫掠的人民实施保护，提供食品。


The US committed 28,000 troops, which for a time imposed a modicum of security.	美国调遣了28000名成员的部队，暂时还能勉强维持和平。


But ill-equipped and poorly led UN replacement forces for the American presence put the remaining US troops in the bull’s eye as they attempted to bring to justice the Somali warlord responsible for the death of Pakistani peacekeepers.	但是代替美军的联合国部队装备不佳，指挥混乱，结果当剩下的美军试图把该为巴基斯坦维和部队成员死亡负责的索马里军阀绳之以法的时候，他们遭受了攻击。


The ensuing bloodbath of US soldiers generated images that the American public could not stomach, prompting the exit of American and then UN forces.	美军士兵之后的大屠杀树立起美国公众难以接受的形象，迫使美国军队和联合国部队先后撤军。


As unrest mounted with these military retreats, offshore US forces monitored and intercepted jihadists who sought to enter Somalia, while Kenya and Ethiopia blocked the unrest from metastasizing across the region.	军事撤退之后骚乱增加，国外的美军对那些试图进入索马里的杰哈德圣战者进行监视和拦截，肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚则防止骚乱越过这一地区向外转移。


In 2006, the capture of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, by the Islamic Courts raised the specter of a jihadist state.	2006年，索马里首都被伊斯兰法院联盟占领，人们担心会一个杰哈德圣战者国家会由此出现。


But Somalia soon demonstrated that quagmires can be a two-way street.	但是索马里很快显示困境也有两条路。


Following Ethiopia’s intervention, the Islamists found themselves out of power.	在埃塞俄比亚的干预下，伊斯兰分子发现他们被权力摒弃在外。


Today, Somalia remains a dysfunctional state, as rival clans, jihadists, and an interim government with Ethiopian support compete for power.	今天，索马里依然是个混乱不堪运转不灵的国家，敌对的部族，杰哈德圣战者，和埃塞俄比亚支持的过渡政府彼此争权夺利。


The US, now out of the quagmire, exercises limited influence from afar.	摆脱泥潭的美国现在只在远处施加有限的影响。


While Lebanon and Somalia remain damaged and failed states, respectively, regional and domestic factors have cauterized the consequences of America’s retreat from Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The result is the stable region that the world sees today.	当黎巴嫩和索马里依然满目疮痍，毫无进步的时候，越南和东南亚自身的地区和国内因素则缓和了美国撤军的后果—即今天世界看到的这个局势稳定的地区。


But the US saw things very differently in the 1960’s, when the ghosts of Munich hovered over Vietnam’s jungles.	但在慕尼黑的幽灵盘旋在越南丛林中的1960年代，美国看到的东西可是大不一样。


As President George W. Bush argued about the war in Iraq, US President Lyndon Johnson predicted that defeat in Vietnam “would be renewed in one country and then another.”	就像乔治·W·布什为伊拉克战争所做的辩护一样，美国总统林登·约翰逊预测说在越南的失败“将在一个国家，然后又一个国家里重现”。


What Johnson failed to foresee were the domestic and regional constraints that would prevent the dominos from falling in the way he predicted.	约翰逊没有预测到的是某些国内和区域内的限制因素，这些因素将会阻止多米诺骨牌按他预计的方式滑落。


Although the US bombed northeastern Cambodia intensely throughout the Vietnam War years, it had no stomach for a ground commitment there.	虽然在整个越南战争期间，美国对柬埔寨的东北方狂轰乱炸，却没有胃口展开地面行动。


Still within congressional restraints, the Nixon administration attempted to bolster Cambodia’s military government.	还是在国会的限制内，尼克松政府试图支持柬埔寨军政府。


But, despite modest material support, the US could not sustain a government that could not sustain itself.	但是，虽然提供了一定的物质元祖，美国无力维系一个不能维系自身的政府。


Rather than the dominos falling following America’s retreat from Saigon in 1975, a Vietnam-Cambodian War ensued.	1975年美国从西贡撤军后，多米诺骨牌没有滑落，反而爆发了越南和柬埔寨之间的战争。


This in turn stimulated China’s unsuccessful intervention in North Vietnam.	随后这又促使中国对北越展开不成功的干涉。


The withdrawal by all of these invading armies to the recognized international boundaries demonstrated that nationalist forces were dominant in the region, not communist solidarity.	所有这些侵略军队撤回到国际承认的边界线显示出这个地区占优势的是民族主义者的力量，而不是共产主义者的团结。


None of these American exits was without consequence.	没有任何一次美国撤军是不产生后果的。


But, while the US suffered costs to its reputation around the world, the supposed advantages from this for America’s opponents proved illusory.	但是，当美国承受在世界范围内声名扫地的代价时，认为美国的敌人会从中获益已经证明是虚幻的。


America’s departure from Mesopotamia will likewise put the burden of problem solving onto Iraqis and other regional players, leaving the US offshore to assist when and where it deems appropriate.	美国撤离美索不达米亚也会同样把解决问题的负担交给伊拉克人和其他该地区的博弈者，美国的海外军队则会在合适的时间和地点介入其中。


History suggests that, in fits and starts, Iraq, like Vietnam and Lebanon, will find itself able to sort out its own affairs.	历史表明，在起起伏伏之间，伊拉克将会如同越南和黎巴嫩一样，发现自己能够处理自身的事务。


Trump’s Deplorables	特朗普的可悲之徒


NEW YORK – Hillary Clinton, the Democratic US presidential nominee, recently described supporters of her opponent, Donald Trump, as a “basket of deplorables.”	纽约—民主党美国总统提名人希拉里·克林顿最近把支持她的对手唐纳德·特朗普的人称为“一群可悲之徒”。


It was neither a tactful nor an elegant phrase, and she later apologized for her remark.	这个用词不得体，也不优雅，随后她因为此番评论而道歉。


But she was more right than wrong.	但她是对的。


Trump has attracted many supporters whose views on race, for example, are indeed deplorable.	特朗普吸引了许多支持者，他们的有些观点确实可悲，比如种族观点。


The problem is that many of these deplorable voters are also relatively uneducated, which makes Clinton’s remark look snobbish.	问题在于许多这些可悲选民相对而言教育程度较低，这让克林顿的评价显得有些势利。


Alas, the United States has too many relatively uneducated people.	唉，美国有太多教育程度相对较低的人。


Among developed countries, the US ranks low in terms of literacy, general knowledge, and science.	在发达国家中，美国识字率、常识和科学排名很低。


Japanese, South Koreans, Dutch, Canadians, and Russians score consistently higher.	日本、韩国、荷兰和俄罗斯的得分比美国高很多。


This is at least partly the result of leaving education too much to the market: those with money are highly educated, and those with insufficient means are not educated enough.	这至少部分是因为教育过于依赖市场：有钱的人受到更好的教育，没有门路的受教育不足。


So far, it seems clear that Clinton appeals to better-educated urban voters, while Trump attracts mainly less-educated white men, many of whom in earlier generations would have been Democrat-voting coal miners or industrial workers.	目前，显然克林顿吸引了教育程度更高的城市选民，而特朗普主要吸引教育程度较低的白人，这些人的祖辈往往是支持民主党的煤矿工人或产业工人。


Does this mean that there is a link between education – or the lack of it – and the appeal of a dangerous demagogue?	这是否意味着教育（或缺少教育）与危险的煽动家的吸引力之间存在关联？


One of the most remarkable things about Trump is the extent of his own ignorance, despite his high educational attainment, and the fact that he seems to benefit from flaunting it.	特朗普身上一个最引人关注的特点是他自身的无知，尽管他受过高等教育，以及他从炫耀自己的无知中获益这一事实。


Perhaps it is easier for a loud-mouthed ignoramus to convince large numbers of people whose knowledge of the world is as slight as his own.	也许大嗓门的无知者更容易让大量对世界的知识与他一样贫乏人们相信自己。


But this is to assume that factual truth matters in the rhetoric of a populist agitator.	但这不啻认为事实真相在民粹主义搅局者的修辞中至关重要。


Many of his supporters don’t seem to care much about reasoned argument – that is for the liberal snobs.	特朗普的许多支持者对理性观点没有什么兴趣——这是自由主义小人关注的东西。


Emotions count more, and the prime emotions that demagogues manipulate, in the US and elsewhere, are fear, resentment, and distrust.	情绪更重要，而在美国和其他国家，煽动家所操纵的主要情绪是恐惧、怨恨和不信任。


This was also true in Germany when Hitler came to power.	希特勒掌权的德国也是如此。


But the Nazi Party in its early days did not find the bulk of its support among the least educated.	但纳粹党初期的支持者主要不是来自教育程度最低的群体。


Germany was more highly educated than other countries, on average, and the most enthusiastic Nazis included schoolteachers, engineers, and doctors, as well as provincial small businessmen, white-collar workers, and farmers.	平均而言，德国的高等教育人口比其他国家更多，并且最狂热的纳粹党中有学校教师、工程师和医生，也有地方小商人、白领工人和农民。


Urban factory workers and conservative Catholics were, on the whole, less susceptible to Hitler’s blandishments than many more highly educated Protestants.	总体而言，相对许多教育程度更高的新教徒，城市工厂工人和保守的天主教徒对希特勒的花言巧语比较不敏感。


Low educational standards do not explain Hitler’s rise.	低教育程度无法解释希特勒的崛起。


Fear, resentment, and distrust ran very high in Weimar Germany, after the humiliation of wartime defeat and amid a devastating economic depression.	恐惧、怨恨和不信任程度在魏玛德国很高，当时一战的失败以及灾难性经济萧条让德国人充满了羞辱感。


But the racial prejudices whipped up by Nazi propagandists were not the same as the ones we see among many Trump supporters today.	但纳粹宣传机器煽动的种族偏见与我们今天常见于特朗普支持者的种族偏见不同。


The Jews were seen as a sinister force that was dominating the elite professions: bankers, professors, lawyers, news media, or entertainment.	犹太人被视为一股邪恶势力，他们主宰了精英职业：银行家、教授、律师、新闻媒体以及娱乐。


They were the so-called back-stabbers who prevented Germany from being great again.	他们是所谓的背后搞鬼者，让德国无法再次走向伟大。


The Trump supporters are showing a similar animus against symbols of the elite, such as Wall Street bankers, “mainstream” media, and Washington insiders.	特朗普的支持者也表现出类似的对精英象征的仇恨，如华尔街银行家、“主流”媒体以及华盛顿局内人。


But their xenophobia is directed against poor Mexican immigrants, blacks, or Middle Eastern refugees, who are perceived as freeloaders depriving honest (read white) Americans of their rightful place in the social pecking order.	但他们的仇视被导向贫穷的墨西哥移民、黑人或中东难民，他们被视为不速之客，抢走了诚（白）实（人）美国人在社会等级中应有的位次。


It is a question of relatively underprivileged people in a globalizing, increasingly multi-cultural world, resenting those who are even less privileged.	这是一个在全球化的、文化日益多元的世界中相对弱势群体仇恨比他们还要弱势的群体的问题。


In the US today, as in the Weimar Republic, the resentful and the fearful have so little trust in prevailing political and economic institutions that they follow a leader who promises maximum disruption.	当今美国就像魏玛共和国，仇恨者和恐惧者对主流政治和经济机构毫无信任可言，因此追随承诺最大程度破坏的领导人。


By cleaning out the stables, it is hoped, greatness will return.	他们希望，通过彻底的“打扫房子”可以恢复昔日荣光。


In Hitler’s Germany, this hope existed among all classes, whether elite or plebeian.	在希特勒德国，这一希望存在于所有阶级中间，不管是精英还是草根。


In Trump’s America, it thrives mostly among the latter.	在特朗普的美国，这一希望主要在草根中间兴盛。


In the US and Europe, today’s world looks less scary to more affluent and better educated voters, who benefit from open borders, cheap migrant labor, information technology, and a rich mixture of cultural influences.	在美国和欧洲，较为丰裕、教育程度较高的选民认为当今世界并不那么可怕，他们得益于开放边境、廉价移民劳动力、信息技术和文化影响的丰富组合。


Likewise, immigrants and ethnic minorities who seek to improve their lot have no interest in joining a populist rebellion directed mainly against them, which is why they will vote for Clinton.	类似地，追求改善生活的移民和少数民族没有兴趣加入主要针对他们的反动，这也是他们投票支持克林顿的原因。


Trump must thus rely on disaffected white Americans who feel that they are being left behind.	因此，特朗普必须依靠认为自己被抛弃的不满的美国白人。


The fact that enough people feel that way to sustain such an unsuitable presidential candidate is an indictment of US society.	深有同感的人多到足够支持特朗普这样的根本不合格的总统候选人，这一事实表明美国社会已经病入膏肓。


This does have something to do with education – not because well-educated people are immune to demagogy, but because a broken education system leaves too many people at a disadvantage.	这确实与教育有一定关系——因为教育程度较高这能够对煽动免疫，也因为拙劣的教育体系让太多人成为弱势群体。


In the past, there were enough industrial jobs for less-educated voters to make a decent living.	在过去，有足够的产业工作岗位留给教育程度较低的选民，让他们过上体面的生活。


Now that those jobs are vanishing in post-industrial societies, too many people feel that they have nothing more to lose.	如今，这些工作岗位正在后工业社会中逐渐消失，太多人觉得自己已经输无可输。


This is true in many countries, but it matters more in the US, where putting a bigoted demagogue in charge would do great damage not only to that country, but also to all countries trying to hold onto their freedoms in an increasingly perilous world.	在许多国家确实如此，但在美国兹事体大，让一位偏执的煽动家主政不但将让美国饱受伤害，也会让所有试图在日益危险的世界中捍卫自由的国家受伤。


America’s Exploding Deficit	美国的赤字怒潮


CAMBRIDGE – Two recent pieces of budget news are a grim reminder of the perilous state of fiscal policy in the United States.	发自剑桥——最近两则与预算有关的新闻是对美国财政政策危机状况的严重警告。


President Barack Obama’s Office of Management and Budget announced that the federal government’s deficit this fiscal year will be about $600 billion, up by $162 billion from 2015, an increase of more than 35%.	奥巴马总统下属的行政管理及预算办公室宣布，本财政年度联邦政府的赤字约为6000亿美元，比2015年增加1620亿美元，同比增长超过35％。


And the annual Long-Term Budget Outlook produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that, with no change in fiscal policy, federal government debt will rise from 75% of GDP to 86% a decade from now, and then to a record 141% in 2046, near levels in Italy, Portugal, and Greece.	而美国国会预算办公室发布的年度长期预算前景则预测，在财政政策不变的情况下，联邦政府债务将会在十年后从相当于GDP的75％上升至86％，并在2046年达到创纪录的 141％，与意大利、葡萄牙和希腊水平相当。


Although the US debt-to-GDP ratio doubled in the past decade, the Obama administration and Congress ignored the problem, focusing instead on the annual deficit’s decline since 2012 and the relative stability of the deficit as a share of GDP.	虽然美国债务相对GDP比率在过去十年增加了一倍，奥巴马政府和国会却刻意无视这一问题，相反着眼于2012年以来年度赤字额的逐步下降和赤字相对GDP比率的相对稳定。


That temporary progress reflected the economic recovery and congressional votes to limit spending on defense and nondefense discretionary programs.	但这个短期成绩其实源自于经济复苏以及美国国会对国防和非国防可自由支配开支项目的限制决议。


But the longer-term rise in the annual deficits – owing to an aging population, changing medical technology, and rising interest rates – and the resulting increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio were inevitable (and were clearly predicted by the CBO and others).	但年度赤字的长期性上涨——由于人口老龄化、医疗技术不断提升和利率上升——以及因此导致的债务相对GDP比率上升是无可避免的（国会预算办公室和其他机构对此已有明确预测）。 大量有资格领取社会保障福利的美国老年人将在未来30年使得社会保障计划支出相对GDP的比例从当前的4.


The larger number of older Americans who are eligible for Social Security benefits will drive the program’s costs from 4.9% of GDP this year to 6.3% of GDP over the next 30 years.	3％。 各项主要联邦医疗保健计划的成本从现在相对GDP5.


Half of the rise in the cost of the major federal health-care programs, from 5.5% of GDP now to 8.9% in 2046, will result from the increased number of older beneficiaries, with the other half caused by the technologically-driven extra cost of treating them.	5％上涨至2046年的8. 9％，一半归因于受益人寿命和人数的双双提升，另一半归因于为治疗他们而产生的额外医疗技术费用。


The Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy has driven down the cost of the net interest on the federal debt to just 1.4% of GDP, despite the increase in the volume of the debt.	尽管债务总额增加，但美联储的非常规货币政策依然拉低了联邦债务净利息的成本，使之仅相当于GDP的1. 4％。


But as interest rates normalize and the volume of debt grows, the cost of servicing the interest on the national debt is projected to increase to 5.8% of GDP.	但随着利率正常化和债务量的增长，维持国家债务利息的成本预计将增加至相当于GDP的5. 8％。


That projected interest cost may be much less than it would actually be if the rest of the deficit and debt forecast turns out to be correct.	如果赤字和债务预测的其余部分都被证明是正确的，预计利息成本可能远小于实际成本。


With a federal debt of 141% of GDP, that 5.8%-of-GDP interest cost implies an average nominal interest rate of just 4% and, given the CBO’s inflation forecast, a real interest rate of about 2% – similar to historic rates when the debt ratio was less than 40% of GDP.	随着联邦债务相对GDP比例达到141％，相当于GDP5. 8％的利息成本意味着只有4％的平均名义利率，鉴于国会预算办公室的通胀预测，实际利率大约是2% ——与债务与GDP比率少于40%时的历史利率相当。


But investors in Treasury bonds might demand a much higher interest rate in exchange for loading up their portfolios with US debt.	但美国国债投资者可能会要求高得多的利率来作为提高自身投资组合中国债比例的回报。


In that case, the interest cost and the debt would be much greater.	在这种情况下，利息成本和债务会大得多。


The fact that more than half of the publicly held US government debt is now owned by foreign investors might make the interest rate even more sensitive to the debt’s relative size.	超过一半的美国公开发行国债都由外国投资者持有的事实可能使利率对债务规模的变化更为敏感。


Foreign investors might fear that the government could adopt policies that reduced the real value of their holdings.	外国投资者可能会担心政府会采取一些减少他们实际持有价值的政策。


While the US government would never explicitly default, it could adopt policies such as deducting income tax on interest payments, which would disadvantage foreign holders and depress the value of the bonds.	尽管美国政府绝不会明目张胆地违约，但它可以采取的政策（如对利息扣除所得税）去这样做，这将对外国持有者不利并压低债券的价值。


Moreover, foreign investors might fear that very high debt levels could lead to inflationary monetary policy, which would depreciate the value of the dollar and lower the real value of their bonds.	此外，外国投资者可能担心过高的债务水平可能会导致通胀性货币政策，这将导致美元贬值并降低债券的实际价值。


Here is an amazing and disturbing implication of the CBO’s forecast.	以下是美国国会预算办公室的预测为何会令人惊讶不安的原因。


By 2046, the projected outlays for the “mandatory” entitlement programs (Social Security and the major health programs), plus interest on the debt, would absorb more than all of the revenue that the government would collect with current tax rates.	到2046年，那些“强制性”福利项目的预计支出（社会保障和主要健康计划），再加上债务利息，将高出政府当前税收水平下的收入。


A small deficit (1.6% of GDP) would emerge even before spending on defense and other annually appropriated “discretionary” programs.	就算把国防等每年拨付“自由裁量”项目支出都节省下来，也会出现一个小规模的赤字（相当于GDP的1. 6％）。


There is no way to offset the growth of the mandatory programs by slowing the growth of defense and other discretionary outlays.	我们是无法借助减缓国防和其他自由裁量项目的增长来抵消强制性项目支出增长的。 总的国防开支仅相当于目前国内生产总值的3.


Total defense spending is now just 3.2% of GDP and is expected to decline to 2.6% over the next ten years and to remain at that level for the next 20 years.	2％，并预计在未来十年内下降至2. 6％并在之后20年内保持在相同水平。


That would be the lowest defense share of GDP since before World War II.	这将是自二战前以来国防支出相对GDP比例最低的水平。


The same reduction is projected for all non-defense discretionary programs, also a record-low share of GDP.	预计所有非国防自由裁量项目也会同步减少，也创下了相对GDP比率的最低记录。


The bright spot in this bleak picture is that it would not take much in terms of annual deficit reductions to prevent the rise in the debt ratio, or even to bring it back to where it was a decade ago.	这种惨淡景象的亮点在于它不需要过多通过削减年度赤字以防止负债率的上升，甚至还能让后者倒退到十年前的水平。


Reducing the annual deficit by 1.7% of GDP by any combination of reduced spending and higher revenue would, if begun in 2017, prevent an increase from the current 75% debt-to-GDP ratio.	如果能在2017年开始利用减少支出和提高收入的任意组合政策使得赤字占GDP的比例下降1. 7％，就可以避免在当前75％的债务相对GDP水平上有所增长。


And reducing the deficit by 3% a year would reverse the debt trajectory and bring it back to where it was in the decades before the recession.	同时每年减少3%赤字将扭转债务发展的轨迹，并将其带回到��济衰退之前那几十年的状态。


Neither of the presidential candidates has indicated either a plan or an inclination to reverse the projected rise in the national debt.	至今没有一个总统候选人发布过扭转国家债务上升预期的计划或意愿。


But it should be a top priority for whoever moves into the White House next year.	但这应该是白宫主人明年施政的重中之重。


Given the need to act quickly to avoid the worst-case scenario, there is no excuse for waiting.	我们没有任何借口去拖延等待，只能迅速采取行动，避免最坏情况的降临。


America’s Anti-Environmentalists	美国的反环境保护主义者


As an American, I am appalled, ashamed, and embarrassed by my country’s lack of leadership in dealing with global warming.	作为美国人，我对我们国家在处理全球气候变暖问题上缺乏领导作用感到惊讶、羞愧以及尴尬。


Scientific evidence on the risks mounts by the day, as most recently documented in England’s magisterial Stern Report .	有关气候变暖风险的科学证据与日俱增。 最近，英国权威的斯特恩报告也作出了记载。


Yet, despite the fact that the United States accounts for roughly 25% of all man-made global carbon emissions, Americans show little will or inclination to temper their manic consumption.	但是，尽管在所有的全球人造碳排放中美国占大约25％，美国人对改变他们的消费没有表现出什么意愿或倾向。


The first George W. Bush administration was probably right to refuse to sign the so-called “Kyoto Protocol,” albeit for the wrong reasons.	尽管出于错误的理由，布什当局在第一个任期拒绝签署所谓的“京都议定书”大概还是正确的。


Among other problems, the Kyoto Protocol does not go far enough towards redistributing carbon emission rights towards developing countries.	京都议定书问题重重，其中之一是向发展中国家重新分配碳排放权利做得并不够。


But why can’t the US bring itself to raise taxes on gasoline and other sources of carbon emission like coal burning power plants?	但是，为何美国就不能对汽油以及类似煤炭发电厂等其他碳排放源增税呢？


It is not like the US government, running a huge deficit despite an economic boom, does not need the money.	尽管经济处于繁荣增长，但是美国政府还是赤字累累。 好像美国并非不需要这些钱。


Many people seem to think that the Bush administration is the problem.	许多人认为布什是问题所在。


Put a Texas oilman and his buddies in charge and what do you expect, conservation?	让一个德克萨斯州的石油商人和及其好友们执掌大权，你能指望什么呢？ 难道是环境保护妈？


Unfortunately, that is a facile excuse.	不幸的是，那是一个浅显的借口。


American citizens’ resistance to moderating energy consumption for the sake of the global environment is much more deeply embedded.	美国公民抵制为了全球环境而减少能源消费是更为根深蒂固的。


Consider former US Vice President Al Gore, for example, whose documentary film on global warming, An Inconvenient Truth , is celebrated for its unflinching look at how fossil fuel consumption is leading mankind to the brink of catastrophe.	例如，美国前副总统戈尔制作的有关全球气候变暖的电影纪录片<<来之不易的真相>>对于化石燃料消费将人类推向灾难边缘进行了深刻的刨析因而赢得赞誉。


The evidence on global warming is considerably more muddled than Gore’s film suggests, but the basic problem is real.	全球气候变暖的证据比戈尔的电影所描述的远远要模糊，但是基本问题确实真实的。


Unfortunately, however, Gore was not successful in carrying the torch on global warming when he was a politician.	但是不幸的是，戈尔在从政期间却并未成功地高举气候变暖的火炬。


One cannot commend the 1990’s Clinton-Gore administration for taking any brave steps aimed at radically reducing carbon emissions.	对于克林顿和戈尔当局在九十年代采取任何果敢的步骤大幅度减少碳的排放，人们并无法恭维。


Small wonder: the American public is fiercely resistant to anything that seriously forces them to compromise on their energy-burning, gas-guzzling lifestyle.	怪不得美国公众强烈抵制任何确实迫使他们改变其大肆耗费石油的生活方式的东西。


It is not just politicians who have failed to provide leadership here.	在这一点上，并非只有政客们没有予以提供领导。 受人尊重的纽约时报编辑版面直到最近还一直明显反对任何能源税，最后才支持这一提议。


The venerable	像许多自由派人士一样，该报的编辑担心更高的能源税将使穷人过多地更为不利。


The typical argument one hears is, “What about the poor guy with the gas-guzzling 1980 Chevy car, who has no other way to get to work?”	人们听到的典型的争辩是这样的：一个开着耗油的1980年雪佛兰破车的穷人没有别的途径上班，你让他怎么办？ 这确实是有效的论点，但是，正如斯特恩报告所指出的那样，如果海平面开始上升，许多我们的孩子们就会在某一天游泳上班了。


It is a legitimate point, but if ocean levels start rising, as the	需要采取纠正性的措施来减少贫困并不是对全球变暖无动于衷的借口。


The change of position by the	宣称你关心环境问题或者像布什那样说神奇的技术将会在没有很大痛苦的情况下解决问题是无关痛痒的。 但是，任何敢于谈论为了将来更为安全的环境而现在作出牺牲的2008年总统候选人肯定冒很大的风险。


Until Americans suck it up and start fixing global environmental problems that they, more than anyone, have caused, it will be difficult to get the wholehearted support of the rest of the world.	在美国人开始解决由他们比其他人所造成更多的全球环境问题之前，很难从世界其他地方得到全心全意的支持。