The refugees arriving on Europe’s shores are often young, well educated, skilled, and eager to integrate quickly into society.	抵达欧洲海岸的难民通常年轻、受过良好教育、掌握一定技术并渴望迅速融入社会。


They are an antidote to aging populations and low birth rates, and many come ready to work.	他们是应对人口老龄化和低生育率的一剂良药，很多人都已做好了工作的准备。


By collaborating with the public sector, business can help to ensure that they get the training and jobs they need.	通过与公共部门合作，企业可以协助确保他们得到所需的培训和岗位。


Business also has a role to play in helping to shape societal attitudes toward refugees.	商界在塑造社会对难民的态度方面也扮演着重要角色。


This is particularly true of public-facing organizations.	面向公众的机构尤其负有这方面的责任。


Football clubs across Europe are not only donating money, but also taking concrete steps to encourage a welcoming atmosphere, with welcome banners, training camps for refugees, and, in the case of Bayern Munich, language lessons.	欧洲足球俱乐部不仅捐赠资金，还采取具体措施制造欢迎氛围，像打出欢迎横幅、开办难民训练营，拜仁慕尼黑还为难民开设语言课。


Not all of these refugees will remain in Europe permanently.	并非所有的难民都会永远留在欧洲。


One day, many may return to their homeland.	有一天他们可能重回祖国。


When they do, they will have the skills to help rebuild their societies and economies, as well as provide strong ties to the country where they sought refuge.	届时他们将掌握重建社会和经济的能力，并在祖国和庇护国之间建立起牢固的纽带。


The importance of this investment in future state building, as well as business relationships, cannot be underestimated.	上述对未来国家建设和商业关系投资的重要性不容低估。


Although the payoff may seem distant, investing in today’s refugees could make all the difference in building tomorrow’s strong, stable trading partners.	虽然回报可能看似遥远，但投资于今天的难民可能带来明天牢固、稳定的贸易伙伴。


Europe’s refugee crisis continues to be viewed solely as a political problem, in part because that is how the media portray it.	欧洲的难民危机仍被视为完全的政治问题，部分因为媒体对它的定位。


The only business coverage tends to focus on the financial impact caused by the disruption of transport links such as the port of Calais.	唯一的商业报道关注加来港等运输联络中断所造成的财务影响。


But Europe’s refugee crisis is also a business problem.	但欧洲难民危机同样也是商业问题。


By addressing it now, business can turn that problem into an opportunity for all.	如果商界现在及时加以解决，可以把难民问题转化为全社会的机会。


The Consequences of a Trump Shock	特朗普冲击的后果


WASHINGTON, DC – With the United States’ presidential election on November 8, and a series of elections and other political decisions fast approaching in Europe, now is a good time to ask whether the global economy is in good enough shape to withstand another major negative shock.	华盛顿—美国总统大选将在11月8日举行，欧洲也即将迎来一系列选举和其他政治决定，现在问一个问题正逢其时：全球经济是否好到能够抵挡新的重大消极冲击。


The answer, unfortunately, is that growth and employment around the world look fragile.	不幸的是，答案是全球增长和就业看上去不堪一击。


A big adverse surprise – like the election of Donald Trump in the US – would likely cause the stock market to crash and plunge the world into recession.	重大“惊吓”——如唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统——可能导致股市崩盘、世界陷入衰退。


There is always a great deal of insight in the International Monetary Fund’s semi-annual economic outlook, which is based on detailed data from around the world.	国际货币基金组织（IMF）半年一度的经济展望总是能带来很多洞见。 该报告以来自全世界各地的详细数据为基础。


And, because the latest version was published in early October, it is particularly relevant.	而由于最新版发布于10月初，因此它特别重要。


(I was previously the IMF’s chief economist and oversaw the forecasting process, but I left that position in August 2008.)	（我曾担任过IMF首席经济学家并负责预测程序，但已与2008年8月离职。 ）


Table 1.1 of the Fund’s World Economic Outlook covers the main points: a baseline forecast of 3.1% global GDP growth this year and 3.4% in 2017.	IMF《世界经济展望》图表1. 1概括了主要论点：今年全球GDP增长基线预测为3.


This represented a nudge down from the projections in April, with signs of weakening perceived in the US, the eurozone, and of course the United Kingdom (grappling with the consequences of impending Brexit – the big and potentially traumatic step of leaving the European Union).	4%。 较4月份的预测有所调低，并且美国、欧元区，当然还有英国（忙于应对即将到来的英国退欧——可能造成极大痛苦的脱离欧盟的一大步——的后果）都出现了疲软信号。


The most obvious dark cloud on the global horizon is Europe.	笼罩在全球上空的最显而易见的乌云是欧洲。


The British issues are not helping, but the deeper issues continue to be related to the eurozone itself (Britain never adopted the euro).	英国问题固然不利，但更生层次的问题仍然在欧元区本身（英国从未采用欧元）。


The headline growth number in Spain is somewhat encouraging, continuing to show some rebound.	西班牙标题增长数字令人略感鼓舞，继续反弹。


But the ongoing gloom about Italy – the third-largest eurozone economy, growing at less than 1% per year – is a serious matter.	但意大利——欧元区第三大经济体，每年增长率不到1%——持续低迷则是一个严重问题。


Compounding these macroeconomic issues is the continuing pressure on eurozone banks.	加剧这些宏观经济问题的是欧元区银行继续承压。


These banks have never fully recovered from earlier losses, and their equity capital levels remain low relative to international competitors (like the US) and to what investors regard as reasonable.	这些银行从未从早前的损失中彻底恢复，它们的股本水平相对国际竞争对手（如美资银行）仍相对薄弱，也低于投资者所认定的合理水平。


The bigger problem remains uncertainty about who is on the hook if a bank’s losses imply potential insolvency.	更大的问题仍然是不确定如果银行损失可能导致破产，谁将是受害者。


These banks are clearly too big to fail – no European government in its right mind would allow a default on bank debt.	这些银行显然太大而不能倒——没有哪个思维正常的欧洲政府会允许银行债务违约。


But there is no agreement on how to share bank losses across countries.	但也不存在关于如何在各国分担银行损失的协定。


Taken as a whole, the eurozone has enough fiscal capacity to stand behind its banks.	从总体看，欧元区有足够的财政实力支持其银行。


But, unfortunately, doing so is still a country-by-country decision – the collective mechanisms for recapitalizing European banks remain partial and far too weak.	但不幸的是，这仍然是一个各国各自做出的决定——重组欧洲银行的集体机制仍然只是局部性质，并且远远不够强大。


Compounding these difficulties, growth in middle-income emerging markets is not strong.	加剧这些困境的是，中等收入新兴市场增长不够强劲。


Slower growth in these countries is reflected in lower projected imports and lower expected commodity prices, which will negatively affect countries that export raw materials and energy resources.	这些国家增长放缓体现在预计进口的下降和预期大宗商品价格的下跌，这将对出口原材料和能源资源的国家带来负面影响。


The Nigerian economy, just to take one example, is expected to contract by 1.7% this year.	随便举个例子，尼日利亚经济预计今年将收缩1. 7%。


Growth in the US, as reported by the IMF, was 2.6% in 2015, and is forecast to slip to 1.6% this year before rebounding slightly to 2.2% in 2017.	据IMF报道，2015年美国增长为2. 6%，预计今年将下滑至1.


There has been a long steady recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, but the effects of that collapse still linger.	2%。 自2008年以来，美国经济经历了长期稳步复苏，但这场崩盘的影响仍然没有退去。


Trump promises to boost US growth immediately to 4-5%, but this is pure fantasy.	特朗普承诺立即将美国增长提高到4—5%，但这纯粹是痴人说梦。


It is far more likely that his anti-trade policies would cause a sharp slowdown, much like the British are experiencing.	更有可能的是他的反贸易政策将导致大幅减速，一如英国现在正在经历的。


In fact, the impact of a Trump victory on the US could well be worse.	事实上，特朗普胜选对美国的影响还会更加糟糕。


Whereas British Prime Minister Theresa May’s government wants to close the UK’s borders to immigrants from the EU, it does want trade with the world.	英国首相梅政府希望对欧盟移民关闭英国边境，但仍想和世界贸易。


Trump, on the other hand, is determined to curtail imports through a variety of policies, all of which are well within the power of a president.	另一方面，特朗普决定通过各种政策打击进口，并且这些政策都在总统权力范围内。


He would not need congressional approval to slam the brakes on the US economy.	他不需要国会批准就能让美国经济坠下悬崖。


Even in the best of times, US policymakers often do not think enough about the impact of their actions on the rest of the world.	即使在最好的时代，美国决策者也常常不能充分考虑他们的动作对世界其他国家造成的影响。


Trump’s trade-led recession would tip Europe back into full-blown recession, which would likely precipitate a serious banking crisis.	特朗普的贸易拉动的衰退将把欧洲拖回全面衰退，而这又有可能引发严重的银行危机。


If this risk were not contained – and the probability of a European banking debacle is already disconcertingly high – there would be a further negative spiral.	如果这一风险得不到遏制——并且欧洲银行大溃败的可能性已然十分高——将产生更进一步的下跌螺旋。


Either way, the effects on emerging markets and all lower-income countries would be dramatic.	无论如何，对新兴市场和所有低收入国家的影响都将十分巨大。


Investors in the stock market currently regard a Trump presidency as a relatively low-probability development.	目前，股市投资者将特朗普成为总统视为概率相对较低事件。


But, while the precise consequences of bad policies are always hard to predict, if investors are wrong and Trump wins, we should expect a big markdown in expected future earnings for a wide range of stocks – and a likely crash in the broader market.	但是，尽管坏政策的确切后果永远难以预测，但如果投资者算错、特朗普胜出，我们大可期待大部分股票预期未来收益大跌——并且整体市场可能出现大崩盘。


The Future is Old	未来是老年人的


MUNICH – The aging of our societies is one of the greatest success stories of the twentieth century.	慕尼黑——社会老龄化是二十世纪最伟大的成就之一。


More than three decades have been added to the lives of hundreds of millions of people over the last hundred years.	一百年来亿万人的寿命已经延长了超过三十年之多。


This is an accomplishment well worth celebrating; but we must also bear in mind that with increased longevity come significant long-term economic consequences – and that many societies are aging at a record speed.	这一成就非常值得庆祝； 但我们也必须牢记寿命延长会带来显著的长期经济后果——许多社会老龄化将达到创纪录的速度。


Last year, the OECD warned that the world was aging at an unprecedented rate and that this could help slow global annual economic growth from an average of 3.6% this decade to about 2.4% from 2050 to 2060.	去年经合组织警告世界正以前所未有的速度实现老龄化，而这可能造成全球年经济增长率从近十年的平均3. 6%放缓至2050到2060年的约2.


OECD countries in particular will be hit by a double demographic shock.	4%。 尤其经合组织国家将遭受双重人口冲击。


Not only will their societies be rapidly aging; diminishing income gaps between rich countries and emerging economies are likely to slow immigration flows, shrinking the workforce by 20% in the eurozone and 15% in the United States.	不仅其自身社会将快速老龄化； 富裕国家和新兴经济体之间收入差距日渐收窄还有可能放缓移民流动，导致美国劳动力缩减15%、欧元区缩减20%。


Demographic researchers divide countries into four categories, according to the share of the over-65 population: young (less than 7% aged 65 or over), aging (7-13%), aged (14-20%), and super-aged (more than 21%).	人口研究员按照65岁以上人口比例将国家分为四类：年轻（65岁或以上人口小于7%）、趋向老龄化（7-13%）、老龄化（14-20%）和超级老龄化（超过21%）。


Today, just three countries – Germany (21%), Italy (22%), and Japan (26%) – qualify as super-aged societies.	目前仅有三国——德国（21%）、意大利（22%）和日本（26%）——被划为超级老龄化社会。


In the next five years, they are expected to be joined by Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, and Portugal.	预计保加利亚、芬兰、希腊和葡萄牙将在未来五年加入到这一行列。


In the following decade, Europe will continue to age, with another 17 countries, including Austria, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, expected to become super-aged, along with Canada, Cuba, and South Korea.	今后十年欧洲将继续老龄化进程，包括奥地利、法国、瑞典和英国等其他17个国家有望与加拿大、古巴和韩国一道成为超级老龄化社会。


During this period, the challenges of rapid societal aging will confront mainly the developed world.	在此期间，主要是发达国家将面对社会迅速老龄化的难题。


But, by 2040 some 55 countries will be struggling to manage an older population, with the US, China, Singapore, Thailand, and Puerto Rico joining the ranks of the super-aged.	但到2040年，55个国家将需要管理年龄不断增长的人口，美国、中国、新加坡、泰国和波多黎各将加入到超级老龄化的行列。


What makes the phenomenon even more remarkable is the speed at which these transitions are taking place.	上述转变发生的速度使得老龄化现象更加令人惊奇。


When France went from being a young country to an aging one in 1850, slavery was still legal in the US, the light bulb had yet to be invented, and Germany had yet to become a unified country.	当1850年法国从年轻国家变为趋向老龄化国家时，奴隶制在美国仍然合法，灯泡还没有发明、德国也没有统一。


It took another 130 years, for the country to become an aged society in 1980.	法国又花了130年才在1980年成为老龄化社会。


France is expected to become super-aged in 2023.	法国预计将于2023年成为超级老龄化社会。


For many years, Japan was considered to have the most rapidly aging population on earth.	多年来，日本被公认为全球老龄化速度最快的社会。


It went from having the youngest population among G-7 countries in the early 1960s to being the world’s oldest country in 2008.	20世纪60年代初日本还在七国集团里年纪最轻，2008年就成了全世界老龄化最严重的社会。


But if current projections hold true, several countries will accomplish a similar transformation a decade faster.	但如果当前预测大体准确，有几个国家比日本还要再少用10年就能完成类似的转型。


Indeed, today the world’s most rapidly aging country is South Korea, which became an aging society in 1999, is expected to become an aged one in 2017, and will be a super-aged one in 2027.	事实上，当今世界老龄化速度最快的国家是韩国，该国于1999年趋向老龄化，预计将于2017年实现老龄化、并于2027年步入超级老龄化行列。


In other words, South Korea will undergo in less than three decades a transformation that will have taken France nearly 175 years.	换言之，韩国将在不到三十年时间里完成法国花了近175年才完成的转型。


And while South Korea may be getting old the fastest, it leads a closely bunched group of countries that includes Bangladesh, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.	虽然韩国老龄化速度可能最快，但还有不少国家跟它非常接近，包��孟加拉、新加坡、泰国和越南。


Iran, still categorized as young, is another contender for the title of fastest-aging country.	现在仍被划归年轻国家的伊朗也加入了老龄化速度最快国家的竞争。


Aging is a product of rising life expectancies and falling fertility rates.	老龄化是预期寿命上升和生育率下降的结果。


The speed of the decline in fertility rates has been dramatic around the world; in Iran, it has been nothing less than astonishing, dropping from seven children per woman in 1984 to 1.9 in 2006.	世界各地生育率下降的速度极富戏剧性； 伊朗生育率下降的速度甚至可以用惊人来形容，从1984年的每名妇女7个孩子下降到2006年的1.


This will certainly have long-term consequences as the working-age population declines and the elderly population soars.	9个。 劳动年龄人口下降和老龄人口激增必将产生长期后果。


Iran is expected to stay young until after 2020, but could then become super-aged less than 30 years later.	伊朗在2020年前或许仍能保持年轻，但之后可能只用不到30年就成为超高龄国家。


And yet, whatever the adverse economic impact of aging, it is important to consider the alternative.	但无论老龄化将带来何种负面经济影响，都必须考虑另外一种选择。


Countries such as Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Central African Republic, and Zimbabwe have among the lowest life expectancies on the planet.	塞拉利昂、莱索托、中非共和国和津巴布韦是地球上预期寿命最低的国家。


They face many challenges – famine, corruption, conflict, lack of access to clean water and education, AIDS, and Ebola – but rapid societal aging is not one of them.	他们面临着饥荒、腐败、冲突、缺乏清洁用水和教育、艾滋病、埃博拉等众多挑战——但快速的社会老龄化却不在其中。


A rapidly aging population may be a problem, but, overall, it is a pretty good problem to have.	人口快速老龄化可能会带来问题，但这个问题本身就标志着一种成功。


The Middle East’s Arc of Prosperity	中东的繁荣之弧


PRINCETON – As Egypt trembles on the brink of civil war, with alarming levels of violence and hardening divisions on all sides, it is hard to find a truly bright spot anywhere in the Middle East or North Africa.	普林斯顿——令人震惊的暴力和不断固化的分歧令埃及在内战边缘战栗，中东或北非已经很难传出真正令人振奋的消息。 叙利亚痛苦持续不断；


Syria’s agony continues unabated; sectarian attacks in Iraq are becoming more frequent and deadly; the threads of Lebanon’s fragile peace are fraying; Jordan is awash in refugees; Libya’s militias are running rampant and distorting its politics; Tunisia faces political crisis; and Turkey’s star as the embodiment of Islamic democracy has dimmed.	利比亚民兵组织活动猖獗、政局扭曲； 土耳其这颗伊斯兰民主之星也逐渐黯淡。


Yet even with this litany of problems, US Secretary of State John Kerry has decided to focus on Israel and Palestine.	即便面对一连串的棘手事件，美国国务卿约翰·克里仍决定将解决以巴问题作为当前的重点。


His justification – “if not now, never” – is almost certainly true.	“现在不解决、就永远也解决不了”的理由几乎铁定成立。


But there is another, equally strong (albeit often overlooked) rationale: the tremendous potential for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian economic zone that would drive the entire region’s growth and development.	但还有另一个理由同样具有说服力（尽管这项理由往往被人忽视）：以色列－巴勒斯坦－约旦经济区可以激发整个地区的增长和发展潜力。


In the immortal words of James Carville, Bill Clinton’s campaign manager in 1992, “It’s the economy, stupid.”	比尔·克林顿的竞选主管詹姆斯·卡维尔1992年曾说过一句不朽名言，“傻瓜，经济才是根本问题。


The dismal failure of Middle Eastern and North African economies to deliver the prosperity that their people desperately want is a constant factor pushing people into the streets.	”中东和北非经济无法带来民众所需繁荣的惨淡失败不断将人们推上街头。


It is not the only factor, but rising food prices helped to spread revolutionary fervor from a small group of activists to much of Egypt’s population in 2011, and again this year in June, when the most frequent grievance against former President Mohamed Morsi concerned not his ideology but his indifference to ordinary Egyptians’ needs.	这并非唯一的因素，但食品价格上涨助推了2011年革命热情从一小撮积极份子扩展到普通民众，今年6月的情况同样如此，针对前总统穆罕默德·穆尔西最常见的不满并不是意识形态，而是普通埃及民众的需求得不到关注。


Against this backdrop, Israel and the Palestinian territories are relatively stable places.	在这样的背景下，以色列和巴勒斯坦领土成为相对稳定的所在。


Israel’s high-quality infrastructure could easily be extended to the West Bank and Gaza if security could be assured, and a young generation of entrepreneurs and technologists has grown up on both sides of the border.	一旦安全得到保证，以色列的高质量基础设施可以轻松拓展到约旦河西岸和加沙地带，年轻一代的技术人才和企业家已经在边境两侧成长起来。


Forbes magazine reports that “hundreds of Israeli[s] and Palestinians are becoming actual business partners and colleagues in startups that are slowly transforming the Palestinian economy, at least in the West Bank.”	《福布斯》杂志报道“数百名以色列和巴勒斯坦人正在成为创业企业中实实在在的同事和商业伙伴，这些企业正逐渐改变巴勒斯坦、至少是西岸经济。 ”


This is most true in high-tech industries, the sector in which the Middle East lags the most.	中东地区最滞后的高科技产业尤其如此。


The author of the Forbes article describes a scene in Ramallah that is “indistinguishable from one in Austin or San Francisco,” where “twentysomething Palestinians sip cocktails, their laptops open, their smartphones on.”	《福布斯》文章作者形容很难将拉马拉与奥斯汀或旧金山的情景分开 ，“二十几岁的巴勒斯坦人在拉马拉边啜饮鸡尾酒，边使用智能手机和笔记本电脑。 ”


All of this activity is taking place against the odds.	所有这些都克服了重重障碍。


Alec Ross, a former senior adviser for innovation to former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, argues that the best way to reinvigorate the peace process is to provide 3G Internet connectivity to the West Bank.	曾任美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿高级创新顾问的亚历克·罗斯认为重振和平进程的最佳方式是为西岸提供3G互联网连接。


He quotes a young woman in the audience at Palestine Polytechnic University, who said, to loud applause, “We must have a better economy to have better lives, and we must have 3G to have…a better economy.”	他引用巴勒斯坦理工大学一位年轻女听众的话，她的观点得到了在座其他人响亮的掌声，“要想过得更好就必须改善经济，而要想改善经济就必须有3G网络。 ”


Without high-speed Internet, foreign investment and indigenous entrepreneurship are almost impossible.	没有高速互联网，利用外国投资和自主创业就几乎没有可能。


The human capital for rapid economic growth is there (roughly 2,000 Palestinians graduate every year with technical skills, yet only 30% of them find a way to use such skills in a paying job), as is the will and the investment capital; but the necessary infrastructure is lacking.	实现快速经济增长的人力资源已经存在（每年约有2,000名巴勒斯坦专业技术人员毕业，但把技术应用于付酬工作的却仅有30%），巴勒斯坦也已具备发展意愿和投资资金； 但却缺乏必要的基础设施。


A vision of a very different Palestine, and of the Israel beside it, is not hard to find.	打造不同的巴勒斯坦及以色列愿景并不难。


In 2005, the Rand Corporation, a US research institute, developed the “Arc,” a genuinely inspiring plan to build a transportation corridor that would link Palestine’s principal business and population hubs in the West Bank, then curve across Israel into Gaza, where a long-planned airport and seaport would be built.	2005年，美国研究机构兰德公司推出了“弧形发展区”理念，这是一项修建连接西岸巴勒斯坦主要商业人口中心交通走廊的鼓舞人心的计划，该走廊穿过以色列进入加沙，筹划已久的空港和海港正在那里修建。


The concept behind this vision is that the size and population density of a future Palestine will be roughly the same as in extended urban regions like the San Francisco Bay area or greater Cairo.	该愿景背后是未来巴勒斯坦的面积和人口密度与旧金山湾区或大开罗等城市拓展区域大致相当的理念。


Thus, the West Bank should be viewed as “an integrated urban region of independent but connected cities.”	因此，西岸地区应被视为“独立但联系密切的城市综合区域”。


Anyone who spends nine minutes watching the video presentation of the Arc will see that its potential is nothing short of breathtaking.	只要花9分钟观看弧形发展区的视频演示，就可以看到这里的发展潜力是多么令人惊叹。


While Palestine would gain economically, Israel would gain politically and socially.	相比于巴勒斯坦的经济收益，以色列的收益则偏重于社会和政治方面。


The costs of not reaching a peace settlement may not show up in Israel’s economic statistics or in formal diplomatic interactions.	达不成和平协议的代价或许不会在以色列的经济数据和正式外交活动中有所彰显。


But young Israelis, in particular, are increasingly aware of the invitations to meetings and conferences that they do not receive – and of the increasing frequency with which their own are not accepted, even by sincere friends of Israel.	但特别是年轻以色列人正越来越真切地感受到他们不被邀请参加某些会议——而且即使面对以色列最真诚的朋友，他们发出的邀请不被接受的情况也越来越频繁。


Bernard Avishai, a distinguished Israeli professor of business and government who divides his time between Israel and the US, notes that whatever Israel’s young people may think of the Palestinians, they “expect to fly off from Ben-Gurion Airport and land, accepted, in the Western world.”	在以色列和美国间来回穿梭的著名以色列商业及政府事务教授Bernard Avisha指出无论以色列年轻人对巴勒斯坦人抱何种态度，他们都“希望从本-古里安机场起飞，能够降落在西方国家的领土并受到欢迎。


Now they know that the stakes are rising.	”现在他们清楚代价正逐渐增加。


So are the opportunities.	机会也同样如此。


Whereas the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been an island of violence and turmoil in a relatively stable (if oppressed) region, now the tables are turned.	鉴于巴以冲突一直是相对稳定（如果说受到压迫）区域中暴力和动荡的孤岛，现在整体局势已经扭转。


An Israel and Palestine that could resolve their differences and live side by side as democracies would become an island of stability and sanity in a sea of political disorder and economic retrenchment.	解决分歧、以民主国家共存的以色列和巴勒斯坦会成为政治混乱和经济紧缩中的稳定和理智因素。


Add a free-trade agreement, or even a customs union with Jordan, and you have the makings of a Middle Eastern Benelux (the grouping of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg that formed the economic kernel of what became the original European Community).	加之自由贸易协定、甚至和约旦的关税联盟，中东比荷卢经济联盟（构成最初欧共体经济核心的比利时、荷兰、卢森堡集团）即初具规模。


A late summer night’s dream?	仲夏夜之梦？


Perhaps.	有可能。


But, Iran aside, all of the region’s major players – Saudi Arabia and its fellow Gulf states, Turkey, and both sides in Egypt – have plenty of reasons to want to see it realized.	但除了伊朗之外，沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家、土耳其和埃及冲突双方等所有主要地区力量想实现这一目标都有充分的理由。


And Israelis and Palestinians themselves, with actual or potential civil war on three of their four borders, need no reminders of what could happen if they do not start spreading peace from the inside out.	而以色列和巴勒斯坦自身四条边境线中的三条都面临着实际或者潜在的内战，应该不需要别人提醒如果不开始由内而外地传播和平将会产生什么样的后果。


Fanatics, Charlatans, and Economists	傻子、骗子和经济学家


DAVOS – Throughout the world, it seems, crisis is gripping national politics.	达沃斯—放眼全球，危机似乎扼住了国家政治的要害。


In election after election, voter turnout has hit historic lows.	在 一次又一次选举中，投票率屡创新低。


Politicians are universally reviled.	政客无不遭受着谩骂。


Mainstream parties, desperate to remain relevant, are caught in a vice, forced to choose between pandering to extremism and the risk of being overwhelmed by populist, anti-establishment movements.	急于捍卫重要性的主流政党左右为难，被迫在迎合极端主义和被民粹主义反现状运动推翻的风险之间做出选择。


Meanwhile, not since the end of World War II has money played such an important role in politics, trumping the power of ideas.	与此同时，自二战结束以来，金钱从未如现在那样具有如此重要的政治作用，胜过了思想的力量。


In the United States, for example, the sound of billions of dollars flowing into election-campaign coffers is drowning out the voices of individual voters.	比如，在美国，选战金库动辄数十亿美元，这让个人选民的声音根本无从听说。


In parts of the world where the rule of law is weak, criminal networks and corruption displace democratic processes.	在法治精神较弱的地区，犯罪网络和腐败取代了民主程序。


In short, the pursuit of the collective good looks sadly quaint.	简言之，追求集体好处看上去如此不合时宜。


The trouble began at the end of the Cold War, when the collapse of a bankrupt communist ideology was complacently interpreted as the triumph of the market.	麻烦始于冷战的结束，破产的共产主义意识形态的崩溃被自鸣得意地解释为市场的胜利。


As communism was discarded, so was the concept of the state as an agent around which our collective interests and ambitions could be organized.	随着共产主义被抛弃，国家作为我们的集体利益和目标组织中心的代理人的概念也被抛弃了。


The individual became the ultimate agent of change – an individual conceived as the type of rational actor that populates economists’ models.	个人成为变化的终极代理人——被当成理性行为人、占领了经济学家的模型的个体。


Such an individual’s identity is not derived from class interests or other sociological characteristics, but from the logic of the market, which dictates maximization of self-interest, whether as a producer, a consumer, or a voter.	这种个体的身份不是来自阶级利益或其他社会特征，而是来自市场的逻辑，即不论作为生产者、消费者还是选民，目标都是个人利益的最大化。


Indeed, economics has been placed on a pedestal and enshrined in institutions like central banks and competition authorities, which have been intentionally separated and made independent from politics.	事实上，经济学被置于神坛地位，受中央银行和竞争当局的顶礼膜拜，后两者被有意隔离出来，使之与政治保持独立。


As a result, governments have been confined to tinkering at the margins of markets’ allocation of resources.	结果，政府的作用被局限在对资源的市场配置做一些边缘修补。


The 2008 global financial crisis, the resulting recession, and rapidly widening income and wealth inequality have punctured the glib triumphalism of economics.	2008年全球金融危机及其所导致的危机，以及快速扩大的收入和财富不平等打破了经济学的胜利神话。


But politics, far from rising to take its place, continues to be discredited, as mainstream leaders – particularly in North America and Europe – call on economic theories to justify their policy choices.	但政治还远不足以取代经济学的地位，它们依旧声名狼藉，因为主流领导人——特别是在北美和欧洲——仍要仰仗经济学理论论证他们的政策选择。


The pursuit of individual attainment is the hallmark of our time, eclipsing the collective dimension of human destiny.	追求个人成就是现时代的标志，遮挡了人类命运的集体维度的光芒。


And yet the deep human need to be part of a group has yet to disappear.	但人类成为集体的一部分的深层次需要并没有消失。


It lingers, but without a credible outlet.	它依然存在，但已经失去了可靠的外表。


National projects ring hollow, and the so-called international community remains an abstraction.	国家工程听上去大而无当，而所谓的国际社会仍然只是抽象概念。


This unfulfilled desire for community may be felt particularly acutely by young people – including, for example, young jihadists.	这一对社会的未满足的渴望也许在年轻人中间最能得到尖锐的认识——包括（比如）年轻的圣战者。


Indeed, nationalist politicians and religious leaders have been the first to spot the vacuum, and they are rapidly filling it.	事实上，民族主义政客和宗教领袖是第一批看到这一真空的人，并且正在快速填补这一真空。


Pope Francis, Vladimir Putin, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Marine Le Pen have little in common.	普京、巴格达迪（Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi）和勒庞（Marine Le Pen）几乎没有共同点。


But they share one insight: There is a deep longing for the creation of communities defined by shared values, not functional needs.	但他们有一点相同：存在一种对建立根据共同价值而不是功能需要结合在一起的社会的深切渴望。


The crisis of national politics has consequences that echo far beyond the borders of individual countries.	国家政治的危机后果远不止于个体国家的边界。


National chauvinism and religious fundamentalism are here to stay, and with them the terrorism that extremists of all stripes embrace, because both phenomena are ideally suited to the age of the individual: They provide imaginary answers to personal angst, instead of political answers to collective challenges.	民族沙文主义和宗教原教旨主义矗立在我们面前，与它们一起崛起的是形形色色的极端分子所实施的恐怖主义：它们为个人焦虑提供臆想的答案，而不提供对集体挑战的政治答案。


These movements’ amorphous nature – often channeled through charismatic leaders – allows each individual to project onto them his or her dreams, making them difficult to counter within the framework of traditional politics.	这些运动的无形性——常常通过魅力超凡的领袖提供——让每一个个体都可以将梦想寄托其上，因此，���传统政治 框架下，它们很难被制约。


But this strength can also be a weakness.	但这一优势也可能成为劣势。


When tasked with managing territories and governing populations, these movements begin to face the same bothersome logistical and organizational constraints as their rivals.	在管理领土和治理人口等问题上，这些运动开始面临与它们的对手一样的麻烦的物流和组织约束。


As a result, bureaucracy is constantly at their heels, leaving them in perpetual need of upheaval and renewal.	结果，官僚制度一直紧随其后，让它们永远需要剧变和复兴。


If politics is to retake the field of values from the fanatics, the charlatans, and the economists, it must be rebuilt from the ground up.	如果政治要从傻子、骗子和经济学家手中夺回价值领域，就必须彻底重建。


More than half of the world’s population now lives in cities, and any political renaissance must counterbalance the appeal of vast virtual communities with resilient urban societies.	如今，全世界超过一半人口居住在城市中，任何政治复兴都必须用高恢复力的城市社会制衡巨大的虚拟社会的吸引力。


Citizens must become reengaged with the political process, educated in public affairs, and provided with real (not merely virtual) platforms to air their differences and debate alternative views.	公民必须愿意重新参与政治程序，在公共事务中接受教育，并得到真正（而不只是虚拟）的平台消弭分歧、争论替代观点。


Furthermore, institutions that provide bridges between states and the global community, such as the European Union, must be strengthened and refocused.	此外，提供国家和全球社会之间的桥梁的机构——如欧盟——必须得到强化并转变重点。


In particular, their technical functions must be clearly distinguished from their political roles.	特别是，它们的技术功能必须与政治角色明确区分。


But, above all, politicians must stop trying to shore up their diminished credibility with the pretense of economic science.	但是，最重要的是，政客必须停止试图用经济科学的幌子巩固它们江河日下的信誉。


Politics begins where contemporary economics ends – with ethics and the attempt to create a justly ordered society.	政治学之兴必始于当代经济学之终——与此同时还需要伦理学和尝试建立公正的有序社会。


The Messy Politics of Economic Divergence	经济分歧中的政治混乱


LAGUNA BEACH – The world is increasingly characterized by divergence – in economic performance, monetary policy, and thus in financial markets.	拉古纳海滩——无论在经济表现、货币政策还是金融市场方面，世界经济已经尽显差异。


Global divergence has already contributed to stock-market volatility, unprecedented declines in advanced economies' government bond yields, and outsize currency movements.	全球差异已导致股市波动、发达国家政府债券收益率史无前例的下降及汇率的波动走势。


And the trend is not abating, placing increasing pressure on already-strained political systems.	而且上述趋势并无减弱迹象，这给本已紧张的政治制度带来了越来越大的压力。


The world's systemically important economies can be placed into four categories.	全世界最重要的经济体可以笼统归为四大类。


The first group includes countries like India and the United States, where economic recovery is broadening, enabling them to overcome financial imbalances.	第一类包括印美等国，经济全面复苏令其得以摆脱金融失衡的束缚。


The second group is exemplified by China, which is achieving a soft landing onto a growth path that, while lower than in recent years, remains adequate to support continued progress toward high-income status and financial stability.	第二类则以中国为代表，那里正在实现经济增长软着陆，尽管增长速度低于前些年，但仍足以支撑其向高收入和金融稳定实现持续过渡。


The third group includes economies – such as Brazil, several eurozone countries, and Japan – that are not growing fast enough, and face downside risks.	第三类包括巴西、某些欧元区国家和日本等经济体，它们的增长速度放缓，面临着经济下行压力。


And, finally, the fourth group consists of economic and financial wildcards like Greece and Russia – countries that could succeed in restoring growth and financial stability, but could just as easily implode, sending shock waves across Europe and beyond.	最后，希腊和俄罗斯等经济和金融动荡国被划为第四类——上述国家有可能恢复经济增长和金融稳定，但同样有可能陷入崩溃，冲击欧洲和其他地区。


This divergence is as much a political phenomenon as it is an economic and financial one.	上述差异既是政治现象也是经济和金融问题。


Overcoming it – and ensuring steady, financially stable global growth – will require responsive national policymaking and multilateral coordination.	克服差异保证全球稳定增长既需要灵活的政府决策，也需要多边协调合作。


Unfortunately, today's rather messy national and international political environments have so far precluded such an approach.	但遗憾的是，今天混乱的国内国际政治环境迄今为止没有为合作留下余地。


Nonetheless, experimental monetary policies in advanced economies – such as the large-scale asset purchases initiated this month by the European Central Bank – have slowed the vicious circle of subpar economic performance and muddled politics.	然而，发达经济体实验性的货币政策——比方说欧洲央行（ECB）本月发起的大规模资产购买计划——已经延缓了经济表现欠佳和政治混乱等恶性循环的脚步。


But it is far from clear that this will continue, especially given the US Federal Reserve's gradual exit from such policies, which puts America on a different path from most of the other advanced economies.	但鉴于美联储逐步退出刺激计划导致美国所走道路与多数发达国家不同，上述状况能否持续依然是个谜。


Moreover, market forces have gained an ever-larger role in reconciling global economic divergence, leading to dramatic shifts in exchange rates.	此外，市场力量在协调全球经济差异中所发挥的作用越来越大，导致汇率呈大幅波动态势。


The list of such currency movements – which so far has included the euro's 25% fall against the dollar, a record low for the Mexican peso, and disorderly depreciations of the Brazilian real and other emerging-economy currencies – is getting longer by the day.	类似的货币走势表——到目前为止包括欧元兑美元下跌25%、墨西哥比索创历史新低、巴西雷亚尔和其他新兴市场货币无序贬值—— 每天都会增加新的事例。


Even healthy economies like South Korea are keen to weaken their currencies, leaving the US alone in its willingness to tolerate significant currency appreciation.	就连韩国等健康经济体也急于让货币贬值，宁愿忍受货币大幅升值的仅美国一家而已。


On their own, currency markets will not bring about the growth-enhancing global economic rebalancing that is needed.	货币市场仅凭一己之力无法实现推动经济加速增长的全球经济再平衡程序。


Better policies at the national, regional, and global levels are also essential – and that requires better politics.	国家、地区和全球更明智的决策同样至关重要——而这需要更加清明的政治。


Too many political leaders around the world remain unable – or unwilling – to fulfill their economic-governance responsibilities.	各国仍有太多政治领袖不能——或不愿履行经济治理责任。


This is particularly regrettable, given that there is a broad consensus regarding the technical components of the required policy response: structural reforms to revamp growth engines, efforts to rebalance aggregate demand, and the elimination of debt overhangs.	鉴于已就所需政策的技术构成——升级发展引擎的结构性改革、总需求的重新平衡以及债务负担的消除——达成了广泛共识，这种状况更让人觉得可惜。


(The eurozone must also work to complete the essential underpinnings of its historic integration project.)	（欧元区也必须巩固其历史性一体化的核心基础。


What is missing is implementation.	）现在迫切需要的是执行和落实。


But governments seem unlikely to overcome their dysfunction anytime soon.	但政府功能障碍似乎不太可能在短期内彻底消除。


In the US, Congress and the executive branch are locked in a stalemate.	美国国会和行政部门正陷入相持局面。


Europe's political systems are being shaken by the rise of populist parties, many of which are winning support with an anti-European platform.	民粹主义政党崛起动摇了欧洲的政治制度，其中不少已经赢得了反欧洲平台的支持。


In the emerging world, Brazil's government has faced multiple corruption scandals.	在新兴国家，巴西政府正面临多重腐败丑闻的威胁。


And Russia's leadership remains committed to its disruptive regional adventures, regardless of their devastating impact on its economy.	俄罗斯领导人仍致力于破坏性的地区冒险，而对冒险所带来的灾难性经济影响完全无视。


In most, if not all, of these cases, we see examples of a broader phenomenon: what might be called governing by inertia – a “can't, won't, and shouldn't" mentality, to paraphrase the economist Mark Blyth, that blocks effective policymaking.	在多数甚至所有情况下，我们都亲眼目睹了广为存在现象的例子：这就是所谓的惯性管理——一种“不能、不会也不该”的心态，套用经济学家马克·布莱思的理论，在很大程度上妨碍了决策效率。


As policy inertia prolongs sluggish growth and impairs job creation, it becomes even more difficult to abandon.	随着政策惯性拉长衰退期和削弱就业机会创造，也使其变得更加难以放弃。


Given how hard it is for governments to initiate a shift to a new policymaking mode (that is, to disrupt themselves), pressure will build from the outside.	鉴于政府启动新决策模式（亦即自我破坏）困难重重，必须从外部施加压力。


In a democracy, this tends to occur through the fragmentation of traditional parties and the emergence of non-traditional parties – some offering genuine alternatives, and others relying on fear and prejudice.	民主政体中上述趋势来源于传统政党的分裂和非传统政党的出现——有些能够提出真正的解决方案，还有些从恐怖与偏见中谋取利益。


The global economy is at a critical juncture.	全球经济正处在关键的转折时期。


Most economists agree on what is needed to avoid another round of lost growth opportunities, inadequate employment, financial instability, and worsening inequality.	多数经济学家已就所应采取的措施达成一致，以避免再次丧失增长机会、影响就业、破坏金融稳定和导致不平等现象进一步加剧。


Central banks and markets cannot achieve an orderly global rebalancing on their own.	各国央行和市场无法凭一己之力构建全球经济再平衡秩序。


As difficult as it may be, politicians need to pursue comprehensive policy responses.	尽管困难重重，但仍需政治家们采取全面的政策措施。


The longer they delay, the less effective their efforts will be.	拖延的时间越长，改革的效果就会越差。


As bad politics block economic opportunity, public trust in governments will continue to erode – with serious potential consequences for political systems, and the economies they administer, worldwide.	而且公众对政府的信任也会随劣政破坏经济机会而不断遭受侵蚀——政治制度会因此承受严重的潜在后果，处于它们管理下的全球经济体也同样如此。


Happiness Is Equality	幸福就是平等


LONDON – The king of Bhutan wants to make us all happier.	伦敦—不丹国王想让我们所有人都更幸福一点。


Governments, he says, should aim to maximize their people’s Gross National Happiness rather than their Gross National Product.	政府，他说，应该把目标放在人民的国民幸福总值（Gross National Happiness）上，而不是国民生产总值上。


Does this new emphasis on happiness represent a shift or just a passing fad?	这一新观点代表了一种转变，还是只是一时兴起？


It is easy to see why governments should de-emphasize economic growth when it is proving so elusive.	很容易就可以看出，在经济增长变得如此困难的受，政府为什么应该淡化它。


The eurozone is not expected to grow at all this year.	据估计，今年欧元区根本不会发生增长。


The British economy is contracting.	英国经济正在收缩。


Greece’s economy has been shrinking for years.	希腊经济下滑已经好几年了。


Even China is expected to slow down. Why not give up growth and enjoy what we have?	即使是中国，预计也会发生减速。


No doubt this mood will pass when growth revives, as it is bound to.	毫无疑问，这种情绪会随着增长的恢复而烟消云散，本应如此嘛。


Nevertheless, a deeper shift in attitude toward growth has occurred, which is likely to make it a less important lodestar in the future – especially in rich countries.	但是，更深层次的关于增长的态度变化已经展开，在未来，经济增长将不再像以前那样如同北极星一样重要了，特别是在发达国家。


The first factor to undermine the pursuit of growth was concern about its sustainability.	阻止人们不再追求增长的第一个因素是对其可持续性的担忧。


Can we continue growing at the old rate without endangering our future?	我们还能继续以从前的速度增长、同时又不损害我们的未来利益吗？


When people started talking about the “natural” limits to growth in the 1970’s, they meant the impending exhaustion of food and non-renewable natural resources.	20世纪70年代，当人们开始谈论增长的“天然”极限时，他们指的是即将发生的食品和不可再生自然资源的耗竭。


Recently the debate has shifted to carbon emissions.	最近，这一争论变成了碳排放。


As the Stern Review of 2006 emphasized, we must sacrifice some growth today to ensure that we do not all fry tomorrow.	正如2006年斯特恩评论（Stern Review）所强调的，我们必须牺牲一些今天的增长，以确保明天的收成。


Curiously, the one taboo area in this discussion is population.	有趣的是，这一争论的一个禁区是人口问题。


The fewer people there are, the less risk we face of heating up the planet.	人口数量越少，我们所面临的地球变热风险就越低。


But, instead of accepting the natural decline in their populations, rich-country governments absorb more and more people to hold down wages and thereby grow faster.	但是，与接受人口自然下降的事实相反，发达国家政府吸收越来越多的人口以降低工资从而刺激增长。


A more recent concern focuses on the disappointing results of growth.	一个更新的担忧关注增长的负面后果。


It is increasingly understood that growth does not necessarily increase our sense of well-being.	我们越来越明白，增长并不能理所当然地增加我们的幸福感。


So why continue to grow?	既然如此，我们还要维持增长干什么？


The groundwork for this question was laid some time ago.	这一问题的基础已经有一些时日了。


In 1974, the economist Richard Easterlin published a famous paper, “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?	1974年，经济学家罗伯特·伊斯特林（Robert Easterlin）出版了他的著名论文《经济增长是否改善了人类命运？ 一些实证证据》（“Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?


Some Empirical Evidence.”	Some Empirical Evidence）。


After correlating per capita income and self-reported happiness levels across a number of countries, he reached a startling conclusion: probably not.	在将多个国家的人均收入和自我评估的幸福水平做了相关性分析后，他得到了一个令人吃惊的结论：或许并非如此。


Above a rather low level of income (enough to satisfy basic needs), Easterlin found no correlation between happiness and GNP per head.	从一个非常低的收入水平开始（仅足以满足基本需求），伊斯特林并没有发现幸福和人均GNP之间具有相关性。


In other words, GNP is a poor measure of life satisfaction.	换句话说，GNP绝不是衡量生活满意度的好指标。


That finding reinforced efforts to devise alternative indexes.	这一发现刺激了人们开发新的替代指标。


In 1972, two economists, William Nordhaus and James Tobin, introduced a measure that they called “Net Economic Welfare,” obtained by deducting from GNP “bad” outputs, like pollution, and adding non-market activities, like leisure.	1972年，两位经济学家——威廉·诺德豪斯（William Nordhaus）和詹姆斯·托宾（James Tobin）引入了他们称为“净经济福利”的指标，该指标通过从GNP中扣除“坏”产出（如污染）并加上非市场活动（如休闲）获得。


They showed that a society with more leisure and less work could have as much welfare as one with more work – and therefore more GNP – and less leisure.	他们证明，一个更多休闲、更好工作的社会可能与更多工作（因而更多GNP）、更少休闲的社会福利水平相同。


More recent metrics have tried to incorporate a wider range of “quality of life” indicators.	更新的计量方法试图引入更广范围的“生活质量”指标。


The trouble is that you can measure quantity of stuff, but not quality of life.	麻烦在于，你可以统计员工数量，但难以计算生活质量。


How one combines quantity and quality in some index of “life satisfaction” is a matter of morals rather than economics, so it is not surprising that most economists stick to their quantitative measures of “welfare.”	你如何加总“生活满意度”之类的指标的数量和质量，这是一个道德问题，而不是经济问题，因此，毫不奇怪，大部分经济学家仍然坚持使用“福利”的量化指标。


But another finding has also started to influence the current debate on growth: poor people within a country are less happy than rich people.	但另一项发现也开始影响当前的增长争论：在同一个国家，穷人没有富人幸福。


In other words, above a low level of sufficiency, peoples’ happiness levels are determined much less by their absolute income than by their income relative to some reference group.	换句话说，在某个低水平的充足度之上，人们的幸福水平受绝对收入规模的影响程度远小于与参照群体相比的相对收入水平。


We constantly compare our lot with that of others, feeling either superior or inferior, whatever our income level; well-being depends more on how the fruits of growth are distributed than on their absolute amount.	我们总是不断地把自己的命运与他人作比较，要么感觉胜出，要么感觉不如，这和我们的收入水平无关； 幸福的感觉取决于增长的果实如何分配，而不是它们的绝对数量。


Put another way, what matters for life satisfaction is the growth not of mean income but of median income – the income of the typical person.	换句话说，决定生活满意度的不是平均收入的增长，而是中位收入（即最典型人口的收入）的增长。


Consider a population of ten people (say, a factory) in which the managing director earns $150,000 a year and the other nine, all workers, earn $10,000 each.	考虑一个十人社会（比如一家工厂），董事每年赚15万美元，其他九名工人每人赚1万美元。 他们的平均收入是2.


The mean average of their incomes is $25,000, but 90% earn $10,000.	5万美元，但90%的人只能赚1万美元。


With this kind of income distribution, it would be surprising if growth increased the typical person’s sense of well-being.	在这样的收入分配下，增长会提高典型人口的幸福感才怪。


That is not an idle example.	这并不是一个凭空捏造的例子。


In rich societies over the last three decades, mean incomes have been rising steadily, but typical incomes have been stagnating or even falling.	过去三十年来，发达国家的平均收入稳步上升，但典型收入一直停滞不前甚至有所下降。


In other words, a minority – a very small minority in countries like the United States and Britain – has captured most of the gains of growth.	换句话说，少数人——在美国和英国等国家，是极少数人——攫取了增长的大部分果实。


In such cases, it is not more growth that we want, but more equality.	在这些情况下，我们想要的不是更多的增长，而是更少的不均。


More equality would not only produce the contentment that flows from more security and better health, but also the satisfaction that flows from having more leisure, more time with family and friends, more respect from one's fellows, and more lifestyle choices.	更大的平等性不但能够产生更多安全感、更健康的身体等因素所产生的满足感，还可以产生更多休闲、更多时间陪伴家人和朋友、更大的周边人群尊重度以及更多的生活方式选择所产生的满足感。


Great inequality makes us hungrier for goods than we would otherwise be, by constantly reminding us that we have less than the next person.	严重的不平等性让我们产生比平常更渴求的物质欲望，因为我们时时刻刻都会认为我们比相邻的家伙拥有得更少。


We live in a pushy society with turbo-charged fathers and “tiger” mothers, constantly goading themselves and their children to “get ahead.”	我们生活在一个讲求出人头地的社会，身边是狼爸和虎妈，时刻鞭策他们自己和他们的孩子“向上”。


The nineteenth-century philosopher John Stuart Mill had a more civilized view:	十九世纪哲学家约翰·穆勒有一个更文明的观点：


“I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think…that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind….The best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back, by the efforts of others to push themselves forward.”	 “坦白说，我并不对那些认为互相践踏、挤压、打击、压迫才是人类最值得追求的生活理想着迷，而这正是社会生活的存在方式。 人类天性的最佳状态是，没人是穷人，没人渴望致富，也没人担心会落后，所有人都在互相推进着前进。


That lesson has been lost on most economists today, but not on the king of Bhutan – or on the many people who have come to recognize the limits of quantifiable wealth.	如今，这一教训早已被大多数经济学家所忘记，但不丹国王还记着，那些认识到数量财富的极限的人也记着。


The Age of Vulnerability	脆弱时代


NEW YORK – Two new studies show, once again, the magnitude of the inequality problem plaguing the United States.	纽约—两项新研究再次证明，不平等问题的程度正在困扰美国。


The first, the US Census Bureau’s annual income and poverty report, shows that, despite the economy’s supposed recovery from the Great Recession, ordinary Americans’ incomes continue to stagnate.	首先是美国人口普查局的年度收入和贫困报告，该报告显示，尽管美国经济被认为已从大衰退中复苏，但普通美国人的收入仍然处于停滞状态。


Median household income, adjusted for inflation, remains below its level a quarter-century ago.	经通胀调整的中位家庭收入仍低于二十五年前。


It used to be thought that America’s greatest strength was not its military power, but an economic system that was the envy of the world.	人们通常认为，美国最大的优势不在于其军事实力，而在于其令全世界艳羡的经济制度。


But why would others seek to emulate an economic model by which a large proportion – even a majority – of the population has seen their income stagnate while incomes at the top have soared?	但其他国家为何要模仿这个大量人口——甚至可以说是大部分人口——收入停滞不前、眼睁睁看着顶层收入狂飙突进的经济模式呢？


A second study, the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report 2014, corroborates these findings.	第二项研究是联合国发展计划署的2014年人类发展报告，该报告印证了第一项研究的发现。


Every year, the UNDP publishes a ranking of countries by their Human Development Index (HDI), which incorporates other dimensions of wellbeing besides income, including health and education.	联合国发展计划署每年都要发布各国人类发展指数（HDI）排名，该排名考察包括健康和教育在内的各项除收入以外的福利。


America ranks fifth according to HDI, below Norway, Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.	美国在HDI排行榜上位列第五，次于挪威、澳大利亚、瑞士和荷兰。


But when its score is adjusted for inequality, it drops 23 spots – among the largest such declines for any highly developed country.	但经不平等性调整后，美国的得分将下降23位——是发达国家中因该调整排名下降幅度最大的国家之一。


Indeed, the US falls below Greece and Slovakia, countries that people do not typically regard as role models or as competitors with the US at the top of the league tables.	事实上，美国将跌至希腊和斯洛伐克等国家之下，而这些国家从未被视为榜样或可以与美国一决高下的竞争对手。


The UNDP report emphasizes another aspect of societal performance: vulnerability.	联合国发展计划署的报告强调另一个社会表现维度：脆弱性（vulnerability）。


It points out that while many countries succeeded in moving people out of poverty, the lives of many are still precarious.	报告指出，尽管许多国家在减少贫困方面取得了成功，但仍有许多人情况危急。


A small event – say, an illness in the family – can push them back into destitution.	很小的事件——比如家人患病——就可能让他们重回贫困。


Downward mobility is a real threat, while upward mobility is limited.	向下流动是一个实实在在的威胁，而向上流动性饱受制约。


In the US, upward mobility is more myth than reality, whereas downward mobility and vulnerability is a widely shared experience.	在美国，向上流动与其说是现实，不如说是传说； 而向下流动性和脆弱性倒是比比皆是。


This is partly because of America’s health-care system, which still leaves poor Americans in a precarious position, despite President Barack Obama’s reforms.	这部分是拜美国医疗制度所赐，尽管奥巴马总统实施了改革，但这套制度仍让美国穷人处于相当危险的境地。


Those at the bottom are only a short step away from bankruptcy with all that that entails.	位于底层的人群距离破产只有一步之遥。


Illness, divorce, or the loss of a job often is enough to push them over the brink.	疾病、离异和失业往往就足以让他们万劫不复。


The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or “Obamacare”) was intended to ameliorate these threats – and there are strong indications that it is on its way to significantly reducing the number of uninsured Americans.	2010年患者保护和平价医疗法（Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act，即“奥巴马医改”）本是为了消除这些威胁——而强有力的信号表明该法案正在显著降低无保险美国人的数量。


But, partly owing to a Supreme Court decision and the obduracy of Republican governors and legislators, who in two dozen US states have refused to expand Medicaid (insurance for the poor) – even though the federal government pays almost the entire tab – 41 million Americans remain uninsured.	但是，部分拜最高法院一项的裁决以及共和党执政者和立法者的顽固所赐——二十四个州拒绝扩大面向穷人的医疗补助（Medicaid）计划，机关联邦政府几乎全额负担了其中的成本——仍有4,100万美国人没有医保。


When economic inequality translates into political inequality – as it has in large parts of the US – governments pay little attention to the needs of those at the bottom.	当经济不平等性演变为政治不平等性时——美国大部分地区就是如此——政府却没有关注底层人民的需要。


Neither GDP nor HDI reflects changes over time or differences across countries in vulnerability.	GDP和HDI都没有反应脆弱性随时间和国别的不同。


But in America and elsewhere, there has been a marked decrease in security.	但在美国和其他地区，安全性（security）发生了显著下降。


Those with jobs worry whether they will be able to keep them; those without jobs worry whether they will get one.	有工作的担心是否能保住饭碗； 没工作的担心是否能找到饭碗。


The recent economic downturn eviscerated the wealth of many.	最近的经济衰退影响了许多人的财富。


In the US, even after the stock-market recovery, median wealth fell more than 40% from 2007 to 2013.	在美国，虽然股市早已复苏，但2007—2013年间中位财富仍缩水超过40%。


That means that many of the elderly and those approaching retirement worry about their standards of living.	这意味着许多老年人和临近退休者需要担心今后的生活水平。


Millions of Americans have lost their homes; millions more face the insecurity of knowing that they may lose theirs in the future.	数百万美国人失去了住房； 另有数百万面临眼看就要失去住房的不安全性。


These insecurities are in addition to those that have long confronted Americans.	这些不安全性令长期困扰美国人的不安全感雪上加霜。


In the country’s inner cities, millions of young Hispanics and African-Americans face the insecurity of a dysfunctional and unfair police and judicial system; crossing the path of a policeman who has had a bad night may lead to an unwarranted prison sentence – or worse.	在美国内陆城市，数百万西班牙裔和非洲裔美国人面临不作为、不公正的警察和司法制度所带来的不安全性； 遇到心情不好的警察很有可能导致无妄的牢狱之灾甚至更糟糕的情况。


Europe has traditionally understood the importance of addressing vulnerability by providing a system of social protection.	传统上，欧洲更加理解通过社会保障制度解决脆弱性问题的重要性。


Europeans have recognized that good systems of social protection can even lead to improved overall economic performance, as individuals are more willing to take the risks that lead to higher economic growth.	欧洲人明白好的社会保障制度甚至可以改善总体经济表现，因为个体将更愿意承担能带来更高经济增长的风险。


But in many parts of Europe today, high unemployment (12% on average, 25% in the worst-affected countries), combined with austerity-induced cutbacks in social protection, has resulted in unprecedented increases in vulnerability.	但如今，在欧洲许多地区，高失业（平均12%，最严重的国家25%）加上紧缩造成的社会保障缩水导致了前所未有的脆弱性增加。


The implication is that the decrease in societal wellbeing may be far larger than that indicated by conventional GDP measures – numbers that already are bleak enough, with most countries showing that real (inflation-adjusted) per capita income is lower today than before the crisis – a lost half-decade.	这意味着社会福利的下降可能远比常规GDP指标所显示的严重——尽管GDP数字已经十分难看，表现最差的国家真实（经通胀调整的）人均收入还不如危机前——一个失去的五年。


The report by the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (which I chaired) emphasized that GDP is not a good measure of how well an economy is performing.	国际经济表现和社会进步测量委员会（International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress，我是该委员会主席）的报告强调GDP不是衡量经济表现好坏的好指标。


The US Census and UNDP reports remind us of the importance of this insight.	美国人口普查和联合国发展计划署的报告提醒我们这一洞见的重要性。


Too much has already been sacrificed on the altar of GDP fetishism.	GDP崇拜让我们牺牲了太多东西。


Regardless of how fast GDP grows, an economic system that fails to deliver gains for most of its citizens, and in which a rising share of the population faces increasing insecurity, is, in a fundamental sense, a failed economic system.	从根本上说，不管GDP增长有多快，不能让大部分公民带来福祉、让越来越多的人口面临越来越严重的不安全性的经济制度都是一个失败的经济制度。


And policies, like austerity, that increase insecurity and lead to lower incomes and standards of living for large proportions of the population are, in a fundamental sense, flawed policies.	从根本上说，增加不安全性、导致大比例人口收入和生活水平下降的政策（比如紧缩）是有缺陷的政策。


Taming the Populists	驯服民粹主义份子


MADRID – In many Western democracies, right-wing populists, energized by self-proclaimed victories over “establishment elites,” are doubling down on the claim that globalization lies at the root of many citizens’ problems.	马德里——在众多西方民主国家，右翼民粹主义者在自封的对“体制精英”胜利的鼓舞下正在双倍下注，将很多民众问题的根源归结为全球化。


For those whose living standards have stagnated or declined in recent decades, even as political leaders have touted free trade and capital flows as the recipe for increased prosperity, the argument holds considerable appeal.	对那些几十年来生活水平停滞不前甚至下滑的民众来说，即便政治领袖将自由贸易和资本流动奉为日臻繁荣的秘方，认为全球化损害很多人利益的观点仍颇具吸引力。


So it must be addressed head on.	因此我们必须正面解决这个问题。


Of course, economic grievances alone do not fuel anti-globalization sentiment; populism has emerged even in countries with low unemployment and rising incomes.	当然，经济不满本身并不能催生反全球化情绪； 即使低失业率和收入增长的国家也出现了民粹主义。


But such grievances provide the kernel of truth that populist leaders need to attract support, which they then attempt to secure with distortions and exaggerations.	但这样的不满提供了民粹主义领袖争取支持所需的内核，这些人惯用扭曲和夸张等手段来争取民众的支持。


If the economic issues are not addressed, support for such leaders will continue to grow, potentially taking their societies backward, to a less tolerant – and less prosperous – time.	如果经济问题得不到改善，对上述领导人的支持率将继续上升，可能导致社会退回到不那么宽容——也不那么繁荣的——时代。


The likes of Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen did not gain a foothold in their countries’ politics – not to mention the chance of leading them – on their own.	唐纳德·特朗普和马琳·勒庞等人在国内政治中获得立足点——更不要说领导机会——并非凭借他们自身之能。


They exploited the feeling of many citizens that the political classes – which touted the benefits of globalization, while allowing inequality to rise to unprecedented levels – had abandoned them.	他们利用了民众的感情，很多民众认为在鼓吹全球化收益的同时坐视不平等上升到前所未有水平的政治阶层抛弃了他们。


To be sure, globalization has reduced inequality among countries substantially.	可以肯定，全球化大幅抑制了国家间不平等。


But within countries, inequality has risen sharply.	但在国内，不平等现象却急剧上升。


The largest gains from globalization have not only accrued to the middle and upper classes in Asia, but also to the top 1% of earners worldwide.	不仅亚洲的中产及上层阶级从全球化中得到了最大红利，同样获益匪浅的还有全世界1%的最高收入阶层。


In the United States, for example, the Gini coefficient (the most common measure of inequality) increased by five points from 1990 to 2013.	比如在美国，基尼系数（测量不平等的常见指标）从1990到2013年增长了5个百分点。


Inequality has also risen, albeit more slowly, in China, India, and most European countries.	尽管速度相对缓慢，但不平等现象在中国、印度和多数欧洲国家同样有所上升。


Despite rising inequality, the benefits of globalization have been more tangible in developing countries.	尽管不平等现象日益严重，但全球化带来的好处在发展中国家越来越显形。


Indeed, economic openness has helped to lift millions of developing-country citizens out of poverty, which is why the economist Branko Milanovic argues that globalization has driven “the greatest reshuffle of individual incomes since the Industrial Revolution.”	事实上，经济开放已经帮助发展中国家成百上千万民众实现脱贫，经济学家布兰科·米拉诺维奇因此认为全球化推动了“自工业革命以来最大规模的个人收入革命。 ”


But, for many advanced-country citizens, that is precisely the problem.	但很多发达国家民众认为全球化的问题恰恰在此。


They are not opposed to poverty reduction in faraway countries.	他们并不反对遥远的国家减少贫困。


But if they believe that, say, the Chinese are becoming wealthier, while their own real (inflation-adjusted) wages remain largely stagnant, they will not accept globalization.	但如果他们认为中国人越来越富，而他们自己（经通胀调整后）的实际工资却在很大程度上陷入停滞状态，他们就不会接受全球化进程。


If their own societies’ wealthiest members are also becoming richer, conditions become ripe for anti-establishment rebellion.	如果本国社会最富裕的成员同样变得日渐富有，那么发动反体制叛乱的条件就日臻成熟。


The image of “untrustworthy elites” is ideal fodder for populists, who claim that globalization has given the wealthy and powerful more money and power than ever.	“不可信的精英”形象是民粹主义者的理想饲料，他们声称全球化赋予富人和权力阶层的金钱和权力比以往任何时候都多。


But the world that the populists and their constituents hope to recreate – a world of self-sufficient, egalitarian states insulated from developments around them – never existed.	但民粹主义者及其选民希望重建的那个自给自足、不受周边国家发展影响的平均主义世界却从未存在过。


Any effort to close economies – much less borders – would fail disastrously.	任何封闭经济——更不要说边界——的努力都将带来灾难性的失败后果。


The only way to stem the rising tide of destructive populism and prevent the drift toward damaging protectionist measures is to reconnect with frustrated constituencies, and find ways to respond to people’s real economic grievances.	遏制破坏性民粹主义浪潮不断高涨并防止滑向破坏性保护主义措施的唯一方法是重新联系沮丧的选民，并想方设法对民众切实的经济不满作出回应。


A national government’s main job is to protect the social equilibrium that forms the backbone of democratic systems.	国家政府的主要工作是保护构成民主体系支柱的社会平衡。


For that reason, leaders must not reject globalization, but work to guide it, so that it advances their citizens’ interests and wellbeing.	领导人因此不必抗拒全球化，而应努力对其加以引导，以使其对民众的利益和福祉起到推动作用。


Bold initiatives to tackle inequality are crucial.	消除不平等的大胆举措起到至关重要的作用。


In addition to stopgap measures, aimed at immediately improving people’s economic circumstances, leaders must develop systems to ensure that citizens are equipped to thrive in a globalized world in the long term.	除旨在立即改善民众经济环境的权宜之计外，领导人还必须建立制度，以确保民众从长远看能够从全球化世界中收获繁荣。


Creativity, problem-solving skills, and heightened interpersonal competence will be essential.	创造力、解决问题的能力和人际交往能力都将起到至关重要的作用。


Moreover, national authorities must engage with one another to improve global governance.	此外，国家当局必须相互接触以改善全球治理结构。


In recent years, the inadequacies of existing global governance structures, particularly with regard to issues like taxation and employment, have become starkly apparent.	近年来，现有全球治理结构的不足之处，特别是在税收和就业等方面，已经暴露得十分显著。


The agenda for next month’s G20 summit in China includes discussion of concrete measures to reduce inequality.	下月将在中国举行的G20峰会议程包括探讨减少不平等现象的具体举措。


But talk is not enough; leaders must ensure that discussion is translated into real action.	但光是空谈还远远不够； 领导人必须确保讨论能够转化为实际行动。


The sooner, the better: the labor-market transformation now occurring as a result of progress in robotics and artificial intelligence will only make inequality more difficult to address in the future.	采取应对措施越快越好：机器人及人工智能应用进步所带来的劳动力市场转型只会加大未来解决不平等问题的难度。


As the OECD has warned, the automatization of manual and repetitive tasks will chiefly affect those without college degrees – the same group that is already frustrated with their economic circumstances.	经合组织曾经警告手工和重复任务的自动化将主要影响那些不具备大学学历者——而已经对自身经济状况感到不满的同样是这些人。


Over the next year, important national elections will take place in Europe and in the US.	接下来的一年，欧洲和美国将举行重要的全国选举活动。


If populists triumph, many important social achievements will be put at risk.	如果民粹主义获胜，将会危及很多重要的社会成功。


That is why it is so important that national leaders prove, right now, that they can and will tackle inequality and the plight of those who feel left behind by globalization.	因此，国家领导人立即证明他们有能力也有意愿解决不平等问题和在全球化中落后的民众的困境起着至关重要的作用。


A victory for populism would indicate that the political classes really have failed their citizens.	民粹主义的胜利将显示政治阶层真的辜负了自己的民众。


The victory of the campaign in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union should have jolted all of us from the illusion that we are somehow protected from the risks we see around us.	英国脱欧公投的胜利应该已经惊醒了所有人幻想我们能在周围危险中得到保护的好梦。


The unthinkable can happen.	不可思议的事随时可能发生。


Populists can win.	民粹主义份子随时可能获胜。


It is time for national leaders to show that they are paying attention.	国家领袖是时候向外界证明这个问题已经引起了他们的关注。


Inspiring Economic Growth	鼓舞人心的经济增长


NEW HAVEN – In his First Inaugural Address, during the depths of the Great Depression, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously told Americans that, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”	纽黑文—大萧条最严重的时期，美国总统罗斯福发表了他的第一次就职演说，其中有一句名言，他告诉美国人，“我们唯一必须恐慌的是恐慌本身。


Invoking the Book of Exodus, he went on to say that, “We are stricken by no plague of locusts.”	”接着，他援引《出埃及纪》说：“我们没有遭遇蝗灾。


Nothing tangible was causing the depression; the problem, in March 1933, was in people’s minds.	”导致萧条的不是有形的东西； 在1933年3月，问题出在人心上。


The same could be said today, seven years after the 2008 global financial crisis, about the world economy’s many remaining weak spots.	今天也是如此，在2008年全球金融融危机过去七年后，世界经济依然千疮百孔。


Fear causes individuals to restrain their spending and firms to withhold investments; as a result, the economy weakens, confirming their fear and leading them to restrain spending further.	恐慌让个人克制支出，让企业不再投资； 结果是经济疲软，他们的恐慌得到确认，于是进一步克制支出。


The downturn deepens, and a vicious circle of despair takes hold.	衰退深化，绝望的恶性循环成为主宰。


Though the 2008 financial crisis has passed, we remain stuck in the emotional cycle that it set in motion.	尽管2008年金融危机已经过去，但我们仍然陷在危机所导致的情绪周期中。


It is a bit like stage fright.	这有点像怯场。


Dwelling on performance anxiety may cause hesitation or a loss of inspiration.	陷入表现焦虑可能导致犹豫或失去灵感。


As fear turns into fact, the anxiety worsens – and so does the performance.	随着恐慌成为现实，焦虑会加剧——表现也会更差。


Once such a cycle starts, it can be very difficult to stop.	这一循环一旦开始，就难以结束。


According to Google Ngrams, it was during the Great Depression – around the late 1930s – that the term “feedback loop” began to appear frequently in books, often in relation to electronics.	根据Google Ngrams的数据，“反馈回路”一词正是在大萧条期间——20世纪30年代末前后——开始频繁出现在书籍中，其使用常常与电学有关。


If a microphone is placed in front of a loudspeaker, eventually some disturbance will cause the system to produce a painful wail as sound loops from the loudspeaker to the microphone and back, over and over.	把一个扩音器放在喇叭前面，最终某种干扰会导致系统产生刺耳的声音回路，从喇叭传到扩音器，在传回喇叭，以此循环。


Then, in 1948, the great sociologist Robert K. Merton popularized the phrase “self-fulfilling prophecy” in an essay with that title.	接着，1948年，大哲学家罗伯特·莫顿（Robert K. Merton）在同名论文中提出了“自我实现的预言”一词。


Merton’s prime example was the Great Depression.	莫顿所举的主要例子就是大萧条。


But the memory of the Great Depression is fading today, and many people probably do not imagine that such a thing could be happening now.	但如今，对大萧条的记忆正在消退，许多人可能无法想象这种情况还会在发生一次。


Surely, they think, economic weakness must be due to something more tangible than a feedback loop.	他们想，经济疲软的原因当然应该比反馈回路更加实在。


But it is not, and the most direct evidence of this is that, despite rock-bottom interest rates, investment is not booming.	但并非如此，而对此最直接的证据是，尽管利率已经一降到底，但投资仍然没有兴旺起来。


In fact, real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates are hovering around zero throughout much of the world, and have been for more than five years.	事实上，全球大部分地区真实（经通胀调整的）利率在零水平徘徊已经超过五年。


This is especially true for government borrowing, but corporate interest rates, too, are at record lows.	这对于借钱的政府来说尤其如此，但公司利率也处于创纪录的低位。


In such circumstances, governments considering a proposal to build, say, a new highway, should regard this as an ideal time.	在这样的环境下，政府如要考虑建设（比如）一条新高速公路可谓正逢其时。


If the highway will cost $1 billion, last indefinitely with regular maintenance and repairs, and yield projected annual net benefits to society of $20 million, a long-term real interest rate of 3% would make it nonviable: the interest cost would exceed the benefit.	如果高速公路成本是10亿美元，永久需要定期维护和微小，预计每年产生2,000万美元的净社会效益，那么如果长期真实利率超过3%，该项目将难以为继：利息成本将超过收益。


But if the long-term real interest rate is 1%, the government should borrow the money and build it.	但如果长期真实利率为1%，政府应该借钱修建这条公路。


That is just sound investing.	这是可靠的投资。


In fact, the 30-year inflation-indexed US government bond yield as of May 4 was only 0.86%, compared with more than 4% in the year 2000.	事实上，5月4日30年美国通胀指数政府债券收益率只有0. 86%，而2000年超过4%。


Such rates are similarly low today in many countries.	如此低利率在当今许多国家都存在。


Our need for better highways cannot have declined; on the contrary, given population growth, the need for investment can only have become more pronounced.	我们对路况更好的高速公路的需求不可能下降； 相反，随着人口增长，对投资的需求只会越来越大。


So why are we not well into a highway-construction boom?	因此我们为何没有大步走向高速公路建设繁荣？


People’s weak appetite for economic risk may not be the result of pure fear, at least not in the sense of an anxiety like stage fright.	人们对经济风险胃口全无，这也许不是完全是恐慌一个因素的结果； 至少不是类似于怯场这样的焦虑感。


It may stem from a perception that others are afraid, or that something is inexplicably wrong with the business environment, or a lack of inspiration (which can help overcome background fears).	这也许来自一种感觉，即其他人在害怕，或营商环境存在不可名状的大问题，或缺少鼓舞作用（这有助于克服隐藏的恐慌）。


It is worth noting that the US experienced its fastest economic growth since 1929 in the 1950s and 1960s, a time of high government expenditure on the Interstate Highway System, which was launched in 1956.	美国1929年后的最快速经济增长阶段是20世纪五六十年代，当时正逢政府州际高速公路系统（1956年启动）支出高峰。 如今，这一点根本没人重视。


As the system was completed, one could cross the country and reach its commercial hubs on high-speed expressways at 75 miles (120 kilometers) an hour.	随着州际高速公路系统的完工，你可以以75英里（120公里）的时速穿梭在全美各大商业枢纽之间。


Maybe the national highway system was more inspirational than the kinds of things that Roosevelt tried to stimulate the US out of the Great Depression.	也许国家高速公路系统比罗斯福试图刺激美国走出大萧条的计划更加鼓舞人心。


With his Civilian Conservation Corps, for example, young men were enlisted to clean up the wilderness and plant trees.	比如，通过他的民间资源养护队（Civilian Conservation Corps），年轻人被动员起来拓荒植树。


That sounded like a pleasant experience – maybe a learning experience – for young men who would otherwise be idle and unemployed.	对于原本可能游手好闲、找不到工作的年轻人来说，这听起来像是令人愉快的体验——也许还是一种学习经验。


But it was not a great inspiration for the future, which may help to explain why Roosevelt’s New Deal was unable to end America’s economic malaise.	但这并没有起到很好的鼓舞未来的作用，这也许可以解释为何罗斯福新政没能结束美国的经济困境。


By contrast, the apparent relative strength of the US economy today may reflect some highly visible recent inspirations.	相反，如今美国经济显而易见的相对强势也许反映了某些最近表露无遗的鼓舞效应。


The fracking revolution, widely viewed as originating in the US, has helped to lower energy prices and has eliminated America’s dependency on foreign oil.	被广泛视为美国原创的液压致裂革命帮助降低了能源价格，让美国不再依赖外国石油。


Likewise, much of the rapid advance in communications in recent years reflects innovations – smartphone and tablet hardware and software, for example – that has been indigenous to the US.	类似地，近几年来通讯业的快速发展体现了美国本土的创新——比如智能手机和平板电脑软硬件。


Higher government spending could stimulate the economy further, assuming that it generates a level of inspiration like that of the Interstate Highway System.	提高政府支出可以进一步刺激经济，如果能够产生与州际高速公路系统相当的鼓舞效果的话。


It is not true that governments are inherently unable to stimulate people’s imagination.	政府天生无法刺激人们的想象力，这一观点绝非事实。


What is called for is not little patches here and there, but something big and revolutionary.	我们需要的不是零敲碎打，而是革命性的大改变。


Government-funded space-exploration programs around the world have been profound inspirations.	放眼全球，政府出资的空间探索计划产生了深远的鼓舞效果。


Of course, it was scientists, not government bureaucrat, who led the charge.	当然，引领这一潮流的是科学家而不是政府官僚。


But such programs, whether publicly funded or not, have been psychologically transforming.	但这些计划——不管是否公共出资——都具有改变心理的作用。


People see in them a vision for a greater future.	人们从中看到了更伟大的未来。


And with inspiration comes a decline in fear, which now, as in Roosevelt’s time, is the main obstacle to economic progress.	而随着人心得到鼓舞，恐慌将节节败退，而眼下恐慌正是经济进步的最大障碍，一如罗斯福时代。


China’s Growth Challenge	中国的增长挑战


BEIJING – Throughout the just concluded 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party ubiquitous television screens in trains and metro stations broadcast a live feed of the Chinese assembly.	北京—在刚刚结束的中共十八大期间，铁路和地铁站铺天盖地的电视屏幕一直在做着直播。


Beijing’s busy people, however, seemed not to pay close attention: for them, it was business as usual.	但是，繁忙的北京人似乎并不很关注：对他们来说，这稀松平常。


The Chinese public’s indifference to their country’s ceremonial transition of power is hardly surprising.	中国民众对该国礼节式的权力交接漠不关心并不令人惊奇。


All critical decisions were taken well ahead of the Congress, behind closed doors, with very little input from outsiders.	所有重要决定在大会开始前就已经做好了，一切都是暗箱操作，外部根本无从得知。


This apparently seamless transition, however, is widely expected to usher in a complex and potentially difficult decade for China – and for the rest of the world.	但是，这一次显而易见的无缝权力交接正逢中国（以及全世界）进入复杂而可能十分困难的十年。


China is at a turning point.	中国正站在十字路口。


With more than 100 million people still below the official poverty line and per capita income currently just over $6,000 in nominal terms, robust economic growth must be maintained.	1亿多人仍生活在官方贫困线以下，名义人均收入刚刚跨过6000美元，在这样的情况下，稳健的经济增长是必不可少的。


Outgoing President Hu Jintao indicated that China’s total GDP and per capita income should double by 2020, which will require 7.5% average annual growth.	卸任的胡锦涛主席指出，中国总体GDP和人均收入应该在2020年翻一番，这意味着年均7. 5%的增长率。


Is this feasible?	这是可以完成的任务吗？


Recent improvements in data for industrial production, fixed investment, and retail sales suggest that the Chinese economy, which had slowed in recent quarters, may already be on the mend.	最新的工业产出、固定投资和零售数据显示，在经历了最近几个季度的减速后，中国经济已开始复苏。


But the authorities remain cautious, given that China’s economic outlook depends heavily on external conditions, which is the source of most current uncertainty.	但当局仍然谨慎，因为中国的经济前景严重依赖外部条件，而外部条件目前充满了不确定性。


However, as things stand, most independent economists expect 7-7.5% annual GDP in 2013-2017, while the International Monetary Fund forecasts a more optimistic 8.2-8.5% rate during this period.	尽管如此，大部分独立经济学家预计2013—2017年间年GDP增长率可达7—7. 5%，而IMF的预测更加乐观，达到了8.


As we heard repeatedly during the Congress, China’s leadership reckons that its biggest policy challenge in the coming years will be the shift from export-led growth to an economic model based more firmly on domestic consumption.	在十八大期间，我们反复听到，中国领导人认为未来几年最大的政策挑战将是出口导向的增长向基于更加稳固的国内消费的经济模式的转型。


This has now become a matter of urgency, as the United States and Europe are unlikely to provide much support to Chinese exports.	这一转型已经相当紧迫，因为美国和欧洲已不可能为中国的出口提供很大支持。


Indeed, China is now expected to undershoot its 10% growth target for trade in 2012, even though exports to emerging-market economies were up by more than that in the first nine months of the year.	事实上，目前人们预计2012年中国将无法达到其贸易增长10%的目标，尽管前九个月向新兴市场国家的出口增长超过了10%。


Income growth and a lower household savings rate are essential to the shift in China’s growth model, and each presupposes key reforms.	收入增长和家庭储蓄率的下降对于中国的增长模式转变具有关键作用，而这两者均需以重大改革为前提。


For example, improving the provision of health care, education, and care for the elderly, and bringing it into line with the needs and expectations of the emerging middle class should encourage more households to allocate a larger share of their income to consumption.	比如，改善卫生、教育和养老条件并使之与崛起的中产阶级的需求和期望一致可以鼓励家庭将收入的更大部分用于消费。


Likewise, increasing the interest rates paid on bank deposits would enable savings to decline without loss of income.	类似地，提高银行储蓄利率能够在不至于减少收入的情况下降低储蓄。


At the same time, as China proceeds along the path toward a market-based economy established more than 30 years ago by Deng Xiaoping, policymaking has become more complex.	与此同时，随着中国沿邓小平30年前定下的市场经济路线继续前进，决策也将变得越来越复杂。


The economy needs to be steered in the desired direction without triggering instability, making correct sequencing and coordination of policy measures essential.	中国经济需要在不产生动荡的情况下沿着其所期望的方向前进，这使得政策措施的次序和协调变得极其重要。


As some Chinese colleagues told me, the success of reforms in the next decade will depend more than ever on good design.	一些中国同事告诉我，未来十年改革的成功比以前更多地取决于良好的设计。


In particular, the new leadership will have to attend to the linkages between the real economy and the expanding financial sector as it overhauls state-owned companies and liberalizes the banks.	特别是，在改革国有企业和自由化银行时，新领导人需要注意实体经济和扩张的金融部门之间的联系。


From commodities to financial assets, price formation should become more market-based and transparent, while capital allocation should become more efficient and the scope for rent-seeking and corruption should be reduced.	从商品到金融资产，价格形成应该更加市场化、透明化，而资本配置应该更有效率，寻租和腐败的空间应该得到抑制。


Moreover, as the renminbi’s internationalization continues at a steady pace, domestic liberalization should occur in tandem with deeper global integration.	此外，随着人民币继续稳步国际化，国内自由化应该与更深的全球一体化并驾齐驱。


In the coming years, the key issue, reflected in Hu’s Congress-opening speech, will be the relationship between the state and the market.	从胡锦涛的十八大开幕词看，未来几年的关键问题将是国家和市场的关系。


But reforms will continue to be top-down and gradual, especially in the financial sector, where most efforts will be concentrated in the next decade.	但改革将继续是自上而下的、渐进的，特别是在未来十年大部分改革措施的目标金融部门。


Many Chinese seem to believe that market discipline will bring fair competition and contribute to closing the widening gap between rich and poor.	许多中国人认为市场纪律可以带来公平竞争，有助于弥合日渐扩大的贫富差距。


China’s income distribution has become highly skewed: at 0.438, the Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, puts the country closer to the United States than to northern Europe’s egalitarian societies (with the exception of the United Kingdom).	中国收入分配是高度不平等的：基尼系数（用于衡量收入不平等性的指标）达到了0. 438，与美国相当，高于北欧平等社会（英国除外）。


And the unjust allocation of resources, which has enriched so many politically well-connected individuals and families, has become more difficult to bear.	而不公平的资源配置——大量拥有政治人脉的个人和家族因此致富——变得越来越难以纠正。


A key question for the next decade, therefore, is whether the Chinese authorities’ growth targets will be enough to preserve social cohesion as further economic and political reforms are gradually implemented.	因此，未来十年的一个关键问题将是，随着进一步经济和政治改革的逐渐实施，中国当局的增长目标是否足以维持社会凝聚力。


As the economic pie grows less rapidly, greater fairness will be crucial to social stability.	经济蛋糕的增长速度正在变慢，更大的公平将成为社会稳定的关键。


This much seems clear to the new leadership.	这对于新领导人来说是显而易见的。


Whether they will be able to engineer the necessary institutional shifts remains to be seen.	他们是否能够把握好必须的制度变革仍有待观察。


The Limits to Panic	恐慌的极限


COPENHAGEN – We often hear how the world as we know it will end, usually through ecological collapse.	哥本哈根—我们常听说，我们所知道的世界将如何迎来末日，通常的说法是生态崩溃。


Indeed, more than 40 years after the Club of Rome released the mother of all apocalyptic forecasts, The Limits to Growth, its basic ideas are still with us.	事实上，自罗马俱乐部四十多年前发布启示录之滥觞《增长的极限》以来，其基本思想一直伴随着我们。


But time has not been kind.	但时间并不宽容。


The Limits to Growth warned humanity in 1972 that devastating collapse was just around the corner.	1972年的《增长的极限》警告人类，灾难性崩溃近在咫尺。


But, while we have seen financial panics since then, there have been no real shortages or productive breakdowns.	但是，此后我们看到了金融恐慌，却没有看到任何真正的短缺或生产崩溃。


Instead, the resources generated by human ingenuity remain far ahead of human consumption.	相反，人类天才所创造出来的资源满足人类消费绰绰有余。


But the report’s fundamental legacy remains: we have inherited a tendency to obsess over misguided remedies for largely trivial problems, while often ignoring big problems and sensible remedies.	但《增长的极限》的基本思想仍然成立：我们继续着一种趋势，纠结于对细枝末节问题的误导性解决，而忽视大问题和明智的解决。


In the early 1970’s, the flush of technological optimism was over, the Vietnam War was a disaster, societies were in turmoil, and economies were stagnating.	20世纪70年代初，技术乐观情绪不再，越南战争成为一场灾难，社会纷纷陷入动荡，经济则停滞不前。


Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring had raised fears about pollution and launched the modern environmental movement; Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 title The Population Bomb said it all.	蕾切尔·卡森（Rachel Carson）1962年的著作《寂静的春天》点燃了人们对污染的恐慌，也点燃了现代环保主义运动； 保罗·埃尔利希（Paul Ehrlich）1968年的标题《人口炸弹》说明了一切。


The first Earth Day, in 1970, was deeply pessimistic.	在1970年的第一个地球日，人们一片悲观。


The genius of The Limits to Growth was to fuse these worries with fears of running out of stuff.	《增长的极限》的意图是让人们担心资源耗尽。


We were doomed, because too many people would consume too much.	这是我们的宿命，因为太多的人要消费太多的东西。


Even if our ingenuity bought us some time, we would end up killing the planet and ourselves with pollution.	即使我们的天才为我们赢得一些时间，我们最终还是会用污染毁掉地球和我们自身。


The only hope was to stop economic growth itself, cut consumption, recycle, and force people to have fewer children, stabilizing society at a significantly poorer level.	唯一的希望是停滞经济增长本身、削减消费、循环利用以及迫使人们更少生育，在比现在显著贫困的水平上实现社会稳定。


That message still resonates today, though it was spectacularly wrong.	这观点至今仍在引起共鸣，尽管它大错特错。


For example, the authors of The Limits to Growth predicted that before 2013, the world would have run out of aluminum, copper, gold, lead, mercury, molybdenum, natural gas, oil, silver, tin, tungsten, and zinc.	比如，《增长的极限》的作者预测，在2013年之前，世界将耗尽铝、铜、金、铅、汞、钼、天然气、石油、银、锡、钨和锌。


Instead, despite recent increases, commodity prices have generally fallen to about a third of their level 150 years ago.	但是，即使商品价格最近有所反弹，但总体而言已下跌至150年前水平的三分之一。


Technological innovations have replaced mercury in batteries, dental fillings, and thermometers: mercury consumption is down 98% and, by 2000, the price was down 90%.	技术创新取代了电池、假牙材料和温度计中的汞，到2000年，汞消费量下降了98%，价格下跌了90%。


More broadly, since 1946, supplies of copper, aluminum, iron, and zinc have outstripped consumption, owing to the discovery of additional reserves and new technologies to extract them economically.	更广地说，自1946年以来，铜、铝、铁和锌供给都超过了需求，这要归功于新储量的发现和更经济的新提炼技术。


Similarly, oil and natural gas were to run out in 1990 and 1992, respectively; today, reserves of both are larger than they were in 1970, although we consume dramatically more.	类似地，石油和天然气原本预计将分别于1990和1992年耗尽； 如今，两者的储备均高于1970年水平，尽管我们的消费量大大地增加了。


Within the past six years, shale gas alone has doubled potential gas resources in the United States and halved the price.	在过去六年中，页岩气一项就把美国潜在天然气资源量扩大了一倍，价格削去了一半。


As for economic collapse, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that global GDP per capita will increase 14-fold over this century and 24-fold in the developing world.	至于经济崩溃，政府间气候变化委员会（Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change）估计，本世纪全球人均GDP将增加14倍，其中发展中国家增加24倍。


The Limits of Growth got it so wrong because its authors overlooked the greatest resource of all: our own resourcefulness.	《增长的极限》之所以出错，是因为作者忽视了最伟大的资源：我们自身的足智多谋。


Population growth has been slowing since the late 1960’s.	人口增长自20世纪60年代开始放缓。


Food supply has not collapsed (1.5 billion hectares of arable land are being used, but another 2.7 billion hectares are in reserve).	粮食供给并未崩盘（15亿公顷可耕土地正在被利用，除此之外还有27亿公顷储备）。


Malnourishment has dropped by more than half, from 35% of the world’s population to under 16%.	营养不良率已经被消灭了一半以上，从占世界人口的35%降至16%。


Nor are we choking on pollution.	污染也没有难住我们。


Whereas the Club of Rome imagined an idyllic past with no particulate air pollution and happy farmers, and a future strangled by belching smokestacks, reality is entirely the reverse.	罗马俱乐部想象在田园诗般的过去，我们没有悬浮颗粒空气污染，都是快乐的农民，而在未来，暖气烟囱将让我们无法呼吸。 现实与此完全相反。


In 1900, when the global human population was 1.5 billion, almost three million people – roughly one in 500 – died each year from air pollution, mostly from wretched indoor air.	1900年，全球人口只有15亿，而每年有近300万人——相当于500人中就有一人——死于空气污染，其中大部分是室内空气污染。


Today, the risk has receded to one death per 2,000 people.	如今，这一比例下降至2000人中才有一人死亡。


While pollution still kills more people than malaria does, the mortality rate is falling, not rising.	尽管污染致死人数仍然比疟疾要高，但其致死率在下降而不是上升。


Nonetheless, the mindset nurtured by The Limits to Growth continues to shape popular and elite thinking.	尽管如此，《增长的极限》所培养的观念仍在左右公众和精英的思维。


Consider recycling, which is often just a feel-good gesture with little environmental benefit and significant cost.	就拿循环利用来说吧，它通常只是一种让人好受些的姿态，对环境来说花费甚巨而收效甚微。


Paper, for example, typically comes from sustainable forests, not rainforests.	比如，纸张通常来自可持续森林而不是热带雨林。


The processing and government subsidies associated with recycling yield lower-quality paper to save a resource that is not threatened.	与纸张回收相关的程序和政府补贴所带来的是低质量纸张，而它所保护的是并未受到威胁的资源。


Likewise, fears of over-population framed self-destructive policies, such as China’s one-child policy and forced sterilization in India.	类似地，担心人口过度导致了自我毁灭的政策，比如中国的计划生育和印度的强制绝育。


And, while pesticides and other pollutants were seen to kill off perhaps half of humanity, well-regulated pesticides cause about 20 deaths each year in the US, whereas they have significant upsides in creating cheaper and more plentiful food.	此外，尽管杀虫剂和其他污染物被认为会杀死一半人类，良好的杀虫剂管制让每年美国死亡人数只有20例，同时，杀虫剂的使用创造了更廉价、更充足的粮食供给。


Indeed, reliance solely on organic farming – a movement inspired by the pesticide fear – would cost more than $100 billion annually in the US.	事实上，只依靠有机农业——受杀虫剂恐慌刺激的运动——将给美国带来每年1000亿美元的额外成本。


At 16% lower efficiency, current output would require another 65 million acres of farmland – an area more than half the size of California.	农业效率将降低16%，要维持当前产出，就必须多耕种6500万公顷农地——现代刚玉加利福尼亚州面积的一半。


Higher prices would reduce consumption of fruits and vegetables, causing myriad adverse health effects (including tens of thousands of additional cancer deaths per year).	价格上涨将导致水果和蔬菜消费下降，造成严重的消极健康影响（包括每年增加数万例癌症病死数量）。


Obsession with doom-and-gloom scenarios distracts us from the real global threats.	沉迷于阴暗情景让我们无法关注真正的全球威胁。


Poverty is one of the greatest killers of all, while easily curable diseases still claim 15 million lives every year – 25% of all deaths.	贫困是最大的杀手之一，而容易治愈的疾病每年仍要造成1500万人死亡——相当于总死亡人数的四分之一。


The solution is economic growth.	解决方案就在于经济增长。


When lifted out of poverty, most people can afford to avoid infectious diseases.	当人们摆脱贫困后，大部分都可以付得起预防传染病的负担。


China has pulled more than 680 million people out of poverty in the last three decades, leading a worldwide poverty decline of almost a billion people.	在过去三十年中，中国有6. 8亿人拜托了贫困，领导全世界把贫困人口下降了近十亿人。


This has created massive improvements in health, longevity, and quality of life.	这造就了卫生、寿命和生活质量的大面积改善。


The four decades since The Limits of Growth have shown that we need more of it, not less.	《增长的极限》发布以来的四十年历史表明，我们需要更多而不是更少的增长。


An expansion of trade, with estimated benefits exceeding $100 trillion annually toward the end of the century, would do thousands of times more good than timid feel-good policies that result from fear-mongering.	贸易的扩张据估计可以在本世纪末带来每年超过100万亿美元的收益，其益处与宣扬恐惧所导致的畏首畏尾的“好受”政策相比超出不知凡几。


But that requires abandoning an anti-growth mentality and using our enormous potential to create a brighter future.	但这要求抛弃反增长思维，用我们的无穷潜力创造更加光明的未来。


The Economic Trend Is Our Friend	有利于我们的经济趋势


BERKELEY – These are days of grave disillusionment with the state of the world.	发自伯克利——近期以来全世界都被一种浓稠的幻灭感所笼罩着。


Sinister forces of fanatical, faith-based killing – something that we in the West, at least, thought had largely ended by 1750 – are back. And they have been joined by and are reinforcing forces of nationalism, bigotry, and racism that we thought had been largely left in the ruins of Berlin in 1945.	那些邪恶的狂热宗教杀戮势力——某些西方人以为自1750年就已经灭绝了的东西——又卷土重来来了，而那些我们认为早已在1945年被埋葬在柏林城废墟之下的民族主义，偏见和种族主义势力也与之相结合并进一步得到了强化。


In addition, economic growth since 2008 has been profoundly disappointing. There is no reasoned case for optimistically expecting a turn for the better in the next five years or so.	此外，2008年以来的经济增长状况一直令人极为沮丧，也没有什么理由去指望能在未来五年出现好转。


And the failure of global institutions to deliver ever-increasing prosperity has undermined the trust and confidence which in better times would serve to suppress the murderous demons of our age.	由于全球体制无法催生不断增长的繁荣，导致在好年景时有助于遏制回荡在我们这个时代的杀戮恶魔的信任和信心都遭到了损害。


Pessimism understandably comes easy these days – perhaps too easy.	悲观情绪在这段时期非常容易出现——也许是太容易了。


In fact, enthusiastic and positive contrarianism is in order: if we look at global economic growth not just five years out, but over the next 30-60 years, the picture looks much brighter.	事实上，热情和积极的逆向思维也准备就绪：如果我们不仅仅是以未来五年的眼光来看待全球经济增长，而是放长到未来30~60年，这幅图景将会更加光明。


The reason is simple: the large-scale trends that have fueled global growth since World War II have not stopped.	原因很简单：自二战以来推动全球经济增长的大规模趋势一直都没有停止过。


More people are gaining access to new, productivity enhancing technologies, more people are engaging in mutually beneficial trade, and fewer people are being born, thus allaying any continued fears of a so-called population bomb.	越来越多人接触到提高生产率的新技术，更多的人在从事互惠互利的贸易，而出生人口则在减少，从而纾缓了长久以来对所谓人口炸弹的担忧。


Moreover, innovation, especially in the global north, has not ceased, even if it has possibly slowed since the 1880s.	此外，创新虽然可能是自1880年代以来有所放缓，但却从未停止——尤其是在北半球。


And while war and terror continue to horrify us, we are not witnessing anything on the scale of the genocides that were a hallmark of the twentieth century.	尽管战争和恐怖主义不断恐吓我们，我们却再也没有看到二十世纪那种标志性的大规模种族灭绝。


Fortunately, these major trends are likely to continue, according to data from the Penn World Table research project, the best source for summary information on global economic growth.	幸运的是这种大趋势很可能会持续下去，据宾大世界图表研究项目——对全球经济增长的总结性信息的最佳数据来源——发布的数据，。


The PWT data on average real (inflation-adjusted) per capita GDP show that the world in 1980 was 80% better off than it was in 1950, and another 80% better off in 2010 than it was in 1980. In other words, our average material wellbeing is three times what it was in 1950.	平均实际（撇除通胀后）人均国内生产总值显示1980年的世界比1950年提升了80％，而2010年又比1980年提升了80%，换句话说，我们的物质生活丰富程度较1950年提升了三倍。


Tripling global material wellbeing may sound like a lot, but if anything it’s a low estimate.	全球物质生活的三倍提升可能听起来很多，但其实也是被低估了的。


The way we measure real GDP accounts for all the goods and services being produced, but it doesn’t properly account for value that exists but cannot be measured – such as the immense benefits that accrue to social-media users from services that cost them nothing.	我们用所有商品和服务的产量来衡量GDP，但却未合理计算那些存在但无法衡量的价值——例如那些社交媒体用户不花一分钱就享受到的服务所产生的巨大利益。


More than ever before, we are producing commodities that contribute to social welfare through use value rather than market value.	更重要的是我们正在生产一些通过使用价值而非市场价值来促进社会福祉的商品。


Some would argue that this is nothing new, but that argument is unpersuasive, given the sheer bulk of time we now spend interacting with information-technology systems where the revenue flow is, at most, a tiny trickle tied to ancillary advertising.	有人会说这不是什么新鲜事，但只要考虑到我们现在花大量时间与各类信息技术系统互动，而其中的收入流顶多只是一个与附加广告捆绑在一起的涓涓细流，就知道这种说法是错误的。


The PWT data also allow us to sort by country, so let’s consider the cases of China and India, which comprise 30% of humanity.	宾大世界图表数据也允许我们按国家排序，因此我们可以看看占全球人口30%的中国和印度的情况。


China’s real per capita GDP in 1980 was 60% lower than the world average, but today it is 25% above it.	中国的人均实际GDP在1980年时比世界平均水平低60％，如今则高出25％。


India’s real per capita GDP in 1980 was more than 70% below the world average, but India has since closed that gap by half.	而1980年时的印度实际人均GDP低于世界平均水平70％以上，如今已经缩短了一半的差距。


This is indisputable progress of one kind; but, to avoid painting too rosy a picture, we should also consider global inequality. The world’s countries have shown no sign since 1950 of converging at a shared level of prosperity.	这一进步是无可争议的;但是为了避免描画得过于美好，我们也应该考虑全球不平等状况，因为自1950年以来世界各国就没有显示出任何向着一个共有的繁荣水平靠拢的迹象。


According to the PWT data, two-thirds of all countries in 1950 had real per capita GDP veering above or below the global average by at least 45%, and by as much as 225%.	根据宾大全球图表的数据，1950年时有2/3的国家人均实际GDP高于或低于全球平均水平至少45%，差距幅度可以高达225％。


By 1980, that spread had widened to at least 33% and as much as 300%; and today it is 28% and 360%, respectively.	到1980年该一差距已经扩大到至少33％，幅度达300％； 如今则是28％和360％。


Still, all told, the world economy is a more equal place for the average individual today than it was in 1980.	但总体来说当今世界经济的个人平均指标比1980年更加平等。


This is partly thanks to a series of strong leaders, such as those in China since Deng Xiaoping, and in India since Rajiv Gandhi.	这在某种程度上要归功于一系列强有力的领导者，比如中国的邓小平和印度的拉吉夫·甘地。


But there are no more countries as big as China and India to stand up and make significant leaps in development, and few observers are confident that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will match their predecessors’ growth legacies.	但目前还没有更多像中国和印���这样的大国挺身而出实现飞跃发展，也很少有观察家相信，中国国家主席习近平和印度总理莫迪有能力继承前辈的发展轨迹。


Indeed, such episodes of prolonged, rapid growth may become a thing of the past if the world economy has no more opportunities to accelerate technology transfer, and if more countries continue to mature from high-growth developing economies to more steady-state developed economies.	事实上，如果世界经济没有更多的机会去加快技术转移，同时更多国家从高速增长的发展中经济体持续成长为更稳定状态的发达经济体，那么长期、快速的发展的事例可能会成为历史。


It may well be true that the engine of innovation itself will run more slowly.	虽然创新引擎本身可能真的会运行得更慢。


But it will still run, and people will still adopt new technologies, and the world economy will still grow.	但它仍然会继续运行，人们仍然会采用新技术，世界经济仍将增长。


Short of a nightmare scenario like terror-driven nuclear war, you can expect my successors in 2075 to look back and relish that, once again, their world is three times better off than ours is today.	只要没发生恐怖主义核战争这类噩梦场景，你可以期望我的后继者们在2075年回顾往事，并欣喜地发现他们的世界也比我们今天要好上三倍。


Beyond that, things are harder to predict.	在那之后的事情就更难预测了。


If we fail to act now to slow and reverse global temperature trends, climate change will be the specter stalking the post-2080 world.	如果我们不当即采取行动减缓和扭转全球温度变化趋势，气候变化将成为缠扰2080年后世界的幽灵。


In that case, our great-grandchildren will have little to thank us for.	在这种情况下，我们的曾孙们就没什么需要感谢我们了。


Economic Growth’s Many Recipes	经济增长的众多良方


CAMBRIDGE, MA. -- Development “big think” has always been dominated by comprehensive visions about transforming poor societies.	麻省，剑桥——对贫穷社会的全面愿景总是统领有关发展的“宏大构想”。


From the so-called “Big Push” to “Balanced Growth,” from the “Washington Consensus” to “Second Generation Reforms,” the emphasis has been on wholesale change.	从所谓的“大力推动”到“平衡增长”，从“华盛顿共识”到“第二代改革”，其重点总是飘忽不定。


Today’s fashion in development is no different.	今天在发展问题上的风潮也不例外。


The prevailing obsession with the “governance” agenda entails a broad-based effort to remold institutions in developing societies as a prerequisite for economic growth.	对于“管治”议程的盛行关注带来了大范围工作，力图在发展中国家重塑机制，作为经济发展的前提条件。


The United Nations Millennium Project involves a large-scale, coordinated big push of investment in human capital, public infrastructure, and agricultural technologies.	联合国千年发展项目包含在人力资本、公共基础设施以及农业科技等领域大规模协调一致的投资推动。


But there have also been iconoclastic dissenters from such comprehensive approaches, among whom Albert Hirschman was without doubt the most distinguished.	但是，此类全面策略也有特立独行的异议人士，其中，赫希曼无疑最为突出。


Indeed, Hirschman’s seminal contributions have now been recognized by the United States Social Science Research Council, which this year established a prize in his honor.	实际上，联合国社会科学研究委员会已经认可了赫希曼具有创意的贡献，并且在今年以他的名字设立了一份奖项。


Hirschman’s interests shifted away from economic development over the course of his illustrious career.	在其卓著的生涯中，赫希曼的治学兴趣从经济发展转移开来。


But when he was still involved in development debates, he would frequently remind his contemporaries that any country that had the capacity to undertake comprehensive programs would not be underdeveloped to begin with.	但是，当他还在参与发展问题的辩论之计，他就会经常提醒世人，任何具有采取全面项目能力的国家从一开始就不是欠发达国家了。


Indeed, he once chided John Kenneth Galbraith for enunciating a long list of prerequisites for foreign aid to be effective.	的确，他曾经抨击加尔布雷斯提出一长串使得外国援助有效的先决条件。


If developing countries could meet these conditions, he wrote, they would be in a position to send foreign aid to the United States!	赫希曼写道，如果发展中国家能够满足这些条件，它们就可以给美国提供外援了！


Hirschman believed that the possibilities for economic development are not nearly as constrained as comprehensive theories would lead us to believe.	赫希曼相信，经济发展的可能性并非全面理论想要人们相信的那样有局限。


The imbalances specific to underdevelopment create opportunities that policymakers can seize on.	欠发展问题独有的不平衡创造了决策者们可以抓住的机遇。


Instead of relying on fads emanating from abroad, we need to experiment and look for the unique solutions that will allow us to circumvent ingrained social structures that inhibit growth.	我们不应当依赖于外国的时尚观点，而是需要进行试验并且寻找独特的解决之道，让我们规避限制发展的社会结构。


Hirschman’s central insights on development have held up extremely well.	赫希曼有关发展问题的中心观点极为成功。


The key lesson of the last half-century is that policymakers must be strategic, rather than comprehensive.	过去半个世纪的主要经验就是决策者必须具有战略眼光，而不是面面俱到。


They have to do the best with what they have instead of wishing they could transform their society wholesale.	他们不应当盼望他们可以让他们的社会全面转型，而是应当最大程度地利用现有条件。


They need to identify priorities and opportunities, and work on them.	他们需要确定重点和机遇并且在此基础上展开工作。


They must seek sequential, cumulative change rather than a single, all-inclusive breakthrough.	他们应当追求连续累积的变化，而非包罗万象、一蹴而就的突破。


Successful countries do share some common features.	成功的国家具有某些共同特点。


They all provide some degree of effective property rights protection and contract enforcement, maintain macroeconomic stability, seek to integrate into the world economy, and ensure an appropriate environment for productive diversification and innovation.	它们都提供某种程度的、有效的产权保护和强制履约，维持宏观经济稳定，努力融入世界经济，并且为产生效益的多样化和创新确保适当的环境。


But how these ends are achieved differs.	但是实现这些目标的途径迥然不同。


For example, greater integration with world markets can be achieved via export subsidies (South Korea), export-processing zones (Malaysia), investment incentives for multinational enterprises (Singapore), special economic zones (China), regional free trade agreements (Mexico), or import liberalization (Chile).	例如，更大程度地融入世界市场可以通过以下方式实现：韩国实行出口补贴，马来西亚采用出口加工区，新加坡推行跨国公司的投资优惠，中国实行经济特区，墨西哥缔结自由贸易协定，而智利则采纳进口开放。


The best-designed policies are always contingent on local conditions, making use of pre-existing advantages and seeking to overcome domestic constraints.	最佳设计的政策总是取决于当地情况，利用现有优势并且努力克服国内限制条件。


That is why successful reforms often do not travel well.	这就是为何成功的改革不能总是照搬。


Reforms, after all, are not hothouse plants that can be transplanted at will in any soil.	毕竟，改革并非温室作物，可以随意在任何土壤中移植。


Moreover, generating economic growth requires hitting the right targets, not doing everything at once.	而且，创造经济增长要求有的放矢，而不是面面俱到。


What matters at any point in time is to alleviate a society’s immediate binding constraints – another reason why different policies are needed for different places.	任何时候重要的问题都是减轻社会当前的强力局限，这也是为何不同的地方需要不同的政策。


China was constrained by poor supply incentives in agriculture in the late 1970’s.	二十世纪七十年代末期，农业供应激励不足限制了中国。


Today’s Brazil is constrained by inadequate supply of credit.	如今，巴��受到信贷不足的局限。


El Salvador is constrained by inadequate production incentives in tradable goods.	萨尔瓦多受制于缺乏外贸商品的生产激励。


Zimbabwe is constrained by poor governance.	津巴布韦则受到不良管治之苦。


These problems all require different methods for unlocking growth.	这些问题都要求采用不同的方式来释放增长潜力。


What we need is selective, well-targeted reforms, not a laundry list.	我们所需要的是有所选择、目标明确的改革，而不是一张洗衣清单。


Countries run into trouble when they do not use high-growth periods to strengthen their institutional underpinnings.	各国如果不利用高速增长时期来加强其机制基础就会陷入困境。


Two kinds of institutions in particular need shoring up: conflict management institutions to enhance economies’ resilience to external shocks, and institutions that promote productive diversification.	两种机制尤其需要加强。 一是冲突管理机制来增强经济对抗外部冲击的韧性，二是促进高效多样化的机制。


Growth collapsed in Africa in the late 1970’s because of the weakness of the former, and fizzled in Latin America after the first half of the 1990’s because of the weakness of the latter.	七十年代末期，由于第一种机制软弱，非洲的增长崩溃。 九十年代早期，由于第二种机制无力，拉美的发展失败了。


This line of thinking has vast implications for the design of appropriate global economic arrangements.	这一思路对于设计合适的全球经济安排具有极大的影响。


Hirschman would be aghast at the extent of intrusion into domestic policymaking that the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund engage in nowadays.	赫希曼对于世界贸易组织和国际货币基金组织当前侵入各国国内决策的程度一定会感到惊讶。


As international bureaucracies with a penchant for “best practices” and common standards, these institutions are woefully unsuited to the task of seeking innovative, unique pathways suited to each country’s particular circumstances.	由于国际官僚喜好所谓“最佳实务”和共同标准，这些机构根本难以做到寻求具有创新性、适应各国特殊国情的独特的途径。


But Hirschman also would no doubt chide developing country governments for not living up to their responsibilities and for passing on the buck so freely to these external agencies.	但是赫希曼同样也会指责发展中国家政府，因为它们没有履行其责任并把责任如此随便地交给了外部机构。


For, ultimately, it is up to each country to say, “Thanks, but no, thanks; we’ll do it our way.”	因为在最后，还是要由各国来说：“谢谢，但是我们不需要； 我们用自己的方法处理。


Many economists were skeptical about Hirschman’s approach because they could not quite fit it into the economics they had been trained to practice.	许多经济学家对赫希曼的策略感到怀疑，因为这些策略并不符合这些经济学家一贯训练所实施的经济学理论。


But, over the years, economics has become richer, too.	但是多年来，经济学也变得丰富多彩。


Dynamic models have become much more common, an economics of the “second-best” has flourished, political economy has become mainstream, and behavioral economics has thrown the “rational actor” into doubt.	动态模型变得更为平常，“次佳实务”经济学蓬勃涌现，政治经济学成为主流，而行为经济学则对“理性参与者”提出了质疑。


As a result, Hirschman looks less and less the maverick that he fancied himself to be.	结果，赫希曼要比自己想象得越发不如此特立独行。


Conventional wisdom may finally be catching up with him.	常规智慧可能最终与他并驾齐驱。


Half-a-Loaf Growth	“半个面包”增长


MILAN – At a time of lackluster economic growth, countries around the world are attempting to devise and implement strategies to spur and sustain recovery.	米兰—在经济增长萎靡的时期，全球各国都在尝试构思和实施刺激和维持复苏的战略。


The key word is strategy: to succeed, policymakers must ensure that measures to open the economy, boost public investment, enhance macroeconomic stability, and increase reliance on markets and incentives for resource allocation are implemented in reasonably complete packages.	这里的关键词是战略：要想成功，决策者必须保证这些措施能开放经济、提振公共投资、加强宏观经济稳定、增加市场恢复力、资源配置激励以合理且完整的方案实施。


Pursuing only some of these objectives produces distinctly inferior results.	只追求其中几个目标所产生的结果会大大下降。


China provides a telling example.	中国就是一个绝佳的例子。


Before Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of “reform and opening up” in 1978, the country had relatively high levels of public-sector investment.	1978年邓小平启动“改革开放”政策之前，中国公共部门投资相对较高。


But the centrally planned economy lacked market incentives and was largely closed to the global economy’s major markets for goods, investment, and technology.	但中央计划经济缺少市场激励，也基本对全球经济的主要商品、投资和技术市场封闭。


As a result, returns on public investment were modest, and China’s economic performance was mediocre.	结果，公共投资回报十分平庸，中国经济表现也十分低下。


China’s economic transformation began with the introduction in the 1980s of market incentives in the agricultural sector.	中国的经济转型起始于20世纪80年代在农业部门中引入市场激励。


These reforms were followed by a gradual opening to the global economy, a process that accelerated in the early 1990s.	随后是逐渐向全球经济开放的过程，这一过程在20世纪90年代有所加速。


Economic growth surged ahead, and returns on public investment soared, reaching an annual growth rate above 9% of GDP, shortly after the reforms were implemented.	经济增长大踏步向前，公共投资回报也大幅上升，改革是时候不久年GDP增长率就达到了9%以上。


The key to a successful growth strategy is to ensure that policies reinforce and enhance one another.	成功增长战略的关键是确保政策之间要相互加强和强化。


For example, boosting returns on public investment – critical to any growth plan – demands complementary policies and conditions, in areas ranging from resource allocation to the institutional environment.	比如，提振公共投资回报——对任何增长计划，这一点都是关键——需要相辅相成的政策和条件，从资源配置到制度环境在内的诸多领域都是如此。


In terms of effectiveness, the policy package is more than the sum of its parts.	就效率而言，一揽子政策要大于各部分之和。


Of course, the specific portfolio of policies varies depending on the stage of a country’s development; early-stage growth dynamics are distinctly different from those in middle-income and advanced countries.	当然，政策组合的具体内容要根据一国发展阶段而定； 早期阶段增长动态与中等收入和发达国家截然不同。


But the imperative is the same.	但重要性是一样的。


Just as a developing China achieved rapid growth only when a comprehensive policy package was implemented, the advanced countries struggling to restore sustainable growth patterns today have found that incomplete policy packages produce slow recoveries and below-potential growth and job creation.	正如发展中的中国在实施了全面一揽子政策后才实现了高速增长，如今挣扎于重塑可持续增长模式的发达国家发现，全面的政策计划组合只能产生缓慢复苏和低于潜力的增长和就业创造。


Consider the post-crisis performance of the European Union and the United States.	以欧盟和美国在危机后的表现为例。


Though both have had their share of problems, the US is performing somewhat better (though it still faces major challenges in generating middle-income employment).	尽管两大经济体问题相似，但美国的表现要更好一些（尽管它仍面临创造中等收入就业机会的巨大挑战）。


The difference is not that the US launched a large fiscal stimulus focused on public-sector investment; no such stimulus was implemented, though many economists, including me, believe that it would have generated a faster recovery and stronger long-term growth.	区别不在于美国实施了以公共部门投资为核心的大规模财政刺激； 美国没有实施这类刺激，尽管包括我在内的许多经济学家认为这能产生更快的复苏和更强的长期增长。


Nor is the difference greater political effectiveness; few would say that the US government is functioning well nowadays, given rising partisanship and sharp disagreement about its proper role.	区别也不在于美国政治效率更高； 没人会认为美国政府今天的运转情况优秀，因为党派之争日益激烈，对政府合理角色的争论也日益尖锐。


The US economy has benefited from two factors: its greater structural flexibility and dynamism relative to Europe, and the broader mandate of the US Federal Reserve, which has pursued a far more aggressive monetary policy than has the European Central Bank.	美国经济受益于两个因素：它的结构弹性更大、相对欧洲活力更足； 以及美联储权力更广，实施了远比欧洲央行更激进的货币政策。


Though analysts differ on the relative importance of these two factors – and, indeed, it is difficult to weight them – it is safe to say that both played a role in facilitating the US recovery.	尽管对这两大因素谁更重要还存在争议——诚然，要作出比较十分困难——但可以确定地说，这两大因素都起到了促进美国复苏的作用。


Europe is now placing a large bet on an increase in public-sector investment, using a combination of EU-level funding and national investment programs, perhaps augmented by a modification of the EU’s fiscal rules.	如今，欧洲将宝押在了增加公共部门投资上，将欧盟层面资金和国家投资计划相结合，也许还会辅之以欧盟财政规则的修改。


Given that public-sector underinvestment is a common cause of subpar growth, this is a step in the right direction.	考虑到公共部门投资不足是增长萎靡的常见原因，这一步骤的方向是正确的。


But public investment is not enough.	但光靠公共投资是不够的。